









THE NEW LARNED HISTORY  
FOR READY REFERENCE  
READING AND RESEARCH

VOLUME X

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# NEW LARNED HISTORY

FOR READING AND REVISION  
READING AND REVISION

THE SCHOOL WORK OF THE ...

(After reading the ... in the ...)

1805

The ...

SUBJECTS OF ...

W. H. ...

SURRENDER OF GRANADA

The Moorish king Boabdil surrendering the keys of Granada to Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, January, 1492.

(After painting by Francisco Pradilla, in the Senado, Madrid)

# THE NEW LARNED HISTORY

FOR READY REFERENCE  
READING AND RESEARCH

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BIOGRAPHERS AND SPECIALISTS

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OF HISTORY

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*NOW COMPLETELY REVISED, ENLARGED AND BROUGHT UP TO DATE*

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WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF TEXT ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS AND CHARTS  
MANY OF THEM FULL-PAGE INSERTS, IN DUOTONE, AND FRONTISPICES IN COLOR; ALSO NUMEROUS  
DOUBLE AND SINGLE-PAGE HISTORICAL AND OTHER MAPS IN COLOR, FROM ORIGINAL  
STUDIES AND DRAWINGS BY ALAN C. REILEY AND OTHERS

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*IN 12 VOLUMES*

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VOL. X. — SWEDEN TO U. S. A., 1864



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# THE NEW LARNED HISTORY

## FOR READY REFERENCE, READING AND RESEARCH

VOLUME X

### SWEDEN

**Geographical description.**—**Area.**—**Population.**—**Natural resources.**—“The Kingdom of Sweden occupies the eastern and larger section of the Scandinavian Peninsula, which is situated in the north-west of Europe. Of the total area of this Peninsula—about 770,000 sq. km.—Sweden embraces about 448,000 sq. km. (173,000 sq. miles) or approximately 58% [and in 1921 had an estimated population of 5,954,316]. . . . Sweden, covering as it does 4.7% of the area of Europe, is one of the largest countries of that continent. It is a little smaller than either France or the German Empire but, on the other hand, it is nearly half as large again as Great Britain and Ireland. . . . Sweden is bounded on the East, South and in part also on the West by an inland sea and its various arms: the Gulf of Bothnia, the Baltic Sea, the Sound, the Kattegat and the Skagerrak. Its land boundaries are those dividing it from Finland and Norway.”—J. Guinchard, ed., *Sweden (Historical and Statistical Handbook, pt. 1, p. 1)*.—See also **EUROPE: Modern: Political map.**—The three ancient main divisions of Sweden were Svealand, Götaland and Norrland. The present day Sweden is largely agricultural and in 1919 had 428,026 farms under cultivation, with cereals, potatoes and hay as the principal crops. Timber and wood-working industries are of importance. The public forests have an area of 9,504,978 hectares. In 1920 there were 2,411 wood-working mills of all kinds with a total output valued at 1,665,544,112 kronor. Mining is the leading industry of the country. In 1921, the pig-iron produced amounted to 313,080 tons; iron-ore amounted to 4,331,046 tons; ingot iron amounted to 211,602 tons. Some of the other minerals are lead, silver, copper, zinc, and manganese.

**Early inhabitants.** See **SCANDINAVIAN STATES: Their relationships in language and blood; EUROPE: Prehistoric: Neolithic period; Bronze Age: Scandinavia; Iron Age: Scandinavia.**

**Language.**—“The languages spoken in the Scandinavian North belong to the Teutonic family of Indo-European languages, and seem to have been one and almost homogeneous up to the time of the Viking Age (about 700-1060), when various dialects commence to be distinguished. The old uniform language has been preserved in Northern loanwords in the Finnish and Lap languages and in about one hundred of the oldest Runic inscriptions. The early Old Swedish, from the Viking Age to somewhat later than 1200, did not differ much from the Old Norse (the Old Norwegian and Old Icelandic), while the difference from the Old Danish was almost imperceptible. The sources

for the study of this language period are about two thousand later Runic inscriptions and nearly one hundred Old Swedish loanwords, almost all proper names, in the Russian language. The classical period of Old Swedish falls between 1200 and about 1350. Its most important monuments are the provincial laws and a manuscript collection of saintly legends, called *Codex Bureanus*. The language of this period offers a number of dialects, of which only one, the Gutnic, is strictly defined. In the next period of Old Swedish, from 1350 to the Reformation, a universal language for the whole country is distinguished. The so-called *Oxenstiern* manuscripts and *Codex Bildstenianus* are the chief sources of our knowledge of this language period, mostly of religious contents. Modern Swedish dates from the Reformation, its later period being counted from the publication of the state law in 1734. The Swedish language seems to be based chiefly upon the dialect of Södermanland, with influences from other dialects. Among the Scandinavian languages, Swedish ranks next to the Icelandic in point of purity, and is the foremost of them all in point of beauty.”—V. Nilsson, *Sweden (World's Best Histories Series, pp. 8-9)*.—See also **PHILOLOGY: 11.**

**Early history.**—**Viking period.**—**Ynglinga dynasty.**—“We know, from English sources, that about 500 A. D. there ruled in Svealand a family named *Skilfingar*, which, by means of conquests, extended its way towards Götaland. When the native Swedish traditions first attain to any degree of credibility, the territory of this race had already dissolved into petty states, which corresponded pretty nearly to the existing provinces of Sweden. But there was still at *Uppsala* a great and much honoured *God House (gudahov)*. . . . By degrees, this God House acquired ever greater estates throughout the whole country; and without any other dominion than these estates, its ruler was at last able to defy the petty monarchs of the country. By guile and by force, king *Ingjald* gained possession of their kingdoms, thereby laying the foundations of the Kingdom of Sweden proper. It is difficult to determine the date of this event, but it was probably about 700 A. D. . . . The ancient *Uppsala*—or ‘Ynglinga’—dynasty ruled the kingdom of Sweden uninterruptedly till about the year 1050. To this time belongs that period in the history of the North which was so important for the whole of Europe and which is called the Viking Period (800-1050 A. D.). By the year 862, the Varangians had founded a dominion here, which, however, soon fell to pieces again; but in a short time messengers came to Sweden—prob-

ably from the Swedes who had remained in the East—demanding chiefs. It was then that Rörek (or Rurik), at the head of 'all the Rus'—i. e., the entire Swedish contingent or enlisted sea warriors of the east coast ('Rodslogen')—founded a dominion around Lake Ladoga and the city of Novgorod, which from his warriors—'rodsbyggare' or 'rodsmännen'—at length obtained the name of *Rus-sia*, and soon extended over the greater part of eastern Europe. From thence, the Viking fleets pursued their way down to the Caspian Sea, while Swedish Varangians in great hosts offered their services to the Emperor at Byzantium, and to the King of Georgia."—J. Guinhard, ed., *Sweden (Historical and Statistical Handbook, pt. 1, pp. 83-85)*.—See also SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 8th-9th centuries.

9th-12th centuries.—Introduction of Christianity.—Gradual elimination of paganism.—Stenkil kings.—"The expeditions of the Vikings accelerated in a high degree the introduction of Christianity into the North. In the year 820 *St. Ansgarius* [Ansgar] came to Sweden, sent by the King of the Franks. But the Christian mission which he founded in the heart of the country, at the royal town of Birka, on an island of Lake Mälaren, could not survive, surrounded as it was on all sides by Pagan territory. . . . Nearly two hundred years passed away before Christianity once more gained a secure foothold in Sweden, by way of the more favourably situated province of Västergötland. . . . [This period was] . . . marked by long and severe internal conflicts, chiefly between Christianity and Paganism, but also, as a consequence thereof, between the different provinces: between the Swedish inhabitants of Uppland and the Goths of Östergötland and of Västergötland, who could not agree on the question of succession to the throne. [During these struggles, the kingdom became an *elective monarchy*.] . . . At first it seems as if a powerful family in Västergötland, called from its first king the *Stenkil Line*, took unopposed possession of the throne of the old kings, with whom the Stenkil family was related on the female side. . . . [Inge, Stenkil's son] soon succeeded in attacking and killing his opponent, the pagan king *Blotsven*. This royal family, however, seems to have periodically maintained its power, at least in its native province of Östergötland, and great internal divisions prevailed, in consequence of which Sweden lost Jämtland and Härjedalen to Norway in 1111. The Stenkil Line became extinct before 1130. By that time the power of paganism seems to have been broken; but the irreconcilableness of the three chief tribes [Sverker, Eric, and Stenkil lines] and of their claims still remained."—J. Guinhard, ed., *Sweden (Historical and Statistical Handbook, pt. 1, pp. 85-87)*.—See also SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 8th-11th centuries.—About 1130, Sverker, a chieftain in East Götdland, who had married the widow of the last descendant of Stenkil, was elected king.

1000.—Divides Norway with Denmark. See NORWAY: 005-1000.

1150-1160.—Sverker deposed.—Reign of Eric the Saint.—Sveker only ruled over Gothic Sweden. About 1150 the Svedes deposed him and elected Eric, son of Jedvard (Edward), as king. "The line of *St. Eric* seems to have wished to build up the church upon a national foundation; and Eric himself was recognized as a saint by the people only, never by the pope. By means of a crusade to Finland (before 1160) a beginning was made by him towards the introduction of Christian Swedish

culture into that country, and towards the restoration of the Swedish dominion on the other side of the Baltic, which had been lost during the period of religious conflict. [See FINLAND: 1157-1809.] In course of time Christianity won a complete victory in Sweden. The whole country was divided into ecclesiastical districts—parishes and dioceses—and the ecclesiastical law of the papacy pushed victoriously forward."—*Ibid.*, p. 88.

1250-1397.—Folklunga period. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1018-1397.

1397.—Union of Kalmar.—"The ancient royal lines in the three kingdoms of the North almost simultaneously became extinct, and the right of succession to them all fell upon a woman, Queen *Margaret* of Denmark. The Swedish lords who were discontented with King Albrekt, offered her the crown of Sweden; and after Albrekt had been defeated at the battle of Falköping (1389), there came about the union of the three kingdoms of the North, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark [which was consummated 1397]. This was the beginning of the last period of the Middle Ages in Sweden—what is called the Union of Kalmar."—*Ibid.*, p. 90.—See also SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1018-1397; DENMARK: Survey of history.

14th-15th centuries.—Extent of territory. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1397-1527 (Map).

1436-1523.—Rise of two parties.—Sten Sture.—Stockholm massacre.—Under the leadership of Engelbrekt a united national consciousness began to dawn. About 1436, "there arose in Sweden two parties, one which worked for the Danish kings, and the other a national party, which desired to hand over the government of Sweden to Swedes—forming a kind of provisional administration and bearing the name of 'Protector of the Realm' (*riksföreståndare*). At the head of the latter party there usually stood members of the two *Sture* families; and these looked for support to the peasantry of Sweden. [In 1470, *Sten Sture the Elder* was proclaimed administrator of the kingdom.] After the last Protector of the name of Sture, or *Sten Sture the Younger*, had lost his life in 1520, in a battle against King *Christian II*, the last-named monarch once more succeeded in restoring the Union. But in consequence of the insane deeds which began with the 'Massacre of Stockholm,' and caused several hundreds of the best men of Sweden to be treacherously put to death, he made his rule so detested that, in a few months, the whole of Sweden was again in a state of insurrection. This time it was the renowned *Gustavus Vasa* who placed himself at the head of the war of liberation; and with the successful completion of the war, and the proclamation, in 1523, of Gustavus Vasa as King of Sweden, the days of the Kalmar Union were past for ever."—*Ibid.*, pp. 00-02.—See also SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1397-1527.


1523-1604.—Reigns of Gustavus Vasa and his sons.—Wars with Russia and Denmark.—Baltic question.—Prince Sigismund elected king of Poland and consequent loss of the Swedish crown.—Resulting hostilities.—"Gustavus Vasa, the founder of his dynasty, was not a very religious man. He had determined to make Sweden a Lutheran country for two main reasons: first, because he wanted the lands of the Church, both in order to enrich the crown and also to attach the nobles to his cause; secondly, because, as he said, the 'priests were all unionists in Sweden'—that is, they all wished to maintain the union of the three Scandinavian kingdoms which he had broken, and they were, therefore, irreconcilably hostile to his dynasty. Three other great services

were rendered to Sweden by Gustavus I. (1) at the Diet of Westerås, in 1544, the hereditary character of the monarchy was definitely declared. This was a great victory over the nobles, who in nearly all the Northern and Eastern Kingdoms of Europe—and in Sweden itself at a later time—succeeded in erecting an oligarchy, which oppressed the peasants and crippled the activity of the State. (2) Again, by his consistent favouring of the middle classes, and his conclusion of commercial treaties with Russia, France, and the Netherlands, he became the founder of Swedish commerce, and dealt a serious blow at the Baltic supremacy of the Hanseatic League. (3) And lastly, he appears as the founder of that policy of territorial aggression (toward the South and East), which, however, we may judge of its morality in this age . . . was certainly looked upon then as the prime duty of all Kings, and which in the case of Sweden was the direct path toward the great part which she was destined to play in the 17th century. His first enemy was Russia, a recently consolidated State, already bordering on the half-Polish province of Livonia and the Swedish province of Finland; already extending her flanks to the Caucasus and the Don on the south and to the White Sea on the north. . . . The wars of Ivan the Terrible (1534-84) for Finland and Livonia were unsuccessful, and the chief interest which they possess for us is that in 1561, the year after the death of Gustavus I., his son Eric acquired for Sweden the province of Esthonia, which appears to have previously fluctuated between dependence on Denmark and on Russia. [See REVAL.] This was the first of the so-called 'Baltic provinces' of Sweden; herewith began the exclusion of Russia from the 'Dominium Maris Baltici.' But this possession brought Eric face to face with Poland, a country which was disputing with Russia the possession of Livonia. Poland, under the last of the great Jaghellon line, was already displaying the fatal tendency to anarchy which at last devoured her. . . . Poland turned for help to the King of Denmark, in whom Eric, with keen insight, recognised the most dangerous foe for Sweden. In 1563 Eric concluded peace with Russia, and the nations of the North began to assume their natural relation to each other. The Baltic question rapidly became an European one. English sympathies were with Sweden and Russia; Spain and the Emperor as naturally took the other side, and suggested to the King of Denmark, Frederick II (1550-1588), that he should ask for the hand of Mary Stuart; to counteract which King Eric indulged in an elaborate flirtation with Elizabeth. The powers of North Germany took sides in the war (1565), but the war itself produced but little result. The able Eric displayed symptoms of insanity and was extremely unpopular with the Swedish nobles, and Denmark was as yet too powerful an enemy for Sweden to overthrow. In 1567 Eric was deposed by a revolution, the fruit of which was reaped by his brother John. When the great Gustavus I. was dying, and could no longer speak, he made a sign that he wished to write, and wrote half a sentence of warning to his people: 'Rather die a hundred times than abandon the Gospel.' . . . Then his hand failed and he dropped back dead. He was not, I have said, a particularly religious man, but he marked out the true path for Sweden. Now in 1567 a certain reaction set in: many of the nobles, who had felt the yoke of Gustavus heavy and of Eric heavier, seemed ready to drift back to Catholicism,

and John's reign (1567-1592) was one of reaction in many ways. John never openly went over to Catholicism, but he cast off all the Lutheranism that he dared to cast off. He made peace with Denmark [the Peace of Stettin, December 13, 1570] and war with Russia; thereby he allowed the former country to develop her trade and foreign relations enormously and rapidly, and made the task of his successors doubly hard. Above all, he originated, by his marriage with Catherine Jaghellon, the disastrous connexion with Poland. . . . The last of the Jaghellon Kings died in 1572, and the elected King, Stephen Bathori, died in 1586. Ivan the Terrible sought the crown of Poland. . . . John of Sweden, on the other hand, saw an opening for the House of Vasa. His son Sigismund was, by dint of bribes and intrigue, elected King of Poland. But he had to become a Catholic. . . . The union of Sweden with Poland, which would necessarily follow, if Sigismund succeeded his father on the Swedish throne, would be almost certainly a Catholic union. . . . Sweden was still a free country, in the sense of being governed in a parliamentary way with the consent of the four estates, Nobles, Clergy, Citizens, and Peasants. Whatever the Riddarhus might think upon the subject, the three non-noble estates were . . . Protestants and would have no Catholic king. Even the nobles were only induced to consent to Sigismund becoming King of Poland without forfeiting his right to succeed in Sweden, by the grant of extravagant privileges, practically so great, had they been observed, as to emasculate the Vasa monarchy. Luckily the people had a deliverer at hand. Charles, Duke of Sudermania, the youngest of the sons of Gustavus I, lived wholly in the best traditions of his father's policy. He might be relied upon to head an insurrection, if necessary. Even before John's death in 1590 murmurs began to be heard that he had been an usurper—was his son necessarily the heir? These murmurs increased, when in 1593, after waiting three years, Sigismund came home to claim his kingdom, with a present of 20,000 crowns from the Pope in his pocket, 'to defray the cost of the restoration of Catholicism in Sweden.' Duke Charles had already prepared his plans when the King arrived; there seems little doubt that he was playing a game, and for the crown. We are not concerned with his motives, it is sufficient to know that they corresponded with the interests of his country. In 1593, just before Sigismund had landed, Charles had been chosen Regent and President of the Council of State. . . . When Sigismund went back to Poland at the end of the year 1594, he could not prevent Charles being chosen to administer the kingdom in his absence, and Diet after Diet subsequently confirmed the power of the Regent. The peasants of Dalecarlia, the great province of the centre, which had first come forward to the support of Gustavus I, in 1520, sent up a petition to the effect that there ought to be only one king in Sweden, and that Sigismund had forfeited the crown. Charles himself had been unwilling to lead a revolution, until it became apparent that Sigismund was massing troops and raising money in Poland for an attack upon his native land. In 1597 the civil war may be said to have begun; in the following year Sigismund landed (with only 5,000 Polish troops) and was utterly defeated near Linköping (on September 25, 1598). On the next day a treaty was concluded by which Sigismund was acknowledged as King, but promised to send away his foreign troops and maintain Protestantism. It was ob-

viously a mere effort to gain time, and in the following year on failing to keep the condition, which he never had the remotest intention of keeping, he was formally deposed (July, 1599). The contest, however, was by no means over, and it led to that perpetual hostility between Sweden and Poland which played such an important part in the history of Northern Europe in the 17th century. . . . In 1604 Charles was solemnly crowned King; that was the second birthday of the Vasa monarchy; the crown was entailed upon his eldest son, Gustavus Adolphus, and his descendants, being Protestants, and the descendants of Sigismund were forever excluded. 'Every prince who should deviate from the Confession of Augsburg should ipso facto lose the crown. Anyone who should attempt to effect any change of religion should be declared an enemy and a traitor. Sweden should

brought up in Sweden, and might be considered as having some just claim to the throne. The queen mother and Duke John laid down the tutelage and the regency. . . . Nine days later the young king, in the presence of the representatives of the estates of Sweden, received the reins of government. . . . He was then in the first month of his 18th year. He took charge of the kingdom when it was in a critical condition. Since the death of Gustavus Vasa, his grandfather, a period of more than 50 years, Sweden had not enjoyed a single year of peace. In that long space of time, there had been constant dissensions and violence. . . . Sweden was much constrained and embarrassed by her boundaries, and by the jealousies and hostile feelings of her neighbours on the north and the south. Denmark and Norway were united in a kind of dual



STOCKHOLM IN THE 17th CENTURY

Norrmalm on the north shore of the channel of Saltsjö, one of the three main divisions of Stockholm. To the left is the Royal Palace; in the middle the Storkyrka, or great church, dedicated to St. Nicholas; at the right the island of Riddarholm, used as the burial ground of the royal family since the time of Gustavus Adolphus.

never be united with another kingdom under one crown; the King must live in Sweden.'—C. R. L. Fletcher, *Gustavus Adolphus, introduction*.

ALSO IN: E. G. Geijer, *History of the Swedes*, v. 1, ch. 9-14.

1571-1873.—Poor relief by the church.—State regulation. See CHARITIES: Sweden: 1571-1873.

1585.—Establishment of royal library at Stockholm. See LIBRARIES: Modern: Scandinavian states: Sweden.

1611-1629.—Danish, Russian and Polish wars of Gustavus Adolphus.—On the death of Charles in 1611 his son, Gustavus Adolphus, did not immediately assume the title of king. "Sweden remained without a sovereign for two months; for, according to the will of the deceased king, the queen and his nephew (Duke John), with six councillors of state, were to rule till the wishes of the people could be made known in the customary manner. After an interregnum of two months, the Diet opened at Nyköping. . . . Duke John was the son of Sigismund, King of Poland, had been

government under the same king; and both alike were opposed to the growth of Swedish power, and were in continual dispute with her in respect to territory, as well as to the naval and commercial uses of the adjacent seas. Those provinces in the south which are now the most productive and valuable of Sweden, then belonged to Denmark, or were in dispute between the two countries. On the east, Russia and Poland embarrassed and threatened her." During the first year of his reign Gustavus devoted his energies to the war with Denmark. He fought at a disadvantage. His resources were unequal to those of the Danes. His capital, Stockholm, was once attacked by a Danish fleet and in serious peril. But he secured an advantageous peace in the spring of 1613. "Sweden renounced some of its conquests and pretensions, and the Danes gave up to Sweden the city of Calmar on the Baltic, and at the end of six years were to surrender to Sweden its city of Elfsborg on the North Sea; the latter agreeing to pay to the Danes 1,000,000

thalers for the surrender. . . . At the death of Charles IX, and the ascension of Gustavus to the throne, Sweden was in a state of war with Russia, and was so to continue for several years; though hostilities were not all the time prosecuted with vigor, and were some of the time practically suspended. . . . The Swedes held possession of a large area of what is now Russian territory, as well as important towns and fortresses. The extensive country of Finland . . . had been united with Sweden nearly five centuries, as it continued to be nearly two hundred years longer. But towns and territory, also a long distance within the lines of the Russian population, were then in the power of the Swedish forces. The troubles and dissensions relative to the succession, and extreme dislike to the Poles, had caused a numerous party to seek a Swedish prince for its sovereign, and to this end had sent an embassy to Stockholm near the date of the death of Charles IX. Finding that the young Gustavus had acceded to the crown of his father, this Russian party desired to secure for the Russian throne Charles Philip, a younger brother of Gustavus. The Swedish king did not show eagerness to bring this plan to success; but, the war being terminated with Denmark, he was resolved to draw what advantage he could from the weakened condition of Russia, to the advancement and security of the interests of Sweden. In July, 1613, the Russians chose for czar Michael Romanoff, then sixteen years of age. . . . Gustavus proceeded to push military operations with as much vigor as possible. . . . For four years more the war between these two countries continued; . . . the advantages being generally on the side of the Swedes, though they were not always successful in important sieges." Finally, through the mediation of English agents, terms of peace were agreed upon. "The treaty was signed February, 1617. Russia yielded to Sweden a large breadth of territory, shutting herself out from the Baltic; the land where St. Petersburg now stands becoming Swedish territory. . . . The next important work in hand was to deal with Poland. . . . At the death of Charles IX. an armistice had been signed, which was to continue until July, 1612. This was thrice extended, the last time to January, 1616. The latter date had not been reached when the Polish partisans began to intrigue actively in Sweden, and those Swedes who still adhered to the religion and the dynastic rights of Sigismund could not be otherwise than secretly or openly stirred. Sigismund was not only supported by the power of Poland, and by his strong show of legal title to the Swedish crown, but there were strong influences on his side in European high political and religious quarters. He was united to the house of Hapsburg by the bonds of relationship as well as of theology. Philip III. of Spain, and he who afterwards became Ferdinand II. of Austria, were his brothers-in-law. . . . Sigismund came then to the resolution to make war for the possession of Sweden. He was promised enrolment of troops in Germany, the Spaniards had engaged to arm a fleet in his support, and the estates of Poland were to furnish their quota. . . . Efforts were made to stir up revolt against Gustavus in his own kingdom," and he promptly declared war. "During the year 1617 hostilities were prosecuted on both sides with much vigor, and loss of life. Towns and strong positions were taken, and invasions and sudden attacks were made on both sides; the advantages being generally with the Swedes, though not decisive. During the winter of 1618 the Poles invaded Livonia and Esthonia,

carrying pillage and fire in their march, and then retiring." Gustavus would not allow his generals to retaliate. "'We wish not,' he said, 'to war against the peasant, whom we had rather protect than ruin.'" In 1618 there was an armistice, with peace negotiations which failed, and the war began anew. In August, 1621, Gustavus laid siege to Riga with a strong fleet and army, and met with an obstinate resistance; but the place was surrendered to him at the end of nearly six weeks. Again the belligerents agreed to an armistice, and "the year 1624 is declared by the Swedish historians to have been the only one in which Gustavus Adolphus was able to devote all his labors and cares to the interior administration of his country. In the following year the war was renewed. The third campaign of the Swedish king against Poland was terminated by the completion of the conquest of Livonia; and the possession of Courland assured to him Riga, the object of his special care." The decisive battle of the campaign was fought at Wallhof, January 7, 1626. The king of Sweden then "resolved to transport the theater of war from the banks of the Duna to those of the Vistula, to attack Poland at the heart, and approach Germany. Here commences that part of the war of Poland which is called also the war of Prussia. . . . He [Gustavus] realized the need of a port in Eastern Prussia; and the elector of Brandenburg, his brother-in-law, was invested with that duchy under the suzerainty of Poland. [See BRANDENBURG: 1630-1634.] Gustavus did not allow these considerations to arrest his course. . . . June 26 the king arrived before Pillau, and possessed himself of that city without much resistance, the garrison being small. . . . Braunsberg capitulated June 30. July 1, Flanenberg surrendered, and Elbing on the 6th, which was followed by Marienberg on the 8th; the last a well-fortified city. Many towns of less importance were likewise soon captured. Gustavus rapidly pushed aside all resistance, and soon reached the frontiers of Pomerania." In the engagements of the campaign of 1627 the king was twice wounded—once by a musket-ball in the groin, and the second time by a ball that entered near the neck and lodged at the upper corner of the right shoulder-blade. In June, 1629, "there was a heated engagement at Stum, in which Gustavus ran great danger, his force being inferior to the enemy." In September of that year "an armistice [truce of Altmark] was concluded for six years between the belligerent kingdoms. Five cities which had been conquered by Swedish arms were given up to Poland, and three others delivered to the elector of Brandenburg, to be held during the armistice. Gustavus was to continue to occupy Pillau and three other towns of some importance. Liberty of conscience was to be accorded to Protestants and Catholics, and commerce was declared free between the two nations."—J. L. Stevens, *History of Gustavus Adolphus*, ch. 3, 7.—See also POLAND: 1500-1648; AUSTRIA: 1618-1648.

ALSO IN: B. Chapman, *History of Gustavus Adolphus*, ch. 2-3.

1620.—Extent of territory in America. See AMERICA: Map of King James' grants.

1628.—Gustavus Adolphus's interference in the war in Germany.—Relief of Stralsund. See GERMANY: 1627-1620; 1630.

1630-1632.—Campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany.—His death. See GERMANY: 1630-1631, to 1631-1632.

1631.—Treaty of Bärwalde with France. See GERMANY: 1631 (January).

1632.—Full powers given to Oxenstierna in Germany. See GERMANY: 1632-1634.

1638-1640.—Planting of a colony in America, on the Delaware. See DELAWARE: 1638-1640.

1640-1645.—Campaigns of Baner and Torstenson in Germany. See GERMANY: 1640-1645.

1643-1645.—War between Sweden and Denmark.—Torstenson's conquest of Holstein and Schleswig.—Peace of Bromsebro. See GERMANY: 1640-1645.

1644-1697.—Reign and abdication of Queen Christina.—Wars of Charles X and Charles XI with Poland, Denmark and Germany.—Establishment of absolutism.—“Christina, the only child and successor of Gustavus Adolphus, had been brought up by her aunt, Katerina, the Princess Palatine, until the death of the latter in 1639, and in the year 1644, when she reached the age of eighteen, the regency was absolved, and she began to rule in her own name. She had inherited much of her father's talent, and was perhaps the most learned and accomplished woman of her time. She had received the education of a man. . . . She had great taste for the fine arts and for the pursuits of science; but while she encouraged scientific men at her court, she also spent money too recklessly in rewarding artistic merit of all kinds. . . . As a dangerous drawback to her many splendid qualities, she had all the waywardness, caprice, restlessness of mind, fickleness and love of display for which her beautiful mother, Maria Eleanora of Brandenburg, had been noted. She lavished crown lands and the money of the state upon favourites. . . . In the meanwhile the national Estates had been split up into parties, the aristocrats being led by Axel Oxenstierna, and the democrats, with whom the queen sided, by Johan Skytte. The clergy struggled to maintain their independence under the oppressive patronage of the nobles, and the peasants agitated to recover some of the power which the great Gustavus Vasa had granted them, but which his successors had by degrees taken from them. The kingdom was in a ferment, and a civil war seemed to be unavoidable. The council urged upon the queen to marry, and her cousin, Karl Gustaf of the Palatinate, entreated her to fulfil the promise which she had given him in earlier years of choosing him for her husband. At length . . . she proposed him for her successor. . . . After much opposition, Karl Gustaf was declared successor to the throne in the event of the queen having no children of her own. . . . The few years of Christina's reign after her solemn coronation were disquieted by continued dissensions in the diet, attempts at revolts, and by a general distress, which was greatly increased by her profuse wastefulness and her reckless squandering of the property of the crown. As early as the year 1648 she had conceived the idea of abdicating, but, being hindered by her old friends and councillors, she deferred carrying out her wishes till 1654.” In that year the abdication was formally accomplished, and she left the country at once, traveling through Europe. In 1655 she renounced Protestantism and entered the Roman Catholic Church. “At the death [1660] of her cousin and successor, Karl X. Gustaf, as he was called by the Swedes, and who is known to us as Charles X., she returned to Sweden and claimed the crown for herself; but neither then, nor in 1667, when she renewed her pretensions, would the council encourage her hopes, and, after a final attempt to gain the vacant throne of Poland in 1668, she gave up all schemes of ever reigning again, and retired to Rome, where she died in 1689 at the

age of sixty-three. . . . The short reign of Charles X., from 1655 to 1660, was a time of great disorder and unquiet in Sweden. . . . He resolved to engage the people in active war. . . . The ill-timed demand of the Polish king, Johan Kasimir, to be proclaimed the true heir to Christina's throne, drew the first attack upon Poland. Charles X. was born to be a soldier and a conqueror, and the success and rapidity with which he overran all Poland, and crushed the Polish army in a three days' engagement at Warsaw in 1656, showed that he was a worthy pupil and successor of his uncle, the great Gustavus Adolphus. But it was easier for him to make conquests than to keep them, and when the Russians, in their jealousy of the increasing power of Sweden, took part in the war, and began to attack Livonia and Esthonia, while an imperial army advanced into Poland to assist the Poles, who, infuriated at the excesses of the Swedish soldiers, had risen en masse against them, Charles saw the expediency of retreating; and, leaving only a few detachments of troops to watch his enemies, he turned upon Denmark. This war, which was closed by the peace signed at Roeskilde in 1658, enriched Sweden at the expense of Denmark, and gave to the former the old provinces of Skaania, Halland and Bleking [Blekinge], by which the Swedish monarchy obtained natural and well-defined boundaries. The success of this first Danish war, in which Denmark for a time lay crushed under the power of the Swedish king, emboldened him to renew his attacks, and between 1658 and 1660 Charles X. made war five times on the Danish monarch, more than once laid siege to Copenhagen; and, under his able captain, Wrangel, nearly destroyed the Danish fleet. At the close of 1659, when it seemed as if Denmark must be wholly subjugated by Sweden, the English and Dutch, alarmed at the ambition of the Swedish king, sent an allied fleet into the Cattegat to operate with the Danes.” Charles, checked in his operations, was preparing to carry the war into Norway, when he died suddenly, in the winter of 1660, and peace was made by the treaty of Oliva. “By the early death of Charles X., Sweden was again brought under the rule of a regency, for his son and successor, Charles XI., was only four years old when he became king. . . . Every department of the government was left to suffer from mismanagement, the army and navy were neglected, the defences of the frontiers fell into decay, and the public servants were unable to procure their pay. To relieve the great want of money, the regency accepted subsidies, or payments of money from foreign states to maintain peace towards them, and hired out troops to serve in other countries. In this state of things the young king grew up without receiving any very careful education. . . . Charles was declared of age in his 18th year. . . . He was not left long in the enjoyment of mere exercises of amusement, for in 1674 Louis XIV., of France, in conformity with the treaty which the regents had concluded with him, called upon the young Swedish king to help him in the war which he was carrying on against the German princes. [See NETHERLANDS: 1674-1678.] Charles sent an army into Germany, which advanced without opposition into the heart of Brandenburg, but before these forces could form a junction with the French troops then encamped in the Rhineland, the Elector came upon them unawares at Fehrbellin [June 18, 1675] and defeated them. The losses of the Swedes on this occasion were not great, but the result of their defeat was to give encouragement to the old rivals

of Sweden; and early in 1675 both Holland and Denmark declared war against the Swedish king, who, finding that he had been left by the regency almost without army, navy, or money, resolved for the future to take the management of public affairs entirely into his own hands." When he "began the war by a sea engagement with the enemy off Oeland, he found that his ships of war had suffered as much as the land-defences from the long-continued neglect of his regents. The Danes, under their great admiral, Niels Juel, and supported by a Dutch squadron, beat the Swedish fleet, many of whose ships were burnt or sunk. This defeat was atoned for by a victory on land, gained by Charles himself in 1670, over the Danes on the snow-covered hills around the town of Lund. Success was not won without heavy cost, for after a most sanguinary fight, continued from daybreak till night, King Charles, although master of the field, found that more than half his men had been killed. The Danes, who had suffered fully as much, were forced to retreat, leaving Lund in the hands of the Swedes; and although they several times repeated the attempt, they failed in recovering the province of Skaania, which was the great object of their ambition. In Germany the fortune of war did not favor the Swedes, although they fought gallantly under their general, Otto Königsmark [Stettin was surrendered after a long siege in 1677, and Stralsund in 1678]; and Charles XI. was glad to enter into negotiations for taking part in the general peace which France was urging upon all the leading powers of Europe, and which was signed at the palace of St. Germain, in 1679, by the representatives of the respective princes. Sweden recovered the whole of Pomerania, which had been occupied during the war by Austria and Brandenburg, and all Swedish and Danish conquests were mutually renounced. . . . At the close of this war Charles XI. began in good earnest to put his kingdom in order." By sternly reclaiming crown-lands which had been wantonly alienated by former rulers, and by compelling other restitutions, Charles broke the power of the nobles, and so humbled the National Estates that they "proclaimed him, in a diet held in 1603, to be an absolute sovereign king, 'who had the power and right to rule his kingdom as he pleased.' [He attained an absolutism, in fact, which was practically unlimited. He died in 1697, leaving three children, the eldest of whom, who succeeded him, was the extraordinary Charles XII."—E. C. Otté, *Scandinavian history*, ch. 21.—See also BRANDENBURG: 1640-1688.

ALSO IN: H. Tuttle, *History of Prussia to 1740*, ch. 5.—T. H. Dyer, *History of modern Europe*, v. 3, bk. 5, ch. 2 and 4.—G. B. Malleson, *Battle-fields of Germany*, ch. 8.—F. Gribble, *Court of Christina of Sweden*.—J. A. Taylor, *Christina of Sweden*.

1646-1648.—Last campaigns of the Thirty Years' War in Germany. See GERMANY: 1646-1648.

1648.—Peace of Westphalia.—Acquisition of part of Pomerania and other German territory. See GERMANY: 1648: Peace of Westphalia; WESTPHALIA, PEACE OF (1648).

1655.—Conquest of the Delaware colony by the Dutch. See DELAWARE: 1640-1656.

1656.—Establishment of the Bank of Sweden. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 17th-18th centuries.

1668.—Triple Alliance with Holland and England against Louis XIV. See NETHERLANDS: 1668.

1678-1679.—At Peace of Nimeguen. See NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF (1678-1679).

1686.—League of Augsburg against Louis XIV. See GERMANY: 1686.

1697.—Accession of Charles XII.

1697.—Peace of Ryswick. See FRANCE: 1697.

1697-1700.—Conspiracy of three sovereigns against Charles XII.—First campaigns of the young king, in Denmark and Russia.—"Charles XII, at his accession to the throne, found himself the absolute and undisturbed master, not only of Sweden and Finland, but also of Livonia, Carelia, Ingria, Wismar, Viborg, the Islands of Rügen and Oesel, and the finest part of Pomerania, together with the duchy of Bremen and Verden,—all of them the conquests of his ancestors. . . . The beginning of the king's reign gave no very favorable idea of his character. It was imagined that he had been more ambitious of obtaining the supreme power than worthy of possessing it. True it is, he had no dangerous passion; but his conduct discovered nothing but the sallies of youth and the freaks of obstinacy. He seemed to be equally proud and lazy. The ambassadors who resided at his court took him even for a person of mean capacity, and represented him as such to their respective masters. The Swedes entertained the same opinion of him: nobody knew his real character: he did not even know it himself, until the storm that suddenly arose in the North gave him an opportunity of displaying his great talents, which had hitherto lain concealed. Three powerful princes, taking the advantage of his youth, conspired his ruin almost at the same time. The first was his own cousin, Frederick IV, king of Denmark: the second, Augustus, elector of Saxony and King of Poland; Peter the Great, czar of Muscovy, was the third, and most dangerous. . . . The founder of the Russian empire was ambitious of being a conqueror. . . . Besides, he wanted a port on the east side of the Baltic, to facilitate the execution of all his schemes. He wanted the province of Ingria, which lies to the northeast of Livonia. The Swedes were in possession of it, and from them he resolved to take it by force. His predecessors had had claims upon Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia; and the present seemed a favorable opportunity for reviving these claims, which had lain buried for a hundred years, and had been cancelled by the sanction of treaties. He therefore made a league with the King of Poland, to wrest from young Charles XII all the territories that are bounded by the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea, Poland, and Muscovy. The news of these preparations struck the Swedes with consternation, and alarmed the council." But the effect on the young King was instantly and strangely sobering. He assumed the responsibilities of the situation at once, and took into his own hands the preparations for war. From that moment "he entered on a new course of life, from which he never afterwards deviated in one single instance. Full of the idea of Alexander and Caesar, he proposed to imitate those two conquerors in everything but their vices. No longer did he indulge himself in magnificence, sports, and recreations: he reduced his table to the most rigid frugality. He had formerly been fond of gayety and dress; but from that time he was never clad otherwise than as a common soldier. . . . He began by assuring the Duke of Holstein, his brother-in-law, of a speedy assistance. Eight thousand men were immediately sent into Pomerania, a province bordering upon Holstein, in order to enable the duke to make head against the Danes. The duke

indeed had need of them. His dominions were already laid waste, the castle of Gottorp taken, and the city of Tönningen pressed by an obstinate siege, to which the King of Denmark had come in person. . . . This spark began to throw the empire into a flame. . . . On the one side, the Saxon troops of the King of Poland, those of Brandenburg Wolfenbüttel, and Hesse Cassel, advanced to join the Danes. On the other, the King of Sweden's 8,000 men, the troops of Hanover and Zell, and three Dutch regiments, came to the assistance of the duke. While the little country of Holstein was thus the theatre of war, two squadrons, the one from England and the other from Holland, appeared in the Baltic. . . . They joined the young King of Sweden, who seemed to be in danger of being crushed. . . . Charles set out for his first campaign on the 8th day of May, new style, in the year 1700, and left Stockholm, whither he never returned. . . . His fleet consisted of three-and-forty vessels. . . . He joined the squadrons of the allies," and made a descent upon Copenhagen. The city surrendered to escape bombardment, and in less than six weeks Charles had extorted from the Danish King a treaty of peace, negotiated at Travendahl, which indemnified the Duke of Holstein for all the expenses of the war and delivered him from oppression. For himself, Charles asked nothing. "Exactly at the same time, the King of Poland invested Riga, the capital of Livonia; and the czar was advancing on the east at the head of nearly 100,000 men." Riga was defended with great skill and determination, and Augustus was easily persuaded to abandon the siege on the remonstrance of the Dutch, who had much merchandise in the town. "The only thing that Charles had now to do towards the finishing of his first campaign, was to march against his rival in glory, Peter Alexiovitch." Peter had appeared before Narva on October 1, at the head of 80,000 men, mostly undisciplined barbarians, "some armed with arrows, and others with clubs. Few of them had guns; none of them had ever seen a regular siege; and there was not one good cannoner in the whole army. . . . Narva was almost without fortifications: Baron Horn, who commanded there, had not 1,000 regular troops; and yet this immense army could not reduce it in six weeks. It was now the 15th of November, when the czar learned that the King of Sweden had crossed the sea with 200 transports, and was advancing to the relief of Narva. The Swedes were not above 20,000 strong." But the czar was not confident. He had another army marching to his support, and he left the camp at Narva to hasten its movements. Charles' motions were too quick for him. He reached Narva on November 30, after a forced march, with a vanguard of only 8,000 men, and at once, without waiting for the remainder of his army to come up, he stormed the Russian intrenchments. "The Swedes advanced with fixed bayonets, having a furious shower of snow on their backs, which drove full in the face of the enemy." The victory was complete. "The Swedes had not above 600 men. Eight thousand Muscovites had been killed in their intrenchments; many were drowned; many had crossed the river," and 30,000 who held a part of the camp at night-fall, surrendered next morning. When czar Peter, who was pressing the march of his 40,000 men, received news of the disaster at Narva, he turned homeward, and set himself seriously to the work of drilling and disciplining his troops. "The Swedes," he said phlegmatically, "will teach us to beat them."—Voltaire, *History of Charles XII.*

*king of Sweden, bk. 1-2.*—See also UKRAINE: 1700-1721.

1701-1707.—Invasion and subjugation of Poland and Saxony by Charles XII.—Deposition of Augustus from the Polish throne.—Charles at the summit of his career.—"Whilst Peter, abandoning all the provinces he had invaded, retreated to his own dominions, and employed himself in training his undisciplined serfs, Charles prepared to take the field against his only remaining adversary, the King of Poland. Leaving Narva, where he passed the winter, he entered Livonia, and appeared in the neighbourhood of Riga, the very place which the Poles and Saxons had in vain besieged. Dreading the storm that now approached, Augustus had entered into a closer alliance with the czar; and at an interview which took place at Birsen, a small town in Lithuania, it was agreed that each should furnish the other with a body of 50,000 mercenaries, to be paid by Russia. . . . The Saxon army, having failed in their attempt on Riga, endeavoured to prevent the Swedes from crossing the Dwina; but the passage was effected under cover of a thick cloud of smoke from the burning of wet straw, and by means of large boats with high wooden parapets along the sides, to protect the soldiers from the fire of the enemy, who were driven from their intrenchments with the loss of 2,000 killed and 1,500 prisoners. Charles immediately advanced to Mittau, the capital of Courland, the garrison of which, with all the other towns and forts in the duchy, surrendered at discretion. He next passed into Lithuania, conquering wherever he came, and driving 20,000 Russians before him with the utmost precipitation. On reaching Birsen, it gave him no little satisfaction, as he himself confessed, to enter in triumph the very town where, only a few months before, Augustus and the czar had plotted his destruction. It was here that he formed the daring project of dethroning the King of Poland by means of his own subjects, whose notions of liberty could not tolerate the measures of a despotic government. . . . The fate of Augustus, already desperate, was here consummated by the treachery of the primate Radziewiski, who caused it to be immediately notified to all the palatines, that no alternative remained but to submit to the will of the conqueror. The deserted monarch resolved to defend his crown by force of arms; the two kings met near Clissau (July 13, 1702), where after a bloody battle fortune again declared for the Swedes. Charles halted not a moment on the field of victory, but marched rapidly to Cracow in pursuit of his antagonist. That city was taken without firing a shot, and taxed with a contribution of 100,000 rix-dollars. The fugitive prince obtained an unexpected respite of six weeks, his indefatigable rival having had his thigh-bone fractured by an accidental fall from his horse. The interval was spent in hostile preparations, but the recovery of Charles overturned all the schemes of his enemies, and the decisive battle of Pultusk (May 1, 1703) completed the humiliation of the unfortunate Augustus. At the instigation of the faithless cardinal, the diet at Warsaw declared (February 14, 1704) that the Elector of Saxony was incapable of wearing the crown, which was soon after bestowed on Stanislaus Leczinski, the young palatine of Posnania. Count Piper strongly urged his royal master to assume the sovereignty himself. . . . But the splendours of a diadem had few charms in the eyes of a conqueror who confessed that he felt much more pleasure in bestowing thrones upon others than in winning them for himself. Having





SURRENDER OF WARSAW TO THE GREAT ELECTOR AND THE SWEDISH FIELD MARCHAL WRANGEL, 1656

(From the painting by Wilhelm Rauber)



thus succeeded in his favourite project, Charles resumed his march to complete the entire conquest of the kingdom. Everywhere had fortune crowned the bold expeditions of this adventurous prince. Whilst his generals and armies were pursuing their career from province to province, he had himself opened a passage for his victorious troops into Saxony and the imperial dominions. His ships, now masters of the Baltic, were employed in transporting to Sweden the prisoners taken in the wars. Denmark, bound up by the treaty of Travendhal, was prevented from offering any active interference; the Russians were kept in check towards the east by a detachment of 30,000 Swedes; so that the whole region was kept in awe by the sword of the conqueror, from the German Ocean almost to the mouth of the Borysthènes, and even to the gates of Moscow. The Czar Peter in the mean time, having carried Narva by assault, and captured several towns fortresses in Livonia, held a conference with Augustus at Grodno, where the two sovereigns concerted their plans for attacking the Scandinavian invaders in their new conquests, with a combined army of 60,000 men, under Prince Menzikoff and General Schulleberg. Had the fate of the contest depended on numerical superiority alone, Charles must have been crushed before the overwhelming power of his enemies; but his courage and good fortune prevailed over every disadvantage. The scattered hordes of Muscovy were overthrown with so great celerity, that one detachment after another was routed before they learned the defeat of their companions. Schulleberg, with all his experience and reputation, was not more successful, having been completely beaten by Renschild, the Parmenio of the northern Alexander, in a sanguinary action (Feb. 12, 1706), at the small town of Travenstadt, near Punitz, a place already fatal to the cause of Augustus. . . . The reduction of Saxony, which Charles next invaded, obliged Augustus to implore peace on any terms. The conditions exacted by the victor were, that he should renounce for ever the crown of Poland; acknowledge Stanislaus as lawful king; and dissolve his treaty of alliance with Russia. The inflexible temper of Charles was not likely to mitigate the severity of these demands, but their rigour was increased in consequence of the defeat of General Meyerfeld, near Kalisch, by Prince Menzikoff—the first advantage which the Muscovites had gained over the Swedes in a pitched battle. . . . The numerous victories of Charles, and the arbitrary manner in which he had deposed the King of Poland, filled all Europe with astonishment. Some states entertained apprehensions of his power, while others prepared to solicit his friendship. France, harassed by expensive wars in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, courted his alliance with an ardour proportioned to the distressing state of her affairs. Offended at the declaration issued against him by the diet of Ratisbon, and resenting an indignity offered to Baron de Stralheim, his envoy at Vienna, he magnified these trivial affronts into an occasion of quarrelling with the emperor, who was obliged to succumb, and among other mortifying concessions, to grant his Lutheran subjects in Silesia the free exercise of their religious liberties as secured by the treaties of Westphalia. . . . The ambitious prince was now in the zenith of his glory; he had experienced no reverse, nor met with any interruption to his victories. The romantic extravagance of his views increased with his success. One year, he thought, will suffice for the conquest of Russia. The court of Rome was next to feel his vengeance,

as the pope had dared to oppose the concession of religious liberty to the Silesian Protestants. No enterprise at that time appeared impossible to him."—A. Crichton, *Scandinavia, ancient and modern*, v. 2, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: S. A. Dunham, *History of Poland*, pp. 210-221.—T. H. Dyer, *History of modern Europe*, v. 3, bk. 5, ch. 5.

1707-1718.—Charles XII in Russia.—Ruinous defeat at *Poltava*.—Refuge among the Turks.—Fruitless intrigues.—His return to Sweden and death.—"From Saxony, Charles marched back into Poland [September, 1707], where Peter was making some ineffectual efforts to revive the party of Augustus. Peter retired before his rival, who had, however, the satisfaction of defeating an army of 20,000 Russians [at Golowstschin, in the spring of 1708], strongly entrenched. Intoxicated by success, he rejected the czar's offers of peace, declaring that he would treat at Moscow; and without forming any systematic plan of operations, he crossed the frontiers, resolved on the destruction of that ancient city. Peter prevented the advance of the Swedes, on the direct line, by destroying the roads and desolating the country; Charles, after having endured great privations, turned off towards the Ukraine, whither he had been invited by Mazeppa, the chief of the Cossacks, who, disgusted by the conduct of the czar, had resolved to throw off his allegiance. In spite of all the obstacles that nature and the enemy could throw in his way, Charles reached the place of rendezvous; but he had the mortification to find Mazeppa appear in his camp as a fugitive rather than an ally, for the czar had discovered his treason, and disconcerted his schemes by the punishment of his associates. A still greater misfortune to the Swedes was the loss of the convoy and the ruin of the reinforcement they had expected from Livonia. General Lewenhaupt, to whose care it was entrusted, had been forced into three general engagements by the Russians; and though he had eminently distinguished himself by his courage and conduct, he was forced to set fire to his wagons to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. Undaunted by these misfortunes, Charles continued the campaign even in the depth of a winter so severe that 2,000 men were at once frozen to death almost in his presence. At length he laid siege to Pultowa [or *Poltava*], a fortified city on the frontiers of the Ukraine, which contained one of the czar's principal magazines. The garrison was numerous and the resistance obstinate; Charles himself was dangerously wounded in the heel whilst viewing the works; and while he was still confined to his tent he learned that Peter was advancing with a numerous army to raise the siege. Leaving 7,000 men to guard the works, Charles ordered his soldiers to march and meet the enemy, while he accompanied them in a litter (July 8, 1709). The desperate charge of the Swedes broke the Russian cavalry, but the infantry stood firm, and gave the horse an opportunity of rallying in the rear. In the meantime the czar's artillery made dreadful havoc in the Swedish line; and Charles, who had been forced to abandon his canon in his forced marches, in vain contended against this formidable disadvantage. After a dreadful combat of more than two hours' duration, the Swedish army was irretrievably ruined; 8,000 of their best troops were left dead on the field, 6,000 were taken prisoners, and about 12,000 of the fugitives were soon after forced to surrender on the banks of the Dnieper, from want of boats to cross the river. Charles, ac-

accompanied by about 300 of his guards, escaped to Bender, a Turkish town in Bessarabia, abandoning all his treasures to his rival, including the rich spoils of Poland and Saxony. Few victories have ever had such important consequences as that which the czar won at Pultowa; in one fatal day Charles lost the fruits of nine years' victories; the veteran army that had been the terror of Europe was completely ruined; those who escaped from the fatal field were taken prisoners, but they found a fate scarcely better than death; for they were transported by the czar to colonize the wilds of Siberia; the elector of Saxony re-entered Poland and drove Stanislaus from the throne; the king's of Denmark and Prussia revived old claims on the Swedish provinces, while the victorious Peter invaded not only Livonia and Ingria, but a great part of Finland. Indeed, but for the interference of the German emperor and the maritime powers, the Swedish monarchy would have been rent in pieces. Charles, in his exile, formed a new plan for the destruction of his hated rival; he instigated the Turks to attempt the conquest of Russia, and flattered himself that he might yet enter Moscow at the head of a Mohammedan army. The bribes which Peter lavishly bestowed on the counsellors of the sultan, for a time frustrated these intrigues; but Charles, through his friend Poniatowski, informed the sultan of his vizier's corruption, and procured the deposition of that minister. . . . The czar made the most vigorous preparations for the new war by which he was menaced (A. D. 1711). The Turkish vizier, on the other hand, assembled all the forces of the Ottoman Empire in the plains of Adrianople. Demetrius Cantemir, the hospodar of Moldavia, believing that a favourable opportunity presented itself for delivering his country from the Mohammedan yoke, invited the czar to his aid; and the Russians, rapidly advancing, reached the northern banks of the Pruth, near Yassi, the Moldavian capital. Here the Russians found that the promises of Prince Cantemir were illusory," and they were soon so enveloped by the forces of the Turks that there seemed to be no escape for them. But the tsarina, Catherine—the Livonian peasant woman whom Peter had made his wife—gathered up her jewels and all the money she could find in camp, and sent them as a gift to the vizier, whereby he was induced to open negotiations. "A treaty [known as the Treaty of the Pruth] was concluded on terms which, though severe [requiring the Russians to give up Azov], were more favourable than Peter, under the circumstances, could reasonably have hoped; the Russians retired in safety, and Charles reached the Turkish camp, only to learn the downfall of all his expectations. A few series of intrigues in the court of Constantinople led to the appointment of a new vizier; but this minister was little inclined to gratify the king of Sweden; on the contrary, warned by the fate of his predecessors, he resolved to remove him from the Ottoman empire (A. D. 1713). Charles continued to linger; even after he had received a letter of dismissal from the sultan's own hand, he resolved to remain, and when a resolution was taken to send him away by force, he determined, with his few attendants, to dare the whole strength of the Turkish empire. After a fierce resistance, he was captured and conveyed a prisoner to Adrianople. . . . Another revolution in the divan revived the hopes of Charles, and induced him to remain in Turkey, when his return to the North would probably have restored him to his former eminence. The Swedes, under General Steenbock, gained one of the most brilliant

victories that had been obtained during the war, over the united forces of the Danes and Saxons, at Gadebusch [November 20, 1712], in the duchy of Mecklenburg; but the conqueror sullied his fame by burning the defenceless town of Altona [January 10, 1713] an outrage which excited the indignation of all Europe." He soon after met with reverses and was compelled to surrender his whole army. "The czar in the meantime pushed forward his conquests on the side of Finland; and the glory of his reign appeared to be consummated by a naval victory obtained over the Swedes near the island of Oeland. . . . Charles heard of his rival's progress unmoved; but when he learned that the Swedish senate intended to make his sister regent and to make peace with Russia and Denmark, he announced his intention of returning home." He traversed Europe incognito, making the journey of 1,100 miles, mostly on horseback, in seventeen days, "and towards the close of the year [1714] reached Stralsund, the capital of Swedish Pomerania. Charles, at the opening of the next campaign, found himself surrounded with enemies (A. D. 1715). Stralsund itself was besieged by the united armies of the Prussians, Danes, and Saxons, while the Russian fleet, which now rode triumphant in the Baltic, threatened a descent upon Sweden. After an obstinate defence, in which the Swedish monarch displayed all his accustomed bravery, Stralsund was forced to capitulate, Charles having previously escaped in a small vessel to his native shores. All Europe believed the Swedish monarch undone; it was supposed he could no longer defend his own dominions, when, to the inexpressible astonishment of every one, it was announced that he had invaded Norway. His attention, however, was less engaged by the war than by the gigantic intrigues of his new favourite, Goertz, who, taking advantage of a coolness between the Russians and the other enemies of Sweden, proposed that Peter and Charles should unite in strict amity, and dictate the law to Europe. . . . While the negotiations were yet in progress, Charles invaded Norway a second time, and invested the castle of Frederickshall in the very depth of winter. But while engaged in viewing the works he was struck by a cannon-ball, and was dead before any of his attendants came to his assistance [December 11, 1718]. The Swedish senate showed little grief for the loss of the warlike king."—W. C. Taylor, *Student's manual of modern history*, ch. 7, sect. 6 .

1715.—Extent of territory. See EUROPE: Map of eastern Europe in 1715.


ALSO IN: E. Schuyler, *Peter the Great*, v. 2, ch. 53-56, 61-60.—E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 18.—R. N. Bain, *Charles XII and the collapse of the Swedish empire (Heroes of the Nations Series)*.

1719.—Accession of Ulrica Eleonora.


1719-1721.—Constitutional changes.—Treaties of peace ending the northern war.—Swedish cessions of territory.—"An assembly of the States was summoned in February [1719], and completely altered the constitution. Sweden was declared an elective kingdom, and the government was vested in a council of 24 members, divided into eight colleges, who were invested with a power so absolute that their elected queen was reduced to a mere shadow. In short, the ancient oligarchy was restored, and Sweden became the prey of a few noble families. . . . In November a treaty was signed at Stockholm between Sweden and Great Britain, by which the Duchies of Bremen and Verden were ceded to George I. [as elector of

# LINEAGE OF THE SOVEREIGNS OF SWEDEN.


## THE VASA LINE.



## THE HOLSTEIN-GOTTORP LINE.



## THE BERNADOTTE LINE.



Hanover] in consideration of a payment of one million rix-dollars. By another treaty in January 1720, George engaged to support Sweden against Denmark and Russia, and to pay a yearly subsidy of \$300,000 during the war. About the same time an armistice was concluded with Poland till a definitive treaty should be arranged on the basis of the Peace of Oliva. Augustus was to be recognised as King of Poland; but Stanislaus was to retain the royal title during his life, and to receive from Augustus a million rix-dollars. Both parties were to unite to check the preponderance of the Czar, whose troops excited great discontent and suspicion by their continued presence in Poland. On February 1st a peace was concluded with Prussia under the mediation of France and Great Britain. The principal articles of this treaty were that Sweden ceded to Prussia, Stettin, the Islands of Wollin and Usedom, and all the tract between the Oder and Peene, together with the towns of Damm and Golnau beyond the Oder. The King of Prussia, on his side, engaged not to assist the Czar, and to pay two million rix-dollars to the Queen of Sweden. The terms of a peace between Sweden and Denmark were more difficult of arrangement. . . . By the Treaty of Stockholm, June 12th 1720, the King of Denmark restored to Sweden, Wismar, Stralsund, Rügen, and all that he held in Pomerania; Sweden paying 600,000 rix-dollars and renouncing the freedom of the Sound. Thus the only territorial acquisition that Denmark made by the war was the greater part of the Duchy of Schleswig, the possession of which was guaranteed to her by England and France. Sweden and Russia were now the only Powers that remained at war. . . . At length, through the mediation of France, conferences were opened in May 1721, and the Peace of Nystad was signed, September 10th. . . . The only portion of his conquests that [Peter] relinquished was Finland, with the exception of a part of Carelia; but as, by his treaty with Augustus II., at the beginning of the war, he had promised to restore Livonia to Poland if he conquered it, he paid the Crown of Sweden \$2,000,000 in order to evade this engagement by alleging that he had purchased that province."—T. H. Dyer, *History of modern Europe*, v. 3, bk. 5, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: F. C. Schlosser, *History of the eighteenth century*, period 1, div. 1, ch. 2, sect. 3.

1720.—Accession of Frederick of Hesse-Cassel, husband of Ulrica Eleonora.

1720-1792.—Wars with Russia and Prussia.—Humiliating powerlessness of the king.—Parties of the Hats and the Caps.—Constitutional Revolution.—Assassination of Gustavus III.—Ulrica Eleonora, the sister of Charles XII, resigned the crown in 1720, in favor of her husband, prince of Hesse, who became king under the title of Frederick I. His reign witnessed the conquest of Finland and the cession (1743) of a part of that province to Russia (see RUSSIA: 1740-1762). On his death in 1751, Adolphus Frederick, bishop of Lübeck, and administrator of Holstein, was raised to the throne. "Though his personal qualities commanded respect, his reign was a disastrous one. He had the folly to join the coalition of Russia, Poland, Austria, and France against the king of Prussia. [See GERMANY: 1755-1756; 1757 (April-June).] Twenty thousand Swedes were marched into Pomerania, on the pretext of enforcing the conditions of the treaty of Westphalia, but with the view of recovering the districts which had been ceded to Prussia after the death of Charles XII. They reduced Usedom and Wollin,

with the fortresses on the coast; but this success was owing to the absence of the Prussians. When, in 1758, Schwald, the general of Frederic the Great, was at liberty to march with 30,000 men into Pomerania, he recovered the places which had been lost, and forced the invaders to retire under the canon of Stralsund. The accession of the tsar Peter was still more favourable to Frederic. An enthusiastic admirer of that prince, he soon concluded a treaty with him. Sweden was forced to follow the example; and things remained, at the peace of Hubertsburg, in the same condition as before the war. [See GERMANY: 1761-1762.] Scarcely was Sweden at harmony with her formidable enemy, when she became agitated by internal commotions. We have alluded to the limitations set to the royal authority after the death of Charles XII., and to the discontent it engendered in the breasts of the Swedish monarchs. While they strove to emancipate themselves from the shackles imposed upon them, the diet was no less anxious to render them more enslaved. That diet, consisting of four orders, the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants, was often the scene of tumultuous proceedings: it was rarely tranquil; yet it enjoyed the supreme legislative authority. It was also corrupt; for impoverished nobles and needy tradesmen had a voice, no less than the wealthiest members. All new laws, all ordinances, were signed by the king; yet he had no power of refusal; he was the mere registrar-general. . . . The king had sometimes refused to sign ordinances which he judged dangerous to the common weal: in 1756 an act was passed, that in future a stamp might be used in lieu of the sign-manual, whenever he should again refuse. More intolerable than all this was the manner in which the diet insisted on regulating the most trifling details of the royal household. This interference was resented by some of the members, belonging to what was called the 'Hat' party, who may be termed the Tories of Sweden. Opposed to these were the 'Caps,' who were for shackling the crown with new restrictions, and of whom the leaders were undoubtedly in the pay of Russia. . . . As Russia was the secret soul of the Caps, so France endeavoured to support the Hats, whenever the courts of St. Petersburg and St. Germain were hostile to each other. Stockholm therefore was an arena in which the two powers struggled for the ascendancy." Gustavus III., who succeeded his father Adolphus Frederic in 1771, was able with the help of French money and influence, and by winning to his support the burgher cavalry of the capital, to overawe the party of the Caps, and to impose a new constitution upon the country. The new constitution "conferred considerable powers on the sovereign; enabled him to make peace, or declare war, without the consent of the diet; but he could make no new law, or alter any already made, without its concurrence; and he was bound to ask, though not always to follow, the advice of his senate in matters of graver import. The form of the constitution was not much altered; and the four orders of deputies still remained. On the whole, it was a liberal constitution. If this revolution was agreeable to the Swedes themselves, it was odious to Catherine II., who saw Russian influence annihilated by it." The bad feeling between the two governments which followed led to war, in 1787, when Russia was engaged at the same time in hostilities with the Turks. The war was unpopular in Sweden, and Gustavus was frustrated in his ambitious designs on Finland. Peace was made in 1790, each party restoring its con-

quests, "so that things remained exactly as they were before the war. [On Mar. 16, 1792, Gustavus III] was assassinated, being shot at a masquerade ball, by one Ankerstrom, whose motives have remained a mystery. Suspicion attached to others, the king's brother included, but nothing to justify it is proved. The murdered king was succeeded by his son Gustavus IV, who had but just passed the age of three years."—S. A. Dunham, *History of Denmark, Sweden and Norway*, v. 3, bk. 3, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: R. N. Bain, *Gustavus III, 1746-1792*.

1780.—Member of League of Armed Neutrality. See ARMED NEUTRALITY; U. S. A.: 1778-1782.

1797.—Extent of territory. See EUROPE: Map of Central Europe (1797).

1801-1802.—Northern Maritime League.—English bombardment of Copenhagen and summary extortion of peace. See FRANCE: 1801-1802.

1805.—In the third coalition against France. See FRANCE: 1805 (January-April).

1806.—In the Russo-Prussian Alliance against Napoleon. See GERMANY: 1806-1807.

1807-1810.—War of Russia and Denmark with Sweden, and conquest of Finland.—Deposition of the Swedish king.—In fulfilment of the agreements of the Treaty of Tilsit (see GERMANY: 1807 [June-July]), early in August, 1807, "a show was made by Russia of offering her mediation to Great Britain for the conclusion of a general peace; but as Mr. Canning required, as a pledge of the sincerity of the Czar, a frank communication of the secret articles at Tilsit, the proposal fell to the ground." Its failure was made certain by the action of England in taking possession by force of the Danish fleet. On November 5, upon the peremptory demand of Napoleon, war was accordingly declared against Great Britain by the tsar. "Denmark had concluded (Oct. 16) an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, and Sweden was now summoned by Russia to join the Continental League. But the King, faithful to his engagements [with England], resolutely refused submission; on which war was declared against him early in 1808, and an overwhelming force poured into Finland [see FINLAND: 1157-1809], the seizure of which by Russia had been agreed on at Tilsit."—*Epitome of Alison's history of Europe*, sect. 455-456.—"In November, 1808, Finland was virtually given up to Alexander; and Sweden was thus deprived of her great granary, and destined to ruin. [See FRANCE: 1807-1808 (August-November).] England had of late aided her vigorously, driving the Russian navy into port, and blockading them there; and sending Sir John Moore, with 10,000 men, in May, when France, Russia, and Denmark, were all advancing to crush the gallant Swedes. Sir John Moore found the King in what he thought a very wild state of mind, proposing conquests, when he had not forces enough for defensive operations. All agreement in their views was found to be impossible; the King resented the Englishman's caution; Sir John Moore thought the King so nearly mad that he made off in disguise from Stockholm, and brought back his troops, which had never been landed. . . . After the relinquishment of Finland, the Swedish people found they could endure no more. Besides Finland, they had lost Pomerania: they were reduced to want; they were thinned by pestilence as well as by war; but the King's ruling idea was to continue the conflict to the last. . . . As the only way to preserve their existence, his subjects gently deposed him, and put the administration of affairs into the hands of his aged uncle,

the Duke of Sudermania. The . . . King was arrested on the 13th of March, 1809, as he was setting out for his country seat, . . . and placed in imprisonment for a short time. His uncle, at first called Regent, was soon made King [Charles XIII]. . . . Peace was made with Russia in September, 1809, and with France in the following January. Pomerania was restored to Sweden, but not Finland; and she had to make great sacrifices. . . . She was compelled to bear her part in the Continental System of Napoleon, and to shut her ports against all communications with England"—H Martineau, *History of England, 1800-1815*, bk. 2, ch. 1.—"The invasion by the Tzar Alexander I. in 1808 led to the complete separation of Finland and the other Swedish lands east of the gulf of Bothnia from the Swedish crown. Finland was conquered and annexed by the conqueror; but it was annexed after a fashion in which one may suppose that no other conquered land ever was annexed. In fact one may doubt whether 'annexed' is the right word. . . . The conqueror had possession of the Swedish dominions, and he called on the people of that part to meet him in a separate Parliament, but one chosen in exactly the same way as the existing law prescribed for the common Parliament of the whole. . . . In his new character of Grand Duke of Finland, the Tzar Alexander came to Borga, and there on March 27th, 1809, fully confirmed the existing constitution, laws, and religion of his new State. The position of that State is best described in his own words. Speaking neither Swedish nor Finnish, and speaking to hearers who understood no Russian, the new Grand Duke used the French tongue. Finland was 'Placé désormais au rang des nations'; it was a 'Nation, tranquille au dehors, libre dans l'intérieur.' [Finland was 'Placed henceforth in the rank of the nations; it was a Nation tranquil without, free within.'] And it was a nation of his own founding. The people of Finland had ceased to be a part of the Swedish nation; they had not become a part of the Russian nation; they had become a nation by themselves. All this, be it remembered, happened before the formal cession of the lost lands by Sweden to Russia. This was not made till the Peace of Frederikshamn on September 17th of the same year. The treaty contained no stipulation for the political rights of Finland; their full confirmation by the new sovereign was held to be enough. Two years later, in 1811, the boundary of the new State was enlarged. Alexander, Emperor of all the Russias and Grand Duke of Finland, cut off from his empire, and added to his grand duchy, the Finnish districts which had been ceded by Sweden to Russia sixty years before. The boundary of his constitutional grand duchy was brought very near indeed to the capital of his despotic empire."—E. A. Freeman, *Finland (Macmillan's Magazine, Mar., 1892)*.

ALSO IN: General Monteith, ed., *Narrative of the conquest of Finland, by a Russian officer (with appended documents)*.—C. Joyneville, *Life and times of Alexander I*, v. 2, ch. 2.

1808.—Founding of system of education for the deaf. See EDUCATION: Modern developments; 20th century: Education for the deaf, blind and feeble-minded: Deaf mutes.

1809.—Granting of the constitution. See SWEDEN, CONSTITUTION OF.

1810.—Election of Bernadotte to be crown prince and successor to the throne.—The new king, lately called to the throne, being aged, "the eyes of the people were fixed on the successor, or

Crown Prince, who took upon himself the chief labour of the government, and appears to have given satisfaction to the nation. But his government was of short duration. On the 28th of May 1810, while reviewing some troops, he suddenly fell from his horse and expired on the spot, leaving Sweden again without any head excepting the old King. This event agitated the whole nation, and various candidates were proposed for the succession of the kingdom. Among these was the King of Denmark, who, after the sacrifices he had made for Buonaparte, had some right to expect his support. The son of the late unfortunate monarch, rightful heir of the crown, and named like him Gustavus, was also proposed as a candidate. The Duke of Oldenburg, brother-in-law of the Emperor of Russia, had partizans. To each of these candidates there lay practical objections. To have followed the line of lawful succession, and called Gustavus to the throne, (which could not be for-

quired a high reputation in the north of Europe, both when governor of Hanover, and administrator of Swedish Pomerania. On the latter occasion, Bernadotte was said to have shown himself in a particular manner the friend and protector of the Swedish nation; and it was even insinuated that he would not be averse to exchange the errors of Popery for the reformed tenets of Luther. The Swedish nation fell very generally into the line of policy which prompted this choice. . . . It was a choice, sure, as they thought, to be agreeable to him upon whose nod the world seemed to depend. Yet, there is the best reason to doubt, whether, in preferring Bernadotte to their vacant throne, the Swedes did a thing which was gratifying to Napoleon. The name of the Crown Prince of Sweden elect, had been known in the wars of the Revolution, before that of Buonaparte had been heard of. Bernadotte had been the older, therefore, though certainly not the better soldier. On the 18th Brumaire, he was so far from joining Buonaparte in his enterprise against the Council of Five Hundred, notwithstanding all advances made to him, that he was on the spot at St. Cloud armed and prepared, had circumstances permitted, to place himself at the head of any part of the military, who might be brought to declare for the Directory. And although, like every one else, Bernadotte submitted to the Consular system, and held the government of Holland under Buonaparte, yet then, as well as under the empire, he was always understood to belong to a class of officers, whom Napoleon employed indeed, and rewarded, but without loving them, or perhaps relying on them more than he was compelled to do, although their character was in most instances a warrant for their fidelity. These officers formed a comparatively small class, yet comprehending some of the most distinguished names in the French army. . . . Reconciled by necessity to a state of servitude which they could not avoid, this party considered themselves as the soldiers of France, not of Napoleon, and followed the banner of their country rather than the fortunes of the Emperor. Without being personally Napoleon's enemies, they were not the friends of his despotic power."—W. Scott, *Life of Napoleon*, v. 2, ch. 12.—The election of Bernadotte is said to have been brought about by the audacity of a young Swedish officer, Baron Mörner, who went to Paris as a courier, bearing a message on the subject from the Swedish government which had a very different aim. He interviewed Bernadotte and persuaded that marshal to become a candidate for the vacant throne. Bernadotte laid the matter before Napoleon. "Napoleon, who had officially been informed of the thoughts of the Swedish government, looked on the whole matter as a ghost of the brain, but declared that he would not meddle with it. At Mörner's last visit (June 27, 1810) Bernadotte gave him leave to communicate that the emperor had nothing against Bernadotte's election and that he himself was ready to accept if the choice fell on him. It is easy to imagine the astonishment of Engström, the minister of state, when he heard Mörner's description of his bold attempt in Paris. 'What do you bring from Paris?' Engström asked, when Mörner came into the foreign Minister's cabinet in Stockholm. 'That I have induced the prince of Ponte Corvo to accept the Swedish crown.' 'How could you speak to him about it without being commissioned?' 'Our only safety lies in the prince of Ponte Corvo.' 'Are you sure that he will receive it so that we are not doubly committed?' 'Certainly. I have a letter here.'



JEAN BAPTISTE JULES BERNADETTE

(After the painting by Roth)

feited by his father's infirmity, so far as he was concerned,) would have been to place a child at the head of the state, and must have inferred, amid this most arduous crisis, all the doubts and difficulties of choosing a regent. Such choice might, too, be the means, at a future time, of reviving his father's claim to the crown. The countries of Denmark and Sweden had been too long rivals, for the Swedes to subject themselves to the yoke of the King of Denmark; and to choose the Duke of Oldenburg would have been, in effect, to submit themselves to Russia, of whose last behaviour towards her Sweden had considerable reason to complain. In this embarrassment they were thought to start a happy idea, who proposed to conciliate Napoleon by bestowing the ancient crown of the Goths upon one of his own Field Marshals, and a high noble of his empire, namely, John Julian Baptiste Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo. This distinguished officer was married to a sister of Joseph Buonaparte's wife, (daughter of a wealthy and respectable individual, named Clary,) through whom he had the advantage of an alliance with the Imperial family of Napoleon, and he had ac-



'From him to you?' 'No, from me to him.' 'Boy,' exclaimed Mörner's relation, his excellency Von Essen, at the end of the conference, 'you ought to sit where neither sun nor moon will shine on you.' But Mörner's project won more and more favor in the country though he himself was arrested in Örebro, whereby the government desired to prevent his presence as a member of the house of knights at the special diet called at Örebro for election. Through messengers and a pamphlet he worked for his plan."—*Sveriges Historia, 1805-1875* (tr. from the Swedish by L. G. Sellstedt), pp. 29-31.

ALSO IN: M. de Bourrienne, *Private memoirs of Napoleon, v. 4, ch. 7*.—Lady Bloomfield, *Memoirs of Lord Bloomfield, v. 1, pp. 17-34*.—W. G. Meredith, *Memoirs of Charles John, king of Sweden and Norway*.

1810.—Alliance with Russia against France. See FRANCE: 1810-1812.

1812.—Extent of empire in Europe.—Napoleon's campaign. See EUROPE: Modern: Map of Central Europe in 1812.

1813.—With the new coalition against Napoleon.—Participation in the War of Liberation. See GERMANY: 1812-1813, to 1813 (October-December).

1813-1814.—Peace of Kiel.—Cession of Norway to Sweden and of Swedish Pomerania to Denmark.—"The Danes, having been driven out of Holstein by Bernadotte [see GERMANY: 1813 (October-December)], concluded an armistice December 18th, and, finally, the Peace of Kiel, January 14th 1814, by which Frederick VI. ceded Norway to Sweden; reserving, however, Greenland, the Ferroe Islands, and Iceland, which were regarded as dependencies of Norway. Norway, which was anciently governed by its own kings, had remained united with Denmark ever since the death of Olaf V. in 1387. Charles XIII., on his side, ceded to Denmark Swedish Pomerania and the Isle of Rugen. This treaty founded the present system of the North. Sweden withdrew entirely from her connection with Germany, and became a purely Scandinavian Power. The Norwegians, who detested the Swedes, made an attempt to assert their independence under the conduct of Prince Christian Frederick, cousin-german and heir of Frederick VI. of Denmark. Christian Frederick was proclaimed King of Norway; but the movement was opposed by Great Britain and the Allied Powers from considerations of policy rather than justice; and the Norwegians found themselves compelled to decree the union of Norway and Sweden in a storting, or Diet, assembled at Christiania, November 4th 1814. Frederick VI. also signed a peace with Great Britain at Kiel, January 14th 1814. All the Danish colonies, except Heligoland, which had been taken by the English, were restored."—T. H. Dyer, *History of modern Europe, v. 4, bk. 7, ch. 16*.—See also DENMARK: Survey of history; NORWAY: 1814-1815; 1814-1800; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.

1814.—Allies in France and in possession of Paris.—Fall of Napoleon. See FRANCE: 1814 (January-March); (March-April).

1818-1844.—Accession of Charles XIV (Bernadotte).—Antagonism to liberal forms of government. — Norwegian - Finnmark boundary question.—Constitutional reconstruction of the cabinet.—"Charles XIII. died in February, 1818, at the age of seventy, and his talented queen followed him a few months later. Charles XIV. Johann was fifty-four years of age when ascending the throne, but a man in his prime. To the dignity of the crown he brought a great personal influence, and

his fame as a warrior, which spread throughout Europe. The firm diplomatic relations with Russia were continued, but approaches to England were also made. Charles XIV. gave close personal attention to the administration, being especially interested in the defence, finances, canals and roads. . . . One of the most remarkable works carried on during the reign of Charles XIV. was the Gotha Canal system, which was brought to completion. . . . Charles XIV., in his native country, had seen to what an intamy the abuse of liberal forms of government could lead, and he was sternly resolved to antagonize any movement which aimed to introduce more democratic principles in the handling of state affairs and in the remodelling of the system of representation. . . . The severity with which the press was censured and its members punished created a bitterness against the king personally, which ceased only during the last few years of his reign. . . . At the Riksdags of 1827 and 1828 the government was severely taken to task on account of the sale of ships to the Spanish insurgents in South America. The sales were partly annulled and the Swedish government experienced a considerable financial loss. . . . [Russia was] anxious to obtain a slice of the Norwegian Finnmark, with excellent ice-free harbors at the bay of Varanger. In the ultimate settlement . . . in 1829, a great territory was ceded [to Russia] but not any of the important harbors. In 1840 the opposition had waxed strong enough to effect one of its most desired reforms, the constitutional reconstruction of the cabinet. This body was made to consist of ten members, of whom seven were to be the heads of the various state departments. . . . The greatest of contemplated reforms was a new system of representation, but the opposition was not able to carry it through. . . . [A plan for a new diet] with the idea of one chamber, instead of two, was repeatedly discussed at the Riksdag of 1840, but not adopted. This remarkable Riksdag, which lasted seventeen months, did considerable for the improvement of education and was ultimately dismissed by Charles XIV., in a speech of a conciliatory spirit, which went far toward restoring the old popularity of the king. Charles XIV. died March 8, 1844, at the age of eighty-one."—V. Nilsson, *Sweden (World's Best Histories Series, pp. 374-379)*.

ALSO IN: D. P. Barton, *Bernadotte*.—Idem, *Bernadotte and Napoleon*.

1827-1898.—Explorations of Spitsbergen. See SPITSBERGEN: 1827-1898.

1831-1861.—Founding of mortgage associations. See RURAL CREDIT: Sweden.

1844-1858.—Accession of Oscar I.—Proposed reorganization of Riksdag.—Concessions to Norway.—"Oscar I. was forty-five years of age at the death of his father [in 1844]. . . . Few kings have ascended a throne under such enthusiasm and joyful aspirations on the part of the people as at the Riksdag which met in 1844, and the king gave his sanction to them all. It was decided that the Riksdag should meet every third instead of every fifth year, the liberty of the press was augmented, and to women were given equal rights in the stipulations of inheritance and marriage. Oscar I. took great pains to have the industries freed from the restraint under which they had been suffering during the reign of his predecessor. . . . [In the meantime] a powerful conservative party at the Riksdag was organized, with Hartmansdorff as the leader among the nobles and Archbishop Wingard among the clergy. . . . The proposition for a reorganization of the Riksdag, made in 1840, was not

accepted, but a committee was appointed in 1848 to make a new proposition, which failed to please either government or Riksdag. The king then had a new proposition prepared, based upon general elections. The liberals did not think the royal proposition democratic enough and offered one of their own. Both of these were defeated at the Riksdag of 1850, thanks to the opposition of nobility and clergy. A third one was made by Hartmansdorff, but also failed to please, not being conservative enough for the nobles. . . . King Oscar had, from the commencement of his reign, tried to meet all demands for reform made by his Norwegian subjects. The king himself took the initiative steps to give Norway a national flag of its own, the two countries up to the reign of Oscar having had one common flag. He also . . . gave permission to place the name of Norway before that of Sweden in the Norwegian royal title. For these reasons public opinion in Sweden expected Norwegian concessions in regard to the Act of Union, which seemed in need of revision. A committee of men from both countries was appointed to make the revision, but the Norwegian members opposed all measures involving any change. . . . In 1854 the Norwegian Storting decided to abolish the office of a governor-general. King Oscar refused to sanction this law, but allowed the office to remain vacant during the rest of his reign. . . . [King Oscar's] health was injured through illness, in 1857, and he . . . died July 8, 1859."—V. Nilsson, *Sweden (World's Best Histories Series, pp. 382-384, 386, 388)*.

1847-1871.—**Passage of poor laws.**—Community poor relief. See CHARITIES: Sweden: 1800-1914.

1852.—**Signs treaty with powers admitting Denmark's claim to Schleswig.** See DENMARK: 1848-1862.

1859-1872.—**Accession of Charles XV.**—Numerous reforms.—**New parliamentary representation.**—**Growing power of the peasant.**—"Charles XV., the eldest son of Oscar I., succeeded his father [1859], having for two years presided over the government during King Oscar's last illness. . . . He understood better than any king since Charles XI. how to put himself in cordial relation with the masses of the people. . . . The cabinet which surrounded Charles XV. was one of the strongest bodies of its kind that ever controlled the government of Sweden. During his regency, Crown Prince Charles appointed Baron Louis de Geer minister of justice and Ludvig Manderström minister of foreign affairs. These men continued their duties during the reign of Charles XV., while Gripenstedt, as minister of finance, followed up his beneficent activity for the emancipation and development of the national industries. The historian, Frederic Ferdinand Carlson . . . occupied, during the greater part of the reign of Charles XV., the position of minister of ecclesiastics (church and education), in which capacity he did great work for the improvement of educational affairs. . . . New criminal and maritime codes were made at the Riksdag of 1862, and sanctioned by the government. Through the new regulations passed in the same year the foundations for increased municipal home rule were laid. . . . Laws were made which gave the towns the right to elect members to local assemblies (*stadsfullmäktige*), with authority to act in behalf of their communities. Similar institutions (*kommunalstämmer*) were arranged for the country communities. *Landsting* were instituted in every governmental district. . . . The conditions for suffrage and elective franchise in municipal affairs

were based on personal income. The old class distinctions were thus disregarded. . . . The church got a representation of its own in the clerical assembly (*kyrkomåtet*), which meets every fifth year and consists of equal numbers of ministers and laymen. . . . The royal proposition for a new parliamentary representation, placed before the Estates in 1862, was built upon the municipal suffrage and the Landstings or district assemblies, the latter being authorized to elect the members of the senate, or First Chamber. [See also SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Sweden: 1866-1921.] . . . The nobility had lost its old importance. It was no longer advisable for the clergy to take a leading part in political affairs. A new industrial class of wealth and prominence had formed and demanded a representation in the burgher class. . . . The burghers and peasants at the Riksdag of 1860 petitioned the government to present a royal proposition for the reorganization of the Diet. . . . [On Dec. 4, 1865 the royal] proposition was voted on by the burghers and peasants . . . [and] accepted by a vote of 361 yeas against 294 nays. . . . The four Estates adjourned June 22, 1866, forever, and the law of the new system of parliamentary representation was sanctioned the same date. . . . The first Riksdag of the new parliamentary system met January 19, 1867. . . . The power of the peasants made itself felt at once. There was formed a strong and influential party, the *landtmanna*, or countrymen's party, consisting of small landowners. The peasants constituted the majority, but the party also counted many titled and untitled country gentlemen in interests united with them. . . . The opposition consisted of 'the Intelligence or intellectual party, which, without a solid constitution or a fixed policy, has in vain fought the spreading influence and power of the Landtmanna party. . . . After a trip abroad for his health, King Charles XV. died at Malmö, September 18, 1872."—V. Nilsson, *Sweden (World's Best Histories Series, pp. 391-393, 395-399, 407, 411)*.

1872-1892.—**Accession of Oscar II.**—**Remission of taxes.**—**Reorganization of the army.**—**New Protectionist party.**—"Oscar II. ascended the throne [Sept. 18, 1872] at a moment when universal peace was restored after the great conflict between France and Germany, and when an age of commercial prosperity for Sweden seemed to have begun. . . . King Oscar with his crowns had received as an inheritance two important problems to be solved—the reorganization of the Swedish army and the settlement of the difficulties in the relations between the two states of the Union [since 1815 Norway had endeavoured to obtain political equality with Sweden]. . . . The reorganization of the Swedish army was not effected until after twenty years of parliamentary struggle. . . . In 1885 the government and Riksdag agreed on a remission of thirty per cent of the military taxes of landowners in exchange for new regulations for the militia compulsory service. In 1887 the Riksdag sanctioned the total abolition of the 'indelta,' or cantoned troops, as far as the navy was concerned, which was the first step toward the reorganization of the navy, and the same year the militia law [universal conscription] of 1885 went into effect. The old Landtmanna, or agrarian party, in 1888 gave place to a new protectionist party. A contested election of twenty-two members from Stockholm gave a sudden majority to the protectionists, O. R. Themptander, the able minister of state, resigning. . . . The Riksdag of 1888 passed a grain tariff, which went into effect

February 14th of the same year enforcing several other points of a protective tariff system. . . . [In 1892] the land-tax was abolished and a new army bill passed. . . . King Oscar, at his succession to the throne, gave evidence of his desire to meet the reasonable demands of his Norwegian subjects."—V. Nilsson, *Sweden (World's Best Histories Series, pp. 414-419)*.—See also NORWAY: 1814-1899.

1878-1879.—Expeditions to Arctic regions. See ARCTIC EXPLORATION: Chronological summary: 1878-1879.

1884.—Establishment of postal savings banks. See POSTAL SAVINGS BANKS: 1884.

1887-1912.—Conciliation and arbitration boards established.—Protection of Workers' and Children's Employment Acts.—Housing problem.—"As early as 1887 a proposition was brought before the Riksdag . . . for setting up under legal sanction an organization regarding arbitration in labour conflicts. . . . [In 1899] the Government appointed a Royal Commission to carry out the inquiry, and their findings . . . were ready by the year 1901. . . . On the 31st of December, 1906, the Intervention in Labour Conflicts Act was promulgated and Instructions for Conciliators were issued. . . . The chief laws providing for the protection of workers . . . were the Act of 1900 relating to the Employment of Women and Children in certain Trades, and the Protection of Workers Act of 1889. . . . The Riksdag resolved in 1903 to demand the Amendment of the Protection of Workers and the Children's Employment Acts, and other statutes connected with them. . . . [The Protection of Workers Committee, appointed in 1905] brought forward at the end of 1909 its Report, containing proposals for laws relating to the protection of workers, domestic industries, communal inspectors, and the organization of official administration. . . . The main proposal of the Committee was made the basis of a Government Bill on the subject in the Riksdag in 1912. The Riksdag having passed the Bill with certain modifications in detail, it was issued as the *Protection of Workers Act* of the 29th June, 1912. [See also SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: Sweden: 1884-1910.] . . . On the part of the State, the housing problem has been made the object of various sweeping measures. Thus, in 1907 the *Town Planning Act* authorized the urban communities to regulate and supervise building matters. . . . Further, the *Renting Act* of 1907 has clearly defined the legal rights of tenants as against the landlords, and considerably extended the rights of the former. . . . In 1912 there was appointed a *Dwellings Committee* in order to investigate the housing problem. . . . State measures more directly bearing on the housing problem are those for promoting the 'egna hem' ('own home') movement. . . . The erection of dwellings on the basis of *self-aid* occurs largely in Sweden."—J. Guinchard, ed., *Sweden (Historical and Statistical Handbook, pt. 1, pp. 654, 707-708, 673-674, 677)*.

1894-1899.—Legislative membership increased.—First socialist deputy elected.—"In 1894 the number of the members of the Upper Chamber was increased to 150, and that of the Lower Chamber to 250; and the further extension of the somewhat exclusive electorate was also considered, although neither the government nor the Rigsdag was prepared to adopt universal suffrage. . . . Something like a sensation was caused by the election to the Rigsdag of the first socialist deputy, Branting, in 1896; and general indignation was caused in January, 1899, when it became known that the king

and the prime minister Boström had favourably received the bearers of a monster Radical petition, with 363,638 signatures, in favour of the introduction of universal suffrage."—R. N. Bain, *Scandinavia (Cambridge Historical Series, pp. 435, 443)*.

1899.—Represented at First Hague Conference. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1899: Conference; Constitution.

20th century.—Educational system.—Teachers' training requirements. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education; Sweden.

1900-1919.—Coöperation movement.—Rapid growth. See COÖPERATION: Sweden.

1901.—Unveiling of monument to John Ericsson.—Nobel prizes.—First awards.—A monument to the memory of John Ericsson, the Swedish-American inventor, was unveiled at Stockholm with impressive ceremonies on September 14, 1901, that being the date of the reception of his remains at Stockholm eleven years before. The first award of the munificent prizes for beneficial services to mankind, instituted by the will of Alfred Bernard Nobel, the eminent Swedish engineer and inventor, was made on December 10, 1901. See NOBEL PRIZES.

1901-1909.—Antarctic explorations. See ANT-ARCTIC EXPLORATION: 1901-1909.

1902.—Represented at sugar bounty conference. See SUGAR BOUNTY CONFERENCE.

1905.—Seccession of Norway from the union of crowns.—King's practical deposition.—Karlstad Treaty.—"In February 1905 Norway broke off the last negotiations about a separate consular service, and its new Ministry deliberately prepared the disruption of the Union. The offer of the Swedish Crown Prince, April, 1905, acting as Regent during his father's illness, was rejected. The Storting resolved to establish a separate consular service, and when King Oscar refused to sanction this his Norwegian ministers resigned. Oscar II refused to accept their resignations, being 'unable at the moment to form a Ministry' as all parties in Norway stood behind this demand. All the ministers stuck to their resignations, and at a special meeting of the Storting on June 7, 1905, it was unanimously declared that 'as King Oscar II has announced that he is unable to form a Government, he has thereby ceased to reign.' In this strange way the Union of ninety-one years was dissolved. . . . The Swedish Parliament, in an extraordinary session, laid down certain conditions to be fulfilled by Norway before it would recognize the dissolution. This resulted in a conference at Karlstad, in Sweden, in which four members of each Government took part. . . . After several hitches the conference reached an agreement on September 23rd. . . . Disagreements arising out of the Karlstad Treaty were to be submitted to The Hague Arbitration Court. The treaty was agreed to by the Swedish Parliament and approved by Oscar II on October 26, 1905."—J. Stefansson, *Denmark and Sweden with Iceland and Finland, pp. 349-350*.—See also NORWAY: 1902-1905.

ALSO IN: J. Guinchard, ed., *Sweden (Historical and Statistical Handbook, pt. 1, p. 103)*.—N. Eden, *Sweden for peace*.—K. Nordlund, *Swedish-Norwegian union crisis*.

1905-1911.—First liberal ministry.—Franchise reform.—Accession of Gustavus V.—Growth of Swedish party.—"The first Liberal government of modern Swedish history was formed by Hr. Karl Staaff in 1905. This was short-lived and was succeeded by a new Conservative era, which lasted

until 1911, when Hr. Staaff came into power again."—*Neutrality of Sweden (Edinburgh Review, Apr., 1915)*.—During the Staaff ministry, the "Franchise Bill was thrown out, and the Conservative Ministry of Lindman laid proposals for proportional representation in the election for both Chambers before Parliament. The Bill was passed by the Second Chamber on condition that the municipal franchise was reformed so that a democratic element entered the communal councils which elect the First Chamber, the members of which were to be paid and elected on a lower census. [See also SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Sweden: 1866-1921.] The franchise reform was finally passed in 1909. . . . On the death of Oscar II in 1907 he was succeeded by Gustavus V."—J. Stefansson, *Denmark and Sweden with Iceland and Finland*, p. 347.—"The Swedish Party has now been in existence for 25 years. Founded in 1880, with a membership of 3,000, it advanced slowly during the first few years, and reached its maximum in 1907. As the party is based on the trade-unions, the crisis commencing in that year, and the consequences of the general strike of 1900, reduced its membership along with that of the unions. . . . It is to be noted that the suffrage was greatly extended in 1911, and the total number of members of Parliament increased from 165 to 230."—W. E. Walling *et al.*, *Socialism of today*, pp. 145-146.

1907.—Represented at Second Hague Conference. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1907.

1908.—Treaty with Denmark, England, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, for maintenance of the status quo of the North sea. See NORTH SEA: 1908.

1908-1916.—Desire to prevent Russia's control of Aland islands. See ALAND ISLANDS: 12th century to World War.

1909.—Arbitration of frontier dispute with Norway. See NORWAY: 1909 (October).

1910-1911.—Establishment of state power stations.—State railways.—On April 6, 1910, the government introduced a measure for the establishment of a state power-station at the Porjus falls, Lapland. On March 17, 1911, a bill was passed for the construction of a large hydro-electric power-station at Alfkärlby; and on May 23, 1911, another bill was passed for the construction of a state railway from Veiljarvi in Lapland to Karnugi on the Swedish-Finnish frontier and from Karnugi to Matareni.

1910-1919.—Statistics of trade unions. See LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1910-1919.

1911.—New commercial treaty with Germany.—A new commercial treaty between Germany and Sweden was passed May 13, 1911, by both Chambers of the Riksdag. "Sweden succeeded in safeguarding the advantages gained in the year 1906. . . . [and] granted to Germany a reduction on a great many goods, especially leather goods and textiles, and undertook not to impose any export duty on iron ore. As Sweden retained her single tariff system, the reduced duties immediately passed into the new tariff, which came into force on Dec. 1, 1911. The treaty is to be in force, unless terminated by one of the parties, until the year 1921; it may, however, be terminated any time after the year 1917 after one year's notice."—J. Guinchart, ed., *Sweden (Historical and Statistical Handbook, pt. 2, p. 536)*.

1912-1913.—Coöperative organizations.—Arbitration treaty with the United States.—"A fair idea of the extent to which Coöperative Societies are disseminated in Sweden can be obtained from

statistics compiled in 1912. According to these data, there were registered from 1897 to 1911 no less than 5,896 societies for economic purposes, out of which, however, 551 were eventually dissolved. Out of this total 3,800 are stated to fall under the head of workmen's cooperative societies,—1,585 being building societies, and 1,187 cooperative stores, while the remaining 2,096 societies were classed as agricultural cooperative societies."—J. Guinchart, ed., *Sweden (Historical and Statistical Handbook, pt. 1, p. 605)*.—See also COÖPERATION: Sweden.—In 1913, Sweden renewed its arbitration treaty with the United States. This treaty was negotiated in 1908, and provided for an appeal to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, in case of differences of a legal nature between the contracting parties.

1912.—Sickness insurance. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: Sweden: 1912-1919.

1912-1915.—Increase of the Socialist vote.—Proposed abolition of the monarchy.—Elections of 1915.—"The increase of the Socialist vote and of Socialist members elected has been a steady one. . . . In 1912 the Socialist leader, Lindhagen, introduced a bill in Parliament to abolish the monarchy. Another leader, Branting, opposed the introduction of the motion. . . . After a short debate the measure was lost by a vote of 118 to 12. There were at this time 65 Socialist members of Parliament. . . . The elections of September, 1914, showed a most remarkable increase of Socialist votes over those cast in the spring. The victory of the Socialists in the September elections made them the largest party in Sweden, giving them over one-third of the members of the Parliament, and brought up the question of a possible coalition Ministry, to consist of Socialists and Liberals, to go into effect at the end of the war. . . . In the elections of 1915, 'the number of members of the Socialist Party of Sweden increased from 75,444 to 84,410.'"—W. E. Walling *et al.*, ed., *Socialism of to-day*, pp. 146, 151, 153.

1914.—In Scandinavian League with Denmark and Norway. See SCANDINAVIAN LEAGUE.

1914.—Legislation for protection of children. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1914.

1914-1917.—Defense program.—Constitutional crisis.—Neutrality.—Activism.—Meeting of the three kings.—Reception of President Wilson's ideas.—Fall of conservative government.—Because of World War conditions, the Riksdag, in September, 1914, agreed upon a thorough defense program. In accordance with it the period of service both in the army and navy was lengthened. (See also WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1914.) The question of defense brought about a constitutional crisis. As the status quo of Sweden was guaranteed by the Baltic Convention of 1908, the Liberal government, headed by Karl Albert Staaff, opposed the defense plans of its conservative predecessors. With the growing tension in the European situation, the popular demand for the increase of armaments became urgent. A procession of 30,000 peasants marched to the Royal Palace in Stockholm to demand a decision. Gustavus V in a speech acceded to their demands. The Staaff Cabinet, not having been consulted, resigned. A non-party Ministry with Conservative leanings took its place with the solution of the defence question as its sole programme."—J. Stefansson, *Denmark and Sweden with Iceland and Finland*, p. 351.—Harmarskjöld, the new premier, had as his foreign minister, Knut Wallenberg, to whom was due the main direction of Swedish foreign politics after the war broke out.

At the elections held subsequently the Liberal party lost many seats, chiefly to the Conservatives. The new ministry remained in power, supported not only by the Conservatives but by many Liberals. A sidelight upon the condition that obtained in Sweden at the outbreak of the World War follows: "Apart from the actual belligerents, there was no country of Europe which was more . . . startled by the outbreak of war than Sweden. [See also WORLD WAR: 1014: XII. Neutral nations.] In its determination to maintain a position severely aloof, the government of which Mr. Hammarskjöld is the head was faced by . . . difficulties which required patience and tact to overcome. . . . There existed a clique, almost a party, in Stockholm, whose sympathies were so strongly with Germany at the very outset as to create an element of anxiety for the Swedish Government. . . . In their policy of neutrality, the Swedish Ministers were supported by their natural opponents, the Liberals and the Social-Democrats. Working-class sentiment, from the first, has been steadily adverse to any participation in the fighting. But there is a military element in the country which, although not numerically strong, is able to make itself . . . heard. . . . Swedish officers had long been flattered and cajoled in Prussian military circles, and the society in which they shone at home was openly pro-German."—*Neutrality of Sweden* (Edinburgh Review, Apr., 1915).—An exposition of activism vs. neutrality follows: "In Swedish opinion about the war there are many shades, ranging from extreme Activism to a sympathy with the Entente group so pronounced that it also constitutes a counter-Activism. . . . As Activism is primarily a protest, in the Central Powers' favour, against the Neutralist policy favoured by the Swedish Government and nation, it is necessary to make clear what Swedish Neutralism is. . . . The Neutrality proclamation . . . meant that Sweden would not take sides, that she would prevent her citizens violating Neutrality's laws, and that she would resist by force the violation of her territory, showing no favour to either belligerent group. There was no agitation for Neutrality, none being needed. When Activism raised its head, proclaiming that Sweden, independently of any specific cause given by the Entente, should join Germany and Austria, a Neutralist, or Pacifist, agitation began. The Activists are not a political party. They are a group formed *ad hoc* from all parties. But the Right partisans, among whom German sympathies are most pronounced, predominate; and the Pacifist counter-agitation is largely Liberal and Socialist. Sometimes Swedish newspapers speak of 'Right' and 'Left' as practically meaning 'Activist' and 'Neutralist,' but this is not correct. . . . The Activist, and generally the Germanophile, Press declared that the Neutrality agitation was lowering Sweden's dignity, encouraging England to think that Sweden would tolerate any treatment meted out to her, and therefore injuring Sweden's interests in the negotiations. It is necessary, said the Germanophiles, to make clear that Neutrality does not mean absolute Neutrality or even Neutrality which would be abandoned only in case of a violation of Swedish territory. The controversy evoked an official definition of Neutrality. . . . M. Hammarskjöld warned the country against the dangers of both the War agitation and of the Peace agitation. To this statement no party could object. . . . The immediate cause of the Neutralist agitation was the appearance of a hook which stirred minds and caused a polemic without parallel in the history of modern political literature. This is the book, *Sweden's*

*Foreign Policy in the Light of the World-War. Sweden's Foreign Policy* has been called 'The Bible of Activism.' . . . The War-Book owes its fame to the ability with which it is written; to half-veiled anonymity (it is the work of a group of politicians, professors, and soldiers . . . ; and to the circumstance that it is not a party book, but is the work of men from all parties, including prominent Socialists. The War-Book proclaims that the present moment is critical and decisive for Sweden's future, and sharply condemns the Government for not seeing that fact, and acting thereon. An appeal is made to patriotism. 'The one thing necessary is not that we should live, but that Sweden should live. For the future security of Swedish culture and free life we bear the responsibility; and if necessary, it is our duty, as we did in the past, to seal that with our blood.' The World-War is a Culture-War; Sweden is tied up with Germany; and in helping Germany, Sweden is helping her own civilization. Sweden must join Germany. The grounds given mainly concern the old suspicion of Russia, and the old sympathy with Finland; but the War-Book adroitly appeals to such Swedes as dread a German victory more than they dread a Russian. . . . The War-Book led to the series of demonstrations against Activism which evoked M. Hammarskjöld's definition of Neutrality. The book has since caused a crisis in the Social-Democratic Party. . . . 'The Bible of Activism' . . . was written before the Austro-German offensive in Russia gave new vigour and entirely new arguments to the agitators. . . . The Swedish attitude accords with Gustav Sundbårg's 'The Swede is much concerned with his dignity; interests take second place.' This does not explain Swedish Germanophilism. But, given Germanophilism, it explains Activism. Activism appeals to no material interest; it appeals to historic memories, present pride, fear for independence, and to the national Quixotism and love for the fantastic and remote. The causes of the Germanophilism which has developed into Activism are plain. A positive love of Germany plays no rôle worth mentioning. . . . Swedish Germanophilism is primarily dread and dislike of Russia. . . . The anti-English element in Swedish Germanophilism is new. Apart from historic memories, Sweden's anti-Russian feeling is due to two questions which in effect are, one, the alleged Russian plan of aggression against the Scandinavian Peninsula, and the question of Finland. Both these questions have been well ventilated in England."—R. C. Lond. *Swedish Activism: A letter from Stockholm* (Fortnightly Review, Nov., 1, 1915).—See also PAN-GERMANISM: Pan-German League, etc.—In the meanwhile, interests between Sweden, Denmark and Norway were emphasized and consolidated by the meeting of the three kings, accompanied by their foreign ministers, in Malmö December 18, 1914. At the opening of the Riksdag in 1915, the king impressed the fact that Sweden had hitherto been able to maintain the neutrality agreed upon at the beginning of the war; but the maintenance of this neutrality had demanded military measures which involved considerable sacrifices. It was, however, necessary that these sacrifices should be cheerfully borne, for Sweden must continue to maintain her military forces intact even at the cost of serious economic suffering. In his opening address of the Riksdag, on January 17, 1916, he declared that the belligerents have neglected in an ever-increasing degree the written international laws designed for the protection of neutrals and for limiting the violence of war, and that Sweden had as-

sisted in drawing up the laws, and had taken measures for the observance of the duty of neutrals, largely in cooperation with the other two Scandinavian nations. In December, 1916, Sweden sent notes to the belligerent powers seconding President Wilson's peace move as set forth in his speech of December 20. Later the Scandinavian governments refused to follow President Wilson's suggestion relative to a severance of diplomatic relations with Germany when that country announced its policy of ruthless submarine warfare. In September, 1917, Sweden's neutrality was compromised by the revelations made by the United States government to the effect that the Swedish foreign office was permitting German official messages from foreign countries to be sent as its own messages. These, including messages from Count Luxburg, German chargé d'affaires at Buenos Aires in reference to the sinking of ships of the Argentine republic by submarines, raised a storm of protest, and breach of diplomatic relations between Germany and Argentina was narrowly averted.

1914-1918.—*Hammar skjöld-Wallenberg ministry.*—*Malmö meeting.*—*Neutrality proclamation.*—*Economic advantages.*—"When the Riksdag of 'national defence' had served its term [1914] it was dissolved, and another Riksdag resulted from the elections, which in the Upper Chamber gave the majority to the Conservatives, and in the Second Chamber to the Liberals and Socialists. This Riksdag begged the Hammar skjöld-Wallenberg Ministry—due to resign—to remain at the head of the affairs till the end of the war. . . . One of M. Wallenberg's first acts, when the Cabinet had agreed to the extension of his term of office, was to propose to the King that there should be a meeting of the three Scandinavian Sovereigns. . . . King Gustaf willingly . . . buried his personal susceptibilities. . . . The meeting took place at Malmö. . . . A programme for the conduct of the three countries with regard to the formidable events which had divided almost the whole of Europe into two hostile camps was drawn up. The three Scandinavian countries affirmed their solidarity and their excellent mutual relations."—A. Nekludoff, *Diplomatic reminiscences* (tr. by A. Paget), pp. 330-331.—The neutrality proclamation issued by the Swedish and Norwegian governments read as follows: "War having broken out among several foreign powers, the Norwegian and Swedish Governments have mutually declared their firm intention to maintain, during the state of war thus occurring, each for itself and to the final extremity, their neutrality in reference to all the belligerent powers. The two Governments have besides exchanged formal assurances with a view to rendering it impossible that the state of war existing in Europe should result in one of the kingdoms taking hostile measures in reference to the other."—United States State Department, *Neutrality proclamations, 1914-1918*, p. 47.—"The intrigues of the Swedish Activists in favour of an alliance with Germany and against the Hammar skjöld-Wallenberg Cabinet were frustrated. It was a master-stroke of the Swedish Foreign Secretary, who thus acquired a new and solid basis for his policy of open neutrality and of opposition to all sorts of adventures. . . . The world war, of which the economic consequences in the long run were disastrous for the whole of Europe, began with a sudden increase of prosperity for certain neutral countries. . . . Sweden suddenly saw the prices of her exports rising in a dazzling way. Never had the splendid Swedish iron ore been in such enormous demand; never had pit-props attained such

formidable prices. . . . Her steel and iron goods, her agricultural machines, her turbines, her pit-props, her lathes were more and more in demand abroad as the workshops of the belligerent countries specialized in the making of big guns, shells, rifles, submarines, aeroplane engines. . . . But Swedish exportation was not confined to metal, wood, and the products of her foundries and workshops. Seduced by the enormous prices that all agricultural produce had been fetching in Germany from the outbreak of the war, the southern provinces of Sweden, which up till then had supplied the country almost exclusively, began to send to the other side of the Baltic wheat, flour, butter, cattle, pigs, poultry. At first the profits were fabulous; later on the belligerents, enemies of Germany, and the Swedish Government itself put a stop to this traffic: Sweden was in danger of starving if her agricultural provinces, situated at the southern end of the kingdom, continued to send off to Germany all the product that she had hitherto sent up north. . . . Sweden, in consequence of her geographical position, was in a very peculiar situation. As the Baltic was commanding by the German Fleet, the Swedes virtually possessed free traffic with Germany. Consequently German influence weighed in a natural manner—and irrespective of all political sympathy—on the commercial direction of Sweden. And this caused the Entente countries more particularly to restrict the importation into Sweden of all produce and all commodities which might somehow or other take the road to Germany. Very soon certain commodities of neutral origin, such as American wheat, rubber, tanning materials and nitrates from Chile, were not allowed to be imported into Sweden. . . . Wallenberg's master-stroke in arranging the first meeting between the three Scandinavian sovereigns at Malmö . . . [resulted later in] conferences between Swedish, Norwegian and Danish statesmen . . . whenever circumstances or special questions demanded them. A new solidarity was becoming established—a solidarity which was apparent above all in economic and commercial spheres. The three Scandinavian countries strove to supplement mutually their resources and their needs. They made reciprocal concessions, and with regard to the blockade, the interests of the three countries collectively replaced their individual interests."—A. Nekludoff, *Diplomatic reminiscences* (tr. from French by Alexandre Paget), pp. 331-334, 354.—See also NORWAY: 1914-1921.—In February, 1917, following a cabinet crisis Prime Minister Knut H. L. Hammar skjöld resigned and Carl Swartz, one of the Conservative leaders, was entrusted with the formation of a new ministry. The general elections, which were held in September, resulted in the defeat of the Conservative government, which, under Hammar skjöld, had been in power during the World War and till the end of the year. The Socialists cast the largest number of votes, and elected 98 deputies, including 12 radical Socialists, against 62 Liberals and 61 Conservatives. After the elections a coalition government of Liberals and Socialists was formed with Nils Eden, the Liberal leader, as prime minister.

1917.—*Desire to possess Aland Islands.* See ALAND ISLANDS: 1917-1919.

1918.—*Increase of public debt due to World War.*—*Effect upon shipping.* See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIV. Cost of war: b, 9, iii; COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1914-1921.

1919-1923.—*Government program.*—*Elections.*—*Marriage law.*—*Suffrage.*—*Industrial depression.*—"In Sweden the government program, as an-

nounced on October 27 [1919] included gradual reduction of armaments, industrial cooperation as opposed to socialization, government regulation of trusts, obligatory sickness insurance and relief of housing conditions. . . . The new eight-hour law, which became effective on January 1 [1920] resulted in widespread strikes; the workers demanded higher wages to compensate for shorter hours, while the employers insisted upon an increased output. Unable to agree upon the question of taxation, the coalition government, headed by Herr Eden, resigned on March 6. Five days later Hjalmar Branting, leader of the right wing of the socialist party, formed a new ministry. The Branting government [is] unique in being not only the first Socialist government in Sweden but the first to be formed in a constitutional monarchy. . . . The program of the new government includes socialization of industry of parliamentary means, expropriation of large properties for a fair compensation, democratization of courts, free legal defence, abolition of the death penalty, disestablishment of state church, and national disarmament with a view to having all necessary policing done by the League of Nations. One of the most important measures enacted under the Branting régime is a marriage law, which passed the Riksdag on April 17; by its provisions the husband is deprived of personal guardianship over the wife and of legal right to dispose of the wife's personal property. The wife may acquire property in her own right. If the husband owns the family home, he cannot sell it over the heads of his children without his wife's consent. If both parties to a marriage desire a divorce, no court action is required; the parties merely register before a judge, and the marriage is automatically dissolved."—*Scandinavian States (Political Science Quarterly, Supplement, 1920, pp. 139-140)*.—"As a result of elections held in Sweden in September [1921] for the Second Chamber of the Riksdag, the Social Democratic party, under the leadership of Hjalmar Branting, won an overwhelming victory, the political pendulum thus swinging sharply from the Right to the Left. The new laws enfranchising women [see SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: Sweden], removing the tax requirement for voters, and lowering the voting age to 23 years, greatly enlarged the electorate and gave it opportunity to express its political desires. The prospect of a Socialist régime had a depressing effect upon business. Following the election and resignation early in October of the Von Sydow cabinet, a new ministry was constituted. . . . [with Hjalmar Branting as] Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. . . . The Riksdag on May 31, by a vote of 105 to 94 in the Second Chamber and 81 to 47 in the First Chamber, refused to ratify a long-pending commercial treaty with Soviet Russia."—*Ibid.*, 1922, p. 110.—"The result of October [1922] elections to the Provincial Councils in Sweden indicated a sharp decline in the strength of the Liberal party; their seats decreased in number from 201 to 192; the Communists gained (21 to 31) as did also the Social Democrats (322 to 346). The Left Wing Socialists lost five (20 to 24), the Agrarians five (146 to 141), and the Conservatives twenty-four (348 to 324). . . . Industrial depression and labor difficulties gripped the country during the greater part of the year. A deadlock over wages resulted in a lockout in paper and pulp industries on January 29 affecting 30,000 workers. The trouble soon spread to the steel, lumber and shipping industries, and by March 1 [1923] approximately 70,000 were out of employment. Rejection by the Riksdag of the Govern-

ment's proposal to distribute doles among the unemployed led to resignation of the Branting ministry on April 6, (1923). Conservatives opposed the measure, alleging that its adoption would strengthen the prolonged strikes. On April 20 M. Trygger, leader of the Conservatives, formed a purely Conservative cabinet."—*Ibid.*, 1923, pp. 112-113.

1920.—Arbitration board created to prevent strikes. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: Sweden.

1920-1921.—Quarrel with Finland over Aland Islands.—Their award to Finland. See ALAND ISLANDS: 1920; 1921.

1921.—Care of cripples and indigent poor. See CHARITIES: Sweden: 1912-1921.

1922.—Temperance movement. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: Sweden.

1922.—Represented at Genoa conference. See GENOA CONFERENCE (1922).



HJALMAR BRANTING

See also CANALS: Principal European canals: Sweden; CHARITIES: Sweden; CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: Sweden; EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Sweden; EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Sweden; FLAGS: Sweden; MASONIC SOCIETIES: Sweden; MUSIC: Folk music and nationalism: Scandinavia; MYTHOLOGY: Scandinavian; PRISON REFORM: Sweden; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: Sweden; SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE; SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: Sweden; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1348-1922.

ALSO IN: R. N. Bain, *Scandinavia: Political history of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden*.—W. Barnes, *Things seen in Sweden*.—P. Drachmann and H. Westergaard, *Industrial development and commercial policy of the three Scandinavian countries*.—H. G. Leach, *Scandinavia of the Scandinavians*.—T. A. Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*.—*Treaty series, no. 16, 1910, Declarations between the United Kingdom, France and Sweden*.—S. Elkan, *An exile king, v. 2*.—W. F. Reddaway, *Scandinavian north (Cambridge modern history, v. 4)*.—*Idem, Scandinavian kingdoms (Cambridge modern history, v. 5)*.—R. N. Bain, *Charles XII (Cambridge modern history, v. 5)*.

SWEDEN, Constitution of.—“The Riksdag’s Resolution of 1809 inaugurated the Swedish polity that is still in force [1915]. . . . In accordance with the ancient practice that regulations were drawn up in three divisions—the three fundamental laws: the Constitution Act (*Regeringsformen*), of 6 June 1809, . . . the Organic Law for the Riksdag (*Riksdagsordningen*), 1810; and the Act of Settlement (*Successionsordningen*), 1809. . . . A fourth fundamental law was adopted in 1810: the Law on the Liberty of the Press (*Tryckfrihetsförordningen*). A new Act of Settlement had to be adopted on 26 September 1810; the Press Law was replaced by a new one on 16 July 1812; and the Organic Law for the Riksdag of 1810 was rendered null by the new one of 22 June 1866, which in 1909 underwent radical changes in the matter of franchise etc. . . . The Constitution was altered in certain details through the Union with Norway (1814-1905). . . . The King of Sweden, according to a theory that dates far back into the past, is the supreme judge; but his functions as such are conferred upon the High Court of Justice (*Högsta domstolen*). Since 1909, there has also been in existence another high court, the Supreme Administrative Court (*Regeringsrätten*), which settles appeals that may be pursued before the King in the State departments. Besides these, there has also been set up a Law Council (three members of the High Court and one of the Administrative Court) to report upon proposals for the initiation, repeal, amendment or explanation of laws and ordinances. The King-in-Cabinet exercises the right of pardon. . . . The King shares the legislative authority with the Riksdag. He possesses the right of absolute veto. The King has, moreover, one sphere of legislation of his own—that which is called Administrative and Economic Legislation—embracing not merely instructions or regulations for public offices and institutions but also ordinances referring, within certain limits defined by common practice, to the public economy and to industries. . . . In 1909 there was carried through a far-reaching alteration of the franchise for the Second (lower) Chamber in which all property qualifications were removed; and in connection with this change proportional representation was introduced. The conditions of membership of the First (upper) Chamber were also altered. The composition and methods of working of the Riksdag are described in the following section. According to the fundamental law of 1809, the Riksdag was to meet every fifth year; this regulation was altered by the Riksdag of 1844-45 to every third year; according to the new law, the Riksdag assembles every year.”—J. Guinchard, ed., *Sweden, historical and statistical handbook*, pt. 1, pp. 195-198.—“The regular session of the Riksdag (*lagtima riksdag*) begins every year on 15th January in Stockholm, and has a right to continue for four months, unless the Government dissolves one or both of the Chambers and orders new elections. . . . The Riksdag may be convened for an extraordinary (*urtima*) session by Government during the vacations; but in that case the Riksdag may only treat the subjects for which it was convened. . . . If the Chambers come to different decisions on any subject whose treatment falls to an Ordinary Committee, this body must, if possible, put forward proposals for a compromise. In order that a bill may be finally carried, it is necessary to have an identical decision from both Chambers. . . . *Financial questions* are regarded as exceptions to the rule that the consent of both Chambers is necessary; in case of disagreement between the Chambers, these

questions are decided by *united voting*, both Chambers simultaneously voting anew and the result being determined by the united number of votes. This arrangement, which has its root in older Swedish Constitution, has been of great practical importance, since it has checked the occurrence of constitutional struggles between the two Chambers.”—[J. P. Velander] T. Hedrén, *Composition and procedure of the Riksdag* (J. Guinchard, ed., *Sweden (Historical and Statistical Handbook*, pt. 1, *Land and people*, pp. 204-205).—“The First Chamber consists of 150 members, who are elected for a term of six years by the county councils (*Landsting*) of the several counties (*Län*), as well as by the town councils of the five towns of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö, Norrköping, and Gävle, which are not represented in the county councils. The members of the First Chamber are distributed among the different constituencies in proportion to their population, which distribution is regulated every tenth year. . . . In 1909, in connection with the introduction of proportional representation, the period of membership was altered to six years, and it was determined which county-councils and towns should, each of the six years, elect their share of the members of the chamber. When a seat falls vacant, there is summoned for the remaining part of the retiring member’s period of membership a substitute appointed by the same party (*viz.*, the person who received the next largest number of votes). The First Chamber is thus renewed only successively. . . . For *eligibility* to membership of the First Chamber, the candidate must be 35 years old, and must own and, for at least three years before the election, have owned real estate having a rateable value of at least 50,000 kronor, or must pay taxes and, for at least three years, have paid taxes on an annual income of at least 3,000 kronor. The members of the First Chamber also now enjoy a salary of 10 kronor a day or 1,200 kr. for an entire session. . . . The constitution of the Second Chamber was based in 1866 on a thorough-going distribution between *country and town*. The whole number of members was fixed in 1894 at 230, of whom 150 were assigned to the country and 80 to the towns. Through the rise of industrial communities in the country districts and through the enlargement of the constituencies in connection with the introduction of proportional representation this distinction has been substantially limited in its practical effects. . . . The present division . . . is laid down in the Election Law; but the number of members which each constituency has to elect in proportion to the population is settled for each three-year period by the Government. The Organic Law of 1866 underwent so many changes in consequence of the new regulations of 1909 that it may justly be regarded as repealed and replaced by a new fundamental law. . . . *The right to vote* for the Second Chamber is now possessed by every *male* Swede of good character, without respect to means, but not till after the year in which he reached the age of 24 and not if he is under guardianship, or is bankrupt, or is liable for rates or taxes which have fallen due during the last three calendar years, or is in receipt of public assistance, or has neglected his military service. For *eligibility* to the Second Chamber it is necessary that a man should be qualified for the parliamentary franchise and be *domiciled within the constituency*. This last requirement, which was introduced in 1866, is an expression of the Swedish people’s marked dislike of professional politicians. The ‘constituency,’ however, as has already been



indicated above, was enlarged in 1909 from the old limit of a judicial district, a town, or a collection of small towns, so as to embrace, as a rule, a whole county or county-council area including minor towns. The elections are for a term of three years: if the chamber be dissolved . . . the new elections hold good only for the remainder of the three-year term. *The mode of election to both Chambers is proportional.*—*Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.—The following is the text of the constitution as adopted in 1809, the subsequent modifications of which are indicated above:

Form of government adopted by the King and the Estates of the Swedish Realm, at Stockholm, on the 6th of June, 1809; together with the Alterations afterwards introduced.

We Charles, by the Grace of God, King of the Swedes, the Goths, and the Vandals, &c. &c. &c. Heir to Norway, Duke of Sleswick-Holstein, Stormarn, and Ditmarsen, Count of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, &c. &c. &c. make known, that having unlimited confidence in the estates of the realm, charged them with drawing up a new form of government, as the perpetual groundwork of the prosperity and independence of our common native land, We do hereby perform a dear and pleasing duty in promulgating the fundamental law (which has been) upon mature deliberation, framed and adopted by the estates of the realm, and presented unto Us this day, together with their free and unanimous offer of the Swedish crown. Having, with deep emotion and an affectionate interest in the prosperity of a nation which has afforded Us so striking a proof of confidence and attachment, complied with their request, We trust to our endeavors to promote its happiness, as the reciprocal rights and duties of the monarch and the subjects have been marked so distinctly, that, without encroachment on the sacred nature and power of majesty, the constitutional liberty of the people is protected. We do therefore hereby adopt, sanction, and ratify this form of government, such as it follows here:—

We the underwritten representatives of the Swedish realm, counts, barons, bishops, knights, nobles, clergymen, burghers, and peasants, assembled at a general Diet, in behalf of ourselves and our brethren at home, Do hereby make known, that, having by the late change of government, to which we, the deputies of the Swedish people, gave our unanimous assent, exercised our rights of drawing up a new and improved constitution, we have, in repealing those fundamental laws, which down to this day have been in force more or less; viz.,—The Form of Government of the 21st of August 1772, the Act of Union and Security, of the 21st of February and the 3d of April 1789, the Ordinance of Diet, of the 24th of January 1617, as well as all those laws, acts, statutes, and resolutions comprehended under the denomination of fundamental laws;—We have Resolved to adopt for the Kingdom of Sweden and its dependencies the following constitution, which from henceforth shall be the chief fundamental law of the realm, reserving to Ourselves, before the expiration of the present Diet, to consider the other fundamental laws, mentioned in the 85th article of this constitution.

Article 1. The kingdom of Sweden shall be governed by a king, who shall be hereditary in that order of succession which the estates will further hereafter determine.

Art. 2. The king shall profess the pure evangelical faith, such as is contained and declared in the

Augsburgian Confession, and explained in the Decree of the Diet of Upsala in the year 1593.

Art. 3. The majesty of the king shall be held sacred and inviolable; and his actions shall not be subject to any censure.

Art. 4. The king shall govern the realm alone, in the manner determined by this constitution. In certain cases, however, (to be specified) he shall take the opinion of a council of state, which shall be constituted of well-informed, experienced, honest, and generally-esteemed native Swedes, noblemen and commoners, who profess the pure evangelical faith.

Art. 5. The council of state shall consist of nine members, viz., the minister of state and justice, who shall always be a member of the king's supreme court of judicature, the minister of state for foreign affairs, six counsellors of state, three of whom at least must have held civil offices, and the chancellor of the court, or aulic chancellor. The secretaries of state shall have a seat and vote in the council, when they have to report matters there, and in cases that belong to their respective departments. Father and son, or two brothers, shall not be permitted to be constant members of the council of state.

Art. 6. The secretaries of state shall be four, viz. —One for military affairs; a second for public economy, mining, and all other affairs connected with the civil and interior administration; a third for the finances of the realm, inland and foreign commerce, manufactures, &c.; and the fourth, the affairs relating to religion, public education, and charities.

Art. 7. All affairs of government shall be laid before the king, and decided in a council of state: those of a ministerial nature, however, excepted, concerning the relations of the realm with foreign powers, and matters of military command, which the king decides in his capacity of commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces.

Art. 8. The king can make no decision in matters in which the council of state are to be heard, unless at least three counsellors of state, and the secretary of state whom it concerns, or his deputy-secretary, are present.—All the members of the council shall, upon due notice, attend all deliberations deemed of importance, and which concern the general administration of the affairs of the kingdom; such as questions for adopting new statutes, repealing or altering those in existence, introducing new institutions in the different branches of the administration, &c.

Art. 9. Minutes shall be kept of all matters which shall come before the king in his council of state. The ministers of state, the counsellors of state, the aulic chancellor, and the secretaries of state or deputy-secretaries, shall be peremptorily bound to deliver their opinions; it is, however, the prerogative of the king to decide. Should it, however, unexpectedly occur, that the decisions of the king are evidently contrary to the constitution and the common law of the realm, it shall in that case be the duty of the members of the council of state to make spirited remonstrances against such decision or resolution. Unless a different opinion has been recorded in the minutes (for then the counsellors present shall be considered as having advised the king to the adopted measure), the members of the council shall be responsible for their advices, as enacted in the 10th article.

Art. 10. Necessary informations having been demanded and obtained from the proper boards, authorities, and functionaries, the affairs for deliberation shall be prepared by the secretary of

state and eight skilful and impartial men, consisting of four nobles and four commoners, in order to their being laid before the king in the council of state.—The secretary, as well as all the other members of this committee (which are nominated by the king) for preparing the general affairs of the kingdom, shall upon all occasions, when so met, deliver their opinions to the minutes, which shall afterwards be reported to the king and the council of state.

Art. 11. As to the management of the ministerial affairs, they may be prepared and conducted in the manner which appears most suitable to the king. It appertains to the minister for foreign affairs to lay such matters before him in the presence of the aulic chancellor, or some other member of the council, if the chancellor cannot attend. In the absence of the minister of state this duty devolves upon the aulic chancellor, or any other member of the council of state, whom his majesty may appoint. After having ascertained the opinions of these official persons entered in the minutes, and for which they shall be responsible, the king shall pronounce his decision in their presence. It shall be the duty of the aulic chancellor to keep the minutes on these occasions. The king shall communicate to the council of state the information on these topics as may be necessary, in order that they may have a general knowledge even of this branch of the administration.

Art. 12. The king can enter into treaties and alliances with foreign powers, after having ascertained, as enacted in the preceding article, the opinion of the minister of state for foreign affairs, and of the aulic chancellor.

Art. 13. When the king is at liberty to commence war, or conclude peace, he shall convoke an extraordinary council of state: the ministers of state, the counsellors of state, the aulic chancellor, and the secretaries of state; and, after having explained to them the circumstances which require their consideration, he shall desire their opinions thereon, which each of them shall individually deliver, on the responsibility defined in the 107th article. The king shall thereafter have a right to adopt the resolutions, or make such decision as may appear to him most beneficial for the kingdom.

Art. 14. The king shall have the supreme command of the military forces by sea and land.

Art. 15. The king shall decide in all matters of military command, in the presence of that minister or officer to whom he has entrusted the general management thereof. It shall be the duty of this person to give his opinion, under responsibility, upon the resolutions taken by the king, and in case of these being contrary to his advice, he shall be bound to enter his objections and counsel in the minutes, which the king must confirm by his own signature. Should this minister or official person find the resolutions of the king to be a dangerous tendency, or founded on mistaken or erroneous principles, he shall advise his majesty to convoke two or more military officers of a superior rank into a council of war. The king shall, however, be at liberty to comply with or to reject this proposition for a council of war; and if approved of, he may take what notice he pleases of the opinions of such council, which shall, however, be entered in the minutes.

Art. 16. The king shall promote the exercise of justice and right, and prevent partiality and injustice. He shall not deprive any subject of life, honour, liberty, and property, without previous

trial and sentence, and in that order which the laws of the country prescribe. He shall not disturb or cause to be disturbed, the peace of any individual in his house. He shall not banish any from one place to another, nor constrain, or cause to be constrained, the conscience of any; but shall protect every one in the free exercise of his religion, provided he does not thereby disturb the tranquillity of society, or occasion public offence. The king shall cause every one to be tried in that court to which he properly belongs.

Art. 17. The king's prerogative of justice shall be invested in twelve men, learned in the law, six nobles, and six commoners, who have shown knowledge, experience, and integrity in judicial matters. They shall be styled counsellors of justice, and constitute the king's supreme court of justice.

Art. 18. The supreme court of justice shall take cognizance of petitions to the king for cancelling sentences which have obtained legal force, and granting extension of time in lawsuits, when it has been, through some circumstances, forfeited.

Art. 19. If information be sought by judges or courts of justice concerning the proper interpretation of the law, the explanation thus required shall be given by the said supreme court.

Art. 20. In time of peace, all cases referred from the courts martial shall be decided in the supreme court of justice. Two military officers of a superior degree, to be nominated by the king, shall, with the responsibility of judges, attend and have a vote in such cases in the supreme court. The number of judges may not, however, exceed eight. In time of war, all such cases shall be tried as enacted by the articles of war.

Art. 21. The king, should he think fit to attend, shall have right to two votes in causes decided by the supreme court. All questions concerning explanations of the law shall be reported to him, and his suffrages counted, even though he should not have attended the deliberations of the court.

Art. 22. Causes of minor importance may be decided in the supreme court by five members, or even four, if they are all of one opinion; but in causes of greater consequence seven counsellors, at least, must attend. More than eight members of the supreme court, or four noblemen and four commoners, may not be at one time in active service.

Art. 23. All the decrees of the supreme court of justice shall issue in the king's name, and under his hand and seal.

Art. 24. The cases shall be prepared in the "king's inferior court for revision of judiciary affairs," in order to be laid before, or produced in the supreme court.

Art. 25. In criminal cases the king has a right to grant pardon, to mitigate capital punishment, and to restore property forfeited to the crown. In applications, however, of this kind, the supreme court shall be heard, and the king give his decision in the council of state.

Art. 26. When matters of justice are laid before the council of state, the minister of state and justice, and, at least, two counsellors of state, two members of the supreme court, and the chancellor of justice shall attend, who must all deliver their opinions to the minutes, according to the general instruction for the members of the council of state, quoted in the 91st article.

Art. 27. The king shall nominate, as chancellor of justice, a juris-consult, an able and impartial man, who has previously held the office of a judge. It shall be his chief duty, as the highest legal officer or attorney general of the king, to prose-

cute, either personally or through the officers or fiscals under him, in all such cases as concern the public safety and the rights of the crown, on the king's behalf, to superintend the administration of justice, and to take cognizance of, and correct, errors committed by judges or other legal officers in the discharge of their official duties.

Art. 28. The king, in his council of state, has a right to appoint native Swedes to all such offices and places within the kingdom for which the king's commissions are granted. The proper authorities shall, however, send in the names of the candidates to be put in nomination for such employments. The king may, likewise, appoint foreigners of eminent talents to military offices, without, however, entrusting to them the command of the fortresses of the realm. In preferments the king shall only consider the merits and the abilities of the candidates, without any regard to their birth. Ministers and counsellors of state and of justice, secretaries of state, judges, and all other civil officers, must always be of the pure evangelical faith.

Art. 29. The archbishop and bishops shall be elected as formerly, and the king nominates one of the three candidates proposed to him.

Art. 30. The king appoints, as formerly, the incumbents of rectories in the gift of the crown. As to the consistorial benefices, the parishioners shall be maintained in their usual right of election.

Art. 31. Citizens, who are freemen of towns, shall enjoy their privilege as heretofore, of proposing to the king three candidates for the office of burgomaster or mayor, one of whom the king selects. The aldermen and secretaries of the magistracy of Stockholm shall be elected in the same manner.

Art. 32. The king appoints envoys to foreign courts and the officers of the embassies, in the presence of the minister of state for foreign affairs and the aulic chancellor.

Art. 33. When offices, for which candidates are proposed, are to be filled up, the members of the council of state shall deliver their opinions on the qualifications and merits of the applicants. They shall also have right to make respectful remonstrances against the nomination of the king respecting other offices.

Art. 34. The new functionaries created by this constitution, viz.—the ministers and counsellors of state and counsellors of justice, shall be paid by the crown, and may not hold any other civil offices. The two ministers of state are the highest functionaries of the realm. The counsellors of state shall hold the rank of generals, and the counsellors of justice that of lieutenant-generals.

Art. 35. The minister of state for foreign affairs, the counsellors of state, the presidents of the public boards, the grand governor of Stockholm, the deputy governor, and the chief magistrate of police in the city, the aulic chancellor, the chancellor of justice, the secretaries of state, the governors or lord-lieutenants of provinces, field marshals, generals and admirals of all degrees, adjutant generals, adjutant in chief, adjutants of the staff, the governors of fortresses, captain lieutenants, and officers of the king's life guards, colonels of the regiments, and officers second in command in the foot and horse guards, lieutenant-colonels in the brigade of the life regiments, chiefs of the artillery of the royal engineers, ministers, envoys, and commercial agents with foreign powers, and official persons employed in the king's cabinet for the foreign correspondence, and at the embassies, as holding places of trust, can be removed by the king,

when he considers it necessary for the benefit of the realm. The king shall, however, signify his determination in the council of state, the members whereof shall be bound to make respectful remonstrances, if they see it expedient.

Art. 36. Judges, and all other official persons, not included in the preceding article, cannot be suspended from their situations without legal trial, nor be translated or removed to other places, without having themselves applied for these.

Art. 37. The king has power to confer dignities on those who have served their country with fidelity, bravery, virtue, and zeal. He may also promote to the order of counts and barons, persons, who by eminent merits have deserved such an honour. Nobility and the dignity of a count and baron, granted from this time, shall no longer devolve to any other than the individual himself thus created a noble, and after him, to the oldest of his male issue in a direct descending line, and this branch of the family being extinct, to the nearest male descendant of the ancestor.

Art. 38. All despatches and orders emanating from the king, excepting such as concern military affairs, shall be countersigned by the secretary who has submitted them to the council, and is responsible for their being conformable to the minutes. Should the secretary find any of the decisions made by the king to the contrary to the spirit of the constitution, he shall make his remonstrances respecting the same, in the council of state. Should the king still persist in his determination, it shall then be the duty of the secretary to refuse his countersign and resign his place, which he may not resume until the estates of the realm shall have examined and approved of his conduct. He shall, however, in the meantime, receive his salary, and all the fees of his office as formerly.

Art. 39. If the king wishes to go abroad, he shall communicate his resolution to the council of state, in a full assembly, and take the opinion of all its members, as enacted in the ninth article. During the absence of the king he may not interfere with the government, or exercise the regal power, which shall be carried on, in his name, by the council of state; the council of state cannot, however, confer dignities or create counts, barons, and knights; and all officers appointed by the council shall only hold their places *ad interim*.

Art. 40. Should the king be in such a state of health as to be incapable of attending to the affairs of the kingdom, the council of state shall conduct the administration, as enacted in the preceding article.

Art. 41. The king shall be of age after having completed eighteen years. Should the king die before the heir of the crown has attained this age, the government shall be conducted by the council of state, acting with regal power and authority, in the name of the king, until the estates of the realm shall have appointed a provisional government or regency; and the council of state is enjoined strictly to conform to the enactments of this constitution.

Art. 42. Should the melancholy event take place, that the whole royal family became extinct on the male side, the council of state shall exercise the government with regal power and authority, until the estates have chosen another royal house, and the new king has taken upon himself the government. All occurrences or things having reference to the four last articles, shall be determined by the whole council of state and the secretaries of state.

Art. 43. When the king takes the field of battle, or repairs to distant parts of the kingdom, he shall constitute four of the members of the council of state to exercise the government in those affairs which he is pleased to prescribe.

Art. 44. No prince of the royal family shall be permitted to marry without having obtained the consent of the king, and in the contrary case shall forfeit his right of inheritance to the kingdom, both for himself and descendants.

Art. 45. Neither the crown prince, or any other prince of the royal family, shall have any appanage or civil place. The princes of the blood may, however, bear titles of dukedoms and principalities, as heretofore, but without any claims upon those provinces.

Art. 46. The kingdom shall remain divided, as heretofore, into governments, under the usual provincial administrations. No governor-general shall, from this time, be appointed within the kingdom.

Art. 47. The courts of justice, superior as well as inferior, shall administer justice according to the laws and statutes of the realm. The provincial governors, and all other public functionaries, shall exercise the offices entrusted to them according to existing regulations; they shall obey the orders of the king, and be responsible to him if any act is done contrary to law.

Art. 48. The court of the king is under his own management, and he may at his own pleasure appoint or discharge all his officers and attendants there.

Art. 49. The estates of the realm shall meet every fifth year. In the decree of every Diet the day shall be fixed for the next meeting of the estates. The king may, however, convoke the estates to an extraordinary Diet before that time.

Art. 50. The Diets shall be held in the capital, except when the invasion of an enemy, or some other important impediment, may render it dangerous for the safety of the representatives.

Art. 51. When the king or council convokes the estates, the period for the commencement of the Diet shall be subsequent to the thirtieth, and within the fiftieth day, to reckon from that day when the summons has been proclaimed in the churches of the capital.

Art. 52. The king names the speakers of the nobles, the burghers and the peasants; the archbishop is, at all times, the constant speaker of the clergy.

Art. 53. The estates of the realm shall, immediately after the opening of the Diet, elect the different committees, which are to prepare the affairs intended for their consideration. Such committees shall consist in,—a constitutional committee, which shall take cognizance of questions concerning proposed alterations in the fundamental laws, report thereupon to the representatives, and examine the minutes held in the council of state;—a committee of finances, which shall examine and report upon the state and management of the revenues;—a committee of taxation, for regulating the taxes;—a committee of the bank for inquiring into the administration of the affairs of the national bank—a law committee for digesting propositions concerning improvements in the civil, criminal, and ecclesiastical laws;—a committee of public grievances and matters of economy, to attend to the defects in public institutions, suggest alterations, &c.

Art. 54. Should the king desire a special committee for deliberating with him on such matters as do not come within the cognizance of any of the other committees, and are to be kept secret, the

estates shall select it. This committee shall, however, have no right to adopt any resolutions, but only to give their opinion on matters referred to them by the king.

Art. 55. The representatives of the realm shall not discuss any subject in the presence of the king, nor can any other committee than the one mentioned in the above article hold their deliberations before him.

Art. 56. General questions started at the meetings or the orders of the estates, cannot be immediately discussed or decided, but shall be referred to the proper committees, which are to give their opinion thereupon. The propositions or report of the committees shall, in the first instance, without any alteration or amendment, be referred to the estates at the general meetings of all the orders. If at these meetings, observations should be made which may prevent the adoption of the proposed measure these objections shall be communicated to the committee, in order to its being examined and revised. A proposition thus prepared having been again referred to the estates, it shall remain with them to adopt it, with or without alterations, or to reject it altogether. Questions concerning alterations in the fundamental laws, shall be thus treated:—If the constitutional committee approves of the suggestion of one of the representatives, or the committee reports in favour of or against a measure proposed by the king, the opinion of the committee shall be referred to the estates, who may discuss the topic, but not come to any resolution during that Diet.—If at the general meetings of the orders no observations are made against the opinion of the committee, the question shall be postponed till the Diet following, and then be decided solely by yes or no, as enacted in the 75th article of the ordinance of Diet.—If, on the contrary, objections are urged at the general meetings of the orders against the opinion of the committee, these shall be referred back for its reconsideration. If all the orders be of one opinion, the question shall be postponed for final decision, as enacted above. Should again a particular order differ from the other orders, twenty members shall be elected from among every order, and added to the committee, for adjusting the differences. The question being thus prepared, shall be decided at the following Diet.

Art. 57. The ancient right of the Swedish people, of imposing taxes on themselves, shall be exercised by the estates only at a general Diet.

Art. 58. The king shall at every Diet lay before the committee of finances the state of the revenues in all their branches. Should the crown have obtained subsidies through treaties with foreign powers, these shall be explained in the usual way.

Art. 59. The king shall refer to the decision of this committee to determine what the government may require beyond the ordinary taxation, to be raised by an extraordinary grant.

Art. 60. No taxes of any description whatever can be increased without the express consent of the estates. The king may not farm or let on lease the revenues of state, for the sake of profit to himself and the crown; nor grant monopolies to private individuals, or corporations.

Art. 61. All taxes shall be paid to the end of that term for which they have been imposed. Should, however, the estates meet before the expiration of that term, new regulations shall take place.

Art. 62. The funds required by government having been ascertained by the committee of finances, it shall rest with the estates whether to assign

proportionate means, and also to determine how the various sums granted shall be appropriated.

Art. 63. Besides these means, two adequate sums shall be voted and set apart for the disposal of the king, after he has consulted the council of state,—for the defence of the kingdom, or some other important object;—the other sum to be deposited in the national bank, in case of war, after the king has ascertained the opinion of the council and convened the estates. The seal of the order for this latter sum may not be broken, nor the money be paid by the commissioners of the bank, till the summons to Diet shall have been duly proclaimed in the churches of the capital.

Art. 64. The extraordinary revenues of the land, as well as the extraordinary grants which may be voted by the estates, shall be at the disposal of the king for the civil list and other specified purposes.

Art. 65. The above means may not be applied but for the assigned purposes, and the council of state shall be responsible if they permit any deviation in this respect, without entering their remonstrances in the minutes, and pointing out what the constitution in this case ordains.

Art. 66. The funds of amortissement or national debt, shall remain, as heretofore, under the superintendence and direction of the estates, who have guaranteed or come under a responsibility for the national debt; and after having received the report of the committee of finances on the affairs of that establishment, the estates will provide, through a special grant, the requisite means for paying the capital as well as the interest of this debt, in order that the credit of the kingdom may be maintained.

Art. 67. The deputy of the king shall not attend the meetings of the directors or commissioners of the funds of amortissement, on any other occasion than when the directors are disposed to take his opinion.

Art. 68. The means assigned for paying off the national debt shall not, under any pretence or condition, be appropriated to other purposes.

Art. 69. Should the estates, or any particular order, entertain doubts either in allowing the grant proposed by the committee of finances, or as to the participation in the taxes, or the principles of the management of the funds of amortissement, these doubts shall be communicated to the committee for their further consideration.—If the committee cannot coincide in the opinions of the estates, or a single order, it shall depute some members to explain circumstances. Should this order still persist in its opinion, the question shall be decided by the resolution of three orders. If two orders be of one, and the other two of a different opinion, thirty new members of every order shall be added to the committee—the committee shall then vote conjointly, and not by orders, with folded billets, for adopting, or rejecting, unconditionally the proposition of the committee.

Art. 70. The committee of taxation shall at every Diet suggest general principles for dividing the future taxes, and the amount having been fixed, the committee shall also propose how these are to be paid, referring their proposition to the consideration and decision of the states.

Art. 71. Should a difference of opinion arise between the orders, as to these principles and the mode of applying them, and dividing the taxes; or, what hardly can be presumed, any order decline participating in the proposed taxation, the order, which may thus desire some alteration, shall communicate their views to the other representatives.

and suggest in what mode this alteration may be effected without frustrating the general object. The committee of taxation having again reported thereon to the estates, they, the estates, shall decide the question at issue. If three orders object to the proposition of the committee, it shall be rejected. If, again, three orders oppose the demands of a single order, or if two be of an opinion contrary to that of the other two, the question shall be referred to the committee of finances, with an additional number of members, as enacted in the above article. If the majority of this committee assent to the proposition of the committee of taxation, in those points concerning which the representatives have disagreed, the proposition shall be considered as the general resolution of the estates. Should it, on the contrary, be negatived by a majority of votes, or be rejected by three orders, the committee of taxation shall propose other principles for levying and dividing the taxes.

Art. 72. The national bank shall remain, as formerly, under the superintendence and guarantee of the estates, and the management of directors selected from among all the orders, according to existing regulations. The states alone can issue bank-notes, which are to be recognized as the circulating medium of the realm.

Art. 73. No troops, new taxes or imposts, either in money or kind, can be levied without voluntary consent of the estates, in the usual order, as aforesaid.

Art. 74. The king shall have no right to demand or levy any other aid for carrying on war, than that contribution of provisions which may be necessary for the maintenance of the troops during their march through a province. These contributions shall, however, be immediately paid out of the treasury, according to the fixed price-current of provisions, with an augmentation of a moiety, according to this valuation. Such contributions may not be demanded for troops which have been quartered in a place, or are employed in military operations, in which case they shall be supplied with provisions from the magazines.

Art. 75. The annual estimation of such rentes as are paid in kind shall be fixed by deputies elected from among all the orders of the estates.

Art. 76. The king cannot, without the consent of the estates, contract loans within or without the kingdom, nor burden the land with any new debts.

Art. 77. He cannot also, without the consent of the estates, vend, pledge, mortgage, or in any other way alienate domains, farms, forests, parks, preserves of game, meadows, pasture-land, fisheries, and other appurtenances of the crown. These shall be managed according to the instructions of the estates.

Art. 78. No part of the kingdom can be alienated through sale, mortgage, donation, or in any other way whatever.

Art. 79. No alteration can be effected in the standard value of the coin, either for enhancing or deteriorating it, without the consent of the estates.

Art. 80. The land and naval forces of the realm shall remain on the same footing, till the king and the estates may think proper to introduce some other principles. No regular troops can be raised, without the mutual consent of the king and the estates.

Art. 81. This form of government and the other fundamental laws cannot be altered or repealed, without the unanimous consent of the king and the estates. Questions to this effect cannot be brought forward at the meetings of the orders, but must

be referred to the constitutional committee, whose province it is to suggest such alterations in the fundamental laws, as may be deemed necessary, useful, and practicable. The estates may not decide on such proposed alterations at the same Diet. If all the orders agree about the alteration, it shall be submitted to the king, through the speakers, for obtaining his royal sanction. After having ascertained the opinion of the council, the king shall take his resolution, and communicate to the estates either his approbation or reasons for refusing it. In the event of the king proposing any alteration in the fundamental laws, he shall, after having taken the opinion of the council, deliver his proposition to the estates, who shall, without discussing it, again refer it to the constitutional committee. If the committee coincide in the proposition of the king, the question shall remain till next Diet. If again the committee is averse to the proposition of the king, the estates may either reject it immediately or adjourn it to the following Diet. In the case of all the orders approving of the proposition, they shall request that a day be appointed to declare their consent in the presence of his majesty, or signify their disapprobation through their speakers.

Art. 82. What the estates have thus unanimously resolved and the king sanctioned, concerning alterations in the fundamental laws, or the king has proposed and the estates approved of, shall for the future have the force and effect of a fundamental law.

Art. 83. No explanation of the fundamental laws may be established by any other mode or order, than that prescribed by the two preceding articles. Laws shall be applied according to their literal sense.

Art. 84. When the constitutional committee find no reason for approving of the proposition, made by a representative concerning alterations or explanations of the fundamental laws, it shall be the duty of the committee to communicate to him, at his request, their opinion, which the proposer of the resolution may publish, with his own motion, and under the usual responsibility of authors.

Art. 85. As fundamental laws of the present form of government, there shall be considered the ordinance of Diet, the order of succession, and the act concerning universal liberty of the press.

Art. 86. By the liberty of the press is understood the right of every Swedish subject to publish his writings, without any impediment from the government, and without being responsible for them, except before a court of justice, or liable to punishment, unless their contents be contrary to a clear law, made for the preservation of public peace. The minutes, or protocols, or the proceedings, may be published in any case, excepting the minutes kept in the council of state and before the king in ministerial affairs, and those matters of military command; nor may the records of the bank, and the office of the funds of amortissement or national debt, be printed.

Art. 87. The estates, together with the king, have the right to make new and repeal old laws. In this view such questions must be proposed at the general meetings of the orders of the estates, and shall be decided by them, after having taken the opinion of the law committee, as laid down in the 56th article. The proposition shall be submitted, through the speakers, to the king, who, after having ascertained the opinion of the council of state and supreme court, shall declare either his royal approbation, or motives for withholding it. Should the king desire to propose any

alteration in the laws, he shall, after having consulted the council of state and supreme court, refer his proposition, together with their opinion, to the deliberation of the states, who, after having received the report of the law committee, shall decide on the point. In all such questions the resolution of three orders shall be considered as the resolution of the estates of the realm. If two orders are opposed to the other two, the proposition is negated, and the law is to remain as formerly.

Art. 88. The same course, or mode of proceeding, shall be observed in explaining the civil, criminal, and ecclesiastical laws, as in making these. Explanations concerning the proper sense of the law given by the supreme court in the name of the king, in the interval between the Diets, may be rejected by the states, and shall not afterwards be valid, or cited by the courts of judicature.

Art. 89. At the general meetings of the orders of the estates, questions may be proposed for altering, explaining, repealing, and issuing acts concerning public economy; and the principles of public institutions of any kind may be discussed. These questions shall afterwards be referred to the committee of public grievances and economical affairs, and then be submitted to the decision of the king, in a council of state. When the king is pleased to invite the estates to deliberate with him on questions concerning the general administration, the same course shall be adopted as is prescribed for questions concerning the laws.

Art. 90. During the deliberations of the orders, or their committees, no questions shall be proposed but in the way expressly prescribed by this fundamental law, concerning either appointing or removing of officers, decisions and resolutions of the government and courts of law, and the conduct of private individuals and corporations.

Art. 91. When the king, in such cases as those mentioned in the 30th article, is absent from the kingdom longer than twelve months, the council shall convoke the estates to a general Diet, and cause the summons to be proclaimed within fifteen days from the above time, in the churches of the capital, and speedily afterwards in the other parts of the kingdom. If the king, after being informed thereof, does not return to the kingdom, the estates shall adopt such measures as they deem most beneficial for the country.

Art. 92. The same shall be enacted in case of any disease or ill health of the king, which might prevent him from attending to the affairs of the kingdom for more than twelve months.

Art. 93. When the heir of the crown, at the decease of the king, is under age, the council of state shall issue summons to the representatives to meet. The estates of the realm shall have the right, without regard to the will of a deceased king concerning the administration, to appoint one or several guardians, to rule in the king's name, according to this fundamental law, till the king becomes of age.

Art. 94. Should it ever happen that the royal family become extinct in the male line, the council of state shall convene the estates, to elect another royal family to rule conformably to this fundamental law.

Art. 95. Should, contrary to expectation, the council of state fail to convoke the estates, in the cases prescribed by the 91st, 93d, and 94th articles, it shall be the positive duty of the directors of the house of nobles, the chapters throughout the kingdom, the magistrates in the capital, and the

governors in the provinces, to give public notice thereof, in order that elections of deputies to the Diet may forthwith take place, and the estates assemble to protect their privileges and rights of the kingdom. Such a Diet shall be opened on the fiftieth day from that period when the council of state had proclaimed the summons in the churches of the capital.

Art. 96. The estates shall at every Diet appoint an officer, distinguished for integrity and learning in the law, to watch over, as their deputy, the conduct of the judges and other official men, and who shall, in legal order and at the proper court, arraign those who in the performance of their offices have betrayed negligence and partiality, or else have committed any illegal act. He shall, however, be liable to the same responsibility as the law prescribes for public prosecutors in general.

Art. 97. This deputy or attorney-general of the estates shall be chosen by twelve electors out of every order.

Art. 98. The electors shall at the same time they choose the said attorney-general, elect a person possessing equal or similar qualities to succeed him, in case of his death before the next Diet.

Art. 99. The attorney-general may, whenever he pleases, attend the sessions of all the superior and inferior courts, and the public offices, and shall have free access to their records and minutes; and the king's officers shall be bound to give him every assistance.

Art. 100. The attorney-general shall at every Diet present a report of the performance of his office, explaining the state of the administration of justice in the land, noticing the defects in the existing laws, and suggesting new improvements. He shall also, at the end of each year, publish a general statement concerning these.

Art. 101. Should the supreme court, or any of its members, from interest, partiality, or negligence, judge so wrong that an individual, contrary to law and evidence, did lose or might have lost life, liberty, honour, or property, the attorney-general shall be bound, and the chancellor of justice authorised, to arraign the guilty, according to the laws of the realm, in the court after mentioned.

Art. 102. This court is to be denominated the court of justice for the realm, and shall be formed by the president in the superior court of Swea, the presidents of all the public boards, four senior members of the council of state, the highest commander of the troops within the capital, and the commander of the squadron of the fleet stationed at the capital, two of the senior members of the superior court of Swea, and the senior member of all the public boards. Should any of the officers mentioned above decline attending this court, he shall be legally responsible for such a neglect of duty. After trial, the judgment shall be publicly announced: no one can alter such a sentence. The king may, however, extend pardon to the guilty, but not admitting him any more into the service of the kingdom.

Art. 103. The estates shall at every Diet nominate a jury of twelve members from out of each order, for deciding if the members of the supreme court of justice have deserved to fill their important places, or if any member without having been legally convicted for the faults mentioned in the above articles, yet ought to be removed from office.

Art. 104. The estates shall not resolve themselves into a court of justice, nor enter into any special examination of the decrees, verdicts, resolutions of the supreme court.

Art. 105. The constitutional committee shall have right to demand the minutes of the council of state, except those which concern ministerial or foreign affairs, and matters of military command, which may only be communicated as far as these have a reference to generally known events, specified by the committee.

Art. 106. Should the committee find from these minutes that any member of the council of state has openly acted against the clear dictates of the constitution, or advised any infringement either of the same or of the other laws of the realm, or that he had omitted to remonstrate against such a violation, or caused and promoted it by wilfully concealing any information, the committee shall order the attorney-general to institute the proper proceedings against the guilty.

Art. 107. If the constitutional committee should find that any or all the members of the council of state have not consulted the real interest of the kingdom, or that any of the secretaries of state have not performed his or their official duties with impartiality, activity, and skill, the committee shall report it to the estates, who, if they deem it necessary, may signify to the king their wish of having those removed, who may thus have given dissatisfaction. Questions to this effect may be brought forward at the general meetings of the orders, and even be proposed by any of the committees. These cannot, however, be decided until the constitutional committee have delivered their opinion.

Art. 108. The estates shall at every Diet appoint six individuals, two of whom must be learned in the law, besides the attorney-general, to watch over the liberty of the press. These deputies shall be bound to give their opinion as to the legality of publications, if such be requested by the authors. These deputies shall be chosen by six electors out of every order.

Art. 109. Diets may not last longer than three months from the time that the king has informed the representatives of the state of the revenues. Should, however, the estates at the expiration of that time not have concluded their deliberations, they may demand the Diet to be prolonged for another month, which the king shall not refuse. If again, contrary to expectation, the estates at the expiration of this term have not regulated the civil list, the king shall dissolve the Diet, and taxation continue in its former state till the next meeting of representatives.

Art. 110. No representative shall be responsible for any opinion uttered at meetings of the orders, or of the committees, unless by the express permission of at least five-sixths of his own order: nor can a representative be banished from the Diet. Should any individual or body, either civil or military, endeavour to offer violence to the estates, or to any individual representative, or presume to interrupt and disturb their deliberations, it shall be considered as an act of treason, and it rests with the estates to take legal cognizance of such an offence.

Art. 111. Should any representative, after having announced himself as such, be insulted, either at the Diet or on his way to or from the same, it shall be punished as a violation of the peace of the king.

Art. 112. No official person may exercise his official authority (his authority in that capacity) to influence the elections of deputies to the Diet, under pain of losing his place.

Art. 113. Individuals elected for regulating the taxation shall not be responsible for their lawful deeds in this their capacity.

Art. 114. The king shall leave the estates in undisturbed possession of their liberties, privileges, and immunities. Modifications which the prosperity of the realm may demand can only be done with the general concurrence and consent of the estates and the sanction of the king. Nor can any new privileges be granted to one order, without the consent of the other, and the sanction of the sovereign.

This we have confirmed by our names and seals, on the sixth day of the month of June, in the year after the birth of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and nine.

On behalf of the Nobles, M. Ankarsvard. On behalf of the Clergy, Jac. Ax. Lindblom. On behalf of the Burghers, H. N. Schwan. On behalf of the Peasantry, Lars Olsson, Speakers.

The above form of government we have not only acknowledged Ourselves, but do also command all our faithful subjects to obey it; in confirmation of which, we have thereto affixed our manual signature and the seal of the realm. In the city of our royal residence, Stockholm, on the sixth day of the month of June, in the year after the birth of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and nine.

CHARLES.

**SWEDENBORG, and the New Church.**—“Emanuel Swedenborg [or Svedberg] was born at Stockholm, January 29, 1688. . . . [His] father was a Lutheran Clergyman, and afterwards Bishop of Skara. . . . A university education at Upsala, . . . and studies for five years in England, France, Holland and Germany, brought . . . [many] interests into play. . . . The earliest of these were mathematics and astronomy, in the pursuit of which he met Flamsteed and Halley. His gift for the detection and practical employment of general laws soon carried him much farther afield in the sciences. Metallurgy, geology, a varied field of invention, chemistry, as well as his duties as an Assessor on the Board of Mines and of a legislator in the Diet, all engaged him. . . . The *Principia* and two companion volumes, dedicated to his patron, the Duke of Brunswick, crowned his versatile productions in the physical sciences. . . . Conspicuous in Swedenborg's thought all along was the premise that there is a God and the presupposition of that whole element in life which we call the spiritual. As he pushed his studies into the fields of physiology and psychology, this premised realm of the spirit became the express goal of his researches. Some of his most valuable and most startling discoveries came in these fields. Outstanding are a work on *The Brain* and two on the *Animal Kingdom* (kingdom of the *anima*, or soul). As his gaze sought the soul, however, in the light in which he had more and more successfully beheld all his subjects for fifty-five years, she eluded direct knowledge. . . . It was now, for the first time, too, that he gave a deep consideration to the condition of the Christian Church, revealed in otherworld judgment to be one of spiritual devastation and impotency. To serve in the revelation of ‘doctrine for a New Church’ became his Divinely appointed work. He forewent his reputation as a man of science, gave up his assessorship, cleared his desk of everything but the Scriptures. He beheld in the Word of God a spiritual meaning, as he did a spiritual world in the world of phenomena. In revealing both of these the Lord, he said, made His Second Coming. For the rest of his long life Swedenborg gave himself with unremitting labor but with a saving calm to this

commanding cause, publishing his great Latin volumes of Scripture interpretation and of theological teaching at Amsterdam or London, at first anonymously, and distributing them to clergy and universities. . . . Swedenborg died in London, March 29, 1772. In 1908 his remains were removed from the Swedish church in that city to the cathedral at Upsala, where they lie in a monument erected to his memory by the Swedish Parliament.”—J. K. Smyth and W. F. Wunsch, *Gist of Swedenborg* (Biographical note).—“The basis of Swedenborg's teaching . . . was that the Bible must be accepted absolutely as a divinely inspired book, but must be taken in an allegorical sense. Thus where historical events are recorded they are not recorded for the sake of history, for the object of the Scriptures is to treat not of the kingdoms of the earth, but of the Kingdom of God. In other parts of the Bible, as in Genesis, there is no truth in the story from the historical point of view. The record is merely an allegory of the soul. His doctrine of Correspondences was merely the recognition of this allegorical relationship of the spiritual and material. The universe, according to Swedenborg, is symbolical throughout. All material things are derived from their spiritual archetypes, and are representations of these. The bodily form represents the spiritual character, for the spirit forms the body in its own likeness. A man's acts are thus the outcome of his inward nature, and there is consequently a similar correspondence between them and the inward man. The basis of these ideas is, of course, the ancient occult teaching that the universe is the macrocosm, and man the microcosm. . . . Swedenborg's doctrine of Degrees appears to follow from his doctrine of Correspondences. The three degrees of the human mind correspond to the three kingdoms of Nature: animal, vegetable, and mineral, corresponding to spirit, soul, and body. ‘Degrees,’ Swedenborg tells us, ‘are of two kinds, discrete and continuous.’ ‘All things, from least to greatest, in both the spiritual and natural worlds, co-exist at once from discrete and continuous degrees. In respect of discrete degrees there can be no intercourse between either by continuity.’ It follows, therefore, with regard to the degrees of the human mind, the celestial, spiritual, and the natural, that they cannot communicate under normal conditions one with another. Thus, too, men on earth can have no sensible communication with the spiritual world or see things of that world without a special opening of the spiritual sight. . . . Another doctrine of Swedenborg's was that of regeneration. In order to be partaker of the higher life, man, he held, must be born again, but this regeneration was not a special occurrence of any particular date, but a continuous process. One of the orthodox doctrines which Swedenborg attacked was that of the Trinity. He denied that Jesus Christ was merely the Second Person of a Divine Trinity. He cites St. Paul's statement that ‘in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily,’ and maintains that the whole Trinity is centred in his Person.”—R. Shirley, *Occultists & mystics of all ages*, pp. 107-100.—The first movement toward organization of the New Church began in London in 1782, when a printer, Robert Hindmarsh, formed a class for the study of Swedenborg's writings. Gradually a society developed, and in 1788 public services were held. In 1780 the first General Conference of the New Jerusalem Church was held in England. In 1915 there were seventy-two societies in the Conference, with a total membership of 6694. There were also a few societies not con-



nected with the Conference. Throughout Great Britain and Ireland, there are about 10,000 followers of Swedenborg. On the continent there are societies in Paris, Zurich, Berlin, Budapest, Vienna, Stuttgart, Copenhagen, and Stockholm. The first society of the New Church in the United States was organized in Baltimore in 1792. The first meeting of the General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the United States and Canada was held in Philadelphia in 1817. In 1922 the Convention reported a membership of 107 churches, composed of a total of 7066 persons. Taken altogether, it is estimated that there are about 20,000 members of the faith in the world.—See also SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE: 1750-1807.

ALSO IN: G. F. E. LeBoys Des Guays, *Letters to a man of the world*.—B. F. Barrett, *Lectures on the new dispensation*.—E. Swedenborg, *Four leading doctrines of the New Church*.—Idem, *Heaven and hell*.—Idem, *Divine Providence*.—Idem, *Divine love and wisdom*.—W. P. Swainson, *Emanuel Swedenborg, the Swedish seer*.—G. Trobridge, *Emanuel Swedenborg, his life teachings, and influence*.

SWEDEN-NORWEGIAN CONSULAR COMMISSION (1902). See NORWAY: 1902-1905.

SWEDISH LITERATURE. See SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE.

SWEDISH MOOR CULTURE ASSOCIATION (1886). See EDUCATION; AGRICULTURAL: Sweden.

SWEELINCK, Jan Pieterszoon (1562-1621), German musician. See MUSIC: Medieval: 1450-1600; Modern: 1620-1722.

SWERKER I (d. 1155), king of Sweden, 1134-1155.

Swerker II, king of Sweden, 1195-1210.

SWERRE, king of Norway, 1184-1202.

SWEYN I, Forkheard or Splitheard (d. 1014), king of Denmark, 991-1014. Invaded England, 994 and 1003; conquered England, 1013. See ENGLAND: 979-1016; IRELAND: 1014.

Sweyn II, king of Denmark, 1047-1076.

Sweyn III (d. 1157), king of Denmark, 1156-1157.

Sweyn, king of Norway, 1030-1035.

Sweyn, or Blotsweyn (fl. 1081), king of Sweden. See SWEDEN: 9th-12th centuries.

SWIFT, Jonathan (1667-1745), English satiric writer. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1660-1780; IRELAND: 1722-1724.

SWIFT & COMPANY. See TRUSTS: United States: 1903-1906.

SWINBURNE, Algernon Charles (1837-1900), English poet and dramatist. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1833-1900; DRAMA: 1815-1877.

SWISS GUARD. See VATICAN: 15th century; 1744.

SWISS MERCENARIES. See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 13; 18.

SWISS NATIONAL BANK. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1836-1907.

SWITCHBACK RAILWAY. See RAILROADS: 1826-1850.

SWITHUN, or Swithin, Saint (d. 862), English bishop of Winchester. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 6th-11th centuries.

## SWITZERLAND

Geographical description.—Resources.—“Switzerland lies in the mountainous heart of southwestern Europe. Germany is her neighbor to the north, Austria and the diminutive principality of Liechtenstein to the east, Italy to the south, and France to the west. . . . Switzerland is the only considerable European state without direct access to salt water. . . . The area of Switzerland is 15,976 square miles [and the population, 1920, was 3,880,320]. The lowest point in Swiss territory is 646 feet above sea level. Her highest peaks tower to an altitude of 15,000 feet. Only 2 per cent of the area of the country is below 1000 feet in elevation, 58 per cent is between 1000 and 4000, and 34 per cent is over 4000 feet high. Lakes, glaciers, and perpetual snow fields cover over 6 per cent of the surface. . . . Switzerland falls naturally into three great divisions: first, the region of the Alps, which with their ramifications cover the whole central, southern, and eastern sections of the country; second the Jura district, the lesser ranges of which are merely outlying spurs of the Alps; and third, the plateau or basin which lies between two mountainous divisions.”—R. C. Brooks, *Government and politics of Switzerland*, pp. 1-2.—“Apart from building stone, cement, and salt, the mineral resources of the country are negligible. . . . Switzerland is still in the main an agricultural and pastoral country. . . . Of the entire productive area of Switzerland slightly more than a third is devoted to grass and meadows, and nearly three tenths to forestry. . . . The remaining one third of the arable land of the country is divided between fruit production and ordinary crops,—18.7 per cent of

the whole being devoted to the former and 16.4 per cent to the latter. . . . Potatoes are produced in quantities almost sufficient for the domestic demand. Hemp, flax, and tobacco also are grown to a small extent. In five cantons the grape is cultivated. . . . It is on the side of animal husbandry, however, that Swiss farmers are most successful. Nearly three fourths of the total value of their annual production is due to this branch of agriculture. . . . Cheese, condensed milk, and milk chocolate, all of which enjoy a great reputation abroad, are the principal products of this form of Swiss agricultural industry. . . . Switzerland is a land of small peasant holdings, nearly 300,000 in number. . . . These holdings average less than twenty acres, but each of them represents a definite ‘stake in the country’ for the peasant proprietor and the members of his family. . . . [In manufacturing] textiles take first rank, with a total of over 100,000 employees engaged in silk, cotton, woolen, linen, and embroidery factories; in machine building, metal working, and electrical and chemical industries, 82,000 workers are engaged; jewelry and watch-making nearly 35,000. [Other important industries are the manufacture of food products, clothing, wood-working, paper and graphic trades, clay and stone works.]”—*Ibid.*, pp. 4-8.

Lake dwellings.—“In many parts of Europe, especially in Switzerland and northern Italy, plain traces of some curious habitations of people who lived through the later Stone Age into the Bronze Age, and even after it, have been brought to light. These are the ‘lake dwellings,’ or ‘lacustrine habitations,’ as they have been called, which have excited interest in late years. They

were generally built on piles, driven into a lake-bottom, at such distance from shore as would make them easy of defense against enemies. The foundations of whole villages of these dwellings have been found in the Swiss and North Italian lakes, and less numerous elsewhere. From the lake-mud under and around them, a great quantity of relics of the lake-dwellers have been taken, and many facts about their arts and mode of life have been learned. It is known that, even before a single metal had come into their hands, they had begun to cultivate the earth; had raised wheat and barley and flax; had domesticated the horse, the ox, the sheep, the goat, the pig and the dog; had become fairly skilful in weaving, in rope-making, and in the art of the potter, but without the potter's wheel. Gradually copper and bronze made their appearance among the implements of these people, as modern search discovers them imbedded, layer upon layer, in the old ooze of the lake-beds where they were dropped. In time iron, too, reveals itself among their possessions, showing that they lived in their lake-villages from the latter Stone Age into that third period of the early process of civilization which is named the Iron Age—when men first acquired the use of the most useful of all the metals. It appears, in fact, that the lake-dwellings were occupied even down to Roman times, since articles of Roman make have been found in the ruins of them."—J. N. Larned.—See also LAKE DWELLINGS; EUROPE: Prehistoric period: Lake dwellings of Switzerland.

**Strategic position of country.** See ALPS: As barriers.

**Three Forest Cantons.—Original confederation (Eidgenossenschaft).—Relations with the House of Austria.**—It is pretty clear that among those Helvetii (see HELVETII) with whom Cæsar had his cruel struggle, and who subsequently became an integral portion of the empire, there were no people from the Forest Cantons of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden. "The Swiss Confederation is one of the numerous states which have arisen out of the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, but it differs from all the rest both in its origin and in its characteristics. Whereas elsewhere the German states owed their origin to princely houses, which had brought together their various domains by inheritance, by marriage, and by conquest, Switzerland grew out of the voluntary union of small communities to form a republican federation of states. . . . In August, 1201, the three Forest Cantons, Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, became united by an Everlasting League [*Eidgenossenschaft*] into an indissoluble community and secured their democratic independence by the glorious victory which in 1315 at Morgarten on the Lake of Aegeri they obtained over Leopold of Austria and his knights. These three original Cantons constituted the nucleus around which gathered all those between the Jura, the Rhine, and the Alps that were hostile to the Habsburg rule. In commemoration of the victors at Morgarten, the men of Schwyz, this union received the name of the *Swiss Confederation*. Towns such as Lucerne, Zurich, Bern, Fribourg, and Solothurn, and rural districts like Glarus, Zug, and Appenzell endeavoured by joining the Confederation to secure their right to self-government. . . . In Germany the feudal aristocracy and its princely leaders maintained their authority; in Switzerland, on the other hand, the lower social strata, the burghers, and the peasants, took the power into their hands. With the diminution of the power of

the Habsburg ruling house went that of the higher and the lower nobility, save in so far as the nobles submitted to absorption into the civic communities. With trifling exceptions, the lordships of the nobles which separated the towns from the rural districts of the Confederation gradually fell to the latter by purchase, by mortgage, and by the fortune of war, and thus there came into existence the continuous geographical area which was essential for the formation of the Swiss state. . . . At the end of the fifteenth century there existed in Switzerland two classes only: on the one hand, the burghers of the sovereign towns, and the country folk of the sovereign rural cantons; and, on the other, the dwellers in the subject domains. . . . Every 'subject' could enter a town, and could there, for a few gulden, acquire the right of citizenship; and then the path to honours and offices was as open to him as to any burgher by birth. It was hardly possible to rule against its will a people every one of whom had a pike and a halberd hanging on the wall of his house. Even though the governments of the town cantons were exclusively composed of the burghers of the chief town, the authority of these was limited by the laws and the customs of the country regions. Moreover, it was found advantageous, in important emergencies, to ask the opinion of the whole people, not merely that of the burghers in the town, but also that of their relatives in the country districts, and to be guided by the popular voice. It followed that the inhabitants of the subject lands felt themselves to be also free Confederates; they also were proud to be liberated from the 'arbitrary rule of the princes and the nobles'; and by them also the tyrannicide, William Tell, was honoured, in word and picture, as a national hero."—W. Oechsli, *History of Switzerland, 1400-1014*, pp. 1-3.—According to the popular tradition, the people of the three cantons were maddened by wanton outrages and insolences on the part of the Austrian dukes, until three bold leaders, Werner Stauffacher, Arnold of the Melkthal, and Walter Fürst, assembled them in nightly meetings on the little meadow of Grütli or Rütli, in 1307, and bound them by oaths in a league against Austria, which was the beginning of the Swiss confederation. This story, and the famous legend of William Tell, connected with it, are fading out of authentic history under the light which modern investigation has brought to bear on it.

ALSO IN: O. Delepiepierre, *Historical difficulties.*—J. Heywood, *Establishment of Swiss freedom, and the Scandinavian origin of the legend of William Tell* (*Royal Historical Society Transactions*, v. 5).—*Legend of Tell and Rütli* (*Edinburgh Review*, Jan., 1869).

**Nationality.—Character of Swiss politics and political organization.**—"The Swiss are the supreme example of the phenomenon of Nationality as independent of Religion and Language. On a map of religious or linguistic 'distribution' they would not figure as an entity at all: on a map of Nationality they deserve distinction as much as, or more than, any other European group."—J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the war*, p. 505.—"The scanty attention which Swiss institutions have received, and the inadequate recognition of their value to students of political philosophy, seem largely due to the unexciting and what may be called the prosaic humdrum character of Swiss political life. There are no sensational events to draw the eyes of the outer world; no Cabinet crises, as in England; no brilliant displays of

oratory, as in the French Chamber; no dramatic surprises, as in the huge national nominating conventions of the United States. So the achievements of modern Switzerland, just because they do not appeal to imagination or emotion, have been little regarded, though directed with unusual success to what ought to be the main aims of government, the comfort and well-being of the individual, the satisfaction of his desire for intellectual pleasures, the maintenance of peace and kindly relations between social classes."—J. Bryce, *Modern democracies*, v. 1, pp. 505-506.—"There is not one democracy in Switzerland; there are as many democracies as there are cantons and demicantons. The twenty-five more or less autonomous states which comprise the Confederation and this Confederation itself are political laboratories, al-

four centuries thereafter Rome occupied the country, imposing its language, religion, and civilization upon the native tribes. Primitive forms of agriculture soon gave way before the better methods taught by the conquerors. Swiss mountain passes and valleys were opened up by well-made roads of the sort which everywhere followed the triumphant flight of the Roman eagles. Along these highways trade flowed freely, under the protection of the *pax Romana*. Toward the close of the imperial occupation Christianity spread rapidly. But, on the other hand, during this period Roman soldiery domineered over the native peoples. Roman vices sapped their vitality, and the crafty Roman policy of *divide et impera* reduced them to political impotence."—R. C. Brooks, *Government and politics of Switzerland*, p. 16.



THE OATH AT THE RÜTLI MEADOW  
 (After drawing by Hottenroth)

ways at work. They are all so many small nations animated by a ceaseless desire to perfect their political organization and to develop their democratic institutions. Politically Switzerland offers a picture almost as varied in its character as it does physically. All forms of popular government are, or have been, practiced in Switzerland, and the results of all of them can be studied there at the present time."—F. Bonjour, *Real democracy in operation*, p. vii.

**B. C. 1st century.—Celtic inhabitants.—Roman occupation.**—"At the time when Roman writers first mention Switzerland, it was inhabited by Keltic tribes, chief among which were the Rhaetians, who lived in the projecting eastern angle of the country, and the Helvetians, who occupied all the plateau or basin region and the adjacent mountain districts. The Helvetians [see HELVETII] raised cattle and carried on a rude sort of agriculture, but were almost constantly engaged in warfare among themselves and in raiding expeditions against their neighbors. In 58 B. C. Cæsar began the conquest of the Helvetians. For

**A. D. 3rd-5th centuries.—Teutonic invasions.**—"With the breakdown of the Empire under barbarian inroads the influence of Rome in Switzerland was quickly obliterated, and little remained to show it save the ruins of her highways and engineering works. As early as 260 A. D. the first wave of the Allemanni [see ALEMANNI: 496-504], a German race, reached northeastern Switzerland. Successive waves of this conquering people followed, until by the middle of the fifth century they had spread as far west as Geneva. Also from Savoy, where land had previously been allotted them by the Romans, the Burgundians pushed into Switzerland [see BURGUNDY: 500], occupying Valais, Freiburg, and other western districts. From these two basic stocks the Swiss people and civilization of today are largely derived. However, it was in exclusively Teutonic territories that the political evolution of modern Switzerland originated and received much of its distinctive form. Not till a comparatively recent date do the French-speaking descendants of the Burgundians begin to cooperate in this process.

The Allemannians were pagan worshippers of Odin, who seized goods and lands alike and reduced their captives to slavery. In accordance with Teutonic customs the territory conquered by these tribes, under the leadership of various chieftains and kings, was divided into counties, each of which was placed under the rulership of a count, chosen by the people from among the nobles. When war broke out all the fighting men united under a duke or leader of their own choosing. From time to time popular assemblies of freemen were held to decide upon common action, to render judicial decisions, and for religious and other purposes. In spite of these democratic elements there were sharp distinctions among the Allemannians between the 'free' and the 'unfree.' Indeed, the feudalism which was to spread over Switzerland later had its roots in the sharp social cleavages established by the barbarian conquests."—*Ibid.*, pp. 16-18

536-843.—Frankish control.—Feudal system and the opposition of the walled cities.—"As a result of the Frankish conquest in the sixth century Switzerland passed under the control of the Merovingian dynasty (536-752 A.D.), and later of the Carolingian dynasty (752-843 A.D.). With the exception of the reigns of a few enlightened monarchs, these were centuries of disorder, war, and misery. One bright spot was due to the coming, early in the seventh century, of a party of Irish monks, whose fiery preaching spread the gospel over the entire country and led to the foundation of many churches, shrines, and monasteries. Under the Merovingians the system of government was further centralized. Feudalism was thoroughly established, cruelty and oppression were widespread. Even the monasteries became landlords on a great scale, although as a rule their tenants were treated more humanely than those of the lay nobles. Early in the ninth century Switzerland became a part of the German Empire. As such it took its full share of the fighting and much more than its full share of the suffering caused by the long-drawn-out duel between the imperial and papal powers. Not till the end of the thirteenth century does the country begin to have an independent history. It had been but a minor pawn in the game of conquest waged first by the Romans, then by Allemannians and Franks: it was nothing more in the hands of the Holy Roman Emperors. In the great struggle against feudalism which was to be fought out later over the whole of Europe, walled cities everywhere became centers of the democratic movement. Fortunately Switzerland had such centers from an early date. Owing to the pouring in of marauders from the east, the building of strong walls around all towns of a certain size was ordered in the tenth century. . . . In return for the burden thus imposed and to encourage immigration from rural districts, certain privileges were conferred upon the *Bürger*, or citizens living within such fortified places (*Bürgen*). But Switzerland possessed other possible centers of resistance to feudal oppression. These were the high and remote valleys of the country, protected, not by man-made walls, but by frowning mountain ramparts. Communities dwelling within such valleys could resist assaults as well as could the fortified cities of the plain. If beaten they could flee pursuit, a thing which the *Bürger* could not do. Finally, they had the advantage of offering far less to the cupidity of conquerors than did the wealthy lowland centers of trade and industry. Switzerland owes its liberty to a union of

peasant communes and walled cities. It was by the former . . . that the first great historic step was taken toward independence."—*Ibid.*, pp. 18-20.

1200-1830.—Democracy in suffrage. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: 1200-1600; 1200-1830: SWITZERLAND.

1207-1401.—Extension of the dominions of the House of Savoy beyond Lake Geneva.—City of Geneva surrounded. See SAVOY and PIEDMONT: 11th-15th centuries.

1291-1315.—Liberation from Austria.—Formation of Swiss Confederation. See above: Three Forest Cantons; AUSTRIA: 1291-1349; GERMANY: 1273-1308.

14th century.—Military organization. See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 13.

1332-1460.—Extension of the old confederation, or "Old League of High Germany."—Three cantons increased to eight.—"All the original cantons were German in speech and feeling, and the formal style of their union was 'the Old League of High Germany.' But in strict geographical accuracy there was . . . a small Burgundian element in the Confederation, if not from the beginning, at least from its aggrandizement in the 13th and 14th centuries. That is to say, part of the territory of the states which formed the old Confederation lay geographically within the kingdom of Burgundy, and a further part lay within the Lesser Burgundy of the Dukes of Zähringen. But, by the time when the history of the Confederation begins, the kingdom of Burgundy was pretty well forgotten, and the small German-speaking territory which it took in at its extreme northeast corner may be looked on as practically German ground. . . . It is specially needful to bear in mind, first, that, till the last years of the 13th century, not even the germ of modern Switzerland had appeared on the map of Europe; secondly, that the Confederation did not formally become an independent power till the 17th century; lastly, that, though the Swiss name had been in common use for ages, it did not become the formal style of the Confederation till the 10th century. Nothing in the whole study of historical geography is more necessary than to root out the notion that there has always been a country of Switzerland, as there has always been a country of Germany, Gaul, or Italy. And it is no less needful to root out the notion that the Swiss of the original cantons in any way represent the *Helvetii* of Cæsar. The points to be borne in mind are that the Swiss Confederation is simply one of many German Leagues, which was more lasting and became more closely united than other German Leagues—that it gradually split off from the German Kingdom—that in the course of this process, the League and its members obtained a large body of Italian and Burgundian allies and subjects—lastly, that these allies and subjects have in modern times been joined into one Federal body with the original German Confederates. The three Swabian lands [the three forest cantons] which formed the kernel of the Old League lay at the point of union of the three Imperial kingdoms, parts of all of which were to become members of the Confederation in its later form. . . . The Confederation grew for a while by the admission of neighbouring lands and cities as members of a free German Confederation, owning no superior but the Emperor. First of all [1332], the city of Luzern joined the League. Then came the Imperial city of Zürich [1351], which had already begun to form a little dominion in the adjoining lands. Then [1352]

came the land of Glarus and the town of Zug with its small territory. And lastly came the great city of Bern [1353], which had already won a dominion over a considerable body of detached and outlying allies and subjects. These confederate lands and towns formed the Eight Ancient Cantons. Their close alliance with each other helped the growth of each canton separately, as well as that of the League as a whole. Those cantons whose geographical position allowed them to do so, were thus able to extend their power, in the form of various shades of dominion and alliance, over the smaller lands and towns in their neighbourhood. . . . Zürich, and yet more Bern, each formed, after the manner of an ancient Greek city, what in ancient Greece would have passed for an empire. In the 15th century [1415-1460], large conquests were made at the expense of the House of Austria, of which the earlier ones were made by direct Imperial sanction. The Confederation, or some or other of its members, had now extended its territory to the Rhine and the Lake of Constanz. The lands thus won, Aargau, Thurgau, and some other districts, were held as subject territories in the hands of some or other of the Confederate States. . . . No new states were admitted to the rank of confederate cantons. Before the next group of cantons was admitted, the general state of the Confederation and its European position had greatly changed. It had ceased to be a purely German power. The first extension beyond the original German lands and those Burgundian lands which were practically German began in the direction of Italy. Uri had, by the annexation of Urseren, become the neighbour of the Duchy of Milan, and in the middle of the 15th century, this canton acquired some rights in the Val Leventina on the Italian side of the Alps. This was the beginning of the extension of the Confederation on Italian ground. But far more important than this was the advance of the Confederates over the Burgundian lands to the west."—E. A. Freeman, *Historical geography of Europe*, ch. 8, sect. 6.

1386-1388.—Austrian defeats at Sempach and Naefels.—"Seldom, if ever, has Switzerland seen a more eventful month than that of July, 1386, for in that month she fought and won the ever-memorable battle of Sempach. . . . There is seldom much love lost between oppressor and oppressed, and Austria and the Swiss Confederation had for some time held that relation to each other. A ten years' peace had indeed been concluded between the two powers, but it was a sham peace, and the interval had been used by both to prepare for new conflicts. . . . Zurich laid siege to Rapperswyl with the intent to destroy the odious Austrian toll-house; Lucerne levelled with the ground the Austrian fort Rothenburg, and entered into alliances with Entlebuch and Sempach to overthrow the Austrian supremacy. This was equal to a declaration of war, and war was indeed imminent. Duke Leopold III., of Austria, was most anxious to bring the quarrel to an issue, and to chastise the insolent Swiss citizens and peasantry. . . . The nobles of Southern Germany rallied round the gallant swordsman, and made him their leader in the expeditions against the bourgeoisie and peasantry. And no sooner had the truce expired (June, 1386), than they directed their first attack on the bold Confederation. . . . Leopold's plan was to make Lucerne the centre of his military operations, but in order to draw away attention from his real object, he sent a division of 5,000 men to Zurich to simulate an

attack on that town. Whilst the unsuspecting Confederates lay idle within the walls of Zurich, he gathered reinforcements from Burgundy, Swabia, and the Austro-Helvetian Cantons, the total force being variously estimated at from 12,000 to 24,000 men. He marched his army in the direction of Lucerne, but by a round-about way, and seized upon Willisau, which he set on fire, intending to punish Sempach 'en passant' for her desertion. But the Confederates getting knowledge of his stratagem left Zurich to defend herself, and struck straight across the country in pursuit of the enemy. Climbing the heights of Sempach, . . . they encamped at Meyersholz, a wood fringing the hilltop. The Austrians leaving Sursee, for want of some more practicable road towards Sempach, made their way slowly and painfully along the path which leads from Sursee to the heights, and then turns suddenly down upon Sempach. Great was their surprise and consternation when at the junction of the Sursee and Hiltisrieden roads they came suddenly upon the Swiss force. . . . The Swiss . . . drew up in battle order, their force taking a kind of wedge-shaped mass, the shorter edge foremost, and the bravest men occupying the front positions. . . . The onset was furious, and the Austrian Hotspurs, each eager to outstrip his fellows in the race for honour, rushed on the Swiss, drove them back a little, and then tried to encompass them and crush them in their midst. . . . All the fortune of the battle seemed against the Swiss, for their short weapons could not reach a foe guarded by long lances. But suddenly the scene changed. 'A good and pious man,' says the old chronicler, deeply mortified by the misfortune of his country, stepped forward from the ranks of the Swiss—Arnold von Winkelried. Shouting to his comrades in arms, 'I will cut a road for you; take care of my wife and children!' he dashed on the enemy, and, catching hold of as many spears as his arms could encompass, he bore them to the ground with the whole weight of his body. His comrades rushed over his corpse, burst through the gap made in the Austrian ranks, and began a fierce hand-to-hand encounter. . . . A fearful carnage followed, in which no mercy was shown, and there fell of the common soldiers 2,000 men, and no fewer than 700 of the nobility. The Swiss lost but 120 men. . . . This great victory . . . gave to the Confederation independence, and far greater military and political eminence. . . . The story of Winkelried's heroic action has given rise to much fruitless but interesting discussion. The truth of the tale, in fact, can neither be confirmed nor denied, in the absence of any sufficient proof. But Winkelried is no myth. . . . There is proof that a family of the name of Winkelried lived at Unterwalden, at the time of the battle. . . . The victory of Naefels [April, 1388] forms a worthy pendant to that of Sempach. . . . The Austrians, having recovered their spirits after the terrible disaster," invaded the Glarus valley in strong force, and met with another overthrow, losing 1,700 men. "In 1380 a seven years' peace was arranged. . . . This peace was first prolonged for 20 years, and afterwards, in 1412, for 50 years."—Mrs. L. Hug and R. Stead, *Story of Switzerland*, ch. 15.

1396-1499.—Grey Leagues.—Democratic independence of Graubünden (Grisons) achieved.—Alliance with the Swiss cantons.—Swabian War.—Practical separation of the confederacy from the Empire.—"It was precisely at this epoch [the later years of the fourteenth century] that the common people of Graubünden [or the Grisons]

felt the necessity of standing for themselves alone against the world. Threatened by the Habsburgs, suspicious of the See of Chur [see TYROL], ill-governed by their decadent dynastic nobles, encouraged by the example of the Forest Cantons, they began to form leagues and alliances for mutual protection and the preservation of peace within the province. Nearly a century was occupied in the origination and consolidation of those three Leagues which turned what we now call Graubünden into an independent democratic state. . . . The town of Chur, which had been steadily rising in power, together with the immediate vassals of the See, took the lead. They combined into an association, which assumed the name of the Gotteshausbund; and of which the Engadine [the upper valley of the Inn] formed an important factor. Next followed a league between the Abbot of Dissentis, the nobles of the Oberland, the Communes of that district, and its outlying dependencies. This was called the Grey League—according to popular tradition because the folk who swore it wore grey serge coats, but more probably because it was a League of Counts, Gräfen, Grawen. The third league was formed after the final dispersion of the great inheritance of Vaz, which passed through the Counts of Toggenburg into the hands of females and their representatives. This took the name of Zehn Gerichte, or Ten Jurisdictions, and embraced Davos, Belfort, Schanfigg, the Prättigau, and Maienfeld. The date of the formation of the Gotteshausbund is uncertain; but its origin may be assigned to the last years of the 14th century [some writers date in 1396]. That of the Grey League, or Graue Bund, or Obere Theil, as it is variously called, is traditionally 1424. (It is worth mentioning that this League took precedence of the other two, and that the three were known as the Grey Leagues.) That of the Zehn Gerichte is 1438. In 1471 these three Leagues formed a triple alliance, defensive and offensive, protective and aggressive, without prejudice to the Holy Roman Empire of which they still considered themselves to form a part, and without due reservation of the rights acquired by inheritance or purchase by the House of Austria within their borders. This important revolution, which defeudalized a considerable Alpine territory, and which made the individual members of its numerous Communes sovereigns by the right of equal voting, was peaceably effected. . . . The constitution of Graubünden after the formation of the Leagues, in theory and practise, . . . was a pure democracy, based on manhood suffrage. . . . The first difficulties with which this new Republic of peasants had to contend, arose from the neighbourhood of feudal and imperial Austria. The Princes of the House of Habsburg had acquired extensive properties and privileges in Graubünden. . . . These points of contact became the source of frequent rubs, and gave the Austrians opportunities for interfering in the affairs of the Grey Leagues. A little war which broke out in the Lower Engadine in 1475, a war of raids and reprisals, made bad blood between the people of Tirol and their Grisons neighbours. But the real struggle of Graubünden with Austria began in earnest, when the Leagues were drawn into the so-called Swabian War (1496-1499). The Emperor Maximilian promoted an association of south German towns and nobles, in order to restore his Imperial authority over the Swiss Cantons. They resisted his encroachments, and formed a close alliance with the Grey Leagues. That was the commencement of a tie which bound Graubünden,

as a separate political entity, to the Confederation, and which subsisted for several centuries. Graubünden acted as an independent Republic, but was always ready to co-operate with the Swiss. . . . Fighting side by side [in the Swabian War] with the men of Uri, Glarus, Zürich, the Bündners learned the arts of warfare in the lower Rheinthal. Afterwards, in 1499, they gained the decisive battle of this prolonged struggle on their own ground and unassisted. In a narrow gorge called Calven, just where the Münsterthal opens out into the Vintschgau above Glurns, 5,000 men of the Grey Leagues defeated the whole chivalry and levies of Tirol. Many thousands of the foe (from 4,000 to 5,000 is the mean estimate) were left dead upon the field." Maximilian hastened to the scene with a fresh army, but found only deserted villages, and was forced by famine to retreat. "The victory of Calven raised the Grisons to the same rank as the Swiss, and secured their reputation in Europe as fighting men of the best quality. It also led to a formal treaty with Austria, in which the points at issue between the two parties were carefully defined."—J. A. Symonds, *History of Graubünden* (Strickland's "The Engadine," pp. 29-33).—During the Swabian War, in 1499, the Swiss concluded a treaty with France. "Willibald Pirckheimer, who was present with 400 red-habited citizens of Nuremberg, has graphically described every incident of this war. The imperial reinforcements arrived slowly and in separate bodies; the princes and nobles fighting in real earnest, the cities with little inclination. The Swiss were, consequently, able to defeat each single detachment before they could unite, and were in this manner victorious in ten engagements." The emperor, "dividing his forces, despatched the majority of his troops against Basle, under the Count von Fürstenburg, whilst he advanced towards Geneva, and was occupied in crossing the lake when the news of Fürstenburg's defeat and death, near Dornach, arrived. The princes, little desirous of staking their honour against their low-born opponents, instantly returned home in great numbers, and the emperor was therefore compelled to make peace [1499]. The Swiss retained possession of the Thurgau and of Basle, and Schaffhausen joined the confederation, which was not subject to the imperial chamber, and for the future belonged merely in name to the empire, and gradually fell under the influence of France."—W. Menzel, *History of Germany*, v. 2, ch. 191.

15th century.—Supply of soldiers for papal guard. See VATICAN: 15th century.

1414.—Council of Constance. See PAPACY: 1414-1418.

1476-1477.—Defeat of Charles the Bold. See BURGUNDY: 1476-1477.

1481-1501.—Disagreements over the spoils of the war with Charles the Bold.—Threatened rupture.—Convention of Stanz.—Enlargement of the confederacy.—Its loose and precarious constitution.—"In the war with Charles the Bold, Bern had gained greatly in extent on the west, while the immense booty taken in battle and the tributes laid on conquered cities seemed to the country cantons to be unfairly divided, for all were supposed to receive an equal share. The cities protested that it was no fair division of booty to give each one of the country states, who had altogether furnished 14,000 men for the war, an even share with Bern which had sent out 40,000. Another bone of contention was the enlargement of the union. The cities had for a long time desired to bring the cantons of Freiburg and Solo-

thurn into the League. . . . But these were municipal governments, and the Forest States, unwilling to add more to the voting strength of the cities and thereby place themselves in the minority, refused again and again to admit these cantons. The situation daily grew more critical. Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden made an agreement with Glarus to stand by each other in case of attack. Luzern, Bern, and Zürich made a compact of mutual citizenship, a form of agreement by which they sought to circumvent the oath they had taken in the League of Eight to enter into no new alliances. Just at this point there was alleged to have been discovered a plot to destroy the city of Luzern by countrymen of Obwalden and Entlibuch. The cities were thrown into a frenzy and peace was strained to the utmost. Threats and recriminations passed from side to

tion and importance, was a most desirable acquisition, and in the same year the addition of Schaffhausen, like Basel, a free imperial city with outlying territories, still further strengthened the Union. The next, and for 285 years the last, addition to the inner membership of the alliance was Appenzell. . . . Connected with the confederacy there were, for varying periods and in different relationships, other territories and cities more or less under its control. One class consisted of the so-called Allied Districts ('Zugewandte and Verbündete Orte'), who were attached to the central body not as equal members, but as friends for mutual assistance. This form of alliance began almost with the formation of the league, and gradually extended till it included St. Gallen, Biel, Neuchâtel, the Bishopric of Basel (which territory lay outside the city), the separate confederacies



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side, but finally, as an almost hopeless effort toward reconciliation, a Diet was called to meet at Stanz on the 8th of December, 1481. The details of this conference read like romance, so great was the transformation which took place in the feelings of the confederates. . . . Just as the Diet was about to break up in confusion a compromise was effected, and an agreement was drawn up which is known as the Convention of Stanz (Stanzerverkommis). . . . As to the matter latest in contention, it was agreed that movable booty should be divided according to the number of men sent into war, but new acquisitions of territory should be shared equally among the states participating. Thus the principle of state-rights was preserved and the idea of popular representation received its first, and for 300 years almost its only recognition. In another agreement, made the same day, Freiburg and Solothurn were admitted to the League on equal terms with the others. In 1501 the confederation was enlarged by the admission of Basel, which, on account of its situa-

tion and importance, was a most desirable acquisition, and in the same year the addition of Schaffhausen, like Basel, a free imperial city with outlying territories, still further strengthened the Union. More closely attached to the confederation were the 'Gemeine Vogteien,' or subject territories [Aargau, Thurgau, etc.], whose government was administered by various members of the league in partnership. These lands had been obtained partly by purchase or forfeiture of loans and partly by conquest. . . . Before the middle of the 16th century nearly all the territory now included in Switzerland was in some way connected with the confederation. Upon this territorial basis of states, subject lands and allies, the fabric of government stood till the close of the 18th century. It was a loose confederation, whose sole organ of common action was a Diet in which each state was entitled to one vote. . . . Almost the only thread that held the Swiss Confederation together was the possession of subject lands. In these they were interested as partners in a business corporation. . . . These common properties were all that prevented complete rupture on several critical occa-

sions."—J. M. Vincent, *State and federal government in Switzerland*, ch. 1.

16th century.—Education under Calvin. See EDUCATION: Modern; 16th century: Calvin.

16th century.—Paracelsus and advance of medical science. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Medieval; 16th century: Paracelsus.

16th century.—1891.—Initiative and referendum. See INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: Early development and growth in Switzerland.

1513-1516.—Invasion of France.—Defeat by the French at Marignano.—Treaties of perpetual alliance with Francis I. See FRANCE: 1513-1515; 1515-1518; 1516-1517.

1519.—Geneva in civic relations with Berne and Freiburg. See GENEVA: 1504-1535.

1519-1524.—Beginning of the Reformation at Zurich, under Zwingli. See PAPACY: 1519-1524.

1528-1531.—Spread of the Reformation.—Adhesion of the Forest Cantons to Romanism.—



HULDREICH ZWINGLI

Differences between the Swiss Reformers and the German Protestants.—Conference at Marburg.—Civil war among the cantons.—Death of Zwingli.—From Zurich, "the reformed faith penetrated, but only gradually, into the northern and eastern cantons. Bern was reached in 1528, after a brilliant disputation held in that city. Basel and Schaffhausen followed in 1529, and then St. Gall, Appenzell, Graubünden, and Solothurn, though some of them had serious struggles within themselves and fell in only partly with the reforms. But in the Central or Forest Cantons it was that the fiercest opposition was encountered. . . . From the very simplicity of their lives the people ignored the degeneracy of the priesthood, and amongst these pastoral peoples the priests were of simpler manners and more moral life than those in the cities; they disliked learning and enlightenment. Then there was the old feeling of antipathy to the cities, coupled with a strong dislike for the reforms which had abolished 'Reislaufen' [military service under foreign pay], that standing source of income to the cantons. Lucerne, bought

with French gold, struggled with Zurich for the lead. So far was the opposition carried that the Catholic districts by a majority of votes insisted (at the Diet) on a measure for suppressing heresy in Zurich, whilst some were for expelling that canton from the league. The Forest Cantons issued orders that Zwingli should be seized should he be found within their territories; consequently he kept away from the great convocation at Baden, 1526. . . . Wider and wider grew the chasm between the two religious parties, and Zwingli at length formed a 'Christian League' between the Swiss Protestants and some of the German cities and the Elector of Hesse. On the other hand, the Catholics entered into an alliance with Ferdinand of Austria, a determined enemy to the reformed religion. At last the Protestant party was exasperated beyond bearing, and Zurich declared war on the Forest Cantons, Zwingli himself joining in the vicissitudes of the campaign. His camp presented the 'picture of a well-organized, God-fearing army of a truly Puritan stamp.' The encounter at Kappel, in June, 1529, however, took a peaceful turn, thanks to the mediation of Landammann Aebli, of Glarus, greatly to the disgust of Zwingli, who prophetically exclaimed that some day the Catholics would be the stronger party, and then they would not show so much moderation. All ill-feeling, indeed, subsided when the two armies came within sight of each other. The curious and touching episode known as the 'Kappeler Milchsuppe' took place here. A band of jolly Catholics had got hold of a large bowl of milk, but lacking bread they placed it on the boundary line between Zug and Zurich. At once a group of Zurich men turned up with some loaves, and presently the whole party fell to eating the 'Milchsuppe' right merrily. A peace was concluded on the 29th of June, 1529, by which the Austrian League was dissolved, and freedom of worship granted to all. . . . By his treatise, 'De vera et falsa religione' (1525), Zwingli had, though unwillingly, thrown the gauntlet into the Wittenberg camp. The work was intended to be a scientific refutation of the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, and a war of words arose. The contest was by each disputant carried on 'suo more'; by Luther with his usual authoritative and tempestuous vehemence, by Zwingli in his own cool reasoning, dignified, and courteous style and republican frankness. Presently there came a strong desire for a union between the German Protestants, and the Swiss Reformers [called Sacramentarians by the Lutherans], . . . the impulse to it being given by Charles V.'s 'Protest' against the Protestants. Landgrave Philip of Hesse, the political leader of the German reformers, invited Luther and Zwingli to meet at his castle of Marburg [1529], with the view of reconciling the two sections. The religious colloquium was attended by many savants, princes, nobles, and all the chief leaders of the Reformation, and might have done great things, but came to grief through the obstinacy of Luther, as is well known, or rather through his determination to approve of no man's views except they should agree exactly with his own. Luther insisted on a literal interpretation of the words 'This is my body,' whilst Zwingli saw in them only a metaphorical or symbolical signification. . . . To return for a moment to home politics. The peace of 1529 was a short-lived one. Zwingli, anxious only to spread the reformed faith over the whole republic, did not realize clearly the hatred of the Forest district against the new creed. . . . War was imminent, and was indeed eagerly desired on



both sides. Bern, finding that war was likely to be injurious to her private ends, insisted on a stoppage of mercantile traffic between the opposing districts, but Zwingli scorned to use such a means to hunger the enemy and so bring them to submit. However Zurich was outvoted in the Christian League (May 16th), and the Forest was excluded from the markets of that city and Bern. . . . On Zurich was turned all the fury of the famished Forest men, and they sent a challenge in October, 1531. A second time the hostile armies met at Kappel, but the positions were reversed. Zurich was unprepared to meet a foe four times as numerous as her own, and Bern hesitated to come to her aid. However Göldlin, the captain of the little force, recklessly engaged with the opposing army, whether from treachery or incapacity is not known, but he was certainly opposed to the reformed faith. Zwingli had taken leave of his friend Bullinger, as though foreseeing his own death in the coming struggle, and had joined the Zurich force. He was with the chief banner, and with some 500 of his overmatched comrades, fell in the thickest of the battle. . . . But the reformation was far too deeply rooted to be thus destroyed. Bullinger, the friend of Zwingli, and, later on, of Calvin, worthily succeeded to the leadership of the Zurich reformers."—Mrs. L. Hug and R. Stead, *Switzerland*, ch. 22.

ALSO IN: J. H. Merle d'Aubigné, *History of the Reformation in the sixteenth century*, v. 3-4, bk. 11, 15-16.—L. von Ranke, *History of the Reformation in Germany*, v. 3, bk. 6, ch. 2-4.

1531-1648.—Religious divisions and conflicts.—Annexations of territory.—Peace with the duke of Savoy.—Coming of Protestant refugees.—Industrial progress.—Peace.—"A peace at Denikon in 1531 marks the acknowledgment of the principle of each Canton's independence. . . . The Confederacy was now fatally divided. There is, perhaps, no other instance of a State so deeply and so permanently sundered by the Reformation. Other governments adopted or rejected the reformed religion for their dominions as a whole; the Confederacy, by its constitution, was constrained to allow each Canton to determine its religion for itself; and the presence of Catholic and Reformed States side by side, each clinging with obstinacy to the religion of their choice, became the origin of jealousies and wars which have threatened more than once to rend asunder the ties of union. Next to the endless but uninteresting theme of religious differences comes the history of the annexations" by which the confederacy extended its limits. "In the direction of the Jura was a country divided between many governments, which the princes of Savoy, the Hapsburgs of the West, had once effectually ruled, but which had become morselled among many claimants during a century and a half of weakness, and which Duke Charles III. of Savoy was now seeking to reconcile to his authority. Geneva was the chief city of these parts. . . . Factions in favour of or against [the rule of the duke of Savoy] . . . divided the city [see GENEVA: 1504-1535]. The alliance of Bern and Freyburg was at length sought for; and the conclusion of a treaty of co-citizenship in 1526 opened at once the prospect of a collision between the House of Savoy and the Confederacy. That collision was not long delayed. In 1536, after repeated acts of provocation by Charles III., 7,000 men of Bern appeared within Geneva. To reach the city they had traversed the Pays de Vaud; after entering it they passed onwards to the provinces of Gex and Chablais. All that they traversed they

annexed. Even the city which they had entered they would have ruled, had not some sparks of honour and the entreaties of its inhabitants restrained them from the annihilation of the liberties which they had been called on to defend. The men of Freyburg and of the Valais at the same time made humbler conquests from Savoy. Later, the strong fortress of Chillon, and the rich bishopric of Lausanne, were seized upon by Bern. A wide extent of territory was thus added to the Confederacy; and again a considerable population speaking the French tongue was brought under the dominion of the Teutonic Cantons. These acquisitions were extended, in 1555, by the cession of the county of Gruyère, through the embarrassments of its last impoverished Count. They were diminished, however, by the loss of Gex and Chablais in 1564. The jealousy of many of the cantons at the good fortune of their confederates, and the reviving power of the House of Savoy, had made the conquests insecure. Emmanuel Philibert, the hero of St. Quentin, the ally of the great sovereigns of France and Spain, asked back his provinces; and prudence counselled the surrender of the two, in order to obtain a confirmation of the possession of the rest [see SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: 1559-1580]. The southern side of the Lake Lemman, which had thus been momentarily held, and which nature seemed to have intended to belong to the Confederacy, was thus abandoned. The frontiers, however, which were now secured became permanent ones. The Dukes of Savoy had transferred much of their ambition, with their capital, beyond the Alps; and the Confederates remained secure in their remaining possessions. The Confederacy might now have added further to its power by admitting new members to its League. . . . Constance . . . had urged its own incorporation. The religious tendencies of its inhabitants, however, had made it suspected; and it was allowed to fall, in 1548, without hope of recovery, under the dominion of Austria. Geneva . . . was pleading loudly for admission. The jealousy of Bern, and later the hostility of the Catholic Cantons to the faith of which the city had become the centre, refused the request. She remained a mere ally, with even her independence not always ungrudgingly defended against the assaults of her enemies. Religious zeal indeed was fatal during this century to political sagacity. Under its influence the alliance with the rich city of Mulhausen, which had endured for more than a hundred years, was thrown off in 1587; the overtures of Strasburg for alliance were rejected; the proposals of the Grisons Leagues were repulsed. The opportunities of the Confederates were thus neglected, while those of their neighbours became proportionately increased. . . . The progress that is to be traced during the 16th century is such as was due to the times rather than to the people. The cessation of foreign wars and the fewer inducements for mercenary service gave leisure for the arts of peace; and agriculture and trade resumed their progress. Already Switzerland began to be sought by refugees from England, France, and Italy. The arts of weaving and of dyeing were introduced, and the manufacture of watches began at Geneva. . . . War, which had been almost abandoned except in the service of others, comes little into the annals of the Confederation as a State. . . . As another century advances, there is strife at the very gates of the Confederation. . . . But the Confederacy itself was never driven into war."—C. F. Johnstone, *Historical abstracts*, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: H. Zschokke, *History of Switzerland*,

ch. 33-41.—J. Planta, *History of the Helvetic confederacy*, v. 2, bk. 2, ch. 6.

1536-1564.—Calvin's ecclesiastical state at Geneva. See GENEVA: 1536-1564.

1579-1630.—Catholic revival and rally.—Borromeo or Golden League.—“Pre-eminent amongst those who worked for the Catholic revival was the famous Carlo Borromeo, Archbishop of Milan and nephew of Pius IV. He lived the life of a saint, and in due time was canonized. To his see belonged the Swiss bailliages in the Ticino and Valtellina. Indefatigable in his labours, constantly visiting every part of his diocese, toiling up to the Alpine huts, he gathered the scattered flocks into the Papal fold, whether by mildness or by force. . . . For the spread of Catholic doctrines he hit upon three different means. He called into being the Collegium Helveticum in 1579 at Milan, where the Swiss priests were educated free. He sent the Jesuits into the country, and placed a nuncio at Lucerne, in 1580. In 1586 was signed, between the seven Catholic cantons, the Borromeo or Golden League, directed against the reformers, and in the following year a coalition was, by the same cantons, excepting Solothurn, entered into with Philip of Spain and with Savoy. The Jesuits settled themselves in Lucerne and Freiburg, and soon gained influence amongst the rich and the educated, whilst the Capuchins, who fixed themselves at Altorf, Stanz, Appenzell, and elsewhere, won the hearts of the masses by their lowliness and devotion. In this way did Rome seek to regain her influence over the Swiss peoples, and the effect of her policy was soon felt in the semi-Protestant and subject lands. . . . In the Valais, the Protestant party, though strong, was quite swept out by the Jesuits, before 1630.”—Mrs. L. Hug and R. Stead, *Switzerland*, ch. 25.

1620-1626.—Valtelline revolt and war with the Grisons. See FRANCE: 1624-1626.

1648.—Peace of Westphalia.—Acknowledged independence and separation from the German empire. See GERMANY: 1648: Peace of Westphalia; WESTPHALIA, PEACE OF (1648).

1652-1789.—Peasant revolt and the Toggenburg War.—Religious conflicts.—Battles of Villmergen.—Peace of Aarau.—“About the middle of the 17th century there was growing up, in all the cantons except the Waldstätten, a feeling of strong discontent among the peasants, who still suffered from many of the tyrannies which had descended to them from the old days of serfdom. They felt the painful contrast between their lot and that of the three old cantons, where every peasant voted for his own magistrates and his own laws, and helped to decide the taxes and contributions which he should pay. . . . Now that their liberty had been proclaimed at Westphalia, they were inspired with the idea of trying to make it a reality. . . . They rose on the occasion of the reduction of the value of their copper coinage. . . . Opposition began among the Entlibuchers of Lucerne, a tall and sturdy race, that lived in the long, fertile valley on the banks of the Emmen. . . . Their spirit was soon quenched, however, by the threats of Zurich and Berne; but though they yielded for the moment, their example had spread, and there were popular risings, excited in the large canton of Berne by the same causes, which were not so easily checked. There was a second revolt in Lucerne, which was intended to be nothing less than a league of all the lower classes throughout the ten cantons. The peasants of Lucerne, Berne, Basel, Solothurn, and the territory of Aargau, all joined in this and held an assembly

at Sumiswald, in April 1653, where they chose Nicholas Leuenberger as their chief, and proclaimed their purpose of making themselves free as the Small Cantons. To this union, unfortunately, they brought neither strength of purpose nor wisdom. . . . Meanwhile the cities were not idle. Zurich, the capital, gave the order for the whole confederacy to arm, in May 1653. The struggle was short and decisive. For a few weeks Leuenberger's soldiers robbed and murdered where they could, and made feeble and futile attempts upon the small cities of Aargau. Towards the end of May he met, near Herzogenbuchsee, the Bernese troops. . . . A desperate fight ensued, but the insurgents were soon overpowered. . . . This battle ended the insurrection.” Leuenberger was beheaded. “No sooner was this revolt of the peasants over than the smouldering fires of religious hatred, zealously fanned by the clergy on both sides, broke out again. . . . Several families of Arth, in Schwyz had been obliged by the Catholics to abjure their faith, or fly from their homes.” Zurich took up their cause, and “a general war broke out. . . . Berne first despatched troops to protect her own frontier, and then sent 40 banners to the help of Zurich.” The Bernese troops were so careless that they allowed themselves to be surprised (January 14, 1656) by 4,000 Lucerners, in the territory of Villmergen, and were ruinously defeated, losing 800 men and eleven guns. “Soon afterwards a peace was concluded, where everything stood much as it had stood at the beginning of this war, which had lasted only nine weeks. . . . A second insurrection, on a smaller scale than the peasants' revolt, took place in St. Gall in the first years of the 18th century. The Swiss, free in the eyes of the outside world, were, as we have already seen, mere serfs in nearly all the cantons, and such was their condition in the country of Toggenburg. . . . The greater part of the rights over these estates had been sold to the abbot of St. Gall in 1468. In the year 1700, the abbey of St. Gall was presided over by Leodegar Burgisser as sovereign lord. . . . He began by questioning all the commune rights of the Toggenburgers, and called the people his serfs, in order that they might become so used to the name as not to rebel against the hardness of the condition. Even at the time when he became abbot, there was very little, either of right or privilege, remaining to these poor people. . . . When, in 1701, Abbot Leodegar ordered them to build and keep open, at their own expense, a new road through the Hummelwald, crushed as they had been, they turned.” After much fruitless remonstrance and appeal they took up arms, supported by the Protestant cantons and attacked by the Catholics, with aid contributed by the nuncio of the pope, himself. “The contest was practically ended on the 25th of July, 1712, by a decisive victory by the Protestants on the battle-field of Villmergen, where they had been beaten by the Lucerne men 56 years before. The battle lasted four hours, and 2,000 Catholics were slain. . . . In the month of August, a general peace was concluded at Aarau, to the great advantage of the conquerors. The five Catholic cantons were obliged to yield their rights over Baden and Rapperswyl, and to associate Berne with themselves in the sovereignty over Thurgau and the Rheinfeld. By this provision the two religions became equalized in those provinces. . . . The Toggenburgers came once more under the jurisdiction of an abbot of St. Gall, but with improved rights and privileges, and under the powerful protection of Zurich and Berne. The Catholic Cantons were



COLLOQUY OF LUTHER AND ZWINGLI AT MARBURG, 1529  
Famous conference on Transubstantiation in the Rittersaal of the Castle  
(After the painting by A. Noack)



long in recovering from the expenses of this war. . . . During 86 years from the peace of Aarau, the Swiss were engaged in neither foreign nor civil war, and the disturbances which agitated the different cantons from time to time were confined to a limited stage. But real peace and union were as far off as ever. Religious differences, plots, intrigues, and revolts, kept people of the same canton and village apart, until the building which their forefathers had raised in the early days of the republic was gradually weakened and ready to fall, like a house of cards, at the first blow from France."—H. D. S. Mackenzie, *Switzerland*, ch. 15-16.

ALSO IN: H. Zschokke, *History of Switzerland*, ch. 42-56.

1746-1827.—Educational reforms. See EDUCATION: Modern; 18th-19th centuries; Pestalozzi.

1792-1798.—Ferment of the French Revolution.—Invasion and subjugation by the French.—Robbing of the treasure of Berne.—Formation of the Helvetic republic.—"The world rang with arms and cries of war, with revolutions, battles and defeats. The French promised fraternity and assistance to every people who wished to make themselves free. . . . Their arms advanced victorious through Savoy and the Netherlands and over the Rhine. Nearer and nearer drew the danger around the country of the Alpine people. But the government of the Confederate states showed no foresight in view of the danger. They thought themselves safe behind the shield of their innocence and their neutrality between the contending parties. They had no arms and prepared none; they had no strength and did not draw closer the bands of their everlasting compact. Each canton, timidly and in silence, cared for its own safety, but little for that of the others. . . . All kinds of pamphlets stirred up the people. At Lausanne, Vevey, Rolle and other places, fiery young men, in noisy assemblages, drank success to the arms of emancipated France. Although public order was nowhere disturbed by such proceedings, the government of Berne thought it necessary to put a stop to them by severe measures and to compel silence by wholesome fear. They sent plenipotentiaries supported by an armed force. The guilty and even the innocent were punished. More fled. This silenced Vaud, but did not quell her indignation. The fugitives breathed vengeance. . . . In foreign countries dwelt sadly many of those who, at various times, had been banished from the Confederacy because they had, by word or deed, too boldly or importunately defended the rights and freedom of their fellow-citizens. Several of these addressed the chiefs of the French republic. . . . Such addresses pleased the chiefs of France. They thought in their hearts that Switzerland would be an excellent bulwark for France, and a desirable gate, through which the way would be always open to Italy and Germany. They also knew of and longed for the treasures of the Swiss cities. And they endeavored to find cause of quarrel with the magistrates of the Confederates. . . . Shortly afterwards, came the great general Napoleon Buonaparte, and marched through Savoy into Italy against the forces of the emperor. . . . In a very few months, though in many battles, Buonaparte vanquished the whole power of Austria, conquered and terrified Italy from one end to the other, took the whole of Lombardy and compelled the emperor to make peace. He made Lombardy a republic, called the Cisalpine. When the subjects of Grisons in Valtellina, Chiavenna and Bormio saw this, they pre-

ferred to be citizens of the neighboring Cisalpine republic, rather than poor subjects of Grisons. For their many grievances and complaints were rarely listened to. But Buonaparte said to Grisons: 'If you will give freedom and equal rights to these people, they may be your fellow-citizens, and still remain with you. I give you time; decide and send word to me at Milan.' . . . When the last period for decision had passed, Buonaparte became indignant and impatient, and united Valtellina, Chiavenna and Bormio to the Cisalpine republic (22d Oct., 1797). . . . So the old limits of Switzerland were unjustly contracted; four weeks afterwards also, that part of the bishopric of Bâle which had hitherto been respected on account of its alliance with the Swiss, was added to France. Thereat great fear fell on the Confederates. . . . Then the rumor spread that a French army was approaching the frontiers of Switzerland to protect the people of Vaud. They had called for the intervention of France in virtue of ancient treaties. But report said that the French intended to overthrow the Confederate authorities and to make themselves masters of the country. . . . Almost the whole Confederacy was in a state of confusion and dissolution. The governments of the cantons, powerless, distrustful and divided, acted each for itself, without concert. . . . In the meanwhile a large army of French advanced. Under their generals Brune and Schauenberg they entered the territory of the Confederates, and Vaud, accepting foreign protection, declared herself independent of Berne. Then the governments of Switzerland felt that they could no longer maintain their former dominion. Lucerne and Schaffhausen declared their subjects free and united to themselves. Zurich released the prisoners of Stafa, and promised to ameliorate her constitution to the advantage of the people. . . . Even Freiburg now felt that the change must come for which Chénaur had bled. And the council of Berne received into their number 52 representatives of the country and said: 'Let us hold together in the common danger.' All these reforms and revolutions were the work of four weeks; all too late. Berne, indeed, with Freiburg and Solothurn, opposed her troops to the advancing French army. Courage was not wanting; but discipline, skill in arms and experienced officers. . . . On the very first day of the war (2d March, 1798), the enemy's light troops took Freiburg and Solothurn, and on the fourth (5th March), Berne itself. [See BERNE.] . . . France now authoritatively decided the future fate of Switzerland and said: 'The Confederacy is no more. Henceforward the whole of Switzerland shall form a free state, one and indivisible, under the name of the Helvetic republic. [See HELVETIAN REPUBLIC.] All the inhabitants, in country as well as city, shall have equal rights of citizenship. The citizens in general assembly shall choose their magistrates, officers, judges and legislative council; the legislative council shall elect the general government; the government shall appoint the cantonal prefects and officers.' The whole Swiss territory was divided into 18 cantons of about equal size. For this purpose the district of Berne was parcelled into the cantons of Vaud, Oberland, Berne and Aragus; several small cantons were united in one; as Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden and Zug in the canton of Waldstätten; St. Gallen district, Rheintal and Appenzell in the canton of Santis; several countries subject to the Confederacy, as Baden, Thurgau, Lugano and Bellinzona, formed new cantons. Valais was also added as one; Grisons was invited

to join; but Geneva, Muhlhausen and other districts formerly parts of Switzerland, were separated from her and incorporated with France. So decreed the foreign conquerors. They levied heavy war-taxes and contributions. They carried off the tons of gold which Berne, Zurich and other cities had accumulated in their treasure-chambers during their dominion. . . . But the mountaineers of Uri, Nidwalden, Schwyz and Glarus, original confederates in liberty, said: 'In battle and in blood, our fathers won the glorious jewel of our independence; we will not lose it but in battle and in blood.' . . . Then they fought valiantly near Wollrau and on the Schindellegi, but unsuccessfully. . . . But Aloys Reding reassembled his troops on the Rothenthurm, near the Morgarten field of victory. There a long and bloody battle took place. . . . Thrice did the French troops renew the combat: thrice were they defeated and driven back to Aegeri in Zug. It was the second of May. Nearly 2,000 of the enemy lay slain upon that glorious field. Gloriously also fought the Waldstätten on the next day near Arth. But the strength of the heroes bled away in their very victories. They made a treaty, and, with sorrow in their hearts, entered the Helvetic republic. Thus ended the old Bond of the Confederates. Four hundred and ninety years had it lasted; in seventy-four days it was dissolved."—H. Zschokke, *History of Switzerland*, ch. 57, 60.—"A system of robbery and extortion, more shameless even than that practised in Italy, was put in force against the cantonal governments, against the monasteries, and against private individuals. In compensation for the material losses inflicted upon the country, the new Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible, was proclaimed at Aarau. It conferred an equality of political rights upon all natives of Switzerland, and substituted for the ancient varieties of cantonal sovereignty a single national government, composed, like that of France, of a Directory and two Councils of Legislature. The towns and districts which had been hitherto excluded from a share in government welcomed a change which seemed to place them on a level with their former superiors: the mountaintowns fought with traditional heroism in defence of the liberties which they had inherited from their fathers; but they were compelled, one after another, to submit to the overwhelming force of France, and to accept the new constitution. Yet, even now, when peace seemed to have been restored, and the whole purpose of France attained, the tyranny and violence of the invaders exhausted the endurance of a spirited people. The magistrates of the Republic were expelled from office at the word of a French Commission; hostages were seized; at length an oath of allegiance to the new order was required as a condition for the evacuation of Switzerland by the French army. It was refused by the mountaineers of Unterwalden, and a handful of peasants met the French army at the village of Stanz, on the eastern shore of the Lake of Lucerne (Sept. 8). There for three days they fought with unyielding courage. Their resistance inflamed the French to a cruel vengeance: slaughtered families and burning villages renewed, in this so-called crusade of liberty, the savagery of ancient war."—C. A. Fyffe, *History of modern Europe*, v. 1, ch. 4.—"Geneva at the same time [1798] fell a prey to the ambition of the all-engrossing Republic. This celebrated city had long been an object of their desire; and the divisions by which it was now distracted afforded a favourable opportunity for accomplishing the object. The democratic party loudly demanded a union

with that power, and a commission was appointed by the Senate to report upon the subject. Their report, however, was unfavourable; upon which General Gerard, who commanded a small corps in the neighbourhood, took possession of the town; and the Senate, with the bayonet at their throats, formally agreed to a union with the conquering Republic."—A. Alison, *History of Europe, 1789-1815*, v. 6, ch. 25.—See also FRANCE: 1792 (June-August).

ALSO IN: A. Thiers, *History of the French Revolution (American edition)*, v. 4, pp. 248-252.—Mallet du Pan, *Memoirs and correspondence*, v. 2, ch. 13-14.

1797.—Bonaparte's dismemberment of the Graubünden. See FRANCE: 1797 (May-October). 1798-1799.—Battlefield of second coalition against France. See FRANCE: 1798-1799 (August-April).

1799 (August-December).—Campaign of France against Russians.—Battle of Zurich.—Carnage in the city.—Suvarov's retreat. See FRANCE: 1799 (August-December).

19th century.—Education made compulsory. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: Switzerland.

19th century.—Growth of young men's associations. See YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1844-1854.

1800.—Bonaparte's passage of the Great St. Bernard. See FRANCE: 1800-1801 (May-February).

1802.—Revolution instigated and enforced by Napoleon.—Effects.—Constitution of Malmaison. See FRANCE: 1801-1803.

1803.—Pledged to support France in war against England. See FRANCE: 1802-1804.

1803-1848.—Napoleon's Act of Mediation.—Independence regained and neutrality guaranteed by Congress of Vienna.—Geneva, the Valais, and Neuchâtel.—Federal pact of 1815.—Sonderbund and civil war.—Federal constitution of 1848.—Bonaparte summoned deputies of both parties to Paris, and after long consultation with them he gave to Switzerland, on the 2d February 1803, a new Constitution termed the Act of Mediation. Old names were restored, and in some cases what had been subject lands were incorporated in the League, which now consisted of 19 Cantons, each having a separate Constitution. The additional six were: St. Gallen, the Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, and Vaud. This was the fifth phase of the Confederation. A Diet was created, there being one deputy to each Canton, but still with limited powers, for he could only vote according to his instructions. The 19 deputies had, however, between them 25 votes, because every deputy who represented a Canton with more than 100,000 inhabitants possessed two votes, and there were six of these Cantons. The Diet met once a year in June, by turns at Zürich, Bern, Luzern, Freiburg, Solothurn, and Basel, the Cantons of which these were the capitals becoming successively directing Cantons. Three were Catholic and three Protestant. The head of the directing Canton for the time being was Landammann of Switzerland and President of the Diet. The Act of Mediation was not acceptable to all parties, and before Switzerland could become entirely independent there was to be one more foreign intervention. The fall of the Emperor Napoleon brought with it the destruction of his work in that country, the neutrality and independence of which were recognized by the Congress of Vienna [see VIENNA, CONGRESS OF], though upon condition of the maintenance in the Con-

federation of the new Cantons; and in 1814 the Valais (a Republic allied to the Confederation from the Middle Ages till 1708), Neuchâtel (which, from being subject to the King of Prussia, had been bestowed by Napoleon upon Marshal Berthier), and Geneva (which had been annexed to France under the Directory in 1798, but was now independent and rendered more compact by the addition of some territory belonging to France and Savoy) were added to the existing Cantons. Finally, the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of her territory were guaranteed by Austria, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, and Russia, in an Act signed at Paris on the 20th November 1815. Neuchâtel, however, only really gained its independence in 1857, when it ceased to be a Prussian Principality. The Confederation now consisted of 22 Cantons, and a Federal Pact, drawn up at Zürich by the Diet in 1815, and accepted by the Congress of Vienna, took the place of the Act of Mediation, and remained in force till 1848. It was in some respects a return to the state of things previous to the French Revolution, and restored to the Cantons a large portion of their former sovereignty. . . . Then came an epoch of agitation and discord. The Confederation suffered from a fundamental vice, i.e., the powerlessness of the central authority. The Cantons had become too independent, and gave to their deputies instructions differing widely from each other. The fall of the Bourbons in 1830 had its echo in Switzerland, the patricians of Bern and the aristocratic class in other Cantons lost the ascendancy which they had gradually recovered since the beginning of the century, and the power of the people was greatly increased. [See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Switzerland: 1830-1848.] In several months 12 Cantons, among which were Luzern and Friburg, modified their Constitutions in a democratic sense, some peaceably, others by revolution. . . . Between 1830 and 1847 there were in all 27 revisions of cantonal Constitutions. To political disputes religious troubles were added. In Aargau the Constitution of 1831, whereby the Grand Council was made to consist of 200 members, half being Protestants and half Catholics, was revised in 1840, and by the new Constitution the members were no longer to be chosen with any reference to creed, but upon the basis of wide popular representation, thus giving a numerical advantage to the Protestants. Discontent arose among the Catholics, and eventually some 2,000 peasants of that faith took up arms, but were beaten by Protestants of Aargau at Villmergen in January 1841, and the consequence was the suppression of the eight convents in that Canton, and the confiscation of their most valuable property. . . . A first result of the suppression of these convents was the fall of the Liberal government of Luzern, and the advent to power of the chiefs of the Ultramontane party in that Canton. Two years later the new government convoked delegates of the Catholic Cantons at Rothen, near Luzern, and there in secret conferences, and under the pretext that religion was in danger, the basis of a separate League or Sonderbund were laid, embracing the four Forest Cantons, Zug, and Friburg. Subsequently the Valais joined the League, which was clearly a violation not only of the letter but also of the spirit of the Federal Pact. In 1844 the Grand Council of Luzern voted in favour of the Jesuits' Council to be entrusted with the direction of superior public education, and this led to hostilities between the Liberal and Ultramontane parties. Bands of volunteers attacked Luzern and

were defeated, the expulsion of the Jesuits became a burning question [see JESUITS: 1700-1871], and finally, when the ordinary Diet assembled at Bern in July 1847, the Sonderbund Cantons declared their intention of persevering in their separate alliance until the other Cantons had decreed the re-establishment of the Aargau convents, abandoned the question of the Jesuits, and renounced all modifications of the Pact. These conditions could evidently not be accepted. . . . On the 4th November 1847, after the deputies of the Sonderbund had left the Diet, this League was declared to be dissolved, and hostilities broke out between the two contending parties. A short and decisive campaign of 25 days ensued, Friburg was taken by the Federal troops, under General Dufour, later Luzern opened its gates, the small Cantons and the Valais capitulated and the strife came to an end. . . . As soon as the Sonderbund was dissolved, it became necessary to proceed to the revision of the Federal Pact."—F. O. Adams and C. D. Cunningham, *Swiss Confederation*, ch. 1.

1810-1812.—Annexation of the Valais to France.—Extent of dominions in Europe. See FRANCE: 1810 (February-December); EUROPE: Modern: Map of Central Europe in 1812.

1817.—Accession to the Holy Alliance. See HOLY ALLIANCE.

1836.—First bank of issue established. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1830-1907.

1848-1890.—New constitution drawn up.—Revisions.—Constitution of 1874.—On the conclusion of the Sonderbund secession and war, the task of drawing up a constitution for the confederacy was confided to a committee of fourteen members, and the work was finished on April 8, 1848. "The project was submitted to the Cantons, and accepted at once by thirteen and a half; others joined during the summer, and the new Constitution was finally promulgated with the assent of all on the 12th September. Hence arose the seventh and last phase of the Confederation, by the adoption of a Federal Constitution for the whole of Switzerland, being the first which was entirely the work of Swiss, without any foreign influence, although its authors had studied that of the United States. . . . It was natural that, as in process of time commerce and industry were developed, and as the differences between the legislation of the various Cantons became more apparent, a revision of the first really Swiss Constitution should be found necessary. This was proposed both in 1871 and 1872, but the partisans of a further centralization, though successful in the Chambers, were defeated upon an appeal to the popular vote on the 12th May 1872, by a majority of between five and six thousand, and by thirteen Cantons to nine. The question was, however, by no means settled, and in 1874 a new project of revision, more acceptable to the partisans of cantonal independence, was adopted by the people, the numbers being 340,100, to 108,013. The Cantons were about two to one in favour of the revision, 14½ declaring for and 7½ against it. This Constitution bears date the 20th May 1874, and has since been added to and altered in certain particulars."—F. O. Adams and C. D. Cunningham, *Swiss Confederation*, ch. 1.—"Since 1848 . . . Switzerland has been a federal state, consisting of a central authority, the Bund, and 10 entire and 6 half states, the Cantons; to foreign powers she presents an united front, while her internal policy allows to each Canton a large amount of independence. . . . The basis of all legislative division is the Commune or 'Gemeinde,' corresponding in

some slight degree to the English 'Parish.' The Commune in its legislative and administrative aspect or 'Einwohnergemeinde' is composed of all the inhabitants of a Commune. It is self-governing and has the control of the local police; it also administers all matters connected with pauperism, education, sanitary and funeral regulations, the fire brigade, the maintenance of public peace and trusteeships. . . . At the head of the Commune is the 'Gemeinderath,' or 'Communal Council,' whose members are elected from the inhabitants for a fixed period. It is presided over by an 'Ammann,' or 'Mayor,' or 'President.' . . . Above the Commune on the ascending scale comes the Canton. . . . Each of the 19 Cantons and 6 half Cantons is a sovereign state, whose privileges are nevertheless limited by the Federal Constitution, particularly as regards legal and military matters; the Constitution also defines the extent of each Canton, and no portion of a Canton is allowed to secede and join itself to another Canton. . . . Legislative power is in the hands of the 'Volk'; in the political sense of the word the 'Volk' consists of all the Swiss living in the Canton, who have passed their 20th year and are not under disability from crime or bankruptcy. The voting on the part of the people deals mostly with alterations in the cantonal constitution, treaties, laws, decisions of the First Council involving expenditures of Frs. 100,000 and upward, and other decisions which the Council considers advisable to subject to the public vote, which also determines the adoption of propositions for the creation of new laws, or the alteration or abolition of old ones, when such a plebiscite is demanded by a petition signed by 5,000 voters. . . . The First Council (Grosse Rath) is the highest political and administrative power of the Canton. It corresponds to the 'Chamber' of other countries. Every 1,300 inhabitants of an electoral circuit send one member. . . . The Kleine Rath or special council (corresponding to the 'Ministerium' of other continental countries) is composed of three members and has three proxies. It is chosen by the First Council for a period of two years. It superintends all cantonal institutions and controls the various public boards. . . . The populations of the 22 sovereign Cantons constitute together the Swiss Confederation. . . . The highest power of the Bund is exercised by the 'Bundesversammlung,' or Parliament, which consists of two chambers, the 'Nationalrath,' and the 'Ständerath.' The Nationalrath corresponds to the English House of Commons, and the Ständerath partially to the House of Lords; the former represents the Swiss people, the latter the Cantons. The Nationalrath consists of 145 members. . . . Every Canton or half Canton must choose at least one member; and for the purpose of election Switzerland is divided into 49 electoral districts. The Nationalrath is triennial. . . . The Ständerath consists of 44 members, each Canton having two representatives and each half Canton one. . . . A bill is regarded as passed when it has an absolute majority in both chambers, but it does not come into force until either a plebiscite is not demanded for a space of three months, or, if it is demanded (for which the request of 30,000 voters is necessary) the result of the appeal to the people is in favor of the bill. This privilege of the people to control the decision of their representatives is called Das Referendum [see REFERENDUM]. . . . The highest administrative authority in Switzerland is the Bundesrath, composed of seven members, which [like the Bundesversammlung] . . . meets in Bern. Its members are chosen by the

Bundesversammlung and the term of office is ten years. . . . The president of the Confederation (Bundespräsident) is chosen by the Bundesversammlung from the members of the Bundesrath for one year. . . . The administration of justice, so far as it is exercised by the Bund, is entrusted to a Court, the Bundesgericht, consisting of nine members."—P. Hauri, *Sketch of the constitution of Switzerland (Strickland's "The Engadine")*.—See also SWITZERLAND, CONSTITUTION OF; FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: Modern federations; INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: Early development and growth in Switzerland; PRESIDENT: Switzerland; SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Switzerland: 1874-1921.

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1854.—Government control of telegraphs. See TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES: 1854-1908.

1865-1894.—Commercial treaties with Germany. See TARIFF: 1853-1870; 1870-1900; GERMANY: 1892-1894.

1866-1881.—Latin Union and silver question.—At international conference on bimetalism.—New banking laws. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1853-1874; 1867-1893; 1836-1907.

1870-1897.—Socialism.—Federal legislation.—Initiative and referendum.—"Revolutionary socialism as a political factor of importance in Swiss national affairs is a product of the last generation. The origin of the industrial proletariat in Switzerland . . . dates back about a century and a so-called 'Swiss Social Democratic Party' was founded as early as 1870, but . . . long remained unorganized and ineffective. In 1890 six socialists were elected to the National Council (House of Representatives), whose membership was at that time but 147. In 1893 the party launched its first constitutional initiative proposing the insertion of a general 'right-to-work' clause in the fundamental law of the land. The signature of 52,387 citizens—only 2000 more than were required—having been secured, the measure was put to a vote of the electorate. It was rejected on June 3, 1894, by all the cantons and by a crushing popular majority of 308,298 nays against 75,880 ayes."—W. E. Rappard, *Democracy vs. demogogy (Political Science Quarterly, June, 1923, p. 201)*.—"Meanwhile vigorous work was undertaken in the development of the Federal legislation required by the constitution of 1874. In . . . [1874] the permanent Federal Supreme Court was instituted, sitting in Lausanne; the military system was transformed by a new military organization; in 1875, by a law relating to civil status, which, after a fierce struggle, was adopted by a Referendum with 213,199 votes against 205,069, obligatory civil marriage was introduced; in 1877, by a factory law, a normal working day of eleven hours was fixed, and by an employer's liability law an epoch-making step was taken in legislation for the protection of labour; in 1880 a law of commercial obligations, including commercial law and the law of exchange, was passed; in 1801, there was founded at Zurich a Swiss National Museum of national antiquities; in 1894, a Swiss National Library was opened in Bern. Since 1884, the Confederation has spent considerable sums in subsidies to the Cantons and communes and to private associations, on behalf of agricultural, industrial, commercial and economic education, and also on behalf of the cultivation of the arts and sciences. Owing to the continued new demands upon the activities of



the Confederation, there gradually ensued, from 1874 onwards, a transformation of the Federal constitution, effected by a number of partial revisions. In 1879, in an ebullition of popular sentiment aroused by certain murders, the prohibition of capital punishment was removed from the constitution. In 1885, as the outcome of the campaign against alcoholism, the State monopoly of alcohol was introduced, the income from the drink traffic being divided by the Confederation among the Cantons. In 1887, the registration of patents, in 1890 insurance against illness and accident, and in 1891 the issue of bank-notes, became purely Federal affairs. Through a further partial revision, constitutional changes were facilitated by the addition of the Popular Initiative; on the initiative of 50,000 burghers, the repeal or alteration of any article in the Federal constitution or the introduction of new articles must be submitted to the Swiss nation. [See also INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: Early development.] For a time, the extremists of the Right and of the Left competed with one another in initiative proposals of a more or less dubious character, most of which, however, were frustrated by the good sense of the community without doing any harm. On the other hand, in 1897, the Federal supervision over forests and canals was extended to the entire country; and the Confederation became competent to legislate in matters relating to food inspection. As regards the foreign world, the creditable position occupied by the country was manifested by entrusting to the Swiss *Bundesrat* the management and supervision of a number of international concerns, some of which had been called into existence, partly in response to popular initiative—for instance the postal union (1874), the international telegraph union (1875), the union for the protection of industrial property (1883) and of artistic property (1886), and the international agreement concerning the transport of goods by railway (1890).—W. Oechslí, *History of Switzerland, 1490-1914*, pp. 414-416.

1872-1888.—Immigration problem. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: Switzerland; European problems.

1877.—Factory Act. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1874-1918.

1897.—Argol agreement on tariff with United States. See TARIFF: 1897 (March-July).

1898-1912.—Nationalization of railways.—Codification of the civil and criminal law.—“A mile-stone in the internal development of the Federal State was passed in the year 1898, when, on February 20th, by a popular vote of 387,000 against 183,000, the nationalisation of the principal railways was decided on; and when, on November 13th, the codification of the civil and of the criminal law was voted by 265,000 against 102,000, and by 16½ Cantons against 5½. Within a few years, by far the greater portion of the network of Swiss railways, including the St. Gotthard line and the Simplon line (begun in 1808 and completed in 1906) had been acquired by the State [see RAILROADS: 1005-1006], and since then have been worked as Federal railways. In 1902, the duty was imposed upon the Confederation of giving financial support to the Cantons in matters of primary education; and in 1908 it acquired the right of legislating about industrial matters, the utilisation of water power, and the supply of electrical energy. In 1903, a new customs' tariff was instituted, the increase of certain duties constituting an economic measure of defence against foreign competition. In 1907, a new system of

military organisation was adopted, increasing the term of service for the militia, and involving a considerable increase of military expenditure, the change being approved on a Referendum by 330,000 votes against 268,000. In 1906, a Swiss national bank was instituted as a central note-issuing bank for the regulation of the monetary circulation. In codified civil code was completed, and was put in force on New Year's Day of 1912. In 1912, the law for general insurance against accident and illness was approved by 287,000 against 241,000 votes.”—W. Oechslí, *History of Switzerland, 1490-1914*, p. 415.

1899 (May-July).—Represented at First Hague Conference. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1899: Constitution.

20th century.—Democratic advance. See DEMOCRACY: Progress in the early part of the 20th century.

1900.—Arbitration between Brazil and France. See BRAZIL: 1900.

1900-1905.—Rejection of new electoral proposals.—Defeat of Socialists.—On Nov. 4, 1900, the Swiss nation gave its decision regarding two important proposals which under the name of the “double initiative” had been causing great excitement among the population of the confederation. One of these proposals had for its object the election of members of the National Council on the system of proportional representation, the other the election of the Federal Council by the people. Both proposals were rejected. The coalition hitherto maintained between Radical and Socialist parties was broken entirely in the elections of October, 1905, because of the anti-military attitude of the latter, who sought to have all national feeling and policy sunk in international sentiments and principles. The Socialists elected but two representatives in the National Council.—See also SOCIALISM: 1899-1908.

1901.—Poor law reforms. See CHARITIES: Switzerland: 1892-1901.

1902.—Commercial treaty with Germany. See TARIFF: 1902-1906.

1907.—Represented at Second Hague Conference. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1907.

1909-1915.—St. Gotthard railway agreement.—An “interesting manifestation of Swiss democratic feeling toward diplomacy occurred in connection with the long-drawn-out controversy over the St. Gotthard Railway treaties. To facilitate the construction of the tunnel for that line, agreements were entered into with Germany and Italy in 1860. . . . When the Swiss government finally decided to nationalize railways, negotiations regarding the St. Gotthard line were again taken up with Italy and Germany, certain objections being raised by the latter power.”—R. C. Brooks, *Government and politics of Switzerland*, pp. 272-273.—“The St. Gotthard line, laid down in 1882, was only completed, thanks to subsidies amounting to 30 millions from Germany, and 55 millions from Italy, while Switzerland only spent 28 millions. Germany and Italy demanded an important share in the profits as a reward for their contributions, and thus obtained a controlling right which was very annoying to the Federation. Switzerland, therefore, declared her intention, in 1904, of buying in the shares of the other two nations. They, however, did not see why they should abandon, merely for a refund of money, all the material and moral advantages which they had acquired in the country. The negotiations for the repurchase, which were very long and complicated, ended in that notorious Convention of Berne [1906]. . . .

1. It confers upon Germany and Italy Most Favored Nation treatment no longer merely over the St. Gotthard system but over all Swiss railways. This treatment, which till then had only applied to 276 kilometers of line laid down in common, now extended to 2,700 kilometers of rail. 2. Germany and Italy obtained the right to control all the arrangements that the Swiss Government might make in the future with foreign railways. This, as Swiss patriots pointed out . . . constituted a limitation of the sovereignty of the Swiss Federation for the benefit of Germany and Italy. To all intents and purposes Switzerland was prohibited from ever having a free policy in railway matters; she could never, for instance, make an agreement with France to connect the systems, or by a reduction of rates attempt to attract goods or passenger traffic going to Italy. 3. The Swiss Government, to allow Germany and Italy to recover their capital, consented to reduce by 35 per cent. up to 1912 and by 50 per cent. after that date the surcharge on tariffs which the great expense of running a mountain line renders imperative."—P. Vergnet, *France in danger*, pp. 127-128.—The St. Gotthard agreement, drawn up by Germany, Italy and Switzerland Oct. 13, 1909, was immediately ratified by the two former countries but the Swiss feared the domination of the Triple Alliance. "During the progress of these negotiations, it was learned that Germany had protested eleven years earlier against the ownership and operation of railroads by the Swiss government. As a result of the withholding of this knowledge from the people, intense feeling was engendered against secret diplomacy. An enormous public demonstration of protest, attended by representative citizens from all parts of the country, was held at Bern."—*Ibid.*, p. 273.—In spite of opposition the convention was finally ratified by the National Council on April 4, 1913. The 108 affirmative votes were cast mostly by Liberals of the German provinces with an opposition of 77 Democrats, Social Democrats, Clericals and French.—See also RAILWAYS: 1905-1909.—"Out of this movement there came a demand by means of initiative petition for an amendment to the constitution providing for the submission of treaties to the referendum on the same terms as ordinary legislation."—*Ibid.*, p. 274.

1910-1919.—Statistics for trade unions.—Social insurance. See LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1910-1919; SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: Switzerland: 1912-1919.

1913.—Reorganization of Federal Council.—Revision of factory law.—The Federal Council was reorganized in 1913. The essential feature in the reorganization was the restoration of the system under which the president of the confederation, instead of taking charge during his year of office of the political department which includes foreign affairs, remains in charge of the same department as before his election to the presidency; also, the function of the permanent members was extended, to lessen the administrative work of the Federal Council members. The factory law of 1877 was revised in 1913. The principal provisions of the new law relate to the prohibition of women and children in night and Sunday work; rest after confinement for women; and prohibiting the employment of boys under fourteen and girls under fifteen.

1914-1918.—Neutrality during World War.—Mobilization of the army.—Food regulation.—Press control.—Activities of the Red Cross.—"With the outbreak of war a quick and sweeping

transfer of authority was effected by the passage of a federal resolution providing in part that: 'the Federal Assembly confers unlimited power . . . upon the Federal Council to take all measures necessary to the security, integrity, and neutrality of Switzerland [see also BELGIUM: 1830-1914], and to protect the credit and economic interests of the country, especially including the assurance of its food supply. For this purpose the Federal Council shall possess unlimited credit to meet expenses. It is especially authorized to conclude all necessary loans. The Federal Council shall account to the Federal Association at its next session with regard to its employment of the unlimited powers hereby conferred upon it.' . . . The Federal Assembly conferred plenary powers upon the Swiss executive. To safeguard this power against abuse in the field of foreign relations, each of the two houses promptly established a neutrality committee."—R. C. Brooks, *Government and politics of Switzerland*, pp. 114, 281.—See also WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 51.—"On Friday, July 31st, . . . the 'last line' troops (*Landsturm*), . . . were at once called out to do guard duty on railroad bridges, tunnels, stations, and roads so as to allow the troops of the first and second line (*Élite and Landwehr*) to go to the assembling places of their units. . . . On the first of August the Government decided to call out the entire armed strength of the nation. . . . August 3d, . . . mobilization was proclaimed and every man from twenty up to forty-eight, who had ever had military training, was called to the colors. The Government assumed full control of all the railroads and turned their operation over to the railroad department of the General Staff. [See RAILROADS: 1917-1919.] . . . Within forty-eight hours the full strength of the country had been assembled and concentrated with all the reserves, all the equipment, all the horses, up to the full number of 300,000 men."—T. A. Christen, *Organization and training of the Swiss army (National Service, May, 1917)*.—"Closely connected with the maintenance of neutrality were certain economic difficulties which threatened not only the industries but the very life of the people. Switzerland depends upon other countries for four-fifths of its grain, and for virtually all the coal and iron needed by its railroads, manufacturers, hotels, and homes. After the outbreak of war it was forced to procure grain through the territories of the Entente, chiefly from America. On the other hand the only possible source of supply of coal and iron was Germany. . . . The Swiss government . . . tried to meet this situation by negotiating a series of economic agreements with each of the belligerent groups."—R. C. Brooks, *Government and politics of Switzerland*, p. 281.—"The Council . . . [August 2, 1914] initiated a strictly paternal *régime* throughout the country; export was checked or completely cut off; a maximum price was declared in many instances; the Confederation announced a monopoly of many articles of food, as, for example, in the case of rice, sugar, etc. The vast milk and cheese output was brought under Federal control, and all arbitrary and unreasonable advance in prices was brought under the strictest provisions of penal legislation."—G. E. Sherman, *Maintenance of Swiss neutrality in the present war (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Feb., 1917, pp. 317-322)*.—"Early in the war the strongly expressed sympathies of the people, dividing along racial lines, for the various belligerents threatened to compromise neutrality and even to

break down the sentiment of national unity. Never has the tension been greater between the German and non-German sections of the country. Exaggerations of these differences by certain newspapers led to the establishment of a political Press Control Commission of five members appointed by the Federal Council, two of them, to be nominated by the Swiss Press Association. [See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: III. Press reports and censorship: d, 1.] On two occasions the Federal Council found itself compelled to address words of solemn warning directly to the people. No utterances called forth by the great war express a deeper sentiment of patriotism."—R. C. Brooks, *Government and politics of Switzerland*, p. 281.—"At the outbreak of war the International Committee at Geneva was . . . fully prepared to take up the great work which had been allotted to it by international convention. The Genevese Committee was fortunate in its President [Gustave Ador], . . . president of the Swiss Confederation. . . . The International Committee at Geneva made its first appeal to the belligerents on August 15th, 1914, requesting the belligerents to form those special commissions for prisoners of war which had been part of the engagements taken by all Red Cross Societies at the International Conference in 1912. Further, the Genevese International Committee informed the Red Cross Societies of the belligerents that it was proposed to open at Geneva an *Agence Internationale de Secours et de Renseignements en Faveur des Prisonniers de Guerre*. Further, invoking the terms of the Hague agreement of 1907, the Genevese Committee requested all the Governments concerned to accord free postage to letters and parcels sent to and from the prisoners of war. The great majority of such letters and parcels passed through Switzerland. During the war the Swiss postal service transmitted the gigantic sum of more than ten million letters and parcels to and from prisoners of war. . . . The Swiss did not charge postage on letters and parcels sent to and from prisoners of war. . . . The first object, . . . of the *Agence* was to trace the missing. . . . A special and most important branch of the *Agence* dealt with the civilians interned. At the beginning of the war the *Agence* undertook to trace all civilians who had been lost sight of by their families since the outbreak of war. The *Agence* further undertook to arrange for letters and to forward parcels, precisely as they had done for the military prisoners. . . . At a very early stage of the war the Swiss suggested to both groups of belligerents that prisoners of war who were not qualified for direct exchange . . . might be interned in Switzerland. . . . In January, 1916, the first convoys of interned arrived. Most of the early arrivals were prisoners suffering from tuberculosis. Of these the French were sent to Leysin and Montana and the Germans to Davos and Arosa, these being the four best stations in the Alps for the cure of tuberculous diseases. In May, 1916, the first English arrived, the second convoy arriving in July. The English were sent to Château d'Oex, in French-Switzerland, and to Mürren, the famous English centre in the Bernese Oberland. . . . The Germans were sent, for the most part, to the Grisons. The respective Governments paid four francs a day for the N. C. O.'s and men and six francs a day for the officers."—S. Croft, *Was Switzerland pro-German?* pp. 101-102, 104, 109-110.—See also RED CROSS: 1919-1920.

1914-1918.—Increase of public debt and taxation due to the World War. See WORLD WAR:

Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIV. Cost of war: b, 9, ii.

1915.—German-Swiss commercial agreement. —"Early in the war there was no shortage of bread grain, but the raw material problem was apparent to the Swiss Government from the first. . . . But the tendency of each set of belligerents was to insist, as far as possible, that what it furnished did not inure to the benefit of its enemy and that some compensation should be made for its sacrifice in letting Switzerland have material which it wanted for itself. . . . The outcome of this controversy was an agreement by which coal to the amount of 253,000 tons was furnished by Germany, with the iron and steel required; German-owned goods in Switzerland were to be held by the government until the end of the war, and foodstuffs were furnished to Switzerland by the Entente Powers. Such was the arrangement until the spring of 1918 when the coal supply was reduced to 200,000 tons."—T. S. Woolsey, *German-Swiss commercial agreement* (*American Journal of International Law*, 1918, pp. 590-597).

1915-1919.—Constitutional amendments.—Direct taxation.—Strike in Zurich.—Growth of the Socialist party.—Proportional representation.—"The measures found necessary to meet the extraordinary expenses incident to mobilization and maintaining the country's military force soon obliged the Federal Council to seek financial aid through some means outside of the Confederation's ordinary sources of supply. These, which are summarized in Article 42 of the National Constitution, do not comprise the power of *direct* taxation, but are derived from tariff and excise sources, through the Confederation's administration of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone service, the monopoly of powder and alcohol, the military exemption tax, etc., and in the last resort from contributions of the Cantons, according to their wealth and population. The existing war situation having strained the Federal finances to the uttermost and the Cantonal governments having no adequate means of raising revenue sufficient to meet the national want, the Council on February 12th, 1915, laid before Parliament, then in its winter session, a proposition looking to the enactment of a new constitutional provision permitting the laying of a direct tax *for the period of the war only on both property and income*. The result of this step was that Parliament, on the 15th day of April following, determined to lay before the people a project of constitutional amendment on the lines proposed by the Council, the proposition for constitutional change containing the hitherto unknown feature of a grant of authority to the Federal Assembly to carry out the proposed amendment by any such measure or measures as it should deem proper, these measures not, therefore, to be subject to referendum vote [and in addition to the foregoing, the amendment was to remain in force only until the tax was completely paid]. On April 23rd, June 6th was fixed by the Council as the date for a popular vote on the constitutional proposal and provision was made at the same time for taking the suffrages of all men under the colors, with the result that the amendment was accepted as proposed by Parliament, by a vote of 452,117 as against 27,461 opposed, this being the highest numerical majority ever attained in the many votes on constitutional change in Switzerland."—G. E. Sherman, *Maintenance of Swiss neutrality in the present war* (*University of Pennsylvania and American Law Register*, Feb.,

1917, pp. 322-323).—"Paid in the course of 1916 and 1917, this first war tax produced about 125 millions, of which the federal treasury retained about 100 millions, after ceding twenty per cent of the receipts to the cantons as provided for in the constitutional amendment. As the war and its expenses continued and as on the other hand it had given rise to great industrial and commercial activity in many quarters, a federal war-profits tax was next adopted in 1916. . . . On May 13, 1917, the people adopted another constitutional amendment providing for the introduction of a stamp tax on securities, which by the end of 1918 had yielded about ten millions of francs. The sums thus raised by direct taxation, although compensating the loss resulting from the decrease of customs revenue, were far from sufficient to cover the greatly increased current expenses, to repay the public debt and still less to allow for the realization of any scheme of old-age pensions. . . . Encouraged . . . by the success of the first war tax . . . [the Socialist party] initiated a movement in favor of a constitutional amendment giving the federal government the right to levy a permanent direct tax on the capital and earnings of individuals and corporations. . . . The Council of States (federal Senate) after discussing the socialist bill on March 12, 1918, rejected it by a vote of 31 to 1. . . . In the National Council . . . it was rejected by 138 votes against those of the socialist members and of a few extreme radicals, 21 in all. On June 2, 1918, the people at the polls confirmed this decision by rejecting the bill by 325,814 nays against 276,735 ayes. . . . Immediately after this referendum, which had rejected the socialist proposal, the government presented its own bill for 'a renewed federal war tax.' This measure was drafted with a view both to fiscal and to political ends. It was to provide for a speedy repayment of the war debt and at the same time to refute the criticisms of the 276,735 citizens who had voted in favor of the socialist proposal and who since their defeat were naturally inclined to accuse the majority of having none but a negative policy. The bill was based on the same principles as the first war tax of 1915, but the rate applied both to property and to earned income was slightly higher, and more steeply progressive. Besides it was to be levied, not once only, but every three years until three-quarters of the mobilization costs had been paid off. It was hotly discussed in the latter half of September, 1918, by the National Council and finally carried in that branch of the legislature on October 2, 1918, by 98 votes against 43. . . . The policy of the government was approved in both Houses by the representatives of all the non-socialist parties and sanctioned by a vote of 136 against 15 in the National Council and by a unanimous decision in the Council of States."—W. E. Rappard, *Democracy vs. demogogy (Political Science Quarterly, June, 1923, pp. 294, 296, 298-299)*.—"Just before the signature of the armistice, in the first days of November, 1918, a general strike of a clearly revolutionary character broke out in Zurich and soon spread all over Switzerland. On November 10 the strike committee, composed of the leaders of the Socialist party, demanded the immediate demobilization of the troops that had been raised to maintain order and the prompt compliance with a brief but very radical program of political and social reform. Among the nine demands made, two of the most moderate concerned the establishment of an old-age pension and invalidity insurance scheme and the repayment of all public debts by the propertied

classes. The government in response mobilized more troops, but at the same time made some very significant statements as to its social and political policies. On November 12, 1918, Mr. Calonder, president of the Confederation, addressed Parliament on behalf of his unanimous colleagues of the government. . . . 'For Swiss democracy, it is a question of to be or not to be. . . . While we believe that the condition of the laboring classes should as far as is at all possible be improved step by step, we would emphasize that all reforms must naturally be realized on the basis of right and law and that the will of the whole people must be respected in conformity with our democratic constitutional and legal institutions. In our democracy the majority alone rules. The most thorough social reforms and changes can with us be accomplished without upsetting or impeding our national life. All social and political battles are to be fought with the sole weapon of the ballot. That is our pride and our strength.' . . . On November 14, 1918, President Calonder was able to announce in both Houses that, at two o'clock that morning the strike committee had informed him of their decision unconditionally to recall the strike. . . . After the general strike [November 1918] its first financial effect was directed towards securing the final adoption of the renewed war-tax measure, the discussion of which had been interrupted in October, 1918. After several prolonged parliamentary debates the constitutional bill was voted by both Houses on February 13 and 14, 1919, by majorities of 81 to 10 and 27 to 2 respectively. . . . The bill was finally submitted to the constitutional referendum on May 4, 1919, and adopted by 307,528 ayes against 165,119 nays, two French-speaking cantons alone rejecting the measure. In its final form it provides that the extraordinary tax shall be levied every four, and not every three, years until the total mobilization costs, and not only three-quarters thereof, shall have been covered. . . . Since . . . [1804] the socialist party has gradually gained in power, but in 1918 it still had but 19 representatives in the National Council, whose membership, based on the population of the country, had grown to 189. . . . At the October elections of 1919, at which the principle of proportional representation was applied for the first time, the socialists captured 38 seats, besides 3 which were secured by their still more extreme communist allies. However even then they represented only a fourth to a fifth part of the national electorate."—*Ibid.*, pp. 291, 298-300, 302.

1917 (June).—Grimm-Hoffman Affair.—"Grimm, a member of the National Council and of the extreme wing of the Socialist party, had gone to Petrograd shortly after the outbreak of the Russian revolution. Throwing himself into the whirlpool of plots and counterplots, he was able to persuade the Swiss minister to transmit a telegram to Herr Arthur Hoffmann, head of the political (foreign affairs) department of the Federal Council, inquiring as to the German attitude toward Russia. After an interval of a week Hoffmann replied stating what purported to be the German peace terms and assuring Grimm that Germany would undertake no offensive so long as a satisfactory agreement with Russia seemed possible. Both telegrams were intercepted and made public by Russian officials, and Grimm was expelled from the country. Publication of these facts caused an enormous sensation in Switzerland. In spite of all that was said in defense of Federal Councilor Hoffmann, it was evident that his con-

duct could be interpreted,—indeed, was certain to be interpreted,—in the chancelleries of the Entente, as undertaken in the interests of a separate peace between Germany and Russia, and hence as threatening the interests of the Entente in the most dangerous manner. From a Swiss point of view it was 'a blow against international confidence in the unconditional honorable neutrality of our leading men and thence in the conduct of the country itself.' Before any remonstrances were received from the countries unfavorably affected by his conduct, Federal Councilor Hoffmann tendered his resignation in a statement which made it clear that he had acted in the matter wholly on his own responsibility and without the knowledge of his colleagues of the Federal Council. The election of Gustav Ador of Geneva, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the vacancy did much to allay the bitter feeling created in Romance Switzerland by the Grimm-Hoffmann affair. Another consequence was the determination to return to the old system whereby the Federal President takes charge of the political department. It was believed that Federal Councilor Hoffmann's long-continued tenure of this position predisposed him to disregard his colleagues in the Grimm case. With a new head in charge of foreign affairs each year, similar errors are not so likely to occur."—R. C. Brooks, *Government and politics of Switzerland*, pp. 283-284.

1918.—Geneva system of industrial arbitration.—Prohibition of strikes. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: Switzerland.

1919.—Adoption of military insurance plan. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: Switzerland: 1912-1919.

1919-1920.—Attempts to increase production of food-stuffs. See FOOD REGULATION: 1918-1920.

1919-1920.—Eight hour day law introduced.—Child welfare legislation. See LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1873-1922; 1920-1922.

1919-1920.—Housing problems. See HOUSING: Switzerland.

1919-1920.—Controversy over the relation of Switzerland to the League of Nations.—Restatement of Swiss neutrality.—"By its resolution of November 21, 1919, the Federal Assembly authorized the Federal Council to declare, at an opportune time, the accession of Switzerland to the Covenant establishing the League of Nations, which was adopted by the Peace Conference. At the same time it decreed that the resolution should be submitted to the vote of the people and the cantons, but it specified that such a vote could not take place until all the five Great Powers should have ratified the League Covenant. . . . The Council of the League has taken cognizance of the declarations made by the Swiss Government in its message to the Federal Assembly of August 4, 1919, and in its memorandum of January 13, 1920, declarations which have been confirmed by the Swiss delegates to the session of the Council, and according to which Switzerland recognizes and proclaims the duties of joint liability which devolve upon her from the fact that she is to be a member of the League of Nations, including the duty of participating in the commercial and financial measures demanded by the League of Nations against a State which violates the Covenant, and is ready for every sacrifice to defend her own territory herself in all circumstances, even during an action undertaken by the League of Nations, but that she shall not be forced to participate in a military action or to permit the passage of foreign troops or the preparation of military

enterprises upon her territory. In accepting these declarations, the Council recognizes that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the guaranty of the inviolability of her territory, such as were derived from international law, particularly by the Treaties and the Acts of 1815, are justified by the interests of universal peace and, consequently, are compatible with the Covenant. As concerns the declaration of accession to be made by the Swiss Government, the Council of the League of Nations, being mindful of the altogether unique constitution of the Swiss Confederation, is of the opinion that the notification based on the decision of the Federal Assembly and effected within the time limit of two months beginning January 10, 1920, the date of the entrance into effect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, may be accepted by the other members of the League as the declaration required by Article I for admission as an original member, on condition that the confirmation of this declaration by the people and the Swiss cantons be effected in the shortest time possible.

"Done at London, Saint James Palace, February 13, 1920."—*Federal resolution of Nov. 21, 1919, concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations (International Conciliation, July, 1920, pp. 316-324).*

1920.—Accession to League of Nations.—At the beginning of March, 1920, both Houses of Parliament passed by large majorities the resolution declaring the adhesion of Switzerland to the League, only the Socialist party opposing the resolution. The government were therefore able to announce the accession of Switzerland within the two months prescribed for original members by the Treaty of Versailles, although in the case of Switzerland the accession was subject to the approval of a plebiscite. "The Swiss referendum of May 16 on the League of Nations was the most important vote of its kind in the history of the republic. All other countries entering the league thus far have done so by parliamentary and executive action, that is, through purely representative means. Switzerland alone referred the question to the direct decision of her electorate. . . . Acceptance of membership in the league was strongly favored by the powerful Independent Democratic (Radical) party, the Liberal Democratic (Protestant Conservative) party, the recently formed anti-bolshevist Peasants' party, the Christian Social party, and the *Grüthliker*. The Catholic Conservatives were divided, some of their most eminent leaders, both lay and clerical, being found in opposing camps. The Socialists who have accepted bolshevist leadership fought the league with all their accustomed arguments and bitterness. Curiously enough, the same attitude was taken by a group of the higher officers of the Swiss army, led by Ulrich Wille, the former general in chief. Party lines were more or less cut across, however, by racial linguistic, religious and personal prejudices. A very marked influence upon the referendum was exerted by the federal council, all seven members of which not only favored the league but also campaigned for it vigorously throughout the country. Further, the federal council on May 7, officially issued a powerful appeal to the Swiss people urging them to vote affirmatively. . . . Although not entering largely into public discussion, there was an underlying fear that rejection of the league might cause grave disaffection, perhaps even a secessionist movement, in Romance Switzerland. Opponents of the league made the utmost of the failure of the United States to ratify, but this was discounted as due

almost entirely to partisan and anti-Wilson rancor prior to a presidential election. Very little was said openly about German influence, but it seems to have been generally accepted that the Junker and bolshevist elements of Germany desired the Swiss to reject the league, while all the elements supporting the present government of that country favored its acceptance. Certain it is that Dr. Müller, German ambassador to Switzerland, openly expressed the wish to Federal President Motta that 'the hopes and efforts of the federal council in favor of the entry of Switzerland' into the League of Nations might be realized. . . . The referendum resulted in a popular vote of 415,819 for to 323,225 against the league. It is estimated that about 76 per cent of the electorate voted, which is a very high, although not the highest, percentage of participation on record."—R. C. Brooks, *Swiss referendum on the League of Nations* (*American Political Science Review*, Aug., 1920).—In December, 1920, M. Edmond Schulthess, who had been president in 1917, was again elected president for 1921 by the legislature, in succession to M. Motta, whose term expired this month.

1920.—Liechtenstein incorporated with Switzerland for postal and telegraphic purposes. See LIECHTENSTEIN.

1921.—New president elected.—Statement of financial conditions.—Deficit and taxation.—At the close of the year, 1921, the Swiss Federal Assembly elected Robert Haab, president of the confederation to succeed M. Motta who retained charge of the political department. Finance minister Musy announced in the National Council that the financial situation of the confederation was still so serious, that at the end of 1921, the deficit would be greater than at the close of 1920, when expenditures exceeded receipts by 99,500,000 gold francs (\$3,980,000). Consequently there was no other course than to levy a new tax on dividend warrants, which was expected to yield from fifteen to seventeen million gold francs annually.

1921-1922.—Federal capital levy.—Contested political battle.—Unusual proportion of electors.—“On September 13, 1921, the executive committee of the Swiss Socialist party submitted to the Federal Council a constitutional initiative petition providing for a federal capital levy. . . . In certain of its more formal provisions it was a conscious imitation of the two previous direct federal taxes of 1915 and 1919, while on other points of more material importance it was, for Switzerland at least, a novel and very bold socialistic measure. Like the 'non-renewable war tax' of 1915 and the 'new extraordinary war tax' of 1919, the 'single capital levy' of 1922 was a direct federal tax of a temporary nature, which could be introduced only by means of a constitutional amendment. It was therefore provided that it should, like its predecessors, be submitted to the vote of the people and of the cantons and should remain in force only until it had been duly collected. Like them also it was to be administered by the cantonal authorities for the Confederation and its proceeds were to be divided between the central and local governments. The tax-bearers in all three measures were to be individuals and corporations; and the tax-free public institutions, enumerated in almost identical terms, were in all cases appreciably the same. There, however, the main analogies between the three taxes cease. The socialist proposal differed from the two preceding measures in purpose, subject and rates as well as in the period and mode of its collection. While the two war taxes were destined to allow the

repayment of the war debt, the yield of the capital levy was expressly intended to finance new State projects of social reform and notably the long-promised old-age pensions and invalidity insurance scheme. While the 1915 and 1919 taxes were assessed on property and on earned income, the 1922 proposal was a capital levy only. . . . The most novel and significant provision of the 1922 bill was that relating to the optional or compulsory payment of the tax in kind. . . . Having taken cognizance of the constitutional initiative petition, the Federal Assembly on March 28 and April 5, 1922, instructed the government to prepare a report on the proposal. This report was published on August 1, 1922. . . . On the basis of this report parliament proceeded to the discussion of the socialist proposal at its autumn session of 1922. The Council of States, which happened to have the priority in the matter, devoted its sitting of September 28, 1922, to the bill. . . . At the end of this parliamentary controversy [Oct. 6, 1922], the National Council . . . rejected the socialist capital levy by 129 votes against 40. . . . Under Swiss law any constitutional amendment proposed by 50,000 citizens must, after discussion in Parliament, be submitted to a popular vote. . . . The date fixed for the constitutional referendum was December 3, 1922. . . . On the side of the friends of the proposal the direction of the operations lay exclusively in the hands of the executive committee of the Swiss Social Democratic Party. In all parts of the country the official socialist organizations and press were solidly in favor of the measure. The minority group of 'Gruttléens,' or moderate, national socialists, were divided, but their numbers were small and their importance almost negligible. The enemies of the bill, on the other hand, were much less cohesively organized. The government was unanimously against the capital levy, but they did not take a very active part in the popular campaign. . . . Besides the Federal Council and quite independently of it, all the non-socialist political organizations decided to participate in the campaign and several Cantonal governments took the rather unusual step of issuing proclamations against the capital levy. The economic organizations were no less active. All the banking, manufacturing, artisan and agricultural interests, grouped in Chambers of Commerce, associations, unions, and clubs of various sorts, passed resolutions opposing the bill. The churches and particularly the Catholic bishops condemned it from the pulpit and one university even so far departed from the academic tradition of political neutrality as to denounce it in a public statement. In most of the larger cantons non-partisan committees were formed to coordinate the efforts of these various groups and institutions, to raise campaign funds, organize lectures, issue and distribute pamphlets, tracts, posters, etc., and to supply local sub-committees with propaganda material. The cantonal committees were loosely federated into a 'National Action Committee Against the Capital Levy,' which established its headquarters in Berne. . . . The campaign was conducted very much along the lines adopted during the preparation of the referendum on the League of Nations. . . . The socialists, attacked from all possible angles and by all imaginable means, overwhelmed by the written and spoken propaganda of the united bourgeois parties, and seeing their own troops faltering under the pressure of their enemies, were toward the end of the campaign placed entirely on the defensive.

After the referendum of September 24, 1922, at which, allied to a large part of Swiss liberal opinion, they had scored a signal victory by defeating a government measure at the polls, some of their leaders may have believed in the possible success of the capital levy initiative. A large portion of the investing public certainly did so, as the prolonged panic on the stock exchange, the very important withdrawals of cash and securities, the disappearance of gold, the fall of the exchange and the increased circulation of paper money clearly showed. After the legislative elections of October 20, 1922, however, which demonstrated that the socialists did not represent more than a fourth part of the electorate, no one still seriously doubted the outcome of the referendum. Here again the favorable reaction of the stock market was symptomatic. From then on until Dec. 3, the only subject of political speculation was the probable strength of the negative majority. These results came as a stupendous surprise to all concerned, as well as to all Swiss and foreign observers. Never in the history of the country had such a large proportion of electors taken part in a federal referendum and never had a contested political battle been so decisively won. . . . Direct democracy has once more been vindicated in the eyes of impartial observers, although there is a growing feeling that the use of the constitutional initiative should be regulated so as to prevent a small minority of the electorate from periodically plunging the body politic into sterile and economically harmful agitation."—W. E. Rappard, *Democracy vs. demagogy (Political Science Quarterly, Sept., 1923, pp. 361, 366-367, 369, 371, 379-381, 384, 386-387.*

1922.—Represented at Genoa conference. See GENOA CONFERENCE (1922).

1922.—Settles boundary dispute between Colombia and Venezuela. See COLOMBIA; 1922: Boundary dispute.

See also CHARITIES: Switzerland; COÖPERATION: Switzerland; EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Switzerland; EDUCATION, ART: Modern period: Switzerland; FLAGS: Switzerland; HISTORY: 25; LIBRARIES: Modern: Switzerland; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 41; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1348-1922.

ALSO IN: W. D. McCrackan, *Rise of the Swiss republic.—Cambridge modern history, v. 2, ch. 10-11, v. 6, ch. 17, v. 11, ch. 8.*—F. O. Adams and C. D. Cunningham, *Swiss Confederacy.*—F. Bonjour, *Democracy in operation.*—J. Macy and J. W. Gannaway, *Comparative free government.*—S. Deplöige, *Referendum in Switzerland.*—F. Fox, *Switzerland.*—J. Sowerby, *Forest Cantons.*—F. Webb, *Switzerland of the Swiss.*—A. T. Story, *Swiss life in town and country.*—F. G. Baker, *Model republic: A history of the rise and progress of the Swiss people.*—K. Dändliker, *Short history of Switzerland.*

SWITZERLAND, Constitution of.—After the Sonderbund secession and War of 1847 (see SWITZERLAND: 1803-1848), the task of drawing up a constitution for the confederacy was confided to a committee of fourteen members. The work was finished Apr. 14, 1848. The following text of the federal constitution of the Swiss confederation is a translation from parallel French and German texts, by Professor Albert Bushnell Hart, of Harvard University. It appeared originally in "Old South Leaflets," no. 18. Amendments, to July, 1893, are included.

mote the unity, strength, and honor of the Swiss nation, has adopted the federal constitution following:

Chapter I

Article 1. The peoples of the twenty-two sovereign Cantons of Switzerland, united by this present alliance, viz.: Zurich, Bern, Luzern, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (Upper and Lower), Glarus, Zug, Freiburg, Solothurn, Basel (urban and rural), Schaffhausen, Appenzell (the two Rhodes), St. Gallen, Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva, form in their entirety the Swiss Confederation.

Art. 2. The purpose of the Confederation is, to secure the independence of the country against foreign nations, to maintain peace and order within, to protect the liberty and the rights of the Confederates, and to foster their common welfare.

Art. 3. The Cantons are sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution; and, as such, they exercise all the rights which are not delegated to the federal government.

Art. 4. All Swiss are equal before the law. In Switzerland there are neither political dependents, nor privileges of place, birth, persons, or families.

Art. 5. The Confederation guarantees to the Cantons their territory, their sovereignty, within the limits fixed by Article 3, their Constitutions, the liberty and rights of the people, the constitutional rights of citizens, and the rights and powers which the people have conferred on those in authority.

Art. 6. The Cantons are bound to ask of the Confederation the guaranty of their Constitutions. This guaranty is accorded, provided: (a) That the Constitutions contain nothing contrary to the provisions of the Federal Constitution. (b) That they assure the exercise of political rights, according to republican forms, representative or democratic. (c) That they have been ratified by the people, and may be amended whenever the majority of all the citizens demand it.

Art. 7. All separate alliances and all treaties of a political character between the Cantons are forbidden. On the other hand the Cantons have the right to make conventions among themselves upon legislative, administrative or judicial subjects; in all cases they shall bring such conventions to the attention of the federal officials, who are authorized to prevent their execution, if they contain anything contrary to the Confederation, or to the rights of other Cantons. Should such not be the case, the covenanting Cantons are authorized to require the coöperation of the federal officials in carrying out the convention.

Art. 8. The Confederation has the sole right of declaring war, of making peace, and of concluding alliances and treaties with foreign powers, particularly treaties relating to tariffs and commerce.

Art. 9. By exception the Cantons preserve the right of concluding treaties with foreign powers, respecting the administration of public property, and border and police intercourse; but such treaties shall contain nothing contrary to the Confederation or to the rights of other Cantons.

Art. 10. Official intercourse between Cantons and foreign governments, or their representatives, shall take place through the Federal Council. Nevertheless, the Cantons may correspond directly with the inferior officials and officers of a foreign State, in regard to the subjects enumerated in the preceding article.

IN THE NAME OF ALMIGHTY GOD. THE SWISS CONFEDERATION, desiring to maintain and to pro-

Art. 11. No military capitulations shall be made.

Art. 12. No members of the departments of the federal government, civil and military officials of the Confederation, or federal representatives or commissioners, shall receive from any foreign government any pension, salary, title, gift, or decoration. Such persons, already in possession of pensions, titles, or decorations, must renounce the enjoyment of pensions and the bearing of titles and decorations during their term of office. Nevertheless, inferior officials may be authorized by the Federal Council to continue in the receipt of pensions. No decoration or title conferred by a foreign government shall be borne in the federal army. No officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier shall accept such distinction.

Art. 13. The Confederation has no right to keep up a standing army. No Canton or Half-Canton shall, without the permission of the federal government keep up a standing force of more than three hundred men; the mounted police [gendarmerie] is not included in this number.

Art. 14. In case of differences arising between Cantons, the States shall abstain from violence and from arming themselves; they shall submit to the decision to be taken upon such differences by the Confederation.

Art. 15. In case of sudden danger of foreign attack, the authorities of the Cantons threatened shall request the aid of other members of the Confederation and shall immediately notify the federal government; the subsequent action of the latter shall not thereby be precluded. The Cantons summoned are bound to give aid. The expenses shall be borne by the Confederation.

Art. 16. In case of internal disturbance, or if the danger is threatened by another Canton, the authorities of the Canton threatened shall give immediate notice to the Federal Council, in order that that body may take the measures necessary, within the limits of its power (Art. 102, §§ 3, 10, 11), or may summon the Federal Assembly. In extreme cases the authorities of the Canton are authorized, while giving immediate notice to the Federal Council, to ask the aid of other Cantons, which are bound to afford such aid. If the executive of the Canton is unable to call for aid, the federal authority having the power may, and if the safety of Switzerland is endangered shall, intervene without requisition. In case of federal intervention, the federal authorities shall take care that the provisions of Article 5 be observed. The expenses shall be borne by the Canton asking aid or occasioning federal intervention, except when the Federal Assembly otherwise decides on account of special circumstances.

Art. 17. In the cases mentioned in Articles 15 and 16, every Canton is bound to afford undisturbed passage for the troops. The troops shall immediately be placed under federal command.

Art. 18. Every Swiss is bound to perform military service. Soldiers who lose their lives or suffer permanent injury to their health, in consequence of federal service, are entitled to aid from the Confederation for themselves or their families, in case of need. Each soldier shall receive without expense his first equipment, clothing, and arms. The weapon remains in the hands of the soldier, under conditions which shall be prescribed by federal legislation. The Confederation shall enact uniform provisions as to an exemption tax.

Art. 19. The federal army is composed: (a) Of the cantonal military corps. (b) Of all Swiss who do not belong to such military corps, but are never-

theless liable to military service. The Confederation exercises control over the army and the material of war provided by law. In cases of danger, the Confederation has also the exclusive and direct control of men not included in the federal army, and of all other military resources of the Cantons. The Cantons have authority over the military forces of their territory, so far as this right is not limited by the Federal Constitution or laws.

Art. 20. The laws on the organization of the army are passed by the Confederation. The enforcement of military laws in the Cantons is intrusted to the cantonal officials, within limits which shall be fixed by federal legislation, and under the supervision of the Confederation. Military instruction of every kind pertains to the Confederation. The same applies to the arming of troops. The furnishing and maintenance of clothing and equipment is within the power of the Cantons; but the Cantons shall be credited with the expenses therefor, according to a regulation to be established by federal legislation.

Art. 21. So far as military reasons do not prevent, bodies of troops shall be formed out of the soldiers of the same Cantons. The composition of these bodies of troops, the maintenance of their effective strength, the appointment and promotion of officers of these bodies of troops, belong to the Cantons, subject to general provisions which shall be established by the Confederation.

Art. 22. On payment of a reasonable indemnity, the Confederation has the right to use or acquire drill-grounds and buildings intended for military purposes, within the Cantons, together with the appurtenances thereof. The terms of the indemnity shall be settled by federal legislation.

Art. 23. The Confederation may construct at its own expense, or may aid by subsidies, public works which concern Switzerland or a considerable part of the country. For this purpose it may expropriate property, on payment of a reasonable indemnity. Further enactments upon this matter shall be made by federal legislation. The Federal Assembly may forbid public works which endanger the military interests of the Confederation.

Art. 24. The Confederation has the right of superintendence over dike and forest police in the upper mountain regions. It may cooperate in the straightening and embankment of torrents as well as in the afforesting of the districts in which they rise. It may prescribe the regulations necessary to assure the maintenance of these works, and the preservation of existing forests.

Art. 25. The Confederation has power to make legislative enactments for the regulation of the right of fishing and hunting, particularly with a view to the preservation of the large game in the mountains, as well as for the protection of birds useful to agriculture and forestry.

Art. 26. Legislation upon the construction and operation of railroads is in the province of the Confederation.

Art. 27. The Confederation has the right to establish, besides the existing Polytechnic School, a Federal University and other institutions of higher instruction, or to subsidize institutions of such nature. The Cantons provide for primary instruction, which shall be sufficient, and shall be placed exclusively under the direction of the secular authority. It is compulsory and, in the public schools, free. The public schools shall be such that they may be frequented by the adherents of all religious sects, without any offense to their freedom of



conscience or of belief. The Confederation shall take the necessary measures against such Cantons as shall not fulfill these duties.

Art. 28. The customs are in the province of the Confederation. It may levy export and import duties.

Art. 29. The collection of the federal customs shall be regulated according to the following principles: 1. Duties on imports: (a) Materials necessary for the manufactures and agriculture of the country shall be taxed as low as possible. (b) It shall be the same with the necessities of life. (c) Luxuries shall be subjected to the highest duties. Unless there are imperative reasons to the contrary, these principles shall be observed also in the conclusion of treaties of commerce with foreign powers. 2. The duties on exports shall also be as low as possible. 3. The customs legislation shall include suitable provisions for the continuance of commercial and market intercourse across the frontier. The above provisions do not prevent the Confederation from making temporary exceptional provisions, under extraordinary circumstances.

Art. 30. The proceeds of the customs belong to the Confederation. The indemnity ceases which hitherto has been paid to the Cantons for the redemption of customs, for road and bridge tolls, customs duties and other like dues. By exception, and on account of their international alpine roads, the Cantons of Uri, Grisons, Ticino, and Valais receive an annual indemnity, which, considering all the circumstances, is fixed as follows: Uri, 80,000 francs. Grisons, 200,000 francs. Ticino, 200,000 francs. Valais, 50,000 francs. The Cantons of Uri and Ticino shall receive in addition, for clearing the snow from the Saint Gotthard road, an annual indemnity of 40,000 francs, so long as that road shall not be replaced by a railroad.

Art. 31. The freedom of trade and of industry is guaranteed throughout the whole extent of the Confederation. The following subjects are excepted: (a) The salt and gunpowder monopoly, the federal customs, import duties on wines and other spirituous liquors, and other taxes on consumption expressly permitted by the Confederation, according to article 32. (b) [Added by amendment of Dec. 22, 1885.] The manufacture and sale of alcohol, under Article 32 (ii). (c) [Added by amendment of Dec. 22, 1885.] Drinking places, and the retail trade in spirituous liquors; but nevertheless the Cantons may by legislation subject the business of keeping drinking places, and the retail trade in spirituous liquors, to such restrictions as are required for the public welfare. (d) [Originally (b)] Measures of sanitary police against epidemics and cattle diseases. (e) [Originally (c)] Provisions in regard to the exercise of trades and manufactures, in regard to taxes imposed thereon, and in regard to the police of the roads. These provisions shall not contain anything contrary to the principle of freedom of trade and manufacture.

Art. 32. The Cantons are authorized to collect the import duties on wines and other spirituous liquors, provided in Article 31 (a), always under the following restrictions: (a) The collection of these import duties shall in no wise impede transportation; commerce shall be obstructed as little as possible and shall not be burdened with any other dues. (b) If the articles imported for consumption are reexported from the Canton, the duties paid on importation shall be refunded, without further charges. (c) Products of Swiss origin shall be less burdened than those of foreign coun-

tries. (d) The existing import duties on wines and other spirituous liquors of Swiss origin shall not be increased by the Cantons which already levy them. Such duties shall not be established upon such articles by Cantons which do not at present collect them. (e) The laws and ordinances of the Cantons on the collection of import duties shall, before their going into effect, be submitted to the federal government for approval, in order that it may, if necessary, cause the enforcement of the preceding provisions. All the import duties now levied by the Cantons, as well as the similar duties levied by the Communes, shall cease, without indemnity, at the end of the year 1890.

Art. 32 (ii). [Amendment of Dec. 22, 1885.] The Confederation is authorized by legislation to make regulations for the manufacture and sale of alcohol. In this legislation those products which are intended for exportation, or which have been subjected to a process excluding them from use as a beverage, shall be subjected to no tax. Distillation of wine, fruit, and their by-products, of gentian root, juniper berries, and similar products, is not subject to federal legislation as to manufacture or tax. After the cessation of the import duties on spirituous liquors, provided for in Article 32 of the Constitution, the trade in liquors not distilled shall not be subjected by the Cantons to any special taxes or to other limitations than those necessary for protection against adulterated or noxious beverages. Nevertheless, the powers of the Cantons, defined in Article 31, are retained over the keeping of drinking places, and the sale at retail of quantities less than two liters. The net proceeds resulting from taxation on the sale of alcohol belong to the Cantons in which the tax is levied. The net proceeds to the Confederation from the internal manufacture of alcohol, and the corresponding addition to the duty on imported alcohol, are divided among all the Cantons, in proportion to the actual population as ascertained from time to time by the next preceding federal census. Out of the receipts therefrom the Cantons must expend not less than one tenth in combating drunkenness in its causes and effects. [For additional articles of this amendment see Temporary Provisions, Article 6, at the end of this constitution.]

Art. 33. The Cantons may require proofs of competency from those who desire to practice a liberal profession. Provision shall be made by federal legislation by which such persons may obtain certificates of competency which shall be valid throughout the Confederation.

Art. 34. The Confederation has power to enact uniform provisions as to the labor of children in factories, and as to the duration of labor fixed for adults therein, and as to the protection of workmen against the operation of unhealthy and dangerous manufactures. The transactions of emigration agents and of organizations for insurance, not instituted by the State, are subject to federal supervision and legislation.

Art. 34 (ii). [Amendment of Dec. 17, 1890.] The Confederation shall by law provide for insurance against sickness and accident, with due regard for existing sick-benefit funds. The Confederation may require participation therein, either by all persons or by particular classes of the population.

Art. 35. The opening of gaming houses is forbidden. Those which now exist shall be closed Dec. 31, 1877. The concessions which may have been granted or renewed since the beginning of the year 1871 are declared invalid. The Con-

ederation may also take necessary measures concerning lotteries.

Art. 36. The posts and telegraphs in all Switzerland are controlled by the Confederation. The proceeds of the posts and telegraphs belong to the federal treasury. The rates shall, for all parts of Switzerland, be fixed according to the same principle and as fairly as possible. Inviolable secrecy of letters and telegrams is guaranteed.

Art. 37. The Confederation exercises general oversight over those roads and bridges in the maintenance of which it is interested. The sums due to the Cantons mentioned in Article 30, on account of their international alpine roads, shall be retained by the federal government if such roads are not kept by them in suitable condition.

Art. 38. The Confederation exercises all the exclusive rights pertaining to coinage. It has the sole right of coining money. It establishes the monetary system, and may enact provisions, if necessary, for the rate of exchange of foreign coins.

[Art. 39. (*Abrogated by the article following it*). *The confederation has the power to make by law general provisions for the issue and redemption of bank notes. But it shall not create any monopoly for the issue of bank notes, nor make such notes a legal tender.*]

Art. 39. [Substitute for former Art. 39, adopted Oct. 18, 1891.] The Confederation has the exclusive power to issue bank notes and other like currency. The Confederation may exercise the exclusive power over the issue of bank notes through a National Bank carried on under a special department of administration; or it may assign the right to a central joint stock bank hereafter to be created, which shall be administered under the coöperation and supervision of the Confederation; but the privilege to take over the bank, by paying a compensation, shall be retained. The bank possessed of the exclusive right to issue notes shall have for its chief function to regulate the circulation of money in Switzerland and to facilitate exchange. To the Cantons shall be paid at least two-thirds of the net profits of the bank beyond a reasonable interest or a reasonable dividend to the stockholders, and the necessary transfers to the reserve fund. The bank and its branches shall not be subjected to taxation by the Cantons. The Confederation shall not make bank notes and other like currency legal tender, except in urgent need in time of war. The principal office of the bank and the details of its organization, as well as in general the carrying into effect this article, shall be determined by federal law.

Art. 40. The Confederation fixes the standard of weights and measures. The Cantons, under the supervision of the Confederation, enforce the laws relating thereto.

Art. 41. The manufacture and the sale of gunpowder throughout Switzerland pertain exclusively to the Confederation. Powders used for blasting and not suitable for shooting are not included in the monopoly.

Art. 42. The expenditures of the Confederation are met as follows: (a) Out of the income from federal property. (b) Out of the proceeds of the federal customs levied at the Swiss frontier. (c) Out of the proceeds of the posts and telegraphs. (d) Out of the proceeds of the powder monopoly. (e) Out of half of the gross receipts from the tax on military exemptions levied by the Cantons. (f) Out of the contributions of the Cantons, which shall be determined by federal legislation, with special reference to their wealth and taxable resources.

Art. 43. Every citizen of a Canton is a Swiss citizen. As such he may participate, in the place where he is domiciled, in all federal elections and popular votes, after having duly proven his qualification as a voter. No person can exercise political rights in more than one Canton. The Swiss settled as a citizen outside his native Canton enjoys in the place where he is domiciled, all the rights of the citizens of the Canton, including all the rights of the communal citizen. Participation in municipal and corporate property, and the right to vote upon purely municipal affairs, are excepted from such rights, unless the Canton by legislation has otherwise provided. In cantonal and communal affairs, he gains the right to vote after a residence of three months. Cantonal laws relating to the right of Swiss citizens to settle outside the Cantons in which they were born, and to vote on communal questions, are submitted for the approval of the Federal Council.

Art. 44. No Canton shall expel from its territory one of its own citizens, nor deprive him of his rights, whether acquired by birth or settlement. [Origine ou cité.] Federal legislation shall fix the conditions upon which foreigners may be naturalized, as well as those upon which a Swiss may give up his citizenship in order to obtain naturalization in a foreign country.

Art. 45. Every Swiss citizen has the right to settle anywhere in Swiss territory, on condition of submitting a certificate of origin, or a similar document. By exception, settlement may be refused to or withdrawn from, those who, in consequence of a penal conviction, are not entitled to civil rights. In addition, settlement may be withdrawn from those who have been repeatedly punished for serious offenses, and also from those who permanently come upon the charge of public charity, and to whom their Commune or Canton of origin, as the case may be, refuses sufficient succor, after they have been officially asked to grant it. In the Cantons where the poor are relieved in their place of residence the permission to settle, if it relates to citizens of the Canton, may be coupled with the condition that they shall be able to work, and that they shall not, in their former domicile in the Canton of origin, have permanently become a charge on public charity. Every expulsion on account of poverty must be approved by the government of the Canton of domicile, and previously announced to the government of the Canton of origin. A Canton in which a Swiss establishes his domicile may not require security, nor impose any special obligations for such establishment. In like manner the Communes cannot require from Swiss domiciled in their territory other contributions than those which they require from their own subjects. A federal law shall establish the maximum fee to be paid the Chancery for a permit to settle.

Art. 46. Persons settled in Switzerland are, as a rule, subjected to the jurisdiction and legislation of their domicile, in all that pertains to their personal status and property rights. The Confederation shall by law make the provisions necessary for the application of this principle and for the prevention of double taxation of a citizen.

Art. 47. A federal law shall establish the distinction between settlement and temporary residence, and shall at the same time make the regulations to which Swiss temporary residents shall be subjected as to their political rights and their civil rights.

Art. 48. A federal law shall provide for the regulation of the expenses of the illness and burial

of indigent persons amenable to one Canton, who have fallen ill or died in another Canton.

Art. 49. Freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable. No person can be constrained to take part in a religious society, to attend religious instruction, to perform a religious rite, or to incur penalties of any kind whatever on account of religious opinion. The person who exercises the parent's or guardian's authority has the right, conformably to the principles above stated, to regulate the religious education of children up to the age of sixteen completed years. The exercise of civil or political rights shall not be abridged by any provisions or conditions whatever of an ecclesiastical or religious kind. No person shall, on account of a religious belief, release himself from the accomplishment of a civil duty. No person is bound to pay taxes of which the proceeds are specifically appropriated to the actual expenses of the worship of a religious body to which he does not belong. The details of the carrying out of this principle are reserved for federal legislation.

Art. 50. The free exercise of religious worship is guaranteed within the limits compatible with public order and good morals. The Cantons and the Confederation may take suitable measures for the preservation of public order and of peace between the members of different religious bodies, and also against encroachments of ecclesiastical authorities upon the rights of citizens and of the State. Contests in public and private law, which arise out of the formation or the division of religious bodies, may be brought by appeal before the competent federal authorities. No bishopric shall be created upon Swiss territory without the consent of the Confederation.

Art. 51. The order of the Jesuits, and the societies affiliated with them, shall not be received into any part of Switzerland; and all action in church and school is forbidden to its members. This prohibition may be extended also, by federal ordinance, to other religious orders, the action of which is dangerous to the state or disturbs the peace between sects.

Art. 52. The foundation of new convents or religious orders, and the reestablishment of those which have been suppressed, are forbidden.

Art. 53. The civil status and the keeping of records thereof is subject to the civil authority. The Confederation shall by law enact detailed provisions upon this subject. The control of places of burial is subject to the civil authority. It shall take care that every deceased person may be decently interred.

Art. 54. The right of marriage is placed under the protection of the Confederation. No limitation upon marriage shall be based upon sectarian grounds, nor upon the poverty of either of the contractants, nor on their conduct, nor on any other consideration of good order. A marriage contracted in a Canton or in a foreign country, conformably to the law which is there in force, shall be recognized as valid throughout the Confederation. By marriage the wife acquires the citizenship of her husband. Children born before the marriage are made legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents. No tax upon admission or similar tax shall be levied upon either party to a marriage.

Art. 55. The freedom of the press is guaranteed. Nevertheless the Cantons by law enact the measures necessary for the suppression of abuses. Such laws are submitted for the approval of the Federal Council. [*By amendment of Nov. 13, 1808, this paragraph will cease to be in force as soon as a*

*Federal criminal code is adopted.*] The Confederation may enact penalties for the suppression of press offenses directed against it or its authorities.

Art. 56. Citizens have the right of forming associations, provided that there be in the purpose of such associations, or in the means which they employ, nothing unlawful or dangerous to the state. The Cantons by law take the measures necessary for the suppression of abuses.

Art. 57. The right of petition is guaranteed.

Art. 58. No person shall be deprived of his constitutional judge. Therefore no extraordinary tribunal shall be established. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction is abolished.

Art. 59. Suits for personal claims against a solvent debtor having a domicile in Switzerland, must be brought before the judge of his domicile; in consequence, his property outside the Canton in which he is domiciled may not be attached in suits for personal claims. Nevertheless, with reference to foreigners, the provisions of international treaties shall not thereby be affected. Imprisonment for debt is abolished.

Art. 60. All the Cantons are bound to treat the citizens of the other confederated States like those of their own State in legislation and in all judicial proceedings.

Art. 61. Civil judgments definitely pronounced in any Canton may be executed anywhere in Switzerland.

Art. 62. The exit duty on property [*traite foraine*] is abolished in the interior of Switzerland, as well as the right of redemption [*droit de retrait*] by citizens of one Canton against those of other confederated States.

Art. 63. The exit duty on property is abolished as respects foreign countries, provided reciprocity be observed.

Art. 64. The Confederation has power to make laws: On civil capacity. [*The confederation shall also have the power to legislate concerning all other matters within the field of the civil law. (As amended Nov. 13, 1808. After several years of legislative work a Swiss civil code was adopted on Dec. 10, 1007, and became effective on Jan. 1, 1912.)*] On all legal questions relating to commerce and to transactions affecting chattels (law of commercial obligations, including commercial law and law of exchange). On literary and artistic copyright. On the protection of new patterns and forms, and of inventions which are represented in models and are capable of industrial application. [*Amendment of Dec. 20, 1887.*] On the legal collection of debts and on bankruptcy. The organization of the courts, judicial procedure, and the administration of justice shall remain, as heretofore, subject to cantonal control. [*As amended Nov. 13, 1808.*]

Art. 65. The death penalty is abolished; nevertheless the provisions of military law in time of war shall be observed. Corporal punishment is abolished. [*Amendment of June 20, 1870: No death penalty shall be pronounced for a political crime. Corporal punishment is abolished.*]

Art. 66. The Confederation by law fixes the limits within which a Swiss citizen may be deprived of his political rights.

Art. 67. The Confederation by law provides for the extradition of accused persons from one Canton to another; nevertheless, extradition shall not be made obligatory for political offenses and offenses of the press.

Art. 68. Measures are taken by federal law for the incorporation of persons without country

(Heimathlosen), and for the prevention of new cases of that nature.

Art. 60. Legislation concerning measures of sanitary police against epidemic and cattle diseases, causing a common danger, is included in the powers of the Confederation.

Art. 70. The Confederation has power to expel from its territory foreigners who endanger the internal or external safety of Switzerland.

## Chapter II

Art. 71. With the reservation of the rights of the people and of the Cantons (Articles 89 and 121), the supreme authority of the Confederation is exercised by the Federal Assembly, [Assemblée fédérale; Bundesversammlung] which consists of two sections or councils, to wit: (A) The National Council. (B) The Council of States.

Art. 72. The National Council [Conseil National; Nationalrath] is composed of representatives of the Swiss people, chosen in the ratio of one member for each 20,000 persons of the total population. Fractions of upwards of 10,000 persons are reckoned as 20,000. Every Canton, and in the divided Cantons every Half-Canton, chooses at least one representative.

Art. 73. The elections for the National Council are direct. They are held in federal electoral districts, which in no case shall be formed out of parts of different Cantons.

Art. 74. Every Swiss who has completed twenty years of age, and who in addition is not excluded from the rights of a voter by the legislation of the Canton in which he is domiciled, has the right to vote in elections and popular votes. Nevertheless, the Confederation by law may establish uniform regulations for the exercise of such right.

Art. 75. Every lay Swiss citizen who has the right to vote is eligible for membership in the National Council.

Art. 76. The National Council is chosen for three years, and entirely renewed at each general election.

Art. 77. Representatives to the Council of States, members of the Federal Council, and officials appointed by that Council, shall not at the same time be members of the National Council.

Art. 78. The National Council chooses out of its own number, for each regular or extraordinary session, a President and a Vice-President. A member who has held the office of President during a regular session is ineligible either as President or Vice-President at the next regular session. The same member may not be Vice-President during two consecutive regular sessions. When the votes are equally divided the President has a casting vote; in elections he votes in the same manner as other members.

Art. 79. The members of the National Council receive a compensation out of the federal treasury.

Art. 80. The Council of States [Conseil des États; Ständerath] consists of forty-four representatives of the Cantons. Each Canton appoints two representatives; in the divided Cantons, each Half-State chooses one.

Art. 81. The members of the National Council and those of the Federal Council may not be representatives in the Council of States.

Art. 82. The Council of States chooses out of its own number for each regular or extraordinary session a President and a Vice-President. Neither the President nor the Vice-President can be chosen from among the representatives of the Canton

from which the President has been chosen for the regular session next preceding. Representatives of the same Canton cannot occupy the position of Vice-President during two consecutive regular sessions. When the votes are equally divided the President has a casting vote; in elections he votes in the same manner as the other members.

Art. 83. Representatives in the Council of States receive a compensation from the Cantons.

Art. 84. The National Council and the Council of States consider all the subjects which the present Constitution places within the competence of the Confederation, and which are not assigned to any other federal authority.

Art. 85. The subjects within the competence of the two Councils are particularly the following: 1. Laws on the organization of and election of federal authorities. 2. Laws and ordinances on subjects which by the Constitution are placed within the federal competence. 3. The salary and compensation of members of the federal governing bodies and of the Federal Chancery; the creation of federal offices and the determination of salaries therefor. 4. The election of the Federal Council, of the Federal Court, and of the Chancellor, and also of the Commander-in-chief of the federal army. The Confederation may by law assign to the Federal Assembly other powers of election or of confirmation. 5. Alliances and treaties with foreign powers, and also the approval of treaties made by the Cantons between themselves or with foreign powers; nevertheless the treaties made by the Cantons shall be brought before the Federal Assembly only in case the Federal Council or another Canton protests. 6. Measures for external safety and also for the maintenance of the independence and neutrality of Switzerland; the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. 7. The guaranty of the Constitution and of the territory of the Cantons; intervention in consequence of such guaranty; measures for the internal safety of Switzerland, for the maintenance of peace and order; amnesty and pardon. 8. Measures for the preservation of the Constitution, for carrying out the guaranty of the cantonal constitutions, and for fulfilling federal obligations. 9. The power of controlling the federal army. 10. The determination of the annual budget, the audit of public accounts, and federal ordinances authorizing loans. 11. The superintendence of federal administration and of federal courts. 12. Protests against the decisions of the Federal Council upon administrative conflicts. (Art. 113.) 13. Conflicts of jurisdiction between federal authorities. 14. The amendment of the federal Constitution.

Art. 86. The two Councils assemble annually in regular session upon a day to be fixed by the standing orders. They are convened in extra session by the Federal Council upon the request either of one fourth of the members of the National Council, or of five Cantons.

Art. 87. In either Council a quorum is a majority of the total number of its members.

Art. 88. In the National Council and in the Council of States a majority of those voting is required.

Art. 89. Federal laws, enactments, and resolutions shall be passed only by the agreement of the two Councils. Federal laws shall be submitted for acceptance or rejection by the people, if the demand is made by 30,000 voters or by eight Cantons. The same principle applies to federal resolutions which have a general application, and which are not of an urgent nature.

Art. 90. The Confederation shall by law estab-

lish the forms and intervals to be observed in popular votes.

Art. 01. Members of either Council vote without instructions.

Art. 02. Each Council takes action separately. But in the case of the elections specified in Article 85, § 4, of pardons, or of deciding a conflict of jurisdiction (Art. 85, § 13), the two Councils meet in joint session, under the direction of the President of the National Council, and a decision is made by the majority of the members of both Councils present and voting.

Art. 03. Measures may originate in either Council, and may be introduced by any of their members. The Cantons may by correspondence exercise the same right.

Art. 04. As a rule, the sittings of the Councils are public.

Art. 05. The supreme direction and executive authority of the Confederation is exercised by a Federal Council [Conseil fédéral; Bundesrath], composed of seven members.

Art. 06. The members of the Federal Council are chosen for three years by the Councils in joint session from among all the Swiss citizens eligible to the National Council. But not more than one member of the Federal Council shall be chosen from the same Canton. The Federal Council is chosen anew after each election of the National Council. Vacancies which occur in the course of the three years are filled at the first ensuing session of the Federal Assembly, for the remainder of the term of office.

Art. 07. The members of the Federal Council shall not, during their term of office, occupy any other office, either in the service of the Confederation or in a Canton, or follow any other pursuit, or exercise a profession.

Art. 08. The Federal Council is presided over by the President of the Confederation. There is a Vice-President. The President of the Confederation and the Vice-President of the Federal Council are chosen for one year by the Federal Assembly from among the members of the Council. The retiring President shall not be chosen as President or Vice-President for the year ensuing. The same member shall not hold the office of Vice-President during two consecutive years.

Art. 09. The President of the Confederation and the other members of the Federal Council receive an annual salary from the federal treasury.

Art. 100. A quorum of the Federal Council consists of four members.

Art. 101. The members of the Federal Council have the right to speak but not to vote in either house of the Federal Assembly, and also the right to make motions on the subject under consideration.

Art. 102. The powers and the duties of the Federal Council, within the limits of this Constitution, are particularly the following: 1. It conducts federal affairs, conformably to the laws and resolutions of the Confederation. 2. It takes care that the Constitution, federal laws and ordinances, and also the provisions of federal concordats, be observed; upon its own initiative or upon complaint, it takes measures necessary to cause these instruments to be observed, unless the consideration of redress be among the subjects which should be brought before the Federal Court, according to Article 113. 3. It takes care that the guaranty of the cantonal constitutions be observed. 4. It introduces bills or resolutions into the Federal Assembly, and gives its opinion upon the proposals

submitted to it by the Councils or the Cantons. 5. It executes the laws and resolutions of the Confederation and the judgments of the Federal Court, and also the compromises or decisions in arbitration upon disputes between Cantons. 6. It makes those appointments which are not assigned to the Federal Assembly, Federal Court, or other authority. 7. It examines the treaties made by Cantons with each other, or with foreign powers, and approves them, if proper. (Art. 85, § 5.) 8. It watches over the external interests of the Confederation, particularly the maintenance of its international relations, and is, in general, intrusted with foreign relations. 9. It watches over the external safety of Switzerland, over the maintenance of independence and neutrality. 10. It watches over the internal safety of the Confederation, over the maintenance of peace and order. 11. In cases of urgency, and when the Federal Assembly is not in session, the Federal Council has power to raise the necessary troops and to employ them, with the reservation that it shall immediately summon the Councils if the number of troops exceeds two thousand men, or if they remain in arms more than three weeks. 12. It administers the military establishment of the Confederation, and all other branches of administration committed to the Confederation. 13. It examines such laws and ordinances of the Cantons as must be submitted for its approval; it exercises supervision over such departments of the cantonal administration as are placed under its control. 14. It administers the finances of the Confederation, introduces the budget, and submits accounts of receipts and expenses. 15. It supervises the conduct of all the officials and employees of the federal administration. 16. It submits to the Federal Assembly at each regular session an account of its administration and a report of the condition of the Confederation, internal as well as external, and calls attention to the measures which it deems desirable for the promotion of the general welfare. It also makes special reports when the Federal Assembly or either Council requires it.

Art. 103. The business of the Federal Council is distributed by departments among its members. This distribution has the purpose only of facilitating the examination and despatch of business; decisions emanate from the Federal Council as a single authority.

Art. 104. The Federal Council and its departments have power to call in experts on special subjects.

Art. 105. A Federal Chancery [Chancellerie fédérale; Bundeskanzlei], at the head of which is placed the Chancellor of the Confederation, conducts the secretary's business for the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council. The Chancellor is chosen by the Federal Assembly for the term of three years, at the same time as the Federal Council. The Chancery is under the special supervision of the Federal Council. A federal law shall provide for the organization of the Chancery.

Art. 106. There shall be a Federal Court [Tribunal fédéral; Bundesgericht] for the administration of justice in federal concerns. There shall be, moreover, a jury for criminal cases. (Art. 112.)

Art. 107. The members and alternates of the Federal Court shall be chosen by the Federal Assembly, which shall take care that all three national languages are represented therein. A law shall establish the organization of the Federal Court and of its sections, the number of judges

and alternates, their term of office, and their salary.

Art. 108. Any Swiss citizen eligible to the National Council may be chosen to the Federal Court. The members of the Federal Assembly and of the Federal Council, and officials appointed by those authorities, shall not at the same time belong to the Federal Court. The members of the Federal Court shall not, during their term of office, occupy any other office, either in the service of the Confederation or in a Canton, nor engage in any other pursuit, nor practice a profession.

Art. 109. The Federal Court organizes its own Chancery and appoints the officials thereof.

Art. 110. The Federal Court has jurisdiction in civil suits: 1. Between the Confederation and the Cantons. 2. Between the Confederation on one part and corporations or individuals on the other part, when such corporations or individuals are plaintiffs, and when the amount involved is of a degree of importance to be determined by federal legislation. 3. Between Cantons. 4. Between Cantons on one part and corporations or individuals on the other part, when one of the parties demands it, and the amount involved is of a degree of importance to be determined by federal legislation. It further has jurisdiction in suits concerning the status of persons not subjects of any government (heimathlosat), and the conflicts which arise between Communes of different Cantons respecting the right of local citizenship. [Droit de cité.]

Art. 111. The Federal Court is bound to give judgment in other cases when both parties agree to abide by its decision, and when the amount involved is of a degree of importance to be determined by federal legislation.

Art. 112. The Federal Court, assisted by a jury to decide upon questions of fact, has criminal jurisdiction in: 1. Cases of high treason against the Confederation, or rebellion or violence against federal authorities. 2. Crimes and misdemeanors against the law of nations. 3. Political crimes and misdemeanors which are the cause or the result of disturbances which occasion armed federal intervention. 4. Cases against officials appointed by a federal authority, where such authority relegates them to the Federal Court.

Art. 113. The Federal Court further has jurisdiction: 1. Over conflicts of jurisdiction between federal authorities on one part and cantonal authorities on the other part. 2. Disputes between Cantons, when such disputes are upon questions of public law. 3. Complaints of violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, and complaints of individuals for the violation of concordats or treaties. Conflicts of administrative jurisdiction are reserved, and are to be settled in a manner prescribed by federal legislation. In all the fore-mentioned cases the Federal Court shall apply the laws passed by the Federal Assembly and those resolutions of the Assembly which have a general import. It shall in like manner conform to treaties which shall have been ratified by the Federal Assembly.

Art. 114. Besides the cases specified in Articles 110, 112, and 113, the Confederation may by law place other matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court; in particular, it may give to that court powers intended to insure the uniform application of the laws provided for in Article 64.

Art. 115. All that relates to the location of the authorities of the Confederation is a subject for federal legislation.

Art. 116. The three principal languages spoken in Switzerland, German, French, and Italian, are national languages of the Confederation.

Art. 117. The officials of the Confederation are responsible for their conduct in office. A federal law shall enforce this responsibility.

### Chapter III

[*(These four articles abrogated by the four articles following them, 118-122.)* Art. 118. *The federal constitution may at any time be amended.*]

Art. 119. [*Amendment is secured through the forms required for passing federal laws.*]

Art. 120. [*When either Council of the Federal Assembly passes a resolution for amendment of the federal constitution and the other Council does not agree; or when fifty thousand Swiss voters demand amendment, the question whether the Federal Constitution ought to be amended is, in either case, submitted to a vote of the Swiss people, voting yes or no. If in either case the majority of the Swiss citizens who vote pronounce in the affirmative, there shall be a new election of both councils for the purposes of preparing amendments.*]

Art. 121. [*The amended federal constitution shall be in force when it has been adopted by the majority of Swiss citizens who take part in the vote thereon and by a majority of the States. In making up a majority of the states the vote of a half-canton is counted as half a vote. The result of the popular vote in each canton is considered to be the vote of the State.*]

Art. 118. [*Amendment of July 5, 1891.*] The Federal Constitution may at any time be amended as a whole or in part.

Art. 119. [*Amendment of July 5, 1891.*] General revision is secured through the forms required for passing the federal laws.

Art. 120. When either Council of the Federal Assembly passes a resolution for general revision and the other Council does not agree; or when fifty thousand Swiss voters demand general revision the question whether there shall be such a revision must, in either case, be submitted to the popular vote of the Swiss people. If, in either case, the majority of the Swiss citizens who vote on the question pronounce in the affirmative, there shall be a new election of both Councils for the purpose of preparing a general revision.

Art. 121. [*Amendment of July 5, 1891.*] Specific amendments may be brought forward either through a Proposition of the People [Volksanregung] (Initiative) or by Federal legislation. A Proposition of the People means a demand supported by fifty thousand Swiss voters, either for suspension, repeal, or alteration of specified articles of the Federal Constitution. If by means of the method of Proposition of the People several different subjects are brought forward either for alteration or for incorporation into the Federal Constitution, each one of those separate subjects must be presented in a separate demand for a popular vote [Initiativbegehren]. The demand for a popular vote may take the form either of a request in general terms, or of a definite draft. If such a demand be made in the form of a request in general terms and the Councils of the Federal Assembly agree thereto, the said Councils shall thereupon prepare a specific amendment of the purport indicated by those asking amendment; and such specific amendment shall be submitted to the people and to the states for their acceptance or rejection. In case the Councils of the Federal Assembly do not agree thereto, the question of specific amendment shall then be subjected to the people for a popular vote; and in case the majority of the Swiss voters vote therefor, an amend-

ment of the purport indicated by the vote of the people shall then be prepared by the Federal Assembly. In case the request shall take the form of a specific draft and the Federal Assembly agree thereto, the draft is then to be submitted to the people and the States for acceptance or rejection. If the Federal Assembly shall not agree thereto it may either prepare a substitute draft for itself, or it may propose the rejection of the proposition. The proposition to reject such substitute draft or proposition shall be submitted to the vote of the people and of the States at the same time with the general Proposition of the People.

Art. 122. [*Amendment of July 5, 1891.*] The procedure upon the Proposition of the People and the popular votes concerning amendment of the Federal Constitution, shall be regulated in detail by a Federal Law.

Art. 123. [*Amendment of July 5, 1891.*] The amended Federal Constitution or the specific amendments proposed, as the case may be, shall be in force when adopted by the majority of the Swiss citizens who take part in the vote thereon and by a majority of the Cantons. In making up the majority of the States the vote of a half of each Canton is counted as half a vote. The result of the popular vote in each Canton is considered to be the vote of the state.

**Temporary Provisions**

Article 1. The proceeds of the posts and customs shall be divided upon the present basis, until such time as the Confederation shall take upon itself the military expenses up to this time borne by the Cantons. Federal legislation shall provide, besides, that the loss which may be occasioned to the finances of certain Cantons by the sum of the charges which result from Articles 20, 30, 36 (§2), and 42 (e), shall fall upon such Cantons only gradually, and shall not attain its full effect till after a transition period of some years. Those Cantons which, at the going into effect of Article 20 of the Constitution, have not fulfilled the military obligations which are imposed upon them by the former Constitution, or by federal laws, shall be bound to carry them out at their own expense.

Art. 2. The provisions of the federal laws and of the cantonal concordats, constitutions or cantonal laws, which are contrary to this Constitution, cease to have effect by the adoption of the Constitution or the publication of the laws for which it provides.

Art. 3. The new provisions relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the Federal Court take effect only after the publication of federal laws thereon.

Art. 4. A delay of five years is allowed to Cantons for the establishment of free instruction in primary public education. (Art. 27.)

Art. 5. Those persons who practice a liberal profession, and who, before the publication of the federal law provided for in Article 33, have obtained a certificate of competence from a Canton or a joint authority representing several Cantons, may pursue that profession throughout the Confederation.

Art. 6. [*Amendment of Dec. 22, 1885. For the remainder of this amendment see Art. 32 (ii).*] If a federal law for carrying out Article 32 (ii) be passed before the end of 1800, the import duties levied on spirituous liquors by the Cantons and Communes, according to Article 32, cease on the going into effect of such law. If, in such case,

the shares of any Canton or Commune, out of the sums to be divided, are not sufficient to equal the average annual net proceeds of the taxes they have levied on spirituous liquors in the years 1880 to 1884 inclusive, the Cantons and Communes affected shall, till the end of 1890, receive the amount of the deficiency out of the amount which is to be divided among the other Cantons according to population; and the remainder shall be divided among such other Cantons and Communes, according to population. The Confederation shall further provide by law that for such Cantons or Communes as may suffer financial loss through the effect of this amendment, such loss shall not come upon them immediately in its full extent, but gradually up to the year 1895. The indemnities thereby made necessary shall be previously taken out of the net proceeds designated in Article 32 (ii), paragraph 4.

Thus resolved by the National Council to be submitted to the popular vote of the Swiss people and of the cantons. BERN, January 31, 1874. ZIEGLER, President. SCHIESS, Secretary.

Thus resolved by the Council of States, to be submitted to the popular vote of the Swiss people and of the Cantons. BERN, JANUARY 31, 1874. A. KOPP, President. J. L. LUTSCHER, Secretary.

SWORD, German order of the. See LIVONIA: 12th-13th centuries.

SWORD, Swedish order of the, order, ascribed to Gustavus Vasa. It was revived, after long neglect, by King Frederick I, in 1748.

SYAGRIUS (d. 487), Roman administrator of Gaul, 464-486. Defeated by Clovis at the battle of Soissons, 486.

His kingdom. See GAUL: 457-486.

SYBARIS, SYBARITES.—Sybaris and Kroton were two ancient Greek cities, founded by Achaean colonists, on the coast of the gulf of Tarentum, in southern Italy. "The town of Sybaris was planted between two rivers, the Sybaris and the Krathis (the name of the latter borrowed from a river of Achaia); the town of Kroton about twenty-five miles distant, on the river Æsarus. . . . The fatal contest between these two cities, which ended in the ruin of Sybaris, took place in 510 B. C., after the latter had subsisted in growing prosperity for 210 years. . . . We are told that the Sybarites, in that final contest, marched against Kroton with an army of 300,000 men. . . . The few statements which have reached us respecting them touch, unfortunately, upon little more than their luxury, fantastic self-indulgence and extravagant indolence, for which qualities they have become proverbial in modern times as well as in ancient."—G Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 22.—"The wealth of Sybaris, which became proverbial, was due mainly to her command and use of this 'isthmus' road [Strait of Messina], which led across in two days' journey to her colony of Laos on the Western coast. Here the goods were re-embarked for the ports of Etruria on the further West. That is why, when Sybaris had been destroyed by her neighbor Croton, 'the Milesians of every age shaved their heads and displayed marks of deep mourning; for these two cities had been more closely befriended than any others we know of.' Miletus was the chief Greek trading city."—H. Zimmern, *Greek commonwealth*, p. 27.—See also ACHÆAN CITIES, LEAGUE OF THE.

SYBEL, Heinrich von (1817-1895), German historian. See HISTORY: 28.

SYBOTA, Naval Battle of (432 B. C.), fought between the fleets of Corinth and Corcyra, in the quarrel which led up to the Peloponnesian War,

The Athenians had ten ships present, as allies of the Corcyreans, intending only to watch affairs, but at the end they were drawn into the fight. The Corcyreans were beaten.—Based on Thucydides, *History* (tr. by Jewett), *bk. 1, sect. 46*.

**SYCOPHANTS**.—"Not until now [about 428 B. C., when the demagogue Cleon rose to power at Athens] did the activity of the Sycophants attain to its full height; a class of men arose who made a regular trade of collecting materials for indictments, and of bringing their fellow citizens before a legal tribunal. These denunciations were particularly directed against those who were distinguished by wealth, birth and services, and who therefore gave cause for suspicion; for the informers wished to prove themselves zealous friends of the people and active guardians of the constitution. . . . Intrigues and conspiracies were suspected in all quarters, and the popular orators persuaded the citizens to put no confidence in any magistrate, enjoin or commission, but rather to settle everything in full assembly and themselves assume the entire executive. The Sycophants made their living out of this universal suspicion. . . . They threatened prosecutions in order thus to extort money from guilty and innocent alike; for even among those who felt free from guilt were many who shunned a political prosecution beyond all other things, having no confidence in a jury."—E. Curtius, *History of Greece, v. 3, bk 4, ch. 2*.—See also DELATION.

**SYDENHAM, Charles Poulett-Thompson, 1st Baron** (1709-1841), first governor-general of Canada, 1830-1841. See CANADA: 1838-1843.

**SYDENHAM, Thomas** (1624-1680), English physician. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 16th-17th centuries.

**SYDNEY, Sir Henry** (1529-1586), English statesman. Lord Deputy of Ireland, 1565, 1568, 1575, 1577. See IRELAND: 1559-1603.

**SYDNEY**, capital and port of New South Wales, Australia, on the eastern coast of the continent. In 1921 it had a population of about 905,947. See AUSTRALIA: Map.

1850.—**Founding of University of Sydney**. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1850-1922.

1890-1916.—**Labor strikes**. See AUSTRALIA: 1890-1891; INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD: Recent tendencies.

**SYKES, Sir Mark, 6th Bart.** (1879-1919), English soldier and traveler. Served in the South African War, 1902; elected to Parliament, 1911; served as adviser on Eastern questions to the British government during the World War. See WORLD WAR: 1916: VI. Turkish theater: c, 3.

**SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT** (May, 1916). See SYRIA: 1908-1921.

**SYLLA**. See SULLA, LUCIUS CORNELIUS.

**SYLLABARIES**.—"A good deal of the [Assyrian] literature was of a lexical and grammatical kind, and was intended to assist the Semitic student in interpreting the old Accadian texts. Lists of characters were drawn up with their pronunciation in Accadian and the translation into Assyrian of the words represented by them. Since the Accadian pronunciation of a character was frequently the phonetic value attached to it by the Assyrians, these syllabaries, as they have been termed—in consequence of the fact that the cuneiform characters denoted syllables and not letters—have been of the greatest possible assistance in the decipherment of the inscriptions."—A. H. Sayce, *Assyria, its princes, priests and people, ch. 4*.

**SYLLABUS OF PIUS IX**. See PAPACY: 1864.

**SYLVANIA, Proposed state of**. See NORTH-WEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES.

**SYLVESTER I**, pope, 314-335.

**Sylvester II**, pope, 999-1003. Granted apostolic power to King Stephen of Hungary. See HUNGARY: 972-1116.

**Sylvester III**, anti-pope, 1044. See PAPACY: 887-1046.

**SYLVIVS, Jacobus** (Jacques Dubois) (1478-1555), French anatomist. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 16th-17th centuries.

**SYMINGTON, William** (1763-1831), English civil engineer. Experimented with steam navigation. See STEAM NAVIGATION: Beginnings.

**SYMMAC'HIA**, an offensive and defensive alliance between two Greek states.

**SYMMEs, John Cleves** (1742-1814), American colonizer. Secured a grant to territory in Ohio for an association of men from New Jersey. See CINCINNATI: 1788.

**SYMMORIÆ**.—"In the archonship of Nausinicus in Olymp. 100,3 (378 B. C.), the institution of what were called the symmoriæ (collegia, or companies), was introduced [at Athens] in relation to the property taxes. The object of this institution, as the details of the arrangement themselves show, was through the joint liability of larger associations to confirm the sense of individual obligation to pay the taxes, and to secure their collection, and also, in case of necessity, to cause those taxes which were not received at the proper time to be advanced by the most wealthy citizens."—A. Boeckh, *Public economy of the Athenians* (tr. by Lamb), *bk. 4, ch. 9*.

**SYMONDS, John Addington** (1840-1893), English author. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1880-1920.

**SYMONS, Arthur** (1865- ), English poet and critic. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1880-1920.

**SYMPOSIUM**.—The symposium of the ancient Greeks was that part of a feast which ensued when the substantial eating was done, and which was enlivened with wine, music, conversation, exhibitions of dancing, etc.—Based on C. C. Felton, *Greece, ancient and modern, course 2, lect. 5*.

**SYNDICALISM**. See INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD; GUILD SOCIALISM; LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1867-1912; SOCIALISM: 1904-1921; 1906; BARCELONA: 1903-1919; FRANCE: 1906-1909; Era of socialist, etc.; PAPACY: 1911-1914; PORTUGAL: 1911-1914; SPAIN: 1921; Political outlook in Spain.

**SYNEDRION**. See SANHEDRIM.

**SYNGE, John Millington** (1871-1909), Irish dramatist. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1880-1920; DRAMA: 1802-1921; ARAN ISLANDS.

**SYNOD OF THE OAK**. See ROME: Empire: 400-518.

**SYNTHETIC HISTORY**. See HISTORY: 33.

**SYPHILIS**. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 19th-20th centuries: Serotherapy.

**SYRACUSE**, city of Sicily on the east coast of the island, having a communal population, 1921, of 64,840.

B. C. 734.—**Founding of the city**.—"Syracuse was founded the year after Naxos, by Corinthians, under the leader named Archias, a Heracleid, and probably of the ruling caste, who appears to have been compelled to quit his country to avoid the effects of the indignation which he had excited by a horrible outrage committed in a family of lower rank. . . . Syracuse became, in course of time, the parent of other Sicilian cities, among which Camarina was the most considerable. . . . Forty-five years after Syracuse, Gela was founded by a band collected from Crete and Rhodes, chiefly from Lindus, and about a century later (B. C. 582) sent forth



settlers to the banks of the Acragas, where they built Agrigentum."—C. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. 12.—The first settlement at Syracuse was on the islet of Ortygia. "Ortygia, two English miles in circumference, was separated from the main island only by a narrow channel, which was bridged over when the city was occupied and enlarged by Gelón in the 72nd Olympiad, if not earlier. It formed only a small part, though the most secure and best-fortified part, of the vast space which the city afterwards occupied. But it sufficed alone for the inhabitants a considerable time, and the present city in its modern decline has again reverted to the same modest limits. Moreover, Ortygia offered another advantage of not less value. It lay across the entrance of a spacious harbour, approached by a narrow mouth, and its fountain of Arethusa was memorable in antiquity both for the abundance and goodness of its water."—G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 22.—See also ACHRADINA.

**B. C. 480.**—Defeat of Carthaginians at Himera. See SICILY: B. C. 480.

**B. C. 415-413.**—Siege by Athenians.—The Greek city of Syracuse, in Sicily, having been founded and built up by colonization from Corinth, naturally shared the deep hatred of Athens which was common among the Dorian Greeks, and which the Corinthians particularly found many reasons to cherish. The feeling at Athens was reciprocal, and, as the two cities grew supreme in their respective spheres and arrogant with the consciousness of superior power, mutual jealousies fed their passion of hostility, although nothing in their affairs, either politically or commercially, brought them really into conflict with one another. But Syracuse, enforcing her supremacy in Sicily, dealt roughly with the Ionian settlements there, and Athens was appealed to for aid. The first call upon her was made (428 B. C.) in the midst of the earlier period of the Peloponnesian War, and came from the people of Leontini, then engaged in a struggle with Syracuse, into which other Sicilian cities had been drawn. The Athenians were easily induced to respond to the call, and they sent a naval force which took part in the Leontine War, but without any marked success. The result was to produce among the Sicilians a common dread of Athenian interference, which led them to patch up a general peace. But fresh quarrels were not long in arising, in the course of which Leontini was entirely destroyed, and another Sicilian city, Egesta, which Athens had before received into her alliance, claimed help against Syracuse. This appeal reached the Athenians at a time (416 B. C.) when their populace was blindly following Alcibiades, whose ambition craved war, and who chafed under the restraints of the treaty of peace with Sparta which Nicias had brought about. They were carried by his influence into the undertaking of a great expedition of conquest, directed against the Sicilian capital—the most costly and formidable which any Greek state had ever fitted out. In the summer of 415 B. C. the whole force assembled at Corcyra and sailed across the Ionian sea to the Italian coast and thence to Sicily. It consisted of 134 triremes, with many merchant ships and transports, bearing 5,100 hoplites, 480 bowmen and 700 Rhodian slingers. The commanders were Nicias, Lamachus and Alcibiades. On the arrival of the expedition in Sicily a disagreement among the generals made efficient action impossible and gave the Syracusans time to prepare a stubborn resistance. Meantime the enemies of Alcibiades at Athens had brought about a decree for his arrest, on account of an

alleged profanation of the sacred Eleusinian mysteries, and, fearing to face the accusation, he fled, taking refuge at Sparta, where he became the implacable enemy of his country. Three months passed before Nicias, who held the chief command, made any attempt against Syracuse. He then struck a single blow, which was successful, but which led to nothing; for the Athenian army was withdrawn immediately afterwards and put into winter quarters. In the following spring the regular operations of a siege and blockade were undertaken, at sea with the fleet and on land by a wall of circumvallation. The undertaking promised well at first and the Syracusans were profoundly discouraged. But Sparta, where Alcibiades worked passionately in their favor, sent them a general, Gylippus, who proved to be equal to an army, and promised reinforcements to follow. The more vigorous Athenian general, Lamachus, had been killed, and Nicias, with incredible apathy, suffered Gylippus to gather up a small army in the island and to enter Syracuse with it, in defiance of the Athenian blockade. From that day the situation was reversed. The besieged became the assailants and the besiegers defended themselves. Nicias sent to Athens for help and maintained his ground with difficulty through another long winter, until a second great fleet and army arrived, under the capable general Demosthenes, to reinforce him. But it was too late. Syracuse had received powerful aid, in ships and men, from Corinth, from Sparta and from other enemies of Athens, had built a navy and trained sailors of her own, and was full of confident courage. The Athenians were continually defeated, on land and sea, and hoped for nothing at last but to be able to retreat. Even the opportunity to do that was lost for them in the end by the weakness of Nicias, who delayed moving on account of an eclipse, until his fleet was destroyed in a final sea-fight and the island roads were blocked by an implacable enemy. The flight when it was undertaken proved a hopeless attempt, and there is nothing in history more tragical than the account of it which is given in the pages of Thucydides. On the sixth day of the struggling retreat the division under Demosthenes gave up and surrendered to the pursuers who swarmed around it. On the next day Nicias yielded with the rest, after a terrible massacre at the river Assinarus. Nicias and Demosthenes were put to the sword, although Gylippus interceded for them. Their followers were imprisoned in the Syracusan quarries. "There were great numbers of them and they were crowded in a deep and narrow place. At first the sun by day was still scorching and suffocating, for they had no roof over their heads, while the autumn nights were cold, and the extremes of temperature engendered violent disorders. Being cramped for room they had to do everything on the same spot. The corpses of those who died from their wounds, exposure to the weather, and the like, lay heaped one upon another. The smells were intolerable; and they were at the same time afflicted by hunger and thirst. . . . Every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place befell them. This was the condition of all the captives for about ten weeks. At length the Syracusans sold them, with the exception of the Athenians and of any Sicilian or Italian Greeks who had sided with them in the war. The whole number of the public prisoners is not accurately known, but they were not less than 7,000. Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed of all Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest—the most glorious to the

victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished; for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home. Thus ended the Sicilian expedition."—Thucydides, *History* (tr. by Jowett), *bk.* 6-7.—See also ATHENS: B. C. 413-411.

ALSO IN: E. A. Freeman, *History of Sicily*, v. 3.—G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 58-60.—E. Creasy, *Fifteen decisive battles*, ch. 2.

**B. C. 397-396.**—Dionysius and the Carthaginians.—Eighteen years after the tragic deliverance of Syracuse from the besieging host and fleet of the Athenians, the Sicilian capital experienced a second great peril and extraordinary escape of like kind. The democratic government of Syracuse had meantime fallen and a new tyrant had risen to power. Dionysius, who began life in a low station, made his way upward by ruthless energy and cunning, practising skilfully the arts of a demagogue until he had won the confidence of people, and making himself their master in the end. When the sovereignty of Dionysius had acquired firmness and the fortifications and armament of his city had been powerfully increased, it suited his purposes to make war upon the Carthaginians, which he did 397 B. C. He attacked Motye, which was the most important of their cities in Sicily, and took it after a siege of some months' duration, slaughtering and enslaving the wretched inhabitants. But his triumph in this exploit was brief. Imilkon, or Himilco, the Carthaginian commander, arrived in Sicily with a great fleet and army and recaptured Motye with ease. That done he made a rapid march to Messene, in the northeastern extremity of the island, and gained that city almost without a blow. The inhabitants escaped, for the most part, but the town is said to have been reduced to an utter heap of ruins—from which it was subsequently rebuilt. From Messene he advanced to Syracuse, Dionysius not daring to meet him in the field. The Syracusan fleet, encountering that of the Carthaginians, near Katana, was almost annihilated, and when the vast African armament, numbering more than seventeen hundred ships of every description, sailed into the great harbor of Syracuse, there was nothing to oppose it. The city was formidably invested, by land and sea, and its fate would have appeared to be sealed. But the gods interposed, as the ancients thought, and avenged themselves for insults which the Carthaginians had put upon them. Once more the fatal pestilence which had smitten the latter twice before in their Sicilian wars appeared and their huge army was palsied by it. "Care and attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of 150,000 unburied bodies. The military strength of the Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visitation. Far from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the Syracusans; who . . . were themselves untouched by the distemper. [In this situation the Carthaginian commander basely deserted his army. Having secretly bribed Dionysius to permit the escape of himself and the small number of native Carthaginians in his force, he abandoned the remainder to their fate (394 B. C.). Dionysius took the Iberians into his service; but the Libyans and other mercenaries were either killed or enslaved. As for Imilkon, soon after his return to Carthage he shut himself in his house

and died, refusing food. The blow to the prestige of Carthage was nearly fatal, producing a rebellion among her subjects which assumed a most formidable character; but it lacked capable command and was suppressed."—G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 82.

**B. C. 394-384.**—Conquests and dominion of Dionysius.—"The successful result of Dionysios' first Punic War seems to have largely spread his fame in Old Greece," while it increased his prestige and power at home. But "he had many difficulties. He too, like the Carthaginians, had to deal with a revolt among his mercenaries, and he had to give up to them the town of Leontinoi. And the people of Naxos and Katane, driven out by himself, and the people of Messana, driven out by Himilkon, were wandering about, seeking for dwelling-places. He restored Messana, but he did not give it back to its old inhabitants. He peopled it with colonists from Italy and from Old Greece. . . . He also planted a body of settlers from the old Messenian land in Peloponnésos," at Tyndaris. "Thus the north-eastern corner of Sicily was held by men who were really attached to Dionysios. And he went on further to extend his power along the north coast. . . . The Sikel towns were now fast taking to Greek ways, and we hear of commonwealths and tyrants among them, just as among the Greeks. Agyris, lord of Agyrium, was said to be the most powerful prince in Sicily after Dionysios himself. . . . With him Dionysios made a treaty, and also with other Sikel lords and cities." But he attacked the new Sikel town of Tauromenion, and was disastrously repulsed. "This discomfiture at Tauromenion checked the plans of Dionysios for a while. Several towns threw off his dominion. . . . And the Carthaginians also began to stir again. In B. C. 393 their general Magón, seemingly without any fresh troops from Africa, set out from Western Sicily to attack Messana." But Dionysios defeated him, and the next year he made peace with the Carthaginians, as one of the consequences of which he captured Tauromenion in 391. "Dionysios was now at the height of his power in Sicily. . . . He commanded the whole east coast, and the greater part of the north and south coasts. . . . Dionysios and Carthage might be said to divide Sicily between them, and Dionysios had the larger share." Being at peace with the Carthaginians, he now turned his arms against the Greek cities in Southern Italy, and took Kaulonia, Hipponion, and Rhegium 387 B. C. (see RHEGIUM, SIEGE OF [387 B. C.]) making himself, "beyond all doubt, the chief power, not only in Sicily, but in Greek Italy also." Three years later (384 B. C.) Dionysios sent a splendid embassy to the Olympic festival in Greece. "Lysias called on the assembled Greeks to show their hatred of the tyrant, to hinder his envoys from sacrificing or his chariots from running. His chariots did run; but they were all defeated. Some of the multitude made an attack on the splendid tents of his envoys. He had also sent poems of his own to be recited; but the crowd would not hear them."—E. A. Freeman, *Story of Sicily*, ch. 10.

**B. C. 383.**—War with Carthage. See SICILY: B. C. 383.

**368.**—Siege of Lilybæum by Dionysius. See LILYBÆUM.

**B. C. 344.**—Fall of Dionysian tyranny.—The elder Dionysius,—he who climbed by cunning demagoguery from an obscure beginning in life to the height of power in Syracuse, making himself the typical tyrant of antiquity, died in 307 B. C.

after a reign of thirty-eight years. He was succeeded by his son, Dionysius the younger, who inherited nothing in character from his father but his vices and his shameless meannesses. For a time the younger Dionysius was largely controlled by the admirable influence of Dion, brother-in-law and son-in-law of the elder tyrant (who had several wives and left several families). Dion had Plato for his teacher and friend, and strove with the help of the great Athenian who visited Sicily thrice to win the young tyrant to a life of virtue and to philosophical aims. The only result was finally to destroy the whole influence with which they began, and Dion, ere long, was driven from Syracuse, while Dionysius abandoned himself to debaucheries and cruelties. After a time Dion was persuaded to lead a small force from Athens to Syracuse and undertake the overthrow of Dionysius. The gates of Syracuse were joyfully opened to him and his friends, and they were speedily in possession of the whole city except the island-stronghold of Ortygia, which was the entrenchment of the Dionysian tyranny. Then ensued a protracted and desperate civil war in Syracuse, which half ruined the magnificent city. In the end Ortygia was surrendered, Dionysius having previously escaped with much treasure to his dependent city of Lokri, in southern Italy. Dion took up the reins of government, intending to make himself what modern times would call a constitutional monarch. He wished the people to have liberty, but such liberty as a philosopher would find best for them. He was distrusted, misunderstood, denounced by demagogues, and hated, at last, as bitterly as the tyrants who preceded him. His high-minded ambitions were all disappointed and his own character suffered from the disappointment. At the end of a year of sovereignty he was assassinated by one of his own Athenian intimates, Kallippus, who secured the goodwill of the army and made himself despot. The reign of Kallippus was maintained for something more than a year, and he was then driven out by Hipparinus, one of the sons of Dionysius the elder, and half-brother to the younger of that name. Hipparinus was presently murdered and another brother, Nysæus, took his place. Then Nysæus, in turn, was driven out by Dionysius, who returned from Lokri and re-established his power. The condition of Syracuse under the restored despotism of Dionysius was worse than it ever had been in the past, and the great city seemed likely to perish. At the last extremity of suffering, in 344 B. C., its people sent a despairing appeal to Corinth (the mother-city of Syracuse) for help. The Corinthians responded by despatching to Sicily a small fleet of ten triremes and a meagre army of 1,200 men, under Timoleon. It is the first appearance in history of a name which soon shone with immortality; for Timoleon proved himself to be one of the greatest and the noblest of Greeks. He found affairs in Sicily complicated by an invasion of Carthaginians, coöperating with one Hiketas, who had made himself despot of Leontini and who hoped to become master of Syracuse. By skilfully using the good fortune which the gods were believed to have lavished upon his enterprise, Timoleon within a few months, had defeated Hiketas in the field; had accepted the surrender of Dionysius in Ortygia and sent the fallen tyrant to Corinth; had caused such discouragement to the Carthaginians that they withdrew fleet and army and sailed away to Africa. The whole city now fell quickly into his hands. His first act was to demolish the stronghold of tyranny

in Ortygia and to erect courts of justice upon its site. A free constitution of government was then re-established, all exiled citizens recalled, a great immigration of Greek inhabitants invited, and the city revived with new currents of life. The tyranny in other cities was overthrown and all Sicily regenerated. The Carthaginians returning were defeated with fearful losses in a great battle on the Krimesus, and a peace made with them which narrowed their dominion in Sicily to the region west of the Halykus. All these great achievements completed, Timoleon resigned his generalship, declined every office, and became a simple citizen of Syracuse, living only a few years, however, to enjoy the grateful love and respect of its people.—Based on G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 84-85.

Also in: Plutarch, *Timoleon*.

B. C. 317-289.—Under Agathokles.—A little more than twenty years after Timoleon expelled the brood of the tyrant Dionysius from Syracuse, and liberated Sicily, his work was entirely undone and a new and worse despot pushed himself into power. This was Agathokles, who rose, like his prototype, from a humble grade of life, acquired wealth by a lucky marriage, was trusted with the command of the Syracusan army—of mercenaries, chiefly—obtained a complete ascendancy over these soulless men, and then turned them loose upon the city, one morning at daybreak (317 B. C.), for a carnival of unrestrained riot and massacre. "They broke open the doors of the rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within, and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the temples. . . . For two days Syracuse was thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the soldiery; 4,000 citizens had been already slain, and many more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathokles, as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated at 6,000." In a city so purged and terrorized, Agathokles had no difficulty in getting himself proclaimed by acclamation sole ruler or autocrat, and he soon succeeded in extending his authority over a large part of Sicily. After some years he became involved in war with the Carthaginians, and suffered a disastrous defeat on the Himera (310 B. C.). Besieged in Syracuse, as a consequence, he resorted to bolder tactics than had been known before his time and "carried the war into Africa. [His invasion of Carthage was the first that the Punic capital ever knew, and it created great alarm and confusion in the city. The Carthaginians were repeatedly beaten, Tunes, and other dependent towns, as well as Utica, were captured, the surrounding territory was ravaged, and Agathokles became master of the eastern coast. But all his successes gained him no permanent advantage, and after four years of wonderful campaigning in Africa, he saw no escape from the difficulties of his situation except by basely stealing away from his army, leaving his two sons to be killed by the furious soldiers when they discovered his flight. Returning to Sicily, the wonderfully crafty and unscrupulous abilities which he possessed enabled him to regain his power and to commit outrage after outrage upon the people of Syracuse, Egesta, and other towns, until his death in 289 B. C.]—G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 97.

B. C. 212.—Siege and capture by the Romans. See PUNIC WARS: Second.

A. D. 279.—Sacked by Franks.—The Emperor Probus, who expelled from Gaul 277 A. D., the invaders then beginning to swarm upon the hapless province, removed a large body of captive Franks to the coast of Pontus, on the Euxine, and settled them there. The restive barbarians soon afterwards succeeded (279 A. D.) in capturing a fleet of vessels, in which they made their way to the Mediterranean, plundering the shores and islands as they passed towards the west. "The opulent city of Syracuse, in whose port the navies of

Athens and Carthage had formerly been sunk, were sacked by a handful of the trembling inhabitants. [This was the crowning exploit of the escaping Franks, after which they continued their voyage.]"—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 12.

878.—Siege and capture by Saracens. See SICILY: 827-878.

SYR-DARYA, or Syr-Dariinsk, province in Turkestan, having an area of 166,000 square miles, and a population of more than 1,500,000. The principal city and commercial center is Tashkent. See TURKESTAN.

## SYRIA

Syria is an independent state under the protection of France as a mandatory power. "Between the Arabian Desert and the eastern coast of the Levant there stretches—along almost the full extent of the latter, or for nearly 400 miles—a tract of fertile land varying from 70 to 100 miles in breadth. This is so broken up by mountain range and valley, that it has never all been brought under one native government. . . . It has . . . therefore, been covered by one name, Syria. Like that of Palestine, the name is due to the Greeks, but by a reverse process. As 'Palestina,' which is really Philistina, was first the name of only a part of the coast [see PALESTINE: Name; JEWS: 130-134; CHRISTIANITY: Map of Palestine in the time of Christ] and thence spread inland to the desert, so Syria, which is a shorter form of Assyria, was originally applied by the Greeks to the whole of the Assyrian Empire from the Caucasus to the Levant, then shrank to this side of the Euphrates, and finally within the limits drawn [below]."—G. A. Smith, *Historical geography of the Holy Land*, bk. 1, ch. 1.—Under the mandate, Syria is bounded on the east by Mesopotamia; on the south by the northern boundary of Palestine; on the west by the Mediterranean; and on the north by Turkey. The boundary between Turkey and Syria was fixed by the Franco-Turkish Treaty of October 30, 1921. Palestine, which is geographically part of Syria, has been created a separate state and is administered by Great Britain as a mandatory power. The area of the territory mandated to France is 60,000 square miles. The estimated population, 1923, was 3,000,000.—See also DAMASCUS; TURKEY: Map of Asia Minor.

ALSO IN: H. C. Butler, *Desert Syria, the land of a lost civilization* (*Geographical Review*, Feb., 1920).

**Resources.**—"The poverty of Syria and Palestine is a tradition against which one cannot protest enough. The wheat fields are vast and fertile; tobacco, olive, the vine, fruits are cultivated with profit. . . . Syrian industry is not less important than agriculture; manufactures of silks and woollens, of jewelry, furniture, weapons, sponges, mother-of-pearl, and perfumes, and the preserving of fruit furnish an export business. . . . At the outbreak of the war, the total trade of Syria reached 500,000,000 francs. . . . The sub-soil, which is as yet little known, contains all the particularly valuable metals: gold, silver, copper, iron, nickel, lead, petroleum, bitumen, coal, marble, phosphates, hot mineral waters."—G. Sarné *French interest in Syria* (*Living Age*, Dec. 7, 1918).

ALSO IN: *Great Britain Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, Country East of Jebel*

*Ansariyeh*, ch. 11 (*I. D.* 1215, *Handbook of Syria, including Palestine*, pp. 351-355).

**Racial and religious divisions.**—"The bulk of the population of Syria is Arab in origin, and is of two general classes, the settled, or Felahin, and the nomadic, or Bedouin. The settled population is of very mixed blood. It includes the Syrians, by which we mean the descendants of all these peoples, except the Jews, who spoke Aramaic at the beginning of the Christian era. This stock is modified by an admixture of Arab and Crusader blood, and its language is now Arabic. The Syrians present a great diversity of types. There are the half-nomad, crude farmer folk of the borderland between civilization and the desert, the more advanced farmer class of the mountain districts, the conservative inhabitants of the inland cities, and the fairly cosmopolitan people of the coast cities. . . . Besides the divisions created by location and by occupation there are still others created by religion. . . . Some of the Syrians became Moslems at the time of the Turkish conquests, but a very large proportion are still Christians. The latter are of many denominations, often with antagonistic interests. Probably the foremost bodies among them are the Greek Orthodox and the Maronites, the latter adherents of a modified form of the Roman Catholic Church. . . . While the Druzes are the most numerous of the schismatic sects, there are a number of others, notably the Muta-wallehs, and the Nusairiyeh."—M. McGilvary, *Dawn of a new era in Syria*, pp. 29-30.—See also ASSYRIA: People; PRIESTHOOD: In Semitic religions (non-Jewish).

**Language.** See PHILOLOGY: 15.

B. C. 1500-1000.—Invasions by the Egyptians.—**Campaigns against Hittites.**—**Rise of the Aramæans.**—"Syria chiefly because she includes Phœnicia and Palestine, has been of greater significance to mankind, spiritually and materially, than any other single country in the world. The home of two of the monotheisms which have spread round the earth, and close neighbour to that of the third, Syria holds sites sacred to them all, and is still the resort of their pilgrims from nearly every nation under the sun. . . . The nerves of all three religions still quiver in the soil of Syria, and sometimes round the same stones. . . . Nowhere else has so much history run into or through so narrow a space. The storm-centre of the Ancient East, the debatable ground between its rival Empires in Mesopotamia and on the Nile, and between their Greek successors, the Seleucids and Ptolemies, Syria was for three thousand years the field upon which our civilizations clashed, mingled and found a common deflection to the West by

the islands of the Mediterranean."—G. A. Smith, *Syria and the Holy Land*, pp. 5-6.—"Syria is the north end of the Arabian world. . . . The population of Syria has always been essentially Semitic. [See SEMITES.] . . . It is doubtful whether history has to record any great campaigns . . . earlier than those which Egypt and Assyria waged against each other across the whole extent of Syria. [See EGYPT: About B. C. 1700-1400 to B. C. 670-525.] . . . The Hittites came south from Asia Minor over Mount Taurus, and the Ethiopians came north from their conquest of the Nile.—G. A. Smith, *Historical geography of the Holy Land*, bk. 1, ch. 1.—"One of the periodic overflows of the population of Arabia into Syria took place [in the fourteenth century B. C.]. The invaders were called Khabiri, and gradually mastered the centre and the south, where the Canaanite towns were disunited, and succumbed in turn to the warlike invaders. Towards the end of the century the Egyptian kings of the XIXth Dynasty (Seti I) began to restore Egyptian authority. Rameses II (early thirteenth century) has left several accounts of a great campaign in which he challenged the power of the Hittites of the north. . . . A few years later peace was made between the Hittites and Egypt. The former remained in possession of the north, the latter retained Palestine and the Phœnician coast. . . . By the thirteenth century the Arameans, another overflow from Arabia, . . . began to settle in considerable numbers in northern Syria. In the twelfth century the Hittites were severely shaken by swarms of immigrants from Asia Minor, 'the peoples of the sea,' so that the Arameans became the dominant power in northern and central Syria. They absorbed the old Canaanite population and not a few of the Hittites, who had preceded them."—*Great Britain Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty (I. D. 1215, Handbook of Syria, including Palestine, pp. 114-115)*.—See also EGYPT: About B. C. 1500-1400; about B. C. 1350-1200; HITTITES.

**B. C. 1000-700.—Entrance of Hebrews into southern Syria.—Height of Hebrew power under David and Solomon.**—The entrance of the Philistines and the Hebrews into southern Syria, took place about 1000 B. C. The Philistines were the only one of the 'peoples of the sea' to secure a permanent footing in Syria. . . . The Hebrews, on the contrary were a fresh inflow from the desert, whose settlement amongst the Canaanites resembled that of the Khabiri, with whom some would identify them. For 150 or 200 years they acknowledged no central authority, and their tribes made peace and war, separately or in groups, with the Canaanites and with the border peoples (Moabites, Midianites, &c.). This is the period of the judges 'when there was no king in Israel.' . . . The ultimate fusion of Hebrew and Canaanite may be attributed to their common suffering at the hands of the Philistines. In the early part of the eleventh century the Philistines became masters of inland Palestine as far as the Jordan. Saul's career is distinguished by his deliverance of the hill country from their yoke. . . . The reign of David exemplifies the establishment of a native Syrian power of some considerable extent. David drove the Philistines back into the western lowlands, united the rest of Palestine under his rule, and subdued the country east of Jordan, including the Aramean district of Damascus. But his conquests did not survive his lifetime, and the union of Israel which he effected ended with the death of his son (Solomon). . . . The division of Israel into two petty kingdoms after Solomon's death was probably

settled or confirmed by the Egyptian invasion which then took place."—*Great Britain Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty (I. D. 1215, Handbook of Syria, including Palestine, pp. 115-116)*.—See also JEWS: Conquest of Canaan, to Kingdoms of Israel and Judah.

**B. C. 854-701.—Invasions under the later Assyrian empire.—Campaigns against Damascus.—Tiglath Pileser IV.—Syrian revolts.**—"In 854 B. C. a Syrian league, which included Hama and Damascus and Israel, was formed against Assyria. The allies were defeated at Quarqar, on the Orontes, near Hama. This opened the way for a series of campaigns against Damascus (850, 840, 840, 842, 839). But Damascus, although deserted by its allies, was not conquered. . . . Towards the end of the ninth century (805-804 B. C.) Damascus was besieged by the Assyrians and compelled to pay tribute. From then it lost ground in the border warfare with Israel. During the next half century the Assyrians were little seen in Syria. The reconquest of the north was, therefore, one of the early tasks of Tiglath Pileser (IV) in 741-738 B. C. The conquest of the southern states and towns followed. In three years (734-732) Tiglath Pileser subdued north Israel and the Philistine cities and finally Damascus. A large part of the territory of Israel and of the territory of Damascus became Assyrian provinces. . . . The Assyrian king was the professed ally of King Abaz of Judah, so that Judah was unmolested and a portion of northern Israel survived as a vassal state. The Assyrian conquests were, indeed, far from secure. The Egyptians felt themselves to be menaced and fomented rebellion. Always, however, when it came to a battle, Egypt was defeated, and the revolts of the Syrians made their position less tolerable than before. During one rebellion (724-721) Ephraim was eliminated and became part of an Assyrian province, in another (720) the king of Hama was defeated at Quarqar and an Egyptian army, helper of the Philistines, on the Syrian border at Rafah. A second Philistine revolt (713-711) were also suppressed. In 705 B. C. there was a general rising which could not be dealt with until 701 B. C. In that year the Egyptians were defeated near Ekron, and Judah escaped destruction only because of an incalculable catastrophe which befell Sennacherib's army in the Philistine plain."—*Great Britain Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty (I. D. 1215, Handbook of Syria, including Palestine, pp. 117-118)*.—See also ASSYRIA: Later Assyrian empire.

**B. C. 700-500.—Under Babylonian kings.—Continued revolts.—Destruction of Judah.—Becomes a province of Persia.**—"In the first half of the seventh century Egypt was several times invaded and partially conquered. . . . The years 652-348 were a time of revolt in Mesopotamia, which the subject peoples were not slow to turn to their advantage. Egypt recovered its independence. The Assyrian empire was hastening to its fall. Tribes from Asia Minor and the north swept over its borders. Medes on the east and Babylonians from the south renewed their attacks. After the capture of Ninevah by the Medes (about 606 B. C.) Babylonian kings ruled Mesopotamia and Euphratesia and Syria. [See BABYLONIA: Later empire.] An attempt of the Egyptians to annex Syria failed. They defeated a Syrian army at Megiddo (607 B. C., death of king Josiah), and advanced through the Biquâ' and northwards to the Euphrates, only to be defeated in turn by Nebuchadnezzar at Karkemish. Under the Babylonians the Phœnician towns and the peoples of

southern Syria (Jews, Philistines, &c.) showed the same tendency to revolt as in the time of the Assyrians, and were instigated and backed as before by the Egyptians. It was now that the little kingdom of Judah was destroyed, after having twice revolted (586 B. C.).—*Great Britain Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, Military history, ch. 4 (I. D. 1215, Handbook of Syria, including Palestine, pp. 118-119)*.—"Towards the end of the great duel between Assyria and Egypt, the Scythians from north of the Caucasus devastated Syria. When the Babylonian Empire fell, the Persians made her a province of their empire, and marched across her to Egypt. [See EGYPT: B. C. 525-332.]"—G. A. Smith, *Historical geography of the Holy Land, bk. 1, ch. 1*.

B. C. 333-332.—Conquest by Alexander. See MACEDONIA: B. C. 334-330.

B. C. 332-167.—Rule of the Seleucidæ.—In 332, Alexander established his sway in Syria. "The battle of Ipsus (301 B. C.) placed Alexander's successful marshal Selucius, hitherto satrap of Babylonia, in possession of all northern Syria, . . . and twenty years later the overthrow of Lysimachus at Corupedion added all the Macedonian possessions in Asia Minor. This immense realm was governed from three separate capitals, Antioch in Syria [founded by Seleucus], Seleucia on Tigris, the head of the eastern satrapies, and Sardes, the seat of the government in Asia Minor. . . . The main interests of the Seleucid family were now centred on the Mediterranean sea-board, whence they engaged in rivalry with the other Macedonian kings. Thus native powers were allowed to grow up in the interior. . . . After the decisive defeat of the Seleucid army by the Romans at Magnesia in 190, the Taurus range was left as the northern boundary of the kings' dominions. Coele-Syria for some time remained a hone of contention between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic dynasties, but in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164) the dominion of the Seleucids was compensated for losses in the north by an extension to the frontiers of Egypt, so that it now became co-extensive with Syria. [See JEWS: B. C. 106-40.]"—E. S. Bouchier, *Syria as a Roman province, pp. 19-20*.—See also SELEUCIDÆ: B. C. 281-224; 224-187; GREECE: B. C. 3rd century; JEWS: B. C. 332-167; MACEDONIA: B. C. 277-244; ROME: Republic: B. C. 196-146.

B. C. 323-198.—Control of Bactria and Phœnicia. See BACTRIA; SIDON.

B. C. 323-30.—Relations with Egypt.—Conquest of Palestine from Egypt. See EGYPT: B. C. 323-30; B. C. 80-48; JEWS: B. C. 323-167.

B. C. 192-162.—War between Rome and Antiochus the Great.—Revolt of Maccabees. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 192-189; JEWS: B. C. 166-40.

B. C. 88-64.—First Mithradatic War.—Lucullus in command of the Roman armies in the East.—Second Mithradatic War.—Conquest by Pompey.—End of Seleucid empire. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 88-78; B. C. 78-68; B. C. 66-63; SELEUCIDÆ: B. C. 64.

B. C. 64-63.—Various races at the time of the Roman conquest.—Variety of governments.—Languages.—Romanization of the country.—"A country so strongly diversified naturally presented several types of inhabitants of very different degrees of advancement. . . . When the Romans arrived they found Syria in possession of Greeks and Macedonians who had settled since Alexander's conquests, and, in partial subjection to them, four chief Semitic races, more closely connected with each

other than were the peoples of Europe, and at this period, with one exception, practically identical in language. . . . The Arab or Aramaeo-Arab peoples east of Antilibanus were just at the stage where powerful guidance could be most serviceable. Real Roman colonies were set up among them, which, though not drawn solely from Italians, formed genuine communities, and did not, as in western Syria, consist of mere augmentations of cities of ancient civilization. The Arabs and Syrians were drafted into auxiliary corps and stationed in various parts of the empire; rings of forts were established to protect the more civilized areas, and often garrisoned with members of friendly tribes. Military high roads were constructed, and the facilities for trade which they provided encouraged many nomad clans to adopt a settled life. . . . As fresh waves of immigrants from the Arabian peninsula swept up, they fell into similar habits, and though, as the empire weakened, the vicious system of client princes revived and tribes had to be hired to defend the frontier, it is extremely probable that the marvellous powers of organization, the discipline and devotion, which finally carried the Saracens as conquerors over half the empire, were in some measure due to their familiarity with Roman methods. . . . The Arameans, or north Syrians, took their name from Mesopotamia, but had now spread over most of Syria outside Phœnicia and Palestine. The Phœnicians, whether they derived their origin from the Persian Gulf area, or, as seems more probable, from inland Palestine and adjoining districts, occupied a long strip of coast from Aradus to Dora, with towns situated on the shore, but owning territories which extended as far as or beyond Lebanon. . . . The Phœnicians, though much mingled with Greek settlers, had not lost their individuality, which underwent a curious revival both in art and religion in the Antonine age. They were the chief survivors of the Canaanite race which existed in Old Testament times; but other branches no doubt occupied much of the land on both sides of Jordan, extending to the borders of Phœnicia on the west, but hardly distinguishable from the general Aramaeo-Arab population. A similar mixture of races occupied Palestine, with the addition in the north and centre of some descendants of the Assyrian settlers who were brought to replace the conquered ten tribes. The Jews, while most numerous in Judæa and Galilee, had large colonies in all the great towns of Syria, and had finally abandoned their Hebrew speech in favour of Aramaic about a century before the arrival of the Romans. East and south of all these peoples came a variety of Arab tribes, more or less civilized, of which in the earlier period the Nabataeans, whose capital was Petra, came most into contact with the Romans. The Ituraeans, too, were powerful in northern Palestine, and the Idumæans, who had partially adopted Jewish customs, were settled along the south-west coast. . . . Traces of alien races are not extensive. The Giblites of Byblus and Berytus, once noted for their skill in masonry, represented some aboriginal race from Lebanon of unknown origin, but they were now merged with the Phœnicians. In the north, as in Commagene, Hittite settlements had once been powerful, and the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus, which had its centre in northern Syria, was of Hittite or at least Anatolian origin. Some noble families, such as the royal house of Samosata, traced their ancestry to Persian sources. . . . In the south-west there no doubt remained some descendants of the Philistines, whom research now proves to have been a non-Semitic

people, perhaps akin to the Etruscans, who, coming last from Crete about the time of the Jewish Judges, brought letters and commercial instincts to the coast dwellers of Palestine. Of the five cities of the Old Testament period, three—Gaza, Ascalon and Azotus—were still important under the Romans; and though the Philistine language had disappeared about the fifth century B. C. the cults of Dagon-Marnas and Derceto-Aphrodite continued for some centuries longer. . . . A Græco-Macedonian element existed in all the chief towns, strongest in colonies directly due to the Seleucid kings, as Antioch, Apamea, Seleucia, Chalcis or Laodocæa, but important wherever trade flourished, as in the Phœnician or Philistine coast cities or great inland centres like Damascus or Palmyra. . . . In fact, though Macedonians seem to have been more numerous in Syria than in any other part of Alexander's conquests, and their language influenced the spoken Greek as well as the place nomenclature, the civilization which the Romans found in western Syria was almost purely Hellenistic. The city states . . . to a large extent secured their independence of the central power, and were ruled by their own archons or strategi, under whom stood an elective senate, usually of 500 persons, and a popular assembly, while the native Syrians lacked privileges and were chiefly artisans or slaves. In some cases, indeed, tyrants had sprung up, primarily to repel the attacks of native peoples, but without affecting the form of constitution. . . . The native communities at this time stood under a variety of governments. The Semites had of themselves evolved a system of city states quite apart from the Greek, generally on an oligarchical principle such as we see at Carthage. . . . Others were less centralized, and made the tribe the centre of administration rather than the city. . . . On the eastern frontiers were the still looser organizations of Arab tribes, in some cases professing allegiance to a central chief, but really split up into a number of hordes under military rule. . . . The Hellenistic communities, provided the assembly were not given too much power and the senate were kept fairly exclusive, supplied a ready-made municipal system. The tyrants, indeed, soon disappeared, but as the Romans now guaranteed protection, they were not regretted, and a real service was done by the deliverance of Greek cities from neighbouring Semitic princes, Jew or Arab. The oligarchical Semitic cities also needed little change, while the theocracies were treated with respect. The Jewish high-priest, though no longer a king, was still under the Romans a nominee of native princes. . . . Aramaic was the ordinary language in most of the native principalities, as well as of the country people and lower-class town population within the province. . . . It was sufficiently important for a double version, in Greek and Aramaic, of public acts to be set up in some places, as at Palmyra. . . . There was no fusion of the two languages, the wide differences of structure between an Aryan and a Semitic speech making this unlikely; but . . . each borrowed certain words from the other. . . . Aramaic, besides being spoken in Roman times over all central Syria, Phœnicia, and Palestine, was readily adopted by the more settled Arab peoples on the east, as at Palmyra and among the Nabataeans; and its descendant still holds its ground against Arabic in a few remote valleys. . . . Apart from the Jews, very slight active resistance was made by the Syrians to the superficial Romanizing of their country. Not only was the Roman yoke accepted without opposition, but, with the

exception of the ambitious designs of the Arab dynasty of Palmyra, no serious attempt was made to throw it off. . . . Roman weights, measures, and coinage were very generally adopted, the local calendars mostly gave place to the Roman, even when Macedonian month-names were retained; the commonest era for individual towns was the year in which they had been incorporated in the empire. Latin was the official speech of the magistrates. . . . Citizens' wills were expected to be in Latin, but municipal business outside colonies would be conducted in Greek, and from Trajan's time Greek lettering becomes normal on the coinage. Latin was spoken by the lower class of settlers, soldiers, traders, and the various subordinate officials, and many Syrian inscriptions in Latin are due to such persons. . . . Enfranchised Syrians, such as soldiers who obtained the citizenship on discharge from the army, tended to adopt Roman names, or at least a Roman prænomen, which was thought to lend dignity to the original Greek or Aramaic designation. The massive resistance which the eastern provinces opposed to the Romanizing process is only part of their traditional character. The Syrians appreciated the benefits of the *pax Romana*, and, though they cared little about expeditions against Parthia, heartily supported the empire both in the Jewish revolts and in the rebellion of Zenobia."—E. S. Bouchier, *Syria as a Roman province*, pp. 3-15.

B. C. 57-27.—Under Roman pro-consuls.—Disaster at Carrhæ.—Anthony's efforts to restore order.—Syria under an imperial legate.—"From 57 B. C. onwards a proconsul commanding a powerful army occupied the governor's quarters at Antioch, assisted by a quaestor in the collection of the revenues. . . . The first proconsul was A. Gabinius (57-55 B. C.). . . . In spite of Cicero's invectives in the *de provinciis consularibus*, it is clear that Gabinius was a man of uncommon ability and independence. . . . Disregarding the vacillation of the senate, he boldly ended the anarchy in Egypt by restoring King Ptolemy Auletes, and took up a firm attitude towards the Parthians, who, since the humiliation of Armenia and its subordination to Roman influence, became the chief enemies of the Republic in the East. . . . The successor of Gabinius was the triumvir M. Crassus [who was so disastrously defeated by the Parthians at Carrhæ. (See ROME: Republic; B. C. 57-52.)] . . . Realizing that the Roman hold on all Syria was jeopardized by this disaster Cassius hastened to put the province into a state of defence. During his march against Pharnaces [see Rome: Republic; B. C. 48-47], Cæsar made some stay in Syria (47 B. C.), and conferred privileges on several cities. . . . After the battle of Philippi Antony was charged with the settlement of the East. . . . The Parthian inroads after the defeat of Crassus had resulted in the revival of several of the local tyrants, who [fought] . . . out their quarrels in Syrian territory. . . . A succession of legates despatched by Antony at length restored some sort of order. The Parthians, who were mere marauders, . . . were expelled by the quondam mule-driver Ventidius Bassus, and Antigonus, the last Maccabee to wear the Jewish crown, was deposed by C. Sosius (37 B. C.), and replaced by Herod the Great. Much of the country was still, however, in the hands of native rulers, and a considerable part of Phœnicia and Coele-Syria was granted by Antony to his Egyptian lover. He even ventured to inaugurate one of his sons by Cleopatra, Ptolemy, who could claim descent from the Seleucid royal house, as titular sovereign of

Syria. . . . In 27 B. C., . . . Syria, owing to its importance as a frontier district bordering on the only serious rival of Rome, was placed under an imperial legate, always of consular rank."—E. S. Bouchier, *Syria as a Roman province*, pp. 26-30.

B. C. 40-A. D. 26.—Siege and occupation of Jerusalem.—Judæa made a Roman province.—Roman rule. See JEWS: B. C. 40-A. D. 44.

A. D. 17-66.—Under the early Roman empire.—Policy of Julian and Claudian cæsars.—Struggles with the Parthians.—"The history of Syria in the early empire is much less eventful than in the troublous years which preceded. . . . A few veteran colonies were founded in Syria, and the imperial cult, established at Antioch, formed a centre for provincial gatherings. . . . In A. D. 17, under Tiberius . . . both Syria and Judæa are described as exhausted by their burdens. . . . During the rule of C. Ummidius Quadratus, who held office for a long period under Nero, there took place the first Parthian war since the campaigns of Antony. Since the death of Herod Agrippa (A. D. 44) the Jewish kingdom had been placed under a procurator subordinate to the Syrian legate, who thus had an immense area to administer, and it was resolved to establish a separate military government in the north for the period of the war. Accordingly the able general Domitius Corbulo was ordered (A. D. 55) to command two of the Syrian legions, and act as governor of the territories north of Taurus. . . . The Armenian capital, Tigranocerta, was captured (A. D. 59), and a Roman nominee was placed on the throne instead of Tigranes. A second victorious campaign, in the course of which a Parthian invasion of Syria was repelled, roused the jealousy of Nero, who recalled Corbulo. . . . The succeeding years were fully occupied with the Jewish revolt, and with the events which led to the placing of their own nominee on the imperial throne by the Syrian legions."—E. S. Bouchier, *Syria as a Roman province*, pp. 31, 33, 37-38.—See also **ROME: Empire: B. C. 31-A. D. 14; A. D. 64-68.**

66-79.—Revolt of Judæa.—Vespasian in command of Palestine.—Destruction of Jerusalem under Titus.—Vespasian's skill as organizer in the east.—Commagene and Judæa placed directly under a Roman governor. See JEWS: 66-70; **ROME: Empire: 70-96.**

100-412.—Spread of Christianity. See **CHRISTIANITY: 100-300: Syrian churches; 347-412.**

116-134.—Uprisings of Jews under Trajan and Hadrian. See JEWS: 116; 130-134.

198.—Takes possession of Tyre. See **TYRE: B. C. 332-A. D. 638.**

3rd century.—Rise of kingdom of Palmyra in eastern Syria. See **PALMYRA; ROME: Empire: 102-284.**

284-305.—Under Diocletian.—Importance of Eastern principate. See **ROME: Empire: 284-305.**

632-1099.—Conquered by Moslems.—Seat of caliphate.—Under the Frankish kingdom of Jerusalem. See **CALIPHATE: 632-639; JERUSALEM: 637-1099; CRUSADES: Map of Mediterranean lands in 1097.**

1104-1193.—Conquest by Crusaders.—In dominions of Saladin. See **CRUSADES: 1104-1111; JERUSALEM: 1144-1187; SALADIN, EMPIRE OF.**

13th century.—Union with Egypt. See **CRUSADES: Military aspect of the crusades.**

1401-1402.—Ravages of Timur. See **TIMUR.**

1516.—Becomes province of Turkish empire. See **TURKEY: 1481-1520.**

1798-1799.—Napoleon's march as far as Es-draelon. See **FRANCE: 1798-1799 (August-August).**

1832-1840.—Southern Syria temporarily under

Mehemet Ali.—Yielded again to Turks. See **TURKEY: 1831-1840.**

1860-1864.—Lebanon massacre.—Intervention of European powers.—"The Lebanon Mountains became in 1860 the scene of a tragedy. . . . In this year occurred the massacre of the Christians by the Druzes in some scores of Lebanon villages and the slaughter of about three thousand Christians in Damascus. . . . In view of the fact that the Ottoman Government would do nothing to restore order, the European Powers found it necessary to intervene in Lebanon, which was occupied by 20,000 foreign troops, about half of which were French. The French occupation continued till 1861 when the Sublime Porte was forced to accede to an arrangement which would tend to lessen quarrels between the Christians and the Druzes. . . . Lebanon was constituted a Privileged Province by statute of September 6, 1864, with an autonomous government under the protection of the five Great Powers: England, France, Italy, Austria, and Germany. The Governor of Lebanon was to be a Christian, . . . and arrangements were made for the gradual withdrawal of the Druzes from the jurisdiction of the State."—M. McGilvary, *Dawn of a new era in Syria*, pp. 32-33.

1876-1909.—Abdul Hamid's policy in Syria.—Objection to establishment of Jewish colonies.—Palestine separated from the vilayet of Syria.—"The reign of Abdul Hamid marked a great change in the position and condition of Syria. His foreign policy placed an emphasis upon his Asiatic provinces by which he hoped to redress the balance of Europe. In this policy Syria had a central place as being essential to hold together Mesopotamia, Arabia and Egypt. . . . The Treaty of Berlin, by giving most of the Caucasus to Russia, resulted in the emigration of thousands of Circassians into Turkey. These Abdul Hamid placed in agricultural colonies throughout Syria, especially along the desert, and they became bulwarks against Arab nomadism. Aware that the best method to link Syria with Constantinople was by means of railroads, by the time of his dethronement [1909] he had constructed a splendid railway from Aleppo to Beersheba which was linked by branch roads to five ports on the Syrian coast. The building of the Hejaz railway resulted in Damascus becoming once more the chief gathering place for Moslem pilgrims from all over the Near East and the building of the Bagdad railway effected a revival of the importance of Aleppo in the commerce between East and West. . . . [With the rise of the Zionist movement, Jewish colonies were established in Palestine.] In 1888 the Porte informed the powers that it would not permit the founding of another Jewish colony in Palestine. . . . [In 1904 Abdul Hamid] withdrew Palestine from the vilayet of Syria and erected it into a distinct mutesarif dependent directly upon Constantinople."—S. P. Duggan, *Syrian question (Journal of International Relations, Apr., 1891, pp. 571-574)*.—See also **JEWS: Zionism: Definition; 1897-1918.**

1908-1921.—Under young Turk régime.—Influence of World War.—Sykes-Picot Agreement.—Emir Feisal proclaimed king.—His deposition.—French mandate.—"It would be an exaggeration to say that when the Young Turk revolution occurred in 1908 Syria was a contented province of the Ottoman Empire. Due to Abdul Hamid's personal interest in its fortunes, however, it had secured an unusual share of government help, and it certainly had no thought of revolt. But the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity under a national and representative government ap-



pealed to the Arabs of Syria as much as to other people in the Ottoman Empire. . . . The Reform Club founded at Beirut in 1909 was copied elsewhere in Syria, and a movement was started in favor of control of local affairs by the inhabitants and the use of Arabic as an official language. It did not take long, however, for the Arabs to learn the program of the Young Turks, viz., one race, one language, one administration. Drastic suppression of the Home Rule movement had the same result in Syria that it had in Albania, though the result was longer in developing. The literary societies were transformed into secret political societies; the decentralization movement became a definitely separatist movement. Syrian patriots, in fear of arrest, fled to Cairo and formed a committee there for the control and supervision of the movement. In June, 1913, a Syrian-Arab Congress met in Paris and was officially received by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. It drafted a program calling for the use of Arabic as an official language, the establishment of a General Assembly to collaborate with the Governor General in the control of Syrian administration, the suppression of vexatious taxation, the modification of the military laws, which had been the direct cause of a large emigration, and the reorganization of the judicial administration. . . . The year 1914, . . . was a year of revolutionary intrigue in most of the cities of Syria. When Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany, Turkish officials seized the archives of the French Consul at Beirut, and found evidence of the guilt of the Syrian leaders. A veritable reign of terror was introduced. Permanent courts-martial established at Damascus and Aleppo sent to the gallows or into exile all the leaders of the Syrian movement. 'The Mountain,' as the Lebanon is called, was occupied by Turkish troops the following year, and in 1916 the Organic Statute of 1860, guaranteeing its autonomy, was denounced. . . . Almost to the day of the armistice the reign of terror was maintained, by Djemal Pasha, uniting the Syrians as they had never been united before in hatred of the Turkish rule and in prayer for the success of the allied cause."—S. P. Duggan, *Syria and its tangled problems* (*New York Times Current History*, Feb., 1921).—"On October 25, 1915, the representative of the Sheriff at Cairo was given a document by the governor-general of Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, in which Great Britain undertook, conditional upon an Arab revolt, to recognize the independence of the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire (south of latitude 37 degrees, except in the provinces of Bagdad and Basra where British interests require special measures of administrative control and also except where Great Britain 'is not free to act without detriment to the interests of France.' The last sentence was to bring the agreement as nearly as possible in conformity with the Secret Treaty of March 5, 1915, whereby it was assumed by all Frenchmen that France was to be given a predominant position in Syria. But as the Arabs knew nothing of that treaty, the agreement of October 24, 1915, had the effect of giving a great impetus to the Pan-Arabian movement for the formation of an Arab Empire to include Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia."—S. P. Duggan, *Syrian question* (*Journal of International Relations*, Apr., 1921, p. 576).—"In the spring of 1916, the French, somewhat concerned by our [British] dealings with the Arabs, and jealous of their ancient rights in Syria, pressed for an understanding with regard to the future estate of Turkey-in-Asia. In consequence of this what is known as the Sykes-Picot agreement was hastily

concluded. . . . This pact, made between Britain and France in May, 1916, is described by Colonel Lawrence as follows: 'It divides the Arabic provinces of Turkey into five zones, roughly, (a) Palestine from the Jordan to the Mediterranean, to be "international"; (b) Haifa and Mesopotamia from near Tekrit to the Gulf to be "British"; (c) the Syrian coast, from Tyre to Alexandretta, Cilicia, and most of Southern Armenia, from Sivas to Diarbekir, to be "French"; (d) the interior (mainly the provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Urfa, Deir and Mosul) to be "independent Arab" under two shades of influence: (i.) Between the lines Akaba-Kuweit and Haifa-Tekrit, the French to seek no "political influence," and the British to have economic and political priority, and the right to supply "such advisers as the Arabs desire."' (ii.) Between the line Haifa-Tekrit and the southern edge of French Armenia or Kurdistan, Great Britain to seek no "political influence," and the French to have economic and political priority and the right to supply "such advisers as the Arabs desire.'"—*Problem of Syria* (*Balkan Review*, Sept.-Oct., 1919, p. 206).—See also ARABIA: 1916; WORLD WAR: 1916: 111. Turkish theater: c, 3.—"The Sykes-Picot treaty was a secret document but news of it leaked out and, probably because of the unknown nature of its contents, much dissatisfaction arose among the Arabs, especially the Syrians. As it was most important in 1917 that the Allies in the Near East retain the hearty support of the Arabs in operating against the Turks, Sir Mark Sykes on June 11, 1917, handed a document to seven representatives of Syria which gave assurance that pre-war Arab states, and Arab areas freed by military action of their inhabitants during the war should remain entirely independent. . . . In the summer of 1919 the American Peace Mission at Paris sent the King-Crane Commission to the Near East to discover the wishes of the populations on the subject of mandates. The report of the Commission has never been published, and the State Department refuses to permit it to be read. But the newspaper accounts and the reports of eyewitnesses of the Mission's work enable one to arrive at a conclusion that is probably not far removed from that of the official report. In Palestine the overwhelming mass of the population opposed the separation of Palestine from the rest of Syria and the erection in it of a Jewish commonwealth."—S. P. Duggan, *Syrian question* (*Journal of International Relations*, Apr., 1921, pp. 578-583).—"Prince Feisal, who represented the Hedjaz at the Peace Conference, [1919] proposed that a unified Syria be made a mandatory of the League of Nations. He expressed his own preference for the United States as the mandatory power, and, failing that, Great Britain. . . . The French press campaign for the withdrawal of the British from the regions in Syria, in which, according to the Sykes-Picot treaty, the French were to have 'economic and political priority,' [see SEVRES TREATY OF (1920)] . . . resulted in the agreement of Sept. 15 [1919]. By this agreement the British troops were wholly withdrawn from Syria and Cilicia and replaced by French troops, except in Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (East), which was to continue under the administration of Feisal, provided he maintained order in that region. The Arab administration of that area was to look to France and not to Great Britain for advice and support. Finally General Gouraud replaced General Allenby as head of the Allied Military Administration in Syria and Cilicia, and was

also appointed French High Commissioner. [See ARABIA: 1910: Results of treaty; PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Syria and Mesopotamia.] . . . [General Gouraud's] greatest problem was how to hold Cilicia and Southern Armenia against the attacks of Kemal Pasha's Nationalist Turks. The Turks had become reconciled to the loss of their Arab provinces, but they were determined to keep all territory north of the Taurus Mountains. General Gouraud's forces were inadequate, and his operations were seriously hampered by the intrigues of the Syrian Nationalists. His troops were besieged in Marash and Aintab, and were finally compelled to evacuate them in February, 1920, and fall back to Aleppo and Adana. A dreadful massacre of Armenians, who attempted to accompany the French, resulted. . . . On March 8, 1920, a Pan-Syrian Congress, made up of delegates chiefly though not wholly representing Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (East), was held in Damascus, and it unanimously declared the independence of Syria, including Palestine. Prince Feisal was elected King with the title of Feisal I. A decentralized civil government was ordered established as soon as arrangements could be made for the cessation of foreign military occupation. Feisal, who in January, 1920, had returned to Syria from the Peace Conference, had hoped for a message from the Supreme Council that would have satisfied the Syrian extremists. He was compelled to stand by the congress, however, and issued a declaration stating that, as the Allies had repeatedly declared their intention to erect native Governments in the lands rescued from the Turks, the Syrian Congress had merely anticipated the decisions that must inevitably be taken by the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council refused to recognize the Pan-Syrian Congress, and requested Feisal to go to Paris to explain the situation. His departure would unquestionably have resulted in his dethronement by the Arabs, so he sent a representative instead on the plea that his own presence was necessary to prevent conflicts. But the action of the Damascus Congress had been felt throughout the whole of Syria, and conflicts everywhere increased in number and intensity. . . . The action of the Supreme Council at the San Remo Conference in April in allotting Palestine to Great Britain and Syria to France, respectively as mandates, . . . did not have a calming influence in Syria. Nor did the fact that France relinquished her claim to mandatory powers over Cilicia appease the Turkish Nationalists. Taking advantage of the excitement in Syria they denounced the armistice with the French that had existed for several months, and on June 14 renewed their attacks. Gouraud's operations against the Turks were endangered by the obstacles put in his way by the Syrians, who controlled the railroads leading north from Damascus. Though Feisal and the Syrian Government may really have tried to maintain neutrality, there can hardly be any question that larger bodies of Syrian Nationalists were co-operating with the Turks. . . . On July 15, 1920, Gouraud sent Feisal an ultimatum to be answered within four days on pain of its being enforced by military measures. The chief provisions of the ultimatum were the acceptance of the French mandate over Syria, the acceptance of French-Syrian currency in Feisal's area of administration, French control of the railroad from Risk to Aleppo, French occupation of the City of Aleppo and the punishment of revolutionary criminals. Feisal accepted the ultimatum, but the day after his acceptance had reached Gouraud, the French column advancing east was

attacked by Syrian regulars. The French then pushed forward to Damascus, which they occupied on July 25. Their commander, General Goybet, issued a proclamation dethroning King Feisal, exacting a war contribution of 10,000,000 francs, ordering immediate disarmament of the inhabitants, and reducing the Syrian Army to a police force. Since that date the French have administered the whole of the territory between the British mandates of Palestine and Mesopotamia."—S. P. Duggan, *Syria and its tangled problems* (*New York Times Current History*, Feb., 1921, pp. 239-247).—See also WORLD WAR: 1918: VI. Turkish theater: c; X. Statements of war aims: a; Miscellaneous auxiliary services: I. Armistices: d.

ALSO IN: "Taira," *France and Feisal* (*Balkan Review*, Oct., 1920).

1914-1918.—Conditions during World War.—"In 1914, when the Ottoman Empire broke relations with the Entente Powers, Lebanon ceased to be regarded as an Independent Protectorate. It was ranked as an Independent *Mutaserrifiyeh* and given a Moslem Governor, or *Mutaserrif*, responsible to the Sultan. . . . Lebanon suffered more heavily during the years of the war [1914-1918] than any other part of Syria. Practically three-fourths of her population of approximately half a million were wiped out by starvation. The reason for this was that the rugged Lebanon district, unfit for much level cultivation, raised only a small fraction of the wheat necessary for her population. . . . The Entente blockade, instituted the second year of the war, caused the cessation of numerous small industries. . . . and the temporary destruction of the silk-raising industry. . . . The Government commandeered wholesale, without payment, animals for transport and for army food supply. People dependent on their sheep or mules for support were impoverished, and there were no longer enough animals for the transport of foodstuffs from one place to another; . . . the railways, being in Turkish or German hands, were available only for military use. . . . Had the Turk permitted it, the whole of Syria might have been fed by the two main inland areas, the vast level tracts in the Central Depression and the Hauran. Around Aleppo, Hama, and Homs the apparently bare and uninteresting levels are capable of raising a great deal of wheat. These plains during the war were entirely separated from each other and from the rest of Syria, save for roads over mountain passes or the slender thread of the railway between Aleppo and Reyak. . . . Still more isolated was Hauran, the great wheat-raising region of Syria, which once fed half the Roman world. The plateau of Hauran lies south of Damascus and adjacent to it is another wheat country, Jebel ed-Druz, or Druze Mountain. . . . The coast, dependent both on external and internal trade relations, was isolated on both sides. . . . Syria as a whole was a victim because her position geographically and politically facilitated her becoming a closed highway. . . . With the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Entente, the British, French, and Russian steamers discontinued their service to Turkish ports. All possibilities of import were thus cut off. . . . In a few weeks the Beirut Custom-House was closed, although it contained over one million dollars' worth of goods which the owners could not afford to clear. Within a very short time the general supply of stores in the country was exhausted, or had been hidden. . . . [to protect them from the] mob-plunder carried on by soldiers or by government representatives. . . . In December, 1914, the

local officials in Syria and Palestine were instructed to deport the subjects of belligerent nations resident on the seacoast into the interior. . . . On December 9, 1914, the first deportees, a . . . little band of British, French and Russian subjects, . . . were packed into the train and taken to Damascus, where they were held as civil prisoners. . . . The majority were held nearly four years as civil interned prisoners until shortly before the signature of the Turkish Armistice on October 31, 1918. . . . Later the women also were deported to Aleppo. . . . Later all the belligerents, men, women and children, were deported . . . to Urfa, in the Mesopotamian Valley. Here they witnessed all the horrors of one of the two Armenian massacres before the women were transported to the seacoast at Alexandretta, whence they were removed by an American cruiser. After the second massacre of the Armenians, the men were returned to Anatolia and were scattered in isolated and out-of-the-way Turkish villages about Konia, Sivas and Angora."—M. McGilvary, *Dawn of a new era in Syria*, pp. 33-37, 50, 78-79, 81.

1915-1919.—British and French interest.—Disputes concerning control. See TURKEY: 1915; 1919-1921.

1920.—Kemal-Bolshevist pact acknowledges Turkish control. See TURKEY: 1920 (November-December).

1921.—Ratification of the French treaty with the Angora government of the Turkish Nationalists.—"On October 30 [1921], France announced the ratification of a separate French treaty with the Angora government. . . . By its terms France agrees to withdraw from Cilicia and, in return, receives various economic advantages. . . . The new boundary line between Turkey and French Syria runs from the Bay of Alexandretta, near Bayas, to the railway station of Meidan, thence southeast leaving the region of Marsova in Syria and Killis in Turkey, thence to the railway at Tchebin Bey to Nisibin, thence northeast to Jezireh on the Tigris. [See also TURKEY: 1921 (October).] This treaty was exceedingly distasteful to both Great Britain and Greece. . . . Gaunaris, Greek premier, visited the western chancelleries in a vain attempt to nullify the French efforts. . . . The action of France was furthermore severely condemned by Lord Curzon, who asserted that she had no right to dispose of mandated territory. . . . During November and December a series of lively notes were exchanged between France and Britain in which the former admitted negotiation of a number of secret agreements with the Turkish nationalists which were not included in the Angora treaty. In this correspondence the British insisted, first, that the Angora agreement be revised to correspond with the abandoned treaty of Sèvres and the old tripartite agreements, and, secondly, that France participate in a new tripartite 'intervention in Turkey for the purpose of bringing about peace.' In yielding, France on January 6 officially declared that the Angora agreement was not to be regarded as a treaty of peace and implied neither *de facto* nor *de jure* recognition of the Angora government."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1922, *Supplement*, pp. 16-17.—See also TURKEY: 1921 (March-April): Secret treaties.

Also in: J. L. Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria* (1822).—J. L. Porter, *Five years in Damascus*.—J. Barker, *Syria and Egypt*.—G. L. Bell, *Desert and the sown*.—H. C. Butler, *American archaeological expedition to Syria*.—W. M. F. Petric, *Syria and Egypt from the Tell el-Armarna Letters*.

1921-1922.—Near East relief. See INTERNATIONAL RELIEF: Near East relief.

1922 (May).—Represented at Genoa Congress of Oriental Peoples. See GENOA CONGRESS OF ORIENTAL PEOPLES.

1923.—Boundary settlement with Turkey at Second Lausanne (or Near East) Conference. See TURKEY: 1923 (July-August).

See also BAGDAD RAILWAY: Importance to western world; MISSIONS, CHRISTIAN: Near East; ROUND TOWERS.

SYRIA-CŒLE. See CŒLE-SYRIA.

SYRIAN-ARAB CONGRESS (1913). See SYRIA: 1908-1921.

SYRO-CHALDEAN LANGUAGE. See PHILOLOGY: 15.

SYRTIS MAJOR AND SYRTIS MINOR.—These were the names given by the Greeks to the two gulfs (or rather the two corners of the one great gulf) which deeply indent the coast of North Africa. Syrtis Major, or the Greater Syrtis, is now known as the Gulf of Sidra; Syrtis Minor as the Gulf of Khabs, or Cabes.

SYSSITIA.—"The most important feature in the Cretan mode of life is the usage of the Sys-sitia, or public meals, of which all the citizens partook, without distinction of rank or age. The origin of this institution cannot be traced; we learn however from Aristotle that it was not peculiar to the Greeks, but existed still earlier in the south of Italy among the Cœnотrians. . . . At Sparta [which retained this institution, in common with Crete, to the latest times], the entertainment was provided at the expense, not of the state, but of those who shared it. The head of each family, as far as his means reached, contributed for all its members; but the citizen who was reduced to indigence lost his place at the public board. The guests were divided into companies, generally of fifteen persons, who filled up vacancies by ballot, in which unanimous consent was required for every election. No member, not even the king, was permitted to stay away, except on some extraordinary occasion, as of a sacrifice, or a lengthened chase, when he was expected to send a present to the table: such contributions frequently varied the frugal repast."—C. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. 7-8.

SZABATCH, Battle of (1470). See HUNGARY: 1471-1487.

SZAPARY, Count Julius (1831-1905), Hungarian statesman. Prime minister, 1890-1892. See HUNGARY: 1878-1890.

SZATHMAR, Treaty of (1711). See HUNGARY: 1699-1718.

SZECHENYI, Count Stephen (1701-1860), Hungarian statesman. Member of the Hungarian diet, 1825; projected plan of opening the Danube for trade to the Black sea, 1833; opposed Kossuth, 1847-1848; minister of ways and communications, 1848. See HUNGARY: 1825-1844; DANUBE: 17th-19th centuries.

SZECHUAN-HANKOW RAILWAY. See RAILROADS: 1905-1921.

SZEGEDIN, capital of the county of Csongrad, Hungary, 118 miles southeast of Budapest. It is a modern, attractive city with a population of 100,806 in 1920. It was the temporary capital of Hungary in 1840. See HUNGARY: 1847-1840.

1444.—Treaty between Turkey and Hungary. See TURKEY: 1402-1451.

1849.—Battle between Austrians and Hungarians. See AUSTRIA: 1848-1840.

SZELL, Koloman (1845-1915), Hungarian statesman. Minister of finance, 1875; concluded

first economic Ausgleich with Austria, 1878; minister of the interior, 1899-1903. See HUNGARY: 1878-1890; AUSTRIA: 1899-1901; AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1900-1903.

**SZEMA KWANG.** See SSUMA KUANG.

**SZEMA THSIAN.** See SSUMA CHIEN.

**SZIGETH, Battle of (1566).** See HUNGARY: 1526-1567.

**SZLAVY, Joseph de (1818-1900),** Hungarian statesman. Prime minister, 1872-1874. See HUNGARY: 1868-1890.

**SZOGYENY, Count Ladislaus (1841-1916),** Austrian diplomat. Ambassador to Germany, 1914. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background; 9.

**SZOREG, Battle of (1849).** See HUNGARY: 1847-1849.

## T

**TA TAO HUI,** Chinese organization, later called Boxers. See CHINA: 1900: Origin of Boxers.

**TAAFFE, Eduard Franz Joseph, Count von, Baron of Ballymote (1833-1895),** Austrian statesman of Irish descent. Served in public offices from 1852 to 1893. See AUSTRIA: 1893-1900; SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Austria.

**TAAFNA, Treaty of (1837).** See BARBARY STATES: 1830-1840.

**TAAL DIALECT.** See BOER.

**T'AAN.** See ZOAN.

**TABARI (838-923),** Arabian historian and theologian. See HISTORY: 21.

**TABARRINI, Marco (1818-1898),** Italian prose writer. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 1860-1914.

**TABELLARIAE, Leges.**—"For a long period [at Rome] the votes in the Comitia were given vivâ voce; . . . but voting by ballot ('per tabellas') was introduced at the beginning of the 7th century [2nd century B. C.] by a succession of laws which, from their subject, were named Leges Tabellariae. Cicero tells us that there were in all four, namely: 1. Lex Gabinia, passed B. C. 130. . . . 2. Lex Cassia, carried in B. C. 137. . . . 3. Lex Papiria, passed B. C. 131. . . . 4. Lex Caelia, passed B. C. 107."—W. Ramsay, *Manual of Roman antiquities*, ch. 4.

**TABERNACLE CONNECTION.** See METHODIST CHURCH: 1720-1791.

**TABLES,** sect opposed to the Scottish service book. See SCOTLAND: 1638; 1638-1640.

**TABLES ARCHIVE, Sweden.** See CENSUS: Modern European.

**TABOGA,** island in the Pacific, ten miles south of the city of Panama. In 1920 the United States negotiated with the Republic of Panama in regard to fortifying it for defence of the canal.

**TABOO.**—Certain prohibitions based on religious, or magical, observance are called in the Polynesian language "taboo." The term is applied generally to restrictions imposed by custom, religion, or ritual. See RELIGION: Universal elements; HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: Social organization; INDIA: People.

**TABOR, Mt., Battle of (1799).** See FRANCE: 1798-1799 (August-August).

**TABORITES.**—"The declaration of war by the Church and the German empire against Bohemia, brought about by the burning of Johannes Huss, led to the overthrow of the traditional rules regulating property and society. . . . This was the . . . moment for the communistic sects who now openly declared themselves. . . . In 1410 . . . communist agitators were driven out of Austria, where there was a strong Catholic party. They established themselves . . . on a broad hill overlooking the Luznic River [104 kilometers from Prague]. . . . Here they made their stronghold and named it Tabor. . . . Communists streamed there. . . . Their entire organization was modelled for the purposes of war. They divided them-

selves into two groups, of which one remained at home and labored for the other whose functions were exclusively military, and who were always under arms. . . . The Taborite army was the first since the downfall of ancient Rome, which was regularly organized. . . . [The Taborites] became the most dreaded warriors of Europe. . . . The greater . . . [their] success, the more intolerable became the position of their foes [who laid aside ecclesiastical and political differences to make common cause against them]."—K. Kautsky, *Communism in Central Europe in the time of the Reformation*, pp. 56, 58, 66, 67, 69.—"The Taborites . . . demanded along with ecclesiastical reforms the secularization of church property, and they desired to institute a socialistic theocracy based upon their conception of the primitive Christian life. . . . There were interwoven an insurrection against the authority of the Church, an outbreak of the national spirit, and an attempt to settle the fundamental problems that confront secular society. . . . It came to include a disprizal of culture and a belief that the golden age was to be reached . . . by a sudden and stupendous catastrophe. . . . The movement succumbed to the persistency of the warfare against it and to its own excesses."—E. M. Hulme, *Renaissance, the Protestant Revolution and the Catholic Reformation in continental Europe*, p. 244.—May 30, 1434, a "decisive battle was fought at the village of Lipau, near Brod in Bohemia. . . . Out of 18,000 Taborite soldiers 13,000 were . . . killed. This broke forever the strength of the Taborites."—K. Kautsky, *Communism in central Europe in the time of the Reformation*, p. 74.—See also BOHEMIA: 1410-1434; 1434-1457.

**TABRIZ,** capital of the province of Azerbaijan, Persia. From ancient days it has been an important commercial center, but recently much of its trade has been diverted to the Bagdad road. In 1908, it was the center of the revolutionary movement supported by the Constitutional party. The estimated population was 200,000 in 1923. See PERSIA: 1400-1887; 1908-1909; TURKEY: 1481-1520.

**TACHIES,** North American Indian tribe. See TEXAS: aboriginal inhabitants.

**TACITUS, Cornelius (c. 55-120),** Roman historian. See HISTORY: 17; ANNALS: Roman annals; LATIN LITERATURE: A. D. 14-117.

**TACITUS, Marcus Claudius (c. 200-276),** Roman emperor, 275-276. See ROME: Empire: 192-284.

**TACKING DOCTRINE.** See EQUITY LAW: 1671.

**TACNA, Battle of (1880).** See CHILE: 1833-1884.

**TACNA-ARICA QUESTION.** See CHILE: 1804-1900; 1907; BOLIVIA: 1920-1921; LATIN AMERICA: Map.

**TACTICS, Military.** See MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

**TACULIES**, North American Indian tribe. See **ATHAPASCAN FAMILY**.

**TADCASTER FIGHT** (1642).—Lord Fairfax, commanding in Yorkshire for the Parliament, and having his headquarters at Tadcaster, where he had assembled a small force, was attacked by 8,000 royalists, under the earl of Newcastle, December 7, 1642, and forced to retire, after obstinate resistance. This was one of the earliest encounters of the great English Civil War.—Based on C. R. Markham, *Life of the great Lord Fairfax*, ch. 8.

**TADMOR**. See **PALMYRA**: Rise and fall.

**TACL**, Chinese coin. See **MONEY AND BANKING**: Modern period: 20th century: China.

**TAENSAS**, North American Indian tribe. See **NATCHESAN FAMILY**.

**TAEXALI**, tribe which held the northeastern coast of Caledonia.

**TAFF VALE STRIKE** (1900). See **LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS**: 1900-1914.

**TAFT**, William Howard (1857- ), twenty-seventh president of the United States. President of the Philippine commission, 1901-1904; first civil governor of the islands, 1901-1904; appointed secretary of war, 1904; provisional governor of Cuba, 1906; elected president on the Republican ticket, 1908; defeated for re-election by Wilson, 1912; made president of the Bar Association and professor of constitutional law at Yale University, 1913; appointed president of the League to Enforce Peace, 1914; appointed chief justice of the Supreme Court, 1921. See **U. S. A.**: 1897; 1901-1905; 1905-1909; 1908 (April-November); 1909 (March): Inauguration of President Taft; 1909 (September-October); 1910 (March-June); 1911-1912 (January-June); 1912: Election of 1912; **SUPREME COURT**: 1921; 1921-1922; 1923.

**Administration of Philippine Islands**. See **PHILIPPINE ISLANDS**: 1900: Progress toward civil government; Spanish friars; 1901 (July); 1907.

**Communication to Chinese government regarding Hukuang loan**. See **RAILROADS**: 1905-1921.

**Support of Payne-Aldrich tariff**. See **TARIFF**: 1909; **CANADA**: 1910-1911.

**Recommendation for changes in judicial procedure**. See **COURTS**: United States: President Taft's recommendation.

**Attitude towards Dollar Diplomacy**. See **DOLLAR DIPLOMACY**.

**Conservation policy**. See **CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES**: United States: 1910-1912; **NIAGARA FALLS**.

**Message on trusts**. See **TRUSTS**: 1910.

**Extension of civil service**. See **CIVIL SERVICE REFORM**: United States: 1910-1913.

**Efforts to secure international peace**. See **U. S. A.**: 1911-1912; 1915 (June): League to Enforce Peace.

**Defense of League of Nations**. See **U. S. A.**: 1919 (March); (July-September): Discussion over League of Nations.

**TAG, Der (The Day)**, toast said to have been current in the German navy previous to the World War, tacitly referring to the time when the German and British fleets should meet in battle.

**TAGALOGS**, or Tagalos, Filipino tribe. See **PHILIPPINE ISLANDS**: People; Language: 1898 (August-December).

**TAGLIAMENTO**, river in northern Italy. In 1917 the Austrian and German troops routed the Italians at Caporetto and drove them across the river to the Piave, where the retreat was halted.

See **WORLD WAR**: 1917: IV. Austro-Italian front: d, 4.

**TAGORE**, Rabindranath (1861- ), Hindu poet and philosopher. See **NOBEL PRIZES**: Literature: 1913.

**TAGOS**, or Tagus, ancient Greek title applied to supreme magistrates. See **DEMIURGI**; **THESSALY**.

**TAHITI**, largest of the Society islands in the eastern Pacific belonging to France. (See **PACIFIC OCEAN**: Map of southeastern Asia.) It has an area of 600 square miles. The population in 1923 was 11,746. Ten smaller, contiguous islands form the archipelago. It has impressive mountain scenery and a healthful and delightful climate. The chief town is Papeete on the northwest coast. It is the nearest good harbor in Polynesia to Panama, and lies on the route of the Australian and New Zealand steamers. The chief productions of Tahiti are coconuts, bananas, oranges, sugar cane and vanilla. Its chief industries are the preparation of copra, rum and sugar. Tahiti was discovered by the French explorer, Bougainville in 1763; also, independently, in 1767, by Wallis, captain of *H. M. S. Dolphin*. Roman Catholic missionaries came from Peru before 1707; but soon abandoned the field. In 1707 the London Missionary Society planted a mission there, and in 1809, as a result of civil war, the missionaries retired with the exception of two. After 1812 English civilization and Christianity spread rapidly. In 1825, the then reigning Queen Pomare unsuccessfully petitioned England for protection against European invaders, and for the right to raise the English flag. In 1830, two French Catholic priests landed but were compelled to depart. In 1844 an English missionary was driven out for inciting the natives against the French. (See **FRANCE**: 1842-1848.) This was the beginning of a long and fierce controversy involving England, France and the Tahitian régime, which only ended with the annexation of Tahiti by the French in 1880. A final settlement in 1888 left France free to extend her sovereignty over the whole group.—See also **PACIFIC OCEAN**: B. C. 2500-1500.

**TAHMASP I** (c. 1510-1576), shah of Persia, 1524-1576.

**Tahmasp II**, shah of Persia, 1727-1732. See **PERSIA**: 1490-1887.

**TAHOMES**, North American Indian tribe. See **MUSKHOGEAN FAMILY**.

**TAHRAK**, or Tihhaka, ruler of Egypt, 688-663 B. C. See **EGYPT**: B. C. 670-525.

**TAI**, a people from the table-lands of Yunnan, who were called Shans by the Burmans, whose country they invaded in 1270. They founded the Tai dynasty. See **BURMA**: Early history.

**TAIF**, city in Arabia, about sixty miles east of Mecca. It was taken by the Arabs during their revolt against the Turks in 1016. See **WORLD WAR**: 1910: VI. Turkish theater: c, 3.

**TAIFALÆ**.—In the fourth century, "the Taifalæ inhabited that part of the province of Dacia which is now called Wallachia. They . . . subsequently accompanied the Visigoths in their migrations westward, and settled on the south side of the Liger, in the country of the Pictavi, where they were in the time of Gregory of Tours, who calls them Theiphali, and their district Theiphalia." —W. Smith, *Note to Gibbon's history of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 26.

**TAIFASY**, tribe inhabiting Madagascar. See **MADAGASCAR**: Area.

**TAIKO**, or Great Councillor. See **JAPAN**: 1540-1905.

**TAIKWA ERA**. See **JAPAN**: 550-708.

**TAILLE AND GABELLE.**—Under the old régime, before the Revolution, "the chief item in the French budget was the taille [analogous to the English word "tally" or villein tax]. This was a direct tax imposed upon the property of those assessed, and in theory it was in proportion to the amount they possessed. But in the most of France it fell chiefly upon personal property. It was impossible that with the most exact and honest system it should be accurately apportioned, and the system that was in force was both loose and dishonest. The local assessors . . . released their friends or their villages, and imposed an increased burden upon others, and, to a very large extent, exemptions or reductions were obtained by those who had money with which to bribe or to litigate. . . . From it, indeed, a large part of the population, and the part possessing the most of the wealth of the country, was entirely exempt. . . . Only laborers and peasants, it was said, still remained subject to it. Out of 11,000,000 people [in the seventeenth century] in those portions of France where the taille was a personal tax, probably 2,500,000 were exempt. . . . Next to the taille, the most important tax was the gabelle, and, though less onerous, it also produced a vast amount of misery. The gabelle was a duty on salt. . . . The burden of an excessive tax was increased by the cupidity of those who bought the right to collect its proceeds. The French government retained a monopoly of salt, much like that which it now possesses of tobacco, but the price which it charged for this article of necessity was such that the States of Normandy declared that salt cost the people more than all the rest of their food. . . . From this tax there were no personal exemptions, but large portions of the country were not subject to the gabelle. About one-third of the population were free from this duty, and the exemption was so valued that a rumor that the gabelle was to be imposed was sufficient to excite a local insurrection. Such a duty, on an article like salt, was also necessarily much more oppressive for the poor than the rich. As the exorbitant price would compel many to go without the commodity, the tax was often rendered a direct one. The amount of salt was fixed which a family should consume, and this they were forced to take at the price established by the government. . . . A family of six would, on an average, pay the equivalent of ninety francs, or about eighteen dollars a year, for this duty."—J. B. Perkins, *France under Mazarin*, v. 2, ch. 18.—"This word gabelle is the same as the Anglo-Saxon word 'gafol,' a tax."—T. Wright, *History of France*, v. 1, p. 364.—See also FRANCE: 1761-1773; GHENT: 1451-1453.

ALSO IN: J. C. Morison, *Reign of Louis XIV (Fortnightly Review, Apr., 1874, v. 21)*.—C. F. Warwick, *Mirabeau and the French Revolution*, pp. 11-13, 15-18, 20-23, 30, 32, 43-45, 46-48, 53-54.

**TAIMORAS**, tribe in Madagascar. See MADAGASCAR: Area; 1804-1809.

**TAIPING REBELLION**. See CHINA: 1850-1864.

**TAIRA CLAN**. See JAPAN: 1159-1199.

**TAIREN**. See DAIREN.

**TAISAKAS**, tribe in Madagascar. See MADAGASCAR: Area.

**TAIWAN**, Chinese name for Formosa. See FORMOSA.

**TAJ MAHAL**, mausoleum near Agra, India. It was built by Shah Jahan, 1620-1640, in memory of his wife, and is regarded by many authorities as the most beautiful structure in the world. See

ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: India: 1300-1700; Medieval: Mohammedan; INDIA: 1605-1658.

**TAKAHASHI, Korekiyo, Baron** (1854- ), Japanese statesman. Premier, 1921. See JAPAN: 1921-1922.

**TAKAHIRA, Kogoro, Baron** (1854- ), Japanese statesman. Minister at Washington and plenipotentiary to negotiate treaty of peace with Russia. See JAPAN: 1905; PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF.

**TAKAUGI, Ashikaga** (fl. 14th century), Japanese usurper. Led a revolt which led to the assassination of Prince Moriata. Drove the emperor from the capital and proclaimed himself grand shogun, 1335. See JAPAN: 1334-1574.

**TAKBIR**, Mohammedan war-cry, meaning "God is great."

**TAKILMAN**.—"This name was proposed by Mr. Gatschet for a distinct language spoken on the coast of Oregon about the lower Rogue River."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, p. 121.

**TAKSONY** (947-972), Hungarian chief. See HUNGARY: 907-972.

**TALAAAT PASHA** (d. 1921), Turkish statesman. Grand vizier and minister of the interior, 1914-1918; foreign minister during the World War; represented Turkey in the peace negotiations with Russia at Brest-Litovsk, 1918; assassinated by an Armenian student in retaliation for the Armenian massacres carried out under his orders, 1921. See TURKEY: 1915-1916.

**TALANA HILL, Battle of**. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1899 (October-December).

**TALATUI**, dialect of the Moquelumnan language. See MOQUELUMNAN FAMILY.

**TALavera, Battle of**. See SPAIN: 1809 (February-July).

**TALBOT, Richard**. See TYRCONNEL.

**TALBOT, William Henry Fox** (1800-1877), English inventor. Discovered method of instantaneous photography, 1851. See INVENTIONS: 19th century: Photography.

**TALCA, Battle of** (1818). See CHILE: 1810-1818.

**TALENT, Attic, Babylonian, etc.**—"Not only in Attica, but in almost all the Hellenic States, . . . money was reckoned by talents of sixty minas, the mina at a hundred drachmas, the drachma at six oboli. At Athens the obolus was divided into eight chalcid . . . the chalcid into seven lepta. Down to the half obolus, the Athenian money was, in general, coined only in silver; the dichalehon, or quarter obolus, in silver or copper; the chalcid and the smaller pieces only in copper. . . . The value of the more ancient Attic silver talent, silver value reckoned for silver value, will be 1,500 thlr. Prussian currency; of the mina, 25 thaler; of the drachma, 6 gute groschen; of the obolus 1 g. gr.—equivalent to \$1.026, \$17.10, 71.1 cents., 2.85 cents. respectively. . . . Before the time of Solon, the Attic money was heavier; also the commercial weight was heavier than that by which money was weighed. One hundred new drachmas were equivalent to 72-73 ancient drachmas; but the ancient weight remained with very little alteration as commercial weight, to which, in later times, an increase was also added. Through the alterations of Solon, the Attic money, which before stood to the Æginetan in the relation of 5:6, had to the same the relation of 3:5. The new was related to the ancient Attic money as 18:25. Compared with the heavy Æginetan drachma, . . . the Attic was called the light drachma. . . . The former was equivalent to ten Attic oboli; so that the Æginetan

talent weighed more than 10,000 Attic drachmas. It was equal to the Babylonian talent. Nevertheless the Æginetan money was soon coined so light that it was related to the Attic nearly as 3:2. . . . The Corinthian talent is to be estimated as originally equivalent to the Æginetan, but it was also in later times diminished. . . . The Egyptian talent . . . contained, according to Varro in Pliny, eighty Roman pounds, and cannot, therefore, have been essentially different from the Attic talent, since the Attic mina is related to the Roman pound as 4:3. . . . The Euboic talent is related . . . to the Æginetan as 5:6, and in no other than the money-talent of the Athenians in use before the time of Solon, and which continued in use as commercial weight. According to the most accurate valuation, therefore, one hundred Euboic drachmas are equivalent to  $138\frac{1}{2}$  drachmas of Solon. . . . Appian has given the relation of the Alexandrian to the Euboic talent in round numbers as 6 to 7 = 120 to 140; but it was rather more accurately as 120 to 138%. . . . So much gold . . . as was estimated to be equivalent to a talent of silver, was undoubtedly also called a talent of gold. And, finally, a weight of gold of 6,000 drachmas, the value of which, compared with silver, always depended upon the existing relation between them, was sometimes thus called."—A. Boeckh, *Public economy of Athens* (tr. by Lamb), bk. 1, ch. 4-5.—See also SIEKEL; GREECE: B. C. 4th century; Economic conditions.

**TALFOURD**, Thomas Noon (1795-1854), English jurist and dramatist. See DRAMA: 1815-1877.

**TALIENWAN**. See DAIREN; also CHINA: 1905-1909; PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF.

**TALKAN**, district of Bokhara. See BOKHARA.

**TALLAGE**.—"Under the general head of donum, auxilium, and the like, came a long series of imposts [in the period of the Norman kings], which were theoretically gifts of the nation to the king, and the amount of which was determined by the itinerant justices after separate negotiation with the payers. The most important of these, that which fell upon the towns and demesne lands of the Crown, is known as the tallage. This must have affected other property besides land, but the particular method in which it was to be collected was determined by the community on which it fell, or by special arrangement with the justices."—W. Stubbs, *Constitutional history of England*, v. 1, ch. 13, sect. 161.

**TALLARD**, Camille d'Hostun, Duc de (1652-1728), marshal of France. Defeated the German Imperialists at Speyer, 1703; defeated at Blenheim and taken prisoner by Marlborough, 1704. See GERMANY: 1703; 1704.

**TALLEYRAND-PÉRIGORD**, Charles Maurice de (1754-1838), French diplomatist and statesman. Associated with Mirabeau as member of the department of Paris; went to England after overthrow of monarchy, was expelled, and went to the United States, 1793; permitted to return to France, 1795; foreign minister, July, 1797-1799; became grand chamberlain of the empire upon the assumption of the imperial title by Napoleon, 1804; represented the House of Bourbon at the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815; formed alliance with England and prevented partition of French territory; foreign minister, July-September, 1815; as ambassador to England signed treaty which made France, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal allies, 1834. See FRANCE: 1807; 1814 (March-April); GERMANY: 1801-1803; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.

**TALLIGEWIS**, North American Indian tribe. See ALLEGHANS; CHEROKEES.

**TALLIS**, Thomas (c. 1515-1585), English organist and composer. Organist of Waltham Abbey; appointed gentleman of the chapel royal, serving under Henry VII, Edward VI, Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth; has been styled the "father of English cathedral music." See MUSIC: Modern: 1540-1672.

**TALMUD**.—"The Talmud [from a Hebrew verb signifying 'to learn'] is a vast irregular repository of Rabbinical reflections, discussions, and animadversions on a myriad of topics treated of or touched on in Holy Writ; a treasury, in chaotic arrangement, of Jewish lore, scientific, legal, and legendary; a great storehouse of extra-biblical, yet biblically referable, Jewish speculation, fancy, and faith. . . . The Talmud proper is throughout of a twofold character, and consists of two divisions, severally called the Mishna and the Gemara. . . . The Mishna, in this connection, may be regarded as the text of the Talmud itself, and the Gemara as a sort of commentary. . . . The Gemara regularly follows the Mishna, and annotates upon it sentence by sentence. . . . There are two Talmuds, the Yerushalmi [Jerusalem], or, more correctly, the Palestinian, and the Babil, that is, the Babylonian. The Mishna is pretty nearly the same in both these, but the Gemaras are different. The Talmud Yerushalmi gives the traditional sayings of the Palestinian Rabbis, . . . the 'Gemara of the Children of the West,' as it is styled; whereas the Talmud Babil gives the traditional sayings of the Rabbis of Babylon. This Talmud is about four times the size of the Jerusalem one; it is by far the more popular, and to it almost exclusively our remarks relate."—P. I. Hershon, *Talmudic miscellany, introduction*.—The date of the compilation of the Babylonian Talmud is fixed at about A. D. 500; that of the Jerusalem Talmud was at least a century or more earlier.—See also MISCHNA.

Discussion of medical science. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Ancient; Jewish.

**TALON**, Jean Baptiste (1625-1691), French lieutenant-governor of Canada, 1665-1668. See QUEBEC, PROVINCE OF: 1635-1672.

**TALTARUM CASE OF BARRING ENTAILS**. See COMMON LAW: 1473.

**TALUKDARS**.—"A Taluka [in India] is a large estate, consisting of many villages, or, as they would be called in English, parishes. These villages had originally separate proprietors, who paid their revenue direct to the Government treasury. The Native Government in former times made over by patent, to a person called Talukdar, its right over these villages, holding him responsible for the whole revenue. . . . The wealth and influence thus acquired by the Talukdar often made him, in fact, independent. . . . When the country came under British rule, engagements for payment of the Government Revenue were taken from these Talukdars, and they were called Zamindars."—R. Temple, *James Thomason*, p. 158.—See also INDIA: Finance.

**TAMANES**, Battle of. See SPAIN: 1809 (August-November).

**TAMASP**. See TAMMASP.

**TAMAULAPAS REVOLT** (1910). See MEXICO: 1910-1913.

**TAMAYO**, José Luis, president of Ecuador since 1920. See ECUADOR: 1920 (August).

**TAMERLANE**. See TIMUR.

**TAMILS**, chief member of the Dravidian peoples in southern India. See DRAVIDIAN RACES: CEYLON: Earliest history.

**TAMMANEND**, American Indian chief, after

whom Tammany is said to have been named. See TAMMANY SOCIETY.

**TAMMANY RING.** See TAMMANY SOCIETY; NEW YORK: 1863-1871.

**TAMMANY SOCIETY**, or Tammany Hall.—Tammany Hall, or the Society of St. Tammany, as the order was originally called, was established by William Mooney of New York, an ex-soldier and upholsterer, on May 12, 1789, six years after the peace that ended the American Revolution (1783). When the society was incorporated by the state of New York in 1805, it was designated as the Tammany Society or Columbian Order. "The primary purpose of the society seems to have been to resist a centralization of power in the federal government. Mooney evidently got the name Tammany from older organizations which existed prior to the Revolution under the name of Sons of St. Tammany. . . . The name is supposed to have been derived from [King] Tammanend, an old [Delaware] Indian chief. . . . The title Saint was prefixed to Tammany in imitation of the societies of St. Andrew, St. George, and the like. . . . the Society of St. Tammany adopted Indian customs, dress and names. It was ruled by a board of thirteen Sachems. . . . from. . . which the Chief, or Grand Sachem, was chosen. . . . Washington, toward the end of his second administration, issued a warning against. . . self-creative societies, fearing that they would ultimately be detrimental to the public welfare. As a result. . . a large part of the membership of the (Tammany) society withdrew, but the original founder refused to allow the order to die. He. . . took in members who made it a strictly partisan society, with the specific purpose of exercising an influence over politics. . . . Soon after its reorganization Tammany passed under the influence of Aaron Burr. . . [who] became its acknowledged leader, and it was largely due to him that it became an effectual political organization. So pronounced were Burr's influence and methods that. . . men who had been his. . . followers were influential in it. . . almost to 1840. . . . In the election of 1800 Tammany played an important part, making use of the shrewd methods which have ever since characterized its political campaigns. . . . By 1802 the Tammany Society had grown and extended its power to such proportions under the leadership of Burr, that it was recognized as the local organization of the Republican party, afterward called the Republican-Democratic party, and finally the Democratic party."—C. M. Stebbins, *Tammany Hall, its history, organization and methods*. pp. 3-4, 5, 6-7.—For the later history of Tammany Hall see NEW YORK: 1863-1871; 1913: Impeachment, etc.; NEW YORK CITY: 1874-1892; 1894-1895; 1901-1903; 1909; 1910; Boss: In politics; BUCKTAILS.

ALSO IN: G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. 3, pp. 297-298.—S. W. Williams, *Tammany society in Ohio (Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, July, 1913, pp. 350-353)*.—De A. S. Alexander, *Political history of the state of New York*, v. 1, pp. 181-185, v. 3, pp. 176-178.—G. Meyers, *History of Tammany Hall*.

**TAMPICO**, city and port of Mexico, in the state of Tamaulipas, on the Panuco river, about six miles from the Gulf of Mexico. The port was improved under the Diaz régime in 1898. See MEXICO: 1898; also Map.

1913-1914.—Taken by Carranza forces.—Arrest of American sailors. See MEXICO: 1913-1914; U.S.A.: 1914 (April): Occupation of Vera Cruz.

**TAMULIAN LANGUAGE.** See PHILOLOGY: 16.

**TAMULS.** See TURANIAN RACES.

**TAMWORTH MANIFESTO** (1834). See ENGLAND: 1834-1837.

**TANAGRA**, Battle of (457 B. C.). See ATHENS: B. C. 460-455; GREECE: B. C. 458-456.

**TANAIM**, name assumed by the Jewish Rabbis who devoted themselves to the interpretation of the Mishna.—Based on H. H. Milman, *History of the Jews*, bk. 19.

**TANCRED** (d. 1194), king of Naples and Sicily, 1189-1194.

**TANCRED'S CRUSADE.** See CRUSADES: 1096-1099; JERUSALEM: 1099; 1099-1144.

**TANEY**, Roger Brooke (1777-1864), American jurist. Member of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1799-1800; member of the state senate, 1816-1821; attorney-general of Maryland, 1827-1831; attorney-general of the United States, 1831-1833; chief justice of the Supreme Court, 1836-1864. See SUPREME COURT: 1835-1864.

Attitude toward removal of the deposits of the United States Bank. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1817-1833; U.S.A.: 1833-1836.

Opinion on the Dred Scott decision. See U.S.A.: 1857.

**TANG**, celebrated dynasty of China. It lasted from 618-907. It fostered learning and literature to a striking degree, and marked one of the most brilliant periods of Chinese history. See CHINA: Origin of the people.

**TANG SHAO YI**, Chinese statesman. Became premier, 1912. See CHINA: 1912: Yuan Shi-kai elected president; 1916-1917; OPIUM PROBLEM: 1906.

**TANGA**, seaport of Tanganyika Territory, on the southern shore of Tanga bay. In 1912, it had a population of 16,400. It is the terminus of the railway connecting the Usambara district with the coast. The harbor of Tanga is entered by a broad channel five to eight fathoms in depth. The city is a regular port of call for steamships. Tanga came under British administration in 1919.

Center of activity during World War. See WORLD WAR: 1914: VI. Africa: c, 1; 1916: VII. African theater: a, 11.

**TANGANYIKA COMPANY.** See AFRICA: Modern European occupation; 1914-1920: Lack of railway and industrial development.

**TANGANYIKA TERRITORY.**—Tanganyika Territory, a portion of former German East Africa, is located in the southeastern part of Africa. (See AFRICA: Map.) It had in 1921 a population of 4,124,447. Its total area "is about 365,000 square miles, or 20,000 square miles less than the total area of ex-German East Africa. [It has a coast line of about 500 miles.] . . . Mafia [an island off the coast] with an area of about 200 square miles, . . . although included in Tanganyika Territory, has hitherto been administered from Zanzibar. . . . The two most important seaports are Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga. . . . The most important inland town. . . Tabora, . . . is situated at the junction of the main caravan routes from the coast to Tanganyika, and from Victoria Nyanza to Nyasa. . . . The territory is served by two railways, the Central Railway from Dar-es-Salaam to Kogoma [on Lake Tanganyika] (780 miles), and the Tanga Railway from Tanga to Moshi (222 miles), with a temporary line [built by the British troops during the World War] from Kabe Station linking up with the Uganda Railway at Voi. . . . Damaged by the Germans in 1916, the Tanga line was reopened in August 1916, and the



Central Railway in February 1917. There has existed on the coast of East Africa an ancient civilisation from very early times. . . . The natives of East Africa had trade connections with Arabia and India before the beginning of the Christian era, and . . . there was a regular migration of Himyarites from South Arabia to South Africa, who worked gold mines, and possibly built Zimbabwe and other ruins in Rhodesia. It is also probable that such localities as the Lamu Archipelago, Mombasa, Tanga, Pangani, Dar-es-Salaam and Kilwa . . . were repeatedly occupied before the oldest civilization of which there is any record. . . . Active colonization by Arabs from Oman appears to have begun in the 8th century A. D. . . . Whether the Arabs were preceded or followed by the Persians is uncertain, but the presence of true Persians on the East African Coast has been established by the discovery of Persian inscriptions and coins and of ruins of Persian architecture. . . . The oldest known town in Tanganyika Territory is Kilwa-Kisiwani (Kilwa-on-the-island). . . . This Persian town was founded—probably upon a far older site. . . . The Arabian and Persian colonies in East Africa are said to have reached the height of their prosperity between 1100 and 1300 A. D. . . . The authentic history of East Africa can be said to commence when in 1498 the first Portuguese expedition under Vasco da Gama sailed along this coast on its way to India. . . . A Turkish corsair in 1585 ejected the Portuguese from most of their settlements, but was eventually defeated. . . . The Portuguese rule . . . rested always on rather weak foundations, and the Arabs of Oman and Muskat, . . . between 1660 and 1700 [drove] . . . the Portuguese out of practically all their East African possessions except Mozambique. . . . About 1740 . . . the Mazrui Government of Mombasa and the Nabahan King of Pate declared themselves independent and proceeded to fight with one another for the supremacy of the Coast. This declaration of independence was probably connected with a revolution in Oman when the Yorubi were replaced as the ruling family by the Bu Saidi. . . . For nearly 100 years the Bu Saidi did not trouble much more than the Yorubi had done about their African possessions until Said bin Sultan, the fifth of the line, transferred his capital in 1832 from Muscat to Zanzibar. . . . After Seyid Said's death in 1856 . . . until the partition of Africa between the European powers began in the eighties, few political events of importance occurred in East Africa. . . . The interior of Tanganyika Territory was discovered principally by Englishmen and Germans. Among these may be mentioned . . . Livingstone and Stanley.”—*Report on Tanganyika Territory covering the period from the conclusion of the armistice to the end of 1920, pp. 5, 8, 49, 23, 24, 25.*

**German colonization.**—“German East Africa, the most important of the German Protectorates, came under German influence through the individual initiative of Dr. Karl Peters [representing the Society of German Colonization]. In 1884, Peters, with three companions, made a journey to the interior, and . . . concluded twelve treaties with native chiefs, the territory of these chiefs being then declared by the explorers to be German territory. . . . In 1885 the newly acquired land was placed under the Imperial Government. [See GERMANY: 1899 (June).] This arrangement was recognised by the British Government in 1886, but a ten-mile belt along the littoral was still held to belong to Zanzibar. Two years later Germany

acquired the right of collecting customs duties on the coast, and in 1890 took over the coast strip on payment of £200,000 to the Sultan of Zanzibar.”—*Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.—“The treaty of 1890 left Germany with an East African possession which had an area of twice the German Empire in Europe—roughly, a million square miles, and a population of between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000 people.”—A. F. Calvert, *German African empire*, p. 117.—“The development and pacification of the Protectorate in its early days was largely due to the energy and enterprise of Major Wissmann, who organized the troops raised in 1889 to quell the Arab rising . . . and took part in the suppression of many of the native insurrections which signaled the bringing of the country under European rule. From 1801 to 1893 the Germans were engaged in [tribal wars]. . . . During the latter years of the German Administration the country was to outward appearances comparatively peaceful. . . . The German Imperial Chancellor was originally responsible for the administration of all the German Protectorates, but in 1907 the Colonial Office was separated from the Foreign Office and made independent. The head of the local Government was the Governor, who was assisted by a Council. . . . On the outbreak of war the Governor was Dr. Schnee . . . whilst Major (afterwards Major-General) von Lettow-Vorbeck was commandant of the Troops.”—*Report on Tanganyika Territory covering the period from the conclusion of the armistice to the end of 1920, pp. 26, 30-31*

**Military operations during World War.** See WORLD WAR: 1914: VI. Africa: c; c, 1; 1915: VIII. Africa: b; b, 2; 1916: VII. African theater: a; a, 8; a, 10; a, 12.

**British mandate.**—“By Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including German East Africa; and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in virtue of their rights of sovereignty over the territories which formerly constituted German East Africa, . . . agreed that His Britannic Majesty . . . [should] exercise, in conformity with Article 22, Part 1 (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the above-mentioned Treaty of Peace, a mandate to administer a portion of the said territories. . . . On the ratification of the Peace Treaty with Germany on January 10th, 1920, that part of the former German East African Colony which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had agreed should be administered by Great Britain was named the Tanganyika Territory.”—*Report on Tanganyika Territory covering the period from the conclusion of the armistice to the end of 1920, pp. 4, 36.*—See also BAGAMOYO; BELGIAN CONGO: 1920; BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

**Part awarded to Belgium as a mandatory by Treaty of Versailles.** See BELGIUM: 1919 (June 28).

**TANGIER**, seaport of Morocco, on the Straits of Gibraltar. (See MOROCCO: Geographic description.) Near its site stood an ancient Roman settlement, Tingio; later it passed successively into the hands of the Vandals, Byzantines, and Arabs. By the eighth century it had become a city of considerable importance. Tangier was taken by the Portuguese in 1471. It was captured by Spain in 1580 and returned to Portugal in 1650. In 1602 it passed into the hands of the English as a part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza on her marriage to Charles II, but was relinquished by them to the Moors in 1684. It was bombarded


by the English in 1844, and by the French in 1846. See FRANCE: 1842-1848.

1905.—German emperor's speech. See GERMANY: 1905-1906.

1906.—Algeciras Act.—The Moroccan ruler had been so unsuccessful in his attempts to assure proper protection to the European residents upon whom a series of atrocities had been committed that representatives from several European nations and the United States met in conference and drew up the Algeciras Act which provided for a strong police force to guarantee protection of life and property to foreign residents and a supervision of the administration. The port of Tangier was regulated by European authorities.—See also MOROCCO: 1905-1906.

1912.—Franco-Spanish relations.—A Franco-Spanish agreement was reached November 27,

to Camp Colt, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and organized and recruited as the Tank Corps. Later camps were at Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania, and Raleigh, North Carolina. Battalions of both light and heavy tanks were organized. Only a few of the French machines were available, but the recruits received a thorough infantry and artillery training, with instruction in the gas line engine. Out of some 12,000 "tankers" about 8,000 reached France, where they occupied barracks and billets near the fortress of Langres. A few of these troops were sent as replacements to the two battalions fighting in the Meuse-Argonne. American-made large and small tanks began to reach Langres about the time of the Armistice. Tank Corps General Headquarters at Chaumont, and all the tankers in the American Expeditionary Forces were classified as General Headquarters Troops and assigned



BRITISH TANK

Forcing its way through barbed wire entanglements

1912, guaranteeing to the participating countries specific rights and privileges in Tangier and the vicinity. Tangier and its vicinity were excluded from the Spanish zone, and became a special zone under the Moroccan government.

TANIS. See ZOAN.

TANISTRY, Law of. See TUATH; IRELAND: 1550-1603.

TANK CORPS, United States Army.—Early in 1918, in the American Expeditionary Forces in France, men were taken from infantry and artillery limits, trained in the operation of the French two-men tanks and organized into two battalions, which saw active service at St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne. Simultaneously in America, a tank unit known at first as the 65th Engineers was recruited, mobilized at Camp Meade, Maryland, and sent to England, where it was trained to operate the large British tanks, later engaging, as a battalion, in severe fighting in a British sector. A number of men left behind at Camp Meade were transferred


to the 1st Army. In 1919 the Tank Corps was reorganized at Camp Meade, Maryland, as a permanent force.

TANKARAMAS, inhabitants of Madagascar. See MADAGASCAR: Area.

TANKS: Invention.—Ancient prototypes.—Evolution.—Development in World War.—“If we look back on the 4,000 years of the known history of war, we shall find that . . . in battle the soldier has to think of four main acts: (i) How to strike his opponent when at a distance from him; (ii) How to move forward towards him; (iii) How to strike him at close quarters; (iv) How to prevent himself being struck throughout the whole of this engagement. In these four acts must be sought the origin of the tank, the idea of which is, therefore, much older than the Trojan horse.”—J. F. C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War*, p. 1.—“The present machine is the result of evolution, through intermediate stages, as mechanical science has grown, of old prototypes,

such as the Roman Testudo, or Tortoise, and the medieval Belfry, used in siege operations, in which the missile-throwing power of the defense gradually forced on the attack the adoption of some form of mobile protection."—E. D. Swinton, *"Tanks,"* p. 11.—"Conrad Kyeser, in his military manuscript, written between 1395 and 1405, pictures several 'battle cars.' Some of these are equipped with lances, whilst others are armed with cannon. A few years later, in 1420, Fontana designed a large 'battle car,' and the following year Archinger another, to enclose no fewer than 100 men. All these cars were moved by means of muscle power, *i.e.*, men or animals harnessed inside them. . . . In a work of Valturio's, dated 1472, a design is to be found of one of these vehicles propelled by means of wind wheels. . . . Ten years later . . . Leonardo da Vinci engaged in the design of an-

Watt in 1765 we find an early attempt to apply it to land transportation. . . . As early as 1769 Cugnot, in France, set a steam boiler upon the frame of a wagon and succeeded in making the wagon go. His idea was that this invention could be used in war. . . . Napoleon must have visualised the possibilities of Cugnot's machine . . . for when [he] . . . was selected a member of the French Institute, the subject of his paper was 'The Automobile in War.' [A tank was designed for use in the Crimean War, but was abandoned as being barbarous.] The 'battle car' had now, at least experimentally, evolved into the steam wagon which could run on roads; the next step was to invent one which would move . . . across country, in other words to replace the wheels by tracks. The evolution of the caterpillar tractor brings us to the fourth phase in the evolution of the



UNITED STATES WHIPPET TANK

Carries a three-inch gun and two machine guns

other type of self-moving machine. . . . What the motive force of this engine of war was is unknown, but the . . . description is that of the tank of today. . . . A somewhat similar self-moving wagon was designed for Maximilian I, and in 1558 Holzschuher describes a battle car a picture of which shows it in action preceded by infantry and flanked by cavalry. . . . In 1590 Simon Stevin is supposed to have constructed for the Prince of Orange two veritable landships . . . [consisting of] small battleships fully rigged, mounted upon wheels. . . . 'The earliest English patent for a self-moving wagon which could, if desired, be used in war, was probably that taken out by David Ramsey in 1634. In 1658 Caspar Schott designed one to inclose 100 men and to be employed against the Turks' . . . [But] the science of mechanics was not sufficiently advanced to render self-movement practical and it was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that a fresh attempt was made. . . . 'After the practical application of steam by

'battle car.'"—J. F. C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War*, pp. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9.—In 1888 a practical design was made for a kind of caterpillar to be driven by steam. "The first definite proposal for a fighting machine on the lines of the existing tank was due to the appearance of the Hornsby-Ackroyd Caterpillar Tractor, which was tested for military traction purposes in England in 1900-1908. . . . The project died for want of support."—E. D. Swinton, *Tanks*, p. 15.—"The Holt caterpillar is the outstanding American design for tractors which . . . [was] adopted during the [World] War. . . . In October . . . [1914] Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) E. D. Swinton put forward a suggestion for the construction of an armoured car on the Holt tractor or a similar caterpillar system, capable of crushing down wire entanglements and crossing trenches. At the same time, Captain T. G. Tulloch, manager of the Chilworth Powder Company, was also devoting his attention to the possibility of constructing a land

cruiser sufficiently armoured to enable it to penetrate . . . to the enemy's gun and howitzer positions. . . . While Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton and Captain Tulloch were urging their proposals, a third scheme was brought forward by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon. The name 'tank' was suggested in December, 1915, to insure secrecy during the experimental stages of the invention. . . . On February 2, 1916, occurred . . . the first trial of the new machine. . . . France asked that the army be supplied with a certain number. . . . The first British tank made, and to be used, was . . . the Mark I tank, the general outline of which remained the standard design for the hulls of all British heavy machines up to the end of the war."—J. F. C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War*, pp. 18, 21, 29-31, 35.—See also WORLD WAR: 1916: II. Western front: c, 3; d, 13; e, 15; 1917: II. Western front: c, 4; g, 1; g, 3; 1918: II. Western front: y; Miscellaneous auxiliary services: VI. Military and naval equipment: a, i.

**Pershing's report.** See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: VI. Military and naval equipment: c, 2.

**TANNENBERG**, village in the southwestern part of East Prussia.

1410.—Battle of. See POLAND: 1333-1572.

1914 (August).—Decisive defeat of the Russians. See WORLD WAR: 1914: II. Western front: c, 3.

**TAÑOAN FAMILY.**—"The tribes of this family in the United States resided exclusively upon the Rio Grande and its tributary valleys from about 33° to about 36°."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, p. 122.

**TANOSYS**, inhabitants of Madagascar. See MADAGASCAR: Area.

**TANTALIDÆ.** See ARGOS.

**TANYU** (1601-1674), Japanese painter, last of the Kano school. See PAINTING: Japanese.

**TANZIMAT**, Turkish decree promulgated in 1839. See TURKEY: 1839.

**TAOISM.**—Lao-tse, born in the principality of Thsu, 604 B. C., was highly renowned even in his lifetime as a profound philosopher. . . . He wrote the famous *Tao-te-King*, which became the most sacred book of the [Taoist] sect. . . . *Tao* . . . possesses among the Taosse, who derive their name from it, a mystic significance, and is even worshipped by them as a divine being. Lao-tse distinguishes in his book between the nameless, supreme Tao, which is the ultimate source, and the Tao which can be named, and is the mother of everything. To this, and to the power of virtue proceeding from it (*te virtus*), the highest worship, according to him, is due, and in this does the sage find his ideal. To withdraw entirely into himself and free himself from the constraints of sense, in order, thus, without action or speech, to exercise a blessed power, must be his aim. This is the best philosophy of life and the best policy. The often obscure system developed in the *Tao-te-King* is purely Chinese, and is incorrectly derived from the influence of Indian philosophy. . . . From the Buddhist doctrine it is essentially different. It is marked by a morbid asceticism, and takes up an attitude of hostility towards civilisation and progress, but it is distinguished by a pure and sometimes very elevated morality. . . . The later writings of the Taosse, among which the Book of Rewards and Punishments occupies a prominent place, show that they did not maintain this morality at the same elevation, but gradually lost themselves in confused mysticism and an unreason-

ing belief in miracles. To gain long life and immortality by means of self-chastisement, prayer, and watching, as well as by the use of certain charms, was their highest endeavour."—C: P. Tiele, *Outlines of the history of religion*, pp. 36-38.—See also CHINA; Religions of the people; LAO-TSE; MYTHOLOGY: Chinese; PRIESTHOOD: In China and Japan.

**TAO-KWANG** (1781-1850), Chinese emperor, 1820-1850. See CHINA: 1839-1842.

**TAORMINA**, (or Ancient *Tauromenion*).—About 302 B. C. Dionysios, the tyrant of Syracuse, expelled the Sikels, or natives of Sicily, from one of their towns, *Tauromenion* (modern *Taormina*) on the height of *Tauros* (see SYRACUSE: B. C. 394-384), and it subsequently became a Greek city of great wealth, the remains of which are remarkably interesting at the present day. "There is the wall with the work of the Sikel and the Greek side by side. There is the temple of the Greek changed into the church of the Christian Apostle of Sicily. There is the theatre, the work of the Greek enlarged and modified by the Roman, the theatre which, unlike those of Syracuse and Argos, still keeps so large a part of its scena, and where we hardly mourn the loss of the rest as we look out on the hills and the sea between its fragments."—E. A. Freeman, *History of Sicily*, v. 4, ch. 11, sect. 2.

**TAO-TEH-KING**, sacred book of Taoism. See LAO-TSE; TAOISM.

**TAPÆ**, Battle of (102). See DACIA: 102-106.

**TAPPANS**, North American Indian tribe. See ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

**TAPROBANE**, name by which the island of Ceylon was known to the ancients. Hipparchus advanced the opinion that it was not merely a large island, but the beginning of another world.—Based on E. H. Bunbury, *History of ancient geography*, v. 2, ch. 23, sect. 2.

**TAPURIANS.**—"To the west of the Hyrcanians, between Elburz and the Caspian, lay the Tapurians, whose name has survived in the modern *Taberistan*, and further yet, on the sea-coast, and at the mouth of the *Mardus* (now *Safidrud*), were the *Mardians*."—M. Duncker, *History of antiquity*, v. 5, bk. 8, ch. 1.

**TAPUYAS**, South American Indian tribe. See PATAGONIANS and FUEGIANS; INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in South America; Amazon area.

**TARA**, Battle of (980). See IRELAND: 9th-10th centuries; NORMANS: 10th-13th centuries.

**TARA**, Dynasty of. See IRELAND: From Tuathal to Cormac.

**TARA**, The Hill, the Feis, and the Psalter of.—The Feis Teavrach, or Feis of Tara, in Irish history, was a triennial assembly on the royal hill of Tara, in Meath, which is claimed to have been instituted by a certain King Ollamh Fodhla, at so remote a period as 1,300 years before Christ. "All the chieftains or heads of septs, bards, historians, and military leaders throughout the country were regularly summoned, and were required to attend under the penalty of being treated as the king's enemies. The meeting was held in a large oblong hall, and the first three days were spent in enjoying the hospitality of the king, who entertained the entire assembly during its sittings. . . . What may have been the authority of this assembly, or whether it had any power to enact laws, is not clear; but it would appear that one of its principal functions was the inspection of the national records, the writers of which were obliged to the strictest accuracy under the weightiest penalties."—M. Haverty, *History of Ireland*, p.

24.—The result of the examination and correction of the historical records of the kingdom were "entered in the great national register called the Psalter of Tara, which is supposed to have been destroyed at the period of the Norman invasion. . . . It is supposed that part of the contents of the Psalter of Cashel, which contains much of the fabulous history of the Irish, was copied from it."

—T. Wright, *History of Ireland*, v. 1, bk. 1, ch. 2.

**TARA HILL MEETING.** See IRELAND: 1841-1848.

**TARANAS**, German god. See MYTHOLOGY: Germanic: Identification of Germanic gods, etc.

**TARANTCHIS**, Sarts who were settled in the Kulja province of Chinese Turkestan by the Chinese government after the rising of 1758. See YAKUB BEG, THE DOMINION OF.

**TARASCANS.**—"The Tarascans, so called from Taras, the name of a tribal god, had the reputation of being the tallest and handsomest people of Mexico. They were the inhabitants of the present State of Michoacan, west of the valley of Mexico. According to their oldest traditions, or perhaps those of their neighbors, they had migrated from the north in company with, or about the same time as, the Aztecs. For some 300 years before the conquest they had been a sedentary, semi-civilized people, maintaining their independence, and progressing steadily in culture. When first encountered by the Spaniards they were quite equal and in some respects ahead of the Nahuas. . . . In their costume the Tarascos differed considerably from their neighbors. The feather garments which they manufactured surpassed all others in durability and beauty. Cotton was, however, the usual material."—D. G. Brinton, *American race*, p. 136.

**TARBELLI**, ancient tribe of Aquitaine. See AQUITAINE: Ancient tribes.

**TARBLES CASE.** See WAR POWERS OF UNITED STATES: Power to pass conscription laws.

**TARDIEU**, André (1876- ), French diplomat. French representative at Paris peace conference. See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace.

**TARENTEENS**, or Tarratines, North American Indian tribe. See ABNAKIS; ALGONQUIAN FAMILY; NEW ENGLAND: 1675 (July-September).

**TARENTUM** (modern Taranto).—Taranto, situated on the southeast coast of Italy, on a large gulf of the same name, had a population of 58,166 in 1911. It has an important naval harbor with extensive docks. Tarentum was the most important of the Greek cities in Italy. Of its early history

little is known, excepting that it was a Lacedæmonian colony of very great antiquity. Legend attributes its origin to colonization by a group of Lacedæmonian youths, the natural sons born to Spartan women during the absence of their husbands at the second Messenian war. These youths known as the Parthenii, migrating to Magna Græcia and locating in the territory of the Iapygæ, founded Tarentum. The city had an excellent harbor, strongly fortified. The "native fisherman were always ready to man the navy of the state. But they made indifferent soldiers. Therefore when any peril of war threatened the state, it was the practice of the government to hire foreign captains, soldiers of fortune, who were often kings or princes, to bring an army for their defence. . . . This practice of hiring foreign armies for their wars . . . saved them from the domination of successive tyrants. . . . The government of Tarentum was better and more regular than that of most Greek Republics. . . . Of all the Greek cities of Magna Græcia . . . Tarentum alone was in a condition to cope with Rome."—H. G. Liddell, *History of Rome*, pp. 231-232.—See also SIRIUS; ACHÆAN CITIES, LEAGUE OF.

**B. C. 282-275.**—Alliance with Pyrrhus and war with Rome. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 281-272.

**B. C. 212.**—Betrayed to Hannibal. See PUNIC WARS: Second; ROME: Republic: B. C. 218-202.

**B. C. 209.**—Capture of city by Hannibal's forces. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 218-202.

**6th-11th centuries.**—Conquests.—From the reign of Justinian, Tarentum belonged to the Byzantine empire. Owing to its strategic importance, it was a much-coveted possession occupied in turn by Ostrogoths, Lombards, Saracens, and Normans.

ALSO IN: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her invaders*, v. 4, 6.

**TARENTUM**, Treaty of, treaty in which Octavius and Antony extended their triumvirate to a second term of five years; negotiated at Tarentum, 37 B. C.—C. Merivale, *History of the Romans*, ch. 27.

**TARGOWITZ**, Confederates of. See POLAND: 1791-1792.

**TARI**, Italian coin. See MONEY AND BANKING: Medieval: Coining and banking in the Middle Ages.

**TARIFA**, seaport in Spain, in the province of Cadiz, about twenty-one miles southwest of Gibraltar. It was a scene of struggle between the Christians and Moors. See SPAIN: 1273-1460.

## TARIFF

Origin of the term.—Antiquity of import and export customs.—Modern systems defined.—"Tariffs may embrace duties on exports as well as on imports; but duties on exports are prohibited by the Constitution of the United States and are now levied only by a few countries. . . . The word 'tariff' is said to be derived from the Spanish town of Tarifa, near Gibraltar, where the Moors in the days of their power collected duties, probably much after the manner of those Chinese local custom-houses called 'squeeze stations.' But the thing is older than the name. Augustus Cæsar levied duties on imports into Italy, and there were tariffs long before the Cæsars. The purpose in which tariffs originate is that of raising revenue. The idea of using them for pro-

tection is an afterthought."—II. George, *Protection or free trade*, v. 4, p. 60.—By the Greeks "all trade and commerce were considered to be subject to the control of the community, because they first became possible by the assembling and living together of men in well-regulated societies. Hence proceeded the right of the state, both to regulate trade, as well as indeed, partially, itself to engross its advantages. . . . Moreover, examples enough are found of states controlling exportation and importation, according to their own aims, and wants. This also is not exactly consistent with complete freedom of trade. Aristotle presents five objects of public policy, as the most important, namely, the finances, war and peace, the defence of the country, importation and ex-

portation, legislation. With regard to importation and exportation, it must be ascertained what quantity of the necessities of life the state needs, what amount of them may be raised in the country or may be imported, and what importations and exportations the state requires, in order to make agreements and contracts with those who may be needed for these purposes. Commerce, therefore, was an object of public policy; whence many restraints, and, on the other hand, many concessions, must have arisen. If the exportation of all the products of the soil, except that of oil, was not prohibited by Solon [in the sixth century B. C.], yet he acknowledged, notwithstanding the liberality of his disposition, the admissibility of such prohibitions. And also the exportation of oil was probably not first regulated in the reign of [the Roman emperor] Hadrian, but in more ancient times, in such a manner that a supply for the requirements of the state was first to be secured. The exporter was required to hand in his manifest . . . of the oil which he was about to export, together with the names of those from whom he had obtained it, under penalty of its confiscation. The exportation of grain was always forbidden in Attica. Other states had certainly similar laws; as, for example, the Selymbrians in a time of scarcity prohibited the exportation of grain. There were also many other commodities, the exportation of which was prohibited at Athens, . . . as timber for building, pitch, wax, cordage, flax, askomata; articles which were specially important for the building and equipping of the fleets. It might indeed be supposed, that this prohibition existed only against the Peloponnesians during the war. But how often did Greece enjoy the blessings of peace?"—A. Boeckh, *Public economy of the Athenians* (tr. by A. Lamb), pp. 73-76.—"Three tariff systems are commonly recognized [in modern times]: 1. The single tariff.—Under this system only one schedule of duties is imposed, no discriminations being made among countries. This system is rare. Nevertheless, the United States, with a great variety of duties, many of them at very high rates, retained such a system until 1909. Under this system the executive department of the National Government is deprived of the power of bargaining with other countries through the making of special commercial treaties, designed to secure advantages. For this reason most of the great commercial nations have preferred one of the systems mentioned below. 2. The general and conventional system.—Through the application of a 'most favored nation' clause, lower rates than those agreed upon in general schedules are given to certain countries. [See MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE.] The other countries pay the rates named in the general schedule. This system was applied by Germany from the year 1891 until the outbreak of the World War. 3. The maximum and minimum system.—This consists of two schedules similar to the one just named. The maximum corresponds to the general tariff; the minimum to the conventional tariff. The minimum schedule is composed of a fixed list of rates of duties determined by law, not by the treaty making power. In negotiations with other countries, the executive making a commercial treaty may not go below this minimum schedule, but may apply this schedule to countries entitled to 'most favored nation' treatment. This system was adopted by France in 1892 with some modifications, and from 1909 to 1913 by the United States. There are three kinds of duties: 1. Ad valorem duties.—When duties are levied at a fixed per-

centage of the value of the goods imported, these duties are known as ad valorem. This system required collectors of revenue of tested honesty and ability and importers of high integrity. Under this system the temptation to undervaluation is very great and exporters in foreign countries will frequently aid their customers by underbidding their goods. In consequence, the inspectors and appraisers in the importing country must be highly trained men, constantly informed regarding foreign markets and importers. This system also requires a large body of trained detectives to prevent smuggling, a most undesirable and, in many cases, unsuccessful plan. 2. Specific duties.—The specific duties are generally used in Europe and Asia. They are little used in the United States except in combination with the ad valorem duties. These duties are based on units of measurement, number or weight, as, for example, a certain fixed amount in dollars or cents per yard or gross or pound. The tariff under this system is extremely complicated, but when once framed is simple to enforce by the collectors. 3. Compound duties.—The third system much in use in the United States until the passage of the Underwood Tariff Act in 1913, consists in the main of a specific duty, to which is added a supplementary ad valorem duty. By this method it is sought to combine the advantages of both the ad valorem and specific duties. In many cases the real amount of duty levied is disguised. In some instances discretion is left to the collector to apply either the specific or the ad valorem rate; and he applies whichever will yield the larger amount of revenue. To the collection of the compound duties is added the difficulties of both the ad valorem and specific duties, so that the working of the system is more cumbersome and costly than that of either of the other systems. A bounty has been defined as a premium paid by a government to encourage some branch of production or industry. The best known example in the United States is the beet sugar bounty established under the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890. Usually, in order that the bounty may be effective, it must be accompanied by an import duty to insure its working in case of large fluctuations in prices. Whereas a protective tariff tends to increase the price both of goods imported and goods produced at home (in the latter case during the development of important industries), the bounty affects only the goods produced at home and must be paid out of the general revenues. The bounties, therefore, do not affect the selling price of the goods and are a direct burden upon the taxpayers. . . . With the single exception of the slavery question, the tariff, more than any other issue, has tended to divide the country [United States] on sectional lines. The reason is clearly economic."—J. H. Hammond and J. W. Jenks, *Great American issues*, pp. 174-177, 179.—See also BOUNTIES.

ALSO IN: A. Walker, *Science of wealth*.—W. A. Dunning, *History of political theories*.—J. K. Ingram, *History of political economy*.—W. G. Sumner, *Protectionism*.—C. F. Bastable, *Public finance*.—J. E. Cairnes, *Some leading principles of political economy*.—S. Patten, *Economic basis of protection*.—R. Rea, *Triumph of free trade*.—F. Mathews, *Taxation and distribution of wealth*.—O. F. Boucke, *Development of economics, 1750-1900*.—F. W. Taussig, *Selected readings on international trade and tariff problems*.—J. Bonar, *Philosophy and political economy in some of their historical relations*.

15th-17th centuries.—Venice.—Beginning of

systematic exclusion and monopoly. See VENICE: 15th-17th centuries.

15th-17th centuries.—England.—Tariff control of exported wool.—Trade relations with Flemish towns.—Tariff preferences in navigation laws.—Commercial treaty with Portugal.—“The great export of English raw wool to the Flemish weavers was early made a source of revenue for the French wars by means of an export duty, while in Tudor times the careful restrictions on the export of corn, only allowed when there was an excess, remind us that control of commerce can be in the direct interest of the consumer, though nowadays the interest of the consumer, so far from being a plea for control, has become one of the strongest arguments against any control—the policy of plenty; free trade. One of the earliest examples of interference on behalf of industry is of a similar character, namely, the control of the export of raw wool to ensure ample and cheap supplies for our own growing cloth manufacture under Edward III. It is noticeable that early tariffs were so often in restraint of export; tariffs are more often, in the present age, levied on imports, but a reminder that the export trade can be included in a Protectionist scheme is salutary. . . . By the chartering of privileged trading companies with exclusive rights to participation in trade with specified regions, overseas, effective instruments were created for the pushing of business abroad. They were numerous, but the two greatest examples are ample illustrations of the system; the Merchant Adventurers who wrested our trade with North-West Europe from the German Hansa in Tudor times, and the East India Company.”—A. S. Turberville and F. A. Howe, *Great Britain in the latest age*, pp. 223-224.—“One of the most important events of the reign (Henry VII.) was the Intercursus Magnus, the great treaty with Flanders which followed on the two years suspension of trade (1494-96). It made traffic between the two countries absolutely free in all commodities; each was to aid the other against piracy, and each to open its law courts to merchants of the others. Its result, however, was to transfer to England the cloth manufacture of Flanders.”—H. D. Traill, *Social England*, v. 2, p. 451.—“Control by legislation was also undertaken, the most conspicuous examples being the Navigation Acts. . . . The intention was to encourage our industry, commerce and shipping, to secure the colonies almost entirely and the other non-European countries as far as possible as markets for English manufactures and sources for English raw materials. . . . [and to suppress] competition either from the colonies or foreign countries. [See also NAVIGATION LAWS.] Tariff preferences were introduced, goods in British ships paying lower customs than those in ships of the country of origin. Finally, certain goods useful for our [English] manufactures, such as cotton, wool, indigo, and dye-woods, as well as sugar, tobacco and ginger, typical colonial produce, and suitable material for a flourishing entrepot trade, were always to come to England from the colonies, and never to be shipped from the colonies direct to a foreign country. These methods were often supplemented by tariff treaties. Charles II. concluded treaties with Spain, France, and other countries, whereby the contracting countries concluded bargains for the reduction of tariffs on goods of their respective production. The Methuen treaty of 1703, exchanging the removal of our prohibition on Portuguese wine for a removal of their prohibitive tariff on British cloth is particularly notable, since the contracting powers

guaranteed each other most-favoured-nation treatment, by which each undertook to extend to the other reductions and removal of prohibitions offered to any third power, and not already conceded to the other party of the treaty.”—A. S. Turberville and F. A. Howe, *Great Britain in the latest age*, pp. 223-226.—See also PORTUGAL: 1703; SPAIN: 1703-1704; below: 1689-1721.

ALSO IN: W. Cunningham, *Growth of English industry and commerce*.—G. Cawston, *Early chartered companies*.—H. Hall, *History of customs revenues of England*.—G. Unwin, ed., *Finance and trade under Edward III*.

17th-18th centuries.—Europe.—Mercantile system of trade.—Colonial policy.—Balance of trade theory.—“Statesmen . . . of the period under discussion, set a peculiarly high value on foreign commerce, and regarded it as a more important branch of industry than any other. The chief reason for this view lay in the fact that most of the European states produced little or none of the precious metals, and could get them only by trade with a neighbor or with a distant country. Now money is the ‘sinews of war’ and when states were constantly at war with each other, a good supply of money seemed to the statesman a matter of the first necessity. . . . [Governments] made it a cardinal point in their policy to regulate commerce, so as to increase, if possible, the stock of the precious metals in the country. They argued that the country would make money if it sold more merchandise than it bought of them, for then the foreigners would have to make up the balance in gold or bullion. This was called a ‘favorable balance of trade’ as tending to bring money into the country. If the country became indebted for foreign merchandise to an amount greater than could be offset by the exports, the country would owe a cash balance abroad, and this was an ‘unfavorable balance of trade.’ At the beginning of the period the government tried to effect its object simply by prohibiting the export of bullion (gold and silver); this was the ‘bullionist’ policy. Prohibitions were found to be ineffective, however, and were a severe hindrance to some branches of commerce, that with the East especially, in which the foreigners demanded considerable supplies of the precious metals. The export of bullion, therefore, was generally permitted [as in the case of the East India company], and the government contented itself with a regulation of commerce in merchandise which it hoped would bring more bullion into the country than was carried out. Mercantilism and modern protectionism easily ran together . . . but the spirit animating restrictions was in this period mainly mercantilist, based, that is, on consideration of the flow of precious metals. The methods of tariff regulation, moreover, differed from those of modern protectionism; statesmen did not in most cases, attempt to seal the duties so as just to balance the advantages of the foreign producer, but resorted to downright prohibition of the wares which they desired to exclude from the home market. In the second place, exports were encouraged, for they represented the credit items in a country’s trade, and might bring home a balance in cash. . . . Altogether the best kind of imports, however, was held to be the raw materials of manufacture; if these could be worked up in England and exported, the country cleared not only the sum originally due for the imported material, but also the extra charge for the manufacture. Home industries were given various privileges by the government, because they either spared the

importation or increased the exportation of the wares which they produced. . . . After this review of the characteristics of commercial policy the reader will naturally inquire what were its effects. On one point an answer can be given with considerable assurance; the policy had no important effect on the distribution of the precious metals. Gold and silver were brought from America, the chief source of supply, to Spain, and flowed from Spain to the countries where they were needed in business; it seemed as though all the people in the world were in an unconscious conspiracy to defeat the plans of statesmen for checking or directing the flow. It is noteworthy that Spain, the country which had the best chance, apparently, to accumulate treasure and which pursued a policy of exaggerated mercantilism, was always complaining of the dearth of gold and silver, while Oriental states, which had never heard of mercantilism, accumulated large stores of bullion. The attempts of European countries to rob other countries of their treasure by legislation present, from one point of view, an absurd spectacle, for they were all applying the same principles in much the same way, action and reaction were equal, and no amount of political straining affected the distribution due to economic demand. The commercial policy of the mercantilist period had effects in other directions, if it did miss the mark at which it aimed. It was important, considered merely as a policy of restriction, in checking the exchange of commodities between states. Just as manors and the districts centering around a city had aimed at self-sufficiency in an earlier period, so the states of this period were led by their dislike of imports to attempt the production of everything possible within their borders; and an international organization, in which each state would specialize in the products for which it was best fitted, and would depend on commerce with others for supplying deficiencies, was hindered from developing. The mercantile system furnished a natural basis for the system of national protection, which grew up from it, and which has not entirely outgrown, even yet, its mercantilist origins. One of the most obvious effects of mercantilist commercial policy can be traced in its influence on the foreign relations of states. It was not, as is often said, the cause of the many wars which vexed Europe at this period; their cause lay deeper than any theory of favorable or unfavorable balances of trade. The balance of trade theory did, however, affect the political grouping of countries to a considerable extent, and inclined statesmen to look for friends or foes in the countries with which the balance was favorable or unfavorable. England, for example, made herself the ally of Portugal through a large part of the modern period, because Portugal bought her manufactures, and sold in return wines and other commodities which could not be produced at home; and England kept alive the traditional hostility toward France because the trade with that country showed regularly an unfavorable balance. Based on considerations like the preceding, the colonial policy of this period was marked by restrictions entirely opposed to modern ideas of commercial freedom. A government which permitted or encouraged the establishment of colonies in distant lands, considered it a duty to itself to see that other governments or the colonists themselves did not rob it of the rewards of success. The colonial policy of the period has sometimes been pictured as purely one-sided, selfishly sacrificing the colonists to the interests of the people at home. This view leaves out of

account not only the generous help given by European governments to their dependencies, but also a great mass of legislation aiming to benefit the colonists by assuring them of a market in the home country, and imposing sometimes serious restrictions on the inhabitants there. A government did no more than hold resolutely to the idea that emigrants, wherever they might be, were still citizens of their native state and bound to help maintain its power. The government tried ordinarily to frame its regulations so that mother country and dependency would devote themselves to different lines of production, and so supplement rather than compete with each other. It considered it only natural and proper that the colony should trade mainly or entirely with the mother country. As said above, this was a period of bitter conflict among the European states, and a country's commerce was thought to be one of the mainstays of its military and naval power; it seemed, therefore, to be the plain duty of colonists to contribute by their commerce to the resources on which the independent existence of the whole nation was thought to depend."—C. Day, *History of commerce*, pp. 166-172.

ALSO IN: J. E. T. Rogers, *Economic interpretation of history*.—L. Haney, *History of economic thought*.

1629.—England.—Question of tonnage and poundage. See ENGLAND: 1629; TONNAGE AND POUNDAGE.

1631-1709.—United States.—Tariffs in colonial period.—Powder duties.—Slave trade.—In the colonial period of American history, "the tonnage duties were more general than any other kind of . . . imposts. [See TONNAGE AND POUNDAGE.] In Rhode Island they seem to have been the only duties; and there were not more than three colonies—Georgia, New Jersey, and Delaware—which did not lay a tax on shipping. The powder duties, as the impost on shipping was first called, are also the earliest of any duties imposed by a colonial assembly; and they were continued by most of the colonies until the Constitution transferred to Congress the power of levying imposts. 1631 is the date of the first powder duty and Virginia the colony which imposed it. . . . But the act of 1632 provided that every ship should pay one hundred pounds of powder and ten iron shot for every one hundred tons burden. These are about the average rates imposed in all the colonies. . . . After money became more plentiful, the powder duties were commuted into cash payments ranging from sixpence to one or two shillings per ton, according to the amount of depreciation in the provincial currency. The earliest dates at which powder duties are to be found for the several colonies are, Massachusetts, 1645; Maryland, 1661; Pennsylvania, 1683; South Carolina, 1686; New York, 1709. . . . All the tonnage duties were clearly for revenue, but they were so framed that the colonial shipping interest secured a good degree of protection. In fact, there was no colony which did not exempt at least its own shipping from tonnage dues. The northern colonies all had reciprocity arrangements, by virtue of which the vessels of each entered the ports of the others free. . . . As it was, almost all ships which had a legal right to trade with the northern colonies were freed from the tonnage duties; and, if the navigation acts have been enforced, little revenue could have been received from this source. . . . The tax on slaves imported was a considerable source of revenue to Virginia and Maryland, and still more to South Carolina; while in Massachusetts,



New York and Pennsylvania it was of less importance, both because they imported fewer slaves and because the duties were not very high. In fact, it seems probable that in Massachusetts, at least, the tax was laid to discourage importation rather than to raise revenue."—W. Hill, *First stages of the tariff policy of the United States*, pp. 18-21, 27.

ALSO IN: G. L. Beer, *Commercial policy of England, toward American colonies* (Columbia University historical studies, v. 3, no. 2).—J. D. Goss, *History of tariff administration in the United States* (Columbia University historical studies, v. 6, no. 2).

1664-1667. — France. — Colbert's commercial policy.—"Protection from undue competition from without was the early watchword of Colbert, the inspiring principle of the tariff reform of 1664 [in France]. The main object of this reform was the removal of the multitude of vexatious tariffs within the kingdom, and the introduction of a certain amount of fiscal unity. But the foreign trade of the kingdom as a whole was not neglected. A duty was imposed on foreign shipping, with a view to promote the growth of a merchant marine. The import duties on most of the commodities coming from England and Holland were raised considerably, the increase varying from five or six, to forty or even fifty per cent. On the whole, the intention evidently was, as Colbert professes, merely to protect the newly established industries to a moderate extent, until they were sufficiently strong to stand alone. . . . The theory of the self-sufficiency of that particular territorial unit which we are wont to style a nation, has doubtless an attractive and popular aspect; it appeals both to sentiment and practical instincts, to pride and self-interest; it is a valuable means for the promotion of political unity during the process of national consolidation. But we find that, from the very outset, considerable modifications in the rigid theory were necessary before it could be put into practice in France. The royal power could introduce manufactures, but could not supply the workers with raw material. The method of Colbert was, 'to reduce the export duties on the products and manufactures of the kingdom, and to diminish the import duties on all raw materials for manufacture; but to keep out, by raising the duties, the products of foreign manufacture.' Still, as a consistent advocate of the theory of self-sufficiency, he was unwilling to depend on strangers even for raw material. . . . The tariff of 1664 was intended to clear the way for the revival of industry, and to encourage the home producer by handicapping his foreign competitor. France as yet could not stand alone; time was needed for development. But in the short period of three years, Colbert seems to have considered that the resources of France warranted an extension of the system of protection. The expression of this view was the revised tariff of 1667. . . . The duties of that of 1664 on foreign merchandise were in many cases doubled, in some more than doubled. . . . The tariff of 1664 had caused little serious complaint; the case was far otherwise in 1667. England replied with retaliatory duties on French wines, but only to a moderate extent. Charles was in the pay of Louis, and naturally unwilling to push matters to extremities. Colbert, in referring to the matter, attempts to show, by a strange piece of fallacious reasoning, that the retaliation, so far from decreasing, had actually increased the consumption of French wines in England. The consumption had undoubtedly increased;

he accounts for it by the curious statement, that it is a matter of experience that people drink more wine in proportion as it costs them more. Perhaps the fallacy was not quite accidental."—A. J. Sargent, *Economic policy of Colbert*, pp. 49, 52, 72, 73.—See also FRANCE: 1661-1683.

ALSO IN: J. B. Perkins, *France under the regency*.

1689-1721.—England.—Commercial relations with India, Portugal, and France.—King William's War against France in 1689, intensified the "simmering discontent which had been felt since the time of Cromwell, in regard to the rapidly increasing importations of manufactured goods from France . . . [especially] when Colbert revised the French tariffs, and imposed prohibitory rates on English cloth. . . . There had been days when wool, or undressed cloth, had been the chief commodities of English export, but eighteenth century statesmen were more concerned in trying to secure a better market for finished cloth. This was the aim of Mr. Methuen, in carrying through the much vaunted treaty with Portugal, which was concluded in 1703 [abrogated in 1713]. All those who were interested in the widely diffused manufacture of English cloth, regarded the negotiations as most successful, since they served to reopen a market which had been partially closed. During the preceding twenty years, the Portuguese, in the hope of fostering a native manufacture, had prohibited all importation of English cloth. Mr. Methuen was sent as a special ambassador to Portugal and intimated that it would be very acceptable to the Queen of England 'if the woollen cloths, and the rest of the woollen manufactures of Britain, might be admitted into Portugal, the prohibition of them being taken off.' He was able to carry this point: on the other hand, he conceded to the Portuguese that their wines should always be admitted into England at two-thirds of the duty paid on French wines. . . . A still more interesting illustration of the eagerness of the English public to form such foreign relationships as might conduce to the prosperity of our manufactures, is furnished by the failure of the Tory Government to carry out their schemes of trade policy, when they were negotiating the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The treaty proposed to open trade, on the basis of the arrangements which had existed in 1664, before the war of tariffs and occasional prohibitions, which had lasted for nearly half a century, had begun to rage. Bolingbroke endeavoured, without success, to revert to the traditional policy of the Court party in regard to intercourse with France; by the eighth and ninth clauses of the commercial treaty, which accompanied the Treaty of Peace, it was agreed that French goods should be imported subject to the duties exacted in 1664 and on the same terms as the most favoured nation. A bill was drafted to give effect to this agreement and make the necessary alterations in the tariffs, which then imposed more than fifty per cent. on French imports above what was taken on the goods of other countries. There was a general dread that the proposed arrangement would not only open the home market to the competition of French manufactures, but would indirectly lead to a rupture with Portugal, and the closing of the profitable market for English goods which had been secured in 1703. The proposal roused a storm of indignation; the Government endeavoured to be loyal to their agreement, and tried to secure the suspension of the duties on French wines for two months, in the hope that there would be difficulty in re-imposing

them; but though they commanded a majority in the House of Commons, the motion was rejected. . . . The reasoning which brought about the interruption of the French trade in 1678 gave rise to a new agitation against the East India Company and its operations. In the early seventeenth century the export trade of this Company had been the chief subject of attack, as they were so much in the habit of sending silver to the East. The fiercest opposition, in the period of Whig ascendancy, was directed against their import trade; since the goods they brought from the East, served as substitutes for textiles fabrics woven in England. It was alleged that Indian muslins and silks interfered with the demand for English goods in the home market, and prevented the export of English manufactures to foreign countries."—W. Cunningham, *Growth of industry and commerce, modern times*, pp. 458-463.—"The conclusion of the treaty with France would have required the abandonment of the policy of protecting the woolen industry. The issue that was joined with reference to this measure was thus curiously interwoven with the controversy that had long centered around the East India Company. . . . The agitation of the woolen interests continued and began to assume an acute phase in 1710. This finally resulted in the passage of the Calico Act of 1721, 'an act to preserve and encourage the woolen and silk manufactures and for the more satisfactory employment of the poor, by prohibiting the use and wear of all printed, painted, flowered or dyed calicoes in apparel, household stuffs, furniture or otherwise' after December 25, 1722."—A. P. Usher, *Introduction to industrial history of England*, pp. 283-284.—See also INDIA: 1670-1823.

Also IN: G. W. Morris and L. S. Wood, *Golden fleece*.—W. Page, *History of English commerce and industry*.

18th century.—France.—Physiocrats and their doctrine of trade.—Forerunners of free trade.—"It was not till the middle of the 18th century, when a great School of Economists arose in France, that both rulers and people were forced to pay some regard to the demand for freedom of trade. The demand was simply that what was spontaneous in its origin should be allowed to be spontaneous in its development. This demand was first made (in connection with a system of doctrine) by the remarkable group of French writers, known in their own day as the 'Economists,' and perhaps best known in ours as the Physiocrats."—J. Bonar, *Philosophy and political economy*, p. 133.—"All exchange, the Physiocrats thought was unproductive, for by definition it implies a transfer of equal values. If each party only receives the exact equivalent of what it gives there is no wealth produced. It may happen, however, that the parties to the exchange are of unequal strength, and the one may grow rich at the expense of the other. In giving a bottle of wine in exchange for a loaf of bread there is a double displacement of wealth, which evidently affords a fuller satisfaction of wants in both cases, but there is no wealth created, for the objects so exchanged are of equal value. To-day the reasoning would be quite different. The present-day economist would argue as follows: 'If I exchange my wine for your bread, that is a proof that my hunger is greater than my thirst, but that you are more thirsty than hungry. Consequently the wine has increased in utility in passing from my hands into yours, and the bread, likewise, in passing from your hands into mine, and this double increase of utility constitutes a real increase of wealth.' Such reasoning

would have appeared absurd to the Physiocrats, who conceived of wealth as something material, and they could never have understood how the creation of a purely subjective attribute like utility could ever be considered productive. . . . The Physiocrats would have condemned both the Mercantile and Colbertian systems. Both of these aimed at securing a favourable balance of trade—an aim which the Physiocrats considered illusory, if not actually immoral. But if they thought all trade was useless it is not easy to understand their enthusiasm for Free Trade. Those economists who nowadays favour Free Trade support it in the belief that it is of immense benefit to every country wherein it is practised, and that the more it is developed the richer will the exchanging countries become. But such was not the Physiocratic doctrine. It is a noteworthy fact that they are to be regarded as the founders of Free Trade, not because of any desire to favour trade as such, but because their attitude towards it was one of disdainful *laissez-faire*. They were not, perhaps, altogether free from the belief that *laissez-faire* would lead to the disappearance of commerce altogether. They were Free Traders primarily because they desired the freedom of domestic trade, and we must not lose sight of those extraordinary regulations which completely fettered its movements at this time."—C. Gide and C. Rist, *History of economic doctrines*, pp. 27-30.—See also ECONOMICS: 18th century; Physiocrats.

Also IN: H. Higgs, *Physiocrats*.—H. Martin, *History of France*.

1776.—England.—Trade conditions.—Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations."—His attack on mercantile system.—"The principle of regulation was applied [by England] much more thoroughly to our external than to our internal trade. The former was entirely carried on by great chartered companies, whether they were on a joint-stock footing, like the East India Company, or were 'regulated' like the Turkey Company, in which every man traded on his own Capital. . . . Adam Smith carried too far his revolt against the restrictive system, which led him to denounce corporate trading as vicious in principle. If we bought less than we sold, it was argued, the balance of trade must be paid in coin. To accomplish this end every encouragement was given to the importation of raw materials and the necessaries of life, but the purchase of foreign manufactures was, for the most part, prohibited, and individuals were entreated not to buy imported luxuries. The result was retaliation abroad, and a deadlock in the commercial machine. Wars of tariff were common; for instance, we prohibited the importation of gold-lace from Flanders, and the Flemings in return excluded our wool. The system, however, resisted the teaching of experience, despite the fact that in abolishing the prohibition of the export of gold and silver, the Government acknowledged the true principle of free trade put forward by the East Indian Company. The latter contended that the law forbidding the export of bullion was not only useless, since it was easily stultified by smuggling, but even, if enforced, was hurtful, since the Orientals would only sell their valuable goods for silver. The success of this contention marks the transition from the Mercantile System proper to modern Protection. The advocates of that system had shifted their ground, and instead of seeking merely to prohibit the export of the precious metals, they established a general protection of native industries. Their measures were not all alike bad. The Navigation Acts, for in-

stance, were defended by Adam Smith, and Mill has indorsed his defence, on the ground that national defence is more important than national opulence. The most famous of these Acts was the law . . . by which no goods of the growth or manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America were to be imported into England, Ireland, or the Plantations, except in ships belonging to English subjects, and manned by a crew three-fourths of whom were English; while no goods of any country in Europe were to be imported except in English ships, or ships belonging to the country from which the goods came. The argument used by the promoters of the law was that by excluding the Dutch from the carrying trade to this country we should throw it into the hands of English shipowners, and there would be an increase of English ships. It was admitted, indeed, that this would be giving a monopoly to English shipowners and English sailors, and that therefore freights would be dearer, and a check given to the growth of commerce. It was further admitted that owing to their higher charges English ships might be driven out of neutral ports; but the contention was, that we should secure to ourselves the whole of the carrying trade between America and the West Indies and England, and that this would amply compensate for our expulsion from other branches of commerce. These anticipations were on the whole fulfilled. The price of freights were raised, because English ships cost more to build and man than Dutch ships, and thus the total amount of our trade was diminished. We were driven out of neutral ports, and lost the Russian and the Baltic trades, because the English shipowners, to whom we had given a monopoly, raised their charge. But on the other hand, we monopolized the trade to ports coming within the scope of the Act, the main object of which was 'the preservation of our plantation trade entire.' Our shipping received a great stimulus, and our maritime supremacy grew with it. At the time when the Navigation Act was passed our colonial trade was insignificant; New York and Jersey were Dutch; Georgia, the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Nova Scotia were not yet planted; Virginia, Maryland, New England were in their infancy. At the end of the century the Barbadoes alone employed 400 vessels; while with the growth of the colonies the English power at sea had increased, until it rivalled the Dutch. In the next century the continuous development of the American and East Indian trades gave us a position of unquestionable maritime superiority. There is another argument in favour of Protection, at any rate in its early days. Its stimulus helped to overcome the apathy and dullness of a purely agricultural population, and draw a part of the people into trade. But here, as everywhere, Protection involves this great disadvantage, that, once given, it is difficult to withdraw, and thus in the end more harm is done than good. English industries would not have advanced so rapidly without Protection, but the system, once established, led to perpetual wrangling on the part of rival industries, and sacrificed India and the colonies to our great manufacturers. And our national dislike to Protection deepens into repugnance when we examine the details of the system. Looking at its results during the period from 1688 to 1776, when it was in full force, we are forced to acknowledge that Adam Smith's invectives against the merchants, violent as they were, were not stronger than the facts demanded. . . . If we look for the fundamental ideas of Adam Smith, those which distinguish him most clearly

from earlier writers, we are first struck by his cosmopolitanism. He was the precursor of Cobden in his belief that commerce is not of one nation, but that all the nations of the world should be considered as one great community. We may see how widely he had departed from the old national system of economy, by contrasting the mere title of his book, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), with that of Mun's treatise, *England's Treasure in Foreign Trade*. This cosmopolitanism necessitated a detailed refutation of the mercantile system. He had to prove that gold and silver were not more important than other forms of wealth; and that if we wanted to buy them, we could always do so, if we had other consumable goods to offer in exchange. But it might be objected: 'What if a nation refuses to take your other goods, and wants your gold?' Adam Smith replied: 'In that case, gold will leave your country and go abroad; as a consequence, prices will fall at home, foreigners will be attracted by the low prices to buy in your markets, and thus the gold will return.' . . . Equally prominent in Adam Smith is his individualism, his complete and unhesitating trust in individual self-interest. He was the first to appeal to self-interest as a great bond of society. As a keen observer, he could point to certain facts, which seemed to bear out his creed. If we once grant the principle of the division of labour, then it follows that one man can live only by finding out what other men want; it is on this fact, for instance, that the food supply of London depends. This is the basis of the doctrine of *laissez faire*. It implies competition, which would result, so Adam Smith believed, in men's wants being supplied at a minimum of cost. In upholding competition he was radically opposed to the older writers, who thought it a hateful thing; but his conclusion was quite true. Again it implies the best possible distribution of industry; for under a system of free competition, every man will carry on his trade in the locality most suitable for it."—A. J. Toynbee, *Lectures on the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century in England*, pp. 53, 55-58, 61-62.—See also ECONOMICS: 17th-18th centuries; 18th century.

ALSO IN: S. Dowell, *History of taxation and taxes in England*.—E. Burke, *Speech on conciliation with America*.—G. L. Beer, *Commercial policy of England toward American colonies* (*Columbia University Studies in History*, v. 3, no. 2).—C. Gide and C. Rist, *History of economic doctrine*.

1778.—Spain.—Law for trade with colonies. See LATIN AMERICA: 1764-1707.

1779.—Ireland.—Free trade introduced into the country. See IRELAND: 1778-1782.

1780-1785.—United States.—Protection in Pennsylvania.—"Before the Revolution Pennsylvania had always been slow to impose burdens on trade. While Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina were raising considerable sums from imposts, Pennsylvania commerce was free from restrictions. In 1780, however, the need of revenue overcame the predilection of the Quakers for free trade and they decided 'that considerable sums can be raised by a small impost on goods and merchandise imported into this state without burdening commerce.' Accordingly, low duties were laid on wines, liquors, molasses, sugar, cocoa and tea, with 1 per cent. on all other imports. In 1782 the duties were doubled and the revenue was appropriated to the defence of commerce on the Delaware river and bay. This was done at the request of the merchants who wished to have their interests protected and 'signified their willingness

to submit to a further impost on the importation of goods for that purpose.' When peace came, however, the merchants at once represented it as detrimental to the interests of the state to continue the duties, and they were repealed. In 1784 low duties were again imposed, and later in the same year increased. Early in 1785 . . . came the important act 'to encourage and protect the manufactures of this state by laying additional duties on certain manufactures [imported] which interfere with them.' . . . The Pennsylvania act is of importance . . . because it formed the basis of the tariff of 1789."—W. Hill, *First stages of the tariff policy of the United States*, pp. 53-54.—The preamble of the Pennsylvania Act of 1785 set forth its reasons as follows: "Whereas, divers useful and beneficial arts and manufactures have been gradually introduced into Pennsylvania, and the same have at length risen to a very considerable extent and perfection, insomuch that in the late war between the United States of America and Great Britain, when the importation of European goods was much interrupted, and often very difficult and uncertain, the artizans and mechanics of this state were able to supply in the hours of need, not only large quantities of weapons and other implements, but also ammunition and clothing, without which the war could not have been carried on, whereby their oppressed country was greatly assisted and relieved. And whereas, although the fabrics and manufactures of Europe, and other foreign parts, imported into this country in times of peace, may be afforded at cheaper rates than they can be made here, yet good policy and a regard to the wellbeing of divers useful and industrious citizens, who are employed in the making of like goods, in this state, demand of us that moderate duties be laid on certain fabrics and manufactures imported, which do most interfere with, and which (if no relief be given) will undermine and destroy the useful manufactures of the like kind in this country, for this purpose. Be it enacted" &c.—*Pennsylvania Laws*, 1785.

1784-1786. — England. — Smuggling developed by trade restrictions.—Eden Commercial Treaty with France.—Pitt's trade policy.—The strict regulation of trade by the English government led to smuggling, which the government made an attempt to control. In 1784, "an Act known as the 'Hovering Act,' authorised the confiscation of a kind of vessel that was specially built for the smuggling trade, and of all vessels carrying tea, coffee, spirits, and any goods liable to forfeiture on importation, that were found at anchor or 'hovering' within four leagues of the coast; and an immense variety of regulations were made for preventing frauds in the process of distillation and for increasing the difficulties and dangers of the vast smuggling business which was carried on by vessels in the regular trade. At the same time, in the true spirit of Adam Smith, Pitt clearly recognised the fact that the extraordinary development of smuggling in any article is a proof that the duty on it is excessive, and he adopted on a large scale the policy of reducing and equalising duties, and diffusing the burden over a wide area. It was found by experience that the duty on tea gave rise to the most numerous frauds, and it had hitherto proved impossible to detect them. Pitt, reviving a policy which had been pursued by Pelham, reduced this duty from 110 to 12½ per cent., and provided for the loss which the exchequer might possibly incur by largely increasing the duty on the windows of houses, which it was not

possible to evade. The duty on British and West India rum, which was another important article of the smuggling trade, was also greatly diminished, while the duties on wine were transferred from the Custom House to the excise, which was found the least expensive and the most effectual method of collecting them. . . . Pitt revived the idea of a close commercial treaty with France. Eden was selected as the English negotiator in Paris, and the treaty was signed in September, 1786. This policy required some courage. The memory of the explosion of indignation caused by the commercial clauses of the Treaty of Utrecht had not died away. The popular antipathy to France had naturally acquired a fresh strength during the American War. That the conduct of France to England during the American War was extremely unfriendly, Pitt fully acknowledged. But the policy of nations should not be determined by mere motives of resentment, and it was a matter of legitimate pride that, after so many efforts to crush England, France now acknowledged herself to have failed, and was looking forward with eagerness to the benefit of an amicable connection. . . . The English manufacturers were well established. With the English superiority in capital and coal they were never likely to be shaken. They were increasing with an extraordinary rapidity, and their great want was a more extended market. This market the treaty would give them, and it would more than compensate them for the loss of the monopoly in America. France, on the other hand, was pre-eminently a country of wines and brandies, of oil and vinegar, articles which England did not produce, and which it was a great object to her to obtain at a cheap rate. The two countries were thus peculiarly fitted to carry on a mutually advantageous trade, for each had its own distinct staple; each produced in great abundance what the other wanted, and the great and leading lines of their respective riches did not clash. It was true that duties on a number of articles of import were to be lowered on an average of fifty per cent., but it was well-established and often a wise policy to surrender revenue for great commercial purposes. Nor was such a surrender likely to be serious, for increased consumption would rapidly recuperate the Treasury, and the chief loss would certainly fall upon the smuggling trade, which it was a main object of recent commercial legislation to suppress. . . . In spite of the [opposing] arguments which were . . . powerfully urged, the commercial treaty was carried. . . . One of its most remarkable consequences was an immediate revival of the taste for French wines which had prevailed in England before the wars of the Revolution and the importation of these wines which in the year before the treaty was less than 100,000 gallons rose in six years to 683,000 gallons."—W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the eighteenth century*, pp. 31-46.

ALSO IN: W. J. Ashley, *Introduction to English economic history and theory*.

1789-1792.—United States.—First tariff.—Policy formulated by Alexander Hamilton's report on manufactures.—"The immediate necessity of raising some money led to the passage of a tariff bill at the first session of Congress. It was prepared and carried through the House chiefly by Madison; and its contents, no less than the general tone of the debate in which it was discussed, showed a decided leaning towards the protective system. But this legislation was temporary. . . . The report of Hamilton [on manufactures] deter-

mined the policy of the country. For good or for evil protection was resorted to, with the avowed purpose of encouraging domestic manufacturing as well as of raising a revenue. . . . The principles upon which Hamilton based his tariff were not quite those of pure protection, but constituted what was known as the 'American System'; a system which has been believed in by former generations with a warmth of conviction not easy to withstand."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Life of Alexander Hamilton*, ch. 11.—Hamilton's celebrated report (1791) opens with an elaborate argument to prove the desirability of manufacturing industries in the country, and then proceeds: "A full view having now been taken of the inducements to the promotion of manufactures in the United States, accompanied with an examination of the principal objections which are commonly urged in opposition, it is proper, in the next place, to consider the means by which it may be effected, as introductory to a specification of the objects which in the present state of things appear the most fit to be encouraged, and of the particular measures which it may be advisable to adopt in respect to each. In order to a better judgment of the means proper to be resorted to by the United States, it will be of use to advert to those which have been employed with success in other countries. The principle of these are:—I. Protecting duties, or duties on those foreign articles which are the rivals of the domestic ones intended to be encouraged. Duties of this nature evidently amount to a virtual bounty on the domestic fabrics, since by enhancing the charges on foreign articles they enable the national manufacturers to undersell all their foreign competitors. The propriety of this species of encouragement need not be dwelt upon, as it is not only a clear result from the numerous topics which have been suggested, but is sanctioned by the laws of the United States in a variety of instances; it has the additional recommendation of being a resource of revenue. Indeed, all the duties imposed on imported articles, though with an exclusive view to revenue, have the effect in contemplation; and, except where they fall on raw materials, wear a beneficent aspect towards the manufacturers of the country. II. Prohibitions of rival articles, or duties equivalent to prohibitions. This is another and an efficacious mean of encouraging manufactures; but in general it is only fit to be employed when a manufacture has made such a progress, and is in so many hands, as to insure a due competition and an adequate supply on reasonable terms. Of duties equivalent to prohibitions there are examples in the laws of the United States; and there are other cases to which the principle may be advantageously extended, but they are not numerous. Considering a monopoly of the domestic market to its own manufacturers as the reigning policy of manufacturing nations, a similar policy on the part of the United States, in every proper instance, is dictated, it might almost be said, by the principles of distributive justice; certainly by the duty of endeavoring to secure to their own citizens a reciprocity of advantages. III. Prohibitions of the exportation of materials of manufactures. The desire of securing a cheap and plentiful supply for the national workmen; and, where the article is either peculiar to the country, or of peculiar quality there, the jealousy of enabling foreign workmen to rival those of the nation with its own materials, are the leading motives to this species of regulation. It ought not to be affirmed that it is no instance proper, but it is certainly one which ought to be adopted with

great circumspection and only in very plain cases. IV. Pecuniary bounties. This has been found one of the most efficacious means of encouraging manufactures, and it is, in some views, the best, though it has not yet been practiced upon the government of the United States,—unless the allowance on the exportation of dried and pickled fish and salted meat could be considered as a bounty—and though it is less favored by public opinion than some other modes. Its advantages are these:—1. It is a species of encouragement more positive and direct than any other, and for that very reason has a more immediate tendency to stimulate and uphold new enterprises, increasing the chances of profit, and diminishing the risks of loss in the first attempts. 2. It avoids the inconvenience of a temporary augmentation of price, which is incident to some other modes, or it produces it to a less degree, either by making no addition to the charges on the rival foreign article, as in the case of protecting duties, or by making a smaller addition. The first happens when the fund for the bounty is derived from a different object (which may or may not increase the price of some other article according to the nature of that object); the second when the fund is derived from the same or a similar object of foreign manufacture. One per cent. duty on the foreign article, converted into a bounty on the domestic, will have an equal effect with a duty of 2% exclusive of such bounty; and the price of the foreign commodity is liable to be raised in the one case in the proportion of 1%, in the other in that of 2%. Indeed, the bounty when drawn from another source, is calculated to promote a reduction of price, because, without laying any new charge on the foreign article, it serves to introduce a competition with it, and to increase the total quantity of the article in the market. 3. Bounties have not, like high protecting duties, a tendency to produce scarcity. An increase of price is not always the immediate, though where the progress of a domestic manufacture does not counteract a rise, it is commonly the ultimate effect of an additional duty. In the interval between the laying of the duty and a proportional increase of price, it may discourage importation by interfering with the profits to be expected from the sale of the article. 4. Bounties are sometimes not only the best, but the only proper expedient for uniting the encouragement of a new object of agriculture with that of a new object of manufacture. It is the interest of the farmer to have the production of the raw material promoted by counteracting the interference of the foreign material of the same kind. It is the interest of the manufacturer to have the material abundant and cheap. If prior to the domestic production of the material in sufficient quantity to supply the manufacturer on good terms, a duty be laid upon the importation of it from abroad, with a view to promote the raising of it at home, the interest both of the farmer and manufacturer will be disserved. By either destroying the requisite supply, or raising the price of the article beyond what can be afforded to be given for it by the conductor of an infant manufacture, it is abandoned or fails; and there being no domestic manufactories to create a demand for the raw material which is raised by the farmer, it is in vain that the competition of the like foreign article may have been destroyed. It cannot escape notice that a duty upon the importation of an article can not otherwise aid the domestic production of it than by giving the latter greater advantages in the home market. It can have no influence upon the advantageous sale of the article produced in foreign

markets, no tendency, therefore, to promote its exportation. The true way to conciliate these two interests is to lay a duty on foreign manufactures of the material, the growth of which is desired to be encouraged, and to apply the produce of that duty by way of bounty either upon the production of the material itself, or upon its manufacture at home, or upon both. In this disposition of the thing the manufacturer commences his enterprise under every advantage which is attainable as to quantity or price of the raw material. And the farmer, if the bounty be immediately to him, is enabled by it to enter into a successful competition with the foreign material. . . . There is a degree of prejudice against bounties, from an appearance of giving away the public money without an immediate consideration, and from a supposition that they serve to enrich particular classes at the expense of the community. But neither of these sources of dislike will bear a serious examination. There is no purpose to which public money can be more beneficially applied than to the acquisition of a new and useful branch of industry, no consideration more valuable than a permanent addition to the general stock of productive labor. As to the second source of objection, it equally lies against other modes of encouragement, which are admitted to be eligible. As often as a duty upon a foreign article makes an addition to its price, it causes an extra expense to the community for the benefit of the domestic manufacturer. A bounty does no more. But it is the interest of the society in each case to submit to a temporary expense, which is more than compensated by an increase of industry and wealth, by an augmentation of resources and independence, and by the circumstance of eventual cheapness, which has been noticed in another place. It would deserve attention, however, in the employment of this species of encouragement in the United States, as a reason for moderating the degree of it in the instances in which it might be deemed eligible, that the great distance of this country from Europe imposes very heavy charges on all the fabrics which are brought from thence, amounting from 15% to 30% on their value according to their bulk. [See also BOUNTIES: Bounties by the United States government.] . . . V. Premiums. These are of a nature allied to bounties, though distinguishable from them in some important features. Bounties are applicable to the whole quantity of an article produced or manufactured or exported, and involve a correspondent expense. Premiums serve to reward some particular excellent or superiority, some extraordinary exertion or skill, and are dispensed only in a small number of cases. But their effect is to stimulate general effort. . . . VI. The exemption of the materials of manufactures from duty. The policy of that exemption, as a general rule, particularly in reference to new establishments, is obvious. . . . VII. Drawbacks of the duties which are imposed on the materials of manufactures. It has already been observed as a general rule, that duties on those materials ought, with certain exceptions, to be forborne. Of these exceptions, three cases occur which may serve as examples. One where the material is itself an object of general or extensive consumption, and a fit and productive source of revenue. Another where a manufacture of a simpler kind, the competition of which with a like domestic article is desired to be restrained, partakes of the nature of a raw material from being capable by a further process to be converted into a manufacture of a different kind, the

introduction or growth of which is desired to be encouraged. A third where the material itself is the production of the country, and in sufficient abundance to furnish a cheap and plentiful supply to the national manufacturers. . . . Where duties on the materials of manufactures are not laid for the purpose of preventing a competition with some domestic production, the same reasons which recommend, as a general rule, the exemption of those materials from duties, would recommend, as a like general rule, the allowance of drawbacks in favor of the manufacturer. . . . VIII. The encouragement of new inventions and discoveries at home, and of the introduction into the United States of such as may have been made in other countries; particularly those which relate to machinery. This is among the most useful and unexceptionable of the aids which can be given to manufactures. The usual means of that encouragement are pecuniary rewards, and, for a time, exclusive privileges. . . . IX. Judicious regulations for the inspection of manufactured commodities. This is not among the least important of the means by which the prosperity of manufactures may be promoted. It is indeed in many cases one of the most essential. Contributing to prevent frauds upon consumers at home and exporters and preserve the character of the national manufactures; it cannot fail to aid the expeditious and advantageous sale of them, and to serve as a guard against successful competition from other quarters. . . . X. The facilitating of pecuniary remittances from place to place—is a point of considerable moment to trade in general and to manufactures in particular, by rendering more easy the purchase of raw materials and provisions, and the payment for manufactured supplies. A general circulation of bank paper, which is to be expected from the institution lately established, will be a most valuable mean to this end. . . . XI. The facilitating of the transportation of commodities. Improvements favoring this object intimately concern all the domestic interests of a community; but they may, without impropriety, be mentioned as having an important relation to manufactures. . . . The foregoing are the principal of the means by which the growth of manufactures is ordinarily promoted. It is, however, not merely necessary that the measures of government which have a direct view to manufactures should be calculated to assist and protect them; but that those which only collaterally affect them, in the general course of the administration, should be guarded from any peculiar tendency to injure them. There are certain species of taxes which are apt to be oppressive to different parts of the community, and, among other ill effects, have a very unfriendly aspect towards manufactures. All poll or capitation taxes are of this nature. They either proceed according to a fixed rate, which operates unequally and injuriously to the industrious poor; or they vest a discretion in certain officers to make estimates and assessments, which are necessarily vague, conjectural, and liable to abuse. . . . All such taxes (including all taxes on occupations) which proceed according to the amount of capital supposed to be employed in a business, or of profits supposed to be made in it, are unavoidably hurtful to industry." —Alexander Hamilton, *Report on manufactures* (*Works*, v. 3).—This document set forth the stand which the Federalists took, and their successors the Republicans have since maintained, on the tariff. From 1792 on, the issues which defined the two leading political parties of the United States, under various names, included the tariff, the

Democrats advocating tariff for revenue only, and the Republicans, protection.

Also in: A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union*.—W. S. Culbertson, *Alexander Hamilton*.—U. Rabena, *American commercial policy*.

1789-1826.—France.—Policy during French Revolution.—Napoleon's continental system.—Restoration of prohibitory duties.—The Revolution of 1780 first gave economic unity to France. Until that time internal commerce was hampered by innumerable tolls and feudal dues, by the right of the various provinces to impose customs duties against each other. . . . The transit of goods through the country was so costly as to be almost impossible. The Constituent Assembly swept away all these obstacles; in 1790 it abolished the internal tolls and the provincial tariffs, and it established one common and uniform tariff against foreign countries in 1791. The new duties were fairly moderate; they ranged from 5 to 15 per cent. (or in a few cases 20 per cent.) on manufactured articles, and admitted free most raw materials (such as hides,\* wool, flax, and iron) and foodstuffs, such as corn and cattle. It is true that there were a number of prohibitions of import, but very few were of any economic importance; and the prohibition of exports, to any considerable extent, only came when war was inevitable, and could be justified as a war measure. . . . But in 1792 war broke out, and gradually the tariff policy of France became more and more restrictive. All existing commercial treaties, especially the one made with Great Britain in 1786, were annulled, and the prohibition of the export of commodities was extended; and then the National Convention, recognising that Great Britain was its most dangerous foe, entered on the attempt to cripple her by destroying her foreign trade. In March, 1793, the entry into France of certain commodities coming chiefly from Great Britain was prohibited, and in October of the same year, as that measure did not suffice, the import, sale, and use of all commodities made or manufactured in the United Kingdom or in the British Empire were forbidden under extremely heavy penalties. Yet even this enactment fell very far short of attaining the desired end, and the Directory found it necessary to go still further. It ordered that a large number of commodities, whatever their place of origin, should be *reputed* to be British produce, and should be liable to be seized as such wherever found. But this extreme measure also proved insufficient; certainly by 1802 the customs revenue had fallen to 42 million francs (of which 11 millions were swallowed up by the cost of collection), but an enormous smuggling trade had arisen, and the French Government, in spite of its efforts, could not prevent the constant influx of British goods. Under the Consulate, with Napoleon holding practically supreme power, the same policy was pursued, but its further application was delayed for a time by the negotiations which preceded the Treaty of Amiens, and the signature of that treaty in March, 1802. Though Napoleon declined to accept the contention of the British ministry that the signature of the treaty of peace restored the commercial relations of the two countries to their position under the agreement of 1786, he showed himself willing to make a fresh arrangement, and negotiations commenced, only to be brought to an abrupt end by the renewal of war in May, 1803. After Trafalgar, Napoleon, now become Emperor, began his supreme effort to break Great Britain's industrial and commercial power by isolating her from Continental Europe. The Berlin Decrees

of November, 1806, with their sequel, the Milan Decrees of 1807 and 1808, prohibited all commercial relations between the countries under Napoleon's control (that is, the greater part of Europe) and Great Britain, announced that that country was in a state of blockade, and declared all vessels which had touched at British ports to be lawful prize. Meanwhile, the French tariffs were steadily rising; there had been a great increase in the duties on colonial produce in 1806, and in February and August, 1810, they were raised to an extraordinary height. There were advances also on manufactured goods, but in spite of this and the prohibitions, the manufacturers were constantly asking for yet more protection. The disorders of the early years of the Revolution had almost destroyed the good effect of the liberating work of the Constituent Assembly; up to 1799 trade and commerce in France rather declined than advanced. With the rise to power of Napoleon, who really cared for industrial progress, and with the re-establishment of internal order, conditions began to improve. . . . But there was a reverse side to this industrial progress. The development was essentially artificial; it was the outcome, not so much of the enterprise of French manufacturers, as of the compulsion laid upon consumers to have recourse to them, and their undisturbed sway in the home market. Except in a few cases there was no considerable improvement in their methods, and 'after being kept apart for a quarter of a century from all regular contact with the products of the British manufacturers, we [the French] found ourselves at the establishment of peace even further behind than was the case prior to the war; whilst machinery had gradually developed in England, in France it had made very little progress.' Moreover, there was much over-speculation in France, followed by extensive monetary difficulties, and the bad harvest of 1811 made things worse. The result was a commercial crisis in the years 1811 to 1813. Napoleon recognised that his attempt to destroy the economic basis of Great Britain's power had failed, and that the 'continental system' had resulted only in considerable disaster to the French ports. He tried, therefore, in 1813 to improve matters by granting licences enabling certain goods needed for French manufactures, such as cotton, tobacco, lumber, to be brought in ships so licensed at a duty of only 50 per cent., on condition that the same ships took an outward cargo of French products. But it was too late to save the situation; the commercial disorder and general collapse discredited Napoleon's statesmanship, as the disastrous Russian campaign did much to destroy his military reputation. The Restoration Monarchy was called on to deal with an extremely difficult problem. The economic policy of Napoleon had brought into existence a small but powerful class of iron-masters and textile manufacturers, who were bent on maintaining their monopoly of the French market, and dreaded the threatened invasion of British goods. The landowners were anxious to keep up the high price of grain. In April, 1814, the Comte d'Artois, acting as Lieutenant-General of the realm, issued an edict greatly reducing the duties on coffee and sugar, and practically abolishing those on raw cotton. The merchants holding stocks of colonial produce, and the cotton-spinners, who also thought that the value of their stocks would consequently be depreciated, were at once aroused, and, by representing the Government's action as the first step towards the abandonment of Protection, the opponents of the new policy were able to carry

all the manufacturers with them. . . . The new Government was not able to resist the pressure. Absolute prohibition was maintained in a great many cases, and with regard to others high Protection was adopted, and the record of the economic policy of the Restoration monarchy is simply the story of a Government attempting to hold the balance between the party which favoured commercial liberty and the various well-organised groups representing particular interests, and forced again and again to go much further in the direction of Protection than it desired. The Tariff Act of 1816 made it perfectly clear that, for a very long time, France would adhere to the commercial policy which she had adopted during the war. . . . Commercial policy during the Restoration period . . . was a policy of Protection continued from the Napoleonic era, originally in the interests of the manufacturers; but as the reactionary and agrarian party gained the upper hand in Parliament, the system was generalised, and extended particularly to serve the purpose of agriculture, though some compensation was offered to manufactures in the form of bounties on exports, and drawbacks. The culminating point was reached in the Tariff Act of 1826, which completed the whole scheme of Protection, and seemed intended to make France almost entirely self-contained."—P. Ashley, *Modern tariff history*, pp. 269-275, 278-279.—See also FRANCE: 1806-1810.

ALSO IN: W. Smart, *Economic annals of the nineteenth century*.

1801-1856.—England.—Commercial treaties with Morocco. See MOROCCO: 1799-1856.

1808-1824.—United States.—Effect of War of 1812.—Tariffs of 1816 and 1824.—Free trade advocated by Webster and Hayne.—"The industrial situation changed abruptly in 1808. The complications with England and France led to a series of measures which mark a turning-point in the industrial history of the [United States]. The Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon, and the English Orders in Council, led, in December, 1807, to the Embargo. The Non-Intercourse Act followed in 1809. War with England was declared in 1812. During the war, intercourse with England was prohibited, and all import duties were doubled. The last-mentioned measure was adopted in the hope of increasing the revenue, but had little effect, for foreign trade practically ceased to exist. This series of restrictive measures blocked the accustomed channels of exchange and production, and gave an enormous stimulus to those branches of industry whose products had before been imported. Establishments for the manufacture of cotton goods, woollen cloths, iron, glass, pottery, and other articles, sprang up with a mushroom growth. . . . It is sufficient here to note that the restrictive legislation of 1808-15 was, for the time being, equivalent to extreme protection. The consequent rise of a considerable class of manufacturers, whose success depended largely on the continuance of protection, formed the basis of a strong movement for more decided limitation of foreign competition."—F. W. Taussig, *Protection to young industries*, p. 20.—In his annual report in December, 1815, Dallas [secretary of the treasury] had proposed the extension of the double duties until June 30, 1816, in order to give time for the elaboration of a new tariff bill; and after some discussion Congress agreed to this plan. February 13 he transmitted his reply to the resolutions of the previous February, closing with a carefully prepared schedule of new tariff rates. This, after being worked over in the Ways and Means Committee, was

embodied in a bill and introduced into the House March 12, by Lowndes of South Carolina. . . . The tariff of 1816 was a substantial victory for the manufacturers. . . . But . . . in its working out the tariff of 1816 proved a bitter disappointment to the manufacturing interests."—O. L. Elliott, *Tariff controversy, 1789-1833* (*Leland Stanford University monographs*, no. 1, pp. 163-211).—"The revision of the Tariff, with a view to the protection of home industry, and to the establishment of what was then called, 'The American System,' was one of the large subjects before Congress at the session of 1823-24, and was the regular commencement of the heated debates on that question which afterwards ripened into a serious difficulty between the federal government and some of the southern States. . . . Revenue the object, protection the incident, had been the rule in the earlier tariffs: now that rule was sought to be reversed, and to make protection the object of the law, and revenue the incident. . . . Mr. Clay, the leader in the proposed revision, and the champion of the American System, expressly placed the proposed augmentation of duties on this ground. . . . The bill was carried in the House, after a protracted contest of ten weeks, by the lean majority of five—107 to 102—only two members absent, and the voting so zealous that several members were brought in upon their sick couches. In the Senate the bill encountered a strenuous resistance. . . . The bill . . . was carried by the small majority of four votes—25 to 21. . . . An increased protection to the products of several States, as lead in Missouri and Illinois, hemp in Kentucky, iron in Pennsylvania, wool in Ohio and New York, commanded many votes for the bill; and the impending presidential election had its influence in its favor. Two of the candidates, Messrs. Adams and Clay, were avowedly for it; General Jackson, who voted for the bill, was for it, as tending to give a home supply of the articles necessary in time of war, and as raising revenue to pay the public debt."—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 1, ch. 13.—"The protective tariff of 1824 was christened with the absurd name of the "American System" though it was American in no other or better sense than foreign war to protect fancied national interests is an American system, and though the system had come from the Middle Ages in the company of other restrictions upon the intercourse of nations. It was carried on by the factitious help of this designation and the fine leadership of Henry Clay. . . . The debates upon the tariff in the House of Representatives and in the Senate in April, 1824 were admirable presentations of the subject. Webster in the House and Hayne in the Senate put the free trade side."—E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren*, pp. 84-86.—Their great speeches on the tariff were notable summaries of the arguments of the free traders.

ALSO IN: H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*.—R. W. Thompson, *History of protective tariff laws*.—T. W. Van Metre, *Economic history of United States*.

1815-1828.—England.—Corn Laws for protection of English agriculture.—Interests involved.—"The English Corn Laws are of great variety, and have a very long history. Speaking generally, it may be said that throughout there were three principal objects kept in view, the emphasis being varied according to the needs of the time. All three objects were in themselves eminently reasonable—(1) there was the interest of the consumer in cheapness and abundance; (2) the interest of the producers was naturally an object of concern when for centuries agriculture was the chief occupation



of the great mass of the people; and (3) the interest of the nation, as distinct from the amalgam of the interests of individuals and classes, was considered in various aspects as, for example, with regard to the prerogative of the Crown in trade, or the advancement of naval supremacy or colonial dominion. . . . There is a popular opinion that the interests of the consumer only began to be considered in 1846; as a matter of fact, in England the interests of the consumer had received the continuous attention of the Government for more than six centuries before that date."—J. S. Nicholson, *History of the English corn laws*, pp. 12-14.—During the Napoleonic wars in Europe there was a prolonged period of scarcity, approaching to famine, in Great Britain. There were scant harvests at home and supplies from abroad were cut off by the "Continental system" of Napoleon. (See above: 1789-1826.) "The cry of starvation was everywhere heard amongst the working classes, and tradesmen of all kinds suffered severely; whilst the only well-to-do people were the Farmers and the Landlords. As soon as the war was over, and out ports were opened for the reception of foreign grain, prices came down rapidly. Then the Landlords took alarm, and appealed to Parliament to resist the importation of foreign grain, which they asserted, would be the ruin of the English Farmers. They insisted that in this country, the costs of cultivation were extremely heavy, as compared with those of foreign producers of grain, and that therefore the British Farmer must receive protection in order to prevent his ruin. Hence a Parliament, composed mostly of Landlords, proceeded, in 1815, to enact the Corn Law, which excluded foreign wheat, except at high rates of duty, until the market price should reach 80s. per quarter; and other kinds of grain, until there was a proportionate elevation in prices. The discussions in Parliament on this question made a great impression, and led to a wide-spread sympathy, and to the belief that there was need of a measure, which, according to its advocates, would preserve our Agriculture from ruin, and be at the same time a provision against famine. But by many thoughtful and patriotic people this law was viewed with intense dislike, and was characterised as an atrocious fraud. The fact was, that . . . when rents ought either to have been lowered, or the methods of cultivation improved, the Corn Law was passed by the Landlords in order to keep out foreign corn and to maintain high rents; and many of the common people saw, or thought they saw, what would be the effect; for whilst the legislature was engaged in the discussion of the question, the people of London became riotous, and the walls were chalked with invectives such as 'Bread or Blood,' 'Guy Fawkes for ever,' etc. A loaf, steeped in blood, was placed on Carlton House, (now the Tory Club House). The houses of some of the most unpopular of the promoters of the measure were attacked by the mob. . . . Regardless, however, of the public demonstrations of dislike to the Corn and Provision Laws, the Legislature persisted in upholding the most stringent provisions thereof until the year 1828, when the duties on the importation of grain were adjusted by a sliding scale, in accordance with the average prices in the English market. . . . It was soon found that as a means of protection to the British Farmer, the operation of the sliding scale of duties was scarcely less effective, by deterring imports of grain, than the previous law, which absolutely excluded wheat until it reached 80s. per quarter. The Act certainly provided that foreign

grain might at any time be imported, and be held in bond till the duty was paid; a provision under which it was expected to be stored until the price should be high, and the duty low; but the expenses attendant upon warehousing and preserving it from injury by keeping, were usually looked upon as an undesirable or even dangerous investment of a merchant's capital. . . . Agricultural protection, as exhibited by the Corn Law, would, however, have been very incomplete without the addition of the Provision Laws. By these Laws the importation of Foreign Cattle and foreign meat were strictly prohibited. Butter and Lard were indeed allowed to be imported, but they were not to be used as food, and in order to provide against any infraction of the law, the officers at the Custom Houses were employed to 'spoil' these articles on their arrival, by smearing them with a tarred stick. They could then be used only as grease for wheels, or for the smearing of sheep. With bread purposely made dear, with the import of cattle and of flesh meat prohibited, and with lard and butter wilfully reduced from articles of food to grease for wheels, there is no difficulty in accounting for the frequent murmurs of discontent, and for the starvation among the poorer classes in every part of the Kingdom. Soup kitchens were opened almost every winter, and coals and clothing gratuitously distributed in many places; but such palliatives were regarded with derision by all who understood the true causes of the evil. Such help was scorned, and a cry for justice was raised; scarcity was said to be created by Act of Parliament, in order to be mitigated by philanthropy."—H. Ashworth, *Recollections of Richard Cobden*, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: N. S. B. Gras, *Evolution of English corn market*.—D. Ricardo, *On protection to agriculture*.—J. E. T. Rogers, *Economic interpretation of history*.

1817.—Germany.—Internal tariff.—Menace to commerce. See COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1800-1900.

1817-1848.—England.—Free trade school of economists.—Ricardo and Mill.—Triumph of free trade in repeal of Corn Laws.—"From 1800 on, the most acute economic thinkers began to turn from the, until then, definitive text of the 'Wealth of Nations' and to press their inquiry along these lines left vague or fragmentary by Adam Smith. Long before the corn law issue of 1813-14 brought the debate to some culmination, Malthus, West, Torrens, and probably even Ricardo had undertaken to analyze the principles determining the relative shares of rent, profits, and wages. . . . It is not too much to say that much of our present-day wisdom with respect to (a) currency, (b) taxation and (c) international trade is based upon Ricardo's analyses. . . . But more than this, the theory of international trade, 'as it was left by Ricardo, and expounded, but not substantially altered, by Mill' has furnished the scientific basis for the practical rule of free trade. This is alike the argument of advocates, and the verdict of historians of freedom of trade."—J. H. Hollander, *David Ricardo, a centenary estimate (pamphlet)*, pp. 110, 123, 125.—The corn laws had led the common people of England to want for food, and their hunger caused riots, the culmination of which was the discovery in 1817 of an organized attempt to overthrow the government. Under such circumstances "the Free Trade doctrine . . . gave birth to one of the most powerful movements in economic history, which led to the famous law of June 25, 1846, abolishing import duty on corn.

This law was followed by others, and ended in the complete removal of all tariff barriers. But the eloquence of Cobden, of Bright, and of others was necessary before it was accomplished. A national Anti-Corn League had to be organised, no less than ten Parliamentary defeats had to be endured, the allegiance of Peel and the approval of the Duke of Wellington had to be secured before they were removed. All this even might have proved futile but for the poor harvest of 1845. This glorious campaign did more for the triumph of the Liberal economic school and for the dissemination of its ideas than all the learned demonstrations of the masters."—C. Gide and C. Rist, *History of economic doctrines*, pp. 365-366.—It was a preface to the liberal movements throughout Europe in 1848.—See also ECONOMICS: 19th century: Forerunners of the historical school.

ALSO IN: D. Ricardo, *Economic essays* (E. C. K. Gonner, ed., 1923).—L. Hanev, *History of economic thought*.—G. M. Hurst, *Manchester politician*.

1820-1923.—Latin America.—Revenue tariffs.—Reason for slow development of protectionism.—Since 1820, when the Latin American countries threw off the yoke of Spain, each of the republics has carried out a tariff policy determined by the resources of these countries in raw materials, and their need of manufactured imports. In 1923, "Latin American tariffs [were] primarily for raising revenue. Most Latin American governments are apt to look at the particular tariff provision from the point of how much revenue it will produce, and consequently rates are often raised or lowered in experimental attempts to arrive at the high-revenue producing mark. A secondary purpose underlying Latin American tariffs is that which generally speaking has been the chief purpose of the United States tariff laws and revisions thereof, to protect domestic industry. But the bases for the protection of domestic industry through tariff laws do not exist in any of the Latin American countries as in the United States. As stated above, these countries are not manufacturing countries in the sense that the United States and Western Europe are. Protection is a fact, and not solely a result of the law. The law intended to foster an industry can never become a protective law until the industry exists, and then it is protective only to the degree, in kind and quantity, to which this domestic industry is able to supply the domestic wants. Certain Latin American countries—notably Brazil, Mexico, and Chile—have enacted tariff laws intended to be protective, but the industries have in only a few instances responded in quantity and less often in kind to the domestic demand, so that the foreign exporter may disregard the protective features of Latin American, even of Brazilian, Mexican, and Chilean, tariff laws and regard all such as being high tariff rates in a certain degree, restrictive of trade. In other words Latin-American protective laws are very apt to be not protective, although far above the revenue producing mark."—*Latin American tariffs (Bulletin of the Pan American Union, July, 1910, pp. 42)*.

ALSO IN: C. M. Machine, *What can United States and Latin America do for each other?* (*American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept., 1915*).—W. H. Koebel, *South America, an industrial and commercial field*.

1828.—United States.—"Bill of Abominations."—Webster's change of stand on tariff question.—Attitude of the South.—"The contest between the North and South entered an acute stage when a

still higher protective tariff was demanded by the Northern woolen and iron manufacturers in 1827, and the demand was supported by a protectionist congress held at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. . . . The South was violent in protest. . . . The Southerners were not strong enough to keep a new high tariff bill out of Congress in 1828, but they resorted to a shrewd trick to defeat it. Instead of seeking to lower the tariff rates proposed, they joined the Western farmers in greatly increasing them. A presidential election was approaching, and the South appealed to a large anti-Adams sentiment to frame a tariff bill so preposterous that new England would reject it, and so bring dishonor and defeat upon Adams' cause. . . . All New England's demands for protection to manufactures were granted in the bill, but their benefits were largely neutralized by the addition of high duties on raw wool to please the sheep raisers of Ohio, on hemp to satisfy the farmers of Kentucky, and on pig iron to conciliate the miners of Pennsylvania. In spite of this shrewd plan of the South to match the West against New England, and thus to please nobody by pleasing everybody, the fantastic bill passed the House by a vote of 105 to 94, the Senate by 26 to 21, and became a law by President Adams' signature. . . . The 'Tariff of Abominations', as this bill was called, was one of the most outrageous pieces of legislation ever passed by Congress. It was a low political job which as Randolph said 'had to do with no manufactures except the manufacture of a President!'—D. S. Muzzey, *American history*, pp. 271-273.—"For this bill Mr. Webster spoke and voted. He changed his ground on this important question absolutely and entirely, and made no pretence of doing anything else. . . . Opinion in New England changed for good and sufficient business reasons, and Mr. Webster changed with it. Free trade had commended itself to him as an abstract principle, and he had sustained and defended it as in the interest of commercial New England. But when the weight of interest in New England shifted from free trade to protection Mr. Webster followed it"—H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster, ch. 6*.—See also U. S. A.: 1828-1833.

ALSO IN: D. Mallory, *Life and speeches of Daniel Webster*.—W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a public man*.

1830-1848.—France.—Bastiat's efforts for free trade versus industrial monopolies of the Restoration period.—His influence outside of France.—"The Governments of the Restoration—both Bourbon and Orleanist [during the long reign of Louis Philippe, 1830-1848], were very much more liberal than the Parliamentary majorities. They were, however, powerless against the coalition of 'big' manufacturers and landowners, who were enabled by the restriction of the franchise to control the legislative bodies. It was in these days that a monopolist in the Upper House dared to assert candidly the truth which, under a more democratic régime, is apt to be concealed: 'No society can dispense entirely with an aristocracy; every government has need of one. Do you wish to know the aristocracy of the July monarchy? It is the aristocracy of the great ones in the industrial and manufacturing world. They are the founders of the new dynasty.' It is only fair to add that public opinion was almost without exception on the side of the monopolists. The agitation initiated by Bastiat in imitation of Cobden's League was a failure."—H. O. Meredith, *Protection in France* (W. H. Dawson, ed., *Protection in Various Countries Series, pp. 5-6*).—In

England Bastiat "had become acquainted with the leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League, and determined to do for France what they had done and were doing for England. In 1845 he published *Cobden and the League* (*Cobden et la Ligue*) to glorify 'the grand movement' as he called it. . . . In 1845 Bastiat moved to Paris and became secretary of the Free Trade Association there, and also took charge of a newspaper called *Free Trade*. . . . His most ambitious work and his attempt at a more positive and constructive contribution was the *Harmonies Economiques*. . . . In general criticism of Bastiat's work, it is to be observed that he was greatly influenced by the controversial atmosphere in which he lived. His doctrines appear unduly warped by his propaganda against protectionism and Socialism, while underlying all his argument is the unsound idea that the organization of society under competition is the most perfect that can be effected or even conceived of. . . . Its popular influence has, however, been remarkable. . . . It owed its existence to a great extent to the extreme free trade party in England, called on the Continent generally the Manchester Party, from the city where it has its stronghold. But Bastiat's system has also reacted upon this party, leading it to greater extremes in doctrine. In Germany a party was also formed . . . opposing all interference of government, and accepting Bastiat without reserve."—L. H. Haney, *History of economic thought*, pp. 251-253, 259-260.

ALSO IN: F. Bastiat, *Fallacies of protection*.

1832.—United States.—Clay's tariff of 1832.—American system saved.—President Jackson, in his message of December, 1831, "invited attention to the fact that the public debt would be extinguished before the expiration of his term, and that, therefore, 'a modification of the tariff, which shall produce a reduction of the revenue to the wants of the government,' was very advisable. He added that, in justice to the interests of the merchant as well as the manufacturer, the reduction should be prospective, and that the duties should be adjusted with a view 'to the counteraction of foreign policy, so far as it may be injurious to our national interests.' This meant a revenue tariff with incidental retaliation. He had thus arrived at a sensible plan to avoid the accumulation of a surplus. Clay took the matter in hand in the Senate, or rather in Congress. . . . He recognized the necessity of reducing the revenue, but he would reduce the revenue without reducing protective duties. The 'American System' should not suffer. It must, therefore, not be done in the manner proposed by Jackson. He insisted upon confining the reduction to duties on articles not coming into competition with American products. . . . Instead of abolishing protective duties he would rather reduce the revenue by making some of them prohibitory. . . . When objection was made that this would be a defiance of the South, of the President, and of the whole administration party, he replied, as Adams reports, that 'to preserve, maintain and strengthen the American System, he would defy the South, the President and the devil.' He introduced a resolution in the Senate, 'that the existing duties upon articles imported from foreign countries, and not coming into competition with similar articles made or produced within the United States, ought to be forthwith abolished, except the duties upon wines and silks, and that those ought to be reduced; and that the Committee on Finance be instructed to report a bill accordingly.'" After long debate Clay's "tariff resolution was

adopted, and in June, 1832, a bill substantially in accord with it passed both houses, known as the tariff act of 1832. It reduced or abolished the duties on many of the unprotected articles, but left the protective system without material change. As a reduction of the revenue it effected very little. . . . The reduction proposed by Clay, according to his own estimate, was not over seven millions; the reduction really effected by the new tariff law scarcely exceeded three millions. Clay had saved the American System at the expense of the very object contemplated by the measure. It was extremely short-sighted statesmanship. The surplus was as threatened as ever, and the dissatisfaction in the South grew from day to day."—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 1, ch. 13.—See also AMERICAN SYSTEM.

1833.—United States.—Nullification in South Carolina.—Clay's compromise tariff. See U. S. A.: 1828-1833; SOUTH CAROLINA: 1828-1833.

1833.—Germany.—Frederick List's agitation for protection.—Formation of Zollverein.—"At the close of the Napoleonic Wars, the continental blockade system, under which Germany had left the advantage of Protection in many of her manufactures, came to an end. German ports were thrown open to foreign manufactured imports at low rates of duty, but custom-houses continued to gather duties on the frontiers of all the petty German States from one another. An association, formed to promote the abolition of these internal barriers to trade, elected [Frederick] List as its president. His election to this office, which was disapproved of by the Government authorities, cost List his official appointment in the civil service of Würtemberg, and eventually led him to seek his fortunes in America. While there he made the acquaintance of General Lafayette, President Jackson, Henry Clay and other leading spirits of the United States. His stay in America, where he was successful both in journalism and industrial enterprise, doubtless tended to strengthen his belief in the national and federal value of Free Trade within the national territories, and a Protective tariff outside. On his return to his native country he returned with renewed vigour to the task of converting his countrymen to his views. In 1841 appeared the first part of his *National System of Political Economy*—the fourth part entitled *The Politics* being published in 1844. The avowed object of this work was to advocate a policy for uniting Germany by a Customs Union or Zollverein embracing all the different States, in other words to do as the United States had already done, to allow no duties within the Federation but to maintain and develop them without. Free Trade for the home manufacturer within his own domain—restricted trade for the foreign competitor. A nation without great productive industries of its own, dependent for the bulk of its manufactured supplies on other countries, was no more acceptable to List than it had been to Hamilton, however much such a scheme might commend itself to the English free traders writing avowedly in the broad interests of mankind at large, but really, as List stoutly maintained, on behalf of their country, then the workshop of the world. At the time List wrote his book, the Free Trade doctrines of J. B. Say and Adam Smith had been for some time before the world and had attracted many followers. In meeting them List had no difficulty in showing how much the policy by which England had risen to greatness differed from the teachings of these writers. . . . A Manufacturers' Union with branches throughout Germany

was formed. . . . Deputations visited every German court, the work of the Zollverein began in earnest. [A union was first formed between Württemberg and Bavaria, then, in 1833, with some of the German states and Prussia; then between the middle German states—Saxony, Brunswick, Schaumburg-Lippe, Hesse Cassel, Hesse Darmstadt and Baden; finally there occurred a fusion of these three groups into a general customs union which comprised the whole of Germany (including Luxemburg), except Austria, Hanover, the Hansa towns and the two Mecklenburgs, Hanover, Oldenburg and the Hansa towns formed the North-western League. Trade within the union or Zollverein was free and unrestricted, but as against the outside world a moderate protectionist tariff was maintained.]—A. P. Hillier, *Commonweal*, pp. 73-75, 78.—See also GERMANY: 1817-1840; INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: Germany.

ALSO IN: F. List, *National system of political economy*.—U. Rabbena, *American commercial policy* (essay on List).—J. H. Clapham, *Economic development of France and Germany*.

1836-1841.—England.—Formation of Anti-Corn Law Association at Manchester.—Cobden's leadership.—In 1836 Richard Cobden, on his return from Spain and the Near East, published his epoch-making pamphlet on Russia, and entered into political activity at Manchester. "In October, 1838, a band of seven men met at a hotel in Manchester, and formed a new Anti-Corn Law Association. They were speedily joined by others, including Cobden, who from this moment began to take a prominent part in all counsel and action. That critical moment had arrived, which comes in the history of every successful movement, when a section arises within the party, which refuses from that day forward either to postpone or to compromise. The feeling among the older men was to stop short in their demands at some modification of the existing duty. . . . The more energetic members protested against these faltering voices. . . . The meeting was adjourned, to the great chagrin of the President, and when the members assembled a week later, Cobden drew from his pocket a draft petition which he and his allies had prepared in the interval, and which after a discussion of many hours was adopted by an almost unanimous vote. The preamble laid all the stress on the alleged facts of foreign competition, in words which never fail to be heard in times of bad trade. It recited how the existing laws prevented the British manufacturer from exchanging the produce of his labour for the corn of other countries, and so enabled his foreign rivals to purchase their food at one half of the price at which it was sold in the English market; and finally the prayer of the petition called for the repeal of all laws relating to the importation of foreign corn and other foreign articles of subsistence, and implored the House to carry out to the fullest extent, both as affects manufactures and agriculture, the true and peaceful principles of free-trade. In the following month, January, 1839, the Anti-Corn-Law Association showed that it was in earnest in the intention to agitate, by proceeding to raise a subscription of an effective sum of money. Cobden threw out one of those expressions which catch men's minds in moments when they are already ripe for action. 'Let us,' he said, 'invest part of our property, in order to save the rest from confiscation.' Within a month £6,000 had been raised, the first instalment of many scores of thousands still to come. A great banquet was given to some of the parliamentary

supporters of Free Trade; more money was subscribed, convictions became clearer and purpose waxed more resolute. On the day after the banquet, at a meeting of delegates from other towns, Cobden brought forward a scheme for united action among the various associations throughout the country. This was the germ of what ultimately became the League."—J. Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden*, v. 1, ch. 6.—Cobden carried the agitation against the corn laws into Parliament, to which he was elected in 1841.

ALSO IN: A. Somerville, *Free trade and the league*.—G. M. Trevelyan, *Life of John Bright*.—G. Armitage-Smith, *Free trade movement and its results*.

1842.—United States.—Act of 1842.—Need of increased revenue.—"There had been a lull in tariff legislation for ten years. . . . Whatever difference of opinion existed respecting the necessity of additional protection to manufacturers, some expedient, it was universally conceded, must be adopted to increase the public revenue. As no one favored direct taxation, a revision of the tariff was the only mode of enriching the treasury. . . . The committee on manufactures did not report to the House until the last of March, 1842. . . . The leading provisions of the bill reported by the committee were the following: 1. A general ad valorem duty of 30 per cent, with few exceptions, where the duty was on that principle. 2. A discrimination was made for the security of certain interests requiring it by specific duties, in some instances below, in others above, the rate of the general ad valorem duty. 3. As a general principle, the duty on the articles subject to discrimination was made at the rate at which it was in 1840, after the deduction of four-tenths of the excess on 20 per cent by the Act of 1833."—A. S. Bolles, *Financial history of the United States, 1789-1860*, bk. 3, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: W. McKinley, *Tariff: Review of tariff legislation of United States from 1812 to 1896*.

1842.—England.—First step toward free trade in Peel's modification of Corn Laws.—Sir Robert Peel was called upon to form the new Tory ministry when in 1841 the Whig administration under Melbourne gave way. (See ENGLAND: 1841-1842.) "But neither party was yet prepared to sweep away the whole clumsy and baneful machinery of a tax on the nation's food. The Whigs had declared in 1841 for a fixed duty of 8s. a quarter. This compelled their opponents by an irresistible law of party warfare to adopt the only practicable alternative of a modified sliding scale. . . . With the unerring instinct of a threatened monopoly they felt that to touch the corn law was to weaken it. The Whigs had touched the ark of protection and had perished; the sacred emblem was now placed in the custody of Peel, and it was impossible that he could betray them [so the Tories thought]. Peel was content at the outset to tinker with the sliding scale. The burden must remain, for so the country had resolved, and he was still convinced himself of the justice and necessity of the tax, but he would make it easier to bear. Even this change, however, sufficed to alarm the more thorough-going Protectionists."—J. R. Thursfield, *Peel (English Statesmen Series, pp. 183-185)*.—"On the 9th of February [1842] Peel moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Corn Laws. His speech, which lasted nearly three hours, was necessarily dull, and his proposal was equally offensive to the country gentlemen and to the Anti-Corn Law League. It amounted merely to an improvement

of the sliding-scale which had been devised by the Duke of Wellington's Cabinet [see above: 1815-1828], and was based on the axiom that the British farmer, taking one year with another, could not make a profit by growing corn if foreign corn were admitted at a price of less than 70s. a quarter. By a calculation of prices extending over a long term of years, Peel had satisfied himself that a price of 56s. a quarter would remunerate the British farmer. He proposed to modify the sliding-scale accordingly. . . . Peel retained the minimum duty of 1s. when corn was selling at 73s. the quarter; he fixed a maximum duty of 20s. when corn was selling at from 50s. to 51s. the quarter, and he so altered the graduation in the increase of duty as to diminish the inducement to hold grain back when it became dear. . . . So general was the dissatisfaction with Peel's Corn Law that Russell ventured once more to place before the House his alternative of a fixed 8s. duty. He was defeated by a majority of upwards of 120 votes. Two days later Mr. [Charles] Villiers made his annual motion for the total repeal of the Corn Laws, and was beaten by more than four votes to one. The murmurs of Peel's own supporters were easily overborne, and the Bill was carried through the House of Commons after a month spent in debates. As soon as it had passed, and the estimates for the army and navy had been voted, Peel produced what was really his Budget, nominally Mr. Goulburn's. . . . In every one of the last five years there had been a deficit. . . . Peel therefore resolved to impose an income tax. With these and with the income tax he calculated that he would have a surplus of £1,000,000. Peel was thus able to propose a reduction of the tariff upon uniform and comprehensive principles. He proposed to limit import duties to a maximum of 5 per cent. upon the value of raw materials, of 12 per cent. upon the value of goods partly manufactured, and of 20 per cent. upon the value of goods wholly manufactured. Out of the 1,200 articles then comprised in the tariff, 750 were more or less affected by the application of these rules, yet so trivial was the revenue raised from most of them that the total loss was computed at only £270,000 a year. Peel reduced the duty on coffee; he reduced the duty on foreign and almost entirely abolished the duty on Canadian timber. Cattle and pigs, meat of all descriptions, cheese and butter, which had hitherto been subject to a prohibitory duty, he proposed to admit at a comparatively low rate. He also diminished the duty upon stage coaches. So extensive a change in our system of national finance had never before been effected at one stroke. . . . Immense was the excitement caused by the statement of the Budget. . . . Every part of Peel's scheme was debated with the utmost energy. . . . He procured the ratification of all his measures subject to some slight amendments, and at the cost of a whole session spent in discussing them. Little or nothing else was accomplished by Parliament in this year. Peel had returned to power as the champion of protection. His first great achievement was the extension of the freedom of trade."—F. G. Montague, *Life of Sir Robert Peel*, ch. 8.—"Notwithstanding the objections which free traders might raise, the Budget of 1842 proved the first great advance in the direction of free trade. It did not remove the shackles under which trade was struggling, but it relaxed the fastenings and lightened the load."—S. Walpole, *History of England from 1815*, v. 4, ch. 18.

Also 18: J. E. T. Rogers, *Cobden and modern*

*political thought*.—W. Robertson, *Life and times of John Bright*.—M. M. Trumbull, *Free trade struggle in England*.

1845-1846.—England.—Repeal of the Corn Laws.—Political issues involved.—"The Anti-Corn-Law agitation was one of those movements which, being founded on right principles, and in harmony with the interest of the masses, was sure to gather fresh strength by any event affecting the supply of food. It was popular to attempt to reverse a policy which aimed almost exclusively to benefit one class of society. . . . The economic theorists had the mass of the people with them. Their gatherings were becoming more and more enthusiastic. And even amidst Conservative land-owners there were not a few enlightened and liberal minds who had already, silently at least, espoused the new ideas. No change certainly could be expected to be made so long as bread was cheap and labour abundant. But when a deficient harvest and a blight in the potato crop crippled the resources of the people and raised grain to famine prices, the voice of the League acquired greater power and influence. Hitherto they had received hundreds of pounds. Now, thousands were sent in to support the agitation. A quarter of a million was readily contributed. Nor were the contributors Lancashire mill-owners exclusively. Among them were merchants and bankers, men of heart and men of mind, the poor labourer and the peer of the realm. The fervid oratory of Bright, the demonstrative and argumentative reasoning of Cobden, the more popular appeals of Fox, Rawlins, and other platform speakers, filled the newspaper press, and were eagerly read. And when Parliament dissolved in August 1845, even Sir Robert Peel showed some slight symptoms of a conviction that the days of the corn laws were numbered. Every day, in truth, brought home to his mind a stronger need for action, and as the ravages of the potato disease progressed, he saw that all further resistance would be absolutely dangerous. . . . It was evident that the cabinet was too divided to justify him in bringing forward his measures, and he decided upon resigning office. His resolution to that effect having been communicated to the Queen, her Majesty summoned Lord John Russell to form a cabinet, and, to smooth his path, Sir Robert Peel, with characteristic frankness, sent a memorandum to her Majesty embodying a promise to give him his support. But Lord John Russell failed in his efforts, and the Queen had no alternative but to recall Sir Robert Peel, and give him full power to carry out his measures. It was under such circumstances that Parliament was called for January 22, 1846, and on January 27 the Government plan was propounded before a crowded House. It was not an immediate repeal of the corn laws that Sir Robert Peel recommended. He proposed a temporary protection for three years, till February 1, 1849, imposing a scale during that time ranging from 4s. when the price of wheat should be 50s. per quarter and upward, and 10s. when the price should be under 48s. per quarter, providing, however, that after that period all grain should be admitted at the uniform duty of 1s. per quarter. The measure, as might have been expected, was received in a very different manner by the political parties in both Houses of Parliament. There was treason in the Conservative camp, it was said, and keen and bitter was the opposition to the chief of the party. For twelve nights speaker after speaker indulged in personal recriminations. They recalled to Sir Robert Peel's memory the speeches he had made in de-

fence of the corn laws. And as to his assertion that he had changed his mind, they denied his right to do so. . . . The passing of the measure was, however, more than certain, and after a debate of twelve nights' duration on Mr. Miles's amendment, the Government obtained a majority of 97, 337 having voted for the motion and 240 against it. And from that evening the corn law may be said to have expired. Not a day too soon, certainly, when we consider the straitened resources of the country as regards the first article of food, caused not only by the bad crop of grain, but by the serious loss of the potato crop, especially in Ireland."—L. Levi, *History of British commerce*, pt. 4, ch. 4.

Also in: H. O. Meredith, *Outline of economic history of England*.—W. J. Ashley, *Economic organization of England*.

1846-1861.—United States.—Walker tariff.—Tariff of 1857.—"In 1846 was passed what we will call the 'Walker tariff,' from Robert J. Walker, then Secretary of the Treasury. It reduced the duties on imports down to about the standard of the 'Compromise' of 1833. It discriminated, however, as the Compromise did not, between goods that could be produced at home and those that could not. It approached, in short, more nearly than any other, in its principles and details, to the Hamilton tariff, although the general rate of duties was higher. From that time up to 1857 there was a regular and large increase in the amount of dutiable goods imported, bringing in a larger revenue to the government. The surplus in the treasury accumulated, and large sums were expended by the government in buying up its own bonds at a high premium, for the sake of emptying the treasury. Under these circumstances the 'tariff of 1857' was passed, decidedly lowering the rates of duties and largely increasing the free list. The financial crisis of that year diminished the imports, and the revenue fell off \$22,000,000. It rallied, however, the next two years, but owing to the large increase of the free list, not quite up to the old point."—A. L. Perry, *Elements of political economy*, p. 464.—The Walker tariff was used as the basis for the Morrill tariff of 1861. "The free traders consider the tariff of 1846 to be a conclusive proof of the beneficial effect of low duties. They challenge a comparison of the years of its operation, between 1846 and 1857, with any other equal period in the history of the country. Manufacturing, they say, was not forced by a hothouse process to produce high-priced goods for popular consumption, but was gradually encouraged and developed on a healthful and self-sustaining basis, not to be shaken as a reed in the wind by every change in the financial world. Commerce, as they point out, made great advances, and our carrying trade grew so rapidly that in ten years from the day the tariff of 1846 was passed our tonnage exceeded the tonnage of England. The free-traders refer with especial emphasis to what they term the symmetrical development of all the great interests of the country under this liberal tariff. Manufacturers were not stimulated at the expense of the commercial interest. Both were developed in harmony, while agriculture, the indispensable basis of all, was never more flourishing. The farmers and planters at no other period of our history were in receipt of such good prices, steadily paid to them in gold coin, for their surplus product, which they could send to the domestic market over our own railways and to the foreign market in our own ships. Assertions as to the progress of manufactures in the period under

discussion are denied by the protectionists. While admitting the general correctness of the free-trader's statements as to the prosperous condition of the country, they call attention to the fact that directly after the enactment of the tariff of 1846 the great famine occurred in Ireland, followed in the ensuing years by short crops in Europe. The prosperity which came to the American agriculturist was therefore from causes beyond the sea and not at home,—causes which were transient, indeed almost accidental. Moreover an exceptional condition of affairs existed in the United States in consequence of our large acquisition of territory from Mexico at the close of the war and the subsequent and almost immediate discovery of gold in California. A new and extended field of trade was thus opened in which we had the monopoly, and an enormous surplus of money was speedily created from the products of the rich mines on the Pacific coast. At the same time Europe was in convulsion from the revolutions of 1848, and production was materially hindered over a large part of the Continent. This disturbance had scarcely subsided when three leading nations of Europe, England, France, and Russia, engaged in the wasteful and expensive war of the Crimea. The struggle began in 1853 and ended in 1856, and during those years it increased consumption and decreased production abroad, and totally closed the grain-fields of Russia from any competition with the United States. The protectionists therefore hold that the boasted prosperity of the country under the tariff of 1846 was abnormal in origin and in character. . . . The protectionists maintain that from 1846 to 1857 the United States would have enjoyed prosperity under any form of tariff, but that the moment the exceptional conditions in Europe and in America came to an end, the country was plunged headlong into a disaster [the financial crisis of 1857] from which the conservative force of a protective tariff would in large part have saved it. . . . The free-traders, as an answer to this arraignment of their tariff policy, seek to charge responsibility for the financial disasters to the hasty and inconsiderate changes made in the tariff in 1857, for which both parties were in large degree if not indeed equally answerable."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 9.

1846-1879.—England.—Gradual adaptation of free trade policy.—In England, "with the fall of the principle of the protection in corn may be said to have practically fallen the principle of protection . . . altogether. That principle was a little complicated in regard to the sugar duties and to the navigation laws. The sugar produced in the West Indian colonies was allowed to enter this country at rates of duty much lower than those imposed upon the sugar grown in foreign lands. The abolition of slavery in our colonies has made labour there somewhat costly and difficult to obtain continuously, and the impression was that if the duties on foreign sugar were reduced, it would tend to enable those countries which still maintained the slave trade to compete at great advantage with the sugar grown in our colonies by that free labour to establish which England had but just paid so large a pecuniary fine. Therefore, the question of Free Trade became involved with that of free labour; at least, so it seemed to the eyes of many a man who was not inclined to support the protective principle in itself. When it was put to him, whether he was willing to push the Free Trade principle so far as to allow countries growing sugar by slave labour to

drive our free grown sugar out of the market, he was often inclined to give way before this mode of putting the question, and to imagine that there really was a collision between Free Trade and free labour. Therefore a certain sentimental plea came in to aid the Protectionists in regard to the sugar duties. Many of the old anti-slavery party found themselves deceived by this fallacy, and inclined to join the agitation against the reduction of the duty on foreign sugar. On the other hand, it was made tolerably clear that the labour was not so scarce or so dear in the colonies as had been represented, and that colonial sugar grown by free labour really suffered from no inconvenience except the fact that it was still manufactured on the most crude, old fashioned, and uneconomical methods. Besides, the time had gone by when the majority of the English people could be convinced that a lesson of the beauty of freedom was to be conveyed to foreign sugar-growers and slave-owners by the means of a tax upon the products of their plantations. Therefore, after a long and somewhat eager struggle, the principle of Free Trade was allowed to prevail in regard to sugar. The duties on sugar were made equal. The growth of the sugar plantations was admitted on the same terms into this country, without any reference either to the soil from which it had sprung or to the conditions under which it was grown."—J. McCarthy, *Epoch of reform*, ch. 12.—"The contest on the Navigation Laws [finally repealed in 1849 (see NAVIGATION LAWS: 1849)] was the last pitched battle fought by the Protectionist party. Their resistance grew fainter and fainter, and a few occasional skirmishes just reminded the world that such a party still existed. Three years afterwards their leaders came into power. In February, 1852, the Earl of Derby became Prime Minister, and Mr. Disraeli Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. The Free-traders, alarmed at the possibility of some attempt to reverse the policy of commercial freedom which had been adopted, took the earliest opportunity of questioning those Ministers in Parliament on the subject. The discreet reply was that the Government did not intend to propose any return to the policy of protection during the present Session, nor at any future time, unless a great majority of members favourable to that policy should be returned to Parliament. But far from this proving to be the case, the general election which immediately ensued reinstated a Liberal Government, and the work of stripping off the few rags of protection that still hung on went rapidly forward. On the 18th of April, 1853, Mr. Gladstone, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, made his financial statement in an able and luminous speech. Such was the admirable order in which he marshalled his topics, and the transparent lucidity with which he treated them, that although his address occupied five hours in the delivery, and although it bristled with figures and statistics, he never for a moment lost the attention or fatigued the minds of his hearers. Mr. Gladstone's financial scheme included, among other reforms, the reduction or total remission of imposts on 133 articles. In this way, our tariff underwent rapid simplification. Each subsequent year was marked by a similar elimination of protective impediments to free commercial intercourse with other countries. In 1860, butter, cheese, &c., were admitted duty free; in 1860, the small nominal duty that had been left on corn was abolished; in 1874, sugar was relieved from the remnant of duty that had survived from previous reductions. It would

be superfluous, as well as tedious, to enter upon a detailed reference to the various minor reforms through which we advanced towards, and finally reached, our present free-trade tariff. In fact, all the great battles had been fought and won by the close of the year 1849, and the struggle was then virtually over. By 1879 it [was] evident . . . that our tariff [did] not contain within it one solitary shred of protection."—A. Montgredien, *History of free trade movement in England*, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: L. Cazamian, *Modern England*.—S. J. Chapman, *History of trade between United States and Great Britain*.—W. Cunningham, *Rise and decline of free trade movement*.

1853-1870.—Germany.—Free trade era.—Bismarck's early policy of low tariff.—Trade treaties.—"The German Liberal party . . . had been skilfully shepherded by Prince Smith into the Free Trade fold. Bismarck required the support of the German Liberal party for the work of unifying Germany. He also required the neutrality of France and of England during his wars with Denmark and Austria. He therefore concluded a commercial treaty with France and followed a low tariff policy in Germany. Bismarck, says Schäffle, was at that time (in the sixties) 'at once the political guardian and the political favourite of the Free Trade party.' Bismarck carried things so far that in February, 1870, the Cobden Club actually proposed to make him a member, and would have done so had not Morier threatened to resign if Bismarck were elected. Morier was disarmed but not altogether deceived by these tactics. 'I am totally at a loss to understand,' he wrote to Mallet, 'on what principle of "unnatural selection" you propose to elect Bismarck, of all God's creatures under the sun, a member of the Cobden Club. . . . When our great-grandchildren have to get up the history of the nineteenth century, they will to a certainty find Cobden labelled as the representative of the one doctrine—exchange of cotton goods and Christian love internationalism—and Bismarck as the representative of the opposite doctrine—exchange of hard knocks and blood and iron nationalism.' A rude awakening came with the Franco-Prussian War [1870]. Morier saw to his horror the whole fabric of German Liberalism swept away in a single night."—I. D. Colvin, *Safety of the nation*, pp. 96-98.—"The general liberalization . . . of political life in Western Europe through the events [of 1848] . . . and the larger sympathy they engendered between nations produced, however, a strong movement in Germany and German-Austria in favor of greater freedom of commercial exchange between these two countries. It resulted in the conclusion, for the term of twelve years, of the treaty of 1853 between the Zollverein and Austria, as the first of the international compacts for the promotion of commercial intercourse that formed so prominent a feature of European history during the following twenty years. The treaty was a first, but long step towards free exchange, providing, as it did, for uniform duties on imports from other countries, for a considerable free list and for largely reduced duties between the contracting countries. It also contained stipulations for its renewal on the basis of entire free trade. . . . A very influential association was formed, with free trade as the avowed ulterior object. Its leaders, who were also the champions of political liberalism, represented intellects of the highest order. They included the well-known economists Prince Smith, Mittermaier, Rau, Faucher, Michaelis, Wirth, Schulze and Braun. An 'Economic

Congress' was held annually, the proceedings of which attracted the greatest attention, and exercised a growing influence upon the policy of the governments composing the Zollverein. . . . The beneficial results of the treaty of 1853 were so obvious and instantaneous that the Zollverein and Austria would have no doubt sought to bring about improved commercial relations with other nations by the same means, but for the disturbance of the peace of Europe by the Crimean war, and the conflict of 1859 between France, Italy and Austria. The bitter feelings, caused by the latter war against the two first named countries wherever the German tongue was spoken, rendered the negotiation of commercial treaties with them out of the question for a time. . . . [But] the Zollverein lost no time in following the example of Napoleon by entering successively in 1865 and 1866 into commercial treaties with Belgium, Italy, Great Britain and Switzerland, which were simple conventions, by which the contracting parties granted to each other the position of the most favored nation, or formal tariff regulating treaties after the model of that between the Zollverein and France. These additional treaties were no more than the latter the work of Bismarck. . . . The general upheaval in Germany arising from the war between Prussia and Austria and her North and South-German Allies, while temporarily delaying the farther progress of tariff reform, subsequently accelerated its forward march. . . . A special treaty for the reform of the constitution, so to speak, of the Zollverein was concluded in July, 1867, between the North-German Federation, the new political constellation Prussia had formed out of all Germany north of the Main, after destroying the old Diet, and Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and Hesse, under the provisions of which the tariff and revenue policy of all Germany was to be managed by the 'Zollparlament,' consisting of an upper house, made up of representatives of the governments, and of a lower house of representatives of the people elected by universal suffrage on a population basis. Thus tariff reform was actually the chain that bound up, as it were, the material interests of all Germans outside of Austria for the first time, as those of one nation. Negotiations for a new commercial treaty with the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary—into which Austria had changed in consequence of the events of 1866—commenced immediately after the restoration of peace, and were brought to a satisfactory conclusion in March, 1868. The treaty was to run nine years, and provided for still lower duties than under the old treaty, the principal reductions being on all agricultural products, wines and iron. . . . The Franco-German war put an end to the treaty of 1862 between France and the Zollverein."—H. G. Villard, *German tariff policy* (*Yale Review*, May, 1892).

Also in: G. Krause, *Growth of German unity*.—W. H. Dawson, *Evolution of modern Germany*.

1854-1866.—United States.—Reciprocity with Canada observed for eleven years.—Reasons for discontinuance.—"The Marcy-Elgin treaty of 1854, which regulated our reciprocal commercial relations with the British North American provinces now composing the Dominion of Canada, besides the independent colony of Newfoundland, is noteworthy as being the first instance of the successful adoption by the United States of the reciprocity principle in treaty form. It established limited free trade in natural products between the two countries, the conventional list (identical on both sides) including 28 articles or classes of articles, the

produce of the farm, forest, mine, and fisheries. It also provided for liberal fishing privileges for American fishermen and mutual transportation rights."—J. B. Osborne, *Reciprocity in the American tariff system* (*Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Jan., 1904).—Article 3 (of the treaty) was as follows: "It is agreed that the articles enumerated in the schedule hereunto annexed, being the growth and produce of the aforesaid British colonies or of the United States, shall be admitted into each country respectively free of duty: Schedule: Grain, flour, and breadstuffs, of all kinds. Animals of all kinds. Fresh, smoked, and salted meats. Cotton-wool, seeds, and vegetables. Undried fruits, dried fruits. Fish of all kinds. Products of fish, and of all other creatures living in the water. Poultry, eggs. Hides, furs, skins, or tails, undressed. Stone or marble, in its crude or unwrought state. Slate. Butter, cheese, tallow. Lard, horns, manures. Ores of metals, of all kinds. Coal. Pitch, tar, turpentine, ashes. Timber and lumber of all kinds, round, hewed, and sawed, unmanufactured in whole or in part. Firewood. Plants, shrubs, and trees. Pelts, wool. Fish-oil. Rice, broom-corn, and bark. Gypsum, ground or unground. Hewn, or wrought, or unwrought burr or grindstones. Dye-stuffs. Flax, hemp, and tow, unmanufactured. Unmanufactured tobacco. Rags." Article 5 provided that the treaty should take effect whenever the necessary laws were passed by the imperial Parliament, the provincial Parliaments, and the Congress of the United States, and that it should "remain in force for ten years from the date at which it may come into operation, and further until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same. [Article 6 extended the provisions of the treaty to the island of Newfoundland, so far as applicable, provided the Imperial Parliament, the Parliament of Newfoundland and the Congress of the United States should embrace the island in their laws for carrying the treaty into effect; but not otherwise.]"—*Treaties and conventions between the United States and other powers* (edition of 1889, pp. 448-452).—"This treaty was in actual operation, as respects its customs features, during a period of exactly eleven years. It was terminated March 17, 1866, having been denounced by the United States one year previously in compliance with an act of Congress. The value of the reciprocal arrangement to this country has long been the subject of much discussion and radical difference of opinion. At the outset it was certainly beneficial to both contracting parties, but as time progressed the preponderance of commercial advantage was heavily in favor of Canada. There are several important reasons for this result. . . . But, of course, the circumstance, or rather series of circumstances, that particularly fired the popular indignation and opposition in this country was the sympathy and assistance extended in Canada to Confederate refugees in their hostile movements along the border during the war. The abrogation of the treaty is usually ascribed to the just anger of our people on that account, and, in a lesser degree, to the unsatisfactory economic operation of the treaty. Still another sensible reason for the abandonment of the treaty—and one that has been almost entirely lost sight of by writers on this subject—was that the Government of the United States, at the close of the Civil War, was obliged to retrench expenditures and husband its revenues in every possible quarter; the special free list so



long extended to Canada offered a resource for sorely needed revenue, and the opportunity was improved by Congress; the conventional notice of one year was given to the other high contracting party, and the treaty came to an end as stated."—J. B. Osborne, *Reciprocity in the American tariff system (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Jan., 1904)*.

ALSO IN: J. L. Laughlin and W. H. Parker, *Reciprocity*.—C. C. Tansill, *Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854*.—F. E. Haynes, *Reciprocity Treaty with Canada of 1854 (American Economic Association publications, v. 17, no. 6)*.

1859.—Canada.—Protection developed in the Galt tariff.—"From the earliest dawn of her history Canada has been much concerned about tariffs. Protection was designed in the first instance to secure her absolute industrial dependence on the Motherland, France; at a later date to secure the trade of Canada to her foster-mother, England; still later to bring about her manufacturing independence of the world outside; and the last development was reached when, of her own free will, and without return, Canada modified her protectionist duties in order to give a preference to manufactures in England. . . . Up to 1859 there were a few alterations in the Canadian tariff, tending on the whole in the direction of Protection, and in the year 1859 the Finance Minister, Mr. Galt, introduced a new tariff, in which the protective character was very strongly marked, though the Government was largely influenced by the need of revenue to meet deficits and interest on railway bonds guaranteed by the State. . . . This introduction of Protection into Canada, incidental though it may have been to revenue requirements, was strongly resented in England, and the discussion between the Colonial Office and the Canadian Government which arose out of it was important, as setting once for all the right of the self-governing Colonies to adopt such methods of taxation as they chose. . . . This policy was stated by the Finance Minister, Sir Leonard Tilley, to be: 'To select for a higher rate of duty those articles which are manufactured or can be manufactured in the country, and to have those that are neither made nor are likely to be made in the country at a lower rate.' In spite of this declaration and the imposition of stiff protective duties in accordance with it, there seemed still to be confusion of thought and a strong hankering after reciprocity with the United States, which, if attained, would have exposed Canadians to the unfettered competition of the rivals whom they most feared."—C. H. Chomley, *Protection in Canada and Australia (W. H. Dawson, ed., Protection in Various Countries Series)*.

1860.—France.—Cobden.—Chevalier commercial treaty.—Favored nation clause.—"Richard Cobden had succeeded in using the Free Trade movement as an instrument for placing the effective government of England on a democratic basis; but he was still more enthusiastic about the results which might be expected from the progress of this economic doctrine in the sphere of international politics. He believed that, if the various nations would only agree to allow full commercial intercourse, an era of universal peace would necessarily ensue. . . . Such was the position of affairs when Cobden succeeded in passing the commercial treaty with France in 1860. The Anglo-French Treaty of 1860 was important from the manner in which it enabled each country to participate in the natural advantages of the other; the French opened up their markets to English

iron, and French wines were imported in much larger quantities. The main importance of the agreement lay in the fact that it served as a foundation-stone on which a whole fabric of treaties securing greater freedom of commercial intercourse was built up. The treaty contained a most favoured nation clause; according to this England pledged herself not only to lower her duties on French products, but on similar products from other countries, and France made a corresponding engagement. 'This was not reciprocity of monopoly, but reciprocity of freedom, or partial freedom. England had given up the system of differential duties, and France knew that the products of every other country would receive at the English ports exactly the same measure of treatment as her own. France, on the other hand, openly intended to take her treaty with England as a model for treaties with the rest of Europe, and to concede by treaty with as many Governments as might wish, a tariff just as favourable as that which had been arranged with England. As a matter of fact within five years of the negotiation of 1860 France had made treaties with Belgium, the Zollverein, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria.' These treaties . . . recognised the 'most favoured nation' principle, the 'sheet-anchor' of Free Trade, as it has been called [by the free traders]."—W. Cunningham, *Rise and decline of the free trade movement, pp. 75, 82-83*.—See also FRANCE: 1860.

ALSO IN: J. H. Clapham, *Economic development of France and Germany*.

1860-1883.—United States.—Morrill tariff and Civil War tariffs.—Tariffs in reconstruction period.—"In 1861 the Morrill tariff act began a change toward a higher range of duties and a stronger application of protection. The Morrill act is often spoken of as if it were the basis of the present protective system. But this is by no means the case. The tariff act of 1861 was passed by the House of Representatives in the session of 1859-60, the session preceding the election of President Lincoln. It is clear that the Morrill tariff was carried in the House before any serious expectation of war was entertained; and it was accepted by the Senate in the session of 1861 without material change. It therefore forms no part of the financial legislation of the war, which gave rise in time to a series of measures that entirely superseded the Morrill tariff. Indeed, Mr. Morrill and the other supporters of the act of 1861 declared that their intention was simply to restore the rates of 1846. The important change which they proposed to make from the provisions of the tariff of 1846 was to substitute specific for ad-valorem duties. . . . The specific duties . . . established were in many cases considerably above the ad-valorem duties of 1846. The most important direct changes made by the act of 1861 were in the increased duties on iron and on wool, by which it was hoped to attach to the Republican party Pennsylvania and some of the Western States. Most of the manufacturing States at this time still stood aloof from the movement toward higher rates. . . . Hardly had the Morrill tariff been passed when Fort Sumter was fired on. The Civil War began. The need of additional revenue for carrying on the great struggle was immediately felt; and as early as the extra session of the summer of 1861, additional customs duties were imposed. In the next regular session, in December, 1861, a still further increase of duties was made. From that time till 1865 no session, indeed hardly a month of any session, passed in which

some increase of duties on imports was not made. . . . The great acts of 1862 and 1864 are typical of the whole course of the war measures; and the latter is of particular importance. . . . The three revenue acts of June 30, 1864, practically form one measure, and that probably the greatest measure of taxation which the world has seen. The first of the acts provided for an enormous extension of the internal-tax system; the second for a corresponding increase of the duties on imports; the third authorized a loan of \$400,000,000. . . . Like the tariff act of 1862, that of 1864 was introduced, explained, amended, and passed under the management of Mr. Morrill, who was chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. That gentleman again stated, as he had done in 1862, that the passage of the tariff act was rendered necessary in order to put domestic producers in the same situation, so far as foreign competition was concerned, as if the internal taxes had not been raised. This was one great object of the new tariff. . . . But it explains only in part the measure which in fact was proposed and passed. The tariff of 1864 was a characteristic result of that veritable furor of taxation which had become fixed in the minds of the men who were then managing the national finances. Mr. Morrill, and those who with him made our revenue laws, seem to have had but one principle: to tax every possible article indiscriminately, and to tax it at the highest rates that any one had the courage to suggest. They carried this method out to its fullest extent in the tariff act of 1864, as well as in the tax act of that year. . . . Every domestic producer who came before Congress got what he wanted in the way of duties. Protection ran riot; and this, moreover, not merely for the time being. . . . The average rate on dutiable commodities, which had been 37.2 per cent. under the act of 1862, became 47.06 per cent. under that of 1864. . . . In regard to the duties as they stood before 1883, it is literally true, in regard to almost all protected articles, that the tariff act of 1864 remained in force for twenty years without reductions. The woollens act of 1867 . . . is the most striking illustration of the manner in which protective duties were advanced after the war at the request of domestic producers. There are not a few other cases in which an increase of duties beyond the level reached during the war was made. Wool and woollens, copper, steel rails, marble . . . sufficient examples of the manner in which duties, already raised to high figures during the war, were still further increased after the war, for the benefit of the domestic producers. Other instances could be given in which an equal disregard of the consumer and taxpayer has been shown. . . . The retention of the high duties of the war is to be explained by the pressure of other problems, the fear of infringing on vested rights and interests, the powerful opposition which is always met in withdrawing public notice when once it has been conferred."—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff history of the United States*, pp. 158-160, 210, footnote.—"The process of decided reduction was begun by the act of July 14, 1870. Under that statute the rates on teas, which had been twenty-five cents a pound, were made fifteen cents; coffee, which had been five cents, was made three cents; pig-iron which had been rated \$9 a ton, was carried down to \$7. Spices were generally reduced. Other imposts were changed in a like spirit. The estimated decrease in duties was \$29,000,000 a year, from the operation of this law. Tea and coffee were placed on the free list May 1, 1872. On

the first of June, 1872, another act was passed still further cutting down the war imposts. It was reported by Mr. Dawes, of Massachusetts, and one of its provisions was to strike off ten per cent from the rates collected on most of the commodities, and to put others into the free list. The effect of the acts of May and June, 1872, was estimated to be the reduction of the receipts from customs to the extent of \$44,374,721 a year. The business reaction which produced the panic of 1873, and the consequent falling off in government receipts, in addition to the estimated results of legislation, led to the restoration of this ten per cent., March 3, 1873. No important changes in duties occurred until the appointment of the tariff commission, May 15, 1882, and its report leading to the act of March 3, 1883."—E. H. Roberts, *Government revenue: Especially the American system*, p. 118.—See also U.S.A.: 1877.

ALSO IN: J. A. B. Scherer, *Cotton as a world power*.—S. J. Chapman, *History of trade between United States and Great Britain*.—E. D. Fite, *Social and industrial conditions in North during the Civil War*.—E. Porritt, *Fiscal and diplomatic freedom of British overseas dominions*.

1862-1892.—Australia.—Contrasted tariff histories of Victoria and New South Wales.—"It is in Victoria and New South Wales that the tariff battles of Australia have really been fought, with the result that while the former remained steadily protectionist, the latter maintained, up to the date of federation, almost unflinching allegiance to Free Trade. . . . In the year 1864 a slight tincture of protectionism was given to the New South Wales tariff, but it was soon removed, and up to 1892 customs duties were levied for revenue purposes only. Then Sir George Dibbs, defeating Sir Henry Parkes, introduced a mild protective tariff, containing a number of ten per cent. duties, and carried it through both Houses."—C. H. Chomley, *Protection in Canada and Australia* (W. H. Dawson, ed., *Protection in Various Countries Series*).—On the other hand, Victoria, from 1866 developed a protectionist policy. This difference of opinion on trade policy came out markedly in the conference which the colonies had with one another a few years earlier on matters of tariffs, foreign and intercolonial, and on other subjects of importance to a pioneer civilization. This conference was proposed in 1862 and held the following year. The opposite views on the tariff questions also formed one of the keenest issues of the federation period.

ALSO IN: B. R. Wise, *Making of Australian Commonwealth*.—A. Pratt, *David Syme, father of protection in Australia*.—G. W. Rusden, *History of Australia*.—M. Atkinson, ed., *Australia, economic and political studies*.—E. D. Allin, *History of tariff relations of Australian colonies* (*University of Minnesota Historical Studies*).—E. Pulsford, *Commerce of the empire, 1014 and after*.—E. Porritt, *Fiscal and diplomatic freedom of British overseas dominions*.

1870-1900.—Germany.—Bismarck's change to protective policy.—Reasons for his reversal of policy.—Caprivi commercial treaties.—"Just as it had been considerations of high policy which had led the commercial policy pursued by Prussia in the Zollverein, so also the considerations which caused Prince Bismarck, in 1878, to return to a Protectionist policy were not of a commercial nature. Prince Bismarck had, with the help of a liberal majority, lifted the German empire into the saddle [by the War of 1870]. But towards the end of the seventies this liberal ma-

majority was no longer willing to follow his leadership unless a substantial share in Government was given to it. This Prince Bismarck was not willing to concede. He therefore looked out for another majority. The economic conditions of the time were favourable to him. The boom which had set in after the peace of Frankfort had been followed by the crash of 1873; great depression prevailed in all industries; and when the competition of American and Russian and Indian wheat drove the German agriculturists not only from the English market, but began to endanger their position even in the German markets, the German agrarians, who, during the entire nineteenth century, had been Free Traders, began to turn Protectionists. Prince Bismarck would not have been the politician he was had he not utilized these changed circumstances. He found the new majority which he wanted by giving up the 'Kulturkampf'; and, by giving them Protective duties, made the men, who till then had been his bitterest foes, his most enthusiastic friends. He repeated the policy which, before him, William III. had pursued to consolidate his English throne. He granted to each interest, at the cost of the entire community, the duties it cried for—to the agrarians duties on corn and cattle, to the manufacturers duties on all kinds of foreign manufactures. The era of the so-called 'system of Protectionist solidarity' began; *i. e.*, Parliament became a mart where one traded in duties; each interest was ready to grant to the other the duties it asked for on condition that it got what it gave. Thus a majority was soldered together out of Conservatives, the Catholic centre, and industrial magnates belonging to the National Liberal party, which, in return for the Protectionist duties granted to it, voted to the Government the expenditure and the revenue for which it asked. The costs fell on the mass of the people, which more and more went over to Social Democracy. . . . [By 1900] competition and drastic freedom of trade [belonged] in Germany to the past. Germany [came] under the constantly growing domination of the principle of monopoly. The avowed object of these monopolies [was] to prevent prices being reduced by domestic competition to the level of the prices in the free market of the world. As a justification for them you hear it said that the legislature, by granting duties on foreign manufactures, desired that home-made manufactures should fetch a price in Germany higher than the price in the free market of the world by the amount of the duty; and in order to secure that price each branch of industry must be organised into a 'Kartell.' . . . The Kartells are agreements as to prices, as to the mapping out of the country into districts the supply of each of which is granted as a monopoly to particular members of the Kartell, as to the restriction of the output of each member, or as to the share of each in the sale or in the profit realised by the whole trade."—L. Brentano, *Industrial organisation of Germany under the influence of protection (International Free Trade Congress, London, Aug., 1908)*.—See also CARTELS.—"Since then the stages in the further development of that policy [of protection] have been as follows: (1) A great increase—a trebling indeed on rye and wheat—of the agricultural duties in 1885. This was of course due to the alarm produced by the competition of the corn of the new countries, the United States, Argentina, and (in a sense) Russia. It may be recalled that it was in 1884-85 that the great permanent drop took place in the price of wheat in England. (2) The period of commercial

treaties [containing favored nation clauses] negotiated by the Chancellor Caprivi with Austria-Hungary, [Serbia], Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium (1892), with Roumania (1893), and, most important of all, with Russia (1894)—so arranged as all to last till 1903-4. The last treaty secured, among other things, a reduction of Russian duties on German manufactures in return for a lowering of the tariff barrier against Russian rye. (3) Caprivi's policy, which was justified on the ground of the greater stability it gave to trade, met with the keenest opposition from the 'Agrarians' or representatives of the agricultural interests."—W. J. Ashley, *Progress of the German working classes in the last quarter of a century*, pp. 55-56.—See also GERMANY: 1892-1894.

ALSO IN: J. E. Barker, *Modern Germany*.—W. H. Dawson, *Bismarck and state socialism*.—T. B. Veblen, *Imperial Germany and industrial revolt*.

1870-1901.—Europe.—Protection movement following Franco-Prussian War.—Tariffs of Italy, Belgium, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Holland.—"The nations of the nineteenth century had to face entirely new conditions of industry, commerce, transport, agriculture and colonization, and the question was what ought to be the national attitude. Should the State conduct industry itself or leave it to individuals? If the latter, should it regulate and direct those individuals or leave them entirely free to make their own contracts and bargains? In commerce, ought the nation to adopt the policy of free imports or that of protecting home industry by a tariff? In agriculture, should it intervene to save the peasant or leave the growth of the large farm to proceed unchecked? In transport, ought the railways to be State subsidized or should the building and control of them be left to private companies? In colonization, how far should the State finance or assist the development of the new areas and to what extent should it leave the work to individuals and chartered companies? These questions had to be faced, not by the old governing aristocracy but by the newly enfranchised masses. . . . Hence the new democracies were all on the side of leaving everything to the individual, who was to be as far as possible unhampered by government regulation. In industry they believed in laissez-faire, in commerce in free trade. The result was that they attacked and swept away the old protectionist and development policy of the autocratic kings which had stood for regulation and which was known as mercantilism. To this succeeded, after 1848, an era of liberalism and cosmopolitanism, when the removal of commercial restrictions and the freedom of individual initiative and enterprise was the goal. This is reflected in the commercial treaties of the period, all of which were negotiated on the basis of a low tariff, and in the small amount of legislation which was enacted. A reaction followed, and a third change of national policy becomes obvious after 1870, when there was a return to protection and State regulation on every side increased. There was an abandonment of laissez-faire in commerce, industry, transport and agriculture. This was due to intensified national feelings which rejected the cosmopolitanism of the previous twenty years and strove to make the new unit of the nation more self-sufficing by developing its own resources inside a barrier of tariffs. The admission of the working classes to greater political power also worked in the same direction. With the constant spread of the industrial revolution and the consequent change in working conditions, the artisans demanded and obtained in

every great country an increasingly elaborate code of labour legislation for their protection. . . . In agriculture, the imports of wheat and meat from North America and Australasia produced an acute crisis in Europe with further State intervention. On every side the power of the Government has been extended; even in the United States, the most individualist of all the Great Powers during the century. The functions exercised by the State in the last quarter of the nineteenth century differed, however, from the old mercantilism and paternalism which prevailed from the sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century as fundamentally as did the liberal era of the fifties and sixties. Fifthly, the new nations were anxious to extend their power and influence over-seas, which gave rise to fresh State activity in the colonial sphere. Raw materials and markets became vital questions for the great industrial powers, the railways enabled continents to be opened up, the steamships brought the produce to Europe and the whole world was brought under the economic influence of the new Europe by a new effort of national expansion and colonisation. Distance was largely abolished as a barrier by the new methods of transport, capital was increasingly invested in the undeveloped lands, a new colonial era was inaugurated and the whole world became economically linked up in spite of the striving after self-sufficiency which was characteristic of the new reaction to protection after 1870. The national idea still persisted, however, in the desire to include the mother country and the colonial areas in bigger units which should favour each other or penalize other countries by some form of discrimination in tariffs or shipping. The ideal was the creation if possible of self-sufficing economic Empires—a tendency constantly counteracted by the developments of transport which make for a world economy, *i. e.*, for world production and world distribution irrespective of national boundaries.”—L. C. A. Knowles, *Industrial and commercial revolutions in Great Britain during the nineteenth century*, pp. 11-14.—Italy, “from the formation of the kingdom till 1875, . . . was liberal and tending towards freedom. About the latter date the forces that we have indicated above as operating generally throughout Europe, commenced to affect Italy. The public expenditure had largely increased, and additional revenue was urgently required. Agriculture was so depressed that, though the country is pre-eminently agricultural, alarm was excited by the supposed danger of foreign competition. The result was that on the general revision of duties in 1877 much higher rates were imposed on the principal imports. . . . Depression both in agriculture and elaborative industries continued and strengthened the protectionist party, who succeeded in securing the abandonment of all the commercial treaties, and the enactment of a new tariff in 1887. . . . The first effect of the new system of high taxation with no conventional privileges was to lead to a war of tariffs between France and Italy. . . . Austria may be added to the list of countries in which the protectionist reaction . . . [was] effectively shown. . . . In Russia the revival (or perhaps it would be more correct to say continued existence), of protection . . . [was] decisively marked. . . . Spain and Portugal had long been strongholds of protectionist ideas.”—C. F. Bastable, *Commerce of nations*, ch. o.—Germany under the ministry of von Bülow (1901) was working out her new protective tariff on an agrarian basis. Besides England, with her established free trade traditions, Holland and Belgium

alone adhered to a revenue system in their tariff policies.

ALSO IN: J. A. Blanqui, *History of political economy in Europe*.—J. W. Welsford, *Strength of nations*.—F. A. Ogg, *Economic development of modern Europe*.—G. B. Curtis, *Protection and prosperity*.—W. Smart, *Economic annals of the nineteenth century*, v. 1-2.—A. Vicillate, *Economic imperialism and international relations during the last fifty years*.—J. H. Higginson, *Tariffs at work*.

1871-1892.—France.—Protection reinforced by Franco-Prussian War.—Tariffs of 1872, 1881, and 1892.—“The Franco-German War (1870-1) and the overthrow of Napoleon III at once arrested the free-trade policy, which had little support in the national mind, and was hardly understood outside the small circle of French economists. The need of fresh revenue was imperative, and M. Thiers, the most prominent of French statesmen, was notoriously protectionist in his leanings. Pure revenue duties on colonial and Eastern commodities were first tried; the sugar duty was increased 30%; that on coffee was trebled; tea, cocoa, wines and spirits, were all subjected to greatly increased charges. As the yield thus obtained did not suffice, proposals for the taxation of raw materials were brought forward but rejected by the legislature in 1871, when M. Thiers tendered his resignation. To avoid this result the measure was passed, not however to come into operation until compensating productive duties had been placed on imported manufactures. The existing commercial treaties were a further obstacle to changes in policy, and accordingly negotiations were opened with England and Belgium, in order that the new duties might be applied to their products. As was justifiable under the circumstances, the former country required that if imported raw products were to be taxed, the like articles produced in France should pay an equivalent tax, and therefore, as the shortest way of escape, the French Government gave notice for the termination of the treaties (in the technical language of international law ‘denounced’ them), and new conventions were agreed on; but as this arrangement was just as unsatisfactory in the opinion of the French Chambers, the old treaties were in 1873 restored to force until 1877, and thus the larger part of the raw materials escaped the new taxation. The protectionist tendency was, too, manifested in the departure from the open system introduced in 1866 in respect to shipping. A law of 1872 imposed differential duties on goods imported in foreign vessels. . . . The advance of the sentiment in favour of a return to the restrictive system was even more decidedly indicated in 1881. Bounties were then granted for the encouragement of French shipping, and extra taxes imposed on indirect imports of non-European and some European goods. In 1880 the carrying trade between France and Algiers was reserved for native ships. The revision of the general tariff was a more serious task, undertaken with a view to influencing the new treaties that the termination of the old engagements made necessary. The tariff of 1881 (to come into force in 1882) made several increases and substituted many specific for ad valorem duties. Raw materials escaped taxation; half-manufactured articles were placed under moderate duties. The nominal corn duties were diminished by a fraction, but the duties on live stock and fresh meat were considerably increased. . . . A new ‘conventional tariff’ speedily followed in a series of fresh treaties with European countries. . . . The duties on whole or partially-manufactured goods remained substan-

tially unchanged by the new treaties, which do not, in fact, vary so much from the general tariff as was previously the case. The number of articles included in the conventions had been reduced, and all countries outside Europe came under the general code. The reaction against the liberal policy of 1860 was thus as yet very slight, and did not seriously affect manufactures. The agricultural depression was the primary cause of the legislation of 1885, which placed a duty of 3 francs per quintal on wheat, 7 francs on flour, 2 francs on rye and barley, and one franc on oats, with additional duties on indirect importation. Cattle, sheep, and pigs came under increases of from 50% to 100%. A more decided step towards protection was made by the measure of 1892, under which two scales of tariff were arranged, the lower one to apply to those countries only that should conclude commercial treaties with France. The tariff thus became a double autonomous one, for France was left free, in spite of the conclusion of treaties, to alter not only the general rates, but also the minimum rates; so that, although there was a temptation to enter into commercial agreements with France, nevertheless her freedom of action was much greater than it would have been had she concluded customs treaties of the ordinary type, in which her ability to manipulate the conventional rates would have been limited for the lifetime of the treaty. The inauguration of a new tariff régime was not without its difficulties. A tariff war with Switzerland ensued, which lasted from 1893 to July, 1895, and resulted on the whole in a victory for the Swiss. The French tariff of 1892 remained substantially unaltered till 1910."

—C. F. Bastable, *Commerce of nations*, pp. 92-100.  
ALSO IN: F. A. Ogg, *Development of modern Europe*.

1879-1894.—Canada.—Act of 1879.—Commercial union with United States advocated.—"The [Canadian] Tariff Act of 1879, provided that, with reference to the natural products of both countries, if the United States repealed its duties in whole or in part, the Canadian Government would meet them with equal concessions, and the Finance Minister said that 'the Government intended to impose duties on a great many articles imported from there which had been left on the free list since 1875, in the vain hope of inducing our neighbours to renew the Reciprocity Treaty.' In accordance with this intention the average duty on American goods under this tariff was made 25 per cent."—C. H. Chomley, *Protection in Canada and Australia* (W. H. Dawson, ed., *Protection in Various Countries Series*).—"During the years 1887-1891 there was a strong movement in Canada in favour of 'Commercial Union' with the United States. The leaders of this movement did not hesitate to propose that Canada should agree to set up the same tariff barriers as the United States against all other countries, including the United Kingdom, in return for greater freedom of trade with the land to the South. . . . Considering the position at that time of English public opinion, a Canadian statesman might well despair of closer commercial union with the mother country."—W. J. Ashley, *Tariff problem*, pp. 255, 256, 263.—Amendments were made to the tariff of 1879 in 1887 and 1888, but in 1894 the tariff was revised with considerable reduction of duties.

ALSO IN: G. Smith, *Commonwealth or empire*.—E. Porritt, *Fiscal and diplomatic freedom of British overseas dominions*.—W. L. Griffith, *Dominion of Canada*.

1883.—United States.—Hayes tariff commis-

sion.—Revision of the tariff.—President Arthur, by direction of Congress, had appointed in 1882 a tariff commission, headed by John L. Hayes of Massachusetts, "to take into consideration, and to thoroughly investigate, all the various questions relating to the agricultural, commercial, mercantile, manufacturing, mining, and industrial interests of the United States, so far as the same may be necessary to the establishment of a judicious tariff, or a revision of the existing tariff upon a scale of justice to all interests." . . . Early in their deliberations, the commission became convinced that a substantial reduction of the tariff duties was demanded. . . . The attempt to modify the tariff brought into bold relief the numerous conflicting interests, and the difficulty and delicacy of the undertaking. . . . Although not all of the recommendations of the commission were adopted [in the tariff of 1883] most of them were. Those which pertained to the simplification of the law were adopted with only slight changes. The bill reported by the commission contained, not including the free list, 631 articles and classifications. . . . Less than 25 articles, mainly in the cotton, woolen goods, and the iron and steel schedules, were matters of contention. The rates on 409 of the 631 articles mentioned in the tariff recommended by the commission were adopted, and between 50 and 60 more articles have substantially the same rates, though levied under different clauses. Of the 170 changes, 98 were fixed at lower rates than those proposed by the commission, 46 at higher, and 26 . . . [were] classed as doubtful."—A. S. Bolles, *Financial history of the United States, 1861-1885*, bk. 2, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*.—J. Bernhardt, *History of tariff commission, 1887-1888*.—United States.—President Cleveland's efforts to reduce the national surplus by a reduction of the tariff.—Mills Bill.—President Cleveland "startled the country at the opening of the fiftieth Congress [1885] by devoting the whole of his annual message to the single topic of a reduction of the surplus through a revision of the rates of duties upon imports. In so doing he departed from the unbroken usage of all the Presidents for well-nigh a hundred years. The text upon which he based his urgent appeal for a remission of duties was the redundancy of the revenue, which left a considerable surplus after the demands of the sinking fund had been met. The result was an accumulation of funds in the Treasury, for which there was no outlet, and a corresponding withdrawal of loanable funds from the channels of business. The President examined briefly, and rejected, the plan of disposing of the surplus by repealing internal taxes, and quickly reached the consideration of his main thesis: the necessity of making a large reduction of tariff duties. . . . On another point all men at home as well as abroad were in perfect agreement. It was universally admitted that the President had exhibited splendid courage. There were, to speak broadly, no issues of a vital nature dividing men into parties. The old question that arose out of the Civil War had been fully decided. . . . The free coinage of silver, on the other hand, had not yet become in a true sense an issue between parties. Neither in the Republican nor in the Democratic organization was the preponderance of opinion so strongly in favor of free coinage or opposed to it that either faction ventured so to phrase its sentiments as to drive the other faction into the ranks of the opposition. Administrative reform, also, was rather an aspiration of the best

element in both parties than a guiding principle of either party. Thus the situation was as if, in war, two opposing armies had occupied their camps so long that they had forgotten the original cause of their quarrel. They might have their periodical skirmishes, even now and then a pitched battle; but when the conflict of the day was ended they both retired to the tents they had left in the morning, with no thought of advancing and of occupying conquered territory. Mr. Cleveland changed all this. He announced a policy. . . . Since that time, up till the close of the century, at least, the Democratic party has never been without a purpose. It has not long held to the same purpose, but it has stood for a well-defined policy. The message was of course received with delight by the free trade newspapers and by all men in public or in private life who were urgent for a reduction of tariff rates. The Republicans were hardly less pleased than the revenue reformers; they professed satisfaction that the Democrats must now 'show their true colors.' They themselves had consistently declared their adhesion to the principles of protection. . . . Notwithstanding the extraordinary assistance from without which the committee is supposed to have had, and its freedom from partisan opposition in the preliminaries, the [Mills] bill was not in a state to be reported to the House until April 2 [1886], four months after Congress was informed by the President of the instant need of a reduction of the surplus. The Republicans were prepared to find the 'Mills Bill' unsatisfactory in the whole and in all parts, and their expectations were not disappointed. The main features of the measure were: (1) a transfer of raw materials to the free list; (2) a large substitution of ad valorem for specific duties; and (3) a general reduction of protective duties. . . . While the bill was under discussion in detail in Committee of the Whole, the national conventions of the two great parties were held. The Democrats met at St. Louis on the 5th of June. Their platform may be characterized as an echo of the message of President Cleveland, whom they nominated for reelection. . . . The Republicans were quite as emphatic as their opponents in their expressions of opinion upon the tariff and the Mills Bill. At their national convention held at Chicago, beginning on June 19, they declared themselves 'uncompromisingly in favor of the American system of protection.' 'We accept the issue, and confidently appeal to the people for their judgment. The protective system must be maintained. . . . We denounce the Mills Bill. . . . We condemn the proposition of the Democratic party to place wool on the free list,' and so on. . . . Seventeen days after the adjournment of Congress the election took place. The Republicans were successful. General Harrison was chosen President. The House of Representatives was carried by a narrow majority; the State legislatures gave promise of a Republican majority in the Senate. . . . The report was never taken up for action, and the Mills Bill came to an end without a formal disagreement between the two houses of Congress."—E. Stanwood, *American tariff controversies in the nineteenth century*, v. 2, pp. 226-229, 236-237, 240-242.

ALSO IN: R. McElroy, *Grover Cleveland*.—G. Cleveland, *Presidential problems*.—D. R. Dewey, *National problems*.

1890.—United States.—McKinley Bill.—Reciprocity and Pan-Americanism.—Blaine's influence.—Bounties introduced.—"As Mr. McKinley of Ohio was chairman of the House committee

on ways and means, the act [of 1890] . . . is popularly known by his name. The title of the long and detailed act reads: 'An act to reduce the revenue and equalize duties on imports, and for other purposes.' The justification of any such characterization lay in the repeal of the raw sugar duties; in the reduction of duties on steel rails, iron, and steel plates, and on structural iron and steel; and in an increase of the free list embracing a number of articles of no great commercial importance. Throughout the debate the protectionist philosophy was developed to a point hitherto unknown in tariff discussion. Restrictive duties were no longer regarded as a temporary stage in the arduous journey toward industrial freedom, but a principle which ought to be permanently adopted. Protection was affirmed in increased duties upon wool, woollen goods,—particularly the finer grades,—and dress goods; upon the finer cottons, lawns, laces, and embroideries; upon linens, silk laces, and plush goods; upon cutlery and tin-plate; and upon barley, hemp, and flax. In some cases the duties were practically prohibitory, and so far forth the revenue was certainly reduced. The minimum principle was extended beyond the experiment of 1828; for cotton stockings, velvets, and plushes, boiler and plate iron, pen-knives, shotguns, and pistols, and table cutlery, classes were established based upon values; and on all goods of the same class the same specific duty was laid. The administrative regulations for collecting the customs were made more stringent by another act in the same session. Two new principles were introduced by the McKinley Act: one was the grant of a bounty of two cents a pound for fourteen years on the production of sugar within the United States; and the other, the recognition of commercial reciprocity. The president was empowered to levy duties by proclamation on sugar, molasses, tea, coffee, and hides, if he considered that any country, exporting these commodities to the United States, imposed duties upon agricultural or other produce of the United States, which in view of the free admission of sugar, molasses, tea, coffee, and hides into the United States, he might deem to be reciprocally unjust and unreasonable. This policy was especially designed to apply to Central and Southern American countries, and was adopted largely through Mr. Blaine's influence as a part of a wider measure of Pan-American commercial union. [He had vigorously criticized the original bill.] By this method the executive branch of the government was relieved from submitting to the Senate special reciprocity treaties. Under this act commercial agreements relating to reciprocal trade were made with Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Spain (for Cuba and Puerto Rico), Guatemala, Salvador, the German Empire, Great Britain (for certain West Indian colonies and British Guiana), Nicaragua, Honduras, and Austria-Hungary. During the debate the reciprocity provision was opposed by some excellent constitutional lawyers within the Republican party, on the ground that Congress could not delegate its taxing power to the president. It is held, however, that the president did not under this act receive legislative power, but simply the right to determine the particular time when certain legislation should go into effect. The grant of a federal bounty also raised constitutional objections, more particularly after the Democrats came back into power in 1893. In 1895 the comptroller of the treasury refused to pay the sugar bounty levied while the law was in operation, on the ground that such a

grant was unconstitutional, but this contention was not sustained by the Supreme Court."—D. R. Dewey, *Financial history of the United States*, pp. 438-440.—See also BOUNTIES: Bounties by the United States government.

ALSO IN: R. T. Ely, *Problems of today*.—G. B. Curtis, *Protection and prosperity*.—A. Peniston, ed., *Both sides of the tariff question, 1809-1890*.

1894.—United States.—Wilson-Gorman tariff.—Failure of Cleveland's tariff reform.—Income tax introduced.—"The reaction [against the McKinley tariff] continued, and the Presidential campaign of November, 1892, ended in the return of the Democratic candidate, Cleveland, who represented the anti-protectionist policy. . . . The new President considered his large majority as a mandate for a reform of the customs tariff on the lines which he had indicated, but the hopes with which he undertook the task were doomed to disappointment [in the Wilson-Gorman bill]. The problem was complicated by two circumstances; one being the small and uncertain Democratic majority in the Senate, and the other the silver question. . . . The President had intended that all raw materials should be admitted free, and had carried the House of Representatives with him; the Senate, however, could not be induced to go so far. The chief illustrations of this were furnished by iron ore and coal. The House of Representatives had abolished the duty on both of these commodities; the Senate was content to reduce the duty in each case from 75 cents to 40 cents a ton. Other commodities which the House of Representatives had placed on the free list, but on which the Senate reimposed duties, were nickel, mica and quicksilver, unmanufactured clays or earths, various chemicals (such as ammonia, borax, sulphur), molasses, raw or refined sugar, beef, mutton, pork, bacon, meats, dressed, undressed, or preserved lard, apples, eggs, and coke. The duty on pig-iron was lowered from \$6.72 to \$4 a ton, on steel rails from \$13.44 to \$7.84 a ton, and even on tin plates from 2½ cents to 1½ cents per pound. One other serious change was in the case of sugar. The clauses affecting that commodity in the McKinley Tariff had caused very considerable dissatisfaction: for one thing, the financial results had been somewhat unsatisfactory, and for another, it was widely believed that the duty on refined sugar and the bounties were largely in the interests of the Sugar Trust—one of the earliest of those organisations which now play so great a part in American industrial life. The Democrats now proposed to admit refined sugar as well as raw sugar free, and to abolish the bounty system, but the Senate made many amendments admittedly in the interest, and under the influence, of the Sugar Trust. An *ad valorem* duty of 40 per cent. was imposed on raw sugar; refined sugar was made subject to this rate with the addition of ½ cent per lb., and the surtax on bounty-fed sugar, imported into the United States, was retained."—P. Ashley, *Modern tariff history*, pp. 213-217.—"The Act of 1894 was so garbled in its passage through Congress that the tariff reform president of the period, Cleveland, allowed it to become a law without his signature."—H. R. Seager, *Practical problems in economics*, p. 408.—"When the President [Cleveland] submitted his message to Congress in December, 1893, we find the first suggestion of an income tax, not, indeed, in the shape of a tax on incomes in general, but in the form of a tax on incomes from corporations. . . . Since, therefore, the proposed tariff schedules would have meant a considerable deficit, and since no relief

was to be expected from the internal revenue system, the proposition to make good the difference by introducing the income tax received a hearty welcome. But while the anticipated deficit gave the Western and Southern representatives their opportunity, it was not so much the idea of increasing the revenue as that of correcting inequalities in the tax system that was really in their mind. The truth of this assertion is evident when we reflect on the fortunes of the Wilson bill in the Senate. The Gorman bill put sugar back on the dutiable list, and made many other changes which so weakened the radical nature of the House bill that all danger of a deficit seemed to be at an end. The income tax was no longer a fiscal necessity. Yet all attempts to expunge it from the bill were utterly unavailing. The farmers' influence was too strong. . . . The sentiment in favor of some form of income taxation was so overwhelming among the mass of the voters that the Republican leaders preferred to preserve silence and not run the risk of opposing a popular measure. Thus the vehement Eastern opposition, instituted by the Republicans and more or less openly sympathized with by the Democrats, was wholly ineffectual. No feature of the tariff bill was ever in smaller danger of being successfully opposed than were the income tax sections; for revenue considerations were the pretext for their introduction, not the cause."—E. R. A. Seligman, *Income tax*, pp. 405-496, 500-508.—The following year the Supreme Court decided that the income tax was unconstitutional.

ALSO IN: I. Tarbell, *Tariff in our times*.—F. Pierce, *Tariff and the trusts*.

1894-1895.—Australia.—Defeat of protection in New South Wales.—Liberal tariff. See AUSTRALIA: 1894-1895.

1895-1898.—Germany.—Demands of agrarian protectionists. See GERMANY: 1895-1898.

1896-1901.—Europe and America.—Question of sugar bounties and countervailing duties. See SUGAR BOUNTIES.

1897 (March-July).—United States.—Dingley tariff.—High protection.—Reciprocity with European nations.—Argol agreements.—Kasson treaties.—"The first business of the new Congress [called by McKinley] was to provide revenue. Mr. Cleveland's administration had inherited, as already pointed out, a deficit of nearly \$70,000,000. The tariff bill which had been revised to increase the revenue had failed. The sugar refiners, finding that a duty was to be put on raw sugar, had brought in enormous quantities, free, to hold for their needs. Thus, by their foresight, the treasury in Mr. Cleveland's first year was despoiled of revenues it had a right to count on. Again, the income tax on which they depended for a large sum was declared unconstitutional. Something had to be done to bring in more money. The Republicans had decided to use their power to put back the tariff on wool and to increase that on a variety of manufactured articles, and on December 26, 1895, Mr. Dingley reported a bill providing for these increases. The bill was passed at once by the House. . . . The influence on the bill of the despotic power of the wool interests was similar to that of sugar on the Wilson Bill, but it did not make itself clear in the Senate as it had in the earlier bill. It came out in the conference of the two Houses which followed the passage of the bill by the Senate on July 7 [in the special session of March to July, 1897]. Some 872 amendments had been tacked to the measure and the conference spent nearly a fortnight over

them. When finally reported, the rates were generally higher than either the House or the Senate had advised. It was impossible to give to wool all it demanded on a threat of defeating the bill, unless other interests were favored, and so it happened that when the Dingley Bill was finally passed, it was, on the whole, a more oppressive measure than the McKinley Bill."—I. M. Tarbell, *Tariff in our times*, pp. 240, 251-252.—See also U. S. A.: 1895-1896 (December-February).—"In brief, then, the Act of 1897 was aggressively protectionist. . . . Business was prosperous after the enactment of the Dingley tariff and little agitation for a change was observable for a decade. Prosperity, being world wide, was doubtless not due in its entirety to the American tariff, yet the coincidence of protection and good times gave the Dingley act a pleasant reputation."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War*, pp. 383-385.—"The United States Tariff Act of 1897 made provision for three kinds of reciprocal arrangements. In the second part of Section 3 of that Act is found a provision identical in principle with Section 3 of the Tariff Act of 1890. The President was authorized, without reference to Congress, to negotiate and proclaim treaties securing to the United States special, although not necessarily exclusive, privileges in foreign markets and to grant in return the continued free admission from the countries with which the treaties were made, of coffee, tea, tonka beans, and vanilla beans. These products were admitted free under the regular tariff, and the penalty duties provided were to be used by the President in placing any country from which the specified products came, on a less favorable basis, than other nations, in case of refusal by that nation to grant to the United States special favors in its markets. This part of Section 3 led to no agreements, but it was a favor in securing for the United States preferential treatment in the Brazilian market in 1904. In the first part of Section 3 of the Act of 1897 is found a provision for negotiating reciprocity treaties on a different principle. The President was authorized in return for 'reciprocal and equivalent concessions' to grant specified reductions from duties on argols, brandies, sparkling and still wines, and paintings and statuary. Instead of using penalty duties, the principle is here introduced of making special reductions in the regular tariff rates on certain articles in return for reciprocal reductions in the tariff rates of other countries. Agreements under this provision required neither the ratification of the Senate nor the approval of Congress. Agreements, known as the 'Argol Agreements,' were negotiated and proclaimed with France, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. In return for its concessions the United States received reciprocal concessions in each of these agreements. In no case, however, were these concessions confined to the United States. In most cases they consisted in the grant to the United States, either for the first time or in renewal of a previous grant, of all or part of the rates of minimum or conventional schedules already enjoyed by all the favored nations. In several cases, however, the agreements secured for the United States the benefit of conventional rates lower than those that had previously been effective. The third reciprocity provision (Section 4) in the Tariff Act of 1897 differs from each of those thus far considered, in that treaties negotiated under it had to be ratified by the Senate and approved by Congress before they became effective. Under it the President was authorized to nego-

tiate for concessions in foreign markets and to concede in return a reduction in the duties of the Tariff Act of not more than 20 per centum of those duties, or to transfer to or agree to retain on the free list specified articles from any country making satisfactory concessions. Treaties known as the 'Kasson Treaties' were negotiated with France, with Great Britain for the British West Indies, with Denmark for St. Croix, with the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and the Argentine Republic. These treaties failed of ratification in the Senate and, therefore, never became effective."—W. S. Culbertson, *Commercial policy in war time and after*, pp. 270-272.

ALSO IN: C. W. Wright, *Wool growing and the wool tariff*.—E. L. Bogart, *Economic history of the United States*.—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff history of United States*.

1897-1898.—Canada.—High tariff with British preferences.—"The preference for Great Britain was the only departure of any significance from the National Policy [in the Canadian tariff of 1897]. Some of the schedules were simplified in the new tariff. Mixed duties—that is, *ad valorem* and specific duties combined—were in most cases replaced by *ad valorem* duties. . . . These decreases, however, were offset by increases in the cotton-schedules to safeguard the Canadian factories from the preference, and to afford them even higher protection against New England competition than they had had under Conservative tariffs. The general range of duties in the Liberal National Policy tariff of 1897, and their avowedly protectionist character, may be judged from the fact that embodied in it were eighty-three duties of twenty-five per cent, and seventy of thirty per cent; while fifty were of thirty-five per cent, which, except for two or three items, was the highest range of duties in the tariff of 1894. Besides the reductions in the iron-schedules, which were of advantage to many manufacturers, there were also reductions on other raw materials, and the upward movement in prices that began in 1898 has since then more than compensated for the small reductions in many of the *ad valorem* duties."—E. Porritt, *Sixty years of protection in Canada, 1846-1907*, pp. 387-388.—Preferential treatment was extended in 1898 to New South Wales, the free trade colony of Australia.

ALSO IN: A. Short, *Imperial preferential tariff from Canadian point of view*.—W. Graham, *Free trade and empire*.—J. S. Willison, *Sir Wilfred Laurier and the liberal group*.

1898-1910.—Germany.—Tariff war with Canada.—"Directly Canada, from August, 1898, gave preferential treatment to Great Britain and certain British Colonies, and began to apply to foreign countries her standing tariff, Germany made reprisals. While continuing most-favoured-nation treatment to the rest of the British Empire, she withdrew from Canada the benefit of the conventional tariff and put into force against her the unmodified autonomous tariff. This retaliation on Germany's part lasted for five years, after which Canada imposed a surtax upon German goods to the extent of one-third of the general tariff duties, and this surtax took effect on April 16th, 1903."—W. H. Dawson, *Protection in Germany (Protection in Various Countries Series, p. 123)*.—An agreement finally reached in 1910 ended this tariff war between Germany and Canada.

1899-1900.—Question of status of Porto Rico regarding tariff regulation.—Regulations adopted by the United States government. See PORTO RICO: 1890-1900.



1899-1901. — United States. — Reciprocity treaties with France, Portugal and British West Indies. See U.S.A.: 1899-1901.

1900-1901. — United States. — Case regarding tariff status of new possessions. See U.S.A.: 1900-1901.

1900-1919.—China.—Effect of "open door" policy in China upon the tariff.—China's foreign trade policy controlled by great powers.—"The ten years beginning in 1900 were termed 'the open door decade' [in China]. This period was a sort of crucial one in breaking down Chinese barriers, with the completion of the military campaign following the Boxer revolts. China was more open than ever to foreign influence, and the future of the country seems to have been fixed by Western ideas. England and the United States have been the great promoters of the open door policy. Japan has been especially aggressive in forcing her influence on China. New treaties were dictated by these three countries in 1902-03 which gave added opportunities for trade in China. China has been so bound by treaties that in 1914 she was not at liberty to fix her own tariff."—C. A. Herrick, *History of commerce and industry*, p. 432.—In 1919 her tariff was revised subject to ratification by the great powers. It was believed this revision would increase China's revenue by eight million dollars a year.

Also IN: *China's tariff revised (Economic World, Mar. 22, 1919)*.

1901.—Germany.—Promised increase of protective duties. See GERMANY: 1901 (January).

1901.—Philippine islands.—New tariff. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1901 (July).

1901-1902.—Australia.—Promised protective policy.—Question of free trade discussed in first Parliament. See AUSTRALIA: 1901 (May); 1901-1902.

1902.—Preferential agreements of England and colonies at British colonial conference. See BRITISH EMPIRE: Colonial and imperial conferences: 1902.

1902.—Sugar bounty conference at Brussels. See SUGAR BOUNTY CONFERENCE.

1902-1906.—Germany.—Tariff law of 1902.—Special tariff treaties with European nations.—Von Bülow's policy.—Germany's "autonomous tariff," sponsored by Prince von Bülow, was adopted in December, 1902. "The new tariff obviously marked a clear departure from the policy pursued with so much success by Count von Caprivi. That policy was to hold the balance as fairly as possible between agriculture and industry, while making special allowance for the two important facts that (1), driven by the force of circumstances, Germany is destined to become more and more an industrial country, and that (2) the vital condition of this inevitable transition is cheap food for the working classes. Count von Bülow also professed, in perfect good faith, that it was equally his own desire to give to both factors in the productive life of the nation a fair chance—in his own words, to 'strike the balance between interests that are in many instances opposed to each other'—but with him agriculture had prior consideration. He frankly confessed, when introducing the Tariff Bill in the Reichstag on December 2nd, that his object was 'above all to endeavour to meet those wishes which have been expressed by the agricultural interest in favour of increased protection.' Taking the old duties as a whole, they averaged in 1902 10 per cent. of the aggregate value of the imports taxed. Count von Bülow estimated that the new duties would

add 17 per cent. to that of industrial goods."—W. H. Dawson, *Protection in Germany (Protection in Various Countries Series, p. 147)*.—The tariff was to be in full force by 1906. "The essence of this [so called conventional tariff] system, . . . accompanied by an extensive network of commercial treaties, . . . [was] the mutual exchange of tariff concessions. Its origin is to be found in the change of tariff policy made by Germany in 1891. Until that year the single tariff framed by Bismarck in 1879 had been maintained, and had so far succeeded in its aim of stimulating domestic protection that German manufacturers were now demanding not merely protection at home but also an entry into foreign markets. The other nations of Europe, however, had by this time discarded, wisely or unwisely, the free-trade principles which seemed, in the decade subsequent to 1860, likely to spread far beyond the shores of the United Kingdom, and had returned, from motives which were in most cases relative to the circumstances of the particular countries concerned, to the principle of protection. Consequently, from the markets of Europe, Germany found her goods excluded by high tariff walls, and the only way of obtaining an entrance was by means of reciprocal tariff concessions. Whilst retaining, therefore, the tariff of 1879 as a 'general' tariff, negotiations were opened with the surrounding nations for such reductions as they were prepared to concede in return for a reduction of Germany's 'general' duties upon their exports. Treaties containing reciprocal concessions were concluded with seven countries of Europe, viz., Italy, Switzerland, Russia, Austria, Roumania, Servia and Belgium. The rates of duty thus agreed upon were, by the operation of the Most Favoured Nation clause, extended to certain other countries, and these rates, which are, in most cases, lower than those of the 'general' tariff, formed what was known as the 'conventional' schedule. The tariff of Germany thus consisted of two schedules, one containing the high rates which were to be maintained against imported commodities in general and the other containing the lower duties imposed upon the imports from such nations as extended favourable treatment to the products of Germany. The treaties thus made expired in the year 1903, but the system had been found to work so well that it was continued and numerous new treaties of the same general character were concluded, which will not expire until the year 1917. The example thus set by Germany has been followed by the following countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Russia, Spain and Switzerland. The 'general and conventional' principle may now be said to dominate the tariff policy of Continental Europe."—J. H. Higginson, *Tariffs at work*, pp. 8-10.—The United States entered into a commercial agreement with Germany based on her conventional tariff between 1905 and 1906. "Thanks to the Tariff Law of 1902, our [German] economic policy regained that agrarian bias so indispensable to the interests of the whole community. Side by side with the foreign trade, advancing with such mighty strides, the maintenance of a strong home industry was secured. German agriculture, under the influence of the new tariff and of the commercial treaties based on it, has experienced a decade of vigorous development."—Prince B. von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, pp. 281, 284.

Also IN: E. D. Howard, *Cause and extent of recent industrial progress in Germany*.—H. Dietzel, *Retaliatory duties*.

1903-1905.—Canada.—Attitude of Canadian Manufacturers' Association toward Great Britain and the United States on tariff question. See CANADA: 1903-1905.

1903-1906.—England.—Preferential tariffs challenge free trade tradition.—Imperialistic basis for tariff revision under Chamberlain.—“Free Trade remained almost unchallenged for fifty years in England, because, first, the need of the industries for expansion, and, later, the trade for her great mercantile interests at sea and abroad were best served by the unimpeded exchange of commodities. . . . Before the end of last century the tendencies which had been already matured into systems of high tariffs elsewhere began to exercise some influence in England. English industry had lost its position of overwhelming superiority, not by reason of decay, for it was strong and healthy still, but because other countries, their industrial revolutions completed, were reaching a high state of efficiency. Competition was keen, the evil effects of ‘dumping’ were being realised, and the new industry that invention and discovery brought into being. In the same way, the mercantile marines of other countries were becoming important, especially that of Germany, which, fostered by the state, was making immense strides. . . . Industry began to ask for protection against unfair competition, for a tariff wall behind which to rear new infant industries as their need was revealed. Free Traders retorted that the security of the tariff would discourage initiative and energy in the protected trades, and at the same time the bogey of high prices was exhibited to the full. The dispute became one of tremendous heat and a good deal of renown, and as a result the cases both for Protection and Free Trade were drawn up in very great detail. One strong point greatly insisted upon by the tariff party was that Free Trade left us almost completely outside the treaty system which was regulating the commercial relations of the world. Because we had few tariffs with which to negotiate, so few directions in which we could offer reductions, therefore we could obtain few concessions from other countries. We had not the bargaining power of the tariff. . . . The revival of interest in the colonies, and the closer touch with them brought about by modern communications, suggested the idea of *imperial* self-sufficiency. True, Great Britain could never be a self-sufficing nation, but the resources of the Empire were varied and big enough to enable it to get nearer than any nation in the world, not even excepting the United States, to self-sufficiency. It was the imperial movement that in England attacked Free Trade on the side of politics while competition was attacking it on the side of economics. The argument for imperial preference, championed by Joseph Chamberlain, the man inspired above all others by the vision of close union between the mother and daughter states, was added to the demands of industry and commerce, and drew into the tariff reform party many who would not have been convinced by the economic argument alone.”—A. S. Turberville and F. A. Howe, *Great Britain in the latest age*, pp. 240-257.—Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, exhorting Englishmen to “think imperially” left the cabinet in order to obtain a free hand in advocating tariff reform. His ideas were adopted by the Unionist party, but encountered defeat in the election of 1906. In 1903 South Africa had granted preference in trade to Great Britain; New Zealand followed in 1904.—See also ENGLAND: 1903 (May-September).

ALSO IN: J. Chamberlain, *Imperial union and tariff reform*.—J. W. Root, *Trade relations of British empire*.—A. Mackintosh, *Joseph Chamberlain, an honest biography*.—H. Cox, *British industries under free trade*.—E. E. Todd, *Case against tariff reform*.—R. Walsh, *Principles of industrial economy*.—B. E. Schmidt, *England and Germany*.

1904.—United States.—Views supported in party platforms. See U. S. A.: 1904 (May-November).

1904-1922.—Dumping laws in various countries of the world.—Special legislation to offset dumping has been the feature of the tariff programs of many nations. “Seven countries have enacted laws which specifically provide for the imposition of additional duties on imports sold at dumping prices. These countries, and the dates of original enactment of their laws, are as follows: Canada, 1904; British South Africa, 1914; Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, United States, 1921. The Canadian law was amended in 1907 and again in 1921. The British South African law was amended in 1922. The bulk of this legislation has, therefore, been enacted within the last two years, and all of it is still in effect. Another group of laws also in effect at present consists of the Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906-10 and several American laws which deal with predatory dumping as a phase of the problem of unfair competition. Not clearly belonging to either of these two groups are: the Japanese law of 1920, providing for the imposition of additional duties on foreign goods sold at unreasonably low prices; the Canadian law of 1922 authorizing the arbitrary valuation for assessment of customs duties of natural products imported into Canada under such conditions as prejudicially to affect the interests of Canadian producers; and the provision of the New Zealand law of 1921 authorizing the governor-general in special cases to change the tariff treatment of any class of imports when the existing tariff provisions operate injuriously.”—J. Viner, *Dumping: A problem in international trade*, p. 274.

1905.—Baltic and White Sea Conference for minimum rates. See BALTIC AND WHITE SEA CONFERENCE.

1907.—Canada.—Tariff revision.—The seventh revision of the Canadian “tariff was made in 1907. The outstanding features of that tariff were the introduction of the threefold classifications of preferential, intermediate and general duties, and the establishment of the drawback principle in respect to raw materials imported and subsequently exported in the form of finished products. With rates of duty there was very little interference, the average rate remaining about as before.”—W. L. Edmunds, *New Canadian tariff (New York Times Current History, May, 1921)*.

ALSO IN: J. H. Higginson, *Tariffs at work*.—A. C. Laut, *Canadian commonwealth.—Canadian national problems (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Jan., 1913)*.

1907.—Austria-Hungary.—Settlement of Austro-Hungarian tariff question. See AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1907.

1907.—Philippine islands.—Payne and Colton Bills.—Free trade with United States. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1907-1909.

1907-1909.—Canada.—Convention with France regarding commercial relations.—Its amendment. See CANADA: 1907-1909.

1909.—United States.—Payne-Aldrich tariff.—Double system inaugurated.—Beginnings of a tariff board.—“Until the passage of the Payne-

Aldrich Act all the trade conventions by the United States were on the basis of the single schedule system. This law introduced a new principle into American tariff policy, that of the double tariff. The form followed was an adaptation of the conventional tariffs of European countries based on two sets of schedules. Maximum and minimum rates were provided, the minimum being twenty-five per cent. lower than the maximum rates, or, as it was sometimes put, the maximum being twenty-five per cent. higher than the minimum rates. Nominally, the maximum was the basic tariff. Virtually, it was not, since the minimum rates were accepted as the real measure of customs duties. Under this dual tariff commercial relations were adjusted with one hundred and thirty-four countries. No nation sought to enforce maximum rates against the United States, and all received the minimum rates. The maximum and minimum provision was useful in securing removal of discrimination against cotton-seed oil and other American products. For the first time it enabled something to be effected by the diplomacy of commerce in securing more favorable treatment for American live-stock and meat products under the restrictions which were imposed by foreign governments exercising broad police powers in enforcing sanitary regulations. Some of the most acrid chapters in American diplomacy were the record of controversies on this subject, particularly with Germany and France. When the Payne-Aldrich law was passed, the people of the United States were consuming the bulk of the meat production, and the question was not a vital one. Nevertheless, advantage was taken of the readjustment of the tariff relations to secure the removal of discrimination construction and pure-food and sanitary regulations, although neither France nor Germany admitted that their regulations were utilized as disguised measures of protectionism. The whole world, however, knew that the objection was an economic one insisted on by the powerful agrarian aristocracy of Germany and by the French farmers who wanted American cattle and meats kept out of France. The maximum and minimum experiment was crude, but promising. Its operation showed distinct advantages though it also developed defects. Official recommendations for curing these defects, and giving the principle a more effective application had been made when political revulsion changed the party majority in Congress and the national administration."—C. M. Pepper, *American foreign trade*, pp. 118-119.—Of the bill in general President Taft said: "The bill is not a perfect tariff bill or a complete compliance with the promises made, strictly interpreted; but a fulfilment free from criticism in respect to a subject matter involving many schedules and thousands of articles could not be expected. It suffices to say that, except with regard to whiskey, liquors, and wines, and in regard to silks and as to some high classes of cottons—all of which may be treated as luxuries and proper subjects of a revenue tariff—there have been very few increases in rates. There have been a great number of real increases in rates, and they constitute a sufficient amount to justify the statement that this bill is a substantial downward revision, and a reduction of excessive rates. This is not a free trade bill. It was not intended to be. The Republican party did not promise to make a free trade bill. It promised to make the rates protective, but to reduce them when they exceeded the difference between the cost of production abroad and here, making allowance for the greater normal profit on active in-

vestments here. I believe that while this excess has not been reduced in a number of cases, in a great majority, the rates are such as are necessary to protect American industries, but are low enough, in case of abnormal increase of demand, and raising of prices, to permit the possibility of the importation of the foreign article, and thus to prevent excessive prices."

In the preparation of the Payne-Aldrich bill, "millions of money were spent in securing a mass of information or misinformation during a period of less than five months. It was a physical impossibility for the men on the Ways and Means Committee to frame up a measure which could be fair and equitable. . . . Through all the months of hearings, there was a persistent note which sounded clear throughout the country and the question was asked from Maine to California, why not have a Tariff Body of Experts or a Tariff Commission, call it what you will, but have a scientific system of acquiring facts without even a suggestion of privilege or preference. . . . The real exponents of scientific tariff making stood by until the last and finally saw what appeared to be a tiny provision included in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, which became a law on August 5, 1909. This was in Article 718, Section 2, and read as follows: 'To secure information to assist the President in the discharge of the duties imposed upon him by this Section (that is, relating to the application of the maximum and minimum rates), and the Officers of the Government in the administration of the Customs Laws, the President is hereby authorized to employ such persons as may be required.' Thus was born what was afterward designated as 'The Tariff Board' and the builders of a Tariff Commission began to see a glimmer of hope. It was not until September 14, 1909, that the President under the authority thus given appointed three persons to assist him in the manner contemplated by the act and designated them as constituting the Tariff Board"—H. T. Wills, *Scientific tariff making*, pp. 73-74.

Also in: A. Leroy-Beaulieu, *United States in the twentieth century*.—A. H. Walker, *Income tax law of the United States*.—J. S. Reyes, *Legislative history of American economic policy toward the Philippines (Columbia University studies in history, v. 3, no. 2)*.

1909.—England.—Resolutions of empire congress of chambers of commerce. See BRITISH EMPIRE: Colonial and imperial conferences: 1909 (September).

1909.—United States.—Corruption disclosed in the customs service. See U. S. A.: 1909 (October-November).

1909-1914.—Germany.—Germany's economic position in Europe paralleled by her political prestige.—Protection in Europe determined by Germany's tariff policy.—By 1909 Germany, triumphant in the European crisis which was precipitated when Austria annexed Bosnia with Germany's approval in the face of the protests from England, France, and Russia, was recognized as the political arbiter on the continent. This political prestige was paralleled by her commercial power. "In 1914 Continental Europe was largely protectionist; but since the leader in the protectionist movement was a country primarily interested in foreign trade and possessed of a keen economic sense, the protective tariffs of the important commercial countries were modified by numerous treaties, so that each country was enabled to obtain tariff concessions for its principal products in return for reciprocal concessions. The

foundation of the whole structure was the series of eight treaties negotiated by Germany on the basis of the new German tariff of 1902, specifically constructed with that end in view. It was a highly specialized tariff, considered by many the most scientific tariff in existence—i. e., best adapted to bring about the developments desired by the men who were directing the economic forces of the German Empire. If we take into consideration the fact that the tariff relations between Germany and France were fixed on a most-favored-nation basis by Article II of the Treaty of Frankfurt, and if we allow for the free trade policy of Great Britain, we are justified in stating that the German treaty system embraced most of Europe. In addition to getting the benefit of the treaties concluded directly, Germany, as well as most of the other European countries was also benefiting, by virtue of the most favored nation treatment clause embodied in her treaties, by the concessions to each other or to countries outside of the treaty powers by the countries with which she concluded treaties. These treaties were to expire at the end of 1917 on twelve months' notice and there were evidences of preparation for a new tariff alignment when the war broke out."—L. Domeratzky, *Instability of tariff conditions in Europe* (*Harvard Business Review*, Oct., 1923).—"Russia was before 1914 one of the best markets which her great neighbor, Germany had for manufactured goods, and was also one of the most promising fields for the employment of German capital in industrial enterprises. The prosperity and purchasing power of Russia were growing fast, so German manufactures had a cogent motive for desiring Russia's prosperity and for extending the very profitable trade they were driving with her. Nevertheless, this motive did not prevent the German Government from going to war with Russia in 1914, a step contemplated as probable for some time previously, as was shown by the newspaper campaigns which the German and the Russian newspapers carried on against one another. The action of Germany may have been due partly to a fear of Russia's material growth, which made her think it best to strike at once, partly to the confident belief that Russia, even though leagued with France, could be easily overthrown and brought into a commercial subservience which would enable German traders to dominate Russia and hold it as their exclusive preserve. Be this as it may, considerations of immediate economic loss counted for little or nothing. Even the leading German manufacturers and financiers did not try to prevent war. The other case is still more instructive. For many years before 1914 the growing commercial prosperity of Germany had made for the expansion of the trade between her and England. Among all foreign countries she was England's largest customer, and both countries were profiting immensely by this trade. Though they competed in some kinds of goods, they were in other kinds complementary to one another, for English manufacturers bought from Germany many partly manufactured articles and after finishing them exported them to Germany as well as elsewhere. Despite the check on imports which the high German tariff imposed, the German market was extremely valuable to England, and the English market no less valuable to Germany. On the other hand, there had begun to exist in English manufacturing and mercantile circles a certain jealousy of the rapid extension of German trade, which was supplanting that of England in certain markets, such as those of Spanish America, the

importance of which British exporters had been the first to discover."—J. Bryce, *International relations*, pp. 88-89.—"More specifically, the largest items among the German raw material imports were: raw cotton, silk, and wool (19.8 per cent); raw copper (5.3 per cent); hides and skins (10.0 per cent); iron-bearing ores and pig iron (5.0 per cent); rubber (2.3 per cent); tin, lead, and aluminum (1.8 per cent); pine, walnut, oak, mahogany, and other hard woods (6.4 per cent); chemicals and dyestuffs (6.4 per cent). These raw materials entered directly into the manufacture of commodities for export. Cotton, silk, and wool were converted into textiles and clothing; copper and iron went into the manufacture of industrial and agricultural machinery, rolling stock, and tools and metal articles of all kinds and descriptions for both household and industrial uses; hides and skins went into the manufacture of leather and leather articles; the various woods were used in practically every type of manufacturing; chemicals and dyestuffs produced dyes, fertilizers, and pharmaceutical products; etc., etc. The five principal groups of exports of German manufactured goods and their percentages of the total export in 1913 are as follows: Iron products (15.8 per cent); machinery (11.2 per cent); textiles, not including clothing (12.7 per cent); chemicals and dyes (9.4 per cent); leather and leather articles (5.4 per cent). The vital relationship between the importations of raw materials and the maintenance of German exports is sufficiently illustrated by the foregoing examples."—H. G. Moulton and C. E. McGuire, *Germany's capacity to pay*, p. 44.

ALSO IN: B. E. Schmidt, *Germany, and England*.  
1910.—United States.—Corporation tax in relation to tariff policy.—European tariff agreements.—The 1910 "federal tax on corporations and companies . . . [was] the resultant of several political forces which were brought into play during the discussion of the Tariff Act of 1909. Congress, it will be remembered, had convened upon the call of the President in extraordinary session for the purpose as many people hoped and as a few believed, of reducing the tariff duties upon imports. A bill for that purpose, in accordance with the constitutional requirement, could only originate in the House of Representatives. Accordingly, a comprehensive tariff bill was introduced in that body, and under its expeditious rules was speedily passed. When this bill reached the Senate, however, it was subjected to considerable discussion. A large number of Senators, for one reason or another, were in favor of incorporating in the bill a provision for a tax upon incomes, both of individuals and of corporations. The dominant party, or faction, was opposed to this measure, for reasons which it is not now material to inquire into. They were obligated to admit, however, that the scale of duties on imports which they were desirous of maintaining and which the bill provided for, would not, in all probability, raise sufficient revenue to supply the needs of the government. Possibly, had the tariff duties been reduced, so as to remove the virtual embargo which they imposed on many articles of foreign commerce, this prospective deficit might have been averted; but that remedy was regarded as even worse than an income tax. Yet so long as the proposed income tax was the only suggested source of additional revenue, as an alternative to the inadmissible plan of reducing duties on imports, there was a strong probability that an income tax would be adopted. In vain the powers-that-be argued that an unapportioned

income tax would certainly be pronounced unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and that the government would thus be left without adequate revenue, as was the case when the Income Tax of 1894 met a similar fate. In spite of all these arguments, the adoption of an income tax by the Senate seemed imminent. At this point, a plan was devised . . . which, it was supposed, would raise sufficient revenue, would avoid the constitutional objections to a general income tax, and would at the same time enable the leaders of the Senate to escape the humiliation of a defeat upon the proposed income-tax amendment to the tariff bill. This plan was a so-called excise tax on corporations and companies in proportion to their income. This plan was incorporated in an amendment to the tariff bill, which was adopted in the Senate, and concurred in by the House of Representatives. The bill including this feature was signed by the President on August 5th, 1909."—A. W. Machen, Jr., *Treatise on the Federal corporation tax law of 1909*, pp. 1-3.—In accordance with the same tariff law, on January, 1910, the president issued the first of his proclamations relative to the operation of the maximum and minimum rates of duty. Six countries, namely, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey, were designated as entitled to the minimum rates. A second proclamation, February 7, announced the conclusion of an agreement with Germany which gave to each country the minimum rates of the other. This agreement had been ratified by the Reichstag on the 5th. Negotiations with France and with Canada occupied more time, being protracted in the latter case almost to the limit of the period prescribed in the act. Terms of agreement were arrived at in both instances, and, in the end, the president was not called on to apply the maximum rates to any country.—See also CANADA: 1910-1911.

1910.—France.—Tariff revision.—No change of policy.—Contrast of French tariff with other European tariffs.—In the Tariff of 1910 "there was no suggestion of any change in the commercial policy of France, which followed the example of the United States rather than that of the German Empire and other states of the Continent. France, as the United States, had established two scales of duty; the lower scale to be applied, in whole or part, to the products of countries which did not discriminate unfavorably against French products, and the higher scale to be applied against countries which did so discriminate. Unlike Germany, she had declined as a general rule to enter into treaties which should fix these minimum rates for any definite length of time, and consequently she had retained her autonomy in tariff matters undiminished. There was now in France no controversy whatever as to the desirability of continuing this arrangement and the other characteristic features of French tariff policy, such as colonial preference and the *surtaxes d'entrepôt*; the revision was to be, in consequence, solely a revision of the rates of duty. . . . The revision was predominantly in the interests of industry, thus contrasting strongly with the latest revision of the German tariff, which had been dictated largely by regard for agriculture. . . . The most sweeping changes proposed in regard to the minimum rates, which so far as most industrial nations trading with France are concerned are alone of importance, were in the schedules relating to metals, where the duties were increased especially as regards special steels; manufactures of metal, where there was a far-reaching reclassification and increases in the

rates of duty on such classes of imports as steam-engines, pumps, and ventilators, agricultural machinery, machine tools, mechanics' tools, cables and wire, detached parts of machines, and watches and watch movements; and the textile schedules, owing (*inter alia*) to reclassification, the imposition of surtaxes for mercerization and stamping (*gaufrage*), and the increase of the rates of duty on the highest counts of cotton and linen yarns. . . . A curious provision of the new French law authorized the Government (subject to legislative approval) 'to maintain in force exceptionally and as a temporary measure the rates of the general [*i. e.*, maximum] tariff in force prior to the present law as regards all or any goods the produce of countries which do not subject French products to any differential treatment whatever.' The exact purpose of this clause was not clear, unless it were to give the French government the opportunity of establishing an 'intermediate' tariff, following in this respect the example of Canada; but it was immediately utilized in an agreement with the United States. Under this arrangement, which was confirmed by the Legislature on the same day as the new tariff was enacted, the United States obtain the new minimum rates on a large number of commodities, including, however, some (such as those on coffee, cocoa, pepper, tea and coal) in which they are not specially interested, and not including any of the rates in the textile schedules, and the old general tariffs are continued in respect of certain of their exports, such as preserved fruits, fine cutlery, some classes of boots, iron and steel tubes, common brushware and various other articles."—P. Ashley, *Modern tariff history*, pp. 348-354.

1911.—Canada.—Commercial treaty with Japan. See CANADA: 1911-1913.

1913.—United States.—Underwood tariff.—Revision on basis of ad valorem duties.—It was said that the Underwood tariff of 1913 "was not a 'scientific' tariff. . . . The duties were in fact settled in more or less rough and ready fashion. Doubtless the exact rates in many cases were the results of compromise, not of any close calculation or accurate information. Beyond question the same sort of thing had gone on in previous years, and even more flagrantly. But the Republicans could maintain that since 1909 the Tariff Board had been at work and had shown the possibility of more deliberate and discriminating procedure. And yet the Democrats could not be seriously expected to pay much attention to this demand for prolonged preparation and expert examination. In the first place, the Tariff Board was a Republican device. However excellent its work,—and no competent observer would deny that it had thrown much needed light on the industries which it investigated,—a flavor of partisanship remained. The very fact of its being a Republican product caused the Democrats to turn their backs on it. More important, however, was the circumstance that detailed and elaborate inquiry necessarily meant delay. . . . Postponement of action by the Democrats until the results of an expert board's inquiries should be at hand was to give up their golden opportunity. They had control for the first time in many years of all branches of the national legislature,—not only the House and the Presidency, but even the Senate. Their time had come, and to have waited would have been politically suicidal. Among the changes in duties made in the act of 1913 by far the most conspicuous and important were those on sugar and wool. Both were admitted free; wool at once,

and sugar after an interval of two and a half years. . . . It is difficult to see how anything could be said in favor of free sugar on the principle of a competitive tariff, or on that of attacking only the 'illegitimate' industries. So far as raw sugar is concerned, there had been steady competition between the domestic producers, as well as between them and the foreign producers. The imports of sugar had always been large. The production of cane sugar and beet sugar within the United States was as legitimate as could be the case with any highly protected industry. Possibly the circumstance that the sugar planters of Hawaii and Porto Rico, and in less degree those of Cuba and the Philippines, had been among the beneficiaries of protection, may have promoted an unrelenting attitude. Yet in the main the abolition of the duty, while tactically justified as a move toward lowering the cost of living, could be defended with consistency only on the ground that a cheap supply from abroad is better than a dear supply at home. This is the gist of the principle of free trade. What has been said of free sugar holds for the complete and immediate abolition of the duty on wool. In their tariff bills of 1911 and 1912, the Democrats had not ventured to go so far. It had been proposed to leave the duty on wool at 20 per cent. Through the influence of President Wilson, the bolder step was taken of admitting it free once for all. It will be remembered that this had been the one radical change made in the ill-starred tariff act of 1894. In urging the same step in 1913, President Wilson showed the unhesitating courage which won the respect of his opponents no less than of his friends. It happened that the juncture was favorable for the change. A sweeping reduction, perhaps amounting to complete abolition, had been on the cards for so many months that the market had adjusted itself to the prospect, and the price of wool had been for some time on a free wool basis. . . . Nominally, the reduction in protection on woollens was solely in the reduced *ad valorem* rate only. In fact, however, the abolition of the specific compensating duties meant a further reduction of protection. They had been more than enough to accomplish their nominal object, that of simply offsetting the influence of the wool duty in raising the domestic price of wool. . . . It would seem that in this case the Democrats strove to apply the competitive principle. The inquiries of the defunct Tariff Board, and some further calculations based upon them, indicated that a duty of 35 per cent. would correspond roughly to the difference in expenses of production between American and foreign manufacturers. . . . On cotton goods the reductions were not dissimilar in character and in effect from those in the *ad valorem* rates on woollens. The changes on the statute book were great. But in this case also the consequences in trade and industry were likely to be much less considerable than in the figures. . . . All the duties on cotton goods were now assessed by value. Except for the retention of a remnant of the fence system in the hosiery duties, not a specific rate appeared in the entire schedule. This radical change was made the occasion for severe criticism, on the familiar ground that *ad valorem* duties tempt to undervaluation and fraud. . . . The duties on silks were readjusted on the same principle as those on cottons. *Ad valorem* duties were substituted throughout for specific. The general rate on silk fabrics was made 45 per cent.; on velvets and plushes, 50 per cent. In the Senate, amendments were inserted retaining (though with some reduc-

tions) the previous system of rates by the pound. But the House refused to concur in these amendments and the act as finally passed swept away almost every specific duty in the silk schedule."—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff history of the United States*, pp. 424-444.—The main articles placed on the free list were agricultural implements, leather, dairy products, coal, and lumber.—See also U. S. A.: 1913 (April-December).

ALSO IN: F. A. Ogg, *National progress*.—W. Macdonald, *Three centuries of American democracy*. 1914-1916.—United States.—Effect of the World War on the tariff.—After the outbreak of the World War, "the decline in imports [into the United States] was mainly due to changed conditions within the countries from which our imports had come. Both forces were at work. In 1914-1915, as compared with the previous fiscal year, imports of articles which were not decisively necessary, such as laces, art works, silks, and precious stones, showed a decrease of \$120,000,000; while commodities whose production in belligerent countries had been interfered with by the war, such as breadstuffs, chemicals, dyestuffs, manufactures of copper, fertilizers, fibres, and hides and skins declined by \$159,000,000. On the other hand, the stoppage of the beet-sugar exportation from Europe stimulated the importation of cane-sugar from Cuba. Sugar, India-rubber, wool, meat, and dairy products caused an increase in imports of \$112,500,000 (of which sugar made up \$72,300,000). The severe decline in imports of August, 1914, was followed by a slight recovery (due to orders placed before the war) in the next two months; but the December imports were the lowest in five years. The loss in 1914-1915 from six belligerents was \$259,700,000, offset by a gain of \$83,000,000 from Cuba and Argentina. Including all countries, there was a net decrease of \$220,000,000. The loss from Great Britain was chiefly in textiles, tin, wool, and precious stones; from France, in art works, silks, cotton goods, and wines; from Russia, in hides and wool; from Belgium in hides, rubber, and precious stones. The greatest loss was from Germany, chiefly in colors and dyes, dressed and undressed furs, leather gloves, toys, chinaware, cotton goods, hides and skins, rubber, and tin. In view of later events, it is worth noting that imports from Germany to us recovered after August, 1914, and reached nearly normal proportions in January, 1915. By the middle of 1915, however, they had almost ceased. Looking over the course of imports as a whole before the war and then to the end of the third year [1916], we find they rose in 1915 to about the normal level of \$150,000,000 per month; but since then they [rose] . . . to twice that amount, reflecting somewhat the influence of exceptionally large exports."—J. L. Laughlin, *Credit of the nations*, pp. 306-307.—See also AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: 1880-1916.

ALSO IN: *American interests as affected by the European war (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept., 1915)*.

1914-1918.—Europe.—Tariff situation at the beginning and during the World War.—"In regard to German trade with England herself, it is common knowledge that English markets were flooded with German goods, so that 'made in Germany' became a commercial shibboleth. In short, British companies freely carried on operations in Germany, and German companies and banks were established in Great Britain. Trade is reciprocal, and these rivals were necessary to each other. In 1911 exports from Germany to

the British Empire amounted to \$360,725,000, and the goods sent by the latter to the former were valued at \$442,475,000. There were evidently no restrictions on trade beyond those set by protective tariffs and relative advantages. The British took from Germany sugar, electrical and mining machinery, and mechanical products of the new technic. In return, they sent to Germany products of the older technic, in which the British retained their superiority, such as agricultural and textile machinery; and, in addition, raw materials to be used in the chemical industries, together with yarn, wool, hides, as well as articles of luxury and fashion, like leather goods, laces, cloths, plate glass, porcelain, china, best grades of paper, etc. Gradually it resulted that Germany, as she gained industrially, was buying less from England and England was buying more from Germany. Again French and German bankers were freely competing in Russia and Turkey, and in the Balkan States; while the British were aiding the Turkish navy, Germany was reorganizing the Turkish army. How, then, could it be said that Germany's trade was hindered in these countries? Without doubt, something more than the economic gains of peace entered into the national aspirations of Germany. If the conditions before the war brought to her the greatest progress obtained by any other country in the last thirty years, then the retention of those conditions was the thing most to be desired. Her phenomenal commercial gains were in themselves proof that she had the freedom of the seas. How else could her foreign trade and her shipping have grown so amazingly? The facts show only too clearly that she had the freedom of the seas, and the entry of her goods on equal terms in all ports of the world where her costs allowed her to undersell. Equally clear is it that her cry for the 'freedom of the seas' was born of a plan for herself so to control the seas that, when war came, she would be dominant on the ocean as well as on land. She already had freedom of the seas for peaceful commerce; but an exaggerated ambition looked to dominance on the seas in time of war. Such appears to be the only possible explanation of her foreign and colonial policy. . . . The situation of France made it impossible to greatly increase her exports of goods in order to help pay for the much-needed imports of food and war supplies. The dislocation in trade was very serious. In five months of 1915, as compared with the same months in 1914, the imports had declined 25 per cent and exports 58 per cent. In 1915 the industries of Lyons had now shown recovery; but the china, glass, woodworking, and metal industries showed improvement, while there was a gain of perhaps 20 per cent over the whole field. Workers for the government, as well as those in the chemical, leather, cotton, woollen, canned food, chain, motor, and engineering industries, were occupied night and day. Those formerly producing for export were now largely occupied in supplying war goods. The balance of payments, having been in favor of France before the war, so continued for a time after war began. The franc did not fall below par until May, 1915. It was then that the merchandise account was reversed. In 1915 imports exceeded exports by \$1,000,000,000, and in 1916 by over \$2,500,000,000. The purchases, especially from the United States, were very heavy. The payment for the imports, however, could be offset only to a reduced extent by the exports of goods (although there was a noticeable gain in 1916).—J. L. Laughlin, *Credit of the nations*, pp. 30-32, 186-187.—"Naturally no

constructive tariff legislation took place during the war; the chief use made of the tariff during that period was to encourage the importation of food-stuffs and supplies essential for war purposes, or to assist in the economic phases of the war. As a protectionist measure the tariff naturally played a very insignificant part during the war, its influence being modified or eliminated by the tonnage scarcity, high freight rates, and the tremendous demand for war supplies. It is true, however, that the foundation for the post-war protectionist movement in Great Britain, for instance, was laid as early as 1916, when the lack of certain 'key' commodities, like dyestuffs, scientific glassware, and other products of the highly specialized industries of Germany called attention to the industrial dependence of Great Britain and of the other belligerents as well as neutrals, like the United States, to that country. . . . After the signing of the Armistice and the gradual abandonment of the pretentious but rather hazy reconstruction schemes, the tariff problem was taken up again by nearly all countries, not so much with a view to building up a new system to meet the new economic conditions, but rather to construct a temporary shelter which would enable distracted or overstimulated industries to adjust themselves to the new conditions and save them from the anticipated onslaught of American or German industries."—L. Domeratzky, *Instability of tariff conditions in Europe* (*Harvard Business Review*, Oct., 1923).

ALSO IN: J. Clark, H. Moulton and W. Hamilton, *Readings in economics of war*.

1915.—United States.—Desire for tariff reform. See U.S.A.: 1911-1915.

1915-1918.—Canada.—Financial war emergency measures. See CANADA: 1915-1918.

1916.—Europe.—Paris Economic Conference of Allies and their war tariff policy.—In June, 1916, the Allies (England, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Russia, Serbia, and Portugal) "adopted 'on grounds of necessary and legitimate defense' the famous resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference. These resolutions proposed an economic war during an indefinite period, called the 'reconstruction' period, following the Peace Conference. Most-favored-nation treatment was to be refused to the Central Powers, that is, they were to be discriminated against; and since experience has shown that discrimination is a sword that cuts both ways, compensatory outlets were to be given to any Ally whose commerce was injured. Added to this plan to restrict the markets of the Central Powers, the Allies proposed to deprive German industries of raw materials by conserving for themselves 'their natural resources' and establishing 'special arrangements to facilitate the interchange of these resources.' The commerce of the 'enemy Powers' was to be submitted to 'special treatment,' and their goods—let us not forget that this was to be after peace had been signed—were to be subjected 'either to prohibitions or to a special régime of an effective character.' 'Special conditions' were also to be imposed on Teuton ships—more 'navigation laws,' it may be supposed. As if these restrictions were not enough to remind us of the fiercest days of trade conflict in former centuries, it was proposed to revive the practice of excluding foreigners from all retail trade in the mediæval town; the subjects of the Central Powers were to be prevented from exercising in the countries of the Allies 'industries or professions which concern national defense or economic independence.' This economic alliance was not, according to the reso-

lutions, to be temporary. In the spirit of exclusive nationalism the Allies decided 'to take the necessary steps without delay to render themselves independent of the enemy countries in so far as regards the raw materials and manufactured articles essential to the normal development of their economic activities.' This self-sufficiency was to be achieved by subsidies, enterprises controlled by Government, scientific and technical research, customs duties, and 'prohibitions of a temporary or permanent character.' The Paris resolutions proclaimed Germany a people with whom the Allies would have no dealings. Although the signing of some sort of peace was assumed, the resolutions proposed that after it there should remain an impassable economic gulf between the Allies and the 'enemy countries.'—W. S. Culbertson, *Commercial policy in war time and after*, pp. 346-348).—See also WORLD WAR: 1916: XII. Political conditions in the belligerent countries: a.

The following is the text of the resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference:

The representatives of the allied Governments have met in Paris, Mr. Clementel, Minister of Commerce, presiding, on the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th of June, 1916, for the purpose of fulfilling the mandate which was confided to them by the conference of Paris on March 28, 1916, to put into practice their solidarity of views and interests and to propose to their respective Governments suitable measures for realizing this solidarity. They perceive that the central powers of Europe, after having imposed upon them their military struggle in spite of all their efforts to avoid the conflict, are preparing to-day, in concert with their allies, a struggle in the economical domain which will not only survive the re-establishment of peace, but at that very moment will assume all its amplitude and all its intensity. They cannot in consequence conceal from themselves that the agreement which is being prepared for this purpose amongst their enemies has for its evident object the establishment of their domination over the production and the markets of the whole world and to impose upon the other countries an in-acceptable hegemony. In the face of such a grave danger the representatives of the allied Governments consider that it is their duty, on the grounds of necessary and legitimate defense, to take and realize from now onward all the measures requisite on the one hand to secure for themselves and the whole of the markets of neutral countries full economic independence and respect for sound commercial practice, and on the other to facilitate the organization on a permanent basis of this economic alliance. For this purpose the representatives of the allied Governments have decided to submit for the approval of their Governments the following resolutions:

#### A. Measures for War Period

I. Laws and regulations prohibiting trading with the enemy shall be brought into accord for this purpose: A. The allies will prohibit their own subjects and citizens and all persons residing in their territories from carrying on any trade with the inhabitants of enemy countries of whatever nationality, or with enemy subjects, wherever resident, persons, firms and companies whose business is controlled wholly or partially by enemy subjects or subjects to enemy influence, whose names will be included in a special list. B. The allies will also prohibit importation into their territories of

goods originating or coming from enemy countries. C. The allies will further devise means of establishing a system of enabling contracts entered into with enemy subjects and injurious to national interests to be canceled unconditionally.

II. Business undertakings, owned or operated by enemy subjects in the territories of the allies, are all to be sequestered or placed under control. Measures will be taken for the purpose of winding up some of these undertakings and realizing the assets, the proceeds of such realizations remaining sequestered or under control. In addition, by export prohibitions which are necessitated by the internal situation of each of the allied countries, the allies will complete the measures already taken for the restriction of enemy supplies both in the mother countries and the dominions, colonies and protectorates: 1. By unifying lists of contraband and export prohibition, particularly by prohibiting the export of all commodities declared absolute or conditional contraband. 2. By making the grant of license to export to neutral countries, from which export to the enemy territories might take place, conditional upon the existence in such countries of control organizations approved by the allies, or in the absence of such organizations, upon special guaranties, such as the limitation of the quantities to be exported, and supervision by allied consular officers, etc.

#### B. Transitory Measures for the Period of the Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural and Maritime Reconstruction of the Allied Countries

I. The allies declare their common determination to insure the re-establishment of the countries suffering from acts of destruction, spoliation and unjust requisition, and they decide to join in devising means to secure the restoration to those countries, as a prior claim, of their raw materials—industrials, agricultural plant and stock—and mercantile fleet, or to assist them to re-equip themselves in these respects.

II. Whereas the war has put an end to all treaties of commerce between the allies and enemy powers, and it is of essential importance that during the period of economic reconstruction the liberty of none of the allies should be hampered by any claim put forward by enemy powers to most-favored-nation treatment, the allies agree that the benefit of this treatment will not be granted to those powers during a number of years to be fixed by mutual agreement among themselves.

During this number of years the allies undertake to assure each other, so far as possible, compensatory outlets for trade in case consequences detrimental to their commerce should result from the application of the undertaking referred to in the preceding clause.

III. The allies declare themselves agreed to conserve for the allied countries, before all others, their natural resources during the whole period of commercial, industrial, agricultural and maritime reconstruction, and for this purpose they undertake to establish special arrangements to facilitate the interchange of these resources.

IV. In order to defend their commerce and industry and their agriculture and navigation against economic aggression resulting from dumping or any other mode of unfair competition the allies decide to fix by agreement a period of time during which commerce with the enemy powers will be submitted to special treatment, and goods originating from their countries will be subjected either



to prohibitions or to a special régime of an effective character. The allies will determine by agreement, through diplomatic channels, the special conditions to be imposed during the above-mentioned period on the ships of enemy powers.

V. The allies will devise measures, to be taken jointly or severally, for preventing enemy subjects from exercising in their territories certain industries or professions which concern national defense or economic independence.

### C. Permanent Measures of Mutual Assistance and Collaboration Among the Allies

I. The allies decide to take the necessary steps without delay to render themselves independent of enemy countries in so far as regards raw materials and manufactured articles essential to the normal development of their economic activities. These measures will be directed to assuring the independence of the allies, not only so far as concerns sources of supply, but also as regards their financial, commercial and maritime organization. The allies will adopt such measures as seem to them most suitable for the carrying out of this resolution according to the nature of the commodities and having regard to the principles which govern their economic policy. They may, for example, have recourse to either enterprises subsidized and directed or controlled by the governments themselves or to the grant of financial assistance for the encouragement of scientific and technical research and the development of national industries and resources, or to customs duties or prohibitions of a temporary or permanent character, or to a combination of these different methods. Whatever may be the methods adopted, the object aimed at by the allies is to increase the production within their territories, as a whole, to a sufficient extent to enable them to maintain and develop their economic position and independence in relation to enemy countries.

II. In order to permit the interchange of their products the allies undertake to adopt measures facilitating mutual trade relations, both by the establishment of direct and rapid land and sea transport services at low rates and by the extension and improvement of postal, telegraphic and other communications.

III. The allies undertake to convene a meeting of technical delegates to draw up measures for the assimilation, so far as may be possible, of their laws governing patents, indications of origin, and trademarks. In regard to patents, trademarks, literary and artistic copyright which come into existence during the war in enemy countries, the allies will adopt, so far as possible, an identical procedure to be applied as soon as hostilities cease. This procedure will be elaborated by the technical delegates of the allies.

### D

Whereas, for the purpose of their common defense against the enemy, the allied powers have agreed to adopt a common economic policy on the lines laid down in the resolutions which have been passed; and whereas, it is recognized that the effectiveness of this policy depends absolutely upon these resolutions being put into operation forthwith, the representatives of the allied Governments undertake to recommend that their respective Governments shall take, without delay, all the measures, whether temporary or permanent, requisite to giving full and complete effect to this

policy forthwith and to communicate to each other the decisions arrived at to attain the object.

PARIS, JUNE 17, 1916.

ALSO IN: *American foreign trade relations (Proceedings of American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 9, no. 2)*.—National foreign trade council, *European economic alliances*.

1916.—United States.—Creation of permanent tariff commission.—“As it became clear that the economic effects of the European War would transform the industrial and commercial world, the need of information as a guide to future policies of the government in economic affairs became generally manifest. On January 24, 1916, President Wilson, in a letter to the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, urged the creation of a tariff commission. . . . Provision for the creation of the commission was made by act of September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. L., 705). The act provided for a commission of six members appointed for overlapping terms by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Nonpartisanship was to be secured by the requirement that not more than three of the Commissioners were to be members of the same political party.”—J. Bernhardt, *Tariff commission, service monographs of the United States government, no. 5, pp. 16-17*.—Professor F. W. Taussig of Harvard University, economic expert, was appointed chairman of the commission. One of the functions of the tariff commission has been to issue reports of the results of their investigations of trade conditions throughout the world. These officials reports are very valuable in the detailed study of tariff questions.

1917-1919.—United States.—Control of imports and exports as war measures.—“On October 12, 1917, the President [Wilson] took steps for the exercise of the powers in respect to the control of imports and the enforcement of the provisions regarding trading with the enemy which had been vested in him by the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act of October 6, 1917. This he did by the issue of an executive order of that date setting forth in detail the manner in which the several powers conferred by that Act should be exercised. It . . . created and defined the duties of a Censorship Board and the office of Alien Property Custodian, in addition to making provision for the exercise of control over imports and exports and of trading with the enemy. In respect to the latter features, which are the only ones with which we are here concerned, the order made provision for two new bodies, to be known as the War Trade Council and the War Trade Board, which should supersede and take over the duties of the Exports Council and the Exports Administrative Board and in addition exercise control over imports and the trading with the enemy features of the Act. . . . The signing of the armistice had, probably, less immediate effect upon the operations of the War Trade Board than upon those of any of the other special war agencies. Because of the fact that the embargo against Germany and her allies was rigidly maintained during the period of negotiation of the terms of peace, and the fact that tonnage available for overseas trade still continued wholly inadequate to meet the world needs, the necessity still existed for the maintenance by the United States of a large measure of control over the importation and exportation of most commodities. Notwithstanding this, it was the policy of the United States to alleviate or wholly remove restrictions upon foreign trade as rapidly as circumstances would permit. Especially was it de-

sired to remove restrictions upon trade with neutral nations and to abolish the regulations governing trading with enemy firms or ally-of-enemy firms located in our own or neutral countries. Order after order was accordingly issued having these ends in view. On April 28, 1919, announcement was made that, dating from April 29, 1919, all Enemy Trading Lists theretofore issued or compiled by the War Trade Board were withdrawn and that all disabilities attached to trade and communication with persons included in such lists would cease to operate. This order, however, did not affect any existing restrictions against trade and communication between the United States and Germany or Austria-Hungary. The reservation was also made that the Enemy Trading List might be reimposed at any time should circumstances make such action desirable."—W. F. Willoughby, *Government organization in war time and after*, pp. 128-129, 141.—See also U.S.A.: 1916-1918; AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: Effects of World War.

ALSO IN: J. Clark, W. Hamilton and H. Moulton, *Readings in economics of war.—International economics (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar., 1919)*.—F. W. Taussig, *Free trade, tariff, and reciprocity*.

1918-1919.—United States.—Free port system recommended by tariff commission, and opposed by protectionists.—Between the years 1918 and 1919 the question of free ports,—in imitation of the customary free ports of Europe—came up in Congress. The United States tariff commission, which had made a prolonged study of reciprocity, recommended the establishment of such ports. "A 'free port' is simply an inclosure in a harbor of a country that has a tariff system, into which ships may come and go, unload or transfer cargoes, etc., without necessity of customs supervision. The first idea has been to have these 'free ports' as general international markets, where trans-shipment and re-export business may be freely carried on. Re-export markets give the manufacturers in a country having them an advantage in prices. They also help along the shipping and the general merchandising organization to have these collateral activities of international commerce going on. In the greatest modern development of international commerce, however, the 'free ports' are used as the means of constructing the finest mechanical devices for helping to make transoceanic shipping just as cheap as possible. By having a safely inclosed area, with custom-house entrances and exits on the land side at which the tariff business may be transacted when goods move across the 'tariff line,' it is easy to handle goods and machinery in big units without the careful supervision of customs officials that necessarily impedes and makes costly the movement of loading and unloading at ordinary piers."—*Future machinery for building up commerce (The Americas, July, 1918, p. 136)*.—Opposition of the advocates of protection to the free port policy was voiced in their journal, the *American Economist*. Other recommendations of the tariff commission were: "the United States should ask no special favors and should grant no special favors;" that "it should exercise its powers and should impose its penalties not for the purpose of securing discriminations in its favor but to prevent discriminations to its disadvantage"; and that it should enact legislation authorizing the imposition of additional or penalty duties by proclamation of the president on imports from countries not according the United States the same

treatment accorded to other most-favored nations.

ALSO IN: T. E. G. Gregory, *Tariffs, a study in method*.

1919.—England.—Post-war tariff conditions.—"The War had destroyed the old sense of security, already shaken by the expansion of competing industrial nations, the penetration of our industries and trade by German enterprise, the swift recurrence of cycles of unemployment, and the chronic discontent with low wages. The War has also lifted the questions of the safeguarding of industries and the conservation of raw materials out of the narrow confines of party politics and set them on their proper basis as problems of Imperial meaning. . . . The trend of opinion towards these principles is well illustrated by the report of the Royal Commission presided over by Lord Balfour of Burleigh. This Commission, which included eight Free Traders in its eighteen members, was appointed in July 1916 to consider the commercial and industrial policy to be adopted by Great Britain after the War, with special reference to the conclusions reached at the Economic Conference of the Allies, and to the maintenance of industries essential to the safety of the nation, the recovery of home and foreign trade lost during the War, the opening up of new markets, the development of the resources of the Empire, and their preservation from foreign control. . . . These suggestions were offered as embodying definite lines on which tariffs could be applied, providing a distinct preference to the Empire over neutrals and a smaller preference to Allies who were willing to reciprocate."—E. Saunders, *Self-supporting empire*, pp. 76-77, 80-82.—As a temporary measure England resorted to import restrictions, in 1919, on a wide variety of articles in order to stimulate home production, and to meet the unemployment crisis.

1919.—Europe.—Customs duties and regulations as fixed by the Versailles Treaty. See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Part X. Section 1: Chapter 1.

1919.—Poland.—Tariff regulations. See POLAND: 1919 (June 28).

1919-1920.—France.—Post-war tariff.—System of "coefficients of increase" introduced.—"Some months after the Armistice, the total prohibition of all imports into France, except as licensed and except from the French colonies was enacted as law. When the prohibitions were largely removed, after a short experiment with ad valorem surtaxes, in July, 1919, 'co-efficients of increase' were introduced. These co-efficients (which have been copied in Belgium) ranged at first from 1.1 to 3; but for luxuries, upon the repeal of the later prohibition upon their importation, co-efficients as high as 7.1 are now used. By multiplying the old specific rates by these co-efficients, new rates are easily formed, which for any desired part of a schedule maintain the previous relations between the rates on different articles and between the minimum and general tariff rates. The original set of co-efficients covered all the schedules except animals, animal products, vegetable products and crude minerals, but included wool and slate. The co-efficients are freely revised by decrees which appear at short intervals and nearly all the changes are increases. France has also participated in the movement to restrict the importation of luxuries, and from April to July, 1920, about 175 articles were on the prohibited list, and some 20 articles remain under the ban. The prohibition of luxuries met with especial opposition from a large number of manufacturers and merchants who cater to the tastes of wealthy visitors and who maintain some

of the most characteristic lines of French exports. On the whole, it does not appear that the French have made excessive increases in their import duties. With the balance of trade heavily against them and under severe pressure, both to raise revenue and to restrict imports, their increase in the tariff rates have not kept pace on the average with the advance of prices."—B. B. Wallace, *Post-war tariff changes and tendencies (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 94, p. 181)*.

Also 18; M. Rouston, *France's customs policy since the armistice (Economic Review, June 23, 1923)*.—J. Caillaux, *Whither France—whither Europe?*—J. L'Hôte, *La Douane en France et à l'étranger*.—R. Goujet, *Le Protectionisme en France depuis la guerre*.

1919-1920.—Germany.—Post-war tariff on exports.—To meet the trade restrictions imposed upon her by the peace treaty, and also as a means of correcting the depreciation of the exchanges, Germany, in an "ordinance of 20th December, 1919, 'concerning control of export trade' introduced, . . . a tax on export licenses. By the Ministerial Proclamation of 8th April, 1920, Art. 9, the tax is assessable 'on the total value which is put to the account of the foreign consignee . . . if the merchandise is exported unsold, the tax will be calculated according to the export value of the goods; and in the case of "improvement trade," according to the value of payments made in connection therewith.' The Ministers for Economic Affairs and of Finance can regulate the charges to be made, and are bound to alter them on demand of the Reichsrat. By Art. 10, 'if the wares are priced in foreign currency the value is to be calculated in German currency converted at the rate of exchange to be fixed' by the said Ministers, 'for the purpose of computing the amount of the charge.' So long as the internal purchasing power of the mark was greater than its parity value in terms of foreign currency, this system represented a sharing of the profits between the foreign buyer and the German Government. The value of the system becomes problematical when the internal value of the mark falls, for then no profit is to be obtained by buying German goods, and the tax operates like any other export tax as a discouragement to export."—T. E. G. Gregory, *Tariffs, a study in method, pp. 486-487*.—The Peace treaty allowed Germany, and Austria to require payment in gold.

1919-1920.—World-wide tariff tendencies after the World War.—Increase of protection.—"The significance of the world-wide movement for the increase of tariff rates [1919-1920] need not be overestimated. Modifications in revenue tariffs—the tariffs found throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, with the exception of Japan, the Union of South Africa and certain colonies of Japan, France and the United States—[were] of importance only to the consumers. . . . Exceptions to the generalization that recent tariff changes are upwards are found in certain of the belligerent countries which pushed their revenue rates very high during the war and [after] . . . lowered or only maintained them. . . . Few countries . . . made an approach to a general revision of their tariffs—changes [were] . . . most extensive in France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. The European states named, however [considered] the changes . . . made merely tentative. . . . The Italian Government . . . expressed a preference for an autonomous tariff; i.e., a two-column tariff whose lower rates

may be accorded by treaty *en bloc*, but which remain alterable by the legislature. [See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XII. Reconstruction: c, 2.] The British Empire demands more extended consideration. In recent decades the Empire has been sharply divided on tariff policy: Great Britain, India and the Crown Colonies have held to free trade, while Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa adopted, and from time to time have extended, systems of protection. Further, these Dominions grant to Great Britain (and to some extent to other parts of the Empire) preferential tariff rates. The war . . . strengthened . . . the adherence of the Dominions—now recognized as nations—to the protective policy, and [gave] a new prominence to the question whether the rest of the Empire should maintain its free-trade and non-preferential policy. The British self-governing Dominions [showed] no prospect of any substantial lowering of their protective barriers. . . . A widespread demand for lower duties . . . in Canada led, in 1919, to the repeal of the war tax of 5 per cent ad valorem on merchandise admitted under the preferential tariff, . . . and, in 1920, to the repeal of the 7½ per cent war tax on non-preferential merchandise. . . . In South Africa there . . . [was] some lowering of revenue duties on articles not produced in the country, and some additions of raw materials to the free list. But a strongly nationalist (partly anti-British) feeling in South Africa, combined with the advance in industry, . . . [made] an extension of protection most probable, and an extension of the principle of imperial preference rather improbable. Australia, alone of the British Dominions, . . . thoroughly revised its tariff since the war. The new rates, which went into force provisionally in March, 1920, . . . extended the range and raised the rates even of the preferential schedule but . . . increased also the surtaxes upon non-preferential goods. Ninety manufactured articles . . . [were] made dutiable for the first time. The object . . . [was] not only to protect industries which arose during the war, but also to promise protection to some which it . . . [was] expected will be established. . . . For this purpose 'deferred duties' . . . [were] provided—to go into effect at prescribed future dates unless the Minister of Commerce [decided] that the industries are not yet on a producing basis. The avowed aim . . . [was] to make Australia self-sufficient and independent of long lines of communications, in-so-far as her raw materials provide the basis for self-sufficiency. In India, both educated and uneducated, native and Anglo-Indian opinion [was] strongly in favor of protection, and . . . [had] been increasingly insistent for many years upon the adoption of this policy. [See also INDIA: 1012-1022.] . . . In the United Kingdom two points of recent tariff history stand out. During the war there were imposed—primarily to check imports of luxuries—duties of 33½ per cent ad valorem upon clocks and watches, passenger automobiles and motorcycles, musical instruments, and at specific rates upon cinematograph films and matches. These duties have been maintained since the war obviously as heavily protective. The maintenance of these duties has been the subject of much discussion, and is optimistically regarded by many 'tariff reformers' as the beginning of a general system of protection. Secondly, by the budget bill of 1910, not only these duties but the revenue rates upon tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar, dried fruits, tobacco and alcoholic beverages were reduced in favor of colonial products, i.e., the principle of imperial prefer-

erence was accepted for the whole of the limited tariff schedules of the United Kingdom."—B. B. Wallace, *Post-war tariff changes and tendencies (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar., 1921)*.

1920.—Canada.—Reciprocal agreement with West Indies.—Commercial treaty with France renounced. See CANADA: 1920; Canadian tariff.

1920.—China.—Duties raised in Hong Kong for famine relief. See HONG KONG: 1920.

1920.—Turkey.—Provisions regarding customs in Treaty of Sèvres. See SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920); Part IX.

1921.—Europe.—Import and export prohibitions abolished between Succession States by Portoroso conference. See PORTOROSO CONFERENCE (1921).

1921.—Germany.—Tariff situation in regard to German imports crux of the reparation problem. —"Almost every country whose manufactures were stimulated during the period of the war . . . raised tariff barriers in the hope of safeguarding these infant industries. When in the summer of 1921 German trade showed a slight revival from the depression of the early months of that year, and German goods began once more to appear in increased volumes in world markets; when it was believed that the depreciation of the German currency would give an artificial stimulus to German foreign trade, the trade and financial press of the world was filled with articles . . . about the menace of reviving German competition in foreign markets. A recovery of German exports was regarded as something to be prevented at any cost. Emergency tariff, anti-dumping laws, and safeguarding of industry acts are the striking features of post-war commercial legislation. One can find no more striking example of human fatuity than the demand on the part of the Allied Countries that Germany must make vast reparation payments and the simultaneous erection of tariff barriers, the result of which is to make such payments impossible. The tragedy is that . . . few people realize that any inconsistency is involved. . . . The ability of Germany to develop an export surplus is the essence of the whole reparation problem."—H. G. Moulton and C. E. McGuire, *Germany's capacity to pay*, pp. 138, 242.

ALSO IN: F. Naumann, *Central Europe.—Social and industrial conditions in Germany today (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 12)*.—J. A. De Haas, *Present outlook of United States' trade with Germany (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar., 1921)*.

1921.—Great Britain.—Safeguarding of British Industries Act.—"In the Safeguarding of British Industries Act, 1921, we find a combination of motives—protection for the encouragement of industries considered essential from a national standpoint as a result of the World War experience, and an attempt to protect British industry in general against the dumping by countries enjoying the stimulus to export trade involved in a depreciated currency. The measure [provided] for a 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % ad valorem duty on the products of the so-called 'key' industries—optical glass, laboratory apparatus, scientific instruments, magnetos, hosiery, needles, and so forth; in addition, there . . . [was] a general anti-dumping clause which [authorized] the imposition of a duty up to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % ad valorem on goods of any kind, other than food or drink or the products of any part of the British Empire, which are sold or offered for sale in the United Kingdom (a) at prices below cost of pro-

duction, or (b) at prices which, by reason of the depreciation of the currency of the country of origin, are below the prices at which similar goods can be profitably manufactured in the United Kingdom. The first part, dealing with the protection of 'key' industries, . . . [was] to remain in effect for five years from October 1, 1921."—L. Domeratzky, *Instability of tariff conditions in Europe (Harvard Business Review, Oct., 1923)*.

ALSO IN: W. Page, *Movement toward tariff reform*.—R. G. Webster, *Awakening of an empire*.—S. Barwise, *Economics and the war*.—J. M. Robertson, *Free trade or tariff reform*.—T. E. G. Gregory, *Tariffs, a study in method*.—J. S. Nicholson, *War finance*.—H. L. Gray, *Control of industry*.—J. E. Barker, *Economic statesmanship*.—A. P. Poley, *Imperial commonwealth*.

1921.—United States.—American tariff policy reviewed.—Problem of adjusting commercial traditions to economic crisis in Europe.—"The tariff policy of the United States since our Civil War has been dominated by the purpose to protect and encourage the development of new industries. During most of the time, the political party which avowedly favored this policy has been in power at Washington, and during the short periods that the opposition was in power it could not undertake to make very radical changes. Even if one accepts the doctrines of free trade as theoretically sound, he is forced to admit that a people who possess a country of vast natural resources, like the United States, capable of supporting a great population and of developing a variety of industries will be inclined naturally to use their governmental powers to hasten such development. They are not likely to be content to await the slower processes of unaided growth. Practically all new countries adopt the policy of stimulating development, the daughter dominions of free-trade England as well as the others. . . . The main purpose of the protective policy in the past has been to get our domestic industries into a more balanced state, with factories to supply our own wants and to employ a population which would create a home market for our agricultural products. The policy of protection was not pursued to promote foreign trade. We have not been acting with a view to developing foreign markets. We have not been thinking about foreign markets, or planning to enter them with manufactured goods. In fact, the argument for protection has been based upon the theory that we could not compete successfully with foreign goods in open markets. In recent years, however, our attitude in this respect has been changing. In many lines of goods our producers have demonstrated their ability to compete in the markets of the world and to maintain a profitable and growing volume of sales. What they have done, there is reason to believe that others can do, if they have a fair chance, and the interests of those who are building up an export business are beginning to clash with the interests of those who claim that they must have protection to enable them to succeed even in the home market. . . . While under pre-war conditions we were obliged to have a favorable trade balance of about \$500,000,000 per year in order to meet our obligations abroad, hereafter foreign countries will need to have about such a balance in their dealings with us, in order to meet their obligations. . . . If we expect to have any commercial relations with the world whatever, we must consent to reciprocal relations. If we have any interest in procuring foreign customers, we must give some thought to the means by which they will be able

to make payment, and there is no way in which they can make payment save in the goods of their own production. In other words, it is idle for us to talk of developing foreign trade if we mean only the development of export business. Trade consists of exchange of products. It follows, therefore, that if we wish to allow our producers who are able and desirous of competing in foreign markets to do so, we must allow goods of foreign production to be sold in our markets to balance those exports. We will put an unbearable handicap upon our exporters by restricting imports to an extent which will cause foreign exchange charges to rise against them. . . . The people who advocate prohibitory tariffs are actuated by a mistaken idea that without such protection foreign countries will flood us with goods and ruin our industries. This is an illusion, for other countries can no more sell to us without taking products in exchange than we can sell to them without so doing. The rule of goods for goods is binding on all countries. If a great trade balance should develop against us, as feared, exchange rates would turn about and set up a barrier against imports more flexible and effective than any that can be established by law."—G. E. Roberts, *Imports, the tariff and American foreign trade* (*Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar., 1921*).—In his message to Congress in 1919 President Wilson had advocated the following tariff position: "Anything, therefore, which would tend to prevent foreign countries from settling for our exports by shipments of goods into this country could only have the effect of preventing them from paying for our exports and therefore preventing the exports from being made." Commenting on the president's stand on the tariff, Representative Nicholas Longworth of Ohio, Republican member of the ways and means committee, which was called upon to frame a new tariff bill, said: "The logical conclusion to be deduced from this statement would be that no tariff bars should be erected against the free importation into his country of goods from debtor nations. . . . With this conclusion I am entirely unable to agree. The President goes on to say: 'The productivity of the country, greatly stimulated by the war, must find an outlet by exports to foreign countries and any measures taken to prevent imports will inevitably curtail exports.' And later on he says: 'Whatever, therefore, may have been our views during the period of the growth of American business concerning tariff legislation we must adjust our new economic life to a changed condition growing out of the fact that American business is full grown and that America is the greatest capitalist in the world.' The enactment into law of such a doctrine would in my judgment bring absolute disaster to American business and industry. I concede of course that conditions have changed, but have they changed to such an extent that we ought to abandon all the standards and policies of the past and forgetting our home market to enter into a mad scramble for the world's market?"—N. Longworth, *American tariff policies adapted to present economic situation* (*Proceedings of Academy of Political and Social Science, Jan., 1921*).—"Discriminatory duties on imports carried in American vessels have been a feature of our tariff legislation from the establishment in 1789 of a national policy governing foreign trade to the present time. During much of this period such duties have, for the most part, been rendered imperative by reciprocal treaties with practically all the commercial countries of the world, mutually exempting from such

discrimination the goods carried in the vessels of the contracting nations, or by provisions in the laws themselves exempting from their enforcement articles imported in the ships of countries levying no discriminatory rates against goods carried to their ports in American bottoms. The Merchant Marine Act . . . passed by Congress [1920] and signed by the President provides for the termination of treaties or conventions which restrict the right of the United States to impose discriminatory duties in favor of imports entering this country in American vessels. The evident purpose of this enactment is to encourage trade in American bottoms as a means of protecting and enlarging our mercantile marine."—A. Berglund, *Discriminatory duties on imports in American bottoms* (*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar., 1921*).

1921 (March).—United States.—First Farmers Emergency Tariff Bill.—In the last grand rush of the closing session of Wilson's second administration many projected laws fell by the wayside, but the most controversial measure, the Fordney Emergency Tariff Bill, managed to secure a favorable vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The bill was not a complete tariff measure, as it is virtually limited to agricultural products. President Wilson vetoed the bill on March 3 and the House failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority when it attempted to pass it over the president's veto.

1921 (May).—United States.—Second Farmers' Emergency tariff.—"All the popular debates of the last generation had inculcated the belief that the mere imposing of a duty served at once to benefit the domestic producer. In a time of distress this notion of the wonder-working effect of an import duty naturally led the leaders to propose, and the rank and file to welcome, immediate and drastic tariff changes. Early in the extra session of Congress (May 27, 1921), the [Fordney] 'Emergency' act imposed high duties upon wheat, corn, meat, wool, sugar. It was originally passed with a provision that the duties should be in force for six months only, but was reenacted step by step and remained in effect until the final passage of the [Fordney-McCumber] act of 1922. As a means of meeting the emergency of the time it was hardly more than an amiable gesture. The prices of the several products continued to decline; hardly a better proof could be found of the failure of tariff duties to serve as a remedy of immediate efficacy."—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff Act of 1922* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov., 1922*).

1922.—United States.—Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922.—Five years of the tariff commission.—Effect of Tariff Act of 1922 on European trade situation.—"Although the new Tariff Commission had been at work for more than five years at the time of the passage of the Fordney-McCumber Act [in 1922], its influence on that measure was weakened by the fact that most of its members were Democratic appointees. The old plan of enumerating all the articles likely to be imported was continued, and the advice of the Commission as regards rates was largely ignored. On the other hand, the experts of the Commission did succeed in bringing about a much needed reclassification of the commodities enumerated in the Act, conforming more closely to current commercial practices, and in re-drafting the administrative provisions of the law. In general, however, the methods used in preparing the 1922 tariff were as haphazard and unscientific as those in

connection with any earlier tariff measure. . . . To a greater extent than any previous tariff it [levied] high duties on our leading agricultural products, which normally enter very little into American import trade, while at the same time it [increased] the duties on many manufactured products until they [were] practically prohibitive. . . . As was to have been expected, the new tariff returned to the dutiable list many of the articles that had been transferred to the free list in the Underwood Act, such as pig iron and manufactures of iron and steel, flax, hemp, wool, salt and most of the staple food products. There were left on the free list, however, iron ore, coal, coke, lumber, wood pulp, waste bagging and standard newsprint paper. The most remarkable provision in the . . . law is that which gives the President the power to revise the rates of duty whenever he shall find, after investigation by the Tariff Commission, that differences in production costs in the United States and in the principal competing countries are not equalized by the rates of duty provided in the new measure. The change which may be made by the President may not exceed 50 per cent of the rate as passed by Congress, but if this is not sufficient to bring about the equalization desired, the President may direct that any *ad valorem* duty, based upon the value of the imported article in the country of its origin shall thereafter be based upon its selling price in the American market. . . . [The tariff of 1922] added not a little to the complications of an international situation in which the debts owed to the United States by European countries are a highly important factor. These debts must eventually be paid, if paid at all, largely in goods, the importation of which the 1922 tariff . . . [sought] to limit and in some cases to prohibit."—H. R. Seager, *Practical problems in economics*, pp. 413-415.

\* ALSO IN: E. M. Patterson, *Our stake in Europe (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov., 1922)*.—H. Moulton and C. E. McGuire, *Germany's capacity to pay*.—W. S. Culbertson, *Making of tariffs (Yale Review, June, 1923)*.—L. F. Lybarger, *Tariff primer of Fordney-McCumber tariff*.—F. B. Vandergrift, *Handbook of United States Tariff Act of 1922*.—A. N. Cole, *Textile schedules in Tariff Act of 1922 (Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov., 1922)*.

1922.—China.—Treaty of United States, Belgium, China, England, France, Italy and Japan for revising Chinese custom duties. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

1923.—England.—Tariff crisis in the Baldwin election.—Free trade policy retained by England.—The great question as to whether or not England should relinquish her historic policy of free trade, maintained for three quarters of a century, was submitted to the people in the December elections of 1923 called for by Prime Minister Baldwin. Of this significant election, the editor of the *Economist*, F. W. Hirst, wrote to the *New York World*, "I doubt if ever in our political history we have witnessed a political transformation so swift, so sudden, so unexpected, as that of the last month. Perhaps the nearest approach to it occurred when Sir Robert Peel, leader of the Protectionist Tory Party, became a convert to Free Trade and with the help of the Whigs repealed the Corn Laws in 1846. But in his case public opinion had been prepared for the conversion by two budgets which had gone a long way in the direction of Free Trade. Another parallel is that of 1885-6, when Mr. Gladstone, leader of the Liberal Party, announced his

conversion to Home Rule for Ireland, losing in the process a large section of his followers. That too was a surprise. It startled the country; but at least he gave the electors six months' time for reflection, for the subject was thoroughly discussed in Parliament and in the country before the electors were consulted in the summer of 1886. Mr. Baldwin has given the people no time for reflection. Within a month of his conversion from the policy of 'tranquillity and stability' to the policy of a fiscal revolution, which would throw the whole business of the country into confusion, he has advised the King to dissolve Parliament and has plunged us all into the whirlpool of a general election. His excuse for it all is that an immediate remedy for unemployment must be found, that in his opinion there is no remedy except a protective tariff, and he was pledged at the general election of last year not to introduce a protective tariff during the lifetime of the Parliament then elected. He therefore asks for a new mandate with full powers to impose whatever import duties he and his advisers may think proper for the purpose of increasing employment before winter is over. . . . The appeal of the protectionists is to a number of small industries which for one reason or another are unable to export successfully, and are suffering from competition in the home market. Let me mention a few of the most important. Our imports of paper are valued at ten millions and our exports at only seven millions sterling. Our imports of silk goods are valued at fifteen millions and our exports at only one million. Our imports of leather at eight millions, against exports of four millions. I should have said these figures are for the first nine months of the current year, January to October, 1923. Taking the whole official statistics of our imports and export trade in goods mainly or wholly manufactured for these nine months, we find that imports into Great Britain are valued at 191 millions and exports at 482 millions. So that a policy aiming at the reduction of imports for the benefit of the home market—a policy which would necessarily increase the cost of living and production—might easily lead to disaster; for British manufacturers would stand to lose £48 for every £19 they stood to gain. Here are the seven biggest trades in the list excluding coal, shipbuilding and shipping, which, of course, are bound to lose under a protective tariff like that which Mr. Baldwin contemplates.

	Value of imports in millions sterling.	Value of exports in millions sterling.
Cotton goods.....	5	148
Iron and steel.....	11	62
Woolen goods.....	8	53
Other textiles .....	9	19
Apparel .....	13	22
Chemicals .....	10	21
Vehicles .....	5	24

"Here, then, we have a rough-and-ready test of the probable effect of a protective tariff upon British industries. All experience, of course, shows that a restriction of imports must mean a restriction of exports and vice versa. But British manufacturers are more dependent than those of any other country upon foreign trade, and the margin of profit is usually very narrow."—F. W. Hirst, *New York World, Dec., 6, 1923*.—"On Friday, Dec. 7, Britain . . . voted down protection. Not only in a three-cornered contest involving 20,000,-

ooo votes, have the majority—probably by 4,000,000—been cast against protection, but the latest returns leave little doubt that the whole Conservative majority has been wiped out, which means that, with the Liberals and Laborites both favoring a continuance of the policy of free trade, Premier Baldwin . . . could not put through his radical tariff reform. He has been beaten in a fight which he sought."—*New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1923.

See also AMERICAN SYSTEM; BOUNTIES; LIKIN. ALSO IN: J. F. Bass and H. G. Moulton, *America and balance sheet of Europe*.—T. H. Boggs, *International trade balance*.—J. Grunzel, *Economic protectionism*.—R. N. A. Lane, *Peace treaty and economic chaos of Europe*.—K. Leites, *Recent economic developments in Russia*.—W. S. Culbertson, *Equality of treatment among nations and bargaining tariffs (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar., 1921)*.—F. Naumann, *Central Europe*.—B. Narain, *Source book for study of Indian economic problems*.—A. W. Thomas and H. C. Corner, *Canadian Almanac for 1923*.—W. S. Culbertson, *Making of tariffs (Vale Review, Jan., 1923)*.—A. Berglund, *Tariff Act of 1922*.—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff history of the United States*.—C. C. Tansill, *Canadian reciprocity treaty of 1854*.—J. Bernhardt, *Tariff commission*.

**TARIFF OF ABOMINATIONS.** See TARIFF: 1828.

**TARIK** (died c. 720), Moslem general. Leader of the first Saracen invasion of Spain, 710; defeated Roderick, king of the Visigoths, 711. See SPAIN: 711-713.

**TARLETON**, Sir Banastre (1754-1833), English general. Served under Cornwallis in campaigns in the South. See U.S.A.: 1780 (February-August); 1780-1781.

**TARNOPOL**, town in Poland, about eighty-seven miles southeast of Lemberg. It was formerly in Austrian territory, and was a scene of fighting during the World War. See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF; WORLD WAR: 1914; II. Eastern front: c, 1; 1915: III. Eastern front: i, 5; i, 6.

**TARPEIAN ROCK**, cliff on the Capitoline hill at Rome which was used as a place for the execution of traitors. See CAPITOLINE HILL AT ROME.

**TARQUINIUS PRISCUS**, Lucius, fifth legendary king of Rome, c. 616-579 B.C. See ROME: Ancient kingdom: B.C. 753-510.

**TARQUINIUS SUPERBUS**, Lucius, seventh legendary king of Rome, c. 534-510 B.C. See ROME: Ancient kingdom: B.C. 753-510.

**TARQUINS**, Roman royal family, banished from Rome, 510 B.C. See ROME: Ancient kingdom: B.C. 753-510.

**TARRAGONA**, or Tarraco, city in Spain, the capital of the province of the same name, at the mouth of the river Francoli, sixty-three miles southwest of Barcelona.

1641.—Occupation by the French.—Surrender to the Spaniards. See SPAIN: 1640-1642.

1644.—Siege by French. See SPAIN: 1644-1646.

**TARSHISH**, unidentified ancient city referred to several times in the Old Testament. It seems to have been an important commercial center frequented by the Phoenicians. It has been associated with Crete, Cyprus, and Rhodes.

**TARSUS**, capital of Cilicia, is in the southeast corner of Asia Minor, about twenty miles from the seaport of Mersina. The population in 1911 was estimated at about 25,000, and comprises a medley of peoples from various parts of the East. Tarsus, "a great commercial, political and intellectual centre, is the ideal exponent of the cosmopolitan trend in the continuous life of the

Mediterranean. Its legendary early foundation by a Hittite hero-god, Sandan, and its place in the Hittite empire of the second millennium illustrate its fundamental Anatolian character. This was modified by the addition of a large early Hellenic colony, apparently Ionian, with traditions of foundation by Perseus. In the IX cent. B.C. it came under Assyrian rule, which probably reinforced the Babylonian elements in the Hittite culture of the city. Then for several more centuries it was the centre of a province of the Persian Empire; after which, under the Seleucid kings of the Hellenistic age, it was recolonized with Dorian Greeks and Jews, from whose important colony came Paul of Tarsus. In Roman times it was one of the most important intellectual centres of the world, in the same class as Alexandria and Antioch. In fact it became so much a university town that its government was in the hands of its university professors, who were also famous as travellers and eloquent expositors, so that they had great influence in Rome itself from Augustus to the later Antonines. At one time Tarsus was the capital of three provinces. In this continuous history of some two thousand years while Tarsus never lost her Anatolian character she showed great hospitality to Greek ideas. Also, in the period of which we know most, beginning in the Fifth century B.C., the prominence given to her religious system, as illustrated in her coins, entitles us to use this material as further proof that her high intellectual level makes her an ideal exponent of religious cosmopolitanism."—A. L. Frothingham, *Cosmopolitan religion of Tarsus and the origin of Mithra*, p. 1.—See also CILICIA.

**TARTAN**, title of the chief commander, under the king, of the Assyrian armies.

**TARTANS**, Scottish. See CLANS: Highland.

**TARTARS**. See TATARS.

**TARTESSUS**.—"The territory round Gades, Carteia, and the other Phœnician settlements in this district [southwestern Spain] was known to the Greeks in the sixth century B.C. by the name of Tartessus, and regarded by them somewhat in the same light as Mexico and Peru appeared to the Spaniards of the sixteenth century."—G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 18.—This was the rich region known afterwards to the Romans as Bætica, as Turdetania, and in modern times as Andalusia.—E. H. Bunbury, *History of ancient geography*, ch. 21, sect. 2.—See also COMMERCE: Ancient: B.C. 1000-200; TURDETANIA.

ALSO IN: J. Kenrick, *Phœnicia*, ch. 4, sect. 3.

**TARUMI**, tribe of South American Indians. See CARIBS.

**TARUSATES**, ancient Gallic tribe. See AQUITAINE: Ancient tribes.

**TASHI-LAMA**, chief high priest of Tibet. See TIBET: Name.

**TASHINCHIAO**, Battle of (1004). See JAPAN: 1002-1005.

**TASHKENT**, capital of Russian Turkestan and the territory of Syr-Darya, about 150 miles north-east of Samarkand. It was taken by Russia in 1865. See TURKESTAN; RUSSIA: 1850-1881.

**TASK WAGE**. See LABOR REMUNERATION: Methods of remuneration.

**TASMAN**, Abel Janszoon (c. 1602-1650), Dutch navigator and explorer. Discovered Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania), New Zealand, and the Fiji islands, 1642. See AUSTRALIA: 1601-1800; FIJI ISLANDS; NEW ZEALAND: 1642-1814; PACIFIC OCEAN: 1513-1704.

**TASMANIA**, formerly Van Diemen's Land, is an island situated south of Australia from which

it is separated by Bass Strait. (See AUSTRALIA: Map.) It has an area of 26,215 square miles including the small islands off the coast, and had a population of 213,877 in 1921, of which 227 were half-caste aboriginals. The pure aboriginal is extinct. The chief agricultural productions of Tasmania are grains, potatoes, fruit and live stock. Forests cover a considerable part of the island. Extensive mineral resources are copper, tin, silver, lead, zinc, coal, aspidium and tungsten ores. The principal industries for export are metal extraction and fruit-preserving. Wool, timber and grains are also exported. Hobart, the capital, having a population of 52,163 in 1921, is located on the southern coast and is a regular port of call for steamers from Australia, New Zealand and London. Tasmania was discovered in 1642 by the Dutch navigator, Abel Janszoon Tasman and named by him in honor of Governor Van Diemen of the Dutch East Indies. In 1798 it was visited by Dr. George Bass who discovered that it was an island, not a peninsula, as Tasman had believed. (See AUSTRALIA: Location and physical features; 1601-1800.) "The first occupation of Van Diemen's Land as a British settlement dates from the 13th of June, 1802, when Lieutenant John Bowen, of H. M. S. Glatton, was instructed by the Governor of New South Wales to proceed thither from Sydney in order 'to establish His Majesty's right' to the Island. . . . A mere handful of convicts, guarded by a few soldiers, constituted the vanguard of the great army of criminals which was to follow. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the colony in 1824. . . . About 18 months after his arrival in Van Diemen's Land it was proclaimed an independent colony [see NEW SOUTH WALES: 1821-1831], and the Imperial Government instituted Executive and Legislative Councils, with advisory and legislative functions. . . . For the better administration of justice, Governor Arthur divided the island into police districts, with a stipendiary magistrate for each; but he caused the laws to be executed with a Draconic severity, which transformed wretched convicts—many of whom had been transported for trivial offences—into sullen madmen, or ferocious and revengeful devils. . . . In the year 1825, as many as 100 escaped convicts with arms in their hands had re-established a reign of terror in the country districts. . . . Governor Arthur placed himself at the head of a strong body of soldiers and civilians, and hunted the daring outlaws down. As many as 103 persons underwent capital punishment in the years 1825 and 1826. . . . The Government of the Island remained in the hands of Colonel Arthur for twelve years. . . . Captain Sir John Franklin . . . was the next Governor of Van Diemen's Land, where he arrived in January, 1837. . . . To numbers of even well-informed persons in the Old World the very name of this remote island was unfamiliar until it became associated with that of the illustrious navigator. . . . Sir John Franklin was replaced in the Government of the colony by Sir John Eardley Wilmot, on the 21st of August, 1843. . . . Shortly after his appointment to the Governorship of Van Diemen's Land, the penal settlement in Norfolk Island had been constituted a dependency of the former; and the most depraved, desperate and irreclaimable of the convicts had been herded together on that beautiful spot. It would be difficult to exaggerate the horrors perpetrated by such a 'pestilent congregation' of criminals of the deepest dye. . . . There were 2,000 prisoners concentrated in Norfolk

Island in the year 1845, under the nominal rule of a superintendent who is alleged to have been stern, merciless and cruel in the exercise of the authority entrusted to him. . . . The result was the prevalence of a state of things upon the Island, which, in its unexampled misery and horror, it would be impossible to find adequate words to describe. The Imperial Government happening to learn what a pandemonium Norfolk Island had become, determined upon putting an end to it, and Governor Wilmot received instructions for the immediate transfer of the establishment to Port Arthur. . . . A turning point had now arrived in the history of Van Diemen's Land; and its free population found itself confronted by two alternatives. Either it must consent to succumb to, and to be overwhelmed by, the criminal and servile element, . . . or it must resolve, as it soon afterwards did, that transportation should cease. . . . In . . . 1846 Sir Eardley Wilmot was recalled. . . . The vice-regal term of Governor Denison, who followed, marks the dawn of the new day. . . . In the year 1850 the Imperial Parliament passed an Act for the better Government of the Australian Colonies, and among its provisions was one for the establishment of a Legislative Council in Van Diemen's Land, to consist of eight Members nominated by the Governor for the time being, and sixteen to be elected by as many districts. . . . The new Legislative Council did not meet for the dispatch of business until the 1st of January, 1852, and one of its earliest proceedings was to pass a resolution condemnatory of the continuance of the system of transportation. . . . Sir William Denison pertinaciously advised the Secretary of State for the Colonies to uphold transportation to Van Diemen's Land, and stigmatized its opponents as 'a few itinerant agitators.' Happily, wiser counsels prevailed in Downing Street, and when the Earl of Aberdeen came into office, the Duke of Newcastle was enabled to convey to the people of Van Diemen's land the gratifying assurance that . . . transportation to that Island had been put an end to for ever. The welcome dispatch . . . was published in . . . May, 1853. . . . To break the more effectually with such of the associations of the past as were painful in the present, there was a general understanding that the old name of Van Diemen's Land should be allowed to fall into disuse, and that that of the Dutch navigator who had discovered the Island should be bestowed upon it. . . . Henceforth it was to be known as Tasmania, and the judicious change was formally sanctioned by Legislative Enactment a short time afterwards. . . . By an Act of the Imperial Parliament which received the Royal Assent upon the 1st of May, 1855, a Constitution was bestowed upon Tasmania. Two Houses, both of them elective, the Council consisting of 15, and the Assembly of 30 Members, were created and invested with all the Legislative and Administrative powers and functions enjoyed by the august body which had called them into existence."—J. Smith, *Historical review of Tasmania (Australasia Illustrated, v. 2, pp. 925-941)*.—Since its constitutional organization, the history of Tasmania has been one of moderate progress. Tasmania became a state in the Australian Commonwealth on Jan. 1, 1901, and is represented in the federal Parliament by six senators and five representatives.

1884.—Represented at colonial conference at Ottawa. See BRITISH EMPIRE: Colonial and imperial conferences: 1894.

1885-1900.—Member of Council for Confederation.—Ratification of Australian constitution.



See AUSTRALIA: 1885-1892; 1900: Federation of Australian colonies; Constitution of Australia.

1903.—Suffrage granted to women. See SUFFRAGE; WOMAN: Australia.

See also EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Australia; CHARITIES: Australasia; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1850-1922.

TASSO, Torquato (1544-1595), Italian poet. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 1450-1595.

TASSONI, Alessandro (1565-1635), Italian satiric poet. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 1600-1700.

TATARIC LANGUAGE. See PHILOLOGY: 20.

TATARS.—"The Chinese used the name in a general sense, to include the greater part of their northern neighbours, and it was in imitation of them, probably, that the Europeans applied the name to the various nomad hordes who controlled Central Asia after the Mongol invasion. But the name properly belonged, and is applied by Raschid and other Mongol historians, to certain tribes living in the north-eastern corner of Mongolia, who, as I believe, were partially, at least, of the Tungusic race, and whose descendants are probably to be found among the Solons of Northern Manchuria."—H. H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, pt. 1, p. 25.—"The name of Tartars, or Tatars, has been variously applied. It was long customary among geographical writers to give this title to the Kalmucs and Mongoles, and even to use it as a distinguishing name for those races of men who resemble the Kalmucs in features, and who have been supposed, whether correctly or not, to be allied to them in descent. Later authors, more accurate in the application of terms, have declared this to be an improper use of the name of Tartar, and by them the appellation has been given exclusively to the tribes of the Great Turkish race, and chiefly to the northern division of it, viz. to the hordes spread through the Russian empire and independent Tartary. . . . Whatever may be the true origin of the name of Tartar, custom has appropriated it to the race of men extensively spread through northern Asia, of whom the Ottoman Turks are a branch. It would, perhaps, be more strictly correct to call all these nations Turks, but the customary appellation may be retained when its meaning is determined."—J. C. Prichard, *Researches into the physical history of the races of mankind*, v. 2, ch. 5, sect. 1.—"The populations in question [the remnants, in southern Russia and Siberia, of the great Mongol empire of the Kiptchak], belong to one of three great groups, stocks, or families—the Turk, the Mongol, or the Tungus. When we speak of a Tartar, he belongs to the first, whenever we speak of a Kalmuk, he belongs to the second, of these divisions. It is necessary to insist upon this; because, whatever may be the laxity with which the term Tartar is used, it is, in Russian ethnology at least, a misnomer when applied to a Mongol. It is still worse to call a Turk a Kalmuk."—R. G. Latham, *Nationalities of Europe*, v. 1, ch. 23.—See also MONGOLIA; TURKEY; PAN-TURANISM; GYPSIES; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 33; 42.

12th-13th centuries.—Conquest of Mongols. See MONGOLIA: 1153-1227; 1220-1294.

1229-1294.—Invasion of Hungary. See HUNGARY: 1116-1301.

1237-1294.—Invasion of Russia. See RUSSIA: 1237-1294.

1250.—Invasion of Rumania. See RUMANIA: 13th-18th centuries.

1258-1872.—In Bulgaria. See BULGARIA: 1258-1872.

1294-1736.—Conquest of China.—Extent of

territory in Asia. See CHINA: 1294-1736; MONGOLIA: Map of Mongolian empires.

14th-15th centuries.—Conquests of Timur. See TIMUR.

15th century.—Effects of Tatar domination on Russia. See RUSSIA: 15th century.

16th-17th centuries.—Conquests by Manchuria.—War with Cossacks in Siberia. See MANCHURIA: Early history; SIBERIA: 1578-1800.

1918.—Relations between Tatars and Armenians in the Caucasus. See WORLD WAR: 1918: VI. Turkish theater: b.

TAUBERBISCHOFSEIM, Battle of. See GERMANY: 1866.

TAUI, or Manus, principal island in the group of the Admiralty islands. See ADMIRALTY ISLANDS.

TAUNTON, capital of Somersetshire, England, in the valley of the Tone, thirty-eight miles south-west of Bristol.

1685.—Welcome to Monmouth.—Maids of Taunton and their flag.—"When Monmouth marched into Taunton [1685], it was an eminently prosperous place. . . . The townsmen had long leaned towards Presbyterian divinity and Whig politics. In the great civil war, Taunton had, through all vicissitudes, adhered to the Parliament, had been twice closely besieged by Goring, and had been twice defended with heroic valour by Robert Blake, afterwards the renowned Admiral of the Commonwealth. Whole streets had been burned down by the mortars and grenades of the Cavaliers. . . . The children of the men who, forty years before, had manned the ramparts of Taunton against the Royalists, now welcomed Monmouth with transports of joy and affection. Every door and window was adorned with wreaths of flowers. No man appeared in the streets without wearing in his hat a green bough, the badge of the popular cause. Damsels of the best families in the town wove colours for the insurgents. One flag in particular was embroidered gorgeously with emblems of royal dignity, and was offered to Monmouth by a train of young girls. [After the suppression of Monmouth's rebellion, and while the "bloody Assizes" of Jeffreys were in progress, these little girls were hunted out and imprisoned, and the queen's maids of honor were permitted to extort money from their parents for the buying of their pardon and release.]"—T. B. Macaulay, *History of England*, ch. 5.—See also ENGLAND: 1685 (May-July).

TAURICA, TAURIC CHERSONESE, ancient Greek name of the Crimea, derived from the Tauri, a savage people who once inhabited it; "perhaps," says Grote, "a remnant of the expelled Cimmericians." See CIMMERIANS.

TAURIS, Naval battle near (47 B. C.).—In the Roman civil war between Cæsar and his antagonists, an important naval battle was fought near the little island of Tauris, on the Illyrian coast. Vatinius, who commanded on the Cæsarian side, defeated Octavius, and drove him out of the Adriatic.—Based on G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic*, v. 5, ch. 21.

TAUROMENION. See TAORMINA.

TAUSSIG, Frank William (1850- ), American economist. Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission, 1917-1919; economic adviser at the Paris peace conference. See PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Sources of information.

TAVASTLAND, Finnish dialect. See FINLAND: Ethnology.

TAVERNER'S BIBLE. See BIBLE, ENGLISH: 16th-17th centuries.

**TAVETA**, town in British East Africa. It was a scene of fighting during the World War. See **WORLD WAR: 1916: VII. African theater: a; a, 2.**

**TAVORA PLOT** (1758). See **JESUITS: 1757-1773.**

**TAWACONIES**, North American Indian tribe. See **PAWNEE FAMILY.**

**TAXATION: Direct and indirect taxes.—Incidence of property tax.—Corporation taxes.—**“A tax may be defined as a compulsory contribution to the government to defray expenses incurred for the common benefit without reference to special advantages enjoyed. The points to be emphasized in this definition are that the payment is compulsory, that the proceeds are to be used for the common benefit and that the justification for the payment is participation in these common benefits rather than any special advantage enjoyed.”—H. R. Seager, *Principles of economics*, p. 481.—“Taxation in normal times takes the place of compulsory service in modern states. When citizens become free it is often detrimental to their interests for them to perform governmental service and neglect their own affairs. Hence they readily grant a small per cent of their income in lieu of service. This proves advantageous to the government also, for with money it can hire willing workers, always more efficient than compulsory service. In modern states, therefore, the government through taxation secures means to support a well trained permanent army and navy, and capable officials and skilled labor for public works. As the citizens themselves in democracies fix by law their own tax rates, and settle the items for expenditure and supervise the auditing of accounts, friction is thereby avoided. Government and people harmoniously cooperate in furthering general interests, for all recognize that joint success is individual benefit and that the injury of any part becomes the detriment of the whole. . . . The modern battles of democracy have regularly raged about principles of taxation. In England the struggle has been for the ‘control of the purse’; in the American Colonies, that there be ‘no taxation without representation’; and in general, that all taxation be for public, never for private, interests, and that the burden of taxes be equitably assessed. The motive in such struggles is not necessarily mercenary; experience shows that when the citizen body as a whole controls the tax rate and expenditures, public policy loses its military aspects and attention is concentrated on the upbuilding of internal improvements and systems of general education.”—J. Q. Dealey, *State and government*, pp. 318-320.—“Writers upon finance have commonly made a distinction between direct and indirect taxes. The former are said to be levied directly upon the person who has to bear the burden of them; while the latter are collected in the first instance from people who add the amount of the tax to the prices of commodities, and thus shift the burden upon the ultimate consumers of the articles taxed. Income, poll, property, and inheritance taxes are called direct; and customs and excise taxes are considered to be indirect. . . . Poll or inheritance taxes are clearly borne by the very persons who are called upon to pay them, and most of our customs and excise taxes ultimately fall upon other people than those from whom the government collects them. But other cases present considerable difficulty. If I import goods for my own use, without resorting to any middleman, the customs duty will fall directly upon me. Again it is often difficult to determine who will ultimately bear the burden of such a direct tax as

that upon property. In some cases the tax can be shifted from the landlord to the tenant. . . . Such facts as these seem to deprive this distinction between direct and indirect taxes of strict scientific validity. [When considering the incidence of the general property tax] . . . we are not dealing with one tax, but rather with a group of diverse taxes, which may be classified as follows: (1) a tax on land; (2) a tax on consumable goods in the hands of their owners; and (3) taxes on investments of private capital. The incidence of the tax on land will be first considered. This tax is levied in this country [the United States] upon the selling price of the land, and it is virtually graded according to the amount of rent that each tract yields, since the selling price is the annual rental capitalized at the current rates of interest. Now a tax levied upon economic rent must be borne by the landowner, and cannot be shifted. The rent of land is determined by the superior advantages that one tract furnishes for the investment of capital over the opportunities offered by the poorest tracts utilized. The landlord will, if competition is active, exact from the tenant all that the superior situation or quality of his land enables him to demand. The imposition of the tax will not alter the situation so as to change the economic rent and enable the landlord to shift the burden onto the tenant by charging a higher rental. But it is important to notice that the land tax in this country is a burden mainly upon the original owner of the property at the time that a new tax is first laid, or an old one increased. This is because a prospective purchaser will make allowance for the tax when he determines how much he can afford to pay for the land. Investments in corporation securities and many other things largely escape taxation under our present methods. A man will not purchase land unless he can obtain from it the same return that can be secured from these untaxed investments; and he will, accordingly, offer a smaller price than he would be willing to pay if the land were untaxed. Thus, if a tract of land yielded an annual rent of \$5,000, and the rate of interest on equally secure investments was five per cent., its selling price would be \$100,000. Now if a tax of \$500 should be imposed, prospective purchasers would deduct \$10,000, the capitalized value of the tax, from the price that they would be willing to pay; and the burden would fall entirely upon the original owner. The property tax, in the second case, reaches many kinds of consumer's goods in the hands of their owners, such as dwelling-houses inhabited by owners, household furniture, and the like. All these goods are not kept for sale or for hire, but solely for the owners' use. Consequently the tax cannot be shifted onto tenants or purchasers, and must be borne by the owners of the property. In the third case, the general property tax is supposed to fall upon all kinds of private capital invested for the sake of income. If the purpose of the laws were actually accomplished, so that all possible fields of investment were taxed equally, the tax could not be shifted, and would be borne by the owners of capital. This is for the reason that shifting can take place only when capital can be withdrawn from an industry that is taxed, and invested in others that are free from taxation. When this can be done, the taxation of capital invested in a few industries results in a readjustment of prices, which will finally enable the taxed investments to yield the same return as those which are untaxed. Now the wholesale evasion of our property tax leaves a large part

of the field for investments virtually untaxed, so that it is frequently possible for shifting to take place. Some of the more important kinds of investments need to be examined separately. (A) Taxes upon dwelling-houses that are built for hire are in large measure shifted onto the occupier, since capitalists will not make such investments unless the same rate of return can be obtained as can be secured in untaxed enterprises. In case, however, a lessened demand for lodgings makes the supply of houses greater than the number actually required, then rentals will have to be lowered and the tax will fall upon the owners. This is because the capital invested in the form of houses cannot be withdrawn and applied elsewhere in new enterprises. (B) Taxes upon buildings, machinery, and stocks of goods used in commerce or manufactures would also be shifted if competition were perfect. But these investments, when once made, are highly specialized, and trade conditions often make it difficult to shift such taxes upon consumers. Thus, for instance, competition by foreign producers, or by producers more advantageously situated in some other part of the country, may render it impossible for merchants or manufacturers to raise prices and shift the tax. (C) The same considerations apply to taxes on buildings, live stock, and implements used in agriculture, and with added force. American farmers sell a large part of their products in foreign markets where prices are determined by international competition. Moreover, they are slow to adjust themselves to new conditions, so that competition acts very imperfectly upon agricultural industry. It seems reasonably certain that taxes upon farming capital are borne by the farmers themselves. (D) Taxes upon mortgages operate very differently. The capital invested in this manner is more free to seek the most profitable fields of investment. It can in a few years leave any state or community where unusual burdens are placed upon it, and has repeatedly done so. The result is that, where our tax laws actually reach mortgage investments, the tax is surely shifted upon the borrower, in the form of a higher rate of interest. In many states mortgages practically evade all taxation; but when they are reached, as in California, the rate of interest is higher than that asked for other equally safe investments, and higher by something more than the amount of the tax. (E) Finally, we may mention taxes upon corporation stocks and bonds. For the most part these escape taxation, but, when they are reached, the probability is that shifting often takes place. (F) The results of the foregoing discussion need to be qualified in the case of taxes that reach enterprises of a monopolistic character. These cannot be shifted if they are fixed in amount, or if they are proportioned to monopoly profits."—C. J. Bullock, *Introduction to the study of economics*, pp. 548-549, 564-568.—"Taxes on corporations and on franchise privileges furnish a constantly increasing revenue for the state. The state even may itself engage in business for public-welfare purposes and derive income from the excess of profits over expenditure. The conditions of modern business life are so complex by contrast with those of former centuries, that national systems of taxation are undergoing rapid changes and are constantly subject to revision so as to suit newer conditions of economic life and changes in the variety and intensity of public demands."—J. Q. Dealey, *State and government*, p. 65.—See also DEATH DUTY; PHYSIOCRATS; SINGLE TAX; TARIFF.

Growth from earliest times.—Taxation in the

Middle Ages.—Venetian republic.—England.—Florence.—France.—Germany.—"Taxation in its early crude forms was naturally suited to the conditions of savage or barbarian life. As war was the chief and almost only business of the state, its activity was intermittent. Taxation consisted in a demand for the services of its fighting men for war and of other capable members of the community for purposes of advice, defense, and maintenance. . . . The state's power of taxation, then, implied its right to enroll or to conscript its able-bodied men for war and to demand suitable arms and supplies. . . . As the state grew in importance, it assumed other functions that involved men's services. Roads and bridges had to be built for war and commercial purposes; public buildings, such as temples, palaces, monuments, and fortresses had to be erected; cities were founded, irrigating canals dug, public lands cultivated, and civic business administered. All these involved taxation, and the system employed was similar to that used in war."—J. Q. Dealey, *State and government*, pp. 62-63.—"The method of capitation seems . . . to appertain to the infancy of the system of taxation. . . . In fact ancient Persia and ancient China [see LIKIN] had . . . systems of imposts, eminently personal. . . . [The land tax] . . . appears in the economic history of the peoples coeval with private property. . . . The first indication of this we find among the Hebrews precisely in the form of a tenth. It was a land tax consisting of an annual impost paid to the Levites . . . [and] comprised a tenth part of the products of the land. . . . In ancient Egypt, according to Diodorus, the land was divided in equal parts between the kings, the priests and the military caste, and according to the Bible, the kings had the right to a fifth of the product of the lands conceded to the two orders of citizens. . . . The kings of Greece in Homeric times had no other resource than that proceeding from the land. . . . In Persia the land tax certainly existed, as one deducts from the orders . . . given by Darius to measure the territory of the Greek colonies in Asia Minor and tax it by parasangs."—E. La Cecilia, *Historic essay on the evolution of tributes* (tr. from the Italian), v. 1, pp. 29-31.—"The Kings of ancient Chaldea made "such large concessions of [their territory] . . . to their vassals that the greater part of their domains was always in the hands of the nobles or private individuals . . . [who] paid on account of it a tax which varied at different epochs, but which was always burthensome."—G. Maspero, *Dawn of civilization, Egypt and Chaldea* (tr. by M. L. McClure), p. 701.—"A definite system of taxation came into use with the rise of private property and the personal ownership of flocks and the products of agriculture. Its first form was the levy of a definite per cent of the produce of the flocks or herds or of the fruits and crops of the land. The privilege of collecting this, involving much extortion, was given to favorites or sold to collectors, the *publicani* of the New Testament."—J. Q. Dealey, *State and government*, p. 63.—In Babylon during the reign of Hammurabi (c. 2124-2081 B. C.) "wool of the flocks was a source of revenue both for the temple and the palace."—R. C. Thompson, *Cambridge ancient history*, v. 1, p. 545.—In ancient Egypt, "beside the poll and house tax [the workmen of the towns] . . . were subject to a special toll, a trade licence which they paid in products of their commerce or industry. . . . The time when the tax fell due came upon the nomes [provinces] as a terrible crisis which affected the whole population. For several days

there was nothing to be heard but protestations, threats, beating, cries of pain from the tax payers and piercing lamentations from the women and children. . . . [The free agricultural laborers] paid, beside the capitation tax, a ground rent proportionate to the extent of their property . . . and to the kind of land of which it was composed. . . . The capitation tax, the ground rent and the house duty of the time of the Ptolemies already existed under the rule of the native Pharaohs. . . . Everything tends to make us believe that . . . [the land] tax represented one-tenth of the gross produce, but the amount of the latter varied. It depended on the annual rise of the Nile and it followed the course of it with almost mathematical exactitude. . . . In theory the collecting of the tax was based on the actual amount of land covered by the water. . . . In practise it was regulated by taking the average of preceding years and deducting from that a fixed sum which was never departed from except in extraordinary circumstances. . . . The payment of taxes was exacted in wheat, dourah, beans and field produce. . . . In the same way as in the town, the stick facilitated the operations of the tax collector."—G. Maspero, *Dawn of civilization, Egypt and Chaldea* (tr. by M. L. McClure), pp. 311, 314, 328 and footnote, 330-332.—An elaborate system of farming the revenues is found in Ptolemaic Egypt.—Based on W. S. Davis, *Wealth in imperial Rome*, p. 27.—In ancient Greece "the payment of taxes in kind, which was still in use during the sixth century . . . had in the following century been generally superseded by money contributions. Extraordinary expenditure . . . was sometimes met by the imposition of a general property tax. . . . The first levy of [the property tax in Athens] . . . is recorded in 428 B.C. (Thuc. III. 19). . . . In the fourth, probably also in the fifth century, both real and personal estate was taxed, and corporate property was also subject to the impost, but the poorer citizens were exempt."—M. O. B. Caspari, *Finance* (L. Whibley, ed., *Companion to Greek studies*, pp. 492, 494).—See also ATHENS: B.C. 466-454; B.C. 413-411; LITURGIES; SYMMORIAE.—"The chief source of income for the [Chinese] government [reign of Wu Ti, second century B.C.] . . . was the property tax, which was levied to the extent of one-fifteenth of the produce of the land. At times this was reduced to one-thirtieth, and was even remitted entirely in years of famine or in districts through which the emperor had passed on his journeys. The occupant himself was responsible for the declaration of his assessment and false information was punishable by death."—M. von Brandt, *Japan, China and Korea* (*World's history*, v. 2, ch. 1, p. 79).—When to the tax on the produce of land "was added a tax on property fixed to the land, e.g., a building, we have the modern idea of real estate as distinct from movable, or personal, property. Personal services were gradually commuted for other forms of payment. . . . In farming communities real property is naturally large in amount when compared with personal property, but the rise of commerce and manufactures multiplied this latter form of property, resulting in the development of newer forms of taxation. Besides the direct tax on personal property, always hard to estimate and to collect, came taxes on goods sent out or brought into a country, the modern export and import taxes. Again, a tax might be levied on goods manufactured for the purpose of domestic sale, or on the sales themselves, or on the profits of business transactions; or on special business

transactions, as a stamp tax; or on occupation, a special form of which is the license tax, for permission to enter on business which from its nature must be under governmental supervision, such as the sale of liquors, explosives, or poisons. A common but obnoxious tax is the poll, or head, tax. Income and inheritance, or legacy, taxes have a history of many centuries. They were levied in the classic period and owing to the exigencies of the war period have become increasingly popular with governments."—J. Q. Dealey, *State and government*, p. 64.—In imperial Rome an important indirect tax was introduced by Augustus, and paid from the year 6 A.D. "It was a charge of 5% on all sums above 100,000 sesterces bequeathed to persons other than near relations, and its introduction was partly due to Augustus' anxiety to encourage matrimony. Its imposition was vigorously opposed, and was only carried by the threat of introducing a direct tribute into Italy. Only Roman citizens paid the legacy-duty."—G. H. Stevenson, *Finance* (J. E. Sandys, ed., *Companion to Latin studies*, p. 350).—See also ROME: Empire: A.D. 54-64; CENSUS: Ancient; TRIBUTUM; VECTIGAL.—"The main outlines of a public fisc are . . . present already in the feudal state of the Middle Ages. In virtue of the military character of that state, the duty which . . . constitutes the foundation of every state, becomes the central fact in its system of public duties. . . . Scutage and tallage [see SCUTAGE; TALLAGE] are contributions of a genuine political character toward defraying the expenses of war, and they replace the liability to personal military service and form the transition to the modern system of taxation. . . . Where, contrary to its nature [the tax] . . . takes on the character of a fixed burden, it is transformed into a burden on real property; a fixed personal tax being, to the mediæval sense of personal liberty and dignity, a mark of the bondman. And . . . this class of imposts blends with the peculiar burdens pertaining to villenage; a fact which becomes intelligible when it is remembered that villenage originates in personal inability to bear arms. . . . But even during these earlier centuries the personal taxes developed into quite a different form when employed under circumstances which approached modern political life in being freed from the trammels of the feudal system and the territorial state. What I have in mind is the democratic organizations of the old cantons of Switzerland and the city republics of the Middle Ages. The rule is the same here as elsewhere during those centuries. The tax is for the most part an extraordinary burden, levied to meet cases of special necessity or the exigencies of war. Still, in certain ones of them there is a relatively early development of a fixed tax constituting a permanent element of the public finances."—G. Cohn, *Science of finance*, pp. 86-87, 382, 384.—See also GAFAL; BRITAIN: 284-305.—In the Venetian republic "the payment of tithes was a usage of high antiquity. Posterior to 697 it was customary for each House to lay at the feet of the Chief Magistrate its proportionate oblation of fish, bread, oil, honey, wine and the other necessaries of life."—W. C. Hazlitt, *Venetian republic*, v. 1, p. 66.—"Venice was almost to the last severely protectionist. . . . Imports and exports alike paid duty; a stringent excise guarded all points of ingress or egress; and even the members of the Craft-guilds contributed a certain quota of their gains in addition to the entrance fees."—*Ibid.*, v. 2, p. 776.—In England "from a period antecedent to the Conquest itself commerce had been nominally at least

—under the control of the Crown. . . . The origin of the royal prerogative . . . may perhaps be traced from the tribal contributions in support of the kingly state, which took the later form of purveyance, per-emption, prisage and butlerage, dismes, and finally Customs. . . . From the middle of the twelfth century onwards a regular scale of dues was levied at the outports. Similar dues were also exacted by seigniorial and municipal franchises, but these depended in turn upon a grant from the Crown. . . . [Under Richard I the royal ministers] made assessment by elected representatives the regular rule for taxation, both of personalty and of land, and thus left but one step to be taken toward the creation of representative parliaments. . . . The constitutional history [of England] might, in fact, be written, so to speak, in terms of taxation. The improvement of the judicial system in the twelfth century originated as a mode of gathering taxes; the royal administration was primarily a tax-collecting agency, and the growth of Parliament was necessitated by new forms of taxation. Thus the feudal aid, which was the earliest form of tax, being in theory a voluntary gift, established the principle that taxation requires the subjects' assent. When the new taxes on personalty came in, this assent was made a greater reality by the taxpayer's help being required for assessment and collection; gradually the separate negotiations with each shire were simplified by calling the representatives of each shire to meet all at once and settle the grant. . . . Thus it is clear that as late as 1290, so great a man as Edward I still regarded the old feudal council as adequate for all purposes of government except the new form of taxation; for this, and this alone, he deemed a representative assembly necessary."—H. D. Traill, ed., *Social England*, v. 1, pp. 460-470, 262-263, 400-401.—See also ENGLAND: 1085-1086; 1629; 1629-1640; BAGMONT'S ROLL; TONNAGE AND POUNDAGE.—In Florence "taxation from Cosimo's time [1389-1464] had been the Medici substitute for the dagger. Opponents were crushed out financially where elsewhere they disappeared bodily. . . . [Lorenzo] made no such cruel and vindictive use of it as Cosimo had made . . . and . . . took some steps to put the general system of taxation upon a fixed and definite basis. His fundamental principle was that taxation should be graduated, and fall mainly on the land. . . . The revenue derived from land was supplemented by a graduated poll-tax . . . and later on, a graduated tax was imposed on movables and earnings."—E. L. S. Horsburgh, *Lorenzo the Magnificent and Florence in her Golden Age*, p. 207.—"In France . . . from the time that feudalism became fully established, and the old allodial taxation, which of course had been used under the Merovingians and Karlings, was entirely superseded, . . . the support of the king and of the framework of government depended legally on demesne lands and the proceeds of the feudal incidents. While the kingdom was very weak, it made government cheap and war difficult, and taxation accordingly small. . . . But Philip the Fair, having called together the states-general for a political purpose, would fain utilise them for a financial one. In 1314 they granted him a subsidy, . . . the towns for the first time being consulted whether they would give or no. The towns before this had been tallaged at the will of the king, now they vote money as a free state. . . . The states of Tours in 1484 were a remarkable, and the last remarkable, assembly of the kind. . . . [They] demanded that no tax should ever be levied again without the consent

of the states. They tried for too much and came to an end in a not altogether inglorious way. Henceforth the king took his taxes as he wanted them. [See also FRANCE: 1509-1610; PARIS: 1381; TAILLE AND GABELLE; TARIFF: 1664-1667.] . . . [In Germany] it would be difficult to say that there was any general taxation through the middle ages commonly so called; the emperor was, as a matter of fact, entirely dependent on the proceeds of his own estates and on the money voted by his hereditary provinces."—W. Stubbs, *Lectures on early English history*, pp. 304-306.—"It is quite in accord with the traditions of the feudal system that we find that the Great Elector of Brandenburg, as late as the year 1662, had gradually . . . succeeded in substituting, in place of special grants for the purpose, fixed contributions from his territories toward the support of the standing army which he had created. At the same time the obligation of the knighthood to follow the sovereign in war was commuted into a money payment of forty thalers for each horseman. In the towns, wherever the requirements of the tax administration permitted, the excise was generally introduced after 1667, to take the place of Contributions; a step which lightened the taxes of the burghers and increased the revenue. The inadequacy of the Contribution became evident as early as the years 1677 and 1679, when an extraordinary subsidy, a 'poll-money' [*Kopfschoss*], was levied on all inhabitants. In point of fact this contribution appears to have been an income tax. . . . This poll tax was repeated under his successor with increasing frequency but was made the subject of a formal waiver by Frederick William I. (1715), and was restricted to the case of a defensive war. Frederick the Great finally found other means of obtaining a revenue in order to provide for the heavy expenditures of the wars. [See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 27.] . . . The Contribution, however, was made use of by both the two great Prussian kings of the eighteenth century as the point of departure for reforms which prepared the way for the modern land tax by means of a registry of incomes; they aimed partly to consolidate the burdens resting on the land into a single impost, partly to lessen the inequality of the burdens resting on land owned by peasants compared with that owned by the knighthood."—G. Cohn, *Science of finance*, pp. 382-384.—See also TITHES.

Parliamentary taxation in England.—American Revolution.—Adam Smith's canons.—"The Declaration of Right, with some slight but essential changes, was incorporated at the second session of this Parliament, the 25th of October, 1689, in statutory form known subsequently as the Bill of Rights. In the matter of taxation, it sums up in a few clauses the whole principle which had been in course of evolution since the German chieftains received gifts of cattle and fruits from their people. . . . It states that King James 'did endeavor to subvert and extirpate . . . the laws and liberties of this kingdom . . . by levying money for and to the use of the crown, by pretense of prerogative, for other time and in other manner than the same was granted by Parliament.' Then follows the definite assertion, 'that levying money for or to the use of the crown by pretense of prerogative, without grant of Parliament for longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal.' The clause which gave to these statements the force of law, emphasizes the power of Parliament. 'All which their Majesties are contented and pleased,' so it goes, 'shall be declared,

enacted, and established by authority of this present Parliament, and shall stand, remain, and be the law of this realm forever; and the same are by their said Majesties, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, declared, enacted and established accordingly.' With the passing of the Bill of Rights the principle was vindicated in its fullness that Parliament rather than the crown has the power to tax. Within Parliament itself the power of laying taxes had undergone further differentiation in that the House of Commons claimed the sole right of initiating tax levies. The theory deduced therefrom, that the House of Commons has sole control over money bills and that interference by the House of Lords is an assumption of power beyond the constitutional rights of that House, came up for fuller definition 220 years later. The corollary principle that Parliament has the power to appropriate supplies for specific purposes and that it can demand an accounting for the money so appropriated were accorded general acquiescence then and thereafter."—S. A. Morgan, *History of parliamentary taxation in England*, pp. 306-308.—See also BILL OF RIGHTS, ENGLISH.—"The second year of the war of American Independence forms a date of peculiar interest in the history of taxation in this country [England]. Our chancellors of the exchequer had for years been at their wits' end for new and productive taxes. . . . Despair of obtaining additional revenue at home had driven us to the unfortunate attempt to obtain revenue from our colonies in America. How . . . was North . . . able to find the taxes necessary for the purpose of this long and costly war? An answer may be supplied by reference to the title-page of the first edition of Adam Smith's work on 'the cause of the increase in the wealth of nations,' subsequently famous as . . . 'The Wealth of Nations.' . . . To this work North had recourse for suggestions in taxation in 1777, when he was compelled to find an additional revenue of nearly a quarter of a million."—S. Dowell, *History of taxation and taxes in England*, v. 2, ch. 7, pp. 105-106, 168.—"The maxims inseparably associated with [the name of Adam Smith] were in his own day accepted by theorists and statesmen, and have by constant repetition become an indispensable part of any exposition of finance. Though fully in harmony with the spirit of the last century [the eighteenth], they have not been found inapplicable to modern conditions, and in spite of much hostile criticism bid fair to hold their ground in the future. These famous maxims . . . are four in number, and run as follows: (1) 'The subjects of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities—that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State.' (2) 'The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary. The form of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor and to every other person.' (3) 'Every tax ought to be levied at the time or in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.' (4) 'Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the State.'"—C. F. Bastable, *Public finance*, p. 384.

Tax levy on land owners in Japan. See JAPAN: 833-1050.

Papal taxation. See PAPACY: 8th-16th centuries; also VENICE: 1606-1607.

Early Spanish taxation. See CORTES, EARLY SPANISH.

Stamp tax on English newspapers. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1712; 1853-1870.

Taxation in South America in the eighteenth century. See LATIN AMERICA: 1715-1810.

Turgot's policy in France. See FRANCE: 1761-1773; 1774-1788.

Prussia, France and Great Britain.—Tax reform and development during the nineteenth century.—In Prussia, "the reforms of Stein and Hardenburg in the forms of land tenure . . . may be regarded as having been accomplished in 1811. Briefly stated, their result was to abolish personal serfdom, dissolve the feudal partnership between tenants and proprietors, and establish free trade in land. Although these reforms had to do mainly with land, and although the accompanying edict of 1810 promised speedy reform of the land tax on the basis of a new survey, or *cadastre*, nothing material was accomplished in the reorganisation of this tax until 1861. . . . The edict of 1810, which . . . [promised] a reform of the land tax, seriously attempted to remove inequalities by destroying many feudal exemptions and privileges, and removing local differences. A general scheme of consumption taxes on necessities, of which the excise on meal is a type, was planned for city and country alike. It was, however, immediately found that the meal tax was hard to collect in rural parts. As early as 1811, therefore, a poll tax of one-half thaler from every person over twelve years of age was substituted for the meal tax in all places except the larger towns. In 1820 this tax, still applying to the same places, developed into a classified poll tax. . . . In 1851, this tax was changed in order to make room for the introduction of an income tax on all persons having an income of over 1000 thalers. Those persons whose incomes were below this amount were taxed in the large cities by the meal and meat tax; in the country and in small towns, by a class tax. . . . The income tax . . . was a progressive tax on the income of every person. When the land tax was reformed in 1861, the building tax was separated from it, having been until that time a part of it; and all old taxes of a similar sort were merged in the new one. . . . One of the reforms that was made after the peace of Tilsit to strengthen the weakened economic resources of the country was the establishment of general industrial freedom. Naturally, such a change would have been regarded as a failure from the standpoint of the statesmen of the times, if it could not be made to yield a revenue to the treasury; so the new industries were burdened with a new tax. This tax, which was very weak, and which, wisely, perhaps, failed to meet all the new forms of industry which came into existence, was subjected to a thoroughgoing reform in 1801. . . . The Prussian system, as it existed before the great reforms of 1803, may now be seen as a whole. It consisted of two parts: (1) There was a group of three complementary taxes upon the produce of property and capital,—the land tax, the building tax, and the industry tax; (2) there was a system of personal taxes culminating in an income tax. The former group, true to the economic tenets of the first three-quarters of the century, taxed the productive agencies. The latter, although it originated as a consumption

tax, aimed at taxing the shares in distribution. Thus the older consumption taxes, which were originally assessed without any very clear idea of what the justification was, but were used because productive of large revenues, yielded to new taxes supposed to be more fairly in accord with the modern system of distribution. We are now in position to see the significance of the great reforms of 1893 (all of which went into effect in 1895), made under the leadership of *Finanzminister* Dr. Miquel. . . . The income tax, which has long been correctly regarded as the foundation of the Prussian tax system, was subjected to a thorough reform in 1891. . . . It was felt that the existing produce taxes (*Ertragsteuern*), the land, building and industry taxes, failed to accomplish this end. Hence one of the reforms of 1893 was the surrender of these taxes as royal taxes, and the initiation of a general property tax as supplementary to the income tax. . . . This tax being supplementary to the income tax accomplishes the result of imposing a differential rate on funded income as against unfunded income. The abandonment by the State of the three old taxes on land, buildings, and industry rendered the reform of local taxation possible. [See also GERMANY: 1885.] In France indirect taxation has probably found a higher development than anywhere else. Some of the main taxes are on the consumption of wine, spirits, beer, sugar, salt, tobacco, etc.; there are also the *octrois* or gate duties collected by some of the cities as a means of contributing their share of some of the direct taxes to the general treasury. There are also the taxes on acts and transfers, and the customs duties. Not peculiar to France, but receiving a high development there, is the mode of collecting a tax on consumption by a monopoly of the manufacture of tobacco in the hands of the government. The imperative necessity under which France has laboured all through this [nineteenth] century of continually increasing her revenues, and the danger of making the burden unbearable if thrown upon the existing direct taxes, as well as the desire on the part of the legislators of concealing so far as possible the actual burden, lest an impatient constituency rebel, accounts well for the relatively high development of indirect taxation. . . . Direct taxation in France dates in its present form from the Revolution. All the taxes of the ancient monarchy were abolished at that time and a fixed scheme of taxes on revenue-yielding property substituted. This system of direct taxes had four chief members: (1) the tax on real estate; (2) the tax on persons in dwellings; (3) the tax on doors and windows; (4) the tax on business. Supplementary to this system are a number of taxes classed officially as assimilated to the direct taxes. These, so far as they flow into the State treasury, are: (1) the tax on mines; (2) the charges for the verification of measures; (3) the tax on goods in mortmain falling on the property of the *communes*, hospitals, churches, seminaries, charitable institutions, etc.; (4) the charges for the cost of inspection of pharmacies, grocers, druggists, and herbists. Of these numbers 2 and 4 are practically fees, numbers 1 and 3 are merely definite kinds of real estate taxes. The real estate tax, the personal and dwelling tax, and the door and window tax are apportioned taxes. The real estate tax, which is a combined land and building tax, is apportioned upon the basis of a very elaborate survey and valuation completed in 1850, and carefully kept up. These taxes are apportioned in successive steps first to the *departments*, then to the *arrondissements*, and then to the

communes, by the several legislative bodies, and finally divided among the individuals in each commune by a 'conseil de repartition.' The tax on persons and dwellings, also apportioned, is a poll tax, with an attempt at gradation according to the ability supposed to be indicated by the rent of the building occupied. It consists of two parts: (1) The amounts of three days' wages of labour at from one-half to one and one-half francs *per diem*; (2) the tax on the rent of the building occupied as a private dwelling. The cities of Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, and a few others raise their shares of this tax by the means of duties on goods brought into the city, *i. e.*, *octroi*. The door and window tax is an apportioned tax rated according to the number of windows and doors in the houses. It was intended to supplement the personal and dwelling tax, but it is really an addition to the real estate tax. It is paid by the owner and he is allowed to shift it if he can to the tenant. The industry tax, contribution des *patentes*, unlike the other member of the system, is not apportioned but proportioned. It is intended to reach the bulk of the personal property, and in a rough way covers income from certain kinds of labour. Originally it was assessed in proportion to the value of the location of the factory, store, or workshop occupied by the industry. Now it is assessed upon some elaborately constituted classes, in rates which vary with the size of the community in which the business is done, and the rental of the place of business. It includes all kind of commercial and industrial enterprises and occupations, large and small, and also the liberal professions, when not exercised in behalf of some already taxed business enterprise. The agriculturists are exempt. Direct taxation in France may be summarized as falling mainly on the agents of production and the sources of wealth. [See also FRANCE: 1801-1809.] . . . The greatest change in the British scheme of taxation within this [nineteenth] century was the elimination of the protective principle from the customs duties,—and indirectly from the excises also,—brought about in the period from 1840-1850, by the abolition of the corn laws and the agitation leading thereto. The consequent simplification of both the import duties and the excises rendered it possible to manage them simply as a source of revenue with a view to obtaining relatively larger sums. The customs duties, the entire tariff of which now contains only 40 rates, and the somewhat more numerous excises and stamp duties, pay one-half the total annual revenue. The property and income tax . . . was restored in 1842 and has since been the variable or elastic element in the system. . . . Inasmuch as this famous property and income tax is a system, in itself, of five taxes which are calculated to fall upon the chief sources of wealth, it complies, in a way, with the requirements of universality. Its rate is digressive, so that it attempts to comply with the requirements of justice. It may be looked upon as the complete system of direct taxation. Outside of the system there are two remnants of older taxes. . . . They are the land tax of the eighteenth century, which is now a redeemable rent charge, and the house duty. This latter developed out of the hearth tax of 1662. In 1688 it had been replaced by a window tax. In 1778 a tax on the annual rental was added to the window tax, and finally after 1851 this tax on the rental value was left to stand alone. There is still another tax which supplements the property and income tax, and that is the inheritance tax. . . . These inheritance

taxes, 'death duties,' . . . have existed in England since 1694. . . . The important thing to note in this connection is that these taxes have introduced the principle of progression very extensively into the tax system of England. The English system as it now stands, consists (1) of the customs and excise duties, (2) of the so-called property and income tax, a digressive tax upon five kinds of income, (3) two older taxes, the land tax and the house tax, (4) a graduated inheritance tax. The different authorities that have had the power to levy local rates in England are very numerous. The whole system is very complex. The different rates, each going by the name of the authority that levies it, or the purpose for which it is collected, are mostly upon the same base, namely, the annual rental of the various tenements. They are generally levied upon occupiers. In the case of tenements of less than £10 annual value, the difficulty of collecting from the occupier is so great that the plan of making the landlord advance the tax has been adopted. He then shifts it to the occupier. The recent reforms of county and municipal government in England have resulted in a simplification of local rates."—C. C. Plehn, *Introduction to public finance*, pp. 150-162.—See also ENGLAND: 1885; IRELAND: 1850-1896; TARIFF: 1842: England.

Land taxation in New Zealand. See NEW ZEALAND: 1890-1909.

Outline in United States.—"The principal taxes imposed in the United States may be classified as follows: Taxes on income, including inheritance taxes; taxes on property; and taxes on business, including excise taxes and customs duties. The Federal Government derives more than nine-tenths of its net revenue from internal revenue or excise taxes, and tariff or customs duties. These are described as taxes on business because they apply to commodities usually before they have come into the possession of consumers and consequently affect business relations. The revenues of the states come for the most part from the general property tax and from corporation, license and inheritance taxes. The last are characterized as taxes on income because from one point of view inheritances are income and may be so described for purposes of taxation. Finally, the local governing bodies depend for their revenues mainly upon the general property tax, which may be supplemented by local license taxes. Among the influences which have given its present form to the system of taxation in operation in the United States are certain provisions inserted in the Federal Constitution when the country was still in its infancy and altered only by judicial interpretation [or constitutional amendment] since. Of these the most important are: (1) The requirement that 'all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.' (2) The provision that 'no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid [by Congress] unless in proportion to the census' of population. (3) The provision that 'no tax or duty shall be laid by Congress on articles exported from any state.' (4) The provision that 'no state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any impost or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.' The principal effects of these provisions have been to make the courts very strict in their insistence on the rule that taxes must be 'uniform'; to give to the Federal Government exclusive use of import duties as a source of revenue; to prevent any hampering of the country's export business through taxation;

and to nullify the income tax imposed in 1894 and cause the adoption, after a long struggle, of the amendment to the federal constitution expressly giving Congress the power to tax incomes in February, 1913. [See U. S. A., CONSTITUTION OF.] . . . The general property tax is an institution peculiar to the United States, which owed its existence largely to the conditions found in a primitive agricultural community. When the American states began imposing taxes they accepted two principles for their guidance, first, that every head of the family should contribute something toward the support of the government and, second, that the amount of a man's property was the fairest index of his ability to pay taxes. In harmony with these views they imposed poll and general property taxes. Because of their inconvenience and of the small returns to be derived from them poll taxes have now been given up by most of the states, but the general property tax is almost universally retained."—H. R. Seager, *Principles of economics*, pp. 495-498.—See also SINGLE TAX.

Early disputes over taxation.—England's policy.—Stamp Act and Townshend duties. See U. S. A.: 1757-1762; 1761; 1763-1764; 1764; 1765: Stamp Act, to 1766; Repeal, etc.; 1770.

Alexander Hamilton's plan for meeting the national debt. See U. S. A.: 1789-1792.

Suffrage qualifications based on amount of taxation. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: 1776-1787.

Various federal taxes in the United States.—Excise duties.—Transaction taxes.—Income taxes.—"Excise duties are levied upon commodities of domestic production. Except for a few years after the adoption of the present Constitution, and in the War of 1812, they were not used by our federal government prior to the Civil War. Moreover, the freedom of commercial intercourse between the States was such that no commonwealth could levy an excise without injuring or destroying the industry upon which it might fall. But in 1862 and 1864 Congress was obliged to establish a formidable system of excise taxes upon almost all conceivable articles, by which, in 1866, an internal revenue of not less than \$190,000,000 was obtained. After the war taxation was reduced, and most of the excise duties were repealed; but the expenditures remained so much larger than they had been in 1860 that the taxes on spirits, beer, and tobacco had to be retained. . . . In 1913 the internal revenue receipts aggregated \$344,416,000. Our commodity taxes are collected by means of stamps which must be affixed to all packages containing the dutiable articles, in such a manner that the stamps will be destroyed when the goods are opened for consumption. In addition, producers of these articles are subject to a certain amount of supervision. . . . During the . . . war with Spain the rates imposed on beer and tobacco were largely increased and some additional articles were taxed. . . . The Civil War led to the establishment of many duties upon business or legal transactions in which written instruments were employed; and again in 1898 stamp taxes were levied upon bills of exchange, transfers of stocks and bonds, bills of lading, bank checks, telegraph messages, express receipts, and some other objects. In other countries transaction taxes form a part of the permanent revenue system; but, with us, they have been reserved for employment in special emergencies. If additional income must be had, the use of such a resource is legitimate; but, on purely economic grounds, the taxation of transactions is not to be commended. It is next to impossible to



graduate these taxes according to the amount of the transaction, except in a few cases; so that the burden cannot be equitably distributed. Then, too, they have the effect of interfering with the normal course of business, since they oblige taxpayers to avoid so far as practicable the transactions upon which duties are laid. During the recent war transaction taxes were again introduced, and in 1918 they yielded \$18,815,000. During the Civil War Congress was obliged to establish an income tax, which, in 1866, yielded the sum of \$72,982,000. Up to that time this form of taxation had been used by a few states without much success, but had never been tried by the national government. The federal tax was discontinued in 1872, and thereafter taxation of incomes was practically unknown in the United States. In 1894, in order to obtain additional revenue and equalize the burden of taxation, Congress established another tax upon incomes, exempting all of less than \$4,000; but before it could go into operation, this law was pronounced unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. . . . An amendment conferring upon Congress power to levy an income tax without apportioning it according to population, was finally adopted by Congress in 1909 [see also U. S. A.: 1909 (July)], and ratified by the necessary number of states early in 1913. Acting under the authority thus granted, Congress proceeded immediately to frame a law imposing a tax upon incomes. This Act of 1913 imposed an ordinary tax of one per cent upon all incomes in excess of \$3,000 (or \$4,000 in the case of a married couple), and also a graduated surtax, or additional tax, ranging from one to six per cent, on incomes in excess of \$20,000, the highest rate applying to the excess of incomes above \$500,000. In the case of corporations the ordinary tax was collected from the corporations themselves and stockholders were exempted from it. This tax yielded \$60,710,000 in 1914. In 1916, on account of the reduction of the yield of customs duties as a result of the European war, the rate of the normal tax was increased to two per cent and the rates of the surtax were fixed at from one to thirteen per cent., the highest rate applying to the excess of incomes above \$2,000,000. This produced about \$323,000,000 of revenue in 1917."—C. J. Bullock, *Elements of economics*, pp. 376-377, 379, 381.—The income tax for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1923, yielded \$1,680,177,400.

**Local taxation in the United States.**—**Property tax.**—Poll, corporation, license, inheritance and income taxes.—"American states, counties, cities, and towns have long derived most of their revenue from the general property tax, which is supposed to be levied upon all the property, both real and personal, in the possession of the taxpayers. In 1902 the total amount of the state and local receipts was \$934,020,000; and of this sum, taxes on property yielded about seventy-five per cent. . . . Many of our American commonwealths levy poll or capitation taxes. These are imposed at a uniform rate, at \$2 per poll, upon all males between the ages of 20 or 21 and 45 or 60. . . . The poll tax has been abandoned in most civilized countries, and must be viewed as an antiquated financial expedient. . . . The failure of the general property tax to reach the stocks and bonds of corporations had led various states to adopt a much more successful expedient, the taxation of the corporations themselves; and as the number of business corporations has increased, corporation taxes have become increasingly important in state finance. . . . License taxes upon various business

and professional pursuits have been often employed in the United States. In time of emergency the federal government has made extensive use of them. . . . Practically all of our cities . . . and many of the states impose license taxes upon certain occupations. In the cities of the South a very extensive system of business taxes exists. . . . Elsewhere licenses are confined to a few occupations, such as those of . . . peddlers, pawnbrokers, and the like, and have other purposes oftentimes than the mere collection of revenue. . . . The inheritance tax, as it is popularly called, is imposed 'on the devolution of property, whether real or personal, whether by will or by intestacy.' It is extensively employed to-day in Europe and Australia; and has been introduced, in some form, in most of our states. In many of our commonwealths only collateral inheritances are taxed, but in most cases direct inheritances are also included. The tax has met with such general success that its adoption by other states seems merely a question of time."—C. J. Bullock, *Elements of economics*, pp. 385, 389-390, 393.—The following states levy income taxes, individual and corporation: ALABAMA, MASSACHUSETTS (see STATE GOVERNMENT: 1913-1921), MISSOURI, NEW MEXICO, NEW YORK (see NEW YORK: 1919), NORTH DAKOTA, OKLAHOMA, VIRGINIA, WEST VIRGINIA, WISCONSIN (see WISCONSIN: 1911); individual: DELAWARE (see DELAWARE: 1917), MISSISSIPPI, NORTH CAROLINA; corporation: CONNECTICUT, MONTANA.

See also TARIFF; SINGLE TAX.

**Legislation in New York.** See NEW YORK: 1899 (May); 1899-1901; NEW YORK CITY: 1909-1919; 1921 (February).

**Law in Minnesota.** See MINNESOTA: 1898-1906.

**Single tax campaign in Oregon and Missouri.** See OREGON: 1908-1914; MISSOURI: 1912-1914.

**Tax reforms in California, Louisiana, and Nebraska.** See CALIFORNIA: 1911; LOUISIANA: 1921; NEBRASKA: 1920-1921.

**Supreme Court decision on the income tax.** See SUPREME COURT: 1921-1922.

**Chinese tax on opium.** See OPIUM PROBLEM: 1900-1906.

**Increased income, estate and direct taxes in England.** See ENGLAND: 1909 (April-December).

**Graduated income tax in France.** See FRANCE: 1906-1909; Presidency of Armand Fallières.

**Increased matricular contributions in Germany.** See GERMANY: 1900-1912.

**Conditions in the Congo improved.** See BELGIAN CONGO: 1906-1908.

**Taxation in Australia.** See AUSTRALIA: 1910.

**Tax levies in Switzerland.** See SWITZERLAND: 1915-1919; 1921; 1921-1922.

**Problems of Mexico.** See MEXICO: 1918.

**Reforms in Algeria.** See ALGERIA: 1910.

**World War taxation.**—Great Britain.—France.—Italy.—Russia.—Germany.—United States.—Taxation of war profits and incomes.—Great Britain endeavored to raise as much revenue as possible from taxation. The war expenditures were, however, so prodigious that it soon turned out to be impracticable to obtain more than a comparatively small proportion of the total outlay from taxation. For five years, the proportion of war taxes to war expenditures was about 17 per cent. But even this proportion of revenue derived from taxation was sufficient to maintain the credit of Great Britain. (See ENGLAND: 1914-1918: Taxation policy; 1918-1921; 1921: Local taxation.) In France the invaded territory represented the richest and the most industrially developed part of

the country. This operated largely to reduce the ordinary revenue. The resultant economic confusion, as well as the general political situation, rendered it difficult to impose any new taxes at all. The first three years of the war the tax revenues of France were actually smaller than before the war and did not suffice even to defray the ordinary peace expenditures. After a while, indeed, France found it possible to levy some war taxes; but they were only just about sufficient to make up the deficit in the ordinary peace budget. In France, therefore, we may conclude that no part of the war expenditures was met by war taxes. Italy entered the war somewhat later and was not compelled to endure the strain for so long a time. Italy consequently proceeded as soon as possible to levy new war taxes; but, as it had always been relatively overtaxed as compared with Great Britain, the war taxes levied by Italy were just about sufficient to pay the interest on the war loans, and she was not able to defray any of the war expenditures proper out of war taxation. Even before the October revolution in 1917 Russia was able to put very little reliance upon revenue from war taxation. Germany at the outset of the war, had so confidently counted upon victory, with resultant huge indemnities, that it resolved to follow the loan policy, at all events so far as the imperial government was concerned. In Germany a not insignificant part of the war expenses was met by the separate states; and in the states a considerable increase of taxation was provided for at once. As the hopes of a speedy and complete victory gradually faded away, Germany began to change her policy, and decided, especially from 1916 on, to impose more and more taxes. The result was that by the end of the war, Germany had done a little better than France although a little less well than Italy. When the United States entered the World War, it was confronted by the two rival theories of public finance. One was to the effect that the war expenses should be defrayed entirely by loans. The other theory was that the war expenditures ought to be defrayed entirely out of war taxes. The prodigious profits made during the opening years of the World War and the resulting prosperity throughout the country enabled Congress to levy taxes far higher than had ever before been attempted in the nation's history. Even with an immense addition to taxation, however, the proportion derived from war taxes was relatively small, and in fact considerably smaller than is ordinarily stated. For the entire period of our participation in the war it appears that less than one fourth (or exactly 23.3 per cent) of the war expenditures were paid out of war taxes. And if the loans to Allies are excluded, the proportion is still under one third or, more exactly, 32.5 per cent. In almost all of the continental countries, about as much additional revenue was raised from indirect as from direct taxation. In France about 60 per cent was raised from direct and about 40 per cent from indirect taxes. In Italy, in 1916, while the rate of the war profits tax was increased so as to vary from 20 to 60 per cent and that of the income tax to about 16 per cent, the stamp taxes were raised and the number of state monopolies was increased. The same policy was followed during the next year. The result was that in 1918 just about as much additional revenue was derived from the new indirect taxes as from the new direct taxes. In Germany the exact figures as to the proportion between the two categories of taxation are not yet available (1919); but it is quite safe to say that in the

federal government, at least, the revenue from indirect taxes considerably exceeded that from direct taxes. In the separate commonwealths . . . the situation was the reverse, without, however, materially changing the general result. In England considerable increase of revenue was derived from indirect taxes like customs and excises. However, the chief reliance for meeting the war expenditures was placed on a new war profits tax and an augmented income tax. In the United States (see U. S. A.: 1917-1919: Taxation and expenditures) as a result of the Revenue Act of 1917, over seventy-nine per cent of the tax revenue came from direct taxation, principally the income tax and the excess profits tax. As a consequence of the second great Revenue Act of 1918, the proportions were still more favorable, the amount ascribable to direct taxation in 1919 being in reality almost eighty-one per cent although the introduction of the system of payment by instalments somewhat obscures this result.—Based on E. R. A. Seligman, *Cost of the war and how it was met* (*American Economic Review*, Dec., 1919, pp. 748-761).—See also CANADA: 1915-1918; WAR POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES: Taxing power; INSURANCE: Early effects of the World War.

**New regulations in Germany.** See GERMANY: 1919 (August-November): Political problems.

See also MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: City finance, and the constitutions of the various countries.

ALSO IN: H. C. Clark, *Can Congress tax "gross income" under Sixteenth Amendment?* (*American Bar Association Journal*, Aug., 1922).—C. B. Fillebrown, *Taxation*.—L. B. Gleason and A. Otis, *Inheritance taxation*.—R. M. Haig, *Tax-exempt securities versus progressive income tax*.—J. A. Hobson, *Taxation in the new state*.—C. E. Lord, *Farmer and the sales tax* (*Forum*, Aug., 1922).—J. I. Miller, *High lights of the Federal Revenue Act of 1921* (*Central Law Journal*, Aug. 11, 1922).—R. W. Nedham, *Income tax: Enactments and regulations*.—E. R. A. Seligman, *Essays in taxation*.—Idem, *Income tax*.—Y. Sheftel, *Taxation of land value*.—J. Stamp, *Fundamental principles of taxation in the light of modern developments*, p. 201.—A. H. Treman, *National bank taxes in New York*.—National Industrial Conference Board, *Taxation and national income* (*Research Report*, no. 55, Oct., 1922).

**TAXIARCH, PHYLARCH.**—"The tribe appears to have been the only military classification known to Athens, and the taxiarch the only tribe officer for infantry, as the phylarch was for cavalry, under the general-in-chief."—G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: G. F. Schömann, *Antiquities of Greece: The state*, pt. 3, ch. 3.

**TAXILA**, ancient city of India, the ruins of of which are in the modern district of Rawalpindi, in the Punjab. It was one of the wealthiest of ancient cities and was an important commercial and cultural center. A university of the medical sciences was located here. See INDIA: B. C. 600-327.

**TAYLOR, Alonzo Englebert** (1871- ), American physician and university professor. Appointed commissioner to London to consult with the Allies, 1917. See U. S. A.: 1917 (November).

**TAYLOR, George** (1716-1781), American patriot. One of the signers of the Declaration of Independence; member of Pennsylvania Provincial Assembly, 1764-1770; member of the Continental Congress, 1776-1777. See U. S. A.: 1776 (July): Text of Declaration of Independence.

**TAYLOR, Hannis** (1851- ), American lawyer and diplomat. Minister to Spain, 1893-1897; author of books on the development of constitutional law. See U.S.A.: 1914-1921.

**TAYLOR, Sir Henry** (1800-1886), English poet and dramatist. See DRAMA: 1815-1877.

**TAYLOR, Isaac** (1829-1901), English philologist. See ALPHABET: Theories of origin and development.

**TAYLOR, Richard** (1826-1879), American general in the Confederate army, son of President Taylor. See U.S.A.: 1865 (April-May).

**TAYLOR, William** (1821-1902), American Methodist Episcopal missionary bishop to Africa, 1884-1896. Made a study of the Swahili language. See PHILOLOGY: 24.

**TAYLOR, William Sylvester** (b. 1853), governor of Kentucky, 1899-1900. See KENTUCKY: 1805-1900.

**TAYLOR, Zachary** (1784-1850), twelfth president of the United States, 1849-1850. As a general in the army, conducted campaigns in the Mexican War, 1846-1847; nominated by the Whig convention, 1848. See MEXICO: 1846-1847; U.S.A.: 1848; 1848-1849; 1850 (March); (April-September); (June).

**TAYLOR CYLINDER**, Hebrew record. See JEWS: B. C. 724-604.

**TAYU-LING**, mountain range in China. See CHINA: Geography, etc.

**TCHAD**, Lake. See LAKE CHAD.

**TCHAIKOVSKY, Peter Ilyitch** (1840-1893), Russian composer. Studied with Zarembo at St. Petersburg; became teacher of harmony at the Moscow Conservatory, 1866; achieved his first real success with the opera, "Eugen Onegin," 1870; expressed his happiest work in the fantasy form of which "Manfred," "Romeo et Juliette," "The Tempest," and "Francesca da Rimini" are the best examples; however, it is on his symphonies and overtures that his claim to immortality rests. See MUSIC: Folk music and nationalism: Russia.

**TCHATALJA**. See CIATALJA.

**TCHERNAYA, Battle of** (1855). See AUSTRIA: 1856-1859.

**TCHICHERIN, Georgi Vasiliyevitch**, Russian statesman. Minister for foreign affairs; representative at the Genoa conference. See GENOA CONFERENCE (1922).

**TCHINOVNIKS**.—In the days of the empire, to keep the vast and complex bureaucratic machine of Russia in motion it [was] . . . necessary to have a large and well-drilled army of officials. "These are drawn chiefly from the ranks of the noblesse and the clergy, and form a peculiar social class called Tchinovniks, or men with 'Tchins.' As the Tchins plays an important part in Russia, not only in the official world, but also to some extent in social life, it may be well to explain its significance. All officers, civil and military, are, according to a scheme invented by Peter the Great, arranged in fourteen classes or ranks, and to each class or rank a particular name is attached. . . . As a general rule a man must begin at or near the bottom of the official ladder, and he must remain on each step a certain specified time. The step on which he is for the moment standing, or, in other words, the official rank or Tchins which he possesses, determines what offices he is competent to hold. Thus rank or Tchins is a necessary condition for receiving an appointment, but it does not designate any actual office, and the names of the different ranks are extremely apt to mislead a foreigner."—D. M. Wallace, *Russia*, ch. 13.

**TCHITCHAGOF, Paul Vasiliyevitch** (1767-

1849), Russian general. Served in campaigns against Napoleon. See RUSSIA: 1812 (June-September); (October-December).

**TCHOUPRIA, Battle of** (1804). See SERBIA: 1804-1817.

**TE RAUPARAHĀ, Maori warrior**. Waged war on white settlers in New Zealand. See NEW ZEALAND: 1818-1838.

**TEA: Introduction into Europe**.—"The Dutch East India Company were the first to introduce it into Europe, and a small quantity came to England from Holland in 1666. The East India Company thereafter ordered their agent at Bantam to send home small quantities, which they wished to introduce as presents, but its price was 60s. per lb., and it was little thought of. Twenty years elapsed before the Company first decided on importing tea, but by degrees it came into general use."—L. Levi, *History of British commerce*, p. 239.

**TEA PARTY, Boston**. See BOSTON TEA PARTY.

**TEA WATER PUMP**. See NEW YORK CITY: 1740-1862.

**TEACHING, Carnegie Endowment for the Advancement of**. See FOUNDATIONS.

**TEARLESS BATTLE** (367 B.C.). See GREECE: B. C. 371-362.

**TEA-ROOM PARTY** (1867). See ENGLAND: 1865-1868.

**TECPANECAS, tribe of Indians in Mexico**. See MEXICO: 1325-1502.

**TECTOSAGES, ancient tribe of France**. See VOLCAE.

**TECUMSEH** (c. 1775-1813), American Indian chief. Leader in wars against the United States; incited the southern Indians to fight against the whites in the Creek War, 1813. See U.S.A.: 1811; 1812 (June-October); 1812-1813; Harrison's northwestern campaign; 1813-1814 (August-April).

**TEGĒA, ancient Greek city of Arcadia**. For several centuries it served as a defense against Spartan aggression, and figured prominently in later Greek wars. See GREECE: B. C. 8th-5th centuries: Growth of Sparta; B. C. 480; Persian War: Thermopola; B. C. 371-362; B. C. 321-312; SPARTA: B. C. 743-510.

**TEGNER, Esaias** (1782-1846), Swedish poet. See SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE: 1813-1877.

**TEGYRA, Battle of**, first important victory won by the Thebans (375 B.C.), in the war which broke the power of Sparta. It was fought in Locrian territory.—Based on C. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. 38.

**TEHERAN, capital and largest city in Persia**, in the province of the same name, seventy miles south of the Caspian sea. In 1923 it had a population of over 220,000. See ASIA: Map.

1906-1903.—Political disturbances.—Captured by Nationalists. See PERSIA: 1905-1907; 1908-1909.

1915.—Evacuated by Turks and Persians. See WORLD WAR: 1915: VII. Persia and Germany.

**TEHUANTEPEC INTEROCEANIC RAILWAY**. See RAILROADS: 1854-1906.

**TEHUEL CHE, South American Indians**. See PATAGONIANS.

**TEJADA, Sebastian Lerdo de**. See LERDO DE TEJADA. SIBASTIAN.

**TEJUAS, North American Indian tribe**. See APACHE GROUP.

**TEKELY, Emmerich**. See THÖKÖLY, IMRICH.

**TEKKE TURCOMANS, Tatar nomads of central Asia**. They were conquered by Russia, 1877-1881.

**TEL EL KEBIR, Battle of** (1882). See **EGYPT: 1882-1883.**

**TELAMON, Battle of** (225 B.C.). See **ROME: Republic: B.C. 205-191.**

**TELCHINES**, first settlers of the Island of Rhodes. See **RHODES, ISLAND OF: Ancient history.**

**TELEFUNKEN WIRELESS PLANT:** Taken by the United States. See **U.S.A.: 1915 (July).**

**TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES: Invention.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony.**

**State and private ownership.**—"The free right of way granted by the American government to the telegraph is in distinct contrast to the absolute control taken of it in European countries. To the telephone also free scope was given by the national government, though it had not the same right of way. . . . In Europe, on the other hand, with the constant menace of war, the telegraph was early taken possession of because of its fundamental importance as a military necessity. The service in many countries is good, with low rates, which satisfy the people. The losses, where they occur, are made up, as are the postal deficits in our own country, from the general government funds."—K. B. Judson, *Government ownership of telegraphs and telephones*, p. ii, introduction.—"In the various European countries, we find that with one exception the work of establishing and developing telephonic communication was at first taken up by commercial companies working under a license or concession from the Government. The exception is Germany. . . . Telephone companies were organized and started work in the early eighties with the crude apparatus which was then available. Even in Germany a beginning was made in organizing a telephone company, but the German Post Office compensated the enterprising organisers and took over the nucleus of the system before it was established as a business. In most of the licenses or concessions granted to the early telephone companies the various Governments reserved the right to buy out the companies at stated intervals, generally at periods from five to seven years apart, and in almost all cases the Government reserved to itself the privilege of building and operating the trunk or long-distance lines between towns. In a large proportion of cases the Government option to purchase the telephone systems was exercised at a very early date, as soon as it had become evident that the telephone service was a practical and remunerative business."—H. L. Webb, *Development of the telephone in Europe*, pp. 24-25.

**1845-1847.—France.—Government construction of telegraph lines.**—"In France, the first electric telegraph line was constructed in 1845 by the government for its own purposes. . . . This line was not open to the public. A year or two later a railroad company established a short line for operating purposes only, from Versailles to St. Germain. Further private construction was forbidden by the Government."—A. N. Holcombe, *Public ownership of telephones on the continent of Europe*, p. 8.—In 1837, a law had been passed in France making every kind of telegraph including the optical telegraph, forerunner of the electric telegraph, a state monopoly.—Based on J. Lee, *Economics of telegraphs and telephones*, p. 2.

**1846-1849.—Austria.—Government construction and ownership of telegraph lines.**—"In Austria, in 1846, Metternich issued a decree declaring the telegraph to be a monopoly of the state. Here he stopped, but after the events of 1848 . . . the

work of building telegraphs in Austria was taken up with great energy. . . . In . . . 1849, the system was established, and . . . tentatively opened to the public."—A. N. Holcombe, *Public ownership of telephones on the continent of Europe*, p. 11.

**1847-1852.—Netherlands.—Construction and ownership of telegraph lines.**—"In the Netherlands, a royal ordinance of December 8, 1847, prescribed the conditions under which private persons might establish telegraph undertakings. The government reserved the right of precedence for state despatches, of operation by the authorities in time of war, of approval of rates, and of compensation for loss occasioned to the postal revenue by the competition of telegraphs. . . . March 7, 1852, a law was enacted providing that the Government itself should build the important lines itself, leaving to others only the secondary lines. . . . What actually happened was that the local municipal authorities had to undertake the task of completing the Dutch telegraph system after the central government had constructed the main trunk line."—*Ibid.*, p. 13.

**1849.—Prussia.—State telegraphs established.**—"In 1849 the Prussian state telegraphs were established, the military authorities having from the outset regarded it as reasonable to let the public share in the convenience."—J. Lee, *Economics of telegraphs and telephones*, p. 3.

**1850-1851.—Belgium.—Construction of telegraph lines.—Government ownership.**—"An English company began the work of constructing telegraph lines in Belgium, and actually completed the line from Brussels to Antwerp, but found it unprofitable. "In 1850 the company . . . sold back its original undertaking to the public authorities [who built] . . . their telegraph system themselves. . . . The government constructed lines on the state railroads and opened them to the public. In 1851 other lines were also opened to the public, and the system soon proved profitable."—A. N. Holcombe, *Public ownership of telephones on the continent of Europe*, p. 12.—"The Belgian government possesses the monopoly of the telegraph. . . . The use of telegraphic stamps is obligatory for all telegrams."—R. B. Lines, *Report on telegraphic service (to United States Congress)*, 1880, p. 15.

**1850-1867.—France.—Expansion of telegraph service.**—"On the 20th of November, 1850, a law was made permitting private persons to send dispatches over the wires (the state hitherto was the only party using it) after rigorous investigation of their identity. . . . On the 31st of December, 1851, was inaugurated the submarine cable from Calais to Dover. . . . In 1854 was created the general direction of telegraphic lines. The writing apparatus of Morse substituted the fugitive signals of the Foy-Bréguet system. . . . The year 1860 was signaled by an important fact. A conditional agreement was concluded with Mr. Hughes, professor of physics at New York, the celebrated inventor of the printing apparatus, which was definitely adopted in 1861 by the French. . . . [In 1867] the first pneumatic line appeared in Paris. With the advent of the third republic, and up to within the last years, prodigious developments have been made in telegraphy."—W. Lodian, *Century of the telegraph in France (Popular Science Monthly, Apr., 1804, p. 797)*.

**1853-1855.—Russia.—State ownership of telegraphs.**—Telegraphs were established in Russia in 1853, the state declaring a monopoly in 1855.

**1854-1908.—Switzerland.—State ownership of telegraphs and telephones.**—"In Switzerland the state monopoly had been declared (in 1854) and

in . . . four years Switzerland had the most extensive system on the continent of Europe."—J. Lee, *Economics of telegraphs and telephones*, p. 3.—"The laws regulating telegraphs in Switzerland commence with the Act of December 20, 1854, organizing the Service as a branch of the post office. The ordinance of the Federal Council of November 29, 1880 [regulated] . . . the establishment of telephone lines."—R. B. Lines, *Report on telegraphic service (to United States Congress)*, 1880, p. 14.—"The telegraphic and telephonic service extends to nearly every town and village in the country, and every railway service is equipped with both systems. . . . They are operated in connection with the postal service, every post office being provided with telegraphic facilities, and practically all of them with public telephones. . . . Long distance connections are made with all the local or urban telephone lines. . . . There are also international connections with all the countries bordering on Swiss territory. A feature of the Swiss telephone service is that the government manufactures all the instruments used, makes the insulations and controls the business absolutely."—R. H. Mansfield, *Monthly Consular and Trade Report*, no. 332:161-162 (quoted by K. B. Judson; *Government ownership of telegraph and telephones*, p. 120).

1858.—India.—Telegraph in the siege of Delhi.—So important was the telegraph in the siege of Delhi in 1858 that since that date an arrangement has been in force whereby the Government can seize at will all wires, including those controlling railway traffic.

1861-1889.—Italy.—Status of telegraphs at formation of kingdom.—Subsequent developments.—"The Kingdom of Italy being established and the various telegraphic administrations of the different provinces centered under one central management, great reforms were put into operation in material, in personnel and in the arrangement of service. . . . Not alone . . . was there lack of communication on a large scale between the various important centres of the peninsula but . . . very often between different sections in the interior of individual provinces. . . . Available data on the various old administrations shows that when they ceased to have separated existence they totalled 8243 Kilometers [of telegraph line]."—*Statistical report on the use of the telegraphs in the year 1862*, pp. 3-4.—"The new Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs [was formed in 1888. The posts and telegraphs previously] were a subdivision of the Ministry of Public Works and were entrusted to two general managements which had a certain autonomy. . . . [Among the innovations established by the new ministry was] the instruction of 'the postal employees in telegraph service and of the telegraph employees in postal service, with the intention of combining the two very important services wherever it was deemed possible and advantageous.' . . . At the end of 1880 [the postal and telegraph services were united at Rome, Turin, and nine other centers]."—A. F., *Ministry of posts and telegraphs and reforms in posts and telegraph service (Nuova Antologia, 1800, v. 26, pp. 640-653)*.

1865.—New Zealand.—Establishment of telegraphs.—"Some telegraph lines were constructed by the Provincial Governments [of New Zealand] before 1865, but nothing was done in a national way until that year, when the general assembly authorized the governor to establish electric telegraphs and appoint a Commissioner of Telegraphs to manage them. . . . The telegraphs afterwards became a part of the postal system."—F. Parsons, *Story of New Zealand*, p. 87.

1867-1875.—Germany.—Control of telegraphs by the state.—"In Prussia the telegraphs had remained a part of the postal service until 1867, . . . [when] they were erected into a separate department under the management of a military officer. In the following year the telegraph service was made over to the North German Confederation, and in 1871, together with the telegraphs of the other German states, except Bavaria and Wurtemberg, to the German Empire. . . . The service . . . in 1875 was joined once more to the Post Office."—A. N. Holcombe, *Public ownership of telephones on continent of Europe*, p. 23, footnote.—"The telegraphs in Germany [except Bavaria and Wurtemberg] are regulated by the provisions of article 48 of the Imperial constitution [1871]. Telegraphy has from the beginning been a state institution in Germany, and has always been administered as such. . . . It is permitted to pay the duties for telegraphs, which are handed to a telegraph office, by means of postage stamps."—R. B. Lines, *Report on telegraphic service (to United States Congress)*, 1880, p. 15.

1868.—England.—Government control of telegraphs.—"In Great Britain the telegraph was at first controlled by private parties. . . . In July, 1868, an act was passed 'to enable Her Majesty's Postmaster-General to acquire, work and maintain electric telegraphs. . . . The rate for messages was fixed throughout the kingdom at one shilling for twenty words, excluding the address and signature. This rate covered delivery within one mile of the office of address, or within its postal delivery. . . . [The lines of the existing telegraph companies were purchased on terms which were commonly held to be exorbitant.] . . . It was this sentiment that led Parliament to change the original intention and to confer a monopoly of the telegraphs on the post office department. . . . But notwithstanding the exorbitant price paid for the telegraph, the investment has not proved an unprofitable one.—N. P. Hill, *Speech in the Senate of the United States, Jan. 14, 1884 ("Speeches and Papers," pp. 212, 214, 215)*.

1870-1872.—Australia.—Telegraph lines connected with Java cable.—In 1870 the colony of South Australia constructed "a telegraph line from Adelaide to Port Darwin, on the shores of the Indian Ocean. To that place a cable was laid . . . from Java and when, after two years [in 1872], the overland line was completed, all Australia was united by the electric telegraph with the northern hemisphere."—R. P. Thomson, *National history of Australia, New Zealand and the adjacent islands*, p. 206.

1872.—Cape Colony.—Purchase of telegraph lines by government.—"So far as telegraphic communication is concerned . . . South Africa held a low position in 1872, but [owing to] the success of the Diamond Fields . . . Parliament resolved to purchase the lines belonging to the Cape of Good Hope Telegraph Company for £45,000 and to spend £25,000 in extending the wires towards the new seat of riches and enterprise near the Vaal River."—A. Wilmot, *History of our own times in South Africa*, p. 36.

1873.—Austria-Hungary.—Government control of telegraphs.—In Austria the telegraph was under the direction of the ministry of commerce, together with the post-office, but in 1873 this special direction was abolished and its duties transferred to the minister himself. In the new organization the post and the telegraph formed one section of the ministry above named, at the head of which was placed a director-general under the authority of

the minister. In Hungary the direction of telegraphs was placed under the authority of the director-general of posts and telegraphs, who was himself subject to the minister of commerce.—Based on—Commissioners of United States to International Exhibition at Vienna, *Reports*, 1873, v. 2, *sect. 1, ch. 2, pp. 54-55.*

1873.—Belgium.—Union of telegraphs with railways and posts.—“The direction of the Belgium telegraphs forms one of the eight bureaux of the general direction of railways, posts, and telegraphs, under the department of public works. . . . Except in the principal offices, the same employé is charged with two of these services, and sometimes with all three. The post-office gives its aid gratuitously to the telegraph in forwarding telegrams, and in the smaller towns messages and letters are delivered by the same carriers. . . . Messages on postal service are sent free by the telegraph.”—*Ibid.*, p. 55.

1873.—Rumania.—Merged with the post-office.—“In Roumania the two administrations [telegraph and post-office] form but one general direction, belonging to the ministry of the interior. Their organization is regulated by the same law, they have the same central administration, and, save in a few important places, their offices are in the same building and under the authority of the same person. Finally, their receipts and expenses are merged together in their accounts.”—*Ibid.*, p. 57.

1873.—Serbia.—Under the department of the interior.—“In Serbia the telegraph is a bureau in the department of the interior. If not completely merged with the post-office, as in Roumania, it has at least many points in common with it, both as regards the central administration and the working of its offices.”—*Ibid.*, p. 57.

1873.—Spain.—Government control of telegraphs.—Relation to postal system.—“In Spain the telegraph forms one section of the general direction of posts and telegraphs, often styled the general direction of communications, which itself is placed under the ministry of the interior. The two services have distinct staffs in the principal offices, but in the smaller towns the telegraph is not generally employed, except in conjunction with the post-office, the municipalities furnishing the necessary offices. . . . The question of a more intimate union between the post-office and the telegraph has been frequently raised. In 1865 the proposition was rejected after inquiry by a committee and a debate in the Corps Legislatif.”—*Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

1879-1910.—Belgium.—Telephones established.—Taken over by government.—“In Belgium the telephone business was started in 1879-80 by companies, but only short term licences were granted and almost all the company systems were taken over by the Government in 1893. . . . In 1894 there were 8,500 subscribers in Belgium, and by 1910 the total . . . increased . . . to 42,540.”—H. L. Webb, *Development of the telephone in Europe*, pp. 59-60.

1880.—Great Britain.—Status of the telephone.—Control of system by postmaster-general.—“The High Court [of Great Britain and Ireland] in 1880 . . . declared that the telephone, in law, was a telegraph instrument. That settled the Postmaster-General's monopoly of the telephone. . . . With a couple of exceptions . . . all the telephone systems of the United Kingdom are now under the control of the Postmaster-General.”—J. Lee, *Economics of telegraphs and telephones*, pp. 5, 11.

1880-1890.—Germany.—State control of tele-

phone services.—“By the end of 1877 fifteen rural villages [had been brought] . . . into the general telegraph system by means of telephone connections. . . . In the year 1880 [the postmaster general] decided to introduce the telephonic system of communication into the German urban telegraph service.”—A. N. Holcombe, *Public ownership of the telephones on the continent of Europe*, pp. 24-25.—In “1890 there were 4,000 telegraph offices in Germany equipped with a telephone as the telegraph instrument. The post office has equipped some 2,000 small telegraph offices, both in rural districts and in the outer districts of large towns with a telegraph instead of a telephone instrument.”—J. Lee, *Economics of telegraphs and telephones*, p. 6.—Bavaria and Würtemberg have always retained intrastate control of their telegraph and telephone services. “In some of the South German states the question of private or public ownership never even arose. The only commercial undertakings which felt the need of rapid telegraphic service were themselves in the hands of the public authorities. Thus in Würtemberg . . . a telegraph signal service was quietly installed by the state railroad management.”—A. N. Holcombe, *Public ownership of telephones on the continent of Europe*, p. 10.—“In Germany the telephone has always been a Government monopoly, and, as in other branches of industrial effort, the German Government has encouraged the development of the telephone on purely German lines without regard to the experience of other countries and without relying on external aid of any sort. The German Post Office has had its own rate schemes and its own ideas of technical practice in telephony, and has usually refused to adopt improvements devised in other countries until German manufacturers have been able to supply them, or imitations of them. . . . These various errors in technical policy have naturally resulted in a very low standard of efficiency in the German telephone service, and have made it necessary, as modern telephone practice has tardily penetrated into Germany, for the Administration to reconstruct entirely the large city telephone systems.”—H. L. Webb, *Development of the telephone in Europe*, pp. 64-65.

1881-1901.—Russia.—Development of telephone.—Concessions.—Government control of long-distance service.—“The first exchanges in Russia—those of St. Petersburg and Moscow—opened in 1881.”—A. R. Bennett, *Telephone systems of the continent of Europe*, p. 316.—“The development of the telephone [in Russia] is extremely low, barely reaching one telephone per 1,000 inhabitants. . . . Telephone companies were established under licence from the Government in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Warsaw, . . . but the progress made was extremely slow, . . . when the expiry of the original licences approached, the Russian Government, with a view to securing greater development, lower rates, and a higher efficiency of service, put up new concessions to competition, the competition to hinge upon the offer of low rates and of proper guarantees of an efficient service. In St. Petersburg the concession was obtained by the municipality, and in Moscow and Warsaw by companies organised by a group of Swedish, Danish and Russian capitalists. These new concessions were granted in 1901. . . . Similar concessions were granted for Riga and Odessa. . . . The Russian Government, while hedging round these concessions with numerous restrictions and retaining the right to purchase the telephone systems at the end of the licence, . . . [encouraged]

the development of the telephone for the benefit of the public and [exacted] . . . from the concessionaires a royalty of only three per cent. on the gross receipts. . . . The long-distance service in Russia . . . [remained] in the hands of the Government, and is very undeveloped, Moscow and St. Petersburg being practically the only great cities connected by long-distance telephone lines."—H. L. Webb, *Development of the telephone in Europe*, pp. 70-71.

1881-1917.—Italy.—Development of the telephone.—"Italy occupies telephonically one of the very last places among civilized nations as much in regard to its diffusion as to the quality of its service. . . . In our country the telephone made its appearance for public use in 1881. . . . The first interurban line was opened to the public only in 1804, between Milan and Monza. . . . The State saw in the telephone only a source of competition with the telegraph."—P. Ferrerio, *Telephone service in Italy* (*L'Elettrotecnica*, v. 8, 1920, pp. 2-3).—In 1910 there were "only 62,000 telephones [in Italy] among a population of 33,500,000. The Italian Government . . . assumed an entire monopoly of the service, and . . . organized a State Telephone Department, separate from the Telegraph Administration."—H. L. Webb, *Development of the telephone in Europe*, p. 70.—In the Chamber of Deputies from 1886 to 1917 various bills were successively introduced, aimed at the improvement of the telephone service. These projects have constituted a continuous see-saw between those who believe in the necessity of government control of telephones and those who favor private ownership.—Based on P. Ferrerio, *Telephone service in Italy* (*L'Elettrotecnica*, v. 8, 1920, pp. 3-4).

1884-1891.—Spain.—Government ownership of telephones.—Concessions.—"A royal decree, dated August 11, 1884, made telephonic exchange communication a Government monopoly; but . . . in June 1886 another decree entirely reversed the first one and provided that the exploitation of telephones in Spain should henceforth be left to private enterprise. . . . Under this decree concessions for thirty-five exchange systems were granted. . . . The exchanges in Madrid and Barcelona . . . opened in 1886. . . . A third royal decree made its appearance in November 1890 and came into operation on January 2, 1891. . . . It was deemed judicious to recall the decree of 1886 in order that the State might again be free to undertake exchange work where expedient. At the same time, it was proposed to give future companies a greater degree of freedom. . . . The new policy has, it is understood, been attended by considerable development. . . . The Spanish system, although now modified on decidedly liberal lines—so liberal as to include the cheapest rate for telegrams in the world—is defective in one important particular. The concessions are for twenty years only, after which the whole system becomes the property of the State *without payment* to the concessionaries of any kind, unless the State is willing to take over the switch-boards and subscribers' instruments . . . which will then be paid for at a rate to be settled by arbitration failing friendly agreement."—A. R. Bennett, *Telephone systems of the continent of Europe*, pp. 323, 325-327.

1884-1904.—New Zealand.—Telephone, a public monopoly.—"The Electric Lines Act of 1884 provided for the establishment of telephone systems by the Governor, and prohibited anyone else from constructing or maintaining for hire or profit any electric line for communication by telephone,

except by the sanction of the Government. That is the telephone . . . was made a public monopoly from the start. It is now [1904] a part of the postal system. . . . The national ownership of railways, telegraphs and telephones, was not included among . . . disputed questions in New Zealand, because there was practically no difference of opinion in respect to public ownership."—F. Parsons, *Story of New Zealand*, pp. 87, 95.

1887-1902.—Netherlands.—Government concessions in construction and operation of telephones.—"Owing to financial and other reasons it was not . . . deemed politic for the State to undertake the constructions of trunks; but it was not till 1887 . . . that it was resolved to allow [a private company] . . . to connect Amsterdam with Haarlem."—A. R. Bennett, *Telephone systems of the continent of Europe*, p. 221.—"In Holland the early telephone work, both local and long distance, was undertaken by companies. . . . In later years it became the policy of the Dutch Government to operate the long distance service itself and to grant concessions for operating the local service to companies or to the municipalities. . . . The early telephone companies . . . did not develop the business with sufficient activity and did not either keep their plant up to date or adopt modern tariffs and commercial policy. The result was that in the large cities the concessions to the companies were cancelled at the end of their original term and new concessions were granted to the municipalities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague; the municipalities built new systems and started the telephone business afresh, so to speak, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 1896, and in the Hague in 1902. . . . Since the establishment of the new municipal systems the development of the telephone in Holland has been more rapid than previously."—H. L. Webb, *Development of the telephone in Europe*, pp. 60-61.

1896-1903.—Austria-Hungary.—Government monopoly of the telephone.—"A beginning [of telephone installation] was made by private companies, chiefly of English origin, but by 1896 the last of these had disappeared and the telephone service had been converted into a complete Government monopoly. The antiquated tariffs adopted and the frequent political deadlocks . . . prevented any sound and rapid development of the telephone. . . . In recent years [written in 1910] more enlightened efforts have been made to develop the telephone in Austria by the adoption of graduated rates and the abolition of the old practice of charging the subscriber with the capital cost of his line. Arrangements have also been made for the annual supply of a certain amount of capital for new telephone construction. By these measures the checks on the development of the telephone in Austria have been somewhat lessened, and more rapid progress is now being made; but this is purely relative to the previous stagnation. . . . Hungary has its separate telegraph Administration, and the telephone branch has followed its own policy, and not imitated that of Austria. Outside of Budapest there is little development of the telephone, and the development of the whole country is somewhat lower than that of Austria. . . . In Budapest the telephone service was originally started by a company, but the State purchased the system after a few years and assumed the monopoly of telephone work. The system was reconstructed in 1903."—*Ibid.*, pp. 60-70.

1904.—Russia.—Development of telegraph in Siberia.—Russia (including the Asiatic dominion) possesses, approximately 100,000 miles of tele-

graph lines. In Siberia there are two lines from Port Arthur to the Baikal, then three to Irkutsk, four to Omsk and six to the Urals and (then merging with the Russian lines proper) eight to a dozen to the capital, St. Petersburg. Installed originally by Danish capital, with Scandinavian operators throughout, the trans-Siberian telegraph has since a dozen years reverted entirely to the Russian state and not even one of the old employees is left.—Based on L. Lodian, *Telegraph in Siberia* (*Electrical Review*, [N. Y.] 1904, v. 44, p. 594).

1908.—France.—State management of telegraphs and telephones.—“The telephone was made a Government monopoly in France in 1889, and twenty years later it is described by most Frenchmen, and notably by those who have investigated it the most closely, as a national disgrace. The development is extremely low, the plant is largely antiquated, or where it has been renewed its efficiency is destroyed by bad organization, the tariff is the tariff of the eighties, and the commercial practice is the rigid and cumbersome routine of the most bureaucratic of bureaucracies. The service, notably in Paris, which contains about a third of all the telephones in France, is a by-word with all Frenchmen.”—H. L. Webb, *Development of the telephone in Europe*, p. 63.—“Despite the diversity of its operations, the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone administration has not known how, or has not desired to apply the principle of specialization. . . . The administration starts with the principle that any employee . . . is able to fill any position in the three services, postal, telephone and telegraph, which it operates. . . . He will become proficient at the expense of the public. We need not be astonished, therefore, that our letters do not reach their destination until after several days' journey, that our telegrams are distorted and incomprehensible, that our telephone connections are made at random.”—France, *Official Report on Budget for posts and telegraphs*, 1908, pp. 11-13 (quoted by K. B. Judson, *Government ownership of telephones on the continent of Europe*, p. 100).

1908.—Comparative use of telegraphs and telephones in New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway and the United States.—“The use of the Government telegraphs in New Zealand amounts [in 1908] to 5 telegrams per year for each inhabitant against 1 per inhabitant in the United States. The use of the state telegraphs in Australia, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium and Norway is also greater than the telegraph traffic [in the United States]. Sweden and Norway are the best ‘telephoned’ nations in the world, and Switzerland next; but the use of the telephone is greatest in the United States, and the figures for Massachusetts far exceed any of the national averages [in number of exchanges per 1,000 population, and annual number of conversations per capita].”—F. Parsons, *Story of New Zealand*, p. 722.

1908.—United States.—Ownership and operation of the Washington-Alaska cable and telegraph system.—Cable and telegraph lines in the Philippines and Porto Rico.—“The United States government owns and operates one of the longest and most intricate commercial cable and telegraph systems in the world—the Washington-Alaska system, which join the cities and towns of the United States and the world in general with the cities and towns of the Alaskan coast, the Yukon Valley and the region around the Bering straits. . . . Cable and telegraph lines have also been officially built and operated in the Philippines. . . . At pres-

ent [1908] 6322 miles of land lines and 1437 lines of cable besides twenty-four telephone systems are operated in the Philippine archipelago, which are fixed, according to the postal system, irrespective of distance. In Porto Rico [1908] the Government is operating telegraph and telephone lines so profitably that . . . the price of telegrams was reduced. The smallest towns in the most remote part of the islands are connected with telegraph stations by the telephone.”—J. Martin, *Our government's widespread socialistic activities* (*World's Work*, Sept., 1908).

1912.—Porto Rico.—Telephone concessions.—In 1912 “an ordinance granted to P. J. Rosaly the right to construct, maintain and operate a system of long distance telephone lines between the city of Ponce and certain towns together with local systems in such towns, and authorized the South Porto Rico telephone company to extend its service to Cabo Rojo.”—*Railroad telegraph and telephone franchises in Porto Rico, Message from President of the United States Transmitting Ordinances*, Washington, 1912.

1912.—Case against Oregon. See SUPREME COURT: 1888-1913.

1913.—Countries owning telegraph and telephone systems.—In 1913 the following countries owned both telegraph and telephone: “Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, New Caledonia, Dahomey, Denmark (at least part—state, private and municipal), Egypt (part), Formosa, France (Tunis), Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain, Sweden (greater part), Greece, South Africa (Union of) French Guinea, Servia, Hungary, Roumania, India (British—state and private), India (Dutch—state and private), Norway (greater part), Japan (including Korea), New Zealand, Luxembourg, the Netherlands (state, municipal and private), Russia (state and private). Countries owning telegraphs only [were]: Alaska, Argentine, Bolivia (not all), Brazil, Chili (nearly all), Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay. England, since January 1912 . . . has assumed the entire postal function by taking over the Bell service. Some of the provinces of Canada took the step a few years ago.”—D. J. Lewis, *Discussion on government ownership of telegraphs and telephones* (*Congressional Record*, Dec. 22, 1913).

1914-1918.—Use in World War.—Wireless telephone for airplanes. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless or radio: 1914-1918; WORLD WAR: 1916: IV. Austro-Italian front: d, 2; Miscellaneous auxiliary services: V. Moving men and materials: a, 12; VI. Military and naval equipment: a, 2.

1916.—Canada.—Government control of telephones.—An inquiry into the status of telephone ownership made in 1916, include the systems of the province of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. In these provinces government ownership had been adopted about a decade previous. In Manitoba, the Bell property was purchased by the government Dec. 30, 1907.—Based on J. Mavor, *Government telephones, preface and p. 28*.

1918.—South Africa.—Use of telegraph service.—The postmaster-general of South Africa in his report for 1918 called attention to the widespread telegraph service of South Africa, taking into consideration the comparatively sparse European population and the immense area of the country.

1919.—Germany.—Provisions under the constitution of the republic.—“In the same way there is an increase in the authority of the Reich over



the interior situation, the provisions according to which the Reich only has the power to legislate on posts, telegraphs, and telephones. It is true that the former constitution had put forward the principle that the posts and telegraphs of the German Empire should be organized and administered in a uniform manner; but this provision and principle was nullified by the fact that it was not applied in Bavaria and in Wurtemberg, these states having in virtue of special treaties 'particular' rights. But these rights were annulled by the present constitution."—R. Brunet, *New German constitution*, p. 63.

1920.—Grants to Turkey by Treaty of Sèvres. See SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920): Part XI: Ports, etc.: Telegraph and telephone.

1920.—Germany.—Ownership of telegraphs.—Length of lines.—The postal and telegraph services were retained by the republican government. There were 138,446 miles of telegraph lines and 91,450 miles of telephone lines.

1921.—Extent of telegraph and telephone lines in Switzerland, Belgium, Spain and Netherlands.—Switzerland had 1,664 miles of telegraph lines and 13,917 miles of telephone lines. There were 2,810 telegraph offices and 376,457 miles of telephone line in service in Belgium. Spain had 72,905 miles of telegraph lines; also 110 urban and 595 interurban telephone circuits. In the Netherlands most of the telegraph lines were owned by the state, but there were several private lines. The length of the state lines was 5,617 miles. The telephone, administered by the state, had 2,742 miles of line.

1922.—Great Britain.—Extent of telegraph and telephone lines.—There were 587,652 miles of post-office wires used for telegraphic purposes and 13,080 telegraph offices. The telephone system included 8520 circuits.

1923.—Canada.—Extent of service.—Compilations by the Department of Trade and Commerce show that "at least one out of every ten inhabitants of Canada has telephone service, placing the dominion second in proportion of telephones in the world. . . . There are now 944,029 telephones in Canada, an increase of 212 per cent. since 1911."—*New York Evening Mail*, Oct. 26, 1923.

1923.—France.—Proposed telephone extension.—"The administration of the P. T. T., manager of telephone service, acknowledges 'that there is a great telephone crisis in France.' . . . To remedy this [the administration] proposes a 'program of extension' which has been inserted in the Bill of Finances of 1923 already voted by the Chamber and which is under discussion in the Senate. The program of extension . . . is to be completed in ten years."—*Telephone problem in France (Revue politique et parlementaire, May 10, 1923, pp. 256, 284)*.

TELEKI, Count Paul (1879- ), Hungarian statesman. Premier of Hungary, 1920-1921. See HUNGARY: 1920-1921.

TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH MERGER, United States. See TRUSTS: United States: 1909.

TELEPHONE STRIKE, United States. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1918-1919: New England telephone operators strike.

TELESCOPE: Invention and improvement. See INVENTIONS: 10th-17th centuries: Instruments; 18th century: Instruments; SCIENCE: Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Roger Bacon.

TELL, William, hero of a famous Swiss legend, long believed to be based on historical fact. See

SWITZERLAND: Three forest cantons; AUSTRIA: 1291-1349.

TELL EL-AMARNA, region in middle Egypt. It includes the ruins of the city of Ekhaton, founded by the great reformer Amenophis IV. See also EGYPT: B. C. 1500-1400.

TELLER RESOLUTION (1898). See CUBA: 1895-1898.

TELLIER, Charles (1823-1913), French engineer. Invented the modern type of refrigerator, 1868. See INVENTIONS: 19th century: Refrigeration.

TELMELCHES, South American Indian tribe. See PAMPAS TRIBES; INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in South America; Pampean area.

TELUGU LANGUAGE. See PHILOLOGY: 16.

TEMENIDÆ.—"The history of the Macedonian kingdom is the history of its royal race. The members of this royal house called themselves Temenidæ; i. e. they venerated as their original ancestor the same Temenus who was accounted the founder of the Heraclide dynasty in Peloponnesian Argos."—E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, v. 5, bk. 7, ch. 1.

TEMENITES.—One of the suburbs of the ancient city of Syracuse was so-called from the ground sacred to Apollo Temenites which it contained. It afterwards became a part of the city called Neapolis.

TEMESVAR, Banat of. See BAN; also RUMANIA: 1919: Rumania's Treatment, etc.; Creation of Greater Rumania; SERBIA: 1919; TRIANON, TREATY OF (1920).

TEMESVAR, Battle of (1849). See AUSTRIA: 1848-1849; HUNGARY: 1847-1849.

TEMPE, Vale of. See THESSALY.

TEMPERA PAINTING. See PAINTING: Meaning.

TEMPERANCE. See LIQUOR PROBLEM.


TEMPERANCE MOVEMENTS.—Organized movements in behalf of temperance having begun in the United States in 1820, the idea soon spread through Great Britain. In 1820 temperance societies were formed in Ireland at New Ross and in Scotland at Glasgow. The first English society is reported to have taken form at Bradford in 1830. A British and Foreign Temperance Society was organized in 1831. The Order of Rechabites in England was instituted in 1835. In 1838, Father Mathew entered on his great temperance mission in Ireland. In 1853, the United Kingdom Alliance for the suppression of the liquor traffic was formed in Great Britain. See LIQUOR PROBLEM.

TEMPLARS: 1118.—Founding of the order.—In 1118, nine knights, of whom Hugh de Payens was the principal, took a vow, in the presence of Baldwin I, king of Jerusalem, to be both monks and soldiers, devoting themselves to the protection of the pilgrims who visited the Holy Land. They were given part of the king's palace for residence, and the open space between the palace and the temple—whence they took the name of Templars. In 1128 Hugh de Payens and others visited Europe and awakened great interest in the order. "Then Templars appeared before the council of Troyes, and gave an account of their order and its objects, which were highly approved of by the fathers. The celebrated Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, took a lively interest in its welfare, and made some improvements in its rule. A white mantle was assigned as their habit, to which Pope Eugenius some years afterwards added a plain red cross on the left breast; their banner was formed of the black and white striped cloth named Bauseant, which word became their battle-cry, and it bore the humble inscription. 'Not unto us, O Lord, but

unto thy name be glory! Hugh de Payens returned to Syria at the head of three hundred knights of the noblest houses of the West, who had become members of the order."—T. Keightley, *Crusaders*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: J. A. Froude, *Spanish story of the Armada and other essays*, ch. 4.

1185-1313.—Order in England and elsewhere.—"The Knights Templars first established the chief house of their order in England, without Holborn Bars [London] on the south side of the street, where Southampton House formerly stood; . . . but when the order had greatly increased in numbers, power, and wealth, and had somewhat departed from its original purity and simplicity, we find that the superior and the knights resident in London began to look abroad for a more exten-



KNIGHT TEMPLAR

sive and commodious place of habitation. They purchased a large space of ground, extending from the White Friars westward to Essex House without Temple Bar, and commenced the erection of a convent on a scale of grandeur commensurate with the dignity and importance of the chief house of the great religio-military society of the Temple in Britain. It was called the New Temple, to distinguish it from the original establishment at Holborn, which came thenceforth to be known by the name of the Old Temple. . . . [In 1185] Geoffrey, the superior of the order in England, caused an inquisition to be made of the lands of the Templars, . . . and the amount of all kinds of property possessed by the Templars in England at that period is astonishing. . . . The annual income of the order in Europe has been roughly estimated at six millions sterling! According to Matthew Paris, the Templars possessed nine thousand manors or lordships in Christendom, besides a large revenue and immense riches arising from the constant

charitable bequests and donations of sums of money from pious persons. . . . The Templars, in addition to their amazing wealth, enjoyed vast privileges and immunities."—C. G. Addison, *Knights Templars*, ch. 3.—When the order of the Templars was suppressed and its property confiscated, the convent and church of the temple in London were granted by the king, first, in 1313, to Aymer de Valence, earl of Pembroke; afterwards, successively, to the duke of Lancaster and to Hugh le Despenser. "The Temple then came for a short time into the hands of the Knights Hospitallers, and during the reign of Edward III, it seems to have been occupied by the lawyers, as tenants under the Hospitallers. When that order was dissolved by Henry VIII, the property passed into the hands of the Crown, the lawyers still holding possession as tenants. This continued till the reign of James I, when a petition was drawn up and presented to the king asking him to assign the property to the legal body in permanence. This was accordingly done by letters patent, in A.D. 1609, and the Benchers of the Inner and Middle Temple received possession of the buildings, on consideration of a small annual payment to the Crown."—F. C. Woodhouse, *Military religious orders*, pt. 2, ch. 7.—"Many of the old retainers of the Temple became servants of the new lawyers, who had ousted their masters. . . . The dining in pairs, the expulsion from hall for misconduct, and the locking out of chambers were old customs also kept up. The judges of Common Pleas retained the title of knight, and the Fratres Servientes of the Templars arose again in the character of learned serjeants-at-law, the coil of the modern serjeant being the linen coif of the old Freres Serjens of the Temple."—W. Thornbury, *Old and new London*, v. 1, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: C. G. Addison, *Knights Templars*, ch. 7. 1299.—Their last campaign in Palestine. See CRUSADES: 1299.

1307-1314.—Prosecution and destruction of the order.—"When the Holy Land fell completely into Mahomedan hands on the loss of Acre in 1291 [see JERUSALEM: A.D. 1291] they [the Templars] abandoned the hopeless task and settled in Cyprus. By the end of the thirteenth century they had almost all returned to Europe. They were peculiarly strong and wealthy in France—the strength and wealth were alike dangerous to them. In Paris they built their fortress, the Temple, over against the King's palace of the Louvre; and in that stronghold the King himself had once to take refuge from the angry Parisian mob, exasperated by his heavy extortions. During the life and death struggle with the Papacy, the order had not taken the side of the Church against the sovereign; for their wealth had held them down. Philip [Philip IV], however, knew no gratitude, and they were doomed. A powerful and secret society endangered the safety of the state: their wealth was a sore temptation: there was no lack of rumours. Dark tales came out respecting the habits of the order; tales exaggerated and blackened by the diseased imagination of the age. . . . There were strange rumours of horrible infidelity and blasphemy; and men were prepared to believe everything. So no one seemed to be amazed when, in October, 1307, the King made a sudden coup d'état, arrested all the Templars in France on the same day, and seized their goods. The Temple at Paris with the Grand Master fell into his hands. Their property was presently placed in the custody of the Pope's nuncios in France; the knights were kept in dark and dismal prisons. Their trial was long and tedious. Two hundred and thirty-one knights were

examined, with all the brutality that examination then meant; the Pope also took the depositions of more than seventy. From these examinations what can we learn? All means were used: some were tortured, others threatened, others tempted with promises of immunity. They made confession accordingly; and the ghastly catalogue of their professed ill-doings may be read in the history of the trial. Many confessed and then recanted their confession. . . . The knights made a dignified defence in these last moments of their history; they did not flinch either at the terrible prospect before them, or through memory of the tortures which they had undergone. Public opinion, in and out of France, began to stir against the barbarous treatment they had received; they were no longer proud and wealthy princes, but suffering martyrs, showing bravery and a firm front against the cruelties of the King and his lawyers. Marigni, Philip's minister and friend, and the King himself, were embarrassed by the number and firmness of their victims, by the sight of Europe looking aghast, by the murmurs of the people. Marigni suggested that men who had confessed and recanted might be treated as relapsed heretics, such being the law of the Inquisition, . . . and accordingly in 1310 an enclosure was made at Paris, within which fifty-nine Templars perished miserably by fire. Others were burnt later at Senlis. . . . The King and Pope worked on the feeble Council, until in March 1312 the abolition of the order was formally decreed; and its chief property, its lands and buildings, were to be given over to the Knights of St. John, to be used for the recovery of the Holy Land; 'which thing,' says the Supplementor to William of Nangis, 'came not to pass, but rather the endowment did but make them worse than before.' The chief part of the spoil, as might be well believed, never left the King's hands. . . . The four heads of the order were still at Paris, prisoners—Jacques de Molai, Grand Master, Guy of Auvergne, the Master of Normandy, and two more. The Pope had reserved their fate in his own hands, and sent a commission to Paris, who were enjoined once more to hear the confession of these dignitaries, and then to condemn them to perpetual captivity. But at the last moment the Grand Master and Guy publicly retracted their forced confessions, and declared themselves and the order guiltless of all the abominable charges laid against them. Philip was filled with devouring rage. Without further trial or judgment he ordered them to be led that night to the island in the Seine; there they were fastened to the stake and burnt."—G. W. Kitchen, *History of France*, v. 1, bk. 3, ch. 10, sect. 3.—In England, a similar prosecution of the Templars, instigated by the pope, was commenced in January, 1308, when the chiefs of the order were seized and imprisoned and subjected to examination with torture. The result was the dissolution of the order and the confiscation of its property but none of the knights were executed, though some died in prison from the effects of their barbarous treatment. "The property of the Templars in England was placed under the charge of a commission at the time that proceedings were commenced against them, and the king very soon treated it as if it were his own, giving away manors and convents at his pleasure. A great part of the possessions of the Order was subsequently made over to the Hospitallers. . . . Some of the surviving Templars retired to monasteries, others returned to the world, and assumed secular habits, for which they incurred the censures of the Pope. . . . In Spain, Portugal,

and Germany, proceedings were taken against the Order; their property was confiscated, and in some cases torture was used; but it is remarkable that it was only in France, and those places where Philip's influence was powerful, that any Templar was actually put to death."—F. C. Woodhouse, *Military religious orders*, pt. 2, ch. 5, 6-7.

See also MASONIC SOCIETIES: Legend and fact; MONASTICISM: 11th-13th centuries.

ALSO IN: C. G. Addison, *Knights Templars*, ch. 7.—J. Michelet, *History of France*, bk. 5, ch. 3.—H. H. Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*, v. 5, bk. 12, ch. 1-2.

TEMPLE, Charles Lindsay (1871- ), English colonial statesman. Lieutenant-governor of the Protectorate of Nigeria, 1914-1917. See NIGERIA: 1914: Amalgamation; Public treasury.

TEMPLE, Sir William (1628-1699), English statesman, diplomatist and prose writer. Ambassador at The Hague, 1668-1671; 1674. See BALANCE OF POWER: Modern application; NETHERLANDS: 1668-1674.

TEMPLE (London), convent of the Templars. See TEMPLARS: 1185-1313.

TEMPLE OF CONCORD.—After the long contest in Rome over the Licinian laws, which were adopted 367 B. C., M. Furius Camillus—the great Camillus—being made dictator for the fifth time, in his eightieth year, brought about peace between the patricians and plebeians, in commemoration of which he vowed a temple to Concord. "Before he could dedicate it, the old hero died. The temple, however, was built according to his design; its site, now one of the best known among those of ancient Rome, can still be traced with great certainty at the northwestern angle of the Forum, immediately under the Capitoline. The building was restored with great magnificence by the Emperor Tiberius; and it deserved to be so, for it commemorated one of the greatest events of Roman history."—H. G. Liddell, *History of Rome*, v. 1, bk. 2, ch. 15.

TEMPLE OF JANUS.—"The Temple of Janus was one of the earliest buildings of Rome, founded according to Livy (i. 10.) by Numa. It stood near the Curia, on the northeast side of the Forum, at the verge of a district called the Argiletum. . . . [It was] a small 'aedicula' or shrine, which towards the end of the Republic, or perhaps earlier, was of bronze. It is shown with much minuteness on a First Brass of Nero as a small cella, without columns, but with richly ornamented frieze and cornice. Its doors were closed on those rare occasions when Rome was at peace with all the world. From the time of its traditional founder, Numa, to that of Livy, it was only twice shut—once after the first Punic War, and secondly after the victory of Augustus at Actium. . . . It contained a very ancient statue, probably by an Etruscan artist, of the doublefaced Janus Bifrons, or Geminus. . . . The Temple of Janus gave its name to this part of the edge of the Forum, and from the numerous shops of the argentarii or bankers and money-lenders which were there, the word Janus came to mean the usurers' quarter."—J. H. Middleton, *Ancient Rome in 1885*, ch. 5.—The temple of Janus was closed, once more, by Vespasian, after the destruction of Jerusalem and the ending of the war in Judea, 71 A. D. "It had stood open since the German wars of the first princes [Augustus]; or, according to the computation of the Christian, Orosius, from the birth of Christ to the overthrow of the Jewish people: for the senate had refused to sanction Nero's caprice in closing it on his precarious accommodation with Parthia. Never

before had this solemn act addressed the feelings of the citizens so directly. . . . The Peace of Vespasian was celebrated by a new bevy of poets and historians not less loudly than the Peace of Augustus. A new era of happiness and prosperity was not less passionately predicted."—C. Merivale, *History of the Romans*, ch. 60.

**TEMPLE OF REASON.** See FRANCE: 1793 (November).


**TEMPLE OF SOLOMON.**—"There were at Solomon's accession, two Tabernacle tents in Israel [one of which] had the Ark of the Covenant within its bosom. Scarcely had David transferred the Ark to the capital than the incongruity of its resting 'within curtains' while he himself dwelt in a palace lined of cedar, struck him, and preparations were set on foot for the planning and building of a permanent Temple such as the settled conditions of public affairs demanded. These preparations were completed before David's death. So minute were the specifications of the work to be carried out, that not only were patterns of the various utensils given to Solomon by his father, but also gold was provided by weight for the vessels of gold, and silver by weight for all the vessels of silver (1 Chronicles XXVIII, 14). So [it was] with all other materials used. . . . Plans and preparations for the Temple occupied the closing years of David's life. Between the transfer of the Ark to Jerusalem and his death lay that tract of time which . . . the royal poet devoted to the working out of his ideal, in writing and drawing. (1 Chronicles XXVIII, 19). . . . It was determined to find in the Tabernacle of Moses the outline and the measures which were to dominate the new Temple building. . . . The materials for the Temple were to be costlier and less perishable than those used in the Tabernacle, but they were to be treated as wholly subordinate to the scope and design of the structure."—W. S. Caldecott, *Solomon's Temple, its history and its structure*, pp. 220-221.—"The Temple of Solomon was largely of Phœnician workmanship. Its actual remains are most scanty, consisting of certain foundations, the megalithic aspect of which recalls similar work at Baalhec. Among the many restorations of the temple based upon Biblical texts, great discrepancies exist. None of them bear such an air of inherent probability as to be really convincing. From the texts it is easily seen that the Temple of Solomon has an entrance porch, a rectangular chamber lighted by narrow windows, and called the holy part, and a cubical sanctuary, the holy of holies. All these excepting the porch, were surrounded by many small chambers, three stories in height, apparently in the thickness of the exterior wall. Although the arrangement of the plan is clear, the manner in which the exterior was treated is not known. The very detailed description of the temple seen by Ezekiel in a vision is partly a memory of the earlier structure and partly a fabric of the imagination. Ezekiel shows us a temple with surroundings far larger and more complete than those of the earlier temple."—F. M. Day, *Temples* (R. Sturgis, *Dictionary of architecture and building*, v. 3, pp. 764-765).—"The one great achievement of Jewish architecture was the national Temple of Jehovah, represented by three successive edifices on Mount Moriah, the site of the present so-called 'Mosque of Omar.' The first, built by Solomon (1012 B. C.) appears from the Biblical description [1 Kings VI-VII; 2 Chronicles III-IV] to have combined Egyptian conceptions (successive courts, lofty entrance-pylons, the Sanctuary and the sekos of 'Holy of Holies')

with Phœnician and Assyrian details and workmanship (cedar wood-work, empaistic decoration or overlaying with repoussé metal work, the isolated brazen columns Jachim and Boaz). The whole stood on a mighty platform built up with stupendous masonry and vaulted chambers from the valley surrounding the rock on three sides."—A. D. F. Hamlin, *Textbook of the history of architecture*, p. 39.—"It is not doubted that the site of the Temple of the Jews was the great terrace that encloses the summit of Mount Moriah at the southeast corner of Jerusalem. This is an irregular quadrangle more than a quarter of a mile long from north to south and two-thirds as long from east to west. . . . In the middle is a platform rising some 16 feet above the terrace, which an unbroken Jewish tradition holds to be the platform of the Temple itself. In this most modern authorities concur. This platform which encloses the summit of Mount Moriah . . . is about 450 feet and is reached by eight flights of steps. . . . Solomon's temple, burned in 588 B. C., when Jerusalem was taken by the Chaldeans, was restored by Zerubbabel [515 B. C.] on about the same plan as the original, but with much less richness and remained until Herod undertook its complete reconstruction with a view of renewing the splendor of Solomon."—W. P. P. Longfellow, *Cyclopedia of works of architecture in Italy, Greece and Levant*, pp. 186-187.—The Temple "precinct was nearly doubled in size by Herod (18 B. C.) who extended it southward by a terrace-wall of still more colossal masonry. Some of the stones are twenty-two feet long; one reaches the prodigious length of forty feet. The 'Wall of Lamentations' is a part of this terrace, upon which stood the Temple on a raised platform. As rebuilt by Herod, the Temple reproduced in part the antique design, and retained the porch of Solomon along the east side; but the whole was superbly reconstructed in white marble with abundance of gilding. Defended by the Castle of Antonia on the northwest, and embellished with a new and imposing triple colonnade on the south, the whole edifice, a conglomerate of Egyptian, Assyrian and Roman conception and forms, was one of the most singular and yet magnificent creations of ancient art."—A. D. F. Hamlin, *Textbook of the history of architecture*, p. 39.—See also ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Palestine; TEMPLES: Stage of culture, etc.; JERUSALEM: B. C. 1400-700; JEWS: Religion and the prophets; CHRISTIANITY: Map of Jerusalem.

ALSO IN: P. E. Osgood, *Temple of Solomon, a study of Semitic culture*.—E. Schmidt, *Solomon's Temple in the light of other oriental temples*.

**TEMPLE SOCIETY**, religious organization. See FRIENDS OF THE TEMPLE.

**TEMPLES:** Stage of culture represented by development of temple architecture.—Survey of temples of Egypt, Asia Minor, Greece and Rome, India and the Far East.—"The temple is common to religions which have reached a certain stage of advancement, having generally passed beyond the worship of natural objects and reached a point at which an image of the god needs the protection of walls and a roof. Thus the Cultos image is the *raison d'être* of the temple."—F. M. Day, *Temples* (R. Sturgis, *Dictionary of architecture and building*, v. 3, p. 759).—"The earliest temples were nothing but caverns, and from this circumstance the custom of consecrating caverns was long preserved in Greece, and by many other people, but more particularly in Persia and India. . . . Troglodites adored their gods in grottoes. Where natural grottoes were not to be found,



RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TEMPLE OF SOLOMON AT JERUSALEM



vast artificial caverns were formed with incredible labour. In the plains the temple was, perhaps, at first merely an enclosure, containing an altar for sacrifice. This enclosure they surrounded with upright stones, forming a rude kind of colonnade, as we find instances among the Druids of the west, and in many scattered remains of antiquity in various parts of the East."—R. Stuart, *Dictionary of architecture*, v. 2, p. 10.—"By the time that man had superimposed a stone horizontally upon two vertical ones . . . the embryo was conceived that in the fullness of time would be developed into the trabeated design of the Egyptian temple and the column-and-entablature design of Classic architecture. From the colossal, monolithic form, still preserved, for example, in Stonehenge, there is a direct progression to the highly organized perfection of the Parthenon."—C. H. Caffin, *How to study architecture*, p. 8.—See also ARCHITECTURE: Prehistoric; AVEBURY; STONEHENGE.—"The religious ceremonies of the ancients were largely centred around the altar, which, although it was not within the temple, was of more moment to them than the image of the god. Thus a temple is not necessarily a place of public worship [see BABYLONIA: Social structure], many temples being open to the priests only. In providing for the needs of both worship and ritual, a temple generally has, first, either in or near it, a place for the meeting of the worshippers (as around the altar in the Greek and Roman temple or in the great forecourt in the Egyptian temple); second, an important chamber (as the naos of the Greek or the hypostyle hall of the Egyptian temple); third, a sanctuary, adytum, or holy of holies."—F. M. Day, *Temples* (R. Sturgis, *History of architecture and building*, v. 3, p. 750).—See also ASYLUM, RIGHT OF.—In ancient Egypt "the Temples embody the pride and glory of the national, collective life. [See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 2.] Indeed, it would seem that during life the individual, except only the King, . . . was regarded simply as a factor in the collective organisation of the community, the splendour and power of which was visualised in the Temples. [See EDUCATION, ART: Egypt.] Hence the importance which was attached to size and beauty of colour in the Temple architecture."—C. H. Caffin, *How to study architecture*, p. 33.—See also ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Egypt; CARTOUCHE.—"Certain Assyriologists maintain that the plain-inhabiting races of Mesopotamia regarded their gods as mountain-born and as dwellers upon mountain tops, and that, therefore, in erecting dwelling places for them, they sought to reproduce their mountain homes. Certain it is that a mound of earth was piled up and formed into a terrace for the temple, which, both in Babylonia [see BABYLON: Origin and influence; Decline] and Assyria, took the form of a square tower, known as the zikkurat. . . . Hugeness and especially height were the criteria of excellence in the zikkurat. [See also ARCHITECTURE: Chaldean.] The Phœnicians, who carried the arts of Egypt and Mesopotamia to all the shores of the Mediterranean, were undoubtedly builders of great temples. . . . There is sufficient evidence to show that a monumental enclosure surrounded a great platform (as at Baalbec) [see BAALBEK], on which stood a sanctuary. Of the sanctuary itself, our knowledge, revived chiefly from certain medals, is very slight. [See ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Phœnicia.] The architecture of ancient Judæa was Phœnician in character."—F. M. Day, *Temples* (R. Sturgis, *Dictionary of architecture and building*, v. 3, pp. 763-764).—"The problem set before

the architect of the first [Solomon's] temple . . . was no other than to produce a Tabernacle—tent in wood and stone. . . . From that tent-like construction . . . the Jewish Temple never departed during the thousand years of its existence. It was the master-idea which flowed from Mosaic, through Davidic and Maccabean, to Herodian days."—W. Shaw Caldecott, *Solomon's Temple, its history and its structure*, p. 222.—See also TEMPLE OF SOLOMON; ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Palestine.—"The architectural remains of Persia include no temples. The Zoroastrian religion has no use for temples made with hands. Its temple was the universe; the floor of it the mountain tops of Persia, from which countless altars . . . sent up flames in worship of the element of fire. [See also ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Persia.] . . . The



HINDU TEMPLE AT TANJORE, INDIA

architecture of Greece reached its highest expression in the temple, the supreme monument of the community's civic consciousness. [See AMPHICTYONIC COUNCIL; ATHENS: B. C. 461-431: General aspect, etc.] The developed form of the Hellenic temple resembled the Egyptian in being a product of the 'post and beam' principle of construction; but differed in its purpose that the outside rather than the inside should present superior dignity of design. . . . [The genius of Rome] was displayed in practicalness; in the resourcefulness with which it extended the scope of architecture to serve the necessities and ideals of life. Hence the temple-form . . . ceased to occupy the chief attention. . . . The plan of the Roman temple was circular, polygonal, or rectangular; the last being the most usual type."—C. H. Caffin, *How to study architecture*, pp. 80-81, 116, 160.—See also ARCHITECTURE: Classic; TEMPLE OF CONCORD; TEMPLE OF JANUS.—"Of the temples of the first Brahmini-

cal period in India, the age anterior to the third century B. C., and extending to the fifth century of our era, abundant remains of temples, both above and below ground, exist. [See BUDDHIST TEMPLES.] The general form of the tope or tumulus raised over a sacred relic is a hemisphere carried on a circular basement, while that of the cave temple is a basilica with two aisles and a nave, at the end of which stands a sanctuary in the form of a tope. The façade, ornamented with columns, was cut like the rest of the temple from the rock. . . . The second Brahminical period, beginning about the fifth century and reaching to the present time, developed new temple types, of which the pagoda is the most striking and important. [See ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: India.] . . . [In China and Japan the temple] is a building of two stories, of which the lower is open in front but surrounded by a veranda, while the upper is covered by an ornate roof. The sanctuary is enclosed by a sort of cloister, behind which are rooms for pilgrims and cells for bonzes. . . . In China the arrangement of temples is generally a symmetrical one. [See ARCHITECTURE: Oriental:

most splendid of which is the Kailds, built about 760-780.—See also SCULPTURE: India, etc.

**ERECTHTEION, OR ERECHTHEUM.** A temple on the Acropolis of Athens, in the Ionic style, and of irregular plan, portions being dedicated to Athene Polias, Erechtheus, Poseidon, and Hephæstus; completed 408 B. C., damaged by fire and repaired soon after; used as a church in Christian times, and as a harem under Turkish rule; much damaged in the siege of 1827; now being restored. See ARCHITECTURE: Classic: Greece; ERECTHTEION AT ATHENS.

**HEROD, TEMPLE OF.** At Jerusalem; built on site of Solomon's Temple; plan uncertain; Hellenistic influence in treatment.

**HORIJUJ, MONASTERY OF.** Near Nara, Japan; begun in 593 by Korean architects; gate, temple and pagoda are original structures; the remainder has been rebuilt from time to time in the same style.

**JUPITER CAPITOLINUS, TEMPLE OF.** At Rome; first built in wood; rebuilt, last by Domitian, on same plan. See ARCHITECTURE: Classic: Etruscan.

**KAABA.** Temple at Mecca. See KAABA AT MECCA.



RUINS OF THE BASILICA AND TEMPLE OF NEPTUNE AT PÆSTUM.

The Basilica, at the left, apparently a temple for two deities, Ceres and Proserpina, dates from about the sixth century B. C. The Temple of Neptune is a coarse stone building, hexastyle peripteros with fourteen columns on each side. It was built about the fifth century B. C.

China.] In Japan, where the picturesque prevails, the sacred enclosure is often treated as an informal park. [See ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Japan.] A similarity exists between the temples of Mesopotamia and those of Mexico, Yucatan, and Peru.—F. M. Day, *Temples* (R. Sturgis, *Dictionary of architecture and building*, v. 3, pp. 771-773).

See also MEXICO: Aboriginal peoples; WOMAN'S RIGHTS: B. C. 2250-538.

**Ancient examples.**—The most famous of the ancient temples are as follows:

**ATHENA NIKE, TEMPLE OF** (wrongly called Nike Apteros). On the Acropolis of Athens; a very small (18½ x 27 ft.) and perfect example of the Ionic style, built 450-400 B. C. See ARCHITECTURE, Classic: Greece.

**BAAL, TEMPLE OF.** At Baalbek. See BAALBEK.

**DIANA, TEMPLE OF** (more properly Artemis). At Ephesus; also called the Artemision; (1) a large Ionic structure, built in the sixth century B. C. and contributed to by Cræsus; destroyed by fire in the fourth century B. C., (2) a Hellenistic edifice on the same site, begun immediately after this, sacked and burned by the Goths in 262 A. D.; excavated on behalf of the British Museum, 1863-1874, 1904-1905.—See also EPHEBUS.

**ELLORA, TEMPLES AT.** In the native state of Hyderabad, India; a series of rock cut temples, the

**KARNAK, TEMPLES OF.** In Egypt; three enclosures, the greatest of which is the temple of Ammon, begun during the Middle Kingdom, and continued from time to time through the reigns of Ptolemies, the immense Hall of Columns being built by Seti I and Rameses II. See ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Egyptian.

**LUXOR, TEMPLE OF.** In Egypt; sacred to Ammon, Mut and Khons; built by Amenophis III, court added by Rameses II, sanctuary rebuilt by Alexander; since occupied by Christian churches and Moslem village and tomb; cleared since 1885. See ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Egyptian.

**MAISON CARRÉE.** Græco-Roman temple at Nîmes, France; most important example remaining; built under Augustus; now used as museum.

**NIKKO, TEMPLES AT.** In Japan; various buildings, but especially the shrine and tomb of Iyeyasu, first shogun of the Tokugawa dynasty.

**OBAKU-SAN, TEMPLE OF.** Near Kyoto, Japan; typical of the Chinese revival of the seventeenth century.

**PANTHEON.** At Rome; its dome has the largest diameter in the world (about 142 feet); probably built under Hadrian, replacing earlier structure called Pantheon of Agrippa; since 609 a Christian church, S. Maria Rotunda. See ARCHITECTURE: Classic: Roman; PANTHEON AT ROME.



**PARTHENON.** Chief temple of Athena, on the Acropolis at Athens; most perfect example of Doric order; built by Pericles to replace an earlier building of the same name; probably remained intact until the sixth century A. D. See ARCHITECTURE: Classic: Greek; SCULPTURE: Greece: B. C. 5th century.

**PHILE, TEMPLES OF.** In Egypt; group dating from the third century B. C. to the second A. D., the most important, a temple of Isis, finally closed under Justinian; occupied by a Christian church; now submerged as consequence of Assuan dam.

**POSEIDON, OR NEPTUNE, TEMPLE OF.** Chief of a group (so-called Basilica and Temple of Ceres, Greek, sixth century B. C., and Roman Temple of Peace, second century B. C.) at Paestum or Posidonia, a Greek colony in Italy; built; about 420 B. C. See ARCHITECTURE: Classic: Greek.

**SOLOMON, TEMPLE OF.** See TEMPLE OF SOLOMON.

**SUN, TEMPLE OF THE (or of Jupiter-Baal).** At Baalbek (Heliopolis); dedicated in reign of Septimius Severus; built on foundations of Phœnician temple; clearance undertaken in 1901. See ARCHITECTURE: Classic: Roman; BAALBEK.

**THESEION, OR THESEUM.** At Athens; Doric temple believed to be dedicated to Theseus, but now known to have been a temple of Hephæstus; used as a church in the Middle Ages.

**VESTA, TEMPLE OF.** Name applied with more or less accuracy to various circular Roman temples; especially to one in the Forum at Rome, the ruins of which were re-discovered in 1875. See ARCHITECTURE: Classic: Roman.

**ZEUS, TEMPLE OF.** At Athens; called also Temple of the Olympian Zeus; built first in early historical days; existing remains date from Hadrian. See ARCHITECTURE: Classic: Greek.

**ZEUS, TEMPLE OF.** At Olympia, Doric style, built in fifth century B. C.; dismantled and used as fortress in fifth century A. D. and later destroyed by earthquakes; excavated 1875-1881.

Two modern edifices from an architectural point of view have been distinctly inspired by the classic temple: The Church of the Madeleine, Paris (eighteenth century), is on a Roman columnar plan, with three cupolas; the Pantheon de Paris, designed by Soufflot in the reign of Louis XVI, is in the Roman domed style. See ARCHITECTURE: Modern: France.

**TEN, Board of (Probuli),** administrative body in Athens. See ATHENS: B. C. 413-411.

**TEN, Council of,** administrative body in Venice, 1310-1797. See VENICE: 1032-1310.

**TEN HOURS BILL,** England (1847). See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1802-1847; LABOR LEGISLATION: 1801-1878.

**TEN THOUSAND,** Greek assembly. See GREECE: B. C. 404-350.

**TEN TRIBES OF ISRAEL.** See JEWS: Kingdoms of Israel and Judah.

**TEN YEARS' WAR** (431-421 B. C.).—The long conflict between Athens and her confederated enemies, Sparta at the head, which is usually called the Peloponnesian War, was divided into two periods by the Peace of Nicias. The war in the first period, covering a decade, was known as the Ten Years' War; though the Peloponnesians called it the Attic War.—E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, bk. 4, ch. 2.—See ATHENS: B. C. 421.

**TENANT FARMING,** British Isles. See AGRICULTURE: Modern: British Isles: 20th century.

**TENANT LEAGUE,** Irish, organization for reform of land laws founded in 1850. See IRELAND, 1847-1860.

**TENANT RIGHT,** Ulster. See IRELAND: 1845-1847; 1847-1860.

**TENAWAS,** North American Indian tribe. See APACHE INDIANS; INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: Southwest area.

**TENCHEBRAI,** Battle of (1106). See ENGLAND: 1087-1135.

**TENCHI (Tenji),** emperor of Japan, 668-671. See JAPAN: 550-708.

**TENCHERI,** Germanic tribe. See USIPETES.

**TENEDOS,** island in the Ægean sea, five miles from the northwest coast of Asia Minor, having an area of sixteen square miles. (See ÆGLAN.) It belonged successively to Persia, Athens, Rome, the Byzantine emperors, Venice, and Turkey.

circa B. C. 1100.—Early Greek settlement. See ASIA MINOR: B. C. 1100.

1378.—Dispute of Genoa and Venice over sovereignty. See VENICE: 1378-1379.

1455-1920.—Occupied by Turks. See TURKEY: 1498-1502.

1655-1656.—Taken by Venetians and retaken by the Turks. See TURKEY: 1645-1660.

1920.—Ceded to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres. See GREECE: 1918-1920; SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920): Part III Political clauses: Greece.

1922.—Placed under Turkish sovereignty.—By an article in the draft Treaty of Lausanne (1922), Tenedos, although outside the Dardanelles, was placed under Turkish sovereignty subject to special arrangements for its local administration.—See also TROIA; CONSTANTINOPLE: Map of the Dardanelles, etc.

**TENEZ,** North American Indian tribe. See ZAPOTEC.

**TENNESSEE,** state in the south central part of the United States, known popularly as the "Volunteer state." It has an area of 42,022 square miles, and the population in 1920 was 2,337,885. It is bordered on the north by Kentucky and Virginia; on the east by North Carolina; on the south by Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi; and on the west by the Mississippi river. The Cumberland and the Tennessee are the principal rivers traversing its territory.

**Resources.**—Coal is the most important mineral production of Tennessee, the coal fields of the state having an area of 4,400 square miles. Other principal resources are gold, silver, iron, copper, and other metals, marble, phosphates and timber. The well-defined natural divisions of the state cause a diversity of soils and climatic conditions very favorable to a variety of productions and industries. The production of fruits, vegetables and grains is common to the entire state. Stock-raising, including sheep, cattle, hogs, horses and mules, while carried on everywhere, is especially developed in central Tennessee where the blue grass flourishes spontaneously. Tobacco and cotton are among the staple crops of that portion of the Mississippi valley marking the western border of the state. Development of water-power has resulted in the rapid progress of manufacturing. The manufacture of flour-mill, and grist mill, products, lumber and timber products, and iron and steel working are the most important industries of the state.—See U. S. A.: Economic Map.

**Aboriginal inhabitants.** See INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: Southeastern area; CHEROKEES; IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY: Their conquests and wide dominions.

1629.—Embraced in the Carolina grant to Sir Robert Heath. See AMERICA: 1620.

1748.—First English exploration from Virginia. See OHIO: 1748-1754.

1768.—Treaty with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix.—Pretended cession of country south of the Ohio. See U.S.A.: 1765-1768.

1769-1772.—First settlers in the eastern valley.—Watauga commonwealth and its constitution.—“Soon after the successful ending of the last colonial struggle with France, and the conquest of Canada, the British king issued a proclamation forbidding the English colonists from trespassing on Indian grounds, or moving west of the mountains. [See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1763.] But in 1768, at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, the Six Nations agreed to surrender to the English all the lands lying between the Ohio and the Tennessee [see U.S.A.: 1765-1768]; and this treaty was at once seized upon by the backwoodsmen as offering an excuse for settling beyond the mountains. However, the Iroquois had ceded lands to which they had no more right than a score or more other Indian tribes. . . . The great hunting-grounds between the Ohio and the Tennessee formed a debatable land, claimed by every tribe that could hold its own against its rivals. The eastern part of what is now Tennessee consists of a great hill-strewn, forest-clad valley, running from northeast to southwest, bounded on one side by the Cumberland, and on the other by the Great Smoky and Unaka Mountains; the latter separating it from North Carolina. In this valley arise and end the Clinch, the Holston, the Watauga, the Nolichucky, the French Broad, and the other streams, whose combined volume makes the Tennessee River. The upper end of the valley lies in southwestern Virginia, the headwaters of some of the rivers being well within that State; and though the province was really part of North Carolina, it was separated therefrom by high mountain chains, while from Virginia it was easy to follow the watercourses down the valley. Thus, as elsewhere among the mountains forming the western frontier, the first movements of population went parallel with, rather than across, the ranges. As in western Virginia the first settlers came, for the most part, from Pennsylvania, so, in turn, in what was then western North Carolina, and is now eastern Tennessee, the first settlers came mainly from Virginia, and, indeed, in great part, from this same Pennsylvanian stock. Of course, in each case there was also a very considerable movement directly westward. They were a sturdy race, enterprising and intelligent, fond of the strong excitement inherent in the adventurous frontier life. Their untamed and turbulent passions, and the lawless freedom of their lives, made them a population very productive of wild, headstrong characters; yet, as a whole, they were a God-fearing race, as was but natural in those who sprang from the joins of the Irish Calvinists. Their preachers, all Presbyterians, followed close behind the first settlers and shared their toil and dangers. . . . In 1769, the year that Boon first went to Kentucky, the first permanent settlers came to the banks of the Watauga, the settlement being merely an enlargement of the Virginia settlement, which had for a short time existed on the headwaters of the Holston, especially near Wolf Hills. At first the settlers thought they were still in the domain of Virginia, for at that time the line marking her southern boundary had not been run so far west. . . . But in 1771, one of the new-comers, who was a practical surveyor, ran out the Virginia boundary line some distance to the westward, and discovered that the Watauga settlement came within the limits of North Carolina. Hitherto the settlers had supposed that they themselves were

governed by the Virginian law, and that their rights as against the Indians were guaranteed by the Virginian government; but this discovery threw them back upon their own resources. They suddenly found themselves obliged to organize a civil government. . . . About the time that the Watauga commonwealth was founded, the troubles in North Carolina came to a head. Open war ensued between the adherents of the royal governor, Tryon, on the one hand, and the Regulators, as the insurgents styled themselves, on the other, the struggle ending with the overthrow of the Regulators at the battle of Alamance. [See NORTH CAROLINA: 1766-1771.] As a consequence of these troubles, many people from the back counties of North Carolina crossed the mountains, and took up their abode among the pioneers on the Watauga and upper Holston; the beautiful valley of the Nolichucky soon receiving its share of this stream of immigration. Among the first comers were many members of the class of desperate adventurers always to be found hanging round the outskirts of frontier civilization. . . . But the bulk of the settlers were men of sterling worth; fit to be the pioneer fathers of a mighty and beautiful state. . . . Such were the settlers of the Watauga, the founders of the commonwealth that grew into the State of Tennessee, who early in 1772 decided that they must form some kind of government that would put down wrong-doing and work equity between man and man. Two of their number already towered head and shoulders above the rest in importance and merit especial mention; for they were destined for the next thirty years to play the chief parts in the history of that portion of the Southwest which largely through their own efforts became the State of Tennessee. These two men, neither of them yet thirty years of age, were John Sevier and James Robertson. . . . With their characteristic capacity for combination, so striking as existing together with the equally characteristic capacity for individual self-help, the settlers determined to organize a government of their own. They promptly put their resolution into effect early in the spring of 1772, Robertson being apparently the leader in the movement. They decided to adopt written articles of agreement, by which their conduct should be governed; and these were known as the Articles of the Watauga Association. They formed a written constitution, the first ever adopted west of the mountains, or by a community composed of American-born freemen. It is this fact of the early independence and self-government of the settlers along the headwaters of the Tennessee that gives to their history its peculiar importance. They were the first men of American birth to establish a free and independent community on the continent. . . . The first step taken by the Watauga settlers, when they had determined to organize, was to meet in general convention, holding a kind of folk-thing, akin to the New England town-meeting. They then elected a representative assembly, a small parliament or ‘witanagemot,’ which met at Robertson’s station. Apparently the freemen of each little fort or palisaded village, each block-house that was the centre of a group of detached cabins and clearings, sent a member to this first frontier legislature. It consisted of thirteen representatives, who proceeded to elect from their number five—among them Sevier and Robertson—to form a committee or court, which should carry on the actual business of government, and should exercise both judicial and executive functions. This court had a clerk and a sheriff, or

executive officer, who respectively recorded and enforced their decrees. . . . In fact, the dwellers, in this little outlying frontier commonwealth, exercised the rights of full statehood for a number of years; establishing in true American style a purely democratic government with representative institutions."—T. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, v. 1, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: E. Kirke (pseud. J. R. Gilmore), *Rear-guard of the Revolution*, ch. 2-6.—J. Phelan, *History of Tennessee*, ch. 1-3.


1776-1784.—Annexation to North Carolina.—Cession by that state to the Congress of the Confederation.—Consequent revolt.—Repeal of the act of cession.—"The Watauga people had hopes, when the articles of association were adopted, of being able eventually to form an independent government, governed as the older colonies were governed, by royal governors. When the disagreements between the colonies and the mother country arose, they modified their views to the new order of things, and regarded themselves as a distinct though as yet inchoate state. But their weakness . . . rendered the protection of some more powerful state necessary for their welfare. . . . They petitioned North Carolina for annexation in 1776. Their petition was granted. . . . The provincial congress of North Carolina met at Halifax in November, 1776, and [Robertson, Sevier and two others] were delegates from Washington District, Watauga settlement. . . . After the annexation of the Washington District the old form of government was allowed to stand until the spring of 1777. . . . In November of this year, 1777, the District of Washington became Washington County. . . . From 1777 until the disturbances of eight years later, the history of Tennessee was a part of the history of North Carolina. . . . The part played by the inhabitants of Tennessee in the war for independence was active, and in one instance [at King's Mountain] decisive. Their operations were chiefly of a desultory, guerilla kind, under the leadership of Sevier . . . and Shelby." Sevier was also the leader in wars with the Indians, which were carried on with unsparing fierceness on both sides. "In the April session of 1784, the General Assembly of North Carolina, in accordance with the recommendation of Congress itself, as well as with the dictates of a far-seeing and enlightened statesmanship, imitated the example of Virginia and New York and ceded to the United States all the territory which is now the State of Tennessee. This of course included all the settlements. The condition of the cession was its acceptance by Congress within two years. Until Congress should have accepted the ceded territory, the jurisdiction of North Carolina over it was to remain in every respect the same as heretofore. . . . When the question of cession was first broached, it was accepted by the four representatives of the western counties at Hillsboro, as well as by those who proposed it, as the natural and legitimate solution of a complex problem. No one apparently dreamed of opposition on the part of the settlers themselves. . . . There is no reason to think that the Watauga people had any objection to the cession. . . . The objection was against the manner of the cession and its conditions. . . . The main cause of complaint was that North Carolina had left them without any form of government for two years. . . . A storm of indignation swept through the entire settlement. . . . The people regarded themselves without government, and, true to the traditions of their race, they sought the solution of the difficulty in their own re-

sources. . . . It is one of the noteworthy facts in the history of institutions that the possessors of English tradition always begin with the first primal germ of local self-government at hand, be it court leet, court of quarter sessions, township, county, school district, or military company, and build upward. The Watauga people had nothing so convenient as the militia companies, and they began with them as representing a more minutely varied constituency than the county court. Each company elected two representatives, and the representatives so elected in each county formed themselves into a committee, and the three committees of Washington, Sullivan, and Greene counties met as a kind of impromptu or temporary legislature, and decided to call a general convention to be elected by the people of the different counties. This convention met on the 23d of August, 1784, at Jonesboro. John Sevier was elected president, and Landon Carter secretary. . . . It is supposed that the convention which met at Jonesboro adopted the resolution to form a 'separate and distinct State, independent of the State of North Carolina.' . . . Provision was made for the calling of a future convention in which representation was to be according to companies. . . . The meeting adjourned, having fairly inaugurated the contest with North Carolina, which still claimed jurisdiction." Soon afterward the legislature of North Carolina repealed the act of cession, and "for a time it was supposed that this would terminate the agitation in favor of a new State."—J. Phelan, *History of Tennessee*, ch. 5-10.

ALSO IN: J. R. Gilmore, *John Sevier as a commonwealth builder*, ch. 2.—J. G. M. Ramsey, *Annals of Tennessee*, ch. 3.

1779-1780.—Colonization of Cumberland by Henderson.—Judge Richard Henderson, "in whom the genius of the colonizer and the ambition of the speculative capitalist were found in striking conjunction, was. . . inspired . . . to open for colonization, settlement and the sale of land, the vast wilderness of the valley of the Cumberland . . . But so universal was the prevailing uncertainty in regard to boundaries that it was necessary to prolong the North-Carolina-Virginia line in order to determine whether or not the Great French Lick, the ideal location for settlement lay within the chartered limits of North Carolina. . . . Judge Henderson chose as leader of the now colonizing party the ablest of the Tennessee pioneers, James Robertson, . . . who set forth from the Holston settlement on February 6, 1770, to make a preliminary settlement and to plant corn 'that bread might be prepared for the main body of emigrants in the fall.' After erecting a few cabins for dwellings and posts of defense, Robertson plunged alone into the wilderness and made the long journey to Post St. Vincent on the Illinois, in order to consult with George Rogers Clark. . . . After perfecting arrangements with Clark for securing 'cabin rights' should the land prove to lie in Virginia, Robertson returned to Watauga to take command of the migration."—A. Henderson, *Conquest of the Old Southwest*, pp. 270-282.—"Nothing more heroic is recorded of these people than the migration of three hundred and sixty of their number from Watauga into the wilds of West Tennessee under the lead of James Robertson. . . . It was the coldest winter ever known on this continent; their way was beset by lurking enemies. . . . Robertson's party set out from Watauga about the 1st of November, 1770; but the route through the woods soon became deep

with snow, and, encumbered as they were with cattle, and pack-horses laden with provisions and farming-utensils, their progress was slow."—J. R. Gilmore, *Advance-guard of western civilization*, pp. 3, 4.—"During the autumn Judge Henderson and other commissioners from North Carolina, in conjunction with commissioners from Virginia, had been running out the boundary line between the two states. On the very day—Christmas, 1770—that Judge Henderson reached the site of the Transylvania Fort, now called Boonesborough, the swarm of colonists from the parent hive at Watauga, under Robertson's leadership, reached the French Lick and on New Year's Day, 1780, crossed the river on the ice to the present site of Nashville."—A. Henderson, *Conquest of the Old Southwest*, p. 282.—The women and children with their escort arrived the following April. "But all the immigrants had not arrived in safety. . . . Thirty-three had perished by the way, and, of those who escaped, nine were more or less wounded.



JOHN SEVIER

. . . Nearly two thousand miles they had journeyed, in frail boats, upon unknown and dangerous rivers, never before navigated by a white man. The country through which they passed was infested by hostile Indians, and their way had been over foaming whirlpools and dangerous shoals thirty miles in extent, where for days they had run the gauntlet and been exposed to the fire of the whole nation of Chickamaugas, the fiercest Indian tribe on this continent."—J. R. Gilmore, *Advance-guard of western civilization*, pp. 7-8.—"Shortly after the middle of April [1780], Judge Henderson . . . proceeded to organize a government for the little community. On May 1st articles of association were drawn up; and important additions thereto were made on May 13th, when the settlers signed the complete series."—A. Henderson, *Conquest of the Old Southwest*, p. 285.

ALSO IN: C. L. Skinner, *Pioneers of the Old Southwest*, pp. 184-194.

1780.—Battle of King's Mountain. See U.S.A.: 1780-1781.

1783-1786.—Exploration and settlement. See U.S.A.: 1783-1786.

1785.—Organization of state of Franklin.—"Toward the close of May [1785] the western lands being again under discussion [in Congress], a resolution was carried urging North Carolina to reconsider her act of the previous November, and once more cede to Congress her possessions beyond the mountains. Had the request been granted, there can be no doubt the measure would have speedily brought peace and quiet to that distracted region. But North Carolina was too intent on bringing her rebellious subjects to terms to think for a moment of bestowing them with their lands and goods on Congress. Indeed, when the news of the request was carried into the district some months later, the malcontents expressed much surprise. They could not, they said, understand why Congress should apply to North Carolina; North Carolina had nothing to do with them. The parent State had, by her act of 1784, given them away. Congress did not take them under its protection. They belonged, therefore, to nobody, and while in this condition had called a convention, had framed a constitution, had formed a new State, had chosen for it a name, and elected a Legislature which was actually in session at the time the act of the 23d of May was passed. . . . Much of what they stated was strictly true. The delegates to the second convention had assembled early in 1785. These had given the State the name of Franklin, and had drawn up a constitution which they submitted to the people. It was expected that the men of the district would consider it carefully, and select delegates to a third convention, which should have full power to ratify or reject. The place fixed upon for the meeting of the convention was Greenville. But as there was then no printing-press nearer than Charleston or Richmond, and as much time must elapse before the constitution could become known to all, the delegates were not to convene till the 14th of November. Meanwhile the Legislature was to organize. Elections were held without delay; members were chosen after the manner in which the settlers had long been accustomed to elect representatives to the Assembly of the parent State, and these, meeting at Jonesboro, conducted their business with so much dispatch that on the last day of March they adjourned. . . . The name of the State has often been asserted to be Frankland, the land of the Franks, or Freemen. . . . But letters are extant from high officials of the State to Benjamin Franklin declaring that it was named after him."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 3, with footnote.

ALSO IN: J. G. M. Ramsey, *Annals of Tennessee*, ch. 4.

1785-1796.—History and the fall of state of Franklin.—Rise of the state of Tennessee.—On receiving news of the organization of the independent state of Franklin, Governor Martin, of North Carolina, issued a proclamation which was skillfully addressed to the cooler judgment of the mountaineers and which "was not without its effect." But, although the adherents of North Carolina "gradually gained ground in the new commonwealth, a majority still clung to Sevier, and refused to recognize any government but the one they themselves had organized. In this opposition of parties, disorders sprang up which presently degenerated into lawlessness. Both governments claimed jurisdiction, and both sought to exercise it. The consequence was that both became inefficient. Party quarrels ensued; old friends became enemies; Tipton and his followers

openly supported the claims of North Carolina; Sevier sought to maintain his authority as the executive officer of Franklin. This antagonistic spirit led to the commission of various outrages. . . . But in the midst of these inglorious quarrels, Governor Sevier did not neglect to defend from Indian aggressions the state over which he had been called to preside. . . . He was far less successful, however, in giving peace to the distracted state of Franklin. The continuance of intestine dissensions, and the nice balance of parties which took place in 1787, induced the people to refuse to pay taxes either to North Carolina or to the local government, until the supremacy of one or the other should be more generally acknowledged. In this state of affairs, with his government tottering to its downfall, Sevier earnestly appealed to North Carolina for a ratification of the independence of the state of Franklin, and to Franklin himself, and the governors of Georgia and Virginia, for counsel and assistance. Disappointed on all sides, he finally rested for support upon his immediate friends, conscious of the rectitude of his own intentions. . . . But the people were already weary of a feud which threatened, at every fresh outbreak, to end in bloodshed. In 1787 the last legislature of the state of Franklin held its session at Greenville. . . . The conciliatory measures of North Carolina presently disarmed the malcontents of all further arguments for opposing the reunion; and in February, 1788, the state of Franklin ceased to exist." Fierce conflicts between Sevier and Tipton and their hotter partisans still continued for some time; until, in October, Sevier was arrested for high treason and imprisoned at Morgantown. He escaped soon after, through the aid of his sons, was elected to the North Carolina senate, and was permitted to qualify for the seat on renewing his oath of allegiance. "His services were remembered and his faults forgotten." Meantime, settlements on the Cumberland, founded in 1779 by James Robertson, had prospered and grown strong, and Nashville, the chief among them, assumed its name in 1784, "in commemoration of the patriotic services of Colonel Francis Nash," of North Carolina, who fell in the battle of Germantown. In 1790, after ratifying the Federal Constitution, North Carolina, re-enacted the cession of her western territory, coinciding with the present state of Tennessee, to the United States, stipulating "that no regulation made or to be made by Congress shall tend to the emancipation of slaves." The "Territory southwest of the Ohio" was then organized, with William Blount for governor. Six years later (January, 1796), the population of the territory having been ascertained by a census to be 67,000 free white inhabitants and 10,000 slaves, a constitution was adopted, the state of Tennessee was formed, with John Sevier for governor, and, after some opposition in Congress, it was formally admitted to its place and rank as one of the United States of America. Its first representative in the House was Andrew Jackson.—W. H. Carpenter, *History of Tennessee*, ch. 13-17.—See also U.S.A.: 1781-1786; 1785-1790.

ALSO IN: J. R. Gilmore, *John Sevier as a commonwealth-builder*, ch. 4-12.

1785-1800.—Question of free navigation of the Mississippi.—Discontent of settlers and intrigues among them. See LOUISIANA: 1785-1800.

1813-1814.—Creek War. See U.S.A.: 1813-1814 (August-April).

1815-1835.—Era of expansion.—Growth of democracy.—Constitutional revision.—"The gen-

eration and more following the admission of the state and preceding the constitutional convention of 1834 was marked by the passage of the frontier beyond the borders of Tennessee; Tennesseans themselves became emigrants. It was an era of expansion and of aspirations for greater expansion. The population of the state, between 1800 and 1830, increased more than six-fold—from 105,602 to 681,004—while the population of the country as a whole little more than doubled. The slave population was increasing still faster and was setting another barrier between the mountains of the east and the hills and lowlands west of the Cumberland. The attitude toward free negroes was growing intolerant, while abolition movements were beginning to spring up. Land holdings grew smaller, but, except following the opening of new districts to settlement, land was no longer to be cheaply bought. Business enterprise of various kinds was springing up and bearing fruit. Banks, both state and national, were coming to the aid of commercial transactions. . . . The people were taking advantage of steam for navigation and were ready to lead the triumph of the agricultural sections of the country, which were striving for foreign markets and low tariffs, against the manufacturing interests of the northeast, when they sent Jackson to the White House in 1829. It was during his second administration that, yielding to the influence of the ascendant political democracy of the times—to dissatisfaction with land taxation that took no account of value, and to the desire for express authorization for state aid to internal improvement schemes, the people sent their representatives to Nashville for a constitutional revision. In response to the economic demands of the times, the new instrument ratified by the electorate in 1835, while retaining the provisions already in force—except the specific land tax—added (1) that a 'well-regulated system of internal improvement . . . ought to be encouraged by the general assembly'; (2) an express provision that the legislature could grant charters of incorporation; (3) that the legislature should fix a uniform rate of interest; (4) that laws for the emancipation of slaves without the consent of their owners should not be passed; and finally (5) that all property reserved for taxation should be taxed 'according to its value.' . . . Increased democracy—but democracy limited to the white race—was the keynote of the convention's work. Property qualifications both for voting and holding office were swept utterly away, so far as officials named in the constitution were concerned. Free white men, who were citizens of the United States and had been citizens of the county for six months, constituted the electorate. Disfranchisement for crime was, however, authorized. . . . Finally, instead of the provision for calling a convention to change the constitution there was devised a method of amending it by vote of two successive legislatures and submission to the electorate."—M. McClure, *Development of the Tennessee constitution* (*Tennessee Historical Magazine*, 1015, pp. 306-310).

ALSO IN: J. W. Caldwell, *Studies in the constitutional history of Tennessee*, ch. 5.

1830-1847.—Establishment of free school system.—"In 1823 the Legislature passed the first public school law enacted in this State. . . . The provision for a school fund, in the Act of 1823, was too insignificant to be of value, except as a first step in the direction of a public system. A small addition was made to it in 1825, and a substantial fund was provided in 1827."—W. R. Garrett and A. V. Goodpasture, *History of Tennessee*, pp. 200,

300.—“The first definite plan attempted was by the act of 1820. County courts at the first or second term after January 1, 1830, were to appoint commissioners to meet at regimental musters on the third Saturday in April 1830, to divide regiments into school districts and make registers of names of heads of families. . . . This bill gave existence to the common-school system of Tennessee, and this is the germ from which the present organization has grown. . . . The constitution of 1834 provided that the common-school fund should be ‘a perpetual fund, the principal of which should never be diminished by legislative appropriations.’ . . . The establishment of the bank of 1838, one object of which was to increase the public-school fund, but partially accomplished its purpose. . . . On the 10th of February, 1836, an act was passed making it the duty of the superintendent of public instruction to prepare plans for the improvement and organization of common schools. Under this act some changes of minor importance were made in the organization of the schools, and the first scholastic year began in July, 1838. In 1845 was passed a measure which manifested for the first time a correct understanding of the true principle of common education. This was the introduction of the feature of self-taxation for the support of common schools.”—J. Phelan, *History of Tennessee*, pp. 235-236, 237.—“The first long stride toward a more efficient [school] system was made by the city of Nashville. Professor J. H. Ingraham came to reside in that city in 1847. . . . He proposed a plan . . . in 1848. . . . The Nashville system of public schools was put in operation in 1885.”—W. R. Garrett and A. V. Goodpasture, *History of Tennessee*, pp. 300-301.

1834-1856.—Gubernatorial elections.—Rise of Whigs.—Election of President Polk from Tennessee.—Immortal Thirteen.—Party conflicts and fall of Whigs.—“With the adoption of the Constitution of 1834, Tennessee entered upon a new and distinct epoch in her history. Hitherto there had been no considerable division in the State upon questions of national politics. . . . There was but one political party in the State—that now known as the Democratic party, of which Andrew Jackson had long been the masterful leader. Jackson was about to retire from the Presidency. He felt himself under a weight of obligation to Martin Van Buren, of New York, whom he desired to succeed him as President. [This antagonized many political supporters who thereupon joined the Whig party.] . . . The Tennessee election in August, 1835, received national attention on account of its supposed influence on the Presidential election in 1836. Interest was intense from the beginning, and the contest determined and bitter. . . . Cannon [Whig] was elected by a plurality of more than 11,000 votes. . . . In 1837 . . . Cannon was again elected by an increased majority. . . . At the Presidential election in 1836, White [Whig] carried Tennessee by a majority of nearly 10,000 over all other candidates. . . . The Democrats determined to make a supreme effort to recover the State in 1839. . . . Governor Cannon offered for reelection and was accepted as the Whig candidate. The Democrats desired to put their strongest man forward to oppose him. The choice fell on James K. Polk, then serving his second term as Speaker of the national House of Representatives. . . . Polk was elected by a majority of 3,000, and the Democrats secured a majority in both branches of the State Legislature. . . . The struggle for supremacy between the

Whigs and Democrats of Tennessee from 1834 to 1844 was really but one continuous contest. . . . Polk was a candidate for reelection. None of the old Whig leaders seemed willing to meet him on the stump. In their desperation, the Whigs nominated James C. Jones, a man of yesterday ‘unknown to fame.’ . . . Jones was elected, and reelected in 1843. He was the first native Tennessean elected governor. . . . While Jones carried the State by a comfortable majority in 1841, the Legislature was almost evenly divided between the Whigs and Democrats. The Whigs claimed a majority of one on joint ballot, but the Senate had thirteen Democrats against twelve Whigs. These thirteen Democratic members of the Senate—the ‘Immortal Thirteen,’ as they were called . . . steadfastly refused to meet with the House for the purpose of electing United States Senators, whereby they prevented the election of two United States Senators, and Tennessee went without representation in the Senate from 1841 to 1843. . . . The cause of Texas independence and, afterwards, of the annexation of Texas to the United States, were earnestly favored by the people of the Southwest, and especially by those of Tennessee. . . . As the Presidential election of 1844 approached, James K. Polk declared that ‘the present opportunity should not be lost of becoming reunited with a country from whom we should never have been separated.’ . . . When the convention met, it nominated James K. Polk, a result that gave great satisfaction to the friends of Texas annexation. . . . The Whigs nominated Henry Clay, and opposed the annexation of Texas. After a hard-fought campaign, Polk was elected, but he failed to carry Tennessee. This is the only instance in which a President has been elected without receiving the vote of his own State. Still, Polk is entitled to the credit of having reduced the Whig majority in Tennessee from 12,102, in 1840, to 113, in 1844. . . . The gubernatorial contest in 1845 was between Aaron V. Brown, Democrat, and Ephraim H. Foster, Whig. . . . Brown was elected by a majority of 1,623 votes. . . . The annexation of Texas resulted in war with Mexico. Upon the requisition of the War Department, on the 26th of May, 1847, Governor Brown called for three regiments of volunteers, numbering in all 2,800 men. In answer to his call, 30,000 volunteers promptly tendered their services. . . . The contest in 1847 came on before the close of the Mexican War. The rich fruits of Polk’s sagacious policy were not yet apparent. Aaron V. Brown offered for reelection, and the Whigs nominated Neill S. Brown to oppose him. . . . The election was close and hotly contested, but resulted in a majority for Neill S. Brown. . . . When the war was ended, its returning heroes were received with little less than a triumph, and were honored by the people of the nation and State with the highest offices in their gift. . . . In Tennessee, . . . General William Trousdale, known as ‘the War Horse of Sumner County,’ was nominated by the Democrats to oppose Governor Neill S. Brown. . . . When the Whig convention met in 1851, William B. Campbell was nominated for governor by acclamation. . . . Trousdale was again the candidate of the Democrats. . . . The people again alternated between the parties . . . and elected Campbell by the customary small majority. He was the last Whig governor. . . . The opposing candidates for governor in 1853 were Andrew Johnson, Democrat, and Gustavus A. Henry, Whig. . . . After a remarkable canvass, in which the speeches of the

candidates bore little reference to each other, Johnson was elected. . . . The Know-Nothing party, . . . gave their support to Meredith P. Gentry, whom the Whigs brought forward to oppose the reelection of Governor Johnson, in 1855. . . . Johnson made Know-Nothingism the leading issue of the canvass, and in a memorable campaign defeated Gentry. . . . The Democratic party had now gained a permanent ascendancy in Tennessee. In the presidential election of 1856, the State went Democratic for the first time since the election of Andrew Jackson, in 1832. In 1857, Isham G. Harris, Democrat, was elected governor over Robert Hatton by more than eleven thousand majority. . . . In 1859, Governor Harris was re-elected."—W. R. Garrett and A. V. Goodpasture, *History of Tennessee*, pp. 182, 185, 187-191, 193-202.—See also U.S.A.: 1850 (June).

1853-1861.—State property taxed for public school support.—"Andrew Johnson . . . in his message in 1853 . . . urged a State appropriation to maintain schools. . . . Accordingly the Legislature passed an Act taxing all the property of the State for school purposes, under which the fund available for public schools was doubled. This was the first school tax ever levied by the State. But the law was defective in many respects, and the Civil War came on before any successful system of public schools was put into operation."—W. R. Garrett and A. V. Goodpasture, *History of Tennessee*, p. 301.

1860.—Topography of Tennessee in its relation to slavery.—Events leading up to secession.—"Tennessee was composed of three grand divisions which were in several essentials so different as to be almost separate states. The citizens of one division spoke and thought of those of the others very much in the same manner as of the citizens of the adjoining states. In topography and soil the difference of these divisions was very marked. East Tennessee consisted of rugged mountains and narrow valleys; Middle Tennessee, of long mountain slopes and plateaux and undulating table-lands; West Tennessee, of broad alluvial plains. These conditions influenced the people in their attitude toward slavery. . . . There was a radical difference in the character, sentiments and traditions of the people of the East and West Divisions which had been inherited from the original settlers. East Tennessee was settled at a time when hostile Indians inhabited the region in such numbers as to make life and property unsafe. Slave-labor did not seek such a home. The sturdy Scotch, Pennsylvania Dutch and the poorer people from Virginia and North Carolina were the first settlers. It was here that the first abolition society in America was organized, and the first abolition paper published. West Tennessee was settled after the Indians had been removed beyond the Mississippi river, and by men from the sea-board who brought their slaves thither for larger enterprise."—J. W. Fertig, *Secession and reconstruction of Tennessee*, p. 28.—"The first attitude of Tennessee on the question dividing the North and the South immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War was one of nominal neutrality. This attitude was foreshadowed by the action of her delegates in the Charleston Convention of 1800. They voted against the Southern proposition to give slavery *carte blanche* in the territories, and met afterwards with the Northern delegates at Baltimore, but when the Baltimore convention refused to readmit the delegates who withdrew at Charleston, the Tennessee delegates, believing a compromise no longer possible, withdrew and joined the other

Southern delegates in nominating Breckinridge, thus forecasting the attitude and action of their state in the secession movement. In the Presidential election which followed, the state gave another example of her neutral attitude by casting her electoral vote for her own son, John Bell, the National Union candidate, who stood for the Constitution and the laws as they then existed and opposed alike the doctrine of the Democrats and Republicans. . . . Although Lincoln had not received a single vote in the state there was no cause to fear any opposition from her citizens. They had expected his election and were prepared to do their duty under the Constitution. . . . An open letter from ex-Governor Neil Brown, published in all the journals of the state, exhorted the people to stand by the Union, since there was every reason to believe that President Lincoln would administer the government in a conservative manner. . . . The fact that ex-Governor Johnson, one of the United States Senators, and a majority of the Representatives were uncompromising Union men, further served to steady public sentiment. The strong Union sentiment in Tennessee, although not the result of, was in a large degree dependent upon, the attitude and acts of the other Southern States. A few days after the election of Lincoln were sufficient to show that South Carolina would, without doubt, execute her threat of secession, and the spread of the contagion southward and westward depended upon the action of Georgia. . . . When the Legislature of the latter state, November 18th, decided to call a state convention to take action on the question of secession, and appropriated \$1,000,000 to arm the state, the neutral policy of Tennessee was materially weakened. This policy was further weakened when the Legislature of Georgia adopted, December 3, a resolution proposing a conference of all the slave-holding states. This action of the Legislature of Georgia played into the hands of the secessionists in Tennessee. Under pretext of advocating this conference, meetings were held in various parts of the state for the purpose of creating and organizing secession sentiment. . . . Petitions were signed at these meetings asking the Governor to convene the Legislature to appoint delegates to the proposed conference. Governor Harris, warmly sympathizing with the secession movement, and maintaining an active correspondence with its leaders in other states, was not slow to act on these petitions. . . . Accordingly, on the 8th of December he issued his proclamation calling the General Assembly to meet in extra session, January 7, 1861. The purpose of the session as expressed in the proclamation was 'to consider the present condition of the country,' a phrase sufficiently indefinite to cover secession or any measures less radical."—*Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

1861 (January-May).—Secession from Union.—"The Legislature of Tennessee met on the 6th of January. On the 12th, a bill for the calling of a state convention [with the object of following the lead, in secession, which South Carolina had taken on the 20th of December (see U.S.A.: 1860: October-December)] was passed. It was passed subject to the approval of the voters. The election took place on the 8th day of February. The people voted against holding a convention by 67,360, to 54,150. In disregard of this vote of the people, however, the legislature, on May 1st, passed a joint resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a military league with the Confederate States. The league was formed. The Governor, Isham G. Harris, sent a message to the legislature,

announcing the fact. He stated its terms. . . . It stipulated that until the state should become a member of the Confederacy, 'the whole military force and military operations, offensive and defensive, of said state, in the impending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chief control and direction of the President of the Confederate States.' It was also agreed that the state would, as soon as it should join the Confederacy, turn over all public property it might acquire from the United States. The legislature ratified the league by decided majorities of both branches. These final proceedings took place on the 7th day of May. On the preceding day, the legislature put forth a declaration of independence. It was submitted to the votes of the people for ratification. This document waives the right of secession, as follows: 'We, the people of the State of Tennessee, waiving an expression of opinion as to the abstract doctrine of secession, but asserting the right, as a free and independent people,' declare that all the laws and ordinances by which Tennessee became a member of the Federal Union, 'are hereby abrogated.' The vote for separation was declared by the governor to be 104,010 for, and 47,238 against that measure. It thus appears that the Legislature of Tennessee, in declaring the separation of the state from the Federal Union, placed its action upon the ground of a revolutionary right."—S. S. Cox, *Three decades of federal legislation*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: F. Moore, ed., *Rebellion record*, v. 1, document 201-205.—O. J. Victor, *History of the Southern rebellion*, v. 2, div. 4, ch. 11.

1861 (April).—Governor Harris's reply to President Lincoln's call for troops. See U.S.A.: 1861 (April): President Lincoln's call for arms.

1861 (June).—East Tennessee convention.—Loyalty of East Tennessee.—"Seventy per cent of the vote against secession was cast in East Tennessee, which cast only thirty per cent of the entire vote. . . . Such radical difference of sentiment made it unlikely that East Tennessee would submit to the domination of the rest of the state, although out-voted two to one. As soon as it was known that the ordinances had been passed by the Legislature, a call was issued by the leading men of East Tennessee, chief among these, Senator Andrew Johnson, for a convention to meet at Knoxville, May 30. Delegates from all the counties of East Tennessee and from a few counties of Middle Tennessee came together that day, and formulated and published an address to the people of the state. They protested against secession as ruinous and heretical, and against the attempt of those in authority to override the deliberate judgment of the people expressed in the previous election. They declared that the Legislature had disregarded the rights of the people and had transcended its constitutional powers, in negotiating the Military League which they regarded as the only authority for arming the state. They appealed to the people to restore the state to its former position. . . . While East Tennessee was protesting against the usurpation of the Legislature, West Tennessee fortified the Mississippi from Memphis to the Kentucky line, raised an army of 15,000 men under General Pillow, admitted into the state 8,000 troops from Mississippi, and sent several thousand troops to East Tennessee to suppress any insurrection or to repel any attack in that quarter. . . . The convention of East Tennessee met again [June 17], and this time at Greeneville, as it was unsafe at Knoxville on account of the number of Confederate troops there. Reaffirming the work done

at Knoxville, they protested against the want of freedom in the election and against the dishonesty at the count, and appointed . . . a committee to prepare a memorial to the General Assembly asking that East Tennessee, and such counties of Middle Tennessee as desired to cooperate, be allowed to withdraw and form a separate state. [See also ALABAMA: 1861.] . . . The memorial, which the committee drew up and presented to the Legislature then in session, was referred to a committee of four from the Senate and eight from the House, but the Legislature adjourned in three days without taking further action. In case their petition was not granted, it was the intention of the leaders in East Tennessee to raise an army, place John Baxter at its head, seize the railroads and hold that part of the state for the Union by force of arms. For this purpose, they secretly organized the people, but before they could arrange for a general rising, the Confederates were in the state in such force that an attempt to hold the region would have been a desperate enterprise. . . . By the election in June it was decided that the state should send representatives to the Confederate Congress. The election of these representatives was set for the first Thursday in August. . . . In the four districts of East Tennessee the people would not vote for the Confederate candidates, but nominated and elected men to go to Washington. . . . The action of the people of East Tennessee so alarmed Governor Harris that he requested President Davis to send 14,000 additional troops into that part of the state. From this time Union men were suppressed into silence or hunted from the state. Many thousands left the state and joined the Union army in Kentucky."—J. W. Fertig, *Secession and reconstruction of Tennessee*, pp. 27-32.

ALSO IN: O. P. Temple, *East Tennessee and the Civil War*, ch. 16, 17, 18.—O. J. Victor, *History of the Southern rebellion*, v. 2, div. 5, ch. 5.—T. W. Humes, *Loyal mountaineers of Tennessee*, ch. 6-11.—W. Rule, *Loyalists of Tennessee in the late War (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery, Loyal Legion, v. 2)*.

1862 (February).—Breaking of the Confederate line of defense at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. See U.S.A.: 1862 (January-February): Kentucky-Tennessee.

1862 (March).—Andrew Johnson appointed military governor. See U.S.A.: 1862 (March-June).

1862 (April).—Continued advance of Union armies.—Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing. See U.S.A.: 1862 (February-April): Tennessee.

1862 (April-May).—Union advance upon Corinth, Mississippi. See U.S.A.: 1862 (April-May): Tennessee-Mississippi).

1862 (June).—Evacuation of Fort Pillow and surrender of Memphis by Confederates. See U.S.A.: 1862 (June: On the Mississippi).

1862 (June-October).—Buell-Bragg campaign.—Chattanooga secured by the Confederates. See U.S.A.: 1862 (June-October: Tennessee-Kentucky); (September-October: Mississippi).

1862-1863 (December-January).—Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough. See U.S.A.: 1862-1863 (December-January: Tennessee).

1863 (February-April).—Engagements at Dover and Franklin. See U.S.A.: 1863 (February-April: Tennessee).

1863 (June-July).—Tullahoma campaign of Rosecrans. See U.S.A.: 1863 (June-July: Tennessee).

1863 (August-September).—Burnside in east



Tennessee. See U.S.A.: 1863 (August-September: Tennessee): Burnside's deliverance.

1863 (August-September).—Chickamauga campaign and battle.—Union army at Chattanooga. See U.S.A.: 1863 (August-September: Tennessee): Rosecrans's advance.

1863 (October-November).—Siege and battles of Chattanooga.—Battle on Lookout Mountain.—Assault of Missionary Ridge. See U.S.A.: 1863 (October-November: Tennessee).

1863 (October-December).—Siege of Knoxville. See U.S.A.: 1863 (October-December: Tennessee).

1863-1864 (December-April).—Winter operations.—Withdrawal of Longstreet from east Tennessee. See U.S.A.: 1863-1864 (December-April: Tennessee-Mississippi).

1864 (April).—Fort Pillow massacre. See U.S.A.: 1864 (April: Tennessee).

Government, who have never voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy.' . . . Tennessee, as Johnson bluntly maintained, could only be organized and controlled as a State in the Union by that portion of her citizens who acknowledged their allegiance to the Government of the Union. Under this theory of procedure the popular convention proposed an amendment to the State constitution, 'forever abolishing and prohibiting slavery in the State,' and further declaring that 'the Legislature shall make no law recognizing the right of property in man.' The convention took several other important steps, annulling in whole and in detail all the legislation which under Confederate rule had made the State a guilty participant in the rebellion. Thus was swept away the ordinance of Secession, and the State debt created in aid of war against the Union. All these proceedings were submitted to popular vote on the 22d of February,



THE HERMITAGE

The home of Andrew Jackson, near Nashville, Tennessee

1864 (September-October).—Forrest's raid.—Capture of Athens. See U.S.A.: 1864 (September-October: Georgia).

1864 (November).—Hood's invasion and destruction.—Battles of Franklin and Nashville. See U.S.A.: 1864 (November: Tennessee), (December: Tennessee).

1865.—President Johnson's recognition of reconstructed state government. See U.S.A.: 1865 (May-July).

1865-1866. — Reconstruction. — Abolition of slavery.—Restoration of the state to its "former, proper, practical relation to the Union."—In the early part of 1865, Andrew Johnson, though vice president-elect, was "still discharging the functions of military governor of Tennessee. A popular convention originating from his recommendation and assembling under his auspices, was organized at Nashville on the 9th day of January, 1865. Membership of the body was limited to those who 'give an active support to the Union cause, who have never voluntarily borne arms against the

and were ratified by an affirmative vote of 25,203 against a negative vote of 48. The total vote of the State at the Presidential election of 1860 was 145,333. Mr. Lincoln's requirement of one-tenth of that number was abundantly complied with by the vote on the questions submitted to the popular decision. . . . Under this new order of things, William G. Brownlow, better known to the world by his soubriquet of 'Parson' Brownlow, was chosen governor without opposition on the 4th day of March, 1865, the day of Mr. Lincoln's second inauguration. The new Legislature met at Nashville a month later, on the 3d of April, and on the 5th ratified the Thirteenth Amendment; thus adding the abolition of slavery by National authority to that already decreed by the State. The Legislature completed its work by electing two consistent Union men, David T. Patterson and Joseph S. Fowler, to the United States Senate. The framework of the new Government was thus completed and in operation before the death of Mr. Lincoln."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of*

*Congress, v. 2, ch. 3.*—After the organization of a loyal government in Tennessee, more than a year passed before the restoration of the state to its constitutional relations with the United States, by the admission of its senators and representatives to Congress. Tennessee was the first, however, among the seceded states to obtain that recognition, by being the first to ratify the Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment. "Immediately on the reception of the circular of the Secretary of State containing the proposed amendment, Governor Brownlow issued a proclamation summoning the Legislature of Tennessee to assemble at Nashville on the 4th of July [1866]. . . . Every effort was made to prevent the assembling of the required number [to constitute a quorum]. The powerful influence of the President himself was thrown in opposition to ratification." By arresting recalcitrant members, and by "the expedient of considering the members who were under arrest and confined in a committee room as present in their places," the quorum was assumed to have been made up and the amendment was ratified. "Immediately after the news was received in Washington, Mr. Bingham, in the House of Representatives, moved to reconsider a motion by which a joint resolution relating to the restoration of Tennessee had been referred to the Committee on Reconstruction," and, this motion being adopted, he introduced a substitute which declared, "That the State of Tennessee is hereby restored to her former, proper, practical relation to the Union, and again entitled to be represented by Senators and Representatives in Congress, duly elected and qualified, upon their taking the oaths of office required by existing laws. [On the following day this joint resolution passed the House, and a day later (July 21), it was adopted by the Senate.]"—W. H. Barnes, *History of the 30th Congress, ch. 20*.

ALSO IN: Ira P. Jones, *Reconstruction in Tennessee (Why the Solid South? ch. 7)*.—J. W. Fertig, *Secession and reconstruction in Tennessee, ch. 3, 4*.

1866-1871.—Ku Klux Klan outrages. See KU KLUX KLAN.

1870.—New state constitution.—Its important provisions.—"The war resulted in a tremendous destruction of values, and in the complete overthrow of the industrial system. . . . The people were impoverished, helpless, despairing. The future was inscrutable and threatening. . . . Nevertheless we find a Constitutional Convention assembling in 1870 . . . and in this body were many of the most thoughtful, capable and conservative men of the state, prominent in public affairs."—J. W. Caldwell, *Studies in the constitutional history of Tennessee, ch. 6, p. 146*.—"The convention of 1870 met as a result of a successful political coup, made possible by dissensions in the ranks of the party which had opposed secession and was an expedient whereby the Democrats sought to realize permanently again their ante-bellum control of the state. Beyond this the convention as a whole did not care to proceed, and evidently thought that more settled times were at hand when a succeeding convention could more efficiently renovate the constitution. The revised instrument, like its predecessor, contains a preamble setting forth the outline of the previous constitutional enactments of the state, and eleven articles, the first of which is a declaration of rights, followed by a schedule of temporary adjustments. . . . Though much longer, it is . . . very similar to the work of the convention of 1834. There are few

provisions which can be said to be the direct voluntary result of the economic developments of the period preceding its adoption. The old ones generally were retained, with some extensions, as that the interest rate must not be more than ten per cent., and that laws for the creation of corporations must be general and alterable at will, provided such alteration does not disturb vested rights. There are also provisions concerning the state finances and state aid to private undertakings. . . . The property tax section, making mandatory the taxation of all property, merely puts into the constitution what statutes, gradually adding items to the list as the variety of property increased had already accomplished. Its all-inclusiveness naturally led to certain specific exemptions, permissive save in the case of products of the soil in the hands of the producer and his immediate vendee and one thousand dollars' worth of personality to each taxpayer. The latter provisions and the homestead exemption from sale under legal progress, within certain circumstances, may be evidenced as signs of growing social democracy, as may also the absolute prohibition of imprisonment for debt in civil cases. The permissive income tax on stocks and bonds not taxed according to a value was intended to draw revenue from the holders of Federal government bonds. The constitution has remained unchanged since 1870."—W. McClure, *Development of the Tennessee constitution (Tennessee Historical Magazine, 1915, pp. 310-311)*.

1870-1884.—State debt and its importance in state politics.—"At the general election, November 1870, General John C. Brown was elected governor, with a Democratic Legislature. . . . The comptroller reported that the State debt reached the enormous sum of \$41,863,406.69. The Thirty-eighth General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the governor, passed [a] . . . measure . . . to fund the State debt. . . . A strong opposition was . . . offered to his financial policy. In spite of this, his influence was sufficient to secure the enactments which he recommended. During his two terms, the bonded indebtedness was reduced from \$41,863,406.69, to a little over \$20,000,000; a large floating debt liquidated; an act was passed to fund the State debt at par; the payment of interest was resumed, and the credit of the State was fully restored. . . . Having served two terms with distinction, Governor Brown declined to be a candidate for reelection. In 1874, Hon. James D. Porter (Democrat) was elected governor, with a Democratic Legislature. . . . Governor Porter served two terms, extending from 1875 to 1879. Early in his administration, the Funding Act of 1873 was repealed. The Democratic party was divided in reference to the State debt. . . . Governor Porter repeatedly urged upon the Legislature to make a final adjustment of the State debt, and to provide for paying the interest. . . . An extra session of the Legislature was called to consider the proposition, which convened December 5, 1877, but failed to reach a final adjustment. . . . Governor Porter declined reelection at the end of his second term, and Col. A. S. Marks was elected governor. . . . During the two years of this administration, the State debt was the pressing issue. . . . The status of the debt was unsatisfactory and confused. The payment of interest had been suspended for several years, and the credit of the State was suffering. The Democrats were divided on the question of funding the debt. . . . Finally, a law was passed by the Legislature, providing for funding the debt at the ratio of fifty

cents on the dollar in bonds bearing four per cent interest; the said law to be submitted for ratification or rejection to a vote of the people. The election was held August 7, 1879, and the proposed law . . . was defeated. . . . At the end of his term, Governor Marks declined to be a candidate for reelection. The Democratic convention for nomination of a candidate was hopelessly divided. Hon. John V. Wright was nominated by the 'State Credit' wing and Hon. S. F. Wilson by the 'low tax' wing. . . . This split in the Democratic party led to the election of Hon. Alvin Hawkins (Republican) as governor. . . . An effort was made at the beginning of this administration to settle the State debt on a basis satisfactory to the bondholders. An act was passed in 1881 'to settle the State debt at one hundred cents on the dollar, and three per cent interest, and making coupons receivable for taxes.' The Supreme Court declared this act unconstitutional, and the vexed question was again opened. Three extra sessions of the Legislature were held. At the third extra session an act was passed 'to settle and fund the State debt into bonds.' . . . This act was approved May 20, 1882, and bonds were issued under it to the amount of \$8,211,000. Like its predecessors, it was unsatisfactory to the people. . . . The Democratic Convention, which met in June, adopted in its platform a plan for settling the State debt, and nominated Gen. William B. Bate for governor. . . . General Bate was elected. . . . Upon the strong recommendation of the governor, the Legislature enacted a law for the funding of the State debt, which proved to be the final adjustment of the vexed question. . . . This settlement was accepted by the bondholders, and the entire State debt was ultimately funded under the act."—W. R. Garrett and A. V. Goodpasture, *History of Tennessee*, pp. 261-267.

**1870-1885.—Changes in public school system.—Creation of new state bureaus, offices and commissions.**—"The results of the Civil War changed the whole aspect of public education in Tennessee. A bill was introduced into the legislature for the 'Reorganization, Supervision, and Maintenance of Common schools,' in October, 1865, but did not become a law until March, 1867. In 1870 the legislature unwisely repealed the law of 1867, and remitted the support of the public schools to the action of the several counties. . . . The school law passed by the legislature in 1873 was a bill drafted and recommended by a committee of the State Teachers' Association . . . and is entitled 'An Act to establish and maintain a uniform system of public schools.' It provides for State and County Superintendents of Public Instruction, and combined the State, county, and district systems. The permanent school fund of \$1,500,000, together with the interest accrued thereon during the war . . . were funded into a certificate of indebtedness . . . bearing six per cent interest. The interest on the permanent school fund was supplemented by a tax of one mill on the dollar levied by the State for school purposes, and by a State poll tax of \$1. The counties and school districts were also authorized to levy taxes for the benefit of their local schools, but the provision respecting districts was found to be unconstitutional and was repealed in 1875."—W. R. Garrett and A. V. Goodpasture, *History of Tennessee*, pp. 301, 302.—"During Governor Brown's administration, the Bureau of Agriculture and the Bureau of Immigration were established. It was at this time that the office of state geologist and the office of superintendent of prisons were created. As a

result of the prevalence of yellow fever in Tennessee during the year 1878, the State Board of Health was created. This board has continued its work down to the present day. During Governor Bate's first term of office the State Railroad Commission was established, . . . but at the next meeting of the legislature [1885] this law was repealed."—G. W. Dyer, *School history of Tennessee*, p. 197.

**1887-1908.—Liquor question.—Prohibition measures.—Pendleton law.—Election contests.—Assassination of Senator Carmack.**—"In 1887, the legislature passed the 'Four Miles Law.' This prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors within four miles of an incorporated institution of learning, unless such sale should take place in an incorporated town. This was the first law passed by the Tennessee legislature after the Civil War to restrict the sale of liquors in the state. . . . In 1887, an amendment to the constitution, prohibiting the sale of liquors in the state, was voted on by the people of Tennessee [and defeated]. . . . The legislature of 1880 passed an act which allowed all incorporated towns in the state with a population of two thousand or less, to surrender their charters which prohibited the sale of liquors within their borders. In 1903, this law was amended so that it was made to apply to towns of 5,000 population or less; and in 1907, the law was extended to all the cities and towns of the state. This act is known as the Pendleton Law, taking its name from Senator I. L. Pendleton, who introduced the measure in the senate and led the fight for its passage. Acting under this law, all the towns in the state, with the exception of four which had not surrendered their charters under previous laws, gave up their charters and reincorporated as 'dry' towns. The four places in which the sale of liquors continued were Memphis, Nashville, Chattanooga, and LaFollette. Governor Patterson [1907-1911] opposed very vigorously the Pendleton Act, but he was not able to prevent its passage. Governor Patterson was a candidate for reelection in 1908. A state Democratic primary was arranged for nominating a candidate for governor. Governor Patterson and ex-Senator Carmack were candidates before this primary for the Democratic nomination for governor. The leading issue in the primary campaign was the question of state-wide prohibition, Senator Carmack standing for state-wide prohibition and Governor Patterson against it. Governor Patterson received the nomination. Soon after this primary, Senator Carmack became the editor of the *Nashville Tennessean*. He with many others asserted that the people had a right to take any position they desired on the liquor question, when they came together in their state convention to adopt a platform for the Democratic Party; that the primary did not settle anything except the question of the nominee of the Democratic Party for governor. When the state convention assembled to adopt a platform, the state committee acting in the interest of Governor Patterson, unseated one hundred and fifty-one delegates sent to the convention by the people, and appointed others in their places . . . Senator Carmack, as editor of the *Tennessean*, said that this committee had no right to unseat the people's delegates and substitute its own appointees in their places, and he refused to be bound by the platform of such a convention which he asserted did not represent the views of the majority of the people. He supported the nominee of the party, but repudiated the platform, and urged the people to elect a legislature that would

pass a state-wide prohibition law. When the returns came in after the November election, it seemed that in both the senate and the lower house a majority who were in accord with Senator Carmack's views had been elected. Within one week after this election [November 9, 1908] Senator Carmack was killed on the streets of Nashville by Duncan B. Cooper and his son, Robin Cooper. Colonel Duncan B. Cooper had been a strong supporter of Governor Patterson. . . . The legislature met in the following January and passed the state-wide prohibition law. This law was fought in every possible way by Governor Patterson, but it was passed by a large majority in both houses over the governor's veto. Duncan B. Cooper and his son were denied bail, and were kept in jail until their trial. They were convicted by the jury and were given a sentence of twenty years in the penitentiary. The case was appealed to the supreme court . . . [which] affirmed the sentence of Duncan B. Cooper, but granted a new trial to Robin Cooper. Governor Patterson granted a full pardon to Duncan B. Cooper, within a few minutes after the supreme court had affirmed the sentence of the lower court. A new judge and a new attorney-general had now come into office in Davidson County, the judge by appointment of Governor Patterson, and the attorney-general by election. These officials had the case against Robin Cooper dismissed without allowing it to come to trial a second time."—G. W. Dyer, *School history of Tennessee*, pp. 206-210.

1891-1899.—Development of school system.—"The public school course has been extended by the enactment of the Secondary School law in 1891, . . . to expand the curriculum, but not to impair 'the efficiency of elementary instruction, which is, and always must be, the foundation of every good school system.' In 1899 an additional step was taken by the enactment of the High School law, which confers on the several counties the power to establish High Schools, and thus render the school course of the county complete. . . . Another educational enactment of great importance was 'An act to create a State Text-Book Commission, and to procure for use in the free public schools in this State a uniform series of text-books.'"—W. R. Garrett and A. V. Goodpasture, *History of Tennessee*, pp. 285, 303.

1897.—Centennial exposition.—The centennial anniversary of the admission of Tennessee to the American Union was celebrated by the holding of a very successful exposition at Nashville, which opened May 1, 1897.

1898.—Part in the Spanish-American War.—"In this war, Tennessee maintained her title to the 'Volunteer State.' She furnished her full quota of troops, and other volunteers offered their services. Four regiments from the State were accepted and mustered into the Volunteer Army of the United States."—W. R. Garrett and A. V. Goodpasture, *History of Tennessee*, p. 281.

1907.—Railroad legislation. See RAILROADS: 1907.

1913-1917.—Legislative enactments.—Part played in World War.—In 1913 the parole system for convicts in the state penitentiary was adopted. Not until 1917 did the state take its place in the ranks of those states having compulsory primary election laws. In the same year the legislature approved an act providing for an executive budget system. Besides the coal, iron, zinc, lead and other materials, which Tennessee contributed toward increasing the strength of the nation during the World War, she sent 75,825 of her men into

the national armies. This was 2.02 per cent. of the total fighting force.—See also WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: p. 2.

1919.—Ratification of Federal constitutional amendments.—Two Federal constitutional amendments were ratified by the state legislature subsequent to the armistice. On January 8, 1919, the Eighteenth (or prohibition) Amendment was ratified. The Nineteenth (or woman suffrage) Amendment caused a constitutional question in the state legislature which attracted the attention of the entire country. In June, 1920, President Wilson sent a telegram to Governor Roberts, urging him to call the legislature in special session to consider ratification of the Federal amendment. This Governor Roberts did, in spite of restriction contained in Article II, section 32 of the State Constitution, which reads: "No convention or general assembly shall act upon any amendment of the Constitution of the United States proposed by Congress to the several states, unless such convention or general assembly shall have been elected after such amendment has been submitted." The opposition to woman suffrage in the legislature grouped its arguments about this section of the state constitution and held that the governor's action in calling a special session sought to nullify the ordinance. The supporters of woman suffrage relied upon opinions from the state's attorney and the solicitor-general of the United States to the effect "that the power of the legislature to ratify an amendment to the Federal Constitution is derived solely from the people of the United States through the Federal Constitution and not from either the people or the Constitution of the State." The Nineteenth Amendment was finally ratified, Tennessee making the required three-fourths of the states.

ALSO IN: J. Haywood, *Civil and political history of Tennessee*.—J. W. Fertig, *Secession and reconstruction of Tennessee*.—G. R. McGee, *History of Tennessee from 1663 to 1911*.—T. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*.

1923.—Changes in workmen's compensation laws. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States: 1923.

TENNIS-COURT OATH. See FRANCE: 1789 (June).

TENNYSON, Alfred Tennyson, 1st Baron (1809-1892), English poet. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1832-1880; DRAMA: 1815-1877.

TENOCHTITLAN, early name of the city of Mexico. See MEXICO: 1325-1502.

TENPET, title meaning chief of the Magi. See MAGIANS.

TENTERDEN, Charles Abbott, 1st Baron (1762-1832), lord chief justice of England, 1818-1832. See COMMON LAW: 1828.

TENURE, Feudal. See FEUDALISM: Organization.

TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACT (1867). See U.S.A.: 1866-1867 (December-March); 1886-1887; PRESIDENT: United States: Presidential powers, etc.

TEQUESTAS, American aborigines. See TIMUQUANAN FAMILY.

TERAUCHI, Masakata, Count (1852-1919), Japanese statesman. Governor-general of Korea, 1911-1916; prime minister of Japan, 1916-1918. See JAPAN: 1914-1918: Okuma and Terauchi cabinets; 1918-1921; KOREA: 1910.

TERCEIRA, island in the Atlantic ocean belonging to Portugal and forming part of the Azores archipelago. See AZORES.

TEREK, province in the eastern part of Russian Caucasia, bordering on the Caspian Sea. Russia

granted the right of colonization to Germany in the Rapallo treaty of 1922. See RAPALLO, TREATY OF (1922).

**TERENCE** (Publius Terentius Afer) (c. 185-c. 150 B.C.), Roman poet and dramatist. See LATIN LITERATURE: B. C. 234-103.

**TERENTILIAN LAW** (451 B.C.). See ROME: Republic: B. C. 451-449.

**TERESAH** (Corinna Teresa Ubertis), (1877- ), Italian novelist and dramatist. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 1880-1920.

**TERGNIER**, town in Aisne, France, 19 miles northwest of Laon. It was constructed as an industrial town by the Nord Railway Company for its employees. In 1918, it was captured by the Germans. See HOUSING: France: Workmen's dwellings; WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: d, 2.

**TERMINER AND OYER**, Courts of. See CRIMINAL LAW: 1285.

**TERMONDE**, town in Belgium in the province of East Flanders, twenty-five miles southwest of Antwerp at the junction of the Scheldt and the Dender. It was a scene of fighting between the Belgians and the Germans in 1914. See WORLD WAR: 1914: I. Western front: f, 1; Miscellaneous auxiliary services: X. Alleged atrocities and violations of international law: a, 10.

**TERNATE**, small island in the Malay archipelago off the western coast of Halmahera. See MOLUCCAS.

**TEROUENNE**, Siege of (1513). See FRANCE: 1513-1515.

**TERRA FIRMA**. See TIERRA FIRME.

**TERRA NOVA EXPEDITION** (1910). See ANTARCTIC EXPLORATION: 1910-1913.

**TERRAIL**, Pierre de. See BAYARD PIERRE TERRAIL.

**TERRITORIAL AND RESERVE FORCES ACT**, England (1907). See WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1907-1909: British territorial force.

**TERRITORIAL FORCE**, English. See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 33.

**TERRITORIES AND DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES**.—In the administrative system of the United States a territory signifies a region of the national domain which has not been admitted to the Union as a state. In 1923, Alaska (see ALASKA: 1884-1912) and Hawaii were the only territories under United States rule. The Philippines, Porto Rico, Guam, Samoan islands and Virgin islands, besides some small islands scattered in the Pacific, are classified as "insular dependencies."—See also U.S.A.: Historical geography; COLONIZATION: United States.

"Congress, notwithstanding its sincere desire to give to the principle of self-government the fullest possible application, has not hesitated to deny the grant of such privilege until it has been satisfied that the inhabitants of the territory in question are fully qualified for its enjoyment. . . . Congress has in the same way laid down the principle that all of the rights guaranteed to citizens of the States by the Constitution do not of their own force apply to dependent territory but only as they are expressly extended to it by legislative act. Neither has Congress felt itself under any compulsion to apply in all cases those political principles which lie at the very basis of the American constitutional system, but on the other hand has resolutely refused to do so until it has been satisfied that such action will be for the best interests of the people of both the dependent territory and the nation as a whole. Thus Congress has granted to the same person, the President of the United

States, full executive and judicial power to take such action as he may deem best for the government of territory pending definite provision by Congress. Even when Congress itself has created a system of government, the exercise of two or all three of the branches into which governmental powers are divided—legislative, executive and judicial—has been placed in the same hands, thus violating the principle of the separation of powers, which is considered one of the most characteristic features of our constitutional system. So, also, Congress has not hesitated to make provision for an appointive or partly appointive instead of an elective legislature."—W. F. Willoughby, *Territories and dependencies of the United States*, pp. 51-52.—"The Government of an organized territory has usually provided for three departments: 1. Executive; 2. Legislative; 3. Judicial. 1. The executive consists of a Governor and other officers appointed for four years by the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate. The Governor performs the ordinary executive duties, to see that the laws of the United States and of the Territory are faithfully executed. He generally has a veto on legislative acts, which may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of each House. The other executive officers of the Territory, the Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor, and Superintendent of Public Instruction, are also appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and, like the Governor, are subject to the President's removal. 2. The legislature is composed of two Houses, a Senate of twenty-four persons, and a House of sixty-two persons. Each House is elected by the voters of the Territory for a term of two years, and the legislature sits but once in that period. . . . The House work by the *Committee System*. . . . The legislative power of every Territory is as extensive as that of a State,—extending 'to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.' This includes, of course, the organizing act creating the Territory. . . . 3. The judiciary consists of three or more judges of a Supreme Court, appointed for four years by the President with the consent of the Senate, together with a United States District Attorney and a United States Marshal. . . . These officers administer both the Federal and local law."—J. A. Woodburn, *American republic and its government*, pp. 305-307.—See also IOWA: 1838-1848; U.S.A.: 1853-1854; 1862 (April-June); 1865-1872.

**TERROR**, ship commanded by Ross in Antarctic explorations, 1830-1842. See ANTARCTIC EXPLORATION: 1830-1845.

**TERROR**, Reign of.—As commonly used, this phrase describes the prevailing conditions in France during a period of the French Revolution which ended with the fall of Robespierre, July 27 (Ninth Thermidor), 1794. The beginning of the period so called is usually placed at the date of the coup d'état, May 31-June 2, 1793, which overthrew the Girondists and gave unrestrained power into the hands of the Terrorists of the Mountain. The Reign of Terror was not however fully organized as a deliberately merciless system, and made, according to the demand of the Paris commune, "the order of the day," until the following September. In another view, the Reign of Terror may be said to have begun with the creation of the revolutionary tribunal, March, 1793. See FRANCE: 1793 (February-April), to 1794-1795 (July-April).

**TERRY**, Alfred Howe (1827-1800), American general. Captured Fort Fisher in 1865; commanded an attack against the Indians, 1876. See

U. S. A.: 1864-1865 (December-January: North Carolina); 1866-1876.

**TERTULLIAN** (Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus) (c. 155-c. 222), church father. See LATIN LITERATURE: 2nd-4th centuries; CHRISTIANITY: 100-300: Church in Carthage.

**TESCHEN**, small district in the southeast corner of the former province of Austrian Silesia, has an area of 2,282 square kilometres. Its mineral wealth, especially its coke and gas coal and its position as a nodal point in the road and railway system of central Europe, give it an importance out of all proportion to its actual size. In the settlement of territorial questions growing out of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire the first problem dealt with by the Peace Conference of Paris was that of Teschen, partly occupied by Czech and partly by Polish troops. An Inter-Allied mission was authorized for Teschen January 30, 1919, but all attempts on the part of the Peace conference and Inter-Allied commission to bring about an adjustment either by plebiscite or by arbitration failed. Finally on the 28th of July, 1920, the Supreme Council sent to the delegates of the four Allied Powers in the Ambassadors' conference, instructions dividing the duchy of Teschen between the two republics. The Ambassadors' conference, consisting of the representatives of the four Powers and of the United States of America, drew up a declaration delimiting the frontiers of Teschen, . . . which was signed by Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, while Poland and Czecho-Slovakia signed their acceptance of the award on July 28, 1920. The agreement was ratified by the Czecho-Slovak Chamber on January 28, 1921. The line of division assigns to Czecho-Slovakia the whole of the Karvin mining area and the Oderberg-Jablunka railway, which passes through a modern suburb of Teschen on the western bank of the river. Poland, on the other hand, obtains the ancient town of Teschen, which since 1848 has been the centre of Polish literary and political activities in the duchy. She also acquires the valuable agricultural region to the east of the Olsa, containing the German enclave of Bielitz with its textile factories which are connected economically with those in the German town of Biala in Galicia.—Based on *History of the peace conference of Paris* (H. W. V. Temperley, ed.), v, 4, pp. 132, 350-363.

**TESCHEN, Treaty of** (1779). See BAVARIA: 1777-1779; RUSSIA: 1768-1796.

**TESHER**, Egyptian name for the Arabian desert. See EGYPT: Names.

**TESLA, Nikola** (1857- ), American inventor and electrician, born in Austria-Hungary. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: 1823-1921.

**TEST ACT** (1673). See ENGLAND: 1672-1673; 1687; 1827-1828: Removal of disabilities; SCOTLAND: 1681-1689.

**TESTI, Fulvio** (1593-1646), Italian poet. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 1600-1700.

**TESTRI, Battle of** (687). See FRANKS: 511-752; GERMANY: 687-800.

**TETANUS**. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 1914-1918.

**TETHMOSIS**. See THOTHMES.

**TETON-DAKOTA**, North American Indian tribe. See INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America; Plains area; SIOUAN FAMILY.

**TETRARCH**.—As originally used, this official title, from the Greek, signified the governor of one-fourth part of a country or province. Later, the Romans applied it to many tributary princes, in Syria and elsewhere, to whom they wished to give

a rank inferior to that of the tributary kings.

**TETRICUS, C. Pius Esvuvius** (fl. 267-274), king of Gaul, 267-270. Pretender to the Roman throne, defeated at Chalons, 271. See CHALONS, BATTLE OF.

**TETZEL, Johann** (c. 1460-1519), German Dominican preacher. Attacked by Luther for his sale of indulgences. See GERMANY: 1517-1523; PAPACY: 1517: Tetzel, etc.

**TEUCHTERI**, wandering German tribe. See GERMANY: 3rd century.

**TEUKRIANS**.—"The elegiac poet Kallinus, in the middle of the seventh century B. C., was the first who mentioned the Teukrians; he treated them as immigrants from Krête, though other authors represented them as indigenous, or as having come from Attica. However the fact may stand as to their origin, we may gather that, in the time of Kallinus, they were still the great occupants of the Troad [northwestern Asia Minor]. Gradually the south and west coasts, as well as the interior of this region, became penetrated by successive colonies of Æolic Greeks. . . . The name Teukrians gradually vanished out of present use and came to belong only to the legends of the past."—G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 14.

**TEUTECAS**, early Indian tribe of Mexico. See ZAPOTECAS.

**TEUTOBERG FOREST, Battle of** (9 A. D.). See GERMANY: B. C. 8-A. D. 11; ROME: Empire: B. C. 8-A. D. 11.

**TEUTONES, TEUTONIC**.—The Teutones were a tribe of Germans living at the mouth of the Elbe. They joined the Cimbri and moved southward into Gaul in the last part of the second century B. C. They were annihilated by Marius at Aquæ Sextiæ in 102 B. C. (See BARBARIAN INVASIONS: B. C. 113.) "In the way of evidence of there being Teutones amongst the Germans, over and above the associate mention of their names with that of the Cimbri [see CIMBRI], there is but little. They are not so mentioned either by Tacitus or Strabo. . . . Arguments have been taken from . . . the supposed connection of the present word 'Deut-sch'='German,' with the classical word 'Teut-ones' . . . It is clear that the present word 'Deut-sch' proves nothing respecting the Teutones. Perhaps, however, as early as the time of Martial the word 'Teutonicus' was used in a general sense, denoting the Germans in general. Certain it is that, before his time, it meant the particular people conquered by Marius, irrespective of origin or locality."—R. G. Latham, *Germany of Tacitus*, appendix 3.—The name Teutonic is applied particularly to a division of European people composed of almost the whole of the population of Germany, the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Great Britain (see ENGLAND: End of the 6th century) and Switzerland. It is also represented by large numbers in other parts of the world.—See also ARYANS, OR ARYAS: Meaning of term; EUROPE: Introduction to historic period: Distribution of races; Migrations.

**TEUTONIC COURTS**. See COURTS: Early Teutonic.

**TEUTONIC KNIGHTS OF THE HOSPITAL: Founding of the order**.—"It is not possible to find the exact date of the foundation of the Teutonic Order, but it was probably about 1190 that it received its full organization as one of the recognized Religious Military Orders. Its actual commencement, like that of the other Orders, was obscure and humble. About 1128 or 1129, a wealthy German, who had taken part in the siege and capture of Jerusalem, settled there

with his wife, intending to spend the remainder of his life in the practice of religion and in visiting the holy places. His attention and interest were soon excited by the misfortunes of his poorer countrymen, who came in great numbers as pilgrims to Jerusalem. Many fell sick, and endured great miseries and hardships. Moved with compassion, he received some of the more distressing cases into his own house. But he soon found that the work grew beyond this, and he built a hospital, with a chapel dedicated to the Blessed Virgin. In this institution he passed the whole of his time, nursing the sick pilgrims; and to their maintenance he devoted the whole of his means." One by one, others of his countrymen joined the pious German in his benevolent work, and "banded themselves together after the pattern of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and united the care of the sick and poor with the profession of arms in their defence, under the title of Hospitaliers of the Blessed Virgin. This little band put themselves under the direction of the Grand Prior of the Hospitaliers of St. John of Jerusalem, although they did not actually join this Order, whose operations they so closely imitated. . . . It was, however, during the siege of Acre [1180-1191] that the Teutonic Order received its final and complete organization as one of the great Military Religious Orders of Europe." At Acre, the Hospitaliers of the Blessed Virgin, then driven from Jerusalem by Saladin's conquest, joined certain citizens of Bremen and Lubeck in providing a field-hospital for the wounded and sick, and in their new sphere of labor they acquired the designation of the Teutonic Knights of the Hospital of the Blessed Virgin at Jerusalem. (See JERUSALEM: 1021.) "It is said that the Order owed its constitution to Frederick Duke of Suabia; but there is much obscurity, and little authentic record to determine this or to furnish particulars of the transaction. The Order seems, however, to have been confirmed by Pope Celestine III."—F. C. Woodhouse, *Military religious orders*, pt. 3, ch. 1.—The order was composed of knights, priests and servants, and the insignia was a white mantle and a black cross.

13th century.—Conquest of Prussia. See PRUSSIA: 13th century; LIVONIA: 12th-13th centuries.

1386-1466.—Subjection to Poland.—Secularization of the order.—Surrender of its territories. See POLAND: 1333-1572.

1455.—Sale of New March to Brandenburg. See BRANDENBURG: 1417-1640.

1803.—Electoral vote retained after Lunéville Treaty. See GERMANY: 1801-1803.

1809.—Suppression by Napoleon. See GERMANY: 1809 (July-September).

TEWFIK PASHA (1852-1892), khedive of Egypt, 1870-1892. During his reign Egyptian finances were controlled by the French and English, 1870-1882; the rebellion of the Nationalists under Arabi Pasha occurred in 1882, which led to the establishment of an English protectorate over the country; the revolt of the Mahdists, 1884-1885, led to the loss of the Nile and Upper Sudan regions. See EGYPT: 1875-1882; 1882-1883.

TEWKESBURY, Battle of (1471), final battle of the "Wars of the Roses," in which Edward IV of England overthrew the last Lancastrian army, collected by Queen Margaret of Anjou and her adherents fought May 4, 1471. Three weeks previously, at Barnet, he had defeated and slain the earl of Warwick. At Tewkesbury, Queen Margaret was taken prisoner, her young son disappeared, how or when is uncertain, and her husband, the deposed

King Henry VI, died mysteriously a few days afterwards in his prison in the tower. It was the end of the Lancastrian struggle. See ENGLAND: 1455-1471.

TEXAS, south central state of the United States, the largest in the union, popularly called the "Lone Star State." It is bounded on the north by Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico; on the east by Louisiana and Arkansas, and, in the so-called Panhandle region, by Oklahoma; on the south by the Republic of Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico; and on the west by New Mexico and the Republic of Mexico. The area of Texas is 262,398 square miles. The population numbered 4,663,228 in 1920 and was estimated at 4,860,658 in July, 1922.

Archæological remains.—"In Ochiltree county, Texas, on the south bank of Wolf creek, is a group of stone ruins which has . . . caused much speculation. . . . An expedition consisting of twelve members . . . [was] equipped and sent out by the scientific department . . . [of Canadian (Texas) Academy] during March of 1907 for the purpose of excavating among the ruins. . . . The pottery and flints found here are the culture of . . . [the Plains Indian] tribes and can be found all over the plains region northward and eastward from this section. . . . But the remains of recent times are not to be confounded with those of the 'buried city' which certainly antedated these by many years and form a distinct subject for ethnological research. . . . Certain peculiarities . . . indicate the work of a tribe more advanced in civilization than were the majority of the Plains Indians."—T. L. Everly, *Buried city of the Panhandle (Archæological Bulletin, Jan.-Mar., 1912, pp. 1-2, 4)*.—In March, 1920, "arrangements were made for the financing of a large expedition. The survey located itself on the ranch owned by Messrs. Sam and Oscar Handley, Wolf creek, Ochiltree county. . . . Something like three hundred specimens were secured. . . . About twenty-five miles southwest, on the main Canadian, is a similar group . . . now named King's ruins. Farther up the river at Plemons are Cotton Wood and Tarbox creeks. On both of these are more buildings or foundations than occur at either King's or Handley's. . . . Still farther up the river . . . are other groups. . . . Proceeding to the Landerger ranch, forty miles north of Amarillo is yet another group. . . . The expedition of 1920 did not extend operations beyond the Landerger ranch. . . . As a result of the . . . expedition . . . nearly one hundred sites or places where aboriginal work was in evidence have been mapped. . . . The survey of 1920 has opened a new field in American archæology. . . . There is nothing found indicating Mexican origin or Pueblo influence. On the contrary, so far as the writer can observe, we have a tribe originally living in the buffalo country and of Plains Culture status which changed as it spread westward up the Canadian. . . . As they moved farther away from the buffalo country they continued to change and develop until they established themselves in permanent villages—were no longer nomads—and finally became the Pueblo-Cliff Dweller people."—W. K. Moorehead, *Recent explorations in northwestern Texas (American Anthropologist, Jan.-Mar., 1921)*.

Resources and industries.—Within the domain of this great "empire" cotton, corn, wheat, oats, and rice, sugar-cane and tobacco, vegetables and fruits are successfully grown. Texas produces more cotton than any other state in the Union. Other agricultural products are hay, prairie grasses, millet, alfalfa, broom corn, tobacco, and peanuts. Stock-

raising is the chief industry in the western half of the state. In the year 1920, of the 2,950,488 acres of land of the arid region of Texas, 585,120 acres had been irrigated and were under cultivation. The mineral resources are coal, lignite, oil (petroleum), asphaltum (mineral pitch), natural gas, iron ores, quicksilver, mercury, silver, copper and lead, salt, sulphur, gypsum, lime and cement rocks. The manufacturing industries of the state include shops for the construction of cars and railroad appliances wood-working mills, flour and rice mills, machine shops and foundries. According to the reports of the United States Geological Survey for 1922, Texas ranked third among the states in the production of petroleum, the total output for the year being 116,670,000 barrels.—See also U.S.A.: Economic map.

**Aboriginal inhabitants and name.**—Amongst the small tribes found early in the nineteenth century existing west of the Mississippi on Red river and south of it, and believed to be natives of that region, were the Caddoes, "the Nandakoos, the Inies or Tachies, who have given their name to the province of Texas, and the Nabadaches . . . [who] speak dialects of the Caddo language. [Also, the Natchitoches, the Yatasees, the Adaise, the Appelousas, etc.]"—A. Gallatin, *Synopsis of the Indian tribes (Archæologia Americana, v. 2, introduction, sect. 3)*.—See also APACHE INDIANS; COAHUILTECAN FAMILY; KARANKAWAN FAMILY; TONKAWAN FAMILY.

ALSO IN: *President's message, Feb. 19, 1806, with accompanying documents.*

**1528-1684.—Early Spanish explorations.**—"The success of Cortes [in Mexico, 1519-1521] aroused the envy and jealousy of many influential Spanish leaders, who wished to have the continuation of his enterprise committed to themselves . . . [and the following experience was one of the results]: There arrived in Mexico in the year 1536 three white men and a negro who told one of the most extraordinary tales of shipwreck, suffering, captivity, and ultimate escape that ever fell from mortal lips. The most prominent man of the party, Cabeza de Vaca, afterwards wrote a detailed account of his experiences. The four were survivors of the Narvaez expedition, which had been sent out from Spain to subdue and govern Florida, and the remnant of which had suffered shipwreck on the western shore of the Gulf in the year 1528. After an awful experience of about seven years in slavery among the Indians, they had run away and finally reached the Christian settlements in Mexico. They were apparently the first Europeans to tread the soil of Texas, and they brought the earliest information as to the inhabitants and the character of the yet unchristened land. . . . In 1540 Coronado led forth from his province a strong and well-equipped force into the northern wilds. With his two years of wanderings and conquests and the disappointment of both himself and Mendoza over the unsubstantial results of the expedition we have nothing here to do. The one fact to be noted in this connection is that his route must have carried him across the northern part of what is now Texas. Subsequently the country was penetrated by explorers at various points while it was yet unsettled and nameless. . . . An *entrada* of 1650, led by Captains Hernan Martin and Diego del Castillo, is said to have penetrated to the Tejas tribe of Indians; and in another in 1684 Padre Nicolas Lopez and Captain Juan Domingo de Mendoza conducted a party of missionaries and soldiers from El Paso down the Rio Grande to the mouth of the Conchos

and thence into the interior across the Pecos to a *rancheria* of Jumanas and Hediondas."—G. P. Garrison, *Texas*, pp. 14-16.

**1685-1687.**—La Salle's shipwrecked colony. See CANADA: 1660-1687.

**1690-1806.—First European settlement.—Failure of early missions.—Cession to Spain by France.—Questions raised by Louisiana Purchase.**—"In his search for the Mississippi, La Salle had wandered over much of East and Central Texas. He had also made the first real European settlement on . . . [the] State soil. For these reasons France claimed Texas. . . . The Spaniards learned from the sailors that the French were on their way to plant a colony on the Gulf shore. Four different times Spanish vessels were sent overland, but it was not until 1689 that Captain De Leon . . . and his men found the ruins of Fort St. Louis [which La Salle had built on the Lavaca river]. . . . On De Leon's return, the Viceroy of Mexico inquired closely into the condition of affairs. From the reports of De Leon and Father Massanet . . . he decided to found a mission in Texas. In 1690 at the request of the Indians, the mission of San Francisco de los Tejas . . . was established in the land of the Tejas, . . . [but it] was not successful. . . . In 1693, the priests, at the command of the Spanish government, abandoned the missions. . . . For some twenty years after this neither Spain nor France took steps toward colonizing Texas. . . . In 1712 the King of France gave the sole right of Louisiana trade to Antoine Crozat, one of the keenest business men of the day. Crozat saw a fortune was to be made by opening trade with Mexico through Texas and began to make his plans to that purpose. . . . Governor Cadillac [of Louisiana] . . . sent a ship to Vera Cruz [1713] to ask if trade might not be opened between Louisiana and Mexico. The Viceroy refused, saying Spain was unwilling to permit any country to trade with her colonies. [See LOUISIANA: 1698-1712.] . . . In 1713 the [French] Governor called upon Saint-Denis, . . . a bold, dashing, young trader and explorer, to lead an expedition into Texas . . . [but the Spanish] captain . . . held them [at the presidio of the Rio Grande] . . . until he could obtain orders from the Viceroy. . . . Finally a guard was sent to escort Saint-Denis to the City of Mexico; here he was asked to write out the object of his expedition. . . . His story was enough to arouse the Spaniards. . . . [The Viceroy decided that] the French must be kept out; to do this, the Spaniards must build missions and establish permanent settlements in East Texas. . . . With Captain Diego Ram6n in command an expedition started northward [in 1716] to carry out these plans. The Mission San Francisco was reestablished and five other missions were founded. . . . France . . . ceded Louisiana to Spain in 1762. . . . In 1800 Spain secretly returned Louisiana to France. Napoleon . . . sold Louisiana, in 1803, to the United States. [See LOUISIANA: 1798-1803.] Spain objected to this; and when the Americans claimed all the land east of the Rio Grande as a part of Louisiana, she grew indignant. . . . for Spain not only claimed Texas, but even wanted to cross the Sabine and take a part of Louisiana. At last the matter was peacefully arranged (October, 1806) by making the land between the Sabine and the Arroyo Hondo . . . neutral till the boundary question should be settled. . . . This contract, about which a certain amount of mystery has always hung, was entered into suddenly by Generals Wilkinson and Herrera. It was an agreement between men and not between nations."



—A. J. Pennybacker, *History of Texas*, pp. 9-10, 12-13, 15, 39, 303-304.

Also IN: R. C. Clark, *Beginning of Texas*.—H. E. Bolton, *Texas in the middle eighteenth century*.

1799-1821.—Spanish rule.—Nolan's expedition.—Invasion by Gutierrez and Magee.—Republic of Texas established by Long.—“In the beginning of the nineteenth century when Spanish laws had become almost unbearable, the fame of Texas . . . had spread further and further to the east. French traders . . . had told the story and aroused the interest not only of the French and the Creoles but also of the Americans. In the year 1800 a number of American adventurers, under the leadership of Philip Nolan, came to Texas as far as Waco. They were rounding up and catching wild mustangs and, whilst engaged in this work, were surprised by a company of Spanish soldiers. Eleven of their number were taken as prisoners and brought to San Antonio. . . . As a consequence of this incident the Spanish government placed a large number of soldiers in the San Antonio garrison and enacted still more stringent laws against the influx of foreigners and trading with foreign countries. . . . As a result of . . . [these laws] a revolutionary party was born in Mexico, a branch of which was organized in San Antonio. . . . In San Antonio the revolutionary party . . . was a secret organization . . . [and] at that time [the city] was the gathering place of numerous, leading Spanish generals and spies. . . . Trouble was brewing between the United States and Spain on account of the Louisiana Purchase Act. . . . The first revolution broke out in Mexico under the leadership of Father Hidalgo, a religious. This attempt for liberty met with failure: the Republicans were defeated by the Royalists, Father Hidalgo was taken prisoner and promptly executed. Two other patriots escaped, one of them to San Antonio where he, too, was captured [and] beheaded. . . . Bernardo Gutierrez, another one of Father Hidalgo's assistants, escaped to ‘no man's land’—a strip of territory in eastern Texas which, by an agreement between the United States and Spain, was not to be transgressed by soldiers of either nationality. . . . ‘No Man's Land,’ in the course of time, had become the home of a daring band of lawless adventurers, who had congregated here for the purpose of holding up and robbing the trading expeditions. These renegades of all nations had finally become so bold that the Secretary of War of the United States was forced to send an expedition in order to break up these bands. . . . Lieutenant Augustus W. Magee was put in command of a sufficient force and he succeeded in routing the outlaws. He became acquainted with Bernardo Gutierrez, the fugitive Republican. Gutierrez . . . gave to Lieutenant Magee such a glowing account of the struggle for independence going on in Texas and Mexico, as to finally inflame the patriotism and ambition of Magee and his band. As soon as Magee had carried out his orders, he resigned his position in the United States army and proceeded to organize an army of his own which was called ‘The Republican Army of the North.’ The army, to all appearances, was under the command of Gutierrez, but Magee was the commander in fact.”—R. Sturmberg, *History of San Antonio and of the early days in Texas*, pp. 52-54.—“In 1812 Bernardo Gutierrez and Augustus Magee . . . invaded Texas with a considerable force of American adventurers, Spaniards and Indians. They took Nacogdoches [and La Bahia] in August, and Goliad in October. Here Magee died. In the spring of 1813 [Gutierrez] . . . advanced in

San Antonio and after defeating the Spanish governor in a terrible battle [at Rosillo], entered the town on April 1. Gutierrez's brutality to the prisoners alienated many of the Americans, who now abandoned him. The others were decoyed into an ambush by General Arredondo near the Medina River in June and badly defeated. . . . After the signature of the Florida treaty of 1819 by which the United States relinquished its claim to Texas, Dr. James Long of Natchez, Mississippi, led an expedition which for a brief time occupied Nacogdoches and proclaimed the independence of Texas. . . . At the time of Long's invasion the royalist power had almost succeeded in stamping out the revolution in Mexico, and Texas was well defended. Troops advanced from San Antonio, and catching Long's forces in scattered detachments easily defeated and expelled them. Long took advantage of the renewed revolutionary wave in 1820 to return to Texas, but was no more successful than before. In fact, he was taken prisoner and sent to Mexico City, and there a short time later was killed by a Mexican soldier. In a sense Nolan, Magee and Long, with the men whom they led, were but the advance couriers of American expansion. . . . That the adventurous pioneers entered Texas in organized bands rather than as peaceful trappers and settlers was probably due to the revolutionary condition of New Spain from 1810 to 1821.”—F. W. Johnson, *History of Texas and Texans*, v. 1, p. 5.

Also IN: L. Gutierrez de Lara and E. Pinchon, *Mexican people*, pp. 64-67.—A. J. Pennybacker, *History of Texas*, pp. 36-40.

1819-1835.—Relinquishment of American claims to Spain.—Condition as a Mexican province.—Encouragement of immigration from the United States and Europe.—Austin's colony.—“By the treaty of 1819 with Spain for the cession of the Floridas, the United States relinquished all claim to the western portion of Louisiana lying south of Red River and west of the Sabine. [See FLORIDA: 1810-1821; LOUISIANA: 1708-1803.] After the final ratification of that treaty by both governments, and the cession and delivery of the Floridas to the United States, the Spaniards took formal possession of the country west of the Sabine, and erected it into the ‘Province of Texas,’ under the authority and jurisdiction of the Viceroy of Mexico. From that time the Sabine River was the western boundary of the United States, near the Gulf of Mexico. The province of Texas at this time was occupied by the native tribes of savages, interrupted only by a few Spanish settlements. . . . The whole population, including some settlements in the vicinity of the sea-coast, scarcely exceeded 5,000 souls, of whom the greater portion were the remains of old colonies formed during the Spanish dominion over the province of Louisiana. Each principal settlement, from San Antonio de Bexar to Nacogdoches, was placed under the government of a military commandant, who exercised civil and military authority within the limits of his presidio. . . . Such was the province of Texas under the Spanish monarchy until the year 1821, when Mexico became an independent nation. . . . On the 24th of October, 1824, the Mexican States adopted a Republican form of government, embracing ‘a confederation of independent states’ known and designated as the ‘United States of Mexico.’ In this confederation the departments of Texas and Coahuila were admitted as one state, and were jointly represented in the Congress of Mexico. Soon after the establishment of independence in the United States of Mexico, the

colonization and settlement of Texas became a favorite subject of national policy with the new government. To attract population for the settlement of the country, colonization laws were enacted, to encourage enterprising individuals from foreign countries to establish large colonies of emigrants within the limits of Texas. Under the provisions of these laws enterprise was awakened in the United States and in some portions of Europe. Founders of colonies, or 'Empresarios,' were induced to enter into engagements for the occupancy and settlement of large tracts of country, designated in their respective 'grants'; the extent of the grant being proportionate to the number of colonists to be introduced. The first grant was made to Moses Austin, a native of Durham, Connecticut, in 1821, and under its provisions he was required by the Mexican authorities to introduce 300 families from the United States. This enterprising man, having departed from Bexar for the introduction of his colony, died on his journey through the wilderness, leaving his plans of colonization to be prosecuted by his son, Colonel Stephen F. Austin. . . . Having succeeded to his father's enterprise, he subsequently acquired more influence with the Mexican government than any other 'empresario' in the province. . . . But a few years had elapsed when nearly the whole area of the department of Texas had been parceled out into extensive grants for settlement by the different 'empresarios' with their colonies. . . . Emigration from the United States, as well as from Great Britain and Ireland, continued to augment the population in all the departments until the year 1834, when political troubles began to convulse the Mexican Republic." In 1835 "the whole Anglo-American population of Texas was about 20,000; of this number General Austin's colony comprised no less than 13,000, or more than half the entire population. These were chiefly emigrants from the United States. . . . The Mexicans within the limits of Texas at this period scarcely exceeded 3,000, most of whom resided in the vicinity of Bexar."—J. W. Monette, *Discovery and settlement of the Mississippi valley*, v. 2, pp. 569-572.

ALSO IN: H. Yoakum, *History of Texas*, v. 1, ch. 15-21.—E. C. Barker, *Government of Austin's colony*.

1824-1830.—Introduction of slavery.—Schemes of the slave power in the United States.—The American settlers in Texas "brought their slaves with them, and continued to do so notwithstanding a decree of the Mexican Congress, issued in July, 1824, which forbade the importation into Mexican territory of slaves from foreign countries, and notwithstanding the Constitution adopted the same year, which declared free all children thereafter born of slaves. About that time the slave holders in the United States began to see in Texas an object of peculiar interest to them. The Missouri Compromise, admitting Missouri as a Slave State and opening to slavery all that part of the Louisiana purchase south of 36° 30', seemed at first to give a great advantage to the slave power. But gradually it became apparent that the territory thus opened to slavery was, after all, too limited for the formation of many new Slave States, while the area for the building up of Free States was much larger. More territory for slavery was therefore needed to maintain the balance of power between the two sections. At the same time the Mexican government, growing alarmed at the unruly spirit of the American colony in Texas, attached Texas to Coahuila, the two to form one state. The constitution of Coahuila forbade the

importation of slaves; and in 1829 the Republic of Mexico, by the decree of September 15, emancipated all the slaves within its boundaries. Then the American Slave States found themselves flanked in the southwest by a power not only not in sympathy with slavery, but threatening to become dangerous to its safety. The maintenance of slavery in Texas, and eventually the acquisition of that country, were thenceforth looked upon by the slaveholding interest in this Republic as matters of very great importance, and the annexation project was pushed forward systematically. First the American settlers in Texas refused to obey the Mexican decree of emancipation, and, in order to avoid an insurrection, the Mexican authorities permitted it to be understood that the decree did not embrace Texas. Thus one point was gained. Then the Southern press vigorously agitated the necessity of enlarging the area of slavery, while an interest in the North was created by organizing three land companies in New York, which used pretended Mexican land grants in Texas as the basis of issues of stock, promising to make people rich overnight, and thus drawing Texas within the circle of American business speculation. In 1830 President Jackson made another attempt to purchase Texas [Henry Clay, in 1827, when Secretary of State under John Quincy Adams, had already made a proposal to the Mexican government for the purchase], offering five millions, but without success. The Mexican government, scenting the coming danger, prohibited the immigration of Americans into Texas. This, however, had no effect."—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 2, ch. 17.—"In the year 1830 America was divided into two well-marked and antagonistic factions—the free, industrial, and rapidly developing North, the slaveholding, agricultural, and stagnant South. . . . Texas was already largely American and Southern in personnel. Slavery was one of its established institutions. Its territory when divided properly would be sufficient to return no less than eighteen additional Democratic Senators to Washington. . . . [The Washington delegate] Poinsett was succeeded at the Mexican legation by Butler—a close friend of Andrew Jackson, and a *slave-holder*. Shortly after his arrival in Mexico City in 1829 Butler wrote Jackson the following illuminating note. 'I have not lost sight for one moment of the Texas question in which you have such a great interest, not only because I know your wishes about it, but because I know the great advantage to our country to obtain it. But the public opinion of this country is so strongly opposed to the acquisition of Texas by the United States that I believe the Government will never be willing to entertain a proposition in this respect, and much less the cession of Texas. Any time that the press try to arouse the fire of the opposition against President Guerrero, articles appear in the papers charging him with being willing to sell Texas to us, and that for this one crime alone he deserves to be thrown out of office.' (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 July, 1844, p. 239.) When Jackson recognized that the Mexican Liberal government was not to be brought into the cession of Texas he changed his tactics: and by making known the failure of his overtures turned the attention of the South toward more drastic measures. . . . To this end he dispatched to the scene of operation his friend, Sam Houston [of Tennessee. Houston had fought with General Jackson in the Indian wars and was a capable and daring leader.] The Journal de la Louisiane, in speaking of Houston's departure for Texas, announced: . . . 'He has gone to Texas to

start a revolution in favour of its independence with the purpose of annexing it to the United States. We may expect shortly to hear of his raising his flag."—L. G. De Lara and E. Pinchon, *Mexican people*, pp. 112-115.


Also in: N. W. Stephenson, *Texas and the Mexican War*, pp. 17-62.

1824-1835.—Causes of the war with Mexico.—Abolition of the federal system.—Unwillingness of the colonists to revolt.—Lawless methods of Mexican church party and military authorities.—Annexationist, Independent and Mexican parties.—"In considering the war with Texas it will be necessary to bear in mind several important basic facts: 1. The Church in Mexico wanted war. A war with some foreign country was at this time absolutely necessary to the ruling class in Mexico for the preservation of its powers. 2. The Southern States of the United States wanted war. A war with some foreign country was at this time beginning to be highly desirable for the ruling class in the Southern States, for the diversion of national attention from the conflicting issues of the North and South, and for the preservation of the planting interests in Congress. 3. The Southern States wanted Texas for political, not territorial, reasons. In view of the rapid development of the industrial North, the feudal South recognized that unless it could strengthen its numerical representation in the Senate by the acquisition of additional slave-holding territory, such as Texas, it would soon lose its economic and political dominance in the country. 4. The Texans were loyal to Mexico. The Texan colonists were heartily opposed to secession from Mexico, and not until the last moment, when harried to desperation by bands of hired American outlaws and bodies of Mexican regulars, did they take any hand in the matter themselves. 5. A tacit understanding existed between Andrew Jackson and Santa Ana. . . . Never at any time was the conflict viewed seriously by either of the ruling classes, American or Mexican, who invoked it: never at any time did Lucas Alaman, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, and Santa Ana, the Mexican President and commander-in-chief of the Army . . . act in conflict with the desires of Andrew Jackson and his Cabinet in Washington. [See U. S. A.: 1808 (March-April).] 6. The interests of the Church in Mexico and of the Southern planters were identical. . . . 7. Religious fanaticism was used by both parties to fan the conflict. . . . When Bustamante seized the control of government from the hands of President Guerrero, he at once obeyed the dictates of the Church. . . . There was but one possible method of averting the coming conflict—to embroil the nation in a foreign war (and) it was to this well-worn expedient that the Clerical party, represented by Bustamante and Alaman, turned. . . . Bustamante, immediately after his accession to power, abolished the federal system in Texas, and established the central system, accompanied by brutal military rule. . . . Stephen Austin . . . wrote, in a letter addressed to General Mier y Teran: 'I have informed you many times, and I inform you again, that it is impossible to rule Texas by a military system. I am convinced that the more the army is increased in Texas the greater will become the danger to the country's peace and tranquillity. . . . From the year 1821 I have maintained order and enforced the law in my colony simply by means of civil courts without a single soldier, and without a dollar of expense to the nation. . . . Upon this subject of military despotism I have never hesitated to express my

opinion, for I consider it the source of all revolutions, and of the slavery and ruin of free peoples. I firmly believe that until the reduction of military authority and the abatement of military privilege is accomplished, no peace, stability, or progress can be expected in Mexico. This, and the establishment of religious liberty, are the two remedies most sorely needed, and the man who will bring them to pass will deserve the honest name of "Washington of Mexico." . . . The fact that more than half of the colonists were Protestant Americans, and that the Protestant faith was beginning to gain ground even among the Mexicans, furnished the Church with yet another weapon for provoking the required strife. . . . As matter of history the United States as a whole was profoundly ignorant of the wretched imbroglio. . . . President Bustamante had dispatched General Mier y Teran to Texas with instructions to suppress all trace of civil government. Teran executed his orders with zeal, and not only suppressed the civil courts and trial by jury established by the colonists, but even declared null and void all contracts and land concessions made by the federal government prior to April, 1830, thus . . . depriving the more recent colonists of the farms and homes which they had established. . . . Teran [also] permitted . . . Francisco Madero, who had accompanied him from Mexico, to set himself up as a distributor of land concessions under the supposed authority of the central government: and many of these land concessions included the cancelled concessions already homesteaded. In addition to this, on the 6th of April, 1830, the national Congress of Mexico passed a measure prohibiting the further colonization of Texas by American immigrants: and General Teran, in enforcing the law, interpreted it in such fashion as to deny the right of any man of Anglo-Saxon extraction to hold Texan land concessions, giving to this . . . interpretation a retroactive effect against the land concessions already recognized by the law. . . . From the moment General Teran set foot in Texas the country was given over to the lawless ruffianism of the Mexican military. . . . In the month of April, 1835, President Santa Ana was preparing to strike the final blow at the revolutionary movement of the Liberals under Gomez Farias, and it is a matter of the highest significance that at this time 'it was announced in the . . . government offices that in the year 1830 an expedition would be dispatched against the Texan colonists, not merely to enforce their obedience to the law, but to punish them severely with extermination or expulsion.' (Blas Filisola, *Guerra de Texas*, Vol. 2, p. 137, 138.) At . . . [this] time the Texan colonists were not in revolt. . . . On the 31st of August, 1835 . . . a circular, couched in the following terms, was addressed to all governors and municipal authorities at the instigation of the Church: 'The colonists, established in Mexico have shown unequivocally to what extremes they are prepared to go in their perfidy, ingratitude, and treachery. Forgetting their duty to the Supreme Government and to the nation which had so generously given them a place in her bosom, with fertile lands for cultivation, and all the natural resources necessary for their bountiful living, they have revolted against this nation under the pretext of sustaining a system, a change in which has been desired by the majority of Mexicans; in this way hoping to hide their criminal ambitions to dismember the Republic' (*Collection de Leyes Decretos y Circulares. Dublin y Maza tomo que comprende los anos de 1835 à 1840.*) The effect of this circular distributed broadcast throughout

the country, coupled with the persistent agitation set up by the pulpit and press, was successful in arousing the . . . people of Mexico to the desired war fever, and in causing them to lay aside for the time all effort to remedy their own . . . wrongs. . . . The population of Texas as a whole at this time was divided into three parties: The Annexationist, the Independent, and the Mexican. The Annexationist party comprised only a weak and uninfluential group organized by the paid agents . . . maintained in Texas by Andrew Jackson, then the President of the United States. The Independent party, another comparatively weak and uninfluential minority, wished to erect Texas into a separate independent republic. They were strongly opposed to the policy of the annexationists, for they clearly discerned that annexation to the

claimed.—Battle of San Jacinto.—In 1835 the half-hearted conflict, in which the great majority of the colonists held aloof, began. "The three counts which in the later months of 1835 made up the Texan indictment of Mexico were: first, the destruction of the constitution of 1824; second, the use of military power to tyrannize a state; and third, duplicity of conduct. Upon this basis the Consultation drew up a *Declaration of causes for taking up arms against Mexico*. Though some phrases savored of independence, the heart of the manifesto was the statement that Texas would 'continue faithful to Mexico, so long as that nation is governed by the constitution and laws that were framed for the government of the political association.' The Consultation offered to combine with those Mexicans who stood by the constitution of



THE ALAMO

Franciscan mission at San Antonio, Texas, built about 1722

United States meant annexation to the already jeopardized slave-holding interest of the South. The Mexican party, on the contrary, which included in its ranks the great majority of the wealthier and better educated colonists, and of course the Mexican residents, upheld the policy of loyalty to Mexico at any price. It opposed annexation for the same reason that the Independent party opposed it, and it opposed independence on the . . . grounds that it would prove a very costly matter for so small a population as Texas then held to maintain a separate system of governmental machinery as well as the large standing army which her exposed position would render imperative."—L. G. De Lara and E. Pinchon, *Mexican people*, pp. 100-120.

ALSO IN: E. C. Barker, *Government of Austin's colony*.—S. F. Stephen, *Austin and the independence of Texas*.

1835-1836.—Spirit of manifesto to Mexico.—Armed conflicts.—Independence of Texas pro-

1824 and whose rights, like theirs, were 'threatened by encroachments of military despots.' A motion to secede was voted down by a large majority. But it was significant of the temper of the assembly that for president of the provisional government which was now set up, Henry Smith was elected by a vote of 31 as against 22 for Austin. The organization of an army was provided for, and Sam Houston was made its commander."—N. W. Stephenson, *Texas and the Mexican War*, pp. 64-65. —"General Santa Anna, who by a successful revolutionary stroke had put himself at the head of the Mexican government, attempted to reduce the unruly Americans to obedience. In 1835 armed conflicts took place, in which the Americans frequently had the advantage. The Texans declared their independence from Mexico on March 2, 1836. The declaration was signed by about 60 men, among whom there were only two of Mexican nationality. The constitution of the new republic confirmed the existence of slavery under its juris-


diction, and surrounded it with all possible guaranties. Meanwhile Santa Anna advanced at the head of a Mexican army to subdue the revolutionists. Atrocious butcheries marked the progress of his soldiery. On March 6 the American garrison [250 men] of the Alamo [a mission church at San Antonio de Bexar] was massacred, and on the 27th a large number [500] of American prisoners at Goliad met a like fate. These atrocities created a great excitement in the United States. But on April 21 the Texans under Houston, about 800 strong, inflicted a crushing defeat upon Santa Anna's army of 1,500 men, at San Jacinto, taking Santa Anna himself prisoner. The captive Mexican President concluded an armistice with the victorious Texans, promising the evacuation of the country, and to procure the recognition of its independence; but this the Mexican Congress refused to ratify. The government of the United States maintained, in appearance, a neutral position. President Jackson had indeed instructed General Gaines to march his troops into Texas, if he should see reason to apprehend Indian incursions. Gaines actually crossed the boundary line, and was recalled only after the Mexican Minister at Washington had taken his passports. The organization of reinforcements for Houston, however, had been suffered to proceed on American soil without interference."

—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 2, ch. 17.

ALSO IN: H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 7.—H. H. Bancroft, *History of the Pacific states*, v. 8, (Mexico, v. 5), ch. 7.—A. M. Williams, *Sam Houston and the War of Independence in Texas*.—E. C. Barker, *San Jacinto campaign*.

1836-1845.—Eight years of independence.—Annexation to the United States.—Question in Congress and the country.—Presidents of the period.—"Santa Anna, . . . constrained in his extremity to acknowledge the independence of Texas, . . . was liberated, and the new republic established in October, 1836, with a Constitution modeled on that of the United States, and with General Houston inaugurated as its first President. The United States forthwith acknowledged its independence [Mar. 2, 1837]. In less than a year application was made to the United States government to receive the new republic into the Union, and, though this was at the time declined, it was obvious that the question was destined to play a most important part in American civil policy. The North saw in the whole movement a predetermined attempt at the extension of slavery, and in the invasive emigration, the revolt, the proclamation of independence, the temporary organization of a republic, and the application to be admitted into the Union as a state, successive steps of a conspiracy which would, through the creation of half a dozen or more new states, give a preponderance to the slave power in the republic. Mr. Van Buren, who had declined the overtures for the annexation of Texas, was succeeded in the Presidency by General Harrison, who, dying almost immediately after his inauguration, was followed by the Vice President, Mr. Tyler, a Virginian, and a supporter of extreme Southern principles. The annexation project was now steadily pressed forward, but, owing to the difficult circumstances under which Mr. Tyler was placed, and dissensions arising in the party that had elected him, nothing decisive could be done until 1844, when Mr. Upshur, the Secretary of State, being accidentally killed by the bursting of a cannon, Mr. Calhoun succeeded him. A treaty of annexation was at once arranged, but, on being submitted to the Senate, was rejected.

Undiscouraged by this result, the South at once determined to make annexation the touchstone in the coming Presidential election. . . . Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Clay, the prominent candidates of the two opposing parties for the Presidency, were compelled to make known their views previously to the meeting of the nominating Conventions," and both discountenanced annexation. Van Buren was accordingly defeated in the Democratic Convention and James K. Polk received the nomination. Clay was nominated by the Whigs, and made an attempt, in the succeeding canvass, to change his ground on the Texas question; but "his attempt only served to make the matter worse, and cost him the support of the anti-slavery party, whose votes would have elected him." Polk was chosen President; but the annexation of Texas did not wait for his inauguration. "On December 10th a joint resolution was introduced into the House of Representatives providing for annexation. Attempts were made to secure



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half the country for free labor, the other half being resigned to slavery. . . . This proposition was, however, defeated. . . . As the measure eventually stood, it made suitable provision for the mode in which the 'State of Texas' should be admitted into the Union, the disposal of its munitions of war, public property, unappropriated lands, debts. On the main point it was arranged that new states, not exceeding four in number, in addition to Texas proper, should subsequently be made out of its territory, those lying south of latitude 36° 30' to be admitted with or without slavery, as their people might desire; in those north of that line, slavery to be prohibited. Mr. Tyler, on the last day of his term of office, unwilling to leave to his successor, Mr. Polk, the honor of completing this great Southern measure, dispatched a swift messenger to Texas; her assent was duly secured, and the Mexican province became a state of the Union. But the circumstances and conditions under which this had been done left a profound dissatisfaction in the North. The portion of territory ceded to freedom did not belong to Texas; her boundary did not approach within 200 miles of the Missouri Compromise line. The South

had therefore secured the whole of the new acquisition; she had seized the substance, and had deluded the North with a shadow."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 22.—During the period of the republic the presidency of Sam Houston, 1836-1838, was followed by that of Mirabeau B. Lamar, 1838-1841. Houston was again president, 1841-1844 and was followed by Anson Jones, 1844-1846.—See also U. S. A.: 1841-1844.

ALSO IN: T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 2, ch. 135, 138-142, 148.—H. H. Bancroft, *History of the Pacific states*, v. 8, ch. 13.—H. Greeley, *History of the struggle for slavery extension*, ch. 10.—J. H. Smith, *Annexation of Texas*.

1839-1850.—Location of capital.—"Houston . . . [was] the capital until 1839, when Congress decided to locate a city that should bear the name of Austin. . . . The site of the present city was chosen and the capital was located there. . . . In 1842 President Houston, thinking Austin in danger from an attack by the Mexicans, removed the headquarters of the department to Houston. . . . When the United States proposed terms for annexation . . . President Jones convened the convention at Austin, July 4, 1845. . . . The State Convention provided that in 1850 the people should select a capital for the next twenty years. Austin received the majority of votes."—A. J. Pennybacker, *History of Texas*, pp. 231, 346.—Austin has remained the seat of government.

1846-1848.—Mexican War. See MEXICO: 1846 to 1848.

1846-1849.—First governors.—J. Pinckney Henderson, a Democrat, was the first governor of the new state, 1846-1847. He was followed by George T. Wood, 1847-1849.

1848.—Territory extorted from Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. See MEXICO: 1848.

1850 (June).—Represented at Nashville convention. See U. S. A.: 1850 (June).

1850-1861.—Advantages to Texas from joining the United States.—Prosperity.—Immigration.—"For the relinquishment of independence Texas was not without compensation. Her revenue from customs had passed to the United States, but along with it had gone the burden of the diplomatic and military establishments incident to nationality. The payment to Texas provided for by the Compromise of 1850 was partly in the nature of indemnity for the loss incurred by the transfer of the duties; and this . . . was the main element in bringing order to the finances of the State. The expenditures of the Republic for military purposes had been quite small for some years previous to annexation, but how long they could have remained so if the independent status had continued is exceedingly doubtful. The greatest gain, however, lay in getting rid of the question of foreign relations. Delicate and serious as this question was for the great powers in their dealings with the Republic, it was infinitely more so for the Republic in dealing with them. . . . [After the annexation to the United States] prosperity . . . visited the State. Its abundant natural resources began to make themselves apparent. Immigration flowed in, and wealth began to increase with leaps and bounds. . . . In the great stream of immigration that flowed into Texas during the fifteen years of statehood previous to the Civil War, as well as during the ten years of the Republic, there came a few whose coming was due to the fact that they had committed some offense against the law. It is scarcely worth while to say that there were not

enough of this class to determine the character of the population in any given locality."—G. P. Garrison, *Texas*, pp. 260-271.

1850-1861.—Troubles with Indians and Mexicans.—Brazos and Clear Fork Indian agencies.—Removal of Indians across Red river.—Negro uprising.—"Cart war."—Depredations of Juan Cortina.—Governors of the period.—There was more serious trouble for the state than undesirable immigration. "It was impossible for the United States to protect the State from invasion, Texas had an enemy that was practically within her gates, with whom it was much more difficult to deal. This was the Indian. The tribes inside the limits of the State on the north were friendly, but those of the Indian Territory made frequent raids into the country south of Red River, and were very troublesome. . . . The most annoying Indians . . . were the Comanches, along the western frontier . . . [where] the line of exposure was several hundred miles in length. The circumstances invited the application of the system of colonizing the Indian on reservations. The State granted the necessary lands, and in 1855 two colonies were established on reservations, situated the one on the upper course of the Brazos River [1851], and the other on one of its tributaries known as Clear Fork. At the Brazos agency were gathered about eight hundred Indians of various tribes who had long been in contact with the whites, and whose original locations were now within the settled districts, while on the Clear Fork, considerably further west, were placed about three hundred Comanches. The colonies appear, from the reports of the agents, to have prospered beyond reasonable anticipation. The Indians on the reservations, who in 1858 amounted in all to nearly fifteen hundred, were said to be rapidly acquiring the arts of civilized life. A number of them were enlisted in the ranger service and had made themselves very useful. It seemed for a time that the amount expended by the United States government on these Indians, which reached about three hundred and fifty thousand dollars in four years, would be well repaid in tangible good results. But unfortunately there were on the reservations a few who could not give up the habit of horse-stealing and plundering, and who broke away from time to time and joined with roving Indians. . . . This greatly exasperated the settlers in the neighborhood, who had at best too little patience with the Indians, and they soon began to insist that none of them should leave the reservations at all. In December, 1858, a party from the Brazos reservation which was encamped beyond its limits on the river was surprised by a band of whites and nearly all killed or wounded. The other Indians were much angered by this event and declared their intention to be avenged. The whites made counter threats and organized and armed themselves in anticipation of an outbreak of hostilities. Finally in 1859 the situation became so serious that the Indians were moved across Red River into the Territory. From this time on, the depredations along the northern frontier became specially frequent and troublesome."—G. P. Garrison, *Texas*, pp. 260, 271-273.—"Affairs in Mexico were in such a troubled condition that scores of Mexican laborers sought refuge in Texas. Some of these married negro slaves. In 1856, in Colorado County, it was discovered that the negroes were on the point of rising against their masters; they had organized, and had collected a supply of arms. Their plan was to murder the whites, seize all the property they could carry with them, and then flee to Mexico. Two hundred of the negroes

were severely punished, a few of them being put to death. . . . It was believed that the instigators of the plot were Mexicans, hence a violent prejudice against all Mexican laborers sprang up throughout Colorado [county] and the adjoining counties, . . . and the Mexicans were ordered to leave. . . . At this time Mexican teamsters were doing most of the hauling from the seaports to San Antonio, for they worked more cheaply than Texan wagoners. In spite of public warnings, farmers and merchants continued to employ the labor they could get for the least money. The Texas teamsters and their friends then attacked the teams of the Mexicans, stole their goods, killed their animals, destroyed their wagons . . . [hence called the "Cart War"] and, in some cases, murdered the drivers. Indignant at the cruelty inflicted upon his countrymen, the Mexican minister (October, 1857) complained to the United States authorities."—A. J. Pennybacker, *History of Texas*, pp. 232-233.—"Shortly after this a reign of terror was inaugurated on the lower Rio Grande, from Laredo to Brownsville, by the Mexican, Juan Cortina. He began his career by combining with his business of stockman that of cattle-stealer and bandit. In 1850, in order to increase his following, he began to represent himself as the avenger of the wrongs of the native Mexicans, and he had about him at one time five or six hundred of them. In September, 1859, he and his men took temporary possession of Brownsville and killed a peace officer and several other citizens who became involved in resistance to them. Within the next two months two successive expeditions were sent against him, but both retreated without accomplishing anything. In December, however, he was attacked by a combined force of United States regulars and Texas rangers amounting to about three hundred, and was defeated and driven into Tamaulipas."—G. P. Garrison, *Texas*, p. 275.—The governors of Texas during this period included P. H. Bell, 1840-1853; acting governor James W. Henderson, 1853; and H. R. Runnels, 1857-1859. Sam Houston, of military fame, the first president of the republic, was elected governor as an Independent and Unionist in 1859.

1850-1861.—Educational progress.—Conditions preceding Act of 1858.—Provisions of Act of 1858.—"Disorders were natural to a new and still unadjusted social organization including diverse and antagonistic elements. There were, however, other activities and tendencies prevailing in the life of the State that were full of promise. One of these appeared in the gradual development of a system of free public education. The provisions of the constitution of 1836 concerning education and the act of January, 1839, in accordance therewith . . . was followed up by another [act] in February, 1840, providing for a board of school commissioners with power to organize school districts, inspect schools, give certificates to teachers, etc. The educational provisions of the first constitution of the State, adopted in 1845 . . . [substituted] for the general and indefinite terms of . . . [the constitution of 1836] an explicit and positive mandate to the legislature to 'establish free schools throughout the State, and . . . furnish means for their support by taxation on property.' . . . [These provisions were followed by the Act of 1853, which] set aside as a permanent educational fund two million dollars of the five per cent. bonds received from the United States, and provided that the interest thereon should be distributed among the counties in proportion to the number of free white children between six and sixteen years of age. It required the division of the counties into school

districts, in each of which the people must provide a good and properly furnished school-building before they could obtain their share of the public money. This money was to be expended only in payment of the teachers, and the balance due, over and above the amount of the public fund, was to be paid by the patrons of the school, each contributing in proportion to the number of pupils he sent and the time they were in actual attendance. [By] the act of 1839, . . . fifty leagues of land [had been] appropriated for the purpose of establishing two colleges or universities . . . [but] the idea of having two . . . colleges or universities was abandoned for that of one, which was on its organization made coeducational. The act of February 11, 1858, was a more definite step towards realizing the plan of a state university. This provided for the creation of an endowment for an institution of higher learning by setting apart for the purpose one hundred thousand dollars of the United States bonds in the treasury, and every tenth of the alternate sections of land reserved by the State in the grants to railroads made in pursuance of the statute of January 30, 1854. The statute referred to granted sixteen sections of land for each mile of railroad to be built thereafter in the State, the land to be surveyed in solid blocks, and alternate sections to be reserved by the State. . . . The act of 1858 provided also for the organization of the university, but this was prevented by the approach and outbreak of the Civil War."—G. P. Garrison, *Texas*, pp. 275-277, 279.

1861 (February).—Secession from the Union. See U.S.A.: 1860 (November-December); 1861 (January-February).

1861 (February).—Twiggs' surrender of the Federal army, posts and stores. See U.S.A.: 1860-1861 (December-February).

1861-1865.—Governors of Civil War period.—Sam Houston was succeeded in the governorship, in 1861, by Francis R. Lubbock, after a short period during which Edward Clark was acting governor. Pendleton Murrah served as governor from 1863 to 1865, when the provisional government was set up.

1862.—Farragut's occupation of coast towns. See U.S.A.: 1862 (May-July: On the Mississippi).

1865.—Last battle of the Civil War.—The last battle of the Civil War in the state, was fought at Palmito, on the Rio Grande, May 13, 1865.

1865-1876.—Provisional government.—New constitution.—Reconstruction measures.—Freedmen's bureau.—Inadequate frontier protection.—Constitution of 1866.—Resumption of military control.—Carpet bag constitution.—Readmission to Union (1870).—Constitution of 1876.—"The final formal surrender of the Trans-Mississippi department, including Texas, was made on board a United States flagship, off Galveston bar, on the 2d of June, 1865. . . . On the 10th the Federal General Granger landed and took military possession. By proclamation General Granger announced the freedom of the slaves and the suspension of all civil and military [rule]."—M. M. Brown, *School history of Texas*, p. 245.—"On June 17, 1865 . . . President Johnson . . . appointed A. J. Hamilton provisional governor of Texas. . . . Governor Hamilton arrived in Galveston on July 21st. . . . He found all affairs of state in confusion. . . . Immediately a commission was appointed to look into the condition of the treasury. . . . Taxes were assessed by proclamation and ordered collected. . . . As rapidly as possible officers of district, county, and justice courts, sheriffs, tax assessors and collectors, and county commis-

sioners were appointed and the machinery of the law set in motion. . . . The chief duty of the provisional governor . . . was to provide for the assembling of a constitutional convention elected by the loyal people of the state. The test of loyalty was simply the taking of the oath of amnesty. . . . Governor Hamilton, on August 10th [1860], issued a proclamation providing for the registration of voters. . . . The people responded to the invitation without enthusiasm. . . . A lingering belief was manifest . . . that compensation might yet be secured for the loss of slaves, and hence a reluctance to take the amnesty oath lest it should in some way estop claims for the compensation. . . . But . . . the people gave abundant evidence of good-will toward the provisional government itself. . . . As soon as the new state government had been set up, public meetings . . . were called in many counties, and resolutions were passed tendering the provisional governor the support of the citizens in the maintenance of law and order and in the restoration of the civil government on the basis of the President's policy. . . . Most of the charges of disloyalty in Texas were based upon alleged persecution and maltreatment of Union men and freedmen. . . . Violence of this sort constantly occurred, but it appears to have been due far less to actual hostility to the Federal government than to the wide-spread disorder and lawlessness attending the break-up and the interregnum following it. . . . In response to petitions from various quarters where outrages were occurring, and from others where fears of a negro uprising existed, the governor issued a proclamation, November 18th [1865] authorizing the organization of a police force in each county, to be subject to the civil authorities and to act with the military. . . . The most immediate and pressing problem . . . was to preserve the normal balance of society, and to provide for the freedman an industrial position in that society such that agricultural interests would suffer the least possible additional shock. . . . The Freedmen's Bureau, created by act of Congress, March 3, 1865, to take control of all subjects relating to freedmen, refugees, and abandoned lands in the conquered states, did not begin operations in Texas until much later than elsewhere. . . . It was not until December that . . . [it was] so far perfected [as] an organization as to [have] . . . a dozen local agents, of whom five were civilians, at the most important points in the interior. . . . The general character of the work the Bureau had to do in Texas [since] there were no abandoned lands in the state and the Union refugees usually depended upon the military for such protection as they needed . . . [was] confined to looking after the interests of the negro. These activities may be classified roughly as relief work, educational work, labor supervision, and judicial protection. . . . Throughout 1865 and 1866 the whole extent of the frontier from north to south was in constant terror and became almost depopulated. The governor was besieged with petitions for troops and made repeated requests to General Wright for cavalry. Wright disclaimed any authority over the cavalry and referred the matter to Sheridan. Sheridan refused the troops on the ground that they were needed at interior garrisons for the protection of freedmen. Hamilton, too, believed that there were not enough troops in the interior to maintain order, and thereafter contented himself with appealing in Washington for more soldiers for Texas. Almost two years elapsed, however, before frontier posts were finally established and some measure of

protection afforded."—C. W. Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas*, pp. 55-62, 64, 66-68, 70-72, 75-76, 84.—Although the convention had been called in January, it was not until early in the summer that "a constitution was formed, and ratified by a vote of the people June 4, 1866, at which time, also, all State, district, and county officers were elected—James W. Throckmorton, Governor, and George W. James, Lieutenant-Governor. The Legislature met and organized August 13, 1866, Nathaniel M. Burford of Dallas being elected Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Governor and Lieutenant-Governor were installed, then the provisional government ceased. The Legislature enacted such laws as were deemed necessary, and adjourned. This action, and President Johnson's plan of reconstruction were disapproved by Congress, and Texas was again provisionally put under military control, being, with Louisiana, declared to be Military District, No. 5, under General Sheridan, with headquarters in New Orleans, while under him, General Griffin, with headquarters in Galveston, commanded Texas. On July 30, 1867, General Sheridan removed Governor Throckmorton, and appointed ex-Governor Pease instead. A new registration of voters was ordered, and the State divided into fifteen registration districts. General Winfield S. Hancock for a time succeeded General Sheridan; in a short time he was superseded by General J. J. Reynolds, with headquarters in Austin. . . . Governor Pease resigned as provisional Governor [1869], and from that time till February, 1870, the State was directly under military government. A second convention, elected under orders from General Griffin, assembled June 1, 1868, elected Edmund J. Davis as its president, and was officially recognized by Governor Pease. It sat three months, adjourned, and reassembled December 7th, finally adjourning February 6, 1869. The constitution framed by it was . . . properly enrolled and submitted to the people for ratification or rejection at an election to be held in July, at which time, also, should be elected State and county officers. President Grant changed the date of election to the 30th of November and the first three days of December. At that time Edmund J. Davis [a Republican] was elected Governor, with a full set of State officers and a new Legislature. A military order declared this election provisional, and ordered the Legislature to meet in provisional session February 5, 1870."—M. M. Brown, *School history of Texas*, pp. 245-247.—"In February, 1870, the Texas legislature ratified the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. On March 30, 1870, by act of congress, Texas was re-admitted to the Union. Her senators and representatives once more entered the halls of congress and military rule was withdrawn. . . . [Governor Davis remained and continued in office until 1874.] Difficulties beset the new administration on every hand. At the close of the war, Texas had no debt worthy of mention; in 1874 she owed three and a half millions, besides various undetermined claims. Many of the taxes had been left for years uncollected. The credit of the state was low. . . . The constitution adopted in 1869 was unpopular. The state officers [Richard Coke, a Democrat, assumed the governorship in 1874] and legislators found it impossible to remedy many of the evils then existing so long as this constitution was in force. In September 1875, a Constitutional Convention met at Austin. After two and a half months of hard work, they presented the [new] Constitution. . . . The Constitution was ratified (February 15, 1876)."—A. J.



Pennybacker, *History of Texas*, pp. 249, 252-253.—See also U. S. A.: 1865 (May-July), to 1868-1870: Reconstruction complete.

1866-1883.—Cattle trade with Indian Territory.—Cattle Raisers' Association. See OKLAHOMA: 1866-1883.

1869.—Case of Texas vs. White. See U. S. A.: 1869-1872; SUPREME COURT: 1866-1873.

1870-1896.—Border raids.—Reciprocal agreement with Mexico (1882).—Apache "Kid."—Governors of the period.—"During the some fifteen or sixteen years subsequent to the Civil War in the United States and the fall of Maximilian in Mexico, conditions on the international border, and especially along the Rio Grande, were probably more unsettled and irritating than ever before or since. . . . The states to the south were perturbed by revolutions and counter-revolutions characteristic of the section from the achievement of Mexico's independence to the régime of the iron-handed Diaz. On the right bank of the lower Rio Grande bands of cattle thieves were systematically organized. . . . Above Laredo, Texas, the American border was being laid waste by Indians, which the inhabitants of the region declared to live in the mountain fastnesses of Coahuila and Chihuahua. . . . Successive commissions sent by the United States to the border . . . [reported that] conditions were little short of appalling. . . . Matters reached their worst stage between 1870 and 1880. . . . In southwestern Texas cattle raising was followed on a very large scale during this period. . . . Horse raising was likewise engaged in to a considerable extent along the lower Rio Grande, and on a much larger scale farther to the northwest. The raids of the thieves threatened to destroy these important industries. . . . While the main object of the raiders who crossed over into the Rio Grande-Nueces region was the theft of cattle, they were . . . led into the perpetration of even worse outrages. Travelers who chanced to meet them and individuals who were thought likely to give out incriminating information were murdered; thousands of dollars in money, merchandise, and other property were taken; towns were raided; postoffices and customs houses were looted; and numerous public officials were killed. . . . Between 1875 and 1877 the situation in this section amounted to a reign of terror. . . . The policy of the Mexican government in regard to these raids was ineffective, and in the eyes of the government of the United States, dilatory and indifferent. . . . These occurrences led the Washington government to issue positive orders for the crossing of the Mexican border in the pursuit of Indian and Mexican marauders. On June 1, 1877, General Sherman was instructed in regard to the southwestern frontier as follows: 'The President desires that the utmost vigilance on the part of the military forces in Texas be exercised for the suppression of these raids. . . . You will instruct General Ord, commanding in Texas, to invite such cooperation on the part of the local Mexican authorities, and to inform them that while the President is anxious to avoid giving offense to Mexico, he is nevertheless convinced that the invasion of our territory by armed and organized bodies of thieves and robbers to prey upon our citizens should not be longer endured. . . . You will, therefore, direct General Ord that in case the lawless incursions continue he will be at liberty, to the use of his own discretion, when in pursuit of a band of marauders, and when his troops are either in sight of them or upon a fresh trail, to follow them across the Rio Grande, and to overtake and punish them, as

well as retake stolen property taken from our citizens and found in their hands on the Mexican side of the line.' . . . In the course of the more than two years during which the orders remained in force, some ten or fifteen punitive expeditions were made. . . . Certain readjustments which the United States government attempted to make in the location of these Indians led to a series of the most formidable uprisings the southwestern frontier had witnessed in years. . . . In order to cope with the situation the United States government again appealed to Mexico for permission to cross the border in pursuit of the marauders, and . . . in the fall of 1880, President Diaz prevailed upon the Mexican Senate to permit an agreement for reciprocal crossing of the boundary for three months. . . . On July 29, 1882 . . . such a reciprocal agreement was made, and this was renewed from time to time so that troops were permitted to pursue Indian raiders into Mexico from August 18, 1882, to November 1, 1886, with the exception of a brief interval lasting from August 18 to October 31, 1884. . . . Again in 1890 Indian difficulties led a provisional agreement to remain in force not more than a year; and on November 25, 1892, it was renewed for another year in order that the troops of the United States might pursue the band of the Apache 'Kid,' a notorious outlaw and fugitive from justice, who had escaped into Sonora whence he and his accomplices frequently made destructive raids upon the American frontier. After May, 1893, nothing seems to have been heard of this outlaw for some time; but he apparently put in his appearance again in the summer of 1896, for on June 4 of that year the United States and Mexico signed another agreement to remain in force until 'Kid's hand' was 'wholly exterminated.'—J. F. Rippey, *Some precedents of the Pershing expedition into Mexico* (E. C. Barker and H. E. Bolton, ed., *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, Apr., 1921, pp. 299-302, 310, 313-315).—Richard B. Hubbard succeeded Governor Coke in 1877, the new constitution then being in force. Oran M. Roberts served as governor, 1879-1883, and John Ireland, 1883-1887. Lawrence S. Ross took office in 1887 remaining in the chair until 1891 when James S. Hogg became governor of the state.

1875.—Farmers' Alliance organized. See NATIONAL FARMERS' ALLIANCE; U. S. A.: 1866-1877.

1881-1884.—"Fence Cutters' War."—"For many years the public lands of Texas had been a free pasture for thousands of cattle. In 1881 and 1882, this land was placed on the market. It sold rapidly, the buyers being mostly wealthy cattle men, who bought immense tracts. They at once began building wire fences about their property. . . . They did not stop with fencing their own land; hundreds of acres of school land were fenced. Few roads were left. Small lots belonging to poor men were either inclosed within these large fences, or they were so cut off from all roads as to be worthless. . . . A strong feeling arose against the cattle men; their fences were cut again and again [hence the name "Fence Cutters' War"]. In January, 1884, the governor called a special session of the legislature to settle the troubles. It was decided that all public roads must be left open; that gates must be made every three miles; that persons whose land had been fenced without their consent should have full redress; that fence-cutting should be considered a felony."—A. J. Pennybacker, *History of Texas*, pp. 258-259.

1881-1888.—New capitol.—The old state capitol at Austin was completely destroyed by fire on Nov. 9, 1881. As three million acres of land in

the Panhandle of Texas had been set apart to pay for a new state house, arrangements were made to apply the fund realized on the sale of the land to a new capitol instead. The building was completed and dedicated on May 16, 1888.

1883.—Opening of university.—The state university at Austin, organized two years previously and arranged for by the Act of Feb. 11, 1858, opened its doors to students in 1883.

1892.—Opposition of railroad company to railway commission.—“The most important political problem which Texas has met and solved since the days of reconstruction, is the proper regulations of the railroads and express companies doing business in the state. The most prominent man in working out this problem, was Governor James Stephen Hogg. . . . In November [1891] . . . the legislature passed a law, . . . creating a commission of three men, appointed by the governor, with powers to investigate all complaints against railroads and to fix the rates which they could charge for carrying freight and passengers. . . . The railway . . . disobeyed the orders . . . [of] the new commission, . . . saying that the law creating their office was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States . . . decided that the law was constitutional. . . . [The railroad then] tried to defeat Governor Hogg and . . . secure a repeal or a modification of the commission law. But . . . this also . . . failed, for in November 1892, . . . Governor Hogg was re-elected. . . . [This event] ended the fight on the commission. . . . Later . . . the commission . . . was given power to control the issuing of railroad stocks and bonds.”—E. C. Barker, C. S. Potts and C. W. Ramsdell, *School history of Texas*, pp. 256-258.

1895-1915.—State administration.—Charles A. Culberson followed James S. Hogg as governor of the state, 1895-1899. Incumbents of the governorship up to the year 1915 included Joseph D. Sayers, 1899-1903; S. W. T. Lanham, 1903-1907; Thomas M. Campbell, 1907-1911; and Oscar B. Colquitt, 1911-1915. James E. Ferguson became governor in 1915.

1896-1923.—Texas and Oklahoma boundary settlement.—The case of the United States vs. Texas, in 1896, brought about a decision which has since been made more definite in the question of the boundary line between Texas and Oklahoma. “The [Texas boundary] line as agreed upon by the United States and Spain was to run up the Sabine River from its mouth to thirty-two degrees north, thence north to the Red River, . . . etc., but the Red River has two branches. . . . Texas claimed the north fork; and until the matter was finally adjudicated, exercised jurisdiction . . . over the district included between . . . the two forks, which was known as Greer County. In 1896 . . . a decree of the supreme court of the United States fixed the boundary of Texas at the south fork.”—G. P. Garrison, *Texas*, p. 267.—This matter was again brought into the Supreme Court in 1921 by the state of Oklahoma against the state of Texas to ascertain and have marked on the ground the boundary line between the two states along Red river. The portion of the boundary in question is about 600 miles in length. “In the early stages of the suit the chief point of difference between the parties was that Oklahoma and the United States were claiming the south bank of the river as the boundary, while Texas was contending for the thread or middle of the stream. That difference was disposed of in an opinion delivered April 11, 1921, wherein the Court recognized that in the earlier case of United States v.

Texas [Greer County case, 1896] . . . it had been adjudged that the boundary, as fixed by the treaty, is along the south bank. . . . The purport of that opinion was embodied in an interlocutory decree of June 1, 1921, which also made provision for taking additional evidence and for a further hearing to determine what constitutes the south bank, where along that bank the boundary is, and the proper mode of locating it on the ground,—these being matters on which the parties were unable to agree.”—*Opinion of the court, Oklahoma vs. Texas (United States Reports of Supreme Court, v. 260, no. 4, p. 624)*.—The principal issue then to be determined by the Supreme Court was whether the boundary should be run at high water mark as contended for by Oklahoma and the United States or at low water mark being “the edge of the water at that usual and ordinary state in which it is found most of the year,” as contended by the defendant. The conclusion reached by the court January 15, 1923, was that “the boundary line intended is on and along the bank and not at low water mark or any other point within the river bed.” Three commissions were appointed by the court for running, locating, and marking the boundary, decrees to this purpose being declared on Mar. 12, 1923. An order directing the commissions in the work was entered June 4, 1923 and an order providing for the release from existing receivership of lands lying on the north side of the medial line of Red river was entered June 11, 1923.

1898.—Part played in the Spanish-American War.—“Upon the outbreak of the [Spanish-American war] . . . Texas came forward with her full quota of four regiments of infantry and one of cavalry. In addition to this a regiment of ‘immunes’ or men who had had yellow fever, was raised at Galveston and sent to Cuba. The most famous regiment recruited in Texas was Colonel Roosevelt’s Rough Riders. . . . It was organized in San Antonio [and] . . . composed of cowboys and frontiers men from many of the western states.”—E. C. Barker, C. S. Potts and C. W. Ramsdell, *School history of Texas*, p. 260.

1900.—Galveston flood.—“On September 8, 1900, a furious tropical storm swept over the entire coast of Texas, doing tremendous damage to life and property. The greatest damage was done at Galveston. . . . The people of Galveston set to work to rebuild their city.”—*Ibid.*, pp. 262-265.—See also GALVESTON; 1900.

1901.—Beginning of commission government in Galveston. See COMMISSION GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CITIES; 1901-1903.

1901-1902.—Boll-weevil attack on cotton crop.—The years of 1901 and 1902 were marked by a severe and wide-spread drought that resulted in great decrease in crops. The Mexican boll-weevil made its appearance in many parts of the state, causing ruin to the cotton crops.

1901-1919.—Discovery and development of oil fields.—“The story of the discovery and development of the Texas Oil Fields is one of the most interesting and romantic of all the stories in this magic industry. Like other fields which have become famous, surface indications of oil were observed many years ago. Special attention was called to these indications in 1883. . . . Only the inaccessibility of Texas to established lines of transportation prevented its immediate development. . . . Interest was perceptibly increased in 1894 by the discovery of oil in Navarro County, in what has since been known as the Corsicana field. . . . It was not, however, until 1901 that Texas aston-

ished the oil world with the famous 'gusher,' known as Spindle Top. It was on January 10th [1901] that the drill tapped the imprisoned oil at a depth of 1050 feet. So great was the pressure that the 1000 feet of four-inch iron drill pipe was lifted from the bore hole, completely wrecking the derrick. A six-inch stream of oil was thrown one hundred and sixty feet into the air. The estimated rate of this flow was between 70,000 and 100,000 barrels per day. . . . Spindle Top was, therefore, the beginning of that phenomenal development which includes Mexico, Central America and Colombia, as well as Texas. . . . Following the sinking of the Spindle Top well, a new era began for Beaumont and southeastern Texas. Hundreds of oil companies were organized and many wells were drilled. So great was the rush to sink wells that the heavy machinery necessary, was frequently shipped by express from the north regardless of the great expense involved. As a result production soon exceeded storage capacity and transportation facilities. Many of the companies soon failed and very few have survived to the present time. A conspicuous exception to these failures was The Texas Company which has become one of the great oil companies of our day. . . . A pipe line was built to the coast at Port Arthur, docks constructed and storage tanks built. Very soon, too, a refinery was added to this equipment. In this way the Company was not only able to care for the oil produced by its own wells, but to purchase oil from the many Companies which had provided no such facilities. The Port Arthur works now cover many acres and through its refinery more than 50,000 barrels of crude oil pass every day. . . . During the ten years following the Spindle Top discovery in 1901, many new fields were discovered in the Coastal Region."—L. A. Harvey, *Oil fields of Texas (Pan-American Magazine, Nov., 1919, pp. 25-26, 28)*.—In 1905 the Humble field in Harris county was opened up; in 1911, Goose Creek; in 1910, the Burkburnett field in Wichita county and the Ranger field in Eastland county; in 1918, Desdemona in Comanche county and Breckenridge in Stephens county; and in 1919, the Blue Ridge and West Columbia fields (the latter in Brazoria county). In 1919 the centre of interest was in the Desdemona field where 120 companies were operating and from forty to forty-five thousand barrels of oil were being produced daily.

1906.—Brownsville Affair. See U.S.A.: 1906 (August).

1907-1909.—Disasters.—Irrigation.—In 1907 a disastrous fire occurred in Houston and a money panic prevailed throughout the country. The following year floods destroyed about ten million dollars worth of railroad property, in and near Dallas. Another great fire occurred in Fort Worth in 1909 with a loss of about a million dollars. Since 1900, irrigation of the arid district has made rapid progress; by 1909 there were about six hundred thousand acres of this land being irrigated and under cultivation. Nearly half of the acreage was sown in rice.

1910.—Race riot at Slocum.—Lynching at Del Rio.—About twenty negroes were killed in a race riot at the town of Slocum during 1910, when a mob of whites, incited by the insolent remark of a negro to a white man, attacked the colored population. State rangers quelled the disturbances and placed several white men under arrest. The lynching of Antonio Rodriguez, a Mexican, at Del Rio, Texas, on November 2, following the man's

murder of a ranchman's wife was followed by official protestations from Mexico. An investigation resulted in the finding that the victim of the lynching was a citizen of New Mexico and that Mexico was therefore not concerned.

1910-1919.—Ratification of Federal amendments.—On Aug. 17, 1910, the Sixteenth Federal Amendment (authorizing an Income Tax) was ratified; this was followed on Feb. 7, 1913, by the Seventeenth (Direct Election of Senators); on Mar. 1, 1918, by the Eighteenth (Prohibition); on June 28, 1919, by the Nineteenth (Woman Suffrage).

1911-1917.—Important court decisions and legislation.—In 1911 the United States Supreme Court decided that the recall was constitutional. This decision was the outgrowth of a case arising from the recall of the superintendent of schools at Dallas. In 1913 a presidential primary election law and a measure permitting cities of less than 5000 inhabitants to adopt the commission form of government were passed, a bureau of child and animal protection was created, an act providing for the adoption of indeterminate sentence and parole, and one providing a fifty-four hour week for women in certain industries were passed. In 1915 it was proposed to divide the state by creating out of Panhandle a new state to be known as Jefferson. Such action on the part of a legislature was unusual, and was not taken in this case but proposal was significant in demonstrating that such a right exists for Texas. It was conferred in the act admitting Texas to the Union. In 1917 a mothers' pension act was passed.

1912-1913.—Fire at Houston.—Home rule.—A disastrous fire again occurred in 1912 destroying fifty-seven city blocks in Houston and causing a loss of about \$5,000,000. The measure for home rule of cities passed by the legislature in 1913 was largely the result of such repeated disasters.

1914.—Houston ship canal completed.—Convict labor abolished.—A ship canal was completed at Houston in 1914. Improvements on the canal began soon after, with the expectation of making it navigable for the largest sea-going vessels. Convict labor, which had in some measure been employed on this work, was abolished Jan. 1, 1914, and since then no prisoners have been allowed to be leased, or worked out on shares.

1917.—Race riots at Houston.—Impeachment of Governor Ferguson.—In retaliation for violence in the arrest of some negro soldiers at Houston, riots were started by other negroes of the regiment. Seventeen persons were killed and many wounded. The city was placed under martial law and the negro soldiers involved in the killing were courtmartialled. Thirteen were hanged on December 11, and forty-one others committed to life imprisonment.

The impeachment of Governor Ferguson was a significant event of the year 1917. "The state Senate on September 22nd [1917], sitting as a high court of impeachment, by more than the required two-thirds majority, sustained ten of the twenty-one articles of impeachment preferred against Governor Ferguson by the House of Representatives. Three days later the Senate pronounced judgment against the governor removing him from office, and disqualifying him from again holding any office of honor, trust or profit under the state government. . . . The attempt of Governor Ferguson to dominate the State University through improper influence on the Board of Regents and his vetoing the university appropriation brought matters to a head and forced the impeachment pro-

ceedings. But it was the proving of actual crooked dealings in the state's money affairs which compelled the final vote of removal and disqualification."—*Impeachment of governor of Texas (Equity, Jan., 1918)*.

**1917-1918.—Part played in World War.**—When the president called for troops, the state furnished 155,000 soldiers, or 4.5% of the whole force. A national army camp, Camp Travis, was maintained; National Guard camps, Logan, Bowie and McArthur were located at Houston, Fort Worth and Waco; and a motor transport camp at San Antonio. There was also an aviation camp, Camp Love, at Dallas, maintained on the old exhibition grounds.

**1917-1923.—Governors of the state.**—Following the impeachment and removal from office of James E. Ferguson, September, 1917, the lieutenant-governor, William P. Hobby, became governor. Hobby defeated Ferguson in the Democratic primaries the next year and was elected governor. He was reelected for the term 1919-1921. Pat M. Neff was made governor in 1921 and reelected in 1923.

**1918.—State prohibition measure.—Fund for suppression of lynching.**—An act of the legislature providing for state-wide prohibition became effective on June 26, 1918. During the year "the *San Antonio Express*, . . . at a stockholders' meeting, voted for the establishment of a fund of \$100,000 to be paid in rewards for the punishment of inciters to mob violence and of lynchers. A reward of \$500 . . . [was to] be paid to each person who . . . [should] be directly responsible for the arrest, the subsequent conviction and punishment of any person or persons who were instrumental in arousing a mob to commit a lynching or in putting through the lynching itself, when the individual lynched was not a Negro, and a reward of \$1,000 for the same deed of public valor when the victim was a Negro."—*Common welfare (Survey, Aug. 24, 1918, p. 593)*.

**1919.—State health department.—Information bureau.—Home of helium.—Cotton crop.**—Early in the year 1919, three new bureaus were established in the state department of health of Texas; that of Child Hygiene, Communicable Diseases, and Public Health Education. The Texas College Association created in 1919 the Texas Information Bureau to receive and gather information as to lectures, publicists, demonstrators, musicians, or exponents of literature, art, political science, music, drama, or anything of cultural value to the state. The headquarters of this association was at Dallas. In 1919, Texas was the only place in the United States where helium, a gas in demand for airplane use, was being extracted in any large quantities. At this time the chief works in operation for this gas, were in Petrolia, under government auspices, which had arranged to spend \$6,000,000 in producing it. There were also two other plants producing helium at Fort Worth, which were closely guarded by men from the United States army, no civilian being permitted to enter the plants. At the close of the World War the gas was being shipped in cylinders to New Orleans and from there to France. In spite of the absence of so many men in the service the cotton production of the year was estimated at 2,700,000 bales of 500 lbs. each. This was the largest yearly yield of any single state in the Union.

**1919.—Minimum wage law passed.** See LABOR REMUNERATION: 1910-1920.

**1919.—Trouble with Mexico.** See MEXICO: 1919 (June-December).

**1920.—Open port or anti-strike law.**—The State of Texas enacted an anti-strike law of a very definite and restricted character in the latter part of 1920. "In reviewing this bill the American Association for Labor Legislation, which is devoted to the legislative interests of the workingmen, published the following: 'TEXAS. It is declared to be state policy that the operation of common carriers shall not be impeded or interfered with, to molest or harass persons engaged in transporting commerce, by intimidation or violence is unlawful. Transporting commerce includes employment by express companies or on docks, wharves, switches, railroad tracks, compresses, depots, freight depots, pipe lines or approaches or appurtenances to or incident to or used in connection with handling commerce by common carriers. Anyone who in conversation or otherwise with a person engaged in transporting commerce, or with any member of his family, at work or at home, attempts to cause him to desist from work through fear of violence, is deemed guilty of intimidation. Violation is heavily penalized. (B. B. 6. In effect, January 2, 1921.)'"—*Texas open port law (Survey, Feb. 12, 1921, p. 700)*.

**1921.—Antagonism to Japanese and Mexicans.**—"Japanese farmers in California in view of the increasing hostile attitude of the government of the state, recently tried through an agent to acquire land in Texas on which to settle. This agent was met at the border by delegates of the American Legion and threatened with dire consequences to himself and those he represented if they endeavored to carry out that plan, which was subsequently abandoned. . . . On February 16 at Ranger there were about one hundred Mexican workmen . . . beaten up by masked men and ordered to leave town. Mexican homes in the nearby oil camps were attacked and women and children chased into the open. The mayor of Ranger, in cooperation with the Texas Rangers . . . [took] steps to protect these workers."—*Survey, Feb. 26, 1921, p. 774*.

**1921-1923.—Legislative measures.**—Measures passed by the state legislature in session in 1921 were an amendment relative to the enforcement of the law concerning the rights and disabilities of aliens; an amendment providing for increased conservation of the state's national resources; a provision for cooperative marketing associations; one authorizing international trading corporations under state laws; proposed constitutional amendment restricting suffrage to native born or naturalized citizens and providing for absentee voting; provision for the adoption of the commission form of government by cities of less than 5000; proposed constitutional amendment for the purpose of granting pensions to confederate war veterans and their widows. Legislation in the session of 1923 included an amendment making more stringent the state anti-trust laws; the extension of certain oil and gas permits on specified lands then under receivership control of the United States Supreme Court; a measure authorizing the control of highways by the state and providing for the construction, operation and maintenance of a system of public highways; creation of a state board of vocational education; creation of a commission to codify the general laws of the state; a measure releasing citizens of Hidalgo County from the payment of state taxes for twenty-five years in view of calamities they had suffered; appropriation of \$3,000,000 from the state treasury to aid rural schools, and the creation of a state educational survey commission; the request for the cooperation of the Uni-

versity of Texas in working out a plan to reduce illiteracy in the state; and provision for a topographic survey to be made by the board of water engineers and the state reclamation engineer.

ALSO IN: N. Smithwick, *Evolution of state*.—C. T. Brady, *Conquest of the Southwest*.—J. T. Shields, *Border wars of Texas*.—B. B. Paddock, *History of central and western Texas*.—I. Stewart, *Constitutional amendments in Texas (Southwestern Political Science Quarterly, Sept., 1922)*.

TEXAS VS. WHITE, Case of (1869). See U. S. A.: 1869-1872; SUPREME COURT: 1866-1873.

TEXAS-SHREVEPORT CASE. See RAILROADS: 1910-1916.

TEXTILE STRIKES: New England. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1918; 1919: Lawrence textile strike; 1922: New England textile strike.

TEZCATLIPOCA, one of the principal gods of Aztec mythology. See MYTHOLOGY: Latin America.

TEZCUCO, town in the state of Mexico, Mexico, sixteen miles east of Mexico City. It was here that Cortés organized the siege of Mexico and built the brigantines with which he attacked the city. See MEXICO: 1525-1502; 1520-1521; 1521 (May-July).

THABORITES. See TABORITES.

THACKERAY, William Makepeace (1811-1863), English novelist. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1832-1880; BIBLE, ENGLISH: Modern estimates of the Bible.

THADDEUS, one of the apostles, also called Jude or Judas and Lebbaeus. Supposed founder of the Armenian church. See ARMENIAN CHURCH.

THADOMINBYA (fl. 14th century), king of Burma. Founded the city of Ava, 1364. See BURMA: Early history.

THAI RACE. See SIAM.

THAKOMBAU (d. 1882), Fiji chieftain. Ceded his kingdom to Great Britain, 1874. See FIJI ISLANDS.

THALES (640-546 B. C.), Greek philosopher. "Thales of Miletus, of Phœnician descent, . . . is distinguished by Aristotle as the originator of the Ionic Natural Philosophy [and hence indirectly also of Greek philosophy in general]. The fundamental doctrine of his philosophy of nature is thus expressed: Water is the original source of all things. . . . 'According to Thales, the magnet is animated, because it attracts iron.' . . . 'Thales believed that all things were filled with gods.' . . . The reason, according to Aristotle, why philosophy begins with Thales, is that in his attempt to explain the world, a scientific tendency is first manifested, in opposition to the mythical form, which prevailed in the works of the ancient poets, and, to a great extent, in those of Pherecydes also. [All the writers who give lists of the seven wise men of Greece mention his name.]"—F. Ueberweg, *History of philosophy, v. 1: History of ancient and mediæval philosophy* (tr. by G. S. Morris, additions by N. Porter), pp. 32, 34-35.

THAMANÆANS, ancient people who occupied the region in western Afghanistan which lies south and southeast of Herat, from the Haroot-rud to the Helmand.—Based on G. Rawlinson, *Five great monarchies, Persia, ch. 1*.

THAMES, Battle of the. See U. S. A.: 1812-1813: Harrison's northwestern campaign.

THAMES RIVER CANAL. See CANALS: Principal European canals: British Isles.

THAMUDITES, ancient race of Arabia. See ARABIA: Ancient succession and fusion of races.

THANAGE, old Celtic tenure by which certain thanes' estates were held in Scotland, and which feudalism displaced.—Based on W. F. Skene, *Celtic*

*Scotland, v. 3, p. 246*.—Thanage was the name given to the district of a thane or the services due a thane.

THIANE, or Thegn, name of a minor class of nobles in Anglo-Saxon times, acting originally as household servants and companions, and following the lord to war as his bodyguard. See COMITATUS; ÆTHEL; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 30; ENGLAND: 959-975.

THANET, Isle of, northeastern part of Kent, England. It was invaded by the Jutes in 449. See ENGLAND: 449-473.

THANKSGIVING DAY, American.—In 1621 the Pilgrims, at Plymouth, "determined to have a period of recreation, combined with thanksgiving for their many mercies. The Governor thereupon sent out four huntsmen, who in one day secured enough game to supply the Colony for nearly a week. Hospitality was extended to Massasoit, who accepted and brought ninety people with him. The guests remained three days, during which they captured five deer to add to the larder of their hosts."—J. A. Goodwin, *Pilgrim republic, pp. 179-180, and footnote*.—The first Thanksgiving Day observed in all the states of the American Union was recommended by a proclamation from the Continental Congress, after Burgoyne's surrender, in 1777, and fixed for Thursday, December 18. Each year thereafter, until 1784, the Continental Congress continued to recommend a day for thanksgiving services which the several states accepted and appointed. Then came an interval during which the observance was left wholly to the states. The first Congress under the Federal constitution, in 1789, adopted a resolution which requested President Washington to recommend a day for national thanksgiving and prayer, and the president's proclamation named Thursday, November 26, of that year. This proceeding, however, was much opposed by the anti-federalists, and it was not repeated until 1795, when President Washington, without action of Congress, recommended a day of thanksgiving, on February 19. Until 1815 there was no other national appointment. In that year, by resolution of Congress and proclamation of the president, April 13 was set apart as a day of national thanksgiving for the restoration of peace. Then, for almost half a century, the national observance ceased. It was revived by President Lincoln in 1863, when he appointed a special day of thanksgiving for the victory of Gettysburg, on August 16, and nationalized, by his proclamation, the autumnal Thanksgiving Day of November, which had become a fixed festival in most of the states. From that time the day has been appointed for the whole nation each year by presidential proclamation.—Based on W. De L. Love, Jr., *Fast and thanksgiving days of New England, ch. 27*.—The latest day upon which Thanksgiving Day has ever fallen since the revival by President Lincoln was in 1865 when because of the many settlements to be arranged after the Civil War, President Johnson appointed December 7th. "The President's designation of December 7th for a National Thanksgiving will meet with a far more general and hearty response from the people than if a much earlier day had been named, for we have had time to realize the greatness of victory which last April consummated."—*New York Tribune, Dec. 5, 1865*.—See also HOLIDAYS, UNITED STATES.

ALSO IN: F. B. Hough, *Proclamations for Thanksgiving*.

THANN, or Thau, Battles of (1638, 1800) See GERMANY: 1634-1630; 1800 (January-June).

THAPSACUS, important fording place on the

Euphrates, where many armies crossed the river in ancient times. See APAMEA.

**THAPSUS**, in ancient geography, a town on the coast of northern Africa, near the modern Cape Dimas in Tunis, thirty miles southeast of Susa. Here Caesar defeated the adherents of Pompey in 46 B. C. See CARTHAGE: DOMINIANS; ROME: Republic: B. C. 47-46; AFRICA: Ancient and medieval civilization: Roman occupation.

**THAREKETARA**, ancient city of Burma. See BURMA: Early history.

**THASOS**, island off the coast of Thrace, in the northern part of the Ægean sea, celebrated in antiquity for its gold mines. After an attempted revolt in 463 B. C., it was reduced by the Athenians who held it intermittently until the end of the 3rd century B. C., when it passed into the hands of Macedonia. After the battle of Cyncephala, 197 B. C., it enjoyed autonomy under Rome. See ATHENS: B. C. 466-454; GREECE: B. C. 477-461.

**THAUSS**, Battle of (1431). See BOHEMIA: 1419-1434.

**THEATER**.—"The Athenians are given the credit for first designing buildings especially for the presentation of plays, and the word theater itself is from the Greek, meaning a place for seeing. The date when the first Greek theater was built is not known, but it was certainly before 500 B. C., although perhaps no really permanent structure was erected before that time. The great theater at Athens, known as the Dionysiac Theater, was begun about this time and was completed 340 B. C. It is hollowed out of the rock at the base of the Acropolis, and its magnificent view of the Athenian temples and the island-studded waters of the blue Ægean sea must have given added point to the lofty passages of the old plays."—T. C. Atwood, *Amphitheater, theater and stadium, ancient and modern* (American City, Jan., 1917, p. 1).—See also DRAMA: Origin.—"The theatre at Epidaurus is perhaps the easiest to trace in all its parts of all the theatres of purely Greek design, as the stone steps forming the seats are generally in place, and large fragments of the proscenium remain within reach. This also is known to history as the most important and splendid of the theatres of Greece, the circular space occupied by the orchestra was forty feet in diameter, with a fountain in the middle evidently for the altar of Dionysos. [See DRAMA: Physical features of the ancient Greek theater.] . . . The Roman theatre, modelled upon that of the Greeks and consisting like it of a nearly semicircular funnel-shaped auditorium with seats either of wood or stone, differed from its prototype in having a semi-circular space reserved for the chorus, and a stage much enlarged, raised high above the floor of the orchestra, and backed by somewhat elaborate architectural structures, often a two-story or three-story colonnaded building. The lavish way in which the Roman proconsuls and prætors built is exemplified by the comparative indifference shown to taking advantage of the ground, as well as by the costly architectural work of the stage and proscenium. [See also COLOSSEUM.] . . . The theatre of Marcellus, at Rome, has preserved for us more of the exterior of the auditorium than any other, but the wall behind the stage and the other structures there can best be judged from the theatre at Orange (Vaucluse) in the south of France, where the great wall forming the back or outside of the proscenium stands almost intact, 140 feet high. The colonnades of the stage, which in this case was roofed and open on one side only, can be partly under-

stood. . . . [When, after many centuries the art of the theater was rediscovered, a very different type of building was evolved.] A modern theatre . . . consists properly of two buildings closely attached each to the other. The one of these contains the scenery and the galleries and passages for its arrangement and its easy management, together with the Dressing Rooms for actors, a Foyer or more foyers than one, and some few private rooms and offices. This building may be extremely simple, four-square, and roofed with an ordinary low-pitch roof, as nothing is needed but a large, safe, unobstructed interior in which the theatrical engineer and machinists can do their work. . . . The other building, that which contains the auditorium, contains so much else in addition to this that frequently the auditorium seems in plan to be but a minor consideration. In any large modern theatre, vastly more superficial space on any one horizontal plane is occupied by lobbies, staircases, the foyer for the public, ticket offices, corridors, and the like, than for the mere seating of the spectators. . . . The number of seatings is generally kept down from considerations of acoustics, of easy view of the stage from all parts of the house, and of reluctance to have an auditorium so large that it will be but rarely filled. Thus, the opera house at Paris, though built at lavish cost between 1865 and 1875, provides for only 2156 spectators; and the famous *Théâtre Française*, largely supported by the state, which supplies the house as well as an annual income, seats but 1520 persons. The famous *Odéon*, standing free on all sides and forming an architectural monument of some importance, has 1650 seatings."—R. Sturgis, *Dictionary of architecture and building*, v. 3, pp. 788-791.—Other notable theaters, of earlier date, are: the Olympic theater at Vicenza, built in 1580, after the designs of Palladio; the Sheldonian theater at Oxford (1660-1664), after those of Wren; and the Royal theater at Berlin, designed by Schinkel.—See also HIPPODROME; ODEUM.

**Early English theaters**. See DRAMA: 1558-1592; 1592-1648.

**THEATINES**, a Roman catholic religious order which was second only to the Jesuits in its importance in the reform movement of the sixteenth century. The founders of the order of the Theatines (1524) were "Gaetano of Thiene [St. Cajetan], a native of Vicenza, and Gian Pietro Caraffa [afterwards Pope Paul IV]. The former had quitted a lucrative post at the Roman court in order to transplant the ideas of the Oratory of the Divine Love to his native city, Verice, and Verona, and had gradually come to concentrate his pious thoughts upon the reformation of the secular clergy of the Church. On his return to Rome, Bonifacio da Calle, a Lombard lawyer, became interested in his design, and then it was enthusiastically taken up by Caraffa, whose bishopric of Chieti, or, according to the older form, Theate, gave its name to the new order of the Theatines."—A. W. Ward, *Counter Reformation*, p. 28.—"To the vow of poverty they made the special addition that not only would they possess nothing, but would even abstain from begging, and await the alms that might be brought to their dwellings. . . . They did not call themselves monks, but regular clergy—they were priests with the vows of monks. . . . The order of the Theatines did not indeed become a seminary for priests precisely, its numbers were never sufficient for that; but it grew to be a seminary for bishops, coming at length to be considered the order of priests peculiar to the nobility."—L. von Ranke, *History of*

*the popes, v. 1, bk. 2, sect. 3.*—They spread over Italy, Spain, Poland and Germany in succeeding years, and the first French house was established in Paris under Cardinal Mazarin. In 1099 Pope Pius X united the order with a Spanish order at Barcelona.—See also MONASTICISM: 10th-19th centuries.

1607.—Expelled from Venice. See VENICE: 1606-1607.

**THEBAIS**, southern district of upper Egypt, taking its name from Thebes.

**THEBAN SACRED BAND.** See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 5; THEBES: B.C. 378.

**THEBAU.** See THIBAW.

**THEBES**, Egypt, famous ancient city, capital of the fourth nome of upper Egypt. The site of the ruined city is today occupied by scattered villages. "No city of the old world can still show so much of her former splendour as Egyptian Thebes. . . . Not one of the many temples of Thebes has wholly disappeared; some are almost complete; many of the royal and private tombs were, until the tourist came, fresh with colours as of yesterday. . . . The origin of the great city is obscure. Unlike Memphis, Thebes, her southern rival, rose to the headship by slow degrees. It was towards the close of the dark age marked by the rule of Hanes, that a new line of kings arose in the upper country, with Thebes for their capital. At first they were merely nobles; then one became a local king, and his successors won the whole dominion of Egypt. These were the sovereigns of the Eleventh Dynasty. Their date must be before Abraham, probably some centuries earlier. . . . Thebes, like the other cities of Egypt, had a civil and a religious name. The civil name was Apiu, 'the city of thrones,' which, with the article 't' or 'ta,' became Ta-Apiu, and was identified by the Greeks with the name of their own famous city, by us corruptly called Thebes. The sacred name was Nu-Amen, 'the city of Amen,' and god of Thebes; or simply Nu, 'the city,' and Nu-ā, 'the great city.' In these names we recognize the No-Amon and No of Scripture."—R. S. Poole, *Cities of Egypt*, ch. 4.—See also ASSYRIA: Map.—It was in the twelfth dynasty that "the seat of government was transferred from Herakleopolis to Thebes. . . . Whilst the Hyksos [see EGYPT: Hyksos] of the fifteenth and sixteenth dynasties were in possession of the Delta, a considerable number of petty kings reigned at Thebes. . . . How long the struggle for supremacy between them lasted cannot be said, but towards the end of the Hyksos rule it is . . . certain . . . as quoted by Josephus, 'the Kings of the Thebais . . . made an insurrection against the Shepherds, and there was a long and terrible war.' . . . The fight between the Hyksos and the Thebans appears to have taken a turn favourable to the latter under a small group of kings who formed the seventeenth dynasty from Thebes. . . . The great kings of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth dynasties [still held Thebes as the capital]."—E. A. W. Budge, *Short history of the Egyptian people*, pp. 53, 69, 71.—See also EGYPT: Old empire and the middle empire.—"Egypt became a military state. . . . The wealth, the rewards and the promotion open to the professional soldier were a constant incentive to a military career. . . . In the biographies which they have left in their tombs at Thebes the survivors of the noble class narrate with the greatest satisfaction the campaigns which they went through at Pharaoh's side, and the honours which he bestowed upon them. [Among the chief biographies recorded, is that of

Nakht, at one time scribe and serving priest of Amon who died late in the reign of Amenhotep III.] Side by side with the soldier appears another new and powerful class, that of the priesthood. . . . The head of the state temple at Thebes, the High Priest of Amon, was the supreme head of the greater body also. . . . The triumph of a Theban family had brought with it the supremacy of Amon. . . . Thutmose III, . . . named king by oracle of Amon, . . . laid out his imposing colonnaded halls at the . . . east end of the temple [of Karnak], where they today form one of the great architectural beauties of Thebes. . . . In Hatshepsut's (his consort's) splendid temple her fame still lives. . . . Her Karnak obelisk displays her name and records. . . . A pair of enormous obelisks . . . were erected [by Thutmose] at the Karnak temple and one of them bore the proud words 'Thutmose, who crossed the great "Bend of Naharin" (the Euphrates) with might and with victory at the head of his army.' The other obelisk of this pair has perished but this one now stands in Constantinople. . . . Of his two Heliopolitan obelisks, one is on the Thames Embankment in London and the other in Central Park, New York City. . . . The wealth and the captive labour of Asia and Nubia were being rapidly transmuted into noble architecture, on a scale of size and grandeur surpassing all precedent, and at Thebes a new fundamental chapter, in the history of the world's architecture was being daily written. Amenhotep [III] supported his architects with all his unparalleled resources. . . . At Luxor, the old southern suburb of Thebes, his architects laid out a superb forecourt of the temple of Amon, in front of which they planned a pew and more ambitious hall than had ever been attempted before. . . . Unfortunately the vast hall was unfinished at the death of the king and the whole stands to-day a mournful wreck of an unfinished work of art, the first example of a now universal type of great architecture. . . . Amenhotep now proceeded to give the great buildings of the city a unity which they had not before possessed. Approaching the gorgeous pylon which he set up in front of the Karnak temple, an avenue led up from the river between two tall obelisks, which flanked a colossal portrait statue of the Pharaoh, hewn from a single block sixty-seven feet long. Through the beautiful gardens, with which he united Karnak and Luxor, avenues of sculptured rams connected the great temples. . . . Thebes was thus rapidly becoming a worthy seat of empire, the first monumental city of antiquity. Nor did the western plain on the other side of the river behind which the conquerors slept, suffer by comparison with the new glories of Karnak and Luxor. Along the foot of the rugged cliffs, from the modest chapel of Amenhotep I on the north, there stretched southward in an imposing line the mortuary temples of the emperors. At the south end of this line, but a little nearer the river, Amenhotep III now erected his own mortuary sanctuary, the largest temple of his reign. . . . But this sumptuous building, probably the greatest work of art ever wrought in Egypt, has vanished utterly. Only the two weather beaten colossi which guarded the entrance still look out across the plain. . . . Behind the temple appeared a palace of the king . . . Innumerable products of the industrial artist which fill the museums of Europe indicate with what tempered richness and delicate beauty such a royal chateau was furnished and adorned. . . . The walls were covered with woven tapestry which skilled judges have declared equal

to the best modern work. Besides painted pavements depicting animal life, the walls also adorned with blue glazed tiles, the rich color of which shone through elaborate designs of gold leaf, while glazed figures were employed in encrusting larger surfaces. [It was these walls that the Metropolitan Museum Egyptian expedition of 1907, studied and copied.] . . . Sculpture also flourished under such circumstances as never before. . . . The perfection attained in the sculpture of animal forms by the artists of this time marks the highest level of achievement attained by Egyptian art herein. . . . Especially in relief were the artists of this age masters."—J. H. Breasted, *History of the ancient Egyptians (Historical Series for Bible Students, v. 5, pp. 193-104, 203, 221, 222, 229, 234, 243, 256-260)*.—Toward the end of the Middle Empire "the dominance of Egypt in Asiatic affairs had irresistibly drawn the centre of power on the Nile from Thebes to the Delta. Thebes remained the religious capital of the state and . . . a distinct principality, capable of offering serious opposition to the ruling family in the Delta. The city itself at least was not taxable by Pharaoh, and was never visited by his fiscal officials. . . . The state of disorganization and helplessness which was gradually evolving is revealed to us in a chapter from the government of the Theban necropolis preserved in certain legal archives of Rameses IX reign. . . . Thebes . . . was now rapidly declining but it continued to be the burial place of all the royal dead. . . . Within a generation as the work of plunder continued all the bodies of Egypt's kings and emperors buried at Thebes, were despoiled, and of the whole line of Pharaohs from the beginning of the Eighteenth to the end of the Twentieth Dynasty, only one body, that of Amenhotep II, has been found still lying in its sarcophagus. [Tut-ankh-Amen's body was found in a sarcophagus.] . . . Thus while the tombs of the Egyptian emperors at Thebes were being ransacked and their bodies rifled . . . the empire which they had . . . conquered was crumbling to final ruin."—*Ibid.*, pp. 362, 349-350.—See also ARCHITECTURE: Oriental: Egypt.

1922 (November).—Excavations by Lord Carnarvon and Howard Carter of the tomb of Tut-ankh-Amen. See EGYPT: 1922-1923.

ALSO IN: J. H. Breasted, *History of Egypt*.—E. A. W. Budge, *Book of the dead*.

**THEBES, Greece**, city of Bœotia in ancient Greece. A modern town occupies the site of the ancient citadel but few traces of the old city remain "In the fruitful plain, only traversed by low hills, which stretches from the northern declivity of Mount Cithæron to the Bœotian lakes opposite the narrowest part of the sound which separates Eubœa from the mainland, in the 'well-watered, pasture-bearing region of the Aones,' as Euripides says, lay the citadel and town of Thebes. According to Greek tradition, it was built by Cadmus the Phœnician. The Aones, who inhabited the country, are said to have amalgamated with the Phœnicians whom Cadmus brought with him, into one people. The citadel lay on a hill of moderate height between the streams Ismenus and Dirce; it bore even in historical times the name Cadmea; the ridge to the north of the town was called Phœnicium, i. e., mountain of the Phœnicians. In the story of Cadmus and Europa, Greek legend relates the Phœnician mythus of Melkarth and Astarte. In order to seek the lost goddess of the moon, Astarte, Cadmus-Melkarth, the wandering sun-god, sets forth. He finds her in the far west,

in Bœotia, and here in Thebes, on the Cadmea, celebrates the holy marriage. . . . There are a few relics of the wall of the citadel of Cadmea, principally on the north side; they are great blocks, not quite regularly hewn. Of the city wall and the famous seven gates in it nothing remains; even this number seven points to the Phœnicians as well as the designations which were retained by these gates even in historical times. The Electric gate belonged to the sun-god Baal, called by the Greeks Elector; the Neitic gate, it would seem, to the god of war. . . . The gate Hypsistia was that of Zeus Hypsistos, whose shrine stood on the Cadmea; . . . the Prætidic gate belonged to Astarte, whose domain was the moon; the Oncaic gate in the north-west belonged to Athena Onca, who is expressly called a Phœnician goddess. . . . It is probable that the two remaining gates, the Homoloic and the Crenaic, were also dedicated to gods of this circle—to the spirits of planets. According to Greek legend, Cadmus invented the building of walls, mining, armour, and letters. Herodotus contents himself with saying that the Phœnicians who came with Cadmus taught much to the Greeks, even writing; from the Phœnicians the Ionians, in whose midst they lived, had learned letters. If even this early borrowing of writing on the part of the Greeks is incorrect, all the other particulars,—the legend of Cadmus, which extends to the Homeric poems, where the inhabitants of Thebes are called Cadmeans; the rites of the Thebans; the walls and gates,—taken together, give evidence that the Phœnicians went over from Eubœa to the continent, and here fixed one of their most important and lasting colonies upon and around the hill of Cadmea."—M. Duncker, *History of Greece, bk. 1, ch. 4*.—See also BŒOTIA; BŒOTIAN LEAGUE.

B. C. 509-506.—Unsuccessful war with Athens. See ATHENS: B. C. 509-506.

B. C. 480.—Traitorous alliance with the Persians. See GREECE: B. C. 480: Persian Wars: Salamis; Thermopylae.

B. C. 479.—Siege and reduction by confederate Greeks.—Punishment for the Persian Alliance. See GREECE: B. C. 479: Persian Wars: Plataea.

B. C. 457-456.—War with Athens.—Defeat at Œnophyta.—Overthrow of oligarchies. See GREECE: B. C. 458-456; ATHENS: B. C. 457-456.

B. C. 447.—Bœotian revolution.—Overthrow of Athenian influence.—Defeat of Athens at Coronea. See ATHENS: B. C. 447.

B. C. 431.—Disastrous attack on Plataea.—Opening hostilities of the Peloponnesian War. See GREECE: B. C. 432-431; PLATAEA: B. C. 431.

B. C. 404-403.—Shelter and aid to Athenian patriots. See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

B. C. 404-359.—Type of Greek government in Thebes. See GREECE: B. C. 404-359.

B. C. 4th century.—Growth of power. See GREECE: B. C. 4th century: General conditions.

B. C. 395-387.—Confederacy against Sparta and alliance with Persia.—Corinthian War.—Battle of Coronea.—Peace of Antalcidas. See GREECE: B. C. 390-387.

B. C. 382.—Seized by Spartans. See GREECE: B. C. 385-383.

B. C. 379-371.—Liberation of the city.—Rise of Epaminondas.—Overthrow of Spartan supremacy at Leuctra. See GREECE: B. C. 379-371.

B. C. 378.—Sacred band.—"This was an institution connecting itself with earlier usages of the land. For already in the battle of Delium a band of the Three Hundred is mentioned, who fought, like the heroes of the Homeric age, associated in



pairs, from their chariots in front of the main body of the soldiery. This doubtless very ancient institution was now [378 B.C.] revived and carried out in a new spirit under the guidance of Epaminondas and Gorgidas. They had quietly assembled around them a circle of youths, with whom they had presented themselves before the community on the day of the Liberation, so that they were regarded as the founders of the Sacred Band of Thebes. It was now no longer a privilege of the nobility to belong to the Three Hundred; but those among the youth of the land who were in feeling the noblest and most high-minded, and who already under the oppression of the Tyrants had been preparing themselves for the struggle for freedom, were henceforth the elect and the champions. It was their duty to stimulate the rest eagerly to follow their example of bravery and discipline; they were associated with one another by the bonds of friendship and by identity of feelings. . . . A soldier-like spirit was happily blended with ethical and political points of view, and ancient national usage with the ideas of the present and with Pythagorean principles; and it constitutes an honorable monument of the wisdom of Epaminondas."—E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, bk. 6, ch. 1.

**B. C. 370-362.**—Intervention in Peloponnesus.—Successful expeditions of Epaminondas.—Invasions of Sparta.—Formation of the Arcadian Union.—Battle of Mantinea and death of Epaminondas. See GREECE: B. C. 371-362.

**B. C. 357-338.**—Ten Years' Sacred War with the Phocians.—Intervention of Philip of Macedonia.—Loss of independence and liberty. See GREECE: B. C. 357-336; MACEDONIA: B. C. 345-336.

**B. C. 335.**—Revolt.—Destruction by Alexander the Great.—Citizens sold into slavery. See GREECE: B. C. 336-335; SLAVERY: Greek.

**B. C. 316.**—Restoration by Cassander of Macedonia. See GREECE: B. C. 321-312.

**B. C. 291-290.**—Siege by Demetrius.—Thebes, with other Bœotian towns, united in a revolt against Demetrius Poliorcetes, while the latter held the throne of Macedonia, and was reduced to submission, 290 B.C., after a siege which lasted nearly a year.—Based on C. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. 60.

**B. C. 146.**—Destroyed by Rome. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 107-146.

**1146.**—Sack by Normans of Sicily.—Abduction of silk-weavers. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: 1146.

**1205.**—Included in Latin duchy of Athens. See ATHENS: 1205-1308.

**1311.**—Conquest by Catalans.—With its destruction in 1311 by the Catalans, Thebes passed out of the domain of universal history. See CATALAN GRAND COMPANY.

**THEGN.** See THANE.

**THEILE, Johann** (1646-1724), German composer. See MUSIC: Modern: 1630-1800.

**THEIPHALI, THEIPHALIA.** See TAIFALÆ.

**THEISM.**—"Theism by etymology means all forms of belief in the existence of the Divine, but in usage is identified with monotheism, and is opposed to pantheism and polytheism, as well as atheism. It holds that the universe owes its existence and continuance to one supreme and perfect Being, who is distinct from what he created. The historical origin of the belief is much disputed, some regarding it as the primeval form of religion, while others hold that it was always preceded by polytheism. Not enough of man's primitive condition is known to decide this point on scientific

grounds."—T. W. Chambers, *Theism (Concise dictionary of religious knowledge*, p. 909).—In the eighteenth century the term theism was frequently identified with deism, but a later interpretation of the two beliefs recognizes the negative attitude of deism in its denial of revelation and the positive or affirmative element in theism in its emphasis on belief in God. In the nineteenth century Theodore Parker and others applied the term theism to their speculative belief in God. "Without renouncing theism, he [Parker] affirmed that its doctrine issues from the progress of religion on the plane of nature, and is not derived from supernatural teaching. . . . The essentials of Christianity had been reduced to a *minimum*; that minimum Parker conveyed over to natural theology."—G. P. Fisher, *History of Christian doctrine*, p. 434.—"As is well known, when the Christian Church began to feel the need of a philosophical foundation for its theology, it sought that foundation primarily in Neo-Platonism. . . . [By the fifth century] the Neo-Platonic conception of God . . . became a part and parcel of the orthodox Christian thought. It is this conception that St. Anselm assumes in his famous attempt to prove the existence of God by an argument which . . . has been a centre of philosophical controversy from the date of its first becoming generally known to our day—the so-called 'ontological proof' of the existence of God . . . In the 13th century, the golden age of scholastic philosophy, it was rejected as a sophism by St. Thomas Aquinas, whose great authority has ever since discredited it. . . . The most important of the relevant passages in the works of Thomas Aquinas are *Summa contra Gentiles* i. 10, 11, and *Summa Theologica*, I. qu. ii. art. 1, both dealing formally with the question whether the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident. . . . Descartes' theism, like that of his mediæval predecessors, is predominantly of the Neo-Platonic type, and is intimately connected with the assumption, which underlies the reasoning of the *Meditation*. . . . [In] Leibniz's treatment of the subject . . . the proposition 'God exists' holds a unique position. It is a 'truth of fact' and therefore, like all 'truths of facts' synthetic. . . . The most important philosophical treatment of the theistic problem between Leibniz and Kant is unmistakably that of Hume in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. . . . His real attitude towards theism seems to have been . . . [that] he is very unwilling to believe that his leaning towards it rests on nothing more solid than emotional bias, but the alleged proofs of theism are open to criticisms which Hume does not know how to refute, and there are 'appearances' which it is hard to reconcile with the theistic 'hypothesis.' . . . Much more closely knit is the assault on the whole of natural theology in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. . . . Kant had not always been a disbeliever in the possibility of demonstrating theism. In his thesis for his degree . . . he offers proof . . . that 'there is a being whose existence is antecedent to the possibility of itself and of all things, which being must therefore be said to exist with an absolute necessity.' . . . Lotze . . . [reasserted] this particular version of the cosmological argument which finds in God the necessary actual ground of possibilities . . . in the chapter of 'Proof of the Existence of God.' . . . The Theistic argument as presented by Lotze provides an opportunity for considering the type of ultimate pluralism . . . as the most serious philosophical alternative to theism. This type of view is best represented in contemporary English philoso-

phy by the writings of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell."—A. E. Taylor, *Theism* (J. Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics*, v. 12, pp. 272-275, 281-282).—See also BRAHMANISM: Essential features; CHRISTIANITY: Stage of development of religious philosophy; JEWS: Religion and the prophets; MOHAMMEDANISM: Moslem orthodoxy; NEOPLATONISM; ZOROASTRIANS.

ALSO IN: J. S. Mill, *Nature, the utility of religion and theism*.—J. Martineau, *Study of religion*.—A. C. Fraser, *Philosophy of theism*.—H. M. Gwatkin, *Knowledge of God*.—W. James, *Varieties of religious experience*.—A. Caldecott and H. R. Mackintosh, *Selections from the literature of theism*.—C. C. Everett, *Theism and the Christian faith*.—A. J. Balfour, *Theism and humanism*.—J. E. Carpenter, *Theism in medieval India*.—N. Macnicol, *Indian theism*.—F. von Hügel, *Essays and addresses on the philosophy of religion*.—E. D. Soper, *Religion of mankind*.—J. C. Oman, *The Brahmins, Theists and Muslims of India*.

**THEMES**, administrative divisions of the Byzantine empire. "The term *thema* was first applied to the Roman legion. The military districts, garrisoned by legions, were then called *themata*, and ultimately the word was used merely to indicate geographical administrative divisions."—G. Finlay, *History of Byzantine empire*, bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 1, footnote.—See also BYZANTINE EMPIRE: 717.

**THEMISTOCLES** (c. 514-449 B. C.), Athenian statesman and general. Became political leader in opposition to Aristides, who was ostracized in 483 B. C.; instrumental in creating the naval resources of Athens, and in bringing about the victory over the Persians at Salamis, 480 B. C.; ostracized, c. 471 B. C.; charged with complicity in the treason of Pausanias; lived in exile in Argos, and went to Persia, 465 B. C., where he was pensioned by Artaxerxes. See GREECE: B. C. 480: Persian Wars: Salamis; ATHENS: B. C. 470-476; B. C. 472; ACROPOLIS OF ATHENS.

**THEOBALD**. See THIBAUT.

**THEOCRITUS** (fl. 3rd century B. C.), Greek poet. See GREEK LITERATURE: Greek poetry reborn in Sicily.

**THEODORA** (c. 508-547), Byzantine empress, 527-547. As the wife of Justinian, she took an important part in the administration of state affairs. See ROME: Medieval city: 527-565.

**Theodora** (d. 1057), Byzantine empress, 1054-1057. Daughter of Constantine VIII; joint empress with her sister, Zoë, 1042; became sole ruler, 1054.

**Theodora** (called the *Senatrix*) (fl. 10th century), Roman woman. Influential in Rome and in papal affairs; instrumental in the election of Pope John X, 914. See PAPACY: 887-1046; ROME: Medieval city: 903-964.

**THÉODORE I**, pope, 642-649.

**Theodore II**, pope, 807.

**Theodore (Feodor) I** (1557-1508), tsar of Russia, 1584-1598. See RUSSIA: 1533-1682.

**Theodore II** (1589-1605), tsar of Russia, April to July, 1605.

**Theodore III** (1661-1682), tsar of Russia, 1676-1682.

**THEODORE**, Davilmar (d. 1015), Haitian revolutionist. Military president of Haiti, 1914. See HAITI, REPUBLIC OF: 1911-1916.

**THEODORE LASCARIS** (d. 1222), emperor of Nicæa, 1206-1222. Was raised to the throne after distinguishing himself during the sieges of Constantinople by the Venetians and the Crusaders, 1203-1204. See NICÆA: 1204-1261.

**THEODORE LIJ KASA**. See LIJ KASA.

**THEODORE VON NEUHOFF**. See NEUHOFF, THEODORE STEPHEN, BARON VON.

**THEODORIC I**, king of the Franks, at Metz, 511-534.

**Theodoric II**, king of the Franks (Austrasia), 612-613; king of Burgundy, 596-613.

**Theodoric III**, king of the Franks (Neustria and Burgundy), 670-691.

**Theodoric IV**, king of the Franks (Neustria, Austrasia and Burgundy), 720-737.

**Theodoric I, the Great** (c. 454-526), king of the Ostrogoths, c. 474-526. Sent as hostage to Constantinople, 451; invaded Mæsia with his father, 473; succeeded his father, c. 474; invaded Italy, 488; defeated Odoacer at Isonzo, and Verona, 489; concluded a peace with Odoacer, February, 493, by which they were to rule Italy conjointly; violated truce by killing Odoacer, March, 493; sole ruler of Italy, 493-526, and during this period introduced many reforms. See GOTHS: 473-488; ROME: Medieval city: 488-520; ALEMANNI: 490-504; RAVENNA: 493-525.

**Theodoric I** (d. 451), king of the Visigoths, 419-451. Fought against the Huns under Attila at the battle of Chalons, 451. See GOTHS: 419-451; HUNS: 451.

**Theodoric II** (426-466), king of the Visigoths, 453-466. See GOTHS: 453-484.

**THEODOSIA** (fl. 4th century), Roman physician. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Ancient: 3rd-6th centuries.

**THEODOSIAN CODE**.—"In the year 429 Theodosius determined to form a collection of all the constitutions issued by the renowned Constantine, the divine Emperors who succeeded him, and ourselves." The new code was to be drawn up on the model of the Gregorian and Hermogenian codes, and the execution of the work was entrusted to a commission of nine persons, among whom was Apelles, professor of law at the new university. Nine years later the work was completed and published, but during the intervening years the members of the commission had changed; of the eight who are mentioned in the edict which accompanied the final publication only two, Antiochus and Theodorus, were among the original workers, and a constitution of A. D. 435, which conferred full powers on the committee for the completion of the work, mentions sixteen compilers. The code was issued conjointly by Theodosius and Valentinian, and thus expressed the unity of the Empire (February 15, A. D. 438). The visit of the younger Emperor to Constantinople on the occasion of his marriage with his cousin Eudoxia facilitated this co-operation. On December 23 of the same year, at a meeting of the Senate of Old Rome, the code which had been drawn up by the lawyers of New Rome was publicly recognised, and an official account of the proceedings on that occasion—*gesta in senatu Urbis Romæ de recipiendo Codice Theodosiano*—may still be read. . . . The Code of Theodosius was superseded at the end of a hundred years by the Code of Justinian."—J. B. Bury, *History of the later Roman empire*, v. 1, pp. 232-234.—See also CODES: 117-533; CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS.

**THEODOSIUS I, the Great** (c. 346-305), Roman emperor (Eastern), 379-305. Commanded in Mæsia, 374; made joint emperor by Gratian and ruler over the East, 379; defeated the Visigoths and Ostrogoths 380-383; after the death of Gratian, had as colleagues Maximus, Valentinian II, and Eugenius; ordered the massacre at Thessalonica, for which he had to suffer the humiliation of submission to Bishop Ambrose, 390; defeated Arbogast

and Eugenius at the Frigidus, near Aquileia, 394, and became sole emperor. See **ROME: Empire: 363-379; 379-395; 391-395; GOTHs: 379-382; BARBARIAN INVASIONS: 4th century; THESSALONICA: 390.**

**Theodosius II** (401-450), Roman emperor (Eastern), 408-450. Waged wars against the Persians, 421, and 441; during his reign frequent incursions of the Huns took place; ordered the compilation of the Theodosian Code, 429. See **ROME: Empire: 400-518; THEODOSIAN CODE.**

**Theodosius** (d. 370), Roman general of Spanish birth. Freed southern Britain from the Caledonians and Scots, 367-370. See **BRITAIN: 367-370.**

**THEOLOGY: During the Middle Ages.** See **EDUCATION: Medieval: 9th-15th centuries; Scholasticism.**

**Types during the 17th-20th centuries.** See **CHRISTIANITY: 17th-20th centuries.**

**Interpretation of history.** See **HISTORY: 18.**

**THEOPHILUS**, Roman emperor (Eastern), 820-842. Waged war against the Saracens, 837. See **AMORIAN WAR.**

**THEOPHRASTUS** (c. 372-287 B.C.), Greek philosopher. Disciple of Aristotle; succeeded him as head of the Peripatetic school, 322-287 B.C. See **SCIENCE: Ancient: Greek; EDUCATION: Ancient: B.C. 7th-A.D. 3rd centuries: Greece: Socrates and the philosophical schools.**

**THEORI.**—The name of Theori, among the ancient Greeks, "in addition to its familiar signification of spectators at the theatre and public ambassadors to foreign sanctuaries and festivals, was specially applied to certain public magistrates, whose function it was to superintend and take charge of religious affairs in general, though they often possessed along with this some more extensive political power."—G. Schömann, *Antiquities of Greece: The state, pt. 2, ch. 5.*

**THEORICON.**—"By means of the Theoricon, . . . the most pernicious issue of the age of Pericles, there arose in a small free state [Athens] a lavish expenditure, which was relatively not less than in the most voluptuous courts, and which consumed large sums, while the wars were unsuccessful for the want of money. By it is understood the money was distributed among the people for the celebration of the festivals and games, partly to restore to the citizens the sum required for their admission into the theatre, partly to enable them to procure a better meal. In part it was expended for sacrifices, with which a public feast was connected. . . . The superintendents of the theoricon were not called treasurers; but they evidently had a treasury. Their office was one of the administrative offices of the government, and indeed of the most eminent. They were elected by the assembly of the people through cheirotomia. Their office seems to have been annual. Their number is nowhere given. Probably there were ten of them, one from each tribe. . . . The Athenian people was a tyrant, and the treasury of the theorica its private treasury."—A. Boeckh, *Public economy of Athens* (tr. by Lamb), *bk. 2, ch. 7, 13.*

**THEOSOPHY.**—According to its exponents "Theosophy has long been the name for the ancient Wisdom-religion: those basic truths that have always been the life of religion, philosophy, science and art. This being a world of growth, the practical value of Theosophy lies most in its cultivation of discernment between non-essentials and the things that are worth while, resulting in determination to achieve true progress. . . . 'Divine-Wisdom Religion' or Theos-osophia is that which has been the enlightening principle of all culture and

of every civilization. Beside Brotherhood, its tenets with which we have most concern are un-failing Compensation of 'Karma,' and Reincarnation."—C. T. Stark, *What is Theosophy? (Overland Monthly, Apr., 1916, p. 304)*.—"To estimate the value of the work done by Theosophy is rather a difficult task. It has certainly popularized, in Europe and America, a number of the best Oriental books, such as the Upanishads [see **UPANISHADS**] and the *Gita*, and has taught Theosophists to sympathize with Orientals and to think of them as brothers; while in India it has helped to restore to the Hindu and the Buddhist that self-respect which tended to evaporate amid the almost universal depreciation of Oriental thought, life and art. But there is a vast amount to be placed on the other side of the account. Theosophy under Madame Blavatsky condemned and ridiculed Orientalists, and yet took from them, almost without acknowledgement, practically all the trustworthy knowledge of the East it possessed."—J. N. Farquhar, *Modern religious movements in India, pp. 288-289*.—"The system of thought and terms used are largely drawn from Hinduism and Buddhism. The theosophical system is divided into various stages of individual spiritual development—namely: Adept, Master, Mahatma,—Mahatma being the highest. The theosophist of this last class refrains from entering Nirvana and remains on earth that he may help mankind by his presence. "There are now [1922] branches of the Theosophical Society in almost every country in the world. The number of lodges is 1,100, the membership about 30,000, and the influence of theosophical teaching is even greater than these considerable numbers might lead us to imagine. . . . It is undoubtedly true that India is the country most affected by theosophical influences. [See **INDIA: 1815-1922.**] America, however, is a good second, and in the latter country the percentage is greater. . . . Besides this, there is in America a Society, with a considerable membership, calling itself the Universal Brotherhood and Theosophical Society, and claiming to be the original Theosophical Society. . . . In Britain the explicit progress of theosophy has not been so rapid as in America and India. . . . The modern history of theosophy may be said to date from the year 1875, when in the words of Mrs. Besant, 'theosophy again rode into the arena of the world's thought, mounted on its new steed, the Theosophical Society,' under the guidance of . . . Helena Petrovna Blavatsky . . . known by her followers as H. P. B. . . . In 1873 she went to America, and in 1875. . . . she, in conjunction with Col. Olcott, founded the Theosophical Society. . . . As things in America did not prove altogether to their liking, the two leaders, frequently known as the 'Theosophical Twins,' migrated to India in 1878, and here fortune favoured them to a greater extent. Madame Blavatsky . . . made a direct appeal to India's justifiable pride in a rich philosophical and religious inheritance, and thus evoked the patriotic sentiments of the people of the land. . . . [She] left Madras in 1885, never to return. . . . Mr. W. Q. Judge, one of the Blavatsky group, separated from the main Theosophical Society, and founded the 'Universal Brotherhood and Theosophical Society,' having its headquarters in California. The main tradition in India was carried on by Col. Olcott and Mrs. Besant (who had spent most of her time there since 1893), and since the death of the former, in 1907, Mrs. Besant has been the President of the Theosophical Society."—W. S. Urquhart, *The-*

osophy and Christian thought, pp. 16-22.—See also MYSTICISM; NEOPLATONISM.

ALSO IN: A. Besant, *Esoteric Christianity*.—G. B. S. Mead, *Did Jesus live 100 B.C.?*—C. W. Leadbeater, *Christian creed*.—Idem., *Textbook of theosophy*.—A. Besant and C. W. Leadbeater, *Man; Whence, how and whither*.—Veritas, *Mrs. Besant and the Alcyone case: A detailed account of the first trial in Madras*.—E. Levy, *Mrs. Besant and the present crisis in the Theosophical Society*.—H. P. H. Blavatsky, *Secret doctrine*.

**THÉOT**, Catherine (1716-1794), French visionary. Her hallucinations, that Robespierre was to be the redeemer of mankind, figured in the proceedings of the ninth Thermidor. See FRANCE: 1794 (June-July); French victory at Fleurus.

**THEOW**.—"In the earliest English laws . . . slaves are found; the 'theow' [from the same root as "dienen," to serve] or slave simple, whether 'wealh'—that is, of British extraction, captured or purchased—or of the common German stock descended from the slaves of the first colonists; the 'esne' or slave who works for hire; the 'wite-theow' who is reduced to slavery because he cannot pay his debts."—W. Stubbs, *Constitutional history of England*, ch. 5, sect. 37.

**THERA**, ancient name of the Greek island of Santorin, one of the Sporades, whose inhabitants were enterprising navigators, and weavers and dyers of purple stuffs. They are said to have founded Cyrene, on the north African coast.—Based on E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, bk. 2, ch. 3.—See also CYRENAICA; GREECE: B. C. 416.

**THERAMENES** (d. 403 B.C.), Athenian statesman and general. Leader of the Four Hundred, the oligarchy which he later opposed, 411 B.C.; took part in the battle of Cyzicus, 410 B.C.; brought about the condemnation of the Athenian generals after the defeat at Arginusæ, 406 B.C.; concluded peace with Sparta, 404 B.C.; was chosen one of the Thirty Tyrants; put to death through the influence of Critias, 403 B.C. See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

**THERESA**, Saint (Teresa de Cepeda) (1515-1582), Spanish Carmelite nun and reformer. Canonized by Gregory XV, 1622.

**THERESA OF CASTILE** (fl. 11th century), regent of Portugal, 1114-1128. See PORTUGAL: 1095-1325.

**THERMA**, ancient site of the modern Salonika. See SALONIKA.

**THERMÆ**, public baths of Roman cities. See BATHS.

**THERMES**, Palais de. See PARIS: Julian's residence.

**THERMIDOR**, eleventh month of the French revolutionary calendar. See CHRONOLOGY: French revolutionary era, etc.

Ninth of Thermidor. See FRANCE: 1794 (June-July).

**THERMIDORIANS**, French revolutionary party. See FRANCE: 1794-1795 (July-April).

**THERMOPYLÆ**, Greek pass leading from Locris into Thessaly, between Mount Oeta and the Maliac gulf. See THESSALY; GREECE: Map of ancient Greece.

B. C. 480.—Defense by Leonidas against the Persians. See GREECE: B. C. 480: Persian Wars: Thermopylæ.

B. C. 352.—Repulse of Philip of Macedon. See GREECE: B. C. 357-336.

B. C. 279.—Defense against the Gauls. See GAULS: B. C. 280-270.

B. C. 191.—Defeat of Antiochus by the Romans. See SELEUCIDÆ: B. C. 224-187.

1822.—Greek victory over the Turks. See GREECE: 1821-1829.

**THERVINGI**, Roman name for the Visigoths. See GOTHS: 376.

**THESES OF LUTHER**, Ninety-five. See PAPACY: 1517.

**THESEUM**, temple of Athens. See ATHENS: B. C. 461-431: General aspect of Periclean Athens; TEMPLES: Ancient examples.

**THESMOTHETÆ**, six junior archons at Athens. See ATHENS: B. C. 753-650.

**THESPIÆ**, ancient Greek city of Bœotia, eight miles southwest of Thebes. It sent 700 men to Thermopylæ who fought against the Persians with the Spartans under Leonidas. See GREECE: B. C. 480: Persian Wars: Thermopylæ.

**THESPIS** (fl. 6th century B.C.), Greek poet, called the founder of Greek tragedy. See DRAMA: Origin.

**THESPROTIANS**, Hellenic tribe. See HELLAS; EPIRUS.

**THESSALONICA**, ancient city of Greece, now known as Salonika. Originally called Therma from the hot springs in the vicinity. This city of Macedonia, received the name of Thessalonica, about 315 B.C., in honor of the sister of Alexander the Great, who married Cassander. Cassander gave an impetus to the city which proved lasting. It rose to a high commercial rank, acquired wealth, and became, under the Romans, the capital of the Illyrian provinces.

A. D. 52-53.—St. Paul's missionary work. See CHRISTIANITY: A. D. 35-60.

390.—Massacre ordered by Theodosius.—A riotous outbreak at Thessalonica, 390, caused by the imprisonment of one of the popular favorites of the circus, was punished by the Emperor Theodosius in a manner so fiendish that it seems well-nigh incredible. He caused the greatest possible number of the inhabitants to be invited, in his name, to witness certain games in the circus. "As soon as the assembly was complete, the soldiers, who had secretly been posted round the circus, received the signal, not of the races, but of a general massacre. The promiscuous carnage continued three hours, without discrimination of strangers or natives, of age or sex, of innocence or guilt; the most moderate accounts state the number of the slain at 7,000; and it is affirmed by some writers that more than 15,000 victims were sacrificed. . . . The guilt of the emperor is aggravated by his long and frequent residence at Thessalonica."—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 27.

904.—Capture and pillage by the Saracens.—The capture of Thessalonica by a piratical expedition from Tarsus, 904, was one of the most terrible experiences of its kind in that age of blood and rapine, and one of which the fullest account, by an eye-witness and sufferer, has come down to posterity. The wretched inhabitants who escaped the sword were mostly sold into slavery, and the splendid city—then the second in the Byzantine empire—was stripped of all its wealth. The defense of the place had been neglected, with implicit dependence on the good will and the power of St. Demetrius.—G. Finlay, *History of the Byzantine empire, from 716 to 1057*, bk. 2, ch. 1, sect. 2.

1204-1205.—Acquired by the marquis of Monferrat. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: 1204-1205.

1222-1234.—Greek empire. See EPIRUS: 1204-1350.

1430.—Capture by Turks.—Thessalonica, feebly defended by Venetians and Greeks, was taken by the Turks, under Amurath II, in February, 1430.

"The pillage and the carnage," relates the Greek Anagnosta, an eye-witness of this disastrous night, 'transcended the hopes of the Turks and the terror of the Greeks. No family escaped the swords, the chains, the flames, the outrages of the Asiatics fierce for their prey. At the close of the day, each soldier drove like a herd before him, through the streets of Salonica, troops of women, of young girls, of children, of calovers and anchorites, of monks of all the monasteries. Priests were chained with virgins, children with old men, mothers with their sons, in derision of age, of profession, of sex, which added a barbarous irony to nudity and death itself.'"—A. Lamartine, *History of Turkey*, bk. 10, sect. 27.

For later history see SALONIKA.

**THESSALY**, division of ancient Greece, now a part of the Hellenic kingdom. "Thessaly, the largest and most fertile country of [ancient] Greece Proper, was almost identical with the basin of the Peneus. [See GREECE: Map of ancient Greece.] It was a region nearly circular in shape with a diameter of about seventy miles. Mountains [familiar names, such as Olympus, Pelion and Ossa, Parnassus, Helicon and Othrys] surrounded it on every side, from which descended numerous streams, all of them converging, and flowing ultimately into the Peneus. The united waters passed to the Sea through a single narrow gorge, the celebrated vale of Tempe which was said to have been caused by an earthquake. Thessaly was divided into four provinces:—(a) Perrhaebia on the north, along the skirts of Olympus and the Cambunians; (b) Histiaiotis, toward the west, on the flanks of Pindus, and along the upper course of the Peneus; (c) Thessaliotis, towards the south, bordering on Achaea Phthiotis and Dolopia; and (d) Pelasgiotis, towards the east, between the Enipeus and Magnesia. [See MAGNESIA.] Its chief cities were, in Perrhaebia, Gonni and Phalanna, in Histiaiotis, Gomphi and Tricca; in Thessaliotis, Cierium and Pharsalus; in Pelasgiotis, Larissa and Pherae."—G. Rawlinson, *Ancient history*, p. 101.—"Quitting Thesprotia in Epirus (about B. C. 1200) the Thessalians crossed the Pindus mountain chain, and descending on the fertile valley of the Peneus, drove out the Boeotians and occupied it. . . . [Under the conquerors] a federal tie of the weakest character united the several states of Thessaly in ordinary times; but upon occasions this extreme laxity was replaced by a most stringent centralization. A Tagus (commander-in-chief) of all Thessaly was appointed, who exercised powers little short of despotic over the whole country."—*Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.—See also GREECE: Migrations of Hellenic tribes in the peninsula.—As late as after 500 B. C. the tagus was chosen from the princely family of the Alenadae whose stronghold was on Peneus. "Under their influence Thessaly . . . received a common system of national institutions, particularly an organization of its army. . . . They extended their dominion into the vicinity of Thermopylae, and are by Herodotus styled outright the kings of the country. . . . Their ambition was directed to the acquisition of an unconditioned and hereditary sway over the country; and they therefore entered into negotiations with the Persians . . . [and were] the first among all the Hellenes to offer voluntary homage to Xerxes . . . in the name of the Thessalian people, though wholly unauthorized by the latter. . . . Thus before Xerxes had taken a single step himself, he found the largest country of Greece prostrate at his feet. [After the battle of Thermopylae] the

Thessalians rejoiced in the opportunity of vengeance on their hated enemies, the Phocians, since the latter had . . . refused to purchase the mediation of the Thessalians. . . . The Persians, guided by the Thessalians devastated the valley of Cephians."—E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, v. 2, pp. 274-275, 315.—In 480 B. C. Mardonius, commander-in-chief of the Persian troops, was stationed in Thessaly.—See also GREECE: B. C. 470: Persian Wars; Plataea.—"Conditions of division and party-conflict continued during the entire period of the Peloponnesian War; and we see individual party-chiefs, who succumbed at home, seeking for aid abroad and thus drawing foreign states into the sphere of the domestic affairs of Thessaly. Thus Hellenocrates, the Larisaean, applies to the Macedonian king Archelaus, and again Aristippus to Cyrus, who sends him money, to enable him to hire troops and maintain himself at Larisa. . . . Sparta resumed her endeavors to acquire power in Thessaly with fresh order after the overthrow of Athens. The Spartans recovered possession of the city of Heraclea, . . . placed a garrison in Pharsalus, and established for themselves a supremacy over the tribes of Southern Thessaly. . . . About the close of the Peloponnesian War new movements . . . [broke] out in Thessaly. . . . Here Medius, the dynast of Larisa had for years been involved in a feud with Lycophron, the tyrant of Pherae. The latter being supported by Sparta, had the advantage in this quarrel. As soon [however] as the Larisaean heard of the anti-Spartan [Corinthian] league they applied to it, and . . . succeeded in taking Pharsalus. . . . The whole of Thessaly joined the League [305 B. C. and] . . . in the space of a few months, the influence of Sparta in Central and Northern Greece had been virtually annihilated. . . . But Lycophron contrived to maintain himself even without foreign support; and now succeeded in placing Pharsalus on his side. . . . The schemes of Lycophron were carried out by Iason, his successor in the government . . . [whose goal was] the union of Thessaly, a single undivided Hellas from Mount Olympus to Crete, and a Persian war under Thessalian leadership. . . . Thessaly had become one vast military camp. . . . Pherae was the centre and focus of the entire country . . . [when in 370 B. C. at the Pythian festival at Delphi] Iason . . . in the character of supreme military chief was assassinated. . . . With him the whole future of Thessaly was carried to the grave. . . . The contrary of all Iason had sought to bring about actually came to pass; instead of a lawful government, savage despotism; instead of union of the land, division and discord; instead of a power reaching beyond the boundaries of Thessaly, weakness, an instance of which was her appeal to Thebes, intervention from abroad, and dependence upon foreign powers."—E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, v. 4, pp. 462-464, 244, 460, 470, 472-473.—See also GREECE: B. C. 477-461; B. C. 371-362; ATHENS: B. C. 458.—In 344 B. C. Thessaly became united with Macedonia through the influence of King Philip. (See GREECE: B. C. 357-336.) While Philip was in Epirus, 342 B. C., Athens had stirred up an agitation among the Thessalians. For this reason Philip divided the country into four parts, and placed each part under a separate tetrarch entirely dependent upon himself. Consequently Thessaly ceased to exist, and the numerous separate Hellenic town-communities were mere villages devoid of rights and belonging to the Macedonian province. The country remained under

Macedonian control until 197 B. C. when it was united with Macedonia and made subject to Rome. After Constantine it became a separate Roman province. It was under the rule of the Venetians in 1204, but from 1331-1355, during the reign of Stephen VI, it was under the sway of Serbia. In 1355 it was taken by the Turks, but by the Treaty of Berlin, 1881, it was again acquired by Greece (which had become an independent kingdom in 1832), and constituted the northern frontier of Greece until the Balkan War in 1912.—Based on L. Thorndike, *History of mediæval Europe*, pp. 554, 536.—See also GREECE: 1862-1881.

1878.—Under Turkish control by Treaty of San Stefano See BALKAN STATES: 1878.

1897.—Ceded to Greece. See TURKEY: 1897.

See also ÆGEAN CIVILIZATION; Minoan Age: B. C. 1200-750.

ALSO IN: G. W. Botsford, *Hellenic history*.—C. F. Terry, *Short history of Europe*, pp. 30-60.

THETES, term for the lowest of the four classes in Athens. See ATHENS: B. C. 504.

THEUDEBERT (d. 548), king of the Franks (Austrasia), 534-548. Conquered Rhatia, 536. See FRANKS: 539-553.

THIASI.—"The name denotes associations [in ancient Athens] which had chosen as their special protector and patron some deity in whose honour at certain times they held sacrifices and festal banquets, whilst they pursued in addition objects of a very varied nature, sometimes joint-stock businesses, sometimes only social enjoyments."—G. F. Schömann, *Antiquities of Greece*, pt. 3, ch. 3, sect. 2.

THIAUMONT, fortified position east of the Meuse and about two miles north of Verdun, eastern France. In 1016 it was taken by the Germans and retaken by the French. See WORLD WAR: 1916: II. Western front: b, 15; b, 18.

THIBAUT, or Theobald I (1201-1253), count of Champagne and Brie, king of Navarre, 1234-1253, and French poet. Went to Palestine, 1239, and was defeated at Gaza. See SPAIN: 1212-1238; MUSIC: Medieval: 12th-14th centuries.

Thibaut II, king of Navarre, 1253-1270.

THIBAUT, Jacques Anatole. See FRANCE, ANATOLE.

THIBAW, or Thebau (d. 1916), king of Burma, 1878-1886. Dethroned by the British and sent to India, 1886, when his territories were annexed by Britain. See BURMA: Early history; 1824-1886; INDIA: 1864-1893.

THIBET. See TIBET.

THIEPVAL, village of northern France, in the department of Pas-de-Calais, about four miles north of Albert. In 1916, during the battle of the Somme, it was taken from the Germans by the Allies. It was also a scene of fighting in 1918. See WORLD WAR: 1916: II. Western front: d, 5; d, 9; d, 12; 1918: II. Western front: k, 1.

THIERRY, or Theodoric, name of several Frankish kings. See THEODORIC.

THIERRY, Jacques Nicolas Augustin (1795-1856), French historian. See HISTORY: 29; 30; FRANCE: 12th-13th centuries.

THIERS, Louis Adolphe (1797-1877), French statesman and historian. Supported Louis Philippe, and held various cabinet offices, 1832-1836; premier, 1836, and 1840; banished by Napoleon III, 1851, but returned to France, 1852; elected to the Corps Législatif, 1863; led the opposition to the imperial policies of Napoleon; opposed the war with Prussia, 1870; conducted peace negotiations with Germany, 1871; suppressed the insurrection of the commune; was declared president of the republic by the as-

sembly, 1871; resigned, 1873. See FRANCE: 1830-1840, to 1842-1848; 1851: Plot of the coup d'état; 1871 (January-May); 1871-1876; 1875-1889; TARIFF: 1871-1892; PARIS: 1833-1848; DEMOCRACY: Genesis of modern democracy; HISTORY: 28.

ALSO IN: *Memoirs of M. Thiers*, 1870-1873.

THIN, or Thinā, ancient name of China. See CHINA: Names of the country.

THING, THINGVALLA, ALTHING.—"The judicial and legislative assembly of the Northmen represented by the word 'thing' (from 'tinga' = to speak, and allied to our English word 'think') can be traced in many local names throughout England, and more especially in the extreme North, where the Scandinavian race prevailed, and where the 'thing' was primitively held upon the site of, or as an appanage to, a 'hof' or temple. It is plainly seen in the Tynwald Court or general legislative assembly for the Isle of Man, where the distinctive feature of the primitive open-air assembly still survives in the custom of the whole assembly going once a year in solemn procession, attended by the governor of the island and a military escort, to a hill known as the Tynwald Hill, whence all the laws that have been passed in the course of the past year are proclaimed in English and Manx. . . . In Norway there is an 'Al-thing' or general assembly, and four district 'things' for the several provinces, as well as a Norwegian Parliament familiar to us as 'Stor-thing' or great council."—R. R. Sharpe, *Introduction to calendar of wills, Court of Hustling, London*, v. 1.—"By the end of the period of the first occupation of Iceland, a number of little kingdoms had been formed all round the coast, ruled by the priests, who, at stated times, convened their adherents and retainers to meetings for the settlement of matters which concerned any or all of them. These were called 'Things'—meetings, i. e. Mot-things. Each was independent of the other, and quarrels between the members of two separate Things could only be settled as the quarrels of nations are settled, by treaty or war. But the time soon arrived when the progress of political thought began to work upon this disjointed constitution; and then amalgamation of local Things into an Althing, of local jurisdiction into a commonwealth jurisdiction, was the historical result. . . . The Thingvalla, or Thingfield itself, was a vast sunken plain of lava, about four miles broad and rather more than four miles deep, lying with a dip or slope from north-east to south-west, between two great lips or furrows. A stream called Öxará, (Axewater) cuts off a rocky portion of the plain, so as almost to form an island. This is the famous Hill of Laws, or Lögberg, which was the heart of the Icelandic body politic. . . . This example of the Icelandic Thing is the most perfect that is known to history."—G. L. Gomme, *Primitive folk-moots*, ch. 2.

930.—Establishment of the Althing. See ICELAND: 870-1004.

1798.—Loss of power and suspension. See ICELAND: 18th century.

1843.—Revival as consultative assembly. See ICELAND: 1830-1854.

1874.—Powers under constitution of 1874. See ICELAND: 1851-1900.

20th century.—Constitution and membership. See ICELAND: 1918; 1919.

ALSO IN: G. W. Dasent, *Introduction to story of Burnt Njal*.

THINGMEN. See HOUSECARLS.

THIONVILLE, fortified town in Lorraine, France, on the Moselle, seventeen miles north of Metz.

1643.—Siege and capture by the French. See FRANCE: 1643.

1659.—Ceded to France. See FRANCE: 1659-1661.

1918.—Bombed by the Allies. See WORLD WAR: 1918: VIII. Aviation.

THIRD ESTATE. See ESTATES, THREE; STATES-GENERAL OF FRANCE.

THIRD INTERNATIONAL. See INTERNATIONAL: 1919 (March); 1920-1921; 1921.

"THIRD PARTY" or Anti-Imperialists, American political party. See U.S.A.: 1900 (May-November).

THIRTEEN CENSORS, Vermont. See VERMONT: 1777-1778.

THIRTEEN COLONIES, the American colonies which became the thirteen original states of the United States. See MASSACHUSETTS; RHODE ISLAND; CONNECTICUT; NEW HAMPSHIRE; NEW YORK; NEW JERSEY; PENNSYLVANIA; DELAWARE; MARYLAND; VIRGINIA; NORTH CAROLINA; SOUTH CAROLINA; GEORGIA; also NEW ENGLAND; U.S.A.: 1607-1752.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT. See U.S.A.: 1865 (January).

"THIRTY DAYS' WAR" (1807). See TURKEY: 1807.

THIRTY TYRANTS OF ATHENS, aristocratic body headed by Critias, which usurped the government of Athens, 404-403 B. C. See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

THIRTY TYRANTS OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, popular name given to the pretenders to the Roman empire during the reigns of Valerian, Gallienus, and others. See ROME: Empire: 192-284.

THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE. See GREECE: B. C. 449-445; ATHENS: B. C. 446-445.

THIRTY YEARS' WAR. See GERMANY: 1608-1618, to 1648: Thirty Years' War; AUSTRIA: 1618-1648; BOHEMIA: 1611-1618; HUNGARY: 1606-1660; POLAND: 1590-1648; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 16; CITIES, IMPERIAL AND FREE, OF GERMANY.

THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES.—The "Thirty-nine Articles of Religion were drawn up [1553, originally Forty-two Articles] by Cranmer and revised 1563 by Archbishop Parker in Queen Elizabeth's reign. . . . They are not intended as articles of Faith, but are rather explanations and safeguards to the Faith as set forth in the Creeds."

—J. S. Littell, *Historians and the English Reformation*, p. 118.—The articles were again revised in 1571 and an act passed by Parliament requiring the subscription of the clergy to "such of them as only concern the confession of the true Christian faith, and the doctrine of the Sacraments." A convocation of 1604 settled disputed points and left the articles as they now stand. The Irish church in convocation adopted them in 1635 and the Scottish Episcopal church in 1804. The American Episcopal church in its general convention of 1801 adopted the articles with several slight modifications. "The chief differences are the omission of the Athanasian Creed in Art. VIII.; the omission of Art. XXI., on the authority of General Councils; and the entire reconstruction of Art. XXXVII., on the Power of the Civil Magistrate."—P. Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, v. 3, p. 486.—The text may be found in the standard American edition of the "Book of Common Prayer."—See also CHURCH OF ENGLAND: 1534-1563.

Also in: C. H. S. Smith, *Outlines of church history*.—D. Stone, *Outlines of Christian dogma*.—W. B. Carpenter, *Popular history of the Church of England from the earliest times to the present day*.

—C. A. Lane, *Illustrated notes on English church history*.—E. H. Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*.

THIS, or Thinis, in ancient geography, a city of Upper Egypt, near Abydos or perhaps identical with it. See EGYPT: Old empire and middle empire; MEMPHIS.

THISTLE: Scottish national emblem. See ST. ANDREW, SCOTTISH ORDER OF.

THISTLE, Order of the, Scottish order of knighthood instituted by James V in 1530.

THISTLEWOOD, Arthur (1770-1820), instigator of the Cato Street conspiracy, a plot formed to assassinate British cabinet ministers in 1820. See ENGLAND: 1820-1827.

THÖKÖLY, or Tekeli, Imre (Emerich), Prince (1657-1705), Hungarian patriot. Led an insurrection in Hungary, 1678; was aided by the Turkish sultan, Mohammed IV, 1682; imprisoned by the Turks after his defeat in 1685; invaded Transylvania, 1680, but was forced back; excluded from the amnesty promised to Hungarian rebels by the Peace of Carlowitz, 1699. See HUNGARY: 1668-1683; 1683-1687.

THOMAR, Antonio Bernardo da Costa Cabral, Count of (1803-1880), Portuguese statesman. Minister of justice and ecclesiastical affairs, 1830-1842; minister of the interior, 1842-1846; overthrown by a popular uprising, 1846; prime minister, 1840-1851. See PORTUGAL: 1824-1880.

THOMAS, Albert, French political leader. Minister of national industry, 1914. See FRANCE: 1914 (August-September).

THOMAS, Augustus (1850- ), American dramatist. See DRAMA: 1865-1913.

THOMAS, George Henry (1816-1870), American general. Made commander of the Army of the Cumberland, October, 1863; fought at the battle of Chattanooga, and with General Sherman invaded Georgia; 1864; defeated Hood at Nashville, 1864.

Campaign against Zollicoffer. See U.S.A.: 1862 (January-February: Kentucky-Tennessee).

Refusal of the command of the Army of the Ohio. See U.S.A.: 1862 (June-October: Tennessee-Kentucky).

At Chickamauga, and in the Chattanooga campaign. See U.S.A.: 1863 (August-September: Tennessee); Rosecrans's advance; (October-November: Tennessee).

Atlanta campaign. See U.S.A.: 1864 (May: Georgia), to (September-October: Georgia).

Campaign against Hood. See U.S.A.: 1864 (November: Tennessee); (December: Tennessee).

Secretary of war in President Johnson's cabinet. See U.S.A.: 1867 (March-May).

THOMAS, Isaiah (1740-1831), American printer and publisher. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1850-1922.

THOMAS, John (1725-1776), American general. See U.S.A.: 1775 (May-August).

THOMAS, John (1805-1871), English divine. Founder of the society of the Brothers of Christ. See CHRISTADELPHIANS.

THOMAS, Philemon (1764-1847), American soldier and political leader. Led an insurrection in West Florida against Spain, 1810; member of the House of Representatives from Louisiana, 1831-1835. See FLORIDA: 1708-1810.

THOMAS, Theodore (1835-1905), American conductor. See MUSIC: Modern: 1774-1908.

THOMAS À BECKET. See BECKET, THOMAS À.

THOMAS À KEMPIS (Thomas Hammerken (c. 1380-1471), German mystic writer, generally re-

garded as the author of the "Imitation of Christ." See MYSTICISM.

**THOMAS OSTOJIC.** See STEPHEN VI.

**THOMOND**, ancient district of Ireland and part of the present County Clare in the province of Munster. It fell under Irish control in 1369. See IRELAND: 1327-1367.

**THOMPSON, William Hale** (1869- ), mayor of Chicago, 1915-1923. See CHICAGO: 1919 (April).

**THOMPSON, William Ormonde**, American lawyer. Counsel for the Commission on Industrial Relations, at Washington, and member of the coal commission. See U.S.A.: 1918-1920.

**THOMSON, David**, English colonial settler in New Hampshire. Took possession of a grant of land called Pannaway in 1623. See NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1622-1679.

**THOMSON, Sir Joseph John** (1856- ), English physicist. See SCIENCE: Modern: 20th century: Physics; NOBEL PRIZES: Physics: 1906.

**THOPIA**, House of, ruling family of northern Albania, 1359-1392. See ALBANIA: 1358-1443.

**THOR**, in Northern mythology, the god of thunder. He was second only to Odin in power, and first of all the gods of Valhalla in warlike exploits, especially directed against the evil giants and other malign forces.—See also MYTHOLOGY: Scandinavian.

**THORBECKE, Jan Rudolf** (1798-1872), Dutch statesman. Premier, 1840-1853, 1862-1866, and 1871-1872. See NETHERLANDS: 1840-1890, to 1853-1867.

**THOREAU, Henry David** (1817-1862), American naturalist and writer. See AMERICAN LITERATURE: 1830-1845.

**THORFINN KARLSEFNE**, or Karlsefni (fl. 11th century), Scandinavian explorer. Leader of the chief medieval expedition for the colonization of America, about 1007. See AMERICA: 10th-11th centuries.

**THORGILS.** See TURGEIS.

**THORGILSSON, Ari Frodi**, or Are (1067-1148), Icelandic chronicler. See SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE: 1120-1250.

**THORILD, Thomas** (1750-1808), Swedish critic. See SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE: 1750-1807.

**THORINGTON VS. WHITE**, Case of. See U.S.A.: 1869-1872.

**THORIUM**, Discovery of. See CHEMISTRY: Radio-activity: Thorium.

**THORLAKSSON, Jon** (1744-1819), Icelandic poet. See SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE: 1600-1850.

**THORN**, or Torun, fortress town in Upper Silesia, Poland, on the right bank of the Vistula. It was founded by the Teutonic order in 1231, as an outpost against the Poles, and it was one of the towns of the Hanseatic League. In 1454 the townspeople revolted against the Teutonic order, and Thorn became a Polish town. It became an important stronghold in the 17th century and in 1878 it was converted into a fortress of the first rank. In 1921 Thorn had a population of 39,419. It was one of the towns of Upper Silesia allotted to Poland by the Ambassador's Conference July 28, 1920.—See also POLAND: 1793-1796; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.

**Peace of (1466).** See POLAND: 1333-1572.

**THORNTON, Sir Edward** (1817-1906), English diplomat. Ambassador to the United States, 1867-1881; aided in the settlement of the Alabama Claims controversy, 1871. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: 1869-1871.

**THORNTON, Matthew** (1714-1803), American patriot. Signer of the Declaration of Independence.

See U.S.A.: 1776 (July): Text of Declaration of Independence.

**THORNTON, William** (1762-1828), American architect. Submitted plans which were accepted for the capitol at Washington, 1793; superintendent of patents, 1802-1828. See WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1791-1800; STATE, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES: 1790-1909.

**"THOROUGH" SYSTEM IN IRELAND.** See IRELAND: 1633-1639.

**THORVALD** (fl. 10th century), Icelandic missionary. Converted Iceland to Christianity, about 1000 A.D. See ICELAND: 981-1000.

**THOTH**, Greek name for the Egyptian god of letters, invention, and wisdom. See MYTHOLOGY: Egyptian.

**THOTHMES, or Tethmosis I**, son of Amenophis I. King of Egypt, c. 1540 B.C. See EGYPT: About B. C. 1700-1400.

**Thothmes II**, king of Egypt, c. 1500 B.C. See EGYPT: About B. C. 1700-1400.

**Thothmes III**, king of Egypt, c. 1503-1449 B.C. Conquered the known world of his day, including Syria, Phœnicia, Libya, and Ethiopia; built the temple of Karnak at Thebes. See EGYPT: About B. C. 1700-1400; CYPRUS: Early history; THEBES, EGYPT.

**THOU, Jacques Auguste de.** See DE THOU, JACQUES AUGUSTE.

**THOUROUT**, town of Belgium, in West Flanders, eleven miles southwest of Bruges. It was occupied by the Allies in 1918. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: m; r, 2.

**THRACE**, name applied from ancient times to a large area in the Balkan peninsula, its boundaries varying from time to time.

**People.**—"That vast space comprised between the rivers Strymon and Danube, and bounded to the west by the easternmost Illyrian tribes, northward of the Strymon, was occupied by the innumerable subdivisions of the race called Thracians, or Threïcians. [See BALKAN STATES: Map showing distribution of nationalities.] They were the most numerous and most terrible race known to Herodotus: could they by possibility act in unison or under one dominion (he says) they would be irresistible. . . . Numerous as the tribes of Thracians were, their customs and character (according to Herodotus) were marked by great uniformity: of the Getæ, the Trausi, and others, he tells us a few particularities. . . . The general character of the race presents an aggregate of repulsive features unredeemed by the presence of even the commonest domestic affections. . . . It appears that the Thynians and Bithynians, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, perhaps also the Mysians, were members of this great Thracian race, which was more remotely connected, also, with the Phrygians. And the whole race may be said to present a character more Asiatic than European; especially in those ecstatic and maddening religious rites, which prevailed not less among the Edonian Thracians than in the mountains of Ida and Dindymon of Asia, though with some important differences. The Thracians served to furnish the Greeks with mercenary troops and slaves."—G. Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 26.—"Under Seuthes [424 B.C.], Thrace stood at the height of its prosperity. It formed a connected empire from Abdera to the Danube, from Byzantium to the Strymon. . . . The land abounded in resources, in corn and flocks and herds, in gold and silver. . . . No such state had as yet existed in the whole circuit of the Ægean. . . . But their kingdom failed to endure. After Seuthes it broke up into several princi-



palities."—E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, bk. 7, ch. 1.

B. C. 323-281.—Kingdom of Lysimachus and its overthrow. See MACEDONIA: B. C. 323-316, to 297-280.

B. C. 200.—Yielded to the Romans by Macedonia. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 215-100.

B. C. 168-A. D. 46.—As an autonomous state under Roman rule.—After the fall of Macedonia Thrace was for a time an independent state. In 133 B. C. it came under the suzerainty of Rome. Under the supremacy of the Romans, the Thracians were governed by a native line of vassal kings, reigning at Bizye (Wiza), between Adrianople and the coast of the Black sea, until the Emperor Claudius, 46 A. D., suppressed the nominal kingdom and made Thrace a Roman province.—Based on T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. 8, ch. 6.

379-382.—Settlements made by the Goths. See GOTHs: 379-382.

395.—Invasion by the Goths under Alaric. See GOTHs: 395.

395-1453.—As part of the Eastern empire.—From the time that Constantinople became the capital of the Eastern empire, the fortunes of Thrace were closely connected with it. When Constantinople fell, in 1453, the whole country came into the hands of the Turks. In the eighth and ninth centuries, "the great Thracian race, which had once been inferior in number only to the Indian, and which, in the first century of our era, had excited the attention of Vespasian by the extent of the territory it occupied, had . . . almost disappeared. The country it had formerly inhabited was peopled by Vallachian and Slavonian tribes."—G. Finlay, *History of the Byzantine empire*, bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 1.

1307-1309.—Ravaged by Catalans. See CATALAN GRAND COMPANY.

1878-1913.—Bulgarian Thrace.—Creation of Eastern Rumelia and its union with Bulgaria.—Cession of territory in western Thrace to Bulgaria.—By the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, after the close of the Russo-Turkish War, the northern portion of Thrace became an autonomous province under the name of Eastern Rumelia, under Turkish suzerainty, but to be ruled by a Christian governor nominated by the Porte. The people of the province revolted in 1885 and proclaimed their union with Bulgaria. By the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, Bulgaria received from Turkey a narrow section of western Thrace which gave her a frontage on the Aegean.—See also BALKAN STATES: 1913; BULGARIA: 1913; Second Balkan War.

1914-1918.—Part in the World War.—Eastern Thrace.—Western Thrace was occupied by Greece, with the consent of the allied and associated powers. See BULGARIA: 1914-1918; TURKEY: 1914-1918.

1918-1921.—Thracian problem at Paris peace conference.—Geographical, racial and religious factors involved.—Treaties of Neuilly and Sèvres.—"Thrace, consisting of the Provinces of Adrianople and Constantinople [in 1918, was] . . . on the table before the Peace Conference for more than two months [in 1910], and . . . caused more discussion in the political circles than any other territorial problem, with the exception of Fiume. Modern Thrace [then comprised] . . . the region extending along the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmora, from the eastern boundary of Macedonia, which is generally coterminous with the Mesta River, to Constantinople on the Bosphorus. . . . It touched on the east the Black Sea and [extended] . . . northward to the Bulgarian Plateau. The river Maritza which leaves Bulgaria in the

neighborhood of Adrianople and flows southward to the sea near Enos and Dedeagatch, divide[d] Thrace into two parts, Eastern Thrace, otherwise known as Turkish Thrace, and Western or Bulgarian Thrace. The northern boundary of Eastern Thrace which [was the] . . . boundary with Bulgaria, pass[ed] to the north of Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse from the Maritza River to the Black Sea. The northern boundary of Western Thrace follow[ed] generally the course of the Arda River, from the neighborhood of Pasmakli to its junction with the Maritza in the neighborhood of Adrianople."—G. M. Bolling, *Question of Thrace at the peace conference* (*Journal of International Relations*, Jan., 1920, p. 337).—"The racial problems of Thrace are [extremely complicated]. . . . Religious factors add to the confusion. In Western Thrace there is a large population called the Pomaks; people who are probably Bulgarian in race and speech, but who are Moslems in religion. . . . In Eastern Thrace the Greeks . . . [had] the best claim on the basis of nationality . . . [for] not only did the Greeks hold virtually the entire coast, even on the side of the Black Sea; but in the interior they formed the matrix of this strange agglomeration, in which the Turkish and Bulgarian enclaves were embedded. In Western Thrace . . . Mr. Venizelos estimated a total population of about 400,000, made up . . . of Turks, . . . Greeks, and . . . Bulgarians. . . . In 1919 Bulgarian estimates . . . [did] not admit the existence of any Greeks at all there. . . . A slight Greek majority over the Bulgarians . . . [was] claimed by the one side . . . and a large Bulgarian preponderance . . . [was] claimed by the other. . . . Bulgaria [claimed that if she were] . . . deprived of Western Thrace . . . [her] one direct and secure access to the open sea, . . . [it] would be a disaster and an affront from which . . . [her] people would never recover. . . . From the standpoint of nationality, it would seem only just to award Eastern Thrace to Greece, and perhaps at least the southern half of Western Thrace as well. . . . The Greeks ardently . . . [desired] this, both for the sake of liberating their kinsmen, and also . . . in order to build a bridge towards Constantinople."—E. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, *Some problems of the peace conference*, pp. 282-284.—In accordance with the Peace Treaty of Neuilly, Nov. 27, 1919, Bulgaria ceded to Greece the section of western Thrace which she had obtained from Turkey in 1913. (See BULGARIA: 1919.) According to the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey (Aug. 10, 1920), Turkey ceded eastern Thrace, west of the Chatalja to Greece, receiving only the Derkos water-supply. (See GREECE: 1918-1920; 1920.) "On February 2, 1921, Thracian deputies in the Greek National Assembly presented a memorandum to the Minister of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, asking that Thrace under no circumstances be separated from Greece."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1922, Supplement, p. 85.—See also BALKAN STATES: 1921; Greece.

1922.—Return of eastern Thrace to Turkey.—Exodus of Christians.—"The Near Eastern problem, during the year [1922, was] featured by . . . the elimination of Greece from Asia Minor, and the return of the Turk to Eastern Thrace. . . . As soon as it was definitely known that Eastern Thrace was once more Turkish territory a great exodus of Christian inhabitants from that region began. On November 11 Dr. Dokiader, the Greek Minister of Interior, stated that there were over 1,500,000

refugees from Thrace and Asia Minor in Greece and that outside assistance would be needed if they were to be cared for."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1023, *Supplement*, pp. II-13.—See also GREECE: 1922 (September-October); TURKEY: 1922-1923.

1923.—Greek status quo maintained as result of the Near East conference. See NEAR EAST CONFERENCE (1922-1923).

**THRACER BULLET.** See RIFLES AND REVOLVERS: Shot-guns in World War.

**THRACIAN BOSPORUS.** See BOSPORUS: Thracian Bosphorus.

**THRACO-ILLYRIANS**, early tribe of Bulgaria. See BULGARIA: Earliest inhabitants.

**THRASYBULUS** (died c. 380 B. C.), Athenian general and statesman. Opposed the oligarchists at Samos, 411 B. C.; commanded at the battle of Cynossema, 411 B. C.; banished by the Thirty Tyrants, 404 B. C.; overthrew the Thirty and restored democracy, 403 B. C.; aided Thebes against Sparta, 395 B. C. See ATHENS: B. C. 413-411; B. C. 404-403.

**THREE CHAPTERS**, Dispute of, famous church dispute raised in the sixth century by the Emperor Justinian, who discovered an heretical taint in certain passages, called the Three Chapters, culled out of the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia and two other doctors of the church who had been teachers and friends of Nestorius. A solemn church council called (553) at Constantinople—the fifth general council—condemned the Three Chapters and anathematized their adherents. But this touched by implication the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon, which were especially cherished in the Latin church, and Rome became rebellious. In the end, the Roman opposition prevailed, and, "in the period of a century, the schism of the three chapters expired in an obscure angle of the Venetian province."—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 47.

Also in: H. H. Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*, bk. 1, ch. 4.

**THREE EMPERORS' LEAGUE.** See WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: c.

**THREE HENRYS**, War of the. See FRANCE: 1584-1580.

**THREE HUNDRED OF THEBES.** See THEBES, GREECE: B. C. 378.

**THREE KINGS**, Battle of (1570). See MOROCCO: 647-1860; PORTUGAL: 1570-1580.

**THREE KINGS' ALLIANCE** (1849). See GERMANY: 1850-1851.

**THREE LEGS OF MAN.** See TRI-SKELION.

**"THREE MILE LIMIT,"** boundary of territorial waters of a maritime state, that is, the line to which absolute jurisdiction, as over land, extends from the shore.

**THREE PRESIDENCIES OF INDIA.** See INDIA: 1600-1702.

**THREE RESOLUTIONS** (1620). See ENGLAND: 1620.

**THREE THOUSAND OF ATHENS.** See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

**THUCYDIDES** (c. 471-c. 401 B. C.), Greek historian. See HISTORY: 16; AMPHIPOLIS; ATHENS: B. C. 461-431: Appreciation of the Age of Pericles.

**THUGS**, members of an Indian cult devoted to assassination. They were worshipers of the goddess Kali, the patroness of destruction. The British took active measures against the Thugs in 1831 and by 1840 they were practically suppressed. See INDIA: 1823-1833; DACOITS.

**THULE.**—Pytheas, a Greek traveler and writer of the time (as supposed) of Alexander the Great,

was the first to introduce the name of Thule into ancient geography. He described it vaguely as an island, lying six days' voyage to the north of Britain, in a region where the sea became like neither land nor water, but was of a thick and sluggish substance, resembling that of the jelly fish. "It appears to me impossible to identify the Thule of Pytheas with any approach to certainty; but he had probably heard vaguely of the existence of some considerable island, or group of islands, to the north of Britain, whether the Orkneys or the Shetlands it is impossible to say."—E. H. Bunbury, *History of ancient geography*, ch. 15, sect. 2, footnote.—Some modern writers identify Thule with Iceland; some with the coast of Norway, mistakenly regarded as an island. But, whichever land it may have been, Thule to the Greeks and Romans, was Ultima Thule,—the end of the known world,—the most northerly point of Europe to which their knowledge reached.—Based on R. F. Burton, *Ultima Thule*, v. 1, introduction, sect. 1.

**THUNDERING LEGION.**—During the summer of the year 174, in a campaign which the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus conducted against the Quadi, on the Danube, the Roman army was once placed in a perilous position. It was hemmed in by the enemy, cut off from all access to water, and was reduced to despair. At the last extremity, it is said, the army was saved by a miraculous storm, which poured rain on the thirsty Romans, while lightning and hail fell destructively in the ranks of the barbarians. According to the pagan historians, Aurelius owed this "miraculous victory," as it was called, to the arts of one Arnuphis, an Egyptian magician. But later Christian writers told a different story. They relate that the distressed army contained one legion composed entirely of Christians, from Melitene, and that these soldiers, being called upon by the emperor to invoke their God, united in a prayer which received the answer described. Hence, the legion was known thereafter, by imperial command, as the Thundering Legion.—Based on P. B. Watson, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, ch. 5.—See also ROME: Empire: 138-180.

Also in: Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical history*, bk. 5, ch. 5.

**THUN-HOHENSTEIN**, Count Franz Anton (b. 1847), Austrian statesman. Premier, 1898-1899. See AUSTRIA: 1898.

**THURGAU**, canton of northeastern Switzerland, bordering on the Lake of Constance and the Rhine as it issues from that lake. The population, in 1920, was 135,933. It became an independent canton in 1803, and in 1831 proposed a revision of the Federal Pact of 1815. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Switzerland: 1830-1848.

**THURII**, or **Thurium**, in ancient geography, a city of Magna Græcia, Italy, near the site of the older Sybaris and the modern Terranova. It was founded by fugitives from Sybaris in 452 B. C., who were soon after expelled, and it was refounded by Greek colonists, 443 B. C. It was plundered and depopulated by Hannibal in 204 B. C. See SIRIS; ATHENS: B. C. 466-445.

**THURINGIA**, territory and free state of central Germany. (See GERMANY: Map.) It is made up of a group of states lying between Prussia, Hesse-Nassau, Bavaria, and Saxony and consists of the union of the seven states of Weimar, Meiningen, Altenburg, Gotha, Reuss, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, and Schwarzburg-Sondershausen. It has a total area of 4,546 square miles, and in 1919, the population was 1,512,866. "To the eastward of the Saxons and of the Franks, the Thuringians had

just formed a new monarchy. That people had united to the Varni and the Heruli, they had spread from the borders of the Elbe and of the Undstrut to those of the Necker. They had invaded Hesse or the country of the Catti, one of the Frankish people, and Franconia, where they had distinguished their conquests by frightful cruelties. . . . It is not known at what period these atrocities were committed, but Thierry [or Theoderic, one of the four Frank kings, sons of Clovis] towards the year 528, reminds his soldiers of them to excite their revenge; it is probable that they were the motives which induced the Franks of Germany and those of Gaul to unite, in order to provide more powerfully for their defence." Thierry, the Frank king at Metz, and Clotaire, his brother, who reigned at Soissons, united in 528 against the Thuringians and completely crushed them. "This great province was then united to the monarchy of the Franks, and its dukes, during two centuries, marched under the standards of the Merovingians."—J. C. L. S. de Sismondi, *French under the Merovingians*, ch. 6.—See also EUROPE: Map showing barbaric migrations; SAXONY.

ALSO IN: W. C. Perry, *Franks*, ch. 3.

515-528.—Subjugated by Franks. See FRANKS: 511-752; GERMANY: 481-768.

526-550.—Control of Bohemia. See BOHEMIA: Its people and their early history.

1918-1920.—New state formed by union of small states. See GERMANY: 1918-1920; REUSS.

THURN, Count Heinrich Matthias (1580-1640), leader of the Bohemian Protestant insurrection at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, 1618. See GERMANY: 1618-1620; 1620.

THURSBY, Sir Cecil Fiennes (1861- ), British admiral. Engaged in operations about the Dardanelles, 1914-1915. See WORLD WAR: 1915; VI. Turkey: a, 4, v.

THYATIRA, Battle of (85 B.C.). See MITHRATIC WARS.

THYMBRÆAN ORACLE. See ORACLES.

THYNIANS. See BITHYNIANS.

THYROID GLAND. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern; 19th century: Endocrinology.

TIARET, Battle of (c. 665). See AFRICA: Ancient and medieval civilization: Arab occupation.

TIBARENIANS, people who anciently inhabited the southern coast of the Euxine, toward its eastern extremity.—Based on G. Rawlinson, *Five great monarchies: Persia*, ch. 1.

TIBBOOS, Egyptian name for the Berber race. See LIBYANS.

TIBERIAS, town in Palestine on the western shore of the sea of Galilee, seventeen miles north-east of Nazareth. It was founded by Herod Antipas in the first half of the first century A. D. and was a seat of Hebrew learning. It was taken by Saladin in 1187. The town was occupied by the British in 1918. See JEWS: 200-400; JERUSALEM: 1144-1187; WORLD WAR: 1918; VI. Turkish theater: c, 13; c, 21.

TIBERIUS (Tiberius Claudius Nero) (42 B.C.-37 A.D.), Roman emperor, 14-37 A.D. Became consul in 13 B.C., and tribune, 6 B.C.; adopted by Augustus, 4 A.D.; conducted several campaigns in Germany; became emperor, 14 A.D. See ROME: Empire: 14-37; GERMANY: B.C. 8-A. D. 11.

TIBERIUS ABSIMARUS, Roman emperor (Eastern), 698-704.

TIBERIUS CONSTANTINUS (d. 582), Roman emperor (Eastern), 578-582. See ROME: Medieval city: 505-628.

TIBET: Name.—Geography.—Inaccessibility

of Lhasa.—Priest government.—Dalai Lama and Tashi Lama compared.—Seats of learning.—Civil law.—Parties.—The name of Tibet is applied not only to the southwest portion of China but also to more than half of Kashmir occupied by people of Tibetan origin. "Tibet owes its remarkable isolation from the outside world primarily to its geographical position. [See ASIA: Influence of geography, etc.; CHINA: Map.] Between the Himalayas and the northern ranges of the Kuen-Lun and Arkha Tagh lies the Chang-tang, or 'northern plain,' the highest and most extensive tableland in the world, comprising some 300,000 square miles of bleak and barren waste at an average altitude of 14,000 to 16,000-feet above sea-level. North of this, again, lie the trackless sand-deserts of Gobi and Takla Makan, and along the whole southern border of Tibet the huge wall of the Himalayas bars the road to India; while in the south-east wild tribes, such as the Abors and Mishmis, prevent any intercourse with Burma or Assam. Thus Tibet is effectually shut off from her neighbours, except in the North-east and East, where a number of large rivers, springing from the edge of the plateau, flow into Chinese territory, forming so many roads from China into Tibet, and hence we find that the Mongols and Chinese alone of all nations have ever invaded Tibet or established close intercourse with the inhabitants. The total extent of [all] Tibet is certainly not less than 700,000 square miles. [The area of Tibet proper or Central Tibet was estimated, in 1922, as 463,200 square miles with a population of about 2,000,000.] The country is divided into four great provinces: Nari; . . . Tsang, on the upper waters of the Tsang-pu River; . . . U, . . . meaning 'central,' the most fertile and populous part of Tibet, containing the holy city of Lhasa; and Kham [and Kashmir] which includes the eastern districts adjoining China, governed by eighteen chiefs. . . . Tsang and U constitute Tibet proper, and are governed directly from Lhasa."—G. E. Bruce, *Our relations with Tibet (Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, July, 1904, pp. 32-33)*.—The inaccessibility of Lhasa which lies in the very heart of the country is due in part to the "well-nigh insurmountable natural barriers [see LHASA] . . . and to the extreme difficulty of journeying within the country of Tibet itself, owing to the enormous elevation . . . and the absence of all facilities for travel. But the chief cause has been the political barriers raised by the [Buddhist] monks, the lamas, who are at the same time the rulers, the priests and the merchants of the country; and who prompted by their own commercial and clerical self-interest and their dread of losing their advantageous monopoly by the introduction of Europeans and their methods, have struggled and striven by every means in their power to preserve their isolation. . . . Nor was the jealousy of the Lamas directed against Europeans only. All natives of India, whether Buddhists or not, except a few well-known merchants from Nepal and Ladak, were equally excluded and prevented from crossing the frontier, in accordance with the standing order of the Emperor of China . . . which prescribed that 'no Moghul, Hindostani (Indian) Pathan or Feringhi (European) should be admitted into Tibet. . . . This isolation of Lhasa maintained for so many centuries, has resulted in that city becoming the center of the most extreme form of priest government the world has ever seen, and has led its esoteric priest-king [the Dalai Lama], in his luxurious, self-centered leisure, to arrogate to himself the position of the

divinity. He is adored as a manifestation of the Divine Being who has taken an undying form upon the earth."—L. A. Waddell, *Lhasa and its mysteries*, pp. 3-4, 20.—Of the two provinces of Central Tibet, or Tibet proper, Tsang in the west and U in the east, Tsang has in recent years come under the political control of the eastern province of which Lhasa with its Dalai Lama is the capital. Nevertheless the abbot of the Tashilhunpo Monastery is still the titular ruler of Tsang; and while the Dalai Lama has more political power, the two abbots rank as equals in religious matters and many Tibetans regard the Dalai Lama as the secular and the so-called Tashi Lama as the spiritual ruler of the country at large. The Dalai Lama lives in a magnificent palace called the Potala where he receives in audience pilgrims bearing rich gifts from every part of Tibet. A great army of priests and monks has grown up, the lamas of Lhasa alone numbering about 20,000. Monasteries

erated by the real owner. The very houses and furniture and all movable property are held in trust for the supreme master, whose subjects must be grateful if he takes a portion only for the requirements of the administration. One of the most ordinary sentences, in fact, is wholesale confiscation, when the condemned must leave house and lands, betaking themselves to a camp life, and living by begging in the districts assigned to them."—É. Reclus, *Earth and its inhabitants: Asia*, v. 2, ch. 2.—See also LAMAS; PRIESTHOOD: Pagan.—The code of laws in use in Tibet has for years been only a custom code and according to the observations made in a series of articles in the *New York Times*, October-November, 1923, by Professor W. M. McGovern, an Englishman who visited Lhasa in 1923, even this code "has broken down and the magistrates now attempt to judge every case on its individual merits, irrespective of statutes and only slightly influenced by precedents." Pro-



PALACE OF THE DALAI LAMA

Potala Hill, Lhasa, Tibet

exist in almost every town and country-side, some of the better known ones being, besides Lhasa and Tashilhunpo, Samding, Samyé and Mindolling, all celebrated for many centuries as seats of learning and all immensely wealthy. While thus opportunity for education is open to those of the priestly class who care to seize it, the monks and priests are for the most part lazy, sensual, degraded and law-breaking, while the bulk of the lay population are hopelessly ignorant and superstitious. "The Tibetan Government is in theory a pure theocracy. The Dalai-lama, . . . is at once god and king, master of the life and fortunes of his subjects, with no limit to his power except his own pleasure. Nevertheless he consents to be guided in ordinary matters by the old usages, while his very greatness prevents him from directly oppressing his people. His sphere of action being restricted to spiritual matters, he is represented in the administration by a viceroy chosen by the Emperor in a supreme council of three high priests. . . . The whole land belongs to the Dalai-lama, the people being merely temporary occupants, tol-

lessor McGovern also states that Tibet has never had a prison system and that since the formerly practiced inhuman punishments have recently been abolished by the present Dalai Lama as inconsistent with Buddhism, the only legal recourse for crimes, including murder, is flogging or banishment. The Dalai Lama acting under the advice of a liberal-minded and powerful minister, Tsarong Shapé, has instituted many reforms since he returned to power after the expulsion of the Chinese in 1912. Most of his progressive measures have met with vigorous resistance by the monks who dictate the policy of the so-called National Assembly, the reactionary party, pro-Chinese in its sympathies. The Court party, also autocratic, is however comparatively progressive and is pro-British in temper.

ALSO IN: H. Bower, *Diary of a journey across Tibet*, ch. 16.—E. Amundsen, *In the land of the lamas*.—F. Gerard, *Tibet: The country and its inhabitants*.

Early History.—"The early history of Tibet is wrapped in myth. The first King of whom we

have any authentic record was Fanni Tübat, of the great Tartar clan of Tübat, who reigned about the year 461 A. D., and from whom Tibet is supposed by some to take its name. . . . The fifth in descent from Fanni Tübat was Srong-btsan-sgampo, a powerful and enlightened King, who introduced Buddhism and handwriting from India, and founded the city of Lhasa in 639 A. D. He extended his kingdom as far as Ladak and Nepal, and Chinese historians assert that his rule ran to the Bay of Bengal, which they say was known up to the tenth century as the Tibetan Sea. . . . In the eighth and ninth centuries Tibet was involved in war with China, but, after a prolonged struggle and severe fighting, peace was finally made in 821 A. D. The monarchy ended about 1026, and an interregnum ensued which lasted until 1256, when Kublai Khan, who had ascended the throne of China, entered Tibet and conquered the eastern portion. He largely increased the temporal power of the lamas, and thenceforth much jealousy and dissension arose between rival monasteries, culminating about the year 1340 in open war, which ended in Chyang Chub Gyaltsan, surnamed Phagmodu, from his native town, seizing the throne and establishing a dynasty of twelve Kings, who ruled for many years over Tibet proper and the south-eastern province of Kham. The last Kings of this dynasty, however, were too weak to control their turbulent subjects, and civil war again broke out."—G. E. Bruce, *Our relations with Tibet* (*Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, July, 1904, p. 29).

1660-1875.—Beginning of Manchu influence.—Expulsion of Mongols by Chinese (1720).—Expulsion of Nepalese by Chinese (1790).—Annexation of Nyarong (1860).—Death of twelfth and reincarnation of thirteenth Dalai Lama (1875).—"China's position as Suzerain of Tibet appears to date from the early days of the Manchu Dynasty in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) had by that time already spread over vast areas of High Asia from Ladak to Manchuria, and the early Manchu Emperors, by adopting Lamaism as their State religion and recognising the Dalai Lama of Tibet as its head, secured a hold over Tibet, Mongolia, and the other lamaistic countries of Asia, which lasted until the fall of their Dynasty two and a half centuries later in 1911. [See also CHINA: 1662-1838.] It was the Manchu Emperor, rather than the Chinese Government, who was for more than two centuries recognised by the Tibetans as their Suzerain; and up to the last days of the Dynasty the Emperor was represented at Lhasa by a Manchu and not a Chinese. Early in the eighteenth century Tibet was invaded by the Dzungarian Mongols. The Manchu Emperor thereupon despatched two armies to the assistance of the Tibetans. Advancing by the Tachientu road from Szechuan and the Sining road from Kansu, the Chinese succeeded in reaching and occupying Lhasa and expelled the Mongols [1720]. This was the first of three successful Chinese advances into Tibet, each of which assured the dominion of the Manchu Emperors over the country for a short time afterwards. On this occasion a Manchu Resident and a garrison of Chinese soldiers were left in Lhasa, while communications with China were assured. . . . During the latter part of the eighteenth century Chinese power in Tibet was on the wane until, about 1790, the Nepalese invaded the country and sacked Shigatse. Roused to action the Manchu Emperor Ch'ien Lung despatched an army into Tibet, which defeated and expelled the Nepalese and even pursued them into their own country. At this period

the power of the Manchus was at its height, and Chinese armies, under Manchu leadership, were able to march thousands of miles from Peking across the plains and mountains of China and the deserts of Tibet to appear on the frontiers of Hindostan. This was the second of the three Chinese advances into Tibet, and again the Manchus decided to consolidate their position and strengthen their hold over the country. By Imperial Decrees of 1793 two Ambans were appointed, given equal rank with the Dalai and Panshen Lamas, and made responsible for the superintendence of the administration of the country. The Dalai Lama was placed to some extent in the hands of the Ambans by a law providing that he could only communicate with the Throne by means of memorials forwarded through the Ambans. After the death of the great Ch'ien Lung there followed the weak reigns of the Emperors Chia Ch'ing, Tao Kuang, Hsien Feng, Tung Chih, and Kuang Hsü, and again Chinese power in Tibet waned to the point of extinction. . . . In 1860 the Tibetans of Nyarong, under the leadership of an ambitious and warlike Chief named Gombu Nyamjyel, invaded and conquered the neighbouring States, including De-ge, and the Five Principalities of Hor. . . . The Tibetan claim to Nyarong, and to a lesser extent to De-ge and the Hor States, dated from this time (1865). Nyarong appears to have been annexed by the Dalai Lama with the approval of the Manchu Throne. . . . In 1875 the twelfth Dalai Lama died, and was reincarnated in the present Pontiff, thirteenth of the long line of Priest Rulers of Tibet."—E. Teichman, *Travels of a consular officer in eastern Tibet*, pp. 1-2, 4-6.

1886-1902.—Events leading to Sikkim convention.—Provisions of Sikkim convention (1890).—Repudiation by Tibetans.—"In 1886, the Tibetans raided the Sikkim frontier, and were expelled a year or two later by a small British expedition. As a result of these events the Sikkim Convention was concluded in 1890 between Great Britain and China, and a set of Trade Regulations for the control of commercial relations between India and Tibet was signed three years later. No Tibetan representative took part in the negotiations for the Sikkim Convention, Great Britain dealing with China as the master of Tibet. These events brought Great Britain for the first time [although earlier attempts to open communications had been made by both Warren Hastings and Coleman Ma-caulay], on the scene of Sino-Tibetan relations. . . . The Sikkim Convention concluded between Great Britain and China in 1890 defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, and contained a reciprocal engagement on the part of both contracting parties to prevent acts of aggression across the border. During the years following its conclusion, however, it became more and more apparent that no progress had been made in opening friendly relations between India and Tibet and that little satisfaction was to be expected from this instrument concluded with China over the heads of the Tibetans; for the latter appeared to consider that as they were not directly a party to the Convention there was no need for them to carry out its provisions. All attempts by the Authorities in India to open friendly relations with the Tibetan Government were frustrated, peaceful messengers were maltreated, and letters returned unopened. The Sikkim Convention had been concluded with the Chinese Government on behalf of the Tibetan Government at the request of the former. But when the Tibetans failed to observe its provisions and recourse was had to diplomatic representations


at Peking, the Chinese Government were found to be apparently unable to influence the Tibetans in any way."—*Ibid.*, pp. 6, 9-10.

1902.—Russo-Chinese treaty for control of the country.—"A Russo-Chinese treaty concerning Tibet was negotiated [in the later months of 1902] . . . by Yung-lu. And as it had to be notified to the Chief-Lamas of the different Buddhist countries, it became possible to obtain the confidential communication of its text immediately on its conclusion. This text . . . runs as follows:

"Art. 1st.—Tibet being a territory situated between Central China and Western Siberia, Russia and China are mutually obliged to care for the maintenance of peace in that country. In case troubles should arise in Tibet, China, in order to preserve this district, and Russia, in order to pro-

the European model, and obliges herself to carry into effect this reform in a good spirit and without incurring blame from the native population. China, for her part, is to take care of the development of the economic situation of Tibet, and especially of her progress abroad."—A. Ular, *England, Russia, and Tibet* (*Contemporary Review*, Dec., 1902).

1902-1904.—British enforcement of unfulfilled promises.—Peaceful mission of Colonel Younghusband which forced its way to Lhasa.—Anglo-Tibetan convention, 1904.—Following renewed attempts in 1902-1903 to make a settlement through China of trade relations between India and Tibet "the British Government, realising the hopelessness of continuing to attempt to deal with the Tibetans through the Chinese Government and the absolute necessity of establishing direct relations with the



GALLERY OF ABBOTS IN THE MONASTERY AT GYANTSE, TIBET

tect her frontiers, shall despatch thither military forces on mutual notification.

"Art. 2nd.—In case of apprehension of a third Power's contriving, directly or indirectly, troubles in Tibet, Russia and China oblige themselves to concur in taking such measures as may seem advisable for repressing such troubles.

"Art. 3d.—Entire liberty in what concerns Russian orthodox as well as Lamaist worship will be introduced in Tibet; but all other religious doctrines will be absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, the Grand-Lama and the Superintendent of the Orthodox Peking Mission are bound to proceed amicably and by mutual assent, so as to guarantee the free propagation of both religions and take all necessary measures for avoiding religious disputes.

"Art. 4th.—Tibet shall be made, gradually, a country with an independent inner administration. In order to accomplish this task, Russia and China are to share the work. Russia takes upon herself the reorganisation of the Tibetan military forces on

Lhasa Government if trade was ever to be opened between India and Tibet and the peace of the frontier secured by proper treaty relations with the neighbouring State, despatched a Mission [under Colonel Younghusband in June, 1903], to negotiate a commercial agreement with the Tibetan Authorities direct. [Meetings promised by the Chinese resident or Amban at Lhasa failed to materialize.] Whatever the advice tendered to the Tibetans by the Chinese Amban may have been, they refused to receive any communication from the Mission, which met with repulse after repulse, until, having started as a peaceful embassy, it eventually reached Lhasa in August, 1904, as a military expedition. The Dalai Lama fled for the north shortly before the British force reached Lhasa. A convention was, however, concluded with the remainder of the Tibetan Government in the summer of 1904. Under this Agreement Tibet undertook to recognise the Sikkim Convention (which she has faithfully observed ever since), while provision was also made

for the opening of commercial relations between India and Tibet and for the establishment of Trade Marts at Gyantse and Gartok as well as at Yatung (the latter already opened under the Sikkim Convention). The British troops withdrew from Lhasa immediately after the conclusion of this Agreement, leaving the territorial integrity of Tibet and the independence of the Tibetan Government unimpaired."—E. Teichman, *Travels of a consular officer in eastern Tibet*, p. 10.

1904-1906.—Confirmation of Anglo-Tibetan convention.—"Negotiations were soon after opened to secure the adhesion of China, the nominal suzerain of Tibet, to the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904. The Chinese Government at first endeavoured to revive their claim to be the sole medium of communication between the Government of India and the Tibetans and to replace the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty by a new Agreement. Eventually, however, the Lhasa Convention was duly confirmed by an Agreement between Great Britain and China signed at Peking in April, 1906. Under this instrument China adhered to and confirmed the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904, while Great Britain undertook not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in any way in the internal Tibetan administration of the country."—*Ibid.*, p. 11.

1907.—Anglo-Russian convention concerning Tibet.—"In August, 1907, an Agreement was arrived at between Great Britain and Russia under which both parties undertook to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Tibetan Government."—*Ibid.*, p. 11.—See also ANGLORUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1907.

1908.—Trade regulation conference in India.—"In 1908 a set of Trade Regulations governing Indo-Tibetan trade was signed at Calcutta between British, Chinese, and Tibetan representatives. The object of Great Britain in concluding these various agreements was to assure the territorial integrity of Tibet and to safeguard her existence as a peaceful autonomous buffer State between the three great Asiatic Empires, Russia, India and China, as well as to provide for the opening of friendly relations between the British and Tibetan Authorities in the interests of the peace of the Indian border and of trans-frontier trade. The fact, however, had been overlooked that China had through these very agreements obtained a free hand in re-establishing and consolidating her position in Tibet without the possibility of foreign interference, and was thus enabled to keep the Tibetans for a few more years in a state of political and economic vassalage."—*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.


1910-1914.—Chinese authority strengthened in Tibet.—Flight of the Dalai Lama.—His formal deposition.—Expulsion of Chinese and return of Dalai Lama.—Chinese action checked by Great Britain.—Independence of Tibet proclaimed.—Conference at Simla.—The Dalai Lama, who had fled from Lhasa in 1904, on the approach of the British expeditionary force under Colonel Younghusband, did not return to Tibet until more than five years later. Meantime he had visited Peking, where he was coldly received, and seems to have wandered widely through the empire. During his absence the Chinese authority in Tibet had been strengthened, and his return was followed by a considerable reinforcement of troops to support the Ambans who represent the Chinese government at Lhasa. What friction arose then is not known, but the lama fled again, this time into India, and on February 25, 1910, he was deposed by an imperial decree. "During the three years following

the close of the conference in India peace reigned on the frontier between China and Tibet, though civil war and political strife in Western China, reacting on border affairs, prevented the Chinese from making any progress in consolidating their position in the Tibetan inhabited districts left in their hands. . . . Autonomous Tibet, on the other hand, freed from Chinese rule, had been enjoying years of internal peace and prosperity, and had reorganised and strengthened her frontier army."—*Ibid.*, pp. 47, 51.—"Taking advantage of the confusion . . . [in Chinese ranks] the Tibetans expelled them from their country, brought back the Dalai Lama to Lhasa [June, 1912] and duly installed him in authority. The semi-independent Chiefs in Inner Tibet and in Chinese territory west of the Yalung River were likewise affected. They challenged Chinese authority, and forced the garrisons that had been stationed there to withdraw. The Chinese government despatched the Szechuanese and the Yunnanese armies to suppress the revolt. Hsiangchen and Litang were occupied by its force, but at this point the British government intervened. On August 17, 1912, the British Minister at Peking informed the Chinese authorities that his government disapproved of China's interference in Tibet's internal affairs; that it opposed the exercise of administrative power by the Chinese officials in Tibet and refused to recognize China's rights to treat Tibet as one of her provinces, and to station an unlimited number of soldiers within its borders and insisted that a convention must be concluded embodying these proposals; and that for the time being the communications between China and Tibet via India were closed. He further declared that unless China would send delegates to confer on these matters Great Britain and Tibet would separately make treaties. In conclusion, China was invited to come to an agreement prior to Great Britain's recognition of the Republic. . . . On January 11, 1913, Tibet declared its independence by concluding a treaty with the Living Buddha of Urga, the head of Outer Mongolia. [See MONGOLIA: 1913.] The Tutuh [governor] of Szechuan despatched troops to attack Hsiangchen. Simultaneously President Yuan Shih-Kai [of China] sent a delegate to Chiamodo to discuss with the representatives of the Dalai Lama the terms of peace and the demarcation of the frontier. In May the British Minister renewed his demand for the early settlement of the Tibetan question, which resulted in the holding of a Tripartite Conference at Simla between October 13, 1913, and July 3, 1914. . . . China finally agreed to the extension of the eastern boundary of the Outer Tibet to as far as the Salween River. . . . [Regarding] the northern boundary . . . the Tibetan delegate insisted upon the inclusion in Outer Tibet, of that part of Chinghai south of the Altyn-tao, while the Chinese delegate contended with equal persistence that Inner Tibet where China would be at liberty to develop and strengthen her position, should have the Tangla Range as its southern boundary. As China was unable to give up over 40,000 square miles of her territory, her delegates refused to sign the Convention [and the question remained unsettled]."—H. K. Tong, *British and Chinese governments again considering Tibetan question* (*Millard's China National Review*, June 7, 1910, pp. 8, 10).

1917-1919.—Renewal of hostilities with Chinese.—Provisional settlement.—Toward the end of 1917 a pretext for resuming hostilities was found by the neglected and disaffected Chinese

border forces who had been practicing brigandage and plundering the natives. The Tibetans undertook the rescue of one of their officers who had been seized in the course of a trivial dispute, skirmishing followed and the Chinese claimed that the truce of 1915 was over and prepared to advance. This step was followed by the surrender of the Chinese relief force at Toba and the siege and fall of Chamdo, a Chinese fortress. "With the fall of Chamdo the greater part of the old Szechuan Frontier Force (*Pien Chün*), which had garrisoned the border since the days of Chao Erh-feng, had ceased to exist. Two or three thousand Chinese prisoners of war were marched off to Lhasa, where they were well treated, judging by

cessation of hostilities, and the mutual withdrawal of the troops of both sides out of touch with one another. The provisional boundary between Szechuan and Tibet resulting from these frontier negotiations chanced to coincide to a considerable extent with the old seventeenth century line of the Manchus, the Chinese remaining in control of Batang, Litang, Nyarong, Kanze and the country to the east of those States, while the Tibetans retained Chamdo, Draya, Markam and De-ge, and the country further west. By the end of 1918 the frontier regions had settled down after the conclusion of the truce, the trade routes had been reopened, and peaceful relations generally had once more been resumed between China and Tibet."



MAP OF TIBET SHOWING DR. MCGOVERN'S ROUTE TO LHASA

oriental standards, and whence they were subsequently repatriated to West China . . . with the assistance of the British Authorities, via India, Burma, and Yunnan. . . . By the middle of the summer of 1918, . . . the Lhasa forces [were practically] in possession of all the country up to Tachienlu. At this juncture, however, the local Chinese leaders on the frontier invoked the mediation of the British Consular Agent stationed in Western China, whose duty it was to watch events on the border with a view to keeping the peace between the two parties pending a final settlement of the dispute by diplomatic means, and, the Tibetan leaders having been persuaded to stay their advance, the fighting ceased. . . . Peace negotiations followed between the various Chinese and Tibetan frontier authorities, the British representative acting as middleman, and arrangements were eventually concluded providing for a general

E. Teichman, *Travels of a consular officer in eastern Tibet*, p. 58.

1922-1923.—British scientific expedition.—Experience of Dr. McGovern in Lhasa.—Dr. William W. McGovern, the scientific adviser of a British research mission to Tibet made a perilous and significant visit to Tibet in 1923 reaching the Forbidden City of Lhasa. In July, 1922, the expedition called the British Buddhist Mission, sailed for India and proceeded to Tibet after receiving permission from the Indian government to travel to Gyantse via Yatsung. The Tibetan government, however, refused it permission to continue to Lhasa. McGovern was forced with the others to return to India to keep his word of honor to the government of India but he had studied the country closely in order to return secretly in disguise. He spoke Tibetan fluently. Leaving Darjeebug on Jan. 10, 1923, he made a



hazardous journey disguised as a coolie, straight through Sikkim, entering Tibet near Kampa Dzong thence north through the heart of Tsang Province to Shigatse and the Brahmaputra river and on to Lhasa. He arrived in Lhasa about the middle of February in time for the Tibetan New Year's festivities, when, for twenty-one days the city government is turned over to a government of monks and the Dalai Lama and his cabinet have no control. The results of McGovern's unusual experience in the Forbidden City where he enjoyed the patronage of the Dalai Lama's favorite minister, Tsarong Shapé, the strong man of Tibet (although he was compelled to become a prisoner of state to escape the fanaticism of the temporary priestly régime) were the securing of numerous priceless manuscripts and an extraordinary opportunity for observing the life and institutions of the country. Many of his impressions have been recorded in printed form and by the cinematograph camera secretly used. After six weeks stay in Lhasa McGovern was permitted to return to India under escort.

ALSO IN: S. Hedin, *Trans-Himalaya: Discoveries and adventures in Tibet*.

**TIBISCUS**, ancient name of the river Theiss. **TIBULLUS**, Albius (c. 54-19 B. C.), Roman poet. See **LATIN LITERATURE**: B. C. 43-A. D. 14.

**TIBUR**, important Latin city, more ancient than Rome, from which it was only twenty miles distant, on the Anio. Tibur, after many wars, was reduced by the Romans to subjection in the fourth century, B. C., and the delightful country in its neighborhood became a favorite place of residence for wealthy Romans in later times. The ruins of the villa of Hadrian have been identified in the vicinity, and many others have been named, but without historical authority. Hadrian's villa is said to have been like a town in its vast extent. The modern town of Tivoli occupies the site of Tibur.—Based on R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 14.

**TIBURON**, or "SHARK," ISLAND, in the Gulf of California, is about thirty miles long and belongs to Mexico. During the last three centuries more than fifty recorded attempts to subjugate the Seri, inhabitants of the island, have been made. Two San Francisco newspaper men who landed here in 1910 never returned. The interior of the island has never been explored.

**TIBURTINE SIBYL**. See **SIBYLS**.

**TICINO**, canton of Switzerland, on the southern slope of the Alps. It was the scene of important political struggles between 1830 and 1848. See **SUFFRAGE**, **MANHOOD**: Switzerland: 1830-1848.

**TICINUM**, ancient name for Pavia. See **VERONA**: 493-525.

**TICINUS**, Battle on the (218 B. C.). See **PUNIC WARS**: Second; **ROME**: Republic: B. C. 218-202.

**TICKET-OF-LEAVE SYSTEM**. See **CRIMINAL LAW**: 1825.

**TICKNOR**, George (1701-1871), American educator and historian. Mapped out and directed the policy of the Boston Public Library. See **LIBRARIES**: Modern: United States: Free public libraries.

**TICONDEROGA**, village in the township of Ticonderoga, Essex county, New York. It was fortified in 1731. See **CANADA**: 1700-1735.

1756.—Reconstructed by the French. See **CANADA**: 1756.

1758.—Bloody repulse of Abercrombie. See **CANADA**: 1758.

1759.—Taken by General Amherst. See **CANADA**: 1759 (July-August).

1775.—Surprised and taken by the Green Mountain Boys. See **U. S. A.**: 1775 (May).

1776.—Capture delayed by Arnold. See **CANADA**: 1775-1776.

1777.—Recapture by Burgoyne. See **U. S. A.**: 1777 (July-October).

**TIENTSIN** (Chinese "Ford of Heaven"), most important city of northern China, and the principal sea outlet for the trade of the provinces of Chihli, Shansi, Shensi, Kansuh and part of Honan. It is situated at the head of the Gulf of Pechili at the junction of the Grand canal and the Pei Ho and is about eighty miles distant from Peking with which it is connected by water and by rail. The estimated population in 1923 was 2,000,000.—See also **CHINA**: map.

Early history.—Tientsin was formerly a military station only, but toward the end of the seventeenth century became a city of great importance. "Before the advent of steamers . . . Tientsin had become a flourishing centre for junk traffic, and when the tribute rice no longer followed the Grand Canal route—owing to the shoaling of this ancient and celebrated waterway—it was sent to Tientsin in sea-going junks until comparatively recent years. . . . During the long satrapy of Li [Ilung-Chang] the trade and importance of the city developed exceedingly. Li, by the vigour of his rule, soon quelled the rowdiness for which the Tientsinese were notorious throughout the empire, and as he made the city his chief residence and the centre of his many experiments in military and naval education [he established the Imperial Military College in 1884], it came to be regarded as the focus of the new learning and national reform. [The Imperial University was established in 1805 by Americans with the approval of the emperor.] . . . The expeditions of the Allies in 1858-61 greatly enhanced the importance of the city, as it then proved to be the military key of the capital, and an excellent base. It was here on June 26th, 1858, that Lord Elgin signed the treaty which was to conclude the war, but which unhappily led to its prolongation. . . . The city . . . [witnessed] the massacre of the French Sisters of Mercy and other foreigners on June 21st, 1870. . . . The Roman Catholic Cathedral was destroyed on that occasion. . . . The foreign affairs of China were practically directed from Tientsin during the two decades 1874-94. . . . Li Hung-Chang authorized . . . [the sinking] of a coal shaft at Tong Sha in the 'seventies'; this was done and proved the precursor of a railway, which was later extended to Shan haik wan for military purposes, and from thence round the Gulf of Liau to Kinchow; 1000 saw the line pushed on to Newchwang. In 1897 the line to Peking was opened, and proved such a success that the line had to be doubled in 1898-9. . . . A river improvement scheme of some importance was inaugurated in 1898 . . . [and] resulted in deepening the channel and facilitating navigation for the time being."—*Tientsin (Directory and Chronicle for the Far East, 1923, pp. 608-609, 612)*.

1900-1923.—Effect of Boxer uprising.—Development of foreign concessions.—Flood of 1917.—Work of flood commission.—"In 1900 the violence of the Boxers was chiefly directed against the railways, all of which were more or less destroyed, but under British, French, and Russian military administration they were afterwards all restored to their former efficiency. Foreigners formerly lived in three concessions—British, French and

German. . . . The Japanese took up a concession in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. . . . During 1901 Russia, Belgium, Italy and Austro-Hungary all appropriated large areas . . . while the existing concessions extended their boundaries very considerably. These developments have thrown all present and future landing facilities for direct sea-going traffic into foreign hands. . . . Upon the entry of China into the Great War in 1917 the Chinese Authorities took over the German and Austrian Concessions on the 16th March of that year, and these have since been administered by the Chinese Police Bureau, but authority has been received from the Central Government to form an advisory committee of local residents. In the autumn of 1920 the local Chinese authorities assumed charge of Russian Consular functions and the policing of the Russian Concession, leaving the Municipal Council, however, to continue to function in minor municipal affairs. . . . During the first half of the year 1917 the country suffered from a prolonged drought, lasting for over six months. Later on there were incessant rains. . . . Early in September the Hunho was in flood, and, finally, the Grand Canal burst its banks a few miles west of Tientsin, carrying away the main line of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, which resulted in the concessions being flooded before much warning of the impending danger could be given. . . . The flood waters . . . [were pumped out by steam pumps lent by] the South Manchurian Railway Company and worked by a detachment of army engineers from Manchuria. It is estimated that . . . crops to the value of \$100,000,000 were utterly lost, and that 80,000 groups of dwellings . . . were destroyed. The question of conserving the waterways of the Chihli province with a view to preventing a recurrence of such disasters and safeguarding the trade and shipping interests of Tientsin . . . was brought forward in the autumn of 1917 . . . with the appointment of a 'joint-commission' composed of representatives of the Chinese Government and the Haiho Conservancy Board [established by the peace protocol]. . . . During 1920, the surveys of the rivers to the northward of Tientsin were completed, and a topographic survey of the country lying between the Yungtingho and Peiho was approaching completion. Towards the south, river surveys . . . were completed in addition to topographical surveys of several localities. . . . The new outlet channel for the Machang Canal, commenced in October, 1920, has been completed [1923]. . . . Four important cuttings have been effected [1923] in the river . . . which have not only facilitated the movement of the flood tide but have shortened the distance to the sea by some 20 miles by the removal of some corkscrew windings and dangerous bends; and powerful dredgers have been acquired for work on the Bar."—*Tientsin (Directory and Chronicle for the Far East, 1923, pp. 609-611)*.

1919.—Chinese concessions returned by Germany. See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Part IV. Section II.

See also UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1808-1922.

TIENTSIN, Convention of (1885). See KOREA: 1866-1894.

Treaties of (1858, 1884). See CHINA: 1856-1860; FRANCE: 1875-1880.

TIERRA FIRME.—"The world was at a loss at first [after Columbus's discovery] what to call the newly found region to the westward. It was easy enough to name the islands, one after another, as they were discovered, but when the Spaniards reached the continent they were back-

ward about giving it a general name. . . . As the coast line of the continent extended itself and became known as such, it was very naturally called by navigators 'tierra firme,' firm land, in contradistinction to the islands which were supposed to be less firm. . . . The name Tierra Firme, thus general at first, in time became particular. As a designation for an unknown shore it at first implied only the Continent. As discovery unfolded, and the magnitude of this Firm Land became better known, new parts of it were designated by new names, and Tierra Firme became a local appellation in place of a general term. Paria being first discovered, it fastened itself there; also along the short to Darien, Veragua, and on to Costa Rica, where at no well defined point it stopped, so far as the northern seaboard was concerned, and in due time struck across to the South Sea, where the name marked off an equivalent coast line. . . . As a political division Tierra Firme had existence for a long time. It comprised the provinces of Darien, Veragua, and Panamá, which last bore also the name of Tierra Firme as a province. The extent of the kingdom was 65 leagues in length by 18 at its greatest breadth, and 9 leagues at its smallest width. It was bounded on the east by Cartagena, and the gulf of Urabá and its river; on the west by Costa Rica, including a portion of what is now Costa Rica; and on the north and south by the two seas. . . . Neither Guatemala, Mexico, nor any of the lands to the north were ever included in Tierra Firme. English authors often apply the Latin form, Terra Firma, to this division, which is misleading."—H. H. Bancroft, *History of the Pacific states, v. 1, p. 290, footnote*.—See also SPANISH MAIN.

TIERS ÉTAT. See ESTATES, THREE.

TIFLIS, capital of the government of the same name in Transcaucasia, on the Kura river. The city was made the capital of the Transcaucasian republic, established in April, 1918. When Georgia became a separate state, May, 1918, its independence was proclaimed in Tiflis, and the city was made the seat of government. In 1915 the government had a population of 1,394,800.—See also GEORGIA, REPUBLIC OF: 1920: Foreign relations.

TIGERNACH O'BRAEIN (Tighernach O'Brien) (d. 1088), Irish annalist. Abbot of Clonmacnois and Roscommon. See ANNALS, IRISH.

TIGHE, Sir Michael Joseph (1864- ), British lieutenant-general. In command of the campaign in East Africa, 1914-1916. See WORLD WAR: 1916: VII. African theater: a; a, 4.

TIGLATH PILESER I, king of Assyria, 1120-1100 B. C. See ASSYRIA: People, etc.

Tiglath Pileser II or III, king of Assyria c. 950-930 B. C. See ASSYRIA: Later Assyrian empire.

Tiglath Pileser III or IV (Poros, Pulu, or Pul) (d. 727 B. C.), king of Assyria, 745-727 B. C. Conducted a campaign in Syria in 738 B. C. See JEWS: Kingdom of Israel and Judah; SYRIA: B. C. 854-701.

TIGORINI, or Tigurini, in Gaul.—After the Cimbri had defeated two Roman armies, in 113 and 109 B. C., "the Helvetii, who had suffered much in the constant conflicts with their north-eastern neighbours, felt themselves stimulated by the example of the Cimbri to seek in their turn for more quiet and fertile settlements in western Gaul, and had, perhaps, even when the Cimbrian hosts marched through their land, formed an alliance with them for that purpose. Now, under the leadership of Divico, the forces of the Tougeni (position unknown) and of the Tigorini (on the

lake of Murten) crossed the Jura and reached the territory of the Nitiobroges (about Agen on the Garonne). The Roman army under the consul Lucius Cassius Longinus, which they here encountered, allowed itself to be decoyed by the Helvetii into an ambush, in which the general himself and his legate, the consular Gaius Piso, along with the greater portion of the soldiers, met their death."—T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 5.—Subsequently the Tigorini and the Tougeni joined the Cimbri, but were not present at the decisive battle on the Raudine plain and escaped the destroying swords of the legions of Marius, by flying back to their native Helvetia.—See also CIMBRI AND TEUTONES: B. C. 113-101.

**TIGRANES I**, or Dikran, king of Armenia, c. 05-55 B. C. Attacked by the Romans in 69 B. C. See ARMENIA: B. C. 585-55; ROME: Republic: B. C. 78-68.

**TIGRANOCERTA**, Battle of (60 B. C.). See ROME: Republic: B. C. 78-68.

**TIGRIS-EUPHRATES VALLEY**.—The ancient Greeks gave to the land embraced by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers the name of Mesopotamia, meaning "the land between the rivers." "Physical conditions in the Tigris-Euphrates valley were in many ways similar to those along the Nile. A warm but invigorating climate, fertile, alluvial soil, deposited by the great rivers and renewed each year by the floods, and the protection of the desert on the west favored the development of a virile civilization, as early if not earlier than that of Egypt. Starting from the same northern mountains, the two great rivers find their way to the Persian Gulf by widely different courses. The Tigris flows southeast in a comparatively direct course of eleven hundred miles. Its name, 'The Arrow,' suggests the rapidity of its descent. The Euphrates, on the contrary, makes a long detour westward toward the Mediterranean and then turns to the southeast, where for the greater part of the last half of its one thousand eight hundred miles it flows through the desert."—C. F. Kent, *Biblical geography and history*, pp. 5-6.—"Differences in geological structure divide this region into an upper and a lower district; and this twofold physical division is reflected, as we shall see, throughout its political history. The northern part of the valley, the portion that comprises ancient Assyria, consists of undulating plains, broken in places by mountain ridges. This region nourished a hardy and warlike race, and became the seat of a great military empire. The southern part of the valley, the part known as Babylonia or Chaldea, is, like the Delta region of Egypt, an alluvial deposit. The making of new land by the rivers has gone on steadily during historic times. . . . In ancient times the land was protected against the river floods, and watered in seasons of drought, by a stupendous system of dikes and canals, which at the present day, in a ruined and sand-choked condition, cover like a network the face of the country. The productions of Babylonia are very like those of the Nile valley. The luxuriant growth of grain upon these river flats excited the wonder of the Greek travelers who visited the East. . . . This favored plain in a remote period of antiquity became the seat of an agricultural, industrial, and commercial population among which the arts of civilized life found probably their very earliest development."—P. Van Ness Myers, *General history for colleges and high schools*, pp. 30-32.—See also BABYLONIA: Land and its characteristics.

Recent archæological excavations. See ARCHÆOLOGY: Chronology, etc.: 1888-1900.

Railway building. See RAILROADS. 1899-1916; BAGDAD RAILWAY.

Irrigation projects. See TURKEY: 1909 (October).

In World War. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VI. Turkish theater: a, 1, iii; a, 2, iv; a, 3, ii; a, 3, iv.

TIKHON, Patriarch (1865- ), head of the Russian church, 1917-1922. See RUSSIA: 1917-1922

TILDEN, Samuel Jones (1814-1886), American statesman. Member of the New York legislature, 1845-1846; governor of New York 1874-1876.

In the free soil movement. See U. S. A.: 1848. Overthrow of the Tweed Ring. See NEW YORK: 1863-1871.

Defeat in presidential election. See U. S. A.: 1876-1877.

Bequest to the New York Public Library. See LIBRARIES: Modern: United States: New York Public Library; GIFTS AND BEQUESTS.

TILLEMONT, Sébastien le Nain de (1637-1698), French ecclesiastical historian. See HISTORY: 24, 25.

TILLET, Benjamin (1860- ), English labor leader and socialist. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1889.

TILLI, early name of Chile. See CHILE: Origin of the name.

TILLOTSON, John (1630-1694), English ecclesiastic. Archbishop of Canterbury; influential preacher of the Cambridge school of Latitudinarians. See LATITUDINARIANS.

TILLY, Johann Tzerclaes, Count of (1559-1632), Flemish field marshal. Commander of the army of the Catholic League in the Thirty Years' War; made commander-in-chief of Maximilian's army, 1620. See GERMANY: 1620, to 1624-1626, 1630-1631; 1631; 1631-1632; AUSTRIA: 1618-1648.

TILSIT, Treaty of. See GERMANY: 1807 (June-July); AUSTRIA: 1809-1914.

TIMAR, TIMARLI, SAIM, SPAHI.—"It was Alaeddin who first instituted a division of all conquered lands among the 'Sipabis' or Spahis (horsemen), on conditions which, like the feudal tenures of Christian Europe, obliged the holders to service in the field. Here, however, ends the likeness between the Turkish 'Timar' and the European fief. The 'Timarli' were not, like the Christian knighthood, a proud and hereditary aristocracy almost independent of the sovereign and having a voice in his councils, but the mere creatures of the Sultan's breath. The Ottoman constitution recognised no order of nobility. . . . The institution of military tenures was modified by Amurath I., who divided them into the larger and smaller ('Siamet' and 'Timar'), the holders of which were called 'Saim' and 'Timarli'. . . . The symbols of . . . investment were a sword and colours ('Kilidsch' and 'Sandjak')."—T. H. Dyer, *History of modern Europe*, v. 1, introduction.—See also SPAHIS; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 42.

TIMBUKTU, chief town of the territory of Timbuktu in French West Africa, about nine miles north of the Niger. It was occupied by the French in 1893. See AFRICA: Modern European occupation: Later 19th century.

TIME, Measurement of. See INVENTIONS: Ancient and Medieval: Measurements; 16th and 17th centuries; Time measurement.

TIME WAGE. See LABOR REMUNERATION: Methods of remuneration

TIMOCRACY. See GEOMORI; ATHENS: B. C. 650-504.

**TIMOLEON** (c. 411-337 B. C.), Greek statesman and general. Was sent from Corinth to aid Syracuse, 344 B. C. See SYRACUSE: B. C. 344.

**TIMOR**, island of the Malay archipelago. The southwestern part of the island is claimed by the Netherlands, and the northeastern by Portugal. See PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

**TIMOUR**. See TIMUR.

**TIMUCHI**, members of the senate or Council of Six Hundred of Massilia, ancient Marseilles.

**TIMUCUA**, North American Indian tribe. See TIMUQUANAN FAMILY.



TIMUR

Miniature in the Bodleian Library, Oxford

**TIMUQUANAN FAMILY, TEQUESTAS.**—“Beginning at the southeast, we first meet the historic Timucua family, the tribes of which are extinct at the present time. . . . In the 16th century the Timucua inhabited the northern and middle portion of the peninsula of Florida, and although their exact limits to the north are unknown, they held a portion of Florida bordering on Georgia, and some of the coast islands in the Atlantic ocean. . . . The people received its name from one of their villages called Timagoa. . . . The name means ‘lord,’ ‘ruler,’ ‘master’ (‘atimuca,’ waited upon ‘muca,’ by servants, ‘ati’), and the people’s name is written Atimuca early in the 18th century. . . . The languages spoken by the Calusa and by the people next in order, the Tequesta, are unknown to us. . . . The Calusa held

the southwestern extremity of Florida, and their tribal name is left recorded in Calusahatchi, a river south of Tampa bay. . . . Of the Tequesta people on the southeastern end of the peninsula we know still less than of the Calusa Indians. There was a tradition that they were the same people which held the Bahama or Lucayo Islands.”—A. S. Gatschet, *Migration legend of the Creek Indians*, v. 1, pt. 1.—During the eighteenth century, when a neighboring tribe in the Atlantic states, the Catawba Indians (Siouan stock) of South Carolina, were active in the wars of the English against the French, the Timuquans were already extinct.—See also INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: Southeastern area.

**TIMUR, Timour, or Tamberlaine, Conquers of.**—“Timour the Tartar, as he is usually termed in history, was called by his countrymen Timourlenk, that is, Timour the Lame, from the effects of an early wound; a name which some European writers have converted into Tamerlane, or Tamberlaine. He was of Mongol origin, and a direct descendant, by the mother’s side, of Zenghis Khan. He was born at Sebzar, a town near Samarcand, in Transoxiana, in 1336 [and reigned from 1370 to 1405]. . . . Timour’s early youth was passed in struggles for ascendancy with the petty chiefs of rival tribes, but at the age of thirty-five he had fought his way to undisputed pre-eminence, and was proclaimed Khan of Zagatai by the ‘couroul-tai,’ or general assembly of the warriors of his race. He chose Samarcand as the capital of his dominion, and openly announced that he would make that dominion comprise the whole habitable earth. . . . In the thirty-six years of his reign he raged over the world from the great wall of China to the centre of Russia on the north; and the Mediterranean and the Nile were the western limits of his career, which was pressed eastward as far as the sources of the Ganges. He united in his own person the sovereignties of twenty-seven countries, and he stood in the place of nine several dynasties of kings. . . . The career of Timour as a conqueror is unparalleled in history; for neither Cyrus, nor Alexander, nor Cæsar, nor Attila, nor Zenghis Khan, nor Charlemagne, nor Napoleon, ever won by the sword so large a portion of the globe, or ruled over so many myriads of subjugated fellow-creatures.”—E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 3.—Timur “bore throughout life the humble title of Emir, and led about with him a nominal Grand Khan [a descendant of Chagatai, one of the sons of Jenghiz Khan], of whom he professed himself a dutiful subject. His pedigree may in strictness entitle him to be called a Mogul; but, for all practical purposes, himself and his hordes must be regarded as Turks. Like all the eastern Turks, such civilization as they had was of Persian origin; and it was of the Persian form of Islam that Timour was so zealous an assertor.”—E. A. Freeman, *History and conquests of the Saracens*, lecture 6.—In 1378 Timur overran Khuarezm. Between 1380 and 1386 he subjugated Khorasan, Afghanistan, Baluchistan and Sistan. He then passed into southern Persia and forced the submission of the Mozafferides who reigned over Fars, punishing the city of Isfahan for a rebellious rising by the massacre of 70,000 of its inhabitants. This done, he returned to Samarkand for a period of rest and prolonged carousal. Taking the field again in 1389, he turned his arms northward and shattered the famous “Golden Horde,” of the khanate of Kiptchak, which dominated a large part of Russia. In

1392-1393 the Tatar conqueror completed the subjugation of Persia and Mesopotamia, extinguishing the decayed Mongol empire of the Ikhans, and piling up a pyramid of 90,000 human heads on the ruins of Bagdad, the old capital of Islam. (See BAGDAD: 1393-1638.) Thence he pursued his career of slaughter through Armenia and Georgia, and finished his campaign of five years by a last destroying blow struck at the Kiptchak Khan whom he is said to have pursued as far as Moscow. Once more, at Samarkand, the red-handed, invincible savage then gave himself up to orgies of pleasure-making; but it was not for many months. His eyes were now on India, and the years 1398-1399 were spent by him in carrying death and desolation through the Punjab, and to the city of Delhi, which was made a scene of awful massacre and pillage. No permanent conquest was achieved; the plunder and the pleasure of slaughter were the ends of the expedition (see INDIA: 1200-1308). A more serious purpose directed the next movement of Timur's arms, which were turned against the rival Turk of Asia Minor, or Roum—the Ottoman, Bayezid, who boasted of the conquest of the Roman Empire of the East. In 1402, Bayezid was summoned from the siege of Constantinople to defend his realm. On the 20th of July in that year, on the plain of Angora, he met the enormous hosts of Timourlenk and was overwhelmed by them—his kingdom lost, himself a captive. The merciless Tatar hordes swept hapless Anatolia with a besom of destruction and death. Nicæa, Prusa and other cities were sacked. Smyrna provoked the Tatar savage by an obstinate defense and was doomed to the sword, without mercy for age or sex. Even then, the customary pyramid of heads which he built on the site was not large enough to satisfy his eye and he increased its height by alternate layers of mud. Aleppo, Damascus, and other cities of Syria had been death with in like manner the year before. When satiated with blood, he returned to Samarkand in 1404, rested there until January 1405, and then set out upon an expedition to China; but he died on the way. His empire was soon broken in pieces.—Based on A Vámbéry, *History of Bokhara*, ch. 10, 11, 12.—See also TURKEY: 1380-1403.

ALSO IN: J. Hutton, *Central Asia*, ch. 5-6.—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 65.—A. Lamartine, *History of Turkey*, bk. 7.—H. G. Smith, *Romance of history*, ch. 4.—Sharaf ud din Ali Yazdi, *Zaf-Arnamah* (tr. by Petis de la Croix).

**TIN ISLANDS.** See CASSITERIDES.

**TIN PLATE COMPANY.** See TRUSTS: United States: Tin Plate Company.

**TINCHEBRAY, Battle of** (1106). See ENGLAND: 1087-1135.

**TINDAL, Mathew** (c. 1653-1733), English deist. See DEISM: English deism.

**TINGIO**, ancient Roman settlement near Tangier. See TANGIER.

**TINNEH**, North American Indian tribe. See ATHAPASCAN FAMILY.

**TINOCO, Frederico**, Costa Rican general. Leader of a revolt in 1917. See COSTA RICA: 1914-1917: Presidency of Gonzalez.

**TINTORETTO, Jacopo Robusti** (1518-1594), Venetian painter. See PAINTING: Italian: High Renaissance.

**TIONONTATES**, North American Indian tribe. See IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY.

**TIPPECANOE, Battle of.** See U. S. A.: 1811. "TIPECANOE AND TYLER TOO." See U. S. A.: 1840: Fourteenth presidential election.

**TIPPERMUIR, Battle of** (1644). See SCOTLAND: 1644-1645.

**TIPPU, or TIPPOO, SAHIB** (1753-1799), sultan of Mysore, India, 1782-1799. Fought in the Mysore Wars against the English, 1780-1799. See INDIA: 1780-1783; 1785-1793; 1798-1805.

**TIRANA**, city of Albania, about twenty miles northeast of Durazzo. It was made the seat of government in 1921. See BALKAN STATES: 1921: Albania.

**TIRLEMONT**, town in the province of Brabant, Belgium, about eleven miles southeast of Louvain. In 1914 it was evacuated by the Belgians. See WORLD WAR: 1914: I. Western front: c, 1.

**TIRNOVA**, former capital of Bulgaria, 124 miles northeast of Sofia, on the river Jantra. In 1877 it was captured by the Russians. See BULGARIA: 1885-1886; TURKEY: 1877-1878.

**TIRO, Marcus Tullius** (fl. 1st century B. C.), slave, pupil and amanuensis of Cicero. Inventor of ancient stenography. See ABBREVIATION: Roman system.

**TIROL.** See TYROL.

**TIRPITZ, Alfred von** (1840- ), German admiral. Secretary of state for the imperial navy, 1897-1916; instituted the submarine blockade during the World War. See WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1909: German side of navy building; WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background, 3; 1917: VIII. United States and the war: a; IX. Naval operations: a.

**TIRSHATHA**, ancient Persian title, borne by an officer whose functions correspond with those of high sheriff.—Based on H. Ewald, *History of Israel*, bk. 5, sect. 1.

**TIRYNS**, in ancient geography, a city of Argolis, Greece, three miles north of Nauplia. It was excavated by Schliemann, 1884-1885. See ÆGEAN CIVILIZATION: Excavations and antiquities: Mycenaean area; ARGOS; HERACLEIDÆ.

**Battle of** (c. 495 B. C.). See ARGOS: B. C. 496-421.

**TISHCHENDORF, Lobegott Friedrich Konstantin von** (1815-1874), German biblical critic. See BIBLE, ENGLISH: Modern biblical research.

**TISSA** (fl. 251 B. C.), king of Ceylon. See CEYLON: Earliest history.

**TISSAPHERNES** (d. 395 B. C.), Persian soldier and statesman. Became satrap in Asia Minor in 414 B. C., and carried on war against Athens, 413-407 B. C. See GREECE: B. C. 413; B. C. 413-412; B. C. 411-407.

**TISZA, Kalman** (1830-1902), Hungarian statesman. Prime minister, 1875-1890. See HUNGARY: 1868-1890; 1878-1890.

**TISZA, Stephen, Count** (1861-1918), Hungarian statesman. Premier and minister of the interior, 1903-1906; 1913-1917. See HUNGARY: 1897-1910; 1917-1918; AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1903-1905; 1905-1906.

On electoral reform. See HUNGARY: 1907-1914; SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Hungary: 1222-1918.

Influence in dual monarchy. See AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1915; HUNGARY: 1914.

In World War. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 13; 14; 32.

Assassination. See AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1918; HUNGARY: 1918 (November).

**TITANIC.**—"A terrible disaster, involving a greater loss of life than has ever been known in the history of the mercantile marine, happened to the White Star liner 'Titanic' . . . [Apr. 14, 1912]. The 'Titanic' which was the largest ship in the world, was on her maiden voyage across the Atlantic. When in latitude 41.16 North, longi-

tude 50.14 West, the nearest land being Cape Race, she struck an iceberg about 11.40 p. m. According to a statement drawn up by some of the survivors, there was a smooth sea and the stars were visible, though there was no moon. The iceberg was reported by the look-outs to the officers on the bridge, but not in time to avoid the collision. The boats were lowered and took off the women and children and a proportion of the men. But the boats, which numbered twenty in all, including the collapsible boats, were not nearly enough, and out of the 2,208 persons on board apparently only 705 were saved. The number of drowned is therefore said to have reached the appalling total of 1,503. The 'Titanic,' carrying down with her the great majority of men passengers and crew, sank about 2 a. m.—*Spectator*, Apr. 20, 1912, p. 605.—On April 16, following the disaster, the transatlantic lines mutually agreed to make use of routes farther south in the iceberg zone. Following the investigation of the calamity by a sub-committee of the Committee on Commerce of the United States Senate during April and May of 1912, a number of the general rules and regulations applying to safety at sea were amended. The British court of inquiry appointed by the ministry acting for the Board of Trade was headed by Lord Mersey. It found that the loss of the ship was due to collision with an iceberg brought about by the excessive speed at which the ship was being navigated. In view of the customary practice of masters in the North Atlantic, who steam at full speed in clear weather, the court found itself unable to blame the captain. At the same time, its recommendations that speed must be reduced when ice is reported, that there should be "boats for all," that boat-drill, a continuous service of wireless telegraphy, and the policing of a disaster are vital precautions, were steps toward setting up a new standard on the sea. "The owner [of the Titanic], the Ocean Steam Navigation Company, Ltd., alleging that the loss was occasioned and incurred without its privity or knowledge filed a petition under the statutes of the United States and the rules in admiralty praying that the petitioner's interest in the life-boats and pending freight be appraised, the sum paid into court, that the petitioner's liability be adjudged as limited to this sum, and that the prosecution of all suits against the petitioner for loss resulting from the accident be enjoined. . . . Under the British rule the contingent liability of the owner of the Titanic was represented by a huge fund, while under the United States statute applied by the Supreme Court to the advantage of the British shipowner against American claimants, it was practically nothing."—A. K. Kuhn, *International aspects of the Titanic case (American Journal of International Law, Apr., 1915, pp. 336, 351)*.—See also ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless, or radio: 1909-1912.

**TITCHFIELD ABBEY**, medieval abbey of the thirteenth century in Hampshire, England. The ruins are still extant. See LIBRARIES: Medieval: Monastic libraries.

**TITHE**, tenth part, recognized from very early times as a religious or secular tax, either voluntary or enforced.

**Primitive conceptions.**—Practice among ancient peoples.—Evidence shows that "the Egyptians recognized it as a duty to offer a part of their property to their gods . . . [for] as far back as we know anything of their history . . .

the god's portion was deemed sacred, and . . . to diminish it was regarded a sin. . . . Pharaoh and his officials, with many, if not all of the people, annually offered the first fruits of their crops to their temples, which they permanently endowed with estates, towns, ships, lands, slaves, cattle, soldiers, and scribes for the assistance, education and support of the priests as well as for temple repairs and enlargements, together with the furniture and accessories of worship. They offered also a portion of the spoils taken in war and on festivals and various other occasions, made further offerings of the most varied kinds. . . . [The] proportion these offerings bore to their entire income . . . seems to have been not less than a tenth and in some cases is believed to have reached a sixth. . . . [Similarly] we find Tiglath Pileser, Nebuchadnezzar, Nabonidus, Belshazzar, Cyrus, and other [Babylonian and Semitic] sovereigns, with all classes of the people in the Euphrates valley, as well as Phoenician colonists in Carthage . . . annually offering a tenth of their increase, whether from fruits of the ground or profits from merchandise; whether from spoils of war, from transit-dues, portions of tribute, or other sources of income, whereby the temples were furnished and endowed, the priests supported, and the gods honoured. . . . The earliest allusions to tithe-paying in Greece come down from mythological times and cluster around the oldest writers and lawgivers, such as Hesiod and Draco. . . . We have [as a later example] Pausanius, a Spartan general [who died before 466 B. C.], after his victory over Mardonius, paying out of the tithe of the spoil a tripod of gold to Apollo, and two brazen statues, one to Jupiter Olympus, the other to the Isthmian Neptune. . . . Among the earliest peoples and persons known to us in Europe, we have the Pelasgi, the Argives, and the legendary kings of Rome, offering tenths of their warlike spoils. . . . When, moreover, we reach the period of authentic history, we read of Spartan generals, Roman dictators, lawyers and farmers, Greek shepherds, sailors, merchants, miners, cooks . . . even dissolute women—thinking it right and religious to offer a tenth of their increase to the gods. . . . This practice of tithe-paying was known and observed also among other European nations, such as the Samothracians, Sicilians, Gauls, and even Britons and Saxons, . . . facts attested by . . . Hesiod, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Aristophanes, Aristotle and Demosthenes among the Greeks; and among the Romans, Plutarch, Cicero, Varro, Julius Caesar, Pliny and others."—H. Lansdell, *Sacred tenth*, v. 1, pp. 19-21, 24, 36.—See also AGRICULTURE: Zoroastrian literature provides allusions to both ecclesiastical and secular tithes and Chinese sacred literature refers to a levy of a tenth of the harvest. In Mohammedan law the tithe was sometimes only one-twentieth or one-fortieth, but the same general notion of a fractional tax or tribute prevailed and is still the general method of taxation in Mohammedan countries. Among the Hebrews the tithe system was a recognized and regulated method of religious support. Abraham paid tithes to Melchizedek, king of Salem, who "was the priest of the most high God" (Genesis, 14-20); Jacob vowed to the Lord "of all that thou shalt give me I will surely give the tenth unto thee" (Genesis, 28:22). "Later the Mosaic law made the tithe obligatory upon the Israelites. The tithe, whether of the seed of the land or of the fruit of the tree belonged to Yhwh and consequently was holy.

... According to the Rabbis . . . there were three kinds of tithes: (1) that given to the Levites as stated in Num. 18:21 *et seq.*, and termed 'the first tithe'; . . . (2) the tithe which was to be taken to Jerusalem and there consumed by the landowner and his family, and which was termed 'the second tithe,' . . . it being taken from what remained after the first tithe had been appropriated; and (3) that given to the poor. . . . Therefore two tithes were to be taken every year except in the seventh year: Nos. 1 and 2 in the first, second, fourth and fifth years; Nos. 1 and 3 in the third and sixth years. . . . Samuel informed the Israelites that they would have to give a tenth of everything to the king (1 Sam. 8:15, 17). When the Israelites afterward fell into idolatry, they continued to bring their tithes to the temple of their idols. . . . King Hezekiah again imposed the tithe on his subjects; and the people of Judah brought it in abundance, apparently for the use of the Levites. . . . In the time of . . . [Amos] the Israelites paid tithes for the use of their sanctuaries in the Northern Kingdom, as, similarly, in the Persian period the tithes were converted to the use of the Temple of Yhwh. . . . Those instituted by Nehemiah for payment to the Levites were a development of the heave-offering . . . given to the priests. . . . It is stated in Neh. 10:37 *et seq.*, that the Levites were required to collect their tithes under the supervision of a priest."—M. Seligsohn, *Tithe* (*Jewish encyclopedia*, v. 12, pp. 150-152).

**Early Christian and medieval periods.—**Claims of the church enforced by ecclesiastical and civil law.—"The tithe customary with the Hebrews passed from the synagogue to the church at a time when the latter's officiant came to be viewed as priest and the priesthood of the Church as the continuation and fulfilment of that in the Old Testament. Hence it was now required of all Christians to pay tithes as a religious obligation [Apostolic Constitutions, Apostolic Canons, etc.] . . . However, some time elapsed before this requirement was generally recognized. The tithes actually paid bore the appearance of a voluntary contribution, and so continued till the sixth century. On the other hand, the second Synod of Macon (585) commanded payment under threat of excommunication, and from that time forth payment was enjoined in various ways, especially through the confessional, where the omission to pay tithes was treated as a sin. . . . The provision was made [in the capitulares of Charlemagne] . . . that of the goods of the Church which the State leased as benefices subject to reversion to the Church, the tithe, and furthermore, a ninth of the remaining ninety per cent, or two tithes in all, were to be contributed. . . . The bishops were . . . empowered to receive and to distribute tithes. The obligation was transferred to the newly converted Saxons in the so-called *Capitulatio de partibus Saxonie*, chap. XVII. . . . From that time onward, the tithes were in continual use in Germany and France, also in other countries, coming with the introduction of Christianity, though often fiercely opposed. Thus they were established in Portugal not until the close of the eleventh century, about the same time in Denmark and Iceland, and in Sweden not till the beginning of the thirteenth century. . . . Special provisions . . . in the canonical collections . . . aim to restore to the Church such tithes as had been withdrawn through alienation or otherwise. Possession of tithes by

the laity was pronounced a sin. All attempt to contest the claims of the Church to tithes were opposed by the Council of Trent" (1545-1563).—E. Sehling, *Tithes* (*New Schaff-Herzog encyclopedia of religious knowledge*, v. ii, p. 454).—See also INSURANCE: Life insurance: Early forms.

**Development of system after the Reformation.**—Retention of system by evangelical bodies.—Policy of repeal by civil governments.—Modification of system.—Following the Reformation, the tithe system passed on to the evangelical bodies. The Anabaptists of Switzerland, alone, seem to have denied its authority. The twelve German articles of 1525 did not repudiate the obligation, while Luther not only regarded the tithe system as the most expedient form of taxation but advocated their payment to the temporary ruler. Tithes were retained in the German evangelical state churches with modifications and strict limitations. France formally repealed the tithes without indemnity in 1780. Other countries repealed certain of them with compensating indemnity. The repeal of tithes has in general been promoted by the state on economic and political grounds. "At the present time, in most countries where some species of tithes still exist, as in England (for the Established Church), in Austria, and Germany, the payment has been changed into a rent charge. In English speaking countries generally, as far as Catholics are concerned, the clergy receive no tithes. In consequence . . . equivocal payments in lieu of tithes [have been substituted] . . . In some parts of Canada, the tithe is still recognized by civil law, and the Fourth Council of Quebec (1808), declared that its payment is binding in conscience on the faithful."—W. H. W. Fanning, *Tithes* (*Catholic encyclopedia*, v. 14, p. 742).

**Evolution of system in England.**—Early recognition (8th century).—Statute of Westminster (1285).—Alienation by suppression of monasteries under Henry VIII.—Exemptions and commutations.—Church revenue commissions.—Corn-rent Commutation Act of 1836.—Amendment acts.—Redemption provisions in Act of 1918.—"English law very early recognized the tithe, as in the reigns of Athelstan, Edgar, and Canute before the Norman Conquest. In English statute law proper, however, the first mention of tithes is to be found in the Statute of Westminster of 1285."—W. H. W. Fanning, *Tithes* (*Catholic encyclopedia*, v. 14, p. 741).—"Long prior to the Reformation and probably by the middle of the thirteenth century predial tithe was recognized as payable as of common right to the parson in return for services rendered. 'The suppression of the monasteries,' says Hallam ('Constitutional History of England,' p. 67), 'poured in an instant such a torrent of wealth upon the Crown, as has seldom been equalled in any country by the confiscations following a subdued rebellion.' . . . The tithes thus alienated, though only a small part of the properties confiscated, passed into the hands of laymen. In most cases the grantee purchased the tithes from the Crown on a valuation of twenty years' purchase. Others had tithes given to them for services rendered to the Crown. Some obtained the tithes by the exchange of lands and other property given to the Crown as an equivalent. Under Elizabeth and James I. commissioners were appointed by letters patent who employed contractors to sell to the highest bidder and pay the proceeds into the Exchequer. Others received grants of tithes 'for the support of their

dignity.' While a vast amount of tithe was thus alienated to secular purposes a large portion was given back to the Church by Henry VIII., who endowed the new sees of Bristol, Chester, Oxford, Peterborough and Westminster almost exclusively with tithes. Hospitals and schools were also endowed with tithe by Edward VI. Prior to the Reformation, land belonging to the religious orders had been exempted by the Pope from the payment of tithe. This benefit was confirmed by the Statute 31 Hen. VIII. cap. 13 s.21. It thus comes about that a vast extent of land is held by lay owners tithe free, a fact which is not commonly known. It appears from a partial examination of the tithe apportionment deeds . . . ('Alienated Tithes,' 1896) that the laity hold abbey lands exceeding 82,000 acres on which they pay no tithes [and that] . . . this acreage would be 'thrice doubled' . . . by further search. A vast amount of tithe has disappeared by the merging of tithe in glebe lands, by the merging of tithes in the freehold of their lands by owners who held the tithe and land as well jointly by the sale of tithe by clerical owners to redeem land tax, by the sale by Bishops to build episcopal residences, by episcopal and Capitular Corporations under the Enfranchising Acts, and by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners; though in these cases the Church has obtained an equivalent in money value. From the time of Henry VIII. to the year 1835 there appears to be no official parliamentary report of the revenues of the Church. But on June 16 of that year was published the Report of the Ecclesiastical Revenues Commission. And on February 4, 1835, another Royal Commission was appointed to consider the state of the several dioceses with reference to the more equal distribution of episcopal duties and to consider the state of the several Cathedral and Collegiate Churches, and to devise the best mode of providing for the cure of souls with special reference to the residence of the Clergy on their respective benefices. This commission is generally known as the 'Church Enquiry Commission.' It presented four Reports, which, in conjunction with the previous commission, made clear the whole facts relating to the revenues of the Church. . . . The Commutation Act of 1836 made a great change. Between the years 1757 and 1830 there had been upwards of 2,000 Acts containing clauses for the commutation of tithes, as appears from a parliamentary return of December 5, 1831, but many of these, being under Local Enclosure Acts, were of the nature of Private Estate Acts, and were not printed by authority unless at the expense of the parties obtaining the Acts. For four or five years previous to 1831, there had been a period of agricultural depression and much discontent amongst tithe-payers. It was agreed by economists that the right of the Church to appropriate a tenth of the produce was a bar to cultivation, and prevented waste lands from being brought into productive use. The clergy had frequently been content with much less than their legal due, and there was ill-will between farmers and clergymen. Pitt and Peel had both attempted to deal with the evil, but it was left to Lord John Russell to frame the Act by which the question was settled. . . . The principle of the . . . [Act of 1836] was that the landowner or tenant might agree with the tithe-owner to commute the tithe, whether paid by modus or composition or otherwise, into a corn-rent payable in money and permanent in

quantity, but fluctuating in yearly value. The corn were to be wheat, barley and oats, and the basis of the calculation was to be the tithe paid for the seven-years previous to Christmas 1835. All other tithable produce was disregarded, which explains why land which may never have grown wheat may nevertheless be liable to tithe rent-charge. The arrangement was to be voluntary up to October 1, 1838, then compulsory. Three Commissioners, two of whom were appointed by the Crown and one by the Archbishop of Canterbury, were empowered to proceed by certain fixed rules to a final adjudication. The process was completed in about seven years. . . . Many of the provisions of the Tithe Commutation Act have now become obsolete, as the process of commutation has been completed, and for the purpose of statute-law revision, all the provisions in the Tithe Acts relating exclusively to the process of commutation have been repealed. These extensive repeals have left the Tithe Acts in many cases obscure, and a Consolidation Act is much required, and should be undertaken without delay. . . . Between the years 1836 and 1886 twelve Tithe Amendment Acts were passed. The most important of these was the Extraordinary Tithe Redemption Act, 1886 . . . [which], in addition to the ordinary charge for the parish, . . . introduced an extraordinary charge which was to be a rate per acre, and payable only when the land was cultivated with hops or fruits, or as a market garden. . . . The Act of 1886 provided that until redemption at the capital value fixed the lands should be charged with a rent-charge of four per cent. on such capital value. The parishes to which the Act applied numbered 541 in fifteen counties. Two hundred and ninety of these parishes were in Kent. The total area under this special cultivation in 1886 was found to be 68,772- $\frac{3}{4}$  acres. The clergy of the parishes affected by the Act had their incomes reduced by about thirty per cent., but on the other hand the rent-charge was exempted from the payment of any rates. It was one object of the Act of 1918 to encourage redemption, and as the clauses of this part of the Act are favourable to the landowners redemption is now [1921] taking place on a large scale. . . . Various leaflets have been put out by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries which may be briefly summarized as sufficiently summarizing the changes made by the Act of 1918. This Act provides that tithe rent-charge of any amount shall, on the application of the owner of the land, and without the consent of the owner of the tithe rent-charge, the Bishop or the patron, be directed by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries to be redeemed, unless owing to exceptional circumstances the Minister directs otherwise. It further provides that the minimum limit of twenty-five years' purchase shall be abolished, and that the consideration for redemption shall be fixed by agreement between the landowner, and the titleowner, or in default of such agreement shall be determined by the Minister. No agreement however so far as spiritual person is concerned in respect of his benefice is valid without the consent of Queen Anne's Bounty Board."—A. G. B. Atkinson, *Tithe rent-charge*, pp. 3-7.—See also FRANKPLEDGE.

ALSO IN: L. Thorndike, *History of Medieval Europe*.—D. C. Munro, *Middle Ages*.—V. Duruy, *History of the Middle Ages*.—C. J. H. Hayes, *Political and social history of modern Europe*.—W. Easterby, *History of the law of tithes in England*.



**TITHE**, Irish. See IRELAND: 1760-1798; ENGLAND: 1832-1833.

**TITHE OF SALADIN**. See SALADIN, TITHE OF.

**TITIAN** (Tiziano Vecellio, or Vecelli, da Cadore) (c. 1477-1576), Italian painter of the Venetian school. See PAINTING: Italian: High Renaissance.

**TITIENSIS**, early Roman tribe. See ROME: Ancient kingdom: Genesis, etc.

**TITLES**, Land. See LAND TITLES.

**TITTONI**, Tommaso (1853- ), Italian statesman. Secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1903-1906; 1919 (June-November). See ITALY: 1905-1906; 1919: Internal affairs.

**TITUS**, Flavius Sabinus Vespasianus (c. 40-81). Roman emperor, 79-81. See ROME: Empire: 70-96.

**TIVITIVAS**, South American Indian tribe. See CARIBS.

**TIVOLI**, town in the province of Rome, Italy, about eighteen miles northeast of Rome. It occupies the site of ancient Tibur. See TIBUR.

**TLASCALA**, or Tlaxcala, capital of the state of the same name in Mexico, about twenty-two miles northwest of Puebla, on the Atoyac river. It was captured by Cortés in 1519. See MEXICO: 1519 (June-October); 1520-1521.

**TLEMÇEN**, town of Algeria near the frontier of Morocco, eighty-one miles southwest of Oran. Its population was 43,090 in 1921. It originated as a kingdom in the thirteenth century. See AFRICA: Ancient and medieval civilization: Arab occupation.

**TLINGITS**, or Tlinkets, North American Indian tribe. See ATHAPASCAN FAMILY; INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: North Pacific Coast area; Linguistic characteristics.

**TMUTARAKAN**, ancient Ekaterinodar. See UKRAINE: Origin of the people.

**T. N. T.** See CHEMISTRY: Practical application: Explosives: Sprengel.

**TOBACCO**. See AMERICA: 1584-1586.

**Farmer's Union: Kentucky**. See KENTUCKY: 1905-1909.

**Trust**. See TRUSTS: United States: 1905-1906; 1907: Chief existing combinations; 1907-1909: Suit of the government against the tobacco trust; 1911: Supreme Court decisions; 1921-1923; SUPREME COURT: 1888-1913.

**TOBACCO NATION**, North American Indian tribe. See HURONS; IROQUOIAN CONFEDERACY.

**TOBAGO**, island in the British West Indies, 20 miles northeast of Trinidad. See BRITISH EMPIRE: Extent; TRINIDAD.

**TOBAS**, South American Indian tribe. See PAMPAS TRIBES.

**TOCA**, Joaquin Sánchez de. See SÁNCHEZ DE TOCA, JOAQUIN.

**TOCQUEVILLE**, Alexis Henri Charles Maurice Clérel, Comte de (1805-1859), French historian. See HISTORY: 27.

**TODLEBEN**, Franz Eduard Ivanovich, Count (1818-1884), Russian general and military engineer. Defended Sevastopol, 1854-1855. See RUSSIA: 1854-1856.

**TOEPLITZ**, Treaty of (1813). See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.

**TOGA, Roman**.—"The toga, the specifically national dress of the Romans, was originally put on the naked body, fitting much more tightly than the rich folds of the togas of later times. About the shape of this toga, which is described as a semicircular cloak . . . many different opinions

prevail. Some scholars consider it to have been an oblong piece of woven cloth . . . others construct it of one or even two pieces cut into segments of a circle. Here again we shall adopt in the main the results arrived at through practical trials by Weiss ('Costümkunde,' p. 956 et seq.). The Roman toga therefore was not . . . a quadrangular oblong, but 'had the shape of an oblong edged off into the form of an oval, the middle length being equal to about three times the height of a grown-up man (exclusive of the head), and its middle breadth equal to twice the same length. In putting it on, the toga was at first folded lengthwise, and the double dress thus originated was laid in folds on the straight edge and thrown over the left shoulder in the simple manner of the Greek or Tuscan cloak; the toga, however, covered the whole left side and even dragged on the ground to a considerable extent. The cloak was then pulled across the back and through the right arm, the ends being again thrown over the left shoulder backwards. The part of the drapery covering the back was once more pulled towards the right shoulder, so as to add to the richness of the folds.' . . . The simpler, that is narrower, toga of earlier times naturally clung more tightly to the body."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 95.—"No tacks or fastenings of any sort indeed are visible in the toga, but their existence may be inferred from the great formality and little variation displayed in its divisions and folds. In general, the toga seems not only to have formed, as it were, a short sleeve to the right arm, which was left unconfined, but to have covered the left arm down to the wrist. . . . The material of the toga was wool; the colour, in early ages, its own natural yellowish hue. In later periods this seems, however, only to have been retained in the togas of the higher orders; inferior persons wearing theirs dyed, and candidates for public offices bleached by an artificial process. In times of mourning the toga was worn black, or was left off altogether. Priests and magistrates wore the 'toga pretexta', or toga edged with a purple border called pretexta. This . . . was . . . worn by all youths of noble birth to the age of fifteen. . . . The knights wore the 'trabea', or toga striped with purple throughout."—T. Hope, *Costume of the ancients*, v. 1. —See also COSTUME: Egyptian, etc.

**TOGGENBURG WAR** (1712). See SWITZERLAND: 1652-1780.

**TOGHRUL BEG** (d. 1063), Seljuk Turkish Sultan, 1037-1063. See TURKEY: 1004-1063.

**TOGO**, Heihachiro, Count (1847- ), Japanese admiral. Commanded the Japanese navy in the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-1905. See JAPAN: 1902-1905.

**TOGOLAND**, or Togo, colony on the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa, bounded on the east by Dahomey, on the south by the Gulf of Guinea, on the west by the Gold Coast Colony, and on the north by the colony of the Upper Senegal and Niger. (See AFRICA: Map.) "Although the smallest of the territories which formed the German Colonial Empire in Africa, Togoland, with its area of 33,000 square miles, and its population estimated in 1913 at 1,030,000, was officially regarded as a model colony since it had been for many years financially independent of the Fatherland. . . . [While the country was under German administration, a stable government was established, the hinterland was opened up, three railways and many excellent roads were built, slavery

was abolished and inter-tribal warfare discouraged, and a number of experimental plantations were formed.] The Government, by its energetic policy, . . . developed the resources of the country, established trade and commerce on sound lines, and made considerable progress towards the betterment and prosperity of the people. The whole country has been described as a great storehouse, actual and potential, for the supply of the most varied tropical products—including palm kernels and palm oil, cotton, cocoa, maize, groundnuts, cassava, coffee, rice, and rubber. . . . Some German merchants, with a view to avoiding the high import duties on the English Gold Coast, obtained a concession from the local chief, and founded factories in Anecho or Little Popo. From the death of the chief in 1833 until 1884, the disputes over the succession kept the country in a ferment. In July, of the latter year, Dr. Nachtigal, the German Consul General for West Africa, restored order by entering Little Popo and hoisting the German flag in Bagida and Lome. [See AFRICA: Modern European occupation: Later 19th century.] In 1886 a defensive treaty was concluded between the German Imperial Commissioner Falkenthal and the paramount chief, the German standard was unfurled in Agome-Palimo in 1887, and in 1888 Falkenthal made his successful march to Salaga, which was followed by the Anglo-German treaty declaring the neutrality of Goneja and Dagomba. (See also GERMANY: 1800 (June).) . . . With the beginning of 1913, steps were taken to erect a powerful wireless station at Kamina. Road construction was proceeded with so steadily that by 1914 there were 755 miles of roads suitable for motor traffic."—A. F. Calvert, *German African empire*, pp. 215-218.—On the outbreak of the World War the German wireless station immediately attracted the attention of the Allied naval authorities and the whole province was soon forced to surrender unconditionally, August, 1914, to the French and British. (See also WORLD WAR: 1914: VI. Africa: a.) In the peace settlement after the war, 1919, Togoland was divided between France and Great Britain, the latter receiving about one-third of the interior region bordering on the Gold Coast territory.—See also AFRICA: Modern European occupation: 1918-1920: Territorial acquisitions.

**TOHOPEKA**, Battle of (1814). See U. S. A.: 1813-1814 (August-April).

**TOISON D'OR**, French name of the "Order of the Golden Fleece." See GOLDEN FLEECE.

**TOKIO**, or Tokyo, capital and first city of the Japanese empire. It is situated on Tokio bay on the southeastern coast of the island of Hondo. The river Sumida divides the city into two unequal parts, the eastern portion low and flat, the western portion hilly with thickly populated valleys. The population, census of 1920, was 2,173,162. See JAPAN: Map.

**Feudal city of Yedo.**—"Tokyo is by no means an ancient city as things go in Japan. For nearly a thousand years, while the center of the Empire was at Nara and Kyoto far away to the southwest, the site of Tokyo was a remote marsh at the base of a low rolling plain stretching back from the head waters of the bay. It was not until the twelfth century that its old name Yedo appears in the records of Japan; it was not until Ota Dokwan built his fortress there in 1457 that it began to be a center of influence. Its real importance, however, dates from the year 1603 when the mighty feudal lord, Tokugawa Iyeyasu,

having laid all other lords low in the dust, became the Shogun, chief minister of the Emperor, and with his 80,000 retainers took up his residence in Yedo. [See JAPAN: 1549-1605.] That was in the reign of King James, four years before the founding of Jamestown, Virginia, and seventeen years before the landing of the Pilgrims. For two centuries and a half, the mighty Tokugawa family ruled Japan from its seat at Yedo while the Emperors, as nominal sovereigns, whiled away their hours with ceremonies amid the exquisite beauties of far-off Kyoto. Established as the center of real power at the time when America was being founded, Tokyo was still the center of power when Commodore Perry, representing the independent United States of America, anchored in the mouth of the Bay of Yedo in 1853. [See JAPAN: 1797-1854.] During those long years [from 1603 to 1853], the city grew into a huge metropolis. Official reckonings made in 1687 placed the population at 1,370,000 people, not counting the feudal lords, Daimios and their retainers (Samurai), stationed there. Fire after fire swept over the city; earthquakes shattered it again and again; plagues decimated it; but undaunted in spirit it arose anew after each disaster, stronger and richer than ever. So it was a great city when in 1869 the Tokugawa shogunate was overthrown, the Emperor restored to real power, the capital of the empire moved from Kyoto to Yedo and the ancient name changed to Tokyo, or, translated into English, 'the Eastern Capital.' [See JAPAN: 1868-1894.] This history gives the key to the physical structure and spirit of Tokyo. The home of feudal lords with their armies of retainers and families, the life of the city centered in feudal customs and ceremonials. The shrewd Tokugawas compelled the restive and warlike vassals to live under the frowning walls of their castles a certain part of each year and to leave their families there as hostages for good behavior when at home on their estates. So everything revolved around the needs of the feudal lords. The shops, industries, and mercantile establishments that sprang up catered to the lordly families. The consummate skill of weaving, carving, building, and metal working was drawn upon to serve the Daimios and Samurai of Tokyo and their families. Thus Yedo, like Kyoto, became a center of taste as well as political power."—C. A. Beard, *Rebuilding in Japan* (*American Review of Reviews*, Oct., 1923).

1869-1923.—**Removal of capital from Kyoto to Tokio.**—Introduction of modern civilization.—Effect of World War on industrial and financial enterprise.—Progress in municipal government.—Viscount Goto's program of modernization.—"When the Emperor moved his residence to Tokyo all the old characteristics were merely accentuated. New and still more splendid temples and palaces were erected. The army of imperial officers was transferred to the city. It became the center of the great revolution brought about by the introduction of steam, electricity, railways, and industry. It became the center of the new financial institutions associated with the revolution in the government. To the ancient feudal society, proud, restrained, and limited, were added new and strange foreign elements, as ambassadors and ministers from all civilized countries of the world who brought their retinues into Tokyo. Brick and stone buildings after European styles began to appear, sometimes looming up like monstrosities beside the characteristic architecture of

old Yedo. There the Japanese gentlemen began to cast off their flowing robes for frock coats, trousers, and high hats; the ladies, more conservative, clinging with greater tenacity to old ways and costumes. For almost fifty years, however, Tokyo while changing rapidly in appearance, manners, and customs, went on her course in a somewhat conservative manner, as if regretting the dying days. When the World War broke out in 1914 the economic life of the Empire was quickened beyond all precedents. Huge war fortunes were accumulated. Thousands of Japanese hurried to the West to study, to discover new business methods, and to buy new industrial devices. Factories sprang up as if by magic in the city and in the suburbs. With Europe an influence almost cut off, American influence rose to immense heights, and with it the American passion for skyscrapers. Almost in a flash new steel and concrete buildings, five, six or seven stories high began to shoot up from the wide reaching sea of low wooden buildings. Great department stores were opened on American models. Brilliantly lighted streets lined with shops displaying wares from the ends of the earth pushed out in every direction from the center to the city. For enterprise, industrial activity, financial stability, Tokyo took her place among the great capitals of the world. . . . At Tokyo the East and the West met in strange confusion; and a social revolution was being wrought under our very eyes. . . . Measured by the standards of the best-governed American cities, Tokyo on September 1, 1923, was still in a primitive condition in many respects. But compared with old Yedo immense progress had been made. A water-works plant had been erected and an army of working people was engaged in extending it. . . . Wooden, concrete, and asphalt pavements were going down. . . . One large section of the city had sewer service and mains were being laid rapidly; but more than three-fourths of the city was without sewers and relief upon ancient methods for removing the night soil which was used for fertilizer by the outlying farmers. The city owned and operated a street-car system which served the great thoroughfares, but was utterly inadequate to handle the traffic of the city. A private corporation furnished gas to most of the city and many of the surrounding suburbs. With electric light and power the people of Tokyo were abundantly supplied by the city government and a private corporation. . . . The city of Tokyo was busily engaged in a program of modernization when it was shaken down by the earthquake. . . . The magnificent plan for a greater Tokyo, inaugurated under the inspiration of Viscount Goto, was being pushed under his competent successor, Mayor Nagata. . . . A plan for extending the boundaries to cover the area of greater Tokyo had been prepared and laid before the imperial Government. It was in the Home Office when the crash came. . . . In addition to enlarging the physical boundaries of the city and making better provision of public services, the Goto plan embraced a large program of social work; the construction of municipal lodging houses and dwellings for working people (some of which were finished just in time to be thrown down), new hospitals, a new waste-disposal system, employment exchanges, playgrounds, day nurseries, orphanages, municipal markets, the destruction of slum areas, and child health stations. This was not a paper program; energetic leaders with ample

funds were engaged in actual construction and operation. Within a decade or more Tokyo would have been transformed. In keeping with material improvements there was a progressive development of municipal democracy which revealed a startling change in the outlook of Japanese statesmen. When Tokyo was given autonomous government in 1889, the Prussian model was adopted under the influence of a Prussian adviser. In other words, the city council was elected under the three-class system. The highest taxpayers, who paid one-third of the taxes, formed the first class; those who paid a second third formed the second class; and all the remaining taxpayers formed the third class. . . . At the last election under this system in 1920, there were only 51,000 eligible voters legally entitled to vote for city councillors, in a city of more than two million people. Many and vigorous were protests made against this exclusive system, and at length, in 1922, the Imperial Parliament . . . abolished the three-class system and substituted a two-class system. Every male person who for two years had paid a direct municipal tax, no matter how small, even a license tax for a bicycle or rickshaw, can vote. The voters are divided into two classes. The total amount of taxes paid by the direct taxpayers is divided by the number of taxpayers and an 'average tax' is thus established. All those who pay the average amount or more are put into the first class and elect one-half of the municipal councillors. The remainder who pay less than the average, fall into the second class and elect half the councillors. The effect of this act was a three-fold increase in the municipal electorate at the election held in July, 1922. . . . Like the other premier cities . . . [Tokio] is governed under a general imperial law. The city is merely a subdivision of the prefecture and all its important acts must be approved by the prefect who is appointed by the Imperial Government, as well as by the appropriate Imperial minister under whose authority the act comes. Police control is in the hands of a commissioner of police appointed by the Imperial Government and responsible to it. The authority of the commissioner is very wide; it covers police protection, fire administration, and the enforcement of the building code. As would be expected, there is a duplication of functions and much waste in this system. An essential part of Viscount Goto's program, therefore, dealt with the vexatious questions which Americans know as 'home rule.' It called for the ousting of the prefect altogether from the entire area of Greater Tokyo, and the transference of many functions from the police commissioner to the city authorities."—C. A. Beard, *Rebuilding in Japan* (*American Review of Reviews*, Oct., 1923).

1923.—Earthquake and fire.—In September, 1923 Tokio and "all along Tokyo Bay, westward and northward to the Mountains, suburbs, villages and towns . . . [were] shaken down by earthquake, ravaged by fire, or scourged by tidal waves."—*New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1923.—"The unprecedented earthquake came without warning a few minutes before noon, on Sept. 1. The shock was so violent that its work of destruction was completed in a few minutes reducing to debris not only Tokio, Yokohama and Yokosuka but numerous other cities. . . . In Tokio by 4 o'clock the same afternoon fire was raging in at least twelve different sections and lasted until the evening of Sept. 3, when more than 350,000 houses or 75 per cent of the total number of houses in

the metropolis had been converted into smoldering charcoal and ashes. All the Government buildings with the exception of the Navy and Justice buildings were destroyed by the flames. All the foreign embassies and delegations met the same fate, although the Ambassadors and Ministers; as well as their staffs, were able to escape. Today 1,400,000 inhabitants, or almost 80 per cent of Tokio's entire population are homeless. . . . On Sept. 7 the Home Department estimated the number of dead in Tokio at 47,000. The next day the figures rose to 60,000. On Sept. 10 the figures from the same source were 84,114; on Sept. 12 the number of dead and injured was 1,336,749. . . . When a comprehensive estimate is made Tokio's dead will reach 100,000 with a proportionately large number of injured. . . . On the day after the earthquake while Tokio was still ablaze and the earth still heaving, the new Yamamoto Cabinet was organized on the open ground adjoining the Akasaka, detached palace of the Prince Regent. With remarkable vigor and resolution the new Government took hold of the appalling situation. . . . Due to their . . . [efficient organization] perfect order was maintained throughout the cities and by Sept. 8 trolley and lighting systems and the water works in Tokio were again partially in operation. . . . Immediately after the earthquake the Government appropriated 9,500,000 yen (\$4,750,000) for relief while the Emperor contributed 10,000,000 yen (\$5,000,000). On Sept. 8 the Government appropriation was increased to 520,000,000 yen (\$260,000,000). . . . Meanwhile the world went to the rescue. . . . The American warships were the first to arrive at the scene of the disaster with provisions and medical supplies."—K. K. Kawakami, *Japan's ordeal through earthquake and fire* (*New York Times Current History*, Oct., 1923).—“Howard P. Moore, general manager of the Foreign Insurance Association . . . stated that the figures for damages to property by earthquake, fire and flood in Tokio and Yokohama should be put at \$843,213,750. He does not believe the total will exceed \$1,000,000,000. . . . According to Moore, the recent earthquake and fires will (as in the earthquake of 1855) be a total economic loss without any insurance to act as a cushion.”—*New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1923.

1923 (December).—**Restoration plans.**—“When Yamamoto became Premier on the heels of the earthquake, with Shimpei Goto, Minister for Home Affairs, it was expected that the recovery of the country would proceed quietly, quickly and without undue friction. There was the moral influence of the fact that the Premier belonged to the Satsuma clan, into which the Prince Regent was about to enter through his contemplated marriage with Princess Nagako Kuni; there were the comprehensive plans of Goto for the building of magnificent and durable twin metropolises over the ruins of Tokio and Yokohama. But the time when such moral influence could be successfully employed had gone by. Disbelief and suspicion prevailed. The House of Representatives voted a restoration fund of \$171,016,400, apportioned over six years. It reduced the budget some \$50,000,000. But it declined to accept Viscount Goto's plans. Legislation was blocked in both houses in spite of the intervention of the Crown.”—*Ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1924.

See also EDUCATION, ART: Modern: Japan; LIBRARIES: Modern: Japan.

**TOKIO UNIVERSITY.** See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1871-1913.

**TOKUGAWA, Prince Iyesato** (1863- ),

Japanese statesman. President of the House of Peers of the Japanese Parliament; chief of Japanese delegation to the Washington conference. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

**TOKUGAWA FAMILY,** Japanese dynasty, 1603-1867. See JAPAN: 1593-1625, to 1863-1868; TOKIO: Feudal city of Yedo; JAPANESE LITERATURE: 794-1868.

**TOKUGAWA IYEFASU.** See IYEFASU.

**TOLAND, John** (1670-1722), English deist. See DEISM: English deism.

**TOLBERT-ULLMAN AMENDMENT.** See NEW YORK: 1922.

**TOLBIAC, Battle of** (496). See ALEMANNI: 496-504; FRANKS: 481-511.

**TOLEDO, Fernando Alvarez de, Duke of Alva.** See ALVA.

**TOLEDO, Frederico de,** Spanish soldier. Besieged and captured Haarlem, 1573. See NETHERLANDS: 1572-1573; 1573-1574.

**TOLEDO, Pedro de** (1484-1553), Spanish viceroy in Naples, 1532-1553. See ITALY (Southern): 1528-1570.

**TOLEDO, Ohio,** county-seat of Lucas county, on both banks of the Maumee river, about ninety-five miles west of Cleveland. It was first settled in 1817, as Port Lawrence and in 1853 united with the town of Vistula under the name of Toledo, after the famous city in Spain. It was the scene of much fighting with the Indians. In 1920 it had a population of 243,164.

1805-1836.—**Site in dispute between Ohio and Michigan.** See MICHIGAN: 1837.

1899-1903.—**“Golden Rule” Jones as mayor.**—Importance was given to the municipal election of April, 1899, by the character of the chosen mayor, Samuel M. Jones. He had first made himself known as a manufacturer in the city, by his dealings with his employees. The “Golden Rule” was posted in his shops, as the law by which he expected his own conduct and that of the men who served him to be governed, and it was found that he consistently obeyed the rule. In 1897, the Republican party, needing a candidate for mayor, put him forward and elected him. In office, he served the people so well and the politicians and monopoly interests so little to their satisfaction, that his party, obedient to the latter, cast him aside and nominated to the mayor's office a more “practical” man. In 1903 Mayor Jones was reelected for his fourth term. He died in 1904.

1906-1911.—**Brand Whitlock as mayor.**—Brand Whitlock, who later was American minister to Belgium, was mayor from 1906 to 1911 and carried on the independent movement begun by “Golden Rule” Jones.

1917-1921.—**Municipal experiments.**—Early in 1917 Toledo installed at a cost of \$190,924 a high-pressure fire protection station operating over a large part of the business sections of the city. “The abuses arising from the petty court system constituted the chief cause for the passage by the Ohio legislature of the Toledo Municipal Court Act [1918], which abolished all justice courts in the city and established one municipal court which took their place as well as that of the so-called city courts and the police court. . . . [After] this municipal court . . . [had] been in existence for more than three years a survey made by the Commission of Publicity and Efficiency showed that . . . [former] abuses . . . [had] been eliminated under the new system.”—W. F. Johnson, *Poor man's court* (*Survey*, Feb. 11, 1922, p. 767).

**TOLEDO, Spain**, capital of the province of Toledo and formerly of the whole kingdom, forty-seven miles southwest of Madrid on the River Tagus. It is the seat of an archbishop who bears the title of primate of all the Spains. The city is also famous for its manufacture of arms, especially the Toledo blades. In 1919 the population was 444,156.

531-712.—Capital of Gothic kingdom in Spain. See **GOTHS**: 507-711.

712.—Surrender to Arab-Moors. See **SPAIN**: 711-713.

1033-1085.—Recovery from the Moors.—On the crumbling of the dominions of the Spanish caliphate of Cordova, Toledo became the seat of one of the most vigorous of the petty kingdoms which arose in Moorish Spain. But on the death of its founder, Aben Dylhun, and under his incapable son Yahia, the kingdom of Toledo soon sank to such weakness as invited the attacks of the Christian king of Leon, Alfonso VI. After a siege of three years, on May 25, 1085, the old capital of the Goths was restored to their descendants and successors.—Based on S. A. Dunham, *History of Spain and Portugal*, bk. 3, sect. 1, ch. 1.

1520-1522.—Revolt against the government of Charles, the emperor.—Siege and surrender. See **SPAIN**: 1518-1522.

1808-1813.—Uprising against France.—Toledo took part in the national uprising against France in the Peninsular War and was badly damaged by the military forces.

**TOLEDO, Councils of**. See **GOTHS**: 507-711; **FILIOQUE CONTROVERSY**.

**TOLENTINO, Battle of** (1815). See **VIENNA, CONGRESS OF**.

**TOLENTINO, Treaty of** (1797). See **FRANCE**: 1796-1797 (October-April).

**TOLERATION, Religious**: 313.—Constantine's Edict of Milan. See **ROME: Empire**: 313.

1593.—Established in Leghorn, Tuscany, by Ferdinand I. See **LIVORNIA, DECREE OF**.

1598-1599.—Edict of Nantes. See **FRANCE**: 1598-1599.

1618-1700.—Protestant religions of every denomination favored in Hohenzollern state. See **PRUSSIA**: 1618-1700.

1631-1661.—Denied in Massachusetts. See **MASSACHUSETTS**: 1631-1636; 1636, to 1649-1651; 1656-1661.

1634-1757.—Practised in Maryland. See **MARYLAND**: 1633-1637; 1643-1649, to 1650-1675; 1688-1757. \*

1636-1776.—Established by Roger Williams in Rhode Island.—Statutes affecting Roman Catholics.—Position of Jews. See **RHODE ISLAND**: 1638-1647; 1647-1776.

1648-1665.—Practised in Holland. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1648-1665.

1655.—Toleration of Jews in England by Cromwell. See **Jews: England**: 1655.

1689.—Partial enactment in England. See **ENGLAND**: 1689 (April-August); **CHURCH OF ENGLAND**: 17th century.

18th-19th centuries.—Position of Jews in Europe and the United States. See **Jews**: 18th-19th centuries.

1778.—Repeal of Catholic penal laws in England. See **ENGLAND**: 1778-1780.

1827-1829.—Removal of disabilities from Dissenters and emancipation of Catholics in England and Ireland. See **ENGLAND**: 1827-1828; Removal of disabilities, etc.; **IRELAND**: 1811-1829.

1848.—Obtained by the Waldensian sect. See **WALDENSES**: 1808-1848.

1869.—Disestablishment of the Irish church. See **ENGLAND**: 1868-1870.

1871.—Abolition of religious tests in English universities. See **ENGLAND**: 1871; **CHURCH OF ENGLAND**: 19th century.

1905.—Ukase granting religious liberty in Russia. See **RUSSIA**: 1905 (April-November).

1917.—Abolition of religious persecution by revolution. See **RUSSIA**: 1917 (March-April).

1919.—Granted by Bulgaria in Treaty of Neuilly. See **NEUILLY, TREATY OF** (1919).

See also **CHURCH AND STATE: Revolutionary idea of religious toleration**; **BELGIUM, CONSTITUTION OF: Title II**; **POLAND, CONSTITUTION OF: Section V**; **MEXICO, CONSTITUTION OF**; **RUSSIA, SOVIET CONSTITUTION OF: Article II**; **U.S.A., CONSTITUTION OF**.

**TOLERATION ACT**. See **ENGLAND**: 1689 (April-August).

**TOLEWAHS**, North American Indian tribe. See **MOHOCs**.

**TOLOSA**, early name of Toulouse. See **TOULOUSE: B. C.** 106.

**TOLOSA, Battle of Las Navas de**. See **ALACAB**.

**TOLSTOY, Alexei Konstantinovich, Count** (1817-1875), Russian poet. See **RUSSIAN LITERATURE**: 1855-1889.

**TOLSTOY, Liov (Leo) Nikolaievitch, Count** (1828-1910), Russian novelist and social reformer. See **RUSSIAN LITERATURE**: 1851-1910; **RUSSIA**: 1900-1901; **ART: Definitions and theories**; **ECONOMICS: 19th-20th centuries: Influence of Carlyle, Ruskin, Tolstoy; PEACE MOVEMENT: Typical views of war**.

**TOLTECS**, Indian tribe in Mexico and Central America. See **MEXICO: Aboriginal peoples**; 1325-1502; **CENTRAL AMERICA: Aborigines**.

**TOMASHEVSKY, Boris** (1866- ), Jewish actor born in Russia. See **Jews: Drama and theater**.

**TOMI**, ancient Greek city on the Euxine. It was Ovid's place of banishment. Its site is occupied by the modern town of Kustendje.

**TONAWANDA RESERVATION**. See **IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY: Iroquoian family**.

**TONE, Theobald Wolfe** (1763-1708), Irish rebel. Founder of the Society of United Irishmen, 1791. See **IRELAND**: 1793-1798; **ULSTER**: 1791-1797.

**TONGA, or FRIENDLY ISLANDS**, archipelago in the south Pacific ocean, about 250 miles southeast of Fiji and 350 miles southwest of Samoa. There were 22,689 natives and 350 Europeans here in 1919. (See **BRITISH EMPIRE: Extent**.) "According to Mariner, the Tongans did not deserve the name Cook gave them, that of the Friendly Islanders. He says that the chiefs intended to treacherously massacre Cook and his company, but the scheme came to nothing on account of differences among themselves as to how their amiable designs should be carried out. . . . The Tongan Archipelago is composed of at least a hundred islands and islets, comprised between 18° and 20° S. lat., and 174° and 170° W. long. The three principal islands of Tongatabu, Vavau and Eoa, are alone of any extent, which is in their cases from 15 to 20 miles in length. Six others, namely, Late, Tofua, Kao, Namuka, Lefuga, and Ilaano are from five to seven miles in extent. The rest are much smaller. Many of them are in fact only banks of sand and coral, covered with some tufts of trees. . . . Late Island has a peak

about 1800 feet high in the centre of the island, which at one time was a volcano. . . . The Tongans, like the Fijians and Samoans, have had, from time immemorial, a civilisation of their own. They have more moral stamina, energy and self-reliance than any other existing race in the Pacific. Had they been acquainted formerly with the use of metals, there can be no doubt that they would have subdued all Polynesia. When Captain Cook was in the islands, the habits of war were little known to the natives; the only quarrels in which they had at that time engaged had been among the inhabitants of the Fijis. They visited that group for the purpose of getting sandalwood, and to join the fighting Fijians for their own ends. From the latter they gained a knowledge of improved spears, and bows, and arrows."—H. Stonehewer Cooper, *Coral lands*, v. 2, ch. 12.—"In 1835 some Methodist missionaries arrived in New Zealand, whence they sailed to the Friendly or Tonga Islands. There they effected the conversion of the supreme chief of that archipelago. King George of Tonga, following the principle of 'cujus regio, ejus religio,' had his subjects baptised. The British Government recognised his title of king, concluding a treaty of friendship with him in 1879, and established a consulate in his capital. At the instance and under the direction of the missionaries, George I. granted his people a free constitution and parliament. . . . The archipelago has attained a degree of comparative prosperity and civilisation such as is not found in any other independent group of Oceania."—Baron von Hübnér, *Through the British empire*, v. 2, pt. 5, ch. 2.—"On each of the great islands there resides a governor. These are men of intelligence who speak English, dress well, and live in imported houses of the European fashion. . . . The Tongan laws are generally just, and are very strictly enforced. The statutes are printed, and distinctly understood by all the people. . . . The laws of Tonga forbid the sale of land to foreigners, but it is permitted to be leased on such liberal conditions and for so long a term as to be tantamount to an actual sale. All traders, planters, or permanent foreign residents not in the service of the Government, are obliged to take out a license. Spirits and some other articles pay a heavy duty. All the people contribute to the support of the state, the tax being on an adult male about six dollars per annum. All the great islands are traversed by broad roads laid out by a European engineer. They are formed and kept in repair by the labour of convicted criminals."—H. S. Cooper, *Coral lands*, v. 2.

1899-1918.—British protectorate.—Up to 1890 the Tonga islands continued to be neutral territory in accordance with the declaration of Berlin, Apr. 6, 1886. By the Anglo-German Agreement of Nov. 14, 1890 (see SAMOA: 1889-1900), they were under the suzerainty of Great Britain, and a British protectorate was formally declared in May, 1900. In December, 1900, a British high commissioner assumed civil and criminal jurisdiction over subjects of foreign powers in the islands. In 1905 British coin was made the only legal tender. In 1918 upon the death of her father, George II, Queen Salote succeeded to the rule of the islands under the British protectorate.

**TONGALAND.** See AMATONGALAND.

**TONGKING.** See TONKIN.

**TONIKAN FAMILY.**—"The Tonika are known to have occupied three localities: First, on the Lower Yazoo River (1700); second, east shore of

Mississippi River (about 1704); third, in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana (1817). Near Marksville, the county seat of that parish, about twenty-five are now living."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, p. 125.

**TONKAWAN FAMILY**, North American Indian tribe. "The Tonkawa were a migratory people and a coluvies gentium, whose earliest habitat is unknown. Their first mention occurs in 1719; at that time and ever since they roamed in the western and southern parts of what is now Texas."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, p. 126.—See also INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: South-eastern area.

**TONKIN**, or Tongking, Province in the north-eastern part of French Indo-China, bounded on the north by the provinces of Kwang-Si and Yun-nan, on the west by Laos, on the south by Annam, and on the east by the Gulf of Tonkin. The population was 6,850,453 in 1921. See CHINA: Map; INDO-CHINA.

**B. C. 218.**—Conquest by China. See INDO-CHINA: B. C. 218-1886.

1775.—Conquest by Cochin China. See INDO-CHINA: B. C. 218-1886.

1883-1884.—Conflict with the French.—French protectorate established. See FRANCE: 1875-1889; INDO-CHINA: 1787-1891.

1893-1896.—Disorder and subsequent pacification. See INDO-CHINA: 1893-1921.

**TONNAGE:** United States. See TARIFF: 1631-1709.

**TONNAGE AND POUNDAGE**, tax or custom of two shillings on the tun of wine and sixpence on the pound of merchandise, which became, in England, from the fourteenth century, one of the regular parliamentary grants to the crown, for a long period. It grew out of an agreement with the merchants in the time of Edward II, to take the place of the former right of prisage; the right, that is, to take two tuns of wine from every ship importing twenty tuns or more,—one before and one behind the mast.—Based on W. Stubbs, *Constitutional history of England*, v. 2, ch. 17, sect. 276-277.—See also ENGLAND: 1629.

**TONTINE FUNDS.** See INSURANCE: Life Insurance: Early forms.

**TONTONTÉAC**, North American Indian tribe. See PUEBLOS.

**TONTOS**, North American Indian tribe. See APACHE INDIANS.

**TONTY**, Henri de (c. 1650-c. 1704), French explorer. Sailed along the eastern shore of Lake Michigan in 1679 and down the Mississippi in 1682. See MICHIGAN: 1616-1701; CANADA: 1669-1687.

**TOPEKA CONSTITUTION.** See KANSAS: 1854-1859.

**TOPNAAR TRIBE**, branch of the Nama Hottentots occupying the Wallich bay territory. See SOUTHWEST AFRICA, PROTECTORATE OF: 1885.

**TORAH**, Hebrew name for the Pentateuch. See EDUCATION: Ancient: B. C. 14th-A. D. 6th centuries.

**TORAL Y VELAZQUEZ**, José (1832-1904), Spanish general. Defended Santiago de Cuba; surrendered the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba. See U. S. A.: 1898 (June-July); (July 4-17).

**TORCH.** See INVENTIONS: Ancient and medieval: Artificial light.

**TORDESILLAS**, Treaty of (1494). See AMERICA: 1493; 1494.

**TORGAU**, town in the republic of Saxony, Germany, thirty miles northeast of Leipzig on the left bank of the Elbe. It was yielded to the Swedes in 1645, and captured by the French in 1813. See GERMANY: 1640-1645; 1813 (October-December).

**Battle of.** See GERMANY: 1760.

**League of (1526).** See PAPACY: 1525-1520.

**TORGUD.** See DRAGUT.

**TORIES:** Origin of the party in England. See RAPPAREES; ENGLAND: 1641 (October); 1680; CONSERVATIVE PARTY: England.

1681-1683.—Tory reaction and downfall of the Whigs. See ENGLAND: 1681-1683.

1710-1712.—Growth of power. See ENGLAND: 1710-1712.

1846.—Vengeance of the Tory-Protectionists. See ENGLAND: 1846.

Of the American Revolution, and their exile. —“Before the Revolution the parties in the colonies were practically identical with the Whigs and Tories of the mother country, the Whigs or anti-prerogative men supporting ever the cause of the people against arbitrary or illegal acts of the governor or the council. In the early days of the Revolution the ultra Tories were gradually driven into the ranks of the enemy, until for a time it might be said that all revolutionary America had become Whig; the name Tory, however, was still applied to those who, though opposed to the usurpations of George III., were averse to a final separation from England.”—G. Pellet, *John Jay*, p. 200.—“The terms Tories, Loyalists, Refugees, are burdened with a piteous record of wrongs and sufferings. It has not been found easy or satisfactory for even the most candid historian to leave the facts and arguments of the conflict impartially adjusted. Insult, confiscation of property, and exile were the penalties of those who bore these titles. . . . Remembering that the most bitter words of Washington that have come to us are those which express his scorn of Tories, we must at least look to find some plausible, if not justifying, ground for the patriot party. Among those most frank and fearless in the avowal of loyalty, and who suffered the severest penalties, were men of the noblest character and of the highest position. So, also, bearing the same odious title, were men of the most despicable nature, self-seeking and unprincipled, ready for any act of evil. And between these were men of every grade of respectability and of every shade of moral meanness. . . . As a general rule, the Tories were content with an unarmed resistance, where they were not reinforced by the resources or forces of the enemy. But in successive places in possession of the British armies, in Boston, Long Island, New York, the Jerseys, Philadelphia, and in the Southern provinces, there rallied around them Tories both seeking protection, and ready to perform all kinds of military duty as allies. By all the estimates, probably below the mark, there were during the war at least 25,000 organized loyalist forces. . . . When the day of reckoning came at the close of the war, it needed no spirit of prophecy to tell how these Tories, armed or unarmed, would fare. . . . That it was not till six months after the ratification of the treaty by Congress that Sir Guy Carleton removed the British army from New York—the delay being caused by his embarrassment from the crowds of loyalists seeking his protection—is a reminder to us of their forlorn condition. . . . From all over the seaboard of the continent refugees made their way to New York in crowds. . . . They threw themselves in despair upon the protection of the British commander. . . . He pleaded his en-

cumbrances of this character in answer to the censures upon him for delaying his departure, and he vainly hoped that Congress would devise some measures of leniency to relieve him. . . . Many hundreds of them had been seeking refuge in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick since the autumn of 1782, and additional parties, in increasing number, followed to the same provinces. . . . Large numbers of the loyalists of the Southern provinces were shipped to the Bahamas and to the West India Islands. At one time Carleton had upon his hands over 12,000 Tories clamorous for transportation. . . . A celebration of the centennial of the settlement of Upper Canada by these exiles took place in 1884. At a meeting of the royal governor, Lord Dorchester, and the council, in Quebec, in November, 1789, in connection with the disposal of still unappropriated crown lands in the province, order was taken for the making and preserving of a registry of the names of all persons, with those of their sons and daughters, ‘who had adhered to the unity of the empire, and joined the royal standard in America before the treaty of separation in the year 1783.’ The official list contains the names of several thousands. [See also U.S.A.: 1783-1787.] . . . It was by their descendants and representatives that the centennial occasion referred to was observed. . . . Some bands passed to Canada by Whitehall, Lake Champlain, Ticonderoga, and Plattsburg, then southward to Cornwall, ascending the St. Lawrence, and settling on the north bank. Others went from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia up the St. Lawrence to Sorel, where they wintered, going afterwards to Kingston. Most of the exiles ascended the Hudson to Albany, then by the Mohawk and Wood Creek to Oneida and Ontario lakes. [See also ONTARIO: 1783-1841.] . . . As these exiles had stood for the unity of the empire, they took the name of the ‘United Empire Loyalists’ [a name which is often abbreviated in common use to U. E. Loyalists].”—G. E. Ellis, *Loyalists and their fortunes (Narrative and critical history of America, v. 7, pp. 185-214)*. —“Some 10,000 refugees had, in 1784, and the few years following, found homes in Western Canada, just as it is estimated . . . that 20,000 had settled in the provinces by the sea. Assuming full responsibility for the care and present support of her devoted adherents, Great Britain opened her hand cheerfully to assist them. . . . The sum paid by the British Government to the suffering refugees was about \$15,000,000.”—G. Bryce, *Short history of the Canadian people, ch. 7, sect. 2*.—See also U.S.A.: 1778 (June-November); (July).

Also in: E. Ryerson, *Loyalists of America and their times*.—L. Sabine, *Biographical sketches of the Loyalists of America*.—M. C. Tyler, *History of American literature, ch. 13-17*.—Idem, *Party of the Loyalists in the American Revolution (American Historical Review, v. 1, p. 24)*.—S. G. Fisher, *True history of the American Revolution, pp. 233-372*.

**TORNOSA, Battle of.** See SPAIN: 1808 (September-December).

**TORO, Battle of (1476).** See SPAIN: 1368-1470.

**TOROMONOS**, South American Indian tribe. See BOLIVIA. Aboriginal inhabitants.

**TORONTO**, capital of the province of Ontario, is the second largest city in Canada. It is situated on a sheltered bay on the northern side of Lake Ontario, opposite the mouth of the Niagara river. It is noted for its parks, its beautiful public building, and its many churches. It has large numbers of manufacturers, is second only to Montreal in finance and industry in the Dominion, and, as the

three transcontinental railways run through the city, it is the chief distributing point for the agricultural products of the rich province of which it is the chief social and political center. Its population in 1921 was 521,893.

1749.—**First settlement.**—"The Northern Indians were flocking with their beaver-skins to the English of Oswego; and in April, 1749, an officer named Portneuf had been sent with soldiers and workmen to build a stockaded trading-house at Toronto, in order to intercept them,—not by force, which would have been ruinous to French interests, but by a tempting supply of goods and brandy. Thus the fort was kept well stocked, and with excellent effect."—F. Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, v. 1, ch. 3.

1790-1813.—**Founding of the city.—Growth of population.**—Toronto, first known as York, was founded in 1790, as the capital of Upper Canada, by John Graves Simcoe, first lieutenant-governor of the province. "Though the first meeting of the Executive Council of the Province was held at York . . . [in 1797] there was as yet no building. . . . Meantime, the work of laying out the town advanced; and ere the woods had put on their autumnal glory several huts were built, and some portion of the region surveyed. . . . Shrewdly discerning the importance of communication northward, he determined to open up a highway . . . [to the north. The road which he planned is thirty-two miles long, and runs from the bay, through the city, northward to Lake Simcoe. It] was called after the English Secretary of War, and has ever since borne the name of Yonge Street. . . . The Governor periodically returned to Newark to summon and prorogue Parliament and direct the affairs of State. The buildings which he had ordered to be planned for the Legislature at York meantime had been proceeded with, and streets were beginning to branch out from the site of the New Westminster. With all his enthusiasm and practical energy, however, the development of the town was necessarily slow. The plan of the city was extensive, and before it could be built the forest had to be cleared. Yet there was progress as the years went by. . . . [The legislature sat in York in June, 1797, where two halls for the legislature and courts of justice had been erected.] They were built of brick, and might have seen length of years, and been preserved to later generations as a sacred relic, but unfortunately, in 1813, they fell a prey to the torch of the invader. . . . The population of the capital had by this time grown to 2,000."—*History of Toronto and County of York*, v. 1, pp. 207-208, 211.

1813.—**Taken and burned by Americans.** See U. S. A.: 1813 (April-July).

1816-1878.—**Growth of the town.—First hospital.—City Charter Act.—Change of name.—Cholera.—Fires.—Growth of population.**—"In 1816 we find a grant made by the legislature for the re-establishment of the library which had been destroyed by the invaders in 1812. . . . In the following year provision was made for the first police system. Meanwhile York was extending its boundaries. . . . About the market had sprung up a number of public buildings, stores, taverns, and land and steamboat offices, and more than one denomination had begun to build itself a sanctuary. . . . Newspapers had come into existence, and there was already talk of founding a college, in addition to the District Grammar School. . . . The professions also were beginning to establish themselves, and legislation had been enacted to regulate their practice. In legislation we also find the evi-

dence of growth and prosperity. In 1820 increased representation was granted to the House of Assembly. . . . In 1822 the Bank of Upper Canada came into corporate existence; and steps were taken to establish a uniform currency. The following year saw the erection of a jail and court-house; and the unexpended moneys of the 'Loyal and Patriotic Society of Upper Canada' were devoted to the building of an hospital. . . . The population of York in 1834, the year which witnessed the birth of the City of Toronto, was, in round numbers, ten thousand souls. Within its contracted limits nearly every industrial occupation was represented; there were steam sawmills, iron foundries, and steam-engine manufactories, starch, candle and soap, and paper factories, besides a theatre, schools, and half a dozen printing offices, a fire department, and an artillery company. . . . In February, 1834, a Bill embodying . . . proposed [incorporation] measures was introduced in the Legislature by Mr. Jarvis, the member for the town, and carried through the House. On the 6th of March it received the Royal assent and became law. The main features of the Act, which was a formidable document, . . . were provisions for constituting the place a city, under the name of the City of Toronto, . . . with two Aldermen and two Common Councilmen for each ward, to be elected by the citizens, and a Mayor, who should be elected by the Aldermen and Common Councilmen from among themselves. . . . [The first mayor and alderman were elected on March 27.] The city's finances were in a deplorable condition; it was burdened by a debt of over nine thousand pounds. . . . Its treasury was practically empty, and money was urgently needed for public buildings, and still more urgently for the repair of the streets. . . . [Money was raised by taxation and borrowing for revenue and needed improvement, and from that time forward the city prospered. Toronto was visited in 1834 by an epidemic of cholera, from which five per cent. of the population of the city died. In 1838 it was proposed to move the legislature of the province to Kingston and on the formation of the union of the two provinces this was done. It was feared that this proceeding would militate against the prosperity of Toronto. On the contrary, however], during the eight years from 1841 to 1849 the growth of the city was rapid. . . . At the time of the incorporation of the city in 1834 its population was somewhat under 10,000; in 1841, the first year of the Union, it was slightly in excess of 15,000. Sir R. H. Bonnycastle, who visited Toronto in 1845, describes it as 'a city in earnest, with upwards of 20,000 inhabitants—gas-lit, with good plank sidewalks and macadamized streets, with vast sewers and fine houses of brick or stone.' . . . Gas had been introduced in 1840. . . . [In the year 1846], a local chronicler stated that the city—the entire length of which was three miles—contained ninety-two streets, twenty-one churches and chapels, fifteen common schools, and ten newspapers; it enjoyed the privileges not only of gas but of waterworks; it was connected by steamboat with Kingston, Hamilton, Niagara and Rochester. . . . [In 1849] the city was swept by a disastrous fire by which damage to the extent of £100,000 sterling was sustained by the citizens. [The fire] was followed by another epidemic of cholera . . . [which raged] until it was checked by the approach of cold weather. 1849 was marked by . . . [riots, against the amnesty, which permitted the return of William Lyon McKenzie and other insurgents, to the country. No one was injured, however, and the city quieted



down quickly.] In 1856 there were evidences of commercial depression and monetary stringency, but 1857 . . . [was] the gloomiest epoch in the history of the commerce and industries of the country. Solvency and enterprise seemed to be things of the past. Mercantile houses of long established reputation went by the board; the factories were idle, trade was stagnant, and the streets swarmed with beggars and vagrants. . . . During 1858 the condition of affairs underwent a slight improvement, but it was not until the following year that confidence was re-established, and the city resumed its normal business-like aspect. In 1851 . . . the population of the city was 30,775. In 1856 this had increased to 45,000. . . . [On December 27, 1867, the first meeting of the legislature of Ontario was held in Toronto, and from that time forward the growth of the city in importance was continuous.] Of the growth in population an idea may be formed from the following figures: In the census of 1871 the population was given as 56,092, being an increase of 11,271 during the previous decade. In 1881 the census gave 86,415. . . . [During the years 1872 to 1874 Toronto began to make rapid strides in commercial progress, but in 1875 a period of depression set in, which lasted until 1878. In September 1878 an Industrial Association Exhibition was held, to mark the semi-centennial of the city.]—*History of Toronto and County of York, v. 1, pp. 239, 253, 255, 260, 267-268, 278.*—See also CANADA: 1838-1843.

1837.—Mackenzie rising.—Defeat of the rebels. See CANADA: 1837-1838.

1879-1913.—Industrial exhibition.—Introduction of electric light.—Other civic undertakings.—Fire of 1904.—Negotiations over railway and electric light franchises.—In March, 1870, the Industrial Exhibition Association was organized and incorporated, as an outcome of the exhibition of the year before. "Under this constitution the Exhibition has grown in importance from year to year until [in 1923 it was] the largest and most complete annual Fair in the world, with annual paid admissions exceeding one million. . . . [In 1881, electric light was introduced, and in 1883, the public library was authorized.] At the beginning of 1891 the general debt of the City was \$12,349,415.20. . . . The most important event in civic administration was the expiry of the street railway franchise. In thirty years the railway system had expanded greatly although it had not kept pace with transportation requirements of the growing city. The total length of single-track was 80.60 miles, and the Company possessed 90 two-horse closed cars and 56 open, 116 one-horse cars, 90 buses, 100 sleighs and 1,372 horses. Preparatory to the taking over of the property the city had secured from the Legislature interpreting acts setting forth the procedure of the necessary arbitration. . . . [The arbitrators] . . . thoroughly examined the claim of the Company for compensation exceeding \$5,000,000 [and their] judgment was that the assets of the Company were worth \$1,453,788. No allowance was made for 'intangibles,' since the terms of the franchise was very clearly 30 years, without provision for renewal. . . . [There was a body of opinion in favor of the civic ownership and operation of the railway, but the more conservative considered the risks too great, and it was leased to a company to be transformed into an electric railway system.] The Sunday cars agitation which turned the entire community into a debating club, had its beginning in 1891. Public opinion was generally hostile, and a clause

was written into the agreement providing that no Sunday cars would be allowed on the streets until the electors had given approval at the polls. . . . At last on May 15th, 1897, the electors reversed previous judgments. The vote was 16,372 for Sunday cars, and 16,051 against—a majority of 321. . . . On September 18th, 1899, the new City Hall was officially opened by Mayor Shaw—eight years after the laying of the cornerstone, and ten years after the granting of the contract. . . . [A great fire swept the wholesale warehouse section of the city on April 19 and April 20, 1904. The fire began] on the north side of Wellington Street near Bay, probably from an electric short circuit. There was a strong north wind and despite the most ardent efforts of the firemen building after building caught fire. By midnight the whole area south of the *Telegram* office to the Bay and from the Queen's Hotel to the old Custom House on the corner of Front and Yonge Streets was a seething furnace. Firemen came to aid from Hamilton, Niagara Falls, Buffalo, Peterboro', Brantford and London, but despite all efforts 14 acres of warehouses were razed, and the loss reached \$13,000,000. . . . [In 1913 the mayor proposed] to purchase the assets of the Toronto Railway Company and the Toronto Electric Light Company. Mr. Hocken initiated the negotiations with Sir William Mackenzie for the ending of these franchises, and finally \$22,000,000 was named for the railway [which was taken over by the city] and \$8,000,000 for the lighting plant [which the Electric Light Company elected to keep]. While the sum was large the supporters of the proposal pointed out the advantage of obtaining a complete monopoly of the city lighting market for the Hydro-Electric distributing plant, now practically completed."—J. E. Middleton et al., *Municipality of Toronto, a history, v. 1, pp. 313, 339, 343-344, 347, 353, 368, 372.*

1914-1923.—Effect of World War on municipal affairs.—Finances.—War work.—Municipal control of street railways.—Progress of city apparent in 1923.—"The war was the great fact of 1914 and successive years, and municipal affairs were subordinated to it. The pressure of rising prices for materials and labor bore hard upon the municipalities in Canada. In Toronto the comfort of a low tax rate fled away. From 1898 to 1913 the average impost on the ratepayer was a shade over 19 mills. In 1915, it was 23; 1916, 22.5; 1917, 25.5; 1918, 30.5. . . . [and in 1922 it had reached] 32.35. The pre-war position of the City's finances was as follows: The bonded debt, less sinking fund accumulations, was \$60,564,385.48. Of this rather more than \$34,000,000 was invested in revenue-producing properties and 'specials,' such as the waterworks, the Hydro System, the Exhibition, the Local Improvement loans, the street railway pavement loans. This \$34,000,000 was 'self-carrying.' The debt which had to be carried by interest and fixed charges collected in taxation amounted to \$26,158,114. Against this, the City owned real estate valued by the assessment department, a low valuation, at \$41,747,541. . . . [The city sent to the World War a number of men equivalent to three divisions. The exhibition buildings were used as a concentration camp and a large aviation camp was created in the vicinity.] From 1914 to 1918 Toronto subscribed \$7,645,000 to [the Patriotic Fund]. . . . Of this amount \$1,000,000 was paid through the civic treasury and the remainder, through private subscriptions. The second largest item [of contribution to the war cost] was paid out for life insurance on

citizens. The City Council agreed to pay \$1,000 to the relatives of every citizen who was killed overseas and this entailed a civic expense which amounted to about \$4,500,000. . . . [Subscriptions to other funds brought the total contributed by Toronto to \$20,000,000 exclusive of Victory Loans. In 1920 an act was passed authorizing the city to take over the Toronto Railway Company and the street railways are now operated by the city.] For the first twenty years of its existence Toronto was a nest of small houses in a clearing, a meeting place of three roads; from Kingston, from Holland Landing, from Dundas and beyond, a village beside a marsh, but with as fair a prospect of forest, lake and island as one could ask. From the end of the war with the Americans until the 'forties,' the village had expanded to a size commensurate with its dignity as a capital. 'The streets are well paved, and lighted with gas, the houses are large and good, the shops excellent.' . . . The era of railway building continued the prosperity and growth of the city. . . . [In 1923] from the town-line between York and Scarborough to the Humber the City [lay] . . . an east and west distance of twelve miles. It runs northward to the very edge of Hogg's Hollow, six miles from the Bay. The total assessment in 1922 was \$775,578,488. . . . 'The Water Works System of Toronto has been municipally controlled and operated since July, 1873, at which time the privately owned plant was taken over at a price of \$220,000.' [Since the incorporation in 1834 the population was doubled every fifteen years.]"—J. E. Middleton et al., *Municipality of Toronto, a history*, v. 1, pp. 373, 389, 398-399.

See also CITY PLANNING: Canada; LIQUOR PROBLEM: International movements.

**TORONTO UNIVERSITY.** See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1790-1920.

**"TORP" TENANCY.** See FINLAND: 1918.

**TORPEDO: Development.—Origin of Whitehead type.—Addition of gyroscope.—Other early types.**—"In 1864 Captain Lupuis of the Austrian Navy conceived the idea of a new form of destructive engine to be used in naval warfare. The proposed weapon was a very crude affair resembling a small surface boat in shape, which was to be driven by a propeller turned by clock work from within and guided by means of ropes from the shore. The fore part of the little boat was to carry a heavy charge of gunpowder which was to be exploded by a trigger device operated by a contact spar fitted to the bow. When the spar struck the side of a ship the impact would pull the trigger and explode the charge. The only bit of importance attached to this device however, is that in its conception Captain Lupuis consulted Mr. Robert Whitehead, an English civil engineer residing in Fiume, Austria, about some of the mechanical problems involved. The idea brought to Mr. Whitehead in this way without a doubt was the first occasion that he had ever given thought to such a device. . . . His imagination was set to work though, and after about two years he built his first torpedo, which was made of boiler plate, carried eighteen pounds of gun-cotton and had a speed of six knots for a very short distance. . . . [Since that time all naval powers have used Whitehead self-propelled torpedo or some modification of it.] When the head of the torpedo strikes a ship or any other rigid object the firing pin or plunger is driven against a percussion cap containing fulminate of mercury and situated in the center of the bursting charge. The explosion of this cap detonates the high explosive

contained in the chamber with sufficient force to rupture the plating of any battleship. . . . In actual practice though, it was found that no matter how carefully the torpedo had been tested and balanced, it would behave in a very erratic manner when fired. Instances have been known when the torpedo would run a certain distance and then swerve to the right or left or perhaps dive to the bottom. . . . No practical remedy was found for this objectionable feature until the advent of the gyroscope. . . . [Captain John A. Howell's gyroscope method for steering torpedoes, invented about 1884, was driven out of the field by another] ingenious device known as the Obry gear, acting in conjunction with rudders placed at the stern [by which] the torpedo is steered in a horizontal plane just as is a ship. By the use of the Obry gear the [Whitehead style of] torpedo can now be held true to a course, the direction in which it is first aimed from the launching tube, or the gear can be so adjusted that the torpedo can be fired in one direction and after running a certain distance the gyroscopic influence of the gear acting on the rudders will cause it to take up and continue an entirely different course."—A Hoar, *Submarine torpedo boat*, pp. 174, 179-180.—In the meantime the first controllable torpedo, propelled by carbonic-acid gas and directed by electricity, was invented by J. L. Lay. This type of torpedo also represented by later inventions, the Lay-Haight, Nordenfelt, Sims-Edison and others, has been discarded.—See also INVENTIONS: 20th century: Instruments; SUBMARINES.

**Use in World War.—American production and developments for submarine use.—Air and seaplane use.—Recent inventions.**—During the World War the use of the torpedo became of increased importance due to the emphasis placed upon it by the Germans in their submarine campaign. The various participants of naval engagements used the torpedo on large ships, torpedo boats, destroyers, coastal motor boats and experimentally on airplanes and seaplanes. (See also SUBMARINES: 1914-1918; WARSHIPS: 1914-1918.) "When war was declared the Newport station, in conjunction with the E. W. Bliss Company—which manufactures the major proportion of the American Navy's torpedoes—was designing a 21 inch torpedo for war in submarines. On April 1st, 1917, only twenty torpedoes were approaching completion at the Bliss works. In order to hasten production the Navy Department made an arrangement with the company . . . [by which] it was hoped . . . to bring the output up to at least 300 torpedoes a month. This figure, however, was never attained . . . and the maximum output per month did not exceed 150 torpedoes. . . . In August, 1918, it was decided to build (a Government torpedo assembly) plant at Alexandria, Va. The Armistice was not allowed to interfere with this work which has since been completed. Near at hand in Chesapeake Bay, 220,000 yard torpedo range has been laid out. In November, 1917, a torpedo repair station was established at Queens-town, Ireland, to take care of the torpedo material of the American vessels co-operating with the British naval forces. Some months later the Paravane shed at Haulbowline was turned over to the Americans by the Admiralty . . . and later on . . . enlarged at the joint expense of the American and British. . . . In contrast to the reciprocating engine type used by practically every other navy, the American torpedo is propelled by balanced turbines. . . . Since the summer of 1918 when the demand for increased range became

apparent, the Bureau, [of Ordnance] in connection with the Naval Gun Factory, completed the design of three new torpedoes, which are . . . in process of manufacture. Two of these torpedoes will have a range in excess of any torpedoes now known to exist, while the third will be capable of a range at a speed greater than any yet realized."—*American ordnance production in the Great War* (*Engineer*, Sept. 9, 1921, p. 268).

Italian and British naval experts first experimented in the use of the torpedo in air attacks. Admiral Fiske of the United States Navy was also an advocate of this method of warfare before the World War was declared. Experimental work was carried on with numerous practical results throughout the course of the war. Torpedo seaplanes were successfully employed only late in the war. Recently these are thought to lie in the field of greatest future development. "The torpedoed system of fighting (virtually adopted by the British, Italian, Japanese and American navies) is that by which an airplane or seaplane equipped with an automobile submarine torpedo which may be detached at the right moment, attacks a fighting ship and launches the torpedo at such close range and with such easy aim that the ship is practically helpless before the attack."—*Scientific American*, Jan. 15, 1921, p. 46.—The "torpedo-carrying mechanism of . . . [the torpedo seaplane recently completed for the United States Navy Department] is described as a cantilever monoplane, with the Engines virtually mounted on wings."—*Another step in torpedo air-craft* (*Illustrated World*, Sept., 1922, p. 70).—Recent ingenious inventions include the application of the gyroscopic method to a high-powered turbine-driven airplane torpedo designed by H. W. Shounard of Montclair, New Jersey (associated with the Bliss-Levitt torpedo) and a radio controlled air torpedo devised by Charles S. Price, a British mechanical engineer.

Also in: W. E. Dommett, *Submarine vessels*.

**TORQUEMADA**, Thomas (1420-1498), inquisitor-general of Spain. See **INQUISITION**: 1203-1525.

**TORQUES**.—"The Latin word torques has been applied in a very extended sense to the various necklaces or collars for the neck, found in Britain, and other countries inhabited by the Celtic tribes. This word has been supposed to be derived from the Welsh or Irish 'torc,' which has the same signification, but the converse is equally plausible, that this was derived from the Latin."—S. Birch, *Archaeological Journal*, v. 2.

**TORRE**, Andrea (1866- ), Italian statesman. See **ADRIATIC QUESTION**: Torre-Trumbitch Agreement.

**TORRENS**, Sir Robert Richard (1814-1884), British colonial statesman. Appointed treasurer of South Australia in 1852, premier and treasurer in 1857, and land commissioner in 1858. See **LAND TITLES**: 1858-1922.

**TORRENS ACT** (1866). See **HOUSING**: Great Britain: Legislation.

**TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND TITLE REGISTRATION**. See **LAND TITLES**: 1858-1922.

**TORRES VEDRAS**, town in the district of Lisbon, Portugal, about forty-three miles northwest of Lisbon. The fortifications called the "lines of Torres Vedras" were constructed by Wellington in 1810. See **SPAIN**: 1808-1809 (August-January); 1809-1810 (October-September); 1810-1812.

**TORRE-TRUMBITCH AGREEMENT** (1918). See **ADRIATIC QUESTION**: Torre-Trumbitch Agreement.

**TORRICELLI**, Evangelista (1608-1647), Italian physicist and mathematician. See **INVENTIONS**: 16th-17th centuries: Instruments; **SCIENCE**: Modern: 17th century.

**TORRINGTON**, Arthur Herbert, Earl of (1647-1716), British admiral. Fought against Château-Renault in Bantry bay in 1689 and at Beachy Head in 1690. See **IRELAND**: 1689; **ENGLAND**: 1690 (June).

**TORSTENSSON**, Lennart, Count (1603-1651), Swedish general. Served in the Thirty Years' War; appointed commander-in-chief of the Protestant forces, 1641; gained victory of Schweidnitz, 1642; conquered Moravia and invaded Austria, 1645. See **GERMANY**: 1640-1645.

**TORTOLA**, chief island of the Virgin islands, British West Indies. See **VIRGIN ISLANDS**.

**TORTONA**, town in Piedmont, Italy, fourteen miles east of Alessandria, on the Scrivia. It was destroyed by Frederick Barbarossa in 1155 and 1163, and captured by the Spaniards in 1745. See **ITALY**: 1154-1162; 1745.

**TORTOSA**, city in the province of Tarragona, Spain, about forty-three miles southwest of the city of Tarragona, on the River Ebro, twenty-two miles above its mouth. It was captured from the Catalonians by the Spanish in 1640. See **SPAIN**: 1640-1642.

**TORTUGA**, one of the West Indies islands off the north coast of Haiti. It was the resort of buccaneers in the seventeenth century. See **AMERICA**: 1630-1700.

**TORTURE**. See **CRIMINAL LAW**: 1708.

**TORUN**. See **THORN**.

**TORY**. See **TORIES**.

**TOSKI**, Battle of (1880). See **EGYPT**: 1885-1896.

**TOTEMS**.—"A peculiar social institution exists among the [North American] Indians, very curious in its character; and though I am not prepared to say that it may be traced through all the tribes east of the Mississippi, yet its prevalence is so general, and its influence on political relations so important, as to claim especial attention. Indian communities, independent of their local distribution into tribes, bands, and villages, are composed of several distinct clans. Each clan has its emblem, consisting of the figure of some bird, beast, or reptile; and each is distinguished by the name of the animal which it thus bears as its device; as, for example, the clan of the Wolf, the Deer, the Otter, or the Hawk. In the language of the Algonquins, these emblems are known by the name of 'Totems.' The members of the same clan, being connected, or supposed to be so, by ties of kindred more or less remote, are prohibited from intermarriage. Thus Wolf cannot marry Wolf; but he may, if he chooses, take a wife from the clan of Hawks, or any other clan but his own. It follows that when this prohibition is rigidly observed, no single clan can live apart from the rest; but the whole must be mingled together, and in every family the husband and wife must be of different clans. To different totems attach different degrees of rank and dignity; and those of the Bear, the Tortoise, and the Wolf are among the first in honor. Each man is proud of his badge, jealously asserting its claims to respect; and the members of the same clan, though they may, perhaps, speak different dialects, and dwell far asunder, are yet bound together by the closest ties of fraternity. If a man is killed, every member of the clan feels called upon to avenge him; and the wayfarer, the hunter, or the warrior is sure of a cordial welcome in the distant lodge of the clansman whose face perhaps he has never seen. It may be added that

certain privileges, highly prized as hereditary rights, sometimes reside in particular clans; such as that of furnishing a sachem to the tribe, or of performing certain religious ceremonies or magic rites."—F. Parkman, *Conspiracy of Pontiac*, ch. 1.—"A totem is a class of material objects which a savage regards with superstitious respect, believing that there exists between him and every member of the class an intimate and altogether special relation. The name is derived from an Ojibway (Chippeway) word 'totem,' the correct spelling of which is somewhat uncertain. It was first introduced into literature, so far as appears, by J. Long, an Indian interpreter of last century, who spelt it 'totam.' . . . The connexion between a man and his totem is mutually beneficent; the totem protects the man, and the man shows his respect for the totem in various ways, by not killing it if it be an animal, and not cutting or gathering it if it be a plant. As distinguished from a fetich, a totem is never an isolated individual, but always a class of objects, generally a species of animals or of plants, more rarely a class of inanimate natural objects, very rarely a class of artificial objects. Considered in relation to men, totems are of at least three kinds:—(1) the clan totem, common to a whole clan, and passing by inheritance from generation to generation; (2) the sex totem, common either to all the males or to all the females of a tribe, to the exclusion in either case of the other sex; (3) the individual totem, belonging to a single individual and not passing to his descendants."—J. G. Frazer, *Totemism*, pp. 1-2.—See also CHURCH AND STATE: Totemism; RELIGION: Universal elements.

ALSO IN: L. H. Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, ch. 4.—Idem, *Ancient society*, pt. 2.—L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, appendix B.—W. R. Smith, *Kinship and marriage in early Arabia*, ch. 7.—E. Durkheim, *Elementary forms of the religious life*.

TOTILA (d. 552), king of the Ostrogoths, 541-552. See BARBARIAN INVASIONS: 527-533; ROME: Medieval city: 535-553.

TOTONACOS.—"The first natives whom Cortes met on landing in Mexico were the Totonacos. They occupied the territory of Totonacapan, now included in the State of Vera Cruz. According to traditions of their own, they had resided there 800 years, most of which time they were independent, though a few generations before the arrival of the Spaniards they had been subjected by the arms of the Montezumas. . . . Sahagun describes them as almost white in color, their heads artificially deformed, but their features regular and handsome. Robes of cotton beautifully dyed served them for garments, and their feet were covered with sandals. . . . These people were highly civilized. Cempoalla, their capital city, was situated about five miles from the sea, at the junction of two streams. Its houses were of brick and mortar, and each was surrounded by a small garden, at the foot of which a stream of fresh water was conducted. . . . The affinities of the Totonacos are difficult to make out. . . . Their language has many words from Maya roots, but it has also many more from the Nahuatl."—D. G. Brinton, *American race*, p. 139.—See also INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in Mexico and Central America: Aztec area.

TOUL, town in northeastern France, capital of an arrondissement in the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle, twenty-one miles west of Nancy. France acquired possession of it in 1552. See FRANCE: 1547-1559.

1648.—Incorporated with France in the Peace

of Westphalia. See GERMANY: 1648: Peace of Westphalia; WESTPHALIA, PEACE OF (1648).

TOULON, seaport, fortress and naval station in the department of Var, France, capital of the arrondissement of Toulon, on the Mediterranean, forty-two miles southeast of Marseilles. Its population was 106,331 in 1921.

1793-1794.—Revolt against the revolutionary government at Paris.—English aid called in.—Siege, capture and frightful vengeance by the Terrorists. See FRANCE: 1793 (June); (July-December): Civil War; Progress of the war of the coalition; 1793-1794 (October-April).

TOULOUSE, Raymond IV, Count of (d. 1105), leader of the First Crusade, 1096. Besieged Tripolis, 1104. See CRUSADES: 1104-1111; Military aspect, etc.; Map of Mediterranean lands in 1097.

TOULOUSE, Raymond VI, Count of (1156-1222), leader of the Albigenses against the Crusaders under Simon de Montfort. Defeated by the latter, 1213. See ALBIGENSES: 1209; 1210-1213; 1217-1220.

TOULOUSE, city of southwestern France, on the Garonne, capital of the department of Haute-Garonne, 159 miles southeast of Bordeaux. The population was 175,434 in 1921.

B. C. 106.—Acquisition by the Romans.—Tolosa, modern Toulouse, was the chief town of the Volcæ Tectosages (see VOLCÆ), a Gallic tribe which occupied the upper basin of the Garonne, between the western prolongation of the Cévennes and the eastern Pyrenees. Some time before 106 B. C. the Romans had formed an alliance with the Tectosages which enabled them to place a garrison in Tolosa; but the people had tired of the arrangement, had risen against the garrison and had put the soldiers in chains. On that provocation, Q. Servilius Cæpio, one of the consuls of the year 106, advanced upon the town, found traitors to admit him within its gates, and sacked it as a Roman general knew how to do. He found a great treasure of gold in Tolosa, the origin of which has been the subject of much dispute. The treasure was sent off under escort to Massilia, but disappeared on the way, its escort being attacked and slain. Consul Cæpio was accused of the robbery; there was a great scandal and prosecution at Rome, and "Aurum Tolosanum"—"the gold of Toulouse"—became a proverbial expression, applied to ill-gotten wealth.—Based on G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic*, v. 2, ch. 1.

A. D. 410-509.—Gothic kingdom. See BARBARIAN INVASIONS: 408-423; GOTHs: 410-419, 453-484; 507-509.

721.—Repulse of the Moslems. See CALIPHATE: 715-732.

781.—Made a county of Aquitaine. See AQUITAINE: 781.

10th-11th centuries.—Rise of the counts.—The counts of Toulouse "represented an earlier line of dukes of Aquitaine, successors of the dukes of Gothia or Septimania, under whom the capital of southern Gaul had been not Poitiers but Toulouse, Poitou itself counting as a mere underfief. In the latter half of the tenth century these dukes of Gothia or Aquitania Prima, as the Latin chroniclers sometimes called them from the Old Roman name of their country, had seen their ducal title transferred to the Poitevin lords of Aquitania Secunda—the dukes of Aquitaine with whom we have had to deal. But the Poitevin overlordship was never fully acknowledged by the house of Toulouse; and this latter in the course of the following century again rose to great importance and distinction, which reached its height in the person of Count

Raymond IV., better known as Raymond of St. Gilles, from the name of the little county which had been his earliest possession. From that small centre his rule gradually spread over the whole territory of the ancient dukes of Septimania. In the year of the Norman conquest of England [1066] Rouergue, which was held by a younger branch of the house of Toulouse, lapsed to the elder line; in [1088] the year after the Conqueror's death Raymond came into possession of Toulouse itself; in 1094 he became, in right of his wife, owner of half the Burgundian county of Provence. His territorial influence was doubled by that of his personal fame; he was one of the chief heroes of the first Crusade; and when he died in 1105 he left to his son Bertrand, over and above his Aquitanian heritage, the Syrian county of Tripoli. On Bertrand's death in 1112 these possessions were divided, his son Pontius succeeding him as count of Tripoli, and surrendering his claims upon Toulouse to his uncle Alfonso Jordan, a younger son of Raymond of St. Gilles. Those claims, however, were disputed. Raymond's elder brother, Count William IV., had left an only daughter who, after a childless marriage with King Sancho Ramirez of Aragon, became the wife of Count William VIII. of Poitou. From that time forth it became a moot point whether the lord of St. Gilles or the lord of Poitiers was the rightful count of Toulouse. . . . With all these shiftings and changes of ownership the kings of France had never tried to interfere. Southern Gaul—"Aquitaine" in the wider sense—was a land whose internal concerns they found it wise to leave as far as possible untouched."—K. Norgate, *England under the Angevin kings*, v. 1, ch. 10.—See also **BURGUNDY**: 1032.

12th century.—Joyous court. See **PROVENCE**: 1179-1207.

1209.—Beginning of the Albigensian crusades. See **ALBIGENSES**: 1209.

1213.—Conquest by Simon de Montfort and his Crusaders. See **ALBIGENSES**: 1210-1213; **ARAGON**.

1229.—End of the reign of the counts. See **ALBIGENSES**: 1217-1229.

1321.—Persecution of the Jews. See **JEWS**: 1321.

1323-1324.—"Floral games."—The famous "floral games" were instituted in Toulouse in 1324. In these games, held at the height of the spring season between the first and the third of May, the poets of Languedoc contended for the prize of the golden amaranth and other gold and silver flowers. The tradition of the floral games is still maintained by the Académie des Jeux Floraux, which awards similar prizes for compositions in prose or verse.

1814.—Last battle of the Peninsula War.—Occupation of the city by the English. See **SPAIN**: 1812-1814.

**TOURAINNE**, former province in France along the banks of the Loire, bounded on the north by Orléanais, on the west by Anjou and Maine, on the south by Poitou and on the east by Berry. It belonged to England from 1154 to 1205. See **ENGLAND**: 1205.

**TOURCOING**, town of northeastern France in the department of Nord, close to the Belgian border. During practically the whole of the World War the town was held by the Germans. The population was 78,600 in 1921. See **WORLD WAR**: 1916: V. German rule in northern France and Belgium: a, 1.

Battle of. See **FRANCE**: 1794 (March-July).

**TOURNAMENT**. See **TOURNEY**.

**TOURNAI** (Tourhai), town on the Scheldt in the province of Hainaut, in western Belgium, near the French border. It had a population of 35,805 in 1920. It has several buildings of medieval architecture, notably the Cathedral of Notre Dame.

1513.—Capture by the English. See **FRANCE**: 1513-1515.

1581.—Siege and capture by the Spaniards. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1581-1584.

1583.—Submission to Spain. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1584-1585.

1667.—Taken by the French. See **BELGIUM**: 1667.

1668.—Ceded to France. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1668.

1709.—Siege and reduction by Marlborough and Prince Eugene. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1708-1709.

1713.—Ceded to Holland. See **UTRECHT**: 1712-1714; **NETHERLANDS**: 1713-1715.

1745-1748.—Siege.—Battle of Fontenoy and surrender to the French.—Restoration at the peace. See **BELGIUM**: 1745; **AIX-LA-CHAPELLE**: Congresses: 2.

1794.—Battles near the city.—Surrender to the French. See **FRANCE**: 1794 (March-July).

1814.—Belgian provinces annexed to Holland. See **FRANCE**: 1814 (April-June).

1830-1832.—Separation of Belgian provinces from Holland.—Creation of an independent government. See **BELGIUM**: 1830-1832.

1914-1918.—Captured by the Germans (August, 1914).—Taken by the Allies (October, 1918). See **WORLD WAR**: 1918: II. Western front: w, 2.

**TOURNEY, TOURNAMENT, JOUST**.—"The word tourney, sometimes tournament, and in Latin 'torneamentum,' clearly indicates both the French origin of these games and the principal end of that exercise, the art of manœuvring, of turning ('tournoyer') his horse skilfully, to strike his adversary and shield himself at the same time from his blows. The combats, especially those of the nobility, were always fought on horseback, with the lance and sharp sword; the knight presented himself, clothed in armour which covered his whole body, and which, while it preserved him from wounds, bent to every movement and retarded those of his war horse. It was important, therefore, that constant exercise should accustom the knight's limbs to the enormous weight which he must carry, and the horse to the agility which was expected of him. In a 'passage' or 'pass of arms' ('passage' or 'pas d'armes') the generic name of all those games, this exercise was composed of two parts: the joust, which was a single combat of knight against knight, both clothed in all their arms, and the tourney, which was the image of a general battle, or the encounter and evolutions of two troops of cavalry equal in number."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *France under the feudal system* (tr. by W. Bellingham), ch. 8.—Tournaments were said, by the earliest chroniclers of the game, to have been invented by a French baron, Geoffire de Prulli, in the eleventh century. In England in the twelfth century tournaments were forbidden by Henry II, who feared lest such great martial gatherings be turned to something besides sport. Richard I, however, granted licenses for tournaments, and the sources of our knowledge of these assemblies are often found in the record of the granting or withholding of licenses for tournaments and the reasons therefor, together with records of fines and penalties for unlicensed tourneying. By the fourteenth century tournaments had, in many instances, become very rich and splendid international assem-

blies of princes and nobles." On St. George's Day in 1344 a mighty tournament was held at Windsor, and heralds published at all the principal courts of the continent, in France, Burgundy, Flanders, etc., a notice of the tournament and the king's offer of safe-conduct for competitors. Even monarchs themselves took part in the games. Henry II of France died of a wound incurred in a tournament. As time went on, pageants and masques were included as part of the general display of the tournament, and by the sixteenth century, the martial element in the game had yielded to gorgeous show.

**TOURS**, city of central France, capital of the department of Indre-et-Loire, 145 miles southwest of Paris. It was named from the Gallic tribe, Turones, and was an ally of Vercingetorix against the Romans. In 473 it was taken by the Visigoths and in 507 by the Franks under Clovis. In 732 Charles Martel defeated the Moors here. (See **FRANKS**: 511-752; **GERMANY**: 687-800.) In 1870 it became the seat of the French provisional government of national defense. During the World War it was an important divisional center of the American army in France. It had a population of 75,096 in 1921.

Council of (566). See **CHARITIES**: France: 511-1553.

**TOURVILLE**, Anne-Hilarion de Cotentin (or Costantin), Comte de (1642-1701), French admiral and marshal of France. Defeated the Anglo-Dutch fleet off Palermo, 1677, and near the Isle of Wight, 1690; was defeated at La Hogue, 1692. See **ENGLAND**: 1602.

**TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE**, or Louverture, Pierre-Dominique (c. 1746-1803), one of the liberators of Haiti. See **HAITI, REPUBLIC OF**: 1632-1803.

**TOWER AND SWORD**, Order of the.—This was an order of knighthood founded in Portugal by Alfonso V, who reigned from 1438 to 1481. "The institution of the order related to a sword reputed to be carefully guarded in a tower of the city of Fez: respecting it there was a prophecy that it must one day come into the possession of a Christian king; in other words, that the Mohammedan empire of northwestern Africa would be subverted by the Christians. Alfonso seemed to believe that he was the destined conqueror."—S. A. Dunham, *History of Spain and Portugal*, v. 3, p. 225.

**TOWER BRIDGE**, drawbridge spanning the Thames just below the Tower of London. See **LONDON**: 1804.

**TOWER OF LONDON**.—"Built originally by the Conqueror to curb London, afterwards the fortress-palace of his descendants, and in the end the State prison, from which a long procession of the ill-starred great went forth to lay their heads on the block on Tower Hill; while State murders, like those of Henry VI. and the two young sons of Edward IV., were done in the dark chambers of the Tower itself."—Goldwin Smith, *Trip to England*, p. 56.—"Even as to length of days, the Tower has no rival among palaces and prisons. . . . Old writers date it from the days of Caesar; a legend taken up by Shakespeare and the poets in favour of which the name of Caesar's Tower remains in popular use to this very day. A Roman wall can even yet be traced near some parts of the ditch. The Tower is mentioned in the Saxon Chronicle, in a way not incompatible with the fact of a Saxon stronghold having stood upon the spot. The buildings as we have them now in block and plan were commenced by William the Conqueror; and the series of apartments in Caesar's Tower

[the great Norman keep now called the White Tower]—hall, gallery, council chamber, chapel—were built in the early Norman reigns and used as a royal residence by all our Norman kings."—W. H. Dixon, *Her majesty's tower*, ch. 1.—"We are informed by the 'Textus Roffensis' that the present Great or White Tower was constructed by Gundulph, Bishop of Rochester, under the direction of King William I, who was suspicious of the fidelity of the citizens. The date assigned by Stow is 1078."—J. Britton and E. W. Brayley, *Memoirs of the Tower of London*, ch. 1.—See also **LONDON**: 1066-1154.

Also in: Lord de Ros, *Memorials of the tower*.

**TOWN**.—"Burh, burgh, borough, in its various spellings and various shades of meaning, is our native word for urbes of every kind from Rome downward. It is curious that this word should in ordinary speech have been so largely displaced by the vaguer word tun, town, which means an enclosure of any kind, and in some English dialects is still applied to a single house and its surroundings."—E. A. Freeman, *City and borough* (*Macmillan's Magazine*, May, 1889).—See also **TOWNSHIP**; **BOROUGH**; **GUILDS**: Medieval; **COMMUNE**; **EUROPE**: Middle Ages: Growth of towns; also **ENGLAND**: 959-975; **GERMANY**: 1648: Thirty-Years' War.

**TOWN PLANNING**. See **CITY PLANNING**; **CIVIC BEAUTY**; also **HOUSING**: Great Britain: Legislation, National housing; Norway; Russia.

**TOWNLEY**, Arthur C., organized the Non-Partisan League in North Dakota in 1915. See **NON-PARTISAN LEAGUE**.

**TOWNSEND**, Charles (1725-1767), English chancellor of the exchequer, 1766-1767. Introduced and sponsored taxation of the American colonies. See **ENGLAND**: 1765-1768; **U.S.A.**: 1765: News of the Stamp Act, etc.; 1766-1767.

**TOWNSEND**, John G. (1871- ), governor of Delaware, 1917-1921. See **DELAWARE**: 1917; 1018-1010.

**TOWNSHEND**, Charles Townshend, 2nd Viscount (1674-1738), English statesman. Secretary of state, 1714-1716. See **ENGLAND**: 1714-1721.

**TOWNSHEND**, Sir Charles Vere Ferrers (1861- ), British major-general. Commanded a British expeditionary force in Mesopotamia, 1915; was besieged by the Turks at Kut-el-Amara and was forced to surrender, Apr. 28, 1916; remained a prisoner of war until October, 1918. See **WORLD WAR**: 1916: VI. Turkish theater: a, 1, iii; b, 2; c; c, 2; c, 3; c, 4; c, 4, i; c, 4, ii; 1918: VI. Turkish theater: c, 25.

**TOWNSHEND MEASURES**. See **U.S.A.**: 1766-1767; 1770.

**TOWNSHIP**.—"In recent historical writing dealing with Anglo-Saxon conditions, a great place has been occupied by the 'township.' The example was set sixty years ago by Palgrave; but it does not seem to have been generally followed until in 1874 Dr. Stubbs gave the word a prominent place in his 'Constitutional History.' With Dr. Stubbs the 'township' was 'the unit of the constitutional machinery or local administration'; and since then most writers on constitutional and legal history have followed in the same direction. . . . The language commonly used in this connection need not, perhaps, necessarily be understood as meaning that the phenomenon which the writers have in mind was actually known to the Saxons themselves as a 'township' ('tunscepe'). It may be said that 'township' is merely a modern name which it is convenient to apply to it. Yet, certainly, that language usually suggests that it was under that name that

the Saxons knew it. . . . It is therefore of some interest, at least for historical terminology,—and possibly for other and more important reasons—to point out that there is no good foundation in Anglo-Saxon sources for such a use of the term; that 'tunscepe' in the few places where it does appear does not mean an area of land, an extent of territory, or even the material houses and crofts of a village; that it is probably nothing more than a loose general term for 'the villagers.' . . . Only three passages in Anglo-Saxon literature have as yet been found in which the word 'tunscepe' appears,—the Saxon translation of Bede's 'Ecclesiastical History,' v. 10, the laws of Edgar, iv. 8, and the 'Saxon Chronicle,' s. a 1137. . . . The later history of the word 'township' would probably repay investigation. It is certainly not a common word in literature until comparatively recent times; and, where it does appear, its old meaning seems often to cling to it. . . . There is a good deal to make one believe that 'town' [see TOWN] continued to be the common popular term for what we may describe in general language as a rural centre of population even into the 18th century. . . . The far more general use of the word 'town' than of 'township' in early New England is most naturally explained by supposing that it was the word ordinarily employed in England at the time of the migration,—at any rate, in East Anglia.—W. J. Ashley, *Anglo-Saxon "Township"* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Apr., 1894). See MANORS; SELECTMEN; COURTS: Teutonic; also VIRGINIA: 1700.—The word was given a distinct meaning, an American usage, by the act of Congress in 1785 which prescribed that the western lands offered for sale by the Ohio Company, should be laid out in townships six mile square, each township to be divided into thirty-six sections. Every sixteenth section was to be reserved for the support of a school, and the company was required to set aside two townships for a university. This township system served as a pattern for the development of the western lands throughout the United States.—See also U. S. A.: 1785-1790.

**TOWNSHIP AND TOWN-MEETING, New England.**—“When people from England first came to dwell in the wilderness of Massachusetts Bay, they settled in groups upon small irregular-shaped patches of land, which soon came to be known as townships. . . . This migration . . . was a movement, not of individuals or of separate families, but of church-congregations, and it continued to be so as the settlers made their way inland and westward. . . . A township would consist of about as many farms as could be disposed within convenient distance from the meeting-house, where all the inhabitants, young and old, gathered every Sunday, coming on horseback or afoot. The meeting-house was thus centrally situated, and near it was the town pasture or ‘common,’ with the school-house and the block-house, or rude fortress for defence against the Indians. . . . Around the meeting-house and common the dwellings gradually clustered into a village, and after a while the tavern, store, and town-house made their appearance. . . . Under these circumstances they developed a kind of government which we may describe in the present tense, for its methods are pretty much the same to-day that they were two centuries ago. In a New England township the people directly govern themselves; the government is the people, or, to speak with entire precision, it is all the male inhabitants of one-and-twenty years of age and upwards. The people tax themselves. Once each year, usually in March but sometimes as early as

February or as late as April, a ‘town-meeting’ is held, at which all the grown men of the township are expected to be present and to vote, while any one may introduce motions or take part in the discussion. . . . The town-meeting is held in the town-house, but at first it used to be held in the church, which was thus a ‘meeting-house’ for civil as well as ecclesiastical purposes. At the town-meeting measures relating to the administration of town affairs are discussed and adopted or rejected; appropriations are made for the public expenses of the town, or in other words the amount of the town taxes for the year is determined; and town officers are elected for the year. . . . The principal executive magistrates of the town are the selectmen. They are three, five, seven, or nine in number. . . . It [the town] was simply the English parish government brought into a new country and adapted to the new situation. Part of this new situation consisted in the fact that the lords of the manor were left behind. There was no longer any occasion to distinguish between the township as a manor and the township as a parish; and so, as the three names had all lived on together, side by side, in England, it was now the oldest and most generally descriptive name, ‘township,’ that survived, and has come into use throughout a great part of the United States. . . . New York had from the very beginning the rudiments of an excellent system of local self-government. The Dutch villages had their assemblies, which under the English rule were developed into town-meetings, though with less ample powers than those of New England. . . . The New York system is of especial interest, because it has powerfully influenced the development of local institutions throughout the Northwest.—J. Fiske, *Civil government in the United States*, ch. 2, 4.—“The name town first occurs in the record of the second colonial meeting of the Court of Assistants [Massachusetts bay, Sept. 7, 1030], in connection with the naming of Boston, Charlestown and Watertown. . . . A rude pattern of a frame of town government was shaped by Dorchester, when, in place of the earlier practice of transacting business at meetings of the whole body of its freemen (the grants of land being certified by a committee consisting of the clergymen and deacons), it designated certain inhabitants, twelve in number, to meet weekly, and consult and determine upon public affairs,—without any authority, however, beyond other inhabitants who should choose to come and take part in their consultations and votes. About the same time, at Watertown, it was ‘agreed by the consent of the freemen, that there should be three persons chosen for the ordering of the civil affairs.’ In the fourth year from the settlement of Boston, at which time the earliest extant records were made, three persons were chosen ‘to make up the ten to manage the affairs of the town.’ The system of delegated town action was there perhaps the same which was defined in an ‘Order made by the inhabitants of Charlestown, at a full meeting [Feb. 10, 1035], for the government of the town by Selectmen,—the name presently extended throughout New England to the municipal governors. . . . The towns have been, on the one hand, separate governments, and, on the other the separate constituents of a common government. In Massachusetts, for two centuries and a quarter, the Deputies in the General Court—or Representatives, as they have been named under the State Constitution—continued to represent the municipal corporations. In New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut and Rhode Island, that basis of represen-

tation still subsists."—J. G. Palfrey, *History of New England*, v, 1, ch. 9.—"Boston . . . is the largest community that ever maintained the town organization, probably the most generally able and intelligent. No other town ever played so conspicuous a part in connection with important events. It led Massachusetts, New England, the thirteen colonies, in the struggle for independence. Probably in the whole history of the Anglo-Saxon race, there has been no other so interesting manifestation of the activity of the Folk-mote. Of this town of towns, Samuel Adams was the son of sons. . . . One may almost call him the creature of the town-meeting."—J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams, the man of the town-meeting* (*Johns Hopkins University Studies*, series 2, no. 4).—See also NEW ENGLAND: 1640-1644; SELECTMEN.

ALSO IN: E. Channing, *Town and county government in the English colonies* (*Johns Hopkins University Studies*, series 2, no. 10).—J. A. Fairlie, *Local government in cities, towns and villages*.—W. B. Munro, *Government of the United States*, pp. 530-537, 561-564.

**TOWTON, Battle of** (1461).—On Palm Sunday, Mar. 20, 1461, two armies of Englishmen met on a "goodly plain," ten miles from the city of York, between the villages of Towton and Saxton, to fight out the contention of the parties of the "two roses,"—of Lancaster and York. The battle they fought is called the bloodiest that ever dyed English soil. It raged through an afternoon and a night until the following day, and the slain of the two sides has been variously reckoned by different historians at 20,000 to 38,000. No quarter was given by the victorious partisans of Edward IV and the Lancastrians were utterly crushed. Henry VI fled to Scotland and Queen Margaret repaired to France.—Based on C. Ransome, *Battle of Towton* (*English Historical Review*, July, 1889).—See also ENGLAND: 1455-1471.

**TOXANDRIA**.—After Julian's successful campaigns against the Franks, 358, the latter were permitted to remain, as subjects of the Roman empire, in "an extensive district of Brabant, which was then known by the appellation of Toxandria, and may deserve to be considered as the original seat of their Gallic monarchy. . . . This name seems to be derived from the 'Toxandri' of Pliny, and very frequently occurs in the histories of the middle age. Toxandria was a country of woods and morasses, which extended from the neighbourhood of Tongres to the conflux of the Vahal and the Rhine."—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 19, with footnote.—See also GAUL: 355-361.

**TOXARCHI**, commanders of the Athenian archers and of the city-watch (known as Scythians).

**TOXINS**. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 19th century: Antitoxin.

**TRABEA**, toga ornamented with horizontal purple stripes. See TOGA.

**TRACHIS**, ancient city in Greece, at the foot of Mt. Ceta, near Thermopylæ. King Xerxes pitched camp here before the battle of Thermopylæ in 480 B. C. See GREECE: B. C. 480: Persian Wars: Thermopylæ.

**TRACTARIAN MOVEMENT**. See OXFORD, OF TRACTARIAN, MOVEMENT.

**TRACTORS**. See AUTOMOBILES: 1678-1803; 1858-1910; TANKS: Invention.

**TRACY**, Alexandre de Prouville, Marquis de (1603-1670), French soldier and administrator. Appointed lieutenant-general of the French possessions in North America, 1663. See QUEBEC, PROVINCE OF: 1635-1672.

**TRADE**. See COMMERCE.

Control of foreign trade. See TARIFF.

Voluntary restraint of. See COMMON LAW: 1711.

**TRADE BOARD ACTS**: Great Britain. See LABOR LEGISLATION: 1900-1918.

**TRADE COMBINATIONS**. See TRUSTS.

**TRADE COMMISSION**, United States. See COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES.

**TRADE CONFERENCE**, International. See COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF.

**TRADE COUNCILS**: England. See LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1843-1864.

**TRADE DISPUTES ACT**: England (1906). See LABOR LEGISLATION: 1901-1918.

**TRADE GUILDS**. See GUILDS.

**TRADE MARKS**, Laws of. See COMMON LAW: 1783; EQUITY LAW: 1875.

**TRADE RELATIONS BUREAU**. See STATE, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES: 1909-1913.

**TRADE ROUTES**: Ancient. See COMMERCE: Primitive: Transportation and communication.

Discovery of ocean passage to the Indies. See COMMERCE: Medieval: 11th-16th centuries.

Oriental and occidental trade routes to Asia. See COMMERCE: Medieval: 12th-16th centuries.

Changes made by discoveries of new routes to India. See COMMERCE: Era of geographic expansion: 15th-16th centuries; 15th-17th centuries.

Sea routes of the twentieth century. See COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1770-1921.

**TRADE SCHOOLS**. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Vocational education.

**TRADE UNION COLLEGE**: Boston. See BOSTON: 1911-1919; EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Workers' education: United States.

Washington, D. C. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Workers' education: United States.

**TRADE UNION COUNCILS**: France. See LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1919; Economic Council of Labor.

England. See WHITLEY COUNCILS: Organization and method.

**TRADE UNIONS**. See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR; ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL; GUILDS; INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD; KNIGHTS OF LABOR; LABOR LEGISLATION; LABOR ORGANIZATION; LABOR PARTIES; LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS; also COMPAGNONNAGES.

**TRADESCANT**, John (c. 1570-c. 1637), English traveler and naturalist. First Englishman to make a considerable collection of objects in natural history. See ASHMOLEAN MUSEUM.

**TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT**: South Africa. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1916.

United States. See U. S. A.: 1917 (October). Trading with the Enemy Act; WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: III. Press and censorship: a, 7; CENSORSHIP: World War.

**TRAETTA**, Tommaso (1727-1779), Italian composer. See MUSIC: Modern: 1730-1816: Italian.

**TRAFALGAR**, Naval battle of. See FRANCE: 1805 (March-December).

**TRAFFIC AND TRAFFIC PROBLEMS**. See RAILROADS; MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: Transportation and health.

**TRAGEDY**. See DRAMA.

**TRAILOS PRABANDHU**, Prince, Siamese representative at the peace conference. See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace.

**TRAILS**, in American history: Old Mohawk Trail.—Branch across New York State.—Oneida Trail.—"There is plenty of evidence that our first



settlers found the wilderness crossed by numerous Indian footpaths or trails, which by the testimony of Indians then living, had been used by countless generations of their race. . . . Because of the Indian habit of traveling single file these trails were seldom over eighteen inches wide, yet they were the highways for traders, migrating Indians or settlers, embassies and messengers. They naturally follow the line of least resistance. . . . So it was that the first settlers of the Deerfield Valley found one of these ancient trails following the river up from Deerfield, and the first settlers at Albany found a similar trail following the Hoosic from its mouth nearly to its source. . . . So for centuries ran the Indian foot path up the Hoosic valley, across the Hoosic divide and down the Deerfield valley to the Connecticut. But with the advent of the white men, it immediately began to disappear and as settlements pushed along the Hoosic and Deerfield from either side, the trail was replaced by roads, the course across the divide being the last portion to be replaced. At the building of Fort Massachusetts we know that a passable road existed from there to the Hudson. A road from Deerfield to Charlemont was made at an even earlier period, but not until 1753 did a road cross the mountain barrier, the ancient trail thus losing the last portion of its course as a foot path. . . . The Mohawk Trail runs from the mouth of the Hoosic River to North Adams, thence to the Deerfield and on to the Connecticut. Popularly there is no limit to its extension east and west of these points. From the mouth of the Hoosic to Eagle Bridge it seems to be generally accepted that the trail lay along the river bank, and probably on both sides of the river. . . . From Eagle Bridge, . . . its course was practically the same as the existing roads on the northerly bank. From this point the trail followed along the left bank in practically the exact location of the present highway past Williamstown station through Blackinton and North Adams. . . . [On] June 12, 1764, Samuel Rive of the Charlemont petitioned the General Court as follows: "The road over Hoosuck mountains being at present very dangerous, several creatures have lost their lives thereof, your petitioner hath found a better place for a road, and as there is about 200 acres of Province Land near the Deerfield River, prays for a grant of same, he obliging himself to build a road up said mountain as good as the land will allow of." . . . It was better in that it led directly into the Charlemont intervals and crossed the river at a better place. . . . In 1786 a committee was named by the General Court to sell unappropriated lands on Hoosac Mountain and to complete a good wagon road over the mountain from the west line of Charlemont to the east line of Adams. The road was to be built before 1787, with a bridge over the Deerfield at a convenient place. . . . Unlike the second road, the new road did not ascend the mountain at the crossingplace, but kept along the river bank until it reached the point nearest the Hoosic valley where it made its steep ascent over the mountain precisely as later on the tunnel made the passage through the mountain at the same spot. This was the long used stage road. . . . In 1707 the Turnpike Association was incorporated with Asaph White and Jesse King and their associates as incorporators and continued until dissolved March 14, 1833."—W. B. Browne, *Mohawk Trail*, pp. 5-8, 24-25.—During colonial times that branch of the Mohawk Trail across New York state was of great importance. It was the strategic portage in the route from Albany to

Oswego and Niagara, and in the route from central New York to Pennsylvania. "In 1777 the 'Northern War Path' became again the route of armies. . . . The western war-route to the Lakes was up the Mohawk and down the Onondaga (Oswego) Rivers. Albany and Oswego were its termini; and the Oneida carrying-place of one mile (in favorable seasons) between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek, at Rome, New York, was its key. . . . 'The first carrying place on the great western route was from the Hudson at Albany through the pine woods to the Mohawk at Schenectady. . . . At the terminus of the old Indian carrying place on the Hudson, now called Albany, the Dutch, under Hendrick Christensen, in 1614, built Fort Nassau on Castle Island. . . . In 1617 they built another fort at the mouth of the Normanskill.' . . . In the year 1662 Arendt van Curler, and other inhabitants of Fort Orange, 'went west' across the old carry through the pines to the rich Mohawk flats and founded a settlement. To this settlement they applied the old Indian name of Albany, calling it Schenectady. . . . 'From Schenectady' the western trail ran up the Mohawk to what is now the city of Rome, where there was another carry of a mile in length, to a Wood Creek which flows into Oneida Lake. This carrying place [was] afterward the site of Fort Stanwix. . . . From it the old trail ran through the Oneida Lake, and down the Oswego River to Lake Ontario. . . . The Oneida portage—as the carrying place between the Mohawk and Wood Creek is known in history—was guarded at its Mohawk terminus as early as 1732 by the erection of Fort Williams, and at the Wood Creek terminus as early as 1737 by Fort Bull. Throughout the century of conflict between French and English the Oneida portage route was of utmost importance. In the crucial years between 1755 and 1759 it was especially important. . . . In the British Museum may be seen a colored 'plan of the forts at the Oneida, or great carrying place, in the province of New York in America.' . . . The Oneida portage led to the West—to the Lakes and the Ohio Basin."—A. B. Hulbert, *Portage paths (Historic highways of America, v. 7, pp. 135-138, 143)*.

**Boone's Trace, or the Wilderness Road.**—The Wilderness Road "is said to be the first road built into the wilderness for the purpose of encouraging settlement and development. . . . Daniel Boone, the noted hunter and explorer, had several times left his home in North Carolina to hunt and travel in the wilds of Kentucky. He brought back to the eastern side of the mountains glowing descriptions. These excited the cupidity of a friend, a judge and prominent citizen of North Carolina, James Henderson. Henderson employed Boone to confer with the Cherokee Indians who claimed this territory for the sale of their rights. Boone sought out the Indians and by means now unknown got them to agree to sell."—G. R. Chatburn, *Highways and highway transportation*, p. 30.—See also KENTUCKY: 1792.

**Cumberland, or National Road.** See CUMBERLAND, OR NATIONAL, ROAD.

**Nashville, Lexington-Limestone and Louisville Roads.** See KENTUCKY: 1792.

**Scioto Trail.**—"Traders from Virginia who reached far out in Tennessee and Kentucky found competition from those who came down by one of the several routes from the Great Lakes or up from the lower Mississippi. A route left Lake Erie at what is now Cleveland, passed up the Cuyahoga, portaged across to a tributary of the Ohio, then into Kentucky; another left the Lake at Sandusky, fol-

lowed the Miami, crossed to the Scioto, thence down to the Ohio, across Kentucky to Cumberland Gap, sometimes called the Scioto trail and farther south the Warrior's Trail. As western territory settled, trails and roads became more numerous."—G. R. Chatburn, *Highways and highway transportation*, p. 38.

**Transcontinental trails.**—Passes through the Rockies.—Oregon Trail.—Salt Lake, later California, Santa Fé, Gila, and Spanish Trails.—“Following the purchase of the Louisiana territory [and the Lewis and Clark expedition of 1804] there was, of course, an extension of settlement to the prairies beyond the Missouri. . . . The settlement of these lands, together with the opening of Oregon and later California with its great gold rush, created a demand for transcontinental roads. The mountain ranges were searched for passes, possibly not so much for the purposes of settlement as means of going to and coming from fur trading posts which large companies established through the whole Rocky Mountain region. St. Louis became the greatest fur center in the world. . . . Provost, leader of a detachment of the Rocky Mountain Fur Company . . . found the South Pass by way of the Sweetwater branch of the North Fork of the Platte River, 1823. This pass held preëminence as a crossing through the Rockies to the great interior basin and to the Pacific coast. . . . Bridger discovered the pass in Southern Wyoming bearing his name, about 1824. This defile though wide enough for an army to pass through seems narrow because of its lateral walls of red granite and metamorphic sandstone extending almost perpendicularly from 1000 to 25,000 feet. The overland mail route prior to the building of the Union Pacific Railroad was through this pass. Jedediah Smith . . . explored practically all the region from Great Salt Lake to the Pacific, and from San Diego to the upper Columbia River in Canada. . . . New England was especially interested in the Oregon country and through men from there the Humboldt River route was discovered. During this same period there were being opened up trade and trade routes with the Spanish possessions farther south. In 1822 a wagon train was taken from Missouri to Santa Fé by a man named Beckwith, to trade for horses and mules. . . . The Oregon Trail, the Santa Fé Trail, the Spanish Trail and the Gila Route, had become quite well known by the early ‘thirties’ and after the discovery of gold in California in ‘forty-nine’ carried many people and much traffic across the continent. . . . The Astorian Expedition [was] organized June 23, 1810, by John Jacob Astor’s American Fur Company. This Expedition discovered the Oregon Trail which spread knowledge of the Nebraska country leading to its occupancy by white people. . . . As a result two expeditions were fitted out to go to and establish trading posts in Oregon with a central control or main post at Astoria. One of these expeditions went by water around Cape Horn to ‘carry out the people, stores, ammunition and merchandise, requisite for establishing a fortified trading post at the mouth of the Columbia River.’ The other . . . ‘was to proceed up the Missouri, and across the Rocky Mountains, to the same point: exploring a line of communication across the continent, and noting the place where interior trading posts might be established.’ The overland expedition, consisting of about sixty men with four boats . . . proceeded up the [Missouri] river in the spring of 1811. They deviated somewhat from Lewis and Clark’s route by leaving the Missouri River at the mouth

of the Grand River. . . . They seem to have gone across the country north of the Black Hills into Wyoming to the Wind River and Wind Mountains south of the Yellowstone Park, . . . thence a short distance to the head waters of the Snake River, a part of the Lewis and Clark route, which with some deviations they followed to the Columbia. At the mouth of the Columbia they met the sea party, and on July 28, 1812, a party of six men started back with dispatches. . . . The Oregon Trail was . . . clearly outlined and . . . was thoroughly established in 1842. . . . The Trail as finally adopted and used by emigrants and freighters to Oregon in the ‘forties’ started from Independence and Westport (outfitting stations near the present metropolis of Kansas City, Missouri) then followed in a general way the Kansas, Big Blue, and Little Blue Rivers to near the Platte, crossing over to the latter river a short distance west of the present city of Kearney. The trail here proceeded up the South bank of the forks, and from there up the North Fork to the Sweetwater which it followed through South Pass. Thence it bore southwestward, westward, and northwestward to the Snake River which was followed to a point about west of Boise where a cutoff was made through the Blue Mountains arriving at the Columbia River about the mouth of the Umatilla, thence down the Columbia to the Pacific Ocean. . . . [Many variations of the Salt Lake Trail were in use at this time.] Travelers up the Missouri River disembarked at St. Joseph, Nebraska City, Plattsmouth and especially at Council Bluffs. The great Mormon trek was made from the last-named place. They reached the Platte River west of Omaha and followed it on the north bank, paralleling the Oregon Trail from Fort Kearney to Fort Laramie, where they crossed over and joined with the Oregon Trail through South Pass then leaving that trail turned south and west to Great Salt Lake. . . . The Later California Trail was a continuation of the Salt Lake route. It ran north of Great Salt Lake and along the Humboldt River, across the desert to near Lake Tahoe, where there was a crossing through the Sierra Nevada Mountains, the Truckee Pass, thence to the Gold Diggings or across California by way of the American and Sacramento Rivers. . . . [It was] very popular to California gold miners and was afterwards used by the overland stage. . . . [The Santa Fé Trail] passed westward and a little south to the Arkansas River, which it followed to Bent’s Fort (Colorado), thence up Timpas Creek and over the Raton Pass to Las Vegas (New Mexico). Then westward through Apache Canõn to Santa Fé. This trail was too rough for wagon traffic, so later a route which crossed over south from the Arkansas to the Cimarron and meeting the old trail at Las Vegas was used. . . . [The Gila and Spanish Trails were the two routes possible from Santa Fé. One passed] southwestward by way of the Rio Grande and Gila Rivers into southern California. The other took a northwesterly direction up the Chama River, down the Dolores Valley, and across to the Grand River near the present site of Moab, Utah. Then west to the Sevier, up which it followed until it crossed over to the Virgin River; up this for a short distance then turned directly southwest across the Mohave desert toward Los Angeles. This last route received the name of Spanish Trail. Many of these trails were difficult on account of scarcity of water in the deserts. Description of early travel over them are replete with hardships, sickness, and deaths. . . . Many travelers and settlers

were killed by the Indians; the tribes apparently becoming more hostile as the number of whites increased until their own numbers became so decimated they could no longer command sufficient warriors to warrant further attacks."—G. R. Chatburn, *Highways and highway transportation*, pp. 53-58.

**TRAINED BANDS:** English army. See **MILITARY ORGANIZATION:** 30.

**TRAINING CAMPS:** United States. See **WORLD WAR:** 1917: VIII. United States and the War: i, 1; i, 3; i, 6; i, 7; i, 8.

**TRAITORS.** See **TREASON.**

**TRAJAN (Marcus Ulpius Trajanus)** (53-117), Roman emperor, 98-117. Adopted by Nerva, 97; succeeded him, 98; developed the defenses of the empire on the northeastern frontier; built roads and encouraged various reforms; waged war against the Dacians, 101-106; annexed Dacia to the empire; carried on an unsuccessful war against the Parthians, 114-116; an uprising of the Jews occurred in 116. See **ROME: Empire:** 06-138; **AFRICA: Ancient and medieval civilization: Roman occupation; DACIA:** 102-106; **PARTHIA AND PARTHIAN EMPIRE; MILITARY ORGANIZATION:** 11; **JEW:** 116.

**TRAJAN, Arch of.** See **ARCH.**

**TRAJAN, Library of.** See **LIBRARIES: Ancient: Rome.**

**TRAJAN'S FORUM.** See **FORUMS OF ROME: Imperial.**

**TRAJAN'S WALL.**—The emperor Trajan "began a fortified line, afterwards completed, from the Rhine to the Danube. This great work was carried from Ratisbon to Mayence. It was known as Trajan's Wall. It may still be traced to some extent by the marks of a mound and a ditch."—Church and Brodrigg, *Notes to the Germany of Tacitus*, ch. 20.

**TRALLES**, ancient town of Caria, Asia Minor, near the Meander, twenty-eight miles southeast of Ephesus. It renewed its allegiance to Rome during the Mithradatic Wars. See **MITHRADATIC WARS.**

**TRANI**, seaport in the province of Bari, Italy, on the Adriatic. It was pledged to Ferdinand of Aragon by the Treaty of Cambrai, 1509. See **VENICE:** 1508-1509.

**TRANSACTION TAX, United States.** See **TAXATION: Various Federal taxes, etc.**

**TRANSALPINE**, beyond the Alps, from the Roman viewpoint.

**TRANSALPINE AERIAL FLIGHT.** See **AVIATION: Important flights since 1900: 1910.**

**TRANS-ANDEAN RAILWAY, South America.** See **CHILE: 1909-1910; RAILROADS: 1872-1912.**

**TRANSATLANTIC AERIAL FLIGHTS.** See **AVIATION: Important flights since 1900: 1910; 1919: Attempts to cross Atlantic; (May); (May-June); (June); (July); Development of airplanes and air service: 1918-1921: Aerial law.**

**TRANSATLANTIC CABLES.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: 1855-1917.**

**TRANSATLANTIC TRAVEL: First steamship to cross Atlantic.** See **STEAM NAVIGATION: On the ocean.**

**TRANSATLANTIC WIRELESS TELEGRAPH.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless or radio: 1907.**

**TRANSATLANTIC WIRELESS TELEPHONE.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless or radio: 1915-1921.**

**TRANS-AUSTRALIAN RAILWAY.** See **AUSTRALIA: 1907-1920.**

**TRANSBAIKALIA**, province of eastern Si-

beria lying east of Lake Baikal, bounded by Irkutsk on the north, by Amur and Manchuria on the east, and Mongolia on the south. In 1915 it had an estimated population of 971,700. It was a region of fighting during the World War. See **WORLD WAR: 1918: III. Russia: e, 1.**

**TRANSCAUCASIA**, southern division of the Russian Caucasus, comprising the three Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russian Armenia. The federal republic of Transcaucasia was proclaimed in 1917, but dissolved in May, 1918. See **CAUCASUS: Territory: 1902-1917; 1918-1920; GEORGIA, REPUBLIC OF; AZERBAIJAN.**

**TRANSCENDENTAL CLUB: United States.** See **SOCIALISM: 1840-1847.**

**TRANSCENDENTALISM: In American literature.** See **AMERICAN LITERATURE: 1830-1845.**

**TRANSCONTINENTAL AERIAL RACE.** See **AVIATION: Important flights since 1900: 1919 (October).**

**TRANSCONTINENTAL AIR ROUTES.** See **AVIATION: Development of airplanes and air service: 1918-1921: Air service after World War.**

**TRANSCONTINENTAL RADIO TELEPHONE.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless or radio: 1921.**

**TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILWAYS: Africa.** See **CAPE-TO-CAIRO RAILWAY.**

**Asia.** See **RAILROADS: 1876-1921.**

**Australia.** See **RAILROADS: 1908-1918.**

**North America.** See **RAILROADS: 1860-1910; 1871-1910; 1890-1919.**

**South America.** See **RAILROADS: 1872-1912.**

**TRANSCONTINENTAL TELEPHONE.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: Telephone: 1915-1917; 1920-1921.**

**TRANSCONTINENTAL TRAILS.** See **TRAILS: Transcontinental.**

**TRANSCONTINENTAL WIRELESS TELEPHONE.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless or radio: 1915-1921.**

**TRANSFORMER, Electric.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: 1831-1921.**

**TRANSFORMISM**, system of securing political leadership of a party, which obtained in Italy from about 1876-1887. See **ITALY: 1870-1901.**

**TRANS-JURANE BURGUNDY**, ancient name for that part of the kingdom of Burgundy which included the northern part of Savoy, and all of Switzerland between the Reuss and the Jura. See **BURGUNDY: 843-933.**

**TRANSLIETHANIA**, Hungarian half of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy. See **AUSTRIA: 1866-1867.**

**TRANSMIGRATION**, Belief in. See **RELIGION: Universal elements.**

**TRANS-MISSISSIPPI EXPOSITION.** See **OMAHA: 1898.**

**TRANS-MISSOURI FREIGHT ASSOCIATION CASE.** See **RAILROADS: 1890-1902.**

**TRANSOXANIA**, ancient name for Bokhara. See **BOKHARA.**

**TRANS-PACIFIC CABLES.** See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: 1855-1917.**

**TRANSPADANE GAUL.** Cisalpine Gaul north of the Padus, or Po. See **PADUS.**

**TRANSPORT SERVICE: World War.** See **WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: V. Moving men and material.**

**TRANSPORT WORKERS' FEDERATION.** See **LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1913-1921.**

**TRANSPORTATION: Aerial.** See **AVIATION: Development of airplanes and air service: 1918: Aerial law; Air service after World War.**

Land. See RAILROADS.

Motor. See AUTOMOBILES.

Water. See CANALS; COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1770-1921; RAILROADS: 1916-1920.

See also CHANNEL TUNNEL.

**TRANSPORTATION, Municipal.** See MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: Transportation and health; European municipal ownership, particularly British; German municipal ownership; BERLIN: 1916; NEW YORK CITY: 1860-1920; 1918-1921; 1919-1923.

**TRANSPORTATION ACT: United States.** See RAILROADS: 1920; Esch-Cummins Act.

**TRANSPORTATION CORPS: United States.** See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services; V. Moving men and material: a, 10.

**TRANSRHENANE,** beyond the Rhine (looking from the Roman standpoint), that is, on the eastern and northern side of the Rhine.

**TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.**—"For over 30 years the question of constructing this line had been a theme of interminable discussions and reports. Finally, the following unmistakably emphatic note of its Imperial founder, the Emperor Alexander III., appended to a report on the general condition of Siberia, moved the whole project definitely forward as a thing that was to be and at once: 'How many of these reports of the Governors-General of Siberia have I perused, and with sorrow and shame must own that the Government has hitherto hardly done anything to satisfy the demands of this rich but neglected region! It is time, indeed time!' A further equally emphatic and still briefer note, added to a report of the Minister of Ways with regard to the projected Ussuri route, is to form the appropriate inscription to the monument to be erected at Vladivostok, the terminus of his great work, to his late Imperial Majesty: 'The construction of this railway must be begun forthwith.' . . . A Siberian railway committee was formed under the presidency of the then Grand Duke Nicholas Alexandrovich, whose duties were (1) to construct the main and necessary feeding lines; (2) to take measures for the general commercial and industrial development of Siberia; and (3) to direct and control the colonisation movement."—Great Britain, *Parliamentary Publications (Papers by Command: Miscellaneous series no. 533, 1900, pp. 5-7)*.—"The construction of the railway was begun at the Pacific end, and . . . Czar Nicholas II, when Czarvitch, inaugurated the colossal enterprise by laying the first stone of the eastern terminus at Vladivostok on May 12, 1901. Uniformity of gauge is the unbending rule of Russian railway engineers, so that the five foot gauge of the Great Siberian makes it uniform with all the railroads throughout the Russian empire. The Trans-Siberian nominally begins in Europe starting with the magnificent iron bridge which spans the Volga at Samara, in East Russia. . . . This . . . bridge joins the European railway system with the Asiatic line, but that line practically begins in the heart of the Ural Mountains, . . . [at] the little town of Cheliabinsk which formerly was the terminus of the European system. . . . The Siberian line was designed to run through the arable lands of the fertile zone but for many hundreds of versts [verst = two-thirds of a mile] it traverses the pasture lands of the Kirghiz. . . . Both for pasture and for the culture of cereals, the vast territory between the Obi and Yenisei is unrivaled in the world. . . . Very soon after the opening of the railway Siberian grain began to find its way to foreign markets and as early in its history as 1898 there was an acute congestion on

the West Siberia line of endless wagonloads of wheat. . . . Reaching the Yenisei river, the greatest of Siberian waterways, the train crosses it by a bridge 1,000 yards in length. . . . A little further on the railway reaches Irkutsk and somewhat beyond that, one of the most remarkable places in the world—Lake Baikal. This great sheet of water is as long as England; it is nearly a mile deep, and covers an area of 13,430 square miles; its surface is 1,500 feet above the level of the sea, and on every side it is hemmed in by lofty mountains covered with thick forest. . . . At first the forty mile width of Lake Baikal was crossed by means of a train-ferry service but later the railroad was continued around its southern border. The section of which this is a part takes the line from Lake Baikal to the Amur, in a gradual ascent to the crest of the Yablonoi Mountains, reaching a height of 3,412 feet above the sea level, the greatest altitude attained by the Siberian railway. . . . To avoid the great northern bend made by the Amur and [to] save the construction of bridges and tunnels, . . . it was necessary to take the shorter and comparatively easy cut across Chinese Manchuria. A perception of this necessity came simultaneously with the sudden and surprising victories of Japan over China in 1895, which brought her triumphant army to Newchwang, with an open road to Peking. . . . Hence the agreement of September 6, 1896, between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank which contemplated the construction of a railroad to be called the Eastern Chinese, from Stretensk to Vladivostok by way of an obscure settlement on the Sungari, since known . . . as Harbin. This was followed by the agreement of March, 1898, under which permission was obtained to continue the Eastern Chinese railroad southward from Harbin to Talienwan and Port Arthur. [This was begun in 1900 and finished in 1901.] The route as originally projected from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok covered a distance of 9,876 Russian versts, or . . . 6,173 miles. . . . The change of route shortened the distance by 1,200 miles and supplied the Pacific terminus of the road with an ice-free port. The work of construction in the Chinese Eastern railway was started in the spring of 1897, and in the same year the city of Harbin was founded and made the headquarters of construction. . . . The completed system in Manchuria measured about 1,600 miles. In August, 1905, the Japanese government by virtue of article 6 of the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Japan, acquired that part of the Manchurian main line between Changchun and Port Arthur, together with its branch lines and all the rights, privileges, and properties attaching thereto, including the coal mines formerly owned by the Chinese Eastern Railway. The gauge had been reduced by Japan during the war to a narrow gauge to suit the Japanese equipment, and a light railway had been constructed between Mukden and Antung for military purposes. With the transfer of the railway to Japan preliminary agreements were entered into for the construction of a branch from Kwan-chengtzte to Kirin by Japanese and Chinese capital; for the transfer and reconstruction of the Mukden-Antung line. In undisputed Russian control, there remained the trans-Siberian as extended through Manchuria by way of Harbin to Vladivostok, under the agreement with China of September, 1896. . . . [During the World War] the main function of the line . . . [was] the transportation of munitions and military stores, and along its route normal business enterprise [languished]."—J. Foord,

*Siberia and its railway (Asia, June, 1917).*—After the revolution of 1917, upon the request of the Kerensky government, President Wilson sent the first party of expert American engineers under the direction of J. F. Stevens, to Russia. They arrived at Petrograd in June and placed their services at the disposal of the government. They had the entire control of the Russian and Siberian railways until October, 1917, when, because of the overthrow of the government by the Bolsheviks, the commissioners returned to the United States, with the exception of J. F. Stevens, who remained to study the railroad question in Manchuria, Japan and Siberia. On Mar. 5, 1919, a new board was formed, called the Inter-Allied Railway Technical Board, consisting of engineers from Italy, France, England, Czechoslovakia, United States, China, Russia, and Japan, who took complete control of the entire Siberian railroad, excepting such parts as were under the power of the Bolsheviks. This commission continued until Nov. 1, 1922, when by an agreement between the governments of the United States and Japan, the commission was to cease to act and be dissolved, when the last of the Allied soldiers should leave Siberia. After the Allied troops had departed, the Japanese left Oct. 25, 1922. Six days later, the Inter-Allied Railway Technical Board was dissolved. These men had worked through the various changes of government during this time. The Kerensky and Kolchak governments had been very friendly and had assisted the board in every way that was within their power. With the Bolsheviks, they had no official connection. After October, 1922, the Trans-Siberian Railroad was taken over by the Soviet government, excepting a thousand miles crossing Manchuria, which remained partially under the control of China.—See also RAILROADS: 1876-1921; ASIA: 1500-1000; also map.

ALSO IN: O. Bilbreath, *Sick man of Siberia* (*Journal of the American Asiatic Association, June, 1910*).

**TRANSUBSTANTIATION, Doctrine of.** See MASS.

**English royal declaration against it.**—From the time of the enactment of the Bill of Rights (1689) and the Test Act (1672-1673) it was the custom of the British monarch, on ascending the throne, to take an oath that he believed the doctrine of transubstantiation and the invocation of the saints to be "idolatrous." This clause which had long been offensive to Catholics, and against which there was considerable agitation at the time of the accession of Edward VII, was removed from the coronation oath by the Accession Declaration Act of 1910, passed by Parliament at the time of the accession of George V. Instead of specifically disclaiming Roman Catholic doctrines, the King of England now uses the following form: "I (name of sovereign) do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God, profess, testify, and declare that I am a faithful Protestant, and that I will, according to the true intent of the enactments which secure the Protestant succession to the Throne of my Realm, uphold and maintain the said enactments to the best of my powers according to law."

**TRANSVAAL**, inland province of the Union of South Africa, between the Vaal and the Limpopo rivers. It is bounded on the south by the Orange Free State and Natal; on the west by the Cape province and the Bechuanaland protectorate; on the north by Rhodesia; and on the east by Portuguese East Africa and Swaziland. It has an area of 110,450 square miles. The districts of Utrecht and Vryheid and part of the district of

Wakkerstroom, which were included in the Transvaal republic were transferred to Natal in 1903. In 1921, the total population was 2,087,636.—See also SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1899 (October-December): Map of Boer republics; AFRICA: Modern European occupation: 1914-1920: Climatic conditions.

Early settlements. See BOER.

1877-1881.—Annexed by British.—Restoration of self-government under suzerainty of Great Britain. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1800-1881.

1884-1894.—Restored independence of Boers.—London convention. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1884-1894.

1885.—Discriminating regulations against Asiatics. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: South Africa.

1885-1890.—Gold discoveries on the Rand. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1885-1890.

1894.—Commandeering question. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1894.

1895-1896.—Closing of Vaal river drifts.—Discontent among Uitlanders.—Jameson raid.—German emperor's message to Kruger regarding the Jameson raid. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1895 (September-December); (November); 1895-1896; 1896 (January).

1896-1897.—Controversies with England.—Conflict of judiciary with executive and Volksraad. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1896-1897 (May-April); 1897 (January-March).

1897 (April).—Treaty of alliance with Orange Free State. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1897 (April): Treaty.

1897 (May-October).—British reassertion of suzerainty over South African republic. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1897 (May-October).

1898.—Kruger reelected president. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1898 (January-February).

1898-1899.—Continued dispute with Great Britain over sovereignty.—Petition of British subjects to Queen Victoria.—Bloemfontein conference.—Advice of Germany and Holland to Kruger.—Franchise amended. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1898-1899; 1899 (March); 1899 (May-June); 1899 (May-August); (July-September).

1900.—Speech of President Kruger.—British invasion.—Resignation of Kruger.—Annexed by British empire. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1900 (May): Speech of President Kruger, etc.; 1900 (May-June); (September): Leave of absence; 1900 (October).

1901.—Condition of the country. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1901 (February-April).

1902.—Peace preliminaries.—Treaty with England concluded. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1901-1902.

1902-1903.—Repatriation of Boers. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1902-1903.

1903-1908.—Anti-Indian agitation. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1903-1908.

1905-1907.—Constitution.—Self-government.—Represented at Imperial conference in London.—Discussion of defense of Privy Council. See BRITISH EMPIRE: Colonial and imperial conferences: 1907; SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1905-1907.

1909.—In South African Union. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1908-1909.

1909.—Represented at Imperial Defense Conference.—Naval program. See WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1909: British Imperial Defense Conference.

1919.—Educational developments.—Language question.—High schools. See EDUCATION: Mod-

ern developments: 20th century: General education: South Africa.

1921.—Electoral system. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: British empire: 1921.

**TRANSYLVANIA**, or **Sibenbürgen**, formerly a province of the kingdom of Hungary. By the Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, it was ceded to Rumania. (See **TRIANON, TREATY OF** [1920].) It occupies the western part of Rumania and is surrounded and transversed by the Carpathian mountains and the Transylvanian Alps. It has an area of 22,312 square miles, with a population in 1920 of 2,678,267, consisting of a medley of races, Hungarians, Rumanians, Szeklers, Saxons, Jews, Armenians, Bulgarians, Ruthenians and Greeks.—See also **SIEBENBÜRGEN**; **BALKAN STATES**: Map showing distribution of nationalities.

Early history. See **DACIA**.

Huns in possession. See **HUNS**: 433-453.

12th century.—Conquest by Hungary.—Settlement of Germans. See **HUNGARY**: 1116-1301.

1526-1567.—John Zapolya, the waivod, elected king of Hungary.—Contest with Ferdinand of Austria.—Appeal to the Turks.—Sultan assumes suzerainty of the country. See **HUNGARY**: 1526-1567.

1567-1660.—Struggles between the Austrian and the Turk. See **HUNGARY**: 1567-1604; 1606-1660.

1575.—Stephen Batory, the duke, elected king of Poland. See **POLAND**: 1574-1500.

1595-1606.—Union with Austria against Turkey.—Yoke of the Ottomans partly broken. See **HUNGARY**: 1595-1606.

1660-1664.—Recovery of independence from the Turks. See **HUNGARY**: 1660-1664.

1682.—In league with Hungary against Austria. See **HUNGARY**: 1668-1683.

1699.—Ceded to House of Austria by the Turks, in the Treaty of Carlowitz. See **HUNGARY**: 1683-1699.

1849.—Scene of fighting between the Russians and Hungarians. See **HUNGARY**: 1847-1849.

1860-1868.—Granted autonomy and separate Diet.—Union with Hungary and loss of independence. See **HUNGARY**: 1856-1868.

1914-1916.—Rumanian desire for possession.—Invasion by Rumania. See **WORLD WAR**: 1914: III. Balkans: d; 1916: V. Balkan theater: c, 6, i.

1921.—Control by Rumania. See **BALKAN STATES**: 1921: Rumania; **RUMANIA**: 1919: Creation of Greater Rumania.

**TRANSYLVANIA**, Kentucky colony of.—For several years after the settlement of the region of Kentucky began it was known as the "colony of Transylvania," and seemed likely to bear that name permanently. See **KENTUCKY**: 1765-1778.

**TRAPPISTS**, name originally applied to the monks of La Trappe, a Cistercian abbey near Soligny in Normandy. This celebrated abbey was one of the most ancient, belonging to the Order of Cîteaux (the Cistercians). "In the year 1122 Rotrou, Count of Perche, founded an abbey which he called 'L'Abbaye de Notre-Dame de la Maison-Dieu de la Trappe.' . . . The abbey at its foundation in 1122 was affiliated with the order of Fontevault. . . . but in the year 1148, under the guidance of the fourth abbot, it had become Cistercian, and through the efforts of St. Bernard himself became one of the many monasteries closely connected with Cîteaux. . . . In the fourteenth century the power of the church . . . [was] dealt a serious blow by the exile of the Popes to Avignon. . . . But another factor . . . much more potent than the 'Babylonian Captivity' in min-

istering to the decay of monastic purity in France . . . was the 'One Hundred Years' War.' . . . The abbey was sacked again and again by the English. . . . Absence from the monastery and its restraints, and the corruption of the world into which they had been forced, had produced a total change in their views of the rigid rule of Cîteaux. . . . Temporal ruin followed swiftly upon the decadence of spiritual life. . . . The reformation of La Trappe, and the introduction into this abbey of the rigid observances known to this day as Trappist, were due to the efforts of Armand Jean le Bouthillier de Rancé, Abbé in Commendam. . . . De Rancé became a Cistercian monk and Abbot in possession, and in formal terms, of La Trappe [in 1664]. . . . The reforms . . . which were introduced by De Rancé may be summarized as follows: 1. Abstinence. 2. Perpetual Silence. 3. Manual Labor. . . . The confiscation of La Trappe immediately upon the decree of the Assembly in 1790 had been postponed in view of numberless petitions in its favor, but now the blow fell, the monks were scattered, a contingent of them went to Switzerland, the rest dispersed, the buildings of the monastery were thrown down and the fields were left uncultivated. In 1815, after the final defeat of Napoleon, La Trappe was repurchased by the Abbot, new buildings were erected, and from that time . . . it has continued to be the Mother House of the Order."—W. R. Perkins, *History of the Trappist abbey of New Melleray in Dubuque county, Iowa* (State University of Iowa Publications, *Historical monograph*, no. 2, pp. 10-11, 13, 15, 21-23). —"The French Revolution drove the Trappists as wanderers into various countries. Some of them went to Ireland and founded the abbey of Mount Mellary, whence, in 1851, the cloisters having become crowded, thirty of the monks were dispatched to build a new home in America. The site of New Mellary [twelve miles from Dubuque, Iowa], was selected after long searching, and there was built a wooden structure which stands some distance from the present abbey. The latter . . . is a spreading quadrangular pile, enclosing a specious court, and, solidly built of white stone. . . . Since 1858 an offshoot of the abbey of La Meilleraye, reoccupied after the subsidence of the fury of the French Revolution, has been established at Gethsemane, in Kentucky, and more recently another band of French Trappists have found a home in the province of Quebec."—R. R. Wilson, *Brothers of silence* (*National Magazine*, Apr., 1901, p. 50). —There is also a Trappist monastery in the Chinese hills, a two days' journey from Peking. In 1917 there were about twenty of the Trappist Fathers in the monastery, eight of them French, German, Dutch and Canadian, and a dozen Chinese. There were about seventy Chinese lay-brothers of secondary rank who do more of the work and less of the ceremonials than the Fathers.—Based on L. D. Frielick, *Trappist in the Peking hills* (*Journal of the American Asiatic Association*, Mar.-Dec., 1917).

ALSO IN: J. K. Huysmans, *En route*.

**TRASIMENE**, Battle of Lake (217 B. C.). See **PUNIC WARS**: Second; **ROME**: Republics: B. C. 218-202; **SELEUCIDE**: B. C. 224-187.

**TRASTAMARA**, or **Trastamere**, House of. See **SPAIN**: 1358-1470.

**TRASTEVERE**.—Trastevere was a suburb of Rome "as early as the time of Augustus; it now contains the oldest houses in Rome, which belong to the 11th and 12th centuries."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lectures on ancient ethnography and geography*, v. 2, p. 103.

**TRAUN, Otto Ferdinand, Count von Abensperg und** (1677-1748), Austrian field-marshal. Conducted the Italian campaigns of the War of the Austrian Succession. See AUSTRIA: 1744-1745.

**TRAUSI**, early tribe of Thrace. See THRACE: People.

**TRAVE AND ELBE CANAL**, Germany. See GERMANY: 1000 (June).

**TRAVELERS' CLUB**, London. See CLUBS: 10th-20th centuries: London.

**TRAVELING LIBRARIES**: United States. See LIBRARIES: Modern: United States: Traveling libraries.

**TRAVELS OF MARCO POLO**: Their influence.—“The most famous of all mediæval travellers in the East were the Venetian merchants Nicolo and Matteo Polo and their nephew Marco. These enterprising traders, leaving their warehouses in Soldaia on the Crimea, in two successive journeys made their way along the northern and central trade-routes to Peking, in northern China, or Cathay, which had become the capital of the Great Khan. For almost twenty years the Polos were attached to the court of Kublai Khan, the nephew, Marco, rising higher and higher in the graces of that ruler. Marco Polo was one of the well-known type of Italian adventurers who appeared at foreign courts, and, with the versatility of their race, made themselves useful, and indeed indispensable, to their masters. He learned the languages of the East, and went upon missions for the Great Khan to all parts of his vast empire. When, in 1202, the Polos obtained permission to return home they followed the longest and most important of the three main trade-routes. . . . They sailed from Zaiton, a seaport of China, and passing along the shores of Tonquin, Java, and farther India, made their way from port to port through the Bay of Bengal to Ceylon, then to the Malabar coast of India, along which they passed to Cambay, and thence through Red Sea to Cairo, and so to Venice. Their journey homeward from China, with its long detentions in the East Indies, took almost three years. All the world knows of Marco Polo's subsequent experiences in Venice, his capture and imprisonment in Genoa, the stories of his travels with which he whiled away the weary days of his captivity, and the gathering of these into a book which spread widely through Europe within the next few years and has been eagerly read ever since. Neither the travels of Marco Polo nor those of his predecessors or immediate successors disclosed any lands the existence of which was not before known to Europeans; but they gave fuller knowledge of many countries and nations of which the names only are known; and they gave this knowledge with astonishing freshness, minuteness, and accuracy. The writers of these books travelled over many thousands of miles, and they described, in the main, what they saw, although, of course, they repeated, with more or less of exaggeration, much which they only knew from conversation or from hearsay. Besides the written stories of such experiences, other Europeans who accompanied these travellers, or who made independent journeys to various parts of Asia, spread knowledge of the same things. . . . As a result of these travellers' reports, the traditions of earlier times and the knowledge of the nearer East possessed by traders were supplemented and popularized. The journeys of the travellers of the later thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries were a veritable revelation to Europe of the condition of Tartary, Persia, India, China, and many intervening lands. Espe-

cially strong was the impression made by the reports about China and Japan. The land of the Seres, lying on the border of the eastern ocean, had indeed been known to the ancients, and mentioned by tradition as the sources from which came certain well-known products; but under the name of Cathay, which Marco Polo and his contemporaries gave to it, it attained a new and strong hold on men's imaginations. Its myriad population, its hundreds of cities, its vast wealth, its advanced civilization, its rivers, bridges, and ships, its manufactures and active trade, the fact that it was the easternmost country of Asia, washed by the waters of the external ocean—all made Cathay a land of intense interest to the rising curiosity of thirteenth-century Europe. Similarly the great island of Cipangu, or Japan, lying a thousand miles farther to the eastward, though never actually visited by Marco Polo, and described by him with a vague and extravagant touch, was of equally keen interest to his readers, as were the 'twelve thousand seven hundred islands' at which he calculates the great archipelagoes which lie in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. It was his accounts of 'the province of Mangi,' 'the cities of Zaiton and Quinsay,' 'the Great Khan,' 'the island of Cipangu,' and of their vast wealth and active trade that took special hold on the mind of Columbus. His copy of Marco Polo may still be seen, its margins filled with annotations on such passages, made by the great navigator; and it was to these that his mind reverted when he had discovered in the West Indies, as he believed, the outlying parts of the Khan's dominions.” —E. P. Cheyney, *European background of American history, 1300-1600*, pp. 46-50.—See also CHINA: 1250-1204.

ALSO IN: H. Yule, ed., *Book of Sir Marco Polo* (revised by H. Cordier, 1003).—T. W. Knox, *Travels of Marco Polo for boys and girls*.—G. M. Towle, *Marco Polo*.—W. Marsden, *Travels of Marco Polo*.

**TRAVENDAHL, Treaty of** (1700). See SWEDEN: 1007-1700.

**TRAVENSTADT, Battle of** (1706). See SWEDEN: 1701-1707.

**TRAVERSE-DE-SIOUX, Treaty of** (1851). See DAKOTA TERRITORY: 1851-1850.

**TRAVILLIAN STATION, Battle of**. See U. S. A.: 1864 (May-June: Virginia): Campaigning in the Shenandoah valley.

**TREACLE BIBLE**. See BIBLE, ENGLISH: 16th-17th centuries.

**TREASON**.—“Treason is a breach of allegiance, and on account of self-preservation being the first duty of government, is regarded as the highest crime known to the law.”—S. A. Hackett, *Treason* (W. Mack, ed., *Cyclopedia of law and procedure*, v. 38, p. 951).

Roman law. See MAJESTAS, LAW OF.

English law.—“The principal English statute (25 Edw. III, c. 2 [1351]) declares that treason consists (1) in compassing or imagining the death of the king or queen or their eldest son and heir; (2) in violating the king's companion, or the king's eldest daughter unmarried, or the wife of the king's oldest son and heir; (3) in levying war against the king in his realm; (4) in adhering to the king's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere; and (5) slaying the chancellor, treasurer, or the king's justices of the one bench or the other, justices in eyre, or justices in assize, and all other justices assigned to hear and determine, being in their places doing their offices. . . . The crime has been

further extended in England by later statutes, particularly by 1126 How. Vict. c. 12, §1 which in effect declares it to be treason for any person or persons within the realm or without to compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend death or destruction, or any bodily harm tending to death or destruction, maim or wounding, imprisonment or restraint, of the person of the king, or his heirs or successors, and such compassings, imaginings, inventions, devices or intentions, or any of them, to express, utter or declare, by publishing any printing or writing, or by any overt act or deed. . . . In England the crime of petit treason at common law was involved in some uncertainty. . . . [Under Edward III it was] reduced to three heads: (1) Where a servant killed his master; (2) where a wife killed her husband; (3) where an ecclesiastic killed his superior. . . . However, that portion of the statute relating to petit treason was repealed . . . [under George IV and Victoria] in which offences formerly constituting petit treason are declared to be murder only. . . . The most famous treason trials in English history are those of Stafford, Laud and Anne Boleyn. Canadian statutes (Can. Rev. St., 1906, p. 2438; 55 & 56 Vict. c. 29, 65; 57 & 58 Vict. c. 57, §1) are generally similar to English law in defining treason."—S. A. Hackett, *Treason* (W. Mack, ed., *Cyclopedia of law and procedure*, v. 38, p. 952).—See also CRIMINAL LAW: 1547; 1695; LESE-MAJESTY.

**United States law.**—"While various and numerous acts against the sovereign and the government are classed as treason under the statutes of England and Canada, the constitution of the United States itself defines and limits the crime by declaring that 'treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort,' [United States Constitution, Article III, Section 3] thus not only abolishing and refusing to recognize petit and what is commonly known as constructive treason, but leaving congress without power to enlarge or restrict the offense. . . . [In order to be convicted of treason, either the accused must confess in court, or the testimony of two witnesses to the overt act must be obtained. The treason of Benedict Arnold never resulted in conviction as the culprit fled to England before he could be tried. Another notable case was that of Aaron Burr. The jury which tried him could find no "overt act of treason" and he was therefore discharged. (See U. S. A.: 1781; 1807).] While the jurisdiction of state courts over cases of treason against the state depends entirely upon the statutes of the state, cases of treason against the United States are not cognizable in the state courts, but are triable only by the United States courts located in the state and district wherein the alleged crime was committed. . . . The statutory punishment for treason in the United States is death [Act of April 30, 1790] or, at the discretion of the court, imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years, together with a minimum fine of ten thousand dollars, and incapacity to hold any office under the United States. [Act of 1862 and statutes of 1878 and 1901.]"—S. A. Hackett, *Treason* (W. Mack, ed., *Cyclopedia of law and procedure*, v. 38, pp. 952, 957, 959).—See also WAR POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES: Treason.

**TREASURY DEPARTMENT, United States.**—"The Secretary of the Treasury is charged by law with the management of the national finances. . . . He prepares plans for the improvement of the revenue and for the support of the public credit; superintends the collection of the revenue, and di-

rects the forms of keeping and rendering public accounts and of making returns; grants warrants for all moneys drawn from the Treasury in pursuance of appropriations made by law and for the payment of moneys into the Treasury; and annually submits to Congress estimates of the probable revenues and disbursements of the Government. He also controls the construction of public buildings; the coinage and printing of money, the administration of the life-saving, revenue-cutter, and the public health and marine hospital branches of the public service, and furnishes generally such information as may be required by either branch of Congress on all matters pertaining to these. There are three Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury, to whom are assigned the general direction and supervision of the various divisions and offices of the department. There are besides these: the Controller of the Treasury, who prescribes the form of keeping and rendering all public accounts save those relating to postal revenues; auditors for the departments of the Treasury, War, Post-office, Interior and Navy, and for the State and other departments; a Treasurer of the United States, who is charged with the disbursement of all public moneys that may be deposited in the Treasury at Washington and in the Sub-Treasuries and in the National Bank United States depositaries; who is the agent for the redemption of National bank notes, trustee for bonds held to secure National Bank circulation and public deposits in National Banks, custodian of miscellaneous trust funds, fiscal agent for paying interest on the public debt, and for paying the land purchase bonds of the Philippine Islands, special disbursing officer for the school fund of the Indian Territory and for the Philippine Islands 'tariff fund,' and agent and commissioner in other and minor interests; a Register of the Treasury, who signs and issues all bonds of the United States and who performs other duties suggested by the name Register; the Controller of the Currency, who has, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, supervision of National Banks; their organization, the preparation and issue of National Bank circulation, the examination and consolidation of the reports of National Banks, and the redemption and destruction of notes used by National Banks; the Director of the Mint, who has general supervision of all the mints and assay offices of the United States; the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who has general supervision of the collection of all internal revenue taxes, the enforcement of internal revenue laws, the employment of agents, etc.; the Surgeon-General of the Public Health and Marine Hospital service, who has supervision of marine hospitals and other relief stations of the service, the care of sick and disabled seamen taken from merchant vessels of the United States and from vessels in public service, the distribution of supplies to medical officers, the making of tests for pilot licenses, the forming of regulations for the prevention of the introduction and spread of contagious diseases and the conduct of the quarantine service of the United States; the Bureau of Engraving and Printing; and the General Superintendent of the Life-Saving Service."—J. H. Finley and J. F. Sanderson, *American executive and executive methods*, pp. 295, 298.—"In establishing the Treasury Department a strong effort was made to create a Secretary of the Treasury as an agent of Congress rather than as the officer of the President. The details of the office were therefore carefully regulated by the statute, and specific duties



were assigned to the Secretary. He was, however, appointed by the President, and the question was raised whether he was also removable by the President. The Senate insisted that the removal should not be valid without its approval; the House insisted that the President should be unrestrained: by the casting vote of the Vice-President the latter system was adopted."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union, 1750-1820*, p. 144.—The law allows Congress to call directly upon the Treasury Department for information without requesting it of the president, as in the case of the other departments. During the World War, the Bureau of War Risk Insurance was added to the Treasury Department.—See also BUDGET; MONEY AND BANKING: Modern; 1782-1792; 1790-1816; 1817-1833; 1861-1864; 1863-1914; 1874-1890; 1901-1909; 1912-1913; INDEPENDENT TREASURY: United States; U. S. A.: 1837; 1921 (June).

ALSO IN: *United States Treasury Department, Organization of the office of the secretary of the treasury, 1884*.—M. L. Muhleman, *Treasury system of the United States*.

**TREATIES, Making and termination of.**—"A war between two hostile nations cannot, from the nature of the case, be perpetual, hence the introduction of treaties of peace to settle their differences, a method which has been in practice from very early times. Besides treaties of peace, strictly so called, there are various others, such as treaties for commerce, extradition, trade-marks, loans, the settlement of claims, for navigation, for the settlement of frontier boundaries, for naturalization, about consuls and their rights, and other objects. No special form of words is essential to the validity of a treaty, but usage requires them to be written. A treaty of guarantee or alliance is an engagement by which one state promises to aid another when threatened by a third power; it may be offensive or defensive. By an offensive treaty, the ally engages to assist the other party against a hostile power; by a defensive treaty, the ally aids only in a war of aggression against the contracting power. . . . A convention is an agreement or contract less definite than a treaty, and is sometimes preliminary to that instrument. It may be formal, or it may be informal, as between commanders of armies for the suspension of hostilities. A protocol is the first copy or rough draught of treaties or other documents. The following are some of the general principles in regard to treaties: Commissioners, to execute a treaty, must all agree to the same, and subscribe their names with their seals attached. A *Treaty of Cession* is a deed or grant by one sovereign power to another, transferring the right to property alone. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the constitution and laws of that nation's own government. All treaties, contracts, and rights of property between governments, are suspended during hostilities of the parties. . . . Treaties are regarded as terminated or suspended, as the case may be. A violation of a treaty with a foreign state, by a citizen of the United States, may be punished by indictment in the Federal courts. A suspension of hostilities between belligerents, and a mutual agreement to waive all claims which caused the war, is sometimes designated a *peace*: as the Peace of Antalcidas, the Peace of Thorn, the Peace of Augsburg. Certain compacts between nations may be made by virtue of a general implied power, confided to certain public agents, as included in their official positions; such as the acts of generals and admirals, limiting hostilities by truces, capitulations, or car-

tels for the exchange of prisoners, which do not require the ratification of the supreme authority, unless there be a reservation making it necessary. In other cases, however, a public minister or other diplomatic agent is not entitled to conclude or sign a treaty with a foreign state to which he is accredited, without full power, independent of his general letter of credence. Even then, it is sometimes considered expedient to have special ratification. . . . Men, from the earliest periods of history, have confessed their helplessness when isolated, by seeking the aid and sympathy of their neighbors; and for this purpose they have formed associations, called leagues, for the attainment of some desired object, or for defence against powerful foes. A league, then, may be defined as a union between persons or states for the attainment of the same object, and may, like treaties, be offensive or defensive. The term is sometimes synonymous with alliance, confederacy, coalition, compact, and so forth. It was used to designate, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, more particularly a political alliance or coalition. Some of these leagues were formidable military organizations, and carried on extensive wars, and constitute a large part of ancient, mediæval, and even modern history. . . . As treaties form so important a part in the history of nations, and are largely the results of their wars, some facts connected with them are necessary to an intelligent understanding of the frequent allusions to these compacts, by writers on public affairs. A treaty generally takes the name of the place where the commissioners meet for the purpose of arranging the terms, and it sometimes occurs that more than one treaty has been formed in the same place; therefore it is important to designate which one is intended, whether first, second, and so forth,—otherwise, confusion or mistakes may arise. For illustration: A treaty was made at Aix-la-Chapelle, between France and Spain, at the close of the war for the possession of the Spanish Netherlands, 1668; and another in 1748, at the end of the eight years' war of the succession of Maria Theresa to the Empire. This ancient town, one of the capitals of Charlemagne, in which thirty-seven German Emperors and eleven Emperesses have been crowned, was ceded to France by the treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, and again by the treaty of Luneville, 1801, but in 1815 it came into possession of Prussia. Aix-la-Chapelle was also selected for the meeting of a congress of the great powers, in 1818, to settle the affairs of Europe, when France was admitted to the league, and formed one of the five great states that signed a protocol declaring the policy known as the Holy Alliance. Commercial treaties were formed as early as the thirteenth century, when Edward I. formed a compact of that nature, with the Earl of Flanders, and in 1338, Edward III. formed a similar treaty with Flanders, which was followed by frequent alliances of this kind between the two countries. . . . The commercial importance of the Netherlands, on account of their value as an inlet to trade, naturally gave rise to numerous treaties between them and other countries, more especially Great Britain. Most of the great nations of antiquity found it necessary, for their interest and self-preservation, to enter into friendly or commercial relations with one another, therefore, their treaties constitute an important feature in their history. Of these nations, Greece, Rome, and Carthage were the greatest treaty-making powers"—S. M. Burnham, *Struggles of the nations*, v. 2, pp. 727-731.

Forms of international contract.—"The prac-

tice of the United States differs in one respect from the procedure . . . [in other countries]. According to the constitution of that country, the treaty-making power is vested in the Senate, to whose approval a treaty must be submitted before ratification, and there are instances on record in which the Senate has introduced amendments into a treaty as a condition of its acceptance. If such amendments are not accepted by the other party to the treaty, the treaty remains inoperative, as in the case of the 'Clarendon-Dallas' Treaty of October 17, 1856, relating to Central America. In the United States a treaty duly ratified by the Senate, and entering into force, becomes *ipso facto* a portion of the law of the land. [See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: SENATE: POWERS.] This is not so in England, and care has therefore to be taken in negotiating a treaty that its stipulations are not antagonistic to the law, or if they are so, that the law be amended so that it shall agree with the treaty; otherwise a government may find itself in the position of being bound towards a foreign country to give effect to stipulations which the law of the land forbids it to carry out. . . . In the case of general treaties between several Powers, concluded as a rule in the French language, the Plenipotentiaries sign in alphabetical order of countries: thus the German Plenipotentiary would sign under the letter A (Allemagne); those of Spain and the United States under the letter E (Espagne, Etats-Unis). This principle was adopted in the Vienna Congress Treaty of 1815. Nevertheless, the British copy of the General Act of Brussels of 1890 (relating to the African Slave Trade) was signed first by the British Plenipotentiaries, the others following in the Alphabetical order of their countries. . . . All treaties and conventions contain, or should contain, a ratification article. Although its absence is no bar to ratification, it sets at rest all doubt as to the intention. There are instances in which the less formal 'Agreement' has received ratification, though unprovided with a stipulation requiring it. . . . In order to avoid disputes respecting the true interpretation of a treaty when signed in more than one language, it has occasionally been agreed that in the event of discrepancy between the different 'texts,' one or other of them shall be held to convey the intentions of the negotiators. Thus, in the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia signed at Portsmouth (United States) on September 5, 1905, it was agreed, in Article XV, as follows: 'The present Treaty shall be signed in duplicate, in both the English and French languages.' The texts are in absolute conformity, but 'in case of discrepancy in interpretation, the French text shall prevail.'—A. Oakes and R. B. Mowat, *Great European treaties of the nineteenth century*, pp. 1-8.—See also ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1913; PRESIDENT: United States: President and foreign affairs; "MOST FAVORED NATION" CLAUSE.

Termination of treaties.—"In modern times Treaties of *Commerce* have almost invariably been made terminable at the end of a certain specified time, subject to one of the parties thereto giving notice to the other of an intention to terminate it. Such a notice is often referred to as a 'Denunciation' of the treaty. . . . Speaking generally, political treaties are of a permanent character, and are not made subject to termination, unless their nature is such as to render that course desirable or obvious; but there are other treaties besides those for regulating commercial intercourse, which are as a rule terminable on denunciation, for instance, Extradition Treaties and others treating of

a particular subject. . . . A treaty which is not, in virtue of its stipulations, terminable in the manner described, can in strictness be terminated only by mutual agreement between the contracting parties, or by the occurrence of a war between them, war being considered, with certain exceptions, as having the effect of abrogating treaties, or by the advent of special circumstances incompatible with its continued observance. . . . An abrogation without consent has been attempted, namely, in the case of the Black Sea Articles of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, regarding which the Russian Government announced, in 1870, that it held itself to be emancipated. Great Britain replied that it had always been held that the right of releasing a party to a treaty belonged only to the Governments which had been parties to the original instrument. Russia's bare announcement of withdrawal, if acquiesced in, would result in the entire destruction of treaties in their essence. Russia thereupon abandoned the position she had taken up, and a conference was held in London at which the articles objected to were amended by common consent, and a Declaration was at the same time signed by the Powers (including Russia) on January 17, 1871, recognizing 'that it is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.' The Treaty for the revision of the Black Sea Articles of the Treaty of 1856 was signed on March 13, 1871.—A. Oakes and R. B. Mowat, *Great European treaties of the nineteenth century*, pp. 9-11.—Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant will, if effective, provide a reasonable solution for this predicament.

ALSO IN: S. B. Crandall, *Treaties, their making and enforcement*.—C. Phillipson, *Termination of war and treaties of peace*.—D. P. Myers, *Manual of collections of treaties and of collections relating to treaties*.—United States State Department, *Treaty-making power in various countries*.

Treaty-making power.—Supreme Court affirming constitutionality of Migratory Bird Treaty.—Power of Congress to carry out treaty pledges and administrative regulations.—International Labor conference to enact for the United States its recommendations on labor.—"From the historical point of view no more interesting case was decided last term than that of *Missouri v. Holland*, (252 U.S. 416) in which a bill in equity brought by the state of Missouri to prevent a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918. The act gives effect to the Treaty of August 16, 1916, between the United States and Great Britain, which pledges this government and the Canadian government reciprocally to protect certain game birds making seasonal migrations from the United States into Canada and vice versa. Earlier than this Congress had, by the Act of March 4, 1913, attempted to extend the protection of the national government over migratory game birds, but the act had been held void by a state and one or two federal courts, passing muster, however, in another. It was before the Supreme Court in *Cary v. So. Dak.*, 250 U.S. 118, but for construction only. (See U.S.A.: 1913: Protection of migratory birds.) . . . The objectors to the statute and the underlying treaty based their argument upon the Tenth Amendment. 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people,'

supplemented by the proposition that the control of migratory birds within their respective limits is a power reserved to the states, . . . and from these premises they proceeded to draw the conclusion that 'what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the states, a treaty cannot do.' But, Justice Holmes answers in his opinion for the court, the treaty-making power is expressly delegated to the United States (Article 2, section 2, which reads: 'He [the President] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur'; treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land, and by article 1, section 8, Congress may pass all laws necessary and proper to carry valid treaties into effect: 'The Congress shall have power . . . to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.' He then proceeds: 'Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention. We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well-being that an act of Congress could not deal with, but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, "a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government" is not to be found. . . . But for the treaty and the statute, there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and of our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the states. The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to act. We are of opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld.' Among the parts omitted in the above quotation from the opinion is the following striking passage: 'We may add that when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience, and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.' . . . These rather sweeping propositions raise some interesting questions with reference to Part 13 of the pending Peace Treaty with Germany [August 1921]. This division of the treaty provides for an International Labor Conference whose 'draft conventions' or 'recommendations,' as the case may be, must be submitted to the proper authorities of the member states for action upon them within a year. But 'in the case of a federal state,' the document reads, 'the power of which to enter in

conventions is subject to limitations, it shall be in the discretion of that Government to treat a draft convention to which such limitations apply as a recommendation only.' Supporters of the league and the treaty in the senate and elsewhere have been at pains to explain that this provision was inserted at the particular instance of the United States and to meet the requirements of the United States Constitution. It may, however, be fairly asked, with *Missouri v. Holland* in mind, whether the power of the national government to enter into conventions on labor is 'subject to limitations.' And if it is not, we are confronted with the further question, whether we should like to see the treaty-making power and Congress, either separately or conjointly, vested by an unqualified ratification of Part 13 of the treaty with the power of enacting for the United States such recommendations as the International Labor Conference may elect to make from time to time. Unquestionably *Missouri v. Holland* makes more important than ever the political check which resides in the senate on the treaty-making power. The case has another interesting aspect. 'The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment, and that the acts of the defendant, done and threatened under that authority, invade the sovereign right of the state and contravene its will manifested in statutes. The state also alleges a pecuniary interest, as owner of the wild birds within its borders and otherwise, admitted by the government to be sufficient, but it is quite enough that the bill is reasonable and proper means to assert the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a state.'—E. S. Corwin, *Migratory bird treaty (American Political Science Review, Feb., 1921, pp. 52-54)*.

See also INTERNATIONAL LAW; ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL.

ALSO IN: C. H. Butler, *Treaty making power of the United States*.

**TREATIES OF PEACE, CONGRESSES,** etc. The following is a list of some of the most important treaties, congresses, conventions, international pacts, agreements, alliances, and settlements in history.

- Aarau, 1712. See SWITZERLAND: 1652-1780.
- ABC conference, 1914. See ABC CONFERENCE.
- Abo, 1743. See RUSSIA: 1740-1762.
- Ackerman, 1826. See TURKEY: 1826-1829.
- Adrianople, 1829. See ADRIANOPLE, TREATY OF.
- Aix-la-Chapelle: 803. See VENICE: 607-810.
- 1668. See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: Congresses: 1.
- 1748. See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: Congresses: 2.
- 1818. See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: Congresses: 3.
- Amapala, 1895. See CENTRAL AMERICA: 1805-1902.
- American-Chinese, 1880. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1880-1906.
- Amiens: 1527. See AMIENS, TREATY OF (1527).
- 1802. See FRANCE: 1801-1802.
- Ancon, 1884. See CHILE: 1804-1900.
- Anglo-Abyssinian, 1897. See ABYSSINIA: 1806-1807.
- Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899. See EGYPT: 1800 (January); SYRIAN: 1800.
- Anglo-French Agreement: 1890. See MADAGASCAR.
- 1904. See ENTENTE CORDIALE; NIGERIA, PROTECTORATE OF: 1901-1913.
- Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902. See ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

- Anglo-Persian, 1919. See ANGLO-PERSIAN TREATY.
- Anglo-Portuguese, 1891. See AFRICA: Modern European occupation: 1884-1899.
- Anglo-Russian: 1825. See ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION: 1867-1903.
1895. See AFGHANISTAN: 1805.
1899. See CHINA: 1800 (March-April).
1907. See ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1907.
1908. See PERSIA: 1908 (October).
- Antalcidas, 386 B. C. See ANTALCIDAS, PEACE OF.
- Arras: 1414. See FRANCE: 1380-1415.
1435. See FRANCE: 1431-1453.
- Ashburton, 1842. See U. S. A.: 1842: Treaty with England.
- Augsburg, 1555. See GERMANY: 1552-1561.
- Austro-German Alliance, 1879. See DUAL ALLIANCE; TRIPLE ALLIANCE: Austro-German Alliance of 1870.
- Austro-Russian Alliance, 1848. See HUNGARY: 1847-1849.
- Badajos, 1524. See AMERICA: 1519-1524: Voyage of Magellan.
- Baden, or Rastadt, 1714. See UTRECHT: 1712-1714.
- Balta-Liman, 1849. See RUMANIA: 1828-1858.
- Barcelona, 1529. See ITALY: 1527-1529.
- Barrier: 1709, 1715. See BARRIER FORTRESSES.
- Bartenstein, 1807. See GERMANY: 1807 (February-June).
- Basel, 1795. See FRANCE: 1794-1795 (October-May); 1795 (June-December).
- Bassein, 1802. See INDIA: 1798-1805.
- Belgrade, 1739. See RUSSIA: 1734-1740.
- Bergerac, 1577. See FRANCE: 1577-1578.
- Berlin: 1806. See U. S. A.: 1804-1809; 1810-1812; FRANCE: 1806-1810; CONTINENTAL SYSTEM.
1878. See BERLIN, CONGRESS OF.
1881. See THESSALY.
- 1884-1885. See BERLIN ACT.
- Blois, 1504. See ITALY: 1504-1506.
- Boer-British, 1902. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1901-1902.
- Breda, 1666. See NETHERLANDS: 1665-1666.
- Breslau, 1742. See AUSTRIA: 1742 (June).
- Brest-Litovsk, 1918. See BREST-LITOVSK TREATIES: 1918.
- Bretigny, 1360. See BRETAGNY, TREATY OF.
- Bromsebio, 1645. See GERMANY: 1640-1645.
- Bryan-Wilson, 1913. See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern period: 1913.
- Bucharest: 1812. See SERBIA: 1804-1817; TURKEY: 1789-1812.
1913. See BALKAN STATES: 1913; BULGARIA: 1913; Second Balkan War; RUMANIA: 1912-1913; SERBIA: 1909-1913.
1918. See BUCHAREST, TREATY OF (1918).
- Burlingame, 1868. See CHINA: 1857-1868.
- Cambrai: 1508. See VENICE: 1508-1509; ITALY: 1510-1513.
1529. See ITALY: 1527-1529.
- Campo-Formio: 1797. See FRANCE: 1797 (May-October).
- Cannes, 1922. See CANNES CONFERENCE.
- Carlowitz, 1699. See TURKEY: 1684-1696; HUNGARY: 1683-1699.
- Carlsbad, 1819. See GERMANY: 1814-1820.
- Cateau-Cambresis, 1559. See FRANCE: 1547-1559.
- Catholic leagues: 1530. See PAPACY: 1530-1531.
1576. See FRANCE: 1576-1585.
1609. See GERMANY: 1608-1616.
- Chaumont, 1814. See CHAUMONT, TREATY OF; FRANCE: 1814 (January-March).
- Chino-German, 1921. See CHINA: 1921 (July).
- Chino-Japanese, 1918. See CHINA: 1918.
- Christiania, 1907. See NORWAY: 1907-1908.
- Cintra, 1808. See CINTRA; SPAIN: 1808-1809 (August-January).
- Clayton-Bulwer, 1850. See NICARAGUA: 1850.
- Concordat, 1801. See FRANCE: 1801-1804.
- Conflans, 1465. See FRANCE: 1461-1468.
- Constance, 1183. See ITALY: 1174-1183.
- Constantinople: 1787. See TURKEY: 1776-1792.
1897. See TURKEY: 1807.
1913. See BALKAN STATES: 1913.
- Copenhagen, 1660. See SWEDEN: 1644-1697.
- Corfu Declaration, 1917. See CORFU, DECLARATION OF; ADRIATIC QUESTION; JUGO-SLAVIA: 1868-1917.
- Crespy, 1544. See FRANCE: 1532-1547.
- Dorpat, 1920. See BALTIC STATES: Estonia: 1919-1920; FINLAND: 1920 (October-December).
- Dover, 1670. See ENGLAND: 1668-1670.
- Dresden, 1745. See AUSTRIA: 1744-1745.
- Dura, 363. See DURA, TREATY OF.
- Dyrrachium, 205 B. C. See GREECE: B. C. 214-146.
- Edinburgh, 1560. See SCOTLAND: 1558-1560.
- Endless Peace of Rome and Persia, 532. See PERSIA: 226-627.
- Entente Cordiale, 1904. See ENTENTE CORDIALE.
- Erfurt, 1808. See FRANCE: 1808 (September-October).
- Family Compact: 1733. See FRANCE: 1733.
1743. See FRANCE: 1743 (October).
1761. See FRANCE: 1761 (August); SPAIN: 1761-1763.
- Fontainebleau: 1807. See FRANCE: 1807-1808 (August-November); PORTUGAL: 1807.
1814. See FRANCE: 1814 (March-April).
- Franco-English Alliance, 1896. See SIAM: 1806-1899.
- Franco-Japanese, 1907. See JAPAN: 1905-1914.
- Franco-Turkish, 1921. See TURKEY: 1921 (March-April); Secret treaties.
- Frankfort, 1871. See FRANCE: 1871 (January-May).
- Friburg, 1517. See FRANCE: 1516-1517.
- Gastein, 1865. See GERMANY: 1861-1866.
- Genoa, 1922. See GENOA CONFERENCE (1922).
- Germano-Polish, 1921. See POLAND: 1921: Peace treaty with Russia.
- Ghent: 1576. See NETHERLANDS: 1575-1577.
1814. See U. S. A.: 1814 (December): Treaty of peace; ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1814.
- Granada, 1500. See ITALY: 1501-1504.
- Greco-Bulgarian, 1912. See GREECE: 1912.
- Greenville, 1795. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1790-1795.
- Grosswardein, 1538. See HUNGARY: 1526-1567.
- Guadeloupe-Hidalgo, 1848. See MEXICO: 1848.
- Guerrand, 1365. See BRITANNY: 1341-1365.
- Guines, 1546. See FRANCE: 1532-1547.
- Hague: 1399, 1907. See HAGUE CONFERENCES.
1922. See HAGUE (ALLIED) CONFERENCE, 1922.
- Haitian, 1915. See U. S. A.: 1915 (August-September).
- Halepa, 1878. See TURKEY: 1896.
- Hanover, 1725. See SPAIN: 1713-1725.
- Hawaiian-American, 1897. See HAWAII: Discovery and early history.

- Hay-Bond, 1902. See NEWFOUNDLAND: 1902-1905.
- Hay-Herran, 1903. See COLOMBIA: 1902-1903; U. S. A.: 1914-1921.
- Hay-Pauncefote, 1901. See PANAMA CANAL: 1880-1903; U. S. A.: 1914-1921.
- Heilbronn, 1633. See GERMANY: 1632-1634.
- Holy Alliance, 1815. See HOLY ALLIANCE.
- Hubertusburg, 1763. See GERMANY: 1761-1762; SEVEN YEARS' WAR: Treaties which ended the war.
- Huê, 1884. See INDO-CHINA: 1787-1891.
- Japanese-Korean, 1904. See KOREA: 1904-1905.
- Jassy, 1792. See TURKEY: 1770-1792.
- Jay Treaty, 1794. See U. S. A.: 1793-1795.
- Kiel, 1814. See SWEDEN: 1813-1814.
- Kuchuk-Kainardji, 1774. See RUSSIA: 1768-1796; TURKEY: 1768-1774; ASIA: 1500-1900; BOSPORUS: 1774-1807.
- Kulja, 1851. See ASIA: 1500-1900.
- Kutayah, 1833. See TURKEY: 1831-1840.
- Ladies' Peace, 1529. See ITALY: 1527-1529.
- Lambeth, 1217. See LAMBETH, TREATY OF.
- Lansing-Ishii, 1917. See U. S. A.: 1907-1917; CHINA: 1917 (November).
- Lausanne, 1912. See ITALY: 1911-1913; TRIPOLI: 1911-1913; TURKEY: 1911-1912. 1922-1923. See NEAR EAST CONFERENCE, 1922-1923.
- Léoben, 1797. See FRANCE: 1796-1797 (October-April).
- Limerick, 1691. See IRELAND: 1691.
- Little Entente, 1920. See LITTLE ENTENTE.
- Livadia, 1879. See ASIA: 1500-1900.
- London: 1763. See SPAIN: 1761-1763. 1867. See LUXEMBURG: 1780-1914. 1871. See DARDANELLES: 1833-1914. 1884. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1884-1894. 1909. See LONDON, DECLARATION OF (1900). 1913. See BALKAN STATES: 1912-1913; 1913. 1915. See LONDON, TREATY OR PACT OF (1915).
- Lübeck, 1629. See GERMANY: 1627-1629.
- Lucerne, 1560. See SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: 1559-1580.
- Lucknow, 1801. See INDIA: 1798-1805.
- Lunéville, 1801. See AUSTRIA: 1798-1806; FRANCE: 1801-1802; GERMANY: 1801-1803.
- Lyons, 1601. See SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: 1580-1713.
- Madrid, 1526. See PAPACY: 1525-1529; FRANCE: 1525-1526. 1750. See LATIN AMERICA: 1750-1777.
- Malmö, 1848. See DENMARK: 1848-1862; GERMANY: 1848 (March-September).
- Mersen, 870. See BELGIUM: Ancient and medieval period.
- Minorities Treaty, 1919. See POLAND: 1919 (June 28).
- Monsieur, 1576. See FRANCE: 1573-1576.
- Montgomery, 1246. See WALES: 1200-1277.
- Montpellier, 1622. See FRANCE: 1620-1622. 1626. See FRANCE: 1624-1626.
- Münster, 1648. See WESTPHALIA, PEACE OF.
- Nanking, 1842. See CHINA: 1830-1842.
- Nantes, Edict of, 1598. See FRANCE: 1598-1599.
- Nérac, 1579. See FRANCE: 1578-1580.
- Nerchinsk, 1689. See ASIA: 1500-1900; MANCHURIA: 1689-1860.
- Neully, 1919. See NEULLY, TREATY OF.
- Newport, 1648. See ENGLAND: 1648 (September-November).
- Nicaragua, 1905. See NICARAGUA: 1894-1905.
- Nice, 1538. See FRANCE: 1532-1547.
- Nicias, 421 B. C. See GREECE: B. C. 424-421.
- Nielsburg, 1866. See GERMANY: 1866.
- Niklasburg, 1622. See GERMANY: 1621-1623.
- Nikli: 1205, 1308. See ATHENS: 1205-1308.
- Nimeguen, 1678-1679. See NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF.
- Ninfeo, 1261. See GENOA: 1261-1299.
- Northampton, 1328. See SCOTLAND: 1328.
- North Sea and Baltic Agreement, 1908. See NORTH SEA: 1908.
- Noyon, 1516. See FRANCE: 1516-1517.
- Nuremberg, 1532. See GERMANY: 1530-1532.
- Nystad, 1721. See SWEDEN: 1719-1721.
- Oliva, 1660. See SWEDEN: 1644-1697; BRANDENBURG: 1640-1688.
- Panama Blackmail Treaty, 1914. See U. S. A.: 1914-1921.
- Paris: 1635. See GERMANY: 1634-1630. 1763. See SEVEN YEARS' WAR: Treaties which ended the war; BRITISH EMPIRE: Treaties promoting expansion: 1763; CUBA: 1762-1763; U. S. A.: 1793; Treaty of Paris. 1783. See U. S. A.: 1783 (September); SPAIN: 1779-1783. 1814. See FRANCE: 1814 (April-June); VIENNA, CONGRESS OF. 1815. See FRANCE: 1815 (June-August); (July-November); VIENNA, CONGRESS OF. 1856. See PARIS, DECLARATION OF; RUSSIA: 1854-1856; DANUBE: 1850-1916. 1898. See U. S. A.: 1898 (July-December).
- Partition, Treaties of: 1772. See POLAND: 1763-1790. 1793. See POLAND: 1793-1796. 1795. See POLAND: 1793-1796; RUSSIA: 1768-1796.
- Passarowitz, 1718. See BOSNIA: 1528-1875; HUNGARY: 1699-1718; TURKEY: 1714-1718.
- Passau, 1552. See GERMANY: 1546-1552.
- Peking, 1860. See ASIA: 1500-1900.
- Perpetual Edict, 1577. See NETHERLANDS: 1575-1577.
- Perry's Treaty, 1854. See JAPAN: 1797-1854.
- Philocrates, 345 B. C. See GREECE: B. C. 357-330; MACEDONIA: B. C. 345-336.
- Pleiswitz, 1813. See AUSTRIA: 1800-1814; GERMANY: 1813 (May-August).
- Plessis-les-Tours, 1580. See NETHERLANDS: 1581-1584.
- Polish-Russian, 1921. See POLAND: 1921; Peace treaty with Russia.
- Ponts-de-Ce, 1620. See FRANCE: 1620-1622.
- Poona, 1817. See AHMEDNAGAR.
- Potras-Anderson, 1910. See COSTA RICA: 1910.
- Port Treaty, 1921. See NEW YORK CITY: 1910-1923.
- Portorosa, 1921. See PORTOROSA CONFERENCE.
- Portsmouth, 1905. See PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF.
- Potsdam Agreement, 1910. See POTSDAM AGREEMENT.
- Pragmatic Sanction. See PRAGMATIC SANCTION.
- Prague: 1634. See GERMANY: 1634-1630. 1813. See GERMANY: 1813 (May-August). 1866. See GERMANY: 1866.
- Pressburg: 1491. See AUSTRIA: 1471-1491. 1805. See AUSTRIA: 1798-1806; GERMANY: 1805-1806; RUSSIA: 1801-1805.
- Pretoria, 1902. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1901-1902.
- Pruth, 1711. See SWEDEN: 1707-1718.
- Puget Sound, 1920. See U. S. A.: 1920 (July).

- Pyrenees, 1659. See FRANCE: 1659-1661; ITALY: 1635-1659.
- Quadruple Alliance: 1718. See FRANCE: 1717-1719; ITALY: 1715-1735; SPAIN: 1713-1725.  
1815. See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: Congresses: 3; FRANCE: 1815 (July-November).  
1834. See SPAIN: 1833-1846.
- Rapallo: 1920. See RAPALLO, TREATY OF (1920).  
1922. See RAPALLO, TREATY OF (1922).
- Rastadt, 1714. See UTRECHT: 1712-1714.
- Reciprocity, Canadian, 1854. See TARIFF: 1854-1866.
- Reinsurance, 1887. See GERMANY: 1887.
- Rhine, Confederation of the, 1806. See GERMANY: 1801-1803, 10 1805-1806; 1809 (July-September); 1813 (October-December); FRANCE: 1814 (January-March).
- Rhuddlan, 1277. See WALES: 1200-1277.
- Rio de Janeiro, 1909. See ACRÉ DISPUTES: 1909.
- Ripon, 1640. See ENGLAND: 1640.
- Rivoli, 1635. See GERMANY: 1634-1639.
- Roeskild, 1658. See SWEDEN: 1644-1697; BRANDENBURG: 1640-1688.
- Root-Takahira Agreement, 1908. See JAPAN: 1005-1014.
- Russo-Chinese: 1900. See MANCHURIA: 1900-1001.  
1902. See TIBET: 1002.
- Russo-Japanese: 1898. See KOREA: 1895-1898.  
1916. See RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY.
- Ryswick, 1697. See AUSTRIA: 1672-1714; FRANCE: 1695-1696; 1697; NEWFOUNDLAND: 1694-1697; U. S. A.: 1690-1748.
- St. Germain: 1570. See FRANCE: 1563-1570.  
1635. See GERMANY: 1634-1639.  
1648. See FRANCE: 1647-1648.  
1679. See SWEDEN: 1644-1697; BRANDENBURG: 1640-1688.  
1919. See ST. GERMAIN, TREATY OF.
- St. Ildefonso: 1777. See LATIN AMERICA: 1750-1777; ARGENTINA: 1580-1777; BRAZIL: 1654-1777.  
1800. See U. S. A.: 1800-1803; FRANCE: 1801-1803.
- St. Julien, 1603. See GENEVA: 1602-1603.
- St. Lorenzo, 1795. See U. S. A.: 1795.
- St. Omer, 1460. See ALSACE-LORRAINE: 842-1477.
- St. Petersburg, 1896. See MANCHURIA: 1896.
- San Remo, 1920. See SAN REMO CONFERENCE.
- San Stephano, 1878. See BALKAN STATES: 1878; BERLIN, CONGRESS OF; TURKEY: 1877-1878; 1878; BULGARIA: 1878.
- Schönbrunn, 1809. See GERMANY: 1809 (July-September).
- September Convention, 1864. See ROME: Modern city: 1850-1870.
- Serbo-Bulgarian, 1912. See BULGARIA: 1912: Serbo-Bulgarian pact.
- Serpul, 1868. See RUSSIA: 1859-1881.
- Seville: 1724. See ITALY: 1715-1735.  
1729. See SPAIN: 1726-1731.
- Sèvres, 1920. See SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920).
- Shimonoseki, 1895. See SHIMONOSEKI, TREATY OF.
- Sistova, 1791. See TURKEY: 1776-1792.
- Sitvatorok, 1606. See HUNGARY: 1595-1606.
- Spa, 1920. See SPA, CONFERENCE OF.
- Stockholm: 1720. See SWEDEN: 1719-1721.  
1813. See GERMANY: 1812-1813.
- Sykes-Picot, 1916. See SYRIA: 1908-1921.
- Szgedin, 1444. See TURKEY: 1402-1451.
- Taafna, 1837. See BARBARY STATES: 1830-1846.
- Tarentum, 37 B. C. See TARENTUM, TREATY OF.
- Teschen, 1779. See BAVARIA: 1777-1770.
- Thorn, 1466. See POLAND: 1333-1572.
- Three Kings' Alliance, 1849. See GERMANY: 1850-1851.
- Tientsin: 1858. See CHINA: 1856-1860.  
1884. See FRANCE: 1875-1889.
- Tilsit, 1807. See AUSTRIA: 1809-1814; GERMANY: 1807 (June-July).
- Toeplitz, 1813. See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.
- Tolentino, 1797. See FRANCE: 1796-1797 (October-April).
- Tordesillas, 1494. See AMERICA: 1493; 1494.
- Torre-Trumbitch, 1918. See ADRIATIC QUESTION: Torre-Trumbitch Agreement.
- Travendahl, 1700. See SWEDEN: 1697-1700.
- Traverse-de-Sioux, 1851. See DAKOTA TERRITORY: 1851-1850.
- Trianon, 1920. See TRIANON, TREATY OF.
- Triple Alliance: 1668. See NETHERLANDS: 1668.  
1717. See FRANCE: 1717-1719; SPAIN: 1713-1725.  
1882. See TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
- Troyes: 1420. See FRANCE: 1417-1422.  
1564. See FRANCE: 1563-1564.
- Uchali, 1889. See ITALY: 1895-1896.
- Ulm, 1620. See GERMANY: 1618-1620.
- Unkiar Skelessi, 1833. See DARDANELLES: 1833-1914; TURKEY: 1831-1840.
- Utrecht, 1713. See UTRECHT: 1712-1714.
- Verdun, 843. See VERDUN, TREATY OF.
- Vergara, 1839. See SPAIN: 1833-1846.
- Verona, 1822. See VERONA, CONGRESS OF.
- Versailles: 1871. See GERMANY: 1871 (January).  
1919. See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF.
- Vervins, 1598. See FRANCE: 1593-1598.
- Vienna: 1725. See SPAIN: 1713-1725.  
1731. See SPAIN: 1726-1731.  
1735. See FRANCE: 1733-1735.  
1815. See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.  
1864. See GERMANY: 1861-1866.  
1921. See U. S. A.: 1921 (July-August): Peace with Germany and Austria.
- Villafranca, 1859. See AUSTRIA: 1856-1859; ITALY: 1856-1859.
- Wallingford, 1153. See WALLINGFORD, TREATY OF.
- Washington: 1842. See U. S. A.: 1842: Treaty with England.  
1871. See ALABAMA CLAIMS.
- Wedmore, 878. See WEDMORE, PEACE OF.
- Westminster: 1655. See FRANCE: 1655-1658.  
1674. See NETHERLANDS: 1674.
- Westphalia, 1648. See WESTPHALIA, PEACE OF.
- Worms: 1122. See PAPACY: 1056-1122.  
1743. See ITALY: 1743; AUSTRIA: 1743-1744.
- Znaim, 1809. See GERMANY: 1809 (July-September).
- Zürich, 1859. See ITALY: 1859-1861.

See also LEAGUES; COALITION; ARMISTICE; INTERNATIONAL LAW; ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL.

**TREATY PORTS**, Chinese ports designated by the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, open to foreign merchants. See CHINA: 1830-1842.

**TREBIA**, or **Trebbia**, Battles of the (218 B. C., 1700 A. D.). See ROME: Republic: B. C. 218-202; PUNIC WARS: Second; FRANCE: 1799 (April-September).

**TREBIZOND**, capital of the Turkish vilayet of the same name in Asia Minor, on the southeastern shore of the Black sea. (See TURKEY: Land; Map of Asia Minor). The population of the city numbers 55,000. By their railroad from Batum to

Baku, the Russians reduced the importance of the caravan trade to Persia and Central Asia, of which Trebizond was the western terminus. There is a considerable Greek and Armenian population in the city, handling this commerce.

Origin of the city.—"Trebizond, celebrated in the retreat of the Ten Thousand as an ancient colony of the Greeks, derived its wealth and splendour from the munificence of the Emperor Hadrian, who had constructed an artificial port on a coast left destitute by nature of secure harbours. The city was large and populous."—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 10.

258.—Capture by Goths. See GOTHIC: 258-267.

1204-1461.—Greek empire.—"The empire of Trebizond was the creation of accident. . . . The destruction of a distant central government, when Constantinople was conquered by the Frank Crusaders, left [the] provincial administration without the pivot on which it had revolved. The conjuncture was seized by a young man, of whom nothing was known but that he bore a great name, and was descended from the worst tyrant in the Byzantine annals. This youth grasped the vacant sovereignty, and, merely by assuming the imperial title, and placing himself at the head of the local administration, founded a new empire. Power changed its name and its dwelling, but the history of the people was hardly modified. The grandeur of the empire of Trebizond exists only in romance. Its government owed its permanence to its being nothing more than a continuation of a long-established order of civil polity, and to its making no attempt to effect any social revolution." The young man who grasped the sovereignty of this Asiatic fragment of the shattered Byzantine empire was Alexius, a grandson of Andronicus I, the last emperor at Constantinople of the family of Comnenos. This Alexius and his brother David, who had been raised in obscurity at Constantinople, escaped from the city before it was taken by the Crusaders, and fled to the coast of Colchis, "where their paternal aunt, Thamar, possessed wealth and influence. [See CAUCASUS: 1080-1393.] Assisted by her power, and by the memory of their tyrannical grandfather, who had been popular in the east of Asia Minor, they were enabled to collect an army of Iberian mercenaries. At the head of this force, Alexios entered Trebizond in the month of April 1204, about the time Constantinople fell into the hands of the Crusaders. He had been proclaimed emperor by his army on crossing the frontier. To mark that he was the legitimate representative of the imperial family of Komnenos, and to prevent his being confounded with the numerous descendants of females, or with the family of the emperor Alexius III. (Angelos), who had arrogated to themselves his name, he assumed the designation of Grand-Komnenos. Wherever he appeared, he was acknowledged as the lawful sovereign of the Roman empire." For a time Alexius of Trebizond, with the help of his brother David, extended his dominions in Asia Minor with rapidity and ease, and he was brought very soon into collision with the other Greek emperor, Theodore Lascaris, who had established himself at Nicea. It seemed likely, at first, that Trebizond would become the dominant power; but the movement of events which favored that one of the rival empires was presently stayed, and then reversed, even though Alexius took aid from the Latin emperor at Constantinople. Not many years later, in fact, the empire of Trebizond evaded extinction at the hands of the Turkish sul-

tan of Iconium, or Roum, only by paying tribute and acknowledging vassalage to that sovereign. For sixty years the so-called empire continued in a tributary relationship to the Seljuk sultans and to the grand khan of the Mongols who overthrew them in 1244. But, if not a very substantial empire during that period, it seems to have formed and exceedingly prosperous and wealthy commercial power, controlling not only a considerable coast territory on its own side of the Euxine, but also Cherson, Gothia, and all the Byzantine possessions in the Tauric Chersonesos; and "so close was the alliance of interest that these districts remained dependent on the government of Trebizond until the period of its fall." On the decline of the Mongol power, the empire of Trebizond regained its independence in 1280, and maintained it for nearly a century, when it was once more compelled to pay tribute to the later Mongol conqueror, Timur. At the end of the fourteenth century the little "empire" was reduced to a strip of coast, barely forty miles wide, extending from Batum to Kerasunt, and the separated city of Oinaion, with some territory adjoining it. (See MONGOLIA: Map of Mongolian empires.) But, within this small compass, "few countries in Europe enjoyed as much internal tranquillity, or so great security for private property. [The commerce of Trebizond had continued to flourish, notwithstanding frequent quarrels and hostilities with the Genoese, who were the chief managers of its trade with the west. But the decay of the empire, politically, commercially, and morally, was rapid in its later years. First becoming tributary to the Ottoman conqueror of Constantinople, it finally shared the fate of the Byzantine capital. The city of Trebizond was surrendered to Mohammed II. in 1461. (See also TURKEY: 1451-1481). Its last emperor, David, was permitted to live for a time, with his family, in the European dominions of the Turk; but after a few years, on some suspicion of a plot, he was put to death with his seven sons, and their bodies were cast unburied to the dogs. The wife and mother of the dead—the fallen empress Helena—guarded them and dug a grave for them with her own hands. The Christian population of Trebizond was expelled from the city and mostly enslaved. Its place was taken by a Moslem colony.]"—G. Finlay, *History of the empire of Trebizond (History of Greece and of the empire of Trebizond)*.

1914-1920.—In the World War.—During the first two years of the World War, Trebizond was bombarded by Russian fleets and on Apr 18, 1916, after a combined attack by land and sea it was captured by them (see WORLD WAR: 1916: VI. Turkish theater: d, 5), but was retaken by the Turks Feb. 24, 1918. After the armistice, near the end of 1918, the city was reoccupied by Allied representatives. It was intended to unite the vilayet of Trebizond, with a population of 1,000,000 people, to the new republic of Armenia, along with the vilayets of Van, Erzerum and Bitlis; but owing to the strength of the Turkish Nationalist power and the refusal of any Allied power to undertake a mandate of the League of Nations for Armenia, the latter was retaken by the Turks in 1920.—See also ARMENIA: 1910-1920; WORLD WAR: 1915: VI Turkey: d, 1; SEVRES, TREATY OF (1920): Part III. Political clauses: Armenia; Part XI. Ports, waterways and railways.

1922.—Bombarded by the Greeks. See GREECE: 1922 (April-July).

ALSO IN: J. T. Bramhall, *Trebizond, a lost empire (Open Court, June, 1916)*.

**TREBONIAN LAW** (55 B. C.). See **ROME**: Republic: B. C. 57-52.

**TREE**, Sir Herbert Beerbohm (1853-1917), English actor. See **DRAMA**: 1888-1921.

**TREE CULTIVATION**. See **AGRICULTURE**: Ancient: Tree and vine culture.

**TREITSCHKE**, Heinrich von (1834-1896), German historian and publicist. See **HISTORY**: 28; 29; **WORLD WAR**: Causes: Indirect: h, 2; **PAN-GERMANISM**: German presentation of Pan-Germanism.

**TREK**, Great (1836), migration of the Boer settlers from Cape Colony, South Africa, to escape English rule. See **SOUTH AFRICA**, UNION OF: 1806-1881; **BOER**.

**TREBOVLA**, or Tremblova, town in Poland,

to be trench warfare. "When the British and French armies began their retreat from Mons, the British army was hampered by its lack of knowledge of trench warfare as used in the South African War. The men retired day by day, hardly staying in one place long enough to dig themselves in. At that time, one valuable lesson for digging a trench system was learned and that was, that the hole they had been taught to make in such circumstances was useless, as it offered them no protection against overhead shrapnel. This hole used to be dug a little more than the width of a man and straight back his full length; he naturally threw the dirt in front of him and thus made a little parapet. After the battle of the Marne a new system was used. A round hole was dug by



BRITISH NORTH COUNTY TROOPS WITH CAMOUFLAGE HELMETS WAITING IN RESERVE TRENCHES

Official photograph taken on the British Western Front, Battle of Menin Road, 1917

100 miles southeast of Lemberg. It was the scene of a Russian victory in 1915. See **WORLD WAR**: 1915; III. Eastern front: i, 6.

**TREMECEN**, ancient Barbary city state. See **BARBARY STATES**: 1505-1510; 1516-1535.

**TREMONT**: Origin of the name in Boston. See **MASSACHUSETTS**: 1630.


**TRENCH WARFARE**: Beginning and development.—Listening posts.—Observation posts and support trenches.—The use of trenches as an important factor in warfare must ever be associated with the World War. Trenches and ditches as auxiliaries to fortification and siege-craft were probably known in the earliest days and were certainly employed extensively in classical and medieval times. The occasional use of rifle-pits had been noted in the American Civil and Russo-Japanese wars. However, these sporadic occurrences never approached what we now understand

each man to fit his individual size. Here he squatted and fought if necessary, with the enemy's line from 100 to 500 yards distant from him. During the night, when not fighting, these men deepened their shelters and joined them together by little narrow ditches. During the next day there might be bitter fighting so that it would be even possible that other troops would come up and relieve during the early dusk. The relieved troops would retire a short distance and dig themselves another row of holes where they might act as supports in case the temporary front line gave. During that night the holes on the front line would be enlarged until they finally joined, and gradually, without deliberate intention, the trench became a permanent feature. Then the line slightly in the rear became connected with the front line system by what were then merely ditches. This was the origin of the system. The trench systems



generally consisted of three complete lines or systems of trenches, each system being self-supporting and independent of the other. The second and third systems were generally laid with due consideration to protection, fields of fire, and all the other tactical requirements necessary to such a system, because it was practically impossible to keep these points in mind during the building of the first or original line. These systems usually ran to a depth of six to eight miles from the front firing line. They were so constructed that when a firing line was broken through to any great extent, what was formerly a communication trench at once became a fire trench, and served to bring a heavy enfilade fire on the troops occupying the captured area. The site for a defensive firing line was divided into three sections: firing line, immediate support and reserves. The probable lines and manner of defense of the enemy

fire-bays interrupted by a series of traverses. The object of these being to localize the effect of shells or bombs landing in a fire-bay and to prevent enfilade fire down the length of the trench, as well as to localize any entry of the enemy into your line. Dimensions varied up and down the line, sometimes according to the lay of the land, sometimes according to the opinions or whims of the regiments making them, but the following dimensions show the average of the whole general line on the western front. Fire-bays generally were from twelve to eighteen feet long (defendable by four to six men, but accommodating eight to twelve, when necessary) plus a two foot covered sentry-box recessed into the traverse and giving room for one more man; this depending entirely on the energy and initiative of the men occupying the section. Every traverse averaged 9 x 9 feet, including a fairly liberal allowance for wear and



TRENCH MORTAR

had to be considered and whether the trenches were for permanent or for temporary use. The main object was to attain the greatest firing field that could be covered by defensive fire and the greatest security from offensive fire. The work of filling sandbags was continuous. Any damage to parados or traverses was at once attended to, and in the night damage to the wire entanglements was repaired. The ultimate design of a fire-trench depended upon its closeness to the enemy. When the latter were within 150 yards, the traversed fire trench had to provide adequate accommodation and protection for men who might at any moment be called upon to make use of bomb, bayonet and bullet; but if the enemy trenches were more than 150 yards distant, the ultimate design would depend upon the number of machine guns and automatic rifles available. Each of these guns had a firing capacity equal to about 25 rifles. Each gun therefore decreases the number of men required to hold the line, and in consequence reduces the amount of trench needed to protect these men. A traversed trench consisted of a series of

tear, and was the minimum allowance for stopping enfilade fire and localizing fire. Three feet was about the maximum width at the bottom of the trench. Recesses were dug at favorable places for the storage of bombs. Only in exceptional circumstances were shelters cut in a trench wall. The real dug-outs for the accommodation of men holding a line were generally behind the fire-trenches in an immediate support line, or as in the case of T-bays, in the control trench and communication trenches leading to and from them. These were large dug-outs, having a depth of thirty and forty feet, and in some cases capable of holding 100 to 250 men, generally having from five to ten exits and entrances. Here the men stayed during the bombardment, they were generally safe from any caliber shell that might light on top, unless a number dropped on the same spot. Between the front lines of the opposing armies, in No Man's Land, there were often areas of ground, ditches, and streams that, because of the lay of the land, could not be watched from a fire trench immediately facing them. The control of these areas was


necessary to prevent surprise attacks, etc. The listening post was often dug just inside the outer fringe of the barbed wire entanglements, just large enough to allow two men to stand in it unobserved. It was reached by a very narrow, irregular trench running out from a fire-bay, where it was easy to secure the maximum amount of concealment necessary to give protection. The soil excavated from these places was placed in sand bags and taken into the trench and used there. The chief duties of a listening post were to listen and report. Most of the work was done at night and no firing or sniping was allowed from it during the day. Patrols generally came out via one listening post and returned by another, so that all listening posts were warned of the trench by which the patrol would come out and the approximate time of departure and of return. During an attack, firing through loopholes was never possible because they were too restricted to have value. All the firing was done over the parapet. The difficulty of constructing new observation posts, which were effectual and inconspicuous for any length of time, resulted in their not being made in a parapet, where when located by the enemy they were as often as not a source of danger. A support trench was usually within 30 to 300 yards of a fire trench for the purpose of covering the fire trenches of skilled riflemen or an indirect machine-gun fire but mainly to shelter troops from observation and shell fire. Support dug-outs served three purposes: replacing casualties occurring in the fire trenches; holding the support trenches when fire trenches were captured by the enemy; and in an attack on enemy's trenches leading the attack over the heads of the occupants of the fire trench. Support points were forts, or strong points 100 to 300 yards behind the fire trenches garrisoned with firing troops strongly protected with barbed wiring and sandbags. The Second Line trenches duplicated the front line system, and were far enough behind it so that, in the event of the first system being taken, the second line was ready to be taken up by the troops driven out of the front line.—Based on J. S. Smith, *Trench warfare*, pp. viii-xi, 1-48.

**Defensive weapons.—Body armor and helmets.**—"When the movements of armies in the great war ceased and they were held in deadlock in the trenches, the fighters at once began devising weapons with which they could kill each other from below ground. . . . [They] developed the hand grenade [from the Roman fire-ball throwers] beyond the point which it had been brought in the European warfare of the last century. They called upon an industry which had once existed solely for the amusement of the people, the fireworks industry, for its golden rain and rainbow-hued stars for signals with which to talk to each other by night. Other geniuses of the trenches took empty cannon cartridges and, setting them up as ground mortars, succeeded in throwing bombs from them across No Man's Land into the enemy ranks. They even for a time resurrected the catapult of Trojan days, although this device attained no great success. But from all such activities new weapons of warfare sprang, crude at first, but later refined as only modern science and manufacture could protect them. . . . There is a widespread impression that helmets and body armor passed away with the invention of gunpowder and because of that invention. This impression is not at all true. Body armor came to its highest development long after gunpowder was in common use in war. The sixteenth century witnessed the most extensive use

of armor; yet at that time guns and pistols formed an important part of the equipment of every army, and even a weapon which is generally fancied to be ultramodern, the revolver, had been invented. The fact is that not gunpowder but tactics caused the decline of armor. Not that armor was unable to stop many types of projectiles shot from guns, but that its weight hampered swift manœuvring, caused it to be laid aside by the soldier. The decline of armor may be said to date from the Thirty Years' War. The armies in that period, and particularly that of the Swedes, began making long marches for surprise attacks, and the body armor of the troops was found to be a hindrance in such tactics. Thereafter armor went out of fashion. Yet it never completely disappeared in warfare. Gen. Rochambeau is said to have worn body armor at the siege of Yorktown. Great numbers of corselets and headpieces were worn in the Napoleonic wars. The corselet which John Paul Jones wore in his fight with the *Serapis* is preserved at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. The Japanese army was mailed with good armor as late as 1870. Breastplates were worn to some extent in the Civil War in the United States, and an armor factory was actually established at New Haven, Conn., about 1862. In the museum at Richmond, Va., is an equipment of armor taken from a dead soldier in one of the trenches at the siege of that city. There was a limited use of armor in the Franco-Prussian War. Some of the Japanese troops carried shields at Port Arthur. Helmets were worn in the Boer War. A notorious Australian bandit in the eighties for a long time defied armed posses to capture him because he wore armor and could stand off entire squads of policemen firing at him with Martini rifles at close range. Thus it cannot be said that armor, in coming into use again in the great war, was resurrected; it was merely revived. In its static condition during most of the four-year period, the war against Germany was one in which armor might profitably be used. This opportunity could scarcely be overlooked, and indeed it was not. . . . Yet body armor itself was coming into favor again, and only the welcome but unexpected end of hostilities prevented it, in all probability, from becoming again an important part of the equipment of a soldier. As a consequence of the attenuated but persistent use of armor by soldiers during the past two centuries and of the demand of the aristocratic for helmets and armor as ornaments, the armorer's trade had been kept alive from the days of Gustavus Adolphus to the present. The war efforts of the United States in 1917 and 1918 demanded a wide range of human talents and special callings; but surely the strange and unusual seemed to be reached when in the early days of our undertaking the Engineering Division of the Ordnance Department sought the services of expert armorers. It may be said that there were but two nations in the great war which went to the Middle Ages for ideas as to protective armor—ourselves and Germany. The Germans, who applied science to almost every phase of warfare, did not neglect it here. Germany at the start consulted her experts on ancient armor and worked along lines which they suggested. The German helmet used in the trenches was undoubtedly superior to any other helmet given a practical use. The first helmets to be used in the great war were of French manufacture. They were designed by Gen. Adrien, and 2,000,000 of them were manufactured and issued to the French Army. These helmets were the product of hasty pioneer work, but the fact that they saved from

2 to 5 per cent of the normal casualties of such a war as was being fought at once impelled the other belligerents to adopt the idea. Great Britain, spurred by the necessity of producing quickly a helmet in quantity, designed the most simple helmet to manufacture, which could be pressed out of cold metal. When America entered the war she had, naturally, no distinctive helmet; and the English type, being easiest to make, was adopted to fill the gap until we could design a more efficient one ourselves. . . . The British helmet possessed some notable defects. It did not afford a maximum of protective area. The center of gravity was not so placed as to keep the helmet from wobbling. The lining was uncomfortable and disregarded the anatomy of the head. It was vulnerable at the

a thickness of 0.036 of an inch is able to stop at a distance of 10 feet a jacketed, automatic pistol ball, .45 caliber, traveling at the rate of 600 feet a second. This was important not only from the standpoint of helmet production, but from the further inference that body armor of such steel might still be profitably used. The records of the hospitals in France show that 7 or 8 of every 10 wounded soldiers were wounded by fragments of shell and other missiles which even thin armor plate would have kept out. The German troops used body armor in large numbers, each set weighing from 19 to 24 pounds. In this country we believed it possible to produce body armor which would not be difficult to carry and which would resist the impact of a machine-gun bullet at fairly



GERMAN SNIPER'S POST MADE OF THREE-INCH KRUPP STEEL

concave surface where bowl and brim joined. It is not an astonishing circumstance that some of the earlier helmets worn by the men-at-arms of the days of knighthood possessed certain of these same defects, notably, that they were apt to be top-heavy and uncomfortable. Only by centuries of constant application and improvement were the armorers of the Middle Ages able to produce helmets which overcame these defects and which embodied all of the principles of defense and strength which science could put into them. The best medieval helmets stand at the summit of the art. It was the constant aim of the modern specialist, aided by the facilities of the twentieth century industries, to produce helmets as perfect technically as those rare models which are the pride of museums and collectors. Certainly in one respect we had the advantage of the ancients in that we have nowadays at our disposal the modern alloy-steels of great resistance. An alloy of this kind having

close range. The production of helmets, however, was our first concern; and in order to be sure of a sufficient quantity of these protective headpieces, we adopted the British model for production in the United States. . . . For the metal we adopted after much experimentation a steel alloy with a high percentage of manganese. This was practically the same as the steel of the British helmet. Its chief advantage was that it was easy to work in the metal presses in existence and it required no further tempering after leaving the stamping presses. Its hardness, however, wore away the stamping tools much more quickly than ordinary steel sheets would do. While we adopted the British helmet in design and substantially in metal used, we originated our own helmet lining. The lining was woven of cotton twine in meshes three-eighths of an inch square. This web, fitting tightly upon the wearer's head, evenly distributed the weight of the two-pound helmet, and in the same way distributed

the force of any blow upon the helmet. The netting, together with small pieces of rubber around the edge of the lining, kept the helmet away from the head, so that even a relatively large dent could not reach the wearer's skull. . . . The helmets were painted in the olive-drab shade for protective coloring. While on dull days such objects could not be discerned at a great distance, in bright weather their rounded surfaces might catch and reflect sunbeams, thus betraying the positions of their wearers. To guard against this, as soon as the helmets were treated to a first coat of paint, fine sawdust was blown upon the wet surface. When this had dried, another coat of paint was applied, and a nonreflective, gritty surface was thus produced."—B. Crowell, *America's munitions, 1917-1918*, pp. 200, 221-224.

See also GRENADES; LIQUID FIRE; POISON GAS; ORDNANCE: 20th century.

ALSO IN: W. H. Waldron, *Elements of trench warfare*.—P. J. L. Azan, *Warfare of today*.

TRENT, fortified town in the Italian Tyrol, on the Adige, seventy-six miles northwest of Venice.

1806.—Ceded to Bavaria by the Treaty of Pressburg. See GERMANY: 1805-1806.

1918.—Occupied by the Italians. See WORLD WAR: 1918: IV. Austro-Italian theater: c, 11.

TRENT, Council of (1545-1563). See PAPACY: 1534-1540; 1537-1563; HISTORY: 23; EUROPE: Renaissance and Reformation: Catholic Reformation; CHRISTIANITY: 16th century: Counter-Reformation; IDOLATRY AND IMAGE-WORSHIP: Practice and theory in Roman church.

TRENT, Treaty of (1501). See ITALY: 1501-1504.

TRENT AFFAIR.—"Immediately after the firing upon Fort Sumter, Jefferson Davis, president of the then newly organized Confederate States, had sent out to Europe agents to forward the interests of the proposed nationality. These agents had there spent some seven months, accomplishing little. Disappointed at their failure, Davis determined upon a second and more formal mission. The new representatives were designated as 'Special Commissioners of the Confederate States of America, near the Government' whether of Great Britain or of France, as the case might be. James Murray Mason of Virginia and John Slidell of Louisiana were selected, the first named for London, the second for Paris. Both . . . had recently been senators of the United States, Slidell having withdrawn from the Senate February 4, 1861, immediately after the passage of the Ordinance of Secession by the state of Louisiana; while Mason, having absented himself about March 20, during the session of the Senate for executive business, did not again take his seat. Virginia seceded April 17, and Mason, together with several other Southern senators, was in his absence expelled by formal vote (July 11) at the special session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress, which met under the call of President Lincoln, July 4, 1861. Probably no two men in the entire South were more thoroughly obnoxious to those of the Union side than Mason and Slidell. The first was, in many and by no means the best ways, a typical Virginian. Very provincial and intensely arrogant, his dislike of New England, and especially of Massachusetts, was pronounced, and exceeded only by his contempt. Slidell, on the other hand, an intriguer by nature, unscrupulous in his political methods, was generally looked upon as the most dangerous person to the Union the Confederacy could select for diplomatic work in Europe. The first object of the envoys was to secure the recog-

nitiation of the Confederacy. The ports of the Confederate States were then blockaded; but the blockade had not yet become really effective. The new envoys selected Charleston as their port of embarkation, and October 12 as its date. The night of the 12th was dark and rainy, but with little or no wind, conditions altogether favorable for their purpose. They left Charleston on the little Confederate steamer *Theodora*, evaded the blockading squadron, and reached New Providence, Nassau, two days later, the 14th. It had been the intention of the envoys to take passage for Europe at Nassau on an English steamer; but, failing to find one which did not stop at New York, the *Theodora* continued her voyage to Cardenas in Cuba, whence the envoys and those accompanying them proceeded overland to Havana. Arriving at Havana about the 22d of October, Messrs. Mason and Slidell remained there until the 7th of November. They then embarked on the British steamer *Trent*, the captain of the *Trent* having full knowledge of their diplomatic capacity as envoys of an insurgent community, and giving consent to their embarkation. The *Trent* was a British mail packet, making regular trips between Vera Cruz, in the Republic of Mexico, and the Danish island of St. Thomas. She was in no respect a blockade-runner; was not engaged in commerce with any American port; and was then on a regular voyage from a port in Mexico, by way of Havana, to her advertised destination, St. Thomas, all neutral ports. At St. Thomas direct connection could be made with a line of British steamers running to Southampton. The envoys, therefore, when they left Havana, were on a neutral mail steamer, sailing under the British flag, on a scheduled voyage between neutral points. At just that time the United States war steamer, *San Jacinto*, a first-class screw sloop mounting fifteen guns, was returning from a cruise on the western coast of Africa, where for twenty months she had been part of the African squadron engaged in suppressing the slave-trade. She was commanded by Captain Wilkes, who had recently joined her. Returning by way of the Cape Verde Islands, Captain Wilkes there learned from the newspapers about the last of September of the course of public events in the United States, and rumors reached him of Confederate privateers, as they were then called, destroying American vessels in West Indian waters. He determined to make an effort at the capture of some of these 'privateers'. On October 10 the *San Jacinto* reached the port of St. Thomas, and subsequently touched at Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba. There Captain Wilkes learned, also from the newspapers, that the Confederate envoys were at that very time at Havana, and about to take passage for Southampton. Reaching Havana on the 28th of October, the commander of the *San Jacinto* further learned that the commissioners were to embark on the steamer *Trent*, scheduled to leave Havana on the 7th of November. Captain Wilkes then conceived the design of intercepting the *Trent*, exercising the right of search, and making prisoners of the envoys. No question as to his right to stop, board, and search the *Trent* seems to have entered the mind of Captain Wilkes. He did, however, take into his confidence his executive officer, Lieutenant Fairfax, disclosing to him his project. Lieutenant Fairfax entered, it is said, a vigorous protest against the proposed action, and strongly urged on Captain Wilkes the necessity of proceeding with great caution unless he wished to provoke international difficulties, and not impossibly a war with Great Britain. He then suggested that his commanding officer consult

an American judge at Key West, an authority on maritime law; which, however, Captain Wilkes declined to do. Leaving Key West on the morning of November 5, Captain Wilkes directed the course of the *San Jacinto* to what is known as the Bahama Channel, through which the *Trent* would necessarily pass on its way to St. Thomas, and there stationed himself. About noon on the 8th of November, the *Trent* hove in sight, and when she had approached sufficiently near the *San Jacinto*, a round shot was fired athwart her course; the United States flag was run up at the masthead at the same time. The approaching vessel showed the English colors, but did not check her speed or indicate a disposition to heave to. Accordingly, a few instants later, a shell from the *San Jacinto* was exploded across her bows. It is unnecessary to go into the details of what then occurred. For present purposes it is sufficient to say that the two envoys, together with their secretaries, were identified and forcibly removed, being taken on board the *San Jacinto*; which, without interfering with the mails or otherwise subjecting the *Trent* to search, then laid its course for Fortress Monroe. Arriving there on the 15th, news of the capture was immediately flashed over the country. The *Trent*, on the other hand, proceeded to St. Thomas, where her passengers were transferred to another steamer, and completed the voyage to Southampton. They arrived and the report of the transaction was made public in Great Britain Nov. 27, twelve days after the arrival of the *San Jacinto* at Fortress Monroe, and the publication of the news of the arrest in the United States.—C. F. Adams (*American Historical Review*, Apr., 1912, pp. 541-543).—See also U.S.A.: 1861 (November).

**TRENT AND MERSEY CANAL.** See CANALS: Principal European canals: British Isles. "TRENTE-TRES," thirty-three leaders of the revolt in 1825 against Brazil, which won the independence of Uruguay, 1828. See URUGUAY: 1821-1905.

**TRENTINO**, region about the city of Trent, in the southern part of the Tyrol, inhabited largely by Italians. It was ceded to Italy by Austria, in 1919. See ITALY: Geographic description; LONDON, TREATY OR PACT OF; WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: b, 1; e; 1915: IV. Austro-Italian front: a; ADRIATIC QUESTION: Problem of Italy's new frontiers.

**TRENTON**, Battle of (1776). See U.S.A.: 1776-1777: Washington's retreat.

**TREPOV**, Dmitry Feodorovitch (1855-1906), Russian soldier and administrator. Governor-general of St. Petersburg (Petrograd), 1905; assistant minister of the interior, 1905; commandant of the imperial palace, 1905. See RUSSIA: 1905; 1905 (November-December).

**TREVELYAN**, Sir George Otto (1838- ), English historian and statesman. Chief secretary for Ireland, 1882-1884; secretary of state for Scotland, 1886, 1892-1895. See HISTORY: 32.

**TREVES** (Trier), city of Rhenish Prussia, on the Moselle river, sixty-nine miles southwest of Coblenz. It is the oldest Roman settlement north of the Alps. Several buildings of ancient origin may be found, notably the Porta which is in excellent condition and was formerly the gateway to the city, and a Roman amphitheatre. Its population, in 1919, was 53,248.

**Origin.**—Trèves was originally the chief town of the Treviri, from whom it derived its name. When the Romans established a colony there they called it Augusta Trevirorum. In time, the Augusta was dropped and Trevirorum became Trèves, or Trier. See TREVIRI.

**Under the Romans.**—"The town of the Treveri . . . soon gained the first place in the Belgic province; if, still, in the time of Tiberius, Durocortorum of the Remi (Rheims) is named the most populous place of the province and the seat of the governors, an author from the time of Claudius already assigns the primacy there to the chief place of the Treveri. But Treves became the capital of Gaul—we may even say of the West—only through the remodelling of the imperial administration under Diocletian. Aiter Gaul, Britain and Spain were placed under one supreme administration, the latter had its seat in Treves; and thenceforth Treves was also, when the emperors stayed in Gaul, their regular residence, and, as a Greek of the fifth century says, the greatest city beyond the Alps."—T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. 8, ch. 3.—See also ROME: Empire: 284-305.

306.—Ludi Francici. See FRANKS: 306.  
364-376.—Capital of Valentinian and the Western empire. See ROME: Empire: 363-370.

402.—Abandoned by Roman præfecture. See BRITAIN: 407.

410-420.—Pillaged by the Franks. See FRANKS: 410-420.

1125.—Origin of the electorate. See GERMANY: 1125-1272.

1675.—Taken from the French by the Imperialists. See NETHERLANDS: 1674-1678.

1689.—Threatened destruction by the French. See FRANCE: 1689-1690.

1697.—Restored to empire. See FRANCE: 1697.

1704.—Taken by Marlborough. See GERMANY: 1704.

1794.—Taken by the French. See FRANCE: 1794 (March-July).

1801-1803.—Extinction of the electorate. See GERMANY: 1801-1803.

1815.—Returned to Prussia by Congress of Vienna. See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.

1918.—Allied aerial attack. See WORLD WAR: 1918: VIII. Aviation.

**TREVILLIAN'S STATION**, Battle of. See U.S.A.: 1864 (May-June: Virginia): Campaigning in the Shenandoah.

**TREVIRI.**—The Treviri were one of the peoples of Gaul, in Cæsar's time, "whose territory lay on the left bank of the Rhine and on both sides of the Mosella (Mosel). Trier [ancient Treves] on the Mosel was the headquarters of the Treviri."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic*, v. 4, ch. 8. See TRÈVES: Under the Romans.

**TREVISO**, Duc de. See MORTIER.

**TREVISO**, capital of the province of Treviso, Italy, on the Sile river, eighteen miles northwest of Venice. A member of the Lombard League (1167), it fell under the tyrannous rule of Eccelino di Romano, 1236-1250, and came under the control of Venice, 1338. It was captured by the French under Mortier in 1797. The population of the town was 40,843 in 1910. See ITALY: 1056-1152; 1402-1406; VERONA: 1236-1250; 1260-1338.

**TREVITHICK**, Richard (1771-1833), English engineer and inventor. See AUTOMOBILES: 1678-1803; RAILROADS: 1750-1881.

**TREZEL**, Camille Alphonse (1780-1860), French soldier. Fought against the Arabs in Algeria, 1835. See BARBARY STATES: 1830-1840.

**TRIAD SOCIETY**, or **Water-Lily Sect.**—The most extensive of the many secret societies among the Chinese was "the Tienti hwui, or San-hoh hwui, i. e. the Triad Society. It was formerly known by the title of the Pih-lien kiau, or Water-lily Sect, but having been proscribed by the gov-

ernment, it sought by this alteration of name, and some other slight changes, to evade the operation of the laws. . . . The known and indeed almost openly avowed object of this society [was] . . . for many years the overturn of the Mant-chou dynasty."—*Chinese rebellion (North American Review, July, 1854)*.—See also CHINA: 1808 (April-July).

ALSO IN: Abbé Huc, *Christianity in China, &c.*, v. 2, pp. 274-277.—H. A. Giles, *Historic China*, pp. 395-399.

TRIAL: By assize. See COMMON LAW: 1164-1176.

By combat. See WAGER OF BATTLE; COMMON LAW: 1077; CRIMINAL LAW: 1818.

By jury. See COMMON LAW: 440-1066; 1066-1154; 1794.

By martial law. See MILITARY LAW: Courts-martial; WAR POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES: Martial law.

By ordeal. See CRIMINAL LAW: 1108-1109.

TRIANON, a palace museum situated close to Versailles park, some miles outside Paris, comprising two buildings, the grand and petit Trianon. The historical interest of the place begins with Louis XIV, who bought the hamlet of Trianon on the outskirts of his new park, had its little dwellings torn down, and a small summer house of porcelain built on the site, for the Marquise de Montespan. After de Montespan had lost his favor, he had this small building pulled down and replaced by the château known as the grand Trianon. The petit Trianon, which was erected by Louis XV for Madame du Barry, was the favorite retreat of Marie Antoinette, the unhappy queen of Louis XVI.

TRIANON, Treaty of (1920).—"The treaty [of the Allies] with Hungary, which was delayed for three months, awaiting the establishment of a stable and representative government, was delivered to the Hungarian delegation, headed by Count Apponyi, on January 15, at Neuilly, near Paris, where the Bulgarian treaty had been signed. As originally drafted it provided that Hungary should formally waive claim to Fiume and to all former Austro-Hungarian territory awarded to Italy, Rumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; that she should adhere to the clauses of the Austrian treaty concerning national minorities; that her army should not exceed 35,000 men, with guns of not more than ten centimeter calibre and heavy guns not larger than 105 millimeter bore; that she should assume a proportional share of the Austro-Hungarian debt; place no restriction upon the export of foodstuffs into Austria; and insure to Austrian purchasers terms as favorable as those given to Hungarians. The remaining clauses of the treaty were similar to those of the treaty of St. Germain. So bitter were the denunciations of the treaty in Hungary, and so determined were the Hungarians that they would not accept it as drafted, that it was reconsidered by the Supreme Council. The revised document, however, granted only a few economic concessions, and the territorial clauses, against which such vigorous protest had been made, were unchanged."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, p. 4.—The boundary settlements of Hungary were more drastic than any except the proposed Turkish. As between Austria and Hungary, the principle of nationality was apparently applied in favor of the former republic by the award of Búrgenland in the west, which was only effected in October, 1921; Slovakia in northern Hungary was united with Bohemia to form the

independent Czecho-Slovakian republic, including however a considerable minority of Magyars; on the east Transylvania, including colonies of Hungarians and Germans, became Rumanian; the banat of Temesvar in the south was divided between Rumania and the new kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the latter two constituents having separated themselves from Hungary, which also lost its only outlet to the sea, the port of Fiume. Thus, Hungary as well as Austria and Czecho-Slovakia each was reduced to landlocked conditions like little Switzerland, the only country in Europe without a seaport before the World War. An international control of communications, established in the previous Versailles Treaty with Germany, of all the principal rivers of central Europe, including the Danube, was confirmed. In addition to the demarkation of the boundaries "the main features of the treaty are as follows: "Hungary recognizes the full independence of the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Czechoslovak State: the frontiers between Hungary and the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Rumania will be determined by a commission composed of seven members, five of whom will be appointed by the principal allied and associated powers, one by the interested State and one for Hungary. Hungary renounces in favor of Italy, the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Rumania and the Czechoslovak State all rights and claims on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy recognized as being an integral part of these States. Rumania accepts the dispositions that the principal allied and associated powers judge necessary for the protection in Rumania of the interests of the inhabitants who differ from the majority of the population by race, language or religion. She agrees also to clauses framed for the protection of the freedom of transit and an equitable régime for the trade of other nations. The Czechoslovak State undertakes not to erect any military works on the part of its territory situated on the right bank of the Danube to the south of Bratislava. Hungary renounces all rights and claims to Fiume and the adjacent territory belonging to the former Hungarian Kingdom and comprised within the boundaries which will be ultimately fixed, and she undertakes to recognize the stipulations which will be made on this subject. Hungary renounces in favor of Austria all her rights in territories of the old Hungarian Kingdom, situated beyond the boundaries fixed today. The military clauses are identical with those contained in the treaty of Saint Germain, except on two points. The total number of the Hungarian military forces is fixed at 35,000 men. No heavy guns are permitted—that is to say, guns of a larger calibre than 105 millimeters. As to reparations, the provisions are the same as those in the treaty of Saint Germain, except that Hungary is to give the allied powers an option on the annual delivery of railway coal for the period of five years, the amount to be fixed by the Réparations Commission, and the coal to go to the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Regarding the proportion and character of the financial obligations of Hungary which will be borne by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, by virtue of territory placed under their sovereignty, these will be decided upon in conformity with the financial clauses of the present treaty, which are identical with those of the Treaty of Saint Germain, except for two additions. The provisions by which Hungary must undertake to support the allied armies of occupa-

tion in her territory are not to apply to military operations subsequent to Nov. 3, 1918, without the consent of the principal allied and associated powers. In this case the Reparations Commission will fix the share of the expense to be borne by Hungary. On the other hand, it is laid down that the Hungarian Government must guarantee to pay in addition to the Hungarian public debt, part of the Austrian debt representing her contribution to the general debt of Austria-Hungary. The economic clauses are identical with those of the Treaty of Saint Germain, except as to some points of detail concerning economic relations between Austria and Hungary. Publication of these terms caused an uproar in Hungary. A statement issued by Count Apponyi on his arrival in Vienna, implied that the treaty in the form dictated would never be signed.—*New York Times Current History, Mar., 1920, p. 447.*—"The treaty . . . was accepted by the delegation for Hungary only after protest and a demand for modification, especially regarding boundaries, for which a decision by plebiscite was asked. . . . [In reply] it was pointed out that the conditions in Central Europe were such that it was impossible to make the political frontiers coincide with the ethnic. More than one aggregation of Magyars, consequently, said M. Millerand, the allied spokesman, must of necessity find themselves under the sovereignty of another State. A return of such territories to Hungary, when containing compact masses of population averse either to union or assimilation, would be impossible. Hence the allied Governments refused on practical grounds to modify the frontiers. It was further stated that plebiscites, if conducted fairly, would bring no substantial alteration in the boundaries as laid down by the allied experts after careful scientific study of the conditions prevailing. After this unequivocal rejection of the Hungarian demands, however, the note announced that the allied and associated powers had adopted a method of correcting frontier lines. The Delimitations Commissions, which had already begun their work, were given power, in case they were of the opinion that the boundary provisions of the treaty created injustice, to report this to the Council of the League of Nations, which could then offer its good offices to rectify the original line. . . . Modifications on the subjects of national minorities, military and naval clauses and war-guilty nationals were similarly rejected, and Hungary was given ten days in which to declare her willingness to sign the terms imposed. M. Prasenowski, Hungarian Minister, reached Paris from Budapest on May 21, the last day of the time limit. Early in the afternoon he notified the allied authorities that his Government accepted the treaty as drawn. A note, signed by the Hungarian Premier and Foreign Minister, was also presented, stating that the provisions of the treaty would be carried out loyally. The ceremony of signing was held on June 4 in the long gallery of the Grand Trianon [at Versailles]. It was brief and un spectacular. . . . The day of signing was made a day of national mourning in Budapest. They city was hedecked with black flags and draperies, railways and street cars stopped service, and stores and banks were closed. One of the features of the celebration was a series of riots in which 'awakening Magyars' killed several Jews and wounded many more. These occurrences were reported to the State Department at Washington by U. Grant Smith, American High Commissioner at Budapest, who said that the allied missions at Budapest protested to the Hungarian Government, demanding

the restoration of law and order. The Peace Treaty was denounced in the National Assembly, in the churches and public meetings as an outrage."—*Ibid., July, 1920, pp. 615-617.*

**TRIANON TARIFF.** See FRANCE: 1806-1810.

**TRIARI,** class of Roman soldiers which formed the third rank from the front. See LEGION, ROMAN.

**TRIBAL SONGS,** History in. See HISTORY: 13.

**TRIBOCES,** a people who, in Cæsar's time, were established on both banks of the Rhine, occupying the central part of the modern republic of Baden and the opposite region of Gaul.—Based on Napoleon III, *History of Cæsar, bk. 3, ch. 2, footnote.*—See also VANGIONES.

**TRIBON,** garment of thick cloth and small size worn by Spartan youths, and sometimes by old men.—C. C. Felton, *Greece, ancient and modern, course 2, lecture 7.*

**TRIBUNAL, Hague.** See HAGUE TRIBUNAL; HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1899: Convention for pacific settlement.

**TRIBUNAL, Revolutionary.** See FRANCE: 1792 (August-September); 1792 (September); 1793 (February-April); 1794 (June-July): Monstrous law.

**TRIBUNALS, Legal.** See COURTS.

**TRIBUNES, Roman.** See ROME: Republic: B. C. 494-492; 456; 445-400; CONSULAR TRIBUNES. At Venice. See VENICE: 697-810.

**TRIBUNITIA, Potestas.** See POTESTAS TRIBUNITIA.

**TRIBUTUM,** war-tax, collected from the Roman people in the earlier periods of the republic. It was "looked upon as a loan, and was returned on the termination of a successful war out of the captured booty. . . . The principle that Rome was justified in living at the expense of her subjects was formally acknowledged when, in the year 167 B. C., the tributum—the only direct tax which the Roman citizens paid—was abolished, because the government could dispense with it after the conquest of Macedonia. The entire burden and expense of the administration were now put off upon the subjects."—W. Ihne, *History of Rome, v. 4, bk. 6, ch. 7.*

**TRICAMARON, Battle of (533).** See VANDALS: 533-534.

**TRICASSES,** earlier name of the city of Troyes, France.

**TRICHINOPOLY,** capital of the district of Madras, British India. It was governed by a line of rajahs until 1732, and was the scene of fighting between the English and the French during the Carnatic wars, 1740-1761. It came under British control in 1801. The population in 1921 was 120,422. See INDIA: 1743-1752.

**TRICOTEUSES (Knitting women).** See FRANCE: 1793 (October): Life in Paris.

**TRICOUPIS, or Trikoupis, Charilaos (1832-1896),** Greek statesman. Prime minister, 1875, 1880, 1882-1885, 1880-1895. See GREECE: 1882-1895.

**TRIDENTINE COUNCIL.** See TRENT, COUNCIL OF.

**TRIDENTINE INDEX.** See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1564-1581.

**TRIENNIAL ACTS, England (1641, 1693).** See PARLIAMENT, ENGLISH: 1641-1664; 1693.

**TRIENNIAL CONVENTION.** See BAPTISTS: Triennial convention established.

**TRIER.** See TRÈVES.

**TRIERARCHY, Liturgy of.** See LITURGIES.

**TRIESTE,** formerly an Austrian crownland, consisting of the port of Trieste, near the head of

the Adriatic, and the surrounding country. Except when held for brief periods by Napoleon (1797-1805 and 1809-1813), Trieste was for over 500 years an Austrian possession and the principal seaport of the empire. It was ceded to Italy, in 1910. The population of the province numbered 238,655, in 1921. See ITALY: Geographic description; 1921 (January-March); Map showing unification; GERMANY: 1800 (July-September); ADRIATIC QUESTION: Treaty of London; LONDON, TREATY OR PACT OF; WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: e; 1915: IV. Italy: a; c; d; 1915: IX. Naval operations: b, 3; 1915: X. War in the air; 1917: IX. Naval operations: b, 2; 1918: IV. Austro-Italian theater: c, 13.

**TRIEWALD**, Martin (1601-1747), Swedish engineer and mathematician. See INVENTIONS: 18th century: Improved diving bell.

**TRIFORIUM**, in architecture, the arcaded story between the nave and the clerestory of a cathedral. See CATHEDRAL: Historical importance.

**TRIGLYPHS**, blocks used in the decoration of the Greek Doric column. See ORDERS OF ARCHITECTURE.

**TRI-INSULA**, independent commonwealth to consist of Long, Staten, and Manhattan islands, proposed in 1861 by New York City.

**TRIKOUPIS**, Charilaos. See TRICOUPIS.

**TRIM**, capital of the county of Meath, Ireland, on the Boyne, about thirty miles northwest of Dublin. It was under English control in 1367. See IRELAND: 1327-1367.

**TRINACRIA**, name for Sicily. See ITALY (Southern): 1232-1300.

**TRINCOMALEE**, Battle of (1767). See INDIA: 1767-1769.

**TRINIDAD**.—The island of Trinidad, which lies close to the South American continent, off the delta of the Orinoco, was discovered by Columbus on his third voyage, 1498 (see AMERICA: 1498-1505), but the Spaniards made little use of it, except for slave hunting. Late in the eighteenth century a French settlement was established in the island, though under the government of Spain. In 1797 it was taken by the English, and it was ceded to England in 1802. United with the neighboring island of Tobago, it is one of the crown colonies of the British empire. (See BRITISH EMPIRE: Treaties promoting expansion: 1815.) The area of Trinidad is 1,862 square miles. The population, in 1921, was 365,913. It is one of the most fertile of the West Indies islands. Its sole mineral wealth is in the extraordinary lake of half-solid pitch or asphalt, of which a graphic description may be found in the eighth chapter of Charles Kingsley's account of his visit to Trinidad, in 1860, entitled "At Last."—See also BRITISH EMPIRE: Extent; WEST INDIES: 1920-1922.

**TRINITARIAN EDICT** (380). See ROME: Empire: 370-395.

**TRINITY**. See ARIANISM.

**TRINITY COLLEGE**, Dublin. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1258-1921; 1591-1917; DUBLIN: 1400-1600; IRELAND: 1844.

**TRINITY HOUSE**.—"Perhaps there is throughout Britain no more interesting example of the innate power and varied developments of the old gild principle, certainly no more illustrious survival of it to modern times, than the Trinity House. It stands out now as an institution of high national importance, whose history is entwined with the early progress of the British navy and the welfare and increase of our sea craft and seamanship; in an age when the tendency is to assume state control over all matters of national

interest the Trinity House, a voluntary corporation, still fulfils the public functions to which its faithful labours, through a long course of years, have established its right and title. Although its earliest records appear to be lost or burned, there seems to be no doubt that Henry VIII's charter of 1514 was granted to a brotherhood already existing. . . . In the charter itself we read that the shipmen or mariners of England 'may anew erect' a gild, and lands and tenements in Deptford Strond, already in possession, are referred to. Similar bodies were formed in other places. . . . The charitable side of the Trinity House functions has always been considerable; in 1815 they possessed no less than 144 almshouses, besides giving 7,012 pensions; but of late years their funds applicable to such purposes have been curtailed. . . . It is significant that in Edward VI's reign the name and style of Gild was abandoned by the brethren for the title of 'the Corporation of the Trinity House of Deptford Strond.' Gilds now had come into disrepute. The functions of the Trinity House have long been recognized of such value to the public service that their honourable origin, so consonant with other English institutions, is apt to be forgotten. . . . To cherish the 'science and art of mariners,' and to provide a supply of pilots, especially for the Thames up to London, were their prime duties. The Admiralty and Navy boards were established as administrative bodies in 1520, and the ship-building yard at Deptford, with the store-houses there, 'was placed under the direct control of the gild.' The Sea Marks Act of 1566, which throws considerable light on the position of the company at that time, endowed them with the power of preserving old and setting up new sea marks or beacons round the coasts, among which trees came under their purview. How far their jurisdiction extended is not stated; it would be interesting to know whether their progress round the whole shores of Britain were gradual or not. It is, perhaps, for its work in connexion with light-houses, light-ships, buoys, and beacons, that the Trinity House is best known to the general public. . . . It was only in 1836 that parliament 'empowered the corporation to purchase of the crown, or from private proprietors, all lights then in existence,' which are therefore at present under their efficient central control. . . . The principal matters in their sphere of action [are] the important provision of pilots, the encouragement and supply of seamen, ballastage and ballast, lights and buoys, the suppression of piracy and privateers, tonnage measurement, the victualling of the navy, their intimate connexion with the gradual growth and armament of the navy, the curious right to appoint certain consuls abroad"—L. T. Smith, *Review of "Trinity house of Deptford Strond"*; by C. R. B. Barrett (*English Historical Review*, Apr., 1894).

**TRINOBANTES**.—The Trinobantes were the first of the tribes of Britain to submit to Cæsar. They inhabited the part of the country now embraced in the county of Essex and part of Middlesex. Their chief town, or stronghold (*oppidum*) was Camulodunum, where the Romans afterwards founded a colony which became the modern city of Colchester. Cunobelin, the Cymbeline of Shakespeare, was a king of the Trinobantes who acquired extensive power. One of the sons of Cunobelin, Caractacus, became the most obstinate enemy of the Romans when they seriously began the conquest of Britain, in the reign of Claudius.—Based on E. L. Cutts, *Colchester*, ch. 2-3.—See also BRITAIN: Celtic tribes; 43-53.



ALSO IN: C. Merivale, *History of the Romans*, ch. 51.

**TRIOBOLON.**—Three oboli was the daily compensation paid in Athens to citizens who served as judges in the great popular courts; afterwards paid, likewise, to those who attended the assemblies of the people.—Based on A. Boeckh, *Public economy of Athens*, bk. 2, ch. 15.

**TRIPLANE.** See AVIATION: Development of airplanes and air service: 1910-1920.

**TRIPLE ALLIANCE.**—There have been a number of triple alliances formed in European history (see NETHERLANDS: 1668; SPAIN: 1713-1725; FRANCE: 1717-1719); but the one in recent times to which allusion is often made is that in which Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, were the three parties. It was formed by treaty in May, 1882, and was preceded by an alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, known as the Dual Alliance.—See also BALANCE OF POWER: Neutralization of states.

**Austro-German alliance of 1879.**—"A close alliance between Germany and Austria was an idea which Bismarck had entertained before [1879], and even informally suggested. . . . Yet, much as he had disliked the previous hollow friendship between Vienna and Berlin, which he believed to be entirely to the advantage of the former, and convinced as he was that Prussia could only fulfil her ambitions by a successful war with Austria, none the less, even before that war was finished [1866], he had begun to look forward to better relations in the future. The obstinacy with which in the hour of victory he had stood out against the eager wish of his master and of the Prussian military leaders for an acquisition of Austrian territory, was due only in part to the immediate dangers that he perceived in case Prussia should show herself immoderate in her demands. It was also due to his extraordinary foresight as to the advantages of not alienating Austria permanently, but of leaving the way open to a subsequent reconciliation. . . . Whatever may have been Bismarck's designs in 1875, the famous war scare [with Russia] at least made clear that Russia was not minded to permit him to attack France. . . . Neither Russia nor Germany was ready at the last analysis to grant the other a perfectly free hand as against France and Austria respectively. . . . To these considerations we may add the deeper one of the common nationality and history of the Germans in Germany and of those in Austria. For a thousand years they had been in the same empire, and their present political severance from one another dated back scarcely more than a decade. Such factors weighed with Bismarck, and he mentions them among the reasons for his decision. . . . Angered by the attitude of Russia since the Congress of Berlin [1878], and fearing that in spite of assurances to the contrary, the retirement of Andrassy [Austria-Hungary's foreign minister] might lead to a change of policy at Vienna, he determined while there was still time to bind Germany and Austria together by an alliance which should put an end to the dangers that threatened them both. . . . Count Andrassy, on his part . . . had been aiming for just such a result ever since he had become foreign minister. It did not, therefore, take long for the two statesmen to reach an understanding when they came together at Gastein. They agreed that after each had obtained the approval of his master, Bismarck should proceed to Vienna to enter into formal negotiations for an Austro-German alliance. The idea was immediately approved by Emperor Fran-

cis Joseph, but the aged German emperor was at first quite unfavorable to it. . . . Only after obstinate resistance did . . . [Emperor William] unwillingly consent to negotiations for a defensive alliance, but it must not be one that was specifically directed against Russia. On September 21, Prince Bismarck arrived in Vienna. . . . The discussion between him and Count Andrassy and the drawing up of the treaty lasted but three days. Andrassy declined Bismarck's suggestion that the pact should be made part of the constitution of both empires, thus bringing them into a permanent relation with one another that would recall in a measure the Germanic federation dissolved by the war of 1866. He also refused to sign any general treaty of alliance, declaring that Austria had no quarrel with France and wished to keep on good terms with her, partly out of consideration for England. As Germany was amply able to hold her own against France without assistance, just as Austria was against Italy, an alliance for such contingencies was not necessary or desirable. The only real menace was from Russia, or from a combination of Russia and some other power, and this was all that should be provided against. . . . [So] in a memorandum to his emperor, on September 24, [Bismarck] recommended the ratification of the agreement that had been reached. This led to another acute crisis. Emperor William asserted repeatedly that the proposed treaty would be an act of ill faith on his part . . . [and] most reluctantly he yielded to the pressure put upon him. . . . On October 7, 1879, the Austro-German alliance was signed by him and by Prince Reuss, the German ambassador in Vienna [and] the news of what had been done soon transpired. In both Germany and Austria it was greeted with loud applause. . . . It was purely defensive in character, . . . by its existence and power it formed a dam against the progress of Pan-slavism, while it helped to keep France quiet by making her feel her isolation."—A. C. Coolidge, *Origins of the Triple Alliance*, pp. 157, 163, 166, 169-170, 172.

ALSO IN: A. F. Pribram, *Secret treaties of Austria-Hungary*.

**Predicament of Italy, 1870-1882.**—**International situation.**—**Triple Alliance formed.**—"The young kingdom of Italy had been completed by the occupation of Rome in September, 1870. Unlike Prussia, Italy had not reached greatness by brilliant victories of her own; her success had been due not only to her efforts, but also to the misfortunes of others, which she had turned to good account. After the achievement of her unity, she still feared an Austrian attempt to reverse the verdict of 1859 and of 1866, and that this time she would not have a French or a Prussian ally. She feared still more that some power might take up the cause of the Pope and demand the restoration of his temporal authority, and she believed that the greatest danger in this respect threatened her from the side of France. . . . [Napoleon III, at the Peace of Villafranca] had exacted, in compensation for his services and for the sacrifices of France, the cession of Nice and Savoy. . . . The enforced cession of these two districts, although not objected to by the inhabitants themselves, have not been forgiven by the Italians to this day. Whenever relations have been strained between Italy and France, the eyes of those who dream of Italia Irredenta and every Italian patriot has dreamed of it more or less—have turned in the direction of Nice and Savoy, and of the island of Corsica, which once belonged to the republic of Genoa and . . . have been French only since

the middle of the eighteenth century. Another cause of Italian discontent was the continued occupation of Rome by French troops, in deference to the wishes of the clerical party in France. When the garrison was withdrawn in 1867, Garibaldi's ill-advised expedition against the city led to its prompt return, and to the painful incident of the hero's defeat at Mentana. In 1870 Italy, if given permission to occupy Rome, was ready to join with France against Prussia, her partner of four years earlier. But as Napoleon refused his consent until too late, the Italians, without running any risks, profited by his disasters, and after the withdrawal of the French garrison seized the Eternal City. . . . After the Peace of Frankfurt [Jan. 18, 1871] the relations between France and Italy became worse. The Italians . . . had little sympathy for the French republic, whose example might encourage the republican party in Italy, though they feared a Bourbon restoration, believing that it would mean a French intervention in behalf of the Pope. This fear was strengthened by the outspoken advocacy of the papal claims by many French royalists, including the Pretender, the Comte de Chambord himself, and also by the fact that until October, 1874, the French government unwisely kept a man-of-war stationed at Civita Vecchia, the port of Rome. The Italians, therefore, began to look for friends in other quarters. In 1873 King Victor Emmanuel visited Vienna and Berlin, and there was talk of the probable adhesion of Italy to the League of the Three Emperors. But these first advances led to nothing. The three empires looked askance at Italy and felt no particular need of her friendship. . . . In 1877, aroused by rumors of the agreement of Reichstadt, the Italian government sent Francesco Crispi on a mission to sound the German chancellor as to the possibility of an alliance between Italy and Germany against France and Austria. But Bismarck, while expressing a willingness to make a defensive treaty against France, frankly declared that he was on excellent terms with Austria and would remain so. . . . At the Congress of Berlin [1874] Italy neither gained anything herself nor dared oppose the gains of Austria. This outcome produced disappointment and discontent in the peninsula, which was not much allayed by the statement of the ministry that 'Italy had returned from the congress with clean hands'; others called it with empty hands. France, too, came back from Berlin 'with clean hands,' but she had something in her pocket, and that something was an object Italy coveted."—A. C. Coolidge, *Origins of the Triple Alliance*, pp. 179-180, 182, 184-191.—"Tunis and French Mediterranean ambitions brought France at once into sharp collision with the sister Latin race in Italy. The kingdom of Italy desired colonies and a sure grip on the Mediterranean. The French occupation of Tunis was a bitter blow. [See TUNIS: 1878-1881; 1881-1898.] . . . Isolated, [Italy's] . . . position was becoming desperate, [for] she could not stand alone. . . . A confidential explanation from Berlin of the terms and meaning of the Dual Alliance of 1879, made one certainty absolutely clear. 'Unredeemed Italy' (*Italia irredenta*)—Trieste and Istria, the Alpine frontier of the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy of 1810, the Balkan littoral of the Adriatic were now postponed to the German Kalends. If Italy could not get these from Austria single-handed, she assuredly could not get them by a war in which Germany stood behind Austria. The Dual Alliance sponged from the screen of the future the Italian dream of

rounding off the unification of 1859 and 1866 by the incorporation of unredeemed Italy or securing the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic. And the exposed shores of the peninsula were vulnerable to sea-power and to French sea-power, located at Toulon, Corsica, Tunis, Bizerta—perhaps Egypt. Given the conditions of 1882, the accession of Italy to the Dual Alliance was—if the invitation were held out from Berlin—a foregone conclusion."—C. G. Robertson, *Bismarck*, p. 405.—"The treaty was accordingly negotiated. The final cause that ended the negotiation, and which Bismarck used as a decisive factor to win Italy over, was the seizure by France, in 1882, of the land which bordered on Italy's province of Algeria.—See also ITALY: 1870-1901.

**Success of the alliance.**—"To Bismarck the conclusion of the Treaty of May 20, 1882, was the culmination of his system. Henceforward German hegemony in Central Europe moved securely on the pivotal point of the Triple Alliance, which gradually and naturally grew into the one grand combination of the European State system, with which all other possible combinations or ententes had to reckon. . . . [The] Italian policy in 1882 came under the control of the Wilhelmstrasse, and control was stealthily and relentlessly followed by the moral and economic penetration of the German bankers, cartels, syndicates, and commercial travellers."—C. G. Robertson, *Bismarck*, p. 407.—By means of the agreement between the three countries, sufficient unanimity of policy was obtained so that the Triple Alliance achieved considerable success. After the retirement of Bismarck, the main reliance of the coalition was not German diplomacy so much as German military power.

**Content of the treaties.**—"The leading statesmen of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy have often discussed the contents of the treaties, but always in the most general terms, limiting themselves to the statement that the Triple Alliance had purely defensive aims: the maintenance of peace on the territorial bases created by the national unification of Germany and of Italy, and by the reconstruction of Austria-Hungary in the year 1867, followed by the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878. . . . Bismarck, it was reported, had declared that the tenor of the treaties of the Triple Alliance would never be made public, even after the Alliance had ceased to have legal force. Fostered by this assertion, fantastic rumors concerning the stipulations made by the several allies found wide circulation and ready credence. . . . In the summer of 1915, the Austro-Hungarian government published four articles of one of the treaties in question, thus furnishing the first authentic contribution to the knowledge of their contents. It was learned that the three powers had reciprocally promised friendship and peace. They had also agreed to enter upon an exchange of views upon political and economic questions of a general nature, and to pledge their support to one another within the limits of their particular interests (Article I). Reciprocal assistance backed by full military strength was to be rendered whenever one or two of the signatories were attacked by two or more of the Great Powers without direct challenge on their part (Article 3). In case one of them should, through the menaces of a Great Power not a party to the treaty, become involved in a war with such a power, the other two signatories were under all conditions to observe a benevolent neutrality towards their ally. Furthermore, it was left to the judgment of each of them,

whether or not to participate in such a passage at arms by the side of its ally (Article 4). The last of the articles published (7) concerned Austria-Hungary and Italy alone. It determined when, and under what conditions, one of these powers was to enter upon temporary or permanent occupation of territories in the Balkans or on the Ottoman coasts of the Adriatic or the Ægean Sea. The presupposition was that such occupation should take place only upon previous agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy. Such an agreement would be on the basis of reciprocal indemnification for every territorial or other advantage over and beyond the existing status quo. . . . Let it be emphasized first of all that the Triple Alliance is by no means to be regarded as supplanting the Austro-Hungarian-German treaty of October 7, 1879. On the contrary, it did not impair the validity of that treaty in any way. Independently of the treaty which the Central Powers concluded with Italy in 1882 (a treaty four times renewed), the Austro-Hungarian-German treaty, from October, 1879, to the outbreak of the World War, constituted the basis of action of the Central Powers in all questions of foreign policy, most especially as concerns their relation to Russia. For in none of the treaties of the Triple Alliance is Russia mentioned as that power, upon whose single and unprovoked attack upon one of the allies the *casus foederis* was to be considered established for the other two. The duty of giving aid in this case devolved exclusively upon Germany and Austria-Hungary, to the extent provided for in the treaty of October, 1879. . . . The first treaty of the Triple Alliance, with a five-year term, was signed on May 20, 1882. It contained Articles 1, 3, and 4, published by the Austro-Hungarian government in 1915, the contents of which have already been given. Of the remaining articles of the treaty, the most important is the one binding Austria-Hungary and Germany to aid Italy with their entire military strength in case she should be attacked without provocation by France (Article 2). Italy alone assumed a similar obligation towards Germany; Austria-Hungary did not. The latter was to aid the German Empire against France only in case another Great Power aligned itself with France. Nor was Italy bound to give armed assistance to Austria-Hungary in case the latter should be attacked without provocation by Russia alone. By the terms of the treaty, Italy was in this case bound merely to observe a benevolent neutrality towards Austria-Hungary. For Germany also, as has been already mentioned, the treaty of the Triple Alliance contained no stipulation which would have compelled her participation in a war provoked by an attack of Russia upon Austria-Hungary. Germany was pledged to such participation only through the treaty of October 7, 1879, of which the Italian government had no knowledge in 1882. A guaranty of the possessions of the three allies, especially of Rome to Italy, which was repeatedly mentioned as an established fact in the literature on the subject, was expressed neither in the first nor in any of the subsequent treaties of the Triple Alliance. To be sure, there was no lack of attempts in this direction by the Italian statesmen during the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the first of the treaties of the Triple Alliance; but their efforts were frustrated by the firm refusal of the cabinet of Vienna to heed Italy's wishes. Nor was Italy more successful in having inserted in the treaty stipulations concerning the promotion of Italy's colonial plans or the combination of Austria's future terri-

torial acquisitions in the Balkans with Italian claims on the Trentino. . . . It is to be ascribed solely to Italy's incessant urging that the second treaty of the Triple Alliance, concluded on February 20, 1887, for another term of five years, no longer exhibits the purely defensive nature characteristic of the first treaty. Austria-Hungary and Germany were now pledged to participate in wars which could no longer be regarded as a defence against unprovoked attacks of a hostile Great Power. Italy, it is true, did not succeed in carrying her demands to their full extent. The cabinet of Vienna refused most emphatically to enter upon engagements which might embroil Austria-Hungary in a war with France for the sake of Italy's Mediterranean programme. Prince Bismarck, on his part, was most desirous of keeping Germany, so far as possible, aloof from all active participation in Balkan wars—if only on account of Russia. After protracted and heated negotiations, which several times threatened to miscarry, a compromise was finally resorted to in order to avoid a break. This compromise, presumably adopted on Bismarck's initiative, provided for a division of the obligations to be assumed by Germany and Austria. To this end three treaties were concluded in 1887. . . . Four years later, in 1891, the third treaty of the Triple Alliance was concluded. By dint of incessant urging, Italy succeeded this time in bringing about the union of the three treaties into one. On the other hand, the efforts of the Italian statesmen to obtain a material extension of the obligations of the Central Powers were frustrated. Austria-Hungary declined all further intervention in behalf of Italy's Mediterranean interests; Germany took the same ground with respect to Italian plans in the Balkans. Italy was again successful, however, in that Germany's willingness to intervene in behalf of Italian interests in Northern Africa—Tunish was now brought into the foreground, as well as Tripoli—was more definitely formulated, and the intention was expressed to come to an agreement with England with reference to these questions. As far back as December, 1887, England had been in harmony with Austria-Hungary and Italy concerning the maintenance of the Turkish possessions in the Orient. Now a protocol attached to the treaty gave consideration to Italy's desire to induce England to approve and support certain stipulations in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance in as binding a form as possible, a desire energetically seconded by Germany. These stipulations concerned the North African territories bordering on the central and western Mediterranean. This marks England's closest approach to the Triple Alliance, as well as the culmination of the importance of the Triple Alliance in safeguarding the interests of the allies and the peace of Europe. The crucial test of the Triple Alliance began with the moment in which the first serious differences between Germany and England made their appearance. As far back as 1896, Italy, as the present investigation shows, had notified the Central Powers that she could not participate in a war in which England and France should figure as the joint adversaries of the states included in the Triple Alliance. The fact that Germany, and likewise Austria-Hungary under the influence of Germany, refused to take cognizance of this declaration, which was incompatible with the contents of the treaty, did not alter the fact that Italy from that time on moved away from her allies and entered upon a course which gradually led her into the camp of their enemies. The treaty of the Triple Alliance was,

indeed, twice renewed in unchanged form, in 1902 and 1912 [see ITALY: 1912-1914]; likewise the protocol of 1891, although the latter, in so far as it had reference to England, became less and less in harmony with the actual facts through the widening divergences between Germany and England. Furthermore, Italy succeeded in inducing Austria-Hungary to attach a declaration to the treaty of 1902, in which Austria-Hungary expressed the willingness to give her ally a free hand in Tripoli. Moreover, in a second protocol to the treaty of 1912, Austria-Hungary recognized the sovereignty of Italy over Tripoli, and confirmed the agreements made with Italy in 1901 and 1909 concerning Balkan questions, and particularly concerning Albania. All other demands of the ally that had now become untrustworthy were rejected by the Central Powers. The assertion often made, that the treaties of the Triple Alliance also contained definite military stipulations, is incorrect. Article 5 of the Treaty of 1882, which has hitherto remained unknown, merely stated that the allies, at the moment when danger was threatened, should agree in due season upon the military measures necessary for joint operations. And it rested here; no further dispositions are to be found in any of the later treaties of the Triple Alliance. However, a number of special military agreements were made in the course of time."—A. F. Pribram, *Secret treaties of Austria-Hungary*, pp. 3-11.

**Effect of Russo-Japanese War on European balance of power.**—Triple Entente, a counterpoise.—The Dual Alliance (France and Russia) "was the inevitable outcome of the existence and power of the Triple Alliance. . . . [It] grew out of the need which both Russia and France felt, of outside support in the presence of so powerful a combination. If there was to be anything like a balance of power in Europe, Russia and France must combine."—C. D. Hazen, *Modern Europe*, p. 685.—That balance was seriously disturbed for a time by Russia's defeat in the war with Japan in 1904-1905. The Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France in 1904 can hardly be said to have restored that balance, for the agreement contained no defensive provisions. It was not until the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 that a possible counterpoise of the Triple Alliance was created. The German declarations of war against Russia and France in 1914 converted the Entente into a solid alliance. See WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: c.

**Break-up of Triple Alliance.**—**Secession of Italy.**—"The lack of dexterity shown by our [German] diplomacy—where could all the high-horn Borussen and Saxo-Borussen be expected to learn skill in business!—the defects of our diplomacy are constantly made good by the weight of the army, standing in the background. . . . Thus in all the conflicts of recent years Germany, in union with Austria and Italy, has come out quite well in the end, and her allies, relying on the power of Germany, have been able to bear home spoil, with which it would scarcely be proper to compare the acquisitions of the Triple Alliance. Was Austria not able in 1908 to bag Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fat morsel of more importance than twenty Moroccos? Was Italy not able to appropriate without a European conflict Tripoli and the Ægean islands. . . . In addition to the open door in Morocco, which is of more value than any costly rights of possession demanding the expenditure of blood, have we not got into the bargain a considerable piece of the French Congo—an exchange which cost Caillaux, the Minister respon-

sible for it, his prestige and his position, and which almost cost his wife her life? Did we not, acting with our ally Austria, achieve in her interests the great feat of gracefully turning the Montenegrins out of Scutari, which they had purchased with streams of blood, and of introducing there an international garrison? Was not the creation of that mannikin-kingdom of Albania, . . . accomplished exclusively in the interests of our allies Austria and Italy? Were we not able to complete with England and Turkey an agreement that was favourable to us in connection with Asia Minor and the Bagdad line?"—R. Grelling, *J'accuse*, pp. 72-73.—"Italy was bound by the agreement of the Triple Alliance to aid Germany and Austria in case of a defensive war. Deciding that this was offensive on the part of her allies, she abandoned them and gave her allegiance to the Entente, declaring war on her old-time enemy, Austria, on May 23d, 1915."—V. Duruy, *History of France*, p. 728.—See also ITALY: 1914: Position of Italy; WORLD WAR: 1915: IV. Italy: a.

ALSO IN: E. J. Dillon, *From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance*.—W. O. Pitt, *Italy and the unholy alliance*.

**Text of the document.**—The following is the text of the Triple Alliance published in A. F. Pribram's "Secret treaties of Austria-Hungary." The translation is by D. P. Myers and J. G. D'Arcy Paul:

#### A. First Treaty of Alliance between Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy

(Vienna, May 29, 1882)

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary, the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, and the King of Italy, animated by the desire to increase the guaranties of the general peace, to fortify the monarchical principle and thereby to assure the unimpaired maintenance of the social and political order in their respective States, have agreed to conclude a Treaty which, by its essentially conservative and defensive nature, pursues only the aim of forestalling the dangers which might threaten the security of Their States and the peace of Europe. To this end Their Majesties have appointed, to wit, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary. Count Gustavus Kálnoky, General, His Minister of the Imperial Household and of Foreign Affairs: His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, Prince Henry VII of Reuss, Aide-de-Camp General, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, His Majesty the King of Italy, Count Charles Felix Nicolis de Robilant, Lieutenant-General, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, who, furnished with full powers which have been found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and will enter into no alliance or engagement directed against any one of their States. They engage to proceed to an exchange of ideas on political and economic questions of a general nature which may arise, and they further promise one another mutual support within the limits of their own interests.

Art. 2. In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other Contracting

Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the Party attacked. This same obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of any aggression without direct provocation by France against Germany.

Art. 3. If one, or two, of the High Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on their part, should chance to be attacked and to be engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers nonsignatory to the present Treaty, the *casus foederis* will arise simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties.

Art. 4. In case a Great Power nonsignatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its Ally.

Art. 5. If the peace of any of the High Contracting Parties should chance to be threatened under the circumstances foreseen by the preceding Articles, the High Contracting Parties shall take counsel together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual co-operation. They engage henceforward, in all cases of common participation in a war, to conclude neither armistice, nor peace, nor treaty, except by common agreement among themselves.

Art. 6. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents and existence of the present Treaty.

Art. 7. The present Treaty shall remain in force during the space of five years, dating from the day of the exchange of ratifications.

Art. 8. The ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged at Vienna within three weeks or sooner if may be.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Vienna, the twentieth day of the month of May of the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two.

Kánoky.	H. VII of Reuss.	C. Robilant.
L. S.	L. S.	L. S.

**B. Additional Declaration of Italy That the Provisions of the Alliance Could Not Be Regarded as Directed against England**

(Rome, May 22, 1882)

**Ministerial Declaration**

The Royal Italian Government declares that the provisions of the secret Treaty concluded May 20, 1882, between Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, cannot, as has been previously agreed, in any case be regarded as being directed against England. In witness whereof the present ministerial Declaration, which equally must remain secret, has been drawn up to be exchanged against identic Declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary and of the Imperial Government of Germany.

Rome, May 22, 1882.  
The Royal Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
L. S. Mancini.

**C. Declaration of Austria-Hungary Similar to the Italian One**

(Vienna, May 28, 1882)

**Ministerial Declaration**

The Imperial and Royal Government declares that the provisions of the secret Treaty concluded May 20, 1882, between Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, cannot, as has been previously agreed, in any case be regarded as being directed against England. In witness whereof the present ministerial Declaration, which equally must remain secret, has been drawn up to be exchanged against identic Declarations of the Imperial Government of Germany and of the Royal Government of Italy.

The Imperial and Royal Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Vienna, May 28, 1882.

**D. Declaration of Germany Similar to the Italian One**

(Berlin, May 28, 1882)

**Ministerial Declaration**

The Imperial Government declares that the provisions of the secret Treaty concluded May 20, 1882, between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, cannot, as has been previously agreed, in any case be regarded as being directed against England. In witness whereof the present ministerial Declaration, which equally must remain secret, has been drawn up to be exchanged against identic Declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary and of the Royal Government of Italy.

Berlin, May 28, 1882.  
The Chancellor of the Empire.  
L. S. v. Bismarek.

**TRIPLE ENTENTE** (1895), the agreements concluded between England, France and Russia. See BALKAN STATES: 1014-1910; WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: e; Diplomatic background: 70; 75; 1014; IV. Turkey: d.

**TRIPLE ENTENTE.** See LITTLE ENTENTE. **TRIPLE INDUSTRIAL ALLIANCE**, Great Britain. See LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1013-1021; LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1021-1022; Great Britain; ENGLAND: 1910 (October).

**TRIPLE MONARCHY**, proposed monarchy to consist of Austria, Hungary and the kingdom of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia. See AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1000 (December); 1014 (June).

**TRIPOLI:** Geographic description.—Early history.—Under Turkish rule.—“The great territory of Tripolitania embraces what is known as the *vilayet* of Tripoli, the Fezzan to the south, and the province of Barca on the east, governed as an integral part of Turkey. The Pashalic of Tripoli includes that portion of the vilayet extending from Tunisia to the southern-most point of the Gulf of Sidra. [See AFRICA: Map.] . . . The majority of those who live in the towns of Tripolitania . . . are of the four great native races: Berbers, descendants of the original inhabitants; Arabs, progeny of those conquerors who overran the country centuries ago; the native Jew; and lastly, itinerant Blacks who migrate from the South. . . . Twelve centuries before Christ, Phœnician traders had worked their way along the southern shores of the Mediterranean. As centuries rolled by Outili (Utica) and other cities were reared, among them

Carthage and at the close of the Third Punic War, the territory we now know as Tripolitania, became a province of the Cæsars. Three cities, Leptis, Sabrata, and Oea, anciently constituted a federal union known as Tripolis, while the district governed by their Concilium Annum was called Lybia Tripolitania. [See also LEPTIS MAGNA.] On the site of Oea modern Tripoli, in Barbary, now stands. 647 A. D. saw the beginning of the great Arab invasion. . . . It broke down what was left of Roman rule, and merged the wild Berber aborigines into the great sea of Islam. Since that remote past the flags of various nations of the Cross have for brief periods flung their folds in victory over this Moslem stronghold. In the sixteenth century the Turkish Sultan, Soliman the Magnificent, drove the Knights of St. John from Tripoli, and received the submission of the Barbary States. [See BARBARY STATES: 1505-1510; 1543-1560.] In 1714 the Arabs of Tripoli gained independence from their Turkish rulers and for over a century were governed by their own bashaws. In 1835 Tripoli again came under Turkish rule.—C. W. Furlong, *Tripoli in Barbary* (*Journal of Race Development*, July, 1911).

1785-1816.—Depredations upon American commerce.—War with the United States.—Abolition of Christian slavery. See BARBARY STATES: 1785-1801; 1803-1805; 1815; 1816.

1838-1911.—Italy's desire for colonization.—German enterprises.—"Italian aspirations to a share of the lands of Northern Africa, bordering on the Mediterranean, date back to the chaotic days before unity was achieved. Even as early as 1838, only three years after Tripoli had been declared a Turkish vilayet, Massini and other Italian patriots, looking to the future, asserted that Tripoli must become an Italian colony. . . . When Italy attained to nationhood almost her first solicitude was to turn her attention to the North African littoral. The severe check to Italian ambitions administered by France in occupying Tunis, made Italian statesmen all the more determined to gain the control of Tripoli. In 1890 Crispi. [premier of Italy] resolutely set about to secure Italian sovereignty of the Barbary Coast, and by making friends with Hassuna Pasha Karamanli, the direct descendant of the old Tripolitan 'Bashaws,' took the first decisive step in behalf of Italy. . . . Toward the end of . . . [1896] the Marchese Visconti Venosta, who had taken over the direction of the Foreign Office, entered into an agreement with France regarding the revision of the treaties respecting Tunis. . . . He pointed out clearly that Italy expected compensation for this step in Tripolitana. Italy, in recognising French sovereignty over Tunis, had opened the road for her own occupation of Tripoli. . . . [By] 1911 . . . Germany had shown a singular interest in Tripolitana. A German Consulate was newly established at Tripoli, and a German line of steamers . . . made the city a regular port of call; German capital was being invested in local enterprises, and towards the end of the spring of 1911, the Italians learned that a German group was on the eve of securing considerable concessions from the Ottoman Government, which would have given the German interests essential commercial advantages in Tripoli. . . . Italy, therefore, felt justified in seizing the occasion to vindicate her claims to Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. Italian grievances against Turkish rule in Tripolitana were numerous. . . . The new Young Turk régime had made matters worse rather than better. . . . On July 20, 1911, the Italian Government instructed its representa-

tives abroad that, unless there was an improvement in their relations with Turkey regarding Tripoli, Italy would take action."—W. K. Wallace, *Greater Italy*, pp. 114-118.—See also TURKEY: 1911-1912.

1911-1913.—Italian war with Turkey.—Treaty of Lausanne.—"The first of the Young Turks' external calamities came from Italy. . . . In 1911 the Rome government having made sure of the diplomatic situation and being well informed as to the blunders of the new régime at Constantinople, on September 26, demanded the right to occupy Tripoli 'under the suzerainty of the Sultan.' A forty-eight-hour time limit was set to these demands. The Turks rejected them with fury. The Italians declared war, took Tripoli by force, and their navy prevented any successful effort by the Turks to save the isolated province. The Moorish tribes of the interior indeed made much trouble for the invaders, and out of regard for Austria Italy refrained from any serious attacks upon the Ottoman territories in Europe and Asia; nevertheless the utter weakness of the Young Turkish régime was advertised to the world. After vain procrastination the Porte signed the Treaty of Lausanne with Italy, October 18, 1912, by which the Ottomans relinquished the last of their African possessions."—W. S. Davis, *Short history of the Near East*, pp. 367-368.—"Early in January, 1913, the Italians resumed their forward movement for the occupation of the interior of Tripolitania. Without great difficulty, though at the cost of great hardships to the troops, the Italian forces pushed their way through Zintan, Fessato, and Nalut to the Tunisian border and south to Ghadames, which was entered by Captain Pavone on April 27. At the same time other columns were pressing south through Misna and Socna to the Fezzan and Murzuk which was occupied in the fall of the same year. And practically all of Tripolitania proper has . . . passed under Italian control."—N. D. Harris, *Intervention and colonization in Africa*, p. 305.—See also ITALY: 1911-1912.

1915-1922.—Railroads.—Pacification of the country.—Economic conditions.—Education.—"Since 1915 there have been built in Tripolitania about 150 miles of railway of the standard gauge (about four feet) adopted by almost all railways in the African continent. The Tripoli Railway System connects with the new harbor, also built by Italy, and in North Africa second only to Alexandria and Port Said. . . . Since the spring of 1922 the whole western half of Tripolitania has been carefully raked and cleaned, all rebels disarmed, contrabands suppressed, and the Berber tribes . . . reinstated on their lands and in their homes. The whole country has been thoroughly pacified. In this work both Erythrean and Libyan troops have served successfully and efficiently under Italian officers. . . . Italy is a compact nation of 40,000,000 people, rapidly increasing in numbers and wealth; while the inhabitants of Tripolitania may at the utmost number 500,000, of whom 300,000 living in the seacoast oases are peaceful and law-abiding agriculturists, who have nothing to lose and everything to gain by the advent of Italian colonists who do not covet their land. The 200,000 population of the interior is divided into tribes that have been incessantly fighting and robbing each other since even before the times of Cæsar. Depending on trade with the coast for such necessary commodities as tea, sugar, cotton, goods, etc., and unable to market their dates and wool except by way of the coast,

they have an economic interest to be at peace with Italy. [By the end of 1922] wherever a few Italians lived, Arab youngsters [had learned] . . . to speak Italian; while many Italian workmen and agriculturists . . . (had picked) up the Arab tongue, the study of which [was] compulsory in . . . [Italian] schools. Similarly in the Arab schools the study of Italian . . . [was] compulsory."—E. O. Fenzi, *Italy, at home and abroad (Outlook, Feb. 21, 1923)*.—On September 12, 1910, as a result of the treaty of 1915, the frontier was altered so that it extended in a curve from west of Ghadames to south of Tummo.

**TRIPOLI**, Syria, town in Asiatic Turkey on the river Abu-Ali about two miles from the port Al-Mina. It was captured by the Crusaders in 1109, ravaged by the Carismians in 1244 and recaptured by the sultan of Egypt in 1289. See **CRUSADES**: 1104-1111; **JERUSALEM**: 1100; 1244.

1918.—Captured by the British. See **WORLD WAR**: 1918: VI. Turkish theater: c, 13; c, 23.

**TRIPONTIUM**, town in Roman Britain, where one of the great roads crossed the Avon, near modern Lilburne.—Based on T. Wright, *Celt, Roman and Saxon, ch. 5*.

**TRISAGION**, short hymn in the Eastern church. See **CONSTANTINOPLE**: 511-512.

**TRI-SKELION, GAMMADION, FYLFOT-CROSS, SWASTIKA**.—"One of the most remarkable instances of the migration of a symbol is that afforded by the 'tri-skelion,' or, as we more familiarly know it, 'the three legs of Man.' It first appears on the coins of Lycia, circa B. C. 480; and then on those of Sicily, where it was adopted by Agathocles, B. C. 317-307, but not as a symbol of the morning, midday, and afternoon sun, but of the land of Trinacria, i. e., 'Three Capes,' the ancient name of Sicily; and finally on the coins of the Isle of Man, on which it seems to refer rather to the position of that island between England, Scotland, and Ireland, than to its triangular shape. The tri-skelion of Lycia is made up of three cocks' heads. . . . But on the coins of Sicily and of the Isle of Man the tri-skelion consists of three human legs of an identical pattern, excepting that those of the latter island are spurred. This form of tri-skelion is borne on the arms of several old English families, and it was in all probability first introduced into this country [England] by some Crusader returning from the East by way of Sicily. . . . The tri-skelion is but a modification of the 'gammadion' or 'lyllot-cross,' the 'svastika' of the Hindus. The latter was long ago suspected by Edward Thomas to be a sun-symbol; but this was not positively proved until Mr. Percy Gardner found a coin of the ancient city of Mesembria in Thrace stamped with a gammadion bearing within its open centre an image of the sun—Mesem meaning the city of 'Mid-day,' and this name being figured on some of its coins by the decisive legend  $ME\S\text{A}$ . . . . The gammadion has travelled further afield than any other symbol of an Itiquy. . . . Count Goblet d'Alviella traces it back at last to the Troad as the cradle of its birth, some time anterior to the 13th century B. C."—*Athenaeum, Aug. 13, 1892 (Reviewing Comte Goblet d'Alviella's "La migration des symboles")*.—The swastika appeared first in the Bronze Age, and has been found in the Swiss lake dwellings, but its origin appears to have been in the Caucasus. It was used as a sacred symbol in India by both Jainism and Buddhism, and it was probably through Buddhism that it was introduced to China, Japan, and Tibet. It is found also, in the historic period, in Armenia, Asia Minor, Korea,

Greece, Italy, France, Germany, Russia, Scandinavia, Great Britain, Mexico, and North and South America in Indian mounds.

**TRITAEA**, ancient city in the southern part of Achaia. It was a member of the Achaean League. See **ACHAEAN LEAGUE**.

**TRITTYES**, political division of the four tribes or phylæ of the Greek state. See **PHYLÆ**.

**TRIUMPH AND OVATION**, Roman.—"The highest reward of the commander was the triumphal entrance. At first it was awarded by senate and people to real merit in the field, and its arrangement was simple and dignified; but soon it became an opportunity of displaying the results of insatiable Roman rapacity and love of conquest. Only the dictators, consuls, praetors, and, in late republican times, occasionally legates, were permitted by the senate to enter Rome in triumph, the permission to the legate being granted only in case he had commanded independently ('suis auspiciis'), and conducted the army to Rome from a victorious campaign 'in sua provincia.' As in later times it was impossible to conduct the whole army from distant provinces to Rome, the last-mentioned condition was dispensed with, the claim of the commander to a triumph being acknowledged in case of one of the battles gained by him 5,000 enemies had been killed. The senate granted the expenses necessary for the procession after the quaestor urbanus had examined and confirmed the commander's claim. Streets and squares through which the procession had to pass were festively adorned. The temples were opened, and incense burnt on the altars. Improvised stands were erected in the street, filled with festive crowds shouting 'Io triumphe!' The commander, in the meantime, collected his troops near the temples of Bellona and Apollo, outside the gates of Rome. . . . The victor was met at the 'porta triumphalis' by the senate, the city magistrates, and numerous citizens, who took the lead of the procession, while lictors opened a way through the crowd. After the city dignitaries followed tibicines, after them the booty. . . . Fettered kings, princes, and nobles followed, doomed to detention in the Mamertine prison. Next came sacrificial oxen with gilt horns, accompanied by priests; and, finally, preceded by singers, musicians, and jesters, the triumphal chariot drawn by four horses. Clad in a toga picta and the tunica palmata, temporarily taken from the statue of the Capitoline Jupiter, the triumphator stood in his chariot holding the eagle-crowned ivory sceptre in his hand, while a servus publicus standing behind him held the corona triumphalis over his head. The army brought up the rear of the procession, which moved from the Campus Martius through the circus of Flaminius to the Porta Carmentalis, and thence, by way of the Celabrum and the Circus Maximus, the Via Sacra and the Forum, to the Capitol. Here the triumphator deposited his golden crown in the lap of the Capitoline Jupiter, and sacrificed the usual suovetaurilia. . . . The ovatio was granted for less important conquests, or to a general for victories not won 'suis auspiciis.' The victor, adorned with the toga praetexta and the myrtle crown, originally used to walk; in later times he rode on horseback."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans, sect. 100*.—See also **VIA SACRA**; **RECREATION**: B. C. 100-A. D. 400.

**TRIUMVIRATE**, First and Second. See **ROME**: Republic: B. C. 63-58; 57-52; 44-42.

**TRIVIUM**, in medieval schools, part of the curriculum which included grammar, rhetoric and logic. See **EDUCATION**: Modern: 14th-16th centuries:

Brethren of the Common Life; 16th century: Melancthon; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: Nature of medieval universities.

**TROCHAS**, Spanish term applied to military entrenchments or fortified lines. See CUBA: 1895-1898.

**TROIA**. See TROY.

**TROIS ÈVÈCHES**, district formed from the three bishoprics, Toul, Metz and Verdun. France took possession of it in 1552. It was secured to her in 1648 and 1680. See FRANCE: 1547-1559; 1670-1681; WESTPHALIA, PEACE OF.

**TROISVILLE**, Battle of. See FRANCE: 1794 (March-July).

**TROIZEN**, ancient city in Peloponnesus, Greece, about thirty-nine miles southwest of Athens. In 243 B. C. the city joined the Achæan League. See GREECE: B. C. 280-146.

**TROJAN WAR**. See TROY: Story of the Trojan War; ACHILLES; GREECE: Indo-European migrations.

**TROLLEY CARS**. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Electric power.

**TROMP**, Cornelius Van (1629-1691), Dutch admiral. Commanded a squadron against the Barbary pirates, 1648; defeated by the English at Solebay, 1665; became lieutenant-admiral-general of the United Provinces, 1676. See NETHERLANDS: 1665-1666; 1672-1674.

**TROMP**, Martin Harpertzoon (1597-1653), Dutch admiral. Gained two victories over the Spaniards, 1639; defeated by the English, 1652; but gained victories over them in 1652 and 1653. See NETHERLANDS: 1625-1647.

**TROPAION**, the trophy erected by a victorious army, among the Greeks, on the spot from which the enemy had been driven. The trophy was constructed in some manner out of the booty taken.—Based on E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 54.

**TROPPEAU**, Congress of (1820). See VERONA, CONGRESS OF; AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: Congresses: 3.

**TROTHA**, Lothar von (1848- ), governor of Southwest Africa, 1904-1905. See SOUTHWEST AFRICA, PROTECTORATE OF: 1905.

**TROTSKY**, Lev (Leiba Bronstein) (1877- ), Russian communist leader. Exiled to Siberia, 1901, but escaped, 1902; organized the secret conference held at Troppau by the Russian revolutionary organizations abroad, 1912; one of the organizers of the Bolshevik rising, July, 1917; president of the Petrograd Soviet, 1917; minister of foreign affairs, November, 1917 to March, 1918; minister of war since 1918; organized and became commander-in-chief of the Red army. See RUSSIA: 1917 (October-November); 1918-1919; WORLD WAR: 1917: III. Russia and the Eastern front: n; p; q; 9, 5; LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1917-1921; BOLSHIEVSKI: Development, etc.; BREST-LITOVSK: Treaties, 1918; U. S. A.: 1917 (June): American mission, etc.

**TROTULA** (fl. 1050), woman physician. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Medieval: 10th-12th centuries.

**TROUBADOURS**, **TROUVÈRES**, **JOGLARS**, **JONGLEURS**.—"The poets of the South of France during the Middle Age called themselves 'Trobadors,' that is to say, 'inventors' or 'finders'; and they adapted the 'langue d'oc,' also called the Romansh of the South, or the Provençal, to the expression of poetical sentiments. It is probable that poets of this description existed as early as the formation of the idiom in which they wrote. At any rate, we know that toward the year 1000 they already enjoyed considerable distinction, although there is scarcely now anything left us from the earliest period of their existence. . . . In regard to

the time within which the poetry of the Troubadours was in vogue, M. Fauriel assumes only two periods. But it may perhaps be more conveniently divided into three, as follows: The first commences with its origin, as a popular poetry, and extends to the time when it became an art and a profession, the poetry of the nobles and the courts, that is to say, from about 1090 to 1140. The second is the period of its culmination, which extends from the year 1140 to 1250. The third is the period of its decadence, from 1250 to 1290."—G. J. Adler, *Introduction to Fauriel's "History of Provençal poetry."*—"Sufficient has been said . . . to show the superiority of lyrical over epic poetry in Provence. This inequality of the two branches implied a commensurate difference of praise and social esteem awarded to those who excelled in either of them, and it is perhaps from this point of view that the two great divisions of poets in the 'langue d'oc,' respectively described as 'joglars' and 'troubadors,' or, in the French and generally adopted form of the word, 'troubadours,' may be most distinctly recognised. . . . It seems sufficiently established that the verb 'trobar' and its derivative noun first and foremost apply to lyrical poetry. To speak therefore of the Troubadour as the singer of songs, of cancos and sirventeses and albas and retroensas is a correct and tolerably comprehensive definition."—F. Hueffer, *Troubadours*, ch. 6.—"In the twelfth century, the Romance-Wallon [or the 'langue d'oïl' of northern France] became a literary language, subsequent, by at least a hundred years, to the Romance-provençal. . . . The reciters of tales, and the poets, giving the name of Troubadour a French termination, called themselves Trouvères. With the exception of the difference of language, it may be thought that the Troubadour and the Trouvère, whose merit was pretty nearly equal; who were equally ignorant or well-informed; who both of them spent their lives at courts, at which they composed their poems, and where they mingled with knights and ladies; and who were both accompanied by their jongleurs and minstrels, should have preserved the same resemblance in their productions. Nothing, however, can be more dissimilar than their poems. All that remains of the poetry of the Troubadours is of a lyrical character, while that of the Trouvères is decidedly epic. . . . The Trouvères have left us many romances of chivalry, and fabliaux."—J. C. L. S. de Sismondi, *Literature of the south of Europe*, v. 1, ch. 7.—"We know nothing of the rise or origin of the two classes of Trouveurs and Jongleurs. The former (which it is needless to say is the same word as Troubadour, and Trobador, and Trovatore) is the term for the composing class, the latter for the performing one. But the separation was not sharp or absolute."—G. Saintsbury, *Short history of French literature*, bk. 1, ch. 1.—See also FRENCH LITERATURE: 1050-1350; MUSIC: Folk music and nationalism: Italy; Medieval: 12th century.

**TROUSDALE**, William (1700-1872), American major-general. Governor of Tennessee, 1849-1851. See TENNESSEE: 1834-1856.

**TROUT NATION**, North American Indian tribe. See SIQUAN FAMILY.

**TROUVÈRES**. See TROUBADOURS.

**TROY**: Geography of the Troad.—Scene of Homeric legends.—Discoveries of Schliemann and Dörpfeld.—The northwestern promontory of Asia Minor, known as the Troad, or land of Troy, is bounded on the north by the Hellespont and the Propontis, on the west by the Ægean sea, on



the south by the Gulf of Adramytheum, and on the east by the mountain range of Ida. "The springs of the Ida range collect into rivers, of which two flow to the Propontis, and one, the Scamander, into the Ægean. The latter first flows through his bed high in the mountains, through which he then breaks in a narrow rocky gorge, and quitting the latter enters the flat plain of his watershed, surrounded on three sides by gentle declivities, and open on the West to the sea. . . . In the innermost corner of this plain projects a rocky height with precipitous sides, as if it would bar the passage of the river breaking forth from the ravine. Skirted in a wide curve by Scamander on the East, it sinks to the West in gentle declivities, where numerous veins of water spring from the earth; these unite into two rivulets, distinguished by the abundance and temperature of their water, which remain the same at all seasons of the year. This pair of rivulets is the immutable mark of nature, by which the height towering above is recognized as the citadel of Ilium."—E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, bk. 1, ch. 3.—The Troad owes its fame and its never-dying interest to the Homeric poems and legends. (See ASIA MINOR: B. C. 1100.) "In the days when Crete was first receiving metal (after 3000 B. C.), there arose at the northwest corner of Asia Minor a shabby little Late Stone Age village known as Troy. It was probably built by traders attracted by the profitable traffic which was already crossing back and forth between Asia and Europe at this point. By 2500 B. C., some centuries after the first metal had been introduced, the rulers of Troy were wealthy commercial kings, and their castle was the earliest fortress in the Ægean world, for it was a thousand years older than the fortresses at Mycenæ and Tiryns. During this thousand years (2500 to 1500 B. C.) Troy was rebuilt several times, but it continued to flourish, and it finally must have controlled a kingdom of considerable extent in northwestern Asia Minor. Thus about 1500 B. C. the splendid and cultivated city of Troy was a powerful stronghold. . . . The discoverer of the Ægean civilization [see ÆGEAN CIVILIZATION: Excavations and antiquities: Mycenaean area] . . . was Heinrich Schliemann. Schliemann was an American citizen of German birth. [His American citizenship was merely accidental, due to the fact that he happened to be in California when it was admitted to statehood.] In his youth before coming to America he had a romantic business career. After being shipwrecked on the coast of Holland, he began his business experience there while a mere lad, as a clerk in a little grocer's shop. In the brief intervals of leisure between dealing out smoked herring and rolls of butter, he taught himself Greek and began to read Homer. In the infatuated ears of this enthusiastic boy the shouts of the Greek heroes on the plain of Troy mingled with the jingle of small change and the rustle of wrapping paper in the dingy little Dutch grocery. He had not lost this fascinating vision of the early world, when years afterward he retired from business, after having won a large fortune in Russian petroleum. It was therefore as the fulfillment of a dream of his youth that Schliemann led a body of Turkish laborers to begin excavations in the great mound of Troy in 1870. In less than four years he uncovered the central portions of nine successive cities, each built upon the ruins of the next city beneath, which had preceded it. A towered gateway in the Second City contained a splendid treasure of golden jewelry, and Schliemann be-

lieved that he had here discovered the Troy of Homer's Greek heroes. But we now know that this Second City was built a thousand years before Homer's Troy (the Sixth City)."—J. H. Breasted, *Ancient times; A history of the early world*, pp. 238-239, 245-246.—There had been great discussion with regard to the exact site of ancient Ilium, even to the last decade of the nineteenth century. Hissarlik and Bunárbashi were the leading claimants, with the balance of opinion in favor of the latter. "Dr. Schliemann commenced his famous excavations on the mound of Hissarlik in 1871, believing that here would be found the site of ancient Troy rather than on the *Balidagh*. The mound of Hissarlik confessedly occupied the site of new Ilium, but most modern scholars, with the exception of Grote, had partly followed Demetrius of Scepsis, who denied that New Ilium was on the site of Old Ilium. . . . Modern scholars saw the site of Troy in the ruins of Balidagh half-an-hour above Bunárbashi. Schliemann followed the local tradition and excavated at New Ilium from 1871 to 1879. He found great fortification walls and gates, but what he declared to be the palace was only an assemblage of petty dwelling-houses with small rooms and thin walls. In 1882 in the second stratum from the bottom were found the strong walls of extensive buildings, afterwards proved through the analogous structures at Tiryns and Mycenæ to have been the principal chambers of a palace."—W. Ridgeway, *Early age of Greece*, v. 1, p. 42.—"In 1882 Schliemann . . . resumed his excavations, in company with a German architect, Dr. Dörpfeld, whose help was of the greatest value. Schliemann himself was no architect, and was not even a scientifically-trained observer. His natural commonsense stood him in good stead. But he was often too downright in his methods, and might at times be accused of vandalism in the pursuit of his end—the discovery of the Heroic civilization of Greece. He cut through everything ruthlessly to get down to the stratum he wanted. Dörpfeld was a guarantee of more scientific methods, necessary on a site like Troy, with its superimposed strata of different ages of settlement very different from the simple grave-clearing at Mycenæ. The result of the renewed work was eventually the discovery of the 'Mycenaean' city of Troy. This, however, was not the work of Schliemann, but of Dörpfeld, and the discovery was not communicated to the world till the 'nineties—after Schliemann's death."—M. R. Hall, *Ægean archaeology*, pp. 17-18.—"With regard to the discoveries at Hissarlik, it must in this place suffice to say that the main result as regards the Iliad is this: first, that evidence for the historical reality of a siege of Troy by the Achæans is now greatly strengthened; and secondly, that the account of it given in the Iliad is at best based upon vague tradition."—W. Leaf, *Introduction to C. Schuchhardt, Schliemann's excavations*, p. xxxi.

Also ix: T. D. Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age*.—H. Schliemann, *Troy and its remains*.

Story of the Trojan War.—"In mythological chronology the war of the Epigoni immediately precedes the expedition against Troy, whose legend forms the termination of the Heroic Age. While it was the last, it was also the greatest of all the heroic achievements. It formed the subject of innumerable epic poems, and has been immortalized by the genius of Homer. Paris, son of Priam, king of Ilium or Troy, abused the hospitality of Menelaus, king of Sparta, by carrying off his wife Helen, the most beautiful woman of the age. All the Grecian princes looked upon

the outrage as one committed against themselves. Responding to the call of Menelaus, they assemble in arms, elect his brother Agamemnon, king of Mycenae, leader of the expedition, and sail across the Ægean in nearly 1200 ships to recover the faithless fair one. Several of the confederate heroes excel Agamemnon in fame. Among them Achilles, chief of the Thessalian Myrmidons, stands pre-eminent in strength, beauty, and valour, while Ulysses, king of Ithaca, surpasses all the rest in the mental qualities of counsel, subtlety and eloquence. Thus, though by opposite endowments, these two heroes form the centre of the group. Next to them . . . [came] the aged Nestor, king of Pylus, distinguished for his wisdom and experience; the valiant Diomedes, king of Argos, son of Tydeus, slain at Thebes, and one of the Epi-goni; the Telamonian Ajax, of Salamis, who, though somewhat heavy and unwieldy, is next to Achilles in person and fighting power; and lastly, Idomeneus of Crete, a grandson of Minos. Among the Trojans, Hector, one of the sons of Priam, is most distinguished for heroic qualities, and forms a striking contrast to his handsome but effeminate brother Paris. Next to Hector in valour stands Aeneas, son of Anchises and Aphrodite (Venus). Even the gods take part in the contest, encouraging their favourite heroes, and sometimes fighting by their side or in their stead. It is not till the tenth year of the war that Ilium yields to the inevitable decree of fate, and it is this year which forms the subject of the Iliad. Achilles, offended by Agamemnon, abstains from the war, and even entreats his mother Thetis to obtain from Jove victory for the Trojans. In his absence the Greeks are no match for Hector. The Trojans drive them back into their camp, and are already setting fire to their ships, when Achilles gives his armour to his friend Patroclus, and allows him to charge at the head of the Myrmidons. Patroclus repulses the Trojans from the ships, but the god Apollo is against him, and he falls under the spear of Hector. Desire to avenge the death of his friend proves more powerful in the breast of Achilles than anger against Agamemnon. He appears again in the field in new and gorgeous armour, forged for him by the god Hephaestus (Vulcan) at the prayer of Thetis. The Trojans fly before him; and although Achilles is aware that his own death must speedily follow that of the Trojan hero, he slays him in single combat. The Iliad closes with the burial of Hector. The death of Achilles and the capture of Troy were related in later poems, as well as his victories over Penthesilea, queen of the Amazons, and Memnon, king of Ethiopia. The hero of so many achievements perishes by an arrow, shot by the unwarlike Paris, but directed by the hand of Apollo. The noblest combatants had now fallen on either side, and force of arms had proved unable to accomplish what stratagem at length effects. It is Ulysses who now steps into the foreground and becomes the real conqueror of Troy. By his advice a wooden horse is built, in whose inside he and other heroes conceal themselves. The infatuated Trojans admit the horse within their walls. In the dead of night the Greeks rush out and open the gates to their comrades. Ilium is delivered over to the sword, and its glory sinks in ashes.—W. Smith, *General history of Greece*, pp. 22-23.—See also MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 3; PALLADIUM; also HOMER AND THE HOMERIC POEMS.

**Roman Ilium.**—The burnt city.—According to the legend Ilium immortalized by Virgil, the great an-

cestor of the founders of Rome was Æneas, who escaped from the destruction of Troy to found a state in Latium. Belief in the story caused the Romans to regard Troy with great veneration; and many of their rulers and leading men visited the site as pilgrims. Under the usurped rule of Sulla, Ilium, the city founded by Rome on the accepted site of the old Troy, was adorned with magnificent temples. Cæsar also paid great attention to Ilium, and is reported to have conceived the plan of making that city the great residential centre of the Roman Empire. After Constantine, who had some thought of making Ilium his capital, transferred his choice to Byzantium, the city was neglected, and finally fell into complete ruin. "On the top of a hillock which sustains no less than nine successive settlements stands Roman Ilium with a marble temple of Athena. Next beneath it lie two Hellenic villages which flourished between 1000 B. C. and the Christian era. The sixth city from the bottom is now widely accepted as Homer's Troy. It has a mighty circuit wall, with imposing towers, and is built of massive ashlar masonry. Its area is about two and a half times as great as that of the Second City and it flourished in the latter half of the second millennium B. C. Immediately below this stratum are the remains of three prehistoric settlements, with unimportant houses of stone and brick built on and with the ruins of the Second City and covering the period of *circa* 2000-1500 B. C. Archæologists were especially interested in the discovery of the Second or Burnt City, which antedates Homeric Troy by as many years as separated the latter from classical times. It was a small fortress, not more than one-third the size of the Acropolis at Athens, but well built with stout walls of stone surmounted by brick. At this level was unearthed an extraordinary mass of treasure, including silver jars, gold daggers, and diadems of pure gold, one of which was woven of more than 16,000 rings and leaves—a Crown jewel indeed. The Burnt City had a chequered career, for during an existence of about 500 years, 2500-2000 B. C., it was attacked and destroyed three times. Its predecessor was an unimportant primitive settlement, with walls of small quarry stones and clay, built upon the virgin rock."—C. H. and H. Hawes, *Crete, forerunner of Greece*, pp. 6-7.

**TROYES, Treaties of** (1420, 1564). See FRANCE: 1417-1422; 1563-1564.

**TROYON, Constant** (1810-1865), French painter. See PAINTING: Europe (19th century).

**TROYON**, fort about ten miles south of Verdun. It was captured by the Germans in 1914. See WORLD WAR: 1914; Western front: s, 2; s, 5.

**TRUAX VS. CORRIGAN**. See SUPREME COURT: 1921-1922.

**TRUCE, Sacred**. See SACRED TRUCE.

**TRUCE, Thirty years'**. See GREECE: B. C. 449-445.

**TRUCE OF GOD.**—"The extraordinary institution is the most speaking witness, at once to the ferocity of the times [eleventh century], and also to the deep counter feeling which underlay men's minds. Clergy and laity alike felt that the state of things which they saw daily before their eyes was a standing sin against God and man, repugnant alike to natural humanity and to the precepts of the Christian religion. States were everywhere so subdivided, governments were everywhere so weak, that, in most parts of Europe, every man who had the needful force at his command simply did that which was right in his own eyes. . . . Every man claimed the right of private war

against every other man who was not bound to him by some special tie as his lord or his vassal. And the distinction between private war and mere robbery and murder was not always very sharply drawn. . . . A movement on behalf of peace and good will towards men could not fail in those days to assume an ecclesiastical form. As of old the Amphiktyonic Council, the great religious synod of Greece, strove to put some bounds to the horrors of war as waged between Greek and Greek, so now, in the same spirit, a series of Christian synods strove, by means of ecclesiastical decrees and ecclesiastical censures, to put some bounds to the horrors of war as waged between Christian and Christian. . . . The movement began in Aquitaine [1034], and the vague and rhetorical language of our authority would seem to imply that all war, at any rate all private war, was forbidden under pain of ecclesiastical censures. It must not be forgotten that, in that age, it must have been exceedingly difficult to draw the distinction between public and private war. . . . But the doctrine, hard as it might be to carry out in practice, was rapturously received at its first announcement. As the first preaching of the Crusade was met with one universal cry of 'God wills it,' so the Bishops, Abbots, and other preachers of the Truce were met with a like universal cry of Peace, Peace, Peace. Men bound themselves to God and to one another to abstain from all wrong and violence, and they engaged solemnly to renew the obligation every five years. From Aquitaine the movement spread through Burgundy Royal and Ducal. But it seems to have been gradually found that the establishment of perfect peace on earth was hopeless. After seven years from the first preaching of peace, we find the requirements of its apostles greatly relaxed. It was found vain to forbid all war, even all private

war. All that was now attempted was to forbid violence of every kind from the evening of Wednesday till the morning of Monday. It was in this shape that the Truce was first preached in northern and eastern Gaul. The days of Christ's supper, of His passion, of His rest in the grave and His resurrection, were all to be kept free from strife and bloodshed."—E. A. Freeman, *Norman conquest*, v. 2, ch. 8, sect. 2.—See also FEUDALISM: Disastrous effect of private wars.

ALSO IN: P. Schaff, *History of the Christian church*, v. 4, ch. 6, sect. 78.

TRUCELESS WAR (241-238 B.C.). See CARTHAGE: B.C. 241-238.

TRUCKS, Motor. See AUTOMOBILES: 1858-1919; also WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: V. Moving men and material: d.

"TRUE" CROSS. See JERUSALEM: 615; 628-637; 1099; ROME: Medieval city: 565-628.

TRUE INSPIRATION SOCIETY. See AMANA COMMUNITY.

TRUE TEMPERANCE ASSOCIATION: England. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: England: 1909: Organization of the True Temperance Association.

TRUMBITCH, Ante, Jugo-Slavic statesman. President of the Jugo-Slav committee at the Corfu conference, 1917; Serbo-Croatian representative at the peace conference, 1919. See ADRIATIC QUESTION: Torre-Trumbitch Agreement; VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace; WORLD WAR: 1917: V. Balkan theater: c.

TRUMBULL, John (1756-1843), American painter. See PAINTING: American (18th-19th centuries).

TRUMBULL, Lyman (1813-1866), American jurist and political leader. Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 1848-1853; United States senator, 1855-1873.

## TRUSTS

**Definition.**—"A Trust was originally a combination of a number of companies through a board of trustees to whom the shareholders assigned their shares in exchange for trust certificates. This special form of industrial organization which is now illegal in the United States, except in Massachusetts, has given the popular name to the general movement of industrial combination which includes a great variety of structures. The prominence of the Standard Oil, Sugar, and Whiskey Trusts made the name familiar and it passed over to the companies which were formed to replace the 'trusts' declared illegal in 1892. From that to the whole problem of industrial organization was an easy step, and everyone speaks of the trust problem, the trust danger, including forms as various as the Beef Trust, the Westphalian Coal Kartell or Messers. J. & P. Coats. The one common point about all forms is the combination of several capitalists who formerly operated singly; beyond that the structure may vary infinitely, it may be in intention permanent or temporary, it may be for all purposes, or for some only, it may include manufacturers only, or wholesalers only, or retail vendors only, or any two or all three of those classes. The object of all forms is the same, so to regulate the industry that it may become more profitable to those in whose interests it is regulated. In the words of Mr. S. C. T. Dodd, Attorney to the Standard Oil Co., a trust 'em-

braces every act, agreement, or combination of persons or capital believed to be done, made, or formed with the intent, effect, power, or tendency to monopolize business, restrain, or interfere with competitive trade, or to fix, influence or increase the price of commodities.'"—H. W. Macrosty, *Trust movement in British industry* (*Harvard Law Review*, Oct., 1893, pp. 1-2).—See also CAPITALISM.

### AUSTRALIA

1906-1910.—Industries Preservation Act.—"The Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906 as amended in 1907, 1909, and 1910, in its title provides 'for the preservation of Australian industries, for the repression of destructive monopolies.' The following extracts contain the most important provisions of the Act.

#### "Part II. Repression of Monopolies

"4. (1) Any person who, either as principal or as agent, makes or enters into any contract, or is or continues to be a member of or engages in any combination in relation to trade or commerce with other countries or among the States—(a) in restraint of or with intent to restrain trade or commerce; or (b) to the destruction or injury of or with intent to destroy or injure by means of unfair

competition any Australian industry the preservation of which is advantageous to the Commonwealth, having due regard to the interests or producers, workers, and consumers, is guilty of an offense. Penalty, £500, or, in the case of a continuing offense, £500 for each day during which the offense continues. . . .

"6. (1) For the purposes of section 4 and section 10 of this act, unfair competition means competition which is unfair in the circumstances; and in the following cases the competition shall be deemed to be unfair unless the contrary is proved: (a) If the defendant is a commercial trust. (b) If the competition would probably or does in fact result in an inadequate remuneration for labor in the Australian industry. (c) If the competition would probably or does in fact result in an inadequate remuneration for labor in the Australian industry or throwing workers out of employment. (d) If the defendant, with respect to any goods or services which are the subject of the competition, gives, offers, or promises to any person any rebate, refund, discount, or reward upon condition that that person deals, or in consideration of that person having dealt, with the defendant to the exclusion of other persons dealing in similar goods or services. (2) In determining whether the competition is unfair, regard shall be had to the management, the processes, the plant, and the machinery employed or adopted in the Australian industry affected by the competition being reasonably efficient, effective, and up to date.

"7. (1) Any person who monopolizes or attempts to monopolize, or combines or conspires with any other person to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce with other countries or among the states, is guilty of an indictable offense. Penalty, £500 for each day during which the offense continues, or one year's imprisonment, or both; or, in the case of a corporation, £1,000 for each day during which the offense continues. . . .

"7A. (1) Any person who, in relation to trade or commerce with other countries or among the states, either as principal or agent, in respect of dealings in any goods or services, gives, offers, or promises to any other person any rebate, refund, discount, concession, or reward for the reason, or upon the condition, express or implied, that the latter person (a) deals, or has dealt, or will deal, or intends to deal exclusively with any person, either in relation to particular goods or services or generally; or (b) deals, or has dealt, or will deal, or intends to deal exclusively with members of a commercial trust, . . . or (c) does not deal, or has not dealt, or will not deal, or does not intend to deal with certain persons, . . . or (d) is or becomes a member of a commercial trust, is guilty of an offense. Penalty, £500. . . . (3) It shall be a defense to a prosecution under this section, and an answer to an allegation that a contract was made or entered into in contravention of this section, if the party alleged to have contravened this section proves that the matter or thing alleged to have been done in contravention of this section was not to the detriment of the public, and did not constitute competition which was unfair in the circumstances, and was not destructive of or injurious to any Australian industry. . . .

"11. (1) Any person who is injured in his person or property by any other person, by reason of any act or thing done by that other person in contravention of this part of this act, or by reason of any act or thing done in contravention of any injunction granted under this part of this act, may, in the high court, before a justice, without a jury,

sue for and recover treble damages for the injury.

(2) No person shall, in any proceeding under this action, be excused from answering any question put either viva voce or by interrogatory, or from making any discovery of documents, on the ground that the answer or discovery may criminate or tend to criminate him; but this answer shall not be admissible in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding other than a prosecution for perjury. . . .

"17. Unfair competition has in all cases reference to competition with those Australian industries, the preservation of which, in the opinion of the comptroller general or a justice as the case may be, is advantageous to the Commonwealth, having due regard to the interests of producer, workers, and consumers."—J. W. Jenks, *Trust problem*, pp. 460-464.

1912.—Commission to deal with combinations appointed.—In 1912 an Australian interstate commission of three members was appointed, and given authority to deal with combinations in restraint of trade or commerce by unfair competition or to the detriment of the public.

ALSO IN: A. Marshall, *Industry and trade*.

## AUSTRIA

1852-1915.—Regulation of combinations.—The earliest provisions by law for restraining combinations in Austria were in 1852 and in 1870. These statutes together with the civil law have made price agreements and other trade contracts to the detriment of the public illegal. At the same time many and powerful combinations have been in existence and through selling bureaus and by division of markets have successfully controlled outputs and prices. "In 1897 the combinations among the brewers, sugar refiners and others seemed to the Government to threaten somewhat the interests of the treasury. . . . With this thought in mind the Finance Department proposed a bill placing these combinations whose goods were subject to the consumption tax under the somewhat rigid supervision of the Government, and providing that in case unreasonable measures were taken, the Government might forbid a contract or might give the fullest degree of publicity to all of the business of the combination. Owing in part to the political condition of Austria, in part also, perhaps, to the fact that the law was not more general in its application, nothing further has come of this. About the same time the Department of Trade and Industry appointed a special committee to consider the subject of the regulation of the combinations. This committee, after careful discussion of the whole question, handed in its report . . . [recommending the legal recognition of combinations under certain conditions] which would prevent abuse of the power which they undoubtedly possess. The recommendations however were not enacted into law, and the only laws against the combinations are those of the civil law and some special provisions of earlier laws of 1852 and 1870. Under these laws agreements of manufacturers for the purpose of raising the price of a commodity to the disadvantage of the public are unlawful. The courts have in several cases upheld the law and declared agreements invalid when though prices had not in fact been advanced, the intent as it appeared from the agreement being sufficient. . . . Whatever [anti-trust] agitation there may have been has been limited largely to editorials and speeches without any very effective results, except somewhat more rigid court decisions and the re-

fusal to favor the combinations, as in Germany. . . . During the [early years of] the war the Kartells . . . [were] able to carry out a regular policy of steadily increasing prices while the unorganized industries . . . [were] in many cases . . . subjected to any irregular, often extraordinary, contradictory price policy sometimes dictated by a few unimportant firms."—J. W. Jenks, *Trust problem*, pp. 232, 236, 238, 240.—The most successful combinations in the country have been those in iron, sugar and petroleum.

Also in: F. W. Hirst, *Monopolies, trusts and Kartells*.—W. Z. Ripley, *Trusts, pools and corporations*.—C. R. Van Hise, *Concentration and control*.

## CANADA

1888-1910.—*Regulation under criminal code and Customs Act*.—"The earliest serious official notice of combines [in Canada] came to light in 1888 when the House appointed a committee to examine into and report upon the effect of combines. The committee found combination to exist in the case of sugar and groceries, undertakers' supplies, cordage and binder twine, among millers, founders, confectioners, etc. Their report advised legislative action for repressing the evils arising from these and similar combinations. As a result of this report legislation was enacted which now appears as Section 408 of the Criminal Code. . . . In 1897 a further provision against the evils of combination was inserted in the Customs Act. . . . This allows the government to commission any judge of the Supreme Court or Exchequer Court of Canada or of any superior court in any Province to make an investigation and report findings when there is reason to believe that a combine is unduly enhancing prices. If the report of the judge shows that the customs duties enable a combine to injure the consumers, the Governor in Council is empowered to reduce or remove the duty on the article in question. In 1900 this law was enlarged to apply to combines resulting from a court judgment. This law was invoked once in 1901 in the case of news-print paper and the duty was reduced. What effect resulted may be gathered from the fact that prices were already lower in Canada than at other sources of supply. In 1906 an act was passed allowing the government to cancel any inland revenue license where the manufacturer holding the same employed a contract imposing a burden upon those customers who dealt also in the goods of rival firms. There is no record at hand to show that this law was invoked for any but the specific case for which it apparently was brought into being viz., the American Tobacco Company of Canada, Ltd. In the few years before the panic of 1907 there were several prosecutions under the Criminal Code, Section 408, in which convictions were secured. . . . In the first decade of the century the movement toward actual consolidation found considerable impetus. About 1910 a temporary reaction set in owing to the collapse of a few of the ventures, and it was several years before the movement toward combination was fully renewed."—R. J. McFall, *Regulation of business in Canada (Political Science Quarterly, June, 1922, pp. 178-180)*.

1909.—*Merger of Dominion Iron, Steel, and Coal Companies*.—*Cement combination*.—The following is a press dispatch from Halifax, Nova Scotia, Nov. 13, 1909: "The formation of the Canada Steel Corporation, the proposed \$70,000,000 merger of the Dominion Iron and Steel Company and the Dominion Coal Company, was made possi-

ble by the agreement of James Ross of Montreal, president of the Dominion Coal Company, to transfer to a syndicate of Toronto capitalists a portion of his holdings of the coal company stock. Final arrangements regarding the stock transfer will be made here to-day. President Ross owns coal company stock of a par value of \$5,000,000, and, although he does not dispose of all this, he is to transfer enough to give control of the coal company to the Toronto capitalists, who have already acquired a controlling interest in the steel company. The plants of the Dominion Iron and Steel Company and the Dominion Coal Company are in Cape Breton, where they give employment to thousands of men, and where they have caused little fishing villages to spring up into flourishing cities." Announcement of the completion of the merger was made in December.

1910-1912.—*Combines Investigation Act*.—*Upheld by judicial committee of Privy Council*.—*Reasons for disuse*.—"The old legislation had been aimed at conspiracies between two or more separate parties. Actual mergers were not covered by the law. To include such mergers in the provisions of the law and also to provide machinery for enforcement somewhat similar to that which was giving satisfactory results in the field of labor disputes, Mr. Mackenzie King, as Minister of Labour, introduced the Combines Investigation Act which became law in May, 1910. This included among the interdicted forms of business organization 'what is known as a trust, monopoly or merger.' The new legislation provided machinery for investigations and penalties for infractions. However, to set this machinery in motion it was necessary that six or more British subjects, residents of Canada, should state in writing to a judge that they believed that a certain combine existed and that thereby prices were enhanced or competition restricted to the detriment of consumers or producers. They must also declare themselves to be injured by the alleged combine and must set forth in writing (a) the nature of the alleged combine and the persons believed to be concerned therein; (b) the manner in which the alleged combine affected prices or restricted competition, and the extent to which the alleged combine was believed to operate to the detriment of consumers or producers. Following the receipt of such a detailed charge the judge must hold a hearing of the complaint and the defense. If upon such hearing the judge was satisfied that a combine existed which was injurious to trade or which operated to the detriment of consumers or producers, and that it was in the public interest that an investigation be held, the judge was supposed to direct an investigation under the act. The order of the judge directing the investigation was to be forwarded to the Department of Labour and the Minister thereupon was to appoint an impartial board to make a complete investigation. This board was to have full power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. However, they were not allowed to make field investigation or otherwise to make an effective audit of any books. Upon return of a verdict of guilty to the Minister of Labour the offenders were confronted with the penalty of \$1,000 a day if they still persisted in the same offense. The government also might have any protective customs tariff reduced if they saw fit."—R. J. McFall, *Regulation of business in Canada (Political Science Quarterly, June, 1922, pp. 180-181)*.—Before two years had passed after its enactment, the Combines Investigation Act was tested in the courts, "the

litigation arising out of an order granted in February [1911] . . . by one of the Quebec judges for an investigation under the act of the business of the United Shoe Machinery Company in respect of an alleged combine, in the manufacture and sale of boot and shoe making machinery. The company sought to delay and prevent investigation proceedings by raising technical and other objections to methods of procedure, and the rights of the parties to secure, as well as the powers of the government to compel an inquiry in accordance with the provisions of the statute. . . . Having exhausted the courts of the Dominion in its applications for injunctions and appeals, the company sought leave to appeal to the judicial committee of the Privy Council in England; this body, the highest and final court in the British Empire, refused to grant such leave and this admitted the rights of the applicants to an inquiry and the government's power to compel an investigation in accordance with the provisions of the statute."—W. L. M. King, *Canadian Combines Investigation Act (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1912)*.—"But there was no provision for prosecution for offense committed before the final findings of the board. At most, the offenders could be told that if they were not good in future they might be fined. As was to be expected, only one action was taken under this act and that was against a foreign corporation. In labor disputes men can readily be found to bring complaint. But for anyone who is an injured party under an alleged combine to lay information is to court reprisals, whether or not the case is successful. The case of one man in Hamilton, who laid information before the Board of Commerce and was not only openly reproved for the same by the acting chairman of the Board but dismissed from the corporation by which he was employed, was sufficient to make it plain in Canada that no relief could come from such a program. This law lay on the statute books until it was forgotten."—R. J. McFall, *Regulation of business in Canada (Political Science Quarterly, June, 1922, p. 182)*.

1919-1922.—Combindes and Fair Prices Act.—Its inadequacy.—Proposed legislation for Ontario.—Finally the Combines Investigation Act "was repealed in July, 1919, with the passage of its successor, the Combines and Fair Prices Act. . . . The new legislation under which the Board [of Commerce] acted was prepared by the former 'Acting Commissioner.' It forbade all combines, but defined a combine as any agreement, merger etc. that the Board decided was against the public interest. It also forbade prices or profits on necessities of life which the Board said were unfair, and in addition to food, fuel or clothing and their related commodities, any articles prescribed as such by the Board might also be included in the definition of 'necessaries of life.' The law gave the Board the right and duty to make preliminary inquiry and final investigation into suspected combines, on complaint or on its own initiative. However, the formalities required for bringing a complaint were as onerous as in the Combines Investigation Act which was repealed. The law under which the Cost of Living Commissioner had acted was rescinded. The provisions in the Criminal Code against combines were rendered inoperative without the written consent of the Board. No provision was made for penalty for acts committed before a hearing was held. Only ignoring or refusing to obey the orders of the Board was subject to penalty. . . . The situation at present [1922] is that there is no Board [two having

resigned], and consequently even the old Criminal Code provisions cannot be called into play by consumers, afflicted business rivals or even an Attorney-General of a Province."—*Ibid.*, pp. 205, 208.—"Before the board of commerce (appointed by the Dominion government in 1920) disbanded, it had looked into the matter of the methods of two grocers' associations, but no charge of illegality was filed. . . . Later the attorney-general of Ontario brought suit against the wholesale Grocers Association of Ontario to try to prove that the association was a combine in restraint of trade. . . . The decision here was that the attorney-general had no right to try such a case and the point as to the legality of fixing resale prices was not passed upon. The attorney-general's next move was to introduce a bill in the Ontario Legislature making it illegal for a manufacturer to have a fixed resale price on his products from wholesaler to retailer. This bill was submitted [early in 1922], . . . but because of objections from manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, it was held over . . . and it has since been decided not to put through the bill in its original form. A new bill which has been drafted, and which will no doubt be submitted at the new session of the provincial legislature permits the agent of the attorney general to examine books and records and to investigate the policies, systems, contracts, etc. of any manufacturer. If this agent thinks there is a restraint of trade, the manufacturer can then be brought to trial."—F. S. Johnson, *Ontario's new Anti-Combine Bill (Commercial Reports, Mar. 19, 1923, pp. 761-762)*.

1920.—Formation of Canadian steel trust.—There was formed in Canada in May, 1920, a steel corporation of large proportions. The new organization, known as the British Empire Steel Corporation, started out with an authorized capitalization of \$500,000,000 and an initial capital issue of \$207,000,000, the result of the merging of the Dominion Steel Corporation and its subsidiaries; the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, the Canadian Steamship Company, the Canada Foundry and Forgings, the Maritime Nail Company, the Halifax Shipyards, Ltd., the Collingwood Shipbuilding Company, the Port Arthur Shipbuilding Company, the Davie Shipbuilding and Repair Company, as well as several smaller concerns. The real strength of the merger arose out of the support given to the promoters by a strong group of British industrial interests, assuring financial success from the beginning. With its control of valuable oil fields in Newfoundland, and no less valuable coal fields in Nova Scotia, the corporation is in a position to compete on favorable terms with any other part of the world in the manufacture of steel. The control also of the Canada Steamship Company gives it the beginning of a fleet to carry ore to Nova Scotia and products to foreign ports. With raw materials at tide water, ample rail and water transportation facilities, a nucleus of iron-and-steel manufacturing units, and an abundance of British capital, the British Empire Steel Corporation may soon become a formidable competitor even of the United States Steel Corporation.

ALSO IN: F. Walker, *Policies of Germany, England, Canada and the United States toward combinations (American Academy of Political and Social Science, Publication no. 681)*.

## FRANCE

Policy toward corporate organization.—"In France the laws provide heavy penalties against

price agreements for food products. The courts have held that combinations which do not have the purpose of raising prices, but to prevent prices from falling and to regulate their fall, are lawful. . . . Also combinations which do not strive to raise prices but only to secure a market so as to put them in a position to compete with their rivals have been held to be lawful. One of the effects of the laws against combinations and agreements in France has been to drive them to secrecy, the same as in this country [United States]. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the extent to which combinations exist, but it is certain that they are wide spread. Selling bureaus have been established which receive orders and fix prices for the establishments concerned. This form of organization has not been successfully attacked in the courts. These agreements and selling agencies affect many industries, including sugar, petroleum, and porcelain."—C. R. Van Hise, *Concentration and control*, pp. 220-221.

1810-1896.—Penal code of 1810.—Effect of trade association law of 1884.—Significant cases and decisions.—Practical value of law to-day.—“The era of the Revolution was marked by the abolition of the ancient corporations, maitrises, or jurandes, and by the enactment of severe laws against combination. . . . Most of the legislation of the Revolution in this direction was of an ephemeral character, but the law against l'accapement, with less severe penalties, was embodied in the penal code of 1810, articles 410 and 420, and has continued to the present day. The more important of these articles reads as follows: ‘Art. 419. All those who by false or calumnious reports sown by design in the community, by offers of prices in advance of those asked by the vendors themselves, by union or coalition between the principal possessors of the same merchandise or commodity not to sell or to sell at a certain price only, or by whatever fraudulent ways and means, shall have effected the advance or decline of the prices of commodities or merchandise or of public securities above or below the prices which the natural and free competition of trade would have fixed, shall be punished with imprisonment of one month at least or of one year at most and with a fine of 500 francs to 10,000 francs. The culprits may, further, be placed by decree or judgment under the oversight of the superior police during two years at least and five years at most.’ The following article (420) provides heavier penalties if the commodities in question are breadstuffs, bread, or wine or other potables. Since the adoption of this code other laws of minor importance have been enacted concerning combinations under particular conditions. For our present purpose these require no notice. One law, however, not directly concerned with our subject, requires attention, because it has been declared in some quarters to abrogate articles 410 and 420 of the penal code. This is the law of March 21, 1884, concerning the establishment of trade associations. In Article 3 of this law the aim of the associations authorized is defined as follows: ‘Professional syndicates have for their exclusive aim the study and defense of economic, industrial, commercial, or agricultural interests.’ The courts have held, as seems only reasonable, that this does not permit them to violate a criminal statute from the operation of which they are not expressly excepted. One of the earliest cases involving the status of cartels under the criminal code was that of certain soda manufacturers of Marseille, which was decided in

1838. The manufacturers had formed a combination to sell all their output through the agency of one Mille, who added the precaution of hiring six factories which were not in operation, in order to prevent the re-establishment of competition. Prices were advanced about 25 per cent, although the price of the raw material had declined. The court of cassation declared briefly that this combination came within the prohibition of article 419. In a case decided in the same year the court of cassation declared that a combination of concerns in the form of a fusion or consolidation was not an illegal coalition within the meaning of that article, because a plurality of persons was necessary, and this was not found in a single juristic person (*personne morale*). In the year following (1839) an action was brought against a coach company respecting agreements as to the price of places, and the court of cassation declared that the commodities embraced in article 419 included incorporeal as well as corporeal goods. The following decision illustrates the application of the law where prices are depressed by combination. A case came before the court of cassation in 1870 concerning a combination among the manufacturers of iodine, who employed a common purchasing agent, divided up the field which supplied the raw material, and fixed the prices of the same. The court said that this was a combination ‘organized by the principal manufacturers of iodine,’ tending to give to the commodity prices above or below the course which would have been determined ‘by the free and natural competition of commerce,’ and was repugnant, therefore, to article 410 of the penal code and to article 1133 of the civil code. The earlier judgments of the French courts showed a tendency to interpret and apply article 410 in a comprehensive and effective manner. The modern tendency has been less rigorous. . . . A case of international notoriety and of some interest on account of the points of law involved, arose in connection with the famous copper corner (1887-1880) engineered by Secrétan in Paris. Appeal was taken to the court of cassation from the judgment of the court of Paris, but the same was affirmed on grounds substantially as follows: . . . One circumstance, . . . essential to the proof of a violation of the law was lacking, namely, an agreement as to the price. From the nature of the arrangement this could only exist in the assumption by Secrétan of an obligation to sell only above a certain price, and no such condition was to be found in the contracts. Hence the court concluded that the law had not been violated. A rather interesting case came up in 1802 concerning a combination of pottery manufacturers near Grenoble who had established a central selling agency. In view of the facts that the agreement was limited as to time and as to markets, that it embraced only a minority of the producers of the commodity, and that the prices had fluctuated with the market, the court concluded that the agreement was not an unlawful one under article 410. The courts do not always take this benignant attitude, even at the present day. . . . [The case of Germain-Perret in the court of Lyons, 1806, against a syndicate of dealers in aerated waters, which had advanced prices by artificial methods, was decided against the syndicate as contrary to the penal code and not exonerated by the law of 1884.] An attempt to form a monopoly contrary to article 410 of the penal code was condemned very recently in the case of the St. Astier Lime Co. This was an association ‘sous nom collectif.’ The plaintiff, Mallebray, de-

manded the dissolution of the association, on the ground that it was formed with the sole purpose of suppressing competition among the lime manufacturers of St. Astier. The defendants declared, on the other hand, that it was not an unlawful coalition, such as had formerly existed among them and had been dissolved by judicial decree [Dec. 16, 1890], but a legally organized association. This combination was condemned, nevertheless, on the ground stated in the complaint. . . . The provisions of the civil law have often been applied to industrial combinations by the courts, generally in connection with article 419 of the penal code, but sometimes independently where the penal code could have no application. . . . In considering the French law and the interpretation of the courts, the first impressions probably would be that they were characterized by uncertainty and inconsistency. It is doubtful, however, if this impression is correct. In the interpretation of the various rules established by the law, it is the effort of the courts, as has been shown by the above citations, to ascertain whether there is a combination exercising a monopoly power in a manner injurious to the consumers. . . . Duchaine complains that the law is of little practical value in view of the almost undisturbed monopoly enjoyed by the sugar and oil combinations, and Colliez calls it a 'super-annuated text,' which does not correspond to the necessities of the present day. This writer in fact says that the benevolent attitude of the courts in recent years is 'inspired perhaps by the desire to permit the French manufacturers to combat with equal weapons against their foreign competitors.'—F. Walker, *Law concerning monopolistic combinations in continental Europe (Trusts in Foreign Countries, Laws and References concerning Industrial Combinations in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and continental Europe, United States Committee on Interstate Commerce pamphlet, pp. 67-73)*.

ALSO IN: J. H. Clapham, *Economic development of France and Germany*.

### GERMANY

Corporation reforms.—Cartel and trust systems compared.—Influences of coal and coke cartels.—Thirty years ago the German people went through corporation experiences much like our own. There, as here, the corporation, as originally designed, was a mere shell. There, as here, under the shelter of that shell, the property of the country was being transferred from the German people at large, even the little they had, to the few. There, thirty years ago, as here now, great corporate scandals were exposed. And there, as here, the human nature that is everywhere behind civilization eventually began to recoil. It began there before it began here, only because conditions reached a climax there earlier than here, and because we as a people were too prosperous and too busy to look even a little way beneath the surface of things. But when the work of reform did come there, it was a genuine reform. It did not content itself with indiscriminate denunciation, or with mere lawsuits. Nor did it die out, leaving the door still open to every character of corporation the cunning of men might conceive. Before a corporation can be organized in that country, it must prove, as in a court proceeding, its rightful title to a corporate existence. In the same way it must establish the amount and the character of the capitalization it is allowed to put out. When property is turned in, its value

must be judicially ascertained. Upon officers and directors is not conferred supreme power; in the German corporation the shareholders' meeting is the counterpart of our New England town meetings—a genuine assembly intended to do something more than pass resolutions of approval. And every violation of trust, not merely to the public, but to the shareholder as well, is quickly punished with punishment that smarts. There is in the German corporation no room for one to do, with impunity, in his capacity as a corporation officer or promoter, what if done individually would land him in the penitentiary."—S. Grosscup, *Corporation and the people (Outlook, Jan. 12, 1907)*.—Industrial combinations, quite as effective as the trusts of the United States, have been created in Germany on a wholly different plan. The constituent organizations in them, of capital and industry, are simply knitted or tied together by hard and fast agreements, instead of being fused into huge corporations, as the trusts are. For the kind of covenant which unites them a military term has been borrowed, and they are called "cartels." The difference between the cartel and the trust is described by a Scottish writer, D. H. Macgregor, in his work on "Industrial combination," as follows: "The Cartel is an agreement for a time, the Trust is a permanent structure; the former is therefore a factor in industry full of speculative possibilities, both as regards its actual operation, and because the 'residual' competition of parties who break away at the end of the period is considerably to be feared. . . . The principle of the pure Cartel is compensatory action. It is an organization in which certain producers deal with themselves, and exist for that purpose in a double relation; they are producers of goods, and purchasers of their own produce. What they stand to lose in one aspect they stand to gain in the other. . . . The operation is broadly as follows. The members of the Cartel, meeting as producers in general assembly, determine a price for their product which covers cost of production, being in fact practically a competitive price. This is the base or normal price (*Richtpreis*). Thus they assure themselves, in this capacity, of adequate remuneration. They then sell to the Syndicate, that is to themselves as members of the Syndicate, for what is called the 'taking over' or 'accounting' price (*Verrechnungspreis*) which is usually on the average higher than the base price, so that they have now created for themselves as producers a 'Cartel advantage.' The Syndicate then resells to the consumer, for a price which will be as high as it can get, but which varies with the competition to be met in different parts of the market; this price (*Verkaufspreis*) may not in some cases be so high as the taking-over price, or may not exceed it by more than the margin necessary to cover the Syndicate's expenses of management. . . . It is the Syndicate which figures in the public eye; and while it itself offers no sign of monopoly profit it shelters the companies which gain by its handling of their goods. It conceals monopoly dividends."—D. H. Macgregor, *Industrial combination*.—An elaborate history and description of the "Monopolistic combinations in the German coal industry," by Francis Walker, was published for the American Economic Association in 1904. These are treated as representative, because, says Francis Walker, "the most important and fundamental of all German cartelled industries" are those in mining and metallurgy. He traces their development from a beginning in 1858, when an association of the mining interests of the mining district of Dortmund



was founded. In part, his conclusions as to the effect of the coal cartels are as follows: "The German coal cartels have not had an injurious influence, in general, on the production of coal. More particularly they cannot be accused, justly, of unduly limiting production among themselves. Nor have they attempted to accomplish the same end by crushing outside competition, by unfair methods. It would be preposterous to say that they have hindered technical progress. The cost of production, on the other hand, probably has been somewhat increased by the preservation of weak and costly mines through participation in the cartels. In regard to prices, the policy of the coal cartels, on the whole, has been moderate, taking circumstances into consideration, while the policy of the coke cartel may be fairly pronounced extortionate. The prices of coal have been more stable than they would have been under free competition; during the *hausse* they were not screwed up so high as they might easily have been, but, on the other hand, they have not declined so quickly with the *baisse*. The like may be said of the coke prices, but, at the same time, they were exorbitant considered from the point of view of costs and profits. . . . The *déroute* of the iron industry was not due to the coal or coke cartels in any important degree, *i. e.*, even with low prices, disaster to the iron industry would have been inevitable. No other industry was affected so much as iron, and it is at least very questionable whether the cartels in general (excluding the coal cartels in particular) are to be blamed for the crisis. . . . That they are to be blamed for the ill-judged over-development of certain industries, which was apparently the real cause of the crisis, does not seem to be a just conclusion. On the other hand, the cartels may be accused, with more probability of truth, of retarding the convalescence of German industry by not reducing prices, and if this is true, the coal and coke cartels are specially to blame."—F. Walker, *Monopolistic combinations in the German coal industry*, pp. 322-323.—See also CARTELS.

1896-1906.—Tendency to industrial concentration.—"The tendency to industrial concentration is shown by the returns of public companies, which point to the growing domination of large undertakings. Of 4,740 registered public companies in 1805, 13.6 per cent. had a share capital not exceeding £5,000, but in 1906, of 5,000 such companies, only 0.6 per cent. had a capital of that amount; the companies with a capital from £5,000 to £12,500 decreased from 14.0 to 10.4 per cent., and those with a capital of from £12,500 to £25,000 decreased from 16.0 to 14.2 per cent. On the other hand the companies with a capital of from £25,000 to £50,000 increased from 20.7 to 21.3 per cent.; those with a capital of from £50,000 to £250,000 increased from 28.5 to 35.0 per cent.; those with a capital of from £250,000 to £500,000 increased from 3.4 to 5.4 per cent., and those with a capital exceeding £500,000 increased from 2.0 to 4.1 per cent. In 1806 there were only two companies with a capital exceeding five millions; in 1906 there were nine such companies, and their combined capital was over seventy millions, having been more than doubled since 1806. In spite of this tendency towards the concentration of capital and the multiplication of large undertakings, however, Germany is still an interesting illustration of an industrial country which has not yet entirely gone over to the factory system of production. The handicrafts, the characteristic feature of which is the small, independent master-workman, sur-

rounded by his handful of journeymen and apprentices, contend tenaciously, yet unfortunately with only partial success, against the on-coming tide of 'great capitalism' (private joint stock, and coöperative), and the house industries continue to afford employment to a multitude of workers of both sexes, estimated at half a million."—W. H. Dawson, *Evolution of modern Germany*, pp. 50-60.

1904-1917.—German steel syndicate.—Tendency toward integration in marketing.—"The union of the leading German steel manufacturers in the steel syndicate in the year 1904 brought into existence the most comprehensive combination in the German iron industry and, next to the coal syndicate, the most powerful of all German cartels. Its organization was of the advanced cartel type; providing adequate machinery for the purposes of the combination, chief among which were limitation of production and control of price. The steel works owners became members of the Association of Steel Works Owners and at the same time stock holders of the steel syndicate, which constituted the sales and administrative agency of the combination. . . . The steel syndicate contracts, made in 1904 were to expire in three years from date of organization—so short a period that matters connected with the initial organization had scarcely been settled when the question of renewal came up for consideration. Experience of the members with the operation of the syndicate had been sufficiently satisfactory to incline them toward extension rather than toward restrained competition. . . . Nevertheless it was recognized that renewal would be effected only with difficulty and would be dependent upon the satisfactory adjustment of several important matters of controversy. . . . As is so often the case in cartel negotiations there seemed to prevail a sort of fatalistic hope that the combination would be extended eventually, even though nothing was accomplished before the last day (in this case April 30, 1907). In the course of the protracted negotiations extending from the middle of 1906, after the plan for provisional renewal had been abandoned, now the one problem, now the other seemed to dominate the situation. The less important differences were taken up first and disposed of; attention was then turned to decisive matters. But the necessary assent to extension was secured only two hours before the time limit had expired. At this time the Westphalian Steel Works Company entered. As extended, the steel syndicate was essentially the same in form as before."—H. R. Tosdal, *German steel syndicate* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Feb., 1917).—"The great Westphalian Coal Syndicate disposes of the whole output of its members, except that part which those integrated firms which are members use in their own iron and steel works. The powerful Steelworks Union, until its dissolution after the Peace of Versailles, aimed at covering all the successive processes in the steel industry except the most elaborate of all, and undertook the whole marketing of the simpler products of its members, such as blooms and rails, though with regard to their more highly finished products, such as sheets and wheels, it had to be content with regulation of output. . . . The syndicate of this kind is in theory a somewhat democratic form of organization, involving a wide diffusion of the powers of industrial government. For whereas with unfettered competition or complete amalgamation the small firm disappears altogether, in the syndicate each firm, however small and weak, receives its 'participation,' or allotted quota of the

output, and maintains its own separate existence. In practice, however, things do not always work out this way, for the stronger firms are apt sooner or later to buy up the participations of the weaker. Further, the syndicate form encourages the practice of vertical integration: for by this device the more powerful firms can avoid handing over their output to the syndicate for sale. For both these reasons there has been a tendency even in Germany for strong amalgamations, typified in English imaginations by the name of Herr Stinnes, to grow up within the walls of the Cartel and to dominate its policy. And in two of the strongest groups of German industries, the electrical and chemical groups, the Cartel form has never played a prominent part: but the powerful firms controlling them have exercised joint control over marketing, especially abroad. On the whole there can be no doubt that the integration of marketing increases the concentration of industrial power in the hands of a few persons."—D. H. Robertson, *Control of industry*, pp. 54-55.

1920.—New German industrial trusts.—Effect of World War on organization of industries.—Since the signing of the Versailles treaty Germany has been working out an entirely novel economic system along the line of greater concentration in national industries. "This system is the 'Plan Industry.' The trust or syndicate is not its only feature, but it is the dominant feature; and the union of all the trusts into a single trust is an ultimate aim. The aim was most comprehensively put by one of the original planners, Dr. Walther Rathenau, head of the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft, who counselled handling the national industry in the way in which it would be handled if a single milliardaire or 'bank purchased all the producing concerns of Germany, and set himself to combine them in a single concern.' Unnoticed by the outside world, this process of trust-creation has already gone pretty far; the three greatest branches of raw material production, coal, potash and iron, have for some time past been working as all-German trusts; coal-tar has followed; an all-German paper trust is already fully planned; and all-German trusts for textiles, chemicals, potteries, wood and about fifteen other industries, have been considered, and duly allotted their places in the all-German trust scheme. But these trusts, big as they are, do not exhaust the plan. The 'Plan Industry,' which by adopting the trust form proclaims in the interest of productive efficiency for all the unshrinking methods of uncontrolled capitalism, is to be mitigated by a separate parallel Social-organization, the function of which is to ensure a fair equilibrium between economic exigencies and social needs. Each of these two branches of the 'Plan-Industry' is highly complicated and differentiated. The typical all-German trust is not to be a simple combine of a whole branch of industry producing uniform goods. It is to ramify down into smaller trusts embracing more specialized, smaller branches; and further to have appended to it an organization for controlling the whole foreign trade in its branches and sub-branches. The parallel chain of social organizations is also to consist of numerous ramifications; all, first, on territorial lines; secondly, on the lines of division between employers and employed. Finally, the two chains of organizations—the trust organizations and the social organizations—are to meet in, and be together controlled by, a supreme representative body, the Federal Economic Council which last month (July, 1920) held its first sessions; and it already bids fair to eclipse the Reichs-

tag in all matters that concern finance, industry and trade."—R. C. Long, *All German industrial trust: A letter from Berlin (Fortnightly Review, Sept., 1920, pp. 377-378)*.

1922-1923.—Further development of trust concentration.—Effect of depreciating currency.—Industrial and political domination of corporation magnates.—"Before the war the cartels and syndicates were private enterprises, now some have been reorganized as semipublic corporations by the intervention of the Government, while others have been converted into trusts or absorbed by large concerns. . . . The best-known example of a trust is the great Stinnes concern, the most powerful of all. Three large mining and manufacturing companies, the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerk, the Deutsch-Luxemburgische Gesellschaft and the Bochumer Gusztahlverein united to form the Rhine-Elbe Union, with which were later incorporated the electrical works of the Siemens-Schuckert group and a large number of other plants, including paper mills and even news bureaus and newspapers. The Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft has absorbed a number of industrial companies and now produces everything from coal to an electric railway. Other powerful trusts are associated with the names of Wolff, Thyssen, Stumm, Kloeckner, Haniel and others. Navigation, banking and insurance are following the example set by industry, and concentration is the order of the day. This feverish activity in trust building is due to several causes. A rational readjustment of production is usually given as the principle reason for the new combinations, though it may at times be but a secondary one. . . . Other important factors are to be considered, such as the desire for power, independence, and freedom from official interference, and finally the elimination of the risk involved in the fluctuations of a depreciating currency. That risk appears to be one of the principal compelling forces in the building of trusts, while, on the other hand, the steady depreciation of currency offers an efficient protection against foreign competition in the domestic market, apart from the tariff."—J. J. Kral, *Trade associations abroad (United States Department of Commerce, Trade Association Activities, Elimination of Waste Series, 1923, pp. 315-316)*.—"During the long months of the reparations controversy facts were brought to light which laid to the door of the powerful German industrial magnates the gigantic German mark swindle which found victims not only in Germany but in other countries. The United States alone is said to have lost more than a billion dollars through the depreciation of the mark brought about by the machinations of the great corporations headed by Hugo Stinnes, long recognized as the financial and industrial dictator of the country, and now said to be aiming at political domination as well. The situation as typified in the Krupp plant at Essen has been described in the *New York Times* in an interview at Düsseldorf with Representative A. Piatt Andrew of Massachusetts formerly of the economics department in Harvard university. At the Krupp factory [see CAPITALISM: 19th-20th century], Andrews was informed that the plant had its own printing presses to print money to pay the wages of its employees. 'That chance remark is the key to the situation in the Ruhr. What Krupp has been doing, Thyssen has been doing and all the other great industrial mining magnates in the Ruhr. It is indicated by the paper money issued by scores of Ruhr firms which I obtained at the Dresdner Bank. It is evidenced also by the scores of mines and cokeries and

foundries which I saw in travelling through the Ruhr, which are producing nothing today, but in whose plants one sees vast new chimneys and factory walls rising in process of construction.' This policy of putting employes at new construction work to add to their capital and of avoiding taxation by not creating immediate income or produce that could be taxed and of paying wages in worthless currency 'seems to have been followed not only in the Ruhr, but throughout the length and breadth of Germany. The National Government . . . [said to be under the control of the industrialists] has built, extended or improved canals, railroads and public works. The municipalities and other local governments have built schools and other public buildings. Great corporations have built new factories and large foundries, improved docks, constructed ships, erected immense apartment houses, stores, office buildings and long rows of dwellings. On almost every street in German cities, and especially in industrial towns, one sees building operations going on.'—*New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1923.

1922-1923.—Franco-German combine proposal.—Steps in its realization.—"After the Wiesbaden agreement [of August, 1921, also known as the Rathenau-Loucheur Accord, providing for direct understandings without government intervention between property-owners sustaining damages and the German industrialists], there were considerable possibilities that a Franco-German industrial combination would come into existence based on the coal and iron of the Basin du Nord, the smelting furnaces and roller mills of Creusot, and the electrical technique of the A. E. G. (Allgemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft). The Rhine-Elbe Union, on the other hand, was seeking to create an Anglo-German combine for the exploitation of Russia. The French landholders and the international money houses in Paris and London largely broke down the chances of the Loucheur-Rathenau combination."—M. P. Price, *Capitalist concentration in Germany* (*Labour Monthly*, June, 1922).—Nevertheless, the idea of a Franco-German coal and iron combine was still held by many to be the only solution to troubles in Central Europe, the entire basin of the Rhine to be treated as one economic and geological unit, and coal, coke, lignite, iron and potash to be consolidated in one comprehensive industry. This would imply that the great German industrialists like Thyssen and Stinnes would have an understanding with great French industrialists like Schneider, de Lubersac and de Wendel of the Lorraine steel plants to work together for Europe. "Nearly 70 per cent of the coke used in the blast furnaces in Lorraine comes from German Westphalia. . . . At the same time the purely German plants on the East side of the Rhine cannot get along satisfactorily without large quantities of Lorraine ore. This forms a natural basis for workable commercial arrangements, and eventually such arrangements will materialize, in spite of the political obstacles which may have to be surmounted."—H. C. Estep, *New Balance of Power in European iron and steel* (*Manchester Guardian Commercial: Reconstruction in Europe*, Sept. 7, 1922, p. 434).—Late in October, 1923, a definite agreement with Otto Wolff and the Carp group was signed "by the German interests concerned and the representatives of France and Belgium. This agreement provides for gratuitous delivery of reparation coal. Negotiations are in progress with the Stinnes group. The Harpener group (coal mines) has asked to be allowed to enter into negotiations with the Inter-allied Mission."—*New*

*York Times*, Oct. 22, 1923.—On October 28, the newspapers reported that negotiations were already far advanced with the Krupp directors.

ALSO IN: J. H. Clapham, *Economic development of France and Germany*.—R. H. Fife, *German empire between two wars*.—C. R. Van Hise, *Concentration and control*.—F. H. Simonds, *Fate of Germany* (*American Review of Reviews*, Nov., 1923).

## GREAT BRITAIN

Development of industrial combinations.—Four types.—Examples of horizontal and vertical consolidations.—"The pre-war position of Trusts in Great Britain need not detain us long, not because the study is not interesting, but because most of the information is now out of date as a result of the war. . . . The causes making for trustification of industries in Great Britain are quite different from those of America and Germany. It will be better to indicate them after stating what types of combination existed in Great Britain before the war. Broadly speaking, there were four types of combinations in this country. First 'honourable' understandings, varying from informal meetings of a Chamber of Trade in a country town to fix closing hours and variations of prices of similar commodities, to tacit and informal meetings of traders to fix medium prices on certain articles such as nails, boot protectors and leather. Next we have associations, local, district or national, for the regulation of trade and the fixing of prices. These differ from the former in that they are more definite and are properly constituted with a secretary, officers, subscriptions. . . . The third type of association was the combine [or 'pool'], which was an association of a temporary nature for the fixation of prices, for the regulation of output without fixing prices, or for the determination of output and prices, or that would undertake the selling of the members' products. It is important to note that when this last phase has been reached the constituent members are still financially and technically independent. Thus a good example of this type was the Bedstead Makers' Federation formed in 1912. . . . Arrangements similar to that described above were before the war in existence in almost every large industry or trade in the United Kingdom. The National Light Castings Association had an advanced type of organization. Several associations in the non-ferrous metal industries were highly organized, so also the smelter industry, the white lead, sheet lead and lead oxide industries. The same remarks apply to the electrical industries, while the textile industries, the chemical, building, oil and petrol industries all had associations either for fixing prices or output on the combine or 'pool' type. The fourth type of association is that of the consolidation, which can be described as an association in the same type of industry, financially interlocked with a single board of directors controlling the separate units, though these might continue to trade under their original name; or, secondly, a strong association or merger, again financially a single unit, comprising unifications of businesses in different types of industry. The former are sometimes called horizontal combinations, and the latter vertical. A few examples of each of these will clear up any ambiguity in regard to their structure. The 'consolidation' type of association is usually permanent, not terminable. The 'vertical' combination is the kind of association that exists in the coal and steel industries. That is, the financial power controls all the stages of manu-

facture from the raw material or iron ore and coal to the finished product in the form of engines and bridges. Examples of this type in Great Britain will presently be described. The 'horizontal' type of consolidation is the name given to associations of a permanent character which comprise mergers of industries usually at the same stage of manufacture or in one type of industry. The textile trades have several good examples of this type of combination. In the spinning branches there are two very powerful associations, one of which is 'The Fine Cotton Spinners' and Doublers' Association, Ltd., which is an amalgamation of over forty similar concerns; the other is the 'Linen Thread Company.' Then again, in dyeing and printing both in the woollen and cotton industries we have very powerful horizontal combinations, the best known of which is the Bradford Dyers' Association, Ltd., a merger of forty-six firms. . . . One good example of the vertical and horizontal type of consolidation in the same firm is that of Palmers Shipbuilding and Iron Company, Ltd. Established in 1865 as engineers and shipbuilders for both Naval and Mercantile Marine Services, the firm has grown until it forms now a huge composite and mixed establishment. It has shipbuilding yards, engine works, iron and steel works at Jarrow and Hebburn, on the river Tyne, while at Hebburn it has a shipyard, boiler shop, foundry and important graving dock carried on by the Palmers Hebburn Company, Ltd., the whole of the shares of which are owned by the Palmers Shipbuilding Company. The Companies own extensive works and valuable sites on the Tyne, where vessels of large tonnage are built for the British Government as well as for British shipowners. It controls its own supplies of ore, smelts it, manufactures its own steel and converts it into engines of all kinds, as well as forming it into the various multitudinous shapes and conditions necessary for incorporations as passenger, refrigerated tank, cargo and oil tank steamers. The capital of the Company is well over five millions. During the war this Company alone turned out one Dreadnought battleship, one cruiser, three monitors, eighteen torpedo-boat-destroyers and two submarines, all important vessels of war. Another example of a vertical combination on a large scale in the iron, steel and shipbuilding industries is that of Vickers, which on the marine side has a magnificent shipyard and engine works at Barrow. They have a motor-car works and also works for airships and aeroplanes. In addition to the heavy steel industries as outlined above in the case of Palmers, after the war there seems to be financial interlocking and amalgamation with other firms manufacturing sewing-machines, machine-tools, heavy oil engines and electric plant, so that the total capitalization of the Company has been increased to 26½ millions. The Bradford Dyers' Association is a good example of a horizontal combination of twenty-two firms. The issued capital is £3,886,000 and debentures amount to £1,455,000. This firm and the British Cotton and Wool Dyers' Association are 'commission dyers.' This is, they execute work according to orders. We shall give examples of other horizontal groupings later on in this book. It will suffice at this stage to point out that in addition to powerful consolidations, generally of a horizontal type, in the textile industries, other examples of consolidation of both types of structure are found in entirely dissimilar classes of British industry. Two cement combinations control practically the whole industry, though there are one or two other

firms outside. All salt producers and sellers are connected together by the Salt Union, Ltd., or the North Eastern Salt Co., Ltd., while Borax Consolidated, Ltd., represents a grouping of twelve firms originally. Another combination which has secured complete dominance of the trade of the Union Kingdom is the Wall Paper Manufacturers, Ltd., while the Imperial Tobacco Company, Ltd., with its capital of over fifteen millions, has a very strong grip of the home market. It was formed in 1901 to resist the attack on the United Kingdom market by the United States interests. . . . It is true that small firms manufacturing well-known brands are able to hold their own, but they form on the whole an insignificant percentage of the total turnover of trade. The chemical industries noted by Mr. Ashley are the United Alkali Company, Ltd., a consolidation of forty-eight firms and Brunner Mond & Co., Ltd., which has very important connexions with the Mond Gas Co., Ltd., and the Mond Nickel Co., Ltd. The Castner-Kellner Alkali Co., Ltd., has by an exchange of shares consolidated its interests with that of Brunner Mond. Lever Bros., Ltd., has control of both sources of supply and oils requisite for soap manufacture with the consequent practical monopoly of the market. British Oil & Cake Mills, Ltd., which was formed in 1899, is a combination of seventeen firms. It has refineries and crushing mills capable of dealing with over one-half of the oil seeds imported into the United Kingdom. The foregoing constitute the principal groupings that were well known in this country before the war."—J. M. Rees, *Trusts in British industry, 1914-1921*, pp. 15-21.—See also EQUITY LAW: 1742; 1836; MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: Early development of public works.

1918-1923.—Post-war development of combinations.—Cotton and wool.—Iron and steel.—"The war has brought a profound change in the size of units of manufacture. The big financial promoter has come into the cotton industry, and whereas, before the war, 'The Fine Cotton Spinners,' 'Calico Printers and Bradford Dyers' represented the strong combinations in some special processes, and firms like Messrs. J. & P. Coats in sewing cotton, now the whole area is becoming rapidly linked up into powerful consolidations from raw cotton supply to the finished product. This is a new phase as regards the cotton industry."—*Ibid.*, pp. 114, 245.—"The present tendency towards large amalgamation in the wool textile industry is regarded with disfavor by the majority of traders. Up to within recent years it was the boast of the West Riding industry that private control gave the best results but the movement in the direction of fusion is now a power to be reckoned with."—*Textile fusion (Economist [London], Sept. 22, 1923, p. 433)*.—"The National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers came into existence in 1918 to deal with economic questions affecting the industry. . . . It has not superseded the local machinery of wage negotiations or the various price associations. While, therefore, it has become one of the great powers in the world of industrial politics, it has not become a trust, though by bringing the members of the industry constantly together and compelling them to formulate a trade point of view this product of the war is obviously a potential breeder of trusts. In this connection two tendencies call for comment. In the first place, both during and since the war developments have been consistently in the direction not of horizontal combinations within the iron and steel trade itself, but of further in-

tegration between the earlier and later stages of metallurgical production. Thus important engineering groups have acquired control of iron and steel works which in their turn possess reserves in ore and fuel, while the chief producers of tin plates and galvanized sheets—the largest export sections of the iron and steel trade—have all in the last few years become associated with or have built steelworks which assure their supply of material. Perhaps the most remarkable episode of this kind was the scramble in 1919 and 1920 of the big shipbuilding concerns of the country to acquire steel works in order to assure their supply of plates. . . . [However] some, though by no means all of the arrangements for linking steel-works to the shipbuilding industry have fallen through.”—*Influence of the war on the British iron and steel industry (Manchester Guardian Commercial; Reconstruction in Europe, Sept. 7, 1922, p. 440).*

1919.—Report of trust committee.—Recent tendency toward concentration in industry.—Recommendations.—A committee appointed by the minister of reconstruction to consider and report on organizations and combinations in the United Kingdom presented a comprehensive report in 1919. “We find,” says the committee, “that there is at the present time in every important branch of industry in the United Kingdom an increasing tendency to the formation of Trade Associations and Combinations, having for their purpose the restriction of competition and the control of prices.” It is, on the whole, impossible to quarrel with this verdict, though it may be suggested that there is a tendency to overload the emphasis. There are still many branches of production and distribution in which organization is non-existent or rudimentary, and even where it exists, competition frequently plays a larger part in the process than would be gathered from some paragraphs in the document. Nevertheless, the committee’s statement remains broadly true.”—C. E. Fayle, *Trade combinations (Edinburgh Review, July, 1919, p. 3)*.—“In their Conclusions and Recommendations” [1921] the members of the Committee on Trusts state: More information is urgently required. . . . The first recommendation of the Committee on Trusts is that it ought to be the duty of the Board of Trade to obtain from all sources information on these matters and that it ‘shall present annually to Parliament a report upon the nature, extent and development of such forms of organizations.’”—J. M. Rees, *Trusts in British industry, 1914-1921, p. 246*.

ALSO IN: H. W. Macrosty, *Trust movement in British industry*.—D. H. Macgregor, *Industrial combination*.—A. Marshall, *Industry and trade*.—M. E. Hirst, *Story of trusts*.—J. Hilton, *Study of trade organizations and combinations in the United Kingdom*.—H. Levy, *Monopoly and competition*.—J. M. Keynes, *Economic consequences of the peace*.—F. Hodges, *Nationalization of the mines*.

## NEW ZEALAND

1910.—Legislation for repression of monopolies.—“The New Zealand Act for the repression of monopolies in trade or commerce of 1910 goes quite into detail as regards restraints of business. The following quotations illustrate fully its spirit:

“2. (1) In this act, unless the contrary intention appears, ‘commercial trust,’ means any association or combination (whether incorporated or not) of any number of persons, established either before or after the commencement of this act, and either

in New Zealand or elsewhere, and (a) having as its object, or as one of its objects, that of (1) controlling, determining, or influencing the supply or demand or price of any goods in New Zealand or any part thereof or elsewhere, or that of (2) creating or maintaining in New Zealand or any part thereof or elsewhere a monopoly, whether complete or partial, in the supply or demand of any goods; or (b) acting in New Zealand or elsewhere with any such object as aforesaid: and includes any firm or incorporated company having any such object, or acting as aforesaid.

“3. Every person commits an offense who, either as principal or agent in respect of dealings in any goods, gives, offers, or agrees to give to any other person any rebate, refund, discount, concession, allowance, reward, or other valuable consideration for the reason or upon the express or implied condition that the latter person (a) Deals . . . exclusively or principally, . . . with any person or class of persons, either in relation to any particular goods or generally; or (b) Does not deal . . . with any person or class of persons, either in relation to any particular goods or generally; or (c) Restricts . . . his dealing with any person or class of persons, either in relation to any particular goods or generally; or (d). . . . Becomes a member of a commercial trust; or (e) Acts . . . in obedience to or in conformity with the determinations, directions, suggestions, or requests of any commercial trust with respect to the sale, purchase, or supply of any goods.

“4. Every person commits an offense who, either as principal or agent, refuses, either absolutely or except upon disadvantageous or relatively disadvantageous conditions, to sell or supply to any other person, or to purchase from any other person, any goods for the reason that the latter person (a) Deals . . . with any person or class of persons, either in relation to any particular goods or generally; or (b) Is not . . . a member of a commercial trust; or (c) Does not act . . . in obedience to or in conformity with the determinations, directions, suggestions, or requests of any commercial trust with respect to the sale, purchase, or supply of any goods.

“5. Any person who conspires with any other person to monopolize wholly or partially the demand or supply in New Zealand or any part thereof of any goods, or to control wholly or partially the demand or supply or price in New Zealand or any part thereof of any goods, is guilty of an offense if such monopoly or control is of such a nature as to be contrary to the public interest.

“6. (1) Every person commits an offense who, either as principal or agent, sells or supplies, or offers for sale or supply, any goods at a price which is unreasonably high, if that price has been in any manner directly or indirectly determined, controlled, or influenced by any commercial trust of which that person or his principal (if any) is or has been a member. (2) Every person commits an offense who, in obedience to or in consequence of or in conformity with any determination, direction, suggestion, or request of any commercial trust, whether he is a member of that trust or not, sells or supplies, or offers for sale or supply, any goods, whether as principal or agent, at a price which is unreasonably high.

“7. (1) If any commercial trust, whether as principal or agent, sells or supplies, or offers for sale or supply, any goods at a price which is unreasonably high, every person who is then a member of that trust shall be deemed to have committed an offense against this act. (2) If in

any such case the commercial trust is a corporation, it shall itself be guilty of an offense against this act; but the liability of the trust shall not exclude or affect the liability of its members under the last preceding subsection.

"8. For the purposes of this act the price of any goods shall be deemed to be unreasonably high if it produces or is calculated to produce more than a fair and reasonable rate of commercial profit to the person selling or supplying, or offering to sell or supply, those goods, or to his principal, or to any commercial trust of which that person or his principal is a member, or to any member of any such commercial trust.

"9. Every person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures, or is in any way knowingly concerned in the commission of, an offense against this act, or the doing of any act outside New Zealand which would if done in New Zealand be an offense against this act, shall be deemed to have committed that offense.

"10. (1) Every person who commits an offense against this act shall be liable to a penalty of £500. (2) If two or more persons are responsible for the same offense against this act, each of those persons shall be severally liable to a penalty of £500, and the liability of each of them shall be independent of the liability of the others.

#### "SCHEDULE

##### "GOODS TO WHICH THIS ACT APPLIES

"Agricultural implements, coal, meat, fish. Flour, oatmeal, and other products or by-products of the milling of wheat or oats. Petroleum or other mineral oil (including kerosene, naphtha, and the other products or by-products of any such oil). Sugar. Tobacco (including cigars and cigarettes)."  
—J. W. Jenks, *Trust problem*, pp. 465-468.

#### UNITED STATES

Industrial combinations.—Evolution of forms.—Gentlemen's agreement.—Pool.—Legal trust.—Corporation.—Reorganizations in New Jersey.—Survival of legal trust in Massachusetts.—"The simplest and most elementary form of industrial coöperation was the *gentlemen's agreement*. The manufacturers met together infrequently or at regular intervals and discussed what prices 'ought to be.' The meeting usually ended with a tacit understanding that all the manufacturers would maintain prices at these levels, but no written agreements were ordinarily entered into because of the impossibility of enforcing them, even under the common law. Sometimes the price understandings were reinforced by a definite agreement to curtail production, but such supplementary arrangements were not necessarily involved in any agreement covering the maintenance of price. A good outline of the successive forms of gentlemen's agreements is suggested by J. W. Jenks in his outline of the history of the cordage industry by Clark. . . . The second stage was a *pool*. The difference between a gentlemen's agreement and a pool is that the latter always involved a paying in and drawing out clause. Finding that one or more of the parties to the first form of gentlemen's agreement always broke the agreement, in spirit if not in letter, the manufacturers who intended to live up to their compact insisted that some forfeit be established so that what could not be enforced in law should be maintained from motives of pecuniary expediency. This was accomplished by penalizing over-production. The outputs of all

the manufacturers were agreed upon among themselves according to the existing capacities of their factories. The total probable sales at remunerative prices were then apportioned in accordance with the capacities of the various plants. Each manufacturer was permitted to increase his output beyond the allotment, but in that case he paid into the pool or common treasury a certain amount per unit of product,—for example a half a cent a pound on binder twine or glucose,—which was believed to represent the net profit. The manufacturer whose output fell below the allotment drew out the same amount for each unit of the difference between his actual sales and his allotted sales. Generally there was an auditor who examined the books of the members of the pool to prevent deceptions. Such deceptions would, however, occur in spite of the utmost precautions and the stronger members would insist on a real allotment when it became clear that they continuously paid in, so that the individual pool always proved short-lived although a succession of pools, under varying agreements, might continue for a long period of time. The third stage was the *legal trust*. Conditions of law and policy were changed after 1890, so that none of the industrial consolidations promoted after that time passed through this stage. In effect the trust form of consolidation arose as a safe-guard against the deception and misrepresentation of the pool form of organization, just as the pool arose as the means of making more binding the looser gentlemen's agreement. The trustees of the trust were usually important men in the industry or else managers of the previous pool. They were usually selected for strategic purposes to represent the more important manufacturers and the various sections of the country in which the trust operated. These trustees held either the legal title to the shares of the corporations merged under the trust agreement, or else the titles in fee or the leaseholds of the separate pieces of real estate. The surrender of the stock to the trustees, rather than of the actual property, was the commoner method, that the constituent corporations might operate under their original charters. In return for the stocks or real estate, the trustees issued certificates which gave the registered holders rights under the original deed of trust but no legal title to the property held by the trustees. In this way the entire property acquired could be administered by the trustees as a unit for the interests of all, factories could be closed when it seemed wise, prices could be raised or depressed at will, and as the trustees were the legal owners of the constituent companies, there could be no destructive competition, no deception and no aggressive policies maintained at the expense of one over another. The fourth stage was the *corporation*, or more properly the holding corporation. Owing to legal complications on the one hand and the liberality of the New Jersey statutes on the other, the old trusts were reorganized as holding corporations, which took title to the property previously held by the trustees. All consolidations promoted of late years assumed directly the corporate form of organization so that the stage of the trust, intermediate between the pool and the organized corporation, is seldom to be found after 1890 and never after 1892, except in Massachusetts, where it survives to the present, sanctioned by the English common law, and undisturbed by Massachusetts statutes."—A. S. Dewing, *Corporate promotions and reorganizations*, pp. 518-521.

Historical outline of movement.—Two cycles

previous to depression of 1903.—Emphasis on suppression of competition and increase of production.—New type of consolidations beginning 1915.—Emphasis on capitalization and integration.—“The large manufacturing corporation is of very recent development in the industrial organization of society. The great combinations of manufacturing establishments—the ‘trusts’ so called—appeared suddenly during the closing years of the nineteenth century, with comparatively little warning. [See CAPITALISM: 10th century: United States.] The movement quickly reached its climax, and then shrunk to inconspicuous proportions. [See U. S. A.: 1866-1877.] In 1880 there was nothing analogous to an industrial trust or consolidation in the sense that the term was used later. By 1888 several industries were dominated by large consolidations such as the Standard Oil ‘trust.’ By 1800 the tendency had reached such proportions that public opinion, thoroughly aroused against a movement in industry which seemed to threaten the stability of democratic institutions, brought about the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. [See SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT.] The movement toward industrial consolidations stopped abruptly with the panic of May, 1893, and remained dormant during the depression of the succeeding three years. It started in afresh, with renewed vigor, in 1897, when the first pulsations of returning prosperity began to quicken business enterprise. It again reached a climax about 1901, and again ceased altogether with the industrial depression of 1903. Since 1905 there have been sporadic instances of industrial consolidations but no general movement analogous in magnitude or significance to the consolidations of the closing years of the last century. The stupendous wave of industrial consolidations which began in the late eighties and closed with the depression of 1903 has been divided in another connection into two cycles. Each cycle began with the prosperity succeeding a depression, each culminated at the climax of feverish speculation and each was abruptly terminated by conditions verging on a panic. The earlier, or minor cycle, so called because the consolidations were fewer in number and smaller in size, began in the years immediately following the depression of the middle eighties—a depression caused by the failure of numerous overextended railroads. The consolidations formed at this time were of the typical trust form of organization in which a board of trustees assumed ownership of the corporate shares of numerous small, previously competing concerns. The trusts stifled competition effectually, but in so doing thoroughly aroused public opinion against them. The trusts were seen in the garb of a social menace. They became the dominating social and political ‘problem’ demanding a legislative solution, and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 was the response of a feverishly aroused Congress. Engrossing the act on the federal statute books had, it is true, little immediate effect. Two state court decisions, one in New York and the other in Ohio, were adverse to the trust form of organization, and in consequence most of the consolidations formed after 1800 were organized as holding companies. Yet neither the prohibiting federal statute nor the anti-trust court decisions decreased the rate at which consolidations were forming. These continued with increasing frequency until the spring of 1893, and attained even greater size. Then occurred the scandalous failure of the National Cordage Company, the bankruptcy of several great transcontinental railroads [see also RAILROADS: 1890-1902;

1893-1910], and the evil consequences of the bimetallic legislation. The panic of 1893 followed quickly and with it the promotion of industrial consolidations ceased. The later or major cycle of industrial consolidations began in 1897. It was among the first outward signs of the returning prosperity following the stagnation consequent upon the panic of 1893. At first the consolidations were few in number, but the movement, once begun again, quickly reached far beyond anything thought of in the preceding period. Every conceivable line of manufacturing had its trust. Conservative bankers, shrewd business men, and doctrinaire economists became infected with the virus of large-scale production. People condemned the trusts one moment and bought their securities in the next. It was the harvest-time of promoters. By the end of 1899 more than a hundred and thirty consolidations of considerable magnitude had been organized, all for the sole purpose of suppressing competition and increasing the scale of production. During 1900 and 1901 the movement continued, but the new promotions were fewer in number, owing to the fact that most opportunities for the formation of ‘trusts’ had already been fully exploited by the bankers and promoters. Accordingly the ground was combed over again. The trusts themselves were consolidated. A pyramid was built of pyramids. The United States Steel Corporation, capitalized at over thirteen hundred millions of dollars, was built up out of half a dozen smaller ‘trusts,’ themselves, in several cases, the combinations of smaller combinations. By 1902 signs were apparent that many of the trusts had not justified the predictions of their promoters. The public investors became suspicious. Stock market quotations of speculative industrial common stocks became at first unsteady and then began to fall. New promotions became infrequent and several embryonic consolidations were stifled before their birth. By 1903 a veritable panic occurred in the stocks of industrial consolidations and new promotions ceased altogether. An industrial depression ensued. During 1905 and 1906 few consolidations were formed, and these few were of insignificant importance. After the depression following the panic of 1907 there were occasional consolidations of industrial business, more especially in the retail merchandizing and automobile industries. Yet, after all is said, the evidence is clear that during the period from 1902 down to the opening of the Great War the number of industrial consolidations was insignificant compared with the period of fifteen years preceding the depression of 1903. Several highly significant reasons explain why the movement toward consolidations ended as quickly as it did. Paramount is the simple fact that, as a whole, the trusts had turned out ill. They failed to meet the expectations of their promoters. Competition was not suppressed and the widely heralded economies of large-scale production were not realized. Most of the securities of the consolidations were acquired by public investors with a speculative trend of mind who fully expected to make their fortunes out of them. Anticipated earnings did not develop. The bankers who underwrote new promotions during the closing years of the period found themselves with large amounts of such securities remaining unsold. The public investors witnessed the slow but nevertheless uninterrupted decline of the ‘trust stocks.’ Few paid any dividends on the common shares and many ceased to pay regular dividends on the preferred shares, even after dividends had been begun. Highly speculative

common stocks were carried on margin by speculators and accumulating interest charges steadily increased the loss. Furthermore, many of the industrials actually failed. And at the time of each failure, financial scandals, unconscionable bankers' and promoters' profits, even downright dishonesty and fraud, were fully and widely featured by the daily press. As a direct consequence the business world, the public investors, even the economists, lost faith in the economic expediency and financial wisdom of industrial consolidation. A second reason for the almost total cessation of industrial promotions was the changed attitude of the law. Although the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, it was not until early in 1895 that an important case under this act was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. The decision of the highest court indicated clearly that industrial consolidations were to be considered legal. The court let them pass, by a verbal subterfuge, notwithstanding the spirit of the act. But in 1890 the Supreme Court reversed itself. Consolidations were not to be legalized by a mere verbal subterfuge. The act of 1890 did apply to the combinations of manufacturing plants and could, moreover, be invoked to dismember those which had been illegally formed. But this idea did not vividly and thoroughly permeate the intelligence of the banking world until the great Northern Securities decision in 1903 [see RAILROADS: 1901-1905], when the teeth of the act of 1890 were felt. [See also ANDYSTON PIPE CASE.] This decision was widely advertised and the country as a whole realized that the act of 1890 was not dead legal verbiage, but meant exactly what it said—namely, that consolidations of competing enterprises were illegal. A third reason that explains the decline of industrial promotions after 1903 was the shift of investment sentiment. This reason was perhaps less important than the others, but it was, nevertheless, very vital in the point of view of the banker without whom no industrial consolidation could be promoted. Public utilities began to assume importance to promoters and to bankers. Prior to 1900 most of the local utilities had been built and extended by local capital alone. The savings of the community produced the local utility. But slowly the promoter-engineer began to succeed in enlisting the help of bankers in combining local utilities into large operating and holding companies. Much new capital was required. And both bankers and investors turned from manufacturing enterprises, where competition would not be inhibited by combination, to public service enterprises where competition was legally prohibited by means of the exclusive franchise. These were the main causes which brought about the shift of promoting, banking, and investing sentiment away from industrial consolidations in the decade preceding the Great War. But beginning in the autumn of 1915, as a direct consequence of the enormously increased demand for manufactured products, the rapidly rising prices, the loosening of restrictions on monopoly—all economic concomitants of great war—a new movement toward industrial combinations began. These recent consolidations differed in many important respects from the consolidations of twenty or more years before. In the first place, no attempt was made to secure all the plants in a given industry—good, bad, and indifferent—in the confident hope that thereby competition could be suppressed. On the contrary the purpose was to select a relatively few plants and these were chosen on the basis of efficiency of operation. Very often the chief pur-

pose was to secure more capital for an old-established industry, either from bankers or the public. The consolidation of separate and independent plants was a mere incident to expansion. New capital, rather than the suppression of competition, was held to be essential to success. . . . A second type of enterprise, in which consolidation has been of obvious benefit, is in those industries in which it is possible to reach back to the primal raw material and forward to the ultimate consumer. This is known as 'integration.' . . . Integration has been one of the chief reasons for the success of the United States Steel Corporation. It acquired, with the old Illinois Steel Company, extensive iron mines west of Lake Superior; it acquired, with the Carnegie Steel Company, a railroad from Lake Erie to Pittsburgh. Certain of its constituents, like the American Steel and Wire Company, the National Tube Company, and the American Bridge Company, manufactured and sold fabricated steel products to the ultimate consumer. The Steel Corporation acquired coking coal and limestone deposits, coke ovens, and pig iron furnaces. It organized numerous intermediate links to the chain so that, soon after its organization, the corporation could claim, in truth, that it carried on every branch of the steel business, from mining the ore to the sale of the fabricated products to their ultimate consumers. Other successful industrial consolidations have followed the same policy, so far as individual conditions permitted. The American Agricultural Chemical Company owns very large areas of phosphate rock in the South, and had, until the events of the Great War changed entirely the complexion of American investments abroad, a large interest in German potash deposits. In addition, it has pushed the retail sale of its private brands of fertilizers among the small farmers. One conspicuous reason for the success of the present Corn Products Refining Company under the Bedford management has been the fact that it has directed its chief efforts to producing end products sold directly to the ultimate consumers, rather than intermediate products sold to other manufacturers. It even acquired control of companies which produced the end products when this course seemed preferable to developing a market of its own. The number of instances in which this kind of vertical consolidation has taken place within recent years is very large. But the central idea in every case is the same—to control all the steps of production and distribution from the raw material to the delivery of the finished product into the hands of the ultimate consumer."—A. S. Dewing, *Financial policy of corporations*, v. 4: *Expansions*, pp. 34-41, 54-56.—See also CAPITALISM; 19th century; Regulation of capitalism in the United States; SUPREME COURT: 1887-1914; MICHIGAN: 1896-1900; NORTH DAKOTA: 1892-1896.

**Standard Oil Company.**—Events leading to organization in 1882.—Report on, in 1900.—Testimony of John D. Rockefeller and others.—Question of discriminations.—Dissolution and reorganization.—The form of organization that has given industrial combinations their name "trusts" was that started by the Standard Oil Trust in 1882, afterwards followed by the Whisky Combination—the Distillers and Cattle Feeders' Trust—and by the Sugar Trust. "In 1881 the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, the nucleus of the Standard 'alliance,' was a corporation capitalized at \$3,500,000. Since the formation of the 'alliance' it had maintained connections with its allies by a union, not of corporations, but of stock-



holders. 'Then,' as the solicitor of the Standard Oil Company [S. C. T. Dodd] explains, 'for convenience of control and management the Standard Oil Trust was formed. It was simply an agreement, placing all the stock of these various companies in the hands of trustees, declaring the terms on which they were held, and providing for the issuance of a certificate showing the amount of each owner's interest in the stock so held in trust. . . . We organized a Standard Oil Company in New York, in New Jersey, in Kentucky, in Iowa, in Minnesota; and similar corporations already existed in Ohio and Pennsylvania.' As the first 'trust' form of combination, the agreement under which this union was brought about deserves attention. There were three classes of parties to the contract; first, all the stockholders and members of the Standard 'alliance,' together with members of some other companies; second, all the more important officers and stockholders of these several companies; and, third, a portion of the stockholders and members of some additional corporations and limited partnerships. Provision was made for the admission of new companies and individuals, and for the formation, whenever advisable, of a Standard Oil Company in any State or Territory in the Union. The parties of the several classes were to transfer all their property to the Standard Oil Companies in their several States, in consideration of which they should receive stock equal at par value to the appraised value of the property so transferred. This stock—and here is the significant feature of the new organization—was to be delivered to trustees, and held by them and their successors thereafter; and no subsequent issue of stock should be made by the companies except by these trustees. In return for the stock intrusted to them, the trustees were to deliver trust certificates, equal to the par value of the stock of the several Standard Oil Companies to be established and to the appraised value of the stocks of other companies delivered to the trustees. The trustees provided for were nine in number. They were John D. Rockefeller, O. N. Payne, and William Rockefeller, elected to hold office till 1885; J. A. Bostwick, H. M. Flagler, and W. G. Warden, to hold office till 1884; and Charles Pratt, Benjamin Brewster, and John D. Archbold, to hold office till 1883. At each annual meeting the certificate owners elected three trustees for three years each, to fill vacancies due to expiration of term. Such was the 'trust' as formed by the agreement of January 2, 1882. By an amendment two days later this agreement was slightly changed, as it was deemed inexpedient that all the companies mentioned should transfer their property immediately to the several Standard Oil Companies. The trustees were given power to decide what companies should convey their property and when the sale should take place. The powers of the trustees, then, as defined by the 'trust' agreement, were to collect on the stock which they held the dividends of the several constituent companies, and afterwards, upon the trust certificates outstanding, to disburse their receipts as dividends. Four years before the formation of the trust, two pipe-line companies—the Seaboard Pipe-Line Company and the Equitable Petroleum Company—projected to afford an outlet to the seaboard, had been organized by oil producers. Upon their failure, the producers organized the Tidewater Pipe-Line Company, which ran from the Bradford region to Williamsport, a distance of one hundred and ten miles; and thence, by a connection with the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, the

oil was carried a distance of two hundred and fifty miles to Philadelphia. On the 1st of June, 1879, this company commenced the shipment of oil. The railroads were not content to see the oil traffic slip through their hands; and on the 5th of June, at a conference between the four trust lines at Niagara Falls, resolute measures were adopted to drive this rival transportation agent from the business. The rate on crude oil per barrel was lowered to 20 cents on all oil of the Standard 'alliance' moving from the oil regions to New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. A corresponding reduction of the rate to the general public was made from \$14 to 30 cents. These rates took effect at once; and, as competition continued, a further reduction was made on August 1st to 15 cents per barrel. Throughout the period of the organization of the trust, and for a full year after, this fierce contest between the railroads and the Tidewater Pipe-Line Company continued. The immediate effect, of course, was to benefit the shippers, and particularly the largest shipper, which was the Standard. The ownership by the Standard of the terminal facilities and of the greater number of the oil-cars of the railroads now became a fact of importance. In consideration of its heavy investments in these interests, and of its agreements to ship and to unload its oil at its own risk, the Standard had already been allowed rebates. But now the Standard began the building of pipe-lines to the seaboard and the formation of the National Transit Company. As pipe-lines were a cheaper mode of transportation than railways, the building of these lines made necessary a readjustment of freight rates; and, as the pipe-lines then building could not carry the oil the entire distance, contracts for joint carrying had to be made with the railroads. The first contract—made between the National Transit Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad on May 6, 1881—related to the apportionment of the freight when the haul was partly by pipe-line and partly by rail. The Pipe-Line Company guaranteed the railroad one-third of the transportation of oil to the seaboard. The Standard was to pay exactly the same rate as other shippers over the railroad. On such oil as was carried partly by pipe-line and partly by rail a through rate was made, of which the pipe-line naturally received a share; and, finally, the Pipe-Line Company agreed to remit part of the charge of its local pipes to the railroad. Instead of a contract for rebates to the Standard, this was a contract for rebates to the railroad. The reason for this contract was that the seaboard pipe-line of the Standard did not extend beyond Hamilton, Pennsylvania; and to compensate the railroad for its low rate of freight and for its grants of rights of way—no free-pipe-line law then existing in New Jersey—these rebates were provided. Strengthened by these mutually helpful contracts, the National Transit Company and the railroads were meanwhile wearing out the Tidewater Pipe-Line Company, and in 1883 forced it to cease its opposition. The company was never absorbed by the Standard Oil Trust; but on October 6th, by an agreement with the National Transit Company, it agreed to accept as its share of the oil traffic eleven and one-half per cent. of the total pipe-line transportation of petroleum to the seaboard, and was guaranteed \$500,000. in annual profits for fifteen years. With this settlement the war of the transportation agents ceased, and the Standard Oil Trust established itself in the strategic position which substantially controlled the transportation of oil to

the seaboard. By the early seventies the Standard had attained the pre-eminence in mechanical efficiency which it has ever since maintained; by the agreement with the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1878 it had gained a dominance over transportation which it never since has lost; and by its contract in 1881 it made possible the completion of its pipe-line to the seaboard and its independence of railroads. Such contracts as the Standard subsequently made with the Pennsylvania Railroad were agreements by which the railroad got some part of the freight, though it did no part of the carrying. The Standard Oil Trust now gave rebates instead of receiving them. Over every branch of the industry, in 1883, it was supreme. . . . The passing of the Interstate Commerce Act, in 1887, makes a natural division in the record of the railroad arrangements made by the Standard. By the terms of that act discriminations were forbidden, and such contracts with shippers as had



JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER

been the rule since the late sixties were made illegal. The Interstate Commerce Act seems to have been observed by the Standard Oil Company. 'Little testimony,' says the Industrial Commission of 1900, 'was brought forward to prove that it actually receives lower rates for shipment over the same tracks than its competitors.' In the testimony before the commission on this latter point the opinion was expressed by witnesses testifying in opposition to the Standard Oil Company that direct discriminations and rebates are still received by the Standard; but the evidence adduced in proof of this opinion was unsatisfactory, and was considered entirely inconclusive by the commission. In other ways than by discriminations in actual rates the Standard Oil Company, after 1887, secured special advantages in transportation. The shipments of oil from those localities which it chose for distributing points were so large that the freight rates for that locality were naturally most favorable to this chief commodity of shipment. Competitive points, points where several railroads compete, or where water transportation competes with the railways, were generally fixed upon as distributing

centres, accordingly, lower freight rates prevailed at the large shipping points of the Standard than prevailed at places where its competitors made most of their shipments. The Standard Oil Company located its refineries at points nearer the place of consumption, and so economized in shipping distance. Thus it transferred most of its business from Cleveland to Whiting, Indiana, in order to be nearer the Southern market and to the West, and began to supply the Eastern market from its refineries at Bayonne, New Jersey. By wise distribution of its refineries the Standard became largely independent of the changing freight rates that distressed those independent refiners who shipped their oil long distances. A less honorable advantage, it has been alleged, accrued to the Standard by the practice, among the railroads, of under-billing the weight of the contents of the tank-car. As to interstate shipments, this has been specifically denied by representatives of the Standard Oil Company; and the instances where such under-billing has occurred are explained as occasional errors. . . . With nothing more exciting than an occasional case before the Interstate Commerce Commission regarding shipments by tank-car, the Standard Oil Trust continued from 1887 until 1892. Its growth and prosperity had been steady. The property of the various companies that entered the trust in 1882 was valued at \$75,000,000. In 1892 the value was estimated at \$121,631,312; and fifty per cent. of this increase had come from profits invested and the remainder from additional capital subscribed. The dividends meanwhile had risen from five and a quarter per cent. in 1882 to twelve per cent. in 1891. During the ten years following 1882 there had been a gentle decrease in the price of refined oil and a slight decrease in the difference between the price of refined and the price of crude oil—a difference which measures the charge for refining. The attitude of the Standard Oil Trust during these years was one of quiet dominance. It was now to meet an unexpected difficulty in the courts, which rendered necessary a complete change of organization."—G. H. Montague, *Rise and progress of the Standard Oil Company*, pp. 77-88, 101-106, 108-110.

The following passages from testimony concerning the history of these early years throw additional light on the questions of discriminating rates received from the railroads and of pipe-line consolidations. The first is from the examination of John D. Rockefeller made by a United States Industrial Commission some years later:

"Q. Did the Standard Oil Company or other affiliated interests at any time before 1887 receive from the railroads rebates on freight shipped, or other special advantages?—A. The Standard Oil Company of Ohio, of which I was president, did receive rebates from the railroads prior to 1880, but received no special advantages for which it did not give full compensation. The reason for rebates was that such was the railroad's method of business. A public rate was made and collected by the railway companies, but, so far as my knowledge extends, was never really retained in full, a portion of it was repaid to the shippers as a rebate. . . . The Standard Oil Company of Ohio, being situated at Cleveland, had the advantage of different carrying lines, as well as of water transportation in the summer, and taking advantage of those facilities made the best bargains possible for its freight. All other companies did the same, their success depending largely upon whether they had the choice of more than one route. The Standard sought also to offer advantages to the

railways for the purpose of lessening rates of freight. It offered freights in large quantity, car-loads and train loads. It furnished loading facilities and discharging facilities. It exempted railways from liability for fire. For these services it obtained contracts for special allowances on freights. These never exceeded, to the best of my present recollections, 10 per cent. But in almost every instance it was discovered subsequently that our competitors had been obtaining as good, and, in some instances, better rates of freight than ourselves. . . .

"Q. About what percentage of the profits of the Standard Oil Company came from special advantages given by the railroads when these were greatest?—A. No percentage of the profits of the Standard Oil Company came from advantages given by railroads at any time. Whatever advantage it received in its constant efforts to reduce rates of freight was deducted from the price of oil. The advantages to the Standard from low freight rates consisted solely in the increased volume of its business arising from the low price of its products. . . .

"Q. To what advantages, or favors, or methods of management do you ascribe chiefly the success of the Standard Oil Company?—A. I ascribe the success of the Standard to its consistent policy to make the volume of its business large through the merits and cheapness of its products. It has spared no expense in finding, securing, and utilizing the best and cheapest methods of manufacture. It has sought for the best superintendents and workmen and paid the best wages. It has not hesitated to sacrifice old machinery and old plants for new and better ones. It has placed its manufactories at the points where they could supply markets at the least expense. It has not only sought markets for its principal products, but for all possible by-products, sparing no expense in introducing them to the public. It has not hesitated to invest millions of dollars in methods for cheapening the gathering and distribution of oils by pipe lines, special cars, tank steamers, and tank wagons. It has erected tank stations at every important railroad station to cheapen the storage and delivery of its products. It has spared no expense in forcing its products into the markets of the world among people civilized and uncivilized. It has had faith in American oil, and has brought together millions of money for the purpose of making it what it is, and holding its markets against the competition of Russia and all the many countries which are producers of oil and competitors against American oil."—United States Industrial Commission, *Preliminary Report, Mar., 1900, (56th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Document no. 476, pt. 2, p. 704)*.

Against the testimony of Rockefeller that the Standard Oil Company obtained no exclusive advantages from railway companies, other witnesses contended that such advantages were given to it. On this point, the Commission say in their report: "It was charged by most of the leading opponents of the Standard Oil Company that the chief reason for the rapid growth of the Standard, and its apparent great success in underselling rivals and winning markets, was the special advantages that it had received from the railroads. It was claimed that the company not merely received discriminating rates on its own shipments, but that it was frequently paid rebates on the shipments of its competitors. It was conceded by representatives of the Standard Oil Company that before the passage of the interstate-commerce act

special freight rates and rebates were frequently received. It was asserted, however, that this was the usual custom on the part of all railroads with all large shippers and that competitors of the Standard had received similar favors. . . . Much greater differences of opinion exist with reference to the condition of affairs since the passage of the interstate-commerce act. It has been charged as a matter of general belief on the part of almost all of the opponents of the Standard Oil Company that these discriminations in various forms have been continually received even up to date. On the other hand, these charges have been denied in toto and most emphatically by every representative of the Standard Oil Company with reference to all cases excepting one, which they claim was a mistake, the amount of freight due being promptly paid on discovery of the error. . . . Certain opponents of the company claimed that the Standard Oil Company received commissions for shipping freight over railroads, which commissions amounted to rebates. This charge is emphatically denied by the Standard Oil Company and no positive proof on the subject has been offered."—*Ibid., pt. 1, p. 25*.

Of testimony on the subject of pipe-line consolidations in the oil business, the report says: "Several witnesses describe the process by which the Standard Oil Company gradually secured control of the various pipe lines throughout the oil regions. The opponents of the trust attribute the success of the Standard Oil Company in this movement to the railway discriminations upon oil received from pipe lines controlled by that company. It appears that for a considerable period a rebate of 22 cents per barrel was allowed on oil from pipe lines maintaining the agreed rates of pipage. . . . Other opponents of the combination ascribe its success in driving out competing pipe lines largely to the practice of paying premiums upon oil in the territory of such competing lines. Mr. Boyle [publisher of the *Oil City Derrick*] gives the fullest statement of the growth of the pipe-line consolidation during the seventies and attributes it to the natural advantages arising from large capital and from skill in organizing. He testifies that during the early part of that decade very numerous pipe lines had been established. These, were at first constructed on a small scale by separate oil producers, but, having entered the business, many producers were inclined to extend their lines and form a system. There thus arose an excessive number of competing lines, and the solvency and integrity of some of them became a matter of doubt. This excessive competition was the cause of driving the pipe lines into a more complete organization. As early as 1873 or 1874 a pooling arrangement was made by some of the pipe lines, and rebates were paid by railways on oil received from such lines. The United Pipe Line Company was established in 1877, with a capital at first of \$3,000,000, and acquired by purchase a large number of lines. The new company included many producers and stockholders of the smaller companies, but it is estimated that the persons controlling the Standard Oil Company had somewhat more than a one-half interest in the United Pipe Lines. The National Transit Company is the present owner of the United Pipe Lines System, and the Standard Oil Company controls the National Transit Company. . . . It was pointed out by several witnesses that the almost complete control of the pipe-line system by the Standard Oil Company gives it great power in fixing the prices of crude oil, since producers can

dispose of their product only through the pipe lines, especially in view of the further fact, which is alleged, that railway rates on crude oil are by agreement kept at least as high as, if not higher than, the pipe-line charges. The pipe-line system also gives the combination great advantage over other refiners, who must pay the rates of pipage fixed by the Standard, which are claimed to be excessively high or the high rates of freight."—*Ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 100.—"In 1891 the State of Ohio, by its attorney-general, began action to oust the Standard Oil Company of its corporate rights, on the ground that it had abused its corporate franchises in becoming a party to an agreement against public policy. . . . The place this case occupies in the law of corporations is of the first importance. A previous case, in which the Sugar Trust was defendant, had decided that an agreement of associations to which the corporations were party was *ultra vires*. Further than declaring partnership of corporations illegal, however, the law had not yet gone; and upon the question whether such combination was illegal, because in restraint of trade and opposed to public policy, the court had declined to express an opinion. In the instance of the Standard Oil Company the court made a bold advance; it not only forbade members of several corporations to combine as such and merge their interests in a trust, but it also declared such combination a restraint of trade, illegal, and quite opposed to public policy, and by the force of its decision put an end to the trust as a form of business combination. Accordingly, in 1892, the Standard Oil Trust was dissolved and the separate establishments and plants reorganized into twenty constituent companies. . . . While the independent refiners have been seeking security in the trust form of organization, the Standard Oil Company has adopted the contrary policy. In 1892 the trust dissolved into its constituent companies, the former trustees holding a majority of the stock in each corporation and the holders of trust certificates exchanging them for the stock of the several companies in agreed proportion. By purely informal harmony, a unity of action among these corporations was maintained. A large quantity of trust certificates were still outstanding; and the dividends, when declared, were at a certain percentage upon these outstanding certificates and at a properly adjusted rate upon the capital stock of the different companies, so that the rate of dividends might be considered as if it were entirely on the trust certificates at their former full amount. In order to secure more complete unity and to provide for the claims of smaller holders of trust certificates, the Standard Oil Company was organized under the laws of New Jersey in 1899. This corporation, though practically a new organization, was in form a continuation of the old Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, with an amended charter and capital increased from \$1,000,000 to \$110,000,000. This corporation was authorized to own the stock of any of the different corporations connected with the Standard Oil Company, and to buy from all parties who own such stock whenever they desired to sell. 'The new Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,' said the Industrial Commission in 1900, 'has recently been formed with the intention of transferring the stock of the different corporations into the stock of the new company, so that, when the transfer is finally made, one single corporation, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, will own outright the property now owned by the separate companies which are commonly known and mentioned to-

gether under the name of the Standard Oil Company. This combination at present has no formal unity. It has a practical unity as great as it will have probably after the complete change into the New Jersey company is affected."—G. H. Montague, *Rise and progress of the Standard Oil Company*, pp. 110, 114-115, 127-129.—See also U. S. A.: 1882-1889; SUPREME COURT: 1888-1913.

ALSO IN: I. Tarbell, *History of Standard Oil Company*.

**Sugar trust.—Report on, in 1900.—Testimony of Henry O. Havemeyer.**—The following, submitted by the same report is from the testimony of Henry O. Havemeyer:

"Q. The history and organization of the Sugar Refining Company has been gone over so many times in testimony before that it is not worth while to dwell on it at length, but in order that we may have the record somewhat complete, will you give a brief sketch of its development, going back to the conditions of the old sugar trust? [1887]—A. There were about twenty-five different firms or corporations in the sugar business. I think the evidence before some one of the Congressional committees was that for a period of 5 or 6 years before the formation of the trust, 18 of those failed or went out of business.

"Q. Eighteen out of 25?—A. Not out of 25; 18 out of about 40. It occurred to some one to consolidate the others, and 18 out of 21, I believe, went into the trust, leaving 3 or 4 outside, who represented, I think, 30 per cent. Then Spreckles built a refinery in Philadelphia, and, 2 or 3 years after the formation of the trust, the trust or its successor bought the Philadelphia refineries.

"Q. Will you explain in a word or two the difference between the trust and its successor and the reason for its going into this other form?—A. The trust was attacked, and the courts decided it was illegal, and a company was organized in New Jersey which bought outright and paid for the different companies, which were the constituent companies of the trust. They then represented, I think, over 90 per cent of the output; then other refineries began to be constructed, until now I think they would represent 50 per cent of the consumption. . . .

"Q. The condition before the formation of the trust was about this: When these 18 different companies failed, business was in such a condition, as a whole, that it was considered unprofitable?—A. Very unprofitable—ruinous.

"Q. Now, can you tell what special advantages—if you can give this in some detail I shall be glad—come from this organization, and in what way you make your savings?—A. The greatest advantage is in working the refinery full and uninterrupted. Of course, if you have a capacity of 1,000,000 and you can only melt 100,000,000 somebody has got to cut down materially. The moment you cut down you increase the cost; by buying up all the refineries . . . and concentrating the meltings in four refineries and working them full, you work at a minimum cost. That enables us to pay a dividend on the common stock.

"Q. So the chief advantage in the combination was in concentrating the production and destroying the poor refineries?—A. Precisely."—United States Industrial Commission, *Preliminary Report, Mar., 1900 (56th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives Document no. 476, pt. 2, p. 109)*.—See also U. S. A.: 1897 (March-July); 1909 (October-November) SUGAR BOUNTIES.

**Earlier combinations in steel production.—Report on, in 1900.**—"Mr. Reis, president of the


National Steel Company, states that that company was organized in February, 1899, under the laws of New Jersey, with a capital of \$59,000,000, \$27,000,000 of 7 per cent cumulative preferred stock and \$32,000,000 of common stock. The company includes six steel plants, located at New Castle, Youngstown, Sharon, Mingo Junction, Bellaire, and Columbus. These plants are engaged in producing steel billets and slabs, which are the raw materials for making tin plates and various other products. The plants include 15 blast furnaces. The company also owns iron mines in northern Michigan at Iron Mountain and Ishpeming. These are expected to produce from 1,250,000 to 1,400,000 tons of ore annually, the total amount required for the use of the steel plants in the combination being about 3,000,000 tons. The National Steel Company also owns nine lake boats for transporting ore, capable of carrying about 1,000,000 tons annually. . . . Mr. Reis testifies that the National Steel Company is not a 'trust' in the ordinary sense, since it makes no attempt to secure control of a large proportion of the output of steel. Its economies are sought in the combination of steel plants with sources of raw materials. The National Steel Company produces only about 18 per cent of the Bessemer steel made in this country. The other chief concerns engaged in steel production are the Carnegie Steel Company; Federal Steel Company; the Maryland; Jones & Laughlin Steel Company; Wheeling Steel and Iron Company, and the Lorain Steel Company. . . . Mr. Reis states that the tariff, so far as it is placed upon steel billets, bars, and sheets, is no longer necessary for the protection of the industry. No steel is imported, and during the past 8 or 10 years the tariff has cut no figure. But if the tariff should be removed from the tin plate or from certain other branches of the iron and steel industry there would be an indirect effect upon the making of steel. . . . Mr. Gary states that the Federal Steel Company owns all the capital of the Minnesota Iron Company, the Illinois Steel Company, the Lorain Steel Company, and the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railroad Company. The Minnesota Iron Company is the owner of 150,000 acres of iron ore property on the Vermilion and Mesaba ranges. It owns the Duluth and Iron Range Railroad Company, connecting its mines with Lake Superior at Two Harbors and Duluth. It owns large ore docks and also 22 steel lake vessels capable of carrying 2,000,000 tons per annum. The product of the Minnesota Iron Company will probably be 3,500,000 tons in 1900. The Lorain Steel Company manufactures chiefly steel rails for street railways, and to some extent steel billets. It produces about 500,000 tons of pig iron per year. The Illinois Steel Company has plants at North Chicago, West Chicago, South Chicago, Milwaukee, and Joliet. It produces about 1,500,000 tons of pig iron per year, and also manufactures steel rails, billets, plates, etc. It owns the Chicago, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, which connects its plants in the neighborhood of Chicago. It also owns large tracts of coal property in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, and makes there about 1,500,000 tons of coke per year. This company also owns iron mines in Wisconsin and Michigan. . . . Mr. Stetson, a lawyer, who drafted the charter and conducted the legal arrangements in the organization of the Federal Steel Company, testified that it was organized in September, 1898, with an authorized capital of \$100,000,000 6 per cent noncumulative preferred stock and \$100,000,000 common stock. Of this, \$98,000,000 in all was originally issued

. . . Mr. Gary states that the Federal Steel Company is not a trust in any sense. It has not sought to restrict competition and has not brought together companies which were competing with one another, as is the case with most so-called trusts. The company has bought the stocks of companies doing different lines of business, just as an individual might do. . . . The American Steel and Wire Company operates iron mines in the Lake Superior region. It controls, perhaps, one-sixth or one-seventh of the output of that region. It owns and operates coal mines and burns coke. It operates 8 or 9 blast furnaces, 17 open-hearth furnaces, from 22 to 25 rolling mills, and from 20 to 30 wire mills. Its finished product is plain wire, barbed wire, wire fencing, rope, etc., wire nails, and all kindred articles. . . . Mr. Gates, chairman of the American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey, testified concerning the formation of that company. It was organized on January 12, 1899. A gradual process of consolidating wire plants had been going on previously. As early as 1890 companies in which Mr. Gates was interested practically controlled the manufacture of barbed wire in this country. In December, 1897, and January, 1898, J. P. Morgan & Co investigated the value of the various wire plants throughout the country with a view to further consolidation. The American Steel and Wire Company of Illinois, formed in March, 1898, seems to have resulted from this effort. . . . The combination into the American Steel and Wire Company was not rendered necessary by excessive competition and consequent losses among the wire companies. The Consolidated Steel and Wire Company, for example, made between 27 and 28 per cent during the last three years of its existence. It was believed, however, that more profit would be made through better management under consolidation."—*Ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 190.

**Tin plate industry.—Report on, in 1900.**—"The American Tin Plate Company was incorporated under the laws of New Jersey on January 6, 1899. Its authorized capital is \$20,000,000 of 7 per cent cumulative preferred stock and \$30,000,000 of common stock. Of this, \$18,000,000 of preferred and \$28,000,000 of common stock has been issued. . . . It is made clear by the evidence of all the witnesses that the tin-plate industry in the United States has been built up practically since the McKinley tariff of 1890, which raised the duty on tin plates from 1 to 2.2 cents per pound. Without the protection, all the witnesses agree, the industry could not have been profitably established. Having once been established, it was able to submit to the reduction of the duty to 1.2 cents by the Wilson tariff of 1894, and is now sufficiently protected by the duty of 1.5 cents under the Dingley tariff of 1897."—*Ibid.*, pt. 1, pp. 174, 187.

1900.—Definition of the term "industrial combination" formulated at the census bureau.—Statistics as collected in 1900.—"The officials of the Census Office, in order to prevent misconceptions and insure consistency in the plan and system of tabulation, formulated the following definition of the term 'industrial combination': 'For the purpose of the Census, the rule has been adopted to consider no aggregation of mills an industrial combination, unless it consists of a number of formerly independent mills which have been brought together into one company under a charter obtained for that purpose. We therefore exclude from this category many large establishments comprising a number of mills, which have grown up, not by combination with other mills, but by the erection

of new plants or the purchase of old ones.' . . . So far as can be ascertained from the data in the Census Office, the number of these industrial consolidations is 183. They control 2203 separate plants, scattered throughout the United States, 2029 being active and 174 idle during the census year. For 56 of the idle plants no returns could be obtained, making the total number of reporting plants 2147. The 183 combinations extend to almost all lines of industry, producing articles of luxury, materials essential to the upbuilding and growth of the country, and even the very necessities of life. Fully 50 per cent of these combinations were chartered just prior to or during the census year; and it is noteworthy that the epidemic of industrial consolidation, as far as the so-called monopolies are concerned, has been practically confined to the past four years. It is evident, therefore, that the disease—if it be regarded as such—



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has spread very rapidly. Naturally enough, iron and steel, with 69 combinations, heads the list. The number of reporting plants engaged in this industry is 460, and the capital invested, consisting of land, buildings, machinery, tools and implements, and cash and sundries, is valued at \$348,000,000.—W. R. Merriam, "Trusts" in the light of census returns (*Atlantic Monthly*, Mar., 1902).

1901.—Climax of consolidation in steel industries.—Formation of the United States Steel Corporation.—In February, 1901, the climax was reached in movements of industrial combination, so far as concerns the production and greater uses of iron and steel, by the formation of one gigantic corporation, to embrace not only the companies named above, but to purchase the enormous interests of the Carnegie Company outright, and to take in several organizations of more than considerable magnitude besides. The combination was effected by the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., New York, as "syndicate managers," and an official statement of its essential terms was published

in a circular from that firm on March 2, addressed to the stockholders of the Federal Steel Company, National Steel Company, National Tube Company, American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey, American Tin Plate Company, American Steel Hoop Company, American Sheet Steel Company, to whom the following announcement was made: "The United States Steel Corporation has been organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey, with power, among other things, to acquire the outstanding preferred stocks and common stocks of the companies above named, and the outstanding bonds and stock of the Carnegie Company. A syndicate, comprising leading financial interests throughout the United States and Europe, of which the undersigned are managers, has been formed by subscribers to the amount of \$200,000,000, (including among such subscribers the undersigned and many large stockholders of the several companies,) to carry out the arrangement hereinafter stated, and to provide the sum in cash and the financial support required for that purpose. Such syndicate, through the undersigned, has made a contract with the United States Steel Corporation, under which the latter is to issue and deliver its preferred stock and its common stock and its five per cent. gold bonds, in consideration for stocks of the above named companies and bonds and stock of the Carnegie Company and the sum of \$25,000,000 in cash. The syndicate has already arranged for the acquisition of substantially all the bonds and stock of the Carnegie Company, including Mr. Carnegie's holdings. The bonds of the United States Steel Corporation are to be used only to acquire bonds and 60 per cent. of the stock of the Carnegie Company. The undersigned, in behalf of the syndicate, and on the terms and conditions hereinafter stated, offer, in exchange for the preferred stocks and common stocks of the companies above named, respectively, certificates for preferred stock and common stock of the United States Steel Corporation, upon the basis stated." Details relating to the terms and the procedure of exchange are then given, and several statements of public interest are made, among them these: "The authorized issue of capital stock of the United States Steel Corporation presently provided for in said contract is \$850,000,000, of which one-half is to be seven per cent. cumulative preferred stock and one-half is to be common stock. The company will also issue its five per cent. gold bonds to an aggregate amount not exceeding \$304,000,000. In case less than all of the bonds and stock of the Carnegie Company or less than all of the stocks of the other companies above referred to shall be acquired, the amounts of bonds and stocks to be issued will be reduced as provided in said contract. The forms of the new bonds and of the indenture securing the same, and of the certificates for the new preferred and common shares, and the entire plan of organization and management of the United States Steel Corporation, shall be determined by J. P. Morgan & Co. Every depositor shall accept in full payment and exchange for his deposited stock the shares of the capital stock of the United States Steel Corporation, to be delivered at the rates above specified, in respect of the stock by him so deposited; and no depositor or holder of any receipt issued hereunder shall have any interest in the disposition of any other of the shares of stock, or of the bonds of the United States Steel Corporation, by it to be issued and delivered to or for account of the syndicate or of any proceeds thereof. All shares of the United States Steel Corporation de-

liverable to or for account of the syndicate, which shall not be required for the acquisition of the stock of the Carnegie Company or for delivery to depositors under the terms of this circular, are to be retained by and belong to the syndicate. . . . It is proper to state that J. P. Morgan & Co. are to receive no compensation for their services as syndicate managers beyond a share in any sum which ultimately may be realized by the syndicate." Subsequently the American Bridge Company and the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines were taken into consolidation, and, on April 1, 1901, the United States Steel Corporation filed with the secretary of state at Trenton, New Jersey, amended articles of incorporation increasing its authorized capital stock to \$1,100,000,000. The stock was equally divided into 7 per cent cumulative preferred stock and common stock. The total was greater by \$250,000,000 than the amount stated in the circular issued by J. P. Morgan & Co., on March 2, as "presently provided for," and with the 5 per cent gold bonds, not exceeding \$304,000,000, brought the security issues of the great steel combination up to \$1,404,000,000.

1901-1903.—*Question of Federal control and regulation.—Urgency of President Roosevelt for effective legislation.*—In his first message to Congress, three months after his succession to the presidency, President Roosevelt expressed his mind frankly and clearly on the then increasing demand in the country for more stringent measures of government, to control and regulate the exercise of the power which great aggregations of incorporated capital have created in recent times. In part, he then said: "There have been abuses connected with the accumulation of wealth; yet it remains true that a fortune accumulated in legitimate business can be accumulated by the person specially benefited only on condition of conferring immense incidental benefits upon others. . . . Much of the legislation directed at the trusts would have been exceedingly mischievous had it not also been entirely ineffective. In accordance with a well-known sociological law, the ignorant or reckless agitator has been the really effective friend of the evils which he has been nominally opposing. All this is true; and yet it is also true that there are real and grave evils, one of the chief being over-capitalization because of its many baleful consequences; and a resolute and practical effort must be made to correct these evils. There is a widespread conviction in the minds of the American people that the great corporations known as trusts are in certain of their features and tendencies hurtful to the general welfare. . . . In the interests of the public, the Government should have the right to inspect and examine the workings of the great corporations engaged in interstate business. . . . When the Constitution was adopted, at the end of the eighteenth century, no human wisdom could foretell the sweeping changes, alike in industrial and political conditions, which were to take place by the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time it was accepted as a matter of course that the several States were the proper authorities to regulate so far as was then necessary, the comparatively insignificant and strictly localized corporate bodies of the day. The conditions are now wholly different and wholly different action is called for. I believe that a law can be framed which will enable the National Government to exercise control along the lines above indicated: profiting by the experience gained through the passage and administration of the Interstate-Commerce Act. If, however, the judgment of the Congress is that it lacks the con-

stitutional power to pass such an act, then a constitutional amendment should be submitted to confer the power."—*President's message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1901.*

In the following summer, during a tour which he made through some of the New England states the President gave prominence to the same subject in his addresses, emphasizing the necessity of Federal legislation to arm the general government with more effective authority for regulating the action of corporations engaged in interstate trade. In speaking at Providence, he said: "Those great corporations containing some tendency to monopoly, which we have grown to speak of rather loosely as trusts, are the creatures of the State, and the State not only has the right to control them, but is in duty bound to control them wherever the need for such control is shown. There is clearly a need of supervision—need to exercise the power of regulation on the part of the representatives of the public, wherever, as in our own country at the present time, business corporations become so very strong, both for beneficent work and for work that is not always beneficent. . . . The conditions are complicated, and we find it difficult to frame national legislation which shall be adequate, while as a matter of practical experience State action has proved entirely insufficient, and in all human probability cannot or will not be made sufficient, to meet the needs of the case. Some of our States have excellent laws—laws which it would be well indeed to have enacted by the national legislature. But the wide differences in these laws, even between adjacent States, and the uncertainty of the power of enforcement result practically in altogether insufficient control. I believe that the nation must assume this power of control by legislation, and if it becomes evident that the constitution will not permit needed legislation, then by constitutional amendment. The immediate need of dealing with trusts is to place them under the real, not nominal, control of some sovereign to which, as its creature, the trusts shall owe allegiance, and in whose courts the sovereign's orders may with certainty be enforced. That is not the case with the ordinary so-called 'trust' today, for the trust is a large State corporation, generally, doing business in other States also, and often with a tendency to monopoly. Such a trust is an artificial creature not wholly responsible to or controllable by any legislature, nor wholly subject to the jurisdiction of any one court. Some governmental sovereign must be given full power over these artificial and very powerful corporate beings. In my judgment this sovereign must be the national government. When it has been given full power, then this full power can be used to control any evil influence, exactly as the government is now using the power conferred upon it under the Sherman Anti-Trust law. Even when the full power has been conferred it would be highly undesirable to attempt too much or to begin by stringent legislation. The mechanism of modern business is as delicate and complicated as it is vast, and nothing would be more productive of evil to all of us, and especially to those least well off in this world's goods, than ignorant meddling with this mechanism, and, above all, if the meddling was done in a spirit of class or sectional rancor. . . . The first exercise of that power should be the securing of publicity among all great corporations doing an interstate business. The publicity, though non-inquisitorial, should be real and thorough as to all important facts with which the public has concern. The full light of day is

a great discourager of evil. Such publicity would by itself tend to cure the evils of which there is just complaint, and where the alleged evils are imaginary, it would tend to show that such is the case. When publicity is attained it would then be possible to see what further should be done in the way of regulation. . . . I think the national administration has shown its firm intention to enforce the laws as they now stand on the statute books without regard to persons, and I think that good has come from this enforcement. I think, furthermore, that additional legislation should be had, and can be had, which will enable us to accomplish much more than has been accomplished along these same lines."—Theodore Roosevelt, *Address at Providence, Aug. 23, 1902 (New York Tribune, Aug. 24, 1902)*.

In his next message to Congress [Dec. 2, 1902], President Roosevelt renewed his urgency for the needed legislation. A year later, when the president addressed his message to the next Congress, at the opening of its first session, he was able to say: "The Congress has created the Department of Commerce and Labor, including the Bureau of Corporations, with for the first time authority to secure proper publicity of such proceedings of these great corporations as the public has the right to know. It has provided for the expediting of suits for the enforcement of the Federal anti-trust law; and by another law it has secured equal treatment to all producers in the transportation of their goods, thus taking a long stride forward in making the effective work of the Interstate Commerce Commission."—*President's message to Congress, Dec. 7, 1903*.

1901-1906.—Summary of governmental action against corporate wrongdoers, by Elihu Root.—**Legislation.**—**Litigation.**—**Court decisions.**—"The act creating the bureau of corporations [see U. S. A.: 1903 (February)], the act expediting the trial of trust cases, the anti-rebate act, the act for the regulation of railroad rates, have made possible redress which was impossible before. Under the direction of two successive Attorney Generals of the first order of ability, sincerity and devotion, in hundreds of courts, incessant warfare has been waged and is being waged under the federal laws against corporate wrongdoers. The Northern Securities Company, which sought to combine and prevent competition between two great continental railroads, has been forced to dissolve by the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States. [See RAILROADS: 1901-1905.] The methods of the Beef Trust in combining to suppress competition in the purchase of livestock and the sale of meat have been tried and condemned, and the trust has been placed under injunction to abandon these practices by judgment of the Supreme Court. The combination of paper manufacturers in the territory from Chicago to the Rocky Mountains has been dissolved by the judgment of the Supreme Court, and the combination has been abandoned, and the price of white paper in that territory has gone down 30 per cent. The Retail Grocers' Association in this country has been dissolved by decree of the court. The elevator combination in the West has been dissolved in like manner. The salt combination west of the Rocky Mountains has been dissolved by decree of the court. The Wholesale Grocers' Association in the South, the meat combination and the lumber combination in the West, the combination of railroads entering the city of St. Louis to suppress competition between the bridges and ferries reaching that city; the Drug Trust, which suppresses competition all

over the country, are being vigorously pressed in suits brought by the federal government for their dissolution. The salt combination has been indicted and convicted and fined for failing to obey the judgment of dissolution. The Beef Trust has been indicted for failing to obey the injunction against them, and have been saved so far only by a decision that they had secured temporary immunity by giving evidence against themselves. One branch of the Tobacco Trust is facing an indictment of its corporations and their officers in the federal court in New York, and the other branches are undergoing investigation. The lumber combination in Oklahoma is under indictment. The Fertilizer Trust, a combination of thirty-one corporations and twenty-five individuals to support and fix prices, has been indicted, the indictments have been sustained by the courts, and the combination has been dissolved. The ice combination of the District of Columbia is facing criminal trial. Special counsel are investigating the coal combination, and special counsel are investigating the Standard Oil combination. Three of the causes won in the Supreme Court of the United States have furnished decisions of the utmost importance. In the Tobacco Trust case of *Hale agt. Henkel*, the Supreme Court denied the claim of the trust corporations to be exempt under the Constitution from furnishing testimony against themselves by the production of their books and papers before a federal grand jury. Thus, the protection of secrecy for corporate wrongdoing is beaten down. In the Northern Securities case the Supreme Court held that a wrong accomplished by means of incorporating in accordance with the express provision of the New Jersey statute was just as much a violation of federal law as if there had been no incorporation. Thus, the state rights defence of protection from favoring state statutes is beaten down. In the Beef Trust case the Supreme Court held that, although the business of manufacture was carried on within the limits of a single state, yet the purchase of the raw material in different states and the sale of the finished product in different states brought the business within the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution and gave the federal government authority over it. Thus, the defence that the state alone can deal with manufacturing corporations, however widespread their business, is beaten down. The obstacles to the enforcement of the federal anti-trust act thus removed are obstacles which stood in the way of all proceedings, and they had to be cleared away before any proceedings of the same character against the same classes of corporations could be successfully maintained. They have been removed, not by newspaper headlines and denunciation, but by skill, ability, and energy of the highest order. After the Elkins anti-rebate law was passed by Congress in 1903 it was supposed, and the Interstate Commerce Commission reported, that the railroads had substantially abandoned giving rebates. Their good resolutions do not seem, however, to have lasted. The struggle for business enabled the shippers soon to secure a renewal of rebates or by ingenious devices advantages equivalent to rebates. Thereupon the Department of Justice began active prosecutions for the enforcement of the law. Fifty-three indictments have been found against hundreds of defendants and covering many hundreds of transactions. There have been fourteen criminal convictions. Fourteen individuals have been fined, to the gross amount of \$66,125. Nine corporations have been fined to the amount of \$253,000. Thirty-five indictments are



ready for trial in the regular order upon the court calendar. The original statute provided only for punishment by fine. Last winter it was amended by providing punishment by imprisonment, and, if the fines imposed under the original law shall not prove to have stopped the practice, we shall see whether fear of the penitentiary under the amendment will not do so. Under this statute also it was necessary to sweep away defences which stood as barriers to general prosecution, and in the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad case, decided by the Supreme Court February 19 of this year, and the Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit case, decided in the Seventh Circuit on May 31 of this year, the courts have held that the substance and not the form is to control in the application of the statute, and that, however the transaction may be disguised, an unlawful discrimination can be reached and punished. The way is therefore cleared for all other prosecutions. The Railroad Rates act, which was the subject of such excited discussion during the last session of Congress, has already justified itself. Since the passage of the act, less than five months ago, there have been more voluntary reductions of rates by our railroads than during the entire nineteen years of the previous life of the Interstate Commerce Commission. On the single day of the 29th of August, 1906, two days before the act went into force, over five thousand notices of voluntary reduction of rates were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission by the railroads of the United States."—Elihu Root, *Speech at Utica, Nov. 1, 1906* (*New York Tribune, Nov. 2, 1906*).

1903-1906.—Beef trust suits and investigations.—United States vs. Swift & Company et al.—Commissioner Garfield's investigation.—Indictment of Armour & Company and others.—Immunity decision of Judge Humphrey.—Fines for receiving rebates from railways.—In the case known as that of the United States vs. Swift & Co. et al., the defendants were seven corporations, one copartnership, and twenty-three other persons (commonly styled "the Beef Trust"), charged with violations of the anti-trust law, by combination in restraint of the trade which they conducted, namely, the buying of live stock, slaughtering the same in different states and selling the meats thus produced. It was affirmed by the government that they, together, controlled about sixty per cent of the total volume of that trade in the country, and that if the alleged combination among them did not exist they "would be and remain in competition with each other"; but that by such "unlawful combination and conspiracy" they were directing and requiring their agents (1) not to bid against one another in the live-stock markets of the different states; (2) to bid up prices for a few days so as to induce cattlemen to send their stock to the stock-yards; (3) to fix prices at which they would sell, and hence, when necessary, to restrict shipments of meat; (4) to establish a uniform rule of credit to dealers and to keep a blacklist; (5) to make uniform and improper charges for cartage; and (6) to obtain less than lawful rates from the railways to the exclusion of all competitors. The case, on motion for injunction, was tried first in the Circuit Court of the northern district of Illinois, Judge Peter S. Grosscup. The opinion of the court, given April 18, 1903, held that, under the definition of the term by the Supreme Court in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case (see RAILROADS: 1800-1902), "there can be no doubt that the agreement of the defendants to refrain from bidding against

each other in the purchase of cattle is combination in restraint of trade; so also their agreement to bid up prices to stimulate shipments, intending to cease from bidding when the shipments have arrived. The same result," continued the judge, "follows when we turn to the combination of defendants to fix prices upon and restrict the quantities of meat shipped to their agents or their customers. Such agreements can be nothing less than restriction upon competition, and, therefore, combination in restraint of trade; and thus viewed, the petition, as an entirety, makes out a case under the Sherman Act. . . . The demurrer is overruled, and the motion for preliminary injunction granted." On appeal, the case went to the Supreme Court, where it was argued in January, 1905, and decided on the 30th of the same month. The opinion of the court, rendered by Justice Holmes, with no dissent, affirmed, but modified, the decree of injunction issued by Judge Grosscup; the aim of the modifications being to give more definiteness to the decree. "The defendants," said Justice Holmes, for example, "cannot be ordered to compete, but they properly can be forbidden to give directions or to make agreements not to compete. The injunction follows the charge. No objection was made on the ground that it is not confined to the places specified in the bill. It seems to us, however, that it ought to set forth more exactly the transactions in which such directions and agreements are forbidden. The trade in fresh meat referred to should be defined somewhat as it is in the bill, and the sales of stock should be confined to sales of stock at the stock-yards named, which stock is sent from other States to the stock-yards for sale or is bought at those yards for transport to another State."—*Federal anti-trust decisions, 1900-1906, v. 2*, prepared and edited by J. A. Finch, by direction of the attorney-general (*Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907*).

On March 7, 1904, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution requesting the secretary of commerce and labor to "investigate the causes of the low prices of beef cattle in the United States since July 1st, 1903, and the unusually large margins between the prices of beef cattle and the selling prices of fresh beef, and whether the same conditions have resulted in whole or in part from any contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of commerce among the several States and Territories or with foreign countries; also, whether said prices have been controlled in whole or in part by any corporation, joint stock company, or corporate combination engaged in commerce among the several States or with foreign nations; and, if so, to investigate the organization, capitalization, profits, conduct and management of the business of such corporations, companies, and corporate combinations, and to make early report of his findings according to law." In compliance with this resolution, the commissioner of corporations, Mr. James R. Garfield, went to Chicago in April and began the requested investigation, which was prosecuted throughout most of the ensuing year. "The inquiries of the Bureau of Corporations were naturally concerned chiefly with the six great concerns which, by the injunction of 1902, were grouped together, and which were popularly considered as the Beef Trust. The 'Big Six,' in the approximate order of their magnitude as indicated by the number of animals slaughtered, are: Swift & Co., with seven large plants; Armour & Co., and the Armour Packing Company, which have the same stockholders, and which together operate five pack-

ing-houses; the National Packing Company, with eight comparatively large plants and two or three minor ones; Morris & Co., operating three plants; the Cudahy Packing Company, with three plants in the middle West and a minor one at Los Angeles; and the Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Company, operating three plants. [See BIG FIVE.] Nearly all of the important packing-houses of these six companies are situated in the eight great livestock markets,—Chicago, Kansas City, South Omaha, East St. Louis, South St. Joseph, Fort Worth, South St. Paul, and Sioux City." As for the National Packing Company, it grew, apparently, out of an abortive scheme for the consolidation of the other five concerns which was rumored in 1902. "Shortly prior to the formation of this company the Armour interests had acquired control of the G. H. Hammond Company and the Omaha Packing Company, the Swifts had secured the Anglo-American Provision Company and the Fowler Packing Association, and the Morris family had become dominant in the United Dressed Beef Company of New York. The National Packing Company, organized in 1903, took over the control of the various corporations thus previously acquired by the three packing interests named, and has since absorbed two or three other smaller concerns. The directorate of the National Company consist almost wholly of representatives of the Armour, Swift, and Morris companies. Aside from this community of interest, the bureau finds that there is no important inter-ownership of securities among the six leading packing companies. The 'Big Six' are by no means the only slaughterers of cattle in the United States. They, with a few minor affiliated concerns, killed 5,521,697 cattle in 1903, while, from the best available data, the Bureau of Corporations computes the total slaughter of the country at about 12,500,000. But the proportion of 45 per cent. thus indicated by no means measures the full economic significance of the six great packers. Their importance lies in the fact that they are the only concerns which do an extensive business in shipping dressed beef. . . . The 'Big Six' kill about 98 per cent. of the cattle slaughtered at the eight leading Western markets above named."—E. D. Durand, *Beef industry and the government investigation (American Review of Reviews, Apr., 1905)*.—Early in March, 1905, just before the adjournment of Congress, his report of it, in part, was transmitted by the president to Congress. The following summary of important facts set forth in the extended report was published in *The Outlook* of the following week: "The report as sent to Congress deals with the prices of cattle and dressed beef, the margins between such prices, and the organization, conduct, and profits of the corporations engaged in the beef-packing business. In some respects the conclusions presented are distinctly favorable to the packers; in others, quite as unfavorable. It appears that the profits of the six great companies whose operations were covered by the investigation were very much smaller during the years 1902 and 1903 than the public had been led, suppose,—that, in fact, for a part of that period the business was conducted at an actual loss. The percentage of profit on the gross volume of business during the years 1902-4 was comparatively low. That realized by Swift & Co. is placed at two per cent. This, however, we repeat, is the percentage on total sales, which is a very different thing from profit on the investment. It is a well-known fact that the actual capitalization of the packing companies is very

much less than the annual volume of business. From statements made by the six companies to the Bureau of Corporations it appears that their gross business is not less than \$700,000,000 per year, while their nominal capitalization is only \$88,000,000, exclusive of \$5,000,000 bonds of Swift & Co. On the other hand, it is practically impossible, as the report shows, to determine accurately just what proportion of the total investment represents plants and properties concerned with the beef industry exclusively. Still, it is obvious that Swift & Co.'s net profit of two per cent. on their sales would amount to very much more than two per cent. on their investment. The report makes an approximate estimate of twelve per cent. On one other count the report is favorable to the companies. It declares that they are apparently not overcapitalized. This conclusion, it is true, is robbed of some of its exculpatory force when the private-car system is taken into consideration. It is shown that the companies' profits on refrigerator cars, revived from mileage paid by the railroads, has ranged from 14 to 22 per cent. The report gives clear and definite information as to the trust's field of operations. It shows that the six companies slaughtered in 1903 only about 45 per cent. of all the cattle killed in that year, but that these companies slaughter nearly 98 per cent. of all the cattle killed in the leading Western packing centers, and that they control a large percentage of the trade in beef in many large cities—75 per cent. in New York, 85 per cent. in Boston, 95 per cent. in Providence, and in a number of other important cities from 50 to 90 per cent. In all these centers of population the consumer is now paying more for meats than ever before, while the cattle-grower on the Western plains is receiving less for his beeves. These two facts are doubtless capable of explanation, but the published results of the investigation ordered by Congress throw little light on the matter."

Soon after the publication of the report of the Bureau of Corporations a special federal grand jury at Chicago began the investigation of charges brought by the attorney-general of the United States against five of the corporations engaged in the meat-packing business and seventeen of their officials. An indictment was returned by the grand jury on July 1, 1905, charging, in a number of counts, persistent violation of the injunction laid on these corporations and their officials by Judge Grosscup with affirmation by the Supreme Court, and continued combination in restraint of trade,—by requiring their purchasing agents to refrain from bidding in good faith against one another; by agreements that fixed the prices of beef; by restricting sales to maintain prices, etc. On the trial of the indictment, which was begun on January 29, and concluded on March 21, 1906, the defendants claimed immunity, under that clause of the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States which reads: "Nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Their claim for immunity under this constitutional prescription was founded on the fact that "upon the lawful requirement of the Commissioner of Corporations" they "had furnished evidence, documentary and otherwise, of and concerning the matters charged in the indictment"; and that a section of the act creating the Department of Commerce and Labor provides that persons testifying or producing evidence before the commissioner shall be entitled to the immunities conferred by the act in relation to testimony before

the Interstate Commerce Commission of Feb. 11, 1893. Judge Humphrey, of the United States district court, before whom the case was tried, sustained the plea in his charge to the jury, so far as concerned the individual defendants, saying: "Under the law of this case, the immunity pleas filed by the defendants will be sustained as to the individual defendants, the natural persons, and denied as to the corporations, the artificial persons, and your verdict will be in favor of the defendants as to the individuals, and in favor of the Government as to the corporations." The same Federal grand jury at Chicago which returned the indictments dealt with in the case mentioned above brought another indictment against four men in the employ of one of the meat-packing companies, who were accused of unlawfully combining and agreeing to solicit rebates for their corporation from the Michigan Central, the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific, the Grand Trunk Western, the Lehigh Valley, the Boston and Maine, and the Mobile and Ohio railroads. It was charged that the defendants conspired with one another in presenting to the railroad companies pretended claims for damages which were in fact claims for rebates. They were brought for trial before Judge Humphrey in September, 1905, and pleaded guilty. The judge then pronounced sentence on them as follows: "Punishment for this offense as fixed by Congress has a wide range, giving the Court unusual latitude, ranging from a nominal fine without imprisonment to a heavy fine and two years' imprisonment, all in the discretion of the Court. I am disposed to consider this case with reasonable moderation. The sentence of the Court in the case of the defendant Weil will be a fine of \$10,000 and costs, and commitment to the county jail until the fine is paid, and in the cases of Todd, Skipworth, and Cusey a fine of \$5,000 and costs, with the same provision in regard to payment."

ALSO IN: F. Walker, *Beef trust and the United States government* (Economic Journal, Dec., 1906).

1904.—Views contained in party platforms. See U. S. A.: 1904 (May-November).

1904-1909.—Standard Oil Company.—Federal government investigation of its methods of business.—Criminal prosecutions for violation of the law against rebates.—Fine of \$29,000,000 and its annulment.—Acquittal of the company.—After a dozen years or more of slight oil production in Kansas, that state became quite suddenly, in 1904, one of the important sources of petroleum supply. The Standard Oil Company had taken care to be prepared for whatever development might occur, and had organized its operations in this western field under the name of the Prairie Oil and Gas Company, of Kansas. Its refineries were ready to furnish a market to the Kansas producers of crude oil, and they had no other. Independent enterprises in oil refining were made quite impossible, and the Prairie Oil and Gas Company was complete master of the situation. The Kansas oil producers were soon writhing under its dictation of prices and rules of dealing, as the Pennsylvanians had been years before, and the Kansas legislature came promptly to their rescue. In the winter of 1904-1905 it passed five vigorous acts; authorizing the establishment of a state oil refinery; making pipe lines common carriers within the state; placing them under the jurisdiction of the state board of railroad commissioners; fixing maximum rates for the transportation of oil by freight or pipe line; and, finally, prohibiting discrimination between localities in the sale of any commodities. Furthermore, the anti-trust laws of the state

were brought into action against the Standard Oil Company and the railroads accused of giving it special rates and privileges. At the same time, the Kansas situation was brought to the attention of Congress and the Federal executive. On motion of a Kansas representative, the lower House of Congress, in February, adopted a resolution calling on the president for an investigation of the methods of business pursued by the Standard Oil Company. The desired investigation was conducted in the following year by Commissioner Garfield, the head of the Bureau of Corporations, and his report was communicated to Congress on May 5, 1906, with an accompanying special message, by the president. Nothing of the detail of facts in the report can be given here; but the conclusions drawn from them by the commissioner were summed up by him, as follows: "Upon the request of its attorney, all the essential facts discovered by this Bureau were presented to the company at the close of the investigation, and an exhaustive statement relating thereto was made by its chief traffic officer. There was no denial of the facts found, but explanations of particular situations were offered, and it was urged that the facts did not show any violation by the Standard of the letter or spirit of the interstate-commerce law. A most careful review of the facts and the explanations leads to the following conclusions: The Standard Oil Company has habitually received from the railroads, and is now receiving, secret rates and other unjust and illegal discriminations. During 1904 the Standard saved about three-quarters of a million dollars through the secret rates discovered by the Bureau of Corporations, and of course there may be other secret rates which the Bureau has not discovered. This amount represents the difference between the open rates and the rates actually paid. Many of these discriminations were clearly in violation of the interstate-commerce law, and others, whether technically illegal or not, had the same effect upon competitors. On some State business secret rates were applied by means of rebates. These discriminations have been so long continued, so secret, so ingeniously applied to new conditions of trade, and so large in amount as to make it certain that they were due to concerted action by the Standard and the railroads.

"The Standard Oil Company is receiving unjust discriminations in open rates. The published rates from the leading Standard shipping points are relatively much lower than rates from the shipping points of its competitors. The advantage to the Standard over its competitors from such open discriminations is enormous, probably as important as that obtained through the secret rates. If an unfair discrimination be obtained by one shipper through a device which in itself is seemingly not prohibited by law, that fact shows that the law is defective and should be strengthened; it does not show that the discrimination is proper or just."—*Report of the commissioner of corporations on the transportation of petroleum, May 2, 1906, Letter of submittal, pp. xxi-xxv* (50th Congress, 1st Session House of Representatives, Document no. 812).

Consequent on the information secured by this investigation, criminal proceedings against the Standard Oil Company in its various state organizations were instituted in 1906-1907. The number and character of the indictments found in these cases are set forth in tabular form, in an article on "The Oil Trust and the Government," by Francis Walker, published in the *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1908. The following

statement of them is summarized from that table:

In the northern district of Illinois, Aug. 27, 1906, against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, 1903 and 134 indictments on shipments over the Chicago and Alton railway, from Whiting, Indiana, to East St. Louis, Illinois, and from Chappell, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri.

In the same district, same date, against same Company, 2124 and 220 indictments on shipments over the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railway, from Whiting to East St. Louis and St. Louis.

In the same district, same date, against same company, 1318 and 597 indictments on shipments over the Chicago and Eastern Illinois and the Evansville and Terre Haute railways, from Whiting to Evansville.

In the same district, same date, against same company, 103 indictments, on shipments over the Chicago and Eastern Illinois and the Evansville and Terre Haute railways from Whiting, via Grand Junction, Tennessee, to various points in the South.

In the eastern division of the western district of Tennessee, Oct. 16, 1906, against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, 1524 indictments, on shipments over the Illinois Central and Southern railways, from Evansville, via Grand Junction, to various points.

In the eastern district of Missouri, Nov. 18, 1906, against the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, seventy-six indictments, on shipments over the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern railway, to various points.

In the western district of Louisiana, Jan. 28, 1907, against the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, thirty-two indictments, on shipments over the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern railway, to various points.

In the western district of New York, August 10, 1907, against the Vacuum Oil Company, twenty-three indictments, on shipments from Olean to Vermont.

In the western district of New York, Aug. 24, 1906, against the Standard Oil Company of New York, twenty-three and 123 indictments, on shipments from Olean to Vermont.

In the same district, Aug. 9, 1907, against same company, 188 and forty indictments, on shipments from Olean, New York, to Burlington, Vermont, over New York Central and Rutland and Vermont Central railways.

In same district, same date, against the Vacuum Oil Company, 188 and forty indictments on shipments from Olean to Burlington and to Rutland and Burlington.

In same district, Sept. 6, 1907, against the Standard Oil Company of New York, fifty-four indictments, on shipments from Olean and Rochester to points in Vermont. The most notable of these criminal prosecutions has been the one described first in the list above. The opening chapter of its history is sketched as follows by Francis Walker, in the article already referred to: "The only important case which, up to December, 1907, had come to trial, was the indictment against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana for accepting a secret rate on shipments over the Chicago and Alton Railway, from Whiting Indiana, to East St. Louis, Illinois, and from Chappell, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri. The published rate on this traffic was eighteen cents per hundred pounds (as far as East St. Louis, a bridge toll of one and a half cents being added on shipments to St. Louis); while the rate paid by the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, during the period of about three years

covered by the indictment and for many years before, was only six cents per hundred pounds. On this rate, the Standard had transported, as charged in the indictment, 1903 carloads of oil, each carload being made the subject of a distinct count and separate proof. The trial of this case began in Chicago, on March 4, 1907. . . . The jury returned a verdict of guilty on 1462 counts, on April 14, 1907: a considerable number of counts, namely 441, were thrown out on technical grounds. . . . The court held . . . that the unlawful rate was made on a carload basis, and that each carload unlawfully transported constituted a distinct offence. In considering the amount of the fine to be levied, the court demanded information from the officials of the Standard Oil Company regarding the net earnings and dividends of the chief holding company of the trust—the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Their attendance and testimony were obtained only by writ of subpoena; and it was admitted that the net profits during the years 1903 to 1905 (when these rebates existed) amounted to \$81,336,994, \$61,570,110, and \$57,459,356 respectively. . . . The court adjudged, on August 3, 1907, that the defendant should pay the maximum penalty and fined the Standard Oil Company \$20,000 for each offence, that is, for each of the 1462 counts in the indictment upon which conviction was obtained. The total fine, therefore, amounting to \$29,240,000."—F. Walker, *Oil trust and the government (Political Science Quarterly, Mar., 1908)*.

On a writ of error the case went now to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, where it was argued at the April session, 1908, and the opinion, by Judge Peter S. Grosscup, circuit judge, delivered on the 22d of the following July. In his opinion the district court was held to have erred in deciding that each single carload of oil was to be dealt with as a separate offence, and that it reasoned erroneously in determining the fine imposed. On this latter point Judge Grosscup said: "Briefly stated, the reason of the trial court for imposing this sentence was because, after conviction and before sentence, it was brought out on an examination of some of the officers and stockholders of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, that the capital stock of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, the defendants before the court, was principally owned by the New Jersey corporation, a corporation not before the court—the trial court adding (upon no evidence however to be found in the record, and upon no information specially referred to) that in concessions of the character for which the defendant before the court had been indicted, tried, and convicted, the New Jersey corporation was not a 'virgin' offender. Is a sentence such as this, based on reasoning such as that, sound? Passing over the fact that no word of evidence or other information supporting the trial court's comment is to be found in the record, would the comment, if duly proven, justify a sentence such as this—one that otherwise would not have been imposed? Can a court, without abuse of judicial discretion, wipe out all the property of the defendant before the court, and all the assets to which its creditors look, in an effort to reach and punish a party that is not before the court—a party that has not been convicted, has not been tried, has not been indicted even? Can an American judge, without abuse of judicial discretion, condemn any one who has not had his day in court? . . . The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case remanded with instructions to grant

a new trial, and proceed further in accordance with this opinion." The government failed in attempts to secure a rehearing before the Appellate court, as well as in an application for the reviewing of the case by the Supreme Court. On the new trial to which the case was remanded Judge Landis, whose judgment had been set aside, declined to sit, and Judge A. B. Anderson, of Indianapolis, was called to Chicago to occupy his bench. The trial was opened on Feb. 23, 1909. On March 2 Judge Anderson sustained the motion of the defense that the government must proceed on the theory that there were thirty-six alleged offences—that is, that each settlement on which an alleged rebate was paid instead of each carload, constituted a separate offence. This made it impossible to claim a penalty beyond \$720,000, being at the rate of \$20,000 for each offence. But even that was put out of the question by the ultimate decision of the judge, that the law, as laid down by the United States Court of Appeals, required him to direct the jury to find the Standard Oil Company not guilty on the charge of accepting rebates from the Chicago and Alton railroad. This instruction he gave on March 10, thus bringing the case to an end. The outcome in this case was said to mean that all but two of the pending indictments against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, as recapitulated above, are void and would be abandoned by the government. The two cases not affected are cases involving the shipment of 1915 carloads of oil from Whiting, Indiana, to Evansville, Indiana, via Dolton junction, over the Chicago and Eastern Illinois railroad. On March 15, five days after the acquittal of the company in Illinois, a fine of \$20,000 was imposed upon it by the United States district court of the western district of New York, on one of the indictments founded on shipments from Rochester and Olean to points in Vermont. Previously, the New York Central railroad had paid a heavy fine for granting rebates on those shipments. Numerous state prosecutions, under state laws in Missouri, Texas, Minnesota, Ohio, and elsewhere, had been assailing the monopolistic corporation simultaneously with the proceedings of the general government against it, and some of them with greater seriousness of effect than the Federal prosecutors had accomplished. The more important of these were in Texas, against the subsidiary Waters-Pierce Oil Company of Missouri, and in Missouri, against that company in association with the Standard of Indiana, and with another of the same trust family. The Texas suit, after making its slow way through the state courts and to the United States Supreme Court, came to its conclusion early in 1909, with the result of a fine of \$1,623,500, and the exclusion of the company from business in the state. The suit in Missouri, as decided at about the same time by the Supreme Court of the state, resulted in an order for the dissolution of the Waters-Pierce Company and for the perpetual exclusion of the other companies, chartered elsewhere, from operations within the state. The outcome of this vindication of the law of the state is understood to have been an arrangement under which the business of the Waters-Pierce Company is taken over by a new company, the stock of which is held by trustees approved by the Supreme Court of the state and acting as officers of the court.

1904-1911.—Movement to break political power\* of trusts. See NEW JERSEY: 1904-1911.

1905-1906.—Tobacco trust case of Hale vs. Henkel.—Denial by the Supreme Court of the claim of corporations to be exempt from the

production of books and papers before a grand jury.—A proceeding begun by the government of the United States, in the spring of 1905, to ascertain the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the methods of business pursued by the so-called tobacco trust, was embarrassed by the refusal of a witness to give evidence for which he was summoned before the grand jury of the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York. The case pending was between the United States and the American Tobacco Company and MacAndrews & Forbes Company. The witness, Hale, was secretary and treasurer of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company. He refused to answer any questions that were put to him concerning the business of that company, or to produce any of the books, accounts, contracts, correspondence, etc., that were demanded, being advised by counsel that he was under no legal obligation to do so, and that the evidence given or produced by him might tend to incriminate himself. He was held to be in contempt of court and was committed to the custody of the United States Marshal. Being then, on a writ of *habeas corpus*, brought before another judge of the same court, after a hearing, the writ was discharged and he was remanded to custody (June 18, 1905). An appeal to the Supreme Court followed, which was argued in the early days of January, 1906, and decided on the following March 12. The decision of the court, rendered by Justice Brown, was on two issues which it found to be presented in the case: the first involving "the immunity of the witness from oral examination; the second the legality of his action in refusing to produce the documents called for by the *subpoena duces tecum*." The witness justified his refusal to answer questions, "1st upon the ground that there was no specific 'charge' pending before the grand jury against any particular person; 2d that the answers would tend to criminate him." On the first point the court found it "entirely clear that under the practice in this country, at least, the examination of witnesses need not be preceded by a presentment or indictment formally drawn up, but that the grand jury may proceed, either upon their own knowledge or upon the examination of witnesses, to inquire for themselves whether a crime cognizable by the Court has been committed." As to the plea of an apprehended self-incrimination, the court held that the witness was protected by the act which provides that no person shall be prosecuted on account of anything concerning which he may testify or produce evidence. But it was further insisted that while the immunity statute may protect individual witnesses it would not protect the corporation of which the appellant was the agent and representative. "This is true," says the court, "but the answer is that it was not designed to do so. The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person."

On the second issue in the case, the substance of the decision is in the following passages from it: "Having already held that, by reason of the immunity act of 1903, the witness could not avail himself of the Fifth Amendment, it follows that he cannot set up that Amendment as against the production of the books and papers, since in respect to these he would also be protected by the immunity act. . . . We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular be-

tween an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. . . . The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. . . . Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. . . . Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. . . . Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the Legislature to investigate its contracts and to find out whether it has exceeded its powers. . . . The defense amounts to this: That an officer of a corporation, which is charged with a criminal violation of the statute, may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges." Taking note of the fact that the franchises of the corporation in this case were derived from one of the states, the court proceeds to say: "Such franchises, so far as they involve questions of inter-State commerce, must also be exercised in subordination to the power of Congress to regulate such commerce, and in respect to this the General Government may also assert a sovereign authority to ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised in a lawful manner, with due regard to its own laws. . . . The powers of the General Government in this particular, in vindication of its own laws, are the same as if the corporation had been created by an act of Congress." Justices Harlan and McKenna dissented from some of the views set forth in the opinion of the majority, as declared by Justice Brown, but concurred in the final judgment, which affirmed the order of the Circuit Court, remanding the prisoner to the custody of the Marshal. Justice Brewer and the chief justice dissented from the conclusions relative to corporations, and from the judgment, holding that "the order of the Circuit Court should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to discharge the petitioner, leaving the grand jury to initiate new proceedings not subject to the objections to this."—*Federal anti-trust decisions, 1000-1906*, prepared and edited by J. A. Finch by direction of the attorney-general, v. 2, p. 874 (Washington: Government printing office, 1907).

1906-1910.—Standard Oil Company.—Suit of the government for its dissolution.—Decree for its dissolution by the Circuit Court.—Appeal to the Supreme Court.—Entirely distinct from the criminal prosecutions of the Standard Oil Company by the United States government, as reviewed above was a suit begun in November, 1906, in the United States Circuit Court for the eastern division of Missouri. The former actions were to penalize the company for violations of the Elkins Act, by the procuring of railway rebates. The later suit was to dissolve the combination in restraint of trade which the company was alleged to be, and therefore illegally existing, in the view of the Sherman anti-trust law. The complaint was directed against the parent organization, known as the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, with

its various subsidiary corporations. It was also directed against seven individuals namely, John D. Rockefeller, William Rockefeller, Henry M. Flagler, Henry H. Rogers (now deceased), John D. Archbold, Oliver H. Payne, and Charles M. Pratt. The main company, its branches, and these individuals were charged in the complaint with having entered into an agreement, combination, and conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce among the several states, to monopolize the trade in petroleum, both in its purchase and its shipment and transportation by pipe-line steamships and by rail, also in the manufacture and refining of petroleum. One of the evidences of its monopoly adduced by the government was the enormity of its earnings which were summarized thus: The Standard Oil trust and the Standard Oil Company, on an investment of \$69,024,480, had earned up to the end of 1906, \$838,783,783. Adding the estimated profits of 1907 and 1908, we have substantially, the brief states, a billion dollars earned by this company in twenty-seven years, with an original investment of about \$60,000,000. The United States asked for a perpetual injunction, and for the dissolution of the Standard Oil combination. Hearings were held in New York, Washington, Chicago, Cleveland, and St. Louis, about four hundred witnesses being examined. It was not until Apr. 5, 1906, that the case reached the stage of argument, before Judges Walter H. Sanborn, Willis Van Devanter, William C. Hook and Elmer B. Adams, constituting the United States Circuit Court at St. Louis. The decision of the court was announced on the following November 20, the four judges concurring in the opinion, written by Judge Sanborn, which held the Standard Oil Company to be an illegal corporation and decreed its dissolution. Appeal from the decree was taken to the Supreme Court where it was preceded by the appeal of the tobacco trust from a similar decree involving substantially the same questions. On motion of the government the cases were advanced on the docket and decisions were handed down in due time. See below: 1911: Supreme Court decisions in Standard Oil and tobacco trust cases.

1907.—Chief existing combinations.—Their operation through stock ownership.—"Passing the matter of railroad combinations, as to which it may be said that through stock ownership the control of all American lines is now concentrated in seven groups of parent properties, we are chiefly concerned with the practical use that has been made of the new corporate power by the largest and strongest of our manufacturing and industrial enterprises.

"The United States Steel Corporation, organized under the laws of New Jersey, with a capital stock of \$1,100,000,000 owns a majority of the stock of eleven subsidiary companies, and controls industries scattered over the entire country under different styles and corporate names. This corporation owns or manages 213 manufacturing and transportation plants and forty-one mines located in eighteen different States; it has more than 1,000 miles of railroad tracks to ore, coke and manufacturing properties, and a lake fleet of 112 vessels. This stock ownership gives it control of hundreds of millions of capital that is not represented by its own billion dollars of stock.

"The Amalgamated Copper Company, incorporated in New Jersey, has no asset whatever except the stocks of other corporations. It owns all the stock of four operating companies and a controlling interest in seven others, and has taken

them over by an issue of \$155,000,000 of its own stock.

"The American Smelting and Refining Company, organized under the laws of New Jersey, controls the business of thirteen corporations, in which it either owns the entire stock or a majority interest. Associated with it are the American Linseed Company, the National Lead Company and the United Lead Company, and they together control twenty-eight concerns and ninety-three affiliated corporations.

"The Standard Oil Company, incorporated in New Jersey, with a capital stock of \$110,000,000, controls, directs and manages more than seventy corporations through its possession of a majority of their stock. Some of these companies own stock in still other corporations, and all together the combine operates more than 400 separate and distinct properties, thus monopolizing 90 per cent. of the export oil trade and 84 per cent. of the domestic trade. The market value of its capitalization is about \$650,000,000, and all this vast property was brought together under one head without the payment of a single dollar of cash, the whole consolidation being effected through the issue of stock in the holding company in payment of stock in the companies that are held.

"The United Gas Improvement Company, incorporated in Pennsylvania, owns stock in thirty corporations doing the character of business for which it was organized, and in addition to this is interested in numerous street railway properties, including the New York City surface railways. With it is allied the Public Service Corporation of New Jersey and the Rhode Island Securities Company, which last named owns all the stock of the Rhode Island Company, which again has leased for 999 years several of the most important railroad companies doing business in that State. The power of this corporation, through this system of stock ownership, is scarcely calculable, and the value of properties controlled would equal hundreds of millions, although its own capital stock is but \$36,000,000.

"The American Tobacco Company, organized under the laws of New Jersey, with a capital stock of \$40,000,000, practically controls the whole market through its ownership of the stock of innumerable other corporations.

"The International Harvester Company, incorporated in New Jersey, with a capital stock of \$120,000,000, while probably not a holding company, maintains most, if not all, the corporations which it has bought out, and they are operated as if they were distinct and competing concerns.

"The American Sugar Refining Company, incorporated in New Jersey, with a common stock of \$40,000,000 controls fifty-three other corporations.

"The American Telegraph and Telephone Company, incorporated in New York, with a capital stock of \$250,000,000 controls, through stock ownership, thirty-five subsidiary corporations.

"The Western Union Telegraph Company owns stock in twenty-four other corporations; the Distillers' Security Company owns 90 per cent. of the stocks of the Distilling Company of America, and has acquired ninety-three plants, representing 60 per cent. of the industry; the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company owns the stock of twelve elevated and street railway companies; the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company owns the stock of seven others; the Metropolitan Securities Company of New York owns the stock of many traction companies, and the controlling interest in others;

the Inter-State Railways of New Jersey own all the stock of the United Power and Transportation Company, which latter company controls the capital and franchises of about forty other projected companies in New Jersey and Pennsylvania; while the International Mercantile Marine Company of New Jersey owns a majority of the shares of many of the most important steamship companies whose vessels cross the Atlantic Ocean.

"These are but a few instances of the promotion of combinations through stock ownership."—W. H. Ellis, attorney-general of Ohio, *Paper read at national conference on trusts and combinations, Chicago, Oct. 22, 1907.*

1907.—National conference on the trust question, invited by the National Civic Federation.—An assembly at Chicago, of delegates from all parts of the country, purporting to voice all interests, was brought about by the invitation of the National Civic Federation, in October, 1907, for a thorough discussion of the questions which troubled the country and confused its attitude toward trusts and combinations, as subjects of regulation by law. There had been a similar conference at Chicago in 1899, at the call of the civic federation of that city; but no common ground of agreement could then be found. The conference of 1907 held nine sessions, extending over four days. It adopted and presented to Congress and the president, resolutions pointing out "the necessity of legislation which shall render more secure the benefits already gained and better meet the changed conditions which have arisen during a long period of active progress, both in the enforcement of statute law and in the removal of grave abuses in the management of railroads and corporations."—*Proceedings of the National Conference on Trusts and Combinations, Chicago, Oct. 22-25, 1907 (New York: National Civic Federation, 1908).*

1907.—Corporation commission established in Oklahoma. See OKLAHOMA: 1907-1910.

1907-1909.—Theft of the sugar trust.—In the fall of 1907 disclosures were made to the government which led to an investigation of the methods whereby imports of raw sugar for the American Sugar Refining Company, known commonly as the sugar trust, were weighed for the payment of customs duties, at the company's docks in Williamsburgh and Jersey City. The result of the investigation was to prove that this enormously wealthy corporation had practiced systematic theft against the government. Several ingenious inventions of trickery with the weighing scales had been employed at the sugar docks prior to 1904, but the crowning one appears to have been brought to use in that year. "This," said the *New York Evening Post* of Apr. 29, 1900, in a full rehearsal of the story of the sugar trust larcenies, "consisted of a thin steel corset spring, which was inserted through a hole drilled in the uprights or stanchions supporting the scales. If inserted at a time when there was a load on the platform, its pressure against the walking beam of the scale resulted in creating a false balance, and in making the load appear considerably lighter than it really was. This little device proved to be so satisfactory for the purposes for which it was designed that it was fitted to all the seventeen government scales at the Havemeyer & Elder refinery. Holes were drilled in the stanchions of each of the scales—hence the 'case of the seventeen holes' to which Mr. Stimson called attention. So successful was the operation of this mechanism that it was used constantly down to the very day. November 20,

1907, when a United States Treasury agent found it in use. The method of use was simple. The scales were placed with the stanchions in a dark corner, next to the wall, and close beside this stanchion sat the company's checker, whose ostensible duty it was to record in a little book the weight of each load as it was read off to him by the government weigher standing at the other end of the scale. The checker's really important duty seems to have been, however, to manipulate the steel spring through the hole in the stanchion, so that on each truck load, the company which employed him was saved the payment of duty on some fourteen pounds of sugar. Evidence was adduced at the subsequent trial to show that the company considered this special service on the part of its checkers worthy of additional compensation. For although there were seventeen scales, all of which could be used for this purpose, practically all the weighing was done on six, and the six reliable checkers who, year in and year out, operated the little steel springs, all received extra pay in their weekly pay envelopes for this service." Consequent on the discovery of these facts, "several indictments were found against the Sugar Trust's employees, and with that discovery as a basis the government began to work up its case. . . . When the government came to work up its case and to fix approximately the amount out of which it had been defrauded, it was found possible to present a piece of evidence which so thoroughly clinched the case that defence, when it came to be made, was so weak as to be negligible. This evidence consisted of a tabulation comparing the weights of sugar on which duty was paid and the weights for which the company paid the planters between the time the first cargo of sugar of December, 1901, arrived at the refinery and the discovery of the fraud in November, 1907. It took a score or more of accountants working steadily for six months to complete the tabulation, but when it was finished the astonishing corroborative story it told made it well worth all the time and trouble expended. Never was there a better example of the deadly parallel. For every entry the weights on which duties were levied was set alongside of the weights for which the company paid the planters." The first result of the proceedings of the government against the sugar trust was a pecuniary settlement with it, concerning which the following official statement was given out at Washington, by Attorney-General Wickersham, on Apr. 29, 1909: "The Attorney-General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury, has just approved a settlement between the American Sugar Refining Company and the United States Government of all the claims which the latter has against it arising out of the fraudulent weighing on the docks of its refineries at Brooklyn and Jersey City. In making this settlement the sugar company pays in full the recent judgment for the penalty in the amount of \$134,411.03, which was awarded against it by the jury in the case tried in the federal court last March, with interest, and agrees to take no appeal from the judgment. In addition to this, it pays into the United States treasury \$2,000,000 more, representing the duties which have been unpaid during the last twelve years, owing to the fraudulent practices; \$1,230,088.07 of this amount has already been paid in under protest to Collector Loeb on his reliquidation, as a result of the trial above mentioned, of the duties upon the cargoes entered at the Havemeyer & Elder refineries between the years 1901 and 1907, when the

frauds were discovered. The sugar company abandons its protests on these payments and gives up its right to appeal from Mr. Loeb's reliquidation and in addition to this pays into the United States treasury the above judgment and over \$760,000 more to cover the duties unpaid at the Havemeyer & Elder docks prior to 1907 and at the Jersey City refinery between 1896 and 1906. This settlement with the sugar company in nowise affects the criminal prosecution of the individuals who are responsible for the perpetration of these frauds, and such prosecutions will be pressed to a finish by the government." Soon after this settlement with the government by the sugar trust for shortage in payment of duties, the firm of Arbuckle Brothers made a similar settlement, paying \$605,573.19. A few days after the above announcement of a pecuniary settlement with the American Sugar Refining Company, the grand jury of the circuit court in the New York District presented indictments against Oliver Spitzer, who was superintendent on the company's docks, Thomas Kehoe, Eugene M. Voelker, Edward A. Boyle, J. R. Coyle, J. M. Halligan, Jr., and Patrick J. Hennessy. In November, further indictments were found against these employees of the company, and James F. Bendernagel, general superintendent of the Williamsburgh refinery for many years past, was arrested on an indictment found by the same grand jury. The trial of the accused, in the United States District Court, was opened on November 30. Late in December, convictions were secured against the weighers and checkers indicted. Oliver Spitzer, superintendent of the company's docks, turned states' evidence and was granted immunity from prosecution. (In the case of James F. Bendernagel the jury twice disagreed and the charge was nolle. Evidence brought out at the trial in December, 1910, led to the arrest, indictment and conviction of Ernest H. Gerbracht, general superintendent of the American Sugar Refining Company. On Jan. 17, 1910, Charles R. Heike, secretary and treasurer of the American Sugar Refining Company, was arraigned before Judge Hough in the criminal branch of the United States Circuit Court, charged with making false entries and conspiring to defraud the government. Heike was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of \$5,000 and spend eight months in prison. The case was appealed and in due time came before the Supreme Court for decision. In January, 1913, the court affirmed the conviction in the lower court. President Taft, however, commuted the prison sentence on Mar. 2, 1913.)

1907-1909.—Suit of the government against the tobacco trust.—Decree of circuit court restraining the combined companies from interstate and foreign trade.—Report of commissioner of corporations on tobacco trust.—On July 10, 1907, the government began suit at New York against the so-called tobacco trust. The defendants in the case included sixty-five corporations and twenty-seven individuals, the principals, however, being six companies, namely, the American Tobacco Company, the British-American Tobacco Company, the Imperial Tobacco Company, the American Snuff Company, the American Cigar Company, and the United American Cigarette Company. Of these the parent organization, dominating all the others, is the American Tobacco Company, which began the finally gigantic combination in a small way in 1800. The object sought in the government's suit was an injunction to restrain the combination as such from engaging in interstate and foreign trade, or for the appointment of re-



ceivers to take the management of the business concerned. The case was argued before the Second Circuit Court of the United States in May, 1908, and the decision of the court was announced on the following November 7, Judges Lacombe, Noyes, and Coxe agreeing and Judge Ward dissenting. The court found that an injunction should issue against some, but not all, of the principal defendants, to prevent the continuance of their violation of the Sherman anti-trust law. It acquitted the trust, however, of the charge of dishonest and oppressive practices, and it denied the application for receiverships. The final decree of the court was filed on Dec. 15, 1908. Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States were taken, both by the government and by the defendants and the case was decided in due time. (See below: 1911: Supreme Court decisions, etc.) Parts of an elaborate report on the organization of the tobacco combination were published in February, 1909, by the commissioner of corporations, Herbert Knox Smith. It showed the combination to be composed of "the American Tobacco Company and its three great subsidiary combinations, the American Snuff Company, the American Cigar Company, and the British-American Company, besides eighty-two other subsidiary concerns doing business in the United States, Porto Rico, and Cuba. The combination represents a total net capitalization of over \$316,000,000. A very small group of ten stockholders controls 60 per cent. of the outstanding voting stock of the American Tobacco Company, through which company the entire combination is controlled." A list of the subsidiary companies controlled, "including over twenty hitherto secretly controlled, so-called 'bogus independent concerns,'" is given in the report. It is shown also that the combination is practically the only important exporter of tobacco manufactures from this country. In 1891 the combination controlled 89 per cent of the business of cigarette manufactures, and this proportion practically is maintained. In cigars its output increased from 4 per cent of the business in 1897 to 14.7 per cent in 1906; while in manufactured tobacco (chewing, smoking, fine-cut, and snuff) "the combination's output increased from 7 per cent of the total in 1891 to 77 per cent in 1906. Finally, in 1906, the combination controlled of these separate products, respectively, plug, 82 per cent; smoking, 71 per cent; fine-cut, 81 per cent, and snuff, 96 per cent." In the year 1906 the combination used in the manufacture of its various products nearly 300,000,000 pounds of leaf tobacco. The report adds: "An idea of the absorption of competing plants and of the changes through combination within the last decade may be had from the fact that in 1897 the combination had ten plants, each producing over 50,000 pounds of manufactured tobacco or snuff per year, while there were 243 independent plants of the same class. In 1906, on the other hand, the combination had 45 plants of this class, and independent manufacturers 140. Especially conspicuous has been the absorption of the large plants. In 1897 the combination had eight plants, each producing over 1,000,000 pounds of these products per year, while its competitors had forty-six such plants. In 1906 the combination had thirty-four plants of this size, and independent concerns only seventeen."—See also KENTUCKY: 1905-1909.

1907-1912.—Suit to dissolve the alleged anthracite coal combination.—The following statements were made in an associated press dispatch from Philadelphia, Mar. 8, 1909: "Testimony of

the Government in its suit against the anthracite coal-carrying railroads and several coal companies, to dissolve a so-called Trust agreement, alleged to be existing among them, has been filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Suit was begun here on June 12, 1907, and in the course of three months all the defendants made answer, denying the allegations of the Government. Subsequently, the court appointed an examiner to take testimony, and a great part of last year was taken up in hearing witnesses, sessions being held mainly in Philadelphia and New York. The Government closed its case in New York several weeks ago, having taken more than its allotted time, and the next move will be for the Government to file a motion apportioning a certain amount of time for the defendant companies to present their witnesses for examination. Much of the testimony thus far has been documentary, and it is believed this will be the case with the defendants. After all the testimony is filed with the court for review, arguments will be had on the case." Not until Dec. 16, 1912, did the Supreme Court decide that the evidence presented by the government was not sufficient to establish the existence of an anthracite coal trust. However, it found that the existing railroads had purchased a majority of the stock of the Temple Iron Company in order to prevent the construction of a new road into the anthracite region. For this reason it ordered a dissolution of the interests controlling that company.

For the proceedings under the Commodity clause of the Hepburn Act, and the decision of the United States Supreme Court, see COMMODITY CLAUSE OF THE HEPBURN ACT; RAILROADS: 1887-1906; 1908-1909.

ALSO IN: E. Jones, *Anthracite coal combination in the United States*.

1908-1909.—Question of amending the Sherman anti-trust law.—Action of the National Civic Federation.—The resolutions adopted at the national conference of 1907 on the trust question, as summarized above, were duly presented to Congress at its next session, and to the president, with results which were stated at the annual meeting of the National Civic Federation in December, 1908, by its President, the Hon. Seth Low, as follows: "When these resolutions were presented to the two Houses, the Conference Committee was asked to submit a definite Bill in legislative form to carry out its proposals. . . . The Executive Committee of the Federation took the matter up. The result of its action was the preparation of a Bill, which was submitted in due time to Congress, and which became the subject of numerous hearings before the Judiciary Committees both of the House and of the Senate. Without changing the law, certain restraints of trade, if not disapproved in advance by some government authority, might be assured freedom from prosecution. The hearings before the Congressional Committees made it evident that no relief from the embarrassments caused by the Sherman Anti-Trust Law can be looked for along this line of procedure. . . . The mercantile classes favor amendments to the law which, instead of forbidding all restraints of trade, will forbid only unreasonable restraints of trade; and which will provide amnesty for the past, (1) on the theoretical ground that what has been done has often been done without any realization that it was contrary to the law; and (2) on the practical ground that to attempt to rip up what has already been done will destroy the industry of the country. The representatives of organized la-

bor, on the other hand, ask to be omitted altogether from the provisions of the Sherman Act. . . . These being the terms of the problem, it is apparent, on the face of things, that the effort to amend the Sherman Anti-Trust Law in any effective way is beset by difficulties at every turn. . . . The whole subject is made infinitely difficult by the Constitutional limitations upon the power of Congress, which have led the United States Supreme Court to decide, in effect, that Congress can regulate inter-State commerce, but cannot regulate the corporation that does it; because the corporation that does inter-State commerce is a creature of the State and not of the United States. The separate States, on the other hand, can regulate the corporations that do inter-State commerce, because they create them; but the States cannot regulate the inter-State commerce that is done, because under the United States Constitution, inter-State commerce is under National control. It cannot be too clearly apprehended that the effect of this situation is, that neither sovereignty—neither the National sovereignty nor the State sovereignty—can regulate both the agent that does inter-State commerce and the inter-State commerce that is done."

1909.—Forbidden to contribute to politics. See U. S. A.: 1907 (January).

1909.—Threatened combination to control the water power of the country.—Dissolution of a paper-making combination.—Merger of telephone and telegraph corporations.—Sugar trust settles conspiracy charge.—Illegality of a trust invalidates a debt to it.—Speaking at the National Irrigation Congress, convened at Spokane, Washington, in August, 1909, the national forester, Gifford Pinchot, declared that, notwithstanding the contradictions issued by the parties in interest, a gigantic combination was forming to seize the sources of the country's water power, and be in a position later to dominate all industry. "There could be no better illustration," he said, "of the eager, rapid, unwearyed absorption by capital of the rights which belong to all the people than the Water Power Trust, not yet formed, but in rapid progress of formation. This statement is true, but not unchallenged. We are met at every turn by the indignant denial of the water power interests. They tell us that there is no community of interest among them, and yet they appear year after year at these Congresses by their paid attorneys, asking for your influence to help them remove the few remaining obstacles to their perpetual and complete absorption of the remaining water powers. They tell us it has no significance that the General Electric interests are acquiring great groups of water powers in various parts of the United States, and dominating the power market, in the region of each group. And whoever dominates power, dominates all industry. . . . The time for us to agitate this question is now, before the separate circles of centralized control spread into the uniform, unbroken, nation-wide covering of a single gigantic Trust. There will be little chance for mere agitation after that. No man at all familiar with the situation can doubt that the time for effective protest is very short." The same warning has been given by others who are in a position to speak with knowledge, and heed has been given to them by the government. The annual report of the secretary of the interior, the Honorable Richard A. Ballinger, made public Nov. 28, 1909, contained the following important announcement: "In anticipation of new legislation by Congress to prevent the acquisition of power sites on the public domain

by private persons or corporations with the view of monopolizing or adversely controlling them against the public interest, there have been temporarily withdrawn from all forms of entry approximately 603,355 acres, covering all locations known to possess power possibilities on unappropriated lands outside of national forests. Without such withdrawals these sites would be enterable under existing laws, and their patenting would leave the general government powerless to impose any limitations as to their use. If the Federal government desires to exercise control or supervision over water-power development on the public domain, it can only do so by limitations imposed upon the disposal of power and reservoir sites upon the public lands, the waters of the streams being subject to State jurisdiction in their appropriation and beneficial use. I would, therefore, advise that the Congress be asked to enact a measure that will authorize the classification of all lands capable of being used for water-power development, and to direct their disposal, through this department. . . . Unreasonable or narrow restrictions beyond the necessity of public protection against monopoly, or extortion in charges, will, of course, defeat development and serve no useful purpose. The statute should, therefore, while giving full protection against the abuses of the privileges extended, so far as consistent, encourage investment in these projects; and it must always be borne in mind that excessive charges for the franchise will fall upon the consumer. Legislation of this character proceeds upon the theory that Congress can impose such contractual terms and conditions as it sees fit in the sale or use permitted of government lands so long as such limitations do not conflict with the powers properly exercised by the State wherein they may be situated."

By a decree of the United States Circuit Court, Judge Hough, at New York, in May, 1909, the Fiber and Manila Association, a combination of twenty-five paper manufacturers, located in many parts of the country, East and West, was adjudged to be an illegal combination in restraint of trade, and perpetually enjoined from further operations in such combination. The members were enjoined further from fixing prices or the qualities that shall be manufactured or to maintain any pool or fund made up of contributions from its members. Counsel for the association announced that no appeal would be made.

Announcement of one of the most important financial mergers of recent years was made Nov. 16, 1909, when the American Telephone and Telegraph Company disclosed its acquirement of control of the Western Union Telegraph Company. "The American Telephone and Telegraph Company has obtained the control of a substantial minority interest in the shares of the Western Union Telegraph Company," was the wording of the official statement, but it became known that sufficient voting rights of other stock had been obtained to give the telephone interests control of the telegraph company. According to a statement issued on May 1, 1909, the total capital and outstanding interest-bearing obligations of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and allied systems was \$502,475,400. This amount included capital stock aggregating \$361,636,800, subdivided as follows: American Telephone and Telegraph company, \$208,393,500; associated operating companies in the United States and Canada, about thirty-five in number, \$142,674,400; associated holding and manufacturing companies, \$10,668,900.

The Western Union Telegraph Company has a capitalization of \$125,000,000 in stock and \$40,000,000 in bonds.

While the American Sugar Refining Company, in the spring of 1909, was being forced to make good to the government its defrauding of the Custom House, it was being compelled, at the same time, to indemnify a competitor in business. The Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Company, whose refinery had been established by Adolph Segal, of Philadelphia, in 1903, became financially embarrassed, and accepted a loan of \$1,250,000, from a person who acted secretly in the transaction for the American Sugar Refining Company. The loan was made on terms which gave the lender control of a majority of the stock of the Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Company, and Adolph Segal found, when too late, that the real lender was the sugar trust. It used its power to shut down the plant, which was said to be the most perfect of its kind, and the Pennsylvania Company was wrecked. It brought a suit for damages to the amount of \$30,000,000, inflicted upon it in contravention of the anti-trust law. Before the trial ended, negotiations were opened which resulted (June 8, 1909) in a settlement of the claim outside of court. The settlement was said to involve a cash payment by the American Company to the Pennsylvania Company of \$750,000, the cancellation of the \$1,250,000 loan made by the trust to Adolph Segal, of Philadelphia, and the return of securities given by Segal as collateral for the loan. (An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, but in December, 1912, the indictments were dismissed on motion of the government, since the evidence necessary to convict was excluded by reason of the statute of limitations.)

In a suit brought by the Continental Wall Paper Company to recover a debt, payment of which was resisted on the ground that the company was an illegal combination in restraint of trade, the Supreme Court of the United States, on Feb. 1, 1909, affirmed a judgment of the circuit court of appeals which had dismissed the suit. The case was so decided by a bare majority of one. The opinion of the majority, delivered by Justice Harlan, held that a judgment in favor of the company would give effect to agreements constituting the illegal combination. "Upon the whole case," said Justice Harlan, "and without further citation of authority, we adjudge upon the admitted facts that the combination represented by the plaintiff in this case was illegal under the anti-trust act of 1890; is to be taken as one intended, and which would have the effect, directly to restrain and monopolize trade among the several states and with foreign states; and that the plaintiff cannot have a judgment for the amount of the account sued on because such a judgment would, in effect, be in aid of the execution of agreements constituting that illegal combination. We consequently hold that the circuit court of appeals properly sustained the third defense in the case and rightly dismissed the suit." In the dissenting opinion by Justice Holmes and others it was set forth that "whenever a party knows that he is buying from an illegal trust, and still more when he buys at a price that he thinks unreasonable, but is compelled to pay in order to get the goods he needs, he knows that he is doing an act in furtherance of the unlawful purpose of the trust, which always is to get the most it can for its wares. But that knowledge makes no difference, because the policy of not furthering the purposes of the trust is less important than the policy of preventing people from getting other

people's property for nothing when they purport to be buying it."

1910.—Special message of President Taft on legislation touching "trusts."—A special message, recommendatory of legislation on the two subjects of interstate commerce and the combinations called "trusts," was addressed to Congress by President Taft on Jan. 7, 1910. It had been expected that the executive would advise amendments to the Sherman anti-trust law, so-called, but he did not. On the contrary he favored the policy of leaving that law untouched, on the ground that its defects have been cured already to a great extent by judicial decisions, and that it is safer and better for the business interests of the country to trust the law to the gradual molding which the courts are giving it, than to undertake amendments which would start a new series of judicial interpretations. But the president's conclusions on this point were supplemented by the advocacy of an enactment to provide for the federal chartering of corporations engaged in interstate commerce, as a means of substituting continuous regulation of such organizations for the spasmodic and disturbing investigations which the government is now compelled frequently to institute.

In part, the president's discussion of these questions is as follows:—

"To the suggestion that this proposal of Federal incorporation for industrial combinations is intended to furnish them a refuge in which to continue industrial abuses under Federal protection, it should be said that the measure contemplated does not repeal the Sherman anti-trust law, and is not to be framed so as to permit the doing of the wrongs which it is the purpose of that law to prevent, but only to foster a continuance and advance of the highest industrial efficiency without permitting industrial abuses. . . . A Federal compulsory license law, urged as a substitute for a Federal incorporation law, is unnecessary except to reach that kind of corporation which, by virtue of the considerations already advanced, will take advantage voluntarily of an incorporation law, while the other State corporations doing an interstate business do not need the supervision or the regulation of a Federal license and would only be unnecessarily burdened thereby. The attorney-general, at my suggestion, has drafted a Federal incorporation bill embodying the views I have attempted to set forth, and it will be at the disposition of the appropriate committees of Congress."

1910.—Corporation tax introduced. See **TARIFF**: 1910: United States.

1910-1912.—Investigation of the beef trust.—An investigation of the business methods of the great meat-packing concerns at Chicago, by the grand jury of the United States District Court, Judge K. M. Landis presiding, was begun on Jan. 24, 1910. Indictments were returned against ten officials of Swift & Company, Armour & Company, and Morris & Company, under a penal provision of the Sherman Act. After a trial lasting more than three months the officials were acquitted on Mar. 26, 1912. The jurors balloted three times, four voting for conviction on the opening ballot. The total cost of the prosecution was \$600,000, one-sixth of which was borne by the government.

1911.—Agreement with the New York Clearing House. See **MONEY AND BANKING**: Modern period: 1907-1910.

1911.—Supreme Court decisions in Standard Oil and tobacco trust cases.—"On May 15 the United States Supreme Court declared the Stand-

ard Oil Company to be a combination in restraint of trade and ordered its dissolution within six months. The full bench concurred in the opinion which was prepared by the chief justice (White) and which affirmed the decree issued by the lower court in November, 1909. In reaching this conclusion the chief justice expressed the view that the Sherman Act prohibits contracts and combinations only when they unreasonably or unduly restrain interstate trade and commerce or unreasonably restrict competition. From this position Justice Harlan dissented sharply, remarking that this application of 'the rule of reason' had been expressly excluded by the court fifteen years before. . . . In obedience to the decree of the court the Standard Oil Company announced to its stockholders of record September 1 (1911) that the shares of the thirty-three subsidiary corporations would be distributed to them pro rata by the first of December."—C. H. Hayes and E. M. Sait, *Record of political events (Political Science Quarterly, Dec., 1911)*.—The public, however was by no means convinced that the power of the great oil combination was effectually curbed. The following voices the conviction of many even at that time: "As a result of these decisions and orders the Standard Oil Company has now been broken into thirty-eight companies. These companies are not to have common officers or directors. The stock of the Standard was not widely distributed and the new companies have common owners. The officers of seven of the more important new companies remain in the same quarters which the Standard Oil Company before occupied, 26 Broadway. President Taft announced that the plan of the administration in prosecuting trusts is to secure 'a decree of disintegration by which competition between its parts shall be restored and preserved.' Will this result be reached in the case of the Standard Oil Company? Will the officers of the seven large companies in different rooms of 26 Broadway really compete in prices? That this will occur has been widely doubted by the public from the outset, and on February 29, 1912, it was announced that the Waters-Pierce Company of Texas had alleged that the disintegrated companies are combining, and this company had instituted an investigation in order to show the facts. Also the 'Street' evidently does not take the Standard Oil decision seriously. When the case was in the courts, the stock gradually declined and reached a low level of 585. After the decision was rendered which finally dissolved the company, Standard Oil stock again rose until 600 was reached, more than 300 points higher than when the company was under attack. Apparently the men who know believe that the decision of the court will not be sufficiently destructive to reduce the great profits which the Standard has enjoyed and which will now go to the constituent companies."—C. R. Van Hise, *Concentration and control (1912)*, pp. 182-183. "On May 29 the Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the American Tobacco Company on the ground that its monopoly of the industry and the acts by which it acquired the monopoly amounted to undue and unreasonable restraint of trade. Six months were allotted the company in which to make plans to create out of the elements now composing it a new condition, which shall be honestly in harmony with and not repugnant to the law." Justice Harlan again argued against applying the test of reasonableness and declined to consider the reorganization and continuance of the company under any guise whatever. On May 31 the company's stock fell 70 points on the New York Stock Exchange. . . . Tentative plans for reorganization

into fourteen independent companies were announced by the American Tobacco Company in October. On October 31 Attorney-General Wickersham pronounced them unsatisfactory but later agreed to certain modifications. The circuit court of New York approved the modified plans on November 8, 1911."—C. H. Hayes and E. M. Sait, *Record of political events (Political Science Quarterly, Dec., 1911)*.—"The outstanding securities, bonds, preferred and common stock, of the American Tobacco Company were found to aggregate \$223,168,250. The tobacco business, which was by far the larger part of the business of the company, was divided among three companies, the American Tobacco Company, having a capitalization of \$53,408,499; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, having a capitalization of \$67,447,499; and the P. Lorillard Company, having a capitalization of \$47,552,501. Thus these three companies together have a capitalization of \$168,408,499, which constitutes 70 per cent. of the entire business of the original company and leaves but 30 per cent. of the assets to be distributed among the other eleven companies. One small subsidiary company, the Amsterdam Supply Company, which was a purchasing agency, was dissolved and the assets transferred into cash and distributed to the share-holders. A number of companies, including the Conley Foil Company, the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, the American Snuff Company, the American Stogie Company, and the American Cigar Company, each were required to divide into not less than two companies each, or to convert their assets into cash. Further the restrictive arrangements which had been made by the American Tobacco Company with foreign companies were abrogated. The fourteen companies are enjoined from cooperating in business in any way; they must not occupy the same offices; they cannot hold the stock of one another, or even stock in companies in which other companies hold stock. Each company must do business in its own house, and the products of each must bear the firm name. For five years they are enjoined from having common officers or directors or the same sales agents. The stock of the American Tobacco Company was, in a manner like that of Standard Oil, distributed proportionally to his holdings to each stockholder of the fourteen companies. There were twenty-nine men who held a dominating position in the old corporation and they in like manner hold a dominating position in the three new companies into which the chief assets of the old company have been divided. It is the opinion of the Attorney-General [Wickersham] that the disintegration ordered will accomplish the objects of the law, and will effectually prevent the recurrence of the agreements which, in the past, have resulted in a monopolistic situation. He says that 'the natural tendency of men to compete with one another will operate and the fact that there is community of stockholding cannot prevent that natural tendency.' . . . In the opinion of Mr. Louis Brandeis, one of the counsel for the independent companies, the order to disintegrate the American Tobacco Company will prove to be a farce. He says that not only was the tobacco business distributed among three companies, but the part of the business which was assigned to each company was such as to give them substantial monopoly for important lines of business assigned to them. Mr. Felix H. Levy, another of the attorneys of the independent companies, says the plan of disintegration 'is a sham and a subterfuge.' Mr. Samuel Untermyer says, 'They have simply changed its clothes; that

is all; and they have not made a very complete change at that.' As a matter of fact, we now have fourteen tobacco combinations which have the sanction of the courts instead of one that did not. It is notable that after the order was given by the Supreme Court to dissolve the corporation, the stock of the American Tobacco Company fell to \$390 per share; but that after the decision of the Circuit Court as to the kind of disintegration which was to take place, the common stock rose to as high a price as ever before in the history of the company, with the exception of a single day, \$529 per share. This is the result of more than four years' litigation which cost the independent companies and the American company vast sums of money, and the government as large or larger sums, all of which will ultimately be paid by the public. There remains to be mentioned the most notable feature of the tobacco decision. The Supreme Court . . . took on the function of giving an order to the lower court to do administrative work, of a kind which has usually been done by a commission, and for which a commission is much better adapted. When the order was executed as directed, the members of the disintegrated trust had the advantage of having the sanction of the law. The administrative work of the court in disintegrating the American Tobacco Company, already severely criticized and generally believed to be futile, is one of the best evidences of the lack of adaptation of the courts to the handling of the complex administrative problems of great concentration in industry."—C. R. Van Hise, *Concentration and control* (1912), pp. 184-187.

ALSO IN: R. L. Raymond, *Standard Oil and Tobacco cases* (*Harvard Law Review*, Nov., 1911, pp. 31-58).—F. B. Kellogg, *Results of Standard Oil decision*, (*American Review of Reviews*, June, 1912, pp. 728-730).

1911.—Du Pont Powder Company dissolved.—The prominence given to the decisions in the Standard Oil and tobacco cases has tended to obscure many of the important points developed in minor cases in the inferior courts. In the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Delaware an opinion handed down on June 12, 1911, in *United States of America vs. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company*, discussed the possibility of a combination escaping the condemnation of the Anti-Trust Act by merely assuming a form not obnoxious to the provisions of the act. The decision read in part as follows: "The recent decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that a combination cannot escape the condemnation of the anti-trust act merely by the form it assumes or by the dress it wears. It matters not whether the combination be 'in the form of a trust or otherwise,' whether it be in the form of a trade association or a corporation, if it arbitrarily uses its power to force weaker competitors out of business or to coerce them into a sale to or union with the combination, it puts a restraint upon interstate commerce and monopolizes or attempts to monopolize a part of that commerce in a sense that violates the anti-trust act. The record of the case now before us shows that from 1872 to 1902, a period of thirty years, the purpose of the trade associations had been to dominate the powder and explosives trade in the United States, by fixing prices, not according to any law of supply and demand, for they arbitrarily limited the output of each member, but according to the will of their managers. It appears, further, that although these associations were not always strong enough to control absolutely the prices of explosives, their purpose to do so was

never abandoned. Under the last of the trade association agreements—the one dated July 1, 1896, and which was in force until June 30, 1904—the control of the combination was firmer than it had before been. Succeeding the death of Eugene du Pont in January, 1902, and the advent of Thomas Coleman Du Pont and Pierre S. du Pont, the attempt was made to continue the restraint upon interstate commerce and the monopoly then existing by vesting, in a few corporations, the title to the assets of all the corporations affiliated with the trade association, then dissolving the corporations whose assets had been so acquired, and binding the few corporations owning the operating plants in one holding company, which should be able to prescribe policies and control the business of all the subsidiaries without uncertainties attendant upon a combination in the nature of a trade association. That attempt resulted in complete success. Much the larger part of the trade in black and smokeless powder and dynamite in the United States is now under the control of the combination supported by the 28 defendants above named. That combination is the successor of the combination in existence from 1896 to June 30, 1904. It is a significant fact that the trade association, organized under the agreement of July 1, 1896, was not dissolved until June 30, 1904. It had been utilized until that date by Thomas Coleman du Pont, Pierre S. du Pont and Alfred I. du Pont in suppressing competition and thereby building up a monopoly. Between February, 1902, and June, 1904, the combination had been so completely transmuted into a corporate form that the trade association was no longer necessary. Consequently, the trade association was dissolved and the process of dissolving the corporations whose capital stocks had been acquired, and concentrating their physical assets in one great corporation, was begun. Before the plan had been fully carried out this suit was commenced. The proofs satisfy us that the present form of combination is no less obnoxious to the law than was the combination under the trade association agreement, which was dissolved on June 30, 1904. The 28 defendants are associated in a combination which, whether the individual defendants were aware of the fact or not, has violated and still plans to violate both section 1 and section 2 of the anti-trust act. . . . Our power is defined in the fourth section of the anti-trust act. That section invests us 'with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violation' of the act. The same section provides that the petition may contain a prayer that the violation of law therein alleged 'shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited' It is our purpose, as it is our duty, to exert the power thus conferred on us to the extent necessary to 'prevent and restrain' further violations of the act. In other words, the relief we can give in this proceeding is preventive and injunctive only. If our decree, limited to that purpose, shall necessitate a discontinuance of present business methods, it is only because those methods are illegal. The incidental results of a sweeping injunction may be serious to the parties immediately concerned, but, in carrying out the command of the statute, which is as obligatory upon this court as it is upon the parties to this suit, such results should not stay our hand; they should only challenge our care that our decree be no more drastic than the facts of the case and the law demand. The dissolution of more than sixty corporations since the advent of the new management in 1902, and the consequent impossibility of restoring original conditions in the explosive trade, narrows the field of

operation of any decree we may make. It should not make the decree any the less effective, however. In the Standard Oil case Mr. Chief Justice White said: 'It may be conceded that ordinarily where it was found that acts had been done in violation of the statute, adequate measure of relief would result from restraining the doing of such acts in the future. *Swift v. United States*, 106 U. S. 375. But in a case like this, where the condition which has been brought about in violation of the statute, in and of itself, is not only a continued attempt to monopolize but also a monopolization, the duty to enforce the statute requires the application of broader and more controlling remedies.'—W. S. Stevens, *Industrial combinations and trusts*, pp. 424-428.

1911-1915.—Struggle of the Federal government against trusts. See U.S.A.: 1911-1915.

1912.—Investigation of United States Steel Corporation.—Testimony of James A. Farrell.—At the hearings before the committee on investigation of the United States Steel Corporation during the second session of the Sixty-second Congress in 1912, the question of supervision of corporations by governmental agencies received special consideration. James A. Farrell, president of the United States Steel Corporation, taking the position that it is not practicable for the government to fix even maximum prices for commodities or wages for labor, suggested as a remedy for the evils of monopoly, government supervision to the extent of compelling a policy of publicity on the part of the manufacturers and of granting the opportunity for agreements on prices between them. He said in part: "I believe that it is important for the Government to assume the power of such supervision of corporations engaged in interstate traffic as will result in full and clear publicity of their general operations, their receipts and expenditures and profits and losses, in order to protect investors and the people generally. . . . Such publicity as I have in mind is along the lines of the information that has been freely and fully given out by the United States Steel Corporation in its annual reports and frequent statements. . . . When it might appear to the Government board of supervision, either on their own initiative, or from the complaint of any considerable body of consumers, that prices in any line of industry are unreasonably high, they should be empowered to make inquiry into the facts, to call upon manufacturers to disclose their profits, and to determine and indicate to manufacturers their opinion as to the reasonableness of their price, subject, if necessary, to review by the courts as to any contention that prices were confiscatory. Likewise, when, in the opinion of any body of manufacturers, it should appear necessary, in order to prevent destructive competition, the lowering of wages, the impairment of plants, throwing workmen out of employment, and other similar evils through reduction of prices to levels which would not permit efficient plants to operate at a fair profit, it should be permissible for manufacturers or the owners of plants to enter into agreement as to such reasonable prices as might be necessary to prevent such results. To avoid the possibility of such manufacturers agreeing on excessive prices there would be the remedy of the opportunity of appeal by consumers to the Government board of supervision, and the consequent publicity, which would act as a restraint upon manufacturers from fixing excessive prices; penalties, such as forfeiture of Federal incorporation or other suitable means of redress could be enforced, if necessary, to dissuade manufacturers from main-

taining prices adjudged to be either excessive or ruinously low. . . . I do not believe in the repeal of the Sherman Act, but I believe the Sherman Act should be amended so as to enable manufacturers to know what they can do. We do not know now what we can do. . . . As the Sherman law is designed to prohibit monopoly, which would inevitably result from destructive competition, driving the weaker competitors out of business, it should be equally clear that it should permit such agreements among manufacturers as to prices as would enable them to avoid the destructive competition which is impliedly prohibited."—W. S. Stevens, *Industrial combinations and trusts*, pp. 561-563.

Also in J. A. Fitch, *United States Steel Corporation and labor (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1912, pp. 10-19)*.

1912-1914.—Enforcement of Sherman Act.—Numerous convictions.—Between 1912 and 1914 prosecutions and convictions under Sherman Act were unusually numerous. On Nov. 18, 1912, the Supreme Court held that the so-called bathtub trust was a combination in restraint of trade and ordered its dissolution. The individuals and corporations involved in the trust were convicted of criminal conspiracy and fines aggregating \$51,000 were imposed. On Feb. 13, 1913, twenty-nine officials of the National Cash Register Company, including the president, J. H. Patterson, were found guilty of criminal conspiracy under the Anti-Trust Act. Sentences of imprisonment for terms varying from three months to a year were imposed at Cincinnati. An order for the dissolution of the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific railroad merger was issued by the Supreme Court in December, 1912. The plan for the dissolution was approved on June 28, 1913, and provided that \$38,000,000 of Southern Pacific stock should be exchanged for \$42,000,000 of Baltimore and Ohio stock and the remaining \$88,000,000 of Southern Pacific stock should be sold by a trustee under restrictions. In a number of cases the department of justice was able to secure the voluntary dissolution of corporations which had been threatened with Federal prosecution. Notable among these were the American Telephone and Telegraph Company which in December, 1913, agreed to dispose of its Western Union stock, the New York, New Haven and Hartford railroad which relinquished control of the Boston and Maine in January, 1914, and the American Thread Company which agreed to dissolve on June 8, 1914. Not all the dissolutions were voluntary, however. On August 12, the United States District Court at Saint Paul found that the International Harvester Company was a monopoly in restraint of trade and ordered its dissolution.

1914.—Commodity clause decision. See COMMODITY CLAUSE OF THE HEPBURN ACT.

1914.—Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Act.—"By Act of Congress approved September 26, 1914, a non-partisan Federal commission was created, which is directed to 'prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, excepting banks and common carriers subject to the acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition in commerce.' To carry out the provisions of this act, the Federal Trade Commission composed of five members appointed by the President, is empowered to conduct hearings in any city of the United States. If unfair methods are shown, the commission shall direct the offenders to desist therefrom, and may apply to the U. S. Circuit

Court of Appeals for the enforcement of its orders. The commission is also empowered to enforce compliance with certain sections of the Clayton Act; to conduct investigations into business practice and management; to investigate the enforcement of decrees under the Sherman Act; and to investigate and report to Congress on foreign trade combinations. Maximum penalties of imprisonment for six months, a fine of \$1,000 or both, are provided for refusal to testify before the commission, falsification of evidence, and failure to submit required reports. . . . The Clayton Law which was approved October 15, 1914, is further entitled: 'An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes.' The provisions of the law that apply to trusts may be summarized as follows: 'It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities, except where such discrimination merely allows for differences in quality, in quantity sold, or in selling and transportation costs, or is made in good faith to meet competition (sec. 2). No corporation shall acquire the whole or part of the stock or other share capital of any other corporation "where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition" between the two corporations, "or to restrain such commerce in any section or community," or tend to create a monopoly. This shall not prevent corporations from holding such stock simply for investment, its voting power not being used to lessen competition, or from forming legitimate subsidiary corporations (sec. 7). After two years from the approval of this Act, no person shall at the same time be a director or employee of more than one bank or trust company which has deposits, capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than \$5,000,000; and no person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations engaged in commerce, any one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than \$1,000,000 (sec. 8). After two years from the approval of this act, no common carrier shall deal in the securities or supplies, or make any construction or maintenance contracts to the amount of more than \$50,000 in any one year, with any other corporation, when the common carrier has as one of its officials, or its agent in the particular transaction, any person who is an officer or agent or has a substantial interest in the corporation with which the business is done—unless the contract is awarded through competitive bidding, under the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission (sec. 10). Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue in a district court of the United States, and may recover threefold the damages sustained by him, and the cost of the suit (sec. 4). A decree rendered against the defendant in a suit brought by the United States under the anti-trust laws shall be *prima facie* evidence in any suit brought by any other party against the defendant; and the statute of limitations shall not run against any private right of action under the anti-trust laws during the pendency of a Federal suit under these laws based in whole or in part upon any matter essential to the private suit (sec. 5). Whenever a corporation violates any of the penal provisions of the anti-trust laws, such violation shall be deemed to be that of the individual directors, officers, or agents who have authorized or done the violating acts, under penalty of fine up to \$5,000, and imprisonment up to one year, or both (sec. 14). Any per-

son shall be entitled to sue in a Federal Court for injunctive relief against threatened immediate and irreparable loss or damage by a violation of the anti-trust laws (sec. 16). No injunction shall be granted by Federal judges in any labor dispute, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property; and no injunction shall prohibit any person from quitting work, or from peacefully advising or persuading others to quit. No injunction shall forbid any person to cease to patronize or to employ any party to a labor dispute, or by peaceful and lawful means to recommend, advise, or persuade others so to do. No injunction shall forbid persons to assemble peaceably in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes, or from doing anything, which might lawfully be done in the absence of the dispute, by any party to the dispute (sec. 20).'

"The Clayton Law prohibits specifically new holding company operations, interlocking directorates and price discriminations, while the Federal Trade Commission Act declares unfair methods of competition to be unlawful. The whole tenor of both acts is toward preventing control of so large a proportion of an industry by any combination that it becomes a menace to competitive conditions. Clearly the anti-monopoly mind of the American people is here expressed in large capitals. . . . The key section which emphasizes the anti-monopoly spirit is Section 7 of the Clayton Act: 'That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation also engaged in commerce where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.' This excerpt from that section records the extreme legislation against corporate combination. No horizontal combination, big or little, is possible under this act for it is inconceivable that one of two competitors should acquire the other's stock and yet not disturb the competition between them. Strict construction of this Section 7 would prevent any further corporate combinations in the United States. It was an act of grace that closed the section with the saving clause that 'nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right heretofore legally acquired.' This seems to say that such Trusts as have before September-October, 1914, succeeded in getting past the previous anti-trust barriers are to be tolerated as they are, but this act creates a stone wall barrier to stop them from any further combination growth and to prevent altogether the advance of any new combinations. It will be interesting to observe once more the penetrability of an impenetrable legislative wall if the evolutionary strength of the combination movement in the United States is not yet spent. Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act make of it an American Magna Charta for organized labor in the thought of labor leaders. Section 6 exempts labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations from being 'held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws.' Section 20 apparently sets limits to the use of the injunction against labor organizations. The frequent salting of the phraseology of the latter section with such ambiguous terms as 'peaceful,' 'peaceably,' 'peacefully,' 'lawfully,' 'lawful means,' 'lawful manner' and 'lawful purposes' raises question in the mind of

the lay reader whether limits set are not far more apparent than real. None the less organized labor sees its will written into an anti-trust statute of 1914 in clear contrast to the defeat of the proposed amendment similar to Section 6 of the Clayton Act during the original debates on the Sherman Act."—J. W. Jenks, *Trust problem*, pp. 206, 271-275.—See also CLAYTON ANTI-TRUST ACT; U.S.A.: 1914 (September).

ALSO IN: W. H. S. Stevens, *Clayton Act (American Economic Review, Mar., 1915)*.—E. D. Durand, *Trust problem*.—Idem, *Trust legislation of 1914 (Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov., 1914, pp. 72-97)*.—A. A. Young, *Sherman Act and the new anti-trust legislation (Journal of Political Economy, Mar., 1915, pp. 201-220; Apr., 1915, pp. 305-326; May, 1915, pp. 417-436)*.

1915-1920.—Recent anti-trust decisions.—**Changing attitude of the courts.**—The period between 1915 and 1920 witnessed the reversal by the Supreme Court of decisions handed down by inferior Federal courts previous to 1915. On June 14, 1915, the Supreme Court refused to review the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which had reversed the lower court in the case of the twenty-eight officials of the National Cash Register Company. By this refusal to review the government lost its case under the criminal clauses of the Sherman Act. The department of justice experienced a further disappointment when the court ordered that the International Harvester case be reargued in October, 1915. On August 24, 1915, the United States district court at Buffalo held that the Eastman Kodak Company was an illegal corporation within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Appeal from the decision was taken in the usual manner to the Supreme Court and the case was still pending in 1920. The government failed to establish its case against the Quaker Oats Company on Apr. 21, 1916, in the Circuit Court of Appeals at Chicago. The court held that the company was not a combination in restraint of trade. During 1917 the government's action against certain coal combines resulted in the trial of fifty-five coal operators and 108 corporations in New York City. The defendants were charged with combining in an illegal manner to fix the price of smokeless and semi-bituminous coal in the Virginia and West Virginia districts. The verdict was an acquittal for the accused. After losing in the lower courts the government won its case against the Lehigh Valley Railroad company by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court on Dec. 6, 1920. The opinion, written by Justice Clarke, was a severe indictment of the practices of the Lehigh Coal Combine. It declared that the railroad company had adopted a policy of controlling the mining and transportation of anthracite coal before the anti-trust law was enacted, and after it was enacted, continued the policy with increasing energy. The company sought to evade the law by the organization of the Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Company. As a result of the decree the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, the Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Company, Coxe Brothers and Company, Inc., the Delaware, Susquehanna & Schuylkill Railroad Company must sever their interlocking directorates and establish themselves as independent industrial units.

1915-1920.—Steel corporation decisions.—"The action of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in the case of *United States v. The United States Steel Corporation* and others, handed down by the court in question on June 3 (1915) adds another to the series of important

court decisions intended to interpret and illustrate the meaning of the Sherman law, and will rank with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Tobacco and Oil cases. The suit in question was instituted during the Taft administration (1911) and has been in course of prosecution for about three years. The present decision is a complete and thorough review of the immense mass of material relating to the steel industry, which has been collected by government bureaus, congressional committees, and court officers for several years past. In passing upon the great volume of data placed before it, the court states the questions at issue as follows: First: Was the Steel Corporation, when this bill was filed in 1911, prejudicing the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the course of the steel and iron trade between the states or with foreign nations? . . . Second: Did the Steel Corporation, when it was formed in 1901, either by intent of those forming it, or by inherent nature of that company's contemplated acts, prejudice the public interest by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the course of the steel and iron trade, interstate or foreign? . . . The two questions thus put are taken up for careful analysis and two distinct classes of conclusions are arrived at by the majority and minority of the court, both, however, uniting in the opinion that the application of the government for a dissolution order should be dismissed. In brief, the conclusion of the majority of the court is that, as to the defendants, it is apparent that the bill should be dismissed. Concerning the principal relief sought against the corporation and its subsidiaries, the opinion is expressed that the government has not made out a case that should be followed by a decree of dissolution and that sufficient reasons have not been afforded to justify the court in awarding an injunction against the further continuance of the concern in its present form. The minority of the court reaches the conclusions that the organizers of the Steel Corporation (1) intended to create a monopoly and to restrain trade, and (2) combined with others and attempted to monopolize trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Further it is held that the Steel Corporation itself (1) neither attempted nor possessed the power alone to do the unlawful things intended by its formation, but (2) unlawfully combined with others to restrain trade by controlling prices. For many reasons, the view is then arrived at that, whatever remedy there may be against the organizers of the corporation for acts violative of the statute, certainly in this proceeding a decree of dissolution cannot be awarded against the corporation for the unlawful intent, and the unsuccessful efforts of its organizers to violate the law. . . . The court's decision, in both the majority and minority opinions, is thus positive and distinct in its findings that various methods were resorted to by the Steel Corporation and its affiliated concerns for the purpose of restraining and interfering with competition, but the opinion is clearly held that these efforts were not sufficiently successful to warrant the drastic action demanded by the government in its dissolution petition. The position taken by the court has, however, been somewhat hastily received by the business world as a defense of the Steel Corporation, with the result that renewed activity in various kinds of shares was witnessed on the stock exchange immediately after the verdict was announced."—*Washington Notes (Journal of Political Economy, July, 1915, pp. 723-724)*.—An appeal from the above decision was taken to the Supreme Court by the govern-



ment and a decision was handed down on Mar. 1, 1920. By a four to three vote the court held that the United States Steel Corporation was not a trust within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The majority opinion stressed the fact that no overt acts violative of the Sherman act had been committed and that, while the corporation was in a position to dominate the trade, the evidence did not show that it had done so. Finally, it was held that to order the dissolution asked by the government would involve the risk of great disturbance to the financial and economic structure and would menace the public interest, which deserves first consideration. The dissent of Justices Clark, Pitney and Day was vigorous, alleging that the majority opinion was contradictory to the decisions in the Standard Oil and tobacco trust cases. The decision is not generally considered as committing the court to a definite policy, since neither Justice McReynolds nor Justice Brandeis took part in it. The former was attorney-general when the government was prosecuting the case and the latter had in 1911, before being appointed to the bench, stated that he considered the steel corporation a trust within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Moreover, it is thought the decision will have its effect upon the course of the attorney-general's office in subsequent cases.

1918-1921.—Webb-Pomerene Act.—Its results. "The Webb-Pomerene Act approved April 10, 1918, exempts from the provisions of the Sherman Law contracts, agreements or combinations among persons or corporations doing business in the United States for the purpose of conducting export business only. This act specifically states that its provisions must not be used 'artificially or intentionally' to affect domestic business. It also confers jurisdiction upon the Federal Trade Commission to supervise the conduct of export associations and their members, and applies the rule against unfair methods of competition to the conduct of export associations as related to American competitors in foreign markets. The Webb-Pomerene Law directly repeals the Sherman Law in so far as export business is concerned."—R. C. Butler, *Sherman anti-trust law and readjustment* (*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Mar. 1919, p. 223).—"The act presumes that manufacturers can be associated in their foreign business and yet remain competitors in their domestic business. It requires a kind of trade duplicity. Part of this duplicity is a pure fiction and part is based on sound economic principles. In so far as the Webb bill presumes that foreign business can be carried on without affecting domestic business, it is an anomaly; but so far as it presumes that foreign business requires the continued support of a large producing organization, it is absolutely sound. In this it is merely copying what European nations have already done in building up their foreign commerce. And without this support our rapidly expanding foreign trade would be stifled by the very anxiety of the small producers to preserve their existence at least under the necessarily competitive conditions of the domestic market. In other words, some kind of organized and united effort must take place in order to enable American manufacturers to export their merchandise in competition with the organized and united efforts of European exporting organizations. But whether the problem is to be solved by combinations among export houses themselves, which carry many lines into a few highly developed markets, or by combinations of manufacturers carrying a single product into many markets, only the future developments of

commerce can tell."—A. S. Dewing, *Financial policy of corporations*, v. 4, p. 68.—"On June 30, 1921, there were 48 such export associations doing business, including in their membership about 1,000 plants and factories scattered over forty-one states. During 1920, despite the great handicaps on exportation, imposed by economic conditions, goods valued at approximately \$221,000,000 were exported by such associations. Among the commodities handled by these organizations were steel, copper, cement, lumber, food-stuffs, locomotives, textile and foundry material, paper, tanning materials, paint, furniture, office equipment, and general merchandise. Some of these associations, such as the Consolidated Steel Corporation and the Copper Export Association which are strongly financed and control a large percentage of the supply available for export, have quickly become very powerful factors in our export trade."—F. D. Jones, *Trade association activities and the law*, pp. 223-224.—The Federal Trade Commission in its annual report, 1921, stated the intention of Congress to limit the activities of such associations in regard to restraining trade within the United States, destroying the business of others in foreign trade or artificially or intentionally increasing prices to the home consumer. In the meantime, "in 1910, to strengthen American business in foreign fields, the Edge Act, authorizing the formation of banking corporations to do an exclusive foreign banking business was enacted. The purpose of this law was to afford agencies through which long-term credits could be financed in export trade and through which foreign securities could also be handled. Under the provisions of the law, not less than five persons may form such banking corporations to engage in international banking or financial operations. . . . Restrictions are provided as to the amount to be invested in any one corporation. . . . Such an institution can not carry on any part of its business in the United States except such as in the judgment of the Federal Reserve Board is incidental to its foreign business. . . . A majority of the shares of the stock of the corporation must be owned by American citizens or by concerns, the controlling . . . interest in which is owned by citizens of the United States."—*Ibid.*, pp. 234-236.

1919-1923.—Recent significant legislation and suits affecting: Meat combination.—Agricultural producers.—Building industry.—Vaudeville interests.—Coffee and sugar markets.—A consent decree of December, 1919, possibly influenced by a prospective dissolution suit under the Sherman Act materially affected the business of the Big Five (Swift and Company, Armour and Company, Morris and Company, Wilson and Company and Cudahy Packing Company). (See BIG FIVE.) The court's decree was entered on Feb. 27, 1920, and provided for a cessation of the most obnoxious practices of the beef combination, restricting them to wholesale trade in meat, poultry, eggs, butter and cheese. "Under an act of Congress passed in 1921 [Packers and Stockyards Act], the regulation of the competitive acts of the meat packers, with reference to transactions not only in meat and meat products, but also in dairy products, poultry and eggs, is taken from the Commission and placed under the direction of the Department of Agriculture. The prohibitions of this act are much more severe than the Federal Trade Commission Act. An anomalous situation, however, is created. Manufacturers and distributors of dairy products, poultry and eggs are subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission; meat packers engaged also in handling these products are subject only

to the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture."—F. D. Jones, *Trade association activities and the law*, p. 18.—See also FOOD REGULATION: 1921-1922.—The Capper-Volstead Act, "an act to authorize association of producers of agricultural products," approved Feb. 18, 1922, restricts members to a single vote, prohibits dividends in excess of eight per cent per annum and provides that the association shall not deal in the products of non-members to an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members.

The consent decree signed in New York City early in 1923 by Judge Knox of the Federal district court, concerning the Gypsum Industries Association dissolved that association as such and purported to formulate a code of principles setting forth what trade associations may and may not do under the Sherman anti-trust law. The virtual "letting off" of this combine which was one of those exposed by the Lockwood Committee in its investigation into the building trades of New York City and the fact that in the opinion of Samuel Untermyer and others it "prohibits the members from doing nothing that is not already prohibited by existing law" discounts such an evaluation of the decree in many minds. Late in the year the existence of a "vaudeville trust" was alleged by Shubert Advanced Vaudeville, Inc., when they announced the preparation of papers to be filed in the Federal district court against the Keith vaudeville interests, demanding \$10,050,000 damages and making accusations of restraint of trade. "A rather surprising legal action brought by the Department of Justice [in 1923] which had for its aim the suppression of the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange. This matter, although decided against the Government in the lower courts, is soon to come up for hearing on appeal. If the lower court's judgment is affirmed New York will remain the world's chief sugar market, an advantage gained during the war. Although the first effects of this action were violent, they soon wore off; the aftermath continued for months.

"With prices rising as a result of natural causes, and with the public becoming alarmed at the prospect of paying much more for sugar than it had been accustomed to for nearly three years, the Government delivered its coup."—*New York Evening Post*, Oct. 27, 1923.

1921-1923.—Recent trend toward mergers.—Survey of several combinations.—Tobacco.—Wool.—Automobiles.—Steel.—The continuation of a trend toward industrial combination that has been going on ever since the recovery of business from the 1920-1921 depression is evidenced in such a series of organizations as the Bethlehem-Midvale merger, the Anaconda-Chile copper merger, Kennecott-Cooper's acquisition of the Utah Copper Company; the Tobacco Products Corporation's plan to take over control of the Porto Rican-American Tobacco Company; the amalgamation of nine companies manufacturing matches into the Federal Match Corporation, and Armour and Company's completed arrangements for the purchase of the physical assets of Morris & Company, in spite of the objections of the secretary of agriculture. The *New York Evening Post* is quoted as believing that many companies "after experiencing the price deflation of 1920-21 and with depleted resources are in no position to carry on competition of the old-fashioned bludgeoning sort. There is reason to believe that the present movement has by no means run its course. . . . Whether as a result of the present trend toward industrial combination we shall have a recrudescence of the so-called 'trust

problem' of past decades can not of course be stated at this time but it appears hardly possible. A higher plane of business ethics, greater publicity in corporate transactions, and the more certain attitude of the Government toward undue restriction of competition all argue against the repetition on a large scale of the objectionable practices of two or three decades ago."—*New York Evening Post*, Mar. 17, 1923.—In October, 1923, announcement was made in the daily papers of the acquisition by the American Tobacco Company of the manufacturing properties of the Tobacco Products Corporation, including equipment and supplies for a period of ninety-nine years. This is considered the largest transaction effected in recent years in the tobacco industry. Successful combination in the American wool industry is significant when compared with the ups and downs of cotton combinations in this country and with the absence of combinations in the woolen trade of foreign countries. The American Woolen Company "has been able to maintain, improve and extend its organization, until it is of prime importance in the American wool-manufacturing industry. It has established and maintained a high measure of efficiency and its labor and marketing policies have been a driving force in the industry. While the exact measure of its financial success is, and seemingly must remain problematical, still it has never been in danger of dissolution or reorganization, and by a conservative management in the distribution of its profits and in the building of its mammoth new plants, as well as by the fortunate acquisition of new capital just before the crisis of 1920, it has been able to consolidate its financial position and make its future promise further success."—A. H. Cole, *Neglected chapter in the history of combinations: American wool manufacture* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1923, p. 472).—"The General Motors Corporation is the outstanding combination in the automobile industry. It has already secured control of the various companies necessary for its efficient operation and any further extensive additions by it are unlikely. The recent development of the Durant Motors, Inc., is based primarily upon the personal reputation and skill of Mr. Durant and the successful completion of the project depends largely upon his efforts. The companies combined are new, except the Locomobile Company, and their ability to withstand competition is yet to be determined. . . . The competitive situation in the industry warrants the conclusion that, except in the case of the Ford Motor Company, no company has either complete or monopoly power. The presence of numerous strong and active competitors and the peculiar character of the demand for automobiles indicates little possibility of the development of monopoly power by any one company or group of companies. The Ford Motor Company produces approximately 95 per cent of the cars in its class, and therefore has a virtual monopoly of its field. Its tremendous resources and its manufacturing efficiency are all factors which should assist it in maintaining this position against possible competitors."—C. C. Edmonds, *Tendencies in the automobile industry* (*American Economic Review*, Sept., 1923).—That the Steel Corporation has not ceased to maintain a position to dominate the trade during the three years following on the Supreme Court's favorable decision is evidenced by the following descriptions of its assets and earnings: "Let us consider the size and strength of the Steel Corporation. Its total assets are listed at \$2,430,000,000. Its gross volume of business during 1920 was \$1,755,000,000.

It owns 145 steel works, approximately 800,000 acres of coal and coke properties, 993 miles of railway, 1470 locomotives, and 112 steamers. In addition to these large holdings, the Corporation is represented in many other industries. . . . The policies of the Corporation are determined by a Board of Directors, composed of thirteen members in 1921, and a Finance Committee of six members. The total number of stockholders is over 100,000, but a majority of the stock is held by less than 2 per cent of the stockholders. The vast majority of the stockholders take no active part whatever in determining policies. Actual control is in the hands of the thirteen directors, six of whom are also members of the Finance Committee."—K. Page, *United States Steel Corporation (Atlantic Monthly, May, 1922)*.—"Judging from the action of the stock market, Wall Street has been greatly impressed by the Steel Corporation's earnings and dividend policy. Certainly the corporation's ability to earn over \$48,000,000 in the third quarter of the year, and at a time when business was falling off and the twelve-hour day was being eliminated, was a distinct surprise to most observers. An appreciable decrease from the showing of the second quarter, when activity was at its height and when the corporation earned \$48,800,000, was looked for. Declaration of an extra dividend of one-quarter of 1 per cent on the common stock was an even greater surprise; it was, in fact, wholly unexpected."—*New York Evening Post, Nov. 1, 1923*.

ALSO IN: E. Jones, *Trust problem in United States*.—J. Moody, *Masters of capital*.—G. H. Montague, *Coöperation and anti-trust laws (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 63)*.—W. H. Taft, *Anti-trust acts and Supreme Court*.—United States Department of Justice, *Federal anti-trust decisions: Cases decided in the United States courts, 1890-1917*.—*White on corporations: Laws amended to Jan. 1, 1923 (9th edition)*.

## INTERNATIONAL

**General survey.**—"The advantages of quantity production, which brought about the concentration of industries within certain countries, and the profits accruing from a limitation of competition on the home market, have given rise to understandings between great national industries. The development of international competition has brought about in certain industries similar understandings concerning the markets of the whole world, providing either for a division of the territory or for a determination of the general basis of contracts, especially prices and rates. The former type of understanding has been applied in particular in the steel industry for certain important items like rails and structural steel, and in the plate-glass and explosives industries. The second type has been applied in ocean transportation, where shipping rings have become a characteristic feature, declared to be necessary to the interests of the shippers themselves, in order to ensure the operation of regular lines with dates of sailing well distributed between the several companies, and a greater stability in rates."—A. Viallate, *Economic imperialism and international relations during the last fifty years, p. 99*.—"Macrosty says that 'rails, tubes, nails, screws, sewing thread, bleaching powder, borax, nitrates, and tobacco are to a greater or less degree brought under international control, while at least till lately, dynamite was so controlled, and repeated efforts have been made similarly to syndicate the whole steel trade.' The

forces which have produced such international combinations are the same as those which have resulted in those confined to one country, the maintenance of prices, division of territories, and limitation of production. Perhaps the most important of these combinations is the International Rail Syndicate, which was formed in 1883 between Great Britain, Germany, and Belgium. Under this agreement England was awarded 66 per cent of the business afterwards reduced to 63½ per cent; Germany 27, afterwards 29 per cent; and Belgium 7, afterwards 7½ per cent. Later this pool was broken up with a fall of prices, but in 1904 it got together again on a different basis, that of division of territory. In 1905 the United States was taken into the arrangement. Also, there have been international combinations for a number of other iron and steel products. . . . Oil is one of the businesses in which the international combination and coöperation have gone far, in some places there being union, in others division of territory. As we have already seen the American Tobacco Company made an agreement with the Imperial Tobacco Company under which each was to respect the home territory of the other, and a combination company was created, the British-American Tobacco Company, through which the two handled their foreign business. The nitrate combination regulates prices and output. Some businesses have become international by one of the great companies buying other companies in the same business, or establishing branches in foreign countries. The latter applies to a number of the greater companies of the United States, illustrated by the Westinghouse Company."—C. R. Van Hise, *Concentration and control, pp. 222-223*.

**Transatlantic shipping companies.**—**Agreements with the British government.**—**Control of commodities.**—Announcement was made in October, 1902, of the incorporation on the 1st of that month, under a New Jersey charter, of the International Mercantile Marine Company, with a capital of \$120,000,000, and an issue of 4½ per cent bonds to the amount of \$75,000,000. The combination included the American, the Red Star, the White, the Atlantic Transport, the Leyland and the Dominion lines. Both American and British capitalists were represented in the board of directors, the former in the majority. Several partners in the firm of J. Pierpont Morgan & Company, were included, and Mr. Morgan was understood to be the architect of the combination; but he did not appear personally in its organization. The first step towards such a shipping combination had been taken sixteen years before, when the British Inman steamship line was taken over by the International Navigation company, made up of Americans, at the head of whom was Clement A. Griscom, of Philadelphia. "The British Government promptly withdrew the liberal subsidy which it had been paying to the Inman liners; but Mr. Griscom and his comrades brought the *New York* and *Paris* beneath the Stars and Stripes, built the *St. Louis* and *St. Paul*, secured a subsidy from the United States and gave the first-class British lines a most formidable competitor. Indeed, commercial rivalry in high grade ships on the North Atlantic soon became too keen to permit of reasonable dividends and Mr. Griscom found British ship-owners in a responsive mood when he broached anew the great idea of an international combination. This union was made all the easier by the fact that meanwhile another important British steamship concern, the Leyland line, had been acquired by Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan in the spring of 1901. This line, itself the fruit of several con-

solidations, controlled the largest British tonnage in the North Atlantic trade. It owned no fast mail ships, no greyhounds. But it did possess forty or fifty good, useful steamships of moderate speed, many of them of large tonnage, and fit for passengers as well as freight. The main Leyland service lay between Boston or New York on this side, and Liverpool or London on the other, and the business of the company had been so profitable for a long term of years that its shares were quoted at a handsome premium. Mr. Morgan paid a generous price for his maritime investment. It is said that he gave £14 10s. for each £10 share, or a bonus of 45 per cent. But amazement at Mr. Morgan's 'liberality' ceased when the next stage in the great, far-sighted negotiations was unfolded. This was the dramatic uniting of the Leyland line with the American and Red Star lines of the International Navigation Company, and the Atlantic Transport line, another British steam fleet owned by American capital. Later still it transpired that the famous White Star line of fast mail, passenger, and freight ships and the smaller but excellent Dominion line were embraced in the huge consolidation. The White Star was one of the two lines—the Cunard was the other—which performed the British mail service between Queenstown and New York. Its fleet included the great liners *Oceanic* and *Celtic*, the swift *Teutonic* and *Majestic*, and the favorite *Britannic* and *Germanic* which had held ocean records in their day, together with a considerable number of large and efficient freighters. The American purchase of the White Star line was long disputed, and when it was finally confirmed, something like consternation seized the British press and people, for the White Star fleet had been regarded as distinctively a British institution as the Bank of England. Its fast ships received not only the mail pay of the post-office, but the subventions of the Admiralty, and were enrolled on the 'merchant cruiser' list.—W. L. Marvin, *Great ship "combine"* (*American Review of Reviews*, Dec., 1902).—The anxieties with which the combination was regarded at first in Great Britain were allayed materially by Gerald Balfour, president of the board of trade, who made public, in a speech at Sheffield, the terms of an arrangement that had been made by the government with the Cunard Company, on one hand, and the combination on the other. The Cunard Company, he said, "pledged themselves to remain in every respect a British company, managed by British directors—the shares not to be transferred to any but British subjects. Their ships were to be officered by British officers. They also engaged to construct two vessels of twenty-four to twenty-five knots which, as well as the entire Cunard fleet, the Admiralty would have the right to charter or purchase at any time on terms fixed in the agreement. The money for the construction of the fast steamers would be advanced to the company at the rate of 2¾ per cent. interest, while in lieu of the present Admiralty subvention—£28,000 a year for the contingent use of three ships—the company would receive £150,000 a year. With Mr. Pierpont Morgan, the head of the Shipping Combination, who had shown the utmost readiness to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government, it had been agreed that the British companies in the Combination should remain British, not merely in name but in reality. The majority of their directors were to be British subjects. All their ships now flying the British flag were to continue to fly it, and at least one-half of those hereafter to be built for the Combination would likewise fly British colours, be

commanded by British officers, and manned in reasonable proportion by British sailors. On the other hand, the combined companies would continue to be treated, as heretofore, on a footing of equality with other British companies in respect of any services, whether postal, or military, or naval, which His Majesty's Government might require from the British mercantile marine. It had been further stipulated that in the event of the Combination pursuing a policy hostile to our mercantile marine or to British trade, the King's Government should have the right to terminate the agreement."

Struggle for oil concessions.—Causes of hostility.—Need for international machinery.—"Chester Concession."—Struggle to control Levantine oil market.—"Whereas so often happens, trusts are international in character and the world markets are apportioned out amongst the various firms . . . [the check of healthy foreign competition] is no longer operative. . . . The oil industry is of such a nature that there is a national tendency toward monopoly. . . . The desire to make profit safer by being sure not only of supplies but also of storage and trading facilities has resulted in the formation of trusts with worldwide interests and of international importance. Thus the Standard Oil Co. . . . has sought for new oil bearing areas in Mexico and South America, in Rumania, Russia, Czecho-Slovakia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Persia. The same is true of the Royal Dutch Shell (the result of the union of big companies of Holland and England) and of the Anglo-Persian Co. . . . Towards the end of 1920 there was a possibility of serious friction and even open hostility between America and England, solely because the American oil companies resented the fact that combines composed largely of British capital and staffed by Englishmen, had managed to acquire possession of a large number of the richest petroliferous areas. To balance what was considered an unfair advantage over their own nationals, the United States government began to cancel many of the concessions held by the British in Mexico and South America. . . . The first political cause of hostility was the conclusion in April, 1920, of the San Remo agreement between France and England, which provided for joint political action with regard to oil development in Mesopotamia, Galicia, Rumania, Asia Minor, etc. It was agreed that in Mesopotamia the French should take over the 25 per cent share formerly held by the Germans in the Turkish Petroleum Co. (of which the remaining shares were held (50 per cent by the Anglo-Persian Co.) of which the British government is the largest share holder) and 25 per cent by the Royal Dutch Shell combine (which is largely British). The American government immediately protested on behalf of the Standard Oil Co. and as a result of that intervention gained for the company a concession in Palestine. . . . In a like way the fear of one oil trust that another might rival it in supplies resulted in the breakdown of . . . [the Genoa] conference [1922]. . . . A problem which is international in scope can be dealt with only by machinery which is international in nature. The Economic Section of the League of Nations seems a very suitable body to take upon itself full investigation of the activities of all outer national combines and make recommendations as to what should be done. The recommendations of the League are not necessarily ratified by the respective governments, but publicity would be of the greatest value, and would make clear the issues on which action might be taken."—G. Williams,

*Social aspects of industrial problems*, pp. 52, 59-63.—The "Chester Concession" approved by the Angora government of Turkey on Apr. 10, 1923, provided for the construction of more than 1,000 miles of railways and for the development of the Mosul oil region, and was the successful termination of negotiations by an American syndicate to obtain the right to develop these rich regions. The origin of the Chester grant goes back to President Roosevelt's administration, when in 1908, negotiations were initiated through the agency of Rear Admiral Colby M. Chester, and were opposed by British, French and Russian interests in the field. Political events prevented the furtherance of the American plan until the 1923 grant authorized the Ottoman-American Development Company to carry on the proposed work. (See **TURKEY**: 1922-1923.) General George W. Goethals was named president of the company. "For the time being the worldwide struggle for oil concessions has come to a close. It has been solved by agreements between different national groups. In February, 1922, the Dutch-Shell and the Union Oil incorporated a company in the State of Delaware. French and American interests have formed a joint company in Czechoslovakia. The Anglo-Persian and Standard Oil Companies have formed a similar organization in Persia. And now the Turkish Petroleum and American interests are apparently to co-operate in Mesopotamia. But these private combinations are not extensive enough. They are still based on the principle of a trust, and one which is subject to no international control."—R. L. Buell, *Oil interests in the fight for Mosul* (*New York Times Current History*, Mar., 1923, p. 938).—"The Sinclair interests, which, through the International Barnsdall Corporation, already are participating in oil developments on the Russian side of the Caucasus, have made a bid for the northern Persian fields, according to a dispatch from Teheran, Persia. The Standard Oil Company is also said to have approached the Teheran Government for the same concession. The dispatch describes the bids as another skirmish in the persistent struggle which is proceeding between these two American groups on the one hand and several foreign groups on the other for the present and potential fields, which would give control of the Levantine oil market. The struggle centres in Russia, as the north Persian fields always have been considered in the sphere of Russian influence, and the Soviet Government, following the Czarist precedent, is taking considerable interest into which hands they pass. Soviet oil syndicates have showed a deficit in operating in Russian fields for the year ending in October, and in consequence the foreign interests consider the present time ripe to bid for their control on a mixed company or contracting basis. It is understood that no definite decision has been reached as yet, although proposals have been submitted directly or indirectly by five groups—the Stinnes group, a French combination, the Sinclair and Standard Oil interests, and the English-Dutch combination."—*New York Evening Post*, Oct. 27, 1923.—See also U.S.A.: 1913-1914; 1920 (November): Note; 1921 (April-July).

**Rubber industry.**—**Predicament of the United States.**—"Rubber is the latest commodity to disturb international relations. The automotive and rubber industries of the United States, representing an investment of over \$10,000,000,000 and dependent entirely upon rubber produced in the British and Dutch equatorial possessions, are facing a critical situation, due to the drastic restrictions placed by the British Government upon the pro-

duction and export of crude rubber. The international aspect is further complicated by the fact that the British Rubber Commission, which recommended these restrictions, has also advised that the Dutch Government be asked to adopt similar measures so as to insure bringing to terms the American rubber consumers, who consume about 72 per cent. of the total world production, though producing none at all and controlling only less than 3 per cent. of the world's rubber-producing area. . . . That the seriousness of the situation is now realized was shown when, in Washington on Feb. 27, a movement was launched at a meeting of several hundred American rubber, automobile and accessories manufacturers to protest against the British rubber monopoly and consider how American manufacturers could develop their own sources of crude rubber. Secretary Wallace, who was present, outlined the plans of the Department of Agriculture for experimentation with rubber-producing plants in the United States, which, he predicted, would come. He thought there was as much prospect of developing an American rubber industry as there was of the sugar-beet industry a hundred years ago. That is encouraging, but the immediate problem remains for the time being unsolved."—H. Woodhouse, *America at the mercy of British rubber monopoly* (*New York Times Current History*, Apr., 1923, pp. 134, 149).

ALSO IN: J. A. Hobson, *Evolution of modern capitalism*.—E. D. Durand, *Trust problem*.—W. C. Dunn, *Trusts for business purposes*.—J. M. Keynes, *Economic consequences of the peace*.—W. Z. Ripley, *Trusts, pools and corporations*.—F. Franklin, *Trusts and their manifest destiny* (*Independent*, May 12, 1923).—A. Marshall, *Industry and trade*.

**TRUXTON**, Thomas (1755-1822), American naval officer. Captured the French frigate, *Insurgente*, 1790. See U.S.A.: 1797-1799.

**TRYON**, William (1720-1788), American colonial governor. Lieutenant-governor of North Carolina, 1764-1765; governor of North Carolina, 1765-1771; governor of New York, 1771-1780. See **NORTH CAROLINA**: 1766-1771; **NEW YORK**: 1775 (April-September).

**TRYPANOSOMES**. See **MEDICAL SCIENCE**: Modern; 20th century: Trypanosomes.

**TSAMAK**, North American Indian tribe. See **PUJUNAN FAMILY**.

**TSAR**, title of the former sovereigns of Russia. "Peter the Great, after consolidating Russia, abolished the title of Tsar of Muscovy, and proclaimed himself Emperor of all the Russias; purposely using the same term 'Imperator' as that employed by the Roman Emperor, and thus putting himself on an equality with him. I know by experience that it is impossible to din into the heads of those unfamiliar with Russia that since Peter the Great's time there has never been a Tsar. The words 'Tsar,' 'Tsarina,' 'Cesarevitch,' beloved of journalists, exist only in their imagination; they are never heard in Russia. The Russians termed their Emperor 'Gosudar Imperator,' using either or both of the words. Empress is 'Imperatritza'; Her Apparent 'Nadslyednik.' If you mentioned the words 'Tsar' or 'Tsarina' to any ordinary Russian peasant, I doubt if he would understand you, but I am well aware that it is no use repeating this, the other idea is too firmly ingrained."—Lord F. Hamilton, *Vanished pomps of yesterday*, pp. 52-53.—See also **CAESAR**: Title; **RUSSIA**: 1547; 1010: Russian absolutism.

**TSARSKOYE SELO**, district town of Russia, in the government of Petrograd, and formerly used as a summer residence of the tsar. The town is

noted for its imperial parks and gardens, and historic palaces.

**TSCHAIKOWSKY.** See **TCHAIKOVSKY.**

**TSCHIRSCHKY UND BÖGENDORFF, H. L. von** (1855-1916), German ambassador to the Austro-Hungarian Court, 1907-1916. See **WORLD WAR**: Diplomatic background: 3; 9; 38.

**TSHEKHS.** See **CZECHS.**

**T-SHELLS.** See **POISON GAS**: T-shells and K-shells.

**T-SHERKESS.** See **CIRCISSIANS.**

**TSIAM NATION**, ancient people of China. See **TONKIN**; **INDO-CHINA**: Geography.

**TSIMSHIAN**, North American Indian tribe. See **INDIANS, AMERICAN**: Cultural areas in North America: North Pacific coast area; Linguistic characteristics.

**TSING**, name assumed by the Manchu dynasty of China, 1644-1912. See **CHINA**: 1294-1736.

**TSING-TAO**, or **Tsing-tau**, port of the former German colony of Kiao-Chau, in the Shantung peninsula, occupied by Japan from 1914 to 1922. See **JAPAN**: 1914-1918: In the World War; 1922 (December); **WORLD WAR**: 1914: V. Japan: d, 1; d, 2; d, 3; d, 4; d, 5.

**TSINUKS**, North American Indian tribe. See **CHINOOKAN FAMILY.**

**TSONEKAN**, South American Indian tribe. See **INDIANS, AMERICAN**: Cultural areas in South America: Pampean area.

**TSUMEB, Battle of.** See **SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF**: 1015; **WORLD WAR**: 1915: VIII. Africa: a, 2.

**TSUNG-LI-YAMEN**, department of foreign affairs under the old Chinese monarchy. See **CHINA**: 1898 (April-July); 1900.

**TSU-SHIMA, Battle of** (1905). See **JAPAN**: 1902-1905.

**TSZ'E HSI** (1834-1908), empress dowager of China. See **CHINA**: 1898 (June-September).

**TUAN, Chi-jui**, Chinese general. Premier of China, 1920. See **CHINA**: 1916-1917; 1920: Leading parties; Failure of victorious generals to unite China.

**TUAREGS**, or **Tuariks**, Berber nomadic tribes of the Sahara desert. See **AFRICA**: Races of Africa: Prehistoric; Modern peoples; **LIBYANS.**

**TUATH.**—"Among the people of Gaelic race [in Ireland and Scotland] the original social unit appears to have been the 'Tuath,' a name originally applied to the tribe, but which came to signify also the territory occupied by the tribe community. . . . Several of these Tuaths were grouped together to form a still larger tribe, termed a Mortuath or great tribe, over whom one of the kings presided as *Ri Mortuath*. . . . Then several of these Mortuath formed a province, called in Irish 'Cuicidh,' or a fifth. . . . Over each province was the *Ri Cuicidh*, or provincial king, and then over the whole was the *Ardri*, or sovereign of all Ireland. The succession to these several grades of *Ri*, or king, was the same as that of the *Ri Tuath*, and was regulated by the law of *Tanistry*, that is, hereditary in the family but elective in the individual, the senior of the family being usually preferred."—W. F. Skene, *Celtic Scotland*, v. 3, pp. 136-150.—See also **BREHON LAWS**: Description, etc; **IRELAND**: 1269.

**TUATHA-DE-DANAAN**, one of the races named in Irish legend as original settlers of Ireland, represented to have come from Greece and to have been extraordinarily proficient in the arts of magic. They were conquered, after two centuries, as the legend runs, by the Milesians, or Scots.—Based on T. Wright, *History of Ireland*, v. 1, bk.

1, ch. 2.—See also **IRELAND**: Primitive Inhabitants.

**TUATHAL TECHTMAR**, king of Ireland, 130-160. Founder of the feudal system in Ireland. See **IRELAND**: From Tuathal to Cormac.

**TUBANTES**, Germanic tribe in the Frankish confederation. See **FRANKS**: Origin and earliest history.

**TUBERCULOSIS.** See **MEDICAL SCIENCE**: Modern: 19th century: Development of bacteriology.

**TUBUAI ISLANDS.** See **AUSTRAL ISLANDS.**

**TUCKER, Benjamin Ricketson** (1854- ), American anarchist. See **ANARCHISM**: 1839-1894.

**TUCKER, Daniel**, governor of the Bermudas. See **BERMUDAS**: 1612-1620.

**TUDELA, Battle of.** See **SPAIN**: 1909 (September-December).

**TUDOR**, family name of the dynasty occupying the English throne from 1485 to 1603. The Tudor monarchs were Henry VII (1485-1509), Henry VIII (1509-1547), Edward VI (1547-1553), Mary (1553-1558), and Elizabeth (1558-1603). See **ENGLAND**: 1471-1485, to 1603; **LONDON**: 1585-1603; **PRIVY COUNCIL**; **WALES**: 1485-1603.

**TUDOR STYLE OF ARCHITECTURE.** See **ARCHITECTURE**: Renaissance: England.

**TUGELA**, river in Natal, southeast Africa. It was a scene of operations during the Boer War. See **SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF**: 1899 (October-December); 1900 (January-February).

**TUGENDBUND**, German patriotic association. See **GERMANY**: 1808 (April-December).

**TUGHLAQ DYNASTY.** See **KARAUNA.**

**TUGHRA**, personal symbol of the Sultan. See **FLAGS**: Turkey.

**TUILERIES.**—The palace of the Tuileries is said to have taken its name from the tile-making which had been carried on formerly in the vicinity of the ground on which it was built. "The history of it begins in the year 1564, when Catherine de Medicis conceived the idea of having a palace to herself near the Louvre, yet independent, in which she might be near enough to her son Charles IX. to have influence over him. . . . The palace was never very long or very closely connected with the history of the monarchy. It is not at all comparable to Windsor in that respect. Henry IV. liked it, Louis XIV. preferred Versailles, Louis XV. lived at the Tuileries in his minority. The chosen association of the palace with the sovereigns of France is very recent. Louis XVI. lived in it, and so did Charles X. and Louis-Philippe. The two Napoleons were fond of it. . . . The last inhabitant was the Empress Eugénie, as Regent. . . . The parliamentary history of the Tuileries is important, as it has been not only a palace but a parliament house. . . . The destruction of the Tuileries by the Communards [1871] was a lamentable event from the point of view of the historian and the archaeologist, but artistically the loss is not great."—P. G. Hamerton, *Paris in old and present times*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: *History of Paris* (London: 1827), v. 2, ch. 2.

1792.—**Mobbing of the king.**—**Attack of August 10.**—**Massacre of the Swiss.** See **FRANCE**: 1792 (June-August).

**TUKUARIKAS**, North American Indian tribe. See **SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.**

**TULANSINGO, Battle of** (1828). See **MEXICO**: 1822-1828.

**TULCHAN BISHOPS.** See **SCOTLAND**: 1572.

**TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.** See **U.S.A.**: 1863 (June-July: Tennessee).

**TUMULSA**, Battle of (1825). See BOLIVIA: 1809-1825.

**TUMULT**, or **CONSPIRACY**, OF AM-BOISE (1560). See FRANCE: 1559-1561.

**TUMULUS**. See RATHS; AFRICA: Races of Africa: Prehistoric.

**TUN**, **TUNSCUPE**. See TOWN; TOWNSHIP; BOROUGH.

**TUNGSTEN LAMP**. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Electric lighting: 1841-1921.

**TUNGUSIAN LANGUAGE**. See PHILOLOGY: 20.

**TUNIC**, Roman.—“The tunica was put on in the same way as the Greek chiton. Its cut was the same for men and women, and its simple original type was never essentially modified by the additions of later fashion. It was light and comfortable, and was worn especially at home; out of doors the toga was arranged over it.”—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 95.—See also COSTUME: Egyptian, etc.

**TUNICAN**, North American Indian tribe. See INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: Southeastern area.

**TUNIS**: Geography. — Population. — “The coast-line of Northern Africa runs almost due east as far as Cape Bon, the Mercurii Promontorium of the Romans, at which point it takes an abrupt turn southwards till it reaches the island of Jerba, famous in history as the fabled abode of the lotus-eaters, and close to the lower extremity of the Gulf of Gabes, once known as the Lesser Syrtis. From this point the shore of the Mediterranean again resumes its easterly course towards Alexandria and the Nile. The tract of country which occupies the angle thus formed is the Regency of Tunis. As its very name denotes, the *Regency* of Tunis never had any pretensions to be more than a quasi-independent state. The dominion of Tunis is or rather was a Regency or sief of the Turkish Empire, and the Beys of Tunis were both politically and religiously vassals of the Sublime Porte. . . . The most northerly part of Tunis is only divided by some eighty miles from the sea of Sicily. Indeed, a line of rocks beneath the waves, known as the Ferki reefs, forms a junction between the island and the Atlas mountains of the African mainland. It is this strait or channel which separates the eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean. ‘This Tunis,’ as Shakespeare says, ‘was Carthage.’ It afterwards became in turn Africa Propria, Zeugitania and Byzacium. Numerous authors have handed down to posterity the history of its remote antiquity, but the Tunis of to-day was little better than a *terra incognita* when the events of the French invasion forced the fact of its existence on the attention of Europe and England. The Gulf of Tunis and the now land-locked harbour of Bizerta command the passage of the narrow sea before them, and hence arises the maritime importance of Tunis in the past, the present and the future. . . . The Regency of Tunis is bounded on both the north and the east by the Mediterranean, on the west by Algeria, on the south by the Sahara of the Touaregs, and on the southeast by Tripoli. [See AFRICA: Map.] It has an area of about sixty thousand square miles, and a sea-coast 550 miles in length.”—A. M. Broadley, *Tunis, past and present*, pp. 1-6.—The population, according to the 1921 census, was 1,037,824 natives, chiefly Arab or Bedouin, and 156,115 Europeans, of whom 54,476 were French and 84,799 were Italian (see COLONIZATION: French). Among Europeans in Tunis the Italians outnumbered the

French, showing, according to Sir Charles Lucas “that there was some substantial ground for Italian resentment when France forestalled Italy in Tunis.”—C. Lucas, *Partition and colonization of Africa*.—In 1916 Hubert Adams Gibbons wrote: “Tunis contains two hundred thousand Europeans of whom less than fifty thousand are French. With all the increase of wealth of these two possessions, the French element has not greatly increased since 1900. . . . It is in vain that the French flag flies over Tunis. Its European civilian element is distinctively Italian. Every Frenchman who visits Tunis sees this with a sinking of the heart.”—H. A. Gibbons, *New map of Africa, 1900-1916*, p. 145.—The 1921 census, however, showed an increase of 8,000 in the French inhabitants since the census of 1911.

13th century.—Rise. See AFRICA: Ancient and medieval civilization: Arab occupation.

1270.—Besieged by Crusaders. See CRUSADES: 1270-1271.

1535.—Conquest by Charles V. See BARBARY STATES: 1516-1535.

1572-1573.—Capture by Don Juan of Austria.—Recovery by the Turks. See TURKEY: 1572-1573.

1665.—Bombardment by the French. See BARBARY STATES: 1664-1684.

1785-1801.—Piratical depredations upon American commerce.—Exaction of tribute for navigation of Mediterranean.—Treaty with the United States. See BARBARY STATES: 1785-1801.

1816.—Abolition of Christian slavery. See BARBARY STATES: 1816.

1860-1881.—Steps leading to French occupation.—Rivalry of several powers.—Relation to later history.—“When the French conquered Algeria [1830] they looked upon the occupation of Tunisia as a logical sequel. But after the Crimean War Turkey revived her claim of suzerainty. Napoleon III was busy with other affairs, and the British began to get control. They loaned money to the bey and built the first railroad, waterworks, and warehouses. Owing to the proximity of Malta, a British protectorate was talked about. The Italians, however, immediately after their unification, decided that Tunisia must be theirs. [See ITALY: 1870-1901.] They competed with the British and in 1880 bought the railroad from them. From 1860 to 1880 tens of thousands of Italian colonists went to the coveted land. In 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, unknown to Italy, Salisbury, with the consent of Bismark, assured France that there would be no opposition to intervention by her in Tunisia. The French invaded the country from Algeria in 1881, occupied Tunisia, and forced the bey to sign a treaty putting himself under French protection. [See FRANCE: 1875-1889.] After two years of fighting the French were in full control. Great Britain, followed by the other powers, accepted the *fait accompli* of the protectorate. Only the Italians, heartbroken but unable to fight the French, refused to recognize the occupation. They thereupon entered the Triple Alliance with Germany and their traditional enemy Austria and only in 1866 was their attitude of protest abandoned. On the ground that the regency of Tunisia was a part of the Ottoman dominions, the Porte objected to the French invasion and to the proclamation of the protectorate. Turkey had no power to back her remonstrances but she continued to make frontier troubles for the French until the Italian occupation of Tripoli thirty years later.”—H. A. Gibbons, *Introduction to world politics*, pp. 55-56.

1881-1898.—Establishment of complete French rule.—Achievements.—“Already, on November 20, 1881, Gambetta, then French Premier, and Jules Ferry, influenced by the opinions of Baron de Courcel and Saint-Hilaire, had determined upon the establishment of a thorough-going French rule in Tunisia, the first move toward which was the appointment of Paul Cambon. On March 27, 1883, a law was authorized by Ali Bey establishing a system of French courts in the leading cities, the details of which were provided in the later decrees of April 14, 1883, and July 6, 1884. This was followed by an ordinance dated May 5, giving these courts jurisdiction over all foreigners who gave up their extraterritoriality. Thereupon, Great Britain in December, 1883, and Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the Netherlands in 1884, issued orders abolishing, respectively, their consular jurisdictions in Tunisia. Conditions remained far from satisfactory; and it was evident that the proper adjustments would not take place or the introduction of reforms essential to the development and progress of the country be possible under the existing régime. The French, therefore, decided to strengthen their position and secure the necessary powers to inaugurate a comprehensive reform plan. On June 8, 1883, Paul Cambon secured a new treaty from the Bey, known as the Convention of Marsa, in which Ali agreed to permit such administrative, judicial, and financial reforms as the French deemed advisable, and the French promised to guarantee loans of 120,000,000 francs on the Consolidated Debt and 17,550,000 francs on the Floating Debt of Tunisia. The interest charge on these loans was to be a first lien on the revenues of the regency, and the expenses of the Tunisian administration and of the protectorate. Thus was accomplished the final step in the creation of a French protectorate over the dominions of the Bey of Tunis. . . . The lines of French expansion in North Africa had been definitely determined, and the security of the French position in Algeria assured by the acquisition of Tunisia. It was a costly affair, however, the French exchequer being drawn upon for over \$12,600,000 in the years 1881 and 1882 alone. . . . Instead of attempting to impose any French system of law or government upon the country, the French authorities worked out the necessary reforms in finance, justice, and administration with the local customs, methods, and institutions as a basis. A system of French supervision, similar in theory to that of the British in Egypt, was imposed quietly but effectively upon every branch of the state and local public service. . . . By the decrees of April 22, 1882, November 10, 1884, and June 23, 1885, the position and powers of the Resident-General were definitely determined. While responsible directly to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was entrusted with an extensive discretionary authority and a wide freedom of action. He has command of all the naval and military forces of Tunisia, approves all general legislation and that affecting French colonists, and presides over the cabinet of the Bey, whom he serves as Minister of Foreign Affairs and whom he counsels on all financial, administrative, or other reforms. . . . Public order and security were established throughout the land. . . . Over a hundred thousand people fled into Tripoli at the time of the French invasion, but within a few years all except some three hundred had returned. Numerous public improvements have been introduced, including telegraphs, telephones, posts, government buildings, schools, hospitals, over

2500 miles of splendid national roads and 949 miles of railway. The substantial progress of Tunisia is shown nowhere better than in the development of its trade. In 1885, the total of its exports and imports amounted only to about \$9,200,000; but twenty-five years later—in 1910—this total had multiplied approximately fivefold, reaching \$45,170,000. About one half of the imports in this year came from France, one eighth from Algeria and Great Britain, and one twentieth from Italy. Of the exports, France again received about one half, but Italy was favored with nearly one fifth, while one tenth went to England and one twentieth to Algeria. The chief exports are grain, phosphates, and a goodly product of cattle, esparto grass, olive oil, and lead, iron, and zinc ore. The leading imports include cotton goods, iron, hardware, flour, and machinery. While the French attempts at colonization and irrigation have not yielded as yet any noteworthy results [see CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: France: 1910-1917]—only about 1,000,000 hectares being cultivated at present out of a possible 12,000,000,—a good deal of French and Italian capital has been invested in the country to the great improvement of trade and other conditions generally.”—N. D. Harris, *Intervention and colonization in Africa*, pp. 236-239, 241.—In 1898, the general results produced in Tunis by seventeen years of French control were described in an elaborate report to the British government by its representative in the protectorate, or regency, Sir H. Johnston. The following is quoted from that report: “The protectorate of Tunis is nominally an Arab Kingdom, ruled by a prince of Turkish descent under the guidance and control of a French Minister Resident-General and a staff of French officials. . . . The personal staff of the Resident-General consists of about nine members. In addition, the French Government is more or less directly represented throughout the Regency by officials corresponding almost exactly to our vice-consuls, collectors and assistant-collectors in our African Protectorates, with this difference, that the collectors are called ‘contrôleurs.’ . . . The whole of Tunisia is now under civil administration, except the Sahara district to the south of Gabes, which still remains under military control. . . . In the districts which I visited, the natives, talking to me freely, said that they would sooner be under the rule of any Frenchman than under that of their own kaid. The French are face to face here with the same problem that we find so difficult in other oriental countries—that of creating amongst the natives a body of public officials who will keep their hands from picking and stealing, and their tongues from evil speaking, lying and slandering. No tyrant is so cruel to an Arab as an Arab; no one is harder on Muhammadans than their co-religionists. Justice is administered to Europeans, and to the protected subjects of European powers, by French tribunals, which equally deal with cases arising between Europeans and Tunisians. . . . Justice is administered to natives, in cases where natives alone are concerned, by Arab courts depending directly on the Tunisian Government, but with a Frenchman at the head of each principal department. At all the centres of population there are Arab courts of justice. The Court of Appeal for the French courts in Tunis is the Supreme Court of Algiers; the appeal from the Arab courts is to the Bey. . . . Public works are entirely under French control, though Tunisians are employed in minor posts. . . . Public education is under French and Arab direction. . . . In ad-



dition to Government-supported schools, a large number of private establishments have sprung up at Tunis and at Sfax. . . . In 1880 life and property were thoroughly insecure. The property of Europeans, perhaps, was safe, provided they were the subjects of a Power able to coerce the Government of Tunis, and their lives were not in any great danger in the principal towns; but it would have been impossible for any European to have travelled about many parts of the Regency without a considerable escort; impossible, indeed, to penetrate some parts of the Regency at all unless at the head of an army. . . . The whole Regency of Tunis is now as safe for tourists as France."—Great Britain, *Parliamentary Publications (Papers by command)*, 1898, C. 8649-18, pp. 10-15, 2-3).

1919.—French plans for development of country.—After the World War France declared her policy of a more intensive cultivation of her colonies. On behalf of plans for the further development of Tunis, Étienne Flandin, French resident-general in 1919, advocated the consolidating of French control in the interior by a systematic filling up of the depleted ranks of colonists. This was to be through an employment agency which would especially attract war veterans and orphans. On the other hand, native interests received consideration when Flandin insisted "on the necessity of safeguarding, from the point of view of Muhammadan Arabian France, their moral and political preponderance in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. He had recalled on frequent occasions that the French pacification in Tunisia, as in the remainder of northern Africa, could not present durable guarantees if it did not extend to Syria, to Aleppo, and above all to Damascus, that great center of Arab Islam. He was confident that such a religious and political solidarity would be consecrated by the peace. Their work in Tunisia had been sufficiently splendid and the Regency had too well proved its loyalty for the circumstances of its future with regard to the Mediterranean to be allowed to drop out."—*Christian Science Monitor*, Apr. 24, 1919.—See also AFRICA: Modern European occupation; 1914-1920: Climatic conditions; Lack of railway and industrial development.

1920.—French protectorate recognized by Treaty of Sèvres. See SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920): Part III: Political clauses: Morocco, Tunis.

1922.—"Reform" party and the government.—"The 'Young Tunisian' or 'Reform' party, created about 1907 under the leadership of the gifted and ill-fated Ali Bach Hamba [included in 1922], seven-eighths of the educated natives. Many of the present leaders have been graduated, like him, from the best universities and law schools—or even military schools—of France. A hundred thousand natives of Tunisia served gallantly in the World War, of whom only half came home. . . . Among those now agitating for a written constitution, and an assembly at least half composed of Mussulman natives, with control of taxation and appropriations, there are on the one hand some leaders with liberal French education, sincerely loyal to the Republic; and at the other extreme at least one fanatical adherent to Mohammedan dress, language and manners, who raises openly the cry of 'Martyred Tunisia,' and laments the Golden Age when the Bey was real master in Tunis. Persecution may serve only to drive these coreligionists into political unity also. . . . The malcontents imagine that the mere grant of the 'Destour' (Constitution) would suffice to make life easy. The French of Tunis see in this Bolshevistic agitation,

or even the hand of Germany! In general the French press of the colony demands the sternest measures of repression."—*French in Tunis (American Review of Reviews, Dec., 1922, p. 659)*.—Late in 1922 the government's experiment of regional councils for native participation in ruling the country went into effect. The five council centers are Tunis, Bizerta, Susa, Keï and Sfax.

TUNNAGE AND POUNDAGE. See TONNAGE AND POUNDAGE.

TUNNEL, Channel. See CHANNEL TUNNEL.

TUPAC AMARU (José Gabriel Condorcanqui) (1742-1781), Peruvian revolutionist. Led a revolt against the Spaniards in Peru, 1780. See PERU: 1550-1810.

TUPAMBAY, Battle of (1832). See URUGUAY: 1821-1905.

TUPI, GUARANI, TUPUYAS.—"The first Indians with whom the Portuguese came in contact, on the discovery of Brazil, called themselves Tupinama, a term derived by Barnhagen from Tupi and Mba, something like warrior or nobleman; by Martius from Tupi and Anamba (relative) with the signification 'belonging to the Tupi tribe.' These Tupi dwell on the east coast of Brazil, and with their language the Portuguese were soon familiar. It was found especially serviceable as a means of communication with other tribes, and this led the Jesuits later to develop it as much as possible, and introduce it as a universal language of intercourse with the Savages. Thus the 'lingua geral Brasílica' arose, which must be regarded as a Tupi with a Portuguese pronunciation. The result was a surprising one, for it really succeeded in forming, for the tribes of Brazil, divided in language, a universal means of communication. Without doubt the wide extent of the Tupi was very favorable, especially since on this side of the Andes, as far as the Caribbean Sea, the continent of South America was overrun with Tupi hordes. . . . Von Martius has endeavored to trace their various migrations and abodes, by which they have acquired a sort of ubiquity in tropical South America. . . . This history . . . leads to the supposition that, had the discovery been delayed a few centuries, the Tupi might have become the lords of eastern South America, and have spread a higher culture over that region. The Tupi family may be divided, according to their fixed abodes, into the southern, northern, eastern, western, and central Tupi; all these are again divided into a number of smaller tribes. The southern Tupi are usually called Guarani (warriors), a name which the Jesuits first introduced. It cannot be determined from which direction they came. The greatest number are in Paraguay and the Argentine province of Corrientes. The Jesuits brought them to a very high degree of civilization. The eastern Tupi, the real Tupinamba, are scattered along the Atlantic coast from St. Catherina Island to the mouth of the Amazon. They are a very weak tribe. They say they came from the south and west. The northern Tupi are a weak and widely scattered remnant of a large tribe, and are now in the province of Para. on the island of Marajo, and along both banks of the Amazon. . . . It is somewhat doubtful if this peaceable tribe are really Tupi. . . . The central Tupi live in several free hordes between the Tocantins and Madeira. . . . Cutting off the heads of enemies is in vogue among them. . . . The Mundrucu are especially the head-hunting tribe. The western Tupi all live in Bolivia. They are the only ones who came in contact with the Inca empire, and their character and manners show the

influence of this. Some are a picture of idyllic gayety and patriarchal mildness."—*Standard natural history* (J. S. Kingsley, ed., v. 6, pp. 248-249).—"In frequent contiguity with the Tupis was another stock, also widely dispersed through Brazil, called the Tupuyas, of whom the Botocudos in eastern Brazil are the most prominent tribe. To them also belong the Gés nations, south of the lower Amazon, and others. They are on a low grade of culture, going quite naked, not cultivating the soil, ignorant of pottery, and with poorly made canoes. They are dolichocephalic, and must have inhabited the country a long time."—D. G. Brinton, *Races and peoples*, pp. 260-270.—See also INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in South America; Amazon area.

**TUPPER**, Sir Charles (1821-1915), Canadian statesman. Prime minister of Nova Scotia, 1864-1867; president of the privy council of Canada, 1870-1872; high commissioner for Canada at London, 1884-1887; 1888-1896; premier of Canada, 1896. See NOVA SCOTIA: 1782-1860; 1867; HIGH COMMISSIONER.

**TUPUYAS**, South American Indian tribe. See TUPI.

**TURAN**.—"The old Persians, who spoke an Aryan tongue, called their own land Iran, and the barbarous land to the north of it they called Turan. In their eyes, Iran was the land of light, and Turan was the land of darkness. From this Turan, the land of Central Asia, came the many Turkish settlements which made their way, first into Western Asia and then into Europe."—E. A. Freeman, *Ottoman power in Europe*, ch. 2.—See also IRAN; TURANIAN RACES AND LANGUAGES.

**TURANIAN RACES AND LANGUAGES**.—The name Turanian has been given to a large group of peoples, mostly Asiatic, whose languages are all in the agglutinative stage and bear evident marks of a family relationship. "This race, one of the largest, both numerically and with regard to the extent of territory which it occupies, is divided into two great branches, the Ugro-finnish and the Dravidian. The first must be again subdivided into the Turkish, including the populations of Turkestan and of the Steppes of Central Asia, as well as the Hungarians who have been for a long time settled in Europe; and the Uralo-finnish group, comprising the Finns, the Estonians, the Tchouides, and, in general, nearly all the tribes of the north of Europe and Asia. The country of the Dravidian branch is, on the contrary, to the south. This branch is in fact composed of the indigenous people of the Peninsula of Hindustan; Tamuls, Telingas, Carnates, who were subjugated by the Arian race, and who appear to have originally driven before them the negroes of the Australian group, the original inhabitants of the soil, who are now represented by the almost savage tribe of the Khonds. The Turanian race is one of the oldest in the world. . . . The skulls discovered in France, England and Belgium, in caves of the close of the quaternary epoch, appear from their characteristics to belong to a Turanian race, to the Uralo-finnish group, and particularly resemble those of the Estonians. Wherever the Japhetic or pure Indo-European race extended, it seems to have encountered a Turanian population which it conquered and finally amalgamated with itself."—F. Lenormant, *Manual of ancient history of the East*, bk. 1, ch. 4.—"Not only were distant stocks like Finns and Manchus quite unaware of any common Turanian bond, but even obvious kindred like Ottoman Turks and Central Asian Turkomans regarded

one another with indifference or contempt. . . . Arminius Vambéry tells how, when he first visited Constantinople in 1856, 'the word *Turkluk* (i. e., "Turk") was considered an opprobrious synonym of grossness and savagery, and when I used to call people's attention to the racial importance of the Turkish stock (stretching from Adrianople to the Pacific) they answered: "But you are surely not classing us with Kirghiz and with the gross nomads of Tartary." . . . It was, in fact, the labors of Western ethnologists like the Hungarian Vambéry and the Frenchman Léon Cahun that first cleared away the mists which enshrouded Turan. These labors disclosed the unexpected vastness of the Turanian world. And this presently acquired a most unacademic significance. The writings of Vambéry and his colleagues spread far and wide through Turan and were there devoured by receptive minds already stirring to the obscure promptings of a new time. . . . Of course one may query whether these diverse peoples actually do form one genuine race. But, as we have already seen, so far as practical politics go, that makes no difference."—L. Stoddard, *New world of Islam*, pp. 193-194, 193.—See also ETRUSCANS; PACIFIC OCEAN: B. C. 2500-A. D. 1500; PAN-TURANISM; PHILOLOGY: 20.

**TURATI**, Filippo (1857- ), Italian Socialist. See SOCIALISM: 1860-1920.

**TURBINES**. See STEAM AND GAS ENGINES: Steam Turbine engines; ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Survey of late inventions; INVENTIONS: 19th century: Power.

\* **TURCOMANS**. See TURKOMANS.

**TURDETANI**.—"There is a tradition that the Turdetani (round Seville) possessed lays from very ancient times, a metrical book of laws, of 6,000 verses, and even historical records. At any rate, this tribe is described as the most civilized of all the Spanish tribes, and at the same time the least warlike."—T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. 3, ch. 7.—"The most mixed portion of the Peninsular population . . . is that of the water-system of the Guadalquivir and the parts immediately south and east of it, . . . the country of the Turdetani and Bastitani, if we look to the ancient populations—Bætica, if we adopt the general name of the Romans, Andalusia in modern geography; . . . it was the Iberians of these parts who were the first to receive foreign intermixture, and the last to lose it."—R. G. Latham, *Ethnology of Europe*, ch. 2.

**TURDETANIA**, ancient name of modern Andalusia, in Spain, known still more anciently as Tartessus. See TARTIUS.

**TURENNE**, Henri de Latour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de (1611-1675), marshal of France. Served in the Dutch War of Independence, 1625; left Holland and entered the service of France, 1630.

**Campaign in Thirty Years' War and the war with Spain**. See ITALY: 1635-1659; GERMANY: 1640-1645; 1643-1644; 1646-1648.

**Wars of the Fronde**. See FRANCE: 1649; 1650-1651; 1651-1653.

**Campaigns against the Spaniards under Condé**. See FRANCE: 1653-1656; 1655-1658.

**Campaign in the Netherlands**. See NETHERLANDS: 1672-1674; 1674-1678.

**TURGEIS**, or Thorgies (died 844), Danish king of North Ireland, 832-844. Invaded Ireland, 832. See IRELAND: 9th-10th centuries; SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 8th-9th centuries.

**TURGENEV**, Ivan (1818-1883), Russian novelist. See RUSSIAN LITERATURE: 1855-1880.

**TURGOT**, Anne Robert Jacques, Baron de Laune (1727-1781), French statesman and economist. Intendant of Limoges, 1761-1774 and minister of marine, 1774; controller-general of finance, 1774-1776; in this capacity introduced many reforms including the abolition of the *corvée* or the forced employment of the peasants without remuneration upon the building and repairing of roads. See FRANCE: 1761-1773; 1774-1778; 1789; Survey of France on the eve of the revolution; Literary forerunners; GUILDS: Modern times; FRENCH LITERATURE: 1700-1800; HISTORY: 25; ECONOMICS: 18th century: Physiocrats.

**TURIERO**, South American Indian tribe. See CHIBCHAS.

**TURIN**, capital of the province of Piedmont in northwestern Italy, with a population of 427,106. It has many famous buildings of great architectural beauty and a university founded in 1400. Because of its proximity to the St. Gotthard tunnel and the Simplon pass it has become a great railway center.

312.—Defeat of Maxentius by Constantine. See ROME: Empire: 305-323.

11th-12th centuries.—Acquisition of Republican independence. See ITALY: 1056-1152.

12th century.—Included in the original Italian possessions of the House of Savoy. See SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: 11th-15th centuries.

1536-1544.—Occupation by the French and restoration to the duke of Savoy. See FRANCE: 1532-1547.

1559.—Held by France while other territory of the duke of Savoy was restored to him. See FRANCE: 1547-1559.

1562-1580.—Evacuation by the French.—Establishment of the seat of government by Duke Emanuel Philibert.—Increased importance. See SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: 1559-1580.

1639-1657.—Extraordinary siege within a siege.—The citadel, and its restoration by France to the duke of Savoy. See ITALY: 1635-1659.

1706.—Siege by the French and rout of the besiegers. See ITALY: 1701-1713.

1861-1865.—Capital of new kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: 1859-1861; 1862-1866.

1915-1918.—Base in the World War.—During the World War, Turin was an important base for military operations on the north Italian front.

1917-1920.—Riots.—In August, 1917, and at various times during the three following years, riots broke out, involving the Communists or Socialists and the Fascisti, as the militant nationalists were called.

**TURIN PAPYRUS**, Egyptian papyrus preserved in the Turin museum, for which it was purchased from M. Drovetti, consul-general of France. "If this papyrus were entire, the science of Egyptian antiquities could not possess a more valuable document. It contains a list of all the mythical or historical personages who were believed to have reigned in Egypt, from fabulous times down to a period we cannot ascertain, because the end of the papyrus is wanting. Compiled under Ramses II. (19th dynasty), that is, in the most flourishing epoch of the history of Egypt, this list has all the characteristics of an official document, and gives us the more valuable assistance, as the name of each king is followed by the duration of his reign, and each dynasty by the total number of years during which it governed Egypt. Unfortunately this inestimable treasure exists only in very small pieces (164 in num-

ber), which it is often impossible to join correctly." —F. Lenormant, *Manual of ancient history of the East*, bk. 3, ch. 1, sect. 2.—See also HISTORY: 14.

**TURKESTAN**, name given to regions of central Asia, encompassed by Siberia on the north, the Caspian sea on the west, Afghanistan and India on the south, and Mongolia on the east. (See ASIA: Map.) A part of Afghanistan including Badakshan has been referred to as included in Turkestan in the broadest meaning of the term. Turkestan, however, is generally considered as applying to either that division of Russia in Central Asia, comprising the provinces of Samarkand, Ferghana, Syr-Darya and Semirychensk called Western or Russian Turkestan; or to a dependency of China, sometimes called Kashgaria which lies to the north of Tibet and forms part of the province called by the Chinese, Sin-Kiang. This country is known as Eastern or Chinese Turkestan. (See CHINESE TURKESTAN.)

The region which is commonly designated as Chinese or Eastern Turkestan is watered by the Yarkand and Khotan rivers, which unite to form the Tarim. The elliptical Tarim basin is separated by the Tian-Shan mountains from Dzungaria (see ZUNGARIA) lying to the north, and by the Kuen-Lun mountains from Tibet on the south. It extends over an area of 354,000 square miles, of which over half is desert land. The hold of Chinese authority is of the very slightest degree, particularly since the revolution of 1911, over the inhabitants of this region. (See TURANIAN RACES AND LANGUAGES.) In fact all the Chinese territory between Mongolia on the north and Tibet on the south is regarded as a separate province with its civil governor residing in the north at Ili, the capital. Its neighbor, Outer Mongolia, is even more independent. Nominally, under Chinese officials, each is autonomous at the present time. The total population is estimated at about 2,000,000. Mohammedanism is the prevailing religion.—See also YAKUB. BEG, DOMINION OF.

Russian or Western Turkestan is a government of the Soviet republic of Russia, consisting of the provinces of Ferghana, Samarkand, Syr-Darya and Semirychensk in Central Asia, having together a population of approximately 7,000,000 and covering an area of 57,700 square miles. Tashkent is the capital, with 300,000 inhabitants, and Kokand and Samarkand, each having a population of over 100,000, are important cities. Turkestan also originally included the Transcaspian province, the Bokhara amirate and the khanate of Khiva. Physically, western Turkestan, besides the Syr-Darya, has the lower Ili, flowing through Semirychensk into Lake Balkhash, and the Zerafshan, along which the Transcaspian railroad runs to the city of Andijan. In the past, however, the passes of the lofty mountain systems have determined the great caravan routes of this historic region, some of which, like the rivers, are now lost in the desert. Irrigation in Russian Turkestan extends to 4,000,000 acres and is particularly advantageous to the orchards and gardens, the water being distributed according to each family's needs under Moslem law. The agricultural class is industrious, honest and sober. Cotton is one of the principal crops in the Ferghana province.

6th century.—Turkish conquest. See TURKEY: 6th century.

710.—Mohammedan conquest. See CALIPHATE: 710.

1073-1092.—Annexed by Malek Shar. See TURKEY: 1073-1092.

1220.—Conquests of Jenghiz Khan. See MONGOLIA: 1153-1227; KHUAREZM: 12th century.

14th century.—Conquests of Timur. See TIMUR.

1859-1865.—Russian conquest. See RUSSIA: 1859-1881; ASIA: 1500-1900.

1895.—Anglo-Russian agreement concerning "spheres of influence" in the Pamirs. See AFGHANISTAN: 1895.

1916.—Condition of Turkestan under Russian tsarist rule.—Mobilization in World War.—Revolt.—"In 1916 the natives revolted when the news that the Moslem races were called up to serve in the Russian army, reached the bazars of Central Asia and the remote Kirghiz nomad villages. They had long had grievances against Russian rule. Requisition of their land and their rights and every form of oppression became worse under the Russian czars than it had been under the despotic khans. There was neither justice nor freedom for the sons of the steppes and the mountains. The mobilization to serve in the army of their oppressors was the last drop that overflowed the cup of resentment. The Kirghiz, Sarts and other tribes of Semirychensk attacked the principal town of the region, Verny, and annihilated the Cossacks to the last man, capturing 5,000 Russian officials and civilians and carrying them off as hostages into the mountains. The mutiny, of course, was suppressed by a merciless punitive expedition, but the suppression was only temporary."—B. L. T. Roustam Bek, *First Mohammedan republic (Asia, May, 1920, p. 388)*.

1917-1920.—Bolshevist activities.—Ataman Dutov's resistance.—Destruction of Kokand.—"The Red Terror, nourished by German trade agencies, had laid hold of Tashkent and spread over all the Russian dominion in Turkestan, where 180,000 Germans, Austrians, and Magyars had been confined in their prison camps. Amongst these were the men that had been the garrison of Przemyśl. In October 1917 all were 'comrades,' so of course there could be no prisoners, and the kindly Soviet opened the gates in the barbed wire and discontinued the ration issue. Ninety thousand ex-prisoners of war died during that winter. Many of the survivors joined the Red Army, some fled to Afghanistan, and some worked for, or starved with, the easy-going Kirghiz and Sarts. . . . In Turkistan, missions, under various cloaks, organized the surviving prisoners into battalions and brigades, gave them good new uniforms and boots, and tried to smuggle trained specialists to Afghanistan. . . . The three years' cotton crop of Ferghana and Sir Daria, many thousands of tons . . . lay rotting in the warehouses of Turkistan, or served as bullet-proof protection on Bolshevik armoured trains. . . . The Orenburg Cossacks, under Ataman Dutov, had achieved much success against the Red Army in 1918 in the steppes north of Tashkent. . . . [But] they lost the city, though they retained a hold of the Orenburg Railway that connects Moscow with Tashkent. This circumstance was of no little value to the Allies, since it prevented the Turkistan cotton crop from being sent to Germany by that route. In fact, the operations of this loyalist army of Orenburg Cossacks form a fine chapter in the story of the war, and one that has not come into the limelight. For three years this

force of Ataman Dutov's, averaging some seven thousand strong, often without ammunition, fighting with swords and lances, held its own against the Red forces all round them. They were quite isolated from Allied help, and in fact from any other loyal force, except for the brief period when they were in touch with the army of Admiral Kolchak, himself a Cossack. Meanwhile the Musalman of Tashkent, Kokand, and Bukhara revolted against the Soviet. In all three cities the rising was suppressed with great slaughter. Kokand was razed to the ground by high explosive shell-fire, and thirty thousand souls were reported massacred: it had been one of the greatest commercial cities in Asia. In Bukhara one Kolesov used armoured cars in the crowded streets, which ran with blood. Although the Reds gained control over the city, to this day they have little or no hold over the country districts, where large bands of Uzbeks and Kipchaks roam the valleys, maintaining a guerilla warfare against any Bolshevik force that leaves the railway and the guns of its armoured trains."—L. V. S. Blacker, *Travels in Turkistan, 1918-1920 (Geographical Journal, Sept., 1921, pp. 178-181)*.—See also WORLD WAR: 1918: VI. Turkish theater: b, 5.

1922-1923.—Mohammedan revolt.—Reorganization of Soviet rule in Bokhara.—"Young Bokhara" party.—Economic conditions in Ferghana province.—Radium discovery.—Early in 1922, Enver Pasha, a former Turkish military leader, joined the revolting emir of Bokhara against the Bolsheviks, captured Bokhara and other cities in quick succession and was proclaimed emir of Turkestan by the victorious Mohammedans. Peace terms between Enver Pasha and the Bolsheviks on the basis of recognition of the Turkish leader's authority over Turkestan were reported to be in negotiation late in the year. The insurgent forces were, however, apparently routed and scattered and the republican government in Bokhara was reorganized under soviet control. In the meantime the nationalist propaganda seems to have been more or less active. "A mission representing the 'Young Bokhara' Party . . . [went to] Afghanistan early in June with the object of enlisting sympathy and material support for its plan of a Turkestan National Republic. The mission claimed that a widespread movement was afoot for the establishment of a Federation of Central Asian Moslem States."—*New York Times Current History, Oct., 1923, p. 175*.—"The Deputy President of the Central Executive Committee, who arrived in Moscow on Aug. 13, informed the Soviet Government that 387,000 of the population of Ferghana were doomed this year to starvation, and that malaria was increasing so rapidly in Daghestan that whole villages had been wiped out. Last year's 170,000 head of cattle in Ferghana had already dwindled to 37,000. Before the war the province had 170,000 horses, but now only 27,000. On Sept. 6 the Radium Institute in Petrograd announced that the expedition it had sent into Ferghana had discovered what was probably the world's largest deposit of radium."—*Ibid, Oct., 1923, p. 175*.

ALSO IN: G. Macartney, *Chinese Turkestan: Past and present (Royal Institution of Great Britain, 1922, v. 22, pp. 534-536)*.—W. Steru, *Glimpses of Russian Turkestan (Manchester Geographical Society Journal, 1920, v. 34, pp. 9-17)*.

## TURKEY

(Formerly Ottoman empire)

**Land.—Geographic description.—Extent of territory.**—"Turkey" is, in a way, a misnomer. Turkey is not a country inhabited mainly by Turks, as Italy is inhabited by Italians, England by Englishmen, Spain by Spaniards, &c. . . . The Turkish language has no word for 'Turkey,' which would properly be Turkestan, as Arabistan stands for Arabia. Under the old regime the official title of Turkey was 'the exalted State,' while the Arabic expression for 'Ottoman lands' was used to connote the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks have endeavoured to popularize the Levantine form, i. e., 'Turkia.'—*Turkey in Europe (Handbook of the Historical Section of the British Foreign Office, no. 16, p. 13).*—"Turkey lies at the junction of three continents. . . . [With its former possessions of Syria, Palestine and Arabia it was] thrust in between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, between the Black Sea and the Red . . . [bridging] the space between the Balkan Peninsula and Persia, between Persia and Egypt, . . . a great isthmian region, dominating the chief intercontinental trade routes of the eastern hemisphere [and flanking] for a thousand miles the steamer highway of the Suez Canal and Red Sea. It controls the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus leading to the Black Sea lands. It is crossed by old caravan tracks and the future railroad routes connecting the Mediterranean and Black Sea ports with the Persian Gulf coast. It therefore holds a highly strategic position. By reason of its location, Turkey has drawn the elements of its population from the grasslands of Semitic Arabia, from the highlands of Aryan Persia, from the Caspian plains of Mongolian Asia, from the multifarious race stocks of the Russian Caucasus, from the Greek coasts of the Balkan Peninsula and Ægean Isles. These it has assimilated more or less to the indigenous Hittite or Alarodian race. The peoples comprised within the borders of Turkey differ in racial and geographic origin, in language and religion, in social and economic development. On the other hand they are united by certain common bonds found in the semiarid climate of Turkey, the prevailing steppe vegetation with its concomitant, pastoral-nomadic life, the patchy distribution of the arable land, the sparsity of the population, and finally the deep underlying community of ideals molded by this environment through a process of social development unfolded from within through the ages. To these may be added the religion of Islam and the fanatical devotion of its adherents, who here number five-sixths of the people. The Anatolian Peninsula stretches like a bridge between southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe. It consists of a high plateau, increasing in altitude towards the east, and rimmed on its three seaward sides by young mountains rising boldly from the coast. Structurally and racially it is part of Asia. Its wide steppe interior has been a passway for Asiatic migrations, but the massive mountain barriers which trace the northern and southern coasts have excluded oversea immigrants from Europe and thus maintained the Asiatic solidarity of the peninsula. Only the Ægean front, with its deeply embayed coast and its structural valleys opening westward, has been hospitable to Hellenic colonization and European influences. The rain-bearing winds from

the neighboring seas expend their moisture on the outer slopes of the coast ranges (rainfall 600 to 1,000 mm.) and reach the interior impoverished. Hence the plateau core has an arid climate, extensive steppes or saline wastes where nomads pasture their herds, mountains bare or thinly covered by a scrubby growth of trees on the high inland slopes, and shallow U-shaped valleys drained by meager streams which serve to irrigate strips of tillage lands along the interior piedmont. The coast ranges get ample precipitation for winter grain crops along their lower slopes, where the typical Mediterranean vegetation prevails, and they have abundant water to irrigate in summer the orchards and gardens of the deltaic plains or valley lowlands at their base. On their upper slopes they support a magnificent belt of forests, which averages 60 miles in breadth and comprises one-third of Anatolia's area. . . . Armenia is a high plateau (5,200 to 6,000 feet) located behind the lofty Lazistan ranges and almost barred alike from the rains and the cultural influences emanating from the Black Sea. It is bordered on the south by the Armenian Taurus, which greatly impedes communication with the Mesopotamian plains. It is crossed, east and west, by folds of the Anti-Taurus and Zagros Mountains, which have been disturbed by recent volcanic upheavals and overlaid by vast lava flows, so that the relief of the country is extremely complex. Its valleys are blocked on the east by lofty ranges, whose passes are snow-bound eight months in the year, and they open westward upon high and arid plateaus which form an inhospitable transit land to Anatolia. Armenia is a natural stronghold, giving its possessor a grip upon the surrounding countries. It has always been an object of conquest for neighboring states who wanted it for a border fortress against aggression."—E. C. Semple, *Regional geography of Turkey: Review of Banse's work (Geographical Review, July, 1921, pp. 338-339, 342).*—"The size of Turkey has steadily diminished since the times of Suleiman the Magnificent, but the 20th century has been particularly disastrous to Turkey. During the Balkan Wars, 1912-1914, she lost all her possessions in Europe except Thrace (see BALKAN STATES: Map). "By the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey was all but eliminated from Europe, since she would have retained besides the city of Constantinople only a small tract of land immediately adjacent thereto. [Her territories in Asia Minor were also lessened and Armenia taken away.] The Lausanne terms restore to Turkey the Thracian boundary of 1914 in all but a few minor details. . . . The Maritza now forms a boundary from a point near Adrianople southward to the Ægean. Opposite Adrianople is the important railway station of Karagach. It becomes Turkish and thus gives Turkey immediate access upon her own territory to a section of railway that connects this important city (and former Turkish capital) with the present railway line between Bulgaria and Constantinople. Greece is excluded from Eastern Thrace and from the coast of the sea of Marmora after three years' occupation. Bulgaria's boundary stands as defined in the treaty of Neuilly. An important feature of the Thracian boundary is the establishment on either side of it of a demilitarized

zone. A similar demilitarized zone is established on either side of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles."—*Geographical Review*, Oct., 1923, pp. 627-628.—Under the Lausanne Treaty, Armenia and the whole of Anatolia is restored to Turkey. This comprises an area of 282,144 square miles. The World War was particularly disastrous to the Asiatic possessions of Turkey. She lost the following states: (1) Syria given under mandate to France; (2) Palestine given under mandate to Great Britain; (3) Trans Jordan, the political status of which is to be determined by the League of Nations; (4) Mesopotamia given under mandate to Great Britain, now the Kingdom of Iraq under King Feisel; (5) Hedjaz proclaimed a kingdom in 1916 under the protection and subsidy of Great Britain. In 1913 the emir of Nejd and Hassa drove out the Turks and proclaimed himself an independent emir. The emirate of Jebel Shammar which lies to the north of Nejd proclaimed its independence in the middle of the nineteenth century so that none of the Arabian provinces of Turkey remained to her. (See ARABIA: Map.) Before its dismemberment (after the World War) Turkey was called the Ottoman empire and embraced some of the most diverse climates and soils of any country. "No formula can embrace the variety of the countries marked 'Ottoman' on the map: the High Yemen, with its monsoons and tropical cultivation; the tilted rim of the Hedjaz, one desert in a desert zone that stretches from the Sahara to Mongolia; the Mesopotamian rivers, breaking the desert with a strip of green; the pine-covered mountains terraces of Kurdistan, which gird in Mesopotamia as the hills of the North-West Frontier of India gird the plains; the Armenian Highlands, bleak as the Pamirs, which feed Mesopotamia with their snows and send it the soil they cannot keep themselves; the Anatolian peninsula—an offshoot of Central Europe with its rocks and fine timber and mountain streams, but nursing a steppe in its heart more intractable than the Puzeta of Hungary; the coast-lands—Trebizond and Ismid and Smyrna clinging to the Anatolian mainland and Syria interposing itself between the desert and the sea, but, with their vines and olives and sharp contours, keeping true to the Mediterranean; and then the waterway of narrows and landlocked sea and narrows again which links the Mediterranean with the Black Sea and Russian hinterland, and which has not its like in the world."—A. J. Toynbee, *Turkey: A past and a future*, pp. 1-2.

Diverse peoples of the country.—"There were less than twenty million people in Turkey before the [World] War, and during it the Government has caused a million or so to perish by massacre, starvation, or disease. Yet, in spite of this dæmonic effort after uniformity, they are still the strangest congeries of racial and social types that has ever been placed at a single Government's mercy. The Ottoman Empire is named after the Osmanli, but you might search long before you found one among its inhabitants. These Osmanlis are a governing class, indigenious only in Constantinople and a few neighbouring towns, but planted here and there, as officers and officials, over the Ottoman territories. They come of a clan of Turkish nomads, recruited since the thirteenth century by converts, forced or voluntary, from most of Christendom, and crossed with the blood of slave-women from all the world. They are hardly a race. Tradition fortified by inertia makes them what they are, and also their Turkish language, which serves them for business of state

and for a literature, though not without an infusion of Persian and Arabic idioms said to amount to 95 per cent. of the vocabulary. This artificial language is hardly a link between Osmanli officialdom and the Turkish peasantry of Anatolia, which speaks Turkish dialects derived from tribes that drifted in, some as late as the Osmanlis, some two centuries before. Nor has this Turkish-speaking peasantry much in common with the Turkish nomads who still wander over the central Anatolian steppe and have kept their blood pure; for the peasantry has reverted physically to the native stock, which held Anatolia from time immemorial and absorbs all newcomers that mingle with it on its soil. Thus there are three distinct 'Turkish' elements in Turkey, divided by blood and vocation and social type; and even if we reckon all who speak some form of Turkish as one group, they only amount to 30 or 40 per cent. of the whole population of the Empire. The rest are alien to the Turks and to one another. Those who speak Arabic are as strong numerically as the Turks, or stronger, but they too are divided, and their unity is a problem of the future. There are pure-bred Arab nomads of the desert; there are Arabs who have settled in towns or on the land, some within the last generation, like the Muntefik in Mesopotamia, some a millennium or two ago, like the Meccan Koreish, but who still retain their tribal consciousness of race; there are Arabs in name who have nothing Arabic about them but their language—most of the peasantry of Syria are such, and the inhabitants of ancient centres of population like Damascus or Bagdad; in Syria many of these 'Arabs' are Christians, and some Christians, though they speak Arabic, have retained their separate sense of nationality—notably the Roman Catholic Maronites of the Lebanon—and would hardly be considered as Arabs either by themselves or by their neighbors. The same is true of the Druses, another remnant of an earlier stock, which has preserved its identity under the guise of Islam so heretically conceived as to rank as an independent religion. As for the Yemenis—they will resent the imputation, for no Arabs count up their genealogies so zealously as they, but there is more East African than Semitic blood in their veins. They are men of the moist, fertile tropics, brown of skin, and working half-naked in their fields, like the peoples of Southern India and Bengal. And on the opposite fringes of the Arabic-speaking area there are fragments of population whose language is Semitic but pre-Arabic—the Jacobite Christians of the Tor-Abdin, and the Nestorians of the Upper Zab, who once, under the Caliphs, were the industrious Christian peasantry of Mesopotamia, but now are shepherds and hillmen among the Kurds. The Kurds themselves are more scattered than any other stock in Turkey, and divided tribe against tribe, but taken together they rank third in numerical strength, after the Arabs and Turks. There are mountain Kurds and Kurds of the plain, husbandmen and herdsmen, Kurds who have kept to their original homes along the eastern frontier, and Kurds who, under Ottoman auspices, have spread themselves over the Armenian plateau, the North Mesopotamian steppes, the Taurus valleys, and the hinterland of the Black Sea. The chief thing the Kurds have in common is the Persian dialect they speak, but it is usual to class as Kurds any and every community in the Kurdish area which is not Turkish or Arab and can by courtesy be called Moslem (the Kurds, for that matter, are only Moslems skin-deep). Such communities



Galata bridge  
Hippodrome

Mosque of Ahmed

St. Sophia  
Imperial Palace

Site of the old city of Byzantium

BIRDS EYE VIEW OF STAMBOUL, THE HISTORIC QUARTER OF CONSTANTINOPLE





abound: the Dersim highlands, in particular, are an ethnographical museum; 'Kizil-Bashi' is a general name for their kind; only the Yezidis, though they speak good Kurdish, are distinguished from the rest for their idiosyncrasy of worshipping Satan under the form of a peacock (Allah, they argue, is good-natured and does not need to be propitiated) and they are repudiated with one accord by Moslem and Christian. But not all the scattered races in Turkey are isolated or primitive. The Greeks and Armenians, for instance, are, or were, the most energetic, intellectual, liberal elements in Turkey, the natural intermediaries between the other races and western civilization—'were' rather than 'are,' because the Ottoman government has taken ruthless steps to eliminate just these two most valuable elements among its subjects. The urban Greeks survive in centres like Smyrna and Constantinople, but the Greek peasantry of Thrace and Anatolia has mostly been driven over the frontier since the Second Balkan War. As for the Armenians, the Government has been destroying them by massacre and deportation since April, 1915—business and professional men, peasants and shepherds, women and children—without discrimination or pity. A third of the Ottoman Armenians may still survive. . . . To compensate for its depopulation of the countries under its dominion, the Ottoman Government, during the last fifty years, has been settling them with Moslem immigrants from its own lost provinces or from other Moslem lands that have changed their rulers. These 'Mouhadjirs' are reckoned, from first to last, at three-quarters of a million, drawn from the most diverse stocks—Bosniaks and Pomaks and Albanians, Algerines and Tripolitans, Tchetchens and Circassians. Numbers have been planted recently on the lands of dispossessed Armenians and Greeks. They add many more elements to the confusion of tongues, but they are probably destined to be absorbed or to die out. The Circassians, in particular, who are the most industrious (though most unruly) and preserve their nationality best, also succumb most easily to transplantation, through refusal to adapt their Caucasian clothes and habits to Anatolian or Mesopotamian conditions of life. All this is Turkey, and we come back to our original question: What common factor accounts for the name? What has stained this coat of many colours to one political hue? The answer is simple: Blood. Turkey, the Ottoman state, is not a unity, climatic, geographical, racial, or economic; it is a pretension, enforced by bloodshed and violence whenever and wherever the Osmanli Government has power."

—A. J. Toynbee, *Turkey: A past and a future*, pp. 4-9.—See also BALKAN STATES: RACES existing; INDIA: People; KURDISTAN AND THE KURDS; MONGOLIA: Country and people; PAN-TAURANISM; TATARS; TURANIAN RACES AND LANGUAGES; EUROPE: Introduction to the historic period; Migrations.

**Resources.**—“On the big broad uplands the prime staple produce is winter wheat with barley second in the farmer's estimation. The native strains of wheat in Turkey are first class; it is the home of 'Turkey Red' wheat. . . . Rye is cultivated to a considerable extent, also millet in some places, and oats are raised, but in comparatively small quantities. Corn is a second rate article in the common estimation, but a good deal of corn with small cobs and hard kernels is grown on the mountains similar in kind to the flint corn of New England. The introduction of potatoes is attributed to missionaries; they are easily raised and people like them, but have not become habitu-

ated to their extensive use. Tobacco of Smyrna, Bafra and Samsoun is famous in the American and European market, and American representatives are heavy purchasers at these and other points. Fields gay with poppies are a common sight in the spring, and there is an active trade in opium, almost entirely for export. White rice at Tosia and elsewhere, and red rice at Niksar are cultivated in quantity, and rice is one of the most important articles of commerce and of food. Licorice, gum tragacanth and valonia grow without cultivation and are important articles in the export trade of the country. . . . It is generally believed that the mineral resources of Asia Minor are varied and rich, though some of the best authorities are rather sceptical except as regards coal. Copper has been mined in different sections from time immemorial. The mines at Tocat have been worked until within the memory of living men they have fallen into disuse. Rich copper deposits are reported along the Halys River, and water transportation might be an advantage in shipping the ore. Arghuni Maden is famous; the deposits are rich and extensive. Three out of six known mines are now in operation and the ore contains 70% of copper. Publications of 'The Mineral Industry' report the copper production of Turkey at less than one thousand tons per year. Greek miners have always found more or less silver. Gumush Hane above Trebizond means 'Silverton' and is named from the extensive mines in that region. . . . Some traces of gold are found in the silver of Bulgar Maden, and grains occasionally appear after torrential floods in the Mamouret ul-Aziz province, but the mines of Cræsus seem to have been lost to sight. Lead is produced in the Konia province. . . . Coal is the one mineral undoubtedly found in Turkey. The atlas published in connection with the 'Coal Resources of the World' locates known deposits at about four score points. The coal basin of prime importance is that of Eregli or Heraklia, Cozlu, and Zoungoultag on the coast of the Black Sea 140 miles east of Constantinople. The reserves here are extensive and have been exploited with growing returns by a French company. . . . It is not certain how far the rich oil deposits, which reach all the way from Baku on the Caspian Sea through Persia and Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf, extend to the west, but it is almost certain that further exploration will discover great stores that have not yet been brought to light. Oil is found occasionally on the surface of some rivers, also in the region of the Dead Sea, and shale has been picked up in various places bearing a combustible oily substance. The oil areas await adequate exploration.”—G. E. White, *Agriculture and Industries* (W. H. Hall, ed., *Reconstruction in Turkey*, pp. 135, 147-149).

**Languages of the people.**—“The languages of Turkey are Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac, and Bulgarian. Turkish is the official language of the entire empire and is used to a greater or less extent everywhere except in the remote villages of Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Syria, and throughout Arabia. Arabic is spoken everywhere south of the Taurus Mountains, with the exception of a few cities in the vicinity of Aintab and Marash. Kurdish is used in the mountains of Eastern Turkey and to a limited extent in the mountainous sections of Asia Minor. Armenian is spoken over the entire empire wherever there are Armenians. Greek is used along the borders of the Black Sea, the Archipelago and the Mediterranean and to a very limited degree inland. Syriac

is used among the Nestorians and Jacobites, chiefly the former, in the mountains of Eastern Turkey. The use of Bulgarian is confined to Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, and Macedonia. Constantinople itself is a babel, all the different Oriental and many of the European languages being found there in everyday use. Turkish is spoken by the Turks and Circassians and the various Moslem tribes, also to a considerable degree by the Kurds, Armenians, and Greeks, and by government officials everywhere. Certain . . . of the Armenians, especially those in Central Asia Minor, from Sivas west to Angora and Cesarea, and those south of the Taurus in the vicinity of Marash and Aintab, have in years past used Turkish almost entirely, preserving their ancestral language only in the church services. The same is true of the Greeks in Central Asia Minor. Arabic is used by Moslems and Christians alike in the sections where it is the vernacular. Kurdish is spoken both by Moslems and Christians. Bulgarian is used only by Bulgarians. All of these languages vary somewhat in their characteristics, according to the section where they are used and the class of people by which they are spoken. Thus the Arabic of the plains and of Egypt is much milder in its form than that found in the mountains. The same thing is true of the Turkish and the Armenian of Bitlis, and the people of that section are almost unintelligible to those farther west. The Greek of the Turkish Empire is also quite different in many respects from that of Greece proper. The Arabic and Greek languages are so well known as not to need any particular description. . . . The Turkish language is peculiar in many respects. Originally a Tartar dialect, it has many of the characteristics of the Saxon. It is terse and strong in its form of expression, and to a considerable degree monosyllabic. The Turks, however, passing through Persia, came very much under the influence of . . . its language and felt the softening influences of it. The Persian, as spoken by the Persians, is smooth and flowing, liquid as any of the Pacific Island languages, and even more so than the Italian. The way in which an educated Persian uses his own language is unsurpassed for delicacy of expression or sound. Passing from Persia and accepting the Koran, the Turks came under the influence of the Arabic language, and the Turkish of to-day is the result of the commingling of the three elements. As a consequence it is an exceedingly rich language. As it is ordinarily spoken it is not at all difficult to learn, but to use it in literature correctly and with the appropriate adaptation of the forms derived from the Arabic and Persian, requires an amount of study and skill such as comparatively few have been able to bring to it. The character used is the Arabic, which, however, is not entirely adapted to the simpler Tartar forms, and as a result there is more or less of reduplication of letters. While the lettering of the three languages, Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, is the same, each language has its own distinct form, so that a book printed in the type favored by the Turks will not be acceptable either to the Persians or the Arabs, and the same is true of the others. The tendency of education with Turkish, as with Arabic, is to soften the gutturals, of which there are several harsh ones, and Turkish as spoken in Constantinople by the educated is a smooth and flowing language."—E. M. Bliss, *Turkey and the Armenian atrocities*, pp. 45-48.—See also PHILology: 20; 23.

Influence of Saracens, Moslems and Byzan-

—Importance of the "ruling institution."—"The Saracens gave the Ottomans a complete religious and social system, united under a Sacred Law which professed to provide for all relations of life, and which became more and more rigid as time went on. Into this had been wrought slowly by generations of learned men most of the Persian governmental ideas . . . together with others from Arabian and Byzantine sources, such as a species of laws of inheritance and a system of juristic responses. The Saracens gave also their alphabet and a large stock of Arabic words. All that the Moslems gave the Ottomans was embodied in one great, complex institution, which was founded upon an elaborate system of education and supported by the revenues from a large part of the land of the empire, and which possessed great solidity and an almost changeless permanence. In the Ottoman Empire, as in all other Moslem lands, the influence of this completed institution was ultimately very injurious; when added to the Tatar love of custom, it laid a heavy hand on all movements toward improvement and progress. . . . What was left for the Byzantines to contribute to the Ottoman? He had received already the main features of his national character,—language, literary influences, law, and religion. One of his two leading institutions was already almost fully developed in Moslem lands, and required only transplantation. The other, however, the institution of war and government, could still be modified considerably; and this was to incorporate much from the Byzantines. Many details of governmental organization, both imperial and local, a supplementary system of taxation, a greatly elaborated taste for court ceremonial and splendor, a plan of organizing foreign residents under a special law, and a host of lesser usages and customs were to be taken over by the Ottomans. The Ottoman feudal system also probably owed its final form to the Byzantines; and perhaps it was from them that the Ottomans learned their abnormal love for fees and gifts. The matchless structure of Saint Sophia served as a model for the superb mosques that lift the shapely masses of their great gray domes, supported by clusters of demidomes and lesser domes, above the cypress trees and gardens of the rounded hills which in Constantine's city slope down to the blue waters of the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, and the Golden Horn."—A. H. Lybyer, *Government of the Ottoman empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, pp. 21, 23-24.—One of the most important factors in the history of the Ottoman empire was the "ruling institution," a method of training the finest children of both their own and conquered races for important positions in the army and state. Thus, however insipid and degenerate the court officials became, the empire had capable men who were able to carry on the government efficiently. The Phanariots and Janissaries were late developments of this system. "The Ottoman Ruling Institution included the sultan and his family, the officers of his household, the executive officers of the government, the standing army composed of cavalry and infantry, and a large body of young men who were being educated for service in the standing army, the court, and the government. These men wielded the sword, the pen, and the scepter. They conducted the whole of the government except the mere rendering of justice in matters that were controlled by the Sacred Law, and those limited functions that were left in the hands of subject and foreign groups of non-Moslems. . . . Every one

who belonged to the Ruling Institution in any capacity from gardener to grand vizier, save only the members of the royal family, bore the title of *kud*, or slave, of the sultan. . . . Parents [of conquered races] who wished to keep their sons would sometimes marry them in tender years, since married boys were ineligible; those who had means bought exemption for their sons from the recruit-officers, who thus reaped great rewards. On the contrary, many parents were glad to have their sons chosen, knowing that they would thus escape from grinding poverty, receive a first-rate training suited to their abilities, and enter upon the possibility of a great career. Some parents, in fact, came to regard the process as a privilege rather than a burden; and they had reason to do so, since Turkish parents envied them the opportunity, and sometimes tried to evade the regulations by paying Christians to take their Moslem sons, and declare them as Christian children, so that they might be enrolled as the sultan's slaves. Apart, then, from political theory and religious prepossession, the levying of tribute children was by no means a mere evil to the parents. The situation of the boys themselves, considered under the same reservations, was almost wholly favorable. . . . In this system of the training of slaves for war and government lay the nucleus of the fundamental institution of the Ottoman state, which, together with the institution based on the Sacred Law, was to sum up practically the entire organized life of the Ottoman nation. Under the Samanids it was Turkish boys who were thus educated by Arabs and Persians, but the Ottomans were later to apply the same principle to the education of Christian youth."—A. H. Lybyer, *Government of the Ottoman empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, pp. 36, 47, 54, 23.—See also MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 42.

**B. C. 323.**—Beginning of Turkish domination in the Caucasus. See CAUCASUS: B. C. 323-18th century.

**A. D. 6th century.**—Empire in Tatory.—“At the equal distance of 2,000 miles from the Caspian, the Icy, the Chinese, and the Bengal seas, a ridge of mountains is conspicuous, the centre, and perhaps the summit, of Asia, which, in the language of different nations has been styled Imaus, and Caf, and Altai, and the Golden Mountains, and the Girdle of the Earth. The sides of the hills were productive of minerals; and the iron-forges, for the purpose of war, were exercised by the Turks, the most despised portion of the slaves of the great khan of the Geougen. But their servitude could only last till a leader, bold and eloquent, should arise to persuade his countrymen that the same arms which they forged for their masters might become in their own hands the instruments of freedom and victory. They sallied from the mountain; a sceptre was the reward of his advice. . . . The decisive battle which almost extirpated the nation of the Geougen established in Tartary the new and more powerful empire of the Turks. . . . The royal encampment seldom lost sight of Mount Altai, from whence the river Irtysh descends to water the rich pastures of the Calmucks, which nourish the largest sheep and oxen in the world. . . . As the subject nations marched under the standard of the Turks, their cavalry, both men and horses, were proudly computed by millions; one of their effective armies consisted of 400,000 soldiers, and in less than fifty years they were connected in peace and war with the Romans, the Persians, and the Chinese. . . . Among their southern conquests the most splendid was that of

the Nephthalites, or White Huns, a polite and warlike people, who possessed the commercial cities of Bochara and Samarcand, who had vanquished the Persian monarch, and carried their victorious arms along the banks and perhaps to the mouth of the Indus. On the side of the west the Turkish cavalry advanced to the lake Maotus [Sea of Azov]. They passed that lake on the ice. The khan, who dwelt at the foot of Mount Altai, issued his commands for the siege of Bosphorus, a city the voluntary subject of Rome and whose princes had formerly been the friends of Athens.”—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 42.—“Although the name of the Turks first became known to the western nations in the sixth century, the people had appeared in the west a century earlier, for there is every reason to believe that the Huns belonged to the Turkish stock. The Turks of Mount Altai are called Thù-kiù by the Chinese writers and are regarded as the same people as the Hiong-nù of earlier times. . . . The Chinese name . . . appears to be a corruption of the Turkish word ‘terk’ . . . a ‘helmet.’ The Thù-kiù became very powerful under their leader Tumere, who conquered the Jéujen (the Geougen of Gibbon), united under his sway all the Turkish tribes . . . and assumed the title of Chagan or Khan, 546.”—W. Smith, *Note to above*.—See also TATARS; MONGOLIA: Country and people; BALKAN STATES: Races existing.

ALSO IN: J. H. Newman, *Lectures on the history of the Turks (Historical sketches, v. 1, lectures 1-4)*.

**710.**—Subjugation by Saracens. See CALIPHATE: 710.

**815-945.**—Slaves and masters of the caliphate. See CALIPHATE: 815-945.

**999-1183.**—Gaznevide empire.—The decline of the caliphate at Bagdad in the ninth century was signalized by the rise to practically independent power of several dynasties in its Persian and Central Asian dominions. Among these was the dynasty of the Samanides who ruled, for a hundred and twenty-five years, an extensive dominion in northern Persia and modern Afghanistan and in the Turkoman regions to the Oxus and beyond. In this dominion of the Samanides was included the Turkish tribes which had submitted to Islam and which were presently to become the master champions of the faith. Their first attainment of actual empire in the Moslem world was accomplished by the overthrow of the Samanide princes, and the chief instruments of that revolution were two Turks of humble origin—Sebectagi, or Sabek-tekín, and his son Mahmud. Sebectagi had been a slave (in the service of a high official under the Samanides) who gained the favor of his masters and acquired command of the city and province of Gazna; whence his famous son Mahmud was called the Gaznevide, and the wide conquests which the latter made are sometimes distinguished as the Gaznevide empire. “For him the title of Sultan was first invented [see SULTAN]; and his kingdom was enlarged from Transoxiana to the neighbourhood of Ispahan, from the shores of the Caspian to the mouth of the Indus. But the principal source of his fame and riches was the holy war which he waged against the Gentoos of Hindostan. . . . The Sultan of Gazna surpassed the limits of the conquests of Alexander; after a march of three months, over the hills of Cashmir and Thibet, he reached the famous city of Kinoge, on the Upper Ganges, and, in a naval combat on one of the branches of the Indus, he fought and vanquished

4,000 boats of the natives. Delhi, Lahor, and Multan were compelled to open their gates; the fertile kingdom of Guzarat attracted his ambition and tempted his stay. [The throne of Mahmud scarcely outlasted himself. In the reign of his son Masoud, it was nearly overturned by another Turkish horde—later comers into the region of Bokhara from the steppes beyond. In a great battle fought at Zendecan, in Khorasan, 1038, Massoud was defeated and driven from Persia to a narrowed kingdom in Cabul and the Punjab, which survived for more than a century longer and then disappeared.]—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 57.—See also INDIA: 977-1290.

ALSO IN: J. H. Newman, *Lectures on the history of the Turks (Historical sketches, v. 1, lecture 4)*.

1004-1063.—Conquests of Seljuk and Togrul Beg.—“The history of the origin of the Seldjukides is obscured by numerous myths, but it appears from it that Seldjuk, or more correctly Seldjik, the son of Tokmak, and Subash, commander of the army of a prince named Pigu or Bogu, were expelled from their native steppes for some crime, and forced to seek their fortunes in strange countries. Seldjuk, with 100 horsemen, 1,000 camels, and 50,000 sheep, migrated to a place on the southern confines of the desert, in the neighbourhood of Djend [described as distant twenty fersakhs from Bokhara]. He settled there and, with all his followers, embraced Islamism.” Under Seljuk and his two grandsons, Togrul and Tchakar, the Seljuks grew formidable in numbers and power, on the border of the empire of Mahmud the Ghaznevide, then rising on the ruins of the principality of the Samanides. Thinking to control these turbulent kinsmen of his race, Mahmud unwisely proposed to them to quit the country they occupied, between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, and to settle themselves in Khorasan. “In the year . . . (1030), that is, within a year of the death of Sultan Mahmud, we find the Seldjukides west of Merv, on the ground now occupied by the Tekke-Turkomans, in the neighbourhood of the southern cities of Nisa and Abiverd, from which point they molested the rich province of Khorasan by constant raids, as grievously as is done by the Turkomans to this very day.” When it was too late, the Ghaznevide sultan attempted to expel the marauders. His armies were routed, and the grandsons of Seljuk were soon (1039) in undisputed possession of the whole of Khorasan, with the rich and flourishing cities of Merv, Balkh, and Nishapur. A few years later they had pushed forward “over the ruins of the former power of the Buyyides [or Bouides, of Persia] to Azerbaïdjan, and, in the year 446 (1054) the skirmishers of the Turkish army, led by Togrul Beg, penetrated into the interior of the eastern Roman Empire [that is, into Asia Minor]; and although the bold inhabitants of the desert in their raid on the land of the Cæsars were bent rather on plunder than on actual conquest, yet even their temporary success against the great name of Rome—so long one of awe to the ancient Asiatic—increased enormously the prestige and reputation of the Seldjukides.”—A. Vámbéry, *History of Bokhara*, ch. 6.—“Togrul Beg, under pretence of a pilgrimage to Mekka had entered Irak at the head of a strong army, and sought to obtain admission into Baghdad. The khalif, in opposition to the advice of his vizier and the officers of the Turkish militia, consented; on the 22nd Ramadan, 447 (December, 1050), the name of Togrul was inserted in the public prayer; and three days after he made his

entry into the city. He had taken an oath, before entering, to be the faithful and obedient servant of the khalif; but it is needless to add that he broke this immediately afterwards, and occupied the city in force.”—The caliph was forced, nevertheless, to crown Sultan Togrul with two crowns, one to represent the sovereignty of Persia and the other the sovereignty of Arabia, and to confer on him the title of “The Sultan of the Court, the Right Hand of the Chief of Believers, the King of the East and of the West. [The Seljuk sultan was now master of the Asiatic Mohammedan empire. But civil war was still protracted for a period, by struggles of the partisans of the Bouides, assisted by the Fatimite caliph of Egypt, and the unfortunate city of Bagdad suffered terribly at the hands of each party in turn. Togrul Beg, in the end, destroyed the opposition to his rule, and was at the point of marrying one of the caliph’s daughters, when a sudden illness ended his life, 1063. He was succeeded by his nephew, Alp Arslan, who extended the empire of the Seljuks in Asia Minor and Armenia.]”—R. D. Osborn, *Islam under the khalifs of Baghdad*, pt. 3, ch. 2.

1063-1073.—Conquests of Alp Arslan.—Military tactics of Romanus Diogenes.—“Alp Arslan, the nephew and successor of Togrul Beg, carried on the havoc and devastation which had marked the career through life of his uncle. Togrul Beg had on two or three occasions invaded the Asiatic territories of the Byzantine Empire; Alp Arslan carried these partial conquests to completion. He invaded in person the northern parts of Armenia and Iberia. He laid waste the country in the cruellest manner, for it was the notion of these barbarians that a country was not really conquered unless it was also depopulated. Iberia had been long celebrated for the industry of its inhabitants, the wealth of its numerous towns, and the valour of its people. There is no doubt they could have flung back the invaders had the Byzantine Empire come to their aid. But avarice was the dominant passion of the Emperor, Constantine X., and rather than disburse his loved hoards, he preferred to look idly on, while his fairest provinces were laid waste and overrun. The country was, in consequence, compelled to submit to the Seljuk Turks, and the invaders settling upon it, like a swarm of locusts, swiftly converted the happiest and most flourishing portion of Asia into a scene of poverty and desolation. From Iberia, Alp Arslan passed into Armenia. Ani, the capital, was stormed and taken, after a gallant defence, on the 6th June, 1064. . . . So great was the carnage that the streets were literally choked up with dead bodies; and the waters of the river were reddened from the quantity of bloody corpses.”—*Ibid.*—“So far as one can judge from the evidence of modern and mediæval travellers and of Byzantine historians, Asia Minor, at the time of the Seljuk invasion of Alparslan, was thickly occupied by races who were industrious, intelligent, and civilised—races with a certain mixture of Greek blood and mostly Greek as to language. The numerous provincial cities were the centres of civilisation. Their walls and amphitheatres, their works of art, aqueducts, and other public buildings, give evidence of a long-continued sense of security, of peaceful and progressive peoples, and of a healthy municipal life. Wealth was widely diffused. . . . It was against this prosperous portion of the Empire, which had contributed largely to the wealth of the capital, that Alparslan turned his attention when the border states were no longer

able to resist his progress. . . . The Strong Lion of the Seljuks devoured many cities and devastated the fairest provinces. Cappadocia was laid waste; the inhabitants of its capital, Cæsarea, were massacred. . . . Mesopotamia, Mitylene, Syria, and Cilicia were plundered."—E. Pears, *Fall of Constantinople*, ch. 2.—"Though the internal condition and administration of the [Byzantine] empire had been steadily deteriorating since the death of Basil II (1024), it cannot be said that its army showed any decline till the very day of Manzikert. . . . The Seljuks of Alp Arslan were in tactics just like the Turks whom Leo the Wise had described a century and a half before. . . . In the spring of 1071 Romanus [Diogenes] collected a very large army, at least sixty thousand strong, and betook himself to the extreme eastern corner of his dominions, with the intention of meeting the Turks at the very frontier, and recovering the fortresses of Akhlat and Manzikert. . . . He had retaken the latter place, and the former was being besieged by a detached division of his army, when the main host of the Seljuks came upon the scene. It was a great horde of horse-archers, more than a hundred thousand strong, and full of confidence in its victorious Sultan. The tactics which Romanus should have employed were those laid down in Leo's manual—to beware of ambushes and surprises, never to fight with uncovered flanks or rear, to use infantry as much as possible, and never to allow the army to get separated or broken up. Romanus violated all these precepts. His first brush with the enemy was a disaster on a small scale, caused by pure heedlessness. When a small body of Turkish cavalry came forward to reconnoitre the Imperial camp, it was furiously charged by a rash officer named Basilakes, who commanded the theme of Theodosiopolis: he drove it before him till he lost sight of his master, and fell into an ambush, where he and all his men were killed or captured. A division which Romanus sent to support them found nothing but the bodies of the slain. With this warning before him, the emperor should have acted with all caution: perhaps, indeed, he intended to do so till his rashness ran away with him. He drew up his host in front of his camp with great care. The right wing was composed of the cavalry from the easternmost themes—Cappadocia, Armeniacon, Charsiana, and the rest, under Alyattes, strategos of the Cappadocian theme. The left wing, under Nicephorus Bryennius, was formed of the drafts of the European themes. In the centre was the emperor, with his guards and the regiments of the metropolitan provinces. A very strong rear line, composed of mercenary cavalry (which included a regiment of Germans and also some Normans from Italy) and the levies of the nobles of the eastern frontier, was placed under Andronicus Ducas, a kinsman of the late Emperor Constantine. He was unfortunately, though a good officer, a secret enemy of Romanus. Alp Arslan had been so moved by the news of the size and splendour of the army which was moving against him, that on the morning after the skirmish in which Basilakes had been captured, he sent an embassy offering peace on the terms of *uti possidetis*. He would withdraw and undertake to make no further invasions of the empire. Romanus was probably right in refusing to negotiate, for Turkish promises could not be trusted. He told the ambassadors that the first condition of peace must be that the Sultan should evacuate his camp, retire, and allow it to be occupied by the Imperial forces. Alp Arslan would not consent to sacrifice his prestige, and the

armies were soon in collision. . . . The empire had suffered other defeats as bloody as that of Manzikert, but none had such disastrous results. The captivity of Romanus Diogenes threw the nominal control of the realm into the hands of his ward, Michael Ducas, who, though he was only just reaching manhood, displayed the character of a pedant and a miser. His reign of seven years was one chaotic series of civil wars; half a dozen generals in corners of the empire assumed the purple; and Romanus, after his delivery from prison, tried to reclaim his crown. Meanwhile, the Seljuks flooded the plateau of Asia Minor, almost unopposed by the remnants of the Imperial army, who were wholly taken up in the civil strife. No man of commanding talents arose to stem the tide, and ere long the horse-bowmen of Malekshah, the son of Alp Arslan, were seen by the Aegean and even by the Propontis. The Turkish invasion was a scourge far heavier than that of the Saracens. While the latter, when bent on permanent conquest, offered the tribute as alternative to the 'Koran or the sword,' the Seljuks were mere savages who slew for the pleasure of slaying. They were barbarous nomads, who had no use for towns or vineyards or arable land. They preferred a desert in which they could wander at large with their flocks and herds. Never, probably, even in the thick of the Teutonic invasions of the fifth century, was so much harm done in ten short years as in Asia Minor during the period 1071-1081. By the end of the latter year the flourishing themes which had been for so long the score of the East-Roman realm had been reduced to mere wastes. Thirty years after Manzikert, when the armies of the Crusaders marched from Nicaea to Tarsus, right across the ancient heart of the empire, they nearly perished of starvation in a land of briars and ruins."—C. Oman, *History of the art of war*, pp. 216-220.—See also ARMENIA: 008-1085.

1054.—Attacks on Christian pilgrims. See CRUSADES: CAUSES, etc.

1073-1092.—Empire of Malek Shah and its subordinate sultans.—Alp Arslan, assassinated in 1073, "was succeeded by his son, Malek Shah, in whose reign the power of the Seljukian Turks attained its greatest height. . . . Turkestan, the home of his race, including Bokhara and Samarcand, was annexed by Malek, and the rule of the shepherd Sultan was admitted at Cashgar. In addition to Persia and the countries just mentioned, his territory included at one time nearly the whole of what is now Turkey in Asia. . . . The Seljukian empire, however, broke up on the death of Malek, which took place in 1002, and, after a period of civil war, was divided into four parts. . . . One of the divisions . . . was carved out of the dominions of the Roman empire, and the capital was, for the most part, at Iconium, a city which to-day, under the name of Konieh, retains somewhat of a sacred character among the Turks, because of its connection with the first Sultans who obtained the right to be Caliphs. Sultan Malek, eighteen years before his death, had prevented a quarrel with Suliman, his cousin, by consenting to allow him to be Sultan of the Seljuks in the lands of the Christian empire. With Suliman there begins the famous line of robber chiefs who are known as Seljukian Sultans of Rome or Roum, or as Sultans of Iconium."—E. Pears, *Fall of Constantinople*, ch. 2.—"The dominion of Suleiman over the greater part of Asia Minor was recognised by a treaty with the Byzantine empire in 1074, when Michael VII. purchased the assistance of a Turkish auxiliary force against the rebellion of

Oursel and his own-uncle John Dukas. Nicephorus III. ratified the treaty concluded with Michael VII., augmented the power of the Turks, and abandoned additional numbers of Christians to their domination, to gain their aid in dethroning his lawful prince; and Nicephorus Melissenos, when he rebelled against Nicephorus III., repeated a similar treason against the traitor, and, in hopes of gaining possession of Constantinople, yielded up the possession of Nicæa to Suleiman, which that chief immediately made the capital of his dominions. . . . When Alexius ascended the throne [Alexius I. (1081)], the Seljouk conquests in Asia Minor were still considered as a portion of the dominions of the Grand Sultair Malekshah, the son of Alp Arslan, and Suleiman, the sultan of Nicæa, was only his lieutenant, though as a member of the house of Seljouk, and as cousin of Malekshah, he was honoured with the title of Sultan. The prominent position which his posterity occupied in the wars of the Crusaders, their long relations with the Byzantine empire, and the independent position they held as sultans of Iconium, have secured to them a far more lasting place in history than has been obtained by the superior but less durable dynasty of the grand sultans. . . . Toutoush, the brother of Malekshah, who acted as his governor at Damascus at the same time, became the founder of the Syrian dynasty of Seljouk sultans."—G. Finlay, *History of the Byzantine and Greek empires, from 716 to 1453, bk. 3, ch. 2, sect. 1*.—The empire of Malek Shah "was as vast as that of the Sassanian kings in the height of their glory. He encouraged the cultivation of science and literature, and his reign is famous for the reformation of the Calendar [in which work Omar el-Khayyam, the poet, was one of the astronomers employed]. An assembly of all the astronomers of Persia adopted a system of computing time which Gibbon says 'surpasses the Julian and approaches the accuracy of the Gregorian era.' It was called the Jalalæan era, from Jalalu-'d-Din, 'Glory of the Faith,' one of the titles of Malik-Shah, and commenced on March 15, 1079."—C. R. Markham, *History of Persia, ch. 6*.

1092-1160.—Dissolution of the empire of Malek Shah.—"Melikshah's reign was certainly the culminating point of the glory of the Seldjukides. . . . Mindful of the oriental adage, 'Perfection and decay go hand in hand,' he determined as far as possible to provide, during his own lifetime, against discord breaking out amongst those who should come after him, by dividing the empire between his different relations. Anatolia was given to Suleiman Shah, whose family had hitherto governed Gazan; Syria fell to his brother Tutush, the adversary of the Crusaders; Nushtekin Gartcha, who had raised himself from slavery to the rank of generalissimo, and who became later the founder of the dynasty of the Khahrezmides, was invested with Khahrezm; Aksonghar got Aleppo; Tchekermish Mosul, Kobulmish Damascus, Khomartekin Fars, and his son Sandjar was entrusted with the administration of Khorasan and Transoxania. These precautions proved, however, ineffectual to preserve the dynasty of the Seljukides from the common fate of oriental sovereign races, for after the death of Melikshah, which took place in 485 (1092), his son Berkyaruk (the Very Brilliant One) had scarcely ascended the throne before the flames of discord were kindled amongst the numerous members of the family." Sandjar, who died in 1160, "was almost the only one of all his race who took to heart the decay of their power in their old hereditary dominions, or made any earn-

est endeavour to arrest it."—A. Vámbéry, *History of Bokhara, ch. 6*.

1097-1099.—First encounters with Crusaders. See CRUSADES: 1066-1099.

1101-1102.—Destruction of three hosts of Crusaders. See CRUSADES: 1101-1102.

1147-1149.—Second Crusade. See CRUSADES: 1147-1149.

1184-1244.—Trebizond in tributary relationship to sultans. See TREBIZOND: 1204-1461.

1188-1192.—Third Crusade. See CRUSADES: 1188-1192.

1193.—Overthrow by Khuarezmiens. See KHUAAREZMI.

(Ottoman): 1240-1326.—Origin and rise of the modern Turkish power.—On the final defeat and death, in Kurdistan, of the last Khuarezmian or Carizmian prince, who was pursued relentlessly by the Mongols of Jenghiz Khan and his successors, there was dissolved an army which included various Turkish hordes. The fragments of this Khuarezmian force were scattered and played several important parts in the history of the troubled time. "The bolder and more powerful chiefs invaded Syria, and violated the holy sepulchre of Jerusalem; the more humble engaged in the service of Aladin, Sultan of Iconium [last surviving remnant of the great empire of the Seljukian Turks], and among these were the obscure fathers of the Ottoman line. They had formerly pitched their tents near the southern bank of the Oxus, in the plains of Mahan and Nesa; and it is somewhat remarkable that the same spot should have produced the first authors of the Parthian and Turkish empires. At the head or in rear of a Carizmian army, Soliman Shah was drowned in the passage of the Euphrates. His son Orthogrul or [Ertogrul] became the soldier and subject of Aladin, and established at Surgut, on the banks of the Sangar, a camp of four hundred families or tents, whom he governed fifty-two years both in peace and war. He was the father of Thaman, or Athman, whose Turkish name has been melted into the appellation of the Caliph Othman. . . . Othman possessed, and perhaps surpassed, the ordinary virtues of a soldier, and the circumstances of time and place were propitious to his independence and success. The Seljukian dynasty was no more. [A remnant called the Seljukian Sultanate of Rum existed until the thirteenth century] and the distance and decline of the Mogul Khans soon enfranchised him from the control of a superior. He was situated on the verge of the Greek empire. The Koran sanctified his 'gazi,' or holy war, against the infidels; and their political errors unlocked the passes of Mount Olympus, and invited him to descend into the plains of Bithynia. . . . It was on the 27th of July, in the year 1299 of the Christian era, that Othman first invaded the territory of Nicomedia. . . . The annals of the twenty-seven years of his reign would exhibit a repetition of the same inroads. It was not till Othman was oppressed by age and infirmities that he received the welcome news of the conquest of Prusa [or Brusa], which had been surrendered by famine or treachery to the arms of his son Orchan [or Orkhan]. . . . From the conquest of Prusa we may date the true era of the Ottoman empire. The lives and possessions of the Christian subjects were redeemed by a tribute or ransom of thirty thousand crowns of gold; and the city, by the labors of Orchan, assumed the aspect of a Mahometan capital."—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire, ch. 64*.—"Osman is the real Turkish

name, which has been corrupted into Othman. The descendants of his subjects style themselves Osmanlis, which has in like manner been corrupted into Ottoman."—W. Smith, *Note to above*.

1248-1254.—War with the Crusaders. See CRUSADES: 1248-1254.

1270-1271.—Repulse of Crusaders. See CRUSADES: 1270-1271.

1326-1359.—Progress of conquests in Asia Minor.—Janissaries.—"Orchan [the son and successor of Othman] had captured the city of Nicomedia in the first year of his reign (1326); and with the new resources for warfare which the administrative genius of his brother [Alaeddin] placed at his command, he speedily signalled his reign by conquests still more important. The great city of Nice [Nicaea] (second to Constantinople only in the Greek Empire) surrendered to him in 1330. . . . Numerous other advantages were gained over the Greeks: and the Turkish prince of Karasi (the ancient Mysia), who had taken up arms against the Ottomans, was defeated; and his capital city, Berghama (the ancient Pergamus), and his territory, annexed to Orchan's dominions. On the conquest of Karasi, in the year 1336 of our era, nearly the whole of the north-west of Asia Minor was included in the Ottoman Empire; and the four great cities of Brusa, Nicomedia, Nice, and Pergamus had become strongholds of its power. A period of twenty years, without further conquests, and without war, followed the acquisition of Karasi. During this time the Ottoman sovereign was actively occupied in perfecting the civil and military institutions which his brother had introduced; in securing internal order, in founding and endowing mosques and schools, and in the construction of vast public edifices. . . . Orchan died in the year 1359 of our era, at the age of seventy-five, after a reign of thirty-three years, during which the most important civil and military institutions of his nation were founded, and the Crescent was not only advanced over many of the fairest provinces of Asia, but was also planted on the European continent."—E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 2.—"It is with Othman's son Orkhan that the Ottoman Empire really begins. He threw off his nominal allegiance to the Sultan [of Iconium], though he still bore only the title of Emir. And in his time the Ottomans first made good their footing in Europe. But while his dominion was still only Asiatic, Orkhan began one institution which did more than anything else firmly to establish the Ottoman power. This was the institution of the tribute children. By the law of Mahomet . . . the unbeliever is allowed to purchase life, property, and the exercise of his religion, by the payment of tribute. Earlier Mahometan rulers had been satisfied with tribute in the ordinary sense. Orkhan first demanded a tribute of children. The deepest of wrongs, that which other tyrants did as an occasional outrage, thus became under the Ottomans a settled law. A fixed proportion of the strongest and most promising boys among the conquered Christian nations were carried off for the service of the Ottoman princes. They were brought up in the Mahometan faith, and were employed in civil or military functions, according to their capacity. Out of them was formed the famous force of the Janissaries, the new soldiers who, for three centuries, as long as they were levied in this way, formed the strength of the Ottoman armies. These children . . . formed a body of troupes such as no other power, Christian or Mahometan, could command. . . . While the force founded by Orkhan lasted in its first shape,

the Ottoman armies were irresistible. But all this shews how far the Ottomans were from being a national power. Their victories were won by soldiers who were really of the blood of the Greeks, Slaves, and other conquered nations. In the same way, while the Ottoman power was strongest, the chief posts of the Empire, civil and military, were constantly held, not by native Turks, but by Christian renegades of all nations. The Ottoman power in short was the power, not of a nation, but simply of an army."—E. A. Freeman, *Ottoman power in Europe*, ch. 4.—"The name of Yeni Tscheri, which means 'new troops,' and which European writers have turned into Janissaries, was given to Orchan's young corps by the Dervish Hadji Beytarch."—E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 2.

1360-1389.—Conquests in Europe of Murad I.—Battle of Kossovo.—"The dissensions of the elder and younger Andronicus [emperors at Constantinople, the younger—a grandson—in revolt and the elder finally deposed, 1320-1328], and the mistaken policy of Cantacuzene [Great Domestic of the empire, regent, after the death of Andronicus the younger, 1341, and then usurper of the throne from 1341 until 1355], first led to the introduction of the Turks into Europe; and the subsequent marriage of Orchan with a Grecian princess was acceded to by the Byzantine court as a faint bond of peace between a dreaded conqueror and a crouching state. The expectation of tranquillity was, however, fatally blasted; and, in the last quarrel of Cantacuzene with his pupil [John Palæologus, the youthful son of Andronicus the younger, who was deprived of his crown for fourteen years by Cantacuzene], the disastrous ambition of the former opened the path of Solyman [or Suleiman Pasha], the son of the Orchan, across the Hellespont [1356], and laid the northern provinces of the kingdom open to the temporary ravages of the barbarians, thus inflicting a lasting and irremediable injury on the liberties of Christendom. The exploits of Solyman, however, led to no other permanent results than the example which they left to the ambition of Amurath I. [or Murad, younger son of Orkhan], who, amongst his earliest achievements, led his victorious army across the Hellespont [1360], ravaged the extended district from Mount Hamus to the Straits, and, taking possession of Adrianople [1361], made it the first seat of his royalty, and the first shrine of Mahomedanism in Europe. His conquests had now drawn a circle round the enfeebled dominions of the Emperor; and the submission of John Palæologus, together with his political views in more distant quarters, alone prevented Amurath from contracting the circumference to the centre, and annihilating the empire of the East, by seating himself on the throne of Byzantium. For the present, he turned his back upon the city, and pursued his course towards the wilds of Bulgaria and Servia."—J. E. Tennent, *History of modern Greece*, v. 1, ch. 4.—"Hitherto the Turkish victories in Europe had been won over the feeble Greeks; but the Ottomans now came in contact with the far more warlike Slavonic tribes, which had founded kingdoms and principalities in Servia and Bosnia. Amurath also menaced the frontiers of Wallachia and Hungary. The Roman See, once so energetic in exciting the early crusades, had disregarded the progress of the new Mahometan power, so long as the heretical Greeks were the only sufferers beneath its arms. But Hungary, a country that professed spiritual obedience to the Pope, a branch of Latin Christendom, was now in peril; and Pope

Urban V. preached up a crusade against the infidel Turks. The King of Hungary, the princes of Servia, of Bosnia and Wallachia, leagued together to drive the Ottomans out of Europe; and their forces marched towards Adrianople until they crossed the river Marizza at a point not more than two days' journey from that city. [A single battle, fought on the Marizza, in 1363, broke this first Slavonic league against the Turks, and Murad proceeded in his acquisition of towns and territory from the Serbians and Bulgarians until 1376, when both people purchased a short peace, the former by paying a heavy annual tribute of money and soldiers, the latter by giving their king's daughter to the Turk. The peace thus secured only gave an opportunity to the Slavic nations to organize one more great attempt to cast out their aggressive and dangerous neighbor Serbia led the movement, and was joined in it by the Bulgarians, the Bosnians, and the Skipetars of Albania, with aid likewise promised and rendered from Hungary, Wallachia, and Poland. But nothing prospered in the undertaking; it served the ambition of the Turks and quickened their conquest of south-eastern Europe. Murad fell upon Bulgaria first (1389), broke down all resistance, dethroned the king and annexed his state to the Ottoman dominions. A few weeks later in the same year, on August 27, 1389, the great and famous battle of Kossovo was fought, which laid the heavy yoke of Turkish tyranny upon the necks of the Serbian people, and the memory of which has been embalmed in their literature. Murad was assassinated in the hour of victory by a despairing Serbian nobleman, but lived long enough to command the execution of the captive Serbian king].—E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 3.—See also BALKAN STATES: Races existing; BULGARIA: 1258-1372; HUNGARY: 1301-1442; RUMANIA: 13th-18th centuries; SERBIA: 14th-18th centuries.

ALSO IN: L. von Ranke, *History of Servia*, ch. 2.—Madame E. L. Mijatovich, *Kossovo*.

1371.—Occupation of Macedonia. See MACEDONIA: 11th-15th centuries.

1389-1403.—Conquests of Bayezid I.—Emir becomes sultan.—His overthrow and capture by Timur.—“The character of Bajazet [or Bayezid], the son and successor of Amurath, is strongly expressed in his surname of Ilderim, or the Lightning; and he might glory in an epithet which was drawn from the fiery energy of his soul and the rapidity of his destructive march. In the fourteen years of his reign he incessantly moved at the head of his armies, from Bursa to Adrianople, from the Danube to the Euphrates. . . . No sooner had he imposed a regular form of servitude on the Servians and Bulgarians than he passed the Danube to seek new enemies and new subjects in the heart of Moldavia. Whatever yet adhered to the Greek empire in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, acknowledged a Turkish master. . . . The humble title of emir was no longer suitable to the Ottoman greatness; and Bajazet condescended to accept a patent of sultan from the caliphs who served in Egypt under the yoke of the Mamelukes—a last and frivolous homage that was yielded by force to opinion, by the Turkish conquerors to the House of Abbas and the successors of the Arabian prophet. The ambition of the sultan was inflamed by the obligation of deserving this august title; and he turned his arms against the kingdom of Hungary, the perpetual theatre of the Turkish victories and defeats. Sigismund, the Hungarian king, was the son and brother of the emperors of the West; his cause was that of Europe and the Church; and

on the report of his danger, the bravest knights of France and Germany were eager to march under his standard and that of the cross. In the battle of Nicopolis [Sept. 28, 1396], Bajazet defeated a confederate army of 100,000 Christians, who had proudly boasted that if the sky should fall they could uphold it on their lances. The far greater part were slain or driven into the Danube; and Sigismund, escaping to Constantinople by the river and the Black Sea, returned, after a long circuit, to his exhausted kingdom. In the pride of victory, Bajazet threatened that he would besiege Buda; that he would subdue the adjacent countries of Germany and Italy; and that he would feed his horse with a bushel of oats on the altar of St. Peter at Rome. His progress was checked, not by the miraculous interposition of the apostle, not by a crusade of the Christian powers, but by a long and painful fit of the gout. . . . At length the ambition of the victorious sultan pointed to the conquest of Constantinople; but he listened to the advice of his vizir, who represented that such an enterprise might unite the powers of Christendom in a second and more formidable crusade. His epistle to the emperor was conceived in these words: ‘By the divine clemency, our invincible scimitar has reduced to our obedience almost all Asia, with many and large countries in Europe, excepting only the city of Constantinople; for beyond the walls thou hast nothing left. Resign that city; stipulate thy reward; or tremble for thyself and thy unhappy people at the consequences of a rash refusal.’ But his ambassadors were instructed to soften their tone, and to propose a treaty, which was subscribed with submission and gratitude. A truce of ten years was purchased by an annual tribute of thirty thousand crowns of gold. [The truce was soon broken by Bayezid, who found a pretext for again demanding the surrender of Constantinople. He had established his blockade of the city and would surely have won it by famine or assault if Timur's invasion of Asia Minor (1402) had not summarily interrupted his plans and ended his career. Defeated at the battle of Angora and taken prisoner by the Tatar conqueror, he died a few months later—whether caged like a beast or held in more honorable captivity is a question in some dispute].—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 64-65.—See also TIMUR.

1392.—Invasion of Bosnia. See BOSNIA: 1391-1444.


1393.—Treaty with Rumania.—First capitulation. See RUMANIA: 13th-18th centuries.

1393.—Wallachian capitulation. See RUMANIA: 13th-18th centuries.

1402-1451.—Prostration and recovery.—Conquests of Mohammed I and Murad II.—It is one of the marvels of history that the Ottoman empire, broken and dismembered by Timur, recovered its vigor and reëntered upon a long career. After the fall of Bayezid, three fragments of his dominions were held by three of his surviving sons, while other portions were transferred by Timur to princes of the old Seljuk house. Civil war broke out between the brothers of the Ottoman race; it resulted in the triumph of Mohammed, the youngest (1413), who reunited a large part of the dominions of his father. He reigned but eight years, which were years of peace for the Greeks, with whom Mohammed maintained a friendly intercourse. His son, Murad II (or Amurath), was provoked to renew the state of war, and a formidable attack upon Constantinople







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was made in August, 1422. The first assault failed, and disturbances at home recalled Murad before he could repeat it. The Roman capital was reprieved for thirty years; but its trembling emperor paid tribute to the sultan and yielded most of the few cities that remained to him outside of his capital. The Ottoman power had become threatening again in Europe, and Serbians, Bosnians, Albanians, Wallachians, Hungarians, and Poles now struck hands together in a combination, once more, to oppose it. "A severe struggle followed, which, after threatening the utter expulsion of the house of Othman from Europe, confirmed for centuries its dominion in that continent, and wrought the heavier subjugation of those who were then seeking to release themselves from its superiority. In 1442 Amurath was repulsed from Belgrade; and his generals, who were besieging Hermanstadt, in Transylvania, met with a still more disastrous reverse. It was at Hermanstadt that the renowned Hunyades [or Hunyadi] first appeared in the wars between the Hungarians and the Turks. He was the illegitimate son of Sigismund, King of Hungary, and the fair Elizabeth Morsiney. In his early youth he gained distinction in the wars of Italy; and Comines, in his memoirs, celebrates him under the name of the White Knight of Wallachia. After some campaigns in Western Christendom, Hunyades returned to protect his native country against the Ottomans." At Hermanstadt, and again at Vasag, Hunyadi defeated the Turks with great slaughter and rivalled them in the ferocity with which his prisoners were treated. His fame now gave a great impulse to the Crusade against the Turks which Pope Eugenius had preached, and drew volunteers to his standard from all the nations of the West. In 1443, Hunyadi led a splendid and powerful army across the Danube near Semendra, drove the Turks beyond the Balkans, forced the passage of the mountains with a boldness and a skill that is compared with the exploits of Hannibal and Napoleon, and extorted from the sultan a treaty (of Szegeddin, July 12, 1444) which rescued a large Christian territory from the Moslem yoke. "The Sultan resigned all claims upon Serbia and recognised George Brankovich as its independent sovereign. Wallachia was given up to Hungary." But the peace which this treaty secured was brief; Christian perfidy destroyed it, and the penalty was paid by whole centuries of suffering and shame for the Christians of the Danubian states. "Within a month from the signature of the treaty of Szegeddin the Pope and the Greek Emperor had persuaded the King of Hungary and his councillors to take an oath to break the oath which had been pledged to the Sultan. They represented that the confessed weakness of the Ottomans and the retirement of Amurath [who had placed his fourteen year old son, Mohammed on the throne and withdrawn from the cares of sovereignty] to Asia, gave an opportunity for eradicating the Turks from Europe which ought to be fully employed. The Cardinal Julian [legate of the pope] pacified the conscientious misgivings which young King Ladislaus expressed, by his spiritual authority in giving dispensation and absolution in the Pope's name. . . . On the 1st of Sept., the King, the legate, and Hunyades, marched against the surprised and unprepared Turks with an army of 10,000 Poles and Hungarians. The temerity which made them expect to destroy the Turkish power in Europe with so slight a force was equal to the dishonesty of their enterprise."

They advanced through Bulgaria to the Black sea, and southward along its coast as far as Varna, which they took. There they were called to account. Murad had resumed the sceptre, put himself at the head of 40,000 of the best warriors of Islam and on November 10 he dashed them upon the Christian forces at Varna, with the broken treaty borne like a banner at their head. His victory was overwhelming. Cardinal Julian and the king of Hungary were both among the slain. Hunyadi fled with a little remnant of followers and escaped to try fortune in other fields. "This overthrow did not bring immediate ruin upon Hungary, but it was fatal to the Slavonic neighbours of the Ottomans, who had joined the Hungarian King against them. Serbia and Bosnia were thoroughly reconquered by the Mahometans; and the ruin of these Christian nations, which adhered to the Greek Church, was accelerated by the religious intolerance with which they were treated by their fellow Christians of Hungary and Poland, who obeyed the Pope and hated the Greek Church as heretical. . . . The bigotry of the Church of Rome in preaching up a crusade against the sect of the Patarenes, which was extensively spread in that country [Bosnia], caused the speedy and complete annexation of an important frontier province to the Ottoman Empire. Seventy Bosnian fortresses are said to have opened their gates to the Turks within eight days. The royal house of Bosnia was annihilated, and many of her chief nobles embraced Mahometanism to avoid a similar doom. [After once more attempting to escape from the throne, and being recalled by domestic disturbances, Murad reigned yet six years, extending his dominions in the Peloponnesus, defeating once more his old antagonist, Hunyadi, who invaded Serbia (1448), but being successfully defied in Albania by the heroic Scanderbeg. He died in 1451]."—E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: L. von Ranke, *History of Serbia*, ch. 2.—E. Szabad, *Hungary*, pt. 1, ch. 3-4.—A. Lamartine, *History of Turkey*, bk. 10-11.

1430.—Capture of Thessalonica. See THESSALONICA: 1430.

1431-1467.—Conquest of Albania.—Rout by Scanderberg. See ALBANIA: 1358-1443.

1445.—Destruction of Corinth. See CORINTH: 1445.

1451-1481.—Conquest of Constantinople.—Empire organized and perfected by Mohammed II.—Mohammed II, son of Murad II, "finished the work of his predecessors; he made the Ottoman power in Europe what it has been ever since. He gave a systematic form to the customs of his house and to the dominion which he had won. His first act was the murder of his infant brother, and he made the murder of brothers a standing law of his Empire. He overthrew the last remnants of independent Roman rule, of independent Greek nationality, and he fixed the relations which the Greek part of his subjects were to bear both towards their Turkish masters and towards their Christian fellow-subjects. He made the northern and western frontiers of his Empire nearly what they still remain. The Ottoman Empire, in short, as our age has to deal with it, is, before all things, the work of Mahomet the Conqueror. The prince whose throne was fixed in the New Rome held altogether another place from even the mightiest of his predecessors. Mahomet had reigned two years, he had lived twenty-three, on the memorable day, May 20th 1453, when the Turks entered the city of Cæsars and when the last Emperor, Con-

stantine, died in the breach [see CONSTANTINOPLE: 1453; PHANARIOTS]. . . . And now that the Imperial city was at last taken, Mahomet seemed to make it his policy both to gather in whatever remained unconquered, and to bring most of the states which had hitherto been tributary under his direct rule. Greece itself, though it had been often ravaged by the Turks, had not been added to their dominions. The Emperors had, in the very last days of the Empire before the fall of Constantinople, recovered all Peloponnesos, except some points which were held by Venice. Frank Dukes also reigned at Athens [see ATHENS: 1456], and another small duchy lingered on the islands of Leukas and Kephallenia and on the coasts of Akarnania. The Turkish conquest of the mainland, again saving the Venetian points, was completed by the year 1460, but the two western islands were not taken until 1479. Euboa was



SULTAN MOHAMMED II

(After the painting of Gentile Bellini in the Layard collection, Venice)

conquered in 1471. . . . The Empire of Trebizond was conquered in 1461 [see ARMENIA: 1453-1878; TREBIZOND: 1204-1401], and the island of Lesbos or Mitylene in 1462. There was now no independent Greek state left. Crete, Corfu, and some smaller islands and points of coast, were held by Venice, and some of the islands of the Ægean were still ruled by Frank princes and by the Knights of Saint John. But, after the fall of Trebizond, there was no longer any independent Greek state anywhere, and the part of the Greek nation which was under Christian rulers of any kind was now far smaller than the part which was under the Turk. While the Greeks were thus wholly subdued, the Slaves fared no better. In 1450 Serbia was reduced from a tributary principality to an Ottoman province, and six years later Bosnia was annexed also. [See BOSNIA: 1453-1528.] . . . One little fragment of the great Slavonic power in those lands alone remained. The little district of Zeta, a part of the Servian kingdom, was never fully conquered by the Turks. One part of it, the mountain district called Tsernagora or Mon-

tenegro, has kept its independence to our times. Standing as an outpost of freedom and Christendom amid surrounding bondage, the Black Mountain has been often attacked, it has been several times overrun, but it has never been conquered. . . . To the south of them, the Christian Albanians held out for a long time under their famous chief George Castriot or Scanderbeg. After his death in 1459, they also came under the yoke. These conquests of Mahomet gave the Ottoman dominion in Europe nearly the same extent which it has now. His victories had been great, but they were balanced by some defeats. The conquest of Serbia and Bosnia opened the way to endless inroads into Hungary, South-eastern Germany and North-eastern Italy. But as yet these lands were merely ravaged, and the Turkish power met with some reverses. In 1456 Belgrade was saved by the last victory of Huniades [see HUNGARY: 1442-1458], and this time Mahomet the Conqueror had to flee. In another part of Europe, if in those days it is to be counted for Europe, Mahomet won the Genoese possessions in the peninsula of Crimea [1475], and the Tartar Khans who ruled in that peninsula and the neighbouring lands became vassals of the Sultan. . . . The last years of Mahomet's reign were marked by a great failure and a great success. He failed to take Rhodes [1480], which belonged to the Knights of Saint John; but his troops suddenly seized on Otranto in Southern Italy. Had this post been kept, Italy might have fallen as well as Greece; but the Conqueror died the next year, and Otranto was won back."—E. A. Freeman, *Ottoman power in Europe*, ch. 4.—See also CONSTANTINOPLE: 1453-1481; ITALY: 1447-1480; SERBIA: 14th-18th centuries.

Also in: A. Lamartine, *History of Turkey*, bk. 12-13.—E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 5-6.—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 68.

1454-1479.—Treaty with Venice, followed by war. See GREECE: 1454-1479.

1478-1880.—Rule in Albania. See ALBANIA: 1478-1880.

1479.—Defeat at Kenyer-Mesö by the Hungarians and Wallachians. See HUNGARY: 1471-1487.

1481-1520.—Captivity of Prince Jem.—Massacre of the Shiites.—Selim's conquests in Persia, Syria and Egypt.—Sultan becomes the successor of the caliphs, the chief of Islam.—"The long reign of Bayezid II (1481-1512) which surpassed that of his father and grandfather, so that the three together nearly completed a century, was marked by a general lethargy and incapacity on the part of the Turkish Government. . . . Family dissensions were indeed the leading incidents of Bayezid's reign, and for many years he was kept in a state of anxious uncertainty by the ingenious intrigues of the Christian Powers concerning the custody of his brother, the unfortunate Prince Jem. The adventures of Prince Jem (the name is short for Jemshid, but in Europe it has been written Zizim) cast a very unpleasant light upon the honour of the Christians of his time, and especially upon the Knights of Rhodes. Of the two sons of Mohammed II Jem was undoubtedly the one who was by nature fitted to be his successor. . . . Jem, however, was not the first to hear of his father's death, and a year's warfare against his brother ended in his own defeat. The younger prince then sought refuge with the Knights of Rhodes, who promised to receive him hospitably, and to find him a way to Europe, where he intended to renew his opposition to his brother's au-

thority. D'Aubusson, the Grand Master of Rhodes, was too astute a diplomatist to sacrifice the solid gains that he perceived would accrue to his Order for the sake of a few paltry twinges of conscience; and he had no sooner made sure of Prince Jem's person, and induced him to sign a treaty, by which, in the event of his coming to the throne, the Order was to reap many sterling advantages, than he ingeniously opened negotiations with Sultan Bayezid, with a view to ascertain how much gold that sovereign was willing to pay for the safe custody of his refractory brother. It is only fair to say that Bayezid, who had no particle of cruelty in his nature, did all he could to come to terms with Jem. . . . All negotiations and compromise having proved ineffectual, he listened to the proposals of the crafty Grand Master, and finally agreed to pay him 45,000 ducats a year, so long as he kept Jem under his surveillance,

was interrupted by Charles VIII of France, who invaded Italy at this juncture, passed through Rome, and took the captive prince in his train when he went on to Naples. Jem died on the way, and few have doubted that Pope Alexander poisoned him, as he had poisoned many before. "The curious conclusion one draws from the whole melancholy tale is, that there was not apparently a single honest prince in Christendom to take compassion upon the captive." In 1512 Bayezid was deposed by his son Selim, and did not long survive the humiliation. To avoid troubles of the Prince Jem character, Selim slew all his brothers and nephews, eleven in number, making a family solitude around the throne. Then he prepared himself for foreign conquest by exterminating the sometimes troublesome sect of the Shias, or Shiites, in his dominions. "A carefully organized system of detectives, whom Selim distributed throughout



MOSQUE OF SULTAN BAYEZID II AT CONSTANTINOPLE

. . . . Meanwhile Grand Master D'Aubusson was driving a handsome trade in his capacity of jailor. All the potentates of Europe were anxious to obtain possession of the claimant to the Ottoman throne, and were ready to pay large sums in hard cash to enjoy the privilege of using this specially dangerous instrument against the Sultan's peace. . . . Charles VIII of France considered that the Grand Master had made enough profit out of the unlucky prince, and the king resolved to work the oracle himself. His plan was to restore Jem to a nominal sultanate by the aid of Matthias Corvinus, Ferdinand of Naples, and the Pope. He took Jem out of the hands of the knights, and transferred him to the custody of Innocent VIII, who kindly consented to take care of the prince for the sum of 40,000 ducats a year, to be paid by his grateful brother at Constantinople." Innocent's successor, the terrible Borgia, Alexander VI, unsatisfied with this liberal allowance, opened negotiations with Constantinople looking to the payment of some heavy lump sum for summary riddance of poor Jem. But the sinister bargain


his Asiatic provinces, revealed the fact that the number of the heretical sect reached the alarming total of 70,000. Selim . . . secretly massed his troops at spots where the heretics chiefly congregated, and at a given signal 40,000 of them were massacred or imprisoned. . . . Having got rid of the enemy within his gates, Selim now proceeded to attack the head of the Shias, the great Shah Ismail himself [the founder of the Sufi line of Persian sovereigns, who had lately established his authority over the provinces of Persia]. . . . Selim set forth with an army estimated at over 140,000 men, 80,000 of which were cavalry. . . . After weary and painful marching, the Ottomans forced Ismail to give battle at Chaldiran [or Tabriz (see PERSIA: 1499-1887)], and defeated him. "The victory of Chaldiran (1514) might have been followed by the conquest of Persia, but the privations which the soldiery had undergone had rendered them unmanageable, and Selim was forced to content himself with the annexation of the important provinces of Kurdistan and Dyarbekr, which are still part of the Turkish Empire; and then turned

homewards, to prosecute other schemes of conquest. No peace, however, was concluded between him and the Shah, and a frontier war continued to be waged for many years. During the campaign against Persia, the Turks had been kept in anxiety by the presence on their flanks of the

[Tuman Bey, however, was captured and executed and Selim returned to Constantinople in 1518.] By the conquest of the Mamluk kingdom he had also succeeded to their authority over the sacred cities of Arabia, Mekka and Medina, and in recognition of this position, as well as of his undoubted supremacy among Mohammedan monarchs, he received from the last Abbaside Khalif, who kept a shadowy court at Cairo, the inheritance of the great pontiffs of Baghdad. The 'fainéant' Khalif was induced to make over to the real sovereign the spiritual authority which he still affected to exercise, and with it the symbols of his office, the standard and cloak of the Prophet Mohammed. Selim now became not only the visible chief of the Mohammedan State throughout the wide dominions subdued to his sway, but also the revered head of the religion of Islam, wheresoever it was practised in its orthodox form. The heretical Shias of Persia might reject his claim, but in India, in all parts of Asia and Africa, where the traditional Khalifate was recognized, the Ottoman Sultan henceforth was the supreme head of the church, the successor to the spiritual prestige of the long line of the Khalifs. [Selim died in 1520, and was succeeded by his son Suleiman, or Solymán, who acquired the name of 'the Magnificent.']\*—S. Lane-Poole, *Story of Turkey*, ch. 8-9.—See also ABYSSINIA: 15th-16th centuries; BAGDAD: 1303-1638; CALIPHATE: 1262-1543.

ALSO IN: A. de Lamartine, *History of Turkey*, v. 2, bk. 15-18.—A. A. Paton, *History of the Egyptian revolution*, ch. 5.

1498-1502.—War with Venetians.—“During the first 17 years of Bajazet's reign, the peace between the Venetians and the Porte, though occasionally menaced, remained on the whole undisturbed. The Venetians complained of the Turkish incursions, and the definitive occupation of Montenegro, while the Porte, on its side, was jealous because the Republic had reduced the Duke of Naxos to dependence, and obtained possession of Cyprus (1489). At last, in 1498, the Turks, after making great naval preparations, suddenly arrested all the Venetian residents at Constantinople, and in the following year seized Lepanto, which surrendered without striking a blow (August 1499). Soon after, a body of 10,000 Turks crossed the Isonzo, carrying fire and desolation almost to the lagoons of Venice. In August 1500, Modon was taken by assault. . . . Navarino and Koron surrendered soon after, but towards the close of the year the Venetians were more successful. They captured Ægina, devastated and partly occupied Mytilene, Tenedos, and Samothrace, and with the help of a Spanish squadron, and 7,000 troops, under Gonsalvo de Cordova, reduced the island of Cephalonia. For this service the grateful Venetians rewarded Gonsalvo with a present of 500 tuns of Cretan wine, 60,000 pounds of cheese, 266 pounds of wrought silver, and the honorary freedom of their Republic. In 1501 the Venetian fleet was joined by a French, a Papal, and a Spanish squadron, but, through a want of cordiality among the commanders, little was effected. . . . The war . . . continued through 1502, and the Venetians were tolerably successful, having captured many Turkish ships, and, with the assistance of the French, taken the island of Sta. Maura. But at length a treaty was signed, Dec. 14th, by which Venice was allowed to hold Cephalonia, but restored Sta. Maura, and permitted the Porte to retain its conquests, including the three important fortresses of Modon, Koron, and Navarino.”—T. H. Dyer, *History of modern Europe*, v. 1, bk. 1, ch. 6.



HOLY CARPET

Sent each year by the Egyptian government with the pilgrim caravan from Cairo to Mecca

forces of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt and Syria, whose frontiers now marched with the territory of the Ottomans.” Turning his arms against the Mamelukes, “Selim set out in 1516 for Syria, and meeting the Mamluk army on the field of Marj Dabik near Aleppo, administered a terrible defeat, in which the aged Sultan El-Ghuri was trampled to death. He found a brave successor in Tuman Bey, but in the interval the Turks had mastered Syria and were advancing to Gaza.

1519.—Sultan acquires sovereignty of Algiers and Tunis. See BARBARY STATES: 1516-1535.

1520-1566.—Accession and reign of Suleiman I.—Caliphate.—Extent of territories.—Reasons for his conquests.—“Suleiman, called by foreigners ‘the Magnificent’ and by his own people Kanuni or ‘the Law-Giver’ [came to the throne in 1520, at the age of twenty-six years]. He was a man more moderate and less licentious than his predecessors, a lover of literature and the arts and a tolerable poet, yet a brave soldier and a clever strategist. He had that greatest of all gifts in rulers—the instinct to choose the right man for the right place. His viziers were often Greek and Italian renegades, eunuchs, and Jews, but they successfully governed one of the greatest empires the world has ever seen—so successfully that in forty years not one of the twenty subject races revolted. His admirals were seldom Turks—Kheir-ed-din Barbarossa was a renegade Greek from Mytilene; Dragut and Piale were Croats—yet by utilizing the services of these Moslem corsairs, in conjunction with his own fleet, he obtained the command of the Mediterranean and the allegiance of the Arab states along the northern coasts of Africa. The Turks are not a seafaring people; but the naval warfare of the day rather called forth the qualities of the soldier than of the mariner. The galleys generally hugged the coast; the working crew were Greeks from the Ægean sea-board and the oarsmen Christian slaves; the only duty of the complement of Turks and Janissaries was to fight. From their bases in the Mediterranean—including for a time Toulon, in accordance with the terms of Suleiman’s alliance with Francis I.—Suleiman’s corsair-admirals carried their devastating raids, not only along the coasts of Spain, France, and Italy, but even as far as those of England and Ireland. His military organisation was such that every year great armies could be collected at the capital and sent, with abundance of equipment and provisions, to the frontier of Austria or Persia—as the Sultan might choose. During thirteen campaigns the Turkish armies were only once short of supplies—in the retreat from Vienna in 1529; and so great was their strength that, with the exception of the disastrous battle of Mohacz, the enemies of Islam—even Charles himself—never risked a pitched battle. Suleiman’s opponents were forced to rely on the defence of walled towns to break the force of the Turkish invasions—and these towns generally fell. Suleiman never left victory to chance—he always employed overwhelming forces. Yet, like Philip II., he never found it necessary to increase taxation in order to support his armies; they always lived on the invaded country. The young Sultan, signalled his succession by the capture of Belgrad, the key to Hungary, where such a disastrous defeat had been inflicted on Mahommed II. [See HUNGARY: 1487-1526.] Next year he attacked Rhodes, and after a siege of nine months, during which bombs were used for the first time, the Knights were forced to capitulate and transferred their headquarters to Malta. [See HOSPITALIERS OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM: 1522.] Suleiman then turned definitely against Hungary, weakened at that time by a peasants’ rebellion and a civil war. Even the loss of Belgrad had not aroused the Magyar nobles to a sense of the national danger. In 1526 Louis II., the weak young King of Bohemia and Hungary, was defeated and killed at the battle of Mohacz and Suleiman entered Buda. Next year, however, he was called to the Persian frontier, and dissension broke out

among the Hungarian nobles. One party, anxious to secure the assistance of the Empire, elected the Emperor’s brother, the Archduke Ferdinand, as king, while the extreme national party chose John Zapolya, a conscientious, unimagi-native man. Zapolya was defeated and asked the support of the Sultan. A long and costly war ensued. The struggle on the Danube was changed in character: Hungary and Turkey were no longer the combatants; it was a contest between the Habsburgs and the Turks for the possession of Hungary. In 1529 Suleiman, encouraged by the French king, again invaded Hungary, professedly to reinstate Zapolya, and with 250,000 men and hordes of irregular cavalry moved on Vienna. Then took place the memorable defence by Count Salm, a defence which resulted in the repulse of the Turks—the first serious set-back which they received. The war dragged on until 1538, when a truce for five years was concluded, leaving the Sultan in possession of Eastern Hungary, while Ferdinand kept the western portion in payment of an annual tribute of 30,000 ducats. At sea, Suleiman’s arms were crowned with success. The story of the rise of Turkish sea-power is one of the most amazing chapters of history. The huge red-bearded Kheir-ed-din [Barbarossa] beginning with a single pirate galley, created in a few years a fleet which dominated the Mediterranean. [See BARBARY STATES: 1516-1535.] He was in reality independent, but he chose to recognize the authority of the sublime Porte, and to confine his activities to the enemies of the Osmanli. After plundering the coasts of Naples (1533), Kheir-ed-din suddenly descended on Tunis and ousted its degenerate ruler, the Mulai Hassan. Charles V. himself, with a huge armament, undertook to recapture the city, and the corsair was forced to abandon it. In 1538, however, he avenged himself by defeating the fleets of Spain, Venice, and the Papacy at the famous battle of Prevesa. In 1541 the Emperor failed in an attack on Algiers, and two years later Kheir-ed-din participated with the Duc d’Enghien in the capture of Nice. The savage old corsair died in his bed at Constantinople (1546), and strange to say, his vast wealth was bequeathed to found a college. Another of these corsairs, Dragut Reis, conquered Tripoli, and a third, Piale, captured Oran, and in 1560 defeated the combined fleets of the Knights of St. John, Genoa, and other Italian cities, under Andrea Doria, at the Island of Djerbe, off the coast of Tripoli. [See BARBARY STATES: 1543-1560.] Two other admirals of Suleiman, Piri Reis and Sidi Ali, the one a geographer of note, the other a poet, defeated the Portuguese in the Red Sea, and captured Aden and several places on the north-west coast of Hindustan. . . . In 1565 the old Sultan determined to utilise his powerful fleets to oust the Knights of St. John from their stronghold at Malta, and to signalise the end of his reign by their extinction, as he had signalled the beginning by their expulsion from Rhodes. But after a desperate siege of four months, during which Dragut lost his life, the Turks were forced to retire with a loss of 25,000 dead. Suleiman, now an old man in weak health, was childishly anxious to retrieve his honour, and determined to take personal command of a great army which was preparing to enter Hungary, where war had broken out again. In May 1566 he left Constantinople, carried in a litter at the head of his army. The Turkish army invaded Hungary, but was checked by the heroic defence of Sziget. Before this fortress fell, the old Sultan died suddenly of apop-

lexy (that bane of so many of his hard-living ancestors), with the complaint on his lips that 'the drums of victory had not yet beat.' Thus passed 'the Star of his Age.' Throughout his life he had been the arbiter of Europe. Although he never came to conclusions with Charles V., and although the successful defence of Vienna saved Germany from invasion, it may be claimed that Suleiman maintained the balance of power in Europe, at a time when the Habsburgs designed to bring the united strength of Germany and Spain against France, and to re-establish under Charles V. the Empire of Charles the Great. Suleiman ruled with an enlightenment and toleration, with which the bigoted policies of Henry VIII., of Francis I., and of Charles V. cannot be compared, an Empire which included not only Sunnis and Shiis but large populations of Roman Catholics, Orthodox Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, and numerous lesser denominations. He earned the honorary sobriquet of the 'Lawgiver,' by a series of moderate enactments which provided for the reform of the Turkish feudal system, the regulation of wages, prices, and tariffs, and the mitigation of the existing severe punishments for criminal offences. Under his benignant rule, the condition of the Rayahs (Christian peasants) was far happier than that of the miserable serfs of France, Germany, and Russia, who were subject to every caprice of their lords."—W. E. D. Allen, *Turks in Europe*, pp. 34-40.—"Turkish power reached its zenith during the reign of Suleiman 'the magnificent' (1520-66). The Turkish 'Emirs' had long ago exchanged the title for that of Sultan [see SULTAN], and to the Sultanate Suleiman's predecessor had added the Caliphate. Successor to the Prophet; spiritual father of the whole Moslem world; Suleiman ruled as temporal lord from Buda to Basra, from the Danube to the Persian Gulf. 'On the north [says Finlay] their frontiers were guarded against the Poles by the fortress of Kamenietz, and against the Russians by the walls of Azof; while to the south the rock of Aden secured their authority over the southern coast of Arabia, invested them with power in the Indian Ocean, and gave them the complete command of the Red Sea. To the east, the Sultan ruled the shores of the Caspian, from the Kour to the Tenek; and his dominions stretched westward along the southern coast of the Mediterranean, where the farthest limits of the regency of Algiers, beyond Oran, meet the frontiers of the empire of Morocco. By rapid steps the Ottomans completed the conquest of the Seljouk sultans in Asia Minor, of the Mamlouk sultans of Syria and Egypt, of the fierce corsairs of Northern Africa, expelled the Venetians from Cyprus, Crete, and the Archipelago; and drove the knights of St. John of Jerusalem from the Levant, to find a shelter at Malta. It was no vain boast of the Ottoman Sultan that he was the master of many kingdoms, the ruler of three continents and the lord of two seas.' The achievement was indeed stupendous, but its brilliance was evanescent. The seeds of decay were already germinating even amid the splendours of the reign of Suleiman. The astonishing success of the Ottoman invaders is due partly to conditions external to themselves, partly to their own characteristics and institutions. The irrecoverable decrepitude of the Greek Empire; the proverbial lack of political cohesion among the Slav peoples; the jealousy and antagonism of the Christian Powers."—J. A. R. Marriott, *European Commonwealth*, p. 258.

Also in: S. Lane-Poole, *Barbary corsairs*.

1521-1526.—Capture of Belgrade.—Great in-

vasion of Hungary.—Overwhelming victory of Mohacs. See HUNGARY: 1487-1526; AUSTRIA: 1525-1527.

1522.—Conquest of the isle of Rhodes.—Expulsion of the knights of St. John. See HOSPITALERS OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM: 1522.

1526-1718.—Control in Croatia. See CROATIA: 1526-1718.

1527-1875.—Final subjugation and rule of Bosnians. See BOSNIA: 1453-1528; 1528-1875.

1528-1567.—Suzerainty over Transylvania and Hungary.—Invasion of Austria and siege of Vienna.—Death of Suleiman the Magnificent. See HUNGARY: 1526-1567.

1531-1532.—Protestant participation in expulsion from Hungary. See GERMANY: 1530-1532.

1532-1553.—Frightful depredations along the coast of southern Italy. See ITALY (Southern): 1528-1570.

1535-1542.—Alliance with France.—Siege of Nice. See FRANCE: 1532-1547.

1535-1774.—Recognition of rights of Christians in Jerusalem. See JERUSALEM: 16th-20th centuries.

1551-1560.—Unsuccessful attack on Malta.—Capture of Tripoli.—Disastrous attempt of the Christians to recover that city. See BARBARY STATES: 1543-1560.

1565.—Unsuccessful attack on the knights of St. John in Malta. See HOSPITALERS OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM: 1530-1565; MALTA, ISLAND OF: 1530-1798.

1566-1571.—Reign of Selim II.—War with the Holy League of Spain, Venice and the pope.—Conquest of Cyprus.—Great defeat at Lepanto.—"In 1566, Solyman the Magnificent closed his long and prosperous reign. His son and successor, Selim II, possessed few of the qualities of his great father. Bred in the Seraglio, he showed the fruits of his education in his indolent way of life, and in the free indulgence of the most licentious appetites. With these effeminate tastes, he inherited the passion for conquest which belonged, not only to his father, but to the whole of his warlike dynasty. . . . The scheme which most occupied the thoughts of Selim was the conquest of Cyprus. . . . Selim, resolved on the acquisition of Cyprus, was not slow in devising a pretext for claiming it from Venice as a part of the Ottoman empire. The republic . . . was not prepared to surrender without a struggle the richest gem in her colonial diadem. War was accordingly declared against her by the Porte, and vast preparations were made for fitting out an armament against Cyprus. Venice, in her turn, showed her usual alacrity in providing for the encounter. . . . But Venice no longer boasted a navy such as in earlier days had enabled her to humble the pride of Genoa, and to ride the unquestioned mistress of the Mediterranean. . . . In her extremity, she turned to the Christian powers of Europe, and besought them to make common cause with her against the enemy of Christendom." The only responses to her appeal came, first, from Pope Pius V., and finally, through his urgency, from Philip II of Spain. After much deliberation, Philip agreed, in the spring of 1570, to enter into an alliance with Venice and the pope against the Ottoman Porte. "The ensuing summer, the royal admiral, the famous John Andrew Doria, who was lying with a strong squadron off Sicily, put to sea, by the king's orders. He was soon after reinforced by a few galleys which were furnished by his holiness, and placed under the command of Mark Antonio Colonna. . . . On the last





of August, 1570, the combined fleet effected its junction with the Venetians at Candia, and a plan of operations was immediately arranged. It was not long before the startling intelligence arrived that Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, had been taken and sacked by the Turks, with all the circumstances of cruelty which distinguish wars in which the feeling of national hostility is embittered by religious hatred. The plan was now to be changed. A dispute arose among the commanders as to the course to be pursued. No one had authority enough to enforce compliance with his own opinion. The dispute ended in a rupture. The expedition was abandoned. . . . Still the stout-hearted pontiff was not discouraged"; nor did the king of Spain draw back. "Venice, on the other hand, soon showed that the Catholic king had good reason for distrusting her fidelity. Appalled by the loss of Nicosia, with her usual inconstancy, she despatched a secret agent to Constantinople, to see if some terms might not yet be made with the sultan." Her overtures, however, were coldly received by the sultan, and she was won back to the alliance. "Towards the close of 1570, the deputies from the three powers met in Rome to arrange the terms of the league." With much difficulty, a treaty (the Holy League) was concluded, and ratified in May, 1571, to the effect that the operations of the league "should be directed against the Moors of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, as well as against the Turks." The sultan was not dismayed. "He soon got together a powerful fleet, partly drawn from his own dominions, and in part from those of the Moslem powers on the Mediterranean, who acknowledged allegiance to the Porte. The armada was placed under the command of Selim's brother-in-law, the Pacha Piali. . . . Early in the season [of 1571] the combined fleets sailed for the Adriatic, and Piali, after landing and laying waste the territory belonging to the republic, detached Uluch [dey of Algiers] with his squadron to penetrate higher up the gulf. The Algerine, in executing these orders, advanced so near to Venice as to throw the inhabitants of that capital into . . . consternation. . . . Meanwhile the Venetians were pushing forward their own preparations with their wonted alacrity,—indeed with more alacrity than thoroughness. . . . The fleet was placed under the command of Sebastian Veniero," and sailed before midsummer, "or as much of it as was then ready, for the port of Messina, appointed as the place of rendezvous for the allies. Here he was soon joined by Colonna, the papal commander, with the little squadron furnished by his holiness; and the two fleets lay at anchor . . . waiting the arrival of the rest of the confederates and of Don John of Austria." The latter reached Messina on August 25. "On the 16th of September the magnificent armament . . . stood out to sea." Before encountering the Turkish fleet, the allies received tidings "that Famagosta, the second city of Cyprus, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and this under circumstances of unparalleled perfidy and cruelty. . . . The fall of Famagosta secured the fall of Cyprus, which thus became permanently incorporated in the Ottoman empire." On Sunday, October 7, the armada of the Turks was found and attacked in the gulf of Lepanto. The terrific fight which ensued lasted only four hours, but those were hours of indescribable destruction and carnage. As to the armada of the Turks, "it may almost be said to have been annihilated." Not more than 40 galleys escaped out of near 250 which entered into the action. . . . The news of the victory of

Lepanto caused a profound sensation throughout Christendom. . . . In Venice, which might be said to have gained a new lease of existence from the result of the battle, . . . the 7th of October was set apart to be observed for ever as a national anniversary. . . . It is a great error to speak of the victory of Lepanto as a barren victory, which yielded no fruits to those who gained it. True, it did not strip the Turks of an inch of territory. . . . But the loss of reputation—that tower of strength to the conqueror—was not to be estimated."—W. H. Prescott, *History of Philip II*, bk. 5, ch. 9-11.

ALSO IN: W. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, v. 1, ch. 13-15.—S. Lane-Poole, *Barbary corsairs*.

1569-1571.—First collision with Russians.—Peace with the tsar. See RUSSIA; 1569-1571.

1572-1573.—Withdrawal of Venice from the Holy League.—Conquest of Tunis by Don John of Austria and its recovery, with Goletta.—"Uluciali, whom Selim . . . made commander-in-chief of all his naval forces, exerted himself with extraordinary vigour and activity in fitting out a new fleet, to supply the place of that which had been ruined in the battle of Lepanto; and such at this time were the resources of the Turkish empire, that he was ready by the month of April [1572] to leave Constantinople, with more than 200 galleys, besides a great number of other ships. With this fleet he coasted along Negropont, the Morea, and Epirus; put the maritime towns into a posture of defence; chastised with great severity many of those Christians who had been concerned in the invitation given to Don John [who had just been offered the sovereignty of Albania and Macedonia by the Christians of those countries]; and afterwards took his station at Modon in the Morea, with an intention to watch there the motions of the enemy. He had full leisure to finish all the preparations which he judged to be necessary. The allies disputed long with one another concerning the plan of their future operations," and were also held inactive by the Spanish king's fear of an attack from France. "It was the last day of August before the allies could effectuate a junction of their forces; and it was the middle of September before they came in sight of the enemy. . . . Uluciali drew out his fleet, as if he intended to offer battle; but no sooner had he made a single discharge of his artillery . . . than he retired under the fortifications of Modon." The allies thought first of besieging Modon, but gave up the project. They then sent Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma—afterwards so famous in the Netherlands—to reduce Navarino; but he had no success and abandoned the siege. The expedition then returned to Messina. The Venetians, dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, now faithlessly negotiated a separate peace with the Turks; but Philip II of Spain maintained his alliance with the pope (now Gregory XIII), and ordered his brother, Don John, to proceed the next spring to Africa and undertake the reduction of Tunis. Don John obeyed the order and "took possession of the place without meeting with the smallest opposition. Philip had instructed his brother, when he sent him on this expedition, to destroy Tunis, and to strengthen the fortifications of the isle and fortress of Goletta. But instead of complying with these instructions, Don John resolved to fortify the town more strongly than ever; and having laid the foundations of a new fort, or citadel, he treated all the inhabitants who remained with lenity and indulgence; and engaged

many of those who had fled to return and submit to the Spanish government; after which he carried back his fleet to Sicily." It is believed that Don John had conceived ambitious hopes of a kingdom on the African border of the Mediterranean. "In the summer following [1573], Selim sent Uluciali against Tunis, with a fleet consisting of 300 ships, having about 40,000 troops on board, under the command of his son-in-law, Sinan Basha. The new fort which Don John had begun to build was not yet complete. Nor was the garrison which he had left strong enough to hold out long enough against so great a force. [Before Don John could reassemble a fleet with which to make his way to the protection of his African conquest, both Tunis and Goletta were carried by assault, and passed again into the possession of the Turks and their Moorish vassals.]"—R. Watson, *History of Philip II*, bk. 9.

ALSO IN: W. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, v. 2, ch. 1-3.

1572-1623.—Beginning of the decline of Ottoman power.—"The conquest of Cyprus was the last great exploit which ever added materially to the dominions of the Porte; the battle of Lepanto was the final blow which destroyed its naval superiority. The days of greatness had gone by. The kingdoms of the West were developing their strength, and had learnt the policy of union and of peace among themselves. Their armies had acquired the discipline and had learnt the lessons in which the Ottomans had shown so formidable an example; and their navy rode triumphant on the seas. The Empire, no longer in the hands of Charles V. with foreign interests to absorb its power, could bestow an undivided strength upon its own affairs; and the Emperor Ferdinand was looking forward with some hope to an incorporation of Hungary, which should end the weakness, and ensure the safety, of his eastern frontier. As the pre-eminence of the Porte, however, and the dread of it declined, a wider intercourse for her with Europe began. . . . Slowly the Sultans were beginning to take part in the schemes and combinations of the Christian Powers, from which they had hitherto so contemptuously stood aloof. Five reigns succeeded to that of Selim [the "Sot," son of Suleiman the Magnificent], during which the progress of decline continued marked. The indolence of Amurath III [1574-1595], the incapacity of Mahomet III [1595-1603], the inexperience of Achmet [or Ahmed, (1603-1617)], the imprudence of Othman II [or Osman, (1618-1622)], and the imbecility of Mustapha [or Mustafa I, (1617-1618, and 1622-1623)], contributed to bring the Ottoman Empire into a condition of anarchy and weakness. During the reign of Amurath hostilities with Austria were renewed, and successive losses testified to the enfeebled state of the Ottoman arms."—C. F. Johnstone, *Historical abstracts*, ch. 3.

1591-1606.—Wars in Hungary and Croatia.—Great victory at Cerestes.—Peace of Sitvatorok. See HUNGARY: 1567-1604; 1595-1606.

17th century.—European diplomacy after Suleiman.—Beginning of Eastern Question.—"After Suleiman there was hardly one man of mark among the Sultans until the accession of Mahmud the Second in 1808. When absolutism ceases to be efficient, decadence is necessarily rapid. In the case of the Turks it was temporarily arrested by the emergence of a remarkable Albanian family, the Kiuprili, who supplied the Porte with a succession of Viziers during the latter half of the seventeenth century. In the first half of the cen-

tury the Thirty Years' War had given the Ottomans a magnificent chance of destroying the last bulwark of Western Christendom. The earlier Sultans would never have missed it; but Othman the Second, Mustapha the First, and Ibrahim were not the men to seize it, and Amurath the Fourth was otherwise occupied. Such a chance never recurs. In 1683 the Vizier Kara Mustapha carried the victorious arms of Turkey to the very gates of Vienna; but the Habsburgs were saved by John Sobieski of Poland, and in the last year of the century they inflicted a series of crushing defeats upon the Turk. The tide had clearly turned. The naval defeat at Lepanto (1571) was, perhaps, a premature indication; after Montecuculi's victory at St. Gothard (1664), and Prince Eugene's at Zenta (1697), men could no longer doubt it. The diplomatic system was also crumbling. Louis the Fourteenth followed as best he could the evil example of Francis the First [who had made the first European alliance with the Turks against Charles V]; but alliance with Kiuprili was not the same thing as friendship with Suleiman; the Turk was too hopelessly decadent to be an effective factor in French diplomacy. The Venetian conquest of the Morea, the resounding victories of the Habsburgs, above all the entrance of Russia on the stage of European politics, announced the opening of a new chapter in the history of the Eastern Question."—J. A. R. Marriott, *European commonwealth*, pp. 259-260.

1621-1622.—War with Poland.—Victory at Cecora and defeat at Khotin. See POLAND: 1590-1648.

1623-1640.—War with Persia.—Siege and capture of Bagdad.—Horrible massacre of inhabitants.—"During the first twelve years of the reign of Amurath IV [1623-1635], the Ottoman Empire had been occupied with active hostilities in different parts of Europe, and especially with Poland, Germany, and the maritime powers of the Mediterranean. . . . In the east, however, great losses had been sustained. Shah Abbas, a sovereign well entitled to the epithet 'Great,' had repossessed himself of Diarbekr, Bagdad [1623], the district of the Euphrates, with Kourdistan; and, on the north, he had regained Armenia, and a considerable part of Anatolia. The Sultan therefore resolved to undertake an expedition to recover the territories thus taken from him, and to this he was encouraged by the death of his formidable foe the Persian monarch. Amurath marched from his capital early in 1635, to superintend the operations of the campaign. . . . In passing through Asia, he took care personally to examine into the conduct of his various Pashas, and wherever it was requisite he subjected them to a severe punishment. One of them, the Pasha of Erzeroum, was put to death. Having at that city reviewed his army, he found them to amount to 200,000 men, and as his first object was the seizure of Armenia, the key of the Persian provinces, he besieged Erivan, and notwithstanding a vigorous defence, the fortress in a few days surrendered. Tauris and the surrounding provinces speedily fell into his hands, and Amurath returned in the winter to Constantinople, entering the city in great triumph. The affairs of Europe were in such a state of confusion, that it was several years ere he again appeared in the east, the scene of so many of his victories. The Khan of Tartary threw off his allegiance, the Polish serfs appeared suddenly on the Caspian shores, and, joining a body of Russians, attacked and carried the fortress of Azof. . . . The European war, which at this time

occurred, rendered it unnecessary for the Sultan to entertain any serious apprehension from his enemies in the west, who were sufficiently occupied with their own affairs. He therefore directed his attention to Persia, resolved to subjugate that country, and to seize upon Baghdad. To this end his preparations were proportionally great. An immense army was collected on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. . . . After a successful march, this immense army arrived at Baghdad. The city was strongly fortified, and defended by a resolute army of 80,000 men. The Shah, however, was absent in the northern part of his dominions, which had been threatened by an invasion from India, under Shah Jehan, father of the celebrated Aurungzebe. Baghdad, therefore, was left to its own resources. The operations of the siege began in October 1638. . . . The besieged made repeated sallies, with a force of five or six thousand men at a time, who, on retiring, were succeeded by a similar number, and thus the losses of the Ottoman army were sometimes very great. The 200 great guns, however which played upon the ramparts, at length made a wide opening in the walls, and after five days' fighting in the breach thus made, where 'the slain lay in immense multitudes, and the blood was stagnated like a pool to wade through,' the city was taken. . . . In the morning of the 23d of December the Sultan marched into the city, passing with his army over the innumerable bodies of the unfortunate Persians, whose gallant defence merited a better fate. Some 15,000 women, children and old men were all that remained of the inhabitants, who, but a day or two before, filled every part of the magnificent capital. . . . The capture of Baghdad closed the military career of the Sultan."—R. W. Fraser, *Turkey, ancient and modern*, ch. 17.—"A peace with Persia, on the basis of that which Solymn the Great had granted in 1555, was the speedy result of Amurath's victories (15th September, 1630). Eriwan was restored by the Porte; but the possession of Bagdad and the adjacent territory by the Ottomans was solemnly sanctioned and confirmed. Eighty years passed away before Turkey was again obliged to struggle against her old and obstinate enemy on the line of the Euphrates. . . . Amurath died at the age of 28, on the 6th of February, 1640."—E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 13.—See also BAGDAD: 1393-1638.

1625-1626.—War in Hungary. See HUNGARY: 1606-1660.

1640.—Accession of Ibrahim.

1645-1669.—War of Candia.—Conquest of Crete.—"The Turks attacked the island [of Crete] in 1645, and the war went on till 1669, when Crete was lost. This is called the war of Candia, from the long siege of the town of Candia, which was most gallantly defended by the Venetians, with the help of many volunteers from Western Europe."—E. A. Freeman, *Ottoman power in Europe*, p. 145.—"The war which cost the republic of Venice the island of Crete owed its origin to the incessant irritation caused by the Western corsairs in the Archipelago. Some strong measures adopted by the Venetians to suppress the piracies committed by Turkish and Barbary corsairs in the Adriatic, created much dissatisfaction on the part of the Othoman government, which looked chiefly to the Mohammedan corsairs as a protection against the Christian corsairs in the Levant, and considered it the duty of the Venetians to suppress the piracies of these Christians. The Porte at last resolved to seek a profitable revenge, and

a pretext soon presented itself. In 1644 some Maltese galleys made a prize which offended the personal feelings of the reigning sultan, Ibrahim. . . . As he feared to attack Malta, he resolved to make the Venetians responsible for the shelter which Crete had afforded to the corsairs. The Porte affected to consider Venice as a tributary State, which was bound to keep the Archipelago free from Christian corsairs, in return for the great commercial privileges it enjoyed in the Othoman empire. Immediate preparations were made for attacking Crete, but the project was concealed from the Venetian senate, under the pretence of directing the expedition against Malta. . . . In the month of June 1645, the Othoman army landed before Canea, which capitulated on the 17th of August. This treacherous commencement of the war authorised the Christian powers to dispense with all the formalities of international law in lending assistance to the Venetians during the celebrated War of Candia, which lasted nearly 25 years. During this long struggle the Venetians generally maintained the superiority at sea, but they were unable to prevent the Othoman navy, whenever it exerted its full force, from throwing in supplies of fresh troops and ample stores, by which the Othoman army was enabled to command the whole island, and kept Candia, and the other fortresses in the hands of the republic, either blockaded or besieged. The Greeks generally favoured the Turks, who encouraged them to cultivate their lands by purchasing the produce at a liberal price, for the use of the army. . . . The squadrons of the republic often ravaged the coasts of the Othoman empire, and on one occasion they carried off about 5,000 slaves from the coast of the Morea, between Patras and Coron. In the year 1656, after Mocenigo's great victory at the Dardanelles, they took possession of the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos, but they were driven from these conquests by the Othoman fleet in the following year. At the end of the year 1666, the grand vizier, Achmet Kueprily [or Ahmed Kuprili], one of the greatest ministers of the Othoman empire, took the command of the siege of Candia. The whole naval force of Venice, and numerous bands of French and Italian volunteers, attempted to force the grand vizier to raise the siege; but the skill of the Italian engineers, the valour of the French nobles, and the determined perseverance of Morosini, were vain against the strict discipline and steady valour of the Othoman troops. The works of the besiegers were pushed forward by the labours of a numerous body of Greek pioneers, and the fire of the powerful batteries at last rendered the place untenable. At this crisis Morosini proved himself a daring statesman and a sincere patriot. When he found that he must surrender the city, he resolved to make his capitulation the means of purchasing peace for the republic. . . . On the 27th September 1669, Achmet Kueprily received the keys of Candia, and the republic of Venice resigned all right to the island of Crete, but retained possession of the three insular fortresses of Karabusa, Suda, and Spinalonga, with their valuable ports. No fortress is said to have cost so much blood and treasure, both to the besiegers and the defenders, as Candia; yet the Greeks, in whose territory it was situated, and who could have furnished an army from the inhabitants of Crete sufficiently numerous to have decided the issue of the contest, were the people on the shores of the Mediterranean who took least part in this memorable war. So utterly destitute of all national feeling was the Hellenic race at this period."—G. Fin-

lay, *History of Greece under Othoman and Venetian domination*, ch. 2.

1649.—Accession of Mohammed IV.

1660-1664.—Renewed war with Austria.—Defeat at St. Gotthard.—Twenty years truce. See HUNGARY: 1660-1664.

1664-1665.—Alliance with France broken.—War of the French with Tunis and Algiers. See BARBARY STATES: 1664-1684.

1670-1676.—Wars with the Poles. See POLAND: 1668-1696.

1681-1684.—Rupture with France.—French attack on Scio and war with the Barbary States. See BARBARY STATES: 1664-1684.

1683.—Great invasion of Austria.—Siege of Vienna.—Overwhelming defeat by Sobieski and the Imperialists. See HUNGARY: 1668-1683.

1683-1699.—Expulsion from Hungary.—Peace of Karlowitz. See HUNGARY: 1683-1699.

1684-1696.—War with the Holy League.—Expulsion from Hungary.—Venetian conquests in Greece.—Revolution at Constantinople.—Accession of Suleiman II.—Tsar Peter's capture of Azov.—First Russian acquisition on the Black sea.—In 1684, "a league against the Turks, under the protection of the Pope, and thence called the Holy League, was formed by the Emperor, the King of Poland, and the Republic of Venice; and it was resolved to procure, if possible, the accession to it of the Czar of Muscovy. The Venetians were induced to join the league by the hope of recovering their former possessions, and declared war against the Sultan, Mahomet IV, July 15th. The war which ensued, now called the Holy War, lasted till the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699. Venice in this war put forth a strength that was little expected from that declining state. Many thousand Germans were enrolled in her army, commanded by Morosini, and by Count Königsmark, a Swede. The Austrians pursued the campaign in Hungary with success [steadily expelling the Turks. (See HUNGARY: 1683-1699.) . . . While the war in Hungary had been conducted by the Emperor with such eminent success, the King of Poland had made only some fruitless attempts upon Moldavia. The Czar of Muscovy, Ivan Alexiowitsch, who, after settling some disputes about boundaries with the King of Poland, had joined the Holy League in 1686, did not fare much better. All the attempts of the Russians to penetrate into the Crimea were frustrated by the Tartars. The Venetians, on the other hand, had made some splendid conquests. St. Maura, Koron, the mountain tract of Maina, Navarino, Modon, Argos, Napoli di Romana, fell successively into their hands. The year 1687 especially was almost as fatal to the Turks in their war with Venice as in that with Hungary. In this year the Venetians took Patras, the castles at the entrance of the bay of Lepanto, Lepanto itself, all the northern coast of the Morea, Corinth, and Athens. Athens had been abandoned with the exception of the acropolis or citadel; and it was in this siege that one of the Venetian bombs fell into the Parthenon, which had been converted by the Turks into a powder magazine, and destroyed the greater part of those magnificent remains of classical antiquity. The acropolis surrendered September 20th. The fall of Athens [see ATHENS: 1687-1688], added to the disastrous news from Hungary, excited the greatest consternation and discontent at Constantinople," and brought about a revolution which deposed the sultan, raising his brother Suleiman (II) to the throne (1687) in his place. "By the capture of Malvasia in 1600, the Venetians completed the conquest of the

Morea. The Isle of Chios, taken in 1694, was again lost the following year; but in Dalmatia and Albania the Venetian Republic made many permanent conquests, from the mountains of Montenegro to the borders of Croatia and the banks of the Unna. The operations of the Poles in the Turkish war were insignificant; but in July 1696, the Russians, under the Czar Peter, after many long and fruitless attempts, at length succeeded in taking Azov, at the mouth of the Don; a most important conquest as securing for them the entry into the Black Sea. It was the fall of this place, combined with the defeat at Zenta [in Hungary], that chiefly induced the Porte to enter into negotiation for a peace."—T. H. Dyer, *History of modern Europe*, v. 3, bk. 5, ch. 4.

1689.—Protection of Catholics promised. See JERUSALEM: 16th-20th centuries.



SULTAN SULEIMAN II, THE GREAT

1691.—Accession of Ahmed II.

1695.—Accession of Mustafa II.

1703.—Accession of Ahmed III.

1709-1714.—Refuge given to Charles XII of Sweden.—His intrigues.—Unlucky invasion of Moldavia by Peter the Great.—Treaty of the Pruth. See SWEDEN: 1707-1718.

1714-1718.—War with Venice and Austria.—Recovery of the Morea and disasters in Hungary.—Peace of Passarowitz.—"By the treaty of the Pruth the Russian conquest of Azof had been recovered. This success encouraged the hope of repairing the other losses that had been incurred in the former war. There were two states which had aggrandised themselves at Turkish expense, Austria and Venice. Of these the republic was far the less formidable and was naturally chosen as the first object of attack. A pretext was found in the protection which Venice had given to some Montenegrin fugitives, and in December, 1714, the Porte declared war. Venice was entirely unprepared, and moreover had failed to acquire popularity amongst her Greek subjects. In 1715, the grand vizier, Ali Cumurgi, landed in the Morea,

and by the end of the year was master of the whole peninsula. . . . The intervention of Austria saved Venice from ruin. The grand vizier and the main body of the Turkish army had to be employed in Hungary. Still a considerable army and fleet was sent to attack Corfu. The Venetian troops were commanded by count Schulenburg, who had won a great reputation in the northern war, and whose services had been procured for the republic by Eugene [prince of Savoy]. A heroic defence ended successfully, and in August, 1716, the Turks were compelled to raise the siege. 'It was the last glorious military exploit in the annals of the republic, and it was achieved by a German mercenary soldier.' Meanwhile the vizier, with an army of 150,000 men, had laid siege to Peterwardein, the most important of the Austrian border-fortresses in Hungary," and suffered death there, in a great defeat which Prince Eugene inflicted upon his army, Aug. 5, 1716. The same year, Eugene took Temesvar, and in August, 1717, he annihilated the Turkish army before Belgrade, capturing the town. (See HUNGARY: 1699-1718.) The result was the Treaty of Passarowitz, signed in July, 1718. "Austria retained all its conquests, thus completing its possession of Hungary by acquiring the Banat of Temesvar, and adding to it Belgrad and a strip of Servia. The Turks, on their side, kept the Morea, while Venice was confirmed in its possession of Corfu and Santa Maura, together with the conquests which it had made in 1717 in Albania and Dalmatia."—R. Lodge, *History of modern Europe*, ch. 16.

1730.—Accession of Mahmud I.

1735-1739.—War with Russia and Austria.—Favorable treaty of Belgrade.—Important acquisitions of territory from Austria. See RUSSIA: 1734-1740.

1754.—Accession of Osman III.

1757.—Accession of Mustafa III.

1768-1774.—War with Russia on behalf of Poland.—Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji.—Concession of independence to the Crim Tatars.—The Poles, in their struggle with Catherine II of Russia found a strange champion in the Turk. (See POLAND: 1763-1790.) "The Sultan, Mustafa III, was opposed to intervention in Poland; but his hand was forced by a rising in Constantinople, and he declared war against Russia in October, 1768. Hostilities were not commenced till the next year, and they never assumed considerable proportions. The Turkish army was in the last stage of inefficiency, and the Russians, who were wholly unprepared for war, were little better. Galitzin, an incompetent commander, defeated the grand vizier, and took Khoczim [Khotin] after his first attack had been repulsed. His successor, Romanzow, 'the Russian Turenne,' acted with greater energy. He drove the Turks from Moldavia, and in 1770 he occupied Wallachia, won a great victory over vastly superior numbers at Kaghul [August 1, 1770], and advanced into the Crimea. At the same time a Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean with the avowed intention of restoring Greece to independence. But the admiral, Alexis Orloff, mismanaged the expedition. After encouraging the Greeks to rebel, he left them to the horrors of a Turkish revenge, and sailed towards Constantinople. A victory over the Turkish fleet gave him possession of Chios and other islands of the Archipelago, but he refused, in spite of his English officers, to attempt the passage of the Dardanelles." In May, 1772, a truce was arranged and a congress assembled to settle the terms of peace. "But the Russian demands were too ex-

cessive for the Porte to accept, and the Turks resumed hostilities in 1773. They attempted to recover Moldavia and Wallachia, and for a time they succeeded in forcing the Russians to retreat. Mustafa III died in December, and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Hamid. In the next year Romanzow won a complete victory, and compelled the grand vizier to accept the terms dictated to him at Kutschuk Kainardji [July 16, 1774]. The Russians restored the conquered provinces except Azof and Kinburn, only stipulating for toleration for the Christian population. The Tartars of the Crimea and Kuban were declared independent of the Porte, and authorised to elect their own Khan. Russian ships were allowed free passage through the Dardanelles, and the right of sailing in the Turkish seas and on the Danube. Poland, for which the Turks had undertaken the war, was not even mentioned in the treaty."—R. Lodge, *History of modern Europe*, ch. 20, sect. 11-12.—See also below: 18th century; BOSPORUS: 1774-1807; RUSSIA: 1768-1796.

ALSO IN: F. C. Schlosser, *History of the eighteenth century*, v. 4, pp. 405-441.

1774.—Accession of Abdul Hamid I.

1774-1812.—Intercession of European powers in behalf of Rumanian principalities. See RUMANIA: 1774-1812.

1776-1792.—Acquisition of the Crimea by the Russians.—War with Russia and Austria.—Treaties of Sistova and Jassy.—Territorial concessions.—"A peace of some years followed the treaty of Kainarji. . . . On that treaty Catharine [II of Russia] put what interpretation she pleased. . . . She offered her protection to the voivods of Wallachia and Moldavia, who, in consequence, were her vassals rather than those of the Porte. The Christians on the opposite bank of the Danube were in correspondence with Russia; they were encouraged to revolt, to claim her protection, to oppose the Turkish government in every way. . . . More than once . . . the Russian troops appeared in . . . [the Crimean] peninsula. In 1776 they deposed the reigning khan and elected in his stead another, who was easily induced to solicit the protection of the empress. Turkey threatened to resume the war. . . . At length . . . a new treaty, or rather a modification of the former, was signed at Constantinople in 1779. In it Russia promised to desist from some of her obnoxious pretensions in regard both to the two principalities and the Crimea; but promises cost little. . . . Almost every year brought new complaints and evasions. The foundation of that city of Cherson, about ten leagues from Otkakof [Ochakov, or Otchakov], gave peculiar umbrage to the Porte. This place had now a population of 40,000; and the number of warlike vessels constructed in its arsenal were evidently intended to overawe Constantinople. In 1783 another insulting message was sent to the Turkish ministers—that, let the conduct of the empress in regard to the Crimea be whatever it might, they should not interfere. At the same time she prevailed on the khan whom she had supported, Sahim Gherei, to make the most outrageous demands from the Porte. . . . A manifesto declared that the Crimea, Kuban, and Taman, were for ever incorporated with the empire. In a document of some length, and of great force, the Turkish ministry exposed to the world the unprincipled encroachments of their neighbours." But Russia responded to it by marshalling three great armies on the frontiers, with an exhibition of formidable fleets in the Euxine and the Baltic. "The Porte, terrified at this menacing dis-

play, listened to the advice of France and Austria; and, by another treaty (signed at Constantinople early in 1784) recognised the sovereignty of the empress over the Crimea, Taman, and a great part of Kuban. To the first and last of these places she restored their ancient classical names, Taurida and Caucasus." The treaty of Constantinople did not put an end to Russian aggressions, and in August, 1787, the sultan declared war. "The campaign was opened with ardour. Knowing that Otzakof would be the earliest object of hostility, the Sultan sent a considerable force to cover it. Another army marched to the Danube, and the vizier in person took the field. . . . On the other hand, Potemkin, the commander-in-chief, having under his orders some of the best generals in the service, hastened to the frontiers, which were soon covered by Russian troops. At the same time the emperor Joseph [according to a prior agreement with Catherine] sent 80,000 Austrians into Moldavia; while a powerful fleet in the Euxine prepared to co-operate with the allies, and another in the Baltic was ready to sail for the Mediterranean. It seemed, indeed, as if Catherine's favourite dream, the elevation of her grandson Constantine to the throne of the Greek empire, was about to be realised. Yet these mighty preparations had no commensurate effect. An attack on Kinburn by 5,000 Turks from the garrison of Otzakof was repulsed [by Suvarov] with heavy loss. But this advantage was counterbalanced by the dispersion of the Euxine fleet in a storm, with the loss of some vessels. These were the chief events of the first campaign. The second, of 1788, was more decisive. Otzakof was taken by assault, and the garrison [with nearly all the inhabitants] put to the sword. At the same time Joseph took Sobach; and his generals captured Soubitza [Dubitza?]. On the deep, too, fortune was equally adverse to the Turks. Their fleet was defeated in the Euxine. . . . In the following campaigns the superiority of the Russians was maintained. . . . The death of Abdul Hamet, and the accession of Selim III., made no difference in the character of the war; it was still adverse to the Turks. Fortress after fortress [including Belgrade, taken by General Loudon for the Austrians] was reduced by the enemy; and, though no general engagement was risked, the loss of men was not the less felt. Suvarof saved the Austrians [in Moldavia, defeating the Turks, who had nearly overwhelmed them, at Fockshani, July 30, and again at Rimmik, Sept. 10, 1780]; Repnin forced the Seraskier, Hussein Pasha, to seek refuge in Ismail; Komenski reduced Galatza; Ackerman fell into the power of the Christians; Bender was forced to capitulate. In the following campaign, the important fortress of Ismail was assailed: the siege was conducted by Suvarof, the most dreaded of all the Russian generals. . . . It was taken . . . though the loss was most severe; and, in revenge, the garrison, with the greater part of the population [nearly 40,000 in all], was put to the sword. Other successes followed, both on the banks of the Caspian, and on those of the Danube. Bohada was stormed; at Kotzim 100,000 Turks were defeated by Repnin; Varna was menaced; and the road to Adrianople lay open. The grand vizier now sued for peace, which Catherine was ready to grant, on conditions much less onerous than might have been expected." Austria had already made peace with the sultan and withdrawn from the war. By the treaty of Sistova, which the new emperor, Leopold, signed on Aug. 4, 1791, the Austrians relinquished all their conquests except the town of Old Orsova and

a small district in Croatia along the left bank of the river Unna. With these slight variations the same boundary between Austria and Turkey was reconstituted in 1791 that had been defined by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. The treaty of the Turks with Russia was signed at Jassy on Jan. 9, 1792. "By that treaty, Catherine retained the whole country between the Bog and the Dniester, but restored all the other conquests which she had made since 1787. This was the last of the hostilities between Russia and the Porte during the reign of this empress; and the peace of Jassy enabled her to carry into effect her designs on Poland."—R. Bell, *History of Russia*, v. 2, ch. 11.—See also RUSSIA: 1768-1796.

ALSO IN: E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 21.—F. C. Schlosser, *History of the eighteenth century*, v. 6, period 5, div. 1, ch. 2.—G. B. Malleson, *London*, ch. 15.

1785-1801.—Tribute exacted for navigation of Mediterranean. See BARBARY STATES: 1785-1801.

1789-1812.—Attempted reforms of Selim III.—Their fate and his.—Palace revolutions.—Reign of Mahmud II.—War with Russia.—"Abd-ullamid died on the 7th April, 1789, and was succeeded by his nephew, Selim III (1789-1807). . . . [He] commenced a correspondence with Choiseuil, the French envoy at Constantinople in 1786, and also had sent his intimate friend Isaac Bey to France, to enquire into the state measures and administrative organization of that country. Selim had also entered into correspondence with Louis XVI, and this lasted till 1780, when the French Revolution broke out simultaneously with Selim's ascension of the throne. All this throws a clear light upon Selim's eventual exertions to cause reforms, which at last cost him both his throne and his life. His thirst for knowledge leads us to presume that he was not deficient in natural and sound talent. . . . His chief care was to form an army after the European fashion, in order by their assistance to gain the mastery over the Janissaries, in whom old customs and traditions found their most zealous guardians. He took several steps, therefore, to call into life the new military organization, called the Nizam Djedid; and as money was required for the purpose, he laid a tax on articles of consumption. This was quite sufficient to cause the popular discontent to burst into a flame. The Ulema declared themselves hostile to the Nizam Djedid, and Pashwan Oglu, Pacha of Widdin, who placed himself at the head of the Janissaries, openly rebelled against the Porte, which could not effect anything to check him, but acquiesced in all that was demanded. The extraordinary conquests of Napoleon diverted attention from Turkey, and instead of seeking to divide the dominions of a weak neighbour, the Great Powers of the Continent were trembling for their own safety. Egypt became the battlefield between England and France [see FRANCE: 1798-1800 (August-August)]; 1801-1802], and its invasion by Napoleon obliged the Turks to unite with the Allied Powers against France. When the French were expelled from Egypt, that province was restored to Turkey, and peace concluded between the two Powers. Selim, under the influence of General Sebastiani who was then French ambassador at Constantinople, signed [seized?] what was considered by him a favourable opportunity for renewing the war with Russia, in which, however, the Turks were defeated both by land and sea. These misfortunes the Janissaries attributed to the new troops or Seymens. . . . At the end of May, 1807, the chiefs of the Janissaries and the Ulema

had already formed their plans for the overthrow of the Sultan, when Selim accelerated the outbreak by going to the mosque on Friday, accompanied by a body of Seymens and the French ambassador, Sebastiani. The Janissaries, aroused by this, broke out in open revolt [and] . . . demanded the abdication of the Sultan, whom the Mufti declared unworthy to be a successor of Muhammad, through his partiality for foreigners, and marched to the Seraglio, to carry their designs into effect. But when the Mufti and the Ulema entered it, they found a new Sultan. Selim, under the conviction that he could not resist the storm his attempts at reform had created, had retired to the Harem, where his nephew, Mustapha, was confined, and led him to the throne: he had then attempted to destroy his own life by a cup of poisoned sherbet, but had been prevented by Mustapha, and was led into the apartments of the Royal Princes, with a promise that he should ever be treated as a friend and an uncle. On the same afternoon, Sultan Mustapha III [IV] (who reigned from 31st May, 1807, to 28th July, 1808 . . . did away with the Nizam Djedid, and restored the old customs. . . . Mahmud II, the second son of Abd-ul-Hamid, was born on the 2nd July, 1785, and was consequently twenty-three years of age when he ascended the throne. . . . Mahmud appointed Mustapha Bairaktar [who had deposed Mustapha III] his Grand Vizier, and, regardless of the fate of his predecessor, restored all the measures of reform which Selim had undertaken. Within three months the Janissaries were again in open rebellion, and on the night of the 14th November, 1808, attacked the Seymen, destroyed a great number of them, and, after storming the new barracks, forced their way into the Grand Vizier's palace. He fled and appealed to the people for help, but the greater portion abused him as a renegade and joined the rebels. . . . [He] sent a deputation to the insurgents and [gave] . . . an unconditional assent to their demands. . . . As an additional guarantee for his own safety on the throne, ensanguined with the blood of his uncle and his brother, Mahmud ordered his brother's son, a child of three months old, to be strangled, and four of the Sultanas to be thrown into the Bosphorus. The reign of Mahmud is one of the longest and most important in the whole of Turkish history. It commenced with war. The Emperor Alexander menaced him on the Danube: the Hospodar of Servia, Czerny George, had rebelled against him. The campaign of the Turks in 1809, was, consequently, not a prosperous one. The contest lasted till 1812, when it was ended by the treaty of Bucharest, which surrendered the whole of Bessarabia, as far as the Pruth, to Russia. At the same time the Russian protectorate of the Greek Christian subjects of the Porte, which had been stipulated in the treaty of Kudjuk Kainardji, was again confirmed."—J. Porter, *Turkey*, v. 1, pp. 104-204.

ALSO IN: E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 21-24.

1790.—Alliance with Prussia. See POLAND: 1701-1702.

1798.—In coalition against France.—War declared. See FRANCE: 1708-1709 (August-April).

18th century.—Summary of European diplomacy.—"In the 18th century it was France who undertook to save [the peoples of eastern Europe] from the Russian danger, and, in the person of the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV's ambassador, and the Comte de Bonneval, who had become a Mussulman, breathed a new life into the Sublime Porte, and helped it to cripple the action of Tsar-

ism. Nevertheless the French were never influenced, as European politics subsequently were, by the idea of admitting Turkey into the family of nations. Such an idea could never have occurred to His Most Christian Majesty, or to the Cardinals who directed his policy. For . . . this policy was purely selfish, and was only concerned with creating diversions against the enemies of France, and of accruing to the benefit of French trade in the Levant. But this does not alter the fact that in the eyes of the historian, the Turk, thanks to French policy, became from time to time the custodian and protector of the liberties of those nations which were threatened by the Tsars; while the *ancien régime*, in its own way, adopted the rôle of permanent mediator between Christianity and Islam, and was amply rewarded by the Capitulations. [See CAPITULATIONS.] . . . Bonneval asserted that Russia was not only compassing the humiliation, but the total ruin, of the States immediately beyond her frontiers. He was the first to point out the connection between the Polish and the Turkish problem—an historical connection which only manifested itself very much later, when in the Treaty of Kainardji, Catherine, by insisting that the Turks should refrain from defending Polish independence, established the right of Russia to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Porte. Nevertheless, the prophetic vision of Bonneval was nowhere reflected in international politics in the 18th century. Prussia and Austria, the two Powers most interested in keeping Russia out of Europe, actually beckoned her in; Prussia opening her way to Warsaw, and Austria preparing her path to Constantinople. It has now become obvious that these two roads have led to ruin."—F. Valji, *Europe in Asia Minor*, pp. 12-13.—"In its second phase (1702-1820) the Eastern Question might indeed be defined as the Relations of Russia and Turkey. The Habsburgs were frequently on the stage, but rarely in the leading rôle, and the part they played became more and more definitely subsidiary as the eighteenth century advanced. From the days of Peter the Great to those of Alexander I Europe, not indeed without spasmodic protests from France, acquiesced in the assumption that Russia might fairly claim a preponderant interest in the settlement of the Eastern Question. This acquiescence seems to a later generation the more remarkable in view of the fact that Russia herself had so lately made her entrance upon the stage of European politics. Perhaps, however, this fact in itself explains the acquiescence. Russia was already pushing towards the Black Sea before Western Europe recognized her existence. By the conquest of Azov (1696) Peter the Great 'opened a window to the South.' It was closed again as a result of the capitulation of the Pruth (1711); but the set-back was temporary, and by the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) Azov was restored in permanence to Russia. [See RUSSIA: 1734-1740.] The occupation of Azov was the first breach in the continuity of Ottoman territory round the shores of the Black Sea. Hitherto that sea had been a Turkish lake. But though Russia now touched its shores, no firm grip upon it was obtained until the war which was ended by the Treaty of Kutchuck-Kainardji (1774). Of all the many treaties concluded between Russia and Turkey that was the most momentous. The Turkish frontier on the north-east was driven back to the Boug; the Tartars to the east of that river were declared independent of the Porte, except in ecclesiastical affairs; important points on the seaboard passed to Russia, and the latter obtained the right



of free commercial navigation in the Black Sea. More than this: the Danubian principalities and the islands of the Aegean Archipelago were restored to the Porte, only on condition of better government, and Russia reserved to herself the right of remonstrance if that condition was not observed. Most significant of all: Russia stipulated for certain privileges to be accorded to the Christian subjects of the Porte. To say that thenceforward Russia was the 'protector' of the Greek Christians in the Balkan Peninsula would be technically unwarrantable; but certain it is that the ground was prepared for the assertion of claims which in 1854 occasioned the Crimean War. The Treaty of Kainardji was the first of many milestones marking the journey of the Romanoffs towards the Bosphorus. Jassy (1792) was the next [see RUSSIA: 1768-1796]; Bucharest followed (1812), and then came (1829) the famous Treaty of Adrianople. But before that milestone was reached new factors in the problem were beginning to make their presence felt. France had never been unmindful of her interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. By the capitulations of 1535 Francis I had obtained from Suleiman the Magnificent considerable trading privileges in Egypt. D'Argenson, in 1738, published an elaborate plan for the construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, and for restoring, by the enterprise of French traders and the efforts of French administrators, political order and commercial prosperity in Egypt. In the negotiations between Catherine II and the Emperor Joseph for the partition of the Ottoman dominions the interests of France were recognized by the assignment of Egypt and Syria to the French monarch. But it was Napoleon who first directed the attention of the French people to the high significance of the problems of the Near East. The acquisition of the Ionian Isles; the expedition to Egypt and Syria; the grandiose schemes for an attack on British India; the agreement with the Tsar Alexander for a partition of the Ottoman Empire—all combined to stir the imagination alike of traders and diplomatists in France. And not in France only. If Napoleon was a great educator of the French, hardly less was he an educator of the English. For some two hundred years English merchants had been keenly alive to the commercial value of the Levant. The politicians, however, were curiously but characteristically tardy in awakening to the fact that the development of events in the Ottoman Empire possessed any political significance for England. The statesmen of the eighteenth century observed with equal unconcern the decrepitude of the Turks and the advance of the Russians. The younger Pitt was the first and only one among them who displayed any interest in what, to his successors in Downing Street, became known as the *Eastern Question*. With a prescience peculiar to himself he perceived that England was supremely concerned in the ultimate solution of that problem. His earliest diplomatic achievement, the Triple Alliance of 1788, was designed largely, though not exclusively, to circumscribe Russian ambitions in the Near East. But his apprehensions were not shared by his contemporaries. Few English statesmen have commanded the confidence and the ear of the House of Commons as Pitt commanded them. Yet even Pitt failed to arouse attention to this subject, and when in 1790 he proposed a naval demonstration against Russia he suffered one of the few checks in his triumphant parliamentary career. The enemies of England were less slow to perceive where her vital interests lay.

'Really to conquer England,' said Napoleon, 'we must make ourselves masters of Egypt.' Hence the importance attached by General Bonaparte, at the very outset of his political career, to the acquisition of the Ionian Isles. Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia were, he declared in 1797, more important for France than the whole of Italy. They were the stepping-stones to Egypt; Egypt was a stage on the high road to India. Hardly a generation had elapsed since Clive, strenuously seconded by the elder Pitt, had turned the French out of India. To Egypt, therefore, the thoughts of Frenchmen naturally turned, not only as affording a guarantee for the maintenance of French commercial interests in the Near East, but as a means of threatening the position so recently acquired by England in the Farther East. These ideas constantly recur in the reports of French ambassadors, and Talleyrand, on taking office, found, as he tells us, his official portfolio bulging with schemes for the conquest of Egypt. Napoleon, therefore, in this as in other things, was merely the heir and executor of the traditions of the *ancien régime*. He brought, however, to the execution of these schemes a vigour which, of late years, the old monarchy had conspicuously lacked. But even Napoleon was only partially successful in arousing the attention of English people to the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean. The decrepitude of the Turks, the advance of Russia, the ambitions of France were regarded as the accentuation of a problem that was local rather than European. Not until the events which followed upon the insurrection of the Greeks in 1821 did the English Foreign Office, still less did the English public, begin to take a sustained interest in the development of events in South-Eastern Europe."—J. A. R. Marriott, *European commonwealth*, pp. 260-264.

1804-1817.—Serbian struggle for freedom. See SERBIA: 1804-1817.

1806-1807.—Alliance with Napoleon, and hostilities with Russia and England.—British fleet before Constantinople.—Its humiliating retreat.—English again in Egypt.—Disastrous failure of their expedition.—"Before the end of 1806, Russia had driven Selim into the arms of France; and war was declared at the Porte just after Napoleon's victories in Prussia had filled Alexander with alarm. His troops had overrun some Turkish territory before war was declared; but just at this juncture he wanted all his forces for the defence of his own frontier. He dreaded the effects of withdrawing them from the Turkish provinces, which would immediately fight for France; but he must do it. He besought the British to undertake another of those 'diversions' which began to sound so disagreeably to the ears of Englishmen. . . . The Grenville Cabinet . . . gave orders to Sir John Duckworth, then cruising off Ferrol, to join Admiral Louis at the mouth of the Dardanelles. . . . Neither the efforts of Sebastiani [French representative at Constantinople] . . . nor any other warning that the English were coming, had roused the Turks to make the slightest preparation. The ships sailed proudly up the strait [February, 1807], undelayed by the fire of the forts at the narrowest part of the channel, and belching out flames and cannonballs as they went. They took and burned some Turkish ships, and appeared before Constantinople. . . . The Divan would have yielded at once; but Sebastiani prevented it, and instigated a negotiation which proved a fatal snare to Sir John Duckworth, notwithstanding express warnings and instructions,

strong and clear, from Lord Collingwood. He was unwilling to destroy the city, and shoot down the defenceless inhabitants; and he allowed himself to be drawn on, from day to day, exchanging notes and receiving promises. . . . Meantime, not a moment was lost by Sebastiani and the Turks, whom he was instructing in Napoleon's methods of warfare. Women and children, Christians and Mohammedans, worked day and night at the defences; and in a few days the whole coast was bristling with artillery, and the chance was over. . . . There was nothing to be done but to get away as safely as they yet might. . . . For thirty miles (reckoning the windings of the channel) the ships ran the gauntlet of an incessant fire. . . . So ended the second of the 'diversions' proposed under the Grenville Ministry. The third legacy of this kind that they left was a diversion on the side of Egypt. For some time, a notion had been gaining ground, in the minds of English politicians, that the Sultan would, some day soon, be giving Egypt to Napoleon, in return for the aid afforded to Constantinople, on the Danube, and elsewhere. Egypt was in an unhappy state. Mohammed Alee, the Viceroy, was at feud with the Memlooks; and the Arab inhabitants were made a prey of by both. The Grenville Ministry thought that a diversion in that direction would be of great service to Russia, and great injury to Napoleon; and they confidently reckoned on being enthusiastically received by the Arab inhabitants, and probably by the Memlooks also. In laying their plans, however, they strangely underrated the forces and the ability of Mohammed Alee. . . . The small British force was drafted from the troops in Sicily. It landed without opposition on the 17th of March, supposing that Sir John Duckworth must by this time have conquered the Sultan, and that his province of Egypt would come very easily into our hands. No opposition was made to the landing of the troops, and Alexandria capitulated immediately. Only seven lives were lost on the British side. Within the city, however, no provisions were found." A detachment of 1,200 men sent to Rosetta for supplies were trapped in the city by Mohammed Alee's Albanians, and 400 of them, with their general, were shot down in the streets. Then Rosetta was besieged, with results of disastrous failure and the loss of 1,000 or 1,200 more men. General Fraser, the commander, "was discouraged from home, and hourly harassed by the enemy. . . . More and more of the enemy came up as his little force dwindled away; and at last, on the appearance of a column which he was unable to encounter, he sent out a flag of truce, with an offer to evacuate Egypt on the restoration of the prisoners taken since the invasion. This was in August, 1807; and in September the last English soldier left the mouth of the Nile. By this time, the Sultan had declared war against England, and had caused a seizure of all the British property in his dominions."—H. Martineau, *History of England, 1800-1815*, bk. 2, ch. 1. —See also BOSPORUS: 1774-1807; EGYPT: 1803-1811.

1806-1808.—Revolt of the Kurds. See KURDISTAN AND THE KURDS.

1807.—Accession of Mustafa IV.

1807.—Schemes of Napoleon and Alexander I at Tilsit for the partition of Turkey. See GERMANY: 1807 (June-July).

1808.—Accession of Mahmud II.

1820.—Beginning of missionary work. See MISSIONS, CHRISTIAN: Near East.

1821-1840.—Eastern Question becomes im-

portant to Great Britain.—Castlereagh and Canning.—Effects of treaties of Adrianople, London and Unkiar-Skelessi.—"The Greek rising is, for three reasons, profoundly significant. [See GREECE: 1821-1829.] It marks, in the first place, the real beginning of the new 'nationality' movement in the Ottoman Empire; secondly, it evoked enthusiastic sympathy in Europe, and particularly in Western Europe; and, thirdly, it revealed for the first time a feeling of rivalry, if not of antagonism, between Russia and Great Britain in Eastern Europe. As far as England is concerned, the Greek insurrection inaugurated an 'Eastern Question.' [See also EASTERN QUESTION.] Hitherto, the Eastern Question had meant the growth or decline of Ottoman power; a struggle between Turks on the one hand and Austrians or Venetians on the other. More lately it had centred in the rivalry between the Sultan and the Tsar. Henceforward it was recognized, primarily through the action of Russia and the newly aroused sympathies of England, as an international question. The more cautious and the more disinterested of European statesmen have persistently sought to 'isolate' the politics of the Near East. They have almost consistently failed. The Greek insurrection struck a new note. If refused to be isolated. The Tsar Alexander, though deaf to Hypsilanti's appeal, had his own quarrel with Sultan Mahmud. There was therefore an obvious probability that two quarrels, distinct in their origin, would be confused, and that the Tsar would take advantage of the Greek insurrection to settle his own account with the Sultan. To avoid this confusion of issues was the primary object of English diplomacy. Castlereagh and Canning were fully alive to the significance of the Hellenic movement, alike in its primary aspect and in its secondary reaction upon the general diplomatic situation. And behind the statesmen there was for the first time in England a strong public opinion in favour of determined action in the Near East. The sentiment to which Byron and other Phil-Hellenist enthusiasts appealed with such effect was a curious compound of classicism, liberalism, and nationalism. A people who claimed affinity with the citizens of the States of ancient Hellas; a people who were struggling for political freedom; who relied upon the inspiring though elusive sentiment of nationality, made an irresistible appeal to the educated classes in England. Canning was in complete accord with the feelings of his countrymen. But he perceived, as few of them could, that the situation, unless dexterously handled, might open out new and dangerous developments. Consequently, he spared no efforts to induce the Sultan to come to terms with the insurgent Greeks lest a worse thing should befall him at the hands of Russia. The Porte was, as usual, deaf to good advice, and Canning then endeavoured, not without success, to secure an understanding with Russia, and to co-operate cordially with her and with France in a settlement of the affairs of South-Eastern Europe. That co-operation, in itself a phenomenon of high diplomatic significance, was in a fair way of achieving its object when Canning's premature death (1827) deprived the new and promising machinery of its mainspring. Owing to untimely scruples of the Duke of Wellington England lost all the fruits of the astute and far-seeing diplomacy of Canning; the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe was destroyed, and Russia was left free to deal as she would with the Porte and to dictate the terms of a Treaty, which, by the Duke's own admission, 'sounded the death-knell of

the Ottoman Empire in Europe.' But although the Treaty of Adrianople [see ADRIANOPLE, TREATY OF] represented a brilliant success for Russian policy at Constantinople, Great Britain was able to exercise a decisive influence on the settlement of the Hellenic question. By the Treaty of London (1832) Greece was established as an independent kingdom [see GREECE: 1830-1802], under the protection of Great Britain, Russia, and France. . . . To save himself from Mehemet Ali, the Sultan appealed to the Powers. Russia alone responded to the appeal, and as a reward for her services imposed upon the Porte the humiliating Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833). [See DARDANELLES: 1833-1914.] By the terms of the Treaty Russia became virtually mistress of the Bosphorus [see BOSPORUS: 1832-1878] and the Dardanelles. The Tsar bound himself to render unlimited assistance to the Porte by land and sea, and in return the Sultan undertook to close the Straits to the ships of war of all nations, while permitting free egress to the Russian fleet. To all intents and purposes the Sultan had become the vassal of the Tsar. Thus far England, as a whole, had betrayed little or no jealousy of Russian advance towards the Mediterranean. Canning, though not unfriendly to Russia, had indeed repudiated, and with success, her claim to an exclusive or even a preponderant influence over Turkey. By the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi that claim was virtually admitted. Russia had established a military protectorate over the European dominions of the Sultan. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi inaugurates yet another phase in the evolution of the Eastern Question. From that time down to the Treaty of Berlin (1878), the primary factor in the problem is found in the increasing mistrust and antagonism between Great Britain and Russia. Lord Palmerston, inheriting the diplomatic traditions of Pitt and Canning, deeply resented the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Turkey, and determined that, at the first opportunity, the Treaty in which it was embodied should be torn up. Torn up it was by the Treaties of London (1840 and 1841), under which the collective protectorate of the Western Powers was substituted for the exclusive protectorate of Russia. After 1841 the Russian claim was never successfully reasserted. That Great Britain had a vital interest in the development of events in South-Eastern Europe was frankly acknowledged by Russia, and the Tsar Nicholas I made two distinct efforts to come to terms with Great Britain. The first was made in the course of the Tsar's visit to the Court of St. James's in 1844; the second occurred on the eve of the Crimean War, when the Tsar made specific though informal proposals to Sir Hamilton Seymour, then British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Neither attempt bore fruit. The overtures were based upon the assumption that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, and that it was the duty, as well as the obvious interest, of the Powers most closely concerned to come to an understanding as to the disposition of the estate. British statesmen refused to admit the accuracy of the Tsar's diagnosis, and questioned the propriety of the treatment prescribed. The 'sick man' had still, in their opinion, a fair chance of recovery, and to arrange, before his demise, for a partition of his inheritance seemed to them beyond the bounds of diplomatic decency."—J. A. R. Marriott, *European commonwealth*, pp. 266-269.—See also CRETE: 1800-1913.

1822-1823.—Congress of Verona. See VERONA, CONGRESS OF.

1826.—Reforms of Mahmud II.—Insurrection

of the Janissaries.—Their subjugation and destruction.—"While the struggle in Greece was proceeding, Mahmud had been busily engaged with his internal reforms, many of which were of a nature to offend the prejudices of his subjects. His great object was to give a European character to the institutions and the manners of his country. . . . He resolved also to recommence the military reforms of his uncle Selim, and again to establish the Nizam Jedid, or body of troops organized after European models. This last design roused once more the savage fanaticism of the Janizaries. On the 15th of June, 1826, when the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were in the country, the dissatisfied troops rose in insurrection, and committed great excesses. The Grand Vizier, hastily recalled to the metropolis, took measures for vindicating his master's authority, and . . . before the day was over 6,000 Janizaries had perished at the hands of their fellow-troops. Fifteen thousand who had not taken part in the movement were exiled to different places in Asia Minor, and on the following day a Hatti-Sherif pronounced the abolition of a corps which had contributed so much to the military predominance of Turkey, but which had at length become a source of internal danger too great to be suffered."—E. Ollier, *Cassell's illustrated history of the Russo-Turkish War*, v. 1, ch. 23.

1826-1829.—Convention of Akkerman.—War with Russia.—Surrender of Varna and Silistria.—Disastrous battle of Koulevscha.—Treaty of Adrianople.—Cessions of territory.—"It was not to be expected that an event so remarkable as the destruction of the Janizaries would fail to be taken advantage of by the court of St. Petersburg. The Emperor Nicholas had brought with him to the Russian throne a thorough determination to carry out the aggressive policy of the Empress Catherine, of which the terms of the celebrated treaty of Kutschouk-Kainardji [see above: 1768-1774] afforded so striking an illustration, and the annihilation of the Ottoman army, as well as the distracted condition of many of the provinces of that empire, afforded an opportunity too tempting to be neglected. The Czar, therefore, demanded that the Sultan should conclude with him a treaty, the provisions of which were made the subject of discussion at Ackerman, a town in Bessarabia; and Mahmoud, pressed by the necessity of his condition, . . . had found it requisite to conclude the arrangement, and the celebrated convention of Ackerman was ratified in October 1826. . . . Russia accused the Porte of an endeavour to cause a revolution in the Caucasus, and of a violation of treaties by closing the Bosphorus against Russian ships, and by its conduct towards its Christian subjects. There was no inconsiderable foundation for such a complaint, and especially for the latter part of it. . . . Both sides immediately prepared for the struggle, which a variety of circumstances have proved that the Czar had long contemplated, and only waited for a suitable opportunity of entering upon. . . . In the month of May [1828] the [Russian] force began to assemble on the banks of the Pruth, and crossed that river at three different points. Being unopposed by the Ottomans, the Russian forces almost immediately entered Jassy and Bucharest, took possession of Galatz, and in a few weeks had occupied the whole of the left bank of the Danube. To accomplish, as rapidly as possible the objects of the campaign, as well as to avoid having their very widely extended line exposed to the enemy, it was resolved by the leaders of the Russian forces to cross the Danube at Brahilow, and thence to ad-

vance with rapidity upon Silistria, Varna, and Schumla. This resolution they immediately proceeded to carry into effect. . . . The fall of Brailow and Varna were the only important events of the campaign of 1828 in Europe, and even these successes had been attained at a vast expense of human life. Out of nearly 100,000 men who had crossed the Danube at the beginning of the campaign, only about one-half remained. . . . In Asia operations were carried on by the Russians with equal vigour and much more success, in consequence, in a great measure, of the military genius and experience of General Paskewitch, who commanded the troops on the east of the Black Sea. . . . The first attack of the Russians in Asia was made upon the fortress of Anapa. . . . After a siege of about a month, the place was taken, with 85 guns and 3,000 prisoners, and the fleet sailed immediately to Varna. . . . After some other successes, General Paskewitch resolved upon attacking the town and fortress of Akhalkikh, a very important place in the pashalik of that name. . . . The surrender of Akhalkikh was followed by that of other important places of strength, which closed the campaign of 1828 in Asia. . . . After the fatal battle of Koulevscha, the siege of Silistria was carried on with redoubled vigour, and on the 30th of June the fortress surrendered, when the whole garrison were made prisoners of war, and to the number of 8,000, and the Russians found on the ramparts 238 cannon, in addition to those on board the vessels in the harbour. The fall of Silistria now determined the Russian commander-in-chief to push across the Balkans. . . . After defeating with great facility such troops as opposed their advance, the Russian army pressed on with the utmost activity towards Hadrianople [Adrianople], and entered the city not only unopposed, but amidst the rejoicings of a multitude of the Greek population. . . . The celebrated treaty of Hadrianople [see also ADRIANOPLE, TREATY OF], which concluded the war of 1828-29, . . . contained sixteen distinct articles, by which, among other matters, the following conditions were agreed upon:—The principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and all the conquered places in Bulgaria and Roumelia, were restored to the Porte, with the exception of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, which were to remain the possession of Russia. In Asia all the recent conquests were to revert to the Porte, with the exception of Anapa, on the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea, several important fortresses, together with an extensive district situated to the north and east of a line of demarcation supposed to be drawn from the then existing boundary of the province of Gouriel, and thence by that of Imeritia direct to the point where the frontiers of Kars unite with those of Georgia. The conditions of the treaties of Kainardji, Bucharest, and Ackerman were confirmed; . . . the passage of the Dardanelles was declared open to all Russian merchant ships, as well as the undisputed navigation of the Black Sea; an indemnity for losses by Russian subjects was fixed at £750,000, to be paid in eighteen months; and the expenses of the war were to be paid to the Russian Government, amounting to 10,000,000 ducats, about £5,000,000. . . . To this treaty two separate acts were annexed, the provisions of which are of scarcely less importance than the treaty itself. By these acts it was arranged that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be elected for life instead of for seven years; that no interference in the affairs of these provinces by any of the officers of the Porte should take place; that no fortified towns,

nor any establishment of Muslims, should be retained by the Porte on the left bank of the Danube; that the Turkish towns on that bank of the river should belong to Wallachia; and that the Mussulmans who possessed property in such places should be required to sell it in the space of eighteen months. . . . The conclusion of these treaties, on the 14th September 1829, terminated the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.”—R. W. Fraser, *Turkey, ancient and modern*, ch. 30-31.—See also RUSSIA: 1825-1855.

ALSO IN: A. Alison, *History of Europe, from 1850 to 1852*, ch. 15.

1826-1856.—European powers and disintegration of Turkey.—Congresses of Vienna and Paris.—“At the Congress of Vienna the Eastern question was ignored, and with good reason. The allies were sufficiently occupied in restoring the balance of power in Western Europe, and were by no means anxious to encourage any movement on the part of discontented nationalities. The Emperor Alexander was perhaps additionally averse to any discussion which might interfere with the long cherished designs of Russia upon Constantinople. A similar policy guided the subsequent congresses of the Holy Alliance. Disturbances in Greece or Wallachia found as little favour as insurrections in Spain or at Naples. When Ypsilanti appealed to Alexander at Laibach, the Emperor replied that the aspirations of the Greeks, though natural, could never be realised by revolt and warfare. But the policy of the Holy Alliance fell into discredit, and the Western Powers had leisure during the long peace both to extend their sympathy to the subject races of the Ottoman Empire, and to watch with jealousy the encroachments made upon that Empire by Russia. . . . The assumption of a collective authority on the part of the powers to supervise the solution of the Eastern question—in other words, to regulate the disintegration of Turkey—has been gradual. Such an authority has been exercised tentatively since 1826, systematically since 1856. It has been applied successively to Greece, to Egypt, to Syria, to the Danubian principalities and the Balkan peninsula generally, to certain other of the European provinces of Turkey, to the Asiatic boundaries of Turkey and Russia, and to the treatment of the Armenians. . . . At the Congress of Paris, Russia had to renounce the pretensions which she had gone to war to maintain. At the Congress of Berlin she had to submit to the re-settlement of her contract with Turkey from the point of the general interest of Europe. The treaties of Paris and of Berlin thus resemble one another, in that both alike are a negation of the right of any one Power, and an assertion of the right of the Powers collectively, to regulate the solution of the Eastern question. But these two great treaties differ considerably from one another in several important particulars. The Treaty of Paris was primarily a treaty of peace, and contains therefore a number of articles which answer the merely temporary purpose of putting an end to a state of war. The Treaty of Berlin is primarily a political settlement, supervening upon a peace, the terms of which had been previously agreed upon, as between the belligerents, by the treaty of San Stefano. [See below: 1878.] Again, in 1856, Turkey and her allies were victorious, and the object of the arrangement was the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, which was to be left to perform its promises of well-doing without external interference.”—T. E. Holland, *European concert in the Eastern Question*, pp. 1-2, 221.—See also BERLIN, CONGRESS OF; EASTERN


QUESTION; JERUSALEM: 16th-20th centuries; PARIS, DECLARATION OF; RUSSIA: 1854-1856.

1830.—Recognition of autonomy of Serbia. See SERBIA: 1817-1875.

1831-1840.—Rebellion of Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt.—Intervention of Russia and the western powers.—Egypt made an hereditary pashalik.—“The peace of Adrianople (1829) had greatly discredited the authority of the Porte; insurrections multiplied, and Turkish armies had to enter Bosnia and Albania. In these and all other matters by which the embarrassment of the Porte was increased, the ambitious Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, had a hand. As payment for his services against the Greeks, he had demanded the pashalik of Damascus. Sultan Mahmoud II. had refused the demand, and only given him the promised Candia. Hence, while the Western powers were occupied with the consequences of the July revolution [in France], and all Europe appeared to be on the verge of a new upheaval, he undertook to seize his booty for himself. In consequence of a quarrel with Abdallah, Pasha of Acre, Ibrahim Pasha [son of Mehemet Ali], notorious for his barbarous conduct of the war in Peloponnesus, crossed the Egyptian frontier, October 20th, 1831, with an army organized on the European system, took Gaza, Jaffa and Jerusalem without resistance, and besieged Acre, which was resolutely defended by Abdallah. Mehemet Ali now demanded both pashaliks—Damascus and Acre. The sultan commanded him to evacuate Syria. The demand was naturally refused; so Mehemet and his son Ibrahim were outlawed. But the latter proceeded with his operations, took Acre by storm May 25th, 1832, and entered Damascus. In the mean time, a Turkish army, under Hussein Pasha, had advanced into Syria. Mehemet Pasha, Hussein's lieutenant, was defeated at Homs, July 9th. Hussein himself, attempting to retrieve this loss, was defeated at Beylan July 27th, and his army scattered. The sultan sent a new army against Ibrahim, under Reshid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who had displayed great efficiency in the reduction of the Albanians and Bosnians. Reshid . . . was utterly defeated at Konieh December 20th, and was himself taken prisoner. The sultan was in a critical situation. He could not at the moment bring together another considerable army, while Ibrahim had 100,000 well-trained troops, and the road to Constantinople lay open before him.” Russia, having no wish to see the energetic pasha of Egypt in possession of that coveted capital, offered her help to the sultan and he was driven to accept it. “A Russian fleet appeared in the Bosphorus, and landed troops at Scutari, while a Russian army was on the march from the Danube to cover Constantinople. . . . At length England and France perceived how dangerous it was to forget the East in their study of the Dutch-Belgian question. Their ambassadors had enough to do, by a hasty peace, to make Russia's help unnecessary. As their threats made no impression on the victorious Mehemet Ali, they filled the sultan with distrust of Russia, and by representing a cession of territory to his vassal as the lesser of the two evils, persuaded him into the peace of Kutayah (May 6th, 1833), by which Mehemet Ali received the whole of Syria and the territory of Adana, in south-eastern Asia Minor. Russia had to retire with her object unattained, but had no sooner been thrown out at the front door than she came in at the back. She called the sultan's attention to the favor shown to the insatiable pasha by England and France in the peace of Kutayah, and con-

cluded with him, July 8th, 1833, the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, by which he entered into a defensive alliance with Russia for eight years, and pledged himself to permit no foreign vessel of war to pass through the Dardanelles. The Western powers took this outwitting very ill, and from that time on kept a sharp eye on Constantinople.” Mehemet Ali was meantime giving another direction to his ambition. “The west coast of Arabia, as far as the English post at Aden, had been in his possession since 1829. He now sought to extend his sway over the eastern coast, and subdue the sultan of Muscat. . . . If this were to continue, the two most important roads to the East Indies, by Suez and by the Persian Gulf, would be in the hands of Mehemet Ali. . . . With Egypt, Syria, and Arabia in his hands, England's position in the East would receive a blow that must be felt. So it was a foregone conclusion which side England would take. In 1838 she concluded with the Porte a commercial treaty by which the abolition of all monopolies, as well as free exportation from all parts of the Turkish empire, including Egypt and Syria, was secured to her. Mehemet Ali hesitated about accepting this treaty; and Mahmoud, full of hate against a vassal who threatened ultimately to devour him, declared him a traitor, deprived him of all his dignities, and caused an army to advance into Syria under Hasiz Pasha. But again fortune was not favorable to the Turks. In their camp, as military adviser of the commander-in-chief, was a Prussian captain, Hellmuth von Moltke. For two years he had been assisting the sultan in planning and putting into execution military reforms. Recognizing the weakness and unreliable character of the Turkish army, he advised Hasiz Pasha to fall back on the strong camp at Birdshik, bring up the re-enforcements which were under way, and then risk a battle. But the Pasha would not listen to Moltke's advice, pronouncing retreat a disgrace. He was completely routed at Nisib, on the Euphrates, June 24th, 1839, and his army scattered. For the second time the road to Constantinople lay open to Ibrahim. Misfortunes fell thick and fast upon the Turks. Sultan Mahmoud died June 30th, and the empire fell to a sixteen-year old youth, his son Abdul Medhid. Five days later, Capudan Pasha, with the Turkish fleet, sailed out of the Dardanelles under orders to attack the Egyptians. Instead of this he went over to Mehemet Ali with his whole fleet—in consequence of French bribery, it was said. . . . In order to prevent Turkey from casting herself a second time into Russia's arms, four great powers—England, France, Austria, and Prussia—declared, July 27th, 1839, that they would themselves take the Eastern question in hand. To save herself from being wholly left out, Russia had to give her consent, and become a party to the treaty. But there were very different views as to the way in which the question was to be settled. France, which was striving after the control of the Mediterranean, and which, since Napoleon's campaign, had turned its eyes toward Egypt, wished to leave its friend Mehemet Ali in full possession. England saw her interests endangered by the pasha, thought France's occupation of Algiers quite enough, and was afraid that if Turkey were too weak she might become the defenceless prey of Russia. The latter wished at no price to allow the energetic pasha to enter upon the inheritance of Turkey, or even of a part of it, and was pleased at seeing the cordial understanding between France and England destroyed. Austria and Prussia supported England and Russia, and so France was left alone. The

Anglo-Prussian view found expression in the quadruple alliance which the great powers, with the exception of France, concluded in London, July 15th, 1840. By this the hereditary possession of the pashalik of Egypt, and the possession for life of a part of Syria, were secured to Mehemed Ali, in case he submitted to the conclusions of the conference within ten days. . . . The allied powers began hostilities against Mehemed Ali, who, relying on French assistance, refused to submit. The Anglo-Austrian fleet sailed to the Syrian coast, and took Beirut and Acre; and Alexandria was bombarded by Commodore Napier. This and the fall of the Thiers ministry brought Mehemed Ali to a full realization of his mistake. He might consider himself lucky in being allowed to hold Egypt as hereditary pashalik upon evacuating Syria, Arabia, and Candia, and restoring the Turkish fleet. For this favor he had to thank England, which sought by this means to secure



SILVER COINS IN CIRCULATION SINCE  
THE TIME OF ABDUL MEJID

his friendship and the Suez road to India. The catastrophe of the 'sick man' [the Turk] was again put off for a few years."—W. Müller, *Political history of recent times*, sect. 11.—See also EASTERN QUESTION.

ALSO IN: A. A. Paton, *History of the Egyptian revolution*, v. 2, ch. 1-20.—C. A. Fyfe, *History of modern Europe*, v. 2, ch. 6.—S. Walpole, *History of England from 1815*, v. 3, ch. 16.

1839.—Accession of Abdul Mejid.—Proclamation of Tanzimat.—Abdul Mejid came to the throne in 1839. "Fortunately he possessed in Reshid Pasha a great Minister, who shared and seconded, and perhaps prompted, the reforming ardour of his master; and on the 3rd November 1839 an Imperial Rescript, the famous Hatti Humayoun of Gulhane [or Tanzimat, was proclaimed]."—A. H. Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, p. 20.—The following is the text of this document:

"All the world knows that in the first days of the Ottoman Monarchy, the glorious precepts of the Koran and the Laws of the Empire were always honoured. The Empire in consequence increased

in strength and greatness, and all her subjects, without exception, had risen in the highest degree to ease and prosperity. In the last 150 years a succession of accidents and divers causes have arisen which have brought about a disregard for the sacred code of Laws, and the Regulations flowing therefrom, and the former strength and prosperity have changed into weakness and poverty: an Empire in fact loses all its stability so soon as it ceases to observe its Laws. These considerations are ever present to our mind, and, ever since the day of our advent to the Throne, the thought of the public weal, of the improvement of the state of the Provinces, and of relief to the peoples, has not ceased to engage it. If, therefore, the geographical position of the Ottoman Provinces, the fertility of the soil, the aptitude and intelligence of the inhabitants are considered, the conviction will remain that, by striving to find efficacious means, the result, which by the help of God we hope to attain, can be obtained within a few years. Full of confidence, therefore, in the help of the Most High, assisted by the intercession of our Prophet, we deem it right to seek by new institutions to give to the Provinces composing the Ottoman Empire the benefit of a good Administration. These institutions must be principally carried out under 3 heads, which are:—

1. The guarantees insuring to our subjects perfect security for life, honour, and fortune.
2. A regular system of assessing and levying Taxes.
3. An equally regular system for the levy of Troops and the duration of their service.

And, in fact, are not life and honour the most precious gifts in existence? What man, however much his character may be against violence, can prevent his having recourse to it, and thereby injure the Government and the country, if his life and honour are endangered? If, on the contrary, he enjoys in that respect perfect security, he will not depart from the ways of loyalty, and all his actions will contribute to the good of the Government and of his brothers. If there is an absence of security on the score of fortune, every one remains insensible to the voice of the Prince and the country; no one interests himself in the progress of public good, absorbed as he is with his own troubles. If, on the contrary, the citizen keeps possession, in all confidence, of all his goods, then, full of ardour in his affairs, which he seeks to enlarge in order to increase his comforts, daily renewing in his heart his love for the Prince and the country, and his devotion to his native land. These feelings create in him the most praiseworthy actions. As to the regular and fixed assessment of the Taxes, it is very important to settle that matter, for the State which is forced to incur many expenses for the defence of its Territory cannot obtain the money necessary for its Armies and other services except by means of contributions levied on its subjects. Although, thanks be to God, our Empire has for some time past been delivered from the scourge of Monopolies, falsely considered in times of war as a source of revenue, a fatal custom still exists, although it can only have disastrous consequences; it is that of vena concessions, known under the name of 'Iltizam.' Under that name the civil and financial administration of a locality is delivered over to the passions of a single man, that is to say, sometimes to the iron grasp of the most violent and avaricious passions, for if that Contractor is not a good man, he will only look to his own advantage. It is therefore necessary that henceforth each member of the Ottoman Society should be taxed for a quota of a fixed Tax, ac-

ording to his fortune and of his means, and that it should be impossible that anything more could be exacted from him. It is also necessary that special laws should fix and limit the expenses of our Land and Sea Forces. Although, as we have said, the defence of the country is an important matter, and that it is the duty of all the inhabitants to furnish soldiers for that object, it has become necessary to establish Laws to regulate the contingent to be furnished by each locality, according to the necessity of the time, and to reduce the term of Military Service to 4 or 5 years. For it is at the same time doing an injustice, and giving a mortal blow to agriculture and to industry to rake, without consideration to the respective population of the localities, in the one more, in the other less men than they can furnish, it is also reducing the soldiers to despair, and contributing to the depopulation of the country, by keeping them all their lives in the service. In short, without the several Laws, the necessity for which has just been described, there can be neither strength, nor riches, nor happiness, nor tranquillity for the Empire; it must, on the contrary, look for them in the existence of these new Laws. From henceforth, therefore, the cause of every accused person shall be publicly judged in accordance with our Divine Law, after enquiry and examination, and so long as a regular judgment shall not have been pronounced, no one can, secretly or publicly, put another to death by poison or in any other manner. No one shall be allowed to attack the honour of any other person whatever. Each one shall possess his Property of every kind, and shall dispose of it in all freedom, without let or hindrance from any person whatever; thus, for example, the innocent Heirs of a Criminal shall not be deprived of their legal rights, and the Property of the Criminal shall not be confiscated. These Imperial concessions shall extend to all our subjects, of whatever Religion or sect they may be; they shall enjoy them without exception. We therefore grant perfect security to the inhabitants of our Empire, in their lives, their honour, and their fortunes, as they are secured to them by the sacred text of our Law. As for the other points, as they must be settled with the assistance of enlightened opinions, our Council of Justice (increased by new members, as shall be found necessary), to whom shall be joined, on certain days which we shall determine, our Ministers and the Notabilities of the Empire, shall assemble, in order to frame Laws regulating the Security of Life and Fortune, and the Assessment of the Taxes. Each one in those assemblies shall freely deliver his ideas and give his advice. The Laws regulating the Military Service shall be discussed by a Military Council, holding its sittings at the Palace of the Seraskier. As soon as a Law shall be passed, in order to be for ever valid, it shall be presented to us; we shall give it our approval, which we will write with our Imperial sign manual. As the object of these Institutions is solely for the purpose of reviving Religion, Government, the Nation, and the Empire, we engage not to do anything which is contrary thereto. In testimony of our promise, we will, after having deposited them in the Hall containing the glorious mantle of the Prophet, in the presence of all the Ulemas, and the Grandees of the Empire make Oath in the name of God, and shall afterwards cause the Oath to be taken by the Ulemas and the Grandees of the Empire. After that, those from among the Ulemas or the Grandees of the Empire, or any other persons whatsoever, who shall infringe these Institutions, shall undergo,

without respect of rank, position, and influence, the punishment corresponding to his crime, after having been well authenticated. A Penal Code shall be compiled to that effect. As all the Public Servants of the Empire receive a suitable salary, and that the salaries of those whose duties have not, up to the present time, been sufficiently remunerated, are to be fixed, a rigorous Law shall be passed against the traffic of favouritism and of appointments (*richvet*), which the Divine Law reprobates, and which is one of the principal causes of the decay of the Empire. The above dispositions, being an alteration and a complete renewal of ancient customs, this Imperial Rescript shall be published at Constantinople, and in all places of our Empire, and shall be officially communicated to all the Ambassadors of the friendly Powers resident at Constantinople, that they may be witnesses to the granting of these Institutions, which, should it please God, shall last for ever. Wherein, may the Most High have us in His holy keeping. May



MIDHAT PASHA

those who shall pass an Act contrary to the present Regulations be the object of Divine malediction, and deprived for ever of every kind of happiness. Read at Gulhané, 3rd November, 1830."—E. Hertlet, *Map of Europe by treaty*, v. 2, 1828-1863, pp. 1002-1005.—"The two moving spirits in the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz were undoubtedly Midhat Pasha and Hussein Avni Pasha, the Minister of War. . . . As soon as the final resolution of Ministers was arrived at, and before any commencement of execution could be given to it, it was indispensable to obtain a *Fetva* (authoritative decree) of the Sheik-ul-Islam, Hassan Hairullah, the highest authority and mouthpiece of the Sacred Law, in order to give legal validity to the act of deposition. . . . These stipulations were the following:—1. To promulgate without delay the new Constitution. 2. To act in matters of State only with the advice of his responsible advisers. 3. To appoint Zia Bey and Kemal Bey his private secretaries, and to make Sadullah Bey the head of the Palace Secretariat. The importance attached by Midhat and Rushdi to this last condition was very great. It afforded a guarantee against those intrigues of the Palace which had ship-wrecked

so many schemes of reform, and prevented, so far as was possible, a renewal of that mute opposition between the Palace and the Porte which had existed for centuries, and had paralysed the efforts of so many Ministers. At this historical interview at Muslou-Oglou Prince Hamid evidently 'played a deep game' with Midhat Pasha. He promised all and more than all that was asked of him. He pretended to opinions more advanced than the most advanced of his Ministers, and in favour of even a more democratic Constitution than the one elaborated. The other condition he accepted without demur [without the least intention of keeping his promise]. . . . It was reserved for [Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908)], . . . after he had suppressed a Constitution that he had sworn to observe as the very condition of his mounting to the throne, to brush all checks and counterpoises of every kind aside, and to set up a pure, unmixed despotism, based on caprice and corruption alone. Such a system of government had been hitherto unknown to the Ottoman Constitution, was emphatically denounced by the prophets, was contrary to the express provisions of the Sacred Law, was repudiated by Mehemet II. and all the early Sultans as well as Caliphs of Islam, and ran counter to all the traditions of the Ottoman people."—A. H. Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, pp. 82, 97-98, 13.—"A series of revolts which soon broke out in the Lebanon, Crete, and Montenegro, and a massacre at Kerbela soon proved that the promises of Abdul Medjid were as empty and as incapable of fulfilment as those of his predecessors. In fact the very publication of the *Tanzimat* caused a dangerous reaction at Constantinople, as a result of which the moderate Grand Vizier Reshid gave place to the corrupt and fanatical Riza."—W. E. D. Allen, *Turks in Europe*, p. 131.

1849.—Convention of Balta-Liman. See RUMANIA: 1828-1858.

1853-1856.—Crimean War. See EUROPE: Modern: Wars of the great powers; RUSSIA: 1853-1854; 1854-1856.

1856.—Declaration of Paris.—Danube Commission. See PARIS, DECLARATION OF; DANUBE: 1850-1916.

1856-1862.—War with Montenegro. See MONTENEGRO: 1389-1868.

1861-1876.—Reign of Abdul Aziz, and accession of Abdul Hamid.—"Troubles broke out in the Lebanon in 1860 and a French army was dispatched to restore order. . . . In 1861 the Sultan Abdul Mejid died, and with him passed away the hope of regenerating Turkey. His brother and successor Abdul Aziz was an ignorant bigot, whose extravagance brought his country to avowed insolvency (1875). . . . In 1876 he was deposed, and—found dead. How he came by his death is a matter of doubt, but his end is said to have turned the brain of his successor, Murad V., a son of Abdul Mejid, who after three months was removed as an imbecile, and succeeded by his brother, . . . Abdul Hamid."—S. Lane-Poole, *Story of Turkey*, ch. 17.

1861-1877.—Union of Wallachia and Moldavia.—Revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina.—Reforms demanded by the great powers.—War with Serbia.—Conference at Constantinople.—Abdul Hamid and the constitution of 1876.—"Before four years were over [after the termination of the Crimean War by the Treaty of Paris], one of the chief stipulations of the treaty was set aside. Wallachia and Moldavia, which it had been the policy of the Powers to separate, displayed a constant desire to join. Two of the great Continental

Powers—France and Russia—favoured the junction. England, Austria, and Turkey, thinking that the union would ultimately lead to their independence, opposed their fusion under one prince. . . . [In 1858, the two provinces chose the same prince, or hospodar, in the person of Prince John Couza, who took the title of prince of Rumania. The Porte protested, but was induced, in 1861, to recognize this union of the coronets. Prince Couza aspired to absolutism, and was forced to abdicate in 1866. Then a German, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, was chosen by the two provinces to be his successor.] Thus, five days after the Peace of Paris, one of the stipulations on which England had insisted was surrendered. In 1870 the Franco-German War led to the obliteration of another of them. In November, when the armies of France were either beaten or besieged, Russia repudiated the clause of the Treaty of Paris which had limited the forces of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea. The declaration of the Russian Government came as a painful shock to the British people. The determination of a great European state to tear up the clause of a treaty excited indignation. It was recollected, moreover, that it was for the sake of this clause that the Crimean War had been prolonged after the Vienna negotiations; and that all the blood which had been shed, and all the money which had been spent, after the spring of 1855, were wasted in its abandonment. . . . In the spring of 1875 an insurrection broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two of the northern provinces of European Turkey. [See also BOSNIA: 1849-1875.] The Porte failed to quench the disturbance; and, its efforts to do so increasing its pecuniary embarrassments, was forced in the autumn to repudiate the claims of its many creditors. . . . In the meanwhile the insurrection continued to spread, and attracted the attention of the great European Powers. At the instigation of Austria a note was drawn up [by Count Andrassy, and known, therefore, as the Andrassy Note], which was at once signed by all the European Powers except England, and which was ultimately accepted by England also, declaring that 'the promises of reform made by the Porte had not been carried into effect, and that some combined action by the Powers of Europe was necessary to insist on the fulfilment of the many engagements which Turkey had made and broken.' As the note failed to effect its object, the representatives of the Northern Powers—Germany, Austria, and Russia—met at Berlin, proposed a suspension of arms for two months, and intimated that if Turkey in the two months failed to fulfil her broken promises, 'force would be used to compel her' to do so. The British Government, unwilling to join in a threat, refused to sign this new note. The insurrection went on; Servia, sympathising with the insurgents, declared war against Turkey; Russian officers and Russian troops fought in the Servian battalions; and Russia herself, setting her legions in motion, evidently prepared for hostilities. When these events occurred, large numbers of the English people were prepared to support the Turk. Though they had been partially estranged from the cause of Turkey by the repudiation of the Ottoman debt in the previous autumn, they recollected the sacrifices of the Crimean War; they were irritated with the manner in which one part of the Treaty of Paris had been torn up in 1870; and they were consequently prepared to resist any further movement on the part of Russia. The Porte, however, dreading the extension of revolt, allowed its officers to anticipate dis-



order by massacre. The atrocious cruelty with which this policy was executed [especially in Bulgaria (see BULGARIA: 1875-1878)] excited a general outburst of indignation in this country [England]; and the British Ministry, whose leader had hitherto displayed much sympathy with the Turks, found himself forced to observe a strict neutrality. In the short war which ensued in the autumn of 1876, the Servian troops proved no match for the Turkish battalions. At the request or command of Russia the Porte was forced to grant an armistice to the belligerents; and, on the suggestion of the British Ministry, a Conference of the Great Powers was held at Constantinople to provide for the better government of the Turkish provinces. The Constantinople Conference, held at the beginning of 1877,

Turkish empire in 1877, and the effort was abandoned. When Hamid saw that the Constitution would avail nothing in averting war, and that Russia would not tolerate any constitutional government in Turkey, he prorogued the Legislature and bundled up the Constitution and pigeonholed it with the understanding that Parliament would be convoked anew after peace with Russia. In spite of that promise the Constitution remained for thirty years where he filed it."—A. W. Hidden, *Ottoman dynasty*, pp. 390-391.

ALSO IN: E. Ollier, *Cassell's illustrated history of the Russo-Turkish War*, v. 1, ch. 1-10.—Duke of Argyll, *Eastern Question*, v. 1, ch. 3-9.—S. Menzies, *Turkey old and new*, v. 2, bk. 4, ch. 4.

1863-1918.—Founding of colleges. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1863-1918.



SULTAN ABDUL HAMID II IN THE EARLY YEARS OF HIS REIGN

(After a contemporary pen drawing by Q. May)

formed in many respects an exact parallel to the Vienna Conference held in the summer of 1855. . . . The Porte rejected all the proposals on which the other Powers were agreed. . . . In each case the failure of the Conference was followed by war. But the parallel ends at this point. . . . In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, Turkey was left to fight her own battle alone."—S. Walpole, *Foreign relations*, ch. 3.—"In December, 1876, a conference of the powers met at Constantinople for the purpose of giving Abdul-Hamid II sage advice. Even as their excellencies the ambassadors were in session, sudden salvos of artillery distracted their august deliberations."—W. S. Davis, *Roots of the war*, pp. 82-83.—"To strengthen himself, to disarm his critics and enemies, Abdul Hamid determined to declare a Constitution, which was proclaimed on December 23, 1876. Midhat Pasha and his associates drew up the Constitution. The carrying out of this project of reform, however, was impossible under conditions prevailing throughout the

1864-1874.—Immigration of Circassians from the Caucasus. See CAUCASUS: 1801-1877.

1870-1912.—Power in Macedonia. See MACEDONIA: 1870-1912.


1871.—Control of Dardanelles by Treaty of London. See DARDANELLES: 1833-1914.

1876-1909.—Policy of Abdul Hamid in Syria. See SYRIA: 1870-1909.

1877-1878.—War with Russia.—Heroic defense of Plevna.—Defeat and surrender.—In 1877 the Eastern Question was still unsettled. "The Turks used their new constitution with some adroitness as a scheme for further delay. How could the powers continue to demand reforms when all possible reforms were going to be voted and put into effect—just as soon, of course, as the new parliament could be convened and pass the necessary measures? And, in the meantime, how could the *Padishah*, as a 'constitutional sovereign,' enact legislation by his mere fiat? As for other matters, the Turks proved themselves to the ambassadors

to be incorrigible. When the question of Bulgaria was raised, the sultan's ministers at first solemnly averred 'they did not know what the word meant.' They permitted themselves to remember that it might be a 'geographical term for the region north of the Balkans,' but that was all. In short, these slippery barbarians, 'who wore tight clothes and chattered French,' but who seemed to have neither honesty nor intelligence under their red fezzes, alienated their last friends and drove even England to wash her hands of them. Lord Salisbury, going home in despair, declared that 'all had tried to save Turkey, but she would not allow them to save her.' Thus the year 1877 opened with war between the czar and sultan all but certain, and England looking on as a neutral. Czar Alexander II was probably an honest lover of peace but despotic as were the institutions of Russia, he could not be indifferent to public opinion. The

delusion that England would somehow fight for them. Lord Salisbury had vainly telegraphed to London from the Constantinople conference, 'The grand vizier believes that he can count on the assistance of Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield.' Yet the British cabinet had nevertheless failed to make it plain to Abdul-Hamid that it could never stand between him and the wrath of Russia, as he had now provoked it. The Turkish 'free parliament,' although duly 'elected' and opened with some pomp in March, 1877, had instantly exhibited itself as nothing but a comically useless tool for the purpose of despotism. Its members were mere dummies for the government, and were speedily nicknamed the 'Yes, Sirs' (*Evet Eflendim*), from their willingness to ratify every suggestion from above. On April 24 the czar took the long expected action and declared war. . . . The Russians had entered into the war with enthusiasm



MEETING OF GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS WITH OSMAN PASHA AT THE SURRENDER OF PLEVNA, 1878

(After a contemporary drawing by Durand)

Muscovite empire had lately been stirred by a strong Pan-Slavic movement, an agitation for the union of all Slavdom in one confederacy, of course under the hegemony of Russia. The outraged Bulgars were counted Slavs, too; and their woes had produced a great impression at St. Petersburg and Moscow. . . . Finally, and of still keener national interest, was the fact that in marching as the champion of Christian civilization against the sultan, Russia was also taking another step toward that outlet upon warm, blue water which was a necessity for her empire. All in all, Alexander II drew the sword in 1877 with a great national enthusiasm impelling him forward. The war was popular for the time in Russia. A private understanding with Austria had assured the czar against interference from Franz-Joseph, and the military course therefore seemed very plain. On April 10, 1877, the Turks in a spirit of incredible folly rejected the London Protocol, a last despairing proposal for reform which had been flung at them by the concert of the powers. Down to the last the sultan and his grand vizier had hugged the

and confidence that the odds were so entirely on their side that, if Western Europe would but give them fair play, they could easily crush the infidel. Their difficulties, however, were great. The Turkish navy prevented the use of transports on the Black Sea and the railroads through Southern Russia were few and in Rumania still fewer. The hindrances to moving huge armies at a vast distance from their base thus proved almost unsurmountable. The czar's forces also suffered, as in the Great War some four decades later, from rascally contractors and grievously imperfect munitions and supplies. Alexander, too, at first had trouble in finding highly competent generals. Nevertheless, the incapacity of the Turkish commanders was, on the whole, so great that only the offsetting excellence of the Turkish infantrymen seemed likely to make the war at all equal. In the summer of 1877 the Russians forced their way over the Danube, penetrated Bulgaria, took Tirnova, the old capital of that afflicted country, and, to crown all, seized Shipka Pass, the best defile over the Balkan Mountains. There was

panic in Constantinople, and a hasty shifting of posts took place among the excited pashas. Then came a long respite. The Turks had found a really able general—one of those admirable fighters who often come out of the Orient—Osman Pasha, who was able to inflict on the czar and his grand dukes anxious nights, heavy losses, and a humiliating delay. In their sudden advance through Bulgaria the Russians had neglected to occupy the small town of Plevna, located most strategically at the intersection of the main roads along which the invaders must pass. With some forty-five thousand men Osman Pasha flung himself into Plevna, and suddenly the Russians found their whole line of advance menaced. On July 20, not realizing the strength of their enemies, they assaulted with inadequate forces and met a bloody repulse. Ten days later a more powerful attack met a still greater disaster. There was nothing for it but the Grand Duke Nicholas must needs telegraph to Prince Carol to bring up his despised Rumanian allies to aid in the siege. The prince proudly required (and obtained) that he should be appointed commander-in-chief of the entire besieging force. On September 11 there was a third and still more desperate assault. The Rumanians covered themselves with glory before the bloody Turkish breastworks, but the pasha's inner lines could not be carried. The only option was to bring up reinforcements, hem Osman Pasha in, and slowly starve him out. This last stage of the siege lasted till December 10. In the meantime the whole Russian plan of campaign lagged, and if there had been real capacity at Constantinople, something might have been done to save the Ottoman Empire from overthrow. But Osman was unique in his tenacity and skill among the Turkish commanders. In Asia, in the Caucasus region, where, of course, an independent campaign could be conducted, the Turks had been driven [from the Little Yahni hills. On November 4 Erzeroum fell] and on November 18 they lost the great fortress of Kars. At last, in December, the stout Osman was at the end of his resources. He served out his last biscuits and ammunition to his men and made a despairing attempt to cut his way through the besiegers. The effort failed, and he surrendered with forty thousand half-starved troops. The Russians treated him honorably as a doughty foe, and well they might. He had cost them twenty-one thousand men (sixteen thousand Russians and five thousand Rumanians) and five months of valuable time. But the roads through Bulgaria had been opened at last: The surrender of Osman was followed by the speedy rout of the remaining Turkish armies. The czar's service had now developed two redoubtable generals, Gurko and Skobelev. The first of these took Sofia and utterly defeated the army of Sulciman Pasha near Philippopolis; the second reopened Shipka Pass, which had been almost rewon by the Turks during the siege of Plevna. Serbia, too was again in arms [see SERBIA: 1875-1885]; likewise little Montenegro [see MONTENEGRO: 1874-1880]; while from every other quarter messengers of calamity hastened in toward Abdul-Hamid's palace. The Cossacks raged and raided through the Mohammedan regions around Adrianople in a manner that indicated that Christians also understand the arts of massacre. Adrianople itself fell in January, 1878, and so far as the sultan's own strength was concerned, the Turkish power was at an end. There was nothing for it but negotiate. With a noose about their necks the Ottomans accepted an

armistice on January 31, to be followed by the more definitive Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878."—W. S. Davis, *Roots of the war*, pp. 83-87.—See also RUSSIA: 1875-1877; RUMANIA: 1875-1881; BULGARIA: 1875-1878; EUROPE: Modern: Wars of the great powers; RED CROSS: 1864-1914.

ALSO IN: V. Baker, *War in Bulgaria*.—F. V. Greene, *Russian army and its campaign in Turkey*.—T. W. Knox, *Decisive battles since Waterloo*.

1878.—Excitement in England over Russian advance.—British fleet sent through the Dardanelles.—Arrangement of the Berlin Congress.—Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.—Effects of Sultan's Asiatic possessions.—"At the opening of 1878 the Turks were completely prostrate. The road to Constantinople was clear. Before the English public had time to recover their breath and to observe what was taking place, the victorious armies of Russia were almost within sight of the minarets of Stamboul. Meanwhile the English Government were taking momentous action. . . . Parliament was called together at least a fortnight before the time usual during recent years. The Speech from the Throne announced that her Majesty could not conceal from herself that, should the hostilities between Russia and Turkey unfortunately be prolonged, 'some unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent on me to adopt measures of precaution.' This looked ominous to those who wished for peace, and it raised the spirits of the war party. There was a very large and very noisy war party already in existence. It was particularly strong in London. It embraced some Liberals as well as nearly all Tories. It was popular in the music-halls and the public-houses of London. . . . The men of action got a nickname. They were dubbed the Jingo Party. . . . The Government ordered the Mediterranean fleet to pass the Dardanelles and go up to Constantinople. The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that he would ask for a supplementary estimate of six millions for naval and military purposes. Thereupon Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, at once resigned. . . . Lord Derby was also anxious to resign, and indeed tendered his resignation, but he was prevailed upon to withdraw it. The fleet meanwhile was ordered back from the Dardanelles to Besika Bay. It had got as far as the opening of the Straits when it was recalled. The Liberal Opposition in the House of Commons kept on protesting against the various war measures of the Government, but with little effect. . . . While all this agitation in and out of Parliament was going on . . . the news came that the Turks, utterly broken down, had been compelled to sign an armistice, and an agreement containing a basis of peace, at Adrianople. Then, following quickly on the heels of this announcement, came a report that the Russians, notwithstanding the armistice, were pushing on towards Constantinople with the intention of occupying the Turkish capital. A cry of alarm and indignation broke out in London. . . . The fleet was now sent in good earnest through the Dardanelles, and anchored a few miles below Constantinople. Russia at first protested that if the English fleet passed the Straits Russian troops ought to occupy the city. Lord Derby was firm, and terms of arrangement were found—English troops were not to be disembarked, and the Russians were not to advance. Russia was still open to negotiation. Probably Russia had no idea of taking on herself the tremendous responsibility of an occupation of Constantinople. She had entered

into a treaty with Turkey, the famous Treaty of San Stefano, by which she secured for the populations of the Christian provinces almost complete independence of Turkey, and was to create a great new Bulgarian State with a seaport on the Ægean Sea. The English Government refused to recognise this Treaty. Lord Derby contended that it involved an entire readjustment of the Treaty of Paris, and that that could only be done with the sanction of the Great Powers assembled in Congress. Lord Beaconsfield openly declared that the Treaty of San Stefano would put the whole south-east of Europe directly under Russian influence. Russia offered to submit the Treaty to the perusal, if we may use the expression, of a Congress; but argued that the stipulations which merely concerned Turkey and herself were for Turkey and herself to settle between them. This was obviously an untenable position. . . . Turkey meanwhile kept feebly moaning that she had been coerced into signing the Treaty. The Government determined to call out the Reserves, to summon a contingent of Indian troops to Europe, to occupy Cyprus, and to make an armed landing on the coast of Syria. . . . The last hope of the Peace Party seemed to have vanished. . . . Prince Bismarck had often during these events shown an inclination to exhibit himself in the new attitude of a peaceful mediator. He now interposed again and issued invitations for a congress to be held in Berlin to discuss the whole contents of the Treaty of San Stefano. After some delay, discussion, and altercation, Russia agreed to accept the invitation on the conditions proposed, and it was finally resolved that a Congress should assemble in Berlin on the approaching June 13. . . . Much to the surprise of the public, Lord Beaconsfield announced that he himself would attend, accompanied by Lord Salisbury, and conduct the negotiations in Berlin. . . . The great object of most of the statesmen who were concerned in the preparation of the Treaty which came to the Congress, was to open for the Christian populations of the south-east of Europe a way into gradual self-development and independence. But on the other hand it must be owned that the object of some of the Powers, and especially, we are afraid, of the English Government, was rather to maintain the Ottoman Government than to care for the future of the Christian races. These two influences, acting and counteracting on each other, produced the Treaty of Berlin."—J. McCarthy, *History of our own time*, v. 4, ch. 65.—"San Stefano [where the Treaty of San Stefano was negotiated in 1878] is a small village on the outskirts of Constantinople. . . . The Muscovites were in great anxiety to tie their defeated foes by a hard and fast treaty and confront Europe with an 'accomplished deed' before the other great powers, and especially England, could intervene. The czar's ministers knew that not merely England, but Austria would fight to the death rather than see them occupy Constantinople, and they did not attempt it; but otherwise the changes they dictated were sweeping enough. Montenegro and Serbia were to receive appreciable increases of territory. Bosnia was to be 'reformed' not by promises only, but under the joint control of Austria and Russia. Other reforms were to be granted the oppressed Armenians in Asia Minor, in which region a considerable strip of territory (including Kars) was to be ceded outright to Russia. As for Rumania, she was to be set up as a strictly independent nation, but she was to cede Bessarabia

to Russia and receive in return (at the expense of Turkey) the Dobrudja, the miasmatic marshy delta of the Danube. But the most striking clause was that relating to the creation of an entirely new unit in modern Europe—Bulgaria. According to the terms of this treaty a huge Bulgaria would have sprung into existence. Constantinople had its hinterland back to Adrianople, Saloniki and the territory around it, and part of Albania would have been left to the sultan; otherwise he would have been expelled from Europe. The lost dominions were to be formed into 'an autonomous tributary principality, with a Christian governor and a national militia.' Abdul-Hamid's pride might be salved a little by saying that the new country was merely to be a vassal-region of the Ottoman Empire. The fact, of course, was evident to all men that practically the vassalage consisted in a certain amount of tribute money, likely to cease some fine day. By their own sins and follies the Ottomans had had themselves pushed to the outermost corner of Europe. As the Russians advanced, and, still more, as the full tenor of their demands became evident, a large percentage of the English public took ever-increasing alarm. The memory of the Bulgarian massacres was already fading; the fear of the Muscovites advancing along the road to India by way of Constantinople began again to grip the British heart. It was claimed, with some show of justice, that the czar was anxious to impose a peace, as if the quarrel were between him and the sultan alone, to the total ignoring of legitimate British interests. . . . Under these circumstances war would surely have followed, had not Russia been willing to consider the question of the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano. There were plenty of hot-headed officers around the czar and plenty of ardent Pan-Slavists in the rear quite ready to urge flinging defiance at Disraeli and tempting his government to do its worst. But Russia's hand was forced by the threatening attitude of Austria. Despite the fact that Franz-Joseph had given some kind of assurances of neutrality when the attack on Turkey began, Austrian troops now began to mobilize in the Carpathians in a position to make a deadly flank attack upon the Russians, strung out as they were in a long line of communication through Rumania and Bulgaria to the gates of Constantinople. The fear lest the proposed Bulgarian state would be a satrapy of Russia in all but name had entered the hearts of the leaders at Vienna no less than at London. It would have been tempting destruction to have fought both England and Austria simultaneously, and, as a consequence, even before the final signing of the Treaty of San Stefano, the czar began giving tokens of a willingness to compromise. Nevertheless, ere Alexander II could be induced to lay the settlement of the Balkans before a general congress of the powers, there were tense moments and renewed threats of war. . . . On April 1, 1878, Disraeli gave notice that the reserves of the British army and navy would be called out. Fifteen days later, to advertise to the world the solidarity of the queen's empire, he ordered eight regiments of Indian Sepoy troops to Malta. This sign of resolution brought the czar's ministers to a more tractable mood, and they agreed to such concessions concerning the boundaries of Bulgaria, etc., as to make it likely that peace could be maintained. But meantime Disraeli was proving to the Turks that he was not championing their integrity out of pure disinterested friendship. By letting them believe that Russia

was likely to renew the war, and that English aid would be indispensable, the sultan was induced to promise that if Russia retained her conquests in Asia Minor (as it was perfectly certain she would do) and was likely to push her conquests further, England would give armed aid to the sultan, but to enable England to defend these territories the Ottomans gave her the occupation and administration of Cyprus. The sultan also promised to introduce the 'necessary reforms' for the protection of the Armenian Christians. The peculiar execution of these reforms and England's part therein were destined to play a very ignoble part in later history. Russia was thus forced to submit her entire scheme for the reconstruction of the Balkans to a congress of the powers. This congress presently assembled (June 13 to July 13, 1878) at Berlin, and was undoubtedly the most distinguished diplomatic gathering since the Congress of Vienna (1814-15).—W. S. Davis, *Roots of the war*, pp. 88-91.—“The Treaty of Berlin, signed by the Plenipotentiaries on the 13th of July, 1878, and of which the ratifications were exchanged on the 3rd of August, was the Treaty of San Stefano, with additions, subtractions, and amendments. . . . Speaking generally, it may be said that the objects of the Treaty of Berlin, as distinguished from its predecessor, were to place the Turkish Empire in a position of independence, and to protect the jeopardised rights of Europe. These ends it accomplished, or partially accomplished, by several important provisions. It divided the so-called Bulgaria into two provinces, of which the one to the north of the Balkans was formed into a tributary Principality, while the one to the south, which was to be designated Eastern Roumelia, was to remain under the direct authority of the Sultan, with administrative autonomy and a Christian Governor-General. It left to the Sultan the passes of the mountains, and the right of sending troops into the interior of Eastern Roumelia whenever there might be occasion. It reduced the stay of the Russian army in European Turkey. . . . It secured to Roumania, as compensation for the loss of that portion of Bessarabia which had been annexed to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris (1856), a larger amount of territory, south of the Danube, than had been granted at San Stefano. It restored to Turkey the whole of the northern shores of the Ægean, a wide extent of country in Europe, and in Asia, the valley of Alashgerd and the town of Bayazid. . . . It gave far ampler guarantees for religious liberty than had entered into the projects of the Czar.”—E. Ollier, *Cassell's illustrated history of the Russo-Turkish War*, v. 2, ch. 9, 21.—“In her private agreement with Russia, England had consented to the cession of Batoum, but she now sought to diminish the value of that post by stipulating that the fortifications should be demolished and the port declared free. The dispute, which at one time assumed a serious character, was finally settled by a declaration on the part of the Czar that Batoum should be a free port. Kars, Ardahan, and Batoum were ceded to Russia, the district of Khotur to Persia, and the Sultan pledged himself to carry out the requisite reforms in Armenia without loss of time, and to protect the inhabitants against the Kurds and Circassians. At the same time a secret treaty was made known which had been contracted between England and Turkey on the 4th of June. By this treaty the Porte pledged itself to carry out reforms in Asia Minor, and England, on her part, guaranteed the integrity of the Sultan's Asiatic posses-

sions. To put England in a position to fulfil her part of the treaty, and as a pledge for the execution of the promised reforms, the Porte surrendered Cyprus to England as a naval and military station, the latter agreeing to regard the island as an integral part of the Turkish empire, and to make over the surplus revenue to the Sultan. This treaty, which had received the consent of Germany and Russia at the time of its execution, aroused great indignation in France and Italy. . . . To pacify the former state, Beaconsfield and Salisbury entered into a secret arrangement with Waddington, in accordance with which England was to put no obstacles in the way of a French occupation of Tunis—an arrangement of which the French government finally took advantage in the year 1881. The English representatives had also entered into an arrangement with Austria in reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the sitting of June 29th Andrassy read a memorandum in which he set forth that Austria had been disturbed for a whole year by the insurrection in those provinces, and had been compelled to receive and provide for over 150,000 Bosnian fugitives, who positively refused again to submit to the hardships of Turkish misrule; that Turkey was not in a position to restore order in the disturbed districts. . . . Thereupon the Marquis of Salisbury moved that Austria be charged with the occupation and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and . . . the congress . . . decided to hand over those two provinces to Austro-Hungary. . . . The independence of Servia and Montenegro was recognized on condition that full freedom and political equality were accorded to the members of all religions. Servia received an addition to her population of 280,000 souls, her most important acquisition being the city and fortress of Nish. She also assumed a part of the Turkish debt. The recognition of Roumanian independence was conditioned on the cession of Bessarabia to Russia, and the admission to political equality of the members of all religions—a condition which had special reference to the Jews. In compensation for Bessarabia Roumania was to receive the Dobrudsha and the islands at the mouth of the Danube. [See also RUMANIA: 1866-1914.] . . . Austria took possession of her share of the booty at once, but not without the most obstinate resistance.”—W. Müller, *Political history of recent times*, sect. 30.—“In Europe the Treaty of Berlin left the sultan the mere shadow of his former dominions,—some 65,000 square miles, divided with rough equality between Thrace (or Roumelia proper), Macedonia and Albania. About 6,000,000 people lived in this long, narrow, ill-compacted 'Turkey in Europe,' and outside of Constantinople and the Albanian uplands the majority of them were Christians. 'Turkey in Asia,' however, was still a truly huge empire, embracing some 700,000 square miles, without reckoning uncertain claims to suzerainty over the tribes of Arabia and of Tripoli in Africa. These Asiatic dominions possessed little unity save that of a common oppression. It was utterly beyond the ability of the Ottomans, although they had been in Asia Minor since well before 1300, to weld even the Mohammedan portion of their subjects into a single nation. The population of Asiatic Turkey was about 17,000,000. Of this possibly 6,000,000 were actual Turks. The remainder was rather equally divided between non-Ottoman Mohammedans, Arabs and Kurds (the latter mainly in the Caucasus Mountains), and various kinds of Christians.—Greeks, Armenians and

Syrians. The Christians were the leaders of the merchant and artisan classes and probably represented at least ninety per cent. of the intelligence and hope of progress in the entire empire. The Turks were settled pretty solidly in Asia Minor and their lower elements were hard working though very unprogressive peasants; of course they also furnished most of the civil officials and the officers for the army. The Arabs in Syria and Mesopotamia were on very cold terms with their Ottoman fellow believers. They represented another and worthier type of Moslem civilization, and regarded the Turks as oppressive interlopers. As for the Kurds, they were such crude, unruly mountaineers that the sultans counted themselves lucky if they were not in constant uproar and rebellion. On the whole, the Asiatic Christians and Mohammedans lived together in tolerable harmony, but the least unlucky incident would touch off the Moslem fanatics to go on a Jihad—a 'holy war' to kill infidels—and then massacre would become the order of the day. It is needless to remark that in 1878 Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia had practically no railroads and very few decent highroads, and that a great part of the sultan's Asiatic dominions represented the true unspoiled Orient,—a certain amount of tawdry luxury and glitter almost hidden under a much vaster amount of squalor, sordidness, primitiveness in all economic and cultural conditions, with here and there black patches of even grosser barbarism. If the conditions in Turkey in Europe were bad, conditions in Turkey in Asia were still worse. And Europe had hardly given them the slightest serious attention."—W. S. Davis, *Roots of the war*, pp. 268-269.—See also BERLIN, CONGRESS OF; BALKAN STATES: 1878; 1878-1891; BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1878; BOSPORUS: 1878-1914; BULGARIA: 1878; WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: d, 2.

ALSO IN: J. A. Froude, *Lord Beaconsfield*, ch. 16.—H. D. Traill, *Marquis of Salisbury*, ch. 11.—R. Wilson, *Life and times of Queen Victoria*, v. 2, ch. 21.—Lord Eversley, *Turkish empire: Its growth and decay*.

1879-1883.—**Egyptian Question.**—Misgovernment of Ismail Pasha.—Succession of Mohammed Tewfik Pasha.—Revolt of Arabi Pasha.—Bombardment of Alexandria. See EGYPT: 1870-1883; 1875-1882; 1882-1883.

1881.—**Cession of territory to Greece.** See GREECE: 1862-1881.

1885-1886.—**War with Bulgaria.**—Agreement with Prince Alexander regarding Roumelia. See BULGARIA: 1885-1886.

1888.—**Origin of the Bagdad railway.** See BAGDAD RAILWAY: The plan; GERMANY: 1881-1913.

1889.—**Visit of William II of Germany.** See GERMANY: 1890-1914: Alteration of foreign policy.

1890-1893.—**Beginning of Armenian troubles.**—**Attitude of Russia.**—"Travellers have recognised for centuries that the Armenian population of Turkey, numbering about 2 millions [in 1915] is a most valuable element in the country. . . . A community with the desire for education is not likely to sit quietly under Turkish or other misrule, and in a very real sense it may be said that the fomentors of political agitation in Armenia, as in Bulgaria, were the schoolmasters and the missions, Catholic or Protestant. The Turks, amongst whom the Armenians are generally dispersed, resented this desire for instruction and closed the schools. . . . The Armenian question had already become a European one when the Congress of Berlin met in 1878. An effort was there made

to improve the conditions of the Armenians. The Treaty provided for the drafting of reforms to be submitted by the Porte to the Powers, who were to be notified also of their execution. . . . The condition of disorder in Armenia had gradually become worse instead of better. Then Abdul Hamid seems to have determined to try his own hand at statesmanship. Men were arrested on the slightest pretext and thrown into prison. . . . Readers will recognise that with such a spirit of hostility towards everything Christian the Armenians continued to have a bad time. The inevitable result followed. The ardent spirits among them joined their brethren the Russian Armenians across the border and made futile attempts to raise a rebellion. Such attempts were repeated and invariably led to the slaughter of innocent persons. Some Armenians had reached Paris and England and naturally endeavoured to arouse sympathy with those who were in open rebellion against Turks."—E. Pears, *Forty years in Constantinople*, pp. 151-153, 155.—Early in 1890, the churches of Erzerum were broken into and profaned while a score of Armenians were killed and wounded. The Armenians then decided that their only hope of salvation was, at any cost, to bring about European intervention and Russian revolutionaries instituted a system of anarchism, bombs and dynamite by which they counted on provoking the sultan to such massacres as should force the intervention of Europe. So far as the massacres went, their calculations were correct; but Russia was opposed to an autonomous or independent Armenia and invariably prevented any active coercion being put upon the Sultan. In 1893 all the Greek orthodox churches were closed as a protest and the Armenian Question became severe.

1894-1895.—**Revolt and massacres in Armenia.**—**Atrocities on both sides.**—"Under such circumstances the revolt of a handful of Armenians had not a chance of success and was therefore unjustifiable. . . . The result of the failure of these attempts of revolt was that Abdul Hamid determined once and for all to make revolt impossible. It was commonly said that he had made up his mind to exterminate the Armenian population. It may well be doubted whether he deliberately contemplated a step so difficult. But he and some of his creatures organised a series of massacres such as had not been in any European country for upwards of a century. . . . When all arrangements had been made for preventing news coming from Armenia, Abdul Hamid set about the task which he called giving the Armenians a lesson. Emisaries were sent into the provinces. The Moslems were invited to assemble in the mosques, were informed of the Sultan's plan, and told that they were at liberty to take their neighbours' goods and to kill them if any resistance was made."—E. Pears, *Forty years in Constantinople*, pp. 156-157.—"In 1894 a massacre took place in Turkish Armenia, caused by a Kurdish raid in which two Kurds were killed. Their corpses were conveyed by friends to Moush, who declared that the Armenians had revolted and killed some of the Sultan's troops. This report was telegraphed to Constantinople, and served as a pretext for an order from the Sultan to massacre the defenseless people, upon whom his troops committed the most indescribable outrages with the least regard of age or sex. . . . Many of the wives and female relatives of Christians were taken from the Kharput vilayet into the Turkish harem; at another time, twenty

Armenian women were dragged into the harem of Hussein Pasha of the Van district; also several into that of the Commissaire of Police; while many others, singly and in couples were taken into other houses or sent to different parts of the country. A Turkish Agha at Tadem exchanged Christian women and girls for horses and donkeys; the same Agha also distributed women and girls for zabtiehs or policemen, and soldiers . . . quartered at Vertmenik for the protection of the village."—A. W. Hidden, *Ottoman dynasty*, p. 409.—Further massacres of Armenians were reported to Lord Salisbury by Sir Philip Currie in December, 1895. The loss of life was estimated at 30,000.

1896.—Conflict in Crete between Christians and Mussulmans, and its causes.—In 1868, the Cretans, for the second time, were thrust under the Turkish yoke. "By way of solace the Powers exerted themselves feebly in inducing the Porte to concede the so-called 'Organic Statute' [or 'Organic Regulation' (see GREECE: 1862-1881)]. . . . As the Charter remained a dead letter, the Cretans seized the next favourable opportunity to rise in 1877. Their case was brought before the Congress of Berlin. . . . Ultimately, through the mediation of England, the Porte was induced, in November of that year, to concede the Pact of Halepa, so named after the village near Canea where it was negotiated, and signed under the supervision of the British Consul, Mr. T. B. Sandwith. . . . The arrangement was accepted by the Cretans as a compromise, in spite of its many and manifest drawbacks. Nevertheless, it brought about, at the outset, certain beneficial results. Political parties were formed in which the Mohammedan Cretans blended, irrespective of religious differences, with their Christian countrymen; and unprecedented phenomenon of a Christian Vali completing his four years' tenure of governorship was witnessed in the person of Photiades Pasha. . . . True to its traditional tactics, the Porte took with one hand what it had given with the other. The Mussulman Deputy Governor and the military commander frustrated every effort of the Vali, the very funds necessary for the maintenance of the gendarmerie being denied him. Karatheodory was consequently forced to resign. Complete anarchy now reigned in the island"—Ypsilioritis, *Situation in Crete (Contemporary Review, Sept., 1896)*.—"Occasional skirmishes between the Christian inhabitants and the soldiers kept the excitement simmering and ushered in the sanguinary scenes that finally followed. Turkhan Pasha, taking time by the forelock, armed the Cretan Moslems for the combat with the approval of the commander of the troops, and the city of Canea prepared for a blood bath. The Mohammedan Lent (Ramazan) was drawing to a close, and the three days of rejoicing which invariably follow (Bairam) were supposed to be fixed for the attack on the Christians. These anticipations were duly realised, and on the 24th May, 1896, at 1 o'clock P. M., the Turks fired the first shots, blowing out the brains of several Christians to make that Moslem holiday. Forewarned, however, is forearmed, and the Christians defended themselves to the best of their ability on that day and the 25th and 26th, during which every house in Canea was barricaded, and neighbours living on opposite sides of the absurdly narrow streets fired at each other from behind stone heaps piled up in the windows of their bedrooms. The streets were deserted, all traffic suspended, and it was not until the 27th that the thirty Christian corpses (including two women and

four children) and the twenty lifeless Turks were removed for burial. These events provoked a new administrative change of scene: Turkhan Pasha was recalled, and Abdullah Pasha, at the head of four battalions from Salonica, came to take his place. These troops laid waste the villages and fields of the provinces of Apokorona, Cydonia, and Kissamo, burning houses, huts, and churches on the way. The best soldiers in the world, however, run terrible risks in the interior of Crete, and Abdullah was repulsed with the loss of two hundred men at the town of Vamos. The foreign consuls at Canea, having verified these facts, strongly blamed his conduct in a joint verbal note, and the Porte shortly afterwards recalled him, and appointed Berovitch Pasha [prince of Samos] in his place. This was the beginning of the end. The Christians of the island meanwhile met, and through their delegates formulated certain demands, which the foreign consuls referred to their ambassadors at Constantinople, and the famous 'Modifications of the Convention of Halepa' were framed in consequence. The sultan, too, yielding to tardy pressure, graciously conceded the nomination of a Christian governor-general in the person of Berovitch, the summoning of the National Assembly, and other demands. . . . The questions of the tribunals and the gendarmerie [for the enforcement of peace and order in the island] were to be arranged by international commissions; but weeks and months passed away before they were even appointed. . . . At last the commissions arrived and began their work in December [1896]."—E. J. Dillon, *Crete and the Cretans (Fortnightly Review, May, 1897)*.

1896 (January-March).—Turkish opposition to English and American measures for relief to Armenian sufferers.—Work of Clara Barton and the Red Cross Society.—"With the greater massacres that followed the disturbance in Constantinople and Trebizond, there broke upon the Christian world a revelation of horror and of terror that was even greater than any previous. From every side came the most piteous appeals to the Christian world. Language itself seemed to fail in telling of the situation, and many a sturdy man and high-hearted woman felt absolutely helpless as they looked out over the plains, into the villages and along the streets of the most prosperous cities, and saw starvation and death staring hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children in the face. . . . It is sufficient here to say that everywhere throughout England and America there was a prompt and cordial response. . . . Committees were formed in a great many cities and Armenian relief associations . . . were organized. Most naturally . . . the great Red Cross Society furnished its aid. . . . The appeal came first from the field and from those who, ready and willing to do all they could, felt that the burden was heavier than they could bear. The appeal met with a cordial response and Clara Barton, notwithstanding her advanced years, rose immediately to the emergency and gathered her forces to join those already on the field for the relief of the thousands of suffering ones. . . . For a time it seemed as if everything was going favorably and Miss Barton was on the point of starting. Then came the well-known objection of the Turkish Government. Word was sent that the Sultan absolutely refused to allow the Red Cross to do the work. In the first place he denied that there was any work needed; affirmed that the stories of suffering were false, gotten up

purely for political effect; and that whatever work was needed was already being done through Turkish officials and could be carried out by the corresponding organization in his own empire called the Red Crescent. Miss Barton, however, and those in charge of the committees, were not discouraged. Appeals were sent through Congress and the President and in an unofficial way pressure was brought to bear by Minister Terrell in Constantinople. The result was that at last objections were overborne and Clara Barton and her associates reached Constantinople. From there they have spread throughout the empire using the means already at hand of assisting those who are overborne, and are bringing relief to the sufferers in all the empire."—E. M. Bliss, *Turkey and the Armenian atrocities*, pp. 510, 512.

1896 (August).—Attack of Armenian revolutionists on Ottoman bank at Galata.—Turkish massacre of Armenians in the city and in the provinces.—"The Armenian revolutionists, encouraged by the outbreak in Crete, Syria and Macedonia, warned the embassies at Constantinople that the nonfulfillment of these promises for reform would force them again to make demonstrations against the Turkish Government. The embassies treated the threats with contempt. They planned outbreaks at Adana, Angora and Van. The last came to a head, but without any result; the majority of the revolutionists, with thousands of innocent Armenians, were slaughtered in cold blood. Through spies the Turkish Government was fully informed as to the plan of seizing the Ottoman Bank, but nothing was done to prevent it. It was quietly preparing for the following massacre. On the 26th of August, 1896, at 12.30 twenty-seven armed Armenians seized the Ottoman Bank at Perchembeh Bazar, Galata. They began firing and throwing bombs at the gathered crowds made up of low-class Turks and Kurds, who were organized previously for the occasion; they were armed with clubs and firearms. Turkish troops and police arrived at the spot and surrounded the bank; they had orders to assist the mob if necessary. The revolutionists, seeing that by holding the bank they would not accomplish anything, thought it advisable to come to some terms for their own safety. They demanded their liberty without conditions, and to be pardoned by the Sultan. If these claims were not granted they threatened to blow up the bank and all in it. The demand was communicated to and accepted by the Sultan; and the next day they were escorted by the director of the bank and the dragomans of the foreign embassies on board the steamer of the French line 'Messagerie Maritime.'"—A. W. Hidden, *Ottoman dynasty*, pp. 412-413.—After the revolutionists had capitulated, a terrible massacre of Armenians began. "There were from 150,000 to 200,000 Armenians in Constantinople. They were merchants, shopkeepers, confidential clerks, employés in banks and offices of every kind—the chief business men of the city. They were the bakers of the city, they had charge of the khans and bazaars and the wealth of the city; they were the porters, house-servants, and navvies. . . . Now the Government has undertaken to ruin this whole population. They are hunted about the city and over the hills, like wild beasts. . . . Thousands have been sent off at once to the Balkan Sea ports, to find their way as best they can without money or food to their desolated villages in the interior. . . . Thousands have fled to foreign countries."—*Constantinople massacre (Contemporary Review, Oct., 1896)*.

1897.—Fresh conflicts in Crete.—Massacre at Canea.—Greek interference.—War with Greece.—Turkish victories.—Intervention of the powers.—Terms of peace.—Cession of Thessaly to Greece.—"The customary delay in beginning the work of organising the police made the Christians suspicious; and a Mussulman outbreak at Canea [in Crete] on February 4, 1897, followed by the burning of a large part of the Christian quarter, renewed the civil war. The Christians occupied Akroteri, the 'peninsula' between Canea and Suda bay, and proclaimed union with Greece. Meanwhile, the news of a massacre at Canea had caused immense excitement at Athens. . . . Trikoupes, who had counselled quiet at the time of the last insurrection, was now dead; and Deligiannes, the bellicose Minister of 1885, was once more in power. . . . On February 15 a Greek force under Col. Vassos, with orders to occupy Crete in the name of King George, to restore order and to drive the Turks from the forts, landed a little to the west of Canea. [See also CRETE: 1800-1913.] The same day the admirals of the five European Powers, whose ships were then in Cretan waters, occupied the town, whence the last Turkish governor of the island had fled for ever. The insurgents on Akroteri then attacked the Turkish troops, until the admirals forced them to desist by a bombardment, which caused intense indignation at Athens and some disgust in London among those who remembered Navarino. A note of the Powers promising autonomy on condition of the withdrawal of the Greek ships and troops met with an unfavourable reply. . . . Among the Greeks, who had had no war with Turkey since that of Independence, but who had wished to fight in 1854, in 1878, and in 1886, there was intense enthusiasm, unfortunately as yet unaccompanied by organisation. The contest was unequal, even though a band of red-shirted 'Garibaldians' of various nations, under a son of the great captain, came to the aid of the Greeks and money poured into the war fund from abroad. On April 9 armed bands of the 'National Society' crossed into Macedonia; further conflicts occurred on the Thessalian frontier; and on April 17 Turkey declared war. True to his traditional policy of dividing the Christian races of the near east against each other, the Sultan secured the neutrality of Bulgaria and Serbia by an opportune grant of bishoprics, commercial agents, and schools in Macedonia. An Austro-Russian note to the Balkan courts warned them not to interfere in the struggle. Thus any hopes of common action by the Christians were dissipated, and the ring was confined to the two combatants. The 'Thirty Days' War' was an almost unbroken series of Greek disasters. The Turkish advance across the Thessalian plain aroused a reaction at Athens. The indignant crowd marched on the unprotected palace; and the King owed the preservation of his throne to the prompt intervention of M. Demetrios Rhalles, a democratic politician, who had formed a party of his own in Attica and had become the most influential leader of the Opposition, and the idol of the Athenians. M. Rhalles for forthwith appointed Prime Minister on April 29. Next day Col. Smolenski, 'the hero of Reveni,' who had fought in Crete as a volunteer in 1868, and was the one officer who had distinguished himself in the war, repulsed the Turks in a first attack on Velesino, the site of the legend of Alkestis, but had to yield in a second battle; the classic field of Pharsalos was the scene of one Greek defeat, and the unknown village of Gribovo in Epirus that of another; and the climax was



reached when, on May 17, the battle of Domokos, in which the Italian Fratti renewed the heroic tradition of Santa Rosa, as Harris had that of Byron, opened to the Turks the Phourka pass which leads down to Lamia. A panic seized the Athenians at the news; the royal family durst not show itself in the streets; the royal liveries were changed; pictures of Smolenski replaced the royal portraits in the shop windows. Then the Powers intervened; an armistice was signed on May 19 and 20 in Epirus and Thessaly; and Col. Vassos, who had already left Crete, was followed by the rest of his men. A treaty of peace was concluded at Constantinople on December 4, which provided for the evacuation of Thessaly by the Ottoman troops, and the cession for the second time of that province to Greece, except one village and certain strategic positions, which brought the Turkish frontier very near Lárisa. Greece was ordered to pay a war indemnity of £14,000,000, and submitted to an International Commission of Control over 'the collection and employment of revenues sufficient for the service of the war indemnity loan and the other national debts.'—W. Miller, *Ottoman empire, 1801-1913*, pp. 434-438.

1897-1899.—Prolonged anarchy in Crete.—Inharmonious "Concert of Europe."—Final departure of Turkish troops and officials from the island.—Organization of government under Prince George of Greece.—The autonomous régime promised to this unfortunate island—the Cuba of Europe—was at the end of 1897 apparently far from realization. In the meantime a most distressing condition, amounting to practical anarchy, prevailed everywhere except at some ports where the international gendarmerie maintained a fair semblance of order. Presently, a new attempt was made to select a Christian governor-general. France and Russia proposed Prince George of Greece, but Austria and Turkey opposed. In April, Austria and Germany withdrew from the blockade and from the "Concert," leaving Great Britain, Russia, France and Italy to deal with Cretan affairs alone. The admirals of these powers, acting under instructions, then divided the Cretan coast among themselves, each directing the administration of such government as could be conducted in his own part. The British admiral had Candia, the capital town, and there trouble arose which brought the whole Cretan business to a crisis. He attempted to take possession of the customs house (September 6), and landed for that purpose a small force of 60 men. They were attacked by a Turkish mob, with which they fought desperately for four hours, losing 12 killed and some 40 wounded, before they could make their retreat to the shore and regain their ship. At the same time a general massacre of Christians in the town was begun and some 800 perished before it was stopped. Edhem Pasha, with about 4,000 Turkish troops at his command, waited long for the mob to do its work before he interfered. This outbreak brought the four powers to a decisive agreement. They joined in imperatively demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops and officials from the island, and enforced the demand. Guarantees for the safety of the Mohammedan population in life and property were given; it was conceded that the sultan's suzerainty over Crete should be maintained, and he was allowed to hold one military post in the island for a sign of the fact. On those terms the Turkish evacuation of Crete was carried out in November, and Prince George of Greece was appointed not governor-

general, but high commissioner of the four powers, to organize an autonomous government in the island and administer it for a period of three years. The appointment was accepted, and Prince George was received with rejoicing in Crete on December 21. The blockade had been raised on the 5th, and on the 26th the admirals departed. During the following two years (1899-1900) there seems to have been a generally good condition of order restored and preserved. A constitution was framed by a national assembly, which conferred the executive authority on Prince George, as high commissioner, with responsible councillors, and created a Chamber of Deputies, elected for the most part by the people, but containing ten members appointed by the high commissioner. Equal rights for all religious beliefs was made a principle of the constitution.—See also CRETE: 1800-1913

1899 (May-July).—Representation in the peace conference at The Hague. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1899: Constitution.

1899 (October).—Concessions to the Armenians.—In October an irade was published by the sultan which withdrew restrictions on the movements of Armenians in the provinces, except in the case of suspects; granted pardon or commutation of sentence to a number of Armenian prisoners; ordered payment of sums due to Armenian government officials who had been killed or expelled at the time of the massacres; directed assistance to be given in the repairing and rebuilding of churches, schools, and monasteries which had been injured or destroyed, and also gave direction for the building of an orphanage near Constantinople.

1899-1908.—Concession to Germany for Bagdad railway.—Alarm at German aggressions in the East. See RAILROADS: 1899-1910, BAGDAD RAILWAY: The plan.

19th century.—Summary of British diplomacy.—Pitt, Urquhart, Beaconsfield and Gladstone.—"It was William Pitt who created what Sorel calls 'the grand diplomatic charter of England in the 19th century' by refusing in a speech, now famous, to enter into any discussions whatsoever with anyone who proposed to put an end to the Ottoman Empire. The attitude of his great adversary, Fox, was more favourable to Catherine II; for, being in need of the English, the Tsarina lavished her compliments and her caresses both liberally and skilfully upon this statesman. Thus it came about that, on March 20th, 1791, he boasted in the Commons of having helped Russia in her march towards the East, and scoffed at the idea, already formulated by the new school of diplomacy, of admitting Turkey into the family of nations and of making her part of the European system. . . . [The leader of this new school was David Urquhart (1805-1877).] This Scotsman, who had been entirely forgotten, though his ideas in his own day reverberated throughout Europe, was the real originator of British intervention in favour of Turkey, and it was his policy that triumphed at the Paris Congress of 1850. As a young man he, like all the men of his generation, was much impressed by the ideas of Bentham. He began his career in foreign politics, as so many did at that time, as a Philhellene, but, as a result of a visit to the Near East in 1827 in the company of Lord Cochrane, he came back very strongly in sympathy with Islam, and inaugurated the pro-Turk campaign in England, which ultimately compelled Lord Palmerston to be more cautious in his relations with Russia. . . . The appearance on the

scene of a man of this stamp resulted in the complete overthrow of Russian designs during the first half of the 19th century. . . . He insisted on admitting the Turkish nation into the international system, because he was convinced that if only we could succeed in preventing the eternal interferences with the domestic affairs of the Turks, the latter might, with the help of Western nations, raise themselves from the slough into which they had fallen precisely owing to these repeated interferences. The idea that the Sick Man was irretrievably condemned to an early death was, according to Urquhart, the principle source of all the complications. Moreover, this idea was not based upon an examination of the real facts, but upon the diagnosis of a doctor interested in the inheritance. In the end Turkey was persuaded that it was necessary for her to submit to a European treatment that did not suit her, and thus she came to be inoculated with the poison which finally made her really ill. Urquhart firmly believed in the vitality of the Turkish race. He made a close study of the political institutions and the spiritual traditions of Islam, and in them he discovered the outlines of an organisation so healthy that he preferred it before a lifeless imitation of European institutions. He insisted upon the Western Powers of Europe, abstaining from any interference whatsoever in Turkish affairs in order that the historical process of transforming the Moslem people into modern nations, might be accomplished on natural lines with the collaboration of enlightened Europeans familiar with the problems of the East, and free from all diplomatic interference and international intrigue. Urquhart did not hesitate to declare that the Turkish problem, in the form in which it had been raised before Europe by Muscovite diplomacy, was a piece of mystification destined only to keep alive the troubles in the Near-East, for which one day the world would have to pay very dearly. Urquhart was not alone in propagating these ideas. Among the Europeans at Constantinople was a well-intentioned Frenchman named Blacque, Director of the Ottoman Monitor, who did his utmost to convince the public opinion of his country of the intrinsic vitality of the Turkish race. In France, however, the diplomatic tradition of the Marquis de Villeneuve was completely dead, and the somewhat belated opinions of Napoleon on the value of Islam had never been accepted. France dreamed only of the left bank of the Rhine, and the last Government of Charles X—the Polignac Cabinet—declared itself ready to sacrifice Constantinople to the Russians in exchange for a similar reward in Europe. . . . From this time forward the keys of the Turkish problem lay in the hands of England. Lord Beaconsfield had a lofty conception of the task of the Anglo-Saxon in the East. He dreamed of the moral protectorate of Great Britain over Islam; and, on his journeys in the Near East, he studied the spirit of the Moslem people, which he thought worthy of participating in the work of modern civilisation as it had participated in the civilisations that have preceded our own. He wished his country to preside, in brotherly collaboration, over the political education of the Moslem peoples, and over the vast reform movements which have been agitating the minds of Mussulmans for the last hundred years. His point of view, which was inspired by the ideas identified with Urquhart, might possibly have been able to save Europe from a general conflagration by promoting a spirit of confidence between Christianity and Islam, and

preventing Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism from fishing in the troubled waters of the political and social reforms, which must of necessity herald the birth of a new order in the Near East. The defensive alliance which he made the English Ambassador at Constantinople sign with Turkey on June 4th, 1878, guaranteed to the Porte the help of England against the covetousness of Russia in regard to Asia Minor. Unfortunately England, which was soon to be absorbed in domestic troubles in which Gladstone was to play a high-handed part, did not understand Beaconsfield. Hatred of Islam was, as everybody knows, one of the strongest actuating motives of the former statesman, deeply impregnated as he was by Christian theology. Under his influence the Oriental policy of Great Britain changed completely, and she became in fact, if not in theory, the unconscious ally of Tsarism against Islam."—F. Valji, *Europe in Asia Minor (pamphlet)*, pp. 14, 16-17, 19-20, 23-24.

20th century.—Status of women. See WOMAN'S RIGHTS: 1900-1921.

1901-1902.—Abduction of Ellen M. Stone by brigands.—Ransom paid for her release.—"In a communication to the president of the United States, Mar. 24, 1908, the secretary of state, Elihu Root, recited the circumstances which attended the abduction by brigands, in 1901, of Ellen M. Stone, an American missionary to Turkey, as she traveled the highway between Bansko and Djumia, Macedonia, in the Turkish empire, and the necessary payment of a ransom to her captors, to secure her release. In the judgment of Secretary Root the government should refund the ransom money to the citizens from whom it was obtained by subscription at the time [and this was done]."—60th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document, no. 408.

1902-1903.—Conventions for building the Baghdad railway. See BAGDAD RAILWAY: The plan.

1902-1903.—Insurgent operations in Macedonia.—Turkish misrule.—Rejection of reform plans.—Insurgent operations in Macedonia were opened in the fall of 1902 and continued the following year, and into 1904. Besides an activity of insurgent bands and collisions with Turkish soldiery, there were many dynamite explosions, wrecking a bank at Salonica, blowing up a railway train, a passenger steamer, and other outrages of that kind. Then came confused and revolting accounts of a terrible retaliation by the Turks. "Abdul Hamid's want of statesmanship was nowhere more conspicuous than in his treatment of Macedonia. He had witnessed the loss of Serbia and Bulgaria. In Macedonia, adjoining Greece and these liberated States, the people were mostly of the same race, religion, and language as those of these adjacent countries, and a ruler might have been expected to examine the circumstances under which they had been detached from the Empire, and to ask himself how far similar circumstances were likely to produce a similar result. . . . The Province had suffered previous to his accession from the same kind of mis-government which had led to aspirations in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and then to the Russo-Turkish war. In the Treaties both of San Stefano and Berlin suggestions had been made for bettering the lot of Moslem and Christian inhabitants in order to remove legitimate discontent. While the usual evils attendant upon Turkish rule prevailed in Macedonia, such as the non-payment of the troops quartered upon the population, the lawless exactions of Moslems from the Christians, the

want of protection for life, woman's honour, and property, Macedonia had its own special grievances. Non-government was a not less fertile ground of complaint than mis-government. The traditionally hostile elements of the population. Greeks, Bulgarians, and Albanians, were left to fight out their own quarrels. Redress in the law courts could not be had. Corrupt as they were throughout the Empire, they were probably worse in Macedonia than elsewhere. Already a large portion of the country had been unjustly acquired by Moslems from the Christian peasants, and the disputes between the legal Moslem owners themselves as well as between them and the peasants, had brought about something like anarchy. Abdul Hamid in the early years of his reign let things drift. He did nothing. . . . Bulgaria, especially, desiring a peaceful neighbour and wishing to stop immigration, presented projects for its reform to the Porte. She did not ask for or desire its annexation, because, though the population of Southern Macedonia was largely Bulgarian, the people of the Principality did not wish their influence to be swamped by the union with the people of that Province. There was, indeed, considerable jealousy between the two populations, but Bulgaria suggested the establishment of an autonomous Government in Macedonia under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Thereupon the Albanians, probably at the instigation of the Sultan, put forth another project on different lines. Neither project was accepted by the Porte."—E. Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, pp. 269-272.—See also MACEDONIA: 20th century.

1903-1904.—Inursions of Armenian revolutionists from Russia and Persia into Asiatic Turkey.—Exaggerated accounts of retaliatory massacre.—Many bands of revolutionary Armenians who crossed the frontiers from Russia and Persia during 1903 and 1904, making incursions into Armenian Turkey, and bringing upon the inhabitants there the tender mercies of Turkish troops, appear to have been acting generally in coöperation with the Bulgarian revolutionists in Macedonia. The consequent barbarities were dreadful enough, no doubt, but were found to be greatly exaggerated in the reports current at the time. This was the conclusion of the British ambassador to Turkey, derived from investigations made on the ground by a consular officer who traversed it with care.

1903-1907.—Revolutionary plans of Young Turks.—Coöperation of Armenian and other revolutionary elements secured.—Program adopted.—"There were few political difficulties in the way of an understanding between the Young Turks and the Armenian revolutionaries. The problem was not like that of the Greeks and Slavs in Macedonia, who had on the frontier independent nations of people of their own kin on whom to lean and to whom to look for protection and perchance annexation. For Armenia is now but a geographical expression, and ancient Armenia has been partitioned between Turkey, Russia, and Persia. The Armenians in Turkish Armenia are vastly outnumbered by the Moslem population; and the creation of an independent Armenian principality, desired by a section of the revolutionists, was obviously an impracticable scheme. The more sensible Armenians realised that the only alternative for the rule of Turkey was that of Russia, and the experience of their brethren across the border had proved to them that, of the two, the rule of Turkey was to be preferred; for under it they enjoyed a measure of racial autonomy and various

privileges—much restricted, it is true, under Abdul Hamid's despotism—which the Russian Government, ever bent on the Russianisation of the nationalities subject to it, would certainly have denied to them. It was, therefore, the aim of the moderates among the Armenian malcontents, while remaining under Ottoman rule, to secure the civil liberties and institutions calculated to guarantee their personal safety, the security of their property, and the honour of their wives and daughters. Now the Young Turk programme promised them these things and more; so, realising that this great Mussulman movement was likely to meet with success, they decided to throw in their lot with Ahmed Riza and his brother revolutionaries. But this union could not be accomplished until the Armenians had consented to abandon the methods of their propaganda. They had for years been appealing to the European Powers, through their Committees, to compel the Sultan to grant good government to his Christian subjects in Armenia in accordance with the solemn pledges which he had given to the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. But the Young Turks insisted that there must be no appealing to foreign Powers for assistance. . . . The Young Turks thus came to an understanding with the Armenians, and later on it was arranged between them that when the time was ripe, and the Committee gave the word for the Mussulman revolt in Turkey, the Armenians should also rise; for it was realised that the Sultan would yield to nothing but force, and that only by means of an armed rebellion. . . . And now the Young Turks set themselves to win over to their cause the other non-Mussulman revolutionary Committees. With the Jews, as with the Armenians, they had relatively little difficulty, for the Jews were a people without a land, and therefore could entertain no schemes of national independence; their hope and interests lay in the good government of the Ottoman Empire. But with the Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs of Macedonia, whose very last idea it was to become patriotic Ottomans, the Young Turks found the work of persuasion attended with almost insuperable difficulties. . . . [It was pointed out to them] that it would be to the advantage of the Macedonian Christians to abandon their ideas of separation from the Ottoman Empire and to join cause with the Young Turks, whose aim it was to hold the Empire together and to give equal rights to all its peoples. Wonderful to say, the Macedonian Committees in Paris at last allowed themselves to be persuaded, and threw in their lot with the Young Turks, halfheartedly, perhaps, at first, and with mental reservations. They realised that they could hope for little help from Europe, and were willing to work with the Young Turks in upsetting the Hamidian régime. After a successful revolution something might turn up that would enable them to gain the national independence that they still had at heart; and even if that hope was destroyed, they would be able, having supported the Young Turks, to claim the equal rights which these had promised to them. But the conflict of interests that severed the various groups, and the anarchical principles that some of the revolutionary leaders professed, made the reconciliation of all these discordant elements a matter of great difficulty. The Congress held in Paris, in 1902, had for its chief result the accentuation of schism; it was not till 1907 that the various Committees were able at last to arrange a programme that was acceptable to all; and by that time the Young Turks had established their secret society in Macedonia and had gained

the allegiance of a considerable portion of that formidable Turkish army without whose cooperation, as the Christians in Macedonia knew well, no revolution had a chance of success. So in December, 1907, a Congress of the Turkish revolutionaries met in Paris, at which were represented the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, the Armenian, Bulgarian, Jewish, Arab, Albanian, and other Committees; and the delegates all agreed to accept the following principles: The deposition of the Sultan Abdul Hamid. The maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Absolute equality in the eyes of the law of the various races and religions. The establishment of Parliamentary institutions on the lines of Midhat Pasha's Constitution. The 'Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress,' as representing the dominant race and the fighting forces of the revolution, naturally now took the lead, and its members, of whom but a few were non-Musulmans, became the organisers of the revolt and mandatories of the other Committees. It may be pointed out here that the resolutions of the Congress had no effect in pacifying Macedonia, where, indeed, the condition of affairs was ever becoming worse; for Greece and Bulgaria, still looking forward to the disruption of Turkey, were pouring into Macedonia their armed bands to 'peg out claims' in the Greek and Bulgarian interest; and throughout all that region violence, murder, and rapine prevailed. Of no more effect were the efforts of the Great Powers, which, in 1907, issued a categorical declaration that no Macedonian race would be permitted to draw any territorial advantage from the action of its hands."—E. F. Knight, *Turkey*, pp. 80-86.

1903-1908.—Attempts to relieve the Macedonian situation.—Mürzsteg programme and its failure.—Financial control by the powers.—Continued disorders.—In 1903 "Revolutionary Committees . . . began to appear in various towns in Macedonia. They urged Sofia and the Powers to demand Macedonian autonomy from the Porte. . . . Indeed, the Powers had never ceased to press for reforms. As a result of negotiations between the Porte and the Powers, an Inspector-General of the gendarmery had been named, but with insufficient powers. The appointment itself, only accepted after long negotiations, marked the limit of the success of Europe. The condition of the country became so serious that Austria and Russia, the two Powers after Turkey most interested in the pacification, took the matter in hand. A meeting between the Austrian Emperor and the Czar was held at Mürzsteg in the summer of 1903. It resulted in the drawing up of a programme of reforms which was presented to the Porte in October of that year. . . . In September Abdul Hamid expressed his regret to the two Powers that such demands were considered necessary, but, of course, left a further answer to be given by his Sublime Porte. . . . The negotiations were long and ended in an unsatisfactory compromise. Austria, either because she was afraid that disorder in Macedonia might be too completely suppressed or was influenced by Germany not to push the Sultan too far, ceased to take an energetic part in pressing on the reforms. She and Germany now acted together, and it soon became the popular and not unfounded opinion that the districts for which they had the appointment of gendarmery officers saw little of the keen activity which those under British and French officers witnessed in the desire of the officers placed in charge to secure effective police. The stipulations which had been weakly

accepted that the inspectors whose duty *inter alia* it was to report on murders or other outrages should only act on orders from Turkish officials proved useless. It was soon found that the great object of such officials was to conceal crime when committed by Turkish and other favoured bands, and their visits came to be regarded as worse than farce. Abdul Hamid was curiously persistent in his determination not to tolerate any reform initiated by the European Powers. He was equally minded not to allow any suggested by his own people. During the years between 1904 and 1908, the Moslem population of Macedonia, as well as Bulgars and Greeks, again pressed Abdul Hamid to take measures to provide for the safety of life and property. The Mürzsteg programme of the two Emperors had failed in producing useful results. Lord Lansdowne in February, 1905, informed the Balkan Committee that the British Government was 'pressing the Porte for permanent and effective reforms.' In November, 1905, England, France, and Italy sought to compel Abdul Hamid to carry financial reforms into execution. They asked that a budget of income and expenditure should be submitted to the two Civil Agents appointed under the Mürzsteg programme. The Porte agreed, but objected to control by the Civil Agents, and asked to increase custom duties from 8 to 11 per cent. The Powers refused, but England proposed that the control should be international, and that a Council should be appointed. On July 11, the Porte refused, pleading the Sultan's sovereign rights. The Powers stuck to their proposal, and a fleet consisting of British, French, Russian, Italian, and Austrian ships made a demonstration. They seized the Custom houses of Mitylene and Lemnos, and held them until Abdul Hamid yielded (November, 1905). Germany had already begun to pose as the Sultan's friend, and would not name foreign gendarmery officers, or take any part in the naval demonstration. She was now the only great Power which declined to co-operate in securing order in Macedonia. No proposal for even the most limited form of autonomy was listened to. Every year saw a larger amount of emigration from Macedonia to America, and other foreign countries. The best of the Moslem population, as well as the Christians, recognised that with an unpaid soldiery, disorder was certain to continue. Moslems and Christians came to believe that Abdul Hamid was the great hinderer of the execution of reform. He had refused to consider even the proposals made by his own subjects, just as he had cut out of the project presented by Austria and Russia the provisions which would have guaranteed the proposed reforms and would have contented the bulk of the inhabitants. All Europe insisted that reform was necessary; for during the years 1905 and 1906 the condition of Macedonia had become worse than ever. Greek and Bulgarian bands waged civil war against each other. Murders, theft, attacks upon villages by men of a hostile race; sometimes upon no pretext whatever, except, if by Greeks, that the village was Bulgarian, or *vice versa*; at other times on the pretext that the villagers had given aid to rival bands; Turkish troops now joining one side, now another. Farms were deserted. Mines were abandoned. People of all races were seeking the means of getting out of the country."—E. Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, pp. 275-276, 278-280.—See also MACEDONIA: 20th century.

ALSO IN: W. E. D. Allen, *Turks in Europe*.

1905-1906.—Demand in Crete for union with

Greece.—Appointment of high commissioner. See CRETE: 1800-1913.

1905-1907.—Anti-British agitation in Egypt.—Encroachments on the Sinai frontier. See EGYPT: 1905; 1906-1907.

1906.—Troublesome punctilio removed.—United States represented at Constantinople by an ambassador.—The diplomatic rank of the United States representative at Constantinople was, until 1906, an obstacle to American influence with the Turkish government. The following quotation explains the condition that prevailed previous to that year, when the rank of the American representative was raised to that of ambassador. "According to usage in Constantinople, an Ambassador may obtain an audience at any time with the Sultan, and force many items through even against the influence of both the Palace and the Porte. But every representative lower than an Ambassador can never appear before the Sultan except when called for by his High Gracious Majesty. This invitation can be secured sometimes by indirect means; but when, for any reason, the Sultan does not wish to see a Minister of any foreign Power, the Palace officials can baffle him, if necessary, for years. Now, the American representative is called 'Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,' and is outranked by every Ambassador to Turkey. Hence, he lacks the all-important privilege of approaching the Sultan uninvited."—*Americus. Some phases of the issues between the United States and Turkey (North American Review, May, 1906).*

1907.—Represented at Second Hague Conference. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1907.

1907-1914.—Relations with Austria-Hungary and Balkan states.—Loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1914; WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 8.

1908.—Young Turk party and the Committee of Union and Progress.—Revolutionary plans hastened by fear of foreign intervention.—Albanian incident.—Beginning and rapid spread of revolt.—Proclamation of Constitution of 1876.—Yielding of the sultan.—Summoning of Chamber of Deputies.—Administrative reforms.—The Young Turks had, in building up their cause, abstained from violence, and labored with secret propaganda to gain the support of the army. In 1908 the headquarters of the party were transferred from Paris to Salonica. Most of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress were military officers, among whom were Major Enver Bey and Major Niazi Bey. "It was the intention of the Committee to begin the revolution on the anniversary of the Sultan's accession, August 31; but events caused it to hasten its action. The meeting between Edward VII and the Tsar at Reval made it fear foreign intervention; Abdul Hamid, informed by his spies of the agitation among his Macedonian troops, had made preparations to crush it; and an incident, which in any other country would have had no political importance, secured for the conspirators the co-operation of the Albanians, whom of all his subjects the Sultan had humoured, feared, and trusted most. [However, the Albanians had become irritated by unpopular taxes and edicts which closed their schools and forbade printing presses.] This incident was nothing more alarming than an excursion, organized for the benefit of the Austrian school at Üskub, to a wood near Ferisovich on the line of Mitrovitza. But the Albanians of that district considered the proposed entertainment, of which dancing was to have been an item, as bad for public morals, already contaminated by the

music-halls of Üskub; while the rumoured display of Austrian flags aroused their political suspicions. Accordingly, they burnt the platform erected for the dancers, and threatened to fire upon the excursion-train if it attempted to traverse the cut-throat gorge of Katchanik. This threat alarmed the Committee of Union and Progress, which feared that an Albanian attack upon Austrian subjects would be made the pretext for an Austrian invasion of the country, and that consequently its own scheme would be frustrated. Some of its members parleyed with the Albanians of Ferisovich to such purpose that the latter threw in their lot with the revolutionary movement, and telegraphed to the Sultan demanding the revival of the constitution of 1876. Meanwhile, several occurrences had shown the spread of the agitation among the officers of the 3rd army corps. At Resnja, near the lake of Prespa, on July 3, Major Niazi, after seizing the military chest and a number of rifles, took to the mountains as the chief of a 'Young' Turkish band; and the Shemshi Pasha, who was sent to suppress him, was killed at Monastir. Other assassinations of reactionary officers followed in quick succession; the Sultan, realising that he could rely upon neither the Albanians nor the army, on July 22 appointed as Grand Vizier 'little' Said Pasha, the Liberal statesman who had once fled for refuge to the British Embassy. It was too late, however, for half-measures; on the morrow Major Enver Bey and the Committee proclaimed the constitution at various places in Macedonia, and the 2nd and 3rd army corps threatened to march upon Constantinople. On the 24th a decree of the Sultan announced the restoration of the constitution, which had been suspended since 1878. The censorship of the press and the spy system were abolished, and a Chamber of 280 deputies, elected by grand electors, themselves chosen by every group of from 250 to 750 adult males above 25 years of age, was summoned to meet. Great was the enthusiasm of the people, when they found that the news was true. For some days Macedonia seemed to have become Utopia. Enver Bey exclaimed that 'arbitrary government' had 'disappeared.' 'Henceforth,' cried this enthusiastic leader of the revolution, 'we are all brothers. There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, Roumans, Jews, Mussulmans; under the same blue sky we are all equal, we glory in being Ottomans.' At Serres the president of the Bulgarian Committee embraced the Greek Archbishop; at Drama the revolutionary officers imprisoned a Turk for insulting a Christian; in an Armenian cemetery a procession of Turks and Armenians listened to prayers, offered up by their respective priests, for the victims of Armenian massacres; at Samsun the Turks saluted the beard of a Greek prelate; at Tripoli Turks and Arabs joined in thanksgiving services. The Bulgarian bands surrendered, and the brigand Sandanski was received like the prodigal son. Even the cautious British government, which might have been expected to regard with scepticism the results of this sudden conversion of an Oriental autocracy into a constitutional monarchy, hastened to prophesy, through the medium of Sir Edward Grey, that 'the Macedonian question and others of a similar character will entirely disappear.' The magic word 'Constitution' had, indeed, an extraordinary effect upon British Liberals. Without pausing to consider whether the 'Young' Turk would not prove to be merely the 'Old' Turk with a varnish of Parisian culture and without a belief in religion, they welcomed enthusiastically the Committee of

Union and Progress. Pro-Bulgarians became in a moment pro-Turks; an Ottoman deputation met the British ambassador on his arrival at Constantinople; and the popularity of Great Britain rose in Turkey to a point which it had not attained since the time of Beaconsfield. There were, however, some persons who foresaw that the position of the Christians of Turkey would be worse, instead of better, under the new system, which would inevitably aim at reducing them all to one dead level. The Greeks were suspicious from the outset, while here and there, in Arabia and Armenia, reactionary pashas struggled, but in vain, against the new order. On the other side, the triumphant revolutionaries naturally increased their demands. They insisted on the removal of the Sultan's favourite, Izzet, and accused Said of having violated the constitution by reserving to his master the nomination of the Ministers of War and Marine. Accordingly, Said made way for Kiamil, likewise an Anglophil but of a more advanced Liberalism, who included both a Greek and an Armenian in his Cabinet. Sweeping changes were made in the administration; and several of those who had battened on the Hamidian misgovernment were made to disgorge. In the house of one ex-Minister, who had been in office for no more than 18 months, £170,000 were found and appropriated to the public service! The new men and the new methods inspired such confidence in the Powers, that they decided to remove the vestiges of foreign control, as the Committee of Union and Progress desired, from Macedonia. The foreign officers were recalled; the International Commission of Finance ceased to exist; 'Young' Turkey was to act by herself."—W. Miller, *Ottoman empire, 1801-1913*, pp. 474-477.—See also ALBANIA: 1908-1914.—The idea of a strong Ottoman empire was looked upon with little relish by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, both of whom took steps to extend their power over former Turkish dominions. October 5, 1908, Bulgaria declared its independence (see BULGARIA: 1908-1909) and on October 7, Francis Joseph definitely annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina by an imperial rescript.—See also BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1908.

1909.—Represented at International Opium Commission. See OPIUM PROBLEM: 1909 (February): International Opium Commission.

1909.—Rejoicing over constitution.—Counterplots and disturbances.—Massacre of Armenians in Adana.—Attempt of Abdul Hamid to regain power.—His deposition and seating of Mohammed V on the throne.—Failure of Young Turks to punish Adana murderers.—"There were everywhere great rejoicings over the new Constitution, though very few people beyond Constantinople and Salonika had any conception of what it meant. There was for a time great enthusiasm for England, and the new ambassador, Sir Gerard Lowther, on arriving at Constantinople to take up the post received a great ovation. On December 10th the new Parliament met, and was opened by the Sultan with a speech, in which he promised to safeguard the Constitution and to protect the sacred rights of the nation. The various Christian and other subject races were well represented in the Chamber of Deputies. Its members showed an unexpected ability in the conduct of its proceedings and in their speeches. It was not long, however, before difficulties began to arise, and reaction reared its head again at the secret instigation of the Sultan. There was an outbreak in Albania against the Committee of Union and Progress. The bodyguard of Albanians was won

back to the support of Abdul Hamid by profuse bribery. Disorder broke out in many parts of the Empire. It was at Constantinople, however, that the gravest dangers to the new order of things arose. The first act of the new Government was to dismiss the host of spies, who had been maintained at a cost of £1,200,000 a year. . . . The new ministers also cleared the public departments of a vast body of superfluous and useless employés, most of them hangers-on of the palace. These two classes of people made a formidable body of malcontents, who conceived that their fortunes depended on the restoration to the Sultan of his old powers of corruption. They were supported by a small body of fanatical mollahs, who believed, or pretended to believe, that the new Constitution was in opposition to the sacred law. But more important than these agencies of reaction were the personal efforts made by Abdul Hamid to tamper with the fidelity to the new Government of the troops at Constantinople by the profuse distribution of money from his private stores. The new ministers had also made the mistake of releasing from prison, not merely great numbers of persons imprisoned at the will of the Sultan for political reasons, but also all the prisoners convicted of serious crimes. These formed an element of disorder in the city and caused alarm and distrust among the well-disposed citizens."—Lord Eversley, *Turkish empire*, pp. 348-349.—"Although the composition of the new Parliament chosen in October, 1908, and of the first constitutional Cabinet, was a prophecy of how they were to be left out in the cold, the Armenians were throughout that winter, when the constitution was new, firm and loyal, as well as intelligent, supporters of regenerated Turkey. . . . On April 14, 1909, on a morning when the sun had risen upon the peaceful and happy city of Adana, . . . without provocation, the Moslem population began to attack and kill the Christians. The Governor of the province and his military officials not only did nothing whatever to stop the bloodshed, but they actually handed out arms and munitions to the blood-frenzied mob of peasants, who were pouring into the city. For three days, killing, looting, and burning of houses were aided by the authorities. The massacres spread west through the great Cilician plain to Tarsus, and east over the Amanus Range into northern Syria, as far as Antioch. . . . The world, horrified by the stories which soon made their way to the newspapers, realized that the 'bloodless revolution' had not regenerated Turkey. . . . The Great Powers sent their warships to Mersina, the port of Tarsus and Adana. Even from the distant United States came two cruisers, under pressure, over six thousand miles. . . . In the meantime, events of great importance, but not of equal significance in the future of Turkey, were taking place at Constantinople. On the eve of the first Adana Massacre, Abdul Hamid, having corrupted the soldiers of the Constantinople garrison, set in motion a demonstration against the constitution. The soldiers shot down their officers in cold blood, marched to Yildiz Kiosk, and demanded of the Sultan the abolition of the constitution, which they declared was at variance with the Sheriat, the sacred law of Islam. Abdul Hamid gladly consented. Popular sympathy in Constantinople and through the Empire was with the Sultan, as far as the object of the revolution went. But the way in which it was brought about made it impossible for the Sultan to remain within the pale of civilization. Of all nations, none relied on its army more than

Turkey. Were the assassination of the officers to go unpunished, the disintegration of the Empire necessarily followed. So the military hierarchy, 'Old' Turks as well as 'Young,' rose against the Sultan. The army corps in Salonika under the command of Mahmud Shevket pasha, marched against the capital and with very little resistance mastered the mutiny of the Constantinople garrison. Abdul Hamid was deposed [Apr. 27, 1909], and sent into exile at the Villa Alatini at Salonika. His brother, Reshid Mohammed, came to the throne, under the title of Mohammed V. As soon as the Young Turks found themselves again in control of the situation, even before the proclamation of the new Sultan, they sent from Beirut to Adana a division of infantry to 're-establish order.' These regiments disembarked at Mersina on the day Mohammed V ascended the throne, April 25th. Immediately upon their arrival in Adana they began a second massacre which was more horrible than the first. Thousands were shot and burned,

though shaken, in the intentions of the Young Turks to grant to the Christians of Turkey the regime of equality and security of life and property which the constitution guaranteed. Even the Armenians, terrible as this blow had been, were also willing to forgive and forget. But the condition of forgiveness, and the proof of sincerity of the declarations of the Young Turks, both to the outside world and to the Armenians would be the punishment of those who had been guilty of this most horrible blot upon the civilization of the twentieth century. This was to be the test. The Court-Martial, sent to Adana from Constantinople after the new Sultan was established upon the throne and the Young Turks were certain of their position, had every guarantee to enable it to do its work thoroughly and justly. It was not influenced or threatened. There was, however, no honest intention to give decisions impartially and in accordance with the facts that the investigation would bring forth. The methods and find-



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and more than half of the city was in ruins. This second massacre occurred in spite of the fact that a dozen foreign warships were by this time anchored in the harbour of Mersina. It is impossible to estimate the losses of life and property in the vilayets of Cilicia and northern Syria during the last two weeks of April, 1908. Not less than thirty thousand Armenians were massacred. . . . From the very beginning, the Young Turks, now re-established in Constantinople with a Sultan of their own creation, and having nothing more to fear from the genius and bad will of Abdul Hamid, protested before Europe that the massacres were due to the old régime and that they had been arranged by Abdul Hamid, whose deposition cleared them of responsibility. But the revelations of the *New York Herald*, the *Tribuna of Rome*, and the *Berliner Tageblatt*, translated and reprinted in the British, French, and Russian press, were so moving that it was necessary for the Young Turks to send special commissions to the capitals of Europe to counteract the impression of these articles. Europe was willing to accept the explanation of the Constantinople Cabinet, and to continue its faith,

ings of the Court-Martial were a travesty of justice. Its members refused absolutely to go to the bottom of the massacre, and to punish those who had been guilty."—H. A. Gibbons, *New map of Europe*, pp. 189-194.

1909 (May-December).—Hilmi Pasha, grand vizier.—Parliament opened by the new sultan.—Constitutional amendments on religion and education.—Committee of Union and Progress.—Change of ministry.—When the counter revolution, which ended in the deposition of Abdul Hamid II began in Constantinople the grand vizier, Kiamil Pasha, was forced to resign Feb. 14, 1909, by the Committee of Union and Progress. His successor was Hilmi Pasha. Strife over the assassination of Hassan Fehmi Effendi, editor of a paper representing the Christian electorate, caused the resignation of Hilmi Pasha who was succeeded April 14, by Tewfik Pasha. Upon the downfall of the sultan, he was reappointed by the new rule and remained in office from May 1 to May 5, when Hilmi Pasha was returned to the grand vizierate. On the 20th of the month the sultan in person opened the session of Parliament. On the 24th

the grand vizier announced the program of measures and general policy to be undertaken by his ministry, and received, after debate, a vote of confidence by 190 to 5. The reconstituted government was now a fully organized fact. Questions concerning the attitude of the state towards religion and education, as it should be defined in the Constitution, were among the earliest of high importance to be brought before the Parliament. On June 8 it adopted an amendment to the article in the constitution of 1876, reading as follows:

"Islam is the State religion. The State, while safeguarding this principle, guarantees the free exercise of all cults recognized in the Empire, and maintains the religious privileges granted to divers communities, provided public order and morality be not infringed." On the subject of education the constitution was amended to read: "Education is free. All schools are placed under the control of the Government. The necessary measures shall be taken to assure to every Ottoman subject a uniform system of education. There shall be no interference with the religious education of the different communities." The Christian communities, especially the Greek, objected strenuously to this, fearing that governmental control would be found to mean the imposition of the Turkish language in all schools, as an instrument of nationalization. Another proposed amendment, making members of the Chamber of Deputies eligible for the posts of parliamentary under-secretaries of state, failed to secure the requisite two-thirds majority, and this was regarded as a defeat of the civilian leaders of the "Young Turk" Committee of Union and Progress, who were supposed to be desirous of holding the posts in question, while sitting also in the Chamber. The second session of Parliament was opened by the sultan, on November 14 with a speech of roseate contentedness in its contemplation of Turkish affairs. Late in December a change of ministry occurred. The high office of grand vizier was then conferred on Hakki Bey, Turkish ambassador at Rome, and Mahmud Shevket Pasha accepted office in his cabinet as minister of war. The Young Turkish régime proceeded to make the Turkish language official, to plant Mohammedan colonies in Macedonia, to practise violence and bribery at elections, to forbid public meetings, to repress all anti-Turk propaganda, to disarm Christians and completely to "Ottomanize" the empire.

1909 (October).—*Railway and irrigation projects in the Tigris-Euphrates delta.*—Sir William Willocks, the British engineer who was engaged for some time in surveys for the Turkish government, having reference to irrigation and railway improvements for the reclamation of the great Mesopotamian region, made a report to the ministry of public works at Constantinople in October, 1900, in which he advocated the construction of a railway from Bagdad to the Mediterranean, and the reclamation of one million hectares of land in the Tigris-Euphrates delta.

1909-1911.—*Influence in Egypt.* See EGYPT: 1907-1911.

1910-1911.—*Albanian insurrection.*—Difficulties with Arab and Greek subjects.—"During 1910 and 1911 the Committee [of Union and Progress] continued its work, but made a series of grave blunders. . . . The extreme members of the Committee were still engaged upon their work of Turkifying everything, and this led them into many blunders, two of which had serious consequences. The Albanians were not allowed to receive instruction in their own language, but only in

Turkish. Even in respect to the Arabs the proposal was made to forbid the teaching of that language. The struggle ended in permission being given to teach it, but the medium of instruction was to be Turkish. Now, as completely as Hebrew is the sacred language of the Jews, so is Arabic of Moslems. Nothing gave greater offence to the Moslem party than the giving of second place to Arabic in Moslem schools. The result was that there arose two serious questions, one with the Albanians and the other with the Arabs. The latter question soon became the more pressing. A project for the government of Yemen, which had been for years in a state of revolt, and where tens of thousands of Turkish soldiers had perished from the heat and malaria of the country, had been carefully prepared and finally approved by the Government, with the consent of the Arab deputies. Kiamil Pasha, when Grand Vizier, had taken great interest in it. His successor, Hilmi Pasha, had also examined it and approved. The Committee, however, now rejected it, always acting upon their determination to bring about a unification of language. Another of their blunders during this time was to quarrel with the Greek subjects of the empire. A boycott of Greek ships, shops, and merchandise was preached, and with great success. The object, however, was not so much to injure the Greeks of the kingdom as the Greek subjects of Turkey. General discontent was also increasing in the army, produced by the unification idea. Troops were sent to fight Albanians. . . . A certain Colonel Sadyk was the organiser of discontent. Hakki, the Grand Vizier, took sides with those who wished to arrest Sadyk and put him on his trial for treason, but Shevket, who knew the temper of the troops better than Hakki, recognised that it would be dangerous to do so, the troops being unwilling to fire on their Moslem brethren in Albania, just as they were to fire on the dissatisfied Arabs. The struggle became so severe that Hakki threatened to take over the office of Minister of War himself, and to place Sadyk under a court-martial. Finally the matter was arranged by a compromise, and Sadyk was sent to Salonica. . . . By the middle of May all Albania was ablaze. The Governor of Scutari had proclaimed a Holy War against the Albanians, but Moslem opinion forced him to back down two or three days afterwards. Then, on the suggestion of the Commission, the Sultan went on a royal progress into Macedonia to meet the Albanians, and a remarkable religious service took place, at which 80,000 Albanians were present on the Plain of Kossovo Pol, before the famous tomb of Murad I, who had been assassinated on the battlefield in 1389."—E. Pears, *Forty years in Constantinople*, pp. 306-308.—See also ALBANIA: 1908-1914.

1911-1912.—*War with Italy over Tripoli.*—*Peace of Lausanne.*—"The vital significance of the Italian declaration of war upon Turkey, September 27, 1911, was not generally realized at the time. None of the Powers approved Italy's aggressive action, but apparently they failed to perceive the far-reaching consequences that might result from it. France and Great Britain feared that it would lead to a disturbance of the Mediterranean balance, and although they had consented to Italy's occupation of Tripoli when it was put before them in the light of a rather indefinite possibility, they were obviously troubled by the active steps taken by Signor Giolitti. Germany and Austria were naturally displeased by this attack made by their ally upon Turkey, with whom they themselves



were anxious to remain on terms of close friendship. But all the Powers trusted that the conflict would be confined to Tripoli and that it would not reopen the Eastern Question. Italy herself desired sincerely to avoid any disturbance of Turkey's position in the Near East; she hoped that the war would be brief, and even that the result of her declaration of war would be the peaceable surrender of Tripoli by the Turks. Hence she confined her first military actions to the African seaboard. Tripoli was bombarded on September 30, and a week later surrendered. An expeditionary corps disembarked early in October and succeeded in foiling all attempts made at counter-attacks by the Turks. On November 5, the Italian Parliament approved the decree that declared the annexation of the Turkish provinces in North Africa. The following months were spent in merely securing the foothold that had been won on the coast. The Government continually made clear its unwillingness to prosecute an aggressive war against the Porte, provided Tripoli were surrendered. But the Turkish Government refused to take advantage of the opportunity offered her of escaping from further attack, and the position of Italy, both from the military and diplomatic point of view, was difficult. Turkey was, it is true, incapable of winning back the military positions that she had lost, or of driving out the invaders. But the Arabs continued a vexatious and at times effective resistance under Turkish leadership, and in February, 1912, it became clear that if Turkey refused to acknowledge the Italian conquest, it would be years before Italy could hope to pacify and control her new possessions. The sole way of striking Turkey and forcing her to admit defeat was to shift the war to the Adriatic or the Ægean. Action in the Adriatic was not possible because of the interests of Austria, Italy's ally. An attack upon the Dardanelles threatened the position of Turkey so vitally that it might reopen the whole Eastern Question; and . . . the ambitions of Italy's other ally, Germany, demanded that the status of the Eastern Question remain unchanged. Turkey's position as guardian of the Straits was essential to the German policy in Mesopotamia. Italy had promised at the beginning of that war that she would not under any circumstances disturb the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula. But by April, 1912, as the deadlock in North Africa was becoming more and more apparent, it was obvious that a direct attack upon Turkey must be undertaken. Only thus could Turkey be forced to recognize the Italian conquest of Tripoli. On April 18th the forts of Kum Kalé at the mouth of the Dardanelles were bombarded, and early in May, Rhodes was invaded. Other islands in the Ægean were also occupied. Turkey's answer was the closing of the Dardanelles. Had the hands of Turkey been absolutely free, Italy would have found difficulty in wringing acceptance of her conditions from the Porte, even after the direct attack upon the Ottoman Empire. The Dardanelles were impenetrable and Turkey might well have prolonged the deadlock. But revolution had broken out in Albania and taxed the military resources of the Young Turks to their fullest extent. Furthermore, the Balkan States were assuming a hostile attitude and an outbreak in that quarter began to appear imminent. The result was that in June, 1912, Turkish representatives met the Italians to discuss bases for a settlement of the conflict. Oriental methods prolonged the negotiations until October, when Italian patience was finally exhausted and a distinct threat conveyed to Turkey

that in case of war in the Balkans, Italy might be found in alliance with the Balkan States. Turkey yielded and the preliminaries of peace were signed on October 15, 1912. The Treaty of Lausanne provided for the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Tripoli and of the Italian army from the islands of the Ægean; nothing was said about the cession of Tripoli to Italy for the sake of Turkish pride, but the recognition of the conquest was absolute, although merely tacit. Italy's restoration of the islands, provided for in the treaty, has never taken place. Nor has Turkey complained, inasmuch as they must later have fallen into the hands of Greece had they not been held by Italy. The real significance of Italy's war with Turkey is not to be found in the conquest of Tripoli. That was an eventuality already foreseen by the Powers, and before 1911 Italy had taken long steps towards its accomplishment. The importance of the war lies rather in the example of direct attack upon Turkey that had been set by Italy. It was too much to expect that the Balkan States would not follow the lead thus given, and take advantage of the favorable opportunity offered in 1912.—C. Seymour, *Diplomatic background of the war, 1870-1914*, pp. 221-224.—See also ITALY: 1911-1913; TRIPOLI: 1911-1913; PAN-ISLAMISM; RHODES, ISLAND OF: 1911-1913.

1912-1913.—Dissatisfaction of Balkan states.—Coalition against Turkey.—Reverses of Turkey in war.—Peace with large cessions of Turkish territory.—“A secret clause [in the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1912] provided that in the event of any portion of Macedonia being conquered the parts respectively nearest to the two States should be annexed to them, and that the intervening territory should be divided between them by the arbitration of Russia. This clearly showed that the intervention aimed at territorial conquest. Two months later another treaty was signed between Greece and Bulgaria, binding the two States to aid one another if attacked by Turkey, or in the event of systematic violation of rights by that Power. Nothing was said in this as to the division of spoil after the war. Montenegro later came into the chain of alliances, and, in fact, was always eager for war with Turkey. When it became known to the Great Powers that these alliances were formed, and that war was imminent, they made every effort to allay the storm and to maintain peace. A strong protest was addressed, on September 25th, by Russia and Austria on behalf of all the Powers. They endeavoured to resuscitate the treaty of Berlin, which had so signally failed, to secure order and good government in the remaining Christian provinces of Turkey. They undertook, by virtue of the twenty-third article of that treaty, to insist on the realization of the promised reforms in the administration of these provinces, but with the reservation which made the promise futile in the eyes of all concerned, that the reforms should not in any way diminish the sovereignty of the Sultan or impair the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The allied Balkan States, in a very dignified despatch of October 15th, declined to act on the advice of the Powers. . . . Early in 1912 negotiations for armed intervention in Macedonia took place between the Governments of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, at the instance mainly of the . . . Premier of Greece, M. Venezelos. For the first and only time in their history a combination was effected between these three States against the Turkish Empire. It will be seen that, though it was most effective for its immediate purpose

of defeating the Turks and expelling them from nearly the whole of their European possessions, it broke down, with most unfortunate results, almost immediately after this great success. On March 18, 1912, a treaty was signed between Bulgaria and Serbia for mutual military aid to one another in war with Turkey. . . . [On the same day] they enclosed a copy of an ultimatum which . . . they addressed to the Porte, insisting on the carrying out of a series of reforms specially detailed. . . . Among the list of reforms insisted on was the ceding and confirmation of the ethnical autonomy of provinces of the Empire, with all its consequences. . . . [The Porte] treated it as a declaration of war. Its first and most important act was to come to terms with Italy in order to free its hands for the more important war at its very portals. . . . [The Treaty of Lausanne] was signed on October 15th. . . . Meanwhile hostilities had already commenced in the Balkans. Montenegro declared war on October 8th. The three other States followed suit on October 18th, and each of them sent its army on the same day, or nearly so, across its frontiers to invade Turkey. Beyond the desire for the better government of the Christian provinces of Turkey, there were doubtless *arrière pensées* on the part of all the allied States. Greece coveted Crete and other islands in the Ægean Sea, and hoped to extend its frontiers on the mainland. Bulgaria yearned for the big Bulgaria as defined by the treaty of San Stefano. Serbia had ambitions for a revival of its wide boundaries under Stephen Dushan, and aimed at access both to the Ægean Sea and the Adriatic. Montenegro wished for a part of Albania and for extensions in the Adriatic. Each State had large populations of a kindred race beyond its frontier suffering from cruel misgovernment and tyranny and crying for help. But it seems improbable that they could have expected to realize their full hopes, or to achieve such a *dénouement* as actually occurred. The allies between them had seven hundred thousand men under arms. Turkey had no more than four hundred thousand in Europe. It had, however, great reserves in Asia, and its aggregate force largely exceeded that of the allies. It was to be expected that the Turkish armies in Europe would make a good fight, and would at least afford time for these reserves to come up. The Greek army, under the command of the Crown Prince Constantine, . . . who had received a military education in Germany, crossed the northern frontier and, in four days, on October 22nd, encountered a Turkish army, under Hassan Pasha, at Sarandoporos. The Turks held a very strong position and were little inferior in numbers. In spite of this, they were worsted, and were compelled to retreat in the following night. The next day the Greeks renewed their attack. The unfortunate Turks, disheartened by their defeat at Sarandoporos and wearied by the long night march, were caught unawares in a ravine which offered no possibility of defence. Terror-stricken and demoralized, they fled before their foe. They left behind them the whole of their artillery and transport. The retreating Turks, despite their panic, found time to wreak their vengeance on the unfortunate Christian inhabitants on their route and mercilessly butchered them. What remained of their army retired on Veria, where it was reinforced by fourteen fresh battalions. On the 28th the Greek army resumed its march. In front of Veria it again came in contact with the Turks, who were posted in a very strong position. The

issue was not long in doubt. The unhappy Turks were mown down by the Greek guns. Officers and men again fled like a beaten rabble. After these signal defeats the remainder of the Ottoman army crossed the River Vardar on November 3rd, within a few miles of Salonika. On the 8th that city capitulated to the Greeks, not without suspicion of treachery. Hassan Pasha and twenty-five thousand men, the remains of his army, were made prisoners. On the next day a division of the Bulgarians, detached from their main army in Thraee, appeared on the scene at Salonika, after a forced march, in the hope of being able to claim a share in the capture of that important city. At the request of its generals, the Greeks gave permission to two regiments of Bulgarians to enter the city. In spite of this limitation, ten regiments were sent there, and were the cause of much subsequent trouble. While these great and unexpected successes were being achieved by the Greeks, the Serbians were advancing from the north. A Turkish army of a hundred thousand men, under Zeki Pasha, had marched up the valley of the Vardar River to meet them. The two armies, about equal in numbers, met at Koumanovo on October 23rd, the day after the victory of the Greeks at Sarandoporos. The Turks were well supported with all modern implements of war, with machine guns, aeroplanes, and wireless telephone apparatus, but they had not a staff competent to make use of them. Their artillery was the best which Krupp's celebrated German works could turn out, and was superior in number to that of the Serbians. The French Creüset guns, however, of the latter proved to be the better in action. But, worst of all, the commissariat arrangements of the Turks were of a most primitive character. They relied mainly on their men feeding themselves at the expense of the peasantry on their route, with the result that they were underfed. The weather was most inclement and the troops were only provided with light summer clothing. The best of soldiers cannot fight with empty stomachs and scanty clothing. As a result, in spite of a vigorous resistance in the great battle, the Turkish lines were broken by the splendid infantry of the Serbians. There resulted a rout and the precipitate retreat of the Turkish army. It lost the whole of its artillery—a hundred and twenty guns. Of the hundred thousand men, only forty thousand survived as a military force. Uskub, the ancient capital of Serbia, was captured. Another Serbian army advanced towards the Adriatic and captured Durazzo. After the fierce and decisive battle at Koumanovo, what remained of the Turkish army retreated down the Vardar Valley to Veles, and thence, instead of marching to Salonika, where it might have been in time to save that city from the Greeks, it marched westward to Prilip, on the route to Monastir. The Serbians, after a brief delay, followed it up and came in contact again at Prilip, where the Turks held an immensely strong position. It was taken at the point of the bayonet, a striking proof of the superb quality of the Serbian infantry. The Turks retreated thence to Monastir, where they found reinforcements. On November 17th and 18th, another great battle was fought in front of Monastir, in which the Turks were again defeated, with the loss of ten thousand prisoners. The remains of the army retreated into Albania, where it was too late in the season for the Serbians to follow them. They were ultimately, in the following spring, brought back to Constantinople by sea from the Adriatic. There could not have been

a more completely victorious campaign for the Serbians. Zeki's army was virtually extinguished. While these critical events were pending in Macedonia the Bulgarians were equally successful in the east. They invaded Thrace on October 18th in great force, and on the 22nd encountered a Turkish army at Kirk Killisse and, after a two days' battle, defeated it. On the 28th they fought the main Turkish army, under Nazim Pasha, which was drawn up in a line from Lulu Burgas to Visa. The Turks made an obstinate resistance, but after forty-eight hours of fierce assaults by the Bulgarians they gave way and retreated in terrible disorder, till they found themselves behind the lines of Tchatalja, the celebrated fortifications which protect Constantinople at a distance of nineteen miles on a line from the Black Sea to the Marmora. On their advance through Thrace the Bulgarian soldiers, assisted by irregulars of Bulgarian race, committed atrocities and cruelties on the Turkish population which rivalled all that the Turks in the past had perpetrated. On November 17th the Bulgarians attacked these lines of Tchatalja with great vigour. But the Turks had brought up fresh troops from Asia. The lines were well defended with Krupp guns, and several successive assaults were repelled. On December 3rd, at the instance of the Great Powers, an armistice was agreed upon between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia. War, however, was continued with Greece and Montenegro. As a result of the campaign the Turks had been defeated in every engagement by Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, and Montenegrins. They were driven from Macedonia and from nearly the whole of Thrace and Epirus. They still, however, retained Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari. It was only when in defence of such cities, or behind such lines as those of Tchatalja that the Turkish soldiers showed the tenacity and courage for which they had been famous. Whenever they met the enemy in the open field they were always defeated. . . . The winter of 1912-13, after the conclusion of the armistice, was spent in futile negotiations for peace at a Conference in London. The main cause of failure was Adrianople. The Bulgarians insisted on its cession to them as a condition of permanent peace. The Porte, in the first instance, was not unwilling to give way on this. But a military *émeute* occurred at Constantinople. A deputation from the army, headed by Enver Bey, insisted on entering the chamber where the Council of Ministers were deliberating on the question, with the object of protesting against the surrender of the stronghold. Nazim Pasha, the Minister of War, and his aide-de-camp were killed in the endeavour to resist this inroad. The Grand Vizier was thereupon terrorized into resignation. In his place Mahmoud Shefket, who had proved to be so loyal to the Young Turks at the early stage of their movement, was appointed. He refused to surrender Adrianople. The negotiations in London were broken off. Early in 1913, on January 4th, the Bulgarians gave notice of the termination of the armistice. War was renewed. On February 4th the Bulgarian army commenced an attack on Adrianople, supported on this occasion by fifty thousand Serbians. On the same day they fought a battle near Bulair, defeated the Turks, and captured that important fortress, threatening the command of the Dardanelles. The Greeks also renewed the war. They sent an army into Epirus and, on March 6th, captured Janina, making prisoners thirty-three thousand Turks and seizing immense stores of guns and ammunition. On the 10th of the same month their fleet captured the

island of Samos. On March 28th the Bulgarians captured Adrianople and its garrison of twenty thousand Ottomans, and on April 21st the Montenegrins succeeded in getting possession of Scutari, which they claimed as the capital of their State. After these serious reverses the Porte was desirous of coming to terms, and was willing even to cede Adrianople and almost the whole of Thrace. It invited the mediation of the Great Powers. The allied States agreed to this. A second Conference was held in London on the basis that the Porte was to give up all its possessions in Europe, save the small part of Thrace south of a line drawn from Enos, in the Ægean Sea, to Media, in the Black Sea, a few miles north of the Tchatalja lines. Crete was to be ceded to Greece (see CRETE: 1800-1913), and the destination of the islands in the Ægean Sea lately in the possession of Turkey, and some of which were necessary for its defence, was to be left to the decision of the Powers. [See ÆGEAN.] A treaty was effected between the Porte and the Powers to this effect. But there was far greater difficulty in determining how the ceded districts were to be divided between the victorious Balkan States. The position was aggravated by Roumania coming into the field and claiming compensation in territory, in consideration of the important changes impending in the balance of power in the Balkans.—Lord Eversley, *Turkish empire*, pp. 357-364.—See also BALKAN STATES: 1912: War opened by Montenegro; 1912-1913; 1913; 1913-1914; GREECE: 1912; 1913: Second Balkan War; SERBIA: 1909-1913.

1914.—In the control of Germany.—William II's visit in 1888.—Spread of German interests in Turkey.—Berlin-Bagdad railroad.—“Peaceful penetration” pushed in every direction.—“Within a year of his accession [1888], William II decided, against Bismarck's advice, to pay a State visit to Constantinople. It was a remarkable and a fateful visit, for it gave rise to one of the first serious differences of opinion between the old Chancellor and his young sovereign, and it brought him into immediate contact with an Oriental ruler whose singular personality exerted a lasting influence upon him. We are apt to remember only Abdul Hamid's inglorious downfall and to forget the remarkable part he played during a reign of over thirty-two years. . . . The old Chancellor did not approve of the visit before the Emperor started. He approved of it still less when the Emperor returned full of the visions he had seen on the Bosphorus. Bismarck looked upon Constantinople as a profitable field for German statesmanship, in the service of a policy which was confined, on the principle of ‘*beati possidentes*,’ to a maintenance of Germany's hegemony in Europe. For William II Constantinople was already the bridge over which Germany was to pass out of Europe into Asia and enter upon a vast field of splendid adventure. In the following year Bismarck was dismissed [1890], and the Emperor was free to steer his own course. The famous ‘Reinsurance’ Treaty with Russia was dropped; and, though various circumstances delayed for a good many years the outbreak of acute antagonism between Austria and Russia and at times even produced a temporary *rapprochement* between them, Austrian ascendancy in the Balkan peninsula and an ultimate advance upon Salonica became part and parcel of William II's great scheme for the creation of a Germanic wedge reaching from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.’ Combining with a vein of almost medieval mysticism a thorough appreciation of modern business practices, William

It realised from the outset that the transformation of Germany into a World Empire, which he had set before himself as his life-work, could only be effected if economic expansion went hand in hand with political expansion. In order to bring Turkey permanently within the orbit of German world-policy, the first thing to do was to peg out Germany's claims in the domain of commerce, industry and finance. German manufacturers, German engineers, German capitalists overran Turkey. Already in 1888 the Deutsche Bank had obtained the right of working a short railway from the Bosphorus along a strip of the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmora, which had originally been given to an English Company; and to this was added a concession for an extension to Angora, which, after the Emperor's visit, was pushed on with the



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utmost energy, and soon developed into a claim for German monopoly of railway enterprise throughout Asiatic Turkey. . . . At Constantinople German influence was paramount, for it stuck scrupulously to its bargain never to worry the Sultan about administrative reforms or about the wrongs of his Christian subjects. On the contrary, when other Powers, and notably England, tried to curb Turkish misrule, Germany was always ready with the effective sovereignty of the Sultan. . . . In the autumn of 1898, while Abdul Hamid's hands were still dripping with the blood of his Armenian subjects and the laurels of his victories over Greece were still fresh on his brow, William II, accompanied by the Empress, proceeded on a second pilgrimage to Turkey; and on this occasion a State visit to Constantinople was followed by a sensational progress through Palestine and Syria. The German Emperor entered Jerusalem as a Knight Templar, and masqueraded at the Holy

Shrines of the Christian faith as the protector of Christendom. But a week later, at Damascus, he proclaimed himself with still greater emphasis the protector of Pan-Islamism, and, to quote Prince Bülow again, defined what was to be henceforth the position of Germany not merely towards Turkey, but 'towards Turkey and Islam.' . . . Within the next twelve months the first convention was signed between Dr. Seimens, Director of the Deutsche Bank, and the Sublime Porte, conceding in principle to the German Anatolian Railway Company the right to extend down to the Persian Gulf. A commission of German engineers, headed by the German Consul-General Stemrich, and including the German Military Attaché at Constantinople, was immediately sent to report upon the land *tracé*, while a German cruiser visited the Persian Gulf in order to discover the most suitable point for a terminus in its waters. The railways of European Turkey had already passed under the control of the Deutsche Bank group, which had its satellites in South Germany, Austria and Switzerland; and the new concession promised the early fulfilment of the great Pan-Germanic scheme, already known in Berlin as the B. B. B. (Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad). [See BAGDAD RAILWAY.] . . . When wireless telegraphy began to take practical form, the Germans were the first in the field with concessions for wireless lines between Constantinople and Syria, and between the Turkish islands in the Mediterranean and the main land. German schools, German scientific expeditions, German missions contributed at the same time to the diffusion of German culture, while German control of the Turkish military administration was so tightened up, after its value had been proved in the campaign against Greece, that William II was already learning to rely upon the Turkish army as a subordinate wing of the German army in the event of a great European conflict.—V. Chirol, *Turkey in the grip of Germany* (*Quarterly Review*, Dec., 1914, pp. 235, 239-240, 243-244).—"For the first twenty years of his reign all went well with the policy of the Kaiser in the Near East. But everything depended upon the personal friendship of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, and upon the stability of his throne. In 1908 his throne was threatened; in 1909 it was overturned. The triumph of the Young Turk revolution imposed a serious check upon German policy; but, to the amazement of European diplomacy, the check proved to be only temporary. Enver Pasha quickly succeeded to the place in the circle of imperial friendship vacated by his deposed master. Bulgaria finally declared her independence. Bosnia and the Herzegovina were definitely annexed by Austria. Russia, as the patron of the Southern Slavs, naturally protested; but Russia was not at the moment prepared to accept the challenge of the 'knight in shining armour' at Berlin, and so *Mittleuropa* took a very important step towards the Aegean. Few Englishmen were at the time sufficiently alive to the significance of the events of 1908-9. But we have recently learnt from the *Memories* of Lord Redesdale that their significance did not escape the vigilant notice of King Edward. Lord Redesdale happened to be at Balmoral when the news of the Austrian annexations in the Balkans reached the King. 'No one who was there can forget,' he says, 'how terribly he was upset. Never did I see him so moved. . . . Every word that he uttered that day has come true.' It is not too much to say that the Great War of 1914 was implicit in the events of 1908. It now seemed as if one thing and one thing only could interpose a final

and effective barrier between the Central Empires and their ambitions in the Near East—a real union between the Balkan States. In the autumn of 1912 that miracle was temporarily achieved and the first Balkan War ensued (October-December 1912). The Allied arms achieved a remarkable triumph. 'Within the brief space of one month,' writes M. Gueshoff, 'the Balkan League demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries with a population of some 10,000,000 souls defeating a great Power whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000.' But the victory was too rapid and too complete. Not even the statesmanship of M. Venizelos, backed by that of M. Gueshoff, could, in the face of jarring interests in Macedonia, hold the Balkan League together. The collapse of the Turk was from that point of view inconveniently and indeed disastrously rapid. The union of the Balkan States might have been less transitory if victory over the Turk had been more difficult to achieve. As it was, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, having humbled the Ottoman Empire to the dust, took to quarrelling among themselves over spoils which were unexpectedly large. This was Germany's opportunity and she used it with singular adroitness. The first step was, in the name of an autonomous Albania, to prohibit Serbia's access to the Adriatic.—J. A. R. Marriott, *European commonwealth*, pp. 280-291.—See also GERMANY: 1890-1914: Alteration of foreign policy; 1912: Balkan and Asia Minor interests.

1914.—Turkey at the outbreak of the World War.—Repeated violations of neutrality by her.—Attack on Odessa.—Action by Russia and England.—Turkey's entrance into World War as ally of Germany and Austria.—'The declaration by Austria against Serbia and the events which followed in quick succession came as a surprise to everybody, except perhaps the German authorities in Constantinople and Enver Pasha. But there is evidence from Turkey, as well as from other parts of Europe, that not only was the outbreak of war expected about this period, but that Germany had made her preparations before it broke out for forcing Turkey to take part in it. Munitions had been landed in Syria. . . . When on August 11 the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* entered Turkish waters, Admiral Suchon, who was in command, shewed much of the same determined character. When these ships had passed the Dardanelles they should, in conformity with international law, have been disarmed. From the first the behaviour of the officers in command was one of insolence and defiance of international usages and even of the amenities of civilised life. . . . Flagrant violations of international law went on daily, and the Porte had not the courage or perhaps the wish to do more than feebly remonstrate. German soldiers and sailors were coming to the Bosphorus by every boat from Constanza. Munitions of war were being poured into Turkey and were being sent for use, some to the Dardanelles, where the captain of a British merchant ship and his wife counted the mines intended to be laid in the Dardanelles as they were arranged in long lines on the Turkish transports. . . . Others were intended for the coasts of Syria, of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.'—E. Pears, *Forty years in Constantinople*, pp. 341-342.—'The war party proceeded to mobilize troops, to prepare for the invasion of Egypt, to bribe the Bedawin to warlike action, and to demand the departure of British ships from Mohammerah, a Persian port over which the Turks had no authority. All the time the Grand Vizier protested that he desired peace

and made many excuses about the delay in dismissing the officers and crews of the German ships. Then followed the detention of British merchant ships in Turkish waters, attempts to stir up disaffection in Persia, India, Egypt, and amongst the Sanûsis in Africa, violent attacks in Turkish newspapers, now subsidized by German gold, against England declaring that she was the enemy of Islam; the abolition of the capitulations and the closing of foreign post offices, and numberless other acts of a highly provocative character. The British Government was most patient and waited week after week for the dismissal of the Germans. . . . Then, on October 29, 1914, Turkish torpedo-boats raided Odessa, sank a Russian gunboat and damaged French and Russian ships. The response to this unwarranted act of hostility was the withdrawal of the Russian Ambassador from Constantinople and the despatch of Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. . . . [to the effect that] unless. . . the Turkish Government will divest themselves of all responsibility for these unprovoked acts of hostility by dismissing the German military and naval missions, and fulfilling their often repeated promises about the German crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, and will give you a satisfactory reply to this effect within twelve hours from the date of the delivery of the note, you should ask for your passports and leave Constantinople with the staff of the embassy. On November 4, Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London, applied for his passports and a state of war commenced.'—E. Sell, *Ottoman Turks*, pp. 118-120.—See also ITALY: 1912-1914; BAGDAD RAILWAY: The plan; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 42; WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 71, v; 1914: IV. Turkey: a; a, 1; b; c; d; e; f; XI. Political situation: e.

1914.—World War: Loss of control in Egypt. See EGYPT: 1914: World War; WORLD WAR: 1914: IV. Turkey: h.

1914.—World War: Inaccessibility of Turkey maintained through Bulgarian neutrality. See BULGARIA: 1914.

1914-1918.—World War: Outrages in Syria. See SYRIA: 1908-1921.

1915.—World War: Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaign. See BOSPORUS: 1914-1918; DARDANELLES: 1915; WORLD WAR: 1915: VI. Turkey: a; a, 4, xiii; a, 4, xxxi.

1915.—World War: Invasion of Persia. See PERSIA: 1914-1916.

1915.—World War: Attitude toward Armenians.—Interference at Kurdistan. See ARMENIA: 1915; KURDISTAN AND THE KURDS; WORLD WAR: 1915: VI. Turkey: d.

1915.—World War: Attack on Suez canal. See WORLD WAR: 1915: VI. Turkey: b.

1915.—France and Great Britain agree to Russian annexation of Constantinople.—Plans for the partition of Turkey devised by Allies during World War.—When the Bolshevik régime established itself upon the ruins of the Kerensky administration in October, 1917, Leon Trotzky, became foreign minister. One of his earliest activities was to publish a number of secret documents then reposing in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office. Not the least interesting of these papers were copies of some memoranda and telegrams of Sazonov, who had been foreign minister from 1910 until January, 1917. "On the 10th of February (March 4th, 1915) the [Russian] Minister of Foreign Affairs handed a memorandum to the French and British ambassadors in which was defined the position as to annexation to Russia of the follow-

ing territories, as the result of the present war; the city of Constantinople the western shores of the Bosphorus, Marmora Sea, and the Dardanelles; Southern Frigia, to the line of Enos-Media; the shores of Asia Minor, between Bosphorus, the River Samarra, and a point of Ismid Gulf to be subsequently defined; the islands of Marmora Sea and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of England and France within the limits of aforesaid territories to remain undisturbed. The French as well as the English Governments expressed their assent to the fulfilment of our desires in the event of a successful termination of the war and the satisfaction of a series of demands of France and England within the limits of the Ottoman Empire as well as in other places. These demands in so far as they refer to Turkey are substantially as follows: The recognition of Constantinople as a free port for transit of merchandise not coming from or going to Russia, and the freedom of passage through the Straits of merchant ships. The recognition of English and French rights in Asiatic Turkey subject to specific definition in a special agreement between France, England, and Russia. The preservation of sacred Mohammedan places and of Arabia, under an independent Mohammedan rule. The inclusion within the English sphere of influence of the Persian neutral zone created by the treaty of 1907 between England and Russia. In recognizing these claims as in general subject to satisfaction the Russian Government nevertheless made certain reservations: With respect to formulation of our wishes in connection with sacred Mohammedan places it is necessary to define now whether these places will remain under the administration of Turkey, with the retention by the Sultan of the title of Caliph, or is it the intention to create new and independent Governments. In our opinion it would be desirable to separate the Caliphate from Turkey. At all events, the freedom of pilgrimage is to be insured. In agreeing to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia within the English sphere of influence the Russian Government considers it only just to state that the region of the cities Ispahan, Yezd shall be confirmed to Russia, as well as a strip of the neutral zone which cuts in the shape of a wedge between Russian and Afghan boundaries and reaching the boundary itself at Zulphogar, shall be included within the Russian sphere of influence. The Russian Government also considers desirable at the same time to reach the solution of the question as to the territory of northern Afghanistan contiguous to Russia, in line with its wishes expressed in the negotiations of 1914. After the entrance of Italy into the war our wishes were communicated to the Italian Government which expressed its assent on its own behalf on condition that, in the event of successful termination of the war, the Italian claims in general, and specifically in the East, be satisfied, and on recognition by Italy within the limits of territories ceded by us of identical rights as possessed by England and France." The following is a copy of a telegram despatched by Sazonov to the Russian ambassador at Paris on March 18, 1915: "On the 23d of February (March 8) the French Ambassador, in the name of his Government, stated to me that France is ready to take the most friendly attitude towards the realization of our desires . . . in connection with the Straits and Constantinople, for which I have instructed you to express to Delcassé my appreciation. In his conversation with you, Delcassé, even before, repeatedly expressed his assurances that he may depend on the sympathy of

France, and only referred to the necessity of clarifying England's attitude, from which side he feared objections, before giving us more concrete assurances to the aforesaid effect. Lately the British Government expressed in writing its complete agreement to the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits to Russia, within limitations indicated by us, reserving therein only for itself a guarantee of her own economic interests, and also a similar benevolent attitude on our side to the political aims of England in other spheres. For me personally the assurance of Delcassé, in whom I have the deepest confidence, is quite sufficient, but for the Imperial Government more specific declarations are desirable as to the agreement of France to the complete fulfilment of our desires, similar to that made by the Government of Great Britain.—(Signed) Sazonov."—O Ferrara, *Lessons of the war and the peace conference*, pp. 220-231.

"Information with regard to the division of Turkish territory in Asia Minor is contained in the following memorandum of an agreement entered into in the spring of 1916 as result of negotiations taking place in London and Petrograd between the British, French, and Russian Governments. The document has no signature, but is certified as being true to the original. . . . "As a result of negotiations taking place in the Spring of 1916 in London and Petrograd, the British, French, and Russian governments came to an agreement with regard to future distribution of their zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, and also with regard to organization within the limits of Arabia of an independent Arabian government or Confederation of Arabian governments. In general this agreement is substantially as follows: Russia acquires regions of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, Bitlis, and also the territory of South Kurdistan, along the line of the Muscha Sert Lbn Omar—Amali Amalia, Persian boundary. The furthest point of Russian acquisition on the shore of the Black Sea is to be a point west of Trebizond, subject to future determination. France is to receive the coast strip of Syria, Addansk District and territory bounded on the south by a line running, Ajutab-Mardin to the future Russian boundary and on the north by a line Ala-Daga—Kosanya-ak-Daga—Ildiz-Daga—Zara—Ogim—Kharput. Great Britain acquires southern part of Mesopotamia with Bagdad and reserves for herself in Syria the ports of Harpha and Akka. By agreement between France and England the territory in the zones between French and English territories shall be formed into a confederation of Arabian governments, or an independent Arabian government, the zones of influence over which are herewith defined. Alexandro [Alexandretta] is declared a free port. With the aim of conserving the religious interest of the allied powers, Palestine with the sacred places is to be separated from Turkish territory and is to be subject to a special régime by agreement between Russia, France, and England. As a general condition, the contracting powers mutually obligate themselves to recognize the respective concessions and prerogatives existing prior to the war in the territories acquired by them. They agree to assume a proportionate share of the Ottoman debt equivalent to their respective acquisitions. True to Original."—*Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.

1915-1916.—Growth of nationalism.—Abolition of capitulations.—Language regulations.—New interest in Anatolia.—"All New-Turkish Nationalistic efforts at emancipation had as first principle the abolition of Capitulations [see CAPITULA-

TIONS]. As early as summer 1915 there were clear outward indications in the streets of Constantinople of a smouldering Nationalism ready to break out at any moment. Turkey, under the leadership of Talaat Bey, pursued her course along the well-trodden paths, and the first sphere in which there was evidence of an attempt at forcible Turkification was the language. Somewhere toward the end of 1915 Talaat suddenly ordered the removal of all French and English inscriptions, shop signs, etc., even in the middle of European Pera. In tram-cars and at stopping-places the French text was blocked out; boards with public police warnings in French were either removed altogether or replaced by unreadable Turkish scrawls; the street indications were simply abolished. . . . [The removal of German notices] was provided by a second decree of Talaat's some weeks later. . . . A few, who would not believe the order, held out obstinately, and the signs remained in German till they were either supplemented in 1916, on a very clear hint from Stamboul, by the obligatory Turkish language or later quite supplanted. It was not till some time after the German had disappeared—and this is worthy of note—that the Greek signs ceased to exist. Greek had been up to that time the most used tongue and was the commercial language of the Armenians. Then came the famous language regulations, which even went so far—with a year of grace granted owing to the extraordinary difficulties of the Turkish script—as to decree that in the offices of all trade undertakings of any public interest whatsoever, such as banks, newspapers, transport agencies, etc., the Turkish language should be used exclusively for book-keeping and any written communication with customers. One can imagine the 'Osmanic Lloyd' and the 'German Bank' with Turkish book-keeping and Turkish letters written to an exclusively European clientele! Old and trusty employees suddenly found themselves faced with the choice of learning the difficult Turkish script or being turned out in a year's time. The possibility—indeed, the necessity—of employing Turkish hands in European business suddenly came within the range of practical politics—and that was exactly what the Turkish Government wanted. . . . Anatolia was suddenly 'discovered.' At long length the Young Turkish Government, roused intellectually and patriotically by the war and brought to their senses by the terrible loss of human life entailed, suddenly realised the enormous national importance of Anatolia, that hitherto much-neglected nucleus of the Ottoman Empire."—H. Sturmer, *Two years in Constantinople*, pp. 153-157, 171.

1915-1916.—World War: War in Mesopotamia.—Battles of Kut-el-Amara and Ctesiphon. See WORLD WAR: 1915: VI. Turkey: c; 1916: VI. Turkish theater: a; a, 1, iii.

1916.—World War: Declaration of war by Italy. See ITALY: 1915-1916.

1916.—Arabian revolt. See ARABIA: 1908-1916; 1916; 1916 (June).

1916.—World War: Campaigns in Sinai peninsula, Armenia, and the Caucasus.—Operations against Russians in Persia and Armenia. See WORLD WAR: 1916: VI. Turkish theater: b; d; d, 3; d, 5.

1916.—Anglo-French agreement in Syria. See WORLD WAR: 1916: VI. Turkish theater: c, 3.

1917.—World War: Campaign in Mesopotamia. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VI. Turkish theater: a, 1; a, 1, i; a, 1, ii; a, 1, iii.

1917.—End of Mohammedan calendar.—In 1917 the Turks under German influence ended the

Hejira calendar of 1295 years and adopted the Gregorian calendar of 1917 years. See CHRONOLOGY: Era of the Hejira.

1917.—World War: First Battle of Gaza in Palestine.—Surrender of Jerusalem to British. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VI. Turkish theater: c, 1, ii; c, 2, viii.

1917.—World War: Armistice with Russia. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: I. Armistices: a; 1917: III. Russia and the Eastern front: q, 6.

1917-1918.—Provisions for industrial arbitration.—Prohibition of strikes. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: Turkey.

1917-1919.—War with the Caucasus. See CAUCASUS: 1917-1919.

1918.—Accession of Mohammed VI.—On July 3, Mohammed VI, son of Sultan Abdul Medjid, ascended the throne.

1918.—World War: Attack on British in Baku.—Final capture of Baku.—Capture of Urmia from Assyrians. See WORLD WAR: 1918: VI. Turkish theater: a, 8; a, 9; b, 9.

1918.—World War: Trebizond retaken from the Russians. See TREBIZOND: 1914-1920.

1918.—Lloyd George's declaration of British war aims toward Turkey.—President Wilson's peace program.—Count von Hertling's answer to Lloyd George and Wilson regarding war settlement. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: a; b; d.

1918.—Peace sought with England.—Armistice with Allied powers. See WORLD WAR: 1918: VI. Turkish theater: c, 25; Miscellaneous auxiliary services: I. Armistices: d.

1918.—Treaty of Bucharest.—Turkish-Georgian Treaty.—Brest-Litovsk Treaty. See BUCHAREST, TREATY OF; GEORGIA, REPUBLIC OF: 1918; BREST-LITOVSK: Treaties: 1918.

1918.—Effects of World War.—Work of American Relief Association. See COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1914-1921; WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIV. Cost of war: a; b, 3; INTERNATIONAL RELIEF: American relief, etc.

1919 (March).—Reactionary coup anticipated.—New cabinet and steps toward reform.—"Mohammed VI. rid himself of Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey, placing the aged Tewfik Pasha back in power as Grand Vizier and by a coup d'état backed up by French and English bayonets dissolved Parliament on the eve of a reactionary coup projected by the Young Turks, whose political organization is better known as the Committee of Union and Progress. On March 7 a third stroke swept away from the responsible Government all old men, all old influences, whether progressive or reactionary, and established a new Cabinet with Damad Pasha as Grand Vizier and Foreign Secretary. . . . The dissolution of Parliament was made necessary by the fact that the Entente had refused to have any dealings with its representatives, and the new election which then became necessary must be conducted by a Government which had the approval of the Entente, even though its claim to popular representation still had to be decided at the polls. The new Government at once set to work and both General Allenby, the conqueror of Palestine, and General Franchet d'Esperey, the conqueror of Bulgaria and the Commander in Chief of the allied forces in European Turkey, were present at the inauguration on March 5. The first work that Damad Pasha, through Djemed Bey, set out to accomplish was to remove over 500 officials which Tewfik Pasha had inherited from the old régime and which continued to be the chief vehicle of

reactionary propaganda under the new."—*New York Times Current History*, Apr., 1919, pp. 37-38.

1919 (April-May).—Turkish delegation to peace conference.—Revelations of German intrigue and treaties with the Ottoman empire.—Treaty with Turkey deferred.—The Ottoman delegation to the Paris Peace Conference "departed from Constantinople on April 28. It remained incognito at Berne until officially called to Paris. It is headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, whose departure gave rise to the story that he had resigned. . . . Up to May 3,300 prisoners had been arrested in Constantinople or brought there on the evidence furnished by the Interallied Mission. The charges against them range from treason to murder and the instigation of massacres.



MUSTAFA KEMAL

The execution of Kiamil Mahmud Pasha, charged with massacres of Armenians at Yozghad, where he was Governor [had already] taken place on April 12, in Bayazed Square, Stamboul. By May 3, Fethi Bey, ex-Minister of the Interior, and nineteen others had been released with the suspended verdict of 'not yet proven.' The case of the ex-Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha, was then taken up for examination. It is said that he has made statements of the highest political importance, revealing that Germany began as early as July 10, 1914, five days after the famous Potsdam conclave, to win Turkey to the side of the Central Empires, and that a treaty was signed on Aug. 1 by himself, Baron von Wangenheim for Germany, and Count Pallavicini for Austria-Hungary. In this treaty the participation of Great Britain in the war was ignored and Turkey was guaranteed against attack by any two powers. A second treaty was signed by the same parties on Aug. 10, taking

the hostility of Great Britain into account. In the middle of November a third treaty was signed to which Austria-Hungary was not a party. It dealt with the disposition of British interests in the Near East."—*Ibid.*, June, 1919, pp. 435-436.—Owing to President Wilson's stand at the Paris conference, the peace terms with Turkey were delayed pending the report of a Near East inquiry.—See also PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Question of Turkey; VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Part IV: Section VII.

1919-1920.—Turkish dissatisfaction with peace conference.—Appearance of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as head of insurgent Nationalist government at Angora.—Rise and fall of successive ministries.—Rebel control of Anatolia.—Armenian massacres and other disorders.—"Late in July [1919] rumors of the proposed partition of Thrace [see THRACE: 1918-1921] and the creation of a free state of Constantinople [by the Allies at the Paris peace conference] led to a demand by the Young Turks that Damad Pasha, Grand Vizier, be ousted on account of his alleged failure at Paris; the Sultan declined to remove him. Finally, the landing of additional Greek and Italian troops at Smyrna and Adalia, together with the seizure of Konieh, an important railroad center in Asia Minor, by the Nationalist insurgent, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, early in October [1919], caused the downfall of the pro-Entente ministry. This was succeeded by a Nationalist cabinet led by General Ali Rıza Pasba as Grand Vizier. The new government at once made preparations for the holding of parliamentary elections, but the Nationalists immediately set up a rival government at Angora and issued a proclamation demanding application of President Wilson's fourteen points to the settlement of the Turkish problem. . . . The rebels soon had control of the greater part of Anatolia and by January 1 [1920] were reported to have an army of 300,000. . . . On March 2 the ministry signed, and a government somewhat more favorable to the Allies was constructed under Salih Pasha as Grand Vizier, but this proved as helpless as its predecessor; Armenian massacres [see ARMENIA: 1919-1920], attacks on foreign troops and activity by the Nationalists continued. In the hope that conditions might be stabilized an Anglo-Franco-Italian army occupied Constantinople on March 16, and the Turkish government was informed that such occupation would continue until the terms of the Peace Treaty had been accepted and executed; at the same time many Nationalist leaders were placed under arrest. After holding office one month the Salih Pasha cabinet fell, and a new one, headed by Damad Pasha, succeeded it on April 6. This cabinet . . . accomplished little. [It sat for the last time on April 11. After that, it was realized that the Angora government was the only one acceptable to the Turks.]—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, Supplement, pp. 145-146.—See also CALIPHATE: 1919-1920.

1919-1921.—Causes leading to alliance of France and Italy with Turkey.—In 1919 Turkey was a beaten foe with no friends. By 1921 she had allied with both France and Italy against Greece and indirectly Great Britain. This is difficult to understand till it is realized that it was a retaliatory measure by France and Italy against Great Britain's foreign policy not only in the Near East but in Europe. "After 1919 came the swift and embittering break between the French and the British. British statesmanship opposed French occupation of Syria because this occupation carried a fatal blow to the British conception of an Arab



state, which would replace the Osmanli in the world of Islam. The British had promised the Arabs all of the Arab regions, including Syria, which they had also agreed should be French. If they now turned over Syria, which they had conquered in conjunction with the Arabs, to the French, then Arab hostility would be engendered. But if the Syrian dispute poisoned Paris sessions and awakened French distrust, the real trouble was in Europe and the true cause of the Anglo-French trouble to be found in German matters. America failed to ratify the treaty guaranteeing with Britain the security of France against a new German attack. Britain refused to give the guarantee alone, furthermore British policy seemed to the French increasingly to favor Germany. When the Russian Reds invaded Poland in 1920 and approached Warsaw, British statesmanship backed the Russians and practically ordered the Poles to accept a frontier settlement which meant the negation of historical and racial claims as good and founded upon an occupation much more recent than the claim of the Greeks of Smyrna. But the Poles were the allies of the French. For France they represented the assurance of assistance on a new eastern front, if Germany should attack again. British policy revealed itself again when the question of Upper Silesia came up and the Polish and German claims clashed. Then as before Britain frankly opposed the Poles because of their dependence upon the French and because Polish military reinforcement contributed to establishing French military supremacy on the Continent. It was natural, it was inevitable, then, that the British attitude toward Poland, the soldier and ally of France in the northeast, should lead to French reprisals directed against the Greek ally and sentinel of Britain in the Aegean. In a word, just as soon as Anglo-French rivalries began to crop up, then the smaller powers allied to either state were bound to be involved. . . . French policy showed its hand . . . [in 1921] when France, through M. Franklin Bouillon, a French parliamentarian of distinction, negotiated a separate treaty with the Angora government. Nominally this treaty only adjusted disputes between France and Turkey growing out of the French mandate in Syria. Actually it constituted a French recognition of Kemal Pasha, who had raised the standard of Turkish revolt against the Treaty of Sèvres and was preparing to challenge Greek possession of Turkish territory. But in reality this separate treaty assured the Turks that France would not join Britain in backing the Greek. On the contrary, it gave the Turk the tacit assurance of French support which would be translated into the despatch of military supplies. In addition France resigned Cilicia to the Turk and agreed to accept a frontier of the Bagdad railway for the Syrian mandate, while the Turk, who had been engaged in a small campaign against the French to turn the army of occupation out of Cilicia, agreed to respect Syria as newly delimited in the Angora compact. Thus France got out of an imminent war with Turkey and put a spoke in the British-Greek wheel. Italy promptly followed suit, evacuated Adalia as France had quit Cilicia, gave full assurance that she would not support the Greek, who had actually been sent to Smyrna by the British with French consent to forestall the Italian, promised to furnish arms to the Turk, and, like the French, secured the promise of many rich concessions in Turkish territories. Of course the Italian theory was that if the Turk came back to Smyrna he could not hold it permanently and

the Italian claim would have a chance of realization, while if Greece remained, then there was an end of Italian hopes and eastern Asia Minor was certain to be re-Hellenized and Greece to become a considerable power, thus preventing Italy from repeating the achievements of Rome and Venice which she desired to follow. Moreover, Italy had no desire to see Britain supreme in the Mediterranean. She had followed Britain in opposing French policy on the Continent, both in Poland and elsewhere, because she objected to French supremacy on the Continent. She now followed the French example in opposing Britain in the Near East, because she was equally hostile to British hegemony on the inland sea. If one is to grasp the meaning of recent events, these cross currents have to be studied carefully. Still another circumstance had added to the discomfiture of the Anglo-Greek policy. Venizelos had been overthrown [November, 1920]. His King, young Alexander, had died and Constantine had returned. But Constantine had been pro-German and was responsible for the murder of many French sailors in Athens. It was one thing to give Smyrna to the Greece of Venizelos, another to Constantine, brother-in-law of the Kaiser."—F. H. Simonds, *Return of the Turk* (*American Review of Reviews*, Nov., 1922, pp. 483-484).—See also SYRIA: 1908-1921.

1920 (April).—National Pact.—On Jan. 30, 1920, "the Turkish Nationalists severed their allegiance to the Constantinople Government and held elections for a National Assembly. This body met at Angora [Apr. 23, 1920], formally denounced the Treaty of Versailles, and set forth their program in a National Pact, for the realization of which they swore solemnly to fight, and, if necessary, to die. Because this document has been the 'irreducible minimum' in the negotiations with the powers at Lausanne, it is important to have a clear knowledge of its terms. The Pact contains six articles:

"1. The fate of the portion of the Ottoman territory which was under enemy occupation at the time of the conclusion of the armistice in October, 1919, will inevitably be regulated by plebiscite, the territory in question being inhabited by an Arab majority. These portions of the Ottoman territory within as well as outside the armistice line which are inhabited by Ottoman Mussulman majorities, united among themselves by religion and racial ties and by a common ideal as well as by sentiments of mutual respect, constitute an indivisible whole, division whereof is impossible, either in theory or in practice.

"2. We accept a new plebiscite, if necessary, for the three districts, Kars, Ardahan and Batum, which joined themselves to the mother-country by vote of their inhabitants just as soon as they recovered their liberty.

"3. The adjustment of the question of Western Thrace, which has been disputed with Turkey up until the conclusion of peace, will be made the subject of plebiscite executed with the fullest liberty to its inhabitants.

"4. The safety of Constantinople, headquarters of the Mussulman caliphate and capital of the Ottoman Empire, as well as that of the Sea of Marmora, must be assured. This condition once complied with Turkey must then treat with the Allied authorities the subject of opening the Straits to world commerce.

"5. The rights of minorities will be guaranteed by us in the hope that the same rights will be

granted to the Mussulman populations in contiguous territories. The question of guarantees will be subject to the same laws and principles which have been established between the Entente and its enemies and between the Entente and some of its allies.

"6. Our highest and most vital principle is to have entire independence, with which, as in the case of all other countries, we shall be able to develop ourselves both socially and economically. We are opposed to all restrictions which are but obstacles to our political, judicial, and economic development. The terms of the payment of our debts, which will certainly be settled, must not be contrary to the spirit of this principle.

"The terms of the Pact are in essence a declaration of independence from foreign control. They ignore the fact that Turkey lost the war, and should therefore expect to share the humiliations of her allies by being subjected to penalties and indemnities. As the Entente Powers have discovered at Lausanne, the Angora Government repudiates responsibility for the World War, and the logical consequences of defeat."—H. A. Gibbons, *Europe since 1918*, pp. 446-448.

1920 (May).—Territorial extent of Turkey according to Treaty of Sèvres.—Failure of treaty.—By the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey (May 11, 1920) the empire was considerably reduced. (1) Thrace as far as Chatalja together with several islands of the Ægean was ceded to Greece. (See GREECE: 1920.) Smyrna with some surrounding territory was administered by Greece under the sovereignty of Turkey. (3) Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, Armenia, and Hejas became independent, the first three under mandatories. (4) Kurdistan was autonomous. (5) Castellorizo and Dodecanese were ceded to Italy. Turkey held Constantinople (see CONSTANTINOPLE: 1920), but the Dardanelles (see DARDANELLES: 1920), the shores of Marmora and the coasts of the Bosphorus were put under a "Commission of Straits" formed by the League of Nations. (See also BOSPORUS: 1920.) The area of Turkey was thus about 175,000 square miles with a population of 8,000,000, while the area of old Turkey had about 6,000,000 square miles and the population over 20,000,000. "The Entente Powers, after ignoring Russia in drawing up the treaties that were to make the new map of Europe, believed that it was in their power to settle the devolution of the Ottoman Empire. Rid, as they thought, of the embarrassment of Russian claims to Constantinople and to a sphere of influence in Asia Minor, they acted on the assumption that the interests of three powers alone needed to be considered when, at San Remo, they decided upon the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. Even if they had preserved a united front, it would have been difficult to ignore Russia. With the divergence of interests among them, the San Remo compromise, leaving out Russia, was as absurd as it was futile. This was soon discovered. The Turkish Nationalists at Angora naturally appealed to Moscow for aid to prevent the dismemberment of their country. A Russo-Turkish treaty was concluded in the autumn of 1920, which was revised and strengthened in 1921 and 1922. Artillery, airplanes, motor-lorries, gasoline, timber, and ammunition were given to the Angora Government, which enabled Mustafa Kemal Pasha to drive the French out of Cilicia and to check the advance of the Greeks in Asia Minor. The Nationalists were thus enabled to become much stronger than the intrigues of France and Italy had planned that they should become."

H. A. Gibbons, *Europe since 1918*, pp. 187-188.— See also SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920): Part II; Part III: Political clauses: Greece; Morocco, Tunis; Armenia; Libya; Egypt, Sudan and Cyprus; Hedjaz; Kurdistan; Part V: Military clauses: Naval provisions; Part VIII; BALKAN STATES: 1921: Greece.

1920 (June).—Beginning of Greco-Turkish War.—Operations in Asia Minor and Thrace. See GREECE: 1920.

1920 (November-December).—Bolshevist agreement with Mustafa Kemal.—Armistice with Armenia.—Soviet government at Erivan.—"What is deemed the most authentic report of the Kemal-Bolshevist pact was published by the British and French Governments on Nov. 23. It reads as follows: '1. To insure the territorial integrity of Turkey and restore Turkish administration in the regions inhabited by Turks. 2. Turkish control is to be established in the new States of Arabia and Syria. 3. Facilities are to be accorded Russian delegates with a view to the development of communism in Turkey. 4. Russia and Turkey agree to "liberate Moslem countries, such as India, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, from the foreign yoke" and grant them independence. 5. Russia recognizes the independence of Moslem States in her territory, and guarantees their integrity. 6. Russia agrees to grant financial and material aid to Turkey. 7. Russia agrees to dispatch two army corps, followed by more if necessary. 8. Hostilities may be continued against the Entente without previous reference to the National Councils of both countries.' Kemal thereupon began to extend his lines, covering the territory given to Turkey by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, until George Tchitcherin, the Soviet Foreign Minister, informed him that this treaty was invalid. Then Kemal opened negotiations directly with the new Armenian Government at Erivan—a coalition Government formed by Katchaznoui—before it had become entirely dominated by the Bolsheviki. These negotiations resulted in an armistice, which was signed by Armenian and Nationalist delegates at Alexandropol on the night of Dec. 2-3. The terms of this armistice, as reported to the Near East Relief Organization in New York on Dec. 4, were as follows: 'A neutral zone, about sixty-eight miles long, had been provided for between Sanain and Alaguez, the second highest mountain in Armenia, and thirty-four miles northwest of Erivan, the Armenian capital. Other boundaries were unknown to Sanain. A commission of three Turks and three Armenians, to control the neutral area, was to arrive Dec. 6. The territory in the neutral zone includes the important Armenian city of Alexandropol, and Karakliss, Delijan, Habamloo, Bash-Abaran, Akhta, Khoroum, Bandamal and a score of other towns. Under the armistice terms, all troops except officers and six soldiers in Karakliss were to withdraw eleven miles from the zone. Refugees are permitted to return into the area, but it was not known whether any guarantee of their safety had been provided. The Armenians were to deliver to the Turks 2,000 rifles, sixty machine guns, two locomotives and 560 cars. The report had been confirmed, it was added, that the Turks were massacring the inhabitants of two villages near Habamloo in alleged reprisal for the killing of two Turkish soldiers by civilians. President Abrounian of Armenia was at Geneva, striving to have the League do something to prevent Armenia from being crushed by the Bolsheviki on one side and the Turkish Nationalists on the other. Armenian societies in the United States and abroad





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have long pointed out that with proper arms the Armenian army of 17,500 could have given a good account of itself, if the smuggled supplies to the Bolsheviki and the Nationalists could be cut off. Now, however, it is too late. All arms have been surrendered. A Soviet Government has been established at Erivan under Katchaznoui as Prime Minister, replacing Chanjanian, and complete accord has been reached between Erivan and Soviet Russia, Azerbaijan, and the Turkish Nationalists. Armenia as a country has been reduced to less than 500 square miles area, confined entirely to the region of Erivan and Lake Gokcha."—*New York Times Current History, Jan., 1921, pp. 67-68.*—See also ARMENIA: 1920: Turk and Bolshevik attacks.

1921 (January).—Law of Fundamental Organization.—On Jan. 20, 1921, "Mustafa Kemal issued the constitution of his new state, the so-called *Law of Fundamental Organization*. This was as bold a challenge to the Sultan and his government as the National Pact had been to the Allies, for by omission of any mention of the Sultanate and by implication, at least, it proclaimed a republican form of government of an ultra-democratic nature, in which the final authority in all matters was vested in the Grand National Assembly, and a large degree of autonomy localized in the province (*vilayet*) and in the township (*nahieh*)."—B. Miller, *New Turkey (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1923, pp. 136-137)*.

1921 (January-February). — Invitation to Turkish Nationalists to participate in London Near East conference for revision of treaty.—Their hostile attitude.—Proclamation of Nationalist government.—Pan-Islamic conference.—It was officially announced in Constantinople on Jan. 27 that the Supreme Council's invitation for the Sultan's Government to send a delegation to the Near East Conference at London, beginning Feb. 21, at which a revision of the Sèvres Treaty would be considered, had been accepted, and that his Majesty's Government, by promise to the Council, had transmitted a most urgent invitation to Angora, asking Mustapha Kemal Pasha, or a representative of the Nationalist Government there, to participate in the Conference. . . . One party at Angora insisted that the invitation to the conference should come direct from the Supreme Council or one of the Entente Powers, and not through the intermediary of Stamboul; while another party, led by Kemal, insisted that at least Anatolia must be evacuated by the Allies before the invitation to the conference could even be considered. It was stated that the Sultan's delegation had also been instructed to make the following demands: First—Abrogation of the privileges of Greece in the Smyrna region under the Treaty of Sèvres; Second—Autonomy for Thrace; Third—Maintenance of Turkish sovereignty over the Turkish territory awarded to Armenia; Fourth—Modification of the economic clauses of the treaty which infringe upon Turkish sovereignty and independence; Fifth—Modification of the military clauses so that Turkey will be enabled to retain a 'defensive army.' On Feb. 5 the Nationalist Government proclaimed the assertion that it, and it alone, was the true Government of Turkey, and it required the Porte to publish an edict recognizing that fact. France was said to be in favor of recognizing the demand; Great Britain was known to be against it, as the . . . Government at Constantinople . . . [was] Great Britain's creation. Should Kemal's demands be conceded, the Sultan,

it was thought, might be permitted to remain in Constantinople as Caliph, but the Government would be transferred to Angora with the abolition of the Cabinet of Stamboul and its replacement by a commission from Angora. But the Emir of Afghanistan was also a candidate for the Caliphate. On Jan. 19 he sent the following message to Kemal Pasha: 'I should like to have a permanent mission to reorganize my army, which is ready to take the field for the emancipation of our brothers.' . . . In the religious sphere of the situation there were movements and counter-movements. The Stamboul Government submitted a project for the Sultan's approval converting the Ministry of Evkaf, or Pious Foundations, into a department of the Sheik-ul-Islamat, providing for the formation of a council which should organize Moslem communities after the fashion of Christian communities existing in the Ottoman Empire for centuries. This would turn the Caliphate into a hierarchy with authority over its priests and preachers which it does not now possess. On the other hand, there was a Pan-Islamic conference held at Sivas under the Presidency of El Seyid Ahmed, the former Sheik of the Senussi, with the object of drawing up a scheme for the co-ordination of Moslem communities all over the world, with the idea of placing Islam above the States to which the communities in question were subject. There were at the conference Emir Abdulla, Feisal's brother, an Emir of Kerbela, and a representative of the Iman Yehia, and Zaidi Emir of Sanaa in the Yemen, which is part of the domain of Feisal's father, King of Hedjaz, former Sheriff of Mecca."—*New York Times Current History, Mar., 1921, pp. 508-509.*

1921 (February).—Invasion of Georgian republic. See GEORGIA, REPUBLIC OF: 1921.

1921 (March-April).—Greek attempts to impose the Sèvres Treaty by war.—Secret treaties.—"On March 24, 1921, the Greek Army in Asia Minor began its campaign to execute single-handed the Treaty of Sèvres. It did this under the most trying moral and material handicaps. The country's repudiation of Venizelos and its restoration of King Constantine in November had seriously injured its moral status. Both France and Italy entered into separate engagements with the Kemalists which would prevent Greece, even if victorious over Kemal, from enjoying the fruits of that victory, even though they were limited to the original terms of the Treaty. According to the official statement, these proposals are to the following effect:

"The Allies would be prepared to facilitate the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations on condition that they have proof of Turkey's readiness to execute the Treaty as now modified. They would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty the menace at present suspended over Turkey of expulsion from Constantinople in certain contingencies: They would be prepared to concede to Turkey the Chairmanship of the Straits Commission, on which Turkey should, moreover, have two votes instead of one as hitherto proposed. The Allies would admit Turkish membership of the commission to prepare the scheme of judicial reform to replace the Capitulations. . . .

"THE DARDANELLES AND BOSPORUS.—Further, in regard to the Straits, the Allies have in mind considerably to reduce the demilitarized zone. . . .

"CONSTANTINOPLE.—The Allies might also consent to the rapid evacuation of Constantinople, of the Ismid Peninsula, and to limit the allied occupation to Gallipoli and Chanak. . . .

"KURDISTAN.—In regard to Kurdistan, the Allies would be prepared to consider a modification of the Treaty in a sense in conformity with the existing facts of the situation, on condition of facilities for local autonomies and the adequate protection of Kurdish and Assyro-Chaldean interests.

"ARMENIA.—In regard to Armenia, the present stipulations might be adapted on condition of Turkey recognizing the rights of Turkish Armenians to a national home on the eastern frontiers of Turkey in Asia and agreeing to accept the decision of a commission, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, to examine on the spot the question of the territory equitably to be transferred for this purpose to Armenia.

"SMYRNA.—In regard to Smyrna, the Allies would be ready to propose an equitable compromise with a view to ending the present unhappy state of hostilities and ensuring the return of peace. The region called the Vilayet of Smyrna would remain under Turkish sovereignty."—*New York Times Current History, May, 1921, pp. 347-348.*

"Instead of standing by her fellow-signatories to the Treaty of Sèvres, France has agreed to other changes in that treaty, and has proceeded to carry out certain parts of it without waiting for the Turks to carry out their part, or even to reply to the joint proposals. . . . The separate treaty with France, printed below, surrenders to Turkey portions of Northern Syria which the Treaty of Sèvres set apart as Arab territory, and establishes a boundary entirely different from that previously determined.

"The French agreement is signed by Briand, the French Premier, and by Bekir Samy, delegate of the Grand National Assembly at Angora, acting in the name of the National Turkish Government. There are twelve points in the agreement, lettered from A to L, as follows:

"A.—Cessation of hostilities and exchange of prisoners, according to the terms of the attached annex.

"B.—Disarmament of the populations and of the armed bands in accordance with regulations to be made by the French and Turkish military authorities.

"C.—Establishment of a constabulary (making use of the gendarmerie already formed) under Turkish command, assisted by French officers, who will be placed at the disposition of the Turkish government.

"D.—In accordance with measures to be agreed upon by the French and Turkish military authorities, there will be evacuation at the expiration of one month (after the cessation of the hostilities) of the territories occupied by the armed troops north of the frontiers established by the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish troops are first to retire and then eight day after the evacuation will occupy the localities evacuated by the French troops. Provisional measures will be taken with respect to the evacuation of territories assigned to Syria by the Treaty of Sèvres and reincorporated in the Turkish State by the present agreement, on account of ethnic considerations. Because of the condition of protracted war, and of the deep-rooted confusion which has resulted from it, the French troops will withdraw gradually, according to stipulations to be determined by the French and Turkish authorities, in a joint commission, on the following general basis: Effective pacification, guarantee of safe communication by railway between the Euphrates River and the Gulf of Alexandretta,

the restoration of construction in the Amanus Mountains and at the Bridge of Djerablous, the right of military pursuit in case of attack by bands, the punishment of those guilty of the ambush at Urfa.

"E.—Complete political amnesty and maintenance in their activities of the administrative personnel in Cilicia.

"F.—Pledge to protect the ethnic minorities, to guarantee to them absolute equality of rights in every respect and to have regard in an equitable way to the proportions of the populations for the purpose of establishing an equilibrium in the districts where the populations are mixed when the establishment of the constabulary is undertaken and when the municipal administrations are formed.

"G.—Economic collaboration between the French and Turks, with the right of priority in respect to concessions to be granted for the exploitation and for the economic development of Cilicia in the districts evacuated by the French troops, as well as in the vilayets of Mamurt-el-Aziz, Diarbekr and Sivas, in so far as such exploitation shall not be carried out directly by the Ottoman Government or by Ottoman subjects with the assistance of national funds. Concession to a French group in the Argana copper mines. Concessions which involve monopolies or privileges shall be exploited by companies that are established under the Ottoman law. The widest possible association of Ottoman and French capital (extending to 50 per cent. of Ottoman capital).

"H.—Establishment of proper customs regulations between the Turkish and Syrian territories.

"I.—Maintenance of French educational institutions and hospitals and of philanthropic organizations.

"J.—The French Government will establish a special administration for the District of Alexandretta where the populations are mixed, and agrees to give the inhabitants who are of the Turkish race every facility for the development of their culture and for the employment of the Turkish language, which will have an official character on a parity with the Arabic and French languages.

"K.—Transfer to a French group of the section of the Bagdad Railroad which extends from the Cilician Gates to the Syrian frontier. Every effort will be made to facilitate in every respect the use of the railroad by both Turks and French for economic and military purposes.

"L.—The frontier between Turkey and Syria will start from a point to be chosen on the Gulf of Alexandretta, immediately south of Payas, and will extend in a straight line toward Meidan Ekbes, the railroad station and the town being assigned to Syria. Thence the boundary will turn southeast in such a way as to leave to Syria the town of Marsova, and to Turkey the town of Karnaba, as well as the City of Killis. Thence the frontier meets the railroad at the station of Chotenbeg. From there the frontier will follow the Bagdad Railroad, whose roadbed will remain in Ottoman territory as far as Nissibin. Thence the frontier will go to the bend of the Euphrates north of Azekh and will follow the Euphrates as far as Djeziret-Ibin-Omar. The Turkish line of custom houses will be established north of the railway and the French line of custom houses to the south. . . .

"Done at London in duplicate, March 9, 1921."

"Not only France, but also Italy, it was revealed early in April, had concluded a secret pact with the Turkish Nationalists while Greece was fighting

in Anatolia to enforce the terms of the Sèvres Treaty signed by all the Allies in common. This agreement between Rome and Angora, it now appears, was arranged between Count Sforza and Bekir Samy Bey, representing Kemal, during the London conference in March. The pact itself was signed on March 12. Count Sforza on April 2 officially informed the Italian Chamber of the signing of this treaty, and explained the objects sought to be attained. The following week the British Government instructed its Minister at Rome to ascertain what the provisions of this secretly concluded compact were. The salient points of the treaty, finally published in Rome on April 7, and summarized in Paris on April 12, were as follows:

"1. The two Governments at Angora and Rome have in view Italian-Turkish economic collaboration with the right of priority for concessions of an economic character to be accorded in the Sandjaks of Adalia, Meugia, Bourdour and Sparta and in part of the Sandjaks of Afium, Karahissar and Kutahia, which will be determined when the accord becomes definite, as well as in the coal basin of Heraclea, so far as the above-mentioned should not be directly given by the Ottoman Government to Ottoman subjects with Ottoman capital.

"2. When the concessions contain privileges or monopoly they shall be exploited by societies formed according to Ottoman law.

"3. Ottoman capital shall be assisted as largely as possible with Italian capital. Ottoman participation may reach 50 per cent. of the total.

"4. The Royal Government of Italy pledges itself to support effectively in relations to its allies all demands of the Turkish delegation relative to the Peace Treaty, and especially restitution to Turkey of Smyrna and Thrace.

"5. This part of the agreement involves the withdrawal of Italian troops which still remain in Ottoman territory.

"6. The foregoing disposition will come into effect as a result of a convention to be concluded between the two contracting parties immediately after the conclusion of peace assuring Turkey a free and independent existence."

"On April 2, Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, gave in the Rome Chamber a comprehensive account of the Near East Conference and of the German Conference which followed. In regard to the former he said—and this is most important, as it has not been imparted by any other statesman of the Entente:

"The first proposal for a Commission of Inquiry in Thrace and Smyrna, conditionally accepted by the Turks and rejected emphatically by the Greeks, could not be imposed with force, and therefore another solution was required. It consists of fresh proposals made on March 12 concerning which the Turks showed themselves well disposed, and the Angora delegates promised to refer the matter to their National Assembly. The Greeks will refer the matter to Athens. The proposal is for a partial revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. [Here the Count paraphrased the proposals of the Allies.] I desired to reach an agreement with the Turkish delegates on our own economic action in Anatolia and the Heraclea mining basin, and it was understood that the policy of the Italian Government was to proceed in perfect harmony and co-operation with the Turkish authorities. I was able, happily, to conclude an agreement, signed on the evening of March 12, by which a vast zone in Asia Minor is open specially to Italian economic penetration

without any political aims, and I have secured the sincere and cordial co-operation of Turkey, which is convinced of the honest and loyal intentions of Italy."

—G. R. Montgomery, *Secret pacts of France and Italy with Turkey* (*New York Times Current History*, May, 1921, pp. 203-205).—See also GREECE: 1920-1921; 1921.

1921 (October).—**Franco-Turkish Treaty.**—"It is a sad commentary upon the fundamental heartlessness and cynicism of international politics that France, who profited greatly in Syria by the Greek victories of the summer of 1921, should have used the advantage they gave her to help her enemies against her ally. On October 20, 1921, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and M. Franklin Bouillon signed a treaty, which was ratified by the French Government ten days later. The convention was elaborate. France not only gave back to the Nationalists Cilicia (which she had received from Great Britain) without any stipulation for the protection of the unfortunate Armenians to whom the French authorities in Cilicia had appealed three years earlier to help France against the Turks, but returned to Turkish rule a strip of northern Syria that had been included in the mandate entrusted to France by the League of Nations. The section of the Bagdad Railway up to the Tigris was restored to Turkey. In return for extensive and exclusive economic concessions and preferential commercial treatment, France agreed to make the same promise that Italy had made, i. e., to support the Angora Government in ousting Greece from Smyrna and Thrace. The news of the treaty, leaking out almost immediately, caused a great outcry against France in Great Britain. Parliament and press united in denouncing the French act as a blow to the Entente alliance, a disloyal and underhand proceeding, and the betrayal of France's glorious and traditional rôle as protector of the Christians in the Levant."—H. A. Gibbons, *Europe since 1918*, pp. 454-455.—See also SYRIA: 1921.

1921 (November).—**Secret Pact of Sèvres published.**—"A considerable stir in world politics was occasioned on November 5, 1921 by the publication of the terms of the Italo-Franco-British agreement for maintaining respective spheres of influence in Asiatic Turkey. This pact, secretly signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920, the date of the Turkish peace treaty, defined the areas of special interest to France and Italy. . . . This treaty however was not ratified."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1921, *Supplement*, p. 7.

1922.—**Deportation of Greeks.**—Turkish atrocities.—Activities of the Greek fleet.—Defeat of Greek army in Asia Minor.—Burning of Smyrna. See GREECE: 1922 (January-March); 1922 (April-July); 1922 (August-September).

1922.—**Republican Turkey.**—**Caliphate.**—The Nationalist party had proclaimed Turkey a republic in 1920 by the Law of Fundamental Organization, but they were not strong enough to depose the sultan till 1922. "The National Assembly on Nov. 16 [1922], accused . . . Mohammed VI., of treason, and ordered him and his Cabinet Ministers to be placed on trial. The . . . Sultan, who had so far remained in his palace in Constantinople, refusing to abdicate, now believed that his life was in danger and applied to the British authorities for protection. Lieut. Gen. Harrington thereupon communicated with the Government in London, and arrangements were made for Mohammed VI [to escape to Malta]. Great Britain's defense for giving refuge to the ex-Sultan was that he formally

asked as Caliph of the Mussulmans for protection from what he considered a personal danger, and that Great Britain could do nothing else but comply. It was pointed out that Great Britain had traditionally been the refuge of deposed sovereigns, and that even Napoleon had been removed to safety on a British ship."—*New York Times Current History, Jan., 1923, pp. 699-700.*—Abdul Medjid Effendi, son of Abdul Aziz "was selected as the best qualified among the members of the Osman royal family in accordance with the decision passed in the Great National Assembly of Turkey on Nov. 1, 1922, which provided that the Caliphate should continue to be exercised by the royal family, and that he should be chosen by the National Assembly. The election of the Caliph without political power is not only an epoch making event in Islam, but has a vital importance to the whole world. About 3,000,000 Mohammedans are scattered over the globe. Half of them are under British rule, and at least 30,000,000 are subjects of France. There is no power today, including the United States, which does not number some Mohammedans among its subjects. . . . So far no objection has been raised in the Moslem world against the decision of the National Assembly. On the contrary, there are many evidences of approval from the different parts of the world of Islam. The Indian Caliphate Committee, which represents 75,000,000 Mohammedans of India, immediately cabled its approval to the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference. The Egyptian Nationalist delegation at Lausanne declared in a public interview that 'the Turks have a right to overthrow the Sultan and Caliph and select a new Caliph for the place.' The hundreds of millions of Mohammedans living in Russia, in Turkestan, in Afghanistan and in the others parts of Asia have already declared that they recognize the new Caliph elected by Angora as the legitimate spiritual head of the world of Islam. Only the attitude of the Arabs remains to be seen."—M. Zekeria, *New Turkish Calif (New York Times Current History, Jan., 1923).*

1922.—Expedition of Enver Pasha to Bokhara. See TURKESTAN: 1922-1923.

1922.—Represented at Genoa Congress of Oriental Peoples. See GENOA CONGRESS OF ORIENTAL PEOPLES.

1922-1923.—First and second conferences at Lausanne.—End of Greek War.—Armistice of Mudania.—Chester concession.—Republic established.—"Owing to Russian support, the Turks at the [first] Lausanne Conference [see NEAR EAST CONFERENCE], at the end of 1922 were defiant and refused to accept modification of the Treaty of Sèvres which would safeguard Entente economic interests in the Ottoman Empire. . . . Great Britain and France stood together in deciding to exclude Russia from active participation in the Lausanne Conference with the approval of the new government in Italy. The Fascisti had always been anti-bolshevist, and Mussolini reversed the policy of his predecessors. Tchitcherin was told that Russia would be allowed to sign the convention concerning the Straits, to be embodied in the new treaty with Turkey, but could have no part in drafting the convention or in discussing other provisions of the treaty. Since Russia was more interested in the Lausanne decisions than any other great power, the policy of refusing her active participation in making the treaty, especially the clauses relating to the Straits, angered the Russians. They became a powerful factor in encourag-


ing Ismet Pasha. The conference broke up. The Entente Powers were incensed, and did not invite Russia to send a delegation when the conference met again in April, 1923. Notwithstanding this the Soviet minister at Rome was ordered to Lausanne, where he was assassinated in a restaurant. This tragedy led to a renewed declaration that whatever agreement was reached at Lausanne would be considered null and void by Russia. . . . [In the meantime] the Turks agreed to meet the Entente Powers and the Greeks in an armistice conference at Mudania, on the Sea of Marmora. The Turks wanted to reoccupy Constantinople and Thrace immediately. The British refused. After long discussion a compromise was made. The Greeks should evacuate Eastern Thrace; and Turkish gendarmes, with civilian functionaries, should be allowed to take over the administration of Thrace, pending the decision of the Peace Conference. [See THRACE: 1922.] The Nationalists might also send functionaries to Constantinople. But the Entente Powers should remain in control of the Straits, and the garrisons at Constantinople should not be withdrawn until after peace was signed. This was the situation when the delegates of the Entente Powers, the Little Entente, Greece, and Turkey—all of whom had signed the defunct Treaty of Sèvres—met at Lausanne on November 20, 1922, to try again to establish peace in the Near East. . . . The movement for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, which was begun before the treaty was signed, had its origin in the economic rivalry and the mutual suspicions of the visitors. Had not this conflict of interests . . . become acute enough for Italy and France to decide to give encouragement and aid to the Turkish Nationalist movement, there need not have been a Lausanne Conference. The sentimentalists, who see in Mustafa Kemal Pasha 'the George Washington of his country,' have not studied the Young Turk movement of a decade ago and experienced its bitter disillusionment. . . . The conference resumed its sessions at Lausanne on April 22 [1923], in an atmosphere that had not changed during the recess. Quite the contrary! During the fortnight preceding the reopening, several events had complicated the diplomatic situation in the Near East. The Greeks had seemingly been able to reconstitute an army of 100,000 mobilized on the Thracian frontier. On April 15 the deposed sultan, who, through British aid, had gone to the Hedjaz, issued a proclamation from Mecca, declaring null and void the decree of the Angora Assembly, deposing him from the double office of sultan and khalif and naming a new khalif. On April 10 the Turkish Government announced that it had granted a sweeping concession in Asia Minor to a supposedly American group, headed by Admiral Chester, U.S. Navy, retired. [See also TRUSTS: International: Struggle for oil concessions.] More than a thousand miles of railways, with ports, and a modern city at Angora, were to be built by the Chester group at an estimated cost of \$300,000,000 in return for which the right to minerals and oil was granted the Americans from Mosul to Samsun, a country believed to be abounding in undeveloped wealth. Although the Chester group did not seem to have financial backing to cope with a concession of this magnitude, and was not taken seriously by financiers in New York, London, and Paris, the French Government made a vigorous protest, through General Pellé at Constantinople, refusing to recognize the validity of the part of the concession relating to the railway outlet to the Black



Sea. The French claimed that the Samsun Railway concession had already been granted to a French group in 1914, before the outbreak of the war, in return for a loan on which heavy instalments had been paid by Paris to Constantinople. The British Government declared that Turkey had no authority to grant a concession involving the oil and minerals and projected railways of the Mosul region. The feeling aroused over the Chester concession, and the subsequent attempt of British and French bankers to have it set aside and a trade monopoly in Asia Minor granted to them, indicated that the negotiators of the Entente Powers at Lausanne were primarily representing the commercial interests of their countries."—H. A. Gibbons, *Europe since 1918*, pp. 198-199, 460-462,

fault was a lack of energy in production; that before the war (1911) imports had amounted to nearly £T 54 millions, while exports had scarcely totalled £T 30 millions. He further declared that the decline of the country in the past had been caused not so much by the 'economic subjection' in which it had been held—the reference is of course to the foreign concessions and to the tariff clauses of the capitulations—as by a complete ignorance on the part of the Turks of the most elementary laws of economics."—B. Miller, *New Turkey (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1923, pp. 136-137, 139).*

1923 (July-August).—Second Treaty of Lausanne.—Turkish gains.—Constantinople a Turk-



502-503.—See also NEAR EAST CONFERENCE; GREECE: 1922 (September-October).

1923.—Prohibition movement. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: Turkey.

1923 (February).—Economic pact.—“As the result of inquiries made by Mustafa Kemal on a tour of inspection through Asia Minor, a great economic congress was held at Smyrna in the latter half of February . . . at which 1,135 delegates are said to have been present. This congress presented the nation with a new pact, the *Economic Pact*, the twelve articles of which constitute a confession of sins, negligences, and ignorances in the past, and affirmation of good resolutions for the future. They assert that lack of thrift, laziness, and dishonesty are the deadly enemies of all progress; they advocate the conservation of natural resources, increase of population, physical and technical education, and scientific innovations. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in his address to the congress, declared that the chief national

ish city.—Dardanelles and straits.—Capitulations.—“Turkey has gained most all her points at the conference because she has been strong enough to insist on them and would have yielded only to military pressure so hazardous, costly, and extensive that none of the allied powers would for a moment have attempted to have exerted it. This situation has been equally patent to the Turkish and allied plenipotentiaries and the results of the struggle have been predestined by it. . . . Greece's prospect of acquiring anything west of the Maritza or on the mainland of Anatolia has dwindled into the remote distance, if it has not altogether disappeared; while Turkey has ceased to aim at anything beyond a zone sufficiently deep to cover the straits of Constantinople.”—A. J. Toynbee, *East after Lausanne (Foreign Affairs, Sept., 1923)*.—The treaty of the allied powers and Turkey, the official text of which is published herewith, was signed in the Palais de Lumière at Lausanne, Switzerland, on July 24, 1923. Jugo-

slavia refused to sign because of dissatisfaction with the provisions for the apportionment of the Ottoman debt. Russia's signature confirming her acceptance of the convention referring to the Straits was added subsequently. . . . The treaty was ratified by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey at Angora, the present capital in Asia Minor, on Aug. 23. The Greek Government on Aug. 20 issued two decrees, one ratifying the treaty and the other declaring the cessation of the war with Turkey. A subsidiary treaty between Turkey and Poland was signed shortly before the signing of the Turco-allied agreement. Two treaties, one general and the other relating to extradition, were signed between Turkey and the United States on Aug. 6. . . .

### Part I.—Political Clauses

[The first clauses are those dealing with territorial questions, the more important being:]

Art. 2. From the Black Sea to the Ægean the frontier of Turkey is laid as follows:

(1) *With Bulgaria:* From the mouth of the River Rezvaya, to the River Maritza, the point of junction of the three frontiers of Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece: the southern frontier of Bulgaria as at present demarkated;

(2) *With Greece:* Thence to the confluence of the Arda and the Maritza: the course of the Maritza; then upstream along the Arda, up to a point on that river to be determined on the spot in the immediate neighborhood of the village of Tchörek-Keuy: the course of the Arda; thence in a southeasterly direction up to a point on the Maritza, 1 kilometer below Bosna-Keuy: a roughly straight line leaving in Turkish territory the village of Bosna-Keuy. The village of Tchörek-Keuy shall be assigned to Greece or to Turkey according as the majority of the population shall be found to be Greek or Turkish by the Commission for which provision is made in Article 5, the population which has migrated into this village after the 11th October, 1922, not being taken into account; thence to the Ægean Sea: the course of the Maritza.

Art. 3. From the Mediterranean to the frontier of Persia, the frontier of Turkey is laid down as follows:

(1) *With Syria:* The frontier described in Article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921;

(2) *With Iraq:* The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months. In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.

[Then follow articles dealing with the methods by which the Boundary Commission shall carry out the work of tracing the frontier defined in Article 2. (2) Article 12 confirms previous treaties regarding the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the Islands of Lemnos, Samothrace,

Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, subject to the provision made by Article 15, quoted below. Except where provided for to the contrary in this treaty, the islands less than three miles from the Asiatic Coast remain under Turkish sovereignty. Article 13 lays down restrictions to prevent the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria being used for warlike purposes. Article 14 provides that the islands of Imbros and Tenedos shall have a special local administration and that the native non-Moslem population shall be guaranteed protection and further that the agreement for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations shall not apply to the inhabitants of these islands. Next come these clauses:]

Art. 15. Turkey renounces in favor of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Cases (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisvros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi) and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo.

Art. 16. Turkey hereby renounced all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned. The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising from neighbourly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and any limitrophe countries.

Art. 17. The renunciation by Turkey of all rights and titles over Egypt and over the Soudan will take effect as from the 5th November, 1914.

Art. 18. Turkey is released from all undertakings and obligations in regard to the Ottoman loans guaranteed on the Egyptian tribute, that is to say, the loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894. The annual payments made by Egypt for the service of these loans now forming part of the service of the Egyptian Public Debt. Egypt is freed from all other obligations relating to the Ottoman Public Debt.

Art. 19. Any questions arising from the recognition of the State of Egypt shall be settled by agreements to be negotiated subsequently in a manner to be determined later between the Powers concerned. The provisions of the present Treaty relating to territories detached from Turkey under the said Treaty will not apply to Egypt.

Art. 20. Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914.

[Article 21 deals with the acquisition of British nationality by Turkish nationals in Cyprus. Under Article 22 Turkey recognizes, subject to certain provisions, the definite abolition of all rights and privileges which she enjoyed in Libya. The separate conventions relating to the Straits and the Thracian frontier are declared by Articles 23 and 24 to have the same force as the main treaty, while under Articles 25 and 26 Turkey recognizes the treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria and the frontiers laid down as a result of the general settlement after the war. The next two clauses read:]

Art. 27. No power or jurisdiction in political, legislative or administrative matters shall be exercised outside Turkish territory by the Turkish

Government or authorities, for any reason whatsoever, over the nationals of a territory placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of the other Powers signatory of the present Treaty, or over the nationals of a territory detached from Turkey. It is understood that the spiritual attributions of the Moslem religious authorities are in no way infringed.

Art. 28. Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, in so far as it is concerned the complete abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey in every respect.

[The treatment of Moroccans, Tunisians and natives of Libya in Turkey are dealt with in Article 29. The subject of nationality is covered by Articles 30-36, the main provision being that Turkish subjects habitually resident in territory which under this treaty is detached from Turkey are to become nationals of the State to which such territory is transferred. The clauses (Section III, of Part I.) relating to the protection of minorities are the following:]

#### PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

[Articles 37 to 45 deal with the protection of minorities.]

Art. 38. The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defense, or for the maintenance of public order. . . .

Art. 44. Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court

shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

Art. 45. The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory. . . .

[Parts II-V contain clauses relating to financial, economic, communications and sanitary questions, and miscellaneous provisions.]—*New York Times Current History, October, 1923, pp. 89-92.*

The Straits convention signed on the same day as the Treaty of Lausanne guaranteed freedom of transit without tax through the Straits to ships of all nations. A straits commission was inaugurated which has to submit annually to the League of Nations an account of its activities as well as a report of all information likely to be of use to commerce and navigation. The Capitulations were abolished, but Turkey undertook to put European legal advisers into her judiciary system for a while.—See also NEAR EAST CONFERENCE; CAPITULATIONS.

1923 (October).—Mustafa Kemal president.—“The National Assembly at Angora has voted the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Mustapha Kemal Pasha has been unanimously elected President. The Turkish Constitution . . . provided that Turkey should be proclaimed a republic, with a President elected for a period of four or five years. The title of President of the Grand National Assembly has been held by Mustapha Kemal, who also holds the post of Commander-in-Chief of the army.”—*New York World, Oct. 30, 1923.*

See also ARCHITECTURE: Medieval; Mohammedan; FLAGS: Turkey; MASONIC SOCIETIES: Turkey; MOHAMMEDANISM; PAN-TURANISM; SPAHIS; SULTAN.

ALSO IN: E. A. Freeman, *Ottoman power in Europe*.—A. J. Toynbee, *Barbarous Turk*.—D. B. MacDonald, *Moslem theology, jurisprudence and constitutional theory*.—W. M. Ramsay, *Historical geography of Asia Minor*.—L. von Ranke, *Ottoman and Spanish empires in 16th and 17th centuries*.—Idem, *Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey*.—Syed Ameer Ali, *Spirit of Islam*.—Lord Headlam, *Western awakening to Islam*.—H. A. Salmoné, *Fall and resurrection of Turkey*.—R. Knollys, *History of the Turks*.—G. Gaillard, *Turks and Europe*.—J. Creagh, *Armenians, Koords and Turks*.—T. Williams, *Turkey: A problem of today*.—H. A. Gibbons, *Foundations of Ottoman empire*.—P. M. Brown, *Foreigners in Turkey*.—Patriarchate Œcumenical, *Persecutions of Greeks in Turkey, 1014-1018*.—Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry, *Reports on atrocities in Ismid peninsula*.—G. F. Abbott, *Turkey, Greece and the great powers*.—Carnegie Peace Endowment, *Report of International Commission to inquire into causes and conduct of Balkan Wars*.—J. A. R. Marriott, *Eastern question*.—Ottoman Government, Ministry of Interior, *Greek atrocities in Turkey*.—W. M. Ramsay, *Intermixture of races in Asia Minor: Its causes and effects*.—F. G. Afalo, *Regilding the crescent*.—F. McCullagh, *Fall of Abdul Hamid*.—L. Dominian, *Europe at Turkey's door*.—W. S. Davis, *Short history of the Near East, 330-1922*.—M. A. C. Czaplicka, *Turks of Central Asia*.—F. H. Newell, *Asiatic Turkey, its problems and resources*.—G. Malas, *Turk as he is*.—W. Miller, *Ottoman empire*.—L. Stoddard, *New world of Islam*.—E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the great powers and the Bagdad railway*.—J. S. Eversley and C. Valentine, *Turkish empire, from 1288 to 1922*.—King Crane, *Re-*

*port on the Near East, 1922.*—F. Schevill, *History of the Balkan peninsula.*

**TURKEY, Constitution of.**—Turkey at present is under the rule of the Grand National Assembly, which came into power in January, 1920. Early in 1921 the Law of Fundamental Organization, passed by the Grand National Assembly proclaimed Turkey a republic and deposed the sultan in 1922. [See **TURKEY: 1921 (January).**] Members are elected to the Grand National Assembly for a period of two years. The president is elected by the Assembly for two years. There is no senate, but members of the Assembly are chosen by the president to form the executive body. The first attempt of the Turks at constitutional government was by means of the *Tanzimat* or *Halli Hamayouna* in 1839. [See **TURKEY: 1839.**] The *Mihlat* constitution with a senate and chamber of deputies was proclaimed by Abdul Hamid II in 1876, but he ruled as an absolute monarch until his deposition in 1908, when the constitution was restored. [See **TURKEY: 1861-1877; 1908.**] The chamber of deputies last sat April 11, 1920. "An official statement from Angora announced that 'the Grand National Assembly of Turkey [see **TURKEY: 1922; 1922-1923**], in its session the afternoon of October 27, 1923, made the following decisions by unanimous vote. (1) The form of the Turkish State is Republican, its religion Moslem and its official language Turkish. The President of the republic, who is the Chief of State, is elected by the Grand National Assembly from among its members for the period for which the members of the Assembly are elected; and in this quality he presides whenever he judges it necessary over the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister is chosen from among the members of the Grand National Assembly by the President of the republic, who chooses as well the other Ministers from among the members of the same Assembly. The Council of Ministers thus constituted is presented by the President of the republic for the approval of the Assembly. This approval is postponed until a meeting of the Grand National Assembly, if the latter is not in session. (2) His Excellency Gazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha was in the same session unanimously elected President of the Republic.' . . . Important steps were thus taken in the evolution of a form of government for New Turkey. The 'Organic Statute' of November, 1922, continued the extraordinary condition of the previous three years by confirming the National Assembly as the only seat of sovereignty and authority. Under the plan Ministers of State were elected separately and entrusted with very limited powers, being constantly responsible to the Assembly. Serious defects arose in practice and a commission of twelve, composed mostly of lawyers, but having Mustapha Kemal Pasha among its members, was chosen to elaborate the Constitution. After differences and delays, the new scheme was adopted which transfers the executive powers of the Assembly to the President during its four years term. The 'Chief of State' is assisted by a Cabinet or 'Council of Ministers' (like himself chosen from the membership of the Assembly), to which is added during recesses the chairman of standing committees. . . . The distinctive and essential feature of the present Turkish Constitution, novel for Turkey, Islam, and Asia, is the express location of sovereign power in an Assembly elected by all males of voting age."—A. H. Lybyer, *Turkey and the Near East (New York Times Current History, Dec., 1923).*

**TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS.**—"Turks and Caicos Islands . . . form a part of the Bahamas, which may be considered to extend from off the Florida coast to Navidad Bank, north of the eastern end of Haiti. The Turks and Caicos Islands owe their existence as a British colony to the salt ponds that are found upon the two principal keys of the group. . . . In 1848, the Turks and Caicos Islands—the Caicos Islands by this time being a recognized part of the colony—were authorized to govern themselves under the supervision of the Governor of Jamaica. From 1848 until 1874 the islands were controlled in this manner. The local method of governing did not prove a success, however, for the little colony was unable to support itself from the revenues derived from export taxes on salt. In consequence, on January 1, 1874, the Turks and Caicos Islands were formally declared to be a Crown Colony and a dependency of Jamaica, which status they have retained until the present day."—T. de Booy, *Turks and Caicos Islands (Geographical Review, July, 1918).*—See also **BAHAMA ISLANDS; BRITISH EMPIRE: Extent.**

**TURLUPINS.** See **BEGUINES.**

**TURNACUM,** early name of Tournay. See **TOURNAI.**

**TURNER, George** (1850- ), United States senator. Member of the Senate, 1897-1903; member of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal, 1903. See **ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION: 1867-1903.**

**TURNER, Joseph Mallord William** (1775-1851), English landscape painter. See **PAINTING: Europe (19th century).**

**TURNER, Nat** (1800-1831), negro slave, leader of an insurrection in Virginia in 1831. See **SLAVERY: 1828-1832; U. S. A.: 1829-1832.**

**TURONES,** tribe in ancient Gaul which gave its name to Touraine, the district which they inhabited, and to Tours, the chief town of that district. See **GAUL: People; VENETI OF WESTERN GAUL.**

**TURRHENOI.** See **TYRRHENIANS.**

**TUSCAN COLUMN.** See **ORDERS OF ARCHITECTURE.**

**TUSCAN DIALECT.** See **ITALIAN LITERATURE: Transition from Latin to Italian.**

**TUSCANY,** district on the west coast of Italy, bounded on the northwest by Liguria and Emilia, on the east by the Marches and Umbria, on the southwest by the province of Rome and on the west by the Mediterranean. The population was 2,830,747 in 1921.

685-1115.—**Founding of the duchy.**—**Reign of Countess Matilda.**—**Rise of free cities.**—"The first Lombard duke of whom any sure record remains is a certain 'Alovisino' who flourished about the year 685; and the last, though of more doubtful existence, is 'Tachiputo,' in the 8th century, when Lucca was the principal seat of government, with the privilege of coining, although her Counts were not always Dukes and Marquises of Tuscany. About the year 800, the title of Duke seems to have changed to that of Count, and although both are afterwards used the latter is most common: Muratori says, that this dignity was in 813 enjoyed by a certain Boniface whom Sismondi believes to be the ancestor of Countess Matilda; but her father, the son of Tedaldo, belonged to another race: he was the grandson to Attone, Azzo, or Adelberto, Count of Cannosa. . . . The line of Boniface I finished in 1001 by the death of Hugo the Great. . . . After him, on account of the civil wars between Ardoino and Henry, there was no

permanent Duke until 1014, when the latter appointed Ranieri, whom Conrad the Salique deposed in 1027, making room for Boniface the father of Countess Matilda. This heroine died in 1115 after a reign of active exertion for herself and the Church against the Emperors [in the "War of Investitures" (see PAPACY: 1056-1122)], which generated the infant and as yet nameless factions of Guelph and Ghibeline. . . . The fearless assertion of her own independence by successful struggles with the Emperor was an example not overlooked by the young Italian communities under Matilda's rule. . . . These seeds of liberty began first to germinate amongst the Lombard plains, but quickly spreading over the Apennines were welcomed throughout Tuscany [see ITALY: 1056-1152]. . . . It seems probable that in Tuscany, towards the commencement of the 12th century, the Count's authority had passed entirely into the principal communities, leaving that of the Marquis as yet untouched; but there are reasons for believing that the Countess Matilda in some of her difficulties was induced to sell or cede a portion of her power, and probably all that of the Count's. . . . Altogether, there appears little reason to doubt the internal freedom of most Tuscan cities very early in the 11th century."—H. E. Napier, *Florentine history*, v. 1, bk. 1, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: P. Villari, *Two first centuries of Florentine history*, v. 1, ch. 2.

925-1020.—Rise of Pisa. See PISA: Origin, etc. 1063-1200.—Cultivation of architecture at Pisa. See PISA: 1063-1203.

1077-1115.—Countess Matilda and her Donation to the Holy See. See PAPACY: 1077-1102.

1215.—Beginning of the wars of Guelfs and Ghibellines. See ITALY: 1215.

1248-1278.—Guelph and Ghibelline wars. See FLORENCE: 1248-1278; ITALY: 1250-1250.

1250-1293.—Development of popular constitution of the Florentine commonwealth. See FLORENCE: 1250-1293; SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: 1000-1300.

1282-1293.—War between Pisa and Genoa.—Battle of Meloria.—War of Florence and Lucca against Pisa. See PISA: 1063-1203.

1300-1313.—New factions of Florence.—Bianchi and Neri. See FLORENCE: 1295-1300; 1301-1313.

1310-1313.—Visitation of the emperor, Henry VII.—War with the Guelph cities. See ITALY: 1310-1313; Visitation of the emperor.

1313-1328.—Wars of Florence and Pisa.—Subjection of Lucca to Castruccio Castracani and his war with the Florentines.—Hostile visitation of the emperor, Louis of Bavaria. See ITALY: 1313-1330.

1336-1338.—War of Florence with Mastino della Scala, of Verona. See VERONA: 1260-1338.

1341-1343.—Defeat of the Florentines by the Pisans before Lucca.—Brief tyranny of the duke of Athens at Florence. See FLORENCE: 1341-1343.

1353-1359.—Sufferings and deliverance from "the Great Company." See ITALY: 1343-1393.

1378-1427.—Democratizing of Florence.—Tumult of the Ciompi.—First appearances of the Medici. See FLORENCE: 1378-1427.

1390-1402.—Resistance of Florence to the conquests of the duke of Milan. See FLORENCE: 1390-1402.

1433-1464.—Ascendancy of Cosimo de' Medici at Florence. See FLORENCE: 1433-1464.

1452-1454.—War of Florence and Milan against Venice, Naples, Siena and other states. See MILAN: 1447-1454.

1469-1492.—Government of Lorenzo de' Medici, the Magnificent, at Florence. See FLORENCE: 1469-1492.

1494-1509.—French deliverance of Pisa.—Long struggle and reconquest by Florence. See PISA: 1494-1509; 1509-1551.

1500-1501.—Conquests of Cesare Borgia. See ITALY: 1499-1507.

1502-1569.—Restoration of the Medici in Florence and their creation of the grand duchy of Tuscany. See FLORENCE: 1502-1569.

1593.—Decree of Livornia. See LIVORNIA, DECREE OF.

1712-1714.—Cession of territory to Austria by treaty of Utrecht. See UTRECHT: 1712-1714.

1725.—Reversion of the grand duchy pledged to the Infant of Spain. See SPAIN: 1713-1725; ITALY: 1715-1735.

1735.—Reversion of the duchy secured to the ex-duke of Lorraine. See FRANCE: 1733-1735; ITALY: 1715-1735.

1793.—In first coalition of allied powers against France. See FRANCE: 1793 (March-September).

1796.—Seizure of Leghorn by the French. See FRANCE: 1796 (April-October).

19th century.—Educational laws. See EDUCATION: Modern; 19th century; Italy.

1801.—Grand duchy transformed into the kingdom of Etruria and given to the son of the duke of Parma. See FRANCE: 1801-1803.

1807.—End of the kingdom of Etruria.—Cession and annexation to France. See PORTUGAL: 1807; FRANCE: 1807-1808 (August-November).

1815.—Restored to Ferdinand III, of Austria. See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF; ITALY: 1814-1815; AUSTRIA: 1815-1840.

1848-1849.—Revolution.—Expulsion of the grand duke.—Proclamation of a republic and union with Rome.—Old order restored. See ITALY: 1848-1849.

1859-1861.—Flight of the grand duke.—Formation of a provisional government.—Annexation to Sardinia.—Absorption in the new kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: 1856-1859; 1859-1861; Map showing unification of Italy.

1921.—Riots of communists and fascisti. See ITALY: 1921 (January-March).

TUSCARORAS, North American Indian tribe. See IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY: Iroquoian family; Tribes of the south.

TUSCULAN VILLAS.—"In Cicero's time the number of country-houses which a wealthy Roman considered it necessary to possess had evidently become considerable, and the amount spent upon them very great. The orator himself had villas at Tusculum, Antium, Formiæ, Baiæ, and Pompeii, besides his town-house on the Palatine, and his family seat at Arpinum. . . . The Tusculanum of Cicero had formerly been in the possession of Sylla. . . . Close to the Villa of Cicero, and so near that he could go across to fetch books from the library, was the Villa of Lucullus. . . . Many other Roman villas lay on the Tusculan hills."—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 14, pt. 3.

TUSCULUM.—"In the times of the Latin League, from the fall of Alba to the battle of Lake Regillus, Tusculum was the most prominent town in Latium. It suffered like the other towns in Latium, a complete eclipse during the later Republic and the Imperial times; but in the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, under the Counts of Tusculum, it became again a place of great importance and power. [The ruins of Tus-

culum, about fifteen miles from Rome, on the Alban hills, have been considerably explored.]"—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 14, pt. 2.—See also ALBA.

**TUSUYANS**, North American Indian tribe. See SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.

**TUT-ANKH-AMEN** (fl. 14th century B. C.), Egyptian king. His tomb was excavated in 1922. See EGYPT: 1922-1923.

**TUTELOES**, North American Indian tribe. See IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY: Tribes of the south; SIOUAN FAMILY.

**TUTRAKAN**, or Turtukai, town in Rumania, twenty-eight miles southwest of Silistria, on the south bank of the Danube. It was captured by the Bulgars and Germans in 1916. See WORLD WAR: 1916: V. Balkan theater, c, 5; c, 6, ii.

**TUTTlingen**, or Dütlingen, Battle of (1643). See GERMANY: 1643-1644.

**TUTUHS**, military governors in China. See CHINA: 1912: Yuan Shi-Kai, etc.

**TUTUILA**, island of American Samoa, containing the fine harbor of Pago Pago. It was ceded to the United States by the native chiefs in 1900. See SAMOA: 1900-1920.

**TVRTKO**. See STEPHEN I.

**TWAIN**, Mark. See CLEMENS, SAMUEL LANGHORNE.

**TWEED**, William Marcy (1823-1878), American politician. Leader of the so-called Tweed Ring in New York City. See NEW YORK: 1863-1871; 1865-1878.

**TWEED CHARTER**. See MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: Evolution of types.

**TWEED RING**. See NEW YORK: 1863-1871; 1865-1878.

**TWELVE APOSTLES OF IRELAND**. See CLONARD, MONASTERY OF.

**TWELVE PEERS OF FRANCE**.—The Twelve Peers of France were the nobles and prelates "who held the great fiefs immediately from the Crown. . . . Their number had been fixed by Louis VII. at twelve; six lay and six ecclesiastical. They were the Dukes of Normandy, Burgundy, Guienne, the Counts of Champagne, Flanders, Toulouse; the Archbishop of Rheims, and the Bishops of Laon, Noyon, Châlons, Beauvais and Langres. . . . The immediate vassals of the Duchy of France, who held of the King as Duke, not as King, were not Peers of France."—G. W. Kitchin, *History of France*, v. 1, bk. 3, ch. 6.

**TWELVE TABLES OF THE LAW**. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 451-449; LATIN LITERATURE: circa B. C. 753-264.

**TWELVERS**, branch of the Shiites. See SHIITES; IMAMS.

**TWENTY-SECOND PRAIRIAL**, Law of the. See FRANCE: 1794 (June-July).

**TWIGGS**, David Emanuel (1790-1862), American soldier. Major-general in Confederate service. See U. S. A.: 1860-1861 (December-February).

**TWIGHTWEES**. See ILLINOIS AND MIAMIS.

**TWO SICILIES**, Kingdom of the.—The kingdom, founded in southern Italy and Sicily by the Norman conquest in the eleventh century (see ITALY [Southern]: 1000-1090; 1081-1194), maintained its existence until recent times, sometimes as a unit, and sometimes divided into the two dominions, insular and peninsular, of Sicily and Apulia, or Naples. (See ITALY [Southern]: 1250-1268). The division occurred first after the rising against the French and the massacre known as "the Sicilian Vespers" (see ITALY [Southern]: 1282-1300). The crown of Sicily was then acquired by Peter, king of Aragon, succeeded by his son Frederick. Charles

of Anjou and his successors were left in possession of the kingdom of Naples, alone, although still claiming Sicily in union with it. "As the king who reigned at Naples would not give up his right to Sicily, . . . his kingdom is often called Sicily as well as the Island Kingdom; and so when at last the two kingdoms became one [again (see ITALY: 1412-1447)], the strange name of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies arose."—W. Hunt, *History of Italy*, p. 93.—See also NAPLES; SICILY; MEDICAL SCIENCE: Medieval: 10th-12th centuries.

1530-1600.—Spanish domination. See ITALY: 1530-1600.

1734.—Don Carlos proclaimed king. See ITALY: 1715-1735.

1815.—Partition of Italy by Congress of Vienna. See ITALY: 1814-1815.

1820-1821.—Revolt against Spain. See ITALY: 1820-1821.

1860.—In Kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: 1859-1861; Map showing unification of Italy.

**TYCOON**, title formerly applied to the shogun of Japan by foreigners. See SHOGUN.

**TYE**, Christopher (c. 1497-1572), English organist and composer. See MUSIC: Modern: 1540-1672.

**TYI** (fl. 14th century B. C.), queen of Egypt, wife of Amenophis III. See EGYPT: B. C. 1414-1379.

**TYLER**, John (1790-1862), tenth president of the United States. Member of the House of Representatives, 1816-1821; governor of Virginia, 1825-1827; United States senator, 1827-1836; vice president, 1840-1841, and president of the United States following death of President Harrison, 1841-1844. See U. S. A.: 1840; 1841; 1842: Treaty with England; TEXAS: 1836-1845.

**TYLER**, Wat (died 1381), English rebel. Led a rebellion of the peasants in 1381. See ENGLAND: 1381.

**TYLIS**, Celtic empire of.—"The empire of Tyllis in the Haemus, which the Celts, not long after the death of Alexander [the Great], . . . had founded in the Moeso-Thracian territory, destroyed the seed of Greek civilisation within its sphere, and itself succumbed during the Hannibalic war to the assaults of the Thracians, who extirpated these intruders to the last man."—T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. 8, ch. 7.

**TYLOR**, Sir Edward Burnett (1832-1917), English anthropologist. See ANTHROPOLOGY: Scope of study.

**TYNDALE**, or Tindale, William (c. 1492-1536), translator of the New Testament and Pentateuch. See BIBLE, ENGLISH: 16th century.

**TYNDALL**, John (1820-1893), British natural philosopher. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1832-1890.

**TYNDARIS**, Naval battle of (257 B. C.). See PUNIC WARS: First.

**TYNWALD**, Court of, legislature of the Isle of Man. See MANX KINGDOM; also THING.

**TYPEWRITER**. See INVENTIONS: 19th century: Typewriter.

**TYPHOID FEVER**. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 1014-1018.

**TYRANTS**, Greek.—"A 'tyranny,' in the Greek sense of the word, was the irresponsible dominion of a single person, not founded on hereditary right, like the monarchies of the heroic ages and of many barbarian nations, nor on a free election, like that of a dictator or æsymnete, but on force. . . . Aristotle makes it an element in the definition of tyranny, that it is exercised for selfish ends. But, according to the ordinary Greek notions, and the usage of the Greek historians, a mild and hen-

efficient tyranny is an expression which involves no contradiction."—C. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. 10.—"In spite of the worst which has been said against them, the tyrants hold a legitimate place in the progress of Greek constitutional history. They were the means of breaking down the oligarchies in the interests of the people. . . . It was at Sicyon that the first tyrannis arose. . . . About the year 670 B. C. a certain Orthagoras, who is said to have been a cook, succeeded in establishing himself as tyrant in Sicyon. (See SICYON.) Of his reign no incident is recorded. He was succeeded by his son Myron."—E. Abbott, *History of Greece*, pt. 1, ch. 12.—See also ATHENS: B. C. 560-510; B. C. 404-403.

ALSO IN: J. P. Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek history*, ch. 4.

TYRAS, ancient name of the river Dniester.

TYRCONNELL, Richard Talbot, Earl (Titular Duke) of (1630-1691), Irish Jacobite. Appointed lord deputy and military governor of Ireland, 1687. See IRELAND: 1685-1688; ULSTER: 1687-1689.

TYRCONNELL, ancient kingdom of Ireland in northwestern Ulster. See ULSTER: 1199-1260.

TYRE.—Tyre is the ancient name of the coastal town of Sur, or Es Sur, in Syria. It is situated about forty-six miles south of Beirut and its population is about 6,000. "Tyre consisted of two parts, an island about three-quarters of a mile in length, separated from the mainland by a strait four stadia, about half a mile, in width at its northern end, and a town on the shore. The latter was distinguished as Palæ-Tyrus, or Ancient Tyre, and was the chief seat of the population, till the wars of the Assyrian monarchs against Phœnicia. It extended along the shore from the river Leontes in the north to the fountain of Ras-el-Ain in the south, a distance of seven miles, great part of which would be suburb rather than city. Pliny, who wrote when its boundaries could still be traced, computes the circuit of Palæ-Tyrus and the island together at nineteen Roman miles, that of the island town being 22 stadia. . . . Whatever may have been the relative importance of Palæ-Tyrus and the island, previous to the great migration from Sidon [see SIDON], occasioned by the victory of the Ascalonites, there can be no doubt that from this time the population of the island greatly increased. The colonization of Gades took place about a century later. But we have no connected history of Tyre till near the age of Solomon."—J. Kenrick, *Phœnicia: History*, ch. 1.—See also PHœNICIANS: Origin; B. C. 604-500; CANAAN; COMMERCE: Ancient; B. C. 1000-200; B. C. 1000-600; CHRISTIANITY: Map.

Founding of the colony of Carthage. See CARTHAGE: Founding.

B. C. 598-585.—Siege by Nebuchadrezzar. See PHœNICIANS: B. C. 850-538; BABYLONIA: Nebuchadrezzar.

B. C. 332.—Siege and capture by Alexander the Great.—After defeating the Persians at Issus (see MACEDONIA: B. C. 334-330), Alexander turned his attention to the tributary Phœnician cities, whose fleets gave to the great king a naval power more formidable than the hosts of the nations which marched at his command. Sidon, Byblus, and other towns submitted promptly to the conqueror. Tyre offered a qualified surrender, which did not satisfy the haughty Macedonian, and he instantly laid siege to the city. Having no adequate fleet with which to reach the island-town, he resolved to carry a causeway across the channel which separated the island from old Tyre, on

the mainland, and he demolished the buildings of the latter to provide materials for the work. It was an undertaking of immense magnitude and difficulty, and the ingenious Tyrians found many modes of interfering with it. They succeeded in destroying the mole when half of it had been built; but Alexander, with obstinate perseverance, began his work anew, on a larger scale than before. He also collected a strong fleet of war-galleys, from Cyprus and from the Phœnicians who had submitted to him, with which the opposition of the enemy was checked and his own operations advanced. After seven months of prodigious labor and incessant battle, the strong walls of Tyre were beaten down and the city taken. "It soon became a scene of unresisted carnage and plunder. The Macedonians, exasperated by the length and labour of the siege, which had lasted seven months, and by the execution of their comrades [Greek prisoners, whom the Tyrians had put to death on the walls before the eyes of the besiegers, and cast into the sea], spared none that fell into their hands."—C. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. 50.

ALSO IN: Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*, bk. 2, ch. 15-24.

B. C. 332-A. D. 638.—Under Greek and Roman domination.—"The Carians, with whom Alexander re-peopled the city [of Tyre] fell into the habits of the former population, and both Tyre and Sidon recovered much of their commercial greatness. After a long struggle between the kingdoms of Egypt and Syria, Phœnicia was finally secured to the latter by Antiochus the Great (B. C. 198). But the commercial rivalry of Egypt proved more serious even than political subjection; and the foundation of Berenice on the Red Sea diverted to Alexander much of the oriental commerce that had previously flowed through Tyre and Sidon. But still they did not succumb to their younger rival. Under the Romans, to whom Phœnicia was subjected with Syria [by Pompey the Great B. C. 64], Tyre was still the first commercial city of the world."—P. Smith, *History of the world: Ancient*, ch. 24.

B. C. 322.—Absorbed in Egypt by Ptolemy Lagus. See EGYPT: B. C. 323-30.

A. D. 638.—Capture by Moslems.—After the taking of Jerusalem by the Caliph Omar, the Moslems made themselves masters of the remainder of Palestine very quickly. Tripoli was first won by treachery, and then the same traitor who had delivered it, making his way to Tyre, succeeded in bringing about the betrayal of that place.—Based on S. Ockley, *History of the Saracens*, pp. 251-253 (*Bohn ed.*).

1124.—Siege and conquest by the Venetians and Crusaders.—The Venetians took little or no part in the First Crusade, being largely engaged in commerce with the Saracens. But in 1124—a full quarter of a century after the taking of Jerusalem—they found it wise to obtain an interest in the Christian conquests that were spreading along the Levantine coasts. They accordingly sent their doge, with a formidable fleet, to offer aid to the Latin king of Jerusalem—then Baldwin II—for the reduction of either Ascalon or Tyre, both of which cities were still held by the Moslems. Finding it difficult to make choice between the two places, a solemn drawing of lots took place, at the altar of the holy sepulcher, as a means of ascertaining the will of God. The lot decided that Tyre should be attacked, and operations were accordingly begun. But "the Venetians, more devoted to the interests of their commerce and of their nation than to those of a Christian kingdom,

demanded, before beginning the siege of Tyre, that they should enjoy a church, a street, a common oven, and a national tribunal in every city in Palestine. They further demanded other privileges and the possession of a third of the conquered city. [The demands of the Venetians were complied with, and Tyre, after a siege of over five months, beleaguered by land and sea, was taken. The capitulation was an honorable one and honorably respected. The Moslem inhabitants were permitted to leave the city; the Christians entered it triumphally, and the day on which the news reached Jerusalem was made a festival.]—J. F. Michaud, *History of the Crusades*, bk. 5.

**TYROL**, or Tirol, one of the eight provinces of the republic of Austria, situated in the valley of Inn and the central zone of the eastern Alps. Its natural mountain barriers have made it of strategic importance. This territory has an area of 4,787 square miles, and a population in 1920 of 306,156. See ALPS: As barriers; BRENNER PASS; BALKAN STATES: Map.

**Origin of the county and its name.**—"Tyrol freed herself from the suzerainty of Bavaria in very early times. She was divided among a number of princes, lay and ecclesiastical. The principal of these were the counts of the Adige or of the Tyrol, and the counts of Andechs, who obtained the title of duke from Frederick I [1152-1100], and called themselves dukes of Meran. Their race came to an end in 1248, and their domains were united to those of the counts of Tyrol who thus became possessed of the larger part of the lands between the Inn and the Adige. Tyrol takes its name from the castle of Tirol, which was built on the site of the Roman station Teriolis, not far from Meran, on the upper waters of the Adige."

—L. Leger, *History of Austro-Hungary*, p. 144, *footnote*.—"After the dissolution of the classic Roman Empire, the Province of Rætia split up into parcels. . . . Tirol . . . [was] detached from Rætia Prima, and . . . began to form a separate entity. Meanwhile a power of first rate importance in the future history of Graubünden [the Grisons] had arisen: namely the Bishopric of Chur. . . . The Bishops of Chur took rank as feudal lords of the first class. . . . Originally an insignificant house, exercising . . . the functions of Bailies to the See of Chur, the Counts of Tirol acquired influence and territory under the shadow of distant ecclesiastical superiors."—J. A. Symonds, *History of Graubünden* (in Strickland's "*The Engadine*," pp. 23-27).

**1363.**—Acquired by the House of Austria. See AUSTRIA: 1330-1364; also Map showing Hapsburg possessions.

**1805.**—Taken from Austria and annexed to Bavaria. See GERMANY: 1805-1806; BAVARIA: 1801-1814; AUSTRIA: 1798-1806.

**1809.**—Heroic rising under Hofer, against the Bavarians and the French.—Crushing of the revolt. See GERMANY: 1809-1810 (April-February); BAVARIA: 1801-1814.

**1814-1815.**—Restored to Austria. See FRANCE: 1814 (April-June); VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.

**1915.**—Southern Tyrol promised to Italy by Treaty of London. See LONDON, TREATY OR PACT OF.

**1918.**—Included in the Austrian republic. See AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1918: German Austria, etc.

**1919.**—Division by treaty after the World War.—By geographic redistribution under the terms of the peace treaty signed between the Allies and Austria in 1919, North Tyrol became a part of the Austrian republic and South Tyrol was ceded to Italy. See AUSTRIA: 1919; ITALY: Map showing unification.

**TYRONE.** See O'NEILL.

**TYRRELL**, Father George (1861-1909), Irish ecclesiastic. He was the writer of a letter which gave a notable impulse to the movement of thought in the Roman Catholic Church known as "Modernism," which Pope Pius X condemned as heretical in his encyclical of 1907. (See PAPACY: 1907 [September].) The letter was addressed to an English man of science (supposed to have been Professor Mivart) who, being a Roman Catholic, found difficulty in reconciling his scientific convictions with the tenets of his church. Parts of the letter obtained publication in Italy, and led to the expulsion of Father Tyrrell from the Society of Jesus. He then gave publication to the full text of the letter, under the title of "A Much Abused Letter." On the appearance of the encyclical against Modernism he criticised it with keenness, and was virtually excommunicated from the church. The fact that on his death-bed, when stricken with speechlessness, he received the sacraments of the church, gave rise to much controversy, as to his volition in the matter and as to the justification of the priest who ministered to him. Father Tyrrell had entered the Roman church in 1870, under the influence of the writings of Cardinal Newman.

**TYRRHENIANS, TYRRHENIAN SEA.**—The ancient race of people in western Italy whom the Romans called Etrusci, and who called themselves the Rasenna, were known to the Greeks as the Turrhenoi, or Tyrrhenians. They were an enterprising maritime people, and hence the Greeks called that part of the Mediterranean which washes the Western Italian coast the Tyrrhenian sea. See ETRUSCANS; COMMERCE: Ancient; B. C. 1000-200.

**TYRWHITT**, Sir Reginald Yorke (1870- ), British admiral, commanded the destroyer flotillas in Heligoland Bight, 1914. See WORLD WAR: 1914: IX. Naval operations: c.

**TYSON**, Edward (1650-1708), English physician and naturalist. See ANTHROPOLOGY: Definition.

**TZAR.** See TSAR.

**TZE-HSI.** See Ts'z'e Hsi.

**TZENDALS**, Central American Indian tribe. See MAYAS.

**TZOUECAS.** See PATAGONIANS AND FUEGIANS.

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**UAUPE**, South American Indian tribe. See GUCK, OR COCO, GROUP.

**UBERTI FAMILY**, prominent in Florence in the 13th century. See FLORENCE: 1215-1250; 1248-1278.

**UBERTIS**, Teresa. See TERESAH.

**U-BOAT**, an abbreviation of *Unterseeboot*, the German word for submarine. See SUBMARINES; WORLD WAR: 1916: IX. Naval operations: b; 1917: I. Summary: b, 5; IX. Naval operations: b, 3; 1918: IX. Naval operations: g.

**U. C., A. U. C., or A. U.**—Anno Urbis Condite:



the "Year of Rome," reckoned from the founding of the city. See **ROME**: Ancient kingdom: B. C. 753-510.

**UCAYALI**, name of a river in Peru which is one of the sources of the Amazon river. See **AMAZON RIVER**: Its course.

**UCCELLO, Paolo** (1397-1475), Florentine painter. See **PAINTING**: Italian; Early Renaissance.

**UCHALI**, Treaty of (1889). See **ITALY**: 1895-1896.

**UCHEAN FAMILY**.—**Uchees**.—"The pristine homes of the Yuchi are not now traceable with any degree of certainty. The Yuchi are supposed to have been visited by De Soto during his memorable march, and the town of Cofitachiqui chronicled by him, is believed by many investigators to have stood at Silver Bluff, on the left bank of the Savannah, about 25 miles below Augusta. If, as is supposed by some authorities, Cofitachiqui was a Yuchi town, this would locate the Yuchi in a section which, when first known to the whites, was occupied by the Shawnee. Later the Yuchi appear to have lived somewhat farther down the Savannah."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report, Bureau of Ethnology*, p. 126.—See also **MUSKIOGEAN, OR MASKOKI, FAMILY**.

**UCLES, Battles of** (1108, 1809). See **PORTUGAL**: 1095-1325; **SPAIN**: 1808-1809 (December-March).

**UDAIPUR, Udaipore, Oodeypoor, or Mewar**, native state in India in the Rajputana agency. The population, in 1921, was 1,380,063. See **RAJPUTS**.

**UDAL, Nicholas** (1504-1556), English schoolmaster and playwright. See **EDUCATION**: Modern: 16th and 17th centuries; 1530-1611.

**UDHA-NALA, Battle of** (1763). See **INDIA**: 1757-1772.

**UDINE**, town of Venetia, Italy, about eighty-four miles northeast of Venice. It was a scene of conflict during the World War. See **WORLD WAR**: 1917: IV. Austro-Italian front: d, 4; 1918: IV. Austro-Italian theater: c, 14; d.

**U. E. LOYALISTS**, name for American Tories. See **TORIES**: Of the American Revolution.

**UFA**, town in southeastern Russia, capital of the government of the same name. It was taken by the Soviets in 1918. See **RUSSIA**: 1918-1920; **WORLD WAR**: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: X. Alleged atrocities, etc.: e.

**Conference of** (1918). See **RUSSIA**: 1918-1920; **SIBERIA**: 1917-1919.

**UGALENZES**, North American Indian tribe. See **ESKIMO FAMILY**.

**UGANDA**, British protectorate lying between Lake Victoria, Lake Albert and Lake Rudolph in eastern equatorial Africa. (See **AFRICA**: Map.) It has an area of about 110,000 square miles. In 1918 the population was 3,354,314, of which 3,350,000 were native, 847 European, and 3,467 Asiatics (chiefly Indians. [See also **BRITISH EMPIRE**: Extent.]). For conveniences of administration the protectorate is divided into five provinces—Buganda, Western, Eastern, Northern and Rudolph. Four native kingdoms under native rulers are included—Buganda, the most important, which forms the province of that name, Toro and Ankole in the Western Province, and Bunyoro in the Northern province. Three or four thousand years ago the country was invaded by Hamitic races who introduced a certain amount of Egyptian civilization. Strong native states with an aristocracy of Hamitic (or Galla) descent, developed in Buganda, Bunyoro and Ankole. In the nineteenth century when these kingdoms first came into contact with Europe, that of Buganda was the most powerful. "It

was in 1858 that the travellers Burton and Speke, starting from Zanzibar, first made Europe acquainted with the existence of that vast inland sea, the Victoria Lake, of which Rebmann and Erhardt had already heard native reports. Four years later Speke and Grant, passing round the western shore, reached Uganda; and they found here, if I may employ the paradox, a singular, barbaric civilisation. Combined with the most barbarous usages and the grossest superstition were many of those advances in the scale of humanity which we are wont to accept as indications of civilisation. There was an appeal to law, and cases were decided after a formal hearing. The administration was vested in the king,—an absolute despot,—and from him downwards there existed a regular chain of delegated power and control. Well-made roads, kept constantly in repair, intersected the country in all directions. Rough bridges were constructed across river swamps. An army was maintained, and also a fleet of canoes on the waters of the lake. The arts of building, smith-work, &c., were very far in advance of anything to be found between Uganda and the coast. The ideas of decency, the use of clothing, and the planting of trees, were indications of long years of development, of which the intricate customs and etiquettes surrounding the Court were an additional proof. Speke traces the earliest developments of this civilisation to Unyoro and its shepherd kings, descendants of a nomadic, pastoral race—the Wahuma—whom he supposes to be an offshoot from the Abyssinians or Gallas. . . . Speke was enthusiastic about the fertility of Uganda, and the development of its people as compared with the savage tribes of Africa. The next European to visit the country was Colonel Chaillé Long, who was sent by [General] Gordon [from the Egyptian Sudan] in the summer of 1874. Stanley followed in 1875. . . . In 1876 Gordon sent . . . [his lieutenant, Emin Bey (afterwards pasha)] with a party of soldiers to Mtesa's capital. They were for some time quartered there, and Gordon had views of annexing Uganda to the Egyptian Sudan. . . . Stanley was even louder in his praises of Uganda than Speke had been, and described it as the 'Pearl of Africa.' In consequence of his appeal on behalf of the people, a fund was started, and missionaries were despatched to Uganda. These arrived in June 1877. . . . Some two years later—February 1879—the French (R. Catholic) Algerian Mission despatched a party of 'White Fathers' to begin mission-work in Uganda. . . . The Arabs from the coast had already settled in Uganda, and brought with them the religion of Islam. [From this time on the history of Uganda was a violent struggle between religious factions.] . . . Mtesa showed great toleration to all creeds, though at one time he had leaned to Mohammedanism, and had ordered all Uganda to embrace that creed. Shortly after, however, as the followers of Islam refused to eat the king's meat because it was not killed in the orthodox way according to the Koran, he ordered the massacre of all Mohammedans. . . . Mtesa died in the autumn of 1884, and Mwanga, then about eighteen years old, succeeded him. . . . At this time the three religions had made great progress, and their disintegrating influences on the old customs began to be more and more apparent. This was especially the case with regard to the Christians, who no longer regarded the king as divine, nor his acts, however gross and cruel, as having a divine sanction. They owned a Higher allegiance, though they remained obedient subjects, and distinguished themselves by bravery in war. Such an

attitude was, of course, intolerable to a cruel despot like Mwanga. . . . There was still a further reason for suspicion and fear of the white men. . . . The Egyptian flag had been hoisted at Mruli and Fauvera in Unyoro, only just beyond the borders of Uganda, and Gordon's envoys—Colonel Long and Emin—and his troops had penetrated to Mtesa's capital. The Arabs also told of the doings of the Belgians on the Congo. At a later period reports reached Mwanga of German annexations in Usagara on the East Coast. Last, and most disturbing of all, was the news of Mr. Thomson's arrival near Usoga in the East—the route from the coast by which native tradition said that the conquerors of Uganda would come. Mwanga had succeeded his father in November 1884. Early in 1885 he determined to stamp out those dangerous religions, Mohammedan and Christian alike, which were disintegrating his country. The missionaries Mackay and Ashe, were seized, and their followers persecuted. . . . After this the position of the Europeans was very precarious, but not till the following May (1886) did the storm burst. Mwanga then threw aside all restraint, and butchered the Christian converts wholesale."—F. D. Lugard, *Rise of our East African empire*.—Mwanga also broke openly with the Mohammedan faction and entered into a plot to put both Christians and Mohammedans on an island and leave them there to starve. The plot failed. At length, in 1888, there was a revolt, in which Christians and Mohammedans seem to have combined, and Mwanga fled to an island at the south of the lake. His brother Kiwewa was made king (1888), and for a time, the Christians were in control of affairs. But the Mohammedans grew jealous, and by a sudden rising drove the Christians out. Kiwewa refusing to accept the creed of Islam, was deposed, and another brother, Karema, was raised to the throne. The exiled Christians now made overtures to Mwanga, and an alliance was concluded, which resulted in the overthrow of the Mohammedan or Arab party, and the restoration of Mwanga to the throne in October, 1889. At this time an appeal for help was sent to the newly organized British East Africa Company. The two Christian factions, Catholic and Protestant, or French and English, divided the country and all the offices of government between them, but were bitterly jealous of each other and perpetually quarreled, while the defeated Mohammedans were still strong and unsubdued. Affairs were in this state when Dr. Karl Peters, the explorer in command of the German "Emin Relief Expedition," came to Uganda, ostensibly to rescue Emin Pasha but in reality to annex territories behind the British sphere, having learned of the rescue of Emin Pasha by Stanley. Dr. Peters, with the aid of the French party, succeeded in arranging some kind of treaty with Mwanga, and this alarmed the Imperial British East Africa Company when news of it had been received. These and other circumstances led to the despatching of Captain Lugard with a small force to Uganda to represent the British East Africa Company and establish its influence there. Captain Lugard arrived at Mengo, the capital of Uganda, on December 18, 1890. Meantime Great Britain and Germany, by the Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890 (see AFRICA: Modern European occupation; 1884-1890) had settled all questions between them as to their respective "spheres of influence," and Uganda had been definitely placed within the British "sphere." (See AFRICA: Modern European occupation; Later 19th century.) This enabled Captain Lugard to

secure the signing of a treaty which recognized the suzerainty of the company, established its protectorate over Uganda, and conceded to it many important commercial and political powers. He remained in the country until June, 1892, during which time he was driven to take part in a furious war that broke out between the Catholic (or French) and Protestant (or English) parties. The war ended in a partition of territory between the factions, and three small provinces were, at the same time, assigned to the Mohammedans. After maintaining Captain Lugard and his force in the country for eighteen months, the company found the cost so heavy and the prospect of returns so distant, that it came to a resolution to withdraw; but was induced by a subscription of £16,000 from the Church Missionary Society to remain for another year in the exercise of the control which it had acquired. At the end of 1892 the company renewed its resolution to evacuate the region west of Lake Victoria, and the British government was urgently pressed to take upon itself the administration of the country. It was only persuaded, however, to assume the cost of a further occupation of Uganda for three months by the Company's officers, in order to give more time for ensuring the safety of missionaries and other Europeans. It consented, moreover, to despatch a commissioner to investigate the situation and report upon it. The official selected for that duty was Sir Gerald Porter, consul-general at Zanzibar. His report in December, 1893, urged the maintenance of an effective control over the government of Uganda, to be exercised directly by the British government, in the form of a protectorate, keeping the king on his throne, with a commissioner at his side to direct his action in all important particulars. After much discussion, the decision of the government was announced at the beginning of June, 1894. It determined to establish the proposed protectorate in Uganda, not extending to Unyoro, and to place a sub-commissioner on duty between Lake Victoria and the sea, for the purpose of watching over communications, and apparently without political powers.—Based on F. D. Lugard, *Rise of our East African empire*.—See also BRITISH EMPIRE: Expansion; 19th century; Africa: East Africa: 1893; BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

ALSO IN: G. Porter, *British mission to Uganda in 1893*.—P. L. McDermott, *British East Africa, or Ibea*.

Climate. See AFRICA: Modern European occupation; 1914-1920: Climatic conditions.

1894.—Creation of the protectorate. See BRITISH EAST AFRICA: 1895-1897.

1897-1898.—Native insurrection and mutiny of Sudanese troops.—A train of serious troubles in the Uganda protectorate began in May, 1897, with an insurrection of some of the chiefs, instigated by the king, Mwanga, who was restive under British control. The revolt was suppressed after some sharp fighting, especially at Kiango, on July 24, and King Mwanga escaped into German territory. In August he was formally deposed by a council of chiefs, and his infant son, Chua, was elected king in his place, under a regency of three of the chiefs. But a more serious trouble followed, from the mutiny of a part of the Sudanese troops which had been serving in Uganda. These troops (which had been recruited by Captain Lugard and had borne the brunt of the fighting in Uganda) were being sent to join an expedition, under Major Macdonald, for the exploration of the districts adjacent to the Italian sphere of influence, and were not permitted to take their women with them.

This seems to have been their chief grievance. They also complained of being overworked, underpaid, insufficiently fed, and commanded by young officers who would not listen to their complaints. They seized Fort Lubas, on the frontier between Uganda and Usoga, made prisoners of several of their officers, whom they finally murdered, and held the fort against repeated attacks until early in January, 1898, when they made their escape. They were pursued and attacked (February 24) at Kabagambe, on Lake Kioja, where they had built a fort. Many were killed, the remainder much scattered. A considerable party got away to the eastern side of the Nile and continued to give trouble there throughout the year. Meantime, the deposed king, Mwanga, had escaped from the Germans and effected a new rising among his late subjects; and another deposed king, Kabarega, of Unyoro, had also reappeared, to make trouble in that region. After the suppression of the Sudanese mutiny these risings were overcome, with the help of some 1,100 troops brought from India for the emergency. In March, there was news of Kabarega's death, and the British acting commissioner and consul-general issued the following proclamation: "Whereas Kabarega, the deposed King of Unyoro, is reported to have deceased, and whereas the present disordered state of affairs in that country has proved that, for the maintenance of good government and good-will, it is expedient to provide for the succession to the kingdom of a member of the Royal House, it is hereby publicly proclaimed that Karukala, son of Kabarega, is now appointed King of Unyoro, under the protection of Her Britannic Majesty. The Kingdom of Unyoro comprises the provinces of—Busindi, Shifalu, Magungu, Kibero, Bugoma, Bugahiaobeire. This appointment is in accordance with the general conditions by which countries in British African Protectorates are guided and regulated, and it secures to the Kingdom of Unyoro all the advantages which accrue from its being an integral part of such a Protectorate. The local government of the country will be administered, under the guidance of Her Majesty's Representative, by a Council of Regency of either two or three Chiefs, to be appointed by Her Majesty's Commissioner. This Council of Regency will, subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Commissioner, select and appoint the Katikiro and the other Chiefs of the first rank required in accordance with local custom. These Chiefs, on their appointment being confirmed, will select and appoint in full Council the lesser grade Chiefs, until the system of local administration is complete."—Great Britain, *Parliamentary Publications (Papers by Command: Africa, no. 7, 1898, p. 42)*.

**1898-1920.—Administrative and economic development.**—Ernest J. L. Berkeley (Sir Ernest) "who as the first regular commissioner had arrived in June 1895, left the country towards the end of 1898, and in December 1899 Sir H. H. Johnston arrived at the head of a special commission. The purposes of this commission were to investigate the resources of the Protectorate, to evolve a permanent system of administration, and to report as to what extent the cost of administration could be met by the local revenue. . . . With the *Kobaka* and chiefs of Buganda was made the Uganda Agreement of March 10, 1900, in which were provisions relating to native administration, taxation, and ownership of land. . . . Treaties on similar lines were made with Ankole and Toro. . . . The results of Sir H. H. Johnston's special commission were embodied in the Uganda Order

in Council 1902 which laid down the basis of the Protectorate's constitution. This enactment set up legislative, administrative, and judicial machinery, and applied to Uganda certain bodies of law and special enactments. It enumerated also the administrative divisions of the Uganda Protectorate. . . . In April 1907 by a proclamation of Sir H. H. Bell the administrative divisions were reorganized . . . [into] five provinces. . . . [In 1903 a small part of the Uganda territory was transferred to British East Africa and in 1914 another portion became part of the Sudan with a view to more convenient administration. In] the period from 1902 onward to the present time [written in 1920] the history of the Protectorate has been chiefly remarkable for rapid administrative and economic development. The most serious problem has been that of disease, namely sleeping-sickness, which broke out in 1901 and is said to have carried off 200,000 persons. . . . The old sources of political disturbance disappeared, and no new ones of any importance have opened up. . . . Agreements providing for new regulations as to taxation and justice were made with Toro in 1910, 1912, and 1914. . . . The extension of British administration to the outlying districts has not met with any serious resistance on the part of the natives. . . . In the Bukedi district, which was first opened up during the Sudanese Mutiny, punitive expeditions against various clans, the Bagishu, chiefly, were necessary in 1904, 1907, 1909, and 1911. . . . That part of the Kigezi district which had originally formed part of the Belgian Congo was handed over to the British authorities in May 1911 and in January of the following year a tract of country south of 1° south latitude was officially handed over by the Germans. . . . [During the World War, trouble of a more serious nature was given] by the tribes in the Turkana country, which extends roughly from the Sudan frontier southwards along the west side of Lake Rudolf into British East Africa."—Geographical section of the Great Britain Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, I. D. 1217, *Handbook of the Uganda protectorate*, pp. 364, 369-374.—See also *WORLD WAR: 1914: VI. Africa: c, 2*.

**1911-1914.—Population.—Official capital.**—The population of the country, according to the census of 1911, was 2,840,469, of whom only about 1,000 were Europeans; there were 3,000 Indians and the remainder were various native tribes. Of the latter the Buganda, numbering over 700,000, were the most intelligent and civilized, owing doubtless to the fact that many of them were converted to Christianity through the efforts of French and English missionaries. Entebbe, situated on the northwestern shore of Lake Victoria, was the official capital and headquarters of the administration. It was chiefly a residential center and is beautifully laid out on a high hill overlooking the lake. The native capital and most important trading center, Kampala, is about twenty-five miles north of Entebbe.—Based on *United States Consular Report, 1914*.

**1921.—Creation of legislative council.**—On March 23, 1921, was held the first session of a legislative council, to which various sections of the community nominated members. Because of the new policy of differential treatment of Indians, which had occasioned some dissatisfaction, the Indian community refused to send representatives, but the council was otherwise a success.

ALSO IN: J. F. Cunningham, *Uganda and its people*.—R. T. Coryndon, *Uganda (United Empire, June, 1920)*.—H. H. Johnston, *Uganda protecto-*

rate.—H. Colville, *Uganda (British Africa, British Empire Series, v. 2)*.

**UGANDA RAILWAY**, railroad lying wholly in British East Africa (now called Kenya Colony). It was finished in 1902 at a total cost of £5,300,000. The main line does not enter Uganda, but by the introduction of motor vehicles a road service has been established in Buganda, Eastern and Northern Provinces. Steamship service is maintained on Lakes Victoria, Albert, and Kioga. "The earliest of the great continental lines [in British Africa], the Uganda railway, has abundantly justified the faith of its promoters. This railway, 584 miles in length, starting from Mombasa and ending at Kisumu (Port Florence) on the Victoria Nyanza, provides [written in 1917] the main avenue for traffic from Uganda to the eastern littoral. With the construction of a line from Namasagali, on Lake Choga, a little below Kikindu, along the right bank of the river Nile to Jinga, known as the Busoga railway (61 miles), an enormous impetus was given to the growing of cotton in this district of Central Africa, and direct communication was established with the coast by means of the steamers across the Victoria Nyanza. The Uganda railway, which until recently was a trunk line without feeders, has now been provided with three branches. The first of these has been constructed to the great soda deposits around Lake Magadi, near the Anglo-German boundary; the second has been built from Nairobi, the capital, to Thika, and will eventually be constructed to Fort Hall and the Mount Kenia districts; whilst the third has been built during the War for military reasons from Voi to Moschi, the northern terminus of the German Usambara railway to Tanga, and thus, like the Uppington-Kalkfontein line in the Cape Province, links up the British and German railway systems."—E. Lewin, *Railways in Africa (United Empire, Mar., 1917)*.

**UGRI**, early name for Magyars. See **HUNGARY**: Origin of the Hungarians.

**UGRIA**, original abode of the Magyars. See **HUNGARY**: Origin of the Hungarians.

**UGRO-FINNISH**, branch of the Ural-Altai family, to which the Magyars belong. See **TURANIAN RACES AND LANGUAGES**; **BALTIC PROVINCES**: Original and existing races; **PHILOLOGY**: 20; **HUNGARY**: Origin of the Hungarians.

**UGUCCIONE DELLA FAGGIUOLA** (fl. 14th century), Ghibelline general and captain of the Pisans. See **ITALY**: 1313-1330.

**UHILCHES**, South American Indian tribe. See **PAMPAS TRIBES**.

**UHLANS**. See **ULANS**.

**UI**, Irish prefix to names. See under *o'*.

**UIRINA**, South American Indian tribe. See **GUCK**, or **COCO**, **GROUP**.

**UITLANDERS**, Dutch word used in South Africa, meaning outlander or foreigner. They were given the vote in 1897. See **SOUTH AFRICA**, **UNION OF**: 1885-1890; 1895 (November); 1895-1896; 1897 (February): Franchise.

**UJIJI**, or Kavele, town in former German East Africa, now under British administration, on Lake Tanganyika. It was occupied by the British in 1916. See **WORLD WAR**: 1916: VII. African theater: a, 14.

**UKASE**, edict of the imperial Russian government which derived the force of law from the absolute authority of the tsar.

**UKERWE ISLAND**, in Lake Victoria Nyanza, former German East Africa. The island was taken by the British in 1916. See **WORLD WAR**: 1916: VII. African theater: a, 12.

**UKIO-YE**, school of Japanese art. See **PAINTING**: Japanese.

**UKRAINE**, soviet republic of southeastern Europe including parts of southern Russia and former Austria-Hungary. (See **RUSSIA**: Map of Russia and the new border states.) It is divided into nine provinces with an area of 174,510 square miles and a population of 26,001,802. Ukraine is one of the principal soviet republics of Greater Russia. Before the World War and consequent formation of the republic, the country was divided into Russian Ukraine, often known as Little Russia, and Austrian Ukraine which included parts of Galicia, Bukovia and the Sub-Carpathian districts of Hungary. The Ukrainian people are also known as South Russians, Little Russians, Ruthenes, and Ruthenians. The Ukraine is very rich in fertile soil and of great strategic and political importance due to its free access to the Black sea and Central Europe. "The country known as the Ukraine, where the characteristic Cossack civilization arose and developed, is, as the name indicates, a continental 'border land,' neither European nor Asiatic. [See **RUSSIA**: Great, Little, etc.] . . . It was upon the shores of the great river Dnieper, known to the Ancients as the Borysthenes, that the first permanent Cossack communities established had their settlements. . . . By slow degrees, under the increasing influence of peasant immigration from the North (bringing with it the religion of Russia and such rude civilization as the northern woods had developed) the Asiatic and 'tribal' features of Cossack life began to disappear. During the early days of the XVIIth century they had so strengthened their hold upon the broad lands lying between the Dnieper and the Don, that we find the terms 'Free Cossacks of the Ukraine' and even 'The Republic of the Don' used to describe their settlements."—W. P. Cresson, *Cossacks*, pp. 11-13.

**Origin of the people.**—"Before Russia was Russia, so to speak, when the little kingdom of Muscovy stood alone in the midst of powerful neighbours, there was at first a kingdom, then an independent State, called Ukraine. Its kernel was the kingdom of Kiev, the origin of which, says Professor Hrushevsky in his 'History of the Ukrainian People,' is one of the most difficult problems in the history of the world. The oldest Kiev chronicle, the 'Povisty Vremennykh Lit,' cannot be counted on as accurate when it asserts that the kingdom was founded in the middle of the ninth century. Its origin is [probably] of much earlier date. . . . The kingdom of Kiev is called 'realm of Rusj' in native and foreign sources. . . . 'Rusj' was first used especially for the country of the Poliani tribe, which occupied the immediate environs of Kiev, being bounded by the Dnieper and its tributaries, the Irpen and the Ros, and formed the nucleus of the Ukrainian people, and the name gradually spread over the whole country. Be that as it may, the capital of the Ukraine, Kiev, early became the most important town of the kingdom. The period of Slavonic colonization in the sixth and seventh centuries was followed by quieter times and the beginnings of trade. The so-called decimal organization of troops would probably have started not later than the eighth century, for Kiev, being a centre of commerce, would have needed to organize an army and a strong central power for the protection of trade. The people of Kiev were accustomed to make expeditions for levying tribute, and thus made new commercial roads. From the first part of the ninth century the military power of the kingdom was augmented by a fighting con-

tingent of the wandering Scandinavian tribes, the Varangians. Without keeping altogether to the 'Povisty' account of the Varangian origin of the . . . Ukraine [which attributes its origin to Scandinavian invasions] great importance, says Professor Hrushevsky, may nevertheless be attached to the part played by these troops in the building-up process of the kingdom during the ninth and tenth centuries. Varangians were often chosen as Stadtholders of subject provinces, and Varangian troops were employed down to the time of King Yaroslav (d. 1054). . . . [The state was ruled over by a line of Scandinavian kings, the princes of Kiev, of whom Sojatoslav (d. 792) was the first of any note.] By the end of the tenth century the monarchs of Kiev were fairly absolute, partly owing to the help of their Varangian troops. As early as the ninth century we hear of treaties with Byzantium. The Ukrainians were mentioned in Byzantium documents, even as early as the fourth century, under the name of Antes. The kingdom reached the zenith of its prosperity under Vladimir the Great, who succeeded to the throne in or about 980. This King brought the lands belonging to his realm into closer connection with Kiev by giving them as governors his own sons instead of other princes. The countries governed by his sons occupied all the territory of present-day Ukraine as well as the outlying provinces of Novgorod, Pskov, Polozk, and Smolensk. The Ukraine of those days comprised the provinces of Vladimir—*i.e.*, Volhynia and the Carpathian country and boundaries of Poland—Tmutorokañ (the Don region, Crimea, and parts of Caucasus), and Rostov, the middle region of the Dnieper being in Vladimir's own immediate government."—G. Raffalovich, *Ukraine*, pp. 22-24.—During this period Kiev maintained its superiority over Novgorod, its strongest political and commercial rival. In the twelfth century the Great Russians to the north, under a younger branch of the Kiev dynasty, built up the state of Muscovy, which gradually out-rivalled the state of Kiev in power. "The decadence of the State of Kiev does not by any means coincide with the ruin of the life of the Ukraine. . . . The princes of Tchernicov . . . were the first to take up the part that the House of Kiev had played in the political life of the Ukraine. But these attempts were not successful, for the Mongolian invasion of 1239 . . . soon deprived the principality of Tchernicov of its remaining independence. On the other hand the principality of Halitch-Volhynia which had sprung up at the end of the twelfth century (1190) through the reunion of the principality of Vladimir of Volhynia with the principality of Halitch, showed, in the hands of a descendant of the eldest branch of the House of Kiev, Prince Roman, a much greater . . . political importance. . . . The State of Halitch-Volhynia lasted nearly another century and became the centre of the intellectual and political life of the Ukraine, with the exception of Eastern Ukraine, which remained untouched by its influence. This period of Ukrainian history is one of immense importance, for it was at this time that the Byzantine ideas (till now predominant) were neutralized by fresh influences coming from the west, especially from Germany. These influences gave birth to the system of . . . communes, modelled on German Law which sprang up in Halitch-Volhynia at the beginning of the thirteenth century. . . . [For a time] circumstances became more favourable for the development of Ukrainian culture. But the alliance between Poland and Hungary, through the treaty of 1336, was

soon to put an end to the West Ukrainian State."—M. Hrushevsky, *Historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem (pamphlet)*, pp. 11-12.

**Military organization of Cossacks.** See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 38.

1340-1654.—Under Lithuania and Poland.—**Struggle for independence.—Annexation to Russia.**—"The Tartar invasions from the East drove many Little Russians westward, and they settled in Western Bukovina, Eastern Galicia and the surrounding territory. It was here that the Little Russians became known as Ruthenes in later years. This dispersal of the race weakened it, while to the northwest two great powers were developing, Lithuania and Poland. The latter obtained control over Galicia in 1340, when the Polish king, Casimir the Great, established himself in Little Russia upon the death of its duke, in 1339. Lithuania also coveted part of that southern land and the two kingdoms finally divided it among themselves, Lithuania taking the eastern regions of Little Russia. But Lithuania later became united with Poland so that Little Russia, from the Carpathians to the Don, was incorporated with Greater Poland. Under the rule of Poland Ukraine was subjected to considerable oppression. The Poles sought to impose their Catholic faith upon the Orthodox Little Russians. The Polish gentry succeeded in Polonizing the Little Russian gentry by barring the latter from their diets unless they became Roman Catholics. The Little Russians were originally peasants. But the introduction of the institution of serfdom in the northern countries sent a whole stream of freemen and criminals to the southern steppes of the borderland—Ukraine. These adventurers formed the nucleus for the Cossacks, who were freelances banded together by the Polish government to combat the Tartar and Turkish invaders. The Cossacks loved freedom, and when the Polish and Lithuanian nobles extended their grip over Ukraine and sought to impose serfdom on its inhabitants, a feeling of bitter enmity developed between the Ukrainians and their masters. As in many a similar case, religious persecution and economic oppression helped to mold a national consciousness in the Little Russians, fostering first of all a spirit of revolt. . . . [Constant fighting ensued between the Poles and the Ukrainian Cossacks. In the early years of the seventeenth century under the hetman Konashevick Sahaidachnyi the Cossacks gained considerable power.] A climax was reached in 1648, when the Cossacks, led by their great hetman, Bogdan Khmel'nitsky, raised the banner of insurrection. . . . The battle that ensued was a decisive victory for the Cossacks. The Poles then offered terms to the Cossacks, but they were rejected by Khmel'nitsky. Under the personal leadership of the king, the Poles continued desperately their efforts to subdue the rising. . . . After many battles the latter were defeated and peace was concluded, but not of long duration. Hostilities were renewed and the Cossacks found it necessary to transfer their allegiance to the Muscovite Tsar. Khmel'nitsky sent an envoy to the northern ruler offering Little Russia to him, as an autonomous unit. The treaty of Pereyaslav, concluded between Ukraine and Russia in 1654, stipulated that the former retain its separate organization under the aegis of Moscow. The Ukrainian governmental system, if it may be described thus, was crudely republican. The hetman was elected by a general assembly of the Cossacks. This democratic institution was to be perpetrated even under the Tsar's suzerainty, according to the treaty."—I. D. Levine,

*Resurrected nations*, pp. 85-88.—See also POLAND: 1648-1654.

1700-1721.—Wars between Russia and Sweden.—Attempted rebellion of the Ukraine.—Suppression of books and schools.—Soon after the treaty of Pereyaslav, Khmel'nitsky died. Russia immediately began to disregard the provisions of the treaty and Ukraine rapidly lost the freedom that had been guaranteed to her. By 1700 when Peter the Great entered into his long conflict with Charles XII, king of Sweden (Northern War, 1700-1721), the Ukrainians were eager to free themselves from Russian dominion. They had risen in revolt in 1658, 1659, and 1668 without success. In 1667 a part of the Ukraine had been given to Poland by a treaty between Poland and Russia. The Ukrainians now resolved to take advantage of the situation and ally themselves with Sweden against Russia. "With the approach of the invading Swedish armies twenty thousand Cossacks were summoned by Peter to join in the defense of the Ukraine. His emissaries found the Cossack settlements in a state of almost open rebellion. A tax of seventy kopecks (no small sum of money in that day) had recently been placed upon every Cossack, not excepting those who were performing military service—an act bitterly resented as an infringement of the rights they had been assured at the time of their voluntary subjection to Russia. In Peter's plans for an accurate census of the Ukraine the Cossacks saw only a plan for fresh taxations and even more onerous terms of military service. By thus overriding privileges of the Ukraine, Peter had aroused the resentment of both Cossack and non-Cossack inhabitants. . . . Both classes felt themselves subjected for the first time to the treatment as the despised *moujik* population of Great Russia—the serfs of the great administrative class favored by Peter's 'reforms.' . . . Mazeppa as hetman of the Cossacks of the Ukraine . . . [then offered his aid to Sweden]. As the Cossack *polii* were needed as auxiliaries, Mazeppa was instructed to maintain his fellow countrymen in a state of "discontent"—a none too difficult task—without definitely engaging himself until the last moment."—W. P. Cresson, *Cossacks*, pp. 26-29.—"The renowned Ivan Mazeppa . . . the old Hetman hesitated, fearing to take a false step and he only took his place at the side of Charles XII when this latter entered Ukrainian territory (1708). It was too late; the Muscovite army had also invaded the country to such purpose that the hetman did not even manage to join the Swedish army with all his regiments. The population, held back by the strict measures taken against all those who had in any way participated in the rising, adopted an entirely passive attitude. It was soon apparent that the movement stood no chance of success, and many dignitaries returned to offer their allegiance to Peter the Great. After the defeat of the Poltava [1709, which crushed the power of Sweden], Mazeppa fled with Charles XII to Turkish territory, accompanied by the dignitaries and Cossacks who remained faithful to his flag. . . . This nationalist movement was construed by the adversaries of Ukrainian autonomy into something extraordinary and dangerous, and gave Peter the Great and his partisans the necessary pretext for abandoning the system of progressive restrictions taken up till then by the Muscovite government. From then on, there was a rapid and sudden disappearance of Ukrainian institutions. . . . After Mazeppa was deposed, the Tsar Peter instituted a supervision over the autonomous administration

which was exercised first through Russian residents, and then by a college of Muscovite officers through whose hands passed everything that came in or out of the hetman's chancellery."—M. Hrushevsky, *Historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem (pamphlet)*, pp. 26-28.—"At the same time as Ukraine's political institution was being demolished, Russia initiated measures of repression against the Ukrainian language. In 1680 it . . . [had been] banned from ecclesiastical literature. In 1720 the printing of Ukrainian books was prohibited, followed by the suppression of Ukrainian schools. According to one authority, there were in the eighteenth century in the province of Tchernigov alone 866 schools, while sixty years later none of them remained in existence."—I. D. Levine, *Resurrected nations*, p. 89.

1722-1795.—Suppression of the office of hetman.—Partition of Poland.—"On the death of the hetman Skoropadsky in 1722 the Tsar completely suppressed the power of the hetmans. . . . The considerable period during which the last hetman, Cyril Razumovsky, ruled, brought a little peace to the country and left the officials to govern in comparative freedom, thanks to the exceptional position which the hetman occupied with the Moscow authorities. . . . From the moment the Empress Catherine came to the throne the days of the Ukrainian autonomy were, however, over. Using as a pretext the first suitable occasion—which was in fact a petition to confirm the hetmanship upon the Razumovskys in a hereditary character—Catherine caused Razumovsky to be deposed (1764), abolished the post of hetman and appointed a governor-General assisted by a college composed partly of Muscovite and partly of Ukrainian members. This reform aroused a widespread discontent in the Ukraine. . . . In 1775 the 'Zaporogues of the Sich' [the Cossack military post], the last representatives of the ancient democratic traditions of the Cossacks, were taken by surprise and totally defeated. In 1780 the old administrative traditions of the time of the hetmans were replaced by those of the Russian Empire. This brought about at the same time the disappearance of the military organization of the Cossacks on all the territory under the jurisdiction of the hetmans."—M. Hrushevsky, *Historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem (pamphlet)*, pp. 28-30.—"In 1772 and 1793-5, when Poland was partitioned [see POLAND: 1763-1790; 1793-1796] those parts of Ukraine which belonged to it were taken over by Russia, except Eastern Galicia and part of Bukovina. These latter, known as Ruthenia, went to Austria, disguised as Polish territory. The modern Ukrainian problem dates from this division and is really a double problem, that of the Ukrainians in Russia and of the Ukrainians in Galicia. In the first they were subjected to an intense campaign of Russification, while in the second they were controlled by the Poles who desired to have them Polonized."—I. D. Levine, *Resurrected nations*, p. 90.

1727.—Immigrant Jews to Russia expelled. See JEWS: Russia; 1727-1800.

1795-1860.—Russian rule.—After the partition of Poland in 1795 "for a while it looked as though the old institution of the hetman period were about to be re-established: the Tsar Paul [1796-1801] who strongly opposed the policy of his mother, gave evidence of a wish from the beginning of his reign to give new life to some of the old political liberties. It is said that it was the minister Bezborodko, an Ukrainian patriot, who inspired

his master with these designs. The reign of Paul was a short one, however, and his successor Alexander returned to the principles of Catherine and set up again in the Ukraine the organization established there by the Empress. Nothing remained to remind the people of the time of the hetmans save the civil law, applicable to this day in the governments of Tchernicov and Poltava, the country of the hetmans of old. The longing to see the old constitution restored made itself manifest from time to time, especially on such occasions as the Russian government sought to recruit the Cossack militia in the Ukraine. This happened in 1812 and again during the Polish rising in 1831, on both of which occasions the authorities sought to blind the eyes of the people with various promises of ameliorative measures. During the Crimean War especially the enrolling of volunteers aroused intense excitement among the peasantry, in whom national aspirations were still vigorous. All expectations of this kind met only with disappointment, but they helped to keep alive the nationalist feeling among the Ukrainian people. . . . [About the middle of the nineteenth century under the influence of] ideals imported from Western Europe, Ukrainian political thought abandoned its aspirations towards an independence that was no longer feasible, as well as to the establishment of a Cossack State, in order to replace them by a realizable political programme adapted to the existing circumstances. The oldest of these programmes that was in any way realized, dates from 1846. It was started by the Ukrainian organization of Kiev, known as the guild of Cyril and Methodius, which played an important part in the course of later events. This body was organized at the beginning of the year 1846. It included the most eminent representatives of Ukrainian learning (the poet Shevchenko, the ethnographer Kulich, the historian Kostomarov, the lawyer Hulak, etc.) and soon found many partisans. . . . The number of members of the guild was raised to a hundred in the space of a year in the different towns of the Ukraine, and this in spite of the secret nature of the body. The guild aspired to a Slav Federation, an alliance between the 'Slav Republics' of which that of the Ukraine would be a member. They desired a democratic and liberal constitution which would abolish privileges and classes and everything in fact of a nature to debase the people. Absolute freedom of speech, of thought, and of religion was to be guaranteed. Measures were to be taken to educate the people and to enlighten their political conscience. They counted on the creation of a popular literature to attain this end, on the bringing together of the upper classes and the people, and of working on the minds of the youth of the lycées and high schools so as to instil into them the ideas of confederation. Actually all this practical activity was killed at birth. For in the year 1847 one of the students informed on the leaders and denounced them, with the result that they were arrested and condemned. This repression put a stop to any development of political thought in the Ukraine, now that the most talented and active leaders were reduced to silence. When they returned from their exile and assumed their patriotic task, circumstances, such as the suppression of serfdom in Russia and the amelioration of the lot of the peasantry, compelled them to labour chiefly for the comfort of the peasants. They were occupied in teaching the agricultural classes and in educational work of various kinds as well as in creating

a popular literature, etc. Yet this activity, though it was purely of an educational nature, was suppressed by the government, in conformity with the principle proclaimed by the Minister of the Interior Valujev in 1863: 'The Ukrainian language,' he said, 'never has existed, does not exist, and must not exist.' As soon as the reprisals became less severe, about 1870, the work began again. It was directed in particular by an organization established at Kiev and known by the name of 'Hromada' containing the best representatives of the new government in the Ukraine. . . . [But], in spite of . . . [its] moderation . . . the Russian government regarded this activity with an unfavourable eye. . . . Any establishments or organizations where Ukrainian scientific workers congregated were forbidden and in the spring of 1876 the celebrated Ukase appeared determining the fate of the movement for many years. This Ukase forbade the publishing in Ukrainian of any work other than those of an historical or literary nature. It also required that Russian spelling should be used while every work was to be censored. Conferences, theatrical representations of Ukrainian concerts were absolutely forbidden. . . . [When the movement became no longer possible in Russia, it sought an outlet beyond the frontier in the territory of Austrian Ukraine.] The exodus of the Ukrainians or the divergence of the national activity towards Austrian Ukraine, towards Lemberg, which became a centre for the national life, was weighty with results not only for the Ukrainian movement in Russia, but also for the development of Austrian Ukraine itself. Already, about the year 1860, after the first prohibition of the Ukrainian language in Russia, this event had contributed to the sustenance of the Ukrainian national life in Austria at a very critical moment in the development of this section of the subject peoples. . . . The Austrian government sought in the Ukrainian population something to set off against the Polish revolutionary movement [which had found vent in the revolution of Poles and Hungarians in 1848]. The final liberation of the serfs, the admission of the moral and political rights of the Ukrainian people (or Ruthenians) the creation of the first institution of any importance in the domain of culture and politics, the nationalization of the schools, the formal promise of a university for Lemberg, the administrative separation of the two Galicias (Ukrainian and Polish) which had been artificially united in 1772; all these influences assisted the birth of a new era in the life of the Austrian Ukraine. But these years that were so full of hope soon passed, to be followed in their turn by the reaction . . . [by which] the Ukrainians of Galicia . . . were left to the unscrupulous rule of . . . [the Polish] nobles, into whose hands the whole administration of Galicia [had] passed once again in the year 1850. The Polish aristocracy and bureaucracy utilized the growing influence which they possessed for the purpose of insinuating to the Austrian rulers that the Ukrainian population of Galicia was an uncertain element, devoted to Russia and the orthodox faith. . . . [Under the] Polish predominancy in Galicia, . . . the Ukrainians suffered horribly."—M. Hrushevsky, *Historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem (pamphlet)*, pp. 35-36, 39-42, 44-45.

1840-1914.—Ukrainian movement in Galicia.—Revolutionary parties.—Affairs in Russia.—In Galicia the Polish revolutionary movement which had so disturbed the Austrian government during the years following 1840 had a permanent influence

on the development of the Ukrainian cause. Austria had granted many privileges to the Ukrainians, and even after decided reaction on the part of the government had set in, the movement gained ground. "From about 1880 this 'popular' Ukrainian movement, as it was called, took a firm hold of the people in Galicia, nor did it fail to keep in touch with the Ukrainian movement in Russia as well. It acquired considerable influence over the masses. This was especially so with the left wing of the movement which was the more radical part and originated in 1890. . . . From 1880 to 1905, that is to say for a quarter of a century, Galicia was, so to speak, a kind of intellectual Piedmont for the Ukrainian movement. . . . This movement, almost entirely banished from Russia, took up an irreconcilable attitude in regard to the centralizing policy of the Russian government. It was further equally intransigent in its hostility to the Polish oppression in Galicia."—M. Hrushevsky, *Historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem (pamphlet)*, pp. 45-46.—"The conditions under which the Ukrainians lived in Galicia finally culminated in a general strike, in 1902, and which extended over all of Eastern Galicia. This was preceded, in 1897, by a conflict with the Poles which resulted in the murder of eight Ukrainians and many wounded. In 1900 two political parties were organized by the Ukrainians in Galicia. They demanded the division of Galicia into two parts, Eastern and Western, the former to be constituted as a separate Ukrainian province. It was these parties who were responsible for the strike of 1902 and for the numerous subsequent demonstrations. The revolutionary outbreaks in Russia in 1905 reverberated in Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian movement there gained in intensity just as the Polish policy of suppression grew in severity. The dramatic climax of the contest occurred in 1908 when the Polish governor of Galicia, Count Potocki, was shot by Miroslav Sichinsky, a Ukrainian student. The indictment of the assassin recognized the fact that the shooting was the outcome of the struggle of the Ukrainian peasants against the Polish nobility, admitting that the slain governor supported the Russian policy in Galicia. In 1913 a semi-official Russian statement said that a secret pact between the Polish leaders in Galicia and the Russian Prime Minister Stolypin was in existence. This agreement apparently was the result of the menace which the Ukrainian democratic movement constituted to both the Russian autocracy and Polish aristocracy. Sichinsky later escaped and made his way to the United States, where he was admitted after the United States government held his offense to have been a political act."—I. D. Levine, *Resurrected nations*, pp. 94-95.—During the early years of the twentieth century Ukrainian revolutionary parties took definite shape. The National Democrats were founded in 1900 to fight for rights similar to those of the Poles in Galicia and for the autonomy of Russian Ukraine as a federated state. The Revolutionary Ukrainian party was organized in Lemberg in 1900 and in 1905 changed its title to that of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workingmen's party. "In 1906 . . . the law concerning newspapers was repealed. This law did away with all restrictions in respect of special idioms, under which term the Ukrainian language was included. From this time on the Ukraine was freed of its shackles and was enabled to found papers, associations and all kinds of organizations with a certain amount of freedom. The constitution of 1906, although it left many

restrictions still in existence, enabled the Ukrainians to choose their representatives. As a consequence the first and even the second Duma contained an important fraction of deputies elected by Ukrainian peasantry; yet the short duration of these assemblies prevented the representatives from accomplishing anything of importance. . . . These hopes, however, were not realized. A new reactionary movement [set in and the Ukrainians] . . . suffered from the modifications introduced in the election laws, modifications which revoked the suffrage of the peasantry. At the same time the Ukraine lost its representation in the Duma. The promised liberties—freedom for the Press and for associations . . . [never came] into force, and a strict censor . . . [was] kept over printed works, newspapers and associations in the country. . . . The Ukrainian movement in Russia was forced back to its old position."—M. Hrushevsky, *Historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem (pamphlet)*, pp. 48-49.

1907-1908.—Anti-Russian sentiment. See POLAND: 1867-1910.

1914-1921.—Effects of the World War.—Suppression of newspapers.—Early results of the Russian Revolution.—General Secretariat of the Ukraine.—People's republic.—Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.—War with Poland.—Territorial claims.—"The Great War brought Galicia into the international arena. The Russian armies occupied Galicia in 1914 and immediately the Tsar's government instituted a campaign of Russification there. . . . The Russian language was immediately introduced and the Ukrainian prohibited. Russian officials were appointed and the Ruthenian Uniate Church subjected to persecution. The Ukrainian deputy Levitsky protested in the Austrian parliament against the Russian activities, while in the Russian Duma the same methods were denounced by the radical members. When the Russians were driven out of Galicia and Russian Poland was occupied by the Central Powers, the latter sought to win the support of the Poles by setting up a reunited Poland under their protection. The Ukrainians in Galicia were alarmed at the prospect of being incorporated in Poland and again raised their voices for autonomy."—I. D. Levine, *Resurrected nations*, pp. 94-96.—See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1914-1915.—"In Russian Ukraine the Nationalist papers, which had sprung up in Kiev, Kharkov, and elsewhere since 1905, had all been suppressed on the day after the outbreak of the War: and the reversion to the *status quo ante* 1905 in regard to the Ukrainian Movement was complete. . . . Attempts to revive the Ukrainian newspapers were suppressed one after the other, in Kiev, in Kharkov, in Odessa, at different times in 1915 and 1916. The Cadets at one time took up the Ukrainian Nationalists in connection with their campaign against the Government: but even the very cautious, general terms in which, after their manner—there was no Party in Russia which the subject nationalist so deeply distrusted—they declared for 'cultural autonomy' for the Ukraine produced a split in the Party, and the well-known Deputy Struve resigned from the Central Committee (1915). On this silence in Little Russia fell the crash of Revolution. At the outset the Nationalist *intelligentsia* took control. Early in April 1917 they collected a Ukrainian National Congress at Kiev, which pronounced for autonomy within the Russian Republic. Separatist tendencies were not strong at this Congress. The Congress further elected a Council or Rada, so named after the



ancient Assembly of the Ukrainian Cossacks; and Prof. Hrushevsky was acclaimed its President. The Rada demanded recognition by the Provisional Government of Ukrainian autonomy, immediate and complete local control, and the formation of a separate Ukrainian Army. The Cadet attitude in reply to these demands was to refer the question to the Russian Constituent Assembly, in which (as both parties very well knew) the Ukrainians would be completely outnumbered. . . . Failing to obtain any satisfaction of their demands, the Rada set up an independent Government."—R. Butler, *New Eastern Europe*, pp. 148-150.—"Taking advantage of the weakness of the provisional government the Rada issued on June 26, 1917, a Manifesto announcing that the Ukrainian people would henceforth manage their own affairs. The Provisional government had to give way; it recognized the General Secretariat of Ukraine as the highest administrative power of Southern Russia; the future constitution of the country was left to the decision of the Constituent Assembly which was expected soon to convene. With the overthrow of the Provisional government by the Bolsheviks [in November, 1917], the conflict between the North and the South of Russia became most bitter. . . . Threatened by the Bolsheviks on the one side and by the Russian nationalists on the other, the Ukrainian Council decided that it had nothing to gain and perhaps everything to lose by delaying radical action; and accordingly, on November 20, 1917, it proclaimed the establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic. [See RUSSIA: 1917 (November-December).] In a manifesto issued at that time the Rada stated that it took this step in order to spare the country the horrors of a civil strife; it disclaimed any desire to bring about the disintegration of Russia, the establishment of the Ukrainian Republic being, according to the statement, merely a stepping stone towards the formation of a federation of free and equal peoples of Russia. On February 9, 1918, the Ukrainian Republic, whose representatives sat at Brest-Litovsk, alongside the delegates of the Bolshevik government, concluded a separate peace with the Central Powers."—S. Litman, *Republic of Ukraine (University of Illinois Bulletin, Jan. 20, 1919)*.—See also BREST-LITOVSK: Treaties, 1918.—"As a result of the separate peace the Teutons extended their influence in Ukraine and finally dissolved the Ukrainian national Rada and [in April 1918] set up in its stead a dictatorship headed by Hetman Skoropadsky. [See below: 1917-1921.] The downfall of the Central Powers naturally led to the downfall of their puppet. The breakup of Austria liberated the Austrian Ukrainians, or Ruthenians, and there was no apparent obstacle toward their union with Russian Ukraine. [See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1917-1918.] But such an obstacle did arise as soon as the Poles learned that the Ukrainian National Council took over the administration of Eastern Galicia. The former would not admit the national claims of the Ruthenians, and war between the two races opened when Lemberg was occupied by the Ukrainians. Polish troops reconquered the city, but the Ukrainians besieged it again in January, 1919. [See also POLAND: 1919-1920: War with Russia.] . . . The Ukrainian national council claimed in Russia for Ukraine the provinces of Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav, Kherson and Tauris (less the Crimea). In addition, it claimed some districts of other adjoining provinces, including that of Kholm, which the Poles also claimed

for Poland, thus creating another Polish-Ukrainian quarrel. The main dispute . . . [was] of course, in Galicia. The Poles . . . [claimed] Lemberg, the capital of Eastern Galicia, on the ground that a majority of its inhabitants . . . [were] Poles."—I. D. Levine, *Resurrected nations*, pp. 98-99.

1916-1918.—Abolition of private property by Rada decree.—German occupation.—Re-establishment of private ownership by Skoropadski.—From 1916 on, events moved rapidly in the Ukraine, until the convention of the first Rada in April 1917. "The Petrograd government refused to recognize [the autonomous republic declared by the Rada], and by doing so strengthened the Separatist Group. As a result of negotiations, Kerenski conceded most of the Ukrainian demands, but opposed their demand for a Ukrainian army on the ground that it would break up the Russian army. The favorable attitude of Kerenski caused a split in the Provisional Government at Petrograd, and the Cadets left the Cabinet on this question. Kerenski's attitude towards the Ukraine was equally displeasing to the old Imperialists and the Bolsheviks. Between July and November, 1917, public opinion in the Ukraine went through many transformations; it exhibited in varying degrees a marked tendency for closer understanding with Moscow on the one hand, or with Germany on the other. These movements resulted in November in the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic. . . . [See above: 1914-1921] which, by a *universale*, or decree] abolished private ownership of land, introduced State control of production, an eight-hour day, did away with the death penalty, and expressed the hope that the Ukrainian National Republic would be federated with the Russian Soviet Government. From this moment . . . acute differences with the Soviet Authorities [appeared]. In December the Ukrainian Central Rada, which had been negotiating with Germany, sent to Brest-Litovsk a delegation of which Petlura was a member. In January, 1918, this delegation secured a formal recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by the Central Powers. Petlura and his associates had high hopes of recognition by the Western Powers—hopes strongly fortified by the Allied Mission to the Ukraine sent out in December, 1917. At the end of January the Petrograd Government broke off connection with the Rada, and the latter declared by 508 votes to 4 for the complete independence of the Ukraine. Meanwhile, inspired by Moscow, a Soviet Government was established in the Eastern Ukraine, and matters became so threatening that the Rada appealed to the Central Powers for support. As a result, the Germans occupied the North Eastern and the Austrians the Southern Ukraine. It can hardly be doubted that this fact went far to discredit the Rada with that large proportion of the Ukrainian people who were genuinely out for an independent Ukrainian Republic. The Rada, trying to retrieve its mistake, was overthrown in April by the German armies of occupation, which set up General Skoropadski, a Russian of Ukrainian descent, at the head of affairs. The German Commander-in-Chief, published a decree re-establishing private ownership of land on a large scale, disarmed the Ukrainians, and organized an army in the German interests."—D. Mountjoy, *Ukraine politics (New Europe, June 24, 1920)*.

1917-1921.—Civil wars.—Recognition by Poland and Russia.—The Germans "came ostensibly to drive away the Bolsheviks. . . . [In reality] they exploited Ukraine economically, by requisition-

ing bread, cattle and grain from the farmers. [See also RUSSIA: 1918 (March).] . . . [General Skoropadski, to whom was given the old Ukrainian title of hetman], was acceptable to the Teutons because he was a militarist, a large landholder, a conservative, and a willing tool in the German scheme, which was to make Ukraine the centre and nucleus in a reconstruction of the old centralized Russian empire, every part of which the Germans intended to control, both politically and economically. The result was foreseeable."—E. Revyuk, *Ukraine and the Ukrainians* (pamphlet), p. 15.—"The Soviet Government and the Ukrainian Rada now came to terms; Moscow recognized the Ukraine as an independent State and in June [1917] the Russo-Ukrainian Armistice was formally signed. On 24 May a peasants' rising had broken out all over the Ukraine, directed against the big landowners and the Germans. The objects of the rising were set forth in the Manifesto of the Peasants' Congress at Kiev on 7 June, which demanded: (a) That the Hetman chosen by the great landowners and the Germans should be deposed; (b) that the Ukraine should be a 'Peoples' Republic'; (c) that no land should be returned to the proprietors; (d) that a Legislative Assembly should be convoked. However, the Germans continued forcibly to suppress strike and requisition food, and as a result, Von Eichhorn was assassinated on 30 July at Kiev. The Ukraine now became the battle-ground of at least five different parties: pro-German, pro-Allies, pro-Russian, Federalist, Bolshevik, and Separatist-Nationalist. Skoropadski's Government only lasted a short time after the signing of the Armistice. The Conservative elements in the Ukraine, whether Ukrainians, Poles, or Russians, desired the Allies to support him and to send a fresh army of occupation to replace the Germans and Austrians. However, the more democratic elements in the country triumphed; the old Rada organised itself into a Directorate with Villenchenko and Petlura at its head, and, with the Allies' approval, replaced Skoropadski's Government in December, 1918. . . . It will thus be seen that Petlura and his associates had taken up a definitely anti-German attitude, had got rid of the German reactionary Government, set up a really democratic Government based on the ascertained will of the peasants, and had established and developed relationships with the Allies to the extent of drafting an agreement which was to be fully considered by a special Commission representative of both parties. These were no mean achievements. From Brest-Litovsk to the Armistice Petlura had steered a very difficult and necessarily somewhat chequered course. In the New Year of 1919 he seemed to be on the verge of consummating his desire to see his country a free and independent nation, actively allied with the more progressive Western Powers. As far as could be seen he had no feelings of enmity towards the Soviet Russians and was willing to come to terms with the Soviet Government on the basis of their recognition of an independent Ukraine, with full use by them of Ukrainian railways, waterways and ports. . . . The draft agreement made by the Ukraine Directorate and the Allies came to nothing, and in the early part of 1919 the offensives of Denikin [with his 'White' volunteers] and Kolčak, were launched with the full support of the Allies. The Ukraine was thus, single-handed, fighting the Allies, Soviet Russia and Poland. General Petlura has been blamed, more particularly in Labour circles in England and France, for not

having come to terms with Soviet Russia. There is clear evidence that, from 1917 onwards, the Ukrainians were quite willing to come to terms with Russia, provided their autonomy and freedom was left to them and that they were not forced to adopt a Soviet form of Government, which does not suit their character or temperament. It is obvious that they required all their energies to fight Denikin and Kolčak, whom they regarded as being the champions of the old Tsarist régime, and that they would have been glad to establish amity and cooperation with the democratic elements of the new Russia."—D. Mountjoy, *Ukraine politics* (New Europe, June 24, 1920).—The directorate "was recognized by the National Congress held at Kiev at the end of January, 1919, and also by that part of Ukraine which, up to the Teutonic defeat, had remained under Austrian control, but immediately after the Austrian breakdown, had organized itself into an independent nation called the Western Ukrainian Republic."—E. Revyuk, *Ukraine and the Ukrainians* (pamphlet), p. 16.—In 1921 both Poland and Russia agreed to recognize the Ukrainian republic.—See also POLAND: 1921: Peace treaty with Russia.

1918.—Property loss due to World War. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIV. Cost of war: b, 4.

1919.—Union of Eastern and Western Ukraine.—Award of East Galicia to Poland.—"At the height of its success, the White Army had defeated the remnants of Petlura's force and compelled him to seek refuge behind the Polish front. Thus the Ukrainian Government lost its last bit of Ukrainian territory. But this was Denikin's last success. . . . But a new factor of importance was now introduced in the political configuration—Poland. Immediately after the Austrian Revolution, the Ruthenians of Eastern Galicia had proclaimed their autonomy and their adherence to the Ukrainian State. A treaty was concluded between the Ruthenian leaders and the Directory (November 1918), by the terms of which Galicia was incorporated in Ukraina. On principle the two were to be united for ever and without conditions, but the great differences in political circumstances and traditions compelled the Ruthenians to retain their virtual independence. Galicia received the official appellation of 'Ukraina across the Dniestr' (Naddnistrova Ukrayina). As Galicia was far better organized and prepared for political self-help than Russian Ukraina, the Galicians naturally acquired a great importance in the new State, and they pledged themselves to uphold the Directory against all their enemies. This was a rash promise, for Galicia had an enemy of its own, and one far more formidable than the Bolsheviks. The Poles immediately proved themselves aggressive and insatiable. They were far stronger than the Ruthenians, having behind them not only the three armies of Haller, Pilsudski, and Dowbor-Musnicki, but, what was more, the support of the Allies. They lost no time in representing the Ukrainian Ruthenians as dangerous pro-Germans. The result of the struggle, in which the Directory could not help the Galicians (who on their side had squandered their forces to help the Directory), was what might have been expected. By March 1919 the whole of Galicia had become a Polish province; the remains of the Galician army had joined Petlura in Podolia. The Poles then crossed the frontier and occupied portions of Volynia and Podolia."—D. Mirsky, *Ukraine*, pp. 333-334.—On January 3, 1919, the union of "Eastern" (Rus-

sian) Ukraine and "Western" (Austrian) Ukraine was proclaimed. On December 28, 1919, East Galicia was awarded to Poland by the supreme council at Paris under a mandate for twenty-five years.—See also POLAND: 1919 (September).

1919.—Reply to proposed peace conference of Allies at Prinkipo island. See RUSSIA: 1919.

1919.—Republic of Western Ukraine set up by Ruthenians.—Struggle with Poles.—Collapse of the republic. See POLAND: 1919 (September).

1919.—Massacres of Jews. See JEWS: Russia: Ukraine.

1920.—Struggles with Bolsheviks.—The war with Wrangel affected the territory of Ukraine but slightly, and so far as Denikin's army was concerned, not a single "White" soldier remained in Ukraine by January 1920. "So long as a victory of Denikin was within the limits of probability, the Poles did not budge against the Bolsheviks. But no sooner had the Bolsheviks triumphed over the White Army, than the Poles entered into negotiations with Petlura with a view to conquering Ukraina for him. The new Petlurian Ukraina was to stand in the same relations to Poland as that in which the Ukraina of Skoropadsky had stood to Germany. In the end of April 1920, an offensive, under the personal supervision of the head of the State, was launched, and on May 2 Kiev was taken, . . . [but] was lost in a few weeks. . . . The net result of the whole Petlura-Pilsudski adventure for Ukraina was: (1) the recognition by Poland of Soviet rule in Ukraina; (2) the cession to Poland of eight districts of Volynia and Podolia, together with Brest, Kholm, and Galicia; (3) a complete rupture between Petlura and the Galicians. . . . Henceforward the Galicians have had no other name for Petlura but 'zradnyk'—traitor."—D. S. Mirsky, *Ukraine (Quarterly Review, April, 1923)*.—See also RUSSIA: 1920 (October-November); GALICIA: 1914-1920.

1921-1923.—Union with Russia.—On Dec. 30, 1922 delegates from the Ukraine together with delegates from the other principal soviet republics met at Moscow and concluded a Treaty of Union which set up a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Ukraine thus became one of the federated states of Greater Russia. "The peace of Riga (March 1921) is the last event in the history of Ukraina. Since that date it has been a province—an autonomous republic, officially—of the Soviet Federation. Its capital is Kharkov. . . . Its constitution is identical with that of Moscow. It is nominally independent, and . . . a treaty was even signed between Soviet Ukraina and Kemal Turkey. But to all intents and purposes it is a province of Bolshevik Russia. The net result of the Revolutionary years for the Ukrainian idea may be summed up as follows. The people of Ukraina have become accustomed to what some may call anarchy and others freedom. But this freedom is a purely local freedom, the largest unit of independence being in many cases the village, sometimes the district. . . . In this sense Ukraina has asserted its right to self-determination. But it has failed to prove itself a national and exclusive unit."—D. S. Mirsky, *Ukraine (Quarterly Review, April, 1923)*.

1922.—Lease of sugar beet territories to German land banks. See RAPALLO, TREATY OF (1922).

ALSO IN: H. A. Gibbons, *Ukraine and the balance of power (Century Magazine, July, 1921)*.

UL. See EL.

ULADISLAV. See WLADISLAV; LADISLAUS.

ULAIÐH, early name of Ulster. See ULSTER: Legendary history.

ULANS, or Uhlans, originally light cavalry armed with the lance in the Polish, Prussian and Austrian armies. In the modern German army the Ulans were classed as heavy cavalry. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: X. Alleged atrocities, etc.: a, 2.

ULBO ISLAND, off the east shore of the Adriatic. It was promised to Italy by the treaty of London, 1915. See LONDON, TREATY, OR PACT OF.

ULCA, Battle of (488). See ROME: Medieval city: 488-526.

ULEMA, collective name of the body of theologians and mystics in Mohammedan countries. They are the recognized interpreters of the Koran and of the laws based upon it. "Islam has developed a clergy, with gradations and ranks. These vary in different countries. . . . In Constantinople the mosque schools have from ten thousand to twenty thousand students [written in 1916], half of whom are studying Sacred Law. Grades whose duties are almost wholly religious are the Imam, the leader of prayers, and the Khatib or mudarris, the mosque preacher. Four degrees higher than the Khatib is the Mufti, who resembles the lawyer among the Jews in New Testament times. From this grade are appointed the Kadis; seven ranks higher is the Grand Mufti, Chief Judge according to Canon Law; and five grades higher yet is the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the head of the religious clergy and of the religio-civil judges. The Sheikh-ul-Islam is ex-officio Minister of Public Worship and does not change with the other ministers of the Sultan. He is also official Interpreter of the Shariat [Mohammedan law]. His decision for the time is effective, even if it be a fatwa [legal decision] deposing a Sultan. But decisions by him have no binding force on others of the Ulema. He continues to wear a long white robe and a yellow turban with a grey *aba*, cloak, though the viziers have changed to European dress. All these higher grades are called Ulema, Doctors, the *alim* or learned. There is in Turkey no ordination. The diploma is the authorization and prepares one for appointment, but in Central Asia the binding of the turban on the head is a sign of authorization. In Turkey the duties of many of the Ulema are both religious and civil, but in Persia as well as in countries like Russia, where their civil duties are more restricted, it is more easily realized that their prime function is religious. In the thought of the people they are the clergy. Dr. Dwight facetiously refers to them as 'the Ulema who deny that they are priests, yet act like them.'"—S. G. Wilson, *Modern movements among Moslems*, pp. 29, 31.—See also SUBLIME PORTE; TURKEY: 1789-1812.

ULFILAS (c. 311-383), bishop of the Goths and translator of the Bible into Gothic. See MISSIONS, CHRISTIAN: 4th-7th centuries; CHRISTIANITY: 238-400; GOTHIS: 341-381; GERMAN LITERATURE: 350-9th century.

ULLOA, Antonio de (1716-1795), Spanish naval officer and scientist. Governor of Louisiana, 1766-1768. See LOUISIANA: 1766-1768.

ULM, fortress city of Germany on the north bank of the Danube, in the republic of Württemberg, sixty-three miles northwest of Munich. In 1919 the population was 56,020.

1620.—Treaty of Evangelical Union with Catholic League. See GERMANY: 1618-1620.

1702-1704.—Taken by Bavarians and French, and recovered by Marlborough. See GERMANY: 1702; 1704.

1805.—Mack's capitulation. See AUSTRIA: 1798-1806; FRANCE: 1805 (March-December); RUSSIA: 1801-1805.

ULMENES, order of nobility among the Araucanian tribes of Chile. See CHILE: Aborigines.

ULSAN, Battle of (1905). See JAPAN: 1902-1905.

ULSTER: Location, divisions, area and population.—Ulster, the northern province of Ireland, comprises the counties of Donegal (Tyrconnell), Londonderry, Antrim, Fermanagh, Tyrone, Cavan, Monaghan, Armagh, and Down. (See IRELAND: Map.) Six counties, Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, Tyrone, are officially entitled Northern Ireland, with a separate government set up under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920. (See IRELAND: 1920.) The area of Ulster is 8,613 square miles, including Northern Ireland. In 1911 the population of the total area was 1,581,696. In 1922 the population of Northern Ireland was estimated at 1,284,000. Aside from agriculture the chief industries are the manufacture of linen and cotton, ropes, and shipbuilding. The ship yards of Harland, Wolff & Co. are among the greatest in the world, and there is also a large shipbuilding company in Larne.

Legendary history.—Ancient civilization.—Origin of name.—Ancient divisions.—At the time of the Milesian conquest in the tenth century B. C., the province of Ulster with Emain Macha as its capital was given it is said, to Eber, son of Ir and grandson of Mileadh. Little is known of this early period. With the reign of the powerful Niall Noigiallach, or "Niall of the nine hostages" (379-405), history becomes more authentic, but until the eleventh century it is marked chiefly by tribal wars. (See IRELAND: From Tuathal to Cormac, to 1014.)—"It would seem that from early Neolithic times, Ulster has been inhabited by a thriving population. In the Irish Heroic period (which corresponds with La Tène, or second Iron-Age), Ulster, as portrayed by the Irish Sagas, played a prominent part. The relations, hostile or friendly, between Ulster and Connaught, lie at the base of the prose epics belonging to the Cuchulainn cycle."—E. G. R. Armstrong, *Antiquities* (G. Fletcher, ed., *Ulster [Provinces of Ireland]*, p. 101.)—A number of articles made of gold, which were discovered in 1896 in the county Londonderry, are said to be of late Celtic production, and of "exquisite fineness and workmanship." These objects which are believed to date to the first century B. C. seem to prove that a comparatively high state of civilization must have existed at that time. The modern name Ulster comes from the old name Ulaidh, to which the suffix ster (a steading) was added. "Like most of the ancient territorial names in Ireland, this was originally the name of a population, not of a tract of land. Originally the *Ulaidh* occupied the whole of what is now called Ulster—that is, the part of Ireland cut off by a line joining the mouth of the *Droghas* . . . [the Drowse, in Donegal], with *Inbher Colptha*, the mouth of the Boyne. After A. D. 332, however, the name lost its extended application, and the Ulidians proper were restricted to . . . the modern counties of Antrim and Down. A very mixed population inhabited this region, with a large infusion of the aboriginal element, called *Criúthne* in Irish history [the Picts]. . . . The district was further subdivided among a number of ancient septa, as the *Dal Riada* in North Antrim, the *Dál n-Araide* in South and North Down, and the *Dal Fiatach* in South Down. It appears that the kings of Ulidia (in this restricted sense) were

selected alternately from the Dal n-Araide and the Dal Fiatach. The remainder of the modern province of Ulster was divided as follows. In the central portion was the great territory of *Tír Eoghain*, the Land of Eoghan—the territory of the tribe claiming descent from Eoghan (died A. D. 465) son of Niall of the Nine Hostages. . . . The western part of Donegal bore the name *Tír Chonail*, the land of Conail—the territory of the reputed descendants of Conail Guibán, another son of Niall, died A. D. 464. The remnant of the *Airghialla* occupied the south of the province—in Louth, Armagh, Monaghan, and Fermanagh."—R. A. S. Macalister, *Ancient geography* (G. Fletcher, ed., *Ulster [Provinces of Ireland]*, pp. 2-3).

1022-1166.—Struggle of Irish High Kings to subdue Ulster.—"Ireland . . . [in the eleventh century was] divided into five provinces or provincial kingdoms, with the kingdom of Meath in the centre. In Ulster, the descendants of Niall of the Nine Hostages still ruled, their tribal name being 'Sons of Niall,' Hy Neill, or O'Neill. A branch of the Hy Neill, the Hy Lochlain, or O'Loughlins, at this time held the dominant power among the Sons of Niall. . . . The O'Loughlins of Ulster, the O'Conors of Connaught, and the O'Briens of Munster all equally desired the title of Ard-Rig, or High King, which carried with it the overlordship of Ireland and the possession of the central kingdom of Meath. The period after Malachi the Great, who died in 1022, is filled with the struggles of these families to wrest the overlordship from each other. . . . Meanwhile Ulster had remained practically independent of the High Kings. Turlogh O'Brien made a vigorous effort to assert his power over the northern kingdom, but was defeated by the men of Ulster at the old frontier ford at At-Ferdiad, or Ardee, where Cuculaind, the champion of Ulster, had long centuries before defeated Ferdiad, the champion of the armies of the south and west. The feud passed on to Turlogh's son, Murkertagh O'Brien, who became king of Leinster in 1086. . . . The kingdoms of Ulster and Munster, headed by Donall O'Loughlin, and Murkertagh O'Brien, fought steadily for the overlordship of Ireland for more than thirty years [at the beginning of the twelfth century]. Wearied of strife, these two kings finally left their thrones and entered monasteries, the king of Ulster taking refuge in a religious house at Derry. . . . The strife between these two kingdoms weakened them both, and advantage was taken by Turlogh O'Conor, king of Connaught, who claimed the title of High King, and fought for it against Murkertagh O'Loughlin, king of Ulster, until his death in 1156. . . . Turlogh O'Conor was succeeded by his son, Boderick O'Conor, who carried on the fight against Ulster. . . . In 1162, an army was assembled by the king of Ulster, Murkertagh O'Loughlin, to march against At-Cliait, that is, Dublin, and attack the Norsemen and Leinstermen there. Roderick O'Conor joined the expedition, bringing an army of his own Connaught-men and the men of Meath. The foray was successful, and 'a peace was concluded between the Foreigners [Norsemen] and the Gaels; and six score ounces of gold were given by the Foreigners to O'Loughlin, and five score ounces of gold were paid by Dermot O'Melaghlin to Roderick O'Conor, for West Meath.' . . . Murkertagh O'Loughlin died in 1166, and the claim of Roderick O'Conor to the overlordship was admitted without dispute."—C. Johnston and C. Spencer, *Ireland's story*, pp. 87-89, 92-94.

1171-1186.—Rise of de Courcy.—In 1171, when Henry II crossed over to Ireland, modern Ulster was represented by the kingdoms of Ailech (Tír Eoghain [Owen]), Oriel and Ulida. Of these the Uí Neill or Cenel Eoghain (race of Owen) who of right ruled over Ailech, were the strongest. As the sequel showed, it was from these northern men that the Anglo-Norman invaders had most to fear. "Hugh de Lacy was appointed 'Procurator general and Custos of Ireland' in May 1177, and so held till 1181. . . . The danger from the North, which bred soldiers in abundance, was now the serious question for the colonists. It came home to them especially when at the end of 1176, Melachlin MacLochlain with Cenel Eoghain and the men of Oriel marched against De Lacy's castle at Slane, destroyed it, and slew Richard Fleming, its warder, and the garrison of five hundred. In the next year Melachlin, by slaying his rival of the O'Neills, Aedh, became all-powerful, and held single sway till 1185. So in Tír Conaill, Flahertach O'Maeldory, beginning to reign in 1167, . . . [later slew his rival, Rury O'Canannain (in 1188)], and ruled triumphantly till 1197. The feuds of the northern kings, and the imminent need of striking in before the Ulster menace should culminate, suggested the most epical exploit of the whole Invasion. John de Courcy, a Somersetshire knight, collecting a number of the discontented and restless of the Dublin English, set out to conquer Ulster . . . without royal permission. . . . With some three hundred colonists and some native troops De Courcy set off for the North early in 1177, and on February 1 carried Downpatrick, the capital of Ulidia, and a city as sacred as Armagh itself, by a brilliant *coup-de-main*. But its king, Rury MacDonlevy, soon returned with a great array, and Cardinal Vivian, Papal Legate, who was then at Down, blessed the native cause. MacDonlevy, however, was again defeated. . . . The king of Ulidia then went to Melachlin MacLoughlain, his over-lord, got help from him, and returned with O'Carain, Archbishop of Armagh, the bishop of Down, many clergy, and the most sacred relics of Armagh, to face De Courcy once more. But the great rally of the North was totally defeated, the English slaughtered the clergy indiscriminately with the lay combatants, and the archbishop and bishop were taken, along with the relics, on June 24, 1177. . . . De Courcy's first aim had been to conquer Ulidia (Ulaidh), and the title '*Princeps Ulidiae*,' which he apparently assumed, would make him the successor of MacDonlevy. But earlier, as there were native scholars to tell him, Ulidia had stretched west of the Bann and Loch Neagh, and these old claims became his. Further, he aimed at subjecting Oriel and then of overthrowing MacLochlain himself with his over-kingdom: thus would the Norman become what the kings of Ailech had been, supreme king over the whole North. Hence the later confusion as to what the earldom of Ulster meant—was it merely Ulidia east of the Bann and Newry, or was it the whole province, the Ultonia, 'Ulveste,' and Ulster of later usage? . . . The Cenel Eoghain for twenty years made no attempt to save Ulidia. . . . Irish Ulidia and Irish Oriel were doomed to disappear before the conquerors . . . and in the portion of Oriel which survived, namely, Monaghan, or 'Irish Oriel,' the MacMahons took chief place. . . . Carrickfergus, with its castle and the Premonstrant abbey which De Courcy founded, became an English town, and the Benedictines and the Cistercians whom he brought, . . . [introduced a new Anglo-

French civilization into the North]. It was the first Plantation of the North, but a French, not an Anglo-Saxon one, for De Courcy neither expelled the Irish nor planted English plebeians. It was, and remained, the thinnest of the English colonies. If De Courcy was not entirely after the Irish heart, as little was he an Englishman. He rendered no homage for Ulidia to Henry or John, though his charters recognize them as liege lords. [He married a sister of the king of Man, and dreamed of founding a kingdom with its base on Ulster and Man.]—E. Curtis, *History of medieval Ireland from 1110 to 1513*, pp. 85-89.—In 1186 de Courcy was created justiciar of Ireland by John.

1188-1230.—Advance by de Courcy.—Rise of the O'Neills and O'Donnells.—De Courcy, though no longer justiciar, was commissioned in 1192 to make peace with Cathal Crovderg (the "Red hand") brother of Rury or Rory O'Connell, and a claimant to the kingdom of Connaught. De Courcy recognized Crovderg as king of Connaught but de Burgh, (or de Burgo) took up the cause of Cathal Carrach, the other claimant, "brought in an army from Munster and drove Crovderg into exile in Ulster. De Courcy, though near his tragic fall, was still advancing in Ulidia. In 1188 his new fort at Moy Cova, north of Newry, gave him the command of the passes of the North, and the castle that he built at Kinsantail, near Coleraine, threatened Inishowen. Part of the coast here he granted to Duncan, son of Gilbert, Lord of Galloway. A great leader now arose among the Cenel Eoghain. [On the death in 1196 of] Murchertach MacLochlain, . . . Aedh O'Neill became king of Tír Eoghain till his death in 1230. Flahertach of Tír Conaill died in February 1197, and an O'Hegnigh ruled Fermanach and the Cenel Conaill for a time. Cathal Crovderg enlisted these new kings, and the three invaded Connaught in 1200, but were cut off at Esdara (Ballysodare) by De Burgo's forces and O'Hegnigh slain. Thereupon Conor Beg MacLochlain claimed the kingship of Cenel Eoghain, but Egnechan O'Donnell saved Aedh O'Neill his throne by sailing with a large force to Gaeth-an-Chairrgin, near Portrush, where in battle MacLochlain was slain (1201). Egnechan, who ruled Tír Conaill till 1208, established the primacy of the O'Donnells. Bound in a common alliance, the O'Neills and O'Donnells swept every rival out of their path, and thus the two great families of the North rose together amid the wreckage of the Norman Conquest, to fall together four centuries later at Kinsale. The MacLochlains still survived, but in 1241 at Cameirgi Brian O'Neill slew Donal and ten of the MacLochlain 'derbfine' and practically extinguished the race."—E. Curtis, *History of medieval Ireland, from 1110 to 1513*, pp. 105-106.

1199-1260.—Fall of de Courcy.—Attempt to encircle Ulster.—"The policy of John was to remove the early conquerors, men of true feudal type, and promote men familiar with new Monarchy. Hence his veto on De Burgo's designs upon Connacht, and the overthrow of De Courcy. De Courcy's northern kingdom, of whose patent from an English prince no trace could be found, was of the sort to alarm an overlord so jealous of overmighty subjects. Yet no proof exists of De Courcy's intention to shake off the English yoke. His land grants are made '*vice Regis Anglie*.' In reality his fall was due to John's inherent suspicion of 'dangerous men,' to De Courcy's generous outburst against the King for the murder of Prince Arthur, and to the intrigues of Hugh de Lacy,

anxious to be an Earl. Sure of royal approval, the Lacys picked a border quarrel, and when de Courcy refused to go to the King's court in 1202, though summoned, Hugh marched into Ulster and defeated him at Down. . . . [John created Hugh de Lacy earl of Ulster, in 1205, and de Courcy's last effort to overthrow his rivals was defeated by Walter de Lacy at Rath Castle. No attempt was made] to conquer Ulster west of the Bann and Aedh O'Neill held his own against the new Earl. . . . [In the settlement with the chiefs, which followed John's visit to Ireland in 1210] no terms were made with the Northern kings. O'Neill and O'Donnell had declined to come in to John in 1210, and in any case the Dublin government was determined to seize the frontiers of Connacht and Ulster, in readiness for a further advance West and North, and especially to control the Northern coasts. . . . This encircling policy menaced the independence of the Northern Irish. In 1212 Gilbert de Angulo . . . began to build a castle at Cael-uisee, to command the narrow gateway from Connacht to Tir Conaill. The Cenel Eoghaim were similarly to be hemmed in from the sea; and at Carrickfergus, John de Gray granted to Alan FitzRoland, Earl of Galloway, in the King's name, no less than one hundred and forty knights' fees. . . . Thus was threatened a Scottish plantation of Ulster [which was however unsuccessful. In 1243 Hugh de Lacy died, and in 1245 the earldom of Ulster was bestowed by Henry III on his son Edward. In 1255 Edward conferred the "county of Ulster" on Walter de Burgh, who was created earl.] Meantime Maurice FitzGerald, as Justiciar had utilized the State revenues, the feudal levies, and the royal castles for a war upon the unconquered Irish. . . . [In 1245 he was succeeded by John FitzGeogrey who held office until 1256. Maurice induced FitzGeogrey to continue the same policy, and a double campaign] was planned by which O'Donnell and O'Neill were assailed from the Erne, the North Sea, and the South Ulster frontier. A line of fortresses at Sligo, Donagh-moyne, Moycova, Coleraine and Cael-uisee supported the attack [and in January 1247, Melachlin O'Donnell was defeated and slain in battle with Fitzgerald]. The death of Maurice FitzGerald in the spring of 1257 emboldened the chiefs of North and West to appear in arms. Goffraidh O'Donnell [successor of Melachlin] marched south, and defeated the English at Credran [near Sligo; but was badly wounded. Before he could recover, Brian O'Neill appeared in Tir Conaill demanding homage. Borne in a litter, O'Donnell took the field and defeated the O'Neill, but died of his wounds after the battle (1258). At this time the northern chiefs chafed under the feudal exactions of the seneschal of Prince Edward in Ulster.] The time for revolt seemed come; now that FitzGerald's encircling campaign had failed, and there was no more a Lacy Earl of Ulster, Brian O'Neill therefore brought together a great Irish confederacy. . . . [At the battle of Drumderg (Downpatrick), which followed (May 14, 1260) the English were victorious and Brian O'Neill was slain.] Thus ended in apparent failure the first attempt since the Conquest to restore the Ard Ri-ship. . . . [But in the upshot not only did Donal Og O'Donnell] secure Tir Conaill to his race, but ultimately FitzGerald's own fiefs of Fermanagh and Sligo passed under the O'Donnells. The successful, if selfish hostings of the O'Donnells had lasting results. In one corner of Ireland the forward movement had been that of the Irish."—E. Curtis, *History of medieval*

*Ireland from 1110 to 1513*, pp. 111-112, 130, 153-154, 157-160.

1333.—Murder of earl of Ulster. See IRELAND: 1327-1367.

1367.—Irish county under Irish control. See IRELAND: 1327-1367.

1422-1461.—Raids on Louth and Meath by Irish of Ulster.—Talbot's subjection of Ulster leaders. See IRELAND: 1413-1467.

1540-1567.—O'Neills and O'Donnells.—Rise and fall of Shane O'Neill.—In 1540, when Henry VIII was proclaimed king of Ireland, "except for some English and recent Scotch settlements on the coast of Down and Antrim, the population of Ulster was entirely Irish. The two most important tribes were those of the O'Neills and the O'Donnells. The former occupied what is now Armagh, Tyrone, and part of Londonderry; the rule of the latter extended over Donegal. These two tribes . . . were [now] the most powerful in Ireland. They both claimed to be of Royal descent, and . . . had always been foes. Con O'Neill was one of the chiefs who were won over by Henry VIII. In 1542, in return for acknowledging the King's supremacy, he was created Earl of Tyrone, and the succession to the lands of the O'Neill was secured to his eldest (but illegitimate) son, Mathew, who was at the same time created Baron of Dungannon. Shane O'Neill, however, a younger and legitimate son who had made a name for himself in raids against the Ulster Scots, and in feuds with the O'Donnells, was selected as 'Tantist' by the tribe, and soon a struggle began for the succession to the chieftaincy. Con was chased from Ulster and Mathew was murdered. Shane thereupon received the title of 'The O'Neill' from his people, thus rejecting the Earldom conferred upon his father, and so defying the power of the English Government. . . . Shane . . . was full of ambition, and he determined to make himself lord over Ulster. He gained a great deal of power, and adopted such a menacing attitude that in 1561 the Earl of Sussex proceeded against him. Shane could not be forced to any definite engagement, wore out Sussex's army, and captured the chief of the O'Donnells, who had allied himself with the English. At length he was persuaded to come to terms. . . . He arrived in London with his Celtic train in January, 1562, made his submission, and . . . was allowed to return with a promise to reduce the Scots and keep the O'Donnells in check. Once again in Ireland he took no trouble to conceal his ambition. He subdued the Maguires and O'Reillys, attacked the O'Donnells, and began to threaten the English settlements. In view of the danger from Scotland another truce was patched up with him in 1563, and his title of 'The O'Neill' was formally acknowledged. Up to this Shane had shown intelligence and some prudence, but [now] instead of joining with the O'Donnells and the Scots, who had lately settled in Antrim, in a solid alliance against the English, he turned against both and tried to crush them. . . . [In consequence] Elizabeth resolved to crush him as her father had crushed Kildare. He was proclaimed a traitor in August, 1566, and Sir Henry Sydney, with a large force, invaded Tyrone. Many of the Northern chiefs were gained over by the English, with the result that Shane was defeated by the O'Donnells in May, 1567."—C. Maxwell, *Short history of Ireland*, pp. 34-37.

1570-1603.—Elizabethan grants.—Scottish settlements.—"There were two or three small [unsuccessful] attempts made to colonise the east-

ern portion of Ulster in Elizabeth's reign. . . . About 1570 a grant of part of Armagh was made to Thomas Chatterton, but the O'Neills sent an expedition against the settlers, and drove them out. Again, about the end of 1571, the district of Ards in County Down [a possession of the O'Neills] was granted to Sir Thomas Smith of Essex. . . . [Smith, who was not supported by the Deputy], was defeated in battle and slain in October 1573, but a few of his followers still remained on in that district. Another attempt on a much larger scale was made in 1573, when the Earl of Essex received from Elizabeth half of the County of Antrim and the Barony of Farney in County Monaghan. Essex came with twelve hundred soldiers to Belfast Lough, to find that the Scots of the Glynnes of Antrim, under Sorley Boy had joined with the O'Neills against him. . . . [After two years of fighting he was compelled to return to England. (See IRELAND: 1559-1603).] In 1603 Sir Arthur Chichester for his services in the war with O'Neill obtained a grant of . . . [the east coast of Antrim] and also of the land for some distance up the valley of the Lagan. . . . [He settled the districts around Belfast and Carrickfergus with English from Devon, Lancashire and Cheshire.]—J. B. Woodburn, *Ulster Scot*, pp. 44-45.—Immigrants from Scotland had already settled in North Antrim. Both Mary and Elizabeth objected to their presence and tried to eject them. Their efforts, however, were without avail and in the sixteenth century the Scots advanced steadily westward. "In the end the Government thought it better to accept the inevitable, and to gain the loyalty of the predominant clan of the MacDonnells, the Queen granted Sorley Boy, their most formidable leader, a large slice of Antrim in return for submission and acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Crown (1586). Sir Randal MacDonnell, who, as a Scotsman, stood high in the favour of James I, received in 1603 the entire region known as the Glynnes and the Route. The unsettled condition of Ireland at this time drew . . . many enterprising persons who wished to lay the foundations of their fortunes [to Ulster where the merciless wars had left large portions almost uninhabited]. Sir Hugh Montgomery, the Laird of Braidstane in Ayrshire, secured [from Con O'Neill] a large grant in the district known as Claneboy and the Great Ards; he brought over with him many substantial farmers from the Scottish Lowlands, and owing to their industry a flourishing colony was soon in existence."—C. E. Maxwell, *Irish history from the contemporary sources*, pp. 56-57.—Thus the way was paved for the great confiscation known as the Plantation of Ulster.

1584.—Division into counties.—"In 1584, Sir John Perrott [lord lieutenant] divided the province of Ulster into seven counties, Armagh, Monaghan, Tyrone, Coleraine (which was later changed to Derry), Donegal, Fermanagh, and Cavan. The two counties of Antrim and Down in Ulster had been formed some years before."—C. Johnston and C. Spencer, *Ireland's story*, p. 165.—"Ulster was the last of Irish districts to be reduced to shire ground, and here as elsewhere the English authority was for a long time only nominal. It was not till James I's reign that county administration became really effective throughout Ireland."—C. E. Maxwell, *Irish history from contemporary sources*, p. 38.

1585-1608.—Hugh O'Neill's alliances and growing power.—"Flight of the earls."—"Shane

O'Neill was succeeded as head of his clan by his cousin Turlough. Hugh O'Neill, the second son of Mathew, Baron of Dungannon [the elder son was dead] was thus disregarded, but . . . he was taken under the protection of the state, and sent to be educated at the court of Elizabeth. . . . In 1585 Hugh was made Earl of Tyrone, and on the death of Turlough the tribesmen elected him as chief, giving him the title of 'The O'Neill.' This changed the attitude of the Government towards him. By accepting the old tribal title he might, it was felt, lay claim at any time to the Lordship of Ulster and follow in Shane's footsteps. . . . He was a far better statesman than Shane. He saw that the Irish must be united to make a successful war upon the English, and that foreign aid was also necessary. He allied with the O'Donnells, and instead of crushing the other Ulster tribes, he won over the chiefs [who had been offended and alarmed by the proceedings of Sir William Fitz-William the lord deputy], and built up a great League of the North. . . . He drilled and disciplined his soldiers in the English fashion, and bought arms and ammunition from Spain. In the summer of 1598 he laid siege to a fort named Portmore, near Armagh, and when Bagenal [the lord-marshal] marched to its relief with 5,000 men, he entrenched himself at a place called the Yellow Ford, on the river Callan, about two miles from the town. . . . On the 14th August Bagenal's forces . . . [were] completely routed . . . [and Bagenal himself was killed]. Portmore, Monaghan, and Armagh then surrendered to O'Neill, which left all Ulster in his hands with the exception of Carrickfergus. . . . In the spring . . . of 1599 Elizabeth sent over the Earl of Essex. . . . [Essex should have struck first at Ulster and the power of O'Neill, but he was foolishly persuaded to march into Munster, where] his army melted away in the guerrilla warfare carried on by the natives and was defeated. . . . The Queen, enraged at his failure, commanded Essex to march north without further delay. In August, 1599, he, therefore, proceeded to Ulster. With his sadly diminished army he did not dare to attack O'Neill, now at the height of his power, and so arranged a meeting with him. At this conference a truce was arranged, in which the Irishman got the better terms. In February, 1600, the young but experienced soldier, Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, was sent over. . . . The long-expected aid from Spain . . . [for which O'Neill had asked] at last arrived. On the 23rd September, 1601, a Spanish fleet, under the command of Don Juan de Aguila, reached Kinsale with 3,400 troops . . . [and O'Neill marched south to meet them. Against his counsel] on the 24th December, 1601, a night attack was made, but as the English had been forewarned, and as the Spaniards failed to co-operate, the Irish were completely routed. . . . The chiefs hastened back to the north. . . . O'Neill was gradually hemmed in, and as the chiefs deserted him, one after the other, . . . [he made his submission in 1603]. He was allowed to retain his lands and his earldom, but not the coveted title of 'The O'Neill.' He had also to promise to introduce English laws and customs into Tyrone, and to abandon all intrigues with foreign powers. Thus the great rebel, Hugh O'Neill, had once more become a servant of the Crown. His position in Ireland as such soon became impossible. . . . Rory O'Donnell, who had also submitted and been created the Earl of Tirconnell, was in a similar position. In 1607 matters were brought to a crisis by a report in-

vented by their enemies of a conspiracy in which the two Earls were supposed to have taken part. They decided to leave the country, and on the 14th September embarked with their families from the shore of Lough Swilly. . . . After the 'Flight of the Earls' their estates were confiscated, and when the short-lived rising in the north of Sir Cahir O'Dogherty had been put down in July, 1608, the English crown was absolutely supreme in Ireland."—C. Maxwell, *Short history of Ireland*, pp. 40-44.—See also IRELAND: 1559-1603.

1609-1611.—Plantation of Ulster.—The "flight of the earls" opened the way for a larger plantation than had yet been attempted in Ulster. Their estates were declared forfeited to the crown and "the other chieftains of Ulster, O'Caahan of Londonderry, Maguire of Fermanagh, and O'Reilly of Cavan were compelled to resign all or most of their lands, which were also confiscated. According to English law all that should have fallen to the Crown was the freehold estate of those who were attained, but the theory was put forth that the right of the chieftains extended to the soil of six entire counties, Donegal, Londonderry, Tyrone, Armagh, Cavan, and Fermanagh, and that the sub-chiefs who had been created freeholders in 1604 were no better than tenants-at-will. It was resolved to plant the confiscated lands with English and Scottish settlers and to eject the natives from all the most valuable portions."—J. B. Woodburn, *Ulster Scot*, pp. 64-65.—See also SCOTCH-IRISH.—Monaghan, after the execution of Hugh "Roe" Macmahon, had been divided amongst eight of the principal chieftains and the clansmen at large, and was not included in the settlement. "In accordance with Tudor practice, the Crown took up a legal position, and proceeded to prove that the minor clansmen, who were now at the mercy of the government, had no right to their lands. After the fall of Shane O'Neill, by the 11 Eliz. c. 1. his lands in Ulster were declared forfeited. This Act was taken as the foundation for Government action. As a result of the flight of the Earls, their supposed treason and the suppression of their allies, lands which included the six counties of Donegal, Tyrone, Armagh, Coleraine, Fermanagh and Cavan, were confiscated. Further, Sir John Davies, the Attorney-General, ignoring the fact that the King had promised . . . [protection to all vassals], stated that practically the whole of Ulster was absolutely at the disposal of the Crown. Certain moderate statesmen . . . held that better results would be obtained by some consideration for the rights of the Irish. Future events were to prove the wisdom of their opinions, but . . . [Davies's policy prevailed]. The plantation was carried through by a series of three Commissions [1609-1611], the most important of which was appointed in the summer of 1609 to make an exact survey of the escheated counties, to hold inquisitions and to mark out the proportions of the undertakers. In the 'Orders and Conditions,' . . . [issued in January 1609], the scheme of the plantation was set forth. The lands were divided into three proportions of 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000 acres, and were offered to English and Scottish planters on . . . [certain conditions]. Market towns and free schools were to be founded, and individual settlers were to build strong castles, or brick houses, with 'bawns' or courtyards about them, take the Oath of Supremacy and pay a fixed rent. . . . Servitors, or military men, for a higher rent might have Irish tenants upon their lands. The other planters, supposed to be without military

experience, were forbidden to have them, but were to import a competent number of English and Scotch to reside on their estates. The Irish, besides being admitted to the lands of the servitors, were to receive small proportions in certain districts, not always in the worst or poorer districts as is sometimes supposed, so that they were not entirely excluded from the settlement though they lost the bulk of their lands. To put heart into the enterprise, the Government approached the wealthy city of London with a view to plantation. . . . The City secured excellent terms, a company was formed to represent the Corporation of the City of London, later known as 'The Irish Society,' for the plantation of the modern county of Londonderry, which included the City of Derry [which they rebuilt] and the County of Coleraine, besides part of Tyrone and adjoining districts in Donegal and Antrim. . . . The Londoners looked upon the settlement as a commercial speculation, and had an eye to immediate profits. Like the rest of the settlers they obtained more land than was originally intended, and by selling the timber of the woods and retaining the cheap labour of the Irish upon their lands . . . [against the terms of their agreement], ensured the success of their undertaking."—C. E. Maxwell, *Irish history from contemporary sources*, pp. 52-55.—See also IRELAND: 1607-1611.

ALSO IN: H. O'Grady, *Strafford and Ireland*, pp. 822-833.

1609-1641.—Results of the Plantation.—"Of the various surveys of the plantation made during the next fifteen years, that by Captain Nicholas Pynnar is the best known. He states that in 1619 there were two thousand British families in the six counties, and notes that 126 castles had been built, but remarks upon a general want of buildings, and the large numbers of Irish that had remained. [There were actually more Irish than colonists within the plantation.] The planters from Scotland seem to have been the mainstay of the plantation. They were more industrious than the English and made more of their Irish tenants. They brought with them the organisation of their national Church, and so gave to the settlement the distinctly Puritan character which it still retains. The discontent displayed by the Irish over the settlement is the best evidence of the success of English policy. The clan system was broken. The people had to give up their pastoral habits and submit themselves to English landlords, some hundreds were transported to fight in the Swedish wars, some went into Connacht, and some remained in their native bogs and forests as woodkerne or outlaws, to prey on the settlers and watch for an opportunity to regain their lands. As long as the colonists had the support of the home Government all went well with them, but upon the development of Covenanting principles in the North, Laud wrote to Strafford of the 'great inconvenience,' of the strength of the Scots in Ulster, and the latter aroused the hostility of the Crown. This put heart into the Irish, and they determined to revenge their wrongs. In more ways than one the great rebellion of 1641 was the outcome of the plantation of James I. . . . The plantation policy and the colonisation of Ulster mark an important era in Anglo-Irish relations. Ireland was no longer a mere feudal dependency as she had been during the Middle Ages, but was definitely becoming a colony. During the next two hundred years English policy in Ireland was a colonial policy conducted in accordance with



the views of the period."—C. E. Maxwell, *Irish history from contemporary sources*, pp. 55-57.

1635.—Establishment of linen industry.—"One benefit conferred on Ireland [about 1635] by [Sir Thomas Wentworth] was the establishment in Ulster of the linen trade, which has proved so great a boon. Finding that the soil of Ireland was suitable to the growth of flax, he purchased in Holland a thousands pounds' worth of seed, and, obtaining workmen from Flanders and from France, he set up six or seven looms as a beginning. At the same time he discouraged the woollen manufactures, for which certain districts in Ireland had become celebrated, lest they should compete with those of England. [The important cotton manufacturing industry of present-day Ulster was not introduced until 1777.]"—W. F. Collier, *History of Ireland for schools*, pp. 137-138.

Also IX: H. O'Grady, *Strafford and Ireland*, pp. 330-334.

1641.—Catholic rising. See IRELAND: 1641.

1653.—Cromwellian settlement. See IRELAND: 1653.

1687-1689.—Opposition to James II.—Siege of Londonderry.—Events in Ireland, were even more fevered than in England toward the close of James II's short reign. Tyrconnell was appointed lord-deputy in 1686, and the year 1687 had scarcely arrived before Ulster had taken fright at his Jacobite activities. He was planning to make Ireland into a refuge for James, and a foothold for an invasion of England in case of need. The actual fall of James created a still greater panic, and the Protestant inhabitants began to gather behind the walls of Londonderry and Enniskillen. And now in answer to James's call for military aid "Tyrconnell denuded Londonderry of its garrison; but speedily recognizing the risk he was thereby running he ordered the Marquis of Antrim to proceed thither with his regiment. . . . As the citizens of Londonderry watched the approach of the soldiers with heavy hearts the apprentices of the city, seized 'by a strange impulse,' closed the gates in their face. The attitude of Derry was immediately imitated by Enniskillen and Sligo, and Tyrconnell, seeing the necessity for prompt action, sent Richard Hamilton with a strong force into Ulster to restore order there early in 1689. At Dromore Hamilton came up with a considerable body of Protestants under the command of Sir Arthur Rawdon and Major Baker, but after a short resistance the Protestants broke and fled, some to Coleraine, others to Enniskillen and Derry. Two days before the 'Break of Dromore,' as this incident is called, James landed at Kinsale, accompanied by a number of French and English officers. . . . Full of his intention to get to Scotland as soon as possible, James, after issuing writs for a meeting of Parliament in May, proceeded in person at the head of his army against Derry. It was hoped that his presence and the overwhelming force with which he was attended would bring the recalcitrant citizens to their senses. The opinion was shared by Colonel Lundy, to whom the defence of Derry had been entrusted, and James, having reached the outskirts of the city on 18 April, was negotiating for a surrender when a cannon ball, fired either accidentally or of set purpose, came dangerously near to cutting his career short. Apologies followed, but that same night Lundy, finding himself suspected of treason, fled, and the defence of the city being placed in more determined hands, Londonderry entered on her famous . . . siege."—R. Dunlop, *History of Ireland from*

*earliest times to present day*, pp. 123-124.—James returned to Dublin, and the siege was left to Richard Hamilton, who was succeeded by De Rosen.—See also LONDONDERRY: 1689.

1704.—Test oath imposed. See SCOTCH-IRISH.

1791-1797.—Wolfe Tone and the Society of United Irishmen.—Peep o' Day Boys and Defenders.—"In October, 1791, Wolfe Tone, a young Dublin barrister, founded the Society of the United Irishmen at Belfast. The Society at first sought to unite Irishmen of all religions in order to gain Catholic Emancipation and parliamentary reform, but as time went on it became revolutionary, and desired complete separation from England. . . . [About this time the "Defenders" and "Peep o' Day Boys" (see IRELAND: 1795-1796), came into being, and] in 1795, after serious rioting near Armagh, the Orange Society was formed among the Protestant peasantry of Ulster as a league of defence."—C. Maxwell, *Short history of Ireland*, pp. 107-108.—"The great majority of the leaders of the United Irishmen were Protestants, who were all of course for Catholic emancipation. But, in Ulster especially, there was, all along, bitter strife between the Catholics and Protestants. Tone, himself a Protestant, had done all in his power to bring them to friendly union and co-operation, but in vain: religious animosity was too strong for him. At last the Peep-o'-day boys and the Defenders fought a regular battle on the 21st September 1795, at a village called The Diamond in Armagh: the Protestants, though inferior in number, were better armed, and the Defenders were defeated with a loss of 48 killed. The Protestants next banded themselves in a new society called 'Orangemen,' with the openly expressed intention to expel all the Catholics from Ulster. . . . General Craddock was sent with the military to restore order, but so close a watch was kept on his movements that he found it almost impossible to arrest the bands of armed Orangemen; and outrages still went on. General Henry Luttrell Lord Carhampton was sent to Connaught to repress the Defenders. . . . Meantime the society of United Irishmen spread, until finally it numbered 500,000. There were now many Catholics, but to the last the confederacy was mainly Protestant; and the members were more numerous and active in Ulster than elsewhere. . . . A stringent Insurrection act [was passed] in 1796. The *Habeas Corpus* act was suspended, which suspension gave the magistrates the power to arrest any one they pleased. General Lake got command of the army in Ulster, and [early in 1797] he proclaimed martial law in Down, Antrim, Tyrone, Derry, and Donegal, which placed the people entirely at the mercy of the military. He arrested two committees of United Irishmen sitting in Belfast, seized their papers, and suppressed their journal, the *Northern Star*. He disarmed Ulster, seizing vast numbers of muskets, cannons, and pikes. For publishing a violent address Arthur O'Connor was arrested and imprisoned in Dublin castle."—P. W. Joyce, *Concise history of Ireland*, p. 277.—See also IRELAND: 1793-1798; 1795-1796.

1820-1870.—Rise of the Ribbon Society. See IRELAND: 1820-1870.

1845-1860.—Tenant right.—Ulster custom. See IRELAND: 1845-1847; 1847-1860.

1885-1891.—First Home Rule Bill.—Opposition in Ulster.—In 1885 Gladstone adopted "the Home Rule programme of Parnell. . . . In 1886 there was another election on this issue. Nine-tenths of the old Liberal party in Ulster seceded from Mr. Glad-

stone on this question. . . . Faced with a common foe in 1886, the Protestant forces in Ulster . . . laid aside their difficulties and put up a fight for the Union. [There were riots in Belfast in June, July and August of 1886. In October a royal commission with Justice Day at its head made an official inquiry into the matter of the riots, and when the report was published in January 1887, fresh riots resulted. The Home Rule Bill was defeated.]—H. S. Morrison, *Modern Ulster*, pp. 88, 90.—See also IRELAND: 1885-1891.

1892.—**Ulster convention.**—In June 1892, when the second Home Rule Bill was being agitated, a large number of delegates from the different parts of the province met at Belfast. Resolutions in opposition to home rule and in favor of maintaining the Union of Great Britain and Ireland were passed, and a petition against home rule was drawn up.

1912-1914.—**Opposition to home rule.** See IRELAND: 1912-1914; IRELAND: 1912-1914; 1913-1916.

1914.—**Curragh incident.** See CURRAGH INCIDENT.

1919.—**Opposition to the Irish republic.** See IRELAND: 1919.

1921.—**Opening of Ulster Parliament.**—King's speech.—Under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, a separate parliament and executive government were established for Ulster or Northern Ireland. At the royal opening of the Ulster Parliament on June 22, 1921, King George addressed the speaker of the new Northern Parliament and representatives of Ulster men and appealed to them to make the grant of self-government to the six counties the stepping stones to a settlement of "the age-long Irish problems affecting the whole English-speaking world. . . . In his speech from the throne the King made it clear that it was not for Belfast or Northern Ireland only that his visit was intended. 'This is a great and critical occasion for the Six Counties,' he said, 'but not for the Six Counties alone, for everything which interests them touches Ireland, and everything which touches Ireland finds an echo in the remotest corners of the Empire. . . . I appeal to all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and forget, and to join in making for the land they love a new era of peace, contentment, and good will.'—W. A. Philips, *Revolution in Ireland*, p. 211.

1921.—**Attempt to exclude Ulster from Irish Free State.** See IRELAND: 1921.

1922.—**Withdrawal from terms of Free State constitution.**—"Under the terms of the Act establishing the Free State the Constitution was to apply to the whole of Ireland, subject, however, to the right of Northern Ireland to withdraw under Article XI of the Treaty. If there was any hope that this right would not be exercised it was rapidly belied. On the day following the signing of the Act, 7 December, the Northern House of Commons, on the motion of Sir James Craig, decided unanimously to present the following address to the King:

'Most Gracious Sovereign, We, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled, having learnt of the passing of the Free State Constitution Act, 1922, being the Act of Parliament for the ratification of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, do, by this humble address, pray your Majesty that the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland. On the same day an address in similar

terms was adopted by the Senate on the motion of the Marquess of Londonderry. Thus it was decided that Ireland was to remain 'partitioned.'—W. A. Philips, *Revolution in Ireland*, pp. 309-310.

1922.—**Attempts to force union with southern Ireland.** See IRELAND: 1922-1923.

1923.—**Map showing division between Free State and Unionist Ulster.** See IRELAND: 1691: Maps: 1923.

ALSO IN: J. W. Good, *Ulster and Ireland*.—L. Crawford, *Problem of Ulster*.—E. Hamilton, *Elizabethan Ulster*.—P. S. O'Hagerty, *Ulster, a brief statement of fact*.—R. McNeill, *Ulster's stand for union*.—W. A. McKnight, *Ireland and the Ulster legend*.—G. Fletcher, ed., *Ulster*.—F. F. Moore, *Truth about Ulster*.—*Ulster in 1921* (*Blackwood's Magazine*, Oct., 1922).—A. G. Bradley, *Ulster plantation*.—R. B. O'Brien, ed., *Studies in Irish history*, 1603-1649.

ULSTER, Annals of. See ANNALS: Irish annals.

ULSTER, Plantation of. See IRELAND: 1607-1611; ULSTER: 1600-1611.

ULSTER CONFEDERACY. See IRELAND: 1550-1603.

ULSTER CONVENTION. See ULSTER: 1892.

ULSTER TENANT RIGHT. See IRELAND: 1847-1860.

ULSTER VOLUNTEERS. See IRELAND: 1913-1916; 1914-1916.

ULTIMA THULE. See THULE.

ULTRA VIRES. See COMMON LAW: 1846.

ULTRAMONTANE, ULTRAMONTANISM.

—The term ultramontane (beyond the mountain) has been used for so long a time in France and Germany to indicate the extreme doctrines of papal supremacy maintained beyond the Alps—that is, in Italy, and especially at Rome—that it has come to have no other meaning. The ultramontanists in each country are those who make themselves partisans of these doctrines, in opposition to the more independent division of the Roman Catholic church. "Roman development during the nineteenth century has been in the direction of the assertion of papal supremacy, that called Ultramontanism—i. e., beyond the mountains from the point of view of northern and western Europe—that is Italian. To this Ultramontane tendency to exalt the papacy above all national or local ecclesiasticism the Jesuits have powerfully contributed. Pius VII's successor, Leo XII (1823-1829), was reactionary, condemning, like his predecessor, the work of Bible societies. Gregory XVI (1831-1846) was a patron of learning, but reactionary toward modern social and political ideals. This essentially mediæval outlook and refusal to make terms with the modern world led to the formation, in the first half of the nineteenth century, of clerical and anticlerical parties in Catholic countries, whose contests have largely determined the politics of those lands to the present [written in 1918]. The Ultramontane tendencies found their conspicuous illustration in the papacy of Pius IX (1846-1878). . . . In religion he was sincerely convinced that in the papacy is a divinely appointed institution to which the modern world can appeal for the decision of its vexed religious problems. . . . In 1864 a Syllabus of Errors, prepared under papal auspices, condemned many things which most Christians oppose; but also repudiated much which is the foundation of modern states, like the separation of church and state, non-sectarian schools, toleration of varieties in religion, and concluded by condemning the claim that

'the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, and civilization as lately introduced.' The crowning event of Pius IX's pontificate was the Vatican Council. Opened on December 8, 1869, with a remarkably large attendance from all over the Roman world, its most important result was the affirmation, on July 18, 1870, of the doctrine of papal infallibility by a vote of five hundred and thirty-three to two. . . . Thus the Vatican Council sealed the triumph of Ultramontanism. . . . Though undoubtedly the logical outcome of centuries of papal development, this doctrinal definition encountered considerable opposition, especially in Germany. The most eminent refuser of conformity was the distinguished Munich historian, Johann Joseph Ignaz von Döllinger (1790-1890), but though excommunicated, he declined to initiate a schism. What he refused, others achieved, and the result was the organization of the Old Catholics. . . . In spite of growing Ultramontanism, modern historical criticism, Biblical investigation, and scientific conceptions of growth through development, have found a foothold, though scanty, in the Roman communion. . . . Against this movement Pius X set his face. By a 'syllabus,' and an 'encyclical,' in 1907, Modernism was condemned, and stringent measures taken for its repression."—W. Walker, *History of the Christian church*, pp. 560-561, 564.—See also GERMANY: 1873-1887; 1887-1893; PAPACY: 1864; 1860-1870; 1907 (September).

**ULTRAMONTANE UNIVERSITY.** See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1231-1339.

**ULUNDI**, district in Zululand, South Africa, formerly the royal kraal. It was occupied by the British in 1879. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1877-1879.

**UMANITARIA SOCIETY.** See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Workers' education: Italy.

**UMBERT I.** See HUMBERT I.

**UMBRIA**, district in central Italy comprising the province of Perugia. Until 1860 it was part of the Papal States. In ancient times the name applied to a larger region in the central and northern part of Italy. See ROME: Map of ancient Italy.

**UMBRIAN SCHOOL OF LITERATURE.** See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 12th-14th centuries.

**UMBRIANS**, race of ancient Italy. "The Umbrians at one time possessed dominion over a great part of central Italy. Inscriptions in their language also remain, and manifestly show that they spoke a tongue not alien to the Latin. (See PHIL- OLOGY: 9.) The irruption of the Sabellian and of the Etruscan nations was probably the cause which broke the power of the Umbrians, and drove them back to a scanty territory between the Æsis, the Rubicon, and the Tiber."—H. G. Liddell, *History of Rome, introduction, sect. 2.*—See also ITALY: Ancient; ROME: Ancient kingdom: Genesis of the people of Rome.

**UMBRO-SABELLIANS.** See ROME: Ancient kingdom: Genesis of the people of Rome.

**UMMAYYADS.** See OMMAYYADS.

**UMRA KHAN** (c. 1860-1903), Indian mountain chieftain. Fought against the British at Chitral, 1895. See INDIA: 1895 (March-September).

**UNALACHTIGOS**, North American Indian tribe. See DELAWARES.

**UNAMIS**, North American Indian tribe. See DELAWARES.

**UNCIA**, Roman unit of measurement of one thumb-joint length, corresponding to the inch. See FOOT, ROMAN.

**UNCIAL MANUSCRIPT.** See BIBLE, ENGLISH: Sources.

**UNCLE SAM**, name given to a figure used in cartoons to represent the United States. According to the legend concerning the origin of the name, during the war of 1812, Samuel Wilson, a government inspector, when asked the meaning of the initials U. S. with which he stamped barrels and boxes, replied, "Uncle Sam," the name by which he was himself known. Uncle Sam is usually represented as an old man, tall and thin, with a long goatee beard, dressed in an exaggeration of the style of the early nineteenth century, his vest and trousers forming the flag, and wearing a tall white beaver hat.

**UNCOMPAHGRE**, river and valley in the southwestern part of Colorado. The valley has been irrigated and reclaimed for agriculture. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1902-1910.

**UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.** See BLACK AND TAN CONVENTION.

**UNCPAPAS**, North American Indian tribe. See SIOUAN FAMILY.

**UNCTION**, Royal. See CORONATION.

**UNDERGROUND RAILROAD**, route by which fugitive slaves were aided in their escape to Canada. See SLAVERY: 1840-1860.

**"UNDERTAKERS,"** Irish.—The settlement of Ulster was accomplished by grants of land by the crown to "undertakers," who rented the land to tenants. See ULSTER: 1609-1611; IRELAND: 1760-1798.

**UNDERWOOD**, Oscar Wilder (1862- ), American legislator. Member of the House of Representatives, 1895-1915; took a leading part in framing the tariff bill of 1913, which bears his name; United States senator, 1915-1921; chosen Democratic leader, 1920. See U. S. A.: 1912; Woodrow Wilson and the election; 1913 (April-December); TARIFF: 1913.

**UNDERWOOD TARIFF BILL.** See TARIFF: 1913; U. S. A.: 1913 (April-December).

**UNDERWRITER:** Origin of the term. See INSURANCE: Marine insurance: Ancient.

**UNDESET**, Sigrid (1882- ), Norwegian novelist. See SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE: 1888-1920.

**UNELLI**, one of the Armorican tribes of ancient Gaul. Their country was the present department of Manche.

**UNEMPLOYMENT:** Insurance against. See SOCIAL INSURANCE.

**UNEMPLOYMENT CONFERENCE:** United States. See U. S. A.: 1921 (July-December).

**UNGAVA**, or New Quebec, district in Canada, north of the province of Quebec. In May, 1912, it was annexed to Quebec, and later in the same year was erected into the territory of New Quebec. It has an area of 351,780 square miles. See CANADA: 1895; also Map of Dominion of Canada and Newfoundland.

**UNGERN-STERNBERG**, Michael, Baron von (1870-1921), anti-Bolshevik general. See SIBERIA: 1920-1922.

**UNIATE**, or **UNIAT**, **CHURCHES**, religious bodies that have separated from the Eastern churches and submitted to the pope, and at the same time have retained their ancient rites. "A Uniate is a Christian of any Eastern rite in union with the Pope; namely a Catholic who belongs not to the Roman but to an Eastern rite. They differ from other (schismatic) Eastern Christians in that they are in communion with Rome and from Latins in that they have other rites. . . . The history of some of . . . [these] venerable sees begins

with the Apostolic age. . . Negotiations under Coerularius [which culminated in the open schism of 1054] were the first instance of Rome's treating with the Orthodox with a view of reunion. The second council of Lyons (1274) and the council of Ferrara-Florence (1438-1439) were the first efforts on a large scale. . . In the sixteenth century, . . . [due] to the unceasing labors of the Latin missionaries, the number of Orientals entering into Union with Rome became so great that Uniate churches were formed. . . Historically . . . the oldest of these Uniate patriarchates is that of the Maronites. In 680 the patriarch of Antioch, Marcarius, was deposed by the general council for Monothelism. The Monothelites then grouped themselves round the *hegumenos* of the Maronite monastery, John (707). Thus begins the separated Maronite . . . church. . . At the time of the Crusades the Maronites united with Rome (1162 and again in 1216) . . . and finally during the sixteenth century they became Catholics. . . The next oldest Uniate patriarchate is that of Babylon for the Chaldeans (converted Nestorians). It began with the submission of the Nestorian Patriarch John Sulaga (d. 1555); the title of Babylon was not used until Pope Innocent XI conferred it in 1681. . . The Melchite patriarchate dates from 1724. . . This also began with a disputed succession, namely that of the old patriarchal see of Antioch. The Uniate Byzantine (Melchite) sees of Alexandria and Jerusalem are, since the time of Pope Gregory XVI, considered as united to that of Antioch, i. e. the Patriarch is administrator, his titles thus being Patriarch of Antioch, of Alexandria, of Jerusalem and of all the East. . . The Uniate Armenians have a patriarch who resides at Constantinople but does not take his title from that city. His line began in 1739 with a disputed election to Ctesiphon, one of the several Armenian exarchates. He is called Patriarch of Cilicia of the Armenians. The history of the Syrian patriarchate is as follows: In 1737 Ignatius Giarve, Jacobite bishop of Aleppo, was canonically elected patriarch of Antioch. He then made his submission to Rome and the . . . bishops deposed him and chose a Monophysite as patriarch. It is from Giarve that the line of Uniate Syrian patriarchs of Antioch descends. Finally in 1895 Pope Leo XIII erected a Uniate Coptic patriarchate of Alexandria, thus replacing the Coptic vicar apostolic by a patriarch and two bishops. . . The Oriental rites are divided into sections or branches [as follows:] (1) Byzantine Branch. These form a branch in which the same liturgy, the Byzantine (so-called on account of having its origin in Constantinople) is used, each group having with few exceptions its own liturgical language. These groups are [written in 1918], (a) the Uniate Melchites in Syria and Egypt, about 165,000, . . . (b) one Georgian congregation in Constantinople, last remnant of old Georgian church, . . . (c) Uniate Greeks [about 1000 in Thrace], . . . (d) Uniate Ruthenians, . . . nearly four millions in Austria Hungary [and Russian Ukraine], . . . (e) Bulgarian Uniates, about 15,000, . . . (f) Roumanian Uniates, about a million and a half, chiefly in Transylvania, . . . (g) Italo-Greeks, about 60,000; (2) Armenian branch, about 90,000; . . . (3) Antiochian Syrian branch, (a) United Syrians, 35,000, . . . (b) Chaldeans, 70,000, . . . (c) Chaldeans from Malabar, about 320,000, . . . (d) Maronites, about 350,000; . . . (4) Alexandrian branch, (a) Copts, about 15,000, . . . (b) Abyssinians, about 15,000. [By the bulls Reversurus, 1861, and Cum Ecclesiastica, 1869, Pius

IX attempted to Romanize the rites of the Armenian and Chaldean Uniate churches and as a result brought about a schism. Leo XIII (1878-1903) adopted a policy of conciliation and even continued to recognize bishops of different rites in the same see, as for instance the three Uniate patriarchs of Antioch, representing the Græco-Melchite, Maronite and Syrian rites respectively.]—P. J. Sandalgi, *Uniate oriental churches* (*Ecclesiastical Review*, Feb., 1918).—See also RUSSIA: 1881-1894; UKRAINE: 1914-1921.

ALSO IN: A. Fortescue, *Orthodox Eastern church*.—W. F. Adeney, *Greek and Eastern churches*.

**UNICAMERAL SYSTEM.** See BICAMERAL SYSTEM.

**UNIFORMITY, Acts of.**—Two Acts of Uniformity were passed by the English Parliament in the reign of Edward VI (1548 and 1552), both of which were repealed under Mary. In 1559, the second year of Elizabeth, a more thorough-going law of the same nature was enacted, by the Provisions of which, "(1) the revised Book of Common Prayer as established by Edward VI in 1552, was, with a few alterations and additions, revised and confirmed. (2) Any person, vicar, or other minister, whether beneficed or not, wilfully using any but the established liturgy, was to suffer, for the first offence, six months' imprisonment, and, if beneficed, forfeit the profits of his benefice for a year; for the second offence, a year's imprisonment; for the third, imprisonment for life. (3) All persons absenting themselves, without lawful or reasonable excuse, from the service at their parish church on Sundays and holydays, were to be punished by ecclesiastical censures and a fine of one shilling for the use of the poor."—T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *English constitutional history*, ch. 12.—See also ENGLAND: 1559.—In 1662, soon after the Restoration, another Act of Uniformity was passed, the immediate effect of which was to eject about 2,000 ministers from the Established church.—See also ENGLAND: 1662-1665; ACADEMIC FREEDOM; CHURCH OF ENGLAND: 17th century.

**UNIFORMS, Military.** See COSTUME: Survivals.

**UNIGENITUS BULL.** See PORT ROYAL AND THE JANSENISTS: 1702-1715; BULLS, PAPAL: 1713.

**UNION, Act of (1535).** See WALES: 1485-1603. Act of (1707). See SCOTLAND: 1707.

Act of (1800). See IRELAND: 1799-1800.

**UNION, Inter-Parliamentary: Founding (1887).** See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1889-1890.

**UNION, Plan of.** See U.S.A.: 1754.

**UNION, Postal.** See POSTAL SYSTEMS: 1874-1901.

**UNION, Treaty of (1706).** See PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES: 1640-1910.

**UNION AND PROGRESS, Committee of.** See TURKEY: 1000; 1910-1911.

**UNIÓN CÍVICA,** political organization of Argentina. See ARGENTINA: 1880-1891.

**UNION CLUB:** New York. See CLUBS: 19th-20th centuries: New York.

Paris. See CLUBS: 19th-20th centuries: Paris.

**UNION COLLEGE,** founded in 1795 at Schenectady, New York. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1795.

**UNION GUARDS.** See KLU KLUX KLAN.

**UNION JACK,** the national flag of Great Britain and Ireland, uniting the red cross of St. George and the diagonal crosses of St. Andrew and St. Patrick. See FLAGS: British empire.

**UNION LEADERS, Kentucky.** See KENTUCKY: 1859-1861.

**UNION LEAGUE**, secret political society formed in the United States soon after the outbreak of the Civil War, having for its object a closer and more effective organization of the supporters of the national government. It was very large in numbers for a time, but declined as the need of such an organization disappeared. See U.S.A.: 1863 (March); 1866-1871.

**UNION OF ARRAS** (1579). See NETHERLANDS: 1577-1581.

**UNION OF BRUSSELS** (1577). See NETHERLANDS: 1575-1577; 1577-1581.

**UNION OF CENTRAL AMERICA**. See CENTRAL AMERICA: 1871-1885; 1886-1894.

**UNION OF HEILBRONN** (1633). See GERMANY: 1632-1634.

**UNION OF KALMAR** (1397). See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1018-1397; 1397-1527.

**UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA**. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF.

**UNION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE MOUNTAINEERS OF THE CAUCASUS**. See CAUCASUS: 1902-1917.

**UNION OF UTRECHT** (1579). See NETHERLANDS: 1577-1581.

**UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY**. See RAILROADS: 1869-1910; 1870-1910; 1921: United States.

**UNIONIST PARTY**: England. See ENGLAND: 1885-1886; 1900 (September-October).

Portugal. See PORTUGAL: 1911-1914.

**Union of South Africa**. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1920-1921.

**UNIONS, Labor**. See LABOR ORGANIZATION.

**UNIT RULE**, method of voting. In political conventions the delegation of a state, or other political division, is frequently instructed or decides that the votes of all its members shall be cast in one or more ballots for a certain candidate or successive candidates. When it appears that none of these can obtain the nomination, the delegates are released from observing this "unit rule" and vote severally for such candidates as they please.—See also ELECTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL: United States: Work of the nominating convention: Nomination by the national conventions.

**UNITED BROTHERN** (Unitas fratrum). See MORAVIAN, OR BOHEMIAN, BROTHERN.

**UNITED CHRISTIAN PARTY**. See U.S.A.: 1904 (May-November).

**UNITED COLONIES OF NEW ENGLAND**. See NEW ENGLAND: 1643.

**UNITED EMPIRE LOYALISTS**. See TORIERS: Of the American Revolution.

**UNITED FREE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND**. See SCOTLAND: 1900-1905.

**UNITED GAS IMPROVEMENT COMPANY**. See TRUSTS: United States: 1907: Chief existing combinations.

**UNITED GRAIN GROWERS, LTD.** See COOPERATION: Canada.

**UNITED IRISHMEN**, Society of. See IRELAND: 1793-1798.

**UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN**, Formation of the. See SCOTLAND: 1707.

**UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND**, Creation of the. See IRELAND: 1799-1800.

**UNITED LABOR EDUCATION COMMITTEE**. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Workers' education: United States.

**UNITED MEXICAN STATES**. See MEXICO: 1820-1826.

**UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA**, Strikes of. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOY-

COTTS: 1910-1914; 1914-1915; 1920-1922: Warfare in West Virginia; U.S.A.: 1918-1920.

**UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA VS. CORONADO COAL COMPANY**. See SUPREME COURT: 1921-1922.

**UNITED NETHERLANDS**, United Provinces, or United States of the Netherlands. See NETHERLANDS: 1577-1581, and after.

**UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH**. See PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES: 1838-1867.

**UNITED PRESS**. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1865-1917.

**UNITED PROVINCES OF INDIA**, Government of. See INDIA: 1921.

**UNITED STATES BANK**. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1790-1816; 1817-1833; U.S.A.: 1833-1836.

**UNITED STATES BOYS' WORKING RESERVE**, organization of boys mobilized to work on the farms in the United States during the World War, some times called "farm cadets." "The United States Boys' Working Reserve . . . [was] a registered army of patriotic youths, organized under the Department of Labor, with branches in every State in the Union and the Territory of Hawaii. Its purpose . . . [was] to mobilize for productive service, chiefly upon American farms, all physically fit boys in the United States between the ages of 16 and 20, and to maintain their education and prevent their exploitation while so mobilized. Enrollment in the Boys' Working Reserve . . . [was] entirely voluntary. . . . Upon the satisfactory completion of the period of service for which . . . [the boy] enrolled, the minimum limit of which is six weeks of six days a week, of eight hours a day, he received the Federal Bronze Badge, bearing the Great Seal of the United States. . . . The Boys' Working Reserve was organized in May, 1917. In that year it carried its organization into forty-odd States, brought its program to the attention of the State Councils of Defense in every State in the Union; secured the indorsement of the Governors in all States, and mobilized about 100,000 boys and placed them upon the farms of America. In 1918 the Boys' Working Reserve completed its organization in every State in the Union, in the District of Columbia, and the Territory of Hawaii; had enrolled and placed upon the farms of the United States about 210,000 boys; had trained intensively, through its Farm-Craft Lessons and its Central Farm Training Camps, about 30,000 high-school boys; and had been indirectly the means of sending thousands of younger boys into the food production under State auspices. In 1918 boys in the Boys' Working Reserve raised enough food to feed a million soldiers for a year. The value of this food, which, except through their efforts, would not have been produced, . . . [was] conservatively estimated at \$75,000,000."—*United States Boys' Working Reserve (Bulletin of the United States Employment Service, Department of Labor)*.

**UNITED STATES CHRISTIAN COMMISSION**. See SANITARY COMMISSION.

**UNITED STATES COAL COMMISSION** (1922). See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1922: Nation-wide coal strike.

**UNITED STATES CONGRESS**. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

**UNITED STATES FOOD AND FUEL ADMINISTRATION**. See FOOD REGULATION: 1917-1918; U.S.A.: 1917 (May): Mobilization of civilian forces; 1917 (June): Food and fuel control act.

**UNITED STATES MINT**: Establishment in 1782. See MONEY AND BANKING: 1782-1792.

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

**Geographical description.—Resources.—Population.**—“The United States, constituting a Federal Republic, occupy the central part of North America from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, and are bounded on the north by Canada, and on the south by Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico. They lie between 25° and 49° north latitude and 67° and 124 30' west longitude. The area, exclusive of Alaska, is 3,025,600 square miles, of which 38,400 square miles are estimated to be covered by lakes and rivers. Including Alaska, the area is 3,602,990 square miles. The coast-line on the two oceans extends 13,200 miles, exclusive of the many bays and sounds, and there are 3,620 miles of water along the Great Lakes bordering upon Canada. . . . No country in the world has a more varied or a more abundant and valuable mineral supply.”—*Library Atlas of Modern Geography, Map no. 53, pp. 1-2.*—“In the territory now included in the United States, a virile, energetic people found extraordinary opportunities for industrial development, and devoted themselves to the exploitation of the natural resources with wonderful success. The keynote of the national history of the United States is to be found in this work of winning a continent from Nature and subduing it to the uses of man. A truly gigantic task, it has absorbed the main energies of the American people from the beginning, and has been approached in significance only by the struggle to preserve the Union. Inevitably it has left its impress on the character and ambitions of the people. . . . The second great factor in the development of the country has been its wealth of natural resources. Of these we must consider first the extent of territory. By the treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, the United States came into possession of an immense domain of 827,844 square miles. Since that time the area of the United States has been vastly increased, by purchase, by conquest, and by cession, until, in 1900, the United States consisted of 3,726,500 square miles or about one fourteenth of the entire land surface of the earth. Continental United States, exclusive of Alaska or our island possessions, contains 2,972,584 square miles of land surface, or somewhat less than Europe, which has an area of some 3,700,000 square miles. . . . [One of the most valuable resources of the country is its almost unrivalled water power.] In colonial days this was of chief importance and determined the location of many a town. With the invention of the steam engine and the use of coal as a motive power, industry became less dependent upon water power, but with the rise of electrical appliances and the harnessing of our streams and falls for their service, we [have learned] to value this item in our national wealth more highly. ‘It is probable,’ says Shaler, ‘that, measured in horse power or by manufactured products, the energy derived from the streams of this country is already more valuable than those of all other lands put together.’ The most valuable water powers are found east of the Mississippi River and west of the Cordilleran chain. Even in the case of the best water power there are, however, in spite of its cheapness, certain drawbacks: it must be applied where it is found, except as it is used to develop electric power, and is subject often to serious seasonal limitations. The energy which is obtained from coal, on the

other hand, may be developed where it is needed, at any time and to any amount. On this account the presence of coal has proved a more important factor than water power in determining the concentration of the population and the regional distribution of industries. . . . According to the United States Geological Survey there are 335,000 square miles of coal-burning strata in this country, but much of it is too thin or impure to be available for industrial use. It serves, however, in many localities as domestic fuel, and few places in the United States are far removed from burnable coal. By far the greatest part of our available supply is bituminous, the area which is underlaid with anthracite being not more than 484 square miles. . . . Next in importance to the fuel supplies of the United States rank its stores of iron ore. These exist in large quantity and are widely disseminated, though in the main they occupy three great fields. . . . [the Appalachian field in the east, the Lake Superior region, and the Cordilleran district in the west]. Iron and coal, more than any other mineral substances, form the material basis of our industrial prosperity, and in the possession of large supplies of both, the United States is greatly blessed. Next after iron, copper ranks as the most necessary in the industrial arts. In primitive civilizations, as among the Indians, it was especially valuable because easily worked. With the discovery of processes for smelting iron, copper lost its earlier importance, which it has regained only . . . as the result of a rapid extension in the use of electricity. . . . [Large quantities of lead and zinc, some aluminum, and immense deposits of gold and silver are found in the United States. Building stones, salt, phosphates, cements, clays, graphites and other mineral resources are also valuable.] The forests of the United States cover an area of about 700 million acres, or more than 35 per cent. of the area of the country. Of these by far the greater part is found in the section east of the Mississippi, which originally was a vast continuous forest. In the northern States there stretched the great white pine forest, from which most of our lumber has come, from colonial days to the present; south of this in a broad belt lies the southern pine forest, whose most important tree is the yellow pine. In the Mississippi valley are found the hardwood forests of oaks, hickories, ashes, gums, etc. West of the Mississippi stretches a forestless, often treeless, area of millions of acres; with the Rocky Mountains begins again the coniferous interior forest, and still farther west the Pacific coast forest. In . . . [the] interior section the chief lack has always been water rather than wood. . . . The early settlers drew upon the forests for food, fuel, and shelter. And yet the dense woods of the Atlantic coast, which had to be cleared before crops could be raised, and which often concealed hostile Indians and animals, came to be regarded rather as an obstacle than a blessing. Vast areas were ruthlessly burned down and the land denuded of its forest growth. This lavish waste of one of our most important natural resources has persisted almost down to the present time, and we are only now beginning to realize the necessity and possibility of preserving and increasing this source of wealth. Among the valuable resources of a country should be included a good climate and a fertile soil: together, these are of

great importance in promoting the welfare, prosperity, and material comfort of the people. Considered as a whole, the fertility of the soil of the United States is remarkably great."—E. L. Bogart, *Economic history of the United States*, pp. 1-3, 5-7, 9.—"The United States has incomparable natural advantages in that it stretches across the whole breadth of a continent, thus commanding two oceans, and enjoying the products of both east and west marginal types of climate; it opens to the great Gulf of Mexico in the south, thus receiving tropical warmth and moisture without the disadvantages of a tropical latitude; it lies wholly within the temperate and warm temperate belts, thus having neither frozen wastes such as those of Canada nor tropical territory such as presents so great a problem to Australia. The eastern United States bears some resemblance to northern and central China, having a plentiful rainfall, and as regards the northern section a brief but severe winter followed by a hot summer, but, as regards the southern section, a mild or warm winter, followed by a very hot summer. On the whole, however, the presence of the Gulf of Mexico and of the Great Lakes as additional sources of atmospheric humidity gives to the eastern States a rainfall that is less markedly seasonal than that of China, and extends farther into the interior. The total rainfall diminishes with increasing distance from the sea-board, and at the same time becomes more definitely confined to the summer months. . . . The main physical units comprised within the United States are three in number. The great mountain belt of the west is the first. It includes two distinct chains parallel to the coast between which lie the head of Puget Sound, the fertile Willamette Valley, and the larger and still more important Californian Valley. The coast is naturally smooth and unbroken, and the three gaps in its 1,500 miles are consequently important. They are the outlet of Puget Sound, south of Vancouver Island, the estuary of the Columbia River (of which the Willamette is a tributary), and the mouth of the joint Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers (the famous San Francisco harbour) which drain the Californian valley. Beyond these parallel coastal chains lies the mountain belt proper, a series of plateaus and basins, large and small, of varying elevations, separated by subsidiary chains, and stretching to the Rocky Mountains, which form the eastern limit of the belt. Over the northern portion of this elevated region the Snake River follows a winding course until it joins the Columbia, passing through a lava plateau of great fertility. The southern portion is drained by the Colorado River, which crosses the Sage Plains, and the Painted Desert, passes through the famous Cañon, and finally enters the Gulf of California in Mexican territory. Between these two drainage areas is the Great Basin, where the rivers terminate in saline lakes of which Great Salt Lake in Utah is the chief. The most striking resources of the States of this mountain belt are the deposits of base and precious metals, the great grazing lands, and the mountain forests. Sloping away from the foothills of the Rockies [eastward] towards the Mississippi valley are the Great Plains (the second unit), drained by the Missouri, Platte, Arkansas and Red Rivers, all tributary to the Mississippi, which flows from a point barely 100 miles from the Canadian frontier to the Gulf of Mexico, and is navigable almost throughout its length. North-eastward of the main valley the plains rise gradually, and form the

high shores of the Great Lakes, the premier inland waterway of the world. Eastwards (drained by the Ohio and Tennessee rivers [also tributary to the Mississippi]) they rise to the edge of the Appalachian system. . . . The great central Plains are built mainly of sedimentary rocks, smoothly outspread, so that each formation covers a wide area. Among these formations are carboniferous rocks, and hence there are coalfields of vast extent, while beneath certain beds are great stores of mineral oil and here and there reservoirs of natural gas. The land immediately around the shores of Lakes Superior and Huron . . . is part of the great wedge of extreme ancient rocks and forms the core of Canada. . . . The Appalachian System . . . [which, with the eastern coastal region comprises the third unit], stretches from the north-east frontier to the Gulf Plains, and presents a varied surface of ridge and valley and low undulating plateau. The debris worn from this secondary mountain belt has been deposited along the Atlantic margin, but whereas in the south these sediments form a broad and sometimes swampy coastal plain, in the north the sea has encroached over them, so that they are transformed into fishing banks, while the valleys are also drowned, and therefore form a series of safe and valuable harbours (Hudson Valley, Delaware Bay, Chesapeake River). The Appalachian belt, because of its ridge and valley character, is more difficult to cross than its height would suggest, hence the extraordinary value, as an entry into the interior plains, of the Hudson River, which with its tributary the Mohawk cuts a gap, with easy gradients throughout, right across the mountains. . . . Along the margins, and especially the inner margin of the Appalachian belt, there are coal-measures, besides valuable beds of iron ore and reservoirs of oil. Nearly the whole of the eastern United States as far as the 95th meridian was, owing to the abundant rainfall, originally forested, and large and valuable forest reserves still remain. . . . In the area immediately north of the Ohio and Lower Missouri valleys . . . woods are less abundant, and here occur the rich prairie lands, . . . which proved so easy to bring under the plough. Further west, the increasing lack of rainfall gives grasses the advantage over trees, and most of the country is open prairie. . . . The western mountains are clothed with coniferous forests and mountain pastures, the ranges facing the Pacific having enormous forests of conifers, including the giant Big Trees (sequoia) of California, and the Douglas Pine."—E. G. R. Taylor, *Business man's geography*, pp. 468-471.—The population which in 1790 was less than four millions (3,029,214), scattered through the Atlantic States, had by 1890 increased approximately to sixty-three millions (62,947,714). These figures meant that in the thirty years which had elapsed from 1860 (when it numbered 31,443,321) the population had doubled. During the next three decades the increase was almost as phenomenal. The census of the year 1920 showed that the population was then 105,710,620, exclusive of Alaska and the island dependencies.

ALSO IN: R. E. Dodge, *Dodge's advanced geography*, pp. 89-182.—E. W. Heaton, *Regional geography of six continents, North America*, bk. 3, pp. 37-70.—N. S. Shaler, *Nature and man in America*.—J. R. Smith, *Industrial and commercial geography*.

Historical geography.—Growth of national domain.—Acquisition of Alaska and of island possessions.—Political influence of position on

the Pacific.—Between the exterior and the interior historical geography of the United States the relation differs from that in most other countries. The internal historical geography of the Old World nations, barring the feudal period, involves so largely questions concerning mere provincial administration that it has no claim, from a geographical standpoint, to an importance equal to the shifting of the great national frontiers. Examples of this are found in the Roman and Byzantine empires, and in the majority of the modern states. In our own case however the order of interest is reversed. Our internal geography has attracted the chief attention of the student, not so much from the greater difficulty of the subject as from its vast importance in the early history of our government. It is not, indeed, too much to say that the organization of the present government under the constitution is an event of scarcely greater importance than the determination of the final policy of the states and the nation concerning the unoccupied western lands. It is this fact alone which gives the higher degree of relative importance to our internal historical geography. The general facts concerning our external geography are quickly told. The outlines of the entire subject are contained in the enumeration of cessions, as follows: the original territory ceded by Great Britain at the peace of Paris in 1783; the Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803; the acquisition of Florida from Spain by the treaty of 1819; the admission of Texas in 1845; the undisputed acquisition of the Oregon country by treaty with Great Britain in 1846; the first Mexican cession by the Peace of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848; the second Mexican cession, known as the Gadsden Purchase, in 1853; the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. The enumeration of these eight acquisitions, all of which, save the final one, are shown on the first United States map, affords a complete picture of the successive stages of our territorial growth. The occasion of these different annexations, as well as their exact territorial extent, would involve us in a series of details which are beyond the purpose of the present article. It should be observed, however, that in several cases the map shows the territories in question as finally determined by treaty or survey, rather than their actual extent as understood at the time the annexations were made. This is one of the inevitable disadvantages in the purely cartographic treatment of such a subject. The historical map is compelled from its nature to give a tangible appearance to matters which are often very intangible in fact. In the case, for example, of what we may call the first United States, the country as recognized by the treaty of Paris, the western line of the Mississippi was the only boundary which was not the subject of future discussion. The southern frontier as arranged at Paris was affirmed by treaty with Spain in 1795. On the other side, however, Great Britain retained a number of posts in the Old Northwest up to the Jay treaty of 1794; the boundary between the upper Mississippi and the Lake of the Woods, imperfectly described in the Paris treaty, was not settled until 1818; the line from the intersection of the St. Lawrence to the Sault Ste. Marie was established in 1822 by joint commission under the treaty of Ghent; while the Maine frontier question, the most difficult and obstinate of all our boundary disputes, was not finally settled until the year 1842. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 brought in fresh questions concerning our territorial limits. On three sides, the north, west and southwest the frontiers of this

vast area were undefined. On the northern side the boundary was settled with Great Britain by the treaty of 1818 which carried the line along the forty-ninth parallel to the Rocky mountains, while the treaty of 1819 with Spain, which ceded Florida to the United States, also defined the limits of Louisiana on the southwest. This line of 1819 has an additional importance, in that it drew the frontier between Spain and the United States along the forty-second parallel to the Pacific coast. The importance of this lay in the fact that it gave us a clear title on the Spanish side to the so-called Oregon country. The exact connection, real or supposed, between this territory and the Louisiana country was for many years one of the disputed points in American historical geography. The belief in this connection, at one time general, undoubtedly had its origin in the undefined character of Louisiana at the time of the purchase, and the fact that our government turned this indefiniteness to its own purpose in advancing its Oregon claims. It is now clear, however, from the evidence of the old maps, the official statement of the limits of the region, of which there is but one in existence (the Crozat grant of 1712) and lastly the understanding of France herself at the time of the cession, that Louisiana did not include in its limits any part of the Pacific watershed. A map published in a subsequent work of the French plenipotentiary placed the western boundary of Louisiana at the one hundred and tenth meridian. A line drawn in this arbitrary fashion and unsanctioned by the terms of the treaty itself may be regarded merely as one of convenience. If this view is correct it is certainly more convenient and, at the same time, more logical, to consider the western boundary as extending to the Rocky mountain watershed,—a line which would not deviate to any radical extent from the meridian in question. The historical connection however between the Louisiana purchase and our subsequent acquisition of the Oregon country is perfectly clear. The exploration of the latter followed almost immediately but its final annexation was delayed by the opposing claim of Great Britain. In this controversy the claim of the United States was merely relative as opposed to that of England. The just claimant was undoubtedly the king of Spain, whose rights, based on discovery, antedated those of either of the contesting powers. The Spanish title, however, having, as we have seen, been relinquished by the treaty of 1819, the issue between Great Britain and the United States became clearly defined. A joint occupation of the disputed territory by the two powers ensued from 1818 to 1846. In the latter year was negotiated the compromise treaty, which continued our northern line of 1818 on the forty-ninth parallel from the Rocky mountains to the Pacific coast. From the treaty of 1846 we may date the completion of our northern frontier, although the ownership of certain islands between Vancouver and the mainland was not settled until 1872. A few more years witnessed the completion of our southern frontier, as well. In 1845 Texas was admitted to the Union. The western boundary of the Rio Grande, claimed by the new state under her constitution of 1836, led directly to the war with Mexico, and by that war to the great additional cession at Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. The southern boundary was finally completed by the Gadsden purchase of 1853. Coming now to the study of our internal geography, we find ourselves in contact with what is practically a distinct subject. Here we encounter a whole series of those weighty questions,



the solution of which figures so prominently in the early history of the American government. We have already noted that the first western boundary of the United States was placed by the treaty of 1783 at the Mississippi river. But during the Paris negotiations our ally France and quasi ally Spain both opposed this westward extension of our territory and it was long an open question, even after our independence itself was assured, whether we should not be compelled to accept a western boundary on the Appalachian range. Years before the final settlement of the question at Paris, the expectancy of the Mississippi boundary had given rise to questions which caused an undercurrent of dissension between the states during the entire period of the Revolutionary War. In their relation to the western land question, the thirteen original states divide themselves into two classes, the claimant and non-claimant states. In the first class were Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, the two Carolinas and Georgia; in the second, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland. The claims of the seven first named states covered every inch of our prospective western domain and in the country north of the Ohio, known as the Old Northwest, there were opposing claims of two and in some districts of even three states to the same territory. The extent of these claims is indicated on the map of the Federated states in 1783. They rested for the most part upon the royal grants and charters to the colonies, and, in the case of New York, upon the treaties with the Iroquois. Their relative merits were conflicting, or their collective merit as a whole, are questions which we will not attempt to discuss. It is sufficient to observe that if insisted upon in their entirety they would have presented an insuperable obstacle to the formation of an American federate government. In the proceedings of the Continental Congress, as well as in the state legislative bodies, touching this western domain, we may find the germs of nearly all the political and constitutional questions which have made the greater part of our subsequent history. The relative rank and power of the states, the obligation of one state towards another, the individual rights of states as opposed to the collective rights of the Union; all of these questions entered into the great problem which the nation was now called upon to solve. The objections to the western claims by the non-claimant states, though urged with varying degrees of vehemence and accompanied with many widely differing alternatives, may be fairly resolved into the two following contentions: that it was unjust that so vast a domain, whose acquisition at the peace could only be insured through the joint labor of all the states, should thereafter become the property of a certain favored few, and also that the claims if allowed would in the end give the claimant states a preponderating power which would be extremely prejudicial if not dangerous to the others. Of all the non-claimant states, Maryland was the most determined in her opposition, and it is to her that Professor Herbert B. Adams in his monograph on "Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States," assigns the chief credit for the final creation of the first national domain. The claim though a just one cannot be asserted without an important qualification. The proposition advanced by Maryland, that a national title to the western lands be asserted by a clause in the Articles of Confederation, was manifestly one to which the claimant states would never give their consent. It

was due, however, to the action of Maryland,—which refused for more than three years, from November 1777 to March 1781, to ratify the articles,—that the question was kept open until the claimant states, in order to complete the circle of the Union, found it necessary to adopt the policy of voluntary cessions, suggested by Congress. The history in detail of the several state cessions involves many questions concerning the distribution and sale of public lands which need not concern us. Some of the offers of cession, at first conditional and partial, were made absolute and final, as, one by one, the besetting difficulties were cleared away. The dates of the final cessions by the seven claimant states in order were as follows: New York 1781, Virginia 1783, Massachusetts 1785, Connecticut 1786, South Carolina 1787, North Carolina 1790, Georgia 1802. Certain land reservations north of the Ohio, as shown on the map of the United States in 1790, were made by both Virginia and Connecticut; but Virginia renounced jurisdiction over these lands in the cession, and Connecticut did likewise in 1800, the two states reserving merely the property rights. The territory south of the Ohio was not included in the Virginia cession of 1783 but the district of Kentucky was made the subject of a second cession in 1789. The completion of this list closed the interesting chapter in our history covered by the state cessions and gave to the United States the sovereignty over its first great western public domain. Before pursuing this subject further, let us see in what relation the cessions stand to the present form of the thirteen original states. Some boundary contentions still remained, but these are not of historic importance. The claim of Massachusetts in what is now western New York was settled by joint commission in 1786, while Pennsylvania purchased a tract of land on lake Erie from the general government in 1792. At the present day sixteen states stand upon the territory which remained to the original thirteen, the three additional ones each springing from the partition of one of the older states. In 1790 New York assented to the independence of Vermont, which was admitted to the Union in the following year; in 1820 Maine was separated from Massachusetts and admitted; and finally, in 1862, West Virginia was set off from Virginia and became a state in 1863. We will now resume the subject of the disposition of the western lands. We have already noted the termination of that stage of their history which involves the territorial claims of individual states. The second stage concerns itself with the evolution of what may be called the American system of territorial government. The first, indeed, had not reached its completion before the second began to receive the greater measure of public attention. The western land cessions to the government were made with the general understanding, tacit in most cases, but in that of Virginia explicitly stated, that the ceded territory should eventually be formed into additional states. The first national domain may therefore be regarded as a district held in trust by the government for a special purpose. This view, which was not only required by the terms of the Virginia cession, but also represented the general sentiment of the time, has formed the basis of our entire subsequent policy in dealing with the national domain,—a policy which has remained unaltered even in the case of the immense territories that afterwards came into the direct possession of the government by treaty with foreign powers. The one question remaining was the erection of the legislative ma-

chinery which should provide for the government of the territories during their preparation for statehood. The problem was finally solved by the Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest territory. This famous ordinance, the first of the long series of acts concerning territorial government, was the last noteworthy piece of legislation under the old Articles of Confederation, and the year which witnessed both the successful inauguration of our territorial policy and the adoption of the new constitution is the most memorable in the entire history of American institutions. Of this ordinance Daniel Webster said in the Senate, forty years later "I doubt whether any single law of any lawgiver ancient or modern has produced effects of more distinct and lasting character." (See *NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES; 1787.*) Many of its provisions, suited only for the special occasion of their use, are now antiquated and obsolete, and neither their letter nor spirit find a place in subsequent territorial legislation. But the fact remains that this act was in a certain sense the great prototype; it was the first to organize and set in motion the machinery of our territorial policy. A policy that has provided without friction for the tremendous national expansion which has ensued during the nineteenth century may justly be regarded as one of the greatest achievements in the political history of the American government. In our own day, when the admission of a new state or the erection of a new territory is regarded as hardly more than a routine event in the working of our political system, it is easy for us to underestimate the vital importance of the first steps which were taken concerning the regulation of the national domain. It was because those steps were to determine in a measure our entire future policy, that the history of the old Continental Congress should form an absorbing theme for every student of our internal geography. It is unnecessary to follow this subject in detail through its later history, which is simply a monotonous record of legislative enactments for the organization of new territories or the admission of new states. The principle had been fully established; the history of the next century, followed step by step, can show very little beyond its consistent application. Political considerations have, it is true, often delayed or prematurely hastened the admission of new states, but there has been one case only where we have been called upon again to face a question similar to that which was solved by the old congress. The circumstances of the admission of the republic of Texas bear no analogy to that of any other state received into the Union since the formation of the government. Here was, not a state created by mere legislative enactment, but an independent foreign sovereignty, admitted to the Union at its own solicitation, bringing with it as a dower a territory immeasurably greater than the national policy had ever before assigned to a single state. Once more therefore we have the old question of a troublesome state sovereignty in immense unoccupied lands. The comparative absence of friction in the solution of this new problem proves again the efficiency of the old policy in dealing with all such questions. No cession of territory was wrung from Texas or in this case even solicited. The state was admitted to the Union in 1845 claiming a continuous western boundary on the Rio Grande. In 1850, after the peace of Guadalupe Hidalgo had determined our boundary on the Mexican side, Texas sold to the general government, for the sum of \$10,000,000, all of her territorial claims

north and west of her present boundaries. With some modifications the history of the original cessions repeats itself in this transaction, which was the last occasion of a great transfer of territory to the Union by one of its members.—Alan C. Reiley.

"The first weak foothold of the young Republic in the faraway station of Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia River, and . . . [the] early trade in furs with China, seemed prophetic of the destiny of the nation. The never abandoned purpose to widen the frontage on the western ocean, the obstinate debate of the 'Oregon Question,' and the conquest of California, committed the United States to the career of a Pacific power. Wide though the ocean is . . . and sparse though the islands are for a belt of two thousand miles off its American shores, the mere presence of the United States on the Pacific has been a sufficient reason for concern in all matters pertaining to this ocean. This was the ground on which Russia in 1867 pressed Alaska upon us, strengthening our base on the Pacific and weakening that of her hereditary enemy in British Columbia by placing this English colony between the fires of American enterprise on both its northern and southern borders. The 'ten marine leagues,' moreover, which fix the width of the long 'panhandle' of southern Alaska, cut off a thousand miles of the natural Pacific frontage of British Columbia; while the possession of the peninsula and the Aleutian Islands gives our Pacific base a reach of over four thousand miles from San Diego to Attu, three hundred miles beyond the international date-line of the one hundred and eightieth meridian, and only six hundred miles from the nearest Japanese islands. The acquisition of Alaska gave us Russia for a near neighbor in Bering Strait. The ownership of the Pribilof Islands in Bering Sea, which the seals have adopted as their breeding-grounds, made us the most interested party in the controversy of the seal fisheries, and involved us in negotiations with Russia, Japan, and England, which resulted in the Paris Commission of 1895. The vast importance of our Alaskan territory is developed, however, only with our advance as an acknowledged world power in the domain of the Pacific by the acquisition of the Philippines. The cause lies in our increasing need of coal. This Alaska can furnish in abundance and of an excellent quality. . . . The possession of the Philippines . . . was the signal for us to profit by certain other advantages which lay at our door within our hands and had been ignored. Dewey's victory in Manila Bay made imperative the annexation of Hawaii, Wake Island, and the retention of Guam, the southernmost isle of the Ladrone group, so that a direct mid-ocean line of communication between the home shore and our oriental colony might be assured. . . . Far back, between 1841 and 1867, she claimed Wake, Christmas, and Midway islands by right of discovery, but entered into active possession of the first only, . . . when its geographical location between Guam and Hawaii indicated its natural province as a Pacific cable-station. Since 1889 the position of the United States as a Pacific power had been attested by its share in the tripartite government of the Samoan Islands. This share was converted into the absolute ownership of Tutuila and Manua in 1899 by the acquiescence of England and Germany. The fact that the superior harbor of Pango-pango on Tutuila was ceded to the United States as a coaling-station as early as 1872, but was not actively occupied till 1898, bears witness

to the American change of policy. The whole Samoan group is of great strategic value. It is situated at about 14° south latitude and 170° west longitude, on the direct path from Puget Sound to Sydney, Australia, and on a line from the Isthmus of Panama to east Australian ports. Herein lies its significance for the United States. . . . The Hawaiian group, the only place in the whole Pacific north of the Equator and east of the continental islands festooning the coast of Asia where the nebula has condensed into a constellation, by their location, their magnitude, and their isolation become the paramount strategic position west of the American shores. They afford the first ocean-station on a trans-Pacific line of communication. Political gravitation has drawn the Hawaiian Islands to the dominion of the United States. . . . In 1851 a strong effort, emanating from the Islands themselves, was made for annexation; but the United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty offered by the Hawaiian Parliament, and instead promised protection. Meanwhile trade between the two countries was growing and with it the sentiment of annexation in Hawaii, while the big Republic held to its continental policy. Sugar became the chief interest of the Islands; it was almost wholly in the hands of Americans, who formed the monied and the ruling class, but who found a naturally remunerative industry almost hopelessly crippled by the heavy duties on their products at the port of San Francisco. Annexation would make them rich, so the agitation was kept up. Here again that extra-territorial expansion which had fixed the destiny of West Florida and Texas was doing its work. In 1876 a compromise was effected. The chief Hawaiian products were admitted to the United States free of duty, and the United States was given a naval station in the vicinity of Honolulu. The barrier was beginning to fall. The Islands were commercially within the sphere of the United States, and the United States had advanced to the strategic outpost on the Hawaiian shores. This status of overlapping boundary was maintained until 1898. . . . Prior to our acquisition of the Philippines, Hawaii possessed far greater political utility for British Columbia than for us, because it was the one East Pacific station on the long intercontinental sea route between Vancouver and Sydney. From a military standpoint, however, it was quite as important to us; because Hawaii as a coaling and naval station, two thousand and eighty miles from San Francisco and not more than twenty-five hundred from any point on our western coast, in the hands of any foreign power would have been a standing threat. . . . The Hawaiian Islands, Wake Island, and Guam form to Manila a line of communication lying between the narrow limits of the thirteenth and twenty-first parallels. . . . A chain of historical events, largely geographical in their causes, determined that the Philippines should be the channel of American influence in the East. The detachable character, inner weakness, and protected isolation of every island group maintained Spain in her insular possessions here, as in the Antilles; so that the blow which despoiled her of one took all. Now this same protection against international entanglements which is yielded by an insular position accrues to the United States, makes her situation in the Orient analogous to her continental location at home, and gives her the best possible base from which to protect her interests."—E. C. Semple, *American history and its geographic conditions*, pp. 425-434.—"On March 31, 1917, the United

States took formal possession of the Danish West Indies, by far the larger portion of the Virgin Islands. The history of the sale and the transfer of these islands is somewhat involved. [The first effort to obtain them was made by Secretary Seward in 1866. The Senate, however, pigeonholed the treaty. In 1902 another treaty was negotiated and this time the Danish Upper House failed to ratify.] Not until the latter part of 1916 was another determined effort made to induce the Danes to cede the islands. For the three principal islands and their outlying cays \$25,000,000 was offered. . . . The islands finally came into the possession of the United States on January 17, 1917, when Secretary of State Lansing and Minister Bruun of Denmark signed the ratification of the treaty of cession."—T. de Booy and J. T. Faris, *Virgin islands*, pp. 16, 23-24.—See also WEST INDIES; VIRGIN ISLANDS.—There are many other features in our internal geography, among the most notable the institution of slavery, which would be worthy of attention were the space to permit. In view of this limitation, however, we cannot pursue the subject beyond this general review of its main outlines. There is a dearth of works on American historical geography subsequent to the Declaration of Independence. It is a subject, indeed, which cannot be very satisfactorily studied simply through the literature dealing exclusively with the topic. For a more careful study there is of course no substitute for the texts of the grants, charters, treaties and legislative acts of Congress, and the more important of these are freely quoted from in Mr. Gannett's work.—Alan C. Reiley.—See also HISTORY: 28; 29; 30; 32.


ALSO IN: R. E. Dodge, *Dodge's advanced geography*, pp. 89-182.—H. Gannett, *Boundaries of the United States, with historical sketch of territorial changes (United States Geological Survey, Bulletin no. 13)*.—A. B. Hart, *Epoch maps illustrating American history*.—W. B. Scaife, *America, its geographical history*.—A. Hinsdale, *Old Northwest, with view of Thirteen Colonies as constituted by royal charters*.—E. C. Semple, *Mountain passes: A study in anthropology*.—*Bulletin of American Geographical Society*, no. 2-3.—H. B. George, *Relations of geography and history*.—N. S. Shaler, *Nature and man in America*.—A. B. Hulburt, *Historical highways of America*.—D. E. Smith, *Syllabus on historical geography*.—A. P. Brigham, *Geographic influences in American history*.—B. A. Hinsdale, *How to study and teach history*.—W. Westergaard, *Danish West Indies*.—*Report of the American Historical Association*, 1908, v. 1.

Historical influence of the frontier.—"Up to our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development. . . . Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions. The peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life. . . . All peoples show development; the germ theory of politics has been sufficiently emphasized. In the case of most nations, how-

ever, the development has occurred in a limited area; and if the nation has expanded, it has met other growing peoples whom it has conquered. But in the case of the United States we have a different phenomenon. Limiting our attention to the Atlantic coast, we have the familiar phenomenon of the evolution of institutions in a limited area, such as the rise of representative government; the differentiation of simple colonial governments into complex organs; the progress from primitive industrial society, without division of labor, up to manufacturing civilization. But we have in addition to this a recurrence of the process of evolution in each western area reached in the process of expansion. Thus American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line [on the edge of free land], and a new development for that area. American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West. Even the slavery struggle, . . . occupies its important place in American history because of its relation to westward expansion. . . . In the settlement of America we have to observe how European life entered the continent, and reacted on Europe. Our early history is the study of European germs developing in an American environment. Too exclusive attention has been paid by institutional students to the Germanic origins, too little to the American factors. The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. . . . It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. . . . In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe, nor simply the development of Germanic germs, any more than the first phenomenon was a case of reversion to the Germanic mark. The fact is, that here is a new product that is American. At first, the frontier was the Atlantic coast. It was the frontier of Europe in a very real sense. Moving westward, the frontier became more and more American. . . . Each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics. Thus the advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines. And to study this advance, the men who grew up under these conditions, and the political, economic, and social results of it, is to study the really American part of our history. In the course of the seventeenth century the frontier was advanced up the Atlantic river courses, just beyond the 'fall line,' and the tidewater region became the settled area. In the first half of the eighteenth century another advance occurred. Traders followed the Delaware and Shawnee Indians to the Ohio as early as the end of the first

quarter of the century. Gov. Spotswood, of Virginia, made an expedition in 1714 across the Blue Ridge. The end of the first quarter of the century saw the advance of the Scotch-Irish and the Palatine Germans up the Shenandoah Valley into the western part of Virginia, and the Piedmont region of the Carolinas. The Germans in New York pushed the frontier of settlement up the Mohawk up to German Flats. In Pennsylvania, the town of Bedford indicates the line of settlement. Settlements had begun on New River, and branch of the Kanawha, and on the sources of the Yadkin and French Broad. The King attempted to arrest the advance by his proclamation of 1763, forbidding settlements beyond the sources of the rivers flowing into the Atlantic; but in vain. . . . In . . . successive frontiers we find natural boundary lines which have served to mark and to affect the characteristics of the frontiers, namely: the 'fall line'; the Alleghany Mountains; the Mississippi; the Missouri where its direction approximates north and south; the line of the arid lands, approximately the ninety-ninth meridian; and the Rocky Mountains. The fall line marked the frontier of the seventeenth century; the Alleghanies that of the eighteenth; the Mississippi that of the first quarter of the nineteenth; the Missouri that of the middle of [the nineteenth] century (omitting the California movement); and the belt of the Rocky Mountains and the arid tract. . . . Each was won by a series of Indian wars. At the Atlantic frontier one can study the germs of processes repeated at each successive frontier. We have the complex European life sharply precipitated by the wilderness into the simplicity of primitive conditions. The first frontier had to meet its Indian question, its question of the disposition of the public domain, of the means of intercourse with older settlements, of the extension of political organization, of religious and educational activity. And the settlement of these and similar questions for one frontier served as a guide for the next. The American student needs not to go to the 'prim little townships of Sleswick' for illustrations of the law of continuity and development. For example, he may study the origin of our land policies in the colonial land policy; he may see how the system grew by adapting the statutes to the customs of the successive frontiers. He may see how the mining experience in the lead regions of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa was applied to the mining laws of the Sierras, and how our Indian policy has been a series of experiments on successive frontiers. Each tier of new States has found in the older ones material for its constitutions. Each frontier has made similar contributions to American character. . . . The United States lies like a huge page in the history of society. Line by line as we read this continental page from West to East we find the record of social evolution. It begins with the Indian and the hunter; it goes on to tell of the disintegration of savagery by the entrance of the trader, the pathfinder of civilization; we read the annals of the pastoral stage in ranch life; the exploitation of the soil by the raising of unrotated crops of corn and wheat in sparsely settled farming communities; the intensive culture of the denser farm settlement; and finally the manufacturing organization with city and factory system. . . . Particularly in eastern States this page is a palimpsest. What is now a manufacturing State was in an earlier decade an area of intensive farming. Earlier yet it had been a wheat area, and still earlier the 'range' had attracted the cattle-herder. . . .





Maps prepared specially for the **NEW LARNED** under direction of the editors and publishers.

French colonization was dominated by its trading frontier; English colonization by its farming frontier. There was an antagonism between the two frontiers as between the two nations. . . . And yet, in spite of this opposition of the interests of the trader and the farmer, the Indian trade pioneered the way for civilization. The buffalo trail became the Indian trail, and this became the trader's 'trace'; the trails widened into roads, and the roads into turnpikes, and these in turn were transformed into railroads. The same origin can be shown for the railroads of the South, the Far West, and the Dominion of Canada. The trading posts . . . situated so as to command the water systems of the country, have grown into such cities as Albany, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Council Bluffs, and Kansas City. Thus civilization in America has followed the arteries made by geology . . . until at last the slender paths of aboriginal intercourse have been broadened and interwoven into the complex mazes of modern commercial lines. . . . It is like the steady growth of a complex nervous system for the originally simple, inert continent. If one would understand why . . . [the United States is] to-day one nation, rather than a collection of isolated states, he must study this economic and social consolidation of the country. . . . The effect of the Indian frontier as a consolidating agent in . . . [its] history is important. From the close of the seventeenth century various intercolonial congresses have been called to treat with Indians and establish common measures of defense. Particularism was strongest in colonies with no Indian frontier. This frontier stretched along the western border like a cord of union. . . . Most celebrated of these conferences was the Albany congress of 1754, called to treat with the Six Nations, and to consider plans of union. Even a cursory reading of the plan proposed by the congress reveals the importance of the frontier. . . . It is evident that the unifying tendencies of the Revolutionary period were facilitated by the previous coöperating in the regulation of the frontier. . . . From the time the mountains rose between the pioneer and the seaboard, a new order of Americanism arose. The West and the East began to get out of touch of each other. The settlements from the sea to the mountains kept connection with the rear and had a certain solidarity. But the over-mountain men grew more and more independent. The East took a narrow view of American advance, and nearly lost these men. Kentucky and Tennessee history bears abundant witness to the truth of this statement. The East began to try to hedge and limit westward expansion. Though Webster could declare that there were no Alleghanies in his politics, yet in politics in general they were a very solid factor. The exploitation of the beasts took hunter and trader to the west, the exploitation of the grasses took the rancher west, and the exploitation of the virgin soil of the river valleys and prairies attracted the farmer. Good soils have been the most continuous attraction to the farmer's frontier. The land hunger of the Virginians drew them down the rivers into Carolina, in early colonial days; the search for soils took the Massachusetts men to Pennsylvania and to New York. As the eastern lands were taken up migration flowed across them to the west. . . . Thus the census of 1890 shows, in the Northwest, many counties in which there is an absolute or a relative decrease of population. These States . . . [had] been sending farmers to advance the frontier on the plains, and . . . [had] themselves begun

to turn to intensive farming and to manufacture. A decade before this, Ohio had shown the same transition stage. Thus the demand for land and the love of wilderness freedom drew the frontier ever onward. . . . We may next inquire what were the influences on the East and on the Old World. . . . First, we note that the frontier promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the American people. The coast was preponderantly English, but the later tides of continental immigration flowed across to the free lands. This was the case from the early colonial days. The Scotch-Irish and the Palatine Germans, or 'Pennsylvania Dutch,' furnished the dominant element in the stock of the colonial frontier. With these peoples were also the freed indentured servants, or redemptioners, who at the expiration of their time of service passed to the frontier. . . . In the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor characteristics. The process has gone on from the early days to our own. Burke and other writers in the middle of the eighteenth century believed that Pennsylvania was 'threatened with the danger of being wholly foreign in language, manners, and perhaps even inclinations.' . . . In another way the advance of the frontier decreased . . . [colonial] dependence on England. The coast, particularly of the South, lacked diversified industries, and was dependent on England for the bulk of its supplies. In the South there was even a dependence on the North colonies for articles of food . . . [but] before long the frontier created a demand for merchants. As it retreated from the coast it became less and less possible for England to bring her supplies directly to the consumer's wharfs, and carry away staple crops, and staple crops began to give way to diversified agriculture for a time. The effect of this phase of the frontier action upon the northern section is perceived when we realize how the advance of the frontier aroused seaboard cities like Boston, New York, and Baltimore, to engage in rivalry for what Washington called 'the extensive and valuable trade of a rising empire.' The legislation which most developed the powers of the national government, and played the largest part in its activity, was conditioned on the frontier. . . .

"The growth of nationalism and the evolution of American political institutions were dependent on the advance of the frontier. . . . The pioneer needed the goods of the coast, and so the grand series of internal improvements and railroad legislation began, with potent nationalizing effects. Over internal improvements occurred great debates, in which grave constitutional questions were discussed. Sectional groupings appear in the votes, profoundly significant for the historian. Loose construction increased as the nation marched westward. But the West was not content with bringing the farm to the factory. Under the lead of Clay . . . protective tariffs were passed, with the cry of bringing the factory to the farm. . . . The public domain [also] has been a force of profound importance in the nationalization and development of the government. . . . Administratively the frontier called out some of the highest and most vitalizing activities of the general government. The purchase of Louisiana was perhaps the constitutional turning point in the history of the Republic, inasmuch as it afforded both a new area for national legislation and the occasion of the downfall of the policy of strict construction. But the purchase of Louisiana was called out

by frontier needs and demands. As frontier States accrued to the Union the national power grew. . . . When we consider the public domain from the point of view of the sale and disposal of the public lands we are again brought face to face with the frontier. The policy of the United States in dealing with its lands is in sharp contrast with the European system of scientific administration. Efforts to make this domain a source of revenue, and to withhold it from emigrants in order that settlement might be compact, were in vain. The jealousy and the fears of the East were powerless in the face of the demands of the frontiersmen. . . . The reason is obvious; a system of administration was not what the West demanded; it wanted land. . . . 'No subject,' said Henry Clay, 'which has presented itself to the present, or perhaps any preceding, Congress, is of greater magnitude than that of the public lands.' When we consider the far-reaching effects of the government's land policy upon political, economic, and social aspects of American life, we are disposed to agree with him. But this legislation was framed under frontier influences, and under the lead of Western statesmen like Benton and Jackson. . . . It was this nationalizing tendency of the West that transformed the democracy of Jefferson into the national republicanism of Monroe and the democracy of Andrew Jackson. The West of the War of 1812, the West of Clay, and Benton and Harrison, and Andrew Jackson, shut off by the Middle States and the mountains from the coast sections, had a solidarity of its own with national tendencies. On the tide of the Father of Waters, North and South met and mingled into a nation. Interstate migration went steadily on—a process of cross-fertilization of ideas and institutions. The fierce struggle of the sections over slavery on the western frontier does not diminish the truth of this statement; it proves the truth of it. . . . But the most important effect of the frontier has been in the promotion of democracy [in the United States] and in Europe. As has been indicated, the frontier is productive of individualism. . . . It produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control. The tax-gatherer is viewed as a representative of oppression. Prof. Osgood, in an able article, has pointed out that the frontier conditions prevalent in the colonies are important factors in the explanation of the American Revolution, where individual liberty was sometimes confused with absence of all effective government. . . . The same conditions aid in explaining the difficulty of instituting a strong government in the period of the confederacy. The frontier individualism has from the beginning promoted democracy. The frontier States that came into the Union in the first quarter of a century of its existence came in with democratic suffrage provisions, and had reactive effects of the highest importance upon the older States whose peoples were being attracted there. . . . From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual traits of profound importance. The works of travelers along each frontier from colonial days onward describe certain common traits, and these traits have, while softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place of their origin, even when a higher social organization succeeded. The result is that to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great

ends; that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom—these are traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of the frontier. . . . What the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities, that, and more, the ever retreating frontier has been to the United States directly, and to the nations of Europe more remotely. And now, four centuries from the discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history."—F. J. Turner, *Frontier in American history*, pp. 1-4, 9-11, 13-15, 18, 22-27, 29-30, 37-38.

1497-1615.—Discovery and exploration of the Atlantic coast of North America. See AMERICA.  
1607-1752.—Early unsuccessful attempts at settlement.—First settlement and organization of the Thirteen Original English Colonies.—The earliest attempts at European settlement (as distinct from exploration) within the present limits of the United States were made by French Huguenots, under the patronage of Admiral Coligny; first at Port Royal, on Beaufort river, Florida, where Jean Ribaut, in 1562, placed a few colonists who soon abandoned the spot, and, two years later, at Fort Caroline, on St. John's river, in the same peninsula. The second colony, commanded by René de Laudonnière, was considerable in numbers but unpromising in character, and not likely to gain a footing in the country, even if it had been left in peace. It was tragically extinguished, however, by the Spaniards in September, 1565. (See FLORIDA: 1565.) The first undertakings at colonization from England were inspired and led by Sir Walter Raleigh. After unsuccessful attempts, in conjunction with his elder half-brother, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, to establish settlements in Newfoundland, Raleigh obtained a grant from Queen Elizabeth, in 1584, under which he planted a colony of 108 settlers, commanded by Ralph Lane, on Roanoke island, within the boundaries of the present State of North Carolina. In honor of the virgin queen of England, the name Virginia was given to the region at large. Lane's colonists had expected to find gold, silver and pearls, and lost interest in the country when none could be discovered. In June, 1586, they persuaded Sir Francis Drake, who had touched at Roanoke with his fleet, to carry them home. Soon afterwards, several ships, sent out by Raleigh with reinforcements and supplies, arrived at the island, to find it deserted. They left fifteen men to hold the ground; but a year passed before another expedition reached the place. The fort was then found in ruins; the fifteen men had disappeared, and nothing of their fate could be learned. The new colony perished in the same way—its fate an impenetrable secret of the savage land. Sir Walter assigned his rights and interests in Virginia to a company of merchant adventurers, which accomplished nothing permanently. Twenty years passed before another vigorous effort of English colonization was made. In 1606 King James issued a royal charter to a company singularly formed in two branches or divisions, one having its headquarters at London, and known as the London Company, the other established at Plymouth and known as the Plymouth Company. Between them they were given authority to occupy territory in America from the 34th to the 45th degree of latitude; but the two grants



overlapped in the middle, with the intention of giving the greater domain to the company which secured it by the earliest actual occupation. The London Company, holding the southward grant, despatched to Virginia a company of 105 emigrants, who established at Jamestown, on the northerly bank of James river (May 13, 1607), the first permanent English settlement in America, and founded there the colony and the subsequent state of Virginia. In 1619, negro slavery was introduced; and by that time the white inhabitants of Virginia had increased to nearly 4,000 in number, divided between eleven settlements. (See VIRGINIA: 1619.) Meantime, the Plymouth Company had done nothing effectively in the northward region assigned to it. Bartholomew Gosnold, in 1602, had examined the coast from Maine to Cape Cod, and built a lonely house on the island of Cuttyhunk; Martin Pring, in 1603, had loaded two ships with sassafras in Massachusetts bay; a colony named in honor of the chief justice of England, Sir John Popham, had shivered through the winter of 1607-1608 near the mouth of Kennebec river and then gone home (see MAINE: 1607-1608); Captain John Smith, in 1614, had made a voyage to the country, in the interest of London merchants, and had named it New England; but no lasting English settlement had been made anywhere within the bounds of King James's grant to the Plymouth Company, at the waning of the year 1620, when Virginia was well grown. It was then by chance, rather than by design, that the small ship *Mayflower* landed a little company of religious exiles on the Massachusetts coast, at Plymouth (Dec. 21, 1620), instead of bearing them farther south. They came with a patent from the London, or South Virginia Company, and expected to plant their settlement within that company's territorial bounds. But circumstances which seemed adverse at the time bent their course to the New England shore, and they accepted it for a home, not doubting that the proprietors of the land, who desired colonists, would permit them to stay. The next year they received a patent from the Council for New England, which had succeeded to the rights of the Plymouth Company. For eight years they remained the only successful colony in New England. Then came the memorable movement of Puritans out of Old England into New England, beginning with the little settlement at Salem, under John Endicott; expanding next year into the "Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay" founding Dorchester, Roxbury, Charlestown, Watertown, and Boston, in 1630. (See MASSACHUSETTS: 1620, to 1630.) In the Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay a cleavage soon occurred, and democratic seceders pushed southwestwards into the Connecticut valley, where Dutch and English were disputing possession of the country. There they settled the question decisively, in 1635 and 1636, by founding the towns of Hartford, Windsor, Wethersfield and Springfield. Three years later the three towns first named confederated themselves in a little republic, with a frame of government which is the first known written constitution, and so gave birth to the future state of Connecticut. In 1638 New Haven was founded by a company of wealthy nonconformists from England, under the lead of their minister, John Davenport, and was a distinct colony until 1662, when it was annexed to Connecticut by a royal charter. (See CONNECTICUT: 1634-1637, to 1662-1664.) Another state, the smallest of the New England commonwealths, was taking form at this same time, in a little wedge of territory

on Narragansett bay, between Connecticut and Massachusetts. Roger Williams, the great apostle of a tolerant Christianity, driven from Salem by the intolerant Puritanism of the bay, went forth with a few followers into the wilderness, bought land from the Narragansett Indians, and laid the foundations (1636) of the town of Providence. In that same year another small company of people, banished from Boston for receiving the teachings of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson, bought the island of Aquidneck or Aquetnet from the Indians and settled at its northern end. This community was soon divided, and part of it removed to the southern end of the island, beginning a settlement which grew to be the town of Newport. The island as a whole received the name of the Isle of Rhodes, or Rhode Island (see RHODE ISLAND: 1631-1636, to 1641-1643); and in 1644 its two settlements were united with Providence, under a charter procured in England by Roger Williams, forming the colony of Providence Plantations. In 1643 the colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven, entered into a confederation, from which Rhode Island was excluded, calling themselves "The United Colonies of New England." The object of the confederation was common action in defence against the Indians and the Dutch on the Hudson. It was the beginning of the cementing of New England (see NEW ENGLAND: 1643). Before this time, small settlements had been planted here and there in northern New England, within territory covered by grants made to Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason. The province claimed by Gorges was subsequently called Maine, and that of Mason, New Hampshire; but Maine never rose to an independent colonial existence. It remained the "District of Maine" until 1820, when Massachusetts yielded the separation which made it a sovereign state in the American Union. The New Hampshire settlements were also annexed to Massachusetts, in 1641, but finally parted from Massachusetts in 1692, from which time until the Revolution they remained a distinct colony. (See NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1622-1679, to 1681-1692.) While the English were thus colonizing New England at the north and Virginia at the south, the Dutch had taken possession of the important valley of the Hudson river and the region around its mouth, and had named the country "New Netherland," but no real colonization was undertaken until 1623. The New Netherland Company had then been superseded by the Dutch West India Company, with rights and powers extending to Africa as well as the West Indies and the North American coasts. It bought Manhattan island and large tracts of land from the Indians (see IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY: Their conquests and wide dominions), but had little success for several years in settling them. In 1629 it introduced a strange experiment, creating a kind of feudal system in the New World, by conveying great estates to individuals, called Patroons, or Patrons. Several Patroon colonies were established on a baronial scale; but, generally, the system did not produce satisfactory results, and in 1640 the company tried the better experiment of making the trade of New Netherland free to all comers. The company government, however, as administered by the directors or governors whom it sent out, was too arbitrary to permit a colonial growth at all comparable with that of New England. Southward, on the Delaware, the Swedes made a settlement where the city of Wilmington now stands. This Swedish colony prospered and enlarged itself during six-

teen years, but was overcome by Director Stuyvesant of New Netherland in 1654. In 1664 the whole situation in this middle region was changed by the English conquest of New Netherland. The territory so acquired—or regained, if the original English claim had been good—passed then, by royal grant, to the Duke of York (afterwards King James II), and became the proprietary province of New York. (See NEW YORK: 1664; 1664-1674.) The duke of York, in turn, the same year, transferred to Lord John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret the part of his domain which lay between the Hudson and the Delaware, and it received the name of New Cæsarea, or New Jersey. Under encouragement from Berkeley and Carteret the New Haven colonization was resumed. Ten years later Berkeley sold his rights to a party of Quakers who were seeking a refuge for their persecuted sect in the New World. A division of the province was made and the Quaker proprietors received West Jersey, while East Jersey remained to Carteret. (See NEW JERSEY: 1664-1667; 1673-1682.) Before this time, William Penn had become the principal owner of the West Jersey interest. Not long afterwards (1681), Penn procured from King Charles II a much greater proprietary domain, on the western side of the Delaware, 40,000 square miles in extent, which received the name of Pennsylvania. To his title from the king he added a deed of purchase from the Indians. Penn's scheme of colonization was very liberally framed, and it was conducted with marked success. Philadelphia, first laid out in 1683, had 2,000 inhabitants in 1685, and Pennsylvania at large had 8,000. (See PENNSYLVANIA: 1681; 1681-1682.) In order to possess one bank of the Delaware river and bay to the sea, William Penn, after securing his grant from the king, bought additionally from the duke of York the claims of the latter to that strip of territory which the Swedes had settled on and struggled for with the Dutch, and which took an independent political form in later days as the state of Delaware. (See DELAWARE: 1691-1702.) Adjoining Penn's province on the south was the domain of another great proprietor, Lord Baltimore, whose title deed, from the same royal source as that of Penn, but prior in time by half a century, gave rise to conflicts which troubled the whole life of the Peaceful Friend. The first Lord Baltimore (George Calvert) received from James I in 1632 a patent which gave him territory on the northerly side of the Potomac river, stretching to the Delaware bay and river and to the 40th parallel of north latitude. By its terms it did undoubtedly take in Delaware and part of Pennsylvania; but the intervening occupation by the Swedes and Dutch, the English conquest, and the royal grant to the duke of York, confused the title. The controversy was not settled until 1761-1767, when "Mason and Dixon's line" was run as the accepted boundary between Maryland and Pennsylvania. The lords proprietary of Maryland had been in conflict long before Penn's time with their neighbors at the south, in Virginia, and had many difficulties to encounter and many troubles in their undertaking to found a state. (See MARYLAND: 1632, to 1751-1775.) Beyond the Virginia plantations, in the South, the coasts to which Raleigh had sent his first colonists, and to which the virgin queen had intended to give her name, waited long for settlement. The first durable colony within that territory which took its name in time from a less worthy sovereign was planted in 1653, at Albemarle, on the Chowan river, by a small company of dissenters from Virginia. In

1665 a considerable party of emigrants from the Barbadoes, headed by a wealthy planter of that island, Sir John Yeamans, established themselves on Cape Fear river, near its mouth, in the district which was afterwards called Clarendon. Two years before this time, in 1663, King Charles II had discharged some part of his heavy obligations to his loyal supporters by granting that whole section of the American continent which lies between the 31st and 36th parallels of latitude to a company of courtiers, including Clarendon, Monk, Shaftsbury, and others, and the province was named Carolina. It was divided into two great counties, Albemarle and Clarendon, and these corresponded somewhat nearly to the North Carolina and South Carolina of the present day. In 1670 the lords proprietors sent out a colony under William Sayle, which settled first at Port Royal; but Sayle died soon after landing, and the colonists were induced to migrate northwards to the Ashley river, where Sir John Yeamans met them with a considerable part of his Clarendon colony, and became the head of the united settlements. There they founded "Old Charleston," and, after a few years, shifting the site to the confluence of the Ashley and the Cooper, they began the building of the present city of Charleston. This became the nucleus of the subsequently distinct colony of South Carolina, as Albemarle did of that of North Carolina. The division was made in 1729, when the rights of the proprietors were bought by the crown, and the Carolinas became crown colonies. (See NORTH CAROLINA: 1639-1663, to 1688-1729; SOUTH CAROLINA: 1670-1696, to 1712-1732.) The last of the "Thirteen Colonies" to come into existence was the colony of Georgia, founded so late as 1733 by General James Oglethorpe. It occupied territory too close in neighborhood to the Spaniards of Florida to be attractive to settlers in the seventeenth century. The first emigrants left England in the fall of 1732, and early in the next year Savannah was laid out by Oglethorpe in person. (See GEORGIA: 1732-1739.)—J. N. Larned.—In Georgia the prohibition of slavery was removed in 1749. Other restrictive regulations were also abandoned. In 1750 the restrictions on the tenure and alienation of land were removed. (See GEORGIA: 1735-1749; 1735-1750; 1743-1764.) "After the removal of these restrictions . . . [the colony] developed much more rapidly, and a considerable movement of planters from South Carolina began into the so-called Midway District between the Ogeechee and South Newport rivers. These planters brought their slaves with them in such large numbers that a contemporary writer estimated the negroes brought into the colony during the years 1751 and 1752 at nearly a thousand. Thus the low country of Georgia began, in spite of the theories of the trustees, to reproduce in its essential features the social system of South Carolina. The political experience of Georgia was in many respects unlike that of any other English colony. No provision was made in the charter for a representative legislature and none was established under the proprietary government. An assembly which met in 1751 was not authorized to make laws, but only 'to propose, debate, and represent to the trustees.'"—E. B. Greene, *Provincial America, 1690-1740*, pp. 267-268.

Also in: O. Straus, *Roger Williams, the pioneer of religious liberty*.—J. Winsor, *Narrative and critical history of America*, v. 3, ch. 5-13.—L. G. Tyler, *England in America*, ch. 3-16.—H. L. Osgood, *American colonies in the seventeenth century*.—J. Fiske, *Dutch and Quaker colonies in America*.—

J. A. Doyle, *English colonies in America*.—C. M. Andrews, *Colonial self-government, 1652-1689*, ch. 7, 9, 11.—E. B. Greene, *Provincial America*, ch. 15.—Wynne and Gilman, *Colonial records of Virginia*.—E. McCrady, *History of South Carolina*.—G. Chalmers, *Political annals of the present united colonies, from their settlement to the peace of 1763*.

1607-1775.—Liquor problem. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1607-1775.

1612.—First coinage in America. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 17th century: Colonial coinage in America.

1616-1701.—Exploration of Michigan.—Founding of Detroit. See MICHIGAN: 1616-1701.

1619.—Introduction of slavery. See VIRGINIA: 1619.

1619.—Origin of William and Mary College. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1619-1819.

1620-1776.—Constitutional relations of colonies to English crown and Parliament.—Working of the leaven of independence in New England Puritanism.—The history of the development of the question between England and her colonies, as to their constitutional relations to one another, "falls naturally into two periods: first, from the beginning of English colonization in America to the Revolution of 1688; second, from 1688 to the Declaration of Independence. . . . Passing now to the history of the first period, it is to be observed that the leading institution in the English government at that time was the King in Council. . . . But in the 17th century, owing to a combination of very strong political and religious forces, the struggle between the King in Parliament and the King in Council was . . . opened and pushed with vigor. It continued with alternations of success, but on the whole with results favorable to Parliament, till 1688. Then the King in Parliament finally gained the ascendancy, and this result was so secured by statute as never afterwards to be seriously called in question. The supremacy of Parliament was established by a series of royal concessions. The parliamentary party viewed these as compromises between Parliament and king. This gave color to the theory of social contract, which was now given new impulse and form by the parliamentary writers of the 16th and 17th centuries. . . . It naturally follows from what has been said that the administration of colonial affairs previous to 1688 was in the hands of the King in Council. Such was the fact. The enterprises of discovery were fitted out under the patronage of the crown; the territories discovered or visited were taken possession of in its name; and grants of land, of rights of government and trade, were made to actual settlers by the kings. Every colonial charter is a proof of this. As the king was by the theory of English law feudal proprietor of England, so he became proprietor of colonial territory, though that territory was granted out in socage, one of the freest forms of English tenure. Certain superficial distinctions were introduced in the form of colonial governments as royal, proprietary, and charter; but they all emanated from the crown. Its supremacy extended around and beneath them all. The fact that they were established by grant is proof of this, even though there had been no subsequent acts to enforce the control. They were colonies of the English crown; their inhabitants were its subjects. The true doctrine of sovereignty and allegiance necessitates this conclusion. . . . Parliament passed a few statutes affecting the colonies. Yet, not to mention others,

there were five such of very great importance which fall within this period: the Act of Supremacy (1 Eliz. cap. 1), and the four Navigation acts. In all these the colonies were expressly mentioned. But the relative position of crown and Parliament is illustrated by the fact that when in 1624 the Council was proceeding to annul the third Virginia charter, the House tried to interfere but was warned off—because the business concerned only the king and his advisers. Moreover there was no lack of precedents for the extension not only of common law but of royal ordinances and statute law outside of the original realm of England. . . . Such in outline was the status of English colonial law previous to 1688. It was in the process of formation and adaptation to the new empire. There were ample precedents for the exercise of the rights of British sovereignty in America, but those rights had not yet been called into the fullest operation. Their legitimacy however was in general fully acknowledged by the colonies. They had been allowed great liberty in establishing their governments, erecting courts, levying taxes, organizing and calling out their militia for defence against the Indians. Colonial society had been allowed to develop freely in all lines and the product was far different from anything which existed in the mother country. It was democratic rather than aristocratic; it was also extremely particularistic, and too remote from England to feel much interest in the general concerns of the empire. In this divergence of social organization and interests, as between the colonies and the mother country, lay the germ which might develop into resistance on the part of the plantations, if at any time England should attempt to enforce her rightful supremacy over them. But as yet there was too little of the spirit of union among the colonists to make possible any combined action. Also those dynasties whose government had been most arbitrary in England, the Tudors and Stuarts, had, till the reign of James II. treated the colonies with great leniency. But the statements just made do not cover the whole ground. They describe the attitude of the colonies in general toward the mother country, but they do not describe the special conditions which prevailed in New England. If we wish to know how the theory of colonial independence originated, we must look in that direction. The American revolution cannot be explained without reference to the political character and tendencies of Puritanism. . . . Puritanism then was a political as well as a religious movement. On the one hand its doctrines contained a strong democratic leaven; on the other they contained principles which might lead to the separation of church and state. How the former tendency worked itself out in New England is familiar; how the latter failed of accomplishment there is equally well known. The Puritans of Massachusetts were not opposed to the union of church and state or to the employment of the secular power to enforce religious conformity. . . . What they were opposed to was every other form of state church except their own. . . . In order to maintain her peculiar system, Massachusetts had to be on her guard against all interference from outside. . . .

"The Massachusetts charter was brought over to this country. [See MASSACHUSETTS: 1620-1630.] A few years later the Plymouth company was dissolved, and representation of the colony in England, except by such agents as she might send, ceased. The terms of the charter were very lib-

eral; but like all the others it was a royal grant, and expressly stated that the inhabitants of the colony were to be subjects of England and were to enjoy all the liberties and immunities of such, as if they were in the realm of England. The oaths of supremacy and allegiance were to be administered to all who should go to the colony. The company was made a 'body corporate and politic' and was given ample powers of government; but its laws, statutes, and ordinances were not to be contrary to the laws of England. The admission of freemen was left in the hands of the corporation. How did the Puritan oligarchy make use of this charter for serving the purposes of their government? In a word, they interpreted the expression 'body corporate and politic' to mean an independent state, and virtually abandoned all legal connection with England except an empty acknowledgment of allegiance. The oath of allegiance was not administered, but instead an oath of fidelity to the government of Massachusetts. An ecclesiastical system wholly different from that of England was established. Only those were admitted to political rights, made freemen, who were members of a Congregational church. . . . The colony also exercised full legislative and judicial powers, and denied the right of appeal both practically and theoretically. The proof of this is most direct and convincing. To illustrate: in 1646 the General Court refused to permit the appeal of Dr. Child and others who, as Presbyterians, desired to lay before Parliament the wrongs they suffered in Massachusetts. Not only was the right denied, but the petitioners were prevented by force from carrying their case to England. The same course was pursued in reference to appeals in ordinary judicial cases. During the discussion of the affair just mentioned it was boldly affirmed in the General Court that subjects were bound by English laws only so long as they lived in England; that neither statutes nor royal ordinances were in force beyond the seas. A little later than this both the magistrates and the elders were called upon to give their views on the legal relations between the colony and England. Both agreed that by their charter they 'had absolute power of government'; that their government was perfect and sufficient in all its parts, not needing the help of any superior to make it complete. They acknowledged that they had received the charter from England, and 'depended upon that state for protection and immunities as freeborn Englishmen'; but the duties which were correlative to those immunities, and which are necessary to a true conception of allegiance, were not mentioned. This position was consistently maintained by the Puritans of Massachusetts as long as they remained in power. In their correspondence with the home government and its officials between 1664 and 1684 the right of appeal was always denied. Its exercise was never allowed. If we add to this the further statements that Massachusetts coined money; strove to enlarge the bounds of her patent, not only without consulting the king, but in defiance of his absolute prohibition; taxed English imports; and, without the consent of the home government, entered the New England confederation, some notion can be formed of the degree of independence claimed and exercised by that colony. The exercise of this independence however did not make it legal. It only illustrates the fact that the roots of the American revolution extend back into the times of which we are speaking. . . . It was to be expected that England would

interfere to bring Massachusetts within the bounds of constitutional dependence. Complaints against the colony, on the part of Gorges and of those who had been banished by the Puritans, began very early. These led to 'quo warranto' proceedings for the recall of the charter in 1635. But civil strife at home compelled the government of Charles I to abandon the project. Then came the period of the Commonwealth, when the views of the English government were so fully in harmony with those of the New England leaders that the practical independence of the colony was ignored. . . . From the restoration dates the beginning of a more comprehensive colonial policy." With the fall of the Massachusetts charter, in 1684, "closes the first stage in the development of the idea of colonial independence. [See MASSACHUSETTS: 1671-1686.] The struggle between the Puritans of Massachusetts and the crown is the most significant fact in American history previous to 1760. The Puritans were defeated; the authority of England was reasserted. . . . But for our purpose the important result is that the Puritans left behind them an armory full of precedents and arguments in favor of colonial independence. They had constructed the American theory on that subject. That was the chief permanent result of their experiment. They had from first to last adhered to the theory which expediency taught them to adopt. They taught the colonists how to resist the exercise of the ecclesiastical and judicial supremacy of the crown. If now at any time in the future the Americans should consider themselves aggrieved by the acts of the English government, the Puritan spirit and theory would be likely to appear. Such was the aspect of affairs at the close of the first period of colonial history. After the revolution of 1688, Parliament assumes more and more the control of American concerns. Statutes on those subjects multiply. The administration of the colonies becomes a branch of the ministerial government of Great Britain. The development of an imperial as distinguished from an insular policy is begun. The interference of England in colonial affairs became more frequent and the control asserted more extensive than heretofore. . . . The attitude of the colonists during this period was one of passive rather than active resistance. Parliamentary restrictions were so far evaded as not to be burdensome. . . . The records show that the burden of opinion in the colonies was jealousy of all government, so far as it operated as a restraint. The interference of government, whether colonial or imperial, was welcomed by the colonists, when it could be used for the advancement of their private or local interests; when larger objects were aimed at, it was if possible ignored or resisted. . . . The political condition of the colonies was for the first time clearly revealed during the French and Indian war. This history of Germany can furnish no more vivid spectacle of the evils of particularism than does that struggle. . . . The condition of anarchy and helplessness revealed by the war was such as to convince all the servants of the crown in America that active parliamentary interference was necessary, if the colonies were to be defended and retained as an integral part of the British empire. The fact that the British government, within a reasonable time after the close of the war, proceeded to put this suggestion into execution, implies nothing arbitrary or unreasonable. It had the undoubted constitutional right to do so; and so far as could be seen at the time, expediency prompted in the same

direction. But during the century since the Puritan oligarchy of Massachusetts yielded to the supremacy of the crown, the theory of social contract had been fully developed. It had formulated the needs of the opposition in all the European countries to the system of absolutism. It was the theory of government very generally held by the Puritans in both England and America. . . . This theory, as soon as it was understood, would naturally find general acceptance in the colonies. . . . The American revolution, as truly as the French, was the outgrowth of the doctrine of natural rights and social contract. By this I mean simply that the doctrine in question formed the theoretical basis of both movements. So far as the American revolution is concerned the proof of this statement is contained in the writings of the patriot leaders at the time, the various state papers that were issued, and the doctrine that was held respecting the right of imperial taxation. No man contributed so much to bringing about the revolution as Samuel Adams; and his mind was saturated with the theory of social contract. He made it the basis of all his reasonings. . . . The reason why New England became the leader of the movement clearly appears. The process of development through which the colonies passed was a natural, and therefore a necessary one. It was slow and obscure, and therefore could not be clearly recognized at the time. But that it was nevertheless revolutionary becomes evident when we compare the views and aims of the colonists with the constitution of the British empire. When the two systems came into collision the colonists adopted a theory which was 'in the air' at the time, but one under which no government can be successfully carried on. When they came to erect a government of their own, they had to abandon it. It is not claimed that the doctrine of natural rights ever found such general acceptance in America as in France. The character of the people and the absence of a despotic government prevented that. But that the American revolution cannot be explained without assigning it a prominent place is evident. It is not intended to convey the impression that the colonists had no grievances. There were causes for complaint, but they were doubtless greatly exaggerated. A mind filled with the democratic theories of the times, and with the loose notions concerning sovereignty and allegiance which then prevailed, could easily imagine that Parliament, unless resisted, would establish a despotic government in America."—H. L. Osgood, *England and the colonies (Political Science Quarterly, Sept., 1887)*.—"Institutionally considered, the history of the American colonies falls into two phases or periods. The two phases appear in the system of chartered colonies and the system of royal provinces, with the transition from one to the other. This comprises all there is in the constitutional history of that period. The meaning of the period, its unity and diversity, the character of the colonies as special jurisdictions, as well as their relations with the sovereign imperial power, will become sufficiently clear if these subjects are properly treated. The fundamental trend of events during the period will also become evident. By the chartered colonies is meant the corporate colonies of New England and the proprietary provinces. The term 'chartered' signifies nothing as to the internal organization of the dependencies to which it is applied, but relates only to the method of their origin. They all originated in grants from the English crown, the privileges being conveyed

through royal charters. Permissions to undertake voyages of discovery were issued in this form. All the colonies were founded under grants of this nature, and their development embodied the results contributed by private and local enterprises to the general movement. Their founders and settlers bore the risks, hardships, and losses which were incident to the beginnings of colonization. Their efforts, under authority from the English government, gave rise to a group of colonies which possessed variety of internal organization and enjoyed a large degree of independence. They were emphatically special jurisdictions, and their founders and inhabitants exhibited all the love for corporate liberty which characterizes the history of such jurisdictions. The corporate colonies of New England were practically commonwealths and developed with scarcely any recognition of the sovereignty of England. Their ecclesiastical polity differed from that of England. Their land system and the relations between their executives and legislatures were peculiar to themselves. They founded a confederation without the consent of the home government, taking advantage of the civil troubles in England for the purpose. Of the proprietary provinces, the earliest were founded by trading companies resident in England, and at the outset joint management of land and trade were prominent characteristics of their policy. This, however, soon passed away and left a body of free tenants. The later proprietary provinces were founded by individuals or boards of proprietors, through whom political rights passed to the inhabitants. In some of these provinces the proprietors and their appointees retained at the beginning large powers in their own hands, and only gradually did these come to be shared by the people through their representatives in the lower house of the legislature. In others the proprietors at the beginning admitted the representatives of the colonists to a large, or even the largest, share of power. Thus varieties of a common type appear prominently in this class of provinces; institutions shade off into one another."—H. L. Osgood, *American colonies in the seventeenth century, v. 1, pp. xxviii-xxix*.

1621.—Indian money made legal tender. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 17th century: Indian money used in American colonies.

1621-1776.—Manhood suffrage. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1621-1776.

1624-1776.—Colonial administration.—Constitutional results of trade legislation.—Colonial governors.—Colonial legislation.—"The governments of the American colonies were, at the close of the Stuart period, in a state of decidedly unstable equilibrium, due to the adoption by the English crown of a new and aggressive colonial policy. These new measures, however, cannot be appreciated without recalling certain leading principles of English colonial policy in its earlier phases. The first is the leaving of responsibility, not merely for the economic development but for the government of new colonies, to private individuals, private associations, or corporations, acting either under the authority of royal charters, or, as sometimes happened in New England, simply by the sufferance of the crown. No one of the mainland colonies began its career under a royal or provincial government, and until 1684 only two were definitely so organized: Virginia, which became a royal government in 1624, after the charter of the Virginia Company had been annulled; and New Hampshire, which, after a varied experience

at first under the nominal rule of a proprietor, and then as a part of Massachusetts, was finally, in 1697, organized as a separate royal province. Secondly, the tendency was, instead of concentrating governmental responsibility in a few hands, to authorize, or to permit, a large number of small governments. By 1684 there were on the mainland twelve distinct colonial governments: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Plymouth, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, East New Jersey, West New Jersey, Pennsylvania with the 'lower counties,' Virginia, Maryland, and Carolina, having, for the most part, no political connection with each other except their common subjection, slight and intangible as that often was, to the English crown and Parliament. The greatest variety appeared in the character of these governments, both as to the nature of their relations with the home government and as to their internal organization. In Virginia the constitution was in the main embodied in the royal commission and instructions issued to each succeeding governor. In the more recently organized proprietary governments the proprietor, though given considerable freedom of action, was held in check by such requirements as the allowing of appeals to the Privy Council or the submission of colonial laws for the approval of the crown. There were also quasi-independent governments like those of Maryland, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, where the crown had no effective check on colonial law and administration. Under the royal charters, New England had become the home of practically republican governments, where judges and executive officers as well as law-makers were chosen by the people or their representatives. The Maryland proprietary government may be described as a constitutional monarchy of the conservative type, while Penn's constitution was much more liberal. These governments, however, had one thing in common: the principle of popular representation had in some form or other been conceded in all of them, sometimes freely, as in Pennsylvania, and sometimes tardily, or only temporarily, as in New York. Often, however, the privileges of these representative bodies were imperfectly defined and held on a somewhat precarious tenure. A third striking characteristic of early colonial policy was the almost entire absence of parliamentary control. The English territories in America, whether acquired by discovery or by conquest, were the domains of the crown. The king determined the conditions under which they should be occupied, their trade carried on, and their governments organized. Not until the period of the Commonwealth . . . [had Parliament begun] to concern itself actively in the affairs of the colonies; and at first its work was mainly confined to the assertion of principles, without providing adequate machinery for their enforcement. During the second half of the seventeenth century there was in England greater interest in the problem of colonial government. The material resources and the industry of the colonies were to be exploited and made factors in the development of national power. By the navigation acts of the Commonwealth and Restoration governments, Parliament undertook to regulate the course of colonial enterprise. . . . The primary motive of . . . [trade] legislation was financial or economic, but it had also important constitutional results. Since the existing colonial governments could not be relied upon to enforce thoroughly the requirements of the navigation acts, a special official service was organized in the colonies, charged with this specific

duty. Consequently, there soon appeared side by side with the local governments of individual colonies, whether provincial, proprietary, or republican, the surveyor-general and the collectors of customs, as the representatives of a new imperial control. These new officials in turn were supervised and controlled by the Privy Council with its Committee of Trade and Plantations. Even these measures, however, were inadequate. The thorough enforcement of the law required the cordial co-operation of the colonial governor with the royal agent, but instead of this there was mutual suspicion and dislike. The governor was influenced by the local sentiment of the colony or the personal interests of the proprietor, which were often at variance with those of the crown. It was natural enough, therefore, that such men as Edward Randolph, who looked at the problem from the point of view of a royal official, should demand a reorganization of the colonial governments themselves, in order to make them more effective agents of imperial control. These general considerations, with others of a more local character, gradually led the English government to adopt new principles of colonial administration. The changed attitude of the crown towards the proprietary governments was illustrated in the New York patent of 1664 [see NEW YORK: 1664], and still more in Penn's charter of 1681. [See PENNSYLVANIA: 1681; 1681-1682.] In both these provinces the right of appeal to the Privy Council was expressly reserved by the crown, and in Pennsylvania this check upon provincial independence was reinforced by a number of new provisions, including a royal veto on colonial laws. . . . [Beginning with 1684 came the policy of amalgamation of provinces in the north and annulment of proprietary grants.] It seems probable that if this policy had not been interrupted by the revolution of 1689, direct control by the crown would have been secured in all, or nearly all, of the colonies. Thus the later policy of the Stuarts embodied these two leading principles: the substitution of royal for proprietary or elective governments; and the consolidation of numerous petty jurisdictions into a small number of strong provinces. Such a policy would probably in any case have provoked sharp antagonism from the colonists, and from the various proprietary interests which were thus assailed. It was still further weakened by being associated with another form of restriction with which it had no necessary connection: the colonies which were successively incorporated in the 'greater New England' of 1688 were left without any general representative assembly to take the place of the various local bodies which had been superseded. The extension of imperial control and the consolidation of governments may be regarded in some aspects at least as measures of progress; the denial of popular representation was distinctly reactionary."—E. B. Greene, *Provincial America, 1690-1740*, pp. 10-16.—"No colony was allowed to make laws contrary to those of England, though at first no colony was required to transmit its acts to England for acceptance or rejection. Not until the issue of the charter to Penn was such requirement made, and then the colony was called upon to transmit its laws to England within five years after their passage, and the council was to act upon them within six months after their receipt. A similar clause was inserted in the Massachusetts charter of 1691 when the period was limited to three years and no restriction was imposed upon the action of the council. The charter corporations

always denied the validity of the acts of Parliament in America unless re-enacted by their own assemblies; and Massachusetts refused to acknowledge the right of the council to invalidate her laws even when contrary to those of England. The idea of creating a uniform system of administration in the colonies, of bringing all to conform to a common type, and of rendering them more dependent on the home government by union under the crown, developed very slowly. The charter of the Virginia company was dissolved in 1624, and that of Massachusetts threatened in 1635-1637; but these annullments were no part of a common plan. The Council for Foreign Plantations, desiring to administer the navigation acts more efficiently, proposed to Charles II. in 1661 that he take all the existing proprietary colonies into his own hands and create no new ones in the future; but, though this plan for a uniform and centralized colonial organization was emphasized in Noell and Povey's 'Overtures,' the king allowed his personal inclinations to override the suggestions of the committee. Between 1660 and 1670 six new charters were issued; the four new colonies of the Carolinas, New York, the Jerseys, and Bahamas were founded; and Connecticut and Rhode Island received new charters. Even as late as 1676 the council committee could say that 'to consider New England so as to bring them under taxes and impositions or to send thither a governor to raise fortune from them cannot be of any use or service to his Majesty.' When, however, the reports of illegal trading and of quarrels between the collectors and the colonies began to come in, the Lords of Trade viewed the matter differently. Breaches of the acts of trade affected the king's income, a matter of great concern to the committee, which existed for the very purpose of safeguarding and increasing the customs revenues of the crown. The committee had already declared that the plantations could enact no laws touching the king's revenue without the king's 'particular knowledge'; and had already studied how best the colonies might be brought to a closer dependency on the crown in matters of trade. After 1680 complaints came in rapidly: Maryland, the Bermudas, and Massachusetts were the first colonies to give offence in the eyes of the board: the proprietary of Maryland and the companies in Bermuda and in Massachusetts were warned that continued violations of the acts would lead to the forfeiture of their charters."—C. M. Andrews, *Colonial self-government, 1652-1689*, v. 5, pp. 37-39.—"By 1700 the groundwork of government in every colony was the charter or the royal grant or concession. This was regarded as a pledge of good faith on the part of the home government and it was the doctrine in the colonies that neither the king nor his officers could rightfully violate the provisions of the charter. Even a law of the colonial legislature was regarded as void if it was contrary to the charter. In all the colonies government was organized on the principle that power should flow in three streams, and in every colony there were three great departments, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The legislative branch in nearly all the colonies consisted of the lower house elected by the voters, and of a small upper house—usually known as the council—appointed by the governor. The legislature could pass any law that was not contrary to the law of England and its statutes related to almost every subject of governmental concern. The lower house had full control in respect of the

raising and spending of money. The head of the executive department was the governor, a most important political personage in colonial life. In Connecticut and Rhode Island the governor was elected by the people; in the other colonies he was appointed either by the proprietor or by the king. The council, besides acting as one of the branches of the legislature, assisted the governor in the discharge of his duties. In every colony there was a judicial system, the judges of which were appointed by the governor, or by the king through the governor. In all the colonies the right of suffrage was made dependent upon the ownership of a certain amount of property and only the male adults could vote. In all the colonies there were counties and county officers. In the southern colonies, the county was the only local government. The Virginia county, modeled after the English shire, was for a long time a close corporation and was virtually an aristocracy of large landholders. But the English shire did not suit the conditions which prevailed in New England. Here, since the tillable land was divided by nature into small areas marked off by bold hills and troublesome streams, the settlers found it convenient to build their houses as close together as possible, and settle in compact villages rather than to spread out on large plantations. The form of local government adopted for these thickly settled communities was one that had almost perished from the earth. The ancient town or village meeting that the Anglo-Saxons had brought with them to England a thousand years before was revived in its ancient form and vigor and made to do duty in the Puritan communities. The town was a pure democracy in which all the adult inhabitants who were church-members had a voice. The New England town was chosen as an agency of local government throughout all New England, and under its stimulating and healthful influence there was developed a citizenship that has received the admiration of the world. The powers exercised by the colonial governments were very large. The colonial legislature could legislate on all matters pertaining to the welfare of the colony, but it could not infringe upon the laws of England. If a colonial law was contrary to the law of England it could be vetoed by the king. The royal veto was sometimes brought into use, but in most things each colony was a self-governing community left to manage its own affairs in its own way. It was a recognized principle that the colonies might legislate for themselves as they pleased, provided their laws were consistent with allegiance to the crown and were not contrary to those acts of Parliament in which the colonies were expressly mentioned. The independence enjoyed by the colony in matters of legislation is the cardinal fact of our colonial political history."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 37-38.

Also in: G. L. Beer, *Commercial policy of England toward the American colonies* (Columbia University studies in history, economics and public law, v. 3, no. 2).—Idem, *Cromwell's economic policy* (*Political Science Quarterly*, v. 16, pp. 582-611, v. 17, pp. 46-70).—W. B. Weeden, *Economic and social history of New England*, v. 1, ch. 7.—J. E. T. Rogers, *Economic interpretation of history*, ch. 15.—R. G. T. Thwaites, *Colonies, 1492-1750* (*Epochs of American History*).

1628-1776.—Industries in the colonies.—Social life.—"The economic life of the colonies was extremely simple, the main energies of the people being directed to the extractive industries. In ad-

dition to agriculture, which naturally in a new country claimed the first attention of the colonists, other industries soon sprang up as needs and opportunities directed. In New England, where agriculture by reason of the unfertile soil was least profitable, the chief occupations were lumbering, ship-building, trading, and fishing. The people of the middle States engaged in the fur trade, and, as did those of New England, in the manufacture of a wide range of household supplies; carpentry, black-smithing, and tanning were generally carried on in every community, while the spinning-wheel, the loom, and the hand card were to be found in almost every house. In the South, on the contrary, there were few industries outside the plantations of sugar, tobacco, rice, and indigo; some naval stores were produced, chiefly in North Carolina, but the varied household manufactures of the North were entirely lacking, even the most necessary supplies being procured from the northern colonies or from England. From the very beginning the efforts of the colonists were directed to the utilization of the almost exhaustless resources of the forests which surrounded them. Although in the southern colonies the magnificent forests were regarded rather as an encumbrance and recklessly cleared off to make room for the all-consuming tobacco, in the North they were early utilized as a cheap and quick export. Even by hand a man could make 15,000 clapboards or pipe-staves in a year, which, according to Wright, were worth in the colonies £4 per thousand, and in the Canaries £20. Owing to the scarcity of labor, however, it was exceedingly desirable to have machinery to do the work. Artisans were sent as early as 1620 to Virginia to set up a sawmill, but none seems to have been erected until 1652, when one was built at a cost of forty-eight beaver skins. The first mill in the colonies is stated by Bishop to have existed in Dorchester, New England, as early as 1628, which was thirty-five years before they were introduced into England. The Dutch built many mills along the Hudson to run by wind or water. The New Hampshire and Maine settlements were at first composed almost entirely of timber cutters, and here there was a sawmill as early as 1635. . . . One of the most important industries in the colonies, particularly in New England, was ship-building. The industry was begun within three years after the establishment of Plymouth Colony, and by 1631 had already grown to such proportions as to require official regulation. In 1676 Massachusetts had a total of 730 vessels. Owing to the large supplies of splendid timber at the water's very edge, cheaper and better vessels could be built in the American colonies than anywhere in Europe. Toward the end of this period an oak vessel could be built in Massachusetts for \$24 a ton, while neither in England nor on the continent could a similar vessel be built for less than \$50 a ton. American ships soon began not merely to carry on a vigorous trade at home, but to crowd out English shipping in the home ports. About fifty New England built vessels were annually sold abroad, and by 1775 about 398,000 tons or nearly one third of the tonnage afloat under the British flag had been built in American dock-yards. . . . It was in the fisheries in truth that New England gained her greatest wealth. The industry was developed early and throughout the whole of the colonial period remained a lucrative one. The cod fishery began about 1670, and developed so rapidly that within five years 665 vessels were employed in this in-

dustry, which required the services of over four thousand seamen. About 1700 the whale fishery was begun and prosecuted with such success that by 1721 two hundred and sixty vessels were employed. Within fifty years the whales deserted the American coast, but were followed to the Arctic and Antarctic Oceans by the whalers. In 1771 this business employed 304 vessels, with 4059 seamen. The fishing industry was confined exclusively to New England, and was estimated to bring in about £255,000 a year; during the colonial period not a vessel engaged in either the cod or whale fisheries was owned south of Connecticut. For that section it possessed great economic significance. . . . Although the commerce and trade of the colonies kept expanding, by the end of the colonial period the total exports from all the colonies amounted to only \$20,000,000. But so insignificant was the world's trade at that time that this comprised one seventh of the total commerce of England, and was considered sufficiently important for England to reserve it to herself."—E. L. Bogart, *Economic history of the United States*, pp. 49-53.—"The tilling of the soil absorbed the energies of not less than nine-tenths of the colonial population. Even those who by occupation were sailors, fishermen, fur traders, or merchants often gave a part of their time to the cultivation of farms or plantations. Land hunger was the master passion which brought the men of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries across the sea and lured them on to the frontier. Where hundreds sought for freedom of worship and release from political oppression, thousands saw in the great unoccupied lands of the New World a chance to make a living and to escape from their landlords at home. To obtain a freehold in America was, as Thomas Hutchinson once wrote of New England, the 'ruling purpose' which sent colonial sons with their cattle and belongings to some distant frontier township, where they would thrust back the wilderness and create a new community. Throughout the whole of the colonial period this migration westward in quest of land, whether overseas or through the wilderness, whether from New England or Old England or the Continent, continued at an accelerating pace. The Revolutionary troubles, of course, brought it temporarily to a standstill. . . . The towns of New England were compact little communities, favorably situated by sea or river, and their inhabitants were given over in the main to the pursuit of agriculture. Even many of the seaports and fishing villages were occupied by a folk as familiar with the plow as with the warehouse, the wharf, or the fishing smack, and accustomed to supply their sloops and schooners with the produce of their own and their neighbors' acres. Life in the towns was one of the incessant activity. The New Englander's house, with its barns, outbuildings, kitchen garden, and back lot, fronted the village street, while near at hand were the meetinghouse and schoolhouse, pillories, stocks, and signpost, all objects of constant interest and frequent concern. Beyond this clustered group of houses stretched the outlying arable land, meadows, pastures, and woodland, the scene of the villager's industry and the source of his livelihood. Thence came wheat and corn for his gristmill, hay and oats for his horses and cattle, timber for his sawmill, and wood for the huge fireplace which warmed his home. The lots of an individual owner would be scattered in several divisions, some near at hand, to be reached easily on foot, others



two or more miles distant, involving a ride on horseback or by wagon. While most of the New Englanders preferred to live in neighborly fashion near together, some built their houses on a convenient hillside or fertile upland away from the center. Here they set up 'quarters' or 'corners' which were often destined to become in time little villages by themselves, each the seat of a cow pound, a chapel, and a school. Sometimes these little centers developed into separate ecclesiastical societies and even into independent towns; but frequently they remained legally a part of the original church and township, and the residents often journeyed many miles to take part in town meeting or to join in the social and religious life of the older community. . . . Outside New England there was greater variety of landholding and cultivation. The Puritan traveler journeying southward through the Middle Colonies must have seen many new and unfamiliar sights as he looked over the country through which he passed. He would have found himself entirely at home among the towns of Long Island, Westchester County, and northern New Jersey, and would have discovered much in the Dutch villages about New York and up the Hudson that reminded him of the closely grouped houses and small allotments of his native heath. But had he stopped to investigate such large estates as the Scarsdale, Pelham, Fordham, and Morrisania manors on his way to New York, or turned aside to inspect the great Philipse and Cortlandt manors along the lower Hudson, or the still greater Livingston, Claverack, and Rensselaer manors farther north, he would have seen wide acres under cultivation, with tenants and rent rolls and other aspects of a proprietary and aristocratic order. Had he made further inquiries or extended his observations to the west and north of the Hudson, he would have come upon grants of thousands of acres lavishly allotted by governors to favored individuals. He would then have realized that the division of land in New York, instead of being fairly equal as in New England, was grossly unequal. . . . [The same conditions obtained in New Jersey and Pennsylvania where large estates were also to be found.] But there were also thousands of small fields belonging to the Puritan and Dutch settlers at Newark, Elizabeth, Middletown, Bergen, and other towns in northern New Jersey, and a constantly increasing number of somewhat larger farms in the hands of the Germans and Scotch-Irish in the back counties of Pennsylvania. . . . Unlike the Puritans, to whom country seats and summer resorts were unknown and trips to mountain and seashore were strictly matters of necessity or business, the town-folk of the Middle Colonies residing in New York, Burlington, and Philadelphia had country residences, not mere cottages for makeshift house-keeping but substantial structures, often of brick, well furnished within and surrounded by grounds neatly kept and carefully cultivated. . . . [The southerner] was unacquainted . . . with the self-centered activity of those busy northern communities or the narrow range of petty duties and interests that filled the day of the Puritan farmer and tradesman. Were he a landed aristocrat of Anne Arundel or Talbot county in Maryland, he would himself have possessed an enormous amount of property consisting of scattered tracts in all parts of the province, sometimes fifteen or thirty thousand acres in all. Many of these estates he was accustomed to speak of as manors, though the peculiar rights which distinguished a

manor from any other tract of land early disappeared, and the manor in Maryland and Virginia, as elsewhere, meant merely a landed estate. . . . It would be a mistake, however, to think of Maryland and Virginia as covered only by great plantations with swarms of slaves and lordly mansions. In both these Southern Colonies there were hundreds of small farmers possessing single grants of land upon which they had erected modest houses. Many of these farmers rented lands of the planter under limited leases and paid their rents in money, or probably more often in produce, labor, and money. . . . The only really important towns in these colonies during the colonial period were Annapolis and Williamsburg. In these towns many of the planters had houses which they occupied during the greater part of the year or at any rate when the Assembly was in session and life was gay and festive. . . . In all the cities of the North and South stores and shops were to be found, occupying the first floor, while the family lived in the rooms above. . . . [In the eighteenth century] a thousand and one articles from the great manufacturing towns of England—London, Bristol, Birmingham, Sheffield, Nottingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Torrington, and other centers—were brought in almost every ship that set sail for America. Scarcely a letter went from a Virginia planter or a Boston, New York, or Philadelphia merchant which did not contain a personal order for articles of clothing for himself or his family, and scarcely a captain sailed for England who did not carry commissions of one kind or another. The very names of the fabric which the colonists bought show the extent of this early trade: Holland lawn, linen, duck, and blankets, German serge, Osnaburg linen, Mecklenburg silk, Barcelona silk handkerchiefs, Flanders thread, Spanish poplin, Russian lawn and sheeting, Hungarian stuff, Romal or Bombay handkerchiefs, Scottish tartans and cloths, and Irish linen."—C. M. Andrews, *Colonial folkways* (A. J. Johnson, ed., *Chronicles of America*, v. 9, pp. 23-26, 28-31, 33-35, 37, 62, 76-77).—See also VIRGINIA: 1700: Contrast, etc.

Also in: A. M. Earle, *Home life in colonial days*.

1631-1709.—Early tariff.—Tonnage.—Slave trade. See TARIFF: 1631-1709.

1636.—Founding of Harvard College. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1636.

1636.—First American constitution framed. See CONNECTICUT: 1636-1639.

1642-1735.—Poor relief in colonial days. See CHARITIES: United States: 1642-1770.

1643.—New England Confederation formed. See NEW ENGLAND: 1643.

1651-1672.—Navigation Acts and the colonies.—English restrictive commercial system.—"While England was yielding to her colonies a great deal of freedom in the matter of local government, she was passing many and minute regulations affecting the commerce and internal industrial development of those same colonies; and in this she was carrying out a fairly consistent policy and had done so from early times. When the struggle with Spain in the sixteenth century . . . was succeeded in the seventeenth century by a commercial rivalry with the Dutch, the control of the carrying trade became all-important. The famous series of Navigation Acts, beginning in 1651, unfolded a policy that was frankly intended to develop English shipping as the best support of the navy. Another closely related feature of the commercial

policy . . . was to promote in the colonies the production of naval stores for which England was dangerously dependent upon foreign countries with whom she might at any moment go to war. The colonies were also to provide raw materials which were not procurable at home, and they were to furnish a market for English manufactures, the exchange of commodities to be so regulated that the balance of trade would be in favor of the mother country."—M. Farrand, *Development of the United States*, p. 22.—"The tobacco trade began the shaping of English policy [often spoken of as the Old Colonial system] and determined the direction that her interests should take. Before parliament had placed the subject on the broader foundation of a statute, the Privy Council, as early as 1621, had issued its orders compelling the colonists of Virginia to send all their tobacco to England and forbidding all foreigners to trade with the colonies. In the commercial rivalry with the Dutch that followed, the Rump Parliament under the Commonwealth passed an ordinance in 1651, requiring that such trade should not only be confined to England but should be carried only in ships owned by English people or by the colonists, and manned by English masters with a crew, three quarters of which at least should be English. [See NAVIGATION LAWS: 1651.] The act was not thoroughly enforced and the Dutch continued to trade with the colonies in spite of it, until, after the Restoration, the feeling in England became so strong as to demand the embodiment of these principles in acts of parliament. Consequently, three great acts were passed in 1660, 1663, 1672, which repeated the former commands and added to them. England's commerce must be carried in England's ships, though foreign built ships might be used. Even this exception was withdrawn in 1662, and Ireland, which was included at first within the privileges of the act, was debarred in 1670. In the act of 1660 the former orders of the Privy Council regarding the bringing of tobacco to England only were given a wide extension, and sugar, cotton, indigo, ginger, and dyewoods, and later rice, molasses, beaver skins, cocoa, copper, and naval stores, were barred entirely from the foreign market. When in the operation of the act it was found that the colonists were carrying these commodities from one colonial port to another and then, deeming the law fulfilled, were sailing with them directly to Europe, the act of 1672 was passed. This act required that a duty, apparently equal to that imposed at the time in England, should be paid at the colonial port of entry, in case the ship captain would not bind himself by certificate to carry the commodities to England. . . . The acts thus far defined favored New England as against the other colonies, because the enumerated commodities were nearly all of exclusive southern or West Indian growth. But in 1663 an act was passed touching a new aspect of the case and affecting New England as well as the others. This act declared that all commodities imported into the colonies from the Continent should be brought to England before shipment to America. This meant that all imported articles which the colonies used must come from England, even though such articles might be of foreign manufacture. A few exceptions were allowed, such as salt and 'victual,' and wines from Madeira and the Azores, which were used in the colonies before they were used in England, but the exceptions were comparatively trifling. The ships were, of course, to be English built, and

three-fourths of the mariners English subjects. The captain on arriving in a colonial port must register his name, the ship's cargo, tonnage, and other details, with a person properly appointed to receive them. . . . By these acts the commercial policy of England was formally defined by statute, but for the first thirty years the laws were not strictly obeyed. Licenses were issued, particularly to the ships of Scotland, which kingdom, with Ireland and the Isle of Man, lay outside the privileged area and was forbidden to trade directly with the colonies. In 1665 an order in council allowed the use of foreign built ships manned by seamen of any nation in amity with England, and this order remained in force until 1668. The law was entirely dispensed with during the war with the Dutch in 1672. At other times, however, it was ordered to be strictly enforced, and in consequence complaints poured in, particularly from Barbadoes, Virginia, and New England, and the general charge was made that the acts of trade were seriously injuring the commerce of the plantations. Breaches of the acts were committed in the West Indies, New York, and New England, particularly in connection with the Irish and Scottish trade."—C. M. Andrews, *Colonial period*, pp. 114-118.

The Act of 1672 "was well entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of the Greenland and Eastland fisheries, and for the better securing of the plantation trade.' History is silent respecting the fisheries, but it has been very outspoken concerning its effect on the plantations. The effect was this: if Rhode Island wished to be supplied by Massachusetts with one of the enumerated commodities, and Massachusetts desired to furnish Rhode Island with that commodity, the delivery of the goods could not be made by the producer to the consumer, but the article would have to be sent to England first, and landed there, and then be sent back from England to Rhode Island before the consumer could touch it. A line drawn from Boston, in Massachusetts, to Bristol, in England, and thence back to Newport, in Rhode Island, will show the course which such article must take, if sold by Massachusetts to Rhode Island, before the demands of English commerce were satisfied; it will in all probability likewise show the least angle with the longest sides ever subtended on the chart of trade. Should, however, the parties to the transaction desire to avoid the risk and delay incident to this phenomenal voyage, they could do so by paying the certain rates and duties prescribed by this statute."—E. G. Scott, *Development of constitutional liberty in the English colonies of America*, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: M. Chamberlain, *Revolution impending: Critical essay (Narrative and critical history of America*, v. 6, p. 64).

1663-1745.—Colonial immigration.—Nationality of immigrants.—Causes of migration.—Redemptioners.—"Almost the entire population of New England was English; and in most of the other colonies they outnumbered, or at least equaled, the settlers of any other single nationality. Next to the English the Germans were probably the most numerous. They first began to immigrate to the colonies, in appreciable numbers, during the closing years of the 17th century. About 1664 the troops of Louis XIV overran that part of Germany called the Palatinate, a country lying on both sides of the Rhine. Religious persecution followed and thousands of Germans were practically driven from their homes. . . . England cham-

pioned the Protestant cause, and extended a general invitation to the persecuted Protestants of all Europe to find homes for themselves in her American colonies. . . . [A] well-intentioned but disastrous attempt to settle a colony of Germans in New York, and various plans to divert them to Virginia and the Carolinas [were made]; . . . but Pennsylvania was the central point of settlement for the Germans. [See PALATINES.] A few of that nationality were among the Quaker colonists who founded Philadelphia; and these, from time to time, were joined by others."—E. E. Proper, *Colonial immigration laws* (Columbia University studies in history, economics and public law, 1900, v. 12, no. 2, pp. 77-78).—"Of the serving class, of the English, only a few came willingly. These were the 'free-willers' or 'redemptioners,' who sold their services usually for a term of five years to pay for their passage money. But the great mass of unskilled labor necessary to clear the forests and do the other hard work so plentiful in a pioneer land came to America under duress. Kidnaping or 'spiriting' achieved the perfection of a fine art under the second Charles. Boys and girls of the poorer classes, those wretched waifs who thronged the streets of London and other towns, were hustled on board ships and virtually sold into slavery for a term of years. It is said that in 1670 alone ten thousand persons were thus kidnaped; and one kidnaper testified in 1671 that he had sent five hundred persons a year to the colonies for twelve years and another that he had sent 840 in one year. Transportation of the idle poor was another common source for providing servants. In 1663 an act was passed by Parliament empowering Justices of the Peace to send rogues, vagrants, and 'sturdy beggars' to the colonies. . . . Servants who had worked out their time usually became tenants or freeholders, often moving to other colonies and later to the interior beyond the 'fall line,' where they became pioneers in their turn."—S. P. Orth, *Our foreigners*, pp. 8-10.—"Next to the Germans the Scotch, Scotch-Irish and Irish contributed the largest number of immigrants to the American colonies. [See PENNSYLVANIA: 1710-1740.] After the execution of Charles I., the Scots took up the cause of his son, with the understanding that, if successful, he would protect them in their religious worship. Cromwell's victories soon put an end to their hopes, and several hundred Scottish prisoners were shipped to the colonies. A ship load of them were transported to Boston and became worthy citizens of the Puritan colony. . . . The restoration of Charles II. failed to improve the condition of the Scotch. . . . [Severe laws and treatment] drove thousands from their native country into Ireland; many emigrated to America, and years later a large proportion of the descendants of the former sought homes in the colonies, being known as the Scotch-Irish. . . . Penn and eleven other Quakers, several of whom were Scotch, purchased East Jersey, with the view of securing as extensive an immigration from Scotland as possible. Nor were they disappointed; many from that country and from the north of Ireland were induced to immigrate and settle in that section. In point of virtue, education and piety the Jersey settlers were the equal of any that sought these shores. . . . Princeton University is a monument to their intellectual capacity. But, as in case of the Germans, Pennsylvania received the bulk of the Scotch and Irish immigration."—E. E. Proper, *Colonial immigration laws* (Columbia University studies in history, economics and

public law, 1900, v. 12, no. 2, p. 79).—"The most important and influential influx of non-English stock into the colonies was the copious stream of Scotch-Irish. . . . England, in her mercantilist blindness, began to pass legislation that aimed to cut off these fabrics from English competition. Soon thousands of Ulster artisans were out of work. Nor was their religion immune from English attack, for these Ulstermen were Presbyterians. These civil, religious, and economic persecutions thereupon drove to America an ethnic strain that has had an influence upon the character of the nation far out of proportion to its relative numbers. . . . There has been some trade between Ulster and the colonies, and a few Ulstermen had settled on the eastern shore of Maryland and in Virginia before the close of the seventeenth century. Between 1714 and 1720, fifty-four ships arrived in Boston with immigrants from Ireland. They were carefully scrutinized by the Puritan exclusionists. Cotton Mather wrote in his diary on August 7, 1718: 'But what shall be done for the great number of people that are transporting themselves thither from ye North of Ireland?' . . . The great mass of Scotch-Irish, however, came to Pennsylvania, and in such large numbers that James Logan, the Secretary of the Province, wrote to the Proprietors in 1729: 'It looks as if Ireland is to send all its inhabitants hither, for last week not less than six ships arrived, and every day two or three arrive also.' These colonists did not remain in the towns but, true to their traditions, pushed on to the frontier. . . . The rebellions of the Pretenders in Scotland in 1715 and 1745 and the subsequent break-up of the clan system produced a considerable migration to the colonies from both the Highlands and the Lowlands. These new colonists settled largely in the Carolinas and in Maryland. The political prisoners, of whom there were many in consequence of the rebellions, were sold into servitude, usually for a term of fourteen years. In Pennsylvania the Welsh founded a number of settlements in the neighborhood of Philadelphia."—S. P. Orth, *Our foreigners*, pp. 10, 12-13.—"The records show that nearly 6,000 Irish servants arrived in that colony in 1729, and that up to the middle of the century the arrival of settlers from these countries was in the thousands each year. The provincial historian Proud writes, 'They have flowed in from the north of Ireland in very large numbers.' They settled chiefly in the eastern and middle parts of the colony. Cumberland county was almost wholly peopled with these emigrants. But they or their descendants also migrated in large numbers, the western parts of Maryland, Virginia and the Carolinas receiving the principal share. Besides these migrations, many Scotch and Irish settlers removed to the Southern colonies directly from their native countries. . . . As early as 1684 a small company of Scotch settled in South Carolina. About 1737 multitudes of husbandmen and laborers from Ireland embarked for that Province. Indeed, Ramsay is authority for the statement that of all European countries Ireland furnished South Carolina with the greatest number of her inhabitants. Georgia, too, was partially colonized by the Scotch and Irish, some of whom emigrated from Pennsylvania, although a shipload of Scotch Highlanders went directly there soon after the settlement of the colony. [See also SCOTCH-IRISH.] . . . The immigration of the French Huguenots to America is an exceedingly interesting event in the history of the colonies. Their name is associated with many romantic efforts to plant

settlements on their own account during the sixteenth century; and their arrival in the English colonies began much earlier than is generally supposed. [See FLORIDA: 1562-1563; 1567-1568.] Massachusetts passed an act in 1662 permitting a company of French Huguenots to reside in that colony; and later a considerable number of them were granted lands and made a settlement at Oxford in that Province. Rhode Island also received a company of these exiles. New York at an early date became an asylum for the French Protestants. Even before the English conquests of New Netherland its population contained a considerable number of Huguenot refugees who had fled to Holland and thence made their way to the Dutch colony. New Rochelle [above New York] on the East River was settled almost wholly by these immigrants; and Gov Dongan, writing about 1687, mentions the arrival of Huguenot families in considerable numbers. Wm. Penn had agents in London for the purpose of inducing some of these desirable settlers to locate in his province; but not many availed themselves of his offer. Every great European event affected the fortunes of the colonies. Especially is this observable in the case of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Thousands of Huguenots left France for Holland and England. Collections were taken up for them in the latter country, and Parliament assisted in their transportation to America by a generous grant of money. In 1670 Charles II. sent two shiploads of them to South Carolina, in order to introduce the cultivation of grapes, olives and the silkworm. This was only the beginning of a considerable stream of French Huguenots who continued to pour into the Carolinas down to the time of the Seven Years' War. . . . About 1715 the larger German immigration set in, and for the next forty years a constant stream of Germans landed at the ports of Pennsylvania. [See PENNSYLVANIA: 1710-1740.] The bulk of this comparatively enormous immigration . . . settled in the Quaker colony, but many of the original immigrants and thousands of their children migrated to Maryland and Virginia. The Carolinas also attracted large numbers of these settlers; and about the middle of the century, when these colonies began to offer generous inducements in granting lands, large bodies of settlers gave up their homes in Pennsylvania, and, driving their flocks and herds before them, made their way overland to the Southern colonies. The only considerable settlement of Germans in New England was made at Waldoborough, in Maine, about 1739. . . . The foregoing nationalities constituted the important foreign elements that entered into the colonial immigration. There were, however, other nations represented in lesser degrees. The Dutch were numerous enough in eastern New York to give that region a characteristic social atmosphere. The Swedes once had a flourishing settlement on the Delaware [see DELAWARE: 1638-1640]; but their numbers were too small to make any impression on the colonial population. A small colony of Polish Protestants during the early years of the eighteenth century made their way to New Jersey and settled in the valleys of the Passaic and Raritan. A few Jews found homes in some of the larger cities [see JEWS: United States: 17th-18th centuries], and in Newport were numerous enough to support a synagogue. [In 1691 they had a synagogue in Manhattan. No civil disabilities were imposed against them, except that they could not vote for members of the legislature.] Briefly summarizing the distribution of these nationalities, we

observe that the Germans as a rule settled along the headwaters of the rivers flowing into the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, and along the eastern slope of the Appalachian mountains, as far south as Georgia. The bulk of the Scotch-Irish entered the colonies at the same ports as the Germans, namely, those on the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays and their tributaries, and located in about the same sections and their future migrations took practically the same direction. The French Huguenots made the seaboard districts of the Carolinas their main point of immigration, though they have left their impress on the other colonies in which they settled."—E. E. Proper, *Colonial immigration laws* (Columbia University studies in history, economics and public law, 1900, v. 12, no. 2, pp. 80-81, 78, 81-82).—See also GEORGIA: 1734.

1671.—French claims to Wisconsin. See WISCONSIN: 1671-1685.

1675-1678.—King Philip's War in New England. See NEW ENGLAND: 1674-1675, to 1676-1678.

1677.—Maine purchased by Massachusetts. See MAINE: 1643-1677.

1678-1680.—Transition from Dutch to English government in New York.—Visits of Andros to England.—Controversy of Lewin and Andros.—"The treaty [of Westminster] did not restore New York to the Duke whose name it bore but handed it over directly to Charles II, who, however, again granted it to his brother James. [See NETHERLANDS: 1674.] Edmund Andros, a major in Prince Rupert's regiment of dragoons, was sent out to take control of the province, which had now changed hands for the last time. His character was probably neither so white nor so black as it has been painted; but it is certain that he lacked the tact of Nicolls [the first English governor of the colony] and he brought to his task the habits of a soldier rather than an administrator. He never succeeded in winning the complete confidence of the people."—M. W. Goodwin, *Dutch and English on the Hudson* (A. J. Johnson, ed., *Chronicles of America*, v. 7, p. 144).—"During his administration of seven years as proprietary governor Andros visited England twice, and reported upon the condition of New York. His report on the first occasion—in 1678—was made to the committee of Trade and Plantations, and was occasioned by the charges made by Massachusetts that, during the recent Indian war, the people in the neighborhood of Albany had furnished ammunition and other material for war to Philip and his men. Upon petition of Andros, Stoughton and Bulkley, the agents of Massachusetts, were called upon to justify the charge, but were unable to do so. Thereupon an order in council was issued declaring that none of the inhabitants about Albany should lie under such an imputation unless Massachusetts should prosecute them thereon to a legal conviction within one year, and that the government of Massachusetts should be immediately informed to that effect. The Puritan colonies never responded to the challenge. The relations between them and Andros had never been cordial, and, in fact, could not be so with any governor of New York, so long as by charter its northeast boundary line was the Connecticut river. In the testimony, moreover, which Andros gave before the English authorities concerning the colonies in general, he urged the importance from the military standpoint of the crown regulating the militia of the colonies in such a way as to secure united action. This foreshadowed the course which was later to be taken, and this, with other free criticisms, still

further prejudiced New Englanders against Andros. The confidence of the crown in his ability and fidelity was, however, shown by the bestowment on him at this time of the honor of knighthood. The second visit of Andros to England, and the one which closed his administration, was caused, in 1680, by a direct summons from the duke. . . . At the same time John Lewin, supposed to have been a London attorney, was commissioned as the special agent of the duke, to go to New York and thoroughly inform himself concerning the administration of the revenue of the province and its amount. . . . Lewin submitted a long report, in which he treated several of the charges as substantiated. Andros presented a reply, denying the charges seriatim, and shifting the responsibility on other officials and their conduct after he had left the province. William Dyer, the collector of the customs at New York, having meanwhile been sent to London under a charge arising from illegal collection of the revenue, he, with Andros, Lewin, and others, was examined by John Churchill on behalf of the commissioners of the duke's revenue. Churchill could not find that Lewin and his friends were able to sustain any of their charges against either Andros or Dyer, and both were discharged. But, though the fidelity of Andros to the proprietor was proven, Colonel Thomas Dongan was selected to carry on the government of the province, and to finally quench the hostility of the English merchants to the customs regulations of the duke, from which Andros had suffered, by calling a representative assembly."—H. L. Osgood, *American colonies in the seventeenth century*, pp. 129-131.

1680.—First conquest of New Mexico. See NEW MEXICO: 1678-1800.

1681-1750.—Westward expansion.—Immigration.—French in Mississippi valley.—Spanish influence.—"After the founding of Pennsylvania [under the grant made in 1681 by Charles II to William Penn (see PENNSYLVANIA: 1681; 1681-1682; 1682)], a half-century passed before another colony was planted. During this interval it was more desirable to develop the existing colonies than to organize new ones. The development consisted mainly in pushing back the frontier line—the line which divided the settled country from the wilderness, civilization from savagery—and bringing vacant lands under cultivation. In New England and New York the rapid settlement of the back country was for many years rendered impossible by unfavorable conditions arising out of conflicts on the frontier between the English and the French. In Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, however, settlements were carried westward in energetic fashion. In 1716 Alexander Spotswood, the governor of Virginia, took with him a party of fifty men and pushed out into the Shenandoah Valley. [See VIRGINIA: 1710-1716; 1744.] Soon English settlements began to appear in the valley, and by 1750 the frontier line in Virginia had moved westward as far as the Blue Ridge Mountains. The expedition of Spotswood was the first step in the mighty westward movement. The rapid development of western Virginia and western Pennsylvania was due largely to the industry and enterprise of German and Scotch-Irish immigrants who at the close of the seventeenth and the opening of the eighteenth century began to come to America in large numbers. . . . As they were excellent pioneers, the great forests of Pennsylvania fell rapidly before the heavy strokes of their axes. . . . Hand in hand with the Germans in the settlement of western Pennsylvania went the Scotch-Irish . . .

[who] settled in all parts of British America but most of . . . whom found homes in Pennsylvania. Like the Pennsylvania Dutch, the Scotch were good pioneers. They made settlements wherever they could find unoccupied lands. They paid little attention to the claims of the Indians, as they said 'it was against the laws of God and nature that so much good land should be idle while so many Christians wanted it to work on and raise their bread.' Thus through the industry and enterprise of pioneers the strip of English civilization on the American coast rapidly grew wider. Between 1700 and 1750 the frontier line in some places was carried westward over the Blue Ridge Mountains even to the crest of the Alleghenies. . . . By the time the English were ready to carry their settlements westward beyond the Alleghenies the French had established their power in the Mississippi Valley. The movement which carried the French into the valley began in the reign of Louis XIV, who desired to build up in America an empire which would redound 'to the glory of God' and to his own honor. In accordance with his wishes exploration in America was carried forward in every direction and with renewed zeal. In 1670 at the Sault Sainte Marie, Saint Lussou took possession in the name of Louis XIV of all the territory from the North to the South Sea extending to the ocean in the west. Three years later Joliet and Marquette by the route of the Fox-Wisconsin waterway reached the Mississippi and in their light canoes paddled down the stream as far as the mouth of the Arkansas. After Joliet and Marquette came Robert La Salle, who explored the Mississippi to its mouth and, landing on one of the banks of the great stream, took possession in 1682 of the surrounding country in the name of the king of France, calling it Louisiana in honor of the king. [See CANADA: 1660-1687.] France was now in possession of the St. Lawrence Valley, the Great Lakes region, and the Mississippi Valley. [See below: 1748-1754.] The English by this time were the masters of only a narrow strip of coast land; the French had gained possession of the heart of the American continent. But England and France were jealous rivals for power both in the Old World and in the New, and it was only a matter of time when the ancient enmity of these two nations would show itself in American affairs."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 38-40.—See also LOUISIANA: 1698-1712, and after; MISSOURI: 1762-1803; OHIO: 1748-1754.—"In the sixteenth century Spain . . . had thrust up into the North the two outposts of Florida and New Mexico. In time foreign intrusion made it necessary to occupy the intervening region called Texas, which embraced a goodly slice of what is now Louisiana. While Spain was busy farther south, other nations were encroaching on her northern claims. By 1670 England had planted strong centers of colonization all the way from Jamaica to New England, and had erected trading posts on Hudson Bay. French traders from Canada, meanwhile, had been pushing up the St. Lawrence to the Great Lakes and branching north and south through the wilderness. At the same time French and English buccaneers from the West Indies were marauding the Florida settlements and the coast towns of Mexico. English, French, and Spanish territorial claims and frontier settlements clashed. The lines of competition, imperial and commercial, were drawing tighter with every passing year. On the Atlantic coast the Anglo-Spanish frontiers clashed with resounding echo from the very moment of the founding of

Charleston (1670), just across from the Spanish outpost Santa Elena, on Port Royal Sound. If Plymouth Rock and Hudson Bay were too remote to have a direct influence on Spanish claims, nevertheless their indirect influence—through the acceleration they gave to French activities—was to be potent. France's opportunity, indeed, seemed golden. And it was in the West. In Europe France was rapidly taking the position of supremacy which had been Spain's; and New France promised to become not only a valuable source of revenue through the fur trade—if the wide beaver lands 'beyond' could be secured—but also the point of control over the Strait of Anian for which French explorers as well as Spanish sought. The French had heard also of a great river flowing through the continent; they hoped to discover that river and thus control the best trade route to China. When Joliet and Marquette descended the Mississippi to the Arkansas in 1673 and returned to publish their news in Quebec, some of their hearers at least believed that the river had been found. . . . For several years after 1776 the

Crown, and its possessors were soon given to understand that they must bargain for the ownership of it by paying quit-rents. Andros assumed the government on December 20, 1686. Plymouth and the portion of Maine called the County of Cornwall, which had belonged to the Duke of York before his succession to the crown, were included under the jurisdiction of the new Governor. The only limit on his power of making laws was the necessity for the concurrence of a Council whose members he had the authority to displace, and the requirement of the royal sanction. The Governor could impose taxes with the Council's consent. The severe punishment which followed upon instances of resistance was useless. Andros could institute courts of justice, and no appeal could be taken from their decisions except to the King. Dudley was appointed censor of the press. Without his leave nothing could be printed. . . . The levying of taxes by the fiat of the Governor, the enforced renewal of land-titles, and the exaction of excessive fees, filled the minds of a liberty-loving people with indignation. The



ANDROS'S SEAL WHICH SUPPLANTED THAT OF THE PLYMOUTH COLONY


vital question in Louisiana was the outcome of the American Revolution."—H. E. Bolton, *Spanish borderlands*, pp. 207-209, 252.

1683-1791.—Founding of the University of Pennsylvania. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1683-1791.

1685-1693.—Development of printing. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1685-1693.

1686-1689.—Tyranny of Andros as governor of New England.—In 1683 the charter of the Massachusetts colony was annulled. "For a time, however, the old charter government was allowed to go on, until the new king, James II., by his commission to Joseph Dudley, organized the first royal government in Massachusetts. . . . The commission included New Hampshire, Maine, and the King's Province; and in the following year, 1686, Sir Edmund Andros received a new commission, which included also the colony of Plymouth."—E. B. Greene, *Provincial governor in the English colonies of North America* (*Harvard Historical Studies*, v. 7, p. 16).—"When the charter of Massachusetts was annulled, the colony was left absolutely subject to the King. Its inhabitants were not only stripped of political rights; it was even held that all the land was the property of the

same measures were carried out in Maine, and, to some extent, in New Hampshire. In December, 1686, Rhode Island was joined, without any resistance on her part, to the dominion of Andros. At the same time he entered on the task, which it took nearly a year to accomplish, of annexing Connecticut to his dominion. In October, he visited Hartford. There is a tradition that while the discussion was proceeding with the magistrates, in the presence of a numerous company, the lights were suddenly extinguished, and the charter taken from the table and hidden in the hollow trunk of an oak tree, which was known in later times as the 'Charter Oak.' Some occurrence of interest at the time, perhaps the hiding of a duplicate copy of the charter, is the ground of this legend. . . . In June, 1687, New York and the Jerseys were added to the territories subject to him. While Boston was to be the capital of the extensive 'Dominion,' which was to have the name New England, a Deputy-Governor was to reside in New York. A military expedition, which Andros led into Maine against the Indians, brought great sufferings upon those who took part in it. This increased the unpopularity of the Governor, who was unjustly suspected of sinister designs in con-



INTERIOR OF A COLONIAL HOME

Reconstruction





nection with the enterprise—with nothing less than a secret purpose to destroy the Massachusetts troops. He had previously captured Castine from the French. . . . [When news of the Revolution (1688) reached the colonies in April, 1689, the objectionable government was overthrown in Massachusetts, Andros was taken prisoner, and sent back to England.] In Plymouth, the old government was likewise reinstated. The same thing was done in Connecticut. In Rhode Island, the old officers were restored, but the Governor declined to serve. When James fell from power, the machinery of tyrannical government which he had erected in New England fell with him. Andros, its agent, was hated in New England, but he had simply carried out the will of the government of which he was the agent. As regards his personal character, apart from his sympathy and official connection with an odious system, there is no ground for serious reproach."—G. P. Fisher, *Colonial era*, pp. 160-164.—See also MASSACHUSETTS: 1686-1689; NEW ENGLAND: 1686.

1689-1691.—Committee on Trade and Plantations.—Policy of William III.—Return of the charters.—"One of the first acts of William III. was the appointment, in February, 1689, of a new Committee of the Privy Council on Trade and Plantations, including the leading ministers of state, both Whig and Tory. In the early months of 1689 the general principles of colonial policy were discussed with some care, and the new committee accepted, in large measure, the policy of its predecessors. . . . In the mean time the colonists were taking matters into their own hands. Revolutionary movements in Massachusetts and New York overthrew the Andros administration; the New England colonies resumed their chartered constitutions, and in New York Leisler set up his revolutionary government. In Maryland the agitators of the Protestant Association took advantage of religious prejudices against the Catholic proprietor to overthrow his authority and organize a new government in the name of William and Mary. . . . The confusion was seriously increased in many colonies by the outbreak of war with France and by Indian incursions on the northern frontiers. With these various and perplexing problems to be dealt with, it is not surprising that the king and his ministers were not able at once to restore order and carry out a consistent policy; and it is a mark of statesmanship that during the next two years a fair solution of the problem was worked out in most of the colonies. . . . The question still remained of restoring the old charters, especially in New England. The colonists . . . claimed to stand in defence of ancient privileges arbitrarily taken from them by the now discredited government of James II. . . . Against these claims, however, were enlisted some powerful influences. . . . The revolution also strengthened rather than weakened the influence of the merchants in the government; desiring, as they did, a strict observance of the navigation acts [see NAVIGATION LAWS], and a steady assertion of British as against distinctively colonial interests, it was clearly their interest to extend the administrative control of the mother-country. Lastly the outbreak of war both in Europe and America served to emphasize the military point of view. It was urged again and again in the colonial correspondence that . . . so long as the colonies were divided into petty independent jurisdictions the adjustment of colonial governments from 1689 to 1691 was a fair compromise between the antagonistic views which have just been described.

The idea of a consolidated New England was abandoned: Connecticut and Rhode Island were allowed to resume their rights of government under the old charters which had never been definitely surrendered; and New Hampshire was to be governed, as before, as a separate royal province, though the proprietor of the soil, Samuel Allen, was given a governor's commission. The tendency towards consolidation appears, however, in the new charter of Massachusetts, which organized under a single royal government of Massachusetts, Maine, and the old colony of Plymouth. The charter also included Acadia, recently conquered by Sir William Phips; but this clause was deprived of importance through the French reconquest of Port Royal in 1691."—E. B. Greene, *Provincial America, 1690-1740*, pp. 17-21.—See also NEW ENGLAND: 1686.

1690.—King William's War.—First American congress.—"After the accession [in England, 1689] of William and Mary, hostilities were declared between France and England, which extended to America; and thus began the first inter-colonial war [commonly known in American history as King William's War]. The French soon planned an invasion of Boston and New York. . . . On the 8th of February, 1690, a war-party, who had come stealthily from Canada, entered the open gates of the town of Schenectady, when it was snowing, and broke the stillness of midnight with the terrible yell and whoop of the savages. Men, women, and children, for two hours, were mercilessly butchered. Their dwellings were burned. The whole town was sacked. . . . The intelligence flew through the colonies. . . . Schenectady was the Fort Sumter of that day. The event had a political effect. It shamed the factions in New York at least into a truce. It roused a spirit of patriotism. The governor of Massachusetts urged, in letters to other colonies, the necessity for immediate action to provide for the common defence. . . . The General Court [of Massachusetts], in view of organizing a joint effort of the colonies, proposed to hold a congress. The call for a meeting is dated the 10th of March, 1690. . . . It proposed, as a measure of prevention, that the neighboring colonies, and Virginia, Maryland, and the parts adjacent, should be invited to meet at New York, and conclude on suitable methods for assisting each other for the safety of the whole land. The governor of New York was desired to transmit this invitation to the southern colonies. Such was the first call for a general congress in America. It is free from a narrowness. It is liberal in its spirit, simple in its terms, and comprehensive in its object. . . . The call elicited from several colonies interesting replies. Governor Hinckley, of Plymouth, entered with zeal into the measure, and, though the General Court was not in session, appointed a commissioner. The Quaker-governor of Rhode Island, Henry Bull, replied in an excellent spirit. . . . Though the time was too short to convene the assembly for the appointment of commissioners, he promised the aid of that colony to the utmost of its ability to resist the French and Indians. The head of the convention of Maryland wrote, that it was the design of the assembly to send arms and men to aid in the general defence. . . . President Bacon, of Virginia, replied, that the proposition would require the action of the assembly, and that nothing would be done until the arrival of the daily expected governor. The replies to the invitation were cordial. The commissioners of four colonies [Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New

York] met at New York. . . . The deliberations led to a unanimous result. On the 1st of May, an agreement was signed by the delegates, in behalf of the five colonies [including Maryland under its promise], to raise a force of 855 men for the strengthening of Albany, and, 'by the help of Almighty God, subduing the French and Indian enemies.' It was agreed, that the lieutenant-governor of New York should name the commander of this force; that it should not be employed on any other service without the consent of the five colonies; and that the officers should be required to preserve among their men good order, punish vice, keep the Sabbath, and maintain the worship of God. No proposition appears to have been entertained for a permanent organization. . . . Efforts were made to obtain additional aid from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. . . . As the result of this congress, that it was resolved to attempt the reduction of Canada by two lines of attack,—one to conquer Acadia, and then to move on Quebec; and the other, by the route of Lake Champlain, to assault Montreal. The New England forces under Sir William Phips, assigned to the first route, captured Acadia and Port Royal, and sailed for Quebec, in the expectation of being aided by the other forces who marched by the Champlain route. But they, under Fitz-John Winthrop, with the title of major, were not successful. . . . The failure of Winthrop occasioned the retreat of Phips."—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic of the United States*, ch. 3.—See also CANADA: 1689-1690; 1692-1697.

ALSO IN: *Documentary history of New York*, v. 2 (*Leisler's administration*).—*Documents relating to colonial history of New York*, v. 3.—F. Parkman, *Half century of conflict*.—J. Fiske, *Essays, historical and literary*.

1690-1748.—Treaty of Ryswick.—Queen Anne's War (Spanish Succession).—Treaty of Utrecht.—King George's War.—Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.—"King William's (or Frontenac's) War was costly to the colonists, and resulted in no material advantage to either side. The French, under Governor Frontenac, conducted their operations with vigor. . . . Acadia was retaken by the French . . . [in 1691 and] during the five ensuing years fighting was confined to bushranging along the New York and New England border. The struggle was without further incident until Newfoundland yielded to the French (1696), and a party of French and Indians sacked the little village of Andover, Mass. (1697), but twenty-five miles out of Boston. Later in the year came the treaty of Ryswick, under which each belligerent recovered what he possessed at the outset of the war."—R. G. T. Thwaites, *Colonies, 1492-1750 (Epochs of American History)*, p. 254.—"The Treaty of Ryswick settled nothing of real importance, and within five years England and France were again at war. In 1702 the king of France, Louis XIV, placed his grandson on the throne of Spain. This extension of French influence was resented by England, and there followed a war which spread to America, where it was known as Queen Anne's War. This war was simply King William's War over again, except that in Queen Anne's War the border warfare was confined to the frontier communities of New England. In 1710 an expedition from New England attacked Acadia (Nova Scotia) and gained possession of the peninsula. In 1713 the war was brought to a close by the Treaty of Utrecht. Under the terms of this treaty Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were given to England. In Queen

Anne's War, accordingly, France received a real blow, for she lost to England a valuable portion of her American possessions. For thirty years after the Treaty of Utrecht the French and English in America lived in peace. In 1744 there was a third clash, known as King George's War. This war had little significance, for when it was brought to an end in 1748 by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle it was agreed that all conquests made during the war should be mutually restored."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 41.—See also CANADA: 1602-1697; NEW ENGLAND: 1702-1710, to 1745-1748; AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: Congresses: 2; UTRECHT: 1712-1714.

1696-1697.—Board of trade for supervision of the colonies.—Plans of colonial union by Penn and others.—"The king attempted a more efficient method of administering the colonies; and, in May 1696, a Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, consisting of the chancellor, the president of the privy council, the keeper of the privy seal, the two secretaries of state, and eight special commissioners, was called into being. To William Blathwayte, who had drafted the new charter of Massachusetts, John Locke, and the rest of the commission, instructions were given by the crown 'to inquire into the means of making the colonies most useful and beneficial to England; into the staples and manufactures which may be encouraged there, and the means of diverting them from trades which may prove prejudicial to England; to examine into and weigh the acts of the assemblies; to set down the usefulness or mischief of them to the crown, the kingdom, or the plantations themselves; to require an account of all the moneys given for public uses by the assemblies of the plantations, and how the same are employed.' The administration of the several provinces had their unity in the person of the king, whose duties with regard to them were transacted through one of the secretaries of state; but the Board of Trade was the organ of inquiries and the centre of colonial information. Every law of a provincial legislature, except in some of the charter governments, if it escaped the veto of the royal governor, might be arrested by the unfavorable opinion of the law officer of the crown, or by the adverse report of the Board of Trade. Its rejection could come only from the king in council. . . . The Board of Trade was hardly constituted before it was summoned to plan unity in the military efforts of the provinces; and Locke with his associates despaired, on beholding them 'crumbled into little governments, disunited in interests, in an ill posture and much worse disposition to afford assistance to each other for the future.' The Board, in 1697, 'after considering with their utmost care,' could only recommend the appointment of 'a captain-general of all the forces and all the militia of all the provinces on the continent of North America, with power to levy and command them for their defence, under such limitations and instructions as to his majesty should seem best.' . . . With excellent sagacity—for true humanity perfects the judgment—William Penn matured a plan of a permanent union, by a national representation of the American States. On the 8th day of February 1697, he delivered his project for an annual 'congress,' as he termed it, of two delegates from each province. . . . But the ministry adopted neither the military dictatorship of Locke and his associates, nor the peaceful congress of William Penn."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States (Author's last revision)*, v. 2, pt. 3, ch. 4.—The fol-

lowing is the Plan of Union drafted by Penn: "A Briefe and Plaine Schem how the English Colonists in the North parts of America, viz.: Boston, Connecticut, Road Island, New York, New Jerseys, Pensilvania, Maryland, Virginia, and Carolina may be made more usefull to the Crowne, and one another's peace and safty with an universall concurrence. 1st. That the severall Colonies before mentioned do meet once a year, and oftener if need be, during the war, and at least once in two years in times of peace by their stated and appointed Deputies, to debate and resolve of such measures as are most adviseable for their better understanding, and the public tranquillity and safety. 2d. That in order to it two persons well qualified for sence, sobriety and substance be appointed by each Province, as their Representatives or Deputies, which in the whole make the Congress to consist of twenty persons. 3d. That the King's Commissioner for that purpose specially appointed shall have the chaire and preside in the said Congress. 4th. That they shall meet as near as conveniently may be to the most centrall Colony for use of the Deputies. 5th. Since that may in all probability, be New York both because it is near the Center of the Colonies and for that it is a Frontier and in the King's nomination, the Govr. of that Colony may therefore also be the King's High Commissioner during the Session after the manner of Scotland. 6th. That their business shall be to hear and adjust all matters of Complaint or difference between Province and Province. As, 1st, where persons quit their own Province and goe to another, that they may avoid their just debts, tho they be able to pay them, 2nd, where offenders fly Justice, or Justice cannot well be had upon such offenders in the Provinces that entertaine them, 3dly, to prevent or cure injuries in point of Commerce, 4th, to consider of ways and means to support the union and safety of these Provinces against the public enemies. In which Congress the Quotas of men and charges will be much easier, and more equally sett, then it is possible for any establishment made here to do; for the Provinces, knowing their own condition and one another's, can debate that matter with more freedome and satisfaction and better adjust and ballance their affairs in all respects for their common safty. 7ly. That in times of war the King's High Commissioner shall be generall or chief Commander of the severall Quotas upon service against a common enemy as he shall be advised, for the good and benefit of the whole."—H. W. Preston, *Documents illustrative of American history*, p. 146.

ALSO IN: S. L. Beer, *Old colonial system*.

1696-1749.—Growing despotism of English mercantile policy.—Systematic suppression of colonial manufactures.—"Between 1689 and 1714 colonial administration [by the home government] underwent fundamental changes both in theory and organization. By the end of the reign of Anne it had become largely departmental and official rather than personal, and Parliament had begun to take a somewhat larger hand in running affairs than during the former period. The Board of Trade, a body independent of the Privy Council, which replaced the Lords of Trade in 1696 . . . for a time was the chief agency in the direction of colonial affairs. It lacked executive authority but conducted routine business and gathered information on which the Privy Council, Parliament, and the departments of the treasury, admiralty, and war acted."—H. E. Bolton and T. M. Marshall, *Colonization of North America*,

p. 343.—"Yearly reports of the state of the Provinces were required from the governors, in answer to queries addressed to them by the Board. An Act of Parliament of the same year still further restricted commercial intercourse, by limiting trade between England and her Colonies to English, Irish and Colonial built vessels, and by prohibiting Colonial produce from going to the ports of Ireland or Scotland. . . . The feeble attempts of the Colonists to make a portion of their own clothing from their abundant materials had not been unnoticed in England. Three years after—the Board of Trade having received complaints from English merchants and manufacturers, that the wool and woollen manufactures of Ireland and the North American plantations began to be exported to foreign markets formerly supplied by England—an Act passed the British Parliament, . . . dictated by that sleepless vigilance which guarded the staple manufacture of England. It prohibited the exportation of any wool or woollen manufacture from Ireland, except to certain ports in England; but, by way of compensation, virtually surrendered to Ireland the linen manufacture, then little regarded in comparison with the woollen interests. In reference to the Colonies, it was enacted that 'After the first day of December, 1699, no wool, woollens, yarn, cloth, or woollen manufactures of the English plantations in America shall be shipped in any of the said English plantations, or otherwise laden, in order to be transported thence to any place whatsoever, under the penalty of forfeiting ship and cargo, and £500 for each offence.' . . . A letter from New England to the Board of Trade [in 1715] . . . reiterates the necessity of employing the New England people in producing naval stores, to turn them from manufactures. . . . The discouragement of American manufactures, from this time, became the settled and avowed policy of the government, and, three years later, the Bill prohibiting the erection of forges and iron mills was introduced, and declared that the erecting of Manufactories in the Colonies 'tends to lessen their dependence upon Great Britain.' . . . The company of Felt-makers, in London, petitioned Parliament, in Feb., 1731, to prohibit the exportation of hats from the American Colonies, representing that foreign markets were almost altogether supplied from thence, and not a few sent to Great Britain. The petition was referred to a special committee, who reported that, in New York and New England, beaver hats were manufactured to the number, it was estimated, of 10,000 yearly. . . . The exports were to the Southern plantations, the West Indies, and Ireland. In consequence of this evidence, and that furnished by the Board of Trade in the same session, an act was passed (5 George II. c. 22) that 'no hats or felts, dyed or undyed, finished or unfinished, shall be put on board any vessel in any place within any of the British plantations; nor be laden upon any horse or other carriage to the intent to be expected from thence to any other plantation, or to any other place whatever, upon forfeiture thereof, and the offender shall likewise pay £500 for every such offence.' . . . This severe and stringent law continued in force in the Colonies until the Revolution. It aimed at the prostration of one of the oldest and, on account of the abundance and cheapness of beavers and other furs, one of the most profitable branches of industry."—J. L. Bishop, *History of American manufactures*, v. 1, ch. 14.—"The restrictions upon manufacturing so far were indirect: no colony had been forbidden to make any article for its

own consumption. But in 1750 (almost at the close of the period) the erection or use of iron mills was prohibited altogether. Unlike the unpleasant features of the earlier commercial restrictions, too, this law could not be evaded. The half dozen iron mills that had appeared in the northern colonies were closed, and all manufacture of iron ceased, except for nails, bolts, and the simpler household and farm implements, such as in that day were turned out at the village smithy. [At the same time the Act of 1710 was modified to permit the importation of American pig and bar iron, duty free, into England.] These English laws of 1696, 1732, and 1750 were selfish and sinister,—the most ominous feature in all American colonial history. They must have become bitterly oppressive ere long, had the colonists continued under English rule; and at the time they fully deserved the condemnation visited upon them by the English economist, Adam Smith: "Those prohibitions are only impertinent badges of slavery, imposed upon [the colonies] without sufficient reason by the groundless jealousy of the manufacturers of mother country." Unhappily the colonists seem to have felt aggrieved quite as much by the well-intended, if not always tactful, efforts of England to preserve American forests from careless and greedy destruction, and to prevent the issue of dishonest colonial paper money."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 138-139.—"The English mercantile interest was becoming of increasing importance, and what it demanded Parliament had to grant. . . . Nor was it merely in the interests of English manufacturers that Parliament interfered. The American Colonies had been in the habit of carrying on a profitable export trade to the French West Indies, and of bringing back, in return, rum, sugar, and molasses. A Bill was introduced into the House of Commons, directed against this trade, and, after much dispute, and the defeat of the Bill in its original shape, it was enacted in 1733, that a duty of ninepence per gallon should be paid upon all rum and spirits made in the plantations not subject to Great Britain, on their importation into any of the British plantations: that sixpence a gallon should be paid on all foreign molasses and syrups imported, and five shillings on every hundredweight of sugar. As a matter of fact, it was found impossible to enforce this law, and therefore the practical grievance of the colonists was slight, but it was none the less a sign of the spirit in which colonial affairs were considered. About the same time permission was given first to Carolina and then to Georgia to ship rice to any port south of Cape Finisterre, and a few years later the same privilege was conferred on West India sugar, provided that it carried in British-built ships navigated according to law. It will be seen from the foregoing summary that, so far from the period in question being one of peace and goodwill towards the Colonies, it was a time wherein fresh links were being continually added to that chain of commercial legislation which did so much to alienate and disgust the American Colonies. Mr. Lecky himself observes that 'to a sagacious observer of colonial politics two facts were becoming evident. The one was that the deliberate selfishness of English commercial legislation was digging a chasm between the Mother country and the Colonies, which must inevitably, when the latter had become sufficiently strong, lead to separation. The other was that the presence of the French in Canada was an essential condition of the maintenance of the British empire

in America.' He then goes on to quote the famous passage, wherein the Swedish traveller Kalm, writing, it must be remembered, many years before George Grenville's Stamp Act, declared 'these (commercial) oppressions have made the inhabitants of the English Colonies less tender towards their mother land. This coldness is increased by the many foreigners who are settled among them. For Dutch, Germans and French are here blended with English, and have no special love for Old England. Besides, some people are always discontented and love change, and exceeding freedom and prosperity nurse an untameable spirit. I have been told, not only by native Americans but by English emigrants, publicly, that within thirty or fifty years the English Colonies in America may constitute a separate State entirely independent of England. But as this whole country towards the sea is unguarded, and on the frontier is kept uneasy by the French, these dangerous neighbours are the reason why the love of these Colonies for their metropolis does not utterly decline. The English Government has therefore reason to regard the French in North America as the chief power which urges their Colonies to submission.'"—H. E. Egerton, *Short history of British colonial policy*, pp. 141-143.

ALSO IN: T. C. Haliburton, *Rule and misrule of the English in America*.

1698-1712.—Founding of Louisiana.—Spanish settlement at Pensacola. See LOUISIANA: 1608-1712.

17th-18th centuries.—Colonial education. See EDUCATION: Modern: 17th century: United States; 17th-20th centuries: Christian brothers; 18th century: United States.

17th-18th centuries.—Jewish immigration. See JEWS: United States: 17th-18th centuries.

1701.—Yale college founded. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1701-1717.

1704-1729.—First colonial newspapers. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1704-1729.

1705-1830.—Development of negro problem.—Slavery before the Revolution. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1705-1805; SLAVERY: 1713-1776.

1709-1710.—German immigration. See PALATINES: 1709-1710.

1731-1732.—First subscription library instituted. See LIBRARIES: Modern: United States: Franklin and first subscription library.

1748-1754.—First collisions with the French in the Ohio valley.—"As the year 1750 approached, there came upon the colonies two changes, destined to lead to a new political life. In the first place, the colonies at last began to overrun the mountain barrier which had hemmed them in on the west, and thus to invite another and more desperate struggle with the French. The first settlement made west of the mountains was on a branch of the Kanawha (1748); in the same season several adventurous Virginians hunted and made land-claims in Kentucky and Tennessee. Before the close of the following year (1749) there had been formed the Ohio Company, composed of wealthy Virginians, among whom were two brothers of Washington. King George granted them 500,000 acres, on which they were to plant 100 families and build and maintain a fort. The first attempt to explore the region of the Ohio brought the English and the French traders into conflict; and troops were not long in following, on both sides. At the same time the home government was awakening to the fact that the colonies were not under strict control. In 1750 the Administration began

to consider means of stopping unlawful trade."—R. G. Thwaites, *Colonies, 1492-1750 (Epochs of American History)*, ch. 14, sect. 130.—"All the time the border wars were in progress the French were busy in the Mississippi Valley making settlements, building forts, and in many ways making a great show of strength in the New World. In 1716 Natchez was founded and two years later the streets of New Orleans were laid out. Forts were built on the Mississippi, the Illinois, and the Wabash and on the shores of the Great Lakes. But the power of France in America was by no means so great as it seemed to be. The things done by the French were insignificant when compared with the things done by the English. In 1750 there was more real civilization, more 'seeds of things,' in the town of Boston than in all New France. France was left behind because she had a bad colonial system, while England had a good one. . . . The French in America neglected the occupation of farming while the English colonists made agriculture their basic industry. There were other important differences between the French and the English colonial systems. In New France the colonists were treated as underlings; they were allowed no voice in government and were compelled to obey officers sent out by the French king. In British America the colonists were thrown upon their own resources and could do what in their judgment ought to be done. As a result of these differences in colonial policy British America ran ahead of New France in industry, in trade, in education, in wealth, in population. In 1750 the French in America numbered only about 80,000 while the English numbered more than a million. In the entire Mississippi Valley there were at this time probably fewer than 5,000 Frenchmen. Still, the power of the French in America by 1750 was becoming a menace to the British. England was now seeing clearly that if the great Mississippi Valley should fill up with Frenchmen a tide of French power and French civilization would sweep eastward over the Alleghanies, subjugate the English colonies along the coast, and at last drive the English from the face of the American continent. England accordingly determined to check the growing power of France in the valley. . . . [The grant made to the Ohio company] was regarded by the French as an encroachment. Soldiers were at once sent down from Canada to take formal possession of the Ohio Valley and drive away all English intruders. The French also began to prepare for a conflict. In order to strengthen their position at the entrance of the Ohio region they built in 1752 a chain of three forts, one at Presqu'isle (Erie), one twenty miles away at Le Bœuf, and one at Venango (Franklin, Pennsylvania)."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 41-42.—See also OHIO: 1748-1754.

1749-1755.—Unsettled boundary disputes of England and France.—Preludes of last French war. See NOVA SCOTIA: 1749-1755; CANADA: 1750-1753; 1755 (April); OHIO: 1748-1754.

1749-1774.—Boundary dispute between New York and New Hampshire. See VERMONT: 1749-1774.

1750-1753.—Eve of the great French war.—Attitude of the colonies.—Upon receipt of the news that the French were fortifying on the Ohio "Robert Dinwiddie, the governor of Virginia, promptly sent George Washington, the young adjutant-general of the Virginia militia, to remonstrate with the French against occupying territory which was 'so notoriously known to be the prop-

erty of the crown of Great Britain,' but the governor was given to understand that the French would not budge an inch from their position. The governor now determined to force the issue. He made an attempt to build a fort at the forks of the Ohio—the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela—and thus command the gateway of the Ohio Valley. But Dinwiddie's men were driven from the forts by the French, who themselves built a fort upon the spot, calling it Fort Duquesne. In the first movement, accordingly, the French won their point; New France was now in complete possession of the West. The expulsion of the French would have been the easiest of tasks had there been united action on the part of the colonies, for the English colonists in America at this time outnumbered French thirteen to one. But the spirit of union was lacking. Only in Virginia and New England were the people really eager to help in beating back the French power. In most of the other colonies petty jealousies and local interests arose to prevent union and co-operation."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 44.—"The merchants and planters of the Atlantic coast, far from the scene of frontier massacres and absorbed in their trade with Europe and the Indies, were indifferent to their governors' pleas for defense. They even spoke of the regiments which England sent over to protect them as 'alien garrisons.' Although the English outnumbered the French in America . . . they had not, after two generations of covert or open hostility, gained a single point of vantage. Intercolonial conferences were called, but not attended. Plans of union were proposed, but not accepted. It would be impossible to imagine a more dilapidated state of public opinion than that in which the English colonies faced what proved to be their final struggle with France."—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 46-47.—"The attitude of these various colonies towards each other is hardly conceivable to an American of the present time. They had no political tie except a common allegiance to the British Crown. Communication between them was difficult and slow, by rough roads traced often through primeval forests. Between some of them there was less of sympathy than of jealousy kindled by conflicting interests or perpetual disputes concerning boundaries. The patriotism of the colonist was bounded by the lines of his government, except in the compact and kindred colonies of New England, which were socially united, though politically distinct. The country of the New Yorker was New York, and the country of the Virginian was Virginia. The New England colonies had once confederated; but, kindred as they were, they had long ago dropped apart. . . . Nor was it this segregation only that unfitted them for war. They were all subject to popular legislatures, through whom alone money and men could be raised; and these elective bodies were sometimes factious and selfish, and not always either far-sighted or reasonable. Moreover, they were in a state of ceaseless friction with their governors, who represented the king, or, what was worse, the feudal proprietary. These disputes, though varying in intensity, were found everywhere except in the two small colonies which chose their own governors; and they were premonitions of the movement towards independence which ended in the war of Revolution. The occasion of difference mattered little. Active or latent, the quarrel was always present. . . . Divided in government; divided in origin, feelings, and principles; jealous of each other, jealous of the Crown;

the people at war with the executive, and, by the fermentation of internal politics, blinded to an outward danger that seemed remote and vague,—such were the conditions under which the British colonies drifted into a war that was to decide the fate of the continent.”—F. Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, v. 1, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: R. G. Thwaites, *France in America*, ch. 9-10.

1754.—Congress at Albany and its plans of union.—Franklin's account.—“In 1754, war with France being again apprehended, a congress of commissioners from the different colonies was, by an order of the Lords of Trade, to be assembled at Albany, there to confer with the chiefs of the Six Nations concerning the means of defending both their country and ours. Governor Hamilton [of Pennsylvania], having receiv'd this order, acquainted the House with it, requesting they would furnish proper presents for the Indians, to be given on this occasion; and naming the speaker (Mr. Norris) and myself to join Mr. Thomas Penn and Mr. Secretary Peters as commissioners to act for Pennsylvania. (The House approv'd the nomination, and provided the goods for the present, and tho' they did not much like treating out of the provinces;) and we met the other commissioners at Albany about the middle of June. In our way thither, I projected and drew a plan for the union of all the colonies under one government, so far as might be necessary for defense, and other important general purposes. As we pass'd thro' New York, I had there shown my project to Mr. James Alexander and M. Kennedy, two gentlemen of great knowledge in public affairs, and, being fortified by their approbation, I ventur'd to lay it before the Congress. It then appeared that several of the commissioners had form'd plans of the same kind. A previous question was first taken, whether a union should be established, which pass'd in the affirmative unanimously. A committee was then appointed, one member from each colony, to consider the several plans and report. Mine happen'd to be preferr'd, and, with a few amendments, was accordingly reported. . . . The debates upon it in Congress went on daily, hand in hand with the Indian business. Many objections and difficulties were started, but at length they were all overcome, and the plan was unanimously agreed to, and copies ordered to be transmitted to the Board of Trade and to the assemblies of the several provinces. Its fate was singular: the assemblies did not adopt it, as they all thought there was too much 'prerogative' in it, and in England it was judg'd to have too much of the 'democratic.' The Board of Trade therefore did not approve of it, nor recommend it for the approbation of his majesty; but another scheme was form'd, supposed to answer the same purpose better, whereby the governors of the provinces, with some members of their respective councils, were to meet and order the raising of troops, building of forts, etc., and to draw on the treasury of Great Britain for the expense, which was afterwards to be refunded by an act of Parliament laying a tax on America. . . . The different and contrary reasons of dislike to my plan makes me suspect that it was really the true medium; and I am still of opinion it would have been happy for both sides the water if it had been adopted. The colonies, so united, would have been sufficiently strong to have defended themselves; there would then have been no need of troops from England; of course, the subsequent pretence for taxing America, and

the bloody contest it occasioned, would have been avoided.”—Benjamin Franklin, *Autobiography* (John Bigelow, ed., v. 1, pp. 308-310).—“When the members assembled at the Court House in Albany on the 19th of June, it was found that Pennsylvania was not alone in appointing a distinguished citizen to represent her. On the roll of the congress were the names of Lieutenant-governor De Lancey, of New York, who presided; and from the same province William Smith, the historian, and the future Sir William Johnson, not yet made a baronet. From the proprietary provinces of Pennsylvania and Maryland were the well known officials, John Penn, grandson of the founder; Richard Peters; and Benjamin Tasker. From the province of New Hampshire were her future governor, Meshech Weare, and Theodore Atkinson; and from the province of Massachusetts Bay, the late Lieutenant-governor, Thomas Hutchinson, Colonel John Chandler, of Worcester, and Oliver Partridge, a man of commanding influence in western Massachusetts. Lastly, the two colonies which had so tenaciously preserved their charter governments through the vicissitudes of more than a century,—Connecticut and Rhode Island,—had acceded to the repeated solicitations of the home government, and with unfeigned reluctance, we may be sure, had sent as representatives men of such wide experience in their colonial concerns as Roger Wolcott, Jr., and Stephen Hopkins. 'America,' says Mr. Bancroft, 'had never seen an assembly so venerable for the states that were represented, or for the great and able men who composed it.' They were detained in this hospitable old Dutch town for more than three weeks. . . . Franklin's plan . . . was not approved by a single one of the colonial assemblies before which it was brought; and . . . no action was ever taken on it in England. Yet there is no contribution to constructive statesmanship preceding the year 1776, which had a profounder effect on the subsequent growth and development of the idea of American nationality. Even in the amended form in which it was 'approved' by the congress, it was, says a recent writer, 'in advance of the Articles [of Confederation] in its national spirit, and served as the prototype of the constitution itself.'”—W. E. Foster, *Stephen Hopkins: A Rhode Island statesman*, pt. 1, ch. 6.

The Plan of Union (Franklin's), as adopted by the Congress at Albany, was accompanied by a “Representation of the Present State of the Colonies.” The following is the full text of the Representation, followed by that of the Plan of Union: “That His Majesty's Title to the Northern Continent of America, appears to be founded on the Discovery thereof first made, and the Possession thereof first taken in 1497, under a Commission from Henry the VIIth, of England, to Sebastian Cabot. That the French have possessed themselves of several Parts of this Continent, which by Treaties, have been ceded and confirmed to them: That the Rights of the English to the whole Sea Coast, from Georgia, on the South, to the River St. Lawrence, on the North, excepting the island of Cape-Breton, in the Bay of St. Lawrence, remains plain and indisputable. That all the Lands or Countries Westward from the Atlantic Ocean to the South Sea, between 48 and 34 Degrees of North Latitude, were expressly included in the Grant of King James the First, to divers of his Subjects, so long, as the Year 1606, and afterwards confirmed in 1620; and under this Grant, the Colony of Virginia claims an Extent as far West as to the South Sea; and the

antient Colonies of the Massachusetts-Bay and Connecticut, were by their respective Charters, made to extend to the said South Sea; so that not only the Right to the Sea Coast, but to all the Inland Countries, from Sea to Sea, have at all Times been asserted by the Crown of England. That the Province of Nova Scotia or Accadia, hath known and determinate Bounds, by the original Grant from King James the First; and that there is abundant Evidence of the same, [and of the Knowledge] which the French had of these Bounds, while they were in Possession of it; and that these Bounds being thus known, the said Province by the Treaty of Utrecht, according to its antient Limits, was ceded to Great-Britain, and remained in Possession thereof, until the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, by which it was confirmed; but by said Treaty it is stipulated, That the Bounds of the said Province shall be determined by Commissioners, &c. That by the Treaty of Utrecht, the Country of the Five Cantons of the Iroquoise, is expressly acknowledged to be under the Dominion of the Crown of Great-Britain. That the Lake Champlain, formerly called Lake Iroquoise, and the Country Southward of it, as far as the Dutch or English Settlements, the Lake Ontario, Erie, and all the Countries adjacent, have by all antient Authors, French and English, been allowed to belong to the Five Cantons or Nations; and the whole of those Countries, long before the said Treaty of Utrecht, were by the said Nations, put under the Protection of the Crown of Great-Britain. That by the Treaty of Utrecht, there is a Reserve to the French, a Liberty of frequenting the Countries of the Five Nations, and other Indians in Friendship with Great Britain, for the Sake of Commerce; as there is also to the English, a Liberty of frequenting the Countries of those in Friendship with France, for the same Purpose. That after the Treaty of Utrecht, the French built several Fortresses in the Country of the Five Nations, and a very strong one at a Place called Crown-Point, to the South of the Lake Champlain. That the French Court have evidently, since the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, made this Northern Continent more than ever, the Object of its Attention. That the French have most unjustly taken Possession of a Part of the Province of Nova-Scotia; and in the River St. John's, and other Parts of said Province, they have built strong Fortresses; and from this River they will have, during the Winter and Spring Season, a much easier Communication between France and Canada, than they have heretofore had, and will be furnished with a Harbour more commodiously situated for the Annoying the British Colonies by Privateers and Men of War, than Louisbourg itself. That they have taken Possession of, and begun a Settlement at the Head of the River Kennebeck, within the Bounds of the Province of Main, the most convenient Situation for affording Support, and a safe Retreat, to the Eastern Indians, in any of their Attempts upon the Governments of New-England. That it appears by the Information of the Natives, the French have been making Preparations for another Settlement, at a Place called Cohass, on Connecticut River, near the Head thereof, where 'tis but about ten Miles distant from a Branch of Merrimack River; and from whence, there is a very near and easy Communication with the Abnekais Indians, who are settled on the River St. Francois, about forty Miles from the River St. Lawrence; and it is certain, the Inhabitants of New-Hampshire, in which Province this Cohass is supposed to lie, have been interrupted and im-

peded by the French Indians, from making any Settlement there. That since the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, the French have increased the Number of their Forts in the Country of the great Lakes, and on the Rivers which run into the Mississippi, and are securing a Communication between the two Colonies of Louisiana and Canada, and at the same Time, putting themselves into a Capacity of annoying the Southern British Colonies, and preventing any further Settlements of His Majesty's Dominions. That they have been gradually increasing their Troops in America, transporting them in their Ships of War, which return to France with a bare Complement of Men, leaving the rest in their Colonies; and by this Means, they are less observed by the Powers of Europe, than they would be, if Transports as usual heretofore, were provided for this Purpose. That they have taken Prisoners diverse of His Majesty's Subjects, trading in the Country of the Iroquoise, and other inland Parts, and plundered such Prisoners of several Thousand Pounds Sterling; and they are continually exciting the Indians to destroy or make Prisoners the Inhabitants of the Frontiers of the British Colonies; which Prisoners are carried to Canada, and a Price equal to what Slaves are sold in the Plantations, is demanded for their Redemption and Release. That they are continually drawing off the Indians from the British Interest, and have lately perswaded one Half of the Onondago Tribe, with many from the other Nations along with them, to remove to a Place called Oswegachie, on the River Cadaracqui, where they have built them a Church and Fort; and many of the Senecas, the most numerous Nation, appear to be wavering, and rather inclined to the French. And it is a melancholy Consideration, that not more than 150 Men of all the several Nations, have attended this Treaty, altho' they had Notice, that all the Governments would be here by their Commissioners, and that a large Present would be given. That it is the evident Design of the French to surround the British Colonies, to fortify themselves on the Back thereof, to take and keep Possession of the Heads of all the important Rivers, to draw over the Indians to their Interest, and with the Help of such Indians, added to such Forces as are already arrived, and may be hereafter sent from Europe, to be in a Capacity of making a general Attack upon the several Governments; and if at the same Time, a strong Naval Force be sent from France, there is the utmost Danger, that the whole Continent will be subjected to that Crown: And that the Danger of such a Naval Force is not merely imaginary, may be argued from past Experience. For had it not been by the most extraordinary Interposition of Heaven, every Sea Port Town on the Continent, in the Year 1746, might have been ravaged and destroyed, by the Squadron under the Command of the Duke D'Anville, notwithstanding the then declining State of the French, and the very flourishing State of the British Navy, and the further Advantage accruing to the English, from the Possession of Cape-Breton. That the French find by Experience, they are able to make greater and more secure Advantages upon their Neighbours, in Peace than in War. What they unjustly possessed themselves of, after the Peace of Utrecht, they now pretend they have a Right to hold, by Virtue of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, until the true Boundary between the English and French be settled by Commissioners; but their Conquests made during War, they have been obliged to restore. That the French Affairs relative to

this Continent, are under one Direction, and constantly regarded by the Crown and Ministry, who are not insensible how great a Stride they would make towards an Universal Monarchy, if the British Colonies were added to their Dominions, and consequently the whole Trade of North-America engrossed by them. That the said Colonies being in a divided, disunited State, there has never been any joint Exertion of their Force, or Council, to repel or defeat the Measures of the French; and particular Colonies are unable and unwilling to maintain the Cause of the whole. That there has been a very great Neglect of the Affairs of the Iroquoise, as they are commonly called, the Indians of the Six Nations, and their Friendship and Alliance has been improved to private Purposes, for the Sake of the Trade with them, and the Purchase or Acquisition of their Lands, more than the Public Services. That they are supplied with Rum by the Traders, in vast and almost incredible Quantities; the Laws of the Colonies now in Force, being insufficient to restrain the Supply. And the Indians of every Nation, are frequently drunk, and abused in their Trade, and their Affections thereby alienated from the English; they often wound and murder one another in their Liquor, and to avoid Revenge, fly to the French; and perhaps more have been lost by these Means than by the French Artifice. That Purchases of Land from the Indians by private Persons, for small trifling Considerations, have been the Cause of great Uneasiness and Discontents; and if the Indians are not in fact imposed on and injured, yet they are apt to think they have been; and indeed, they appear not fit to be entrusted at Large, with the Sale of their own Lands: And the Laws of some of the Colonies, which make such Sales void, unless the Allowance of the Government be first obtained, seem to be well founded. That the Granting or Patenting vast Tracts of Land to private Persons or Companies, without Conditions of speedy Settlements, has tended to prevent the Strengthening the Frontiers of the particular Colony where such Tracts lie, and been Prejudicial to the rest. That it seems absolutely necessary, that speedy and effectual Measures be taken, to secure the Colonies from the Slavery they are threatened with: that any farther Advances of the French should be prevented; and the Encroachments already made, removed. That the Indians in Alliance or Friendship with the English, be constantly regarded under some wise Direction or Superintendency. That Endeavours be used for the Recovery of those Indians who are lately gone over to the French, and for securing those that remain. That some discreet Person or Persons be appointed to reside constantly among each Nation of Indians; such Person to have no Concern in Trade, and duly to communicate all Advices to the Superintendents. That the Trade with the said Indians be well regulated, and made subservient to the Public Interest, more than to private Gain. That there be Forts built for the Security of each Nation, and the better carrying on the Trade with them. That warlike Vessels be provided, sufficient to maintain His Majesty's Right to a free Navigation on the several Lakes. That all future Purchases of Lands from the Indians be void, unless made by the Government where such Lands lie, and from the Indians in a Body, in their public Councils. That the Patentees or Possessors of large unsettled Territories, be enjoined to cause them to be settled in a reasonable Time, on Pain of Forfeiture. That the Complaints of the Indians, relative

to any Grants or Possessions of their Lands, fraudulently obtained, be inquired into, and all Injuries redressed. That the Bounds of those Colonies which extend to the South Seas, to be contracted and limited by the Allegheny or Apalachian Mountains; and that Measures be taken, for settling from time to time, Colonies of His Majesty's Protestant Subjects, Westward of said Mountains, in convenient Cantons, to be assigned for that Purpose. And finally, that there be an Union of His Majesty's several Governments on the Continent, that so their Councils, Treasure, and Strength, may be employed in due Proportion, against their common Enemy."

The Plan of Union, adopted on July 10, was as follows: "Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of Massachusetts-Bay, New-Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode-Island, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, and South Carolina, for their mutual Defence and Security, and for the Extending the British Settlements in North-America. That humble Application be made for an Act of the Parliament of Great-Britain, by Virtue of which One General Government may be formed in America, including all the said Colonies; within and under which Government, each Colony may retain its present Constitution, except in the Particulars wherein a Change may be directed by the said Act, as hereafter follows. That the said General Government be administered by a President General, to be appointed and supported by the Crown; and a Grand Council, to be chosen by the Representatives of the People of the several Colonies, met in their respective Assemblies. That within Months after the Passing of such Act, the House of Representatives in the several Assemblies, that happen to be sitting within that Time, or that shall be especially for that Purpose convened, may and shall chuse Members for the Grand Council, in the following Proportions; that is to say: Massachusetts-Bay, 7; New-Hampshire, 2; Connecticut, 5; Rhode-Island, 2; New-York, 4; New-Jersey, 3; Pennsylvania, 6; Maryland, 4; Virginia, 7; North-Carolina, 4; South Carolina, 4: = 48. Who shall meet for the first Time at the City of Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, being called by the President General, as soon as conveniently may be, after his Appointment. That there shall be a new Election of Members for the Grand Council every three Years; and on the Death or Resignation of any Member, his Place shall be supplied by a new Choice, at the next Sitting of the Assembly of the Colony he represented. That after the first three Years, when the proportion of Money arising out of each Colony to the General Treasury, can be known, the Number of Members to be chosen for each Colony, shall from time to time, in all ensuing Elections, be regulated by that Proportion (yet so as that the Number to be chosen by any one Province, be not more than seven, nor less than two). That the Grand Council shall meet once in every Year, and oftener if Occasion require, at such Time and Place as they shall adjourn to at the last preceding Meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at by the President General on any Emergency; he having first obtained in writing, the Consent of seven of the Members to such Call, and sent due and timely Notice to the whole. That the Grand Council have Power to chuse their Speaker, and shall neither be dissolved, prorogued, nor continue sitting longer than six Weeks at one Time, without their own Consent, or the special Command of the Crown. That the Members of the Grand Council



shall be allowed for their Service, Ten Shillings Sterling per Diem, during their Session and Journey to and from the Place of Meeting, twenty Miles to be reckoned a Day's Journey. That the Assent of the President General be requisite to all Acts of the Grand Council; and that it be his Office and Duty to cause them to be carried into Execution. That the President General, with the Advice of the Grand Council, hold or direct all Indian Treaties, in which the general Interest or Welfare of the Colonies may be concerned; and to make Peace or declare War with Indian Nations. That they make such Laws as they judge necessary for regulating all Indian Trade. That they make all Purchases from Indians for the Crown, of the Lands now not within the Bounds of particular Colonies, or that shall not be within their Bounds, when some of them are reduced to more convenient Dimensions. That they make new Settlements on such Purchases, by granting Lands in the King's Name, reserving a Quit-Rent to the Crown for the Use of the General Treasury. That they make Laws for regulating and governing such new Settlements, 'till the Crown shall think fit to form them into particular Governments. That they may raise and pay Soldiers, and build Forts for the Defence of any of the Colonies, and equip Vessels of Force to guard the Coast, and protect the Trade on the Ocean, Lakes, or great Rivers; but they shall not impress Men in any Colony, without the consent of its Legislature. That for those Purposes, they have power to make Laws, and lay and levy such general Duties, Imposts, or Taxes, as to themselves appear most equal and just, considering the Ability and other Circumstances of the Inhabitants in the several Colonies, and such as may be collected with the least Inconvenience to the People; rather discouraging Luxury, than loading Industry with unnecessary Burthens. That they may appoint a general Treasurer and a particular Treasurer in each Government, when necessary; and from time to time, may order the Sums in the Treasuries of each Government, into the General Treasury, or draw on them for special Payments, as they find most convenient; yet no Money to issue, but by joint Orders of the President General and Grand Council, except where Sums have been appropriated to particular Purposes, and the President General is previously empowered by an Act, to draw for such Sums. That the general Accounts shall be yearly settled, and reported to the several Assemblies. That a Quorum of the Grand Council, empowered to act with the President General, do consist of Twenty-five Members; among whom there shall be one or more from a Majority of the Colonies. That the Laws made by them for the Purposes aforesaid, shall not be repugnant, but as near as may be agreeable, to the Laws of England, and shall be transmitted to the King in Council, for Approbation, as soon as may be, after their passing; and if not disapproved within three Years after Presentation, to remain in Force. That in Case of the Death of the President General, the Speaker of the Grand Council for the Time being, shall succeed, and be vested with the same Power and Authorities, and continue 'till the King's Pleasure be known. That all Military Commission Officers, whether for Land or Sea Service, to act under this General Constitution, be nominated by the President General, but the Approbation of the Grand Council is to be obtained, before they receive their Commissions. And all Civil Officers are to be nominated by the Grand Council, and to receive the President General's Approbation, before they officiate. But in Case of Vacancy, by Death

or Removal of any Officer, Civil or Military, under this Constitution, the Governor of the Provinces in which such Vacancy happens, may appoint, 'till the Pleasure of the President General and Grand Council can be known. That the particular Military as well as Civil Establishments in each Colony, remain in their present State, this General Constitution notwithstanding; and that on sudden Emergencies, any Colony may defend itself, and lay the Accounts of Expence thence arisen, before the President General and Grand Council, who may allow and order Payment of the same, as far as they judge such Accounts just and reasonable."—S. Hopkins, *True representation of the plan formed at Albany in 1754, for uniting all the British northern colonies, with introduction and notes by S. S. Rider (Rhode Island Historical Tracts, no. 9).*

ALSO IN: *Proceedings of commissioners at Albany (Documentary history of New York, v. 2, pp. 545-617).*—T. C. Haliburton, *Rule and misrule of the English in America, pp. 253-258.*—J. R. Brodhead, ed., *Documents relative to colonial history of New York, v. 6, pp. 853-905.*—*Journal of Congress at Albany in 1754 (Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, series 3, v. 5).*—*Old South Leaflets, no. 9.*—R. G. Thwaites, *France in America, pp. 168-172.*—W. Wilson, *History of the American people, v. 2, pp. 342-356.*

1755.—Demand by royal governors in America for taxation of colonies by act of Parliament.—After the failure to adopt Franklin's Plan of Union "the Board of Trade . . . formulated a plan of union for military purposes only, but events were occurring which made it necessary to take immediate action. The plan was laid aside, and the board suggested the appointment of a commander-in-chief over all the forces in America, a suggestion which was eventually put into effect. . . . Major-General Edward Braddock, a former governor of Gibraltar, stubborn, irascible, and little given to taking advice, was sent to Virginia with two regiments. . . . Braddock summoned the governors for a consultation and they met in April, 1755, at Alexandria in Virginia."—H. E. Bolton and T. M. Marshall, *Colonization of North America, 1492-1783, p. 371.*—At this congress of governors, "Braddock directed their attention first of all, to the subject of a colonial revenue, on which his instructions commanded him to insist, and his anger kindled 'that no such fund was already established.' The governors present, recapitulating their strifes with their assemblies, made answer: 'Such a fund can never be established in the colonies without the aid of parliament. Having found it impracticable to obtain in their respective governments the proportion expected by his majesty toward defraying the expense of his service in North America, they are unanimously of opinion that it should be proposed to his majesty's ministers to find out some method of compelling them to do it, and of assessing the several governments in proportion to their respective abilities.' This imposing document Braddock sent forthwith to the ministry, himself urging the necessity of laying some tax throughout his majesty's dominions in North America. . . . I have had in my hands vast masses of correspondence, including letters from servants of the crown in every royal colony in America; from civilians, as well as from Braddock and Dunbar and Gage; from Delancey and Sharpe, as well as from Dinwiddie and Shirley; and all were of the same tenor. The British ministry heard one general clamor from men in office for taxation by act of parliament. . . . In England, the government was more and more inclined to enforce the per-

manent authority of Great Britain."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 2, pp. 416-417.

1755-1760.—French and Indian War, known in Europe as the Seven Years' War.—English conquest of Canada. See CANADA: 1750-1753, to 1759; NOVA SCOTIA: 1749-1755; 1755; OHIO: 1748-1754, to 1755; CAPE BRETON ISLAND: 1758-1760; also, for an account of the accompanying Cherokee War, see SOUTH CAROLINA: 1759-1761.

1760-1775.—Crown, Parliament and colonies.—English theory and American theory of their relations.—"The people of every colony were subject to two jurisdictions one local and one general, that must be adjusted to each other. To effect such adjustment caused no little friction; and the Colonies and the Mother Country got on peaceably as long as they did, only because neither one pushed its theory of colonial relations to an extreme, each yielding something to the other and thus effecting a compromise. The Colonies held that the dominion which the Cabots discovered in America belonged to the King, rather than to the Kingdom, of England. Englishmen adventuring into this dominion to plant colonies were entitled to all the privileges of free-born Englishmen at home; trial by jury, habeas corpus, and exemption from taxes that their own representatives had not voted. The British Empire was not one dominion, but several dominions. Every one of these dominions had, or should have, its own legislature to enact laws for its government. The Colonies were not one dominion, but 13 dominions; and in every one the legislature was as supreme as Parliament was in England. Parliament, therefore, had nothing more to do with Massachusetts or Virginia than the legislatures of those colonies had to do with England. The King, who alone had a voice in the matter, had, in their charters, guaranteed to the Colonies the common law so far as this was applicable to their condition, and he was now powerless to withdraw what he had thus conceded. Such, in outline, was the American theory of colonial relations. Still, no one pretended that this theory had ever been fully carried out in practice. It must also be said that it did not appear fully formed at once, but grew up gradually. The British theory was that Englishmen continued Englishmen when they emigrated to the American dominions of the King; that the power of Parliament, to which they were subject in the old home, followed them to the new one; and that Parliament could yield them more or fewer powers of self-government for a time, and then withdraw them. It was also claimed that the Colonies were already represented in the House of Commons; since the several members of that body did not represent particular districts or constituencies, but the whole British Empire. Besides, it was asserted that the Colonies themselves had repeatedly acknowledged the authority of Parliament by submitting to its legislation. Still no one pretended that this theory had ever been fully carried out."—B. A. Hinsdale, *American government*, sect. 92-93.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *Life and times of Joseph Warren*, pp. 30-32.—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, ch. 1-5.—W. M. Sloane, *French War and the Revolution*, ch. 10.—J. A. Woodburn, *Causes of the American Revolution* (*Johns Hopkins Studies*, series 10, no. 12).

1761.—Enforcement of revenue laws in Massachusetts.—Writs of Assistance and Otis's speech.—"Immediately after the conquest of Canada was completed, rumors were widely circulated . . . that the charters would be taken away, and

the colonies reduced to royal governments. The officers of the customs began at once to enforce with strictness all the acts of parliament regulating the trade of the colonies, several of which had been suspended, or become obsolete, and thus had never been executed at all. The good will of the colonists or their legislatures, was no longer wanted in the prosecution of the war; and the commissioners of the customs were permitted and directed to enforce the obnoxious acts. Governor Bernard [of Massachusetts], who was always a supporter of the royal prerogative, entered fully into these views, and shewed by his opinion, his appointments and his confidential advisers, that his object would be, to extend the power of the government to any limits, which the ministry might authorize. The first demonstration of the new course intended to be pursued, was the arrival of an order in Council to carry into effect the Acts of trade, and to apply to the supreme judicature of the Province [Massachusetts], for Writs of Assistance, to be granted to the officers of the customs. In a case of this importance there can be no doubt, that Mr. Paxton, who was at the head of the customs in Boston, consulted with the Government and all the crown officers, as to the best course to be taken. The result was, that he directed his deputy at Salem, Mr. Cockle, in November, 1760, to petition the Superior Court, then sitting in that town, for 'writs of assistance.' Stephen Sewall who was the Chief Justice, expressed great doubt of the legality of such a writ, and of the authority of the Court to grant it. None of the other judges said a word in favour of it; but as the application was on the part of the Crown, it could not be dismissed without a hearing, which after consultation was fixed for the next term of the Court, to be held in February, 1761, at Boston, when the question was ordered to be argued. In the interval, Chief Justice Sewall died, and Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson was made his successor, thereby uniting in his person, the office of Lieutenant Governor with the emoluments of the commander of the castle, a member of the Council, Judge of Probate and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court! . . . The mercantile part of the community was in a state of great anxiety as to the result of this question. The officers of the Customs called upon Otis for his official assistance, as Advocate General, to argue their cause. But, as he believed these writs to be illegal and tyrannical, he refused. He would not prostitute his office to the support of an oppressive act; and with true delicacy and dignity, being unwilling to retain a station, in which he might be expected or called upon to argue in support of such odious measures, he resigned it though the situation was very lucrative, and if filled by an incumbent with a compliant spirit, led to the highest favours of government. The merchants of Salem and Boston, applied to Mr. Pratt to undertake their cause, who was also solicited to engage on the other side; but he declined taking any part, being about to leave Boston for New York, of which province he had been appointed Chief Justice. They also applied to Otis and Thacher, who engaged to make their defence, and probably both of them without fees, though very great ones were offered. The language of Otis was, 'in such a cause, I despise all fees.' . . . The trial took place in the Council Chamber of the Old Town House, in Boston. . . . The judges were five in number, including Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson, who presided as Chief Justice. The room was filled with all the officers of government, and the principal citizens, to hear the arguments in a cause that inspired the

deepest solicitude. The case was opened by Mr. Gridley, who argued it with much learning, ingenuity, and dignity, urging every point and authority, that could be found after the most diligent search, in favour of the Custom house petition; making all his reasoning depend on this consideration—"if the parliament of Great Britain is the sovereign legislator of the British Empire." He was followed by Mr. Thacher on the opposite side whose reasoning was ingenious and able, delivered in a tone of great mildness and moderation. 'But,' in the language of President Adams, 'Otis was a flame of fire.' . . . American Independence was then and there born. The seeds of patriots and heroes, to defend the 'Non sine Diis animosus infans'; to defend the vigorous youth, were then and there sown. Every man of an immense crowded audience appeared to me to go away as I did, ready to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there, was the first scene of the first act of opposition, to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there, the child Independence was born. In fifteen years, i. e. in 1776, he grew up to manhood and declared himself free."—W. Tudor, *Life of James Otis*, ch. 5-7.—Otis "called the general warrants 'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book.' He contended he said, against 'a kind of power, the exercise of which had cost one king of England his crown, and another his head. . . . No Act of Parliament can establish such a writ. . . . An act against the constitution is void.' This final argument is natural to Americans to-day, familiar as we are with the idea of a written constitution as a fundamental law, to which all other law must conform. In England to-day such an argument would be almost impossible, since there Parliament has become so supreme that it can change the law and the 'constitution' at will. In older English history, however, the Common Law and the great charters (especially in so far as they protected the rights of the individual) had been regarded somewhat as we regard our constitutions; and in the time of Otis that view had not been wholly lost. It is in this old English sense that he uses the word 'constitution.' It is interesting to note that a few years later, the Court of the King's Bench adopted this view and declared general warrants in England unconstitutional. Otis lost the cast, but his fiery eloquence roused the people to open the whole question of parliamentary control. Soon afterward, he published his views in two pamphlets which were widely read. 'God made all men naturally equal,' he affirmed. 'Government is instituted for the benefit of the governed,' and harmful government should be destroyed. Parliament he recognized (so long as it governed fitly), but he urged that the colonists, besides keeping their local legislatures, 'should also be represented, in some proportion to their number and estates, in the grand legislature of the nation.'"—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 171-172.—The quotations from Otis's speech are taken from notes made by John Adams, then a law student. "No cause in the annals of colonial jurisprudence had hitherto excited more public interest; and none had given rise to such powerful argument. . . . An epoch in public affairs may be dated from this trial. Political parties became more distinctly formed, and their several adherents were more marked and decided. The nature of ultra-marine jurisdiction began to be closely examined; the question respecting raising a revenue

fully discussed. The right of the British parliament to impose taxes was openly denied. 'Taxation without representation is tyranny,' was the maxim, that was the guide and watch word of all the friends of liberty."—W. Tudor, *Life of James Otis*, ch. 5-7.—See also MASSACHUSETTS: 1761.

ALSO IN: J. Winsor, *Narrative and critical history of America*, v. 6, ch. 1.—J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 1, 2.—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, pp. 76-83.—G. R. Minot, *History of Massachusetts*, v. 2, pp. 87-99.

1763.—Treaty of Paris.—Social and political effects.—"With the surrender of Quebec the French and Indian War, as the struggle was called, virtually came to an end. The results of this war were seen in the Treaty of Paris which was concluded in 1763. By this treaty it was agreed that all French possessions east of the Mississippi except the town of New Orleans and the island on which it stood should be given to England. Thus the French and Indian War gave England not only Canada but also the eastern portion of the Mississippi Valley. In 1759 England, waging war with Spain as well as with France, had taken possession of the island of Cuba. By the Treaty of Paris she agreed to give Cuba back to Spain and in return to receive Florida. On the same day that the treaty was signed the French king secretly ceded to Spain the city of New Orleans and the country known as Louisiana [see LOUISIANA: 1762-1766], spreading westward from the Mississippi toward the Pacific [that is toward the Spanish possessions in the west]. Thus France lost every foot of land she had in North America except only two little islands—Miquelon and St. Pierre—in the Gulf of St. Lawrence."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 45.—See also SEVEN YEARS' WAR: Treaties, etc.—"In a very real sense the year 1763 may be taken as marking the beginning of the American Revolution. The causes of that event are indeed far-reaching. They are as old as the colonial system itself. In many ways for more than a century, although they knew it not, the people of the thirteen provinces were being schooled and disciplined for their part in it. Almost in spite of themselves they were becoming moulded into one social body, and American society, which with the attainment of self-consciousness must inevitably demand a larger and freer, if not an entirely independent life. Their social consciousness was, in fact, stirred by the experiences of the war; and thereafter it was swiftly quickened and nourished by the blunders of the imperial administration. . . . [At the close of the Seven Years' War, the vision of empire which on the one hand was limited by the sea and little ships, on the other was opened to the boundless territory over which the feet of intrepid settlers could carry them without hindrance.] Moreover, their imaginations were quickened and their mental horizon was expanded by the geographical results. For now, with the exception of the island of New Orleans, an imperial domain stretching from the Arctic to the Gulf, and from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, concealing illimitable riches within its mountains and its plains, was thrown open to the industrial conquest of the English race. The enlarged view caused by this new environment is a fact of vast significance in estimating the forces underlying the contest for American independence. The colonist had grown in self-reliance, in mental stature. A greater destiny seemed to await him, and the friends of provincial subjection were already jealous of the possible consequences of his wider ambition. . . . In another way the war had prepared the colonists for the approaching con-

test. They had gained military experience and become aware of their own military strength. Battling side by side with the British regulars against the veterans of France, they had won confidence in themselves. They had tested their own fighting capacity, and had learned the need of modifying European tactics and European methods to suit the exigencies of frontier warfare. . . . Most significant of all the results of the war was its influence in forcing out the already nascent sentiment of social unity. Founded at different times, under separate charters, and for diverse motives, the American provinces were in fact thirteen distinct societies. Except for their allegiance to a common sovereign, they were in theory as independent as if they had been foreign states. They waged commercial and even physical war upon each other. Political, economic, and religious antagonisms hindered their healthier growth. . . . During the century preceding the accession of George III the colonists had generally accepted the imperial theory without serious protest, and exhibited a steadfast loyalty to Great Britain. They had yielded to the king's prerogative, accepted his protection when granted, and freely admitted the right of Parliament to regulate their trade and manufactures. They had prospered amazingly. Under the stimulus of local self-government they had become the freest people in the world, and therefore the most sensitive to the encroachments of the central power. Of a truth, in the quality of their civilization they had in some vital respects far outstripped the mother-country. In political ideals the contrast between Great Britain and her colonies was very great. Unquestionably in the finer sense the political education of the American people was far superior to that of their brethren in the old home. The standard of political morality was much higher. In place of the moral torpor which prevailed in England and Scotland, there had been developed in the colonies an extreme sensitiveness in regard to personal and constitutional rights. Through active participation in the town-meeting, the county court, and the assembly, a fierce spirit of liberty had been fostered which could not be subdued through appeal to worn-out precedents born of lower ideals."—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, pp. 3-4, 6-7, 10, 44.

1763.—General effects, economic and political, of English trade regulations.—“The peace of Paris . . . marked a great turning point in the position of the colonies and of their relations with the mother country. The French were removed from America on the north and west and the Spanish from the Floridas on the south. With the single exception of the city of New Orleans, the frontier lay open to the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico. Danger from outside attack was averted and expansion toward the west and south was unobstructed by any foreign power. No less important was the effect of the peace upon the imperial ambitions of Great Britain. . . . To protect and preserve the new continental territories became from this time the dominant purpose of the British ministry, and inevitably demanded the recasting of the imperial policy to meet the new situation. But in satisfying the demands of the new imperialism no change was made in the fundamental principles of the commercial policy. The object was the readjustment of the old, not the adoption of a new attitude toward the colonies. The latter must still remain in dependence on the mother country and obedient to her authority. No recognition could be given to the independence

already won; on the contrary every effort must be made to restore the full strength of the royal prerogative. More important still, the trade laws must be enforced, and if necessary supplemented by additional legislation; and so heavy had become the debt to the British tax payer, and so untrustworthy the system of quotas and requisitions employed in the colonies during the recent war, that new measures must be taken by the British government itself to meet the expenses for protection in the future.”—C. M. Andrews, *Colonial period*, pp. 237-239.—“Economically the general results of the trade regulations were important. Robert Giffen has repeatedly pointed out how difficult it is, even with modern comparatively accurate methods, to obtain reliable results from the use of export and import statistics. This difficulty is immeasurably enhanced when we have to rely on the meagre figures of a century and a half ago. For we neither know how these statistics were taken, nor at all how accurate they are; while their inadequacy becomes clearly evident when we consider the large amount of smuggling carried on both in England and the colonies. One general proposition, however, can be formulated from the examination of these statistics, and that is the balance of trade between England and the colonies was unfavorable to the latter. And this was an inherent consequence of the mercantile system, by which England regulated these commercial relations. The colonies were unable to pay England for her manufactures entirely in raw materials, and the residue was paid in coin obtained from the favorable trade with Spain, Portugal, and the West Indies. All metal had to be sent to England; it was, as De Foe says, ‘snatched up for returns to England in specie.’ An important consequence followed from this continuous drain of specie. The colonies could with difficulty retain coin, and hence were forced either to fall back on barter, or to issue paper money. . . . [but] while, on the one hand, the acts of trade and navigation are partially responsible for many sad passages in the fiscal history of the colonies, on the other hand they conduced to the development of a most important colonial industry. This industry was ship-building, for which the colonies were especially adapted on account of the cheapness of lumber. In developing this natural fitness, the protection afforded to English and colonial shipping by the Navigation Acts was an important factor. As a rule England did not discriminate against colonial and in favor of English ships, although the colonies frequently attempted by legislation to secure advantages for their own shipping. As a result of this policy ship building and the carrying trade increased rapidly, especially in the New England colonies. . . . So important did this industry become that in 1724 the ship carpenters of the Thames complained to the King, ‘that their trade was hurt and their workmen emigrated since so many vessels were built in New England.’ Massachusetts built ships not only for England, but also for European countries, and for the West Indies. . . . Politically the commercial regulations were not so important. Up to 1763 only slight political importance attaches to the system, for only in a negative way did it affect the political ideas of the colonists. The colonies were peopled by men of varied race and religion, who had little common consciousness of rights and wrongs and few common political ideals. The centrifugal forces among them were strong. Among centripetal forces, such as a common sovereign and a common system of private law, must be reckoned the fact that their

commerce was regulated by a system which, as a rule, was uniform for all the colonies. When the acts of trade worked to their advantage, the colonists reaped common benefits; when they inflicted hardships, the colonists made common complaint. Moreover, the fact that England was unable to enforce certain of her acts, especially the Molasses Act [see below: 1763-1764], caused contempt for parliamentary authority. The continued and, by the very nature of things, the necessary violation of this law led to a questioning of its sanction, while the open favoritism shown in it towards the West India colonies naturally aroused disaffection in those of the continent. The colonial system, as it was administered before 1763, contributed but slightly in bringing about the revolution of 1776. As Mr. Ramsay has said, 'if no other grievances had been superadded to what existed in 1763, they would have been soon forgotten, for their pressure was neither great, nor universal. It was only when the fundamental basis of the acts was changed from one of commercial monopoly to one of revenue, that the acts became of vital political importance.'—G. L. Beer, *Commercial policy of England toward the American colonies* (Columbia University studies in history, economics and public law, v. 3, no. 2, ch. 8, sect. 2).

ALSO IN: A. M. Schlesinger, *Colonial merchants and the American Revolution*.

1763.—King's proclamation excluding settlers from the Western territory lately acquired from France. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1763.

1763-1764.—Pontiac's War. See PONTIAC'S WAR.

1763-1764.—Determination in England to tax the colonies.—Sugar or Molasses Act.—"It did not take four years after the peace of 1763 to show how rapidly the new situation of affairs was bearing fruit in America. . . . The overthrow of their ancient enemy [the French in Canada], while further increasing the self-confidence of the Americans, at the same time removed the principal check which had hitherto kept their differences with the British government from coming to an open rupture. Formerly the dread of French attack had tended to make the Americans complaisant toward the king's ministers, while at the same time it made the king's ministers unwilling to lose the good will of the Americans. Now that the check was removed, the continuance or revival of the old disputes at once foreboded trouble; and the old occasions for dispute were far from having ceased. On the contrary the war itself had given them fresh vitality. If money had been needed before, it was still more needed now. The war had entailed a heavy burden of expense upon the British government as well as upon the colonies. The national debt of Great Britain was much increased and there were many who thought that, since the Americans shared in the benefits of the war, they ought also to share in the burden which it left behind it. People in England who used this argument did not realize that the Americans had really contributed as much as could reasonably be expected to the support of the war, and that it had left behind it debts to be paid in America as well as in England. But there was another argument which made it seem reasonable to many Englishmen that the colonists should be taxed. It seemed right that a small military force should be kept up in America, for defence of the frontiers against the Indians, even if there were no other enemies to be dreaded. The events of Pontiac's war now showed that there was clearly need of such a force;

and the experience of the royal governors for half a century had shown that it was very difficult to get the colonial legislatures to vote money for any such purpose. Hence there grew up in England a feeling that taxes ought to be raised in America as a contribution to the war debt and to the military defence of the colonies; and in order that such taxes should be fairly distributed and promptly collected, it was felt that the whole business ought to be placed under the direct supervision and control of parliament. . . . It was in 1763 that George Grenville became prime minister, a man of whom Macaulay says that he knew of 'no national interests except those which are expressed by pounds, shillings, and pence.' Grenville proceeded to introduce into Parliament two measures which had consequences of which he little dreamed. The first of these measures was the Molasses Act [often called the Sugar Act], the second was the Stamp Act. Properly speaking, the Molasses Act was an old law which Grenville now made up his mind to revive and enforce. The commercial wealth of the New England colonies depended largely upon their trade with the fish which their fishermen caught along the coast and as far out as the banks of Newfoundland. The finest fish could be sold in Europe, but the poorer sort found their chief market in the French West Indies. The French government, in order to ensure a market for the molasses raised in these islands, would not allow the planters to give anything else in exchange for fish. Great quantities of molasses were therefore carried to New England, and what was not needed there for domestic use was distilled into rum, part of which was consumed at home, and the rest carried chiefly to Africa wherewith to buy slaves to be sold to the southern colonies. All this trade required many ships, and thus kept up a lively demand for New England lumber, besides finding employment for thousands of sailors and shipwrights. Now in 1733 the British government took it into its head to 'protect' its sugar planters in the English West Indies by compelling the New England merchants to buy all their molasses from them; and with this end in view it forthwith laid upon all sugar and molasses imported into North America from the French islands a duty so heavy that, if it had been enforced, it would have stopped all such importation. . . . It proved to be impossible to enforce the act without causing more disturbance than the government felt prepared to encounter. Now in 1764 Grenville announced that the act was to be enforced, and of course the machinery of writs of assistance was to be employed for that purpose. Henceforth all molasses from the French islands must either pay the prohibitory duty or be seized without ceremony. Loud and fierce was the indignation of New England over this revival of the Molasses Act. Even without the Stamp Act, it might very likely have led that part of the country to make armed resistance, but in such case it is not so sure that the southern and middle colonies would have come to the aid of New England. But in the Stamp Act, Grenville provided the colonies with an issue which concerned one as much as another."—J. Fiske, *War of Independence*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: J. G. Palfrey, *History of New England*, v. 5, bk. 6, ch. 2-3.—W. B. Weedon, *Economic and social history of New England*, v. 2, ch. 19.—M. Farrand, *Development of United States*, pp. 33-35.—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, p. 57.—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, pp. 102-120.

1764.—Climax of mercantile colonial policy of

England, and its consequences.—“Historians, in treating of the American rebellion, have confined their arguments too exclusively to the question of internal taxation, and the right or policy of exercising this prerogative. The true source of the rebellion lay deeper, in . . . [the traditional English] colonial policy. Just as the Spaniards had been excited to the discovery of America by the hope of obtaining gold and silver, the English merchants utilized the discovery by the same fallacious method, and with the same fallacious aspirations. . . . A hundred years ago the commercial classes believed that the prime object of their pursuits was to get as much gold and silver into England as they could. They sought, therefore, to make their country, as nearly as they might, a solitary centre of the exportation of non-metallic commodities, that so she might be also the great reservoir into which the precious metals would flow in a return stream. On this base their colonial policy was erected. . . . So long as the colonies remained in their infancy the mercantile policy was less prejudicial to their interests. The monopoly of their commerce, the limitation of their markets, the discouragement of their manufactures, in some cases amounting to absolute prohibition, were all less fatal in a country where labour was dear, than they would be in a state where population was more fully developed and land had become scarcer. . . . A contraband trade sprung up between them and the colonies of Spain. . . . [The] settlers imported goods from England, and re-exported them to the Spanish colonies, in return for bullion and other commodities. The result of this was that the Spanish colonists had access to useful commodities from which they would otherwise have been debarred, that the American colonists could without distress remit the specie which was required by the nature of their dealings with England, and that a large market was opened for English products. [See also COMMERCE: Era of geographical expansion: 17th-18th centuries: North American colonies.] This widely beneficial trade was incontinently suppressed in 1764, by one of those efforts of short-sighted rigour which might be expected from any government where George Grenville’s influence was prominent. All smuggling was to be put down, and as this trade was contraband, it must be put down like the rest. The Government probably acted as they did in answer to the prayers of the mercantile classes, who could not see that they were cutting off the streams that fed their own prosperity. They only saw that a colonial trade had sprung up, and their jealousy blinded them to the benefits that accrued to themselves as a consequence of it. Their folly found them out. The suppression of the colonial trade was entrusted to the commanders of men-of-war. . . . We may be sure that the original grievance of the colonists was not softened by the manners of the officers who had to put the law into execution. The result of the whole transaction was the birth of a very strong sense in the minds of the colonists that the mother country looked upon them as a sponge to be squeezed. This conviction took more than a passing hold upon them. It was speedily inflamed into inextinguishable heat, first by the news that they were to be taxed without their own consent, and next by the tyrannical and atrocious measures by which it was proposed to crush their resistance. The rebellion may be characterised as having first originated in the blind greediness of the English merchants, and as having then been precipitated by the arbitrary ideas of the patricians in the first instance, and afterwards of the King and the



least educated of the common people. If the severe pressure of the mercantile policy, unflinchingly carried out, had not first filled the colonists with resentment and robbed them of their prosperity, the imperial claim to impose taxes would probably have been submitted to without much ado. And if the suppression of their trade in 1764 had not been instantly followed by Grenville’s plan for extorting revenue from them, they would probably in time have been reconciled to the blow which had been dealt to their commerce. It was the conjunction of two highly oppressive pieces of policy which taught them that they would certainly lose more by tame compliance than they could possibly lose by an active resistance.”—J. Morley, *Edmund Burke*, ch. 4.—“For the merchants the unfolding of the new imperial program involved a very serious interference with their customary trading operations; and during the decade from 1764 to 1774 their constant aim was to effect a restoration of the commercial conditions of 1763. As a class they entertained neither earlier nor later the idea of independence, for withdrawal from the British empire meant for them the loss of vital business advantages without corresponding benefits in a world organized on a basis of imperial trading systems. They strove to obtain the most favorable terms possible within the empire but not to leave it. Indeed they viewed with no small concern the growth of republican feeling and leveling sentiment which the controversy occasioned. The great ports of the north—Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Newport—bore eloquent testimony to the prosperity of the mercantile class; and on the continuance of this prosperity depended the livelihood of the mechanics and petty shopkeepers of the towns and, to a lesser degree, the well-being of the farmers whose cereals and meats were exported to the West Indies. This proletarian element was not inclined by temperament to that self-restraint in movements of popular protest which was ever the *arrière pensée* of the merchant class; and being for the most part unfranchised, they expressed their sentiments most naturally through boisterous mass meetings and mob demonstrations. In the southern coastal area colonial capital was invested almost exclusively in plantation production; and commerce was carried on chiefly by British mercantile houses and their American agents, the factors. The only town in the plantation provinces that could compare with the teeming ports of the north was Charleston; and political life was focused in the periodical meetings of the great landed proprietors in the assemblies. Under the wasteful system of marketing, which the apparent plenty of plantation life made possible, the planters found themselves treading a morass of indebtedness to British merchants from which it seemed that nothing less than virtual repudiation could extricate them. In the last twenty-five years of colonial dependence the assemblies passed a succession of lax bankruptcy acts and other legislation prejudicial to non-resident creditors; but these laws nearly always ran afoul the royal veto. This fact, together with the sturdy sense of self-determination which the peculiar social system fostered, made the plantation provinces ready to resent any new exercise of parliamentary authority over the colonies, such as the new imperial policy involved. Georgia, as the youngest colony, not yet self-sustaining, and dependent on the home government for protection against a serious Indian menace, was less a part of this picture than the other provinces of the group. On the western fringe of the coastal communities lay an irregular

belt of back-country settlements whose economy and modes of thought were almost as distinctive as those of the two tidewater regions. Certainly the western sections of many of the provinces had grievances in common and resembled each other more than they did the older sections with which they were associated by provincial boundaries. These pioneer settlements extended north and south, up and down the valleys between the fall line of the rivers and mountains, from New England to Georgia. Outside of New England the majority of the settlers were of non-English strains, mostly German and Scotch-Irish; but throughout the long frontier the people cultivated small isolated farms and entertained democratic ideas commensurate with the equalitarian conditions to which their manner of living accustomed them. In many of the provinces they had long been discriminated against by the older settlements in the matter of representation in the assemblies, the administration of justice and the incidence of taxation; and they were thus familiar, of their own experience, with all the arguments which the Revolution was to make popular against non-representative government and unjust taxation. Being self-sustaining communities economically, their zeal for popular rights was in no wise alloyed by the embarrassment of their pocketbooks. Although out of harmony with the popular leaders of the seaboard in both the commercial and plantation provinces on many matters of intracolony policy, they could join forces with them against the new imperial policy; and they brought to the controversy a moral conviction and bold philosophy which gave great impetus to the agitation for independence. The history of the American Revolution is the story of the reaction of these three sections to the successive acts of the British government and of their interaction upon each other. The merchants of the commercial colonies were the most seriously affected by the new imperial policy and at the outset assumed the leadership of the colonial movement of protest. They were closely seconded by the planters of the south as soon as enough time had elapsed to make clear to the latter the implications of the issue of home rule for which the merchants stood. The democratic farmers of the interior, more or less out of contact with the political currents of the seaboard, were slower to take part; and it is largely true that their measure of participation varied inversely according to the degree of their isolation.—A. M. Schlesinger, *American Revolution reconsidered (Political Science Quarterly, Mar., 1919, pp. 66-69)*.—"The laws of trade bore hardly upon New England; but they were so generally evaded and disregarded, either by the venality of the collectors, a post highly valued on this account, or by open and unpunished violation, that in practice they were not felt. When the British ministry began to enforce them, the first sense of oppression was given to the New England people. The genuine loyalty of the people was unquestioned. All the best evidence of the time concurs on this point, and we have the direct opinion of such a man as John Adams as to its truth. The deepest interest was felt in every public event in England, and the Protestant succession was very dear to the descendants of the Puritans. They rejoiced publicly on every victory of the English arms; they celebrated royal births, marriages, and coronations with all the pomp they could muster. They mourned formally and carefully on the occasion of every death in the royal family, and these outward manifestations were not tainted with hypocrisy. They still looked back to

England as the home of their race, and her glory was theirs. But everybody in New England was a politician. 'They are all politicians down to the house-maids,' says Rochefoucauld, 'and read two newspapers a day.' Politics always ran high, and parties were strong and active. There was no need of an elaborate warning to such people that their rights were invaded. They all knew it by instinct, and once aroused, the old spirit of independent government and the hatred of outside interference broke out and could not be quenched. . . . There were no special grievances, there was no peculiar disloyalty; but there was a thoroughly homogeneous people, pure of race, wedded to independence, all educated, all keen politicians, hating external power, and still imbued with the traditions of their fathers, who had fought the great Rebellion [in England], and brought a king to execution. Such a people could not be governed except as seemed right in their own eyes; and when an attempt was made to rule them in other ways the war for independence began."—H. C. Lodge, *Short history of the English colonies in America, pp. 473-474*.—"As early as 1711, Le Ronde Denys warned the New Englanders that the expulsion of the French from North America would leave England free to suppress colonial liberties, while another French writer predicted that it would rather enable the colonies to 'unite, shake off the yoke of the English monarchy, and erect themselves into a democracy.' The prediction was often repeated. Between 1730 and 1763, many men, among them Montesquieu, Peter Kalm, and Turgot, asserted that colonial dependence upon England would not long outlast the French occupation of Canada. The opposition to Grenville's colonial legislation, which gathered force with every additional measure, seemed now about to confirm these predictions. No single law of these early years would have caused its proper part of the resistance which all of them in fact brought about. A measure of oppression could be attributed to each of them, but the pressure of any one was not felt by all classes or all colonies alike. The Proclamation of 1763 was an offense chiefly to speculators in land, and to those border communities that had fought to open free passage to the West only to find the fertile Ohio valleys 'reserved to the Indians'—the very tribes which had brought death and desolation to the frontier. The Sugar Act was a greater grievance to the New England distiller of rum and the exporters of fish and lumber than it was to the rice and tobacco planters of the South. New York merchants were seriously affected by the Currency Act, which scarcely touched Massachusetts, and which, in Virginia, meant money in the pockets of creditors, but bore hardly on debtors and the speculators who bought silver at Williamsburg in depreciated paper in order to sell it at par in Philadelphia. The famous Stamp Act itself chiefly concerned the printers, lawyers, officeholders, the users of the custom-house, and the litigious class that employed the courts to enforce or resist the payment of debt. Only when regarded as a whole was the policy of Grenville seen to spell disaster. Each new law seemed carefully designed to increase the burdens imposed by every other. The Sugar Act, for example, taken by itself, was perhaps the most grievous of all."—C. L. Becker, *Beginnings of the American people (Riverside history of the United States, pp. 214-216)*.—"It was estimated that the new taxes of 1764, with the saving of the drawbacks, would net about £45,000 a year to the British exchequer. But the cost of the military and fiscal machinery

in America would amount to some £360,000, of which the colonies were to be asked to pay about a third. Grenville decided that the most effective method for raising the major part of the colonial revenue was the imposition of a stamp tax. . . . Still, he was willing to try any other method which the colonies had to suggest. He therefore only announced his intention of imposing a stamp tax and waited a full year for the proposition of a substitute tax by the colonies. Protests from colonial agents against any kind of tax at all were ruled out of order. . . . Samuel Adams in a Boston town meeting (May, 1764), instructed the delegates to the Massachusetts general Court to rebuke that assembly for not taking notice of 'the intention of the British ministry to burden us with new

some of the council, and representatives, and by great numbers of people in the town of Boston, and the disuse of mourning soon became general. This was intended to alarm the manufacturers in England. And now [in 1765], an agreement was made, and signed by a great proportion of the inhabitants of Boston, to eat no lamb during the year. This was in order to increase the growth, and, of course, the manufacture of wool in the province. Neither of these measures much served the purpose for which they were professedly intended, but they served to unite the people in an unfavourable opinion of parliament."—T. Hutchinson, *History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, 1740-1774*, pp. 116-117.—The movement thus started in Boston before the passage of the Stamp



BRITISH STAMPS, ISSUED UNDER THE STAMP ACT

taxes.' Two months later, James Otis, in his 'Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,' invoked 'the united application of all who feel aggrieved' to seek redress. That sentiment of common interest among the colonies which the French war had not been able to stir was roused by the Grenville policy."—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, p. 62.

ALSO IN: W. Massey, *History of England: Reign of George III*, v. 1, ch. 5.

1764-1767.—Patriotic self-denials.—"Upon the news of the intention to lay [the Stamp tax] . . . on the colonies, many people, the last year, had associated, and engaged to forbear the importation, or consumption, of English goods; and particularly to break off from the custom of wearing black clothes, or other mourning (it being generally of British manufacture), upon the death of relations. This agreement was then signed by

Act spread rapidly through the other provinces after the act had been passed and continued to be for several years a very serious expression of colonial patriotism and opposition to the oppressive policy of the mother country. See below: 1765.

1765.—Stamp Act.—Currency Act.—"The scheme of the imposition by Parliament of a tax on the American colonists to be collected by stamps was not a new one. Nearly forty years before this time, 'Sir William Keith, the late Governor of Pennsylvania, presented an elaborate disquisition to the King . . . proposing the extension of the stamp duties to the Colonies by Act of Parliament.' It had been one of the projects of the factious Dunbar, during his short career of turbulence and intrigue in New Hampshire. Governor Sharpe of Maryland and Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia had recommended a resort to it at the time of the abortive movement for a union of the Colonies.



Its renewal at this time has been said to have been especially due to Charles Jenkinson, then only private secretary to Lord Bute, but who rose afterwards to be Earl of Liverpool. The project, as now resolved upon, was pursued with inconsiderate obstinacy, though it encountered a spirited debate when it was brought into the House of Commons [February, 1765]. . . . The bill was pending in the House between three and four weeks, at the end of which time it was passed, the largest number of votes which had been given against it in any stage of its progress not having amounted to fifty. It was concurred in by the House of Lords, where it appears to have met no resistance, and in due course [March 22] received the royal assent. No apprehension of consequences counselled a pause. The Stamp Act—as it has ever since been called by eminence—provided . . . for the payment, by British subjects in America to the English Exchequer, of specified sums, greater or less, in consideration of obtaining validity for each of the common transactions of business.”—J. G. Palfrey, *History of New England*, v. 5, bk. 6, ch. 3.

The following is the text of the Stamp Act:

Whereas, by an act made in the last session of parliament, several duties were granted, continued, and appropriated, towards defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the British colonies and plantations in America: and whereas, it is first necessary, that provision be made for raising a further revenue within your majesty's dominions in America, towards defraying the said expenses; we, your majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the commons of Great Britain, in parliament assembled, have therefore resolved, to give and grant unto your majesty the several rites and duties hereinafter mentioned; and do most humbly beseech your majesty that it may be enacted, And be it enacted, by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That from and after the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and sixty five, there shall be raised, levied, collected and paid, unto his majesty, his heirs and successors, throughout the colonies and plantations in America, which now are, or hereafter may be, under the dominion of his majesty, his heirs and successors,

1. For every skin of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, or any copy thereof, in any court of law within the British colonies and plantations in America, a stamp duty of three pence.

2. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any special bail, and appearance upon such bail in any such court. a stamp duty of two shillings.

3. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which may be engrossed, written or printed, any petition, bill, or answer, claim, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, in any court of chancery or equity, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

4. For every skin or piece of vellum, or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any copy of any

petition, bill, answer, claim, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, in any such court, a stamp duty of three pence.

5. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any monition, libel, answer, allegation, inventory, or renunciation, in ecclesiastical matters, in any court of probate, court of the ordinary, or other court exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling.

6. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any copy of any will, (other than the probate thereof,) monition, libel, answer, allegation, inventory, or renunciation, in ecclesiastical matters, in any such court, a stamp duty of six pence.

7. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any donation, presentation, collation or institution, of or to any benefice, or any writ or instrument for the like purpose, or any register, entry, testimonial or certificate of any degree taken in any university, academy, college, or seminary of learning, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two pounds.

8. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any monition, libel, claim, answer, allegation, information, letter of request, execution, renunciation, inventory, or other pleading, in any admiralty court within the said colonies and plantations a stamp duty of one shilling.

9. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any copy of any such monition, libel, claim, answer, allegation, information, letter of request, execution, renunciation, inventory or other pleading, shall be engrossed, written or printed, a stamp duty of six pence.

10. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any appeal, writ of error, writ of dower, 'ad quod damnum,' certiorari, statute merchant, statute staple, attestation, or certificate, by any officer, or exemplification of any record or proceeding, in any court whatsoever within the said colonies and plantations, (except appeals, writs of error, certiorari, attestations, certificates, and exemplifications, for, or relating to the removal of any proceedings from before a single justice of the peace,) a stamp duty of ten shillings.

11. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any writ of covenant for levying fines, writ of entry for suffering a common recovery, or attachment issuing out of, or returnable into any court within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of five shillings.

12. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any judgment, decree, or sentence, or dismissal, or any record of nisi prius or postea, in any court within the said colonies or plantations, a stamp duty of four shillings.

13. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any affidavit, com-

mon bail, or appearance, interrogatory, deposition, rule, order or warrant of any court, or any 'dedimus potestatem,' *capias*, subpoena, summons, compulsory citation, commission, recognisance, or any other writ, process, or mandate, issuing out of, or returnable into, any court, or any office belonging thereto, or any other proceeding therein whatsoever, or any copy thereof, or of any record not herein before charged, within the said colonies and plantations, (except warrants relating to criminal matters, and proceedings thereon, or relation thereto,) a stamp duty of one shilling.

14. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any note or bill of lading, which shall be signed for any kind of goods, wares, or merchandise, to be exported from, or any docket or clearance granted within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of four pence.

15. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, letters of mart or commission for private ships of war, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of twenty shillings.

16. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any grant, appointment, or admission of or to any public beneficial office or employment, for the space of one year, or any lesser time, of or above twenty pounds per annum, sterling money, in salary, fees, and perquisites, within the said colonies and plantations, (except commissions and appointments of officers of the army, navy, ordnance, or militia, of judges, and of justices of the peace,) a stamp duty of ten shillings.

17. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any grant of any liberty, privilege, or franchise, under the seal or sign manual, of any governor, proprietor, or public officer, alone, or in conjunction with any other person or persons, or with any council, or any council and assembly, or any exemplification of the same, shall be engrossed, written, or printed, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of six pounds.

18. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any license for retailing of spirituous liquors, to be granted to any person who shall take out the same, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of twenty shillings.

19. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any license for retailing of wine, to be granted to any person who shall not take out a license for retailing of spirituous liquors, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of four pounds.

20. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any license for retailing of wine, to be granted to any person who shall take out a license for retailing of spirituous liquors, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of three pounds.

21. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any probate of wills, letters of administration, or of guardianship for any estate above the value of twenty

pounds sterling money, within the British colonies [and] plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama islands, a stamp duty of five shillings.

22. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such probate, letters of administration or of guardianship, within all other parts of the British dominions in America, a stamp duty of ten shillings.

23. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any bond for securing the payment of any sum of money, not exceeding the sum of ten pounds sterling money, within the British colonies and plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama islands, a stamp duty of six pence.

24. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any bond for securing the payment of any sum of money above ten pounds, and not exceeding twenty pounds sterling money, within such colonies, plantations and islands, a stamp duty of one shilling.

25. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any bond for securing the payment of any sum of money above twenty pounds, and not exceeding forty pounds sterling money, within such colonies, plantations and islands, a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

26. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any order or warrant for surveying or setting out any quantity of land, not exceeding one hundred acres, issued by any governor, proprietor, or any public officer, alone, or in conjunction with any other person or persons, or with any council, or any council and assembly, within the British colonies and plantations in America, a stamp duty of six pence.

27. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such order or warrant for surveying or setting out any quantity of land above one hundred and not exceeding two hundred acres, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling.

28. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such order or warrant for surveying or setting out any quantity of land above two hundred and not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres, and in proportion for every such order or warrant for surveying or setting out every other three hundred and twenty acres, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

29. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any original grant or deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatever, by which any quantity of land, not exceeding one hundred acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, within the British colonies and plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama islands (except leases for any term not exceeding the term of twenty-one years) a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

30. For every skin or piece of vellum or parch-

ment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, above one hundred and not exceeding two hundred acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, within such colonies, plantations and islands, a stamp duty of two shillings.

31. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, above two hundred, and not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, and in proportion for every such grant, deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument, granting, conveying or assigning every other three hundred and twenty acres, within such colonies, plantations and islands, a stamp duty of two shillings and six pence.

32. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, not exceeding one hundred acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, within all other parts of the British dominions in America, a stamp duty of three shillings.

33. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, and such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, above one hundred and not exceeding two hundred acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, within the same parts of the said dominions, a stamp duty of four shillings.

34. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, and such original grant, or any such deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever, by which any quantity of land, above two hundred and not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres, shall be granted, conveyed, or assigned, and in proportion for every such grant, deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument, granting, conveying, or assigning every other three hundred and twenty acres, within the same parts of the said dominions, a stamp duty of five shillings.

35. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any grant, appointment, or admission, of or to any beneficial office or employment, not hereinbefore charged, above the value of twenty pounds per annum sterling money, in salary, fees, or perquisites, or any exemplification of the same, within the British colonies and plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama islands, (except commissions of officers of the army, navy, ordnance, or militia, and of justices of the peace,) a stamp duty of four pounds.

36. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any such grant, appointment, or admission, of or to any such public beneficial office or employment, or any exemplification of the same, within all other parts of the British dominions in America, a stamp duty of six pounds.

37. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any indenture, lease, conveyance, contract, stipulation, bill of sale, charter party, protest, articles of apprenticeship or covenant, (except for the hire of servants not apprentices, and also except such other matters as hereinbefore charged,) within the British colonies and plantations in America, a stamp duty of two shillings and six pence.

38. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any warrant or order for auditing any public accounts, beneficial warrant, order, grant, or certificate, under any public seal, or under the seal or sign manual of any governor, proprietor, or public officer, alone, or in conjunction with any other person or persons, or with any council, or any council and assembly, not herein before charged, or any passport or letpass, surrender of office, or policy of assurance, shall be engrossed, written, or printed, within the said colonies and plantations, (except warrants or orders for the service of the army, navy, ordnance, or militia, and grants of offices under twenty pounds per annum, in salary, fees, and perquisites,) a stamp duty of five shillings.

39. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any notarial act, bond, deed, letter of attorney, procuracy, mortgage release or other obligatory instrument not herein before charged, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two shillings and three pence.

40. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any register, entry, or enrolment of any grant, deed, or other instrument whatsoever, herein before charged, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of three pence.

41. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any register, entry, or enrolment of any grant, deed, or other instrument whatsoever not herein before charged, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two shillings.

42. And for and upon every pack of playing cards, and all dice, which shall be sold or used within the said colonies and plantations, the several stamp duties following: (that is to say.)

43. For every pack of such cards, one shilling.

44. And for every pair of such dice, ten shillings.

45. And for and upon every paper called a pamphlet, and upon every newspaper, containing public news, or occurrences, which shall be printed, dispersed, and made public, within any of the said colonies and plantations, and for and upon such advertisements as are hereinafter mentioned, the respective duties following; (that is to say.)

46. For every such pamphlet and paper, contained in a half sheet, or any lesser piece of paper, which shall be so printed, a stamp duty of one half penny for every printed copy thereof.

47. For every such pamphlet and paper, (being larger than half a sheet, and not exceeding one whole sheet,) which shall be so printed, a stamp duty of one penny for every printed copy thereof.

48. For every pamphlet and paper, being larger than one whole sheet, and not exceeding six sheets in octavo, or in a lesser page, or not exceeding twelve sheets in quarto, or twenty sheets in folio,

which shall be so printed, a duty after the rate of one shilling for every sheet of any kind of paper which shall be contained in one printed copy thereof.

49. For every advertisement to be contained in any gazette, newspaper, or other paper, or any pamphlet which shall be so printed, a duty of two shillings.

50. For every almanac or calendar, or any one particular year, or for any time less than a year, which shall be written or printed on one side only of any one sheet, skin, or piece of paper, parchment, or vellum, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two pence.

51. For every other almanac, or calendar, for any one particular year, which shall be written or printed within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of four pence.

52. And for every almanac or calendar, written or printed in the said colonies and plantations, to serve for several years, duties to the same amount respectively shall be paid for every such year.

53. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any instrument, proceeding, or other matter or thing aforesaid, shall be engrossed, written, or printed, within the said colonies and plantations, in any other than the English language, a stamp duty of double the amount of the respective duties before charged thereon.

54. And there shall be also paid, in the said colonies and plantations, a duty of six pence for every twenty shillings, in any sum not exceeding fifty pounds sterling money, which shall be given, paid, contracted, or agreed for, with or in relation to any clerk or apprentice, which shall be put or placed to or with any master or mistress, to learn any profession, trade, or employment. 2. And also a duty of one shilling for every twenty shillings, in any sum exceeding fifty pounds, which shall be given, paid, contracted, or agreed for, with, or in relation to, any such clerk or apprentice.

55. Finally, the produce of all the aforementioned duties shall be paid into his majesty's treasury; and there held in reserve, to be used, from time to time, by the parliament, for the purpose of defraying the expenses necessary for the defense, protection, and security of the said colonies and plantations.


"Less noticed at the time, but scarcely less important in its effects upon trade and industry, was the law passed by Parliament in the same year for regulating colonial currency. With the rapid development of commerce in the eighteenth century, and on account of the steady flow of specie to London, the colonies had commonly resorted to the use of paper money as a legal tender in the payment of local debts. Such men as Franklin and Colden defended the practice on the ground of necessity, and it was undoubtedly true that without the issue of new bills of credit the colonies could not have given the military assistance required of them for the conquest of Canada. But it was equally true that in most colonies, except Massachusetts where the issues had been retired in 1749, and New York where their par value had been consistently maintained, the evils of depreciated currency had long existed and still went unremedied. Debtors profited at the expense of creditors, while colonial assemblies often took advantage of the situation to pass laws enabling the American trader to avoid meeting his just obligations to English merchants. In response

to the loud complaints of the latter, and without adequately discriminating between the uses and abuses of a colonial paper currency, Parliament passed the act 'to prevent paper bills of credit hereafter issued in any of his Majesty's colonies, from being declared to be a legal tender in payment of money, and to prevent the legal tender of such bills as are now subsisting, from being prolonged beyond the periods limited for calling in and sinking the same.'—C. L. Becker, *Beginning of the American people*, pp. 208-209.—"Massachusetts was the first of the colonies to issue paper money. This was in 1690, to aid in fitting out an expedition against Canada. The other provinces followed at intervals. Affairs had come to such a pass by 1748 that the price in paper of £100 in coin ranged all the way from £100 in New England to £180 in Pennsylvania. The royal governors in all the colonies, acting under instructions from home, were generally persistent opponents of this financial expedient. Governor Belcher of Massachusetts, in a proclamation against the practice (1740) said it gave 'great interruption and brought confusion into trade business,' and 'reflected great dishonor on his Majesty's government here.' In 1720, Parliament passed what is known as 'the Bubble Act,' designed to break up all private banking companies in the United Kingdom chartered for the issue of circulating notes; this Act was made applicable to the colonies in 1740, and reinforced in 1751, the last-named Act forbidding the further issue of colonial paper money except in cases of invasion or for the annual current expenses of the government, these exceptional cases to be under control of the Crown. In 1763 all issues to date were declared void; although ten years later (1773), provincial bills of credit were made receivable as legal tender at the treasuries of the colonies emitting them. The controversy between the colonies and the home government over these issues of a cheap circulating medium, developed much bitterness on the part of the former, who deemed the practice essential to their prosperity; and it was one of the many causes of the Revolution."—R. G. Thwaites, *Colonies, 1492-1750 (Epochs of American History, pp. 278-279)*.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 17th-18th centuries: Early paper issues, etc.


1765.—News of the Stamp Act in the colonies.—Colonel Barré's speech and the Sons of Liberty.—Patrick Henry's speech in the Virginia assembly.—Formal protests and informal mob-doings in Philadelphia, New York and Boston.—In the course of the debate in the British House of Commons, on the Stamp Act, February 6, 1765, Charles Townsend, after discussing the advantages which the American colonies had derived from the late war, asked the question: "And now will these American children, planted by our care, nourished up to strength and opulence by our indulgence, and protected by our arms, grudge to contribute their mite to relieve us from the heavy burden under which we lie?" This called to his feet Colonel Isaac Barré who had served in America with Wolfe, and who had a knowledge of the country and people which most members of Parliament lacked. "They planted by your care!" exclaimed Barré. "No: your oppressions planted them in America. They fled from your tyranny to a then uncultivated, inhospitable country, where they exposed themselves to almost all the hardships to which human nature is liable: and, among others, to the cruelties of a savage foe, the most subtle, and, I will take upon me to say, the most formidable of any people upon the face of God's

earth; and yet, actuated by principles of true English liberty, they met all hardships with pleasure, compared with those they suffered in their own country from the hands of those who should have been their friends. They nourished up by your indulgence! They grew by your neglect of them. As soon as you began to care about them, that care was exercised in sending persons to rule them in one department and another, who were, perhaps, the deputies of deputies to some members of this house, sent to spy out their liberties, to misrepresent their actions, and to prey upon them; men whose behavior on many occasions has caused the blood of those sons of Liberty to recoil within them; men promoted to the highest seats of justice, some who, by my knowledge, were glad, by going to a foreign country, to escape being brought to the bar of a court of justice in their own. They protected by your arms! They have nobly taken up arms in your defence; have exerted a valor amidst their constant and laborious industry, for the defence of a country whose frontier was drenched in blood, while its interior parts yielded all its little savings to your


means, the execution of the Stamp Act. They were long kept secret, which occasioned loyalists to say that there was a private union among a certain sect of republican principles from one end of the continent to the other. As they increased in numbers, they grew in boldness and publicity, announcing in the newspapers their committees of correspondence, and interchanging solemn pledges of support."—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic of the United States*, p. 183.—See also LIBERTY BOYS.—"In February 1765, a listless and half-empty House of Commons, by a vote of 205 to 49, and a still more listless and empty House of Lords, without division or debate, passed the Stamp Act, which, says Lecky, 'If judged by consequences, must be deemed one of the most momentous legislative Acts in the history of mankind.' To the astonishment of the king and ministry the passage of the Stamp Act aroused a storm of opposition in America. Its enforcement would have meant the thrusting of the hand of the tax gatherer into all the transactions of colonial business; for by the terms of its sixty printed pages all pamphlets and newspapers, all legal and



COLONEL BARRÉ



SAMUEL ADAMS



JAMES OTIS

emolument. And believe me—remember I this day told you so—the same spirit of freedom which actuated that people at first will accompany them still. But prudence forbids me to explain myself further. God knows I do not at this time speak from motives of party heat; what I deliver are the genuine sentiments of my heart. However superior to me in general knowledge and experience the responsible body of this house may be, yet I claim to know more of America than most of you, having seen and been conversant in that country. The people, I believe, are as truly loyal as any subjects the king has; but a people jealous of their liberties, and who will vindicate them, if ever they should be violated. But the subject is too delicate; I will say no more." Notes of Colonel Barré's speech were taken by a Mr. Ingersoll, one of the agents for Connecticut, who sat in the gallery. He sent home a report of it, which was published in the newspapers at New London, and soon the name of the "Sons of Liberty," which the eloquent defender of the resisting colonists had given to them, was on every lip.—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 3, ch. 8.—"Meantime [in 1765], 'The Sons of Liberty'—a term that grew into use soon after the publication of Barré's speech—were entering into associations to resist, by all lawful

commercial paper . . . must bear the stamp which certified that duties had been paid thereon."—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, p. 63.—"A copy of . . . [the act] was printed in the 'Pennsylvania Gazette' on April 18th, but this must necessarily have been in advance of news of its passage. The people of Philadelphia began at once to show their determination to make it [the Stamp Act] a nullity so far as revenue was concerned. An enforced frugality was the first step. . . . In the 'Pennsylvania Gazette' of April 18th there was an article against expensive and ostentatious funerals, the writer saying that often £70 or £100 were squandered on such occasions. August 15th, when Alderman William Plumsted was buried at St. Peter's Church, the funeral, by his own wish, was conducted in the plainest way, no pall, no mourning worn by relatives. In March, the Hibernia Fire Company resolved, 'from motives of economy, and to reduce the present high price of mutton and encourage the breweries of Pennsylvania, not to purchase any lamb this season, nor to drink any foreign beer.' Other fire companies and many citizens copied this example. . . . On October 25th the merchants and traders of Philadelphia subscribed to a non-importation agreement, such as were then being signed all over the country. In this article the subscribers agreed

that, in consequence of the late acts of Parliament, and the injurious regulations accompanying them, and of the Stamp Act, etc., in justice to themselves and in hopes of benefit from their example (1) to countermand all orders for English goods until the Stamp Act should be repealed; (2) a few necessary articles, or shipped under peculiar circumstances, are excepted; (3) no goods received for sale on commission to be disposed of until the Stamp Act should be repealed; and this agreement to be binding on each and all, as a pledge of word of honor."—J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, *History of Philadelphia*, v. 1, ch. 16.—The first stern note of defiance came from Virginia. Patrick Henry had lately been elected to the colonial assembly. Having waited in vain for the older leaders of the house to move in the matter of expressing the feeling of the colony on the subject, on May 29, when the session was within three days of its expected close, "Mr. Henry introduced his celebrated resolutions on the stamp act. I will not withhold from the reader a note of this transaction from the pen of Mr. Henry himself. It is a curiosity, and highly worthy of preservation. After his death, there was found among his papers one sealed, and thus endorsed: 'Enclosed are the resolutions of the Virginia Assembly in 1765, concerning the stamp act. Let my executors open this paper.' Within was found the following copy of the resolutions in Mr. Henry's handwriting:—'Resolved, That the first adventurers and settlers of this, his majesty's colony and dominion, brought with them, and transmitted to their posterity, and all other his majesty's subjects since inhabiting in this, his majesty's said colony, all the privileges, franchises, and immunities, that have at any time been held, enjoyed, and possessed by the people of Great Britain. Resolved, That by two royal charters, granted by King James I., the colonists, aforesaid, are declared entitled to all the privileges, liberties, and immunities of denizens and natural-born subjects, to all intents and purposes, as if they had been abiding and born within the realm of England. Resolved, That the taxation of the people by themselves, or by persons chosen by themselves to represent them, who can only know what taxes the people are able to bear, and the easiest mode of raising them, and are equally affected by such taxes themselves, is the distinguishing characteristic of British freedom, and without which the ancient constitution cannot subsist. Resolved, That his majesty's liege people of this most ancient colony, have uninterruptedly enjoyed the right of being thus governed by their own assembly, in the article of their taxes and internal police, and that the same hath never been forfeited, or any other way given up, but hath been constantly recognised by the king and people of Great Britain. Resolved, therefore, That the general assembly of this colony have the sole right and power to lay taxes and impositions upon the inhabitants of this colony; and that every attempt to vest such power in any person or persons whatsoever, other than the general assembly aforesaid, has a manifest tendency to destroy British as well as American freedom.' On the back of the paper containing these resolutions, is the following endorsement, which is also in the handwriting of Mr. Henry himself:—'The within resolutions passed the house of burgesses in May, 1765. They formed the first opposition to the stamp act, and the scheme of taxing America by the British parliament. All the colonies, either through fear, or want of opportunity to form an opposition, or

from influence of some kind or other, had remained silent. I had been for the first time elected a burgess, a few days before, was young, inexperienced, unacquainted with the forms of the house, and the members that composed it. Finding the men of weight averse to opposition, and the commencement of the tax at hand, and that no person was likely to step forth, I determined to venture, and alone, unadvised, and unassisted, on a blank leaf of an old law-book wrote the within. Upon offering them to the house, violent debates ensued. Many threats were uttered, and much abuse cast on me, by the party for submission. After a long and warm contest, the resolutions passed by a very small majority, perhaps of one or two only. The alarm spread throughout America with astonishing quickness, and the ministerial party were overwhelmed. The great point of resistance to British taxation was universally established in the colonies. This brought on the war, which finally separated the two countries, and gave independence to ours. Whether this will prove a blessing or a curse will depend upon the use our people make of the blessings which a gracious God hath bestowed on us. If they are wise, they will be great and happy. If they are of a contrary character, they will be miserable. Righteousness alone can exalt them as a nation. Reader! whoever thou art, remember this; and in thy sphere, practise virtue thyself, and encourage it in others.—P. Henry.' Such is the short, plain, and modest account which Mr. Henry has left of this transaction. . . . It is not wonderful that even the friends of colonial rights who knew the feeble and defenceless situation of this country should be startled at a step so bold and daring. That effect was produced; and the resolutions were resisted, not only by the aristocracy of the house, but by many of those who were afterward distinguished among the brightest champions of American liberty. The following is Mr. Jefferson's account of this transaction: 'Mr. Henry moved and Mr. Johnston seconded these resolutions successively. They were opposed by Messrs. Randolph, Bland, Pendleton, Wythe, and all the old members, whose influence in the house had, till then, been unbroken. They did it, not from any question of our rights, but on the ground that the same sentiments had been, at their preceding session, expressed in a more conciliatory form, to which the answers were not yet received. But torrents of sublime eloquence from Henry, backed by the solid reasoning of Johnston, prevailed. The last, however, and strongest resolution was carried but by a single vote. The debate on it was most bloody. I was then but a student, and stood at the door of communication between the house and the lobby (for as yet there was no gallery) during the whole debate and vote; and I will remember that, after the numbers on the division were told and declared from the chair, Peyton Randolph (the attorney-general) came out at the door where I was standing, and said, as he entered the lobby: "By God, I would have given 500 guineas for a single vote"; for one would have divided the house, and Robinson was in the chair, who he knew would have negated the resolution. Mr. Henry left town that evening; and the next morning, before the meeting of the house, Col. Peter Randolph, then of the council, came to the hall of burgesses, and sat at the clerk's table till the house-bell rang, thumbing over the volumes of journals, to find a precedent for expunging a vote of the house. . . . Some of the timid members, who had voted for the strongest resolution, had become alarmed; and as soon as the house

met, a motion was made and carried to expunge it from the journals.' . . . The manuscript journal of the day is not to be found; whether it was suppressed, or casually lost, must remain a matter of uncertainty; it disappeared, however, shortly after the session. . . . In the interesting fact of the erasure of the fifth resolution, Mr. Jefferson is supported by the distinct recollection of Mr. Paul Carrington, late a judge of the court of appeals of Virginia, and the only surviving member, it is believed, of the house of burgesses of 1765. The statement is also confirmed, if indeed further confirmation were necessary, by the circumstance that instead of the five resolutions, so solemnly recorded by Mr. Henry, as having passed the house, the journal of the day exhibits only . . . four. . . . 'By these resolutions,' says Mr. Jefferson, 'and his manner of supporting them, Mr. Henry took the lead out of the hands of those who

one of the most perfectly and uniformly decorous speakers that ever took the floor of the house. . . . From the period of which we have been speaking, Mr. Henry became the idol of the people of Virginia; nor was his name confined to his native state. His light and heat were seen and felt throughout the continent; and he was everywhere regarded as the great champion of colonial liberty."—W. Wirt, *Sketches of the life and character of Patrick Henry*, sect. 2.—"The prohibition or colonial legal tender added to their woes and indeed made the hard-pressed planters of the south sharers in the general distress. The Stamp Act, with its far-reaching taxes burdensome alike to merchant and farmer, sealed the union of commercial and plantation provinces at the same time that it afforded an opportunity for placing the colonial argument on constitutional grounds; and because of the character of the taxation, it rallied to the



PATRICK HENRY ADDRESSING THE VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY

(After the painting by A. Chappel)

had, theretofore, guided the proceedings of the house; that is to say, of Pendleton, Wythe, Bland, Randolph.' It was, indeed, the measure which raised him to the zenith of his glory. He had never before had a subject which entirely matched his genius, and was capable of drawing out all the powers of his mind. . . . It was in the midst of this magnificent debate, while he was descanting on the tyranny of the obnoxious act, that he exclaimed in a voice of thunder, and with the look of a god: 'Cæsar had his Brutus—Charles the First, his Cromwell—and George the Third—("Treason!" cried the speaker—"Treason, treason!" echoed from every part of the house. It was one of those trying moments which is decisive of character. Henry faltered not for an instant; but rising to a loftier attitude, and fixing on the speaker an eye of the most determined fire, he finished his sentence with the firmest emphasis)—may profit by their example. If this be treason, make the most of it.' This was the only expression of defiance which escaped him during the debate. He was, throughout life,

colonial position the powerful support of the lawyers and newspaper proprietors. The plan of the British to garrison their new acquisitions in America and to station a few detachments of troops in the older colonies was, in the feverish state of the public mind, envisaged as a brazen attempt to intimidate the colonists into submission. The merchants of some of the ports, intent on restoring the conditions of their former prosperity, adopted resolutions of non-importation; and little recking the future, they aroused the populace to a sense of British injustice, even to the extent of countenancing and instigating mob excesses and the destruction of property."—A. M. Schlesinger, *American Revolution reconsidered* (*Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1919).—"The publication of Mr. Henry's resolutions against the Stamp Act created a widespread and intense excitement. They were hailed as the action of the oldest, and hitherto the most loyal of the colonies; and as raising a standard of resistance to the detested Act. Mr. Otis pronounced them trea-

sonable, and this was the verdict of the Government party. But, treasonable or not, they struck a chord which vibrated throughout America. Hutchinson declared that, 'nothing extravagant appeared in the papers till an account was received of the Virginia resolves.' Soon the bold exclamation of Mr. Henry in moving them was published, and he was hailed as the leader raised up by Providence for the occasion. The 'Boston Gazette' declared: 'The people of Virginia have spoken very sensibly, and the frozen politicians of a more northern government say they have spoken treason.' But the people were no longer to be held down by 'the frozen politicians,' north or south. They commenced to form secret societies pledged to the resistance of the Act by all lawful means, which we called 'The Sons of Liberty.'—W. W. Henry, *Patrick Henry: Life, correspondence and speeches*, v. 1, pp. 93-94.—At New York, "in May articles began to appear in the papers congratulating the public on the patriotic and frugal spirit that was beginning to reign in the Province of New York. The principal gentlemen of the city clad themselves in country manufactures or 'turned clothes.' Weyman printed in large type in his paper, the N. Y. Gazette, the patriotic motto 'It is better to wear a homespun coat than lose our liberty.' Spinning was daily in vogue; materials being more wanting than industrial hands; a need the farmers were endeavoring to remedy by sewing more flax seed and keeping more sheep, and finally we notice the odd statement 'that little lamb came to market as no true lovers of their country or whose sympathetic breasts feel for its distresses will buy it, and that sassafras, balm and sage were greatly in use instead of tea and allowed to be more wholesome.' Funerals and mourning, which were then expensive luxuries, were modified and their extravagance curtailed. The Society for promoting Arts and Manufactures resolved to establish a bleaching field and to erect a flax spinning school where the poor children of the city should be taught the art. They also ordered large numbers of spinning wheels to be made and loaned to all who would use them. In September we find it announced that women's shoes were made 'cheaper and better than the renowned Hoses,' by Wells, Lasher, Bolton, and Davis, and that there was a good assortment on hand; that boots and men's shoes were made, in every quarter of the city, better than the English made for foreign sale; wove thread stockings in sundry places; the making of linen, woolen, and cotton stuffs was fast increasing; gloves, hats, carriages, harness and cabinet work were plenty. The people were now self dependent; cards now appeared recommending that no true friend of his country should buy or import English goods, and the dry goods men were warned that their importations would lie on hand to their cost and ruin. There being now a sufficiency of home made goods it was proposed on the 19th October to establish a market for all kinds of Home Manufactures; and a market was opened under the Exchange in Broad Street on the 23d. From the shortness of the notice the design was not sufficiently known in the country and there was neither plenty nor variety; but numbers of buyers appeared and everything went off readily at good prices. The gentlemen merchants of the city, as they were styled, were not behind any class in patriotism or sacrifice. A meeting was called for Monday 28th October at Jones' house in the Fields, 'The Freemasons Arms,' but the attendance, owing to the short notice, not being sufficient to enter upon business, they were

again summoned on the 30th October to meet the next day at four o'clock at Mr. Burns' long room at the City Arms to fall upon such methods as they shall then think most advisable for their reciprocal interest. On the 31st there was a general meeting of the principal merchants at this tavern, which was known under the various names of the City Arms, the Province Arms, the New York Arms, and stood on the upper corner of Broadway and Stone, now Thames street, on the site later occupied by the City Hotel. Resolutions were adopted and subscribed by upwards of two hundred of the principal merchants; 1st, to accompany all orders to Great Britain for goods or merchandize of any nature kind or quality whatever with instructions that they be not shipped unless the Stamp Act be repealed; 2nd, to countermand all outstanding orders unless on the conditions mentioned in the foregoing resolution; 3rd, not to vend any goods sent on commission, shipped after the 1st January succeeding, unless upon the same condition. In consequence of these resolutions the retailers of goods subscribed a paper obliging themselves not to buy any goods, wares or merchandize after the 1st January unless the Stamp Act was repealed. This was the first of the famous Non Importation Agreement, the great commercial measure of offense and defense against Great Britain. It punished friends and foes alike and plunged a large portion of the English people into the deepest distress; at the same time it taught the Colonies the value and extent of their own resources."—J. A. Stevens, *Stamp Act in New York (Magazine of American History, June, 1877)*.—The Stamp Act was reprinted in New York "with a death's-head upon it in place of the royal arms, and it was hawked about the streets under the title of 'The Folly of England and the Ruin of America.' In Boston, the church-bells were tolled, and the flags on the shipping put at half-mast. . . . Meanwhile, the Massachusetts legislature, at the suggestion of Otis, had issued a circular letter to all the colonies, calling for a general congress, in order to concert measures of resistance to the Stamp Act. The first cordial response came from South Carolina, at the instance of Christopher Gadsden, a wealthy merchant of Charleston and a scholar learned in Oriental languages, a man of rare sagacity and most liberal spirit. . . . On the 14th of August, the quiet town of Boston witnessed some extraordinary proceedings. [See LIBERTY TREE.] . . . Twelve days after, a mob sacked the splendid house of Chief Justice Hutchinson, threw his plate into the street, and destroyed the valuable library which he had been thirty years in collecting, and which contained many manuscripts, the loss of which was quite irreparable. As usual with mobs, the vengeance fell in the wrong place, for Hutchinson had done his best to prevent the passage of the Stamp Act. In most of the colonies, the stamp officers were compelled to resign their posts. Boxes of stamps arriving by ship were burned or thrown into the sea. . . . In New York, the presence of the troops for a moment encouraged the lieutenant-governor, Colden, to take a bold stand in behalf of the law. He talked of firing upon the people, but was warned that if he did so he would be speedily hanged on a lamp-post, like Captain Porteous of Edinburgh. A torchlight procession, carrying images of Colden and of the devil, broke into the governor's coach-house, and, seizing his best chariot, paraded it about town with the images upon it, and finally burned up chariot and images on the Bowling Green, in full sight of Colden and the garrison,




who looked on from the Battery, speechless with rage, but afraid to interfere. Gage [who was in command] did not dare to have the troops used, for fear of bringing on a civil war; and the next day the discomfited Colden was obliged to surrender all the stamps to the common council of New York, by whom they were at once locked up in the City Hall. Nothing more was needed to prove the impossibility of carrying the Stamp Act into effect."—J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 1.—In Connecticut the stamp agent, Jared Ingersoll, was compelled by a body of armed citizens to resign. See CONNECTICUT: 1765.

ALSO IN: D. R. Goodloe, *Birth of the republic: A compilation of accounts of proceedings in the several colonies*, ch. 1.—W. Tudor, *Life of James Otis*, ch. 14.—W. V. Wells, *Life of Samuel Adams*, v. 1, ch. 2.—I. W. Stuart, *Life of Jonathan Trumbull*, ch. 7-8.—T. Hutchinson, *History of province of Massachusetts bay, 1749-1774*, pp. 117-141.—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 2.—M. C. Tyler, *Patrick Henry*, ch. 5.—W. Nelson, *American newspapers of the eighteenth century as sources of history* (Report of American Historical Association, 1908, v. 1, pp. 217-218).—M. C. Tyler, *Literary history of the American Revolution*, ch. 3, 5.

1765.—Stamp Act Congress.—The delegates chosen, on the invitation of Massachusetts, to attend a congress for consultation on the circumstances of the colonies, met, Oct. 7, 1765, in the City Hall at New York. "In no place were the Sons of Liberty more determined, or were their opponents more influential. It was the headquarters of the British force in America, the commander of which, General Gage, wielded the powers of a viceroy. A fort within the city was heavily mounted with cannon. Ships of war were moored near the wharves. The executive Lieutenant-governor Colden, was resolved to execute the law. When the Massachusetts delegates called on him, he remarked that the proposed congress would be unconstitutional, and unprecedented, and he should give it no countenance. The congress consisted of twenty-eight delegates from nine of the colonies; four, though sympathizing with the movement, not choosing representatives. Here several of the patriots, who had discussed the American question in their localities, met for the first time. James Otis stood in this body the foremost speaker. His pen, with the pens of the brothers Robert and Phillip Livingston, of New York, were summoned to service in a wider field. John Dickinson, of Pennsylvania, was soon to be known through the colonies by 'The Farmer's Letters.' Thomas McKean and Cæsar Rodney were pillars of the cause in Delaware. Edward Tilghman was an honored name in Maryland. South Carolina, in addition to the intrepid Gadsden, had, in Thomas Lynch and John Rutledge, two patriots who appear prominently in the subsequent career of that colony. Thus this body was graced by large ability, genius, learning, and common sense. It was calm in its deliberations, seeming unmoved by the whirl of the political waters. The congress organized by the choice, by one vote, of Timothy Ruggles, a Tory,—as the chairman,—and John Cotton, clerk. The second day of its session, it took into consideration the rights, privileges, and grievances of 'the British American colonists.' After eleven days' debate, it agreed—each colony having one vote—upon a declaration of rights and grievances and ordered it to be inserted in the journal. [The following is the 'Declaration': 'The members of this congress, sincerely devoted, with the warmest sentiments of affection and duty, to his maj-

esty's person and government, inviolably attached to the present happy establishment of the protestant succession, and with minds deeply impressed by a sense of the present and impending misfortunes of the British colonies on this continent; having considered, as maturely as time will permit, the circumstances of the said colonies, esteem it our indispensable duty to make the following declarations of our humble opinion, respecting the most essential rights and liberties of the colonists, and of the grievances under which they labor by reason of several late acts of parliament. 1. That his majesty's subjects in these colonies owe the same allegiance to the crown of Great Britain that is owing from his subjects born within the realm, and all due subordination to that august body the parliament of Great Britain. 2. That his majesty's liege subjects in these colonies are entitled to all the inherent rights and liberties of his natural born subjects within the kingdom of Great Britain. 3. That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubted right of Englishmen, that no taxes be imposed on them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their representatives. 4. That the people of these colonies are not, and from their local circumstances cannot be, represented in the house of commons of Great Britain. 5. That the only representatives of these colonies are persons chosen therein by themselves, and that no taxes ever have been or can be constitutionally imposed upon them, but by their respective legislatures. 6. That all supplies to the crown being free gifts from the people, it is unreasonable and inconsistent with the principles and spirit of the British constitution for the people of Great Britain to grant to his majesty the property of the colonists. 7. That trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies. 8. That the late act of parliament entitled 'an act for granting and applying certain stamp duties, and other duties in the British colonies and plantations in America,' &c., by imposing taxes on the inhabitants of these colonies: and the said act, and several other acts, by extending the jurisdiction of the court of admiralty beyond its ancient limits, have a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists. 9. That the duties imposed by several late acts of parliament, from the peculiar circumstances of these colonies, will be extremely burdensome and grievous; and from the scarcity of specie, the payment of them absolutely impracticable. 10. That as the profits of the trade of these colonies ultimately center in Great Britain, to pay for the manufactures which they are obliged to take from thence, they eventually contribute very largely to all supplies granted to the crown. 11. That the restrictions imposed by several late acts of parliament on the trade of these colonies, will render them unable to purchase the manufactures of Great Britain. 12. That the increase, prosperity, and happiness of these colonies depend on the full and free enjoyment of their rights and liberties, and an intercourse with Great Britain mutually affectionate and advantageous. 13. That it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies to petition the king, or either house of parliament. 14. That it is the indispensable duty of these colonies, to the best of sovereigns, to the mother country, and to themselves, to endeavor, by a loyal and dutiful address to his majesty, and humble application to both houses of parliament, to procure the repeal of the act for granting and applying certain stamp duties, of all clauses of any other acts of parliament whereby the juris-

diction of the admiralty is extended as aforesaid, and of the other late acts for the restriction of American commerce.] . . . The delegates present from only six of the colonies—except Ruggles and Ogden—signed the petition; those from New York, Connecticut, and South Carolina not being authorized to sign. On the 25th of October, the congress adjourned. Special measures were taken to transmit the proceedings to the unrepresented colonies. The several assemblies, on meeting, heartily approved of the course of their delegates who concurred in the action of congress; but Ruggles, of Massachusetts, was reprimanded by the speaker, in the name of the House, and Ogden, of New Jersey, was hung in effigy by the people. The action of the assemblies was announced in the press. Meanwhile the Sons of Liberty, through their committees of correspondence, urged a continental Union; pledged a mutual support in case of danger; in some instances stated the number of armed men that might be relied on; and thus



SIR WILLIAM JOHNSON

evinced a common determination to resist the execution of the Stamp Act."—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic of the United States*, ch. 5.—See also ENGLAND: 1765-1768.

ALSO IN: *T. Pitkin, History of the United States*, v. 1, appendix 5-9.—H. Niles, *Principles and acts of the Revolution*, pp. 155-168.—H. C. Lodge, *History of English colonies in America*, pp. 476-478.

1765-1768.—Treaties with Indians at German Flats and Fort Stanwix.—Cession of Iroquois claims to western Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Kentucky.—Boone in Kentucky.—Drawing of the Indian boundary line.—"After the success of Bradstreet and Bouquet [see PONTIAC'S WAR], there was no difficulty in concluding a treaty with all the Western Indians; and late in April, 1765, Sir William Johnson, at the German Flats, held a conference with the various nations, and settled a definite peace. At this meeting two propositions were made; the one to fix some boundary line, west of which the Europeans should not go; and the savages named, as this line, the Ohio or

Alleghany and Susquehannah; but no definite agreement was made, Johnson not being empowered to act. The other proposal was, that the Indians should grant to the traders, who had suffered in 1763, a tract of land in compensation for the injuries then done them, and to this the red men agreed. . . . During the very year that succeeded the treaty of German Flats, settlers crossed the mountains and took possession of lands in western Virginia and along the Monongahela. The Indians, having received no pay for these lands, murmured, and once more a border war was feared. . . . And not only were frontier men thus passing the line tacitly agreed on, but Sir William himself was even then meditating a step which would have produced, had it been taken, a general Indian war again. This was the purchase and settlement of an immense tract south of the Ohio River, where an independent colony was to be formed. How early this plan was conceived we do not learn, but, from Franklin's letters, we find that it was in contemplation in the spring of 1766. At that time Franklin was in London, and was written to by his son, Governor Franklin of New Jersey, with regard to the proposed colony. The plan seems to have been to buy of the Six Nations the lands south of the Ohio, a purchase which it was not doubted Sir William might make, and then to procure from the King a grant of as much territory as the Company which it was intended to form would require. Governor Franklin, accordingly, forwarded to his father an application for a grant, together with a letter from Sir William, recommending the plan to the ministry; all of which was duly communicated to the proper department. But at that time there were various interests bearing upon this plan of Franklin. The old Ohio Company [see OHIO: 1748-1754] was still suing, through its agent, Colonel George Mercer, for a perfection of the original grant. . . . General Lyman, from Connecticut we believe, was soliciting a new grant similar to that now asked by Franklin; and the ministers themselves were divided as to the policy and propriety of establishing any settlements so far in the interior,—Shelburne being in favor of the new colony, Hillsborough opposed to it. The Company was organized, however, and the nominally leading man therein being Mr. Thomas Walpole, a London banker of eminence, it was known as the Walpole Company. . . . Before any conclusion was come to, it was necessary to arrange definitely that boundary line which had been vaguely talked of in 1765, and with respect to which Sir William Johnson had written to the ministry, who had mislaid his letters and given him no instructions. The necessity of arranging this boundary was also kept in mind by the continued and growing irritation of the Indians, who found themselves invaded from every side. . . . Franklin, the father, all this time, was urging the same necessity upon the ministers in England; and about Christmas of 1767, Sir William's letters on the subject having been found, orders were sent him to complete the proposed purchase from the Six Nations, and settle all differences. But the project for a colony was for the time dropped, a new administration coming in which was not that way disposed. Sir William Johnson having received, early in the spring, the orders from England relative to a new treaty with the Indians, at once took steps to secure a full attendance. Notice was given to the various colonial governments, to the Six Nations, the Delawares, and the Shawnese, and a Congress was

appointed to meet at Fort Stanwix during the following October. It met upon the 24th of that month, and was attended by representatives from New Jersey, Virginia, and Pennsylvania; by Sir William and his deputies; by the agents of those traders who had suffered in the war of 1763; and by deputies from all of the Six Nations, the Delawares, and the Shawnese. The first point to be settled was the boundary line which was to determine the Indian lands of the West from that time forward; and this line the Indians, upon the 1st of November, stated should begin on the Ohio at the mouth of the Cherockee (or Tennessee) river; thence go up the Ohio and Alleghany to Kittaning; thence across to the Susquehannah, &c.; whereby the whole country south of the Ohio and Alleghany, to which the Six Nations had any claim, was transferred to the British. One deed, for a part of this land, was made on the 3d of November to William Trent, attorney for twenty-two traders, whose goods had been destroyed by the Indians in 1763. The tract conveyed by this was between the Kenhawa and Monongahela, and was by the traders named 'Indiana.' Two days afterward, a deed for the remaining western lands was made to the King, and the price agreed on paid down. These deeds were made upon the express agreement, that no claim should ever be based upon previous treaties, those of Lancaster, Logstown, &c.; and they were signed by the chiefs of the Six Nations, for themselves, their allies and dependents, the Shawnese, Delawares, Mingoes of Ohio, and others; but the Shawnese and Delaware deputies present did not sign them. Such was the treaty of Stanwix, whereon rests the title by purchase to Kentucky, western Virginia, and Pennsylvania. It was a better foundation, perhaps, than that given by previous treaties, but was essentially worthless; for the lands conveyed were not occupied or hunted on by those conveying them. . . . Meantime more than one bold man had ventured for a little while into the beautiful valleys of Kentucky, and, on the 1st of May, 1769, there was one going forth from his 'peaceable habitation on the Yaddin river in North Carolina,' whose name has since gone far and wide over this little planet of ours, he having become the type of his class. This was Daniel Boone. [See KENTUCKY: 1765-1778.] He crossed the mountains, and spent that summer and the next winter in the West. But, while he was rejoicing in the abundance of buffalo, deer, and turkeys among the cane-brakes, longer heads were meditating still that new colony; the plan of which had been lying in silence for two years and more. The Board of Trade was again called on to report upon the application, and Lord Hillsborough, the President, reported against it. This called out Franklin's celebrated 'Ohio Settlement,' a paper written with so much ability, that the King's Council put by the official report, and granted the petition, a step which mortified the noble lord so much that he resigned his official station. The petition now needed only the royal sanction, which was not given until August 14th, 1772; but in 1770, the Ohio Company was merged in Walpole's, and, the claims of the soldiers of 1756 being acknowledged both by the new Company and by government, all claims were quieted. Nothing was ever done, however, under the grant to Walpole, the Revolution soon coming upon America. After the Revolution, Mr. Walpole and his associates petitioned Congress respecting their lands called by them 'Vandalia,' but could get no help from that body."—J. H. Perkins, *English*

*discoveries in the Ohio valley (North American Review, July, 1839).*

ALSO IN: C. L. Becker, *Beginnings of the American people*, p. 210.—W. L. Stone, *Life and times of Sir William Johnson*, v. 2, ch. 16.—Benjamin Franklin, *Works* (J. Sparks, ed., v. 4, pp. 233-241, 302-380).

1766.—Rise of Methodist church. See METHODIST CHURCH: 1766-1920.

1766.—Examination of Benjamin Franklin before Parliament.—On Jan. 28, 1766, while the bill for the repeal of the Stamp Act was pending in Parliament, Benjamin Franklin was examined before the House of Commons, in committee. The questions and answers of this very interesting examination, as reported in the Parliamentary history, were as follows:

Q. What is your name, and place of abode?—A. Franklin, of Philadelphia.

Do the Americans pay any considerable taxes among themselves?—Certainly many, and very heavy taxes.

What are the present taxes in Pennsylvania, laid by the laws of the colony?—There are taxes on all estates real and personal, a poll-tax, a tax on all offices, professions, trades, and businesses, according to their profits; an excise on all wine, rum, and other spirit; and a duty of ten pounds per head on all negroes imported, with some other duties.

For what purposes are those taxes laid?—For the support of the civil and military establishments of the country, and to discharge the heavy debt contracted in the last war.

How long are those taxes to continue?—Those for discharging the debt are to continue till 1772, and longer, if the debt should not be then all discharged. The others must always continue.

Was it not expected that the debt would have been sooner discharged?—It was, when the peace was made with France and Spain; but a fresh war breaking out with the Indians, a fresh load of debt was incurred, and the taxes, of course, continued longer by a new law.

Are not all the people very able to pay those taxes?—No. The frontier counties, all along the continent, having been frequently ravaged by the enemy and greatly impoverished, are able to pay very little tax. And therefore, in consideration of their distresses, our late tax laws do expressly favour those counties, excusing the sufferers; and I suppose the same is done in other governments.

Are not you concerned in the management of the post office in America?—Yes; I am deputy post-master general of North America.

Don't you think the distribution of stamps, by post, to all the inhabitants, very practicable, if there was no opposition?—The posts only go along the sea coasts; they do not, except in a few instances, go back into the country; and if they did, sending for stamps by post would occasion an expence of postage, amounting, in many cases, to much more than that of the stamps themselves.

Are you acquainted with Newfoundland?—I never was there.

Do you know whether there are any post-roads on that island?—I have heard that there are no roads at all; but that the communication between one settlement and another is by sea only.

Can you disperse the stamps by post in Canada?—There is only a post between Montreal and Quebec. The inhabitants live so scattered and remote from each other, in that vast country, that

posts cannot be supported among them, and therefore they cannot get stamps per post. The English colonies too, along the frontiers, are very thinly settled.

From the thinness of the back settlements, would not the Stamp Act be extremely inconvenient to the inhabitants if executed?—To be sure it would; as many of the inhabitants could not get stamps when they had occasion for them, without taking long journeys, and spending, perhaps three or four pounds, that the crown might get sixpence.

Are not the colonies, from their circumstances, very able to pay the stamp duty?—In my opinion there is not gold and silver enough in the colonies to pay the stamp duty for one year.

Don't you know that the money arising from the stamps was all to be laid out in America?—I know it is appropriated by the act to the American service; but it will be spent in the conquered colonies, where the soldiers are, not in the colonies that pay it.

Is there not a balance of trade due from the colonies where the troops are posted, that will bring back the money to the old colonies?—I think not. I believe very little would come back. I know of no trade likely to bring it back. I think it would come from the colonies where it was spent directly to England; for I have always observed, that in every colony the more plenty of means of remittance to England, the more goods are sent for, and the more trade with England carried on.

What number of white inhabitants do you think there are in Pennsylvania?—I suppose there may be about 160,000.

What number of them are Quakers?—Perhaps a third.

What number of Germans?—Perhaps another third; but I cannot speak with certainty.

Have any number of the Germans seen service, as soldiers, in Europe?—Yes, many of them, both in Europe and America.

Are they as much dissatisfied with the stamp duty as the English?—Yes, and more; and with reason, as their stamps are, in many cases, to be double.

How many white men do you suppose there are in North America?—About 300,000, from 16 to 60 years of age.

What may be the amount of one year's imports into Pennsylvania from Britain?—I have been informed that our merchants compute the imports from Britain to be above 500,000*l*.

What may be the amount of the produce of your province exported to Britain?—It must be small, as we produce little that is wanted in Britain. I suppose it cannot exceed 40,000*l*.

How then do you pay the balance?—The balance is paid by our produce carried to the West Indies, and sold in our own islands, or to the French, Spaniards, Danes, and Dutch; by the same carried to other colonies in North America, as to New England, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Carolina, and Georgia; by the same carried to different parts of Europe, as Spain, Portugal and Italy. In all which places we receive either money, bills of exchange, or commodities that suit for remittance to Britain; which, together with all the profits on the industry of our merchants and mariners, arising in those circuitous voyages, and the freights made by their ships, centre finally in Britain to discharge the balance, and pay for British manufactures continually used in the province, or sold to foreigners by our traders.

Have you heard of any difficulties lately laid

on the Spanish trade?—Yes, I have heard that it has been greatly obstructed by some new regulations, and by the English men of war and cutters stationed all along the coast in America.

Do you think it right, that America should be protected by this country, and pay no part of the expence?—That is not the case. The colonies raised, clothed and paid, during the last war nearly 25,000 men, and spent many millions.

Were you not reimbursed by parliament?—We were only reimbursed what, in your opinion, we had advanced beyond our proportion, or beyond what might reasonably be expected from us; and it was a very small part of what we spent. Pennsylvania, in particular, disbursed about 500,000*l*., and the reimbursements, in the whole, did not exceed 60,000*l*.

You have said that you pay heavy taxes in Pennsylvania; what do they amount to in the pound?—The tax on all estates, real and personal, is eighteen pence in the pound, fully rated; and the tax on the profits of trades and professions, with other taxes, do, I suppose, make full half a crown in the pound.

Do you know anything of the rate of exchange in Pennsylvania, and whether it has fallen lately?—It is commonly from 170 to 175. I have heard that it has fallen lately from 175 to 162 and a half, owing, I suppose to their lessening their orders for goods; and when their debts to this country are paid I think the exchange will probably be at par.

Do not you think people of America would submit to pay the stamp duty, if it was moderated?—No, never, unless compelled by force of arms.

Are not the taxes in Pennsylvania, laid on unequally, in order to burden the English trade, particularly the tax on professions and business?—It is not more burdensome in proportion than the tax on lands. It is intended, and supposed to take an equal proportion of profits.

How is the assembly composed? Of what kinds of people are the members, landholders or traders?—It is composed of landholders, merchants, and artificers.

Are not the majority landholders?—I believe they are.

Do not they, as much as possible, shift the tax off from the land, to ease that, and lay the burthen heavier on trade?—I have never understood it so. I never heard such a thing suggested. And indeed an attempt of that kind could answer no purpose. The merchant or trader is always skilled in figures, and ready with his pen and ink. If unequal burdens are laid on his trade, he puts an additional price on his goods; and the consumers, who are chiefly landholders, finally pay the greatest part, if not the whole.

What was the temper of America towards Great Britain before the year 1763?—The best in the world. They submitted willingly to the government of the crown, and paid, in all their courts, obedience to acts of parliament. Numerous as the people are in the several old provinces, they cost you nothing in forts, citadels, garrisons or armies, to keep them in subjection. They were governed by this country at the expence only of a little pen, ink, and paper. They were led by a thread. They had not only a respect, but an affection for Great Britain, for its laws, its customs and manners, and even a fondness for its fashions, that greatly increased the commerce. Natives of Britain were always treated with particular regard; to be an Old England man was, of itself, a character

of some respect, and gave a kind of rank among us.

And what is their temper now?—O, very much altered.

Did you ever hear the authority of parliament to make laws for America questioned till lately?—The authority of Parliament was allowed to be valid in all laws, except such as should lay internal taxes. It was never disputed in laying duties to regulate commerce.

In what proportion hath population increased in America?—I think the inhabitants of all the provinces together, taken at a medium, double in about 25 years. But their demand for British manufactures increases much faster, as the consumption is not merely in proportion to their numbers, but grows with the growing abilities of the same numbers to pay for them. In 1723, the whole importation from Britain to Pennsylvania, was but about 15,000*l.* sterling; it is now near half a million.

In what light did the people of America use to consider the parliament of Great Britain?—They considered the parliament as the great bulwark and security of their liberties and privileges, and always spoke of it with the utmost respect and veneration. Arbitrary ministers, they thought, might possibly, at times, attempt to oppress them; but they relied on it, that the parliament, on application, would always give redress. They remembered, with gratitude, a strong instance of this, when a bill was brought into parliament, with a clause to make royal instructions laws in the colonies, which the House of Commons would not pass, and it was thrown out.

And have they not still the same respect for parliament?—No; it is greatly lessened.

To what causes is that owing?—To a concurrence of causes; the restraints lately laid on their trade, by which the bringing of foreign gold and silver into the colonies was prevented; the prohibition of making paper money among themselves; and then demand a new and heavy tax by stamps; taking away at the same time, trials by juries, and refusing to receive and hear their humble petitions.

Don't you think they would submit to the Stamp Act, if it was modified, the obnoxious parts taken out, and the duty reduced to some particulars, of small moment?—No; they will never submit to it.

What do you think is the reason that the people of America increase faster than in England?—Because they marry younger, and more generally.

Why so?—Because any young couple that are industrious, may easily obtain land of their own, on which they can raise a family.

Are not the lower rank of people more at their ease in America than in England?—They may be so, if they are sober and diligent, as they are better paid for their labour.

What is your opinion of a future tax, imposed on the same principle with that of the Stamp Act, how would the Americans receive it?—Just as they do this. They would not pay it.

Have not you heard of the resolution of this House, and of the House of Lords, asserting the right of parliament relating to America, including a power to tax the people there?—Yes, I have heard of such resolutions.

What will be the opinion of the Americans on those resolutions?—They will think them unconstitutional and unjust.

Was it an opinion in America before 1763, that the parliament had no right to lay taxes and duties there?—I never heard any objection to the right

of laying duties to regulate commerce; but a right to lay internal taxes was never supposed to be in parliament, as we are not represented there.

On what do you found your opinion, that the people in America made any such distinction?—I know that whenever the subject has occurred in conversation where I have been present, it has appeared to be the opinion of every one, that we could not be taxed in a parliament where we were not represented. But the payment of duties laid by act of parliament, as regulations of commerce, was never disputed.

But can you name any act of assembly, or public act of any of your governments, that made such distinction?—I do not know that there was any; I think there was never an occasion to make any such act, till now that you have attempted to tax us; that has occasioned resolutions of assembly, declaring the distinction, in which I think every assembly on the continent, and every member in every assembly, have been unanimous.

What then could occasion conversations on that subject before that time?—There was, in 1754, a proposition made (I think it came from hence) that in case of a war, which was then apprehended, the governors of the colonies should meet, and order the levying of troops, building of forts, and taking every other necessary measure for the general defence; and should draw on the treasury here, for the sums expended, which were afterwards to be raised in the colonies by a general tax, to be laid on them by act of parliament. This occasioned a good deal of conversation on the subject, and the general opinion was, that the parliament neither would, nor could lay any tax on us, till we were duly represented in parliament, because it was not just, nor agreeable to the nature of an English constitution.

Don't you know there was a time in New York, when it was under consideration to make an application to parliament, to lay taxes on that colony, upon a deficiency arising from the assembly's refusing or neglecting to raise the necessary supplies for the support of the civil government?—I never heard of it.

There was such an application under consideration in New York; and do you apprehend they could suppose the right of parliament to lay a tax in America was only local, and confined to the case of a deficiency in a particular colony, by a refusal of its assembly to raise the necessary supplies?—They could not suppose such a case, as that the assembly would not raise the necessary supplies to support its own government. An assembly that would refuse it, must want common sense, which cannot be supposed. I think there was never any such case at New York, and that it must be a misrepresentation, or the fact must be misunderstood. I know there have been some attempts, by ministerial instructions from hence, to oblige the assemblies to settle permanent salaries on governors, which they wisely refused to do; but I believe no assembly of New York, or any other colony, ever refused duly to support government, by proper allowances, from time to time, to public officers.

But in case a governor, acting by instruction, should call on an assembly to raise the necessary supplies, and the assembly should refuse to do it, do you not think it would then be for the good of the people of the colony, as well as necessary to government, that the parliament should tax them?—I do not think it would be necessary. If an assembly could possibly be so absurd as to refuse raising the supplies requisite for the

maintenance of government among them, they could not long remain in such a situation; the disorders and confusion occasioned by it, must soon bring them to reason.

If it should not, ought not the right to be in Great Britain of applying a remedy?—A right only to be used in such a case, I should have no objection to, supposing it to be used merely for the good of the people of the colony.

But who is to judge of that, Britain or the colony?—Those that feel can best judge.

You say the colonies have always submitted to external taxes, and object to the right of parliament only in laying internal taxes; now can you shew that there is any kind of difference between the two taxes to the colony on which they may be laid?—I think the difference is very great. An external tax is a duty laid on commodities imported; that duty is added to the first cost, and other charges on the commodity, and when it is offered to sale, makes a part of the price. If the people do not like it at that price, they refuse it; they are not obliged to pay it. But an internal tax is forced from the people without their consent, if not laid by their own representatives. The Stamp Act says, we shall have no commerce, make no exchange of property with each other, neither purchase nor grant, nor recover debts; we shall neither marry nor make our wills, unless we pay such sums, and thus it is intended to extort our money from us, or ruin us by the consequences of refusing to pay it.

But supposing the internal tax or duty to be laid on the necessaries of life imported into your colony, will not that be the same thing in its effects as an internal tax?—I do not know a single article imported into the northern colonies, but what they can either do without or make themselves.

Don't you think cloth from England absolutely necessary to them?—No, by no means absolutely necessary; with industry and good management, they may very well supply themselves with all they want.

Will it not take a long time to establish that manufacture among them; and must they not in the mean while suffer greatly?—I think not. They have made a surprising progress already. And I am of opinion, that before their old clothes are worn out, they will have new ones of their own making.

Can they possibly find wool enough in North America?—They have taken steps to increase the wool. They entered into general combination to eat no more lamb, and very few lambs were killed last year. This course persisted in, will soon make a prodigious difference in the quantity of wool. And the establishing of great manufactories, like those in the clothing towns here, is not necessary, as it is where the business is to be carried on for the purposes of trade. The people will all spin and work for themselves, in their own houses.

Can there be wool and manufacture enough in one or two years?—In three years, I think, there may.

Does not the severity of the winter, in the northern colonies, occasion the wool to be of bad quality?—No, the wool is very fine and good.

In the more southern colonies, as in Virginia, don't you know that the wool is coarse, and only a kind of hair?—I don't know it. I never heard it. Yet I have been sometimes in Virginia. I cannot say I ever took particular notice of the wool there, but I believe it is good, though I cannot speak positively of it; but Virginia, and

the colonies south of it, have less occasion for wool; their winters are short, and not very severe, and they can very well clothe themselves with linen and cotton of their own raising for the rest of the year.

Are not the people in the more northern colonies obliged to fodder their sheep all the winter?—In some of the most northern colonies they may be obliged to do it some part of the winter.

Considering the resolutions of parliament as to the right, do you think, if the Stamp Act is repealed, that the North Americans will be satisfied?—I believe they will.

Why do you think so?—I think the resolutions of right will give them very little concern, if they are never attempted to be carried into practice. The colonies will probably consider themselves in the same situation, in that respect, with Ireland; they know you claim the same right with regard to Ireland, but you never exercise it. And they may believe you never will exercise it in the colonies, any more than in Ireland, unless on some very extraordinary occasion.

But who are to be the judges of that extraordinary occasion? Is not the parliament?—Though the parliament may judge of the occasion, the people will think it can never exercise such right, till representatives from the colonies are admitted into parliament, and that whenever the occasion arises, representatives will be ordered.

Did you never hear that Maryland, during the last war, had refused to furnish a quota towards the common defence?—Maryland has been much misrepresented in that matter. Maryland, to my knowledge, never refused to contribute, or grant aids to the crown. The assemblies every year during the war, voted considerable sums, and formed bills to raise them. The bills were, according to the constitution of that province, sent up to the council, or upper house, for concurrence, that they might be presented to the governor, in order to be enacted into laws. Unhappy disputes between the two houses, arising from the defects of that constitution principally, rendered all the bills but one or two abortive. The proprietary's council rejected them. It is true, Maryland did not contribute its proportion, but it was, in my opinion, the fault of the government, not of the people.

Was it not talked of in the other provinces as a proper measure to apply to parliament to compel them?—I have heard such discourse; but as it was well known that the people were not to blame, no such application was ever made, or any step taken towards it.

Was it not proposed at a public meeting?—Not that I know of.

Do you remember the abolishing of the paper currency in New England, by act of assembly?—I do remember its being abolished in the Massachusetts Bay.

Was not lieutenant governor Hutchinson principally concerned in that transaction?—I have heard so.

Was it not at that time a very unpopular law?—I believe it might, though I can say little about it, as I lived at a distance from that province.

Was not the scarcity of gold and silver an argument used against abolishing the paper?—I suppose it was.

What is the present opinion there of that law? Is it as unpopular as it was at first?—I think it is not.

Have not instructions from hence been sometimes sent over to governors, highly oppressive and unpolitical?—Yes.

Have not some governors dispensed with them for that reason?—Yes, I have heard so.

Did the Americans ever dispute the controlling power of parliament to regulate the commerce?—No.

Can any thing less than a military force carry the Stamp Act into execution?—I do not see how a military force can be applied to that purpose.

Why may it not?—Suppose a military force sent into America, they will find nobody in arms; what are they then to do? They cannot force a man to take stamps who chuses to do without them. They will not find rebellion; they may indeed make one.

If the act is not repealed, what do you think will be the consequences?—A total loss of the respect and affection the people of America bear to this country, and of all the commerce that depends on that respect and affection.

How can the commerce be affected?—You will find, that if the act is not repealed, they will take very little of your manufactures in a short time.

Is it in their power to do without them?—I think they may very well do without them.

Is it their interest not to take them?—The goods they take from Britain are either necessities, mere conveniences, or superfluities. The first, as cloth, &c. with a little industry they can make at home: the second they can do without, till they are able to provide them among themselves; and the last, which are much the greatest part, they will strike off immediately. They are mere articles of fashion, purchased and consumed, because the fashion in a respected country, but will now be detested and rejected. The people have already struck off, by general agreement, the use of all goods fashionable in mournings, and many thousand pounds are sent back as unsaleable.

Is it their interest to make cloth at home?—I think they may at present get it cheaper from Britain, I mean of the same fineness and neatness of workmanship; but when one considers other circumstances, the restraints on their trade, and the difficulty of making remittances, it is their interest to make every thing.

Suppose an act of internal regulations connected with the tax, how would they receive it?—I think it would be objected to.

Then no regulation with a tax would be submitted to?—Their opinion is, that when aids to the crown are wanted, they are to be asked of the several assemblies according to the old established usage, who will, as they have always done, grant them freely. And that their money ought not to be given away, without their consent, by persons at a distance, unacquainted with their circumstances and abilities. The granting aids to the crown, is the only means they have of recommending themselves to their sovereign, and they think it extremely hard and unjust, that a body of men, in which they have no representatives, should make a merit to itself of giving and granting what is not its own, but theirs, and deprives them of a right they esteem of the utmost value and importance, as it is the security of all their other rights.

But is not the post office, which they have long received, a tax as well as a regulation?—No; the money paid for the postage of a letter is not of the nature of a tax; it is merely a quantum meruit for a service done; no person is compellable to pay the money, if he does not chuse to receive the service. A man may still, as before act, send his letter by a servant, a special messenger, or a friend, if he thinks it cheaper and safer.

But do they not consider the regulations of the

post-office, by the act of last year, as a tax?—By the regulations of last year the rate of postage was generally abated near thirty per cent. through all America; they certainly cannot consider such abatement as a tax.

If an excise was laid by parliament, which they might likewise avoid paying, by not consuming the articles excised, would they then not object to it?—They would certainly object to it, as an excise is unconnected with any service done, and is merely an aid which they think ought to be asked of them, and granted by them if they are to pay it, and can be granted for them, by no others whatsoever, whom they have not impowered for that purpose.

You say they do not object to the right of parliament, in laying duties on goods to be paid on their importation; now, is there any kind of difference between a duty on the importation of goods and an excise on their consumption?—Yes; a very material one; an excise, for the reasons I have just mentioned, they think you can have no right to lay within their country. But the sea is yours; you maintain, by your fleets, the safety of navigation in it, and keep it clear of pirates; you may have therefore a natural and equitable right to some toll or duty on merchandizes carried through that part of your dominions, towards defraying the expence you are at in ships to maintain the safety of that carriage.

Does this reasoning hold in the case of a duty laid on the produce of their lands exported? And would they not then object to such a duty?—If it tended to make the produce so much dearer abroad as to lessen the demand for it, to be sure they would object to such a duty; not to your right of laying it, but they would complain of it as a burden, and petition you to lighten it.

Is not the duty paid on the tobacco exported a duty of that kind?—That, I think, is only on tobacco carried coastwise from one colony to another, and appropriated as a fund for supporting the college at Williamsburg, in Virginia.

Have not the assemblies in the West Indies the same natural rights with those in North America?—Undoubtedly.

And is there not a tax laid there on their sugars exported?—I am not much acquainted with the West Indies, but the duty of four and a half per cent., on sugars exported, was, I believe, granted by their own assemblies.

How much is the poll tax in your province laid on unmarried men?—It is, I think, fifteen shillings, to be paid by every single freeman, upwards of twenty-one years old.

What is the annual amount of all the taxes in Pennsylvania?—I suppose about 20,000*l.* sterling.

Supposing the Stamp Act continued, and enforced, do you imagine that ill humour will induce the Americans to give as much for worse manufactures of their own and use them, preferably to better of ours?—Yes, I think so. People will pay as freely to gratify one passion as another, their resentment as their pride.

Would the people at Boston discontinue their trade?—The merchants are a very small number compared with the body of the people, and must discontinue their trade, if nobody will buy their goods.

What are the body of the people in the colonies?—They are farmers, husbandmen or planters.

Would they suffer the produce of their lands to rot?—No; but they would not raise so much. They would manufacture more, and plough less.

Would they live without the administration of justice in civil matters, and suffer all the inconveni-

ences of such a situation for any considerable time, rather than take the stamps, supposing the stamps were protected by a sufficient force, where every one might have them?—I think the supposition impracticable, that the stamps should be so protected as that every one might have them. The Act requires sub-distributors to be appointed in every county town, district, and village, and they would be necessary. But the principal distributors, who were to have had a considerable profit on the whole, have not thought it worth while to continue in the office, and I think it impossible to find sub-distributors fit to be trusted, who, for the trifling profit that must come to their share, would incur the odium, and run the hazard that would attend it; and if they could be found, I think it impracticable to protect the stamps in so many distant and remote places.

But in places where they could be protected, would not the people use them rather than remain in such a situation, unable to obtain any right, or recover, by law, any debt?—It is hard to say what they would do. I can only judge what other people will think, and how they will act, by what I feel within myself. I have a great many debts due to me in America, and I had rather they should remain unrecoverable by any law than submit to the Stamp Act. They will be debts of honour. It is my opinion the people will either continue in that situation, or find some way to extricate themselves, perhaps by generally agreeing to proceed in the courts without stamps.

What do you think a sufficient military force to protect the distribution of the stamps in every part of America?—A very great force; I cannot say what, if the disposition of America is for a general resistance.

What is the number of men in America able to bear arms, or of disciplined militia?—There are, I suppose, at least— [Question objected to. He withdrew. Called in again.]

Is the American Stamp Act an equal tax on that country?—I think not.

Why so?—The greatest part of the money must arise from lawsuits for the recovery of debts, and be paid by the lower sort of people, who were too poor easily to pay their debts. It is therefore a heavy tax on the poor, and a tax upon them for being poor.

But will not this increase of expence be a means of lessening the number of lawsuits?—I think not; for as the costs all fall upon the debtor, and are to be paid by him, they would be no discouragement to the creditor to bring his action.

Would it not have the effect of excessive usury?—Yes, as an oppression of the debtor.

How many ships are there laden annually in North America with flax seed for Ireland?—I cannot speak to the number of ships, but I know that in 1752, 10,000 hogsheads of flax seed, each containing seven bushels, were exported from Philadelphia to Ireland. I suppose the quantity is greatly increased since that time; and it is understood that the exportation from New York is equal to that from Philadelphia.

What becomes of the flax that grows with that flax seed?—They manufacture some into coarse, and some into a middling kind of linen.

Are there any slitting mills in America?—I think there are three, but I believe only one at present employed. I suppose they will all be set to work, if the interruption of the trade continues.

Are there any fulling mills there?—A great many.

Did you never hear that a great quantity of stockings were contracted for, for the army, dur-

ing the war, and manufactured in Philadelphia?—I have heard so.

If the Stamp Act should be repealed, would not the Americans think they could oblige the parliament to repeal every external tax law now in force?—It is hard to answer questions what people at such a distance will think.

But what do you imagine they will think were the motives of repealing the Act?—I suppose they will think that it was repealed from a conviction, of its inexpediency; and they will rely upon it, that while the same inexpediency subsists, you will never attempt to make such another.

What do you mean by its inexpediency?—I mean its inexpediency on several accounts; the poverty and inability of those who were to pay the tax; the general discontent it has occasioned; and the impracticability of enforcing it.

If the Act should be repealed, and the legislature should shew its resentment to the opposers of the Stamp Act, would the colonies acquiesce in the authority of the legislature? What is your opinion they would do?—I don't doubt at all, that if the legislature repeal the Stamp Act, the colonies will acquiesce in the authority.

But if the legislature should think fit to ascertain its right to lay taxes, by any act laying a small tax, contrary to their opinion, would they submit to pay the tax?—The proceedings of the people in America have been considered too much together. The proceedings of the assemblies have been very different from those of the mobs, and should be distinguished, as having no connection with each other. The assemblies have only peaceably resolved what they take to be their rights; they have not built a fort, raised a man, or provided a grain of ammunition, in order to such opposition. The ringleaders of riot they think ought to be punished; they would punish them themselves, if they could. Every sober, sensible man would wish to see rioters punished, as otherwise peaceable people have no security of person or estate. But as to an internal tax, how small soever, laid by the legislature here on the people there, while they have no representatives in this legislature, I think it will never be submitted to.—They will oppose it to the last.—They do not consider it as at all necessary for you to raise money on them by your taxes, because they are, and always have been, ready to raise money by taxes among themselves, and to grant large sums, equal to their abilities, upon requisition from the crown.—They have not only granted equal to their abilities, but, during all the last war, they granted far beyond their abilities, and beyond their proportion with this country, you yourselves being judges, to the amount of many hundred thousand pounds, and this they did freely and readily, only on a sort of promise from the secretary of state, that it should be recommended to parliament to make them compensation. It was accordingly recommended to parliament, in the most honourable manner, for them. America has been greatly misrepresented and abused here, in papers, and pamphlets, and speeches, as ungrateful, and unreasonable, and unjust, in having put this nation to immense expence for their defence, and refusing to bear any part of that expence. The colonies raised, paid, and clothed, near 25,000 men during the last war, a number equal to those sent from Britain, and far beyond their proportion; they went deeply into debt in doing this, and all their taxes and estates are mortgaged, for many years to come, for discharging that debt. Government here was at that time very sensible of this. The colonies were recommended to parlia-



ment. Every year the King sent down to the House a written message to this purpose, That his Majesty, being highly sensible of the zeal and vigour with which his faithful subjects in North America had exerted themselves, in defence of his Majesty's just rights and possessions, recommended it to the House to take the same into consideration, and enable him to give them a proper compensation. You will find those messages on your own journals every year of the war to the very last, and you did accordingly give 200,000*l.* annually to the crown, to be distributed in such compensation to the colonies. This is the strongest of all proofs that the colonies, far from being unwilling to bear a share of the burden, did exceed their proportion; for if they had done less, or had only equalled their proportion, there would have been no room or reason for compensation. Indeed the sums reimbursed them, were by no means adequate to the expence they incurred beyond their proportion; but they never murmured at that; they esteemed their sovereign's approbation of their zeal and fidelity, and the approbation of this House, far beyond any other kind of compensation; therefore there was no occasion for this act, to force money from a willing people; they had not refused giving money for the purposes of the act; no requisition had been made; they were always willing and ready to do what could reasonably be expected from them, and in this light they wish to be considered.

But suppose Great Britain should be engaged in a war in Europe, would North America contribute to the support of it?—I do think they would, as far as their circumstances would permit. They consider themselves as a part of the British empire, and as having one common interest with it; they may be looked on here as foreigners, but they do not consider themselves as such. They are zealous for the honour and prosperity of this nation, and while they are well used, will always be ready to support it, as far as their little power goes. In 1739 they were called upon to assist in the expedition against Carthagena, and they sent 3,000 men to join your army. It is true Carthagena is in America, but as remote from the northern colonies as if it had been in Europe. They make no distinction of wars, as to their duty of assisting in them. I know the last war is commonly spoke of here as entered into for the defence, or for the sake of the people of America. I think it is quite misunderstood. It began about the limits between Canada and Nova Scotia, about territories to which the crown indeed laid claim, but were not claimed by any British colony; none of the lands had been granted to any colonist; we had therefore no particular concern or interest in that dispute. As to the Ohio, the contest there began about your right of trading in the country, a right you had by the treaty of Utrecht, which the French infringed; they seized the traders and their goods, which were your manufactures; they took a fort which a company of your merchants, and their factors and correspondents, had erected there to secure that trade. Braddock was sent with an army to re-take that fort (which was looked on here as another incroachment on the King's territory) and to protect your trade. It was not till after his defeat that the colonies were attacked. They were before in perfect peace with both French and Indians; the troops were not therefore sent for their defence. The trade with the Indians, though carried on in America, is not an American interest. The people of America are chiefly farmers and planters; scarce any thing that they raise or produce is an article of commerce with the Indians. The Indian

trade is a British interest; it is carried on with British manufactures, for the profit of British merchants and manufacturers; therefore the war, as it commenced for the defence of territories of the crown, the property of no American, and for the defence of a trade purely British, was really a British war—and yet the people of America made no scruple of contributing their utmost towards carrying it on, and bringing it to a happy conclusion.

Do you think then that the taking possession of the King's territorial rights, and strengthening the frontiers, is not an American interest?—Not particularly, but conjointly a British and an American interest.

You will not deny that the preceding war, the war with Spain, was entered into for the sake of America; was it not occasioned by captures made in the American seas?—Yes; captures of ships carrying on the British trade there, with British manufactures.

Was not the late war with the Indians, since the peace with France, a war for America only?—Yes; it was more particularly for America than the former, but it was rather a consequence or remains of the former war, the Indians not having been thoroughly pacified, and the Americans bore by much the greatest share of the expence. It was put an end to by the army under general Bouquet; there were not above 300 regulars in that army, and above 1,000 Pennsylvanians.

Is it not necessary to send troops to America, to defend the Americans against the Indians?—No, by no means; it never was necessary. They defended themselves when they were but a handful, and the Indians much more numerous. They continually gained ground, and have driven the Indians over the mountains, without any troops sent to their assistance from this country. And can it be thought necessary now to send troops for their defence from those diminished Indian tribes, when the colonies are become so populous and so strong? There is not the least occasion for it; they are very able to defend themselves.

Do you say there were no more than 300 regular troops employed in the late Indian war?—Not on the Ohio, or the frontiers of Pennsylvania, which was the chief part of the war that affected the colonies. There were garrisons at Niagara, Fort Detroit, and those remote posts kept for the sake of your trade; I did not reckon them, but I believe that on the whole the number of Americans, or provincial troops, employed in the war, was greater than that of the regulars. I am not certain, but I think so.

Do you think the assemblies have a right to levy money on the subject there, to grant to the crown?—I certainly think so; they have always done it.

Are they acquainted with the Declaration of Rights; and do they know that by that statute, money is not to be raised on the subject but by consent of parliament?—They are very well acquainted with it.

How then can they think they have a right to levy money for the crown, or for any other than local purposes?—They understand that clause to relate to subjects only within the realm; that no money can be levied on them for the crown, but by consent of parliament. The colonies are not supposed to be within the realm; they have assemblies of their own, which are their parliaments, and they are, in that respect, in the same situation with Ireland. When money is to be raised for the crown upon the subject in Ireland, or in the colonies, the consent is given in the parliament of

Ireland, or in the assemblies of the colonies. They think the parliament of Great Britain cannot properly give that consent till it has representatives from America; for the Petition of Right expressly says, it is to be by common consent in parliament, and the people of America have no representatives in parliament, to make a part of that common consent.

If the Stamp Act should be repealed, and an act should pass, ordering the assemblies of the colonies to indemnify the sufferers by the riots, would they obey it?—That is a question I cannot answer.

Suppose the King should require the colonies to grant a revenue, and the parliament should be against their doing it, do they think they can grant a revenue to the King, without the consent of the parliament of Great Britain?—That is a deep question. As to my own opinion I should think myself at liberty to do it, and should do it, if I liked the occasion.

When money has been raised in the colonies, upon requisitions, has it not been granted to the King?—Yes, always; but the requisitions have generally been for some service expressed, as to raise, clothe, and pay troops, and not for money only.

If the act should pass, requiring the American Assemblies to make compensation to the sufferers, and they should disobey it, and then the parliament should, by another act, lay an internal tax, would they then obey it?—The people will pay no internal tax: and I think an act to oblige the assemblies to make compensation is unnecessary, for I am of opinion, that as soon as the present heats are abated, they will take the matter into consideration, and if it is right to be done, they will do it of themselves.

Do not letters often come into the post offices in America, directed into some inland town where no post goes?—Yes.

Can any private person take up those letters, and carry them as directed?—Yes; any friend of the person may do it, paying the postage that has accrued.

But must not he pay an additional postage for the distance to such an inland town?—No.

Can the post-master answer delivering the letter, without being paid such additional postage?—Certainly he can demand nothing, where he does no service.

Suppose a person, being far from home, finds a letter in a post office directed to him, and he lives in a place to which the post generally goes, and the letter is directed to that place, will the post-master deliver him the letter, without his paying the postage received at the place to which the letter is directed?—Yes; the office cannot demand postage for a letter that it does not carry, or farther than it does carry it.

Are not ferrymen in America obliged, by act of parliament, to carry over the posts without pay?—Yes.

Is not this a tax on the ferrymen?—They do not consider it as such, as they have an advantage from persons travelling with the post.

If the Stamp Act should be repealed, and the crown should make a requisition to the colonies for a sum of money, would they grant it?—I believe they would.

Why do you think so?—I can speak for the colony I live in; I had it in instruction from the assembly to assure the ministry, that as they always had done, so they should always think it their duty to grant such aids to the crown as were suit-

able to their circumstances and abilities, whenever called upon for the purpose, in the usual constitutional manner; and I had the honour of communicating this instruction to that hon. gentleman then minister.

Would they do this for a British concern; as suppose a war in some part of Europe, that did not affect them?—Yes, for any thing that concerned the general interest. They consider themselves as a part of the whole.

What is the usual constitutional manner of calling on the colonies for aids?—A letter from the secretary of state.

Is this all you mean, a letter from the secretary of state?—I mean the usual way of requisition, in a circular letter from the secretary of state, by his Majesty's command, reciting the occasion, and recommending it to the colonies to grant such aids as became their loyalty, and were suitable to their abilities.

Did the secretary of state ever write for money for the crown?—The requisitions have been to raise, clothe, and pay men, which cannot be done without money.

Would they grant money alone, if called on?—In my opinion they would, money as well as men, when they have money, or can procure it.

If the parliament should repeal the Stamp Act, will the assembly of Pennsylvania rescind their resolutions?—I think not.

Before there was any thought of the Stamp Act, did they wish for a representation in parliament?—No.

Don't you know that there is, in the Pennsylvania charter, an express reservation of the right of parliament to lay taxes there?—I know there is a clause in the charter, by which the King grants that he will levy no taxes on the inhabitants, unless it be with the consent of the assembly, or by an act of parliament.

How then could the assembly of Pennsylvania assert, that laying a tax on them by the Stamp Act was an infringement of their rights?—They understand it thus: by the same charter, and otherwise, they are entitled to all the privileges and liberties of Englishmen; they find in the Great Charters, and the Petition and Declaration of Rights, that one of the privileges of English subjects is, that they are not to be taxed but by their common consent; they have therefore relied upon it, from the first settlement of the province, that the parliament never would, nor could, by colour of that clause in the charter, assume a right of taxing them, till it had qualified itself to exercise such right, by admitting representatives from the people to be taxed, who ought to make a part of that common consent.

Are there any words in the charter that justify that construction?—The common rights of Englishmen, as declared by Magna Charta, and the Petition of Right, all justify it.

Does the distinction between internal and external taxes exist in the words of the charter?—No, I believe not.

Then may they not, by the same interpretation, object to the parliament's right of external taxation?—They never have hitherto. Many arguments have been lately used here to shew them that there is no difference, and that if you have no right to tax them internally, you have none to tax them externally, or make any other law to bind them. At present they do not reason so, but in time they may possibly be convinced by these arguments.

Do not the resolutions of the Pennsylvania as-

semblies say, all taxes?—If they do, they mean only internal taxes; the same words have not always the same meaning here and in the colonies. By taxes they mean internal taxes; by duties they mean customs; these are the ideas of the language.

Have you not seen the resolutions of the Massachusetts's Bay assembly?—I have.

Do they not say, that neither external nor internal taxes can be laid on them by parliament?—I don't know that they do; I believe not.

If the same tax should say neither tax nor imposition could be laid, does not that province hold the power of parliament can lay neither?—I suppose that by the word imposition, they do not intend to express duties to be laid on goods imported, as regulations of commerce.

What can the colonies mean then by imposition as distinct from taxes?—They may mean many things, as impressing of men, or of carriages, quartering troops on private houses, and the like; there may be great impositions that are not properly taxes.

Is not the post-office rate an internal tax laid by act of parliament?—I have answered that.

Are all parts of the colonies equally able to pay taxes?—No, certainly; the frontier parts, which have been ravaged by the enemy, are greatly disabled by that means, and therefore, in such cases, are usually favoured in our tax laws.

Can we, at this distance, be competent judges of what favours are necessary?—The parliament have supposed it, by claiming a right to make tax laws for America; I think it impossible.

Would the repeal of the Stamp Act be any discouragement of your manufactures? Will the people that have begun to manufacture decline it?—Yes, I think they will; especially if, at the same time, the trade is opened again, so that remittances can be easily made. I have known several instances that make it probable. In the war before last, tobacco being low, and making little remittance, the people of Virginia went generally into family manufactures. Afterwards, when tobacco bore a better price, they returned to the use of British manufactures. So fulling mills were very much disused in the last war in Pennsylvania, because bills were then plenty, and remittances could easily be made to Britain for English cloth and other goods.

If the Stamp Act should be repealed, would it induce the assemblies of America to acknowledge the right of parliament to tax them, and would they erase their resolutions?—No, never.

Is there no means of obliging them to erase those resolutions?—None, that I know of; they will never do it, unless compelled by force of arms. . . .

What used to be the pride of the Americans?—To indulge in the fashions and manufactures of Great Britain.

What is now their pride?—To wear their old clothes over again, till they can make new ones.—Withdraw.

—*Parliamentary history of England, v. 16, pp. 138-160.*

"Mr. Sparks very justly says that there was no event in Franklin's life more creditable to his talents and character, or which gave him so much celebrity, as this examination before the House of Commons. His further statement, however, that Franklin's answers were given without premeditation and without knowing beforehand the nature or form of the question that was to be put, is a little too sweeping. In a memorandum which Franklin gave to a friend

who wished to know by whom the several questions were put, he admitted that many were put by friends to draw out in answer the substance of what he had before said upon the subject."—J. Bigelow, *Life of Benjamin Franklin, v. 1, p. 507, footnote.*

1766.—Speech of Pitt in defense of American colonies.—Repeal of the Stamp Act and passage of the Declaratory Act.—"The Grenville Ministry had fallen in July [1765], and had been succeeded by that of Rockingham; and Conway, who had been one of the few opponents of the Stamp Act, was now Secretary of State for the Colonies. . . . The Stamp Act had contributed nothing to the downfall of Grenville; it attracted so little attention that it was only in the last days of 1765 or the first days of 1766 that the new ministers learnt the views of Pitt upon the subject; it was probably a complete surprise to them to learn that it had brought the colonies to the verge of rebellion, and in the first months of their power they appear to have been quite uncertain what policy they would pursue. . . . Parliament met on December 17, 1765, and the attitude of the different parties was speedily disclosed. A powerful Opposition, led by Grenville and Bedford, strenuously urged that no relaxation or indulgence should be granted to the colonists. . . . Pitt, on the other hand, rose from his sick-bed, and in speeches of extraordinary eloquence, and which produced an amazing effect on both sides of the Atlantic, he justified the resistance of the colonists."—W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the eighteenth century, v. 3, ch. 12.*—The following is the main part of the speech delivered by Pitt (not yet made Lord Chatham) on Jan. 14, 1766, as imperfectly reported: "It is my opinion, that this kingdom has no right to lay a tax upon the colonies. At the same time, I assert the authority of this kingdom over the colonies to be sovereign and supreme, in every circumstance of government and legislation whatsoever. They are the subjects of this kingdom; equally entitled with yourselves to all the natural rights of mankind and the peculiar privileges of Englishmen; equally bound by its laws, and equally participating in the constitution of this free country. The Americans are the sons, not the bastards of England! Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. In legislation the three estates of the realm are alike concerned; but the concurrence of the peers and the Crown to a tax is only necessary to clothe it with the form of a law. The gift and grant is of the Commons alone. . . . When . . . in this House, we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. But in an American tax, what do we do? 'We, your Majesty's Commons for Great Britain, give and grant to your Majesty'—what? Our own property! No! 'We give and grant to your Majesty' the property of your Majesty's Commons of America! It is an absurdity in terms. . . . There is an idea in some that the colonies are virtually represented in the House. I would fain know by whom an American is represented here. Is he represented by any knight of the shire, in any county in this kingdom? Would to God that respectable representation was augmented to a greater number! Or will you tell him that he is represented by any representative of a borough? a borough which, perhaps, its own representatives never saw! This is what is called the rotten part of the Constitution. It cannot continue a century.

If it does not drop, it must be amputated. The idea of a virtual representation of America in this House is the most contemptible idea that ever entered the head of a man. It does not deserve a serious refutation. The Commons of America represented in their several assemblies, have ever been in the possession of this, their constitutional right, of giving and granting their own money. They would have been slaves if they had not enjoyed it! At the same time, this kingdom, as the supreme governing and legislative power, has always bound the colonies by her laws, by her regulations, and restrictions in trade, in navigation, in manufactures, in every thing, except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent. Here I would draw the line. . . . Gentlemen, sir, have been charged with giving birth to sedition in America. They have spoken their sentiments with freedom against this unhappy act, and that freedom has become their crime. Sorry I am to hear the liberty of speech in this House imputed as a crime. But the imputation shall not discourage me. It is a liberty I mean to exercise. No gentleman ought to be afraid to exercise it. It is a liberty by which the gentleman who calumniates it might have profited. He ought to have desisted from his project. The gentleman tells us America is obstinate; America almost in open rebellion. I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people, so dead to all the feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest. . . . Since the accession of King William, many ministers, some of great, others of more moderate abilities, have taken the lead of government. . . . None of these thought or even dreamed, of robbing the colonies of their constitutional rights. That was reserved to mark the era of the late administration. Not that there were wanting some, when I had the honor to serve his Majesty, to propose to me to burn my fingers with an American stamp act. With the enemy at their back, with our bayonets at their breasts, in the day of their distress, perhaps the Americans would have submitted to the imposition; but it would have been taking an ungenerous, an unjust advantage. The gentleman boasts of his bounties to America! Are not these bounties intended finally for the benefit of this kingdom? If they are not, he has misapplied the national treasures! I am no courtier of America. I stand up for this kingdom. I maintain that the Parliament has a right to bind, to restrain America. Our legislative power over the colonies is sovereign and supreme. I would advise every gentleman to sell his lands, if he can, and embark for that country. When two countries are connected together like England and her colonies, without being incorporated, the one must necessarily govern. The greater must rule the less. But she must so rule it as not to contradict the fundamental principles that are common to both. . . . The gentleman asks, When were the colonies emancipated? I desire to know, when were they made slaves? But I dwell not upon words. When I had the honor of serving his Majesty, I availed myself of the means of information which I derived from my office. I speak, therefore, from knowledge. My materials were good. I was at pains to collect, to digest, to consider them; and I will be bold to affirm, that the profits to Great Britain from the trade of the colonies through all its branches, is two millions a year. This is the fund that carried you triumphantly through the last war. The estates that were rented at

two thousand pounds a year, three-score years ago, are at three thousand at present. Those estates sold then from fifteen to eighteen years purchase; the same may now be sold for thirty. You owe this to America. This is the price America pays you for her protection. And shall a miserable financier come with a boast, that he can bring 'a pepper-corn' into the exchequer by the loss of millions to the nation? I dare not say how much higher these profits may be augmented. . . . I am convinced on other grounds that the commercial system of America may be altered to advantage. You have prohibited where you ought to have encouraged. You have encouraged where you ought to have prohibited. Improper restraints have been laid on the continent in favor of the islands. You have but two nations to trade with in America. Would you had twenty! Let acts of Parliament in consequence of treaties remain; but let not an English minister become a custom-house officer for Spain, or for any foreign power. Much is wrong! Much may be amended for the general good of the whole! . . . A great deal has been said without doors of the power, of the strength of America. It is a topic that ought to be cautiously meddled with. In a good cause, on a sound bottom, the force of this country can crush America to atoms. I know the valor of your troops. I know the skill of your officers. There is not a company of foot that has served in America, out of which you may not pick a man of sufficient knowledge and experience to make a governor of a colony there. But on this ground, on the Stamp Act, which so many here will think a crying injustice, I am one who will lift up my hands against it. In such a cause your success would be hazardous. America, if she fell, would fall like the strong man; she would embrace the pillars of the State, and pull down the Constitution along with her. Is this your boasted peace—not to sheathe the sword in its scabbard, but to sheathe it in the bowels of your countrymen? . . . The Americans have not acted in all things with prudence and temper: they have been wronged; they have been driven to madness by injustice. Will you punish them for the madness you have occasioned? Rather let prudence and temper come first from this side. I will undertake for America that she will follow the example. . . . Upon the whole I will beg leave to tell the House what is my opinion. It is that the Stamp Act be repealed absolutely, totally and immediately. That the reason for the repeal be assigned, viz., because it was founded on an erroneous principle. At the same time, let the sovereign authority of this country over the colonies be asserted in as strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever; that we may bind their trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise every power whatsoever except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent."—C. K. Adams, ed., *Representative British orations*, pp. 98-119.—The views of Pitt "were defended in the strongest terms by Lord Camden, who pledged his great legal reputation to the doctrine that taxation is not included under the general right of legislation, and that taxation and representation are morally inseparable. . . . The task of the ministers in dealing with this question was extremely difficult. The great majority of them desired ardently the repeal of the Stamp Act; but the wishes of the King, the abstention of Pitt, and the divided condition of parties had compelled Rockingham to include in his Government Charles

Townshend, Barrington, and Northington, who were all strong advocates of the taxation of America. . . . In addition to all these difficulties the ministers had to deal with the exasperation which was produced in Parliament by the continual outrages and insults to which all who represented the English Government in America were exposed. Their policy consisted of two parts. They asserted in the strongest and most unrestricted form the sovereignty of the British Legislature, first of all by resolutions and then by a Declaratory Act affirming the right of Parliament to make laws binding the British colonies 'in all cases whatsoever,' and condemning as unlawful the votes of the colonial Assemblies which had denied to Parliament the right of taxing them. Side by side with this measure they brought in a bill repealing the Stamp Act. . . . The great and manifest desire of the commercial classes throughout England had much weight; the repeal was carried [March, 1766] through the House of Commons, brought up by no less than 200 members of the Lords, and finally carried amid the strongest expressions of public joy. Burke described it as 'an event that caused more universal joy throughout the British dominions than perhaps any other that can be remembered.'"—W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the eighteenth century*, v. 3, ch. 12.—"In the end parliament resolved upon the passage of certain remedial laws (1766), an outcome which, from the standpoint of the more radical colonists, can be regarded as little more than a compromise. The Stamp Act was indeed repealed and important alterations were made in the trade regulations; but the Currency Act, the regulations against smuggling and the provisions for a standing army remained unchanged. In addition the Declaratory Act was passed; and the new molasses duty was an unvarnished application of the principle of 'taxation without representation' announced in the Declaratory Act [which declared that "Parliament has power to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever"]. The rejoicing of the colonists can be explained only on the ground that the merchants of the north dominated colonial opinion."—A. M. Schlesinger, *American Revolution reconsidered* (*Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1919).—See also ENGLAND: 1765-1768.

ALSO IN: C. L. Becker, *Eve of the Revolution*, pp. 12-97, 115.—A. M. Schlesinger, *Colonial merchants and the American Revolution*.—S. G. Fisher, *Struggle for American independence*, v. 1, pp. 75-111.—*Parliamentary history*, v. 16, pp. 112-205.—Benjamin Franklin, *Works* (J. Sparks, ed., v. 4).—Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *History of England, 1713-1783*, ch. 45.—M. C. Tyler, *Literary history of the American Revolution*, ch. 10.

1766-1767.—Townshend measures.—"The liberal Rockingham administration, after a few months of power, disappeared [July, 1766]. . . . Of the new ministry the leading spirit was Charles Townshend, a brilliant statesman, but unscrupulous and unwise. His inclinations were arbitrary; he regretted the repeal of the Stamp Act, as did also the king and Parliament in general, who felt themselves to have been humiliated. Pitt, indeed, now Earl of Chatham, was a member of the government; but, oppressed by illness, he could exercise no restraint upon his colleague, and the other members were either in sympathy with Townshend's views, or unable to oppose him. Townshend's three measures affecting America, introduced on the 13th of May, 1767, were: a suspension of the functions of the legislature of New York for contumacy in the treatment of the royal

troops; the establishment of commissioners of the customs, appointed with large powers to superintend laws relating to trade; and lastly an impost duty upon glass, red and white lead, painters' colors, paper, and tea. [See ENGLAND: 1765-1768.] This was an 'external' duty to which the colonists had heretofore expressed a willingness to submit; but the grounds of the dispute were shifting. Townshend had declared that he held in contempt the distinction sought to be drawn between external and internal taxes, but that he would so far humor the colonists in their quibble as to make his tax of that kind of which the right was admitted. A revenue of £40,000 a year was expected from the tax, which was to be applied to the support of a 'civil list,' namely, the paying the salaries of the new commissioners of customs, and of the judges and governors, who were to be relieved wholly or in part from their dependence upon the annual grants of the Assemblies; then, if a surplus remained, it was to go to the payment of troops for protecting the colonies. To make more efficient, moreover, the enforcement of the revenue laws, the writs of assistance, the denunciation of which by James Otis had formed so memorable a crisis, were formally legalized. The popular discontent, appeased by the repeal of the Stamp Act, was at once awake again, and henceforth in the denial of the right of Parliament to tax, we hear no more of acquiescence in commercial restrictions and in the general legislative authority of Parliament. . . . The plan for resistance adopted by the cooler heads was that of Samuel Adams, namely, the non-importation and the non-consumption of British products. From Boston out, through an impulse proceeding from him, town-meetings were everywhere held to encourage the manufactures of the Province and reduce the use of superfluities, long lists of which were enumerated. Committees were appointed everywhere to procure subscriptions to agreements looking to the furtherance of home industries and the disuse of foreign products. . . . Before the full effects of the new legislation could be seen, Townshend suddenly died; but in the new ministry that was presently formed Lord North came to the front, and adopted the policy of his predecessor, receiving in this course the firm support of the king, whose activity and interest were so great in public affairs that he 'became his own minister.'"—J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams*, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *Life and times of Joseph Warren*, ch. 3.—W. Belsham, *Memoirs of the Reign of George III*, v. 1, pp. 139-142.—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, pp. 174-188.

1766-1779.—Spanish occupation of Louisiana.—Spanish forts on the Missouri.—Boundary controversies in the west.—Civil government by pioneers in Ohio valley. See LOUISIANA: 1766-1768; 1769; 1770-1707; MISSOURI: 1766-1770; 1700-1799; OHIO: 1748-1754.

1767.—Settlement of Pennsylvania and Maryland boundaries.—Mason and Dixon's line drawn. See PENNSYLVANIA: 1760-1767.

1767-1768.—Farmer's Letters of John Dickinson.—Circular Letter of Massachusetts, and the "Unrescinding Ninety-two."—"The English ministry was probably misled by the strong emphasis which had been laid here during the controversies concerning the Stamp Act upon the alleged distinction between external and internal taxation. We had refused to submit to the latter, but admitted that the former might be binding upon the whole empire as a commercial regulation. In form the

duties levied on paints, glass, tea, etc., were undoubtedly such a regulation, but it was at once contended here that, in point of fact and of principle, this was as much an exercise of the alleged right of Parliamentary taxation for the purpose of raising a revenue for imperial purposes as the Stamp Act itself. Although it was passed by the opponents of the Stamp Act, and by the Rockingham ministry, who professed to be our friends, the act met at once with opposition here. Late in October, 1767, it was denounced by a public meeting in Boston, which suggested a non-importation agreement as the best means of rendering its operations ineffective. These agreements were favorite expedients for manifesting political discontent in those days, but, as they were voluntary, their obligation sat somewhat loosely upon those who signed them. The truth is, that those who were most decided in opposition to the course of the ministry were somewhat puzzled as to the



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plan they should adopt to exhibit the earnestness of their discontent. . . . While the leaders of the opposition throughout the country were doubtful and hesitating, there appeared in the *Pennsylvania Chronicle* for the 2d of December, 1767, the first of a series of letters on the political situation, afterwards known as the 'Farmer's Letters.' . . . The letters, fourteen in number, followed one another in quick succession, and they were read by men of all classes and opinions throughout the continent as no other work of a political kind had been hitherto read in America. It was, of course, soon known that John Dickinson was their author, and people remembered that he was the person who had formulated what was a genuine Bill of Rights in the Stamp Act Congress. The more these letters were read, the more convinced people became that in the comprehensive survey they took of our political relations with the mother-country, especially as these were affected by the last obnoxious act of Parliament, and in the plans which were proposed to remedy the evil, Mr. Dickinson had struck the true key-note of the opposition to the ministerial measures. He

appeared at this crisis, as he did in the Stamp Act Congress, as the leader and guide in the controversy. From this time until the Declaration of Independence the Pennsylvania idea, which was embodied by Mr. Dickinson in these *Farmer's Letters*, 'controlled the destinies of the country'; and Mr. Bancroft only does justice to Mr. Dickinson's position when he recognizes fully his commanding influence during that period. We may say with pardonable pride . . . that, in the leading spirit in the Stamp Act Congress, Dickinson gave form and color to the agitation in this country which brought about the repeal of that act, and that the arguments by which the claim of the ministry to tax us for revenue by such an act of Parliament as that levying duties on glass, paints, etc., was answered in the 'Farmer's Letters' first convinced the whole body of our countrymen, groping blindly for a cure for their grievances, that there was a legal remedy, and then forced the ministry to consent in a measure to the demand for a repeal of some of its most obnoxious provisions. It is worth remarking that when the ministry yielded at all it yielded to argument, and not to the boastful threats which were so common. The 'Farmer's Letters' gave courage and force to those who in February denounced the law in Pennsylvania; they formed the mainspring of the movement which resulted in the circular letter sent by the legislature of Massachusetts on the 17th of that month to the Assemblies of the other Colonies; in short, they had the rare good fortune not only of convincing those who suffered that the remedy was in their own hands, but also of persuading those who had the power to abandon, or at least to modify their arbitrary measures. . . . Mr. Dickinson begins these grave essays with an air of simplicity as charming as it is calculated to attract the attention of the reader. 'I am a farmer,' he says, 'settled, after a variety of fortunes, near the banks of the river Delaware, in the Province of Pennsylvania. I received a liberal education, and have been engaged in the busy scenes of life, but am now convinced that a man may be as happy without bustle as with it. Being generally master of my time, I spend a good deal of it in my library, which I think the most valuable part of my small estate. I have acquired, I believe, a greater knowledge of history and of the laws and constitution of my country than is generally attained by men of my class,' etc. He then explains the nature of the controversy with the mother-country, making it so clear that the points in dispute are comprehensible by a child. . . . As to our method of asserting our rights, he says, with an elevation of sentiment which reminds one of Edmund Burke more than of any other political writer, 'The cause of liberty is a cause of too much dignity to be sullied by turbulence and tumult. It ought to be maintained in a manner suitable to her nature. Those who engage in it should breathe a sedate yet fervent spirit, animating them to actions of prudence, justice, modesty, bravery, humanity, and magnanimity.' He shrinks, evidently with terror, from speaking of what may be the consequences of the persistent refusal of England to change her oppressive measures. . . . After showing in the most striking manner the nature of our wrongs, the letters turn gladly to the remedy that lies open to us. That remedy is based upon a cultivation of the spirit of conciliation on both sides, and Mr. Dickinson urges again and again upon his English readers the folly of their policy, by showing them the value of the American Colonies to them, and especially

how the trade and wealth of the English merchants are bound up in the adoption of a liberal policy towards us. This is one of the most interesting and important topics discussed in these letters, and the subject is treated with elaborate skill, leading to convincing conclusions drawn from our history. It must not be forgotten that prior to the Revolution an impression widely prevailed among the most thoughtful of our own people, as well as among our friends in England, that if the English people could be made to understand the frightful losses they would suffer in case of a war in which we should be fighting for our independence, or even during a short interruption of the trade between the two countries, they would force the government to yield rather than run the risk of the consequences. . . . Even Dr. Franklin in London, who had had so many proofs of the indifference and contempt with which the representations of the Colonies in England were regarded. . . . thought the appeal of the Farmer to Englishmen so irresistible that, although no friend of Dickinson's, he arranged that these letters should be reprinted in London."—C. J. Stillé, *Life and times of John Dickinson*, ch. 4.—In February, 1768, "the Legislature of Massachusetts sent a Circular Letter [ascribed to Samuel Adams] to the Assemblies of the other colonies, in which was set forth the necessity of all acting together harmoniously, and of freely communicating the mind of each to the others. The course Massachusetts had pursued was described, with the contents of the petition and letters which had been written, and with the hope expressed that she would have their cordial co-operation in resistance to the ministerial measures. The notion that political independence was aimed at was strenuously denied, and the trust was entertained that what had been done would meet the approval of their 'common head and father,' and that the liberties of the colonies would be confirmed. This letter elicited response from some, others returned none officially, but all who answered replied favorably. It gave, however, the greatest offence to the ministry, and particularly to Lord Hillsborough, the Secretary of State, for the Colonies. It seems that he read it entirely by the light which a letter from Governor Bernard to Lord Barrington had shed upon it. This epistle declared the real motive of the colonies to be a determination to be independent. Hillsborough, filled with this idea, communicated it to the other members of the cabinet, and thus the Circular Letter was laid before them, pre-judged. It was determined that it merited consideration, but that the only notice to be given it should be one of censure, and, on the spur of the moment, they resolved upon two things: to require the Massachusetts Assembly to rescind the Letter, and to require the other legislatures before whom it had been laid to reject it. This was done, and the consequences were, that the General Court, or Legislature, of Massachusetts voted, by ninety-two to seventeen, that they would do nothing of the kind, and that the other legislatures gave the outcast a hearty welcome. As for the people, they showed their approval of their representatives by toasting, from one end of the country to the other, 'The unrescinding Ninety-two,' with whom was coupled the number Forty-five, or that of the famous 'North Briton'; while the Bostonians added fuel to the flame by a riot on the score of the sloop Liberty, in which they attacked the houses of the Commissioners of the Customs, and made a bonfire of the Collector's boat. Shortly afterward, (but not by reason of the riot), four

ships of war anchored in Boston harbor, and two regiments of soldiers were quartered on the town."—E. G. Scott, *Development of constitutional liberty*, ch. 10.

Also in: R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic of the United States*, ch. 6.—J. W. Thornton, *Pulpit of the Revolution*, p. 150.—John Adams, *Life and works*.—John Dickinson, *Political writings* (P. L. Ford, ed.).

1768-1770.—Quartering of troops in Boston.—Massacre, and removal of troops. See BOSTON: 1768: Quartering of British troops; 1770: Soldiers and citizens, etc.

1769.—Massachusetts threatened, and Virginia roused to her support.—"The proceedings in Massachusetts attracted in England the greatest attention, elicited the severest comment, and, because a military force had been ordered to Boston to support the stand of the administration, created the greatest solicitude. . . . The king, on opening parliament, characterized the action of Boston as a subversion of the Constitution and evincing a disposition to throw off dependence on Great Britain. The indictment against the colonies was presented in sixty papers laid before parliament. Both Houses declared that the proceedings of the Massachusetts assembly in opposition to the revenue acts were unconstitutional, and derogatory to the rights of the crown and the parliament; that the Circular Letter tended to create unlawful combinations; that the call of a convention by the selectmen of Boston was proof of a design of setting up an independent authority; and both Houses proposed to transport the originators of the obnoxious proceedings in England for trial and condign punishment, under the cover of an obsolete act of Henry VIII. . . . The administration determined to make an example of Massachusetts, as the ring-leading province in political mischief, by transporting its popular leaders to England to be tried for their lives in the king's bench. Such was the purport of an elaborate despatch which Lord Hillsborough sent to Governor Bernard, directing an inquiry to be instituted into the conduct of any persons who had committed any overt act of resistance to the laws. . . . Thus a great issue was created that affected all the colonies. . . . There was no adequate step taken to meet the threatened aggression until the House of Burgesses of Virginia convened in May."—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic of the United States*, ch. 6.—"On the day of the prorogation of parliament [May 9, 1769] the legislature of Virginia assembled at Williamsburg. Great men were there; some who were among the greatest—Washington, Patrick Henry, and, for the first time, Jefferson. Botetourt [the governor], who opened the session in state, was in perfect harmony with the council, received from the house of burgesses a most dutiful address, and entertained fifty-two guests at his table on the first day, and as many more on the second. . . . But the assembly did not forget its duty, and devised a measure which became the example for the continent. It claimed the sole right of imposing taxes on the inhabitants of Virginia. With equal unanimity, it asserted the lawfulness and expediency of a concert of the colonies in defence of the violated rights of America. It laid bare the flagrant tyranny of applying to America the obsolete statute of Henry VIII.; and it warned the king of 'the dangers that would ensue' if any person in any part of America should be seized and carried beyond sea for trial. It consummated its work by communicating its resolutions to every legislature in America, and asking their concur-

rence. The resolves were concise, simple, and effective; so calm in manner and so perfect in substance that time finds no omission to regret, no improvement to suggest. The menace of ardent patriots lost its terrors; and Virginia's declaration and action consolidated union. . . . The next morning, the assembly had just time to adopt an address to the king, when the governor summoned them, and said: 'I have heard of your resolves, and augur ill of their effects; you have made it my duty to dissolve you, and you are dissolved accordingly.' Upon this, the burgesses met together as patriots and friends, with their speaker as moderator. They adopted the resolves which Washington had brought with him from Mount Vernon, and which formed a well-digested, stringent, and practicable scheme of non-importation, until all the 'unconstitutional' revenue acts should be repealed. . . . The voice of the Old Dominion roused the merchants of Pennsylvania to approve what had been done. The assembly of Delaware adopted the Virginia resolves word for word; and every colony south of Virginia followed the example."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), pp. 347-348.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 1, ch. 29.

1770.—**Repeal of Townshend duties except on tea.**—On Mar. 5, 1770—the same day on which the tragical encounter of the king's troops with citizens of Boston occurred—Lord North introduced a motion in Parliament for the partial repeal of Townshend's revenue act; "not on the petitions of America, because they were marked by a denial of the right, but on one from merchants and traders of London. 'The subject,' said he, 'is of the highest importance. The combinations and associations of the Americans for the temporary interruption of trade have already been called unwarrantable in an address of this house; I will call them insolent and illegal. The duties upon paper, glass, and painters' colors bear upon the manufacturers of this country, and ought to be taken off. It was my intention to have extended the proposal to the removal of the other duties; but the Americans have not deserved indulgence. The preamble to the act and the duty on tea must be retained, as a mark of the supremacy of parliament and the efficient declaration of its right to govern the colonies.' . . . Thomas Pownall moved the repeal of the duty on tea. The house of commons, like Lord North in his heart, was disposed to do the work of conciliation thoroughly. . . . Had the king's friends remained neutral, the duty on tea would have been repealed; with all their exertions, in a full house, the majority for retaining it was but 62. Lord North seemed hardly satisfied with his success; and reserved to himself liberty to accede to the repeal, on some agreement with the East India Company. The decision came from the king."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 3, pp. 381-382.

ALSO IN: Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *History of England, 1713-1783*, v. 5, ch. 48.—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, pp. 242-245.—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. 1, ch. 3.

1772.—**Burning of the Gaspé.**—"One of the first overt acts of resistance that took place in this celebrated struggle [in the War of Independence] occurred in 1772, in the waters of Rhode Island. A vessel of war had been stationed on the coast to enforce the laws, and a small schooner, with a light armament of twenty-seven men, called the

Gaspé, was employed as a tender, to run into the shallow waters of that coast. On the 17th of June, 1772, a Providence packet, that plied between New York and Rhode Island, named the Hannah, and commanded by a Captain Linzee, hove in sight of the man-of-war, on her passage up the bay. The Hannah was ordered to heave-to, in order to be examined; but her master refused to comply; and being favoured by a fresh southerly breeze, that was fast sweeping him out of gunshot, the Gaspé was signalled to follow. The chase continued for five-and-twenty miles, under a press of sail, when the Hannah coming up with a bar, with which her master was familiar, and drawing less water than the schooner, Captain Linzee led the latter on a shoal, where she struck. The tide falling, the Gaspé . . . was not in a condition to be removed for several hours. The news of the chase was circulated on the arrival of the Hannah at Providence. A strong feeling was excited among the population, and towards evening the town drummer appeared in the streets, assembling the people in the ordinary manner. As soon as a crowd was collected, the drummer led his followers in front of a shed that stood near one of the stores, when a man disguised as an Indian suddenly appeared on the roof, and proclaimed a secret expedition for that night, inviting all of 'stout hearts' to assemble on the wharf, precisely at nine, disguised like himself. At the appointed hour, most of the men in the place collected at the spot designated, when sixty-four were selected for the bold undertaking that was in view. This party embarked in eight of the launches of the different vessels lying at the wharves, and taking with them a quantity of paving stones, they pulled down the river in a body. . . . On nearing the Gaspé, about two in the morning, the boats were hailed by a sentinel on deck. This man was driven below by a volley of the stones. The commander of the Gaspé now appeared, and ordering the boats off, he fired a pistol at them. This discharge was returned from a musket, and the officer was shot through the thigh. By this time, the crew of the Gaspé had assembled, and the party from Providence boarded. The conflict was short, the schooner's people being soon knocked down and secured. All on board were put into the boats, and the Gaspé was set on fire. Towards morning she blew up."—J. F. Cooper, *Naval history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: S. G. Arnold, *History of Rhode Island*, v. 2, ch. 19.—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 124-128.

1772-1773.—**Instituting of Committees of Correspondence.**—**Tea ships and the Boston Tea Party.**—"The surest way to renew and cement the union [of the colonies] was to show that the ministry had not relaxed in its determination to enforce the principal of the Townshend acts. This was made clear in August, 1772, when it was ordered that in Massachusetts the judges should henceforth be paid by the crown. Popular excitement rose to fever heat, and the judges were threatened with impeachment should they dare accept a penny from the royal treasury. The turmoil was increased next year by the discovery in London of the package of letters which were made to support the unjust charge against Hutchinson and some of his friends that they had instigated and aided the most extreme measures of the ministry. In the autumn of 1772 Hutchinson refused to call an extra session of the assembly to consider what should be done about the judges. Samuel Adams then devised a scheme by which the towns



of Massachusetts could consult with each other and agree upon some common course of action in case of emergencies. For this purpose each town was to appoint a standing committee, and as a great part of their work was necessarily done by letter they were called 'committees of correspondence.' This was the step that fairly organized the Revolution."—J. Fiske, *War of Independence*, ch. 5.—"The town records of Boston [November 2, 1772] say:—"It was then moved by Mr. Samuel Adams that a Committee of Correspondence be appointed, to consist of twenty-one persons, to state the rights of the colonists and of this Province in particular as men and Christians and as subjects; and to communicate and publish the same to the several towns and to the world as the sense of this town, with the infringements and violations thereof that have been or from time to time may be made.' The motion occasioned some debate and seems to have been carried late at night; the vote in its favor, at last, was nearly unanimous. The colleagues of Adams, who had left him almost alone thus far, now declined to become members of the committee, regarding the scheme as useless or trifling. The committee was at last constituted without them; it was made up of men of little prominence but of thorough respectability. James Otis, in another interval of sanity was made chairman, a position purely honorary, the town in this way showing its respect for the leader whose misfortunes they so sincerely mourned. The Committee of Correspondence held its first meeting in the representatives' chamber at the town-house, November 3, 1772, where at the outset each member pledged himself to observe secrecy as to their transactions, except those which, as a committee, they should think it proper to divulge. According to the motion by which the committee was constituted, three duties were to be performed: 1st, the preparation of a statement of the rights of the colonists, as men, as Christians, and as subjects; 2d, a declaration of the infringement and violation of those rights; 3d, a letter to be sent to the several towns of the Province and to the world, giving the sense of the town. The drafting of the first was assigned to Samuel Adams, of the second to Joseph Warren, of the third to Benjamin Church. In a few days tidings came from the important towns of Marblehead, Roxbury, Cambridge, and Plymouth, indicating that the example of Boston was making impression and was likely to be followed. On November 20, at a town-meeting in Faneuil Hall, the different papers were presented: Otis sat as moderator, appearing for the last time in a sphere where his career had been so magnificent. The report was in three divisions, according to the motion. . . . In the last days of 1772, the document, having been printed, was transmitted to those for whom it had been intended, producing at once an immense effect. The towns almost unanimously appointed similar committees; from every quarter came replies in which the sentiments of Samuel Adams were echoed. In the library of Bancroft is a volume of manuscripts, worn and stained by time, which have an interest scarcely inferior to that possessed by the Declaration of Independence itself. . . . They are the original replies sent by the Massachusetts towns to Samuel Adams's committee sitting in Faneuil Hall, during those first months of 1773. One may well read them with bated breath, for it is the touch of the elbow as the stout little democracies dress up into line, just before they plunge into actual fight at Concord and Bunker Hill.

There is sometimes a noble scorn of the restraints of orthography, as of the despotism of Great Britain, in the work of the old town clerks. . . . Yet the documents ought to inspire the deepest reverence. They constitute the highest mark the town-meeting has ever touched. Never before and never since have Anglo-Saxon men, in lawful folk-note assembled, given utterance to thoughts and feelings so fine in themselves and so pregnant with great events. To each letter stand affixed the names of the committee in autograph. This awkward scrawl was made by the rough fist of a Cape Ann fisherman, on shore for the day to do at town-meeting the duty his fellows had laid upon him; the hand that wrote this other was cramped from the scythe-handle, as its possessor mowed an interval on the Connecticut; this blotted signature, where smutted fingers have left a black stain, was written by a blacksmith of Middlesex, turning aside a moment from forging a barrel that was to do duty at Lexington. They were men of the plainest; but as the documents containing statements of the most generous principles and the most courageous determination, were read in the town-houses, the committees who produced them, and the constituents for whom the committees stood, were lifted above the ordinary level. Their horizon expanded to the broadest; they had in view not simply themselves, but the welfare of the continent; not solely their own generation, but remote posterity. It was Samuel Adams's own plan, the consequences of which no one foresaw, neither friend nor foe. Even Hutchinson, who was scarcely less keen than Samuel Adams himself, was completely at fault. 'Such a foolish scheme,' he called it, 'that the faction must necessarily make themselves ridiculous.' But in January the eyes of men were opening. One of the obtest of the Tories, Daniel Leonard, wrote:—"This is the foulest, subtlest, and most venomous serpent ever issued from the egg of sedition. I saw the small seed when it was implanted; it was a grain of mustard. I have watched the plant until it has become a great tree.' It was the transformation into a strong cord of what had been a rope of sand."—J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams*, ch. 13.—"In the spring of 1773, Virginia carried this work of organization a long step further, when Dabney Carr suggested and carried a motion calling for committees of correspondence between the several colonies. From this point it was a comparatively short step to a permanent Continental Congress. It happened that these preparations were made just in time to meet the final act of aggression which brought on the Revolutionary War. The Americans had thus far successfully resisted the Townshend acts and secured the repeal of all the duties except on tea. As for tea they had plenty, but not from England; they smuggled it from Holland in spite of custom-houses and search-warrants."—J. Fiske, *War of Independence*, ch. 5.—"A placard was posted everywhere on the 3d of November, inviting the people of Boston and the neighboring towns to be present at Liberty Tree that day at noon, to witness the resignation of the consignees of the tea, and hear them swear to re-ship to London what teas should arrive. The placard closed,—'Show me the man that dares take this town.' At the time appointed, representatives Adams, Hancock, and Phillips, the selectmen and town clerk, with about five hundred more, were present at the Liberty Tree. But no consignees arrived, whereupon Molineux and Warren headed a party who waited upon them. . . . A town-meet-

ing on November 5, in which an effort of the Tories to make head against the popular feeling came to naught, showed how overwhelming was the determination to oppose the introduction of the tea. . . . When news arrived on the 17th that three tea-ships were on the way to Boston, for a second time a town-meeting demanded through a committee, of which Samuel Adams was a member, the resignation of the consignees. They evaded the demand; the town-meeting voted their answer not satisfactory, and at once adjourned without debate or comment. The silence was mysterious; what was impending none could tell. . . . [On the 28th the *Dartmouth*, the first tea-ship, came into the harbor. Feeling grew rapidly upon its appearance. The determination not to allow the tea to be entered was made, and on December 16, it was destroyed at the Boston tea-party].”—J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams*, ch. 16.

“In Massachusetts Samuel Adams had already become the centre of political agitation. He possessed precisely the qualities which belong to a consummate revolutionary leader. . . . From the first menace of the stamp tax Adams taught the necessity of union. For some time he held under consideration a scheme for party organization through committees of correspondence. The instructions of the ministry requiring the judges to receive their salaries from the crown gave him opportunity to carry out his project. . . . He appealed to the town-meeting; but the other leaders were lukewarm, and his first efforts were not successful. . . . In Massachusetts, Samuel Adams was urging the call of a general congress, and through the Boston committee of correspondence he was zealously stirring up hostility to the ministerial policy. He was perhaps the first American to foresee independence. Apparently he now earnestly desired it; and . . . the Boston tea-party and its immediate results were followed by a continental congress and the appeal to arms. The king and his ministers had committed a serious blunder in retaining the tax on tea in order to assert the parliamentary right; for the colonies determined to resist the tax in order to deny that right. Indirectly the same revenue might have been derived from America by levying in England a duty of threepence a pound; in other words, by reducing by that amount the drawback allowed the East India Company. Indeed, Hutchinson believed that if all the duties laid by Townshend in 1767 ‘had been paid upon exportation from England, and applied to the purpose proposed, there would not have been any opposition made to the act. It would have been a favor to the colonies. The saving upon tea would have been more than the whole paid upon the other articles. The consumer in America would have paid the duty, just as much as if it had been charged upon importation.’ The Townshend revenue act laid an import duty of threepence a pound on tea shipped to America. By the supplementary statute of the same year, on such shipments was allowed a drawback of the whole import duty paid in England, amounting at the time to about twenty-four per cent. of the gross price; but on the express condition that the East India Company, in whose interest the arrangement was made, should make good any loss of revenue by reason of such drawback. As a result, in 1769 tea was actually sold in Boston at ninepence a pound less than before the acts. Moreover, an earlier statute allowed tea to be exported to America without paying any of the inland duties still charged in England, amounting to twenty-five per cent. of the

gross price. Therefore, according to Hutchinson, the accuracy of whose statement is sustained by . . . research, tea ‘was cheaper than it had ever been sold by the illicit traders; and the poor people in America drank the same tea in quality at three shillings the pound, which the people in England drank at six shillings.’ The business of the company did not prosper as well as expected. During the first four years the sales nearly doubled; but to make up the loss of revenue the company was obliged to pay over £115,000. A further concession was therefore sought; and in 1772, on exportation to America, a rebate of three-fifths of the import duty was granted; while the company was no longer required to make up the loss of revenue. But the non-importation agreements now stood in the way: the colonists would not drink the taxed tea at any price. In 1773 ‘about seventeen million pounds of tea lay unsold in the warehouses’ of the company. It had to face impending bankruptcy, and the government must lose its annual payment of £400,000. Again Parliament came to the company’s aid. The whole of the import duty was now remitted on exportation to America. At the same time, by obtaining a license from the treasury, the company was permitted to send the tea directly from its warehouses to its own agents or consignees in America. The middlemen’s profit would thus be saved. For hitherto it had been necessary to ship the tea to England and to sell it at public auction to the merchants, who then exported it to the colonies. Under the new concession the company could have afforded to sell the tea, not merely at ninepence a pound less than in England, but at a small ‘fraction of the price’ obtained there. However, against the advice of Trecothick for the company, the tax of threepence a pound was still exacted; and this effort to force the tea on the colonists was largely due to the king. It is ‘to no purpose making objections,’ said Lord North, ‘for the king would have it so. The king meant to try the question with America.’ He seems to have fancied that the Americans would take the bait and forget the principle. If so he was soon undeceived. The company selected its agents, among whom were the two sons of Hutchinson, and in the autumn of 1773 sent a number of ships laden with tea to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. The people were determined to prevent the landing of the tea, and, by persuasion or menace, to cause the agents to resign their commissions. In Charleston a cargo of two hundred and fifty-seven chests arrived December 2. The agents resigned; and after the twentieth day, the duty being unpaid, the tea was seized by the collector and stored in vaults under the exchange. A meeting of the inhabitants of Philadelphia resolved that the duty on tea was illegal, and that every person who ‘countenanced the unloading, vending, or receiving the tea, was an enemy to his country.’ In both Philadelphia and New York the consignees were induced to resign, and the tea was sent back to London. More serious events were taking place in Boston, where, under authority of the town-meeting, organized resistance was guided by Samuel Adams and the Boston committee of correspondence, with which the committees of four or five neighboring places sometimes sat in Faneuil Hall as a sort of representative senate. An immense mass-meeting of the inhabitants of six towns held in the Old South Church, resolved that ‘at all events’ the tea should be sent back without payment of duty. When the sheriff of Suffolk read the gover-

nor's proclamation warning the people 'unlawfully assembled, forthwith to disperse, and to surcease all further unlawful proceedings, at their utmost peril,' he was greeted with insults and derision. The agents refused to resign their commissions, and took shelter in the castle. Neither clearance papers from the collector nor a pass from the governor could be obtained by the owners to allow them to carry their cargoes back to the Thames. A popular guard was placed over the tea ships to prevent the tea from being landed; and the meetings of various towns in the province promised aid to Boston, even at the hazard of life and property. Finally, on the evening of December 16, 1773, the last day before the tea, for non-payment of duty, might be legally seized by the collector and stored at the castle—a party of fifty or sixty men, dressed as Mohawk Indians, and directed by Adams, boarded the three tea ships at Griffin's wharf, broke open the three hundred and forty-two chests of tea, and cast their contents into the bay. . . . There were not wanting other indications of an impending crisis, which only the highest wisdom could avert. 'The inhabitants, in many parts of the province,' says Hutchinson, 'were learning the use of fire-arms, but not under the officers of the regiment to which they belonged. They were forming themselves into companies for military exercise, under officers of their own choosing; hinting the occasion there might soon be for employing their arms in defense of their liberties.' Throughout the country the exultation over the course taken by Boston was very ominous; party organization was rapidly developed; the assemblies which had not yet responded to the Virginia call now appointed inter-colonial committees of correspondence; and local committees, hitherto confined to Massachusetts, began to be formed in other provinces."—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, pp. 253, 255, 265-271.—See also BOSTON: 1773; NEW YORK: 1773-1774.

ALSO IN: W. V. Wells, *Life of Samuel Adams*, v. 1, pp. 372-375, 495-512, v. 2, pp. 1-9, 24-29, 61-63, 80-81, 103-130.—R. Frothingham, *Life of Joseph Warren*, ch. 9.—Force's *American Archives*, v. 1.—A. Hunt, *Provincial committees of safety of the American Revolution*.—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 127-133.

1774 (March-April).—Boston Port Bill.—Massachusetts Act and Quebec Act.—"The spoken defiance of the other colonies had been quite as efficient as the combination of threats and force to which Boston was compelled to resort, but Lord North launched the first retaliatory and punitive measure against that city [and procured the passage of the series of acts known as the "Intolerable Acts"]. . . . The first of Lord North's bills was the Boston Port Act, which closed the harbor until indemnity for the tea there destroyed should be paid and the king be satisfied that thereafter the city would obey the laws. The demand for indemnity was fair but the indefinite claim of obedience was not only infamous in itself but, as Burke said, punished the innocent with the guilty. . . . North's second bill [the "Regulating Act"] was a virtual abrogation of the Massachusetts charter. The council of twenty-eight had been hitherto elected every year in joint session of the assembly. The king might now appoint the whole body to any number, from twelve to thirty-six, and remove them at pleasure. The men so appointed were designated mandamus councillors. Thereafter, town-meetings could be held only by permission of the governor and for the sole pur-

pose of electing officers [General Gage was made governor under this act, and four regiments were placed in Boston for his support]. Sheriffs were to return all juries, and were to be named by the governor and hold office during his pleasure. The third bill was really a device of the king's, and it is said that the ministry was confused and shamefaced in presenting it. It ordained that magistrates, revenue officers, or other officials indicted in Massachusetts for capital offences were to be tried either in Nova Scotia or Great Britain. Another measure made legal the billeting of troops, against which Boston had hitherto striven with success, and a fifth, known as the Quebec Act, though depriving that province of the right of habeas corpus, restored the French customary law ('coutume de Paris'), established Roman Catholicism as the state religion, and by extending its boundaries to the Ohio and Mississippi, shut off the Northern English Colonies from westward extension. This was intended as an arbitrary settlement of a vexed question. The Puritans, however, . . . exclaimed that the next step would be the establishment among them of English episcopacy."—W. M. Sloane, *French War and the Revolution*, ch. 14.—The point to which feeling rose, in Massachusetts over these acts, is shown by the attitude toward the new councillors twenty-five of whom accepted office. "Popular feeling ran high and fierce; and their countrymen were determined that they should not serve, to whatever lengths it might be necessary to go in order to prevent them. Two thousand men marched in companies on to the common at Worcester, escorting one of their townsmen whose abilities and personal popularity had recommended him to the notice of the Government, and formed a hollow square around him while, with uncovered head, he read the resignation of his seat at the council board. George Watson of Plymouth who, in the stately language of the day, 'possessed almost every virtue that can adorn and dignify the human character,' made known his intention of assuming the proffered dignity. On the next Sunday forenoon, when he took his accustomed place in the meeting-house, his friends and familiar associates put on their hats and walked out beneath the eyes of the congregation. As they passed him he bent his head over the handle of his cane; and, when the time arrived, he declined the oath of qualification. . . . When the day came round for the Courts of Justice to sit in their remodelled shape, the Judges were treated more tenderly as regarded their persons than the mandamus councillors, but with quite as little reverence for their office. They took their seats at Boston only to learn that those citizens who had been returned as jurors one and all refused the oath. A great multitude marched into Springfield, with drums and trumpets, and hoisted a black flag over the Court-house, as a sign of what any one might expect who entered it in an official capacity. . . . Wherever the Judges went, if once they were fairly inside a town, they were not allowed to leave it until they had plighted their honour that they would depart without transacting any legal business. After a succession of such experiences the Chief Justice and his colleagues waited upon the Governor, and represented to him that they must abandon the pretence of exercising their functions in a Province where there were no jurymen to listen to their charges, and where they could not even sit in court to do nothing unless the approaches were guarded by the best part of a brigade of British infantry."—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, v. 1, pt. 1,

pp. 213-216.—See also BOSTON: 1774; CANADA: 1763-1774.

ALSO IN: A. Johnston, *United States: Its history and constitution*, sect. 57-58.—*Parliamentary history*, v. 17.—*Force's American Archives*, series 4, v. 1, pp. 35-220.—Lord Fitzmaurice, *Life of the Earl of Shelburne*, v. 2, ch. 8.—J. A. Woodburn, *Causes of American Revolution (Johns Hopkins University Studies, series 12, p. 56)*.—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, pp. 276-279.

1774 (April-October).—Lord Dunmore's War with the Indians.—Western territorial claims of Virginia. See OHIO: 1774.

1774 (May-June).—Effects of the Boston Port Bill.—Call for a continental congress.—Eve of the Revolution.—“The Boston Port Bill was received in America with honors not accorded even to the Stamp Act. It was cried through the streets as ‘A barbarous, cruel, bloody, and inhuman murder,’ and was burnt by the common hangman on a scaffold forty-five feet high. The people of Boston gathered together in town-meeting at Faneuil Hall, and expresses were sent off with an appeal to all Americans throughout America. The responses from the neighborhood came like snow-flakes. Marblehead offered the use of its wharves to the Boston merchants; Salem averred that it would be lost to all feelings of humanity were it to raise its fortunes on the ruins of its neighbor. Newburyport voted to break off trade with Great Britain, and to lay up its ships. Connecticut, as her wont is, when moved by any vital occurrence, betook herself to prayer and humiliation, first, however, ordering an inventory to be taken of her cannon and military stores. Virginia, likewise, resolved to invoke the divine interposition, but, before another resolution which called for a Congress could be introduced, her House was precipitately dissolved; whereupon the resolution was brought up and passed at a meeting called in ‘the Apollo,’ where it was further declared that an attack on one colony was an attack upon all. Two days later the Massachusetts letter itself was received, upon which the Virginians called a convention. From all parts contributions in money poured into Boston, and resolutions were everywhere passed, declaring that no obedience was due the late acts of Parliament; that the right of imperial taxation did not exist; that those who had accepted office under pay of the king had violated their public duty; that the Quebec act establishing Roman Catholicism in Canada was hostile to the Protestant religion, and that the inhabitants of the colonies should use their utmost diligence to acquaint themselves with the art of war, and for that purpose should turn out under arms at least once a week. In the fulness of time, a cordon of ships was drawn around Boston, and six regiments and a train of artillery were encamped on the Common—the only spot in the thirteen colonies where the government could enforce an order. The conflict between constitutional liberty and absolutism had now reached that dangerous point where physical force became one of its elements. . . . The situation was at once recognized throughout the colonies, and the knowledge that in union there is strength, manifested itself in one general impulse toward a Colonial Congress. Committees of Correspondence were organized in every county, and throngs attended the public meetings. ‘One great, wise, and noble spirit; one masterly soul animating one vigorous body,’ was the way John Adams described this impulse. The Canadas alone remained inani-

mate. . . . But not so those to whom constitutional liberty was as the breath of life. On the 17th of June (1774) the Massachusetts Assembly, which had been removed by a royal order to Salem, answered Virginia by resolving on a call for a Continental Congress at Philadelphia. The governor, hearing of what was going on, sent the secretary of the colony to dissolve the Assembly, but, finding the doors shut upon him, he had to content himself with reading the message to the crowd outside. The House went on with its work, while, at the same time, a great meeting, with John Adams in the chair, was being held at Boston in Faneuil Hall. Twelve colonies agreed to send delegates to a Continental Congress to be held at Philadelphia in September.”—E. G. Scott, *Development of constitutional liberty in the English colonies of America*, ch. 11.—See also BOSTON: 1774.

1774 (May-July).—Governor Hutchinson's departure for England.—His conversation with King George.—In May, 1774, Governor Hutchinson, of Massachusetts, who had applied some months before for leave of absence to visit England, was relieved by General Gage and took his departure. General Gage was temporarily commissioned to be “Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief” of the Province of Massachusetts, and “Vice-Admiral of the same,” combining the civil and military powers in himself. It was then supposed that Hutchinson's absence would be brief; but, to his endless grief, he never saw the country again. Soon after his arrival in England he had an interview with the king, which is reported at length in his diary. The conversation is one of great historical interest, exhibiting King George's knowledge and ideas of American affairs, and representing the opinions of a high-minded American loyalist. It is reprinted here exactly as given in Governor Hutchinson's diary, published by his great-grandson in 1883:

July 1st.—Received a card from Lord Dartmouth desiring to see me at his house before one o'clock. I went soon after 12, and after near an hour's conversation, his Lordship proposed introducing me immediately to the King. . . . The *Lévée* was over; but his Lordship going in to the King, I was admitted, contrary, as L<sup>d</sup> Pomfret observed to me, to custom, to kiss His Majesty's hand in his closet: after which, as near as I can recollect, the following conversation passed. . . .

K.—How did you leave your Government, and how did the people receive the news of the late measures in Parliament?

H.—When I left Boston we had no news of any Act of Parliament, except the one for shutting up the port, which was extremely alarming to the people.

(Lord D. said, Mr. H. came from Boston the day that Act was to take place, the first of June. I hear the people of Virginia have refused to comply with the request to shut up their ports, from the people of Boston, and M<sup>r</sup> H. seems to be of opinion that no colony will comply with that request.)

K.—Do you believe, M<sup>r</sup> H., that the account from Virginia is true?

H.—I have no other reason to doubt it, except that the authority for it seems to be only a newspaper; and it is very common for articles to be inserted in newspapers without any foundation. I have no doubt that when the people of Rhode Island received the like request, they gave this answer—that if Boston would stop all the vessels

they then had in port, which they were hurrying away before the Act commenced, the people of R. Island would then consider of the proposal.

The King smiled.

Lord D.—M<sup>r</sup> H., may it please y<sup>r</sup> Majesty, has shewn me a newspaper with an address from a great number of Merchants, another from the Episcopal Clergy, another from the Lawyers, all expressing their sense of his conduct in the most favourable terms. Lord Dartmouth thereupon took the paper out of his pocket and shewed it.

K.—I do not see how it could be otherwise. I am sure his conduct has been universally approved of here by people of all parties.

H.—I am very happy in your Majesty's favourable opinion of my administration.

K.—I am entirely satisfied with it. I am well acquainted with the difficulties you have encountered, and with the abuse & injury offered you. Nothing could be more cruel than the treatment you met with in betraying your private letters.

The K., turning to Lord D.—My Lord, I remember nothing in them to which the least exception could be taken.

Lord D.—That appears, Sir, from the report of the Committee of Council, and from your Majesty's orders thereon. . . .

K.—Could you ever find M<sup>r</sup> H. how those letters came to New England?

H.—Doctor F., may it please your Majesty, has made a publick declaration that he sent them, and the Speaker has acknowledged to me that he rec<sup>d</sup> them: I do not remember that he said directly from Doctor F., but it was understood between us that they came from him. . . . I sent for the Speaker and let him know what I had heard, which came from one of the six to a friend, and so to me. The Speaker said they were sent to him, and that he was at first restrained from shewing them to any more than six persons.

K.—Did he tell you who were the persons?

H.—Yes, sir. There was M<sup>r</sup> Bowdoin, M<sup>r</sup> Pitts, Doctor Winthrop, D<sup>r</sup> Chauncy, D<sup>r</sup> Cooper, and himself. They are not all the same which had been mentioned before. The two Mr. Adamses had been named to me in the room of M<sup>r</sup> Pitts and D<sup>r</sup> Winthrop. . . .

K.—I have heard of one M<sup>r</sup> Adams, but who is the other?

H.—He is a Lawyer, Sir.

K.—Brother to the other?

H.—No, Sir, a relation. He has been of the House, but is not now. He was elected by the two Houses to be of the Council, but negatived. The speaker further acquainted me that, after the first letter, he received another, allowing him to shew the Letters to the Committee of Correspondence; and afterwards a third, which allowed him to shew them to such persons as he could confide in, but always enjoined to send them back without taking copies. I asked him how he could be guilty of such a breach of trust as to suffer them to be made publick? He excused it by saying that he was against their being brought before the House, but was overruled; and when they had been read there, the people abroad compelled their publication, or would not be satisfied without it. . . .

K.—In such abuse, M<sup>r</sup> H., as you met with, I suppose there must have been personal malvolence as well as party rage?

H.—It has been my good fortune, Sir, to escape any charge against me in my private char-

acter. The attacks have been upon my publick conduct, and for such things as my duty to your Majesty required me to do, and which you have been pleased to approve of. I don't know that any of my enemies have complained of a personal injury.

K.—I see they threatened to pitch and feather you.

H.—Tarr & feather, may it please your Majesty; but I don't remember that ever I was threatened with it.

Lord D.—Oh! yes, when Malcolm was tarred and feathered [Almanac for 1770, May, MS. Note], the committee for tarring and feathering blamed the people for doing it, that being a punishment res<sup>d</sup> for a higher person, and we suppose you was intended. . . .

K.—I think you generally live in the country, M<sup>r</sup> H.; what distance are you from town?

H.—I have lived in the country, Sir, in the summer for 20 years; but, except the winter after my house was pulled down, I have never lived in the country in winter until the last. My house is 7 or 8 miles from the Town, a pleasant situation. . . .

K.—Pray, what does Hancock do now? How will the late affair affect him?

H.—I don't know to what particular affair your Majesty refers.

K.—Oh, a late affair in the city, his bills being refused. . . .

H.—I have heard, Sir, that M<sup>r</sup> Haley, a merchant in the city, is M<sup>r</sup> Hancock's principal correspondent.

K.—Ay, that's the name.

H.—I heard, may it please your Majesty, before I came from N. England, that some small sums were returned, but none of consequence.

K.—Oh, no, I mean within this month, large sums.

Lord D.—I have heard such rumours, but don't know the certainty.

H.—M<sup>r</sup> Hancock, Sir, had a very large fortune left him by his uncle, and I believe his political engagements have taken off his attention from his private affairs. He was sensible not long ago of the damage it was to him, and told me he was determined to quit all publick business, but soon altered his mind.

K.—Then there's M<sup>r</sup> Cushing: I remember his name a long time: is not he a great man of the party?

H.—He has been many years Speaker, but a Speaker, Sir, is not always the person of the greatest influence. A M<sup>r</sup> Adams is rather considered as the opposer of Government, and a sort of Wilkes in New England.

K.—What gave him his importance?

H.—A great pretended zeal for liberty, and a most inflexible natural temper. He was the first that publickly asserted the Independency of the colonies upon the Kingdom, or the supreme Authority of it.

K.—I have heard, M<sup>r</sup> H., that your ministers preach that, for the sake of promoting liberty or the publick good, any immorality or less evil may be tolerated?

H.—I don't know, Sir, that such doctrine has ever been preached from the pulpit; but I have no doubt that it has been publickly asserted by some of the heads of the party who call themselves sober men, and the good of the publick is above all other considerations, and that truth may be dispensed with, and immorality is excusable,

when this great good can be obtained by such means.

K.—That's a strange doctrine, indeed. Pray, M<sup>r</sup> H., what is your opinion of the effect from the new regulation of the Council? Will it be agreeable to the people, and will the new appointed Councillors take the trust upon them?

H.—I have not, may it please y<sup>r</sup> Majesty, been able to inform myself who they are. I came to Town late last evening, and have seen nobody. I think much will depend upon the choice that has been made.

K.—Enquiry was made and pains taken that the most suitable persons should be appointed.

H.—The body of the people are Dissenters from the Church of England; what are called Congregationalists. If the Council shall have been generally selected from the Episcopalians, it will make the change more disagreeable.

K.—Why are they not Presbyterians?

H.—There are very few Churches which call themselves Presbyterians, and form themselves voluntarily into a Presbytery without any aid from the civil government, which the Presbyterian Church of Scotland enjoys. . . .

K.—Pray, M<sup>r</sup> H., does population greatly increase in your Province?

H.—Very rapidly, Sir. I used to think that Doctor F., who has taken such pains in his calculations, carried it too far when he supposed the inhabitants of America, from their natural increase, doubled their number in 25 years; but I rather think now that he did not; and I believe it will appear from the last return I made to the Secretary of State, that the Massachusetts has increased in that proportion. And the increase is supposed, including the importation of foreigners, to be, upon the whole, greater in most of the Southern Colonies than in the Massachusetts. We import no settlers from Europe, so as to make any sensible increase.

K.—Why do not foreigners come to y<sup>r</sup> Province as well as to the Southern Governments?

H.—I take it, Sir, that our long cold winters discourage them. Before they can bring the land to such a state as to be able in summer to provide for their support in winter, what little substance they can bring with them is expended, and many of them have greatly suffered. The Southern colonies are more temperate. . . .

K.—To what produce is your climate best adapted?

H.—To grazing, Sir; your Majesty has not a finer Colony for grass in all your dominions: and nothing is more profitable in America than pasture, because labour is very dear.

K.—Then you import all your bread corn from the other Colonies?

H.—No, Sir, scarce any, except for the use of the maritime towns. In the country towns the people raise grain enough for their own expending, and sometimes for exportation. They live upon coarse bread made of rye and corn mixed, and by long use they learn to prefer this to flour or wheat bread. . . .

K.—New York, I think, comes the next to Boston in their opposition to Government?

H.—Does your Majesty think nearer than Pennsylvania?

K.—Why, I can't say that they do of late. Rhode Island, M<sup>r</sup> H., is a strange form of Government.

H.—They approach, Sir, the nearest to a Democracy of any of your Colonies. Once a year all

power returns to the people, and all their Officers are new elected. By this means the Governor has no judgment of his own, and must comply with every popular prejudice.

K.—Who is their Governor now?

H.—His name, Sir, is Wanton, a Gentleman who I have reason to think wishes to see Government maintained as much as any they could find in the Colonies.

K.—How is it with Connecticut? are they much better?

H.—The constitutions, Sir, are much the same; but Connecticut are a more cautious people; strive to make as little noise as may be, and have in general retained a good share of that virtue which is peculiarly necessary in such a form of Government. . . .

K.—What number of Indians had you in your Government?

H.—They are almost extinct. Perhaps there are 50 or 60 families at most upon the Eastern Frontier, where there is a small fort maintained; tho' I conceive the inhabitants would not be in the least danger. It looks, Sir, as if in a few years the Indians would be extinct in all parts of the Continent.

K.—To what is that owing?

H.—I have thought, Sir, in part to their being dispirited at their low despicable condition among the Europeans, who have taken possession of their country, and treat them as an inferior race of beings; but more to the immoderate use of spirituous liquors. There are near 100 families, perhaps more, of Indians who are domiciliated, and live, some in other towns, but most of them at a place called Mashpee, where they have a church, and a Missionary, to preach to them, and also an Indian Minister who has been ordained, and preaches sometimes in their own language.

K.—What, an Episcopal Minister?

H.—No, Sir, of the Congregational persuasion or form of worship.

The King was particularly in many other enquiries relative to my Administration, to the state of the Province, and the other Colonies. I have minutely what remained the clearest upon my mind, and as near the order which they passed as I am able.

—*Diary and letters of Thomas Hutchinson, ch. 5.*

1774 (September).—Meeting of First Continental Congress.—On the call of the Massachusetts Assembly (see above: 1774 [May-June]), one after another all the colonies, except Georgia, chose members for the proposed congress. The delegates for Massachusetts and Pennsylvania were elected by the colonial assemblies. Those from the other colonies were the choice of committees of correspondence, committees of safety, or provincial mass meetings. "On the 5th day of September most of the delegates elected to the congress were in Philadelphia. They were invited by the speaker of the Pennsylvania assembly to hold their sessions in the State House, but decided to meet in the hall owned by the carpenters,—a fine brick building, having commodious rooms for the use of the committees, and an excellent library in the chambers. . . . At ten o'clock in the morning the delegates met at the City Tavern, walked to Carpenters' Hall, and began the sessions of the Continental Congress. This assembly, when all the members had taken their seats, consisted of fifty-five delegates, chosen by twelve colonies. They represented a population of 2,200,000, pay-

ing a revenue of £80,000 sterling. Georgia, which did not elect delegates, gave a promise to concur with her 'sister colonies' in the effort to maintain their right to the British Constitution. . . . In general, the delegates elect were men of uncommon ability, who had taken a prominent part in the political action of their several localities. . . . New England presented, in John Sullivan, vigor; in Roger Sherman, sterling sense and integrity; in Thomas Cushing, commercial knowledge; in John Adams, large capacity for public affairs; in Samuel Adams, a great character, with influence and power to organize. The Middle colonies presented, in Philip Livingston, the merchant prince of enterprise and liberality; in John Jay, rare public virtue, juridical learning, and classic taste; in William Livingston, progressive ideas tempered by conservatism; in John Dickinson, 'The Immortal Farmer,' erudition and literary ability; in Cæsar Rodney and Thomas McKean, working power; in James Duane, timid Whiggism, halting, but keeping true to the cause; in Joseph Galloway, downright Toryism, seeking control, and at length going to the enemy. The Southern colonies presented, in Thomas Johnson, the grasp of a statesman; in Samuel Chase, activity and boldness; in the Rutledges, wealth and accomplishment; in Christopher Gadsden, the genuine American; and in the Virginia delegation, an illustrious group,—in Richard Bland, wisdom; in Edmund Pendleton, practical talent; in Peyton Randolph, experience in legislation; in Richard Henry Lee, statesmanship in union with high culture; in Patrick Henry, genius and eloquence; in Washington, justice and patriotism. 'If,' said Patrick Henry, 'you speak of solid information and sound judgment, Washington unquestionably is the greatest man of them all.' . . . The congress was organized by the choice of Peyton Randolph of Virginia for President, and Charles Thomson of Philadelphia, not a member, for Secretary. . . . A discussion . . . arose on the rules to be observed in determining questions, . . . which was renewed the next day, when it was agreed that each colony should have one vote."—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic of the United States*, ch. 9.

Also in: J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, *History of Philadelphia*, v. 1, ch. 16.—C. J. Stillé, *Life and times of John Dickinson*, ch. 5.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 13.—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. 1, ch. 5.—J. Ramsay, *History of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 380-394.

1774 (September-October).—Action of the Congress.—"The Congress first resolved 'to state the rights of the colonies in general, the several instances in which those rights were violated or infringed, and the means most proper for a restoration of them.' Next, 'to examine and report the several statutes which affect the trade and manufactures of the colonies,' not earlier than the last nine years. While these subjects were under consideration, resolutions of Boston and its neighbors [Middlesex and Suffolk counties] were laid before them, stating their wrongs and merely defensive measures to which they would adhere, 'as long as such conduct may be vindicated by reason and the principles of self-preservation, but no longer.' . . . Congress unanimously approved and recommended 'a perseverance in this firm and temperate conduct,' trusting a change in the councils of the British nation. The merchants were urged not to order goods, and to suspend those ordered; and it was resolved, that after the

first of next December there should be no importation of British goods, and no consumption of, or traffic in them. A loyal petition to the king [the Declaration of Rights and Grievances] was ordered, assuring him that by abolishing the system of laws and regulations of which the colonies complained, enumerating them, the jealousies they had caused would be removed, and harmony restored. 'We ask but for peace, liberty and safety. We wish not a diminution of the prerogative, nor do we solicit the grant of any new right in our favor. Your royal authority over us, and our connection with Great Britain, we shall always carefully and zealously endeavor to support and maintain.' General Gage was entreated to discontinue the erection of the fortifications on Boston Neck, and to prevent all injuries on the part of the troops; and Massachusetts was asked 'temporarily to submit to a suspension of the administration of justice where it could not be procured in a legal and peaceable manner.' Persons accepting office under the recent act, changing the form of her government, were denounced, 'as the wicked tools of that despotism which is preparing to destroy those rights which God, nature, and compact have given to America.' A memorial was next ordered to the inhabitants of the British colonies there represented, exposing their common wrongs and urging a united 'commercial opposition,' warning them to extend their views 'to mournful events,' to be 'in all respects prepared for every contingency, and to implore the favor of Almighty God.' An appeal was made to the enlightened sympathies of the British people. . . . Finally, an address was made to the inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, inviting their co-operation. In the meantime, the form of a non-exportation, non-consumption association was adopted, and signed by each of the delegates. . . . A declaration of the rights and injuries of the colonies was made, in which the most difficult question was disposed of. The right to participate in the legislative council of their common country, was declared to be the foundation of English liberty and of all free government. . . . Of all these proceedings the language was that of peace, except where other language was demanded. For they approved the opposition of the inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay to the execution of the late acts of Parliament, and declared, 'If these acts shall be attempted to be carried into execution by force, in such case all America ought to support them in their opposition,' and 'that seizing or attempting to seize any person in America, in order to transport such person beyond the sea for trial of offences committed within the body of a county in America, being against law, will justify, and ought to meet with, resistance and reprisal.' These were the essential resolutions. They bound the colonies to a common resistance to acts of force against all, or any one of them. They also declared their opinion of the necessity that another Congress should be held in the ensuing month of May, unless the redress of grievances which they had desired was obtained before that time, and that all the colonies in North America choose deputies, as soon as possible, to attend such Congress. On the twenty-sixth of October, after a secret session of fifty-one days, this body adjourned. The recommendations of this Congress were received with marked respect among the patriots of the colonies."—J. C. Hamilton, *History of the United States as traced in the writings of Alexander Hamilton*, v. 1, ch. 3.—

"Trained in all the theories of the mercantile system, America had been taught to believe (1) that two countries could continue to trade, though one of necessity did so at a loss; (2) that in the trade between England and the colonies, the former both through natural advantages and through law was the party to which the profit accrued; (3) that England was 'a shop-keeping nation,' whose very existence depended on her trade and manufactures. A suspension of trade between England and America therefore would mean misery, if not ruin, to the mother country, while the colonies would 'both save and gain.' With measures of non-importation, non-exportation and non-consumption, accordingly, did this otherwise powerless body hope to coerce the English people and government. Though founded on an economic fallacy, this method of action was certain to have a great effect in England. Twice already had it been employed on a limited scale—against the Stamp Act and against the revenue acts,—and each time with sufficient success to warrant the belief that its wider application would result in victory. Now the agents of the colonies in London were writing home: 'If you have virtue enough to resolve to stop, and to execute the resolution of stopping, your exports and imports for one year, this country must do you justice.' . . . In both England and America the temporary destruction of British trade was viewed not merely as an effective weapon, but as the only peaceful one which the colonies possessed. A failure to unite in a non-importation agreement against England would, according to a prominent English politician, leave nothing for the colonies 'but to decide between ruin and submission.' The question for the Congress was not, therefore, a choice of remedies, but merely whether, and to how great an extent, the delegates could be brought to agree to the only one within their reach. For even while accepting the system as effective against Great Britain, the delegates and their constituents had so far progressed as to realize that it bore with uneven force on the different colonies. The southern colonies were really no more diversified in their industries than the West India islands. South Carolina grew rice and indigo; North Carolina depended largely on tar, pitch and turpentine; Virginia raised tobacco. Unless these products could be exported to Europe, those colonies might suffer for the necessaries of life. . . . The first consideration of the subject in the Congress revealed serious difficulties. The Virginia delegation, 'to avoid the heavy injury that would arise,' were prevented by their instructions from agreeing to an immediate cessation of trade relations. Imports would cease on November 1, 1774, but exports must continue till August 10, 1775. It was in vain they were told 'that a non-exportation at a future day cannot avail,' and that at the Virginia date non-exportation would not operate before the fall of 1776. The Virginians had determined to cure and sell their tobacco crop of 1774 before 'consideration of interest and of equality of sacrifice should be laid aside.' So vital, however, did most of the delegates consider the immediate enforcement, that it was proposed to act without Virginia; for Boston and New England, it was said, would need active support before that date. This proposition was defeated by the refusal of the delegates of North Carolina and Maryland to join unless Virginia should also make the sacrifice. With sorry grace the Congress had to accept the dictation of Virginia. But the trouble did not end here. Vir-

ginia's selfish interest having been triumphant, the South Carolina delegation sought for an equal advantage, and demanded that the two great products of that colony should be especially reserved from the non-exportation clause. . . . Rather than yield, the Congress preferred a cessation of business for several days, in order 'to give our [South Carolina] deputies time to recollect themselves.' But when the Association [the agreement not to carry on either import or export trade with England] was ready for signing, the South Carolina delegates, with but one exception, seceded from the Congress, and their assent was only secured eventually through a compromise, by virtue of which rice alone was excluded from the agreement, while indigo was brought under its terms. Such were the secret deliberations of the Congress, in endeavoring to unite the colonies in the use of their only weapon. The first public results appeared in the form of a unanimous resolution, passed and published on September 22, requesting 'the merchants and others in the several colonies not to send to Great Britain any orders for goods,' and to delay or suspend orders already sent. Five days later it was unanimously resolved that after December 1, 1774, 'there should be no importation into British America from Great Britain or Ireland, or from any other place,' of any goods, wares or merchandise exported from Great Britain or Ireland. Three days later, with no assertion of unanimity, a resolution was announced to the effect 'that from and after the 10th day of September, 1775, the exportation of all merchandise and every commodity whatsoever to Great Britain, Ireland and the West Indies ought to cease, unless the grievances of America are redressed before that time,' and a committee was appointed to draft a plan for carrying into effect these resolves. On October 12 this committee brought in a report, which, after consideration and amendment, was on the 18th of October agreed to and ordered signed. On October 20 it was signed and ordered to be printed. Possessed of no real power, the Congress relied on the people to enforce this agreement. It was recommended that in every county, city and town a committee be chosen 'whose business it shall be attentively to observe the conduct of all persons touching this Association.' With hardly an exception, this recommendation was adopted. As America had refused to trade with Great Britain and her colonies, the government replied by acts prohibiting any such trade. The policy of 'exhausting its opponent by injuring itself' was at last to have a fair trial, but through British, not American action. The colonies were by law interdicted from all commerce, trade and fishing. But before the legislation went into effect blood had been shed at Lexington. The contest could no longer be fought with acts of Parliament and resolves of Congress; 'blows must decide.' The Association was distinctively a peace weapon. Had the Congress really expected war, no action could have been more foolish. A garrison soon to be beleaguered virtually shut its ports to supplies. No better proof is needed of how little the delegates wished or worked for separation."—P. L. Ford, *Association of the First Congress (Political Science Quarterly, Dec., 1891)*.—"It is only after a careful study of the proceedings of this Congress, and the subsequent history of some of its members, that we come at its real character. It was a Peace Congress. Some of the colonies had been compromised by their attitude in respect to the East India Company's teas; and the extreme



measures of the British government in closing the port of Boston, and altering the charter of the contumacious people of Massachusetts, excited the apprehension of other colonies as to the ulterior purposes of the ministry. While it was the patriotic desire of the Congress to express their sympathies and to stand by the people of Boston in the hour of their sufferings, it was hoped and expected that some conciliatory course would be followed which would allow the ministry and the Massachusetts people to extricate themselves from their difficulties without recourse to war. John Adams had no faith in the efficacy of the petition to the king, nor in the addresses to the people of Great Britain and the Canadas. Matters had gone so far in New England that they would be satisfied with no terms short of the withdrawal of the royal troops, the re-opening of the port of Boston, and the total repeal of all measures designed to reduce them to obedience. At the same time, not only the British ministry, but the British people also, were demanding the complete submission of the Bostonians, or the infliction of condign punishment. So far as Massachusetts was concerned, the war was inevitable. John Adams saw it to be so, and prepared himself for it. He endeavored to prepare the Congress for it, and not without valuable results. The great work effected by this Congress was the bringing the colonies on to common ground by a declaration of their rights. Opinions were divided. A compromise ensued, and the famous fourth article was the result. It was drawn by John Adams, and carried mainly by his influence, and reads as follows:—"That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative council; and as the English colonists are not represented, and from their local and other circumstances cannot be properly represented in the British Parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their rights of representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, subject only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as has been heretofore used and accustomed. But from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts of the British Parliament as are bona fide restrained to the regulation of our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country; and the commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding every idea of taxation, internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America, without their consent." This was not precisely what John Adams wanted, but it was much. When this declaration went forth, the cause of Massachusetts, in whatever it might eventuate, was the cause of the colonies. It was nationalized. This was John Adams's greatest feat of statesmanship. On it the success of the impending war, and the Declaration of Independence rested."—M. Chamberlain, *John Adams, the statesman of the American Revolution*, pp. 78-80.—"How far the authority of this first congress extended, according to the instructions of the delegates, it is impossible to determine with certainty as this distance of time. But it is probable that the original intention was that it should consult as to the ways and means best calculated to remove the grievances and to guaranty the rights and liberties of the colonies, and should propose

to the latter a series of resolutions, furthering these objects. But the force of circumstances at the time compelled it to act and order immediately, and the people, by a consistent following of its orders, approved this transcending of their written instructions. The congress was therefore not only a revolutionary body from its origin, but its acts assumed a thoroughly revolutionary character. The people, also, by recognizing its authority, placed themselves on a revolutionary footing, and did so not as belonging to the several colonies, but as a moral person; for to the extent that congress assumed power to itself and made bold to adopt measures national in their nature, to that extent the colonists declared themselves henceforth to constitute one people, inasmuch as the measures taken by congress could be translated from words into deeds only with the consent of the people. This state of affairs essentially continued up to March 1, 1781. Until that time, that is, until the adoption of the articles of confederation by all the states, congress continued a revolutionary body, which was recognized by all the colonies as 'de jure' and 'de facto' the national government, and which as such came in contact with foreign powers and entered into engagements, the binding force of which on the whole people has never been called in question. The individual colonies, on the other hand, considered themselves, up to the time of the Declaration of Independence, as legally dependent upon England and did not take a single step which could have placed them before the mother country or the world in the light of 'de facto' sovereign states. They remained colonies until the 'representatives of the United States' 'in the name of the good people of these colonies' solemnly declared 'these united colonies' to be 'free and independent states.' The transformation of the colonies into 'states' was, therefore, not the result of the independent action of the individual colonies. It was accomplished through the 'representatives of the United States'; that is, through the revolutionary congress, in the name of the whole people. Each individual colony became a state only in so far as it belonged to the United States and in so far as its population constituted a part of the people."—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 1.

Also in: G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, ch. 16.—S. G. Fisher, *Struggle for American independence*.—W. V. Wells, *Life of Samuel Adams*, v. 2, pp. 213-247.—John Adams, *Diary (Works)*, v. 2 pp. 358-401.—*Journal of the Congress which met at Philadelphia, Sept. 5, 1774*.

1774-1775.—Provincial Congress of Massachusetts and Committee of Safety.—Military preparations.—Opposition to parliamentary control.—In the fall of 1774 Massachusetts organized a Provincial Congress and a Committee of Safety. (See MASSACHUSETTS; 1774.) On October 27, Jedediah Preble (who did not accept), Artemas Ward, and Seth Pomeroy, were chosen general officers of the committee; and on the 28th, Henry Gardner was chosen treasurer of the colony, under the title of Receiver-General. "Among the energetic acts of this memorable Congress, was one authorizing the collection of military stores. It dissolved December 10. The committee of safety, as early as November, authorized the purchase of materials for an army, and ordered them to be deposited at Concord and Worcester. These proceedings were denounced by General Gage, in a

proclamation dated November 10, as treasonable, and a compliance with them was forbidden. In a short time the king's speech and the action of Parliament were received, which manifested a firm determination to produce submission to the late acts, and to maintain 'the supreme authority' of Great Britain over the colonies. General Gage regarded this intelligence as having 'cast a damp upon the faction,' and as having produced a happy effect upon the royalist cause. However, a second Provincial Congress (February 1 to 16, 1775) renewed the measures of its predecessor; and gave definiteness to the duties of the committee of safety, by 'empowering and directing' them (on the 9th of February) to assemble the militia whenever it was required to resist the execution of the two acts, for altering the government and the administration of justice. At the same time it appointed two additional generals, John Thomas, and William Heath, and made it the duty of the five general officers to take charge of the militia when called out by the committee of safety, and to effectually oppose and resist such attempt or attempts as shall be made for carrying into execution by force' the two acts. . . . The conviction was fast becoming general that force only could decide the contest. Stimulated and sustained by such a public opinion, the committees of safety and supplies were diligent, through the gloomy months of winter, in collecting and storing at Concord and Worcester materials for the maintenance of an army."—R. Frothingham, *History of the siege of Boston*, ch. 1.—"By the first day of January, 1775, the garrison of Boston had been increased to thirty-five hundred men, and mounted three hundred and seventy men as a daily guard-detail, besides a field officers' guard of one hundred and fifty men on Boston Neck. Three brigades were organized and were officered, respectively by Generals Lord Percy, Pigott and Jones. In November of 1774, General Gage had advised the British government, that he, 'was confident, that to begin with an army twenty thousand strong, would in the end save Great Britain blood and treasure.' Meanwhile, the militia drilled openly, rapidly completed company organizations, and made many sacrifices to procure arms, powder and other materials of war. The Home government, in view of the serious aspect of affairs, ordered Generals Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne to join General Gage, and announced that 'ample reinforcements would be sent out, and the most speedy and effectual measures would be taken to put down the rebellion,' then pronounced to already exist. On the eighth of April, the Provincial Congress resolved to take effectual measures to raise an army, and requested the coöperation of Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Connecticut. On the thirteenth, it voted to raise six companies of artillery, to pay them and keep them at drill. On the fourteenth it advised citizens to leave Boston and to remove to the country. On the fifteenth, it solemnly appointed a day for 'Public Fasting and Prayer,' and adjourned to the tenth of May. The Committee of Public Safety at once undertook the task of securing powder, cannon and small arms. A practical embargo was laid upon all trade with Boston. The garrison could obtain supplies only with great difficulty, and, as stated by Gordon, 'nothing was wanting, but a spark to set the whole continent in a flame.'"—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, ch. 2.—The spark flew from Gage's attempt in April, 1775, to secure the continental stores at Concord.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 3.—G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution*, pp. 298-307.—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. 1, ch. 8.

"Students of the Revolution that believe the movement was economic in origin, character and purpose, may not deny that, after 1768, Parliament had no express hope or intention of obtaining revenue from America. From that time on, British interest was largely, if not wholly, confined to asserting parliamentary omnipotence, or, if this seems too strong, confined to an insistence upon the supreme power of Parliament and to resisting what they believed, under the tutelage of American governors, was a conscious tendency toward independence. Indeed, especially after 1768, but to a considerable extent from 1766, the question was not so much whether the colonies would pay taxes as whether they would acknowledge the legal obligation; and to an amazing extent the conflict was over the existence or non-existence of an abstract right. . . . Much of the colonial argument was in defense of individual liberty, not of states rights; but the center of the controversy was whether or not Parliament was possessed of limitless authority. The colonists at least claimed to be satisfied with the old régime, in which power had been divided, and in which Parliament had chiefly shown its power by the regulation of trade. The parliamentarians insisted that in the law of the empire the will of Parliament was nothing more nor less than supreme and all-inclusive. The colonists insisted, though they did not use this phraseology, that old practises of the empire were the law of the empire and thus, in modern phraseology, they demanded the recognition of a composite empire based on law. Even if we admit the presence of many economic and social forces, we find in actual conflict two theories of imperial order; and in this discussion after 1768, if not before, the English parliamentarians and pamphleteers were victims of certain dogmas of political science curiously similar to the doctrine of indivisible sovereignty. How often did Burke deprecate the continual harping on Parliament's authority, on the necessity of acknowledging the theoretical supremacy of Parliament. He deplored the common talk about the legal rights. Beyond Burke's speeches little needs be cited to show the essentially legalistic character of the whole discussion. It may be rash to assert that the colonists were less insistent upon knowing what the constitution of the empire was than were the Englishmen, though there seems no reason to doubt that the colonists would have willingly accepted the old practise as sufficient, if it were not threatened. Still, the colonists desired to know precisely what were American rights; and in this respect possibly America was more legalistic than Britain, because Parliament insisted on the existence of unlimited power—asserted, one might not unjustly say, that Parliament was above the law—while the colonists asserted that Parliament was bound by rigid law. 'The patchwork government of America,' wrote Bernard in 1765, 'will last no longer; the necessity of a parliamentary establishment of the governments of America upon fixed constitutional principles, is brought out with a precipitation which could not have been foreseen but a year ago; and is become more urgent, by the very incidents which make it more difficult.' At this time, it will be remembered, he proposed an extraordinary Parliament, in which there were to be American representatives, which

should form and establish 'a general and uniform system of American government'; 'and let the relation of America be determined and ascertained by a solemn Recognition; so that the rights of the American governments, and their subordination to that of Great Britain, may no longer be a subject of doubt and disputation.' In 1766 he declares that 'the Stamp Act is become in itself a matter of indifference; it is swallowed up in the importance of the effects of which it has been the cause. . . . And as the relation between Great Britain and the colonies has not only been never settled, but scarce even formally canvassed, it is the less surprising, that the ideas of it on one side of the water and on the other are so widely different, to reconcile these, and to ascertain the nature of the subjection of the colonies to the crown of Great Britain, will be a work of time and difficulty.' There can be little doubt that Bernard was right; the problem of the day was the problem of imperial organization; were Englishmen or Americans capable of finding a law of the empire? If so, that law must be consonant with practical realities; it must be a formulation of the principles of relationship which recognized not centralization but distribution. As an indication of the fact that men were discussing legal rights, and losing sight of financial returns, it may be sufficient for the earlier days to refer to the comments in the *Parliamentary History* on the debate about the Circular Letter. It was insisted by opponents of the ministry in debate on the Massachusetts Circular Letter and in respect to the revenue laws 'that the inutility of these laws was so evident, that the ministers did not even pretend to support them upon that ground, but rested their defense upon the expediency of establishing the right of taxation.' And if we turn again to Dickinson, we find the same thing in a different guise—the necessity of law in the empire—not a law securing centralized authority but freedom. There could be no freedom without legal restriction: 'For who are a free people? Not those, over whom government is reasonably and equitably exercised, but those, who live under a government so constitutionally checked and controlled that proper provision is made against its being otherwise exercised.' We might wisely spend much time in considering the dispute in 1770 already referred to—the dispute as to whether instructions could *ipso facto* dispose of all matters of constitutional right of the colonies, or whether even the crown was limited in imperial authority, by the fact of the existence of competent and legally recognized colonial legislatures. But passing over those three years or so of legalistic dispute, let us come to 'the great controversy' of 1773. In considering this we can echo John Adams' expression of amazement at Hutchinson's audacity in throwing down the gauntlet. The truth probably is that Hutchinson had been previously tried for years, not alone by what he considered the unmannerly conduct of the rabble, but by the doctrines which he heard in the market place and perhaps in legislative halls. He believed that the theories of the malcontents were unsound and that he in the plenitude of his wisdom could establish their invalidity; and he prepared therefore to bring his heaviest artillery to bear upon the unreasoning followers of Samuel Adams and against the arch agitator himself. What he wished to do, be it noticed, was to demolish a false theory of the empire and bring every one to acknowledge, not the wisdom of obnoxious legislation, but the legal authority of Parliament. By this time doubtless there was much talk about complete freedom

from parliamentary control, but there had been little if any formal public announcement by the radicals of anything more than a freedom from taxation. Hutchinson, it must be said, had considerable reason for having confidence in his massed attack; for his argument was able and compelling, serving by its weight to bring into play all the open and masked batteries of the opposition. He finally reached in his first paper a position from which he believed he could discharge one final and conclusive volley; he was prepared to use an undeniable principle of political science; he believed he could silence his enemies with its mere pronouncement: 'It is impossible there should be two independent Legislatures in the one and the same state.' Despite all the discussion that had gone on, despite the fact that Britain had been practising federalism, Hutchinson could see nothing but the theory of centralized legislative omnipotence and could not conceive of distribution of power between mutually independent legislative bodies. And yet this undeniable axiom of political science was to be proved untrue in the course of fifteen years by the establishment of fourteen independent legislatures in the single federal state, the United States of America. The two branches of the legislature met Hutchinson's general argument somewhat differently. The house argued valiantly for complete freedom from parliamentary control; in facing the alternative of complete freedom from Parliament and complete subservience, they unhesitatingly chose the former, though they did seem to recognize the possibility of drawing a line between the supreme authority of Parliament and total independence. The council, wiser and more conservative than the house, announced federalism; they contended that the colony had 'property in the privileges granted to it,' i.e., an indefeasible legal title: 'But, as in fact, the two powers are not incompatible, and do subsist together, each restraining its acts to their constitutional objects, can we not from hence, see how the supreme power may supervise, regulate, and make general laws for the kingdom, without interfering with the privileges of the subordinate powers within it?' This is a clear, precise and thorough description of federalism. It is plain enough, then, that there were some clear-headed men, who, in the years just before the final break with England, were not silenced by the fulminations of British pamphleteers or the dogmatic assertions of Hutchinson into a belief that the empire was simple and unitary; nor were they as yet ready to accept the learned and technical argument of John Adams, though buttressed by pedantic reference to Calvin's case, that the empire was held together by the King, a personal union only.—A. C. McLaughlin, *Background of American federalism (America and Britain, pp. 203-213)*.—See also ENGLAND: 1776-1778.—'In a reminiscent letter, written in his declining years [John Adams] declares that the history of the American Revolution ought to be divided into four periods ranging from 1620 to 1781. 'The Revolution,' he asserted, 'was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.' . . . Everything in their new environment tended to make the settlers forget the power or even the need of the British Government. The fundamentals of political organization remained the same, but a thousand laws, needed to keep order in the highly complex English society, became irrelevant and useless in the sparsely settled forest. New laws of the colonists' own making took the place of those discarded. . . . [From the first, colonists

brought with them 'all the first great privileges of Englishmen on their backs,' and consistently claimed the right to elect their own assemblies, to legislate for them in accordance with the requirements of their new circumstances and surroundings.] Sometimes these enactments were quite contrary to the English laws, even violating the terms of the charter under which the legislators held their hands. The methods of administration also wandered from the ways that custom had established in the homeland. It was not unusual for Winthrop and his fellow magistrates . . . to detain or even set behind the bars men who disputed their methods of rule, and who wished to appeal to the tribunals of England. . . . Divergence was beginning and would go on until, all unaware of the widening breach, Englishmen and Americans would discover, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, that they differed irreconcilably in certain basic political principles. As new colonies one after another were founded in America, there evolved in various ways similar institutions, given to like divergences from the English legal and constitutional development. . . . The whole colonial history abounds in struggles between the assemblies elected by the people and the governors, the appointed agents of King or Parliament. . . . A few men of ability were made governors, but they seem to have been little more successful from the British Government point of view than those who were inefficient or lacking in experience. The colonists opposed them whether good or bad. . . . Things the monarch could no longer do in England his representative in the colony could do. A governor could summon, prorogue, and dissolve a colonial assembly, but the King, at least in practice, dared not so treat Parliament. The colonists naturally strove to reduce the governor's power with reference to their assemblies within the same limits as the King's power with reference to Parliament. . . . Even his sectarian preferences usually made him odious. All governors, lieutenant-governors, secretaries, councillors, attorneys-generals, chief justices, customs officers—all colonial officers, in fact, who were appointed by the British Government—were 'ruffe-shirted Episcopalians,' and attended the Anglican Church. This fact, especially in the northern colonies where an opposing sect was established, served to keep the British officials aloof religiously and to make the Dissenters less willing to yield obedience to them. Moreover, these officers, thus isolated at this important point of social contact, lost that opportunity of understanding and sympathizing with the people. If they took religion at all seriously, they were sure to give offense by merely encouraging Anglican Church practices. . . . [Meanwhile, little by little the imperial power of Britain had been waxing greater, and had drawn the jealous anger of the surrounding nations.] Yet had her enemies realized the magnitude of the problems of organization which accompanied that growth, all emotions of envy would have died within them. At the dawn of the era of expansion the problems of empire had seemed easy of solution. All were answered by the simple formula of the mercantile theory as to colonies. Every governmental act which concerned the American colonies was determined by the political and economic theory that colonies were not worth while unless they could be so managed as to bring gold into the home country. No other motive was thinkable in that age. . . . The natural sequence of such ideas was that in the seventeenth century British statesmen

had an attitude of positive dislike toward New England. These northern colonies were not servicable as were the West Indies to the commercial system. Sandwich told Charles II to 'hinder their growth' as much as possible. The goods they produced too nearly resembled those of England. . . . [The New England pine forests were indeed judged useful for their masts, and the colonists of the North were required to provide tar, pitch and turpentine for the royal navy.] But the colonists preferred the West Indian Trade in builders' supplies, and drove off or sued the government agents who were sent to mark timber suitable for masts. New England maintained its economic independence for a generation before it ventured to assert political independence."—C. H. Van Tyne, *Causes of the War of Independence*, pp. 17-18, 28-29, 33, 37-38, 44-45, 59-61.—See also BOSTON: 1774.

ALSO IN: G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. 1, ch. 5.—C. L. Becker, *Eve of the Revolution (Chronicles of America)*, pp. 200-212.—W. E. H. Lecky, *American Revolution*.—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 4, ch. 1.

1775 (January-March).—Vain efforts toward pacific statesmanship in British Parliament, by Chatham, Burke, and others.—A newly elected British Parliament "met on November 30, 1774; but no serious measure relating to America was taken till January 1775, when the House reassembled after the Christmas vacation. The Ministers had a large majority, and even apart from party interest the genuine feeling of both Houses ran strongly against the Americans. Yet at no previous period were they more powerfully defended. . . . Chatham, having returned to active politics after his long illness in 1774, had completely identified himself with the American cause, and had advocated with all his eloquence measures of conciliation. He . . . moved an address to the King praying that he would as soon as possible, 'in order to open the way towards a happy settlement of the dangerous troubles in America,' withdraw the British troops stationed in Boston. In the course of his speech he represented the question of American taxation as the root-cause of the whole division, and maintained that the only real basis of conciliation was to be found in a distinct recognition of the principle that 'taxation is theirs, and commercial regulation ours'; that England has a supreme right of regulating the commerce and navigation of America, and that the Americans have an inalienable right to their own property. He fully justified their resistance, predicted that all attempts to coerce them would fail, and eulogised the Congress at Philadelphia as worthy of the greatest periods of antiquity. Only eighteen peers voted for the address, while sixty-eight opposed it. On February 1 he reappeared with an elaborate Bill for settling the troubles in America. It asserted in strong terms the right of Parliament to bind the colonies in all matters of imperial concern, and especially in all matters of commerce and navigation. It pronounced the new colonial doctrine that the Crown had no right to send British soldiers to the colonies without the assent of the Provincial Assemblies, dangerous and unconstitutional in the highest degree, but at the same time it recognised the sole right of the colonists to tax themselves, guaranteed the inviolability of their charters, and made the tenure of their judges the same as in England. It proposed to make the Congress which had met at Philadelphia an official and permanent body, and asked it to make a free grant for

imperial purposes. England, in return, was to reduce the Admiralty Courts to their ancient limits, and to suspend for the present the different Acts complained of by the colonists. The Bill was not even admitted to a second reading. Several other propositions tending towards conciliation were made in this session. On March 22, 1775, Burke, in one of his greatest speeches, moved a series of resolutions recommending a repeal of the recent Acts complained of in America, reforming the Admiralty Court and the position of the judges, and leaving American taxation to the American Assemblies, without touching upon any question of abstract right. A few days later, Hartley moved a resolution calling upon the Government to make requisitions to the colonial Assemblies to provide of their own authority for their own defence; and Lord Camden in the House of Lords and Sir G. Savile in the House of Commons endeavoured to obtain a repeal of the Quebec Act. All these attempts, however, were defeated by enormous majorities. The petition of Congress to the King was referred to Parliament, which refused to receive it, and Franklin, after vain efforts to effect a reconciliation, returned from England to America."—W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the eighteenth century*, v. 3, ch. 12.

The following are the more important passages of the speech of Burke, on moving the resolutions which he introduced in the House of Commons, March 22, 1775:

"The proposition is peace. Not peace through the medium of war; not peace to be hunted through the labyrinth of intricate and endless negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal discord, fomented from principle, in all parts of the empire; not peace to depend on the juridical determination of perplexing questions, or the precise marking the shadowy boundaries of a complex government. It is simple peace, sought in its natural course and in its ordinary haunts. It is peace sought in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific. I propose, by removing the ground of the difference, and by restoring the former unsuspecting confidence of the colonies in the mother country, to give permanent satisfaction to your people,—and (far from a scheme of ruling by discord) to reconcile them to each other in the same act and by the bond of the very same interest which reconciles them to British government. My idea is nothing more. Refined policy ever has been the parent of confusion,—and ever will be so, as long as the world endures. Plain good intention, which is as easily discovered at the first view as fraud is surely detected at last, is, let me say, of no mean force in the government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is an healing and cementing principle. . . . The capital leading questions on which you must this day decide are these two: First, whether you ought to concede; and secondly, what your concession ought to be. On the first of these questions we have gained . . . some ground. But I am sensible that a good deal more is still to be done. Indeed, Sir, to enable us to determine both on the one and the other of these great questions with a firm and precise judgment, I think it may be necessary to consider distinctly the true nature and the peculiar circumstances of the object which we have before us: because, after all our struggle, whether we will or not, we must govern America according to that nature and to those circumstances, and not according to our own imaginations, not according to abstract ideas of right, by no means according to mere general theories of government, the resort to which appears

to me, in our present situation, no better than arrant trifling. . . . The first thing that we have to consider with regard to the nature of the object is the number of people in the colonies. I have taken for some years a good deal of pains on that point. I can by no calculation justify myself in placing the number below two millions of inhabitants of our own European blood and color,—besides at least 500,000 others, who form no inconsiderable part of the strength and opulence of the whole. This, Sir, I believe, is about the true number. There is no occasion to exaggerate, where plain truth is of so much weight and importance. But whether I put the present numbers too high or too low is a matter of little moment. Such is the strength with which population shoots in that part of the world, that, state the numbers as high as we will, whilst the dispute continues, the exaggeration ends. Whilst we are discussing any given magnitude, they are grown to it. Whilst we spend our time in deliberating on the mode of governing two millions, we shall find we have millions more to manage. Your children do not grow faster from infancy to manhood than they spread from families to communities, and from villages to nations. . . . But the population of this country, the great and growing population, though a very important consideration, will lose much of its weight, if not combined with other circumstances. The commerce of your colonies is out of all proportion beyond the numbers of the people. . . . The trade with America alone is now within less than £500,000 of being equal to what this great commercial nation, England, carried on at the beginning of this century with the whole world! . . . But, it will be said, is not this American trade an unnatural protuberance, that has drawn the juices from the rest of the body? The reverse. It is the very food that has nourished every other part into its present magnitude. Our general trade has been greatly augmented, and augmented more or less in almost every part to which it ever extended, but with this material difference: that of the six millions which in the beginning of the century constituted the whole mass of our export commerce the colony trade was but one twelfth part; it is now (as a part of sixteen millions) considerably more than a third of the whole. . . . I choose, Sir, to enter into these minute and particular details; because generalities, which in all other cases are apt to heighten and raise the subject, have here a tendency to sink it. When we speak of the commerce of our colonies, fiction lags after truth, invention is unfruitful, and imagination cold and barren. . . . I pass . . . to the colonies in another point of view,—their agriculture. This they have prosecuted with such a spirit, that, besides feeling plentifully their own growing multitude, their annual export of grain, comprehending rice, has some years ago exceeded a million in value. Of their last harvest, I am persuaded, they will export much more. At the beginning of the century some of these colonies imported corn from the mother country. For some time past the Old World has been fed from the New. The scarcity which you have felt would have been a desolating famine, if this child of your old age, with a true filial piety, with a Roman charity, had not put the full breast of its youthful exuberance to the mouth of its exhausted parent. As to the wealth which the colonies have drawn from the sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter fully opened at your bar. You surely thought those acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your envy; and yet

the spirit by which that enterprising employment has been exercised ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised your esteem and admiration. And pray, Sir, what in the world is equal to it? Pass by the other parts, and look at the manner in which the people of New England have of late carried on the whale fishery. Whilst we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits, whilst we are looking for them beneath the arctic circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen serpent of the South. Falkland Island, which seemed too remote and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting-place in the progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. . . . I am sensible, Sir, that all which I have asserted in my detail is admitted in the gross, but that quite a different conclusion is drawn from it. America, gentlemen say, is a noble object,—it is an object well worth fighting for. Certainly it is, if fighting a people be the best way of gaining them. Gentlemen in this respect will be led to their choice of means by their complexions and their habits. Those who understand the military art will of course have some predilection for it. Those who wield the thunder of the state may have more confidence in the efficacy of arms. But I confess, possibly for want of this knowledge, my opinion is much more in favor of prudent management than of force,—considering force not as an odious, but a feeble instrument, for preserving a people so numerous, so active, so growing, so spirited as this, in a profitable and subordinate connection with us. First, Sir, permit me to observe, that the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered. My next objection is its uncertainty. Terror is not always the effect of force, and an armament is not a victory. If you do not succeed, you are without resource: for, conciliation failing, force remains; but, force failing, no further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and authority are sometimes bought by kindness; but they can never be begged as alms by an impoverished and defeated violence. A further objection to force is, that you impair the object by your very endeavors to preserve it. The thing you fought for is not the thing which you recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted, and consumed in the contest. Nothing less will content me than whole America. I do not choose to consume its strength along with our own; because in all parts it is the British strength that I consume. I do not choose to be caught by a foreign enemy at the end of this exhausting conflict, and still less in the midst of it. I may escape, but I can make no insurance against such an event. Let me add, that I do not choose wholly to break the American spirit; because it is the spirit that has made the country. Lastly, we have no sort of experience in favor of force as an instrument in the rule of our colonies. Their growth and their utility has been owing to methods altogether different. Our ancient indulgence has been said to be pursued to a fault. It may be so; but we know, if feeling is evidence, that our fault was more tolerable than our attempt to mend it, and our sin far more salutary than

our penitence. These, Sir, are my reasons for not entertaining that high opinion of untried force by which many gentlemen, for whose sentiments in other particulars I have great respect, seem to be greatly captivated. But there is still behind a third consideration concerning this object, which serves to determine my opinion on the sort of policy which ought to be pursued in the management of America, even more than its population and its commerce: I mean its temper and character. In this character of the Americans a love of freedom is the predominating feature which marks and distinguishes the whole. . . . This fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in the English colonies, probably, than in any other people of the earth, and this from a great variety of powerful causes; which, to understand the true temper of their minds, and the direction which this spirit takes, it will not be amiss to lay open somewhat more largely. First, the people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen. England, Sir, is a nation which still, I hope, respects, and formerly adored, her freedom. The colonists emigrated from you when this part of your character was most predominant; and they took this bias and direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas and on English principles. . . . Your mode of governing them, whether through lenity or indolence, through wisdom or mistake, confirmed them in the imagination, that they, as well as you, had an interest in these common principles. They were further confirmed in this pleasing error by the form of their provincial legislative assemblies. Their governments are popular in an high degree: some are merely popular; in all, the popular representative is the most weighty; and this share of the people in their ordinary government never fails to inspire them with lofty sentiments, and with a strong aversion from whatever tends to deprive them of their chief importance. If anything were wanting to this necessary operation of the form of government, religion would have given it a complete effect. Religion, always a principle of energy, in this new people is no way worn out or impaired; and their mode of professing it is also one main cause of this free spirit. The people are Protestants, and of that kind which is the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion. . . . All Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent in our northern colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance: it is the dissidence of dissent, and the protestantism of the Protestant religion. . . . Permit me, Sir, to add another circumstance in our colonies, which contributes no mean part towards the growth and effect of this untractable spirit: I mean their education. In no country, perhaps, in the world is the law so general a study. The profession itself is numerous and powerful, and in most provinces it takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies sent to the Congress were lawyers. But all who read, and most do read, endeavour to obtain some smattering in that science. I have been told by an eminent bookseller, that in no branch of his business, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many books as those on the law exported to the plantations. The colonists have now fallen into the way of printing them for their own use. I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's 'Commentaries' in America as in England. General Gage marks out this disposition very par-

ticularly in a letter on your table. He states, that all the people in his government are lawyers, or smatterers in law,—and that in Boston they have been enabled, by successful chicanery, wholly to evade many parts of one of your capital penal constitutions. . . . The last cause of this disobedient spirit in the colonies is hardly less powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral, but laid deep in the natural constitution of things. Three thousand miles of ocean lie between you and them. No contrivance can prevent the effect of this distance in weakening government. Seas roll, and months pass, between the order and the execution; and the want of a speedy explanation of a single point is enough to defeat an whole system. . . . Then, Sir, from these six capital sources, of descent, of form of government, of religion in the northern provinces, of manners in the southern, of education, of the remoteness of situation from the first mover of government,—from all these causes a fierce spirit of liberty has grown up. It has grown with the growth of the people in your colonies, and increased with the increase of their wealth; a spirit, that, unhappily meeting with an exercise of power in England, which, however lawful, is not reconcilable to any ideas of liberty, much less with theirs, has kindled this flame that is ready to consume us. . . . The question is not, whether their spirit deserves praise or blame,—what, in the name of God, shall we do with it? You have before you the object, such as it is,—with all its glories, with all its imperfections on its head. You see the magnitude, the importance, the temper, the habits, the disorders. By all these considerations we are strongly urged to determine something concerning it. We are called upon to fix some rule and line for our future conduct, which may give a little stability to our politics, and prevent the return of such unhappy deliberations as the present. . . . It should seem, to my way of conceiving such matters, that there is a very wide difference, in reason and policy, between the mode of proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals, or even of bands of men, who disturb order within the state, and the civil dissensions which may, from time to time, on great questions, agitate the several communities which compose a great empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic to apply the ordinary ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people. . . . I am not ripe to pass sentence on the gravest public bodies, intrusted with magistracies of great authority and dignity, and charged with the safety of their fellow-citizens, upon the very same title that I am. I really think that for wise men this is not judicious, for sober men not decent, for minds tinctured with humanity not mild and merciful.”

In the closing part of his speech, Burke introduced successively and commented upon the following propositions, or resolutions, which formed in their entirety his plan of conciliation. At the end of his speaking they were rejected by a vote of 270 against 78:

“That the colonies and plantations of Great Britain in North America, consisting of 14 separate governments, and containing two millions and upwards of free inhabitants, have not had the liberty and privilege of electing and sending any knights and burgesses, or others, to represent them in the high court of Parliament. That the said colonies and plantations have been made liable to, and bounden by, several subsidies, payments, rates,

and taxes, given and granted by Parliament, though the said colonies and plantations have not their knights and burgesses in the said high court of Parliament, of their own election, to represent the condition of their country; by lack whereof they have been oftentimes touched and grieved by subsidies, given, granted, and assented to, in the said court, in a manner prejudicial to the common wealth, quietness, rest, and peace of the subjects inhabiting within the same. That, from the distance of the said colonies, and from other circumstances, no method hath hitherto been devised for procuring a representation in Parliament for the said colonies. That each of the said colonies hath within itself a body, chosen, in part or in the whole, by the freemen, freeholders, or other free inhabitants thereof, commonly called the General Assembly, or General Court, with powers legally to raise, levy, and assess, according to the several usages of such colonies, duties and taxes towards defraying all sorts of public services. That the said general assemblies, general courts, or other bodies legally qualified as aforesaid, have at sundry times freely granted several large subsidies and public aids for his Majesty's service, according to their abilities, when required thereto by letter from one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State; and that their right to grant the same, and their cheerfulness and sufficiency in the said grants, have been at sundry times acknowledged by Parliament. That it hath been found by experience, that the manner of granting the said supplies and aids by the said general assemblies hath been more agreeable to the inhabitants of said colonies, and more beneficial and conducive to the public service, than the mode of giving and granting aids and subsidies in Parliament, to be raised and paid in the said colonies. That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 7th year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, ‘An act for granting certain duties in the British colonies and plantations in America; for allowing a drawback of the duties of customs, upon the exportation from this kingdom, of coffee and cocoa-nuts, of the produce of the said colonies or plantations; for discontinuing the drawbacks payable on China earthen ware exported to America; and for more effectually preventing the clandestine running of goods in the said colonies and plantations.’ That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, ‘An act to discontinue, in such manner and for such time as are therein mentioned, the landing and discharging, lading or shipping, of goods, wares, and merchandise, at the town and within the harbor of Boston, in the province of Massachusetts Bay, in North America.’ That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, ‘An act for the impartial administration of justice, in the cases of persons questioned for any acts done by them, in the execution of the law, or for the suppression of riots and tumults, in the province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England.’ That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, ‘An act for the better regulating the government of the province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England.’ That it may be proper to explain and amend an act, made in the 35th year of the reign of King Henry VIII., intituled, ‘An act for the trial of treasons committed out of the king's dominions.’ That, from the time when the general assembly, or general court, of any colony or plan-

tation in North America, shall have appointed, by act of assembly duly confirmed, a settled salary to the officers of the chief justice and other judges of the superior courts, it may be proper that the said chief justice and other judges of the superior courts of such colony shall hold his and their office and offices during their good behaviour, and shall not be removed therefrom, but when the said removal shall be adjudged by his Majesty in council, upon a hearing on complaint from the general assembly, or on a complaint from the governor, or the council, or the house of representatives, severally, of the colony in which the said chief justice and other judges have exercised the said offices. That it may be proper to regulate the courts of admiralty or vice-admiralty, authorized by the 15th chapter of the 4th George III., in such a manner as to make the same more commodious to those who sue or are sued in the said courts; and to provide for the more decent maintenance of the judges of the same."—Edmund Burke, *Works*, v. 2.

ALSO IN: T. MacKnight, *Life and times of Edmund Burke*, v. 2, ch. 21.—J. Adolphus, *History of England, reign of George III.*, v. 2, ch. 25.—G. Croly, *Memoir of the political life of Burke*.

1775 (January-April).—Aims at independence disclaimed.—"The denial that independence was the final object, was constant and general. To obtain concessions and to preserve the connection with England was affirmed everywhere; and John Adams, after the peace, went farther than this, for he said:—'There was not a moment during the Revolution, when I would not have given everything I possessed for a restoration to the state of things before the contest began, provided we could have had a sufficient security for its continuance.' If Mr. Adams be regarded as expressing the sentiments of the Whigs, they were willing to remain Colonists, provided they could have had their rights secured to them; while the Tories were contented thus to continue, without such security. Such, as it appears to me, was the only difference between the two parties prior to hostilities. . . . Franklin's testimony, a few days before the affair at Lexington, was, that he had 'more than once travelled almost from one end of the continent to the other, and kept a variety of company, eating, drinking, and conversing with them freely [and] never had heard from any person, drunk or sober, the least expression of a wish for a separation, or a hint that such a thing would be advantageous to America.' Mr. Jay is quite as explicit. 'During the course of my life,' said he, 'and until the second petition of Congress in 1775, I never did hear an American of any class, or of any description, express a wish for the independence of the Colonies.' 'It has always been, and still is, my opinion and belief, that our country was prompted and impelled to independence by necessity, and not by choice.' Mr. Jefferson affirmed, 'What, eastward of New York, might have been the dispositions towards England before the commencement of hostilities, I know not; but before that I never heard a whisper of a disposition to separate from Great Britain; and after that its possibility was contemplated with affliction by all.' Washington, in 1774, fully sustains these declarations, and, in the 'Fairfax County Resolves,' it was complained that 'malevolent falsehoods' were propagated by the ministry to prejudice the mind of the king: 'particularly that there is an intention in the American Colonies

to set up for independent States.' Mr. Madison was not in public life until May, 1776, but he says, 'It has always been my impression, that a reëstablishment of the Colonial relations to the parent country, as they were previous to the controversy, was the real object of every class of the people, till the despair of obtaining it,' &c. . . . The only way to dispose of testimony like this, is to impeach the persons who have given it."—L. Sabine, *Biographical sketches of loyalists of the American Revolution*, v. 1, pp. 64-66.

1775 (January-September).—Revolution in South Carolina. See SOUTH CAROLINA: 1775.

1775 (April).—Beginning of the War of the American Revolution.—Lexington.—Concord.—"In spite of the failure, late in February, of an effort to seize brass cannon at Salem, Gage resolved to destroy the stores at Concord, and on the evening of April 18th, troops for that mission gathered at the waterside. The Committee of Safety was alert, and Joseph Warren dispatched Joseph Dawes, and later Paul Revere, to warn the town people and farmers on the route. Pre-arranged signals in the tower of the Old North Church gave the alarm to many, and the riders reached the rest. As the British force marched up into the country, the ringing of bells and firing of signal guns and the boom of cannon made it clear that the expedition was no secret. As they neared the green at Lexington in the early dawn, they saw 'a body of country people drawn up in military order, with arms and accoutrements.' A shot was fired, but by which side or by whose order is one of the unsolved questions of history."—C. H. Van Tyne, *Causes of the War of Independence*, pp. 453-454.—"On April 19, 1775, the committees of safety could only count up twelve field-pieces in Massachusetts; and there had been collected in that colony 21,540 fire-arms, 17,441 pounds of powder, 22,191 pounds of ball, 144,690 flints, 10,108 bayonets, 17,079 pouches, 15,000 canteens. There were also 17,000 pounds of salt fish, 35,000 pounds of rice, with large quantities of beef and pork. Viewed as an evidence of the forethought of the colonists, these statistics are remarkable; but there was something heroic and indeed almost pathetic in the project of going to war with the British government on the strength of twelve field-pieces and seventeen thousand pounds of salt fish. Yet when, on the night of the 18th of April, 1775, Paul Revere rode beneath the bright moonlight through Lexington to Concord, with Dawes and Prescott for comrades, he was carrying the signal for the independence of a nation. He had seen across the Charles River the two lights from the church-steeple in Boston which were to show that a British force was going out to seize the patriotic supplies at Concord; he had warned Hancock and Adams at Rev. Jonas Clark's parsonage in Lexington, and had rejected Sergeant Monroe's caution against unnecessary noise, with the rejoinder, 'You'll have noise enough here before long—the regulars are coming out.' As he galloped on his way the regulars were advancing with steady step behind him, soon warned of their own danger by alarm-bells and signal-guns. When Revere was captured by some British officers who happened to be near Concord, Colonel Smith, the commander of the expedition, had already halted, ordered Pitcairn forward, and sent back prudently for reinforcements. It was a night of terror to all the neighboring Middlesex towns, for no one knew what excesses the angry British troops might commit on their return march. The



best picture we have of this alarm is in the narrative of a Cambridge woman, Mrs. Hannah Winthrop, describing 'the horrors of that midnight cry,' as she calls it. The women of that town were roused by the beat of drums and ringing of bells; they hastily gathered their children together and fled to the outlying farm-houses; seventy or eighty of them were at Fresh Pond, within hearing of the guns at Menotomy, now Arlington. The next day their husbands bade them flee to Andover, whither the college property had been sent, and thither they went, alternately walking and riding, over fields where the bodies of the slain lay unburied. Before 5 A.M. on April 19, 1775, the British troops had reached Lexington Green, where thirty-eight men, under Captain Parker, stood up before six hundred or eight hundred to be shot at, their cap-

their main body was too strong to be attacked, so they disabled a few cannon, destroyed some barrels of flour, cut down the liberty-pole, set fire to the court-house and then began their return march. It ended in a flight; they were exposed to a constant guerilla fire; minute-men flocked behind every tree and house; and only the foresight of Colonel Smith in sending for reinforcements had averted a surrender. At 2 P. M., near Lexington, Percy with his troops met the returning fugitives, and formed a hollow square, into which they ran and threw themselves on the ground exhausted. Then Percy in turn fell back. Militia still came pouring in from Dorchester, Milton, Dedham, as well as the nearer towns. A company from Danvers marched sixteen miles in four hours. The Americans lost ninety-three in killed, wounded



"SPIRIT OF '76"

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"Minute man" of the Revolution going forth to join his comrades to fight against the forces of George III.  
(After painting by J. W. Dunsmore)

tain saying, 'Don't fire unless you are fired on; but if they want a war let it begin here.' It began there; they were fired upon; they fired rather ineffectually in return, while seven were killed and nine wounded. The rest, after retreating, reformed and pursued the British towards Concord, capturing seven stragglers—the first prisoners taken in the war. Then followed the fight at Concord, where four hundred and fifty Americans, instead of thirty-eight, were rallied to meet the British. The fighting took place between two detachments at the North Bridge, where 'once the embattled farmers stood, And fired the shot heard round the world.' There the American captain, Isaac Davis, was killed at the first shot—he who had said, when his company was placed at the head of the little column, 'I haven't a man that is afraid to go.' He fell and Major Buttrick gave the order 'Fire! for God's sake fire!' in return. The British detachment retreated in disorder, but

and missing that day; the British, two hundred and seventy-three. But the important result was that every American colony now recognized that war had begun."—T. W. Higginson, *History of the United States of America*, ch. 10.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *History of the siege of Boston*, ch. 2.—E. H. Goss, *Life of Paul Revere*, v. 1, ch. 7.—J. L. Watson, *Paul Revere's signal (Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, Nov., 1876)*.—*Force's American archives*, series 4, v. 2.—E. Phinney, *History of Battle at Lexington*.—C. Hudson, *History of Lexington*, ch. 6-8.—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 8.

1775 (April).—First Provincial Convention in New York. See NEW YORK: 1775.

1775 (April-May).—Siege of Boston begun.—"Reinforcements of foreign troops and supplies were constantly arriving in Boston. Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne came, as generals, on the 25th of May. Bitterness, ridicule, and boasting, with

all the irritating taunts of a mercenary soldiery, were freely poured on the patriots and on the 'mixed multitude' which composed the germ of their army yet to be. The British forces had cooped themselves up in Boston, and the provincials determined that they should remain there, with no mode of exit save by the sea. The pear-shaped peninsula, hung to the mainland only by the stem called the 'Neck,' over which the tide-waters sometimes washed, was equally an inconvenient position for crowding regiments in war-like array, and a convenient one for the extemporized army which was about to beleague them there. . . . The town of Charlestown, which lay under the enemy's guns, had contained a population of between two and three thousand. The interruption of all the employments of peace, and the proximity of danger, had brought poverty and suffering upon the people. They had been steadily leaving the town, with such of their effects as they could carry with them. It proved to be well for them that they had acted upon the warning. It would seem that there were less than 200 of its inhabitants remaining in it at the time of the battle, when the flames kindled by the enemy and bombs from a battery on Copp's Hill laid it in ashes. On the third day after the affair at Concord, the Provincial Congress again assembled, voted to raise at once 13,000 men, to rally at Cambridge and the neighborhood, and asked aid from the other provinces, to which Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire responded. The forts, magazines, and arsenals, such as they then were, were secured for the country. . . . Of the 15,000 men then gathered, by the cry of war, at Cambridge and Roxbury, all virtually, but not by formal investment, under the command of General Ward, nearly 10,000 belonged to Massachusetts, and the remainder to New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. They have been designated since, at various times and by different writers, under the extreme contrast of terms, as an 'organized army,' and a 'mob.' Either of these terms would be equally inappropriate. . . . Our troops were 'minute-men' extemporized into fragmentary companies and skeleton regiments. The officers, chosen on the village-green or in its public-house, paying for the honor by a treat, or perhaps because they kept the premises where the treat could be most conveniently furnished, were not commissioned or ranked as the leaders of an army for campaign service. The yeomen of town and village had not come together at the summons of a commander-in-chief through adjutant, herald, or advertisement. They came unbidden, at an alarm from the bell on their meeting-house, or from a post-rider, or from the telegrams transmitted by tongue and ear. . . . And for the most part they were as free to go away as they had been to come. They were enlisted after a fashion, some prime conditions of which were their own convenience or pleasure. . . . Such of them as came from the seaboard might bring with them old sails for tents, while the midsummer days made it scarcely a hardship to many to have only the heavens for a roof. Generally their towns were expected to keep them supplied with food. . . . The forces then mustered at Cambridge as a central camp, and, stretching from the left at Chelsea almost round to Dorchester on the right, for nearly three quarters of a circle, were indeed not organized, nor yet had they any characteristic of a mere mob. They combined in fact four independent armies, united in resistance to a foreign

enemy. . . . Each of the Provinces had raised, commissioned, and assumed the supply of its respective forces, holding them subject to their several orders. After the battle in Charlestown, the Committee of War in Connecticut ordered their generals, Spencer and Putnam, while they were in the territory of this Province, to regard General Ward as the commander-in-chief, and suggested to Rhode Island and New Hampshire to issue the same instructions to their soldiers. . . . General Artemas Ward was a conscientious and judicious patriot. In the French war he had earned some military experience and fame. . . . On October 27, 1774, the Provincial Congress, in which he was a delegate, appointed him a general officer, and on May 19 following, Commander-in-chief. As such he served at Cambridge till the arrival of Washington. On the very day of the battle in Charlestown, when the great chieftain was selected for his high service, Ward was chosen by the Continental Congress as its first major-general. Though he was only in his 48th year when he was burdened with the responsibility of the opening warfare, his body was infirm from disease and exposure. Lieutenant-General Thomas, two years the senior of Ward, was second in command. . . . General Israel Putnam preceded his Connecticut troops in hurrying to the scene of war on the news of the affair at Lexington and Concord. His men soon followed him, with like enthusiasm. The New Hampshire troops, on their arrival at Medford, made choice of Colonel John Stark as their leader. Colonel Nathaniel Greene commanded a regiment from Rhode Island. . . . A few days after the affair at Lexington, when virtually the siege began, General Gage, the British Commander, at the solicitation of some of the leading citizens assembled in Faneuil Hall, had, by a mutual understanding, entered into an agreement that such of the inhabitants as wished to depart from the town should be at liberty to do so, if they would leave their arms behind them and covenant not to engage in any hostility against his army. The agreement was availed of by many of the suffering and frightened people. . . . But the original freedom and fulness of this understanding, on the part of General Gage, were soon reduced by a very strict examination of those who sought to go out of the town, and by a rigid search of the effects which they wished to take with them. . . . Several of the inhabitants remained in it from different motives: some as devoted loyalists; some as timid neutrals; some as spies, to watch each hostile movement and to communicate it to their friends outside. . . . After hostilities commenced, General Gage, of course, regarded the citizens as alike prisoners, either in the same sense in which he was himself under restraint, or as abettors of those who were his enemies. . . . The population of the town, independent of the military, was then about 18,000. To all those who were not in sympathy with them the British behaved in an insulting and exasperating manner. . . . To show, as members of the English Church establishment, their contempt of congregational places of worship, they removed the pews and pulpit from the Old South meeting-house, and, covering the floor with earth, they converted it into a riding-school for Burgoyne's squadron of cavalry. The two eastern galleries were allowed to remain, one for spectators, the other for a liquor-shop, while the fire in the stove was occasionally kindled by books and pamphlets from the library of a former pastor, Dr. Prince, which were in a room in the

tower. . . . At the time of the skirmishes at Lexington and Concord there were about 4,000 British troops in Boston and at the Castle. The number, was increased to more than 10,000 before the action in Charlestown."—G. E. Ellis, *History of the Battle of Bunker's Hill*, pp. 4-26.

Also in: R. Frothingham, *History of the siege of Boston*, ch. 3.—George Washington, *Writings* (W. C. Ford, ed.), v. 3.—Jos. Reed, *Life and correspondence*, v. 1.—C. Stedman, *History of the American War*, v. 1, ch. 1, 5.

1775 (April-June).—Spreading of revolt.—All colonies in line with New England.—"On the 23d of April, the day after the dissolution of the provincial Congress of New York, the news from Lexington burst upon the city. Though it was Sunday, the inhabitants speedily unloaded two sloops which lay at the wharfs, laden with flour and supplies for the British at Boston, of the value of £80,000. . . . The royal government lay hopelessly prostrate. Isaac Sears concerted with John Lamb to stop all vessels going to Quebec, Newfoundland, Georgia, or Boston, where British authority was still supreme. The people shut up the customhouse, and the merchants whose vessels were cleared out dared not let them sail. In the following days the military stores of the city of New York were secured, and volunteer companies paraded in the streets. . . . On the 1st of May the people, at the usual places of election, chose for the city and county a new general committee of one hundred, who 'resolved in the most explicit manner to stand or fall with the liberty of the continent.' All parts of the colony were summoned to send delegates to a provincial convention, to which the city and county of New York deputed one-and-twenty as their representatives. . . . On the 2d of May the New Jersey committee of correspondence called a provincial congress for the 23d at Trenton. To anticipate its influence, the governor convened the regular assembly eight days earlier at Burlington, and laid before them the project of Lord North [adopted by the British parliament in February, offering to each colony freedom from taxation on its making satisfactory provision for the general defense and for support of government]. The assembly could see in the proposition no avenue to reconciliation, and declared their intention to 'abide by the united voice of the continental congress.' Such, too, was the spirit of Pennsylvania. 'Let us not have it said of Philadelphia that she passed noble resolutions and neglected them,' were the words of Mifflin, youngest of the orators who on the 25th of April addressed the town-meeting called in that city on receiving the news from Lexington. Thousands were present, and agreed 'to associate for the purpose of defending with arms their lives, their property, and liberty.' Thomas Paine from that day 'rejected the sullen Pharaoh of the British throne forever.' . . . In Philadelphia, thirty companies, with 50 to 100 in each, daily practiced the manual exercise of the musket. One of them was raised from the Quakers. . . . The Pennsylvania assembly, which met on the first day of May, rejecting the overtures of the governor, 'could form no prospect of lasting advantages for Pennsylvania but from a communication of rights and property with the other colonies.' . . . On the 5th Franklin arrived, after a voyage over the smoothest seas, and the next morning was unanimously elected a deputy to the congress. . . . In Maryland, at the request of the colonels of militia, Eden, at Annapolis, gave up the arms and ammunition of

the province to the freemen of the county. Pleased with his concession, the provincial convention distinguished itself by its moderation; and its delegates to congress determined to labor for a reconciliation. In Virginia [where, in the night of April 20th, Governor Dunmore had carried off the gunpowder stored in the colony's magazine at Williamsburg, and where, as a consequence, the excited people were already in arms, though no further action had yet been taken], on the 2d of May, at the cry from Lexington, the independent company of Hanover and its county committee were called together by Patrick Henry. The soldiers, most of them young men, elected him their chief, and marched for Williamsburg, on the way greatly increasing in numbers. Alarmed by the 'insurrections,' Dunmore convened the council, and in a proclamation of the 3d pretended that he had removed the ammunition lest it should be seized by slaves. Message after message could not arrest the march or change the purpose of Henry. . . . At sunrise on the 4th the governor's messenger met Henry at New Kent, and, as a compensation for the gunpowder taken out of the magazine, paid him £330, for which he was to account to the convention of Virginia. The sum was found to be more than the value of the powder, and the next Virginia convention directed the excess to be paid back. . . . In twelve or thirteen days the message from Lexington was borne to Newbern, in North Carolina, where it 'wrought a great change.' The governor, in his panic, ordered the cannon in the town to be dismounted; and, after a remonstrance made in the name of the inhabitants by Abner Nash, 'the oracle of their committee and a principal promoter of sedition,' he shipped his wife to New York and fled to Fort Johnston, where a sloop-of-war had its station. In South Carolina, Charles Pinckney, on learning the inflexibility of parliament, using power intrusted to him by the provincial congress, appointed a committee of five to place the colony in a state of defence; on the 21st of April, the very night after their organization, men of Charleston, without disguise, under their direction, seized all the powder in the public magazines, and removed 800 stand of arms and other military stores from the royal arsenal. The tidings from Lexington induced the general committee to hasten the meeting of the provincial congress, whose members, on the 2d of June, Henry Laurens being their president, associated themselves for defence against every foe; 'ready to sacrifice their lives and fortunes to secure her freedom and safety.' They resolved to raise two regiments of infantry and a regiment of rangers. . . . 'The people of Charleston are as mad as they are here in Boston,' was the testimony of Gage. The skirmish at Lexington became known in Savannah on the 10th of May, and added Georgia to the union. At that time she had about 17,000 white inhabitants and 15,000 Africans. Her militia was not less than 3,000. Her frontier, which extended from Augusta to St. Mary's, was threatened by the Creeks, with 4,000 warriors; the Chickasas, with 450; the Cherokees, with 3,000; the Choctas, with 2,500. But danger could not make her people hesitate. On the night of the 11th, Noble Wimberley Jones, Joseph Habersham, Edward Telfair, and others, broke open the king's magazine in the eastern part of the city, and took from it over 500 pounds of powder. To the Boston wanderers they sent 63 barrels of rice and £122 in specie; and they kept the king's birthday by raising a liberty-pole."—G. Bancroft, *His-*

tory of the *United States* (Author's last revision), v. 4, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: T. Jones, *History of New York during the Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 2.—W. Wirt, *Life of Patrick Henry*, sect. 5.—W. B. Stevens, *History of Georgia*, v. 2, bk. 4, ch. 1.—*Proceedings of New York Provincial Congress* (*New York State Archives*, v. 1).—W. H. Egle, *History of Pennsylvania*, ch. 8.

1775 (May).—**Surprise of Ticonderoga and Crown Point.**—"Early in the year 1775, as soon as it was made manifest by the attitude assumed on the part of the British government against the colonies, and by the conduct of General Gage in Boston, that open hostilities must inevitably commence in a short time, it began to be secretly whispered among the principal politicians in New England that the capture of Ticonderoga was an object demanding the first attention. In the month of March, Samuel Adams and Dr. Joseph Warren, as members of the Committee of Correspondence in Boston, sent an agent privately into Canada, on a political mission, with instructions to ascertain the feelings of the people there in regard to the approaching contest, and to make such reports as his observations should warrant. . . . This agent sent back intelligence from Montreal, and among other things advised, that by all means the garrison at Ticonderoga should be seized as quickly as possible after the breaking out of hostilities, adding that the people of the New Hampshire Grants had already agreed to undertake the task, and that they were the most proper persons to be employed in it. This hint was given three weeks anterior to the battle of Lexington, and how far it influenced future designs may not be known; but it is certain that, eight days after that event, several gentlemen at that time attending the Assembly in Hartford, Connecticut, concerted a plan for surprising Ticonderoga and seizing the cannon in that fortress, for the use of the army then marching from all quarters to the environs of Boston."—J. Sparks, *Life of Ethan Allen* (*Library of American Biography*, v. 1, p. 270).—"The forts at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which had performed such great services to the French and the English in preceding campaigns, had been used as storehouses and magazines after the conclusion of the Peace of Paris in 1763. In order to keep a proper force at Quebec and to provide even the weak detachment that was sent to Boston, the interior garrisons and posts had been denuded. Possibly Gage, from his knowledge of the weakness of the radicals in New York, had not felt apprehensive for these magazines. They were guarded by very small forces; a few officers and about forty men at Ticonderoga, and even smaller numbers at Crown Point, Fort George, and St. Johns. It occurred to Benedict Arnold, an enterprising Connecticut militia officer, who was hastening to Boston on the first alarm, and also to Ethan Allen, one of the most outstanding of the settlers in the New Hampshire Grants, that the seizure of these posts was entirely feasible, if undertaken immediately without apprising the garrisons of their danger. Arnold asked the Committee of Safety for a commission and authority to recruit a force for this purpose. Both were given him, and he started for western New England; but found that Ethan Allen [leading the "Green Mountain Boys"] had already embodied his expedition. Without recruiting his men, therefore, Arnold joined as a volunteer. Ethan Allen and his followers lived in what is now southern Ver-

mont, on lands which had been granted to them by New Hampshire authorities. . . . They now marched to Lake Champlain, where as many as possible embarked on whatever boats could be seized, crossed the lake to Ticonderoga, entered the fort at night without opposition, and captured it with its startled garrison. Two days later, Crown Point likewise succumbed to their vigorous rapidity of movement. Soon Arnold was joined by fifty recruits. These he placed on a schooner, and, sailing to the outlet of the lake, captured Fort St. John and an armed sloop that lay anchored near by. More recruits joining him, he assumed command of the forces on the lake. This arrogation of authority aroused so much resentment that Arnold returned to Cambridge; but his ardent spirit was not daunted, and he soon joined with others in suggesting the feasibility of surprising Quebec by a rapid march through the wilderness of Maine."—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 173-175.

ALSO IN: C. W. Elliott, *New England history*, v. 2, ch. 15.—J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 3.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 17.—J. H. Smith, *Arnold's march from Cambridge to Quebec*.

1775 (May-August).—**Mecklenburg Declaration.**—Provincial conventions.—Election of Second Continental Congress and its work.—Its powers, theoretical and actual.—Its opportunity.—Its influence.—New England Army adopted as the "Continental Army," and Washington made commander-in-chief.—"In the winter and spring of 1775, regular legal government broke down. In colony after colony, the governors refused to let the legislature meet, and the people refused to let the governors' courts or other officials act. Then in many places, to prevent absolute lawlessness, county meetings or local committees set up some sort of provisional government, to last until 'the restoration of harmony with Great Britain.' Action of this kind in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, on May 30, 1775, through distorted recollections, gave rise years later to the legend of a Mecklenburg 'Declaration of Independence' on May 20. [See NORTH CAROLINA: 1775 (May).] During this turbulent disorder, second provincial conventions were held in several colonies, to act upon the recommendations of the First Continental Congress. Of course the 'Tories' had refused to pay any attention to the 'illegal' elections, and in some cases, indeed, they were excluded from voting by test oaths. Some of these conventions now became de facto governments. They organized troops, raised money, and assumed civil powers far enough to alleviate the existing anarchy. In form, their acts were still recommendations; but the local committees enforced them as law. These second conventions in most of the colonies appointed delegates to the Second Continental Congress. Between the election of that body and its meeting, . . . [General Gage's attempt] to seize Massachusetts military stores at Concord . . . called from 'embattled farmers' 'the shot heard round the world' (April 19, 1775). Gage had sown dragon's teeth. From New England's soil twenty thousand volunteers sprang up to besiege him in Boston. In consequence, the Second Continental Congress swiftly became a government, to manage the continental revolution; and, during the summer, a third lot of provincial conventions openly avowed themselves governments for their respective colonies,—appointing committees of safety (in place of the royal governors, who had

been set aside or driven out), and themselves assuming even the forms of legislative bodies. The members of the Second Continental Congress, like those of the First, had been elected, not as a legislature, but to formulate opinion, and to report their recommendations back to their colonies for approval. The war changed all that. A central government was imperative; and the patriotic party everywhere recognized the Congress as the only agent to fill that place."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 207-209.—"The second General Congress assembled at Philadelphia on the 10th of May. Peyton Randolph was again elected as president; but being obliged to return, and occupy his place as speaker of the Virginia Assembly, John Hancock, of Massachusetts, was elevated to the chair. . . . Many of those most active in vindicating colonial rights, and Washington among the number, still indulged the hope of an eventual reconciliation, while few entertained, or, at least, avowed the idea of complete independence. A second 'humble and dutiful' petition to the king was moved, but met with strong opposition. John Adams condemned it as an imbecile measure, calculated to embarrass the proceedings of Congress. He was for prompt and vigorous action. Other members concurred with him. Indeed, the measure itself seemed but a mere form, intended to reconcile the half-scrupulous; for subsequently, when it was carried, Congress, in face of it, went on to assume and exercise the powers of a sovereign authority. A federal union was formed, leaving to each colony the right of regulating its internal affairs according to its own individual constitution, but vesting in Congress the power of making peace or war; of entering into treaties and alliances; of regulating general commerce; in a word, of legislating on all such matters as regarded the security and welfare of the whole community. The executive power was to be vested in a council of twelve, chosen by Congress from among its own members, and to hold office for a limited time. Such colonies as had not sent delegates to Congress might yet become members of the confederacy by agreeing to its conditions. Georgia, which had hitherto hesitated, soon joined the league, which thus extended from Nova Scotia to Florida. Congress lost no time in exercising their federated powers. In virtue of them, they ordered the enlistment of troops, the construction of forts in various parts of the colonies, the provision of armies, ammunition, and military stores; while, to defray the expense of these, and other measures, avowedly of self-defence, they authorized the emission of notes to the amount of \$3,000,000, bearing the inscription of 'The United Colonies'; the faith of the confederacy being pledged for their redemption. A retaliating decree was passed, prohibiting all supplies of provisions to the British fisheries; and another, declaring the province of Massachusetts Bay absolved from its compact with the crown, by the violation of its charter; and recommending it to form an internal government for itself. . . . The situation of the New England army, actually besieging Boston, became an early and absorbing consideration. It was without munitions of war, without arms, clothing, or pay; in fact, without legislative countenance or encouragement. Unless sanctioned and assisted by Congress, there was danger of its dissolution. . . . The disposition to uphold the army was general; but the difficult question was, who should be commander-in-chief? . . . The opinion evidently inclined in favor of Washington; yet it

was promoted by no clique of partisans or admirers. More than one of the Virginia delegates, says Adams, were cool on the subject of this appointment. . . . Adams, in his diary, claims the credit of bringing the members of Congress to a decision. . . . On the 15th of June, the army was regularly adopted by Congress, and the pay of the commander-in-chief fixed at \$500 a month. Many still clung to the idea, that in all these proceedings they were merely opposing the measures of the ministry, and not the authority of the crown, and thus the army before Boston was designated as the Continental Army, in contradistinction to that under General Gage, which was called the Ministerial Army. In this stage of the business, Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, rose, and nominated Washington for the station of commander-in-chief. The election was by ballot, and was unanimous. It was formally announced to him by the president, on the following day, when he had taken his seat in Congress. Rising in his place, he briefly expressed his high and grateful sense of the honor conferred on him, and his sincere devotion to the cause. 'But,' added he, 'lest some unlucky event should happen unfavorable to my reputation, I beg it may be remembered by every gentleman in the room, that I this day declare, with the utmost sincerity, I do not think myself equal to the command I am honored with. As to pay, I beg leave to assure the Congress that, as no pecuniary consideration could have tempted me to accept this arduous employment, at the expense of my domestic ease and happiness, I do not wish to make any profit on it. I will keep an exact account of my expenses. Those, I doubt not, they will discharge, and that is all I desire.'" Four major-generals,—Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler and Israel Putnam,—and eight brigadier-generals—Seth Pomeroy, Richard Montgomery, David Wooster, William Heath, Joseph Spencer, John Thomas, John Sullivan and Nathaniel Greenc—were appointed. "At Washington's express request, his old friend, Major Horatio Gates, then absent at his estate in Virginia, was appointed adjutant-general, with the rank of brigadier."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 1, ch. 39.—"The Congress of 1775 was not content with mere expression of opinions. It took a large view of its powers. It realized that its efficiency depended wholly upon the acceptance of its acts by the principals of the different delegations; but, following its judgment as to what the patriotism of the colonies would approve and sustain, it initiated action of various kinds, which, from the beginning, assumed the certainty of adoption by the colonies, and derived all its energy from the probability of such ratification. The Congress doubtless exceeded the letter of the instructions received by a portion of its members; but this was not from any misconception of those instructions. . . . In pointing out to the colonies the direction which their preparations for resistance ought to take, the Congress no more acted upon an imagined authority to command the colonies than does the lookout at the bow of the ship, when he reports the direction of danger to the officer of the deck. The Congress unquestionably enjoyed a prestige at this juncture which it subsequently lost. The people, and even the provincial conventions, occasionally addressed it in a tone which indicated that they unconsciously attributed to it power which it plainly did not possess."—A. W. Small, *Beginnings of American nationality (Johns Hopkins University Studies, Series S, no. 1-2, p. 73)*.—"With the energy and recklessness of

a French revolutionary body it might have blotted out the distinctions between colonies, and established a centralized government, to be modified in time by circumstances. In fact, it took no such direction. It began its course by recommendations to the new colonial governments; it relied on them for executive acts; and, as soon as the new colonies were fairly under way, they seized on the power of naming and recalling the delegates to the Congress. From that time the decadence of the Congress was rapid; the national idea became dimmer; and the assertions of complete sovereignty by the political units became more pronounced."—A. Johnston, *United States: Its history and constitution*, ch. 3, sect. 63-66.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic*, ch. 10.—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 1.—*Force's American archives*, v. 2.

1775 (June).—End of royal government in New Hampshire. See NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1775-1776.

1775 (June).—End of royal government in Virginia. See VIRGINIA: 1775.

1775 (June).—Battle of Bunker Hill.—"British reinforcements, under three generals, Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne, arrived at Boston soon after the fight at Lexington. Gage had now about 10,000 men. These occupied the town of Boston, which lay on a peninsula covering the middle of the harbor. Around them, on the hills of the mainland, there were about twice their number of undisciplined and poorly-armed Americans, without cannon and almost without food. Just north of Boston, another peninsula ran out into the harbor. On it there were several hills, and the Americans determined to seize and fortify one of them, called Bunker Hill. About 1,000 men, under Colonel Prescott, were sent into the peninsula for this on a suitable night. For some reason, they passed beyond Bunker Hill, and seized Breed's Hill, much closer to Boston. Breed's Hill is now usually called Bunker Hill, and the Bunker Hill monument is erected upon it. The American fortification was continued silently and swiftly through the night. In the morning of June 17, 1775, the British in Boston woke to see a long line of intrenchments running across the hill above them, and an American working-party busily strengthening it. For a time, the British frigates in the harbor kept up a slow and distant fire, to which the working-party paid no attention; but at noon the work was stopped, for the British troops were coming across the harbor in boats. Three thousand well armed, uniformed, and drilled soldiers, who had never known defeat in equal fight, landed near Charlestown, under General Howe. Here they formed at the water-side, and in a long, steady line began to move upward to scatter the 1,500 farmers who were watching them from the top of the hill. From the roofs of the houses in Boston, the rest of the British army and the townspeople were watching, anxious to see 'whether the Yankees would fight.' Most of the watchers expected to see the untrained soldiers in the fort fire a few hasty shots at a safe distance and run. The fort held a threatening silence until the attacking column was within 150 feet. Then, at the word, came a sheet of fire from the marksmen within; and, when the smoke lifted, part of the British line was lying dead or wounded, and the rest were retreating hastily down the hill. The British were not cowards: the officers re-formed the line at the bottom of the hill, and, after setting fire

to Charlestown, again advanced to the attack. Again there was a steady silence in the fort, a close and deadly fire, and the British line was driven down the hill again. The British then moved up the hill for the third time. The powder in the fort was now gone, and the garrison fought for a few minutes with gunstocks and stones against the British bayonets. But such a struggle was hopeless, and the British gained the fort. They were too tired to pursue the garrison, who escaped to the mainland."—A. Johnston, *History of the United States for schools*, sect. 195-197.—"As soon as Prescott saw the defence was hopeless, he ordered a retreat, and friend and foe mingled together as they surged out of the sally-port amid the clouds of dust which the trampling raised, for a scorching sun had baked the new-turned soil. It was now, while the confused mass of beings rocked along down the near slope of the hill, that Warren [who had joined the defending force that morning as a volunteer] fell, shot through the head. No one among the Americans knew certainly that he was dead, as they left him. . . . Prescott did not conceal his indignation at not having been better supported, when he made his report at Ward's headquarters. He knew he had fought well; but neither he nor his contemporaries understood at the time how a physical defeat might be a moral victory. Not knowing this, there was little else than mortification over the result,—indeed, on both sides. . . . The general opinion seems to be that the Americans had about 1,500 men engaged at one time, and that from 3,000 to 4,000 at different times took some part in it. The British had probably about the same numbers in all, but were in excess of the Americans at all times while engaged. The conflict with small arms lasted about ninety minutes."—J. Winsor, *Conflict precipitated (Narrative and critical history of America*, v. 6, ch. 2).—"How can we exaggerate the relative importance of this day's action? Did it not, in fact, not only open, but make the contest, dividing into two parties not only those determined for the ministry or for enfranchisement, but also all timid, hesitating, reluctant neutrals? It was impossible after this to avoid taking a side. It rendered all reconciliation impossible, till it should offer itself in the shape of independence. It echoed the gathering cry that brought together our people from their farms and workshops, to learn the terrible art which grows more merciful only as it is more ferociously, that is, skilfully, pursued. The day needs no rhetoric to magnify it in our revolutionary annals. When its sun went down, the provincials had parted with all fear, hesitation, and reluctance. They found that it was easy to fight. . . . General Gage's account of the battle, acknowledging the loss of 226 killed and 828 wounded, was received in London, July 25th. While the ministry received with dismay this official intelligence, and kept it back from publication, many private letters accompanying it in its transit anticipated with exaggerations its humiliating details."—G. E. Ellis, *History of the Battle of Bunker's Hill*, pp. 102-105.—"Bunker's Hill had exhibited the Americans to all the world as a people to be courted by allies, and counted with by foes; and it had done them the yet more notable service of teaching them some home-truths. It was a marvel that so many armed citizens had been got together so quickly, and a still greater marvel that they had stayed together so long. Even a Cabinet Minister could not now deny that as individuals they possessed the old courage of their race. They had displayed,

moreover, certain military qualities of a new and special type, such as were naturally developed by the local and historical conditions under which they had been born and bred. But no one who passed the early hours of that summer afternoon on the hill over Charlestown, and still more no one who witnessed the state of things in rear of the position and among the headquarters staff at Cambridge, could be blind to the conviction that a great deal would have to be done, and undone, before the colonies were able to hold the field throughout the protracted struggle which was now inevitable. The material was there,—excellent, abundant, and ductile,—of a national army with features of its own deeply marked; but to mould that material into shape was a task which would have to be pursued under difficulties of unusual complexity. The artificer was already found. A second Continental Congress had assembled at Philadelphia on the tenth of May; and Colonel Washington, who from that day forward attended the sittings in his uniform, was Chairman of all the Committees appointed to deal with military questions. Just before the battle took place, John Adams . . . proposed that the assemblage of troops then besieging Boston should be adopted by Congress as a Continental Army, and indicated Colonel Washington as the officer best fitted to command it. The suggestion was very generally approved, and in the end unanimously accepted. Washington was nominated as chief 'of all the forces then raised, or that should be raised thereafter, in the United Colonies, or that should voluntarily offer their service for the defence of American liberty.' There was no stint in the terms of his commission; and he assumed the trust in a spirit that was a pledge of the manner in which he would fulfil it."—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, v. 1, pt. 1, pp. 370-371.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, *History of the siege of Boston*, ch. 4-7.—Idem, *Life and times of Joseph Warren*, ch. 16.—I. N. Tarbox, *Life of Israel Putnam*, ch. 7-11.—H. B. Dawson, *Bunker Hill* (*Historical Magazine*, June, 1868).—S. A. Drake, *Historic fields and mansions of Middlesex*, ch. 3.—*Force's American archives*, series 4, v. 2.—F. Moore, ed., *Diary of the American Revolution*, v. 1, pp. 97-103.—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the American Revolution*, v. 1.

1775 (August-December).—Unsuccessful expedition to Canada.—"The exploits of Allen and Arnold at Ticonderoga . . . had invited further conquests; but the Continental Congress hesitated to take any steps which might seem to carry war across the line till the Canadians had the opportunity of casting in their lot with their neighbors. On the 1st of June, 1775, Congress had distinctly avowed this purpose of restraint; and they well needed to be cautious, for the Canadian French had not forgotten the bitter aspersions on their religion which Congress had, with little compunction, launched upon its professors, under the irritation of the Quebec Act. Still their rulers were aliens, and the traditional hatred of centuries between races is not easily kept in abeyance. Ethan Allen was more eager to avail himself of this than Congress was to have him; but the march of events converted the legislators, and the opportunity which Allen grieved to see lost was not so easily regained when Congress at last authorized the northern invasion. Arnold and Allen had each aimed to secure the command of such an expedition, the one by appealing to the Continental Congress, the other by representations to that of

New York. Allen had also gone in person to Philadelphia, and he and his Green Mountain Boys were not without influence upon Congress, in their quaint and somewhat rough ways, as their exuberant patriotism later made the New York authorities forget their riotous opposition to the policy which that province had been endeavoring to enforce in the New Hampshire Grants. Connecticut had already sent forward troops to Ticonderoga to hold that post till Congress should decide upon some definite action; and at the end of June, 1775, orders reached Schuyler which he might readily interpret as authorizing him, if the Canadians did not object, to advance upon Canada. He soon started to assume command, but speedily found matters unpromising. The Johnsons were arming the Indians up the Mohawk and beyond in a way that boded no good, and they had entered into compacts with the British commanders in Canada. Arnold had been at Ticonderoga, and had quarrelled with Hinman, the commander of Connecticut troops. Schuyler heard much of the Green Mountain Boys, but he only knew them as the lawless people of the Grants, and soon learned that Allen and Warner had themselves set to quarrelling. . . . In August the news from Canada began to be alarming. Richard Montgomery, an Irish officer who had some years before left the army to settle on the Hudson and marry, was now one of the new brigadiers. He urged Schuyler to advance and anticipate the movement now said to be intended by Carleton, the English general commanding in Canada. At this juncture Schuyler got word from Washington that a cooperating expedition would be dispatched by way of the Kennebec, which, if everything went well, might unite with Schuyler's before Quebec."—J. Winsor, *Conflict precipitated* (*Narrative and critical history of America*, v. 6).—The two movements were made, from Ticonderoga and from the Kennebec, with results which will be found related under CANADA: 1775-1776. "No expedition during the American Revolution had less elements of permanent value than those which were undertaken against Canada during the year 1775. Great results were anticipated, but none were realized. The obstacles were too substantial, and failure was inevitable. Wonderful endurance and great physical courage were manifested, and these were accompanied by a prodigious amount of faith, but there was neither ability nor opportunity for works commensurate with the faith. . . . As a base of operations for a British army moving upon the colonies, Canada had the single advantage of being less distant from England than an Atlantic base, and many supplies could be procured without the expense and delay of their transportation across the Atlantic; but between Canada and the American colonies there was an actual wilderness. Hence a British offensive movement from Canada involved constant waste of men and materials, a deep line through an uninhabited or hostile region, and such a constant backing, as was both inconsistent with the resources of the base, and with a corresponding support of armies resting upon the sea coast. The British government was not ready for operations so extensive and so exhaustive of men and treasure; neither did it realize the necessity for that expenditure. There were two alternatives, one illustrated by General Carleton's plan, viz., to hold the forts of Lake Champlain, as advanced, defensive positions; and the other, that of Burgoyne, to strike through the country and depend upon support from the opposite base. The true defense of the

colonies from such expeditions depended upon the prompt seizure and occupation of the frontier posts. An American advance upon Canada was not only through a country strategically bad, but the diversion of forces for that purpose endangered the general issue, and entrusted its interests to the guardianship of an army already insufficient to meet the pressing demands of the crisis. The occupation of New York in 1775, by an adequate British force, would have infinitely outweighed all possible benefit from the complete conquest of Canada. At the very time when Washington could hardly hold the British garrison of Boston in check,—when he had an average of but nine rounds of ammunition per man, he was required to spare companies, ammunition, and supplies for a venture, profitless at best,—with the certainty that reinforcements could not be supplied as fast as the enemy could draw veteran regiments from Great Britain and Ireland, to defend or recover Canadian soil. . . . It should be noticed that the initiative had been taken before General Washington had been elected commander-in-chief, and that Congress itself precipitated the final movement."—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, ch. 19.


Also in: B. J. Lossing, *Life and times of Philip Schuyler*, v. 1, ch. 19-29, v. 2, ch. 1-4.—J. Armstrong, *Life of Richard Montgomery* (*Library of American Biography*, v. 1).—J. J. Henry, *Account of Arnold's campaign against Quebec, by one of the survivors*.—I. N. Arnold, *Life of Benedict Arnold*, ch. 3-5.—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 2, ch. 4-5, 8-9, 12, 15-16, 19-20.

1775-1776.—Effect of "Association."—Prohibitory Act.—"Through long debates Congress puzzled itself over the difficult task of maintaining the Association and of obtaining the means for carrying on the war. Doubtless a simple way out would be for Congress to allow so much exportation only as might be necessary to pay for arms and ammunition; and still not so simple either, since it would at once excite many jealousies. 'To get powder,' Mr. Jay observed, 'we keep a secret law that produce may be exported.' . . . So the Congress authorized the several colonies to export as much 'produce, except horned cattle, sheep, hogs, and poultry, as they may deem necessary for the importation of arms, ammunition, sulphur, and saltpetre.' Thus powder might be obtained. . . . For the moment all this was no more than a confession that the Association, originally designed as a finely chiseled stepping-stone to reconciliation, was likely to prove a stumbling-block unless the King graciously extended his royal hand to give a hearty lift. It presently appeared that the King refused to extend his hand. October 31, 1775, information reached America that Richard Penn and Arthur Lee, having presented the petition to Lord Dartmouth, were informed that the King would not receive them, and furthermore that no answer would be returned to the Congress. Ignoring the petition was to exhibit only one degree more of contempt for that carefully prepared document than the Congress had shown for Lord North's Resolution on Conciliation; and now that the olive branch had been spurned on both sides, it was a little difficult to see how either side could possibly refuse the sword. That the colonies would refuse the sword was not very likely; but, as if to make a refusal impossible, the British Government, on December 22, 1775, decided to thrust the sword into their hands. This at all events was thought by many men to be the effect of the Pro-

hibitory Act, which declared the colonies outside the protection of the Crown, and which, for the purpose of reducing them to submission, laid an embargo upon all their trade and proclaimed their ports in a state of blockade. I know not [John Adams wrote] whether you have seen the Act of Parliament called the Restraining Act or Prohibitory Act, or Piratical Act, or Act of Independency—for by all these titles is it called. I think the most apposite is the Act of Independency; the King, Lords, and Commons have united in surrendering this country from that, I think, forever. It is a complete dismemberment of the British Empire. It throws thirteen colonies out of the royal protection, and makes us independent in spite of supplications and entreaties. It may be fortunate that the act of Independency should come from the British Parliament rather than from the American Congress; but it is very odd that Americans should hesitate at accepting such a gift from them. The majority of those who refused to accept it—and the number was large—retired, with saddened hearts for the most part, into the ranks of the British Loyalists; only a few, with John Dickinson at their head, could still visualize the vanishing image of reconciliation. . . . On February 16, 1776, Congress . . . took into 'consideration the propriety of opening the ports. . . . The sword, as an instrument for maintaining rights, could after all not be effectively wielded by America so long as her hand was shackled by even the half-broken ties of a professed allegiance to Britain. Therefore, when the Congress, on the 6th of April, opened the ports of the colonies to the world, the Declaration of Independence was a foregone conclusion."—C. L. Becker, *Eve of the Revolution*, pp. 239-245.

1775-1776.—Washington in command at Cambridge.—British forced out of Boston.—Washington "arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the 2d of July [1775], and on the following day presented himself at the head of the army. His head-quarters remained at Cambridge, till the evacuation of Boston by the royal forces on the 17th of March, 1776. The position of affairs was one of vast responsibility and peril. The country at large was highly excited, and expected that a bold stroke would be struck and decisive successes obtained. But the army was without organization and discipline; the troops unused to obey, the officers for the most part unaccustomed, some of them incompetent, to command. A few of them only had had a limited experience in the Seven Years' War. Most of the men had rushed to the field on the first alarm of hostilities, without any enlistment; and when they were enlisted, it was only till the end of the year. There was no military chest; scarce anything that could be called a commissariat. The artillery consisted of a few old field-pieces of various sizes, served with a very few exceptions by persons wholly untrained in gunnery. There was no siege train, and an almost total want of every description of ordnance stores. Barrels of sand, represented as powder, were from time to time brought into the camp, to prevent the American army itself from being aware of its deficiency in that respect. In the autumn of 1775, an alarm of small-pox was brought from Boston, and the troops were subjected to inoculation. There was no efficient power, either in the Provincial Assembly or the Congress at Philadelphia, by which these wants could be supplied and these evils remedied. Such were the circumstances under which General Washington





GEORGE WASHINGTON

(From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the Corcoran Gallery, Washington)



took the field, at the head of a force greatly superior in numbers to the royal army, but in all other respects a very unequal match. Meantime the British were undisputed masters of the approaches to Boston by water. Washington's letters disclose extreme impatience under the inaction to which he was condemned; but the gravest difficulties attended the expulsion of the royal forces from Boston. It could only be effected by the bombardment and assault of that place; an attempt which must in any event have been destructive to the large noncombatant population, that had been unable to remove into the country, and which would have been of doubtful success, for the want of a siege train, and with troops wholly unused to such an undertaking. Having in the course of the year received some captured ordnance from Canada [from Fort Ticonderoga], and a supply of ammunition taken by privateers at sea, Washington was strongly disposed to assault the town, as soon as the freezing of the bay on the western side of the peninsula would allow the troops to pass on the ice. The winter, however, remained open longer than usual, and a council of war dissuaded this attempt. He then determined to occupy Nook's Hill (an eminence at the extremity of Dorchester Neck, as it was called, separated from Boston by a narrow arm of the harbor), and Dorchester Heights, which commanded Nook's Hill and the town itself. In this way the royal forces would be compelled to take the risk of a general action, for the purpose of dislodging the Americans, or else to evacuate the town. The requisite preparations having been made with secrecy, energy, and despatch, the heights were covered with breastworks on the night of the 4th of March, 1776, as 'by enchantment.' A partial movement, undertaken by the royal army to dislodge the Americans, was frustrated by stress of weather; and on the 17th of March, in virtue of an agreement to that effect with the municipal government, the town and harbor of Boston were evacuated by the British army and navy without firing a gun. Thus, without a battle and without the destruction of a building in Boston, the first year of the war was brought to a successful and an auspicious close."—E. Everett, *Life of Washington*, ch. 5.—"In the autumn, General Gage was replaced, as British Commander-in-chief, by Sir William Howe, whose brother Richard, Lord Howe, became Admiral of the Fleet. But the Howes knew no way to break the strangle hold of the Americans. How Washington contrived to create the impression that he was master of the situation is one of the mysteries of his campaigning, because, although he had succeeded in making soldiers of his raw recruits and in enforcing subordination, they were still a very skittish body. . . . Still, Washington pushed steadily on, and in March, 1776, by a brilliant manœuvre at Dorchester Heights, he secured a position from which he could bombard every ship in Boston harbor. On the 17th of March all those ships, together with the garrison of eight thousand, and with two thousand fugitive loyalists, sailed off to Halifax. Boston has been free from foreign enemies from that day to this."—W. R. Thayer, *George Washington*, p. 73.—"Bunker's Hill had been a soldier's battle; but the responsibility for the campaign of which it formed an episode lay with the placemen and their Royal master. They had contrived among them to bring about the discomfiture of a valiant army, responsive to discipline, and containing more than a due proportion of distinguished


or promising officers. They had involved it in almost every calamity which could befall a military force, except disgrace. They had so managed matters that, in a region overflowing with plenty, their troops had been fed from Leadenhall Market, as an orator of the Opposition cleverly and not untruly put it. . . . And yet, much as the English had suffered during the course of the siege from the scarcity and badness of their food, in the last resort they were refused the comparative satisfaction of having yielded to famine, and not to force. The Government deprived Howe of two thousand infantry, at the moment when he most needed to be strong. The reinforcements which were sent from home to fill the void arrived two months too late; and so it came to pass that the ill-used General was in the end not starved but manœuvred out of his positions. The acts of aggressive warfare sanctioned or condoned by the Ministers were as futile as their defensive arrangements, and had consequences most disastrous to the national interests. They had not occupied a single square furlong of soil, fortified or open, in any of the colonies; but they had shelled three towns, had sent into the Gazette a score of loyal merchants, and had rendered a few hundred families homeless. They had alienated all the neutral opinion in America, and had lighted a flame of resentment against Great Britain which they continued to feed with fresh fuel until it grew so hot that it did not burn itself out for a couple of lifetimes."—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, v. 1, pp. 444-445.

ALSO IN: George Washington, *Writings* (W. C. Ford, ed., v. 3).—R. Frothingham, *History of the siege of Boston*, ch. 8-13.

1775-1776.—Lord Dunmore's war against Virginia. See VIRGINIA: 1775-1776.

1775-1776.—Beginning of American navy, and early fitting out of privateers.—"Before the end of 1775 the Continental Congress ordered that five ships of 32 guns should be built, five of 28, and three of 24. This order was carried out, and these vessels are the proper beginning of the navy of the United States. Almost every one of them, before the war was over, had been captured, or burned to avoid capture. But the names of the little fleet will always be of interest to Americans, and some of those names have always been preserved on the calendar of the navy. They are the 'Washington,' 'Raleigh,' 'Hancock,' 'Randolph,' 'Warren,' 'Virginia,' 'Trumbull,' 'Evingham,' 'Congress,' 'Providence,' 'Boston,' 'Delaware,' 'Montgomery.' The State of Rhode Island, at the very outbreak of hostilities, commissioned Abraham Whipple, who went with his little vessel as far as Bermuda, and, from his experience in naval warfare earned in the French War, he was recognized as commodore of the little fleet of American cruisers. . . . Meanwhile, every maritime State issued commissions to privateers, and established admiralty or prize courts, with power to condemn prizes when brought in. Legitimate commerce had been largely checked, and . . . the seamen of the country, who had formerly been employed in the fisheries, or in our large foreign trade with the West India Islands and with Europe, gladly volunteered in the private service. Till the end of the war the seamen preferred the privateer service to that of the government. . . . The larger maritime States had in commission one or more vessels from the beginning, but they found the same difficulty which the Congress found in enlisting seamen, when any bold privateer captain

came into rivalry with them. . . . As early as the 22d of December, in 1775, Congress had appointed Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, commander-in-chief of its navy, and had named four captains besides, with several lieutenants, the first of whom was John Paul Jones. . . . On the 10th of October [1776] a resolution of Congress fixed the rank of captains in the navy, . . . Paul Jones eighteenth on a list of twenty-four. Jones was not pleased that his rank was not higher, but eventually his achievements were such that his reputation probably now stands higher as a successful officer than that of any of the number."—E. E. Hale, *Naval history of the American Revolution (Narrative and critical history of America, v. 6, ch. 7)*.



THOMAS PAINE

ALSO IN: J. F. Cooper, *Naval history of the United States, v. 1, ch. 4-6*.—C. O. Paulin, *Navy of the American Revolution*.

1775-1776.—Attitude of France toward the colonies. See FRANCE: 1775-1776.

1775-1779.—Attitude of Frederick the Great towards the colonies. See GERMANY: 1761-1779.

1775-1782.—Influence of American Revolution on French Revolution. See FRANCE: 1780: Survey of France on the eve of revolution: Résumé of causes.

1775-1783.—Loyalists in the Revolution.—“The loyalists were many—perhaps nearly, if not quite, a third of the population. Many of them were, moreover, or had been when the war began men of substance and of position. On the whole, they came from the conservative classes, who disliked rebellion for itself and because they had something to lose. Men that were looking for a chance to wipe out their old debts and had hopes of get-

ting something ahead in the general overturning were not apt to be Tories. The people that were banished from Boston were members of the old families of the commonwealth. Greene reported to Washington that two-thirds of the property in New York City and its suburbs belonged to Tories.”—A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and the constitution, p. 37*.—“After hostilities began and the Revolution was well under way, the loyalists were probably a majority in New York, in South Carolina, and in Georgia. In Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey they are supposed to have been more evenly balanced, each side claiming the majority. Even in New England and Virginia the loyalists were more numerous than is generally supposed.”—S. G. Fisher, *True history of the American Revolution, p. 233*.—See also TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

1775-1810.—Federal liquor restrictions for the army. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1775-1810.

1776 (January-June).—King George's war measures and Paine's "Common Sense."—Setting of the tide of opinion toward national independence.—“Disastrous news arrived from England before the close of the winter of 1775-6. The King had opened Parliament with a speech in which he had denounced the Colonists as rebels, seeking, with deceitful pretences, to establish an independent empire; and his Majesty recommended decisive, coercive measures against them. . . . The answer to the Royal Address (adopted by a vote of seventy-six to thirty-three in the Lords, and two hundred and seventy-eight to one hundred and eight in the Commons) gave assurances of the firm support of Parliament to the proposed measures. The very moderately conciliatory propositions made by the Duke of Richmond, Mr. Burke, and the Duke of Grafton, were summarily voted down, and not far from the middle of December the atrocious 'Prohibitory Act,' as it was generally designated, passed. It was, in effect, a declaration of war, and a war unrestrained by the customs, and unmitigated by the decencies of civilization. It authorized the confiscation of American vessels and cargoes, and those of all nations found trading in American ports. It authorized British commanders to impress American crews into the British Navy, and to place them on the same footing with voluntarily enlisted seamen; that is, to give them a choice between parricide and being hung at a yardarm! Finally, it referred all future negotiations to two Commissioners, to be sent out along with a conquering armament, who were allowed to grant pardons to individuals and Colonies, on submission, thus leaving no future alternative opposed to the latter but the sword, and indicating that henceforth all appeals to King or Parliament were cut off. . . . Concurrently with these legislative steps, the practical ones for carrying on the war, with a large army, were entered upon. Finding it difficult or impossible to obtain the necessary recruits at home, and that the existing English and Irish regiments embarked with such reluctance that it was necessary to keep a guard upon the transports 'to keep them from deserting by wholesale,' the Ministry successively applied to Russia, the States-General, and finally, several of the German States for mercenaries. . . . The infamy of filling up the British armament was reserved for the Princes of three or four petty German States. . . . As the news of these events successively reached the American Congress and people, in the

winter and spring of 1775-6, the contest took a new coloring. Not only the bold, but the moderate began now to see the real alternative before them. And at a critical moment the remedy, and the path to it, were pointed out by a master hand. 'Common Sense' was published by Thomas Paine, and a more effective popular appeal never went to the bosoms of a nation. Its tone, its manner, its biblical illusions, its avoidance of all openly impassioned appeals to feeling, and its unanswerable common sense were exquisitely adapted to the great audience to which it was addressed; and calm investigation will satisfy the historical student that its effect in preparing the popular mind for the Declaration of Independence, exceeded that of any other paper, speech, or document made to favor it, and it would scarcely be exaggeration to add, than all other such means put together. . . . Independence would have been declared, and, perhaps, nearly as early, had Paine never written. But he did, at a propitious moment, and with consummate adaptation, write a paper which went like the arrow which pierces the centre of the target. Its effect was instantaneous and tremendous. . . . The work ran through innumerable editions in America and France. The world rung with it. . . . It admits of no doubt that pretty early in 1776, all the true Whigs in Congress, moderates as well as ultras, became satisfied of the necessity and expediency of separation, and that henceforth it was only a question of time with them. Enactments placing the struggle on the footing of open war, instead of mere insurrection—issuing letters of marque and reprisal against the enemies of our commerce—advising the local authorities to disarm the disaffected—opening the ports of the country to all nations but Great Britain—directing negotiations for foreign alliances to be undertaken—were successively made. Finally, on the 10th of May, a resolution, prepared by John Adams and R. H. Lee, passed the House, advising all the Colonies to form governments for themselves; and in this, unlike preceding instances of giving advice on the same subject, no limitation of the duration of the governments to be formed 'to the continuance of the present dispute' was inserted. This, with a befitting preamble, written by John Adams, was adopted on the 15th, . . . and was, obviously, a long and bold stride in the direction of independence, and must have been understood by all as its signal and precursor. . . . Congress cheered on those whom peculiar circumstances had rendered more backward, and it tarried for them a little by the way; on the other hand, it prudently waited for the prompting of the more forward. Thus it avoided the appearance of dominating over public opinion—thus it 'kept front and rear together.' Early in April (12th), North Carolina [see NORTH CAROLINA: 1775-1776] 'empowered' her delegates 'to concur with the delegates of other Colonies in declaring independency.' At its 'May session' (the day of the month not appearing in the record under our eye), the General Assembly of Rhode Island abolished its act of allegiance, and directed all commissions and legal processes henceforth to issue in the name and under the authority of the 'Governor and Company.' The Connecticut General Assembly, which met on the 9th of May, before its adjournment (date not before us), repealed its act against high treason, and made the same order with Rhode Island in regard to legal processes. On the 15th of May, Virginia took a still more decisive step, by instructing its dele-

gates in Congress to move for a Declaration of Independence. [See VIRGINIA: 1776.] . . . The Virginia delegates in Congress made choice of Richard H. Lee to move the resolutions contained in their instructions of May 15th; and he did so on Friday, the 7th day of June, John Adams seconding them. Their consideration was postponed until the next day, when they were referred to a committee of the whole, and debated throughout Saturday and the succeeding Monday. On the latter day (10th) Congress resolved: 'That the consideration of the first resolution be postponed to Monday, the first day of July next; and in the meanwhile, that no time be lost, in case the Congress agree thereto, that a committee be appointed to prepare a declaration to the effect of the said first resolution, which is in these words: That these Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown; and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.'—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: G. Bancroft, *History of United States* (Author's last revision), v. 4, ch. 24-28.—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic*, ch. 11.—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. 2, ch. 5.—A. B. Hart, *American history told by contemporaries*, v. 2, no. 159, 186.—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, pp. 61-65, 129.—M. C. Tyler, *Literary history of the American Revolution*, ch. 21.—M. D. Conway, *Life of Thomas Paine*.—W. C. Rives, *Life and times of Madison*, v. 1, ch. 4-5.—*Force's American Archives*, series 4, v. 6.—E. G. Scott, *Development of Constitutional liberty in the English colonies*, ch. 11.—C. J. Stillé, *Life and times of John Dickinson*, ch. 5.

1776 (January-June).—Engagement of hiring Hessians to reinforce British arms.—'Early in the year treaties were signed with the Landgrave of Hesse for taking into British pay 12,000 of his men; with the Duke of Brunswick and other petty potentates of Germany for 5,000 more. These little princes, seeing the need of England, which did not choose to lean, as she might and should have done, on her own right arm, insisted on obtaining, and did obtain, most usurious terms. Under the name of levy-money, there was to be paid to them the price of 30 crowns for every foot-soldier. Under the name of subsidy, each of their Serene Highnesses was moreover to be indulged with a yearly sum, irrespective of the pay and subsistence of the troops; and on the plea that in this case no certain number of years was stipulated as the term of service, the Landgrave of Hesse claimed and was promised a double subsidy, namely 450,000 crowns a year. The men were to enter into pay before they began to march! The subsidies were to be continued for one full year at least after the war was over and the troops had returned to their respective homes. Never yet, in short, was the blood of brave men sold on harder terms. The disgrace of this transaction to the German Princes who engaged in it requires little comment. . . . The ablest by far of the German Princes at that time, Frederick of Prussia, was not in general a man of compassionate feelings. He had no especial love or care for the North American cause. [See GERMANY: 1761-1779.] . . . Yet even Frederick expressed in strong terms his contempt for the scandalous man-traffic of his neighbours. It is said that whenever any of the newly hired Brunswickers or Hessians had to pass through any portion of his territory he

claimed to levy on them the usual toll as for so many head of cattle, since he said they had been sold as such! Nor can the British ministry in this transaction be considered free from blame. Certain it is that among the various causes which at this period wrought upon our trans-Atlantic brethren to renounce their connection with us, there was none more cogent in their minds than the news that German mercenaries had been hired and were coming to fight against them."—Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *History of England, 1713-1783*, v. 6, ch. 53.—"The first German troops to start for America were the Brunswickers. These marched from Brunswick on February 22d, 1776, 2,282 strong, and were embarked at Stade, near the mouth of the Elbe. The second division of Brunswickers embarked at the end of May—about 2,000 men. The first Hessians set out from Cassel early in March, and were shipped at Bremerlehe, near the mouth of the Weser. The second division was embarked in June. Together they numbered between 12,000 and 13,000 men. They were for the most part excellent troops and well equipped, for the Landgrave's little army was one of the best in Germany. . . . The Prince of Waldeck sent his regiment through Cassel without trouble. The Prince of Hesse-Hanau, the Margrave of Anspach-Bayreuth, and the Prince of Anhalt-Zerbst had a longer road."—E. J. Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolutionary War*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: M. von Elking, *Memoirs of General Riedesel*, v. 1, pp. 18-88, and appendix.—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 4, ch. 22.—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. 2, ch. 2.

1776 (April).—Attempt to induce Canadians to join the Revolution. See MONTREAL: 1776-1809.

1776 (May).—Arnold's retreat from Canada. See CANADA: 1775-1776.

1776 (June).—British repulsed at Charleston.—"Early in 1776 the task was assigned to Clinton, who had in January departed from Boston, . . . to force and hold the Southern colonies to their allegiance [see NORTH CAROLINA: 1775-1776], and Cornwallis, with troops, was sent over under convoy of Sir Peter Parker's fleet, to give Clinton the army he needed. The fleet did not reach North Carolina till May. In March, [Charles] Lee, while in New York, had wished to be ordered to the command in Canada, as 'he was the only general officer on the continent who could speak and think in French.' He was disappointed, and ordered farther south. By May he was in Virginia, ridding the country of Tories, and trying to find out where Parker intended to land. It was expected that Clinton would return north to New York in season to operate with Howe, when he opened the campaign there in the early summer, as that general expected to do, and the interval for a diversion farther south was not long. Lee had now gone as far as Charleston (S. C.), and taken command in that neighborhood, while in charge of the little fort at the entrance of the harbor was William Moultrie, upon whom Lee was inculcating the necessity of a slow and sure fire, in case it should prove that Parker's destination, as it might well be, was to get a foothold in the Southern provinces, and break up the commerce which fed the rebellion through that harbor. The people of Charleston had been for some time engaged on their defences, and 'seem to wish a trial of their mettle,' wrote a looker-on. The fort in question was built of palmetto logs,

and was unfinished on the land side. Its defenders had four days' warning, and the neighboring militia were summoned. On the 4th of June the hostile fleet appeared, and having landed troops on an adjacent island, it was not till the 27th that their dispositions were made for an attack. Their ships threw shot at the fort all day, which did very little damage, while the return fire was rendered with precision surprising in untried artillerymen, and seriously damaged the fleet, of which one ship was grounded and abandoned. The expected land attack from Clinton's troops, already ashore on Long Island, was not made. A strong wind had raised the waters of the channel between that island and Sullivan's Island so high that it could not be forded, and suitable boats for the passage were not at hand. A few days later the shattered vessels and the troops left the neighborhood, and Colonel Moultrie had leisure to count the cost of his victory, which was twelve killed and twice as many wounded. The courage of Sergeant Jasper, in replacing on the bastion a flag which had been shot away, became at once a household anecdote."—J. Winsor, *Conflict precipitated (Narrative and critical history of America, v. 6, ch. 2)*.

ALSO IN: H. Flanders, *Life of John Rutledge*, ch. 10 (*Lives of the chief justices*, v. 1).—C. B. Hartley, *Life of General William Moultrie (Heroes and patriots of the South, ch. 2)*.—E. McCrary, *History of the Revolution in South Carolina, 1775-1780*.

1776 (June).—Resolutions for independence.—Making ready for the Declaration.—"Things were now verging on every side to the same point. North Carolina had conferred the necessary powers to vote for independence and foreign alliances as early as the 12th of April. And now came the news from Richard Lee, to Mr. Adams, that on the very day of the passage of the significant preamble in congress, the 15th of May, the convention of Virginia had gone a step further, and had instructed their delegates to propose independence. Authority to assent to its natural consequences, a confederation and foreign alliances, followed as a matter of course. On the other hand, the convention of Massachusetts had referred the subject back to the people, to be considered and acted upon at their primary town meetings, and the responses had been for some time coming in unequivocally enough. So decided was the feeling that Joseph Hawley, impatient of the delay, was stimulating the nowise reluctant Gerry to greater exertions. Perceiving these encouraging indications in opposite quarters, the friends of independence now consulted together, and made up their minds that the moment had come for a final demonstration. Resolutions, embracing the three great points, were carefully matured, which it was arranged that Richard Henry Lee, on behalf of the delegates of Virginia, should present, and John Adams should second, for Massachusetts. The movement took place, accordingly, on the 7th of June. It appears on the journal, recorded with the customary caution, as follows: 'Certain resolutions respecting independency being moved and seconded,—Resolved, that the consideration of them be referred till tomorrow morning; and that the members be enjoined to attend punctually at ten o'clock, in order to take the same into their consideration.' It was well that a measure of so momentous a character should be accompanied with as much of the forms of notice and special assignment as the body could properly give it. The record of what passed



SIGNING OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE  
July 4, 1776

(From the painting by John Trumbull, in the Capitol at Washington)





at the appointed time has come down to us very barren of details. We only know that the resolutions were referred to the committee of the whole, where they were debated with great spirit during that day, Saturday, and again on Monday, the 10th, by which time it had become quite clear that a majority of the colonies were prepared to adopt the first and leading resolution. This majority was composed of the four New England, and three out of the four southern colonies. But it being deemed unadvisable to place this great act upon so narrow a basis, and a prospect being held out of securing a more general concurrence by delaying the decision, a postponement until the 1st of July was effected by a change of the votes of two colonies. In the mean while, however, as it was thought suitable to accompany the act with an elaborate exposition of the causes which were held to justify it, a committee was ordered to have in charge the preparation of such a paper in season for the adjourned debate. . . . At the same time that Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston, all but the last named being of the movement, were appointed the committee to prepare a declaration, as mentioned, the congress formally voted a second committee, with powers to prepare and digest a form of confederation to be entered into between the colonies; and yet a third, to mature a plan of treaties to be proposed to foreign powers. In this compass were included all the elements of national sovereignty abroad and at home. . . . The bulk of opposition now centred in the five middle colonies, and the pillar upon which it leaned was John Dickinson. But under the combined assaults conducted by the leading colonies of Virginia and Massachusetts, it was plain that victory was become a mere question of time. Jonathan D. Sergeant, who had left congress to hasten a change in the counsels of New Jersey, had been so successful in spiriting up the assembly as to be able to write, on the 15th of June, to Mr. Adams, that the delegates about to be elected would be on the spot by the 1st of July, the day to which the question had been assigned, and that they would 'vote plump.' Equally favorable news soon came from Maryland. . . . Thus were two States secured. But Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New York yet remained to move. In the first of these, recourse was had once more to the so-called committees of conference. . . . And here, on the 23d of June, Dr. Benjamin Rush, then a young man, but acting entirely in sympathy and co-operation with the leaders in congress, moved and carried the appointment of a committee to declare the sense of the conference with respect to an independence of the province on the crown of Great Britain. He and James Smith were then joined with Thomas McKean, the chairman of the conference, in a committee, which was ready the next day with a report affirming the willingness of the deputies of the conference to concur in a vote declaring the United Colonies free and independent States. The report was adopted unanimously, was presented to congress on the 25th, and, doubtless had its effect in determining those delegates of the colony to absent themselves on the final vote, upon whose resistance its adverse decision depended. As the hesitation of Delaware was chiefly owing to the feeling that pervaded the county of Sussex, Mr. Rodney had repaired thither for the purpose of bringing about a favorable change, in which errand the news came that he was laboring with success

The delegates from New York, no longer interposing any active opposition, yet unwilling to assume a responsibility which their constituents had not authorized, preferred to withdraw from participation in the decision. Such was the state of affairs on the 1st of July, to which day the discussion had been adjourned. There was then little doubt of an affirmative vote on the part of all but four colonies."—J. Q. Adams and C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, v. 1, pp. 308-318.

**1776 (July).—Authorship, adoption and signing of Declaration of Independence.**—"One of the first facts taught to any child of American birth is, that Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence. The original draft in his handwriting was afterward deposited in the State Department. It shows two or three trifling alterations, interlined in the handwritings of Franklin and Adams. Otherwise it came before Congress precisely as Jefferson wrote it. Many years afterward John Adams gave an account of the way in which Jefferson came to be the composer of this momentous document, differing slightly from the story told by Jefferson. But the variance is immaterial. . . . Jefferson's statement seems the better entitled to credit, and what little corroboration is to be obtained for either narrator is wholly in his favor. He says simply that when the Committee came together he was pressed by his colleagues unanimously to undertake the draft; that he did so; that, when he had prepared it, he submitted it to Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams, separately, requesting their corrections, 'which were two or three only and merely verbal,' 'interlined in their own handwritings'; that the report in this shape was adopted by the committee, and a 'fair copy,' written out by Mr. Jefferson, was then laid before Congress. A somewhat more interesting discussion concerns the question, how Jefferson came to be named first on the committee, to the entire exclusion of Lee, to whom, as mover of the resolution, parliamentary etiquette would have assigned the chairmanship. Many explanations have been given, of which some at least appear the outgrowth of personal likings and dislikings. It is certain that Jefferson was not only preëminently fitted for the very difficult task of this peculiar composition, but also that he was a man without an enemy. His abstinence from any active share in debate had saved him from giving irritation; and it is a truth not to be concealed, that there were cabals, bickerings, heart-burnings, perhaps actual enmities among the members of that famous body, which, grandly as it looms up, and rightly too, in the mind's eye, was after all composed of jarring human ingredients. It was well believed that there was a faction opposed to Washington, and it was generally suspected that irascible, vain, and jealous John Adams, then just rising from the ranks of the people, made in this matter common cause with the aristocratic Virginian Lees against their fellow-countrymen. . . . So it is likely enough that a timely illness of Lee's wife was a fortunate excuse for passing him by, and that partly by reason of admitted aptitude, partly because no risk could be run of any interference of personal feelings in so weighty a matter, Jefferson was placed first on the committee, with the natural result of doing the bulk of its labor. On July 1, pursuant to assignment, Congress, in committee of the whole, resumed consideration of Mr. Lee's resolution, and carried it by the votes of nine colonies. South Carolina and Pennsylvania voted against it. The two delegates from Delaware voted

divided. Those from New York said that personally they were in favor of it and believed their constituents to be so, but they were hampered by instructions drawn a twelvemonth since and strictly forbidding any action obstructive of reconciliation, which was then still desired. The committee reported, and then Edward Rutledge moved an adjournment to the next day, when his colleagues, though disapproving the resolution, would probably join in it for the sake of unanimity. This motion was carried, and on the day following the South Carolinians were found to be converted; also a third member had come post from the Delaware counties, and caused the vote of that colony to be given with the rest; Pennsylvania changed her vote; and a few days later the Convention of New York approved the resolution, 'thus supplying the void occasioned by the withdrawing of her delegates from the vote.' On the same day, July 2, the House took up Mr. Jefferson's draft of the Declaration, and debated it during that and the following day and until a late hour on July 4. Many verbal changes were made, most of which were conducive to closer accuracy of statement, and were improvements. Two or three substantial amendments were made by the omission of passages; notably there was stricken out a passage in which George III was denounced for encouraging the slave-trade. . . . No interpolation of any consequence was made. Jefferson had ample cause to congratulate himself upon this event of the discussion. . . . He himself spoke not a word in the debate. . . . The burden of argument, from which Jefferson wisely shrank, was gallantly borne by John Adams, whom Jefferson gratefully called 'the colossus of that debate.' Jefferson used afterward to take pleasure in tingeing the real solemnity of the occasion with a coloring of the ludicrous. The debate, he said, seemed as though it might run on interminably, and probably would have done so at a different season of the year. But the weather was oppressively warm, and the room occupied by the deputies was hard by a stable, whence the hungry flies swarmed thick and fierce, alighting on the legs of the delegates and biting hard through their thin silk stockings. Treason was preferable to discomfort, and the members voted for the Declaration and hastened to the table to sign it and escape from the horse-fly. John Hancock, making his great familiar signature, jestingly said that John Bull could read that without spectacles; then, becoming more serious, began to impress on his comrades the necessity of their 'all hanging together in this matter.' 'Yes, indeed,' interrupted Franklin, 'we must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.' . . . Amid such trifling, concealing grave thoughts, Jefferson saw his momentous document signed at the close of that summer afternoon."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Thomas Jefferson*, ch. 3.—"The statements relative to signing the Declaration are conflicting. Jefferson states that it was signed generally on the 4th (Memoirs i, 94), and he in other places reiterates this statement, but this manuscript is not known to be extant. . . . According to the journals, Congress, on the 10th of July, resolved that the 'declaration, passed on the 4th, be fairly engrossed on parchment, with the title and style of "The unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America," and that the same, when engrossed, be signed by every member of Congress.' On the 2d day of August, the journals say, 'The Declaration being engrossed, and compared at the table, was signed by the members.'"—R. Frothingham,

*Rise of the republic*, p. 545 and footnote.—"Because statesmen like Dickinson and communities like Maryland were slow in believing that the right moment for a declaration of independence had come, the preposterous theory has been suggested that the American Revolution was the work of an unscrupulous and desperate minority, which, through intrigue mingled with violence, succeeded in forcing the reluctant majority to sanction its measures. Such a misconception has its root in an utter failure to comprehend the peculiar character of American political life, like the kindred misconception which ascribes the rebellion of the colonies to a sordid unwillingness to bear their due share of the expenses of the British Empire. It is like the misunderstanding which saw an angry mob in every town-meeting of the people of Boston, and characterized as a 'riot' every deliberate expression of public opinion. No one who is familiar with the essential features of American political life can for a moment suppose that the Declaration of Independence was brought about by any less weighty force than the settled conviction of the people that the priceless treasure of self-government could be preserved by no other means. It was but slowly that this unwelcome conviction grew upon the people; and owing to local differences of circumstances it grew more slowly in some places than in others. Prescient leaders, too, like the Adamses and Franklin and Lee, made up their minds sooner than other people. Even those conservatives who resisted to the last, even such men as John Dickinson and Robert Morris, were fully agreed with their opponents as to the principle at issue between Great Britain and America, and nothing would have satisfied them short of the total abandonment by Great Britain of her pretensions to impose taxes and revoke charters. Upon this fundamental point there was very little difference of opinion in America. As to the related question of independence, the decision, when once reached, was everywhere alike the reasonable result of free and open discussion; and the best possible illustration of this is the fact that not even in the darkest days of the war already begun did any state deliberately propose to reconsider its action in the matter. The hand once put to the plough, there was no turning back."—J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 4.—See also INDEPENDENCE HALL.

ALSO IN: G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 4, ch. 28.—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 5.—C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, ch. 4.—James Madison, *Papers*, v. 1, pp. 9-27.—J. Sanderson, *Biography of the signers of the Declaration*.—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, ch. 4-6.—A. B. Hart, *American history told by contemporaries*, no. 184-185, 187-188.—H. Friedenwald, *Declaration of Independence*.

1776 (July).—Declaration of Independence.—"It is to be noted that, whatever authority the Declaration of Independence has acquired in the world, has been due to no lack of criticism, either at the time of its first appearance or since then,—a fact which seems to tell in favor of its essential worth and strength. From the date of its original publication . . . it has been attacked again and again, either in anger or in contempt, by friends as well as by enemies of the American Revolution, by liberals in politics as well as by conservatives. It has been censured for its substance, it has been censured for its form; for its misstatements of fact, for its fallacies in reasoning; for its audacious

novelties and paradoxes, for its total lack of all novelty, for its repetition of old and threadbare statements, even for its downright plagiarisms; finally, for its grandiose and vapid style. . . . Perhaps, however, the most frequent form of disparagement to which Jefferson's great state paper has been subjected among us, is that which would minimize his merit in composing it, by denying to it the merit of originality. . . . By no one, . . . has the charge of a lack of originality been pressed with so much decisiveness as by John Adams, who took evident pleasure in speaking of it as a document in which were merely 'recapitulated' previous and well-known statements of American rights and wrongs, and who, as late as in the year 1822, deliberately wrote that 'there is not an idea in it but what had been hackneyed in Congress for two years before. . . .' Perhaps nowhere in our literature would it be possible to find a criticism brought forward by a really able man against any piece of writing, less applicable to the case, and of less force or value, than is this particular criticism by John Adams and others, as to the lack of originality in the Declaration of Independence. Indeed, for such a paper as Jefferson was commissioned to write, the one quality which it could not properly have had—the one quality which would have been fatal to its acceptance either by the American Congress or by the American people—is originality. They were then at the culmination of a tremendous controversy over alleged grievances of the most serious kind—a controversy that had been fiercely raging for at least twelve years. In the course of that long dispute, every phase of it, whether as to abstract right or constitutional privilege or personal procedure, had been presented in almost every conceivable form of speech. At last, they had resolved, in view of all this experience, no longer to prosecute the controversy as members of the empire; they had resolved to revolt, and casting off forever their ancient fealty to the British crown, to separate from the empire, and to establish themselves as a new nation among the nations of the earth. In this emergency, as it happened, Jefferson was called upon to put into form a suitable statement of the chief considerations which prompted them to this great act of revolution, and which, as they believed, justified it. What, then, was Jefferson to do? . . . Was he not . . . to regard himself as, for the time being, the very mouthpiece and prophet of the people whom he represented, and as such required to bring together and to set in order, in their name, not what was new, but what was old; to gather up into his own soul, as much as possible, whatever was then also in their souls—their very thoughts and passions, their ideas of constitutional law, their interpretations of fact, their opinions as to men and as to events in all that ugly quarrel; their notions of justice, of civic dignity, of human rights; finally, their memories of wrongs inflicted upon them during those twelve years by the hands of insolent and brutal men, in the name of the king, and by his apparent command? Moreover, as the nature of the task laid upon him made it necessary that he should thus state, as the reasons for their intended act, those very considerations both as to fact and as to opinion which had actually operated upon their minds, so did it require him to do so, to some extent, in the very language which the people themselves, in their more formal and deliberate utterances, had all along been using. In the development of political life in England

and America, there had already been created a vast literature of constitutional progress—a literature common to both portions of the English race, pervaded by its own stately traditions, and reverberating certain great phrases which formed, as one may say, almost the vernacular of English justice, and of English aspiration for a free, manly, and orderly political life. In this vernacular the Declaration of Independence was written. The phraseology thus characteristic of it, is the very phraseology of the champions of constitutional expansion, of civic dignity and of progress, within the English freedom in the seventeenth century, particularly the Petition of Right in 1629, and the Bill of Rights in 1689; of the great English charters for colonization in America; of the great English exponents of legal and political progress,—Sir Edward Coke, John Milton, Algernon Sidney, John Locke; finally, of the great American exponents of political liberty and of the chief representative bodies, whether local or general, which had convened in America from the time of the Stamp Act Congress until that of the Congress which resolved upon our Independence. To say, therefore, that the official Declaration of that resolve is a paper made up of the very opinions, beliefs, unbeliefs, the very sentiments, prejudices, passions, even the errors in judgment and the personal misconstructions—if they were such—which then actually impelled the American people to that mighty act, and that all these are expressed in the very phrases which they had been accustomed to use, is to pay to that state paper the highest tribute as to its fitness for the purpose for which it was framed."—M. C. Tyler, *Literary history of the American Revolution, 1763-1783*, v. 1, pp. 499, 504-507.—The following is the text of the great manifesto:

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.—Such has been the patient sufferance of these

Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the legislative Powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within. He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of the new Appropriations of Lands. He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our People, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislature. He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power. He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States: For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world: For imposing taxes on us without our Consent: For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences: For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies: For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with Power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, rav-

aged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions. In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free People. Nor have We been wanting in attention to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends. We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.—John Hancock. *New Hampshire*—Josiah Bartlett, Wm. Whipple, Matthew Thornton. *Massachusetts Bay*—Saml. Adams, John Adams, Robt. Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry. *Rhode Island*—Step. Hopkins, William Ellery. *Connecticut*—Roger Sherman, Sam'l Huntington, Wm. Williams, Oliver Wolcott. *New York*—Wm. Floyd, Phil. Livingston, Frans. Lewis, Lewis Morris. *New Jersey*—Richd. Stockton, Jno. Witherspoon, Fras. Hopkinson, John Hart, Abra. Clark. *Pennsylvania*—Robt. Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benja. Franklin, John Morton, Geo. Clymer, Jas. Smith, Geo. Taylor, James Wilson, Geo. Ross. *Delaware*—Cæsar Rodney, Geo. Read, Tho. M'Kean. *Maryland*—Samuel Chase, Wm. Paca, Thos. Stone, Charles Carroll of Carrollton. *Virginia*—George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Th. Jefferson, Benja. Harrison, Thos. Nelson, jr.,



Francis Lightfoot Lee, Carter Braxton. *North Carolina*—Wm. Hooper, Joseph Hewes, John Penn. *South Carolina*—Edward Rutledge, Thos. Heyward, Junr., Thomas Lynch, Junr., Arthur Middleton. *Georgia*—Button Gwinnett, Lyman Hall, Geo. Walton.

"The engrossed parchment with original signatures, preserved for many years in the building of the Department of State at Washington, was transferred in 1921 by an Executive order to the Library of Congress. Until 1894 it was on exhibition. But over a century's exposure to the light wrought such damage that the cracked and faded document had to be inclosed in a steel case."—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, p. 80, footnote.

ALSO IN: C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, pp. 84-85.

1776 (July).—**Constitutional effect of Declaration of Independence.**—"The Declaration of Independence did not create thirteen sovereign states, but the representatives of the people declared that the former English colonies, under the name which they had assumed of the United States of America, became, from the 4th day of July, 1776, a sovereign state and a member of the family of nations, recognized by the law of nations; and further, that the people would support their representatives with their blood and treasure, in their endeavor to make this declaration a universally recognized fact. Neither congress nor the people relied in this upon any positive right belonging either to the individual colonies or to the colonies as a whole. Rather did the Declaration of Independence and the war destroy all existing political jural relations, and seek their moral justification in the right of revolution inherent in every people in extreme emergencies. . . . Political theories had nothing to do with this development of things. It was the natural result of given circumstances and was an accomplished fact before anyone thought of the legal consequences which might subsequently be deduced from it"—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 1.

1776 (August).—**Struggle for New York and the Hudson.—Battle of Long Island.**—"Washington had been informed, early in January that General Sir Henry Clinton had sailed from Boston, with a considerable body of troops, on a secret expedition. Apprehending that the city of New York was his destination, he immediately dispatched General Charles Lee to Connecticut to raise troops, and to proceed to that city to watch and oppose Clinton wherever he might attempt to land. Six weeks before the evacuation of Boston [March 17, 1776], Lee had encamped near New York with twelve hundred militia. Already the Sons of Liberty had been busy, and overt acts of rebellion had been committed by them. They had seized the cannons at Fort George, and driven Tryon, the royal governor, on board the *Asia*, a British armed vessel in the harbor. In March, Clinton arrived at Sandy Hook, just outside New York harbor, and on the same day, the watchful Lee providentially entered the city. The movement, although without a knowledge of Clinton's position, was timely, for it kept him at bay. Foiled in his attempt upon New York, that commander sailed southward. . . . The destination of Howe, when he left Boston, was also unknown to Washington. Supposing he, too, would proceed to New York, he put the main body of his army in motion toward that city, as soon as he

had placed Boston in a state of security. He arrived in New York about the middle of April [April 14], and proceeded at once to fortify the town and vicinity, and also the passes of the Hudson Highlands, fifty miles above. In the mean while, General Lee, who had been appointed to command the American forces in the South, had left his troops in the charge of General Lord Stirling [March 7], and was hastening toward the Carolinas to watch the movements of Clinton, arouse the Whigs, and gather an army there. . . . Pursuant to instructions, General Howe proceeded toward New York, to meet General Clinton and Parker's fleet. He left Halifax on the 11th of June, [1776], and arrived at Sandy Hook on the 29th. On the 2d day of July he took possession of Staten Island, where he was joined by Sir Henry Clinton [July 11], from the South, and his brother, Admiral Lord Howe [July 12], with a fleet and a large land force, from England. Before the first of August, other vessels arrived with a part of the Hessian troops, and on that day, almost 30,000 soldiers, many of them tried veterans, stood ready to fall upon the republican army of 17,000 men, mostly militia, which lay entrenched in New York and vicinity, less than a dozen miles distant. The grand object in view was the seizure of New York and the country along the Hudson, so as to keep open a communication with Canada, separate the patriots of New England from those of the other states, and to overrun the most populous portion of the revolted colonies. This was the military plan, arranged by ministers. They had also prepared instructions to their commanding generals, to be pacific, if the Americans appeared disposed to submit. Lord Howe and his brother, the general, were commissioned to 'grant pardon to all who deserved mercy,' and to treat for peace, but only on terms of absolute submission on the part of the colonies, to the will of the King and parliament. After making a foolish display of arrogance and weakness, in addressing General Washington as a private gentleman, and being assured that the Americans had been guilty of no offense requiring a 'pardon' at their hands, they prepared to strike an immediate and effective blow."—B. J. Lossing, *Family history of the United States*, period 5, ch. 3.—"Realizing that the weight of the British attack would fall on New York, Washington had detached Charles Lee to undertake its defense, and, upon the British evacuation of Boston, had himself repaired thither with the bulk of his army. The city of New York . . . was exceedingly difficult to defend, owing to its being commanded by the heights of Brooklyn on the western end of Long Island and being accessible on either side to the guns of ships of war. Military considerations, alone, would have dictated its abandonment, but other reasons demanded that the Americans should attempt to retain it. Washington, therefore, fortified Brooklyn Heights, and stationed a large portion of his small force on the hills in front of that position. The American army was decimated by sickness; among those in the hospital at the moment was Nathanael Greene, to whom the command of this important post had been given. It fell, therefore, to Israel Putnam and John Sullivan, neither of whom seems to have been fully aware of the precise part he was expected to play. Most skillfully Howe attacked (August 27, 1776) the outlying body of Americans, marched a formidable portion of his soldiers by night [in three divisions under Generals Grant, De Heister, and Clinton and Cornwallis] far to the right of the American

position, captured a mounted patrol that had been sent to watch the road, thrust his detachment between the two American forces, and captured nearly the whole of Sullivan's command with its leader. He stopped his soldiers in front of the heights. By a miracle of good fortune, Washington rescued the garrison and transported it across the East River to Manhattan Island. Then came delay after delay on the part of the British commander; but time did not strengthen Washington's hands. The British and Hessian army under Howe was the finest force that had yet appeared on one side in America, and in the open field could not be opposed by any troops that Washington could summon. It followed, therefore, that notwithstanding some brilliant strokes, as at Harlem Plains and Chatterton Hill the Americans were finally driven from Manhattan Island and the mainland immediately north of it. With the main body Washington retreated slowly across the Jerseys, and, finally, in December, passed the Delaware into Pennsylvania. The one serious disaster in this movement was the loss of Fort Washington at the northern end of Manhattan Island with its entire garrison and all its munitions of war."—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 229-232.

ALSO IN: H. P. Johnston, *Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn (Memoirs of Long Island Historical Society, v. 3, ch. 1-5)*.—T. W. Field, *Battle of Long Island (Memoirs of Long Island Historical Society, v. 2)*.—W. A. Duer, *Life of William Alexander, earl of Stirling*, ch. 5.—J. Fiske, *American Revolution, v. 1, ch. 5*.—C. F. Adams, *Contemporary opinion on the Howes (Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Nov., 1910, pp. 94-120)*.

1776 (September-November).—Struggle for New York and the Hudson.—Successes of the British.—Washington's retreat into New Jersey.—“At daybreak the British awoke, but it was too late. They had fought a successful battle, they had the American army in their grasp, and now all was over. The victory had melted away, and, as a grand result, they had a few hundred prisoners, a stray boat with three camp-followers, and the deserted works in which they stood. To make such a retreat as this was a feat of arms as great as most victories, and in it we see, perhaps as plainly as anywhere, the nerve and quickness of the man who conducted it. It is true it was the only chance of salvation, but the great man is he who is entirely master of his opportunity, even if he have but one. The outlook, nevertheless, was as Washington wrote, ‘truly distressing.’ The troops were dispirited, and the militia began to disappear, as they always did after a defeat. Congress would not permit the destruction of the city; different interests pulled in different directions, conflicting opinions distracted the councils of war, and, with utter inability to predict the enemy's movements, everything led to halfway measures and to intense anxiety, while Lord Howe tried to negotiate with Congress, and the Americans waited for events, Washington, looking beyond the confusion of the moment, saw that he had gained much by delay, and had his own plan well defined. . . . Every one else, however, saw only past defeat and present peril. The British ships gradually made their way up the river, until it became apparent that they intended to surround and cut off the American army. Washington made preparations to withdraw, but uncertainty of information came

near rendering his precautions futile. September 15th the men-of-war opened fire, and troops were landed near Kip's Bay. The militia in the breastworks at that point had been at Brooklyn and gave way at once, communicating their panic to two Connecticut regiments. Washington, galloping down to the scene of battle, came upon the disordered and flying troops. He dashed in among them, conjuring them to stop, but even while he was trying to rally them they broke again on the appearance of some sixty or seventy of the enemy, and ran in all directions. In a tempest of anger Washington drew his pistols, struck the fugitives with his sword, and was only forced from the field by one of his officers seizing the bridle of his horse and dragging him away from the British, now within a hundred yards of the spot. . . . The rout and panic over, Washington quickly turned to deal with the pressing danger. With coolness and quickness he issued his orders, and succeeded in getting his army off, Putnam's division escaping most narrowly. He then took post at King's Bridge, and began to strengthen and fortify his lines. While thus engaged, the enemy advanced, and on the 16th a sharp skirmish was fought, in which the British were repulsed, and great bravery was shown by the Connecticut and Virginia troops, the two commanding officers being killed. This affair, which was the first gleam of success, encouraged the troops, and was turned to the best account by the general. Still a successful skirmish did not touch the essential difficulties of the situation, which then as always came from within, rather than without. To face and check 25,000 well equipped and highly disciplined soldiers, Washington had now some 12,000 men, lacking in everything which goes to make an army, except mere individual courage and a high average of intelligence. Even this meagre force was an inconstant and diminishing quantity, shifting, uncertain, and always threatening dissolution. The task of facing and fighting the enemy was enough for the ablest of men; but Washington was obliged also to combat and overcome the inertness and dulness born of ignorance, and to teach Congress how to govern a nation at war. . . . Meanwhile the days slipped along, and Washington waited on the Harlem Plains, planning descents on Long Island, and determining to make a desperate stand where he was, unless the situation decidedly changed. Then the situation did change, as neither he nor any one else apparently had anticipated. The British warships came up the Hudson past the forts, brushing aside our boasted obstructions, destroying our little fleet, and getting command of the river. Then General Howe landed at Frog's Point, where he was checked for the moment by the good disposition of Health, under Washington's direction. These two events made it evident that the situation of the American army was full of peril, and that retreat was again necessary. Such certainly was the conclusion of the council of war, on the 16th, acting this time in agreement with their chief. Six days Howe lingered on Frog's Point, bringing up stores or artillery or something, . . . and gave six days to Washington. They were of little value to Howe, but they were of inestimable worth to Washington, who employed them in getting everything in readiness, in holding his council of war, and on the 17th in moving deliberately off to very strong ground at White Plains. . . . [It was at this time that Captain Nathan Hale, a native of Connecticut, was captured on Manhattan Island, while

seeking information within the British lines and executed as a spy. His last words: "I only regret I have but one life to lose for my country," flew through the army as if winged, and became the expression of patriotism throughout the country.] On the 28th, Howe came up to Washington's position, and found the Americans quite equal in numbers, strongly intrenched, and awaiting his attack with confidence. He hesitated, doubted, and finally feeling that he must do something, sent 4,000 men to storm Chatterton Hill, an outlying post, where some 1,400 Americans were stationed. There was a short, sharp action, and then the Americans retreated in good order to the main army, having lost less than half as many men as their opponents. With caution now much enlarged, Howe sent for reinforcements, and waited two days. The third day it rained, and on the

It was a serious and most depressing loss, and was felt throughout the continent. Meantime Washington had crossed into the Jerseys, and, after the loss of Fort Lee, began to retreat before the British, who, flushed with victory, now advanced rapidly under Lord Cornwallis."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 1, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, ch. 33-36.—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathanael Greene*, v. 1, ch. 8-11.—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the American Revolution*, v. 2, ch. 23.—W. E. H. Lecky, *American Revolution*, pp. 250-261.

1776-1777. — Washington's retreat through New Jersey and his masterly return movement. — Victories at Trenton and Princeton retrieving the situation.—"On the 17th [of November] Washington ordered Lee [who had lately returned



DEFENSE OF FORT WASHINGTON, NOV. 16, 1776

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fourth Howe found that Washington had withdrawn to a higher and quite impregnable line of hills, where he held all the passes in the rear and awaited a second attack. Howe contemplated the situation for two or three days longer, and then broke camp and withdrew to Dobbs Ferry. Such were the great results of the victory of Long Island, two wasted months, and the American army still untouched. Howe was resolved, however, that his campaign should not be utterly fruitless, and therefore directed his attention to the defences of the Hudson, Fort Lee, and Fort Mifflin, and here he met with better success. Congress, in its military wisdom, had insisted that these forts must and could be held. . . . An attempt was made to hold both forts, and both were lost, as he [Washington] had foreseen. From Fort Lee the garrison withdrew in safety. Fort Mifflin was carried by storm, after a severe struggle. Twenty-six hundred men and all the munitions of war fell into the hands of the enemy.

from the south, and who had command of 7,000 men at Northcastle] to come over and join him; but Lee disobeyed, and in spite of repeated orders from Washington he stayed at Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward had some time since resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to Washington. A good many people were finding fault with the latter for losing the 3,000 men at Fort Mifflin, although . . . that was not his fault but the fault of Congress. Lee now felt that if Washington were ruined, he would surely become his successor in the command of the army, and so, instead of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing letters calculated to injure him. Lee's disobedience thus broke the army in two, and did more for the British than they had been able to do for themselves since they started from Staten Island. It was the cause of Washington's flight through New Jersey, ending on the 8th of December, when he put himself behind the Delaware river, with scarcely 3,000 men. Here was



another difficulty. The American soldiers were enlisted for short terms, and when they were discouraged, as at present, they were apt to insist upon going home as soon as their time had expired. It was generally believed that Washington's army would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did not think it worth while to be at the trouble of collecting boats wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to Baltimore. People in New Jersey began taking the oath of allegiance to the crown. Howe received the news that he had been knighted for his victory on Long Island, and he returned to New York to celebrate the occasion. While the case looked so desperate for Washington, events at the north had taken a less unfavourable turn. Carleton [who began preparations to invade the province of New York as soon as Arnold retreated from Canada] had embarked on Lake Champlain early in the autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had fitted up a small fleet to oppose his advance, and on the 11th of October there had been a fierce naval battle between the two near Valcour Island, in which Arnold was defeated, while Carleton suffered serious damage. The British general then advanced upon Ticonderoga, but suddenly made up his mind that the season was too late for operations in that latitude. The resistance he had encountered seems to have made him despair of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d of November he started back for Canada. This retreat relieved General Schuyler at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and presently he detached seven regiments to go southward to Washington's assistance. On the 2d of December Lee crossed the Hudson with 4,000 men, and proceeded slowly to Morristown. Just what he designed to do was never known, but clearly he had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to assist Washington, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it certainly was. Whatever his plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud. For some unknown reason he passed the night of the 12th at an unguarded tavern, about four miles from his army; and there he was captured next morning by a party of British dragoons, who carried him off to their camp at Princeton. The dragoons were very gleeful over this unexpected exploit, but really they could not have done the Americans a greater service than to rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came in the nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid of Washington. Even after this force and that sent by Schuyler had reached the commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6,000 men fit for duty. With this little force Washington instantly took the offensive. It was the turning-point of his career and in the history of the Revolutionary War. On Christmas, 1776, and the following nine days, all Washington's most brilliant powers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 strong, lay at Princeton. The principal generals, thinking the serious business of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced party of Hessians, 1,000 strong, were posted on the bank of the Delaware at Trenton, and another one lower down, at Burlington. Washington decided to attack both these outposts, and arranged his troops accordingly, but when Christmas night arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating ice, and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the one that Washington led in person. It was less than 2,500 in number, but the moment had come when

the boldest course was the safest. By daybreak Washington had surprised the Hessians at Trenton and captured them all. The outpost at Burlington, on hearing the news, retreated to Princeton. By the 31st Washington had got all his available force across to Trenton. Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others who had just gone home. At this critical moment the army was nearly helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning Robert Morris was knocking at door after door in Philadelphia, waking up his friends to borrow the \$50,000, which he sent off to Trenton before noon. The next day Cornwallis arrived at Princeton, and taking with him all the army, except a rear-guard of 2,000 men left to protect his communications, came on toward Trenton. When he reached that town, late in the afternoon, he found Washington entrenched behind a small creek just south of the town, with his back toward the Delaware river. 'Oho!' said Cornwallis, 'at last we have run down the old fox, and we will bag him in the morning.' He sent back to Princeton, and ordered the rear-guard to come up. He expected next morning to cross the creek above Washington's right, and then press him back against the broad and deep river, and compel him to surrender. Cornwallis was by no means a careless general, but he seems to have gone to bed on that memorable night and slept the sleep of the just. Washington meanwhile was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging and entrenching, and made a fine show with his camp-fires. Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek, and got around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered the British rear-guard, fought a sharp battle with it and sent it flying, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late. To preserve his communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown. There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a position. But to leave Washington in possession of Morristown was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For that position guarded the Highlands of the Hudson on the one hand, and the roads to Philadelphia on the other. Except that the British had taken the city of New York—which from the start was almost a foregone conclusion—they were no better off than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island. In nine days the tables had been completely turned. The attack upon an outpost had developed into a campaign which quite retrieved the situation. The illtimed interference of Congress, which had begun the series of disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated; and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier successes had been local; this was continental. Seldom has so much been done with such slender means."—J. Fiske, *War of Independence*, ch. 6.—"The effect of these two unexpected strokes at Trenton and Princeton was to baffle Howe, and utterly disconcert his plans. Expecting to march upon Philadelphia at his leisure, he suddenly finds Washington turning about and literally cutting his way through the British posts, back to a point where he threatened Howe's flank and rear. The enemy were at once compelled to retire from all their positions below Brunswick,

give up the thought of wintering in Philadelphia, and fall back to the vicinity of New York. When Horace Walpole heard of these movements, he wrote to Sir Horace Mann: 'Washington has shown himself both a Fabius and a Camillus. His march through our lines is allowed to have been a prodigy of generalship. In one word, I look upon a great part of America as lost to this country.' Here the campaign closed. Washington could not be dislodged from his strong mountain position, and Howe was satisfied to rest his troops and postpone further operations until the next season. Meantime the country took heart, Congress voted troops and supplies, and the army was recruited and organized on a better basis. 'The business of war is the result of Experience,' wrote Wolcott from Congress with faith unshaken

Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 21.

1776-1777.—Prisoners and exchanges.—British treatment of captives.—Jersey prison-ship and sugar-house prison.—In New York, during the British occupation of the city, "wretched indeed was the condition of the poor refugee, or the sick soldier, and, above all, the patriot prisoner. The newspapers are filled with calls for charitable contributions for women and children perishing with cold and hunger, for disabled soldiers and families without a shelter. . . . But if the favored Tories suffered, what must have been the condition of the patriot prisoners, confined by thousands in bleak barracks, churches, and prison-ships? . . . In the old Sugar-House were confined the prisoners of Long Island, the captives of sudden forays, the



BATTLE OF PRINCETON, JAN. 3, 1777

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during the darkest hours of the campaign; and experience was now put to good profit. The crisis was passed. Events proved decisive. Hardship and anxiety were yet to come during succeeding years of the war; but it was the result of this year's struggle that cleared away misgivings and confirmed the popular faith in final success. England could do no more than she had done to conquer America; while America was now more ready than ever to meet the issue. Independence was established in the present campaign—in the year of its declaration; and more than to any others we owe this political privilege to the men who fought from Long Island to Princeton."—H. P. Johnston, *Campaign of 1776* (*Memoirs of the Long Island Historical Society*, v. 3, pt. 1, ch. 8).

Also in: J. F. Hageman, *History of Princeton*, v. 1, ch. 4, sect. 4-5.—J. O. Raum, *History of New Jersey*, v. 2, ch. 20.—W. B. Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, v. 1, ch. 4.—W. C. Bryant and S. H.

patriot citizen, and the heroes of the rebel army. Clothed in rags and scarcely covered from the winter air, crowded in narrow apartments and broken by hunger and disease, the prisoners died by thousands. The sick lay down on beds of snow to perish; the feeble wounded quivered in the February blast. Food of the coarsest kind was served out to them in scanty measure, and devoured with the eagerness of famine. . . . So wretched was their condition that Washington refused to consider them fit subjects for exchange. 'You give us only the dead or dying,' he wrote to Howe, 'for our well-fed and healthy prisoners.' Howe, as if in mockery, replied that they had been kept in 'airy, roomy buildings,' on the same fare as his own soldiers. Washington pointed to the condition in which they reached him—diseased, famished, emaciated, and dying, as they were conducted to his quarters. Across the river, in Wallabout Bay, lay the prison-ship 'Jersey.' She was the hulk of a 64 gun ship, long unseaworthy, her

masts and rigging gone, her figure-head broken off, and her whole appearance singularly repulsive. Yet on board of the Jersey were confined 1,200 captured seamen. She was never cleansed, and lay in that condition seven years. . . . The crowded city itself was never free from contagion. In winter the small-pox made fearful ravages."—E. Lawrence, *New York in the Revolution* (*Harper's Magazine*, July, 1868).

ALSO IN: *Force's American Archives*, 4th series, v. 6, 5th series, v. 1-3.—*Historical Magazine*, 1866, supplement.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 21.

1776-1778.—Attitude in England toward American colonies. See ENGLAND: 1776-1778.

1776-1778.—Attitude and feeling of France.—Her disposition to aid the colonies and reasons for it.—American embassy to French court.—Silas Deane and Beaumarchais.—Benjamin Franklin.—"On March 17, 1776, Vergennes presented to his associates in the cabinet—Maurepas, Turgot (controller-general), Sartine (secretary of the navy), and St. Germain (secretary of war)—a paper entitled 'Considerations,' which, after for many years evading the search of historians, . . . was brought to light by De Witt and republished by Doniol. In this important paper Vergennes, after some general reflections on the advantages which the two crowns of France and Spain derived from the continuance of the civil war in America, and, on the other hand, on the inconveniences which might arise from the independence of the Colonies, and the probability that, in case of failure in North America, England would, to recover its credit, turn its arms against the French and Spanish possessions in America, proceeds to consider the course at once to be pursued. He bitterly attacks the English for their habitual breach of good faith, violation of treaties, and disregard of that observance of the sacred laws of morality which distinguish the French, and infers that they will take the first opportunity to declare war against France or invade Mexico. No doubt, if the kings of France and Spain had martial tendencies; if they obeyed the dictates of their own interests, and perhaps the justice of their cause, which was that of humanity, so often outraged by England; if their military resources were in a sufficiently good condition, they would feel that Providence had evidently chosen that very hour for humiliating England and revenging on her the wrongs she had inflicted on those who had the misfortune to be her neighbors and rivals, by rendering the resistance of the Americans as desperate as possible. The exhaustion produced by this internecine war would prostrate both England and her Colonies, and would afford an opportunity to reduce England to the condition of a second-rate power; to tear from her the empire she aimed at establishing in the four quarters of the world with so much pride and injustice, and relieve the universe of a tyranny which desires to swallow up both all the power and all the wealth of the world. But the two crowns not being able to act in this way, they must have recourse to a circum-spect policy." Vergennes "draws the following inferences: (1) That they should continue dexterously to keep the English ministry in a state of false security with respect to the intentions of France and Spain. (2) That it would be politic to give the insurgents secret assistance in military stores and money; that the admitted utility would justify this little sacrifice, and no loss of dignity or breach of equity would be involved in it. (3) That it would not be consistent with the king's

dignity or interest to make an open contract with the insurgents until their independence was achieved. (4) That in case France and Spain should furnish assistance, they should look for no other return than the success of the political object they had at that moment in view, leaving themselves at liberty to be guided by circumstances as to any future arrangements. (5) That perhaps a too-marked inactivity at the present crisis might be attributed by the English to fear, and might expose France to insults to which it might not be disposed to submit. The English, he adds, respect only those who can make themselves feared. (6) That the result to which all these considerations led was that the two crowns should actively prepare means to resist or punish England, more especially as, of all possible issues, the maintenance of peace with that power was the least probable. . . . It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the French support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and exercised a decisive influence. There was a conviction, and a right one, in France that for Britain to hold under control the whole of North America as well as of India would give her a maritime supremacy, as well as a superiority in wealth, which would constitute a standing menace to the rest of the civilized world. There was, again, an enthusiasm among the young nobility and among officers in the army for America, which, even aside from the bitterness towards Britain with which it was mingled, had great effect on people as well as on court; and to this was added the sympathy of doctrinaire political philosophers who then and for some time afterwards had great power in forming French public opinion. By the enthusiasm of the young nobility the queen—brilliant, bold, weary of the traditions of the old court, inconsiderate as to ultimate political results—was affected, and through her her husband was reached. But above this was the sense of right which was uppermost in the breast of the unfortunate sovereign who then, with little political experience but high notions of duty as well as of prerogative, occupied the throne."—F. Wharton, ed., *Revolutionary diplomatic correspondence of the United States*, v. 1, introduction, ch. 4.—"From the earliest moment France had been hopefully regarded by the colonists as probably their friend and possibly their ally. To France, therefore, the first American envoy was dispatched with promptitude [receiving his instructions in March and reaching Paris in the following June, 1776] even before there was a declaration of independence or an assumption of nationality. Silas Deane was the man selected. He was the true Yankee jack-at-all-trades; he had been graduated at Yale College, then taught school, then practiced law, then engaged in trade, had been all the while advancing in prosperity and reputation, had been a member of the first and second congresses, had failed of reelection to the third, and was now without employment. Mr. Parton describes him as 'of somewhat striking manners and good appearance, accustomed to live and entertain in liberal style and fond of showy equipage and appointment.' Perhaps his simple-minded fellow-countrymen of the provinces fancied that such a man would make an imposing figure at an European court. He developed no other peculiar fitness for his position; he could not even speak French; and it proved an ill hour for himself in which he received this trying and difficult honor.

. . . Deane arrived in France in June, 1776. He had with him a little ready money for his immediate personal expenses, and some letters of introduction from Franklin. It was intended to keep him supplied with money by sending cargoes of tobacco, rice, and indigo consigned to him, the proceeds of which would be at his disposal for the public service. He was instructed to seek an interview with de Vergennes, the French minister for foreign affairs, and to endeavor with all possible prudence and delicacy to find out what signs of promise the disposition of the French government really held for the insurgents. He was also to ask for equipment for 25,000 troops, ammunition, and 200 pieces of field artillery, all to be paid for—when Congress should be able! In France he was to keep his mission cloaked in conducting his own affairs. . . . Before the arrival of Deane the interests of the colonies had been already taken in hand and substantially advanced in France by one of the most extraordinary characters in history. Baron de Beaumarchais was a man whom no race save the French could produce, and whose traits, career, and success lie hopelessly beyond the comprehension of the Anglo-Saxon. Bred a watchmaker, he had the skill, when a mere youth, to invent a clever escapement balance for regulating watches; had he been able to insert it into his own brain he might have held more securely his elusive good fortunes. From being an ingenious inventor he became an adventurer general, watchmaker to the king, the king's mistresses, and the king's daughters, the lover, or rather the beloved, of the wife of controller of the king's kitchen, then himself the controller, thence a courtier, and a favorite of the royal princesses. Through a clever use of his opportunities he was able to do a great favor to a rich banker, who in return gave him chances to amass a fortune, and lent him money to buy a patent of nobility. This connection ended in litigation, which was near ruining him; but he discovered corruption on the part of the judge, and thereupon wrote his Memorials, of which the wit, keenness, and vivacity made him famous. He then rendered a private, personal, and important service to Louis XV., and soon afterwards another to the young Louis XVI. . . . He became frenzied in the American cause. In long and ardent letters he opened upon King Louis and his ministers a rattling fire of arguments sound and unsound, statements true and untrue, inducements reasonable and unreasonable, forecastings probable and improbable, politics wise and unwise, all designed to show that it was the bounden duty of France to adopt the colonial cause."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Benjamin Franklin*, ch. 9.—Soon after the arrival of Deane in Paris, the American Congress, having determined to declare the independence of the states represented in it, appointed a committee "to prepare the plan of a treaty to be proposed to foreign powers, which, after a long discussion, was at length agreed to, and ministers were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed. Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were elected; but, the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the appointment offered him, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was chosen in his place. These transactions were placed on the secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any specific information concerning them, or to state more than, 'that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary for obtaining foreign alliances.' The secret committee were directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of £10,000

sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners. They assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that the success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than it had been at any time during the war with both France and Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities and energies of the nation. They were assured that the ports of France would remain open to their ships, and that the American merchants might freely vend in them every article of commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their country. But it was apparent that the minister wished to avoid a rupture with England, and was, therefore, unwilling to receive them openly as the ministers of the United States, or to enter into any formal negotiation with them."—J. Marshall, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 7.—"It is . . . a settled rule of diplomacy that a minister should not be pressed upon a foreign-court by which it is understood that he will not be received. To this may be added the rule that applications for loans should, unless as part of a treaty alliance, be made through business channels. In disregard of these rules the majority of Congress, under the influence of Richard H. Lee and Samuel Adams, instituted a series of missions to European courts for the bare purpose of borrowing money, when the courts so addressed not only gave no intimation that they would receive these envoys, but when, from the nature of things, as well as from unofficial intimation, it should have been known that such reception would be refused. With France there was no difficulty, as France had intimated unofficially that such envoys would be received, at least in a private capacity, France being then ready to take the consequence of war with Britain. And this reception was accorded . . . first to Silas Deane, then to Franklin, and then to Arthur Lee. Here Franklin thought Congress should stop, saying that ministers should not be sent to sovereigns without first having some sort of assurance of recognition of the United States as an independent sovereignty, and that a 'virgin' republic, as he called it, should wait till there was some such recognition before thrusting embassies on foreign courts with demands for money. Congress thought differently. Arthur Lee was instructed to go to Madrid with an alternate commission to Berlin; William Lee was sent to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The Hague, Izard to Florence, and the instructions in each case were to demand not only recognition, but subsidy. . . . The policy of sending ministers to European courts where such ministers were not received worked injuriously to the United States from the mere fact of their non-reception. Another difficulty arose from the circumstance that several of these ministers took up their residence in Paris, and, without specific authority, considered it their duty to take part in the counsels of the American legation. Thus Ralph Izard, commissioned to Tuscany, never went there, but remained in Paris, claiming a right to be informed of all the details of the negotiations with France, and occupying no small share of the time and care of Franklin with discussions of this claim, which Franklin could not accede to, but on which Izard continued to insist. When the triple legation of Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee (and afterwards Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Adams), was commissioned, it was understood that its members were to divide,

so that one (Franklin) should remain in Paris, while the others should take charge of the missions to other capitals. But Arthur Lee, when he found that he could not be received in Madrid, or in Vienna, or in Berlin, made but brief excursions to Spain, to Austria, and to Berlin, reporting himself after each short trip promptly at Paris, there to differ from Franklin, not only as to important business details, but as to the whole policy of the mission. When Adams was in Paris, during their joint mission, he concurred with Arthur Lee in what turned out to be the disastrous measure of removing Williams as commercial agent and putting in his place William Lee, with a nephew of William and Arthur Lee as clerk; while on the whole question of sending legations to foreign courts which had not consented to receive them, and in the still more important question of the attitude to be assumed by the commissioners to the French court, Adams agreed with Lee. . . . It is due to Adams to say that he saw the inherent difficulties of permanent missions conducted by three joint commissioners; that he recommended that there should be but one permanent minister to France; and that he recognized Franklin's great influence with the French ministry as a strong reason for his retention though without colleagues. But there can be no doubt that down to the period when Franklin became sole minister, the American cause in Europe was much embarrassed by the fact that he had colleagues associated with him."—F. Wharton, *Introduction to Revolutionary diplomatic correspondence of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 1, sect. 16-17, ch. 9, sect. 106.—Before Franklin or Lee reached France, Silas Deane had already entered into negotiations with Beaumarchais and opened a train of dealings which proved unfortunate for both. Leaving aside "all the long controversy about the rights and wrongs of Beaumarchais, which have never been completely and satisfactorily solved, . . . it appears that a large part of the misunderstanding between him and Deane and Arthur Lee is attributed to a change of plan between April and July, 1776. Beaumarchais's scheme of operation, when he saw Lee in London, was to expend money which should, at least in pretence and form, be obtained from the voluntary contributions of wealthy Frenchmen in aid of the American cause; but in July, when he saw Deane, that scheme had been dropped, and the project was that he should appear as a merchant. . . . In May, there was a plan on the part of the French government to employ a real merchant. Now the plan was to employ a comedy merchant. This was exactly the rôle which Beaumarchais was qualified to fill, and he proceeded to establish and open a large house, with all the accessories of a house of business, as the same are understood and represented on the stage. At that time it was believed that the colonists had plenty of exportable products which they could and would contribute for the purpose [purchase?] of arms and ammunition. It was thought that their main difficulty would be to find any market in which they could purchase contraband of war. The chief assistance, therefore, which they would need from France would be secret permission to make this exchange in France. Beaumarchais's commercial operations would be real commercial operations, and at worst could only issue in some expenses and losses, on the balance of account, which the French government might have to make good. Beaumarchais approached Deane with all the forms and reality of a commercial proposition, and Deane assured him that he should have same returns in

six months, and full pay for everything which he supplied in a year. Two days later they made a contract by which Congress was to pay the current price of the goods in America when they should arrive, or take them at the cost price, with insurance, charges, and commission 'proportioned to the trouble and care, which cannot now be fixed.' . . . August 18, Beaumarchais writes to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that, led by esteem for a people struggling for liberty, he has established an extensive commercial house, solely for the purpose of supplying them with all things useful, even gold for the payment of troops; and that without waiting for their consent he has already procured 200 cannons, 200,000 pounds of powder, 20,000 guns, with balls, lead, clothing, etc. He wants the cargoes consigned to him in return, and promises that he has great power to use any consignments whatsoever; but he wants especially tobacco. He signs this letter Roderique Hortales & Co. . . . A million livres were advanced by Spain to Beaumarchais, August 11, 1776, and the Farmers-general of France advanced a million livres, but took advantage of the distress of the Americans to stipulate that it should be paid for in tobacco at half its then current price. Beaumarchais also advanced money to Deane for his personal expenses; and it has never been doubted that he exerted himself with the utmost energy, if not always with the greatest prudence, to expedite the shipment of the goods. Of the three ships which he despatched at the end of the year, two were captured by the English; but the one which arrived was of the greatest possible value to the cause. . . . When Arthur Lee received his appointment as Commissioner to France and entered upon the discharge of his duties, he found that the promises made to him by Beaumarchais . . . had not been kept. He reported to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that a change in the mode of sending had been settled between Deane and Hortales. . . . Arthur Lee always held the attitude of suspicion that Deane and Beaumarchais were in a conspiracy to levy contributions for themselves on the free gifts of France to the United States. Franklin always affected to ignore the dealings with Beaumarchais, and to treat them as exclusively in the hands of Deane; while Congress always showed themselves very careful not to pay for anything which possibly was intended as a gift. Therefore Deane and Beaumarchais were left for years to claim and protest that there had been genuine mercantile contracts which had not been fulfilled, and they could scarcely obtain attention. . . . September 8, 1777, Congress voted that Deane had no authority to make contracts with persons to come to America. November 21, they voted to recall him. Undoubtedly the vexation which Deane had caused them by sending over a great number of persons to serve in the army, under contracts which enabled them to demand large pay and high rank, was the chief cause of irritation against him; but Arthur Lee had also been poisoning the mind of his brother, and through him, of the whole Lee-Adams faction in Congress, with suspicions of Deane's honesty. Deane had found himself transferred, within a period of two or three years, from an utterly obscure existence at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to the position of a quasi-ambassador at the court of France. He adopted a large and expensive style of living, and kept open house for the Americans at Paris. It is very reasonable to suppose that this large expenditure on his part was one of the chief grounds of belief that he was

making great gain out of his position. . . . The affair of Silas Deane has importance far beyond the merits or the fate of that individual. The quarrel over him and his rights and wrongs, as will presently be seen, entered into the hottest party contests in Congress during the next two or three years, and it comes up again often subsequently. It has even been asserted that the intimacy into which John Adams was thrown with the Lees, in this connection, was what made him President of the United States, by winning him votes from Virginia in 1796. January 1, 1778, Beaumarchais, having heard that money had been given to the Americans through Grand, the banker, writes to Vergennes: 'So I have lost the fruit of the most noble and incredible labour by those very exertions which conduct others to glory.' . . . He is in terror of bankruptcy. Inasmuch as a treaty of alliance between France and the United States was now made, matters had entered upon a new stage. Beaumarchais, with his fictitious firm of Hortales, was no longer necessary or useful. The French government dealt directly with the American envoys in granting supplies and subsidies. April 7, Congress made a contract with Hortales that they should pay, for all the cargoes already shipped and those to be shipped, the first cost, charges, and freight, in France. The contract between Beaumarchais and Deane is recognized. Hortales is to pay bills drawn every two months at double usance for twenty-four million livres annually. This article, however, is subject to ratification by the house in Paris and the American Commissioners at Paris. American produce is to be exported and consigned to this house. Interest is to be paid on all sums due, with a commission of two and a half per cent. From this time Beaumarchais falls out of sight as an agent of aid and supplies to the American cause, and becomes a claimant, who considers that he has been treated with injustice and ingratitude by the United States."—W. G. Sumner, *Financier and the finances of the American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 8.—"The episode of Beaumarchais . . . was a survival of the secret diplomacy of Louis XV for a short time exercising an extraordinary influence in the first period of the reign of Louis XVI. Louis XVI, on reaching the throne, found the machinery of secret diplomacy so ingeniously constructed by his predecessor in full operation; and, . . . for one or two delicate inquiries at the outset of the new reign, Beaumarchais, who of all the diplomatists of this peculiar breed was the most adroit and fertile in expedients, was well fitted. Hence came his employment, and from his employment came his suggestions, full of brilliant wit and effective reasoning, as to America. But the antagonism between him and Vergennes was too marked to permit sustained political relationship; and when Franklin entered into diplomatic life in Paris Beaumarchais ceased to take a prominent political position. And even during the period of Beaumarchais' greatest activity it must be remembered that he was not technically Vergennes' subordinate. It was one of the peculiarities of the secret diplomacy of Louis XIV and Louis XV, as depicted by Broglié in his admirable treatise on that topic, that even the existence of the secret agent was not to be supposed to be known to the king's ostensible ministers. This was not the case with Beaumarchais; but at the same time Beaumarchais' political influence ceased . . . when, on the arrival of Franklin, Vergennes, with Franklin's aid, took control of Anglo-American diplomacy."—F. Wharton, *Introduction to Revolutionary diplomatic*

*correspondence of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 4, sect. 55.—See also below: 1778 (February); FRANCE: 1775-1776.

ALSO IN: E. E. Hale, *Franklin in France*.—J. B. Perkins, *France in the American Revolution*.—W. C. Bruce, *Benjamin Franklin self-revealed*, v. 1, pp. 247-297.—J. Bigelow, ed., *Life of Franklin, by himself*, v. 2, ch. 13-15.—J. Parton, *Life of Franklin*, v. 2, pt. 6.—L. de Loménie, *Beaumarchais and his times*, v. 3, ch. 20-23.—*Papers in relation to the case of Silas Deane (Seventy-Six Society, 1855)*.—C. Tower, Jr., *Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 5.


1776-1779.—Thirteen Colonies become states.—Framing and adoption of state constitutions.—"The recommendations to form governments proceeded from the general congress; the work was done by the several states, in the full enjoyment of self-direction. Each of them claimed to be of right a free, sovereign, and independent state; each bound its officers to bear to it true allegiance, and to maintain its freedom and independence. Massachusetts [see MASSACHUSETTS: 1776], which was the first state to frame a government independent of the king, deviated as little as possible from the letter of its charter; and, assuming that the place of governor was vacant from the 19th of July 1775, it recognised the council as the legal successor to executive power. On the 1st day of May 1776, in all commissions and legal processes, it substituted the name of its 'government and people' for that of the king. In June 1777, its legislature assumed power to prepare a constitution; but, on a reference to the people, the act was disavowed. In September 1779, a convention, which the people themselves had specially authorized, framed a constitution. It was in a good measure the compilation of John Adams, who was guided by the English constitution, by the bill of rights of Virginia, and by the experience of Massachusetts herself; and this constitution, having been approved by the people, went into effect in 1780. On the 5th of January 1776, New Hampshire [see NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1775-1776] shaped its government with the fewest possible changes from its colonial forms, like Massachusetts merging the executive power in the council. Not till June 1783 did its convention agree upon a more perfect instrument, which was approved by the people, and established on the 31st of the following October. The provisional constitution of South Carolina dates from the 26th of March 1776. [See SOUTH CAROLINA: 1776.] In March 1778, a permanent constitution was introduced by an act of the legislature. Rhode Island enjoyed under its charter a form of government so thoroughly republican that the rejection of monarchy, in May 1776, required no change beyond a renunciation of the king's name in the style of its public acts. [See RHODE ISLAND: 1776.] A disfranchisement of Catholics had stolen into its book of laws; but, so soon as it was noticed, the clause was expunged. In like manner, Connecticut had only to substitute the people of the colony for the name of the king; this was done provisionally on the 14th of June 1776, and made perpetual on the 10th of the following October. [See CONNECTICUT: 1776.] Before the end of June of the same year Virginia, sixth in the series, first in the completeness of her work, by a legislative convention without any further consultation of the people, framed and adopted a bill of rights, a declaration of independence, and a constitution. [See VIRGINIA: 1776.] On the second of July 1776, New Jersey perfected its new, self-created charter. [See NEW JERSEY:

1774-1776.] Delaware next proclaimed its bill of rights, and, on the 20th of September 1776, the representatives in convention having been chosen by the freemen of the state for that very purpose, finished its constitution. The Pennsylvania convention adopted its constitution on the 28th of September 1776; but the opposition of the Quakers whom it indirectly disfranchised, and of a large body of patriots, delayed its thorough organization for more than five months. [See PENNSYLVANIA: 1776.] The delegates of Maryland, meeting on the 14th of August 1776, framed its constitution with great deliberation; it was established on the 9th of the following November. [See MARYLAND: 1776.] On the 18th of December 1776, the constitution of North Carolina was ratified in the congress which framed it. On the 5th of February 1777, Georgia perfected its organic law by the unanimous agreement of its convention. [See GEORGIA: 1775-1777.] Last of the thirteen came New York, whose empowered convention, on the 20th of April 1777, established a constitution that, in humane liberality, exceeded them all. [See NEW YORK: 1777.] The privilege of the suffrage had been far more widely extended in the colonies than in England; by general consent, the extension of the elective franchise was postponed. The age of twenty-one was a qualification universally required. So, too, was residence, except that in Virginia and South Carolina it was enough to own in the district or town a certain freehold or 'lot.' South Carolina required the electors to 'acknowledge the being of a God, and to believe in a future state of rewards and punishments.' White men alone could claim the franchise in Virginia, in South Carolina, and in Georgia; but in South Carolina a benign interpretation of the law classed the free octaroon as a white, even though descended through an unbroken line of mothers from an imported African slave; the other ten states raised no question of color. In Pennsylvania, in New Hampshire, and partially in North Carolina, the right to vote belonged to every resident taxpayer; Georgia extended it to any white inhabitant 'of any mechanic trade'; with this exception, Georgia and all the other colonies required the possession of a freehold, or of property variously valued, in Massachusetts at about \$200, in Georgia at £10. Similar conditions had always existed, with the concurrence or by the act of the colonists themselves. Maryland prescribed as its rule that votes should be given by word of mouth; Virginia and New Jersey made no change in their usage; in Rhode Island each freeman was in theory summoned to be present in the general court; he therefore gave his proxy to his representative by writing his own name on the back of his vote; all others adopted the ballot, New York at the end of the war, the other eight without delay."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 5, ch. 9.—"Thanks to the political instinct of the people, the institution of the new [estate] governments, even in the midst of war and invasion, was accomplished quietly. As to Virginia, Jefferson wrote (August 13, '77).—"The people seem to have laid aside the monarchic, and taken up republican government, with as much ease as would have attended the throwing off an old and putting on a new suit of clothes.' No one of the first eleven constitutions was voted on by the people. In most cases the 'conventions' that adopted them had no express authority to do so; and some of those conventions had been elected months before there was any talk of independence. For the most part,

the constitutions were enacted precisely as ordinary laws were. In Virginia Jefferson urged a referendum on the constitution, arguing that otherwise it could be repealed by any legislature, like any other statute. But this doctrine was too advanced for his State. A 'union of mechanics' [mainly New Englanders] in New York, too, protested vigorously but vainly against the adoption of a constitution by a provincial convention without 'the inhabitants at large' being permitted to 'exercise the right God has given them . . . to approve or reject' it. In New England, on the other hand, thanks to the training of the town meeting, the sovereignty of the people was understood by every artisan and farmer, as elsewhere only by lonely thinkers. . . . The legislatures of Rhode Island and Connecticut did adopt the old charters as constitutions (without change), without reference to the people, because it was held that the people had already sanctioned them by long acquiescence. But in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, where new constitutions were to be adopted, there was no serious thought of acting without a popular referendum. Indeed, that was not enough. The people of these States demanded also a popular initiative in the matter. . . . The thirteen constitutions were strikingly alike. This was due mainly to the similarity between the preceding colonial governments, but in part to a remarkably active interchange of ideas among the leaders during the spring and summer of '76. Before the Fourth Virginia Convention Patrick Henry corresponded freely with the two Adamses. Members of Congress at Philadelphia constantly discussed forms of government at informal gatherings; and, on several occasions, delegates from distant colonies returned home to take part in constitution-making. All the constitutions were 'republican,' without a trace of hereditary privilege. Nearly all safeguarded the rights of the individual by a distinct bill of rights. Most of them formally adopted the English Common Law as part of the law of the land. Except in Pennsylvania and Georgia . . . the legislature had two Houses. Pennsylvania kept a plural executive,—a council with one member designated as 'president'; but elsewhere the revolutionary committees of safety gave way to a single 'governor' or 'president.' The governors, however, had less power than the old colonial governors. The people did not yet clearly see the difference between trusting an officer chosen by themselves and one appointed by a distant king. New York and Massachusetts, however, . . . had had time to learn the need of a firm executive, and strengthened that branch of government somewhat, though they left it weaker than is customary today. These two States also placed the election of the governor in the hands of the people directly. That was already the case in Connecticut and Rhode Island under the colonial charters. Everywhere else the executive was appointed by the legislature. Everywhere the legislature overshadowed the two other branches of government. The judiciary, . . . was usually chosen by the legislature and in many cases was removable by executive and legislature without formal trial. . . . The old executive check upon the legislature, the absolute veto, nowhere appeared. . . . New York gave [the qualified veto, now so common to] . . . the governor and judiciary acting together, in a 'revisionary council'; Massachusetts gave it to the governor alone. Religious discrimination was common. 'Freedom of worship' was generally asserted in the bills of rights; but this did not imply our

modern separation of church and state. Office-holding in several States was restricted to Protestant Christians, and some States kept a specially favored ('established') church. . . . Half these first constitutions had no amendment clause whatever. The omission was due partly to the political inexperience of that day; partly to the vague expectation that, on occasion, by a sort of peaceful revolution, the people would 'recur to fundamental principles. . . .' In South Carolina the legislature gave ninety days' notice (that public opinion might be known), and then acted as in passing any law. In Maryland, an amendment became part of the constitution if passed by two successive legislatures. In Delaware five sevenths of one house and seven ninths of the other were required to carry an

had only to be a taxpayer; but to vote for senator, he must own 50 acres of land; to sit as representative, he must have 100 acres; as senator, 300 acres; and as governor, £1000 of real estate. Here were four ingenious checks upon a dangerously encroaching democracy: (1) an upper House so chosen as to be a stronghold for the aristocracy; (2) indirect election of the executive and judiciary; (3) property qualifications, sometimes graded, for voting; and (4) higher qualifications for holding office. All these had been developed in the colonial period. On the whole the new States weakened the checks (and no State increased them); but every State retained some of them. . . . [In Virginia] According to Edmund Randolph, the phrase equally free was objected to as inconsistent with slavery. Such



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GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON EXAMINING THE FLAG MADE BY BETSY ROSS IN PHILADELPHIA

It was made in accordance with the design adopted by the Continental Congress in 1777

(After painting by J. W. Dunsmore)

amendment. . . . In Pennsylvania, amendments could be proposed only at intervals of seven years, and only in a . . . fashion—which eventually proved unworkable. Only Georgia and Massachusetts provided for calling constitutional conventions in modern fashion. . . . Commonly, a man had to have more property to vote for the upper than for the lower House of the legislature. . . . Commonly, too, there was a still higher qualification for sitting in the legislature,—often more for the upper House than for the lower,—and yet more for a governor. In several States, the upper House was chosen by the lower. In Massachusetts, all men who could vote for one House could vote for the other also, but in choosing the senate, the votes were so apportioned that a rich man counted for several poor men: the richer any part of the State, the more senatorial districts it had. North Carolina pretty well lost her democracy in these gradations: to vote for a representative, a man

objectors were quieted with the amazing assurance that 'slaves, not being constituent members of our society, could never pretend to any benefit from such a maxim.' In Massachusetts, similar words in her bill of rights of 1780 were held later by her courts to have abolished slavery within her limits, though that result was not thought of when the clause was adopted."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 218, 220-223, 215.

ALSO IN: *Force's American Archives*, series 5, v. 2-3.

1776-1800.—Growth of the caucus. See CAUCUS: United States: 1776-1800.

1776-1787.—Manhood suffrage. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1776-1787.

1776-1833.—Progress of agriculture. See AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: 1776-1833.

1777.—American flag introduced by act of Congress. See FLAGS: United States.



1777.—Committee for Foreign Affairs created by Congress. See STATE, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES: 1774-1789.

1777 (January-December).—Campaign on the Delaware.—Lord Howe in possession of Philadelphia.—Battles on the Brandywine and at Germantown.—Winter of Washington's army at Valley Forge.—“Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was not until late in the spring that the new levies reached headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to Middlebrook and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th of June Howe marched from Brunswick and . . . endeavored to bring on a general engagement, . . . but Washington refused to leave the strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy. Early in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. . . . On the 23d of July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels, the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. . . . Signal fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th, it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting with his brother, the general, continued on his course southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay, and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry.” Meantime, Washington had been in great uncertainty as to the destination and intentions of his antagonist, but had drawn his army near to Philadelphia. It had just been joined by several distinguished foreign officers, Lafayette, De Kalb and Pulaski in the number. At Philadelphia there was consternation on the approach of the enemy, but “the pacific influence which the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to bear down all military efforts. . . . To impress the lukewarm with the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the breasts of the patriotic, on the 24th of August Washington marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia. The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats.” The advance of Howe from Elk Ferry was slow, and it was not until September 11, that the Americans encountered him, at Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, where they had taken position. In the battle which occurred that day the British gained a clear victory, by means of a successful flank movement which Cornwallis executed, crossing the river some miles above, while General Knyphausen made feigned attempts at Chad's Ford. “The American loss was about 1,000, killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of the British, 579. . . . The day after the battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle should be risked before the city should be given up. On the 16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing

had actually begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the hills north of the valley, and, finding it impossible to repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and attack their rear should they attempt to follow.” But Wayne was surprised at Paoli, and Washington was deceived by a feigned movement, so that Howe succeeded in entering Philadelphia without another battle, on the 26th, having occupied Germantown the day before. “The main portion of Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single street, two miles in length, and five from the city.” Here, on the morning of October 4, Washington attacked him, and, for a time, with great success; but confusion and misunderstandings on the part of the attacking columns arose, which turned the half-won victory into a defeat. “The Americans lost nearly 1,100 killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British 521. . . . While the Americans were defeated in their object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor. It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that, though driven from the field of Brandywine, they were still aggressive.” The next few weeks were employed by Howe in reducing the forts which commanded the Delaware. Fort Mifflin was taken after a severe siege, and this compelled the abandonment of Fort Mercer, from which the British had been repulsed with heavy loss. Early in December Howe moved upon Washington's lines, at Whitemarsh, intending an attack; but found them so strong that he dared not venture the attempt, and returned to Philadelphia. “As the season was advancing, and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness. But the position was central and easily defended. The army arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection of huts began. They were built of logs, and were 14 by 15 feet each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes at the open fires. . . . The horses died of starvation by hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through their quarters with fearful rapidity. ‘The unfortunate soldiers,’ wrote Lafayette in after-years, ‘were in want of everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes; their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it was often necessary to amputate them. . . . The army frequently remained whole days without provisions, and the patient endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which each moment served to renew.’ . . . While the country around Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support the army, the sufferings of the latter

were chiefly owing to the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the congresses which had preceded it. 'The Continental Congress and the currency,' wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, 'have greatly depreciated.'—F. D. Stone, *Struggle for the Delaware (Narrative and critical history of America, v. 6, ch. 5)*.—The sufferings of the army at Valley Forge, and the shameful neglect which it experienced, were indignantly described by Washington, in a letter addressed to the president of Congress, Dec. 23, 1777: "Since the month of July," he wrote, "we have had no assistance from the quartermaster-general, and to want of assistance from this department the commissary-general charges great part of his deficiency. To this I am to add, that, notwithstanding it is a standing order, and often repeated, that the troops shall always have two days' provisions by them, that they might be ready at any sudden call; yet an opportunity has scarcely ever offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy, that has not been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded on this account. And this, the great and crying evil, is not all. The soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by Congress, we see none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have now little occasion for; few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of the little benefit received from a clothier-general, and as a further proof of the inability of an army, under the circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of soldiers, (besides a number of men confined to hospitals for want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same account,) we have, by a field-return this day made, no less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men now in camp unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise naked. By the same return it appears, that our whole strength in Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty; notwithstanding which; and that since the 4th instant, our numbers fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone, particularly on account of blankets (numbers having been obliged, and still are, to sit up all night by fires, instead of taking comfortable rest in a natural and common way), have decreased near two thousand men. We find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter-quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of mine would warrant the Remonstrance), reprobating the measures as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well-appointed and provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania and Jersey. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen,—who were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops from ocular demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than others, and who advised me near

a month ago to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days agreeable to a decree of the State (not one article of which, by the by, is yet come to hand),—should think a winter's campaign, and the covering of these States from the invasion of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul, I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to relieve or prevent. It is for these reasons, therefore, that I have dealt upon the subject; and it adds not a little to my other difficulties and distress to find, that much more is expected of me than is possible to be performed, and that upon the ground of safety and policy I am obliged to conceal the true state of the army from public view, and thereby expose myself to detraction and calumny."—George Washington, *Writings* (W. C. Ford, ed., v. 6, pp. 259-262).—It was during this trying winter, while the army suffered at Valley Forge, that it was joined by Baron Steuben, an accomplished Prussian officer, trained in the school of Frederick the Great, with a record of distinguished service in the Seven Years' War. He came as a volunteer, and was welcomed by Washington, who found in him the organizer, the disciplinarian, the instructor, which the rudely formed American army so greatly needed. The services rendered by Baron Steuben during that first winter of his stay in America were especially valuable, beyond measure. In his own account of the state of things which he found he says: "My determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied, but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first place, I informed myself relative to the military administration. I found that the different branches were divided into departments. There were those of the quartermaster general, war commissary, provisions commissary, commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc. But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to say, they had imitated the English administration, which is certainly the most imperfect in Europe. The general asked me to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the departments, and their various branches in the European armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon the functions of the quarter-masters (*maréchaux généraux de logis*) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system, bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and quarter-master had a commission of so much per cent. on all the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many millions. I pointed out to General Washington and several members of Congress the advantages of the contract system. I even drew up a memorandum on the subject,

which Colonel Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies. But whether it was that they thought such a system impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were. I directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were supreme. . . . The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number, that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers. Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal! . . . The soldiers were scattered about in every direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants, and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more commissaries and quarter-masters at the time than all the armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one servant, but others had two and even three. If the captains and colonels could give no account of their men, they could give still less an account of their arms, accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all the articles. A company, which consisted, in May, of fifty men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits, who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had completed their time of service. General Knox assured me that, previous to the establishment of my department, there never was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was still greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine month. Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his successor received another from the public store. No captain kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture to say that during an entire campaign there have not been twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. . . . The men were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge, mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old blanket or woolen bed-cover. With regard to their military discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. . . . I commenced operations by drafting 120 men from the line, whom I formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day; and to remove that English prejudice

which some officers entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy, and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision. . . . I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army, and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers with an entire division in presence of the commander-in-chief. . . . The most interesting narrative of the energy employed by Steuben, and the success of his system, is given by his favorite aid-de-camp and intimate friend, William North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his biographical sketch: 'Certainly it was a brave attempt! Without understanding a word of the English language, to think of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word, a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how to follow in a change ment to which they had not been accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B. Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the orders and interpret to the troops. "If," said the baron, "I had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more rejoiced." . . . Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp, and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time, no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of this great object.' . . . Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief. Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in the army, he had greater power and authority than any general could boast of."—F. Kapp, *Life of Frederick William von Steuben*, ch. 6.

Also in: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 13, 18-19, 23-27.—G. W. Greene, *Life of General Nathanael Greene*, v. 1, bk. 2, ch. 16-25.—J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, *History of Philadelphia*, v. 1, ch. 17.—C. J. Stillé, *Major-General Anthony Wayne*, ch. 3.—C. F. Adams, *Campaign of 1777 (Proceedings of Massachusetts Historical Society, Oct., 1910, pp. 14-63)*.—S. G. Fisher, *Struggle for American independence*, v. 2, pp. 74-75.—G. O. Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. 3, ch. 6-8.

1777 (June).—Vermont denied admission to the Union. See VERMONT: 1777-1778.

1777 (July).—Coming of Lafayette.—"La Fayette, barely nineteen years old, was in garrison at

Metz, when he was invited to a dinner that his commander, the Count de Broglie, gave to the brother of the king of England, the Duke of Gloucester, then on his way through the city. News had just been received of the proclamation of the independence of the United States, and, the conversation having naturally fallen on this subject, La Fayette plied the duke with questions to acquaint himself with the events, entirely new to him, which were happening in America. Before the end of the dinner he had made his decision, and, from that moment, he no longer thought of anything else except setting out for the new world. He went to Paris and confided his project to his friends, the Count de Ségur and the Viscount de Noailles, who were to accompany him. The Count de Broglie, whom he also informed, tried to turn him from his design. 'I saw your uncle die in Italy,' he said to him, 'and your father at Minden, and I do not wish to contribute to the ruin of your family by allowing you to go.' Nevertheless, he put La Fayette in communication with the former agent of Choiseul in Canada, the Baron de Kalb, who became his friend. De Kalb presented him to Silas Deane, who, considering him too young, wished to dissuade him from his project. But the news of the disasters experienced by the Americans before New York, at White Plains and in New Jersey, confirmed La Fayette in his resolution. He bought and fitted out a vessel at his own expense, and disguised his preparation by making a journey to London. Nevertheless his design was disclosed at Court. His family became angry with him. He was forbidden to go to America, and, to render this order effective, a lettre de cachet was issued against him. Nevertheless he left Paris with an officer named Mauroy, disguised himself as a courier, went on board his ship at Passage in Spain, and set sail April the 26th, 1777. He had several officers on board. La Fayette successfully avoided the English cruisers and the French vessels sent in pursuit of him. Finally, after a hazardous passage of seven weeks, he reached Georgetown, and, furnished with letters of recommendation from Deane, he reported to Congress."—T. Balch, *French in America during the War of Independence*, ch. 7.—In consideration of the great personal sacrifice he had made in quitting France, and his offer to serve the American cause at his own expense and without pay, Congress, with hesitation, conferred on the young marquis the rank of major general, but without command. He succeeded, too, in procuring a like commission for Baron de Kalb, who had accompanied him. While La Fayette was still busy with these arrangements, Washington came to Philadelphia, and they met at a dinner party. They seem to have been drawn to one another at the first exchange of words, and a friendship began which lasted through their lives. La Fayette was soon invited to become a member of the military family of the commander-in-chief.—Based on B. Tuckerman, *Life of General Lafayette*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: C. Tower, Jr., *Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 1.

1777 (July-October).—Struggle for the Hudson.—Burgoyne's expedition from Canada.—Surrender at Saratoga.—The futility of an attack, from Canada, through the northern wilderness, had not yet become apparent. Already, in 1776, after the failure of the expedition against Canada, an invasion had been attempted. "Sir Guy Carleton the efficient governor of Quebec, gradually pushed the Americans back from Canadian terri-

tory and organized a naval force for the control of Lake Champlain. Fortunately the Americans had in Benedict Arnold a resourceful leader who knew something about ships. During the summer he improvised an effective little fleet, which, though finally destroyed by the British, held them back so long that Carleton gave up his proposed attack on Ticonderoga and returned to Canada."—E. B. Greene, *Foundation of American nationality*, p. 478.—"Out of the ill-fated Canadian campaign grew foolish charges against Schuyler and Arnold, and though both stood an investigation and proved the charges to be unjust, yet there was left a cloud of prejudice and misunderstanding which, later, cost Schuyler his place and subjected Arnold to a series of slights and insults which finally undermined his patriotism. For the present, Arnold yielded to Washington's entreaty, and promised to serve with his old rank. Almost at once he became the hero of a brilliant exploit near his home at New Haven where he was visiting. Tyron with two thousand British troops destroyed the patriot stores at Danbury and fired the town. The local militia resisted, and Arnold with six hundred men engaged the British force at Ridgefield (April 27, 1777), defeating them and barely allowing the remnant to reach the sea and escape. . . . In the spring of 1777 the British government renewed the plan of campaign which had been partly executed in the preceding year. The city of New York was now in British hands, and Washington at Morristown with his remnant of an army was not a serious menace to its possession. At the north, though Carleton, in 1776, had failed to seize Ticonderoga, yet he had driven an entering wedge which would greatly aid an army starting south from that point. Lord George Germaine and General Burgoyne, taking this view of the field, and knowing that the valleys of the Mohawk and the Hudson, which were then the only inhabited parts of New York, were filled with Tories, determined to send three armies along these seeming paths of least resistance, severing the American confederacy at the Hudson, and ending the war by subduing rebellious New England, after it was thus isolated."—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution, 1776-1783*, v. 9, pp. 157, 159, 161-162.—"It was an involved plan, complicated by a lively exchange of letters between the generals in America and the ministry in London. . . . The upshot of it was that General John Burgoyne with an army of 8,000 men should come down from Canada, via Lake Champlain and the upper Hudson Valley, while St. Leger, operating from Lake Ontario, via Fort Stanwix (Rome) and the Mohawk, should join him at Albany, and General Howe should proceed up the Hudson to receive these supporting armies. The British forces thus concentrated, and in possession of the entire Hudson-Champlain line, could turn east or south to crush the rebellion."—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, p. 90.—"Burgoyne started on this expedition [about June 1, 1777], with a brilliant army of 8,000 men, partly British and partly Germans, besides a large number of Canadian boatmen, laborers and skirmishers [about 4,000 British regulars, 3,000 German troops, and about 650 Canadians and Indians]. On the western shore of Lake Champlain, near Crown Point, he met the Six Nations in council, and after a feast and a speech, some 400 of their warriors joined this army. His next step was to issue a proclamation . . . threatening with all the extremities of war all who should presume to resist his arms. Two days after the issue of this proclamation, Burgoyne



WASHINGTON AND LAFAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE

(From the painting by J. W. Dunsmore)



appeared [July 1] before Ticonderoga." The commander of that important fort, General St. Clair, found defense impracticable and evacuated the place. He was vigorously pursued in his retreat and only escaped with the loss of most of his baggage and stores, besides several hundred men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. "After a seven days' march, he joined Schuyler [who had been placed in sole command of the American Northern Department], at Fort Edward, on the Hudson. Here was assembled the whole force of the northern army, amounting to about 5,000 men; but a considerable part were militia hastily called in; many were without arms; there was a great deficiency of ammunition and provisions; and the whole force was quite disorganized. The region between Skenesborough [now Whitehall, where Burgoyne had halted] and the Hudson was an almost unbroken wilderness. Wood Creek was navigable as far as Fort Anne [which the Americans had fired and abandoned]; from Fort Anne to the Hudson, over an exceedingly rough country, . . . extended a single military road. While Burgoyne halted a few days at Skenesborough to put his forces in order, and to bring up the necessary supplies, Schuyler hastened to destroy the navigation of Wood Creek," and to make the road from Fort Anne as nearly impassable as a wilderness road can be made. "All the stock in the neighborhood was driven off, and the militia of New England was summoned to the rescue."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 36.—Mean-time Howe, upon whom Burgoyne relied for assistance from the south, by way of the Hudson, set out to capture Philadelphia, leaving Clinton in command of New York, with 6,000 men, and freeing Washington from the necessity of watching the Hudson. "As Howe was about to set out upon the expedition [to Philadelphia], which the ministry had quite approved, he received (June 5) a copy of the plan of the northern campaign, but no word of instruction for himself. . . . Washington, expecting Howe to go by land, moved down from Morristown to Middlebrook, in the hope of preventing the passage of the British army. Howe saw his aggressive attitude, and with the idea of tempting him to a general engagement delayed and manoeuvred for three weeks. After this serious loss of time he embarked, early in July, some fourteen thousand men with whom to capture Philadelphia. Still he delayed until good news came from Burgoyne; then, after losing a week by foul winds, he got his fleet under way, July 23, just as Burgoyne in the north was pushing his way through the tangled forests from Ticonderoga to Fort Edward, and when Howe should have been going up the Hudson to meet him at Albany. Washington, who knew of Burgoyne's advance from the north, thought that, unless his movement was a mere feint, Howe must be about to move up the Hudson to his support. When, therefore, the news came (July 31) that Howe was off Delaware Bay, Washington was greatly puzzled; nor was the mystery cleared up then, for the naval officers who were with Howe gave him such weighty reasons for not disembarking in the Delaware that he yielded, and lost twenty-four precious days more, sailing around in Chesapeake Bay and up to Elkton, where the troops were landed on August 25, just thirteen miles from the point where they might have landed nearly a month earlier. Here Howe received a note from Germaine, hoping that he might finish this campaign in time to return to the aid of the northern army. That was now almost impossible,

as Washington clearly saw, and he wrote, exultingly, now let all New England 'turn out and entirely crush Genl. Burgoyne.' Already, in fact, Burgoyne had met such an accumulation of difficulties and disasters that relief must be speedy if it would save him. As his army drew near Fort Edward, General Schuyler sensibly withdrew to the south as far as Stillwater. Inadequate transportation facilities delayed the British, while their troubles increased daily."—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution, 1776-1783*, v. 9, pp. 163-164.—"To feed and otherwise supply his army was the chief difficulty. He could bring enough of stores to the head of Lake George, by the water carriage which he commanded, from Canada; but to transport them thence to the Hudson, though the distance was only eighteen miles, proved nearly impracticable. 'The roads were so bad, and the supply of draft cattle so small, that, after a fortnight's hard labor, the British army had only four days' provision in advance.'"—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 36.—"The patriot committees throughout the region had compelled everyone to remove cattle and stores from the path of the British army. There seemed nothing to do but to make an attempt to seize the American stores at Bennington [in the New Hampshire grants, now the state of Vermont]. A motley force of Germans, British, Canadians, and Indians, under Colonel Baum, was sent to unite in this attack with the many loyalists who swarmed in the country, longing, as Burgoyne was assured, to take up arms for the king. To help this attack, John Stark, acting under the sovereignty of New Hampshire, and on his own responsibility, raised eight hundred men and marched to meet the invader. When Stark met the British force (August 15, 1777), Baum quickly chose a strong position and threw up intrenchments. . . . On the morrow, August 16, the backwoodsmen's craft was shown in surrounding their unsuspecting victims, and the British forces were thrown into a panic by an encircling fire which compelled them to surrender within two hours. The tables were then nearly turned by the appearance of a relief party of five hundred Germans, but American reinforcements under Seth Warner saved the day, and the fresh British detachment was also defeated. The evil of this disaster to Burgoyne was not alone in the loss of men, but in the idea that was born in the minds of New England farmers that Burgoyne's whole army might be taken. The eager New England yeomanry began to pour in and to swell the patriot ranks, while Burgoyne's hopes for aid from St. Leger's force were dashed by the ill reports that came daily into his camp. St. Leger had landed at Oswego about the middle of July. He was there joined by Sir John Johnson and Colonel John Butler with their Tory followers. The Indians of western New York were divided in sympathy, but the Mohawks, under Joseph Brant, and part of the Iroquois, Cayugas, and Senecas joined St. Leger. With this ill-assorted force he advanced until, August 3, he appeared before Fort Stanwix. The German settlers in that neighborhood, led by General Herkimer, came to the rescue of the fort, and scouts from their force arranged for a combined attack on the invader—a sortie from the fort and an attack upon St. Leger's rear. The co-operation was not perfect, and, Herkimer's approach becoming known, Johnson's Tories and Brant's Mohawks prepared an ambuscade in a ravine near Oriskany through which the patriot force must pass. The Americans entered and were partly surrounded, but they

fought with such desperate valor that after a struggle with knife, hatchet, and bayonet, unrivalled in its savage horror, the Indians fled and the Tories retreated. Herkimer's force was too weak to advance, but the sortie from the fort was a success, and Johnson's Tories were driven across the Mohawk. Though St. Leger's force still threatened, yet his prestige had suffered and his Indian allies grew so refractory as to be a source of embarrassment. While St. Leger continued his siege of Fort Stanwix a patriot force of one thousand two hundred men were coming up the Mohawk under Benedict Arnold, who had been sent north by Washington, and who arrived in Schuyler's camp just in time to command this relief expedition. When within twenty miles of Fort Stanwix, and fearful lest he should arrive too late, Arnold sent ahead a half-witted Tory, who for his services escaped the death of a spy, and who rushed into St. Leger's camp with the report that Burgoyne was defeated and that an overwhelming force was coming to the relief of the fort. The disheartened Indians now refused to obey commands, stole the camp liquors, and rioted all night through the camp, assaulting the soldiers, and creating such a panic among the Tories that on the following day the whole army dispersed and fled, leaving the camp and stores in the patriot possession. A mere handful of St. Leger's troops reached Oswego and returned with him to Montreal. . . . Just after the battle of Bennington, and just before Burgoyne got the news of St. Leger's failure, the command of the American army of the north was transferred. Schuyler's enemies had so worked upon Congress that at a time when his laurels were almost gathered they were snatched away and given to Gates. Congress acted August 4, but Gates took command only after the middle of the month. For three weeks thereafter the two armies confronted each other on opposite banks of the Hudson. Then, while the Green Mountain militia hung 'like a gathering storm' upon Burgoyne's left, and retreat seemed wise, the British leader determined not to abandon Howe, who was then supposed to be coming up the Hudson. September 13, therefore, the whole British army crossed to the west bank of the river. Retreat was now impossible. . . . To prevent the British advance down the river, the American army had taken a fortified position on Bemis Heights, which commanded the Hudson and the roads leading to the south. Burgoyne hoped to carry this position [September 19] by an attack on the American left. As far as the timid Gates was concerned, success might have crowned the effort, but Arnold ruined the British plan by anticipating the attack. With a command of three thousand men he engaged a large part of Burgoyne's army while Gates held eleven thousand men idle on the heights. The British held the field, but abandoned their previous plan and delayed further assault for eighteen days. One reason for waiting was that Clinton was reported coming up the Hudson from New York; but while Burgoyne waited his supplies diminished and his line of communication was cut by a New England force of 2,000 under General Lincoln [who reached the American camp on September 29. Gates gave Lincoln command of the right wing, and took command in person of the left wing, composed of two brigades, under Poor and Leonard, Morgan's rifle corps, and some of the New England militia]. The American army constantly grew until more than sixteen thousand men confronted Burgoyne's five thousand. [The Amer-

ican lines had been strongly fortified by Kosciuszko, the famous Polish general, who was serving as a volunteer.] In desperation the British commander made another effort, October 7 [at Freeman's farm], to turn the American's left . . . [with a column of 1500 regular troops and field artillery. These troops he led in person, having Generals Phillips, Riedesel and D. Fraser under him.] Again it was Arnold who saw the opportunity for a crushing blow. Despite the fact that since the last engagement he had practically been deprived of his command by Gates, he rode into the midst of the battle and led the delighted soldiers in one charge after another until the field was won and Burgoyne retreated up the river to Saratoga, abandoning his sick and wounded. The Americans had already made the recrossing of the Hudson impossible, and their overwhelming numbers enabled them to so surround and harass the British army that its position became intolerable. Desertion began, the Germans coming over 'in shoals,' as Gates wrote. Burgoyne had no news of Clinton, who was in fact coming rapidly up the Hudson, quite outwitting Putnam. After taking two forts in the highlands he wrote Burgoyne, October 8, that there was nothing between him and Gates. [He had collected six months' stores for Burgoyne's army, and destroyed the American fleet which was being formed on the Hudson.] This cheering news never reached Burgoyne, who at last wearied of waiting, and on October 14 asked Gates for terms of surrender. Three days of negotiations resulted in the 'convention' of Saratoga, as the surrender was called. By this agreement the British army [now numbering 5,790 men of all ranks] was to march out with the honors of war, stack their arms, and go under guard to Boston, thence taking ship to England, after promising to serve no more in the American war. There was no attempt to humiliate the British troops as they laid down their arms, and every courtesy was shown them by the rank and file as well as by the officers of the American army. Congress, however, wrangled with Burgoyne over the carrying out of the terms of the convention, and ended by . . . [not] permitting the return of the British troops. Some of them escaped, while many were assimilated among the American people. The result in America of Burgoyne's surrender was, as a contemporary wrote, that 'Rebellion, which a twelvemonth ago was really a contemptible pygmy, is now in appearance become a giant more dreadful to the minds of men than Polyphemus of old or the sons of Anak.' The ultimate effect, however, was to set free forces that created changes of world-wide extent, bringing into the struggle first France and then other European countries, until the embattled nations confronted England and compelled her to yield. Before entering upon the history of this vast conflict we must turn to the political events that had been passing while Burgoyne was losing an army and Howe was paying dearly for the possession of the 'rebel capital.'—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution, 1776-1783*, v. 9, pp. 163-167, 171-174.

ALSO IN: C. F. Adams, *Studies, military and diplomatic*, pp. 115-137.—E. Creasy, *Fifteen decisive battles of the world*, ch. 13.—J. Burgoyne, *State of the expedition from Canada*.—S. A. Drake, *Burgoyne's invasion*.—W. L. Stone, *Campaign of Burgoyne*.—M. von Eelking, *Memoir of General Riedesel*, v. 1, pp. 88-218.—B. J. Lossing, *Life and times of Philip Schuyler*, v. 2, ch. 6-21.—M. Willett, *Narrative of military actions*, ch. 5.—C. Stark, *Memoir of General John Stark*, pp. 46-140.—T.



Dwight, *Travels in New England and New York*, v. 3, pp. 220-233.

1777-1778.—British in Philadelphia.—Their gay winter. See PHILADELPHIA: 1777-1778.

1777-1778.—Conway cabal.—The capitulation of Burgoyne at Saratoga "was an all-important event in its influence on the progress of the war; but its immediate effect was unpropitious to the reputation of the Commander-in-chief, who was compelled, at the close of the year, to place his army in a state of almost total destitution in winter-quarters at Valley Forge. The brilliant success of [the army commanded by] General Gates at Saratoga, in contrast with the reverses which had befallen the American Army under the immediate command of Washington, encouraged the operations of a cabal against him, which had been formed by certain disaffected officers of the army, and was countenanced by a party in Congress. The design was, by a succession of measures implying a want of confidence, to drive Washington to retire from the service in disgust; and, when this object was effected, to give the command of the army to General Gates, who lent a willing ear to these discreditable intrigues. A foreign officer in the American Army, of the name of Conway [Thomas Conway, an Irishman who had served in the French army], was the most active promoter of the project, which was discovered by the accidental disclosure of a part of his correspondence with Gates. Washington bore himself on this occasion with his usual dignity, and allowed the parties concerned, in the army and in Congress, to take refuge in explanations, disclaimers, and apologies, by which those who made them gained no credit, and those who accepted them were not deceived. A part of the machinery of this wretched cabal was the publication, in London, and the republication in New York of [a] collection of forged letters . . . bearing the name of Washington, and intended to prove his insincerity in the cause of the Revolution. Nothing perhaps more plainly illustrates his conscientious strength of character, than the disdainful silence with which he allowed this miserable fabrication to remain for twenty years without exposure. It was only in the year 1796, and when about to retire from the Presidency, that he filed, in the department of State, a denial of its authenticity."—E. Everett, *Life of Washington*, ch. 6.—In a letter written May 30, 1778, addressed to Landon Carter, from the camp at Valley Forge, Washington alluded to the subject of the cabal as follows: "With great truth I think I can assure you, that the information you received from a gentleman at Sabine Hall, respecting a disposition in the northern officers to see me superseded in my command by General G——s is without the least foundation. I have very sufficient reasons to think, that no officers in the army are more attached to me, than those from the northward, and of those, none more so than the gentlemen, who were under the immediate command of G——s last campaign. That there was a scheme of this sort on foot, last fall, admits of no doubt; but it originated in another quarter; with three men who wanted to aggrandize themselves; but finding no support, on the contrary, that their conduct and views, when seen into, were likely to undergo severe reprehension, they slunk back, disavowed the measure, and professed themselves my warmest admirers. Thus stands the matter at present. Whether any members of Congress were privy to this scheme, and inclined to aid and abet it, I shall not take upon me to say; but am well informed, that no whisper of the

kind was ever heard in Congress."—George Washington, *Writings* (W. C. Ford, ed., v. 7, p. 30).—"It is characteristic of Washington that he should tell Conway at once that he knew of the latter's machinations. Nevertheless Washington took no open step against him. The situation of the army at Valley Forge was then so desperately bad that he did not wish to make it worse, perhaps, by interjecting into it what might be considered a matter personal to himself. In the Congress also there were members who belonged to the Conway Cabal, and although it was generally known that Washington did not trust him, Congress raised his rank to that of Major-General and appointed him Inspector-General of the army. . . . In a few months he left for France. After his departure the cabal, of which he seemed to be the center, died."—W. R. Thayer, *George Washington*, pp. 112-113.

ALSO IN: E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 290-291.—L. C. Hatch, *Administration of the American Revolutionary army*, pp. 23-34.—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 28-30.—J. C. Hamilton, *History of the United States in the writings of Alexander Hamilton*, v. 1, ch. 13-14.—J. Sparks, *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, v. 1, ch. 10.—W. V. Wells, *Life of Samuel Adams*, v. 2, ch. 46.

1777-1781.—Adoption and ratification of the Articles of Confederation.—"On the 11th of June, 1776, the same day on which the committee for preparing the declaration of independence was appointed, congress resolved, that 'a committee be appointed to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between these colonies'; and on the next day a committee was accordingly appointed, consisting of a member from each colony. Nearly a year before this period (viz. on the 21st of July, 1775), Dr. Franklin had submitted to congress a sketch of articles of confederation, which does not, however, appear to have been acted on. . . . On the 12th of July, 1776, the committee appointed to prepare articles of confederation presented a draft, which was in the hand-writing of Mr. Dickinson, one of the committee, and a delegate from Pennsylvania. The draft, so reported, was debated from the 22d to the 31st of July, and on several days between the 5th and 20th of August, 1776. On this last day, congress, in committee of the whole, reported a new draft, which was ordered to be printed for the use of the members. The subject seems not not again to have been touched until the 8th of April, 1777, and the articles were debated at several times between that time and the 15th of November of the same year. On this last day the articles were reported with sundry amendments, and finally adopted by congress. A committee was then appointed to draft, and they accordingly drafted, a circular letter, requesting the states respectively to authorize their delegates in congress to subscribe the same in behalf of the state. . . . It carried, however, very slowly conviction to the minds of the local legislatures. Many objections were stated, and many amendments were proposed. All of them, however, were rejected by congress, not probably because they were all deemed inexpedient or improper in themselves; but from the danger of sending the instrument back again to all the states, for reconsideration. Accordingly, on the 26th of June, 1778, a copy, engrossed for ratification, was prepared, and the ratification begun on the 9th day of July following. It was ratified by all the states, except Delaware and Maryland in 1778; by Delaware in 1779, and by

Maryland on the 1st of March, 1781, from which last date its final ratification took effect, and was joyfully announced by congress. In reviewing the objections taken by the various states to the adoption of the confederation in the form in which it was presented to them, . . . that which seemed to be of paramount importance, and which, indeed, protracted the ratification of the confederation to so late a period, was the alarming controversy in respect to the boundaries of some of the states, and the public lands, held by the crown, within these reputed boundaries."—J. Story, *Commentaries on the constitution of the United States*, v. 1, bk. 2, ch. 2.

The following is the text of the Articles of Confederation:

ARTICLE I. The style of this Confederacy shall be, "The United States of America."

ART. II. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.

ART. III. The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.

ART. IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States or either of them. If any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State shall flee from justice and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offense. Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.

ART. V. For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the Legislature of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year. No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of

holding any office under the United States for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind. Each State shall maintain its own delegates in any meeting of the States and while they act as members of the Committee of the States. In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote. Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress; and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonment during the time of their going to and from, and attendance on, Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

ART. VI. No State, without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any king, prince, or state; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States, in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility. No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, specifying, accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue. No State shall lay any imposts or duties which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States, in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain. No vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only as shall be deemed necessary by the United States, in Congress assembled, for the defense of such State or its trade, nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use in public stores a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States, in Congress assembled, can be consulted; nor shall any State grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States, in Congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or state, and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States, in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States, in Congress assembled, shall determine otherwise.

ART. VII. When land forces are raised by any

State for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of Colonel shall be appointed by the Legislature of each State respectively by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first made the appointment.

ART. VIII. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense, or general welfare, and allowed by the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to, or surveyed for, any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States, in Congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the Legislatures of the several States, within the time agreed upon by the United States, in Congress assembled.

ART. IX. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth Article; of sending and receiving ambassadors; entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatever; of establishing rules for deciding, in all cases, what captures on land and water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated; of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace; appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures; provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following: Whenever the legislative or executive authority, or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another, shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in question, and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear

and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the determination; and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons which Congress shall judge sufficient, or being present, shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and sentence of the court, to be appointed in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and decisive; the judgment or sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned; provided, that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the State where the cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward." Provided, also, that no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States. All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they may respect such lands, and the States which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall, on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United States, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States; fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the United States; regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not infringed or violated; establishing and regulating post-offices from one State to another, throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office; appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers; appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States; making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated "A Committee of the States," and to consist of one delegate from each State, and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction; to appoint one of their number to preside; provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised

for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses; to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half year to the respective States an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted; to build and equip a navy; to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State, which requisition shall be binding; and thereupon the Legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the United States; and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States, in Congress assembled; but if the United States, in Congress assembled, shall, on consideration of circumstances, judge proper that any State should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number than its quota, and that any other State should raise a greater number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the same manner as the quota of such State, unless the Legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number can not be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared, and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States, in Congress assembled. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same, nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States, in Congress assembled. The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of six months, and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations as in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State, on any question, shall be entered on the journal when it is desired by any delegate; and the delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the Legislatures of the several States.

ART. X. The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States, in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Con-

federation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled is requisite.

ART. XI. Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.

ART. XII. All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts contracted by or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present Confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged.

ART. XIII. Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State. AND WHEREAS it hath pleased the great Governor of the world to incline the hearts of the Legislatures we respectively represent in Congress to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify, the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, know ye, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do, by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained. And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by the said Confederation are submitted to them; and that the Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent, and that the Union shall be perpetual. In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands in Congress. Done at Philadelphia in the State of Pennsylvania the ninth day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight, and in the third year of the independence of America.

“Under these Articles of Confederation the treaty of peace with England was concluded and the American nation was governed until the final adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The main defect of the Articles of Confederation was, that although powers sufficiently adequate to create a government were ceded, there was no power to raise revenue, to levy taxes, or to enforce the law, except with the consent of nine States; and although the government had power to contract debts, there were no means by which to discharge them. The government had power to raise armies and navies, but no means wherewith to pay them, unless the means were voted by the States themselves; they could make treaties with foreign powers, but had no means to coerce a State to obey such treaty. In short, it was a government which had the power to make laws, but no power to punish infractions thereof. Washington himself said: ‘The Confederation appears to me to be little more than the shadow without the sub-

stance, and Congress a nugatory body.' Chief Justice Story, in summing up the leading defects of the Articles of Confederation, says: 'There was an utter want of all coercive authority to carry into effect its own constitutional measures; this of itself was sufficient to destroy its whole efficiency as a superintendent government, if that may be called a government which possessed no one solid attribute of power. In truth, Congress possessed only the power of recommendation. Congress had no power to exact obedience or punish disobedience of its ordinances; they could neither impose fines nor direct imprisonments, nor divest privileges, nor declare forfeitures, nor suspend refractory officers. There was no power to exercise force.'—S. Sterne, *Constitutional history of the United States*, ch. 1.—'The individual states had attributed to themselves, in the Articles of Confederation, no powers which could place them in relation to foreign nations in the light of sovereign states. They felt that all such claims would be considered ridiculous, because back of these claims there was no real corresponding power. Congress therefore remained, as heretofore, the sole outward representative of sovereignty. But the power to exercise the prerogatives was taken from it, and this without placing it in any other hands. The changes effected by the Articles of Confederation were rather of a negative than of a positive nature. They did not give the State which was just coming into being a definite form, but they began the work of its dissolution. . . . The practical result . . . was that the United States tended more and more to split up into thirteen independent republics, and . . . virtually ceased to be a member of the family of nations bound together by the 'jus gentium.'—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 1.—'The Articles . . . provided for no executive department. They did provide for the appointment of a member of Congress to preside over its sessions; but in fear of kingly authority, it was stipulated that no one person should serve as president more than one year in any term of three years. They also provided for the appointment of civil officers for managing the general affairs of the United States under the direction of Congress. And yet the course of the war had already proved how unfit for general administrative duties were the whole body of delegates or committees of members, and as a result a movement for the establishment of executive departments began even before the Articles went into effect. The office of postmaster-general, an inheritance from the colonial days, existed from the beginning of the war. In the early part of 1781 the offices of secretary for foreign affairs, superintendent of finance, secretary at war, and secretary of marine were created. To the second position Robert Morris, of Pennsylvania, whose knowledge of business and finance had already been of great service to the country, was appointed. After considerable delay, caused by the customary factional controversies between the cliques of Congress, General Benjamin Lincoln was made secretary at war. He did not take the office until January, 1782. Nothing of consequence was done with the department of marine, probably because of the old difficulty of selecting anybody that would suit the wrangling factions, and the whole department was turned over to the superintendent of finance, who already had more than any one could do in managing the distracted finances of the Confederation. Robert R. Livingston, of New York, was made foreign secretary.'—A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and the con-*

*stitution, 1783-1789*, pp. 51-52.—On the operation and failure of the Articles of Confederation, see below: 1783-1787.—On the question of the western territorial claims of several of the States, and the obstacle which it brought in the way of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, see below: 1781-1786.

ALSO IN: G. Bancroft, *History of the formation of the constitution*, v. 1, ch. 1.—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union*, p. 104.—A. Johnson, *United States, its history and constitution*, p. 79.—D. R. Goodloe, *Birth of the republic*, pp. 353-366.—H. W. Preston, *Documents illustrative of American history*, pp. 218-231.

1778 (February).—Treaty with France.—Effect of treaty on Spanish relations.—'The account of Burgoyne's surrender, which was brought to France by a swift-sailing ship from Boston, threw Turgot and all Paris into transports of joy. None doubted the ability of the states to maintain their independence. On the 12th of December [1777], their commissioners [Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane], had an interview with Vergennes. 'Nothing,' said he, 'has struck me so much as General Washington's attacking and giving battle to General Howe's army. To bring troops raised within the year to this, promises everything. The court of France, in the treaty which is to be entered into, intend to take no advantage of your present situation. Once made, it should be durable; and therefore it should contain no condition of which the Americans may afterward repent, but such only as will last as long as human institutions shall endure, so that mutual amity may subsist forever. Entering into a treaty will be an avowal of your independence. Spain must be consulted, and Spain will not be satisfied with an undetermined boundary on the west. Some of the states are supposed to run to the South Sea, which might interfere with her claim to California.' It was answered that the last treaty of peace adopted the Mississippi as a boundary. 'And what share do you intend to give us in the fisheries?' asked Vergennes; for in the original draft of a treaty the United States had proposed to take to themselves Cape Breton and the whole of the island of Newfoundland. Explanations were made by the American commissioners that their later instructions removed all chances of disagreement on that subject. . . . The question of a French alliance . . . was discussed by Vergennes with the Marquis d'Ossun, the late French ambassador in Madrid, as the best adviser with regard to Spain, and the plan of action was formed. Then these two met the king at the apartment of Maurepas, where the plan, after debate, was finally settled. Maurepas, at heart opposed to the war, loved ease and popularity too well to escape the sway of external opinion; and Louis XVI. sacrificed his own inclination and his own feeling of justice to policy of state and the opinion of his advisers.'—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 5, ch. 17.—'The news of Burgoyne's surrender reached France at the beginning of December, 1777. Vergennes was then employing as a spy the landlord of the house in which Franklin and Deane lived. That spy . . . was able to report that negotiations were in progress with England for an ending of the war. This information convinced Vergennes that further delay would be dangerous. So on December 6, two days after the arrival of the news of Burgoyne's surrender, he sent Gerard . . . to Franklin, to tell him that the French court was at last convinced that the colonies were in earnest and were

able to maintain their independence, and were worthy of recognition, and that it would therefore be glad to renew negotiations for a treaty of alliance. . . . The Americans paused in their negotiations with England, and . . . abandoned them altogether, when, on December 16, the French government announced to them that 'France would not only acknowledge but would support with all her forces the independence of the United States, and would conclude with them a treaty of amity and commerce.' With surprising and commendable frankness it added that 'His Most Christian Majesty desired no indemnification of the United States, nor pretended to act solely with a view to their particular interest, since, besides the benevolence he bore them, it was manifest that the power of England would be diminished by the dismemberment of her colonies.' It was further stated by the French government that this treaty would be made as soon as the assent of Spain

give only naval aid. Ten days later Gerard brought to the American commissioners tentative drafts of the treaties for consideration. . . . Franklin secured the insertion into the treaty of a recognition of the principle first set forth by Frederick the Great of Prussia, and warmly advocated by Franklin, that 'free ships make free goods,' a principle which afterward formed the basis of the Armed Neutrality. . . . There was much discussion, also, over the question of West India trade. . . . Finally, however, an agreement was reached. . . . [Each party reserved possession of its own fisheries: the United States acknowledged the right of the French to share in the Newfoundland fisheries, and to exclusive use of half the coast for drying-places, and the king of France promised to use his good offices with the Barbary States.] On February 6 [1778] the treaties were signed, under a strict pledge that they were to be kept secret until France was ready for their publication. [See



FIRST RECOGNITION OF THE AMERICAN FLAG BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

In the harbor off Quiberon, France, Feb. 13, 1778

(After painting by Edward Moran)

could be got, that being necessary under the Bourbon Family Compact between France and Spain; and that all France would ask of America would be that, in case of war between France and England, which was likely to occur, America would not make peace with England until her own independence was fully secured, nor until France also made peace with England. . . . The French government . . . did not attempt to secure Spain's assent to the treaty, although Vergennes declared to the Americans that it was necessary to do so and that the treaty could not be made until it was done. On the contrary, it carefully concealed from Spain the fact that it was making such a treaty, and, even after the treaty was made and signed, denied that it had made it. The only recognition of the 'Bourbon Family Compact' in the treaty was in a private clause, which provided that Spain's assent should be secured before the treaty became valid. On January 8, 1778, further negotiations took place, the French stipulating that they were not to help America subdue Canada or the British West Indies, and were to

also "MOST FAVORED NATION" CLAUSE.] The news of them, however, leaked out; just how has not appeared. Deane and Lee each accused the other of betraying them, and Lee even went so far as to accuse Franklin. Presently Deane was recalled, and John Adams was appointed to fill his place. The plan of maintaining three co-equal representatives at the French court was an impractical one that was sure to cause trouble, and it was therefore a most auspicious thing for Congress, in October, 1778, to make Franklin sole minister to France. . . . The disclosure of the treaties had its natural effect in causing hostilities between France and England. On March 13, 1778, the Marquis de Noailles, the French ambassador in London, announced to the British government that France had made a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States. He did not mention the treaty of alliance, nor was it necessary that he should do so. The other was sufficient to arouse England's resentment. Ten days later Lord Stormont, the British ambassador, abruptly left Paris without taking leave of the French gov-

ernment. A week later Gerard sailed for America, the first French minister to the United States. Within a month more French and British fleets sailed for American waters, and the war between France and England had begun. . . . Meantime, some interesting complications were in progress with Spain. . . . When at last the facts [of the treaty] came out, the Spanish government was indignant. Charles III of Spain [who] earnestly desired . . . peace in Europe, . . . distrusted France, and feared that Spain would be made her tool and would be sacrificed to her selfish interests. His chief minister, Florida Blanca, took even stronger ground. He aspired to be the dictator of American affairs, and to restore Spanish dominance upon this continent. His wrath at France's recognition of American independence was therefore great. . . . Vergennes, who . . . was almost desperately endeavoring to secure Spanish support in the war with England upon which he was entering, suggested that France had not committed herself to American sovereignty over the territory west of the Alleghenies, and might conspire and cooperate with Spain to rob her of it and keep the United States away from the Mississippi. . . . The Spanish ultimatum to France, therefore, was that the United States should be shut away from the Mississippi, and that peace should not be concluded until England had been compelled to surrender Florida, Jamaica, and Gibraltar. To these terms, Vergennes, in his desperation, agreed. The treaty of Aranjuez was accordingly signed between France and Spain, on April 12, 1779. . . . Spain did not by this treaty ally herself with America. . . . Indeed, it was stipulated that she should not do so, save with the express permission of France. . . . France kept the terms of this precious treaty secret from America. If they had not been kept thus secret the French minister, Gerard, would have had a still more difficult task on hand than he had when he came hither and tried to persuade the committee of Congress on foreign affairs to modify American demands and ambitions so as to meet the wishes of Spain; his argument being that if that was not done, Spain would not help France, and then France could not help America. He further intimated that if the United States would abandon its claims upon the territory between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi, and to a frontage upon the latter river, Spain would recognize American independence and make with the United States a treaty of commerce."—W. F. Johnson, *America's foreign relations*, v. 1, pp. 78-80, 84-87.—See also above: 1776-1778.

ALSO IN: *Treaties and conventions of the United States* (edition of 1889), p. 296.—T. Balch, *French in America during the War of Independence*, ch. 8.

1778 (June).—Peace proposals from England.—British evacuation of Philadelphia and march to New York.—Battle of Monmouth.—"The winter of 1777 at Valley Forge was a time of terrible suffering for Washington's army. . . . Yet the great commander, amid his grave anxieties, not only struggled successfully against all the formidable difficulties of his situation, but with the valuable assistance of . . . Baron von Steuben, . . . took the work of training and disciplining his troops seriously in hand, with the result that by the early spring they were better organized and more efficient than they had ever been before. The British in Philadelphia, on the other hand, were gradually deteriorating. Instead of attacking Washington, only twenty-two miles away, Howe remained inactive, while his officers and their many loyalist friends indulged in gaieties and dissipations. [See

PHILADELPHIA: 1777-1778.] . . . The news of the French alliance put a sudden stop to these delightful proceedings. . . . [General Howe was recalled to England, and was succeeded in command by Sir Henry Clinton, who] received orders from England to abandon Philadelphia, which had proved to be useless as a basis for military operations."—W. H. Hudson, and I. S. Guernsey, *United States from the discovery of the American continent to the end of the World War*, pp. 217-218.—"On May 11th, Sir Henry Clinton relieved Sir William Howe at Philadelphia, and the latter took his departure in a blaze of mock glory. . . . The new commander was more active than his predecessor, but no cleverer, and no better fitted to cope with Washington. . . . Expecting a movement by the enemy, Washington sent Lafayette forward to watch Philadelphia. Clinton, fresh in office determined to cut him off and by a rapid movement nearly succeeded in so doing. Timely information, presence of mind, and quickness, alone enabled the young Frenchman to escape, narrowly but completely. Meantime, a cause for delay, that curse of the British throughout the war, supervened."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 1, ch. 7.—"Howe's successor, General Sir Henry Clinton, was about forty years old, with much less military experience than Howe, but of good ability. . . . If he had had Howe's large army and opportunities he would have undoubtedly altered the course of history. With France against him his task was very difficult and seemed almost impossible; but he came within an ace of succeeding. The alliance of France with the patriots had completely changed the situation. England could no longer concentrate large forces on the colonies, could no longer furnish the enormous army she had given Howe. . . . Clinton could undertake no extensive military operations or grand movements. The great strategic plan of controlling the whole line of the Hudson and cutting the colonies in twain must be abandoned. The two extreme ends of that line, Canada and the city of New York, could be easily held, and that was all that could be done. In short, so far as operations in the colonies were concerned, a totally new system must be adopted. . . . The plan adopted was to keep up the war at every point. The rebel colonists evidently could not take either New York or Canada. They could restrict the operations of the British army, but they could not drive it out of America; and it was doubtful if the French could do so much as that. New York and Canada must therefore be held, and from them predatory expeditions could be sent out to all parts of the rebel colonies. . . . Before this plan was put in operation and a new method of warfare adopted, the ministry resolved to make one supreme effort for conciliation and a peace which would preserve America as some sort of dependency of Great Britain, even if attached by a very slender thread. An act of Parliament was passed appointing commissioners, who spent the summer from June to October, 1778, in the colonies. By this same act the tea tax and the act changing the government of Massachusetts were repealed, the right of raising revenue from the colonies was renounced, and the commissioners were empowered to suspend the operation of any other act passed since 1763 and proclaim pardon and amnesty. . . . Charles Lee, Arnold, and other patriots tinged with loyalism were in favor of accepting this very liberal offer of peace; and Gates wished for a conference with the commissioners. But the majority of the patriot party rejected the offer with

derision. . . . The Congress were so confident of the temper of the patriot party that they freely circulated the printed peace proposals which were ridiculed and publicly burnt by the patriots."—S. G. Fisher, *True history of the American Revolution*, pp. 368-370, 372.—The peace commission consisted of the Earl of Carlisle, William Eden, and Governor Johnstone. "They were excellent men, but they came too late. Their propositions three years before would have been well enough, but as it was they were worse than nothing. Coolly received, they held a fruitless interview with a committee of Congress, tried to bribe and intrigue, found that their own army had been already ordered to evacuate Philadelphia [in apprehension of the arrival of the expected French fleet] without their knowledge, and finally gave up their task in angry despair, and returned to England to join in the chorus of fault-finding which was beginning to sound very loud in ministerial ears. Meanwhile, Washington waited and watched, puzzled by the delay, and hoping only to harass Sir Henry with militia on the march to New York. But, as the days slipped by, the Americans grew stronger, while Sir Henry weakened himself by sending 5,000 men to the West Indies, and 3,000 to Florida. When he finally started [evacuating Philadelphia June 17], he had with him less than 10,000 men, while the Americans had 13,000, nearly all continental troops. Under these circumstances, Washington determined to bring on a battle. He was thwarted at the outset by his officers, as was wont to be the case. Lee had returned more whimsical than ever, and at the moment was strongly adverse to an attack. . . . Washington was harassed of course by all this, but he did not stay his purpose, and as soon as he knew that Clinton actually had marched, he broke camp at Valley Forge and started in pursuit. There were more councils of an old-womanish character, but finally Washington took the matter into his own hands, and ordered forth a strong detachment to attack the British rear-guard. They set out on the 25th, and as Lee, to whom the command belonged, did not care to go, Lafayette [see above: 1777 (July)] was put in charge. As soon as Lafayette had departed, however, Lee changed his mind, and insisted that all the detachments in front, amounting to 6,000 men, formed a division so large that it was unjust not to give him the command. Washington, therefore, sent him forward next day with two additional brigades, and then Lee by seniority took command on the 27th of the entire advance. In the evening of that day, Washington came up, reconnoitred the enemy, and saw that, although their position was a strong one, another day's unmolested march would make it still stronger. He therefore resolved to attack the next morning, and gave Lee then and there explicit orders to that effect. In the early dawn he despatched similar orders, but Lee apparently did nothing except move feebly forward, saying to Lafayette, 'You don't know the British soldiers; we cannot stand against them.' He made a weak attempt to cut off a covering party, marched and counter-marched, ordered and countermanded, until Lafayette and Wayne, eager to fight, knew not what to do, and sent hot messages to Washington to come to them. Thus hesitating and confused, Lee permitted Clinton to get his baggage and train to the front, and to mass all his best troops in the rear under Cornwallis, who then advanced against the American lines. Now there were no orders at all, and the troops did not know what

to do, or where to go. They stood still, then began to fall back, and then to retreat. A very little more and there would have been a rout. As it was, Washington alone prevented disaster. . . . As the ill tidings grew thicker, Washington spurred sharper and rode faster through the deep sand and under the blazing mid-summer sun. At last he met Lee and the main body in full retreat. He rode straight at Lee, savage with anger, not pleasant to look at, one may guess, and asked fiercely and with a deep oath, tradition says, what it all meant. . . . Lee gathered himself and tried to excuse and palliate what had happened, but although the brief words that followed are variously reported to us across the century, we know that Washington rebuked him in such a way, and with such passion, that all was over between them. Lee . . . went to the rear, thence to a court-martial, thence to dismissal and to a solitary life. . . . Having put Lee aside, Washington rallied the broken troops, brought them into position, turned them back, and held the enemy in check. It was not an easy feat, but it was done, and when Lee's division again fell back in good order the main army was in position, and the action became general. The British were repulsed, and then Washington, taking the offensive, drove them back until he occupied the battlefield of the morning. Night came upon him still advancing. He halted his army, lay down under a tree, his soldiers lying on their arms about him, and planned a fresh attack, to be made at daylight. But when the dawn came it was seen that the British had crept off, and were far on their road. The heat prevented a rapid pursuit, and Clinton got into New York. Between there and Philadelphia he had lost 2,000 men, Washington said, and modern authorities put it at about 1,500, of whom nearly 500 fell at Monmouth. . . . Monmouth has never been one of the famous battles of the Revolution, and yet there is no other which can compare with it as an illustration of Washington's ability as a soldier. . . . Its importance lies in the evidence which it gives of the way in which Washington, after a series of defeats, during a winter of terrible suffering and privation, had yet developed his ragged volunteers into a well-disciplined and effective army. The battle was a victory, but the existence and the quality of the army that won it were a far greater triumph. The dreary winter at Valley Forge had indeed borne fruit."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 1, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, ch. 54-56.—Mrs. M. Campbell, *Life of General W. Hull*, ch. 14.—*Lee Papers*, v. 2-3 (*New York Historical Society Collections*, 1872-1873).

1778 (June-November).—War on the border.—Activity of Tories and Indians.—Massacre at Cherry Valley.—"The Six Nations were stirred to hostility by Sir John Johnson and the Mohawk chief Joseph Brant, with Walter Butler, of infamous name. Their tory partisans were more cruel than the red men. At Cobleskill, Schoharie county, June 1, 1778, Brant won a savage triumph with a mixed force, and burned and plundered the settlement. Springfield was also destroyed, and the assailants retired. A month later the Indians were again at Cobleskill, and, burning where they went, beat off a force that attempted to check them. The valley of the Schohariekill was in the succeeding year subjected to invasions from the Senecas, and suffered severely. About Fort Stanwix the tories and red men were continually hovering, and more than once persons were pounced



upon and scalped in sight of the works. In 1778, in the early autumn, German Flats was visited by Brant and his followers, and was entirely destroyed, although all the inhabitants but two were warned in season to escape with their lives. An expedition was sent after the Indians, but failed to bring the warriors to battle, and was rewarded only by laying waste the Indian villages of Unadilla and Oquaga, and capturing a large supply of cattle and provisions. At Cherry Valley a fort had been built, and the village was occupied by a band of colonial troops under Colonel Ichabod Alden. He rested in security, and the settlers were scattered in their habitations, regardless of warnings of approaching foes. Under cover of a severe storm of snow and rain, November 11, Brant and Butler, with 800 Indians and Tories, swooped upon the homes, and 43 persons, including women and children, were butchered, 40 taken prisoners, all the buildings were burned, and the domestic animals seized. So brutal was the massacre that Brant charged Butler and the Tories with acting against his protests. Brant himself was content, July 10, 1779, with destroying the church, mills, houses, and barns at Minnisink, Orange county, without sacrificing lives, but turned upon a party sent in pursuit, and, after capturing a detachment, butchered the wounded, and slew 45 who tried to escape. Such deeds produced a terror in the colony. No one knew where the red men and Tories would strike next. To check and counteract them, excursions were made against the tribes in their homes. One of these was led by Colonels Van Schaick and Willet from Fort Stanwix in April, 1779. Proceeding by Wood Creek and Oneida Lake, they penetrated the villages of the Onondagas, which they destroyed, and seized the provisions and even the weapons of the red men, who fled into the wilderness."—E. H. Roberts, *New York*, v. 2, ch. 24.—The following account of the attack on Cherry Valley is from a pen friendly to Butler and from sources favorable to the Tory side: "After an exhausting march next day through a blinding snow-storm and over ground covered with deep wet snow and mud, Butler halted his men at dark in a pine wood which afforded them some shelter, six miles from Cherry Valley. He assembled the chiefs and proposed that as soon as the moon rose, they should resume their march and surround the house occupied by the officers, while he made a rush upon the fort with the rangers. They readily assented, but before the time appointed arrived it began to rain violently, and they obstinately refused to move until daybreak. It was then arranged that Capt. McDonnell with 50 picked rangers and some Indians should storm the house, while Butler with the remainder assailed the fort. Without tents, blankets or fires, they spent a sleepless night cowering beneath the pines, and were glad to move as soon as day appeared. They had approached unperceived within a mile of the fort by passing through a dense swamp, when the Indians in front fired at two men cutting wood. One fell dead; the other, though bleeding, ran for his life and the entire body of Indians set up a whoop and followed at full speed. Unhappily the rangers had just been halted to fix flints and load their rifles, and the Indians obtained a long start. The Continental officers attempted to escape to the fort but only two or three reached it. The colonel, five other officers and twenty soldiers were killed on the way and the lieutenant-colonel, three subalterns, and ten privates were taken. The colors of the regiment were abandoned in the house and

burnt in it. The garrison of the fort was fully alarmed, and opened a fierce fire of artillery and small arms. The rangers seized and burnt a detached block-house, and fired briskly at the loopholes in the palisades for ten minutes, when Butler saw with horror and consternation that the Indians had set their officers at defiance, and dispersed in every direction to kill and plunder. Their wretched misconduct forced him to collect all the rangers into a compact body on an eminence near the principal entrance to the fort, to oppose a sally by the garrison, which then undoubtedly outnumbered them considerably. There he was obliged to remain inactive all day under a ceaseless, chilling rain, while blazing houses and shrieks of agony told their pitiful tale in the settlement below. At nightfall he marched a mile down the valley and encamped. He then struggled with indifferent success to rescue the prisoners. Those surrendered were placed next the camp fires and protected by his whole force. Next morning most of the Indians and the feeblest men among the rangers were sent away with a huge drove of captured cattle for the supply of the garrison at Niagara, and McDonnell and Brant, with 60 rangers and 50 Indians, swept the valley from end to end, ruthlessly burning every building and stack in sight, while Butler, with the remainder, again stood guard at the gate of the fort. He hoped that this appalling spectacle would provoke the garrison to sally out and fight, but the lesson of Wyoming had not been lost on them, and they continued to look on from the walls in silent fury. Another great herd of cattle was collected, and Butler leisurely began his retreat, having had only two rangers and three Indians wounded during the expedition. He did not disguise the dark side of the story in his letter to Col. Bolton of the 17th November. 'I have much to lament,' he said, 'that notwithstanding my utmost precautions to save the women and children, I could not prevent some of them falling victims to the fury of the savages. They have carried off many of the inhabitants and killed more, among them Colin Cloyd, a very violent rebel. I could not prevail on the Indians to leave the women and children behind, though the second morning Captain Johnson (to whose knowledge of the Indians and address in managing them I am much indebted) and I got them to permit twelve, who were loyalists, and whom I concealed, with the humane assistance of Mr. Joseph Brant and Captain Jacobs of Ochquaga, to return. The death of the women and children on this occasion may, I believe, be truly ascribed to the rebels having falsely accused the Indians of cruelty at Wyoming. This has much exasperated them, and they are still more incensed at finding that the colonel and those who had then laid down their arms, soon after marching into their country intending to destroy their villages, and they declared that they would be no more accused falsely of fighting the enemy twice, meaning they would in future give no quarter.'"—E. Cruikshank, *Story of Butler's Rangers*, pp. 55-56.

ALSO IN: W. W. Campbell, *Annals of Tryon county*, ch. 5.—*Centennial celebrations of New York*, pp. 359-383.—W. L. Stone, *Life of Brant*, v. 1, ch. 17.

1778 (July).—War on the border.—Bloody work of Tories and their Indian allies.—Massacre at Wyoming.—"In 1778, according to the plan of campaign as given by Guy Johnson in his correspondence, the English forces on the western borders of New York were divided into two

bodies: one, consisting of Indians under Brant, to operate in New York, while Deputy Superintendent Butler with the other should penetrate the settled district on the Susquehanna. Brant [Joseph Brant, the Mohawk chief], who, according to Colonel Claus, 'had shown himself to be the most faithful and zealous subject his majesty could have in America,' did his work unsparingly, and ruin marked his track. In the valley of the upper Mohawk and the Schoharie nothing but the garrison houses escaped, and labor was only possible in the field when muskets were within easy reach. Occasionally blows were struck at the larger settlements. . . . In July, 1778, the threatened attack on Wyoming took place. This region was at the time formally incorporated as the county of Westmoreland of the colony of Connecticut. . . . In the fall of 1776, two companies, on the Continental establishment, had been raised in the valley, in pursuance of a resolution of Congress, and were shortly thereafter ordered to join General Washington. Several stockaded forts had been built during the summer at different points. The withdrawal of so large a proportion of the able-bodied men as had been enlisted in the Continental service threw upon the old men who were left behind the duty of guarding the forts. . . . In March, 1778, another military company was organized, by authority of Congress, to be employed for home defence. In May, attacks were made upon the scouting parties by Indians, who were the forerunners of an invading army. The exposed situation of the settlement, the prosperity of the inhabitants, and the loyalty with which they had responded to the call for troops, demanded consideration from Connecticut, to whose quota the companies had been credited, and from Congress, in whose armies they had been incorporated; but no help came. On June 30th an armed labor party of eight men, which went out from the upper fort, was attacked by Major Butler, who, with a force estimated by the American commander in his report at 800 men, Tories and Indians in equal numbers, had arrived in the valley. This estimate was not far from correct; but if we may judge from other raiding forces during the war, the proportion of whites is too large, for only a few local Tories had joined Butler. The little forts at the upper end of the valley offered no resistance to the invaders. On July 3d, there were collected at 'Forty Fort,' on the banks of the river, about three miles above Wilkesbarré, 230 Americans, organized in six companies (one of them being the company authorized by Congress for home defence), and commanded by Colonel Zebulon Butler, a resident in the valley and an officer in the Continental army. It was determined, after deliberation, to give battle. In the afternoon of that day, this body of volunteers, their number being swelled to nearly 300 by the addition of old men and boys, marched up the valley. The invaders had set fire to the forts of which they were in possession. This perplexed the Americans, as was intended, and they pressed on towards the spot selected by the English officer for giving battle. This was reached about four in the afternoon, and the attack was at once made by the Americans, who fired rapidly in platoons. The British line wavered, but a flanking fire from a body of Indians concealed in the woods settled the fate of the day against the Americans. They were thrown into confusion. No efforts of their officers could rally them while exposed to a fire which in a short time brought down every captain in the band. The Indians now cut off

the retreat of the panic-stricken men, and pressed them towards the river. All who could saved their lives by flight. Of the 300 who went out that morning from Forty Fort, the names are recorded of 162 officers and men killed in the action or in the massacre which followed. Major Butler, the British officer in command, reported the taking of 'two hundred and twenty-seven scalps' and only five prisoners.' Such was the exasperation of the Indians, according to him, that it was with difficulty he saved these few. He gives the English loss at two whites killed and eight Indians wounded. During the night the worst passions of the Indians seem to have been aroused in revenge for Oriskany. Incredible tales are told of the inhumanity of the Tories. These measures of vengeance fell exclusively upon those who participated in the battle, for all women and children were spared. As soon as the extent of the disaster was made known, the inhabitants of the lower part of the valley deserted their homes, and fled in the direction of the nearest settlements. Few stayed behind who had strength and opportunity to escape. In their flight many of the fugitives neglected to provide themselves with provisions, and much suffering and some loss of life ensued. The fugitives from the field of battle took refuge in the forts lower down the valley. The next day, Colonel Zebulon Butler, with the remnants of the company for home defence, consisting of only fourteen men escaped from the valley. Colonel Denison, in charge of Forty Fort, negotiated with Major Butler the terms of capitulation which were ultimately signed. In these it was agreed that the inhabitants should occupy their farms peaceably, and their lives should be preserved 'intire and unhurt.' With the exception that Butler executed a British deserter whom he found among the prisoners, no lives were taken at that time. Shortly thereafter, the Indians began to plunder, and the English commander, to his chagrin, found himself unable to check them. Miner even goes so far as to say that he promised to pay for the property thus lost. Finding his commands disregarded, Butler mustered his forces and withdrew, without visiting the lower part of the valley. The greater part of the Indians went with him, but enough remained to continue the devastation, while a few murders committed by straggling parties of Indians ended the tragedy. The whole valley was left a scene of desolation."—A. McF. Davis, *Indians and the border warfare of the Revolution (Narrative and critical history of America, v. 6, ch. 8)*.—"Rarely, indeed, does it happen that history is more at fault in regard to facts than in the case of Wyoming. The remark may be applied to nearly every writer who has attempted to narrate the events connected with the invasion of Colonel John Butler. Ramsay, and Gordon, and Marshall—nay, the British historians themselves—have written gross exaggerations. Marshall, however, in his revised edition, has made corrections. . . . Other writers, of greater or less note, have gravely recorded the same fictions, adding, it is to be feared, enormities not even conveyed to them by tradition. The grossest of these exaggerations are contained in Thatcher's Military Journal and Drake's Book of the Indians. The account of the marching out of a large body of Americans from one of the forts, to hold a parley, by agreement, and then being drawn into an ambushade and all put to death, is false; the account of 70 Continental soldiers being butchered, after having surrendered, is also totally untrue. No regular troops surrendered, and all escaped who survived the battle of

the 3d. . . . There is still another important correction to be made. . . . This correction regards the name and the just fame of Joseph Brant, whose character has been blackened with all the infamy, both real and imaginary, connected with this bloody expedition. Whether Captain Brant was at any time in company with this expedition is doubtful; but it is certain, in the face of every historical authority, British and American, that, so far from being engaged in the battle, he was many miles distant at the time of its occurrence. . . . After the publication of Campbell's 'Gertrude of Wyoming,' in which poem the Mohawk chieftain was denounced as 'the Monster Brant,' his son repaired to England, and, in a correspondence with the poet, successfully vindicated his father's memory."—W. L. Stone, *Life of Joseph Brant*, v. 1, p. 339, footnote, 338 and footnote.—"No lives were taken by the Indians after the surrender; but numbers of women and children perished in the dismal swamp on the Pokono range of mountains, in the flight. . . . The whole number of people killed and missing was about 300. . . . The greatest barbarities of this celebrated massacre were committed by the Tories."—Idem, *Poetry and history of Wyoming*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: W. P. Miner, *History of Wyoming*, Letter 17-18.—G. Peck, *Wyoming*.—J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 2, ch. 11.

1778 (July-November).—French fleet and army and their undertakings.—Ill-fortune and ill-feeling between new allies.—Failure at Newport.—"The first minister of France to the United States, M. Gérard, came accompanied by a fleet and army, under D'Estaing (July). 'Unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances,' as Washington wrote, 'lessened the importance of the French services in a great degree.' In the first place, the arrival was just late enough to miss the opportunity of surprising the British fleet in the Delaware, not to mention the British army on its retreat to New York. In the next place, the French vessels proved to be of too great draught to penetrate the channel and cooperate in an attack upon New York. Thus disappointing and disappointed, D'Estaing engaged in an enterprise against Newport, still in British hands. It proved another failure. But not through the French alone; the American troops that were to enter the island at the north being greatly behindhand. The same day that they took their place, under Sullivan, Greene, and Lafayette, the French left theirs at the lower end of the island, in order to meet the British fleet arriving from New York (August 10). A severe storm prevented more than a partial engagement; but D'Estaing returned to Newport only to plead the injuries received in the gale as compelling his retirement to Boston for repairs. The orders of the French government had been peremptory, that in case of any damage to the fleet it should put into port at once. So far was D'Estaing from avoiding action on personal grounds, that when Lafayette hurried to Boston to persuade his countrymen to return, the commander offered to serve as a volunteer until the fleet should be refitted. The Americans, however, talked of desertion and of inefficiency,—so freely, indeed, as to affront their faithful Lafayette. At the same time, large numbers of them imitated the very course which they censured, by deserting their own army. The remaining forces retreated from their lines to the northern end of the island, and, after an engagement, withdrew to the mainland (August 30). It required all the good offices of Lafayette, of Washington, and of Congress, to keep the peace between the Americans and their allies. D'Estaing,

soothed by the language of those whom he most respected, was provoked, on the other hand, by the hostility of the masses, both in the army and amongst the people. Collisions between his men and the Bostonians kept up his disgust; and, when his fleet was repaired, he sailed for the West Indies (November). . . . On the part of the British, there was nothing attempted that would not have been far better unattempted. Marauding parties from Newport went against New Bedford and Fairhaven. Others from New York went against Little Egg Harbor. Tories and Indians—'a collection of banditti,' as they were rightly styled by Washington, descended from the northern country to wreak massacres at Wyoming and at Cherry Valley. The war seemed to be assuming a new character: it was one of ravages unworthy of any cause, and most unworthy of such a cause as the British professed to be. Affairs were at a low state amongst the Americans."—S. Eliot, *History of the United States*, pt. 3, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: S. G. Arnold, *History of Rhode Island*, v. 2, ch. 21-22.—O. W. B. Peabody, *Life of General John Sullivan* (*Library of American Biography*, series 2, v. 3).—J. Marshall, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 9.

1778 (December).—Anxieties of Washington.—His opinion of Congress.—Serious defects and errors of that body.—"Much of the winter [of 1778-1779] was passed by Washington in Philadelphia, occupied in devising and discussing plans for the campaign of 1779. It was an anxious moment with him. Circumstances which inspired others with confidence, filled him with solicitude. The alliance with France had produced a baneful feeling of security, which, it appeared to him, was paralyzing the energies of the country. England, it was thought, would now be too much occupied in securing her position in Europe, to increase her force or extend her operations in America. Many, therefore, considered the war as virtually at an end; and were unwilling to make the sacrifices, or supply the means necessary for important military undertakings. Dissensions, too, and party feuds were breaking out in Congress, owing to that relaxation of that external pressure of a common and imminent danger, which had heretofore produced a unity of sentiment and action. That august body had, in fact, greatly deteriorated since the commencement of the war. Many of those whose names had been as watchwords at the Declaration of Independence had withdrawn from the national councils; occupied either by their individual affairs, or by the affairs of their individual States. Washington, whose comprehensive patriotism embraced the whole Union, deprecated and deplored the dawning of this sectional spirit."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 38.—The following, from a letter written by Washington in December, 1778, to Benjamin Harrison, speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, intimates the grave anxieties which filled his mind, and the opinion of Congress with which he had returned from a visit to Philadelphia: "It appears as clear to me as ever the Sun did in its meridian brightness, that America never stood in more eminent need of the wise, patriotic, and spirited exertions of her Sons than at this period; and if it is not a sufficient cause for genl. lamentation, my misconception of the matter impresses it too strongly upon me, that the States, separately, are too much engaged in their local concerns, and have too many of their ablest men withdrawn from the general council, for the good of the common weal. . . . As there can be no harm in a pious wish for the good

of one's Country, I shall offer it as mine, that each State wd. not only choose, but absolutely compel their ablest men to attend Congress; and that they would instruct them to go into a thorough investigation of the causes, that have produced so many disagreeable effects in the army and Country; in a word, that public abuses should be corrected & an entire reformation worked. Without these, it does not in my Judgment require the spirit of divination to foretell the consequences of the present administration; nor to how little purpose the States individually are framing constitutions, providing laws, and filling offices with the abilities of their ablest men. These, if the great whole is mismanaged, must sink in the general wreck, and will carry with it the remorse of thinking, that we are lost by our own folly and negligence, or the desire perhaps of living in ease and tranquillity during the expected accomplishment of so great a revolution, in the effecting of which the greatest abilities, and the honestest men our (i.e. the American) world affords, ought to be employed. It is much to be feared, my dear Sir, that the States, in their separate capacities, have very inadequate ideas of the present danger. Removed (some of them) far distant from the scene of action, and seeing and hearing such publications only, as flatter their wishes, they conceive that the contest is at an end, and that to regulate the government and police of their own State is all that remains to be done; but it is devoutly to be wished, that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them like a thunder-clap, that is little expected. I do not mean to designate particular States. I wish to cast no reflections upon any one. The Public believe (and, if they do believe it, the fact might almost as well be so), that the States at this time are badly represented, and that the great and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want either of abilities or application in the members, or through the discord & party views of some individuals. . . . P. S. Phila: 30th. This letter was to have gone by Post from Middlebrook but missed that conveyance, since which I have come to this place at the request of Congress whence I shall soon return. I have seen nothing since I came here (on the 22d Inst.) to change my opinion of Men or Measrs., but abundant reason to be convinced that our affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition than they have been in since the commencement of the War.—By a faithful laborer then in the cause—By a man who is daily injuring his private Estate without even the smallest earthly advantage not common to all in case of a favorable Issue to the dispute—By one who wishes the prosperity of America most devoutly and sees or thinks he sees it, on the brink of ruin, you are beseeched most earnestly, my dear Colo. Harrison, to exert yourself in endeavoring to rescue your Country by (let me add) sending your ablest and best Men to Congress—these characters must not slumber nor sleep at home in such times of pressing danger—they must not content themselves in the enjoyment of places of honor or profit in their own Country while the common interests of America are mouldering and sinking into irretrievable (if a remedy is not soon applied) ruin in which theirs also must ultimately be involved. If I was to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of Men, from what I have seen, and heard, and in part know, I should in one word say that idleness, dissipation & extravagance seems to have laid fast hold of most of them.—That speculation—peculation—and an

insatiable thirst for riches seems to have got the better of every other consideration and almost of every order of Men.—That party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day whilst the momentous concerns of an empire—a great and accumulated debt—ruined finances—depreciated money—and want of credit (which in their consequences is the want of everything) are but secondary considerations and postponed from day to day—from week to week as it our affairs wear the most promising aspect—after drawing this picture, which from my Soul I believe to be a true one, I need not repeat to you that I am alarmed and wish to see my Countrymen roused.—I have no resentments, nor do I mean to point at any particular characters,—this I can declare upon my honor for I have every attention paid me by Congress that I can possibly expect and have reason to think that I stand well in their estimation, but in the present situation of things I cannot help asking—Where is Mason—Wythe—Jefferson—Nicholas—Pendleton—Nelson—and another I could name—and why, if you are sufficiently impressed with your danger do you not (as New Yk. has done in the case of Mr. Jay) send an extra member or two for at least a certain limited time till the great business of the Nation is put upon a more respectable and happy establishment.—Your Money is now sinking 5 pr. ct. a day in this city; and I shall not be surprized if in the course of a few months a total stop is put to the currency of it.—And yet an Assembly—a concert—a Dinner—or supper (that will cost three or four hundred pounds) will not only take Men off from acting in but even from thinking of this business while a great part of the Officers of ye Army from absolute necessity are quitting the service and ye more virtuous few rather than do this are sinking by sure degrees into beggary and want.—I again repeat to you that this is not an exaggerated acct.; that it is an alarming one I do not deny, and confess to you that I feel more real distress on acct. of the prest. appearances of things than I have done at any one time since the commencement of the dispute—but it is time to bid you once more adieu.—Providence has heretofore taken me up when all other means and hope seemed to be departing from me in this.”—George Washington, (W. C. Ford, ed., *Writings*, v. 7, pp. 297-303).—“The first Continental Congress enjoyed and deserved in a remarkable degree the respect and confidence of the country. The second Congress was composed of eminent men, and succeeded, for a time, to the honors and reputation of the first. But when it attempted to pass from discussion to organization, and to direct as well as to frame the machinery of administration, its delays and disputes and errors and contradictions and hesitations excited a well-founded distrust of its executive skill. Conscious of this distrust, it became jealous of its authority; and instead of endeavoring to regain, by correcting its errors, the ground which it had lost by committing them, it grew suspicious and exacting in proportion to the decay of its strength. And while this critical change in its relations to the country was taking place, important changes took place also in the materials of which it was composed,—some of its wisest members being removed by death, or imperative calls to other fields of duty, or by failing of re-election at the regular expiration of their terms of office. Among the first elements with which it was brought into collision were the newly organized governments of the States. The question of State rights, that unsolved problem of our history, be-

gins almost with the beginning of the war. How abundant and active the materials of disunion were, and how difficult it was even for leading men to rise above them might be proved by numerous passages in the letters of Washington and Greene, if it were not still more evident from the conduct of the local legislatures. How far this spirit might have been counteracted or controlled if the policy of the Congress had been that policy of prompt decision and energetic action which, commanding respect at all times, commands in times of general danger general and implicit obedience, it is impossible to say."—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathanael Greene*, v. 1, bk. 2, ch. 18.—"Congress too often fell to the level of a wrangling body of mediocre men. After the first eight years the ability that might have given it dignity was largely employed in the army, on diplomatic missions, or in the establishment and administration of the new State Governments. The particularism of the time is revealed in the belief that a man's first allegiance was to his State; to construct a constitution for Massachusetts was thought to be a greater service than to draft the Articles of Confederation; to be Governor of Virginia a higher honor than to be President of Congress. The political wisdom of the decade is therefore chiefly embodied in the first state constitutions and the legislation of the new State Governments. . . . The erection of stable State Governments greatly diminished the power and prestige of federal authority. Insensibly the Congress and the Continental army found themselves dependent upon thirteen sovereign masters. The feebleness with which the war was supported sometimes strikes one as incredible; but the amazing difficulty of maintaining an army of ten thousand troops for the achievement of independence, in the very colonies which had raised twenty-five thousand for the conquest of Canada was due less to the lack of resources, or to indifference to the result, than to the uncertain authority of Congress, the republican fear of military power, and the jealous provincialism which had everywhere been greatly accentuated by the establishment of the new state constitutions. Washington's army naturally looked with contempt upon a Government that could not feed or clothe its own soldiers. Congress, jealous of its authority for the very reason that it had none, criticized the army in defeat and feared it in victory. The State Governments, refusing to conform to the recommendations of Congress, alternately complained of its weakness and denounced it for usurping unwarranted power. Each State wished to maintain control of its own troops, and was offended, if, in the Continental forces, its many military experts were not all major-generals. The very colony which gave little support to the army when war raged in another province, cried aloud for protection when the enemy crossed its own sacred boundaries; and, with perhaps one-eighth of its proper quota of men at the front, with its requisitions in taxes unpaid, wished to know whether it was because of incompetence or timidity that General Washington failed to win victories."—C. L. Becker, *Beginnings of the American people*, pp. 262-264.

1778-1779.—Clark's conquest of the Northwest for Virginia, and its annexation to the district of Kentucky.—"In 1770, while the States were wrangling over their Western lands, a little band of valiant backwoodsmen won a victory which gave substance to their claims and made their sessions something more than waste paper. Throughout the war the frontier communities were

most loyal supporters of the Revolution. Their expert riflemen, organized in companies, of which that of Daniel Morgan is perhaps the most famous, served in the army of Washington, helped Gates to win the battle of Saratoga, and were of indispensable service in driving Clinton out of North Carolina in 1780, and Cornwallis in 1781. The borderers of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the little settlements at Watauga and Boonesboro, maintained a heroic defense against the Indians, who were paid by General Hamilton, the British commander at Detroit, to wage a war of massacre and pillage on the frontier. Against intermittent Indian raids the backwoodsmen could defend their homes; but so long as the British held Detroit and Vincennes and the Mississippi forts, there could be no peace in the interior, and even if the colonies won independence, it was likely that the Alleghanies would mark the boundary of the new State. Under these circumstances, George Rogers Clark, trapper and expert woodsman and Indian fighter, set himself, with the confident idealism of the frontiersman, to achieve an object which must have seemed to most men no more than a forlorn hope."—C. L. Becker, *Beginnings of the American people*, pp. 265-266.—"Virginia . . . had more western enterprise than any other colony. In 1774 Dunmore's war gave her the 'backlands,' into which her frontiersmen had been for some time pressing. Boone was a Carolinian, but Kentucky was a distinctively Virginia colony. In 1776 the Virginia legislature erected the County of Kentucky, and the next year a Virginia judge dispensed justice at Harrodsburg. Soon the colony was represented in the legislature of the parent state. While thus extending her jurisdiction over the region southwest of the Ohio, the Old Dominion did not forget the language, of [her charter] of 1609, 'up into the land throughout from sea to sea, west and northwest.' George Rogers Clark, a Virginian who had made Kentucky his home, was endowed with something of the general's and statesman's grasp. While floating down the Ohio in 1776, being then 24 years of age, he conceived the conquest of the country beyond the river. . . . Clark says he had since the beginning of the war taken pains to make himself acquainted with the true situation of the Northwestern posts; and in 1777 he sent two young hunters to spy out the country more thoroughly, and especially to ascertain the sentiments of the 'habitants.' On the return of these hunters with an encouraging report, he went to Williamsburg, then the capital of Virginia, where he enlisted Governor Patrick Henry and other leading minds in a secret expedition to the Illinois. Acting under a vaguely worded law, authorizing him to aid 'any expedition against their Western enemies,' Governor Henry gave Clark some vague public instructions, directing him to enlist, in any county of the commonwealth, seven companies of men who should act under his command as a militia, and also private instructions that were much more full and definite. . . . Both the public and private instructions are dated January 2, 1778. The governor also gave the young captain a small supply of money. Clark immediately re-crossed the mountains and began to recruit his command. . . . Overcoming as best he could the difficulties that environed him, he collected his feeble command at the Falls of the Ohio. On June 26, 1778, he began the descent of the river. Leaving the Ohio at Fort Massac, forty miles above its mouth, he began the march to Kaskaskia. This fell into his hands, July 5th, and Cahokia soon after, both

without the loss of a single life. Clark found few Englishmen in these villages, and the French, who were weary of British rule, he had little difficulty in attaching to the American interest. Vincennes, soon after, surrendered to a mere proclamation, when there was not an American soldier within one hundred miles of the place. . . . Clark prevailed upon 100 men to re-enlist for eight months; he then filled up his companies with recruits from the villages, and sent an urgent call to Virginia for re-enforcements. The salutary influence of the invasion upon the Indians was felt at once; it began to spread among the nations even to the border of the lakes'; and in five weeks Clark settled a peace with ten or twelve different tribes. . . . And now Clark began really to feel the difficulties of his situation. Destitute of money, poorly supplied, commanding a small and widely scattered force, he had to meet and circumvent an active enemy who was determined to regain what he had lost. Governor Hamilton [the British governor at Detroit] projected a grand campaign against the French towns that had been captured and the small force that held them. The feeble issue was the capture, in December, 1778, of Vincennes, which was occupied by but two Americans. Clark, who was in the Illinois at the time of this disaster, at once put his little force in motion for the Wabash, knowing, he says, that if he did not take Hamilton, Hamilton would take him; and, February 25, 1779, at the end of a march of 250 miles, that ranks in peril and hardship with Arnold's winter march to Canada, he again captured the town, the fort, the governor, and his whole command. Hamilton was sent to Virginia a prisoner of war, where he was found guilty of treating American prisoners with cruelty, and of offering the Indians premiums for scalps, but none for prisoners." Clark was ambitious to extend his march to Detroit, but could not compass the necessary means. "Detroit lost for a few hundred men," was his pathetic lament as he surrendered an enterprise that lay near his heart. Had he been able to achieve it, he would have won and held the whole Northwest. As it was he won and held the Illinois and the Wabash in the name of Virginia and of the United States. . . . The American Commissioners, in 1782, at Paris, could plead 'uti possidetis' in reference to much of the country beyond the Ohio, for the flag of the Republic, raised over it by George Rogers Clark, had never been lowered. It would not be easy to find in our history a case of an officer accomplishing results that were so great and far-reaching with so small a force. . . . All this time the British were not idle. War-party after war-party was sent against the American border. In 1780 a grand expedition was organized at Detroit and sent to Kentucky under the command of Captain Bird. But it accomplished nothing commensurate with its magnitude and cost. . . . The Northwest had been won by a Virginia army, commanded by a Virginia officer, put in the field at Virginia's expense. Governor Henry had promptly announced the conquest to the Virginia delegates in Congress. . . . But before Patrick Henry wrote this letter, Virginia had welded the last link in her chain of title to the country beyond the Ohio. In October, 1778, her Legislature declared: 'All the citizens of the commonwealth of Virginia, who are actually settlers there, or who shall hereafter be settled, on the west side of the Ohio, shall be included in the district of Kentucky which shall be called Illinois County.' Nor was this all. Soon after, Governor Henry appointed a lieutenant-commandant for the new


county, with full instructions for carrying on the government. The French settlements remained under Virginia jurisdiction until March, 1784."—B. A. Hinsdale, *Old Northwest*, ch. 9.—"It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Clark's conquest. Lord Dunmore's War was one step; it extended Virginia's 'sphere of influence' westward to the Muskingum. But Clark, of his own motion and largely at the expense of his private fortune, chiefly supporting his soldiers on the country and paying them from its plunder, in a series of brilliant achievements captured the Southern key-points of the great Northwest, and held them with military force and his strong personal influence until the treaty of peace with England in 1783. The English peace commissioners at first claimed the Northwest as a part of Canada; but throughout the protracted negotiations Jay and Franklin persisted in demanding the country which Clark had so gallantly won and was still holding. What appears to have had more effect upon the English treaty commissioners than the fact of military occupancy, was Franklin's argument that unless room for growth were given the United States, a permanent peace could not be expected between the two countries—that the tide of emigration westward over the Alleghenies could not be stemmed; that the rough, masterful borderers could not be restrained from intrenching on the English wilderness, and a never-ending frontier fight, disastrous to all concerned, would be inevitable. The situation was admitted. Later, Lord Shelburne, who was chiefly responsible for yielding this point, reinforced his position by maintaining in Parliament that after all the fur-trade of the Northwest was not worth fighting for, and the fur-trade was all that Englishmen wished of that vast area. Nevertheless, Jay and Franklin could have found no footing for their contention, had Clark not been in actual possession of the country. It certainly was a prime factor in the situation."—R. G. Thwaites, *How George Rogers Clark won the Northwest*. pp. 71-72.—See also VIRGINIA: 1770-1797.

ALSO IN: *Clark's campaign in the Illinois (Ohio Valley Historical Series, no. 3)*.—J. H. Perkins, *Annals of the West*, ch. 7.—A. Davidson and B. Stuvé, *History of Illinois*, ch. 16-18.—T. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, v. 2, ch. 2-3.


1778-1779.—French alliance.—Peril of France.—Doubtful feeling in America.—Spanish mediation with England.—"From the third volume of Doniol's comprehensive work on the 'Participation de la France l'établissement des États Unis,' published in 1888, we are able to learn for the first time the extreme peril of France in 1778-'79. When Vergennes advised the recognition of the independence of the United States, it was on the same grounds that Canning advised the recognition of the independence of the Spanish South American States many years afterwards. The fair distribution of power in the civilized world, which was threatened in the latter period by the Holy Alliance, was threatened in the former period by the assumption of maritime supremacy by Britain. In each the object was to call up a new sovereignty in America, so as to check an undue concentration of sovereignty in Europe. Undoubtedly Vergennes was aided, as Canning was aided, by the enthusiasm felt by men of liberal views for a revolution that was expected to extend the domain of liberalism; but with Vergennes, as with Canning, the object was the establishing of a power abroad which could resist a dangerous aggression at home. When in February, 1778,



ISRAEL  
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
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
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
DANIEL MORGAN



THOMAS SUMTER



SIR  
HENRY  
CLINTON



LORD  
CORN-  
WALLIS



JOHN  
BURGOYNE



COMTE  
JEAN  
BAPTISTE  
DE  
ROCHAMBEAU



BARON  
FRIEDRICH  
WILHELM  
VON STEUBEN

GENERALS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION





France acknowledged the independence of the United States, Vergennes had good reason to hold either that Britain would not resent the insult by war, or that she would find that in such a war the odds were against her. A British army had just capitulated at Saratoga. America, so it was reported to Vergennes and so he believed, was unanimous in determining to defend her liberties to the last. In Holland there was a strong party which was expected to force the States-General into a recognition of their sister republic. Spain had already secretly advanced a million of francs to the American commissioners. From Frederick the Great, delighted to see his British relatives, who had not always supported him in his troubles, annoyed by a revolt in their own domain, came words very encouraging to the American envoys. Catharine II listened with apparent satisfaction to a scheme which would relieve her infant shipping from British oppression. It looked as if, should Britain declare war against France, she would have against her the armies and navies of all continental Europe, aided by the people of her American Colonies in a compact mass. But in a few months there came a great change. The British army under Howe was so largely reinforced as for the immediate present to give it a great superiority over any army Congress could bring against it in open field. . . . It is true that the news in April of the French treaty revived the energies of the revolutionists; but this treaty had its drawbacks, as the old dislike of France, in part inherited from England, in part the product of the Seven-years war, intensified the yearning for the mother country which in many hearts still remained. French officers complained that on their first arrival in New England they were received with sullen aversion by the people, though welcomed by the revolutionary leaders. The French army and navy, for the first year in which they were engaged in America, did no good to the American cause; and so great was the popular irritation at their inactivity, so strong, it was said, continued to be the old race attachment to England, that intelligent French observers in America advised Vergennes that he must move warily, for at any moment America might make a separate peace with Britain and then join the British forces against France. No doubt these reports, so far as they pronounced this to be the drift of a large minority in Congress, were unfounded in fact. They were nevertheless communicated under high sanction to Vergennes, and produced in his mind the liveliest anxiety. . . . English influence had for a time regained its ascendancy in Holland. Prussia and Russia, having tasted the delights of neutral commerce, let it be plainly understood that they would not abandon a neutrality so profitable for the risks of belligerency. And Spain had taken alarm and was backing out not merely from the family compact, but from her recent promise to aid the insurgents. Aiding the insurgents, her minister declared, would be cutting her own throat, and no aid to the insurgents should be given except on a very heavy equivalent. If France was to meet the shock of the British navy alone she might be swept from the seas, and, aside from this danger, her finances were in such a ruinous condition that her bankruptcy was imminent. One of two courses must be adopted, not only to save France but to save the independence of the United States and the consequent equipoise of power for which France has gone to war. There must be either a general peace, which would include the independence of the United States, or there must be war, with

Spain joining the allies. . . . It was in this condition of affairs that the position of Spain in 1778-'79 became of commanding importance. She offered herself as mediator between the allies and their common enemy, and through her the terms of pacification were discussed. In the negotiations, protracted and on both sides largely insincere, between Spain and Britain relative to the proposed pacification, the winter of 1778-'79 was consumed."—F. Wharton, *Introduction to Revolutionary diplomatic correspondence of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 5, sect. 86.

1778-1779.—War carried into the South.—Savannah taken and Georgia subdued.—"After Burgoyne's defeat no important offensive operations were undertaken by the British in the northern states, though the coast towns suffered from naval and military raids. They kept their grip on the city of New York and the lower Hudson, but the significant movements of the later years were in the South. Here the British relied largely on the loyalists, who were especially strong in the Carolinas and Georgia, and hoped with their help to detach those states from the Union."—E. B. Greene, *Foundation of American nationality*, p. 493.—Towards the end of November, 1778, a "body of troops, under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, sailed [from New York] for Georgia in the squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker; the British cabinet having determined to carry the war into the Southern States. At the same time General Prevost, who commanded in Florida, was ordered by Sir Henry Clinton to march to the banks of the Savannah River, and attack Georgia in flank, while the expedition under Campbell should attack it in front on the seaboard. . . . The squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker anchored in the Savannah River towards the end of December. An American force of about 600 regulars, and a few militia under General Robert Howe [a brother of the former commander-in-chief], were encamped near the town, being the remnant of an army with which that officer had invaded Florida, in the preceding summer, but had been obliged to evacuate it by a mortal malady which desolated his camp. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell landed his troops on the 29th of December, about three miles below the town. The whole country bordering the river is a deep morass, cut up by creeks, and only to be traversed by causeways. Over one of these, 600 yards in length, with a ditch on each side, Colonel Campbell advanced, putting to flight a small party stationed to guard it. General Howe had posted his little army on the main road, with the river on his left and a morass in front. A negro gave Campbell information of a path leading through the morass, by which troops might get unobserved to the rear of the Americans. Sir James Baird was detached with the light infantry by this path, while Colonel Campbell advanced in front. The Americans, thus suddenly attacked in front and rear, were completely routed; upwards of 100 were either killed on the spot, or perished in the morass; 38 officers and 415 privates were taken prisoners, the rest retreated up the Savannah River and crossed into South Carolina. Savannah, the capital of Georgia, was taken possession of by the victors, with cannon, military stores and provisions; their loss was only seven killed and nineteen wounded. Colonel Campbell conducted himself with great moderation; protecting the persons and property of the inhabitants, and proclaiming security and favor to all that should return to their allegiance. Numbers in consequence flocked to the British standard: the lower part of Georgia

was considered as subdued, and posts were established by the British to maintain possession. While Colonel Campbell had thus invaded Georgia in front, General Prevost "entered the State from Florida, "took Sunbury, the only remaining fort of importance, and marched to Savannah, where he assumed the general command, detaching Colonel Campbell against Augusta. By the middle of January (1779) all Georgia was reduced to submission. A more experienced American general than Howe had by this time arrived to take command of the Southern Department, Major-general Lincoln, who had gained such reputation in the campaign against Burgoyne, and whose appointment to this station had been solicited by the delegates from South Carolina and Georgia. He had received his orders from Washington in the beginning of October."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 37.

ALSO IN: W. B. Stevens, *History of Georgia*, v. 2, bk. 4, ch. 4.

1778-1779.—Washington guarding the Hudson.—Storming of Stony Point.—Marauding warfare of British.—"After Clinton slipped away from Monmouth and sought refuge in New York, Washington took post at convenient points and watched the movements of the enemy. In this way the summer passed. As always, Washington's first object was to guard the Hudson, and while he held this vital point firmly, he waited, ready to strike elsewhere if necessary. It looked for a time as if the British intended to descend on Boston, seize the town, and destroy the French fleet, which had gone there to refit. Such was the opinion of Gates, then commanding in that department, and as Washington inclined to the same belief, the fear of this event gave him many anxious moments. He even moved his troops so as to be in readiness to march eastward at short notice; but he gradually became convinced that the enemy had no such plan. . . . The main army, therefore, remained quiet, and when the autumn had passed went into winter-quarters in well-posted detachments about New York. In December Clinton made an ineffectual raid [in New Jersey], and then all was peaceful again, and Washington was able to go to Philadelphia and struggle with Congress, leaving his army more comfortable and secure than they had been in any previous winter. . . . He now hoped and believed that the moment would come when, by uniting his army with the French, he should be able to strike the decisive blow. Until that time came, however, he knew that he could do nothing on a great scale, and he felt that meantime the British, abandoning practically the eastern and middle States, would make one last desperate struggle for victory, and would make it in the south. Long before any one else, he appreciated this fact, and saw a peril looming large in that region. . . . All this, however, did not change his own plans one jot. He believed that the south must work out its own salvation, as New York and New England had done with Burgoyne, and he felt sure that in the end it would be successful. But he would not go south, nor take his army there. . . . The British might overrun the north or invade the south, but he would stay where he was, with his grip upon New York and the Hudson River. The tide of invasion might ebb and flow in this region or that, but the British were doomed if they could not divide the eastern colonies from the others. When the appointed hour came, he was ready to abandon everything and strike the final and fatal blow; but until then he waited and

stood fast with his army, holding the great river in his grasp. He felt much more anxiety about the south than he had felt about the north, and expected Congress to consult him as to a commander, having made up his mind that Greene was the man to send. But Congress still believed in Gates, who had been making trouble for Washington all winter; and so Gates was sent, and Congress in due time got their lesson, and found once more that Washington understood men better than they did. In the north the winter was comparatively uneventful. The spring passed, and in June Clinton came out and took possession of Stony Point and Verplanck's Point, and began to fortify them. It looked a little as if Clinton might intend to get control of the Hudson by slow approaches, fortifying, and then advancing until he reached West Point. With this in mind, Washington at once determined to check the British by striking sharply at one of their new posts. Having made up his mind, he sent for Wayne and asked him if he would storm Stony Point. Tradition says that Wayne replied, 'I will storm hell, if you will plan it.' A true tradition, probably, in keeping with Wayne's character, and pleasant to us to-day as showing with a vivid gleam of rough human speech the utter confidence of the army in their leader, that confidence which only a great soldier can inspire. So Washington planned, and Wayne stormed [July 15, 1779], and Stony Point fell. It was a gallant and brilliant feat of arms, one of the most brilliant of the war. Over 500 prisoners were taken, the guns were carried off, and the works destroyed, leaving the British to begin afresh with a good deal of increased caution and respect. Not long after, Harry Lee stormed Paulus Hook with equal success, and the British were checked and arrested, if they intended any extensive movement. On the frontier, Sullivan, after some delays, did his work effectively. . . . In these various ways Clinton's circle of activity was steadily narrowed, but it may be doubted whether he had any coherent plan. The principal occupation of the British was to send out marauding expeditions and cut off outlying parties. Tryon burned and pillaged in Connecticut [at New Haven, Fairfield and Norwalk], Matthews in Virginia [at Norfolk, Portsmouth and elsewhere], and others on a smaller scale elsewhere in New Jersey and New York. . . . It was enough for Washington to hold fast to the great objects he had in view, to check Clinton and circumscribe his movements. Steadfastly he did this through the summer and winter of 1779."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 1, ch. 8.—See also WEST POINT.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 3, ch. 38-40, v. 4, ch. 1.—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 31.—J. Armstrong, *Life of Anthony Wayne (Library of American Biography, v. 4)*.—C. J. Stillé, *Major-General Anthony Wayne*, ch. 5.—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathanael Greene*, v. 2, bk. 3, ch. 3-7.

1778-1781.—Spanish campaign in the Mississippi valley.—Ultimate unifying effect of Northwest conquest.—"American activities in the Mississippi valley naturally brought out the complicated problem of relations with Spain. In 1778 the Spaniards held the west bank of the Mississippi from St. Louis to New Orleans. East of New Orleans along the Gulf were the British provinces of West and East Florida, acquired from France and Spain during the last war. Resenting this British occupation of the Gulf coast, the Spaniards were willing to help the rebellious colonies by shipping military supplies up the Mississippi, from

which they could go on up the Ohio as far as Fort Pitt."—E. B. Greene, *Foundation of American nationality*, pp. 499-500.—"Spain still had a covetous eye upon the domain between the Alleghanies and the 'Father of Waters.' When Spain was at last induced by France (1779) to unite in the war against England, she was allured by the hope of regaining Gibraltar and acquiring the region drained by the eastern branches of the Mississippi. She . . . [refused] to acknowledge America's independence, or make a treaty with her except on the condition of her yielding to Spain the possession of the east bank of the Mississippi and the exclusive navigation of the river. Upon declaring war against England, in May, 1779, Spain authorized her American governors to seize Natchez and the other British posts on the Mississippi. She did not mean to aid America in gaining the western country, but to wrest it from Great Britain for herself. Lord George Germaine foresaw the Spanish plan, and sent orders to General Haldimand, in Canada, to anticipate the hostilities of Spain by sending a force to reduce the Spanish posts on the Mississippi and to attack New Orleans. Thus a line of communication might be maintained between Canada and the British military posts in Florida. General Campbell, who was stationed at Pensacola, was to come with his fleet and army up the Mississippi to Natchez, there to meet the Indian bands sent from the north, and with them drive the Spaniards from the lower Mississippi. Clark meanwhile was to be 'amused' by an invasion of Kentucky. But for the energy and promptness of Galvez, the Spanish governor of New Orleans, success might have crowned this last concerted effort of the British to retain the West. Taking the offensive as soon as he learned that Spain and England were at war, he prepared to capture the British Mississippi posts. One after another he took (September, 1779) the forts at Manchaca, Baton Rouge, and Natchez, and then, in the spring of 1780, he took Mobile and Pensacola. He thus kept General Campbell too busy to give any aid to the party coming down from the north, and that expedition went to pieces before St. Louis, because of the unwillingness of the savages to attack a place that had been forewarned. The other force that was to create the diversion in Kentucky captured a few stations, and then retreated to Detroit just in time to escape Clark, who was in pursuit with a force which he had raised in Kentucky. Spain had rendered the Americans a great service by enabling Clark to hold what he had already conquered from the British but she acted with no friendly intent, as her later movements were to show. Though she did not dare, while an ally of France, to attack the territory in Kentucky and Tennessee, where the American settlers were actually in possession, yet she did send an expedition, January, 1781, to capture St. Joseph, a Michigan fort in British hands. The daring exploit was successful, and upon the temporary possession of this single post Spain was suspected of trying to build up a claim to the western territory north as well as south of the Ohio. The territory which Clark and his ill-disposed Spanish allies were conquering for the United States had both a beneficent and a malign effect upon the American union. The kindlier effect was the final one. At first, before the possession of the Northwest was even assured, there were bitter quarrels over its ownership. . . . [But after the cession of their western claims by the states] the members of the confederation felt a stronger bond of union because of their common

interest in common property. Unity in the revolutionary period had been greatly aided by the previous colonial co-operation in regulating the frontier, and now to common interest was added common ownership."—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution, 1776-1783*, v. 9, pp. 284-288.

Also in: F. Edler, *Dutch Republic and the American Revolution*.

1778-1782.—*European complications*.—"For some time it had been plain that the future of America was in the hands of foreign diplomats, and must be secured in European courts rather than upon American battle-fields. Vergennes had no sooner made his treaty with America, in the spring of 1778, than he again set himself to secure the long-sought alliance with Spain, whose naval aid he felt to be absolutely essential to a successful issue of a war with England. . . . The one great temptation for Spain was the hope of regaining Gibraltar, and she first sought a cession of that from England as the price of peace. When that manœuvre failed, the Spanish minister, who had been greatly angered by France's treaty with America, turned again to Vergennes. . . . The wished-for treaty between France and Spain was concluded April 12, 1779, with the aim of invading England, and recovering Minorca and the Floridas. . . . Though America's friends were not increased by the alliance between France and Spain, yet England's enemies were multiplied and new dangers were looming up. . . . At the opening of the American Revolution, no authority on maritime law demanded more protection to neutral ships than that provided by the mediæval sea code, the *Consolato del Mare*, which recognized a belligerent's right to seize his enemy's goods but not the neutral vessel upon which they were carried. England as a great naval power was disposed to hold to the established rule; but since she could damage nations which had many merchantmen and few war-ships more than they could damage her, they now began to assert that neutral ships protected all goods on board—"free ships make free goods," as the phrase ran. The humanitarian spirit of the time accorded with this principle; the interests of peace were recognized as paramount and permanent; the area and influence of war must be limited. The benevolent despots Frederick the Great and Catharine II. became interested in this as well as the commercial phase of the issue. Since England was not only desirous but hopeful of an alliance with Russia, the attitude of Catharine had great weight. In 1781, England went so far as to offer Catharine the island of Minorca, which with Gibraltar had made Great Britain mistress of the Mediterranean. Against this consummation worked Frederick the Great who had been deserted by England in 1761, and who had never forgiven her 'duplicity.' Though he hated England he did not wish to become her open enemy. For the Americans he had no sentimental friendship. He was indifferent to their independence. He permitted them to buy arms in Prussia, but they only made a bargain greatly to their loss. He refused to allow the German mercenaries to cross his dominions, but not from any sympathy with America. When Lee sought to open Prussian ports to American vessels, Frederick merely instructed his minister to put Lee off 'with compliments.' A little good advice and information were drawn from the king, but his greatest aid was indirect and due to coincident interests. This came about through his relations with France and Russia. The European situation was such that he needed French friendship. He encouraged France's desire to hum-

ble England by assuring her of his neutrality. In Russia he opposed the English, and his friendship with Count Panin, to whom Catharine largely left her foreign affairs, gave him great influence. He as much as any one brought Catharine to head an armed neutrality, which was formed in 1780 to enforce the doctrine that free ships make free goods. . . . When Catharine proclaimed her new maritime code (March 8, 1780) Frederick influenced France and Spain to acquiesce. Denmark and Sweden arranged with Russia for mutual protection of their commerce and their agreement was known as the 'Armed Neutrality.' One after another the Netherlands, Prussia, the German Empire, and three minor powers entered the league, which the United States also accepted. Though England's navy was stronger than the combined navies, yet her desire to conciliate Russia made her wary of giving offence. . . . The quarrel began in treaty obligations violated by both powers, Holland refusing to aid England—as she was bound by treaty—in her war with France and Spain, and England refusing to allow Holland's commerce with the enemy, as had been provided by the treaty of 1674. This ill feeling was aggravated by the conduct of Holland in sheltering Paul Jones. . . . England was now at war with America and the three greatest naval powers, after herself, in the world. . . . As the number of England's enemies increased, so much of her military power was locked up in various parts of the world that the efficiency of the military force in America was greatly impaired. It was well for the cause of independence that this was true, for, besides the general dejection and apathy of the people, the American army was itself becoming mutinous. . . . The surrender of Cornwallis came at the right time to produce a great political effect in England. The war had assumed such tremendous proportions that accumulated disaster seemed to threaten the ruin of Great Britain. From India came news of Hyder Ali's temporary successes, and of the presence of a strong French armament which demanded that England yield every claim except to Bengal. That Warren Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote would yet save the British Empire there, the politicians could not foresee. Spain had already driven the British forces from Florida, and in the spring of 1782 Minorca fell before her repeated assaults and Gibraltar was fearfully beset. De Grasse's successes during the winter in the West Indies left only Jamaica, Barbadoes, and Antigua in British hands. St. Eustatius, too, was recaptured, and it was not until the middle of April that Rodney regained England's naval supremacy by a famous victory near Marie-Galante. England had not a friend in Europe, and was beset at home by violent agitation in Ireland, to which she was obliged to yield an independent Irish Parliament. Rodney's victory and the successful repulsion of the Spaniards from Gibraltar, in the summer of 1782, came too late to save the North ministry. North was thrown into despair at the news of Yorktown, but the king still refused to acknowledge American independence."—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, pp. 309-311, 313-316, 319, 321, 328.—See also ARMED NEUTRALITY; ENGLAND: 1780-1782; GERMANY: 1761-1779.

ALSO IN: F. Edler, *Dutch Republic and the American Revolution*.

1779 (August-September).—General Sullivan's expedition against the Senecas.—For the purpose of putting an end to the destructive and bloody incursions of Tories and Indians from western

New York, directed against the border settlements of that state and Pennsylvania—as at Cherry Valley and Wyoming—General Washington, in the early part of the year 1779, determined upon a measure for carrying the war into the home of the invaders. "The command was entrusted to Gen. Sullivan. The army organized for the expedition was in three divisions. That part of it under the immediate command of Gen. Sullivan, coming from Pennsylvania, ascended the Susquehannah to Tioga Point. Another division under the command of Gen. James Clinton, constructing batteaux at Schenectady, ascended the Mohawk and rendezvoused at Canajoharrie, opened a road to the head of Otsego Lake, and from thence proceeded in a formidable fleet of over 200 batteaux, to Tioga Point, forming a junction with the force under Gen. Sullivan, on the 22d of August. Previous to the arrival of Gen. Clinton, Sullivan had sent forward a detachment which fell in with a scouting party of Indians, and a skirmish ensued. The combined forces amounted to 5,000 men. The expedition had been so long preparing, and upon the march, that the enemy were well apprized of all that was going on. Their plan of defence contemplated a decisive engagement upon the Chemung river. For this purpose the Rangers and regular British troops, under the command of Col. John Butler, Cols. Guy and Sir John Johnson, Major Walter N. Butler and Capt. McDonald, and the Indians under Brant, had concentrated their forces upon a bend of the river, near the present village of Elmira [then called Newtown], where they had thrown up a long breast work of logs. The united forces of the British allies, as computed by Gen. Sullivan, was about 1,500. Having ascertained their position, Gen. Sullivan marched in full force and attacked them in the forenoon of the 29th of August. . . . The battle had been waged about two hours, when the British and Indians perceiving their forces inadequate, and that a maneuver to surround them was likely to be successful, broke and fled in great disorder. 'This,' says John Salmon, of Livingston county, . . . 'was the only regular stand made by the Indians. In their retreat they were pursued by our men to the Narrows, where they were attacked and killed in great numbers.' The details of all that transpired in this campaign are before the public in so many forms, that their repetition here is unnecessary. The route of the army was via 'French Catherine's Town,' head of Seneca Lake, down the east shore of the Lake to the Indian village of Kanadesaga (Old Castle), and from thence to Canandaigua, Honeoye, head of Conesus Lake, to Groveland. The villages destroyed (with the apple trees and growing crops of the Indians,) were at Catherinestown, Kendai, or 'Apple Town' on the east side of the Lake, eleven miles from its foot, Kanadesaga, Honeoye, Conesus, Canascraga, Little Beard's Town, Big Tree, Canawagus, and on the return of the army, Scawyace, a village between the Cayuga and Seneca Lakes, and several other Cayuga villages. . . . The march of Sullivan, the devastations committed by his army, would at this distant period seem like Vandalism, in the absence of the consideration that he was acting under strict orders; and that those orders were approved, if not dictated, by Washington. The campaign was a matter of necessity; to be effectual, it was not only necessary that its acts should be retaliatory and retributive, but that the haunts, the retreats, of a foe so ruthless, must be broken up. The object was to destroy all the means of subsistence of the Senecas, desolate their homes,

prevent their return to them, and if possible, induce their permanent retreat beyond the Niagara River. The imprudence, the want of sagacity, which Col. Stone has imputed to Gen. Sullivan in alarming every village he approached by the sound of his cannon, the author conceives a misapprehension of his motives. Stealthy, quiet approaches, would have found as victims, in every village, the old men, the women and children—the warriors away, banded with their British allies. Humanity dictated the forewarning, that those he did not come to war against could have time to flee. . . . The march of Gen. Sullivan, after leaving the Chemung, was bloodless, except in a small degree—just as it should have been, if he could not make victims of those he was sent to punish. The third expedition of this campaign, which has generally been lost sight of by historians, was that of Gen. Broadhead. He left Fort Pitt in August with 600 men, and destroyed several Mingo and Muncey tribes living on the Allegany, French Creek, and other tributaries of the Ohio. The heavy artillery that Gen. Sullivan brought as far as Newton, would indicate that Niagara was originally the destination. There the General and his officers, seeing how long it had taken to reach that point, in all probability determined that too much of the season had been wasted, to allow of executing their tasks in the Indian country, making their roads and moving the army and all its appointments to Niagara before the setting in of winter. Besides, before the army had reached the valley of the Chemung, the fact was ascertained that there would be a failure in a contemplated junction with the army under Gen. Broadhead. After the expedition of Gen. Sullivan, the Indians never had any considerable permanent re-occupation of their villages east of the Genesee river. They settled down after a brief flight, in their villages on the west side of the river in the neighborhood of Genesee, Mt. Morris and Avon, and at Gardeau, Canadea, Tonawanda, Tuscarora, Buffalo Creek, Cattaraugus and Allegany."—O. Turner, *History of the pioneer settlement of Phelps and Gorham's purchase*, pt. 1, ch. 4.—"The Iroquois tribes were so far advanced in the agricultural stage of development that they were much more dependent upon their crops than upon the chase for subsistence; and they had besides learned some of the arts of civilization from their white neighbours. Their long wigwams were beginning to give place to framed houses, with chimneys; their extensive fields were planted with corn and beans; and their orchards yielded apples, pears, and peaches in immense profusion. All this prosperity was now brought to an end. . . . The region thus devastated had come to be the most important domain of the [Iroquois] Confederacy, which never recovered from the blow thus inflicted. The winter of 1779-80 was one of the coldest ever known in America. . . . During this extreme season the houseless Cayugas and Senecas were overtaken by famine and pestilence, and the diminution in their numbers was never afterwards made good. The stronghold at Niagara, however, was not wrested from Thayendanagea. That part of Sullivan's expedition was a failure. From increasing sickness among the soldiers and want of proper food, he deemed it impracticable to take his large force beyond the Genesee river, and accordingly he turned back toward the seaboard, arriving in New Jersey at the end of October, after a total march of more than seven hundred miles."—J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 2, pp. 91-93.—"In his general orders of the 17th of October, General

Washington announced to the army the result of the expedition, as follows: 'The Commander-in-chief has now the pleasure of congratulating the army on the complete and full success of Maj. Gen. Sullivan, and the troops under his command, against the Seneca and other tribes of the Six Nations, as a just and necessary punishment for their wanton depredations, their unparalleled and innumerable cruelties, their deafness to all remonstrances and entreaty, and their perseverance in the most horrid acts of barbarity. Forty of their towns have been reduced to ashes, some of them large and commodious; that of the Genesee alone containing one hundred and twenty-eight houses. Their crops of corn have been entirely destroyed, which, by estimation, it is said, would have provided 160,000 bushels, besides large quantities of vegetables of various kinds. Their whole country has been overrun and laid waste, and they themselves compelled to place their security in a precipitate flight to the British fortress at Niagara. And the whole of this has been done with the loss of less than forty men on our part, including the killed, wounded, captured, and those who died natural deaths. The troops employed in this expedition, both officers and men, throughout the whole of it, and in the action they had with the enemy, manifested a patience, perseverance and valor that do them the highest honor. In the course of it, when there still remained a large extent of the enemy's country to be prostrated, it became necessary to lessen the issues of provisions to half the usual allowance. In this the troops acquiesced with a most general and cheerful concurrence, being fully determined to surmount every obstacle, and to prosecute the enterprise to a complete and successful issue. Maj. Gen. Sullivan, for his great perseverance and activity, for his order of march and attack, and the whole of his dispositions; the Brigadiers and officers of all ranks, and the whole of the soldiers engaged in the expedition, merit and have the Commander-in-chief's warmest acknowledgements for their important services upon this occasion.' On the 9th of November, 1779, General Sullivan wrote to the President of Congress: 'It is with the deepest regret I find myself compelled to request from Congress liberty to retire from the army. My health is so much impaired, . . . that I have not the smallest hope of a perfect recovery.' . . . General Sullivan, in transmitting to Congress an official account of his operations, reported that . . . 'Every creek and river has been traced, and the whole country explored in search of Indian settlements, and I am well persuaded that, except one town situated near the Alleghany, about fifty-eight miles from Chinesee, there is not a single town left in the country of the Five Nations. . . . I flatter myself that the orders with which I was entrusted are fully executed, as we have not left a single settlement or field of corn in the country of the Five Nations, or is there even the appearance of an Indian on this side of Niagara. Messengers and small parties have been constantly passing, and some imprudent soldiers who straggled from the army mistook the route and went back almost to Chinesee without discovering even the track of an Indian.' Sullivan was mistaken in regard to the destruction of all the Indian towns as there were several small villages undiscovered by his troops. . . . While Sullivan fully accomplished the task given him to perform, the results expected were not fully realized. The power of the savages had been weakened, but they were not entirely subdued until years afterward, when

'Mad Anthony Wayne' defeated the confederated bands of the Indians of the west, in 1794, a measure which thoroughly humbled the Indians of Western New York, and gave to the settlers peace and security. Sullivan's expedition was fruitful of great results in other ways, however, than the temporary subjugation of the Indians. The fertile and beautiful country now forming the western part of the State of New York, was then an unknown wilderness, and its value and attractiveness were first made known to the white people through this expedition. . . . Soon after the close of the war the tide of emigration commenced to flow westward. From the New England States, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, came hardy pioneers, led on by the glowing accounts they had heard of the new country, and the vicinity of the inland lakes, the borders of the flowing streams, the forest-covered hills became the dwelling places of a rapidly growing band of settlers. The road which Sullivan had opened from the Susquebanna valley was followed by many of the settlers, even to the banks of the Genesee. Thus many of those who had shared the perils and privations of Sullivan's expedition against the Indian tribes of Western New York, afterward became settlers of the land they had aided to conquer."—A. T. Norton, *History of Sullivan's campaign against the Iroquois*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: L. L. Doty, *History of Livingston county, New York*, ch. 7.—O. W. B. Peabody, *Life of John Sullivan* (*Library of American Biography series 2*, v. 3, ch. 7).—*Journals of the military expedition of Major General John Sullivan, with records of centennial celebrations* (including *Historical address by Reverend David Craft*, pp. 331-388).—J. E. Seaver, *Life of Mary Jemison*, appendix 2.

1779 (September).—John Paul Jones's great sea-fight.—*Bon Homme Richard* and the *Serapis*.—"The enforcement of the new code [formulated by the League of Armed Neutrality] lessened England's power to damage her enemies, chiefly because of the protection afforded to the great carrying trade of the Netherlands, but England soon found a way to obviate that evil. If she could not attack the Dutch while they were neutral, she would make them vulnerable as open enemies. It would not do to declare war upon them because they had entered the league of the Armed Neutrality, but a well-developed quarrel already existed, so that a very slight incident made an excuse for war. The quarrel began in treaty obligations violated by both powers, Holland refusing to aid England—as she was bound by treaty—in her war with France and Spain, and England refusing to allow Holland's commerce with the enemy, as had been provided by the treaty of 1674. This ill feeling was aggravated by the conduct of Holland in sheltering Paul Jones [a Scot, in the service of the United States], the most daring and energetic of America's seamen. Jones had been the first to raise an American flag on an American man-of-war. In 1777 he was given command of the ship *Ranger*, and in the spring of 1778, off the Irish coast, took the *Drake*, a British man-of-war, making also . . . [an] attack upon the town of Whitehaven on the English coast. He took his capture into a French port, and began a most tedious negotiation with the French government to secure aid that would place under his command a squadron strong enough to do the enemy some serious damage."—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution, 1776-1783*, pp. 316-317.—At last, in 1779, he was given five vessels; a French ship (his

flag ship) which he named the *Bon Homme Richard* "of 40 guns, many of them unserviceable; the *Alliance* of 36 guns, both American ships-of-war; the *Pallas*, a French frigate of 32; and the *Vengeance*, a French brig of 12 guns. They ranged the western coast of Ireland, turned Scotland, and, cruising off Flamborough Head, descried the British merchant fleet from the Baltic, under the convoy of the *Serapis* of 44 guns and the *Countess* of Scarborough of 20 guns. An hour after sunset, on the 23d of September, the *Serapis*, having a great superiority in strength, engaged the *Poor Richard*. Paul Jones, after suffering exceedingly in a contest of an hour and a half within musket-shot, bore down upon his adversary, whose anchor he hooked to his own quarter. The muzzles of their guns touched each other's sides. Jones could use only three nine-pounders beside muskets from the round-tops, but combustible matters were thrown into every part of the *Serapis*, which was on fire no less than ten or twelve times. There were moments when both ships were on fire. After a two-hours' conflict in the first watch of the night, the *Serapis* struck its flag. Jones raised his pendant on the captured frigate, and the next day had but time to transfer to it his wounded men and his crew before the *Poor Richard* went down. The French frigate engaged and captured the *Countess* of Scarborough. The *Alliance*, which from a distance had raked the *Serapis* during the action, not without injuring the *Poor Richard*, had not a man injured. On the fourth of October the squadron entered the Texel with its prizes. The British ambassador, of himself and again under instructions, reclaimed the captured British ships and their crews, 'who had been taken by the pirate Paul Jones of Scotland, a rebel and a traitor.' 'They,' he insisted, 'are to be treated as pirates whose letters of marque have not emanated from a sovereign power.' The grand pensionary would not apply the name of pirate to officers bearing the commissions of congress. In spite of the stadholder, the squadron enjoyed the protection of a neutral port."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 5, p. 350.

ALSO IN: A. S. Mackenzie, *Life of Paul Jones v. 1*, ch. 8-9.—*Life and correspondence of John Paul Jones*, pp. 179-235.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 24.—F. Edler, *Dutch Republic and the American Revolution*, pp. 62-69.

1779 (September-October).—Unsuccessful attack on Savannah by Americans and French.—"The state of affairs in the South had called so imperatively for the attention of Congress that a portion of Washington's army had been detached to join General Lincoln. Washington solicited more powerful aid from D'Estaing, who then commanded in the West Indies an army sufficiently powerful to crush entirely the English in Georgia. The French admiral received this application just after having fought a hard battle against Commodore Byron without any decisive result, yet such as obliged the latter to go into port to refit. The former being thus for a time master of the sea, determined at once to comply with the request, took on board 6,000 land-troops, and steered direct for Savannah, where, arriving quite unexpectedly, he captured by surprise a fifty-gun ship and three frigates. Prevost, too, was very unprepared, having his force broken up into detachments distributed along the frontier; but these being instantly ordered in, obeyed with such promptitude that, before the French had landed and formed a

junction with Lincoln, nearly all had arrived. On the 16th of September, D'Estaing appeared before the place and summoned it to surrender. Prevost, under pretext of negotiation, obtained a suspension for twenty-four hours, during which Colonel Maitland entered with the last and largest detachment, eluding the Americans by a route supposed impassable; and the full determination to resist was then announced. . . . A regular siege was now commenced. Heavy ordnance and stores were brought up from the fleet, and the besieging army broke ground. . . . Several batteries were opened on the besieged, which played almost incessantly upon their works, but made no impression on them. The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More time had already been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he had supposed would be necessary for the destruction of the British force in that State. He became uneasy for the possessions of France in the West Indies, and apprehensive for the safety of the ships under his command. The naval officers remonstrated strenuously against longer exposing his fleet on an insecure coast, at a tempestuous season of the year, and urged the danger of being overtaken by a British squadron when broken and scattered by a storm." D'Estaing accordingly decided that he must either raise the siege or attempt the enemy's works by storm. "The latter part of the alternative was adopted. . . . On the morning of the 9th of October, before day, . . . about 3,500 French and 1,000 Americans, of whom between 600 and 700 were regulars and the residue militia of Charleston, advanced in three columns, led by D'Estaing and Lincoln, aided by the principal officers of both nations, and made a furious assault on the British lines. Their reception was warmer than had been expected. . . . For about fifty minutes the contest was extremely obstinate." Then the assailants gave way and a retreat was ordered. "In this unsuccessful attempt the French lost in killed and wounded about 700 men. Among the latter were the Count D'Estaing himself, Major General De Fontanges, and several other officers of distinction. The continental troops lost 234 men, and the Charleston militia, who, though associated with them in danger, were more fortunate, had one captain killed and six privates wounded. Count Pulaski was among the slain. The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed and wounded it amounted only to 55. So great was the advantage of the cover afforded by their works. . . . [Count D'Estaing now] insisted on raising the siege, and both the French and American armies moved from their ground on the evening of the 18th of October. D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies; and Lincoln recrossed the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry and again encamped in South Carolina."—C. B. Hartley, *Life of General Marion (Heroes and patriots of the South, ch. 11)*.


ALSO IN: C. C. Jones, Jr., *History of Georgia, v. 2, ch. 20-21*.—J. Sparks, *Life of Pulaski (Library of American Biography, series 2, v. 4)*.

1780 (January-April).—Gloomy winter at Morristown.—Depreciation to worthlessness of continental currency.—Consequent sufferings of army and country.—"The year 1780 opened upon a famishing camp [at Morristown, New Jersey]. 'For a fortnight past,' writes Washington, on the 8th of January, 'the troops, both officers and men, have been almost perishing with want. Yet,' adds he, feelingly, 'they have borne their sufferings with patience that merits the approbation, and ought to excite the sympathies, of their countrymen.' The severest trials of the Revolution, in fact, were not

in the field, where there were shouts to excite and laurels to be won; but in the squalid wretchedness of ill-provided camps, where there was nothing to cheer and everything to be endured. To suffer was the lot of the revolutionary soldier. A rigorous winter had much to do with the actual distresses of the army, but the root of the evil lay in the derangement of the currency. . . . The commissaries now found it difficult to purchase supplies for the immediate wants of the army, and impossible to provide any stores in advance. They were left destitute of funds, and the public credit was prostrated by the accumulating debts suffered to remain uncanceled. The changes which had taken place in the commissary department added to this confusion. The commissary-general, instead of receiving, as heretofore, a commission on expenditures, was to have a fixed salary in paper currency, and his deputies were to be compensated in like manner, without the usual allowance of rations and forage. No competent agents could be procured on such terms. . . . In the present emergency Washington was reluctantly compelled, by the distresses of the army, to call upon the counties of the State for supplies of grain and cattle, proportioned to their respective abilities. . . . Wherever a compliance with this call was refused, the articles required were to be impressed: it was a painful alternative, yet nothing else could save the army from dissolution or starving. . . . As the winter advanced, the cold increased in severity. It was the most intense ever remembered in the country. The great bay of New York was frozen over. . . . The insular security of the place was at an end. . . . Washington was aware of the opportunity which offered itself for a signal 'coup de main,' but was not in a condition to profit by it."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington, v. 4, ch. 1, 4*.—"There was always food and clothing in the country, but Congress had no money to buy it. Congress had no power to lay taxes, and the colonies, most of which were spending large sums on their own militia, were not disposed to supply the general treasury. The pay of the Continental troops of the general officers, the furnishing of equipments and stores, the support of foreign embassies, were burdens that must be borne, and Congress must find the means. The most successful and the most disastrous resource was the issue of paper-money. When, in June, 1775, it was proposed to meet the general expenses by putting forth two millions in Continental notes, there was but feeble objection. It was the only way of raising money which seemed to cost nobody anything. In the course of a year four millions more followed. Congress, with commendable foresight, called upon each colony to pay in a sum sufficient to retire its proportion of the issue. Nothing was paid, and the printing-press was again put in motion, until January, 1779, fifty millions were issued at a time. In November, 1779, the limit of two hundred millions was reached. In order to float these notes the States passed acts making them a legal tender; but at the same time they were themselves issuing large sums in a similar currency. Counterfeits abounded, but it soon became a matter of little difference whether a bill was good or bad, since the best were worth so little. From the time of the capture of New York by the British in 1776 the notes began to fall. In 1778 the news of the French alliance caused a little rise; but in 1781 the bills fell to a point where a thousand dollars exchanged for one dollar in specie, and a Philadelphia wag made out of the notes a blanket for his dog. The continental currency was

never redeemed, and was consequently a forced tax on those who were least able to pay, since every holder lost by its depreciation while in his

lion specie dollars each year. Of this the Continental bills furnished on an average some eight or ten millions. Another method of raising money



MONEY OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD

1. New York Province half-dollar, 1775. 2. Connecticut Colony, 5 shillings, 1776. 3. United States Continental currency, \$3, 1775. 4. Vermont state currency, 1 shilling, 1781. 5. New Jersey state currency, 1 shilling, sixpence, 1781. 6. North Carolina currency, \$6, 1776.

hands. The absolutely necessary expenditures, without which no army could make head against the British, were from twenty to twenty-five mil-

was that of borrowing on funded loans. Great schemes were put forth. The United States were to borrow at four per cent; they were to borrow



two millions; they were to borrow ten millions; they were to borrow twenty millions. The result was that in three years \$181,000 was thus loaned, and up to the end of the war but \$1,600,000,—hardly a hundredth part of the necessary means. Failing to raise money directly, recourse was had to the so-called loan-office certificates. These were issued to creditors of the government, and bore interest. The greater part of the military supplies were paid for in this extravagant and demoralizing fashion, and in 1789 they had to be settled, with accumulated interest amounting to nearly fifty per cent. Better success was had in Europe. No private banker would lend money to a set of rebels not recognized by any government as independent, but the French and Spanish governments were willing to advance both money and stores. In this way the United States received about three million dollars. When it was evident that the domestic loan had failed, Congress called upon the States to furnish five millions of dollars, apportioned among them according to their importance. These requisitions were repeated at intervals during the Revolution, but always with the same effect. Not a fourth part of the sums asked for was paid by the States. A system of 'specific supplies' was adopted in 1778, by which the State were allowed to pay their quotas in kind. It added a new source of confusion, and brought no more revenue. Every device that the government could put into operation for raising money was eventually tried. A lottery brought considerable sums into the treasury. The supplies for the army were seized at Valley Forge and elsewhere, and paid for in certificates. Bills were drawn on foreign ministers for funds which it was hoped they might have in hand by the time the bill reached them, and the government bought, and sent abroad to meet its indebtedness, cargoes of tobacco and other products."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union, 1750-1829*, pp. 80-91.—"The troubles of Congress were not due wholly to the grudging attitude of the states. Few of its members had ever held any important executive office, and there were important principles of governmental efficiency which they had to learn by slow and painful experience. They did not realize, for example, the advantage of concentrating responsibility. On the contrary, their colonial experience had developed extreme jealousy of one-man power. So Congress tried to handle an impossible amount of detail in general meeting. When they could not do that, they organized numerous committees for administrative as well as legislative work. It was not until June, 1776, after nearly a year of fighting, that Congress organized a War Office, in the charge of a board of which John Adams was chairman. . . . In 1777 Congress appointed a new Board of War, with General Gates, then very popular on account of his victory at Saratoga, as one of its members; but this also proved disappointing. Not until 1781, when the war was nearly over, did Congress see the necessity of appointing a single executive head for this department. Other important departments were similarly managed by committees without sufficient power or responsibility, though they also were served by some able men. In finance the chief figure was Robert Morris, perhaps the ablest business man of his day. With great energy and public spirit, he gave to Congress at a critical time the advantage of his own prestige. When in 1781 Congress finally decided on a single head for this department, Morris was naturally chosen. Of those best qualified for handling foreign relations, sev-

eral were naturally drafted for service abroad,—Franklin, in 1776, and later John Adams and John Jay. The first Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, also appointed in 1781, was Robert R. Livingston of New York, better known now for his part, thirty years later, in the Louisiana purchase. Poor organization and inefficiency were conspicuous not only in the federal government but also in the states, most of which had to go through the process of transformation from revolutionary conventions and committees to orderly constitutional governments. Only Connecticut and Rhode Island, with their exceptionally liberal charters, could continue the old machinery without material change. Massachusetts tried to keep up some features of its charter government without a royal governor; but elsewhere new governments had to be built up almost from the ground. . . . Meanwhile, the legal authority of these new organizations was disputed by the large part of the population which still professed allegiance to the King. Much of the ordinary business of government, including the admission of Justice, was performed with great difficulty and sometimes suspended altogether. . . . The states, which alone possessed the taxing power, were afraid to use it vigorously, partly because such action was bound to be unpopular. Whatever justification there may have been for this policy, it is certain that the Americans of 1776 did not throw their economic resources into the struggle to any such extent as, for instance, the Southern Confederates of 1861, or the belligerent nations in the recent World War."—E. B. Greene, *Foundations of American nationality*, pp. 461-464.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1775-1780.

ALSO IN: W. G. Sumner, *Financier and finances of the American Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 4.—Idem, *History of American currency*.—A. S. Bolles, *Financial history of the United States, 1774-1789*, bk. 1.—J. J. Knox, *United States notes*, ch. 2.

1780 (February-August).—Siege and capture of Charleston by the British.—Defeat of Gates at Camden.—South Carolina subdued.—"After the failure of the attack on Savannah was learned by Sir Henry Clinton, he sent a large additional force to the South. Reinforcements were also sent on to Lincoln, while the main body of the American army went into winter quarters near Morristown, New Jersey. Sir Henry Clinton, as soon as his forces, which had been dispersed by a storm, had been collected at Savannah, proceeded to invest Charleston," landing his troops on St. John's Island in February. The blockading of the port and operations for the investment of the city were conducted cautiously and with success. On the 12th of May, the American commander, General Lincoln, "finding himself incapable of defending Charleston, decided on capitulating; and he acceded to the terms which the besiegers had first offered. The fortifications, shipping, artillery, and public stores were all surrendered. The garrison, and all who had borne arms, were prisoners of war. The militia were allowed to return home on parole. In the siege the British lost 76 killed, and 189 wounded. The Americans about an equal number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to 5,618, counting all the adult males of the town. To bring the country entirely under subjection, Clinton sent forth three detachments. The first and largest, in the northern part of the State, was under Lord Cornwallis. He detached Colonel Tarleton with his legion of cavalry and mounted infantry, to disperse Colonel Buford, then encamped near the North Carolina

line. [Buford] was overtaken at the Waxhaws, and on his refusal to surrender, Tarleton made a furious charge on Buford's men, when some, in dismay, threw down their arms and asked for quarter, and some fired on the enemy. After this partial resistance, no quarter was given. Colonel Buford, with a few of the horse, and about 100 infantry, escaped; 113 were killed on the spot; 150 so badly wounded as to be incapable of being moved; and 53 were brought away as prisoners. The American officers deny (what the British assert), that any who had laid down their arms had again taken them up. All further resistance to the enemy in South Carolina and Georgia seems then to have ceased. The two other detachments of the British army every where received the submission of the inhabitants, who either gave their parole not again to bear arms against the king, or took the oath of allegiance. In a proclamation for settling the government, Sir Henry Clinton required all to return to their allegiance on pain of being treated as rebels and enemies. He then returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command, with 4,000 troops. . . . Lord Cornwallis, considering South Carolina as entirely re-annexed to Great Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants; but insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which, however, was generally taken with reluctance by the people of the lower country. . . . A considerable force, under Baron de Kalb, had been ordered for the Southern army by Congress; but, for want of money, and a sufficient Commissary department, they were so delayed in their march, that it was late in July before they reached Cape Fear River. Here they were joined by General Gates, who had been appointed to the command of the Southern army. The men of this detachment, ill-fed, suffered greatly from dysentery. In South Carolina, Gates was joined by Porterfield's Virginia regiment, Rutherford's corps of North Carolina militia, and Arnaud's legion. . . . Gates having under him about 4,000 men, of whom the regulars were less than 1,000, took post at Clermont. As the force of the Americans was daily increasing, Cornwallis, having under him about 2,000 men, of whom 1,900 were regulars, decided on attacking the American army. It so happened, that the period chosen by Cornwallis to surprise Gates, was the very moment in which Gates proposed to surprise his adversary; and thus the advanced corps of both armies unexpectedly met at two o'clock in the morning [Aug. 6, near Camden]. After some skirmishing, in which the British seemed to have had a decided advantage, both parties suspended their operations till the morning. On the first onset of the British, the Virginia militia under General Stevens fled with precipitation, and were followed by the infantry of Armstrong; and, except Colonel Dixon's regiment, the whole South Carolina division followed the example. Very few of the militia of either State discharged a single musket. Gates was borne away by the torrent, and, with General Caswell, retreated to Clermont, in the hope of collecting a sufficient number of the fugitives to cover the retreat of the regulars; but the hope was vain. He was fain to proceed to Hillsborough, to concert the future plan of operations. Thus left with an inadequate force on the field, De Kalb made a stout resistance; but in an impetuous charge he fell, after having received twelve wounds. His troops were then unable to rally, and their discomfiture was complete. Their loss, in killed, wounded and prisoners, could not have been less than 1,000 men. The British lost 325 men. Just

before the action, Sumter had captured a convoy, and made 200 prisoners; but was subsequently surprised by Tarleton, who recaptured the stores, killed 150, and took 300 prisoners. Sumter escaped with difficulty. There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina, and Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction; and Sumter was able to collect a new force, with which he greatly annoyed the north-western parts of the State."—G. Tucker, *History of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: D. Ramsey, *History of South Carolina*, v. 1, sect. 7.—H. Lee, *Memoirs of the war in the Southern Department*, ch. 17.—F. Bowen, *Life of Benjamin Lincoln*, ch. 5.

1780 (July).—Fresh help from France.—Arrival of Rochambeau and his army, with a fleet.—"La Fayette's second visit to his native country [1779], was most opportune. He arrived in Paris at the moment when the war for the independence of America was in high popularity throughout France. He was put in arrest a week for his disobedience to the order not to leave France, but this was a mere formality. Vergennes received him in private. His example had roused the spirit of the French nobles. The stage resounded with his applauses. Crowds followed his steps. Marie Antoinette, with her quick, enthusiastic spirit, joyed at his distinction. The council of state, the Parliament, the towns, the corporations mingled in the noble excitement. The Royal Treasury was assured support by patriotic offers of contributions, and then was formed the auxiliary army that was to bear succor to America. This public enthusiasm triumphed over the hesitating reluctance of Maurepas, and the economical prudence of Necker. The army, placed under the command of the veteran Rochambeau, commended for his 'steadiness, wisdom, ability and prudence,' a pupil of the Marshal de Belle Isle, distinguished in frequent service, was to be composed of 6,000 troops. Among these shone forth the most brilliant of the nobility."—J. C. Hamilton, *History of the United States, as traced in the writings of Alexander Hamilton*, v. 2, ch. 20.—"General Heath, who commanded the militia in the State of Rhode Island, announced on the 11th of July, the arrival of the French squadron to General Washington, who was then with his staff at Bergen. La Fayette [who had already rejoined Washington] set out almost immediately, provided with instructions from the commander-in-chief, dated the 15th, to repair to the French general and admiral to confer with him. For some time Washington had been considering a plan of offensive operation for the capture of the city and the garrison of New York. This plan, which conformed with the wishes of the French government, was only to be carried out upon certain conditions. First, it was necessary that the French troops should unite with the American forces, and, secondly, that the French should have a naval superiority over the forces of Admirals Graves and Arbuthnot, who had effected their junction at New York the day after the arrival of the French at Newport. This last condition was far from being fulfilled. . . . It had been foreseen that the English, who had concentrated their land and naval forces at New York, would not give the French time to establish themselves on Rhode Island; and Washington informed

Rochambeau that Sir Henry Clinton was embarking his troops and would come shortly to attack the forces of the expedition with the squadrons assembled under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot, which were anchored at Sandy Hook, beyond New York, at the mouth of the Hudson River. . . . At the same time, Washington crossed the Hudson above West Point with the greater part of his troops, and proceeded to King's Bridge, at the northern end of the island, where he made some hostile demonstrations. This manœuvre detained General Clinton, who had already embarked eight thousand men upon the ships of Arbuthnot. He landed his troops and gave up his project. Nevertheless, the English admiral set sail and appeared before Rhode Island with eleven ships of the line and a few frigates, twelve days after the French had landed. . . . On August the 9th, when La Fayette had returned to the headquarters of Washington, which were at Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's Bridge, on the right bank of the North River, he wrote to Rochambeau and de Ternay an urgent dispatch, in which he finished, in the name of the American general, by proposing to the French generals to come at once to attempt an attack on New York. . . . On the other hand, the same courier brought a letter from Washington which made no mention of this project, but which only replied by a kind of refusal to the request of Rochambeau for a conference, 'wherein in an hour of conversation they could agree upon more things than in volumes of correspondence.' Washington said with truth that he did not dare to leave his army in front of New York, for it might be attacked at any moment, and that by his presence he prevented the departure of the large body of the English forces that might have been sent against Rhode Island. Indeed, it is certain that if some differences had not arisen between General Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, the French might have found themselves in a dangerous position at the beginning. From the earliest letters exchanged upon this occasion some discord resulted between La Fayette, Rochambeau and Washington, but, owing to the good sense of Rochambeau, matters were soon smoothed over. He wrote in English to the American general to ask him thereafter to address himself directly to him, and to explain the reasons that induced him to postpone assuming the offensive. At the same time he urgently requested a conference. From that moment the relations between the two leaders were excellent. The mere presence of the French squadron and army, though they were still paralyzed and really blockaded by Admiral Arbuthnot, had effected a useful diversion, since the English had not been able to profit by all the advantages resulting from the capture of Charleston, and, instead of carrying on operations in the Carolinas with superior forces, they had had to bring the greater part of them back to New York."—T. Balch, *French in America in the War of Independence*, ch. 10-11.

1780 (August-September).—**Treason of Benedict Arnold.**—"Washington contemplated the aspect of affairs with the greatest alarm. Doubtful if the army could be kept together for another campaign, he was exceedingly anxious to strike some decisive blow. He proposed to Rochambeau, commanding the French troops at Newport, an attack upon New York; but that was not thought feasible without a superior naval force. Letters were sent to the French admiral in the West Indies entreating assistance; and Washington presently proceeded to Hartford, there to meet Rochambeau,

to devise some definite plan of operations. During Washington's absence at Hartford, a plot came to light for betraying the important fortress of West Point and the other posts of the Highlands into the hands of the enemy, the traitor being no other than Arnold, the most brilliant officer and one of the most honored in the American army. The qualities of a brilliant soldier are unfortunately often quite distinct from those of a virtuous man and a good citizen. . . . Placed in command at Philadelphia, . . . he [Arnold] lived in a style of extravagance far beyond his means, and he endeavored to sustain it by entering into privateering and mercantile speculations, most of which proved unsuccessful. He was even accused of perverting his military authority to purposes of private gain. The complaints on this point, made to Congress by the authorities of Pennsylvania, had been at first unheeded; but, being presently brought forward in a solemn manner, and with some appearance of offended dignity on the part of the Pennsylvania council, an interview took place between a committee of that body and a committee of Congress, which had resulted in Arnold's trial by a court martial. Though acquitted of the more serious charges, on two points he had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to be reprimanded by the commander-in-chief. Arnold claimed against the United States a large balance, growing out of the unsettled accounts of his Canada expedition. This claim was greatly cut down by the treasury officers and when Arnold appealed to Congress, a committee reported that more had been allowed than was actually due. Mortified and soured, and complaining of public ingratitude, Arnold attempted, but without success, to get a loan from the French minister. Some months before, he had opened a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton under a feigned name, carried on through Major André, adjutant general of the British army. Having at length made himself known to his correspondents, to give importance to his treachery, he solicited and obtained from Washington, who had every confidence in him, the command in the Highlands, with the very view of betraying that important position into the hands of the enemy. To arrange the terms of the bargain, an interview was necessary with some confidential British agent; and André, though not without reluctance, finally volunteered for that purpose. Several previous attempts having failed, the British sloop-of-war *Vulture*, with André on board, ascended the Hudson as far as the mouth of Croton River, some miles below King's Ferry. Information being sent to Arnold under a flag, the evening after Washington left West Point for Hartford he dispatched a boat to the *Vulture*, which took André on shore, for an interview on the west side of the river, just below the American lines. Morning appeared before the arrangements for the betrayal of the fortress could be definitely completed, and André was reluctantly persuaded to come within the American lines, and to remain till the next night at the house of one Smith, a dupe or tool of Arnold's, the same who had been employed to bring André from the ship. For some reason not very clearly explained, Smith declined to convey André back to the *Vulture*. . . . Driven thus to necessity of returning by land, André laid aside his uniform, assumed a citizen's dress, and, with a pass from Arnold in the name of John Anderson, . . . set off toward sunset on horseback, with Smith for a guide. They crossed King's Ferry, passed all the American guards in safety and spent the night near Crom Pond, with an acquaintance of Smith's.

The next morning, having passed Pine's Bridge, across Croton River, Smith left André to pursue his way alone. The road led through a district extending some thirty miles above the island of New York, not included in the lines of either army, and thence known as the 'Neutral Ground,' a populous and fertile region, but very much infested by bands of plunderers called 'Cow-Boys' and 'Skinners.' The 'Cow Boys' lived within the British lines, and stole or bought cattle for the supply of the British army. The rendezvous of the 'Skinners' was within the American lines. They professed to be great patriots, making it their ostensible business to plunder those who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the State of New York. [On the morning of André's journey, the road to Tarrytown, on which he rode, was being guarded by a small party of men, who watched for cattle thieves, and for suspicious travelers generally. Three of these intercepted the unfortunate young officer and discovered his character. Arnold received intelligence of what had happened in time to make his escape to the Vulture. André was examined before a board of which Lafayette, Steuben and Greene were members, and on his own statements was executed as a spy. The sympathy with him was very great, among Americans as well as among his own countrymen; but lenity in the case appeared too dangerous to Washington and his military advisers.]—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 41.—See also WEST POINT.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 2, 7, 9-11.—B. J. Lossing, *Two spies*.—J. Sparks, *Life and treason of Benedict Arnold* (*Library of American Biography*, v. 3, ch. 8-15).—W. Sargent, *Life of Major John André*, ch. 11-21.—I. N. Arnold, *Life of Benedict Arnold*, ch. 13-18.—J. H. Smith, *Authentic narrative of the causes which led to the death of Major André*.—B. J. Lossing, *Field-book of the Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 30-32.

1780 (August-December).—Partisan warfare in South Carolina.—Sumter and Marion.—A name "which recalls thrilling tales of desperate enterprise, surprises at midnight, sudden attacks in the gray twilight of morning, lurking-places in the depths of forests, restless activity, and untiring perseverance, is the name of Thomas Sumter. He comes before us tall, vigorous, dauntless, with a bold bearing, and imperious brow, stern to look upon, fierce in his self-will, arrogant in his decisions, tenacious in his prejudices, resolute and vigorous in the execution of his own plans, remiss and almost lukewarm in carrying out the plans of others. Born in South Carolina just as that colony had passed from the control of the Proprietaries to the control of the King, he lived to see her take the first decided step towards passing out of the Union. Little has been preserved of his early life, although his subsequent career in the Senate of the United States proves that he was not deficient in education then, wherever or whenever acquired. In the Revolution he took an early part, and soon made himself conspicuous as a bold and enterprising officer. But it was not till after the siege of Charleston that his talents were brought fully into play. Then at the head of a body of volunteers he moved rapidly from point to point, keeping alive the hopes of the Whigs and the fears of the Tories in the regions watered by the Broad River, the Ennoree, and the Tiger. . . . The ancestors of Francis Marion were Huguenot exiles who took refuge in South Carolina, from the dragonnades of Louis XIV. His father was a planter near Georgetown, who, portioning out his

estate to his children as they came of age, had nothing left for Francis. . . . [When the Cherokee War of 1759 broke out he was engaged in farming.] He was then twenty-six, low in stature, but vigorous, active and healthy. . . . [During the Cherokee War he served as lieutenant in a company of volunteers of which he later became captain. When the War of Independence began, he joined the first South Carolina levies, and was quickly promoted to be lieutenant-colonel in command of a regiment.] During the siege of Charleston his leg was accidentally broken, a lucky accident, which left him free when the city fell, to engage in an adventurous system of warfare which was the only possible system in that low state of our fortunes. In the course of this he was promoted by Governor Rutledge to a brigadiership. . . . His force was constantly fluctuating between 20 men and 70. Up to the 18th of October he had never had over 70. They went and came as they chose, their number ever ebbing and flowing like the tide. Sometimes the very men who had fought with him were ranged in arms against him; a few only serving from honest zeal and true love of country. . . . As his slender form concealed a lion heart, so under his cold, impassive face, there was a perpetual glow of tender sympathies. . . . Without claiming for Marion those powers of combination which belong to the highest order of military genius, he must be allowed to have excelled in all the qualities which form the consummate partisan,—vigilance, promptitude, activity, dauntless courage, and unshaken self-control. . . . Two principles controlled all his actions, and shaped all his ends; the love of country, pure, earnest, and profound; and the love of right, sincere, undeviating, and incorruptible."—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathanael Greene*, v. 3, bk. 4, ch. 7.—"The other partisans . . . had been compelled to take refuge in the mountains. Marion found his security in the swamps. This able partisan maintained his ground below and along the Santee river, and managed, among the defiles and swamps of that region, to elude all the activity of his enemies. His force had been collected chiefly among his own neighbors, were practised in the swamps, and familiar with the country. Like Sumter, utterly unfurnished with the means of war at first, he procured them by similar means. He took possession of the saws from the mills, and converted them into sabres. So much was he distressed for ammunition that he has engaged in battle when he had not three rounds of powder to each man of his party. . . . Various were the means employed to draw off or drive away his followers. The houses on the banks of the Pedee, Lynch's Creek, and Black river, from whence they were chiefly taken, were destroyed by fire, the plantations devastated, and the negroes carried away. But the effect of this wantonness was far other than had been intended. Revenue and despair confirmed the patriotism of these ruined men, and strengthened their resolution. . . . For months, their only shelter was the green wood and the swamp—their only cover the broad forest and the arch of heaven. . . . With a policy that nothing could distract—a caution that no artifice could mislead—Marion led his followers from thicket to thicket in safety, and was never more perfectly secure than when he was in the neighborhood of his foe. He hung upon his flanks along the march—he skirted his camp in the darkness of the night—he lay in wait for his foraging parties—he shot down his sentries, and, flying or advancing, he never failed to harass the invader, and extort from

him a bloody toll at every passage through swamp, thicket, or river, which his smaller parties made. In this sort of warfare—which is peculiarly adapted to the peculiarities of the country in Carolina, and consequently to the genius of her people—he contrived almost wholly to break up the British communications by one of the most eligible routes between the seaboard and the interior.”—W. G. Simms, *History of South Carolina*, bk. 5, ch. 6.

Also in: C. B. Hartley, *Life of General Francis Marion (Heroes and patriots of the South, ch. 14-15)*.—W. G. Simms, *Life of Francis Marion*.—Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*.—E. McCrady, *History of the Revolution in South Carolina, 1775-1780*.

1780-1781.—Vermont as an independent state negotiating with the British. See VERMONT: 1781.

1780-1781.—Greene's campaign in the South.—King's Mountain.—Cowpens.—Guilford Court House.—Hobkirk's Hill.—Eutaw Springs.—British shut up in Charleston.—Cornwallis withdrawn to Virginia.—“After his victory at Camden [Aug. 6, 1780], Lord Cornwallis found it necessary to give his army some rest from the intense August heat. In September he advanced into North Carolina, boasting that he would soon conquer all the states south of the Susquehanna river. . . . In traversing Mecklenburg county Cornwallis soon found himself in a very hostile and dangerous region, where there were no Tories to befriend him. One of his best partisan commanders, Major Ferguson, penetrated too far into the mountains. The backwoodsmen of Tennessee and Kentucky, the Carolinas, and western Virginia were aroused; and under their superb partisan leaders—Shelby, Sevier, Cleaveland, McDowell, Campbell, and Williams—gave chase to Ferguson, who took refuge upon what he deemed an impregnable position on the top of King's Mountain. On the 7th of October the backwoodsmen stormed the mountain, Ferguson was shot through the heart, 400 of his men were killed and wounded, and all the rest, 700 in number, surrendered at discretion. The Americans lost 28 killed and 60 wounded. . . . In the series of events which led to the surrender of Cornwallis, the battle of King's Mountain played a part similar to that played by the battle of Bennington in the series of events which led to the surrender of Burgoyne. It was the enemy's first serious disaster, and its immediate result was to check his progress until the Americans could muster strength enough to overthrow him. The events, however, were much more complicated in Cornwallis's case, and took much longer to unfold themselves. . . . As soon as he heard the news of the disaster he fell back to Winstonsborough, in South Carolina, and called for reinforcements. While they were arriving, the American army, recruited and reorganized since its crushing defeat at Camden, advanced into Mecklenburg county. Gates was superseded by Greene, who arrived upon the scene on the 2d of December. Under Greene were three Virginians of remarkable ability,—Daniel Morgan; William Washington, who was a distant cousin of the commander-in-chief; and Henry Lee, familiarly known as ‘Light-horse Harry,’ father of the great general, Robert Edward Lee. The little army numbered only 2,000 men, but a considerable part of them were disciplined veterans, fully a match for the British infantry.” To increase this small force, Steuben (Baron Steuben, the military organizer and disciplinarian of the Revolutionary armies [see above: 1777 (January-December)], was sent down to Virginia, for the purpose of recruiting and organizing troops. There-

upon detachments from the British army at New York were dispatched by sea to Virginia, and Arnold, the traitor, was given command of them. “The presence of these subsidiary forces in Virginia was soon to influence in a decisive way the course of events. Greene, on reaching South Carolina, acted with boldness and originality. He divided his little army into two bodies, one of which cooperated with Marion's partisans in the northeastern part of the state, and threatened Cornwallis's communications with the coast. The other body he sent under Morgan to the southwestward, to threaten the inland posts and their garrisons. Thus worried on both flanks, Cornwallis presently divided his own force, sending Tarleton with 1,100 men to dispose of Morgan. Tarleton came up with Morgan on the 17th of January, 1781, at a grazing-ground known as the Cowpens, not far from King's Mountain. The battle which ensued was well fought, and on Morgan's part it was a wonderful piece of tactics. With only 900 men in open field he surrounded and nearly annihilated a superior force. The British lost 230 in killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and all their guns. Tarleton escaped with 270 men. The Americans lost 12 killed and 61 wounded. The two battles, King's Mountain and the Cowpens, deprived Cornwallis of nearly all his lightarmed troops, and he was just entering upon a game where swiftness was especially required. It was his object to intercept Morgan and defeat him before he could effect a junction with the other part of the American army. It was Greene's object to march the two parts of his army in converging directions northwards across North Carolina and unite them in spite of Cornwallis. By moving in this direction Greene was always getting nearer to his reinforcements from Virginia, while Cornwallis was always getting further from his supports in South Carolina.”—J. Fiske, *War of Independence, ch. 7*.—“Having disposed of Tarleton, Morgan now fell back before Cornwallis's army to join General Greene; but their combined forces were insufficient to cope with the British and so they steadily retreated northward, drawing Cornwallis after them. By the middle of February this retreat had carried the two armies across North Carolina to the Virginia border, where Greene took up his position behind the Dan River and Cornwallis gave up the pursuit. Though Cornwallis had temporarily driven the Americans out of North Carolina and might claim in a sense to have conquered the state, his position was not at all satisfactory. By persistent running away, Greene had drawn the British far from their base and consolidated his own scattered forces. Now he was ready to change his tactics and take the offensive. Returning to North Carolina, he met Cornwallis at Guilford Courthouse.”—E. B. Greene, *Foundation of American nationality, p. 503*.—“The two wings of the American army came together and were joined by the reinforcements; so that at Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March, Cornwallis found himself obliged to fight against heavy odds, 200 miles from the coast and almost as far from the nearest point in South Carolina at which he could get support. The battle of Guilford was admirably managed by both commanders and stubbornly fought by the troops. At nightfall the British held the field, with the loss of nearly one third of their number, and the Americans were repulsed. But Cornwallis could not stay in such a place, and could not afford to risk another battle. There was nothing for him to do but retreat to Wilmington, the nearest point on the coast. There

he stopped and pondered. His own force was sadly depleted, but he knew that Arnold in Virginia was being heavily reinforced from New York. The only safe course seemed to march northward and join the operations in Virginia; then afterwards to return southward. This course Cornwallis pursued, arriving at Petersburg and taking command of the troops there on the 20th of May. Meanwhile Greene, after pursuing Cornwallis for about 50 miles from Guilford, faced about and marched with all speed upon Camden, 160 miles distant. . . . Lord Rawdon held Camden. Greene stopped at Hobkirk's Hill, two miles to the north, and sent Marion and Lee to take Fort Watson, and thus cut the enemy's communications with the coast. On April 23 [1781], Fort Watson surrendered; on the 25th Rawdon defeated Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, but as his communications were cut the victory did him no good. He was obliged to retreat toward the coast, and Greene took Camden on the 10th of May. Having thus obtained the commanding point, Greene went on until he had reduced every one of the inland posts. At last, on the 8th of September, he fought an obstinate battle at Eutaw Springs, in which both sides claimed the victory. . . . Here, however, as always after one of Greene's battles, it was the enemy who retreated and he who pursued. His strategy never failed. . . . Among all the campaigns in history that have been conducted with small armies, there have been few, if any, more brilliant than Greene's."—J. Fiske, *War of Independence*, ch. 7.—The net result was that the British left the upcountry loyalists to their fate and contented themselves with holding Charleston. Except for the Charleston garrison and that of Wilmington, the Carolinas were practically freed from British control. Considered in relation to the world war of which they formed a part, these encounters, in which the aggregate numbers engaged rarely exceeded five thousand men, seem petty enough; but they helped to cloud still further the gloomy prospect then unfolding before the British public."—E. B. Greene, *Foundation of American nationality*, p. 504.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 2, ch. 15.—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, ch. 65-71.—G. W. Greene, *Life of Nathanael Greene*, v. 3, ch. 1-23.—L. C. Draper, *King's Mountain and its heroes*.—H. Lee, *Memoirs of the war in the Southern Department*, ch. 18-34.—J. Graham, *Life of General Daniel Morgan*, ch. 13-17.

1780-1784.—Establishment of Pennsylvania Bank.—Bank of North America. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1780-1784.

1781.—Organization of department of foreign affairs. See STATE, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES: 1774-1780.

1781 (January).—Mutiny of the Pennsylvania line.—"As the year 1781 opened and the prospect of a new year of struggle became certain, and the invasion of the Southern States began to indicate the prospect of a southern campaign, which was at all times unpopular with northern troops, a disaffection was developed which at last broke forth in open mutiny, and a peremptory demand for discharge. This irritation was aggravated by hunger, cold, and poverty. Marshall says: 'The winter brought not much relaxation from toil, and none from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the point of starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed without proper clothing to the rigors of winter; and had now served almost twelve months without pay.' . . . On the 1st of

January the Pennsylvania line revolted [The soldiers believed they had been deceived about the length of their enlistments.] Captain Billings was killed in an attempt to suppress the mutiny; General Wayne was powerless to restore order, and 1,300 men, with six guns, started to Princeton, with the declared purpose to march to Philadelphia, and obtain redress. They demanded clothing, the residue of their bounty, and full arrears of pay. A committee from Congress and the State authorities of Pennsylvania at once entered into negotiations with the troops for terms of compromise. The American Commander-in-chief was then at New Windsor. A messenger from General Wayne informed him on the 3d of January of the revolt and the terms demanded. It appears from Washington's letters that it was his impulse, at the first intimation of the trouble, to go in person and attempt its control. His second impression was to reserve his influence and authority until all other means were exhausted. The complaint of the mutineers was but a statement of the condition of all the army, so far as the soldiers had served three years; and the suffering and failure to receive pay were absolutely universal. Leaving the preliminary discussion with the civil authorities who were responsible for much of the trouble, the Commander-in-chief appealed to the Governors of the northern States for a force of militia to meet any attacks from New York, and declined to interfere until he found that the passion had passed and he could find troops who would at all hazards execute his will. It was one of the most difficult passages in the war, and was so handled that the Commander-in-chief retained his prestige and regained control of the army. . . . General Clinton received information of the revolt as early as Washington, on the morning of the 23d, and sent messengers to the American army with propositions, looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents were retained in custody. It is sufficient to say that a portion of the troops were discharged without critical examination of their enlistments, on their own oath; that many promptly reenlisted, that as soon as Washington found that he had troops who did not share in the open mutiny, he used force and suppressed the disaffection, and that the soldiers themselves hung several agents who brought propositions from General Clinton which invited them to abandon their flag and join his command. The mutiny of the American army at the opening of the campaign of 1781, was a natural outbreak which human nature could not resist, and whatever of discredit may attach to the revolt, it will never be unassociated with the fact that, while the emergency was one that overwhelmed every military obligation by its pressure, it did not affect the fealty of the soldiers to the cause for which they took up arms. . . . La Fayette thus wrote to his wife, 'Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer the tenth part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens to support hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardiest and most patient that are to be found in the world.'"—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, ch. 67.

ALSO IN: W. H. Egle, *History of Pennsylvania*, ch. 12.—C. J. Stillé, *Major-General Anthony Wayne*, ch. 6.

1781 (January-May).—Benedict Arnold and the British in Virginia.—Opening of Lafayette's campaign in that state.—"In January, 1781, the

news reached headquarters in the Highlands of New York that General [Benedict] Arnold had landed in Virginia with a considerable force [see above: 1780-1781], was laying waste the country, and had already destroyed the valuable stores collected at Richmond; opposed to him were only the small commands of Steuben and Muhlenberg. The situation was very alarming, and threatened to place all the Southern States in the hands of the British. If Arnold succeeded in destroying the few American troops in Virginia, he could then march to the assistance of Cornwallis, who [at this time], with a superior force, was pressing General Greene very hard in the Carolinas. To defeat or capture Arnold before he could further prosecute his designs was, therefore, of the utmost importance. For this purpose it was necessary to send a detachment from the main army against Arnold by land, and a naval force to Chesapeake Bay to prevent his escape by sea. Washington at once communicated the state of affairs to Rochambeau, who, with the French fleet, had long been blockaded at Newport. Taking advantage of the serious injuries lately suffered by the blockading English fleet in consequence of a storm, Admiral Destouches despatched M. de Tilly to the Chesapeake with a ship-of-the-line and two frigates. To cooperate with these French vessels, Washington detached 1,200 light infantry from the main army, and placed them under the command of Lafayette. That officer was particularly chosen for this important trust, because the confidence reposed in him by both the American and French troops made him, in Washington's opinion, the fittest person to conduct a combined expedition. Thus opened the only campaign in America which afforded Lafayette an opportunity to show what abilities he possessed as an independent commander, and on this campaign his military reputation must chiefly rest. Lafayette moved rapidly southward," to Annapolis; but, the cooperating movement of the French fleet having, meantime, been frustrated by an attack from the English squadron, his instructions required him to abandon the expedition and return. He had already set his troops in motion northward when different instructions reached him. Two more British regiments had been sent to Virginia, under General Philips, who now took command of all the forces there, and this had increased the anxiety of Washington. "The situation of the Southern States had become extremely perilous. General Greene had all he could do to fight Lord Cornwallis's superior force in North Carolina. Unless a vigorous opposition could be made to Philips, he would have no difficulty in dispersing the militia of Virginia, and in effecting a junction with Cornwallis. With their forces so combined, the British would be masters in the South. Washington at once determined to place the defence of Virginia in Lafayette's hands. . . . Lafayette marched with such rapidity . . . that he reached Richmond, where there were valuable stores to be protected, a day in advance of General Philips. From his post on the heights of the town he saw the British set fire to the tobacco warehouses at Manchester, just across the river, but there were neither men nor boats enough to make an attack possible. Philips, on his part, was too much impressed with the show of strength made by the Americans to prosecute his plans on Richmond, and retreating down the James river, burning and laying waste as he went, he camped at Hog Island. Lafayette followed, harassing the enemy's rear, as far as the Chickahominy. Here the situation underwent


a considerable change. Lord Cornwallis, after his long and unsuccessful campaign against Greene in North Carolina, made up his mind that his exhausting labors there would prove unprofitable until Virginia should be subjugated. His men were worn out with incessant marching and fighting, while no substantial advantage had been gained. Hearing that General Greene had marched to attack Lord Rawdon at Camden in South Carolina, he determined to join Philips. That officer, accordingly, received orders while at Hog Island to take possession of Petersburg and there await Cornwallis's arrival. . . . On the 13th of May, General Philips died at Petersburg of a fever. . . . Cornwallis arrived at Petersburg on the 20th of May. His forces now amounted to over 5,000 men, which number was soon increased to 8,000."—B. Tuckerman, *Life of Lafayette*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 3, ch. 17.

1781 (May-October).—Cornwallis in Virginia and the trap into which he fell.—Siege of Yorktown by the French and Americans.—Surrender of the British army.—"On the 24th of May, Cornwallis, having rested his troops, marched from Petersburg, and endeavored to engage the American forces. But Lafayette, having removed the military stores from Richmond, retreated across the Chickahominy to Fredericksburg, where he expected to meet General Wayne and a battalion or Pennsylvania troops, without whose assistance he could not venture any fighting. . . . Cornwallis . . . moved between Lafayette and the town of Albemarle, where had been placed a great part of the military stores from Richmond, which now seemed doomed to destruction. But on the 10th of June Lafayette had received his expected reinforcement of Wayne's Pennsylvanians, and thus strengthened felt able to assume the offensive. Rapidly crossing the Rapidan he approached close to the British army which blocked the road to Albemarle. Nothing could have better suited Cornwallis, who prepared for a conflict in which he felt sure of a decisive victory. Lafayette, however, had not lost sight of the vital feature of his campaign,—to protect the property of the State without losing his army. Through his scouts he discovered an old unused road to Albemarle, unknown to the enemy. While Cornwallis was preparing for battle, he had the road cleared, and under cover of the night marched his men through it and took up a strong position before the town. There he was joined by militia from the neighboring mountains, and he showed so strong a front that the British commander did not venture an attack. . . . The British commander, so far foiled in his objects, had to march back to Richmond and thence to Williamsburg, near the coast, thus practically abandoning control over any part of Virginia except where naval forces gave possession. Lafayette effected a junction with Baron Steuben on the 18th of June, and thus increased his force to about four thousand men. The Americans had now become the pursuers instead of the pursued, and followed the British, harassing their rear and flanks."—B. Tuckerman, *Life of General Lafayette*, v. 1, ch. 6.—"There now came a pause in the Virginia Campaign, at least in daily operations and excitements. This State north of the James was relieved. Cornwallis crossed to the south side, at Cobham, on the 7th [July]; and Lafayette, retiring up the river, encamped, about the 20th, on the now historic Malvern Hill, then described as one of the healthiest and best watered spots in the State. . . . The entire British army was soon after concentrated at Portsmouth, and preparations made

to transport a considerable portion of it to New York. Lafayette, meanwhile, at Malvern Hill, could only await developments. He thought of sending re-enforcements to Greene, and asked Washington if, in case Cornwallis left Virginia, he might not return to the Northern army. . . . But while the marquis and Washington and Greene were speculating on the future movements of Cornwallis and were persuaded, from embarkations at Portsmouth, that he was to be deprived of a large part of his force by Clinton, unexpected intelligence came to hand. Instead of any part going to New York, the British force suddenly made its appearance, during the first days in August, at Yorktown, on the Virginia peninsula, which it had abandoned but three weeks before.

the better security of the Point, to occupy Yorktown also, that was to be done. Obeying these instructions, Cornwallis ordered a survey of Old Point Comfort; but, upon the report of his engineers, was obliged to represent to Clinton that it was wholly unfit and inadequate for a naval station, as it afforded little protection for ships, and could not command the channel, on account of its great width. Then, following what he believed to be the spirit of his orders, Cornwallis, before hearing from Clinton, moved up to Yorktown, and began to fortify it in connection with Gloucester, on the opposite shore, as the best available naval station. Clinton made no subsequent objections, and there Cornwallis remained until his surrender. His occupation of the place



GENERALS ROCHAMBEAU AND WASHINGTON ORDERING THE LAST ATTACK UPON YORKTOWN, 1781

(After painting by Auguste Couder)

Here again was a new situation. Cornwallis, at last, at Yorktown—the spot he was not to leave except as a prisoner of war. Why he went there is a simple explanation. Clinton decided, upon certain dissenting opinions expressed by Cornwallis respecting the situation in Virginia, not to withdraw the force in the Chesapeake which he had called for, and which was about to sail for New York, but permitted Cornwallis to retain the whole—all with which he had been pursuing Lafayette and the large garrison at Portsmouth, a total of about seven thousand, rank and file. His new instructions, conveyed at the same time, were to the effect that his Lordship should abandon Portsmouth, which both generals agreed was too unhealthy for the troops, and fortify Old Point Comfort, where Fort Monroe now stands, as a naval station for the protection of the British shipping. In addition, if it appeared necessary, for

was simply an incident of the campaign—a move taken for convenience and in the interests of the navy and the health of his command.”—H. P. Johnston, *Yorktown campaign*, ch. 3.—“The march of Lord Cornwallis into Virginia was the first emphatic fact which enabled General Washington to plan an efficient offensive. The repeated detachment of troops from New York so sensibly lessened the capacity of its garrison for extensive field service at the north, that the American Commander-in-chief determined to attack that post, and as a secondary purpose, thereby to divert General Clinton from giving further aid to troops in the Southern States. As a matter of fact, the prudent conduct of the Virginia campaign eventually rallied to the support of General La Fayette an army, including militia, nearly as large as that of Washington, and the nominal strength of the allied army near Yorktown, early in Septem-



ber, was nearly or quite as great as that of Lord Cornwallis. There were other elements which, as in previous campaigns, hampered operations at the north. The Indians were still troublesome in Western New York, and the Canadian frontier continued to demand attention. The American navy had practically disappeared. The scarcity of money and a powerless recruiting service, increased the difficulties of carrying on the war in a manner that would use to the best advantage the troops of France. . . . The position of the American Commander-in-chief at this time was one of peculiar personal mortification. Appeals to State authorities failed to fill up his army. Three thousand Hessian reinforcements had landed at New York, and the government as well as himself would be compromised before the whole world by failure to meet the just demands which the French auxiliaries had a right to press upon his attention. Relief came most opportunely. The frigate *Concorde* arrived at Newport, and a reiteration of the purpose of Count de Grasse to leave St. Domingo on the 3d of August, for the Chesapeake direct, was announced by a special messenger. The possibilities of the future at once quickened him to immediate action. With a reticence so close that the army could not fathom his plans, he re-organized his forces for a false demonstration against New York and a real movement upon Yorktown. . . . Letters to the Governors of northern States called for aid as if to capture New York. Letters to La Fayette and the Count de Grasse embodied such intimations of his plans as would induce proper caution to prevent the escape of Lord Cornwallis, and secure transportation at Head of Elk. Other letters to authorities in New Jersey and Philadelphia, expressly defining a plan of operations against New York via Staten Island, with the assurance of ample naval support, were exposed to interception and fell into the hands of General Clinton. As late as the 19th, the roads leading to King's Bridge were cleared of obstructions, and the army was put in readiness to advance against New York Island. On the same day the New Jersey regiment and that of Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson at Dobb's Ferry, to threaten Staten Island, and ostensibly to cover some bake-houses which were being erected for the purpose of giving color to the show of operations against New York. The plan of a large encampment had been prepared, which embraced Springfield and the Chatham Pass to Morristown, and this was allowed to find its way to Clinton's headquarters. General Heath was assigned to command of the Hudson-river posts, with two regiments from New Hampshire, ten from Massachusetts, five from Connecticut, the Third artillery, Sheldon's dragoons, the invalid corps, all local companies, and the militia. The following forces were selected to accompany the Commander-in-chief, viz., the light infantry under Colonel Scammel, four light companies from New York and Connecticut, the Rhode Island regiment, under the new army establishment, two New York regiments, that of New Jersey and Hazen's regiment (the last two already across the Hudson) and Lamb's artillery, in all about 2,000 men. The American troops crossed on the 21st, at King's Ferry, and encamped near Haverstraw. The French army followed, and the army was united on the 25th. [Du Barras brought the train of siege artillery from Newport in another French fleet.] . . . General Washington and suite reached Philadelphia about noon, August 30th. The army had already realized the fact that they were destined southward. Some dis-

satisfaction was manifested; but Count de Rochambeau advanced \$20,000 in gold upon the pledge of Robert Morris that he would refund the sum by the 1st of October, and the effect upon the troops, who had long been without any pay, was inspiring."—H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, ch. 74.—"Leaving Philadelphia, with the Army, on the 5th of September, Washington meets an express near Chester, announcing the arrival, in Chesapeake Bay, of the Count de Grasse, with a fleet of twenty-eight ships of the line, and with 3,500 additional French troops, under the command of the Marquis de St. Simon, who had already been landed at Jamestown, with orders to join the Marquis de La Fayette! 'The joy' says the Count William de Deux Ponts, in his previous journal, 'the joy which this welcome news produces among all the troops, and which penetrates General Washington and the Count de Rochambeau, is more easy to feel than to express.' But, in a foot-note to that passage, he does express and describe it, in terms which cannot be spared and could not be surpassed, and which add a new and charming illustration of the emotional side of Washington's nature. 'I have been equally surprised and touched,' says the gallant Deux-Ponts, 'at the true and pure joy of General Washington. . . . Everything now hurries, almost with the rush of a Niagara cataract, to the grand fall of Arbitrary Power in America. Lord Cornwallis had taken post here at Yorktown as early as the 4th of August, after being foiled so often by 'that boy' as he called La Fayette, whose Virginia campaign of four months was the most effective preparation for all that was to follow, and who, with singular foresight, perceived at once that his lordship was now fairly entrapped, and wrote to Washington, as early as the 21st of August, that 'the British army must be forced to surrender.' Day by day, night by night, that prediction presses forward to its fulfillment. [When the British fleet, under Admiral Graves, arrived from New York it was too weak to dislodge the French fleet already in possession, and the way of escape by sea was blocked.] The 1st of October finds our engineers reconnoitering the position and works of the enemy. The 2d witnesses the gallantry of the Duke de Lauzun and his legion in driving back Tarleton, whose raids had so long been the terror of Virginia and the Carolinas. On the 6th, the allied armies broke ground for their first parallel, and proceeded to mount their batteries on the 7th and 8th. On the 9th, two batteries were opened—Washington himself applying the torch to the first gun; and on the 10th three or four more were in play—'silencing the enemy's works, and making,' says the little diary of Colonel Cobb, 'most noble music.' On the 11th, the indefatigable Baron Steuben was breaking the ground for our second parallel, within less than four hundred yards of the enemy, which was finished the next morning, and more batteries mounted on the 13th and 14th. But the great achievement of the siege still awaits its accomplishment. Two formidable British advanced redoubts are blocking the way to any further approach, and they must be stormed. The allied troops divide the danger and the glory between them, and emulate each other in the assault. One of these redoubts is assigned to the French grenadiers and chasseurs, under the general command of the Baron de Viomesnil. The other is assigned to the American light infantry, under the general command of La Fayette. But the detail of special leaders to conduct the two assaults remains to be

arranged. Viomesnil readily designates the brave Count William to lead the French storming party, who, though he came off from his victory wounded, counts it 'the happiest day of his life.' A question arises as to the American party, which is soon solved by the impetuous but just demand of our young Alexander Hamilton to lead it. And lead it he did, with an intrepidity, a heroism, and a dash unsurpassed in the whole history of the war. . . . Both redoubts were soon captured; and these brilliant actions virtually sealed the fate of Cornwallis. 'A small and precipitate sortie,' as Washington calls it, was made by the British on the following evening, resulting in nothing; and the next day a vain attempt to evacuate their works, and to escape by crossing over to Gloucester, was defeated by a violent and, for us . . . most providential storm of rain and wind. . . . A suspension of hostilities, to arrange terms of capitulation, was

surrender of Yorktown Washington returned with his army to the vicinity of New York [see NEW-BURGH], but he felt himself far too weak to attempt its capture, and hostilities were restricted to a few indecisive skirmishes or predatory enterprises. It is curious to notice how far from sanguine Washington appeared even after the event which in the eyes of most men, outside America, had determined the contest without appeal. It was still impossible, he maintained, to do anything decisive unless the sea were commanded by a naval force hostile to England, and France alone could provide this force. The difficulties of maintaining the army were unabated. 'All my accounts,' he wrote in April 1782, 'respecting the recruiting service are unfavourable; indeed, not a single recruit has arrived to my knowledge from any State except Rhode Island, in consequence of the requisitions of Congress in December last.' He strongly



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## SURRENDER OF LORD CORNWALLIS AT YORKTOWN, OCT. 19, 1781

(After painting by John Trumbull, in the Capitol at Washington)

proposed by Cornwallis on the 17th; the 18th was occupied at Moore's House in settling those terms; and on the 19th the articles were signed by which the garrison of York and Gloucester, together with all the officers and seamen of the British ships in the Chesapeake, 'surrender themselves Prisoners of War to the Combined Forces of America and France.'—R. C. Winthrop, *Address at the centennial celebration of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Oct. 19, 1881*.

ALSO IN: Marquis Cornwallis, *Correspondence*, v. 1, ch. 4-5.—Idem, *Answer to Sir H. Clinton*.—Count de Deux-Ponts, *My campaigns in America, 1781*.—T. Balch, *French in America during the War of Independence*, ch. 13-22.—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 25-26, 28.—George Washington (W. C. Ford, ed.), *Writings*, v. 9.—C. Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution*, v. 2, ch. 25-28.

1781-1782.—Practical suspension of hostilities.—Difficulty of maintaining the army.—Financial distress of the country.—'Immediately after the

urged the impossibility of recruiting the army by voluntary enlistment, and recommended that, in addition to the compulsory enrolment of Americans, German prisoners should be taken into the army. Silas Deane, in private letters, expressed at this time his belief that it would be utterly impossible to maintain the American army for another year; and even after the surrender of Cornwallis, no less a person than Sir Henry Clinton assured the Government that, with a reinforcement of only 10,000 men he would be responsible for the conquest of America. . . . Credit was gone, and the troops had long been unpaid. 'The long sufferance of the army,' wrote Washington in October 1782, 'is almost exhausted. It is high time for a peace.' Nothing, indeed, except the great influence, the admirable moderation and good sense, and the perfect integrity of Washington could have restrained the army from open revolt. . . . Holland, immediately after the surrender of Yorktown, had recognised the independence of America, which had as yet only been recognised by France.

John Adams was received as representative at the Hague, and after several abortive efforts he succeeded in raising a Dutch loan. France, as her ablest ministers well knew, was drifting rapidly towards bankruptcy, yet two American loans, amounting together to £600,000, were extorted in the last year of the war. Up to the very eve of the formal signature of peace, and long after the virtual termination of the war, the Americans found it necessary to besiege the French Court for money. As late as December 5, 1782, Franklin wrote from Paris to Livingston complaining of the humiliating duty which was imposed on him. . . . The reply of Livingston was dated January 6, 1783, and it paints vividly the extreme distress in America. 'I see the force,' he writes, 'of your objections to soliciting the additional twelve millions, and I feel very sensibly the weight of our obligations to France, but every sentiment of this kind must give way to our necessities. It is not for the interest of our allies to lose the benefit of all they have done by refusing to make a small addition to it. . . . The army demand with importunity their arrears of pay. The treasury is empty, and no adequate means of filling it presents itself. The people pant for peace; should contributions be exacted, as they have hitherto been, at the point of the sword, the consequences may be more dreadful than is at present apprehended. I do not pretend to justify the negligence of the States in not providing greater supplies. Some of them might do more than they have done; none of them all that is required. It is my duty to confide to you, that if the war is continued in this country, it must be in a great measure at the expense of France. If peace is made, a loan will be absolutely necessary to enable us to discharge the army, that will not easily separate without pay.' It was evident that the time for peace had come. The predatory expeditions which still continued in America could only exasperate still further both nations, and there were some signs—especially in the conflicts between loyalists and revolutionists—that they were having this effect. England had declared herself ready to concede the independence America demanded. Georgia and South Carolina, where the English had found so many faithful friends, were abandoned in the latter half of 1782, and the whole force of the Crown was now concentrated at New York and in Canada. France and Spain for a time wished to protract negotiations in hopes that Rodney might be crushed, that Jamaica and afterwards Gibraltar might be captured; but all these hopes had successively vanished. . . . If the war continued much longer America would almost certainly drop away, and France, and perhaps Spain, become bankrupt."—W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the eighteenth century*, v. 4, ch. 15.

1781-1786.—Cession of Western Territory by the states to the Federal Union.—Western Reserve of Connecticut.—Although the Articles of Confederation were adopted by Congress in 1777 and ratified immediately by most of the states, it was not until 1781 that they became operative by the assent of all. "New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland held out against ratifying them for from two to four years. The secret of their resistance was in the claims to the western territory. . . . The three recalcitrant States had always had fixed western boundaries, and had no legal claim to a share in the western territory. . . . New Jersey and Delaware gave up the struggle in 1778 and 1779; but Maryland would not and did not yield, until her claims were satisfied. Dr. H. B. Adams

has shown that the whole question of real nationality for the United States was bound up in this western territory; that even a 'league government' could not continue long to govern a great and growing territory like this without developing into a real national government, even without a change of strict law; and that the Maryland leaders were working under a complete consciousness of these facts."—A. Johnston, *United States: Its history and constitution*, sect. 89-90.—See also MARYLAND: 1776-1784.—The western claims of Virginia were the most sweeping and were founded upon the oldest historical document. "The charter granted by James I. to South Virginia, in 1609 [see VIRGINIA: 1609-1616], . . . embraced the entire north-west of North America, and, within certain limits, all the islands along the coast of the South Sea or Pacific Ocean. . . . The following is the grant: 'All those lands, countries and territories situate, lying and being in that part of America called Virginia, from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the northward 200 miles; and from the said Point or Cape Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the southward 200 miles; and all that space and circuit of land lying from the sea-coast of the precinct aforesaid, up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west; and also all the islands lying within 100 miles along the coast of both seas of the precinct aforesaid.' The extraordinary ambiguity of this grant of 1609, which was always appealed to as a legal title by Virginia, was first shown by Thomas Paine. . . . The chief ambiguity . . . lay in the interpretation of the words 'up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west.' From which point was the northwest line to be drawn, from the point on the seacoast 200 miles above, or from the point 200 miles below Cape Comfort? . . . The more favorable interpretation for Virginia and, perhaps, in view of the expression 'from sea to sea,' more natural interpretation, was to draw the northwestern line from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above Point Comfort, and the western line from the southern limit below Point Comfort. This gave Virginia the greater part, at least, of the entire north-west, for the lines diverged continually. . . . At the outbreak of the Revolution, Virginia had annexed the 'County of Kentucky' to the Old Dominion, and, in 1778, after the capture of the military posts in the northwest by Colonel George Rogers Clarke. . . . that enterprising State proceeded to annex the lands beyond the Ohio, under the name of the County of Illinois [see above: 1778-1779: Clarke's conquest]. The military claims of Virginia were certainly very strong, but it was felt by the smaller States that an equitable consideration for the services of other colonies in defending the back country from the French, ought to induce Virginia to dispose of a portion of her western territory for the common good. It is easy now to conceive how royal grants to Massachusetts and Connecticut of lands stretching from ocean to ocean, must have conflicted with the charter claims and military title of Virginia to the great north-west. . . . The claims of Massachusetts were based upon the charter granted by William and Mary, in 1691, and those of Connecticut upon the charter granted by Charles II, in 1662. . . . The former's claim embraced the lands which now lie in southern Michigan and Wisconsin, or, in other words, the region comprehended by the extension westward of her present southern boundary and of her ancient northern limit, which was 'the latitude of a league north of the inflow of Lake Winnipiseogee in

New Hampshire. The western claims of Connecticut [the zone lying between her northern and southern boundaries— $41^{\circ}$  and  $42^{\circ} 2'$  north latitude—extended westward] covered portions of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. . . . The extension of charter boundaries over the far west by Massachusetts and Connecticut led to no trespass on the intervening charter claims of New York. Connecticut fell into a serious controversy, however, with Pennsylvania, in regard to the possession of certain lands in the northern part of the latter State, but the dispute, when brought before a court appointed by Congress, was finally decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But in the western country, Massachusetts and Connecticut were determined to assert their chartered rights against Virginia and the treaty claims of New York; for, by virtue of various treaties with the Six Nations and allies, the latter State was asserting jurisdiction over the entire region between Lake Erie and the Cumberland mountains, or, in other words, Ohio and a portion of Kentucky. These claims were strengthened by the following facts: First, that the chartered rights of New York were merged in the Crown by the accession to the throne, in 1685, of the Duke of York as James II.; again, that the Six Nations and tributaries had put themselves under the protection of England, and that they had always been treated by the Crown as appendant to the government of New York; moreover, in the third place, the citizens of that State had borne the burden of protecting these Indians for over a hundred years. New York was the great rival of Virginia in the strength and magnitude of her western claims." In 1780, Maryland still insisting upon the surrender of these western land claims to the federal government, and refusing to ratify the Articles of Confederation until such cession was made, the claimant states began to yield to her firmness. On the 1st of March, 1781, the offer of New York to cede her claims, providing Congress would confirm her western boundary, was made in Congress. "On that very day, Maryland ratified the Articles and the first legal union of the United States was complete. The coincidence in dates is too striking to admit of any other explanation than that Maryland and New York were acting with a mutual understanding. . . . The offer of Virginia, reserving to herself jurisdiction over the County of Kentucky; the offer of Connecticut, withholding jurisdiction over all her back lands; and the offer of New York, untrammelled by burdensome conditions and conferring upon Congress complete jurisdiction over her entire western territory,—these three offers were now prominently before the country. . . . On the 20th of October, 1782, Mr. Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, moved that Congress accept the right, title, jurisdiction, and claim of New York, as ceded by the agents of that state on the first of March, 1781. . . . On the 13th day of September, 1783, it was voted by Congress to accept the cession offered by Virginia, of the territory north-west of the Ohio, provided that state would waive the obnoxious conditions concerning the guaranty of Virginia's boundary, and the annulling of all other titles to the north-west territory. Virginia modified her conditions as requested, and on the 20th of October, 1783, empowered her delegates in Congress to make the cession, which was done by Thomas Jefferson, and others, March 1, 1784."—H. B. Adams, *Maryland's influence upon land cessions to the United States* (Johns Hopkins University Studies, 3rd series, no. 1, pp. 9-11, 19-22, 36-39).—The Massachusetts deed of cession was

executed Apr. 19, 1785. It conveyed the right and title of the state to all lands "west of a meridian line drawn through the western bent or inclination of Lake Ontario, provided such line should fall 20 miles or more west of the western limit of the Niagara River"—that being the western boundary of New York, fixed four years before. In May, 1786, Connecticut authorized a cession which was not complete. Instead of beginning at the western boundary line of Pennsylvania, her conveyance was of lands beyond a line 120 miles west of the Pennsylvania line—thus retaining her claim to the large tract in Ohio known subsequently as the Western Reserve, or Connecticut Reserve. "The acceptance of this cession was strongly opposed in Congress. . . . After a severe struggle it was accepted, May 26, 1786, Maryland alone voting in the negative."—B. A. Hinsdale, *Old Northwest*, ch. 13.—South Carolina executed the cession of her western claims in 1787; North Carolina in 1790, and Georgia in 1802.—A. Johnston, *Connecticut*, ch. 15.—See also OHIO: 1786-1796.

ALSO IN: T. Donaldson, *Public domain: Its history*, ch. 3.—A. Johnston, *Connecticut*, ch. 15.

1781-1799.—Pennamite and Yankee War in Pennsylvania. See PENNSYLVANIA: 1753-1799.

1782 (February-May).—Peace resolutions in British House of Commons.—Retirement of Lord North.—Pacific overtures through General Carleton.—"In Europe and America the effect of the surrender at Yorktown was generally recognized as decisive; but the war was not yet over and there were many anxious months ahead. More than thirty thousand British soldiers still remained in the United States, chiefly at New York with smaller garrisons at Charleston and Savannah. Even in this hour of victory the American government seemed almost at the end of its resources. Although Washington urged the need of continued effort in order to secure a satisfactory peace, it was hard to overcome the general weariness and apathy. Notwithstanding the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, supplies of money and men still depended on the good will of individual states and only a fraction of the money called for was actually paid in. Fortunately, the English people also were tired of the war, and the disaster at Yorktown convinced nearly everyone that there was no chance of subduing the colonies. The King was stubborn and the North ministry was held together for a few months longer; but the logic of events was too much, even for George III. For six months after Yorktown the tide continued to run strongly against the British. In the West Indies they lost not only their recent conquest of St. Eustatius, but even some of their own islands. Across the Atlantic, British prestige in the Mediterranean was weakened by the loss of Minorca. Economic developments were also discouraging; shipping was still being destroyed on a large scale, expenditures were steadily rising, new loans were needed, and the public credit was shaken. All these things naturally strengthened the opposition party. Even former supporters of the ministry had been turned against it by increasing evidences of corrupt and inefficient administration. Long before Yorktown, the government majorities had begun to go down; as early as 1780 the House of Commons passed an often-quoted resolution, declaring that the power of the Crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished. After Yorktown the attack was pushed with new vigor, and by March, 1782, the House of Commons had committed itself squarely against the continuance of the war. Lord



**BATTLE FLAGS SURRENDERED BY CORNWALLIS AT YORKTOWN LAID AT THE FEET OF CONGRESS**

The flags were presented in behalf of General Washington by Colonel David Humphreys, 1781

(From the painting by J. W. Dunsmore)

© J. W. Dunsmore



North gave up the fight and the King had to accept his resignation. . . . [With the new] government Americans could negotiate with some chance of mutual understanding. It was also fortunate for the new ministry that the naval war began to turn in favor of the British. In April, 1782, a French fleet which was expected to combine with the Spaniards in an attack on Jamaica was beaten by Admiral Rodney, whose victory restored British superiority in the West Indies. The thirteen colonies were indeed lost; but so far as her European enemies were concerned, England could look forward to peace terms more favorable than had seemed probable only a few months before."—E. B. Greene, *Foundations of American nationality*, pp. 508-510.—"On the 27th of February [1782], General Conway [had] moved in the house of commons, 'that it is the opinion of this house that a further prosecution of offensive war against America, would, under present circumstances, be the means of weakening the efforts of this country against her European enemies, and tend to increase the mutual enmity so fatal to the interests both of Great Britain and America.' The whole force of administration was exerted to get rid of this question, but was exerted in vain; and the resolution was carried. An address to the king in the words of the motion was immediately voted, and was presented by the whole house. The answer of the crown being deemed inexplicit, it was on the 4th of March resolved by the commons, 'that the house will consider as enemies to his majesty and the country, all those who should advise or attempt a further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North America.' These votes were soon followed by a change of administration [Lord North resigning and being succeeded by Lord Rockingham, with Fox, Shelburne, Burke and Sheridan for colleagues], and by instructions to the commanding officers of his Britannic majesty's forces in America which conformed to them. . . . Early in May, Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Sir Henry Clinton in the command of all the British forces in the United States, arrived at New York. Having been also appointed in conjunction with Admiral Digby a commissioner to negotiate a peace, he lost no time in conveying to general Washington copies of the votes of the British parliament, and of a bill which had been introduced on the part of administration, authorizing his majesty to conclude a peace or truce with those who were still denominated the revolted colonies of North America. These papers he said would manifest the dispositions prevailing with the government and people of England towards those of America, and if the like pacific temper should prevail in this country, both inclination and duty would lead him to meet it with the most zealous concurrence. He had addressed to congress, he said, a letter containing the same communications, and he solicited from the American general a passport for the person who should convey it. At this time, the bill enabling the British monarch to conclude a peace or truce with America had not passed into a law; nor was any assurance given that the present commissioners possessed the power to offer other terms, than those which had formerly been rejected. General Carleton therefore could not hope that negotiations would commence on such a basis; nor be disappointed that the passports he requested were refused by congress, to whom the application was, of course, referred. . . . The several states passed resolutions expressing their objections to separate negotiations, and declaring those to be ene-

emies to America who should attempt to treat without the authority of congress. But the public votes which have been stated, and probably the private instructions given to the British general, restrained him from offensive war, and the state of the American army disabled General Washington from making any attempt on the posts held by the enemy. The campaign of 1782 consequently passed away without furnishing any military operations of moment between the armies under the immediate direction of the respective commanders in chief."—J. Marshall, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 11.—See also ENGLAND: 1782-1783.

ALSO IN: Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *History of England, 1713-1783*, v. 7, ch. 65.

1782 (April).—Recognition by the Dutch republic.—"Sympathy with America had been growing in the Netherlands. At the end of 1779 Holland opened her ports to American warships, particularly to Paul Jones. The thrifty burghers declined, it is true, to lend America money until France assured its repayment, because they were not yet sufficiently confident of our success. Nevertheless they were willing to go far in aiding us. In 1778 William Lee, the American commissioner, drew up with two prominent citizens of Amsterdam a draft of a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States. It had no validity, as the government of Holland was not even cognizant of it, and it was kept secret for a time. But in October, 1780, the British captured an American ship bound for Holland, among whose passengers was Henry Laurens, and among his papers was a draft of this proposed treaty which Congress had approved and which he was taking back to Holland for final ratification. The British government was enraged. It peremptorily demanded of the Dutch government that it disavow the treaty and severely punish the chief magistrate of Amsterdam, who had signed it. The Dutch government did repudiate the treaty, but it could not constitutionally punish the magistrate. The incident was no adequate cause for war or even for offense. But the British government was angry with Holland for opening her ports to American ships [see above: 1779 (September)], and so early in 1781 declared war upon her. . . . [In 1781, John Adams who had been sent to Europe with a commission to negotiate peace with Great Britain, was created minister to the Netherlands, and authorized to negotiate a treaty.] So strong was French influence in Holland at that time that Adams was . . . held aloof for a considerable period. For eight months he waited in vain for recognition, but he knew the secret of the delay and was confident of overcoming it at last."—W. F. Johnson, *America's foreign relations*, v. 1, pp. 103, 117.—"Encouraged by the success at Yorktown, on the 9th of January, 1782, Adams presented himself to the president of the states-general, renewed his formal request for an opportunity of presenting his credentials, and 'demanded a categorical answer which he might transmit to his sovereign.' He next went in person to the deputies of the several cities of Holland, and, following the order of their rank in the confederation, repeated his demand to each one of them. The attention of Europe was drawn to the sturdy diplomatist, who dared, alone and unsupported, to initiate so novel and bold a procedure, but not one of the representatives of foreign powers at the Hague believed that it could succeed."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 5, p. 527.—"On February 28, Friesland, the province most of all

devoted to the principles of liberty, declared in favor of receiving . . . [John Adams] as the envoy of a sovereign power. The other provinces followed the example, and on April 19, . . . the States General, in accordance with the unanimous wish of the provinces, resolved thus to receive him. Thus the Dutch republic was the second power in the world to recognize the independence of the United States. . . . On October 8, 1782, Adams concluded with the Netherlands a treaty of friendship and commerce—before the treaty of Paris was concluded.”—W. F. Johnson, *America's foreign relations*, v. 1, p. 117.

Also in: J. Q. and C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, v. 1, ch. 6.—F. Edler, *Dutch Republic and the American Revolution*, pp. 151-155, 201-230.—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, pp. 316-319.

1782 (September).—Opening of negotiations for peace.—The Rockingham ministry, which succeeded Lord North's in the British government, in March, 1782 (see ENGLAND: 1782-1783), “though soon dissolved by the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, were early distracted by a want of unanimity, and early lost the confidence of the people. The negotiation with America during May and June made no progress. Mr. Oswald was the agent of Lord Shelburne, known to be opposed to the acknowledgment, and Mr. Grenville, of Mr. Fox. This ministry had been forced upon the king by a vote of the House of Commons. The hopes of regaining America were again excited by the decisive victory of Lord Rodney in the West Indies [see ENGLAND: 1780-1782], and the unexpected successes of Sir Eyre Coote against Hyder Ali in the East; and, if credit may be given to the reports of the day, the government looked forward with some confidence to the making a separate peace with Congress by means of Sir Guy Carleton, who had been appointed to the command of the forces in North America. . . . Mr. Adams, writing from the Hague, June 13, '82, observes, ‘I cannot see a probability that the English will ever make peace, until their finances are ruined, and such distress brought upon them, as will work up their parties into a civil war.’ It was not till September of the same year, under Lord Shelburne's administration, formed upon the dissolution of the Rockingham, that the British government took a decisive and sincere step to make peace, and authorized their commissioner, Mr. Oswald, at Paris, to acknowledge the independence of the colonies. . . . This is the first instruction given by the British Ministry in which it was proposed to recognize the celebrated act of July 4th, 1776. A great and immediate progress was now made in the preliminaries. . . . The commission, under which the preliminaries of the treaty were actually concluded, was issued by Congress in June '81. It empowered ‘John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson, or the majority of them, or such of them as may assemble, or in case of the death, absence, indisposition, or other impediment of the others, to any one of them, full power and authority, general and special commission, . . . to sign, and thereupon make a treaty or treaties, and to transact every thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and strengthening the great work of pacification, in as ample form, and with the same effect, as if we were personally present and acted therein.’ All the commissioners, except Mr. Jefferson, were present during the discussions, being in Europe at the time the meeting was appointed. Mr. Jefferson was in America, and did

not leave it, as a report reached the government that the preliminaries were already signed. Mr. Oswald's commission in proper form was not issued till the 21st of September.”—*Diplomacy of the United States*, ch. 8.—“At the moment . . . that negotiations were set on foot, there seemed but little hope of finding the Court of France peaceably inclined. Fox alone among the Ministers, though strongly opposed to a French alliance, inclined to a contrary opinion, and imagined that the independence of America once recognized, no further demands would be made upon England. It was therefore his wish to recognize that independence immediately, and by a rapid negotiation to insure the conclusion of what he believed would prove a favourable peace. Shelburne on the contrary believed that further concessions would be asked by France, and that the best chance England possessed of obtaining honourable terms, was to reserve the recognition of independence as part of the valuable consideration to be offered to the Colonies for favourable terms, and to use the points where the interests of France, Spain, and the Colonies were inconsistent, to foment difficulties between them, and be the means of negotiating, if necessary, a separate peace with each of the belligerents, as opportunity might offer. The circumstances of the time favoured the design. Vergennes had not gone to war for the sake of American independence, but in order to humiliate England. He not only did not intend to continue the war a day longer than was necessary to establish a rival power on the other side of the Atlantic, but was desirous of framing the peace on conditions such as would leave England, Spain, and the United States to balance one another, and so make France paramount. He therefore intended to resist the claim which the Colonies had invariably advanced of pushing their frontiers as far west as the Mississippi, and proposed following the example of the Proclamation of 1763, to leave the country between Florida and the Cumberland to the Indians, who were to be placed under the protection of Spain and the United States, and the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by the Quebec Act of 1774. Nor was he prepared to support the claim of the New Englandmen to fish on the banks off Newfoundland, over a considerable portion of which he desired to establish an exclusive right for his own countrymen, in keeping with the French interpretation of the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris. Of a still more pronounced character were the views of Spain. Her troops had recently conquered West Florida and threatened East Florida as well. She had determined to obtain formal possession of these territories, and to claim that they ran into the interior till they reached the great lakes. The United States, according to both the French and Spanish idea, were therefore to be restricted to a strip of land on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, bounded by almost the same line which France had contended for against England after the Treaty of Utrecht.”—E. Fitzmaurice, *Life of William, Earl of Shelburne*, v. 3, ch. 4.—Assured of ultimate success, as early as 1770, Congress had debated and decided upon terms of peace. “At the middle of February, 1770, a special committee of five was appointed to formulate the American demands. It consisted of Gouverneur Morris of New York, Thomas Burke of North Carolina, John Witherspoon of New Jersey, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts, and Meriwether Smith of Virginia. In a few days the committee reported in favor of demanding, as ulti-



mata, that the United States should have the Northwest territories clear to the Mississippi, and should have not only a frontage on but free navigation of that river from its source down to the Florida line, with further navigation through to the Gulf and the use of a port on Spanish soil near its mouth; but that the United States should never seek to extend its sovereignty beyond the Mississippi, or indeed to expand its territories in any direction beyond the limits which should be prescribed in the treaty of peace; and that the fishing rights in the waters and on the banks and shores of Newfoundland should belong equally to the United States, France, and Great Britain. Congress debated the matter for a month, and then, under French influence, struck out the clause relating to the navigation of the lower Mississippi. Next a long controversy ensued over the fisheries. The New York delegation, led by Gouverneur Morris and John Jay and forming a part of the French or 'pro-Gallican' faction, refused to insist upon demanding a treaty right to the fisheries, while the New Englanders, led by Elbridge Gerry [of Massachusetts], and forming the mass of the 'anti-Gallicans,' were as resolutely in favor of such a demand. In the end, largely through the intrigues and intervention of the French minister, Gerard, the former won. Congress refused to demand the right to the fisheries. That delighted Vergennes, who . . . [maintained that] 'the Americans have no pretension whatever to share in them.' Happily, Congress also set aside the astounding proposition of the committee, to bind the United States never to extend its domain beyond the Mississippi River, or beyond the limits fixed in the treaty of peace. So by the middle of June 1779 the terms were apparently settled. . . . But the matter was not settled. Two days later Gerry threw a bomb into Congress. He moved for a demand of the common right with Great Britain to fish on the banks of Newfoundland and the other banks and seas of North America, as a *sine qua non* of treaty-making. There followed a long and bitter debate. . . . New York, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina threatened to secede from the confederation if it should be adopted. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania supported Gerry. New Jersey, Delaware, and South Carolina were divided. For a time the continued union of the States and the success of the American cause trembled in the balance. . . . [Finally] the whole question of the fisheries was remitted to some subsequent treaty to be made with Great Britain after peace had been established. Encouraged by this success, the French government . . . sought to persuade Congress to forego all demand for recognition of American independence by Great Britain, and to be content with a French guarantee of independence. . . . Thus the United States, instead of realizing the ideal set forth in the Declaration of Independence, to the attainment of which the signers had pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, would have been a dependency of France, and would have enjoyed self-government only under an alien guarantee. . . . The proposal was received with favor by some members of Congress. The majority of that body insisted, however, that Great Britain must recognize American independence. . . . Thus disappointed, Gerard . . . asked Congress to renounce the right to navigate the Mississippi, and to leave that matter entirely to the magnanimity of Spain. This Congress would not do. . . . [It decided to send] a min-

ister of its own to Spain to settle the matter by direct negotiation with that country. . . . After several indecisive ballots, John Adams was chosen as peace commissioner, and was instructed to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain on these terms: Great Britain was to treat with the United States as 'sovereign, free, and independent,' and independence was to be formally confirmed by the treaty; Nova Scotia was to be acquired if possible, but was not to be insisted upon; the fishery rights were to be sought but were not to be insisted upon in the commercial treaty which was to be subsequently negotiated. . . . Jay, was appointed minister to Spain, and was instructed to offer that country an American guarantee of the Floridas in return for a Spanish guarantee of free navigation of the Mississippi to and into the Gulf. He was also instructed to seek a loan of \$5,000,000. . . . He was not favorably received. Indeed he was not officially received at all, nor recognized. The Spanish government took the ground that it could not or would not recognize him as a minister, nor receive him as such, until a treaty was negotiated between the two countries. But it would make no treaty with America until the United States would renounce the right to navigate the Mississippi, which of course the United States would not do.'—W. F. Johnson, *America's foreign relations*, v. 1, pp. 107-111.—"On the 15th February, Congress . . . resolved to instruct Jay to abandon the claim to the navigation of the Mississippi. This practically implied the abandonment of the claim to that river as the western boundary. Shortly after, and again on the demand of Luzerne, the instructions to Adams, who had been appointed Commissioner for negotiating a peace, and was then in Europe, were altered. Independence was to be the sole ultimatum, and Adams was to undertake to submit to the guidance of the French Minister in every respect. 'You are to make the most candid and confidential communications,' so his amended instructions ran, 'upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge or concurrence, and to make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majesty's influence for effectual support in everything that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the United States of America.' As a climax Count Luzerne suggested and Congress agreed to make Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and Laurens, joint Commissioners with Mr. Adams. Of the body thus appointed Jefferson refused to serve, while Laurens, as already seen [had been] . . . captured on his way to England. Of the remaining Commissioners, John Adams was doubly odious to the diplomatists of France and Spain, because of his fearless independence of character, and because of the tenacity with which as a New Englander he clung to the American rights in the Newfoundland fisheries; Jay had been an enthusiastic advocate for the Spanish alliance, but the cavalier treatment he had received at Madrid, and the abandonment of the Mississippi boundary by Congress, had forced upon him the conviction that his own country was being used as a tool by the European powers, for their own ulterior objects. The French he hated. He said 'they were not a moral people, and did not know what it was.' Not so Franklin, influenced partly by his long residence in the French capital, and by the idea that the Colonies were more likely to obtain their objects, by a firm reliance upon France than by confidence in the generosity

of England. He also pointed to the terms of the treaty he had negotiated with the former power, which forbade either party to conclude a separate peace without the leave previously obtained of the other, as imposing a moral and legal obligation on his countrymen to follow the policy which he believed their interests as a power required them to adopt. Meanwhile the King of France congratulated Congress on having entrusted to his care the interests of the United States, and warned them that if France was to be asked to continue hostilities for purely American objects it was impossible to say what the result might be, for the system of France depended not merely on America, but on the other powers at war."—E. Fitzmaurice, *Life of William, Earl of Shelburne*, v. 3, ch. 4.—"Benjamin Franklin, now venerable with years, had been doing at the court of Versailles a work hardly less important than that of Washington on the battle-fields of America. By the simple grace and dignity of his manners, by his large good sense and freedom of thought, by his fame as a scientific discoverer, above all by his consummate tact in the management of men, the willom printer, king's postmaster-general for America, discoverer, London colonial agent, delegate in the Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of Independence, had completely captivated elegant, free-thinking France. Learned and common folk, the sober and the frivolous alike swore by Franklin. Snuff-boxes, furniture, dishes, even stoves were gotten up 'à la Franklin.' The old man's portrait was in every house. That the French Government, in spite of a monarch who was half afraid of the rising nation beyond sea, had given America her hearty support, was in no small measure due to the influence of Franklin. And his skill in diplomacy was of the greatest value in the negotiations now pending."—E. B. Andrews, *History of the United States*, v. 1, pp. 208-209.

ALSO IN: E. E. Hale, *Franklin in France*, v. 2, ch. 3-4.—J. Russell, *Life of Fox*, v. 1, ch. 16-17.

1782 (September-November).—Peace parleyings at Paris.—Distrust of French aims by Jay and Adams.—Secret and separate negotiation with England.—"The task of making a treaty of peace was simplified both by [the change of ministry which placed Lord Shelburne at the head of affairs in England] . . . and by the total defeat of the Spaniards and French at Gibraltar in September. [See ENGLAND: 1780-1782.] Six months before, England had seemed worsted in every quarter. Now England, though defeated in America, was victorious as regarded France and Spain. The avowed object for which France had entered into alliance with the Americans, was to secure the independence of the United States, and this point was now substantially gained. The chief object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France was to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was now decidedly lost. France had bound herself not to desist from the war until Spain should recover Gibraltar; but now there was little hope of accomplishing this, except by some fortunate bargain in the treaty, and Vergennes tried to persuade England to cede the great stronghold in exchange for West Florida, which Spain had lately conquered, or for Oran or Guadaloupe. Failing in this, he adopted a plan for satisfying Spain at the expense of the United States; and he did this the more willingly as he had no love for the Americans, and did not wish to see them become too powerful. France had strictly kept her pledges; she had given us valu-

able and timely aid in gaining our independence; and the sympathies of the French people were entirely with the American cause. But the object of the French government had been simply to humiliate England, and this end was sufficiently accomplished by depriving her of her thirteen colonies. The immense territory extending from the Alleghany Mountains to the Mississippi River, and from the border of West Florida to the Great Lakes, had passed from the hands of France into those of England at the peace of 1763; and by the Quebec Act of 1774 England had declared the southern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River. . . . Vergennes maintained that the Americans ought to recognize the Quebec Act, and give up to England all the territory north of the Ohio River. The region south of this limit should, he thought, be made an Indian territory, and placed under the protection of Spain and the United States. . . . Upon another important point the views of the French government were directly opposed to American interests. The right to catch fish on the banks of Newfoundland had been shared by treaty between France and England; and the New England fishermen, as subjects of the king of Great Britain, had participated in this privilege. The matter was of very great importance, not only to New England, but to the United States in general. . . . The British government was not inclined to grant the privilege, and on this point Vergennes took sides with England, in order to establish a claim upon her for concessions advantageous to France in some other quarter. . . . Jay [who had lately arrived in Paris to take part in the negotiations] soon began to suspect the designs of the French minister. He found that he was sending M. de Rayneval as a secret emissary to Lord Shelburne under an assumed name; he ascertained that the right of the United States to the Mississippi valley was to be denied; and he got hold of a dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of legation at Philadelphia, to Vergennes, opposing the American claim to the Newfoundland fisheries. As soon as Jay learned these facts, he sent his friend Dr. Benjamin Vaughan to Lord Shelburne to put him on his guard, and while reminding him that it was greatly for the interest of England to dissolve the alliance between America and France, he declared himself ready to begin the negotiations without waiting for the recognition of independence, provided that Oswald's commission should speak of the thirteen United States of America, instead of calling them colonies and naming them separately. This decisive step was taken by Jay on his own responsibility, and without the knowledge of Franklin, who had been averse to anything like a separate negotiation with England. It served to set the ball rolling at once. . . . Lord Shelburne at once perceived the antagonism that had arisen between the allies, and promptly took advantage of it. A new commission was made out for Oswald, in which the British government first described our country as the United States; and early in October negotiations were begun and proceeded rapidly. On the part of England the affair was conducted by Oswald, assisted by Strachey and Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville. In the course of the month John Adams arrived in Paris, and a few weeks later Henry Laurens. . . . The arrival of Adams fully decided the matter as to a separate negotiation with England. He agreed with Jay that Vergennes should be kept as far as possible in the dark until everything was cut and dried, and Franklin was reluctantly obliged

to yield. The treaty of alliance between France and the United States had expressly stipulated that neither power should ever make peace without the consent of the other. . . . In justice to Vergennes, it should be borne in mind that he had kept strict faith with us in regard to every point that had been expressly stipulated. . . . At the same time, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated, Vergennes was clearly playing a sharp game against us; and it is undeniable that, without departing technically from the obligations of the alliance, Jay and Adams—two men as honourable as ever lived—played a very sharp defensive game against him. . . . The treaty with England was not concluded until the consent of France had been obtained, and thus the express stipulation was respected; but a thorough and detailed agreement was reached as to what the purport of the treaty should be, while our not too friendly ally was kept in the dark.”—J. Fiske, *Critical period of American history*, ch. 1.—“If his [Vergennes’] policy had been carried out, it seems clear that he would have established a claim for concessions from England by supporting her against America on the questions of Canada and the Canadian border and the Newfoundland fishery. . . . The success of such a policy would have been extremely displeasing to the Congress, and Jay and Adams defeated it. . . . The act was done, and if it can be justified by success, that justification, at least, is not wanting.”—W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the eighteenth century*, v. 4, ch. 15.—“The instructions of congress, given to the American commissioners under the instigation of the French court, were absolute and imperative, ‘to undertake nothing without the knowledge and concurrence of that court, and ultimately to govern themselves by their advice and opinion.’ These orders, transmitted at the time of the enlargement of the commission, had just been reinforced by assurances given to quiet the uneasiness created in France by the British overtures through Governor Carleton. Thus far, although the commissioners had felt them to be derogatory to the honor of their country, as well as to their own character as its representatives, there had been no necessity for action either under or against them. But now that matters were coming to the point of a serious negotiation, and the secondary questions of interest to America were to be determined, especially those to which France had shown herself indifferent, not to say adverse, it seemed as if no chance remained of escaping a decision. Mr. Jay, jealous of the mission of De Rayneval, of which not a hint had been dropped by the French court, suspicious of its good faith from the discourses of the remarkable dispatch of Marbois, and fearful of any advice like that of which he had received a foretaste through M. de Rayneval, at the same time provoked that the confidence expected should be all on one side, the Count communicating nothing of the separate French negotiation, came to the conclusion that the interests of America were safest when retained in American hands. He therefore declared himself in favor of going on to treat with Great Britain, without consulting the French court. Dr. Franklin, on the other hand, expressing his confidence in that court, secured by his sense of the steady reception of benefits by his country, signified his willingness to abide by the instructions he had received. Yet it is a singular fact, but lately disclosed, that, notwithstanding this general feeling, which was doubtless sincerely entertained, Dr. Franklin had been the first person to violate those instructions, at the very inception of the

negotiations, by proposing to Lord Shelburne the cession of Canada, and covering his proposal with an earnest injunction to keep it secret from France, because of his belief that she was adverse to the measure. . . . It may fairly be inferred that, whatever Franklin might have been disposed to believe of the French court, his instincts were too strong to enable him to trust them implicitly with the care of interests purely American. And, in this, there can be no reasonable cause for doubt that he was right. The more full the disclosures have been of the French policy from their confidential papers, the more do they show Count de Vergennes assailing England in America, with quite as fixed a purpose as ever Chatham had to conquer America in Germany. Mr. Adams had no doubt of it. He had never seen any signs of a disposition to aid the United States from affection or sympathy. On the contrary, he had perceived their cause everywhere made subordinate to the general considerations of continental politics. Perhaps his impressions at some moments carried him even further, and led him to suspect in the Count a positive desire to check and depress America. In this he fell into the natural mistake of exaggerating the importance of his own country. In the great game of nations which was now playing at Paris under the practised eye of France’s chief (for Count de Maurepas was no longer living), the United States probably held a relative position, in his mind, not higher than that of a pawn, or possibly a knight, on a chess-table. Whilst his attention was absorbed in arranging the combinations of several powers, it necessarily followed that he had not the time to devote that attention to any one, which its special representative might imagine to be its due. But even this hypothesis was to Mr. Adams justification quite sufficient for declining to submit the interests of his country implicitly to the Count’s control. If not so material in the Count’s eyes, the greater the necessity of keeping them in his own care. He therefore seized the first opportunity to announce to his colleagues his preference for the views of Mr. Jay. After some little reflection, Dr. Franklin signified his acquiescence in this decision. His objections to it had doubtless been increased by the peculiar relations he had previously sustained to the French court, and by a very proper desire to be released from the responsibility of what might from him be regarded as a discourteous act. No such delicacy was called for on the part of the other commissioners. Neither does it appear that Count de Vergennes manifested a sign of discontent with them at the time. He saw that little confidence was placed in him, but he does not seem to have made the slightest effort to change the decision or even to get an explanation of it. The truth is, that the course thus taken had its conveniences for him provided only that the good faith of the American negotiators, not to make a separate peace, could be depended upon. Neither did he ever affect to complain of it, excepting at one particular moment when he thought he had cause to fear that the support he relied on might fail.”—J. Q. and C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, v. 2, ch. 7.—“The radical difference between Franklin and his colleagues was in the question of trust. Franklin saw no reason to distrust the fidelity of France at any time to her engagements to the United States during the revolutionary war. His colleagues did not share this confidence, and yet, while impressed by this distrust of their ally, they made no appeal for explanation. The weight of opinion, as will hereafter be more fully seen, is now that Franklin

was right, and they in this respect wrong. But whatever may have been the correctness of their view, it was proper that, before making it the basis of their throwing off the burden of treaty obligation and their own instructions, they should have first notified France of their complaint. Obligations cannot be repudiated by one party on the ground of the failure of the other party to perform some condition imposed on him, without giving him notice of the charge against him, so that he could have the opportunity of explanation. It may be added, on the merits, that the extenuation set up by Jay and Adams, that France was herself untrue to her obligations, however honestly they believed it, can not now be sustained. Livingston, who knew more of the attitude of France than any public man on the American side except Franklin, swept it aside as groundless. Edward Everett, one of the most accomplished historical writers and diplomatists the country has ever produced, speaks, as we shall see, to the same effect, and other historical critics of authority, to be also hereafter cited, give us the same conclusion. Yet there are other reasons which may excuse their course, and that of Franklin, who concurred with them rather than defeat a peace. In the first place, such was their isolation, that their means of communication with Congress was stopped; and they might well have argued that if Congress knew that the English envoys refused to treat with them except in secret conference their instructions would have been modified. In the second place we may accept Adams' statement that Vergennes was from time to time informally advised of the nature of the pending propositions. In the third place, the articles agreed on in 1782 were not to be a definite treaty except with the assent of France. . . . It now appears that the famous Marbois letter, handed to Jay by one of the British loyalists, and relied on by him as showing France's duplicity, was disavowed by Marbois; and there are, aside from this, very strong reasons to distrust its genuineness. In the second place, we have in the correspondence of George III a new light thrown on the action taken by Jay in consequence of this letter. . . . Benjamin Vaughan, while a gentleman of great amiability and personal worth, was, when Jay sent him without Franklin's knowledge on a confidential mission to the British ministry, in the employ of that ministry as secret agent at Paris. It is due to Jay to say that he was ignorant of this fact, though he would have been notified of it had he consulted Franklin. One of the most singular incidents of this transaction is that George III, seeking double treachery in thus sending back to him his own agent in the guise of an agent from the American legation, regarded it as a peculiarly subtle machination of Franklin, which it was his duty to baffle by utterly discrediting Benjamin Vaughan. It should be added that Franklin's affection for Benjamin Vaughan was in no wise diminished by Vaughan's assumption, with an honesty which no one who knew him would question, of this peculiar kind of mediatorship. And in Jay Franklin's confidence was unabated. He more than once said that no one could be found more suited than Jay to represent the United States abroad. And when, in view of death, he prepared to settle his estate, he selected Jay as his executor."—F. Wharton, *Revolutionary diplomatic correspondence of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 9, sect. 111, ch. 13, sect. 158.—Writing to de la Luzerne, the French minister in the United States, under date of Dec. 19, 1782, Count de Vergennes expressed himself on the conduct of the American Commissioners

as follows: "You will surely be gratified, as well as myself, with the very extensive advantages, which our allies, the Americans, are to receive from the peace; but you certainly will not be less surprised than I have been, at the conduct of the Commissioners. . . . Whenever I have had occasion to see any one of them, and inquire of them briefly respecting the progress of the negotiation, they have constantly clothed their speech in generalities, giving me to understand that it did not go forward, and that they had no confidence in the sincerity of the British ministry. Judge of my surprise, when, on the 30th of November, Dr. Franklin informed me that the articles were signed. The reservation retained on our account does not save the infraction of the promise, which we have mutually made, not to sign except conjointly. I owe Dr. Franklin the justice to state, however, that on the next day he sent me a copy of the articles. He will hardly complain that I received them without demonstrations of sensibility."—J. Bigelow, *Life of Benjamin Franklin*, v. 3, p. 207, note.—See also ENGLAND: 1782-1783.

ALSO IN: J. Jay, *Peace negotiations of 1782-1783 (Narrative and critical history of America)*, v. 7, ch. 2.—E. Fitzmaurice, *Life of William, Earl of Shelburne*, v. 3, ch. 6.—E. E. Hale, *Franklin in France*, v. 2, ch. 5-8.—H. Doniol, *Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'établissement des États-Unis d'Amérique*, v. 5.


1782-1783.—Grievances of the army.—Newburgh addresses.—"Nothing had been done by Congress for the claims of the army, and it seemed highly probable that it would be disbanded without even a settlement of the accounts of the officers, and if so, that they would never receive their dues. Alarmed and irritated by the neglect of Congress; destitute of money and credit and of the means of living from day to day; oppressed with debts; saddened by the distresses of their families at home, and by the prospect of misery before them,—they presented a memorial to Congress in December [1782], in which they urged the immediate adjustment of their dues, and offered to commute the half-pay for life, granted by the resolve of October, 1780, for full pay for a certain number of years, or for such a sum in gross as should be agreed on by their committee sent to Philadelphia to attend the progress of the memorial through the house. It is manifest from statements in this document, as well as from other evidence, that the officers were nearly driven to desperation, and that their offer of commutation was wrung from them by a state of public opinion little creditable to the country. . . . The committee of the officers were in attendance upon Congress during the whole winter, and early in March, 1783, they wrote to their constituents that nothing had been done. At this moment, the predicament in which Washington stood, in the double relation of citizen and soldier, was critical and delicate in the extreme. In the course of a few days, all his firmness and patriotism, all his sympathies as an officer, on the one side, and his fidelity to the government, on the other, were severely tried. On the 10th of March, an anonymous address was circulated among the officers at Newburgh, calling a meeting of the general and field officers, and of one officer from each company, and one from the medical staff, to consider the late letter from their representatives at Philadelphia, and to determine what measures should be adopted to obtain that redress of grievances which they seemed to have solicited in vain. It was written with great ability and skill

[by John Armstrong, afterwards General]. . . . Washington met the crisis with firmness, but also with conciliation. He issued orders forbidding an assemblage at the call of an anonymous paper, and directing the officers to assemble on Saturday, the 15th, to hear the report of their committee, and to deliberate what further measures ought to be adopted as most rational and best calculated to obtain the just and important object in view. The senior officer in rank present [General Gates] was directed to preside, and to report the result to the Commander-in-chief. On the next day after these orders were issued, a second anonymous address appeared from the same writer. In this paper he affected to consider the orders of General Washington, assuming the direction of the meeting, as a sanction of the whole proceeding which he had proposed. Washington saw, at once, that he must be present at the meeting himself, or that his name would be used to justify

1783 (April).—Formation of Society of the Cincinnati. See CINCINNATI, SOCIETY OF THE.

1783 (September).—Definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States.—

The four difficult questions on which the British and American negotiators at Paris arrived, after much discussion and wise compromise, at a settlement of differences originally wide, were (1) boundaries; (2) fishing rights; (3) payment of debts from American to British merchants that were outstanding when the war began; (4) amnesty to American loyalists, or Tories, and restoration of their confiscated property. Within two months after the separate negotiations with England opened, an agreement had been reached, and preliminary or provisional articles were signed on Nov. 30, 1782. The treaty was not to take effect, otherwise than by the cessation of hostilities, until terms of peace should be agreed upon between England and France. This occurred in the fol-



WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS AT NEWBURGH

measures which he intended to discountenance and prevent. He therefore attended the meeting, and under his influence, seconded by that of Putnam, Knox, Brooks, and Howard, the result was the adoption of certain resolutions, in which the officers, after reasserting their grievances, and rebuking all attempts to seduce them from their civil allegiance, referred the whole subject of their claims again to the consideration of Congress. Even at this distant day, the peril of that crisis can scarcely be contemplated without a shudder. Had the Commander-in-chief been other than Washington, had the leading officers by whom he was surrounded been less than the noblest of patriots, the land would have been deluged with the blood of a civil war."—G. T. Curtis, *History of the constitution of the United States*, v. 1, bk. 2, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: J. Marshall, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 11.

1782-1784.—Persecution and flight of Tories or Loyalists. See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION; CANADA: 1782-1784; NEW BRUNSWICK: 1758-1785; ONTARIO: 1783-1841.

lowing January, and on September 3, 1783, the definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States was signed at Paris. The essential provisions of this treaty were the following:

Article 1. His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the Government, propriety and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof.

Art. II. And that all disputes which might arise in future, on the subject of the boundaries of the United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the following are, and shall be their boundaries, viz.: From the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of Saint

Croix River to the Highlands; along the said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river, St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north-westernmost head of Connecticut River; thence down along the middle of that river, to the 45th degree of north latitude; from thence, by a line due west on the said latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataquay; thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie; thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence along the middle of said water communication into the Lake Huron; then through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior; thence through Lake Superior northward to the Isles Royal and Philipeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of said Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through the said lake to the most northwestern point thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river Mississippi until it shall intersect the northernmost part of the 31st degree of north latitude. South, by a line to be drawn due east from the determination of the line last mentioned, in the latitude of 31 degrees north of the Equator, to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River; thence strait to the head of St. Mary's River; and thence down along the middle of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean. East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid Highlands, which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river St. Lawrence; comprehending all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean; excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.

Art. III. It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulph of Saint Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish. And also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island) and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous

agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.

Art. IV. It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.

Art. V. It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties which have been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of His Majesty's arms, and who have not borne arms against the said United States. . . .

Art. VI. That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenc'd, against any person or persons for, or by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the present war. . . .

Art. VII. There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between His Britannic Majesty and the said States, and between the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities, both by sea and land, shall from henceforth cease: All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty, and His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States. . . .

Art. VIII. The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain, and the citizens of the United States.

—H. W. Preston, ed., *Documents illustrative of American history*, p. 232.

ALSO IN: *Treaties and conventions between the United States and other powers*, pp. 370-379.—*Parliamentary history of England*, v. 23.—J. W. Foster, *Century of American diplomacy*, ch. 2-3.

1783 (November-December).—British evacuation of New York.—Dissolution of the continental army and Washington's farewell to it.—"The definitive treaty had been signed at Paris on the 3d of September, 1783 and was soon to be ratified by the United States in Congress assembled. The last remnant of the British army in the east had sailed down the Narrows on the 25th of November, a day which, under the appellation of Evacuation Day, was long held in grateful remembrance by the inhabitants of New York, and was, till a few years since, annually celebrated with fireworks and with military display. Of the continental army scarce a remnant was then [at the beginning of 1784] in the service of the States, and these few were under the command of General Knox. His great work of deliverance over, Washington had resigned his commission, had gone back to his estate on the banks of the Potomac, and was deeply engaged with plans for the improvement of his plantations. The retirement to private life of the American Fabius, as the newspapers delighted to call him, had been attended by many pleasing ceremonies, and had been made the occasion for new manifestations of affectionate regard by the people. The same day that witnessed the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from New York also witnessed the entry into that city of the army of the States. Nine days later Washington bid adieu to his officers. About noon on Thursday, the 4th of December, the chiefs of the

army assembled in the great room of Frances's Tavern, then the resort of merchants and men of fashion, and there Washington joined them. Rarely as he gave way to his emotions, he could not on that day get the mastery of them. . . . He filled a glass from a decanter that stood on the table, raised it with a trembling hand, and said: 'With a heart full of love and gratitude I now take leave of you, and most devoutly wish your latter days may be as prosperous and happy as your former ones have been glorious and honorable.' Then he drank to them, and, after a pause, said: 'I cannot come to each of you to take my leave, but shall be obliged if you will each come and shake me by the hand.' General Knox came forward first, and Washington embraced him. The other officers approached one by one, and silently took their leave. A line of infantry had been drawn up extending from the tavern to Whitehall ferry, where a barge was in waiting to carry the commander across the Hudson to Paulus Hook. Washington, with his officers following, walked down the line of soldiers to the water. The streets, the balconies, the windows, were crowded with gazers. All the churches in the city sent forth a joyous din. Arrived at the ferry, he entered the barge in silence, stood up, took off his hat and waved farewell. Then, as the boat moved slowly out into the stream amid the shouts of the citizens, his companions in arms stood bareheaded on the shore till the form of their illustrious commander was lost to view."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 2.—"As men looked back over the years of strife, they saw clearly that the chief reason why the American cause was not lost before France came to its aid was the personal leadership of Washington. If we seek to explain, it was not his great mind, for Franklin's was greater; not his force, energy, or ingenuity, for Benedict Arnold surpassed him in these qualities; not his military experience, for Charles Lee's was far more extensive; but it was the strength of character which day by day won the love of his soldiers and the perfect confidence of his countrymen. The absence of a mean ambition, the one desire of serving well his country and his fellow-men, the faithfulness that could not be driven from its task through jealousy or resentment, these were the traits that gave him a unique and solitary place among the world's heroes."—C. H. Van Tyne, *American Revolution, 1776-1783*, p. 328.

Also in: J. Fiske, *Critical period*, pp. 222-305.—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 33.—Mrs. M. J. Lamb, *History of the city of New York*, v. 2, ch. 6-7.

1783-1786.—Pioneers.—Westward to Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee.—"It is natural for us to think of the years 1775-1783 as given wholly to patriotic war for political independence. But during just those years thousands of earnest Americans turned away from that contest to win industrial independence for themselves and their children beyond the mountains. While the old Atlantic sections were fighting England, a new section sprang into being, fighting Indians and the wilderness. Until the peace of 1783, settlement penetrated only into the 'dark and bloody ground' between the Ohio and its southern branches. This district had long been a famous hunting ground, where Indians of the north and of the south slew the bison and one another. Frequent war parties flitted along its trails, but no tribe claimed it for actual occupation. So here lay the line of least resistance to the on-pushing wave of settlement.

. . . [The settlement of Watauga (see TENNESSEE: 1769-1772) had been begun in 1769 by a few Virginia frontiersmen who moved into the valley with their families. By 1772 thirteen settlements had been made, and the men of the forts met together to organize a government.] The second group of Western settlements—almost as early as Watauga—was made in Kentucky. . . . Permanent settlement in central Kentucky began . . . [in the spring of 1775]. For a few months it had the form of a proprietary colony."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 238, 241, 244.—"There were three routes that were taken by immigrants to Kentucky. One led by backwoods trails to the Greenbriar settlements, and thence down the Kanawha to the Ohio; but the travel over this was insignificant compared to that along the others. The two really important routes were the Wilderness Road, and that by water, from Fort Pitt down the Ohio River. Those who chose the latter way embarked in roughly built little flat-boats at Fort Pitt, if they came from Pennsylvania, or else at the old Redstone Fort on the Monongahela, if from Maryland or Virginia, and drifted down with the current. Though this was the easiest method, yet the danger from Indians was so very great that most immigrants, the Pennsylvanians as well as the Marylanders, Virginians, and North Carolinians, usually went overland by the Wilderness Road. This was the trace marked out by Boone, which to the present day remains a monument to his skill as a practical surveyor and engineer. Those going along it went on foot, driving their horses and cattle. At the last important frontier town they fitted themselves out with pack-saddles; for in such places two of the leading industries were always those of the pack-saddle maker and the artisan in deer leather. . . . If several families were together, they moved slowly in true patriarchal style. . . . The elder boys drove the cattle, which usually headed the caravan; while the younger children were packed in crates of hickory withes and slung across the backs of the old quiet horses, or else were seated safely between the great rolls of bedding that were carried in similar fashion. The women sometimes rode and sometimes walked, carrying the babies. The men, rifle on shoulder, drove the pack-train, while some of them walked spread out in front, flank, and rear, to guard against the savages. A tent or brush lean-to gave cover at night. . . . In winter the fords and mountains often became impassable, and trains were kept in one place for weeks at a time, escaping starvation only by killing the lean cattle; for few deer at that season remained in the mountains. Both the water route and the wilderness road were infested by the savages at all times, and whenever there was open war the sparsely settled regions from which they started were likewise harried. When the northwestern tribes threatened Fort Pitt and Fort Henry—or Pittsburg and Wheeling, as they were getting to be called,—they threatened one of the two localities which served to cover the communications with Kentucky; but it was far more serious when the Holston region was menaced, because the land travel was at first much the more important.

"The early settlers of course had to suffer great hardship even when they reached Kentucky. The only two implements the man invariably carried were the axe and rifle, for they were almost equally proud of their skill as warriors, hunters, and wood-choppers. Next in importance came

the sickle or scythe. The first three tasks of the pioneer farmer were to build a cabin, to make a clearing—burning the brush, cutting down the small trees, and girdling the large—and to plant corn. Until the crop ripened he hunted steadily, and his family lived on the abundant game, save for which it would have been wholly impossible to have settled Kentucky so early. . . . If the men were suddenly called away by an Indian inroad, their families sometimes had to live for days on boiled tops of green nettles. Naturally the children watched the growth of the tasselled corn with hungry eagerness until the milky ears were fit for roasting. When they hardened, the grains were pounded into hominy in the hominy-block, or else ground into meal in the rough hand-mill, made of two limestones in a hollow sycamore log. Until flax could be grown the women were obliged to be content with lint made from the bark of dead nettles. This was gathered in the spring-time by all the people of a station acting together, a portion of the men standing guard while the rest, with the women and children, plucked the dead stalks. The smart girls of Irish ancestry spun many dozen cuts of linen from this lint, which was as fine as flax but not so strong. Neither hardship nor danger could render the young people downhearted, especially when several families, each containing grown-up sons and daughters, were living together in almost every fort. The chief amusements were hunting and dancing. There being no permanent ministers, even the gloomy Calvinism of some of the pioneers was relaxed. Long afterwards one of them wrote, in a spirit of quaint apology, that 'dancing was not then considered criminal,' and that it kept up the spirits of the young people, and made them more healthy and happy; and recalling somewhat uneasily the merriment in the stations, in spite of the terrible and interminable Indian warfare, the old moralist felt obliged to condemn it, remarking that, owing to the lack of ministers of the gospel, the impressions made by misfortune were not improved. Though obliged to be very careful and to keep their families in forts, and in spite of a number of them being killed by the savages, the settlers in 1776 were able to wander about and explore the country thoroughly, making little clearings as the basis of 'cabin claims,' and now and then gathering into stations which were for the most part broken up by the Indians and abandoned. What was much more important, the permanent settlers in the well-established stations proceeded to organize a civil government."—T. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, v. 1, pp. 313-318.—The cruel border warfare which was "so damaging to the New York frontier settlements and so fatal to the Six Nations [see above: 1779 (August-September)], was really part of a desultory conflict which raged at intervals [during the war] from north to south along our whole western border, and resulted in the total overthrow of British authority beyond the Alleghanies. The vast region between these mountains and the Mississippi river—a territory more than twice as large as the German Empire—was at that time an almost unbroken wilderness. A few French towns garrisoned by British troops, as at Natchez, Kaskaskia, and Cahokia on the Mississippi river, at Vincennes, on the Wabash, and at Detroit, sufficed to represent the sovereignty of George III., and to exercise a very dubious control over the wild tribes that roamed through these primeval solitudes. When the thirteen colonies de-

clared themselves independent of the British Crown the ownership of this western territory was for the moment left undecided. [See above: 1781-1786.] . . . Little respect, however, was paid to the quaint terminology of charters framed in an age when almost nothing was known of American geography; and it was virtually left for circumstances to determine to whom the western country should belong. It was now very fortunate for the United States that the policy of Pitt had wrested this all-important territory from the French. For to conquer from the British enemy so remote a region was feasible; but to have sought to obtain it from a power with which we were forming an alliance would have been difficult indeed."—J. Fiske, *American Revolution*, v. 2, pp. 94-95.—"With the ending of the Revolutionary War the rush of settlers to these western lands assumed striking proportions. The peace relieved the pressure which had hitherto restrained this movement, on the one hand, while on the other it tended to divert into the new channel of pioneer work those bold spirits whose spare energies had thus far found an outlet on stricken fields. To push the frontier westward in the teeth of the forces of the wilderness, was fighting work, such as suited well enough many a stout soldier who had worn the blue and buff of the Continental line, or who, with his fellow rough-riders, had followed in the train of some grim partisan leader. The people of the New England States and of New York, for the most part, spread northward and westward within their own boundaries; and Georgia likewise had room for all her growth within her borders; but in the States between there was a stir of eager unrest over the tales told of the beautiful and fertile lands lying along the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. The days of the early pioneers, of the men who did the hardest and roughest work, were over; farms were being laid out and towns were growing up among the felled forests from which the game and the Indians had alike been driven. There was still plenty of room for the rude cabin and stumped clearing of the ordinary frontier settler, the wood-chopper and game hunter. Folk of the common backwoods type were as yet more numerous than any others among the settlers. In addition there were planters from among the gentry of the sea-coast; there were men of means who had brought great tracts of wild land; there were traders with more energy than capital; there were young lawyers; there were gentlemen with a taste for an unfettered life of great opportunity; in short there were adventures of every kind. All men who deemed that they could swim in troubled waters were drawn towards the new country. The more turbulent and ambitious spirits saw roads to distinction in frontier warfare, politics, and diplomacy. Merchants dreamed of many fortunate ventures, in connection with the river trade or the overland commerce by pack-train. Lawyers not only expected to make their living by their proper calling, but also to raise to the first places in the commonwealths, for in these new communities, as in the older States, the law was then the most honored of the professions, and that which most surely led to high social and political standing. But the one great attraction for all classes was the chance of procuring large quantities of fertile land at low prices. To the average settler the land was the prime source of livelihood. A man of hardihood, thrift, perseverance, and bodily strength could surely make a comfortable liv-



ing for himself and his family, if only he could settle on a good tract of rich soil; and this he could do if he went to the new country. As a matter of course, therefore, vigorous young frontiersmen swarmed into the region so recently won. These men merely wanted so much land as they could till. Others, however, looked at it from a very different standpoint. The land was the real treasury-chest of the country. It was the one commodity which appealed to the ambitious and adventurous side of the industrial character at that time and in that place. It was the one commodity the management of which opened chances of procuring vast wealth, and especially vast speculative wealth. To the American of the end of the eighteenth century the roads leading to great riches were as few as those leading to a competency were many. The two chief topics of thought and conversation, the two subjects which beyond all others engrossed and absorbed the minds of the settlers, were the land and the Indians. . . . Every hunter kept a sharp lookout for some fertile bottom on which to build a cabin. The volunteers who rode against the Indian towns also spied out the land and chose the best spots whereon to build their blockhouses and palisaded villages as soon as a truce might be made, of the foe driven for the moment farther from the border. Sometimes settlers squatted on land already held but not occupied under a good title; sometimes a man who claimed the land under a defective title, or under pretence of original occupation, attempted to oust or to blackmail him who had cleared and tilled the soil in good faith; and these were both fruitful causes not only of law suits but of bloody affrays. Among themselves, the settlers' talk ran ever on land titles and land litigation, and schemes for securing vast tracts of rich and well watered country. These were the subjects with which they filled their letters to one another and to their friends at home, and the subjects upon which these same friends chiefly dwelt when they sent letters in return. Often well-to-do men visited the new country by themselves first, chose good sites for their farms and plantations, surveyed and purchased them, and then returned to their old homes, whence they sent out their field hands to break the soil and put up buildings before bringing out their families. The westward movement of settlers took place along several different lines. The dwellers in what is now eastern Tennessee were in close touch with the old settled country; their farms and little towns formed part of the chain of forest clearings which stretched unbroken from the border of Virginia down the valleys of the Watauga and the Holston. . . . It grew rapidly, the population being composed chiefly of actual settlers who had taken boldings with the purpose of cultivating them, and of building homes thereon. The great growth of the west took place in Kentucky. The Kentucky country was by far the most widely renowned for its fertility; it was much more accessible and more firmly held, and its government was on a more permanent footing than was the case in the Wabash, Illinois, and Cumberland regions. In consequence the majority of the men who went west to build homes fixed their eyes on the vigorous young community which lay north of the Ohio, and which already aspired to the honors of statehood. The immigrants came into Kentucky in two streams, following two different routes—the Ohio River, and Boone's old Wilderness Trail. Those who came overland, along the latter road, were much fewer in number than those who came by water; and

yet they were so numerous that the trail at times was almost thronged, and much care had to be taken in order to find camping places where there was enough feed for the horses. . . . The time of the journey depended, of course, upon the composition of the traveling party, and upon the mishaps encountered; a party of young men on good horses might do it in three days, while a large band of immigrants, who were hampered by women, children, and cattle, and dogged by ill-luck, might take three weeks. Ordinarily six or eight days were sufficient. Before starting each man laid in a store of provisions for himself and his horse; perhaps thirty pounds of flour, half a bushel of corn meal, and three bushels of oats. . . . The chief highway was the Ohio River; for to drift down stream in a scow was easier and quicker, and no more dangerous, than to plod through thick mountain forests. Moreover, it was much easier for the settler who went by water to carry with him his household goods and implements of husbandry; and even such cumbersome articles as wagons, or, if he was rich and ambitious, the lumber wherewith to build a frame house. All kinds of craft were used, even bark canoes and pirogues, or dugouts; but the keel-boat, and especially the flat-bottomed scow with square ends, were the ordinary means of conveyance."—T. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, pp. 4-6, 9-10, 12-13.—See also KENTUCKY: 1765-1778, to 1775-1784; MARYLAND: 1776-1784; NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1784; 1786-1788; OHIO: 1774; TENNESSEE: 1785; 1785-1796; VIRGINIA: 1779-1797.

1783-1787.—After the war.—Resistance to the stipulations of the treaty of peace.—National feebleness and humiliation.—Failure of the Articles of Confederation.—Unifying influences of confederation.—Movements toward a firmer constitution.—"The revolution was at last accomplished. The evils it had removed, being no longer felt, were speedily forgotten. The evils it had brought pressed heavily upon them. They could devise no remedy. They saw no way of escape. They soon began to grumble, became sullen, hard to please, dissatisfied with themselves and with everything done for them. The States, differing in habits, in customs, in occupations, had been during a few years united by a common danger. But the danger was gone; old animosities and jealousies broke forth again with all their strength, and the union seemed likely to be dissolved. In this state of public discontent the House met at Philadelphia early in January, 1784. Some days were spent in examining credentials of new members, and in waiting for the delinquents to come in. It was not till the 14th of the month that the definitive treaty was taken under consideration and duly ratified. Nothing remained, therefore, but to carry out the stipulations with as much haste as possible. But there were some articles which the people had long before made up their minds never should be carried out. While the treaty was yet in course of preparation the royal commissioners had stoutly insisted on the introduction of articles providing for the return of the refugees and the payment of debts due to British subjects at the opening of the war. The commissioners on behalf of the United States, who well knew the tempers of their countrymen, had at first firmly stood out against any such articles. But some concessions were afterward made by each party, and certain stipulations touching the debts and the refugees inserted. Adams, who wrote in the name of his fellow-commissioners, . . . hoped that the middle line adopted would be approved. The middle line to

which Adams referred was that Congress should recommend the States to make no more seizures of the goods and property of men lately in arms against the Confederation, and to put no bar in the way of the recovery of such as had already been confiscated. It was distinctly understood by each side that these were recommendations, and nothing more than recommendations. Yet no sooner were they made known than a shout of indignation and abuse went up from all parts of the country. The community in a moment was divided between three parties. The smallest of the three was made up of the Tories, who still hoped for place and power, and still nursed the delusion that the past would be forgotten. Yet they daily contributed to keep the remembrance of it alive by a strong and avowed attachment to Great Britain. Opposed to these was the large and influential body of violent Whigs, who insisted vehemently that every loyalist should instantly be driven from the States. A less numerous and less violent body of Whigs constituted the third party." The fury of the violent Whigs proved generally irresistible and great numbers of the obnoxious Tories fled (see *TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION*) before it. Some "sought a refuge in Florida, then a possession of Spain, and founded settlements which their descendants have since raised to prosperous and beautiful villages, renowned for groves of orange-trees and fields of cane. Others embarked on the British ships of war, and were carried to Canada or the island of Bermuda; a few turned pirates, obtained a sloop, and scoured the waters of Chesapeake bay. Many went to England, beset the ministry with petitions for relief, wearied the public with pathetic stories of the harsh ingratitude with which their sufferings had been requited, and were accused, with much show of reason, by the Americans of urging the severe restrictions which England began to lay on American commerce. Many more . . . set out for Nova Scotia. . . . The open contempt with which, in all parts of the country, the people treated the recommendation of Congress concerning the refugees and the payment of the debts, was no more than any man of ordinary sagacity could have foretold. Indeed, the state into which Congress had fallen was most wretched. . . . Each of the thirteen States the Union bound together retained all the rights of sovereignty, and asserted them punctiliously against the central government. Each reserved to itself the right to put up mints, to strike money, to levy taxes, to raise armies, to say 'what articles should come into its ports free and what should be made to pay duty. Toward the Continental Government they acted precisely as if they were dealing with a foreign power. In truth, one of the truest patriots of New England had not been ashamed to stand up in his place in the Massachusetts House of Deputies and speak of the Congress of the States as a foreign government. Every act of that body was scrutinized with the utmost care. The transfer of the most trivial authority beyond the borders of the State was made with protestations, with trembling, and with fear. Under such circumstances, each delegate felt himself to have much the character, and to be clothed with very much of the power, of ambassadors. He was not responsible to men, he was responsible to a State. . . . From beginning to end the system of representation was bad. By the Articles of Confederation each of the thirteen little republics was annually to send to Congress not more than seven and not less than two delegates. No thought was taken of

population. . . . But this absolute equality of the States was more apparent than real. Congress possessed no revenue. The burden of supporting the delegates was cast on those who sent them, and, as the charge was not light, a motive was at once created for preferring a representation of two to a representation of seven, or, indeed, for sending none at all. While the war was still raging and the enemy marching and counter-marching within the border of every State, a sense of fear kept up the number of delegates to at least two. Indeed, some of the wealthier and more populous States often had as many as four congressmen on the floor of the House. But the war was now over. The stimulus derived from the presence of a hostile army was withdrawn, and the representation and attendance fell off fast. Delaware and Georgia ceased to be represented. From the ratification of the treaty to the organization of the Government under the Constitution six years elapsed, and during those six years Congress, though entitled to 91 members, was rarely attended by 25. The House was repeatedly forced to adjourn day after day for want of a quorum. On more than one occasion these adjournments covered a period of thirteen consecutive days. . . . No occasion, however impressive or important, could call out a large attendance. Seven States, represented by twenty delegates, witnessed the resignation of Washington. Twenty-three members, sitting for eleven States, voted for the ratification of the treaty. . . . It is not surprising, therefore that Congress speedily degenerated into a debating club, and a debating club of no very high order. Neglected by its own members, insulted and threatened by its mutinous troops, reviled by the press, and forced to wander from city to city in search of an abiding place, its acts possessed no national importance whatever. It voted monuments that never were put up, rewarded meritorious services with sums of money that never were paid, formed wise schemes for the relief of the finances that never were carried out, and planned on paper a great city that never was built. In truth, to the scoffers and malcontents of that day, nothing was more diverting than the uncertain wanderings of Congress. . . . In the coffee-houses and taverns no toasts were drunk with such uproarious applause as 'A hoop to the barrel' and 'Cement to the Union'; toasts which not long before had sprung up in the army and came rapidly into vogue. . . . The men who, in after years, came to eminence as the framers of the Constitution, who became renowned leaders of the Federalists, presidents, cabinet ministers, and constitutional statesmen, were then in private life, abroad, or in the State Assemblies. Washington was busy with his negroes and tobacco; Adams was minister to Holland; Jefferson still sat in Congress, but was soon to be sent as minister to France; Madison sat in the Virginia House of Deputies; Hamilton was wrangling with Livingston and Burr at the bar of New York; Jay was minister to Spain."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 2.—Hamilton's description, in one of the papers of *The Federalist*, of the state of the country in 1787, is very graphic: "We may indeed, with propriety," he wrote, "be said to have reached almost the last stage of National humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character of an independent nation, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which we are

held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor Government. Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to National wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our Government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of National distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded what indication is there of National disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? . . . The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money, but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option. . . . There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations, for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty; regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future

discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. . . . If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general discretionary superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all views towards a Confederate Government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a National Government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a Government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,—the only proper objects of Government.”—Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist*, no. 15.—“Many of the States refused or neglected to pay even their allotted shares of interest upon the public debt, and there was no power in Congress to compel payment. Eighteen months were required to collect only one-fifth of the taxes assigned to the States in 1783. The national credit became worthless. Foreign nations refused to make commercial treaties with the United States, preferring a condition of affairs in which they could lay any desired burden upon American commerce without fear of retaliation by an impotent Congress. The national standing army had dwindled to a corps of 80 men. In 1785 Algiers declared war against the United States. Congress recommended the building of five 40-gun ships of war. But Congress had only power to recommend. The ships were not built, and the Algerines were permitted to prey on American commerce with impunity. England still refused to carry out the Treaty of 1783, or to send a Minister to the United States.”—A. Johnson, *History of American politics*, ch. 1.—“Though the war was over, the year 1783 was full of discouragement; notwithstanding the urgent calls for money, the states did not respond. Morris sent out to the governors a letter of appeal; up to June 13 his payments had exceeded his receipts by more than \$1,000,000. ‘How, indeed, could it be otherwise,’ he asked, ‘when all the taxes brought into the treasury since 1781 did not amount to seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars?’ For the year 1782 Congress asked for \$8,000,000, and for the year 1783 it asked for \$2,000,000; but by the end of the latter year less than \$1,500,000 had been paid in. A committee which was appointed to consider the matter spoke of the distress and poverty of the people ‘just relieved from the ravages of predatory armies, returning from an attendance on camps, to the culture of their fields—beginning to sow, but not yet having reaped.’ The fact is, however, that the people were not in destitution. There is abundance of contemporary evidence to show that at the end of the Revolution the people were living with more ease and circumstance than before the war. ‘The people,’ wrote Morris to Franklin, ‘are undoubtedly able to pay, but they have easily persuaded themselves into a conviction of their own inability, and in a Government

like ours the belief creates the thing.' The trouble was not poverty, but commercial confusion, vicious politics, and native disinclination to pay taxes. 'The necessity of the present application for money,' Morris said in 1782, and his remark held true for the next five years, 'arises from the necessity of drawing by degrees the bands of authority together, establishing the power of Government over a people impatient of control, and confirming the Federal Union of the several States by correcting defects in the general Constitution.'"—A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and the constitution, 1783-1789*, pp. 69-70.—"The territorial claims of the States and of the Union were still in confusion. Virginia roused the suspicion of the small States by making the promised cession in terms which Congress could not accept, and the other States had made no motion towards yielding their claims. Relations with the Indians were still confused. Superintendents of Indian affairs had been appointed, and in 1778 a treaty was negotiated with the Creeks; but the States, particularly Pennsylvania and Georgia, continued to make their own arrangements with Indian tribes. The finances of the country seemed to have reached their lowest ebb. An attempt was made to float a new issue of continental money at one dollar for forty of the old bills. The new obligations speedily sank to the level of the old, and the country was practically bankrupt. The aid of the French was all that kept the government afloat. The return of peace was expected to restore American commerce to its old prosperity; but having gone to war principally because colonial commerce with other countries was restricted, the Americans found themselves deprived of their old freedom of trade with England. They were subject to discriminating duties in English ports, and were excluded from the direct trade with the English West Indies, which had been the chief resource of the colonial ship-owners. The State governments were in debt, embarrassed, and beset with the social difficulties which come in the train of war. The disbanded troops were not accustomed to regular employment or to a quiet life; taxes were heavy and odious; the far Western settlements clamored to be set free from the States to which they belonged. Above all, the national government was weak, inefficient, and little respected by the army or the people at large. . . . The first and fundamental defect of the government was in the organization of Congress. The Continental Congress had been a head without a body; under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was a body without a head. A single assembly continued to be the source of all national legislative, executive, and judicial power. As though to prevent the country from getting the benefit of experience, no man could remain a member of Congress for more than three years in succession. The delegates of each State continued to cast jointly one vote; if only one member were present, the vote of a State was not counted; if but two were present, they might produce a tie. On important questions the approval of nine States was necessary, and often less than that number had voting representatives on the floor. Amendment was impossible, except by consent of all the State legislatures. Although Congress had to deal with difficult questions of peace, its principal power was that of carrying on war. Congress might make treaties, but it could pass no act in defence of American commerce. . . . The Articles of Confederation provided for a special tribunal to settle territorial disputes between the States. The sys-

tem was invoked in 1782, and a verdict was rendered in favor of Pennsylvania and against Connecticut in their rival claims to the Wyoming region. A second set of federal courts was constituted by designating certain State courts to try piracies and felonies committed on the high seas. A third and the only important federal tribunal was the Court of Appeals in prize cases, which began to sit in January, 1780, and before which were sued sixty-five cases. All the courts, like all the executive departments, were created by Congress, alterable by Congress, and subject to the control by Congress. In 1784 the Court of Appeals was allowed to lapse, by the refusal of Congress to pay the salaries of the judges."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union, 1750-1829*, pp. 103-105.—"Several different circumstances must be taken into consideration in interpreting the task of of the American people in the years of national readjustment: the harassing and demoralizing experiences of a war which was at once a civil war and a revolution; the banishment and voluntary emigration of thousands of its most intelligent and substantial citizens; the political thinking of the time, which the course of the war had intensified—thinking that, if allowed to ferment in shallow-pated citizens, might endanger the stability of society itself; and, lastly, the fact that the war had been waged to support local governments against a general government. Amid all of these difficulties America was imperatively called upon to organize its empire, if we may use the word to convey the meaning of the vast territory stretching from the St. Croix to the St. Mary's and westward to the Mississippi—an empire inhabited by thirteen distinct groups of people in large measure ignorant of the lives and thoughts of one another. In solving this problem the United States was at once aided and hindered by its geographical makeup and its history. Geographically separated from Europe by thousands of miles of space and many weeks of time, the Americans felt isolated from the rest of the world, and must therefore have been impressed with the thought of a common destiny; but separated as the states were from one another, when the people were thinking of themselves and not of Europe, they must have felt their differences more keenly than their similarities. South Carolina was so remote from Virginia that we might almost think of her as belonging to the West-Indian group of colonies rather than to the continental. The Declaration of Independence was known in Paris almost as soon as in Charleston. The hardy Yankee seamen who buffeted the winds off stormy Hatteras must have felt far from home when they sailed into the harbor of Wilmington or Savannah. A Georgian knew little of New York or Massachusetts. Life on the plantations of Virginia was far different from life in the little settlements of New England. When John Adams, leaving his fireside in Braintree, went to Philadelphia as a delegate in Congress, the letters which he sent home were welcomed as tidings from a 'far country.' 'Of affairs of Georg[i]a,' wrote Madison to Jefferson in 1786, 'I know as little as of those of Kamskatska.' When we add to all this the fact that the colonies were established at different times and from different motives, and that climate, soil, and industrial life varied greatly from Maine to Georgia, we are so impressed by the diversity that union seems almost beyond the verge of possibility. And yet political unity was a necessity; any form of political order not expressing the fact of real interdependence and essential oneness of purpose was insufficient if America was to organize her

empire. Without modern means of communication, without railroads or telegraphs, the states were also without good highways of any kind. The road between Boston and New York was not very bad, but in the most favorable weather the traveller making the trip must spend four days in a clumsy, uncomfortable coach. . . . The highways of Pennsylvania were often almost impassable, and travel on them was little less than misery. South of the Potomac the roads were still worse; there even bridges were a luxury. Even on the much-travelled route between the north and the south the mails were infrequent. Three times a week throughout the summer they passed between Portland, Maine, and Suffolk, Virginia, but from Suffolk southward only twice a week in the summer and once a week in winter. Inhabitants of towns out of the main course of travel were more isolated than are now secluded hamlets in the heart of the Rockies. . . . A man in the little village of Louisville was often ignorant for months at a time of what was going on at New York or Boston, knowing no more of the internal affairs of the sea-coast towns than 'what our friends are about in the other world.' To such a people, then, thus distracted and thus divided, came the problem of imperial organization. One fact aided them materially: the states were alike in structure; they had the same political inheritance; the fundamental ideas of English liberty and law, taking root in congenial soil, had grown strong in every section; men in all the states thought in the same terms and used the same phrases. Even their Revolutionary philosophy with its notion of absolute rights was a product of English history. Moreover, events, relentless facts, were showing the way to sound union; there could be no real peace and prosperity till political organization was in harmony with industrial and social needs. If the people were reluctant, union on a proper basis was to be established by 'grinding necessity.' The important process of making state constitutions was pretty well completed four years after the Declaration of Independence, but the formation of a national system was not so simple. For some years after the Declaration the affairs of the Union were conducted by a Congress of delegates on whose discretion or authority there were no constitutional restraints; hence Congress did, not what was needed to be done, but what it was able to do or thought it wise to attempt, at times showing energy and intelligence, again sinking into sloth and incompetence. During these years America was acting under an unwritten constitution, and, in spite of the inability of Congress, establishing precedents of some weight and importance."—A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and the constitution, 1783-1789*, pp. 43-47.

"The year 1786 marks a crisis in the development of the Union. The inefficiency of Congress was reflected in the neglect of constitutional duties by the States: Rhode Island recalled her delegates and refused to appoint new members; New Jersey felt so much injured by a New York tariff that an act was passed taxing the lighthouse established by New York on Sandy Hook; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Georgia already had raised troops on their own account and for their own purposes, in violation of the Articles of Confederation. Davie, of North Carolina, a little later declared that the 'encroachments of some States on the rights of others, and of all on those of the Confederation, are incontestable proofs of the weakness and imperfections of that system.' Of the requisition of that year for \$2,000,000 in specie,

only about \$400,000 was paid. Some States offered their own depreciated notes, and New Jersey refused to make any contribution until the offensive New York Acts were withdrawn. In May, 1786, Charles Pinckney on the floor of Congress declared that 'Congress must be invested with more powers, or the federal government must fall.' . . . Before the Articles of Confederation had gone into effect, Congress had already proposed a radical amendment; and within three years it suggested two others. The first proposition, made February 3, 1781, was that the States allow Congress to levy an import duty of five per cent, the proceeds to be applied 'to the discharge of the principal and interest of the debts already contracted . . . on the faith of the United States for supporting the present war.' In the course of about a year twelve States had complied with this reasonable request. Rhode Island alone stood out, and the plan failed. Forthwith Congress presented another financial scheme, which was called a 'generous revenue plan.' April 12, 1783, it asked the States to allow Congress to lay low specific import duties for twenty-five years, to be collected by officers appointed by the States. The States were further recommended to lay some effective taxes, the proceeds to be set aside for government requisitions. The effect was precisely the same as before. Twelve States agreed; but the opposition of New York prevented the first part of the plan from being carried out. Not a single State had condescended to pay attention to the second request. Apparently abandoning any hope of an adequate revenue, Congress, on April 30, 1784, proposed a third amendment, that the States should permit it to pass commercial laws discriminating against foreign powers which refused to make commercial treaties. This was aimed at Great Britain. Washington urged the measure in vigorous language. 'We are,' said he, 'either a united people, or we are not so. If the former, let us in all matters of national concern act as a nation which has a national character to support.' Yet he could not bring even Virginia to agree to the plan, and it quickly failed. A poor constitution, which could be amended only by unanimous vote, was likely to stifle the nation. A few feeble suggestions were heard that the experiment of republican government be given over; others urged that the Americans be brought within one centralized government. Alexander Hamilton would have established a government 'controlling the internal police of the States, and having a federal judiciary.' Upon the last of his three schemes, dated 1783, is written: 'Intended to be submitted to Congress, but abandoned for want of support.' Even Washington's vastly greater influence had no effect. In a circular letter to the governors, dated June, 1783, he says: 'It is indispensable to the happiness of the individual States that there should be lodged somewhere a supreme power to regulate and govern the general concerns of the confederated republic.' Yet not a State would take the initiative in reforming the constitution. From 1784 to 1786 pamphlets began to appear in which more definite suggestions were made for a new government. Pelatiah Webster proposed a government with enlarged powers, and a legislature of two houses. 'If they disagree,' said he, 'let them sit still until they recover their good humor.' The method in which the new government was to enforce its powers was put in a quaint and incisive form. 'My principle is,' said Webster, 'the soul that sinneth, it shall die. Every person . . . who shall disobey the supreme authority shall be answerable to Congress.' The idea

that the constitution needed radical amendment had at last found a lodgment in the public mind."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union*, pp. 117-119.—New York's veto of the import tax "seemed to destroy the last hope of a continuance of national union in America. Perhaps the dismay caused by the action of New York was the most powerful argument in the minds of many for an immediate and complete revision of the government. The first step to Revision was not so designed. In 1785 the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, in pursuance of their right to regulate commerce, had appointed Commissioners to decide on some method of doing away with interruptions to the navigation of Chesapeake Bay. The Commissioners reported their inability to agree, except in condemning the Articles of Confederation. The Legislature of Virginia followed the report by a resolution, inviting the other States to meet at Annapolis, consider the defects of the government, and suggest some remedy. In September, 1786, delegates from five of the Middle States assembled, but confined themselves to discussion, since a majority of the States were not represented. [See also ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION.] The general conclusion was that the government, as it then stood, was inadequate for the protection, prosperity or comfort, of the people, and that some immediate and thorough reform was needed. After drawing up a report for their States and for Congress, recommending another Convention to be held at Philadelphia, in May, 1787, they adjourned. Congress, by resolution, approved their report and the proposed Convention. The Convention met, as proposed, May 14th, 1787."—A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, ch. 1.—"Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the downfall of a government which had been framed with the hope and promise of perpetual duration. . . . But this brief interval was full of suffering and peril. There are scarcely any evils or dangers, of a political nature, and springing from political and social causes, to which a free people can be exposed, which the people of the United States did not experience during that period."—G. T. Curtis, *History of the constitution*, bk. 3, ch. 1.—"It is not too much to say that the period of five years following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of the American people."—J. Fiske, *Critical period of American history*, p. 55.

ALSO IN: J. S. Landon, *Constitutional history and government of the United States*, lecture 3.—A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and the constitution*, pp. 168-183.—T. C. Smith, *Wars between England and America*, pp. 129-138.—J. Fiske, *Critical period*, pp. 212-221.

1783-1789.—Depressed state of trade and industry.—Commercial consequences of want of nationality.—"The effect of the Revolutionary War on the merchant marine of the colonies, which thereby secured their independence as the United States, was not so disastrous as might have been expected. Many ships were lost or captured, and the gains of maritime commerce were reduced; but to offset these losses an active fleet of privateers found profitable employment in the seizure of English merchantmen, and thus kept alive the maritime spirit of the country, and supplied a revenue to the shipowners whose legitimate pursuits were suspended by the war. In 1783, therefore, the American merchant marine was in a fairly healthy condition. During the next six years the disadvantages of the new situation made themselves felt. Before the Revolution the colonies had

had open trade with their fellow-subjects in the British West India Islands. The commerce thus carried on was a very profitable business. The island colonies were supplied with lumber, corn, fish, live stock, and surplus farm produce, which the continent furnished in abundance, together with rough manufactured articles such as pipe staves, and in return the ships of New York and New England brought back great quantities of coffee, sugar, cotton, rum and indigo. . . . As a result of independence, the West India business was entirely cut off. The merchantmen of the United States then came in on the footing of foreign vessels, and all such vessels, under the terms of the Navigation Act, were rigorously excluded from trade with the British colonies. It was evident, however, that the sudden cessation of this trade, whatever loss it might inflict on the newly created state, would be tenfold more harmful to the islands, which had so long depended upon their neighbors of the mainland for the necessities of life. Pitt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, appreciated this difficulty, and in 1783 brought a bill into Parliament granting open trade as to articles that were the produce of either country. The measure failed, owing to Pitt's resignation, and the next ministry, in consequence of the violent opposition of British shipowners, passed a merely temporary act, vesting in the crown the power of regulating trade with America. This power was occasionally exercised by suspending certain provisions of the navigation laws, under annual proclamations, but it did not serve to avert the disaster that Pitt had foreseen. Terrible sufferings visited the population of the West India colonies, and between 1780 and 1787 as many as 15,000 slaves perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the necessary supply of food when their own crops had been destroyed by hurricanes. Apart from the unfavorable condition of the West India trade, another and more important cause had operated to check the prosperous development of American commerce. The only bond of political union at this time was that formed by the Articles of Confederation, constituting a mere league of independent States, any one of which could pass laws calculated to injure the commerce of the others."—J. R. Soley, *Maritime industries of America* (N. S. Shaler, ed., *United States of America*, v. 1, ch. 10).—"The general commerce of the granulated mass of communities called the United States, from 1783 to 1789, was probably the poorest commerce known in the whole history of the country. England sent America £3,700,000 worth of merchandise in 1784, and took in return only £750,000. The drain of specie to meet this difference was very severe, and merchants could not meet the engagements so rashly made. They had imported luxuries for customers who were poor, and non-payment through all the avenues of trade was the consequence. One circumstance and detail of the internal management of this commerce added to the distress and to the necessary difficulties of the time. Immediately after the peace, British merchants, factors, and clerks came across the seas in streams, to take advantage of the new opportunities for trade. It seemed to the citizens to be a worse invasion of their economic rights than the coming of the troops had been to the political rights of the old colonists. The whole country was agitated, but action was initiated in Boston in 1785. The merchants met and discussed all these difficulties. They pledged themselves to buy no more goods of British merchants or factors in Boston. In about three weeks the mechanics

and artisans met in the old Green Dragon Tavern and committed themselves to the same policy. But the merchants went beyond mere non-intercourse with traders at home. The root of the difficulty was in the ill-regulation or want of regulation of our commerce with all foreign countries. The confederation was giving and not getting. Where it should have gotten, foreigners were getting, because the parts of the country had not agreed to unite in acquiring for the common benefit, lest some part should be injured in the process. Congress made treaties for the Confederation. But if unable to treat with any power which excluded American shipping from its ports, or laid duties on American produce, Congress did not control our ports in an equivalent manner. Each individual state was to decide whether the unfriendly power should trade at its own ports. This in effect nullified any retaliatory action. England, being the best market, virtually controlled any change in commerce, as it was then conducted. Her ports were closed to American products unless they were brought in British vessels. France admitted our vessels to her ports, but her merchants cried out against the competition. It was feared that the ministers would be obliged to yield to their clamor and close the ports. Probably the poor economic condition of the country affected the foreign trade even more than the bad adjustment of foreign relations. All causes combined to form two parties, one advocating imposts upon foreign trade or a Navigation Act, the other opposing this scheme, and insisting upon absolute freedom of commerce. It was in this direction that the Boston people moved, after they had instituted non-intercourse in their own market with British traders. They petitioned Congress to remedy these embarrassments of trade, and sent a memorial to their own legislature. This document urged that body to insist on action by Congress. They formed a Committee of Correspondence to enforce these plans upon the whole country."—W. B. Weeden, *Economic and social history of New England*, 1620-1789, ch. 22.

ALSO IN: A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and the constitution*, pp. 71-76.—C. A. Beard, *Economic interpretation of the constitution of the United States*, pp. 40-40.

1784.—Plans for new states in Northwest Territory. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1784.

1784.—Revolt in Tennessee against territorial cession to Congress.—State of Franklin. See TENNESSEE: 1776-1784; 1785.

1784.—Publication of first daily newspaper. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1784-1813.

1784.—Financial administration of Robert Morris.—Cost of the war.—From May, 1781, until April, 1785, the burden of the financial management of the revolutionary struggle rested upon Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, who held the office which Congress had created and entitled "the Superintendent of Finances." "Morris's detractors argued that he deserved no great credit for his management of the finances as compared with his predecessors, because in his time everything turned in his favour. It is true that if things had remained as before, he could not have restored the finances; for the miracle of carrying on a war without means has never yet been performed by anybody. The events which gave him an opportunity to restore the finances, by intelligent and energetic action, were as follows. The first was the collapse of the paper currency and its absolute removal from circulation, in May, 1781, just before he took office. As soon as it was out of the way, specie

came in. He was able to throw aside all the trammels in which the treasury operations had been entangled by the paper system. It is true that he did not succeed in his attempt to relieve himself entirely from these anticipations, which, inasmuch as they were anticipations, would have used up the revenues of his time; but it was a great gain for him to be able to conduct his current operations at least in terms of specie. The second thing in his favour was the great help granted by France in 1781, and especially the importation of a part of this in specie. This enabled him to found the bank, from which he borrowed six times what he put into it. The chief use of the bank to him, however, was to discount the notes which he took for bills of exchange. [A small loan was also obtained from Spain in 1781, and a loan was secured in Holland in 1783.] Then also it was possible for him to reduce the expenses in a way which his predecessors had not had the courage or the opportunity to accomplish, because in their time the abuses of the old method had not gone far enough to force acquiescence in the reforms. In Morris's time, and chiefly, as it appears, by his exertions and merit, the expenditures were greatly reduced for an army of a given size. When the war came to an end, it was possible for him to reduce the entire establishment to a very low scale. Next we notice that the efforts to introduce taxation bore fruit which, although it was trivial in one point of view, was large enough to be very important to him in his desperate circumstances. Finally, when his need was the greatest, and these advantages and opportunities proved inadequate, the rise of American credit made the loan in Holland possible [\$3,600,000, obtained in four different loans]. . . . By the Report of 1790 the total amount of expenditures and advances at the treasury of the United States, during the war, in specie value, was estimated as follows: 1775 and 1776, \$20,064,666.—1777, \$24,086,646.—1778, \$24,289,438.—1779, \$10,794,620.—1780, \$3,000,000.—1781, \$1,942,465.—1782, \$3,632,745.—1783, \$3,226,583.—1784, \$548,525 to November 1.—Total \$92,485,693. This table shows how the country lapsed into dependence on France after the alliance was formed. The round number opposite 1780 is very eloquent. It means anarchy and guesswork. . . . According to the best records we possess, the cost of the war to the United States, reduced to specie value year by year at the official scale of depreciation, which, being always below the truth, makes these figures too high, was, as above stated, \$92,485,693, at the treasury. There were also certificates of indebtedness out for \$16,708,009. There had been expended in Europe, which never went through the treasury, \$5,000,000. The States were estimated to have expended \$21,000,000. Total, \$135,000,000. Jefferson calculated it at \$140,000,000, by adding the debts incurred and the continental currency. The debt contracted by England during the war was £115,000,000, for which £91,000,000 were realized. The Comptroller of the Treasury of France said that it cost 60,000,000 livres a year to support the army in America. Vergennes told Lafayette, in November, 1782, that France had expended 250,000,000 livres in the war. There is an often-repeated statement that the war cost France 1,200,000,000 livres, or 1,280,000,000, or 1,500,000,000. Arthur Young put it at £50,000,000, sterling. Probably if 60,000,000 a year for five years, or \$60,000,000, was taken as the amount directly expended for and in America by France, it would be as fair a computation as could be made of her contribution to American indepen-

dence. She had large expenditures elsewhere in the prosecution of her war against Great Britain, and her incidental losses of ships, etc., were great. When England abandoned the effort to subdue the colonies, she was in a far better position for continuing it than either of her adversaries. George III. was by no means stupid in his comments and suggestions about the war. No Englishman of the period said things which now seem wiser in the retrospect. As early as September, 1780, he said: 'America is distressed to the greatest degree. The finances of France, as well as Spain, are in no good situation. This war, like the last, will prove one of credit.' This opinion was fully justified in 1782. French finances were then hastening toward bankruptcy, so that France could not continue the war expenses or the loans and subsidies to America. English credit was high. October 2, 1782, Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, that the English fleet was stronger than at the beginning of the war, while the fleets of France and Spain were weaker; that French finances were greatly weakened, while English credit was high; that England had recovered influence in Russia, and through Russia on Prussia and Austria. He wanted peace and reconciliation with England in order to act with her in eastern Europe. If England had chosen to persevere in the war, the matter of credit would have been the most important element in her chances of success, aside from the natural difficulties of the enterprise."—W. G. Sumner, *Financier and the finances of the American Revolution*, v. 2, ch. 23.—"The financial condition of the Confederation was throughout deplorable. The revolution imposed upon the country a heavy debt. The accounts of the government were so badly kept that to this day it is impossible to state the amount; but it was probably about thirty millions, with an annual interest charges of about two millions. The necessary expenditure for the support of Congress, of the army on a peace-footing, and of the executive and judicial boards and departments, called for about half a million more. The continental currency had practically been repudiated, and no more could be floated; Congress had no power to lay either direct or indirect taxes; the post-office had an income of about \$25,000 a year, all of which was expended upon the service. Hence Congress fell back on requisitions apportioned on the States: one of its principal functions was each year to calculate the amount necessary for the public service, and to call upon the State legislatures for their quota. The total sum required from 1781 to 1788 was about \$16,000,000. Of this there had actually been paid during the seven year \$3,500,000 in specie, and \$2,500,000 in certificates of national indebtedness. The annual cash income of the government was therefore about half a million, which was entirely absorbed by the necessary running expenses of the government, leaving nothing for the payment of interest. This condition of virtual bankruptcy might have been avoided had Robert Morris been able to carry out the reforms which he proposed when he became superintendent of finance in 1781. He found the financial administration complicated and corrupt. He attempted to substitute business methods and punctuality of payment. . . . In 1784 Morris resigned in despair, and thenceforward a Treasury Board mismanaged the finances of the nation."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union, 1750-1829*, pp. 109-110.

ALSO IN: E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 463-465.—C. J. Bullock, *Finances*

*of the United States, from 1775 to 1789* (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, v. 1, no. 2).

1784.—Trade relations established with China. See CHINA: 1662-1838.

1784-1788.—Disputes with England over execution of treaty of peace.—Difficulties with Spain.—Question of navigation of the Mississippi.—Eastern jealousy and Western excitement.—"Serious disputes soon arose, concerning the execution of the treaty of peace; and each nation complained of infractions by the other. On the part of the United States it was alleged that negroes had been carried away, contrary to the treaty; and as early as May, 1783, congress instructed their ministers for negotiating peace to remonstrate to the British court against this conduct of their commander in America, and to take measures to obtain reparation. The United States, also, complained that the western posts had not been surrendered, agreeably to treaty stipulations. Great Britain, on her part, alleged that legal impediments had been interposed to prevent the collection of British debts in America; and that the 5th and 6th articles, relating to the property of the loyalists, had not been complied with. In June, 1784, the legislature of Virginia not only declared that there had been an infraction on the part of Great Britain of the 7th article, in detaining the slaves and other property of the citizens of the United States, but instructed their delegates in congress to request that a remonstrance be presented to the British court against such infraction and to require reparation. They also directed them to inform congress that the state of Virginia conceived a just regard to the national honor and interest obliged her assembly to withhold their co-operation in the complete fulfilment of the treaty until the success of such remonstrance was known, or they should have further directions from congress. They at the same time declared, that as soon as reparation for such infraction should be made, or congress should judge it indispensably necessary, such acts as inhibited the recovery of British debts should be repealed, and payment made, in such time and manner as should consist with the exhausted situation of the state. In consequence of these difficulties and disputes, congress, early in the year 1785, determined to send a minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain; and on the 24th of February John Adams was appointed to represent the United States at the court of London. He was instructed 'in a respectful but firm manner to insist that the United States be put, without further delay, into possession of all the posts and territories within their limits which are now held by British garrisons.' . . . Mr. Jefferson was soon after appointed to represent the United States at the court of Versailles, in the room of Dr. Franklin, who had leave to return home, after an absence of nine years. Mr. Livingston having resigned the office of secretary of foreign affairs, Mr. Jay, in March, 1784, and before his return from Europe, was appointed in his place. Mr. Adams repaired to the British court, and was received as the first minister from the United States since their independence was acknowledged. . . . In December, 1785, Mr. Adams presented a memorial to the British secretary of state, in which, after stating the detention of the western posts contrary to the stipulations in the treaty of peace, he in the name and in behalf of the United States required 'that all his majesty's armies and garrisons be forthwith withdrawn from the said United States, from all and every of the posts and fortresses before enumerated, and from every port, place and harbor, within the territory



of the said United States, according to the true intention of the treaties.' To this memorial the British secretary, Lord Carmarthen, returned an answer, on the 28th of February, 1786, in which he acknowledges the detention of the posts, but alleges a breach of the 4th article of the treaty of peace on the part of the United States, by interposing impediments to the recovery of British debts in America. . . . This answer was accompanied with a statement of the various instances in which the 4th article had been violated by acts of the states. The complaints of Great Britain also extended to breaches of the 5th and 6th articles of the treaty, relating to the recovery of certain property and to confiscations. The answer of the British secretary was submitted to congress; and in order to remove the difficulties complained of, that body, in March, 1787, unanimously declared that all the acts, or parts of acts, existing in any of the states, repugnant to the treaty of peace, ought to be repealed; and they recommended to the states to make such repeal by a general law. . . . A circular letter to the states accompanied these declarations, in which congress say, 'we have deliberately and dispassionately examined and considered the several facts and matters urged by Great Britain, as infractions of the treaty of peace, on the part of America, and we regret that, in some of the states, too little attention has been paid to the public faith pledged by that treaty.' In consequence of this letter, the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, passed acts complying with the recommendations contained in it. The operation of the act of Virginia, however, which repealed all acts preventing the recovery of debts due to British subjects, was suspended until the governor of that state should issue a proclamation, giving notice that Great Britain had delivered up the western posts, and was also taking measures for the further fulfilment of the treaty of peace by delivering up the negroes belonging to the citizens of that state, carried away contrary to the 7th article of the treaty, or by making compensation for the same. . . . The British court was not yet disposed to enter into any commercial treaty with the United States. The ministers were, no doubt, satisfied that the advantages they enjoyed under their own regulations were greater than could be obtained by any treaty they could make with America. And this was, probably, one of the principal reasons of their refusal to enter into any such treaty. As the British court declined sending a minister to the United States, Mr. Adams, in October, 1787, at his request, had leave to return home. . . . The United States had also at this period to encounter difficulties with Spain as well as Great Britain. The two Floridas having been ceded to his catholic majesty, serious disputes soon arose, not only on the old subject of the navigation of the Mississippi, but with respect to the boundaries of Louisiana and the ceded territory. The Spanish court still persisted in its determination to exclude the Americans from the navigation of the Mississippi."—T. Pitkin, *Political and civil history of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 17.—"In the spring of 1784 Congress commissioned John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson to negotiate treaties of commerce with any nations which should desire or be willing to enter into such conventions. Obviously, it was preëminently desirable for this country that it should establish such relations as widely as possible. But not a single such treaty was made, if we except one with the semi-piratical

power of Morocco. The most important purely diplomatic negotiations after the making of peace but still under the Confederation were those with Spain. That country had during the war refused to aid this country or to recognize its independence, and in the time of peace-making it exerted all its influence to our disadvantage. It was painfully divided between a desire to see England beaten and humiliated and a dread of seeing the Thirteen States succeed and become a strong new nation, since the latter achievement would certainly have an unfavorable influence upon Spain's remaining interests in the Western Hemisphere. When at last, in spite of Spanish intrigues and marplotry, the treaty of peace was made and published, Spain found in it much cause for apprehension and for offense. Two features were particularly obnoxious. One was the disposition of the Yazoo lands. . . . Spain claimed them as her own, and was not inclined to acquiesce in the treaty's disposition of them as belonging either to England or to the United States. The other was the navigation of the Mississippi River, of which in its lower reaches she claimed sole possession. France, it is true, had accepted with only formal demur these results of Jay's astute and audacious diplomacy; but Spain had no mind to do so, at least without a struggle. . . . In the summer of 1784 . . . the Spanish government sent to Congress a formal notification that Spain would not recognize the validity of that instrument, and that if American vessels sought to navigate that part of the Mississippi of which Spain still possessed both banks, they would be seized as trespassers and confiscated. Nor was this an idle or a merely formal threat. It was promptly put into effect, and an organized, vigorous, and versatile campaign was begun by Spain against American interests in the Mississippi Valley. She entered into diplomatic negotiations. She strengthened her military forces along the river. She sent secret agents among the Indian tribes, to incite them to hostility against settlers from the States. Above all, she also sent subtle emissaries among the settlers on our western frontier, to plant seeds of disaffection, discontent, and secession among them, and to induce them, if possible, either to withdraw from the United States and to set up an independent State of their own, or to annex themselves to the Spanish domain. Nor was this last propaganda difficult. Kentucky was rapidly filling up with colonists, and free navigation of the Mississippi was absolutely essential to their prosperity. In 1785 they numbered more than 20,000 souls, and were increasing at a rapid rate. [Congress considered sending a minister to Spain, but the necessity for this was obviated, for] early in the summer of 1785 the first Spanish minister came to this country. This was Don Diego de Gardoqui, and he bore a commission authorizing him to negotiate with the United States concerning all existing boundary disputes. Congress received him, and turned him over to Jay, whom it had made its secretary for foreign affairs. . . . [Negotiations, however, were fruitless, and at the end of the summer of 1786 Jay reported that] the only practicable course, in his view, was to make a treaty for a limited period, twenty-five or thirty years, under which we should have important commercial advantages, but under which, also, in return for those advantages, we should for the time being hold in abeyance our right to navigate the river. This arrangement he frankly regarded as a temporary makeshift, forced upon us by our weak and demoralized condition, and especially by our lack

of that efficient Federal Government which Washington had recommended. In time, he hoped, we should 'become more really and truly a nation,' and then we could assert and maintain our rights."—W. F. Johnson, *America's foreign relations*, v. 1, pp. 137-149.

"The commercial interests of the coast were impatient at having an agreement held up because of these western questions, which they felt to be of little concern. Not all, moreover, favored the opening of the Mississippi. In addition to a feeling that western emigration weakened the older parts of the country, there was a distinct fear voiced by such men as Rufus King, that, should the West learn to face down the Mississippi, the country would be divided into two spheres so distinct that union would cease to be possible. He believed that the development of the West had best wait on the slow process of creating transportation routes across the mountains. The position of Congress had been vacillating. In 1779 it had made the navigation of the Mississippi an ultimatum in any treaty with Spain; in 1781 it had withdrawn this condition; in 1784 it had returned to it. In 1786 Jay, who had ignored the instructions of 1781, concluded that he could not carry out those of 1784, and arranged a treaty with Gardoqui on the basis that the United States should forego the navigation for twenty-five years, without prejudicing her rights. This plan he recommended to Congress, with whom the question assumed a sectional aspect. The commercial regions, New England and the middle states, were in favor of it, the southern states, less interested in general commerce and more closely in touch with the West, were opposed. On one vote seven states out of the thirteen favored the proposal. . . . The people of the West had been anxiously watching these negotiations, and were growing restless at the protracted delay of Congress in securing what they wished. The news of Jay's proposed abandonment of what they considered their birth-right, turned restiveness into distrust. They were not a patient race and their impatience was heightened by the similar failure of Congress to deal effectually with their Indian enemies. The Southwestern Indians were more numerous than the Northwestern, and better organized; the five great tribes, Cherokee, Creeks, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Chicamauga, could together furnish perhaps twenty thousand warriors. The close of the war found these tribes at enmity with the Americans. In 1785 commissioners arranged a treaty with the Cherokee, but the boundary provided was not satisfactory to the frontiersmen, and North Carolina stood by her citizens. The articles of Confederation gave Congress control of Indian affairs only in the case of tribes not living within the limits of a single state. North Carolina, therefore, claiming to comprehend the Cherokee, denied the validity of the treaty. To the failure of Congress to open the Mississippi was thus added the failure to quiet the Indians upon satisfactory terms, and the people of the West came to believe that their happiness must depend on their own exertions. Under these circumstances the West became fertile ground for the development of plans and plots and conspiracies. They grew up, withered, and revived again; they adjusted themselves to times and conditions; they flourished now successively, and now simultaneously even in the same mind. They stretched their threads to Congress and the coast, and across the ocean to Madrid, Paris, and London; they connected themselves with the general history of the age. At times

secret and unobserved, at times the central objects of attention, they together form one of the two leading themes of our diplomatic history until after 1803. During the Confederation they were practically all directed to the solution of western problems by some one of the following four methods,—by the self-reliant seizure of New Orleans, a task somewhat beyond existing resources; by submission to the control of Spain; by independence and alliance with Spain; or by independence and alliance with Great Britain. It is probable that the majority of the inhabitants were at most times disposed to follow a fifth course,—the obvious and legal one of urging their grievances upon the government of the United States in the hope that it would acquire the power to redress them. The supporters of this view, however, were often discouraged, for they were not sustained by any such deep-seated loyalty as developed when the nation had proved itself deserving of their devotion. Fully aware of the situation, Spain was disposed to pull every string of intrigue in order to manipulate it to her own advantage. Her Indian policy was well conceived and well executed. The government encouraged the great Scotch firm of Panton, Leslie and Company, whose American headquarters were at Pensacola. It saw to it that traders frequented the Indian villages, and that their rates for goods were moderate. It allowed a secret trade in firearms. It distributed generous presents. To the great chief of the Creeks, the most powerful man among the Indians, Alexander McGillivray, it paid a yearly pension. Of this man, Navarro, intendant or civil officer of Louisiana, wrote, April 15, 1786: 'So long as we shall have this chief on our side, we may rely on having established, between the Floridas and Georgia, a barrier which it will not be easy to break through. The Indians are now fully convinced of the ambition of the Americans; the recollection of past injuries still dwells on their minds, and, with it, the fear that these greedy neighbors may one day seize upon their lands, and strip them of a property to which they consider themselves as having a right derived from nature herself. It ought to be one of the chief points in the policy of this Government to keep this sentiment alive in their breasts.' Upon these Indians, with the creole population, the Spanish government placed its greatest dependence for the defence of Louisiana, and through Louisiana of the mines of Mexico. It hoped, however, by intrigue with the western settlers to create a still more advanced barrier, namely, to acquire or to control the region which it had endeavored to obtain in the negotiation of 1779 with England and of 1782 with Jay. Alert and eager as it was, however, the Spanish government lacked unity of purpose. One of the plans considered was that of Navarro, who wrote, December 10, 1787: 'It is necessary to keep in mind that, between this province and the territories of New Spain, there is nothing but the feeble barrier of the Mississippi, which it is as easy to pass as it is impossible to protect, and that, if it be good policy to fortify this province by drawing a large population within its limits, there are no other means than that of granting certain franchises to commerce, leaving aside, as much as possible, all restrictions and shackles, or at least postponing them to a future time, if they must exist. In addition, the government must distinguish itself by the equity of its administration, the suavity of its relations with the people, and the disinterestedness of its officers in their dealings with the foreigners who may

resort to the colony. This is the only way to form, in a short time, a solid rampart for the protection of the kingdom of Mexico.' This plan was fostered by Gardoqui, who at Philadelphia entered into relations with Colonel George Morgan and arranged a deal with him. Morgan received a grant of land and undertook to establish a colony, New Madrid, at the strategic point in what is now Missouri, opposite the mouth of the Ohio. George Rogers Clark was interested in a scheme to organize a similar colony on the Yazoo, the similar plans engaged James Wilkinson, John Brown, a delegate in Congress, Harry Inness, the attorney-general of the Kentucky district, and other men of influence and ambition. To make settlement in these new grants desirable it was proposed to allow emigrants to bring in their property free of duty and to enjoy religious tolerance; but of course the main inducement would be freedom to use the Mississippi. The essential point was to keep the river tight closed to those living in the American districts. With regard to the wisdom of this plan it may be remarked that, as immigrants of this kind would change their flag only for their personal advantage, the durability of their loyalty to the Spanish crown might well be suspected. It was like asking the fox to guard the chickens. Something like this was felt by Miro, the governor of Louisiana [who carried on negotiations with Wilkinson, Robertson and Sevier]. . . . McGillivray wrote, April 25, 1788, that the Cumberland settlers had asked for terms, and added that 'they would throw themselves into the arms of his Majesty as subjects, and that Cumberland and Kentucky are determined to free themselves from their dependence on Congress, because that body cannot protect either their persons or their property, or favor their commerce. They therefore, believe that they owe no obedience to a power which is incapable of benefiting them.' . . . The government under the Confederation, therefore, not only failed to open up commerce with the Mediterranean and the West Indies, and to put that with Spain upon a desirable basis, but it was unable to occupy the territory granted to the United States by the treaty of 1783, either in the northwest or on the Florida border. It was unable to quiet the Indians of north or south, or to provide commercial outlets for the trans-Appalachian settlers. Its failure was causing not only discontent but disloyalty, and to such a degree that, although the racial control of the great valley was probably determined by the character of the aggressive population already on the spot, its governmental future was still uncertain. While the western situation was not widely appreciated in the older portion of the country, the financial plight was fully realized. Owing to the lack of national resources, the interest on our foreign debt was met only by occasional sales of such portions of the Dutch loan arranged by Adams as had not been immediately taken up. The loans from France were still unprovided for, and it was the gossip of diplomatic circles that France might take the island of Rhode Island as her payment."—C. R. Fish, *American diplomacy*, pp. 71-78.—The settlers in the Mississippi valley "were much exasperated by the seizure and confiscation of American property by the Spaniards, on its way down the river, which took place about the same time. The proposition made in congress [temporarily to waive the claim to navigation of the river] was magnified into an actual treaty, and called from the western people most bitter complaints and reproaches. . . . To quiet

the apprehensions of the western inhabitants, the delegates from North Carolina, in September, 1788, submitted to congress a resolution declaring that 'whereas many citizens of the United States, who possess lands on the western waters, have expressed much uneasiness from a report that congress are disposed to treat with Spain for the surrender of their claim to the navigation of the river Mississippi; in order therefore to quiet the minds of our fellow citizens by removing such ill founded apprehensions, resolved, that the United States have a clear, absolute, and unalienable claim to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, which claim is not only supported by the express stipulations of treaties, but by the great law of nature.' The secretary of foreign affairs, to whom this resolution was referred, reported, that as the rumor mentioned in the resolution was not warranted by the negotiations between the United States and Spain, the members be permitted to contradict it, in the most explicit terms. Mr. Jay also stated, there could be no objection to declaring the right of the United States to the navigation of the river clear and absolute—that this had always been his opinion; and that the only question had been whether a modification of that right for equivalent advantages was advisable; and though he formerly thought such a modification might be proper, yet that circumstances and discontents had since interposed to render it questionable. He also advised that further negotiations with Spain be transferred to the new general government. On this report, congress, on the 16th of September, 1788, in order to remove the apprehensions of the western settlers, declared that the members be permitted to contradict the report referred to by the delegates from North Carolina; and at the same time resolved 'that the free navigation of the river Mississippi is a clear and essential right of the United States, and that the same ought to be considered and supported as such.' All further negotiations with Spain were also referred to the new federal government."—T. Pitkin, *Political and civil history of the United States, v. 2, ch. 17*.—"It was important for the frontiersmen to take the Lake Posts from the British; but it was even more important to wrest from the Spaniards the free navigation of the Mississippi. While the Lake Posts were held by the garrisons of a foreign power, the work of settling the northwestern territory was bound to go forward slowly and painfully; but while the navigation of the Mississippi was barred, even the settlements already founded could not attain to their proper prosperity and importance. . . . The Westerners were right in regarding as indispensable the free navigation of the Mississippi. They were right also in their determination ultimately to acquire the control of the whole river, from the source to the mouth. However, the Westerners wished more than the privilege of sending down stream the products of their woods and pastures and tilled farms. They had already begun to cast longing eyes on the fair Spanish possessions. . . . Every bold, lawless, ambitious leader among the frontier folk dreamed of wresting from the Spaniard some portion of his rich and ill-guarded domain. It was not alone the attitude of the frontiersmen towards Spain that was novel, and based upon a situation for which there was little precedent. Their relations with one another, with their brethren of the seaboard, and with the Federal Government, likewise had to be adjusted without much chance of profiting by antecedent experience. Many phases of these relations between the people who stayed at home and those who

wandered off to make homes, between the frontiersmen as they formed young States, and the Central Government representing the old States, were entirely new, and were ill-understood by both parties. . . . The attitude towards the Westerners of certain portions of the population in the older States, and especially in the northeastern States, was one of unreasoning jealousy and suspicion; and though this mental attitude rarely crystallized into hostile deeds, its very existence, and the knowledge that it did exist, embittered the men of the West. . . . In the northeastern States, and in New England especially, this feeling showed itself for two generations after the close of the Revolutionary War. On the whole the New Englanders have exerted a more profound and wholesome influence upon the development of our common country than has ever been exerted by any other equally numerous body of our people. They had led the nation in the path of civil liberty and sound governmental administration. But too often they have viewed the nation's growth and greatness from a narrow and provincial standpoint, and have grudgingly acquiesced in, rather than led the march towards, continental supremacy. In shaping the nation's policy for the future their sense of historic perspective seemed imperfect. . . . The extreme representatives of this northeastern sectionalism not only objected to the growth of the West at the time now under consideration, but even avowed a desire to work it harm, by shutting the Mississippi, so as to benefit the commerce of the Atlantic States. . . . These intolerant extremists not only opposed the admission of the young western States into the Union, but at a later date actually announced that the annexation by the United States of vast territories beyond the Mississippi offered just cause for the secession of the northeastern States. Even those who did not take such an advanced ground felt an unreasonable dread lest the West might grow to overtop the East in power. . . . A curious feature of the way many honest men looked at the West was their inability to see how essentially transient were some of the characteristics to which they objected. Thus they were alarmed at the turbulence and the lawless shortcomings of various kinds which grew out of the conditions of frontier settlement and sparse population. They looked with anxious foreboding to the time when the turbulent and lawless people would be very numerous, and would form a dense and powerful population; failing to see that in exact proportion as the population became dense, the conditions which caused the qualities to which they objected would disappear. Even the men who had too much good sense to share these fears, even men as broadly patriotic as Jay, could not realize the extreme rapidity of western growth. Kentucky and Tennessee grew much faster than any of the old frontier colonies had ever grown; and from sheer lack of experience, eastern statesmen could not realize that this rapidity of growth made the navigation of the Mississippi a matter of immediate and not of future interest to the West. . . . While many of the people on the eastern seaboard thus took an indefensible position in reference to the trans-Alleghany settlements, in the period immediately succeeding the Revolution, there were large bodies of the population of these same settlements, including very many of their popular leaders, whose own attitude towards the Union was, if anything, more blameworthy. They were clamorous about their rights, and were not unready to use veiled threats of disunion when they deemed these rights infringed; but they showed little appreciation of

their own duties to the Union. . . . They demanded that the United States wrest from the British the Lake Posts, and from the Spaniards the navigation of the Mississippi. Yet they seemed incapable of understanding that if they separated from the Union they would thereby forfeit all chance of achieving the very purposes they had in view, because they would then certainly be at the mercy of Britain, and probably, at least for some time, at the mercy of Spain also. They opposed giving the United States the necessary civil and military power, although it was only by the possession and exercise of such power that it would be possible to secure for the westerners what they wished. In all human probability, the whole country round the Great Lakes would still be British territory, and the mouth of the Mississippi still in the hands of some European power, had the folly of the separatists won the day and had the West been broken up into independent states. . . . This final triumph of the Union party in these first-formed frontier States was fraught with immeasurable good."—T. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, v. 3, ch. 3.—See also FLORIDA: 1783-1787; LOUISIANA: 1785-1800.

1785.—Tariff situation.—Protection in Pennsylvania. See TARIFF: 1780-1785.

1785-1787.—First troubles and dealings with the Barbary pirates. See BARBARY STATES: 1785-1801.

1785-1790.—Foundation of territorial government policy.—By the cession of "the territory north and west of the Ohio River, . . . [the United States] came into the possession of a public domain estimated to amount to one or two hundred million acres, and supposed to be worth about a dollar an acre. This was an asset sufficient to meet the debt incurred in the war and to leave a balance for the running expenses of the Government. When the Treaty of Peace, in 1783, determined that the country between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi was to belong to the United States and not to any foreign power, the pent-up population broke west of the mountains in a genuine flood. In 1770 it was said that there were only one hundred and seventy-six white men in the whole Kentucky district; but by 1785 the population was estimated at from 20,000 to 30,000, and according to the census of 1790 there were 73,000 in Kentucky and 35,000 in Tennessee. The United States property was northwest of the Ohio River, and there was certain to be a great demand for it as soon as it was opened up. Congress, therefore, faced two important Western problems demanding solution: one was to determine the policy for disposing of its public lands; and the other was to provide a government for settlers upon those lands. The answer to the first was found in the Land Ordinance of 1785. As adopted by Congress it provided for the rectangular survey of the public domain into townships six miles square, each of which was divided into thirty-six sections, and the townships were to be sold, alternately, as a whole and by sections, at prices not less than one dollar an acre. The financial aspect is predominant, for this meant sale in large lots of over 20,000 acres and in small lots of 640 acres; but the purpose of encouraging settlement was not lost sight of, and it was prophetic of a most striking phase of American development when this early law contained a provision that the sixteenth section in each township was to be reserved for the maintenance of public schools. The details are tedious, but the mechanical rectangular method of survey and the requirement that the land must

be surveyed before it could be sold made possible a simple system of recording titles, rendered transfers of property easy, and thereby did away with endless confusion. It proved to be a simple and permanently excellent system which has been widely copied. The problem of government was referred to a committee of which Thomas Jefferson was chairman, where he rendered a service similar to his formulation of the Declaration of Independence, by taking up ideas that were current in the air and expressing them in an acceptable form. The people of the United States were accustomed to self-government, and in the process of expansion they had seen new colonies and even new states come into being. Vermont, although not yet recognized as a member of the Union, had declared itself to be an independent state and had a government of its own. Kentucky was practically independent of Virginia. The formation of new states was therefore not a new conception and, in the first proposals with reference to ceding the Western country to Congress, it was suggested that the territory ceded should be divided up into states. Upon the basis of these ideas Jefferson framed his Ordinance of 1784. There were features that were not satisfactory and it was never actually put into operation, yet it alone made possible its more famous successor, . . . The Ordinance of 1787, which 'has been perhaps the most notable instance of legislation that was ever enacted by the representatives of the American people.' . . . Details are not essential; the ordinance provided for an increasing measure of self-government and ultimate admission into the Union on a footing of equality with the original states. Although differing in particulars, those were the fundamental principles of Jefferson's ordinance which were thus embodied in the Ordinance of 1787. The new states that were thus planned for the West were in reality colonies, but American experience attached an unfortunate stigma to that word, and so the 'territory' northwest of the Ohio River grew to be the generic name. As each new territory was formed, the Ordinance of 1787 was extended over it, and while in the course of . . . years some provisions have been modified and details have been changed, the principles of the territorial system have remained the same. The unique feature of the system is the incorporation of the colony into the parent state, and not only has it proved to be most successful, it also has made this one of the best colonial systems the world has known. The United States at the present time consists of forty-eight separate states. Aside from the original thirteen, only six states have come into the Union without having been territories, and four of these six had had an equivalent training. The remaining twenty-nine have all passed through the territorial stage. The experience in self-government thus acquired, an experience wisely ordered to be under a form of government modeled on that of the original states and already found to be good, has led the people of a territory, in every instance, when allowed to form their own state government, to follow the model which had been set for them. Similarity of training and experience explains the fact, so often the subject of comment, that all of the states in the Union at the present time are so much alike in their form of government. A consideration of even larger significance is that, if such a process of incorporation is continued long enough, the colonies will become greater than the mother country and the colonists will outnumber the parent stock. This has been the

case in the United States. The three or four million people reported by the Census of 1790 have become the hundred million of the present [1920], nearly seventy per cent of whom live beyond the Allegheny Mountains. The colonists of 1787 have grown into the American people of today."—M. Farrand, *Development of the United States, from colonies to a world power*, pp. 63-65.

ALSO IN: A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union, 1750-1789*, pp. 108-109.—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 252, 255-256.—F. J. Turner, *Frontier in American history*, p. 131.

1786-1787.—Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts. See MASSACHUSETTS: 1786-1787.

1787.—Ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory.—Exclusion of slavery forever. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1787.

1787.—Framing of Federal constitution.—Union constructed of compromises.—The convention of delegates appointed to revise the Articles of Confederation (see above: 1783-1787), but which took upon itself the task of framing anew a Federal constitution for the states, assembled at Philadelphia on May 25, 1787, eleven days later than the day appointed for its meeting. "The powers conferred by the several states were not uniform. Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey appointed their delegates 'for the purpose of revising the Federal Constitution.' North Carolina, New Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia 'to decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of the Federal Union'; New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut 'for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation'; South Carolina and Maryland 'to render the Federal Constitution entirely adequate to the actual situation.' Rhode Island held aloof. She was governed by a class of men who wanted to pay their debt in paper money, and she did not wish to surrender her power to collect duties upon the goods that came into her port. The trade of Newport at that day surpassed that of New York. Connecticut came in reluctantly, and New Hampshire late in July, 1787. . . . Washington was made president of the convention. . . . Many names great in the revolutionary struggle were absent from the roll of delegates. John and Samuel Adams, and John Hancock, were not there. Patrick Henry of Virginia refused to attend. Thomas Jefferson and John Jay were absent from the country. George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, however, were there. . . . Among the younger men was James Madison of Virginia. . . . Alexander Hamilton came from New York. . . . Charles C. Pinckney was a delegate from South Carolina. . . . James Wilson of Pennsylvania was a Scotchman. He surpassed all others in his exact knowledge of the civil and common law, and the law of nations. . . . Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman came from Connecticut. . . . Many of the 55 delegates shared Hamilton's contempt for a democracy, but the strength they would repose in a government they preferred to retain in the States. . . . The first business of the convention was the adoption of rules. Each state was to have one vote. Such was the rule in the Confederate Congress. Seven states made a quorum. The convention was to sit with closed doors and everything was to be kept secret: nothing was to be given to the public except the completed work. This injunction of secrecy was never removed. Fortunately James Madison kept a pretty full account of the debates and proceedings, all in his

own hand."—J. S. Landon, *Constitutional history and government of the United States*, lecture 3.—"Madison tells us in his report of these debates that previous to the opening of the Convention it had been a subject of discussion among the members present, as to how the States should vote in the Convention. Several of the members from Pennsylvania had urged that the large States unite in refusing to the small States an equal vote, but Virginia, believing this to be injudicious if not unjust, 'discountenanced and stifled the project.' On the 29th the real business of the Convention was opened by Edmund Randolph, who as Governor of Virginia was put forward as spokesman by his colleagues. He began by saying that as the Convention had originated from Virginia, and the delegation from this State supposed that some proposition was expected from them, the task had been imposed on him. After enumerating the defects of the Confederation, he detailed the remedy proposed. This latter was set forth in fifteen resolutions and was called afterwards the Virginia plan of government. Charles Pinckney from South Carolina had also a draft of a federal government, which was read and like the former referred to a committee of the whole House. . . . The Committee of the Whole . . . debated from day to day the resolutions contained in the Virginia plan, and on the 13th of June they reported nineteen resolutions based upon those of Virginia, forming a system of government in outline. On the following day Mr. Paterson, of New Jersey, asked for time to prepare another plan founded on the Articles of Confederation. This was submitted to the Convention on the 15th. The Virginia and the New Jersey plan were contrasted briefly by one of the members: Virginia plan proposes two branches in the legislature, Jersey, a single legislative body; Virginia, the legislative powers derived from the people, Jersey, from the States; Virginia, a single executive, Jersey, more than one; Virginia, a majority of the legislature can act, Jersey a small majority can control; Virginia, the legislature can legislate on all national concerns, Jersey, only on limited objects; Virginia, legislature to negative all State laws, Jersey, giving power to the executive to compel obedience by force; Virginia, to remove the executive by impeachment, Jersey, on application of a majority of the States; Virginia, for the establishment of inferior judiciary tribunals, Jersey, no provision. Neither of these plans commended themselves to men like Hamilton, who wanted a strong government, and were afraid of democracy or giving power to the people. He thought the Virginia plan 'but pork still with a little change of the sauce.' The Articles of Confederation amended, as in the New Jersey plan, set forth a government approved of by the opposite wing of the Convention, consisting of men like Lansing, who professed an ultra devotion to the rights and autonomy of the States. . . . The Convention did not go again into committee of the whole, but continued to debate the nineteen resolutions from the 19th of June until the 23d of July. Some of these were referred to grand committees, consisting of one member from each State, or they were referred to select committees consisting of five members."—K. M. Rowland, *Life of George Mason*, v. 2, ch. 4.—"In the first place [under the Virginia plan], provision was made for the separation of the three branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial. In the second place the legislature was to consist of two houses, of which the first branch was to be elected by the people

of the several states, the second branch was to be chosen by the first out of persons nominated by the state legislatures, and the voting in both branches was to be proportional either to the quotas of contribution or to the number of free inhabitants, or to both. This legislature was to have the legislative powers of the congress of the confederation, with additional powers to cover all cases where the separate states would be incompetent, together with the right to negative state laws infringing upon the 'Articles of Union' and to use force against any state failing to fulfill its duty. In the next place, the executive was to be chosen by the national legislature, and was to be ineligible for a second term. The executive and 'a convenient number of the national judiciary' were to constitute a council of revision with a veto upon legislative acts that might, however, be overruled by a subsequent vote of both houses. Then there was to be a national judiciary, of a supreme and inferior courts, chosen by the legislature 'to hold their offices during good behaviour,' with jurisdiction in maritime questions, in cases where foreigners were interested, or which respected 'the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.' Provision was also to be made for the admission of new states by less than a unanimous vote, for the guarantee to each state of a republican government and of its territory, for the amendment of the articles of union without the consent of the national legislature, and for the binding of state officers by oath to support the articles of union. Finally it was proposed that whatever amendments might be prepared embodying these changes should be submitted, after their approval by congress, to conventions specially chosen for the purpose by the people of each state."—M. Farrand, *Framing of the constitution*, pp. 69-71.—"The plan presented by Mr. Patterson, called the New Jersey plan, was concerted and arranged between the deputations of that State, of Delaware, of New York, and of Connecticut, with the individual co-operation of Mr. Luther Martin, one of the delegates of Maryland. The extreme jealousy . . . manifested by the representatives of the two first-named States with regard to the equal suffrage of the States in the common councils of the Confederacy, was the principal source of their aversion to the plan reported by the committee of the whole. The delegates of Connecticut, and Messrs. Lansing and Yates,—forming a majority of the delegation of New York,—united with the deputations of New Jersey and Delaware, not so much from an exclusive attachment to the principle of the sovereignty and equality of the States, as from the policy of preserving the existing framework of the confederation, and of simply vesting in Congress, as then organized, a few additional powers. It was under the influence of these mixed political views that the New Jersey plan was conceived and prepared. It proposed to vest in the existing Congress,—a single body in which all the States had an equal suffrage,—in addition to the powers already given to it by the articles of confederation, that of raising revenue by imposts and stamp and postage duties, and also that of passing acts for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and between the States; leaving the enforcement of all such acts, in the first instance, to the State courts, with an ultimate appeal to the tribunals of the United States. Whenever requisitions on the States for contributions should be made, and any State

should fail to comply with such requisitions within a specified time, Congress was to be authorized to direct their collection in the non-complying States, and to pass the requisite acts for that purpose. None of the foregoing powers, however, were to be exercised by Congress without the concurrence of a certain number of the States, exceeding a bare majority of the whole. The plan also proposed the organization of a Federal executive and a Federal judiciary. . . . It was, finally, provided that if any State, or any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution any act of Congress passed in virtue of the powers granted to that body, or any treaty made and ratified under the authority of the United States, the Federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to the acts, or an observance of the treaties, whose execution shall have been so opposed or prevented. Such were the salient features of the plan now brought forward as a substitute for the Virginia propositions, as reported by the committee of the whole. . . . In the progress of the discussion upon the two plans, Colonel Hamilton, of New York, made an elaborate speech, declaring himself to be opposed to both, and suggesting a third and more absolute plan, which he thought was alone adequate to the exigencies of the country. He frankly avowed his distrust of both republican and federal government, under any modification. He entered into a minute analysis of the various sources and elements of political power, in order to show that all these would be on the side of the State governments, so long as a separate political organization of the States was maintained, and would render them an over-match for any general government that could be established, unless a 'complete sovereignty' was vested in the latter. He thought it essential, therefore, to the ends of a good and efficient government of the whole country, that the State governments, with their vast and extensive apparatus, should be extinguished; though 'he did not mean,' he said, 'to shock public opinion by proposing such a measure.' He also expressed his despair of that practicability of establishing a republican government over so extensive a country as the United States. He was sensible, at the same time, that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. Yet 'he had no scruple,' he said, 'in declaring that, in his private opinion, the British government was the best in the world, and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America.' He descanted upon the securities against injustice, violence, and innovation, afforded, in the English system, by the permanent constitution of the House of Lords, and by the elevated and independent position of the monarch. He thence deduced the necessity of as permanent a tenure as public opinion in this country would bear, of the leading branches of the new government. 'Let one branch of the legislature,' he said, 'hold their places for life, or at least during good behavior. Let the executive also be for life.' In concluding, he expressed his conviction that 'a great progress was going on in the public mind; that the people will, in time, be unshackled from their prejudices; and, whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan brought forward by Mr. Randolph [the Virginia plan] would place them, but would be ready to go as far, at least, as he proposed.' He then read a plan of government he had prepared, which, he said, he

did not submit as a proposition to the convention, but as giving a correct sketch of his ideas, and to suggest the amendment which he should probably offer to the Virginia plan in the future stages of its consideration. . . . The convention now had presented for their consideration three distinct schemes of government: one purely Federal, founded upon the idea of preserving undiminished the sovereignty and equality of the States, and of constituting a special political agency in Congress for certain purposes, but still under the dependence and control of the States; another of a consolidated character, bottomed on the principle of a virtual annihilation of the State sovereignties and the creation of a central government, with a supreme and indefinite control over both individuals and communities; the third a mixed and balanced system, resting upon an agreed partition of the powers of sovereignty between the States and the Union,—one portion to be vested in the Union for certain objects of common and national concern, the residue retained by the States for the regulation of the general mass of their interior and domestic interests. . . . On the 19th of June . . . Mr. King, of Massachusetts, moved that 'the committee do now rise, and report that they do not agree to the propositions offered by the Honorable Mr. Patterson; and that they report to the House the resolutions offered by the Honorable Mr. Randolph, heretofore reported from a committee of the whole.' The motion was carried by the votes of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, in the affirmative,—New York, New Jersey, and Delaware voting in the negative; and Maryland, divided."—W. C. Rives, *Life and times of James Madison*, ch. 29.—"The committee of the whole made its second report on June 19, again recommending the amended Virginia plan, and the convention proceeded at once to a more detailed consideration of the separate resolutions. The large-state men, having accomplished their main purpose, were now willing to make some concessions for the sake of harmony. For example, the objectionable word 'national' was stricken out of the first resolution by the unanimous vote, and it was 'as of course' dropped out of each of the subsequent resolutions in turn. As some of the delegates were in favor of electing the members of the lower house annually, a compromise was reached between that and the term of three years previously established, and the final vote for two years was unanimous. Although the same unanimity was not obtainable, other modifications were made that rendered the plan less objectionable; the term of the members of the upper house was fixed at 'six years, one third to go out biennially'; payment of the members of the legislature 'out of the treasury of the United States' was not insisted upon; and members of both houses were rendered eligible to state offices, though they were still declared ineligible to offices of the United States. All of these matters, however, were of minor importance, and on the more essential questions the majority were unyielding. On the other hand, the small-state men had developed a more united and more determined opposition. This fact manifested itself unmistakably. In committee of the whole the vote in favor of two branches for the legislature had been unanimous, now the question found three states in opposition with a fourth divided. Previously Charles Pinckney had only been able to get three states to support his motion for the election of the members of the lower house by the state legislatures, now

there were four states in favor of it with the vote of a fifth divided. Still the discussions were conducted with reasonable equanimity though it was felt by all that the trial was yet to come. When the question of proportional representation had been under consideration in committee of the whole, Franklin observed that 'till this point . . . came before us, our debates were carried on with great coolness and temper.' And so it was now. For a few days everything went comparatively smoothly. But it was only the lull before the storm. . . . So on June 27, when Rutledge made the motion, the convention voted unanimously to proceed at once to the resolution involving 'the most fundamental points, the rules of suffrage in the two branches.'—M. Farrand, *Framing of the constitution*, pp. 91-93.—"It appeared," wrote Madison, in a letter to Jefferson, October 24 "to be the sincere and unanimous wish of the Convention to cherish and preserve the Union of the States. No proposition was made, no suggestion was thrown out, in favor of a partition of the Empire into two or more Confederacies. It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could not be secured by any system founded on the principle of a confederation of Sovereign States. A voluntary observance of the federal law by all the members could never be hoped for. A compulsive one could evidently never be reduced to practice, and if it could, involved equal calamities to the innocent and the guilty, the necessity of a military force, both obnoxious and dangerous, and, in general, a scene resembling much more a civil war than the administration of a regular Government. Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which, instead of operating on the States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals composing them; and hence the change in the principle and proportion of representation. This ground-work being laid, the great objects which presented themselves were: 1. To unite a proper energy in the Executive, and a proper stability in the Legislative departments, with the essential characters of Republican Government. 2. To draw a line of demarcation which would give to the General Government every power requisite for general purposes, and leave to the States every power which might be most beneficially administered by them. 3. To provide for the different interests of different parts of the Union. 4. To adjust the clashing pretensions of the large and small States. Each of these objects was pregnant with difficulties. The whole of them together formed a task more difficult than can well be conceived by those who were not concerned in the execution of it. Adding to these considerations the natural diversity of human opinions on all new and complicated subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of concord which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle. The first of these objects, as respects the Executive, was peculiarly embarrassing. On the question whether it should consist of a single person or a plurality of co-ordinate members, on the mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree of power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated discussions took place. The plurality of co-ordinate members had finally but few advocates. Governor Randolph was at the head of them. The modes of appointment proposed were various: as by the people at large, by electors chosen by the people, by the Executives of the States, by the Congress; some preferring a joint ballot of the two Houses; some, a separate concurrent ballot, allowing to each a negative on the

other house; some, a nomination of several candidates by one House, out of whom a choice should be made by the other. Several other modifications were started. The expedient at length adopted seemed to give pretty general satisfaction to the members. As to the duration in office, a few would have preferred a tenure during good behaviour; a considerable number would have done so in case an easy and effectual removal by impeachment could be settled. It was much agitated whether a long term, seven years for example, with a subsequent and perpetual ineligibility, or a short term, with a capacity to be re-elected, should be fixed. In favor of the first opinion were urged the danger of a gradual degeneracy of re-elections from time to time, into first a life and then a hereditary tenure, and the favorable effect of an incapacity to be reappointed on the independent exercise of the Executive authority. On the other side it was contended that the prospect of necessary degradation would discourage the most dignified characters from aspiring to the office; would take away the principal motive to the faithful discharge of its duties—the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment; would stimulate ambition to violent efforts for holding over the constitutional term; and instead of producing an independent administration and a firmer defence of the constitutional rights of the department, would render the officer more indifferent to the importance of a place which he would soon be obliged to quit forever, and more ready to yield to the encroachments of the Legislature, of which he might again be a member. The questions concerning the degree of power turned chiefly on the appointment to officers, and the controul on the Legislature. An absolute appointment to all offices, to some offices, to no offices, formed the scale of opinions on the first point. On the second, some contended for an absolute negative, as the only possible mean of reducing to practice the theory of a free Government, which forbids a mixture of the Legislative and Executive powers. Others would be content with a revisionary power, to be overruled by three-fourths of both Houses. It was warmly urged that the judiciary department should be associated in the revision. The idea of some was, that a separate revision should be given to the two departments; that if either objected, two-thirds, if both, three-fourths, should be necessary to overrule. In forming the Senate, the great anchor of the government, the questions, as they come within the first object, turned mostly on the mode of appointment, and the duration of it. The different modes proposed were: 1. By the House of Representatives. 2. By the Executive. 3. By electors chosen by the people for the purpose. 4. By the State Legislatures. On the point of duration, the propositions descended from good behaviour to four years, through the intermediate terms of nine, seven, six, and five years. The election of the other branch was first determined to be triennial, and afterwards reduced to biennial. The second object, the due partition of power between the General and local Governments, was perhaps, of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended for an entire abolition of the States; some, for indefinite power of Legislation in the Congress, with a negative on the laws of the States; some, for such a power without a negative; some, for a limited power of legislation, with such a negative; the majority, finally, for a limited power without the negative. The question with regard to the negative underwent repeated discussions, and was finally rejected by a bare



majority. . . . I return to the third object above mentioned, the adjustments of the different interests of different parts of the continent. Some contended for an unlimited power over trade, including exports as well as imports, and over slaves as well as other imports; some, for such a power, provided the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses were required; some, for such a qualification of the power, with an exemption of exports and slaves; others, for an exemption of exports only. The result is seen in the Constitution. South Carolina and Georgia were inflexible on the point of the slaves. The remaining object created more embarrassment, and a greater alarm for the issue of the Convention, than all the rest put together. The little States insisted on retaining their equality in both branches, unless a complete abolition of the State Governments should take place; and made an equality in the Senate a *sine qua non*. The large States, on the other hand, urged that as the new Government was to be drawn principally from the people immediately, and was to operate directly on them, not on the States; and, consequently, as the States would lose that importance which is now proportioned to the importance of their voluntary compliance with the requisitions of Congress, it was necessary that the representation in both Houses should be in proportion to their size. It ended in the compromise which you will see, but very much to the dissatisfaction of several members from the large States."—James Madison, *Letters and other writings*, v. 1, pp. 344-354.—"Those who proposed only to amend the old Articles of Confederation and opposed a new Constitution, objected that a government formed under such a Constitution would be not a federal, but a national, government. Luther Martin said, when he returned to Maryland, that the delegates 'appeared totally to have forgot the business for which we were sent. . . . We had not been sent to form a government over the inhabitants of America considered as individuals. . . . That the system of government we were intrusted to prepare was a government over these thirteen States; but that in our proceedings we adopted principles which would be right and proper only on the supposition that there were no state governments at all, but that all the inhabitants of this extensive continent were in their individual capacity, without government, and in a state of nature.' He added that, 'in the whole system there was but one federal feature, the appointment of the senators by the States in their sovereign capacity, that is by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it was said that this feature was only federal in appearance.' The Senate, the second house as it was called in the convention, was in part created, it is needless to say, to meet, or rather in obedience to, reasoning like this. . . . The Luther Martin protestants were too radical to remain in the convention to the end, when they saw that such a confederacy as they wanted was impossible. But there were not many who went the length they did in believing that a strong central government was necessarily the destruction of the state governments. Still fewer were those who would have brought this about if they could. . . . The real difficulty, as Madison said in the debate on that question, and as he repeated again and again after that question was settled, was not between the larger and smaller States, but between the North and South; between those States that held slaves and those that had none. Slavery in the Constitution, which has given so much trouble to the Abolitionists of this century, and,

indeed, to everybody else, gave quite as much in the last century to those who put it there. Many of the wisest and best men of the time, Southerners as well as Northerners, and among them Madison, were opposed to slavery. . . . Everywhere north of South Carolina, slavery was looked upon as a misfortune which it was exceedingly desirable to be free from at the earliest possible moment; everywhere north of Mason and Dixon's Line, measures had already been taken, or were certain soon to be taken, to put an end to it; and by the Ordinance for the government of all the territory north of the Ohio River, it was absolutely prohibited by Congress, in the same year in which the Constitutional Congress met. But it was, nevertheless, a thing to the continued existence of which the anti-slavery people of that time could consent without any violation of conscience. Bad as it was, unwise, wasteful, cruel, a mockery of every pretense of respect for the rights of man, they did not believe it to be absolutely wicked. . . . The question with the North was, how far could it yield; with the South, how far could it encroach. It turned mainly on representation. . . . There were some who maintained at first that the slave population should not be represented at all. Hamilton proposed in the first days of the convention 'that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants.'"—S. H. Gay, *James Madison*, ch. 7-8.—"When the great document was at last drafted by Gouverneur Morris, and was all ready for the signatures [September 17, 1787], the aged Franklin produced a paper, which was read for him, as his voice was weak. Some parts of this Constitution, he said, he did not approve, but he was astonished to find it so nearly perfect. Whatever opinion he had of its errors he would sacrifice to the public good, and he hoped that every member of the convention who still had objections would on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and for the sake of unanimity put his name to this instrument. Hamilton added his plea. A few members, he said, by refusing to sign, might do infinite mischief. . . . From these appeals, as well as from Washington's solemn warning at the outset, we see how distinctly it was realized that the country was on the verge of civil war. Most of the members felt so, but to some the new government seemed far too strong, and there were three who dreaded despotism even more than anarchy. Mason, Randolph, and Gerry refused to sign. . . . In the signatures the twelve states which had taken part in the work were all represented, Hamilton signing alone for New York."—J. Fiske, *Critical period of American history*, p. 303.—A "popular delusion with regard to the Constitution is that it was created out of nothing; or, as Mr. Gladstone puts it, that 'It is the greatest work ever struck off at any one time by the mind and purpose of man.' The radical view on the other side is expressed by Sir Henry Maine, who informs us that the 'Constitution of the United States is a modified version of the British Constitution' . . . which was in existence between 1760 and 1787. The real source of the Constitution is the experience of Americans. They had established and developed admirable little commonwealths in the colonies; since the beginning of the Revolution they had had experience of State governments organized on a different basis from the colonial; and, finally, they had carried on two successive national governments, with which they had been profoundly discontented. The general outline of the new Constitution seems to be

English; it was really colonial. The President's powers of military command, of appointment, and of veto were similar to those of the colonial governor. National courts were created on the model of colonial courts. A legislature of two houses was accepted because such legislatures had been common in colonial times. In the English Parliamentary system as it existed before 1760 the Americans had had no share; the later English system of Parliamentary responsibility was not yet developed, and had never been established in colonial governments; and they expressly excluded it from their new Constitution. They were little more affected by the experience of other European nations. . . . The chief source of the details of the Constitution was the State constitutions and laws then in force. Thus the clause conferring a suspensive veto on the President is an almost literal transcript from the Massachusetts constitution. In fact, the principal experiment in the Constitution was the establishment of an electoral college; and of all parts of the system this has worked least as the framers expected. The Constitution represents, therefore, the accumulated experience of the time. . . . The real boldness of the Constitution is the novelty of the federal system which it set up."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union, 1750-1829, sect. 62*.—"That a constitution should be framed in detail by a body of uninstructed delegates, expressly chosen for that purpose, was familiar in the States of the Union; but was perhaps unexampled elsewhere in the world, and was certainly unexampled in the history of federations. That the instrument of federal government should provide for proportional representation in one house, and for a federal court, was a step in federal organization which marks a new federal principle. For many purposes the Union then created was stronger than the Prussian monarchy at that moment. In many respects the States were left stronger than the little nominally independent German principalities. The great merit of the members of the convention is their understanding of the temper of their own countrymen. They selected out of English, or colonial, or State usages such practices and forms as experience had shown to be acceptable to the people. . . . The Convention had further the wisdom to express their work in general though carefully stated principles. All previous federal governments had been fettered either by an imperfect and inadequate statement, as in the constitution of the United Netherlands, or by an unwritten constitution with an accumulation of special precedents, as in the Holy Roman Empire. The phrases of the Constitution of 1787 were broad enough to cover cases unforeseen. A third distinction of the federal Convention is the skill with which it framed acceptable compromises upon the three most difficult questions before it. The two Houses of Congress satisfied both large and small States; the three-fifths representation of slaves postponed an inevitable conflict; the allowance of the slave trade for a term of years made it possible for Congress to perfect commercial legislation. The Convention had profited by the experience of the Confederation: on every page of the Constitution may be found clauses which would not have stood there had it been framed in 1781. An adequate revenue was provided; foreign and interstate commerce was put under the control of Congress; the charge of foreign affairs was given entirely to the central authority; the powers of government were distributed among three departments."—A. B. Hart, *Introduction to the study of Federal government, ch. 4*.

—"That in one sense the Constitution was made in four months' time is true; in four months a series of articles and sections were pieced together. In another sense it is not true; time made the American Constitution as it has made others of any moment. An artificial constitution, not the product of a people's life, can never have vitality, strength, or usefulness. The delegates at Philadelphia did not sit brooding over the chaos of the Confederation to bring forth by their fiat a new government. The idea that they created institutions out of nothingness loses sight of the manner and the conditions of their work. Neither is it true that they copied European institutions, borrowing scraps here and there to patch up a system suited to their tastes. . . . They were practical political workers [who] had for years studied the problems of forming governments, and had been acquainted with the great process of making state constitutions. The men of the generation that declared independence and formed new states were steeped in political theory as their great-grandfathers had been in theology, and for years they were engaged in the difficult process of adapting old institutions to new ideas, framing governments and laws that suited the economic, social, and moral conditions which the New World had produced. We might, therefore, expect to find from these experienced craftsmen, not a document hurriedly patched together, nor one taken in part from distant ages or strange climes, but an American document, in its entirety new, but made up of parts that had found their places in the state organizations. If we look, then, for the origin of the Constitution, we find much of it in the failures of the Confederation, in the tribulations of eleven confused years when the nation was without a proper government and when distress and disorder and incompetence were showing the way to success; and much of it, too, in the state constitutions which had been drawn up by men familiar with colonial governments and administration. . . . It may be said that colonial history made the Constitution. Even in the division of authority between the states and the national government we see a readjustment of the old practical relationship between colonies and mother-country, a readjustment which was based in part on the imperfections of the old system but carried out the teachings of the Revolution. Even the essentially American notion, the notion that government is the agent of the people, and must not transcend the law set by the people, was an outgrowth of the free society of a new world, had found its expression in the theory of the Revolution, and had arisen in a country in which from time immemorial there had been no government possessed of all political power."—A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and the constitution, 1783-1789, pp. 273-276*.—"The movement for the Constitution of the United States was originated and carried through principally by four groups of personal interests which had been adversely affected under the Articles of Confederation: money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping. The first firm steps toward the formation of the Constitution were taken by a small and active group of men immediately interested through their personal possessions in the outcome of their labors. No popular vote was taken directly or indirectly on the proposition to call the Convention which drafted the Constitution."—C. A. Beard, *Economic interpretation of the constitution of the United States, p. 324*.—"The convention was over; it had completed its work. In the achievement of its

task James Madison had been unquestionably the leading spirit. It might be said that he was the master-builder of the constitution. This is not an over-valuation of his services derived from his own account of the proceedings in convention, for Madison laid no undue emphasis upon the part he himself played; in fact, he understated it. Nor is it intended to belittle the invaluable services of many other delegates. But when one studies the contemporary conditions, and tries to discover how well the men of that time grasped the situation; and when one goes farther and, in the light of our subsequent knowledge, seeks to learn how wise were the remedies they proposed,—Madison stands pre-eminent. He seems to have lacked imagination, but this very lack made his work of peculiar value at the moment. His remedies for the unsatisfactory state of affairs under the confederation, were not founded on theoretical speculations, they were practical. They were in accord with the historical development of our country and in keeping with the genius of our institutions. The evidence is also strong that Madison not only took an important part in the debates but that he was actually looked up to by both friends and opponents as the leader of those in the convention who were in favor of a strong national government. In these respects, he was in marked contrast to Alexander Hamilton, who was a stronger man intellectually, and suggested a more logical and consistent plan of government than the one which was followed. But Hamilton was out of touch with the situation. He was aristocratic rather than democratic, and while his ideas may have been excellent, they were too radical for the convention and found but little support. At the same time, being in favor of a strong national government, he tried to aid that movement in every way that he could. But within his delegation he was outvoted by Yates and Lansing, and before the sessions were half over he was deprived of a vote altogether by the withdrawal of his colleagues. Finding himself of little service he went to New York and only returned to Philadelphia once or twice for a few days and to sign the completed document in September. Second to Madison and almost on a par with him was James Wilson. In some respects he was Madison's intellectual superior, but in the immediate work before them he was not as adaptable and not as practical. Still he was Madison's ablest supporter. He appreciated the importance of laying the foundations of the new government broad and deep, and he believed that this could only be done by basing it upon the people themselves. This was the principal thing for which he contended in the convention, and with a great measure of success. His work on the committee of detail was less conspicuous but was also of the greatest service. Next to these two men should come Washington. Not that he ever spoke in the convention, beyond the one recorded instance at the close of the sessions, but . . . personal influence must have been an important factor in the outcome of the convention's work, and Washington's support or opposition would be of the greatest importance. He voted with the Virginia delegation, his views were known, and it is therefore a matter of no little moment that Washington's support was given to Madison. Madison's ideas were the predominating factor in the framing of the constitution and it seems hardly too much to say that Washington's influence, however it may have been exerted, was important and perhaps decisive in determining the acceptance of those ideas by the convention.

Gouverneur Morris was a conspicuous member, brilliant but erratic. While he supported the efforts for a strong national government, his support was not always a great help. His best work in the convention was as the member of the committee on style and arrangement to whom was entrusted the final drafting of the constitution. Charles Pinckney also took a conspicuous part in the convention, but his work is not to be classed with that of other and larger minds. It is undoubtedly true that he suggested a great many things that were embodied in the constitution, but they were minor points and details rather than large, constructive features."—M. Farrand, *Framing of the constitution of the United States*, pp. 196-199.—See also U.S.A., CONSTITUTION OF; PRESIDENT: United States: Need of a single, strong executive.

ALSO IN: I. Eliot, *Debates in the convention at Philadelphia, 1787*.—James Madison, *Debates on the adoption of the Federal constitution*.—W. C. Rives, *Life and times of James Madison*, v. 2, ch. 27-33.—G. Bancroft, *History of the formation of the constitution of the United States*.—G. T. Curtis, *History of the constitution of the United States*.—C. E. Stevens, *Sources of the constitution of the United States*.—J. H. Robinson, *Original and derived features of the constitution (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 1)*.

1787-1789.—Struggle for Federal constitution in the states.—Its ratification.—End of confederation.—“The propertyless masses under the prevailing suffrage qualifications were excluded at the outset from participation (through representatives) in the work of framing the Constitution. The members of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the Constitution were, with a few exceptions, immediately, directly, and personally interested in, and derived economic advantages from, the establishment of the new system. The Constitution was essentially an economic document based upon the concept that the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities. The major portion of the members of the Convention are on record as recognizing the claim of property to a special and defensive position in the Constitution. In the ratification of the Constitution, about three-fourths of the adult males failed to vote on the question, having abstained from the elections at which delegates to the state conventions were chosen, either on account of their indifference or their disfranchisement by property qualifications. The Constitution was ratified by a vote of probably not more than one-sixth of the adult males. It is questionable whether a majority of the voters participating in the elections for the state conventions in New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, and South Carolina, actually approved the ratification of the Constitution. The leaders who supported the Constitution in the ratifying conventions represented the same economic groups as the members of the Philadelphia Convention; and in a large number of instances they were also directly and personally interested in the outcome of their efforts. In the ratification, it became manifest that the line of cleavage for and against the Constitution was between substantial personalty interests on the one hand and the small farming and debtor interests on the other. The Constitution was not created by ‘the whole people’ as the jurists have said; neither was it created by ‘the states’ as Southern nullifiers long contended; but it was the

work of a consolidated group whose interests knew no state boundaries and were truly national in their scope."—C. A. Beard, *Economic interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, pp. 324-325.—"The fate of the proposed Constitution remained doubtful for many months after the adjournment of the convention. Hamilton said it would be arrogance to conjecture the result. . . . Delaware was the first state to accept it [Dec. 7, 1787]. Gratiified by the concession of equality in the federal Senate, the ratification was prompt, enthusiastic, and unanimous. Pennsylvania was the second [December 12]. The opposition was sharp, but Franklin was president of the state, and Wilson a delegate to the state convention. Their influence was great. . . . The ratification was effected by a vote of 46 to 23. Then New Jersey [December 18] and Georgia [Jan. 2, 1788] followed unanimously. Next came Connecticut [January 9] by a vote of 128 to 40. The result in these five states was the more easily obtained because the friends of the Constitution were prompt to act. With delay in the other states came a bitterness of contention which made the result doubtful. The first close struggle was in Massachusetts. The public creditor favored the proposed Constitution. He saw in it some hope of his long deferred pay. But the debtor class opposed it; for it would put an end to cheap paper money, with which they hoped to pay their debts, when it became still cheaper. . . . Hancock and Adams scarcely favored the Constitution. They feared it infringed upon the rights of the people, and especially upon the rights of the states. . . . Hancock finally came forward as a mediator. He proposed that the Constitution be ratified, with an accompanying recommendation that it be amended in the particulars in which it was thought to be defective. His proposition was adopted, and the Constitution was ratified [February 6] by a vote of 187 [186] to 168. Maryland next ratified the Constitution with much unanimity [April 28], notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of Luther Martin. . . . South Carolina followed next [May 23], and ratified the Constitution by a majority of 76, but recommended amendments substantially like those of Massachusetts. South Carolina was the eighth state [see SOUTH CAROLINA: 1788-1808]; and, if one more could be obtained, the Constitution would take effect between the nine ratifying states. There remained the five states of Virginia, New York, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. The state convention of Virginia was called for the 2d of June 1788, of New York for the 17th, and of New Hampshire for the 18th of the same month. The result was expected to be adverse in every one of these states. In Virginia the opposition was led by Patrick Henry. . . . Henry was ably seconded by Richard Henry Lee, William Grayson, and George Mason. . . . James Monroe followed their lead. James Madison and Governor Randolph were the leading champions of the new Constitution. . . . John Marshall, afterwards chief justice, came to their assistance. . . . The debate lasted a month. It may be read with instruction, as it is reported in the volumes of Elliot. The ratification prevailed [June 25] by a majority of 10 [11] in a vote of 186 [167]. [See also VIRGINIA: 1788; BILL OF RIGHTS, In United States.] . . . The influence of Washington procured the result. . . . Meanwhile, the state of New Hampshire had ratified the Constitution [June 21], but the fact was not known in Virginia. The opposition to the Constitution was great and bitter in

the State of New York. Fortunately the convention was held so late that New Hampshire, the ninth state, had ratified while the New York convention was engaged in its heated discussions. Two thirds of the delegates were elected to oppose it. . . . The friends of the Constitution felt, long before the convention assembled, that public discussion might be useful in overcoming the hostile attitude of the state. Accordingly, a series of essays in exposition of the Constitution was written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, over the common signature of 'Publius.' These essays were published in a newspaper, between October, 1787, and June, 1788. . . . They were subsequently collected and published in a volume styled 'The Federalist.' From that day to this, 'The Federalist' has held unequalled rank as an authority upon the construction of the Constitution." On the 24th of June a fleet courier, employed by Hamilton, brought from Concord to Poughkeepsie, where the New York convention sat, news of the ratification of the Constitution by New Hampshire, the ninth state. "Now, indeed, the situation was changed. There was no longer a confederacy; the Union was already formed. . . . The state must either join the new system or stay out of it. New York was not favorably situated for a separate nation. New England on the east, and New Jersey and Pennsylvania on the south, belonged to the new Union. Canada was on the north. . . . Delay, with its altered circumstances, finally brought to Hamilton and his party the victory that had been denied to argument and eloquence. But the Anti-Federalists were reluctant to yield, and the debate was prolonged," until July 26, when the ratification was carried by 30 votes against 27. "North Carolina remained out of the Union until November, 1789, and Rhode Island until June, 1790. . . . The ratification by nine states having been certified to the Congress of the Confederacy, that body adopted a resolution fixing the first Wednesday of March, 1789, as the day when the new government should go into operation. As the day fell on the 4th of March, that day became fixed for the beginning and the end of congressional and presidential terms."—J. S. Landon, *Constitutional history and government of the United States*, lecture 4.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, *Critical period of American history*, pp. 306-345.—G. T. Curtis, *History of the constitution of the United States*, v. 2, bk. 5.—G. Bancroft, *History of the formation of the constitution*, v. 2, bk. 4.—J. Elliot, ed., *Debates in the state conventions on the adoption of the Federal constitution*.—*The Federalist*.—Alexander Hamilton, *Works*, v. 2.—W. C. Rives, *Life and times of Madison*, v. 2, ch. 34-36.—K. M. Rowland, *Life of George Mason*, v. 2, ch. 6-8.—A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and the constitution*, ch. 12-18.—C. A. Beard, *Economic interpretation of the constitution of the United States*.—*Idem*, *Readings in American government and politics*, no. 14-21.—B. Moses, *Government of the United States*, pp. 50-53.—J. Bryce, *American commonwealth*, pp. 21-24.—J. W. Burgess, *Political science and comparative constitutional law*, v. 1, pp. 98-108.—S. B. Harding, *Contest over ratification in Massachusetts* (*Harvard Historical Studies*, 1896).—W. Wilson, *History of the American people*, v. 3, pp. 94-98.

1787-1800.—Manhood suffrage qualifications. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1787-1800.

1789.—First presidential election.—Washington called to head new government.—"The adoption of the Federal constitution was another epoch

in the life of Washington. Before the official forms of an election could be carried into operation a unanimous sentiment throughout the Union pronounced him the nation's choice to fill the presidential chair. He looked forward to the possibility of his election with characteristic modesty and unfeigned reluctance; as his letters to his confidential friends bear witness. . . . The election took place at the appointed time [the first Wednesday in January, 1789], and it was soon ascertained that Washington was chosen President for the term of four years from the 4th of March. By this time the arguments and entreaties of his friends, and his own convictions of public expediency, had determined him to accept. . . . From a delay in forming a quorum of Congress the votes of the electoral college were not counted until early in April, when they were found to be unanimous in favor of Washington. 'The delay,' said he in a letter to General Knox, 'may be compared to a reprieve; for in confidence I tell you (with the world it would obtain little credit), that my movements to the chair of government will be accompanied by feelings not unlike those of a culprit, who is going to the place of his execution; so unwilling am I, in the evening of a life nearly consumed in public cares, to quit a peaceful abode for an ocean of difficulties, without that competency of political skill, abilities and inclination, which are necessary to manage the helm.' . . . At length on the 14th of April he received a letter from the president of Congress, duly notifying him of his election; and he prepared to set out immediately for New York, the seat of government."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 4, ch. 37.—The secondary electoral votes, by which the vice president was, at that time, chosen, were scattered among eleven candidates. John Adams received the greater number (34) though not quite a majority of the 69, and was elected.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, *Critical period*, pp. 345-350.—J. S. Bassett, *Federalist system, 1789-1801*, pp. 5-8.—P. L. Ford, *True George Washington*.

1789.—Department of State established. See STATE, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES: 1789.

1789.—Beginning of merchant marine. See COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1789-1920.


1789.—Passage of the act organizing the Supreme Court. See SUPREME COURT: 1789-1835.

1789.—Founding of the Roman episcopate. See PAPACY: 1789-1810.

1789-1792.—Hamilton's report on manufactures. See TARIFF: 1789-1792.

1789-1792.—Organization of Federal government and first administration of Washington.—Dividing of parties.—Federalists and Democratic Republicans.—"March 4th, 1789, had been appointed for the formal inauguration of the new Government, but the members elect had not yet unlearned the Confederacy's slovenly habits. It was not until April 6th that a sufficient number of members of Congress arrived in New York to form a quorum and count the electoral votes. At that time, and until 1805, no electoral votes were cast distinctively for President and Vice-President. Each elector voted by ballot for two persons. If a majority of all the votes were cast for any person, he who received the greatest number of votes became President, and he who received the next greatest number became Vice-President. When the votes were counted in 1789 they were found to be, for George Washington, of Virginia, 69 (each of the electors having given him one vote), for John Adams, of Massachusetts 34 and 35 for various other

candidates. Washington received notice of his election, and, after a triumphal progress northward from his home at Mount Vernon, was sworn into office April 30th [at Federal Hall, corner Wall and Nassau Streets, New York]. The Vice-President had taken his place as presiding officer of the Senate a few days before. Frederick A. Muhlenberg, of Pennsylvania, was chosen Speaker of the House, but the vote had no party divisions, for Parties were still in a state of utter confusion. Between the extreme Anti-federalists, who considered the Constitution a long step toward a despotism, and the extreme Federalists, who desired a monarchy modeled on that of England, there were all varieties of political opinion. . . . The extreme importance of Washington lay in his ability, through the universal confidence in his integrity and good judgment, to hold together this alliance of moderate men for a time, and to prevent party contests upon the interpretation of federal powers



ALEXANDER HAMILTON

(From painting by John Trumbull,  
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York)

until the Constitution should show its merit and be assured of existence. The President selected his Cabinet with a careful regard to the opposite opinions of his supporters. The Treasury Department was given to Alexander Hamilton, of New York, a Federalist. . . . The War Department was given to General Henry Knox, of Massachusetts, also a Federalist. The State Department was given to Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, an Anti-federalist. . . . Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, also an Anti-federalist, was appointed Attorney-General, and John Jay, of New York a Federalist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Twelve Amendments were adopted by this Session of Congress, in order to meet the conscientious objections of many moderate Anti-federalists, and to take the place of a 'Bill of Rights.' Ten of these, having received the assent of the necessary number of States, became a part of the Constitution, and now stand the first ten of the Amendments. They were intended to guarantee freedom of religion, speech, person, and property. . . . January 9th [1790] Hamilton offered his famous Report on the Settlement of the Public Debt. It consisted of three recommendations, first,

that the foreign debt of the Confederacy should be assumed and paid in full; second, that the domestic debt of the Confederacy, which had fallen far below par [from twenty to twenty-five cents on the dollar] and had become a synonym for worthlessness, should also be paid at its par value; and third, that the debts incurred by the States during the Revolution, and still unpaid, should be assumed and paid in full by the Federal Government. Hamilton's First recommendation was adopted unanimously. The Second was opposed, even by Madison and many moderate Anti-federalists, on the ground that the domestic debt was held by speculators, who had bought it at a heavy discount, and would thus gain usurious interest on their investment. Hamilton's supporters argued that, if only for that reason, they should be paid in full, that holders of United States securities might learn not to sell them at a discount, and that the national credit might thus be strengthened for all time to come. After long debate the second recommendation was also adopted. Hamilton's Third recommendation involved a question of the powers of the Federal Government. It therefore for the first time united all the Anti-federalists in opposition to it. They feared that the rope of sand of the Confederacy was being carried to the opposite extreme; that the 'money power' would, by this measure, be permanently attached to the Federal Government; and that the States would be made of no importance. But even this recommendation was adopted, though only by a vote of 31 to 26 in the House. A few days later, however, the Anti-federalists received a reinforcement of seven newly arrived North Carolina members. The third resolution was at once reconsidered, and voted down by a majority of two. Hamilton secured the final adoption of the third resolution by a bargain which excited the deep indignation of the Anti-federalists. A National Capital was to be selected. The Federalists agreed to vote that it should be fixed upon the Potomac River [see WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1791-1800], after remaining ten years in Philadelphia, and two Anti-federalist members from the Potomac agreed in return to vote for the third resolution, which was then finally adopted. Hamilton's entire report was thus successful. Its immediate effects were to appreciate the credit of the United States, and to enrich the holders of the Continental debt. Its further effect was to make Hamilton so much disliked by Anti-federalists that, despite his acknowledged talents, his party never ventured to nominate him for any elective office."—A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, ch. 2.—"December 13, 1790, Hamilton sent to Congress his second report on the public credit and his report on a national bank. In the former he recommended an increase of duties and an excise on the manufacture of spirituous liquors. Both were designed to raise money to pay the additional expenses on account of the new interest charges. The excise encountered serious objection from those who were suspicious of consolidating influences. Hamilton urged that it would increase the power of government to collect a tax directly from the individual. The truth of this argument made it unpopular with those who were jealous of the power of the government. Although in the western parts of Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina spirituous liquor was one of the chief products, and the excise was particularly unpopular, the measure passed into law on March 3, 1791. The prestige of its author was at its highest point, and his confident following had their way in

Congress. In the meantime they pressed for the bill to charter a national bank; but against this measure the whole Republican influence was thrown with great earnestness. There was no explicit warrant in the Constitution for such a bank, but Hamilton argued that the right to establish one was implied in specific clauses. His followers supported him closely and the bill became a law on February 25, 1791. Washington watched the debates with interest, and he was struck by the constitutional argument. Before he would sign the law he called on the members of the cabinet for their opinions on the disputed points. Jefferson and Randolph thought that it was unconstitutional, and Hamilton and Knox took the other side. The president was not clearly convinced but signed the charter on the principle that where there was equal division of opinion he would support the officer in whose department the business under discussion fell. . . . Three other features of Hamilton's financial system demand a consideration. (1) December 5, 1791, he sent to Congress his report on manufactures, in which he outlined the argument for protection. His broad reasoning rested on the necessity of a proper distribution of agricultural manufactures, and commerce in a great and prosperous society; but it was many years before this feature of his policy was accepted by Congress. (2) A sinking-fund was a part of his funding scheme. It was conceived according to the prevalent idea of English financiers; but experience was to prove its utility. Its history demonstrated the truth of the principle that 'nothing pays a debt except clear income.' (3) Hamilton recommended the establishment of a mint, and Congress adopted the suggestion. The only point which roused debate was a proposition of Hamilton's to place on the coins the head of the president in whose administration they were issued."—J. S. Bassett, *Federalist system, 1789-1801*, pp. 38-39, 41.—"Party Organization may be considered as fairly begun about the close [of the first Session of the Second Congress, in 1792]. . . . The various Anti-federalist factions, by union in resisting the Federalists, had learned to forget minor differences and had been welded into one party which only lacked a name. That of Anti-Federalist was no longer applicable, for its opposition to the Federal Union had entirely ceased. A name was supplied by Jefferson, the recognized leader of the party, after the French Revolution had fairly begun its course. That political convulsion had, for some time after 1789, the sympathy of both Federalists and Anti-federalists, for it seemed the direct outgrowth of the American Revolution. But as its leveling objects became more apparent, the Federalists grew cooler and the Anti-federalists warmer towards it. The latter took great pains, even by dress and manners, to show the keenness of their sympathy for the Republicans of France, and about this time adopted the name Democratic-Republican, which seemed sufficiently comprehensive for a full indication of their principles. This has always been the official party title. It is now abbreviated to Democratic, though the name Democrat was at first used by Federalists as one of contempt, and the party called itself Republican, a title which it could hardly claim with propriety, for its tendency has always been toward a democracy, as that of its opponents has been toward a strong republic. The name Republican, therefore, belongs most properly to its present possessors (1870). But it must be remembered that the party which will be called Republican until about 1828 was the party which

is now called Democratic."—A. Johnston, *History of American politics, ch. 2.*—Jefferson's bitterness of hostility to the Federalists was due to the belief that they aimed at the overthrow of the republic. His conviction as to these really treasonable purposes in the leaders of the party was often expressed, but never more distinctly than in a letter written in 1813 to Melish, an English traveler. At the same time, he set forth the principles and aims of his own party: "Among that section of our citizens called federalists," he wrote, "there are three shades of opinion. Distinguishing between the leaders and people who compose it, the leaders consider the English constitution as a model of perfection, some, with a correction of its vices, others, with all its corruptions and abuses. This last was Alexander Hamilton's opinion, which others, as well as myself, have often heard him declare, and that a correction of what are called its vices would render the English an impracticable government. This government they wished to have established here, and only accepted and held fast at first to the present constitution, as a stepping-stone to the final establishment of their favorite model. This party has therefore always clung to England as their prototype and great auxiliary in promoting and effecting this change. A weighty minority, however, of these leaders, considering the voluntary conversion of our government into a monarchy as too distant, if not desperate, wish to break off from our Union its eastern fragment, as being, in truth, the hot-bed of American monarchism with a view to a commencement of their favorite government, from whence the other States may gangrene by degrees, and the whole be thus brought finally to the desired point. For Massachusetts, the prime mover in this enterprise, is the last State in the Union to mean a final separation, as being of all the most dependent on the others. Not raising bread for the sustenance of her own inhabitants, not having a stick of timber for the construction of vessels, her principal occupation, nor an article to export in them, where would she be, excluded from the ports of the other States, and thrown into dependence on England, her direct, and natural, but now insidious rival? At the head of this minority is what is called the Essex Junto of Massachusetts. But the majority of these leaders do not aim at separation. In this they adhere to the known principle of General Hamilton, never, under any views, to break the Union. Anglomany, monarchy and separation, then, are the principles of the Essex federalists. Anglomany and monarchy, those of the Hamiltonians, and Anglomany alone, that of the portion among the people who call themselves federalists. These last are as good republicans as the brethren whom they oppose, and differ from them only in their devotion to England and hatred of France which they have imbibed from their leaders. The moment that these leaders should avowedly propose a separation of the Union, or the establishment of regal government, their popular adherents would quit them to a man, and join the republican standard; and the partisans of this change, even in Massachusetts, would thus find themselves an army of officers without a soldier. The party called republican is steadily for the support of the present constitution. They obtained at its commencement all the amendments to it they desired. These reconciled them to it perfectly, and if they have any ulterior view, it is only, perhaps, to popularize it further, by shortening the Senatorial term and devising a process for the responsibility of judges, more practicable


than that of impeachment. They esteem the people of England and France equally, and equally detest the governing powers of both. This I verily believe, after an intimacy of forty years with the public councils and characters, is a true statement of the grounds on which they are at present divided, and that it is not merely an ambition for power. An honest man can feel no pleasure in the exercise of power over his fellow citizens. And considering as the only offices of power those conferred by the people directly, that is to say, the executive and legislative functions of the General and State governments, the common refusal of these, and multiplied resignations, are proofs sufficient that power is not alluring to pure minds, and is not, with them, the primary principle of contest. This is my belief of it; it is that on which I have acted; and had it been a mere contest who should be permitted to administer the government according to its genuine republican principles there has never been a moment of my life in which I should have relinquished for it the enjoyments of my family, my farm, my friends and books. You expected to discover the difference of our party principles in General Washington's valedictory, and my inaugural address. Not at all. General Washington did not harbor one principle of federalism. He was neither an Angloman, a monarchist, nor a separatist. He sincerely wished the people to have as much self-government as they were competent to exercise themselves. The only point on which he and I ever differed in opinion, was, that I had more confidence than he had in the natural integrity and discretion of the people, and in the safety and extent to which they might trust themselves with a control over their government. He has asseverated to me a thousand times his determination that the existing government should have a fair trial, and that in support of it he would spend the last drop of his blood. He did this the more repeatedly, because he knew General Hamilton's political bias, and my apprehensions from it."—Thomas Jefferson, *Letter to Mr. Melish, Jan. 13, 1813* (H. A. Washington, ed., *Writings, v. 6*).—The view taken at the present day of the Federalism and the Federalists of the first three decades of the Union, among those who see more danger in the centrifugal than in the centripetal forces in government, are effectively stated in the following: "The popular notion in regard to Federalism is that to which the name naturally gives rise. By Federalists are commonly understood those men who advocated a union of the States and an efficient Federal government. This conception is true, but is at the same time so limited that it may fairly be called superficial. The name arose from its first object which the friends of the Constitution strove to achieve; but this object, the more perfect union, and even the Constitution itself, were but means to ends of vastly more importance. The ends which the Federalists sought formed the great principles on which the party was founded, and it can be justly said that no nobler or better ends were ever striven for by any political party or by any statesmen. The first and paramount object of the Federalists was to build up a nation and to create a national sentiment. For this they sought a more perfect union. Their next object was to give the nation they had called into existence not only a government, but a strong government. To do this they had not only to devise a model, to draw a constitution, to organize a legislature, executive, and judiciary, but they had to equip the government thus formed with all those adjuncts without which no government can

long exist under the conditions of modern civilization. The Federalists had to provide for the debt, devise a financial and foreign policy, organize an army, fortify the ports, found a navy, impose and collect taxes, and put in operation an extensive revenue system. We of the English race—whose creed is that governments and great political systems grow and develop slowly are the results of climate, soil, race, tradition, and the exigencies of time and place, who wholly disavow the theory that perfect governments spring in a night from the heated brains of Frenchmen or Spaniards—can best appreciate the task with which our ancestors grappled. . . . Upon a people lately convulsed by civil war, upon a people who had lost their old political habits and traditions without finding new ones in their stead, it was necessary to impose a government, and to create a national sentiment. This the Federalists did, and they need no other

himself at the head of the large though demoralized opposition to the administration he had sworn to support. Filled with the wild democratic theories which his susceptible nature had readily imbibed in France, Jefferson soon infused them into the minds of most of his followers. Instead of a vague dislike to any and all government, he substituted a sharp and factious opposition to each and every measure proposed by the friends of the Constitution.”—H. C. Lodge, *Life and letters of George Cabot*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: W. C. Rives, *Life and times of Madison*, v. 3, ch. 37-46.—J. Parton, *Life of Jefferson*, ch. 42-47.—Martin Van Buren, *Political parties in the United States* ch. 2-4.—J. D. Hammond, *History of political parties in New York*, v. 1, ch. 1-2.—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 5, ch. 1-16.  
1789-1795.—“Virginia dynasty” as chief executives. See VIRGINIA DYNASTY.

1790.—First census.—In accordance with the provisions contained in Article 1 of the constitution, the first decennial census was taken in 1790. “When the first census was taken, . . . the continuous settled area was bounded by a line which ran near the coast of Maine, and included New England except a portion of Vermont and New Hampshire, New York along the Hudson and up the Mohawk about Schenectady, eastern and southern Pennsylvania, Virginia well across the Shenandoah Valley, and the Carolinas and eastern Georgia. Beyond this region of continuous settlement were the small settled areas of Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Ohio, with the mountains intervening between them and the Atlantic area.”—F. J. Turner, *Frontier in American history*, pp. 5-6.—See also CENSUS: United States.—The result showed a total population of 3,929,827, classed and distributed as follows:



THOMAS JEFFERSON

eulogy. With no undue national pride, we can justly say that the adoption and support of the Constitution offer an example of the political genius of the Anglo-Saxon race to which history cannot furnish a parallel. The political party to whose exertions these great results were due was the Federal party. They were the party of order, of good government, and of conservatism. Against them was ranged a majority of their fellow-citizens. But this majority was wild, anarchical, disunited. The only common ground on which they could meet was that of simple opposition. The only name they had was anti-Federalists. They had neither leaders, discipline, objects, nor even a party cry. Before the definite aims and concentrated ability of the Federalists, they fled in helpless disorder, like an unarmed mob before advancing soldiers. But, though dispersed, the anti-Federalists were still in a numerical majority. They needed a leader, organization, and opportunity, and they soon found all three. Thomas Jefferson arrived in New York not only to enter into Washington's cabinet, and lend the aid of his great talents to the success of the new scheme, but soon also to put

STATES AND TERRITORIES

	North		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut . . . . .	232,581	2,801	2,759
Maine . . . . .	96,002	538	...
Massachusetts . . . . .	373,254	5,463	...
New Hampshire . . . . .	141,111	630	158
New Jersey . . . . .	169,954	2,762	11,423
New York . . . . .	314,142	4,654	21,324
Pennsylvania . . . . .	424,099	6,537	3,737
Rhode Island . . . . .	64,689	3,469	952
Vermont . . . . .	85,144	255	17
	1,900,976	27,109	40,370

	South		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Delaware . . . . .	46,370	3,899	8,887
Georgia . . . . .	52,886	398	29,264
Kentucky . . . . .	61,133	114	11,830
Maryland . . . . .	208,649	8,043	103,036
North Carolina . . . . .	288,204	4,975	100,572
South Carolina . . . . .	140,178	1,801	107,094
Tennessee . . . . .	32,013	361	3,417
Virginia . . . . .	442,115	12,766	293,427
	1,271,488	32,357	657,527

1790.—Economic situation of the country.—“The population was still largely rural; there were but six cities of 7500 or more inhabitants, and the largest of these, New York, had only 33,000 people. Work and industry were the rule of life throughout



the country. Agriculture busied nine families out of ten; land was cheap and bought on easy credit, for there were unlimited unsettled tracts stretching out to the West, partly in State lands, partly in the national domain. The value of property employed in agriculture was far greater than that devoted to manufactures or commerce. Excepting the slave plantations of the South, the farm-holdings were small, and the cultivation of each was carried on by members of the family with little hired labor. This developed throughout the North a general equality of political and social interests, if not of economic welfare. Little change had come about in agricultural products since the colonial period. In the South, particularly in Georgia and the Carolinas, rice of a superior quality was raised in large quantities and formed an important export; the same States also produced indigo for foreign shipment as well as for domestic use. Tobacco was a staple produce throughout the South from the borders of Pennsylvania, and contributed a generous share of the exports. The wheat country extended from Virginia to the western end of New England, and American flour had an established reputation in the West Indies. Hemp and flax were raised in large quantities and formed the basis of important manufactures. Sheep for their wool, cattle, and dairy products also contributed to the prosperity of the farmer. The export of salt provisions was increasing. One of the most important economic resources was still the forests; the naval supplies, especially the tar, pitch, and turpentine of North Carolina, showed no exhaustion; and lumber and timber products were shipped from almost all the States. The clearing of the forests also yielded a by-product of pot and pearl ashes, the sale of which frequently tided the pioneer over the earlier months of privation. [See also AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: 1776-1833.] Although agriculture was everywhere the principal occupation, the rapid expansion of settlement caused an increasing demand for mechanics to build the houses, barns, and workshops; and progress was making in some lines of manufactures. The growth of manufactures was especially marked after the establishment of peace; it is estimated that in 1787 the importation of manufactures into Massachusetts was only one-half what it was twenty years before. As soon as the restrictions of the colonial system were removed, the genius of the American people was displayed in every department of mechanical activity then known,—witness the concise description given by Hamilton in his memorable Report on Manufactures in 1791, as well as the equally authoritative papers of Tench Coxe, in which the capacities of the new republic are defended from the aspersions of English critics, who looked for an easy industrial subjugation, even if political supremacy were lost. Hamilton's investigations showed that there were seventeen distinct branches of manufactures which were carried on as regular trades and which had attained a considerable degree of maturity. Naturally these industries were closely related to raw materials which the country then afforded. As examples may be mentioned the following: manufactures of leather, trunks, gloves, parchment, and glue; tanneries were numerous, and foreign competition was hardly to be feared. From iron came bar and sheet iron, rods and nails, stoves, household utensils, and implements of husbandry, some edged tools and hollow ware. There was an abundant supply of charcoal, and iron ore of almost every quality was abundant; one-half of the steel consumed in the United States was home-made. Of copper there were manufactures of wire, utensils

for distillers, sugar refiners, and brewers, and articles for household use. Timber was the raw material of ships, an industry which had been carried to a high point of perfection; there were also manufactures of cabinet and coopers' wares. . . . The rum distilleries of Massachusetts were dependent for their raw material upon the molasses of the West Indies, but in the Middle States stills were common for the distillation of the home grains and fruits; the largest part of the malt liquors consumed was the product of domestic breweries. From flax and hemp were produced cables, sail-cloth, cordage, and twine, and though the manufactures were not large, there was a promising beginning. Manufactures of paper were well advanced, and entirely 'adequate to national supply.' Different manufactories of glass were on foot, and among the extensive and prosperous domestic manufactures were those of refined sugars and chocolates. In addition there were manufactures of bricks and pottery, hats, oils of animals and seeds, tin-ware, carriages, snuff, starch, painters' colors, and gunpowder. The variety of these manufactures was no more striking than the resourcefulness in household manufacture; industry as a whole was in the handicraft stage; cloths of wool cotton, and flax were thus produced in the greatest variety; and in some districts from two-thirds to four-fifths of all the clothing of the inhabitants was made in the home. Woollen manufactures were only beginning to take a place as a factory industry, while the establishment of cotton mills was not much more than a prophecy. The means of internal communication were undeveloped. The Hudson River was navigable 180 miles from the ocean; the Delaware 160; and the Potomac 300 miles above the falls near Georgetown. A few short and narrow canals had been constructed. Roads were everywhere poor and transportation was slow. In 1790 there were but 75 post-offices; mails were infrequent, as, for example, but three per week between New York and Boston, requiring in the best of weather five days on the road. These impediments to travel and intercourse constituted an important element of friction which needs to be thoroughly appreciated as a partial explanation of the difficulty of imposing internal taxes which would be acceptable to the whole country. The foreign trade can be described more definitely. The Americans had long enjoyed an economic advantage in the building of ships, and the enterprise of those engaged in the fisheries had developed a skilful and daring race of sailors. The country exported its surplus products of agriculture and forestry, and with the proceeds bought freely of luxuries and manufactures which were not available at home. The value of the exports at this time was about \$20,000,000, and that of the imports probably about the same. Trade returns are, however, too incomplete to present a satisfactory analysis of foreign commerce, particularly of imports. As in the colonial period, exports to the West Indies provided funds with which to pay for imports from Europe. A general survey of economic conditions must also take into account the growth of sectional interests. Slavery in the South was developing an economy of its own; New York and the New England cities were strongly inclined to commercial undertakings; Pennsylvania was awakening to the possibility of manufactures. These several interests were to furnish storm-centres in the debates and govern the discussion of economic questions."—D. R. Dewey, *Financial history of the United States*, pp. 76-79.

ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, *Making of the nation*,

pp. 63-72.—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 1, pp. 1-101; v. 2, pp. 1-24.—J. Winsor, *Westward movement*, pp. 398-414.

1790.—Rhode Island accepts Federal constitution and ratifies amendments. See RHODE ISLAND: 1783-1790.

1790.—First copyright law. See COPYRIGHT: 1790-1909.

1790.—Organization of Revenue Cutter Service. See REVENUE CUTTER SERVICE, UNITED STATES.

1790.—Creation of regular army. See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 43.

1790-1795.—War with the Indian tribes of the Northwest.—Disastrous expeditions of Harmor and St. Clair.—Wayne's decisive victory. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1790-1795.

1790-1800.—Philadelphia as capital of the colonies. See PHILADELPHIA: 1776-1800.

1790-1820.—Estimated immigration.—Causes of migration movement. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1790-1860.

1791.—Admission of Vermont to the Union. See VERMONT: 1790-1791.

1791.—Admission of Kentucky to the Union.—Slavery in the constitution of the new state. See KENTUCKY: 1789-1792.

1791.—Incorporation of the first Bank of the United States. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1790-1816.

1791.—Founding of the Federal capital. See WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1791-1800.

1791.—Adoption of first ten amendments to Federal constitution.—The first ten amendments to the constitution (see U. S. A., CONSTITUTION OF), embodying a declaration of rights which was thought to be necessary by many who had consented to the adoption of the constitution, but only with the understanding that such amendments should be added, were proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the First Congress, on September 25, 1789. At different dates between Nov. 20, 1789 and Dec. 15, 1791, they were ratified by eleven of the fourteen states. "There is no evidence on the journals of Congress that the legislatures of Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts ratified them."—*Constitution, rules and manual of the United States Senate*, 1885, p. 61.

1792.—Establishment of United States mint.—Postal service established. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1782-1792; POSTAL SYSTEMS: 1600-1800.

1792.—Exploration of mouth of Columbia river by Robert Gray, basis of claim to that region. See OREGON: Early exploration.

1792.—Second presidential election.—George Washington was re-elected with unanimity, receiving 132 votes of the Electoral College, John Adams, vice president, receiving 77 votes, with 50 cast for George Clinton, 4 for Jefferson and 1 for Burr.

1793.—First fugitive slave law.—For some time after the adoption of the Federal constitution, its provision relating to the rendition of persons "held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another" remained without legislation to execute it; "and it is a striking fact that the call for legislation came not from the South, but from a free State; and that it was provoked, not by fugitive slaves, but by kidnapers. . . . A free negro named John was seized at Washington, Pennsylvania, in 1791, and taken to Virginia. The Governor of Pennsylvania, at the instigation of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, asked the return of the three kidnapers;

but the Governor of Virginia, replied that since there was no national law touching such a case, he could not carry out the request. On the matter being brought to the notice of Congress by the Governor of Pennsylvania," a bill was passed which "became law by the signature of the President, February 12, 1793. . . . The act provided at the same time for the recovery of fugitives from justice and from labor; but the alleged criminal was to have a protection through the requirement of a requisition, a protection denied to the man on trial for his liberty only. The act was applicable to fugitive apprentices as well as to slaves, a provision of some importance at the time. In the Northwest Territory there were so-called negro apprentices, who were virtually slaves, and to whom the law applied, since it was in terms extended to all the Territories. Proceedings began with the forcible seizure of the alleged fugitive. The act, it will be observed, does not admit a trial by jury. It allowed the owner of the slave, his agent or attorney, to seize the fugitive and take him before any judge of a United States Circuit or District Court, or any local magistrate. The only requirements for the conviction of the slave was the testimony of his master, or the affidavit of some magistrate in the State from which he came, certifying that such a person had escaped. Hindering arrest or harboring a slave was punishable by a fine of five hundred dollars. The law thus established a system allowing the greatest harshness to the slave and every favor to the master. Even at that time, when persons might still be born slaves in New York and New Jersey, and gradual emancipation had not yet taken full effect in Rhode Island and Connecticut, it was repellant to the popular sense of justice; there were two cases of resistance to the principle of the act before the close of 1793. Until 1850 no further law upon this subject was passed, but as the provisions of 1793 were found ineffectual, many attempts at amendments were made."—M. G. McDougall, *Fugitive slaves, 1619-1865 (Fay House Monographs, no. 3, pp. 17-19)*.—"The fugitive-slave clause in the Constitution is of course obligatory, but there is a wide distinction between the fugitive-slave clause and the fugitive-slave law. The Constitution gives no power to Congress to legislate on the subject, but imposes on the States the obligation of rendition. Chief Justice Horblower, of New York, and Chancellor Walworth, of New York, long since pronounced the fugitive law of '93 unconstitutional on this very ground."—William Jay, *Letter to Josiah Quincy* (B. Tuckerman, ed., *William Jay and the constitutional movement for the abolition of slavery*).

1793.—Popular sympathy with French Revolution.—Washington's proclamation of neutrality.—Insolent conduct of French minister, Genêt.—"The French Revolution, as was natural from the all-important services rendered by France to the United States in their own revolutionary struggle, enlisted the warm sympathy of the American people. . . . As the United States were first introduced to the family of nations by the alliance with France of 1778, the very important question arose, on the breaking out of the war between France and England, how far they were bound to take part in the contest. The second article of the treaty of alliance seemed to limit its operation to the then existing war between the United States and Great Britain; but by the eleventh article the two contracting powers agreed to 'guarantee mutually from the present time and forever, against all

other powers,' the territories of which the allies might be in possession respectively at the moment the war between France and Great Britain should break out, which was anticipated as the necessary consequence of the alliance. Not only were the general sympathies of America strongly with France, but the course pursued by Great Britain toward the United States, since the peace of 1783, was productive of extreme irritation, especially her refusal to give up the western posts, which . . . had the effect of involving the northwestern frontier in a prolonged and disastrous Indian war. These causes, together with the recent recollections of the revolutionary struggle, disposed the popular mind to make common cause with France, in what was regarded as the war of a people struggling for freedom against the combined despots of Europe. Washington, however, from the first, determined to maintain the neutrality of the country"; and, with the unanimous advice of his cabinet, he issued (April 22, 1793) a proclamation of neutrality. "This proclamation, though draughted by Mr. Jefferson and unanimously adopted by the Cabinet, was violently assailed by the organs of the party which followed his lead. [See also NEUTRALITY: Development.] . . . The growing excitement of the popular mind was fanned to a flame by the arrival at Charleston, South Carolina [April 9], of 'Citizen' Genet, who was sent as the minister of the French Republic to the United States. Without repairing to the seat of government, or being accredited in any way, in his official capacity, he began to fit out privateers in Charleston, to cruise against the commerce of England. Although the utmost gentleness and patience were observed by the executive of the United States in checking this violation of their neutrality, Genet assumed from the first a tone of defiance, and threatened before long to appeal from the government to the people. These insolent demonstrations were of course lost upon Washington's firmness and moral courage. They distressed, but did not in the slightest degree intimidate him; and their effect on the popular mind was to some extent neutralized by the facts, that the chief measures to maintain the neutrality of the country had been unanimously advised by the Cabinet, and that the duty of rebuking his intemperate course had devolved upon the secretary of state [Jefferson], the recognized head of the party to which Genet looked for sympathy."—E. Everett, *Life of Washington*, ch. 8.—"As events rapidly transpired a change of sentiment was wrought in the United States. The bloody excesses of the revolutionists, the execution of the king, who was held in high esteem as our best friend during the war of independence, and the disregard of our commercial neutrality, led to a feeling that the French government of the day had no claim on us as an ally. It was held that the Revolution had destroyed the France with which the treaty of alliance was made, and that under the circumstances there was no obligation resting on us to take part in her aggressive wars. The existing government, on declaring war against Austria, had claimed the right, under the circumstances, of determining for itself what treaties of the old monarchy it would accept and what reject. Excitement ran high in the United States, and the country was divided between the partisans of France and those who believed we should take no part in the conflict."—J. W. Foster, *Century of American diplomacy*, p. 152.—A demand for "Genet's recall was determined on during the first days of August. There

was some discussion over the manner of requesting the recall, but the terms were made gentle by Jefferson to the disgust of that Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War [Hamilton and Knox], who desired direct methods and stronger language. As finally toned up and agreed upon by the President and cabinet, the document was sufficiently vigorous to annoy Genet, and led to bitter reproaches addressed to his friend in the State Department. . . . The letter asking Genet's recall, as desired by Washington, went in due time, and in the following February came a successor. Genet, however, did not go back to his native land, for he preferred to remain here and save his head. . . . He spent the rest of his days in America, married, harmless, and quite obscure. His noise and fireworks were soon over, and one wonders now how he could ever have made as much flare and explosion as he did."—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 2, pp. 155-156.

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 4.—J. T. Morse, *Life of Hamilton*, v. 2, ch. 3.—*American state papers*, v. 1, pp. 140-188, 243-246, 311-314.—J. D. Richardson, *Compilation of the messages and papers of the Presidents*, v. 1, p. 156.

1793.—Whitney's cotton-gin and the series of inventions which it made complete.—Their political effect.—Strengthening of slave power, and strengthening of unionism.—"Some English artisans, who, about the middle of the last century, were obtaining a scanty living by spinning, weaving and other such occupations, turned their inventive talent to the improvement of their art. Paul and Wyatt introduced the operation of spinning by rollers; Highs, or Hargreaves, invented the jenny, by which a great many threads could be spun as easily as one. Paul devised the rotating carding-engine; Crompton the mule; Arkwright the water-frame, which produced any number of threads of any degree of fineness and hardness. These ingenious machines constituted a very great improvement on the spindle and distaff of ancient times, and on the spinning-wheel, originally brought from Asia, or perhaps reinvented in Europe. At length one spinner was able to accomplish as much work as one hundred could have formerly done. While the art of producing threads was undergoing this singular improvement, Cartwright, a clergyman, invented, in 1785, the power-loom intended to supersede the operation of weaving by hand, and to make the production of textile fabrics altogether the result of machinery. After some modifications, that loom successfully accomplished the object for which it was devised. [See also INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: England: Inventions in textile industry.] As these inventions succeeded, they necessarily led to a demand for motive power. In the first little cotton factory, the germ of that embodiment of modern industry, the cotton-mill, a water-wheel was employed to give movement to the machinery. The establishment was, therefore, necessarily placed near a stream, where a sufficient fall could be obtained. The invention of the steam-engine by Watt, which was the consequence of the new and correct views of the nature of vapors that had been established by Dr. Black, supplied, in due time, the required motive power, and by degrees the water-wheel went almost out of use. Textile manufacture needed now but one thing more to become of signal importance—it needed a more abundant supply of raw material. . . . Cotton, the fibre chiefly concerned in these improvements, was obtained in limited quantities from various coun-

tries; but, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, not a single pound was exported from the United States. What was grown here was for domestic consumption. Every good housewife had her spinning-wheel, every plantation its handloom. The difficulty of supplying cotton fibre in quantity sufficient to meet the demands of the new machinery was due to the imperfect means in use for separating the cotton from its seeds—a tedious operation, for the picking was done by hand. Eli Whitney, a native of Massachusetts, by his invention of the cotton-gin in 1793, removed that difficulty. The fibre could be separated from the seeds with rapidity and at a trifling cost. There was nothing now to prevent an extraordinary development in the English manufactures. A very few years showed what the result would be. In 1790 no cotton was exported from the United States. Whitney's gin was introduced in 1793. [See also INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: United States.] The next year about 1½ million of pounds were exported; in 1795, about 5¼ millions; in 1860, the quantity had reached 2,000 millions of pounds. The political effect of this mechanical invention, which thus proved to be the completion of all the previous English inventions, being absolutely necessary to give them efficacy, was at once seen in its accomplishing a great increase and a redistribution of population in England. . . . In the United States the effects were still more important. Cotton could be grown through all the Southern Atlantic and the Gulf States. It was more profitable than any other crop—but it was raised by slaves. Whatever might have been the general expectation respecting the impending extinction of slavery, it was evident that at the commencement of this century the conditions had altogether changed. A powerful interest had come into unforeseen existence both in Europe and America which depended on perpetuating that mode of labor. Moreover, before long it was apparent that, partly because of the adaptation of their climate to the growth of the plant, partly because of the excellence of the product, and partly owing to the increasing facilities for interior transportation, the cotton-growing states of America would have a monopoly in the supply of this staple. But, though mechanical invention had reinvigorated the slave power by bestowing on it the cotton-gin, it had likewise strengthened unionism by another inestimable gift—the steam-boat. At the very time that the African slave-trade was prohibited, Fulton was making his successful experiment of the navigation of the Hudson River by steam. This improvement in inland navigation rendered available, in a manner never before contemplated, the river and lake system of the continent; it gave an instantaneous value to the policy of Jefferson, by bringing into effectual use the Mississippi and its tributaries; it crowded with population the shores of the lakes; it threw the whole continent open to commerce, it strengthened the central power at Washington by diminishing space, and while it extended geographically the domain of the republic, it condensed it politically. It bound all parts of the Union more firmly together. . . . In the Constitution it had been agreed that three-fifths of the slaves should be accounted as federal numbers in the apportionment of federal representation. A political advantage was thus given to slave labor. This closed the eyes of the South to all other means of solving its industrial difficulties. . . . To the cotton-planter two courses were open. He might increase his manual force, or he might resort to machinery. . . .

It required no deep political penetration for him to perceive that the introduction of machinery must in the end result in the emancipation of the slave. Machinery and slavery are incompatible—the slave is displaced by the machine. In the Southern States political reasons thus discouraged the introduction of machinery. Under the Constitution an increased negro force had a political value, machinery had none. The cotton interest was therefore persuaded by those who were in a position to guide its movements, that its prosperity could be secured only through increased manual labor.” —J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 1, sect. 3, ch. 16.—See also below: 1818-1821.

1793-1795.—Indian affairs.—Threatening relations with Great Britain.—Jay Treaty.—“The Indian affairs were in a most alarming state. All through the summer stories and rumors of midnight massacres, and cold-blooded murders of emigrants along the Ohio, had been crowding the columns of the Gazettes and Journals. At first they were supposed to be merely accounts of such barbarities as the Indians had always perpetrated on the settlers of a new country from the days of John Smith and Miles Standish down. But ere Christmas came it was well known that the settlers in the western territory were involved in a general Indian war. To form a just conception of the cause of the long series of Indian wars which now began to disturb the peace and prosperity of the West, we must recall briefly the claims of the Indians and of the Government to the land in dispute. . . . When, therefore, the independence of the States was acknowledged, Great Britain surrendered what she had received from France and what she had taken from the Iroquois. But in the region to the north of the Ohio, save the title to a few acres about the forts she continued to hold, she transferred nothing; and there lived the Miamis, the Delawares, the Shawanese, the Ottawas, the Wyandots. In theory, Congress affected to hold that the claim of these Indians to the land had been forfeited by the part they took in the war. In practice, Congress treated them as sovereign nations, made treaties, and sent out commissioners to smoke the calumet and present the wampum and the beads. Indeed, between 1783 and 1790, no less than five treaties were made. The first, in 1784, at Fort Stanwix, secured from the Iroquois all claim to the lands which now make up the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The second, at Fort McIntosh, was with the Wyandots, the Delawares, and the Chippewas. The third was with the Shawanese, at Fort Finney, in 1786. The fourth and fifth, at Fort Harmar, in 1789, confirmed the others. But with the Kickapoos, the Pottawattamies, the Miamis, the Weas, and the Eel river tribes, no treaties were made. Indeed, they declared they would make none. The Ohio should be the southern boundary between the Long Knives and the red men, and over that river no settler should ever come and live.” —J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 1, pp. 593-594, 597.—“The boundary agreed upon in the treaty of peace with England gave to the United States all that part of the northwest which lay south of a line drawn through the Great Lakes and through a chain of watercourses to the Lake of the Woods, and eastward of the Mississippi, together with the right to navigate that great river. . . . Canadian interests . . . were against the formal surrender of this region, and a way was found to impress

their ideals rather strongly on the government in London. This region was chiefly unsettled in 1789, but it was held in a military sense by the posts of Michilimackinac, Detroit, Fort Erie, Niagara, Oswego, Oswegatchie (on the St. Lawrence), and Point-au-Fer and Dutchman's Point (on Lake Champlain). England still refused to surrender these posts, hoping, no doubt, that the chaotic government under the Confederation would never be able to demand them. In fact, there was a good pretence for holding them [on the ground that the terms of the treaty had not been kept in so far as the debts owed to British subjects at the outbreak of the Revolution had not been paid, and that the severe laws against the Loyalists had not been repealed. The English claimed that they had agreed to the treaty on the assurance that recommendations made on the subject to the several states would have a compelling moral force.] . . . The Americans replied that the English must be supposed to know the powers of the Confederation, and that they could not have deluded themselves as to the exact value of the promise. Another cause of disagreement was the provision that the British would carry away no slaves from the places they then held; but it was alleged that in contravention of this they had taken away some thousands of negroes from New York and the southern ports, and no compensation had been paid. The Americans alleged that the failure to make restitution justified the states in disregarding the recommendations of Congress as to the Loyalists. Thus it happened that when the national government began we had a dispute with England over the execution of the treaty, each side charging the other with having first failed to keep its obligations. The truth of the matter was that each side had been wrong, and that each desired to put the blame on the other. . . . The British gave countenance to them [the Indians] and hinted rather broadly that it would be right to create a neutral zone running from Lake Ontario through the upper northwest to the Mississippi, to be surrendered to the savages in sovereignty and safeguarded as a buffer state. The manifest result of such a plan would be to put this buffer state into the hands of the British. Anthony Wayne was next appointed to succeed to the command on the Ohio. . . . He built Fort Greenville, about seventy-five miles north of Cincinnati, and took his forces into winter quarters there. The long and hard drill he was giving them was transforming them into veterans. In the mean time, relations with the British were dangerously near the point of hostilities. The officials on the Canadian frontier expected that Wayne would surely attack the retained posts. Detroit seemed to them to be his real objective. To protect it they sent a detachment to the rapids of the Maumee, sixty miles to the southward, where a fort was built and occupied. This action was entirely a violation of the treaty of 1783, for the spot was in no sense British territory. The excuse that it was a part of the defences of Detroit had but a semblance of truth. In America the effect was decided, and Washington, who was always for peace, ordered Wayne to reduce it if it stood in his way. . . . A still more aggravating circumstance was a speech which Dorchester [Sir Guy Carleton, earl of Dorchester], the governor of Canada, made in February, 1794, to a delegation of the hostile Indians. He told them that the United States had not kept their treaty, that the settlements in the disputed Northwest Territory were unauthorized, and that it was probable

that the British and the Americans would be at war within a year, when the Indians might recover their lands with the improvements. This speech was widely circulated among the savages, where it made a deep impression. In Philadelphia it also caused much excitement. The partisans of England said that it was too absurd to be true, and the British minister tried to parry the effects of it by saying that if it had been uttered it was only a private speech; but the administration responded that the effects on the Indians were the same whether it was private or official. The English government was not so warlike as that of Canada, and rebuked Dorchester in private for his ill-advised words. In June, 1794, Wayne was joined in his camp at Greenville by sixteen hundred mounted militia from Kentucky, and soon afterwards he began his advance. At the point where the Auglaise joins the Maumee he erected works which he called Fort Defiance. Proceeding down the Maumee, he came, on August 18, upon a band of thirteen hundred Indians assembled within two miles of the new British fort. They attacked him from a body of fallen timber which was overgrown with grass. His troops behaved excellently, charging with spirit, and the enemy retreated. The Indians seemed to have expected to be received into the forts, but its gates were not opened to them. They thereupon disappeared into the forest, and thus ended the battle of Fallen Timber. Wayne remained in the vicinity destroying crops, huts, and other Indian property. He did not spare the effects of the traders, but he left the fort untouched. To assail it would have meant the outbreak of war with England. He soon began to receive advances from the Indians. To settle matters with them, he appointed a great council for making a permanent peace in the summer of 1795. At that meeting he was able to tell them that a treaty was about to be signed by which the posts were to be surrendered, and this made his negotiation easier. The treaty of Greenville, agreed to on August 4, established a boundary between the Indians and whites, beginning on the Ohio at a point opposite the mouth of the Kentucky River, running thence to Fort Recovery, thence eastward to the Muskingum, and following that river and the Cuyahoga to Lake Erie. The region south and east of it, together with sixteen small reservations on the other side of it, was ceded to the United States. With this treaty and with the surrender of the posts in 1796 the northwest became peaceful and secure."—J. S. Bassett, *Federalist system, 1789-1801*, pp. 56-58, 66-68.—The disputes with England were not yet settled, however. "The daily increasing 'love-frenzy for France,' and the intemperate language of the Democratic press, naturally emphasized in England that reaction against America which set in with the treaty of peace. On the other hand, the retention of the frontier posts in violation of that treaty was a thorn in the side of the young Republic. In the course of the war [with France] England had adopted, by successive Orders in Council, a policy ruinous to the commerce of neutral nations, especially of the United States. In the admiralty courts of the various British West India islands hundreds of ships from New England were seized and condemned, for carrying French produce or bearing cargoes of provisions chartered to French ports. The New England fishermen and shipowners were vociferous for war, and the Democratic clubs denounced every British insult and celebrated every French victory. On March 26, 1794, an embargo

against British ships was proclaimed for thirty days, and then extended for thirty days longer. The day after the embargo was laid, Dayton, of New Jersey, moved in Congress to sequester all moneys due to British creditors, and apply it towards indemnifying shipowners for losses incurred through the Orders in Council; and on April 21st the Republicans moved a resolution to suspend all commercial intercourse with Great Britain till the western posts should be given up, and indemnity be paid for injuries to American commerce in violation of the rights of neutrals. The passage of such an act meant war; and for war the United States was never more unprepared. . . . In this crisis Washington decided to send to England a special envoy. Hamilton was his first choice, but Hamilton had excited bitter enmities." On Hamilton's recommendation, John Jay, the chief justice, was chosen for the difficult mission, and he sailed for England in May, 1794, landing at Falmouth on June 8. Within the succeeding five months he accomplished the negotiation of a treaty, which was signed on November 19. "The main points that Jay had been instructed to gain were compensation for negroes, surrender of the posts, and compensation for spoiliations; in addition, a commercial treaty was desired. When Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Jay had argued that the negroes, some 3,000 in number, who, at the time of the evacuation, were within the British lines, relying on proclamations that offered freedom, and who followed the troops to England, came within that clause of the treaty of peace which provided that the army should be withdrawn without 'carrying away any negroes or other property.' Lord Grenville, however, insisted upon refusing any compensation. Once within the British lines, he said, slaves were free for good and all. . . . From any point of view the matter was too insignificant to wreck the treaty upon it, and Jay waived the claim. As to the western posts [Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, Mackinaw, etc.], it was agreed that they should be surrendered by June 12, 1796. But compensation for the detention was denied on the ground that it was due to the breach of the treaty by the United States in permitting the States to prevent the recovery of British debts." For the determination and payment of such debts, it was now provided that a board of five commissioners should sit at Philadelphia; while another similar board at London should award compensation for irregular and illegal captures or condemnations made during the war between Great Britain and France. "Under this clause American merchants received \$10,345,000. [According to Fish, nearly \$6,000,000.] . . . The disputed questions of boundaries, arising from the construction of the treaty of peace, were referred to joint commissioners: properly enough, as the confusion was due to ignorance of the geography of the Northwest. British and American citizens holding lands at the time respectively in the United States and in any of the possessions of Great Britain were secured in their rights; a clause much objected to in America, but which was obviously just. A still more important provision followed, a novelty in international diplomacy, and a distinct advance in civilization: that war between the two countries should never be made the pretext for confiscation of debts or annulment of contracts between individuals. In the War of 1812 the United States happened for the moment to be the creditor nation, and the millions which this provision saved to her citizens it would be difficult to estimate. . . . To unpreju-

diced eyes, after the lapse of a hundred years, considering the mutual exasperation of the two peoples, the pride of England in her successes in the war with France, the weakness and division of the United States, the treaty seems a very fair one. Certainly one far less favorable to America would have been infinitely preferable to a war, and would probably in the course of time have been accepted as being so. The commercial advantages were not very considerable, but they at least served as 'an entering wedge,' to quote Jay's expression, and they were 'pro tanto' a clear gain to America."—G. Pellew, *John Jay*, ch. 11.—"The majority in the House was unfavorable to the treaty and held to the dangerous doctrine that as it could not be carried into effect without adequate appropriations by the House, which of course were within its control; and that body, therefore, had the right to judge of the expediency of the treaty, and thus practically to defeat it at their pleasure. The issue was not so much the right of the House to call for the papers in the case, as its right to refuse the necessary appropriations for carrying a treaty into effect. . . . The strictest of strict constructionists could find no word in the Constitution which empowered the House of Representatives thus to participate in the making of a treaty, and, therefore, the Republicans were forced to shift their ground to one of expediency; arguing that because of the exclusive authority given to the House to originate money bills, to regulate trade, and to lay and collect taxes, and as by the Constitution a treaty was a part of the supreme law of the land, it was expedient that the House should participate in the treaty-making power; otherwise a treaty, in which the House had taken no part, might be made which would regulate commerce. . . . The Federalists, for the time becoming strict constructionists, asserted that it was the plain intention of the Constitution to exclude the House from participating in the treaty-making power. The great speech on the subject was by Fisher Ames, whose argument would now be called economic, for he said much concerning the commercial advantages of ratifying the treaty, but very little of the constitutional functions of the House. He reached so high a plane of eloquence that the Republicans somewhat tumultuously adjourned the House lest a vote be taken, but even adjournment could not break the spell of his speech, for on the following day, the thirtieth of April, the House, though only by a majority of three, and, though a day or two before, a very large majority had vociferously opposed the appropriation, voted to carry the treaty into effect and thus settled the question of the functions of the House in the matter of treaties."—F. N. Thorpe, *Constitutional history of the United States, 1788-1861*, v. 2, pp. 340-342.—"The treaty was not published till July 2d. . . . Even before its contents were known, letters, signed 'Franklin,' appeared abusing the treaty; and in Philadelphia an effigy of Jay was placed in the pillory, and finally taken down, guillotined, the clothes fired, and the body blown up. It was clear, then, that it was not this particular treaty, but any treaty at all with Great Britain, that excited the wrath of the Republicans. On July 4th toasts insulting Jay or making odious puns on his name, were the fashion. . . . On June 24th the treaty was ratified by the Senate, with the exception of the article about the West India trade. On August 15th it was signed, with the same exception by Washington."—G. Pellew, *John Jay*, ch. 11.—"The reception given to the treaty cannot be fully explained by the existing relations between the

United States and England. It was only in consequence of its Francomania that the opposition assumed the character of blind rage."—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, p. 124.—See also ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1794.

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 4-6.—W. Jay, *Life of John Jay*, v. 1, ch. 8-10, v. 2, pp. 216-264.—*American state papers*, v. 1, pp. 464-525.—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 9.—J. B. Moore, *American diplomacy*, pp. 201-208.—J. Winsor, *Westward movement*, pp. 462-484.

1793-1800.—Genesis of the United States Navy.—"In consequence of the depredations of the Algerine corsairs, and their apprehended renewal after the conclusion of the Portuguese treaty, Congress in 1793, after a bitter contest, had authorized the building of six frigates, for the express purpose of protecting our ships in the Mediterranean. As a concession to the opponents of the measure, whose utterances were characterized by the extreme partisan violence shown in the politics of that period, it was provided that if the treaty with Algiers, then in process of negotiation, should be concluded, work on the ships should be stopped. Under this act were built the 'Constitution,' 'United States,' 'President,' and 'Congress,' of forty-four guns each, and the 'Constellation' and 'Chesapeake,' of thirty-eight guns. As the sequel showed, no finer ships of their type were ever built in the world. The treaty with Algiers was concluded in 1795, but three of the frigates—the 'Constitution,' 'United States,' and 'Constellation'—were finished notwithstanding, while the remaining three were built and commissioned three years later. About the same time the Navy Department was established. Other acts were soon after passed for the construction of ships, mostly of smaller size, and by the time that hostilities in the West Indies actually broke out, the Government had at its command a very respectable navy. This attitude of the Government had a marked effect upon the commercial community. To the great satisfaction of all classes interested in shipping the Federal authority showed a resolute purpose of affording protection, as in duty bound, to these interests, and the best evidence of this resolution lay in the building of ships of war. The leaders in Congress saw the wisdom of enlisting in the new movement the sympathies of those who were to derive especial benefit from it, and it was accordingly provided that in the various shipbuilding and commercial localities ships of war might be built by private enterprise, which the Government should take, issuing bonds to provide for their payment. By this judicious measure local interest was actively excited, and some of the most famous of the naval cruisers were constructed under the provisions of this act, notably the Essex, built by the East India merchants of Salem, which made her first voyage around the world under Preble in 1800, and which in the War of 1812, under the command of Porter, was destined in the course of a single year completely to dispossess the British in the Pacific."—J. R. Soley, *Maritime industries of America* (N. S. Shaler, ed., *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 530-531).

1794.—Resistance to the excise.—Whisky insurrection in Pennsylvania. See PENNSYLVANIA: 1794.

1794.—Abolition of slave trade. See SLAVERY: 1792-1807.

1795.—Effect of Jay Treaty.—Treaty with Spain.—"The Jay treaty worked more satisfactorily than was expected. Grenville had promised Jay

some concessions not formally mentioned, and these were fulfilled. . . . From 1796, moreover, in spite of the excision of the West Indian article from the treaty, that trade was thrown open to American vessels under certain limitations. Best of all was the quieting effect on the northern frontier. Vermont was relieved by the opening of trade to Montreal, the national power was vindicated by the occupation of the whole national territory, and with the Jay treaty added to Wayne's treaty of 1795 came sixteen years of comparative peace with the Indians. . . . The effect of the Jay treaty was not confined to the relations between the United States and Great Britain. The document was observed by all the cabinets of Europe with varying emotions, but everywhere from the point of view of the obsession that the United States must be upon one side or the other. If she had rejected the overtures of France and made a treaty with England, it must mean that she was to be counted on the side of England. Nowhere, was the effect so immediate and pronounced as in Spain. . . . Her court, believing that it meant the alliance of the United States and Great Britain, saw in imagination irresistible forces descending upon her frail defences in Louisiana and attacking the mines of Mexico. Although convinced of the necessity of coming to terms, her ministers could not shake off their constitutional habits of delay, until on October 24, 1795, Pinckney [Thomas Pinckney, the minister at Madrid] announced his immediate departure for London. His bluff was successful, and on October 27 the treaty of San Lorenzo was signed. As the first treaty between United States and Spain, it laid down the general rules of intercourse upon liberal terms. In regard to neutral rights it provided that provisions should not be contraband of war, and that free ships make free goods. Until 1794 the Spanish fleet had cooperated with that of Great Britain, and had acted upon somewhat the same principles. To settle questions arising from this conduct, a commission was arranged for, which came to an end in 1800 after having awarded over three hundred thousand dollars to American claimants. But these questions were of less interest than those relating to boundaries and the use of the Mississippi. As to the former, Spain accepted the American contention, the thirty-first parallel, and agreed to evacuate her posts in the disputed region. She opened the navigation of the Mississippi to the Americans, and engaged that for three years New Orleans was to serve them as a 'place of deposit' with the right to export their goods therefrom free of duty. [See also DEPOSIT, RIGHT OF.] 'And His Majesty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them on another part of the banks of the Mississippi an equivalent establishment.' With the prompt ratification of this favorable treaty, Washington could indeed feel that the new government had justified itself to the people as their representative before the world. The diplomatic problems that had helped cause the fall of the Confederation had all been solved. Commercial treaties had been made with Spain and Great Britain. If the latter had not permanently opened her West India islands, at any rate they were open now. The Indians north and south had been quieted. Outlets had been obtained down the St. Lawrence to Montreal and Quebec, and down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico. The occupation of the entire national territory had been provided for. In addition, the policy of

national independence from European disputes had been effectively laid down, the worst irregularities of belligerent interference with our commerce had been done away with, and compensation for our losses provided for. If these settlements were not all to prove permanent, at least they established precedents which we were steadily gaining added strength to enforce. For many of these successes Washington could take personal credit, over and above that of choosing the men who accomplished them. The Indian policy was peculiarly his own. His selection from the various alternatives proposed by Hamilton and Jefferson for handling the Genét affair made the policy adopted essentially his. In view of the conflicting forces within him and without, his decision to sign the Jay treaty was a great act which proved to be a wise one. Finally in his farewell address he gave the policy of neutrality a consecration in the minds of the people which still persists. The points on which he might have done better were comparatively minor. He was able to retire in March, 1797, not, to be sure, leaving all problems solved, but having settled all those, except the opening of the Mediterranean, that he was chosen to deal with, and more."—C. R. Fish, *American diplomacy*, pp. 122-125.

1796.—Origin of public health service. See PUBLIC HEALTH: United States: Origin.

1796.—Admission of Tennessee to the Union. See TENNESSEE: 1785-1796.

1796.—Washington's farewell address.—"The period for the presidential election was drawing near, and great anxiety began to be felt that Washington would consent to stand for a third term. No one, it was agreed, had greater claim to the enjoyment of retirement, in consideration of public services rendered; but it was thought the affairs of the country would be in a very precarious condition should he retire before the wars of Europe were brought to a close. Washington, however, had made up his mind irrevocably on the subject, and resolved to announce, in a farewell address, his intention of retiring. Such an instrument, it will be recollected, had been prepared for him from his own notes, by Mr. Madison, when he had thought of retiring at the end of his first term. As he was no longer in confidential intimacy with Mr. Madison, he returned to Mr. Hamilton as his adviser and coadjutor, and appears to have consulted him on the subject early in the present year [1796], for, in a letter dated New York, May 10th, Hamilton writes: 'When last in Philadelphia, you mentioned to me your wish that I should "re-dress" a certain paper which you had prepared. As it is important that a thing of this kind should be done with great care and much at leisure, touched and retouched, I submit a wish that, as soon as you have given it the body you mean it to have, it may be sent to me.' The paper was accordingly sent, on the 15th of May, in its rough state, altered in one part since Hamilton had seen it. 'If you should think it best to throw the whole into a different form,' writes Washington, 'let me request, notwithstanding, that my draft may be returned to me (along with yours) with such amendments and corrections as to render it as perfect as the formation is susceptible of; curtailed if too verbose, and relieved of all tautology not necessary to enforce the ideas in the original or quoted part. My wish is, that the whole may appear in a plain style; and be handed to the public in an honest, unaffected, simple garb.' We forbear to go into the vexed question concerning this address; how much of it is founded on Wash-

ington's original 'notes and heads of topics'; how much was elaborated by Madison, and how much is due to Hamilton's recasting and revision. The whole came under the supervision of Washington; and the instrument, as submitted to the press, was in his handwriting, with many ultimate corrections and alterations. Washington had no pride of authorship; his object always was to effect the purpose in hand, and for that he occasionally invoked assistance, to ensure a plain and clear exposition of his thoughts and intentions. The address certainly breathes his spirit throughout, is in perfect accordance with all his words and actions, and 'in an honest, unaffected, simple garb,' embodies the system of policy on which he had acted throughout his administration. It was published in September [17], in a Philadelphia paper called the *Daily Advertiser*. The publication of the Address produced a great sensation. Several of the State legislatures ordered it to be put on their journals."—W. Irving, *Life of Washington*, v. 5, ch. 30.

The following is the text of the address.

"To the people of the United States. Friends and Fellow-Citizens: The period for a new election of a citizen, to administer the executive government of the United States, being not far distant, and the time actually arrived, when your thoughts must be employed in designating the person, who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise you of the resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among the number of those, out of whom a choice is to be made. I beg you, at the same time, to do me the justice to be assured, that this resolution has not been taken without a strict regard to all the considerations appertaining to the relation, which binds a dutiful citizen to his country; and that, in withdrawing the tender of service, which silence in my situation might imply, I am influenced by no diminution of zeal for your future interest; no deficiency of grateful respect for your past kindness; but am supported by a full conviction that the step is compatible with both. The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to which your suffrages have twice called me, have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty, and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped, that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently with motives, which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement, from which I had been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this, previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea. I rejoice, that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty, or propriety; and am persuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my services, that, in the present circumstances of our country, you will not disapprove my determination to retire. The impressions, with which I first undertook the arduous trust, were explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust, I will only say, that I have, with good intentions, contributed towards the organization and administration of the



government the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not unconscious, in the outset, of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience in my own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself; and every day the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more, that the shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied, that, if any circumstances have given peculiar value to my services, they were temporary, I have the consolation to believe, that, while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not forbid it. In looking forward to the moment, which is intended to terminate the career of my public life, my feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude, which I owe to my beloved country for the many honors it has conferred upon me; still more for the steadfast confidence with which it has supported me; and for the opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my inviolable attachment, by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our country from these services, let it always be remembered to your praise, and as an instructive example in our annals, that under circumstances in which the passions, agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead, amidst appearances sometimes dubious, vicissitudes of fortune often discouraging, in situations in which not unfrequently want of success has countenanced the spirit of criticism, the constancy of your support was the essential prop of the efforts, and a guarantee of the plans by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I shall carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to unceasing vows that Heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its beneficence; that your union and brotherly affection may be perpetual; that the free constitution, which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained; that its administration in every department may be stamped with wisdom and virtue; that, in fine, the happiness of the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete, by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this blessing, as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection, and adoption of every nation, which is yet a stranger to it. Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which cannot end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the present, to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments, which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all-important to the permanency of your felicity as a People. These will be offered to you with the more freedom, as you can only see in them the disinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent reception of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion. Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment. The unity of Government, which constitutes you one people, is also now dear to you. It is justly so: for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquillity at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that

very Liberty, which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee, that, from different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite moment, that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national Union to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as of the Palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion, that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts. For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens, by birth or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of American, which belongs to you, in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of Patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a common cause fought and triumphed together; the Independence and Liberty you possess are the work of joint counsels, and joint efforts, of common dangers, sufferings, and successes. But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves to your sensibility, are greatly outweighed by those, which apply more immediately to your interest. Here every portion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the Union of the whole. The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the South, protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds, in the productions of the latter, great additional resources of maritime and commercial enterprise and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The South, in the same intercourse, benefiting by the agency of the North, sees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into its own channels the seamen of the North, it finds its particular navigation invigorated; and, while it contributes, in different ways, to nourish and increase the general mass of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime strength, to which itself is unequally adapted. The East, in a like intercourse with the West, already finds, and in the progressive improvement of interior communications by land and water, will more and more find, a valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The West derives from the East supplies requisite to its growth and comfort, and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence, it must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength, or from an apostate and unnatural connexion with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious. While, then, every part of our

country thus feels an immediate and particular interest in Union, all the parts combined cannot fail to find in the united mass of means and efforts greater strength, greater resource, proportionably greater security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from Union an exemption from those broils and wars between themselves, which so frequently afflict neighbouring countries not tied together by the same governments, which their own rivalships alone would be sufficient to produce, but which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and embitter. Hence, likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments, which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to Republican Liberty. In this sense it is, that your Union ought to be considered as a main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the other. These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of the Union as a primary object of Patriotic desire. Is there a doubt, whether a common government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal. We are authorized to hope, that a proper organization of the whole, with the auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to Union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those, who in any quarter may endeavour to weaken its bands. In contemplating the causes, which may disturb our Union, it occurs as matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by Geographical discriminations, Northern and Southern, Atlantic and Western; whence designing men may endeavour to excite a belief, that there is a real difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much against the jealousies and heart-burnings, which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other those, who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our western country have lately had a useful lesson on this head; they have seen, in the negotiation by the Executive, and in the unanimous ratification by the Senate, of the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at that event, throughout the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the General Government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi; they have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties, that with Great Britain, and that with Spain, which secure to them every thing they could desire, in respect to our foreign relations, towards confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the Union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such there are, who would sever them from their brethren, and connect them with aliens? To the efficacy and permanency of

your Union, a Government for the whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions, which all alliances in all times have experienced. Sensible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay, by the adoption of a Constitution of Government better calculated than your former for an intimate Union, and for the efficacious management of your common concerns. This Government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true Liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their Constitutions of Government. But the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish Government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established Government. All obstructions to the execution of the Laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation, the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels, and modified by mutual interests. However combinations or associations of the above descriptions may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for themselves the reins of government; destroying afterwards the very engines, which have lifted them to unjust dominion. Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the constitution, alterations, which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human institutions; that experience is the surest standard, by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that, for the efficient management of

your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprise of faction, to confine each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property. I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally. This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy. The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty. Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind, (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight,) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. It serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another, fomenting occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. There is an opinion, that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in Governments of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And, there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume. It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution, in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit

of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against invasions by the others, as been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way, which the constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for, though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield. Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men and Citizens. The mere Politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connexions with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked, Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect, that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. It is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who, that is a sincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric. Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened. As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One method of preserving it is, to use it as sparingly as possible; avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but remembering also that timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts, which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burthen, which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is necessary that public opinion should cooperate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is essential that you should practically bear in mind, that towards the payment of debts there must be Revenue; that to have Revenue

there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devised, which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant, that the intrinsic embarrassment, inseparable from the selection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties), ought to be a decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the measures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate. Observe good faith and justice towards all Nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and Morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great Nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt, that, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages, which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it be, that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a Nation with its Virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices? In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential, than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular Nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The Nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The Nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the Government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The Government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject; at other times, it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of Nations has been the victim. So likewise, a passionate attachment of one Nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite Nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite Nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the Nation making the concessions; by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld. And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens, (who devote themselves to the favorite nation,) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding, with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good,

the base of foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent Patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practise the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the Public Councils! Such an attachment of a small or weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter. Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens,) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake; since history and experience prove, that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of Republican Government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial; else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defence against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation, and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests. The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connexion as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality, we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But

even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing, with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view, that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that, by such acceptance, it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard. In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course, which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations. But, if I may even flatter myself, that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare, by which they have been dictated. How far in the discharge of my official duties, I have been guided by the principles which have been delineated, the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself, the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have at least believed myself to be guided by them. In relating to the still subsisting war in Europe, my Proclamation of the 2d of April, 1793, is the index to my Plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice, and by that of your Representatives in both Houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it. After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend upon me, to maintain it, with moderation, perseverance, and firmness. The considerations, which respect the right to hold this conduct, it is not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe, that, according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the Belligerent Powers, has been virtually admitted by all. The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations. The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and experience. With me, a predominant motive

has been to endeavour to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes. Though, in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am unconscious of intentional error, I am nevertheless too sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors. Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry with me the hope, that my Country will never cease to view them with indulgence; and that, after forty-five years of my life dedicated to its service with an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest. Relying on its kindness in this as in other things, and actuated by that fervent love towards it, which is so natural to a man, who views in it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several generations; I anticipate with pleasing expectation that retreat, in which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking, in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign influence of good laws under a free government, the ever favorite object of my heart, and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors, and dangers. GEORGE WASHINGTON."

1796.—Third presidential election.—Washington succeeded by John Adams.—After the appearance of Washington's farewell address, the result of the presidential election became exceedingly doubtful. "There was no second man to whom the whole of the nation could be won over. The Federalists . . . could not bring forward a single candidate who could calculate on the unanimous and cheerful support of the entire party. There still prevailed at the time a feeling among the people that the vice-president had a sort of claim to the succession to the presidency. But even apart from this, Adams would have been one of the most prominent candidates of the Federalists. The great majority of them soon gave him a decided preference over all other possible candidates. On the other hand, some of the most distinguished and influential of the Federalists feared serious consequences to the party and the country from the vanity and violence as well as from the egotism and irresolution with which he was charged. But to put him aside entirely was not possible, nor was it their wish. They thought, however, to secure a greater number of electoral votes for Th. Pinckney, the Federal candidate for the vice-presidency, which, as the constitution then stood, would have made him president and Adams vice-president. Although this plan was anxiously concealed from the people, it caused the campaign to be conducted by the party with less energy than if the leaders had been entirely unanimous. France was naturally desirous of Jefferson's success. . . . Wolcott asserted that Adet had publicly declared that France's future policy towards the United States would depend on the result of the election. Some did not hesitate to say that, on this account, Jefferson should have the preference, but on the more thoughtful Federalists it exerted the very opposite influence. There is no reason for the assumption that the issue of the election would have been different, had Adet behaved more discreetly. But his indiscretion certainly contributed to make the small majority expected for Adams completely certain, while Hamilton's flank movement in favor of Pinckney helped Jefferson

to the vice-presidency. . . . The result of the election, however, left the country in a very serious condition. Washington's withdrawal removed the last restraint from party passion."—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 3.—Adams received 71 votes in the electoral college and Jefferson 68. As the constitution then provided, the majority of votes elected the president and the next greatest number of votes elected the vice president.

1797.—First contacts with Japan. See JAPAN: 1797-1854.

1797-1799.—Troubles with the French republic.—X Y Z correspondence.—On the brink of war.—"Mr. Adams took his cabinet from his predecessor; it was not a strong one, and it was devoted to Hamilton, between whom and the new President there was soon a divergence, Hamilton being fond of power, and Adams having a laudable purpose to command his own ship. The figure of speech is appropriate, for he plunged into a sea of troubles, mainly created by the unreason-



JOHN ADAMS

(From painting by Gilbert Stuart)

able demands of the French government. The French 'Directory,' enraged especially by Jay's treaty with England, got rid of one American minister by remonstrance, and drove out another [Pinckney] with contempt. When Mr. Adams sent three special envoys [Gerry, Marshall, and Pinckney], they were expected to undertake the most delicate negotiations with certain semi-official persons designated in their correspondence only by the letters X, Y, Z. The plan of this covert intercourse came through the private secretary of M. de Talleyrand, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the impudence of these three letters of the alphabet went so far as to propose a bribe of 1,200,000 francs (some \$220,000) to be paid over to this minister. 'You must pay money, a great deal of money,' remarked Monsieur Y. ('Il faut de l'argent, beaucoup de l'argent.') The secret of these names was kept, but the diplomatic correspondence was made public, and created much wrath in Europe as well as in America. Moreover, American vessels were constantly attacked by France, and yet Congress refused to arm its own ships. At last the insults passed beyond bearing, and it was at this time that 'Millions for defence,

not one cent for tribute,' first became a proverbial phrase, having been originally used by Charles C. Pinckney. . . . Then, with tardy decision, the Republicans yielded to the necessity of action and the Federal party took the lead. War was not formally proclaimed, but treaties with France were declared to be no longer binding. An army was ordered to be created, with Washington as Lieutenant-general and Hamilton as second in-command; and the President was authorized to appoint a Secretary of the Navy and to build twelve new ships-of-war. Before these were ready, naval hostilities had actually begun; and Commodore Truxton, in the U. S. frigate *Constellation*, captured a French frigate in West Indian waters (Feb. 9, 1799), and afterwards silenced another, which however escaped. Great was the excitement over these early naval successes of the young nation. Merchant-ships were authorized to arm themselves, and some 300 acted upon this authority. . . . The result of it all was that France yielded. Talleyrand, the very minister who had dictated the insults, now disavowed them, and pledged his government to receive any minister the United States might send. The President, in the most eminently courageous act of his life, took the responsibility of again sending ambassadors; and did this without even consulting his cabinet, which would, as he well knew, oppose it. They were at once received, and all danger of war with France was at an end. This bold stroke separated the President permanently from at least half of his own party, since the Federalists did not wish for peace with France. His course would have given him a corresponding increase of favor from the other side, but for the great mistake the Federalists had made in passing certain laws, called the 'Alien' law and the 'Sedition' law."—T. W. Higginson, *Larger history of the United States*, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: J. T. Austin, *Life of Elbridge Gerry*, v. 2, ch. 5-8.—J. Q. and C. F. Adams, *Life of John Adams*, v. 2, ch. 10.—F. A. Walker, *Making of the nation*, pp. 137-143.—J. W. Foster, *Century of American diplomacy*, pp. 176-180.—*South Carolina History Magazine*, Jan., 1900, p. 100 ff.—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 2, pp. 308-344, 368-388, 403-408.

1797-1800.—Early attitude of slave owners in Congress.—Treatment of free blacks.—"Many people will not allow the least blame to be cast on this period [the later years of the eighteenth century], because it does not harmonize with their admiration of the 'fathers,' and because they have adopted, without any proof, the common view that the deeper shadows of slavery and slavocracy first appeared comparatively late. . . . In reading through the debates [in Congress], single striking instances of injustice do not make the deepest impression. It is the omnipresent unwillingness to practice justice towards colored persons,—yes, even to recognize them as actual beings. When the defense of their rights is demanded, then congress has always a deaf ear. . . . Swanwick of Pennsylvania laid before the house of representatives, Jan. 30, 1797, a petition from four North Carolina negroes who had been freed by their masters. Since a state law condemned them to be sold again, they had fled to Philadelphia. There they had been seized under the fugitive slave law . . . and now prayed congress for its intervention. Blount of North Carolina declared that only when it was 'proved' that these men were free, could congress consider the petition. Sigreaves of Pennsylvania asked, in reply to this, what sort of proof was offered that the four negroes were not free. This

question received no answer. Smith of South Carolina and Christie of Maryland simply expressed their amazement that any member whatever could have presented a petition of 'such an unheard-of nature.' Swanwick and some other representatives affirmed that the petition must be submitted to a committee for investigation and consideration, because the petitioners complained of violation of their rights under a law of the Union. No reply could be made to this and no reply was attempted. This decisive point was simply set aside, and it was voted by fifty ayes to thirty-three noes not to receive the petition. . . . In order to reach this result, Smith had produced the customary impression by the declaration that the refusal of the demand made by the representatives from the southern states would drive a 'wedge' into the Union. When, three years later, the same question was brought before congress again by a petition of the free negroes of Philadelphia, Rutledge of South Carolina declared in even plainer terms that the south would be forced to the sad necessity of going its own way. . . . The whites who troubled themselves about slaves or free colored persons had no better reception. . . . In all the cases mentioned, the tactics of the representatives of the slaveholding interest were the same. . . . If congress was urged to act in any way which did not please them, then slavery was always a 'purely municipal affair.'—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 8.

1798.—Twelfth Amendment to the constitution.—The Twelfth Amendment to the constitution was proclaimed Jan. 8, 1798. See U. S. A., CONSTITUTION OF.

1798.—Organization of Mississippi Territory.—Government similar in form to that of Northwest Territory. See MISSISSIPPI: 1798-1804.

1798.—Alien and sedition laws.—Naturalization Act.—Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.—"The outrages which we suffered from the injustice of England and France gave additional bitterness to the strife between parties at home. The anti-federal press was immoderate in its assaults upon the administration. It so happened that several of the anti-federal papers were conducted by foreigners. Indeed, there were many foreigners in the country whose sympathies were with the French, and their hostility to the administration was open and passionate. The federal leaders determined to crush out by the strong arm of the law these publishers of slanders and fomentors of discontent. Hence the famous 'alien and sedition laws' were passed. The remedy devised was far worse than the disease. It hastened the federal party to its tomb, and was the occasion of the formulation of that unfortunate creed of constitutional construction and of state sovereignty known as the 'Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-99.'—J. S. Landon, *Constitutional history and government of the United States*, lecture 6.—The series of strong measures carried by the Federalists comprised the Naturalization Act of June 18, the Alien Act of June 25, the second Alien Act, of July 6, and the Sedition Act of July 14, 1798.

The text of the Naturalization Act is as follows:

June 18, 1798. Acts of the Fifth Congress, Statute II, Chap. liv.: An Act supplementary to, and to amend the act, intitled "An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject."

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no alien shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United States or of any state unless in the manner prescribed by the act intitled "An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject" he shall have declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, five years, at least, before his admission, and shall, at the time of his application to be admitted, declare and prove, to the satisfaction of the court having jurisdiction in the case, that he has resided within the United States fourteen years, at least, and within the state or territory where, or for which such court is at the time held, five years, at least, besides conforming to the other declarations, renunciations and proofs, by the said act required, anything therein to the contrary hereof notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who was residing within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, before the twenty-ninth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, may, within one year after the passing of this act—and any alien who shall have made the declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, in conformity to the provisions of the act, intitled "An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject," may, within four years after having made the declaration aforesaid, be admitted to become a citizen, in the manner prescribed by the said act, upon his making proof that he has resided five years, at least, within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States: And provided also, that no alien, who shall be a native, citizen, denizen or subject of any nation or state with whom the United States shall be at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen of the United States.

—*Statutes at Large of the United States* (edition of 1850), v. 1, pp. 566-567.

The following is the text of the two Alien Acts:

June 25, 1798. Statute II, Chap. lviii.—An Act Concerning Aliens.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time during the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within such time as shall be expressed in such order, which order shall be served on such alien by delivering him a copy thereof, or leaving the same at his usual abode, and returned to the office of the Secretary of State, by the marshal or other person to whom the same shall be directed. And in case any alien, so ordered to depart, shall be found at large within the United States after the time limited in such order for his departure, and not having obtained a license from the President to reside therein, or having obtained such license shall not have conformed thereto, every such alien shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three years, and shall never after be admitted to become a citizen of the United States. Provided always and be it further enacted, that if any alien

so ordered to depart shall prove to the satisfaction of the President, by evidence to be taken before such person or persons as the President shall direct, who are for that purpose hereby authorized to administer oaths, that no injury or danger to the United States will arise from suffering such alien to reside therein, the President may grant a license to such alien to remain within the United States for such time as he shall judge proper, and at such place as he may designate. And the President may also require of such alien to enter into a bond to the United States, in such penal sum as he may direct, with one or more sufficient sureties to the satisfaction of the person authorized by the President to take the same, conditioned for the good behavior of such alien during his residence in the United States, and not violating his license, which license the President may revoke whenever he shall think proper.

Sect. 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, whenever he may deem it necessary for the public safety, to order to be removed out of the territory thereof, any alien who may or shall be in prison in pursuance of this act; and to cause to be arrested and sent out of the United States such of those aliens as shall have been ordered to depart therefrom and shall not have obtained a license as aforesaid, in all cases where, in the opinion of the President, the public safety requires a speedy removal. And if any alien so removed or sent out of the United States by the President shall voluntarily return thereto unless by permission of the President of the United States, such alien on conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned so long as, in the opinion of the President, the public safety may require.

Sect. 3. And be it further enacted, That every master or commander of any ship or vessel which shall come into any port of the United States after the first day of July next, shall immediately on his arrival make report in writing to the collector, or other chief officer of the customs of such port, of all aliens, if any, on board his vessel, specifying their names, age, the place of nativity, the country from which they shall have come, the nation to which they belong and owe allegiance, their occupation and a description of their persons, as far as he shall be informed thereof, and on failure, every such master and commander shall forfeit and pay three hundred dollars, for the payment whereof on default of such master or commander, such vessel shall also be holden, and may by such collector or other officer of the customs be detained. And it shall be the duty of such collector, or other officer of the customs, forthwith to transmit to the officer of the department of state true copies of all such returns.

Sect. 4. And be it further enacted, That the circuit and district courts of the United States, shall respectively have cognizance of all crimes and offences against this act. And all marshals and other officers of the United States are required to execute all precepts and orders of the President of the United States issued in pursuance or by virtue of this act.

Sect. 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for any alien who may be ordered to be removed from the United States, by virtue of this act, to take with him such part of his goods, chattels, or other property, as he may find convenient; and all property left in the United States by any alien, who may be removed, as aforesaid, shall be, and remain subject to his order and dis-

posal, in the same manner as if this act had not been passed.

Sect. 6. And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue and be in force for and during the term of two years from the passing thereof.

Approved June 25, 1798.

—*Statutes at Large of the United States* (edition of 1850), v. 1, pp. 570-572.

July 6, 1798. Statute II, Chap. lxvi.—An Act respecting Alien Enemies.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion shall be perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States, by any foreign nation or government, and the President of the United States shall make public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies. And the President of the United States shall be, and he is hereby authorized, in any event, as aforesaid, by his proclamation thereof or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States, towards the aliens who shall become liable as aforesaid; the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject, and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of those, who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, shall refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations which shall be found necessary in the premises and for the public safety: Provided, that aliens resident within the United States, who shall become liable as enemies, in the manner aforesaid, and who shall not be chargeable with actual hostility, or other crime against the public safety, shall be allowed for the recovery, disposal, and removal of their goods and effects, and for their departure, the full time which is, or shall be stipulated by any treaty, where any shall have been between the United States and the hostile nation or government, of which they shall be natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects; and when no such treaty shall have existed, the President of the United States may ascertain and declare such reasonable time as may be consistent with the public safety, and according to the dictates of humanity and national hospitality.

Sect. 2. And be it further enacted, That after any proclamation shall be made as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the several courts of the United States, and of each state, having criminal jurisdiction, and of the several judges and justices of the courts of the United States, and they shall be, and are hereby respectively, authorized upon complaint, against any alien or alien enemies, as aforesaid, who shall be resident and at large within such jurisdiction or district, to the danger of the public peace or safety, and contrary to the tenor or intent of such proclamation, or other regulations which the President of the United States shall and may establish in the premises, to cause such alien or aliens to be duly apprehended and convened before such court, judge or justice; and after a full examination and hearing on such complaint,



and sufficient cause therefor appearing, shall and may order such alien or aliens to be removed out of the territory of the United States, or to give such sureties for their good behaviour, or to be otherwise restrained, conformably to the proclamation or regulations which shall or may be established as aforesaid, and may imprison, or otherwise secure such alien or aliens, until the order which shall and may be made, as aforesaid, shall be performed.

Sect. 3. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the marshal of the district in which any alien enemy shall be apprehended, who by the President of the United States, or by the order of any court, judge or justice, as aforesaid, shall be required to depart, and to be removed, as aforesaid, to provide therefor, and to execute such order, by himself or his deputy, or other discreet person or persons to be employed by him, by causing a removal of such alien out of the territory of the United States; and for such removal the marshal shall have the warrant of the President of the United States, or of the court, judge or justice ordering the same, as the case may be.

Approved July 6, 1798.

—*Statutes at Large of the United States* (edition of 1850), v. 1, p. 577.

The text of the Sedition Act is as follows:

JULY 14, 1798. Chap. lxxiv.—An Act in addition to the act, entitled "An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States."

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That if any persons shall unlawfully combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the government of the United States which are or shall be directed by proper authority, or to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person holding a place or office in or under the government of the United States, from undertaking, performing or executing, his trust or duty; and if any person or persons, with intent as aforesaid, shall counsel, advise, or attempt to procure any insurrection riot, unlawful assembly, or combination, whether such conspiracy, threatening, counsel, advice or attempt shall have the proposed effect, or not, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on conviction before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars and by imprisonment during a term not less than six months nor exceeding five years; and further at the discretion of the court may be holden to find sureties for his good behavior in such sum, and for such time, as the said court may direct.

Sect. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written printed, uttered or published or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either, or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combina-

tions therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States, and one in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government, then such person being thereof convicted before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

Sect. 3. And be it further enacted and declared, That if any person shall be prosecuted under this act, for the writing or publishing any libel aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give in evidence in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.

Sect. 4. And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue and be in force until the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and one, and no longer: Provided that the expiration of the act shall not prevent or defeat a prosecution and punishment of any offence against the law, during the time it shall be in force.

Approved July 14, 1798.

"There has been a general effort on the part of biographers to clear their respective heroes from all responsibility for these ill-fated measures. The truth is, that they had the full support of the congressmen and senators who passed them, of the President who signed them, and of all the leaders in the States, who almost all believed in them; and they also met with very general acceptance by the party in the North. Hamilton went as far in the direction of sustaining the principles of these laws as any one. He had too acute a mind to believe with many of the staunch Federalist divines of New England, that Jefferson and Madison were Marats and Robespierres, and that their followers were Jacobins who, when they came to power, were ready for the overthrow of religion and society, and were prepared to set up a guillotine and pour out blood in the waste places of the federal city. But he did believe, and so wrote to Washington, after the appearance of the X. Y. Z. letters that there was a party in the country ready to 'new model' the constitution on French principles, to form an offensive and defensive alliance with France, and make the United States a French province. He felt, in short, that there was a party in America ready for confiscation and social confusion. A year later, in 1790, he wrote to Dayton, the speaker of the national House of Representatives, a long letter in which he set forth very clearly the policy which he felt ought to be pursued. He wished to give strength to the government, and increase centralization by every means, by an extension of the national judiciary, a liberal system of internal improvements, an increased and abundant revenue, an enlargement of the army and navy, permanence in the laws for the volunteer army, extension of the powers of the general government, subdivision of the States, as soon as practicable, and finally a strong sedition law, and the power to banish aliens. This was what was termed at that day a 'strong and spirited' policy; it would now be called repressive, but by whatever

name it is designated, it was the policy of Hamilton, and is characteristic of both his talents and temperament. Except as to the subdivision of States, it was carried out pretty thoroughly in all its main features by the Federalists. The alien and sedition laws, although resisted in Congress, did not much affect public opinion at the elections which immediately ensued, and the Federalists came into the next Congress with a large majority."—H. C. Lodge, *Alexander Hamilton*, ch. 9.—"The different portions of the country were affected according to the dominant political opinion. Where the Federalists were strong political feeling bore them headlong into prosecutions under the new powers. In the Republican States a sense of injury and danger went hand in hand, and the question of the hour was how to repel the threatening destruction. Mr. Jefferson did not fail to see that the great opportunity for his party had come. His keen political sagacity detected in an instant the fatal mistake the administration had made, and he began at once to look about him for the best means to turn his opponents' mistake to his own advantage. Naturally he felt some delicacy in appearing too forward in assailing a government of which he himself was the second in office. Nevertheless he lent himself willingly to the task of organizing, in a quiet way, a systematic assault upon these laws of Congress, and at once opened a correspondence calculated to elicit the best judgment of his coadjutors and gradually drew out a programme of action. Virginia was by no means unanimous in reprobating these laws. She had a large and influential body of Federalists. . . . But the influence of Jefferson was paramount and the result of Jeffersonian principles soon appeared on every hand. Meetings were held in many of the counties upon their county court days at which were adopted addresses or series of resolutions condemning or praying for the repeal of these laws. . . . New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania sent petitions of appeal to Congress. . . . But it was in Kentucky that the greatest resistance was evoked. The feeling in that State was, indeed, little short of frenzy, and a singular unanimity was displayed even in the most extreme acts and sentiments. This grew out of no passing passion. It was based upon the most vigorous elements in her character as a people. Kentucky was at this time somewhat apart from the rest of the Union. . . . Her complaints, just and unjust, had been many, but hitherto she had not gained the nation's ear. But the time was now ripe for her to assert herself."—E. D. Warfield, *Kentucky Resolutions of 1798*, ch. 1.—The famous Kentucky Resolutions, substantially drafted by Jefferson, as he acknowledged fifteen years afterwards, but introduced in the Legislature of Kentucky by John Breckenridge, on November 8, 1798, were adopted by that body, in the lower branch on the 10th and in the upper on the 13th. Approved by the Governor on the 16th, they were immediately printed and copies officially sent to every other state and to members of Congress. They were as follows:

I. Resolved, that the several states composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their General Government; but that by compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States and of amendments thereto, they constituted a General Government for special purposes, delegated to that Government certain definite powers, reserving each state to itself, the residuary mass

of right to their own self Government; and that whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and are of no force: That to this compact each state acceded as a state, and is an integral party, its co-states forming as to itself, the other party: That the Government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.

II. Resolved, that the Constitution of the United States having delegated to Congress a power to punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, piracies and felonies committed on the High Seas, and offences against the laws of nations, and no other crimes whatever, and it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, "that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people," therefore also the same act of Congress passed on the 14th day of July, 1798, and entitled "An act in addition to the act entitled an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States"; as also the act passed by them on the 27th of June, 1798, entitled "An act to punish frauds committed on the Bank of the United States" (and all other their acts which assume to create, define, or punish crimes other than those enumerated in the constitution) are altogether void and of no force, and that the power to create, define, and punish such other crimes is reserved, and of right appertains solely and exclusively to the respective states, each within its own Territory.

III. Resolved, that it is true as a general principle, and is also expressly declared by one of the amendments to the Constitution that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people"; and that no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press being delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states, or to the people: That thus was manifested their determination to retain to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom and how far those abuses which cannot be separated from their use, should be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed; and thus also they guarded against all abridgement by the United States of the freedom of religious opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right of protecting the same, as this state by a Law passed on the general demand of its Citizens, had already protected them from all human restraint or interference; and that in addition to this general principle and express declaration, another and more special provision has been made by one of the amendments to the Constitution which expressly declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an Establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," thereby guard-

ing in the same sentence and under the same words, the freedom of religion, of speech and of the press, inasmuch, that whatever violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that libels, falsehoods, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion are withheld from the cognizance of federal tribunals. That therefore the act of the Congress of the United States passed on the 14th day of July, 1798, entitled "An act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," which does abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is altogether void and of no effect.

IV. Resolved, that alien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws of the state wherein they are; that no power over them has been delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the individual states distinct from their power over citizens; and it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states respectively or to the people," the act of the Congress of the United States passed on the 22d day of June, 1798, entitled "An act concerning aliens," which assumes power over alien friends not delegated by the Constitution, is not law, but is altogether void and of no force.

V. Resolved, that in addition to the general principle as well as the express declaration, that powers not delegated are reserved, another and more special provision inserted in the Constitution from abundant caution has declared, "that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808." That this Commonwealth does admit the migration of alien friends described as the subject of the said act concerning aliens; that a provision against prohibiting their migration, is a provision against all acts equivalent thereto, or it would be nugatory; that to remove them when migrated is equivalent to a prohibition of their migration, and is therefore contrary to the said provision of the Constitution, and void.

VI. Resolved, that the imprisonment of a person under the protection of the Laws of this Commonwealth on his failure to obey the simple order of the President to depart out of the United States, as is undertaken by the said act entitled "An act concerning aliens," is contrary to the Constitution, one amendment to which has provided that "no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law," and that another having provided "that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence," the same act undertaking to authorize the President to remove a person out of the United States who is under the protection of the Law, on his own suspicion, without accusation, without jury, without public trial without confrontation of the witnesses against him without having witnesses in his favour, without defence, without counsel, is contrary to these provisions also of the Constitution, is therefore not law but utterly void and of no force. That transferring the power of judging any person who is under the protection of the laws, from the

Courts to the President of the United States, as is undertaken by the same act concerning Aliens, is against the article of the Constitution which provides, that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in Courts, the Judges of which shall hold their offices during good behaviour," and that the said act is void for that reason also; and that it is further to be noted, that this transfer of Judiciary powers is to that magistrate of the General Government who already possesses all the Executive, and a qualified negative in all the Legislative power.

VII. Resolved, that the construction applied by the General Government (as is evinced by sundry of their proceedings) to those parts of the Constitution of the United States which delegate to Congress a power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any department thereof, goes to the destruction of all the limits prescribed to their power by the Constitution—That words meant by that instrument to be subsidiary only to the execution of the limited powers, ought not to be so construed as themselves to give unlimited powers, nor a part so to be taken, as to destroy the whole residue of the instrument: That the proceedings of the General Government under colour of these articles, will be a fit and necessary subject for revisal and correction at a time of greater tranquillity, while those specified in the preceding resolutions call for immediate redress.

VIII. Resolved, that the preceding Resolutions be transmitted to the Senators and Representatives in Congress from this Commonwealth, who are hereby enjoined to present the same to their respective Houses, and to use the best endeavours to procure at the next session of Congress, a repeal of the aforesaid unconstitutional and obnoxious acts.

IX. Resolved lastly, that the Governor of this Commonwealth be, and is hereby authorised and requested to communicate the preceding Resolutions to the Legislatures of the several States, to assure them that this Commonwealth considers Union for specified National purposes, and particularly for those specified in their late Federal compact, to be friendly to the peace, happiness, and prosperity of all the states: that faithful to that compact, according to the plain intent and meaning in which it was understood and acceded to by the several parties, it is sincerely anxious for its preservation: that it does also believe, that to take from the states all the powers of self government, and transfer them to a general and consolidated Government, without regard to the special delegations and reservations solemnly agreed to in that compact, is not for the peace, happiness, or prosperity of these states: And that therefore, this Commonwealth is determined, as it doubts not its Co-states are, tamely to submit to undelegated and consequently unlimited powers in no man or body of men on earth: that if the acts before specified should stand, these conclusions would flow from them; that the General Government may place any act they think proper on the list of crimes and punish it themselves, whether enumerated or not enumerated by the Constitution as cognizable by them: that they may transfer its cognizance to the President or any other person,

who may himself be the accuser, counsel, judge, and jury, whose suspicions may be the evidence, his order the sentence, his officer the executioner, and his breast the sole record of the transaction: that a very numerous and valuable description of the inhabitants of these states, being by this precedent reduced as outlaws to the absolute dominion of one man and the barrier of the Constitution thus swept away from us all, no rampart now remains against the passions and the power of a majority of Congress, to protect from a like exportation or other more grievous punishment the minority of the same body, the Legislatures, Judges, Governors, and Counsellors of the states, nor their other peaceable inhabitants who may venture to reclaim the constitutional rights and liberties of the states and people, or who for other causes, good or bad, may be obnoxious to the views or marked by the suspicions of the President, or be thought dangerous to his or their elections or other interests public or personal; that the friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first experiment: but the citizen will soon follow, or rather has already followed; for already has a Sedition Act marked him as its prey: that these and successive acts of the same character, unless arrested on the threshold, may tend to drive these states into revolution and blood, and will furnish new calumnies against Republican Governments, and new pretexs for those who wish it to be believed that man cannot be governed but by a rod of iron: that it would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety of our rights: that confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism: free government is founded in jealousy and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited Constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power: that our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which and no further our confidence may go; and let the honest advocate of confidence read the Alien and Sedition Acts, and say if the Constitution has not been wise in fixing limits to the Government it created, and whether we should be wise in destroying those limits? Let him say that the Government is if it be not a tyranny, which the men of our choice have conferred on the President, and the President of our choice has assented to and accepted over the friendly strangers, to whom the mild spirit of our Country and its laws had pledged hospitality and protection: that the men of our choice have more respected the bare suspicions of the President than the solid rights of innocence, the claims of justification, the sacred force of truth, and the forms and subsistence of law and justice. In questions of power then let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution. That this Commonwealth does therefore call on its Co-states for an expression of their sentiments on the acts concerning Aliens, and for the punishment of certain crimes herein-before specified, plainly declaring whether these acts are or are not authorized by the Federal Compact? And it doubts not that their sense will be so announced as to prove their attachment unaltered to limited Government, whether general or particular, and that the rights and liberties of their Co-states will be exposed to no dangers by remaining embarked on a common bottom with their own: That they will concur with this Commonwealth in considering the said acts so palpably against the Constitution as to amount to an un-

disguised declaration, that the compact is not meant to be the measure of the powers of the General Government, but that it will proceed in the exercise over these states of all powers whatsoever: That they will view this as seizing the rights of the states and consolidating them in the hands of the General Government with a power assumed to bind the states (not merely in cases made federal) but in all cases whatsoever, by laws made, not with their consent, but by others against their consent: That this would be to surrender the form of Government we have chosen, and to live under one deriving its powers from its own will, and not from our authority; and that the Co-states recurring to their natural right in cases not made federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force, and will each unite with this Commonwealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress.

In the month following this declaration from Kentucky, on December 21, Virginia affirmed substantially the same threatening doctrine, more temperately and cautiously set forth in resolutions drawn by Madison as follows:

Resolved, that the General Assembly of Virginia doth unequivocally express a firm resolution to maintain and defend the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of this state against every aggression, either foreign or domestic, and that they will support the government of the United States in all measures warranted by the former.

That this Assembly most solemnly declares a warm attachment to the union of the states, to maintain which, it pledges all its powers; and that for this end it is their duty to watch over and oppose every infraction of those principles which constitute the only basis of that union, because a faithful observance of them can alone secure its existence, and the public happiness.

That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views the powers of the Federal Government, as resulting from the compact, to which the states are parties; as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact; as no farther valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact, and that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.

That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret that a spirit has in sundry instances, been manifested by the Federal Government, to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional charter which defines them; and that indications have appeared of a design to expound certain general phrases (which having been copied from the very limited grant of powers in the former articles of confederation were the less liable to be misconstrued), so as to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular enumeration, which necessarily explains and limits the general phrases; and so as to consolidate the states by degrees into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable consequence of which would be to transform the present republican system of the United States into an absolute, or at best a mixed monarchy.

That the General Assembly doth particularly protest against the palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of the "Alien and Sedition Acts," passed at the last session of Congress, the first of which exercises a power nowhere delegated to the Federal Government; and which by uniting legislative and judicial powers to those of executive, subverts the general principles of free government, as well as the particular organization and positive provisions of the federal constitution: and the other of which acts, exercises in like manner a power not delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto; a power which more than any other ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.

That this state having by its convention which ratified the federal constitution, expressly declared, "that among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by any authority of the United States," and from its extreme anxiety to guard these rights from every possible attack of sophistry or ambition, having with other states recommended an amendment for that purpose, which amendment was in due time annexed to the constitution, it would mark a reproachful inconsistency and criminal degeneracy, if an indifference were now shown to the most palpable violation of one of the rights thus declared and secured, and to the establishment of a precedent which may be fatal to the other.

That the good people of this commonwealth having ever felt and continuing to feel the most sincere affection to their brethren of the other states, the truest anxiety for establishing and perpetuating the union of all, and the most scrupulous fidelity to that constitution which is the pledge of mutual friendship, and the instrument of mutual happiness: The General Assembly doth solemnly appeal to the like dispositions of the other states, in confidence that they will concur with this commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the acts aforesaid are unconstitutional, and that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each for co-operating with this state, in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights, and liberties, reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

That the Governor be desired to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to the executive authority of each of the other states, with a request, that the same may be communicated to the legislature thereof.

And that a copy be furnished to each of the Senators and Representatives, representing this state in the Congress of the United States.

In later years, after Calhoun and his school had pushed these doctrines to their logical conclusion, Madison shrank from the result, and endeavored to disown the apparent meaning of what Jefferson had written and he had seemed to endorse in 1798. He denounced Nullification and Secession as "twin heresies," and denied that they were contained or implied in the resolutions of 1798—either those adopted in Kentucky or the responsive ones written by himself for the legislature of Virginia. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were followed in 1799 by another series, in which the right of a sovereign state to nullify obnoxious laws of the

Federal government was no longer asserted by implication, but was put into plain terms—as follows: "That the principle and construction, contended for by sundry of the state legislatures, that the general government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop not short of despotism,—since the discretion of those who administer the government, and not the Constitution, would be the measure of their powers: That the several states who formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of the infraction; and, That a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument, is the rightful remedy." It was Mr. Madison's desire to cast on these resolutions of 1799, with which Jefferson had nothing to do, the odium of the nullification doctrine, and to remove the stigma from the resolutions of 1798, in which the word "nullification" makes no appearance; "neither that," pleaded Madison, "nor any equivalent term." But, when Madison made this plea, in 1830, "it was not then generally known, whether Mr. Madison knew it or not that one of the resolutions and part of another which Jefferson wrote to be offered in the Kentucky legislature in 1798 were omitted by Mr. Nicholas [to whom Jefferson had entrusted them], and that therein was the assertion . . . 'where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy.' The next year, when additional resolutions were offered by Mr. Breckenridge, this idea in similar, though not in precisely the same language, was presented [as quoted above]. . . . In 1832, this fact, on the authority of Jefferson's grandson and executor, was made public; and further, that another declaration of Mr. Jefferson's in the resolution not used was an exhortation to the co-States 'that each will take measures of its own for providing that neither these acts nor any others of the general government, not plainly and intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shall be exercised within their respective territories.'"—S. H. Gay, *James Madison*, ch. 15.—"The publication of the Kentucky resolutions . . . was instantly followed by a new crop of remonstrances and petitions from the people. . . . Such memorials as reached the House were sent to a committee who, late in February, reported. . . . The report closed with three resolutions, and these were: that it was not in the interest of the public good to repeal either the Alien Law, or the Sedition Law, or any of the laws respecting the army, the navy, or the revenue of the United States. On the twenty-fifth of February the House being in Committee of the Whole, the three resolutions were taken up one by one" and adopted. "The House then agreed to the action of the committee on each of the three resolutions. The Federal party was now at the height of its prosperity and power. It controlled the Senate. It controlled the House. Outwardly it was great and powerful, but within that dispute had begun which, in a few short months, drove Pickering and M'Henry from the Cabinet, split the party in twain, and gave to the country the strange spectacle of staunch and earnest Federalists wrangling and contending and overwhelming each other with abuse."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 11.—See also CENSORSHIP: United States.

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson* v. 2, ch. 8.—James Madison, *Works*, v. 4.—Thomas Jefferson, *Works*, v. 7, p. 220; and v. 0, pp. 464-471.—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history*

of the United States, v. 1, p. 148.—J. T. Morse, *Life of Hamilton*, v. 2, ch. 6.

1798.—Navy department created. See NAVY DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES: Origin.

1798-1799.—Commercial relations with Russia. See RUSSIA: 1796-1801.

1798-1810.—Events leading up to intervention in West Florida.—Its independence declared.—Confusion and anarchy. See FLORIDA: 1798-1810.

1799.—Death of Washington.—A great sorrow fell upon the country, with a shock of surprise, in the last month of the year. Washington was stricken with a suddenly fatal disease, and died after an illness of two days. On December 12 he seemed to be in perfect health, but exposed himself to a cold rain that day, in a long ride about his estate. The next day he had a slight sore throat, and in the night he suffered difficulty in breathing, which followed a severe chill. Physicians were called on the morning of the 14th, who bled him copiously, according to the medical practice of that day. His struggle for breath increased steadily, and he knew that it meant death, facing the prospect with great calmness and thoughtfully arranging his affairs. He was conscious to the end, which came about ten o'clock that night. It is now understood that Washington's disease (which the physicians then called quinsy) was what is known as acute œdematous laryngitis, which might have been overcome by an operation of tracheotomy.—H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, v. 2, ch. 6.

1799-1801.—Expedition of Nolan into Texas.—Results. See TEXAS: 1799-1821.

19th century.—Development of education.—Commercial education.—Industrial schools.—Public school system.—Secondary education.—Training of teachers.—Indian education. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Beginning of commercial education; 19th century: Industrial education; 19th century: United States: Evolution of public school system; Secondary education; Training of teachers; Modern developments: 20th century: General education: United States: North American Indians.

19th century.—Growth of capitalism.—Industrial development. See CAPITALISM: 19th century: United States; INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: United States.

19th-20th centuries.—Educational development.—Spread of kindergartens. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th-20th centuries: Spread of kindergartens.

19th-20th centuries.—Growth and decline of the whaling industry.—Introduction of clippers. See COMMERCE: Commercial age: 1820-1920.

1800.—Creation of Indiana Territory. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1788-1802.

1800.—Establishment of Library of Congress. See LIBRARIES: Modern: United States; Library of Congress.

1800.—General state of the country at the opening of the nineteenth century.—“About ninety-five per cent. of the inhabitants lived in villages or the open country. The Atlantic coast region was one vast stretch of forests and farms. On the river-banks near the coast, and in the south in particular, much of the land had been cleared for cultivation; in the interior the cleared patches were smaller. . . . The great planters of the south dominated the communities in which they lived; they were most numerous along the coasts where the lands were richest. They were people of education, and their ideals were broader than those

of the men of the interior. Many of them were Republicans on philosophical grounds and because they favored France; but the majority were Federalists. All of them, whatever their politics, were aristocrats in their social ideals. In the middle states the medium class and small farmers constituted the mass of the population. They were less isolated than the dwellers in the interior parts of the south, for the forest had yielded more of itself to the aggression of the settler. Distances from the large seaports were not so great, and roads were tolerable. Education was somewhat more advanced, churches were more numerous, ideals were less provincial. In New England the forest had disappeared to a much larger extent, chiefly because of the lumber and ship-building industries. Villages were grouped along the edges of the bays, sounds, and various small streams; and around them lay the little farms upon which, with much labor, the food of the community was raised. The country was thickly settled compared with other sections, roads were better, houses were more attractively built, and the educational spirit was more generally developed than anywhere else in the country. Towns were placed chiefly on the sea-coast and at the heads of navigation of the rivers. Commerce was their only support; for the days of the manufacturing towns had not yet come. The larger places attracted the foreign commerce. The smaller towns looked to the larger ones, sending thither the products which they had gathered from the surrounding communities and distributing the imported goods which they received from the seaports. [See also COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1820-1920.] Most of the towns were north of the Potomac. In 1790 Richmond, the largest town in Virginia, numbered 3761; and Norfolk, Petersburg, and Alexandria were the only other towns in the state with a population of two thousand or more. In North Carolina, Charleston had a population of about fifteen thousand, and was the centre of a large trade in rice and slaves. . . . Boston, long one of the most remarkable of colonial cities, showed signs of lagging. Its population increased from eighteen thousand in 1790 to twenty-five thousand in 1800. This is accounted for partly because of the restrictions brought about by the Revolution, and partly because it had no such monopoly of trade in its neighborhood as Philadelphia and New York. Its opportunity came when it became the fiscal centre of New England manufacturing; but the day for that had not yet arrived. One of the remarkable features of town development in the period was the growth of Baltimore. Long a sleepy colonial community, it had suddenly awakened to great activity. Its population in 1790 was thirteen thousand; and in 1800, through the development of the Susquehanna Valley, it had reached twenty-six thousand five hundred. In size and in trade it then surpassed Boston. . . . The Ohio was already bordered with towns. From Pittsburg floating westward one came to Wheeling, Marietta, Belpre, Gallipolis, Limestone, Columbia, Newport, Cincinnati, and Louisville. Farther down on the Mississippi were New Madrid and Natchez. . . . Cincinnati, on the north side of the river, looked out into hostile territory, till Wayne's victory in 1794 removed that danger. In 1795 came the treaty with Spain, by which the navigation of the Mississippi was secured. Nothing now stood in the way of the dreams of the westerners. Whatever might trouble the east, they had the simple task of developing the vast country which was opened to them. The confidence and tumultuous

joy with which they proceeded marked the future character of the people. Never did American frontier shift more quickly and happily into civilized communities than in the rich plains on each side of the Ohio."—J. S. Bassett, *Federalist system, 1789-1801*, pp. 165-169, 175-176.

1800.—Extent of voting reforms.—Secret ballot. See AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: 1882-1916.

1800.—Convention with France and French Spoliation Claims incident to it.—"Although we did not consider ourselves at war with France, we were fighting her. The policy of isolation had been in part deviated from. Were we going to give it up wholly by becoming the ally of England, and so be enmeshed in the general European conflict? There were many circumstances that rendered such an event probable and many men who desired it. The new British minister, Liston, proved pleasing. He won confidence at once, in 1797, by helping to disclose a project of William Blount, senator from Tennessee, for a joint expedition of frontiersmen and the British fleet to seize Louisiana and put it under the control of Great Britain. Impeached by the House of Representatives, Blount resigned to escape conviction, and was promptly elected governor of his state; his plan serves to show how minds in the West were turning. Since Spain was loath to live up to the treaty of 1795, it was becoming doubtful whether that settlement would prove permanent; Great Britain, therefore, in becoming the enemy of Spain, became the natural friend of the frontiersman. . . . In Paris the negotiations, having the good will of Talleyrand and of the rising Bonaparte, progressed rapidly. On September 30, 1800, a convention was concluded. This agreement was generally satisfactory on points relating to navigation. It laid down the French view, which was also the American, with regard to free ships making free goods, and also with regard to contraband. In one point, however, we were obliged to accept the French view, as Jay had accepted the English,—namely, the provision that neutral goods on enemies' vessels might be seized. The chief difficulty lay in the American demand that indemnity be paid for illegal condemnations by the French, on which were based nearly twenty-three hundred sound claims [spoliation claims], and the French demand for the execution of the treaties of 1778 and 1788. The commissioners finally decided to leave these questions for future negotiation 'at a convenient time,' the treaties meanwhile to be inoperative. This proposal the United States Senate amended by the provision that the convention should remain in force for eight years. . . . Thus were disposed of forever the treaties which constituted our first 'entangling alliance.' The advantage that accrued to the nation is obvious. The justice of thus exchanging private claims for national gain has since then many times engaged the attention of Congress, but these particular 'French Spoliation Claims' became henceforth a domestic problem. The end thus arrived at is to be attributed not only to Adams's decision to make peace, but to his willingness . . . to make war. The brief brush with France had, moreover, brought other results. . . . Spain at length, and reluctantly, in March, 1798, evacuated her posts between the Yazoo and the thirty-first parallel, and the United States for the first time actually possessed in full the boundaries awarded her by the peace of 1783. To the achievements noted at the close of Washington's administration, therefore, the Adams administration added that of meeting the most acute crisis that had yet confronted the nation, and of emerging from

it with the fundamental policy of neutrality still intact, and relieved from treaty of complications. It left the affairs of the nation in a condition superficially satisfactory and actually strong."—C. R. Fish, *American diplomacy*, pp. 134, 138-139.—Spoliations committed by the French in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars subsequently to the year 1800, were indemnified under the provisions of the treaty for the Louisiana purchase (see LOUISIANA: 1798-1803); under the treaty with Spain in 1819, and under a later treaty with France which was negotiated in Andrew Jackson's most imperative manner in 1831. These do not enter into what have become historically specialized as the French Spoliation Claims. The claims were finally settled at the end of the century.

ALSO IN: J. R. Soley, *Wars of the United States, 1789-1850 (Narrative and critical history of America, v. 7, ch. 6, and editor's footnote)*.—F. Wharton, *Digest of the international law of the United States, v. 2, sect. 248, pp. 714-728*.—Daniel Webster, *Works, v. 4, pp. 152-178*.—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view, v. 1, ch. 117-120*.—W. H. Seward, *Works, v. 1, pp. 132-155*.—*Report of Secretary of State (49th Congress, 1st session, United States Senate, Executive Documents no. 74, 102)*.—B. Adams, *Convention of 1800 with France (Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Feb., 1911, pp. 377-428)*.

1800.—Seat of government transferred to Washington. See WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1791-1800.

1800.—Second census.—The total population of the United States in 1800 was 5,305,937 (an increase of slightly more than 35 per cent. since 1790), classed and distributed as follows:

	North		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut .....	244,721	5,330	951
Indiana .....	4,577	163	135
Maine .....	150,901	818	....
Massachusetts .....	416,793	6,452	....
New Hampshire.....	182,898	856	8
New Jersey.....	195,125	4,402	12,422
New York.....	556,039	10,374	20,343
Ohio .....	45,028	337	....
Pennsylvania .....	586,094	14,561	1,706
Rhode Island.....	65,437	3,304	381
Vermont .....	153,908	557	....
	2,601,521	47,154	35,946
South			
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Delaware .....	49,852	8,268	6,153
District of Columbia...	10,066	783	3,244
Georgia .....	101,678	1,019	59,404
Kentucky .....	179,871	741	40,343
Maryland .....	216,326	19,587	105,635
Mississippi .....	5,170	182	3,489
North Carolina.....	337,704	7,043	133,296
South Carolina.....	106,255	3,185	146,151
Tennessee .....	91,709	309	13,584
Virginia .....	514,280	20,124	345,796
	1,702,980	61,241	857,095

See also: JEWS: United States: 19th century; STATISTICS: Vital statistics.

1800-1801.—Fourth presidential election.—Significance.—In 1800 "Adams, whom Dr. Franklin aptly described as 'always an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes and in some things

absolutely out of his senses,' was approaching the end of his term as President, and public attention was absorbed in the task of choosing a successor. . . . At the time of Adams's election, a sectional feeling, destined in the future to work so much evil, had already been developed; and he in consequence received from States south of the Potomac but two electoral votes. New York had given him her twelve, yet the entire majority over his competitor was but three in all the colleges. The national parties were not unequally matched in the State; and it was evident that, could its vote be diverted to Jefferson in the next contest, his victory would be assured. Hence, strenuous efforts were made to accomplish this end, and for months society was like a seething caldron. The trouble with France had, for the moment, swelled the numbers of the Federalists, and closed up their ranks; but the capricious course of the President, and the violent disruption of the cabinet, rent them asunder."—W. Whitelock, *Life and times of John Jay*, ch. 22.—"The Jeffersonian Republicans . . . faithfully represented the interests and aspirations of their rural constituency. The abundance of good farm land and the consequent ease of acquiring a livelihood relieved the farmers and planters of the need of governmental tariffs and other financial assistance in their economic life, and caused them to envisage government merely as a sublimated policeman whose sole function was to preserve peace and good order. Hamilton's ingenious scheme of a national bank, tariff system, and complete financial reorganization seemed to them pure class legislation, officious intrusions into a domain of interests where in private citizens could best work out their own salvation. As they watched the Federalists at work, they became embittered against a government which appeared to be working in the interests of a strongly-organized minority; they devised a doctrine of state rights as their strongest bulwark against federal encroachments; and, confident in their numerical superiority, they exalted democracy—control by the majority—as the only proper government for a free people. Their attacks on the entrenched moneyed interests brought to their support the workmen of the towns, as yet an unimportant though growing element of the population. Without the prestige of Washington and the disorganized state of the opposition party, it is doubtful if the Federalists could have retained power as long as they did. With his death they quickly succumbed to the democratic tide."—A. M. Schlesinger, *New viewpoints in American history*, pp. 56-57.—"As the presidential campaign of 1800 approached, it was evident that the election would be bitterly contested. The Federalists had a large majority in Congress, elected during the war fever of 1798. . . . [But], the tireless propaganda of the vice President [Jefferson] and his party managers had begun to bear fruit. A strong Republican majority flourished in New York. . . . [In 1798] Thomas McLean carried the state of Pennsylvania against his Federal opponent. . . . In Massachusetts the vote for the Republican candidate for governor rose from 8,000 in 1797 to over 17,000 in 1800. . . . The Federalist majority in the legislature of Vermont was reduced in the election of 1800 from over 100 to 34. New England still remained in the Federalist column, but the grip of the old aristocracy was loosened. . . . The Federalists labored under severe difficulties. In the exciting days of 1798, Congress had authorized a direct tax of \$2,000,000 on lands, dwellings, and

slaves, supplemented by new stamp duties and a loan of \$5,000,000. . . . [In 1799] the loan was reduced to \$3,500,000. But, falling revenues had reduced the revenue by \$1,000,000, while the expenses of government mounted from \$6,000,000 in 1797 to \$9,300,000 in 1799. The effect of the direct taxes was already beginning to be felt. John Fries, an auctioneer in Pennsylvania, led a riot against [the window tax]. . . . The Republicans made capital out of the economic situation. . . . Monroe scored the government for 'preparing for a war which does not exist.' . . . Their situation was strengthened when the offers of conciliation came from France and Adams appointed his second commission. In February, 1800, enlistments were suspended, and the next month the army was disbanded. Nothing that the Federalist Congress could have done would have contributed more to the success of the Republicans than these acts. . . . Political intrigue was added to frenzied electioneering. Pennsylvania was a Republican state, but the Federalists, who had a majority in the upper House, refused to concur in the choice of electors by joint ballot until they were assured of seven of the fifteen electoral votes of the state. In New York, Aaron Burr, by the cleverest arts of the political manager, had secured the election of a Republican delegation from New York City to the legislature in the spring of 1800. This insured a majority in the new legislature (which was to choose the presidential electors) for Jefferson and Burr. Hamilton then wrote a letter to Governor Jay begging him to reconvene the old legislature and have it hastily pass a law providing for the choice of the New York electors by districts, so that at least four or five of its electoral votes might be saved for the Federalists. 'No scruples of delicacy and propriety,' wrote Hamilton, 'ought to hinder the taking of a legal and constitutional step to prevent an atheist in religion and a fanatic in politics from getting possession of the helm of state.' The honorable governor filed the letter away with the simple endorsement, 'Proposing a measure for party purposes which it would not become me to adopt.' New York's vote went to Jefferson, and with it the election. The immense significance of the election of 1800 in our history has often been overlooked. . . . The triumph of Jefferson at the polls was the indorsement of a process of political education, which had been going on, under his chief leadership, for a decade—an education in democracy. The Federalists were without faith in the people. For them government belonged by right to 'the rich, the well-born, and the able,' whom the people were to 'venerate.' . . . The suffrage was narrowed by property qualifications and religious tests. In New England 'magistrates were often chosen by one-twentieth of the legal voters.' The few families who assumed leadership during the Revolution had acquired 'an unrepudiated ascendancy,' which made them 'regard any opposition as actual rebellion against the reigning powers.' They refused to recognize the Republicans as a legitimate party, calling them 'insurgents,' . . . [tempted] 'to wish to manage the affairs of the nation,' instead of submitting themselves to those who were 'over them in the Lord.' As against this debasing doctrine of tutelage the Republicans vindicated the principles of the Declaration of Independence. 'There was a time in this country,' wrote a Republican journalist, 'when God had created all men equal . . . but the new creation of Federalism



... has created four or five hundred gentlemen having entire right to rule and reign.' The Jeffersonian doctrine of 'the cherishment of the people' conceived of the government . . . as the people itself acting in its political capacity. It necessitated the greatest diffusion of power among a progressively educated body of citizens. . . . The people should be roused to 'an universal attention to the duty of election.' A jealous watch on their rulers was their only guarantee of freedom. Their liberties were too precious to delegate to an aristocracy. The propagation of this democracy was the Jeffersonian campaign, and the election of 1800 was but its culmination. The enormous growth of the vote even in New England, out of all proportion to the growth in population, was a witness to the progress of the Jeffersonian ideal, for the figures show that the Republican vote was not taken away from the Federalists but was rather added to theirs. . . . The people woke to their privileges and responsibilities. [See also SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1800-1864.] 'Now the Revolution of 1776 is complete,' said the *Aurora* on the morning after the election. Since 1800 no political party in our land . . . has made its appeal to any less comprehensive electorate than the whole body of American freemen."—D. S. Muzzev, *The United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 202-203.—"Jefferson and Burr had received the same electoral vote [73. Adams received 65.] Every Republican had intended Jefferson for President and Burr for second place; but, under the clumsy provisions of the Constitution the election between these two was now left to the old House of Representatives, in which the Federalists had their expiring war majority. Accordingly the Federalists planned to create a deadlock and prevent any election until after March 4. Then they could . . . elect the presiding officer of the old Senate as President of the country. Jefferson wrote at the time that they were kept from this attempt only by definite threats that it would be the signal for the Middle States [Virginia and Pennsylvania] to arm and call a convention to revise the Constitution."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 333-334.—"When the house came to act, Jefferson had eight of the sixteen states and Burr had six, two being divided. Then Hamilton showed that moral quality which raised him in crises above party. He disliked Jefferson, but believed him better than Burr, whom he well knew to be faithless to promises. Through his efforts the federalist representatives from Vermont, Delaware and Maryland were induced to refrain from voting, and on the thirty-sixth ballot, February 17, 1801, Jefferson received the votes of ten states and was declared president-elect. Burr never forgave Hamilton his part in the election, and, although vice-president, was thenceforth an ill-disposed partner in the republican administration. This situation, which caused so much anxiety at the time, was responsible for the adoption of the twelfth amendment, 1804 [see below: 1802-1804], by which electors voted specifically for president and vice-president."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 290-291.—The new president was inaugurated with a simplicity which comported with his surroundings in the unfinished state of the capital. "At twelve o'clock, March 4, 1801 . . . [he] left his lodgings and walked across the square to the partly finished Capitol. In this progress he was accompanied by the secretaries of the navy and treasury, who represented the outgoing administration, some notable personages, and a few political friends,

while the militia from the neighborhood furnished an escort. As he ascended the steps of the Capitol, a discharge of artillery was made. . . . Entering the Senate chamber, he took the vice-president's chair. On one side was Aaron Burr, the new vice-president, on the other was John Marshall, the new chief justice of the supreme court of the United States [who had taken office only a month before.] It was an interesting group, doubly interesting indeed, because probably in the whole country there could not have been found three men who more thoroughly detested and distrusted one another than Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall and Aaron Burr."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1801-1811*, pp. 3-4.—"With all his outward simplicity the Virginian magnate and man of letters, though he might be a Republican, could not in himself be a true embodiment of democracy. He was the friend of the people, but not one of them. . . . The desired day had come when the philosopher was to govern. The words of the address which Jefferson . . . read in a very low voice, are the expression by its great master and archetype of the republican idea which has hitherto reigned supreme in the mind of the American people. These words are monumental, 'Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies, the preservation of the general government in its whole constitutional vigour, as the sheet-anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the People; a mild and safe correction of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which there is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the first movements in war, till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the public expense, that labour may be lightly burdened; the honest payment of our debts, and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid, the diffusion of information, and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reason; freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the "habeas corpus," and trial by jurors impartially selected;— these principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation.' Jefferson's wand was the pen. Yet he is strangely apt to fall into mixed metaphors and even into platitudes. This address had not escaped criticism."—Goldwin Smith, *United States*, ch. 3.—"Jefferson had reached the presidential chair at a most fortunate moment. . . . The prospect of a speedy peace in Europe promised effectual and permanent relief from those serious embarrassments to which, during war on the ocean, American commerce was ever exposed from the aggressions of one or all of the belligerents. The treasury was fuller, the revenue more abundant than at any previous period. Commerce was flourishing, and the pecuniary prosperity of the country very great. All the responsibility of framing institutions, laying taxes, and providing for debts, had fallen on the ousted administration.

Succeeding to the powers and the means of the Federal government without sharing any of the unpopularity at the expense of which they had been attained, and ambitious not so much of a splendid as of a quiet and popular administration, the new president seemed to have before him a very plain and easy path. . . . To the offices of Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Attorney General, left vacant by the resignation of the late incumbents, Jefferson nominated James Madison, Henry Dearborn, and Levi Lincoln, the latter an early leader of the opposition in Massachusetts. . . . As the Senate stood at present, still containing, as it did, of the members present a majority of Federalists, Jefferson did not think proper to make any further nominations; but, soon after the adjournment, he appointed as Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, all along the financial member of the opposition. . . . The Navy Department, after being refused by Chancellor Livingston, was given to Robert Smith, brother of the Baltimore member of Congress. Livingston, however, having reached the age of sixty, and being obliged, under a Constitutional provision, to vacate the chancellorship of New York, consented to accept the embassy to France. . . . Habersham was continued as post-master-general for some six months, . . . but he presently gave way to Gideon Granger, a leader of the Connecticut Republicans."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States, 2d series, ch. 16* (v. 2, or v. 5 of whole work).—He "made less than twenty removals for political reasons, mostly of marshals and district attorneys. The rest of the removals of his time were for misconduct in office. On March 4, 1801, there were 385 officials who were subject to removal by the president. Of these 183 were still in office March 4, 1805. On the other hand, when it fell to Jefferson's lot to appoint a full set of commissioners of bankruptcy under the act of 1801, he distributed them impartially between Republicans and Federalists."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1800-1801*, pp. 9, 11, 17.—"The federal offices were held by Federalists almost to a man. He hoped he would have to make only a few removals; any other course would expose him to the charge of inconsistency after his complacent statement that there was no fundamental difference between Republicans and Federalists. But his followers thought otherwise; they wanted the spoils of victory and they meant to have them. Slowly and reluctantly Jefferson yielded to pressure, justifying himself as he did so by the reflection that a due participation in office was a matter of right. . . . Once removals were decided upon, Jefferson drifted helplessly upon the tide. For a moment, it is true, he wrote hopefully about establishing an equilibrium and then returning 'with joy to that state of things when the only questions concerning a candidate shall be: Is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?' That blessed expectation was never realized. By the end of his second term, a Federalist in office was as rare as a Republican under Adams."—A. Johnson, *Jefferson and his colleagues (Chronicles of America)*, p. 22.

ALSO IN: H. J. Ford, *Washington and his colleagues (Chronicles of America, v. 14, pp. 222-226)*.—E. Channing, *History of the United States, v. 4, pp. 211-220, 238-258*.—C. A. Beard, *Economic origins of Jeffersonian democracy, pp. 382-387*.—T. E. Watson, *Life and times of Thomas Jefferson*.—G. Hunt, *Office-seeking during Jefferson's administration (American Historical Review, Jan., 1898, pp.*

270-201).—J. Fiske, *How the United States became a nation, p. 50*.—A. Johnson, *Union and democracy, pp. 118, 128-132*.

1800-1803.—Treaty of San Ildefonso.—Effect of news of treaty, in 1801, upon Jefferson's policy.—Importance to Mississippi river.—Settlements in Mississippi valley.—Fears of probable effect of French possession of Louisiana.—Appointment of Monroe as special envoy to France.—"Americans could put up with the exclusion from the lower Mississippi and the Gulf, so long as that territory was in the hands of weak and declining Spain. European wars and treaties now began, however, to have far reaching effects, extending to the New World; for in 1795 and 1796 the French government began to urge upon Spain the transfer of the former French province of Louisiana; and actually secured the cession of the Spanish end of the island of San Domingo. No progress was made until 1800, when Napoleon's representative courteously suggested that 'the court of Spain will do then at once a wise and a great act if it calls France to the defence of its colonies by adding Louisiana to them, and by replacing in their hands this outpost of its richest possession in the New World.' Yet some consideration had to be offered even by the world-conquering power, and France proposed to make the son-in-law and daughter of the king of Spain king and queen of the new realm of Etruria. Upon this basis was concluded the Treaty of San Ildefonso, of October, 1800, by which Louisiana was ceded to France, 'with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be in conformity with the treaties entered into between Spain and other states.'"—A. B. Hart, *Foundations of American foreign policy, pp. 186-187*.—"Jefferson was an expansionist. His interest in the country west of the Alleghenies, and even in the great wilderness beyond the Mississippi, was constant from the earliest days of the republic. It was he who drafted the Ordinance of 1784 . . . [and] in the famous Northwest Ordinance, had set the impress of his genius on a policy of territorial government which was to endure for a century. . . . He regarded the English settlements on the Atlantic coast as 'the nest from which America north and south was to be peopled' and foresaw a republic of a hundred million in the great western continent. He had not been in the presidency ten weeks before news came from our minister in London, Rufus King, of [the Treaty of San Ildefonso]. The circumstance was inauspicious for several reasons. It meant the establishment of the strongest and richest of the European countries as a colonial power on our borders. . . . It meant the substitution of the restless and unpredictable ambition of Napoleon Bonaparte in the Western Hemisphere for the supine and dilatory policy of the court of Spain. It meant the control of the Mississippi, through the possession of New Orleans, by a power no more friendly than Spain to the United States, but infinitely more able to paralyze our commerce on the great river. Since the few thousands of pioneers had followed Boone, Sevier, Harrod, and Robertson across the mountains in the days of the Confederation, our Western settlements had grown apace. The opening of the nineteenth century saw some 50,000 farmers established in the rich bottom lands along the Ohio River and its northern tributaries. A hundred thousand immigrants had beaten the buffalo paths and Indian trails of Tennessee into pack roads and begun clearing the hickory





**THE UNITED STATES**

SHOWING ITS TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

- ORIGINAL TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE PEACE OF PARIS 1783
- PROVINCE OF LOUISIANA ACQUIRED FROM FRANCE BY PURCHASE 1803 THE NORTH WESTERN BOUNDARY OF LOUISIANA EXTENDED TO THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY WAS ADJUSTED WITH GREAT BRITAIN BY TREATY OF 1818 AND THE REMAINDER OF THE WESTERN BOUNDARY WAS ARRANGED WITH SPAIN BY TREATY OF 1819
- FLORIDA ACQUIRED FROM SPAIN BY TREATY OF 1819 WEST FLORIDA HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY U.S. SINCE 1810
- REPUBLIC OF TEXAS ADMITTED TO THE UNION IN 1845 THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF TEXAS REMAINED IN DISPUTE WITH MEXICO UNTIL THE MEXICAN WAR
- THE OREGON TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY U.S. SINCE 1804 ACQUIRED BY TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN 1818-1846
- TERRITORY ACQUIRED FROM MEXICO BY TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 1848
- THE GADSDEN PURCHASE ACQUIRED FROM MEXICO 1853

- Route of Joliet and Marquette 1673
- Route of La Salle 1674-1680
- Route of La Salle 1682
- Route of Lewis and Clark 1804-1806
- Route of Pike 1805-1806
- Route of Pike 1806-1808
- Route of Long and Bell 1820
- Route of Smith 1826-1829
- Route of Fremont 1843-1845
- Pony Express
- California Trail
- Oregon Trail
- Santa Fe Trail
- Spanish Trail and California Cut off
- Sublette's Cut off

THE MAP SHOWS THE LIMITS OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES WITH THE DATES OF THEIR ADMISSION OR ERECTION.

Longitude from Greenwich

and sycamore forests for their corn and tobacco, their hogs and cattle. Over 200,000 had gone into Kentucky. The outlet for the increasing products of all this 'back country' was the great river. 'The Mississippi is everything to them,' wrote Madison in 1802; 'it is the Hudson, the Potomac, the Delaware, and all the navigable rivers of the Atlantic coast formed into one.' . . . The custom house books of 1802 showed exports from the port of New Orleans of over \$3,000,000 of sugar, \$1,000,000 of cotton, 200,000 lbs. of tobacco, nearly 10,000 bbl. of flour, besides large amounts of cordage, cider, apples, bacon, pork, and lead. Most of the articles, except the sugar and cotton, came from the settlements up the river, Kentucky and Tennessee alone sending over \$1,600,000 of produce through the port. Out of 267 vessels clearing from New Orleans in the year 1802 there were 158 American as against 104 Spanish. Seagoing ships had even begun to build at Pittsburgh and had successfully made the trip from the upper Ohio to Liverpool. The attachment of the Western states of the Union depended on the guarantee of their commerce, and this guarantee depended on the control of the Mississippi. If the river was not in our hands, at least it must be in the hands of a power with whom we could deal on equal terms."—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 212-214.—That Jefferson well knew the gravity of the situation created by the retrocession, and the importance for the future of the nation with which it was freighted, is clearly shown by his correspondence at this time. In a letter to Livingstone, dated Apr. 18, 1802, he wrote "It completely reverses all the political reverses of the U. S. and will form an epoch in our political course. . . . There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. . . . It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our whole produce and contain more than half our inhabitants. France placing herself in that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years. . . . Her possession of the place would be hardly felt by us. . . . But the day that France takes possession of New Orleans . . . seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force. . . . This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us. . . . If France considers Louisiana however as indispensable for her views, she might perhaps be willing to look about for arrangements which might reconcile it to our interests. If anything could do this it would be the ceding to us the island of New Orleans and the Floridas. . . . Every eye in the U. S. is now fixed on this affair of Louisiana. . . . Perhaps nothing since the Revolutionary war has produced more uneasy sensations through the body of the nation.' To Monroe, on January 13, 1803, he wrote 'On the event of this mission [Monroe's to France] depends the future destinies of this republic,' and again, in a letter of February 1, 1803, to Dupont de Nemours, he said 'He [Monroe] goes . . . to aid in the issue of a crisis the most important the U. S. have ever met since their independence, and which is to decide their future character and career. . . . The use of the Mississippi is so indispensable that we cannot hesitate

one moment to hazard our existence for its maintenance.' [Yet at this time he had no idea of the possibility of obtaining anything except the Floridas and New Orleans, and with them the mouth of the Mississippi].—*Old South Leaflets*, v. 6, pp. 50-51, 53-55.—On Oct. 16, 1802, the right of deposit, granted by the treaty with Spain of 1795, was withdrawn. [See DEPOSIT, RIGHT OF.] The West was thrown into a ferment, and the opposition naturally enough seized upon the situation as a means of promoting their own advancement. This made decided action immediately necessary, and in January, 1803, the president nominated James Monroe as envoy extraordinary to act with H. R. Livingstone and Charles Pinckney at Madrid in an effort to achieve the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas. In his letter to Livingstone, of February 3, 1803, announcing the appointment, he said, "The opposition raised the cry of war, were intriguing in all the quarters to exasperate the Western inhabitants to arm and go down on their own authority and possess themselves of New Orleans."—*Old South Leaflets*, v. 6, pp. 50, 58.

1801.—Appointment of John Marshall to be chief justice of the Supreme Court.—His constitutional decisions.—On Jan. 31, 1801, near the close of the term of President Adams, the latter appointed John Marshall, who had been secretary of state in his cabinet since the previous May, to be chief justice of the Supreme Court. It was a memorable appointment, the most memorable, perhaps, that has ever been made by official and not popular selection, in America, since Washington was appointed to the command of the continental army. Its result was to place the new, uninterpreted, plastic constitution of the Federal republic under the hands of a master, during thirty-four years of the period in which it hardened into practical, determined law. It decided the character of the constitution, and by that decision the great instrument was made a bond of nationality, firm, strenuous and enduring. "The abilities of the new Chief Justice were recognized by the profession and the public at the time of his appointment, but the attractive qualities of his heart and his kindly manners soon caused respect and reverence to ripen into affection. Perhaps no American citizen except Washington ever conciliated so large a measure of popularity and public esteem. . . . In surveying the results of the labors of thirty-four years recorded in thirty-two volumes of reports, it is obvious that it was in the decision of cases involving international and constitutional law that the force and clearness of the Chief Justice's intellect shone most conspicuous. Such was the ready assent of his colleagues on the bench to his supremacy in the exposition of constitutional law, that in such causes a dissenting opinion was almost unknown. Having had occasion to discuss and thoroughly study the Constitution, both in the Virginia convention which adopted it and afterward in the legislature, he had preconceived opinions concerning it, as well as perfect familiarity with it. But in the hot contest waging between the friends of a strict and those of a liberal construction of its language, he wished to take no part. He stated that there should be neither a liberal nor a strict construction, but that the simple, natural, and usual meaning of its words and phrases should govern their interpretation. In the case of *Gibbons v. Ogden*, in which he is called upon to define the true rule of construction of the United States Constitution regarding the

rights of the States and the rights and powers of the general government, he studiously avoids each extreme, steering safely in the middle course. He lays down his own rule thus clearly and definitely:—“This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly; but why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants expressly the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred, nor is there one sentence in the Constitution which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not therefore think ourselves justified in adopting it. If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as a rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded.’ . . . Marshall’s dictum that there must be neither a strict nor a liberal construction of the Constitution, but that the natural meaning of the words must govern, was undoubtedly sound and wise. . . . Jefferson and Hamilton, in a different department of public life from Marshall, had duties and obligations correspondingly different from his. They might properly try to make the Constitution mean what it seemed to them for the public welfare that it should mean. Marshall could not consider any such matter; he had only to find and declare what it did mean, what its words actually and properly declared, not what they might possibly or desirably be supposed or construed to declare. This was the real force and the only real force of his foregoing assertion. As an abstract statement of his function it was impregnable. But, as with most broad principles, the difficulty lay in the application of it to particular cases. The constitutional questions which came before Marshall chiefly took the form of whether or not the Constitution conferred some power or authority upon Congress, or upon the Executive. . . . The decision must be yes or no; the authority did or did not rest in the government. It was easy to talk about the natural and proper meaning of the words; but after all it was the question at issue; did they (not could they) say yes, or did they (not could they) say no, to the special authority sought to be exercised. Now it is one thing, to be impartial and another to be colorless in mind. Judge Marshall was impartial and strongly possessed of the judicial instinct or faculty. But he was by no means colorless. . . . Believing that the Constitution intended to create and did create a national government,

and having decided notions as to what such a government must be able to do, he was subject to a powerful though insensible influence to find the existence of the required abilities in the government. . . . The great majority of his decisions were in accordance with Federalist principles of construction and of policy. The Republicans all denounced him as a Federalist, even of an extreme type.”—A. B. Magruder, *John Marshall*, ch. 10.—See also SUPREME COURT: 1789-1835.

ALSO IN: H. Flanders, *Lives and times of the chief justices of the Supreme Court*, v. 2.—J. Story, *John Marshall* (*North American Review*, v. 26).—E. S. Corwin, *John Marshall and the constitution* (*Chronicles of America*).—A. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*.—J. B. Thayer, *John Marshall*.

1801.—First American naval demonstration against the Barbary pirates. See BARBARY STATES: 1785-1801.

1801.—Treaty with France ratified.—“When the envoys [sent to France by President Adams (see above: 1800: Convention with France)], met in Paris a change had occurred in the French government. The strong hand and wise head of Napoleon had replaced the corrupt and foolish Directory. The policy of nursing a French interest in America, which for seven years had been followed by Republican leaders in Paris, was now abandoned. The relations between the two nations were put upon the grounds of national dignity and national interests. No trouble was discovered in making such an agreement as secured neutrality and reasonable protection to commerce. When Davie returned late in 1800 with the completed treaty he was received with satisfaction. The Republicans were pleased because it brought assurances of peace with France. The Federalists found in it the consolation that the old treaties of 1778 were superseded. It was, in fact, a blessing that we had peace, and that we were no longer bound to another nation by so embarrassing an arrangement as our old French alliance; but the repeal of the old treaty cost us the spoliation claims, for Napoleon insisted that both should stand or fall together. The Senate hesitated: it ratified for eight years, and reserved our right to indemnity; but the matter was prolonged till the Federalists were out of office, and December 19, 1801, the treaty was ratified with indemnity left out. The claims have never been paid by France.”—J. S. Bassett, *Federalist system*, pp. 250-251.—Adams, himself proposed for his epitaph the words: “Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of peace with France in 1800.”

ALSO IN: D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 183-184.

1801.—Domestic and foreign policy.—“The Federalist legislation of recent years which had most angered the Republican opposition were the Alien and Sedition acts, the Naturalization Act, and the Judiciary Act. Of these, the Alien and Sedition acts had expired by limitation. The new Congress repealed the Naturalization Act, substituting in its place the law of 1795, which required a five years’ period of residence for citizenship in place of the fourteen demanded by the law of 1798. With regard to the Judiciary Act, the question of its repeal raised several interesting points. The act of 1801 had provided for the organization of a new set of federal courts midway between the supreme court and the district courts, with judges, attorneys, and marshals of their own. What especially angered the Repub-

ficians in the new judiciary system was the fact that under it recourse to the federal courts would be more easy. The federal jurisdiction would be extended at the expense of the state courts. The repeal was carried, however, by one vote in the Senate and only after a most acrimonious discussion in the House. The most important event of the session was the establishment of a new financial policy. Jefferson argued very strongly for economy, and Gallatin outdid his chief in this respect. In his comments on the draught of Jefferson's first message, Gallatin insisted strongly on three things. These were, first, the payment of seven millions each year on the interest and principal of the national debt; second, on every possible reduction of taxation which could be made; third, on Congress making specific appropriations, and on a simplification of the organization and workings of the treasury and the spending departments. . . . Hamilton, in his report of 1789, had estimated the national debt, including arrears of interest and state debts to be assumed, at \$76,000,000 in round numbers. On January 1, 1802, the debt stood at over \$80,000,000, and on January 1, 1803, the net debt was given by Gallatin as \$77,000,000. That year saw the payment of \$15,000,000 for Louisiana, which was made by means of a loan. In the same year, however, over five and a half millions were paid on account of the principal of the debt. From that time until 1810, there was a steady decrease in the amount of the national debt, until in 1810 it stood at a little over \$53,000,000, the decrease in eight years being almost exactly \$27,500,000, in the face of the \$15,000,000 paid for Louisiana and the money doled out most ungraciously by Gallatin on the navy. In November, 1801, Gallatin estimated the revenue for the next year at \$10,600,000. Of this he proposed to use \$3,600,000 in payment of the interest, and of more than \$3,500,000 to pay the current expenses of the government, including the army and the navy. These figures are the best justification of Gallatin's remarkable financial achievement. For it cannot be denied that, when the interest on the national debt required nearly one-third of the revenue, it was time to take effective measures to relieve the country of so great a burden. The only possible way to accomplish this result, which Gallatin so much desired, was to pursue a steady and prolonged career of economy; and to do that it was absolutely necessary that the country should remain at peace with all the nations. . . . Until the debt was paid, he was disposed to follow the old precept of turning the other cheek to the smiter. When the debt is paid then will be the time to build ships—and not before. When the new Congress assembled, Nathaniel Macon was chosen speaker of the House. . . . The committee on ways and means had been first appointed in 1796, on motion, of Gallatin, when the Republicans were in control of the House but not of the executive department, in order to wrench from the Federalist secretary of the treasury a portion of the control of the national finances. John Randolph . . . now became chairman of the most important committee. . . . Sending for the secretaries of war and of the navy, he secured from them pledges of economy which made Gallatin give his consent to the repeal of all internal taxes. The result showed that Gallatin was right in his lack of faith in naval economy. It also showed that Randolph was right in his faith in the redundancy of the national revenues. For Gallatin, with characteristic caution, had underestimated his receipts, while giving his

expenditures at very nearly their correct figure. In this way went the internal revenue system, and with it about one-quarter of the patronage of the federal government. . . . As to the third point noted above. Gallatin deliberately asked Congress to curtail his own power by making appropriations for specific purposes. He also secured the simplification of the service to bring about greater direct responsibility to himself as the head of the treasury department."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1801-1811*, pp. 25, 27-32.—"Jefferson found the foreign relations of the United States pacific and prosperous, as never before, upon his accession; a state of affairs which President Adams had procured at the cost of disruption in his party and the bitterest personal humiliation. . . . The First Consul promptly assented to the French Convention as modified in our United States, on the further understanding that American spoliation claims should be thereby relinquished; and final ratifications were exchanged between France and the United States accordingly. [See above: 1801.] Peaceful relations having been restored, Livingston [who had been appointed minister (see above: 1800-1808)], sailed for France, while Pichon, . . . had already arrived at Washington, bearing the credentials of a French chargé. The conduct of Great Britain at the outset of Jefferson's administration was friendly to the United States, and British cruisers in the West Indies were ordered to treat American vessels with consideration. In a modest way a national military school was opened at West Point, the headquarters of the engineer corps; and thus was initiated a permanent academy, such as Washington had recommended in his final message to Congress, though by no means upon the scale projected by Hamilton. By way of naval reduction Congress stopped the building of six seventy-fours, for which timber had been collected under an act of the preceding Congress, and reduced the appropriation for the improvement and increase of the navy to a quarter of a million dollars. By the sale of unnecessary ships under that former act our present navy had already been brought down to thirteen vessels. . . . At this session the House made keen scrutiny into the financial methods and expenditures of the late administration. No corruption or scandalous mismanagement appeared; . . . the administration of John Adams, if slack in some respects, had certainly been an honest one. . . . In confirmation of the peaceful state of our foreign relations, the President, before this session closed, communicated the good news that a definite adjustment had been made with Great Britain over the British debts claimed under the Jay treaty. The gross sum of £600,000, or \$2,664,000, as a final satisfaction of these debts, was appropriated by Congress accordingly, this amount being payable by the United States in three annual instalments. Eventually the awards made to American merchants for illegal captures footed up to about \$6,000,000; so that the United States won solid advantage, in the end, from a treaty which had been execrated almost as bitterly as the Stamp Act."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States of America under the constitution*, v. 2, pp. 17, 24, 27.

1802.—Admission of Ohio to the Union. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES.

1802-1803.—Increase in navy.—"In the short session of 1802-1803 many signs proved that the revolution had spent its force, and that a reaction was at hand. Congress showed no eagerness to adopt the President's new economies, and dis-

missed with silence, almost contemptuous, his scheme for building at Washington a large dry-dock in which the navy should be stored for safety and saving. The mint was continued by law for another five years, and twenty thousand dollars were quietly appropriated for its support. Instead of reducing the navy, Congress decided to build four sixteen-gun brigs and fifteen gunboats, and appropriated ninety-six thousand dollars for the brigs alone. The appropriation of two millions as a first instalment toward paying for New Orleans and Florida was another and a longer stride in the old Federalist path of confidence in the Executive and liberality for national objects. The expenditure for 1802, excluding interest on debt, was \$3,737,000. Never afterward in United States history did the annual expenditure fall below four millions. The navy in 1802, cost \$915,000; never afterward did it cost less than a million."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America*, v. 2, p. 77.

1802-1804.—Land cessions of Georgia annexed to Mississippi territory. See *MISSISSIPPI*: 1798-1804.

1802-1804.—Twelfth Amendment to the constitution.—"A month before the counting of the electoral vote, in 1797, a resolution was offered to amend the Constitution so as to direct the electors to designate their choice for President and Vice-President, . . . [thus providing evidence] that the public mind was not at rest on the subject. . . . Meanwhile the Presidential election of 1800 had occurred, its results were known and the first case of a failure to choose a President had arisen. . . . On the twelfth of April, 1802, DeWitt Clinton, in the Senate, submitted an amendment that the persons voted for as President or Vice-President, 'be particularly designated.' . . . [The debate on the amendment in both House and Senate was stormy.] States' rights, State sovereignty, the Constitution a compact between the States, the dangers of intrigue and corruption incident to an election, the merits of three over five and of five over three, . . . the use and uselessness of the office of Vice-President; the public will; the danger of innovations on the Constitution, all were touched on and the vote was taken. . . . The casting vote of Nathaniel Macon, the Speaker, carried the amendment. On the following day the twelfth of December [1803], the Senate concurred. Its progress through the State legislatures was rapid. On the twenty-fifth of September [1804], James Madison, the Secretary of State proclaimed that the amendment had been ratified by three-fourths of the States and it became a part of the Constitution. [See U. S. A., *CONSTITUTION OF*.] Its adoption may be said to have completed the Constitution as a piece of eighteenth century work."—F. N. Thorpe, *Constitutional history of the United States*, v. 2, pp. 299, 304, 327-328.

1803.—Louisiana Purchase.—Its constitutional and political aspects.—"Monroe sailed for France in the middle of January, 1803, while the Federalists in Congress were trying to embarrass Jefferson and outbid the administration in popularity with the Western settlers by advocating the immediate seizure of Louisiana by force. But relief in the tense situation came neither from Livingston's entreaties nor from Monroe's inducements, but from Napoleon himself. . . . On the very day that Monroe landed at Havre the First Consul ordered his minister of finance, Barbé-Marbois, to offer Livingston not New Orleans alone but the entire province of Louisiana for 50,000,000

francs. Livingston who had been trying in vain to persuade Napoleon to sell a part of Louisiana, was dumbfounded by this offer of the whole. He and Monroe discussed the matter with Marbois (who set the price at 100,000,000 francs instead of 50,000,000 as he had been ordered), and after some haggling they agreed on the figure of 60,000,000, together with the assumption of claims by the United States [French Spoliation Claims, (see above: 1800: Convention with France)] to an amount not exceeding 20,000,000 francs, making the total price 80,000,000 francs, or some \$14,500,000. The three negotiators set their names to the treaty on May 2, 1803, and as they rose to shake hands Livingston remarked: 'We have lived long, but this is the noblest work of our whole lives. From this day the United States take their place among the powers of the first rank.' When the Louisiana treaty reached Washington, in midsummer, it was Jefferson's turn to be surprised. He had sent Monroe to purchase New Orleans with West Florida if possible, for not more than \$10,000,000. Now came a bill half again as large for the whole of Louisiana—a tract which doubled the area of the United States. [See also OREGON: 1790-1805; TEXAS: 1690-1806.] There was no doubt that this was an excellent bargain; but aside from the charge imposed on the government (a charge exceeding our total annual revenue), there were points in the treaty to give an advocate of strict construction much uneasiness. . . . Jefferson himself was the first to admit that he had 'done an act beyond the Constitution.' He prepared an amendment to submit to Congress, so that the states' might ratify the purchase through their legislatures or conventions. But before the meeting of Congress, Monroe advised him from Paris that Napoleon might change his mind if there were any delay in the ratification of the treaty and the appropriation of the purchase money by Congress. The Federalist minority in Congress objected to the treaty from every point of view; it contravened the Constitution by giving the port of New Orleans advantages not shared by other ports of the country; it usurped the power of Congress by regulating trade; the payment of so large a sum of money to a belligerent nation was virtually a breach of neutrality; the title of France to the province of Louisiana was not clear; and all that we had bought at this huge price was 'the authority to make war on Spain.'"—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 215-217.—"Hamilton shared Jefferson's view, that the purchase of Louisiana was a question of the greatest, and even of vital, importance for the Union. His opposition on other occasions to the policy of the administration, and his personal enmity to the president, did not prevent his lending him a helping hand in this matter when an opportunity offered. The great majority of the Federalists opposed this increase of the territory of the Union with as much decision as Hamilton advocated it. They showed in their attitude towards this question a shortsightedness which would have been astonishing even among the doctrinaires of the opposite party."—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, pp. 183-185.—"Mr. Jefferson belonged to the school of strict construction, and was in fact its leader and apostle. . . . Under a construction of the Constitution as strict as he had been insisting upon, it was plain that the government would have no power to acquire foreign territory by purchase, and that any attempt in that direction would be usurpation. . . . To give the necessary authority an



amendment of the Constitution would be essential, and amendment would be a slow process which might not be accomplished in time to meet the emergency. The case would be complicated by the fact that if the territory was acquired a considerable population would be brought into the Union and thus made citizens by a process of naturalization not contemplated by the Constitution. Mr. Madison, the Secretary of State, agreed with the President in his views. To use Mr. Jefferson's words, 'The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory; still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union.' But under circumstances so imperative he thought the political departments of the government should meet the emergency by consummating the purchase, and 'then appeal to the nation for an additional article in the Constitution approving and confirming an act which the nation had not previously authorized.' He did not conceal from himself, however, that in so doing ground would be occupied which it would be difficult to defend, and he proceeds to say: 'The less that is said about any constitutional difficulty the better. Congress should do what is necessary in silence. I find but one opinion as to the necessity of shutting up the Constitution for some time.' Mr. John Quincy Adams held similar views. . . . But it is difficult to conceive of any doctrine more dangerous or more distinctly antagonistic to the fundamental ideas of the American Union than the doctrine that the Constitution may be 'shut up' for a time in order that the government may accomplish something not warranted by it. The political immorality was obvious and glaring; more so in the case of the apostle of strict construction than it could have been if advanced by any other statesman of the day. . . . But Mr. Jefferson's political mistake was scarcely greater than that committed by his opponents: and, indeed, from a party standpoint it was no mistake whatsoever, but a bold measure of wise policy. . . . The purchase, according to the Federal view of the Constitution, was perfectly legitimate. . . . But the Federalists in general took narrow and partisan views, and in order to embarrass the administration resorted to quibbles which were altogether unworthy the party which had boasted of Washington as its chief and Hamilton as the exponent of its doctrines. . . . The Federal leaders did not stop at cavils; they insisted that the unconstitutional extension of territory was in effect a dissolution of the Union, so that they were at liberty to contemplate and plan for a final disruption."—Judge T. M. Cooley, *Acquisition of Louisiana (Indiana Historical Society Pamphlets, no. 3)*.—The result of the debates on the Louisiana treaty, in the Senate and the House, "decided only one point. Every speaker, without distinction of party, agreed that the United States government had the power to acquire new territory, either by conquest or by treaty; the only difference of opinion regarded the disposition of this territory after it was acquired. Did Louisiana belong to the central government at Washington, or to the States? . . . Whether the government at Washington could possess Louisiana as a colony or admit it as a State, was a difference of no great matter if the cession were to hold good; the essential point was that for the first time in the national history all parties agreed in admitting that the government could govern. . . . Even in 1804 the political consequences of the act were already too striking to be overlooked. Within three years of his inauguration Jefferson bought a foreign colony without

its consent and against its will, annexed it to the United States by an act which he said made blank paper of the Constitution; and then he who had found his predecessors too monarchical, and the Constitution too liberal in powers,—he who had nearly dissolved the bonds of society rather than allow his predecessor to order a dangerous alien out of the country in a time of threatened war,—made himself monarch of the new territory, and wielded over it, against its protests, the powers of its old kings. Such an experience was final; no century of slow and half-understood experience could be needed to prove that the hopes of humanity lay thenceforward, not in attempting to restrain the government from doing whatever the majority should think necessary, but in raising the people themselves till they should think nothing necessary but what was good."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America, v. 2, ch. 4-6*.—"The Senate immediately ratified the treaty by a vote of 24 to 7, and a few weeks later the House voted the funds in the form of an issue of \$11,250,000 in 6 per cent stock. There was no doubt of the popularity of the Louisiana Purchase. There were grave irregularities in the transaction. Napoleon had not yet fulfilled his part of the treaty of San Ildefonso with Spain when he sold us Louisiana, and the Spanish authorities were still in command at New Orleans. Moreover, Napoleon had promised Spain never to transfer the province to a foreign power, and the French Constitution forbade the First Consul to alienate any of the land of the Republic. . . . But we took the ground that the delinquencies of France toward Spain could not invalidate the good faith of our dealing with France; and Spain, after a first violent protest, acquiesced in the transaction—with her own interpretation of the boundaries of Louisiana. These boundaries, even in the limited form finally fixed by the treaty of 1819 with Spain, inclosed a magnificent domain extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border and from the Mississippi to the Rockies. Fourteen states or parts of states have been made from that domain, in which the value of the farm lands alone a century after the purchase was more than a thousand times as great as the price paid for the whole province. The white inhabitants of this domain increased from 50,000 in 1804 to 20,000,000 in 1914. In abundance and variety of products it is the richest developed area in the world. And the original cost of its 875,000 square miles was about three cents an acre! On November 30, 1803, Louisiana was finally handed over to the French intendant Laussat by the Spanish authorities at New Orleans, and twenty days later the French tricolor was hauled down and the Stars and Stripes were raised in its place."—D. S. Muzzey, *The United States of America, v. 1, pp. 217-218*.—"Brief as was the French occupation it continued long enough for Laussat to publish a new code of French law which reproduced many of the principles of the Code Napoléon. The principal result of this speed in giving laws to a province which was already sold was to make more confused than before the confusion of the combined French law of the old regime and the Spanish laws of the Indies."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1800-1811, pp. 81, 82*.—"The significance of the Mississippi Valley was clearly seen by Jefferson. . . . The acquisition of Louisiana was a recognition of the essential unity of the Mississippi Valley the French engineer Collot reported to his government after an investigation in 1796: 'All the positions on the left [east] bank of the Mississippi

. . . without the alliance of the Western states are far from covering Louisiana . . . when two nations possess, one the coasts and the other the plains, the former must inevitably embark or submit. From thence I conclude that the Western States of the North American republic must unite themselves with Louisiana and form in the future one single compact nation; or else that colony to whatever power it shall belong will be conquered or devoured.' The effect of bringing political unity to the Mississippi Valley by the Louisiana Purchase was profound. It was the decisive step of the United States on an independent career as a world power, free from entangling foreign alliances . . . not only was the nation set on an independent path in foreign relations; its political system was revolutionized, for the Mississippi Valley now opened the way for adding State after State, swamping the New England section and its federalism. The doctrine of strict construction had received a fatal blow at the hands of its own prophet."—F. J. Turner, *Frontier in American history*, pp. 188-189.—See also LOUISIANA: 1803-1804; MISSOURI: 1803-1812.

ALSO IN: *Treaties and conventions between the United States and other powers*, pp. 331-342.—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 298-335.—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 2, pp. 620-635.—A. Johnson, *Union and democracy*, pp. 146-159.—F. A. Ogg, *Opening of the Mississippi*, ch. 10-14.—J. K. Hosmer, *Louisiana Purchase*.—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1800-1811*, ch. 5.—W. M. Sloane, *Louisiana Purchase (American Historical Review)*, v. 4, pp. 430 ff.).—T. Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, v. 4, pp. 258-282.—A. B. Hart, *Foundations of American foreign policy*, pp. 185-209.—J. W. Foster, *Century of American foreign policy*, pp. 187-204.—J. A. James, *Louisiana in American diplomacy (Mississippi Valley Historical Review, June, 1914, pp. 44-56)*.

1803.—Report on British impressment of seamen from American ships.—"In England . . . the navy was manned to a considerable extent by persons who were forced into the service by a process known as impressment. The discipline on British naval ships was harsh, the conditions as to food and clothing were undesirable, and the labor required was arduous. . . . British seamen fled from English ships and embarked on American vessels. It is impossible to state how many sailors of English, Scottish, and Irish birth were serving on American merchant-ships; the number is given in contemporary writings as high as thirty or forty thousand, which is doubtless a gross exaggeration. . . . The peace of Amiens in 1802 found the question of impressment undecided between England and America; the renewal of the conflict between England and France witnessed a revival of the activity of the English press gangs and of the forcing American citizens, both native-born and naturalized, to the decks of the English-men-of-war."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1801-1811*, pp. 172-173.—See also EXPATRIATION.—"In consequence of a resolution of the Senate, calling upon the President for information respecting the violation of the national flag, and the impressment of American seamen, he communicated to that body a letter from the Secretary of State, specifying all the cases of impressment which had come to the knowledge of that Department. The Secretary had no information of the violation of the national flag, except in the . . . aggression of Morocco. It appeared, by this report, that 43 citizens of the United States had been impressed by

the British, of whom 12 had protections. Ten were natives of the British dominions, and 17 of other countries, none of whom were stated to have been naturalized. Thus a practice which, even within the British dominions, violates the dearest rights of personal liberty, and which their courts have never ventured to justify, and which is excused and acquiesced in on the plea of necessity, was unhesitatingly exercised by British navy officers on board of American vessels."—G. Tucker, *History of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 12.—"When the captain of a British frigate overhauled an American merchant-vessel for enemy's property or contraband of war, he sent an officer on board who mustered the crew, and took out any seamen whom he believed to be British. The measure, as the British navy regarded it, was one of self-protection. If the American government could not or would not discourage desertion, the naval commander would recover his men in the only way he could. Thus a circle of grievances was established on each side. . . . The growth of American shipping stimulated desertions from the British service to the extent of injuring its efficiency; and these desertions in their turn led to a rigorous exercise of the right of impressment. To find some point at which this vicious circle could be broken was a matter of serious consequence to both countries, but most so to the one which avowed that it did not mean to protect its interest by force. Great Britain could have broken the circle by increasing the pay and improving the condition of her seamen; but she was excessively conservative, and the burdens already imposed on her commerce were so great that she could afford to risk nothing. . . . Conscious of her own power, she thought that the United States should be first to give way. Had the American government been willing to perform its neutral obligations strictly, the circle might have been broken without much trouble; but the United States wished to retain their advantage, and preferred to risk whatever England might do rather than discourage desertion, or enact and enforce a strict naturalization law, or punish fraud. The national government was too weak to compel the States to respect neutral obligations, even if it had been disposed to make the attempt. The practice of impressment brought the two governments to a deadlock on an issue of law. No one denied that every government had the right to command the services of its native subjects, and as yet no one ventured to maintain that a merchantship on the high seas could lawfully resist the exercise of this right; but the law had done nothing to define the rights of naturalized subjects or citizens. The British government might, no doubt, impress its own subjects; but almost every British sailor in the American service carried papers of American citizenship, and although some of these were fraudulent, many were genuine. The law of England, as declared from time out of mind by every generation of her judges, held that the allegiance of a subject was indefeasible, and therefore that naturalization was worthless. The law of the United States, as declared by Chief Justice Ellsworth in 1799, was in effect the same."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America during the first administration of Thomas Jefferson*, v. 2, pp. 336-338.—"Great Britain was clearly in the wrong. She ought to have kept her seamen by increasing their pay and putting an end to the grievances which produced the mutiny of the *Nore*. In heartlessly neglecting to render the service just to the common sailor, and at the same

time making a brutal use of impressment, aristocratic government showed its dark side. It is true that impressment was conscription in a coarse form, and that the extreme notion of indefeasible allegiance still prevailed. But the practice, however lawful, was intolerable, and its offensiveness was sure to be aggravated by the conduct of British commanders full of the naval pride of their nation and perhaps irritated by the loss of their crews; for it is not denied that many British seamen were seduced from the service and that the American marine, both mercantile and national, was largely manned in this way."—Goldwin Smith, *United States*, ch. 3.—See also below: 1804-1809.

ALSO IN: A. T. Mahan, *Sea power in its relations to the War of 1812*, v. 1, pp. 114-144.—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War*, v. 3, pp. 215-278.—J. Schouler, *History of the United States of America under the constitution*, v. 2, pp. 108-176.

1803.—United States frigate *Philadelphia* taken by the Tripoli pirates. See BARBARY STATES: 1803-1805.

1803-1804.—Federalist secession movement.—“The rising spirit of Republicanism and the increasing popularity of the Administration cast the Federalist leaders into the deepest gloom. The annexation of Louisiana was regarded as a mortal blow, since it imperiled the ascendancy of New England in the Union, and New England was the stronghold of Federalism. At the beginning of the year 1804, most of the Federalist members of Congress from New England were agreed in thinking that a crisis was approaching. Democracy was about to triumph over the forces of law and order. The only question was how to save their section, where the ravages of Jacobinism could yet be stayed. There was but one answer, from the point of view of Senator Timothy Pickering. The people of the Eastern States could not reconcile their habits, views and interests with those of the South and West: therefore, let them withdraw from the Union and form a Northern Confederation. Plumer, of New Hampshire, and Tracy and Griswold of Connecticut, were in hearty agreement with this view. Pickering then put his project before the members of the coterie of Federalists in Massachusetts, which was generally known as the ‘Essex Junto.’”—A. Johnson, *Union and democracy*, p. 163.—“The justifying causes to those who entertained . . . [the project] were, that the annexation of Louisiana to the Union transcended the constitutional powers of the government of the United States; that it created, in fact, a new confederacy, to which the States, united by the former compact, were not bound to adhere; that it was oppressive to the interests and destructive to the influence of the Northern section of the Confederacy, whose right and duty it therefore was to secede from the new body politic, and to constitute one of their own. It was lamented that one inevitable consequence of the annexation of Louisiana to the Union would be to diminish the relative weight and influence of the Northern section; that it would aggravate the evil of the slave representation; and endanger the Union itself, by the expansion of its bulk, and the enfeebling extension of its line of defence against foreign invasion.”—C. F. Robertson, *Louisiana purchase in its influence upon the American system* (*Papers of the American Historical Association*, v. 1, pp. 262-263).—“Aaron Burr was sounded by those most earnest in this business. The silent

but persistent determination of Jefferson's friends to force him into retirement produced bitter feuds in New York, where the Vice-President had a nest of young followers gaping in vain for office. . . . George Clinton, the new nominee for the Vice-Presidency, having declined a re-election as Governor of New York, Burr was put forward as a candidate. His Republican opponents proposed the Chancellor, John Lansing. It was an earnest State canvass, and Burr knew he was politically ruined unless he won. The Federalists of that State were thought to hold the balance of power. Before Congress adjourned, therefore, the Eastern separatists conferred with Burr, who, with real or feigned interest, listened to their project of dismemberment; but they could not win King or Hamilton to their views, and for the present the New York and New England confederacy awaited events, its projectors hoping for Burr's election, but perceiving no way to promote it. Burr's political disaster, followed by Hamilton's tragic death, nipped the Eastern confederacy plot in its present development like an early frost. Except for a later growth from the same root, this extravagant scheme was scarcely worth historical notice.”—J. Schouler, *History of the United States of America under the constitution*, v. 2, pp. 69, 74.

ALSO IN: E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 291-294.—S. E. Morison, *Harrison Gray Otis*, v. 1, pp. 264-270.—W. Plumer, Jr., *Life of William Plumer*, pp. 283-311.

1803-1805.—Relations with Great Britain.—Conventions.—“The ten years ending in 1805, with Jefferson's first term, marking well enough the life of Jay's Treaty, had been singularly harmonious so far as the relations between the United States and Great Britain were concerned, especially during the years of our quasi conflict with France. The British had acted arbitrarily every now and then, but most of the matters in dispute had been smoothed out or arranged by Rufus King, one of the most effective representatives the United States has ever had at London. Before leaving his post in 1803, he negotiated three conventions. One of these, as to impressments, at the last moment failed of acceptance at London. A second was actually signed, but being ratified only in part by the Senate was refused further consideration by the British government. The third convention put an end to the long drawn out contest over the payment of debts due by Americans to British creditors. This provided that the United States should pay a lump sum of nearly three million dollars in satisfaction of all these claims and further provided that the amount that had been awarded by a commission under Jay's Treaty to Americans for British spoiliations should likewise be paid. According to Oliver Wolcott, this convention was ratified by the President and Senate because claims amounting to eight and a half million dollars had been filed by British creditors against inhabitants of the State of Virginia. With the ending of this acrimonious dispute, there would seem to have been good ground for continuing harmonious relations between the two countries. It fell out otherwise, for British ship-owners brought an ever-increasing pressure upon the ministry to put an end to the growing American commerce that seemed to them to be jeopardizing their financial prosperity.”—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 353-354.

1804.—Fifth presidential election.—Thomas Jefferson, Democratic Republican, was re-elected by the vote of 162 electors in the college, against

14 voting for Charles C. Pinckney, Federalist. George Clinton was chosen vice president. "In this election the former rule of the Union was so far changed that Presidential electors in the several States were chosen by the people rather than by the local legislature; a practice henceforth established by Republican precedent, together with that of voting for electors by general list instead of by districts. Uniformity could not be compelled, however, as each State used its own discretion, under the sanction of our Federal constitution, and might vary its own course at pleasure."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States of America under the constitution*, v. 2, p. 70.

1804.—Part of Louisiana Territory separated as Indiana Territory. See IOWA: 1673-1834.

1804.—Destruction of the *Philadelphia* by Decatur.—Bombardment of Tripoli by Preble. See BARBARY STATES: 1803-1805.

1804-1805.—Impeachment and trial of Judge Chase.—"The case of *Marbury v. Madison* was decided on February 24, 1803, and therefore fell between two other events which were immediately of almost as great importance in the struggle now waxing over the judiciary. The first of these was the impeachment of Judge Pickering of the New Hampshire District Court, which was suggested by the President on the 3rd of February [1803, immediately before the first meeting of the Supreme Court after over a year of suspension] and voted by the House on the 18th. of February; the other was an address which Justice Chase delivered on the 2nd of May to a Baltimore grand jury, assailing the repeal of the Judiciary Act and universal suffrage and predicting the deterioration of 'our republican Constitution.'"—E. S. Corwin, *John Marshall and the constitution*, p. 71.—In the closing hours of the session of Congress which expired March 4, 1803, proceedings of impeachment were begun for the removal from the bench of Judge Pickering, new United States district judge of New Hampshire, who had become mentally incapable of discharging the duties of his office. The trial was held in March, 1804. The judge was declared "guilty as charged," and removed from office. "By the Federalists, the attack on Judge Pickering was taken as the first of a series of impeachments, intended to revolutionize the character of the courts, but there is nothing to prove that this was then the intention of the majority."—H. Adams, *John Randolph*, ch. 4.—"The decision in *Marbury's* case [see SUPREME COURT: 1780-1835] naturally exasperated Jefferson; but the chief-justice knew the point beyond which he could not go in asserting the jurisdiction of his court, and was content to leave the matter as it stood. *Marbury* never applied for the mandamus in the court below. The opinion in the case of *Marbury and Madison* was allowed to sleep, and its language was too guarded to furnish excuse for impeachment; but while the President was still sore under the discourtesy of Marshall's law, another member of the Supreme Bench attacked him in a different way. If one judge in the United States should have known the peril in which the judiciary stood, it was Samuel Chase of Maryland, who had done more than all the other judges to exasperate the democratic majority. His overbearing manners had twice driven from his court the most eminent counsel of the circuit; he had left the bench without a quorum in order that he might make political speeches for his party; and his contempt for the popular will was loudly expressed. In the cases of *Fries* and *Callender* in 1800, he had strained

the law in order to convict for the government; . . . That he was not impeached after the change of administration proved the caution of the Republican party; but by this neglect Congress seemed to have condoned his old offences."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America*, v. 2, pp. 147-148.—"Just after the close of the February [1803] term of the Supreme Court, Chase had gone upon his circuit, and May second addressed the Grand Jury at Baltimore. The charge was much in his old-time style. It began with matters appertaining to the jury and ended with matters appertaining to politics. He could not, he said, suffer the jury to go to their chamber without a few words on the welfare and prosperity of the country. Not constitutions, but well-secured rights, made a people free and happy. All history taught that a monarchy might be free, that a republic might be enslaved. Where laws were made without respect to classes, where justice was meted out alike to rich and poor, where wealth gave no protection to violence, and where the property and person of every man were quite secure, there the people were indeed free. Such was the present condition of the United States. Where laws were partial, arbitrary, and uncertain; where there was one kind of justice for the rich man, and another kind of justice for the poor man, where property was no longer safe, and where the person was open to insult without redress by law, there the people were not free, whatever form of government they possessed. To this situation he greatly feared the United States were going. The repeal of the Federal Judiciary Act, the sweeping away of sixteen circuit judges, the changes in the State Constitution of Maryland, the establishment of universal suffrage, the proposal to reform the State judiciary, were signs not to be mistaken. They would, in his opinion, surely and quickly destroy all protection to property, all security to personal liberty, and sink the country into a mobocracy, the worst kind of government known to man. So much of the charge as related to politics at once found its way into the columns of the American and the Anti-Democratic, of Baltimore, and the National Intelligencer, of Washington, and was read by Jefferson. . . . Not a moment did he hesitate what to do. The factious judge should be impeached, and impeached by Joseph Nicholson . . . [a representative from Maryland, and the man who had the management of the Pickering impeachment in hand. On May 13, 1803, in a letter to Nicholson, the president asked: "Ought this seditious and official attack on the principles of our Constitution and the proceedings of a state go unpunished?" and added: "The question is for your consideration, for myself it is better I should not interfere."] Nicholson, however, was advised to have nothing to do with the matter. When Congress met, the impeachment was moved, but it was moved by John Randolph. He, too, thought the language of the Baltimore charge was no ground for impeachment, and went back to the conduct of Chase in the trial of John Fries. He reminded the House, that, at the last session of Congress, a member from Pennsylvania had, in his place, stated facts regarding the official conduct of Judge Chase, which he thought the House was bound to notice. . . . The statement of facts referred to was made in the course of a debate on the Judiciary Bill [when John Smilie of Pennsylvania affirmed that Chase was obnoxious to the people because of his attitude during the trial of John Fries]. When this statement was made the

session, Randolph said, was too far gone to take up the charges. But he had since looked into them; he believed them to be true, and, so believing, moved for a committee of investigation."

—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 168, 171.—"The impeachment of Justice Chase is a landmark in American history, because it was here that the Jeffersonian republicans fought their last aggressive battle, and, wavering under the shock of defeat, broke into factions which slowly abandoned the field and forgot their discipline. That such a battle must one day be fought for the control of the Judiciary was from the beginning believed by most republicans who understood their own principles. Without controlling the Judiciary, the people could never govern themselves in their own way; and although they might, over and over again, in every form of law and resolution, both state and national, enact and proclaim that theirs was not a despotic but a restricted government, which had no right to exercise powers not delegated to it, and over which they, as States, had absolute control, it was none the less certain that Chief Justice Marshall and his associates would disregard their will, and would impose upon them his own. The people were at the mercy of their creatures. The Constitutions of England, of Massachusetts, of Pennsylvania, authorized the removal of an obnoxious judge on a mere address of the legislature, but the Constitution of the United States had so fenced and fortified the Supreme Court that the legislature, the Executive, the people themselves, could exercise no control over it. A judge might make any decision, violate any duty, trample on any right, and if he took care to commit no indictable offence he was safe in office for life. On this license the Constitution imposed only one check: it said that all civil officers should be removed from office 'on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.' This right of impeachment was as yet undefined, and if stretched a little beyond strict construction it might easily be converted into something for which it had not been intended. . . . Judge Chase's offences were serious. The immediate cause of impeachment, his address to the grand jury at Baltimore on the 2d May, 1803, proved that he was not a proper person to be trusted with the interpretation of the laws. In his address he said that those laws were rapidly destroying all protection to property and all security to personal liberty. . . . Perhaps Randolph might have acted more wisely had he followed Mr. Jefferson's hint to rely on this article [founded on the Baltimore address] alone, which in the end came nearer than any other to securing conviction. . . . The articles of impeachment which Randolph presented to the House on March 26, 1804, and which were, he claimed, drawn up with his own hand, rested wholly on the theory of Chase's criminality; they contained no suggestion that impeachment was a mere inquest of office. But when Congress met again, and, on December 3, the subject came again before the House, it was noticed that two new articles, the fifth and sixth, had been quietly interpolated, which roused suspicion of a change in Randolph's plan. . . . No one could doubt that Randolph and his friends, seeing how little their ultimate object would be advanced by a conviction on the old charges, inserted these new articles in order to correct their mistake and to make a foundation for the freer use of impeachment as a political weapon. The behavior of Giles and his

friends in the Senate strengthened this suspicion. He made no concealment of his theories, and labored earnestly to prevent the Senate from calling itself a court, or from exercising any functions that belonged to a court of law."—H. Adams, *John Randolph*, ch. 4-6.—The doctrine of impeachment which Giles (senator from Virginia) and John Randolph maintained, in connection with the trial of Judge Chase, and which seems to have been acquiesced in by the majority of their party, is reported by John Quincy Adams from a conversation to which he was a listener. In Mr. Adams' "Memoirs," under date of December 21, 1804, the incident is related as follows: "There was little business to do [in the Senate], and the adjournment took place early. Sitting by the fireside afterwards, I witnessed a conversation between Mr. Giles and Mr. Israel Smith, on the subject of impeachments; during which Mr. John Randolph came in and took part in the discussion. Giles labored with excessive earnestness to convince Smith of certain principles, upon which not only Mr. Chase, but all the other Judges of the Supreme Court, excepting the one last appointed, must be impeached and removed. He treated with the utmost contempt the idea of an 'independent' judiciary—said there was not a word about such an independence in the Constitution, and that their pretensions to it were nothing more nor less than an attempt to establish an aristocratic despotism in themselves. The power of impeachment was given without limitation to the House of Representatives; the power of trying impeachments was given equally without limitation to the Senate; and if the Judges of the Supreme Court should dare, as they had done, to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, or to send a mandamus to the Secretary of State, as they had done, it was the undoubted right of the House of Representatives to impeach them, and of the Senate to remove them, for giving such opinions, however honest and sincere they may have been in entertaining them. Impeachment was not a criminal prosecution; it was no prosecution at all. The Senate sitting for the trial of impeachments was not a court, and ought to discard and reject all process of analogy to a court of justice. A trial and removal of a judge upon impeachment need not imply any criminality or corruption in him. Congress had no power over the person, but only over the office. And a removal by impeachment was nothing more than a declaration by Congress to this effect: You hold dangerous opinions, and if you are suffered to carry them into effect you will work the destruction of the nation. We want your offices, for the purpose of giving them to men who will fill them better. In answer to all this, Mr. Smith only contended that honest error of opinion could not, as he conceived, be a subject of impeachment. And in pursuit of this principle he proved clearly enough the persecution and tyranny to which those of Giles and Randolph inevitably lead. It would, he said, establish 'a tyranny over opinions,' and he traced all the arguments of Giles to their only possible issue of rank absurdity. In all this conversation I opened my lips but once, in which I told Giles that I could not assent to his definition of the term impeachment."—J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs* (C. F. Adams, ed., v. 1, pp. 322-323).—The trial of Judge Chase was opened on Feb. 9, 1805, and ended on the 23rd. By votes ranging from fifteen to thirty-four (the total number of senators being thirty-four), he was acquitted on each of the charges—a result attributed considerably to the offensive and

incapable manner in which the prosecution had been conducted by John Randolph.—J. Schouler, *History of the United States of America*, v. 2, p. 77.

1804-1805.—Jefferson's plans of national defense.—His gunboat fleet.—Jefferson's views as to the measures required for national defense, in the disturbed foreign relations of the country, were indicated in his message to Congress, when it assembled in November, 1804, but were afterwards communicated more fully to Mr. Nicholson, of Maryland, chairman of the committee to which the subject was referred. "Concerning fortification, he remarks that the plans and estimates of those required for our principal harbours, made fifty millions of dollars necessary for their completion. It would require 2,000 men to garrison them in peace, and 50,000 in war. When thus completed and manned, they would avail but little, as all military men agree that when vessels might

was thought would be sufficient to put every harbour into a respectable state of defence. Congress, neither fulfilling the wishes of the President, nor altogether resisting them, gave the President the means of partially trying his favourite scheme, by the appropriation of 60,000 dollars. . . . The scheme was vehemently assailed by his adversaries in every form of argument and ridicule, and was triumphantly adduced as a further proof that he was not a practical statesman. The officers of the navy were believed to be, with scarcely any exception, opposed to the system of gunboats, especially those who were assigned to this service. . . . It was like compelling a proud man to give up a fine richly caparisoned charger for a pair of panners and a donkey. To stem the current of public opinion, which so far as it was manifested, set so strong against these gunboats, and to turn it in their favour, Mr. Jefferson prevailed on Paine,



WILLIAM CLARK

MERIWETHER LEWIS

pass a fort without tacking, though it may annoy, it cannot prevent them. Two modes of effecting the same object might be 'adopted in aid of each other.' 1. Heavy cannon on travelling carriages, with militia trained to the management of them. 2. Floating batteries or gunboats. There were, he estimated, fifteen harbours in the United States needing and deserving defence. They would require 250 gunboats. The cost of these had been estimated at 2,000 dollars each, but he puts it down at 4,000, amounting in all to 1,000,000 dollars. Such of them as were kept under a shelter, ready to be launched, when wanted, would cost nothing more than an inclosure, or sentinel; those that were afloat, with men enough to take care of them, about 2,000 dollars a year each; and those fully manned for action about 8,000 dollars a year. He thought twenty-five of the second description enough, when France and England were at war. When at war ourselves, some of the third description would be required, the precise number depending on circumstances. There were ten then built and building, and fifteen more it

who had since his return been addressing the people of the United States on various topics, through the newspapers, to become their advocate. . . . The public [however] pinning its faith on experienced men, remained incredulous; and when, soon afterwards, many of the new marine were driven ashore in a tempest, or were otherwise destroyed, no one seemed to regard their loss as a misfortune, and the officers of the navy did not affect to conceal their satisfaction: nor has any attempt been since made to replace them. . . . The error of Mr. Jefferson was not, as his enemies charged, in adopting a visionary scheme of defence, but in limiting his views from a motive of economy, to the protection of the harbours, and in leaving his country's commerce and seamen, on the ocean, defenceless."—G. Tucker, *Life of Thomas Jefferson*, v. 2, ch. 8.

1804-1805.—Expedition of Lewis and Clark across the continent.—Pike's explorations.—"When Jefferson became president he appointed [Meriwether] Lewis as his private secretary, and it was not long before they had contrived a new

scheme for an exploration on a much larger scale than anything hitherto contemplated. In January, 1803, in the crisis of the excitement over the withdrawal of the right of deposit, Jefferson sent a message to Congress adverting to the ignorance which prevailed concerning the Indians of the Missouri, which was undesirable in view of 'their connection with the Mississippi and consequently with us.' He therefore proposed that an intelligent officer, with ten or twelve chosen men taken from the ranks of the army, should explore even to the western ocean. . . . The president nowhere alludes in so many words to the fact that he was proposing to Congress to authorize him to send a detachment of the United States army into the territory of a friendly state; but he seems to recognize the equivocal character of the enterprise by suggesting that Congress pass a bill appropriating the sum asked for to extend the external commerce of the United States. . . . The Louisiana purchase came in the nick of time to save . . . [him] from violating the code of international ethics. . . . The command of the expedition which was set on foot in consequence of the favorable action of Congress was given to Meriwether Lewis, William Clark being joined with him. . . . The expedition was carried on under the articles of war; months . . . were devoted to hardening the men to rigid discipline. . . . In May 1804, the expedition left its winter quarters on the bank of the river Du Bois. . . . There were forty-five persons in all, in three boats. . . . The amount of game, large and small, was prodigious; until the mountains were reached the expedition was abundantly supplied with food. . . . In the whole course of their upward journey their one unpleasant experience was with a band of the Sioux, [but] . . . no open attack was made. . . . [Some 1,600 miles upstream] near the site of Bismarck, North Dakota, they came to a permanent village of the Mandans where they passed the winter, wrote up their journals and observations with assiduous care [and obtained all possible information from officials of the Hudson Company and from the natives]. At this place they happened upon an Indian squaw, the so-called Bird Woman, who belonged to one of the mountain tribes and had been kidnapped years before. She and her husband [Chaboneau], accompanied the expedition when it set forth in the spring of 1805."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1801-1811*, pp. 87-89.—Before proceeding on his journey, Lewis sent a detachment down the river with reports. Then, early in April, 1805, "the explorers, now numbering thirty-two, again began to urge their boats up the river, for their last year's labors had brought them no more than half-way to their first objective, its source. No more Indian purveyors or pilots: their own rifles were the sole reliance for food. Many a wigwam, but no Indian, was espied for four months and four days after they left their winter camp. It was through the great Lone Land that they groped their dark and perilous way. In twenty days after the spring start they arrived at the Yellowstone, and in thirty more they first sighted the Rocky Mountains. Making the portage at the Great Falls cost them a month of vexatious delay. Rowing on another month brought them on August 12 to a point where one of the men stood with one foot each side of the rivulet, and 'thanked God that he had lived to bestride the Missouri, heretofore deemed endless.' They dragged their canoes; however, up the rivulet for five days longer. . . . A mile further they stood on the great divide, and drank of springs which sent their water to the

Pacific. But meantime they had been ready to starve in the mountains. Their hunters were of the best, but they found no game. . . . It was not till August 13 that, surprising a squaw so encumbered with papposes that she could not escape, and winning her heart by the gift of a looking-glass and painting her cheeks, they formed friendship with her nation, one of whose chiefs proved to be a brother of their Bird-woman. Horses were about all they could obtain of these natives, streams were too full of rapids to be navigable, or no timber fit for canoes was within reach. So the party, subsisting on horse-flesh, and afterwards on dog-meat, toiled on along one of the worst possible routes. Nor was it till the 7th of October that they were able to embark in logs they had burned hollow, upon a branch of the Columbia, which, after manifold portages and perils, bore them to its mouth and the goal of their pilgrimage, late in November. Its distance from the starting-point, according to their estimate, was 4,134 miles."—*Nation*, Oct. 26, 1803.—This expedition provided one of the best grounds of claim to possession of the Oregon country.—See also IDAHO: 1804-1811; OREGON: 1790-1805.—"In 1805 Jefferson had, for a second time, made part of the small army useful in the interest of scientific exploration: Lieutenant Zebulon Pike, with a small army, and under great difficulties traced the Mississippi from St. Louis to its source, and afterward explored the headwaters of the Arkansas and Red Rivers."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, p. 405, footnote.—See also MINNESOTA: 1805-1867.

Also in: J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 140-155.—O. D. Wheeler, *Trail of Lewis and Clark*, 1804-1904.—R. G. Thwaites, *Lewis and Clark journals*, 1804-1806.—F. J. Teggart, *Notes supplementary to Lewis and Clark (Report of the American Historical Association, 1908, v. 1, p. 183 ff)*.—E. Coués, *Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike*, v. 1, ch. 1.

1804-1809.—Difficulties with Great Britain.—Neutral rights.—Right of search.—Impressment.—Blockade by orders in council and the Berlin and Milan decrees.—Embargo and Non-intercourse.—The need for strong national defences seemed to be on the increase. After a short interlude, war between England and France had again broken out, and it was evident that in spite of the desire for peace, the country might at any time be drawn into the struggle. For a time, after 1803, almost the whole carrying trade of Europe was in American hands. "The merchant flag of every belligerent, save England, disappeared from the sea. France and Holland absolutely ceased to trade under their flags. Spain for a while continued to transport her specie and her bullion in her own ships protected by her men-of-war. But this, too, she soon gave up, and by 1806 the dollars of Mexico and the ingots of Peru were brought to her shores in American bottoms. It was under our flag that the gum trade was carried on with Senegal; that the sugar trade was carried on with Cuba; that coffee was exported from Caracas; and hides and indigo from South America. From Vera Cruz, from Carthage, from La Plata, from the French colonies in the Antilles, from Cayenne, from Dutch Guiana, from the Isles of France and Reunion, from Batavia and Manilla, great fleets of American merchantmen sailed for the United States, there to neutralize the voyage and then go on to Europe. They filled the warehouses at Cadiz and Antwerp to overflowing. They glutted the markets

of Embden and Lisbon, Hamburg and Copenhagen with the produce of the West Indies and the fabrics of the East, and, bringing back the products of the looms and forges of Germany to the New World, drove out the manufactures of Yorkshire, Manchester, and Birmingham. But this splendid trade was already marked for destruction. That Great Britain should long treat it with indifference was impossible. . . . She determined . . . to destroy it, and to destroy it in two ways: by paper blockades and by admiralty decisions. In January, 1804, accordingly, Great Britain blockaded the ports of Guadeloupe and Martinique. In April her commander at Jamaica blockaded Curaçoa. In August she extended the blockade to the Straits of Dover and the English Channel."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 225-226.—"The issue of direct trade was decided adversely to the contention of the United States, in the test case of the ship 'Essex,' in May, 1805, by the first living authority in England on maritime national law, Sir William Scott. Resting upon the Rule of 1756 [see RULE OF 1756], he held that direct trade from belligerent colonies to Europe was forbidden to neutrals, except under the conditions of the relaxing Orders [in Council] of 1798 and 1803; but the privilege to carry to their own country having been by those extended, it was conceded, in accordance with precedent, that products thus imported, if they had complied with the legal requirements for admission to use in the importing country, thenceforth had its nationality. . . . United States shippers, therefore, were at liberty to send even to France French colonial products which had been thus Americanized. The effect of this procedure upon the articles in question was to raise their price at the place of final arrival, by all the expense incident to a broken transit: . . . With the value thus enhanced upon reaching the continent of Europe, the British planter, carrier, and merchant, might hope that British West India produce could compete. . . . In the cases brought before Sir William Scott, however, it was found that the duties paid for admission to the United States were almost wholly released, by drawback, on re-exportation; so that the articles were brought to the continental consumer relieved of this principal element of cost. He therefore ruled that they had not complied with the conditions of an actual belligerent character; and that the carriage to Europe was by direct voyage, not interrupted by an importation. The vessels were therefore condemned. Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, who were appointed jointly to negotiate a settlement of the trouble wrote that 'the British commissioners did not hesitate to state that their wish was to place their own merchants on an equal footing in the great markets of the continent with those of the United States, by burthening the intercourse of the latter with severe restrictions.' The wish was allowable; but the method, the regulation of American commercial movement by British force, resting for justification upon a strained interpretation of a contested belligerent right, was naturally and accurately felt to be a re-imposition of colonial fetters upon a people who had achieved their independence. Mr. Monroe, who was minister to England when this interesting period began, had gone to Spain on a special mission in October, 1804, shortly after his announcement, . . . that 'American commerce was never so much favored in time of war.' 'On no principle or pretext, so far, has more than one of our vessels been condemned.' Upon his return in July, 1805, he found in full progress the seizures, the legality

of which had been affirmed by Sir William Scott. . . . In January, 1806, Pitt died; and the ministry which succeeded was composed largely of men recently opposed to him in general principles of action. In particular, Mr. Fox, . . . became Secretary for Foreign Affairs. His good dispositions towards America were well known, and dated from the War of Independence. To him Monroe wrote that under the recent measures 'about one hundred and twenty vessels had been seized, several condemned, all taken from their course, detained, and otherwise subjected to heavy losses and damages.' The American envoy was sanguine of a favorable issue; but the British Secretary had to undergo the experience, . . . that in the complications of political life a broad personal conviction has often to yield to the narrow logic of particular conditions. It is clear that the measures would not have been instituted, had he [Fox] been in control; but as it was, the American representative demanded not only their discontinuance, but a money indemnity. . . . In 1806 the Administration determined to constitute an extraordinary mission, for the purpose of 'treating with the British Government concerning the maritime wrongs which have been committed, and the regulation of commercial navigation between the parties.' For this object Mr. William Pinkney, of Maryland, was nominated as colleague to Monroe, and arrived in England on June 24. The points to be adjusted by the new commissioners were numerous, but among them two were made pre-eminent,—the question of colonial trade, . . . and that of impressment of seamen from American vessels. These were named by the Secretary of State as the motive of the recent Act [the Non-Importation Act] prohibiting certain importations. To understand the real gravity of this dispute, it is essential to consider candidly the situation of both parties, and also the influence exerted upon either by long-standing tradition. The British Government did not advance a crude claim to impress American seamen. What it did assert, and was enforcing, was a right to exercise over individuals on board foreign merchantmen, upon the high seas, the authority which it possessed on board British ships there, and over all ships in British ports. The United States took the ground that no such jurisdiction existed, unless over persons engaged in the military service of an enemy; and that only when a vessel entered the ports or territorial waters of Great Britain were those on board subject to arrest by her officers. There, as in every state, they came under the law of the land. The British argument in favor of this alleged right may be stated in the words of Canning. Writing to Monroe, September 23, 1807, he starts from the premise, then regarded by many even in America as sound, that allegiance by birth is inalienable. . . . 'That the exercise of this right involves some of the dearest interests of Great Britain, your Government is ready to acknowledge. . . . It is needless to repeat that these rights existed in their fullest force for ages previous to the establishment of the United States of America as an independent government; and it would be difficult to contend that the recognition of that independence can have operated any change in this respect.' Whether the foundation of the alleged right was solidly laid in reason, or not, it rested on alleged prescription, indorsed by a popular acceptance and suffrage which no ministry could afford to disregard at a time when the manning of the Royal Navy was becoming a matter of notorious and increasing difficulty. . . . Public opinion in the United States



was by no means united in support of the position then taken by Jefferson and Madison, as well as by their predecessors in office, proper and matter-of-course as that seems to-day. Many held, and asserted with vehemence, that the British right existed, and that an indisputable wrong was committed by giving the absentees shelter under the American flag. The claim advanced by the United States Government, and the only one possible to it under the circumstances, was that when outside of territorial limits a ship's flag and papers must be held to determine the nation, to which alone belonged jurisdiction over every person on board, unless demonstrably in the military service of a belligerent. The United States did not refuse to recognize, distinctly if not fully, the embarrassment under which Great Britain labored by losing the services of her seamen at a moment of such national exigency; and it was prepared to offer many concessions in municipal regulations, in order to exclude British subjects from American vessels. Various propositions were advanced looking to the return of deserters and to the prevention of enlistments; coupled always with a renunciation of the British claim to take persons from under the American flag. Various expedients for attaching to the individual documentary evidence of birth were from time to time tried; but the heedless and inconsequent character and habits of the sailor of that day, and the facility with which the papers, once issued, could be transferred or bought, made any such resource futile. The United States was thus driven to the position enunciated in 1792 by Jefferson, then Secretary of State: 'The simplest rule will be that the vessel being American shall be evidence that the seamen on board of her are such.' If this demand comprehended, as it apparently did, cases of arrest in British harbors, it was clearly extravagant, resembling the idea proceeding from the same source that the Gulf Stream should mark the neutral line of United States waters; but for the open sea it formulated the doctrine on which the country finally and firmly took its stand."—A. T. Mahan, *Sea power in its relations to the War of 1812*, v. 1, pp. 101-120.—See also EXPATRIATION.—"The American commissioners were instructed to insist upon three concessions in the treaty which they were to negotiate: restoration of trade with enemies' colonies, indemnity for captures made since the *Essex* decision, and express repudiation of the right of impressment. In return for these concessions, they might hold out the possible repeal of the Non-Importation Act! . . . The mission was . . . doomed from the outset, and nothing more need be said of it than that in the end, to secure any treaty at all, Monroe and Pinkney broke their instructions and set aside the three ultimata. What they obtained in return seemed so insignificant and doubtful, and what they paid for even these slender compensations seemed so exorbitant, that the President would not even submit the treaty to the Senate. . . . Jefferson thought it best 'to let the negotiation take a friendly nap'; but Madison, who felt that his political future depended on a diplomatic triumph over England, drafted new instructions for the two commissioners, hoping that the treaty might yet be put into acceptable form. It was while these new instructions were crossing the ocean that the *Chesapeake* struck her colors."—A. Johnson, *Jefferson and his colleagues (Chronicles of America)*, pp. 147, 149.—"In the early months of 1807, some French frigates had run up Chesapeake Bay to escape a British squadron. Relying on what Jefferson pleasantly termed the hospitality

of the United States, these British men-of-war dropped anchor in Lynnhaven Bay, near Cape Henry, where they could watch the passage through the capes. From one of these British vessels a boat crew of common seamen made their escape to Norfolk. Just at this time the new frigate *Chesapeake*, which had been partially fitted out at the navy yard of Washington for service in the Mediterranean, dropped down to Hampton Roads to receive her complement of guns and provisions for a three years' cruise. On June 22, the *Chesapeake* passed out through the capes, preceded by the *Leopard*, a British frigate of fifty guns. When they were well out on the high seas, the *Leopard* drew alongside the *Chesapeake* and signaled that she had a message for Commodore Barron. This message proved to be an order from Admiral Berkeley at Halifax, instructing commanders of British vessels who fell in with the *Chesapeake* to search her for deserters. The American commander denied that he had deserters on board and refused to allow the search. Almost immediately the *Leopard* approached with her gun decks cleared for action. Unaware of his danger Commodore Barron had not called his crew to quarters. The *Leopard* opened fire and poured three broadsides into the helpless American vessel, killing three men and wounding eighteen others. After fifteen minutes Barron hauled down his flag to spare his crew from needless sacrifice, and suffered the British commander to search the dismantled *Chesapeake*. Four alleged deserters were found and taken away, three of whom subsequently were proved to be American citizens. The *Leopard* then returned to the squadron off Cape Henry, while the *Chesapeake* limped back to Hampton Roads. . . . Had the President chosen to go to war at this moment, he would have had a united people behind him. But Thomas Jefferson was not a martial character. His proclamation ordering all armed British vessels out of American waters and suspending intercourse with them if they remained, was so moderate in tone as to seem almost pusillanimous. John Randolph called it an apology. Instead of demanding unconditional reparation for this outrage, Madison instructed Monroe to insist upon an entire abolition of impressments as 'an indispensable part of the satisfaction.' The astute Canning, who had become Foreign Secretary in the new Portland Ministry, took advantage of this confusion of issues to evade the demand for reparation until popular passion in the United States had subsided. It was not until November [1807] that Canning took active measures. He then sent a special commissioner to the United States."—A. Johnson, *Union and democracy*, pp. 184, 186.—"The moment had come to adopt a policy. Submission and war were equally distasteful to Jefferson, and fortified by his persistent belief that our commerce was indispensable to both belligerents, he recommended that the United States bring them to terms by cutting off that commerce altogether. Every member of his cabinet agreed with him. On December 17, 1807, he sent a message to Congress urging an embargo on all the foreign commerce of the United States. The Senate immediately passed the bill by a vote of 22 to 6, and four days later the House concurred by a vote of 82 to 44. Most of the state legislatures approved the embargo. In January, Congress appropriated \$1,000,000 for the defense of ports and harbors, in March it empowered the president to call on 100,000 militia to serve six months; in April it increased the regular army by 6,000 men. Altogether the military expenses reached about

\$4,000,000."—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 240-241.

Meantime the measures used by Napoleon in his efforts to crush the maritime power of England and destroy her commerce with the continent created a difficult position for the American statesmen who were endeavoring to keep the peace. "The strenuousness of his purpose brought Napoleon face to face with the actual problems of enforcing his System. . . . For certain it was that the continental cordon was somehow being penetrated between Antwerp and Altona. But the imperial attention was still further focused upon this . . . region by the English seizure of Heligoland as an entrepôt for colonial goods and the coincident modification of the blockade of the North Sea littoral. . . . The result was an imperial decree of 13 or 14 October promulgated in the Hanse ports a fortnight later, and matched by a very similar Dutch decree issued about 17 October [1806] for the district of the Dollart to the Ems. For this significant October decree in the absence of an official version we are dependent chiefly upon the preliminary directions given Gaudin in the Emperor's letter of 13 October. . . . Forty days later (23 November), at Milan, Napoleon issued a decree for France whose five articles with very slight verbal changes are a repetition . . . of the October edict. The outstanding provisions of the Hanse decree, of its Dutch counterpart, and its French replica, are those which order the confiscation of every ship with its cargo without distinction, which for any reason may have touched in England. They likewise required not only the sworn statement of the shipmaster and the delivery of all ship's papers on arrival, but also verification of the captain's declaration by the examination of every sailor and passenger on board. Proof of false declarations entailed not only the confiscation for touching in England but heavy fines as well. An outstanding aspect of these measures is their emphasis upon the extra-continental significance of the Continental System, for manifestly all these restrictions bore hardly upon the neutral shippers, especially the Americans. In fact, this Fontainebleau legislation was frankly confirming the disclosures of the weeks preceding that the Berlin decree, issued ostensibly as a retaliatory act in championship of neutral rights, was to be, in reality, a commercial measure for French military and economic purposes, bearing hardest of all upon the neutrals. This new revelation of the animus of the Continental System had come partly as the result of pressure from the American government for an authoritative statement of the imperial policy. . . . [Interpretations of the decree favorable to America had been made in December, 1807, and in March and May, 1808.] Consequently Armstrong could write on 7 July to Monroe at London that it was 'admitted by both ministerial and judicial authority that this Decree did not infract the provisions of the treaty of 1800 between the United States and France.' [But, when Armstrong appealed to Talleyrand in August for an interpretation of the Spanish version of the decree] the Emperor had already ordered the strict enforcement of articles 7 and 8 of the decree whereby entry in France was refused to any ship which touched in England. . . . Obviously this strict interpretation seemed to neutral governments a portentous reversal of policy. Announced to Armstrong about 24 September, it was to serve indirectly—by the publication of a warning sent through Consul Bourne to American traders at Amsterdam—as the spur to the adoption of fresh

retaliatory orders by England. While, reported to Jefferson with Champagny's confirmation, and with the exemplification of its injustice in the case of the *Horizon*, it was to prove yet another direct cause of the American Embargo. . . . Directly following the issuance of the Milan decree of 17 December 1807, there was a sequestration of neutral shipping in French ports. At first, but for only a few days, American ships escaped this. Immediately upon the inclusion of these ships in the general embargo the American minister protested strenuously, and he was destined to continue his reclamations for many weary months thereafter. At first Napoleon's reply was an effort to browbeat the United States into adhesion to the Milan decree and into war upon England, but he immediately realized his mistake and altered his tactics by seeking to bribe the United States into an alliance. This change of tactics was coincident with the discussion by the Council of Administration of the Interior regarding the amelioration of the decrees of November 1806 and December 1807 by a new navigation policy. But just before the critical council of 14 February 1808, news had reached Napoleon of the American Embargo Act. Therefore 'though the proposition was supported by the whole weight of the council he became highly indignant and declared that these decrees should suffer no change, and that the Americans should be compelled to take the positive character either of allies or of enemies.' A month's efforts through Lafayette, Marbois, Talleyrand Fouché, Cretet, and Champagny brought a half promise of relaxation in favor of the United States from Napoleon. But this he almost immediately retracted and when, early in April, at Bordeaux, he learned of the disastrous effect of the American Embargo upon his West Indian possessions he was not slow in finding a plausible mode of retaliation. The result was the so-called Bayonne decree—a letter to Gaudin dated 17 April at Bayonne which used the Embargo as a plea for sequestering all American vessels in imperial or dependent ports on the grounds that there could be no Americans in Europe after the Embargo; therefore so-called Americans were only masked English ships. Armstrong's protests were in vain against this reasoning which had sufficient basis of facts to bear the super-structure of sophistry. . . .

"[By the close of 1808 objection was made by the United States to the licence system, the belligerents' policy of trade by exception.] In the selection of mutually acceptable neutral flags three shifts of policy can be recognized during the period of inaugurating the French licence experiment. These shifts are coincident with three corresponding changes in American relations with the two belligerents. This marked influence of American relations is logical, since, as the one true neutral of importance, the United States had the first right to profit by any relaxations of the anti-commercial system. This recognition of American claims had been the basis of Decrès's September 1808 report and had been the view generally held since 1806 by Napoleon's ministers. It might be inferred from the decree of 16 February, issued coincidentally with the decision in favor of licences, that Napoleon had adopted the view of Decrès, for by the decree American vessels were to be freed at once from the general embargo, and apparently before those of other nations. But a few days later conditions were attached to the release with the American minister protested were not an open discrimination against the United States but were equivalent to issuing French licences for American vessels to

sail the high seas. Not improbably the change of conditions for releasing American vessels was influenced by the arrival of news from the United States of the probable adoption of a non-intercourse act affecting trade with England and France. Undoubtedly such news, as well as Armstrong's open objections to anything like licences for American ships, militated against allowing the use of the United States flag in the exceptional traffic contemplated."—F. E. Melvin, *Napoleon's navigation system, a thesis*, pp. 34-39, 70-72, 101.—"The policy of the United States during the period of the Continental System is an example of the type which, in the course of an economic war to the knife, seeks to maintain neutrality to the uttermost and to take all the consequences of that attitude, without, it is true, the support of either external military power or an efficient internal administration. Down to the close of 1807 this policy brought with it a unique development of American shipping and foreign trade, especially the carrying trade. But when the commercial war became more intense in 1807, it made a complete right-about-face and led to the second great self-blockade caused by the Continental System; and finally, when this became quite untenable, it drove the American Union into the very war which its leading men had done everything in their power to avert. . . . The increased severity in the British treatment of neutrals, went back especially to the new interpretation of 'broken voyages' in the *Essex* case in the summer of 1805, and in April, 1806, it had occasioned. . . . [an] American counter-measure in the form of the Non-importation Act, which prohibited the importation, both from England and from other countries, of most of the main groups of British industrial products, excluding, however, cotton goods. But the American law did not enter into force until November 15, and was suspended at the close of the year, so that it turned out to be nothing more than a threat. The Berlin decree of November 21, 1806, immediately led the American envoy in Paris to address an inquiry to the French minister of the marine, Vice Admiral Decrès, as to the interpretation of the new law at sea. In the absence of the Emperor the answer was favourable, and consequently there was no immediate occasion for uneasiness on the part of America. . . . Nor was any great alteration made in this respect by the first British Order in Council of January, 1807, owing to its restricted range. Accordingly, during the greater part of the year 1807 American trade and shipping continued not merely to flourish, but even to grow. . . . But the turning-point. . . . was made with the authentic interpretation of the law which Napoleon, as the sole final authority, gave to his Berlin decree, whereby it came to apply also to the sea. Then followed the new British Orders in Council of November and Napoleon's Milan decree of December. . . . All this set going the great American series of counter-measures, which also, so far as they concerned Great Britain, were affected by the. . . . '*Chesapeake Affair*' of June, 1807. . . . But what gave the principal impulse to the American commercial, or rather anti-commercial, intervention was not the measures of Great Britain, but rather those of France, that is to say, the new adaptation of the Berlin decree, which brought it about that a stranded American vessel, the *Horizon*, had that part of its cargo which was of British origin declared fair prize. However, the new Orders in Council were known in the United States (in fact, though not officially) when on December 22, 1807, Congress and the

President enacted the Embargo Act, which is one of the most interesting legislative products of the period. . . . An embargo was laid on all vessels lying in American ports and bound for foreign ports. The only exceptions were foreign vessels, which were allowed to depart after being informed of the enactment of the law; and vessels in the American coasting trade were to give security that the cargo should be discharged in an American port. Almost at the same time the Non-importation Act, . . . [was put into force]. Under the pressure of the unreasonable procedure of both the combatants, the American government thus sought to cut off at a blow the abnormally large trade and shipping that the United States had until then enjoyed. In principle the policy was impartial, inasmuch as it was intended, on the one hand, to deprive Great Britain of American cotton and grain, as well as of sales on the American markets, and, on the other hand, to put an end to the colonial trade from which France and Spain and their colonies derived equal advantages, and also to the importation of the industrial products of the European Continent into America. Although the measure was thus indisputably two-sided, the simultaneous enforcement of the one-sided Non-importation Act gave the policy the appearance of being directed distinctly against Great Britain. That country, indeed, had touched on a particularly tender point by imposing duties on the goods which compulsorily passed through its territories, inasmuch as both the United States and the British opposition put it on a level with the taxation of American trade which in the preceding generation had given the final impulse to the Declaration of Independence by 'the old thirteen.' President Jefferson's motive seems to have been partly the bias of the plantation owners, emphasized by his physiocratic tendency toward regarding agriculture as the highest work of man and his grave distrust of everything which departed from agriculture. To begin with, at least, he undoubtedly considered, as the American historian, Channing, says, 'that to put an end to, let us say, three quarters of the commerce of the United States would be a blessing, albeit somewhat in disguise.' But evidently this, like most of the measures of the different powers in the commercial war, was also a measure of reprisal, an endeavour to compel the embittered belligerents to be reasonable. In fact, unlike the majority of their own measures, it was a sincere attempt in that direction. It seems also as if the Embargo Act was a means of saving the great American merchant fleet, the largest next to that of Great Britain, from the extinction which must otherwise have been the almost necessary consequence of the Berlin and Milan decrees and of the Orders in Council. Thus, for instance, a large ship-owner in Maryland stated that of fifteen vessels which he had dispatched during the bare four months between September 1 and the enactment of the Embargo Act, only three had arrived at their destination, while two had been captured by the French and the Spaniards, one had been seized at Hamburg, and nine had been taken to England. However, it is rather an academic question what the effect of the Embargo Act would have been had it been obeyed, for nothing was further from reality."—E. F. Heckscher, *Continental system (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 127-131)*.—Under the Embargo Act "a vessel engaged in the coasting-trade was to give bonds to double the value of its cargo to land the same within the limits of the United States. Discretionary power was given to the presi-

dent to suspend these restrictions as to any vessels at his will and pleasure. . . . Many ship-owners preferred to keep their vessels in service and run the risk of loss. This they accomplished by directing their captains, so far as they could reach them, not to enter an American port. . . . The ink was scarcely dry on the signatures to the embargo act before it became necessary to pass a supplementary act requiring coasting and fishing vessels to give bonds to reland their cargoes in the United States (January 8, 1808), under heavy penalties for both owner and master. The news of the actual issue of the orders in council and of the Milan Decree, coupled with continued evasions of the law, induced Congress to pass a second supplementary act (March 12, 1808), extending the operation of the embargo act to all vessels. . . . From this time on foreign vessels were to be allowed to prosecute the coasting-trade only on giving bonds not to take their cargo to foreign ports. Fishing-vessels were also included in the scope of the act, and it was extended with a view to the prevention of exportation by land. [Efforts to overcome the difficulty of enforcing the embargo culminated in the Enforcement Act of 1809. This was followed by the Non-Intercourse Act which repealed the Embargo Act.]—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1800-1811*, pp. 214, 215.—See also below: 1808; EMBARGO: Definition; First American embargoes.—“As the year 1808 drew towards its close, it became increasingly evident that the desired pressure was not being exerted upon Great Britain. Jefferson and Madison thought that this failure was due to the lax enforcement of the embargo in America. Gallatin, while agreeing with them, wished to declare war. The embargo policy was producing unlooked for and undesirable results in compelling administrative officials to exercise powers that were not authorized by the Constitution or by the laws. Collectors had forbidden the loading of vessels and had refused to issue clearances without any legal authority and only on instructions from the Secretary. Gallatin even offered to finance a war for one year without resorting to loans or new taxations. Jefferson and Madison preferred to make one more trial with the embargo and the Enforcement Act of January, 1809, was passed. This gave Gallatin the power he needed to make it impossible to ship goods outside of the United States. It authorized collectors to seize merchandise or other movable property which was apparently on the way to the frontier, to refuse permits to load merchandise on vessels, and to detain them almost at will,—it conferred upon them almost the same kind of power that had been so strongly reprobated in Otis's arguments against the Writs of Assistance.”—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 381-382.—See also above: 1803; below: 1808-1810; 1810-1812; 1812 (June-October); (September-November); CONTINENTAL SYSTEM; FRANCE: 1806-1810; TARIFF: 1808-1824.

ALSO IN: F. E. Melvin, *Napoleon's navigation system*.—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 3, ch. 3-7.—E. Schuyler, *American diplomacy*, ch. 5, 7.—A. T. Mahan, *Influence of sea power on the French Revolution*, v. 2, ch. 17-18.—F. Wharton, *Digest of the international law of the United States*, v. 2-3, ch. 7, 16, 21.—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 3.

1805.—Louisiana becomes a territory. See LOUISIANA: 1805-1812.

1805.—Session of lands from Choctaw Indians. See MISSISSIPPI: 1801-1811.

1805-1867.—Control of Minnesota Territory.—

Treaties with Indians.—Fur trade. See MINNESOTA: 1805-1867.

1806-1807.—Aaron Burr's filibustering scheme.—His arrest and trial.—Aaron Burr had lost all his friends in the political controversy surrounding the election of 1800 and by his efforts to obtain the presidency in 1801. In 1804 the vice president was a candidate for the governorship of New York, but was defeated, as he had been in 1801, by the efforts of Alexander Hamilton. In revenge, he challenged Hamilton to a duel on Weehawken Heights, in which he shot to kill, and Hamilton fell mortally wounded. Burr, “after his duel with Gen. Hamilton, and after the term of his office as vice-president had expired, . . . seemed to be left alone, and abandoned by all political parties. The state of public feeling in New York was such, after the death of Hamilton, that his presence in that city could not be endured. In New-Jersey he had been indicted by a grand jury for murder. Thus situated, his ambitious, active and restless spirit rendered his condition intolerable to himself. On the 22nd March, but a few days after he left forever the presidency of the United States senate, he wrote to his son-in-law, Mr. Joseph Alston, that he ‘was under ostracism. In New York,’ said he, ‘I am to be disfranchised, and in New-Jersey to be hanged. Having substantial objections to both, I shall not, for the present, hazard either, but shall seek another country.’ Accordingly, early in May, he left Philadelphia for the western country, and arrived at Lexington, in Kentucky, on the 20th of that month. After travelling with great rapidity through that state, he directed his course to Nashville, in Tennessee, and from thence he journeyed through the woods to Natchez. From Natchez he went by land to New-Orleans, where he arrived on the 25th June, 1805. At that time, Gen. Wilkinson was in that city, or in its neighborhood, and commanded the United States troops stationed there. It does not appear that he remained long in New-Orleans, but soon again returned to Lexington, in Kentucky, by the way of Nashville. He was at Cincinnati, and at several places in Ohio, but in a very short time made his appearance at St. Louis, in Missouri, and from thence he travelled to Washington, at which place he arrived on the 29th day of November. These immense journies he performed in a little more than six months; before the great western rivers were rendered navigable by steam, and when the roads were badly constructed; and through a considerable part of the country traversed by him there were no roads at all. His movements were veiled in mystery, and all men wondered what could be the motive which induced these extraordinary journies. From January, 1806, to the month of August following, he spent his time principally in Washington and Philadelphia; but, in the month of August, he again set his face towards the west, and was soon afterwards found in Kentucky. About this time boats were provided, provisions and munitions of war were collected, and men were gathering at different points on the Ohio and Cumberland rivers. Government now began to be alarmed. Mr. Tiffin, governor of Ohio, seized the boats and their cargo and Burr was arrested in Kentucky; but no sufficient proof appearing against him he was discharged. On the 23d January, 1807, Mr. Jefferson sent a message to congress, accompanied by several affidavits, in which he gave the history of Burr's transactions, so far as they had come to the knowledge of the administration. The message stated that, on the 21st of October, Gen. Wilkinson wrote to the president that, from

a letter he had received from Burr, he had ascertained that his objects were, a severance of the union on the line of the Allegany mountains, an attack upon Mexico, and the establishment of an independent government in Mexico, of which Burr was to be the head. That to cover his movements, he had purchased, or pretended to have purchased, of one Lynch, a tract of country claimed by Baron Bastiop, lying near Natchitoches, on which he proposed to make a settlement. That he had found, by the proceedings of the governor and people of Ohio and Kentucky, that the western people were not prepared to join him; but notwithstanding, there was reason to believe that

in the first instance, agreed to be his accomplice; that, as their operations progressed, he began seriously to doubt of success, and then communicated his knowledge of the affair to the government, in order to save himself, and perhaps obtain a reward. . . . That Burr himself was deceived by Wilkinson, there can be not doubt. . . . But there was other evidence besides that of Wilkinson, against Burr, which has never been explained. . . . If his object was merely an attack upon Mexico, why did he not openly avow it, when charged and indicted for treason against his country? . . . Again, unless Col. William Eaton, the man who had then recently so gallantly distinguished himself



SCENE OF THE DUEL BETWEEN AARON BURR AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON  
Weehawken, New Jersey, July 11, 1804

he intended, with what force he could collect, to attack New-Orleans, get the control of the funds of the bank, seize upon the military and naval stores which might be found there, and then proceed against Mexico. The president assured congress that there was no reason to apprehend that any foreign power would aid Col. Burr. A considerable part of the evidence going to show that Burr entertained criminal designs, depended on the affidavit of Wilkinson. It is not my intention to examine into the proofs of the guilt or innocence of Burr, further than to remark, that from the character of the vain, vamping and unprincipled Wilkinson, as before and since developed, no dependence can safely be placed upon his statements, unless supported by strong circumstances, or other evidence; and I believe it will not at this day be doubted, that if Burr plotted treason, Wilkinson,

on the Barbary coasts, has perjured himself, Burr did form a treasonable plot against his country. Col. Eaton, on the 26th January, deposed, in open court, held before Judge Cranch and others, at Washington, that during the preceding winter (1806), Burr called upon him, and, in the first instance, represented that he was employed by the government to raise a military force to attack the Spanish Provinces in North America, and invited Eaton to take a command in the expedition; that Eaton, being a restless, enterprising man, readily acceded to the proposal; that Burr made frequent calls upon him, and in his subsequent interviews complained of the inefficiency and timidity of the government, and, eventually, fully developed his project; which was to separate the western states from the union, and establish himself as sovereign of the country. . . . Burr did not suc-

ceed in collecting and organizing a force on the western waters; but, on the 1st day of March, he was discovered wandering alone in the Tombigbee country, near the line of Florida."—J. D. Hammond, *History of political parties in the State of New York*, v. 1, ch. 12.—Burr's scheme, whatever it may have been, would probably have fallen through earlier than it did, were it not for the aid which he received from Herman Blennerhassett, an Irishman who had established himself on an island in the Ohio, not far from Scioto. Burr first met Blennerhassett in the summer of 1805, when, on his way to Cincinnati, he landed on the island. He saw in Blennerhassett a ready tool for his ambition, and in furtherance of his plans exercised his undoubted charm to make his host his most devoted adherent. Blennerhassett's "lands, his fortune, his life, everything that was his was laid at the feet of Burr. He gave money, he bought supplies, he built boats, he wrote in behalf of the cause. . . . [Blennerhassett's island figured largely at the trial of Burr. To prove him guilty of treason, it was necessary to prove his presence at the assemblage of men, for a treasonable design' which was held on the island.] In the opinion of Marshall, the indictment charged Burr with levying war against the United States. To make good the accusation, the overt act must be proved . . . by the testimony of two witnesses. There was not, however, even one witness. Indeed it was admitted by everybody that Burr was not on the island . . . was not within the jurisdiction of Virginia when the thirty men gathered at the home of Blennerhassett. . . . The indictment of high misdemeanor charged Burr with having on December 10, 1806, on Blennerhassett's Island, began a military expedition against the King of Spain. But Burr was not on the island on the day named."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 61, 85.—"The trial of the indictment against Burr, for treason, occupied many weeks, but he was finally acquitted by the jury, without swearing any witness in his defence. . . . The acquittal seems to have been on technical grounds. . . . After his acquittal, Col. Burr appears still to have persevered in the project of making an effort to detach Mexico from the Spanish government. On the 7th of June, 1808, he sailed from New-York for Europe, it would seem in the hope of engaging the British government to fit out an expedition against Mexico, in which he would take a part. In this he was entirely unsuccessful. His application to the French government was equally vain and useless. He spent four years wandering about in Europe."—J. D. Hammond, *History of political parties in the state of New York*, v. 1, ch. 12.—Wilkinson's culpability seems to have been at least as great as Burr's. Moreover, he appears to have been in receipt of a pension from the king of Spain.—See also **BLANNERHASSETT'S ISLAND**.

Also in: W. H. Safford, *Blennerhassett papers*, ch. 6-15.—M. L. Davis, *Memoirs of Burr*, v. 2, ch. 17-20.—J. Parton, *Life and times of Burr*, v. 2, ch. 21-26.—D. Robertson, *Report of trials of Burr*.—A. Johnson, *Jefferson and his colleagues (Chronicles of America)*.—E. S. Corwin, *John Marshall and the constitution (Chronicles of America)*, pp. 86-114.—W. F. McCaleb, *Aaron Burr conspiracy*.—A. B. Hulbert, *Lost Burr papers (Mississippi Valley Historical Review, June, 1914, p. 95)*.

1806-1812.—Cumberland Road.—First national work of internal improvement.—"In 1806 the United States began the Cumberland Road, its first work of the kind; but it was intended to open

up the public lands in Ohio and the country west, and was nominally paid for out of the proceeds of those public lands. Just as the embargo policy was taking effect, Gallatin, encouraged by the accumulation of a surplus in the Treasury, brought in a report, April 4, 1808, suggesting the construction of a great system of internal improvements: it was to include coastwise canals across the isthmuses of Cape Cod, New Jersey, upper Delaware and eastern North Carolina; roads were to be constructed from Maine to Georgia, and thence to New Orleans, and from Washington westward to Detroit and St. Louis. He estimated the cost at twenty millions, to be provided in ten annual instalments."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union*, sect. 121.—See also **CUMBERLAND ROAD**.

1807.—Practical beginning of steamboat navigation. See **STEAM NAVIGATION: Beginnings**.

1807.—Abolition of slave-trade.—Measure in Congress.—Significance of Southern action.—By the terms of the constitution, Congress was deprived of power to interfere with the importation of slaves before the year 1808, but no longer. The time now approached when that restraint would cease, and the president in his annual message brought the subject to notice. "It was referred to a committee of which Mr. Early of Georgia was the chairman. There was no difference of opinion as to the prohibition of the traffic, or at least no expression of any; but the practical details of the law, the penalties by which it was to be enforced, and, above all, the disposition to be made of such negroes as might be brought into the country in violation of it, gave rise to violent and excited debates. The committee reported a law prohibiting the slave-trade after the 31st of December, 1807, imposing certain penalties for its breach, and providing that all negroes imported after that date should be forfeited. The object of this provision undoubtedly was to obtain directly what the Constitution only gave indirectly and by implication,—the sanction of the government of the United States to the principle of slaveholding, by making it hold and sell men as property. . . . It having been moved that the words 'shall be entitled to his or her freedom' should be inserted after the word 'forfeited,' a furious fight ensued over this amendment. The Southern members resisted it, on the ground that the emancipation of the imported Africans would increase the number of free negroes, who, as Mr. Early affirmed, 'were considered in the States where they are found in considerable numbers as instruments of murder, theft, and conflagration.' And so craftily was this proposition of forfeiture to the government qualified, that its drift was not at first discerned by the Northern members. For, strong as was their disapprobation of slavery in the abstract, they felt no disposition to expose their Southern brethren to all the horrors of insurrection which it was assumed would follow the multiplication of free negroes. Indeed, Mr. Early candidly said, that, if these negroes were left free in the Southern States, not one of them would be alive in a year. And although the Federalists as a party, and Mr. Quincy eminently among them, regarded the political element of slavery as full of dangers to the future of the nation, these opinions had worked no personal and social alienation between Northern and Southern men. . . . Mr. Quincy at first opposed striking out the forfeiture clause, on the ground that this was the only way in which the United States could get the control of the Africans, so as to dispose of them in the manner most for their own interest. . . . These views in-

fluenced a majority of the Northern members until the question of the final passage of the bill approached. At last they came to a sense of the disgrace which the forfeiture of the negroes to the government, and the permission to it to sell them as slaves if it so pleased, would bring upon the nation, and the whole matter was recommitted to a committee of one from each State. . . . This committee reported a bill providing that such imported negroes should be sent to such States as had abolished slavery, there to be bound out as apprentices for a term of years, at the expiration of which they should be free. This bill produced a scene of great and violent excitement on the part of the slaveholders. Mr. Early declared that the people of the South would resist this provision with their lives! . . . The final settlement was by a bill originating in the Senate, providing that, though neither importer nor purchaser should have a title to such negroes, still the negroes should be subject to any regulation for their disposal that should be made by the States into which they might be brought. The design of the slaveholding party to make the United States recognize the rightfulness of property in man was thus avoided, but it was at the cost of leaving the imported Africans to the tender mercies of the Slave States. The fact that the slaveholders were greatly incensed at the result, and regarded it as an injury and an affront, does not make this disposition of these unfortunates any the less discreditable to Congress or the nation."—E. Quincy, *Life of Josiah Quincy*, ch. 5.—See also SLAVERY: 1792-1807.

1808.—Effects of the embargoes.—"The embargo was an experiment in politics well worth making. In the scheme of President Jefferson's statesmanship, non-intercourse was the substitute for war,—the weapon of defence and coercion which saved the cost and danger of supporting army or navy, and spared America the brutalities of the Old World. Failure of the embargo meant in his mind not only a recurrence to the practice of war, but to every political and social evil that war had always brought in its train. In such a case the crimes and corruptions of Europe, which had been the object of his political fears, must, as he believed, sooner or later teem in the fat soil of America. To avert a disaster so vast, was a proper motive for statesmanship, and justified disregard for smaller interests. . . . Everywhere, on all occasions, he proclaimed that embargo was the alternative to war. The question next to be decided was brought by this means into the prominence it deserved. Of the two systems of statesmanship, which was the most costly,—which the most efficient? . . . The economical was less serious than the moral problem. The strongest objection to war was not its waste of money or even of life; for money and life in political economy were worth no more than they could be made to produce. A worse evil was the lasting harm caused by war to the morals of mankind, which no system of economy could calculate. . . . Yet even on that ground the embargo had few advantages. The peaceable coercion which Jefferson tried to substitute for war was less brutal, but hardly less mischievous, than the evil it displaced. The embargo opened the sluice-gates of social corruption. Every citizen was tempted to evade or defy the laws. . . . If the cost of the embargo was extravagant in its effects on the Constitution, the economy, and the morals of the nation, its political cost to the party in power was ruinous. War could have worked no more violent revolution. The trial was too severe for human

nature to endure. At a moment's notice, without avowing his true reasons, President Jefferson bade foreign commerce to cease."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America*, v. 2, pp. 272-273, 276-277.—"The dread of war, radical in the Republican theory, sprang not so much from the supposed waste of life or resources as from the retroactive effects which war must exert upon the form of government; but the experience of a few months showed that the embargo as a system was rapidly leading to the same effects. . . . Personal liberties and rights of property were more directly curtailed in the United States by embargo than in Great Britain by centuries of almost continuous foreign war. . . . While the constitutional cost of the two systems was not altogether unlike, the economical cost was a point not easily settled. No one could say what might be the financial expense of embargo as compared with war. Yet Jefferson himself in the end admitted that the embargo had no claim to respect as an economical measure. . . . As the order was carried along the seacoast, every artisan dropped his tools, every merchant closed his doors, every ship was dismantled. American produce—wheat, timber, cotton, tobacco, rice—dropped in value or became unsalable; every imported article rose in price; wages stopped; swarms of debtors became bankrupt; thousands of sailors hung idle round the wharves trying to find employment on coasters, and escape to the West Indies or Nova Scotia. A reign of idleness began; and the men who were not already ruined felt that their ruin was only a matter of time. The British traveller, Lambert, who visited New York in 1808, described it as resembling a place ravaged by pestilence:—"The port indeed was full of shipping, but they were dismantled and laid up; their decks were cleared, their hatches fastened down, and scarcely a sailor was to be found on board. Not a box, bale, cask, barrel, or package was to be seen upon the wharves." . . . In New England, where the struggle of existence was keenest, the embargo struck like a thunderbolt, and society for a moment thought itself at an end. Foreign commerce and shipping were the life of the people,—the ocean, as Pickering said, was their farm. The outcry of suffering interests became every day more violent, as the public learned that this paralysis was not a matter of weeks, but of months or years. . . . The belief that Jefferson, sold to France, wished to destroy American commerce and to strike a deadly blow at New and Old England at once, maddened the sensitive temper of the people. Immense losses, sweeping away their savings and spreading bankruptcy through every village, gave ample cause for their complaints. Yet in truth, New England was better able to defy the embargo than she was willing to suppose. She lost nothing except profits which the belligerents had in any case confiscated; her timber would not harm for keeping, and her fish were safe in the ocean. The embargo gave her almost a monopoly of the American market for domestic manufactures; no part of the country was so well situated or so well equipped for smuggling. . . . The growers of wheat and live stock in the Middle States were more hardly treated. Their wheat, reduced in value from two dollars to seventy-five cents a bushel, became practically unsalable. . . . The manufacturers of Pennsylvania could not but feel the stimulus of the new demand; so violent a system of protection was never applied to them before or since. Probably for that reason the embargo was not so unpopular in Pennsylvania as elsewhere, and Jeffer-

son had nothing to fear from political revolution in this calm and plodding community. The true burden of the embargo fell on the Southern States, but most severely upon the great State of Virginia. Slowly decaying, but still half patriarchal, Virginia society could neither economize nor liquidate. Tobacco was worthless; but 400,000 negro slaves must be clothed and fed, great establishments must be kept up, the social scale of living could not be reduced, and even bankruptcy could not clear a large landed estate without creating new encumbrances in a country where land and negroes were the only forms of property on which money could be raised. Stay-laws were tried, but served only to prolong the agony. With astonishing rapidity Virginia succumbed to ruin, while continuing to support the system that was draining her strength."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America*, v. 2, ch. 12.—"The year of the embargo was critical in the economic history of the United States. . . . But if the embargo offered small comfort to commerce, it gave a wholly new impetus to manufactures. And herein lies the explanation of a sudden prosperity enjoyed by certain commercial cities at the very time when their sisters and rivals were most depressed. It was not that their shipping was less hit, but rather that their opportunities for a transfer of capital to manufactures were greater. This seems to have been especially true of the commercial cities of Pennsylvania and Maryland, doubtless in part because of the great demand for manufactured articles arising from the rapidly developing Trans-Allegheny region. Baltimore is an example of a commercial city suddenly enlarging the field of its interests. The Baltimore newspapers during the year of the embargo have numerous advertisements of and other references to rapidly expanding manufactures. But Philadelphia is a more conspicuous example of a commercial city—she had something like a twelfth of the shipping tonnage of the United States—able, in spite of the gloom among the purely mercantile elements, to develop a prosperity which was the wonder of the times. Even the opposition press was obliged to concede a measure of prosperity. 'The embargo,' declares the *United States Gazette* of October 8, 1808, 'has as yet produced comparatively little inconvenience in this city and its neighborhood. During the last winter, we began to suffer from the domiciliary visits of labourers, in *forma pauperis*, who could not find employment and were obliged to beg; but, generally, the stores, laid in by poor men before the embargo, were sufficient "to keep want from their doors" until the spring opened; since when, the unexampled improvements in our city have given constant employment to eight or ten thousand of them.' . . . Philadelphia was, in fact, thanks to manufactures and in spite of commerce, in the midst of a wholly unprecedented boom. [Manufacture flourished in woolen and cotton goods, household furnishings, including carpets, chemicals, lead and iron.] As Charles Jared Ingersoll summarized it, 'Who that walks the streets of Philadelphia and sees, notwithstanding a twelve months stagnation of trade, several hundred substantial and elegant houses building, and the labouring community employed at good wages, who reads at every corner advertisements for workmen for factories of glass, of shot, of arms, of hosiery and coarse cloths, of pottery and many other goods and wares; who finds that within the last year rents have risen one-third and that houses are hardly to be had at these prices; that land is worth, as Mr. Brougham observes, much more

than it is in Middlesex; in a word, who perceives, wherever he goes, the bustle of industry and the smile of content; who, under such circumstances, that is not too stupid to perceive, and too prejudiced to believe when he does perceive, can doubt the solid capital of this country?' (C. J. Ingersoll, *View of the rights and wrongs, power and policy of the United States of America*, p. 49, pub. 1808.)—Nicholas Biddle, also, tho he has less to say about the embargo and its effects than one would expect from so important a man of affairs, confirms Ingersoll's estimate of Philadelphia prosperity. Writing to a friend in Paris, he says, 'You would scarcely recognize Philadelphia, so much has it grown and improved. . . . As for politics, our actual position is not the most agreeable. The embargo presses heavily on the people, but it has been put in execution without difficulty, and as the people is very sane, the session of Congress soon to meet will be peaceably awaited. In spite of this the embargo appears to have wrought some change in New England, where the elections have terminated in favor of the Federalists.' (Nicholas Biddle Papers, Library of Congress, v. 1, 1775-1809; Nicholas Biddle to M. de la Grange, September 26, 1808.) In Philadelphia, as elsewhere, the ruin of powerful commercial interests brought a real and somewhat widespread distress. But in Philadelphia, much more than in many other localities subject to similar commercial losses, men found compensation, and frequently much more than compensation in the development of a large scale industrialism. On this basis was reared the superstructure of building operations which made Philadelphia the wonder of the times, and at least one great commercial city toward which Jefferson could point for the vindication of his system."—L. M. Sears, *Philadelphia and the embargo of 1808* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Feb., 1921, pp. 354-359).—See also EMBARGO: First American embargoes.—"From the days of the embargo to the present time it has been the duty of every student of this epoch in our history to examine carefully into the question of whether the embargo could have been enforced, and of its effects, so far as it had any, upon the different section of the United States and upon the belligerents. It is practically impossible with the material at present at the disposal of historical students to come to any conclusion as to the first branch of this inquiry. It is necessary, however, to consider the subject with some care in view of the statements which were made at the time and have been repeated over and over again since those days. We are told, for example, of ships rotting at the wharves of Salem and Boston, of grass growing in the streets of those once-thriving seaports, of the prostration of commerce of New York and Pennsylvania. Moreover, it is often stated that the ruin of the Virginia aristocracy dates back to embargo days. The truth as to these matters may be doubtful; it is certain as anything can be that the ideas conveyed in the assertions just given, and in many which are substantially similar, have no foundation in fact, so far as the truth is known or could be known to any one who made them. As to the ships rotting at the wharves, the policy of commercial restriction continued at most for four years, in which time no self-respecting ship-owner would permit his ship to rot at the wharf or anywhere else. Moreover, a considerable portion of New England vessels never tied up at an American wharf so long as they were likely to be kept there. The wharves were at no time deserted, judging from Gallatin's statement that ten million




dollars were collected in duties in the twelve months ending September 30, 1808, six million dollars in the succeeding twelve months, and twelve million dollars in 1810. As to the Virginia side of the case, facts and figures are almost lacking. The conditions of Virginia life forbade any such supposition as that which even so calm a writer as Mr. Adams permitted himself to make. It is doubtless true, although not susceptible of absolute proof, that Virginia society was already honey-combed with extravagance and debt. Its ruin was already begun; the embargo, so far as it operated to instil ideas of economy into the heads of those whom Josiah Quincy termed the 'lordlings of Virginia,' was a positive benefit. As to Pennsylvania and New York, commerce had ceased to be the most important industry of Pennsylvania, for manufacturing had already taken its place. New York, doubtless, suffered from the embargo as much as any seaport of the country; but even as to that place there had been gross exaggeration. The truth of the matter seems to be that the Federalists seized upon this occasion to place their opponents on the defensive, and succeeded in so doing. The opposition to the embargo in New England was mainly political. The defence of the embargo in Virginia was mainly political."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1801-1811*, pp. 216-219.—See also TARIFF: 1808-1824.—"Our passion," said Jefferson, 'is peace.' He not only recoiled as a philanthropist from bloodshed, but as a politician he with reason dreaded military propensities and sabre sway. . . . Alone among all statesmen he tried to make war without bloodshed by means of an embargo on trade. . . . It is not the highest of his titles to fame in the eyes of his countrymen, but it may be not the lowest in the court of humanity, that he sacrificed his popularity in the attempt to find a bloodless substitute for war. His memory recovered from the shock and his reign over American opinion endured."—Goldwin Smith, *United States: An outline of political history, 1492-1871*, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: H. A. Hill, *Trade and commerce of Boston, 1780-1880* (*Memorial History of Boston*, v. 4, pt. 2, ch. 8).—E. Quincy, *Life of Josiah Quincy*, ch. 6-7.—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 381-395.—G. W. Daniels, *American cotton trade with Liverpool under the embargo* (*American Historical Review*, Jan., 1916, pp. 276-287).—*Secret reports of John Howe, 1808*, (*American Historical Review*, Oct., 1911, pp. 70-102; Jan., 1912, pp. 332-354).—A. Mahan, *Sea power in its relation to the War of 1812*, v. 1, pp. 182-259.

1808.—Sixth presidential election.—Jefferson succeeded by Madison.—"In anticipation of Jefferson's retirement there had been . . . no little dispute and lively canvassing as to the next incumbency of the presidential chair. . . . Upon Madison, it was generally considered that Jefferson had fixed his personal preference. . . . But Madison had many political enemies in the Republican ranks among Virginians themselves. . . . Monroe was the growing favorite. Republicans in Congress, who, from one cause or another, had become disaffected to the Secretary of State, made their new choice manifest. The Quids [see QUIDS], having courted Monroe by letter when he was abroad, crowded about him when he passed through Washington on his way home, just as the Embargo became a law. . . . Monroe hesitated, unwilling to make a breach; and rather than hazard the Republican cause, or the future prospects of their favorite, his more temperate friends took

him off the list of candidates, so that at the usual Congressional caucus, held at the capital, Madison was nominated almost unanimously for President, and George Clinton for Vice-President. But out of 139 Republican Senators and Representatives only 89 were present at this caucus, some being sick or absent from the city, and other keeping away because dissatisfied. Clinton had been a disappointed candidate, as well as Monroe, for the highest honors. . . . His ambition was pursued beyond the caucus, notwithstanding his renomination as Vice-President, until the friends of Madison, who had profited by the diversion among competitors, threatened to drop Clinton from the regular ticket unless he relinquished his pretensions to a higher place than that already assigned him. Meantime the schismatic Republicans had united in



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protesting to the country against Congressional dictation, at the same time pronouncing that the caucus which had nominated Madison was irregularly held. This open letter was signed by 17 Republican members of Congress. . . . Unfortunately for their influence in the canvass, however, they could not agree as to whether Monroe or Clinton should head the ticket. Objectionable, moreover, as the Congressional caucus might be, many more Presidential terms elapsed before other nominating machinery superseded it. National delegates, the national congress or convention of a party, was an idea too huge as yet for American politics to grasp in these days of plain frugality. . . . Harassed with foes within and without, with dissensions among the friends of rival candidates for the succession, with an odious and profitless measure to execute, against which citizens employed both cunning and force, it seemed, at one time, as if the administration party would go down in the fall elections. But Jefferson's wonderful popu-

larity and the buoyancy of Republican principles carried the day. The regular Presidential ticket prevailed, not without a diminished majority."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States of America*, v. 2, ch. 6, sect. 2.—James Madison, Democratic Republican, was elected, receiving 122 votes in the Electoral College; George Clinton, of the same party, receiving 6, and Charles C. Pinckney, Federalist, 47. George Clinton was chosen vice president. "Several state legislatures voted addresses to Jefferson asking him to serve for a third term. After some hesitation, Jefferson replied to these advances that he was old and infirm and also felt that eight years continuance in office of one president was all that the constitution would bear. Successive re-elections would lead to a life of tenure, and that, in no long time, to hereditary succession. It is probable that Jefferson was fixed in his resolution to retire at the end of his second term by the growing difficulties of the situation, which could be better met, perhaps, by a younger man; but a feeling that the democratic principle of rotation in office demanded a new candidate undoubtedly had much to do with his decision. Whatever the precise reason may have been, Jefferson's action, following on that of Washington, established the period of eight years as the maximum length for the tenure of the presidential office."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1801-1811*, pp. 220-221.

ALSO IN: H. Adams, *History of the United States of America*, v. 5, pp. 1-4.

1808-1810.—Substitution of non-intercourse for embargo.—Delusive conduct of Napoleon.—"The strong political contest over the embargo and the successful evasions of the law induced the Republicans in Congress to pass a third supplementary act extending the operations of the law to all craft which went on the water, even rowboats. Collectors were given extraordinary power to seize vessels and suspicious collections of food-stuffs and other possible cargoes. Notwithstanding every effort that the president could make, it was impossible to enforce the embargo under the existing law. In November, 1808, almost at the time of the presidential election, Congress went over the subject of commercial warfare for the fourth time. Those who were opposed to the administration argued for the abandonment of the policy. Jefferson's supporters were not united in its defence, for it was hard to see what effect the embargo had as yet exerted upon either of the belligerents. The speeches which were made in the House and in the Senate had more to do with politics than with the industrial situation. There is a great deal of assertion in them and very little reference to tangible fact. The debate ended in the passage of a fifth embargo measure which is known as the enforcing act as it was drawn 'more effectually to enforce the embargo.' Under this act the collectors of the several ports and of the stations on the internal boundaries were given despotic power."—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1801-1811*, pp. 219-220.—"The hopelessness of the struggle against the disregard of the law by the Americans themselves finally led the President and Congress to give it up, and that, too, shortly after the passing of the Enforcement Act in January, 1809. The fact is that this law gave rise to disturbances and to a still greater feeling of irritation in the shipping states, so much the more so as the insurrection in Spain in the late summer of 1808 seemed to open up new and bright prospects to American trade. The result was a new and famous law, the Nonintercourse Act, passed on

March 1, 1809. That law repealed the Embargo Act as a complete all-round self-blockade, and limited the embargo so as to make it apply only to the two sets of belligerents, Great Britain and France; but by way of compensation it was made, if possible, still more strict against them. Over and above the prohibition of American trade and shipping contained in the Embargo Act, which remained in force with regard to those two countries, all British and French vessels, all goods shipped from Great Britain and France, and all goods produced there, were now forbidden to enter American ports as from May 20, 1809. The substitution of the two-sided prohibition for the one-sided Non-importation Act . . . gave a really consistent expression to an impartial policy of reprisals. The intention was to provide an outlet for American trade which could make the measure feasible without blunting the edge of its task as a measure of reprisal; and it was thus, practically speaking, a rationalization of the Embargo Act. . . . The natural result was a considerable recovery in American foreign trade, in the first place with the more or less neutral places, such as the Hanse Towns, Altona, and especially Tönning in Schleswig and probably Gothenburg. The trade with England continued to go chiefly to Canada and Nova Scotia, and also, especially for cotton, *via* Amelia Island in the St. Mary's River and thence to Europe in British bottoms. . . . Cotton went also *via* Lisbon, Cadiz, the Azores or other permitted ports, while persons who had no reputation to lose made shipments direct to Liverpool."—E. F. Heckscher, *Continental system (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 136-138)*.—"On April 21, 1809, immediately upon the rather unexpected conclusion of a liberal and satisfactory diplomatic arrangement with Erskine, the British minister in Washington, the non-intercourse act was suspended as to Great Britain; and foreign trade, long dormant, suddenly sprang into excessive activity. This happy truce was short-lived. Erskine had effected his arrangement by a deliberate and almost defiant disregard of Canning's instructions; and his acts were promptly disavowed by his government. His recall was followed by a renewal of non-intercourse under a presidential proclamation of August 9, 1809. But notwithstanding the disavowal of Erskine, the British Government had made an apparent concession to the United States by the adoption of new orders in council which revoked the stringent prohibitions of the orders of 1807, and substituted a paper blockade of all ports and places under the government of France—a distinction which, on the whole, was perhaps without any important difference. France, on the other hand, entered upon a course of further aggressions. Louis Bonaparte was driven from his kingdom of Holland because he refused to attack neutral commerce, and all American ships found lying at Amsterdam were seized. Finally, by the decree of Rambouillet, every American ship found in any French port was confiscated and ordered sold. England and the United States thus seemed for the moment to be slowly drawing together in the presence of a common enemy, when suddenly the whole situation of affairs was changed by the formal announcement on August 5, 1810, of the Emperor's intended revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, such revocation to take place on the first day of the following November, provided the British Government revoked their orders in council, or (and this was the important provision) the United States caused their rights to

be respected. This promise, as Napoleon had privately pointed out a few days before, committed him to nothing; but it was accepted with all seriousness on the part of the United States. In reliance upon the imperial word, commercial intercourse with Great Britain—which had been once more resumed in May, 1810—was for the third time suspended. This, it was thought, was 'causing American rights to be respected'; and although the condemnation of American ships went on without a pause in every continental port, the Government of the United States clung with the strongest pertinacity to the belief that Napoleon's declarations were sincere. The practical effect of all this was to bar the door against any possible settlement with Great Britain. Commerce was now permanently suspended; there was a long list of grievances to be redressed, and negotiation was exhausted."—G. L. Rives, ed., *Selections from the correspondence of Thomas Barclay*, ch. 6.—See also *TARIFF: 1808-1824*.

ALSO IN: H. Adams, *History of United States of America*, v. 2, pp. 398-400.—*American State Papers Foreign III*, 262 (*Memorials of Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore*, Jan.-Feb., 1806).

1809.—Territory of Indiana created. See *ILLINOIS: 1809-1839*.

1809.—Smith and Gallatin in cabinet.—Financial status of the country.—Trade under Non-intercourse Act.—Unpreparedness of navy.—"Naturally, to Madison, the first thing and the most important, in the existing state of world politics, was the filling of the position of Secretary of State which had been made vacant by his own elevation to the presidency. He designated Gallatin for this most critical office and found himself confronted by the Smiths, John Randolph of Roanoke, William Branch Giles, and their scanty but devoted bands of followers in both Houses of Congress. Year after year, Gallatin had charged Robert Smith with extravagance and waste in the administration of the navy. There was, no doubt, much inefficiency in that department, especially in the navy yards; but the Mediterranean cruises show that the vessels themselves were kept fully up to the mark when away from home. The Smiths and their allies pointed to the fact of Gallatin's foreign birth as being distinctly against his having the management of the international relations of the United States. After a struggle Madison gave way. Gallatin retained his old post; Robert Smith became Secretary of State, and for a few months there was a reasonable amount of harmony. In June, however, it came to Senator Samuel Smith's ears that Gallatin had accused the commercial firm of which he was the head with indefensible financial transactions with the Navy Department, while his brother Robert was in charge. Gallatin's explanations were rather lame and betrayed considerable ignorance of the course of actual commercial transactions,—the breach between the Smiths and Gallatin was irreparable. For John Randolph, it was quite enough that Gallatin had advocated justice for the Yazoo men; but just why Giles broke with the administration is not clear. The feud between the two sets of politicians affected Gallatin's later career most unfortunately and had an influence upon the course of American history."—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 403-404.—"In November, 1809 . . . [the state department] stood helpless in the face of intolerable insults from all the European belligerents. Neither the diplomatic nor the consular system was better than

a makeshift, and precisely where the Government felt most need of ministers,—at Copenhagen, Stockholm, Berlin, and St. Petersburg,—it had no diplomatic and but few consular agents, even these often of foreign allegiance. The Treasury, hitherto the only successful Executive department, showed signs of impending collapse. . . . The accounts for the year ending September 30 showed that while the receipts had amounted to \$9,300,000, the actual expenses had exceeded \$10,000,000. The deficit of \$1,300,000, as well as reimbursements of debt to the amount of \$6,730,000, had been made good from the balance in the Treasury. The new fiscal year began with a balance of only \$5,000,000. . . . Gallatin threatened to resign. . . . Intended merely as a makeshift, the Non-intercourse Act of March 1, 1809, had already proved more mischievous to America than to the countries it purported to punish. While the great commercial nations—France, England, and the United States—were forcing trade into strange channels or trying to dam its course, trade took care of itself in defiance of war and prohibitions. As one coast after another was closed or opened to commerce, countries whose names could hardly be found on the map—Papenburg, Kniphausen, Tönningen—became famous as neutrals, and their flags covered the sea, because England and France found them convenient for purposes of illegitimate trade. The United States had also their Papenburg. Amelia Island and the St. Mary's River, which divided Florida from Georgia, half Spanish and half American waters, became the scene of a trade that New York envied. . . . The Non-intercourse Act prohibited French and British merchandise; but in disregard of the prohibition such goods were freely sold. . . . Erskine's arrangement, short as it was, brought in a fresh and large supply; custom-house oaths were cheap; custom-house officials did not inquire closely whether cloth was made in England, France, Holland, or Germany, or whether rum, sugar and coffee came from St. Kitt's or St. Bart's. . . . The Non-intercourse Act was not a bad law, . . . but it had few or no defenders even among those who obeyed it. . . . The government lost its revenue, the shipping lost much of its freight, the people paid double prices on imports and received half-prices for their produce; industry was checked, speculation and fraud were stimulated, while certain portions of the country were grievously wronged. Especially in the Southern States all articles produced for exchange were depressed to the lowest possible value, while all articles imported for consumption were raised to extravagant rates. Gallatin best knew how much the Non-intercourse Act or any other system of commercial restriction weakened the Treasury. . . . He faced an indefinite future of weakness and waste, with a prospect of war at the end; but this was not the worst. His enemies who were disposed to destroy, were skilful enough to invent the means of destruction. . . . The Treasury which had till that time sustained the Republican party through all its troubles, stood on the verge of disaster. From the military and naval departments nothing had ever been expected; but their condition was worse than their own chiefs understood. The machinery of both broke down as Madison took control. The navy consisted of a few cruisers and a large force of gunboats. Neither were of immediate use; but a considerable proportion of both were in active service. . . . No sooner had Paul Hamilton succeeded Robert Smith at the navy depart-

ment than the new secretary became aware that his predecessor had wasted a very large sum of money. . . . At least the navy contained as good officers and seamen as the world could show, and no cruisers of their class were likely to be more efficient than the frigates commanded by Rodgers, Bainbridge, and Decatur, provided they could escape a more numerous enemy; but the army was worthless throughout, and its deficiency in equipment was a trifling evil compared with the effects of political influence on its organization. . . . Among a thousand obstacles to any satisfactory reform in the military service, the most conspicuous if not the most fatal was General Wilkinson . . . whose character and temper divided the army into two hostile camps. Wade Hampton, the next general officer in rank, regarded Wilkinson with extreme contempt, and most of the younger officers who were not partisans of Jefferson shared Hampton's prejudice; but July 4, 1808, a military court of inquiry formally acquitted Wilkinson of being a Spanish pensioner."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America*, v. 5, pp. 163-164, 166-168.

Also in: H. Adams, *Life of Albert Gallatin*, pp. 389-402.—D. R. Anderson, *William Branch Giles*, ch. 10.

1809-1810.—Feeling of discontent and nascent ideas of disunion.—Foreign trade.—Rise of manufactures in New England.—“The outlook [in 1809] was more discouraging than at the beginning of any previous Administration. . . . The Legislature of Massachusetts, having issued its Address to the People, adjourned; and a few days afterward the people, by an election which called out more than ninety thousand votes, dismissed their Republican governor. . . . New Hampshire effected the same revolution. Rhode Island followed. In New York the Federalists carried the Legislature, as they did also in Maryland. Even in Pennsylvania, although nothing shook the fixed political character of the State, the epidemic of faction broke out. While the legislatures of Massachusetts and Connecticut declared Acts of Congress unconstitutional, and refused aid to execute them, the legislature of Pennsylvania authorized Governor Snyder to resist by armed force a mandate of the Supreme Court; and when the United States marshal attempted to serve process on the person of certain respondents at the suit of Gideon Olmstead, he found himself stopped by State militia acting under orders. . . . [But] dark as the prospect was both within and without, Madison could safely disregard dangers on which most rulers had habitually to count. His difficulties were only an inheritance from the old Administration, and began to disappear as quickly as they had risen. . . . As yet, the Union stood in no danger. The Federalists gained many votes; but these were the votes of moderate men who would desert their new companions on the first sign of a treasonable act, and their presence tended to make the party cautious rather than rash. John Henry, the secret agent of Sir James Craig, reported with truth to the governor-general that the Federalists leaders at Boston found disunion a very delicate topic, and that ‘an unpopular war . . . can alone produce a sudden separation of any section of the country from the common head.’ On the people of New England other motives more directly selfish began to have effect. The chief sources of their wealth were shipping and manufactures. The embargo destroyed the value of the shipping after it had been diminished

by the belligerent edicts; the repeal of the embargo restored the value. . . . The shipping . . . showed that Gottenburg, Riga, Lisbon, and the Spanish ports in America were markets almost as convenient as London or Havre for the sale of American produce. . . . Massachusetts owned more than a third of the American registered tonnage, and the returns for 1809 and 1810 proved that her profits were great. The registered tonnage of Massachusetts employed in foreign trade was . . . 310,000 tons in 1807 before the embargo; in 1809 it rose again to 324,000; in 1810 it made another leap to 352,000 tons. The coasting trade employed in 1807 about 90,000 tons of Massachusetts shipping . . . and it averaged 110,000 tons for the two years [1809 and 1810]. Such rapid and general improvement in shipping proved that New England had better employment than political factiousness to occupy the thoughts of her citizens; but large as the profits on freights might be, they hardly equalled the profits on manufactures. In truth, the manufactories of New England were created by the embargo, which obliged the whole nation to consume their products or to go without. . . . When the embargo was imposed in 1807, only fifteen [cotton] mills with about eight thousand spindles were in operation. . . . These eight thousand spindles, representing a capital of half a million dollars, were chiefly in or near Rhode Island. . . . Within less than two years the number of spindles was increased, or arrangements were made for increasing it, from eight thousand to eighty thousand. Nearly four million dollars of capital were invested in mills, and four thousand persons were in their employ, or expected soon to be employed in them. . . . Besides these mills, which were worked mostly by water but partly by horse-power, the domestic manufacture of cotton and linen supplied a much larger part of the market. Two thirds of the clothing and house-linen used in the United States outside of the cities was made in farm-houses, and nearly every farmer in New England sold some portion of the stock woven every year by the women of the household. Much of this coarse but strong flaxen material . . . was sent to the Southern States. While the cotton and linen industries of the North became profitable, the manufactures of wool lagged little behind. William Whittemore . . . [reported in 1809 that] ‘since the obstructions to our foreign trade, the manufactures of our country have increased astonishingly. . . . The demand for wool and cotton cards the present season has been twice as great as it has been any year preceding.’ Scarcity of good wool checked the growth of this industry, and the demand soon roused a mania among farmers for improving the breed of sheep. Between one hundred and three hundred per cent of profit attended all these industries, and little or no capital was required. All the Northern and Eastern States shared in the advantages of this production, for which Virginia with the Western and Southern States paid; but in the whole Union New England fared best. Already the development of small industries had taken place, which, by making a varied aggregate, became the foundation and the security of Yankee wealth. Massachusetts taxed her neighbors on many small articles of daily use. . . . As though this were not more than enough, Virginia gave the Northern shipowners the whole freight on Southern produce, two thirds of which in one form or another went into the hands of New England shipbuilders, shippers, and merchants. Slowly the specie capital

of the union drifted towards the Banks of Boston and New Haven, until, . . . the steady drain of specie eastward bankrupted the other States and the national government. Never, before or since, was the country so racked to create and support monopolies as in 1808, 1809, and 1810, . . . under the system of the President who began his career by declaring that if he could prevent the government from wasting the labors of the people under the pretence of protecting them, they must become happy."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America*, v. 5, pp. 12-19.—See also INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: United States; TARIFF: 1808-1824.

1810.—Third census.—The total population of the United States in 1810 was 7,215,791 (being an increase of nearly 36½ per cent. over the population shown in 1800), classed and distributed as follows:

North

	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut . . . . .	255,279	6,453	310
Illinois . . . . .	11,501	613	168
Indiana . . . . .	23,890	393	237
Maine . . . . .	227,736	969	....
Massachusetts . . . . .	465,303	6,737	....
Michigan . . . . .	4,618	120	24
New Hampshire . . . . .	213,390	970	....
New Jersey . . . . .	226,861	7,843	10,851
New York . . . . .	918,699	25,333	15,017
Ohio . . . . .	228,861	1,899	....
Pennsylvania . . . . .	786,804	22,492	795
Rhode Island . . . . .	73,314	3,609	108
Vermont . . . . .	216,963	750	....
	3,653,219	78,181	27,510

South

	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Delaware . . . . .	55,361	13,136	4,177
District of Columbia . . . . .	16,079	2,549	5,395
Georgia . . . . .	145,414	1,801	105,218
Kentucky . . . . .	324,237	1,713	80,561
Louisiana . . . . .	34,311	7,585	34,660
Maryland . . . . .	235,117	33,927	111,502
Mississippi . . . . .	23,024	240	17,088
Missouri . . . . .	17,227	607	3,011
North Carolina . . . . .	376,410	10,266	168,824
South Carolina . . . . .	214,196	4,554	196,365
Tennessee . . . . .	215,875	1,317	44,535
Virginia . . . . .	551,534	30,570	392,518
	2,208,785	108,265	1,163,854

1810.—Unrest in Florida.—Desire for annexation.—Independence of West Florida declared. See FLORIDA: 1798-1810.

1810-1812.—Continued provocation from England and France.—“War of 1812” against Great Britain declared.—“The policy of commercial restriction belonged fully as much to Madison as to Jefferson. He still believed in its efficacy, although, perhaps, the best way to operate it had not been discovered. The Non-intercourse Act would expire by limitation early in 1810. Whether it should be continued or what should take its place became the leading subject for debate. Nathaniel Macon [formerly speaker of the House]

. . . was now appointed chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs. On December 19, 1809, he reported to the House a bill which had been drawn by Gallatin and had been agreed to by the cabinet, including Robert Smith. The bill continued the impartial exclusion of both French and British national ships, and admitted French and British merchandise only when imported from their place of origin in vessels wholly American. . . . The bill passed the House, but in the Senate the Smith faction, joining with the Federalists, amended it by striking out the clause relating to importation. The House insisted upon the original bill, and the measure fell through. A few days later Macon reported another bill from his committee, which is always known as Macon's bill No. 2, although Macon was not the author of the first bill and was hostile to the second. The latter measure repealed the Non-intercourse Act of March, 1809, and authorized the president to prohibit commerce with the other nation in case either Great Britain or France should, before March 3, 1810, recede from its policy of war on neutrals. . . . The bill was passed . . . thus re-establishing freedom of commerce until one or other of the belligerents should withdraw its decree or decrees.”—E. Channing, *Jeffersonian system, 1801-1811*, pp. 243-245.—“The conduct of France had meanwhile been no less offensive than that of Great Britain. On all sorts of pretexts American ships were seized in the harbors and waters controlled by French power. A spirited remonstrance on the part of Armstrong, the American Minister, was answered by the issue of the Rambouillet Decree in May, 1810, ordering the sale of American vessels and cargoes seized, and directing like confiscation of all American vessels entering any ports under the control of France. This decree was designed to stop the surreptitious trade that was still being carried on between England and the continent in American bottoms. When it failed in accomplishing that end, Napoleon instructed his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Champagny, to inform the American Minister that the Berlin and Milan Decrees revoked, and would cease to have effect on November 1, 1810, if the English would revoke their Orders in Council, and recall their new principles of blockade, or if the United States would ‘cause their rights to be respected by the English,’—in the first place restore the non-intercourse act as to Great Britain. . . . The British government, being notified of this by the American Minister, declared on September 29 that Great Britain would recall the Orders in Council when the revocation of the French decrees should have actually taken effect, and the commerce of neutrals should have been restored. . . . Madison, . . . leaning toward France, as was traditional with the Republican party, and glad to grasp even at the semblance of an advantage, chose to regard the withdrawal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees as actual and done in good faith, and announced it as a matter of fact on November 1, 1810. French armed ships were no longer excluded from American ports. [See also FRANCE: 1806-1810.] On February 2, 1811, the non-importation act was revived as to Great Britain. In May the British Court of Admiralty delivered an opinion that no evidence existed of the withdrawal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, which resulted in the condemnation of a number of American vessels and their cargoes. Additional irritation was caused by the capture, off Sandy Hook, of an American vessel bound to France, by some fresh

cases of search and impressment, and by an encounter between the American frigate *President* and the British sloop *Little Belt*, which fired into one another, the British vessel suffering most. But was American commerce safe in French ports? By no means. . . . Outrages on American ships by French men-of-war and privateers went on as before. . . . The pretended French concession was, therefore, a mere farce. Truly, there were American grievances enough. Over 900 American ships had been seized by the British, and more than 550 by the French. . . . By both belligerents the United States had been kicked and cuffed like a mere interloper among the nations of the earth, who had no rights entitled to respectful consideration. Their insolence seemed to have been increased by the irresolution of the American government, the distraction of counsel in Congress, and the division of sentiment among the people. . . . But . . . young Republican leaders came to the front to interpret the 'national spirit and expectation.' They totally eclipsed the old chiefs by their dash and brilliancy. Foremost among them stood Henry Clay; then John C. Calhoun, William Lowndes, Felix Grundy, Langdon Cheves, and others. They believed that, if the American Republic was to maintain anything like the dignity of an independent power, and to preserve, or rather regain, the respect of mankind in any degree,—ay, its self-respect,—it must cease to submit to humiliation and contemptuous treatment; it must fight,—somebody who had wronged or insulted it. The Republicans having always a tender side for France, and the fiction of French concessions being accepted, the theory of the war party was that, of the two belligerents, England had more insolently maltreated the United States. Rumors were spread that an Indian war then going on, and resulting in the battle of Tippecanoe on November 7, 1811, was owing to English intrigues. Adding this to the old Revolutionary reminiscences of British oppression, it was not unnatural that the national wrath should generally turn against Great Britain. . . . Not only the regular army was increased, but the President was authorized to accept and employ 50,000 volunteers. Then a bill was introduced providing for the building of ten new frigates. . . . The war spirit in the country gradually rose, and manifested itself noisily in public meetings, passing resolutions, and memorializing Congress. It was increased in intensity by a sensational 'exposure,' a batch of papers laid before Congress by the President in March, 1812. They had been sold to the government by John Henry, an Irish adventurer, and disclosed a confidential mission to New England, undertaken by Henry in 1809 at the request of Sir James Craig, the governor of Canada, to encourage a disunion movement in the Eastern States. This was the story. Whatever its foundation, it was believed, and greatly increased popular excitement." On April 4, the President signed a bill laying an embargo on commerce with Great Britain for ninety days. "All over the country the embargo was understood as meaning an immediate preparation for war. . . . In May, 1812, President Madison was nominated for reelection by the congressional caucus. It has been said that he was dragged into the war policy by Clay and his followers with the threat that, unless he yielded to their views, another candidate for the presidency would be chosen. This Clay denied, and there was no evidence to discredit his denial. Madison was simply swept into the current by the impetuosity of Young America. . . . On June 1 the President's war mes-

sage came. On June 18 a bill in accordance with it, which had passed both Houses, was signed by the President, who proclaimed hostilities the next day. Thus Young America, led by Henry Clay, carried their point. But there was something disquieting in their victory. The majority they commanded in Congress was not so large as a majority for a declaration of war should be. In the House, Pennsylvania and the states south and west of it gave 62 votes for the war, and 32 against it; the states north and east of Pennsylvania gave 17 yeas and 32 nays,—in all 79 for and 49 against war. This showed a difference of sentiment according to geographical divisions. Not even all the Republicans were in favor of war. . . . Nor were the United States in any sense well prepared for a war with a first-class power."—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 1, ch. 5.—"The American declaration of war against England, July 18, 1812, annoyed those European nations that were gathering their utmost resources for resistance to Napoleon's attack. Russia could not but regard it as an unfriendly act, equally bad for political and commercial interests. Spain and Portugal, whose armies were fed largely if not chiefly on American grain imported by British money under British protection, dreaded to see their supplies cut off. Germany, waiting only for strength to recover her freedom, had to reckon against one more element in Napoleon's vast military resources. England needed to make greater efforts in order to maintain the advantages she had gained in Russia and Spain. Even in America, no one doubted the earnestness of England's wish for peace; and if Madison and Monroe insisted on her acquiescence in their terms, they insisted because they believed that their military position entitled them to expect it. . . . Castlereagh did not abandon the hope of peace until Jonathan Russell [chargé d'affaires], August 24, reported to him the concessions which the President required antecedent to negotiation,—the stoppage of impressments, dismissal of impressed seamen, indemnity for spoliations, and abandonment of paper blockades. The British secretary intimated that he thought these demands, as conditions precedent to an armistice, somewhat insulting; and in conversation he explained to Russell that such concessions would merely cost the Ministry their places without result. . . . Russell then proposed an informal understanding,—adding of his own accord, without authority from his Government, a proposal, afterward adopted by Congress, that the United States should naturalize no more British seamen. . . . [This was refused.] The correspondence closed September 19, and Russell left England; but not until October 13, after learning that the President had refused to ratify the armistice made by Prevost with Dearborn, did the British government order general reprisals,—and even this order closed with a proviso that nothing therein contained should affect the previous authority given to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren to arrange a cessation of hostilities."—H. Adams, *History of United States of America*, v. 7, pp. 1-4.

ALSO IN: S. Perkins, *History of the late war*, ch. 1-2.—C. J. Ingersoll, *Historical sketch of the Second War between the United States and Great Britain*, v. 1, ch. 1.—E. Quincy, *Life of Josiah Quincy*, ch. 9-12.—R. D. Paine, *Fight for a free sea*, pp. 2-9.—T. C. Smith, *Wars between England and America*, pp. 209-210.—H. Adams, *History of the United States*, v. 5, pp. 183-194.

1810-1860.—Agricultural revolution in New

England.—*Influence of railroads.—Western competition.*—"The half-century before the Civil War was, for the farmers of southern New England, a period of great stress. For two or three generations they had been engaged in well-stabilized, self-sufficient agriculture. Then came the development of New England manufactures and the rise of new factory villages and towns which, by creating a new demand for food-stuffs and raw materials, opened a market at the farmers' very doors. Because of the inherent inflexibility of the agricultural industry, the first steps in the transition to commercial agriculture were slow. . . . The changes in agricultural technic and in the social life of the rural folk which did result, however, from . . . two great, new forces, the home market and western competition, were so great and far-reaching that they may well be called an agricultural revolution. . . . The distinguishing characteristic of farm-life [prior to this epoch] was its economic self-sufficiency. Being unable to sell his products, the farmer was unable to buy from outside. Consequently each farm was . . . an economic microcosm, producing for itself practically everything that it consumed. . . . [Of course there was not an entire absence of trade, but] in general, . . . farming was carried on not as a business, but for the satisfaction of the needs of the farm family. In the half-century 1810-1860 there took place in New England an industrial revolution, comparable in its significance and in many of its characteristics to the Industrial Revolution in England of the last half of the eighteenth century. On this side of the Atlantic, as on that, power machinery replaced hand-tools, and the processes of manufacture were transferred from the farmhouses and shops of craftsmen to factories. Railroads, furnishing the cheap transportation essential to industrial changes, . . . assisted in breaking down the isolation of rural communities. . . . Increase in population was accompanied by urban concentration. . . . [Moreover], the new population was a non-agricultural population . . . [and] now for the first time . . . [the farmers] had a market for their products, and that market, moreover, was a home market. . . . One of the earliest and most widespread effects of the new market was an increased interest in agricultural improvement. A new spirit was stirring among the farmers. They began to feel that they were living in a period of great changes, and they were unwilling to lag behind the age. At just this time . . . [agricultural societies first founded in Pittsfield in 1811] spread into practically every county in southern New England in the next fifteen years, . . . stimulating competition by annual cattle shows and exhibitions of agricultural produce. But their success is also explained by the skill with which they satisfied, in their annual gatherings, the farmer's deep-lying need for more social contacts, for closer relations with others in the community. The immediate practical results of the new spirit were not revolutionary. Most farmers continued on about the same lines, doing somewhat better what they had for many years been doing rather poorly. There was, however, in the first quarter of the century the important change from wooden to cast-iron ploughs which took place with spectacular rapidity . . . [and which] made possible the substitution on the farm of horses for oxen as draft animals. . . . To summarize: the home market was the dominant influence affecting New England agriculture from 1810 to 1840. The new market opportunities stimulated a new spirit in

the farmers, leading to the introduction of important technical changes; also, specialized, commercial agriculture was developed in well-defined areas. The second influence . . . [outside competition, chiefly from the West, was made possible by the coming of the railroads]. The influence of the railroads was twofold. In the first place, the trunk-lines laid down between 1830 and 1850, such as the Boston and Albany and the lines running northward from Long Island Sound, brought in wool, wheat, and pork at prices so low as to discourage home production. . . . The railroads [also] brought in the cheaper wools of Michigan, Ohio and Illinois at a transportation cost of only two or three cents a pound. The inevitable effect was the decline of wool prices in New England and the rapid abandonment of sheep-raising. . . . [The check on cattle-raising, by the introduction of cheap beef from the West, was also very pronounced.] The full extent of the effects of cheap transportation on New England are not revealed in its effects on specialized agriculture alone. A large proportion of the farmers never went in for specialties. They felt the stimulating effects of the new market, and responded by attempting to increase production in the lines of general farming. . . . But even the general farmers could not remain unaffected by outside competition. . . . The agricultural revolution brought great changes in household economy. In fact the best evidence of the extent and rapidity of the transition from self-sufficient to commercial agriculture is to be found in the decay of the household industries. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the typical New England farmer was still clad in homespun cloth made from wool sheared from his own sheep, spun, dyed, and woven in his own home by the women of his household. Many other articles of household furnishing such as blankets, towels, and sheets were made by these overworked women. Before the Civil War, however, the household textile industry was transferred entirely to the new factories. . . . The transfer of the textile industry from farmhouses to factories was an interlocking feature of both the industrial and the agricultural revolutions in New England. Until now the change has been studied chiefly with reference to the growth of manufactures; but from the standpoint of the history of the rural people it is hardly of less importance. The significance of the decay of the household manufactures can hardly be exaggerated. . . . As self-sufficient farming declined there went with it long-established habits and traditions, not only in the method of getting a living, but also in ways of thinking and of living. . . . The problem of finding new employment for the farm women was solved . . . by their leaving the farms and taking employment in the rapidly growing urban centres, either in factories, or as school teachers, or in domestic service . . . by the introduction of new industrial occupations in the home. We know how important was the migration of the farmers' daughters to Lowell, Lawrence, and Fall River in the years around 1840, furnishing an indispensable labor force for the new factories, . . . but we are concerned here chiefly with those who stayed on the farms. The employments to which the latter now turned their attention were the sewing of shoes, the plaiting and sewing of straw and palm-leaf hats and bonnets, and the production of men's ready-to-wear clothing. . . . The organization of production was what is known to economists as the commission system, a transitional stage between household and factory production. . . . In the making of shoes, the

most important of these domestic manufactures, the men were also employed. The most depressing and disastrous of all the hindrances to progress in agriculture . . . was the wholesale desertion of the farms by the younger generation. Not only the farmers' daughters, but their sons as well, were leaving their homes throughout this period to seek their fortunes as clerks and factory operatives in the growing urban communities. The boys who wanted to pursue agriculture went West, although the lure of that region was not nearly as strong as in the generation before 1820. . . . Besides having the idea that farming was bound to be unprofitable, the younger generation was oppressed with a growing sense of social inferiority to the city population. . . . The tendency to leave the farms deprived the farmers of their only available labor force, at a time when cheap and reliable labor was particularly necessary if they were to



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take full advantage of the new market opportunities. But the ultimate effects of the rural exodus were of greater importance. The best human material was selected out of the country; the best brains and the boldest spirits went to the cities."—P. W. Bidwell, *Agricultural revolution in New England*, pp. 683-697, 700-701.—See also AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: 1833-1860.

1811.—Refusal to re-charter the Bank of the United States. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1790-1816.

1811.—General Harrison's campaign against Tecumseh and his league.—Battle of Tippecanoe.—"During the interval between the Tripolitan war and the war of 1812, one noticeable campaign was made against the Indians. The operation took place in 1811, under General William H. Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, and was directed against the Shawnees and other tribes which adhered to Tecumseh. This chief, with his brother, known as 'the Prophet,' had been engaged since 1806 in planning a species of crusade against

the whites, and had acquired great influence among the northwestern Indians. For the previous two years Harrison's suspicions had been aroused by reports of Tecumseh's intrigues, and attempts had been made from time to time to negotiate with him, but without satisfactory results. In the summer of 1811 it was decided to strike a decisive blow at the Indians, and in the autumn Harrison, with a regiment of regulars under Colonel Boyd, and a force of militia, marched upon Tecumseh's town, situated on the Tippecanoe River. On the 7th of November the Indians, in Tecumseh's absence, attempted to surprise Harrison's camp, but in the battle which followed they were driven off, and presently abandoned their town, which Harrison burned. The invading force then retired. The importance of the expedition was largely due to the military reputation which Harrison acquired by it."—J. R. Soley, *Wars of the United States (Narrative and critical history of the United States, v. 7, ch. 6)*.

ALSO IN: *American state papers (Indian affairs, v. 1, p. 776)*.—E. Eggleston and L. E. Seelye, *Tecumseh, ch. 12-23*.—H. Adams, *History of the United States, v. 2, ch. 4-5*.—J. B. Dillon, *History of Indiana, ch. 35-38*.—K. C. Babcock, *Rise of American nationality, pp. 31-36*.—J. Richardson, *War of 1812, p. 154 ff.*

1811-1812.—Expedition of Gutierrez into Texas. See TEXAS: 1790-1821.

1811-1813.—Secret statutes relative to occupation of Florida. See FLORIDA: 1811-1813.

1811-1815.—Commercial enterprise of Astor in Oregon.—Founding of Astoria.—British claims.—Oregon boundary question. See OREGON: 1808-1826.

1812.—Opposition of Federalists to the war.—"Unfortunately for the Federalists, while they were wholly right in many of their criticisms on the manner in which the war came about, they put themselves in the wrong as to its main feature. We can now see that in their just wrath against Napoleon they would have let the nation remain in a position of perpetual childhood and subordination before England. No doubt there were various points at issue in the impending contest, but the most important one, and the only one that remained in dispute all through the war, was that of the right of search and impressment. . . . We have . . . Cobbett's statement . . . [that] great numbers of Americans have been impressed, . . . 'and are now in our navy. . . . That many of these men have died on board our ships, that many have been worn out in the service, there is no doubt.' . . . In 1806 the merchants of Boston had called upon the general government to 'assert our rights and support the dignity of the United States.' . . . Yet it shows the height of party feeling that when, in 1812, Mr. Madison's government finally went to war for these very rights, the measure met with the bitterest opposition from the whole Federalist party, and from the commercial States generally. A good type of the Federalist opposition on this particular point is to be found in the pamphlets of John Lowell [who] . . . wrote under the name of 'A New England Farmer.' In spite of the protests offered half a dozen years before by his own neighbors, he declared the whole outcry against impressment to be a device of Mr. Madison's party. . . . He argued unflinchingly for the English right of search, called it a 'consecrated' right, maintained that the allegiance of British subjects was perpetual, and that no residence in a foreign country could absolve them. . . . While such a man, with a large party behind him, took this position,



it must simply be said that the American republic had not yet asserted itself to be a nation. Soon after the Revolution, when some one spoke of that contest to Franklin as the war of independence, he said, 'Say rather the war of the Revolution; the war for independence is yet to be fought.' The war of 1812 was just the contest he described. To this excitement directed against the war, the pulpit very largely contributed, the chief lever applied by the Federalist clergy being found in the atrocities of Napoleon. . . . The Federalist leaders took distinctly the ground that they should refuse to obey a conscription law to raise troops for the conquest of Canada; and when that very questionable measure failed by one vote in the Senate, the nation may have escaped a serious outbreak. . . . It might, indeed, have been far more dangerous than the Hartford Convention of 1814 [see below: 1814 (December): Hartford Convention], which was, after all, only a peaceable meeting of some two dozen men, with George Cabot at their head—men of whom very few had even a covert purpose of dissolving the Union, but who were driven to something very near desperation by the prostration of their commerce and the defencelessness of their coast."—T. W. Higginson, *Larger history of the United States*, ch. 15.—See also **BLUELIGHT FEDERALISTS**.

ALSO IN: H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 6.—H. C. Lodge, *Life and letters of George Cabot*, ch. 11-12.—E. Quincy, *Life of Josiah Quincy*, ch. 11-14.—E. P. Powell, *Nullification and secession in the United States*, pp. 208-220.

1812 (April).—Admission of Louisiana into the Union.—Upper Louisiana becomes Missouri Territory. See **LOUISIANA: 1812; MISSOURI: 1812-1816**.

1812 (June-October).—Rioting at Baltimore.—Opening of actual hostilities and unreadiness of the nation.—Hull's disastrous campaign and surrender, at Detroit.—"It was perhaps characteristic of the conduct of the war, that the first blood spilled should be American blood, shed by Americans. . . . In the night of June 22d, three days after the proclamation of war, a mob in Baltimore sacked the office of the 'Federal Republican,' edited by Alexander Hanson, because he had opposed the war policy. The mob also attacked the residences of several prominent Federalists, and burned one of them. Vessels in the harbor, too, were visited and plundered. About a month later Hanson resumed the publication of his paper, and in the night of July 26th the mob gathered again." This time they were resisted and one was killed; whereupon the authorities seized Hanson and his friends and lodged them in jail. "The rioters, thus encouraged by those whose business it was to punish them, attacked the jail next night, murdered General Langan [one of Hanson's defenders], injured General [Henry] Lee so that he was a cripple for the rest of his life, and beat several of the other victims and subjected them to torture. The leaders of the mob were brought to trial, but were acquitted! In this state of affairs, the war party in the country being but little stronger than the peace party, the youngest and almost the weakest of civilized nations went to war with one of the oldest and most powerful."—R. Johnson, *History of the War of 1812-15*, ch. 2.—"The first attempt of the war party to secure the legislation needed to carry out the policy adopted in the resolutions of the committee on foreign relations showed how difficult it was to transform the old partisan inertia into warlike energy. A bill introduced into the

Senate by Giles raised the number of men to be added to the regular army from ten thousand, proposed by the House committee, to twenty-five thousand. . . . After some sparring between the Houses, the Senate bill finally became a law June 26, 1812. . . . The next measure, for a volunteer force of fifty thousand men, presumably to come from the state militia, but to be put under the control of the United States and thus to be available for service outside the United States, as in Canada or in Florida, revealed the progress the Republicans were making towards the exercise of the broadest sovereign powers by the United States. This measure became a law February 6, but when the third plan, the naval programme, was presented, the Republicans held back. Cheves's request for seven million five hundred thousand dollars for the construction of twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates staggered the House, which had a traditional, almost innate, prejudice against the navy, . . . and the scheme for new vessels was defeated by a majority of only three votes. Aggressive action at sea must thenceforth be confined to the little navy then in service, and to the volunteer, or privateer, navy which would spring up after the declaration of war."—K. C. Babcock, *Rise of American nationality*, pp. 56-57.—"The regular army of the United States numbered only 6,000 men . . . [but in addition to the 25,000 men provided for by the act of June 26] the President was empowered to call for 50,000 volunteers, and to use the militia to the extent of 100,000. Henry Dearborn, of Massachusetts, was made a major-general and appointed to command the land forces. Against the thousand vessels and 144,000 sailors of the British navy, the Americans had 20 war-ships and a few gunboats, the whole carrying about 300 guns. But these figures taken alone, are deceptive; since a very large part of the British force was engaged in the European wars, and the practical question was, what force the United States could bring against so much as England could spare for operations on the high seas and on this side of the Atlantic. In that comparison, the discrepancy was not so great, and the United States had an enormous element of strength in her fine merchant marine. Her commerce being temporarily suspended to a large degree, there was an abundance both of ships and sailors, from which to build up a navy and fit out a fleet of privateers. Indeed, privateering was the business that now offered the largest prizes to mariners and ship-owners. . . . War with Great Britain being determined upon, the plan of campaign that first and most strongly presented itself to the Administration was the conquest of the British provinces on our northern border. . . . In planning for the invasion of Canada, the Administration counted largely upon a supposed readiness of the Canadians to throw off their allegiance to Great Britain and join with the United States. . . . [These expectations] were completely disappointed. In the preceding February, William Hull, Governor of the Territory of Michigan, who had rendered distinguished service in the Revolution, had been made a brigadier-general and placed in command of the forces in Ohio, with orders to march them to Detroit, to protect the Territory against the Indians, who were becoming troublesome. In June he was in command of about 2,000 men, in northern Ohio, moving slowly through the wilderness. On the day when war was declared, June 18th, the Secretary of War wrote him two letters. The first, in which the declaration was not mentioned, was despatched by a special messenger, and reached General Hull

on the 24th. The other informed him of the declaration of war, but was sent by mail to Cleveland, there to take its chance of reaching the General by whatever conveyance might be found. The consequence was, that he did not receive it till the 2d of July. But every British commander in Canada learned the news several days earlier. Hull arrived at Detroit on the 5th of July and set about organizing his forces. On the 9th he received from the War Department orders to begin the invasion of Canada by taking possession of Malden, 15 miles below Detroit, on the other side of the river, if he thought he could do so with safety to his own posts. He crossed on the 12th, and issued a proclamation to the Canadians." He found the enemy too strongly fortified at Malden to be prudently assaulted with raw troops and without artillery. "So it was decided to defer the attack, and in a few days came the news that, on the declaration of war, a force of over 600—British and Indians—had promptly moved against the American post at Michilimackinac—on the rocky little island of Mackinaw, commanding the strait between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan—and the garrison of 61 officers and men capitulated on the 16th of July. This disaster to the Americans roused the Indians to renewed hostility against them, while it proportionately disheartened Hull, and seems to have been the first step in the breaking down of his courage. After a few skirmishes, he recrossed to Detroit on the 7th of August. Meanwhile the British Colonel Proctor had arrived at Malden with reinforcements, and on Hull's withdrawal to Detroit he threw a force across the river to intercept his supplies. This force consisted of a small number of British regulars and a considerable number of Indians commanded by the famous Tecumseh." Two considerable engagements occurred between this force and detachments sent out to meet an expected supply train. In the first, the Americans were badly beaten; in the second, they drove the enemy to their boats with heavy loss; but the supply train was not secured. "During this gloomy state of things at Detroit, a bloody affair took place on ground that is now within the city of Chicago. Fort Dearborn stood at the mouth of Chicago River, and was occupied by a garrison of about 50 soldiers, with several families. Captain Nathan Heald, commanding the post, had been ordered by General Hull to abandon it and remove his force to Detroit." To conciliate the neighboring Indians who professed friendliness, he promised to give them all the property in the fort which he could not carry; but before making the delivery to them he foolishly destroyed all the arms, the gunpowder and the liquors. Enraged by this proceeding, which they considered a trick, the savages pursued Captain Heald's small party, waylaid them among the Sand-hills on the lake shore, and massacred the greater part, twelve children included. The scalps which they took were sold to Colonel Proctor, "who had offered a premium for American scalps." The same day on which this occurred, August 15, "the British General Isaac Brock, who had arrived at Malden a few days before and assumed command there, formally demanded the surrender of Detroit. . . . Said Brock in his letter: 'It is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination; but you must be aware that the numerous bodies of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops will be beyond my control the moment the contest commences.' . . . Brock's force, according to his own testimony, numbered 1,330 men, including 600 Indians, and he had also two ships of war. Hull had

present for duty about 1,000 men. Brock sent a large body of Indians across the river that night, at a point five miles below the fort, and early in the morning crossed with the remainder of his troops, and at once marched on the place." On the approach of the attacking force Hull offered to surrender. "The articles of capitulation were drawn up, and the American general surrendered, not merely the fort and its garrison, but the whole Territory of Michigan, of which he was Governor. . . . Hull's officers were incensed at his action, and he was subsequently court-martialled, convicted of cowardice, and condemned to death; but the President pardoned him, in consideration of his age and his services in the Revolution. . . . Subsequent investigations, if they do not exonerate General Hull, have at least greatly modified the blame attached to him."—R. Johnson, *History of the War of 1812-15*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: J. F. Clarke, *History of the campaign of 1812 and surrender of the post at Detroit*.—B. J. Lossing, *Hull's surrender (Potter's American Monthly, Aug., 1875)*.—F. S. Drake, *Memorials of the Massachusetts Society of Cincinnati*, pp. 341-354.—S. C. Clark, *Hull's surrender at Detroit (Magazine of American History, v. 27)*.—*Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Mar., 1915*, pp. 561-573.

1812 (September-November).—Beginning of hostilities on the New York frontier.—Battle of Queenstown Heights.—"To put Dearborn [who commanded in the northern department] in a condition to act with effect, Governor Tompkins [of the state of New York] made the greatest efforts to get out the New York quota of militia. The Democratic Legislature of Vermont voted to add to the pay of their militia in service as much as was paid by the United States. At the same time they passed a stringent drafting law, and offered \$30 bounty to volunteers. By the co-operating exertions of these states and of the war department, some 3,000 regulars and 2,000 militia were presently assembled on Lake Champlain, under Dearborn's immediate command. Another force of 2,000 militia was stationed at different points along the south bank of the St. Lawrence, their left resting on Sackett's Harbor. A third army was collected along the Niagara River, from Fort Niagara to Buffalo, then a village of a thousand or two inhabitants, in the midst of a newly-settled district. This latter force of nearly 6,000 men, half regulars and volunteers and half militia, was under the immediate command of Major-general Van Rensselaer, a Federalist. . . . The first skirmishes on the New York frontier grew out of attempts, not unsuccessful, made principally from Ogdensburg, a new but much the largest village on the American side of the St. Lawrence, to intercept the British supplies proceeding upward in boats. The militia officer in command at Ogdensburg was General Jacob Brown. A Pennsylvanian by birth, a Quaker by education, while employed as a teacher in the city of New York, some newspaper essays of his had attracted the attention of Alexander Hamilton, to whom, during the quasi war of '98, he became military secretary. Removing afterward to the new settlements of Northwestern New York, his enterprise had founded the flourishing village of Brownsville, not far from Sackett's Harbor. . . . His success in repulsing a British force of 700 men, which attempted to cross from Prescott to attack Ogdensburg, laid the foundation of a military reputation which soon placed him at the head of the American army. There had been built on Lake Ontario, out of the gun-boat appropriations, but

by a fortunate improvement upon Jefferson's model, a sloop of war of light draft, mounting 16 guns. This vessel, called the *Oncida*, just before the breaking out of the war had been furnished with a regular-bred commander and crew. She was attacked shortly after at Sackett's Harbor by five British vessels, three of them larger than herself, but manned only by lake watermen. By landing part of her guns, and establishing a battery on shore, she succeeded, however, in beating them off. Hull's failure having shown how important was the control of the lakes, a judicious selection was made of Captain Chauncey, hitherto at the head of the New York Navy Yard, to take command on those waters. Along with Henry Eckford as naval constructor, and soon followed by ship-carpenters, naval stores, guns and presently by parties of seamen, he was sent to Sackett's Harbor [September, 1812], then held by a garrison of 200 regulars. That newly-settled region could supply nothing but timber; every thing else had to be transported from Albany at vast expense. . . . A 24-gun ship was at once commenced; for immediate use, Chauncey purchased six of the small schooners employed in the then infant commerce of the lake, which, though very ill adapted for war, he armed with four guns each. With these and the *Oncida* he put out on the lake, and soon [November 8] drove the British ships into Kingston. . . . While thus employed, Chauncey had sent Lieutenant Elliot to Buffalo, with a party of seamen, to make arrangements for a force on the upper lakes. Elliot, soon after his arrival, succeeded in cutting out [October 9] from under the guns of Fort Erie, nearly opposite Buffalo, two British vessels just arrived from Detroit. One, the late *Adams*, which the British had armed and equipped, grounded, and it became necessary to destroy her. The other, the *Caledonia*, of two guns, was brought off, and became the nucleus of the naval force of Lake Erie. Elliott also purchased several small schooners lying in the Niagara River; but they, as well as the *Caledonia*, lay blockaded at Black Rock [now a part of the city of Buffalo], the passage into the lake being commanded by the guns of Fort Erie. The troops along the Niagara frontier, highly excited by Elliott's exploit, demanded to be led against the enemy; and, under the idea that the British village of Queenstown, at the foot of the falls [a few miles below] might furnish comfortable winter quarters for a part of his troops, Van Rensselaer resolved to attack it."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States (Second series, v. 3, ch. 25)*.—"The Niagara River, 35 miles long, which conducts the waters of the upper lakes through Erie into Ontario, constituted an important military frontier in such a war; its banks sparsely settled, and the crossing a narrow one. Below the roaring cataracts had assembled another little army, supplied in great measure by regiments of the New York quota, Major-General Van Rensselaer, of the militia of that State, a prominent Federalist, being in command. Hull's sudden surrender left Brock free to confront this second adversary with a moderate force from the Canada side, not without feeling uncertain as to where the American blow would be struck. By October Van Rensselaer had 6,000 men, half of them regulars; and, yielding to the impatience of his volunteers had the public press, he gave orders to cross the river from Lewiston to Queenston. High bluffs arose on either side. There were not boats enough provided to carry more than half the advance party at a time. Too much reliance was placed upon militia, while regulars won the laurels. Wool, a young captain, and Lieu-

tenant-Colonel Scott did gallant work on Queenston Heights; and General Brock, the conqueror of Detroit, fell mortally wounded; but reinforcements crossed too slowly, and with the green militia dreading death, many of the reserve pleading legal exemption from service in an enemy's country, their deserted comrades on the Canada side, unable to return, were forced to surrender. Van Rensselaer, whose advance had been premature, resigned in disgust, leaving a less capable but more pretentious officer, of Virginia birth, General Alexander Smyth, to succeed him. . . . By the 27th of November Smyth had concentrated at Black Rock, near Buffalo, a fair army, 4,500 troops, comprising, in addition to the regulars, volunteer regiments from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York; the last under the command of General Porter. . . . The big moment approached; but, notwithstanding the sonorous promise of 'memorable to-morrows,' and an embarkation to the music of 'Yankee Doodle,' one or two shivering attempts were made to land on the opposite shore, and then the volunteers were dismissed to their homes, and regulars ordered into winter-quarters. . . . Porter having openly charged Smyth with cowardice, the two crossed to Grand Island to fight a duel, and then shook hands. . . . But the country could not be reconciled to such generalship, and Smyth was presently cashiered."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States, v. 2, ch. 8, sect. 2*.

ALSO IN: S. Van Rensselaer, *Narrative of the affair of Queenstown*.—J. Symons, *Battle of Queenstown Heights*.—Gen. W. Scott, *Memoirs, v. 1, ch. 6*.—W. H. Merritt, *Journal during the War of 1812*.—H. Adams, *History of the United States: First administration of Madison, v. 2, ch. 16*.—F. B. Tupper, *Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, ch. 13-14*.—A. T. Mahan, *Sea power in its relations to the War of 1812, v. 1, pp. 353-358*.—M. M. Quaife, ed., *Diary of the War of 1812 (Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Sept., 1914, pp. 272-278)*.

1812 (November).—Seventh presidential election.—James Madison was re-elected, receiving in the electoral college 128 votes, against 80 cast for DeWitt Clinton, Federalist. Elbridge Gerry was elected vice president.

1812-1813.—Possession of West Florida taken from the Spaniards. See FLORIDA: 1811-1813.

1812-1813.—Indifference to the navy at the beginning of the war.—Its efficiency and its early successes.—"The young leaders of the war party in congress looked to successes on land and territorial conquest, and had an indifference to the field which the ocean afforded. And yet the triumphs of our young fleet in the Revolution, the alarm which John Paul Jones excited in English homes, and, later, the brilliant achievements in the Mediterranean, the heroes of which were still in the prime of their service, might have inspired better counsel. Madison's cabinet were said to have without exception opposed the increase and use of our navy; indeed, somewhat after Jefferson's idea in imposing the embargo—to save our vessels by laying them up. The advice of Captains Charles Stewart and William Bainbridge, who happened to be in Washington at the time of the declaration of war, determined Madison to bring the navy into active service. One of the chief causes of the war being the impressment of our seamen, it seems to-day surprising that their ardor in defense of 'Free Trade and Sailors' Rights,'—the cry under which our greatest triumphs were won—should have been either passed by or deprecated."

—J. A. Stevens, *Second war with Great Britain* (*Magazine of American History*, May-June, 1893). —“Although Commodore Preble died in 1807, the credit of the later war belongs more to him than to any other one man. It was not only that he formed many of the individual officers who won the victories of 1812-15,—for Hull, Decatur, Bainbridge, Macdonough, Porter, Lawrence, Biddle, Chauncey, Warrington, Charles Morris and Stewart were all in his squadron,—but he created in the navy the professional spirit or idea, which was the main quality that distinguished it from the army in the war with Great Britain. At the outbreak of the war there were 18 vessels in the navy, ranging from 44-gun frigates to 12-gun brigs. There were also 176 gunboats, on which a large sum of money had been expended, but which were of no use whatever. . . . Immediately after the declaration of war, the frigates in commission in the home ports, together with two of the sloops, put to sea as a squadron under Commodore John Rodgers. They fell in with the English frigate ‘Belvidera,’ but she got away from them. . . . Three weeks later, the ‘Constitution,’ under Captain Hull, sailed from Annapolis. Soon after leaving the Chesapeake she came upon a British squadron of one sixty-four and four frigates, and then ensued the famous three days’ chase, in the course of which, by a marvel of good seamanship and good discipline, the American frigate escaped. After a short respite in Boston, Hull set out again, and on the 19th of August he fought and captured the ‘Guerrière,’ Captain Dacres, in an engagement lasting about an hour. . . . In the next action, in October, the sloop ‘Wasp,’ Captain Jacob Jones, captured the English brig ‘Frolic,’ of approximately the same force. The relative loss of English and Americans was again five to one. Both vessels were soon after taken by a seventy-four. Later in the same month, another frigate action took place, the ‘United States,’ under Decatur, capturing the ‘Macedonian.’ . . . Shortly after this capture, a cruise in the Pacific was projected for a squadron to be composed of the ‘Constitution,’ ‘Essex,’ and ‘Hornet.’ The ‘Essex’ failed to meet the other vessels at the rendezvous off the coast of Brazil, and went on the Pacific cruise alone [having great success]. The ‘Constitution,’ now commanded by Bainbridge, met the frigate ‘Java,’ near Brazil, on the 20th of December. The antagonists were more nearly matched than in the previous frigate actions, but the fight, lasting a little over an hour, resulted in the total defeat and surrender of the ‘Java,’ with a loss of 124 to the Americans’ 34. The ‘Java’ was a wreck, and could not be taken into port, and Bainbridge returned home. Two months later, February 24, 1813, the ‘Hornet,’ commanded by Lawrence, met the ‘Peacock’ off the Demerara, and reduced her in fifteen minutes to a sinking condition, while the ‘Hornet’s’ hull was hardly scratched. The English sloop sank so quickly that she carried down part of her own crew and three of the ‘Hornet’s’ who were trying to save them. The casualties, apart from those drowned, were 5 in the ‘Hornet’ and 38 in the ‘Peacock.’ . . . The moral effect in England of these defeats was very great. . . . In March, 1813, Admiral Sir John Warren assumed the command of the British squadron on the American coast. Although rather past his prime, his defects were more than compensated by the activity of his second in command, Rear-Admiral Cockburn, who during this summer and the next kept the coasts of Chesapeake Bay in a continuous state of alarm by successful raids, in which much

valuable property was destroyed. [See also MARYLAND: 1812-1814.] Among the more important of the actions of 1813 were the capture and destruction (in part) of Havre de Grace, Md., early in May, and an attack on the village of Hampton, Va., on the 25th of June. ‘Acts of rapine and violence’ on the part of the invading forces characterized the latter attack, which excited intense indignation throughout the country. . . . In the summer of 1813 occurred the first serious reverse of the navy during the war. On the 1st of June the frigate ‘Chesapeake,’ Captain James Lawrence, sailed from Boston to engage the ‘Shannon,’ which was lying outside, waiting for the battle. The two ships were nearly matched in guns and men, what slight difference there was being in favor of the ‘Chesapeake’; but the crew of the latter had been recently shipped and was partly composed of disaffected men, and Lawrence had had no time to discipline them. The engagement was short and decisive. Ranging up alongside of the ‘Shannon,’ whose crew had been brought to the highest state of efficiency by Captain Broke their commander, the ‘Chesapeake’ at the first fire received a severe injury in the loss of several of her officers. Falling foul of the ‘Shannon’ she was effectually raked, and presently a boarding party, led by Captain Broke, got possession of her deck. The great mortality among the officers [including Captain Lawrence, who had received a mortal wound just before his ship was boarded, and whose dying appeal, ‘Don’t give up the ship,’ became the battle cry of the American navy during the remainder of the war], and the want of discipline in the crew, resulted in a victory for the boarders. The battle lasted fifteen minutes only, and the ‘Chesapeake’ was carried as a prize to Halifax. During the summer the naval war on the ocean continued with varying fortunes, two important actions being fought. The brig ‘Argus,’ Captain Allen, after a successful voyage in the Irish Sea, in which many prizes were taken and destroyed, was captured by the English brig ‘Pelican,’ on the 14th of August. Early in September the brig ‘Enterprise,’ commanded by Lieutenant Burrows, captured the English brig ‘Boxer,’ near Portland, Me.”—J. R. Soley, *Wars of the United States* (*Narrative and critical history of the United States*, v. 7, ch. 6).—See also REVENUE CUTTER SERVICE, UNITED STATES.—“George Canning, speaking in open Parliament . . . said that the loss of the ‘Guerriere’ and the ‘Macedonian’ produced a sensation in the country scarcely to be equalled by the most violent convulsions of Nature. ‘Neither can I agree with those who complain of the shock of consternation throughout Great Britain as having been greater than the occasion required. . . . It cannot be too deeply felt that the sacred spell of the invincibility of the British navy was broken by those unfortunate captures.’ Of all spells that could be cast on a nation, that of believing itself invincible was perhaps the one most profitably broken; but the process of recovering its senses was agreeable to no nation, and to England, at that moment of distress, it was . . . as painful as Canning described. . . . After all had been said, the unpleasant result remained that in future British frigates, like other frigates, could safely fight only their inferiors in force. What applied to the ‘Guerriere’ and ‘Macedonian’ against the ‘Constitution’ and ‘United States,’ where the British force was inferior, applied equally to the ‘Frolic’ against the ‘Wasp,’ where no inferiority could be shown. The British newspapers thenceforward admitted what America wished to prove, that, ship for ship, British were

no more than the equals of Americans. Society soon learned to take a more sensible view of the subject, but as the first depression passed away a consciousness of personal wrong took its place. The United States were supposed to have stabbed England in the back at the moment when her hands were tied, when her existence was in the most deadly peril and her anxieties were most heavy. England never could forgive treason so base and cowardice so vile. That Madison had been from the first a tool and accomplice of Bonaparte was thenceforward so fixed an idea in British history that time could not shake it. Indeed, so complicated and so historical had the causes of war become that no one even in America could explain or understand them, while Englishmen could see only that America required England as the price of peace to destroy herself by abandoning her naval power, and that England preferred to die fighting rather than to die by her own hand. The American party in England was extinguished: no further protest was heard against the war; and the British people thought moodily of revenge. This result was unfortunate for both parties, but was doubly unfortunate for America, because her mode of making the issue told in her enemy's favor. The same impressions which silenced in England open sympathy with America, stimulated in America acute sympathy with England. Argument was useless against people in a passion, convinced of their own injuries. Neither Englishmen nor Federalists were open to reasoning."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America*, v. 7, pp. 6-8.

ALSO IN: T. Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, ch. 2-5.—J. F. Cooper, *History of the navy of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 9-22.—A. S. Mackenzie, *Life of Decatur*, ch. 10-12.—D. D. Porter, *Memoirs of Commodore David Porter*.—A. T. Mahan, *Sea power in its relation to the War of 1812*.

1812-1813.—Harrison's northwestern campaign.—Winchester's defeat.—Perry's naval victory on Lake Erie.—Battle of the Thames and death of Tecumseh.—Recovery of Detroit and Michigan.—"Great was the indignation of the West, great the mortification of our whole people on learning that, instead of capturing Upper Canada at the first blow, we had lost our whole Michigan Territory. The task now was to retake Detroit under a competent commander. Ohio and Kentucky went on filling rapidly their quotas, while urging the administration to march them under Harrison. The President . . . proposed that Monroe should go to the scene, as a volunteer, if not to command; but Monroe restrained his first military ardor, as was prudent, and Winchester, of Tennessee, another of the recent brigadiers, and a revolutionary veteran, was selected. The selection, however, gave umbrage to the Kentuckians, whose State government had already made Harrison a brevet major-general of militia. The hero of Tippecanoe was finally assigned to the chief command of the Western army, Madison countermanding his first orders. Harrison's route for Detroit was by way of Fort Wayne, and Fort Defiance to the falls of the Maumee. But it was late in the fall [October 1812] before the new military arrangements could be completed; . . . and, except for the destruction of a few Indian villages on the way, the deeds of prowess were reserved for a winter campaign. . . . The winter expedition of the Northwest army . . . [was] retarded by a disaster which overtook Winchester's command near the Maumee Rapids. . . . The design was that he should . . . when weather per-

mitted, cross the frozen Detroit, and fall suddenly upon Malden. Winchester not only pushed on incautiously to his first destination, but, with a design more humane than prudent, undertook to protect against a British and Indian raid the alarmed inhabitants of Frenchtown [now Monroe, Michigan], a place 30 miles nearer Malden. Here [January 22, 1813] he was overpowered by the enemy, which fell upon the American force suddenly at daybreak, with yells and a shower of bombshells and canister. Winchester having been taken prisoner, Colonel Proctor, the British commander, extorted from him the unconditional surrender of all his troops, some 700 in number, as the only means of saving them from the tomahawk and scalping-knife. . . . Our sick and wounded . . . the British commander shamefully abandoned to their fate. . . . Officers and men, many of them the flower of Kentucky, perished victims of barbarities . . . abhorrent to civilized warfare, of which the British Colonel Proctor and Captain Elliott were not innocent. Besides the American loss in prisoners at the sad affair of the Raisin, nearly 200 were killed and missing. Hearing at the Upper Sandusky of Winchester's intended movement, Harrison had pressed to his relief with reinforcements, but fugitives from Frenchtown brought the melancholy tidings of disaster; and Harrison fell back to the Rapids, there to strengthen the post known as Fort Meigs, and go into winter quarters. The terms of many of his troops having now expired, the Northwestern army was for many months too feeble to begin a forward movement. But Harrison possessed the unabated confidence of the West, and, promoted to be one of the new major-generals, he received, through the zealous co-operation of Ohio and Kentucky, whose people were inflamed to take vengeance, enough volunteer reinforcements [in May] to relieve Fort Meigs [which was twice besieged in 1813 by British and Indians] from Proctor's investment in the spring, and at length the quota requisite for resuming the offensive; other frontier plans of the War Department having long deranged his own in this quarter. The splendid co-operation of an American flotilla on Lake Erie opened the way to Detroit and victory. For that memorable service Commodore Chauncey had detailed an aspiring young naval officer, Captain Oliver H. Perry, of Rhode Island. Our little lake squadron was tediously constructed at Presqu' Isle (now Erie). When all at last was ready [in August, 1813], Perry, who had long chafed in spirit while the British fleet hovered in sight like a hawk, sailed forth to dispute the supremacy of the broad inland waters. His heavier vessels were floated over the bar not without difficulty. After conferring at Sandusky upon the combined plan of operations with General Harrison, from whom he received a small detail of soldiers to act as marines and supply vacancies in his crews, he offered battle to Barclay, the British commander,—the latter, a veteran in naval experience, who had served under Nelson at Trafalgar. Barclay had lain idly for several weeks at Malden, in hopes of procuring additional sailors, purposely avoiding an action meanwhile. But Proctor's army having now run short of provisions, longer delay was inexpedient. At sunrise on September 10th Perry descried the approaching British fleet from his look-out, a group of islands off Sandusky. Ten miles to the north of this locality, which was known as Put-in-bay, the two squadrons at noon engaged one another. . . . In officers and men the fleets were about equally matched; there were 6 British vessels to

the American 9, but the former carried more guns, and were greatly superior for action from a distance. . . . Our flag-ship, the Lawrence, exposed to the heaviest of the British cannonade, became terribly battered, her decks wet with carnage, her guns dismantled. Undismayed by this catastrophe, Perry dropped into a little boat with his broad pennant and banner, and crossed to his next largest vessel, the Niagara, the target for 15 minutes of a furious fire while being rowed over. Climbing the Niagara's deck, and hoisting once more the emblems of commander, our brave captain now pierced the enemy's line with his new flag-ship, followed by his smaller vessels, and, gaining at last that advantage of a close engagement which for nearly three hours had eluded him, he won the fight in eight minutes. The colors of the Detroit, Barclay's flag-ship, struck first, three others followed the example, and two of the British squadron attempting to escape were overtaken and brought back triumphantly. 'We have met the enemy and they are ours,' was Perry's laconic dispatch to Harrison; . . . 'two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop.' . . . Barclay lay dangerously wounded, and his next in command died that evening. . . . To Harrison's expectant army, augmented by 3,500 mounted Kentuckians, whom Governor Shelby led in person, the word of advance was now given. . . . Perry's flotilla, aided by the captured vessels, presently landed the American troops on the Canada side. Proctor had already begun the retreat, having first dismantled the fort at Malden and burned the barracks. Harrison pursued him beyond Sandwich, covered by the flotilla, until near a Moravian town, up the river Thames [some thirty miles east of Lake St. Clair], the enemy was overtaken, with Tecumseh's braves. Here, upon well-chosen ground, the British made a final stand [October 5], but at the first impetuous charge of our cavalry their line broke, and only the Indians remained to engage in a desperate hand-to-hand fight. Among the slain was the famous Tecumseh, dispatched, as tradition asserts, by the pistol of Colonel Johnson, a Kentucky officer prominent in the battle. Proctor himself escaped in a carriage with a few followers, incurring afterwards the royal reprimand. . . . The baleful British and Indian alliance was broken up by these victories, while Detroit, Michigan, and all that Hull had lost, and a fair portion of Upper Canada besides, passed into American control. Among American generals in this war Harrison enjoyed the rare felicity of having fully accomplished his undertakings."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 8, sect. 2, ch. 9, sect. 1.—"The victory of Lake Erie was most important, both in its material results and in its moral effect. It gave us complete command of all the upper lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter, increased our prestige with the foe and our confidence in ourselves, and ensured the conquest of Upper Canada; in all these respects its importance has not been overrated. But the 'glory' acquired by it most certainly has been estimated at more than its worth. . . . The simple truth is, that, where on both sides the officers and men were equally brave and skilful, the side which possessed the superiority in force, in the proportion of three to two, could not well help winning. . . . Though we find nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they threw half as much metal again as those of our antagonist."—T. Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, ch. 6.—A history of the war, written from the Canadian point of view, tells the story of the battle

as follows:—On reaching Lake Erie, Captain Barclay "found no adequate supplies there of any kind; and by that time Captain Perry, of the American Navy, . . . had made considerable progress in getting together a flotilla at Presqu'île, which, however, so long as Barclay's vessels could blockade the port, was unable to come over the bar into deep water in face of his guns. But the naval assistance sent from England had not arrived in time to be of the service it would have been earlier in the war in securing and maintaining superiority upon the waters of Lakes Ontario and Erie; and henceforth the words 'Too late' are for Great Britain written large upon the naval operations of this war. What men could do the naval officers and those under them did, but they, as well as British and Canadian interests, were sacrificed to earlier procrastination. . . . At last Captain Barclay felt it necessary to relax the blockade of Presqu'île on Lake Erie, in order to sail to Long Point on that lake, and there meet some expected supplies (which did not, however, arrive at the time anticipated). Perry at once took advantage of his absence to cross the bar, place guns on board his largest vessel, and come out with his flotilla upon the lake. When Barclay, therefore, sailed back to renew the blockade, he was obliged instead to take refuge from the stronger American squadron in the port of Amherstburg. His position now was worse than before, because no supplies could reach him safely over the waters of the lake, even from Long Point; but he worked strenuously to complete the Detroit, his flagship, just launched, placing on board of her some guns from the land forts, and at last, feeling (to use the words of Sir George Prevost) 'compelled from circumstances of imperious necessity to seek the superior forces of the enemy,' he sailed out to bring Perry to battle. He had six vessels mounting sixty-three guns, to Perry's nine mounting fifty-four only, but the latter's guns were of far superior power. At this time not a day's flour was in store for his men, who were on half-allowance, and his equipment was in several respects infamously bad. His crew numbered among them over 200 soldiers, chiefly obtained from Proctor, 85 Canadian-lake men, and only 50 seamen, some of whom had come up but three days before. In the battle which ensued (September 10, 1813) the American flagship was obliged, early in the action to strike her flag, Perry removing to another vessel, and victory then hung in the balance, but in the end the American squadron, skilfully commanded by Perry, was triumphant, and the British flotilla was practically destroyed, Captain Barclay being severely wounded, and most of his superior officers placed *hors de combat*. The British loss was about 135, the American 123."—C. W. Robinson, *Canada and Canadian defence*, pp. 56-57, 60-62.

Also in: C. D. Yonge, *History of the British navy*, v. 3, ch. 36.—E. Eggleston and L. E. Seelye, *Tecumseh*, ch. 26-34.—I. R. Jackson, *Life of W. H. Harrison*, ch. 7-9.—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the War of 1812*, ch. 16-17, 23-26.—G. Bancroft, *History of the Battle of Lake Erie*.—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 487-495.—R. W. Neeser, *Battle of Lake Erie (United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, Sept., 1913)*.—H. Lea, *Legacy of Commodore Perry (North American Review, June, 1913)*.—*Journal of American History*, Jan.-Mar., 1914.—C. B. Galbreath, *Battle of Lake Erie in ballad and history (Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications, no. 20, Oct., 1911, pp. 415-456)*.—A. T. Mahan, *Sea power in its*

relation to the War of 1812, v. 1, pp. 367-378, v. 2, pp. 62-101.

1812-1825.—Development and extent of fur trade in Wisconsin. See WISCONSIN: 1812-1825.

1812-1860.—Development of armored warships. See WARSHIPS: 1782-1860.

1813.—Difficulties in administration.—Changes in army leadership.—“Besides the alarming difficulties which rose partly from failure of military calculations at home and abroad, but chiefly from want of national experience in the business of war, other annoyances surrounded the President, and could not fail to make him wish for peace. Armstrong had not been six weeks in the War Department before he set the members of Administration at odds. The factious days of Robert Smith returned, and the President found the task of maintaining discipline as great in the Cabinet as it was in the army. . . . Monroe was the first to resent Armstrong's proceedings. . . . Already Monroe had surrendered the War Department to him, with the expectation that if any one was to have general command of the armies in the field, Monroe was to be the man. Down to the time when Armstrong took control, the idea was universal that the next campaign was to be fought by Monroe. . . . As acting Secretary of War, Monroe had urged Congress to increase the number of major-generals; and after Armstrong took charge of the Department Congress passed the Act of February 24, 1813, authorizing the increase. February 27 the nominations were sent to the Senate. . . . Monroe said, in effect, that he would have the command in chief or nothing. Armstrong said, in effect, that he meant to be commander-in-chief himself. The new major-generals were James Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, William R. Davy of South Carolina, Morgan Lewis of New York, William Henry Harrison of Indiana Territory, and Aaron Ogden of New Jersey. The command of the Northern army was left to Dearborn, and as the world knew Dearborn's incompetence to conduct a campaign, no one was surprised to learn that Armstrong meant to conduct it as Secretary of War, at the army headquarters in the field, performing the duties of lieutenant-general. . . . The first effect of Armstrong's administration was to turn Monroe into a vindictive enemy; the second was to alienate Gallatin.”—H. Adams, *History of the United States*, v. 7, pp. 34-37, 39.

1813 (March-May).—Offer of mediation by Tsar of Russia.—Acceptance and appointment of Adams, Bayard and Gallatin as commissioners.—Financial arrangements.—“Gallatin's abstract ideas were those of 1801,—simplicity, economy, and purity. Financiering—the providing of money for wasteful expenditure—was his abhorrence. ‘I cannot consent to act the part of a mere financier,’ he wrote to Jefferson in 1809; ‘to become a contriver of taxes, a dealer of loans, a seeker of resources for the purpose of supporting useless haubles of increasing the number of idle and dissipated members of the community, of fattening contractors, pursers, and agents, and of introducing in all its ramifications that system of patronage, corruption, and rottenness which you so justly execrate.’ These words were meant to apply only to a state of peace, but they applied equally well to a state of war from the moment war became useless. In the beginning of Madison's second term, no man of intelligence denied that the war had failed; that its avowed objects could not be gained; that every month of war increased the danger of disunion, brought national bankruptcy nearer, and fastened habits of extravagance and corruption on

the country. From his post at the Treasury, Gallatin could see better than most men the dangers both financial and political, engendered by the war, while his acquaintance with European affairs showed him the need of rapid diplomacy. Armstrong represented everything antagonistic to Gallatin; his methods were arbitrary and underhand; his political training was that of the New York school, tempered by personal contact with the court of Napoleon; from him economy could hardly be expected. . . . Into this embroglio of national and personal difficulties Daschkoff, the Russian *chargé* at Washington, suddenly dropped the Czar's offer to mediate a peace [which had been made to John Quincy Adams in St. Petersburg, by Count Romanzoff, as early as September, 1812]. Of its prompt acceptance, under such circumstances, no one could doubt, and on this point the Administration was united. Daschkoff's letter bore date March 8, and Monroe's reply was sent March 11, 1813. [To aid in negotiation the president and his advisers determined to send two special envoys to the aid of John Adams then at St. Petersburg. The choice fell on John A. Bayard, of Delaware, a Federalist, and on Gallatin, who asked for the appointment himself.] . . . Gallatin's exceptional fitness for the task outweighed all objections. The President consented to appoint him; and Monroe, who had from the first attached himself to Gallatin, acquiesced, although he saw the consequences to the Cabinet and the Treasury. . . . Before he could depart . . . [Gallatin] was obliged to complete the necessary financial arrangements for the coming year. . . . First in importance was the loan of sixteen million dollars. March 12, subscription books were opened in all the principal towns, and the public was invited to take the whole amount at seven per cent interest, to be reduced to six per cent at the end of thirteen years. About four million dollars were offered on these terms, . . . and after an active negotiation between Gallatin and three or four capitalists of New York and Philadelphia,—John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard, David Parish,—the remainder of the loan was provided. . . . The bargain was completed April 7 [1813]. At that moment the Treasury was empty, and could not meet the drafts of the other departments; but with sixteen millions in hand, five millions of Treasury notes, and an estimated revenue of something more than nine millions, Gallatin collected about thirty million dollars, and April 17 wrote to the Secretaries of War and Navy, allotting to the one thirteen millions and a quarter, to the other four and a half millions, which could not be exceeded without the consent of Congress.”—H. Adams, *History of United States of America*, v. 7, pp. 40-45.—Having thus finished his work, Gallatin sailed with Bayard on his mission in May, 1813.

1813 (April-July).—Burning of Toronto.—Capture of Fort George.—“The American fleet on Lake Ontario had been increased, and in 1813 controlled the lake. General Sheaffe had succeeded Brock as Governor as well as commander of the forces. Some 600 troops were in York [now Toronto], the capital. York had about 1,000 inhabitants, and was not regarded as of strategic importance. The Americans, however, set sail from Sackett's Harbour with 16 sail and 2,500 men to attack it. The enemy landed [April 27] to the west of the town, and General Sheaffe evacuated the works, and retired down the Kingston Road. The Americans invested the town, and though skirmishing took place, had an easy victory. The land force was under General Pike, an officer well

known as having, when a lieutenant, explored the sources of the Mississippi. Just as the Americans had well filled the fort, the powder magazine exploded with violence, killing and wounding about 250. General Pike, struck in the breast by a flying stone, died soon after. The Americans, contrary to the articles of surrender, shamefully burnt the town, and retired from York on the 2nd of May, 1813. While the squadron was absent, Sackett's Harbour was attacked by a strong force. The garrison seemed to be on the point of surrendering the fort, when Sir George Prevost, to the surprise of all, ordered a retreat. Little York taken, Commodore Chauncey then crossed the lake to Fort George at the mouth of the Niagara River. General Vincent commanded the fort. Twenty-four of Hull's guns frowned from its bastions. Its defender had 1,340 men. The American army on the Niagara frontier numbered 6,000. Chauncey had eleven war-vessels and 900 seamen. On the 27th of May . . . Vincent drew his men out about a mile from the fort and awaited the attack. He was overpowered and retired, having lost nearly 450 soldiers. The Canadian force retired to a strong position, 'Beaver Dams,' twelve miles from Niagara on the heights, having given up Fort Erie and Chippewa and blown up Fort George. Vincent had now 1,600 men, and with these he retired to Burlington Heights, near the present city of Hamilton. An American army of 2,500 men followed General Vincent to Stoney Creek. On the night of the 8th of June, Colonel Harvey of the British force, with upwards of 750 men, fell stealthily on the sleeping American army, scattered the troops, killed many, captured the American generals Chandler and Winder, and about 100 men, along with guns and stores. The adventurers then retired to their camp. The scattered American soldiers reassembled in the morning and retired in a disorderly manner down the country to Fort George. Vincent now followed the retreating army and reoccupied Beaver Dams. One of his outposts was held by Lieutenant Fitzgibbon and 30 men. Smarting with defeat, the American general sought to surprise this station as a basis for future attacks. He secretly despatched Colonel Boerstler with nearly 700 men to capture it. A wounded militiaman, living within the lines at Queenston, heard by chance of the expedition. . . . The alarm was given [by Laura Secord, the militiaman's wife, who traveled twenty miles through the forest, at night] and that night the men lay on their arms. Early next morning the American party came, but an ambuscade had been prepared for them, and after severe fighting 542 men surrendered into the hands of some 260. General Dearborn soon after retired from the command of the American army, to be succeeded by General Boyd. British parties captured Fort Schlosser and Black Rock on the Niagara River at this time, though at the latter place with the loss of Colonel Bishopp, the idol of his men. Colonel Scott, in command of troops on board Commodore Chauncey's fleet, again scoured Lake Ontario. Landing at Burlington Heights on the 31st of July, they did nothing more than reconnoitre the works and depart. Afterwards the second attack on York was made and the barracks burnt. After this a trial of strength took place between Sir James Yeo's fleet, now sent forth from Kingston Harbour, and Chauncey's squadron. The Americans lost two vessels in a squall, and two were captured by the British, but the result between the two fleets was indecisive."—G. Bryce, *Short history of the Canadian people*, ch. 8, sect. 5.

ALSO IN: R. Johnson, *History of the War of 1812-15*, ch. 7.

1813 (October–November).—Abortive expedition against Montreal.—“While Perry and Harrison were . . . reclaiming our lost ground on Lake Erie and in the northwest, Armstrong was preparing to carry out his favorite plan of a descent on Kingston and Montreal. When he accepted the post of Secretary of War, he transferred his department from Washington to Sackett's Harbor, so that he might superintend in person the progress of the campaign. . . . Although Wilkinson had superseded Dearborn, as commander-in-chief of this district in July, he did not issue his first orders to the army till the 23d of August. . . . General Wade Hampton, who had been recalled from the fifth military district to the northern frontier, encamped with his army, 4,000 strong, at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain. The plan finally adopted by the Secretary was, to have Wilkinson drop down the St. Lawrence, and without stopping to attack the English posts on the river, form a junction with General Hampton, when the two armies should march at once on Montreal. These two Generals were both Revolutionary officers, and consequently too advanced in years to carry such an expedition through with vigor and activity. Besides, a hostile feeling separated them, rendering each jealous of the other's command. . . . Chauncey, in the mean time, after an action with Yeo, in which both parties claimed the victory, forced his adversary to take refuge in Burlington Bay. He then wrote to Wilkinson that the lake was clear of the enemy, and reported himself ready to transport the troops down the St. Lawrence. The greatest expectations were formed of this expedition. The people knew nothing . . . [of a quarrel which had occurred] between Wilkinson and Hampton, and thought only of the strength of their united force. . . . While Wilkinson was preparing to fulfill his part of the campaign, Hampton made a bold push into Canada on his own responsibility. Advancing from Plattsburg, he marched directly for St. John, but finding water scarce for his draft cattle, owing to a severe drought, he moved to the left, and next day arrived at Chateaugay Four Corners, a few miles from the Canada line. Here he was overtaken by an order from Armstrong, commanding him to remain where he was, until the arrival of Wilkinson. But jealous of his rival, and wishing to achieve a victory in which the honor would not be divided, he resolved to take upon himself the responsibility of advancing alone. Several detachments of militia had augmented his force of 4,000, and he deemed himself sufficiently strong to attack Prevost, who he was told had only about 2,000 ill assorted troops under him. He therefore gave orders to march, and cutting a road for 24 miles through the wilderness, after five days great toil, reached the British position. Ignorant of its weakness, he dispatched Colonel Purdy at night by a circuitous route to gain the enemy's flank and rear and assail his works, while he attacked them in front. Bewildered by the darkness, and led astray by his guide, Colonel Purdy wandered through the forest, entirely ignorant of the whereabouts of the enemy or of his own. General Hampton, however, supposing that he had succeeded in his attempt, ordered General Izard to advance with the main body of the army, and as soon as firing was heard in the rear to commence the attack in front. Izard marched up his men [October 26] and a skirmish ensued, when Colonel De Salaberry, the British commander, who had but a handful of regulars un-



der him, ordered the bugles, which had been placed at some distance apart on purpose to represent a large force, to sound the charge. The ruse succeeded admirably, and a halt was ordered. The bugles brought up the lost detachment of Purdy, but suddenly assailed by a concealed body of militia, his command was thrown into disorder and broke and fled. Disconcerted by the defeat of Purdy, Hampton ordered a retreat, without making any attempt to carry the British intrenchments. . . . Hampton, defeated by the blasts of a few bugles, took up his position again at Four Corners, to wait further news from Wilkinson's division. The latter having concentrated his troops at Grenadier Island, embarked them again the same day that Hampton advanced, against orders, towards Montreal. Three hundred boats, covering the river for miles, carried the infantry and artillery, while the cavalry, 500 strong, marched along the bank. . . . They were two weeks in reaching the river. Wilkinson, who had been recalled from New Orleans, to take charge of this expedition, was prostrated by the lake fever, which, added to the infirmities of age, rendered him wholly unfit for the position he occupied. General Lewis, his second in command, was also sick. . . . General Brown led the advance of this army of invasion, as it started for Montreal, 180 miles distant. . . . When it reached the head of the long rapids at Hamilton, 20 miles below Ogdensburg, Wilkinson ordered General Brown to advance by land and cover the passage of the boats through the narrow defiles, where the enemy had established block houses. In the mean time the cavalry had crossed over to the Canadian side and, with 1,500 men under General Boyd, been despatched against the enemy, which was constantly harassing his rear. General Boyd, accompanied by Generals Swartwout and Covington as volunteers, moved forward in three columns. Colonel Ripley advancing with the 21st Regiment, drove the enemy's sharpshooters from the woods, and [November 11] emerged on an open space, called Chryster's Field, and directly in front of two English regiments. Notwithstanding the disparity of numbers this gallant officer ordered a charge, which was executed with such firmness that the two regiments retired. Rallying and making a stand, they were again charged and driven back. . . . At length the British retired to their camp and the Americans maintained their position on the shore, so that the flotilla passed the Saut in safety. This action [called the battle of Chryster's Farm, or Williamsburg] has never received the praise it deserves—the disgraceful failure of the campaign having cast a shadow upon it. The British, though inferior in numbers, had greatly the advantage in having possession of a stone house in the midst of the field. . . . Nearly one-fifth of the entire force engaged were killed or wounded. . . . The army, however, still held its course for Montreal. Young Scott, who had joined the expedition at Ogdensburg, was 15 miles ahead, clearing, with a detachment of less than 800 men, the river banks as he went. Montreal was known to be feebly garrisoned, and Wilkinson had no doubt it would fall an easy conquest. He therefore sent forward to Hampton to join him at St. Regis, with provisions. Hampton, in reply, said, that his men could bring no more provisions than they wanted for their own use, and informed him, in short, that he should not co-operate with him at all, but make the best of his way back to Lake Champlain. On receiving this astounding news, Wilkinson called a council of war, which reprobated in strong terms

the conduct of Hampton, and decided that in consideration of his failure, and the lateness of the season, the march should be suspended, and the army retire to winter quarters. This was carried into effect, and Wilkinson repaired to French Mills, on Salmon river, for the winter, and Hampton to Plattsburg."—J. T. Headley, *Second war with England*, v. 1, ch. 13.—A Canadian history of the war gives their reason for not pursuing the American troops down the river. "The British force in Boyd's rear was only a thousand strong; but, as it included every human element engaged in the defence of Canada, it has a quite peculiar interest of its own. Afloat, it included bluejackets of the Royal Navy, men of the Provincial Marine, French-Canadian voyageurs, and Anglo-Canadian boatmen from the trading-posts, all under a first-rate fighting seaman, Captain Mulcaster, R. N. Ashore, under a good regimental leader, Colonel Morrison—whose chief staff officer was [John] Harvey, of Stoney Creek renown—it included Imperial regulars, Canadian regulars of both races, French-Canadians and Anglo-Canadian militiamen, and a party of Indians. Early on the 11th Brown had arrived at Cornwall with his two thousand Americans, Wilkinson was starting down from Williamsburg in boats with three thousand more, and Boyd was starting down ashore with eighteen hundred. But Mulcaster's vessels pressed in on Wilkinson's rear, while Morrison pressed in on Boyd's. Wilkinson then ordered Boyd to turn about and drive off Morrison, while he hurried his own men out of reach of Mulcaster, whose armed vessels could not follow down the rapids. Boyd thereupon attacked Morrison, and a stubborn fight ensued at Chryster's Farm. The field was of the usual type: woods on one flank, water on the other, and a more or less flat clearing in the centre. Boyd tried hard to drive his wedge in between the British and the river. But Morrison foiled him in manœuvre; and the eight hundred British stood fast against their eighteen hundred enemies all along the line. Boyd then withdrew, having lost four hundred men; and Morrison's remaining six hundred effectives slept on their hard-won ground. Next morning the energetic Morrison resumed his pursuit. But the campaign against Montreal was already over. Wilkinson had found that Hampton had started back for Lake Champlain while the battle was in progress; so he landed at St. Regis, just inside his own country, and went into winter quarters at French Mills on the Salmon river."—W. Wood, *War with the United States: A chronicle of 1812* (M. Wrong and H. H. Langton, ed., *Chronicles of Canada Series*, pp. 129-131).

ALSO IN: W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 4, ch. 8.—S. Perkins, *History of the late war*, ch. 12.—J. Armstrong, *Notices of the War of 1812*, v. 2, ch. 1.—B. Sulte, *La bataille de Chateaugay*.

1813 (December).—Retaliatory devastation of the Niagara frontier.—Fort Niagara surprised.—Burning of Buffalo.—"The withdrawal of troops from the Niagara frontier to take part in Wilkinson's expedition left the defence of that line almost entirely to militia, and the term for which the militia had been called out expired on the 6th of December. The next day General George McClure, who had been left in command at Fort George, found himself at the head of but 60 effective men, while the British General Drummond had brought up to the peninsula 400 troops and 70 Indians—released by the failure of Wilkinson's expedition—and was preparing to attack him. Mc-

clure thereupon determined to evacuate the fort, as the only alternative from capture or destruction, and remove his men and stores across the river to Fort Niagara. He also determined to burn the village of Newark, that the enemy might find no shelter. The laudable part of this plan was but imperfectly carried out; he failed to destroy the barracks, and left unharmed tents for 1,500 men, several pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of ammunition, all of which fell into the hands of Drummond's men. But the inexcusable part—the burning of a village in midwinter, inhabited by noncombatants who had been guilty of no special offence—was only too faithfully executed. The inhabitants were given twelve hours in which to remove their goods, and then the torch was applied, and not a house was left standing. This needless cruelty produced its natural result; Drummond determined upon swift and ample retaliation. In the night of December 18th, just one week after the burning of Newark, he threw across the Niagara a force of 550 men. They landed at Five Mile Meadows, three miles above Fort Niagara, and marched upon it at once, arriving there at four o'clock in the morning. . . . The sentries were seized and silenced before they could give any alarm, and the main gate was found standing wide open, so that the British had only to walk straight in and begin at once the stabbing which had been determined upon. The guard in the south-east block-house fired one volley, by which the British commander, Colonel Murray, was wounded, and a portion of the invalids made what resistance they could. A British lieutenant and five men were killed, and a surgeon and three men wounded. . . . On the same morning, General Riall, with a detachment of British troops and 500 Indians, crossed from Queenstown." Lewiston, Youngstown, Tuscarora and Manchester (now Niagara Falls) were plundered and burned, and the houses and barns of farmers along the river, within a belt of several miles, were destroyed. The two villages of "Buffalo and Black Rock were sacked and burned, and no mercy was shown. . . . Truly, an abundant revenge had been taken for the burning of Newark. . . . On New Year's day of 1814 the settlers along the whole length of the Niagara—those of them who survived—were shivering beside the smouldering embers of their homes."—R. Johnson, *History of the War of 1812-15*, ch. 9.—The Canadian story of the retaliatory measures follows: "On the Niagara frontier the Americans, as the season for active operations drew towards a close, did little but raid the Canadian border, and, on December 10, burning the small town of Niagara, retired to their own bank of that river. This burning of Niagara and turning the inhabitants out of their homes when snow was on the ground was done upon the official pretext that 'the frontier (American) must be protected by destroying such Canadian villages in its front as would best shelter the enemy in winter,' and it is only necessary to allude to it here because this action with respect to an undefended town, together with the burning of buildings at York, and of houses, farms, etc., on the border, caused an extremely bitter feeling throughout Canada, and led to subsequent retaliatory measures on the part of the British both on the American bank of the Niagara River, and elsewhere on the theatre of war outside Canada, such as on the Delaware and at Washington. Towards the middle of December, 1813, General Sir Gordon Drummond . . . assumed command on the Niagara frontier,

and, crossing the river, took the American post of Fort Niagara by storm (December 19), which remained from that time to the close of the war (in December, 1814) in British occupation. Afterwards, moving thence along the northern bank of the Niagara, he burnt or destroyed Lewiston, Black Rock, Buffalo, with much of the shipping there, and Fort Schlosser. In the direction of Lake Champlain also the British had succeeded, towards the close of July and early in August, in destroying a quantity of stores at Plattsburg and some of the enemy's smaller vessels on the lake."—C. W. Robinson, *Canada and Canadian defences*, p. 64.

ALSO IN: G. C. Eggleston, *Red Eagle*—J. W. Monette, *Discovery and settlement of the valley of the Mississippi*, v. 2, bk. 5, ch. 14.—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the War of 1812*, ch. 33-34.

1813-1814.—British blockade of the Atlantic coast.—"The blockade of the Atlantic coast was enforced by British vessels from the beginning of the year 1813. At first they were inclined to spare the coast of New England, which they supposed to be friendly to Great Britain, but this policy was soon abandoned, and the whole coast was treated alike. Groups of war-vessels were stationed before each of the principal sea-ports, and others were continually in motion along the coast, from Halifax on the north to the West Indies. Early in 1813, they took possession of the mouth of Chesapeake Bay as a naval station, and the American Government ordered all the lights to be put out in the neighboring light-houses. The Atlantic coast was thus kept in a state of almost constant alarm, for the British vessels were continually landing men at exposed points to burn, plunder, and destroy. . . . In 1813, the defenceless towns of Lewes, Havre de Grace, and Hampton (near Fortress Monroe) were bombarded, and Stonington, Conn., in 1814; and a number of smaller towns were burned or plundered. Attacks on New York and other larger cities were prevented only by fear of torpedoes, by means of which the Americans had nearly blown up one or two British ships which ventured too near New York. . . . Maine, as far as the Penobscot River, was seized by the British in 1814, and was held until the end of the war."—A. Johnston, *History of the United States for schools*, sect. 384-386.

1813-1814 (August-April).—Creek War.—General Jackson's first campaign.—"The great Indian chief Tecumseh had been trying for years to unite all the red men against the whites. There would have been an Indian war if there had been no war with England, but the latter war seemed to be Tecumseh's opportunity. Among the southwestern Indians he found acceptance only with the Creeks, who were already on the verge of civil war, because some wanted to adopt civilized life, and others refused. The latter became the war party, under Weatherford [Red Eagle], a very able half-breed chief. The first outbreak in the Southwest, although there had been some earlier hostilities, was the massacre of the garrison and refugees at Fort Mims, at the junction of the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers, August 30, 1813. There were 553 persons in the fort, of whom only 5 or 6 escaped. . . . The result of the massacre at Fort Mims was that Alabama was almost abandoned by whites. Terror and desire for revenge took possession of Georgia and Tennessee. September 25th the Tennessee Legislature voted to raise men and money to aid the people of Mississippi territory against the Creeks." Andrew Jackson, one of the two major-generals of the Tennessee militia,

was then confined to his bed by a wound received in a recent fight with Thomas H. Benton and Benton's brother. "As soon as he possibly could, Jackson took the field. Georgia had a force in the field under General Floyd. General Claiborne was acting at the head of troops from Louisiana and Mississippi. This Indian war had a local character and was outside the federal operations, although in the end it had a great effect upon them. . . . The Creek war was remarkable for three things: (1) the quarrels between the generals, and the want of concert of action; (2) lack of provisions; (3) insubordination in the ranks. . . . On three occasions Jackson had to use one part of his army to prevent another part from marching home, he and they differing on the construction of the terms of enlistment. He showed very strong qualities under these trying circumstances. . . . In the conduct of the movements against the enemy his energy was very remarkable. So long as there was an enemy unsubdued Jackson could not rest, and could not give heed to anything else. [See also LOUISIANA: 1813-1815.] . . . At the end of March [1814] Jackson destroyed a body of the Creeks at Tohopeka, or Horse-Shoe Bend, in the northeast corner of the present Tallapoosa County, Alabama. With the least possible delay he pushed on to the last refuge of the Creeks, the Hickory Ground, at the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, and the Holy Ground a few miles distant. The medicine men, appealing to the superstition of the Indians, had taught them to believe that no white man could tread the latter ground and live. In April the remnant of the Creeks surrendered or fled to Florida, overcome as much by the impetuous and relentless character of the campaign against them as by actual blows. Fort Jackson was built on the Hickory Ground. The march down through Alabama was a great achievement, considering the circumstances of the country at the time. . . . The Creek campaign lasted only seven months. In itself considered, it was by no means an important Indian war, but in its connection with other military movements it was very important. Tecumseh had been killed at the battle of the Thames, in Canada, October 5, 1813. His scheme of a race war died with him. The Creek campaign put an end to any danger of hostilities from the southwestern Indians, in alliance either with other Indians or with the English. . . . This campaign . . . was the beginning of Jackson's fame and popularity, and from it dates his career. He was 47 years old. On the 31st of May he was appointed a major-general in the army of the United States, and was given command of the department of the South. He established his headquarters at Mobile in August, 1814."—W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a public man*, ch. 2.

1813-1871.—Early school laws.—Child welfare legislation. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1813-1871.

1814.—Embargo and its effect.—British trade.—Growing dissatisfaction in New England.—Repeal of Non-intercourse Act and embargo.—"As the war went on, New England found new cause for the assertion of the principle of State rights and nullification. Her coast east of Montauk Point had neither been blockaded nor molested by the British, and a brisk trade with Europe had in consequence been carried on. But Congress to stop this laid an embargo in 1813, which fell chiefly on New England (for the rest of our coast was already under British blockade), and set that region once more aflame. Thirty-two towns in

Massachusetts immediately petitioned the General Court for relief. Various are the forms, said the joint committee of the House and Senate, in which the people have expressed their feelings, but the tone of and spirit in all are the same. They all discover an ardent attachment to the union of these States, and all express a reverence for the national Constitution; but they are all stamped with the melancholy conviction that the basis of that union has been destroyed by a neglect of its principles, and that the durability of the Constitution has been impaired by a perversion and abuse of its powers. After due consideration of their petitions, the committee resolved that the Embargo Act was not constitutional; that the people of Massachusetts had always enjoyed the right of sailing from port to port within the limits of the Commonwealth and of fishing along its coasts; that the power of prohibiting the exercise of their rights was never delegated to Congress; and that all laws passed by the General Government and intended to have such an effect 'are therefore unconstitutional and void.'—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 5, p. 411.—"An embargo was laid by Congress on December seventeen [1813] and immediately every foreign food product rose to a fabulous price. Sugar was then sold at fifty cents a pound. For hyson tea by the chest four dollars a pound was offered and refused. At Alexandria salt sold by the quantity at five dollars a bushel. At Portsmouth a case of English hardware, mostly awl-blades and tacks, which cost two hundred pounds sterling, sold at auction for five thousand dollars. Everybody who had money to spare made haste to buy something and held it for a rise in price. Never since revolutionary days had the country experienced such a fever of speculation. Against this the people cried out lustily. They were willing, they said, to pay high prices when such were the result of the pressure of the enemy, but they were not willing to have the embargo, a measure taken to injure the enemy, used to injure and plunder the people of the United States. In Philadelphia the feeling was so strong that the citizens formed non-consumption associations, each member of which pledged himself not to buy coffee at more than twenty-five cents, nor sugar at more than twenty cents a pound; not to use articles made in foreign lands if similar goods were made in America, and not to consume any tea not already in the country. This new restrictive measure, the last of the many embargoes, went into force on the seventeenth of December [1813]. That it was really aimed against Great Britain no sane man could believe. The ports of Russia and Prussia, of Denmark and Sweden, of Spain, and of the countries of South America, were at that moment open to her commerce. That she could, in spite of this, be distressed by shutting the few ports of the United States which she still left unblockaded, was preposterous. All these ports were in New England. To them came, in considerable numbers, the merchant ships of Spain and Sweden, and British ships under Swedish flags, with cargoes of Spanish wool and Muscovado sugar, Campeachy Logwood, Havana segars, cocoa, hides, and Lisbon salt. From New England, again, as well known, went out no inconsiderable part of the supplies on which the British troops in Canada and in the West Indies subsisted. That Boston and Salem should enjoy all this trade, while Philadelphia and Baltimore were deprived of their usual share of it by a rigorous blockade, and should enjoy it as the reward of downright hostility to the war, was too much for Republican patience.

Justly indignant that such a traffic should go on openly, Madison undertook to stop it, and early in December made it the subject of a special message. In it he complained that the laws relating to trade and commerce had produced a state of things most helpful to the enemy and most hurtful to the United States. British products and fabrics daily came into the ports in neutral ships, and in British ships disguised as neutrals by false papers and flags. American products daily went out of the ports to supply the armies of the enemy in distant lands. Nay, the very fleets and troops that infested the coast, harried the shores, and sacked the towns, and the very armies against which his fellow-citizens were contending in Canada, obtained from the United States supplies of food which could not be had elsewhere. . . . He would therefore suggest, as a remedy, that an embargo be laid at once, and that articles known to be derived almost entirely from Great Britain be excluded from the ports, even when brought in neutral vessels. To this the House readily consented. The Senate was less hasty; but on the afternoon of December seventeenth a bill laying an embargo was signed. . . . Long before that time news of what was coming had gone abroad, and all neutral ships in the ports of New England that could possibly do so had put to sea. It was well they did, for the law embargoed every merchant ship, cleared or not cleared, within the jurisdiction of the United States, unless each one of its officers and each one of its crew was a subject of a nation in amity with the United States. Had Madison been a little more patient, had he waited but three weeks longer, the embargo in all probability would not have been even proposed; for, on the thirtieth of December, before it had gone into force along the frontier and on the gulf coast, the British flag of truce *Bramble*, forty-two days out from Plymouth, reached Annapolis with newspapers and a despatch. The despatch was from Lord Castlereagh, and informed Monroe that, while Great Britain could not accept the mediation of Russia, she would willingly treat with the United States directly at Gothenburg or London. The newspapers were from London, and contained information which startled the whole country and aroused the wildest desire for peace. . . . Soon after this the ship *Ann-Alexander*, from Liverpool, entered Boston with newspapers as late as December twenty-fifth containing long accounts of the surrender of Dantzic, of the overtures of peace made by the allies, and of their acceptance by Napoleon. Again the commercial cities were full of excitement. . . . Under the influence of these popular rejoicings, of the hope for peace, and of the changed conditions of Europe, men who were earnest supporters of the administration began to question the wisdom of the embargo. It was right, they admitted, that the shameful trade New England was carrying on with the enemy should be stopped. But now that a fair trade would soon be opened with Holland, with Germany, and perhaps with France, was it just to punish honest men for the sins committed by rogues? . . . Such a policy was distressing to America and the subject of derision in England, which had the markets of Europe at her command. But even before such reasoning the administration could not bear to yield, for New England was every day growing more hostile, more defiant. To the people of that section the embargo was a blow directly at them. They met it accordingly, and from the moment the fall of Bonaparte seemed assured, their leaders, their representatives, their press, their town meetings, began seriously

to discuss the propriety of withdrawing from all share in the war and making their own terms with England. . . . Though the new trade restriction applied with equal force to every port in the United States, it fell with especial severity on those of Massachusetts. The blockade which, during 1813, extended from Rhode Island to New Orleans, had long since stopped all coasting south of Cape Cod. Trade by sea with the Southern States was not, therefore, affected by the embargo. But from Boston to Eastport there had gone on, as usual, a legitimate and proper coasting trade, and this in one moment was destroyed. Ships from Nantucket, from Eastport, from Portland, from any port in Maine that happened to be at Salem or Boston or New Bedford on the fatal day when the law went into operation, were stopped and their crews left, hundreds of miles from home, to shift as best they could. Early in January, as a consequence, the roads from Boston to Maine were dotted with bands of sailors, on foot, with packs on their backs, begging their way homeward. . . . Yet, strange as it may seem, the members of Congress who resisted any modification and finally voted against the repeal of the embargo were the Federalists from New England. The Constitution, they argued, gives Congress no power to prevent trade by sea between towns and cities in the same State, nor between the ports of one State and those on the seacoast or navigable rivers of an adjoining State. The law imposing the embargo is therefore unconstitutional. But when a resolution was offered to instruct the Committee on Foreign Relations to report a bill repealing it, the House refused to even consider the motion. An effort was then made to secure a slight modification, in order that ships away from home when the embargo was laid might be permitted to return. . . . To Congress it could surely make no difference whether the ships were tied to the wharves of one port or another; but to those who owned and to those who sailed the ships it was a matter of very serious importance where they were embargoed. This seemed so reasonable that, when a resolution was moved to bid the committee inquire into the expediency of permitting coasting vessels absent on December seventeenth to return to the ports where the voyage began, the House consented, though almost every Federalist present voted No. . . . [Motions were introduced] to suspend the embargo during the negotiations for peace; to inquire into the expediency of repeal; but the House seemed determined that, as the administration had asked for the measure, the administration must propose its repeal, and refused to consider the motions. To accept this situation was hard indeed; but, as every newspaper that found its way to our shores from England confirmed the first reports of the signal victories of the allies, Madison yielded, and on March thirty-first asked for the repeal both of the embargo and the Non-importation Act, which had been in force against Great Britain since 1811. . . . Lest so sudden a change of policy should be ruinous to the manufactures the restrictive system had produced, he further suggested that the double duties on imports, which were to expire one year after peace with Great Britain, should be continued till two years after that event, and, that the banks might not be embarrassed, he asked that the exportation of specie be forbidden. So much as concerned the embargo and the Non-intercourse Act was quickly reported on by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and a repealing act presented. . . . On April fourteenth it was signed by Madison

and became law at once."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 222-230.—See also EMBARGO: First American embargoes.

1814 (July-September).—On the Niagara frontier.—Chippewa.—Lundy's Lane.—Fort Erie.—"Both parties seemed to have selected [the Niagara frontier] . . . as the principal theatre on which to display their military prowess in the year 1814. Lieutenant General Drummond, governor of Upper Canada, concentrated the forces of that province at fort George, and retained the possession of Niagara. The American Generals Smyth, Hampton, Dearborn, and Wilkinson, under whose auspices the campaigns of 1812 and 13, on the Canada border, were conducted, had retired from that field; and General Brown was appointed major general, and, with the assistance of Brigadiers Scott and Ripley, designated to the command of the Niagara frontier. He left Sackett's Harbour in May, with a large portion of the American troops. . . . On his arrival at Buffalo, calculating upon the co-operation of the Ontario fleet, he determined on an attempt to expel the British from the Niagara peninsula. With this view he crossed the river on the 3d of July. . . . On the same day he invested fort Erie, and summoned it to surrender, allowing the commandant two hours to answer the summons. At five in the afternoon the fort surrendered, and the prisoners, amounting to 137, were removed to Buffalo. On the morning of the fourth General Scott advanced with his brigade and corps of artillery, and took a position on the Chippewa plain, half a mile in front of the village, his right resting on the river, and his front protected by a ravine. The British were encamped in force at the village. In the evening General Brown joined with him with the reserve under General Ripley, and the artillery commanded by Major Hindman. General Porter arrived the next morning, with the New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, and a number of Indians of the six nations. . . . At four in the afternoon, General Porter advanced, taking the woods in order to conceal his approach, and . . . met the whole British force approaching in order of battle. General Scott, with his brigade and Tower's artillery, met them on the plain, in front of the American encampment, and was directly engaged in close action with the main body. General Porter's command gave way. . . . The reserve were now ordered up, and General Ripley passed to the woods in left of the line to gain the rear of the enemy; but before this was effected, General Scott had compelled the British to retire. Their whole line now fell back, and were eagerly pursued. . . . The British left 200 dead on the ground. . . . The American loss was 60 killed, and 268 wounded and missing. After the battle of Chippewa, the British retired to fort George; and General Brown took post at Queenston, where he remained some time, expecting reinforcements. . . . On the 20th, General Brown advanced with his army towards fort George, drove in the outposts, and encamped near the fort, in the expectation that the British would come out and give him battle. On the 22d, he returned to his former position at Queenston; here he received a letter from General Gaines, informing him that the heavy guns, and the rifle regiment, which he had ordered from Sackett's harbour, together with the whole fleet, were blockaded in that port, and no assistance was to be expected from them. On the 24th, he fell back to Chippewa, and on the 25th received intelligence that the enemy having received large reinforcements from Kingston, were advancing upon

him. The first brigade under General Scott, Tower's artillery, all the dragoons and mounted men, were immediately put in motion on the Queenston road. On his arrival at the Niagara cataract, General Scott learned that the British were in force directly in his front, separated only by a narrow piece of wood. Having despatched this intelligence to General Brown, he advanced upon the enemy, and the action commenced at six o'clock in the afternoon. . . . The British artillery had taken post on a commanding eminence, at the head of Lundy's lane, supported by a line of infantry, out of the reach of the American batteries. This was the key of the whole position; from hence they poured a most deadly fire on the American ranks. It became necessary either to leave the ground, or to carry this post and seize the height. The latter desperate task was assigned to Colonel Miller . . . [who] at the point of the bayonet, carried the artillery and the height. The guns were immediately turned upon the enemy; General Ripley now brought up the 23d regiment, to the support of Colonel Miller; the first regiment was rallied and brought into line, and the British were driven from the hill. . . . The British rallied under the hill, and made a desperate attempt to regain their artillery, and drive the Americans from their position, but without success; a second and third attempt was made with the like result. General Scott was engaged in repelling these attacks, and though [severely wounded] . . . continued at the head of his column, endeavouring to turn the enemy's right flank. The volunteers under General Porter, during the last charge of the British, precipitated themselves upon their lines, broke them, and took a large number of prisoners. General Brown . . . [was also badly wounded and] consigned the command to General Ripley. At twelve o'clock, both parties retired from the field to their respective encampments, fatigued and satiated with slaughter. . . . General Ripley, on the 25th, fell back to Fort Erie."—S. Perkins, *History of the late war*, ch. 17.—The battle of Lundy's Lane is claimed by all Canadian historians as a decided British victory. "Early in July [1814], General Brown, commanding the American force, crossed the river from Buffalo with two strong brigades, occupied Fort Erie, which surrendered with its small garrison of under 200 men, and advanced by Queenston upon Chippewa, the British retiring, but disputing the ground. Brown now wrote . . . to Chauncey, urging him to co-operate with him, and the correspondence illustrates the difficulty experienced during the war in arranging combined action between the naval and military forces. . . . Brown still advancing, Sir Gordon Drummond hastily came up from York, and moved forward, though inferior in strength, to oppose him; and one of the most closely contested and sanguinary battles of the war was now fought at Lundy's Lane [July 25, 1814]. The contest was continued until after dark, and both sides lost severely; but the Americans could not drive the British back, and the next day, destroying their heavy baggage, they retreated towards Fort Erie. This British victory was a soldiers' battle of desperate downright fighting with the bayonet, and a most determined courage was shown on both sides. Drummond now endeavoured to carry Fort Erie, which the enemy had occupied, by storm (August 15); but, failing, invested it for some time. . . . Chauncey yet again in the autumn recovered the ascendancy on Lake Ontario; but finally lost it to Yeoo on October 10, by the launch of the British ship *St. Lawrence*, of 100 guns, at Kingston, which

greatly strengthened Yeo's fleet. In the end the Americans blew up the works at Fort Erie [November 5, 1814], and retired across the Niagara. No decisive naval battle had been fought on the waters of Lake Ontario when the peace put an end to hostilities. . . . The Americans term this battle 'Bridgewater,' and have occasionally claimed it as a victory themselves, perhaps because they were not driven from their ground in the battle itself (though they evacuated it afterwards), and also took some guns in it, which were subsequently recovered. Roosevelt says frankly as to this battle: 'Lundy's Lane, though reflecting as much honour on the Americans as on the British, was for the former a defeat and not a victory.'—C. W. Robinson, *Canada and Canadian defence*, pp. 79-81.—'Fort Erie was a small work with two demi-bastions; one upon the north and the other upon the south front. It was built of stone, but was not of sufficient strength to resist ordnance heavier than the field artillery of that day. Ripley at once commenced to strengthen the position. Fortunately, General Drummond delayed his advance for two days, giving the Americans an opportunity of which they industriously availed themselves. . . . General Drummond appeared before the fort, on the 3d of August, with a force of 5,350 men. . . . During the following fortnight several skirmishes occurred in front of Fort Erie, in one of which the gallant Colonel Morgan was killed. General Drummond, having been still further reinforced, determined not to wait for the slow results of a siege, but to carry the place by assault. At two o'clock in the morning of the 3d of August, the British army moved to the attack in three columns . . . [and a determined attempt to take the fort was made; but did not achieve success]. On the 28th [of August Brigadier General Gaines who was in command of the American forces] was wounded by a shell, which fell into his quarters, and General Ripley again assumed the command, but was soon superseded by General Brown, who had recovered from the wound received at Lundy's Lane. General Porter, by dint of superhuman efforts, gathered a considerable body of militia at Buffalo, to reinforce the fort. . . . Notwithstanding the victory . . . and the reinforcements brought by Porter, the American army at Fort Erie was in a very dangerous situation. Their foe was daily increasing in number, and three new batteries were thrown up, whose fire was rapidly making the position untenable. . . . Under the pressure of this great necessity, General Porter planned a sortie, which was submitted to General Brown; who approved it, and ordered it to be carried out. . . . By this enterprise, altogether the most brilliant military event which occurred on this frontier during the war, all of the enemy's guns in position were made useless, and their intrenchments destroyed. We took 385 prisoners, including 11 commissioned officers, and killed or wounded 600 men. Our own loss was 510. . . . Four days after this, General Drummond raised the siege, and fell back to Fort George.'—W. Dorsheimer, *Buffalo during the War of 1812* (*Buffalo Historical Society Publications*, v. 1).

ALSO IN: E. Cruikshank, *Battle of Lundy's Lane* (*Lundy's Lane Historical Society*).—Gen. W. Scott, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 9-11.—C. Johnson, *Centennial history of Erie county, New York*, ch. 26.—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the War of 1812*, ch. 35-36.—*Attack on Fort Erie* (*Portfolio*, Feb., 1816).

1814 (August-September).—Capture and burning of Washington.—Attempt against Bal-

timore.—'The blockade of Chesapeake Bay, which was maintained with more or less vigor after February, 1813, so that Maryland's export trade of four million five hundred thousand dollars in 1811 fell to two hundred and thirty-eight thousand dollars in 1814, did no positive damage to the cities on the bay beyond the stoppage of their commerce. . . . In the Chesapeake the British commanders might attack Baltimore, destroying its shipping, and could hope to annihilate the flotilla of gunboats commanded by Captain Barney, which blockaded the Patuxent River. They were, however, most strongly attracted by the capital of the nation, for the dispersion of the great officers of the government and the suspension of administration are not only in themselves serious calamities, but they have a great moral effect upon any people. . . . Therefore, by the rules of war and of political strategy, the Chesapeake expedition in itself was wise and proper, though some of its incidents cannot be justified on any grounds. The preparations of the United States to meet the invasion of the British were ridiculously inadequate. The hostile fleet had been in full command of the Chesapeake for nearly a year and a half, yet there was neither fortification of consequence nor army of appreciable size or efficiency for the protection of the capital. Though the cabinet had discussed the defence of Washington in early July, there was not a fort, a breastwork, a trench, or a battery, even on paper. The officer in command, General W. H. Winder, appointed for political rather than military reasons, was worse than useless, the very incarnation of incompetency. . . . [Early in August Rear-Admiral Cockburn's blockading squadron had been joined in the Potomac by the fleet of Vice-Admiral Cochrane, who took command. A few days later he was joined by General Ross who came from Bermuda with 4,000 troops.] The news of the landing of General Ross at Benedict, in Maryland, August 19, created a panic at Washington. To meet four thousand British veterans, requisitions for militia were hastily sent to the neighboring states, and all the troops in the vicinity were ordered out. . . . The Americans selected Bladensburg as the place where opposition should be made to the advance of the enemy, and thither flowed an absurd array of secretaries, clerks, cabinet officers, the president himself, regulars, militia, and four hundred sailors from Barney's little fleet. . . . It was the presence of Barney's fighting sailors which alone dignifies the field of Bladensburg with the name of battle. Posted on a hill-side a mile from the village, along the route of the British towards Washington, under the independent command of Barney, and quite undismayed alike by the flight of their friends and the advance of their enemies, they made a fine, firm resistance, until the British got in their rear, when they were compelled to give up the struggle, leaving their wounded commander a prisoner. . . . The British troops marched directly from Bladensburg to Washington, camping just outside the city on the evening of August 24. A detachment of soldiers under orders burned the Capitol and department buildings, while another body proceeded to burn the White House. . . . A third conflagration took place at the navy-yard, where the buildings and vessels were burned by order of the secretary of the navy. While the burning of the Capitol and other public buildings in Washington was a piece of pure, unmitigated vandalism, deliberately committed by high officers in the British service . . . the administration of Madison cannot escape the severest censure for

its ridiculous unpreparedness for defense. The British officer, Gleig, was right in saying that the capture of Washington 'was owing more to the faults of the Americans themselves, than to any other cause.' . . . Having accomplished their purposes at the capital, destroying public property estimated to have been worth more than one million five hundred thousand dollars, the British promptly withdrew to their fleet at Benedict without firing a single musket at their enemy; thus the Washington campaign was completed in a little more than a week, from landing to re-embarkation. The officials and people of Washington filtered back, while part of the American army turned towards Baltimore."—K. C. Babcock, *Rise of American nationality*, pp. 134-140.—On the night of the 25th the British withdrew, returning as they came; but on the 29th their frigates, ascending the Potomac, arrived at Alexandria and plundered that city heavily. "Within less than a fortnight after the re-embarkation of Ross's army, the British fleet, spreading vast alarm as it ascended the Chesapeake, appeared off the Patapsco [September 12]. . . . A landing was effected the next day at North Point, on the northern shore of that estuary, some eight miles up which was Fort M'Henry, an open work only two miles from Baltimore, commanding the entrance into the harbor, which found, however, its most effectual protection in the shallowness of the water. The defense of the city rested with some 10,000 militia. . . . A corps of 3,000 strong had been thrown forward toward North Point. As Ross and Cockburn, at the head of a reconnoitering party, approached the outposts of this advanced division, a skirmish ensued, in which Ross was killed. . . . The fleet, meanwhile, opened a tremendous cannonade on Fort M'Henry; but . . . at such a distance as to render their fire ineffectual. It was under the excitement of this cannonade that the popular song of the 'Star Spangled Banner' was composed, the author [Francis Scott Key] being then on board the British fleet, whither he had gone to solicit the release of certain prisoners, and where he was detained pending the attack. An attempt to land in boats also failed; and that same night, the bombardment being still kept up, the British army, covered by rain and darkness, retired silently to their ships and re-embarked."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States*, v. 6, pp. 510-520.

Also in: J. S. Williams, *Invasion and capture of Washington*.—C. P. Lucas, *Canadian War of 1812*, pp. 229-233.

1814 (September).—Prevost's invasion of New York—Macdonough's naval victory on Lake Champlain.—Lake Champlain, "which had hitherto played but an inconspicuous part, was now to become the scene of the greatest naval battle of the war. A British army of 11,000 men under Sir George Prevost undertook the invasion of New York by advancing up the western bank of Lake Champlain. This advance was impracticable unless there was a sufficiently strong British naval force to drive back the American squadron at the same time. Accordingly, the British began to construct a frigate, the *Confiance*, to be added to their already existing force, which consisted of a brig, two sloops, and 12 or 14 gun-boats. The Americans already possessed a heavy corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and 10 gun-boats or row-galleys; they now began to build a large brig, the *Eagle*, which was launched about the 16th of August. Nine days later, on the 25th, the *Confiance* was launched. The two squadrons were

equally deficient in stores, etc.; the *Confiance* having locks to her guns, some of which could not be used, while the American schooner *Ticonderoga* had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed at the touchholes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Macdonough and Downie were hurried into action before they had time to prepare themselves thoroughly; but it was a disadvantage common to both, and arose from the nature of the case, which called for immediate action. The British army advanced slowly toward Plattsburg, which was held by General Macomb with less than 2,000 effective American troops. Captain Thomas Macdonough, the American commodore, took the lake a day or two before his antagonist, and came to anchor in Plattsburg harbor. The British fleet, under Captain George Downie, moved from Isle-aux-Noix on Sept. 8th, and on the morning of the 11th sailed into Plattsburg harbor." The American force consisted of the ship *Saratoga*, Captain Macdonough, the brig *Eagle*, the schooner *Ticonderoga*, the sloop *Preble*, and ten row-galleys, or gunboats mounting one or two guns each—"in all, 14 vessels of 2,244 tons and 882 men, with 86 guns throwing at a broadside 1,194 lbs. of shot, 480 from long, and 714 from short guns. The force of the British squadron in guns and ships is known accurately, as most of it was captured." It consisted of the frigate *Confiance*, the brig *Linnet*, the sloops *Chubb* and *Finch* and twelve gunboats—"in all, 16 vessels, of about 2,402 tons, with 937 men, and a total of 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,192 lbs., 660 from long and 532 from short pieces. . . . Young Macdonough decided to await the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the head of his line so far to the north that it could hardly be turned. . . . The morning of September 11th opened with a light breeze from the northeast. . . . As the English squadron stood bravely in, young Macdonough, who feared his foes not at all, but his God a great deal, knelt for a moment, with his officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a few minutes of perfect quiet." The fierce battle which followed lasted about two hours and a half, with terribly destructive effects on both sides . . . [and resulted in victory for Macdonough]. The British commander, Downie, was killed early in the action. . . . The effects of the victory were immediate and of the highest importance. Sir George Prevost and his army [which had arrived before Plattsburg on the 6th, and which, simultaneously with the naval advance, had made an unsuccessful attack on the American defensive works, at the mouth of the Saranac, held by General Alexander Macomb] at once fled in great haste and confusion back to Canada, leaving our northern frontier clear for the remainder of the war; while the victory had a very great effect on the negotiations for peace. In this battle the crews on both sides behaved with equal bravery, and left nothing to be desired in this respect; but from their rawness they of course showed far less skill than the crews of most of the American and some of the British ocean cruisers. . . . Macdonough in this battle won a higher fame than any other commander of the war, British or American. He had a decidedly superior force to contend against, the officers and men of the two sides being about on a par in every respect; and it was solely owing to his foresight and resource that we won the victory. He forced the British to engage at a disadvantage by his excellent choice of position, and he prepared beforehand for every possible contingency. . . . Down to the time of the Civil War he is the greatest

figure in our naval history."—T. Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: R. Johnson, *History of the War of 1812-15*, ch. 15.—A. T. Mahan, *Sea power in its relations to the War of 1812*, v. 2, pp. 360-382.—R. Macdonough, *Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough*.

1814 (December).—Hartford Convention.—"The commercial distress in New England, the possession by the enemy of a large part of the District of Maine, the fear of their advance along the coast, and the apparent neglect of the Federal Government to provide any adequate means of resistance, had led the Legislature of Massachusetts, in October, to invite the other New England States to send delegates to Hartford, Connecticut, 'to confer upon the subject of their public grievances.' Delegates [twenty-six in number] from Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, and from parts of Vermont and New Hampshire, met at Hartford in December and remained in session for three weeks. In their report to their State Legislatures they reviewed the state of the country, the origin and management of the war, and the strong measures lately proposed in Congress, and recommended several Amendments to the Constitution, chiefly with intent to restrict the powers of Congress over commerce, and to prevent naturalized citizens from holding office. In default of the adoption of these Amendments, another convention was advised, 'in order to decide on the course which a crisis so momentous might seem to demand.' This was the famous Hartford Convention. The peace which closely followed its adjournment removed all necessity or even desire for another session of it. Its objects seem to have been legitimate. But the unfortunate secrecy of its proceedings, and its somewhat ambiguous language, roused a popular suspicion, sufficient for the political ruin of its members, that a dissolution of the Union had been proposed, perhaps resolved upon, in its meetings. Some years afterward those concerned in it were compelled in self-defense to publish its journal, in order to show that no treasonable design was officially proposed. It was then, however, too late, for the popular opinion had become fixed. Neither the Federal party which originated, nor the Federalist politicians who composed, the assembly, were ever freed from the stigma left by the mysterious Hartford Convention."—A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, ch. 8.—The language of the report of the Hartford Convention "was so skillfully selected that it cannot be said with certainty whether the convention deduced from the nature of the Union a positive right in the individual states to withdraw from the Union, or whether it claimed only a moral justification for revolution. It was prudent enough in the declaration of its position on the constitutional question not to venture beyond vague, double-meaning expressions, except so far as it could appeal to its opponents. But it went just far enough to repeat almost verbatim the declaration of faith laid down in the Kentucky resolutions of 1798. If the members of the convention, and those in sympathy with them, were 'Maratists,' they could claim that they had become so in the school of Madison and Jefferson."—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 1, p. 268.

ALSO IN: T. Dwight, *History of the Hartford Convention*.—H. C. Lodge, *Life and letters of George Cabot*, ch. 11-13.—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 557-564.—S. E. Morison, *Harrison Gray Otis*, v. 2, pp. 52-124.—F. M.

Anderson, *Forgotten phase of the New England opposition to the War of 1812 (Mississippi Valley Historical Society Proceedings, 1912-1913, pp. 176-188)*.—Governor Strong's letter of Jan. 31, 1815 (*Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, Mar., 1915*).

1814 (December).—Treaty of Peace concluded at Ghent.—The offered mediation of the czar was declined by England. The latter power preferred to negotiate directly with the United States, and presently made proposals to that effect, intimating her readiness "to send Commissioners to Göttingen, for which place Ghent was afterwards substituted, to meet American Commissioners and settle terms of pacification. The United States renewed the powers of Messrs. Adams, Bayard, and Gallatin, . . . and added Jonathan Russell, then Minister to Sweden, and Henry Clay. England deputed Lord Gambier, an Admiral, Dr. Adams, a publicist, and Mr. Goulbourn, a member of Parliament and Under Secretary of State. These eight gentlemen accordingly met in Ghent on August 7, 1814. It was upwards of four months before an agreement was reached. . . . The eight were certainly an odd assemblage of peacemakers. The ill-blood and wrangling between the opposing Commissions were had enough, yet hardly equalled the intestine dissensions between the American Commissioners themselves. . . . The British first presented their demands, as follows: 1. That the United States should conclude a peace with the Indian allies of Great Britain, and that a species of neutral belt of Indian territory should be established between the dominions of the United States and Great Britain, so that these dominions should be nowhere conterminous, upon which belt or barrier neither power should be permitted to encroach even by purchase, and the boundaries of which should be settled in this treaty. 2. That the United States should keep no naval force upon the Great Lakes, and should neither maintain their existing forts nor build new ones upon their northern frontier; it was even required that the boundary line should run along the southern shore of the lakes; while no corresponding restriction was imposed upon Great Britain, because she was stated to have no projects of conquest as against her neighbor. 3. That a piece of the province of Maine should be ceded, in order to give the English a road from Halifax to Quebec. 4. That the stipulations of the treaty of 1783, conferring on English subjects the right of navigating the Mississippi, should be now formally renewed. The Americans were astounded; it seemed to them hardly worth while to have come so far to listen to such propositions." But, after long and apparently hopeless wrangling, events in Europe rather than in America brought about a change of disposition on the part of the British government; instructions to the commissioners were modified on both sides, and, quite to their own surprise, they arrived at agreements which were formulated in a treaty and signed, Dec. 24, 1814. "Of the many subjects mooted between the negotiators scarcely any had survived the fierce contests which had been waged concerning them. The whole matter of the navigation of the Mississippi, access to that river, and a road through American territory, had been dropped by the British; while the Americans had been well content to say nothing of the Northeastern fisheries [see FISHERIES: 1814-1818], which they regarded as still their own. The disarmament on the lakes and along the Canadian border, and the neutralization of a strip of Indian territory, were yielded by the English. The Americans were content to



have nothing said about impressment; nor was any one of the many illegal rights exercised by England formally abandoned. The Americans satisfied themselves with the reflection that circumstances had rendered these points now only matters of abstract principle, since the pacification of Europe had removed all opportunities and temptations for England to persist in her previous objectionable courses. For the future it was hardly to be feared that she would again undertake to pursue a policy against which it was evident that the United States were willing to conduct a serious war. There was, however, no provision for indemnification. Upon a fair consideration, it must be admitted that, though the treaty was silent upon all the points which the United States had made war for the purpose of enforcing, yet the country had every reason to be gratified with the result of the negotiation."—J. T. Morse, *John Quincy Adams*, pp. 75-96.—"Instead of wearing themselves out over impracticable, perhaps impossible, questions, the commissioners turned their attention to the northern boundary between the two countries, and it was by them forever settled, and in such manner as to give the United States the foundation for its future greatness. . . . The victory of the American diplomats at Ghent was two-fold: first, they secured the benefits desired without enumerating them—even to a greater extent than if the benefits had been enumerated; and second, if they had insisted upon an enumeration of the benefits obtained, it is apparent they would have periled the entire treaty and lost all."—T. Wilson, *Treaty of Ghent* (*Magazine of American History*, Nov., 1888).—See also ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1814.

Following is the text of the treaty:

Article I. There shall be a firm and universal peace between His Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, of every degree, without exception of place or persons. All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall cease as soon as this treaty shall have been ratified by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned. All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property. And all archives, records, deeds, and papers, either of a public nature or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of the war, may have fallen into the hands of the officers of either party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this treaty. No disposition made by this treaty as to such possession of the islands and territories claimed by both parties shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.

Art. II. Immediately after the ratification of

this treaty by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the armies, squadrons, officers, subjects and citizens of the two Powers to cease from all hostilities. And to prevent all causes of complaint which might arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the said ratifications of this treaty, it is reciprocally agreed that all vessels and effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days from the said ratifications, upon all parts of the coast of North America, from the latitude of twenty-three degrees north to the latitude of fifty degrees north, and as far eastward in the Atlantic Ocean as the thirty-sixth degree of west longitude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each side: that the time shall be thirty days in all other parts of the Atlantic Ocean north of the equinoctial line or equator, and the same time for the British and Irish Channels, for the Gulf of Mexico, and all parts of the West Indies; forty days for the North Seas, for the Baltic, and for all parts of the Mediterranean; sixty days for the Atlantic Ocean south of the equator, as far as the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope; ninety days for every other part of the world south of the equator; and one hundred and twenty days for all other parts of the world, without exception.

Art. III. All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as by sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the ratifications of this treaty, as hereinafter mentioned, on their paying the debts which they may have contracted during their captivity. The two contracting parties respectively engage to discharge, in specie, the advances which may have been made by the other for the sustenance and maintenance of such prisoners.

Art. IV. Whereas it was stipulated by the second article in the treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, that the boundary of the United States should comprehend all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of Nova Scotia; and whereas the several islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the Island of Grand Menan, in the said Bay of Fundy, are claimed by the United States as being comprehended within their aforesaid boundaries, which said islands are claimed as belonging to His Britannic Majesty, as having been, at the time of and previous to the aforesaid treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, within the limits of the Province of Nova Scotia: In order, therefore, finally to decide upon these claims, it is agreed that they shall be referred to two Commissioners to be appointed in the following manner, viz: One Commissioner shall be appointed by His Britannic Majesty, and one by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and the said two Commissioners so appointed shall be sworn impartially to examine and decide upon the said claims according to such evidence as shall be laid before them on the part of His Britannic Majesty and of the United States respectively. The said Commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to

such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall, by a declaration or report under their hands and seals, decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands aforesaid do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. And if the said Commissioners shall agree in their decision, both parties shall consider such decision as final and conclusive. It is further agreed that, in event of the two Commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said Commissioners refusing, or declining, or wilfully omitting to act as such, they shall make, jointly or separately, a report or reports, as well to the Government of His Britannic Majesty as to that of the United States, stating in detail the points on which they differ, and the grounds upon which their respective opinions have been formed, or the grounds upon which they, or either of them, have so refused, declined, or omitted to act. And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States hereby agree to refer the report or reports of the said Commissioners to some friendly sovereign or State, to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences which may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon the report of one Commissioner, together with the grounds upon which the other Commissioner shall have refused, declined or omitted to act, as the case may be. And if the Commissioner so refusing, declining or omitting to act, shall also wilfully omit to state the grounds upon which he has so done, in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such friendly sovereign or State, together with the report of such other Commissioner, then such sovereign or State shall decide *ex parte* upon the said report alone. And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States engage to consider the decision of such friendly sovereign or State to be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

Art. V. Whereas neither that point of the highlands lying due north from the source of the river St. Croix, and designated in the former treaty of peace between the two Powers as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, nor the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River, has yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominions of the two Powers which extends from the source of the river St. Croix directly north to the above mentioned northwest angle of Nova Scotia, thence along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River, thence down along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude; thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguay, has not yet been surveyed: it is agreed that for these several purposes two Commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in the present article. The said Commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall have power to ascertain and determine the points above mentioned, in conformity with the provisions of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-

three, and shall cause the boundary aforesaid, from the source of the river St. Croix to the river Iroquois or Cataraguay, to be surveyed and marked according to the said provisions. The said Commissioners shall make a map of the said boundary, and annex to it a declaration under their hands and seals, certifying it to be the true map of the said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude of the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, of the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River, and of such other points of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such map and declaration as finally and conclusively fixing the said boundary. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing, or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Art. VI. Whereas by the former treaty of peace that portion of the boundary of the United States from the point where the forty-fifth degree of north latitude strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguay to the Lake Superior, was declared to be "along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake, until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie, thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication into the Lake Huron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior"; and whereas doubts have arisen what was the middle of the said river, lakes, and water communications, and whether certain islands lying in the same were within the dominions of His Britannic Majesty or of the United States: In order, therefore, finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred to two Commissioners, to be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in this present article. The said Commissioners shall meet, in the first instance, at Albany, in the State of New York, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall, by a report or declaration, under their hands and seals, designate the boundary through the said river, lakes and water communications, and decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands lying within the said rivers, lakes, and water communications, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. As both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing, or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Art. VII. It is further agreed that the said two last-mentioned Commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties assigned to them in the preceding article, shall be, and they are hereby, authorized upon their oaths impartially to fix and determine, according to the true intent of the said

treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two Powers which extends from the water communication between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, to the most north-western point of the Lake of the Woods, to decide to which of the two parties the several islands lying in the lakes, water communications, and rivers, forming the said boundary, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three; and to cause such parts of the said boundary as require it to be surveyed and marked. The said Commissioners shall, by a report or declaration under their hands and seals, designate the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the points thus referred to them, and particularize, the latitude and longitude of the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, and of such other parts of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agreed to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing, or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Art. VIII. The several boards of two Commissioners mentioned in the four preceding articles shall respectively have power to appoint a Secretary, and to employ such surveyors or other persons as they shall judge necessary. Duplicates of all their respective reports, declarations, statements and decisions and of their accounts, and of the journal of their proceedings, shall be delivered by them to the agents of His Britannic Majesty and to the agents of the United States, who may be respectively appointed and authorized to manage the business on behalf of their respective Governments. The said Commissioners shall be respectively paid in such manner as shall be agreed between the two contracting parties, such agreement being to be settled at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. And all other expenses attending the said Commissions shall be defrayed equally by the two parties. And in the case of death, sickness, resignation or necessary absence, the place of every such Commissioner, respectively, shall be supplied in the same manner as such Commissioner was first appointed, and the new Commissioner shall take the same oath of affirmation, and do the same duties. It is further agreed between the two contracting parties, that in case any of the islands mentioned in any of the preceding articles, which were in the possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the present war between the two countries, should, by the decision of any of the Boards of Commissioners aforesaid, or of the sovereign or State so referred to, as in the four next preceding articles contained, fall within the dominions of the other party, all grants of land made previous to the commencement of the war, by the party having had such possession, shall be as valid as if such island or islands had, by such decision or decisions, been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having had such possession.

Art. IX. The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be

at war at the time of such ratification; and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And His Britannic Majesty engages, on his part, to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations respectively all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against His Britannic Majesty, and his subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

Art. X. Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both His Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.

Art. XI. This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides, without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this day, or sooner if practicable. In faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty, and have thereunto affixed our seals. Done, in triplicate, at Ghent, the twenty-fourth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

ALSO IN: C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 1, ch. 6.—J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs (Diary)*, v. 2-3, ch. 9.—*Letters relating to the negotiations at Ghent, 1812-1814 (American Historical Review, Oct., 1914, pp. 108-129)*.—*Letters of Jonathan Russell, 1815, (Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, Jan., 1911, pp. 305-322)*.

1814.—Last fighting at sea.—Exploits of *Old Ironsides*.—"During the latter part of the war, as might have been foreseen, there was little opportunity for American frigates to show that they could keep up the fame they had so gloriously won. The British were determined that none of them that ventured out to sea should escape; and by stationing a squadron, which their great resources enabled them to do, before each port where a frigate lay, they succeeded in keeping it cooped up and inactive. . . . The 'Adams,' which had been a 28-gun frigate, but which was now a corvette, managed to slip out from Washington in January, 1814, under the command of Charles Morris. . . . Six months were passed in cruising, part of the time off the Irish coast, but with no great success." Returning home, the "Adams" went ashore at the mouth of the Penobscot, but was got off, much injured, and was taken up the river for repairs. An English expeditionary force pursued the crippled vessel, and her commander was forced to set her on fire. "At this time the 'Constitution' [*Old*

*Ironsides*, as she was popularly called] was . . . lying at Boston, watched by a squadron of the enemy. She had proved a lucky ship, . . . and her present captain, Charles Stewart, who had been one of Preble's lieutenants at Tripoli, was certainly a man well fitted to make the most of any chance he had. The frigate had been in port since April, at first repairing, and later unable to get out owing to the presence of the enemy's squadron." In December, however, the *Constitution* contrived to give the blockaders the slip and made her way across the Atlantic to the neighborhood of Madeira, where she fought and captured, at one time, two British war vessels—the corvette *Cyana* of twenty-two guns, and the sloop *Levant*, of twenty guns. A few days afterwards, as the *Constitution*, with her two prizes, was lying at anchor in Port Praya, Cape de Verde islands, Captain Stewart sighted, outside, no less than three ships of the very blockading squadron which he had slipped away from at Boston, and which had pursued him across the ocean. He made his escape from the port, with both his prizes, in time to avoid being hemmed in, and speedily outsailed his pursuers. The latter, giving up hope of the *Constitution*, turned their attention to one of the prizes and succeeded in recovering her. "The only other frigate that left port in the last year of the war was less fortunate than the 'Constitution.' This was the 'President,' now under Commodore Decatur. She was at New York, and for some time had lain at anchor off Staten Island watching for an opportunity to pass the blockading squadron." On a stormy night in January, 1815 (after the treaty of peace had been actually signed at Ghent, but before news of it had reached America), he made the attempt, but was discovered and chased by four of the blockading ships. After a race which lasted from dawn until nearly midnight, and a running fight of two hours, Decatur found escape to be impossible and surrendered his ship.—J. R. Soley, *Boys of 1812*, ch. 17.

ALSO IN: T. Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, ch. 7-9.—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the War of 1812*, ch. 41.

1814.—Economic state of nation at close of war.—"The United States, with a proper currency and untouched resources, should have found no serious difficulty in borrowing thirty or even fifty millions a year in 1814; but they were in reality on the verge of bankruptcy, although the national resources were probably ample. . . . The first and fatal blow to the Treasury was the loss of the Bank of the United States, which left the government without financial machinery or a sound bank-note circulation. The next blow, almost equally severe, was the loss of the Massachusetts and Connecticut banks, which were the strongest in the Union. Whether the responsibility for the loss rested on the Executive, Congress, or the two States might be a subject for dispute; but whoever was responsible, the effect was ruinous. . . . The New England banks were financial agents of the enemy. The bank capital of Massachusetts including Maine was about twelve and a quarter million dollars; that of Connecticut exceeded three millions. The whole bank capital of New England reached eighteen millions, or nearly one third of the paid bank capital of the whole country, if Pitkin's estimate was correct. That nearly one third of the national resources should be withdrawn from the aid of government was serious enough; but in reality the loss was much greater, for New England held a still larger proportion of the specie on which the bank circulation of other States depended. The

system of commercial restrictions was responsible for thus, at the most critical moment of the war, throwing the control of the national finances into the hands of the Boston Federalists. Against the protests of the Federalists, manufactures had been forced upon them by national legislation until New England supplied the Union with articles of necessary use at prices practically fixed by her own manufacturers. From the whole country specie began to flow toward Boston as early as the year 1810, and with astonishing rapidity after the war was declared. The British blockade stimulated the movement, and the embargo of December, 1813, which lasted till April, 1814, cut off every other resource from the Southern and Western States. Unable longer to send their crops even to New England for a market, they were obliged to send specie, and they soon came to the end of their supply. . . . No one knew how much specie the country contained. Gallatin afterward estimated it at seventeen million dollars, and of that amount the banks of New England in 1814 probably held nearly ten millions. The Massachusetts banks, with seven millions in specie, had a bank-note circulation of less than three millions. The Middle, Southern, and Western States must have had a bank-note circulation approaching forty millions in paper, with seven or eight millions in specie to support it, while the paper was constantly increasing in quantity and the specie constantly diminishing. Bank paper, as was believed, could not with safety exceed the proportion of three paper dollars to every specie dollar in the bank vaults; but the banks in 1814 beyond New England were circulating at least four paper dollars to every silver or gold dollar, and in many cases were issuing paper without specie in their possession. Already the banks of New England were pressing their demands on those of New York, which in their turn called on Philadelphia and Baltimore. The specie drained to New England could find its way back only by means of government loans, which New England refused to make in any large amount. On the other hand, Boston bought freely British Treasury notes at liberal discount, and sent coin to Canada in payment of them. Probably New England lent to the British government during the war more money than she lent to her own. The total amount subscribed in New England to the United States loans was less than three millions. This situation was well understood by Congress. In the debate of February, 1814, the approaching dangers were repeatedly pointed out. The alarm was then so great that the Committee of Ways and Means reported a bill to incorporate a new national bank with a capital of thirty million dollars, while Macon openly advocated the issue of government paper, declaring that 'paper money never was beat.' Congress after a diffuse debate passed only a loan bill for twenty-five millions, and an Act for the issue of five million interest-bearing Treasury notes, leaving with the President the option to issue five millions more in case he could not borrow it. The legislation was evidently insufficient, and satisfied no one. 'You have authorized a loan for twenty-five millions,' said Grundy in the debate of April 2, 'and have provided for the expenditure of so much money. Where is the money?' Without attempting to answer this question, April 18 Congress adjourned."—H. Adams, *History of the United States of America during the second administration of James Madison*, v. 7, pp. 386-390.

1814-1849.—Settlement of the middle West.—Road building.—New England emigration.—Black Hawk War.—"New Purchase."—"For sev-



SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF GHENT IN THE OLD CARTHUSIAN MONASTERY, DEC. 24, 1814

Left to Right: Baker, William Adams, Coulbarn, Gambier, John Quincy Adams, Gallatin, Dallas, Bayard, Hughes, Clay, Russell

(After painting by Forestier)



eral years the unsettled conditions on the frontiers had restrained any general migration thither from the seaboard States. But within a few months after the proclamation of peace the tide again set westward, and with an unprecedented force. Men who had suffered in their property or other interests from the war turned to Indiana and Illinois as a promising field in which to rebuild their fortunes. The rapid extinction of Indian titles opened up vast tracts of desirable land, and the conditions of purchase were made so easy that any man of ordinary industry and integrity could meet them. Speculators and promoters industriously advertised the advantages of localities in which they were interested, boomed new towns, and even loaned money to ambitious emigrants. The upshot was that the population of Indiana grew from twenty-five thousand in 1810 to seventy thousand in 1816, when the State was admitted to the Union. Illinois filled with equal rapidity, and attained statehood only two years later. Then the tide swept irresistibly westward across the Mississippi into the great regions which had been acquired from France in 1803. As late as 1812 the Territory of Missouri, comprising all of the Louisiana Purchase north of the present State of Louisiana, had a population of only twenty-two thousand, including many French and Spanish settlers and traders. But in 1818 it had a population of more than sixty thousand, and was asking Congress for legislation under which the most densely inhabited portion should be set off as the State of Missouri. Thus the Old Northwest was not merely losing its frontier character and taking its place in the nation on a footing with the seaboard sections; it was also serving as the open gateway to a newer, vaster, and in some respects richer American back country. In the main, southern Indiana and Illinois—as well as the trans-Mississippi territory—drew from Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia and the remoter South. North of the latitude of Indianapolis and St. Louis the lines of migration led chiefly from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania. But many of the settlers came, immediately or after only a brief interval, from Europe. The decade following the close of the war was a time of unprecedented emigration from England, Scotland, Ireland, and Germany to the United States; and while many of the newcomers found homes in the eastern States, where they in a measure offset the depopulation caused by the westward exodus, a very large proportion pressed on across the mountains in quest of the cheap lands in the undeveloped interior. During these years the western country was repeatedly visited by European travelers with a view to ascertaining its resources, markets, and other attractions for settlers; and emigrating thither was powerfully stimulated by the writings of these observers, as well as by the activities of sundry founders of agricultural colonies. . . . 'These favorable accounts,' wrote Adlard Welby, an Englishman who made a tour of inspection through the West in 1819, 'aided by a period of real privation and discontent in Europe, caused emigration to increase ten-fold; and though various reports of unfavorable nature soon circulated, and many who had emigrated actually returned to their native land in disgust, yet still the trading vessels were filled with passengers of all ages and descriptions, full of hope, looking forward to the West as to a land of liberty and delight—a land flowing with milk and honey.' After the dangers from the Indians were overcome, the main obstacle to western development was the lack of means of easy and cheap transportation. The settler found it difficult to reach the region

which he had selected for his home. Eastern supplies of salt, iron, hardware and fabrics and food-stuffs could be obtained only at great expense. The fast-increasing products of the western farms—maize, wheat, meats, livestock—could be marketed only at a cost which left a slender margin of profit. The experiences of the late war had already proved the need of highways as auxiliaries of national defense. It required a month to carry goods from Baltimore to central Ohio. None the less, even before the War of 1812, hundreds of transportation companies were running four-horse freight wagons between the eastern and western States; and in 1820 more than three thousand wagons—practically all carrying western products—passed back and forth between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, transporting merchandise valued at eighteen million dollars. . . .

"In 1808 Secretary Gallatin had presented to Congress a report calling for an outlay on internal improvements of two million dollars of federal money a year for ten years; and in 1811 the Government had entered upon the greatest undertaking of its kind in the history of the country. This enterprise was the building of a magnificent highway known to the law as the Cumberland Road. . . . Its course was lined with hospitable farm-houses and was dotted with fast-growing villages and towns. . . . Throughout the spring and summer months there was a steady westward stream of emigrants; hardly a day failed to bring before the observer's eye the creaking canvas-covered wagon of the home-seeker. . . . The conquest of the steamboat was speedy and complete. . . . Vessels regularly ascended the navigable tributaries of the greater streams in quest of cargoes, and while craft of other sorts did not disappear, the great and growing commerce of the river was revolutionized. After 1815 New England emigration rose to astonishing proportions, and an increasing number of homeseekers passed—directly or after a sojourn in the Lower Lake country of New York—into the Northwest. The opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 made the westward journey easier and cheaper. The routes of travel led to Lakes Ontario, thence by natural stages into other portions of northern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and eventually into southern Michigan and Wisconsin. Not until after 1830 did the stalwart homeseekers penetrate north of Detroit; the great stretches of prairie between Lakes Erie and Michigan, and to the south—left quite untouched by Southern pioneers—satisfied every desire of these restless farmers from New England. For a long time Southerners determined the course of history in the Old Northwest. They occupied the field first, and they had the great advantage of geographical proximity to their old homes. Furthermore, they lived more compactly; the New Englanders were not only spread over the broader prairie stretches of the north, but scattered to some extent throughout the entire region between the Lakes and the Ohio. But by the middle of the century not only had the score of northern counties been inundated by the 'Yankees' but the waves were pushing far into the interior, where they met and mingled with the counter-current. Both Illinois and Indiana became, in a preëminent degree, melting-pots in which was fused by slow and sometimes painful processes an amalgam which Bryce and other keen observers have pronounced the most American thing in America."—F. A. Ogg, *Old Northwest*, pp. 160-167, 176-177.—"Between 1820 and 1840 the population of Ohio increased from 581,295 to 1,519,467; that of Indiana from 147,178 to 685,866; of Illinois,

from 55,211 to 476,183; and of Michigan, from 8,896 to 212,267. This growth in the population denotes a corresponding extension in the cultivated farm area, though statistics showing this were not yet gathered for the census. While some of those who joined in the westward movement took up land for speculative purposes, the majority had the distinct purpose of becoming farmers. During this period the tide of settlement pushed out beyond the forest belt, which clothed the whole eastern section as far as Ohio and which made the task of the settler in that region so laborious, and reached the treeless prairies of the West. The cost of preparing the soil for cultivation here was certainly less than half what it had been in those sections where the forest had first to be cleared away.—E. L. Bogart, *Economic history of the United States*, p. 267.—“The Black Hawk War opened a new chapter in the history of the northwest. The soldiers carried to their homes stories of the richness and attractiveness of the northern country, and the eastern newspapers printed not only detailed accounts of the several expeditions but highly colored descriptions of the charms of the region. Books and pamphlets by the score helped to attract the attention of the country. The result was a heavy influx of settlers, many of them coming all the way from New England and New York, others from Pennsylvania and Ohio. Lands were rapidly surveyed and placed on sale, and surviving Indian hunting-grounds were purchased. Northern Illinois filled rapidly with thrifty farming population, and the town of Chicago became an entrepot. [See also ILLINOIS: 1832.] Further north, Wisconsin had been organized, in 1836, as a Territory, including not only the present State of that name but Iowa, Minnesota, and most of North and South Dakota. . . . To recount the successive purchases by which the Government freed Iowa soil from Indian domination would be wearisome. The Treaty of 1842 with the Sauks and Foxes is typical. After a sojourn of hardly more than a decade in the Iowa country, these luckless folk were now persuaded to yield all their lands to the United States and retire to a reservation in Kansas. . . . The ‘New Purchase’ was thrown open to settlers in the following spring; and the opening brought scenes of a kind destined to be reenacted scores of times in the great West during succeeding decades—the borders of the new district lined, on the eve of the opening, with encamped settlers and their families ready to race for the best claims; horses saddled and runners picked for the rush; a midnight signal from the soldiery, releasing a flood of eager land-hunters armed with torches, axes, stakes, and every sort of implement for the laying out of claims with all possible speed; by daybreak, many scores of families ‘squating’ on the best pieces of ground which they had been able to reach; innumerable disputes, with a general readjustment following the intervention of the government surveyors. The marvelous progress of the upper Mississippi Valley is briefly told by a succession of dates. In 1838 Iowa was organized as a Territory; in 1846 it was admitted as a State; in 1848 Wisconsin was granted statehood; and in 1849 Minnesota was given territorial organization with boundaries extending westward to the Missouri.”—F. A. Ogg, *Old Northwest*, pp. 205-208.

ALSO IN: E. C. Semple, *American history and its geographical conditions*.

1815.—Final war with the Algerines and suppression of their piracies. See BARBARY STATES: 1815.

1815 (January).—Jackson’s victory at New

Orleans.—In October of the last year “dispatches from the American envoys abroad announced that 12,000 to 15,000 British troops would leave Ireland early in September for New Orleans and Mobile. Intelligence reached Washington, December 9th, by way of Cuba, that the British Chesapeake force, under Admiral Cochrane, had united at Jamaica with these other troops, and all were ready to sail for the mouths of the Mississippi. ‘Hasten your militia to New Orleans,’ now urged Monroe upon the Executives of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia; ‘do not wait for this government to arm them; put all the arms you can find into their hands; let every man bring his rifle or musket with him; we shall see you paid.’ . . . Great results had been expected by Great Britain from the secret expedition fitted out against Louisiana. . . . Fifty British vessels, large and small, bore 7,000 British land troops—comprising the invading force from the Chesapeake and a veteran reinforcement from England—across the Gulf of Mexico from Jamaica to the ship channel near the entrance of Lake Borgne, thus approaching New Orleans midway between the Mississippi River and Mobile Bay. Here the fleet anchored; and, after dispersing a meagre flotilla of American gunboats, which opposed their progress in vain, the invaders took full possession of Lake Borgne, and, by means of lighter transports, landed troops upon a lonely island at the mouth of the Pearl River, which served as the military rendezvous. Crossing thence to the northwestern end of Lake Borgne, a sparsely-settled region, with plantations and sugar-works, half of this invading army, by the 23d [December], struck the Mississippi at a point within nine miles of New Orleans. Not a gun had been fired since the trifling engagement with the American flotilla. The British believed their near approach unknown, and even unsuspected, in the city; they meant to capture it by an assault both brilliant and sudden. . . . But Jackson had received his instructions in good season, and from the 2d of December New Orleans had been, under his vigilant direction, a camp in lively motion.” Martial law was proclaimed; “free men of color were enrolled; convicts were released to become soldiers; the civic force was increased to its utmost. Jackson inspected and strengthened the defences in the vicinity, erecting new batteries. . . . With his newly arrived volunteers from neighboring States, quite expert, many of them, in the use of the rifle and eager for fight, Jackson found himself presently at the head of 5,000 effective men, less than 1,000 of whom were regulars.” With a portion of these, supported by one of the two armed vessels on the river, he boldly attacked the enemy, on the evening of the 23rd, but accomplished little more than to demonstrate the energy of the defence he was prepared to make. On the 28th the English (having previously destroyed one of the troublesome vessels in the river, the *Carolina*, with hot shot) returned the attack, but did not break the American lines. Then General Pakenham, the English commander, brought up heavy guns from the fleet, and soon convinced General Jackson that cotton bales, which the latter had piled up before his men, were too light and too combustible for breastworks against artillery; but the lesson proved more useful than otherwise, and the British batteries were answered with fully equal effect by an American cannonade. “Pakenham’s last and boldest experiment was to carry Jackson’s lines by storm on both sides of the river; and this enterprise, fatal, indeed, to those who conceived it, gives immortal date to the 8th of January,—the



day on which the battle of New Orleans was fought. Four days before this momentous battle, over 2,000 Kentucky militia, under General Adair, arrived at New Orleans, ready soldiers, but miserably equipped. Of their number 700 were marched to the front. Pakenham's army, swelled by a body of reinforcements, commanded by General Lambert, another of Wellington's officers, now consisted in all of 10,000 troops, the flower of British veterans. On the day of the battle Jackson had only half as many soldiers on the New Orleans side of the river, and of these the greater part were new recruits under inexperienced officers. On the opposite bank General Morgan, with about 1,500 men, among them detachments of Kentuckians and Louisiana militia, had entrenched himself in expectation of an assault. Jackson had penetrated the enemy's design, which was to make the main attack upon his lines, while a lesser force crossed the Mississippi to drive Morgan up the bank. Jackson's grand defences, extending for a mile and a half from the Mississippi, along his ditch or canal, to an impassable cypress swamp, consisted of earthworks, a redoubt next the river to enfilade the ditch, and eight batteries, all well mounted. The schooner Louisiana and Commander Patterson's marine battery across the river protected this line. Another intrenchment had been thrown up a mile and a half in the rear, as a rallying-point in case of need. There was a third line just below the city. . . . The morning fog rolled away on the 8th of January. Pakenham, under the fire of a battery he had erected during the night, advanced with the main body of British troops to storm Jackson's position." The Americans, behind their breastworks, withheld their fire until the storming columns were 200 yards away, and then poured volley on volley into the approaching mass of men. "This, with the steady fire from the American batteries all along the line, as the foe advanced over a large bare plain, made hideous gaps in the British ranks, throwing them into utter confusion. It was a fearful slaughter. Dead bodies choked the ditch and strewed the plain. Gallant Highlanders flung themselves forward to scale the ramparts only to fall back lifeless. Soldiers who had served under Wellington in Spain broke, scattered, and ran. Of the four British generals commanding, Pakenham was killed, Gibbs mortally wounded, Keane disabled by a shot in the neck; only Lambert remained. Thornton, across the river, had driven Morgan from his lines meantime, and silenced Patterson's battery; but this enterprise might have cost him dearly, had he not in season received orders from Lambert to return instantly. In this battle the British lost not less than 2,600, all but 500 of whom were killed or wounded; while only 8 were killed and 13 wounded on the American side. Having buried his dead presently under a flag of truce, Lambert, whom this calamity had placed in command, retreated hastily under cover of the night, abandoning the expedition. Re-embarking at Lake Borgne, and rejoining the fleet, he next proceeded to invest Fort Bowyer, at the entrance of Mobile Bay, only to learn, after its little garrison had surrendered, that a treaty of peace [signed December 24, 1814, two weeks before the battle of New Orleans was fought] annulled the conquest. . . . Rude and illiterate as he was, Jackson showed at New Orleans the five prime attributes of military genius: decision, energy, forethought, dispatch, skill in employing resources."

—J. Schouler, *History of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 9, sect. 1.

ALSO IN: A. Walker, *Jackson and New Orleans*.

—J. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 2, ch. 1-23.  
—G. R. Gleig, *Campaigns of the British army at Washington and New Orleans*, ch. 18-23.—M. Thompson, *Story of Louisiana*, ch. 9.—G. W. Cable, *Creoles of Louisiana*, ch. 26-27.—C. F. Adams, *Studies military and diplomatic*, pp. 174-202.—A. T. Mahan, *Sea power in its relations to the War of 1812*, v. 2, pp. 387-397.—J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, pp. 144-211.

1815-1820.—Rise of nationalism.—Reaction to sectionalism.—"The dominant tone of this dawn-ing period was nationalism. The nation was to be made great and rich and free; sectional interests and ambitions were to be merged in the greater national purpose. . . . Under the leadership of John Marshall, the Supreme Court handed down an imposing series of decisions restricting the powers of the States and throwing open the flood-gates for the expansion of national functions and activities. Statesmen of all sections put the nation first in their plans and policies as they had not always done in earlier days. John C. Calhoun was destined shortly to take rank as the greatest of sectionalists. Nevertheless, between 1815 and 1820 he voted for protective tariffs, brought in a great bill for internal improvements, and won from John Quincy Adams praise for being 'above all sectional . . . prejudices more than any other statesman, of this union' with whom he 'had ever acted.' The differences between the nationalist and state rights schools were, however, deep-rooted—altogether too fundamental to be obliterated by even the nationalizing swing of the war period; and in a brief time the old controversy of Hamilton and Jefferson was renewed on the former lines. The pull of political tradition and of sectional interest was too strong to be resisted. In the commercial and industrial East tradition and interest supported, in general, the doctrine of broad national powers; and the same was true of the West and Northwest. The South, however, inclined to limited national powers, large functions for the States, and such construction of the Constitution as would give the benefit of the doubt in all cases to the States. The political theory current south of the Potomac and the Ohio made of state rights a fetish. Yet the powerful sectional reaction which set in after 1820 against the nationalizing tendency had as its main impetus the injustice which the Southern people felt had been done to them through the use of the nation's larger powers. They objected to the protective tariff as a device which not only brought the South no benefit but interfered with its markets and raised the cost of certain of its staple supplies. They opposed internal improvements at national expense because of their consolidating tendency, and because few of the projects carried out were of large advantage to the Southern people. They regarded the National Bank as at best useless; and they resisted federal legislation imposing restrictions on slavery as prejudicial to vested rights in the peculiar institution. After 1820 the pendulum swung rapidly back toward particularism. State rights sentiment was freely expressed by men, both Southern and Northern, whose views commanded respect; and in more than one state—notably in Ohio and Georgia—bold actions proclaimed this sentiment to be no mere matter of academic opinion."—F. A. Ogg, *Reign of Andrew Jackson (Chronicles of America Series, v. 20, pp. 138-141)*.

1815-1860.—Industrial transition.—Increase in manufacturing.—Foreign and domestic trade.—Shipping.—Monetary system.—Influence of free land.—Grain trade.—Cotton.—Beginning of cat-

the industry.—“Upon the conclusion of peace it was expected that things would return to what the same status as before. Importations of foreign commodities grew greatly: in 1814 they were but \$13,000,000 and in 1816, \$147,000,000. The pent up goods of English manufacturers were fairly poured into the country, where they were sold at low prices and on long credit. American merchants and consumers welcomed this stream of European luxuries and foreign wares, but to the manufacturers these enormous importations meant disaster if not ruin. At first, however, agriculture and commerce found such large foreign demand for their products that the complaint of the manufacturer was unheard amid the general rejoicing. Short crops abroad created a demand for our agricultural staples, while the increased imports and exports furnished remunerative business for American shipping. The true state of affairs was concealed by the high prices resulting from a disordered currency, but in 1818 the currency bubble was pricked and prices fell rapidly to a normal level. At the same time the position of both agriculture and shipping was made less secure; the English corn law of 1815 raised the duty and virtually excluded American grain from that market, while our commerce was prevented from expanding by the commercial restrictions imposed upon it by England, France, Holland, and other European countries. As the foreign market was cut off there grew up a demand for the development of a home market; it was seen that we must be more self-contained. At the same time the struggling manufacturers were demanding protection against foreign importations. . . . The period was distinctly one of ‘industrial transition’; the use of machinery, which characterizes the modern system of manufactures, spread gradually. . . . The patents for new inventions showed the same tendency to industrial efficiency: in the period 1790-1811, these had averaged 77 a year, from 1812 to 1817 they were 192 while in 1830 they reached a total of 544. There was also a considerable development of companies, incorporated and otherwise, for the prosecution of various industrial enterprises, a clear sign of the growth of capitalism. In 1824 the capital authorized to manufacturing companies in seven States amounted to \$55,289,500. Two years later the amount of capital invested in manufactures in the United States was estimated at \$156,500,000. . . . But not merely was the period one of industrial development; the nation was rapidly becoming economically independent and was almost self-sufficing. In 1834 the total value of all commodities manufactured annually in the United States was calculated at \$325,000,000, while that of imported goods—with the exception of tea, coffee, wines, and spices, which the United States did not produce—was less than \$50,000,000. Within the country the factory system of manufacture had spread by 1840 from the textile to miscellaneous industries, and begun steadily to force from the market the home-made products with which every community had hitherto chiefly supplied itself. This is seen in the growth of the proportion of the population engaged in manufactures. In 1787 Tench Coxe had estimated that less than one eighth of the population was engaged in manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and trade; the census of 1820 returned 13.7 per cent. of the working population as engaged in manufacturing and the mechanic arts; in 1840 the percentage was 17.1. It is impossible to give any complete statement of the growth of manufactures during this period, as no adequate statistics were collected until 1850.

The census of 1820 was so defective that Congress never authorized its publication, while in 1830 the enumeration of manufactures was altogether omitted. In 1820 the value of manufactures was given as \$52,766,535, and in 1830 as \$112,645,466, for ten States out of twenty-eight; but both fell far short of the mark. For 1840 the census reported manufactures to the amount of \$483,278,215. . . . We shall perhaps get a clearer idea of the development of manufactures during this period if we trace in more detail the history of the three most important manufacturing industries in the United States at this time—cotton, woolen, and iron. During the war, as we have seen, many cotton factories had been established [see above: 1810-1860] and the industry gave employment to considerable capital and labor. This industry, and particularly the factory method of production, received a great impetus from the introduction of the power loom in 1814. . . . Immediately after the war, the immense importation of foreign goods seriously embarrassed the cotton manufacturers, but partly as a result of protection granted by successive acts from 1816 on, and partly from other causes, the industry soon became profitable again. By 1824 cotton manufacturing was firmly established; its further development was one of steady growth. In that year Webster stated, ‘In some sort of fabrics we are already exporting, and the products of our factories are at this moment in the South American markets.’ . . . From the beginning, the cotton industry led all other manufactures in the amount of capital invested, the number of persons employed, and the value of the product. In 1830 the United States was second only to England in the amount of cotton consumed, and exceeded by England and France alone in the number of spindles. The industry was early localized in the New England States, especially Massachusetts; three fourths of all the cotton goods produced in 1840 were turned out by New England mills. . . . The woolen manufacture, like that of cotton, had received a considerable stimulus during the restrictive period, 1808-1815, although it had been hampered, unlike the cotton industry, by the lack of a sufficient supply of domestic wool, and by taxes on the imported raw material. The value of factory-made woolen goods is said to have . . . [reached] \$19,000,000 in 1815. After this date woolen manufacturers, in common with others, had to meet the competition of large and cheap English importations. With only moderate protection from the earlier tariff laws, the manufacture steadily progressed after a few years, and by 1828 was firmly established. The development was very similar to that of cotton, which led the way; indeed the textile machinery introduced in the cotton industry was speedily transferred to the other branches of textile production. There was noticeable also the same concentration of the woolen industry in New England. . . . After the conclusion of peace successive tariff measures granted considerable protection to the iron industry, and by 1824 the pig iron product probably exceeded 100,000 tons annually. As long as pig iron was smelted with charcoal the United States, with its inexhaustible forests at the waters edge, had a great advantage, and during the colonial days had exported considerable pig iron to England. But the use of bituminous coal, the invention in 1837 of the hot-air blast, and improved machinery, had reduced the cost in England below the expense of producing charcoal iron in this country. As the forests were cut down and wood became scarcer the cost of production kept increasing. The iron

furnaces were necessarily small affairs and produced from two to four tons a day. About 1840 the iron trade in this country was revolutionized by the substitution of anthracite coal for charcoal. . . . Upon the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the European countries renewed their own carrying-trade in large part and thus deprived our shipowners of the lucrative business they had enjoyed for almost two decades before. With the growing production of cotton, however, for which there was an insatiable foreign demand, the loss of other forms of freight was partially made good. But as equivalent return cargoes could not easily be secured, ship-building languished for some twenty-five years. . . . The capital of the country was being invested during this period in manufactures, internal improvements, and the development of our internal resources, which offered larger returns than the carriage of ocean freight. The high tariff, too, which imposed duties upon the materials entering into ship-building, considerably increased the cost of construction and equipment; and at the same time, by stimulating our domestic industries, reduced the amount of foreign commerce to be transported. About 1830, moreover, England began to increase her shipping and to bid vigorously for the ocean-carrying trade. . . . During this period a new step was taken in shipping legislation by the establishment of reciprocal liberty of commerce. By the act of March 3, 1815, all the discriminating duties imposed by former laws, both on the tonnage of foreign vessels and on the goods imported in them, were repealed in the case of any foreign nation which should abolish its countervailing duties against us. In accordance with this act, a commercial treaty with England of July 3, 1815, provided among other things for equality of duties and treatment and no discrimination between England and the United States. But England kept her West Indian ports closed to our vessels after the treaty as before, and we soon retaliated by new discriminating duties. In 1830 England agreed to open these ports and we removed many of the restrictions upon British commerce. As a result our imports from the British West Indies increased from \$1901 in that year to \$2,965,585 in 1840. To meet the absolute prohibition of those States which simply closed their ports to us . . . the coasting trade was again forbidden to other nations, and ships engaged in foreign trade, unless two thirds manned by American sailors, were taxed fifty cents a ton. But in this act also the door was left open for repeal in the case of foreign nations which should remove their restrictions upon our vessels, and in 1828 another act provided for reciprocity with foreign nations in the indirect or carrying trade. Treaties were accordingly negotiated, which provided for 'reciprocal liberty,' with France in 1822, Prussia in 1828, and in subsequent years with Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Norway and Sweden, Austria, Russia, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland. Commercial treaties were also signed with most of the Central and South American States. . . . After 1818 there was a steady decline in our foreign commerce until about 1830, due to tariff legislation, the development of manufactures and of our internal resources, the passage of the English corn laws, and protective tariff legislation of European countries. In the early thirties, however, the great development in the production of cotton, which now constituted over one half of our total exports, the growth of the west, and the large investments of foreign capital in our system of internal improvements, combined to raise our foreign

commerce to over \$300,000,000 for the year 1836, the highest figure yet reached. The panic of 1837 and the resulting depression reduced our foreign trade to \$125,000,000 in 1843, but between 1847 and 1860, with the brief exception of the year 1857, in which a second panic occurred, the foreign trade of the United States reached the highest point it had ever attained. In 1861 our imports were \$353,616,119, and our exports \$333,576,057, or a total of \$687,802,176. . . . Large as was our foreign commerce, our internal trade was growing still more rapidly. The condition of the country was well stated by Secretary Robert J. Walker, in his treasury report for 1847-8, in which he said: 'The value of our products exceeds three thousand millions of dollars. Our population doubles once in every twenty-three years, and our products quadruple in the same period. Of this \$3,000,000,000 only about \$150,000,000 are exported abroad, leaving \$2,850,000,000 at home, of which at least \$500,000,000 are annually interchanged between the several States of the Union.' Of the exports, cotton constituted about one half, while gold bullion, agricultural products, and manufactured articles made up about one third of the total. The major part of the export trade was carried on from New York, New Orleans, Boston, Baltimore, Mobile, Charleston, and Philadelphia, in the order named. . . . Ever since 1820 the tonnage of vessels in the domestic trade had equaled that in foreign trade, and after 1860 it greatly exceeded the latter. It is impossible to say just how this traffic was divided between the coasting and inland trade, but each branch was expanding. There was a profitable coastwise trade between northern and southern ports, carried on by northern vessels, which carried New England manufactures, boots and shoes, dry-goods, fish, and other commodities to the South, to an amount of over \$100,000,000 a year. In return they brought back cargoes of southern staples, cotton and tobacco, and also food stuffs, hay, and similar commodities, both for export and for domestic consumption. The falling off of foreign commerce was amply compensated by the growth of domestic commerce, which provided an outlet for American vessels. Here the sailing vessel was able to hold its own against the steamer. Opportunity for longer voyages was given when the rush to the California gold fields began; this was held to be coastwise trade and was consequently restricted to American vessels and brought in large, though temporary, profits. The building of the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, which was completed in 1860, reduced the dangers of the perilous voyage round Cape Hatteras, and by so much aided the coasting trade. . . . The inland trade was undoubtedly more important than either the foreign or the coastwise trade. . . . The shipment of agricultural produce from northern farms to southern plantations, with smaller return cargoes of sugar, molasses, West India fruits, etc., gave rise to a flourishing trade on the western rivers. After 1840, when the railroads first began to invade the West, a steadily growing share of the river trade was diverted to the quicker route. In 1845 it was estimated that of the produce of the Mississippi valley shipped to the seaboard one half found its way to market via the canals and railroads to the Atlantic coast. Of the receipts at New Orleans but 18 per cent. consisted of western produce in 1845, as compared with over 60 per cent. at the beginning of the century. The great expansion of cotton culture throughout the Southwest, however, prevented any falling off in the total New Orleans trade. . . . The lake trade did not develop

until after the building of canals, which afforded an outlet from the interior to the lakes; but after 1840 there was a great increase. . . . That branch of internal commerce which consisted in the exchange of goods between the East and the West grew somewhat more slowly, but ultimately far outstripped the others. At first most of the movement was of manufactured goods from the East to the West, which were paid for, not by agricultural exports from the latter section, but by transfer of credits upon the South. Not until the forties did western produce find its way in large quantities to the eastern seaboard. Thus, to take a typical illustration, the agricultural exports of Ohio grew from the equivalent of 544,000 bushels of wheat in 1835 to 3,800,000 in 1840, and 12,200,000 in 1851. . . . Little gold or silver was as yet mined in the United States, and the excessive issue of bank-notes had prevented the accumulation of any large stock of specie in the country. Coins were nevertheless always to be found in the commercial centers of the country. They consisted for the most part of a heterogeneous collection of foreign coins, often clipped and mutilated. Spanish dollars and subdivisions thereof formed the bulk of the metallic money. No American silver dollars were coined from 1806 to 1836, and gold had disappeared from circulation under the ratio of 1792, which undervalued it. Gold had recently been discovered in North Carolina and Georgia in sufficient quantity to make it appear likely that the domestic monetary needs of the people might be supplied from this source. By the acts of 1834 and 1837 the ratio between gold and silver was changed from fifteen to one to sixteen to one. . . . As this slightly overvalued gold, it came rapidly into circulation again in place of silver, and silver coins began to disappear. The lack of subsidiary silver was a serious disadvantage in retail trade, and doubtless contributed to the demand for a larger supply of banknotes. Under the circumstances some form of paper money would seem to have been unavoidable. After 1840 the silver dollar was rarely seen in circulation, and after the gold discoveries of 1848 even the fractional coins disappeared. When the smaller coins were withdrawn the inconvenience became so great that Congress passed the law of 1853, debasing the fractional coins in order to keep them in circulation by decreasing the amount of pure silver in each. . . . Accordingly the smaller coins remained in circulation, though silver dollars practically disappeared from use. Gold coins of course became general. . . . After the end of the United States Bank in 1836 the government for some years deposited its funds in selected State banks; but in so doing it was exposed to all the dangers and inconveniences connected with an inadequately regulated system of banking. It therefore instituted the plan of caring for its own funds, temporarily in 1840 and permanently in 1846, by means of the so-called independent or sub-treasury system. . . . It would not use [the banks] . . . as fiscal agents nor deposit government revenues with them; nor would it receive bank-notes in payments to itself. . . . [The sub-treasuries should] collect all the revenue in specie, and make all disbursements in cash through its own officials. By using specie exclusively it would ensure the presence of a large amount of coin in the country and would lessen the demand for bank-notes. At the same time it was expected that the banks, since they would no longer receive government deposits, would not be able to expand their circulation so greatly as they had done. This hard money policy of the

government would thus effectively hold the banks in check and act as a regulator of the currency. An official investigation of the independent treasury system made in 1855 showed that both these results had been secured, and also that it prevented losses to the government and gave to the treasury better control of its funds. Down to the period of the Civil War it proved safe, economical, and effective. . . . It is almost impossible to exaggerate the influence which the vast western expanse of free land has had upon the economic history of the United States. . . . This abundance of land has greatly simplified economic and social problems and has acted as a safety-valve in times of depression and panic. . . . With the extension of the cultivated area the production of the cereals increased enormously; most of it, however, found a market in the growing Southwest, and the lake grain trade did not begin to expand until the end of this period. As corn did not stand transportation very well, it was converted into whisky or hogs, and sold in the form of salt pork, hams, bacon, etc. Some cattle were also fattened on corn and driven over the mountains to the Atlantic seaboard. With the opening of the Erie Canal in 1825, an outlet was afforded to the grain of the West. Wheat began to displace corn as the chief money crop of the northern lake region, and became the breadstuff of the northern population. The center of wheat production was still in western New York, however, and its export from the West did not become important until after the building of railroads. As late as 1835 Ohio was the only State in the West exporting grain direct to the Atlantic coast. The first shipments of grain from Chicago consisted of 78 bushels of wheat in 1838, while the first shipment from Wisconsin was not made until three years later. Corn and live stock remained the principle products of the Ohio valley, and were shipped down the Mississippi to the cotton plantations of the South. In 1840, when this crop first appeared in the census, the production of Indian corn amounted to 377,531,87 $\frac{1}{2}$  bushels, and of wheat to 84,823,272 bushels. In New England attention began for the first time on a large scale to be directed to the cultivation of fruit, which up to that time had been very poor, and to market gardening; by 1840 the capital invested in these branches was almost \$3,000,000 and the annual returns somewhat more. . . . One of the most important events in the agricultural history of this period was the rise of cotton to first place among the products of the South. It passed tobacco in 1803 and has ever since led all other southern agricultural staples. . . . The wasteful system of land killing was practised even more extensively in the cultivation of cotton than in the case of the cereals; one piece of land was cultivated continuously until it was exhausted, when it was abandoned and a new tract cleared. As the slaves could be trusted only with heavy and crude tools, the introduction of improved agricultural machinery in southern agriculture was rendered impossible. The use of slaves in cotton culture had also the effect of concentrating the industry on large plantations rather than of scattering it over small farms. . . . Tobacco was cultivated in the northern tier of slave States, and by much the same methods that had prevailed during the colonial period. In Virginia and Kentucky there also grew up a considerable stock-raising industry, especially of horses and mules, for which there was a strong demand on the cotton plantations. . . . The cattle industry of the United States has always flourished on frontier, and during this

period made steady progress in the West. The first fat cattle that ever crossed the Alleghanies were driven from Ohio to Baltimore in the spring of 1805. This proved the beginning of a profitable trade, and until the railroads began to transport them directly to the eastern market, western cattle were fattened on corn in Ohio during the winter months and then driven eastward in the spring. About 1832-36 a general interest in the improvement of live stock began to be manifested by farmers, largely as a result of the exhibitions at county fairs which had begun about 1810, but were now revived and improved. . . . The economic position of the American farmer during this period was one of increasing prosperity, interrupted only temporarily by banking troubles, by panics, or by crop failures. The building of internal improvements was furnishing sections of the country with better means of transportation and affording access to markets. The spread of cotton culture brought in large profits to southern planters and provided an outlet for northern produce, while the growth of manufactures contributed also to the development of a home market. The life of the settlers in the new West was not very different from that of the early colonists in the eastern States. A rude abundance of the necessaries of life was everywhere to be found, and a generous hospitality was remarked by travelers as a characteristic of the people. . . . American farming was still characterized by the wasteful and exhausting methods of cropping without fertilizing that prevailed in colonial times. This was caused partly by the fertility of the soil and the abundance of free land, and partly by the unsettled nature of farming and the unwillingness to sink capital in improvements."—E. L. Bogart, *Economic history of the United States*, pp. 165-171, 222-223, 226-220, 243-244, 246, 263, 269-273.—See also COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1820-1920.

1816.—Beginning of missionary efforts of colonization in Liberia. See LIBERIA: Early history.

1816.—Missouri made territory of first grade. See MISSOURI: 1812-1816.


1816.—Incorporation of second bank of the United States. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1790-1816; 1817-1833.

1816.—Admission of Indiana into the Union. See INDIANA: 1800-1818.

1816.—Increased tariff. See TARIFF: 1808-1824.

1816.—Eighth presidential election.—James Monroe, Democratic Republican, was elected over Rufus King, Federalist, receiving 183 out of 217 votes cast in the Electoral College. Daniel D. Tompkins was chosen vice president. "Opposition to the War of 1812 proved fatal to the Federal party, which ceased to exist as a national party with the close of Mr. Madison's administration. Not only did the odium of opposing the war tend to annihilate that party, but the questions upon which the two parties differed were, in a great measure, settled or disposed of by the war; others, relating to the general interests of the country, such as a tariff, internal improvements, the chartering of a national bank, erecting fortifications, etc., taking their place, and finding advocates and opponents in both the old parties. Candidates for President and Vice-President were then selected by the respective parties by what was termed a Congressional caucus. Mr. Monroe was placed in nomination for President by a caucus of the Republican members of Congress, Daniel D. Tompkins, of New York, being nominated by the same caucus for Vice-President. Mr. Crawford, of

Georgia, was Mr. Monroe's competitor, and fell but few votes behind him in the caucus. Rufus King was the candidate of the Federal party, or what there was left of it, against Mr. Monroe. The latter received 183 electoral votes, the former 34. No President ever encountered less opposition during his four or eight years' service than Mr. Monroe. Parties and the country seemed to be tired of contention, and desirous to enjoy repose. A most able cabinet was selected, consisting of Mr. J. Q. Adams as Secretary of State; William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury; John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War; Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy; and William Wirt, Attorney-General."—N. Sargent, *Public men and events, 1817-1853*, v. 1, ch. 1.—"Remembering only the almost unopposed election and second election of Mr. Monroe, we are apt to think of him as the natural and easy choice of the people. As a matter of fact he was not a great favorite with Republican politicians. He was first nominated by a narrow majority. . . . Numerous meetings were held in



JAMES MONROE

various parts of the country to protest against the caucus system, the most noteworthy of which, perhaps, was held in Baltimore, in which meeting Roger B. Taney, afterward Chief Justice, took a most prominent part. The nomination being made, the presidential election was practically decided. There was no canvass, worthy of the name."—E. Stanwood, *History of presidential elections*, ch. 9.

1816-1817.—Opening of the question of internal improvements.—"The passage of the bank bill in 1816 was to give the United States a million and a half of dollars. Calhoun, therefore, came forward, Dec. 23, 1816, with a bill proposing that this sum be employed as a fund 'for constructing roads and canals and improving the navigation of water-courses.' 'We are,' said he, 'a rapidly—I was about to say a fearfully—growing country. . . . This is our pride and danger, our weakness and our strength.' The constitutional question he settled with a phrase: 'If we are restricted in the use of our money to the enumerated powers, on what principle can the purchase of Louisiana be justified?' The bill passed the House by 86 to 84;

it was strongly supported by New York members, because it was expected that the general government would begin the construction of a canal from Albany to the Lakes; it had also large support in the South, especially in South Carolina. In the last hours of his administration Madison vetoed it. His message shows that he had selected this occasion to leave to the people a political testament; he was at last alarmed by the progress of his own party, and, like Jefferson, he insisted that internal improvements were desirable, but needed a constitutional amendment. The immediate effect of the veto was that New York, seeing no prospect of federal aid, at once herself began the construction of the Erie Canal, which was opened eight years later."—A. B. Hart, *Formation of the Union (Epochs of American history, sect. 121)*.—"Mr. Monroe came out, in his first message to Congress, coinciding, on this point, with Mr. Madison's veto. It is due to both of them, however, to say that they were the advocates of internal improvement, and recommended an amendment of the constitution with that view. Nevertheless, Mr. Madison, by his veto, had dashed the cup from the lips to the ground, as he went out of office; and Mr. Monroe coming in, at least for four years, probably for eight—it proved to be eight—broke the cup in advance, so that it could not be used during his term of office, without an amendment of the constitution. . . . Three presidents successively, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe, had officially expressed their opinion adverse to a power vested in Congress by the constitution for projects of internal improvement, as contemplated by the measures proposed. Not satisfied with these decisions, Mr. Clay and his friends were instrumental in having a resolution brought forward, in the fifteenth Congress, declaring that Congress had power, under the constitution, to make appropriations for the construction of military roads, post-roads, and canals. . . . The resolution declaring the power to be vested in Congress by the constitution, to make appropriations for the construction of military roads, post-roads, and canals, was adopted by a vote of 90 to 75; and the principle involved has been practically applied by acts of Congress, from that time to the present."—C. Colton, *Life, correspondence, and speeches of Henry Clay, v. 1, ch. 10*.

ALSO IN: H. G. Wheeler, *History of Congress, comprising a history of internal improvements, v. 2, p. 109, ff.*—F. J. Turner, *Rise of the new West, ch. 13*.

1816-1818.—First Seminole War.—Jackson's arbitrary conquest of Florida. See FLORIDA: 1812-1819.

1817.—Admission of Mississippi into the Union. See MISSISSIPPI: 1817.

1817-1825.—Era of Good Feeling.—"That same *Columbian Centinel* of Boston, which on the day of the inauguration of the first Republican president . . . had published a bitter lament over the defeat of the glorious Federalist administration, now hailed the inauguration of . . . James Monroe as the promise of 'an era of good feeling.' The phrase . . . pleased President Monroe, who . . . repeated it on the tour of the Southern states which he made . . . the same year (1817)."—D. S. Muzzey, *American history, p. 231*.

1818.—Arbitration with England regarding restoration of slaves. See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL; Modern: 1818.

1818.—Treaty with England providing for joint occupation of Oregon.—Political agitation over Oregon boundary. See OREGON: 1818-1846.

1818.—Treaty with Great Britain relating to fisheries. See FISHERIES: 1814-1818.

1818.—Admission of Illinois into the Union. See ILLINOIS: 1818-1830; INDIANA: 1800-1818.

1818.—Act establishing the flag of the United States. See FLAGS: United States.

1818-1819.—Negotiations with Spain.—Acquisition of Florida.—Adams' support of Jackson.—Payment of claims against Spain.—"The correspondence between the department of state and the Spanish government, following the Seminole War, was keyed remarkably high. When the Spanish minister at Washington, Don Luis de Onís . . . received official notice from Florida of the high-handed acts of Jackson, he made a sharp and spirited protest to the president, demanding not merely the restoration of the forts and other property of Spain, reparation for the insult, and the disavowal of Jackson's conduct, but the inflicting of 'suitable punishment on the author of such flagrant disorder.' He announced, in addition, the suspension of all pending negotiations until 'the one satisfaction which is admissible in the present case is granted.' In negotiations which followed from August until late November, 1818, the French minister, M. Hyde de Neuville, was conscientiously carrying out with good effect his avowed instructions to do everything to preserve peace between the United States and Spain. . . . The culmination of these diplomatic discussions was reached in Secretary Adams's great despatch to Minister Erving at Madrid, dated November 28, 1818. This was in the nature of an ultimatum to Spain, and reviewed at length the conduct of Spanish officials in Florida, the assaults on the peace, property, and lives of Americans in Georgia and Alabama, the refusal of Spain to fulfill treaties, her aiding and abetting theft and sale of stolen property, and her toleration of such men as Nichols, Arbuthnot, and Ambrister. Adams offered, on behalf of the United States, to restore the places captured, when Spain could guarantee an adequate force for fulfilling treaty obligations, and continued: 'but the President will neither inflict punishment nor pass censure upon Gen. Jackson for that conduct, the motives for which were founded in the purest patriotism.' . . . He then proceeded to present the counter-demands of the president of the United States. . . . Added to this were demands for the punishment of the Spanish governor and commandant for neglect of duty, and for indemnities for the charges of the war on the Indians. There was no mistaking such language as this. In the nature of the case, however much her government or her minister at Washington might protest and promise, Spain could not comply with the requirements laid down by Adams for an efficient government in Florida. . . . Nothing remained, then, but to accept the other alternative and endeavor by treaty to secure settlement of all pending difficulties. . . . A 'treaty of amity, settlements, and limits' was finally concluded and signed at [Washington] . . . February 22, 1819, by which Spain ceded the Floridas. The transactions covered both that part which the United States had occupied for seven or eight years . . . and that part which had been relinquished to Spain after two invasions by an army of the United States. By just what title the United States finally held West Florida, it would be hard to determine. . . . As a matter of fact, the United States did not have any valid claim to western Florida before 1819, and did have title to the great territory known as Texas; but the seizure of the smaller province disabled the

United States from pushing too hard for the greater empire. . . . Accordingly, the new boundary excluded Texas. . . . The 'two high contracting parties' reciprocally renounced all claims for damages or injuries to themselves or their citizens up to the time of the signing of the treaty; but in order to protect the just claims of her citizens against Spain, which she had long been pressing, the United States undertook to make satisfaction for these claims to an amount not exceeding five million dollars. Hence it is frequently erroneously stated that the United States paid Spain five million dollars for Florida, whereas the money was really handed over to American claimants.'"—K. C. Babcock, *Rise of American nationality, 1811-1819*, pp. 282-287.

1818-1819.—Dartmouth College case. See COMMON LAW: 1819; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1754-1769.

1818-1821.—First bitter conflict concerning slavery.—Missouri Compromise, on the admission of Missouri to the Union.—"On March 6, 1818, a petition was presented in the House of Representatives praying that Missouri be admitted as a state. A bill authorizing the people of Missouri to form a state government was taken up in the House on February 13, 1819, and Tallmadge of New York moved, as an amendment, that the further introduction of slavery should be prohibited, and that all children born within the said state should be free at the age of twenty-five years. Thus began the struggle on the slavery question in connection with the admission of Missouri, which lasted, intermittently, until March, 1821. No sooner had the debate on Tallmadge's proposition begun than it became clear that the philosophical anti-slavery sentiment of the revolutionary period [see SLAVERY: 1776-1808] had entirely ceased to have any influence upon current thought in the South. The abolition of the foreign slave-trade had not, as had been hoped, prepared the way for the abolition of slavery or weakened the slave interest in any sense. On the contrary, slavery had been immensely strengthened by an economic development making it more profitable than it ever had been before. The invention of the cotton-gin by Eli Whitney, in 1793 [see above: 1793: Whitney's cotton gin], had made the culture of cotton a very productive source of wealth. In 1800 the exportation of cotton from the United States was 19,000,000 pounds, valued at \$5,700,000. In 1820 the value of the cotton export was nearly \$20,000,000, almost all of it the product of slave labor. The value of slaves may be said to have at least trebled in twenty years. The breeding of slaves became a profitable industry. Under such circumstances the slave-holders arrived at the conclusion that slavery was by no means so wicked and hurtful an institution as their revolutionary fathers had thought it to be. . . . On the other hand, in the Northern States there was no such change of feeling. Slavery was still, in the nature of things, believed to be a wrong and a sore. . . . The amendment to the Missouri bill, providing for a restriction with regard to slavery, came therefore in a perfectly natural way from that Northern sentiment which remained still faithful to the traditions of the revolutionary period. And it was a great surprise to most Northern people that so natural a proposition should be so fiercely resisted on the part of the South. It was the sudden revelation of a change of feeling in the South which the North had not observed in its progress. 'The discussion of this Missouri question has betrayed the secret of their souls,' wrote John Quincy Adams. The slave-holders watched with apprehen-

sion the steady growth of the Free States in population, wealth, and power. In 1790 the population of the two sections had been nearly even. In 1820 there was a difference of over 600,000 in favor of the North in a total of less than ten millions. In 1790 the representation of the two sections in Congress had been about evenly balanced. In 1820 the census promised to give the North a preponderance of more than 30 votes in the House of Representatives. As the slave-holders had no longer the ultimate extinction, but now the perpetuation, of slavery in view, the question of sectional power became one of the first importance to them, and with it the necessity of having more Slave States for the purpose of maintaining the political equilibrium at least in the Senate. A struggle for more Slave States was to them a struggle for life. This was the true significance of the Missouri question. The debate was the prototype of all the slavery debates which followed in the forty years to the breaking out of the civil war. . . . The dissolution of the Union, civil war, and streams of blood were freely threatened by Southern men, while some anti-slavery men declared themselves ready to accept all these calamities rather than the spread of slavery over the territories yet free from it. . . . On February 16, 1819, the House of Representatives adopted the amendment restricting slavery, and thus passed the Missouri bill. But the Senate, eleven days afterwards, struck out the anti-slavery provision and sent the bill back to the House. A bill was then passed organizing the Territory of Arkansas, an amendment moved by Taylor of New York prohibiting the further introduction of slavery there having been voted down. . . . Thus slavery was virtually fastened on Arkansas. But the Missouri bill failed in the fifteenth Congress. The popular excitement steadily increased. The sixteenth Congress met in December, 1819. In the Senate the admission of Missouri with slavery was coupled with the admission of Maine, on the balance-of-power principle that one free state and one slave state should always be admitted at the same time. An amendment was moved absolutely prohibiting slavery in Missouri, but it was voted down. Then Mr. Thomas, a Senator from Illinois, on January 18, 1820, proposed that no restriction as to slavery be imposed upon Missouri in framing a state constitution, but that in all the rest of the country ceded by France to the United States north of 36° 30', this being the southern boundary line of Missouri, there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude. This was the essence of the famous Missouri Compromise, and, after long and acrimonious debates and several more votes in the House for restriction and in the Senate against it, this compromise was adopted. By it the slave power obtained the present tangible object it contended for; free labor won a contingent advantage in the future. . . . Clay has been widely credited with being the 'father' of the Missouri Compromise. As to the main features of the measure this credit he did not deserve. So far he had taken a prominent but not an originating part in the transaction." But, at the next session of Congress, when the Missouri question was unexpectedly reopened, and as threateningly as ever, Clay assumed a more important part in connection with the final settlement of it. "The bill passed at the last session had authorized the people of Missouri to make a state constitution without any restriction as to slavery. The formal admission of the state was now to follow. But the Constitution with which Missouri presented herself to Congress not only recognized slavery as existing there; it provided

also that it should be the duty of the legislature to pass such laws as would be necessary to prevent free negroes or mulattoes from coming into or settling in the state." This provoked a new revolt on the part of the Northern opponents of slavery, and it was only through Clay's exertions as a pacificator that Missouri was conditionally admitted to the Union at length (March 3, 1820), the condition being that "the said state shall never pass any law preventing any description of persons from coming to or settling in the said state who now are, or hereafter may become, citizens of any of the states of this Union. [The legislature of Missouri gave its assent, as required, to this 'fundamental condition,' and the 'compromise' became complete.]"—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 1, ch. 8.—"The immediate contest was not over the question of the prohibition of slavery in the Territories. The great struggle lasted for nearly three years, but the final proposition which closed the controversy and which prohibited slavery in almost all the then Federal territory was probably not debated more than three hours. It was accepted without discussion by the great bulk of the advocates of Missouri's free admission. Very few slavery extensionists questioned the right and power of Congress to prevent the spread of slavery to the Territories. That question, in the minds of those who opposed restriction in Missouri, was incidental to the question of the right of Congress to impose conditions upon a State. Incidentally the question of slavery in the Territories came up in the case of Arkansas, a country south of Missouri, in which slavery was already a fact. The restrictionists themselves recognized the fact that the plain, simple issue of limiting the area of human slavery would be strengthened by bringing it before the country unincumbered with the question of imposing conditions on a State, though most of them never wavered in their belief that conditions might be imposed. On the one hand it was only Southern zealots who denied to Congress the power to prohibit slavery in the Territories; on the other hand many in the North who opposed slavery believed that Congress might not impose conditions upon a State. In the cabinet of Monroe, in which sat Wirt, Crawford, and Calhoun, it was unanimously agreed that Congress had power to prohibit slavery in the Territories. But John Quincy Adams, also a member of that cabinet, who hated slavery with all the strength of his soul, thought it was unconstitutional to bind a State by conditions. . . . The struggle and the compromise afford the first clear demarcation between the sections. From this time the equilibrium of political power was a matter of first concern to a section of States and to a powerful political interest. Mason and Dixon's line is extended toward the west, and now marks a political division. The slave States were now, and for the first time, clearly separated from the free. A geographical line dividing the sections was established."—J. A. Woodburn, *Historical significance of the Missouri Compromise (Report of American Historical Association, 1893, pp. 289-294)*.—See also MISSOURI: 1819-1820.

ALSO IN: H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 9.—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 1, ch. 7.

1818-1829.—Money and banking laws in Kentucky.—Troubles of state with Federal banks. See KENTUCKY: 1818-1829.

1819.—Expedition of Long into Texas. See TEXAS: 1799-1821.

1819.—Separation of Maine from Massachusetts. See MAINE: 1814-1819.

1819.—Treaty of Fort Moultrie with Seminoles. See SEMINOLES.

1819.—Admission of Alabama into the Union. See ALABAMA: 1817-1819.

1819.—Land credit system.—Panic.—"The speculative reaction that immediately followed the war, when the long-pent-up crops of cotton found a market at the extraordinary price of nearly thirty cents a pound, and as high as seventy-eight dollars per acre was bid for government land in the offices of the southwest [brought about a panic in 1819.] The policy of the government fostered reckless purchases of public land. In the critical times of the closing years of the war, the treasury agreed to accept the notes of state banks in payment for lands, on condition that these banks should resume specie payment; and then the banks, while taking only nominal steps towards resumption, loaned their paper freely to the settlers and speculators who wished to invest in the public domain. Under the credit system already mentioned, the pioneer was tempted to exhaust his funds in making his first partial payment, and to rely upon loans from some 'wild cat' bank wherewith to complete the purchase of the hundred and sixty acres, the smallest tract offered under the terms of the law; planters, relying equally on the state banks, bought great tracts of land at absurd prices; speculators, tempted by the rapid rise in land values and by the ease of securing loans, purchased large quantities in the hope of selling before it became necessary to complete their payment. On the seaboard, extravagance abounded as a reaction from the economies of war times, imported manufactures found a ready market, and the domestic factories were in distress. While state banks greatly multiplied and expanded their circulation freely to meet the demands of borrowers, the United States Bank not only failed to check the movement, but even contributed to it. After a dance of speculation, the bank, in the summer of 1818, was facing ruin, and it took drastic means to save itself. Its measures compelled the state banks to redeem their notes in specie or close their doors. By the spring of 1819 the country was in the throes of a panic. State-bank issues were reduced from one hundred million dollars in 1817 to forty-five millions in 1819. Few banks in the south and west were able to redeem their notes in specie before 1822; but they pressed their debtors harshly. Staple productions fell to less than half of their former price; land values declined fifty to seventy per cent.; manufacturers were in distress; laborers were out of work; merchants were ruined. . . . From the beginning of our history the frontier had been a debtor region, always favorable to an expansion of the currency and to laws to relieve the debtor class. It was not the continuation of an old practice when the western legislatures in this time of stringency attempted measures of relief for their citizens. . . . The distress brought about by the panic of 1819, the popular antagonism to banks in general, and especially to the Bank of the United States, as 'engines of aristocracy,' oppressive to the common people, and the general discontent with the established order, . . . produced a movement comparable to the populistic agitation of our own time."—F. J. Turner, *Rise of the new West, 1819-1829*, pp. 135-139.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1817-1833.

1819-1821.—Definition of boundary of the Louisiana Purchase as a result of the acquisition of Florida. See FLORIDA: 1819-1821.

1819-1829.—Judicial decisions arising from acquisition of West Florida.—Letter of William Wirt. See FLORIDA: 1819-1829.



1819-1842.—Treaties with Indians in Michigan. See MICHIGAN: 1805-1842.

1819-1922.—Development of statistical work in the various bureaus of the cabinet. See STATISTICS: Statistical work in the United States.

1820.—Second Choctaw land cession. See MISSISSIPPI: 1820-1839.

1820.—Admission of Maine into the Union as a state. See MAINE: 1820; also above: 1818-1821.

1820.—Ninth presidential election.—In the presidential election of 1820, "Monroe like Washington was re-chosen President by a vote practically unanimous. One, however, of the 232 electoral votes cast was wanting to consummate this exceptional honor; for a New Hampshire elector, with a boldness of discretion which, in our days and especially upon a close canvass, would have condemned him to infamy, threw away upon John Quincy Adams the vote which belonged like those of his colleagues to Monroe, determined, so it is said, that no later mortal should stand in Washington's shoes. Of America's Presidents elected by virtual acclamation history furnishes but these two examples; and as between the men honored by so unapproachable a tribute of confidence, Monroe entered upon his second term of office with less of real political opposition than Washington."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States, v. 3, ch. 10, sect. 2.*—Daniel D. Tompkins was re-elected vice president.

1820.—Fourth census.—The total population was 9,638,191 (an increase exceeding 33 per cent. over that of 1810), classed as follows:

	North		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut .....	267,161	7,844	97
Illinois .....	53,788	457	917
Indiana .....	145,758	1,230	190
Maine .....	297,349	929	....
Massachusetts .....	516,419	6,740	....
Michigan .....	8,591	174	....
New Hampshire .....	243,236	786	....
New Jersey .....	257,409	12,460	7,557
New York .....	1,332,744	29,279	10,088
Ohio .....	576,572	4,723	....
Pennsylvania .....	1,017,094	30,202	211
Rhode Island.....	79,413	3,554	48
Vermont .....	234,840	903	....
	5,030,371	99,281	19,108

	South		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama .....	85,451	571	41,879
Arkansas .....	12,579	59	1,617
Delaware .....	55,282	12,598	4,509
District of Columbia	22,614	4,048	6,377
Georgia .....	189,566	1,763	149,654
Kentucky .....	434,644	2,759	126,732
Louisiana .....	73,383	10,476	69,064
Maryland .....	260,223	39,730	107,397
Mississippi .....	42,176	458	32,814
Missouri .....	55,988	347	10,222
North Carolina....	419,200	14,612	205,017
South Carolina.....	237,440	6,826	258,475
Tennessee .....	339,927	2,727	80,107
Virginia .....	603,087	36,889	425,153
	2,831,560	134,223	1,519,017

See also CENSUS: United States.

1820-1869.—Increase of immigration. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1790-1869.

1821.—Beginning of immigration to Texas.—Relinquishment of claims to Texas. See TEXAS: 1819-1835.

1822.—Recognition of independence of South American states. See LATIN AMERICA: 1822-1830.

1823.—Enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine.—One lasting mark of distinction was given to the administration of President Monroe by the importance which came to be attached to his enunciation of the principle of policy since known as the "Monroe Doctrine." This was simply a formal and official statement of the national demand that foreign nations shall not interfere with the affairs of the two American continents. "There has been a good deal of dispute as to the real authorship of this announcement, Charles Francis Adams claiming it for his father, and Charles Sumner for the English statesman Canning. Mr. Gilman, however, in his . . . memoir of President Monroe, has shown with exhaustive research that this doctrine had grown up gradually into a national tradition before Monroe's time, and that he merely formulated it, and made it a matter of distinct record. The whole statement is contained in a few detached passages of his message of December 2, 1823."—T. W. Higginson, *Larger history of the United States, ch. 16.*—"At a cabinet meeting May 13, 1818, President Monroe propounded several questions on the subject of foreign affairs, of which the fifth, as recorded by J. Q. Adams, was this: 'Whether the ministers of the United States in Europe shall be instructed that the United States will not join in any project of interposition between Spain and the South Americans, which should not be to promote the complete independence of those provinces; and whether measures shall be taken to ascertain if this be the policy of the British government, and if so to establish a concert with them for the support of this policy.' He adds that all these points were discussed, without much difference of opinion. On July 31, 1818, Rush had an important interview with Castlereagh in respect to a proposed mediation of Great Britain between Spain and her colonies. The cooperation of the United States was desired. Mr. Rush informed the British minister that 'the United States would decline taking part, if they took part at all, in any plan of pacification, except on the basis of the independence of the colonies.' 'This,' he added, 'was the determination to which his government had come on much deliberation.' . . . Gallatin writes to J. Q. Adams, June 24, 1823, that before leaving Paris, he had said to M. Chateaubriand on May 13, 'The United States would undoubtedly preserve their neutrality provided it were respected, and avoid every interference with the politics of Europe. . . . On the other hand, they would not suffer others to interfere against the emancipation of America.' . . . After Canning had proposed to Rush (September 19, 1823) that the United States should cooperate with England in preventing European interference with the Spanish-American colonies, Monroe consulted Jefferson as well as the cabinet, on the course which it was advisable to take, and with their approbation prepared his message. . . . Enough has been quoted to show that Mr. Sumner is not justified in saying that the 'Monroe doctrine proceeded from Canning,' and that he was 'its inventor, promoter, and champion, at least so far as it bears against European intervention in American affairs.' Nevertheless, Canning is entitled to

high praise for the part which he took in the recognition of the Spanish republics, a part which almost justified his proud utterance, 'I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.'—D. C. Gilman, *James Monroe*, ch. 7.—See also MONROE DOCTRINE.

ALSO IN: W. F. Reddaway, *Monroe Doctrine*.—A. B. Hart, *Foundations of American foreign policy*, ch. 7.—W. C. Ford, *John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine* (*American Historical Review*, Oct., 1902).—C. Sumner, *Prophetic voices concerning America*, p. 157.—G. F. Tucker, *Monroe Doctrine*.—F. Wharton, *Digest of the international law of the United States*, v. 1, sect. 57.

1824.—Protective tariff, called the "American system." See TARIFF: 1808-1824.

1824.—Tenth presidential election.—No choice by the people.—Election of John Quincy Adams by the House of Representatives.—"In 1823, as the Presidential election approached, the influences to control and secure the interests predominating in the different sections of the country became more active. Crawford of Georgia, Calhoun of South Carolina, Adams of Massachusetts, and Clay of Kentucky, were the most prominent candidates. In December, Barbour of Virginia was superseded, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, by Clay of Kentucky; an event ominous to the hopes of Crawford, and to that resistance to the tariff and to internal improvements which was regarded as dependent on his success. The question whether a Congressional caucus, by the instrumentality of which Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe had obtained the Presidency, should be again held to nominate a candidate for that office, was the next cause of political excitement. The Southern party, whose hopes rested on the success of Crawford, were clamorous for a caucus. The friends of the other candidates were either lukewarm or hostile to that expedient. Pennsylvania, whose general policy favored a protective tariff and public improvements, hesitated. . . . But the Democracy of that state . . . held meetings at Philadelphia, and elsewhere, recommending a Congressional caucus. This motion would have been probably adopted, had not the Legislature of Alabama, about this time nominated Andrew Jackson for the Presidency, and accompanied their resolutions in his favor with a recommendation to their representatives to use their best exertions to prevent a Congressional nomination of a President. The popularity of Jackson, and the obvious importance to his success of the policy recommended by Alabama, fixed the wavering counsels of Pennsylvania, so that only three representatives from that state attended the Congressional caucus, which was soon after called, and which consisted of only 60 members, out of 261, the whole number of the House of Representatives; of which Virginia and New York, under the lead of Mr. Van Buren, constituted nearly one half. Notwithstanding this meagre assemblage, Mr. Crawford was nominated for the Presidency. . . . But the days of Congressional caucuses were now numbered. [See CAUCUS: United States: 1804-1828.] The people took the nomination of President into their own hands [and John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay were brought into the field]. . . . The result of this electioneering conflict was that, by the returns of the electoral colleges of the several states, it appeared that none of the candidates had the requisite constitutional majority; the whole number of votes being 261—of which Andrew Jackson had 99, John Quincy Adams 84, William H. Crawford 41, and Henry Clay 37. [The popu-

lar vote cast as nearly as can be determined, was: Jackson, 153,544; Adams, 108,740; Crawford, 46,618; Clay, 47,136.] For the office of Vice-President, John C. Calhoun had 180 votes, and was elected. . . . Of the 84 votes cast for Mr. Adams, not one was given by either of the three great Southern slaveholding states. Seventy-seven were given to him by New England and New York. The other seven were cast by the Middle or recently admitted states. The selection of President from the candidates now devolved on the House of Representatives, under the provisions of the constitution. But, again, Mr. Adams had the support of none of those slaveholding states, with the exception of Kentucky, and her delegates were equally divided between him and General Jackson. The decisive vote was, in effect, in the hands of Mr. Clay, then Speaker of the House, who cast it for Mr. Adams; a responsibility he did not hesitate to assume, notwithstanding the equal division of the Kentucky delegation, and in defiance of a resolution passed by the Legislature of that state, declaring their preference for General Jackson. On the final vote Andrew Jackson had 7 votes, William H. Crawford 4, and John Quincy Adams 13; who was, therefore, forthwith declared President of the United States for four years ensuing the 4th of March, 1825."—J. Quincy, *Memoir of the life of John Quincy Adams*, ch. 6-7.—The new administration "stood upon the same political basis as that of Mr. Monroe. It was but a continuance of the same party ascendancy. It looked to no change of measures, and to no other change of men than became inevitably necessary to supply the vacancies which the accidents of political life had created. . . . The country . . . indulged the hope of a prosperous career in the track which had been opened by Mr. Madison, and so successfully pursued by Mr. Monroe. Less confidently, however, it indulged the hope of a continuance of that immunity from party contention and exasperation which had characterized the last eight years. The rising of an opposition was seen, at the very commencement of this administration, like a dark cloud upon the horizon, which gradually spread towards the zenith, not without much rumbling of distant thunder and angry flashes of fire."—J. P. Kennedy, *Memoirs of the life of William Wirt*, v. 2, ch. 10.—"Monroe was the last President of the Virginian line [see VIRGINIA DYNASTY], John Quincy Adams the last [for many years] from New England. The centre of power was passing from the east to the west. Adams was a genuine New Englander of the Puritan stock, austere moral, from his boyhood laboriously self-trained, not only staid but solemn in his teens, intensely self-conscious, ever engaged in self-examination, the punctual keeper of a voluminous diary, an invariably early riser, a daily reader of the Bible even in the White House, scrupulously methodical and strictly upright in all his ways; but testy, unconciliatory, unsympathetic, absolutely destitute of all the arts by which popularity is won. His election does the highest credit to the respect of the electors for public virtue unadorned. The peculiar features of his father's character were so intensified in him that he may be deemed the typical figure rather than his father. In opinions he was a Federalist who having broken with his party on the question of foreign relations and the embargo had been put out of its pale but had retained its general mould. As he was about the last President chosen for merit, not for availability, so he was about the last whose only rule was not party but the public service. So strictly did he

observe the principle of permanency and purity in the Civil Service, that he refused to dismiss from office a Postmaster-General whom he knew to be intriguing against him. The demagogic era had come but he would not recognize its coming. He absolutely refused to go on the stump, to conciliate the press, to do anything for the purpose of courting popularity and making himself a party. His obstinacy was fatal to his ambition but is not dishonourable to his memory."—Goldwin Smith, *United States*, ch. 4.—"There was this sharp and doubtful struggle for the presidency, with its closing appeal to the managing politicians of the House, just shock enough, just thrill and zest enough of direct challenge and open contest, to bring the hidden lines of party to the surface. The four years of Mr. Adams' administration completed their disclosure, and changed the whole face of politics. The new President was undeniably the choice of a minority of the nation. He seemed to the impatient men of the new generation to be holding the government arbitrarily back from the touch of renewal and of democratization which they were eagerly waiting to give it. . . . Social changes had come upon the nation thick and fast with the passing away of that first age, in which the government had been set up and had received its life and structure, and radical political changes had inevitably followed in their train. In the gathering host of new States at the west there could be nothing but levels of privilege: no special class, trained and preferred for government, as in New England and the South, but universal manhood suffrage; and the example of the West had reacted powerfully upon the East. There, too, social change was touching affairs with the touch of transformation. . . . New industries raised new classes, to rank with the merchants and the lawyers of the older order. The quick, incessant initiative of individuals broke the lines between class and class so often athwart that they became at last confused and lost. The suffrage was inevitably widened in the East, as in the West; and with the number of voters the number of those who played a managing and organizing and originative part in politics also increased. Every right, as far as might be every function of politics, was thrown open to every man. Nine out of the fifteen States which took part in the second election of General Washington chose their electors through their legislatures; only six gave the people any direct part in the choice. In the election just decided by the vote of the House, on the contrary, the electors had been chosen by the direct vote of the people in eighteen out of the twenty-four States of the Union. Before another presidential election came around every State except Delaware and South Carolina had adopted the same popular system. It was the pulse of these changes that now beat in affairs. A new democracy stood eager for its triumph. . . . It was tired of the 'Virginia dynasty' that had ruled it, as if by prescriptive privilege, since the century opened, and was infinitely impatient of Mr. Adams as its heir and successor. . . . The new impulse of the time craved a hero rather than a statesman. No one knew or asked General Jackson's opinions. His friends put him forward, not as a thinker or even as an organizer of parties, but simply as a man, whom the nation could trust: a man with rugged strength enough to break the old order of politics, now grown artificial, and inaugurate a new, under which the people, whose child and type he was, should come to their own. That was the significance of the ninety-nine electoral

votes cast for General Jackson in 1825."—W. Wilson, *History of the American people*, v. 3, pp. 269-272, 274.

ALSO IN: F. J. Turner, *Rise of the new West*, ch. 15.—J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 1, ch. 17, 18.—T. H. Clay, *Henry Clay*, ch. 6.—C. R. Fish, *Civil service and the patronage*, pp. 70-78.

1824.—Agreement with Russia concerning fisheries question and claims on western coast. See FISHERIES: 1821-1824; OREGON: 1741-1836.

1824-1825.—Visit of Lafayette.—One of the most deeply interesting events of the year 1824 was the arrival in the country of the honored Lafayette, companion of Washington and friend of the American republic in its struggle for independence. He came on the invitation of the national government and was entertained as its guest. "He arrived at Staten Island on Sunday, 15th of August, 1824, accompanied by his son, George Washington Lafayette, and his son-in-law, M. Le Vasseur. Here he remained until Monday, and was then met and welcomed by a distinguished



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committee from New York, who escorted him to that city. . . . The arrival of Lafayette was an event which stirred the whole country; everybody was anxious to see him, and every State and city in the Union extended an invitation to him to visit such State or city; and he did so, being everywhere received with the most enthusiastic manifestations of love and respect. . . . He spent a little over a year in the United States, traveling most of the time. . . . Having visited every portion of the United States and received the affectionate homage of the people, General Lafayette returned to Washington, where he became in fact 'the Nation's Guest' at the Presidential mansion. Soon after the meeting of Congress, in December, 1824, a bill was reported by a joint committee of the two Houses granting to him a township of land and the sum of \$200,000, which became a law."—N. Sargent, *Public men and events*, 1817-1853, v. 1, pp. 89-91.

ALSO IN: A. Levasseur, *Lafayette in America*, in 1824-1825.—B. Tuckerman, *Life of General Lafayette*, v. 2, ch. 7.

1824-1835.—Plans of slave power for acquiring Texas. See TEXAS: 1824-1835.

1825.—Ratification of colonization schemes and constitution of Liberia. See LIBERIA: 1824-1847.

1825.—Opening of Erie canal. See CANALS: American: Erie canal.

1825.—Boundary treaty with Indians at Prairie du Chien. See WISCONSIN: 1812-1825.

1825.—Treaties with Indians regarding relinquishment of their land claims to Georgia, Oklahoma and Kansas.—Removal of Indians to Indian territory. See OKLAHOMA: 1824-1837.

1825-1828.—Opposition to the administration.—Question of internal improvements.—Reconstruction of parties.—Democrats and National Republicans.—The inaugural address of President Adams "furnished a topic" against him, and "went to the reconstruction of parties on the old line of strict, or latitudinous, construction of the constitution. It was the topic of internal national improvement by the federal government. The address extolled the value of such works, considered the constitutional objections as yielding to the force of argument, expressed the hope that every speculative (constitutional) scruple would be solved in a practical blessing; and declared the belief that, in the execution of such works, posterity would derive a fervent gratitude to the founders of our Union and most deeply feel and acknowledge the beneficent action of our government. The declaration of principles which would give so much power to the government . . . alarmed the old republicans, and gave a new ground of opposition to Mr. Adams's administration, in addition to the strong one growing out of the election in the House of Representatives. . . . This new ground of opposition was greatly strengthened at the delivery of the first annual message, in which the topic of internal improvement was again largely enforced, other subjects recommended which would require a liberal use of constructive powers, and Congress informed that the President had accepted an invitation from the American States of Spanish origin, to send ministers to their proposed Congress on the Isthmus of Panama [see COLUMBIA: 1826]. It was, therefore, clear from the beginning that the new administration was to have a settled and strong opposition. . . . There was opposition in the Senate to the confirmation of Mr. Clay's nomination to the State department, growing out of his support of Mr. Adams in the election of the House of Representatives, and acceptance of office from him; but overruled by a majority of two to one."—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 1, ch. 21—"It was a bitter thing to bear, . . . [Mr. Jackson's] supporters found, to see Mr. Adams preferred before him, and Mr. Clay's support given, out of the West itself, to the candidate of an eastern minority,—so bitter that they protested in their anger against the constitution itself, which made the thing possible: against any law, though it were the fundamental law of the land, which could thus restrain and defeat 'the will of the people.' Their bitterness turned to malice when Mr. Adams asked Mr. Clay to become Secretary of State under the new administration and Mr. Clay consented. There was here, they said, palpable evidence of a bargain, . . . 'a coalition,' exclaimed John Randolph, with bitter jest, 'unheard of until now, of the Puritan and the blackleg.' The charge was shown to be absolutely groundless. There had been no previous understanding whatever between Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay. But they were facing men who in the vehemence of their passion believed what they chose, and whose leader was as im-

placable and as obstinate in error as he was honest and direct in action. General Jackson had been bred by the rough processes of the frontier; had been his own schoolmaster and tutor; had made himself a lawyer by putting his untaught sagacity and sense of right to the test in the actual conduct of suits in court, as he had made himself a soldier by taking the field in command of frontier volunteers as unschooled as himself in discipline and tactics. There was a certain natural grace and sweetness in the man when he was at ease, and an impressive dignity always. 'General Jackson's manners are more presidential than those of any of the candidates,' wrote a leading member of the House who was his opponent. 'He is grave, mild, and reserved. . . . But his nature was compact of passion. His prejudices, once fixed were ineradicable. He believed with all the terrible force that was in him, when once engaged in any public matter, that those who were with him were his friends and the country's, those who were against him enemies of the country as well as of himself. It had needed such a striking personality as this to bring parties to a head. They took form rapidly enough when he came upon the field. The coalition between Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay had been not only incorrupt, but an arrangement to be looked for in the nature of things. Mr. Clay stood in all his thought for the same principles of liberal construction in applying the constitution and for the same purposes of legislative action in furthering national interests that Mr. Adams frankly avowed and earnestly advocated: protective tariffs, internal improvements; the deliberate building up and binding together of the nation. General Jackson's friends, on the contrary, were found for the most part among the men who had reacted against this new programme, in which every principle and purpose of the old Federalists seemed revived, and who were harking back to the principles upon which the Republican party of Mr. Jefferson had been founded: a scrupulous limitation of the powers of the federal government, a studious regard for the separate powers of the several States, a democratic diffusion of power throughout the body politic. . . . Whether General Jackson definitely or consciously held their views or not they did not stop to ask. What was of moment to them was, that he stood in the eyes of the whole nation an unmistakable type of the unsophisticated man of the people. His instincts, they felt sure, could be trusted to make and keep him a partisan of popular privilege and local self-government. And so parties formed: *National Republicans*, as they began to call themselves [later known as Whigs] turned to Mr. Clay and Mr. Adams for leadership, while all 'Democrats' of the older type turned to those who pressed the candidacy of General Jackson. . . . The four years Mr. Adams was President yielded, accordingly scarcely a single important measure of legislation or of policy. . . . Hitherto the President had been always the real leader of the government. His messages had in no small degree constituted the programmes of party action, in Congress hardly less than in executive policy. Now, of a sudden, they counted almost for nothing. Mr. Adams was treated as if he were the leader of a faction. Congress seldom vouchsafed so much as a respectful consideration to his suggestions. . . . Mr. Adams performed his duties with the diligence, the intelligence, the high-minded regard for principle that had always characterized him. No man of his generation was better acquainted than he with the field of foreign policy, still here and there

perplexed and ominous; and he applied himself like a statesman to the settlement of every question that was likely to affect either the trade or the peace of the country. His successful treaties of commerce nearly equalled in number those of all the preceding Administrations put together. But in the chief matter of all he failed, and his opponents noted that alone. In 1815 Mr. Monroe, then Secretary of State, had succeeded in obtaining from England the right of trade with the British West Indies, in which, the ports once open, American merchants and skippers easily gained a virtual monopoly; but in 1825, when that agreement lapsed, England changed her policy, opened the West Indian ports to all the world on terms which put the United States at a disadvantage, and, because the United States did not, within a year set, accept the new arrangement, flatly refused so much as to open the matter again for negotiation (1826). Congress, not Mr. Adams, had been at fault; but the country, . . . remembered only that he failed to secure the invaluable West Indian trade. The party contests of those barren years of divided counsel turned chiefly upon the tariff question of internal improvements. Mr. Adams was an avowed advocate of internal improvements upon a national scale, conceived and carried forward in accordance with . . . such a scheme as Mr. Gallatin had long ago conceived and advocated. . . . But the new 'Democrats' made that impossible. Money in very liberal sums was voted from time to time for specific works of general or local utility, but the idea of a system of national improvements undertaken by the federal government had to be given up. The tariff was another matter. The systematic protection of domestic industries, once undertaken, could not be kept squared with its object or maintained in good repair without frequent alterations and adjustments. . . . The result was the tariff of 1828."—W. Wilson, *History of the American people*, v. 3, pp. 274-282.—See also **TARIFF: 1828**.—"In October, 1825, the Tennessee Legislature nominated Jackson for the Presidency in 1828, and Jackson accepted the nomination. Crawford's continued ill-health compelled his adherents to look elsewhere for a candidate, and they gradually united upon Jackson. At first the resulting coalition was known as 'Jackson Men,' but, as they began to take the character of a national party, they assumed the name of Democrats, by which they have since been known. They maintained the strict constructionist principles of the Republican party, though the Crawford faction in the South went further, and held the extreme ground of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1799."—A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, ch. 11.

Also in: E. Stanwood, *History of the presidency*, pp. 142-143.

1825-1875.—Early trade unions in America.—National Trades' Union.—National Labor Union.—Knights of St. Crispin. See **LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1825-1875**.

1826.—Death of Adams and Jefferson.—By an impressive coincidence John Adams and Thomas Jefferson died on July 4th, 1826,—the fiftieth anniversary of independence.

1826-1851.—Organized temperance movements.—Growth of societies. See **LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1826-1851**.

1828.—"Tariff of Abominations." See **TARIFF: 1828**.

1828.—Eleventh presidential election.—Triumph of Jackson and the new democracy.—"The campaign was conducted, on both sides, on very

ruthless methods. Niles said it was worse than the campaign of 1798. Campaign extras of the 'Telegraph' were issued weekly, containing partisan material, refutations of charges against Jackson, and slanders on Adams and Clay. The Adams party also published a monthly of a similar character. The country was deluged with pamphlets on both sides. These pamphlets were very poor stuff, and contain nothing important on any of the issues. They all appeal to low tastes and motives, prejudices and jealousies. . . . In September, 1827, the Tammany General Committee and the Albany 'Argus' came out for Jackson, as it had been determined, in the programme, that they should do. A law was passed for casting the vote of New York in 1828 by districts. The days of voting throughout the country ranged from October 31st to November 19th. The votes were cast by the Legislature in Delaware and South Carolina; by districts in Maine, New York, Maryland, Tennessee; elsewhere, by general ticket. Jackson got 178 votes to 83 for Adams. The popular vote was 648,273 for Jackson; 508,064 for Adams. Jackson got only one vote in New England. . . . For Vice-President, Richard Rush got all the Adams votes; Calhoun [who was elected] got all the Jackson votes except 7 of Georgia, which were given to William Smith of South Carolina. General Jackson was therefore triumphantly elected President of the United States, in the name of reform, and as the standard-bearer of the people, rising in their might to overthrow an extravagant, corrupt, aristocratic, federalist administration, which had encroached on the liberties of the people, and had aimed to corrupt elections by an abuse of federal patronage. Many people believed this picture of Adams's administration to be true. Andrew Jackson no doubt believed it. . . . Perhaps no administration, except that of the elder Adams, is under such odium. There is not, however, in our history any administration which, upon a severe and impartial scrutiny, appears more worthy of respectful and honorable memory. Its chief fault was that it was too good for the wicked world in which it found itself. In 1836 Adams said, in the House, that he had never removed one person from office for political causes, and that he thought that was one of the principal reasons why he was not reelected."—W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a public man*, ch. 5.—"In this election there was a circumstance to be known and remembered. Mr. Adams and Mr. Rush were both from the non-slaveholding, General Jackson and Mr. Calhoun from the slaveholding States, and both large slave owners themselves, and both received a large vote (73 each) in the free States—and of which at least 40 were indispensable to their election. There was no jealousy, or hostile or aggressive spirit in the North at that time against the South!"—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 1, ch. 38.—"General Jackson's friends had reason to be satisfied. The effect they had wrought was indeed dramatic, revolutionary. They had cut a line of cleavage between epoch and epoch in the history of the country. They had broken, once for all, the 'Virginian dynasty,' 'the succession of Secretaries,' the leadership of trained and trusted men; had set aside every tradition of national politics; and had begun the administration of the executive office of the Union afresh upon their own plan. They had not indeed, won secure control of either house of Congress. . . . But the whole atmosphere of affairs, the whole tone of the government changed, nevertheless, with the coming in of General Jackson. The new nation,

its quality subtly altered, its point of view insensibly shifted by the movement into the West, had smiled with some degree of patient complacency upon Mr. Monroe, and had endured John Quincy Adams, but now for the first time chose after its own kind and preferred General Jackson. It was a second democratization of the government. And yet it differed radically from the first, which Mr. Jefferson had so shrewdly contrived. . . . Mr. Jefferson had indeed expressed the greatest alarm 'at the prospect of seeing General Jackson President.' 'He is,' he said, 'one of the most unfit men I know of for the place. He has had very little respect for laws or constitutions, and is, in fact, an able military chief. His passions are terrible. He has been much tried since I knew him, but he is a dangerous man.' And had Mr. Jefferson lived to witness the result, he would hardly have altered his judgment. He had stood, for all he was, so full of democratic doctrine, for conservative ways of political growth. . . . General Jackson professed to be of the school of Mr. Jefferson himself; and what he professed he believed. There was no touch of the charlatan or the demagogue about him. The action of his mind was as direct, as sincere, as unsophisticated as the action of the mind of an ingenuous child, though it exhibited also the sustained intensity and the range of the mature man. . . . He was in fact what his partisans loved to call him, a man of the people, of the common people. Mr. Jefferson was only a patron of the people: appealed to the rank and file, believed in them, but shared neither their tastes nor their passions. Moreover, the effective rank and file of the nation had changed since his day of ascendancy. Step by step, one State following another, the old restrictions upon the suffrage, taken for granted in Jefferson's time, had been removed, until in almost every part of the Union the men of the masses had become the stuff of politics. These men Jackson really represented, albeit with a touch of the knight and chivalrous man of honour about him; . . . and the people knew it; felt that an aristocratic order was upset, and that they themselves had at last come to their own. It must have seemed so in very fact at their President's inauguration. Washington filled with crowds come out of every quarter of the Union. All ceremony was overridden, all decorum cast aside. It seemed as if the place were in the possession of a good-natured mob, bent upon no serious mischief, but not to be restrained, not to be forbidden even the drawing rooms of the White House or the committee rooms and chambers of the Capitol. There was scarcely room enough in the streets for the passage of the procession which accompanied General Jackson to the place of inauguration. So great a crowd rushed, unbidden, into the White House, when General Jackson came to it from the Capitol, that he was himself forced against the wall of the reception chamber by its pressure, and was secured against serious danger only by a number of gentlemen linking arms and forming themselves into a barrier. Everywhere it was proclaimed that the people had come into possession of the government; that the domination of professional statesmen and politicians had been thrown off: that the rank and file were the victors, and that to the victors belonged 'the spoils of the enemy.'—W. Wilson, *History of the American people*, v. 4, pp. 1-5.

ALSO IN: J. S. Bassett, *Andrew Jackson*, pp. 375-405.


1828-1833. — Nullification doctrine of South

Carolina. — Webster-Hayne debate. — Compromise tariff. — President Jackson's proclamation. — Passage of Nullification Ordinance. — Before President Jackson's first year in the office had drawn to a close, he was faced with the question of nullification which arose over opposition, by the Southern states, to the tariff, known as the "tariff of abominations." (See TARIFF: 1828.) "It happened most unfortunately that the hard times that began in 1818 and lasted over into the twenties impelled the Northern manufacturers to appeal to Congress again for assistance in the shape of increased protection to their industries. This movement resulted in the Tariff Act of 1824. It was not a high tariff in any way, but it was the first truly protective tariff in our history. The attitude of the Southerners may be gathered from the fact that of the fifty-six or fifty-eight members of the House of Representatives from Virginia and North Carolina and the five Cotton States to the southward, only one—Johnson of Virginia, from the Monongahela District—voted for it. In 1827, a convention of the Friends of Domestic Industry met at Harrisburg in Pennsylvania and called for more protection. This in turn excited the South Carolinians to renewed agitation, and the State legislature adopted a report and resolutions declaring that the Constitution of the United States was 'a compact between the people of the different States with each other, as separate, independent sovereignties,' and the view that the Constitution emanated from the people as a whole was a dangerous doctrine. Georgia and North Carolina also protested against the protective system. The actual passage of the Tariff of Abominations in 1828 gave the signal for more radical demonstrations."—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 5, pp. 418-419.—"In May, 1828, a meeting of the South Carolina delegation in Congress was held in Washington, at the rooms of General Hayne, one of the Senators of that State, to concert measures against the tariff and the protective policy which it embodied. From the history of the times, and the disclosures subsequently made, it is apparent that some violent things were said at this meeting, but it broke up without any definite plan. In the course of the following summer, there were many popular meetings in South Carolina, largely attended, at which the tariff of 1824 was treated as an act of despotism and usurpation, which ought to be openly resisted. . . . They occasioned anxiety and regret among the friends of the Union throughout the country, though nothing more. But, in the autumn, the Legislature of South Carolina adopted . . . [the] 'Exposition and Protest,' which gave form and substance to the doctrines, which thenceforward became known as 'Nullification.' In order to understand them, however, as a theory of the Federal Constitution, it is necessary to state the theory to which they are opposed, and to overthrow which they were brought forward. The Government of the United States, under the Constitution, had hitherto been administered upon the principle that the extent of its powers is to be finally determined by its supreme judicial tribunal, not only when there is any conflict of authority between its several departments, but also when the authority of the whole Government is denied by one or more of the States. . . . Aside from the authority of [the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798]—an authority that was doubtful, because their interpretation was not clear—there had been no important assertion of the principle that a State can determine for its citizens whether they are to obey

an act of Congress, by asserting its unconstitutional character, and that the right to do this is implied as a right inherent in a State, under the Constitution, and results from the nature of the Government. This, however, was what the advocates of nullification now undertook to establish. The remedy which they sought, against acts which they regarded as usurpations, was not revolution, and not the breaking up the Union, as they claimed; but it was a remedy which they held to exist within the Union, and to have been contemplated by the people of the States when they established the Constitution. . . . Although the Legislature of South Carolina had thus propounded a theory of resistance, and held that there was then a case in the tariff which would justify a resort to it, no steps were yet taken toward the immediate exercise of the asserted power."—G. T. Curtis, *Life of Daniel Webster*, v. 1, ch. 16.—"John C. Calhoun now comes to the front. In earlier years he had advocated internal improvements and protection to industry and had sponsored the act chartering the second Bank of the United States. Apparently during Monroe's administration, he had seen nothing wrong in these policies; but now he took charge of the rhetorical campaign and used his great powers of analysis and of literary expression to put the best face possible upon the proposition that a State could refuse obedience to an act of Congress and at the same time not be in a condition of rebellion. . . . Calhoun wrote the report of the committee of the State legislature on Governor Taylor's message which was adopted in December, 1828, and made public early in 1829. For a time, his authorship was kept secret, probably because it might have seemed ill-fitting for the Vice-President to affix his name to a document justifying the annulment of an act of Congress. . . . The nullification doctrine, as one finds it in the 'Exposition' of 1828 and in Calhoun's speech on the Force Bill in 1833, rests on the assumption that the people of each State was sovereign at the time of the ratification of the Constitution and, in ratifying that instrument, acted in its separate and sovereign capacity. The Constitution, therefore, was a compact to which each State was a party and each one of them had a right to judge of its infractions and to interpose to maintain the rights of the people of the State within its limits. The general government is only 'the joint agent of two distinct sovereignties' and the Union is 'a union of States as communities, and not a union of individuals' and there is no immediate connection between individuals and the general government. It followed, therefore, that the people of a State in its sovereign capacity could declare an act of the federal government null and void and not binding on it, and could by legislative action protect the citizens of that State against the federal government. The scene of action now shifts to Washington and centres about the person of Daniel Webster."—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 5, pp. 419-420.

"In 1830 the question of nullification came up on the floor of Congress as an incident to a debate upon the disposition of the national domain. Senator Foote of Connecticut had introduced a resolution, the spirit of which was to limit the sales of the public lands. Nothing important came of the resolution, but the debate brought forth a distinct statement by powerful champions of the North and of the South upon the constitutional principles upon which the two sections were to diverge. The champion of the South was Senator Hayne of South Carolina. Calhoun could not take the floor,

for at the time he was Vice-President and therefore the presiding officer of the Senate. It has been said that Hayne was 'Calhoun's sword and buckler, and that he returned to the contest refreshed each morning by nightly communions with the Vice-President, drawing auxiliary supplies from the well-stored arsenal of his powerful and subtle mind.'"—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 272.—In the great debate which occurred in the Senate, in January, 1830, the doctrine of nullification received for the first time a discussion which sank deep into the mind of the nation. Hayne in his first speech (on the resolutions) made an attack on New England which drew out Webster in vindication, and then, when the South Carolinian replied, he boldly and broadly set forth the nullifying theory which his State had accepted from the sophistical brain of John C. Calhoun. It received its refutation then and there, in Webster's final speech. "The effect of this speech upon the country, that immediately followed its de-



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livery, it is not easy for us at the present day to measure. . . . Vast numbers of Mr. Webster's speech were . . . published and circulated in pamphlet editions, after all the principal newspapers of the country had given it entire to their readers. The popular verdict, throughout the Northern and Western and many of the Southern States was decisive. A great majority of the people of the United States, of all parties, understood, appreciated, and accepted the view maintained by Mr. Webster of the nature of the Constitution, and the character of the government which it establishes."—G. T. Curtis, *Life of Daniel Webster*, v. 1, ch. 16.—"The Webster-Hayne debate in January, 1830, placed the two theories of the union definitely before the nation. People everywhere were taking sides, and it began to be asked on which the President would be found. Within three months of the famous debate the question was answered. . . . April 13th was Jefferson's birthday, long observed by democrats for renewing their devotion to party principles. As the day approached in 1830, the South Carolina group pre-

pared to take a prominent part in its celebration. Their object, says Van Buren very plausibly, was two-fold; (1) to get the sympathy of Virginia by exalting Jefferson and by stressing the relation of their own doctrine to the resolutions of 1798, and (2) to please Georgia, long opposed to South Carolina, by praising her position in the affair of the Cherokees, itself a kind of nullification."—J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 2, pp. 554-555.—"At this time Jackson was in sympathy with the Van Buren faction . . . and it was decided that he should give such a toast as would show his disapproval of Calhoun's theories. He arose at the feast with this sentiment, 'Our federal union, it must be preserved!' . . . Calhoun, who was next called on, tried to retrieve the situation by giving as his toast, 'The union, next to our liberty most dear! May we all remember that it can only be preserved by respecting the rights of the states and distributing equally the benefits and burthens of the union!' But the words of the president were most significant. They indicated that he would not be brought into the general Southern movement which the nullifiers planned."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 401.

"Since the tariff was the cause of most of the irritation, Congress, in 1832, wishing to placate the nullifiers, overhauled the Tariff of Abominations, reducing some of the obnoxious duties, especially those on plantation supplies. [See TARIFF: 1832.] But inasmuch as the reductions were not accompanied by any important modification of the protective system the South was not placated. Upon the passage of the act the members of Congress from South Carolina drew up a formal protest declaring 'that all hope of relief from Congress was irrevocably gone, that protection must henceforth be regarded as the settled policy of the country, and that the people of South Carolina must decide whether their rights and liberties were to be tamely surrendered without a struggle or transmitted undiminished to their posterity.' South Carolina was ready for a struggle. She immediately prepared for a practical application of Calhoun's doctrine of 'interposition.'"—E. S. Forman, *American republic*, pp. 282-283.—"The governor, an ardent nullifier, called a meeting of the legislature, which quickly ordered an election for a convention to meet on November 19th . . . in order that the intended programme might be completed before the meeting of congress in December, 1832. Now appeared the effects of the powerful efforts of Calhoun. Nearly the whole state turned to his doctrine, and, November 24th, the convention passed the famous nullification ordinance. This instrument declared the tariff laws of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional and not binding on the state, it prohibited appeals to the supreme court of the United States in cases arising under this ordinance, it ordered all state officials except members of the legislature to take an oath to obey the ordinance, and it fixed February 1, 1833, as the day when it would go into operation. It closed with a threat that an attempt of the federal government to oppose its enforcement would absolve South Carolina from allegiance to the union and leave it a separate sovereign state."—J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 2, p. 563.—"With the Ordinance the convention issued two addresses, one to the people of South Carolina, and the other to the peoples of the other Commonwealths. . . . The one to the people of South Carolina contained the theory of nullification, as elaborated by Calhoun, and the justification of its employment in the existing situation.

It closed with an appeal to their love of liberty and a demand of obedience. The address to the peoples of the several Commonwealths contained an announcement of the passage of the nullifying Ordinance, the theory upon which it was based, an assertion of the unconstitutionality of the protective tariff, and its oppression upon the people of South Carolina, and a declaration of the spirit and feeling of the convention, and of the people it represented, toward the Union, the Constitution and the people of the manufacturing Commonwealths. . . . In a message of November 27th, Governor Hamilton communicated to the legislature of the Commonwealth the Ordinance of Nullification and recommended the enactment of measures by that body for the execution of the Ordinance. On December 13, the new Governor, Colonel Hayne, who has resigned his seat in the Senate in order that Mr. Calhoun, who had himself resigned the vice-presidency, might be made South Carolina's representative in the Senate, or, as the South Carolinians now considered it, South Carolina's ambassador to the Government of the United States, pronounced his inaugural address before the legislature, dedicating himself to the service of the Commonwealth in the execution of her Ordinance of Nullification. The legislature immediately passed the acts required by the convention and recommended by the Governor [namely the Replevin Act, an act to provide for the event of the employment of military power by the Federal government and a test act]."—J. W. Burgess, *Middle period*, pp. 223-224.—"Some preparation, although little, was made for a conflict of arms"; nor was there any certain show of readiness in other Southern states to stand by South Carolina in the position she had taken. "President Jackson's annual message, which went to Congress on December 4, 1832, was remarkably quiet in tone," and neither alarmed the nullifiers nor gave confidence to the friends of the Union; but "six days later, on December 10, came out Jackson's famous proclamation against the nullifiers, which spoke thus: 'The Constitution of the United States forms a government, not a league. . . . Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power to resist them. To say that any state may at pleasure secede from the Union is to say that the United States are not a nation.' He appealed to the people of South Carolina, in the tone of a father, to desist from their ruinous enterprise; but he gave them also clearly to understand that, if they resisted by force, the whole power of the Union would be exerted to maintain its authority. All over the North, even where Jackson had been least popular, the proclamation was hailed with unbounded enthusiasm. . . . The nullifiers in South Carolina received the presidential manifesto apparently with defiance. The governor of the state issued a counter-proclamation. Calhoun resigned the vice-presidency, and was immediately sent to the Senate to fight the battle for nullification there." The president, now thoroughly roused, called on Congress for extraordinary powers to meet the emergency, and the Force Bill was passed to give the president power to execute the tariff laws by force if necessary. But, at the same time, while they showed this bold front to the nullifiers, Congress and the executive began to prepare a retreat from the ground they had held on the tariff. Henry Clay took the field again, in the exercise of his peculiar talents for compromise, and the result was the nearly simultaneous passage (February 26 and 27, 1833) through Congress of the "Force Bill" and of a compromise



tariff bill, which latter provided for a graduated reduction of the duties year by year, until 1842, when they should stand at 20 per cent., as a horizontal rate, with a large free-list. "The first object of the measure was attained: South Carolina repealed her nullification ordinance. . . . But before long it became clear that, beyond the repeal of the nullification ordinance, the compromise had settled nothing. The nullifiers strenuously denied that they had in any sense given up their peculiar doctrine."

—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 2, ch. 14.—

"The theory of nullification, as set forth by Calhoun, even now, after it has received the benefit of careful study and able expounding by historians, is not clear. He always avowed a loyalty to the Union, but the arguments by which he sought to demonstrate that nullification was compatible with the existence of the Union, and indeed a guarantee of its perpetuity, did not occasion much solicitude to the majority of his party. But no one at the North understood the fallacy of his reasoning or the real end and aim of his party more clearly than did the Union men of his state. They reasoned simply. Said the Camden, S. C. 'Gazette': 'We know of only two ways, under our government, to get rid of obnoxious legislation. We must convince a majority of the nation that a given enactment is wrong and have it repealed in the form prescribed by the constitution, or resist it extraconstitutionally by the sword. . . . But this everlasting cant of devotion to the Union, accompanied by a recommendation to do those acts that must necessarily destroy it, is beyond patient endurance from a people not absolutely confined in their own mad-houses.' . . . A fact . . . that historians have failed to lay any stress upon, and that nevertheless deserves some notice, is the holding of a state convention of the Union party of South Carolina immediately after the nullification convention had completed its work. It was the last important action of that party in the state. Randell Hunt, who presented the first resolutions, epitomized the views of the convention and the question it should consider in three sentences: 'That the Union party acknowledges no allegiance to any government except that of the United States. That in referring this resolution to the general committee they be instructed to inquire whether it is not expedient to give a military organization to the Union party throughout the state. Whether it will not be necessary to call in the assistance of the general government for maintaining the laws of the United States against the arbitrary violence which is threatened by the late convention.' The resolutions which were adopted declared that the ordinance of nullification violated the constitution of the United States and had virtually destroyed the Union, since by preventing the general government from enforcing its laws within the boundaries of the state, it made the state a sovereignty paramount to the United States. They denounced the provisions of the ordinance as tyrannical and oppressive, and the test oath as especially incompatible with civil liberty, in that it disfranchised nearly half the citizens of the state. . . . They concluded by declaring the continued opposition of the signers to the tariff, and their determination to protect themselves against intolerable oppression. The resolutions were signed by all the members of the convention, about 180 in number. In point of fact, the Unionists were not disposed to favor any compromise measures, and looked rather with disfavor upon Mr. Clay's bill, as a measure which was being forced upon the country. . . . The Unionist party . . . never was an active force

in the state again, but the bold spirit which had actuated its members was manifested later, when the struggle for state sovereignty was more widespread; and some of the most intrepid Union men of the South in the civil war were those who had fled from South Carolina years before, when the nullification party had triumphed."—G. Hunt, *South Carolina during the nullification struggle* (*Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1891).—The following is the text of the "Ordinance to nullify certain acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws laying duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities," adopted by the state convention of South Carolina on Nov. 24, 1832:

"Whereas the Congress of the United States by various acts, purporting to be acts laying duties and imposts on foreign imports, but in reality intended for the protection of domestic manufactures, and the giving of bounties to classes and individuals engaged in particular employments, at the expense and to the injury and oppression of other classes and individuals, and by wholly exempting from taxation certain foreign commodities, such as are not produced or manufactured in the United States, to afford a pretext for imposing higher and excessive duties on articles similar to those intended to be protected, hath exceeded its just powers under the constitution, which confers on it no authority to afford such protection, and hath violated the true meaning and intent of the constitution, which provides for equality in imposing the burdens of taxation upon the several States and portions of the confederacy: And whereas the said Congress, exceeding its just power to impose taxes and collect revenue for the purpose of effecting and accomplishing the specific objects and purposes which the constitution of the United States authorizes it to effect and accomplish, hath raised and collected unnecessary revenue for objects, unauthorized by the constitution. We, therefore, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and, more especially, an act entitled 'An act in alteration of the several acts imposing duties on imports,' approved on the nineteenth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, and also an act entitled 'An act to alter and amend the several acts imposing duties on imports,' approved on the fourteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, are unauthorized by the constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens; and all promises, contracts, and obligations, made or entered into, or to be made or entered into, with purpose to secure the duties imposed by said acts, and all judicial proceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmation thereof, are and shall be held utterly null and void. And it is further ordained, that it shall not be lawful for any of the constituted authorities, whether of this State or of the United States, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the said acts within the limits of this State; but it shall be the duty of the legislature to adopt such measures and pass such acts as may be necessary to give full effect to this ordinance, and to prevent the enforcement and arrest the operation of the said acts and parts of acts of the Con-

gress of the United States within the limits of this State, from and after the 1st day of February next, and the duty of all other constituted authorities, and of all persons residing or being within the limits of this State, and they are hereby required and enjoined to obey and give effect to this ordinance, and such acts and measures of the legislature as may be passed or adopted in obedience thereto. And it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts of this State, wherein shall be drawn in question the authority of this ordinance, or the validity of such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed for the purpose of giving effect thereto, or the validity of the aforesaid acts of Congress, imposing duties, shall any appeal be taken or allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and if any such appeal shall be attempted to be taken, the courts of this State shall proceed to execute and enforce their judgments according to the laws and usages of the State, without reference to such attempted appeal, and the person or persons attempting to take such appeal may be dealt with as for a contempt of the court. And it is further ordained, that all persons now holding any office of honor, profit, or trust, civil or military, under this State (members of the legislature excepted), shall, within such time, and in such manner as the legislature shall prescribe, take an oath well and truly to obey, execute, and enforce this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed in pursuance thereof, according to the true intent and meaning of the same; and on the neglect or omission of any such person or persons so to do, his or their office or offices shall be forthwith vacated, and shall be filled up as if such person or persons were dead or had resigned; and no person hereafter elected to any office of honor, profit, or trust, civil or military (members of the legislature excepted), shall, until the legislature shall otherwise provide and direct, enter on the execution of his office, or be in any respect competent to discharge the duties thereof until he shall, in like manner, have taken a similar oath; and no juror shall be empanelled in any of the courts of this State, in any cause in which shall be in question this ordinance, or any act of the legislature passed in pursuance thereof, unless he shall first, in addition to the usual oath, have taken an oath that he will well and truly obey, execute, and enforce this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed to carry the same into operation and effect, according to the true intent and meaning thereof. And we, the people of South Carolina, to the end that it may be fully understood by the government of the United States, and the people of the co-States, that we are determined to maintain this our ordinance and declaration, at every hazard, do further declare that we will not submit to the application of force on the part of the federal government, to reduce this State to obedience; but that we will consider the passage, by Congress, of any act authorizing the employment of a military or naval force against the State of South Carolina, her constitutional authorities or citizens; or any act abolishing or closing the ports of this State, or any of them, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress and egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act on the part of the federal government, to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the acts hereby declared to be null and void, otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the coun-


try, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of this State will henceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States; and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do. Done in convention at Columbia, the twenty-fourth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, and in the fifty-seventh year of the declaration of the independence of the United States of America."—See also SOUTH CAROLINA: 1828-1833.

ALSO IN: W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a public man*, ch. 10, 13.—H. von Holst, *Constitution and political history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 12.—J. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 3, ch. 32-34.—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 1, ch. 78-80.—J. C. Calhoun, *Works*, v. 6 (*Reports and public letters*).—O. L. Elliott, *Tariff controversy in the United States*, ch. 5.—C. H. Ambler, *Life and diary of John Floyd*, pp. 201-227.—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 5, pp. 263-267.—D. F. Houston, *Critical study of nullification in South Carolina*.—W. A. Schaper, *Sectionalism in South Carolina*.—H. M. Wagstaff, *States rights and political parties in North Carolina*.—D. Webster, *Letter to Stephen White*, Jan. 18, 1833 (*American Historical Review*, July, 1920).—T. Roosevelt, *Thomas Hart Benton*, ch. 5.—W. MacDonald, *Jacksonian Democracy*, p. 84 ff.—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 367-378.

1829.—Appointments to cabinet.—Kitchen cabinet.—Introduction of "spoils system."—"Jackson was, as no President before him, the choice of the masses. His popular vote in 1824 revealed not only his personal popularity but the growing power of the democratic elements in the nation, and his defeat in the House of Representatives only strengthened his own and the people's determination to be finally victorious. The untrained, self-willed, passionate frontier soldier came to power in 1828 as the standard bearer of a mighty democratic uprising which was destined before it ran its course to break down oligarchical party organizations, to liberalize state and local governments, and to turn the stream of national politics into wholly new channels. It was futile for men of the old school to protest and to prophesy misfortune for the country under its new rulers. The people had spoken, and this time the people's will was not to be denied. Still haggard from his recent personal loss [in the death of his wife, who died in December, 1828], the President-elect set out for Washington, at the middle of January, 1829. . . . Duff Green, one of the party managers, proposed that a great cavalcade should meet the victor at Pittsburgh and escort him by relays to the capital. On Van Buren's advice the plan was abandoned. But as the party passed along the National Road toward its destination it was accorded an ovation which left nothing to be desired as an evidence of the public favor. . . . The men with whom the Executive-elect was daily closeted were Major Lewis and Senators Eaton and White. Van Buren . . . was ably represented, however, by James A. Hamilton, a son of Alexander Hamilton, to whose correspondence we owe most of what we know about the laying of the plans for the new Administration. The most pressing question was the personnel of the Cabinet. Upon only one appointment was Jackson fully determined when he reached Wash-

ington: Van Buren was to be Secretary of State. . . . The appointments were kept secret until one week before the inauguration, when they were announced in the party organ at the capital, Duff Green's *United States Telegraph*. Everywhere the list caused consternation. Van Buren's was the only name of distinction in it; and only one of the appointees had had experience in the administration of national affairs. Hamilton pronounced the group 'the most unintellectual Cabinet we ever had.'—F. A. Ogg, *Reign of Andrew Jackson (Chronicles of America Series, v. 20, pp. 113-118)*.—"Much thought had been bestowed upon the composition of the Cabinet, and some of the President's warmest supporters urged that he should make use of the group as a council of state, after the manner of his predecessors. Jackson's purposes, however, ran in a different direction. . . . He saw no reason why these men, some of whom were primarily the friends of Calhoun, should be allowed to supplant old confidants like Lewis. Let them, he reasoned, go about their appointed tasks as heads of the administrative departments, while he looked for counsel withersoever he desired. Hence the official Cabinet fell into the background, and after a few weeks the practice of holding meetings was dropped. As advisers on party affairs and on matters of general policy the President drew about himself a heterogeneous group of men which the public labeled the 'Kitchen Cabinet.'"—F. A. Ogg, *Reign of Andrew Jackson (Chronicles of American Series, v. 20, pp. 129-130)*.—Major Lewis, one of the Tennessee friends of General Jackson, who accompanied him to Washington and was persuaded to remain, with his residence at the White House; General Duff Green, editor of the *United States Telegraph*; Isaac Hill, editor of the *New Hampshire Patriot*, and Amos Kendall, late editor of a Jackson paper in Kentucky, but a native of Massachusetts:—"these were the gentlemen . . . who, at the beginning of the new administration, were supposed to have most of the President's ear and confidence, and were stigmatized by the opposition as the Kitchen Cabinet."—J. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson, v. 3, ch. 16*.—See also CABINET, KITCHEN.—After the breach between Jackson and Calhoun, Duff Green adhered to the latter. The *Globe* newspaper was then founded, to be the organ of the administration, and Francis P. Blair, called from Kentucky to undertake the editorship, acquired at the same time Duff Green's vacated seat in the Kitchen cabinet.—J. Schouler, *History of the United States, v. 3, p. 501*.—"The establishment of the 'Globe,' the rupture with Calhoun, and the breaking up of the first cabinet had inaugurated a bitter war between the two rival papers, though really between the President and Mr. Calhoun, in consequence of which there were rich revelations made to the public."—N. Sargent, *Public men and events, 1817-1853, v. 1, p. 186*.—"A favorite theme of the Jackson forces during the late campaign was the abuses of the patronage, and the General came into office fully convinced that an overhauling of the civil service would be one of the greatest contributions that he could make to his country's welfare. . . . He believed that short terms and rapid rotation made for alertness and efficiency. He felt that one man had as much right to public office as another, and he was so unacquainted with the tasks of administration as to suppose all honest citizens equally capable of serving their fellowmen in public station. . . . Shortly after the election Major Lewis wrote to a friend that the General was 'resolved on making a pretty clean sweep of the depart-

ments.' . . . If a complete overturn was ever really contemplated, the plan was not followed up; and it is more than possible that it was Van Buren who marked off the limits beyond which it would not be expedient to go. None the less, Jackson's removals far exceeded those made by his predecessors. Speaking broadly, the power of removal had never yet been exercised in the Federal Government with offensive partizanship. Even under Jefferson, when the holders of half of the offices were changed in the space of four years, there were few removals for political reasons. No sooner was Jackson in office, however, than wholesale proscription began. The axe fell in every department and bureau, and cut off chiefs and clerks with equal lack of mercy. Age and experience counted rather against a man than in his favor, and rarely was any reason given for removal other than that some one else wanted the place. . . . The Post-Office Department and the Customs Service were



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purged with special severity. The sole principle on which the new appointees were selected was loyalty to Jackson. Practically all were inexperienced, most were incompetent, and several proved dishonest. 'There has been,' wrote the President in his journal a few weeks after the inauguration, 'a great noise made about removals.' Protest arose not only from the proscribed and their friends, but from the Adams-Clay forces generally, and even from some of the more moderate Jacksonians. 'Were it not for the outdoor popularity of General Jackson,' wrote Webster, 'the Senate would have negatived more than half his nominations.' As it was, many were rejected; and some of the worst were, under pressure, withdrawn. On the general principle the President held his ground. 'It is rotation in office,' he again and again asserted in all honesty, 'That will perpetrate our liberty,' and from this conviction no amount of argument or painful experience could shake him. . . . No more unfortunate step was ever taken by an American President; the task

of undoing the mischief has been long and laborious. Yet the spoils system was probably an inevitable feature of the rule of the people; at all events, it was accepted by all parties and sanctioned by public sentiment for more than half a century."—F. A. Ogg, *Reign of Andrew Jackson (Chronicles of American Series, v. 20, pp. 124-128)*.—See also CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1828-1885.

1829-1832.—Rise of abolitionists.—"Between the years 1829 and 1832 took place a remarkable series of debates in Virginia on the subject of slavery, brought about by dissatisfaction with the State constitution and by the Nat Turner massacre, in which a number of slaves had risen against their masters. In these debates the evils of slavery were exposed as clearly as they were afterwards by the Abolitionists, and with an outspoken freedom which, when indulged in by Northern men, was soon to be denounced as treasonable and incendiary. These Southern speakers were silenced by the Slave Power. But there were men in the North who thought the same and who would not be silenced. Chief among these was William Lloyd Garrison. He had begun his memorable career by circulating petitions in Vermont in 1828 in favor of emancipation in the District of Columbia. Having joined Lundy in Baltimore in editing the 'Genius of Universal Emancipation,' he had suffered ignominy in the cause, in a Southern jail; drawing from persecution and hardship only new inspiration, he began the publication of the 'Liberator' at Boston in January, 1831. In the following year, under his leadership, was formed the New England Anti-Slavery Society, which placed itself on the new ground that immediate, unconditional emancipation, without expatriation, was the right of every slave and could not be withheld by his master an hour without sin. In March, 1833, the 'Weekly Emancipator' was established in New York, with the assistance of Arthur and Lewis Tappan, and under the editorship of William Goodell. In the same year appeared at Haverhill, Mass., a vigorous pamphlet by John G. Whittier, entitled 'Justice and Expediency, or Slavery considered with a View to its Rightful and Effectual Remedy, Abolition.' Nearly simultaneously were published Mrs. Lydia Maria Child's 'Appeal in Behalf of that Class of Americans called Africans,' and a pamphlet by Elizur Wright, Jr., a professor in the Western Reserve College, on 'The Sin of Slavery and its Remedy.' These publications and the doctrines of the 'Liberator' produced great excitement throughout the country."—B. Tuckerman, *William Jay and the constitutional movement for the abolition of slavery, ch. 3*.—The *Liberator* "was a weekly journal, bearing the names of William Lloyd Garrison and Isaac Knapp as publishers. Its motto was, 'Our Country is the World, Our Countrymen are Mankind,' a direct challenge to those whose motto was the Jingo cry of those days, 'Our Country, right or wrong!' It was a modest folio, with a page of four columns, measuring fourteen inches by nine and a quarter. . . . The paper had not a dollar of capital. It was printed at first with borrowed type. Garrison and Knapp did all the work of every kind between them, Garrison of course doing the editorials. That he wrote them can hardly be said: his habit was often to set up without manuscript. . . . The publishers announced in their first issue their determination to go on as long as they had bread and water to live on. In fact, they lived on bread and milk. . . . Garrison apologizes for the meagreness of the editorials, which, he says, he has but six hours, and those at midnight, to compose, all the rest of his time and

the whole of that of his companion being taken up by the mechanical work. . . . It was against nothing less than the world, or at least the world in which he lived, that this youth of twenty-six, with his humble partner, took up arms. Slavery was at the height of its power. . . . The salutatory of the 'Liberator' avowed that its editor meant to speak out without restraint. 'I will be as harsh as truth and as uncompromising as justice. On this subject I do not wish to think or speak or write with moderation. No! No! Tell a man whose house is on fire to give a moderate alarm; tell him to moderately rescue his wife from the hands of the ravisher; tell the mother to gradually extricate her babe from the fire into which it has fallen—but urge me not to use moderation in a cause like the present. I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch—and I will be heard.' This promise was amply kept. . . . In private and in his family he was all gentleness and affection. Let it be said, too, that he set a noble example to controversial editors in his fair treatment of his opponents. Not only did he always give insertion to their replies, but he copied their criticisms from other journals into his own. Fighting for freedom of discussion, he was ever loyal to his own principle. What is certain is that the 'Liberator,' in spite of the smallness of its circulation, which was hardly enough to keep it alive, soon told. The South was moved to its centre. The editorials probably would not have caused much alarm, as the slaves could not read. What was likely to cause more alarm was the frontispiece, which . . . represented an auction at which 'slaves, horses and other cattle' were being offered for sale, and a whipping-post at which a slave was being flogged. In the background was the Capitol at Washington, with a flag inscribed 'Liberty' floating over the dome. . . . On seeing the 'Liberator' the realm of slavery bestirred itself. A Vigilance Association took the matter in hand. First came fiery and bloodthirsty editorials; then anonymous threats; then attempts by legal enactment to prevent the circulation of the 'Liberator' at the South. The Grand Jury of North Carolina found a true bill against Garrison for the circulation of a paper of seditious tendency, the penalty for which was whipping and imprisonment for the first offence, and death without benefit of clergy for the second. The General Assembly of Georgia offered a reward of five thousand dollars to any one who, under the laws of that State, should arrest the editor of the 'Liberator', bring him to trial, and prosecute him to conviction. The South reproached Boston with allowing a battery to be planted on her soil against the ramparts of Southern institutions. Boston felt the reproach, and showed that she would gladly have suppressed the incendiary print and perhaps have delivered up its editor; but the law was against her, and the mass of the people, though wavering in their allegiance to morality on the question of slavery, were still loyal to freedom of opinion. . . . It was just at this time that the South and its clientage at the North were thrown into a paroxysm of excitement by the Bloody Monday, as Nat Turner's rising at Southampton was called. The rising was easily suppressed, and Virginia saw, as Jamaica has since seen, how cruel is the panic of a dominant race. Not the slightest connection of the outbreak with Northern abolitionism was traced. That Garrison or any one connected with him ever incited the slaves to revolt, or said a word intentionally which could lead to servile war, seems to be utterly untrue. His preach-

ing to the slaves, on the contrary, was always patience, submission, abstinence from violence, while in his own moral code he carried non-resistance to an extreme. Moreover his championship held out hope, and what goes to insurrection is despair."—Goldwin Smith, *William Lloyd Garrison*, pp. 60-65. —"Mr. Emerson once said, 'Eloquence is dog-cheap in anti-slavery meetings.' . . . On the platform you would always see Garrison; with him was . . . Sam May. Stephen S. Foster was always there. . . . Parker Pillsbury, James Buffum, Arnold Buffum, Elizur Wright, Henry C. Wright, Abigail Kelley, Lucy Stone, Theo. D. Weld, the sisters Grimké, from South Carolina; John T. Sargent, Mrs. Chapman, Mrs. Lydia M. Child, Fred Douglas, Wm. W. Brown and Francis Jackson. The last was a stern Puritan, conscientious, upright, clear-minded, universally respected. Edmund Quincy also was there, and he never spoke without saying something that had a touch of wit as well as of logic. Oliver Johnson . . . was one of the very first members of the Society. Theodore Parker, Samuel J. May, John Pierpont, Chas. L. Stearns, Chas. L. Redwood, Geo. Thompson (another wonderfully eloquent man), and, above all, Wendell Phillips."—J. F. Clarke, *Anti-slavery days*, ch. 3.—See also SLAVERY: 1828-1832; RACE PROBLEMS: 1705-1895.

1829-1833.—Incorporation of schools for blind. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Education for the deaf, blind, and feeble-minded: Blind.

1830.—Fifth census.—The total population was 12,866,020 (being about 33½ per cent. more than in 1820), classed and distributed as follows:

North			
	White	Free black	Slave
Connecticut . . . . .	289,603	8,047	25
Illinois . . . . .	155,061	1,637	747
Indiana . . . . .	339,399	3,629	3
Maine . . . . .	398,263	1,100	2
Massachusetts . . . . .	603,359	7,048	1
Michigan . . . . .	31,346	261	32
New Hampshire . . . . .	268,721	604	3
New Jersey . . . . .	300,266	18,303	2,254
New York . . . . .	1,873,663	44,870	75
Ohio . . . . .	928,320	9,568	6
Pennsylvania . . . . .	1,309,900	37,930	403
Rhode Island . . . . .	93,621	3,561	17
Vermont . . . . .	279,771	881	....
	6,871,302	137,529	3,568
South			
	White	Free black	Slave
Alabama . . . . .	190,406	1,572	117,549
Arkansas . . . . .	25,671	141	4,576
Delaware . . . . .	57,601	15,855	3,292
District of Columbia . . . . .	27,563	6,152	6,119
Florida . . . . .	18,385	844	15,501
Georgia . . . . .	206,806	2,486	217,531
Kentucky . . . . .	517,787	4,917	165,213
Louisiana . . . . .	89,441	16,710	109,588
Maryland . . . . .	201,108	52,938	102,994
Mississippi . . . . .	70,443	510	65,659
Missouri . . . . .	114,795	569	25,091
North Carolina . . . . .	472,843	19,543	245,601
South Carolina . . . . .	257,863	7,921	315,401
Tennessee . . . . .	535,746	4,555	141,603
Virginia . . . . .	694,300	47,348	469,757
	3,660,758	182,070	2,005,475

In the decade between 1820 and 1830 the immigrant arrivals in the United States, as officially recorded, numbered 143,439, of which 75,803 were from the British islands. Prior to 1821, there is no official record of immigration.

1830.—Attempt to purchase Texas.—Slavery controversy. See TEXAS: 1824-1830.

1830-1831.—First railroads. See RAILROADS: 1826-1850.

1830-1837.—Division of Indian territory among five civilized tribes. See OKLAHOMA: 1830-1844.

1831.—Arbitration with France regarding losses during Napoleonic Wars. See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1831.

1831-1836.—Early anti-slavery petitions.—"It was in the session of 1831-32, that the first mutterings of the petition storm were heard. On December 12th, 1831, Mr. John Quincy Adams presented, in the House of Representatives, fifteen petitions from sundry inhabitants of Pennsylvania, the chief prayer of all of which was for abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. Mr. Adams said that he would give no countenance to that prayer, but that there was a prayer in the petitions for the abolition of the slave trade in the District, which, he thought, might properly be considered, and he moved the reference of the petitions, for this purpose, to the regular committee of the House for the District. . . . The committee on the District reported, on December 19th, that as the District was composed of cessions of territory from Maryland and Virginia, it would, in the opinion of the members of the committee, be unwise, if not unjust, for Congress to interfere in the question of the relation of slave to master in the District, until Virginia and Maryland should take steps to eradicate the evil from their respective territories. This report seemed to settle the question for the session, and no more petitions appeared in either House. . . . It was first in the session of 1833-34, that petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District from others than Quakers, presumably from the members of the new anti-slavery societies, appeared in both Houses of Congress. Those presented in the Senate were referred to the committee of the Senate for the District, and nothing more was heard of them. Those presented in the House of Representatives were dealt with in the same manner. . . . At length, in the session of 1835-36, the storm broke in all its fury, in both the Senate and the House. It began in the House, December 16th, 1835, upon the presentation of a petition, containing the usual prayer in regard to slavery in the District, by Mr. Fairfield, of Maine. Mr. Cramer, of New York, moved to lay the petition on the table, and the motion was voted. Mr. Fairfield immediately presented another petition of like purport, and himself moved that it be laid upon the table. Mr. Boon, of Indiana, asked that the petition be read, which was done. Thereupon Mr. Slade, of Vermont, moved that it be printed. This meant, of course, that Mr. Slade was determined to have the slavery question agitated in Congress, if he could. Upon him rather than upon Mr. Adams rests the honor, or the blame, whichever it may be, of provoking the excitement over the Abolition petitions, and of upholding the right of petition in the most extreme degree. The House first voted to lay the petition on the table. The Speaker, Mr. James K. Polk, then put Mr. Slade's motion to print. Whereupon Mr. Slade attempted to debate the whole question of slavery in the District under the motion. The Speaker ruled that the contents

of the petition could not be debated under the motion to print. Mr. Vanderpoel, of New York, then moved to lay Mr. Slade's motion on the table, and the House voted to do so by a large majority. . . . Evidently the House thought that, in receiving and hearing the petitions and then laying them on the table, it had found the solution of the question, which neither encroached upon the power of the House over its rules of procedure, nor opened the way for anti-slavery agitation in Congress."—J. W. Burgess, *Middle period*, pp. 252-258.—"The first petitions presented to Congress for the abolition of slavery, at least the first to attract attention, were presented by Mr. Dickson, from the Canandaigua district, New York, who addressed the House in support of the prayer of the petitioners. Perhaps his speech, more than the petition he presented, served to stir up a feeling on the part of Southern men, and to cause other and numerous similar petitions to be gotten up at the North and sent to Congress."—N. Sargent, *Public men and events, 1817-1853*, v. 1, pp. 294-295.—See also SLAVERY: 1828-1832.

1832.—Black Hawk War. See ILLINOIS: 1832.

1832.—Prospective surplus and necessary tariff reduction.—Clay's delusive measure. See TARIFF: 1832.

1832.—Twelfth presidential election.—Re-election of General Jackson.—General Jackson, renominated by his party almost without question, was re-elected over three competitors, the popular vote being as follows: Andrew Jackson, Democrat, 687,502; Henry Clay, National Republican, 530,189; William Wirt, Anti-Masonic, 33,108; John Floyd (voted for only in South Carolina, where electors were chosen by the legislature). The vote in the Electoral College stood: Jackson, 219, Clay 49, Floyd 11, Wirt 7. Martin Van Buren was elected vice president. "This election is notable for several reasons. It marks the beginning of the system of national nominating conventions; it gave Jackson a second term of office, in which he was to display his peculiar qualities more conspicuously than ever; it compacted and gave distinct character to the new Democratic party; and it practically settled directly the fate of the Bank of the United States, and indirectly the question of nullification. Jackson was easily re-elected, for he had established a great popularity, and the opposition was divided. A new party came into the field, and marked its advent by originating the national nominating convention. This was the Anti-Masonic party." (See NEW YORK: 1826-1832.) Both the Democratic and the National Republican parties adopted the invention of the Anti-Masons, and made their nominations for the first time by the agency of great national conventions.—W. Wilson, *Division and reunion, 1829-1880*, p. 62.

1833.—Beginning of penny papers. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1830-1833.

1833-1836.—President Jackson's overthrow of the United States Bank.—Removal of deposits.—"The torrents of paper-money issued during the revolutionary war, which sunk in value to nothing, converted the old prejudice against paper promises-to-pay into an aversion that had the force of an instinct. To this instinctive aversion, as much as to the constitutional objections urged by Mr. Jefferson and his disciples, was owing the difficulty experienced by Alexander Hamilton in getting his first United States bank chartered. Hence, also, the refusal of Congress to recharter that bank in 1811. Hence the unwillingness of Mr. Madison to sanction the charter of the second bank of the

United States in 1816. But the bank was chartered in 1816, and went into existence with the approval of all the great republican leaders, opposed only by the extreme Jeffersonians and by the few federalists who were in public life. . . . But, long before General Jackson came into power, the bank appeared to have lived down all opposition. In the presidential campaign of 1824 it was not so much as mentioned, nor was it mentioned in that of 1828. . . . At the beginning of the administration of General Jackson, the Bank of the United States was a truly imposing institution. Its capital was thirty-five millions. The public money deposited in its vaults averaged six or seven millions; its private deposits, six millions more; its circulation, twelve millions; its discounts, more than forty millions a year; its annual profits, more than three millions. Besides the parent bank at Philadelphia, with its marble palace and hundred clerks, there were 25 branches in the towns and cities of the Union. . . . Its bank-notes were as good as gold in every part of the country. . . . The bank and its branches received and disbursed the entire revenue of the nation. . . . There . . . [was] a tradition in Washington . . . that General Jackson came up from Tennessee to Washington, in 1829, resolved on the destruction of the Bank of the United States, and that he was only dissuaded from aiming a paragraph at it in his inaugural address by the prudence of Mr. Van Buren. . . . General Jackson had no thought of the bank until he had been President two months. He came to Washington expecting to serve but a single term, during which the question of re-chartering the bank was not expected to come up. The bank was chartered in 1816 for twenty years, which would not expire until 1836." But, in 1829, the influence of Isaac Hill, one of the so-called "Kitchen Cabinet" [see CABINET, KITCHEN] at Washington, involved the irascible president in an endeavor to bring about the removal of Jeremiah Mason, a political opponent, who had been appointed to the presidency of the branch of the United States Bank at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. "The correspondence began in June and ended in October. I believe myself warranted in the positive assertion, that this correspondence relating to the desired removal of Jeremiah Mason was the direct and real cause of the destruction of the bank."—J. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 3, ch. 20.—"As soon as the issue between him and the Bank of the United States was declared, Jackson resolved that the bank must be utterly destroyed. The method was suggested by Kendall and Blair, of the Kitchen cabinet. It was to cripple the available means of the bank by withdrawing from it and its branches the deposits of public funds. In the message of December, 1832, Jackson had expressed his doubt as to the safety of the government deposits in the bank, and recommended an investigation. The House, after inquiry, resolved on March 2, by 109 to 46 votes, that the deposits were safe. The bank was at that period undoubtedly solvent, and there seemed to be no reason to fear for the safety of the public money in its custody. But Jackson had made up his mind that the bank was financially rotten; that it had been employing its means to defeat his reelection; that it was using the public funds in buying up members of Congress for the purposes of securing a renewal of its charter, and of breaking down the administration; and that thus it had become a dangerous agency of corruption and a public enemy. Therefore the public funds must be withdrawn, without regard to consequences. But the law pro-

vided that the public funds should be deposited in the Bank of the United States or its branches, unless the Secretary of the Treasury should otherwise 'order and direct,' and in that case the Secretary should report his reasons for such direction to Congress. A willing Secretary of the Treasury was therefore needed. In May, 1833, Jackson reconstructed his Cabinet for the second time. . . . For the Treasury Department Jackson selected William J. Duane of Philadelphia, who was known as an opponent of the bank. Jackson, no doubt expected him to be ready for any measure necessary to destroy it. In this he was mistaken. Duane earnestly disapproved of the removal of the deposits as unnecessary, and highly dangerous to the business interests of the country. . . . A majority of the members of the Cabinet thought the removal of the deposits unwise. . . . In the business community there seemed to be but one voice about it. The mere rumor that the removal of the deposits was in contemplation greatly disturbed the money market. But all this failed to stagger Jackson's resolution. . . . The Cabinet, with the exception of the Secretary of the Treasury, bowed to Jackson's will. But Duane would not shelter himself behind the President's assumed responsibility to do an act which, under the law, was to be his act. He also refused to resign. If he had to obey or go, he insisted upon being removed. Jackson then formally dismissed him, and transferred Roger B. Taney from the attorney generalship to the treasury. Benjamin F. Butler of New York, a friend of Van Buren, was made Attorney General. Taney forthwith ordered the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States; that is to say, the public funds then in the bank were to be drawn out as the government required them, and no new deposits to be made in that institution. The new deposits were to be distributed among a certain number of selected state banks, which became known as the 'pet banks.' . . . The money market became stringent. Many failures occurred. The general feeling in business circles approached a panic. [But the very disturbance was charged upon the bank, itself; the people rallied to the support of their favorite, 'Old Hickory,' and when the national charter of the bank expired, in March, 1836, there was no hope of its renewal. It obtained a charter from the state of Pennsylvania, and continued business as a state institution until it went to pieces in the general commercial shipwreck of 1837-1841.]"—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 2, ch. 15.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1817-1833.

ALSO IN: W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a public man*, ch. 11-14.—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 1, ch. 40, 56, 64-67, 77, 92-111.—M. St. C. Clarke and D. A. Hall, *History of the Bank of the United States*.

1834.—Organization of the Whig party.—The largest section of the opposition to the Jacksonian democracy "was organized in 1834 as the Whig party. According to the 'Whig Almanac' for 1838, the party as then constituted comprised: (1) Most of those who, under the name of National Republicans, had previously been known as supporters of Adams and Clay, and advocates of the American system [of tariff-protection]; (2) Most of those who, acting in defence of what they deemed the assailed or threatened rights of the States, had been stigmatized as Nullifiers, or the less virulent State Rights' men, who were thrown into a position of armed neutrality towards the administration by the doctrines of the proclamation of 1832 against South Carolina; (3) A ma-

majority of these before known as Anti-Masons; (4) Many who had up to that time been known as Jackson men, but who united in condemning the high-handed conduct of the Executive, the immolation of Duane, and the subserviency of Taney; (5) Numbers who had not before taken any part in politics, but who were now awakened from their apathy by the palpable usurpations of the Executive and the imminent peril of our whole fabric of constitutional liberty and national prosperity.' It was not to be expected that a party composed of such various elements would be able to unite on one candidate with heartiness; and, as the event proved, it was necessary that some time should elapse before anything like homogeneity could be given to the organization. Nullification was not popular among the Whigs of the North, nor did the State Rights' people of South Carolina and other States care about the war on the bank and the removal of the deposits."—E. Stanwood, *History of presidential elections*, ch. 14.—"It was now felt instinctively that, in the existing struggle between the parties actually arrayed against each other, and in the principles and doctrines of those who were in power, there was a peculiar fitness in the revival of a term which, on both sides of the Atlantic, had been historically associated with the side of liberty against the side of power. The revival of the name of Whigs was sudden, and it was a spontaneous popular movement. In progress of time, it enabled the public men who were leading the opposition to the party of the Administration to consolidate an organization of distinct political principles, and to strengthen it by accessions from those who had found reason to be dissatisfied with the opinions prevailing among the friends of the President."—G. T. Curtis, *Life of Daniel Webster*, v. 1, p. 499.

1834.—Legislation to secure better organization of Indian territory. See OKLAHOMA: 1830-1844.

1835.—Exclusion of anti-slavery literature from the mails.—"It was during the Twenty-third Congress, 1835, that the abolition of slavery, especially in the District of Columbia, may be said to have begun to move the public mind at the North. . . . The labors of the enemies of slavery, or 'Abolitionists,' had commenced, and by indefatigable men who believed they were serving God and the cause of humanity, and consequently it was with them a labor of conscience and duty, with which nothing should be allowed to interfere. Instead of petitions to Congress, they now sent large boxes of tracts, pamphlets, and various publications which the Southern people denominated 'incendiary,' to the postoffice at Charleston, South Carolina, and other cities, to be distributed, as directed, to various persons. This increased the complaints and inflammatory articles in the Southern papers. The publications thus sent were stopped in the postoffice, and the postmasters addressed the head of the department, Amos Kendall, on the subject, who replied that though the law authorized the transmission of newspapers and pamphlets through the mail, yet the law was intended to promote the general good of the public, and not to injure any section; and intimated that, such being the effect of these publications at the South, postmasters would be justified in withholding them."—N. Sargent, *Public men and events, 1817-1853*, v. 1, pp. 294-295.

ALSO IN: A. B. Hart, *Slavery and abolition*, pp. 286-288.—A. Kendall, *Autobiography*, pp. 645 ff.

1835-1837.—Inflation of credits.—Land sales and speculation.—Great collapse.—"When the

United States Bank lost the government deposits, late in 1833, they amounted to a little less than \$10,000,000. On January 1, 1835, more than a year after the state banks took the deposits, they had increased to a little more than \$10,000,000. But the public debt being then paid and the outgo of money thus checked, the deposits had by January 1, 1836, reached \$25,000,000, and by June 1, 1836, \$41,500,000. This enormous advance represented the sudden increase in the sales of public lands which were paid for in bank paper, which in turn formed the bulk of the government deposits. . . . The increase in the sales of public lands was the result of all the organic causes and of all the long train of events which had seated the fever of speculation so profoundly in the American character of the day. . . . The increase of government deposits was only fuel added to the flames. The craze for banks and credits was unbounded before the removal of the deposits had taken place, and before their great increase could have had serious effect. . . . The insanity of speculation was in ample though unobserved control of the country while Nicholas Biddle [president of the United States Bank] still controlled the deposits, and was certain to reach a climax whether they stayed with him or went elsewhere."—E. M. Shephard, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 8.—"Most of the settlers who moved before 1815 had not purchased their land at the public land offices, but had settled in regions like Kentucky or Tennessee, which had never come under the land system, or on land held under earlier titles, as in Ohio. . . . Between 1815 and 1820 the sales of the land offices were very large as a result of the speculative movement of that period, but a recent writer estimates that at the latter date 'not more than a fourth at most, of the men who were engaged in the westward movement,' were affected by the system regulating the sale of public lands. The use of the public domain as a source of revenue, the two dollar minimum, and the credit system were early denounced by the western men, but any change was resisted by representatives of the eastern States. . . . [But] the possibility of using the public lands as an agency of social reform gradually dawned upon the workingmen, and they began to demand, in their papers and conventions, that speculation should stop and the public domain be opened to the people. Land reform became an important issue in the platforms of organized labor. . . . The early policy of the government, of land sales for the sake of revenue, gradually gave way to the second, and what has proved to be the permanent, policy respecting the public lands. This is the system of land grants for actual settlement in small lots suitable for cultivation. By the act of April, 1820, sale for credit was abandoned and the price reduced to \$1.25 an acre, while the minimum tract to be sold to one individual was reduced to eighty acres. For the next ten years the sales of public land were very steady, averaging about 1,000,000 acres yearly. The introduction of the steamboat upon western waters, the extension of cotton culture through the Southwest, the greater demand for agricultural produce due to the growth in population, all led to a steady demand for land for actual cultivation and settlement. Nevertheless, in December, 1827, the Secretary of the Treasury reported that while more than 261,000,000 acres of land had been added to the public domain, since the organization of the government but 10,000,000 acres had been sold to individuals. . . . Western lands . . . [however, steadily increased in value], and as credit and money became easier under the

speculative fever of the time, they seemed a favorable object of investment to those who were seeking an easy and rapid increase of wealth. Paper villages were laid out, lands were sold at greatly enhanced prices, often fifty times their original cost, and speculation was fanned to a fever heat. The sales of public lands swelled rapidly, amounting to 3,856,278 acres for the year 1833, and to the enormous figure of 20,074,871 acres for 1836. The sales of 1834-36, of 40,000,000 acres, exceeded all that had been sold before. Nor was the speculation confined to western lands; owing to the extension of cotton culture due to the increasing demand for, and the consequent advance in the price of, cotton—from a maximum of 13½ cents a pound in 1833 to 20 cents in 1835—the value of southern plantations and city real estate rose enormously. The coal lands of Pennsylvania and the manufacturing cities of the East felt a similar impetus. Thus the assessed value of real estate in New York City rose from \$143,732,425 in 1835 to \$233,742,303 in 1836, and in Mobile from \$4,000,000 in 1834 to \$27,000,000 in 1837. After the panic of 1837 these values fell even more rapidly. . . . The settlement of the fertile country about the Great Lakes proceeded rapidly after the construction of the Erie and other canals had provided an outlet to the Atlantic ports for western produce."—E. Bogart, *Economic history of the United States*, pp. 264-266.—"In spite of the abolitionist agitation, labor unrest, and growing political opposition, the country seemed to be extremely prosperous as Jackson's term approached its close. The national debt was completely extinguished at the beginning of the year 1835. The revenues from the compromise tariff of 1833 were ample. The sale of public lands, encouraged by the low government price of \$1.25 an acre, with easy extension of credit and abundant issue of notes by the state banks, and stimulated by hopes of rapid development and huge profits in the exploitation of railroads and canals, rose from \$4,887,000 in 1834 to \$14,757,000 in 1835 and over \$24,000,000 in 1836. At the opening of the last named year the balance in the Treasury exceeded \$32,000,000. There seemed to be no way of stopping the income, for the tariff was fixed by the compromise for half a dozen years to come, and the price of lands could not be further lowered without prejudice to those who had already bought. Various schemes for the disposal of the surplus were brought forward, and in the end Clay's long-cherished project of a distribution of the surplus among the states in the ratio of their population was passed by Congress and signed by Jackson on June 23, 1836. Under the Distribution Act about \$18,000,000 was deposited with the States before the panic of 1837 came to change the surplus into a deficit. The American people were living in a fool's paradise in the middle thirties, building air castles of fortune overnight. Land values were immensely inflated; hundreds of banks recklessly chartered by state legislatures were flooding the country with their unsecured notes. The states (especially the new states of the West) were vying with one another in grandiose schemes for canals, railroads, and land improvements, incurring huge debts for public works which they fatuously believed would free them, with the rush of population, from the burdens of taxation. . . . The first shock of this fictitious prosperity came from President Jackson. On July 11, 1836, he ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to publish the Specie Circular, forbidding the land agents, and the deposit banks to receive anything but gold and silver



after August 15 in payment for the sales of public land. Thus by a stroke of the pen the government deprived of their validity that vast mass of state bank notes which the deposit banks had been freely receiving in payment for public lands and reissuing as loans for the purchase of more lands."—D. S. Muzzey, *The United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 391-395.—"The distribution of the surplus among the states by the law of 1836 was the last and in some respects the worst of the measures which aided and exaggerated the tendency to speculation. By this bill, all the money above \$5,000,000 in the treasury on January 1, 1837, was to be 'deposited' with the states in four quarterly installments commencing on that day. . . . From the passage of the deposit bill in June, 1836, until the crash in 1837, this superb donation of thirty-seven millions was before the enraptured and deluded vision of the country. Over nine millions and a quarter to be poured into 'improvements' or loaned to the needy,—what a luscious prospect! The lesson is striking and wholesome, and ought not to be forgotten, that, when the land was in the very midst of these largesses, the universal bankruptcy set in. During 1835 and 1836 there were omens of the coming storm. Some perceived the rabid character of the speculative fever. William L. Marcy, governor of New York, in his message of January, 1836, answering the dipsomaniac cry for more banks, declared that an unregulated spirit of speculation had taken capital out of the state; but that the amount so transferred bore no comparison to the enormous speculations in stocks and in real property within the state. . . . The warning was treated contemptuously; but before the year was out the federal administration also became anxious, and the increase in land sales no longer signified to Jackson an increasing prosperity. . . . So Jackson proceeded with his sound defense of the famous specie circular, long and even still denounced as the 'causa causans' of the crisis of 1837. By this circular, issued on July 11, 1836, the secretary of the treasury had required payment for public lands to be made in specie, with an exception until December 15, 1836, in favor of actual settlers and actual residents of the state in which the lands were sold. . . . Jackson's specie circular toppled over the house of cards, which at best could have stood but little longer. . . . An insignificant part of the sales had been lately made to settlers. They were chiefly made to speculators. . . . Of the real money necessary to make good the paper bubble promises of the speculators not one tenth part really existed. Banks could neither make their debtors pay in gold and silver, nor pay their own notes in gold and silver. So they suspended. The great and long concealed devastation of physical wealth and of the accumulation of legitimate labor by premature improvements and costly personal living, became now quickly apparent. Fancied wealth sank out of sight."—E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 8.—Van Buren "was hardly at home before the panic of 1837 was upon the country. The Specie Circular of July, 1836, which drew money from the East to pay for Western lands, and the distribution of the surplus revenue, by which nearly nine millions must be transferred quarterly from locality to locality were undoubtedly two immediate causes. But behind both was a long series of land speculation, Western booming, extravagant expenditures, with general over-confidence and some disastrous crop failures. All the New York banks but three suspended specie payment on May 10th, and the banks else-

where immediately followed their example. Since by law the government could receive only specie and the notes of specie-paying banks, and since the small amount of specie was largely in hiding, the government, though out of debt through Jackson's rigid policy, had not enough money to transact its business. Much of what it had on hand was locked up in banks which could not withstand the tide of depression. A further embarrassment was due to the fact that government funds could legally be deposited only in banks which paid specie for their notes, and the administration was thus forced to care for its funds, since none of the banks met this requirement. . . . Many democrats began to say that the circular ought to be rescinded at least temporarily. Van Buren [a "hard money man"] withstood the demand, much to the gratification of Jackson, who watched him closely. Business men turned to the expedient of private money. Various public and private corporations issued their tokens of credit; and one of the striking resources was several kinds of copper medals the size of a cent which passed as such generally. . . . Though Van Buren would not rescind the Specie Circular [and required the business of the post-office to be on a specie basis], he called congress in extra session for the first Monday in September. It seemed a good opportunity to adopt Jackson's cherished policy of a 'complete divorce of the Government from all banks,' both as to currency and as to the deposit function. He recommended, therefore, the issue of ten millions of interest-bearing treasury notes, to be receivable with specie for government dues, and he also suggested the creation of a series of sub-treasury offices to hold and pay out public funds without recourse to banks."—J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, v. 2, pp. 723-725.—"In the future, according to this plan, all moneys, as they came in, should be deposited in the treasury at Washington, in the vaults of the mints at Philadelphia, New Orleans, or Dahlonega, or in subsidiary treasuries in the principal importing cities where vaults would be built. The Whigs fought the scheme with all their strength, but in 1840 there was a sufficient administration majority in Congress to pass the acts necessary to establish the Independent Treasury system. [See INDEPENDENT TREASURY.] There were several weak points in the plan. While the necessary vaults were being constructed, it would have been perfectly feasible to deposit the federal monies in the vaults of existing banks where they could be held and drawn upon by the government without being in any way made the basis of loans. The act forbade the treasury officials to make any use whatever of the existing banking institutions. They could not receive the notes of any of them or receive payment in the form of drafts on them."—E. Channing, *History of the United States*, v. 5, p. 461.

ALSO IN: J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 7, pp. 1-49.—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 422-425, 432-433.—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 290-292.—W. McDonald, *Jacksonian democracy*, pp. 458-460.—W. G. Sumner, *History of American currency*, pp. 102-161.—F. A. Walker, *Money*, ch. 21.—C. Juglar, *Brief history of panics*, p. 58.—W. C. Mitchell, *Business cycles*.—M. Beard, *Short history of the American labor movement*, pp. 54-57.

1835-1843.—Second Seminole War. See FLORIDA: 1835-1843.

1836.—Platte purchase for Missouri. See MISSOURI: 1812-1836.

1836.—Atherton gag.—"At this time [1835-

1836], the Northern abolitionists sent petitions to Congress for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. They contended that as this territory was under the control of the United States' Government, the United States was responsible for slavery there; and that the Free States were bound to do what they could to have slavery brought to an end in that District. But the Slave States were not willing to have anything said on the subject, so they passed what was called a 'gag' law in the House of Representatives, and ruled that all petitions which had any relation to slavery should be laid on the table without being debated, printed or referred. John Quincy Adams opposed this rule resolutely, maintaining that it was wrong and unconstitutional. . . . He continued to present petitions, as before, for the abolition of slavery in the District. When the day came for petitions he was one of the first to be called upon; and he would sometimes occupy nearly the whole hour in presenting them, though each one was immediately laid on the table. One day he presented 511."—J. F. Clarke, *Anti-slavery days*, p. 45.—The gag-law has sometimes taken the name of the Atherton gag from its New Hampshire author.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 4, p. 338.—See also CENSORSHIP: United States; ILLINOIS: 1831-1837.

ALSO IN: J. R. Gidding, *History of the rebellion*, pp. 104-124.—J. T. Morse, Jr., *John Quincy Adams*, pp. 246-280.—J. W. Burgess, *Middle period*, pp. 258-261.—J. Quincy, *Memoir of John Quincy Adams*, pp. 251-262.

1836.—Admission of Arkansas into the Union. See ARKANSAS: 1819-1836.

1836.—Jackson's administration reviewed.—"What of the administration as a whole? Parton's view is as follows: 'I must avow explicitly the belief that, notwithstanding the good done by General Jackson during his presidency, his elevation to power was a mistake on the part of the people of the United States. The good which he effected has not continued, while the evil which he began remains.' Sumner, in commenting on 'Jackson's modes of action in his second term,' says: 'We must say of Jackson that he stumbled along through a magnificent career, now and then taking up a chance without really appreciating it; leaving behind him disturbed and discordant elements of good and ill just fit to produce turmoil and disaster in the future.' Later he adds: 'Representative institutions are degraded on the Jacksonian theory just as they are on the divine-right theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire. There is not a worse perversion of the American system of government conceivable than to regard the President as the tribune of the people.' The view of von Holst may be inferred from the following passages: 'In spite of the frightful influence, in the real sense of the expression, which he exercised during the eight years of his presidency, he neither pointed out nor opened new ways to his people by the superiority of his mind, but only dragged them more rapidly onward on the road they had long been traveling, by the demoniacal power of his will.' The meaning of the bank struggle is thus defined: 'Its significance lay in the elements which made Jackson able actually and successfully to assert his claims, in conflict both with the constitution and with the idea of republicanism, to a position between Congress and the people as patriarchal ruler of the republic.' Elsewhere he tells us that the 'curse of Jackson's administration' is that it weakened respect for law; that 'the first clear symptom' of 'the decline of a healthy political

spirit' was the election and re-election of Jackson to the presidency; that his administration paved a 'broad path for the demoralizing transformation of the American democracy'; and that 'his "reign" receives the stamp which characterizes it precisely from the fact that the politicians knew how to make his character with its texture of brass, the battering-ram with which to break down the last ramparts which opposed their will.' According to Parton, Sumner, and von Holst, as I understand them, the net result of Jackson's influence upon the American people was to hasten their progress toward political ruin. I think this conclusion erroneous. The gravest accusation against Jackson is, that his influence undermined respect for law. It is plausibly argued that, since he himself was impatient of authority, his example must have stimulated lawlessness in his followers. It may be urged, in reply, that the history of the country does not support the charge. The worst exhibitions of general lawlessness which have disgraced the United States were the antiabolitionist mobs of Jackson's own day—for which he was not responsible. Since then, the American people, in spite of the demoralizations of the war and reconstruction periods, have steadily grown in obedience to law. . . . It is a curious circumstance that the relation of Jackson to sectionalism has received very little attention; and yet the growth of sectionalism, i. e., the tendency to divide the Union into two portions, politically separate and independent, is the fact which, from the Missouri Compromise of 1820 to the ordinances of secession in 1860, gives our political history its distinctive character. The one important question concerning Jackson, as indeed concerning every public man during the forty years which precede the Civil War, is: What did he do towards saving the Union from sectionalism? . . . Jackson came before the country as a disciple of Jefferson, and therefore as a believer in state rights. There was, it is true, much in his temper and situation which favored centralization; nevertheless, he was an honest, though moderate and somewhat inconsistent Jeffersonian, and he won and retained the confidence of the state-rights element in the democratic party. Moreover, he identified himself with the newly enfranchised and poorer citizens just rising to political self-consciousness. In these ways, his following came to include a large majority of his fellow-citizens, and, what was of the utmost importance, by far the larger proportion of those whose political character and opinions were as yet plastic. . . . Jackson became, to a degree never realized by any other man in our history, the trusted leader and teacher of the masses. . . . This intimate relation to the people, and this unparalleled power over the people, Jackson used to impress upon them his own love of the Union and his own hatred of sectionalism. . . . His character was altogether national. It is easy to think of Calhoun as a southerner and a South Carolinian; but it would not be easy to think of Jackson as belonging to Tennessee or to the border states. The distribution of his support in the election of 1832 is instructive. New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania, as well as Tennessee, Georgia, Missouri, were Jackson's states. He was not looked upon as the representative of any particular section. His policy as President showed no trace of sectionalism. Its aim was the welfare of the masses irrespective of section. To him state lines had little meaning; sectional lines, absolutely none. There is another way in which he rendered great though unconscious service to the cause of national

unity: he made the government, hitherto an unmeaning abstraction, intelligible and attractive to the people. . . . The chief value, then, of Jackson's political career, was its educational effect. His strong conviction of the national character of the Union, his brave words and acts in behalf of the rights of the Union, sank deep into the hearts of followers and opponents."—A. D. Morse, *Political influence of Andrew Jackson (Political Science Quarterly, June, 1886)*.—"In his inaugural address, Jackson declared that with foreign nations it would be his aim 'to preserve peace and to cultivate friendship on fair and honorable terms, and in the adjustment of any differences that may exist or arise to exhibit the forbearance becoming a powerful nation rather than the sensibility belonging to a gallant people.' The same sentiment was more pithily put in his first annual message, where he stated it to be his 'settled purpose to ask nothing that is not clearly right and to submit to nothing that is wrong.' . . . That he would mingle, with extraordinary skill, in his conduct of diplomatic business, tact, forbearance, and firmness, few could foresee. Several important questions were pending in 1829. Ever since the close of the war for independence, the United States had coveted the lucrative direct trade with the British West Indies. . . . [Adams had failed to come to an arrangement with the British government on the subject. (See above: 1825-1828.) Jackson took it up early in his administration, and McLane, his first minister to Great Britain, was instructed to apply for a reopening of the trade.] . . . The move was adroitly followed up, . . . and on October 5 Jackson was able to announce by proclamation that the trade was open. . . . The settlement of pending claims against France was more difficult. These claims had their origin in the injury wrought to American commerce by the arbitrary orders and decrees of France during the Napoleonic Wars [see above: 1800: Convention with France], and ever since 1815 had been the subject of negotiation. The claims of the United States, however, had been met by counterclaims of France on account of alleged violation of the 'most favored nation' privilege accorded by the eighth article of the treaty of 1803, for the cession of Louisiana. . . . [Jackson instructed W. C. Rives, the minister to France to open negotiations. The accession of Louis Philippe gave an opportunity and on] July 4, 1831, a treaty was concluded by which France agreed to pay to the United States, in full satisfaction of the claims of American citizens, twenty-five million francs, payment to be made in six annual instalments, beginning one year from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty. . . . [The treaty was unpopular in France, however, and appropriations for payment were refused. In his annual message in 1834 the president recommended reprisals, and Livingston, who had been sent out as minister in 1834, withdrew in 1835. In January 1836 a special message again urged reprisals.] January 27, 1836, Great Britain offered to mediate. The offer was accepted, and on February 25 the British minister had the satisfaction of informing the secretary of state that the 'frank and honorable manner' in which Jackson had expressed himself had removed the 'difficulties' which had interfered with the execution of the treaty of 1831. On May 10, Jackson was able to appraise Congress that four instalments of the indemnity had been paid. In the session of 1834-1835 claims to the amount of five million dollars, arising from alleged depredations of France on American commerce prior to 1800, were presented to Congress. . . . A bill for

the relief of the claimants passed the Senate January 28, 1835, but was not acted on by the House. The 'French spoliation claims,' as they were called, were brought before Congress from time to time until 1885, when provision for their examination by the court of claims was finally made. Claims against other European countries, similar in origin and character to those against France, were also prosecuted, and in some cases settled, during Jackson's administrations. . . . Jackson's limitations as a diplomatist were offset, in the popular estimation, by the general success of his policy. No international questions of the first order arose during his administrations, and the personnel of the diplomatic service was not distinguished; but a number of important differences, some of them of long standing, were adjusted and respect for the United States appreciably enhanced. Towards powerful states Jackson used frowns or smiles as best suited his mood, while weak states like Mexico were treated with scant regard; but there was unceasing watchfulness over American interests and a jealous care for national honor and standing."—W. MacDonald, *Jacksonian democracy*, pp. 200-205, 208-209, 217.

ALSO IN: M. Van Buren, *Autobiography (Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1918, v. 2)*.—D. S. Muzzey, *American history*, pp. 277-294.—A. C. Buell, *Andrew Jackson*.—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 1-19, 77-94.—J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson*.

1836.—Independence of Texas recognized. See TEXAS: 1836-1845.

1836.—Thirteenth presidential election.—Martin Van Buren chosen.—"As Vice-president, Van Buren was at the side of Jackson during his second term as President. It was the period of the first experiment in producing panics; of reckless expansions of the currency; of extravagant speculation; of an accumulating surplus revenue; of the last struggles of the Bank of the United States for the continuance of its powers. There was not a difficult question on which Jackson did not open his mind to the Vice-president with complete and affectionate confidence. He . . . [was often] heard to narrate incidents illustrating the prompt decision and bold judgment of his younger friend; and in those days of vehement conflicts between the power of the people and interests embodied against that power, the daring energy of the one was well united with the more tranquil intrepidity of the other. How fully this was recognized by the people appears from the action of the Democratic party of the Union. In May, 1835, it assembled in convention at Baltimore, and by a unanimous vote placed Van Buren in nomination as their candidate for the Presidency."—G. Bancroft, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 5.—"For the taking of the vote, the convention adopted the famous [Democratic party] 'two-thirds rule,' under which each state was to be entitled, in the nomination of a candidate for the vice-presidency, to a number of votes equal to the number to which it would be entitled in the electoral college under the new apportionment; two-thirds of the whole number of votes in the convention to be necessary to a choice. So skillfully had the plans been laid, and so powerful was the influence of Jackson, that Van Buren received on the first ballot 208 votes out of 283. No platform was adopted by the convention. In the campaign that followed, violent abuse of the candidates was mingled with spectacular appeals to the voters. Each party had its newspaper organs, to which great importance was attached. Clay insisted on keeping to the front

the tariff and the bank, hoping thereby to divide the Jackson forces in Pennsylvania, which favored the bank, in Ohio and Kentucky, which favored protection, and in the south, which opposed both. Of the two issues, that of the bank turned out to be the most potent; for while the merits of a banking policy could never afford sufficient ground for party divergence among the masses, the attempt to force a recharter gave Jackson a powerful weapon against his enemies. The veto of the bank-charter bill, in July, 1832, together with the inability of Congress to pass the bill over the veto, afforded convincing popular proof that the institution was the menace to the country that Jackson had claimed, and that Jackson was the champion to be relied upon to destroy it. The struggle, accordingly, was between Jackson and the bank, and the anti-administration leaders showed little political wisdom in affecting to believe that in such a contest the people would not side with Jackson."—W. MacDonald, *Jacksonian democracy*, pp. 195-196.—"The Democracy of the Union supported Van Buren with entire unanimity. Out of two hundred and eighty-six electoral votes he received one hundred and seventy; and, for the first time, the Democracy of the North saw itself represented in the Presidential chair. Electoral votes were given for Van Buren without regard to geographical divisions: New York and Alabama, Missouri and Maine, Virginia and Connecticut, were found standing together. His election seemed friendly to the harmony and the perpetuity of the Union."—G. Bancroft, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 5.—Van Buren received a clear majority of the popular vote cast at the election, namely, 762,678, against 735,651 cast in opposition, but divided between four Whig candidates, namely, William H. Harrison, who received 73 electoral votes, Hugh L. White, who received 26, Daniel Webster who received 14, and Willie P. Mangum, who received 11. Richard M. Johnson was chosen vice president.

1837.—Expunging resolution passed. See EXPUNGING RESOLUTION.

1837.—Admission of Michigan into the Union. See MICHIGAN: 1837.

1837.—Introduction of the subtreasury system.—"When the banks went down, they had the government deposits: this was in May, 1837. Van Buren's administration was only two months old. The President was a warm admirer of Jackson, and had formally announced that he would continue his predecessor's policy with respect to the management of the deposits. But the 'experiment' had suddenly culminated. The government deposits were not in its control, and could not be regained; their transfer from one part of the country to another had ceased. . . . Once more, therefore, the government was confronted with a grave question touching its deposits and the circulating medium. It now essayed a brand-new experiment. This was nothing less than keeping the deposits itself, and transferring and paying them as occasion required; while the people were left to regulate the currency themselves. This was a very wide departure from any former policy. The mode proposed of keeping the public deposits may be briefly described. The treasury building at Washington was to constitute the treasury of the United States, and the public money was to be kept within its vaults. The mint at Philadelphia, the branch at New Orleans, the new custom-houses in New York and Boston, were also to contain branch treasury vaults. Places were also to be prepared at Charleston, St. Louis, and elsewhere. The treasury of the United States at Washington, and the treasurers of the mints at

Philadelphia and New Orleans, were to be 'receivers-general,' to keep the public money. . . . At the extra session of Congress in 1837, the Executive recommended the sub-treasury experiment. Congress refused to try it, although a majority in both Houses belonged to the same political party as the President. Nevertheless, the system was continued, without legislative sanction, until 1840, when Congress finally passed a bill legalizing the measure. At the presidential election in 1840 a party revolution occurred, and the sub-treasury system, which had formed a prominent issue in the campaign, was unqualifiedly condemned by the people. Congress repealed the law, and passed a bill creating another national bank," which President Tyler vetoed. (See below: 1841.) "Thus the keeping of the public money remained in the hands of the government officials, without legislative regulation, until the passage of the sub-treasury bill, in 1846. The system established at that time has been maintained ever since."—A. S. Bolles, *Financial history of the United States, 1789-1860*, bk. 3, ch. 2.


ALSO IN: T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 2, ch. 29, 41, 64-65.—D. Kinley, *Independent treasury of the United States*.

1837-1840.—Anti-slavery petitions in the Senate.—Calhoun's resolutions forcing the issue.—Fifth gag rule.—"The movements for and against slavery in the session of 1837-'38 deserve to be noted, as of disturbing effect at the time; and as having acquired new importance from subsequent events. Early in the session a memorial was presented in the Senate from the General Assembly of Vermont, remonstrating against the annexation of Texas to the United States, and praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia—followed by many petitions from citizens and societies in the Northern States to the same effect; and, further, for the abolition of slavery in the Territories—for the abolition of the slave trade between the States—and for the exclusion of future slave States from the Union. . . . The question which occupied the Senate was as to the most judicious mode of treating these memorials, with a view to prevent their evil effects: and that was entirely a question of policy, on which senators disagreed who concurred in the main object. Some deemed it most advisable to receive and consider the petitions—to refer them to a committee—and subject them to the adverse report which they would be sure to receive; as had been done with the Quakers' petitions at the beginning of the government. Others deemed it preferable to refuse to receive them. The objection raised to this latter course was, that it would mix up a new question with the slavery agitation which would enlist the sympathies of many who did not co-operate with the Abolitionists—the question of the right of petition. . . . Mr. Clay, and many others were of this opinion; Mr. Calhoun and his friends thought otherwise; and the result was, so far as it concerned the petitions of individuals and societies, what it had previously been—a half-way measure between reception and rejection—a motion to lay the question of reception on the table. This motion, precluding all discussion, got rid of the petitions quietly, and kept debate out of the Senate. In the case of the memorial from the State of Vermont, the proceeding was slightly different in form, but the same in substance. As the act of a State, the memorial was received; but after reception was laid on the table. Thus all the memorials and petitions were disposed of by the Senate in a way to accomplish the two-fold object, first, of avoiding discussion;

and, next, condemning the object of the petitioners. . . . Every memorial and petition had been disposed of according to the wishes of the senators from the slaveholding States; but Mr. Calhoun deemed it due to those States to go further, and to obtain from the Senate declarations which should cover all the questions of federal power over the institution of slavery. For that purpose, he submitted a series of resolves—six in number—which derive their importance from their comparison, or rather contrast, with others on the same subject presented by him in the Senate ten years later. . . . The six resolutions of this period ('37-'38) undertook to define the whole extent of the power delegated by the States to the federal government on the subject of slavery; to specify the acts which would exceed that power; and to show the consequences of doing anything not authorized to be done—always ending in a dissolution of the Union. The first four of these related to the States; about which, there being no dispute, there was no debate. The sixth, without naming Texas, was prospective, and looked forward to a case which might include her annexation; and was laid upon the table to make way for an express resolution from Mr. Preston on the same subject. The fifth related to the territories, and to the District of Columbia, and was the only one which excited attention, or has left a surviving interest. It was in these words: 'Resolved that the intermeddling of any State, or States, or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this District, or any of the territories, on the ground or under the pretext that it is immoral or sinful, or the passage of any act or measure of Congress with that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack on the institutions of all the slave-holding States.' The dogma of 'no power in Congress to legislate upon the existence of slavery in territories' had not been invented at that time. . . . The resolve went upon 'the existence of the power, and deprecated its abuse.' Mr. Clay offered an amendment, in the nature of a substitute, consisting of two resolutions, the first of which was in these words: "That the interference by the citizens of any of the States, with the view to the abolition of slavery in this District, is endangering the rights and security of the people of the District; and that any act or measure of Congress, designed to abolish slavery in this District, would be a violation of the faith implied in the cessions by the States of Virginia and Maryland—a just cause of alarm to the people of the slaveholding states—and have a direct and inevitable tendency to disturb and endanger the Union.' The vote on the final adoption of the resolution was: [yeas 37, nays 8]. . . . The second resolution of Mr. Clay applied to slavery in a territory where it existed, and deprecated any attempt to abolish it in such territory, as alarming to the slave States, and as violation of faith towards its inhabitants, unless they asked it; and in derogation of its right to decide the question of slavery for itself when erected into a State. This resolution was intended to cover the case of Florida, and ran thus: 'Resolved that any attempt of Congress to abolish slavery in any territory of the United States in which it exists would create serious alarm and just apprehension in the States sustaining that domestic institution, and would be a violation of good faith towards the inhabitants of any such territory who have been permitted to settle with, and hold, slaves therein; because the people of any such territory have not asked for the abolition of slavery therein; and because, when any such territory shall be admitted

into the Union as a State, the people thereof shall be entitled to decide that question exclusively for themselves.' And the vote upon it was—[yeas 35, nays 9]. . . . The general feeling of the Senate was that of entire repugnance to the whole movement—that of the petitions and memorials on the one hand, and Mr. Calhoun's resolutions on the other. The former were quietly got rid of, and in a way to rebuke, as well as to condemn their presentation. . . . The resolutions could not so easily be disposed of, especially as their mover . . . 'desired to make the question, on their rejection or adoption, a test question.'—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 2, ch. 33.

ALSO IN: R. M. McElroy, *Winning of the far West*, ch. 2.—J. W. Burgess, *Middle period*, pp. 263-265.



HENRY CLAY

- 1837-1841.—Wild cat banks of Michigan. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1837-1841.
- 1838.—Creation of Territory of Iowa. See IOWA: 1838.
- 1838.—Bill passed restricting immigration. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1835-1915.
- 1838-1846.—Government of Iowa territory.—Missouri-Iowa boundary dispute. See IOWA: 1838-1848.
- 1838-1914.—Expansion in the Pacific. See PACIFIC OCEAN: 1800-1914.
- 1839.—Disturbances between Maine and New Brunswick. See AROOSTOOK WAR.
- 1840.—Fourteenth presidential election.—Log-cabin and Hard-cider campaign.—Before the Sub-treasury Bill was passed "the presidential campaign of 1840 was being conducted. Van Buren's

nomination by his party was easily secured in a convention in Baltimore, May 4, 1840. Several states had named candidates for the vice-presidency, and the convention thought it best to refrain from deciding between them. It was probably expected that the choice would at last fall to the Senate. A platform strong in Jacksonian principles was adopted as the ground on which the country should continue to manifest its confidence in the existing administration. The whigs approached the election in high spirits. The long period of financial stringency, the inability of the democrats to unite on a positive remedy, and the many opponents of Van Buren in his party indicated that the democrats would have strong opposition. Clay saw the situation and had high hopes. It seemed that his opportunity was at last at hand. The convention was called at Harrisburg, December 4, 1839. As the time approached, a strong anti-Clay opposition appeared within the party. He was a mason, he had spoken against the abolitionists, and he was already twice defeated for the presidency. The opponents of Clay were well led by Thurlow Weed, party manager in the important state of New York. . . . Harrison was finally named in the convention. John Tyler, of Virginia, deeply attached to the defeated leader, was nominated for vice-president."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 433-434.—"The campaign of 1840 marks the final disappearance from American politics of all avowed belief in aristocracy. The two parties rivalled each other in proclaiming devotion to the will of the people; and the Whigs won because their clamor was the loudest and because the Democrats were discredited in the panic of '37. The Whig candidate was William Henry Harrison, the victor of Tippecanoe. An opponent referred to him contemptuously as a rude frontiersman fit only to live in a log cabin and drink hard cider. The Whigs turned this slur in effective ammunition. They had no official platform, and their candidate for Vice President, Tyler, was a Statesrights Democrat who happened to be Hostile to Van Buren. But they swept the country in a 'Hurrah Boys' campaign [known as the "Log Cabin and Hard Cider campaign"] for 'Tippecanoe and Tyler too'—the chief features being immense mass meetings in the country and torchlight processions in the cities, with both sorts of entertainments centering round log cabins and barrels of cider."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, p. 475.—William Henry Harrison, Whig, was elected president, over Martin Van Buren, Democrat, and James G. Birney, candidate of the "Liberty party." The popular vote cast was: Harrison 1,275,016, Van Buren 1,129,102, Birney 7,069. The electoral vote stood: Harrison 234, Van Buren 60, Birney none. John Tyler was elected vice president. "If one could imagine a whole nation declaring a holiday or season of rollicking for a period of six or eight months, and giving themselves up during the whole time to the wildest freaks of fun and frolic, caring nothing for business, singing, dancing, and carousing night and day, he might have some faint notion of the extraordinary scenes of 1840. It would be difficult, if not impossible, otherwise to form even a faint idea of the universal excitement, enthusiasm, activity, turmoil, and restlessness which pervaded the country during the spring, summer, and fall of that memorable year. Log cabins large enough to hold crowds of people were built in many places. Small ones, decorated with coon-skins, were mounted on wheels and used in processions. . . . Meetings were everywhere, and every day, held

in neighborhoods, school-houses, villages, towns, counties, cities, States, varying in number from ten to one hundred thousand; and wherever there was a gathering there were also speaking and singing. . . . Farmers with big teams and wagons, would leave their fields and travel ten, twenty, or thirty miles, accompanied by their families and neighbors, to attend a convention or a barbecue and listen to distinguished orators. Crowds on the road, multitudes in big wagons drawn by four, six, or eight horses, made the welkin ring with their log-cabin songs. . . . The entire population seemed to be absorbed in the great duty of electing General Harrison and thus changing the government. . . .

'What has caused this great commotion, motion, motion,

Our country through?

It is the ball a rolling on

For Tippecanoe and Tyler too,

For Tippecanoe and Tyler too.' . . . The popularity of no one man could have produced such a universal outpouring of the people from day to day for weeks and months unceasingly, abandoning everything else, and giving time and money unstintedly to carry the election. General Harrison was but the figure-head,—the representative of the Whig party for the time being. Few had ever heard of him. . . . As to his fitness for the presidency, the people knew nothing and cared nothing. A change in the government was what they desired and were determined to have."—N. Sargent, *Public men and events*, v. 2, pp. 107-110.

1840.—Sixth census.—The total population was 17,069,453 (exceeding that of 1830 by nearly 33 per cent.), classed and distributed as follows:

North			
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Connecticut . . . . .	301,856	8,105	17
Illinois . . . . .	472,254	3,598	331
Indiana . . . . .	678,698	7,165	3
Iowa . . . . .	42,924	172	16
Maine . . . . .	500,438	1,355	...
Massachusetts . . . . .	729,030	8,669	...
Michigan . . . . .	211,560	707	...
New Hampshire . . . . .	284,036	537	1
New Jersey . . . . .	351,588	21,044	674
New York . . . . .	2,378,800	50,027	4
Ohio . . . . .	1,502,122	17,342	3
Pennsylvania . . . . .	1,676,115	47,854	64
Rhode Island . . . . .	105,587	3,238	5
Vermont . . . . .	291,218	730	...
Wisconsin . . . . .	30,749	185	11
	<u>9,557,005</u>	<u>170,728</u>	<u>1,129</u>
South			
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama . . . . .	335,185	2,039	253,532
Arkansas . . . . .	77,174	405	19,935
Delaware . . . . .	58,561	16,919	2,605
District of Columbia . . . . .	30,657	8,361	4,694
Florida . . . . .	27,943	817	25,717
Georgia . . . . .	407,695	2,753	280,944
Kentucky . . . . .	590,253	7,317	182,258
Louisiana . . . . .	158,457	25,502	168,452
Maryland . . . . .	318,204	62,078	89,737
Mississippi . . . . .	179,074	1,366	195,211
Missouri . . . . .	323,888	1,574	58,240
North Carolina . . . . .	484,870	22,732	245,817
South Carolina . . . . .	259,084	8,276	327,038
Tennessee . . . . .	640,627	5,524	183,059
Virginia . . . . .	740,858	49,852	449,087
	<u>4,632,530</u>	<u>215,575</u>	<u>2,486,326</u>







The number of immigrants arriving in the United States between 1830 and 1840, according to official reports, was 599,125, of whom 283,191 were from the British Islands, and 212,497 from other parts of Europe.—See also CENSUS: United States.

1840-1841.—McLeod case. See CANADA: 1840-1841.

1841.—Settlement of Massachusetts.—Rhode Island boundary dispute. See RHODE ISLAND: 1841.

1841.—Death of President Harrison.—Breach between President Tyler and the Whig party which elected him.—“The rejoicing of the Whigs was soon turned to mourning. Five weeks after the old hero of Tippecanoe had spoken his inaugural address before the enthusiastic crowd gathered at the eastern front of the Capital, his body was lying in state beneath its majestic dome. How far Harrison would have succeeded, had he lived, in controlling and guiding the Whigs, is a matter of conjecture. . . . Both Clay and Webster towered above him, and . . . made slight concealment of their opinion of his ‘mediocrity.’ . . . Clay declined a place in the cabinet, preferring to direct the administration from his place in the Senate; but a full half of the cabinet officers were filled with men of his recommendation—Ewing (Treasury), Badger (Navy), and Crittenden (Attorney-General). Webster, given the choice of positions after Clay’s declination, took the portfolio of State, and brought his follower Francis Granger into the cabinet as Postmaster-General. The President appears to have been allowed to elect his Secretary of War (James K. Bell) without interference from the giants.”—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, p. 403.—“One of his last acts was to call congress in extra session for May 31, 1841. When it met, Tyler was president. Tyler now found himself at the head of a party with which he had little sympathy. He believed in state rights, opposed a bank and a high tariff, and had only left the democratic fold because he resented the towering methods of Jackson. His nomination had been made without the slightest expectation that he would ever be in a position to veto a bill which the whigs had carried through congress. . . . [When the extra session began Clay took charge of the situation like a military commander.] He offered a resolution specifying what work the extra session should perform, the chief features being: the repeal of the sub-treasury act, the incorporation of a bank, the enactment of a higher tariff law, and the distribution of the proceeds of land sales. . . . Tyler was very cautious, but he was also stubborn, and Clay’s dashing assumption of power aroused him.”—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 435.—The bill to abolish the sub-treasury “was passed by both Houses and signed by the President. A bill to incorporate ‘The Fiscal Bank of the United States’ was passed by both Houses. . . . It was vetoed by the President. . . . An effort to pass the bill over the veto did not receive a two-thirds majority. The Whig leaders, anxious to prevent a party disaster, asked from the President an outline of a bill which he would sign. After consultation with the Cabinet, it was given, and passed by both Houses. September 9th the President vetoed this bill also, and an attempt to pass it over the veto did not receive a two-thirds majority. The action of the President, in vetoing a bill drawn according to his own suggestions, and thus apparently provoking a contest with the party which had elected him, roused the unconcealed indignation of the Whigs. The Cabinet, with one

exception [Daniel Webster, secretary of state, who remained in President Tyler’s cabinet until May, 1843, in order that he might conclude the north-eastern boundary negotiations], at once resigned. The Whig members of Congress issued Addresses to the People, in which they detailed the reforms designed by the Whigs and impeded by the President, and declare that ‘all political connection between them and John Tyler was at an end from that day forth.’ . . . The President filled the vacancies in the Cabinet by appointing Whigs and Conservatives. His position was one of much difficulty. His strict constructionist opinions, which had prevented him from supporting Van Buren, would not allow him to approve a National Bank, and yet he had accepted the Vice-Presidency from a party pledged to establish one. The over hasty declaration of war by the Whigs put a stop to his vacillations, and compelled him to rely upon support from the Democrats. But only a few members of Congress, commonly known as ‘the corporal’s guard,’ recognized Tyler as a leader.”—A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, ch. 15, sect. 2-4.

ALSO IN: L. G. Tyler, *Letters and times of the Tylers*, v. 2, ch. 1-4.—C. Colton, *Life and times of Henry Clay*, ch. 14-15.—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years’ view*, v. 2, ch. 80-85.—A. C. Cole, *Whig party in the South*, pp. 64-93.—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 321-323.

1841.—Dorr Insurrection in Rhode Island. See RHODE ISLAND: 1841-1843.

1841-1844.—Negotiations with Texas.—British influence in Texas.—Effect on action of administration.—Annexation of Texas.—By far the most important measure of the Tyler administration was the annexation of Texas. After the defeat of Santa Anna, in 1836, Texas had appealed to the United States for annexation. But, in spite of his anxiety for the territory, and the fact that he had already made two attempts to buy it from Mexico, and the added influence of the vote of Congress to recognize the independence of the republic, Jackson then refused to take the necessary steps. “Texas had made the preservation of slavery one of the grounds of revolution, and if annexed it would be slave territory. The question immediately became a sectional one. Calhoun and the South urged that this vast region be acquired without delay. John Quincy Adams and Webster both made speeches on the other side. Jackson was hending all his energies to carry the election of Van Buren and perpetuate his policy against the bank; and he was unwilling to jeopardize party harmony. . . . [He advised Congress against recognition] but in February, 1837, when it seemed that England was about to grant recognition, he changed his attitude. . . . During Van Buren’s administration the annexation of Texas was held in abeyance. The South desired it, but the North was sure to object, and the question was too dangerous to party harmony to be taken up as long as it could be avoided. . . . After 1838, Texas ceased to offer herself where there was no prospect that she would be accepted.”—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 422, 438.—“In spite of the repulse which the Texan government had suffered in its attempt at annexation, it was first to indicate the desire of returning to the subject. In December, 1841, when Sam Houston became for the second time president of the republic, he immediately sent James Reily as *chargé d’affaires* to Washington, with instructions to ascertain whether the United States was indisposed to negotiate further relative to annexation. Anson

Jones, secretary of state under Houston, says that this was done with little hope of a favorable answer; and the Texan authorities were therefore not disappointed on learning from Reily that his efforts had met with no encouragement. March 25, 1842, he wrote Jones from Washington, saying, 'I would rather die than to remain here. . . . You can see from my official letter that nothing can be done here in the way of any negotiation for Texas.' Shortly afterwards his request to be relieved was granted, and his place was taken by Isaac Van Zandt, who was instructed to keep his government advised, so far as he might be able, of the feeling relative to annexation, both in Congress and among the people of the United States. This indifference of the United States government was suddenly changed to marked anxiety. . . . [By her negotiations with France and England], Texas had finally struck the key-note of the policy that was to win where humble and filial petition had failed. . . . The uneasiness thus awakened at Washington was much increased by reports that began to reach the government concerning a proposed use of British influence in Texas towards the abolition of slavery. One of these reports came through a private letter from 'a citizen of Maryland,' said to have been Duff Green, a friend of Calhoun. Benton asserts that the letter was intended for public use, and was paid for out of the contingent fund of the state department. Whether this be true or not, the story was sensational. It was to the effect that S. P. Andrews, of Houston, Texas, was seeking to get the support of the British government for a plan to abolish slavery in the republic by indemnifying the slave-holders. . . . According to the 'citizen of Maryland' who gave the Texan minister at London as his authority, that government had agreed to guarantee interest on a loan for the purpose, to be repaid with Texan lands, if the government of the republic would abolish slavery. Upshur, the United States secretary of state, who must be regarded as speaking for President Tyler, credited the tale and thought the plan was a vast and deep-laid scheme on the part of England to abolish slavery throughout America . . . and to acquire a dominant influence in the councils of Texas and a monopoly of the Texas trade. A more real danger that he foresaw was the possibility of friction from a Texas without slavery and beyond the limits of the Union, yet adjacent to the slave state of Louisiana. On August 8, 1843, he wrote W. S. Murphy, the United States *chargé* in Texas, telling of the report and his fears, and asking for further information. Murphy's reply, based on the statements of several citizens who had conversed with Andrews after his return from England, went to confirm the story which had reached Upshur. . . . January 25, 1843, Ashbel Smith, the Texan minister to England and France, wrote Isaac Van Zandt, the *chargé* of the republic at Washington, that in July, 1842, a person having relations with the British government had inquired of Smith whether Texas would be willing to abolish slavery if equivalent advantages were offered by England to Texas; and whether it might not be possible to divide the republic into two states, with the Colorado as the boundary between them, the eastern to be slave-holding and the western to be free. The man who made these propositions said that he did it with the knowledge of the Earl of Aberdeen, the English minister of foreign affairs. . . . Putting all things together, it seems certain that the information possessed by the department of state at Washington in the summer of 1843 was such as to

lead to the conclusion that British influence was working strongly in Texas, and that it was one aim of Great Britain to secure the abolition of slavery in that republic."—G. P. Garrison, *Westward extension*, pp. 109-114.—On Upshur's sudden death in 1844, Calhoun, who succeeded him as secretary of state, negotiated a treaty by which Texas became American territory. Its public lands were to be surrendered, but on the other hand its public indebtedness of \$10,000,000 was to be assumed by the United States.—See also TEXAS: 1836-1845.

ALSO IN: J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 7, pp. 321-331.—G. P. Garrison, *Texas*, ch. 10-15.—*Twenty-eighth Congress, 1st Session, United States Senate Document*, no. 341, pp. 18-42.—N. P. Stephenson, *Texas and the Mexican War (Chronicles of America Series*, pp. 127-167).

1842.—Victory of John Quincy Adams in defending Right of Petition.—"John Quincy Adams, now representative from Massachusetts and formerly indifferent to slavery, crowned his long public life with its chief glory by standing forth as the unconquerable champion of the right of petition,—which he insisted, meant that his constituents and others had not merely the right to send petitions to the Congressional waste-paper basket, but the right to have their petitions read and considered. Tireless, skillful, indomitable, unruffled by tirades of abuse, quick to take advantage of all parliamentary openings, Adams wore out his opponents and roused the country."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 488-489.—"Jan. 21, 1842, Mr. Adams presented a petition from 45 citizens of Haverhill, Mass., praying for the dissolution of the Union, and moved it be referred to a select committee, with instructions to report why the petition should not be granted. There was at once great excitement and members called out, 'Expel him,' 'Censure him.' After a good deal of fruitless endeavor to accomplish something, the House adjourned, and forty or fifty slaveholders met to decide what kind of resolutions should be presented to meet the case. Thomas F. Marshall of Kentucky was selected by this caucus from Congress to propose the resolutions, which were to the effect that for presenting such a petition to a body each of whom had taken an oath to maintain the Constitution, Mr. Adams was virtually inviting them to perjure themselves, and that therefore he deserved the severest censure. Marshall supported this with a very violent speech. Mr. Wise followed in another. Then Mr. Adams arose and asked the clerk to read the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, being the one which recognizes the right of every people to alter or abolish their form of Government when it ceases to accomplish its ends. He said that those who believed that the present Government was oppressive had the right (according to the Declaration of Independence, on which the whole of our national unity reposes), to petition Congress to do what they believed was desirable; and all that Congress could properly do would be to explain to them why such an act could not be performed. . . . Mr. Adams had on his desk a great many books and references prepared for his use by some anti-slavery gentlemen then in Washington; after he had gone on for some time with his speech he was asked how much more time he would probably occupy. He replied 'I believe Mr. Burke took three months for his speech on Warren Hastings' indictment. I think I may probably get through in ninety days, per-

haps in less time.' Thereupon they thought it just as well to have the whole thing come to an end and it was moved that the matter should be laid on the table. Mr. Adams consented, and it was done."—J. F. Clarke, *Anti-slavery days*, pp. 57-59.—The objectionable rule, which had been passed in 1836 (see above: 1836: Atherton gag) was finally repealed in 1844, after it had done effective injury to the cause of slavery.

1842.—Tariff Act. See TARIFF: 1842: United States.

1842.—Ashburton Treaty with England.—Settlement of northeastern boundary questions.—"It was arranged in December by the Peel ministry that Lord Ashburton should be sent to Washington as a special minister from Great Britain, with full powers to settle the boundary, and all other pending disputes with the United States. . . . Ashburton, formerly Alexander Baring, of the eminent banking firm of Baring Brothers, and a son of its original founder, was now an old man, who . . . aspired only to bring these two countries to more friendly terms. Like his father before him, he had tact and plain good sense, and understood well the American character, having married here during his youth. Lord Ashburton arrived early the next April, and on the 13th of June [1842] entered upon the duties of his mission. Maine and Massachusetts, the States most interested in the disputed boundary, sent commissioners of their own to yield an assent in this branch of the business. The whole business as conducted at our capital had an easy and informal character. Webster and Lord Ashburton represented alone their respective governments; no protocols were used, nor formal records; and the correspondence and official interviews went on after a friendly fashion in the heat of summer, and while Congress was holding its long regular session. . . . [This Washington or Ashburton Treaty] bore date of the day [August 9] when it was formally signed. It passed by the Oregon or north-western boundary, a point on which harmony was impossible, and this was the most pregnant omission of all; it passed by the 'Caroline' affair; it ignored, too, the 'Creole' case. . . . Nor, on the other side, were the debts of delinquent States assumed by the United States, as many British creditors had desired. Mutual extradition in crimes under the law of nations, and the delivery of fugitives from justice, were stipulated. But the two chief features of this treaty were; a settlement of the boundary between Great Britain and the United States on the north-east, extending westward beyond the great lakes, and a cruising convention for the mutual suppression of the slave-trade. As to the northeast territory in dispute, which embraced some 12,000 square miles, seven-twelfths, or about as much as the King of the Netherlands had awarded, were set off to the United States; Great Britain taking the residue and securing the highlands she desired which frowned upon the Canadian Gibraltar, and a clear though circuitous route between Quebec and Halifax. Our government was permitted to carry timber down the St. John's River, and though becoming bound to pay Maine and Massachusetts \$300,000 for the strip of territory relinquished to Great Britain, gained in return Rouse's Point, on Lake Champlain, of which an exact survey would have deprived us. By the cruising convention clause, which the President himself bore a conspicuous part in arranging, the delicate point of 'right of search' was avoided; for instead of trusting Great Britain as the police of other nations for suppressing the African slave-trade, each nation

bound itself to do its full duty by keeping up a sufficient squadron on the African coast. It so happened that Great Britain, by softening the old phrase 'right of search' into 'right of visitation,' had been inducing other nations to guarantee this police inspection of suspected slave vessels. In December, 1841, ambassadors of the five great European powers arranged in London a quintuple league of this character. But France, hesitating to confirm such an arrangement, rejected that league when the Ashburton treaty was promulgated, and hastened to negotiate in its place a cruising convention similar to ours on the slave-trade suppression; nor was the right of search, against which America had fought in the war of 1812, ever again invoked, even as a mutual principle, until by 1862 the United States had grown as sincere as Great Britain herself in wishing to crush out the last remnant of the African traffic. This cruising convention, however, left the abstract question of search untouched, and in that light Sir Robert Peel defended himself in Parliament. The Ashburton treaty was honorable, on the whole, for each side; what it arranged was arranged fairly, and what it omitted was deferred without prejudice. . . . So satisfactory, in fine, was the treaty, despite all criticism, that the Senate ratified it by more than a three-fourths vote, and at a time, too, when the Whig Congress was strongly incensed against the administration, and Webster had made bitter enemies."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States*, v. 4, ch. 17, pp. 400-403.—See also AFRICAN SQUADRON; MAINE: 1841-1842.—Webster retained office for some months after the ratification of his treaty. But when, in 1843, he saw the administration leaning towards annexation of Texas, to which he was strongly opposed, he resigned. His place was taken by Upshur of Virginia, who was in favor of annexation.

ALSO IN: J. W. Foster, *Century of American diplomacy*, pp. 282-286.—H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*, pp. 241-263.—Idem, *Diplomatic and official papers*.—G. T. Curtis, *Life of Webster*, v. 2, ch. 28-29.—*Treaties and conventions between the United States and other countries*, pp. 432-438.—I. Washburn, Jr., *Northeastern boundary* (Maine Historical Society Collections, v. 8).

1842.—Recognition of independence of Hawaiian islands. See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: Discovery and early history.

1844.—Fifteenth presidential election.—Choice of James K. Polk.—The Texas treaty of annexation had been held in committee in the Senate "till the national conventions of the two parties should declare themselves. Both conventions met in Baltimore, in May, to name candidates and avow policies. The Whigs were unanimous as to who should be their candidate: it could be no one but Henry Clay. Among the Democrats there was a very strong feeling in favor of the renomination of Van Buren. But both Clay and Van Buren had been asked their opinion about the annexation of Texas, both had declared themselves opposed to any immediate step in that direction, and Van Buren's declaration cost him the Democratic nomination. He could have commanded a very considerable majority in the Democratic convention, but he did not command the two-thirds majority required by its rules, and James K. Polk of Tennessee became the nominee of his party." (See also TENNESSEE: 1834-1856.) Polk had been speaker of the House of Representatives, and was honorably though slightly known to the country. The only new issue presented in the party "platforms" was offered by the Democrats in their resolution demand-

ing "the reoccupation of Oregon and the reannexation of Texas, at the earliest practicable period"; and this proved the makeweight in the campaign. [Polk was the first "dark horse" to be nominated for president. (See ELECTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL: United States: Work of the nominating conventions.)] . . . The 'Liberty Party,' the political organization of the Abolitionists, commanded now, as it turned out, more than 60,000 votes. . . . Had the 'Liberty' men in New York voted for Clay, he would have been elected."—W. Wilson, *Division and reunion, 1820-1880, ch. 6, sect. 73*.—Polk received of the popular votes, 1,337,243, against 1,299,062 cast for Henry Clay, Whig, and 62,300 cast for James G. Birney, candidate of the Liberty party. The electoral vote was: Polk, 170; Clay, 105; Birney, 0. George M. Dallas was elected vice president.

Also in: C. Schurz, *Henry Clay, v. 2, pp. 242-268*.—G. P. Garrison, *Westward extension, pp. 135-140*.—E. Stanwood, *History of the presidency, pp. 200-225*.

1844.—Question of encroachment on Indian lands. See OKLAHOMA: 1844-1856.

1844.—Statistical bureau created. See STATISTICS: Statistical work in the United States.

1844.—Treaty of peace and commerce with China. See CHINA: 1839-1844.

1845.—Preserving the equilibrium between free and slave states.—Admission of Iowa and Florida.—"The free State of Iowa, which had framed a constitution in the autumn of 1844 . . . was asking for admission. Some makeweight must be found before this application could be complied with. This . . . [was discovered] in an old constitution, framed by the Territory of Florida five years before. Though Florida was greatly deficient in numbers, and her constitution was very objectionable in some of its features, they seized this occasion to press its claims, and to make its admission a condition precedent to their consent that Iowa should be received. The House Committee on Territories reported in favor of the admission of the two in a single measure. In the closing hours of the XXVIIIth Congress the bill came up for consideration. . . . The constitution of Florida not only expressly denied to the legislature the power to emancipate slaves, but gave it the authority to prevent free colored persons from immigrating into the State, or from being discharged from vessels in her ports. [All attempts to require an amendment of the Florida constitution in these particulars before recognizing that ill-populated territory as a State, were defeated, and the bill admitting Florida and Iowa became a law on the 3d of March, 1845.]"—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power in America, v. 2, ch. 1*.—See also IOWA: 1839-1844; 1846; FLORIDA: 1838-1845.

1845.—Polk's cabinet meetings.—President Polk's diary shows that meetings of his cabinet were held twice a week. This was probably the origin of the custom of regular meetings.

Also in: *American Historical Review, Apr., 1915, pp. 516-517*.

1845.—Mail Subsidy Act.—Extent of postal service. See COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1789-1920; POSTAL SYSTEMS: 1803-1914.

1845-1846.—Oregon boundary question and its settlement.—In 1844 resentment over the neglect to push the claims to Oregon "was expressed with steadily increasing volume throughout the United States, but especially in the West, and was accompanied by shrill demands that the American claim to the whole of the Oregon territory should be effectively asserted. In the presidential cam-

paign of 1844 the Democrats united this demand with that for the annexation of Texas. 'Fifty-four forty or fight' was the alliterative slogan that embodied the jingoistic feeling as to Oregon. The Democratic convention recorded in the party platform its conviction 'that our title to the whole of the territory of Oregon is clear and unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England or any other power.' With all due allowance for the insincerities and bluster of campaign declamation, the election of Polk on such a platform, together with the popular feeling exhibited during the canvass, gave strong evidence that the time was at hand for a definitive settlement of the long-standing question. The inaugural address of the new President, in March, 1845, made the matter perfectly clear. Polk declared it his duty to 'assert and maintain by all constitutional means the right of the United States to that portion of our territory which lies beyond the Rocky Mountains.' This declaration attracted much attention in Great Britain, where it was regarded as a bellicose claim to the whole of Oregon. Sir Robert Peel, the prime minister, as well as the leader of the opposition and other political chieftains, felt called upon to make public counter-declarations that British claims to the region would be sustained at all hazards. While this little flurry of long-range defiance was in progress, with the embellishments that the newspapers were able to add, a more significant element in the general situation showed itself in the unusually large numbers that assembled in western Missouri to join the annual trek over the Oregon Trail. The character of these emigrants was as a whole excellent, and their purpose of making homes for themselves in the distant territory was guaranteed by the large numbers of women and children in every party. To look after the interests of these people, both on their long progress across the plains and mountains and in their new homes, was a most obvious duty of a government that made any pretensions to efficiency. Polk's secretary of state, Buchanan, took up the Oregon question with Pakenham, the British minister at Washington, in the summer of 1845. Negotiations as to the northwestern boundary of the United States had been carried on at intervals ever since the purchase of the Louisiana territory in 1803 gave the United States a definite interest in the region. Diplomacy had exhausted all the arguments based on discovery, exploration, treaty, and occupation, without leaving any possibility that either the British or the American Government could exclude the other entirely from the tract in dispute. Division of the territory had been proposed by both sides, the Americans offering the extension of the parallel of forty-nine degrees from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, the British insisting on the Columbia River from the point at which its northern branch was intersected by the same parallel. Near the close of Tyler's administration an offer of arbitration by the British was declined. When Buchanan resumed negotiations in July, 1845, he again offered forty-nine degrees to the Pacific, explaining that while President Polk believed in American claim to the whole region was valid, he felt precluded by the acts of his predecessors from insisting on it without first trying what they had been willing to concede. Pakenham here made a grave tactical error. Without consulting his government he rejected the proposal, in terms so peremptory and ill-advised as to give great offence to the President. Polk promptly revealed a spirit that he had not

been supposed to possess. Against the almost tearful protests of the timid Buchanan he practically broke off negotiations by directing the secretary to withdraw his offer and to refrain from all further consideration of the question until some definite proposal should be received from Great Britain. This position the President maintained unflinchingly despite repeated efforts of Pakenham to induce a renewal of the offer; for Lord Aberdeen had disapproved of his course in rejecting it, and Pakenham was left in a very uncomfortable position. In his message to Congress in December, 1845, Polk confirmed his uncompromising attitude by revealing the whole situation, claiming that the conciliatory policy of the United States had been flouted by Great Britain, and calling upon Congress for legislation to sustain the right to all Oregon, and to protect its citizens who should settle therein. As against the policy of Great Britain he propounded two dogmas that must prevail in relation to America: first, that there must be no interference by European powers with the independent action of the nations on this continent; second, that no new colony shall be established by any European power in North America. These principles he considered to be implicit in the celebrated dicta of President Monroe twenty-two years earlier, which he cited and reaffirmed. Polk's immediate application of his principles was, of course, to Texas and Oregon. If any portion of the people of this continent should wish to join with the United States, no European power shall interfere to prevent the union; further, 'no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent.' As the first of these expressions referred unmistakably to Aberdeen's diplomatic activities in Texas, so the second, through the indefinite extension of Monroe's doctrine implied . . . , referred no less clearly to Oregon. This belligerent pronouncement of Polk was naturally the prelude to a long season of warlike feeling and hostile recrimination on both sides of the Atlantic. As the treaty of 1827 provided for the termination of the joint occupation of Oregon by one year's notice from either government, Polk asked Congress for authority to give the necessary notice. After debates lasting all through the winter, the authority was given, and Great Britain was duly notified in April of 1846. Long before this date, however, a way had been found for the resumption of diplomatic discussion of the question. Polk stiffly maintained his old position, but consented to take the advice of the Senate on any proposal that should come from Great Britain. The offer duly came of the forty-ninth parallel, reserving to the British Vancouver Island and the navigation of the Columbia River. On the advice of the Senate Polk accepted this; the treaty was signed June 15, 1846, and went into effect in August."—W. A. Dunning, *British empire and the United States*, pp. 128-133.—See also OREGON: 1818-1846; 1846-1855; BRITISH COLUMBIA: 1577-1846.

1845-1846.—Slavery question in the Democratic party.—Hunkers and Barnburners.—Wilmot Proviso.—"With Polk's accession and the Mexican war, the schism in the Democratic ranks over the extension of American slave territory became plainer. Even during the canvass of 1844 a circular had been issued by William Cullen Bryant, David Dudley Field, John W. Edmonds, and other Van Buren men, supporting Polk, but urging the choice of congressmen opposed to annexation. Early in the new administration the division of

New York Democrats into 'Barnburners' and 'Old Hunkers' appeared. The former were the strong pro-Van Buren, anti-Texas men, or 'radical Democrats,' who were likened to the farmer who burned his barn to clear it of rats. The latter were the 'northern men with southern principles,' the supporters of annexation, and the respectable, dull men of easy consciences, who were said to hanker after the offices. The Soft Hunkers were less friendly to slavery. The Barnburners were led by men of really eminent ability and exalted character: Silas Wright, then governor, Benjamin F. Butler, John A. Dix, chosen in 1845 to the United States senate, Azariah C. Flagg, the famous comptroller, and John Van Buren, the ex-president's son. . . . Daniel S. Dickinson and William L. Marcy were the chief figures in the Hunker ranks. Polk seemed inclined, at the beginning, to favor, or at least to placate, the Barnburners. . . . Jackson's death in June, 1845, deprived the Van Buren men of the tremendous moral weight which his name carried, and which might have daunted Polk. It perhaps also helped to loosen the weight of party ties on the Van Buren men. After this the schism rapidly grew. In the fall election of 1845 the Barnburners pretty thoroughly controlled the Democratic party of the state [of New York] in hostility to the Mexican war, which the annexation of Texas had now brought. Samuel J. Tilden of Columbia county, and a profound admirer of Van Buren, became one of their younger leaders."—E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 11.—In the slang nomenclature which New York politics have always produced with great fertility Hard-Shell and Soft-Shell were terms often used instead of Hunker and Barnburner. "Polk announced to Congress (May 11, 1846), 'War exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico!' Congress accepted the pretext and adopted the war. Abolitionists again talked secession. But, outside New England . . . [the war was popular]. As soon as the war with Mexico began, the President had asked Congress for a grant of two million dollars to enable him to negotiate to advantage. It was understood that this money was to be used as a first payment in satisfying Mexico for territory to be taken from her. To this 'Two-Million Dollar Bill' in the House of Representatives, David Wilmot, a Pennsylvania Democrat, secured an amendment providing that slavery should never exist in any territory (outside Texas) to be so acquired. Northwestern Democrats voted almost solidly for this 'Wilmot Proviso,' partly from real reluctance to see slavery extended, partly to punish Polk and the Slave Power for betraying the Northwest in the Oregon matter. The session expired (August 1846) before a vote was reached in the Senate, where the Slave Power had now rallied.—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*, pp. 496-497.—In 1847 the proviso was added to an appropriation bill for \$3,000,000 which the president asked to be employed in negotiating a treaty with Mexico. The proviso was added in the House, but defeated in the Senate, and the bill was then passed without it. Time and again it was added to bills in the House. Abraham Lincoln said he voted for it no less than forty-two times. "Upon this proviso the modern Republican party was formed eight years later; upon it, fourteen years later, Abraham Lincoln was chosen president; and upon it began the war for the Union, out of which came the vastly grander and unsought beneficence of complete emancipation."—E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren*, ch. 11.

1845-1847.—Irish immigration. See IRELAND: 1845-1847.

1846.—Treaty with Colombia regarding Panama canal rights. See PANAMA CANAL: 1800-1850.

1846.—Independent treasury established. See INDEPENDENT TREASURY.

1846.—Walker tariff. See TARIFF: 1846-1861.

1846-1847.—War with Mexico.—Conquest of California and New Mexico. See MEXICO: 1846; 1846-1847; 1847 (March-September); CALIFORNIA: 1846; 1846-1847; NEW MEXICO: 1846.

1847.—Calhoun's policy of agitation, forcing the slavery issue upon the North.—"On Friday, the 10th of February [1847], Mr. Calhoun introduced into the Senate his new slavery resolutions, prefaced by an elaborate speech, and requiring an immediate vote upon them. They were in these words: 'Resolved, That the territories of the United States belong to the several States composing this Union, and are held by them as their joint and common property. Resolved, That Congress, as the joint agent and representative of the States of this Union, has no right to make any law, or do any act whatever, that shall directly, or by its effects, make any discrimination between the States of this Union, by which any of them shall be deprived of its full and equal right in any territory of the United States acquired or to be acquired. Resolved, That the enactment of any law which should directly, or by its effects, deprive the citizens of any of the States of this Union from emigrating, with their property, into any of the territories of the United States, will make such discrimination, and would, therefore, be a violation of the constitution, and the rights of the States from which such citizens emigrated, and in derogation of that perfect equality which belongs to them as members of this Union, and would tend directly to subvert the Union itself. Resolved, That it is a fundamental principle in our political creed, that a people, in forming a constitution, have the unconditional right to form and adopt the government which they may think best calculated to secure their liberty, prosperity, and happiness; and that, in conformity thereto, no other condition is imposed by the federal constitution on a State, in order to be admitted into this Union, except that its constitution shall be republican; and that the imposition of any other by Congress would not only be in violation of the constitution, but in direct conflict with the principle on which our political system rests.' These resolutions, although the sense is involved in circumlocutory phrases, are intelligible to the point, that Congress has no power to prohibit slavery in a territory, and that the exercise of such a power would be a breach of the constitution, and leading to the subversion of the Union. . . . Mr. Calhoun demanded the prompt consideration of his resolutions, giving notice that he would call them up the next day and press them to a speedy and final vote. He did call them up, but never called for the vote, nor was any ever had. . . . In the course of this year, and some months after the submission of his resolutions in the Senate denying the right of Congress to abolish slavery in a territory, Mr. Calhoun wrote a letter to a member of the Alabama Legislature, which furnishes the key to unlock his whole system of policy in relation to the slavery agitation, and its designs, from his first taking up the business in Congress in the year 1835, down to the date of the letter; and thereafter. The letter was in reply to one asking his opinion 'as to the steps which should be taken' to guard the rights of the South. . . . It opens with this

paragraph: 'I am much gratified with the tone and views of your letter, and concur entirely in the opinion you express, that instead of shunning, we ought to court the issue with the North on the slavery question. I would even go one step further, and add that it is our duty—due to ourselves, to the Union, and our political institutions, to force the issue on the North. We are now stronger relatively than we shall be hereafter, politically and morally. Unless we bring on the issue, delay to us will be dangerous indeed. . . . Had the South, or even my own State backed me, I would have forced the issue on the North in 1835, when the spirit of abolitionism first developed itself to any considerable extent. It is a true maxim, to meet danger on the frontier, in politics as well as war. Thus thinking, I am of the impression, that if the South act as it ought, the Wilmot Proviso, instead of proving to be the means of successfully assailing us and our peculiar institution, may be made the occasion of successfully asserting our equality and rights, by enabling us to force the issue on the North. Something of the kind was indispensable to rouse and unite the South. On the contrary, if we should not meet it as we ought, I fear, greatly fear, our doom will be fixed. It would prove that we either have not the sense or spirit to defend ourselves and our institutions.'"—T. H. Benton, *Thirty years' view*, v. 2, ch. 167-8.

ALSO IN: W. M. Meigs, *Life of John Caldwell Calhoun*, v. 2.

1847.—Mormon settlement in Great Salt Lake. See MORMONISM: 1846-1848.

1847-1848.—Dispute over organization of new territories.—"The persistence of the advocates of the Wilmot proviso aroused equal insistence on the part of Calhoun, Davis and other Southern leaders that no restriction of slavery in the new territory should be allowed by Congress. Oregon was anxiously waiting for territorial organization in the summer of 1846, and President Polk urged in his messages of August and December that Congress proceed to the task. But when the House passed a bill which extended the anti-slavery provision of the Northwest Ordinance to Oregon (January 16, 1847), the Senate tabled it. There was no intention in the mind of the Southern senators of carrying slavery into Oregon. What they objected to in the bill was the power to exclude slavery from Oregon. When the ratification of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in the summer of 1848 made New Mexico and California American soil, Polk urged the prompt organization of a territorial government for these provinces also. An attempt was made to settle the whole matter by the so-called Clayton Compromise of July, 1848, according to which Oregon was to have complete territorial government with representation in Congress, while California and New Mexico were to be administered by a governor, a secretary and judges of the Supreme Court. The question of slavery was left to the Oregon legislature, but the governments of New Mexico and California were forbidden to pass any laws 'respecting the prohibition or establishment of African slavery—such being referred to the United States Courts' . . . [a scheme which Thomas Corwin said 'does not enact a law; it only enacts a lawsuit']. This measure the Senate passed after an all-night battle (July 27), but the House tabled it. Finally, in August 1848, the Senate so far receded from its position as to sanction the bill for the organization of Oregon, including the restriction of slavery. But California and New Mexico still remained unorganized."—D. S. Muzzey,

*United States of America, v. 1, pp. 440-441.*—“California and New Mexico were free; and, . . . ‘by the laws of nations, the laws of all conquered countries remain until changed by the conqueror’ . . . [yet] Calhoun denied that the laws of Mexico could keep slavery out of New Mexico and California. ‘As soon as the treaty between the two countries is ratified’ said he, ‘the sovereignty and authority of Mexico in the territory acquired by it become extinct, and that of the United States is substituted in its place carrying with it the constitution, with its overriding control over the laws and insitutions of Mexico inconsistent with it.’ . . . Calhoun must be judged by the fruits of his two favorite dogmas, the extreme states-rights theory of 1832, and the slavery-extension doctrine of 1848. The two thoroughly disseminated through the South, became prime elements of political faith. Their working forced her onward, and induced a proud, high-spirited people to battle for an idea utterly condemned at the tribunal of modern civilization.”—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, v. 1, pp. 94-95.*—See also CALIFORNIA: 1846-1847.

ALSO IN: J. W. Burgess, *Middle period, pp. 94-95.*  
1848.—Free Soil convention at Buffalo and its nominations.—The “Barnburner” Democrats of New York, or Free Soilers as they began to be called, met in convention at Utica, February 16, 1848, and chose delegates to the approaching national Democratic Convention at Baltimore. In April the Barnburner members of the Legislature issued an elaborate address, setting forth the Free Soil principles of the Democratic fathers. The authors of the address were afterwards known to be Samuel J. Tilden and Martin and John Van Buren. The national Democratic Convention assembled in May, 1848. “It offered to admit the Barnburner and Hunker delegations together to cast the vote of the State. The Barnburners rejected the compromise as a simple nullification of the vote of the State, and then withdrew. Lewis Cass was nominated for president, the Wilmot proviso being thus emphatically condemned. For Cass had declared in favor of letting the new territories themselves decide upon slavery. The Barnburners, returning to a great meeting in the City Hall Park at New York, cried ‘The lash has resounded through the halls of the Capitol!’ and condemned the cowardice of northern senators who had voted with the South. . . . The delegates issued an address written by Tilden, fearlessly calling Democrats to independent action. In June a Barnburner convention met at Utica,” which named Van Buren for the Presidency and called a national convention of all Free Soilers to meet at Buffalo, August 9, 1848. “Charles Francis Adams, the son of John Quincy Adams, presided at the Buffalo convention; and in it Joshua R. Giddings, the famous abolitionist, and Salmon P. Chase, were conspicuous. To the unspeakable horror of every Hunker there participated in the deliberations a negro, the Rev. Mr. Ward. Butler [Benjamin F., of New York], reported the resolutions in words whose inspiration is still fresh and ringing. . . . At the close were the stirring and memorable words: ‘We inscribe on our banner, Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and Free Men; and under it we will fight on and fight ever, until a triumphant victory shall reward our exertions.’ Joshua Leavitt of Massachusetts, one of the ‘blackest’ of abolitionists, reported to the convention the name of Martin Van Buren for president.” The nomination was acclaimed with enthusiasm, and

Charles Francis Adams was nominated for vice-president. “In September, John A. Dix, then a Democratic senator, accepted the Free-soil nomination for governor of New York. The Democratic party was agbast. The schismatics had suddenly gained great dignity and importance. . . . The Whigs had in June nominated Taylor, one of the two heroes of the Mexican war. . . . The anti-slavery Whigs hesitated for a time; but Seward of New York and Horace Greeley in the New York Tribune finally led most of them to Taylor, rather than, as Seward said, engage in ‘guerrilla warfare’ under Van Buren. . . . This launching of the modern Republican party was, strangely enough, to include in New York few besides Democrats.”—E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren, ch. 11.*—“The Buffalo Convention was one of the more important upheavals in the process of political disintegration which went steadily on between the years 1844, when the ‘Birneyites’ deprived Henry Clay of the electoral vote of New York, and 1856, when the Whig party disappeared, and the pro-slavery Democracy found itself confronted by the anti-slavery Republican organization of the North. In 1848, though the Whig party was already doomed, its time had not yet come. The Free Soil movement of 1848 was, therefore, premature; and moreover, as the result afterwards showed, there was something almost ludicrous in a combination of ‘Conscience Whigs’ of Massachusetts, in revolt over the nomination of the slave-owning General Taylor, with the ‘Barnburning’ Democrats of New York, intent only upon avenging on Cass the defeat of Van Buren. None the less the Free Soil movement of 1848 clearly foreshadowed the Republican uprising of 1856, and of the men who took part in the Buffalo convention an unusually large proportion afterwards became prominent as political leaders.”—C. F. Adams, *Richard Henry Dana, v. 1, ch. 7.*

ALSO IN: H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power in America, v. 2, ch. 13.*—J. W. Schuckers, *Life of Salmon P. Chase, ch. 11.*—R. B. Warden, *Life of Salmon P. Chase, ch. 21.*—W. W. Whipple, *Democratic party: A history.*

1848.—Peace with Mexico.—Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See MEXICO: 1848.

1848.—Admission of Wisconsin into the Union. See WISCONSIN: 1805-1848.

1848.—Discovery of gold in California. See CALIFORNIA: 1848-1849.

1848.—Oregon organized as a territory. See OREGON: 1843-1848.

1848-1849.—Sixteenth presidential election.—Inauguration and death of General Taylor.—In the presidential election of 1848, the Democratic party put forward as its candidate Lewis Cass; the Whigs named General Zachary Taylor, who had no politics and who, according to J. F. Rhodes, had never voted. No resolutions were adopted by the Whigs, and no address issued. “The candidate was the platform”; the Free Soil party placed Martin Van Buren in nomination. That the Whig party should again have set aside its distinguished leader, Henry Clay, caused great grief among his devoted followers and friends. “But there were those in it who had grown gray in waiting for office under the banner of Mr. Clay, and whose memories were refreshed with what was effected by the éclat of military glory under General Jackson. It was hard, and might seem ungrateful, to abandon a great and long-trying leader. But the military feather waved before their eyes, and they were tempted. . . . It needed a leader, or a few leaders to give the signal of defection; and they

were not wanting. One after another of the great names of the party fell off from Mr. Clay and inclined to General Taylor; and when the national Whig Convention met at Philadelphia, in June, 1848, to nominate a candidate for the Presidency, the first ballot showed that seven out of twelve of the Kentucky delegation, against the expectations and wishes of their constituency, had deserted Mr. Clay, and gone over to General Taylor. The influence of this fact was great—perhaps decisive. For if Mr. Clay's own State was against him, what could be expected of the other States? On the fourth ballot General Taylor had 52 majority, and was declared the nominee. . . . In November following, General Taylor was elected President of the United States, and Millard Fillmore Vice-President. As in the case of General Harrison, who died in thirty days after his inauguration, so in the case of General Taylor . . . he died in sixteen months after he had entered on the duties of his office."—C. Colton, *Life, correspondence and speeches of Henry Clay*, v. 3, ch. 4.—The popular vote cast at the election was, for Taylor, 1,360,099; Cass, 1,220,544; for Van Buren, 291,263. The electoral vote was, for Taylor, 163; for Cass, 127; for Van Buren, none. Millard Fillmore, elected vice president, succeeded to the presidency on the death of General Taylor, July 9, 1850.—O. O. Howard, *General Taylor*, ch. 21-24.

ALSO IN: E. Stanwood, *History of the presidency*, ch. 18.—T. C. Smith, *Liberty and Free-Soil parties* (*Harvard Historical Studies*, v. 6).

1848-1854.—Progress toward disunion.—Influence of immigration on feeling of nationalism.—“The next session (1848-1849) was a short one. The House passed a bill to organize the territory of California without slavery, but the senate refused to concur. Various other propositions on the same subject were made, but none were acceptable. In this session as in the former, Polk urged that the whole question be settled by extending the Missouri Compromise to the Pacific, and some favored the idea. Probably the South would have accepted it, but the North was aroused, and was determined to check the spread of slavery, so that Polk's suggestion was not adopted. While this subject was being discussed, Northern members brought in a bill to forbid the slave trade in the District of Columbia. It passed the house, but was reconsidered and tabled. The Southern members were aroused, and replied by asking for a committee to prepare a more effective fugitive slave law. The request was not granted, but it served to call the attention of the country to a concrete grievance of the South. The Southern congressmen in an address described the growth of discrimination, and soon afterwards the southern legislatures passed resolutions of similar nature. Northern legislature replied by demanding the exclusion of slavery from the territories. On March 4, 1849, congress adjourned after three months of bitter debate, in which no progress was made toward removing the sectional differences. Threats of disunion were freely uttered by Southerners, and before adjournment they organized a committee which sent forth an address on the position of the South. It reviewed the rise of opposition to slavery, arraigned the aggressive spirit of the North on the question, declared the South was denied a fair share of the territory it had done so much to conquer in the recent war, and called on all Southern people to stand as a unit in resistance of the treatment it received.”—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 453.—“The people at large were convinced that

a crisis was at hand in the slavery question and that it must be met. Our country threatened to separate into warring factions. The very protestations of orators North and South in their utter devotion to our priceless Union show how great the danger to that Union was. At the North the principle of the Wilmot Proviso was gaining converts with each rejection by Congress. Its advocates were determined that the acquisitions of the Mexican War should bring no profit to slavery. The abolitionists redoubled their efforts, planting new societies, establishing newspapers and debating clubs, and circulating a great amount of propagandist literature and pictures. Legislatures and conventions in the free states passed scores of resolutions upholding the Proviso, and petitions for its adoption poured in upon Congress in an unbroken stream.”—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, p. 443.—“Until 1842 there had never been so many as a hundred thousand immigrants in a single year; but . . . by 1849 there were two hundred and ninety-seven thousand coming in within a twelvemonth, the tide rising steadily from year to year. . . . Their coming, thousands upon thousands, their ceaseless movement into the West, their stir as of an invading host, subtly gave new impulse to the general movement and resettlement of the population, already afoot of its own accord: to the opening of new lands, the diversification of industry, the quick growth of a nation always making and to be made. Until now the country had been developed for the most part only by men out of the old homes of the first settlers and by natural increase of its own people. Now there was added this power of increase and subtle impulse of change from without. . . . Statesmen found themselves obliged to accommodate affairs to a day of new forces, which escaped them and dominated all they did. Whether it came by immigration or by natural increase, growth of population meant the augmentation, not of sectional, but of national forces. The slave-holding States, though their number included Missouri and Arkansas, which shared the growth of the frontier, showed, even with Texas added, an increase of but little more than two millions in the decade, while the rest of the country saw nearly four millions added to its strength. . . . Though the southern politicians talked only of constitutional rights, and seemed to fight only for the extension of slavery, southern merchants held conventions to plan railways to the Pacific and debated measures for linking their trade with the expanding West. Their thoughts ran eagerly and with a certain enthusiasm upon the great future of the nation, in which they wished to take their part. Their plans were made upon the scale of the continent; they spoke in the spirit of the new age, and sought their right rôle in the general development. And yet there was in all that they said and urged an unmistakable note also of apprehension. They wished to take part, and yet began to fear that they could not. They spoke of the nation, and of their duty and their opportunity in it; but the nation of their thought was not a nation which could easily be united in joint efforts of business. It was a nation sectionalized and divided by social and economic contrasts too gross and obvious to be overlooked; a nation whose several regions showed interests diverse and separate, hardly to be reconciled. This they saw, some vaguely, some with painful clearness, and a deep uneasiness grew upon them more and more from year to year. The spirit and the power of the time were turned against them. And the issues



which made their place apart a fact, not of speculation but of certainty, were mightily hastened by every force afoot in the life of the country as it grew. It became evident almost at once that Congress could not avoid or even postpone its choice with regard to slavery in the new territories seized from Mexico. . . . So long ago as 1843 John Quincy Adams, who thirty-five years before had left the Federalists because they talked of dissolving the Union, had joined with other Whigs in declaring that the addition of Texas to the South would bring about and justify disunion. Mr. Garrison, the leader of the abolitionists, had proposed in 1845 that Massachusetts should lead in a movement to withdraw from the Union, and had won very hearty applause for the suggestion from an anti-annexation convention. The masses of the people, it is true, did not heed these things; the counsels of sober statesmen were not seriously affected by them. But almost every northern State demanded, through its legislature, the adoption of the Wilmot proviso, and every southern State protested against it, in tones not to be mistaken. The southern men, to whose demands Mr. Calhoun gave the touch of final definiteness which only words of precision such as he used could give, now denied outright the power of the federal government to exclude slaves, the legitimate property of southern settlers, from the Territories of the United States. . . . The air was full of disquieting rumors as to what the southerners meant to do should Congress set that principle aside: how they meant to shut their ports against the North and turn all their arts and all their power towards building up an alliance, at once political and economic, with the West: how in the last resort they meant to secede from the Union altogether."—W. Wilson, *History of the American people*, v. 4, pp. 132-134, 137-138.

1849.—Minnesota organized as territory. See MINNESOTA: 1849.

1849-1850.—Proposed state of Deseret.—Utah organized as territory.—Boundaries established. See UTAH: 1849-1850.

1850.—Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain. See NICARAGUA: 1850; PANAMA CANAL: 1800-1850.

1850.—Commercial agent established in Apia. See SAMOA: 1830-1878.

1850.—Seventh census.

	North		Slave.
	White.	Free black.	
California .....	91,635	962	....
Connecticut .....	363,099	7,693	....
Illinois .....	846,034	5,436	....
Indiana .....	977,154	11,262	....
Iowa .....	191,881	333	....
Maine .....	581,813	1,356	....
Massachusetts .....	985,450	9,064	....
Michigan .....	395,071	2,583	....
Minnesota .....	6,038	39	....
New Hampshire.....	317,456	520	....
New Jersey.....	465,509	23,810	236
New York.....	3,048,325	49,069	....
Ohio .....	1,955,050	25,279	....
Oregon .....	13,087	207	....
Pennsylvania .....	2,258,160	53,626	....
Rhode Island.....	143,875	3,670	....
Utah .....	11,354	....	26
Vermont .....	313,402	718	....
Wisconsin .....	304,756	635	....
	13,269,149	196,262	262

	South		
	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama .....	426,514	2,265	342,844
Arkansas .....	162,189	608	47,100
Delaware .....	71,169	18,073	2,290
District of Columbia	37,941	10,059	3,687
Florida .....	47,203	932	39,310
Georgia .....	521,572	2,931	381,682
Kentucky .....	761,413	10,011	210,981
Louisiana .....	255,491	17,462	244,809
Maryland .....	417,943	74,723	90,368
Mississippi .....	295,718	930	309,878
Missouri .....	592,004	2,618	87,422
New Mexico .....	61,547	....	....
North Carolina.....	553,028	27,463	288,548
South Carolina.....	274,563	8,960	384,984
Tennessee .....	756,836	6,422	239,459
Texas .....	154,034	397	58,161
Virginia .....	894,800	54,333	472,528
	6,283,965	238,187	3,204,051

The total population was 23,191,876, nearly 36 per cent. greater than in 1840. The remnant of slavery in the northern States which appears in this census, still lingering in New Jersey, was not quite extinguished in the succeeding decade. The classification and distribution of population was as in above tables.

The immigration in the decade preceding this census had risen to 1,713,251 in number of persons, 1,047,763 coming from the British Islands (mostly from Ireland), and 549,739 from other parts of Europe.—See also CENSUS: United States.

1850 (March).—California and the Fugitive Slave law.—Henry Clay's proposed compromise.—Webster's "7th of March" speech.—"When Polk's final Congress adjourned in the spring of 1849 without having made any provision for the government of the territory acquired from Mexico, Senator Benton advised the Californians to form a government for themselves. There was pressing need for such action. Gold had been discovered in the Sacramento Valley in January, 1848, and the next year saw the swarming of the 'forty-niners' into California. . . . [A] convention met at Monterey, September 3, 1849, and framed a state constitution, excluding slavery by a unanimous vote, although one-third of the members were from the Southern states. When Congress met in December, California, its population grown from 6,000 to over 80,000, was asking admission to the Union as a free state. The people of New Mexico, meanwhile, had petitioned for organization as a non-slaveholding territory, claiming land to the east of the Rio Grande over which Texas had extended her authority. President Taylor, although a Southerner and a slave-owner, became convinced on a visit to the New England states, in the summer of 1849, that the South was the aggressor. He met the threats from South Carolina, Virginia and Mississippi in the spirit of Andrew Jackson. He would answer the first overt act with a blockade of the Southern ports and call for volunteers from the free states. If necessary, he said, he 'would pour out his blood for the defense of the Union.' He was much under the influence of Senator Seward of New York, the leader of the anti-slavery Whigs. While not an advocate of the Wilmot Proviso himself, the President let it be known that he would do nothing


to encourage the program of the Southern radicals. . . . His own plan was to admit California at once as a free state and establish territorial governments in New Mexico and Deseret (Utah) without any provision regarding slavery, leaving the people the choice when they should be ready for statehood. The latter doctrine was known as 'popular sovereignty,' later nick-named 'squatter sovereignty,' because it left the formation of communities with or without slavery to the people who 'squatted' or settled, on the land while it was still the public territory of the nation without the power of a state to determine is municipal law by a regular constitution. The origin of the doctrine is generally ascribed to Lewis Cass, who elaborated it in a letter to a certain Mr. Nicholson of Nashville in December, 1847; but the principle had been discussed two years earlier in connection with the admission of the territory of Florida to statehood."—D. S. Muzzev, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 444-446.—"One day toward the close of January [January 29, 1850], Henry Clay rose from his chair in the Senate Chamber, and waving a roll of papers, with dramatic eloquence and deep feeling, announced to a hushed auditory that he held in his hand a series of resolutions proposing an amicable arrangement of all questions growing out of the subject of slavery. Read and explained by its author this plan of compromise was to admit California, and to establish territorial governments in New Mexico, and the other portions of the regions acquired from Mexico, without any provisions for or against slavery—to pay the debt of Texas and fix her western boundary—to declare that it was 'inexpedient' to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, but 'expedient' to put some restrictions on the slave trade there, to pass a new and more stringent fugitive slave law, and to formally deny that Congress had any power to obstruct the slave trade between the States. Upon this plan of compromise and the modifications afterward made in it, began that long debate, since become historic, which engrossed the attention of Congress and the country for eight weary months."—F. W. Seward, *Seward at Washington, 1846-1861*, ch. 16.—"Clay's speech in support of his resolutions was made February 5 and 6, 1850. He was seventy-three years of age and in feeble health; but he now faced the Senate once more, after an absence of eight years, with the prestige of long-acknowledged political leadership and the confidence of one who had been looked to for advice and had been trustfully followed by the rank and file of his party in many a similar crisis. Beginning with a few words relative to the importance of the occasion, he went on to say that Congress and the state legislatures were 'twenty-odd furnaces in full blast in generating heat, and passion, and intemperance, and diffusing them throughout the whole extent of this broad land'; and expressed his anxiety to restore 'concord, harmony, and peace.' If Congress sought to overthrow slavery in the state, his voice would be for war, and the slave states would have the good wishes of all who loved justice and truth; but no sympathy would be extended them in a war 'to propagate wrongs' in the territory acquired from Mexico. Appealing to the men of the North, he cried: 'What do you want?—What do you want?—you who reside in the free States. Do you want that there shall be no slavery introduced into the territories acquired by the war with Mexico? Have you not your desire in California? And in all human probability you will have it in New Mexico also. What more do you want? You

have got what is worth more than a thousand Wilmot provisos. You have nature on your side—facts upon your side—and this truth staring you in the face that there is no slavery in those territories.' The abolition of the slave-trade in the District of Columbia Clay regarded as no concession, but as something on which both sides should unite. As to the failure to execute the fugitive-slave law, he thought the South had 'serious cause of complaint against the free States'; but disunion would furnish no remedy for any southern grievance. He was 'directly opposed to any purpose of secession, of separation'; he thought there was 'no right on the part of one or more of the States to secede'; in the Union he meant 'to stand and die.'"—G. P. Garrison, *Westward extension*, p. 322.—"At the outset, many of those who had threatened 'Disunion,' opposed 'Clay's Compromise,' because it did not go far enough, while the 'Wilmot Proviso' men were equally resolute in opposing it, because it went too far. Seward with many other Northern Whigs, adhered to the 'President's Plan' [which simply favored the admission of California and New Mexico under constitutions which he had invited their people to frame], as being a much more just and speedy way of solving the problem. Avowing himself unterrified by the threats of 'Disunion,' he insisted that neither 'Compromise' nor the 'Fugitive Slave Law' was necessary, and that it was both the right and the duty of Congress to admit the Territories as free States, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and the slave trade between the States. Southern feeling was predominant in the Senate Chamber, as it had been for many years. Neither of the two great parties was opposed to slavery, and the recognized leaders of both were men of Southern birth. . . . Mr. Clay's resolutions, unsatisfactory as they were, to anti-slavery men, at first met with objections from Southern members. One 'deeply regretted the admission that slavery did not exist in the territories.' Several would 'never assent to the doctrine that slaveholders could not go there, taking their property with them.' Some questioned the validity of the Mexican decree, abolishing slavery in New Spain, and doubted the constitutionality of any attempt on the part of Congress to exclude it. Prognostications and threats of 'disunion' were freely made. On the other hand, there began to be signs of a growing disposition, on the part of many Northern men, to give up the 'Proviso' for the sake of peace; and to follow the lead of Mr. Clay. Conservative Southern Whigs were quite ready to meet these half way. Seward's position was regarded as 'ultra' by both classes; and it not unfrequently happened that, on questions in the Senate relating to slavery, only three Senators, Seward, Chase, and Hale, would be found voting together, on one side, while all the other Senators present were arrayed against them, on the other. Newspapers, received from all parts of the country, showed that elsewhere, as well as at the capital, the proposed compromise was an engrossing topic. Great meetings were held at the North in support of it. State Legislatures took ground, for and against it. Fresh fuel was added to the heated discussion by a new 'Fugitive Slave Law,' introduced by Senator Mason of Virginia, and by the talk of Southern Conventions, and 'Secret Southern Caucuses.' . . . March was an eventful month. Time enough had elapsed for each Senator to receive, from the press and people of his State, their response, in regard to Clay's proposed compromise. Resolutions pro and con

had come from different Legislatures. . . . Each of the leaders in senatorial debate felt that the hour had come for him to declare whether he was for or against it. . . . Mr. Calhoun, though in failing health, obtained the floor for a speech. Everybody awaited it with great interest, regarding him as the acknowledged exponent of Southern opinion. . . . An expectant throng filled the Senate Chamber. His gaunt figure and attenuated features attested that he had risen from a sick bed; but his fiery eyes and unshaken voice showed he had no intention of abandoning the contest. In a few words he explained that his health would not permit him to deliver the speech he had prepared, but that 'his friend the Senator behind him (Mason) would read it for him.' Beginning by saying that he had 'believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in "disunion,"'—the speech opposed Clay's plan of adjustment; attacked the President's plan; adverted to the growing feeling that the South could not remain in Union 'with safety and honor'; pointed out the gradual snapping, one after another, of the links which held the Union together, and expressed the most gloomy forebodings for the future.—F. W. Seward, *Seward at Washington, 1846-1861, ch. 16.*

On March 7, 1850, Webster delivered his speech, "not as a Massachusetts man, nor as a northern man, but as an American, and a member of the Senate of the United States." The first and longer part was an historical review of the slavery question, and an argument maintaining the proposition, as he afterwards stated it in a few words, that there is "not a square rod of territory belonging to the United States the character of which, for slavery, or no slavery is not already fixed by some irrevocable law." The concluding part of his speech contained the passages which caused most grief among and gave most offense to his friends and admirers at the North. They are substantially comprised in the quotations following,—together with his eloquent declamation against the thought of secession: "Mr. President, in the excited times in which we live, there is found to exist a state of crimination and recrimination between the North and South. There are lists of grievances produced by each; and those grievances, real or supposed, alienate the minds of one portion of the country from the other, exasperate the feelings, and subdue the sense of fraternal affection, patriotic love, and mutual regard. I shall bestow a little attention, Sir, upon these various grievances existing on the one side and on the other. I begin with complaints of the South. I will not answer, further than I have, the general statements of the honorable Senator from South Carolina, that the North has prospered at the expense of the South in consequence of the manner of administering this government, in the collecting of its revenues, and so forth. These are disputed topics, and I have no inclination to enter into them. But I will allude to other complaints of the South, and especially to one which has in my opinion just foundation; and that is, that there has been found at the North, among individuals and among legislators, a disinclination to perform fully their constitutional duties in regard to the return of persons bound to service who have escaped into the free States. In that respect, the South, in my judgment, is right, and the North is wrong. Every member of every Northern legislature is bound by oath, like every other officer in the country, to support the Constitution of the United States;

and the article of the Constitution which says to these States that they shall deliver up fugitives from service is as binding in honor and conscience as any other article. No man fulfils his duty in any legislature who sets himself to find excuses, evasions, escapes from this constitutional obligation. I have always thought that the Constitution addressed itself to the legislatures of the States or to the States themselves. It says that those persons escaping to other States 'shall be delivered up,' and I confess I have always been of the opinion that it was an injunction upon the States themselves. When it is said that a person escaping into another State, and coming therefore within the jurisdiction of that State, shall be delivered up, it seems to me the import of the clause is, that the State itself, in obedience to the Constitution, shall cause him to be delivered up. That is my judgment. I have always entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now. But when the subject, some years ago, was before the Supreme



DANIEL WEBSTER

Court of the United States, the majority of the judges held that the power to cause fugitives from service to be delivered up was a power to be exercised under the authority of this government. I do not know, on the whole, that it may not have been a fortunate decision. My habit is to respect the result of judicial deliberations and the solemnity of judicial decisions. As it now stands, the business of seeing that these fugitives are delivered up resides in the power of Congress and the national judicature, and my friend at the head of the Judiciary Committee has a bill on the subject now before the Senate, which with some amendments to it, I propose to support, with all its provisions, to the fullest extent. And I desire to call the attention of all sober-minded men at the North, of all conscientious men, of all men who are not carried away by some fanatical idea or some false impression, to their constitutional obligations. I put it to all the sober and sound minds at the North as a question of morals and a question of conscience. What right have they, in their legislative capacity or any other capacity, to endeavor to get round this Constitution, or to embarrass the free exercise of the rights secured by the Constitu-

tion to the persons whose slaves escape from them? None at all; none at all. Neither in the forum of conscience, nor before the face of the Constitution, are they, in my opinion, justified in such an attempt. . . . I repeat, therefore, Sir, that here is a well-founded ground of complaint against the North, which ought to be removed, which it is now in the power of the different departments of this government to remove; which calls for the enactment of proper laws authorizing the judicature of this government, in the several States, to do all that is necessary for the recapture of fugitive slaves and for their restoration to those who claim them. . . . Complaint has been made against certain resolutions that emanate from legislatures at the North, and are sent here to use, not only on the subject of slavery in this District, but sometimes recommending Congress to consider the means of abolishing slavery in the States. I should be sorry to be called upon to present any resolutions here which could not be referable to any committee or any power in Congress; and therefore I should be unwilling to receive from the legislature of Massachusetts any instructions to present resolutions expressive of any opinion whatever on the subject of slavery, as it exists at the present moment in the States, for two reasons: first, because I do not consider that the legislature of Massachusetts has anything to do with it; and next, because I do not consider that I, as her representative here, have anything to do with it. It has become, in my opinion, quite too common; and if the legislatures of the States do not like that opinion, they have a great deal more power to put it down than I have to uphold it; it has become in my opinion quite too common a practice for the State legislatures to present resolutions here on all subjects and to instruct us on all subjects. There is no public man that requires instruction more than I do, or who requires information more than I do, or desires it more heartily; but I do not like to have it in too imperative a shape. . . . Then Sir, there are the Abolition societies, of which I am unwilling to speak, but in regard to which I have very clear notions and opinions. I do not think them useful. I think their operations for the last twenty years have produced nothing good or valuable. At the same time, I believe thousands of their members to be honest and good men, perfectly well-meaning men. They have excited feelings; they think they must do something for the cause of liberty; and, in their sphere of action, they do not see what else they can do than to contribute to an Abolition press, or an Abolition society, or to pay an Abolition lecturer. I do not mean to impute gross motives even to the leaders of these societies, but I am not blind to the consequences of their proceedings. I cannot but see what mischiefs their interference with the South has produced. And is it not plain to every man? Let any gentleman who entertains doubts on this point recur to the debates in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1832, and he will see with what freedom a proposition made by Mr. Jefferson Randolph for the gradual abolition of slavery was discussed in that body. Every one spoke of slavery as he thought; very ignominious and disparaging names and epithets were applied to it. The debates in the House of Delegates on that occasion, I believe, were all published. They were read by every colored man who could read, and to those who could not read, those debates were read by others. At that time Virginia was

not unwilling or afraid to discuss this question, and to let that part of her population know as much of the discussion as they could learn. That was in 1832. As has been said by the honorable member from South Carolina, these Abolition societies commenced their course of action in 1835. It is said, I do not know how true it may be, that they sent incendiary publications into the slave States; at any rate, they attempted to arouse, and did arouse, a very strong feeling; in other words they created great agitation in the North against Southern slavery. Well, what was the result? The bonds of the slaves were bound more firmly than before, their rivets were more strongly fastened. Public opinion, which in Virginia had begun to be exhibited against slavery, and was opening out for the discussion of the question, drew back and shut itself up in its castle. I wish to know whether any body in Virginia can now talk openly as Mr. Randolph, Governor McDowell, and others talked in 1832, and sent their remarks to the press? We all know the fact, and we all know the cause; and everything that these agitating people have done has been not to enlarge, but to restrain, not to set free, but to bind faster, the slave population of the South. Again, Sir, the violence of the Northern press is complained of. The press violent! Why, Sir, the press is violent everywhere. There are outrageous reproaches in the North against the South, and there are reproaches as vehement in the South against the North. Sir, the extremists of both parts of this country are violent; they mistake loud and violent talk for eloquence and for reason. They think that he who talks loudest reasons best. And this we must expect, when the press is free, as it is here, and I trust always will be. . . . Well, in all this I see no solid grievance, no grievance presented by the South, within the redress of the government, but the single one to which I have referred; and that is, the want of a proper regard to the injunction of the Constitution for the delivery of fugitive slaves. There are also complaints of the North against the South. I need not go over them particularly. The first and gravest is, that the North adopted the Constitution, recognizing the existence of slavery in the States, and recognizing the right, to a certain extent, of the representation of slaves in Congress, under a state of sentiment and expectation which does not now exist; and that, by events, by circumstances, by the eagerness of the South to acquire territory and extend her slave population, the North finds itself, in regard to the relative influence of the South and the North, of the Free States and the slave States, where it never did expect to find itself when they agreed to the compact of the Constitution. They complain, therefore, that, instead of slavery being regarded as an evil, as it was then, an evil which all hoped would be extinguished gradually, it is now regarded by the South as an institution to be cherished, and preserved, and extended; an institution which the South has already extended to the utmost of her power by the acquisition of new territory. Well, then, passing from that, every body in the North reads; . . . and the newspapers, some of them, . . . are careful to spread about among the people every reproachful sentiment uttered by any Southern man bearing at all against the North; every thing that is calculated to exasperate and to alienate; and there are many such things, as every body will admit, from the South, or some portion of it, which are disseminated among the reading people; and they do exasperate, and alienate,

and produce a most michievous effect upon the public mind at the North. Sir, I would not notice things of this sort appearing in obscure quarters; but one thing has occurred in this debate which struck me very forcibly. An honorable member from Louisiana addressed us the other day on this subject. . . . Why, Sir, he took pains to run a contrast between the slaves of the South and the laboring people of the North, giving the preference, in all points of condition, and comfort, and happiness, to the slaves of the South. The honorable member, doubtless, did not suppose that he gave any offence, or did any injustice. . . . But does he know how remarks of that sort will be received by the laboring people of the North? Why, who are the laboring people of the North? They are the whole North. . . . Let me say, Sir, that five sixths of the whole property of the North is in the hands of the laborers of the North; they cultivate their farms, they educate their children, they provide the means of independence. . . . There is a more tanglibe and irritating cause of grievance at the North. Free blacks are constantly employed in the vessels of the North, generally as cooks or stewards. When the vessel arrives at a Southern port, these free colored men are taken on shore, by the police or municipal authority, imprisoned, and kept in prison till the vessel is again ready to sail. This is not only irritating, but exceedingly unjustifiable and oppressive. Mr. Hoar's mission, some time ago, to South Carolina, was a well-intended effort to remove this cause of complaint. The North thinks such imprisonments illegal and unconstitutional; and as the cases occur constantly and frequently, they regard it as a great grievance. Now, Sir, so far as any of these grievances have their foundation in matters of law, they can be redressed, and ought to be redressed; and so far as they have their foundation in matters of opinion, in sentiment, in mutual crimination and recrimination, all that we can do is to endeavor to allay the agitation, and cultivate a better feeling and more fraternal sentiments between the South and the North. Mr. President, I should much prefer to have heard from every member on this floor declarations of opinion that this Union could never be dissolved, than the declaration of opinion by any body, that, in any case, under the pressure of any circumstances, such a dissolution was possible. I hear with distress and anguish the word 'secession,' especially when it falls from the lips of those who are patriotic, and known to the country, and known all over the world, for their political services. Secession! Peaceable secession! Sir, your eyes and mine are never destined to see that miracle. The dismemberment of this vast country without convulsion! The breaking up of the foundations of the great deep without ruffling the surface! Who is so foolish, I beg every body's pardon, as to expect to see any such thing? Sir, he who sees these States, now revolving in harmony around a common centre, and expects to see them quit their places and fly off without convulsion, may look the next hour to see the heavenly bodies rush from their spheres, and jostle against each other in the realms of space, without causing the wreck of the universe. There can be no such thing as a peaceable secession. Peaceable secession is an utter impossibility. Is the Great Constitution under which we live, covering this whole country, is it to be thawed and melted away by secession, as the snows on the mountain melt under the influence of a vernal sun, disappear almost unobserved, and run off? No, Sir! No, Sir! I will not state

what might produce the disruption of the Union; but, Sir, I see as plainly as I see the sun in heaven what that disruption itself must produce; I see that it must produce war, and such a war as I will not describe, in its twofold character. Peaceable secession! Peaceable secession! The concurrent agreement of all the members of this great republic to separate! A voluntary separation, with alimony on one side and on the other. Why, what would be the result? Where is the line to be drawn? What States are to secede? What is to remain American? What am I to be? An American no longer? Am I to become a sectional man, a local man, a separatist, with no country in common with the gentlemen who sit around me here, or who fill the other house of Congress? Heaven forbid? Where is the flag of the republic to remain? Where is the eagle still to tower? or is he to cower, and shrink, and fall to the ground? Why, Sir, our ancestors, our fathers, and our grandfathers, those of them that are yet living amongst us with prolonged lives, would rebuke and reproach us; and our children and our grandchildren would cry out shame upon us, if we of this generation should dishonor these ensigns of the power of the government and the harmony of that Union which is every day felt among us with so much joy and gratitude. . . . Sir, nobody can look over the face of this country at the present moment, nobody can see where its population is the most dense and growing, without being ready to admit, and compelled to admit, that ere long the strength of America will be in the Valley of the Mississippi. Well, now, Sir, I beg to inquire what the wildest enthusiast has to say on the possibility of cutting that river in two, and leaving free States at its source and on its branches, and slave States down near its mouth, each forming a separate government? . . . To break up this great government! To dismember this glorious country! To astonish Europe with an act of folly such as Europe for two centuries has never beheld in any government or any people! No, Sir! No, Sir! There will be no secession! Gentlemen are not serious when they talk of secession."—Daniel Webster, *Works*, v. 5, p. 324.—"The conservative reaction which Mr. Webster endeavored to produce came and triumphed. Chiefly by his exertions the compromise policy was accepted and sustained by the country. The conservative elements everywhere rallied to his support, and by his ability and eloquence it seemed as if he had prevailed and brought the people over to his opinions. It was a wonderful tribute to his power and influence, but the triumph was hollow and short-lived. He had attempted to compass an impossibility. Nothing could kill the principles of human liberty, not even a speech by Daniel Webster, backed by all his intellect and knowledge, his eloquence and his renown. The anti-slavery movement was checked for the time, and pro-slavery democracy, the only other positive political force, reigned supreme. But amid the falling ruins of the Whig party, and the evanescent success of the Native Americans, the party of human rights revived; and when it rose again, taught by the trials and misfortunes of 1850, it rose with a strength which Mr. Webster had never dreamed of."—H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*, ch. 9.—"A public meeting in Faneuil Hall condemned the action of Webster. Theodore Parker, who was one of the principal speakers, said: 'I know no deed in American history done by a son of New England to which I can compare this but the act of Benedict Arnold. . . . The only reasonable way

in which we can estimate this speech is as a bid for the presidency.' In the main, the Northern Whig press condemned the salient points of the speech. . . . Whittier, in a song of plaintive vehemence called 'Ichabod,' mourned for the 'fallen' statesman whose faith was lost, and whose honor was dead. . . . This was the instant outburst of opinion; but friends for Webster and his cause came with more deliberate reflections. . . . When the first excitement had subsided, the friends of Webster bestirred themselves, and soon testimonials poured in, approving the position which he had taken. The most significant of them was the one from eight hundred solid men of Boston, who thanked him for 'recalling us to our duties under the Constitution,' and for his 'broad national and patriotic views.' The tone of many of the Whig papers changed, some to positive support, others to more qualified censure. The whole political literature of the time is full of the discussion of this speech and its relation to the compromise. It is frequently said that a speech in Congress does not alter opinions; that the minds of men are determined by set political bias or sectional considerations. This was certainly not the case in 1850. Webster's influence was of the greatest weight in the passage of the compromise measures, and he is as closely associated with them as is their author. Clay's adroit parliamentary management was necessary to carry them through the various and tedious steps of legislation. But it was Webster who raised up for them a powerful and much-needed support from Northern public sentiment. At the South the speech was cordially received; the larger portion of the press commended it with undisguised admiration. . . . On the 11th of March, Seward spoke. . . . When Seward came to the territorial question, his words created a sensation. 'We hold,' he said, 'no arbitrary authority over anything, whether acquired lawfully or seized by usurpation. The Constitution regulates our stewardship; the Constitution devotes the domain (i. e. the territories not formed into States) to union, to justice, to defence, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The territory is a part, no inconsiderable part, of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the Universe. We are his stewards, and must so discharge our trust as to secure in the highest attainable degree their happiness.' This remark about 'a higher law,' while far inferior in rhetorical force to Webster's 'I would not take pains uselessly to reaffirm an ordinance of Nature nor to re-enact the will of God,' was destined to have transcendent moral influence. A speech which can be condensed into an aphorism is sure to shape convictions. These, then, are the two maxims of this debate; the application of them shows the essential points of the controversy."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, v. 1, ch. 2*.—In the political controversies which accompanied and followed the introduction of the Compromise measures, the Whigs who supported the Compromise were called "Silver-Grays," or "Snuff-Takers," and those who opposed it were called "Woolly-Heads," or "Seward-Whigs."

1850 (April-September).—Clay's last compromise.—Fugitive slave law as passed.—On April 17, "a select committee of the Senate, headed by Mr. Clay, reported a bill consisting of 39 sections, embodying most of the resolutions which had been discussed. From its all-comprehensive nature it

was called the Omnibus Bill. The points comprehended in the omnibus bill were as follows: 1st. When new states formed out of Texas present themselves, it shall be the duty of Congress to admit them; 2d. The immediate admission of California, with the boundaries which she has proposed; 3d. The establishment of territorial governments for Utah and New Mexico, without the Wilmot proviso; 4th. The combination of points 2 and 3 in one bill; 5th. The excision from Texas of all New Mexico, rendering therefor a pecuniary equivalent; 6th. The enactment of a law for the effectual rendition of fugitive slaves escaping into the free states; 7th. No interference with slavery in the District of Columbia, but the slave trade therein should be abolished, under heavy penalties. This bill was discussed until the last of July, and then passed by the Senate, but it had been so pruned by successive amendments that it contained only a provision for the organization of a territorial government for Utah. In this condition it was sent to the House. There, as a whole, the bill was rejected, but its main heads were passed in August as separate bills, and were designated the compromise measures of 1850, and, in their accepted shape, required: (1) Utah and New Mexico to be organized into territories, without reference to slavery; (2) California to be admitted as a free state; (3) \$10,000,000 to be paid to Texas for her claim to New Mexico; (4) fugitive slaves to be returned to their masters; and (5) the slave trade to be abolished in the District of Columbia. The compromises were received by the leaders of the two great parties as a final settlement of the vexed questions which had so long troubled Congress and agitated the country, but the storm was only temporarily allayed. In accordance with these measures California became a state of the Union September 9, 1850. The most important feature of this bill, in its bearing upon future struggles and conflicts, was the fugitive slave law. . . . In the midst of the discussion of these topics occurred the death of the President, July 9, 1850, one year and four months after his inauguration. . . . Mr. Fillmore was inaugurated on the 10th of July, 1850. He departed from the policy of his predecessor, organized a new cabinet, used his influence in favor of the compromise measures [and gave his signature to the Fugitive Slave Law]."—W. R. Houghton, *History of American politics, ch. 15*.—"It was apparent to every one who knew anything of the sentiments of the North that this law could not be executed to any extent. Seward had truly said that if the South wished their runaway negroes returned they must alleviate, not increase, the rigors of the law of 1793; and to give the alleged fugitive a jury trial, as Webster proposed, was the only possible way to effect the desired purpose. If we look below the surface we shall find a strong impelling motive of the Southern clamor for this harsh enactment other than the natural desire to recover lost property. Early in the session it took air that a part of the game of the disunionists was to press a stringent fugitive slave law, for which no Northern man could vote; and when it was defeated, the North would be charged with refusing to carry out a stipulation of the Constitution. Douglas stated in the Senate that while there was some ground for complaint on the subject of surrender of fugitives from service, it had been greatly exaggerated. The excitement and virulence were not along the line bordering on the free and slave States, but between Vermont and South Carolina, New Hampshire and Alabama, Connecticut and Louisiana. Clay gave vent to his

astonishment that Arkansas, Louisiana, Georgia, and South Carolina, States which very rarely lost a slave, demanded a stricter law than Kentucky, which lost many. After the act was passed Senator Butler, of South Carolina, said: 'I would just as soon have the law of 1793 as the present laws, for any purpose, so far as regards the reclamation of fugitive slaves;' and another Southern ultra never thought it would be productive of much good to his section. Six months after the passage of the law, Seward expresses the matured opinion 'that political ends—merely political ends—and not real evils, resulting from the escape of slaves, constituted the prevailing motives to the enactment.'—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 1, ch. 2.—'The fugitive-slave law was to make the citizens of the Free States do for the slave-holders what not a few of the slave-holders were too proud to do for themselves. Such a law could not but fail. But then it would increase the exasperation of the slave-holders by its failure, while exasperating the people of the Free States by the attempts at enforcement. Thus the compromise of 1850, instead of securing peace and harmony, contained in the most important of its provisions the seeds of new and greater conflicts. One effect it produced which Calhoun had clearly predicted when he warned the slave-holding states against compromises as an invention of the enemy: it adjourned the decisive conflict until the superiority of the North over the South in population and material resources was overwhelming.'—C. Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, v. 2, ch. 26.—See also HIGHER LAW DOCTRINE.

ALSO IN: H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 15-16.—Henry Clay, *Life, correspondence, and speeches*, v. 6.—W. H. Seward, *Works*, v. 1, pp. 51-131, and v. 4.—J. S. Pike, *First blows of the Civil War*, pp. 1-98.—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power*, v. 2, ch. 18-28.—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 1, ch. 2.

The following is the complete text of the Fugitive Slave law:

An act to amend, and supplementary to, the Act entitled "An Act respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons escaping from the Service of their Masters," approved February twelfth, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the persons who have been, or may hereafter be, appointed commissioners, in virtue of any act of Congress, by the Circuit Courts of the United States, and who, in consequence of such appointment, are authorized to exercise the powers that any justice of the peace, or other magistrate of any of the United States, may exercise in respect to offenders for any crime or offence against the United States, by arresting, imprisoning, or bailing the same under and by virtue of the thirty-third section of the act of the twenty-fourth of September seventeen hundred and eighty-nine, entitled "An Act to establish the judicial courts of the United States," shall be, and are hereby, authorized and required to exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this act.

Sect. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Superior Court of each organized Territory of the United States shall have the same power to appoint commissioners to take acknowledgments of

bail and affidavits, and to take depositions of witnesses in civil causes, which is now possessed by the Circuit Court of the United States; and all commissioners who shall hereafter be appointed for such purposes by the Superior Court of any organized Territory of the United States, shall possess all the powers, and exercise all the duties, conferred by law upon the commissioners appointed by the Circuit Courts of the United States for similar purposes, and shall moreover exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this act.

Sect. 3. And be it further enacted, That the Circuit Courts of the United States, and the Superior Courts of each organized Territory of the United States, shall from time to time enlarge the number of commissioners, with a view to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor, and to the prompt discharge of the duties imposed by this act.

Sect. 4. And be it further enacted, That the commissioners above named shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the judges of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, in their respective circuits and districts within the several States, and the judges of the Superior Courts of the Territories, severally and collectively, in term-time and vacation; and shall grant certificates to such claimants, upon satisfactory proof being made, with authority to take and remove such fugitives from service or labor, under the restrictions herein contained, to the State or Territory from which such persons may have escaped or fled.

Sect. 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of all marshals and deputy marshals to obey and execute all warrants and precepts issued under the provisions of this act, when to them directed; and should any marshal or deputy marshal refuse to receive such warrant, or other process, when tendered, or to use all proper means diligently to execute the same, he shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of one thousand dollars, to the use of such claimant, on the motion of such claimant by the Circuit or District Court for the district of such marshal; and after arrest of such fugitive, by such marshal or his deputy, or whilst at any time in his custody under the provisions of this act, should such fugitive escape, whether with or without the assent of such marshal or his deputy, such marshal shall be liable, on his official bond, to be prosecuted for the benefit of such claimant, for the full value of the service or labor of said fugitive in the State, Territory, or District whence he escaped: and the better to enable the said commissioners, when thus appointed, to execute their duties faithfully and efficiently, in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution of the United States and of this act, they are hereby authorized and empowered, within their counties respectively, to appoint, in writing under their hands, any one or more suitable persons, from time to time, to execute all such warrants and other process as may be issued by them in the lawful performance of their respective duties; with authority to such commissioners, or the persons to be appointed by them, to execute process as aforesaid, to summon and call to their aid the bystanders, or posse comitatus of the proper county, when necessary to insure a faithful observance of the clause of the Constitution referred to, in conformity with the provisions of this act; and all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law, whenever their services may be required, as aforesaid, for that purpose; and said warrants shall

run, and be executed by said officers, anywhere in the State within which they are issued.

Sect. 6. And be it further enacted, That when a person held to service or labor in any State or Territory of the United States, has heretofore or shall hereafter escape into another State or Territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom such service or labor may be due, or his, her, or their agent or attorney, duly authorized, by power of attorney, in writing, acknowledged and certified under the seal of some legal officer or court of the State or Territory in which the same may be executed, may pursue and reclaim such fugitive person, either by procuring a warrant from some one of the courts, judges, or commissioners aforesaid, of the proper circuit, district, or county, for the apprehension of such fugitive from service or labor, or by seizing and arresting such fugitive, where the same can be done without process, and by taking, or causing such person to be taken, forthwith before such court, judge, or commissioner, whose duty it shall be to hear and determine the case of such claimant in a summary manner; and upon satisfactory proof being made, by deposition or affidavit, in writing, to be taken and certified by such court, judge, or commissioner, or by other satisfactory testimony, duly taken and certified by some court, magistrate, justice of the peace, or other legal officer authorized to administer an oath and take depositions under the laws of the State or Territory from which such person owing service or labor may have escaped, with a certificate of such magistracy or other authority, as aforesaid, with the seal of the proper court or officer thereto attached, which seal shall be sufficient to establish the competency of the proof, and with proof, also by affidavit, of the identity of the person whose service or labor is claimed to be due as aforesaid, that the person so arrested does in fact owe service or labor to the person or persons claiming him or her, in the State or Territory from which such fugitive may have escaped as aforesaid, and that said person escaped, to make out and deliver to such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, a certificate setting forth the substantial facts as to the service or labor due from such fugitive to the claimant, and of his or her escape from the State or Territory in which such service or labor was due, to the State or Territory in which he or she was arrested, with authority to such claimant, or his or her agent or attorney, to use such reasonable force and restraint as may be necessary, under the circumstances of the case, to take and remove such fugitive person back to the State or Territory whence he or she may have escaped as aforesaid. In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence; and the certificates in this and the first [fourth] section mentioned, shall be conclusive of the right of the person or persons in whose favor granted, to remove such fugitive to the State or Territory from which he escaped, and shall prevent all molestation of such person or persons by any process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever.

Sect. 7. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct, hinder, or prevent such claimant, his agent or attorney, or any person or persons lawfully assisting him, her, or them, from arresting such a fugitive from service or labor, either with or without process as aforesaid, or shall rescue, or attempt to rescue, such fugitive from service or labor, from the custody of such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, or other person or persons lawfully assist-

ing as aforesaid, when so arrested, pursuant to the authority herein given and declared; or shall aid, abet, or assist such person so owing service or labor as aforesaid, directly or indirectly, to escape from such claimant, his agent or attorney, or other person or persons legally authorized as aforesaid; or shall harbor or conceal such fugitive, so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of such person, after notice or knowledge of the fact that such person was a fugitive from service or labor as aforesaid, shall, for either of said offences, be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding six months, by indictment and conviction before the District Court of the United States for the district in which such offence may have been committed, or before the proper court of criminal jurisdiction, if committed within any one of the organized Territories of the United States; and shall moreover forfeit and pay, by way of civil damages to the party injured by such illegal conduct, the sum of one thousand dollars, for each fugitive so lost as aforesaid, to be recovered by action of debt, in any of the District or Territorial Courts aforesaid, within whose jurisdiction the said offence may have been committed.

Sect. 8. And be it further enacted, That the marshals, their deputies, and the clerks of the said District and Territorial Courts, shall be paid, for their services the like fees as may be allowed to them for similar services in other cases; and where such services are rendered exclusively in the arrest, custody, and delivery of the fugitive to the claimant, his or her agent or attorney, or where such supposed fugitive may be discharged out of custody for the want of sufficient proof as aforesaid, then such fees are to be paid in the whole by such claimant, his agent or attorney; and in all cases where the proceedings are before a commissioner, he shall be entitled to a fee of ten dollars in full for his services in each case, upon the delivery of the said certificate to the claimant, his or her agent or attorney; or a fee of five dollars in cases where the proof shall not, in the opinion of such commissioner, warrant such certificate and delivery, inclusive of all services incident to such arrest and examination, to be paid, in either case, by the claimant, his or her agent or attorney. The person or persons authorized to execute the process to be issued by such commissioners for the arrest and detention of fugitives from service or labor as aforesaid, shall also be entitled to a fee of five dollars each for each person he or they may arrest and take before any such commissioner as aforesaid, at the instance and request of such claimant, with such other fees as may be deemed reasonable by such commissioner for such other additional services as may be necessarily performed by him or them; such as attending at the examination, keeping the fugitive in custody, and providing him with food and lodging during his detention, and until the final determination of such commissioner; and, in general, for performing such other duties as may be required by such claimant, his or her attorney or agent, or commissioner in the premises, such fees to be made up in conformity with the fees usually charged by the officers of the courts of justice within the proper district or county, as near as may be practicable, and paid by such claimants, their agents or attorneys, whether such supposed fugitives from service or labor be ordered to be delivered to such claimants by the final determination of such commissioners or not.

Sect. 9. And be it further enacted, That, upon affidavit made by the claimant of such fugitive, his agent or attorney, after such certificate has



been issued, that he has reason to apprehend that such fugitive will be rescued by force from his or their possession before he can be taken beyond the limits of the State in which the arrest is made, it shall be the duty of the officer making the arrest to retain such fugitive in his custody, and to remove him to the State whence he fled, and there to deliver him to said claimant, his agent, or attorney. And to this end, the officer aforesaid is hereby authorized and required to employ so many persons as he may deem necessary to overcome such force, and to retain them in his service so long as circumstances may require. The said officer and his assistants, while so employed, to receive the same compensation, and to be allowed the same expenses, as are now allowed by law for transportation of criminals, to be certified by the judge of the district within which the arrest is made, and paid out of the treasury of the United States.

Sect. 10. And be it further enacted, That when any person held to service or labor in any State or Territory, or in the District of Columbia, shall escape therefrom, the party to whom such service or labor shall be due, his, her, or their agent or attorney, may apply to any court of record therein, or judge thereof in vacation, and make satisfactory proof to such court, or judge in vacation, of the escape aforesaid, and that the person escaping owed service or labor to such party. Whereupon the court shall cause a record to be made of the matters so proved, and also a general description of the person so escaping, with such convenient certainty as may be; and a transcript of such record, authenticated by the attestation of the clerk and of the seal of the said court, being produced in any other State, Territory, or district in which the person so escaping may be found, and being exhibited to any judge, commissioner, or other officer authorized by the law of the United States to cause persons escaping from service or labor to be delivered up, shall be held and taken to be full and conclusive evidence of the fact of escape, and that the service or labor of the person escaping is due to the party in such record mentioned. And upon the production by the said party of other and further evidence if necessary, either oral or by affidavit, in addition to what is contained in the said record of the identity of the person escaping, he or she shall be delivered up to the claimant. And the said court, commissioner, judge, or other person authorized by this act to grant certificates to claimants of fugitives, shall, upon the production of the record and other evidences aforesaid, grant to such claimant a certificate of his right to take any such person identified and proved to be owing service or labor as aforesaid, which certificate shall authorize such claimant to seize or arrest and transport such person to the State or Territory from which he escaped: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as requiring the production of a transcript of such record as evidence as aforesaid. But in its absence the claim shall be heard and determined upon other satisfactory proofs, competent in law.

Approved, September 18, 1850.

—U. S. Statutes at large, IX. 462-465.

1850 (June).—Nashville Convention.—“It is highly probable that the Compromise of 1850 postponed secession for a decade. By the advice of Calhoun a convention of Southern delegates had been called to meet at Nashville, Tennessee, in June. A number of radicals were determined to use the Nashville meeting for the publication of an

ultimatum to the North. They believed that the moment for secession had come. But the strong pleas for union in the Senate and the reference of the Compromise measures to a mixed committee tempered the disunion sentiment in the South. A few weeks before the convention met, the *National Intelligencer*, the administration organ at Washington, canvassed the Southern press and found but 50 out of 300 newspapers in the slave states in favor of a radical program at Nashville—and of these 50 many were ‘luke-warm’ and ‘backing down.’ The great majority of the people of the South favored waiting for the results of the debates on the Compromise before taking action. When, therefore, the Nashville convention met in June, only nine states were represented . . . [Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee. North Carolina and Maryland were opposed to the conventions and sent no representatives], and 100 of the 176 delegates were from Tennessee. A small minority denounced compromise of any sort and declared that secession was inevitable; but the majority, after reasserting the doctrine that Congress had no power to exclude slavery from the territories of the United States and asking for the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific, . . . [voted to adjourn until after the session of Congress]. A mere rump convention of 59 radical members reassembled after the passage of the Compromise. . . . It urged the adoption of a policy of social and commercial boycott of the North. The South as a whole, however, accepted the Compromise heartily. Virginia, which had been ready to advise secession if the Wilmot proviso passed, declared herself satisfied and advised her sister state of South Carolina to ‘desist from any meditated secession on her part.’ The Missouri legislature condemned the Nashville convention as ‘tending to foment discord, and alienate one part of the confederation from the other.’ A convention in Georgia declared that it would abide by the Compromise as a ‘permanent adjustment of the sectional controversy.’”—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 454-455.—“Maryland, said a Baltimore journal, is for a quiet settlement of differences. Whoever thinks she will take part, either with the North or the South, in any measure having the slightest tendency to dissolve the Union makes a great mistake. She will not be driven from her adhesion to the Union by threats from any quarter. She knows its value and will not send delegates to a Northern or Southern convention to deliberate on the propriety of separating the States. Maryland wants no representatives in a Southern convention. No man has a right to pledge her. . . . A North Carolina paper was opposed to the convention because the purpose of it was unknown, because it could do no good, and must end in mischief or nothing. . . . So few delegates attended the Newbern and Charlotte conventions that they were not organized.”—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, pp. 34-35.

1850-1851.—Hülsemann Letter.—Kossuth in America.—In July, 1850, Daniel Webster became secretary of state in the cabinet of President Fillmore and retained that post until his death, in October, 1852. “The best-known incident of this period was that which gave rise to the famous ‘Hülsemann letter.’ President Taylor had sent an agent to Hungary to report upon the condition of the revolutionary government, with the intention of recognizing it if there were sufficient grounds for doing so. When the agent arrived, the revo-

lution was crushed, and he reported to the President against recognition. These papers were transmitted to the Senate in March, 1850. Mr. Hülsemann, the Austrian Chargé, thereupon complained of the action of our administration, and Mr. Clayton, then Secretary of State, replied that the mission of the agent had been simply to gather information. On receiving further instructions from his government, Mr. Hülsemann rejoined to Mr. Clayton, and it fell to Mr. Webster to reply, which he did on December 21, 1850. The note of the Austrian Chargé was in a hectoring and highly offensive tone, and Mr. Webster felt the necessity of administering a sharp rebuke. 'The Hülsemann letter,' as it was called, was, accordingly dispatched. It set forth strongly the right of the United States and their intention to recognize any de facto revolutionary government, and to seek information in all proper ways in order to guide their action. . . . Mr. Webster had two objects. One was to awaken the people of Europe to a sense of the greatness of this country, the other to touch the national pride at home. He did both. . . . The affair did not, however, end here. Mr. Hülsemann became very mild, but he soon lost his temper again. Kossuth and the refugees in Turkey were brought to this country in a United States frigate. The Hungarian hero was received with a burst of enthusiasm that induced him to hope for substantial aid, which was, of course, wholly visionary. The popular excitement made it difficult for Mr. Webster to steer a proper course, but he succeeded, by great tact, in showing his own sympathy, and, so far as possible, that of the government for the cause of Hungarian independence and for its leader without going too far. . . . Mr. Webster's course, . . . although carefully guarded, aroused the ire of Mr. Hülsemann, who left the country, after writing a letter of indignant farewell to the Secretary of State."—H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*, ch. 10.

ALSO IN: D. Webster, *Works*, v. 6, pp. 488-504.—J. W. Foster, *Century of American diplomacy*, pp. 329-333.

1850-1860.—Economic conditions.—Railroad construction.—Growth of cities.—Progress of mining.—Agricultural development.—Immigration.—Panic of 1857.—Discovery of petroleum.—“From the excitement occasioned in foreign and domestic affairs by the subject of slavery in the decade of the fifties the mistaken impression must not be formed that the people of the United States at this time talked and thought of little else. The development of the ever receding frontier in the West was a matter of general concern. . . . The central government in the first half of the century refused any considerable aid to public improvements, and . . . the states themselves went heavily into the work, only to repent later of their policy. Congress began to change its course slowly after 1848, not at first by constructing public improvements itself but by giving its aid to the states, with the requirement that the states in turn assist the private companies engaged in improvements. . . . Thousands of acres of ‘swamp lands’ and ‘saline lands’ (were bestowed on the states) to be used as the states might direct. . . . In the decade from 1850 to 1860 the total value of all farm property, which in 1850 was \$3,900,000,000, doubled; the annual cotton crop, which amounted to 2,100,000 bales in 1850, almost doubled in the same interval, while the annual corn crop of 590,000,000 bushels, and that of wheat, which reached 100,000,000 bushels in 1850, increased approximately fifty per cent. Railroad construction

went on in every section. [See also RAILROADS: 1850-1860.] . . . The growth of the western cities was magical. Chicago which had been founded as a fort in the Indian country in 1804 . . . (in) 1860 numbered 109,000 inhabitants, and in this year . . . by lakes, canals and railroads, it shipped 11,000,000 bushels of wheat. This phenomenal advance was an index of the growth of the entire Northwest. . . . New York City . . . increased in wealth and population. The development of the country's mineral resources kept pace with the general progress. In 1810 the average annual production of gold was \$2,000, in 1820 \$73,000, in 1830 \$564,000, in 1840 \$1,000,000, and in 1850, two years after the opening of the California mines, \$50,000,000. In the decade from 1850 to 1860 the annual production of gold averaged \$55,000,000. This large addition to the wealth of the country worked mightily for prosperity. . . . From 1850 to 1860 the annual production of coal and of pig iron, both excellent indices of general prosperity, especially along manufacturing lines, advanced, the one from 6,000,000 tons to 13,000,000 tons, and the other from 560,000 to 820,000 tons. . . . Agricultural development [see AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: 1833-1860], the building of new railroads and cities, and the progress in the mining industries created an unusual demand for laborers, which in turn induced an increase in immigration. . . . In 1820, 8,000 immigrants arrived from Europe, 23,000 came in 1830, 84,000 in 1840, and 370,000 in 1850. Each year of the fifties saw an increase, until in 1854 the number reached 425,000. In the decade 1850-1860, 2,700,000 immigrants, mostly Irish, Germans, and English, entered the United States, the Irish generally settling in the manufacturing centers of the East or seeking work on the canals and railroads, and the Germans and the English finding their way to the agricultural sections of the Middle West. Almost all the newcomers cast their fortunes with the Northern States, for to the independent artisans and laborers of Europe competition with enforced black labor was unattractive. [See also IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1790-1860.] . . . The swelling tide of prosperity which set in during the forties continued up to within a few weeks after President Buchanan took his seat, and then suddenly receded in the financial panic of 1857. Thousands lost their fortunes and other thousands their work. It was the panic of 1837 over again on a somewhat smaller scale, brought about by the same general set of causes. In their prosperity and in the abundance of money after the discoveries of gold in California, men had speculated too heavily in public lands, in railroads, in city real estate, in mineral-bearing lands, and in many other lines of investment. They had gone too far and the inevitable crash overtook them. . . . While the people were gradually recovering from the effects of this panic, providential discoveries of new mineral deposits brought encouragement to the whole nation. Petroleum or crude oil was found in a drilled well at Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859. The first well was not a flowing well, but the oil was pumped from it at the rate of twenty-five barrels per day, which was equal to a daily income of \$1000. Soon the Funk well, the first flowing well, was struck. . . . Along Oil Creek in Pennsylvania, where the discoveries were made, Oil Creek, Franklin, Titusville, and other towns sprang up out of the wilderness, and fifty million gallons of oil were soon produced annually. Similar discoveries were made in other parts of the country.”—E. D. Fite, *History of United States*, pp. 338-339.

1851.—Organization of territorial government in New Mexico. See NEW MEXICO: 1850-1851.

1851.—Treaty of Traverse-de-Sioux with Indians. See DAKOTA TERRITORY: 1851-1859.

1851.—López filibustering expedition to Cuba. See CUBA: 1845-1860.

1851-1865.—Growth of temperance movement. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1851-1865.

1852.—Appearance of the Know Nothing, or American party.—“A new party had by this time risen to active importance in American politics. It appeared in 1852, in the form of a secret, oath-bound organization, of whose name, nature, and objects nothing was told even to its members until they had reached its higher degrees. Their consequent declaration that they knew nothing about it gave the society its popular name of Know Nothings. It accepted the name of the American Party. Its design was to oppose the easy naturalization of foreigners [see also IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1835-1915], and to aid the election of native-born citizens to office. Its nominations were made by secret conventions of delegates from the various lodges, and were voted for by all members under penalty of expulsion in case of refusal. At first, by endorsing the nominations of one or other of the two great parties, it decided many elections. After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the Know Nothing organization was adopted by many Southern Whigs who were unwilling to unite with the Democracy, and became, for a time, a national party. It carried nine of the State elections in 1855, and in 1856 nominated Presidential candidates. After that time its Southern members gradually united with the Democracy, and the Know Nothing party disappeared from politics.”—A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, ch. 18, sect. 4.—“On July 5-6, 1852, the Know-Nothing party held a national convention at Trenton, New Jersey, at which thirty-one delegates representing nine states—Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, Maryland, Virginia, and Georgia—were present. After adopting resolutions setting forth the principles of Americanism, and after changing the name of the party by dropping the word ‘native,’ the convention nominated Daniel Webster of Massachusetts for President, and George C. Washington of Montgomery County, Maryland, for Vice-President. The permanent president of the convention was Jacob Broom of Philadelphia, and one of its most active members was Dr. Reynell Coates of Camden, New Jersey. On learning of his nomination through the public prints, Washington, who had been a member of Congress for four terms and who was a grandnephew of General Washington, declined the nomination, and Dr. Reynell Coates was chosen to fill the vacancy. Webster neither accepted nor declined, and his name remained at the head of the ticket until his death on October 24. Three days later the national executive committee of the American party nominated Jacob Broom to take Webster’s place. . . . At the election on November 2, the ticket of the American party received 1670 votes in Pennsylvania, 831 votes in New Jersey, and 184 votes in Massachusetts. If it received any votes in other states, they were so few and scattering that no record was made of them in collections of returns.”—C. O. Paullin, *National ticket of Broom and Coates, 1852 (American Historical Review, July, 1920, pp. 689-691)*.

Also in: A. Holmes, *Parties and their principles*, pp. 287-295.—T. V. Cooper, *American politics*, pp. 56-68.

1852.—Seventeenth presidential election.—

Franklin Pierce.—“The question of slavery, in its comprehensive bearings, formed the turning point in the presidential canvass of 1852. . . . The national democratic convention which nominated Mr. Pierce, unanimously adopted a platform approving the compromise of 1850 as the final decision of the slavery question. The whig party were widely divided on the question of acquiescence in the compromise measures, and still more at variance in regard to the claims of rival candidates for the presidency. Mr. Seward’s friends in the free states united in the support of General Scott, who had, to a considerable extent, stood aloof from the agitations of the last few years. On the other hand, the exclusive supporters of the compromise, as a condition of party allegiance, were divided between Millard Fillmore, at that time acting president, and Daniel Webster, secretary of state. The whig convention met in Baltimore on the 17th of June, 1852, two weeks after the democratic convention, and nominated General Scott as their candidate for president. A large majority of the delegates from New York, and a considerable number from other states, maintained their opposition to the test resolutions which were proposed by the other branch of the party. These resolutions, however, were adopted, and a platform was thus established resembling, in its main features, that of the democrats. . . . Supported by several advocates of this new platform on the ground of his personal popularity, General Scott received the nomination. He was, however, regarded with great suspicion by a large number of whigs in the slaveholding states. . . . Many ardent friends of the compromise . . . refused to rally around General Scott, distrusting his fidelity to the compromise platform; while a large number of the whigs of the free states, through aversion to the platform, assumed a neutral position or gave their support to a third candidate. Another portion of the whig party nominated Mr. Webster, who died [October 24, 1852], not only refusing to decline the nomination, but openly avowing his disgust with the action of the party.”—G. E. Baker, *Memoir of William H. Seward (Seward’s Works, v. 4)*.—“The Democratic convention was held, first, on June 1, 1852, at Baltimore. It was a protracted convention, for it did not adjourn until the 6th of the month, but it was not very interesting. . . . After a short contest, the two-thirds rule was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The struggle over the nomination was protracted. On the first ballot, General Cass had 116; James Buchanan, 93; William L. Marcy, 27; Stephen A. Douglas, 20; Joseph Lane, 13; Samuel Houston, 8; and there were 4 scattering. The number necessary to a choice was 188. . . . On the twenty-ninth trial, the votes were: for Cass, 27; for Buchanan, 93; for Douglas, 91; and no other candidate had more than 26. At this point Cass began to recover his strength, and reached his largest number on the thirty-fifth trial, namely, 131. On that same ballot, Virginia gave 15 votes to Franklin Pierce. Mr. Pierce gained 15 more votes on the thirty-sixth trial; but at that point his increase ceased, and was then slowly resumed, as the weary repetition of balloting without effect went on. The forty-eighth trial resulted as follows: for Cass, 73; for Buchanan, 28; for Douglas, 33; for Marcy, 90; for Pierce, 55; for all others, 8. The forty-ninth trial was the last. There was a ‘stampede’ for Pierce, and he received 282 votes to 6 for all others. Ten candidates were voted for as a candidate for the vice-presidency. . . . On the second ballot, William R. King of Alabama was unanimously nominated. . . . The anti-slavery

organization, the Free Soil Democrats, though a much less important political factor than they had been four years earlier, held their convention in Pittsburg on August 11. Henry Wilson of Massachusetts presided. John P. Hale of New Hampshire was nominated for President, and George W. Julian of Indiana for Vice-President. . . . The canvass was not a very spirited one. All the early autumn elections were favorable to the Democrats, and the result in November was a crushing defeat of the Whigs in the popular vote and one still more decisive in the electoral vote. . . . The popular and electoral votes were as follows. [Popular vote: Franklin Pierce, 1,601,274; Winfield Scott, 1,386,580; John P. Hale, 155,825. Electoral vote: Pierce, 254; Scott, 42.]—E. Stanwood, *History of presidential elections*, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: W. L. Marcy, *Diary and memoranda (American Historical Review, Apr., 1919, pp. 446-462, July, 1919, pp. 641-653)*.

1852.—Appearance of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," and its effect.—"Of the literary forces that aided in bringing about the immense revolution in public sentiment between 1852 and 1860, we may affirm with confidence that by far the most weighty was the influence spread by [Harriet Beecher Stowe's story "Uncle Tom's Cabin"]. This story, when published [1851-1852] as a serial in the 'National Era,' an anti-slavery newspaper at Washington, attracted little attention, but after it was given to the world in book form in March, 1852, it proved the most successful novel ever written. The author felt deeply that the Fugitive Slave law was unjust, and that there was cruelty in its execution; this inspired her to pour out her soul in a protest against slavery. She thought that if she could only make the world see slavery as she saw it, her object would be accomplished; she would then have induced people to think right on the subject. . . . The effect produced by the book was immense. Whittier offered up 'thanks for the Fugitive Slave law; for it gave occasion for Uncle Tom's Cabin.' Longfellow thought it was one of the greatest triumphs in literary history, but its moral effect was a higher triumph still. Lowell described the impression which the book made as a 'whirl of excitement.' Choate is reported to have said: 'That book will make two millions of abolitionists.' Garrison wrote the author: 'All the defenders of slavery have let me alone and are abusing you.'—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from 1850, v. 1, pp. 278-280*.—Writing only nine months after the publication of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," C. F. Briggs, in *Putnam's Monthly Magazine*, said: "Never since books were first printed has the success of Uncle Tom been equalled; the history of literature contains nothing parallel to it, nor approaching it; it is, in fact, the first real success in bookmaking, for all other successes in literature were failures when compared with the success of Uncle Tom. . . . Don Quixote was a popular book on its first coming out, and so was Gil Blas, and Richardson's Pamela, and Fielding's Tom Jones, and Hannah More's Cælebs, and Gibbon's Decline and Fall; and so were the Vicar of Wakefield, and Rasselas, and the Tale of a Tub, and Evelina, the Lady of the Lake, Waverley, the Sorrows of Werther, Childe Harold, the Spy, Pelham, Vivian Grey, Pickwick, the Mysteries of Paris, and Macaulay's History. These are among the most famous books that rose suddenly in popular esteem on their first appearance, but the united sale of the whole of them, within the first nine months of their publication, would not equal the sale of Uncle Tom in the same time. . . . It is but nine months since this Iliad of the blacks, as an

English reviewer calls Uncle Tom, made its appearance among books, and already its sale has exceeded a million of copies; author and publisher have made fortunes out of it, and Mrs. Stowe, who was before unknown, is as familiar a name in all parts of the civilized world as that of Homer or Shakspeare. Nearly 200,000 copies of the first edition of the work have been sold in the United States. . . . The book was published on the 20th of last March, and on the 1st of December there had been sold 120,000 sets of the edition in two volumes, 50,000 copies of the cheaper edition in one, and 3,000 copies of the costly illustrated edition. . . . They [the publishers] have paid to the author \$20,300 as her share of the profits on the actual cash sales of the first nine months. But it is in England where Uncle Tom has made his deepest mark. . . . We know of twenty rival editions in England and Scotland, and that millions of copies have been produced. . . . We have seen it stated that there were thirty different editions published in London, within six months of the publication of the work here. . . . Uncle Tom was not long in making his way across the British Channel, and four rival editions are claiming the attention of the Parisians, one under the title of 'le Père Tom,' and another of 'la Case de l'Oncle Tom.'—*Uncle Tom-itudes (Putnam's Monthly Magazine, Jan., 1853)*.—"In May, 1852, Whittier wrote to Garrison: 'What a glorious work Harriet Beecher Stowe has wrought. Thanks for the Fugitive Slave Law. Better for slavery that that law had never been enacted, for it gave occasion for Uncle Tom's Cabin.' . . . Macaulay wrote, thanking her for the volume. . . . Four years later [he] wrote to Mrs. Stowe: 'I have just returned from Italy, where your fame seems to throw that of all other writers into the shade. There is no place where Uncle Tom, transformed into Il Zio Tom, is not to be found.' From Lord Carlisle she received a long and earnest epistle, in which he says he felt that slavery was by far the 'topping' question of the world and age, and that he returned his 'deep and solemn thanks to Almighty God, who has led and enabled you to write such a book.' The Rev. Charles Kingsley . . . sent his thanks, saying: 'Your book will do more to take away the reproach from your great and growing nation than many platform agitations and speechifyings.' Said Lord Palmerston, 'I have not read a novel for thirty years; but I have read that book three times, not only for the story, but for the statesmanship of it.' Lord Cockburn declared: 'She has done more for humanity than was ever before accomplished by any single book of fiction.' Within a year Uncle Tom's Cabin was scattered all over the world. Translations were made into all the principal languages, and into several obscure dialects, in number variously estimated from twenty to forty. The librarian of the British Museum . . . made a collection which is unique and very remarkable in the history of books. American visitors may see there thirty-five editions (Uncle Tom's Cabin) of the original English, and the complete text, and eight of abridgments and adaptations. Of translations into different languages there are nineteen, viz.: Armenian, one; Bohemian, one; Danish, two distinct versions; Dutch, one; Flemish, one; French, eight distinct versions, and two dramas; German, five distinct versions, and four abridgments; Hungarian, one complete version, one for children, and one versified abridgment; Illyrian, two distinct versions; Italian, one; Polish, two distinct versions; Portuguese, one; Roman, or modern Greek, one; Russian, two distinct versions; Spanish, six distinct versions; Swedish, one; Wal-

lachian, two distinct versions; Welsh, three distinct versions."—Mrs. F. T. McCray, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (*Magazine of American history*, Jan., 1890).—See also AMERICAN LITERATURE: 1830-1890.

1852-1854.—Perry expedition.—Opening of intercourse with Japan. See JAPAN: 1797-1854.

1853.—Gadsden purchase of Arizona. See ARIZONA: 1853.

1853.—Washington created a territory. See WASHINGTON: 1848-1853.

1853-1854.—Kansas-Nebraska Bill.—Repeal of the Missouri Compromise.—Doctrine of "Squatter sovereignty."—"The admission of California into the Union, and the organization of the territories of Utah, New Mexico, and Minnesota, reduced that part of our country without government to the vast region bounded by the Rocky Mountains on the West, British America on the North, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri and Arkansas on the East, and Texas and New Mexico on the South. In the southeast corner of this splendid domain were the reservations where dwelt the Indians removed from the States East of the Mississippi. . . . Thus closed to settlement, and lying along the entire western border of Missouri and Arkansas, they formed a barrier checking the advancing tide of population so effectually that the most populous counties in Missouri were those on its western border. That such a state of things could long continue, that the country west of Missouri. . . . could remain permanently without organized government, was not to be expected. . . . Indeed, as time passed attempts to break through the barrier were made again and again. Within seven years the legislature of Missouri memorialized Congress to set up government in the region west of the State; Douglas introduced a bill to organize Nebraska; citizens of the frontier town of Parkville petitioned Congress to extinguish the Indian titles, organize Nebraska, and open it to settlement; the Wyandotte Indians sent a territorial delegate to Washington; the House passed a bill organizing Nebraska; Benton dragged the issue into his campaign for the Senate in 1853; the Wyandottes organized a territorial government, elected a provisional governor and council and delegate to Congress, and in 1854 a convention of delegates from Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska met at St. Joseph and demanded the early extinguishment of Indian titles, and the establishment of territorial government in Nebraska as necessary to secure protection to the Pacific Railroad and shelter to the thousands of emigrants annually crossing the plains, and declared in favor of leaving the question of slavery 'to be settled by the citizens of the territory when they form a State government.' ["Popular sovereignty."] . . . Clearly the time for action had come, and on the opening day of the session Senator Dodge of Iowa gave notice that he would introduce a bill providing for territorial government in Nebraska. That another struggle in Congress over slavery was now at hand, that it was the direct result of the Benton-Atchison feud in Missouri, and that, in the course of it, the question of the right of the people in the territory to decide the issue of slavery would play an important part was pointed out by the Washington correspondents of the press, North and South, East and West. They were right, and when Douglas reported the bill on the fourth of January, 1854, it provided that, when admitted as a State or States, Nebraska, or any portion of it, should be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their constitutions might prescribe. With the bill came a report setting forth that the amendments which the com-

mittee deemed it a duty to recommend were those which affirmed and proposed to carry into practical operation in Nebraska the principles established by the compromise measures of 1850, so far as applicable to the territory. These great measures . . . were designed to establish certain great principles which, by withdrawing the question of slavery from the halls of Congress and from the arena of politics and leaving it with those most concerned and alone responsible for its consequence, would afford a remedy for existing evils and avoid for all time to come the perils of slavery agitation. These great principles were: that all questions of slavery in the territories and in the new States formed from them were left to the decision of the people residing therein; that all cases involving title to slaves and questions of personal freedom were referred to the jurisdiction of the local tribunal with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States; and that the act for the return of fugitives from labor was to be as faithfully executed in the territories as in the States. The bill as it came from the printer contained twenty sections. But three days later a new edition appeared with twenty-one sections, and this twenty-first section set forth that, in order to avoid all misconception, it was declared to be the true intent and meaning of the act, as far as slavery was concerned, to carry into practical operation in the territory the great principles established by the compromise measures of 1850. The three principles mentioned in the report were then restated and made a part of the bill. . . . As thus presented the bill merely reaffirmed the doctrine of non-intervention, and left untouched the question whether the restriction imposed by the compromise of 1820 was, or was not, repealed by the compromise of 1850. But Senator Dixon of Kentucky announced that when the bill came up for consideration he would move an amendment expressly repealing the Missouri Compromise. . . . On Monday, the twenty-third of January, accordingly, Douglas called up his bill and offered a substitute which cut the territory into Kansas and Nebraska, and declared the slavery restriction laid on the Louisiana purchase by the Missouri Compromise 'superseded by the principles of the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures,' and no longer operative. . . . The purpose of Douglas was not to declare openly and frankly in his bill that the slavery prohibition of the act of 1820 was repealed, but to claim that it had already been repealed by the compromise measures of 1850. From this position Chase sought to drive him, and early in February opened an attack on the fourteenth section. . . . [See part of statute below.] Walker pointed out that the repeal of the restriction laid on slavery in 1820 would revive the old French law legalizing slavery in all the Louisiana purchase. To quiet this fear Badger of South Carolina announced that . . . he would move an amendment which should read, 'provided that nothing herein shall be construed to revive or put in force any law or regulation which may have existed prior to the act of the sixth of March, 1820, either protecting, establishing, prohibiting, or abolishing slavery.' . . . The bill, thus amended, was reported to the Senate, and at five o'clock on the morning of March fourth, after a session of seventeen hours, the vote was taken on its passage. The yeas were 37 and the nays 14. . . . A bill to organize Nebraska had been introduced into the House late in December, and on the last day of January Richardson reported from the Committee on Territories what was in substance the Kansas-Nebraska bill

of Douglas, and this was still in Committee of the Whole when, on the seventh of March, the Senate bill came down for concurrence. On the twenty-seventh it was referred to the Committee of the Whole, where it slumbered till the eighth of May. The whole North, from Maine to Wisconsin, was then in commotion. . . . A Southern editor declared he had never known such unanimity of sentiment at the North on any question affecting the rights of the South as there prevailed in opposition to the repeal of the compromise of 1820. From mass meetings, from political conventions, from anti-slavery societies, churches, presbyteries, ministers, and clergymen of every denomination, from yearly meetings of the Friends, from the clergymen of the Northwestern States, from those of different denominations in and about the city of New York, from three thousand and fifty clergymen scattered over the New England States, from men of all sorts and conditions, came to Congress hundreds of petitions, memorials, resolutions, remonstrances. . . . The press of the North . . . was vigorously denouncing the Nebraska bill. In some hundred newspapers which we have looked over, said a New York editor, the expression of indignant disapproval is almost unanimous. It is a perfect chain of condemnation. . . . In Ohio forty-one were against and thirteen for it; in Indiana two were for it; in Illinois but one defended it; in Wisconsin eleven were against the bill, and four Democratic journals were for it. In the South a host of journals repudiated the bill as forsaking the position, long held in that section, that Congress had no power to meddle with slavery in any way anywhere. The Nebraska bill is a surrender of the very ground for which the South fought in 1850. Congress has no power to legislate slavery into nor out of a territory; but this bill gives to the people of the territory a power Congress does not possess. Southern support of such a position is a repudiation of that of 1850. . . . In this excited state of the public mind the struggle over Kansas-Nebraska opened in the House. . . . Every expedient that could be used was used to prevent a vote. . . . When Tuesday came the special order on the Pacific Railroad bill was laid aside and the debate was allowed to run till Saturday, when, as had been agreed, it closed and filibustering by offering amendments began. . . . [On May 22 the bill passed the House by a vote of one hundred and thirteen to one hundred. It quickly passed the Senate and on May 30 Pierce signed it and made it law.] The final blow, said a Washington journal, was inflicted on the venerable Missouri Compromise on Thursday night last, and the ancient Pacifier of the Country, the Hater of Discord, the Friend of the Union, was dispatched in the Senate House a little after midnight. Had it been demanded by any section, public meeting, association, county, town, or hamlet in the whole country, the sacrifice might be justified. But it was uncalled for, unnecessary."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 192-196, 199-201, 203-205.—See also KANSAS: 1854-1850.

An event in Boston at this time showed how strongly the tide had set against slavery. On May 24, 1854, a runaway slave named Anthony Burns was arrested. Richard H. Dana, Theodore Parker and Charles L. Ellis defended him in vain. An attempt at rescue and an offer to buy his freedom also failed; but the services of a revenue cutter were required to take him to Virginia, "and to this Burns was taken one afternoon in June. . . . The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill left the party

leaders in the free States divided in their opinions as to what was best to do. But the people in the free States had already made up their minds, and a call for a new and distinctly Northern party was sweeping over the land."—J. B. McMaster, *History of the people of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 208-209.—"The Democrats [had] . . . won in the elections because the Whigs had suffered hopeless division of opinion and had already in fact fallen asunder upon the question of slavery. The Democrats alone, with their chief strength at the South, kept their organization and their power of united action. Men who could not act with them now looked for a party, and yet feared to form one which should bring the sections face to face and fight the slavery question out. And yet they could not trust that question into the background or forget it. Territories were always making and to be made. That unresting host forever moving upon the western plains and rivers must presently be told what Congress meant itself to do, or let them do, with regard to the use and ownership of slaves. Root-and-branch opponents of slavery were very actively and aggressively making opinion against it without too tenderly considering either the politicians who wanted to think of something else or the merchants and manufacturers who dreaded to see peace and trade disturbed. . . . To every man who looked thoughtfully upon the face of affairs the slavery question obviously stalked obtrusive at the front of all policy, despite compromises and evasions. It was the southerners, besides, who seemed always to force the fighting. Whether the question were the reception of a petition against the continuance of the slave trade in the District of Columbia or the acquisition and government of new territory or the admission of a state into the Union, they let no opportunity go by to make known their claims and rights under the constitutional arrangement. They saw with the keen insight of those who lose that the game of growth and extending power went steadily against them. They valued the Union as dearly as the men of the North, were bent upon its preservation as earnestly and honorably as their compatriots of any section; but they were convinced . . . that its preservation depended upon the maintenance of an equilibrium between the sections, and they were determined, with Mr. Calhoun, to make their fight now, while yet there was a chance to win. They waged it, accordingly, like men suspiciously on guard in the face of a subtle enemy, and upon occasion deeply irritated even their friends with their noisy and ceaseless protests, driving their enemies to a like watchfulness and aggression."—W. Wilson, *History of American people*, v. 4, pp. 159-160, 164-165.—"Since the year 1844 there had existed a bitter factional contest in the Democratic Party in Missouri. One faction, comprising the conservatives on the slavery question and those with free-soil sympathies, was led by Col. Thomas H. Benton. The other faction included the radical proslavery men, led by David R. Atchison and James S. Green, who looked to John C. Calhoun for inspiration. After several years of plotting and strife, the Atchison wing of the party succeeded in 1850 in preventing Benton's reelection to the Senate. According to the reckoning of his enemies, this defeat should have annihilated Benton politically, but herein they miscalculated. . . . It was an important, if not the leading, part in Col. Benton's plan of campaign in 1853 so to associate the organization of Nebraska Territory and the construction of the railroad from St. Louis across Missouri to the Pacific that the people of Missouri

should look upon the establishment of the territorial government as indispensable to the success of the railroad."—P. O. Ray, *Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act (Annual Report of American Historical Association, 1914, pp. 262-263)*.—The following is the text of the most important provisions of the act to organize Nebraska and Kansas:

AN ACT TO ORGANIZE THE TERRITORIES OF  
NEBRASKA AND KANSAS.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That all that part of the Territory of the United States included within the following limits, except such portions thereof as are hereinafter expressly exempted from the operations of this act, to wit: beginning at a point in the Missouri River where the fortieth parallel of north latitude crosses the same; thence west on said parallel to the east boundary of the Territory of Utah, on the summit of the Rocky Mountains; thence on said summit northward to the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude; thence east on said parallel to the western boundary of the territory of Minnesota; thence southward on said boundary to the Missouri River; thence down the main channel of said river to the place of beginning, be, and the same is hereby, created into a temporary government by the name of the Territory of Nebraska; and when admitted as a State or States, the said Territory, or any portion of the same, shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission. . . .

Sect. 9. (The section relates to the judicial system of the Territory.) . . . Writs of error, and appeals from the final decisions of said Supreme Court (of the Territory), shall be allowed, and may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations as from the circuit courts of the United States, where the value of the property, or the amount in controversy, to be ascertained by the oath or affirmation of either party, or other competent witness, shall exceed one thousand dollars; except only that in all cases involving title to slaves, the said writs of error, or appeals shall be allowed and decided by the said Supreme Court, without regard to the value of the matter, property, or title in controversy; . . . *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to apply to or affect the provisions of the "act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters," approved February twelfth, seventeen hundred and ninety-three, and the "act to amend and supplementary to the aforesaid act," approved September eighteen, eighteen hundred and fifty. . . .

Sect. 10. *And be it further enacted*, That the provisions of an act entitled "An act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters," approved February twelve, seventeen hundred and ninety-three, and the provisions of the act entitled "An act to amend, and supplementary to, the aforesaid act," approved September eighteen, eighteen hundred and fifty, be, and the same are hereby, declared to extend to and be in full force within the limits of said Territory of Nebraska. . . .

Sect. 14. *And be it further enacted*, . . . That the Constitution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory of Nebraska as elsewhere within the United States,

except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March sixth, eighteen hundred and twenty, which, being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories, as recognized by the legislation of eighteen hundred and fifty, commonly called the Compromise Measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, not to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to revive or put in force any law or regulation which may have existed prior to the act of sixth March, eighteen hundred and twenty, either protecting, establishing, prohibiting, or abolishing slavery. . . .


Sect. 19. *And be it further enacted*, That all that part of the Territory of the United States included within the following limits, except such portions thereof as are hereinafter expressly exempted from the operations of this act, to wit, beginning at a point on the western boundary of the State of Missouri, where the thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude crosses the same; thence west on said parallel to the eastern boundary of New Mexico; thence north on said boundary to latitude thirty-eight; thence following said boundary westward to the east boundary of the Territory of Utah, on the summit of the Rocky Mountains; thence northward on said summit to the fortieth parallel of latitude; thence east on said Parallel to the western boundary of the State of Missouri; thence south with the western boundary of said State to the place of beginning, be, and the same is hereby, created into a temporary government by the name of the Territory of Kansas; and when admitted as a State or States, the said Territory, or any portion of the same, shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission. . . .

[Sections 27, 28, and 32 apply to the Territory of Kansas the provisions of sections 9, 10, and 14, respectively.]

—(*U. S. Statutes at Large, X., 277-290.*)

Senator Douglas's explanation of the reasons on which he grounded his Kansas-Nebraska Bill is given in a report made by Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts, of conversations held by him with the senator in 1859, and taken down in writing at the time, in the exact language of Douglas. "There was," said Senator Douglas, "a necessity for the organization of the Territory, which could no longer be denied or resisted. . . . Mr. Douglas, as early as the session of 1843, had introduced a bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska, for the purpose of opening the line of communication between the Mississippi Valley and our possessions on the Pacific Ocean, known as the Oregon country, and which was then under the operation of the treaty of joint occupation, or rather nonoccupation, with England, and was rapidly passing into the exclusive possession of the British Hudson's Bay Fur Company, who were establishing posts at every prominent and commanding point in the country. . . . Mr. Douglas renewed the introduction of his bill for the organization of Nebraska Territory, each session of Congress, from 1844 to 1854, a period of ten years, and while he had failed to secure the passage of the act, in conse-

quence of the Mexican war intervening, and the slavery agitation which ensued, no one had objected to it upon the ground that there was no necessity for the organization of the Territory. During the discussions upon our Territorial questions during this period, Mr. Douglas often called attention to the fact that a line of policy had been adopted many years ago, and was being executed each year, which was entirely incompatible with the growth and development of our country. It had originated as early as the administration of Mr. Monroe, and had been continued by Mr. Adams, General Jackson, Mr. Van Buren, Harrison, and by Tyler, by which treaties had been made with the Indians to the east of the Mississippi River, for their removal to the country bordering upon the States west of the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers, with guaranties in said treaties that the country within which these



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Indians were located should never be embraced within any Territory or State, or subjected to the jurisdiction of either, so long as grass should grow and water should run. These Indian settlements, thus secured by treaty, commenced upon the northern borders of Texas, or Red River, and were continued from year to year westward until when, in 1844, Mr. Douglas introduced his first Nebraska Bill, they had reached the Nebraska or Platte River, and the Secretary of War was then engaged in the very act of removing Indians from Iowa, and settling them in the valley of the Platte River, with similar guaranties of perpetuity, by which the road to Oregon was forever to be closed. It was the avowed object of this Indian policy to form an Indian barrier on the western borders of Arkansas, Missouri, and Iowa, by Indian settlements, secured in perpetuity by a compact that the white settlements should never extend westward of that line. This policy originated in the jealousy, on the part of the Atlantic States, of the growth and expansion

of the Mississippi Valley, which threatened in a few years to become the controlling power of the nation. . . . This restrictive system received its first check in 1844, by the introduction of the Nebraska Bill, which was served on the Secretary of War, by its author, on the day of its introduction, with a notice that Congress was about to organize the Territory, and therefore he must not locate any more Indians there. In consequence of this notice, the Secretary (by courtesy) suspended his operations until Congress should have an opportunity of acting upon the bill; and inasmuch as Congress failed to act that session, Mr. Douglas renewed his bill and notice to the Secretary each year, and thus prevented action for ten years, and until he could procure action on the bill. . . . When Congress assembled at the session of 1853-'54, in view of this state of facts, Mr. Douglas renewed his Nebraska Act, which was modified, pending discussion, by dividing into two Territories, and became the Kansas-Nebraska Act. . . . The jealousies of the two great sections of the Union, North and South, had been fiercely excited by the slavery agitation. The Southern States would never consent to the opening of those Territories to settlement, so long as they were excluded by act of Congress from moving there and holding their slaves; and they had the power to prevent the opening of the country forever, inasmuch as it had been forever excluded by treaties with the Indians, which could not be changed or repealed except by a two-third vote in the Senate. But the South were willing to consent to remove the Indian restrictions, provided the North would at the same time remove the Missouri restriction, and thus throw the country open to settlement on equal terms by the people of the North and South, and leave the settlers at liberty to introduce or exclude slavery as they should think proper." The same report gives a distinction which Senator Douglas drew between "Popular Sovereignty" and "Squatter Sovereignty," as follows: "The name of Squatter Sovereignty was first applied by Mr. Calhoun, in a debate in the United States Senate in 1848, between himself and General Cass, in respect to the right of the people of California to institute a government for themselves after the Mexican jurisdiction had been withdrawn from them, and before the laws of the United States had been extended over them. General Cass contended that in such a case the people had a right, an inherent and inalienable right, to institute a government for themselves and for their own protection. Mr. Calhoun replied that, with the exception of the native Californians, the inhabitants of that country were mere squatters upon the public domain, who had gone there in vast crowds, without the authority of law, and were in fact trespassers as well as squatters upon the public lands, and to recognize their right to set up a government for themselves was to assert the doctrine of 'Squatter Sovereignty.' The term had no application to an organized Territory under the authority of Congress, or to the powers of such organized Territory, but was applied solely to an unorganized country whose existence was not recognized by law. On the other hand, what is called 'Popular Sovereignty' in the Territories, is a phrase used to designate the right of the people of an organized Territory, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to govern themselves in respect to their own internal polity and domestic affairs."—S. A. Douglas, *Brief treatise upon constitutional and party questions* (reported by J. M. Cutts), pp. 86-92, and



123-124.—“The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was the beginning of the end. . . Throughout the North the conviction grew that Union and slavery could not exist much longer together. On the 4th of July, 1854, Garrison publicly burned a copy of the Constitution of the United States with the words, ‘The Union must be dissolved!’ He represented only an extreme sentiment. But the people at large began to calculate the value of this Union for which so many sacrifices had been made. Slavery became odious to many persons hitherto indifferent to the subject, on the ground that it persistently and selfishly placed the Union in peril.”—B. Tuckerman, *William Jay and the constitutional movement for the abolition of slavery*, ch. 7.—“No act more fateful in character ever passed the Congress of the United States, for it set in motion the train of political changes which led straight to the Civil War. It was the direct cause of a radical alteration of northern political feeling, of the total failure of the compromising or Union policy of 1850, and of the destruction of both the national parties. The suddenness of its introduction, the recklessness of its disturbance of the territorial situation, were such as to make an instant powerful impression; and the members of Congress who passed it realized, when the session finally ended in August, that they had begun a political revolution whose end no man could foresee.”—T. C. Smith, *Parties and slavery, 1850-1850*, pp. 107-108.

ALSO IN: M. Van Buren, *Inquiry into the origin and course of political parties*, ch. 8.—G. T. Curtis, *Life of James Buchanan*, ch. 9.—S. A. Douglas, *Popular sovereignty in the territories* (*Harper's Magazine*, Sept., 1850).—H. von Holst, *Constitutional and political history of the United States*, v. 4, ch. 6-8.—H. Greeley, *History of the struggle for slavery extension*, ch. 14.—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 1, ch. 5.—P. O. Ray, *Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act* (*Annual Report of American Historical Association*, 1914).—A. Johnson, *Stephen Arnold Douglas*, ch. 11-14.—P. O. Ray, *Repeal of the Missouri Compromise*, pp. 195-288.—F. H. Hodder, *Douglas and the Kansas-Nebraska Act* (*Wisconsin Historical Society Proceedings*, 1912).—*Congressional Globe*, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, p. 281.—*New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1854.

1853-1871.—Beginning of Arctic exploration.—Voyages of Kane, Peabody and Hall. See ARCTIC EXPLORATION: 1850-1883.

1854.—Nebraska created a territory.—Anti-slavery sentiment in Wisconsin. See NEBRASKA: 1854-1867; WISCONSIN: 1854.

1854.—Ostend Manifesto.—Black Warrior Affair in Cuba. See CUBA: 1845-1860; 1854.

1854-1855.—Solidification of anti-slavery sentiment in the North.—Birth of the new Republican party.—“Upon parties, the sudden anger which swept the north in 1854 produced revolutionary effects. At the opening of the year the Democratic party controlled the federal government and most of the state governments north and south, and was loyally supported in each section. . . That the Free Democratic [Free Soil] party should ever supplant it as the rival of the Democrats was beyond the bounds of probability, for the third party was weakened by its radicalism and discredited by its habit of coalitions in nearly every state for the sake of gaining office. All calculations based on previous experience were upset, however, by the craze of anger and excitement over the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The Whig party, paralyzed by differences between its northern and

southern wings, could reap no advantage from the blunder of the Pierce administration, for most of its northern members, turning in despair from the old organization as something stale and inadequate, welcomed the opportunity to unite with anti-slavery Democrats and Free-Soilers in order to administer a stunning rebuke to the party in power. The more radical anti-slavery men favored a sectional northern party formed to combat the south and the extension of slavery. Others desired not so much a new anti-southern as a new anti-democratic organization. It was an opportunity when a great leader, a man of the Clay or Webster stamp, was needed to assume control; or in default of such a personality, a group of men able to direct public action. No such leaders appeared, however, and the new forces worked themselves out at random in the several states, with the result that the political tornado which now blew the Whig party to fragments left chaos in its place. . . The region where the desire for a new anti-slavery organization proved strongest was the ‘Old Northwest.’ There Whiggery was less popular, for the party had been in a minority for years and the name had little of the social prestige which attached to it in the east and south. Consequently the opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska bill were able in these states to form a coalition in the summer of 1854. In Michigan a state mass convention at Jackson nominated, on July 6, a mixed ticket of Whigs, Democrats, and Free-Soilers, and adopted a new name, that of Republicans. Their resolutions, the first Republican party platform, placed the new body squarely on anti-slavery grounds by declaring slavery a ‘moral, social and political evil,’ denouncing the repeal of the Missouri Compromise as ‘an open and undisguised breach of faith,’ demanding the repeal of the Kansas-Nebraska act and the fugitive-slave law, and pledging the party to act under the name Republican ‘against the schemes of an aristocracy the most revolting and the most repressive the earth has ever witnessed.’ In Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana similar ‘people’s’ conventions met July 13, the anniversary of the Northwest Ordinance, brought about a union of anti-slavery elements, and organized for the fall campaign. Their enthusiasm, the vigor of their resolutions, and the promptness with which the Whig and Free Soil parties vanished in these states revealed the deep feeling aroused by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. In the two other western states the same result was attained by Whig and Free Soil fusion. In Iowa, the Free Democratic party withdrew its own ticket and indorsed Grimes, the Whig candidate for governor, who ran on an anti-Nebraska platform. In Illinois, an attempt to form an anti-Nebraska party proved abortive, since the movement fell into the hands of radical Free-Soilers, . . . yet the elements of opposition finally managed to unite on a state ticket. In congressional nominations . . . in nearly every district in the north the opponents of the administration . . . [united] upon a distinctly anti-Nebraska candidate. In this way there appeared the beginnings of a purely sectional northern party, whose controlling sentiment was indignation towards the south and a determination to oppose the extension of slavery by restoring the Missouri Compromise, or by some new means of effectual restriction. This movement, however, although the logical outcome of the crisis, failed in the eastern states owing to two obstacles. . . The conservative elements of the Whig party in the states east of Ohio refused to abandon their ranks. The Whig

state convention of Massachusetts, while declaring itself 'unalterably opposed to the extension of slavery over one foot of territory now free,' resolved 'that the Whig party of Massachusetts, ever true to liberty, the Constitution, and the Union, needs not to abandon its organization or change its principles.' . . . In two eastern states, New York and Vermont, the anti-Nebraska men adopted the Whig ticket; elsewhere they let it alone. The only eastern state where the Republican party as such was successfully formed was Maine, where a coalition of Free-Soilers and Temperance Democrats adopted the name. In Massachusetts a convention was called to form the party but it proved almost a fiasco. These hesitating movements of undecided Whigs were rendered unimportant by a totally unexpected political phenomenon which suddenly burst upon the scene. In the spring of 1854 it began to be rumored that a new secret political society was spreading everywhere, and by summer it was evident that this body, whose members affected ignorance of its name, principles, or officers, was going to play a strong part in the coming elections. The 'Order of the Star-Spangled Banner' had been in existence since 1850 as one of several societies opposed to the influence of foreigners and Catholics in politics. . . . Soon riots began between the Catholic Irish and the 'Know-Nothings,' as the members of the secret orders were commonly called, and the year 1854 was marked by tumults of alarming proportions in New York and other large cities. . . . Of course this movement had no connection with the Kansas Nebraska excitement; yet it was undeniably hostile to the party which contained within its ranks the Germans and Irish. Accordingly, when the wrath over the repeal of the Missouri Compromise spread like wildfire over the north, thousands of men who burned to rebuke the Pierce administration, but saw no hope in the conservative Whig organization, found this new, aggressively American order ready to receive them. . . . Other similar orders flourished, and by the end of the summer of 1854 the anti-Nebraska excitement was paralleled by a new and unexpected anti-foreign agitation. . . . When the elections came off, the results of the year of excitement became visible. In the north-west, where the opposition was united in an anti-Nebraska or Republican fusion, it carried every state except Illinois; but in the eastern states the confusion of parties almost defied description. Voters were confronted with three or even four tickets: Republican, anti-Nebraska, Peoples', Fusion, Know-Nothing, Free Soil, Whig, Democratic, 'Hard' and 'Soft' Democrat, anti-Maine Law or 'Rum' Democrat, and Temperance candidates. The Republican or Whig-Free-Soil-Temperance fusion carried Maine, Vermont, and, by a narrow margin, New York; but these successes were cast into the shadow by the astoundingly sudden rise of the Know-Nothings. This hitherto unknown party, with no public campaign at all, cast over one-quarter of the total vote in New York, more than two-fifths in Pennsylvania, and nearly two thirds in Massachusetts [see MASSACHUSETTS: 1854-1865], electing every state officer and nearly every member of the legislature. In other states great numbers of the candidates elected as Republicans or anti-Nebraska men were also Know-Nothings, and the effect of the rebuke to the Pierce administration was almost lost sight of in the general amazement over the rise of the new order."—T. C. Smith, *Parties and slavery, 1850-1850*, pp. 100-111, 116, 118-119.—"Long before November it was evi-

dent that the political revolution among the people of the North was thorough, and that the election day was anxiously awaited merely to record the popular verdict already decided. The influence of this result upon parties, old and new, is perhaps best illustrated in the organization of the Thirty-fourth Congress, chosen at these elections during the year 1854, which witnessed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. . . . The influence of politics during the interim [between the election of a new congress and its first meeting] needs always to be taken into account. In this particular instance this effect had, if anything, been slightly reactionary, and the great contest for the Speakership during the winter of 1855-6 may therefore be taken as a fair manifestation of the spirit of politics in 1854. The strength of the preceding House of Representatives, which met in December, 1853, had been: Whigs, 71; Free-soilers, 4; Democrats, 159—a clear Democratic majority of 84. In the new Congress there were in the House, as nearly as the classification could be made, about 108 anti-Nebraska members, nearly 40 Know-Nothings, and about 75 Democrats; the remaining members were undecided. The proud Democratic majority of the Pierce election was annihilated."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 1, ch. 20.

ALSO IN: W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 242-243.—J. D. Long, ed., *Republican party: Its history, etc.*—A. Holmes, *Parties and their principles*, pp. 274-278.—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 2, ch. 7.—H. Wilson, *Rise and fall of slave power in America*, v. 2, ch. 2.

1854-1856.—Beginning of the struggle for Kansas.—Free-state settlers against Missouri "border-ruffians." See KANSAS: 1854-1850.

1854-1859.—Southern opposition to prohibition of slavery. See SLAVERY: 1854-1859.

1854-1866.—Canadian Reciprocity Treaty and its abrogation. See TARIFF: 1854-1866; FISHERIES: 1854-1866.

1854-1867.—Troubles with Indians in north-west.—Treaty with Nez Percé Indians.—Troubles with Coeur d'Alenes. See IDAHO: 1834-1860; 1858-1867; WYOMING: 1851-1865.

1855.—Arbitration with England over fisheries question. See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1855.

1855-1856.—Proposed plan for a Pacific republic. See OREGON: 1855-1856.

1855-1856.—Long contest for speakership of the House.—Election of Speaker Banks, Republican.—J. R. Giddings's account.—"In the midst of . . . increasing [political] excitement, the ill-fated American party tore itself to pieces upon the unavoidable issue. The first proof of its fatal weakness appeared in a contest for the speakership of the House of Representatives, which delayed the conduct of all public business from the meeting of Congress in December, 1855, until the end of February, 1856. The regular administration Democrats numbered only seventy-five in place of the one hundred and fifty-nine who controlled the previous Congress, and their candidate was Richardson. The opposition, elected in the political whirlwind of 1854, was too heterogeneous to combine. The largest single group comprised about one hundred and seventeen Americans, leaving about forty 'straight' Republicans and a number of independents. But of the Know-Nothing plurality, only about forty could be held together in support of Fuller, of Pennsylvania, the avowedly American candidate. Nearly all the rest joined the

Republicans [in which the Free Soil party had begun to merge] in voting for Banks, of Massachusetts, who had just abandoned the Know-Nothing party for the Republican. For weeks, running into months, the tripartite struggle went on, in an irregular running debate, mainly on the Kansas issue, interrupted with ballotings for speaker."—T. C. Smith, *Parties and slavery, 1850-1859*, p. 145.—J. R. Giddings in his "History of the Rebellion," tells the story of the struggle as follows: "The President of the United States sent his annual message to the Senate on the 31st December. . . . Aware that this was intended to exert an influence against the Republicans, the author at once objected to receiving it, as it was an attempt to introduce a new practice—for up to that time no President had ever presumed to thrust his message upon an unorganized body—and that it could not constitutionally be received by members until a Speaker were elected. But a majority voted to receive it. The next attempt was to read it to the House; but it was again objected that it was not addressed to members in their disorganized condition, but was addressed to the Senate and House of Representatives, which had not then been organized. This objection was sustained, and although they had received the message, they refused to read it. The new year found the House unorganized, with the President's message lying upon the Clerk's desk unopened and unread. One ballot was taken. A motion was next made to take up and read the President's message; but, after debate, the motion was laid on the table. Members now began to make arrangements for continuing the contest indefinitely. . . . In many Republican districts the people met in public conventions and passed resolutions approving the action of their Representatives, made provisions for their members to draw on their local banks for such funds as they deemed necessary for defraying expenses at Washington. . . . Some State Legislatures made appropriations from their State funds. Soon as the republican party became consolidated, its members became more confident. Those of greatest experience assured their friends that as the President, officers of government, and the army and navy must go without pay until the House should be organized, the pressure would soon be so great upon the Democratic party that they would be compelled to submit to the election of a Republican Speaker. Some State Legislatures passed resolutions sustaining the action of their Representatives, declaring the issue involved to be the extension or non-extension of slavery."—J. R. Giddings, *History of the Rebellion*, ch. 26.—"January 12, 1856, the three candidates explained their views. Banks insisted that Congress had both the power and the duty to prohibit slavery in the territories; Fuller denied that either Congress or the territorial legislature had any power except to protect slavery; while Richardson stood on Douglas' ground that, whether Congress had the right to prohibit slavery or not, it rested with the territorial government to afford protection. Incessant attempts at coalition between Democrats and southern Know-Nothings, and between Republicans and all other anti-Nebraska men, were fruitless. The House in exhaustion voted to elect by a plurality, and Banks was chosen, February 2, by 103 votes to 100 for Aiken, of South Carolina. This victory ended a long period of suspense; the defeated southerners acquiesced in the result, and the House was finally ready for business."—T. C. Smith, *Parties and slavery, 1850-1859*, p. 146.

1855-1860.—Walker's filibustering in Nicaragua. See NICARAGUA: 1855-1860.

1856.—Disappearance of Know-Nothings as a political force.—Effect of struggle for Kansas.—In February, 1856, a few days after the election of Banks as speaker, "the Know-Nothing party, shattered as a congressional group, also broke into pieces as a political organization. February 18 a national council of the order met at Philadelphia, modified the party platform . . . and condemned the Pierce administration for reopening sectional agitation by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. No such attempt to befoe the issue could prevent a crisis when the nominating convention of the American party assembled four days later in the same place. The anti-slavery northern members refused to be bound by the platform just adopted by the order, and demanded that no candidates be nominated who were not in favor of interdicting slavery north of 36° 30' by congressional action. When this proviso was laid on the table, at once a score of members withdrew. . . . More members seceded [on the nomination of Fillmore] and joined the earlier bolters in a call for a national convention of all 'Americans opposed to the establishment of slavery in any of the territory which was covered by the Missouri Compromise,' at New York in June. . . . By the end of February, 1856, the results of the Kansas excitement were visible in the definite failure of the American party and the practical certainty that the Republican party would take its place in the north. The presidential election was to be contested by a northern sectional party, long dreaded by all conservatives; and the outcome must depend largely on the course of events in Kansas and the way in which Congress and the administration dealt with them. The situation was highly critical, increasing in tension with every week. When Congress was ready for action, the Kansas situation presented a threefold problem: the policy of the federal government towards the territory; the attitude which parties should take on the pressing question; and the effect of the controversy on the election of a president, vice-president, and congressmen. By this time Pierce had definitely committed himself. . . . [On] March 17, Douglas introduced a bill for the settlement of Kansas affairs in the form of an enabling act for the election of a constitutional convention, and advocated it in a powerful speech. . . . This bill and the speech . . . meant that Douglas and Pierce and their associates recognized the difficulties of the existing situation to the extent of being willing to provide an opportunity for the people of the territory to vote on the slavery problem. The anti-Nebraska opposition, however, was not ready to abandon the Kansas question to the Pierce administration, and met Douglas's plan by advocating the admission of Kansas under the Topeka constitution. When the application of the Topeka legislature was brought to Washington by Lane, the Free State leader, it was done in such a bungling manner as to enable the Democrats to handle the memorial without mercy; but the efficiency of the Republicans in debate was such as to put the administration on the defensive. Hale, Sumner, Seward, and Wade were now joined by Trumbull, of Illinois, Harlan, of Iowa, and Wilson, of Massachusetts, and they made a series of severe attacks upon the pro-slavery party in Kansas. . . . In the House the Kansas question took the form of a struggle for the seat of a congressional delegate, which was contested by Whitfield and Reeder;

and after a month of heated discussion the matter was shelved for a time by the appointment of a special committee to visit Kansas and report on the conduct of elections in the territory."—T. C. Smith, *Parties and slavery, 1850-1859*, pp. 146-149, 152-154.—"During the first months of 1856 the attention of the country was divided between the proceedings of Congress and occurrences in Kansas. All through the cotton States meetings were held to promote interest in a counter colonization movement. But the results were not commensurate with the agitation, as the South did not have the money to embark extensively upon the enterprise. Nevertheless, Colonel Buford . . . sold his slaves to provide money for . . . [a company of men to go to Kansas] and many other Southerners did likewise and contributed money raised from the sale of their jewelry, even women entering with zeal and sacrifice upon the undertaking. . . . While the South was strongly stirred by what it regarded as an attempt on the part of the North to steal from it a lawful opportunity to establish slavery in Kansas, the North, on its part, resented the effort put forth by the South to frustrate the crusade for the conquest of Kansas in the interest of freedom. As an effect of the organization of the Emigrant Aid Society of New England there had sprung up throughout the country 'Kansas Leagues,' organized to promote the purpose which that society was furthering. The next step . . . was an attempt to crystallize the feeling of the North as expressed in . . . numerous leagues. . . . The pro-slavery leaders, determined to arrest the flood of Northern emigration, laid an embargo on Missouri River, . . . steamers were searched, free State merchandise confiscated, and travellers for Kansas whose explanations were not deemed satisfactory were arrested and sent down the river. But the blockade of the Missouri would not stop all the avenues of approach—Iowa and Nebraska were available. . . . [The political conditions in Kansas were so grave as to constitute actual civil war throughout 1856 when the presidential election was impending. (See KANSAS: 1854-1859).] In those conditions are to be found the germs of the social conflict which was to constitute the grave problem of the Buchanan administration."—E. W. Sikes and W. M. Keener, *Growth of the nation, 1837-1860* (*History of North America*, v. 13, pp. 392-393, 400, 403).

ALSO IN: C. Sumner, *Works*, v. 4, pp. 125-342.

1856.—Refusal to sign the Declaration of Paris. See PARIS, DECLARATION OF.

1856.—Senator Sumner's speech on "The Crime against Kansas," and the assault upon him by Brooks of South Carolina.—"Almost simultaneously with the attack on Lawrence (see KANSAS: 1854-1859), an episode in Congress stirred popular feeling to the depths. On May 19 [during a debate on affairs in Kansas], Sumner delivered a speech in the Senate which, in the tension of the time, fairly drove southern members to fury. It was entitled 'The Crime against Kansas,' and very nearly merited the name he attached to it—'the most thorough philippic ever uttered in a legislative body.' Sumner was a high-minded philanthropist, utterly incapable of understanding an opponent, and to him the attempt to make Kansas a slave state was something inconceivably repulsive. On this occasion he freed his mind with almost hyperbolic language in a speech as offensive and insulting to the south as the fertile imagination of the author could possibly make it. Mixed in were personalities as contemptuous

and sneering as could be uttered in the Senate, aimed at Douglas and especially at Butler, of South Carolina, who had made a savage attack on Sumner two years before, which had not been forgotten. Douglas rose on the spot and repaid Sumner's attack with vituperation of equal bitterness and scorn; but southern leaders, when insulted, felt that they needed a different sort of satisfaction, for in their eye Sumner had put himself so far below the plane of decency as to be worthy only of such chastisement as one would give to a dog or an impudent slave."—T. C. Smith, *Parties and slavery, 1850-1859*, pp. 156-157.—"Two days after this exciting debate (May 22d) when the Senate at the close of a short session adjourned, Sumner remained in the Chamber, occupied in writing letters. Becoming deeply engaged, he drew his arm-chair close to his desk, bent over his writing, and while in this position was approached by Brooks, a representative from South Carolina and a kinsman of Senator Butler. Brooks, standing before and directly over him, said: 'I have read your speech twice over carefully. It is a libel on South Carolina and Mr. Butler, who is a relative of mine.' As he pronounced the last word, he hit Sumner on the head with his cane with the force that a dragoon would give to a sabre-blow. Sumner was more than six feet in height and of powerful frame, but pinned under the desk he could offer no resistance, and Brooks continued the blows on his defenceless head. The cane broke, but the South Carolinian went on beating his victim with the butt. The first blows stunned and blinded Sumner, but instinctively and with powerful effort he wrenched the desk from its fastenings, stood up, and with spasmodic and wildly directed efforts attempted unavailingly to protect himself. Brooks took hold of him, and, while he was reeling and staggering about, struck him again and again. The assailant did not desist until his arm was seized by one who rushed to the spot to stop the assault. . . . The injury received by Sumner was much more severe than was at first thought by his physicians and friends. . . . [He] was not able to enter regularly again on his senatorial career until December, 1859. . . . The different manner in which the North and the South regarded this deed is one of the many evidences of the deep gulf between these two people caused by slavery. . . . When Brooks returned to South Carolina he received an enthusiastic welcome. He was honored as a glorious son of the Palmetto State, and making him the present of a cane was a favorite testimonial. . . . At the North the assault of Brooks was considered brutal and cowardly; at the South, his name was never mentioned without calling him gallant or courageous, spirited or noble. . . . A committee was appointed by the House which took a large amount of evidence, and the majority reported a resolution in favor of the expulsion of Brooks. On this resolution, the vote was 121 to 95; but as it required two thirds, it was not carried. Only three Southern representatives publicly condemned the assault; only one voted to expel Brooks. After the decision by the House, Brooks made a speech, which he ended by resigning his place as representative. His district re-elected him almost unanimously; there were only six votes against him."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 2, ch. 7.

1856.—Granting of passports started. See STATE, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES: 1790-1009.

1856.—Eighteenth presidential election.—Buchanan made president.—"The presidential cam-

paign of . . . 1856, showed a striking disintegration and re-formation of political groups. Nominally there were four parties in the field: Democrats, Whigs, Native Americans or Know-Nothings, and Republicans. The Know-Nothings . . . were of little account as a national organization, for they stood upon an issue hopelessly insignificant in comparison with slavery. Already many had gone over to the Republican camp; those who remained nominated as their candidates Millard Fillmore and Andrew J. Donelson. The Whigs were the feeble remnant of a really dead party, held together by affection for the old name; too few to do anything by themselves, they took by adoption the Know-Nothing candidates. The Republican party, . . . differing on other matters, united upon the one doctrine, which they accepted as a test: opposition to the extension of slavery. They nominated John C. Fremont and William L. Dayton, and made a platform whereby they declared it to be 'both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery.' . . . In this Convention 110 votes were cast for Lincoln for the second place on the ticket. . . . In the Democratic party there were two factions. The favorite candidate of the South was Franklin Pierce, for reelection, with Stephen A. Douglas as a substitute or second choice; the North more generally preferred James Buchanan, who was understood to be displeased with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The struggle was sharp, but was won by the friends of Buchanan, with whom John C. Breckenridge was coupled. The campaign was eager, for the Republicans soon developed a strength beyond what had been expected and which put the Democrats to their best exertions. The result was: popular vote, Democrats [Buchanan] 1,838,169, Republicans [Fremont] 1,341,264, Know-Nothings and Whigs [Fillmore] 874,534; electoral vote, Democrats 174, Republicans 114, Know-Nothings and Whigs, 8. Thus James Buchanan became President of the United States, March 4, 1857. . . . Yet, while the Democrats triumphed, the Republicans enjoyed the presage of the future; they had polled a total number of votes which surprised every one; on the other hand, the Democrats had lost ten States which they had carried in 1852 and had gained only two others, showing a net loss of eight States; and their electoral votes had dwindled from 254 to 174."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 1, ch. 4.—"The result was a victory for the conservatives, or 'reactionaries,' as we should perhaps say. The solid South voted for Buchanan; and Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and California were found in the same column. Fremont received the support of a solid East and all the Northwest except the states just mentioned. The fear of radicalism and the distrust of men of great wealth everywhere had defeated the young Republicans."—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 246-247.

ALSO IN: W. F. Johnson, *History of the Republican party*.—F. Curtis, *Republican party*, v. 1, p. 234 ff.

1856-1859.—Dissention in Oregon due to delay in passing Statehood Bill.—Slavery issue. See OREGON: 1856-1859.

1856-1859.—Continued struggle in Kansas.—Topeka vs. Lecompton constitution. See KANSAS: 1854-1859.

1857.—Dred Scott Decision.—"The next contribution to the history of the struggle for Kansas was to come from an entirely new quarter. The

new President indicated, in his inaugural, whence it was to come, if not what it was to be. He said: 'A difference of opinion has arisen in regard to the point of time when the people of a Territory shall decide this question'—the question of slavery—"for themselves. This is, happily, a matter of but little practical importance. Besides it is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled.' The President referred to the Dred Scott case, which had been twice argued before the Supreme Court, and decision upon which, it was understood, would be published to the world in a few days. . . . There were, indeed, two Dred Scott cases, one in the courts of Missouri, and one in the United States courts, but they had no connection with each other. . . . The facts in the two cases were, however, the same. One Dr. Emerson, the owner of Dred Scott, had taken Dred [in 1834] as his slave, into Illinois, a Commonwealth in which slavery was forbidden, and then into the Louisiana territory above the latitude thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, where slavery was prohibited by the Congressional Act of 1820; had allowed Dred [in 1836] to marry in the free territory; had purchased the woman he married; . . . and had taken . . . him back to Missouri, with his wife and a child born to them on free territory, and held them as slaves in Missouri. Dr. Emerson's return to Missouri was in 1838. In 1844 the Doctor died, leaving Dred and his wife and child to Mrs. Emerson. According to the statement of facts recited by the Chief Justice of the United States, Dr. Emerson sold Dred and his family to a Mr. Sandford, a citizen of New York, the defendant in the case before the Supreme Court. . . . [The] first suit was brought in one of the inferior courts of Missouri, and was decided in Dred's favor. Mrs. Emerson appealed the case to the supreme court of Missouri, and two of the three judges upon that bench held that the condition of slavery reattached to the negro upon his being brought back into Missouri, and reversed the decision of the lower court. While the case in the Missouri courts was in progress Mrs. Emerson made over the control of the Scotts to . . . Mr. Sandford, . . . who hired them out to residents of Missouri. It was then, and for this reason, that Dred appealed to Roswell M. Field for his powerful aid in bringing [a] suit against Sandford in the Courts of the United States . . . [which] was begun before the case in the Missouri court was concluded. . . . The court ordered the jury to find for the defendant [and] judgment was rendered in his favor in the month of April, 1854. Mr. Field then carried the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, upon a writ of error, and secured the services of . . . Montgomery Blair, for the negro. Mr. Blair undertook the management of the case at Washington, and, like Mr. Field, gave his time and labor without pecuniary reward. The court costs incurred by Dred in both cases were paid by Taylor Blow, son of the man who sold Dred to Doctor Emerson. . . . The case was argued twice with great learning before the Supreme Court, and the decision finally reached was virtually acquiesced in by seven of the nine Justices. [Each member of the court read a decision], although Justice Nelson did not give his assent to any part of the opinion except that which decided that, on the return of Dred to Missouri with his master, any effect upon his slavery, which the taking of

him into . . . [free territory] might have had, disappeared. This seemed to Justice Nelson sufficient to the decision of the case, and he was unwilling to go farther, but some of his brethren, especially Justice Wayne, thought that the entire record of the case in the Circuit Court was brought up for examination by the Supreme Court, and that the Supreme Court ought to decide every point contained in the record."—J. W. Burgess, *Middle period, 1817-1858*, pp. 447-448, 450-452.—The arguments and the sentiments in the opinion given by Judge Taney, which gave most offense to the conscience and the reason of the country were the following: "The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution. It will be observed, that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves. The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United States. . . . The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them. It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-making power. . . . In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. . . . The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the per-

sonal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, . . . who had then or should afterwards be made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of the United States, and endue him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent? . . . The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts. It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other. . . . It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted. And in order to do this, we must recur to the Governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies, when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of independent nations. We must inquire who, at that time, were recognised as the people or citizens of a State, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English Government; and who declared their independence, and assumed the powers of Government to defend their rights by force of arms. In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. . . . They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race." Finally, having, with great elaboration, decided the question of citizenship adversely to Dred Scott and all his kind, the court proceeded to obliterate the anti-slavery provision of the Missouri Compromise, which constituted one of the grounds on which Dred Scott claimed his freedom. "It is the opinion of the court," wrote Chief Justice Taney, "that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident. We have so far examined the case, as it

stands under the Constitution of the United States, and the powers thereby delegated to the Federal Government. But there is another point in the case which depends on State power and State law. And it is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that he is made free by being taken to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, independently of his residence in the territory of the United States; and being so made free, he was not again reduced to a state of slavery by being brought back to Missouri. Our notice of this part of the case will be very brief; for the principle on which it depends was decided in this court, upon much consideration, in the case of Strader et al. v. Graham, reported in 10th Howard, 82. In that case, the slaves had been taken from Kentucky to Ohio, with the consent of the owner, and afterwards brought back to Kentucky. And this court held that their status or condition, as free or slave, depended upon the laws of Kentucky, when they were brought back into that State, and not of Ohio; and that this court had no jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a State court upon its own laws. This was the point directly before the court, and the decision that this court had no jurisdiction turned upon it, as will be seen by the report of the case. So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into the State of Illinois by his owner, and was there held as such, and brought back in that character, his status, as free or slave, depended on the laws of Missouri, and not of Illinois. . . . Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court, that it appears by the record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it. Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a mandate issued, directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction."—*Report of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Dred Scott vs. John F. A. Sandford (Howard's Reports, v. 19).*—"It was not many weeks before it became entirely manifest that the cause of slavery had lost immensely by the decision, and the cause of free-soilism had gained in the same degree. Justice Curtis had demonstrated that the decision had cast the responsibility for the further extension of slavery upon the nation, and the nation now began to show its resolution to meet its responsibility by acquitting itself of any participation in this great wrong, in the only manner now left to it, that is, by preventing it. The nation could no longer deceive itself with the idea that it could stand neutral. The Court had actually swept away the dogma of 'popular sovereignty' in the Territories. The nation must now neither prohibit, nor allow the Territorial governments to prohibit, slavery within the Territories, as the decision would have it, or the nation must itself prohibit it, as the dissenting opinion would have it. When these alternatives were distinctly recognized as necessary and exhaustive, it did not take the nation long to decide which course it must pursue."—J. W. Burgess, *Middle period, 1817-1858*, pp. 458-459.

ALSO IN: J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 497-499.—H. Wilson, *Rise and fall of the slave power in America*, v. 2, ch. 39.—S. Tyler, *Memoirs of Roger B. Taney*, ch. 4-5.—A. Johnston, *United States: Its history and constitution*, sect. 249.—Goldwin Smith, *United States*, p.

235.—W. A. Larned, *Negro citizenship (New Englander, Aug., 1857)*.

1857.—Tariff reduction in Walker Bill.—Financial collapse. See TARIFF: 1846-1861.

1857-1859.—Mormon rebellion in Utah.—Mt. Meadow massacre. See UTAH: 1857-1859.

1858.—Treaty with China. See CHINA: 1857-1868.

1858.—Minnesota admitted to the Union.—Early government. See MINNESOTA: 1856-1862.

1858.—Treaty with Japan signed at Kanagawa. See JAPAN: 1857-1862.

1858.—Lincoln-Douglas debate in Illinois.—Lincoln's estimate of Dred Scott decision.—"Early in 1858 the worst of the panic was over, the Lecompton scheme was defeated [see KANSAS: 1854-1859], and there was a breathing space in which the politicians had time to think of the presidential election of 1860. To the shrewdest man it seemed that fortune favored Douglas. Much of the enthusiasm of 1856 had subsided. The Kansas-Nebraska law did not seem quite so bad now that it was evident that popular sovereignty did not mean the establishment of slavery in a territory. Douglas's opposition to the Lecompton constitution had brought him the goodwill of many of the conservative republicans, . . . and it was even whispered in some quarters that Northern democrats and republicans might unite to make him president. . . . Two years of peace, it was believed, would go far to remove the sectional strife, and if Douglas could be supported in 1860 by the South, the Northern democrats and the conservative republicans, what might he not expect to do? . . . We are now to see how his prospects were blighted by Abraham Lincoln. Douglas's term in the senate expired in 1859, and his party in state convention nominated him to succeed himself."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 499-500.—To oppose Douglas, the Republican state convention chose Abraham Lincoln, who had come to the front during the Kansas discussions. "There was of course no surprise in this for Mr. Lincoln. He had been all along led to expect it, and with that in view had been earnestly and quietly at work preparing a speech in acknowledgment of the honor about to be conferred on him. . . . Before delivering his speech he invited a dozen or so of his friends over to the library of the State House, where he read and submitted it to them. After the reading he asked each man for his opinion. Some condemned and not one endorsed it. . . . Each man attacked it in his criticism. I was the last to respond. Although the doctrine announced was rather rank, yet it suited my views, and I said, 'Lincoln, deliver that speech as read and it will make you President.' At the time I hardly realized the force of my prophecy. Having patiently listened to these various criticisms from his friends . . . he answered all their objections substantially as follows: 'Friends, this thing has been retarded long enough. The time has come when these sentiments should be uttered; and if it is decreed that I should go down because of this speech, then let me go down linked to the truth—let me die in the advocacy of what is just and right.' The next day, the 17th, the speech was delivered just as we had heard it read. [The part of this famous speech which made the most profound impression and gave rise to the most discussion was contained in the following sentences: 'If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do, and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated

with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South. Have we no tendency to the latter condition? Let any one who doubts carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination—piece of machinery, so to speak—compounded of the Nebraska doctrine and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider not only what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted; but also let him study the history of its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather fail, if he can, to trace the evidences of design and concert of action among its chief architects, from the beginning.] . . . Lincoln had now created in reality a more profound impression than he or his friends anticipated. Many Republicans deprecated the advanced ground he had taken, the more so as the Democrats rejoiced that it afforded them an issue clear and well-defined. Numbers of his friends distant from Springfield, on reading his speech, wrote him censorious letters; and one well-informed co-worker predicted his defeat, charging it to the first ten lines of the speech. These complaints, coming apparently from every quarter, Lincoln bore with great patience. To one complainant who followed him into his office he said proudly, 'If I had to draw a pen across my record, and erase my whole life from sight, and I had one poor gift or choice left as to what I should save from the wreck, I should choose that speech and leave it to the world unerasable.' Meanwhile Douglas had returned from Washington to his home in Chicago . . . [where at a public reception on July 9] he delivered from the balcony of the Tremont House a speech intended as an answer to the one made by Lincoln in Springfield. Lincoln was present at this reception, but took no part in it. The next day, however, he replied. . . . Leaving Chicago, Douglas passed on down to Bloomington and Springfield, where he spoke on the 16th and 17th of July respectively. On the evening of the latter day Lincoln responded again in a most effective and convincing effort. The contest now took on a different phase. Lincoln's Republican friends urged him to draw Douglas into a joint debate, and he accordingly sent him a challenge on the 24th of July. . . . On the 30th Douglas finally accepted the proposition to 'divide time, and address the same audiences,' naming seven different places, one in each Congressional district, outside of Chicago and Springfield, for joint meetings. The places and dates were, Ottawa, August 21; Freeport, August 27; Jonesboro, September 15; Charleston, September 18; Galesburg, October 7; Quincy, October 13; and Alton, October 15."—W. H. Herndon and J. W. Weik, *Lincoln, the true story of a great life*, v. 2, ch. 13.—At Freeport Lincoln asked: "Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the

wishes of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a state constitution?" If Douglas answered No, he would deny his pet doctrine of popular sovereignty; if he answered Yes, he would antagonize the dominant politicians of the South, led by Jefferson Davis, who maintained that the only power that could deal with slavery was the municipal law of a state, and furthermore he would set the local authority of the territory above the Supreme Court which had declared slavery legal in all the territories of the United States by the Dred Scott decision. Douglas answered the question in the affirmative and tried to wriggle out of the trap by declaring that although slavery might be 'legal' in a territory, it could not actually exist for a day or an hour where the people enacted legislation 'unfriendly' to it. That was the famous 'Freeport Doctrine.'"—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 510-511.—See also FREEPORT DOCTRINE.—"During the canvass Mr. Lincoln, in addition to the seven meetings with Douglas, filled thirty-one appointments made by the State Central Committee, besides speaking at many other times and places not previously advertised. . . . The election took place on the second of November, and while Lincoln received of the popular vote a majority of over 4,000, yet the returns from the legislative districts foreshadowed his defeat. In fact, when the Senatorial election took place in the Legislature, Douglas received 54 and Lincoln 46 votes—one of the results of the lamentable apportionment law then in operation."—W. H. Herndon and J. W. Weik, *Lincoln, the true story of a great life*, v. 2, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: T. C. Smith, *Parties and slavery*, ch. 14-17.—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 1, ch. 5.—A. Rothschild, *Lincoln, master of men*, ch. 3.—C. E. Merriam, *American political theories*, ch. 6.—C. Robinson, *Kansas conflict*, ch. 14-17.—H. M. Flint, *Life of Stephen A. Douglas*, pp. 105-114.—I. M. Tarbell, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, v. 1, pp. 307-318.—J. F. Hume, *Abolitionists*, pp. 98 ff.—H. Villard, *Memoirs*, v. 1, pp. 96-97.

1858.—Seward's speech on the "irrepressible conflict." See IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT.

1858-1885.—Origin and early work of Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations. See YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1858-1885; YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1858-1866.

1859.—Admission of Oregon into the Union, with a constitution excluding free colored people.—Lane and Givin conspiracy. See OREGON: 1856-1859; 1859-1861.

1859.—John Brown's attack on slavery in Virginia.—Tragedy at Harper's Ferry.—A repercussion of the conflict in Kansas was heard from Virginia when "on the 17th of October, 1859, this country was bewildered and astounded while the fifteen Slave States were convulsed with fear, rage, and hate, by telegraphic dispatches from Baltimore and Washington, announcing the outbreak, at Harper's Ferry, of a conspiracy of Abolitionists and negroes, having for its object the devastation and ruin of the South, and the massacre of her white inhabitants. . . . As time wore on, further advices, with particulars and circumstances, left no room to doubt the substantial truth of the original report. An attempt had actually been made to excite a slave insurrection in Northern Virginia, and the one man in America to whom such an enterprise would not seem utter insanity and suicide, was at the head of it. [This was John Brown, of Osawatomie, who had been fight-







Maps prepared specially for the NEW LARNED under direction of the editors and publishers.

ing slavery and the border ruffians in Kansas (see Kansas: 1854-1859) for five years, and had now changed his field.]—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 1, ch. 20.—“Brown himself states that he became an abolitionist during the War of 1812, through witnessing the maltreatment of a colored boy, a slave. It is not surprising, with his intensity of character, that as early as 1839 he had decided upon some such course as was taken in 1859. He seems to have kept this steadily in view and to have looked upon his whole family as instruments in the cause. . . . [He was very active in the struggle for Kansas, for which he was supplied with arms.] May 8, 1858, found Brown (known for some time for safety as Shubel Morgan) at Chatham, Canada, with eleven young white associates and one colored man whom he attached to himself and who had been with him in Kansas and elsewhere. At Chatham, by these men and thirty-four colored persons, was adopted an extraordinary ‘Provisional Constitution and Ordinance for the people of the United States,’ which was written in January, 1858, at the house of Frederick Douglass, in Rochester, a paper in itself a witness of the abnormality of the mind of the author. . . . Suspicions of Brown’s intentions reached Senator Henry Wilson from Forbes [an English adventurer]. . . . A letter to Dr. Howe from Wilson caused the committee, of which Stearns was chairman, to write Brown, May 14, 1858, not to use the arms furnished him for any other purpose than the defence of Kansas. . . . May 31 found Brown back in Boston in consultation with Smith, Stearns, Howe, Parker, Higginson, and Sanborn. Here, notwithstanding the danger of publicity, Higginson protested against delay, regarding ‘any postponement as simply abandoning the project.’ But all the others of the committee were against him, Sanborn writing him, May 18: ‘Wilson, as well as Hale and Seward, and God knows how many more, have heard about the plot from Forbes. To go on in the face of this is mere madness.’ . . . Brown wandered in many places until July, 1859, when he appeared in the rough, semi-mountainous country of the upper Potomac, immediately on the highway, and six miles north from Harper’s ferry, where he rented for a year a small place known as the Kennedy farm, on which were two houses. Thither he transported by degrees all his arms and gathered together his twenty-one followers (five of whom were colored). . . . Except John Brown and his son, Owen, they ranged in age from eighteen to twenty-eight. Only five of the whites were over twenty-four years of age; one was not yet nineteen; three were Brown’s sons. Brown’s pretence of looking for a better climate and for a location for raising sheep, imposed upon the unsophisticated neighbors, and no suspicions seem to have been roused by the presence and the going to and fro in this secluded district of a number of strangers, who wandered freely over the mountains of the vicinity. . . . An anonymous letter dated at Cincinnati, August 20, 1859, to the secretary of war, gave full information of the intended movement, but received no attention. It indicated so clearly Brown’s movements that it was evident later that it had been written by one thoroughly informed. . . . Sunday, October 16, the party was assembled in an all-day council at the Kennedy farm, the ‘constitution’ was read for the benefit of four newcomers, commissions for newly made officers made out, and orders given detailing the movement, which Brown had decided should be that evening. . . . The invading procession left the Kennedy farm at eight o’clock.

Brown, with his wagon and party, having captured the bridge watchman, went on to the armory [at Harper’s Ferry, where from 100,000 to 200,000 stands of arms were usually stored], forced the door, and seized the watchman. The several stations assigned were occupied by eleven o’clock. A shot fired at a relief bridge watchman gave the alarm. The stoppage of an eastward-bound train at midnight at first suggested to the passengers a strike among the arsenal workmen; at daylight it was allowed to proceed. . . . Brown himself seeing the conductor across the bridge, as he ‘had no intention of interfering with the comfort of passengers or hindering the United States mails.’ With daylight, October 17, came a four-horse wagon-load of Colonel Washington’s slaves. Washington himself . . . [who] had been ordered to give in charge to Anderson (a colored man) the historic sword, and a pair of pistols from Lafayette . . . was brought in his own carriage to the armory, where he was kept as a prisoner, as were several other neighboring slave-owners. The Washington wagon and fourteen slaves were sent to the Kennedy farm to assist in removing the arms to the Virginia school-house. . . . The countryside being now aroused, men with arms of all sorts poured into the village. Militia began to arrive from all the neighboring and some of the more distant towns, and desultory fighting began with a number of casualties on either side. At nightfall Brown held the engine-house with four men and ten prisoners, his son Oliver dead and another son, Watson, dying. Six others were dead, three wounded, and one a prisoner. At eleven in the evening a company of United States marines arrived from Washington, accompanied by Colonel Robert E. Lee, of General Scott’s staff, who took over the command. At seven the next morning (Tuesday, October 18) Lieutenant J. E. B. Stuart was sent by Lee, under a flag of truce, to demand an unconditional surrender. . . . The failure to obtain a surrender was followed by an assault by the marines, in which the door was battered in, with the loss of one man. Brown received a bayonet wound and several severe sword-cuts in the mêlée. Owen Brown and six others escaped. After Brown was brought out he revived and talked earnestly in response to various questions. His conversation bore the impression of the conviction that whatever he had done to free slaves was right, and that in the warfare in which he was engaged he was entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. Brown’s prisoners all testified to their lenient treatment, and Colonel Washington spoke of him as a man of extraordinary coolness and nerve. Brown and the other prisoners, to whom were added two captured later, were transferred to the county jail at Charlestown. . . . Brown’s trial began October 25, two Virginia lawyers, Lawson Botts and C. J. Faulkner, being assigned to his defence. These gentlemen were replaced later by S. Chilton, of Washington; H. Griswold, of Cleveland, Ohio, and a young Boston lawyer, G. E. Hoyt. The indictment was, first, for conspiring with negroes to produce insurrection; second, for treason to the commonwealth of Virginia; and third, for murder. October 31 he was found guilty, and was hanged December 2. All of the other prisoners in turn suffered the same punishment. Brown’s conduct throughout his imprisonment and trial was of great dignity and reserve, and commanded respect and sympathy. He appeared in court wounded and ill and in a cot. . . . Governor Wise himself gave high praise to Brown. Thousands of letters poured

in upon him urging Brown's pardon. Many threatened; others deemed the execution ill-advised. Wise's message to the legislature, written after Brown's death, gave good reasons for not taking such advice. . . . The South, under the circumstances, was much calmer than might have been expected. This was due in part, no doubt, to a reassurance because the blacks failed to rise, and showed evident loyalty to their masters. Their attitude justified much of what the South had so long upheld as to the contentment of the slaves; and this, with a removal of much of the fear which had hung over the section since Nat Turner's insurrection in 1831, nurtured a satisfaction which did much to offset the indignation which was poured out abundantly upon Brown's northern abettors and upon the many who proclaimed him a martyr. Motions in both houses of the Massachusetts legislature to adjourn on the day of Brown's execution, though lost, . . . rankled in the southern mind, as did also meetings in many parts of the North prompted by ill-advised fanaticism. The strength and extent of this spirit was illustrated by Theodore Parker's belief that 'No American has died in this century whose change of earthly immortality is worth half so much as John Brown's.' Parker was also one who could say, 'I should like of all things to see an insurrection of slaves. It must be tried many times before it succeeds, as at last it must,' an expression which was the outcome of his own full knowledge as to what was brewing. Of this the others of the Boston secret committee, Parker, Stearns, Higginson, Howe, and Sanborn, as already shown on the authority of the last, also had full information, as had Gerrit Smith, with the exception, perhaps, of the exact place at which Brown was to strike. Brown's funds were supplied by these men."—F. E. Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War, 1859-1861*, pp. 69, 74-75, 77-85.

1860.—Slavery concentrated in the South.—Concentration of slavery in the South had been gradual. "After the . . . War [of Independence], commerce generally was controlled by the states, all of which but those in the far south forbade the slave trade. There were vast unsettled regions in the Carolinas and Georgia, and it was thought they must have negroes to develop them. But . . . by 1798 each of these states had forbidden further importations. The constitution . . . declared that congress could not prohibit the trade before 1808. Meanwhile, a movement for emancipation had swept over the entire North. In this section were few slaves, and the opponents of the institution needed only to organize the non-slaveholders, . . . to carry laws for emancipation. Vermont led the way in 1777 by declaring slavery illegal . . . and New Hampshire did the same in . . . 1784. In each state the few slaveholders could only convert their slaves into servants for wages or sell them out of reach of the state's jurisdiction. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 declared that 'all men are born free and equal.' . . . In others the cause of freedom encountered greater opposition, but its advocates had recourse to the legislatures. Their request for emancipation by state statutes was met with argument that to free the slaves was to confiscate property. After struggles of varying length, they carried each Northern state but one for gradual emancipation. . . . The first victory of this kind was in Pennsylvania . . . in 1780. Connecticut and Rhode Island followed in 1784, New York in 1790, and New Jersey in 1804. . . . [In] New York . . . in 1817 . . . a law was carried for complete emancipation after 1827. Delaware alone of the Northern states retained slavery, and here

it was safe until the end of the civil war. The movement for freedom was felt south of the Mason and Dixon line and was strong in Virginia, where Jefferson, Washington, and many leading men wished to rid the state of an unprofitable form of labor and of the presence of an alien and undeveloped element of the population. But here was encountered a more serious obstacle than had yet appeared. The small proportion of blacks in the North involved no menace to the civilization there, were they slave or free. But the people of Virginia knew not what to do with a great mass of freed blacks. To leave them masters of their own actions in the white population seemed to invite trouble, and to send them to Africa, which many thought the only proper accompaniment of emancipation, was so expensive that it was out of the question. . . . At this time [1796] the invention of the cotton gin had begun to have its effect on slavery, making a great demand for slaves in the states to the southward. . . . Thus the seaboard states settled down to a free and a slave section. . . . West of the mountains . . . by the Northwest Ordinance the Ohio divided slavery from freedom between the Mississippi and the Alleghenies. Then came the Missouri Compromise line for the Louisiana purchase; but eventually the matter no longer admitted of compromise."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 350-351.—"The effect of this 'three-fifths' clause was greatly to weaken instead of strengthening the political power of the States in which Slavery existed. For very soon, the number of slaves in the Southern States was considerably increased by accessions from the Northern States. The acts of these Northern States . . . abolishing the Institution within their limits, were generally prospective in their character. Under the operation of these acts, humane as they were, the slaves in these States were to some extent, to what is not and never will be exactly known, brought South, and sold before the period fixed for their final emancipation. Less than half, it is believed by some, in point of fact, ever became free under these acts. . . . This is the way in which many of them, at least, found a resting-place in the more Southern States."—A. H. Stephens, *Constitutional view of the late war between the states*, v. 2, p. 102.—"During the period from 1815 to 1860 slavery concentrated itself in the South. . . . In the Middle States there were . . . 1816 in 1860. Of the latter number 1798 were in Delaware. Much was said about the cruelty of masters towards slaves. It is hard to separate this question from the feeling engendered by the bitter discussion of . . . parties. Slavery is always a hard institution, and the negro, being . . . submissive by nature, invited severe treatment to induce him to labor hard and refrain from evil conduct. Whipping was used freely, because the masters felt it was the punishment most effective with him. Some masters were benevolent, some were severe and careless of the interests of their slaves, but the typical master considered his slave from the standpoint of efficiency, and fed and clothed him, restrained him from the enervating vices, cared for him in sickness, and afforded him religious instruction with the object of making him a sound, moral, and docile laborer. He did not promote his intellectual development or his sense of self-dependence, since such a course would have made the slave wish for freedom. The iron law of slavery was that nothing should be afforded the slave which would weaken the hold of slavery as an institution. The antislavery agitation in the North, by arousing the feeling of the masters, led them to revise the slave codes, and

laws now appeared on Southern statute books forbidding slaves to be taught to read and write, prohibiting their assemblage without the presence of a white man, establishing patrols to keep them from traveling the roads without written permission, and restricting them in many other ways. The first three decades of the century constitute the mildest stage of American slavery. At that time the negro had made a real advance in rudimentary civilization over African barbarism, and the harsher reaction of 1830-1860 had not begun. During this intermediate period there were indications that an ameliorating process had begun. The best Southern opinion openly regretted slavery, manumission was encouraged in the press and on the platform, negroes were taught to read the Bible, and a superior class was forming within the race. In most of the Southern states we hear of negro ministers who preached to congregations of whites and blacks, and in one state at least—North Carolina—was a negro schoolmaster who fitted for the university the sons of the leading white people. Whatever hope was in this softening of slavery into a milder form of service was destroyed by the resentment of the whites against Northern interference. There had always been in the South men who believed a rigid regimen of slaves was necessary, but they were overruled by the more benevolent element. Utilizing the popular resentment against the agitation, they now became the majority, overrode the minds of the rising generation that by 1860 there remained hardly anything of the gentler measures but the fact that slaves were members of the white churches and listened to sermons by white ministers.”—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 460-471.

1860.—Pony Express started to open communications between the West and East. See PONY EXPRESS.

1860.—Eighth census.—The total population was 31,443,322, being an increase exceeding 35½ per cent. over the population of 1850, classified and distributed as follows:

North

	White.	Free black.	Slave.
California .....	361,353	4,086	....
Colorado .....	34,231	46	....
Connecticut .....	451,520	8,627	....
Dakota .....	2,576	....	....
Illinois .....	1,704,323	7,628	....
Indiana .....	1,339,000	11,428	....
Iowa .....	673,844	1,069	....
Kansas .....	106,579	625	2
Maine .....	626,952	1,327	....
Massachusetts .....	1,221,464	9,602	....
Michigan .....	742,314	6,799	....
Minnesota .....	171,864	259	....
Nebraska .....	28,759	67	15
Nevada .....	6,812	45	....
New Hampshire .....	325,579	494	....
New Jersey .....	646,699	25,318	18
New York .....	3,831,730	49,005	....
Ohio .....	2,302,838	36,673	....
Oregon .....	52,337	128	....
Pennsylvania .....	2,840,266	56,840	....
Rhode Island .....	170,668	3,952	....
Utah .....	40,214	30	29
Vermont .....	314,389	709	....
Washington .....	11,138	30	....
Wisconsin .....	774,710	1,171	....
	<u>18,791,159</u>	<u>225,967</u>	<u>64</u>

South

	White.	Free black.	Slave.
Alabama .....	526,431	2,690	435,080
Arkansas .....	324,191	144	111,115
Delaware .....	90,589	19,829	1,798
District of Columbia	60,764	11,131	3,185
Florida .....	77,748	932	61,745
Georgia .....	591,588	3,500	462,198
Kentucky .....	919,517	10,684	225,483
Louisiana .....	357,629	18,647	331,726
Maryland .....	515,918	83,942	87,189
Mississippi .....	353,901	773	436,631
Missouri .....	1,063,509	3,572	114,931
New Mexico .....	82,924	85	....
North Carolina .....	631,100	30,463	331,059
South Carolina .....	291,388	9,014	402,406
Tennessee .....	826,782	7,300	275,719
Texas .....	421,294	355	182,566
Virginia .....	1,047,411	58,042	490,865
	<u>8,182,684</u>	<u>262,003</u>	<u>3,953,696</u>

Immigration in the preceding decade added 2,598,214 to the population, 1,338,003 being from the British Islands, and 1,114,564 from other parts of Europe.

1860.—Laws in southern states against negro education. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: United States: Negroes.

1860.—Abolition of slavery in Kansas.—Code investigation. See KANSAS: 1858-1861; 1860.

1860.—Southern view of slavery.—Effect of division in churches.—The state of opinion and feeling on the subject of slavery to which the people of the southern states had arrived in 1860 is set forth with brevity and distinctness in Claiborne's "Life of General Quitman," which was published that year: "In the early stages of African slavery in the South," says the writer, "it was by many considered an evil, that had been inflicted upon the country by British and New England cupidity. The Africans were regarded as barbarians, and were governed by the lash. The very hatred of the 'evil' forced upon us was, in a measure, transferred to the unhappy victims. They were treated with severity and no social relations subsisted between them and the whites. By degrees slavery began to be considered 'a necessary evil,' to be got rid of by gradual emancipation, or perhaps not at all, and the conditions of the slave sensibly improved. The natural sense of justice in the human heart suggested that they had been brought here by compulsion, and that they should be regarded not as savages, but as captives, who were to be kindly treated while laboring for their ultimate redemption. The progress of anti-slavery sentiment in the Northern States (once regarded by the South as a harmless fanaticism), the excesses it has occasioned, and the unconstitutional power it claims, at length prompted a general and searching inquiry into the true status of the negro. The moment that the Southern mind became convinced, that slavery, as it exists among us, instead of being a moral, social, and political evil, is a moral, social, and political good, and is the natural condition of the negro, as ordained by Providence, and the only conditions in which he can be civilized and instructed, the condition of the Southern slave underwent a thorough change. As a permanent fixture, as a hereditary heirloom, as a human being

with an immortal soul, intrusted to us by God for his own wise purposes, his value increased, and his relation to his owner approximated to the relation of guardian and ward. Interest taught us that it would be wise to cherish what was to be the permanent means of production and profit, and religion exacted the humane and judicious employment of the 'talent' committed to our care. Thus the most powerful influences that sway the heart and the judgment are in operation for the benefit of the slave, and hence his present comfortable and constantly ameliorating condition. It is due, almost solely, to the moral convictions of the slaveholder. Our laws protect the slave in life and limb, and against cruel and inordinate punishment. Those laws are rigorously applied, though rarely necessary for public opinion, more formidable than law, would condemn to execration and infamy the unjust and cruel master. Since these convictions in regard to slavery have been adopted almost unanimously in the South, the value of negroes has quadrupled. This, however, is in some measure an evil, because the tendency is to concentrate the slaves in the hands of the few, who are able to pay the extraordinary rates now demanded. It would be better for the commonwealth, and give additional solidity to our system of domestic servitude, if every family had an interest in it, secured, to a limited extent, against liability for debt. It should constitute in the South, if practicable, a part of every homestead, and then interest, and household tradition, and the friendly, confidential, and even affectionate relations that in the present state of public feeling prevail between master and slave, would unite all men in its defense. Neither land, nor slaves, which are here more valuable than land, should, by either direct or indirect legislation, be concentrated in few hands. Every citizen should have, if possible, that immediate interest in them which would make him feel that, in defending the commonwealth and its institutions, he is defending his own inheritance."—J. F. H. Claiborne, *Life and correspondence of John A. Quitman*, v. 1, ch. 4.—See also MISSOURI: 1860-1861; TENNESSEE: 1860.—"Up to . . . [1824] the sentiment seemed to be well nigh universal in the Tennessee Conference [of the Methodist Episcopal church] that slavery was a great moral evil, a curse to the Church, and slave-holding a sin. . . . In 1844 the General Conference met in New York. . . . Two cases came before that body involving the moral right to hold persons in bondage. The first was that of Francis A. Harding, who had been suspended by the Baltimore Conference from the office of Minister for refusing to manumit five slaves belonging to his wife at the time of their marriage, and which by the laws of Maryland remained the property of the wife after marriage. . . . On appeal to the General Conference, the action of the Baltimore Conference in suspending Mr. Harding from the ministry was affirmed by a vote of 117 to 56. A still more noted case [which] came up for consideration in this Conference . . . was that of Bishop James O. Andrew, of Georgia. He had become, contrary to his will, the owner of two slaves. In addition to these, on a second marriage, he found himself interested in some slaves belonging to his wife. Unwilling to occupy this position, he had the slaves secured to his wife by a trust deed, divesting himself of all interest in them. But he was still the owner of two others, one received by will, and the other inherited from his first wife. . . . Under these circumstances the fol-

lowing preamble and resolution were passed by an affirmative vote of 111 and a negative vote of 69: . . . 'Whereas, Bishop Andrew has become connected with slavery, by marriage and otherwise. . . . Resolved, That it is the sense of this General Conference that he desist from the exercise of the office so long as this impediment remains.' . . . [This] decision was a most unfortunate one. It immediately led to a division of the Church into two bodies, separated by a geographical line, and holding widely antagonistic views on the great and all-absorbing question of slavery. Up to this time no religious denomination, having a sure foothold in the South, except the Quakers, had perhaps been so steadfastly opposed to slavery as the Methodist. . . . Now the whole matter was changed. With one voice that denomination condemned the action of the conference in suspending Bishop Andrew from office. Almost at once the minds of Southern members, under the influence of this wrong as they esteemed it, changed from a state of opposition to slavery, or of mild indifference, to its open advocacy. . . . By this decision of the General Conference, every Methodist slave owner felt that the same intolerant spirit of the majority in the North which had stricken down the great Bishop Andrew might soon be directed against him and his property also. The result was a universal cry for separation. Thus one bond which held the Union together was rudely snapped asunder. This was to the Southern people what the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was to the Northern people ten years later. Then, a few years later, followed the split in the Presbyterian and in the Baptist Churches on the same subject, and their division into separate bodies according to geographical lines. And thus other bonds were severed, and the minds of men became prepared for the secession of the Southern States."—O. P. Temple, *East Tennessee and the Civil War*, pp. 100-104.

ALSO IN: J. N. Norwood, *Schism in American Episcopal church*.

1860 (April-November).—Nineteenth presidential election.—Division of the Democratic party.—Four candidates in the field.—Victory for freedom in the choice of Abraham Lincoln.—"Mr. J. W. Fell, a politician of Pennsylvania, says that after the debates of 1858 [with Douglas] he urged Lincoln to seek the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1860. Lincoln, however, replied curtly that men like Seward and Chase were entitled to take precedence, and that no such 'good luck' was in store for him. . . . In the winter of 1850-60 sundry 'intimate friends,' active politicians of Illinois, pressed him to consent to be mentioned as a candidate. He considered the matter over night and then gave them the desired permission, at the same time saying that he would not accept the vice-presidency. . . . With the opening of the spring of 1860 the several parties began the campaign in earnest. The Democratic Convention met first, at Charleston, April 23; and immediately the line of disruption opened. Upon the one side stood Douglas, with the moderate men and nearly all the Northern delegates, while against him were the advocates of extreme Southern doctrines, supported by the administration and by most of the delegates from the 'Cotton States.' The majority of the committee appointed to draft the platform were anti-Douglas men; but their report was rejected, and that offered by the pro-Douglas minority was substituted, 165 yeas to 138 nays. Thereupon the delegations of Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas, and sundry delegates from other

States, withdrew from the Convention, taking away 45 votes out of a total of 303. Those who remained declared the vote of two thirds of a full Convention, i. e., 202 votes, to be necessary for a choice. Then during three days 57 ballots were cast, Douglas being always far in the lead, but never polling more than 152½ votes. At last, on May 3, an adjournment was had until June 18, at Baltimore. At this second meeting contesting delegations appeared, and the decisions were uniformly in favor of the Douglas men, which provoked another secession of the extremist Southern men. A ballot showed 173½ votes for Douglas out of a total of 191½; the total was less than two thirds of the full number of the original Convention, and therefore it was decided that any person receiving two thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present should be deemed the nominee. The next ballot gave Douglas 181½. Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia was nominated for vice-president. On June 28, also at Baltimore [after a meeting and adjournment from Richmond, June 11], there came together a collection composed of original seceders at Charleston, and of some who had been rejected and others who had seceded at Baltimore. Very few Northern men were present, and the body in fact represented the Southern wing of the Democracy. . . . It promptly nominated John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky and Joseph Lane of Oregon, and adopted the radical platform which had been reported at Charleston. These doings opened, so that it could never be closed, that seam of which the thread had long been visible atwart the surface of the old Democratic party. . . . In May the Convention of the Constitutional Union party met, also at Baltimore. This organization was a sudden outgrowth designed only to meet the present emergency. . . . The party died, of necessity, upon the day when Lincoln was elected, and its members were then distributed between the Republicans, the Secessionists, and the Copperheads. John Bell, of Tennessee, the candidate for the presidency, joined the Confederacy; Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, the candidate for the vice-presidency, became a Republican. The party never had a hope of electing its men; but its existence increased the chance of throwing the election into Congress; and this hope inspired exertions far beyond what its own prospects warranted. On May 16 the Republican Convention came together at Chicago, where the great 'Wigwam' had been built to hold 10,000 persons. . . . Many candidates were named, chiefly Seward, Lincoln, Chase, Cameron, Edward Bates of Missouri, and William L. Dayton of New Jersey. Primarily the contest lay between Seward and Lincoln. . . . Upon the third ballot . . . it stood:—Seward, 180; Lincoln, 231½; Chase, 24½; Bates, 22; Dayton, 1; McLean, 5; Scattering, 1. . . . Before the count could be announced, a delegate from Ohio transferred four votes to Lincoln. This settled the matter; and then other delegations followed, till Lincoln's score rose to 354. . . . Later in the day the convention nominated Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, on the second ballot, by 367 votes for the vice-presidency. . . . Almost from the beginning it was highly probable that the Republicans would win. . . . The only contrary chance was that no election might be made by the people, and that it might be thrown into Congress."—J. T. Morse, Jr., *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 1, ch. 6.—At the popular election, the votes were: Lincoln, 1,866,452 (free states vote, 1,840,022, slave states vote, 26,430); Douglas, 1,375,157 (free states vote, 1,211,632, slave states vote, 163,525); Breckenridge,

847,953 (free states vote, 277,082, slave states vote, 570,871); Bell, 590,631 (free states vote, 74,658, slave states vote, 515,973). In the Electoral College, the four candidates were voted for as follows: Lincoln, 180; Breckenridge, 72; Bell, 39; Douglas, 12.—E. Stanwood, *History of presidential elections*, ch. 20.—"The South gave every evidence that secession would follow the election of Lincoln, and when the Maine campaign indicated that Lincoln would surely be chosen, Douglas gave up his canvass in the Northwest and went South in the hope of saving the Union by urging the leaders there that secession would mean war. In Virginia, North Carolina, and Alabama he foretold plainly the awful consequence of secession. But the lower South paid little heed; their leaders, Rhett and Yancey, were ready to take the first steps to disrupt the Union upon the receipt of news that the Democrats had lost the election. To them Lincoln was not only a democrat who believed in the equality of men before the law; he was also a 'black Republican,' the head of a sectional party whose platform bespoke sectional interests and the isolation of the South. . . . Thus the blunders of Douglas and Chase in 1854 had started the dogs of sectional warfare, and now a solid North confronted a solid South, with only two or three undecided buffer States, like Maryland and Missouri between them."—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 264-265.

ALSO IN: H. W. Raymond, *Life of Lincoln*, ch. 4.—E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Great Rebellion*, p. 1.—J. G. Holland, *Life of Lincoln*, ch. 15-16.—J. G. Nicolay, and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 2, ch. 13-16.—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from 1850*, v. 2, ch. 11.—J. W. Draper, *Civil War in America*, v. 1, ch. 26-31.

1860 (November-December).—Secession of South Carolina.—"Though the South had voted as a unit for Buchanan in 1856 and her leaders had long acted in concert on important matters, the election of Lincoln by a 'solid' North was regarded by most owners of slaves as a revolutionary act; and the Southern reply to the challenge was secession. . . . Jefferson Davis, who had formerly talked freely of that 'last remedy' of minority interests, advised against the movement; and everywhere North and South men of great wealth, as well as the poorer people, who must always bear the heaviest burdens of war, deprecated and warned against the application of a remedy which all sections had at one time or another declared right and lawful. As men came nearer to the application of their 'rightful' remedy, the older and cooler heads urged the leaders of South Carolina not to withdraw from the national confederation. Republicans like Seward and Weed and Lincoln exerted themselves to the utmost to dissuade the Southern radicals; all the influence of the Bell and Everett party was cast into the same side of the scales; and Congress, when it assembled in December, 1860, was pressed from every possible angle to arrange some compromise which would satisfy the angry element in the lower South. Even Republicans of the more radical type offered to do anything, except assent to the further expansion of slavery in the Territories, in order to prevent the formation of a Southern Confederacy and the expected paralysis of business. Nothing availed. South Carolina, under the leadership of Robert Barnwell Rhett, called a state convention which met in Columbia, but adjourned to Charleston, and on December 20 severed all connection with the National

Government and recalled her Representatives in Congress."—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 268-270.—"Shortly before the election, on the 5th of October, 1860, Governor Gist of South Carolina dispatched a circular letter marked 'Confidential' by special messengers to the governors of the Cotton States, in which he said that if a majority of Lincoln electors were chosen, South Carolina would call a convention, and, with any prospect of others following, she would secede. He wished to learn by his proposed convention what coöperation could be expected from other States. On the 18th of October the Governor of North Carolina wrote in reply to this circular that his State would regard Lincoln's election as a sufficient cause for disunion; and on the 25th of October the Governor of Alabama wrote that he thought his State would secede if two or more States set the example. The Governor of Mississippi, on the 26th of October, wrote that 'if any State moves, I think Mississippi will go with her.' The Governor of Louisiana wrote: 'I shall not advise the secession of my State, and I will add that I do not think the people of Louisiana will ultimately decide in favor of that course.' The Governor of Georgia, October 31, ventured his opinion that his people would wait for some overt act Florida was 'ready to wheel into line with the gallant Palmetto State or any other State or States.'"—J. Bigelow, *Retrospections of an active life*, v. 1, p. 295.—"Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were now soon enrolled among the seceded States. Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia, Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware still stood firm, despite all the efforts essayed to shake their constancy. It is indeed true, as Mr. Greeley has deliberately recorded, that after the secession 'conspiracy had held complete possession of the Southern mind for three months, with the Southern members of the cabinet, nearly all the Federal officers, most of the governors and other state functionaries, and seven eighths of the prominent and active politicians pushing it on, and no force exerted against nor in any manner threatening to resist it, a majority of the slave states, with two thirds of the free population of the entire slaveholding region, was openly and positively adverse to it, either because they regarded the alleged grievances of the South as exaggerated if not unreal, or because they believed that those wrongs would rather be aggravated than cured by disunion.'"—H. S. Foote, *War of the Rebellion*, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay, *Outbreak of Rebellion*, ch. 1.—S. W. Crawford, *Genesis of the Civil War*, ch. 2-5.—F. Moore, ed., *Rebellion record*, v. 1.—A. C. Cole, *Era of the Civil War*.—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 511.

The following is the South Carolina Ordinance of Secession, adopted Dec. 20, 1860:

An Ordinance to dissolve the Union between the State of South Carolina and other States united with her under the compact entitled "The Constitution of the United States of America."

We, the People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained. That the Ordinance adopted by us in Convention, on the twenty-third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also, all Acts and parts of Acts of the General Assembly of this State, ratify-

ing amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed; and that the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the name of "The United States of America," is hereby dissolved.

The Declaration of Causes, promulgated by the convention December 24, is as follows:

Declaration of the immediate causes which induce and justify the secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union:

The People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, on the 26th day of April, 1852, declared that the frequent violations of the Constitution of the United States, by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon the reserved rights of the States, fully justified this State in then withdrawing from the Federal Union; but in deference to the opinions and wishes of the other slaveholding States, she forbore at that time to exercise this right. Since that time, these encroachments have continued to increase, and further forbearance ceases to be a virtue. And now the State of South Carolina having resumed her separate and equal place among nations, deems it due to herself, to the remaining United States of America, and to the nations of the world, that she should declare the immediate causes which have led to this act. In the year 1765, that portion of the British Empire embracing Great Britain, undertook to make laws for the government of that portion composed of the thirteen American Colonies. A struggle for the right of self-government ensued, which resulted, on the 4th July, 1776, in a Declaration, by the Colonies, "that they are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; and that, as free and independent States, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do." They further solemnly declared that whenever any "form of government becomes destructive of the ends for which it was established, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government." Deeming the Government of Great Britain to have become destructive of these ends, they declared that the Colonies "are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved." In pursuance of this Declaration of Independence, each of the thirteen States proceeded to exercise its separate sovereignty; adopted for itself a Constitution, and appointed officers for the administration of government in all its departments—Legislative, Executive and Judicial. For purposes of defence, they united their arms and their counsels; and, in 1778, they entered into a League known as the Articles of Confederation, whereby they agreed to intrust the administration of their external relations to a common agent, known as the Congress of the United States, expressly declaring, in the first article, "that each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right which is not, by this Confederation, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." Under this Confederation the War of the Revolution was carried on, and on the 3d September, 1783, the contest ended, and a definitive Treaty was signed by Great Britain, in which she acknowledged the Independence of the Colonies in the following terms: "Article 1.—His Britannic



Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz: New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such; and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety and territorial rights of the same and every part thereof." Thus were established the two great principles asserted by the Colonies, namely, the right of a State to govern itself; and the right of a people to abolish a Government when it becomes destructive of the ends for which it was instituted. And concurrent with the establishment of these principles, was the fact, that each Colony became and was recognized by the mother Country as a free, sovereign and independent State. In 1787, Deputies were appointed by the States to revise the Articles of Confederation, and on 17th September, 1787, these Deputies recommended, for the adoption of the States, the Articles of Union, known as the Constitution of the United States. The parties to whom this Constitution was submitted, were the several sovereign States; they were to agree or disagree, and when nine of them agreed, the compact was to take effect among those concurring; and the General Government, as the common agent, was then to be invested with their authority. If only nine of the thirteen States had concurred, the other four would have remained as they were—separate sovereign States, independent of any of the provisions of the Constitution. In fact, two of the States did not accede to the Constitution until long after it had gone into operation among the other eleven; and during that interval, they each exercised the functions of an independent nation. By this Constitution, certain duties were imposed upon the several States, and the exercise of certain of their powers was restrained, which necessarily implied their continued existence as sovereign States. But, to remove all doubt, an amendment was added, which declared that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people. On 23d May, 1788, South Carolina, by a Convention of her people, passed an Ordinance assenting to this Constitution, and afterwards altered her own Constitution, to conform herself to the obligations she had undertaken. Thus was established, by compact between the States, a Government, with defined objects and powers, limited to the express words of the grant. This limitation left the whole remaining mass of power subject to the clause reserving it to the States or to the people, and rendered unnecessary any specification of reserved rights. We hold that the Government thus established is subject to the two great principles asserted in the Declaration of Independence; and we hold further, that the mode of its formation subjects it to a third fundamental principle, namely: the law of compact. We maintain that in every compact between two or more parties, the obligation is mutual; that the failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a material part of the agreement, entirely releases the obligation of the other; and that where no arbiter is provided, each party is remitted to his own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all its consequences. In the present case, that fact is established with certainty. We assert, that fourteen of the States have deliberately refused for years past to fulfil

their constitutional obligations, and we refer to their own Statutes for the proof. The Constitution of the United States, in its 4th Article, provides as follows: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." This stipulation was so material to the compact, that without it that compact would not have been made. The greater number of the contracting parties held slaves, and they had previously evinced their estimate of the value of such a stipulation by making it a condition in the Ordinance for the government of the territory ceded by Virginia, which now composes the States north of the Ohio river. The same article of the Constitution stipulates also for rendition by the several States of fugitives from justice from the other States. The General Government, as the common agent, passed laws to carry into effect these stipulations of the States. For many years these laws were executed. But an increasing hostility on the part of the non-slaveholding States to the Institution of Slavery has led to a disregard of their obligations, and the laws of the General Government have ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution. The States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa, have enacted laws which either nullify the Acts of Congress or render useless any attempt to execute them. In many of these States the fugitive is discharged from the service or labor claimed, and in none of them has the State Government complied with the stipulation made in the Constitution. The State of New Jersey, at an early day, passed a law in conformity with her constitutional obligation; but the current of anti-slavery feeling has led her more recently to enact laws which render inoperative the remedies provided by her own law and by the laws of Congress. In the State of New York even the right of transit for a slave has been denied by her tribunals; and the States of Ohio and Iowa have refused to surrender to justice fugitives charged with murder, and with inciting servile insurrection in the State of Virginia. Thus the constitutional compact has been deliberately broken and disregarded by the non-slaveholding States, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released from her obligation. The ends for which this Constitution was framed are declared by itself to be "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." These ends it endeavored to accomplish by a Federal Government, in which each State was recognized as an equal, and had separate control over its own institutions. The right of property in slaves was recognized by giving to free persons distinct political rights, by giving them the right to represent, and burthening them with direct taxes for three-fifths of their slaves; by authorizing the importation of slaves for twenty years; and by stipulating for the rendition of fugitives from labor. We affirm that these ends for which this Government was instituted have been defeated, and the Government itself has been made destructive of them by the action of the non-slaveholding States. Those States have assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety of our

domestic institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen other States and recognized by the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of Slavery; they have permitted the open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to claim the property of the citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures to servile insurrection. For twenty-five years this agitation has been steadily increasing, until it has now secured to its aid the power of the Common Government. Observing the forms of the Constitution, a sectional party has found within that article establishing the Executive Department, the means of subverting the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the administration of the Common Government because he has declared that "Government cannot endure permanently half slave, half free," and that the public mind must rest in the belief that Slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction. This sectional combination for the subversion of the Constitution, has been aided in some of the States by elevating to citizenship, persons, who, by the Supreme Law of the land, are incapable of becoming citizens; and their votes have been used to inaugurate a new policy, hostile to the South, and destructive of its peace and safety. On the 4th March next, this party will take possession of the Government. It has announced, that the South shall be excluded from the common Territory; that the Judicial Tribunals shall be made sectional, and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States. The Guaranties of the Constitution will then no longer exist; the equal rights of the States will be lost. The slaveholding States will no longer have the power of self-government, or self-protection, and the Federal Government will have become their enemy. Sectional interest and animosity will deepen the irritation, and all hope of remedy is rendered vain, by the fact that public opinion at the North has invested a great political error with the sanctions of a more erroneous religious belief. We, therefore, the people of South Carolina, by our delegates, in Convention assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared that the Union heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America, is dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, as a separate and independent State; with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.

1860 (December).—President Buchanan's surrender.—Annual message.—In the great emergency with which the country was now faced, the president showed the essential weakness of his character. "Buchanan denied the right of secession, and acknowledged that it was his duty to enforce the laws in South Carolina in so far as he was able. November 17 he asked for an opinion of his attorney-general. . . Attorney-General Black, as sound a jurist as ever advised a Presi-

dent, replied in three days to his request. 'You can now,' he wrote Buchanan, 'if necessary, order the duties to be collected on board a vessel inside of any established port of entry. . . . Your right to take such measures as may seem to be necessary for the protection of the public property is very clear.' . . . [Of the cabinet, Cass, Black and Holt urged that troops should be sent to hold the forts in the South, but Cobb, Thompson and Floyd, all three of whom were secessionists, persuaded the president that such an action would drive the other southern states to secede.] That to garrison the Southern forts would have increased the irritation of South Carolina and would have driven the other cotton States onward in the path of secession, as the defenders of the President maintain, is possible. On the other hand . . . it must be borne in mind that this matter of plain executive duty had not in November become confounded in the Southern mind with the coercion of a State, as it did two months later. . . . He had been so long under Southern domination that he could not throw it off. Common prudence required that he should keep in his cabinet none but staunch Union men; this test would have resulted in the retirement of Cobb and Thompson, and probably a reconstruction of the whole cabinet in the middle of November, such as took place late in December and in January. According to Floyd's diary, a difference developed itself in cabinet meeting as early as November 10, on the question of the South's submission to Lincoln's election and the right of secession, in which dispute Cobb, Thompson, and Floyd ranged themselves on one side, and Cass, Toucey, Black, Holt, and the President on the other. At a time when a plan of resolute action should have been the daily and nightly thought of Buchanan, he sat himself down to write an essay on constitutional law, which he sent to Congress as his annual message."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 3, pp. 128, 130-131.—"The President informed Congress that 'the long-continued and intemperate interference of the Northern people with the question of slavery in the Southern States has at last produced its natural effect.' . . . The President found that the chief grievance of the South was in the enactments of the Free States known as 'personal liberty laws' [designed to protect free citizens, black or white, in their right to trial by jury, which the fugitive slave law denied to a black man claimed as a slave]. . . . Very likely these enactments, inspired by an earnest spirit of liberty, went in many cases too far, and tended to produce conflicts between National and State authority. That was a question to be determined finally and exclusively by the Federal Judiciary. . . . After reciting the statutes which he regarded as objectionable and hostile to the constitutional rights of the South, and after urging their unconditional repeal upon the North, the President said: 'The Southern States, standing on the basis of the Constitution, have a right to demand this act of justice from the States of the North. Should it be refused, then the Constitution, to which all the States are parties, will have been willfully violated. . . . In that event, the injured States, after having used all peaceful and constitutional means to obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the government of the Union.' . . . Mr. Buchanan proceeded to argue ably and earnestly against the assumption by any State of an inherent right to secede from the government at its own will and pleasure. But he

utterly destroyed the force of his reasoning by declaring that, 'after much serious reflection' he had arrived at 'the conclusion that no power has been delegated to Congress, or to any other department of the Federal Government, to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn,' from the Union. . . . Under these doctrines the Government of the United States was shorn of all power to preserve its own existence. This construction was all that the extremists of the South desired."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years in Congress*, v. 1, ch. 10.

Also in: G. T. Curtis, *Life of James Buchanan*, v. 2, ch. 16-17.—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 511-512.

1860 (December).—Vain concessions and humiliations of the North proposed.—Crittenden compromise.—"During this critical month of December [1860], Congress, to whose shoulders Buchanan would willingly have shifted the responsibility of the executive, was busy with plans for the reconciliation of the sections. An able committee of thirteen was appointed in the Senate, including Davis, Douglas, Wade, and Seward. The venerable J. J. Crittenden of Kentucky, the successor of Henry Clay, presented a scheme of compromise [subsequently known as the Crittenden Compromise] consisting of six unamendable amendments to the Constitution and four resolutions. The proposed amendments, besides protecting slavery in the states where it was legal, sanctioning the domestic slave trade, and guaranteeing payment by the United States government for escaped slaves, revived the 36° 30' line of the Missouri Compromise and forbade the interference by Congress with slavery south of that line. The resolutions called for the faithful execution of the Fugitive-Slave Law, the repeal of the Personal-Liberty Acts, and the enforcement of the laws against the African slave trade. The committee met on December 21, the day that the news of the secession of South Carolina reached Washington. Throughout the North there was a lively hope that the Crittenden Compromise might be adopted, especially in the financial and commercial circles, where there was much anxiety for the safety of large sums of money invested in the South. It is fairly certain that if a popular referendum had been taken on the Compromise it would have been adopted. But the committee could not agree. Davis voted with Seward against the restoration of the 36° 30' line. The Republican members, supported by Lincoln, who wrote 'Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery,' voted steadily in the negative. Their furthest concession was that slavery should not be disturbed in the slave states. On December 31 the committee reported that it had not been able to agree on any general plan of adjustment. A committee of thirty-three in the House met with no better success. Its only fruit was the recommendation of a constitutional amendment making slavery inviolable in the state where it was established by law. The amendment passed both Houses by the necessary two-thirds vote, but only two states took pains to ratify it. . . . Texas was the only state in which the convention submitted the secession ordinance to the people for a referendum; and the figures of the popular vote (37,794 to 11,235), contrasted with the vote in the convention (166 to 7) and with the large popular vote cast for the Unionist candidates Bell and Douglas in the November election, tempt one to speculate on the truth of the frequent statement that the people of the South were far ahead of their leaders in the desire for

independence. The adoption of the Crittenden Compromise by Congress or of a Jacksonian policy in the White House might have halted secession at the borders of South Carolina, though it is doubtful whether more than a brief postponement of the ultimate appeal to arms could have been accomplished. The difference between the sections was beyond any device of constitutional machinery to compose. There could be no enduring peace in our land until slavery was banished. Lincoln was right about 'the house divided.' Two civilizations confronted each other across Mason and Dixon's line, each convinced that it stood for the welfare of man and enjoyed the blessing of God; each convinced that the other was aggressive, faithless, and accursed. They no longer understood each other's language. Words like 'honor,' 'right,' 'freedom,' 'citizen,' meant different things to each section. The South asked the North to call an institution right which the North believed to be wrong. The North seemed to cast stigma on the highest society of the South by regarding slavery as a blot on civilization and the slaveholder as a deliberate sinner. The South accused the North of being sectional and at the same time demanded that it should mind its own business and cease to 'meddle' with an institution which the North looked on as a national disgrace. Inconsistency, misunderstanding, and passion ruled."—D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America*, v. 1, pp. 525-528.

Also in: H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 1, ch. 24.—E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 48-90.—J. A. Logan, *Great conspiracy*, ch. 8.—F. E. Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War*, pp. 166-183.—W. G. Brown, *Lower South in American history*, pp. 83-112.—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, pp. 3-5.

1860 (December).—Major Anderson at Fort Sumter.—Floyd's activities in the War Department.—Cabinet rupture.—Loyalty reinstated in the national government.—"In November, 1860, the fortifications of Charleston Harbor consisted of three works—Castle Pinckney, an old-fashioned, circular brick fort, on Shute's Folly Island, and about one mile east of the city; Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, still farther to the east, . . . and lastly, Fort Sumter, an unfinished fortification, named after General Thomas Sumter, the famous partisan leader of the Revolution. . . . The entire force of the United States troops in these fortifications was composed of two weak companies of artillery under command of Major Robert Anderson, and a few engineer employees under Captain John G. Foster. Of these a sergeant and squad of men were stationed at Castle Pinckney for the care of the quarters and the guns; a similar handful were at Sumter; while most of the little force were at Moultrie, where Anderson had his headquarters. . . . On the files of the Engineer Department I found a letter, . . . dated as early as November 24, 1860, from Captain Foster to Colonel De Russy, then the chief of the engineer corps, in which the captain states that, at the request of Major Anderson, he has, in company with that officer, made a thorough inspection of the forts in the harbor; that, in the opinion of Anderson, one additional company of artillery should at once be sent to garrison Castle Pinckney. . . . Upon the back of the letter is the simple but significant indorsement, in his own hand-writing, 'Return to Governor Floyd.' . . . On November 30, Captain Foster again writes to Colonel De Russy, saying: 'I think that more troops should have been sent here 'to guard the forts, and I believe that no

serious demonstration on the part of the populace would have met such a course.' On this is indorsed: 'Colonel Cooper says this has been shown to the Secretary of War. H. G. W.' . . . On December 2, application was made by Captain Foster for the small supply of four boxes of muskets and sixty rounds of cartridge per man, to arm the few civilians or hired laborers who constituted the engineer corps. These arms and ammunition were in the United States arsenal at Charleston, a building which still had a Federal keeper, and over which still floated the Federal flag. On this application is the following indorsement also in General Wright's handwriting: 'Handed to adjutant-general, and by him laid before the Secretary of War on the sixth of December. Returned by adjutant-general on the seventh. Action deferred for the present. See Captain Foster's letter of December 4.' . . . [On December 17, Captain Foster] . . . went to Charleston and took from the Federal arsenal forty muskets, with which to arm his laborers. Early on the morning of the 19th, he received a telegram from Secretary Floyd, directing him instantly to return the arms to the arsenal. On the next day, the 20th, the South Carolinians decided, in State convention, to secede, and proclaimed their State an independent sovereignty. . . . 'Few ventured to breast the storm. [But among these few was James L. Pettigrew, of Charleston, the greatest lawyer of his state] who, when his minister first dropped from the service the prayer for the President of the United States. rose in his pew . . . and slowly and with distinct voice repeated: 'Most humble and heartily we beseech Thee with Thy favor to Behold and bless Thy servant, the President of the United States.' Then, placing his prayerbook in the rack, and drawing his wife's arm within his own, he left the church, nor entered it again until his body was borne there for burial. To their honor be it said that . . . the Carolinians respected his sincerity and candor, and never molested him.'—S. L. Woodford, *Story of Fort Sumter (Personal recollections of the War of the Rebellion, pp. 259-266)*.—'From *Floyd's* private diary, which was found, it is plain that the Southern members of the Cabinet at Washington were in active correspondence with the Committee at Charleston, even to the length of arranging for the immediate purchase and delivery of muskets, and that this was done before any of the members of the Cabinet resigned.'—J. Formby, *American Civil War, p. 41*.—'Intent upon separation from the Union and the formation of a Slaveholding Confederacy, South Carolina swiftly proceeded to carry out a programme agreed upon. It elected three commissioners, December 22, 1860, Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr, who should negotiate with President Buchanan for the delivery to the State of all Federal property within its limits, including forts, magazines and lighthouses. The partnership having been dissolved, South Carolina hastened to divide the property among the partners. The South Carolina Congressmen had had interviews with Buchanan relative to the matter of the occupation of the forts in Charleston harbor and interpreted the president's words as a promise that he would not change the status there without due notice to them. But on the 26th, Major Anderson, in command at Fort Moultrie, dismantled that stronghold and retired with his force to Fort Sumter as the more defensible fort. The act enraged the secessionists in Charleston and persuaded them that Buchanan's words was untrustworthy.

The truth is that Anderson had removed strictly for military reasons and at his own instance, and to the demands of Governor Pickens replied, 'I cannot and will not go back.' The governor at once ordered the State troops to take possession of Fort Moultrie and the palmetto flag was raised over it. Jefferson Davis and his fellow-secessionists from other Southern States were not yet retired from Congress and upon receipt of the news from Charleston, Davis, and others, accompanied by Trescott, the assistant secretary of state and the go-between in the programme of negotiation, called upon Buchanan to expostulate. Davis accused the president of precipitating bloodshed. Buchanan, amazed at the news, declared that Anderson's course was 'against my policy.' Next day the president received the South Carolina commissioners, not as officials, but as private gentlemen. Out of the interview arose the expected: that the commissioners asserted one thing and the president understood another. The national element at the North was becoming impatient at the president's course; the South convinced herself that he had promised one thing and done another, and the North blamed him for doing nothing. One conclusion is safe—that he did not comprehend the gravity of the situation. Civil war was upon the country and the president did not know it. South Carolina interpreted Major Anderson's removal to Fort Sumter as an act of war and the North interpreted Buchanan's course as an act of cowardice. At heart, Buchanan inclined to accede to the demands of the commissioners and prepared a favorable reply to them. This was on the 29th. He submitted it to a divided Cabinet; Stanton, recently made attorney-general, and Black, secretary of state, counselled against it; if it should be issued, Black determined to resign. The secretary would not longer support a policy of *non possumus*, and so informed the president. Buchanan confessing his weakness by the act, handed his proposed answer over to Black, requesting him to modify it as he thought best. The secretary rewrote the memorandum and converted it into a state paper of national character, attacked and refuted the whole secession theory and concluded with the entreaty that Major Anderson be at once supported by the army and navy, else he could see nothing before the country but disaster and ruin.'—F. N. Thorpe, *Civil War, national view (History of North America, v. 15, pp. 221-222)*.—On December 29, three days after Anderson had transferred his command to Fort Sumter, Floyd resigned. Howell Cobb had resigned the Treasury Department previously, on the 10th. A few days later, January 8, Jacob Thompson withdrew from the Interior Department. Loyal men now replaced these secessionists in the cabinet. Joseph Holt of Kentucky took the place of Floyd in the War Department; John A. Dix of New York succeeded Cobb in the treasury, and the place of Thompson was not filled. Edwin M. Stanton entered the cabinet as attorney-general, taking the place of Jeremiah S. Black who became secretary of state. General Cass had held the State Department until December 12, when he, too, resigned, but for reasons opposite to those of Floyd and Cobb. He left the government because it would not reinforce the Charleston forts.—Based on E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Great Rebellion, p. 28*.—Fort Sumter was still held by national forces. "Stimulated by his secretary's memorandum [see above: 1860 (December): Major Anderson, etc.], Bucha-

nan refused to withdraw Anderson; he would reinforce Anderson, but first the commissioners should know his decision. On the second day of the new year their reply was received: the whole story is told in the endorsement which the president ordered with the return of their letter to them: 'This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.' Even Buchanan was stirred. 'It is now all over,' he said to the secretary of war, Holt; 'reinforcements must be sent.' It was decided to send the man-of-war, *Brooklyn*, with adequate reinforcements and supplies, to Anderson, but the president and General Scott, fearing lest the ship might not be able to get over the bar at Charleston, at last, and unwillingly, changed their plans and dispatched the *Star of the West*, a chartered, side-wheel steamer of light draft, and leaving Sandy Hook with two hundred men and supplies, she lay off Charleston harbor, January 8th. Her coming was awaited, as Governor Pickens had been kept informed of her departure from New York. While yet two miles from Fort Sumter she was fired on from Morris Island and struck once. The *Star of the West* was merely a transport and was unarmed. Discovering no signs of aid or support from Fort Sumter and having yet to run past Fort Moultrie, the captain of the transport, fearing serious injury and convinced that he could not reach Sumter, . . . hastened back to New York. . . . Abortive as the president's attempt to reinforce Anderson had proved, it tended to strengthen him at the North as it also tended to strengthen secession at the South. Buchanan reorganized his Cabinet, John A. Dix becoming secretary of the treasury, the Northern members, Black, secretary of state, Stanton, attorney-general, and Dix, now giving it a national cast, not wholly to Buchanan's liking. . . . During the last two months of his administration, House and Senate became theatres of a strange political drama; Davis and the lesser representatives from the South now freely, ardently and aggressively holding forth on the right of secession and announcing the impending dissolution of the Union. . . . Even at this late hour in the movement of events, Northern men, and such as Seward, of New York, could not see the impending outburst of civil war and continued talking of compromise. . . . Even Lincoln favored a constitutional amendment which would forbid Congress to interfere with slavery in the States. In these closing days of Buchanan's administration no man in Congress who had the ear of the public demanded interference with slavery in the slaveholding States."—F. N. Thorpe, *Civil War, national view (History of North America, v. 15, pp. 223-224)*.

ALSO IN: S. W. Crawford, *Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, ch. 1, and 6-10*.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln, v. 2, ch. 18-20, v. 3, ch. 1-6*.—F. E. Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War, ch. 12-19*.

1860-1861 (December-February).—Seizure of arms, arsenals, forts, and other public property by seceding states.—Surrender of army by Twiggs.—"Directly after Major Anderson's removal to Fort Sumter, the Federal arsenal in Charleston, containing many thousand stand of arms and a considerable quantity of military stores, was seized by the volunteers, now flocking to that city by direction of the State authorities; Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie, and Sullivan's Island were likewise occupied by them, and their defenses vigorously enlarged and improved. The Custom-House, Post-Office, etc., were likewise appropriated, with-

out resistance or commotion. . . . Georgia having given [January 2, 1861] a large popular majority for Secession [see GEORGIA: 1861], her authorities immediately took military possession of the Federal arsenal at Augusta, as also of Forts Pulaski and Jackson, commanding the approaches by sea to Savannah. North Carolina had not voted to secede, yet Gov. Ellis simultaneously seized the U. S. Arsenal at Fayetteville, with Fort Macon, and other fortifications commanding the approaches to Beaufort and Wilmington. . . . In Alabama, the Federal arsenal at Mobile was seized on the 4th, by order of Gov. Moore. It contained large quantities of arms and munitions. Fort Morgan, commanding the approaches to Mobile, was likewise seized, and garrisoned by State troops. . . . In Louisiana, the Federal arsenal at Baton Rouge was seized by order of Gov. Moore on the 11th. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, commanding the passage up the Mississippi to New Orleans, and Fort Pike, at the entrance of Lake Pontchartrain, were likewise seized and garrisoned by State troops. The Federal Mint and Custom-House at New Orleans were left untouched until February 1st, when they, too, were taken possession of by the State authorities. . . . In Florida, Fort Barrancas and the Navy Yard at Pensacola were seized by Florida and Alabama forces on the 13th; Commander Armstrong surrendering them without a struggle. He ordered Lieut. Slemmer, likewise, to surrender Forts Pickens and McRae; but the intrepid subordinate defied the order; and, withdrawing his small force from Fort McRae to the stronger and less accessible Fort Pickens, announced his determination to hold out to the last. He was soon after besieged therein by a formidable volunteer force; and a dispatch from Pensacola announced that 'Fort McRae is being occupied and the guns manned by the allied forces of Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi.' . . . The revenue cutter Cass, stationed at Mobile, was turned over by Capt. J. J. Morrison to the authorities of Alabama at the end of January. The McClellan, Capt. Breshwood, stationed on the Mississippi below New Orleans, was, in like manner, handed over to those of Louisiana. Gen. Dix had sent down a special agent to secure them, but he was too late. The telegraph dispatch whereby Gen. Dix directed him, 'If any person attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot,' sent an electric thrill through the loyal heart of the country."—H. Greeley, *American conflict, v. 1, ch. 26*.—"Since the middle of the preceding year the Governors of the Southern States had been increasing the strength of their State Militia, drilling it, and appointing to commands officers whom they could trust. Also, since December, the seizure of United States property in Southern States had been going on; but, with two exceptions, the Southern officers in the old service loyally handed over their charges to their successors, before resigning their commissions, where a successor could be appointed, or until turned out by force. These exceptions were Major-General Twiggs, a veteran of the Mexican War, and Captain G. Magruder, of the Navy: the former surrendered the military posts in Texas, where he was in command [and therewith gave the Confederates command of Texas and the Mexican frontier]; the latter, property in his charge at Norfolk, Virginia. Twiggs was made a Major-General in the Confederate service, and commanded at New Orleans, till succeeded by Lovell at the end of the year; Captain Magruder is not mentioned again."—J. Formby, *American Civil War, p. 49*.—"The defensive fortifications located within the seceding

States were some 30 in number, mounting over 3,000 guns, and having cost at least \$20,000,000. Nearly all these had been seized and appropriated by the Confederates before Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, with the exception of Fortress Monroe (Virginia), Fort Sumter (South Carolina), Fort Pickens (Florida), and the fortresses on Key West and the Tortugas, off the Florida coast."—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 1, ch. 26.

ALSO IN: *Official records of the War of the Rebellion*, series 1, v. 1.

1860-1865.—Status of Indians in the Civil War.—Agreement of friendship. See OKLAHOMA: 1860-1865.

1860-1869.—Race for construction of railroads from Mississippi river to the Pacific coast. See NEVADA: 1860-1913.

1861.—Condition of the navy.—Absence of navy on Confederate side.—Effect of unpreparedness for war.—Purchase of munitions in Europe.—Effect of blockade.—"Some have thought the navy, rather than the army, was the right arm of the government in crushing the Confederacy. Its brilliant efficiency was felt from the first under the leadership especially of the assistant secretary, Captain Gustavus V. Fox. At the outbreak almost no proper ships were available. The list of vessels numbered ninety, but of these fifty were of the old pattern and only useful as supply or store ships. Of the forty ships in commission, some antiquated and some modern, by far the greater number were scattered widely. Of the forty steamers which alone, as it soon appeared, could perform the duty demanded, nearly half were not ready. The home squadron comprised only twelve vessels, of which seven were steamers, and the three of these in northern waters practically constituted the only trustworthy force. As to men, the unpreparedness was no less marked. The complement for the navy had been 7000; in March, 1861, but 207 men were at hand in the depots at the disposal of the government for crews. Officers abounded, but they were in great part sailors of the old school, deep in the ruts of tradition and routine, their fire smouldering under their white hair. In 1845, George Bancroft, secretary of the navy, founded the academy at Annapolis, from which a stream of well-trained young men had poured into the service; but only about a dozen of the younger lieutenants were Annapolis men, who were kept down in lower grades. Three hundred and twenty-two naval officers from the South resigned, many taking service with the Confederacy. Fortunately for the Union, the unpreparedness of the North was set over against complete destitution in naval equipment on the side of the South—not only lack of ships and of crews to man them, but also of workshops, arsenals, and dock-yards for their construction; nor, if these could have been supplied, were there mechanics competent for such labors. . . . To be valid, according to the law of nations, the blockade must be effective, and the rehabilitation of the navy was pressed forthwith. In Lincoln's first call for forces, eighteen thousand sailors were included. To supply the need for officers in the junior grade, the upper classes at Annapolis were assigned to active service. As soon as it could be managed, a system of promotions was arranged by which the aged and incapable in the upper grades were retired and the service vitalized by young blood. . . . Meantime the government was buying or chartering every craft that could be put to use, from a coal-barge to an ocean-liner; the navy-yards and private establishments were driven night and day in build-

ing, and forges and machinshops were employed in the making of engines and armaments. It was early recognized that the naval warfare was certain to be various in character. Not only must ships be provided for the blockade, but craft suitable for the inland streams, cruisers also to pursue the commerce-destroyers, whose activity began early, and heavy ships to deal with fortresses."—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, pp. 35-37.—"If, in 1861, either side could have struck swiftly and with all its force, the story of the war would have been different. The question of relative strength was in reality a question of munitions. Both powers were glaringly unprepared. Both had instant need of great supplies of arms and ammunition, and both turned to European manufacturers for aid. . . . In the supreme American crisis, agents of both North and South hurried to Europe in quest of munitions. On the Northern side the work was done chiefly by the three ministers, Charles Francis Adams, at London; William L. Dayton, at Paris; and Henry S. Sanford, at Brussels; by an able special agent, Colonel George L. Schuyler; and by the famous banking-house of Baring Brothers, which one might almost have called the European department of the United States Treasury. . . . That the Confederate Government acted even more promptly than the Union Government appears from a letter of Sanford to Seward in May: 'I have vainly expected orders,' he complains, 'for the purchase of arms for the Government, and am tempted to order from Belgium all they can send over immediately. . . . Meanwhile the workshops are filling with orders from the South. . . . It distresses me to think that while we are in want of them, Southern money is taking them away to be used against us.' At London, Adams took it upon himself to contract for arms in advance of instructions. He wrote to Seward: 'Aware of the degree to which I exceed my authority in taking such a step, nothing but a conviction of the need in which the country stands of such assistance and the joint opinion of all the diplomatic agents of the United States . . . in Paris, has induced me to overcome my scruples.' How real was the necessity of which this able diplomat was so early conscious, is demonstrated at every turn in the papers of the War Department. . . . Curiously enough, not only the Confederacy but various States of the North were more expeditious in this all-important matter than Cameron and the War Department. Schuyler's first dispatch from London gives this singular information: 'All private establishments in Birmingham and London are now working for the States of Ohio, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, except the London Armory, whose manufacture is supposed to go to the Rebels, but of this last fact I am not positively informed. I am making arrangements to secure these establishments for our Government, if desirable after the present State contracts expire. On the Continent, Messrs. Dayton and Sanford . . . have been making contracts and agreements of various kinds, of which you are by this time informed.' Soon afterward, from Paris, he made a long report detailing the difficulties of his task, the limitations of the existing munitions plants in Europe, and promising among other things those '48,000 rifles from the French government arsenals' for which, in the letter already quoted, the War Department yearned. . . . The last word on the problem of munitions, which was so significant a factor in the larger problem, is the report of the United States Ordnance Office for the first year of the war. It shows that between April,

1861, and June, 1862, the Government purchased from American manufacturers somewhat over 30,000 rifles, and that from European makers it purchased 726,000. From these illustrations it is therefore obvious that the true measure of the immediate strength of the American contestants in 1861 was the extent of their ability to supply themselves from Europe; and this, stated more concretely, became the question as to which was the better able to keep its ports open and receive the absolutely essential European aid. Lincoln showed his clear realization of the situation when he issued, immediately after the first call for volunteers . . . [the] proclamation blockading the Southern coasts. Whether the Northern people at the time appreciated the significance of this order is a question. Amid the wild and vain clamor of the multitude in 1861, with its conventional and old-fashioned notion of war as a thing of trumpets and glittering armies, the North seems wholly to have ignored its fleet; and yet in the beginning this resource was its only strength. The fleet was small, to be sure, but its task was at first also small. There were few Southern ports which were doing a regular business with Europe, and to close these was not difficult. As other ports opened and the task of blockade grew, the Northern navy also increased. Within a few months, to the few observers who did not lose their heads, it was plain that the North had won the first great contest of the war. It had so hampered Southern trade that Lincoln's advantage in arming the North from Europe was ten to one. At the very time when detractors of Lincoln were hysterical over the removal of Frémont, when Grimes wrote to Fessenden that the country was going to the dogs as fast as imbecility could carry it, this great achievement had quietly taken place. . . . [After the seizure of Port Royal in November], while the open Northern ports received European munitions without hindrance, it was a risky business getting munitions into the ports of the South. Only the boldest traders would attempt to 'run the blockade,' to evade the Federal patrol ships by night and run into a Southern port."—N. W. Stephenson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Union (Chronicles of America Series, v. 29, pp. 168-175)*.—See also NAVY DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES: System since 1842: REVENUE CUTTER SERVICE.

ALSO IN: E. A. Pollard, *Lost cause*, p. 132.—J. Davis, *Rise and fall of the Confederate government*, pp. 315-316.—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution*, pp. 238-239, 242.

1861.—California's attitude towards war.—Union sympathy and aid. See CALIFORNIA: 1861.

1861.—Admission of Kansas into the Union.—Part in Civil War. See KANSAS: 1861; 1861-1865.

1861.—Dakota organized as territory. See DAKOTA TERRITORY: 1859-1862.

1861.—Sanitary Commission established. See SANITARY COMMISSION, AND CHRISTIAN COMMISSION.

1861 (January-February).—Secession of Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, Alabama and Texas.—Opposition of Alexander H. Stephens, in Georgia.—"On the 9th day of January, 1861, the State of Mississippi seceded from the Union. Alabama and Florida followed on the 11th day of the same month; Georgia on the 20th; Louisiana on the 26th; and Texas on the 1st of February. [See also ALABAMA: 1861; GEORGIA: 1861; LOUISIANA: 1850-1861; FLORIDA: 1861 (January).] Thus, in less than three months after the announcement of Lincoln's election, all the Cotton States . . . had seceded from the Union,

and had, besides, secured every Federal fort within their limits, except the forts in Charleston harbor, and Fort Pickens, below Pensacola, which were retained by United States troops."—E. A. Pollard, *First year of the war, ch. 1*.—The secession of Georgia was powerfully but vainly opposed by the foremost citizen of that state, Alexander H. Stephens, whose speech before the legislature of Georgia, in protest against the disruption of the Union, had been one of the notable utterances of the time. "Shall the people of the South," asked Mr. Stephens, "secede from the Union in consequence of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency of the United States? My countrymen, I tell you frankly, candidly, and earnestly, that I do not think that they ought. In my judgment, the election of no man, constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any State to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the constitution of the country. To make a point of resistance to the government, to withdraw from it because a man has been constitutionally elected, puts us in the wrong. We are pledged to maintain the constitution. Many of us have sworn to support it. Can we, therefore, for the mere election of a man to the presidency, and that, too, in accordance with the prescribed forms of the constitution, make a point of resistance to the government, without becoming the breakers of that sacred instrument ourselves, by withdrawing ourselves from it? Would we not be in the wrong? Whatever fate is to befall this country, let it never be laid to the charge of the people of the South, and especially to the people of Georgia, that we were untrue to our national engagements. Let the fault and the wrong rest upon others. . . . The election has been constitutionally held. Were we to make a point of resistance to the government and go out of the Union on that account, the record would be made up hereafter against us. But it is said Mr. Lincoln's policy and principles are against the constitution, and that, if he carries them out, it will be destructive of our rights. Let us not anticipate a threatened evil. If he violates the constitution, then will come our time to act. Do not let us break it because, forsooth, he may. If he does, that is the time for us to strike. I think it would be injudicious and unwise to do this sooner. I do not anticipate that Mr. Lincoln will do anything to jeopardize our safety or security, whatever may be his spirit to do it; for he is bound by the constitutional checks which are thrown around him, which at this time render him powerless to do any great mischief. . . . The House of Representatives is largely in a majority against him. In the very face and teeth of the heavy majority which he has obtained in the northern States, there have been large gains in the House of Representatives to the conservative constitutional party of the country, which here I will call the national democratic party, because that is the cognomen it has at the North. . . . Is this the time, then, to apprehend that Mr. Lincoln, with this large majority in the House of Representatives against him, can carry out any of his unconstitutional principles in that body? In the Senate he will also be powerless. There will be a majority of four against him. . . . Mr. Lincoln will be compelled to ask of the Senate to choose for him a cabinet, if the democracy of that party chose to put him on such terms. He will be compelled to do this, or let the government stop, if the national democratic men (for that is their name at the North), the conservative men in the

Senate, should so determine. Then how can Mr. Lincoln obtain a cabinet which would aid him, or allow him to violate the constitution? Why then, I say, should we disrupt the ties of this Union when his hands are tied—when he can do nothing against us?”—A. H. Stephens, *Speech against secession, Nov. 14, 1860* (H. Cleveland, ed., *Alexander H. Stephens in public and private*).—But when in spite of his exertions, Georgia seceded, Stephens lent his voice to the undertaking which he had proved to be without excuse. (See below: 1861 [March]: Surrender, etc.) During this period the president-elect felt keenly his enforced inaction. “Mr. Lincoln observed that each State, as she went out of the Union, prepared to defend her course if necessary. On November 18, Georgia appropriated \$1,000,000 to arm the State, and in January she seized Forts Pulaski and Jackson and the United States arsenal. Louisiana appropriated all the federal property in her borders, even to the mint and custom-house and the money they contained. Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi were not behind in their seizures, and when the new government was formed at Montgomery, it promptly took up the question of defending its life. Mr. Lincoln was not only obliged to sit inactive and watch this steady dissolution of the Union, but he was obliged to see what was still harder—that the administration which he was to succeed was doing nothing to check the destructionists. Indeed, all through this period proof accumulated that members of Mr. Buchanan’s cabinet had been systematically working for many months to disarm the North and equip the South. The quantity of arms sent quietly from Northern arsenals were so great that the citizens of the towns from which they went became alarmed. . . . And when, in December, the citizens of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, found that 123 cannon had been ordered South from the arsenal there, they made such energetic protests that President Buchanan was obliged to countermand the order of his Secretary of War. . . . [In January 1861 Lincoln said to Judge Gillespie]: ‘I would willingly take out of my life a period in years equal to the two months which intervene between now and my inauguration to take the oath of office now.’ ‘Why?’ I asked. ‘Because every hour adds to the difficulties I am called upon to meet, and the present administration does nothing to check the tendency toward dissolution. I, who have been called to meet this awful responsibility, am compelled to remain here, doing nothing to avert it or lessen its force when it comes to me.’ . . . ‘Joe,’ he said [to the judge], as he was about to leave me, ‘I suppose you will never forget that trial down in Montgomery County, where the lawyer associated with you gave away the whole case in his opening speech. I saw you signalling to him, but you couldn’t stop him. Now, that’s just the way with me and Buchanan. He is giving away the case, and I have nothing to say, and can’t stop him. Good-night.’”—I. M. Tarbell, *Life of Abraham Lincoln, v. 1, pp. 388-389, 406-407*.

ALSO IN: L. Pendleton, *Alexander H. Stephens, pp. 153-170*.—A. H. Stephens, *Constitutional view of the late war between the states, v. 2, pp. 200 ff.*

1861 (February).—Adoption of a constitution for “The Confederate States of America.”—Election of a president and vice president.—On Feb. 4, 1861, concurrently with the meeting of the “peace conference” at Washington “a convention of six seceding states, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, was held at Montgomery, Alabama. They were represented

by 42 persons. Measures were taken for the formation of a provisional government. After the vote on the provisional Constitution was taken, Jefferson Davis was elected President, and Alexander H. Stephens Vice-President of the Confederacy for the current year. The inauguration of Mr. Davis took place on February 18th. Both were shortly after re-elected permanently for six years. . . . The permanent Constitution adopted on March 11, for ‘The Confederate States of America,’ the title now assumed, was modeled substantially on that of the United States. It was remarked that, after all, the old Constitution was the most suitable basis for the new Confederacy. Among points of difference must be noticed that the new instrument broadly recognized, even in its preamble, the contested doctrine of state-rights. . . . At this time Virginia was receiving an annual income of \$12,000,000 from the sale of slaves. . . . Notwithstanding this, the Ordinance of Secession did not pass the Virginia Convention until some weeks subsequently (April 17).”—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War, v. 1, ch. 32*. “The Constitution of the Confederate States . . . declared in the preamble that ‘We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity—invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God—do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of America.’ In article I, section 8, in which are specified the powers of Congress, it is stated: ‘The Congress shall have power—(1) To lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, for revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defence, and carry on the government of the Confederate States; but (and this is the significant passage) no bounties shall be granted from the treasury; nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry’ Finally, the question of slavery was dealt with in a manner that characterized the attitude of the South throughout the years preceding the movement toward secession. Article IV contains the following declarations: Section 2, (1) ‘The citizens of each State shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired.’ . . . (3) ‘No slave escaping or lawfully carried into another [state] shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such slave belongs.’ Section 3, . . . (3) ‘The Confederate State may acquire new territory. In all such territory, the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States shall be recognized and protected by Congress and by the territorial government.’ The first Cabinet consisted of Robert Toombs, of Georgia, secretary of state; Christopher G. Memminger, of South Carolina, secretary of the treasury; Leroy Pope Walker, of Alabama, secretary of war; Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida, secretary of the navy; Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, attorney-general; John H. Reagan, of Texas, postmaster-general. . . . The day after the adoption of the Provisional Constitution, or February 9th, the Confederate Congress declared: ‘That all laws of the United States of America in force and in use in the Confederate States of America on the first day of November



last, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the Confederate States, be and the same are hereby continued in force until altered or repealed by the Congress."—W. R. Garrett and R. A. Halley, *Civil War from a Southern standpoint (History of North America, v. 14, pp. 16-18)*.—"In the Executive department, the Constitution provided, in accordance with the early agreement of the Convention of 1787, that the President should be elected for six years and be ineligible. A seat upon the floor of either House of Congress might be granted to the principal officer in each of the Executive departments with the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to his department. The President was empowered to remove at pleasure the principal officer in each of the Executive departments and all persons connected with the diplomatic service. To give entire control of Cabinet officers and of foreign ministers was considered to be necessary for the proper discharge of the President's duties and for the independence of his department. All other civil officers could be removed when their services were unnecessary, or for dishonesty, inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty, but the removals in such cases, with the reasons therefor, were to be reported to the Senate, and no person rejected by the Senate could be reappointed the same office during the recess of the Senate. The President was empowered, while approving portions of an appropriation bill, to disapprove particular items, as in other like cases of veto. . . . The Judicial department was permitted to remain substantially as it was in the old Government. The only changes were to authorize a tribunal for the investigation of claims against the Government, the withholding from the Federal Courts jurisdiction of suits between citizens of different States, and the enactment of a wise provision that any judicial or other Federal officer, resident and acting solely within the limits of any State, might be impeached by a vote of two thirds of both branches of the Legislature thereof. . . . Uniform laws of naturalization and bankruptcy were authorized, but bankruptcy could not affect debts contracted prior to the passage of the law. A two-thirds vote was made requisite to appropriate money unless asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of the departments. . . . To admit new States required a vote of two thirds of each House, the Senate voting by States. Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembled in their several conventions, Congress could summon a convention to consider amendments to the Constitution, but the convention was confined in its action to propositions suggested by the States making the call. . . . 'The importation of negroes of the African race was forbidden, and Congress was required to pass laws effectually to prevent it.'"—J. L. M. Curry, *Southern states of the American Union, ch. 13*.—Alexander H. Stephens, in his "Constitutional view of the late war between the states," says that a majority of the states were looking to Georgia for the president, and the Georgia delegation had unanimously agreed to present Robert Toombs, who would have been acceptable. But a rumor got currency that Georgia would put forward Howell Cobb, whereupon the other states took up Davis, and united upon him. It was generally understood, says Mr. Stephens, that Davis "did not desire the office of President. He preferred a military position, and the one he desired above all others was the chief command of the army."—A. H. Stephens, *Constitutional view of the war between the states, v. 2, pp. 328-333*.

ALSO IN: R. B. Rhett, *Confederate government*

*at Montgomery (Battles and leaders of the Civil War, v. 1, pp. 99-111)*.—Jefferson Davis, *Rise and fall of the Confederate government, v. 1, pt. 3, ch. 5, and appendix K*.

"To foreign eyes, glancing hastily across the Atlantic, the Northern government seemed no surer of continued existence than the Southern. . . . While Lincoln was delivering his inaugural, the Confederate flag was waving for the first time above the Confederate Capitol at Montgomery. . . . A commission, of which William L. Yancey was chief, was created to proceed at once to Europe and seek recognition and alliance; the confederated States at once turned over to the new government public buildings and other property seized from the United States, including the mint at New Orleans with half a million dollars of national coinage. One utterance above all others at the South at this time demands notice: the address of Alexander H. Stephens, vice-president of the Confederacy, on March 21st, at Savannah, Georgia, on the new constitution which he had sworn to support. 'It amply secures all our ancient rights, franchises, and liberties. All the great principles of Magna Charta are retained in it. No citizen is deprived of life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers under the laws of the land. The great principle of religious liberty, which was the honor and pride of the old Constitution, is still maintained and secured. Some changes have been made. . . . They form great improvements upon the old Constitution. . . . The question of building up class interests, or fostering one branch of industry to the prejudice of another under the exercise of the revenue power, which gave us so much trouble under the old Constitution, is put at rest forever under the new. We allow the imposition of no duty with a view of giving advantage to one class of persons, in any trade or business, over those of another.'"—F. N. Thorpe, *History of North America, v. 15, pp. 228-229*.—"On the third day after my inauguration at Montgomery, an officer of extensive information and high capacity was sent to the North, to make purchases of arms, ammunition, and machinery; and soon afterward another officer was sent to Europe, to buy in the market as far as possible, and, furthermore, to make contracts for arms and munitions to be manufactured. Captain (after Admiral) Semmes, the officer who was sent to the North, would have been quite successful but for the intervention of the civil authorities, preventing the delivery of the various articles contracted for. The officer who was sent to Europe, Major Huse, found few serviceable arms upon the market; he however, succeeded in making contracts for the manufacture of large quantities, being in advance of the agents sent from the Northern Government for the same purpose. . . . Captain Semmes had also been directed to seek for vessels which would serve for naval purposes, and, after his return, reported that he could not find any vessels which in his judgment were, or could be made, available for our uses. The Southern officers of the navy who were in command of United States vessels abroad . . . brought the vessels they commanded into the ports of the North, and, having delivered them to the authorities of the United States Government, generally tendered their resignations, and repaired to the States from which they had been commissioned in the navy."—Jefferson Davis, *Rise and fall of the Confederate government, v. 1, pp. 311, 313*.

ALSO IN: H. A. Wise, *Seven decades of the Union, ch. 15*.—L. G. Tyler, *Letters and times of*

the *Tylers*, v. 2, ch. 20.—L. E. Chittenden, *Report of the debates and proceedings in secret session of the Confederate Convention*, Washington, 1861.—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution*, v. 1, pp. 96-12.—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms*, pp. 19-21, 67, 123-124.—H. Cleveland, *Alexander H. Stephens*.—J. C. Schwab, *Confederate states: A financial and industrial history*.—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 271-272, 286-287.—Jefferson Davis, *Rise and fall of the Confederate government*, v. 1, pp. 229-243, 258-263, 484.

1861 (February).—Peace convention.—The time which elapsed between the organization of the Confederacy and the outbreak of war has been called the "period of hesitancy," during which each side hesitated to commence hostilities, and efforts were still being made to avert them. On January 19, before the Confederate convention was held, the General Assembly of Virginia had adopted resolutions inviting "representatives of the several States to assemble in a Peace Convention at Washington, which met on the 4th of February. It was composed of 133 Commissioners, many from the border States, and the object of these was to prevail upon their associates from the North to unite with them in such recommendations to Congress as would prevent their own States from seceding and enable them to bring back six of the cotton States which had already seceded." On February 15, a committee of the convention reported certain proposed amendments to the constitution which "were substantially the same with the Crittenden Compromise. [See above: 1860 (December): Vain concessions.] . . . The following is a copy: 'In all the present territory of the United States north of the parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature to prevent the taking of such persons from any of the States of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law. When any Territory north or south of said line, within such boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required for a member of Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with or without involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such State may provide.'—F. Bancroft, *Final efforts at compromise (Political Science Quarterly, Sept., 1861)*.—"Ex-president Tyler presided, and the debates were in secret. Threshing over the old straw, they at last advised a constitutional amendment somewhat less favorable to the South than Crittenden's. It was opposed by Virginia and other Southern states. As no one thought it would either satisfy the slave states still in the union or conciliate those which had seceded, the recommendation came to inglorious defeat in the senate. Thus ended the period of hesitation and doubt between the election and the inauguration of Lincoln. Buchanan, indecisive by nature, brought up to believe in the theory of state rights, bound to the South by long years of political and personal association, and unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities of a situation which his enemies had created, came at last to the end of his term without an actual resort

to force. His successor, whose election had precipitated the crisis, must decide what the future would bring forth. The actuality of secession alarmed the business interests and conservative men of the north; and many republicans who flouted the threat of secession in the preceding November now felt that they had gone too far. Such persons turned to Seward, whom they considered the real republican leader. They thought Lincoln inexperienced, and were pleased when it was said that Seward would be secretary of state. Thus, powerful influences worked to make the senator from New York think that he alone could save the country. He was not an idealist, and he seems to have concluded that he must invent some plan by which the South could be conciliated and the seceding states brought back."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 514.—On the Confederate side "President Davis was careful to fill the Cabinet and other important posts with men who represented all phases of opinion, with former rivals and even decided opponents of the cause he represented. So cautious and considered was this program of the new administration that ardent secessionists declared before the fall of Fort Sumter that a reunion with the older Federal Government was the object. And the mild and conciliatory attitude of William H. Seward, who was considered as a sort of acting president during the winter of 1860-61, strengthened this feeling in the South. The Southern commissioners whom Davis sent to Washington to negotiate with the Federal Government on the subjects of boundaries between the two countries, the division of the public debt, and the surrender of forts within Confederate territory were great favorites in the old national capital. A friendly attitude toward the new South still further found expression in the New York *Tribune*, supposed to speak for Republicans in general, in the Albany *Journal*, Thurlow Weed's paper, and even in the New York *Times*, Seward's organ. . . . Nationalist sentiment was strong in the North, but not strong enough to make men positive and decided in their actions. President-elect Lincoln expressed this state of the public mind in his inaugural, when he said that he would faithfully execute the laws unless the people, his rightful masters, should refuse their support, and he showed it still more clearly when he adopted the policy of delay in determining the status of Fort Sumter which his predecessor had so long followed."—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 271-272.

1861 (February).—Urgency of South Carolina for the reduction of Fort Sumter before inauguration of President Lincoln.—"I am perfectly satisfied," wrote Governor Pickens of South Carolina to Howell Cobb, "President of the Provisional Congress" of the Confederacy, in a letter dated Feb. 13, 1861, "that the welfare of the new confederation and the necessities of the State require that Fort Sumter should be reduced before the close of the present administration at Washington. If an attack is delayed until after the inauguration of the incoming President of the United States, the troops now gathered in the capital may then be employed in attempting that which, previous to that time, they could not be spared to do. They dare not leave Washington now and do that which then will be a measure too inviting to be resisted. Mr. Lincoln cannot do more for this State than Mr. Buchanan has done. Mr. Lincoln will not concede what Mr. Buchanan has refused. Mr. Buchanan has placed his refusal upon grounds which determine his reply to six States, as com-



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pletely as to the same demand if made by a single State. If peace can be secured, it will be by the prompt use of the occasion, when the forces of the United States are withheld from our harbor. If war can be averted, it will be by making the capture of Fort Sumter a fact accomplished during the continuance of the present administration, and leaving to the incoming administration the question of an open declaration of war. Such a declaration, separated, as it will be, from any present act of hostilities during Mr. Lincoln's administration, may become to him a matter requiring consideration. That consideration will not be expected of him, if the attack on the fort is made during his administration, and becomes, therefore, as to him, an act of present hostility. Mr. Buchanan cannot resist, because he has not the power. Mr. Lincoln may not attack, because the cause of the quarrel will have been, or may be, considered by him as past. Upon this line of policy I have acted, and upon the adherence to it may be found, I think, the most rational expectation of seeing that fort, which is even now a source of danger to the State, restored to the possession of the State without those consequences which I should so deeply deplore."—*Official records of the War of the Rebellion*, v. 1, p. 256.

1861 (February-March).—Inauguration and inaugural address of President Lincoln.—"Lincoln left Springfield February 11, timed to reach Washington February 23. The journey 'embraced two weeks of official reception by committees, mayors, governors, and legislatures . . . and imposing processions and miles of spectators.' It was an ovation which indicated that the tide of northern feeling was rapidly rising, and that there would be no want of support to the incoming president. As he was leaving Springfield he made a short and touching address at the railway station, fine in thought, and in diction such as made Lincoln one of the great masters of our language. 'I now leave,' he said, 'not knowing when or whether ever I may return, with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannot fail. Trusting in Him who can go with me, and remain with you, and be everywhere for good, let us confidently hope that all will yet be well. To His care commending you, as I hope in your prayers you will commend me, I bid you an affectionate farewell.' The next day, February, 12, addressing the legislature at Indianapolis, he defined 'coercion' and 'invasion,' and gave a hint of the trend of his intention. . . . It is clear that in his view the federation of the United States had become a nation, and that it was for the preservation of nationality that he was about to struggle. . . . In Cincinnati, February 12, he repeated a phrase of his speech made in the same city September 17, 1859, addressed more particularly to Kentuckians, and now having a much weightier meaning: 'We mean to treat you, as near as we possibly can, as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison treated you. We mean to leave you alone, and in no way to interfere with your institutions; to abide by all and every compromise of the Constitution.' Between this date and his arrival in Washington he made twenty-four speeches, some of but a few words. His route included Columbus, Pittsburg, Cleveland, Buffalo, Albany, New York, Trenton, Philadelphia, and Harrisburg, and in each of the capitals of the states through which

he passed he addressed the legislatures. The last hours of Lincoln's journey were complicated by a sudden announcement of a plot to assassinate him as he passed through Baltimore in the night. Against his will, and conscious of the probable effect upon the public, he was induced to leave the party and travel the short remainder of the journey incognito. The step was justified by warnings which, whether well or ill based, were so authoritative as to leave no other proper course. No untoward incident occurred, and at six o'clock on the morning of February 23 Lincoln reached Willard's Hotel in Washington. . . . The inaugural address should have assured the country that no mistake had been made in the selection of its new president; it stands among the glories of Anglo-Saxon literature and thought, a witness to the possibilities of democracy."—F. E. Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War, 1859-1861*, pp. 282-285. —"To the anxious, listening country . . . [the president's] speeches on the journey to Washington were disappointing. Perhaps this strangely sensitive mind felt too powerfully the fatefulness of the moment and reacted with a sort of lightness that did not really represent the real man. Be that as it may, he was never less convincing than at that time. . . . The fourth of March arrived, and with it the end of Lincoln's blundering. One good omen for the success of the new Administration was the presence of Douglas on the inaugural platform. He had accepted fate, deeply as it wounded him. . . . By one of those curious little dramatic touches with which chance loves to embroider history, the presence of Douglas became a gracious detail in the memory of the day. Lincoln, worn and awkward, continued to hold his hat in his hand. Douglas, with the tact born of social experience, stepped forward and took it from him without exposing Lincoln's embarrassment. The inaugural address which Lincoln now pronounced had little similarity to those unfortunate utterances which he had made on the journey to Washington. The cloud that had been over him, whatever it was, had lifted. Lincoln was ready for his great labor. The inaugural contained three main propositions. Lincoln pledged himself not to interfere directly or indirectly with slavery in the States where it then existed; he promised to support the enforcement of the fugitive slave law; and he declared he would maintain the Union. . . . Gentle as was the phrasing of the inaugural, it was perfectly firm, and it outlined a policy which the South would not accept, and which, in the opinion of the Southern leaders, brought them a step nearer war. Wall Street held the same belief, and as a consequence the price of stocks fell."—N. W. Stephenson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Union (Chronicles of America Series, v. 29, pp. 98-100)*.

ALSO IN: I. N. Arnold, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 11-12.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 13.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 3, ch. 10-21.—H. J. Raymond, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 5-6.—I. Tarbell, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, p. 423.

The following is the full text of the inaugural address, from Lincoln's *Complete works*:

"Fellow-Citizens of the United States: In compliance with a custom as old as the government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly, and to take, in your presence, the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to be taken by the President 'before he enters on the

execution of his office.' I do not consider it necessary, at present, for me to discuss those matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or excitement. Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the southern states, that, by the accession of a republican administration, their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches, when I declare that 'I have no purpose directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.' Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this, they placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read: 'Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend, and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.' I now reiterate these sentiments; and in doing so I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration. I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the states when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause—as cheerfully to one section as to another. There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions: 'No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.' It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the law-giver is the law. All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution—to this provision as much as to any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause 'shall be delivered up,' their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not, with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath? There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by state authority; but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done. And should any one, in any case, be content that this

oath shall go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept? Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced, so that a free man be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave? And might it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states'? I take the official oath today with no mental reservations, and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules. And while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them, trusting to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional. It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President under our National Constitution. During that period, fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens have in succession administered the executive branch of the Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope of precedent, I now enter upon the same task, for the brief constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted. I hold that in the contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these states is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself. Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an association of states in the nature of a contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak; but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it? Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen states expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation, in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was 'to form a more perfect Union.' But if the destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the states be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that no state, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence within any state or

states against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances. I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the states. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it so far as practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself. In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States in any interior locality shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego, for the time, the uses of such offices. The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper; and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections. That there are persons, in one section or another, who seek to destroy the Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word to them. To those, however, who really love the Union, may I not speak? Before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes, would it not be wise to ascertain precisely why we do it? Will you hazard so desperate a step, while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from—will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake? All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not. Happily the human mind is so constituted that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this. Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written provision of the Constitution has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority

of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution—certainly would if such a right were a vital one. But such is not our case. All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions in the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by national or by state authority? The Constitution does not expressly say. May Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. Must Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities. If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the Government must cease. There is no other alternative; for continuing the Government is acquiescence on one side or the other. If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which, in turn, will divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority refused to be controlled by such minority. For instance, why may not any portion of a new Confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this. Is there such perfect identity of interests among the states to compose a new Union as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession? Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism, in some form, is all that is left. I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government; and while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having

to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon the Court of Judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seeks to turn their decisions to political purposes. One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, cannot be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived, without restriction, in one section, while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other. Physically speaking, we cannot separate; we cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you. This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. I cannot be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should, under existing circumstances, favor, rather than oppose, a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions originated by others not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution—which amendment, however, I have not seen—has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the states, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from

my purpose not to speak of particular amendments, so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable. The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of the states. The people themselves can do this also if they choose, but the Executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present government as it came to his hands, and to transmit it unimpaired by him to his successor. Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people. By the frame of the Government under which we live, this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief; and have with equal wisdom provided for the return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the Government in the short space of four years. My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an object to hurry any of you, in hot haste, to a step which you would never take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there still is no single good reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulty. In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect, and defend it.' I am loth to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break, our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

1861 (March).—President Lincoln and his cabinet.—Secretary Seward.—"Lincoln preferred that his cabinet should be representative rather than harmonious. William H. Seward, of New York, secretary of state, had been a Whig and was now leader of the conservative Republicans. Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, secretary of the treas-



ury, had been a Democrat and now represented the more radical Republicans. Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, secretary of war, stood with Chase. Edward Bates, of Missouri, attorney-general, voiced the loyal sentiment of the border states; Gideon Welles, of Connecticut, secretary of the navy, the more conservative New England ideas; Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, secretary of the interior, a noted stump-speaker, those of the West. Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, postmaster-general—who, with his father and brother, Francis P. Blair, senior and junior constituted the 'Blair family,' an able and widely influential trio—like Bates, stood for border-state ideas. A little later we shall see Lincoln taking into his cabinet Edwin M. Stanton, a Democrat and outspoken personal calumniator. At the Chicago convention, Seward, Chase, Cameron, and Bates had been rivals of Lincoln for the nomination."—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, pp. 21-23, 95.—"Explain Lincoln by any theory you will, his personality was the keystone of the Northern arch; subtract it, and the arch falls. The popular element being a complex and powerful as it was, how could the presiding statesman have mastered the situation if he had not been of so peculiar a sort that he could influence all these diverse and powerful interests, slowly, by degrees, without heat, without the imperative note, almost in silence, with the universal, enfolding irresistibility of the gradual things in nature, of the sun and the rain. Such was the genius of Lincoln—all but passionless, yet so quiet that one cannot but believe in the great depth of his nature."—N. W. Stephenson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Union (Chronicles of America Series, v. 20, p. 136)*.—"Disappointed at not being President and equally disturbed at the prospect of civil war, but still inclined to large and sanguine hopes . . . [Seward] was rather anxious to take things out of Lincoln's hands and very anxious to serve his country as the great peacemaker. Indirect negotiations now took place between him and the Southern Commissioners, who of course could not be officially recognised, through the medium of two Supreme Court Judges. . . . Seward was quite loyal to Lincoln and told him in a general way what he was doing; he was also candid with Campbell and his friends, and explained to them his lack of authority, but he talked freely and rashly of what he hoped to bring about. Lincoln gave Seward some proper cautions and left him all proper freedom. . . . The upshot of the matter is that the decision of the Government was delayed by negotiations which, as it ought to have known, could come to nothing, and that the Southern Government and the Commissioners, after they had got home, thought they had been deceived in these negotiations. Discussions were still proceeding as to Fort Sumter when a fresh difficulty arose for Lincoln, but one which enabled him to become henceforth master of his Cabinet. . . . Upon April 1 [Seward] sent to Lincoln 'Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration.' In this paper, after deploring what he described as the lack of any policy so far, and defining, in a way that does not matter, his attitude as to the forts in the South, he proceeded thus: 'I would demand explanations from Great Britain and Russia and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to raise a vigorous spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention, and if satisfactory explanations are not received

from Spain and France, would convene Congress and declare war against them.' In other words, Seward would seek to end all domestic dissensions by suddenly creating out of nothing a dazzling foreign policy. But this was not the only point, even if it was the main point; he proceeded: 'Either the President must do it' (that is the sole conduct of this policy) 'himself, or devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. It is not my especial province. But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.' . . . In his brief reply Lincoln . . . pointed out that the policy so far, as to which Seward had complained, was one in which Seward had entirely concurred. As to the concluding demand that some one man, and that man Seward, should control all policy, he wrote, 'If this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet.' Seward . . . was one of the ablest men in America, only at that moment strained and excited beyond the limits of his good sense. Lincoln's quiet answer sobered him then and for ever after. He showed a generous mind; he wrote to his wife soon after: 'Executive force and vigour are rare qualities; the President is the best of us.'—Lord Charnwood, *Abraham Lincoln (Makers of the nineteenth century, pp. 210-211)*.

ALSO IN: C. Schurz, *Abraham Lincoln*, pp. 67-73.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 3, ch. 22, 26.—A. Rothschild, *Lincoln, master of men*, ch. 4.—I. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 3, pp. 319-342.—T. K. Lothrop, *William Henry Seward*, pp. 247-262.—A. B. Hart, *Salmon Portland Chase*, pp. 209-210.—M. W. Conway, *Autobiography*, v. 1, pp. 350-351.

1861 (March).—Surrender of Alexander H. Stephens to secession.—His "corner-stone" speech at Savannah.—The following is from a speech made by Alexander H. Stephens at Savannah, on the evening after the secession of Georgia, which he had opposed, but to which he now yielded himself without reserve. It is a speech that became famous on account of its bold declaration that slavery formed the "cornerstone" of the New Confederacy. "The new constitution," said Stephens, "has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the 'rock upon which the old Union would split.' He was right. What was conjecture with him, is now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of that day was that, somehow or other in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the consti-

tution, was the prevailing idea at that time. The constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly urged against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the government built upon it fell when the 'storm came and the wind blew.' Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests upon the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical and moral truth. This truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of science. It has been so even amongst us."—A. H. Stephens, *Speech in Savannah, Mar. 21, 1861* (H. Cleveland, ed., *Alexander H. Stephens in public and private*).

1861 (March).—On the verge of war.—"In spite of the critical situation in Charleston harbor and the perplexity of the administration at Washington; in spite of the failure of the congressional committees to agree on a plan of conciliation; in spite of the rapid secession of the cotton states in January and the formation of a Southern Confederacy at Montgomery, Alabama, on the fourth of February, 1861; in spite of the fact that the *Star of the West*, . . . flying the American flag at her masthead, had been fired upon and turned back by the batteries of Charleston harbor,—the great majority of the citizens of both sections refused to believe that the gates of the temple of Janus were really to be thrown open. War was a horrid thought. The country was prosperous, and a hundred projects of industrial enterprise and social reform were stirring in the American mind. However severe the temporary setback of the panic of 1857, there was no effect of it visible in 1860. Our population during the decade had increased from 23,191,876 to 31,443,322.—a gain of 35.59 per cent. The increase in the city population was 78.62 per cent. The farm, to be sure, still maintained its lead over the factory in 1860, when our agricultural products were valued at \$1,913,000,000 (as much as farm products and manufactures combined in 1850), with manufactures running a very close second at \$1,885,862,000."—D. S. Muzey, *United States of America, v. 1, p. 529*.—"Both the President and Congress formally announced that it was a struggle for the maintenance of the Union and not a war on behalf of the slaves. It was well that this position was taken, else the North might have broken into impotent factions. The East hated the South and warred upon their ancient rivals, the planters; the border States owned slaves, disliked the Republican party, and feared the purposes of those in power; while the West loved the Union, held the negro in contempt, and was committed to the party in power on the smallest possible margin. . . . The people of the North were not willing to invade the sister States of the South for any other cause than to restore the Union. Wealthy bankers, industrial leaders, and railway magnates might be kept together on a platform of enlarging the area of their operations, but

never on a program which proposed the confiscation of billions of dollars' worth of property, which the slaves represented."—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict, pp. 289-290*.—"The anti-slavery men who were abolitionists were little more numerous in 1860 than they had been in 1840, and those who spoke for the Republicans vehemently disclaimed all alliance or sympathy with them. But, though they did not mean to lay the axe to the root of the tree [they] . . . did mean to gird it about and let it die where it stood, as one of the senators from Louisiana passionately told them. They meant by law and force to keep slavery from getting any growth or outlet whatever. They meant also to nullify, if they could not repeal, the laws whose adoption the constitution commanded for the apprehension and return of runaway slaves, and put the whole system of slavery, so far as they might within the formal limits of the fundamental law, beyond the recognition or countenance of federal statute. Their creed and their actions alike were compounded of hostility towards the South; and the challenge of their success was direct and unmistakable. Men of southern mettle could not disregard or decline it. Pride and self-vindication seemed the more imperatively to command that it should be accepted by the southerners because of what their opponents had said, with sneer and taunt and bitter detraction, about the system of slavery, which they maintained and stood for. . . . The system of slavery necessarily deprived the South of a body of small, yeomen farmers; but small farms abounded, nevertheless. A great majority of the southern farmers owned no slaves at all. . . . It was the accusation of moral guilt in the matter of slavery that stung the southern men most intolerably. . . . Many a thoughtful man amongst them saw with keen disquietude how like an incubus slavery lay upon the South; how it demoralized masters who were weak, burdened masters who were strong, and brought upon all alike enormous, hopeless economic loss. . . . That very fact, their very consciousness that they exercised a good conscience in these matters, made them the more keenly sensitive to the bitter attacks made upon them at the North, the more determined now to assert themselves, though it were by revolution, when they saw a party whose chief tenet seemed to be the iniquity of the South, about to take possession of the federal government. They had the inevitable haughty pride of a privileged class. Probably not more than one white man out of every five in the South was a slave holder; not more than half had even the use or direction of slaves. Hundreds of the merchants, lawyers, physicians, ministers who were the natural ruling spirits of the towns owned none. But the men who were slave owners were the masters of politics and of society. Their sensibilities were for all practical purposes the sensibilities of the South; and for close upon forty years now it had seemed as if at every turn of the country's history those sensibilities must be put upon the rack."—W. Wilson, *History of the American people, v. 4, pp. 190, 192, 194-195, 197, 199*.—"Slavery, so called, or that legal subordination of the black race to the white, which existed in all but one of the States, when the Union was formed, and in fifteen of them when the war began, was unquestionably the occasion of the war, the main exciting proximate cause on both sides, on the one as well as the other, but it was not the real cause,

the 'Cause causes' of it. That was the assumption on the part of the Federal authorities, that the people of the several States were . . . citizens of the United States, and owed allegiance to the Federal Government, as the absolute Sovereign power over the whole country, consolidated into one Nation. The war . . . grew out of different and directly opposite views as to the nature of the Government of the United States, and where, under our system, ultimate Sovereign power or Paramount authority properly resides. Considerations connected with the legal status of the Black race in the Southern States, and the position of several of the Northern States toward it, together with the known sentiments and principles of those just elected to the two highest offices of the Federal Government (Messrs. Lincoln and Hamlin), as to the powers of that Government over this subject, and others which threatened, as was supposed, all their vital interests, prompted the Southern States to withdraw from the Union, for the very reason that had induced them at first to enter into it: that is, for their own better protection and security. Those who had the control of the Administration of the Federal Government, denied this right to withdraw or secede. The war was inaugurated and waged by those at the head of the Federal Government, against these States, to prevent their withdrawal from the Union. On the part of these States, which had allied themselves in a common cause, it was maintained and carried on purely in defense of this great Right, claimed by them, of State Sovereignty and Self-government, which they with their associates had achieved in their common struggle with Great Britain, under the Declaration of 1776, and which, in their judgment, lay at the foundation of the whole structure of American free Institutions."—A. H. Stephens, *Constitutional view of the late war between the states*, v. 1, pp. 28-30.—"The war should not be so depicted as to imply that the North and the South differed and quarrelled about the same things. That was not the fact. The questions presented to the men of the North were not the same as those with which their Southern contemporaries had to deal. . . . Mr. Trescott, Assistant Secretary of State in Mr. Buchanan's administration, in his account of the discussions in the Cabinet in the autumn of 1860, gives a forcible picture of this fundamental difference when he is describing the position of his immediate chief, General Cass, then Secretary of State: Not recognizing any right in a State to secede except as a revolutionary measure, he would have resisted the attempt at the commencement, and, as the sworn officer of the United States, he would have done his utmost to preserve its integrity. 'I speak to Cobb,' he would say, 'and he tells me he is a Georgian; to Floyd, and he tells me he is a Virginian; to you, and you tell me you are a Carolinian. I am not a Michigander; I am a citizen of the United States!' Such radical differences as these actually existed among the representative statesmen of the country in the year 1860, however difficult it may be for the present generation to appreciate the fact. It is not possible to exaggerate the importance of these conceptions of political duty; for they directly affected the attitude of every man towards the questions of the day. If a man held that his State was his country, it was his duty, if he proposed to be a patriotic citizen, to serve under the flag of his State. . . . The attitude

. . . which the seceding States assumed towards the States which remained in the Union was that of foreign nations, as one by one they adopted their ordinances of secession, and withdrew their Senators and Representatives from Congress. And there can be no reasonable doubt that when, in any State, the ordinance of secession had been adopted, the people of that State—or the great majority of them at least—felt that their allegiance was now due solely to their State; and even those persons who had strongly and earnestly opposed the secession movement . . . felt themselves none the less bound loyally to serve their State, now that it had seceded. . . . They were not, in their own opinion, rebels at all; they were defending their States—that is, the nations to which they conceived themselves to belong—from invasion and conquest. . . . The attitude of the South was from the beginning one of resistance to the uttermost; it was, in fine, the attitude of a nation, repelling invasion, dismemberment, conquest. . . . It is of the first importance that we should recognize the grounds of this well-nigh universal feeling among the Southern people, if we would understand the causes of the unanimity and devotion with which they, for four long years, withstood the armies of the United States. The populations of the States which remained in the Union, though of many different minds during the winter of 1860 and 1861, were yet, after the war had fairly commenced, substantially agreed upon a policy of active interference. Without concerning themselves to dispute the truth of the contention that the original thirteen States were, when they adopted the Constitution, thirteen independent nations, the Northern people were very certain that in 1861 at any rate the United States constituted but one nation. They were not very clear as to the legal or the political effect on a State of an ordinance of secession, but they were very clear indeed that the United States Government lost none of its jurisdiction by reason of such an act having passed a State legislature. The feeling that they were citizens of a great country, inheritors of a noble history, charged with the important task of preserving intact the great republic of the world, inspired the people of the North with a determination to maintain the integrity of the nation, at any cost."—J. C. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pt. 1, pp. iii-iv, 3-5.—"When . . . war broke out in 1861, the last of the framers of the constitution had been a score of years in his grave; but evidence is conclusive that until the decennium between 1830 and 1840 the belief was nearly universal that in case of a final, unavoidable issue, sovereignty resided in the State, and to it allegiance was due. . . . But it naturally came to pass that in many of the States a generation grew up, dating from the War of 1812, who, gravitating steadily and more and more strongly to nationality, took a wholly different view of allegiance. For them Story laid down the law; Webster was their mouthpiece; at one time it looked as if Jackson was to be their armed exponent. They were, moreover, wholly within their right. The sovereignty was confessedly divided; and it was for them to elect. The movements of both science and civilization were behind the nationalists. The railroad obliterated State lines, while it unified the nation. What did the foreign immigrants, now swarming across the ocean care for States? They knew only the nation. Brought up in

Europe, the talk of State sovereignty was to them foolishness. Its alphabet was incomprehensible. . . . Then the inevitable issue arose; and it arose over African slavery; and slavery was sectional. The States south of a given line were arrayed against the States north of that line. Owing largely to slavery, and the practical exclusion of immigrants because thereof, the States of the South had never undergone nationalization at all to the extent those of the North had undergone it. The growing influence and power of the national government, the sentiment inspired by the wars in which we had been engaged, the rapidly improving means of communication and intercourse, had produced their effects in the South; but in degree far less than in the North. Thus the curious result was brought about, when, at last, the long-deferred issue confronted the country. . . . Those who believed in national sovereignty constituted the conservative majority, striving for the preservation of what then was,—the existing nineteenth-century nation,—while those who passionately adhered to State sovereignty, treading in the footsteps of the fathers, had become eighteenth-century reactionists. Legally, each had a right on his side. The theory of a divided sovereignty had worked itself out to its logical consequence . . . and every man had to 'speak or die.' In the North the situation was simple. State and Nation stood together. The question of allegiance did not present itself, for the two sovereignties merged. It was otherwise in the South; and there the question became, not legal or constitutional, but practical. The life of the nation had endured so long, the ties and ligaments had become so numerous and interwoven, that, all theories to the contrary notwithstanding, a peaceable secession from the Union—a virtual exercise of State sovereignty—had become impossible. . . . That after seventy years of union and nationalization, a peaceable and friendly taking to pieces was possible, is now, as then it was, scarcely thinkable. . . . In other words, practical Secession was revolution theoretically legal. . . . Lee, with intuitive common-sense, struck the nail squarely on the head when amidst the Babel of discordant tongues he wrote to his son: 'It is idle to talk of secession'; the national government as it then was 'can only be dissolved by revolution.' That struggle of dissolution might be longer and fiercer,—as it was,—or shorter, and more wordy than blood-letting,—as the seceding States confidently believed would prove to be the case,—but a struggle there would be. Historically, such were the conditions to which natural processes of development had brought the common country at the mid-decennium of the century."—C. F. Adams, *Studies, military and diplomatic, 1775-1885*, pp. 297, 299-302.

ALSO IN: J. F. Rhodes, *Lectures on the American Civil War*, pp. 4-6.—O. P. Temple, *East Tennessee and the Civil War*, pp. 308-312.—E. A. Pollard, *Lost cause*, p. 75.—C. E. Merriam, *American political theories*, ch. 6.

1861 (March-April).—Opening of hostilities by attack on Fort Sumter.—President Lincoln's statement of the circumstances.—His first difficulties.—Attitude of border states.—"The Cabinet of Buchanan had been undecided, that of Lincoln was for a whole month equally undecided. Men hoped to avoid what all feared, civil war; and it is to the credit of both sections and both cabinets that they hesitated to commit the overt act which was to set free the 'dogs of war.' . . . Conservative members of Congress, John J. Critten-

den, Stephen A. Douglas, William H. Seward, and others, labored . . . [to avert the threatened strife]. It is acknowledged by all that a popular referendum would have brought an overwhelming mandate to let the 'departing sisters go in peace,' or to accept the former Southern demand of a division of the western territory from Kansas to the Pacific along the line of 36° 30'. But stiff-backed Republicans like Senator Chandler, of Michigan, Charles Sumner, and Secretary Chase were unwilling to throw away the results of a victory constitutionally won, even to avoid a long and bloody war. And these men brought all the influence they could command to bear upon the President and his Cabinet during the early days of April. They contended that every moment of delay increased the likelihood of Southern success. . . . At last President Lincoln yielded, and a relief expedition was ordered to Fort Sumter on April 6, where Major Robert Anderson and his garrison had bravely and cautiously maintained their difficult situation in the face of any angry Southern sentiment for nearly four months. This was recognized as a warlike move; and Secretary Seward was so much opposed to it and, the Southerners contended, so sacredly bound not to allow its departure, that he interfered with the expedition, by sending orders, signed by himself for the President, intended to thwart the move."—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 272-274.—The president's delay of action in the case of Fort Sumter was mainly due, on the political side of the question, to the state of things in the border states—especially in Virginia. "There were fifteen slave states . . . [but] at the time of the inauguration, only seven of these fifteen—less than a majority—had revolted. The cotton states alone had followed the lead of South Carolina out of the Union. Such a confederacy could not hope to live a year, and would be obliged to find its way back into the Union upon some terms. In the meantime, two or three conventions in the border states [Virginia, Apr. 4, and Missouri, March], delegated freshly from the people, had voted distinctly and decidedly not to secede. [Kentucky and Tennessee had refused even the call of conventions; while North Carolina, Feb. 28, and Arkansas, Mar. 18, of the states farther south, had voted secession down.] The affairs of the confederacy were really in a very precarious condition when Mr. Lincoln came into power. . . . It became Mr. Lincoln's policy so to conduct affairs as to strengthen the Union feeling in the border states [see also BORDER STATES, and to give utterance to no sentiment and to do no deed which should drive these states toward the confederacy. . . . [The Confederate Congress] passed a measure for the organization of an army, on the 9th of March, and on the 12th two confederate commissioners—Mr. Forsyth of Alabama and Mr. Crawford of Georgia—presented themselves at the State Department at Washington for the purpose of making a treaty with the United States. . . . The President would not recognize them, but sent to them a copy of his Inaugural, as the embodiment of the views of the government. . . . In the meantime [April 8] Lieutenant Talbot, on behalf of Mr. Lincoln, was having interviews with Governor Pickens of South Carolina and with General Beauregard, in command of the confederate forces there, in which he informed them that provisions would be sent to Fort Sumter, peaceably if possible,—otherwise by force. . . . [Talbot was refused permission to visit Anderson in the fort.] The wisdom of Mr.

Lincoln's waiting became evident at a day not too long delayed. Fort Pickens . . . was quietly reinforced [April 12], when the vessels which carried the relief [to Sumter] were dispatched, Mr. Lincoln gave official information to General Beauregard that provisions were to be sent to Major Anderson in Fort Sumter, by an unarmed vessel. He was determined that no hostile act on the part of the government should commence the war, for which both sides were preparing; although an act of open war had already transpired in Charleston harbor. . . . [On January 9, two months before the president's inauguration, the *Star of the West*, sent down with provisions and reinforcements for Anderson, had been driven off.]"—J. G. Holland, *Life of Lincoln*, ch. 18.—"Major Anderson, who held the fort with a small Federal garrison, was a friend of Jefferson Davis, and was keenly alive to the seriousness of his situation, and while his superiors were in doubt, he

time 5,000 Confederate troops, under Beauregard, lay around the place. Davis still delayed, giving conditional orders to Beauregard; and Beauregard acted in the same spirit when he sent Roger A. Pryor and three other aides to the fort to get definite assurance on the point of Federal surrender. But when Anderson, on the night of April 12, gave assurance that on April 15 he would give up his post if he should not receive contrary orders from Washington prior to that time, the four aides of General Beauregard who had been sent to the fort gave notice to the Confederate artillery commander, without consulting superior authority, that the answer was not satisfactory, and the fatal shelling began. On the next day Anderson and his men, finding the walls of the fort falling about them, surrendered. The war had begun."—W. A. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, pp. 274-275.—"Major Anderson saluted his flag with fifty guns, and with his command, was



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maintained the status of things as they were when the negotiations began. But the authorities of South Carolina forbade the sending of fresh supplies of provisions to his men after April 6, and, as there was but a limited amount on hand, it was only a matter of weeks before he must evacuate, if neither the North nor the South decided what should be done. April 15 was the day which he set for giving up his post for the lack of sustenance. If he moved away peacefully, there would be no war, and such was the hope of Seward and the moderates of the North, who thought that a friendly reconstruction would be the result of continued delay. Jefferson Davis, who was informed daily of every move that was made in Washington, determined to let Anderson quietly evacuate Fort Sumter, having assurances from Seward that no supplies would be sent. In this he was supported by the unanimous opinion of his Cabinet until on April 9, when General P. G. T. Beauregard, who commanded the troops gathering at Charleston, telegraphed that the Federal Government had given formal notice that assistance would be sent to the starving garrison. At this

conveyed to the fleet outside, to be taken to New York."—J. C. Ropes, *Story of Civil War*, pt. 1, p. 85.—"The circumstances under which the first blow of the Civil War was struck by the Confederacy at Charleston were recited by President Lincoln, in his message to Congress, at the special session convened July 4, 1861: "On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was by that department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer that reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with

Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the army and the navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the government. . . . In a purely military point of view, this reduced the duty of the administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship 'Brooklyn' into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding the 'Sabine,' to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the 'Brooklyn,' acting upon some quasi armistice of the late administration (and of the existence of which the present administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible—rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced preparing an expedition as well adapted as might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately used, or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward. As had been intended in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the governor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw in man, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given; whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition. It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 56-57.

ALSO IN: F. W. Seward, *Seward at Washington*, ch. 56.—S. W. Crawford, *Genesis of the Civil War: Story of Sumter*, ch. 24-32.—A. Doubleday, *Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie*, ch. 8-11.—A. Roman, *Military operations of General Beauregard*, v. 1, ch. 2-4.—*Battles and leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1, pp. 40-83.—S. L. Woodford,

*Story of Fort Sumter (Personal recollections of the war: New York Commandery Loyal Legion of the United States)*.—F. E. Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War*, ch. 12-10.

1861 (April).—President Lincoln's call to arms.—Mighty uprising of the North.—Response of governors.—"The effect produced by the capture of Fort Sumter was instantaneous and universal throughout the North. No one who did not witness the patriotic enthusiasm of that moment can form any conception of it. It was, in truth, simply magnificent. The Northern public trembled with indignation at the news of the unprovoked attack on Anderson's little garrison, of the outrage committed in compelling the flag of the country to be lowered from the ramparts of Fort Sumter. The sentiment of the people was strong, and outspoken beyond measure; it was also universal. . . . The Northern people felt that their forbearance had been despised, that their toleration had been repaid by violence, and that the time for action had come. They were ready for war, and for war to the bitter end. President Lincoln, who, with his marvellous sagacity for divining the sentiment of the country, did not need to wait until it had been expressed through the ordinary organs of public opinion, instantly saw his opportunity."—J. C. Ropes, *Story of Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 90-91.—"By the next morning (Sunday April 14) the news of the close of the bombardment and capitulation of Sumter was in Washington. In the forenoon, at the time Anderson and his garrison were evacuating the fort, Lincoln and his Cabinet, together with sundry military officers, were at the Executive Mansion, giving final shape to the details of the action the Government had decided to take. A proclamation, drafted by himself, copied on the spot by his secretary, was concurred in by his Cabinet, signed, and sent to the State Department to be sealed, filed, and copied for publication in the next morning's newspapers. The document bears date April 15 (Monday), but was made and signed on Sunday." It was as follows:

"Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the State authorities through the War Department. I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular government; and to redress wrongs already long enough endured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation,

any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country. And I hereby command the persons composing the combination aforesaid to disperse and retire peacefully to their respective abodes within twenty days from date. Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their respective chambers, at twelve o'clock noon, on Thursday the fourth day of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to demand. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this 15th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."

—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, p. 34.

"In view of the subsequent gigantic expansion of the civil war, eleventh-hour critics continue to insist that a larger force should have been called at once. They forget that this was nearly five times the then existing regular army; that only very limited quantities of arms, equipments, and supplies were in the Northern arsenals; that the treasury was bankrupt; and that an insignificant eight million loan had not two weeks before been discounted nearly six per cent. by the New York bankers, some bids ranging as low as eighty-five. They forget that the shameful events of the past four months had elicited scarcely a spark of war feeling; that the loyal States had suffered the siege of Sumter and firing on the 'Star of the West' with a dangerous indifference. They forget the doubt and dismay, the panic of commerce, the division of counsels, the attacks from within, the sneers from without—that faith seemed gone and patriotism dead. Twenty-four hours later all this was measurably changed. . . . War sermons from pulpits; war speeches in every assemblage; tenders of troops; offers of money; military proclamations and orders in every newspaper; every city radiant with bunting; every village-green a mustering ground; war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or town council; war preparations in every public or private workshop; gun-casting in the great foundries, cartridge-making in the principal towns; camps and drills in the fields; parades drum, flags, and bayonets in the streets; knitting, bandage-rolling and lint-scraping in nearly every household. . . . Within the space of a month the energy and intelligence of the country were almost completely turned from the industries of peace to the activities of war."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 4, ch. 4-5.—"In intelligence no army, except perhaps the Athenian, can have ever equalled or approached that of the North. Most of the soldiers carried books and writing materials in their knapsacks, and mail bags heavily weighted with letters were sent from every cantonment. . . . In wealth, in the means of providing the weapons and ammunitions of war, the North had an immense advantage, which, combined with that of numbers, could not fail, if, to use Lincoln's homely phrase, it 'pegged away,' to tell in the end. It was also vastly superior in mechanical invention; which

was destined to play a great part, and in mechanical skill; almost every Yankee regiment was full of mechanics, some of whom could devise as well as execute. In artillery and engineering the North took the lead from the first, having many civil engineers, whose conversion into military civil engineers was easy. The South, to begin with, had the contents of Federal arsenals and armouries. . . . But when these resources were exhausted, replacement was difficult, the blockade having been established, though extraordinary efforts in the way of military manufacture were made. To the wealthy North, besides its own factories, were opened the markets of England and the world. Of the small regular army the Confederacy had carried off a share, with nearly half the regular officers. The South had the advantage of the defensive, which, with long-range muskets and in a difficult country, was reckoned in battle as five to two. The South had the superiority of the unity, force, and secrecy which autocracy lends to the operations of war. On the side of the North these were comparatively wanting."—Goldwin Smith, *United States*, ch. 5.—"In six of the eight slave-labor states included in the call, the president's proclamation and the requisition of the secretary of war "were treated by the authorities with words of scorn and defiance. The exceptions were Maryland and Delaware. In the other States, disloyal Governors held the reins of power. 'I have only to say,' replied Governor Letcher of Virginia, 'that the militia of this State will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an object, in my judgment, not within the province of the Constitution or the Act of 1795—will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and, having done so, we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the Administration has exhibited toward the South.' Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, answered:—Your dispatch is received, and if genuine, which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt, I have to say in reply, that I regard the levy of troops, made by the Administration for the purpose of subjugating the States of the South, as in violation of the Constitution, and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina.' Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, replied:—Your dispatch is received. I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.' Governor Harris, of Tennessee, said:—Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but 50,000, if necessary, for the defense of our rights, or those of our Southern brethren.' Governor Rector, of Arkansas, replied: 'In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas to subjugate the Southern States, I have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury.' . . . Governor Jackson, of Missouri, responded: 'There can be, I apprehend, no doubt that these men are intended to make war upon the seceded States. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholy

crusade.' . . . Governor Hicks, of Maryland, appalled by the presence of great dangers, and sorely pressed by the secessionists on every side, hastened, in a proclamation, to assure the people of his State that no troops would be sent from Maryland unless it might be for the defense of the National Capital, and that they (the people) would, in a short time, 'have the opportunity afforded them, in a special election for members of the Congress of the United States, to express their devotion to the Union, or their desire to see it broken up.' Governor Burton, of Delaware, made no response until the 26th, when he informed the President that he had no authority to comply with his requisition. At the same time he recommended the formation of volunteer companies for the protection of the citizens and property of Delaware, and not for the preservation of the Union. . . . In the seven excepted Slave-labor States in which insurrection prevailed, the proclamation and the requisition produced hot indignation, and were assailed with the bitterest scorn. . . . Even in the Free-labor States, there were vehement opposers of the war policy of the Government from its inception." But, speaking generally, "the uprising of the people of the Free-labor States in defense of Nationality was a sublime spectacle."—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: F. Moore, ed., *Rebellion record*, v. 1. —W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history of the Rebellion*, ch. 4-6.

1861 (April).—The South at the opening of the war.—"The popular excitement and enthusiasm . . . in the South equaled that which marked the early stages of the French Revolution. Party lines and class distinctions disappeared. Two hundred thousand volunteers offered their services to Jefferson Davis; confederate and state bonds to meet the expense of the war were taken at par wherever there was surplus money; men met at their court-houses to drill without the call of their officers; and women, even more enthusiastic than the men, urged their 'guardians and protectors' to the front to meet and vanquish a foe who threatened to invade the Southern soil. Armories were quickly constructed in a country which knew little of the mechanic arts; guns and ammunition were ordered from Europe and from Northern manufacturers as fast as trusty agents could make arrangements; shipbuilding was resorted to on the banks of the sluggish rivers; and machinists and sailors were imported from the North and from England to guide the amateurish hands of the South. Before midsummer four hundred thousand Southerners were in arms or waiting to receive them. Colonel Robert E. Lee, accounted the first soldier of the country, was made a general in the new army. Joseph E. Johnston, Albert Sidney Johnston, Pierre G. T. Beauregard, and others accepted with confidence the commissions of the South, and set hundreds of younger men, trained at West Point or at the Virginia Military Institute, to drilling and organizing the armies rapidly gathering at strategic points along the frontier, which extended from Norfolk, Virginia, to the eastern border at Kansas. The planters had at last made good their threat, and the aristocratic society of the South was welded together more firmly than it had ever been before. Their leaders frankly stated to the world that their . . . billions of negro property was of more importance to them than any federal union which threatened the value of that property by narrowing the limits of its usefulness. The negroes

knew a great war was beginning and that they were the objects of contention; but long discipline and a curious pride in the prowess of their masters kept them at their lowly but important tasks. They boasted that their masters could 'whip the world in arms.' Of insurrections and the massacre of the whites, which at one time had been a nightmare to the ruling classes of the South, there was no rumor. And throughout the four years of war the slaves remained faithful and produced by their steady, if slow, toil the food supplies both for the people at home and for the armies at the front. The small slaveholder was the most enthusiastic and resolute secessionist and supporter of the Confederacy. He was just rising in the world, and anything which barred the upward way was denounced as degrading and insulting. A larger class of Southerners who joined with measured alacrity the armies of defense were the small farmers of the hills and poor eastern counties: but the 'sand-hillers' and 'crackers,' the illiterate and neglected by-products of the planter counties, were not minded to volunteer, though under pressure they became good soldiers because they dreaded the prospect of hordes of free negroes in the South more than they did the guns of the North. Small farmers and landless whites all felt the necessity of holding the slaves in bondage, and thus a society of sharp class distinctions, openly acknowledged by all, was moulded into a solid phalanx by the proposed invasion of the South and the almost certain liberation of the slaves. Moreover, the churches of the South, including the Catholics in New Orleans, Charleston, and elsewhere, were now at the height of their power. Planters, farmers, and the so-called 'poor whites' acknowledged the importance of religious faith and discipline; and the leaders of the churches, from the bishops of the Episcopalians to the humble pastors of negro congregations freely gave their blessings to slavery and urged their membership to heroic sacrifice for the common cause."—W. E. Dodd, *Extension and conflict*, pp. 276-278.—"In resources the South were even more inferior to the North than in population, for they had next to no manufacturing power, and their people did not take to this work. Their railway repair shops, etc., were mostly worked by Northerners, who went back before war broke out, so that the South were even worse off than they seemed to be, and could not use to the best advantage the works that they had, to keep their railways in repair during the War. At the beginning of it there were no works in the country which could roll a 2½ inch plate, cast a gun, or make a marine engine, except the Tredegar Works at Richmond; and, when the Confederacy started, Virginia had not seceded. There were also works at Atlanta (Georgia), at Selma (Alabama), and at New Orleans; but when this latter city was taken, their difficulties, especially of railroad repair, increased very much. In Virginia there were lead works at Wytheville, salt works at Saltville, and a good leather industry at Lynchburg. The Confederates were in need of everything for the equipment of an army and navy, having, as the agricultural section of the community, left all manufactures to the North. Even in the State Armories there were very few efficient arms. . . . It was said of *General Gorgas*, the chief Ordnance Officer, that he created an Ordnance Department out of nothing. . . . The worst drawback, though, was the inability to build a marine engine. . . . With two exceptions,



all the vessels that they built or armoured failed through want of engine-power, and one of these did so from bad armour. The difficulty of supply dogged the footsteps of all Confederate generals. It has been well said that they were often unjustly blamed for not following up a success, since people did not consider that every battle pretty well exhausted their stock of ammunition, the replenishing of which was most difficult: in the matter of supplies they had to live from hand to mouth."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, pp. 59-60.

1861 (April).—Morrill Tariff Act. See TARIFF: 1860-1883.

1861 (April).—Secession of Virginia. See VIRGINIA: 1861 (January-June).

1861 (April).—Activity in Virginia and Maryland.—Peril of national capital.—Attack on Massachusetts volunteers in Baltimore.—“At once, on receiving news of the fall of Sumter, Lincoln issued a call for seventy-five thousand men for three months, the small number and short term not at all indicating that he failed to appreciate the gravity of the crisis, but following an old law by which he thought himself limited. Washington, beset by busy foes within and without, must first be made secure. The drums beat in every town and village, and the rush to arms of the young men was universal. Only Massachusetts, however, was ready on the instant. Governor John A. Andrew, ‘our Merry Andrew,’ had for some months been incurring ridicule by what was regarded as his absurd attention to the equipment and drill of the state militia. At Lincoln’s call he had ready five thousand men, for three thousand of whom arms were at hand; and within a day of the receipt of the cry from Washington the Sixth regiment mustered on Boston Common and [on April 17] started to the rescue.”—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, p. 31.—“The seceders, on their side, had not lost a moment in Virginia. They were in possession of Richmond, where the convention was in session. . . . The workshops and arsenal of Harper’s Ferry, situated at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah, were only guarded by a detachment of 64 dismounted dragoons; and the Virginia volunteers, assembled in the valleys of the Blue Ridge, were ready to take possession of them as soon as the ordinance for the secession of Virginia should furnish them a pretext. . . . On the morning of the 18th [April], a portion of them were on their march, in the hope of seizing the prey which was to be of so much value to the future armies of the Confederacy. But Lieutenant Jones, who was in command at Harper’s Ferry, had been informed of the approach of the Confederate troops under the lead of Ashby—a chief well known since; notwithstanding their despatch, they only arrived in sight of Harper’s Ferry in time to see from a distance a large conflagration that was consuming the workshops, store-houses, and the enormous piles of muskets heaped in the yards, while the Federal soldiers who had just kindled it were crossing the Potomac on their way to Washington. . . . During the last few days the authorities of Virginia had been making preparations for capturing the Norfolk [or Gosport] arsenal (navy-yard). That establishment possessed a magnificent granite basin, construction docks, and a dépôt of artillery with more than 2,000 guns; a two-decked vessel was on the stocks, two others, with a three-decker, three frigates, a steam sloop, and a brig, lay dismantled

in the port; the steam frigate Merrimac was there undergoing repairs; the steam sloop Germantown was in the harbor ready to go to sea, while the sailing sloop Cumberland was lying to at the entrance of the port. . . . Commodore McCauley, the Federal commandant, . . . [thought it necessary to sink all the vessels in the harbor except the Cumberland. As they were sinking, reinforcements arrived from Washington, under Captain Paulding, who superseded McCauley in command. But they came too late. Captain Paulding could do nothing except hastily destroy as far as possible the sinking ships and the arsenal buildings, and then retreat.] The Confederates found abundant resources in artillery and ‘material’ of every description in Norfolk; the fire was soon extinguished, the docks repaired, and they succeeded in raising the Merrimac, which we shall see at work the following year. Fort Monroe had just been occupied by a small Federal garrison. Its loss would have been even more disastrous to the Federal cause than that of the Norfolk navy-yard and arsenal, because the Confederates, instead of having to cover Richmond, would have been able to blockade Washington by sea and besiege it by land. . . . The example of Virginia fired the enthusiasm of the secessionists everywhere, and they applied themselves to the task of drawing into the conflict those slave States which were still hesitating.”—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 1, bk. 2, ch. 4.—“The only approach by rail to Washington was through Baltimore where the strong feeling for secession was vented in threats that Northern troops, bent on the invasion of the South, would not be permitted to pass through its streets. The Colonel of the Sixth [Massachusetts], being informed in Philadelphia of the situation, timed his arrival in Baltimore for the morning (April 19). . . . [Seven companies were driven rapidly through the city from the Philadelphia to the Washington station, but] meanwhile an angry mob had collected, torn up the railroad and erected a barricade to dispute the passage of the rest of the regiment. Informed of this the captains of the four remaining companies decided that they must march to the station; but before they had started, up came the mob, carrying a secession flag and threatening that, if an attempt were made to march through the streets, every ‘white nigger’ of them would be killed. . . . As the soldiers stepped forward, they received a volley of brick-bats and pavingstone from the mob; a hundred yards farther on they came to a bridge which had been partially demolished. . . . In their growing rage, . . . the [mob] fired pistol shots into the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The captain gave the order ‘fire’; a number of the mob fell. The mayor of Baltimore arrived and placed himself at the head of the column. . . . [As his presence failed to allay the tumult, he left his place], but the four companies marched on, fighting their way through to their comrades, aided by the city marshal with fifty policemen who covered their rear. In the Baltimore and Ohio cars . . . the regiment received a volley of stones which so infuriated one of the soldiers that he fired and killed a prominent citizen, a mere looker-on. Finally the train got away and reached Washington late in the afternoon. Of the regiment four had been killed and thirty-six wounded. The casualties in the mob were larger. In Baltimore the excitement was intense. ‘The streets are red with Maryland blood’ are the marshal’s

words. . . . So great was the commotion that a part of the State and city military was called out; citizens volunteered, and, after being more or less adequately furnished with arms, were enrolled for the purpose of defence under the direction of the board of police. In Monument Square a mass-meeting assembled, whose sentiment was decidedly opposed to any attempt to coercion of the Confederate States."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 18-19.—See also MARYLAND: 1860-1864.—"A thousand Pennsylvania volunteers, unarmed, who had arrived on the train with the Massachusetts troops, were sent back, by the advice of the governor, to the Susquehanna River. To avoid further bloodshed through the transit of troops through the city, the local authorities caused the bridges to be burned on the railroad's connection with Harrisburg and the North—the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore, and the Northern Central. The National and State governments then agreed that troops should be taken round Baltimore and not through it. . . . Harper's Ferry was abandoned by the Federal commander on the 18th, after he had destroyed the arsenal and the armory, and on the 20th, the Gosport navy-yard, with vast stores of supplies, was abandoned to the Confederates—both acts of haste and panic and crippling the national government. Already the administration had been considering the choice of an assistant to General Scott who should assume active command of the Union army; Lincoln and the secretary of war were anxious to give the command to Robert E. Lee, but General Lee, making no definite reply to the proposition when presented to him, and unwilling to draw his sword against Virginia, his native State, accepted its commission as commander in chief of its forces offered him by its convention, and on April 20 resigned his commission in the United States army. Meanwhile, volunteers were assembling all over the North, organizing in the large cities and at the county seats, eager to be sent to Washington. That city was in grave danger. . . . It is not strange that Lincoln exclaimed, 'Why don't they come? Why don't they come,' when, on the 23rd of April the capital was still unprotected and only the Sixth Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania volunteers had yet arrived and Beauregard's army might at any moment be marching up Pennsylvania avenue. The machinery of war was not yet sufficiently in motion North or South to make possible an effective attack on either the National or the Confederate Capital. On the 27th, 10,000 New York and Massachusetts troops arrived and Washington was considered safe."—F. N. Thorpe, *Civil War, a national view (History of North America, v. 150, pp. 238-239, 241)*.

ALSO IN: J. W. Hanson, *History of the Sixth Massachusetts Volunteers*, pp. 21-57.—G. W. Brown, *Baltimore and the 20th of April, 1861 (Johns Hopkins University Studies, extra v. 3)*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 2*. D. S. Muzzey, *United States of America, v. 1, p. 546-547*.—J. Schouler, *History of the United States, under the Constitution, v. 6, p. 45*.

1861 (April: South Carolina).—Monarchical cravings.—Intensity of the Carolinian hatred of New England and the North.—An interesting result of the hatred which had been growing up between the North and the South was noted by William H. Russell who was famous in his day as a correspondent of *The Times* (London). He spent some time in South Carolina at the begin-

ning of the war, and described the state of feeling there in a letter from Charleston, written at the end of April: "Nothing I could say," he wrote, "can be worth one fact which has forced itself upon my mind in reference to the sentiments which prevail among the gentlemen of this State. I have been among them for several days. I have visited their plantations, I have conversed with them freely and fully, and I have enjoyed that frank, courteous and graceful intercourse which constitutes an irresistible charm of their society. From all quarters have come to my ears the echoes of the same voice. . . . That voice says, 'If we could only get one of the royal race of England to rule over us, we should be content.' Let there be no misconception on this point. That sentiment, varied in a hundred ways, has been repeated to me over and over again. There is a general admission that the means to such an end are wanting, and that the desire cannot be gratified. But the admiration for monarchical institutions on the English model, for privileged classes, and for a landed aristocracy and gentry, is undisguised and apparently genuine. With the pride of having achieved their independence is mingled in the South Carolinians' hearts a strange regret at the result and consequences, and many are they who 'would go back tomorrow if we could.' An intense affection for the British connection, a love of British habits and customs, a respect for British sentiment, law, authority, order, civilization, and literature, preëminently distinguish the inhabitants of this State, who, glorying in their descent from ancient families on the three islands, whose fortunes they still follow; and with whose members they maintain not unfrequently familiar relations, regard with an aversion of which it is impossible to give an idea to one who has not seen its manifestations, the people of New England and the population of the Northern States, whom they regard as tainted beyond cure by the venom of 'Puritanism.' Whatever may be the cause, this is the fact and the effect. 'The State of South Carolina was,' I am told, 'founded by gentlemen.' It was not established by witch-burning Puritans, by cruel persecuting fanatics, who implanted in the North the standard of Torquemada, and breathed into the nostrils of their newly-born colonies all the ferocity, blood-thirstiness, and rabid intolerance of the Inquisition. . . . 'We could have got on with these fanatics if they had been either Christians or gentlemen,' says [one], 'for in the first case they would have acted with common charity, and in the second they would have fought when they insulted us; but there are neither Christians nor gentlemen among them!' 'Any thing on earth!' exclaims [another], 'any form of government, any tyranny or despotism you will; but'—and here is an appeal more terrible than the adjuration of all the Gods—'nothing on earth shall ever induce us to submit to any union with the brutal, bigoted blackguards of the New England States, who neither comprehend nor regard the feelings of gentlemen! Man, woman and child, we'll die first.'"—W. H. Russell, *Letter to The Times* (London), April 30, 1861.

1861 (April-May).—Proclamation by the Confederate president.—President Lincoln's proclamation of a blockade of Southern ports.—Proclamation of British neutrality.—On April 17, two days after President Lincoln's call for troops, Jefferson Davis, the chief of the Confederacy, published a counter-proclamation, giving notice of the intention of the government at Mont-

gomery to issue letters of marque to privateers. It was as follows:

"Whereas, Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States has, by proclamation announced the intention of invading this Confederacy with an armed force, for the purpose of capturing its fortresses, and thereby subverting its independence, and subjecting the free people thereof to the dominion of a foreign power; and whereas it has thus become the duty of this Government to repel the threatened invasion, and to defend the rights and liberties of the people by all the means which the laws of nations and the usages of civilized warfare place at its disposal; Now, therefore, I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, do issue this my Proclamation, inviting all those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this Government in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make application for commissions or Letters of Marque and Reprisal, to be issued under the Seal of these Confederate States. And I do further notify all persons applying for Letters of Marque, to make a statement in writing, giving the name and a suitable description of the character, tonnage, and force of the vessel, and the name and place of residence of each owner concerned therein, and the intended number of the crew, and to sign said statement and deliver the same to the Secretary of State, or to the Collector of any port of entry of these Confederate States, to be by him transmitted to the Secretary of State. And I do further notify all applicants aforesaid that before any commission or Letter of Marque is issued to any vessel, the owner or owners thereof, and the commander for the time being, will be required to give bond to the Confederate States, with at least two responsible sureties, not interested in such vessel, in the penal sum of five thousand dollars; or if such vessel be provided with more than one hundred and fifty men, then in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, with condition that the owners, officers, and crew who shall be employed on board such commissioned vessel, shall observe the laws of these Confederate States and the instructions given to them for the regulation of their conduct. That they shall satisfy all damages done contrary to the tenor thereof by such vessel during her commission, and deliver up the same when revoked by the President of the Confederate States. And I do further specially enjoin on all persons holding offices, civil and military, under the authority of the Confederate States, that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties incident thereto; and I do, moreover, solemnly exhort the good people of these Confederate States as they love their country, as they prize the blessings of free government, as they feel the wrongs of the past and these now threatened in aggravated form by those whose enmity is more implacable because unprovoked, that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority and efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating all the measures which may be adopted for the common defence, and by which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, we may hope for a speedy, just, and honorable peace. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the Seal of the Confederate States to be affixed, this seventeenth day of April, 1861. By the President, (Signed) Jefferson Davis. R. Toombs, Secretary of State.

"The response was a second proclamation by President Lincoln, announcing a blockade of the ports of the Confederacy, and warning all persons who should accept and act under the proposed letters of marque that they would be held amenable to the laws against piracy. This proclamation was as follows:

"Whereas an insurrection against the government of the United States has broken out in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and the laws of the United States for the collection of the revenue cannot be effectually executed therein conformably to that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United States: And whereas a combination of persons engaged in such insurrection have threatened to grant pretended letters of marque to authorize the bearers thereof to commit assaults on the lives, vessels, and property of good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in commerce on the high seas, and in waters of the United States: And whereas an executive proclamation has been already issued requiring the persons engaged in these disorderly proceedings to desist therefrom, calling out a militia force for the purpose of repressing the same, and convening Congress in extraordinary session to deliberate and determine thereon: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, with a view to the same purposes before mentioned, and to the protection of the public peace, and the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until Congress shall have assembled and deliberated on the said unlawful proceedings, or until the same shall have ceased, have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the law of nations in such case provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her cargo, as prize, as may be deemed advisable. And I hereby proclaim and declare that if any person, under the pretended authority of the said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 35-36.

Apparently on unofficial information of these announcements, indicating a state of civil war in the United States, the government of Great

Britain made haste to declare neutrality between the belligerents, thus placing the insurgent Confederacy on an exactly equal footing with the United States so far as a foreign recognition might do so. The queen's proclamation was as follows:

"Whereas, We are happily at peace with all Sovereigns, Powers, and States; And whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the Government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves 'the Confederate States of America'; And whereas we, being at peace with the Government of the United States, have declared our Royal determination to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest between the said contending parties; We, therefore, have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to issue this our Royal Proclamation: And we do hereby strictly charge and command all our loving subjects to observe a strict neutrality in and during the aforesaid hostilities, and to abstain from violating or contravening either the laws and statutes of the realm in this behalf, or the laws of nations in relation thereto, as they will answer to the contrary at their peril." After reciting the language of certain statutes which forbid the subjects of Her Majesty to engage, without leave and license from the Crown, in any foreign military or naval service, or to furnish or equip any ship or vessel for service against any state with which Her Majesty is not at war, the Proclamation proceeds as follows: "Now, in order that none of our subjects may unwarily render themselves liable to the penalties imposed by said statute, we do hereby strictly command, that no person or persons whatsoever do commit any act, matter or thing whatsoever, contrary to the provisions of the said statute, upon pain of the several penalties by the said statute imposed, and of our high displeasure. And we do hereby further warn all our loving subjects, and all persons whatsoever entitled to our protection, that if any of them shall presume, in contempt of this Royal Proclamation, and of our high displeasure, to do any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral sovereign, in the said contest, or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf—as, for example and more especially, by entering into the military service of either of the said contending parties as commissioned or non-commissioned officers or soldiers, . . . or by fitting out, arming, or equipping, any ship or vessel to be employed as a ship-of-war, or privateer, or transport, by either of the said contending parties; or by breaking, or endeavoring to break, any blockade lawfully and actually established by or on behalf of either of the said contending parties; or by carrying officers, soldiers, despatches, arms, military stores or materials, or any article or articles considered and deemed to be contraband of war according to the law of modern usage of nations, for the use or service of either of the said contending parties, all persons so offending will incur and be liable to the several penalties and penal consequences by the said statute, or by the law of nations, in that behalf imposed or denounced. And we do hereby declare that all our subjects and persons entitled to our protection who may misconduct themselves in the premises will do so at their peril and of their own wrong, and that they will in no wise obtain any protection

from us against any liability or penal consequences."

In the complaint of the United States subsequently submitted to the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, the facts attending this proclamation of neutrality were set forth as follows: "Before any armed collision had taken place, there existed an understanding between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Emperor of the French, with a view to securing a simultaneous and identical course of action of the two Governments on American questions. . . . The fact that it had been agreed to by the two Governments was communicated to Mr. Dallas, by Lord John Russell, on the first day of May 1861. There was nothing in the previous relations between Great Britain and the United States which made it necessary for Her Majesty's Government to seek the advice or to invite the support of the Emperor of the French in the crisis which was threatened. . . . When the news of the bloodless attack upon Fort Sumter became known in Europe, Her Majesty's Government apparently assumed that the time had come for the joint action which had been previously agreed upon; and, without waiting to learn the purposes of the United States, it announced its intention to take the first step by recognizing the insurgents as belligerents. The President's Proclamation, which has since been made the ostensible reason for this determination, was issued on the 10th of April, and was made public in the Washington newspapers of the morning of the 20th. . . . It is absolutely certain that no full copy of the text of the Proclamation could have left Washington by the mails of the 19th, and equally certain that no copy could have reached New York from Washington after the 19th for several days. On the 20th the steamer Canadian sailed from Portland, taking the Boston papers of that day, with the imperfect copy of the Proclamation, in which the clause in regard to the collection of the revenue was suppressed. This steamer arrived at Londonderry on the 1st of May, and the 'Daily News' of London, of the 2d of May, published the following telegraphic items of news: 'President Lincoln has issued a Proclamation, declaring a blockade of all the ports in the seceded States. The Federal Government will condemn as pirates all privateer-vessels which may be seized by Federal ships.' The Canadian arrived at Liverpool on the 2d of May, and the 'Daily News,' of the 3d, and the 'Times,' of the 4th of May, published the imperfect Boston copy of the Proclamation. . . . No other than the Boston copy of the Proclamation appears to have been published in the London newspapers. It is not likely that a copy was received in London before the 10th, by the Fulton from New York. It was on this meager and incorrect information that the advice of the British Law Offices was based, upon which that Government acted. . . . On the 5th of May the steamship Persia arrived at Liverpool with advices from New York to the 25th of April. Lord John Russell stated on Monday, the 6th of May, in a communication to Lord Cowley, 'that Her Majesty's Government received no dispatches from Lord Lyons by the mail which has just arrived [the *Persia*] the communication between Washington and New York being interrupted.' In the same dispatch Lord Cowley is informed 'that Her Majesty's Government cannot hesitate to admit that such Confederacy is entitled to be considered as a belligerent, and as such invested

with all the rights and prerogatives of a belligerent,' and he is instructed to invite the French Government to a joint action, and a line of joint policy with the British Government, toward the United States."—*Case of the United States before the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva* (42nd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document 31, pp. 24-27).—"In the war for the Union of 1861-5 a recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate States by Great Britain was made by the proclamation of neutrality of the Queen of England under date of May 13, 1861. The French declaration of neutrality was issued June 10, 1861, and that of Spain on June 17, these being followed shortly afterward by the other maritime powers. The recognition by Great Britain of the belligerency of the Southern States was received with great disfavor by the government and people of the Northern States as being untimely and precipitous and as an evidence of unfriendliness. Time has softened the feelings which were aroused by this act of Great Britain—the first nation to announce recognition of the belligerency of the Southern States and its intention to observe neutrality in the Civil War just begun. From a legal point of view, and from the point of view of international law, it is difficult not to concede that the action of Great Britain was one of obligation under the circumstances and not one of unfriendliness. In the correspondence between our minister to Great Britain, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, and Earl Russell, then the British foreign minister, in 1868, the question was fully discussed and there is strong ground in the position taken by Earl Russell. 'He referred,' says Mr. Dana, 'to the extent of the territory, population, and resources of the rebellion; the existence of its completely organized state and general governments, its unequivocal determination to treat as war, by sea and land, any acts of authority which the United States, on the other hand, had equally determined to exert; the long antecedent history and preparations for this revolution and the certainty of the magnitude and extent of the war and its rapid development whenever it should begin, and also, in consequence, that it would require the instant decision of maritime questions by neutral vessels of war and merchantmen alike. Hence he argued that it was necessary for England to determine at once, upon facts and probabilities whether she would permit the right of search and blockade as acts of war, and whether the letters of marque and public ships of the rebels, which might appear at once in many parts of the world, should be treated as pirates or lawful belligerents.' Earl Russell further asserted 'that the proclamation of President Lincoln establishing a blockade under date of April 19, 1861, was itself a recognition and the first recognition of the state of belligerency of the Confederate States.' As to the particular question of the precipitate nature of the Queen's proclamation, he says that 'it was, on the contrary, your own government which, in assuming the belligerent right of blockade, recognized the Southern States as belligerents. Had they not been belligerents, the armed ships of the United States would have had no right to stop a single British ship upon the high seas.'"—C. H. Stockton, *Outlines of international law*, pp. 83-84.—See also ALABAMA CLAIMS.

ALSO IN: J. R. Soley, *Blockade and the cruisers*, ch. 2.—W. H. Seward, *Works*, v. 5 (*Diplomatic history of the war*).—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 4, ch. 15.—M. Bernard, *His-*

*torical account of the neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War*, ch. 4-10.—B. Villiers and W. H. Chesson, *Anglo-American relations, 1861-1865*.

1861 (April-May: Maryland).—Ending of trouble in Baltimore and the state.—General Butler in the field.—"The Eighth Massachusetts at once followed the Sixth, with Brigadier-General Benjamin F. Butler, a man long prominent as a lawyer . . . and as an ultra-Democratic politician, who now came forward into national prominence. . . . During the war we shall find him very much in the foreground—adroit, unprincipled, and unbiased, in embarrassing situations full of expedients, occasionally most helpful, sometimes blundering badly. . . . But when he led the Eighth Massachusetts he did it valiantly and well. Finding Baltimore blocked, it made its way by steamer to Annapolis, meeting there the full and handsomely appointed Seventh regiment of New York. Thence over a railroad whose track and machinery were largely destroyed, through hard work and ingenious shifts, the 'dandies' of the Seventh and the 'drudges' of the Eighth fraternizing cordially, they reached Washington within a day or two, putting an end to all apprehension. Soon a revulsion took place in the sentiment of Maryland. Under the lead of the loyal Governor Hicks, sentiment for the Union manifested itself strongly. By a large majority Union congressmen were elected. The sober second thought was fatal to secession. Baltimore grew quiet, and, receiving a Federal garrison, submitted without a murmur to the passage of troops. These now poured forward in answer to Lincoln's call in great numbers, and Washington became a camp."—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, pp. 32-33.—"On the 5th of May General Butler sent two regiments to occupy the Relay House, within nine miles of Baltimore. On the 9th a force of 1,200 Pennsylvania troops and regulars, ordered forward by General Patterson from Philadelphia, were landed near Fort McHenry, under the guns of a United States vessel, and marched through the city. On the night of the 13th, General Butler . . . [who was placed in command of the 'department of Annapolis,' comprising about twenty miles on each side of the railway as far as Bladensburg], with about 1,000 men, including the Massachusetts Sixth, entered the place and took a commanding position on Federal Hill, which was afterwards permanently fortified."—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 18.—See also MARYLAND: 1860-1864.

ALSO IN: *Official records of the War of the Rebellion*, series 1, v. 2.—J. Parton, *General Butler in New Orleans*, ch. 4-5.—T. Winthrop, *New York Seventh Regiment: Our march to Washington* (*Life in the open air*).

1861 (May).—Call for additional volunteers.—On May 3 the president issued a call for forty additional regiments of volunteers, directed an increase of the regular army by ten regiments, and ordered the enlistment of 18,000 seamen—acts subsequently legalized by Congress.

1861 (May).—Exportation of cotton from the Confederacy, excepting through its seaports, prohibited.—On May 21, 1861, the Congress of the Confederate States passed an act declaring that "from and after the 1st day of June next, and during the existence of the blockade of any of the ports of the Confederate States of America by the Government of the United States, it shall not be lawful for any person to export any raw

cotton or cotton yarn from the Confederate States of America except through the seaports of the said Confederate States."

1861 (May).—Secession of North Carolina. See NORTH CAROLINA: 1861 (January-May).

1861 (May).—General Butler at Fortress Monroe and his "contrabands."—First military thrust at slavery.—General Butler was commissioned as major-general of volunteers on May 16, and on the 20th he was ordered to the command at Fortress Monroe. He arrived at the fortress on the 22nd and assumed the command. "On the evening of the second day after his arrival at the post, the event occurred which will for ever connect the name of General Butler with the history of the abolition of slavery in America. Colonel Phelps's visit to Hampton [the previous day] had thrown the white inhabitants into such alarm that most of them prepared for flight, and many left their homes that night, never to see them again. In the confusion three negroes escaped, and, making their way across the bridges, gave themselves up to a Union picket, saying that their master, Colonel Mallory, was about to remove them to North Carolina to work [on fortifications while their families were left in Hampton]. . . . They were brought to the fortress, and the circumstance was reported to the general in the morning. . . . He needed laborers. He was aware that the rebel batteries that were rising around him were the work chiefly of slaves, without whose assistance they could not have been erected in time to give him trouble. He wished to keep these men. The garrison wished them kept. . . . He pronounced the electric words, 'These men are Contraband of War; set them at work.' 'An epigram,' as Winthrop remarks, 'abolished slavery in the United States.' The word took; for it gave the country an excuse for doing what it was longing to do. . . . On Sunday morning, eight more negroes came in. . . . They continued to come in daily, in tens, twenties, thirties till the number of contrabands in the various camps numbered more than 900. A commissioner of negro affairs was appointed, who taught, fed and governed them." General Butler reported his action to the government, and on May 30 the secretary of war wrote to him: "Your action in respect to the negroes who came within your lines, from the service of the rebels, is approved. . . . While . . . you will permit no interference, by persons under your command, with the relations of persons held to service under the laws of any state, you will, on the other hand, so long as any state within which your military operations are conducted remain under the control of . . . armed combinations, refrain from surrendering to alleged masters any persons who come within your lines." "So the matter rested for two months, at the expiration of which events revived the question."—J. Parton, *General Butler in New Orleans*, ch. 6.

1861 (May: Virginia).—First advance of Union troops across the Potomac.—Death of Ellsworth at Alexandria.—"Already 'Confederate' pickets were occupying Arlington Heights and the Virginia shore of the Long Bridge, which spans the Potomac at Washington City; and engineers had been seen on those heights selecting eligible positions for batteries. . . . The General-in-chief was not persuaded to allow an immediate invasion of Virginia. Orders were at once issued [May 23] for the occupation of the shores of the Potomac opposite, and also the city of Alexandria, nine miles below, by National troops.

General Mansfield was in command of about 13,000 men at the Capital. . . . The troops [began to leave Washington about midnight and] moving by land and water reached Alexandria at about the same time. The National frigate Pawnee was lying off the town, and her commander had already been in negotiation for the evacuation of Alexandria. . . . A detachment of her crew, bearing a flag of truce [was] fired upon by some Virginia sentries, who instantly fled from the town. . . . [A detachment of the New York Fire Zouave Regiment, under Colonel Ellsworth], ignorant of any negotiations, advanced to the center of the city, and took possession of it in the name of his Government, while the column under Wilcox marched to the Station of the Orange and Alexandria Railway, and seized it, with much rolling stock. They there captured a small company (thirty-five men) of Virginia cavalry, under Captain Ball. . . . [The Confederate flag had for some days been flying over the Marshall House and] Ellsworth went in person to take it down. When descending an upper staircase with it, he was shot by Jackson. . . . Ellsworth fell dead, and . . . [Jackson] met the same fate an instant afterward, at the hands of Francis E. Brownwell, of Troy, who, with six others, had accompanied his commander to the roof of the house. . . . His [Ellsworth's] death produced great excitement throughout the country. It was the first of note that had occurred in consequence of the National troubles, and the very first since the campaign had actually begun, a few hours before."—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 20.

ALSO IN: F. Moore, *Anecdotes, poetry and incidents of the war*, p. 391.—J. T. Headley, *Great Rebellion*, ch. 5.

1861 (May-June).—Tennessee joins the Confederacy.—Loyal resistance of East Tennessee. See TENNESSEE: 1861 (January-May); (June).

1861 (May-July: Missouri).—Baffling of secessionists in Missouri.—Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson.—Battle of Boonville. See MISSOURI: 1861.

1861 (May-September: Kentucky).—Struggle for the state.—Secession and neutrality overcome. See KENTUCKY: 1861 (January-September).

1861 (June: Virginia).—Fight at Big Bethel.—"Major-General Butler and staff arrived at Fortress Monroe Wednesday afternoon, May 22. . . . [On the Confederate side] Colonel Magruder—late Colonel in the U. S. service, and an officer of much distinction as an obstinate combatant—was placed in command . . . of the Peninsula. . . . Troops rapidly poured into Butler's department, and he soon found himself in a condition to act on the offensive. Magruder's scouts and cavalry greatly annoyed the [Union camps]. . . . They had also seized several Union men. These raids became so frequent and annoying that a night attack [under Brigadier-General Pierce of the Massachusetts troops] was concerted upon their positions at Little Bethel and Big Bethel—the latter, near the north branch of Back River, where it was understood Magruder's outposts were throwing up strong works. . . . Approaching the enemy's position at Big Bethel, it was found that their guns commanded all points of approach. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Washburne had . . . arranged for a flank movement which with a combined attack from the front, must have ended the struggle; but the order for retreat was given before the movement could be executed. . . . The Federal loss was 14 killed, 49 wounded and five missing. Among the killed were . . .

Major Theodore Winthrop, Secretary and Aid to General Butler, and First-Lieutenant John T. Greble, of the United States regular artillery, Second regiment."—O. J. Victor, *History of the Southern Rebellion*, v. 2, div. 4, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular History of the United States*, v. 4, ch. 17.—*Life and poems of Theodore Winthrop*, ch. 9.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 2.


1861 (June-July: West Virginia).—General McClellan's campaign in the mountains.—Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford.—"Although some thousands of West Virginians had volunteered to fight for the Union, none of them were encamped on the soil of their State until after the election held [May 23] to ratify or reject the Ordinance of Secession. [See VIRGINIA: 1861 (January-June).] . . . The Virginians who volunteered were mustered in and organized at Camp Carlile, in Ohio, opposite Wheeling, under the command of Colonel Kelly, himself a Virginian. George B. McClellan, who had been appointed a Major-General and assigned to the command of the Department of the Ohio, remained at Cincinnati, his home. Three days after the election aforesaid, he issued from that city a spirited address 'To the Union men of Western Virginia.' . . . A brief and stirring address to his soldiers was issued simultaneously with the above; and, both being read to those in Camp Carlile that evening, the First Virginia, 1,100 strong. Colonel Kelly, crossed to Wheeling early next morning, closely followed by the Sixteenth Ohio, Colonel Irvine. The Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steedman, crossed simultaneously, and quietly occupied Parkersburg, the terminus of the northwestern branch of the Baltimore and Ohio road."—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 1, ch. 32.—"Both sides sent officers into this district, to gain control and raise men, Colonel Kelley at Wheeling, and Colonel Porterfield at Beverly. The latter promptly attacked the railway, to protect which, McClellan, in whose district West Virginia had been placed, sent a small force, and Porterfield retired to Philippi, where he was surprised and routed on June 3rd; this action had the greatest political value, for it reassured the waverers in the district which the Confederates had overrun, more than three-quarters of West Virginia. The Union force was strengthened to protect Unionists better, and put down Secession; the Confederates sent Generals Garnett and Wise to repair their loss, on which McClellan took the command himself, and drove them from the mountain passes which they were holding at Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain, on July 10th and 11th. Part of their force surrendered, while Garnett fought a rear-guard action at Carrick's Ford, on the Cheat River, in which he was killed and his trains lost. These little campaigns had great military and political results, that of Rich Mountain being decisive, for, though operations went on for some time longer under Rosecrans, after McClellan went to Washington, the Confederates, even under Lee, never regained the ground lost, and the year ended with their being forced out of the great Kanawha Valley, leaving the new State controlled by the Union side."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, pp. 87-88.—See also WEST VIRGINIA: 1860-1861.

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 1, ch. 22.—*Official records of the War of the Rebellion*, series 1, v. 2, pp. 193-293.—J. D. Cox, *McClellan in West Virginia (Battles and leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1.)

1861 (July).—First depredations of the Confederate cruiser *Sumter*. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: 1861-1862.


1861 (July: Virginia).—Seat of Confederate government transferred to Richmond. See VIRGINIA: 1861 (July).

1861 (July: Virginia).—On to Richmond.—First battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.—"The Southern Government having inclined to the defensive policy as that upon which they should act, their first object was to prevent an advance of any Federal force into Virginia. Early in the month of May troops were assembled in Richmond, and pushed forward toward the northeastern boundary of the State, to a position known as Manassas Junction. . . . It is here that a railroad from Alexandria, another from Staunton up the valley and through Manassas Gap, and another from Gordonsville unite. At Gordonsville the railroad from Richmond and the line from East



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Tennessee unite. As a point for concentration none more eligible exists in northeastern Virginia. The advantages for fortification are naturally such that the place can be rendered impregnable. Here the centre of the northern force of the Southern army was posted, with the left wing pushed forward to Winchester [under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, with the Union General Patterson opposed to him] and the right extended to the Potomac, and sustained by heavy batteries which served to blockade the river. The Federal force, the advance of which was assembled at Washington for the defence of that city against any attack by the Southern troops, was posted on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on Arlington Heights, which were strongly fortified. Their right was pushed some distance up the Potomac, and chiefly on the Maryland side, while their left occupied Alexandria. The armies of both sides consisted of raw militia hastily brought together, and of volunteers who for the first time had put on the uniform, and taken up the weapons of the soldier. On both sides the







Map of  
**The Principal Theatre of War**  
**in VIRGINIA,**

REPRODUCED FROM "MAP OF EASTERN VIRGINIA,  
 COMPILED AT THE COAST SURVEY OFFICE, 1864,"  
 SCALE OF MILES,



THE MATTHEWS-NORTHROP CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

forces were constantly accumulating. On the morning of June 27th, the consolidated report of Gen. Mansfield, commanding the Department of Washington, gives the number of troops in that city and vicinity. The privates, including regulars and volunteers present for duty, numbered 22,846 men. The grand aggregate of the force, including officers, etc., present and absent, was 34,160 men. The force of Gen. Patterson, commanding in Maryland above Washington, and also on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on the 28th of June, was returned, embracing officers and men enlisted and present for duty, 15,923. Of these about 550 were reported as sick."—W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history of the Rebellion*, p. 67.—"The return of Johnston's [Confederate] army for June 30th showed his total force present for duty to have been 10,654; but this includes some troops which, though assigned to his army, did not join him till after July 3d. . . . A prime object of Johnston in taking post at Winchester was, that he might be enabled to join the army at Manassas in case of need. On June 2d, only a week after Johnston's arrival at Harper's Ferry, Beauregard had reached Manassas and assumed command. He and Johnston at once communicated with each other, and agreed in their views of the importance of mutual support. . . . As soon as Johnston ascertained . . . that McClellan [from West Virginia] was not moving on Romney and Winchester, the feasibility of this movement to Manassas at the right time became greater. The only problem then remaining was to so time it as to arrive just long enough before the impending battle to take part in it, and not so long as to cause, by the news of his arrival, a corresponding transfer of Patterson. . . . It was for the purpose of gaining as much start as possible on Patterson that Johnston had retired to Winchester, instead of remaining opposite the Northern force at Martinsburg. He kept his cavalry well out, in order to be informed as promptly as possible of the slightest change in Patterson's position. Meanwhile the grand Federal advance upon Manassas had commenced."—R. M. Hughes, *General Johnston*, pp. 47-51.—The advance from Washington, which began on July 16, and which resulted in the grievous defeat of the Union forces at Bull Run, or Manassas, on Sunday, July 21, was undertaken to appease the impatient, ignorant clamor of Northern newspapers, and in opposition to the judgment and the plans of General Scott, who was then at the head of the National army. The cry "On to Richmond" was taken up by congressmen and senators, and the pressure on the government became too strong to be resisted. General Irwin McDowell had been recently placed in command of the army intended for the field, with General Mansfield commanding the troops in Washington. "McDowell was laboring at a great disadvantage—drilling and preparing his troops as best he could—under the heavy pressure from the North to deliver battle to the enemy in his front. Secretary Chase was the champion, in the Cabinet, of the intense feeling in the North that the war should be pushed at once, with a vigor that would end it soon. . . . There is no doubt that General Scott was weakened with the administration, for the reason that he did not believe in the prevailing opinion that a few days would crush the rebellion; and the more the old hero insisted, or faithfully stood by his views, the more it antagonized the opinion of those who hoped and said it would end speedily. At the Cabinet meeting a week before, General Hamilton says: 'General Montgomery Blair said he would march


to Richmond with 10,000 men, armed with lathes.' 'Yes,' said General Scott, 'as prisoners of war. . . . On the Sunday preceding the battle of Bull Run, Scott directed me, his military secretary, to say to McDowell that he wished him to dine with him without fail. At the dinner, at which General McDowell appeared, General Scott used every possible argument to dissuade General McDowell from fighting the first battle of Bull Run under the then existing condition of public affairs. . . . He then begged General McDowell to go to Secretary Chase, his kinsman, and aid him (General Scott) in preventing a forward movement at that moment; one of the arguments used by General Scott being that the Union sentiment of the South had been surprised by the suddenness and promptitude of the movement in favor of secession; that he (General Scott) was well advised that the Union sentiment was recovering itself, and gaining head in the South; that from the moment blood was shed the South would be made a unit. General McDowell regretted that he could not agree with General Scott in his views, and arose and retired. . . . In the course of the succeeding week General McDowell reported to General Scott his proposed plan of battle. . . . After General McDowell had gone through a detailed statement of his plan, and had finished, General Scott remarked, "General McDowell, that is as good a plan of battle as I ever saw upon paper." General McDowell said in reply: "General Scott, the success of this whole plan depends upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check at Winchester." General Scott remarked that General Johnston was a very able soldier, that he had a railroad at his command with which to move his troops, and if General McDowell's plan of battle, which had just been presented to him, depended upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check, his plan was not worth the paper it was drawn upon.' That ended that interview."—J. H. Stine, *History of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 7-10.—In order to understand the position of the opposing forces prior to the battle of Bull Run, or Manassas, which was now impending, it is necessary to go back a little. "During May, the Confederates had erected some batteries on the coast and in the creeks and river mouth, which occasionally exchanged shots with the Union gunboats, since Lee's policy as commander in Virginia, was rather to block the Potomac than take Baltimore, as the wilder spirits urged, and to hold Manassas Junction against the base which the North had seized at Alexandria. The commander there also drew his attention to the strategic importance of the junction with the railway from the Shenandoah Valley, which was at this time thought to be of primary importance, being a great food-producing district not worked by slave labour, with a large white population enthusiastically Southern in feeling. It was bounded by mountain ranges, and of a size which could be held by a medium force; it lay between the main portion of Virginia and West Virginia, just across the mountains; but West Virginia was strongly Unionist, and had formed itself into a provisional State, repudiating the authority of the Governor of Virginia. If therefore the North could control the Valley, not only would the Confederates be deprived of a district, from which they drew large supplies of both men and food, but of an excellent line of attack, and further, West Virginia would be cut off, which would be a first step in General Scott's policy of severing from the Confederacy one district after another, till it fell.

Harper's Ferry, at the mouth of the Shenandoah, was supposed to be of immense strength and great strategical importance, and even Lee, who knew it well, seems to have shared this view; but when, after being seized by the Confederates in April, Joseph Johnston was ordered to hold it against any attempt to recapture by a force under Patterson, his trained judgment instantly appraised it at its true value, and he reported to Davis that to make it safe would take many more men than it was worth, with the certainty of heavy loss if attacked, and obtained permission to retire up to the Valley to Winchester. Johnston's opponent, Patterson, was a veteran of the Mexican War, with a creditable record, but too old for active service. He was ordered to guard Washington from an attack via Harper's Ferry and cover the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, to which was afterwards added the duty of holding Johnston fast in the Valley. McDowell was appointed to command the force for the defence of the Capital, and hold fast troops which might go to strengthen Johnston, at this time, a rôle secondary to Patterson's. Other forces on both sides were a small one under Butler, based on Fort Munroe in the Peninsula of Virginia, opposed by Magruder, who, with small numbers, ably handled, beat him in a skirmish at Big Bethel on June 10th [see above: 1861 (June: Virginia)] and a Confederate force under Huger, . . . guarding the south bank of the James, by Norfolk Navy Yard. A Union train under Schenck was ambushed at Vienna on June 17th. When Richmond became the Confederate Capital, however, on June 1st, the strategical balance changed entirely; Manassas became of primary importance as the approach to it, and was reinforced, Beauregard being sent to take command, while McDowell's rôle was changed from defensive to offensive. He told General Scott that he could manage Beauregard if Johnston were held off, and was promised that this should be done, Patterson being ordered to hold the latter fast, or at all events to neutralize any move he might make, by following close on his heels. The small Confederate successes had been made the most of, and they were confident, while the North were rather depressed, and badly wanted a success on their side to counterbalance them. On the Confederate side, the military operations were directed by Davis, with advice from Cooper and Lee, not an ideal arrangement—any one of them could have done better. Beauregard was kept well informed of McDowell's movements by his agents in Washington, so bided his time confidently; and Johnston, who had retired to Winchester before Patterson's much stronger force, was watching him closely, and covering the Manassas Gap Railway. With Davis' consent, Beauregard had arranged a plan of joint action with Johnston, that the latter should join him on the field if McDowell advanced. As the time for the move drew nearer, Scott reiterated his orders to Patterson to act vigorously, and hold his opponent fast by an attack, but he kept asking for reinforcements to enable him to do so (though he had 18,000 men to Johnston's 9,000 or 10,000), hesitating, and calling councils of war. A Southern lady living in Washington informed Beauregard the moment McDowell moved, and he warned Johnston. This army at Manassas was the only one that the Confederates ever called the Army of the Potomac, and was some 22,000 strong, with 27 guns. Johnston brought with him 8,000 or 9,000 men of his Army of the Shenandoah, with 20 guns, and McDowell's command was from 30,000 to 33,000


strong, with 49 guns. It seems that reinforcements were sent to Patterson at the last minute, which, had they gone to McDowell, would have turned the scale, and that, when Johnston slipped away, he left 22,000 Union troops idle, 'observing' the 1,000 or 1,500 Confederates remaining to bluff them under the brilliant Magruder, who carried out his task to perfection. This large force was no danger to the Confederacy, and had to retreat as the result of the battle of Bull Run. It is but fair to Patterson to say that the loss of men from the termination of their three months' service was a very serious difficulty, which also affected McDowell to a less extent, in the very presence of the enemy. McDowell's plan of battle was to turn the enemy's left, force him from his position, and break the Manassas Gap Railway—that is, cut him off from Gainesville on his left rear, which would prevent Johnston's troops from joining; but the Confederates made haste, while he delayed, wasted several days, and made a useless reconnaissance in force against the Confederate left at Blackburn's Ford, which brought on a bigger action than he intended, and, before the main battle was fought, Johnston had arrived with half his army. This action unduly depressed the one side and elated the other, but, while it made Beauregard expect a frontal attack, it showed McDowell that this would not do, for his adversary was well posted behind a small stream, which had difficult banks in places. Two Union divisions were to make a wide turning movement round the Confederate left, with Tyler's strong division to threaten this part of their line in front and hold it fast, at first by a demonstration only. A sufficient force was left to hold the Confederates to their main position along the stream, and was to try to prevent them from sending help to their left, when turned. On the other side, Johnston took command as senior officer, but adopted Beauregard's plan, to make a converging attack on Centreville, McDowell's base, and crush him before Patterson could come up. McDowell, however, spoilt their plan by attacking first. Their left was very weak, and, when the turning movement was discovered, the danger was imminent, for half of Johnston's army was not up, and the attack was aimed at the most vulnerable point; but the officer commanding the extreme left, *Colonel Evans*, was an able man, and took perhaps the boldest and most effective step of the whole War to meet the danger. He soon recognized that Tyler, with all his strength, would not use it at this time (though his orders were to make a strong demonstration), while the stopping of the turning column at a distance was of vital importance, to let the expected reinforcements come up and give them room to act. Although he commanded but two battalions (of ten companies each) and two guns, he left four companies only to face Tyler, and moved away with the rest to strike at the coming column, sending word of what he was doing to the senior officer commanding the left of the line. Of course he could not, with his tiny force, stop the enemy, but he delayed them seriously on Matthews Hill, while a strong Confederate line was being formed on the Henry Hill, about a mile in rear. To gain a little more time, a brigade and a battery were sent to his support, but at last this weak line was forced back, and Tyler also began to move, on the flank. The new line on Henry Hill was not ready when the Union batteries opened fire from Matthews Hill, and the bringing back of the troops from that advanced position caused much confusion; but all were

rallied, and the line formed, under cover of the inflexible steadiness of Jackson's brigade, which earned him his nickname of 'Stonewall.' During the morning, the Confederate generals had had several pieces of information: first, that their own attack on Centreville was late in starting; next, that McDowell had been too quick for them, and was attacking; and then, when they essayed to change their plan, and turn his left, holding on with their own, that the Union attack was so serious that they would want every man they had to stop it. They instantly took up the new conditions so as to bring every available man to the critical point, where Beauregard took charge, Johnston directing the whole battle. Some fresh men came up from Richmond to strengthen the line on the front of Henry Hill, but after a while it was forced back to the rear crest: it had now become evident that McDowell was throwing his whole weight in here, and that nothing was to be feared from his left, so the right and centre were denuded to the utmost, only making a small demonstration, while every man who could be spared went to the left. McDowell . . . now had to attack


loss, 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 13 missing, total 1,982. There was no general pursuit, for the winners were as much demoralized by victory as the losers by defeat, both sides being composed of raw troops with little discipline. But for this, McDowell's plan, which was good, might have succeeded; some think that Johnston, with a brigade of regulars, could have marched to Washington, which was panic-stricken. The action of the commanders on both sides is worth noting: Major-General McDowell, a major in the old army, remembered the Major, but forgot the General, and went forward into the thick of the fight, where he was only in the way of his subordinates, and could not control the battle or look after his reserves, of which he had plenty idle; while the Johnston-Beauregard combination was most happy, for they took their places so as to direct the battle to the best advantage. . . . Thus ended the first great collision. The North settled down for a long war, the three months' service, just expiring, was changed to three years' service, and Congress took powers to raise half a million men: military operations practically ceased for a time. McCl-



STONEWALL JACKSON



ROBERT E. LEE



JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON

across the open at close quarters, which was not in favour of the rifled guns, as against smooth-bores. Two of his batteries were pushed forward, and wrecked by the Confederate fire, a furious fight took place round them, the Confederate reserves came up from their right, and Kirby Smith's brigade, from the railway, attacked the Union flank: this turned the scale, and the Union troops were driven off the hill. McDowell formed a new line on the other side of Young's Branch, but now to stave off defeat, no longer to win: the Confederates advanced against it in front, while Early's brigade, from reserve, which had marched round, struck it in flank: the battle was won, and McDowell's men finally broke and retreated. At first they moved in good order, followed only by artillery fire, but on reaching Club Run the retreat degenerated into panic, and they never stopped till they reached Washington, twenty miles away. The officer commanding the Union left had been able to stop the Confederate demonstration there, but troops were sent back to the base at Centreville in error, where the reserve lay idle, under a worse than incompetent commander, while the battle was being lost for want of it. Each side had about 18,000 men engaged, the Unionists 24 guns, the Confederates 21. Union loss, 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 1,312 missing—total 2,896. Confederate

lan was sent for from West Virginia to take command, and commanded the Union Army of the Potomac from July 27th to October 31st, during which time he raised its strength to 134,000 men. Patterson was not employed again. On the Confederate side, Johnston established himself at Manassas, but the [Southern] people thought the War over, and crowds left his army. In answer to his appeals for reinforcements, to cross into Maryland in rear of Washington, President Davis replied that men were wanted everywhere, and he could not send any."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, pp. 81-87.—"To the South, Bull Run was a Pyrrhic victory. It relieved Virginia of the pressure of the invasion; it proved to the world that the attitude of the Confederacy was something more than the reckless revolt of a small section; but it led the Government to indulge vain hopes of foreign intervention, and it increased the universal contempt for the military qualities of the Northern soldiers. . . . Despite their skill with the rifle, their hunter's craft, and their dashing horsemanship, the first great battle had been hardly won. The city-bred Northerners, unused to arms and uninvited to hardship, had fought with extraordinary determination; and the same want of discipline that had driven them in route to Washington had dissolved the victorious Confederates

into a tumultuous mob."—G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, pp. 194-198.

ALSO IN: I. McDowell, *Report (Official records, series 1, v. 2, pp. 320, 323-324)*.—R. Johnston, *Short history of the War of the Rebellion*, ch. 4.—G. T. Beauregard, *Report (Official records, series 1, v. 2, pp. 493-494)*.—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 1, bk. 3, ch. 2.—H. W. Slocum, *Military lessons taught by the war (Historical Magazine, Feb., 1871)*.—R. M. Hughes, *General J. E. Johnston*, ch. 6.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 8.—J. G. Nicolay, *Outbreak of the Rebellion*, ch. 13-16.—J. B. Fry et al, *Campaign of the first Bull Run (Battles and leaders of the Civil War, v. 1)*.—J. E. Cook, *Stonewall Jackson*, pt. 1, ch. 12.—A. Roman, *Military operations of General Beauregard*, v. 1, ch. 9.

1861 (July).—Separation of West Virginia from Virginia.—Union sympathies. See VIRGINIA: 1861 (January-June).


1861 (July).—Congress in special session.—Indemnifying acts.—Public debt.—Loans.—"The Thirty-seventh Congress met, responding to the president's call, in special session, July 4, 1861. Diminished by about one-third through the absence of members from the seceding states, it was strongly Republican in character; and the Democrats present were in great part heartily loyal. James G. Blaine, a capable judge, describes the Congress in both houses as being extremely able. . . . Naturally, a Congress so infused with . . . unanimity accomplished in the short session of twenty-nine working days, an amount of business which surpassed all previous records. The message of Lincoln comparable in clear and calm wisdom with the inaugural, was listened to respectfully and its suggestions heeded. Such of Lincoln's acts as had seemed to lack constitutional sanction were all approved. Seventy-six bills were passed, all but four relating to the war. A resolution of prime importance was that offered by Crittenden, of Kentucky, to the effect that the war was waged simply 'to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union,' and not 'for the purpose of overthrowing established institutions,' which was passed, July 22, by large majorities in both Houses. Strong anti-slavery men, however, were not content, Sumner, Thaddeus Stevens, and Owen Lovejoy refraining from voting. Before the meeting of Congress, Chase, secretary of the treasury, could do little. Though the treasury had never before been subject to such demands, no methods could be used excepting those specifically authorized by legislation—namely, taxes, time loans, and treasury notes, besides the delayed settlement of accounts. The credit of the government was low, so much so that early in the year it had been obliged to pay twelve per cent. for money borrowed. The public debt had risen to \$76,000,000. Chase, therefore, had great embarrassment to face when, April 2, he borrowed \$8,000,000, and, on May 21, \$7,000,000—at six per cent.—the bonds soon falling in the market, sometimes as low as 85. With the meeting of Congress, July 4, 1861, came the opportunity to better the situation. Chase recommended increased taxation, that might add about \$30,000,000 to the annual revenue, of which sum \$20,000,000 was to be raised by a direct tax and an income tax of three per cent. He favored, too, an extensive scheme of confiscations, which Congress adopted, but during 1861 little money was realized from them. Congress at the same time authorized the secretary to contract loans to the amount of \$250,000,000, the securities having the form of bonds

and interest-bearing notes. Chase retained in office John J. Cisco, the assistant treasurer in New York, a man much respected in financial circles, and through him he sought to establish cordial relations with the banks of the great cities. These [banks] readily accepted, in July, a loan of \$50,000,000 at seven and three-tenths per cent. interest, and a few weeks later a second loan of the same amount on the same terms; a later attempt was less successful, \$50,000,000 being borrowed at six per cent., but the notes standing decidedly below par, in the neighborhood of 92."—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, pp. 63-65.—See also LEGAL TENDER CASES; MONEY AND BANKING; Modern: 1861-1864; DEBTS, PUBLIC: United States before the World War.

1861 (July).—Enlistment of volunteers authorized by Congress.—The enlistment of 500,000 volunteers was authorized by acts of Congress passed July 22 and 25.

1861 (July-September: Missouri).—Sigel's retreat from Carthage.—Death of Lyon at Wilson's Creek.—Siege of Lexington.—Frémont in command.—The governor of Missouri, Jackson, was favorable to secession. "He had, however, a resolute antagonist in Francis P. Blair, Jr., a man of extraordinary physical and moral courage. . . . Between him and the governor, there ensued [from May to September] four months of political and martial manœuvring, but Blair won in the end and Missouri remained in the Union."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, p. 33.—After his defeat (see MISSOURI: 1861) Governor Jackson and his followers fled west from Booneville to Warsaw on the Osage, first, and thence into Vernon county, where they were joined, July 3, by General Sterling Price. "Their united force is stated by Pollard, at 3,600. Being pursued by Lyon, they continued their retreat next day, halting at 9 P. M., in Jasper County, 23 miles distant. Ten miles hence, at 10 A. M. next morning, they were confronted by a Union force 1,500 strong, under Col. Franz Sigel, who had been dispatched from St. Louis by the Southwestern Pacific road, to Rolla, had marched thence to Springfield, and had pushed on to Mount Vernon, Lawrence County, hoping to prevent a junction between Jackson and some forces which his Brigadiers were hurrying to his support. . . . Sigel found the Rebels, halted after their morning march, well posted, vastly superior in numbers and in cavalry, but inferior in artillery, which he accordingly resolved should play a principal part in the battle. In the cannonade which ensued, he inflicted great damage on the Rebels and received very little, until, after a desultory combat of three or four hours, the enemy resolved to profit by their vast superiority in cavalry by outflanking him, both right and left. This compelled Sigel to fall back. . . . The retreat was made in perfect order . . . to Carthage, and through that town to Sarcoxie, some fifteen miles eastward. . . . Sigel, now outnumbered three or four to one, was constrained to continue his retreat, by Mount Vernon, to Springfield; where Gen. Lyon, who had been delayed by lack of transportation, joined and out-ranked him on the 10th."—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 1, ch. 35.—"The month of August came, and found General Lyon at Springfield, hoping to receive re-enforcements; but the battle of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it impossible to send him aid. Major General Fremont had been appointed [July 9] to the command of the Western Department, and had reached St. Louis (July 25). Meantime Confederate troops were pouring over the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, find-

ing that they were advancing upon him in two columns, determined to strike before he should be overwhelmed by the combined Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas troops. His force did not exceed 5,500, his antagonist had more than 12,000. . . . Moving out of Springfield on a very dark night (August 9-10), and having ordered Sigel, with 1,200 men and six guns, to gain the enemy's rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day broke, to make an attack on their front [on Wilson's creek]. But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was overwhelmed. He lost five out of his six guns, and more than half his men. The attack in front was conducted by Lyon in person with very great energy. His horse was shot under him; he was twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose colonel was at that moment severely wounded, 'Come on, I will lead you,' and in so doing was shot through the heart. After the death of Lyon the battle was still continued,



JOHN CHARLES FRÉMONT

their artillery preserving the national troops from total defeat. News then coming of Sigel's disaster, a retreat to Springfield, distant about nine miles, was resolved on. . . . After this action, the Confederate commanders, McCulloch and Price, quarreling with each other, and unable to agree upon a plan for their campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter advanced from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he found a national force of about three thousand (2,780) under Colonel Mulligan. Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce Mulligan, but they did not succeed. Meantime the assailing forces were steadily increasing in number, until they eventually reached 28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. They surrounded the position and cut off the beleaguered troops from water. They made repeated assaults without success until [September] 20th, when they contrived a movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which they rolled before them as they advanced, and compelled Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to surrender unconditionally. On receiving news of this disaster, Fremont at once left St. Louis with the intention of attacking Price,

but that general instantly retreated, making his way back to the southwest corner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch and his Confederate troops."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 47.

ALSO IN: T. L. Snead, *Fight for Missouri*, ch. 11-14.—J. Peckham, *General Lyon and Missouri in 1861*, bk. 4.—J. C. Frémont, F. Sigel, et al, *Wilson's Creek, Lexington and Pea Ridge (Battles and leaders of the Civil War, v. 1)*.—T. Formby, *American Civil War*, pp. 51-52.

1861 (July-November).—McClellan's rise to the chief command.—Creation of the army of the Potomac.—Reorganization of the western armies.—"Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, Major General McClellan was assigned to the command of the Military Department of Washington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieutenant General Scott retained his command as general in chief of the American army, until the end of October. 'I found,' says General McClellan in his report, 'no army to command—a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces.' . . . General McClellan at once commenced the organization of the great army authorized by Congress. His views of the military position and appropriate military conduct were, for the most part, accepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that the Army of the Potomac had reached, on October 27th, a strength of . . . 168,318. It was the general's opinion that the advance upon the enemy at Manassas should not be postponed beyond the 25th of November. It was his desire that all the other armies should be stripped of their superfluous strength, and, as far as possible, every thing concentrated in the force under his command. On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found his bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a letter to the Secretary of War requesting to be placed on the retired list. . . . His desire was granted. An order was simultaneously issued appointing General McClellan commander-in-chief under the President. This change in his position at once produced a change in General McClellan's views. Hitherto he had undervalued the importance of what was to be done in the West. He had desired the Western armies to act on the defensive. Now he wished to institute an advance on East Tennessee, and capture Nashville contemporaneously with Richmond. . . . In preparation for this, the Department of the West was reorganized. On the day following that of McClellan's promotion, Fremont was removed from his command. His department was subdivided into three: (1.) New Mexico, which was assigned to Colonel Canby; (2.) Kansas, to General Hunter; (3.) Missouri, to General Halleck. To General Buell was assigned the Department of the Ohio, and to General Rosecrans that of West Virginia. The end of November approached, and still the Army of the Potomac had not moved. The weather was magnificent, the roads excellent. . . . Winter at last came, and nothing had been done. . . . Considering the military condition of the nation when General McClellan undertook the for-

mation and organization of the great Army of the Potomac, the time consumed in bringing that force into a satisfactory condition was far from being too long. . . . From the resources furnished without stint by Congress McClellan created that army. Events showed that his mental constitution was such that he could not use it on the battlefield. . . . There probably never was an army in the world so lavishly supplied as that of the Potomac before the Peninsular expedition. General McDowell, who knew the state of things well, declared, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 'There never was an army in the world supplied as well as ours. I believe a French army of half the size could be supplied with what we waste.'—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 44, 49.—'Some persons, who ought to have known better, have supposed that in organizing the Army of the Potomac I set too high a model before me and consumed unnecessary time in striving to form an army of regulars. This was an unjustifiable error on their part. I should, of course, have been glad to bring that army to the condition of regulars, but no one knew better than myself that, with the means at my command, that would have been impossible within any reasonable or permissible time. What I strove for and accomplished was to bring about such a condition of discipline and instruction that the army could be handled on the march and on the field of battle, and that orders could be reasonably well carried out. . . . In spite of all the clamor to the contrary, the time spent in the camps of instruction in front of Washington was well bestowed, and produced the most important and valuable results. Not a day of it was wasted. The fortifications then erected, both directly and indirectly, saved the capital more than once in the course of the war, and enabled the army to manœuvre freely and independently. . . . No other army we possessed could have met and defeated the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. And, with all the courage, energy, and intelligence of the Army of the Potomac, it probably would not have been equal to that most difficult task without the advantage it enjoyed during its sojourn in the camps around Washington.'—G. B. McClellan, *McClellan's own story*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: G. B. McClellan, *Report on organization and campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*.—Prince de Joinville, *Army of the Potomac*.—*Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*, 37th Congress, 3d Session, *House of Representatives*, pt. 1.—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 3.

1861 (August).—Act of Congress freeing slaves employed in the service of the Confederates.—In August, Congress passed an "Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes." As originally framed, it only confiscated "any property used to employed in aiding, abetting or promoting insurrection, or resistance to the laws," which would not include slaves. A new section was added, declaring that "whenever hereafter during the present insurrection against the Government of the United States, any person held to labor or service under the law of any State shall be required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is due to take up arms against the United States, or to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory, intrenchment or in any military or naval service whatever against the Government of the United States, the person to whom such service or labor is due shall

forfeit his claim thereto." The law further provided that, "whenever any person shall seek to enforce his claim to a slave, it shall be a sufficient answer to such claim, that the slave had been employed in the military or naval service against the United States contrary to the provisions of this Act."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 1, p. 342.

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 1, pp. 568-570.—E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Rebellion*, p. 195.

1861 (August: North Carolina).—Hatteras expedition.—"General Wool relieved General Butler Aug. 16th, 1861, of the command at Fortress Monroe. Butler was detailed to active duty. The War and Navy Departments having arranged the first of a series of expeditions against the Southern coast, the command of the land forces was conferred upon Butler—Commodore S. H. Stringham directing the naval arm. Materials for the adventure were rapidly gathered at Fortress Monroe from the date of August 16th to the 26th, on which day the fleet took its departure. . . . Not until the vessels were at sea were any but the directors of the enterprize aware of the point of attack. Forts Hatteras and Clark commanded the entrance to the Sounds of Pamlico and Albemarle, whose waters were a great rendezvous for traders running the blockade. . . . Fort Hatteras was an exceedingly formidable battery. It was nearly surrounded by water, and was only approached by a circuitous and narrow neck of land. . . . The secrecy and rapidity of preparation by the Federals caught the rebels somewhat unprepared for the attack. . . . The bombardment opened Wednesday morning, at ten o'clock, preparatory to the landing of the land forces on the beach above Fort Hatteras. . . . A heavy surf rolled in upon the treacherous sands. After infinite labor, and the beaching of three small boats, the landing was suspended for the day. Those already on shore—315 in number—were safe under the guns of the fleet. . . . The bombardment continued during the entire first day. No land assault was attempted. Fort Hatteras replied with great vigor, but with little avail. . . . On the morning of the 20th, the cannonade opened early. A cloudless sky and a clear sea blessed the cause of the assailants. During the night a transport heavily laden with troops reinforced the fort, running down the Sound which was yet open. Fort Clark was occupied by the Federal forces. . . . The conflict soon raged with extreme vigor on both sides. At eleven o'clock the Confederate flag fluttered uneasily a moment—then ran down the halyards and a white flag was slowly run to the peak. . . . Articles of capitulation were signed on board the flag-ship Minnesota. Butler then landed and took formal possession of the largest fortification. The number of prisoners surrendered was 615, who were all placed on the Minnesota. In four days time they were in New York harbor. . . . The first design, it would appear, was to destroy the forts, stop up the channel with old bulks, and to return, temporarily at least, to Fortress Monroe with the entire force; but the place proved to be so strong that Butler left Weber and Hawkins' commands in possession."—O. J. Victor, *History of the Southern Rebellion*, v. 2, div. 5, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: D. Ammen, *Navy in the Civil War: Atlantic coast*, ch. 8.

1861 (August-October: Missouri).—Frémont's premature proclamation of freedom to runaway slaves.—Lincoln's modification.—Change of command.—Butler's expedient of declaring runaway

slaves to be contraband of war, "did not settle what should be done with runaways whose masters, though residents of seceded States, were loyal to the Union. The War Department decided that they should be held until the end of the war, when probably there would be made 'just compensation to loyal masters.' This first stage of Lincoln's policy rested upon the hope that the Union might be restored without prolonged war."—N. W. Stephenson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Union (Chronicles of America Series, v. 29, p. 185)*.—"The difficulty . . . could not be solved by an epigram. 'Contrabands' or fugitive slaves came continually within the lines of the Union armies, and the question how to dispose of them became a grave one for the President. Having carefully thought out a policy, he sent the following instructions to Butler to serve as a guide for his and other commands: the general should not interfere with the reclamation of fugitive slaves who had escaped from masters in the Union slave States but, in accordance with the Confiscation act, he should respect no claim for negroes who had been employed in the military service of the Confederacy. In spite of the murmurs of the abolitionists and some radical Republicans, a large majority of the Northern people had already acquiesced in this policy as a wise temporary expedient, when General Frémont opened the question afresh by his proclamation in Missouri. Frémont . . . [had] been made a major-general and been placed in command of the Western department, which included Missouri. . . . He was supposed to have military talent, and his appointment to a command was very popular with earnest Republicans. . . . The first months in his headquarters at St. Louis showed Frémont to be utterly unfit for a responsible command. . . . He was deaf to the entreaties of well-informed Union citizens for an order to reënforce a capable general [Lyon], who was actively engaged in the field. Distrusted by men of worth and influence in Missouri, flattered by speculators, it is little wonder that the charge was made that the department of Missouri was managed for the purpose of making private fortunes rather than for the country's weal. Such was the posture of affairs on the evening of August 29. . . . Next day he issued [a proclamation freeing the slaves] . . . declaring the slaves of all persons in the State of Missouri, taking up arms against the United States, freemen. . . . Lincoln learned through the newspapers of Frémont's proclamation and of his 'bureau of abolition,' set up for the purpose of issuing deeds of manumission to slaves. Although this major-general of two months' standing . . . had, on a sudden impulse, assumed to solve a question which the President, his Cabinet and Congress were approaching only in a careful and tentative manner, Lincoln's letter to Frémont of September 2, sent by a special messenger, was as full of kindness as of wisdom. 'The liberating slaves of traitorous owners,' he wrote, 'will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the' Confiscation act of Congress. 'This letter is written in a spirit of caution and not of censure.' Frémont was unwilling to retract the provision objected to and asked that the President should openly direct him to make the correction: this Lincoln cheerfully did by public order [dated September 11]."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865, pp. 49-52*.—"Complications in the personal relations of General Fremont and Colonel F. P. Blair, under

whose personal and family influence General Frémont had received his position, occurred at an early day. It was a very unhappy quarrel, and it is quite likely that there was blame upon both sides, though it occurred between men equally devoted to the sacred cause of saving the country to freedom and justice. . . . General Fremont at length took the field in person. On the 8th of October he left Jefferson City for Sedalia. As he advanced with his forces, Price retreated, until it was widely reported that he would give battle to the national forces at Springfield. Just as Fremont was making ready to engage the enemy, he was overtaken by an order relieving him of his command. He was succeeded by General Hunter; but Hunter's command was brief, and was transferred at an early day to General Halleck."—J. G. Holland, *Life of Abraham Lincoln, ch. 20*.—"Frémont's proclamation stirred the anti-slavery sentiment of the country to its utmost depths, receiving enthusiastic recommendation from many States. . . . [But] Lincoln had such a hold upon the people that he carried with him an efficient public opinion and, after due waiting, proceeded to the next step. He never had any thought of removing Frémont on account of his proclamation; but he felt that the mismanagement and corruption in Missouri must be corrected. Proceeding with caution, he sent to St. Louis Montgomery Blair and Meigs, the Quartermaster-General of the Army, and later Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General Thomas: the four made a thorough and candid investigation. . . . [Montgomery Blair recommended Frémont's removal for inefficiency and Cameron's and Thomas's conclusions made it imperative.] These two reported that Frémont 'was incompetent and unfit for his extensive and important command' and that he had 'around him in his staff persons directly and indirectly concerned in furnishing supplies.' On October 24, the President issued the order for his removal."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865, pp. 53-54*.



ALSO IN: J. C. Frémont, *In Command in Missouri (Battles and leaders of the Civil War, v. 1, pp. 278-288)*.—W. Dorsheimer, *Frémont's hundred days in Missouri (Atlantic Monthly, v. 9, 1862)*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 3, pp. 466-564*.

1861 (August-December: West Virginia).—Rosecrans against Lee.—Battles of Carnifex Ferry and Cheat Summit.—"The successes of McClellan at Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain, had caused the Confederate General Wise to fall back to Lewisburg in the valley of the Greenbrier River, in order to protect his right flank against the possible advance of McClellan southward. After Bull Run, and the call of McClellan to Washington, the Confederate President resolved to make another attempt to occupy Western Virginia. He sent General John B. Floyd to reinforce Wise and assume command in the Kanawha Valley, and General Robert E. Lee to take command of the remnants of Garnett's forces at Valley Mountain and to exercise superior direction of the campaign in all Western Virginia. Lee soon saw that he must give up operating so far to the north as Valley Mountain, in order to maintain communication with Floyd and Wise, on the head waters of the Kanawha. He, therefore, moved southward, and took position in the upper part of the Greenbrier Valley in front of the defiles of Cheat Mountain. General Rosecrans, who had succeeded McClellan in command of the Federal forces, had retired with the main body of his troops to Clarksburg . . . leaving the single brigade of General J. J. Reynolds to guard the passes of Cheat and



Greenbrier Mountains. Floyd began the offensive movement. His forces greatly outnumbered those of General Cox in front of him, and he easily compelled the Federals to fall back upon New River, the south branch of the Kanawha. He then left General Wise with a sufficient force to hold Cox's little army in check, and marched northward to Carnifex Ferry on the Gauley River, with the purpose of intercepting any reinforcements coming from Rosecrans at Clarksburg; . . . surprised the Seventh Ohio regiment at Cross Lanes, a few miles from the Ferry, and scattered it, after inflicting great loss upon it. This little battle took place on the morning of the 26th of August, and after his success, Floyd proceeded to fortify the heights about Carnifex Ferry in order to be able to resist any force coming from the North. So soon as Rosecrans learned of Floyd's movements, he set out from Clarksburg with about ten thousand men, and, in about a week, he appeared before Floyd's intrenchments. This was the 10th of September. Rosecrans immediately ordered Benham's brigade to assault the works. The Federals

with his artillery, the main road eastward over the Alleghanies. Reynolds, having been reinforced, attempted to dislodge him by an assault upon his works, October 3d, but failed. General Lee had, meanwhile, proceeded southward, and had joined Floyd and Wise, assuming command of the entire force of about twenty thousand men. He did not, however, attempt to meet Rosecrans, although his army was much superior in point of numbers to the Federal force. He sent a small detachment across New River to Chapmanville, where, on the 25th of September, they were surprised and routed by a small body of Federals. In addition to these discouragements in the field, General Lee had to deal with the quarrel between Floyd and Wise, which was presently appealed to Richmond, with the result that Wise was withdrawn from his command. Lee himself was recalled a little later, and sent to South Carolina, and a part of the army about Lewisburg was marched into the Shenandoah Valley, to reinforce General Stonewall Jackson at Winchester. Floyd made one more effort to regain the Kanawha Valley, but



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ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT

WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN

were repulsed with considerable loss, and before McCook's brigade could come to their assistance, darkness intervened, and the battle was suspended. During the night, Floyd, who had only about two thousand men, and had asked aid from Wise in vain, slipped away. He retired to Sewell's Mountain and took up a strong position there. Rosecrans did not, however, follow. His troops were tired out by the hundred miles march from Clarksburg, and their exertions in the battle. He had . . . cleared the Kanawha Valley, and seemed to feel that he had accomplished all that was practicable or necessary at the moment. So soon as General Lee learned of Rosecrans's march to the Kanawha Valley, he resolved to capture the passes into the middle section of Western Virginia held by the single brigade of General Reynolds. On the 11th of September, he advanced northward from Huntersville with nearly ten thousand men. . . . On the 15th, he made a feeble attack upon Cheat Mountain, which was vigorously and successfully repelled. Lee now drew his forces back into the valley of the Greenbrier, leaving General H. R. Jackson with a single brigade to guard the passes through the Alleghanies into Eastern Virginia against Reynolds. Jackson intrenched himself on Buffalo Hill, from which he could command,

accomplished nothing more serious than inflicting annoyance upon the Federal supply trains. He was finally driven back into the mountains about the middle of November. And the expulsion of the Confederates from Huntersville, in the Greenbrier Valley, a month later, closed the campaign in Western Virginia, and left this section in the hands of the Federals."—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution, 1850-1865, v. 1, pp. 255-258.*

ALSO IN: V. A. Lewis, *History of West Virginia, ch. 28.*—F. Lee, *General Lee, ch. 6.*—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America, v. 1, bk. 4, ch. 2.*

1861 (September-November: On the Mississippi).—General Grant's first battle, at Belmont.—In August, General Ulysses S. Grant, who had been serving for a few weeks in Missouri, first as colonel of the 21st Illinois Regiment, and later as a brigadier-general, was assigned by General Frémont to "the command of the district of south-east Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in Missouri, as well as all southern Illinois." On September 4th he established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois, and the next day, having learned from a scout that the rebels were preparing to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee river, he placed a couple of regiments

of troops and a light battery on board of steamers: and occupied the place on September 6, telegraphing meanwhile for orders, but not waiting for them. His movement anticipated the enemy by a few hours, only, and secured command of the Tennessee, the importance of which was afterward demonstrated by Grant, himself, when he moved on Forts Henry and Donelson. In his "Memoirs" General Grant says: "From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November, nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. I was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men. . . . About the 1st of November I was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels within their lines. Before my troops could be got off, I was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about 50 miles west, or South-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. On the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the White River, in Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to prevent this movement if possible." To carry out these orders, General Grant directed a demonstration to be made from Paducah towards Columbus, while, at the same time, he conveyed some 3,000 troops down the river, in steamers, and attacked a camp of rebels at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus. The battle was a severe one. "The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for the first time. Veterans," says General Grant, "could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. . . . The moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and the achievements of the command." The result was a rallying of the defeated confederates and a reinforcement from Columbus which forced the Unionists to retire with haste. "Our loss at Belmont was 485 killed, wounded and missing. . . . The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fully accomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from Columbus. . . . If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his 3,000 men. Then I should have been culpable indeed."—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 19-20.

ALSO IN: A. Badeau, *Military history of U. S. Grant*, ch. 1.—W. P. Johnston, *Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston*, ch. 24.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 3.

1861 (October; Virginia).—Confederate project for the invasion of the North vetoed by Jefferson Davis.—"Between the 4th of August and the 15th of October more than 110 regiments and thirty batteries, comprising at least 100,000 men, were added to the forces in Washington and its neighborhood, and there appeared to be no limit to the resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Northern troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the immense resources

at the disposal of the United States Government, that there was every reason to expect in the spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities, on the part of the soldiers. The army at Manassas, on the other hand, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate Government, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter. . . . It was easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have learned 'the trade of the soldier,' . . . the Federal general would enter on the next campaign with all those chances of success which attend largely superior numbers, better arms and equipment, and a sound and thorough organization of his army. Such in fact was the view of the situation taken by the sagacious officer who commanded the lately victorious army at Manassas Junction, Joseph E. Johnston. In his opinion his two corps commanders, Beauregard . . . and G. W. Smith . . . entirely concurred. They saw that some thing must be done to break up this constantly increasing Federal army while it was yet in the process of formation. The Confederate generals, determined to urge their views upon the President of the Southern Confederacy. Mr. Davis responded at once to their expressed wish for a conference upon the military situation, and he reached Manassas on September 30, 1861. The conference was held the next day. The generals strongly advised Mr. Davis to reinforce the army at Manassas so that they might cross the Potomac, cut the communications of Washington with the North and carry the war into the enemy's country. . . . But President Davis decided that he could not furnish the required reinforcement without 'a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions.' The project was therefore dropped, and no further attempt was made during the ensuing autumn and winter to interfere with the uninterrupted development of the Federal army at and near Washington in organization and efficiency. . . . It is altogether probable that the Confederate army was at that time decidedly the superior of its antagonist in many important respects. It had the prestige of victory. . . . We may fairly say therefore, that an invasion of the North, undertaken in October, 1861, held out a very fair promise of a successful result for the Confederate arms."—J. C. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, ch. 10.—By tabulating accounts in the daily papers received from Washington "we always knew quite accurately the strength of the enemy's army. Why the . . . [Federals], by similar obvious methods, did not, also, always know our strength, remains a mystery. But McClellan had a bureau under Pinkerton to estimate for him, from the reports of spies, prisoners, and deserters, and implicitly believed, by preference, the most absurd and impossible of all their reports. As an illustration may be taken his report in October, 1861, in which he estimates the Confederate army on the Potomac as 'not less than 150,000 strong, well-drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly entrenched.' In fact, the Confederate army at the time was only about 40,000 strong. It was very poorly drilled and wretchedly equipped, and it had, practically, no intrenchments whatever. And although it numbered able officers among its generals, it was badly commanded, in that it was not organized into divisions, and could not have

been well handled either on a march or in action. McClellan, though unfit to command in battle, had no superior in organizing an army to take the field as a thoroughly fit machine, able to concentrate its energies wherever needed. By the end of October he might easily have advanced upon the Confederates with a force three to one in numbers and twice better armed and organized. . . . And as so good a fighting machine of American soldiers would do hard fighting, even without a general at their head, as was abundantly shown by McClellan's subsequent career, it is entirely possible that the Confederates may owe their escape from a defeat in November, 1861, as much to yarns spun by their deserters as to their own impudent attitude in the field."—E. P. Alexander, *American Civil War*, pp. 55-56.

1861 (October: Virginia).—Ball's Bluff, or Leesburg.—"By the end of October, 138,000 men were under arms near Washington, and public opinion demanded an advance, but McClellan was not ready. October 21, at Ball's Bluff [or Leesburg], 2,000 men, who had been incautiously thrown across the Potomac, were surrounded and half of them lost. One of the slain was Colonel Baker, of California, an officer of much promise, whose death was deeply regretted. The blow caused profound sorrow in the North, but McClellan did nothing to retrieve it."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 545.—"Measured by subsequent battles, the casualties at Ball's Bluff were not large; but the death of Colonel Baker . . . and the loss to New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania of some of the 'very pride and flower of their young men' caused a profound feeling of discouragement all over the North; still there was little tendency to impute this disaster to McClellan, although it occurred in his department. The victory greatly elated the Confederate soldiers."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, p. 59, footnote.—The troops engaged in this affair were commanded by General Stone, under whom were Colonel Devens of the 15th Massachusetts, Colonel Lee of the 20th Massachusetts, Colonel (Senator) Edward D. Baker, Lieutenant-Colonel Learned and Colonel Coggeswell. "In connection with the disaster, a great wrong seems to have been done to General Stone. Accused of disloyalty, he was arrested, but on no specific charge, imprisoned for six months, denied a trial, and set free without explanation. He went abroad, and for many years was Chief of the General Staff to the Khedive of Egypt."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 17.


1861 (October-December: South Carolina-Georgia).—Blockade of eastern coast.—Hilton Head, or Port Royal.—"The navy was organized in three squadrons. The North Atlantic Squadron, which was authorized to operate to the southern line of North Carolina, was placed under the command of Captain L. M. Goldsborough. The South Atlantic Squadron was placed under the command of Captain S. F. Du Pont. And the Gulf Squadron was entrusted to the command of Captain W. W. McKean. By the 1st of December (1861), the navy had been increased to two hundred and sixty-four war-ships, carrying two thousand five hundred and fifty-seven guns, and manned by over twenty thousand seamen. . . . Among the Confederates the preparations were by no means so earnest, active, and productive."—F. N. Thorpe, *Civil War, national view (History of North America*, v. 15, pp. 237-238).—"A marked feature of the year was the series of land and naval expeditions sent by the United

States against the Southern seacoast points. Following the success of the Hatteras expedition of the previous year a great undertaking was projected. Port Royal in South Carolina was the finest harbor on the southern Atlantic coast, a wide estuary formed by the junction of Broad and Port Royal Rivers and Archer's Creek and their *débouchure* into the Atlantic. The harbor is about half way between Charleston and Savannah, having interior water communications with both cities. It was in the richest agricultural district in South Carolina, the most important seat of the production of the famous sea island cotton. . . . Fifty vessels, including transports, had sailed from Hampton Roads, October 29, 1861, the naval command being assigned to Commodore S. F. Dupont and the army of 22,000 troops in transports being under the command of acting Major-General Thomas W. Sherman. The expedition was two months in preparation and sailed with sealed orders, but though every effort had been made to keep its destination secret, the information reached the Confederate secretary of war. He promptly telegraphed to the governor of South Carolina and the commander at Hilton Head where to expect it. . . . Forts Beauregard and Walker, guarding the eastern and western entrances to the harbor, were occupied in November, 1861, their small garrisons having retired before the combined attack of the entire fleet of gunboats, and thus the United States troops gained the first permanent foothold on the soil of South Carolina. [This battle was called Hilton Head] by the Federals. On the first day of January, 1862, a combined attack of the land and naval forces was made on Port Royal. Every ferryboat and flat procurable was put in readiness, and 3,000 men with their horses were sent from the island to the Port Royal ferry, where it was thought the Confederates were trying to shut in the Federal troops by obstructing Coosaw River and Whale Branch. The combined attack of the land and naval forces accomplished the purpose of the expedition, the Confederates retiring with little resistance. This success at Port Royal enabled the Federals to penetrate all the sounds, rivers, inlets, and bays between the sea islands and the mainland of South Carolina and Georgia, where the Confederates had established earthworks without having the men or the guns to arm them. Expeditions were sent through the sounds all the way down to Fernandina, and, without the means of effectually opposing them, the Confederates retired. . . . Soon the . . . [Federals] were in possession of the whole coast southward from Port Royal, except Savannah."—W. R. Garrett and R. A. Halley, *Civil War from a Southern standpoint (History of North America*, v. 14, pp. 317-318).—"The occupation of most of the islands in the vicinity of the St. Helena group was the natural consequence of the victory of Hilton Head. It was effected gradually before the end of the year [1861]. Among all the points of the coast which the Federals had thus seized without striking a blow, thanks to the prestige of their success, the most important was Tybee Island, at the entrance of the Savannah River. Situated on the right bank of the mouth of that river, . . . where the lighthouse stands, Tybee Island enabled the Federals, as soon as they became masters of it, to obstruct the passage of the blockade-runners on their way to the great mart of Savannah. At the end of the year, Dupont's fleet, supported by detachments from Sherman's army, was in possession of the five large

bays of North Edisto, St. Helena, Port Royal, Tybee, Warsaw, and the whole chain of islands which forms the coast of Carolina and Georgia between those bays."—Comte de Paris *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 1, bk. 4, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: C. B. Boynton, *History of the navy during the Rebellion*, v. 1, ch. 26.—D. Ammen, *Navy in the Civil War; The Atlantic coast*, ch. 2.—C. H. Greeley, *American conflict*, ch. 36.

1861 (November).—Trent Affair.—Arrest of Mason and Slidell.—“On the 8th of November, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, of the U. S. steamer San Jacinto, intercepted on the ocean H. B. M. mail packet boat Trent, having on board four emissaries bound for England. Having boarded the Trent, an officer of the San Jacinto . . . [arrested] Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis, and transferred them to the San Jacinto. The Trent then proceeded on her voyage. Captain Wilkes conveyed his captives to Boston, where



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they were consigned to Fort Warren, then a receptacle for political prisoners. “When this transaction became known to the British government immediate preparations were made for war. In the United States the act was hailed as a victory. The Secretary of the Navy publicly applauded Captain Wilkes, and the House of Representatives did the same. The Secretary of State, upon whom the chief responsibility in the matter rested, saw more clearly than others, that a breach of international law had been committed by the commander of the San Jacinto. The President coincided with Mr. Seward, and it was at once resolved to restore the rebel captives to the protection of the British flag.”—G. E. Baker, *Biographical memoir of William H. Seward* (*Seward's works*, v. 5, pp. 10-11).—In his diplomatic correspondence under the caption “Diary or Notes on the War,” Secretary Seward wrote: “November, 30, 1861.—Captain Wilkes, in the Steamer San Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on an errand of treason against

their own country. Lord Lyons has prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by the British government should be first made to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. In the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us. . . . January 20, 1862.—We have reason to be satisfied with our course in the Trent affair. The American people could not have been united in a war which, being waged to maintain Captain Wilke's act of force, would have practically been a voluntary war against Great Britain. At the same time it would have been a war in 1861 against Great Britain for a cause directly the opposite of the cause for which we waged war against the same power in 1812.” In a despatch to Lord Lyons, British minister, Mr. Seward had written: “If I decide this case in favor of my own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this government could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us. . . . By the adjustment of the present case upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as I trust, mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a question is finally and rightly settled between them, which, heretofore exhausting not only all forms of peaceful discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more than half a century alienated the two countries from each other.”—W. H. Seward, *To Lord Lyons*, Dec. 26, 1861 (*Works*, v. 5, *Diplomatic history of the war*, pp. 308-309).—See also TRENT AFFAIR.


ALSO IN: M. Bernard, *Historical account of the neutrality of Great Britain*, ch. 9.—D. M. Fairfax, *Captain Wilkes's seizure of Mason and Slidell (Battles and leaders of the Civil War*, v. 2, pp. 135-142).—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 72-83.—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution*, pp. 271-273.

1861 (December).—Creation of Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War.—Its work.—Service in publicity.—“At Washington, December 9, was constituted an important joint ‘committee on the Conduct of the War,’ consisting of Wade, Chandler and Andrew Johnson, from the Senate, and Julian, Covode, Gooch, and Odell from the House—a committee of radical tone headed by an impetuous man. It played a great part thenceforth throughout the war. Its zeal often outran its discretion, sometimes with unfortunate, even appalling, results; but it was laborious and well-purposed, and sometimes accomplished good.”—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, p. 80.—“The functions and activities of the committee divide themselves roughly into two divisions—the investigative and the recommendatory or advisory. . . . Most of the investigations of military affairs were made in the East:

the most systematic related to the Army of the Potomac. . . . The battles and campaigns investigated in this connection were as follows: the Peninsula campaign and the battles incident to it, the second battle of Manassas and the Pope campaign, and the Maryland campaign of McClellan. At the same time with these investigations, an inquiry was made into the disasters at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff. Investigations of the battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg were made, and the last two were accompanied with searching examinations of the military administrations of Generals Hooker and Meade. Later, testimony was taken respecting the battle of Petersburg and . . . the Crater. Thorough investigations were made of the Bed River and Fort Fisher expeditions. Testimony was taken . . . on a large number of expeditions, battles, and . . . detached military operations; the campaigns of General Rosecrans [the Hatteras Inlet, Port Royal and Burnside expeditions], the battle at Fort Donelson; the capture of New Orleans; the invasion of New Mexico; the Accomack expedition; the battle of Winchester; the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*, the operations against Charleston; the operations in the Gulf Department; and the battle of Cedar Mountain. Notably important investigations [and reports] relating more directly to the civil aspects of the war or to the work of supplying the army may be grouped as follows: heavy ordnance, light-draught monitors, . . . treatment of Confederate soldiers in Union prisons, the paymaster's department, the administration of the quartermasters located in New York and Philadelphia, ice contracts, returning slaves to their 'rebel' owners, trade regulations as applied on the Mississippi River, trade in military districts, 'protecting rebel property,' treatment of wounded from Front Royal, the convalescent camp at Alexandria, and the Sherman-Johnston terms of surrender. One of the most interesting investigations of the committee was that of the Western Department or Missouri during the Frémont régime, which evidenced their peculiar partizan politics and their radicalism. Another such inquiry was made of the administration of General Steele in Arkansas. . . . Much of the activity of the committee as a conciliar body took the form of suggestions, advice and intrigue. . . . Investigations of governmental inefficiency and of what may be termed scandals occurred in the cases of light-draught monitors, ice contracts, heavy ordnance, employment of disloyal persons in government work, hospitals and the treatment of wounded and illicit trade with the Confederates. . . . That they [the committee] made mistakes, as in overrating Hooker, in underestimating McClellan, in blaming Franklin, and in misinterpreting Meade, may be granted, although they certainly had testimony, to substantiate their conclusions. In defense, it may be contended that the committee succeeded in their aims; that they brought speed and energy into the conduct of the war; that they ferreted out abuses and put their fingers down heavily upon governmental inefficiency; and that they labored, for a time at least, to preserve a balance and effect a co-operation between the legislative and executive departments. That the committee were not experts, nor men of the highest rank of statesmanship, nor of lofty character, are arguments *ad hominem* rather than *ad institutum*. They were partizans, but they were men of energy; they were often rash and impetuous, but their hearts were in the struggle . . . [and] there was

still their great service in giving publicity, in some cases pitiless publicity, to faulty military and questionable political transactions."—W. W. Pierson, Jr., *Committee on the Conduct of the Civil War* (*American Historical Review*, Apr., 1918, pp. 560-562, 573-576).

1861-1862.—Financing of Confederate government.—"The history of the first year of Confederate foreign affairs is interwoven with the history of Confederate finance. During that year the South became a great buyer in Europe. Arms, powder, cloth, machinery, medicines, ships, a thousand things had all to be bought abroad. To establish the foreign credit of the new Government was the arduous task of the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury, Christopher G. Memminger. The first great campaign of the war was not fought by armies. It was a commercial campaign fought by agents of the Federal and Confederate govern-



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ment and having for its aim the cornering of the munitions market in Europe. In this campaign the Federal agents had decisive advantages: their credit was never questioned, and their enormous purchases were never doubtful ventures for the European sellers. In some cases their superior credit enabled them to overbid the Confederate agents and to appropriate large contracts which the Confederates had negotiated but which they could not hold because of the precariousness of their credit. And yet, all things considered, the Confederate agents made a good showing. In the report of the Secretary of War in February, 1862, the number of rifles contracted for abroad was put at 91,000, of which 15,000 had been delivered. The chief reliance of the Confederate Treasury for its purchases abroad was at first the specie in the Southern branch of the United States Mint and in Southern banks. The former the Confederacy seized and converted to its own use. Of the latter it lured into its own hands a very large proportion by what is commonly called 'the fifteen million loan'—an issue of eight per cent bonds

authorized in February, 1861. Most of the specie seems to have been taken out of the country by the purchase of European commodities. A little, to be sure, remained, for there was some gold still at home when the Confederacy fell. But the sum was small. In addition to this loan Memminger also persuaded Congress on August 19, 1861, to lay a direct tax—the 'war tax,' as it was called—of one-half of one per cent on all property except Confederate bonds and money. As required by the Constitution this tax was apportioned among the States, but if it assumed its assessment before April 1, 1862, each State was to have a reduction of ten per cent. . . . What the States did, as a rule, was to assume their assessment, agree to pay it into the Treasury, and then issue bonds to raise the necessary funds, thus converting the war tax into a loan. The Confederate, like the Union, Treasury . . . had recourse to the perilous device of paper money, the gold value of which was not guaranteed. Beginning in March, 1861, it issued under successive laws great quantities of paper notes, some of them interest bearing, some not. It used these notes in payment of its domestic obligations. The purchasing value of the notes soon started on a disastrous downward course, and in 1864 the gold dollar was worth thirty paper dollars. . . . The depreciation of these notes left governmental clerks without adequate salaries and soldiers without the means of providing for their families. During most of the war, women and other non-combatants had to support the families or else rely upon local charity organized by state or county boards. . . . Long before all the evils of paper money were experienced, the North, with great swiftness, concentrated its naval forces so as to dominate the Southern ports, which had trade relations with Europe. The shipping ports were at once congested with cotton to the great embarrassment of merchants and planters. Partly to relieve them, the Confederate Congress instituted in May, 1861, what is known today as 'the hundred million loan.' It was the first of a series of 'produce loans.' The Treasury was authorized to issue eight per cent bonds, to fall due in twenty years, and to sell them for specie or to exchange them for produce or manufactured articles. In the course of the remaining months of 1861 there were exchanged for these bonds great quantities of produce including some 400,000 bales of cotton. . . . The effects of the blockade were felt at the ends of the earth. India became an exporter of cotton. Egypt also entered the competition."—N. W. Stephenson, *Day of the Confederacy (Chronicles of America Series, v. 30, pp. 47-51, 56-57)*.

1861-1862 (December-March: Virginia).—Protracted inaction of McClellan.—Plan of campaign and its frustration by Confederate evacuation of Centreville.—"The country had a right to expect an offensive movement. Inasmuch as McClellan was apt to underestimate the number as well as the fighting quality of his soldiers, his 76,000 'disposable for an advance' could likely enough have been increased to 100,000. But at this time he could not have handled 100,000 men. It is doubtful if any other general in the Union army could have done so. Long after the war, Grant referred to the 'vast and cruel responsibility' devolving upon McClellan at the outset and added 'if McClellan had gone into the war as Sherman, Thomas or Meade, had fought his way along and up, I have no reason to suppose that he would not have won as high a distinction as any of us.'"—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War,*

1861-1865, p. 62.—"McClellan had his shortcomings, as events proved; but in one respect he was very strong. He lacked the bulldog tenacity of Grant, the strategy of Sherman, the impetuous dash of Stonewall Jackson; but as a military organizer he was superior to them all. When he took control of the army it was a great disorganized mass, untrained, discouraged, but possessing the one supreme virtue—patriotism. In four months McClellan had made of this crude mass a trained, disciplined, and organized army equal to any that ever trod American soil. No such work had been done on this side of the Atlantic since the days of Steuben at Valley Forge. 'Had there been no McClellan,' said General Meade in after years, 'there could have been no Grant; the army made no essential improvement under any of his successors.'"—H. W. Elson, *History of the United States of America, v. 4, p. 179*.—An investigation into the cause of delay in the movements of the troops was one of the earliest activities of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, which reported in part as follows: "When Congress assembled . . . in the beginning of December, 1861, so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and so zealously had the people responded to their country's call, that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your committee by the adjutant general of the army showed that, exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men. During the time this large army had been collecting and organizing, nothing of importance had transpired in connection with it, except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the rebels, which your committee treat of more at length in another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of Ball's Bluff, which it made the subject of a separate report. The weather during the fall season, and for some weeks after the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for active military operations. . . . From the testimony before your committee is appeared that the army of the Potomac was well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of discipline by the last of September or the first of October. The men were ready and eager to commence active operations. The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared they had no expectation of doing so. . . . Early in December an order had been issued from headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any persons who should come into our lines from the direction of the enemy; but all such persons were to be sent, without examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was, that the generals examined appeared to be almost entirely ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having only such information as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters. . . . Subsequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very greatly overestimated. . . . The estimate of the force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses examined upon

that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men, leaving 100,000 or upwards that could be used for expeditions at other points. . . . The subject of the obstruction of the navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration of your committee. . . . As was well urged by the Navy Department, the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army co-operate with the navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that co-operation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed. After repeated efforts, General McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to proceed down the river. . . . The troops did not arrive, and the Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed. . . . Captain Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Department had charge. . . . It was then agreed that the troops should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the committee as to what reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as he could ascertain, was, that General McClellan feared it might bring on a general engagement. . . . Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy Department, the effective vessels of the Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter closed, and remained closed until the rebels voluntarily evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening communication by that route. On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the United States, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the armies of the United States, one result of which was the series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the land. After this long period of inaction of the army of the Potomac, the President of the United States, on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order: . . . 'Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. Abraham Lincoln.' To this order General McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as involving 'the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacles (the Occoquan), and by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check.' He then proceeded to argue in favor of a movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving the prefer-

ence to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30 days would be required to provide the necessary means of transportation. He stated that he regarded 'success as certain, by all the chances of war,' by the route he proposed, while it was 'by no means certain that we can beat them (the enemy) at Manassas.' . . . A council of war, held in February, 1862, . . . the first, so far as your committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by General McClellan, and then by direction of the President, was composed of twelve generals. . . . To them was submitted the question whether they would indorse the line of operations which General McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the deliberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and across the country to Richmond. . . . Before the movement by way of Annapolis could be executed, the enemy abandoned their batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at Centreville and Manassas [removing what stores they could and burning the remainder], retiring to the line of the Rappahannock. When General McClellan, then in the city of Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of the whole army in the direction of the position lately occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning of the 10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and destroyed the railroad bridge across it. . . . On the 13th of March General McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of army corps (General Banks being absent), and informed them that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement by way of the York and James rivers."—*Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War; 37th Congress, 3rd Session, House of Representatives, pt. 1, pp. 6-12.*—"December was the fifth month that General McClellan had been in command of the greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was impossible to convince the country that a longer period of preparation was necessary before this army could be led against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in discipline or equipment. . . . McClellan reported to the Secretary of War, that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered 150,000 and that he would therefore require, to make an advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of 240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective total of 41,000 men. . . . Aware that his army was less than one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the time in drilling and disciplining his troops, who, according to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military operations, he says, were practicable until the end of December; but he was never molested."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln, v. 5, ch. 9.*—McClellan says, "It certainly was not till late in Nov., 1861, that the Army of the Potomac was in any condition to move, nor even then were they capable of assaulting entrenched

positions. By that time the roads had ceased to be practicable for the movement of armies, and the experience of subsequent years proved that no large operations could be advantageously conducted in that region during the winter season. Any success gained at that time in front of Washington could not have been followed up and a victory would have given us the barren possession of the field of battle, with a longer and more difficult line of supply during the rest of the winter. If the Army of the Potomac had been in condition to move before winter, such an operation would not have accorded with the general plan I had determined upon after succeeding General Scott as general in command of the armies."—G. B. McClellan, *McClellan's own story*, pp. 199-200.

ALSO IN: J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of military operations*, ch. 3-4.—A. S. Webb, *Peninsula (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 3, ch. 2)*.—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America, v. 1, ch. 4*.—G. B. McClellan, *Peninsular campaign (Battles and leaders of the Civil War, v. 2, pp. 160-187)*.—Idem, *Complete report*.—J. G. Barnard, *Peninsular campaign and its antecedents*.—J. C. Ropes, *General McClellan's plans (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, v. 1)*.

1861-1862 (December-April: Virginia).—Jackson's first campaign in the Shenandoah valley.—Battle of Kernstown.—"Soon after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes." In November, Jackson's force was about 10,000 men. "His only movement of note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition at the end of December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and a dam or two near Hancock, on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. . . . In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and General McClellan collected his army of more than 100,000 men on the Peninsula. . . . Jackson's little army in the Valley had been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5,000 men of all arms available for the defense of his district, which began to swarm with enemies all around its borders, aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8,000 to 10,000 men. A little after the middle of March, Jackson concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit was not vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops from the Valley. The result was so pleasing to the Rich-

mond government and General Johnston that it was decided to reinforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May."—J. D. Imboden, *Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah (Battles and leaders of the Civil War, v. 2, pp. 282-285)*.—"The losses at Kernstown were: Union, 118 killed, 450 wounded, twenty-two missing=590; Confederate, eighty killed, 375 wounded, 263 missing=718."—N. Kimball, *Fighting Jackson at Kernstown (Battles and leaders of the Civil War, v. 2, p. 307, footnote)*.

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon, *Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain, ch. 3*.

1861-1863.—President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.—On April 27, 1861, President Lincoln issued the following order "To the Commanding General, Army of the United States"—at that time, General Scott: "You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ." On July 2 another order was issued in exactly the same language, except that it gave authority to suspend the writ at "any point on or in the vicinity of any military line . . . between the city of New York and the city of Washington." On October 14 a third order to General Scott declared: "The military line of the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any place between that place and the city of Washington." On December 2 a specific order to General Halleck, commanding in the department of Missouri, authorized the suspension of the writ within the limits of his command; and a similar order, long previously, had specially empowered the commander of the forces of the United States on the coast of Florida to do the same. On September 24, 1862, a general proclamation by the president subjected to martial law "all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States"; and suspending the writ of habeas corpus "in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission." On March 3, 1863, the authority of the president to suspend habeas corpus (which some thought questionable) was confirmed by act of Congress; and on September 15 in that year another general proclamation was issued, referring to the act and declaring a suspension of the writ "throughout the United States, in the cases where, by the authority of the President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command, or in their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or drafted or mustered or



enlisted in, or belonging to, the land or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval service by authority of the President of the United States; or for resisting a draft, or for any other offense against the military or naval service."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 38, 45, 54, 85, 93, 239, 406.—"Whether it is the President or Congress that has power under the constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a burning question during the civil war. . . . The case of John Merryman . . . was the first to come up for judicial inter-pretation. Merryman lived near Baltimore, and appears to have been suspected of being captain of a secession troop, of having assisted in destroying railroads and bridges for the purpose of preventing troops from reaching Washington, and of obstructing the United States mail. By order of General Keim of Pennsylvania he was arrested at night in his own house, and taken to Fort McHenry at that time in command of General George Cadwallader. Taney, who was then chief justice of the United States, granted a habeas corpus, but Cadwallader refused to obey it, saying that the privilege had been suspended by the President. On the return of the writ, the Chief Justice filed an opinion denying that the President had any power to suspend habeas corpus and affirming that such power rested with Congress alone. Lincoln continued to arrest and imprison without any regard to this opinion, and indeed was advised by his Attorney-General that he was not bound to notice it. . . . The writ of habeas corpus was . . . not suspended by Congress until the rebellion was half over. In other words, Lincoln suspended it for two years of his own accord and without authority from any one; for two years he made arrests without warrants and held men in prison as long as he pleased. . . . There are few things in American history more worthy of discussion than the power exercised by Lincoln in those two years. It was absolute and arbitrary and, if unauthorized, its exercise was a tremendous violation of the constitution. Whether it was justifiable and necessary is another matter. If it was unconstitutional and yet necessary in order to save the Union, it shows that the constitution is defective in not allowing the government the proper means of protecting itself. That Lincoln used this power with discretion and forbearance there is no doubt. He was the most humane man that ever wielded such authority. He had no taste for tyranny, and he knew the temper of the American people. But, nevertheless, injustice was sometimes done. His subordinates had not always their master's nature."—S. G. Fisher, *Suspension of habeas corpus during the War of the Rebellion (Political Science Quarterly, Sept., 1888)*.—The view which President Lincoln himself entertained, and under which he assumed and exercised authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, was submitted to Congress in his first message, when it convened in special session, July 4, 1861. He said: "Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to authorize the commanding general in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This

authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who has sworn to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' should not himself violate them. Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically, it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that 'the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion. . . . Whether there shall be any legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 59-60.—Congress gave tacit approval to this view of the president's powers by passing no act on the subject until nearly two years afterwards, as shown above.

1861-1864.—Effect of war on the constitution.—Growth of presidential powers.—"The relative force of Federal and State action, when in conflict, was a question that had been sedulously avoided. . . . The Congress and . . . [Buchanan's] Administration came to an end on the fourth of March. How did the constitutional question stand then? Had any advance been made toward an answer to the vexed question of sovereignty? . . . An emasculated national sovereignty had been proclaimed by the Executive; a vigorous State sovereignty had been actively asserted by seven of the commonwealths of the Union; and no position whatever had been assumed by the Federal Legislature. . . . Mr. Lincoln's inaugural address was extremely moderate in tone. His policy, as outlined, was not distinguishable from that of

his predecessor. The constitutional perpetuity of the Union was his central proposition, and from this were deduced the nullity of all State ordinances of secession, and the necessity of enforcing the laws in all the States. But while, like Buchanan, Lincoln announced his intention of preserving the *status quo* till time should sooth excited passions, the right to 'coerce a State' was not even alluded to. . . . Under the impulse of actual hostilities, however, the contempt of the President for the State-sovereignty doctrine assumed a decidedly aggressive form. His message to Congress at the opening of a special session on July 4th contained a severe denunciation of the dogma. The time had come for assuming a position that should at least be clear and intelligible at the present moment; and the President accordingly planted himself unequivocally on the theory of national sovereignty. As his definition of 'sovereignty' he accepted this—a political community without a political superior. 'Tested by this,' he said, 'no one of our States, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty. And even Texas gave up the character on coming into the Union. . . . The States have their *status* in the Union, and they have no other legal *status*.' . . . The question presented to the Administration by the commencement of hostilities was, 'Has this Government the power to preserve its authority over all its territory?' The answer of the old school of constitutional lawyers, was 'Yes, so far as is conferred by the Constitution and the laws'; but the answer we derive from the actual conduct of the war is, 'Yes,' without qualification. Immediately upon the fall of Sumter, the assertion of the new doctrine began. Before the assembling of Congress, July 4th, six distinct proclamations were issued by the Presidents calling into play forces deemed necessary to the preservation of the nation. The calling out of the militia was based upon the law of 1795. Buchanan had declined to consider this law as applicable to the present circumstances. His delicacy, however, was a phase of his scruples about coercing a State, scruples entirely foreign to his successor. . . . It was no extraordinary stretch of construction for Lincoln to act in accordance with the plain terms of the statute. His proclamation avoided any reference to the State governments. And the theory of mere individual uprising was rounded out by including the governors of the seceded States in his call for troops. Four days after the call for volunteers, the President's purpose of ignoring the connection of the State governments with the rebellion was put to a severe test in his proclamation of a blockade of the ports of the cotton States. He was obliged to speak of 'the pretended authority' of those States, but only to declare that persons under such authority molesting United States' vessels would be treated as pirates. This assumption by the Executive of the right to establish a blockade was rather startling to conservative minds. It seemed like a usurpation of the legislative power to declare war. For blockade is an incident of actual warfare, and involves the recognition of belligerent rights. The constitutionality of the President's action, however, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases, and hence, Congress having acquiesced, it has the sanction of all three departments of the Government. Accordingly, the President, as commander-in-chief, can determine, without reference to Congress, the time when an insurrection has attained the proportions of a war, with all the consequences to persons

and property that such a decision entails. . . . A further action of the President previous to the meeting of Congress was the call for the enlistment of forty thousand volunteers, and the increase of the regular army by over twenty thousand men, and the navy by eighteen thousand. With reference to these measures, Mr. Lincoln himself resigned all claim to constitutionality. 'Whether strictly legal or not,' he says, 'they were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then as now that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.' . . . The remaining subject dealt with in the President's proclamations, was the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus. . . . [See above: 1861-1863.] Justice Taney's opinion [on this subject] took strong ground against the constitutionality of the President's act. . . . But to have awaited the meeting and action of Congress in the present case might have been to sacrifice the Government. Lincoln therefore availed himself of the latitude of construction possible by the wording of the clause. Attorney-General Bates sustained the President in an elaborate opinion. . . . In the interval between April 12th and July 4th, 1861, a new principle thus appeared in the constitutional system of the United States, namely that of a temporary dictatorship. All the powers of government were virtually concentrated in a single department, and that the department whose energies were directed by the will of a single man. . . . At the outbreak of the insurrection, then, two distinct courses lay open for the Government to pursue. It could elect to repress the uprising by the civil power, through process of the courts, with the military arm as the marshal's *posse*. . . . The insurgents then would be subject to treatment like ordinary criminals. Or, on the other hand, the rebels could be recognized as belligerents and subdued by the exertion of military power alone. In the latter case, the insurgents would seem to be entitled to the treatment which public law secures to armed public enemies. But the question early arose, could not the Government follow both courses at the same time, and be guided in its dealings with the rebels by public law or by constitutional law, at its discretion? Could it not, for example, hang as traitors rebels taken in battle as prisoners of war? . . . [Such a penalty could not be enforced. There were too many Northern prisoners in Southern hands.] The course of the Administration in reference to the exchange of prisoners and other matters was dictated by the same reasoning. It was decided to secure all the advantages which flowed from the exercise of the war power by the Government, while not conceding belligerent rights to those against whom that power was employed. . . . The developments of the conflict led to the working out of a policy, which, without attributing official recognition to the Confederate Government, sanctioned the doctrine that, as regarded individuals in the insurrectionary districts, the United States Government had the rights of both sovereign and belligerent."—W. A. Dunning, *Constitution of the United States in Civil War and Reconstruction, 1860-1867*, pp. 7, 13, 15-16, 20-24, 28-20.

ALSO IN: E. McPherson, *Political history of the Civil War*, pp. 126, 155.—*Globe*, 1st session xxxvii Congress, p. 393.

1861-1865.—Effect of Civil War in England.—Cotton famine. See ENGLAND: 1861-1865.

1861-1865.—Confederate prisons.—Their con-

dition. See PRISONS AND PRISON PENS, CONFEDERATE.

1861-1865.—**Censorship of newspapers.—Opposition to it.** See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1861-1866.

1861-1865.—**Welfare work of the Y. M. C. A.** See YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1854-1905.

1861-1865.—**Commerce between North and South throughout the war.**—"For seven months after the confederacy had launched on its career as an independent power, no action had been taken by Congress or the President toward laying down a policy concerning commercial intercourse between the North and South in the Mississippi Valley. It is true that the secretary of the treasury, Chase, on May 2, 1861, issued a set of rules . . . which were designed to prevent munitions of war from reaching the confederacy; but they were feeble in their operation and in no way declared a general policy for the United States. On July 13, Congress acted by declaring that all commercial intercourse should cease with the insurrectionary regions whenever the President should by proclamation so order; but . . . [with the] proviso: 'That the President may in his discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse with any such part of said State or section . . . as he, in his discretion, may think most conducive to the public interest'—such intercourse to be carried out under rules laid down by the secretary of the treasury. With this clear mandate the President refrained from acting until August 16, when he issued a proclamation declaring all commercial intercourse with the insurrectionary regions at an end 'without the special license and permission of the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury.' . . . At no time during the four years of the war did the government settle down to a policy of absolute non-intercourse with the confederacy. . . . In 1863, the power to grant permits was restricted to special agents residing in the larger cities, and no permit could be allowed to run for a longer period than one month. . . . After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the entire course of the Mississippi river was freed from obstructions and soon trade under certain restrictions was allowed through the whole river system. The most flagrant violation of the rules occurred daily. Colonel Lafayette C. Baker, chief of the national detective police, said, 'It seems incredible that in the midst of the most tragical scenes that war has ever created, the very arena of conflict should be the busy field of mercenary and lawless trade.' . . . The theoretical policy of complete non-intercourse by 1863 began to disintegrate gradually through treasury regulations until by the beginning of 1865 there was almost unrestricted trade and wild speculation. The entering wedge was the division of the occupied area into 'special agencies' which in turn were divided into numerous trade districts. Under presumably strict regulations private traders were allowed to set up trade stores, to take in a certain monthly allowance ostensibly for the civilian population, and to take out unlimited amounts. . . . Memphis was the center of a truly gigantic traffic directly with the confederacy. A federal army officer charged that 'Memphis has been of more value to the Southern Confederacy since it fell into Federal hands than Nassau.' . . . The federal government at no time ever had a well-balanced, unified policy regarding trade with the confederacy. There were too many departments trying to determine the proper relations and the method of their execution.

This led to a maze of rules which baffled the best minds in their solution, and made possible the rise of a most reprehensible trade of immense proportions. At no time did the trade regulations for the interior approach in effectiveness the naval blockade of southern ports. In effect, the United States alone was trading with a people whose commerce was shut off from all other foreign nations. There can be but little doubt that the confederacy did get immense amounts of war material through the lines; and that the military campaigns in the Mississippi valley were at times seriously involved in and hindered by trade with the confederates."—E. M. Coulter, *Commercial intercourse with the Confederacy in the Mississippi valley, 1861-1865* (*Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Mar., 1919, pp. 379-380, 382-387, 395).

1862.—**Attitude in Illinois towards negroes.** See ILLINOIS: 1861-1870.

1862.—**Law passed for government regulation of railroads during the war.** See RAILROADS: 1861-1865.

1862 (January-February: **Kentucky-Tennessee).**—**First breaking of the Confederate line.—Grant's capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.**—"At the beginning of the new year the Union armies were over 660,000 strong, backed by a fleet of 212 vessels. McClellan lay quiet upon the Potomac all winter, drilling, organizing, disciplining the Army of the Potomac. In his front was Joe Johnston, with a much smaller force, pushing forward with equal energy the schooling of his soldiers. The Western generals were more active. Albert Sidney Johnston, perhaps the most promising Southern officer, was in command in the West, with headquarters at Bowling Green. Buell lay in Johnston's front, having superseded Sherman, whose 'crazy' suggestion that 250,000 men would be required for operations on the Western field had lost him the confidence of his superiors. . . . [In eastern Kentucky the] Confederate Humphrey Marshall had been creating more or less political trouble, and General Garfield was sent against him with some 2,000 men. Marshall somewhat outnumbered Garfield; but in a vigorous January campaign [beginning at Paintsville, January 7, and] culminating at Prestonburg [January 10], Garfield quite dispersed his forces, and drove him into the mountains."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye view of our Civil War*, ch. 6.—"At the beginning of the year 1862 the Confederates held the southern part of Kentucky, the line between the opposing forces passing through Mill Springs, Bowling Green, Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and Columbus on the Mississippi. To break this line and push it farther south, and if possible to rescue the Unionists of eastern Tennessee, was the first object of the Federal armies. Accordingly General W. H. Halleck, who now commanded in the West, sent General George H. Thomas with some ten thousand men to open a way. [Thomas met a force of about five or six thousand men under General F. K. Zollicoffer, who had retreated from his post in advance of Cumberland Gap, at the extreme right of the Confederate line. The two forces, which were about equal in strength, came into collision at Mill Springs, in central Kentucky, where Zollicoffer was killed early in the action, and the Confederate command devolved upon General George B. Crittenden.] A desperate battle ensued. The Confederates fought bravely during the day, but they were completely routed, and at night they fled toward Nashville. . . . [This battle, known variously as Mill Springs, Fishing Creek and Logan Cross Roads, was the first substantial

Union Victory in the West.] The way was now open to eastern Tennessee; but owing to the scarcity of provisions and the badness of the roads, the project was given up, and Thomas rejoined Buell. Kentucky was now occupied by three armies, with another at Cairo, Ill., hovering on its border and about to enter the state. General Albert Sidney Johnston, then reputed the ablest commander of the South, held an army at Bowling Green [which Thomas's advance had the effect of turning], and General Leonidas Polk, the Episcopal bishop of Louisiana, who was also a soldier and a graduate of West Point, commanded a force at Columbus. Opposed to these were a Union army at Louisville under General Don Carlos Buell and the army at Cairo under General U. S. Grant, . . . [who was supported by gun boats]. Western Kentucky is traversed by two parallel rivers that empty into the Ohio near together. . . . These two rivers, which were navigable for hundreds of miles, furnished the southern armies with invaluable means of transportation, and the Union commanders conceived the idea that the evacuation of Kentucky could best be forced by operating up these two rivers. General A. S. Johnston was now the commander of all the Confederate armies west of the mountains, except in the extreme South. He saw too late that while the Mississippi had been strongly guarded by heavy batteries—at Columbus, Island No. 10, Memphis, and Vicksburg—the two inland rivers had been neglected. Two small forts, Henry and Heman, on the Tennessee, were . . . quickly strengthened, and also a far more formidable one on the Cumberland—Fort Donelson. In order to protect Nashville, Johnston, at the beginning of February, made the fatal blunder of dividing his force of thirty thousand men, placing fourteen thousand in Kentucky to watch Buell and sending sixteen thousand to Fort Donelson.”—H. W. Elson, *History of the United States of America*, v. 4, pp. 160-163.—“Halleck's first task as commander of the Western armies was to penetrate the Confederate line of defense. This could be done by breaking its centre or by turning one of its flanks. The former appeared most feasible to Grant, and Commodore Foote, who commanded the naval forces. Under instructions from Halleck, seven of the gunboat flotilla, with Grant's 17,000 men in reserve, moved up the Tennessee river to attack Fort Henry and essay the value of gun-boats in amphibious warfare. Grant landed below the fort, and Foote then opened fire upon it. Tilghman, in command, foreseeing its capture, was shrewd enough to send off the bulk of his force to Fort Donelson. He himself made a mock defense with a handful of men, surrendering the fort after the garrison was well on its way. Without the twin citadel of Donelson [distant about eleven miles, southeastwardly, on the Cumberland river], however, Fort Henry was but a barren triumph, for no column could advance up the Tennessee river while this garrison threatened its flank. It was here that Grant earned his first laurels as a stanch soldier, by compelling, after a stubborn fight, the surrender of this second fortress with its entire garrison. Every effort had been made by Johnston to hold the place. He must here fight for the possession of Nashville. Fort Donelson was strongly fortified and garrisoned. Grant moved against it from Fort Henry with 15,000 men, 5,000 less than the enemy. The ground is difficult; the troops are green. But reinforcements and the fleet come to Grant's assistance. The fort is fully invested, under great difficulties from severity of weather

and the inexperience of the men. Happily there is not much ability in the defense. Floyd, the senior officer, determines to cut his way out. He falls heavily upon Grant's right, held by McClelland and backed by Wallace, thinking to thrust them aside from the river and to escape over the road so won. A stubborn resistance defeats this sortie, though but narrowly. A general assault is ordered, which effects a lodgment in the works. Divided responsibilities between Floyd, Buckner, and Pillow weaken the defense so as to operate a surrender. Our loss was 2,300. The Confederates captured were over 15,000 men.”—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye view of our Civil War*, ch. 6.—The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson had split “the Confederate line of defense in two and rendered its further maintenance an utter impossibility. With the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers in Federal possession it was manifestly absurd to think of maintaining a line of defense which those rivers traversed. The success of Grant had completely ended all possibility of coöperation between the eastern and western wings of that defensive line. The forces west of the Tennessee and those east of that river must henceforth act independently and rather hopelessly, or else they must retire to a new line farther south upon which coöperation might be possible. It was decided to retire. Bowling Green was evacuated and the Federal General Buell instantly occupied it. A little later Nashville was evacuated by the Confederates in behalf of a less exposed position. It was at the same time determined to withdraw from Columbus all the forces assembled there except a garrison sufficient to work the guns, and to defend the point for a time with the aid of Commodore Hollins's gunboats in the Mississippi. The new line of defense adopted by the Confederates was the Memphis and Charleston railroad, running through southern Tennessee and northern Mississippi, Alabama, etc. This line presented no natural advantages of defense, but it covered the most vitally important railroad communications of the Confederacy. Furthermore it will be observed that this line of defense lies almost exactly midway between the Ohio River and the Gulf of Mexico. In other words, under Grant's energetic aggressiveness, the Federal control had been pushed from the Ohio river nearly half way to the gulf. The process of ‘splitting the Confederacy in two,’ was already well advanced at the beginning of the spring of 1862. . . . By making himself master of the two rivers he had completely destroyed the Confederate line and scheme of defense. He had completely cut off that part of the Confederate force which had its headquarters at Bowling Green from that part of it whose chief seat was at Columbus. So complete was this severance, . . . that General Albert Sydney Johnston sent General Beauregard at once to command the western force as a separate army with specific instructions to act upon his own judgment, bearing in mind that coöperation between the two forces was no longer possible.”—G. C. Eggleston, *History of the Confederate War*, v. 1, pp. 309-312.—“It was a great victory for the North, a blow from which the South never recovered. The Mississippi River as far as northern Mississippi was lost, together with the western half of the state of Tennessee. This disaster, together with the loss of Roanoke Island on the North Carolina coast, awakened the South from its fool's paradise. The people realized, with a sudden shock, that the war was only beginning, that the North, so far from conceding Southern independence, was about to put forth gigantic

efforts to crush secession. The passive defensive was crumbling everywhere: Europe made no move toward intervention. It was evident that the Confederacy must make a great and united effort if it would save itself."—H. J. Eckenrode, *Jefferson Davis, president of the South*, p. 167.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, ch. 21-23.—J. M. Hoppin, *Life of Rear Admiral Foote*, ch. 16-18.—W. P. Johnston, *Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston*, ch. 26-28.—*Official Records, series 1*, v. 7.—*Battles and leaders of the Civil War*, v. 1.

1862 (January-March: Missouri-Arkansas).—**Expulsion of Confederates from Missouri.—Battle of Pea Ridge.**—"After the battle of Wilson's Creek the preceding August, the operations in southern Missouri were disturbed on the one side by the removal of Frémont, and on the other by a dispute between the Confederate commanders, Price and McCulloch. At length General Samuel R. Curtis was put in command of the Union forces [numbering about 12,000] west of the Mississippi, and General Early Van Dorn of the Confederate forces [which under Price had retreated from Missouri]. The two armies met in northern Arkansas. The Confederate forces, though outnumbering the enemy, became divided during the battle, and this fact, together with the death of General McCulloch, gave the victory to the army of Curtis, whose ablest subordinate was General Sigel. [The rout of the Confederate army was complete.] Van Dorn then led his forces eastward to join the main Confederate army at Corinth, but did not reach that point till after the battle of Shiloh. The status of Missouri on the subject of secession was settled at Pea Ridge [or Elkhorn in the Ozark mountains]. No longer was there any fear that the state would join the Confederacy. The battle of Pea Ridge was conspicuous in one respect—it was the only important battle of the war in which Indians played a part. In this battle some thirty-five hundred Indians under General Albert Pike fought on the Confederate side; but their methods of warfare differed so greatly from those of the white men that the aid was little felt."—H. W. Elson, *History of the United States of America*, v. 4, pp. 173-174.—"Curtis had saved his army from surrender, and Missouri from another invasion, but at a terrible cost. He reported a loss of nearly fifteen hundred, and estimated the Confederate loss at a higher, though not definite, figure. Van Dorn reported his loss at eight hundred, and estimated the Federal loss at two thousand. . . . He also reported that he went into the battle with only fourteen thousand men, while he estimated the Federal force at about twenty thousand."—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution, 1859-1865*, v. 1, p. 311.

ALSO IN: R. Johnson, *Short history of the War of Secession*, ch. 6.—W. Baxter, *Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove*.—O. J. Victor, *History of the Southern Rebellion*, v. 3, pp. 56-71.—*Official Records, series 1*, v. 8, pp. 189-330.

1862 (January-April: North Carolina).—**Burnside's expedition to Roanoke and capture of Newbern and Beaufort.**—"Early in January, the waters of North Carolina were invaded by a joint naval and military expedition sailing from Hampton Roads under commands of Flag-officer Goldsborough and General Burnside. The naval force, consisting of nineteen vessels with somewhat over fifty guns, being mostly of heavy calibre, were in waiting at Hatteras Inlet by January 28, 1862, and were joined by the army branch February 5th. On the morning of the 7th, this

fleet entered Croatan Sound and engaged in battle about noon. With the coming of darkness the battle ended. Troops were landed as Ashby's Harbor in the afternoon and night to the number of 10,000. On the morning of February 8th the Federal ships withheld their fire until the troops had attacked the fortifications. At the end of the engagement the Confederates retired. . . . [The command on the north of the island, 2,500 strong, was compelled to surrender]. In the naval battle at Elizabeth City, February 10th, the Confederate fleet was destroyed or captured by fourteen Federal gunboats which dashed impetuously upon it, . . . [and part of the town was burned]. Newbern, at the junction of Trent and Neuse Rivers, was taken March 13th [with guns and stores]. But the capture of Roanoke Island was a most serious loss to the Confederacy. It was the key to the rear defences of Norfolk; it permitted access to Albemarle and Currituck Sounds, to eight rivers and two railroads. It guarded more than four-fifths of Norfolk's supply of corn, pork, and forage. Its capture by the Federals cut off General Huger's command from all its most efficient transportation and endangered the very existence of the army, as well as the navy yard at Gosport, and threatened to cut off Norfolk from Richmond and both from railroad communication with the South Atlantic States. It lodged the enemy in a harbor safe from the storms of Hatteras, gave him a rendezvous and a large rich range of supplies, and the command of the seaboard from Oregon inlet to Cape Henry. [This expedition brought General Ambrose E. Burnside into the light]."—W. K. Garrett and R. A. Halley, *Civil War from a Southern standpoint*, pp. 318-319.—"Fort Macon, which commands the entrance of Beaufort Harbor, . . . was bombarded [on April 25] by three steamers and three shore batteries; the former, however, in the course of an hour and a half, were compelled to withdraw. But the shore batteries, continuing their attack, silenced the guns of the garrison, and, in the course of the afternoon compelled the surrender of the fort. In connection with this expedition some operations of minor importance occurred. . . . The chief result, however, was the closure of the ports and suppression of commerce. General Burnside's forces were eventually, for the most part withdrawn. They were taken to Alexandria, and joined the army of General Pope."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 59.

ALSO IN: D. Ammen, *Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic coast*, ch. 8-9.—A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pt. 1, ch. 3-5.—B. P. Poore, *Life of Burnside*, ch. 12-14.—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, p. 112.

1862 (February-April: Georgia-Florida).—**Siege and capture of Fort Pulaski.—Temporary occupation of Florida.—Discouragement of Unionists.**—The blockade of Fort Pulaski in Georgia may be dated from February 22. Preparations were then made on Tybee island to bombard it. Most of the work had to be done in the night. The work was carried on under the supervision of General Gillmore, who was in chief command, and on April 9 eleven batteries, containing an aggregate of thirty-six guns, were in readiness to open fire. General David Hunter, who had just succeeded General Sherman in command of the department, arrived at Tybee on the evening of April 8. At sunrise, on the morning of April 10, Hunter sent Lieutenant J. H. Wilson to the fort, with a summons to the commander of the garrison to surrender. The latter refused,

saying: "I am here to defend this fort, not to surrender it." At a few minutes after eight o'clock the batteries opened fire, and at the end of thirty hours the garrison surrendered. In reporting the capture, General Hunter wrote: "The whole armament of the fort . . . [has] fallen into our hands; also 360 prisoners, of whom the officers will be sent North by the first opportunity that offers. The result of this bombardment must cause, I am convinced, a change in the construction of fortifications as radical as that foreshadowed in naval architecture by the conflict between the Monitor and Merrimac. No works of stone or brick can resist the impact of rifled artillery of heavy caliber." "By this victory, won on the first anniversary of the fall of Fort Sumter [April 12], the port of Savannah was sealed against blockaderunners. The capture of Fort Jackson above, and of the city, would have been of little advantage to the Nationals then, for the forces necessary to hold them were needed in more important work farther down the coast. While Gillmore and Viele were besieging Fort Pulaski, Commodore Dupont and General Wright were making easy conquests on the coast of Florida." Fort Clinch, on Amelia island, Fernandina, Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and other places, were abandoned by the Confederates on the approach of the Federal forces. But these conquests proved rather unfortunate than otherwise. "At first, the hopes they inspired in the breasts of the Union people developed quite a widespread loyalty. A Union convention was called to assemble at Jacksonville on the 10th of April, to organize a loyal State Government, when, to the dismay of those engaged in the matter, General Wright prepared to withdraw his forces, two days before the time when the convention was to meet. . . . In consequence, . . . very little Union feeling was manifested in Florida during the remainder of the war."—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War, v. 2, ch. 12.*

1862 (February-April: Tennessee).—Advance up river.—Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.—"By the end of February, 1862, Major-General Halleck commanded all the armies in the valley of the Mississippi, from his headquarters in St. Louis. These were, the Army of the Ohio, Major-General Buell, in Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General Grant, at Fords Henry and Donelson; the Army of the Mississippi, Major-General Pope; and that of General S. R. Curtis, in Southwest Missouri. He posted his chief of staff, General Cullum, at Cairo, and me [General Sherman] at Paducah, chiefly to expedite and facilitate the important operations then in progress up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. . . . General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which had retreated hastily from Bowling Green to and through Nashville. . . . On the 21st General Grant sent General Smith with his division to Clarksville, 50 miles above Donelson, toward Nashville, and on the 27th went himself to Nashville to meet and confer with General Buell, but returned to Donelson the next day." Orders sent by General Halleck to Grant did not reach the latter, and a supposed disobedience occurred which caused him to be hastily relieved from his command, which was transferred to General C. F. Smith, on March 4. "In the mean time several of the gunboats, under Captain Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up the Tennessee as far as Florence, and on their return had reported a strong Union feeling among the people along the river. On the 10th of March, having received

the necessary orders from General Halleck, I embarked my division at Paducah. . . . I . . . steamed up the Tennessee River, following the two gunboats, and, in passing Pittsburg Landing, was told by Captain Gwin that, on his former trip up the river, he had found a rebel regiment of cavalry posted there, and that it was the usual landing-place for the people about Corinth, distant 30 miles. I sent word back to General Smith that, if we were detained up the river, he ought to post some troops at Pittsburg Landing. We went on up the river cautiously, till we saw Eastport and Chickasaw, both of which were occupied by rebel batteries and a small rebel force of infantry. We then dropped back quietly to the mouth of Yellow River, a few miles below," where the troops were landed and an attempt made to push out and destroy the Memphis and Charleston railroad; but heavy rains had so swollen all the streams that the expedition was foiled and returned. "During the night of the 14th, we dropped down to Pittsburg Landing, where I found Hurlbut's division in boats. Leaving my command there, I steamed down to Savannah, and reported to General Smith in person, who saw in the flooded Tennessee the full truth of my report; and he then instructed me to disembark my own division, and that of General Hurlbut, at Pittsburg Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room for his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in person, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the railroad, contemplated by General Halleck's orders. . . . Within a few days, Prentiss's division arrived and camped on my left, and afterward McClelland's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions, which formed a line to our rear. . . . General C. F. Smith remained back at Savannah, in chief command, and I was only responsible for my own division. . . . We were all conscious that the enemy was collecting at Corinth, but in what force we could not know, nor did we know what was going on behind us. On the 17th of March, General U. S. Grant was restored to the command of all the troops up the Tennessee River, by reason of General Smith's extreme illness, and because he had explained to General Halleck satisfactorily his conduct after Donelson; and he too made his headquarters at Savannah, but frequently visited our camps. . . . From about the 1st of April we were conscious that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting bolder and more saucy."—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs, v. 1, ch. 10.*—"At Corinth, Mississippi, lay a Confederate force under General Beauregard. General Albert Sidney Johnston formed a plan to unite his force with that of Beauregard and attack Grant, with the hope of being able to crush him before the arrival of Buell. The union of the two Confederate armies was effected, and on the morning of April 3d they began their march against Grant. . . . On the afternoon of the 4th there was some sharp skirmishing within about six miles of the Union army. Yet Grant and Sherman did not seem to anticipate any attack. . . . On the morning of April 6th . . . Sherman and McClelland were forced back; Hurlbut, who with Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace held so stubbornly the position called by the Confederates the 'Hornet's Nest,' was at last forced back to Pittsburg Landing; [W. H. L.] Wallace, after giving the order to his division to retire, fell mortally wounded; and still later Prentiss, whose command had been the first to feel the shock of the battle in the early morning . . . was forced

to surrender in person with about 2,200 officers and men. . . . The greater part of Grant's army had now been routed and driven entirely from the field . . . and the Union camps were in possession of the Confederates, with a rich spoil of artillery and military stores of every description. But General Albert Sidney Johnston had been killed, and Beauregard, thinking the victory complete, and that in the morning he could finish up what was left of Grant's army, stopped the fight."—J. T. Derry, *Story of the Confederate States*, pp. 158-161.—"On Sunday morning, the 6th, early, there was a good deal of picket-firing, and I . . . saw the rebel lines of battle in front coming down on us as far as the eye could reach. All my troops were in line of battle, ready, and the ground was favorable to us. . . . In a few minutes the battle of 'Shiloh' began with extreme fury, and lasted two days. . . . Personally I saw General Grant, who with his staff visited me about 10 A. M. of the 6th, when we were desperately engaged. . . . He came again just before dark, and described the last assault. . . . which he had repelled by a heavy battery collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for that day. He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win. General Grant also explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me. About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where I was. . . . Buell said that Nelson's, McCook's and Crittenden's divisions of his army, containing 18,000 men, had arrived and could cross over in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle. I argued that with these reinforcements we could sweep the field. Buell seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing, and I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should become involved in our general disaster. . . . Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle decisively. . . . [Beauregard] afterwards reported his entire loss as 10,699. Our aggregate loss, made up from official statements, shows 1,700 killed, 7,405 wounded, 3,022 prisoners, aggregate, 12,217, of which 2,167 were in Buell's army, leaving for that of Grant 10,050. . . . The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862, the five divisions of McClelland, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about 32,000 men. We had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon as Buell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the enemy. The rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, was, according to their own reports and admissions 45,000 strong."—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 10.—"The results of the battle of Shiloh were not all military. Incorrect accounts were circulated throughout the North; those who had seen only what occurred at the rear misrepresented the actions at the front; others, who were in a single part of the field, attempted to give accurate descriptions of the whole, which they had no opportunities of knowing. General Buell

and some of his officers, arriving late and seeing only the fugitives at the Landing, thought and said that the entire army of the Tennessee was overwhelmed and disgraced; and for a long while the country was ignorant whether or not a great disaster had occurred. Rumors were industriously spread that Sherman had been surprised, that Prentiss was captured early in the morning, and in his shirt; that Grant was drunk, and that Buell was purposely dilatory. The country believed many of these rumors, and in the West especially, the outcry was fierce. The newspapers took up the theme; congressmen and politicians, some of them doubtless with pure intentions, and believing that they were seeking the best interests of the country, beset the President to relieve Grant from command, and the fame that arose from Donelson was obscured by the unmerited odium of Shiloh. Even Grant's military superiors seemed affected by the clamor. General Halleck, removing his headquarters to the field, superseded Grant, who was left second in command, it is true, but was quite ignored in all the operations of the next two months."—A. Badeau, *Military history of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 1, pp. 99-100.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, ch. 23-25.—W. P. Johnston, *Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston*, ch. 30-35.—U. S. Grant, D. C. Buell, and others, *Shiloh (Battles and leaders of the Civil War)*, v. 1.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 10.

1862 (March).—President Lincoln's proposal of compensated emancipation.—"As early as March, 1862, Lincoln proposed the gradual abolishment of all slavery with compensation for the slave-owners and Congress adopted his recommendation. This offer was made during the military successes of the North and though, as a practical measure, there was no expectation that any but Union border slave States would avail themselves of it, the offer was open to all."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, pp. 150-151.—The proposal was made in a special message to Congress, in which the President said: "Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives: I recommend the adoption of a joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be substantially as follows: Resolved, That the United States ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system. If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there is the end; but if it does command such approval, I deem it of importance that the States and people immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to accept or reject it. The Federal Government would find its highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that this government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the slave States north of such part will then say, 'The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section.' To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion; and the initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the States initiating it. The point is not that all the States

tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation; but that while the offer is equally made to all, the more Northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more Southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say 'initiation' because, in my judgment, gradual and not sudden emancipation is better for all. . . . In the annual message last December, I thought fit to say, 'The Union must be preserved, and hence all indispensable means must be employed.' I said this not hastily, but deliberately. War has been made, and continues to be, an indispensable means to this end. A practical re-acknowledgment of the national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue; and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the

ate state might have received at least four hundred dollars apiece for all its slaves. The message was not cordially received . . . but the resolution asked for was passed. Thereupon Lincoln, March 10, convened at the White House the border-state delegates, and besought them to accept compensated emancipation. 'I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually.' Thirty members of Congress listened to the appeal, but only a minority favored it. . . . Blaine declares that the border-state men were becoming doubtful of Union success, and preferred to keep their slaves, rather than part with them for bonds which would soon be valueless. . . . Lincoln encountered here one of his greatest defeats, and probably it was well. Compensation on so vast a scale could hardly have been made, and colonization has never been found practicable. . . . In March, also, Arnold, of Illinois,



NAVAL COMBAT BETWEEN THE "MONITOR" AND "MERRIMAC"

Hampton Roads, March 9, 1862

(Engraved by John C. McRae from the drawing by William Momberger)

ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency, toward ending the struggle, must and will come. The proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more value to the States and private persons concerned than are the institution and property in it, in the present aspect of affairs? . . . In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject. Abraham Lincoln, Washington, March 6, 1862."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 129-130.—Emancipation with compensation "Lincoln urged at length, would be a measure not only just, but economical. The cost of this war for less than eighty-seven days would pay for all the slaves in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri. By its terms the offer was made of general application. Had the South, in that time of Union successes, succumbed and embraced the offer, each Confeder-

introduced a bill making 'freedom national and slavery sectional,' which resulted in an act, June 19, prohibiting slavery 'in the present territories of the United States, and in any that shall hereafter be acquired.' This the president did not sign until its language had been modified to suit border-state sentiment."—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, pp. 206-207.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 1, p. 447.—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power in America*, v. 3, ch. 23.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 5, ch. 12.

1862 (March).—Battle of the *Monitor* and the *Merrimack*.—"As early as May 8, 1861, the Confederate Secretary of the Navy wrote, 'I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity;' and in July, he gave an order to raise the steam frigate *Merrimack* (one of the ships partially burned and sunk when the Gosport navy-yard was destroyed) and convert her into an ironclad; this was accomplished as rapidly as could be expected under the imperfect



manufacturing and mechanical conditions in the South. By an act of August 3, 1861, the United States Congress constituted a naval board; four days later the Navy Department advertised for plans and offers of iron-clad steamboats 'of light draught suitable to navigate the shallow rivers and harbors of the Confederate States.' John Ericsson submitted a plan which was rejected but, on the persuasion of a friend, he went to Washington and demonstrated 'to the entire satisfaction of the board' that his 'design was thoroughly practical and based on sound theory.' His proposal was accepted and Secretary Welles told him to begin the construction forthwith without awaiting the execution of the formal contract, inasmuch as the knowledge of the progress on the *Merrimac* had impressed the naval people with the necessity for speed [and with the danger of having the blockade of Norfolk broken]. Ericsson's ironclad was the *Monitor*; her keel was laid on October 25, 1861; she was launched on January 30, 1862, and on March 6 left New York for Fort Monroe."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, pp. 111-112.—"The design provided for a hull not more than 2 ft. above the water, and with a flat bottom, that the draught might not exceed 10 ft. The sides, to a short distance below the water line, were protected with 4-in. plates. In the centre of the deck was built a circular turret, revolving on a central spindle, and protected with 8 in. of iron. Inside the turret were mounted two 11-in. smooth bore guns, pointing through port holes. They could thus fire in any direction without turning the vessel, an obvious advantage not only on the open sea but especially in narrow waters, for which she was more intended. Such was the famous 'Monitor,' a name given by Ericsson to his creation to admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion, and to be also a monitor to the Lords of the Admiralty in England, suggesting to them doubts as to the propriety of their building four broadside ironclads at three and a half million dollars each."—S. Eardley-Wilmot, *Development of navies*, ch. 4.—"The Confederate ironclad was completed shortly before the *Monitor*. Her arrival in Hampton Roads was immediately followed by her destruction of the *Congress*, a frigate of fifty guns, and the *Cumberland*, a sloop of twenty-four guns. The Union [blockading] fleet was at her mercy. As the *Merrimac* drew twenty-two feet she returned to Sewell's Point, just at evening, her officers not venturing to make the channel on a falling tide; they planned to return next morning and destroy the remainder of the fleet, including the *Minnesota* and several powerful men of war. News of the disaster alarmed Lincoln and his Cabinet; the Union navy was powerless before the *Merrimac*; she could enter and bombard every Northern port at her pleasure. Amidst the anxiety the *Monitor*, which had made the voyage down from New York in bad weather, steamed into Hampton Roads toward evening of the 8th and took a position from which she could defend the *Minnesota*. The *Merrimac* returned to the attack, early on the morning of the 9th: the *Monitor* interposed and began firing. The two iron-clads then joined battle. Save a slight indentation of the *Merrimac's* plates, she received no damage, but she was leaking; the *Monitor* was uninjured; a few men on the *Merrimac* were wounded by the concussion, and Lieutenant John L. Worden, commander of the *Monitor*, was blinded by a Confederate shot which struck the *Monitor's* sight-hole, directly. This injury to her commander put her out of

action for a few minutes, and the *Merrimac's* commander, Buchanan, interpreting the cessation of the firing as a sign of defeat, and fearing lest his ship might sink, she was leaking so badly, ran her ashore. The *Monitor* had saved more than the Union fleet; she had demonstrated that the *Merrimac* and vessels like her could be met on equal terms. More than this, the conflict, the first between iron-clads, sounded the knell of wooden ships of war; yet, at the time of the encounter, the world did not grasp the significance of it all. A fleet of monitors was immediately constructed and the blockade of Southern ports became more complete as the war progressed."—F. N. Thorpe, *Civil War: A national view (History of North America, pp. 262-263)*.—On the evacuation of Norfolk by the Confederates, in May, 1862, the *Merrimac* was destroyed. The following December the *Monitor* went down in a storm at sea while on her way to Charleston, and only a few of her crew were saved.

ALSO IN: F. B. Butts, *Monitor and the Merrimac (Soldiers' and Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode Island, fourth series, no. 6)*.—J. T. Wood, *First Fight of iron-clads (Battles and leaders of Civil War, v. 1, pp. 692-711)*.—J. Ericsson, *Building of the Monitor (Battles and leaders, v. 1, pp. 730-744)*.—W. C. Church, *Life of John Ericsson, v. 1, ch. 15-17*.—Gideon Welles, *First iron-clad Monitor (Annals of the war by leading participants, p. 17)*.—C. B. Boynton, *History of the navy during the Rebellion, ch. 21*.

1862 (March).—Amendment of the military code.—Officers forbidden to surrender fugitive slaves.—"As the formal orders of the government regarding the treatment of slaves who sought refuge near the armies were not always executed, Congress determined to give them a legal sanction; and on the 25th of February and the 13th of March both the Senate and the House of Representatives introduced a new article in the military code, prohibiting officers, at the risk of dismissal, from interfering to restore fugitive slaves to their masters. Notwithstanding the powers with which the government was thus armed, great difficulty was experienced in applying this law in those regiments whose commanders openly professed their sympathies in favor of slavery."—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America, v. 2, p. 733*.

1862 (March).—Results of the first year of the war.—"The first year of the Civil War had passed. The firing on the *Star of the West*, and on Fort Sumter, the attack on the Northern regiments by the mob in Baltimore; the long delay in protecting the capitol; the retirement of General Scott and the succession of General McClellan, and the wearisome waiting for McClellan to attack the Confederacy were anxious events of the early part of the year. In the West the Confederacy had been forced southward: Forts Henry and Donelson taken; the regeneration of Missouri; the partial regeneration of Arkansas; Kentucky and Tennessee quite cleared of Confederate armies; Island No. 10 at the North and New Orleans at the South taken; McClellan with an army of more than 100,000 well drilled troops approaching Richmond; Washington secure; and the great Army of the West, directed by Halleck, converging upon Corinth. The North was rejoicing; the South, desponding. And Congress had made all Federal soil free soil and had begun the process of emancipation, by the confiscation act, in the Confederate States themselves. And last of all, the national government offered to compensate

slave owners who would free their slaves. The North was trying to convince itself that the war would soon be over and Secretary Stanton had issued a general order to stop recruiting. Lincoln had the confidence of the North as never before: a thousand acts of wisdom and kindness endeared him to the plain people; and out in the West, Lincoln had found a man, who also came from Illinois—who was a general and who would fight.”—F. N. Thorpe, *Civil War: A national view (History of North America, v. 15, pp. 267-268)*.—McClellan was still preparing to move against Richmond.

1862 (March-April: On the Mississippi).—New Madrid and Island Number Ten.—On the surrender of Fort Donelson to General Grant, Columbus, on the Mississippi, was hastily abandoned by the Confederates, who fell back to Island Number Ten, thirty miles below, where strong works had been erected. “At the very moment when Grant and Buell were winning the costly victory around Shiloh Church, events were taking place a hundred and fifty miles to the northwest on the line of the Mississippi of a far more satisfactory character to the Federal arms. After the victory at Donelson and the evacuation of Columbus, Halleck had ordered General John Pope to proceed to Cairo, and organize an expedition against the Confederate forces at New Madrid and Island Number Ten, to which places, . . . about one-half of the Confederates from Columbus had retired. On the 21st of February, Pope went from Cairo up the Mississippi to Commerce on the Missouri bank, having decided that it was best to assemble his land force for the attack on New Madrid there, and march thence from that point. By the end of the month he had collected an army of twenty thousand men, and had set his column in motion for the march through the dismal Mingo swamp. . . . In five days it was accomplished, and on the 3rd of March the entire force deployed in front of New Madrid [which was evacuated by the Confederates on March 7th].” —J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution, 1859-1865, v. 1, p. 313*.—“Flag-officer Foote was in command of the river squadron. After capturing New Madrid, Missouri, on the opposite shore, a terrible bombardment was opened . . . [on Island Number Ten] with little effect. Next they cut a canal twelve miles long across the peninsula made by the bend of the river, so as to get the transports below the enemy’s works, and forced the surrender of the island on the 7th of April, with its whole force and military stores. This loosened the grasp of the Confederacy on the Mississippi from Cairo to Memphis.”—H. W. Elson, *History of the United States of America, v. 4, p. 173*.—“There is no question that this bloodless triumph was planned and executed with remarkable ability. It stood out in bold contrast with the bloody barren victory which was at the same time being won at Pittsburg Landing [Shiloh]. . . . It must not, however, be forgotten that except for the repulse of the Confederates at Pittsburg Landing all that had been won by the victories at Mill Springs and Fort Donelson would have been lost again, and perhaps also, all that had been won at Pea Ridge and Island Number Ten. Had the Confederates been successful at Shiloh, they would probably have been able to reoccupy Tennessee and Arkansas, and Southern Kentucky and Missouri. As it was, the re-establishment of the Federal Supremacy over these four important Commonwealths was made secure and substantially permanent by this great, though costly and appar-

ently indecisive, victory. . . . The campaign of the spring of 1862 in the departments west of the Alleghanies had thus been highly successful to the Federals, and had brought to the front the men who were destined to play the chief rôles in the future conduct of the war, Halleck, Grant, and Sherman.”—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution, 1859-1865, v. 1, pp. 317, 320*.—“In the years since 1862, Island Number 10 . . . has disappeared. The river, constantly wearing at its upper end, has little by little swept away the whole. . . . On the other shore a new Number Ten has risen.”—A. T. Mahan, *Navy in the Civil War: The gulf and inland waters, ch. 2*.

Also in: J. D. Champlin, Jr., *Young folks history of the War for the Union, ch. 16*.

1862 (March-May: Virginia).—Peninsular campaign.—McClellan before Yorktown.—“McClellan, who had failed to take advantage of the demoralization in Richmond after the fall of Donelson, was further delayed by the performance of the *Merrimac*, but, on the assurance that the Navy Department would hold the iron-clad in check by the *Monitor* and other war vessels, he proceeded to the execution of his plan, a plan over which he and the president had differed from the first. The president desired the advance to be made directly over land, while McClellan proposed to go by water, to Fort Monroe and advance on Richmond up the peninsula. . . . [Lincoln yielded, but lacking sufficient confidence in McClellan to give him supreme authority, the president relieved him of the command of all military departments except the Potomac (March 11) and directed the organization of the army into four corps, naming the corps commanders himself. Through a misunderstanding with McClellan as to the force necessary to cover Washington, he withheld from him McDowell’s corps of 35,000 men in order to insure the safety of the capital. He had previously detached from the army of the Potomac a division to 10,000 and sent it to Frémont who had, owing to the pressure of the radicals upon Lincoln, been unfortunately entrusted with a command in the Shenandoah mountains.”—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865, pp. 124-125*.—“When Manassas had been abandoned by the enemy [see above: 1861-1862 (December-March: Virginia)] and he had withdrawn behind the Rapidan, . . . the enemy was . . . in position to reach Richmond before we could do so. The alternative remained of making Fort Monroe and its vicinity the base of operations. The plan first adopted was to commence the movement with the First Corps as a unit, to land north of Gloucester and move thence on West Point; or, should circumstances render it advisable, to land a little below Yorktown to turn the defenses between that place and Fort Monroe. . . . As transports arrived very slowly, especially those for horses, and the great impatience of the Government grew apace, it became necessary to embark divisions as fast as vessels arrived, and I decided to land them at Fort Monroe, holding the First Corps to the last, still intending to move it in mass to turn Gloucester. On the 17th of March the leading division embarked at Alexandria. The campaign was undertaken with the intention of taking some 145,000 troops, to be increased by a division of 10,000 drawn from the troops in the vicinity of Fort Monroe. . . . On the 12th of March I learned that there had appeared in the daily papers the order relieving me from the general command of all the armies and confining my

authority to the Department of the Potomac. I had received no previous intimation of the intention of the Government in this respect. . . . On my arrival at Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, I found five divisions of infantry, Sykes's brigade of regulars, two regiments of cavalry, and a portion of the reserve artillery disembarked. Another cavalry regiment and a part of a fourth had arrived, but were still on shipboard; comparatively few wagons had come. . . . The best information obtainable represented the Confederate troops around Yorktown as numbering at least 15,000, with about an equal force at Norfolk; and it was clear that the army lately at Manassas, now mostly near Gordonsville, was in position to be thrown promptly to the Peninsula. . . . On my arrival at Fort Monroe I learned, in an interview with Flag-officer Goldsborough, that he could not protect the James as a line of supply, and that he could furnish no vessels to take an active part in the reduction of the batteries at York and Gloucester or to run by and gain their rear. He could only aid in the final attack after our land batteries had essentially silenced their fire. I thus found myself with 53,000 men in condition to move, faced by the conditions of the problem just stated. Information was received that Yorktown was already being reinforced from Norfolk, and it was apprehended that the main Confederate army would promptly follow the same course. I therefore determined to move at once with the force in hand, and endeavor to seize a point—near the Halfway House—between Yorktown and Williamsburg, where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, and thus cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison and prevent the arrival of reinforcements. The advance commenced on the morning of the 4th of April, and was arranged to turn successively the intrenchments on the roads; the result being that, on the afternoon of the 5th, the Third Corps was engaged with the enemy's outposts in front of Yorktown and under the artillery fire of the place. The Fourth Corps came upon Lee's Mills and found it covered by the unfordable line of the Warwick, and reported the position so strong as to render it impossible to execute its orders to assault. Thus all things were brought to a stand-still, and the intended movement on the Halfway House could not be carried out. Just at this moment came a telegram, dated the 4th, informing me that the First Corps [McDowell's] was withdrawn from my command. Thus, when too deeply committed to recede, I found that another reduction of about 43,000 . . . diminished my paper force to 92,000, instead of the 155,000 on which the plans of the campaign had been founded, . . . which reduced the numbers actually available for battle to some 67,000 or 68,000. . . . In our front was an intrenched line, apparently too strong for assault, and which I had now no means of turning, either by land or water. . . . Whatever may have been said afterward, no one at the time—so far as my knowledge extended—thought an assault practicable without certain preliminary siege operations. . . . We were thus obliged to resort to siege operations in order to silence the enemy's artillery fire, and open the way to an assault. All the batteries would have been ready to open fire on the 5th, or, at latest, on the morning of the 6th of May; . . . but during the night of the 3d and 4th of May the enemy evacuated his positions. . . . Meanwhile, on the 22d of April, Franklin's division of McDowell's corps had joined me by


water, in consequence of my urgent calls for reinforcements. . . . [and, May 7th] disembarked near West Point and took up a suitable position to hold its own and cover the landing of reinforcements."—G. B. McClellan, *Peninsular campaign (Battles and leaders, v. 2, pp. 160-187)*. —General Joseph E. Johnston, who assumed command of the Confederate forces on the Peninsula, April 17, says in his "Narrative": "I went to the Peninsula as soon as possible, reaching General Magruder's headquarters early in the morning. . . . That officer had estimated the importance of at least delaying the invaders until an army capable of coping with them could be formed; and opposed them with about a tenth of their number, on a line of which Yorktown, intrenched, made the left flank. This boldness imposed upon the Federal general, and made him halt to besiege instead of assailing the Confederate position. This resolute and judicious course on the part of General Magruder was of incalculable value. It saved Richmond, and gave the Confederate Government time to swell that officer's handful to an army. . . . The arrival of Smith's and Longstreet's divisions increased the army on the Peninsula to about 53,000 men, including 3,000 sick. . . . I could see no other object in holding the position than that of delaying the enemy's progress, to gain time."—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of military operations, ch. 4-5*.

ALSO IN: J. C. Palfrey, *Siege of Yorktown (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, v. 1, pp. 31-92)*.—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America, v. 2, bk. 1, ch. 1*.

1862 (March-June).—Appointment of military governors in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Louisiana.—"By the Union victories in the spring of 1862 very considerable areas of territory in States in rebellion came under the control and occupation of the Union armies. . . . The sudden change from Confederate to Federal authority involved everywhere either a serious derangement or total cessation of the ordinary administration of local civil law, and the displacement from the occupied territory of State governments and State officials who claimed to be exercising functions under ordinances of secession, and yielding obedience to the self-styled Confederate States. A similar displacement had occurred in Virginia and in Missouri during the year 1861, but in those States prompt remedies were available," by means of popular movements, through delegated conventions, which . . . reinstated loyal state governments in operation. The courses pursued in Virginia and Missouri were not practicable, however, in other cases, and "a substitute was found in the appointment of military governors to represent and exert such State and local authority as the anomalous conditions made practicable, and as the supreme military necessities might allow. The first of these appointments occurred in Tennessee. Nashville, the capital, having been evacuated about February 23, 1862, President Lincoln nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Andrew Johnson (March 4, 1862) as military governor with the rank of brigadier-general. . . . Conforming to this precedent, Mr. Lincoln, through the Secretary of War, appointed Edward Stanley military governor of North Carolina, 'with authority to exercise and perform, within the limits of that State, all and singular the powers, duties and functions pertaining to the office of military governor (including the power to establish all necessary offices and tribunals, and suspend the writ of habeas corpus) during the pleas-

ure of the President, or until the loyal inhabitants of that State shall organize a civil government in conformity with the Constitution of the United States.' . . . In like manner, soon after news was received of the successes in the Gulf, Colonel G. F. Shepley (of the 12th Maine Infantry) of Butler's army was appointed military governor of Louisiana, this selection being made because General Butler had already designated him to act as mayor of the city of New Orleans, and it was thought best to combine both functions in the same individual."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 16.

1862 (April: On the Mississippi).—Farragut's passage of the lower forts and capture of New Orleans.—"On the Gulf side, the retention of Fort Pickens by Union forces from the beginning had put Pensacola harbor under Federal control. The blockade, at first deemed impracticable, within a year of its establishment was throttling the



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foreign commerce which was vital to the Confederacy. On the Atlantic scarcely any important ports were left except Charleston and Wilmington; and before the thresholds of these places lay, night and day, the fierce and watchful wardogs of the Union. Nevertheless, up to April, 1862, the Gulf ports of Mobile, New Orleans, Galveston, and Matagorda still remained to the Confederacy. How long could these maintain themselves? This swift and easy repossession of the southern coast-line by the Union, however important, lacked the wholesale excitement of great and bloody battles and was a game little appreciated. But in the midst of it came an incident dramatic and startling in the highest degree, its hero being a naval officer, Davis Glasgow Farragut."—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, p. 114.—To "four Union victories in the west within a few months (Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, and Island Number Ten,—five, if we include that of Thomas at Mill Springs) another must be added, the most important of them all, the opening of the mouth of the Mississippi and the capture of the greatest

seaport of the South. . . . From the spring of 1861 there had been a few Federal vessels along the gulf coast for the purpose of enforcing the blockade; now an attempt was to be made to get control of the lower Mississippi, but no serious attempt to open the great mid-continent water-way was made till the spring of 1862. The object was to sever the Confederacy in twain, to cut off the supplies to the Confederate armies from Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, and to get possession of the cannon foundries of New Orleans. General B. F. Butler, was put in command of the land force, thirteen thousand strong, and the fleet of bomb vessels and frigates accompanying Farragut's squadron were commanded by Captain Porter."—H. W. Elson, *History of the United States of America*, v. 4, pp. 174-175.—Gustavus V. Fox, the assistant secretary of the navy, "proposed that an armed fleet should run by Forts St. Philip and Jackson [situated on opposite sides of the river, about seventy-five miles below the city], after which, as the navigation of the river was not difficult, the great city would be at their mercy. He won the approval of his chief, and the two broached the plan in conference with the President, McClellan and Commander David D. Porter, . . . [the latter of whom] suggested that the naval fleet be accompanied by a mortar flotilla, which would reduce the forts before the passage was made. . . . Farragut was summoned to Washington, where he learned from Fox the object of the expedition, the number of vessels he should command, and the plan of attack. He entered into the affair with enthusiasm, had no doubt the fleet could run by the forts, but had little faith in the bombardment by the mortar flotilla, . . . but was willing to give it a trial."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 118-119.—"On February 2d, 1862, Farragut sailed for the Gulf, in the sloop-of-war Hartford, . . . a wooden screw-steamer, full ship-rigged, and of 1,900 tons burthen. She was of comparatively light draught, and, therefore, well suited to the service she was called upon to perform. . . . The Hartford arrived at her rendezvous, Ship Island, 100 miles north-northeast of the mouth of the Mississippi, on February 20th. A military force, to co-operate with Farragut's fleet, was sent out, under General B. F. Butler, and arrived at Ship Island on March 25th."—E. Shippen, *Naval battles*, ch. 41.—"By the middle of April [1862], Farragut with six ships and twelve gunboats and Porter with a mortar flotilla of nineteen schooners and six armed steamships . . . were before Fort Jackson and St. Philip. On April 18 the bombardment of Fort Jackson by the mortar boats began and continued for two days, inflicting considerable damage, but not sufficient to compel the Confederates to entertain the idea of surrender. [On the night of the 20th Farragut sent a force to remove a heavy chain which obstructed the passage opposite Fort Jackson. This was partly done, and he gave instructions to run the forts on the 24th. About 2 o'clock A. M. signal was made to get under way.] As the fleet advanced, they fired at the forts which quickly returned the fire. [Fire rafts were set adrift through the fleet] and the Confederate gun-boats and two iron-clad rams took part in this contest; but most of these were destroyed. 'At length the fire slackened,' wrote Farragut, 'the smoke cleared off, and we saw to our surprise that we were above the forts.' As he had divined, the passage of the forts compelled the evacuation of New Orleans by the Confederate military force and its sur-

render, and furthermore, since the enemy's communications were now severed, the surrender of the forts."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 119-123.—"It was a terrible disaster to the Confederacy. The fall of Donelson broke our centre in the West. The fall of New Orleans yet more sorely punished the vanity of the Confederates; annihilated their powers, in Louisiana; broke up their routes to Texas and the Gulf; closed their access to the richest grain and cattle country in the South; gave to the enemy a new base of operations; and, more than anything else, staggered the confidence of Europe in the fortunes of the Confederacy. And yet these disasters were very far from deciding the war. A train of Confederate victories was to follow them, and the attention of the world was now to be fixed upon the campaign in Virginia."—E. A. Pollard, *Lost cause: A new Southern history of the War of the Confederates*, pp. 254-255.—"Thus was accomplished a feat in naval warfare which had no precedent, and which is still without a parallel except the one furnished by Farragut himself, two years later, at Mobile. Starting with 17 wooden vessels, he had passed with all but 3 of them, against the swift current of a river but half a mile wide, between two powerful earth-works which had long been prepared for him, his course impeded by blazing rafts, and immediately thereafter had met the enemy's fleet of 15 vessels, two of them iron-clad, and either captured or destroyed every one of them. And all this with a loss of but one ship from his own squadron."—L. Farragut, *Life of Farragut*, ch. 18-19.—"General Lovell, who was in command at New Orleans, had come down the river in a steamboat to observe the operations and was very nearly captured; he hastened back to the city to withdraw his forces. When the news spread through the streets the Federal fleet had passed the forts and had destroyed the Confederate flotilla, a strange scene followed; a scene impossible, perhaps, in any other American city under parallel circumstances. The brave, active, fighting men of New Orleans were far away in the armies of the South; but they had left behind a slinking swarm of human vermin. . . . These, when they saw a hopeless panic seize the good people of the city, poured forth from their dens and began an indiscriminate pillaging of houses, shops, and storage-sheds. Thus while the better class of citizens were frantically setting fire to the cotton (some 12,000 bales) the cut-throats and ruffians, the hardened women and even the lawless children, were raging from place to place, back and forth, here and there, wildly plundering and aimlessly destroying. . . . All the public materials, consisting of army supplies, were heaped up in the middle of the streets and burned. General Lovell withdrew his soldiers on the evening of the 24th, leaving the city at the mercy of the Federal fleet, which at 1 o'clock on the following day steamed up the river and anchored in the middle of the stream not far from the foot of Canal street. . . . The mob which lately had been committing such foul deeds, now swayed back and forth in the streets, hooting, yelling and cursing, urging the people to resist the landing of the Federals. Commodore Farragut demanded the formal surrender of the city, but the mayor was powerless. He could not surrender the city while the people were controlled by an unreasoning mob. Consequently, on the 29th a detachment under command of Fleet Captain H. H. Bell was sent ashore to take possession of the public buildings."—M. Thompson, *Story of Louisiana*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: C. C. Chesney, *Essays in military biography*, pp. 167-168.—D. D. Porter, J. R. Bartlett and others, *Capture of New Orleans (Battles and leaders, v. 2)*.—A. T. Mahan, *Admiral Farragut*, ch. 7.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 6*.—D. D. Porter, *Naval history of the Civil War*, p. 185.—C. C. Chesney, *Essays in military biography*, p. 167.

1862 (April-May: Alabama).—General Mitchel's expedition.—When the operations which resulted in the battle of Shiloh (see above: 1862 [February-April: Tennessee]) were being carried out, one division of Buell's army which was commanded by General Ormsby M. Mitchel was detached and sent southward through northern Alabama. "General Mitchel performed his part of the grand movement southward with the most wonderful vigor and success. With the engines and cars captured at Bowling Green, his troops had entered Nashville. He was sent forward, and occupied Murfreesboro when the Confederates abandoned it in March. After he parted with the more cautious Buell at that place, on the moving of the army southward at the close of [March 28, 1862], his own judgment was his guide, and his was practically an independent command. . . . On the 4th of April he was at Shelbyville, . . . Tennessee, at the terminus of a short railway branching from that which connects Nashville with Chattanooga. This was almost sixty miles from Nashville, and there he made his deposit of supplies. At that point he struck across the country with a supply-train sufficient for only two days' provisions, in the direction of Huntsville, making forced marches all the way. On the 10th he left Fayetteville, in London County, Tennessee, crossed the State line the same day, and entered Northern Alabama. . . . Mitchel had pushed on with his cavalry to within eight miles of Huntsville, the capture of which and the seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railway there was the chief object of his rapid march. There he halted for his artillery and infantry to come up, that he might prepare for striking a decisive blow."—B. J. Lossing, *Pictorial history of the Civil War in the United States of America*, v. 2, pp. 265-266.—At an early hour on April 11 he entered the town, taking it completely by surprise. "Before the close of the day 100 miles of the Memphis and Charleston railroad were in his possession, stretching in one direction as far as Stevenson, and in the other as far as Decatur. . . . From Decatur he pushed on at once to Tusculumbia. Thus, without the loss of a single life, General Mitchell placed his army midway between Corinth and Chattanooga, prevented the destruction of a fine bridge at Decatur, opened communication with General Buell, and also the navigation of the Tennessee. The occupation of Huntsville also cut off all communication between the east and west by the Memphis and Charleston railroad. . . . This extension of General Mitchell's lines to hold the railroad rendered his situation precarious. Soon the enemy began to gather in force and threaten him. . . . He was raised to the rank of a major-general, and ordered to report directly to the [war] department, and his force was constituted an independent corps. But he got no reinforcements. He was left in such a condition that he at first hardly had anything to report but that he had been gradually driven from those positions, the gaining of which had made him a major-general. [Subsequently he advanced upon Chattanooga; but that important position was not secured. A little later

General Mitchell was transferred to Port Royal, South Carolina.]—W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history of the Rebellion*, ch. 15.

1862 (April-May: Tennessee-Mississippi).—**Bloodless conquest of Corinth.**—“General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April and immediately assumed command in the field. On the 21st General Pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of Island Number Ten in the Mississippi River. He went into camp at Hamburg landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: the Army of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee. His orders divided the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre, and left wing. . . . I [General Grant] was named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right wing and reserve. . . . Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for an advance on Corinth. . . . Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. . . . On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shiloh upon Corinth. The movement was a siege from the start to the close. The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance. Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, ‘not to bring on an engagement.’ . . . For myself, I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. My position was so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during the siege to be relieved. . . . Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the 26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning. Corinth had already been evacuated and the National troops marched on and took possession without opposition. Everything had been destroyed or carried away. The Confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train, to create the impression among the Yankees that reinforcements were arriving. There was not a sick or wounded man left by the Confederates, nor stores of any kind. Some ammunition had been blown up—not removed—but the trophies of war were a few Quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels and wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. . . . After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. But the work of depletion commenced.”—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 26.

ALSO IN: M. F. Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 2, ch. 8)*.—A. Roman, *Military operations of General*

*Beauregard, v. 1, ch. 24.—Official Records, series 1, v. 10.*

1862 (April-June).—**Abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia and in the territories.**—“In the constituency back of the administration in 1862, four elements may be distinguished: (1) the anti-slavery Republicans, of whom, in the cabinet, Chase was the type; (2) the moderate Republicans, for whom stood Seward; (3) the War Democrats, whose standard-bearer had been Douglas, and for whom [stood Stanton now secretary of war]; (4) the loyal border-state men, who expected that their slave-holding would be safeguarded, for whom stood Bates and Montgomery Blair. In Congress, too, each of these four elements was represented, and Lincoln’s difficult task was so to steer that the elements should not fall apart, but combine their powers under his leadership for the saving of the country. . . . When Congress convened for its second session, December 2, 1861, public opinion had greatly changed, a change reflected in the legislative action which was forthwith taken. A bill to reaffirm the Crittenden resolution of the previous summer was set aside by a vote of 71 to 65, a rift now opening widely between the Republicans and Democrats; and a few days later the second great step of Congress towards an anti-slavery policy was initiated by the introduction in the Senate, on December 16, by Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, of a bill abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. This was recognized, indeed proclaimed, to be the entering-wedge; slavery everywhere must go. The president’s message, at the opening, had . . . stated the three cardinal points of his own theory of emancipation: (1) that it should be voluntary on the part of the loyal slave states; (2) that compensation should be made to the slave-owners; (3) that colonization of the freed negroes should take place. Wilson’s bill provided for a moderate compensation, and also for colonization, adopting the president’s suggestions, and became the object of earnest though temperate debate during the ensuing months. Though much was said, slavery being a constant target, it was significant that no man ventured a word in its defence; the attempt was to save it on other grounds than its merits. Senate and House were equally industrious. Prominent in the Senate were Morrill, Sumner, Wilson, Garrett Davis, John Sherman, and Hale; in the House, Thaddeus Stevens, Owen Lovejoy, and Riddle; and, on the opposing side, Clement L. Vallandigham and Crittenden. The bill passed April 16 was readily signed by the president, in harmony with those recommendations a million dollars was appropriated for compensation to owners, and one hundred thousand dollars to assist in colonization. Lincoln, in a message March 6, asked for a joint resolution ‘that the United States ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to each State which may adopt gradual abolishment, pecuniary aid, etc.’—J. K. Hosmer, *Appeal to arms, 1861-1863*, pp. 202, 204-205.—“Lincoln was not an adept in finance and left this department to his Secretary of the Treasury who, in spite of mistakes and some personal failings made a good finance minister. In diplomatic matters Lincoln’s hand may be traced and generally for good. He was a hard student in the art of war and through untoward circumstances and miserable failures, groped his way to the correct method of conducting large military operations. But from the first he handled the slavery question with scarcely a

flaw. The action of Congress during the spring and early summer of 1862 indicated the progress of public sentiment since the first shot at Sumter. The Republicans, in neither of their national platforms, had deemed it prudent to demand the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia but, in April, Congress enacted this, providing at the same time for compensation to the loyal owners of slaves, which was duly made."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, p. 149.

ALSO IN: H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power in America*, v. 3, ch. 21-24.—M. Tremain, *Slavery in the District of Columbia (University of Nebraska: Seminary Papers, no. 2)*.

1862 (May).—Passage of the Homestead Act.—"The homestead bill, or the granting of free homes from and on the public domain, became a national question in 1852. The Free Soil Democracy, at Pittsburgh, Pa., August 11, 1852, in National Convention, nominated John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, and George W. Julian, of Indiana, for President and Vice-President, and adopted the following as the 12th plank or resolution in their platform: "That the public lands of the United States belong to the people, and should not be sold to individuals, nor granted to corporations, but should be held as a sacred trust for the benefit of the people, and should be granted in limited quantities, free of cost, to landless settlers." Thereafter it became a national question. It was a serious innovation and would cause an almost entire change in the settlement laws. Instead of the public lands being sold for cash, for profit, or being taken, first, under the pre-emption system, which eventuated in cash purchases, they were to be given to actual settlers who would occupy, improve, and cultivate them for a term of years, and then receive a patent free of acreage charges, with fees paid by the homesteader sufficient to cover cost of survey and transfer of title. . . . The rich and fertile lands of the Mississippi Valley were fast filling up with settlers. Agricultural lands in the Middle States, which, after the year 1824, were bought for \$1.25 per acre, now sold at from \$50 to \$80 per acre. Former purchasers of these Government lands in the Middle, Western, and Southern States, were selling their early purchases for this great advance, and moving west, to Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Missouri, and there again taking cheap Government lands under the pre-emption laws. The western emigration caused a rush—a migration of neighborhoods in many localities of the older Western States . . . and there was a demand for homes on the public lands, and a strong pressure for the enactment of a law which should confine locators to small tracts, and require actual occupation, improvement, and cultivation. A fierce political battle now ensued, beginning in 1854, and continuing until 1862, the year of the passage of the law. The demand of the settlers was incessant and constant." Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, made himself the special champion of the measure in Congress. On February 1st, 1859, a bill embodying its principles was carried in the House, but was not permitted to reach a vote in the Senate. The slaveholding interest was almost solidly against it. In March, 1860, a similar bill was again passed by the House. The Senate substituted a bill granting homesteads to actual settlers at twenty-five cents per acre, instead of free of cost, which was passed by the House, but vetoed by President Buchanan. Then came the Civil War, absorbing all minor questions, and nearly two years went by before the law which opened the public lands freely to all actual set-

tlers was adopted. It became a law by the signature of President Lincoln on May 20, 1862. The following are the essential provisions of the act: "That any person who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, or who shall have filed his declaration of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization laws of the United States, and who has never borne arms against the United States Government or given aid and comfort to its enemies, shall, from and after the first January, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, be entitled to enter one quarter-section or a less quantity of unappropriated public lands, upon which said person may have filed a pre-emption claim, or which may, at the time the application is made, be subject to pre-emption at one dollar and twenty-five cents, or less, per acre; or eighty acres or less of such unappropriated lands, at two dollars and fifty cents per acre, to be located in a body, in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the public lands, and after the same shall have been surveyed: Provided, That any person owning or residing on land may, under the provisions of this act, enter other land lying contiguous to his or her said land, which shall not, with the land so already owned and occupied, exceed in the aggregate one hundred and sixty acres. . . . That the person applying for the benefit of this act shall, upon application to the register of the land office in which he or she is about to make such entry, make affidavit before the said register or receiver that he or she is the head of a family, or is twenty-one or more years of age, or shall have performed service in the Army or Navy of the United States, and that he has never borne arms against the Government of the United States or given aid and comfort to its enemies, and that such application is made for his or her exclusive use and benefit, and that said entry is made for the purpose of actual settlement and cultivation, and not, either directly or indirectly, for the use or benefit of any other person or persons whomsoever; and upon filing the said affidavit with the said register or receiver, and on payment of ten dollars, he or she shall thereupon be permitted to enter the quantity of land specified: Provided, however, That no certificate shall be given or patent issued therefor until the expiration of five years from the date of such entry; and if, at the expiration of such time, or at any time within two years thereafter, the person making such entry—or if he be dead, his widow; or in case of her death, his heirs or devisee; or in case of a widow making such entry, her heirs or devisee, in case of her death—shall prove by two credible witnesses that he, or she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the affidavit aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated, and that he has borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States; then, in such case, he, she, or they, if at that time a citizen of the United States, shall be entitled to a patent, as in other cases provided for by law: And provided, further, That in case of the death of both father and mother, leaving an infant child or children under twenty-one years of age, the right and fee shall inure to the benefit of said infant child or children; and the executor, administrator, or guardian may, at any time within two years after the death of the surviving parent, and in accordance with the laws of the State in which such children for the time being have their domicile, sell said land for the

benefit of said infants, but for no other purpose; and the purchaser shall acquire the absolute title by the purchaser, and be entitled to a patent from the United States, on payment of the office fees and sum of money herein specified. . . . That if, at any time after the filing of the affidavit, . . . and before the expiration of the five years aforesaid, it shall be proven, after due notice to the settler, to the satisfaction of the register of the land office, that the person having filed such affidavit shall have actually changed his or her residence, or abandoned the said land for more than six months at any time, then and in that event the land so entered shall revert to the Government.' . . . This original homestead act has been amended several times. . . . The principal amendments were in the nature of extension of its privileges, and the limit of 80 acres of land of the double minimum class, \$2.50 per acre, within certain road limits, has since been done away with by acts of March 3, 1879, July 1, 1879, and June 15, 1880; there now being but one class of agricultural lands, so far as regards the minimum quantity in homestead entries. The act of June 8, 1872, was known as the soldiers' and sailors' homestead act. It gave honorably discharged soldiers and sailors from the Army and Navy of the United States lands under the homestead act in any locality, and deducted from the five years' residence which was required to make title their term of service in the Army and Navy during the war of the Rebellion. One year's residence and cultivation, however, were necessary. . . . The soldiers' additional homestead provision was to give those soldiers who had had the benefit of the homestead act, to the extent of a quantity under 160 acres, an additional amount, so as to make their allowance 160 acres."—T. Donaldson, *Public domain*, ch. 27.

1862 (May).—General Hunter's emancipation order rescinded by President Lincoln.—"Lincoln measured the steps forward with discretion and kept the determination of the slavery question entirely in his own hands. On May 9, General Hunter [Major-General David Hunter] who commanded the Department of the South [with headquarters at Hilton Head, South Carolina], issued an order declaring free all the slaves in South Carolina, Florida and Georgia. [At the same time he declared martial law in these states.] Lincoln heard of the emancipation order a week later through the newspapers and at the same time received a letter from Chase, saying that in his judgment the order should be suffered to stand. The President replied to his Secretary: 'No commanding general shall do such a thing upon my responsibility, without consulting me,' and on May 10 he issued a proclamation declaring Hunter's order void. ["Whether it be competent for me," he wrote, "as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free; and whether at any time, or in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government, to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field."] In this proclamation he made an earnest appeal to the people of the Union border Slave States to give freedom gradually to their slaves and accept the compensation preferred them by himself and Congress. 'I do not argue,' he said, 'I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times.'"—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, p. 150.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 5.—E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 250-251.

1862 (May: South Carolina).—Employment of freed negroes as armed soldiers.—The negroes within the Union lines in South Carolina, at Hilton Head and elsewhere, were placed under the charge, at first, of agents appointed by the Treasury Department; but disagreements arose between these agents and the military authorities, and the former were recalled. "These several agents had been replaced by a superior officer of the staff, General Saxton, who was himself placed under the orders of General Hunter with the rank of a military commander. By this action the government at Washington sustained Hunter in his conflict with the agents of the Treasury Department—a conflict originating in very serious causes, for it affected the question of slavery in its most vital points. . . . Mr. Cameron [secretary of war] had authorized General Sherman to organize the negroes into squads and companies. The latter had at first only been employed in manual labor, such as the construction of forts, roads and wharves; but Hunter, on taking Sherman's place, saw that he could give a much wider interpretation to the Secretary's instructions. He substituted muskets for the pick-axes used by the detachments of negro laborers organized by his predecessors, and, instead of making them dig the earth, he had them taught military exercises. Nor did he stop here; but wishing to increase the number of these new soldiers, he gathered all the adult negroes residing on the adjoining islands at Hilton Head on the 12th of May, in order to induce them to enter the military service. . . . The civil agents complained bitterly of the trouble this measure had created among the people entrusted to their charge, and thence sprung the quarrel which Mr. Lincoln cut short by deciding in favor of Hunter. The protection granted to fugitive slaves was the first logical consequence of the war; their enrolment in the Federal armies was the second. As untimely and impolitic as was the proclamation by which Hunter had taken upon himself to free the slaves outside of his jurisdiction, the creation of the first negro regiment was an act skilfully conceived. It was essentially a military act; it raised and ennobled the freedman by entrusting him with arms; its legality was unquestionable from the moment that the President approved of it, for there was no law to prevent him from enlisting colored volunteers. In short, it showed to the Confederates that the Washington government was determined not to allow itself to be any longer paralyzed by the vain hope of reconciliation. . . . But notwithstanding the success of this first experiment, considerable time elapsed before the Federal government concluded to follow Hunter in this direction."—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 2, bk. 7, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: G. W. Williams, *History of negro troops in the War of the Rebellion*, ch. 5.

1862 (May: Virginia).—Peninsular campaign: Battle of Williamsburg and the slow advance to the Chickahominy.—On the evacuation of the Confederate works at Yorktown on May 3, 1862, "our columns followed on in pursuit, McClellan remaining in Yorktown, busy with questions of transportation. The enemy under Longstreet had awaited our approach at Williamsburg. Hooker first attacked, having been brought to a stand by a work known as Fort Magruder, and kept up a



heavy pounding all the forenoon [May 5]. Kearny came to his rescue when Hooker's men were all but spent. Hancock moved around the enemy's left, seized some abandoned redoubts, and made a brilliant diversion. But there was no coöperation in our attack; no one on the field was in supreme command, and the day was fruitlessly spent in partial blows. The enemy retreated at night. Our loss was 2,200; theirs in all probability less."

—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye view of our Civil War*, ch. 11.—"Gen. Johnston says ["Narrative," p. 124]: 'We fought for no other purpose than to hold the ground long enough to enable our baggage-trains to get out of the way of the troops. This object was accomplished without difficulty. There was no time during the day when the slightest uncertainty appeared.' He also says that Longstreet's and Hill's divisions slept on the field; that what deserves to be called fighting ceased two hours before dark, yet the Confederates held the field until the next morning, when they resumed their march. . . . There may be a little rose-color about these statements, but the substantial facts seem to be accurately stated. . . . Gen. McClellan made no pursuit after Williamsburg, for reasons which he who will may find stated in his Report; and we may pass on with the single additional remark that the battle of Williamsburg was unnecessary, for the position might have been turned by a movement by our right. This was actually accomplished by Hancock, after Hooker had met with all his heavy loss; and it might as well have been done before as after. . . . The three weeks which followed the battle of Williamsburg were so devoid of incident that it seems to be sufficient to say that the Confederates moved up the Peninsula in two columns. The right column, composed of the divisions of Smith and Magruder, followed the road by New Kent Court House, and in three marches reached the Baltimore Cross Roads, 19 miles from Barhamsville. The left column, composed of the divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, reached in the same number of marches the Long Bridges. The army remained five days in this position, facing to the east. . . . The iron-clad Virginia [better known as the *Merrimac*] was destroyed on, or just before the 14th of May. This event opened the James River to our navy; and, to be ready to meet an advance up that river as well as from the direction of West Point, the Confederate forces were ordered to cross the Chickahominy on the 15th May. On the 17th their army encamped about three miles from Richmond, in front of the line of redoubts constructed in 1861. . . . During this period the weather was generally fine, cool and breezy, but gradually tending towards heat. . . . McClellan sent out cavalry reconnaissances from Williamsburg on the 5th and 7th May. . . . The advance of the main body began on the 8th; and on the 10th headquarters were at Roper's Church, 19 miles from Williamsburg, with all the troops which had arrived by land, except Hooker's, in the vicinity of that place. . . . By the 15th, headquarters, and the divisions of Franklin Porter, Sykes, and Smith, reached Cumberland on the Pamunkey. . . . On the 19th of May, headquarters and the corps of Porter and Franklin moved to Tunstall's Station on the railroad, five miles from White House. On the 20th, Casey's division forded the Chickahominy, where Bottom's Bridge had been, and occupied the opposite heights. Bottom's Bridge was immediately rebuilt. . . . On the 22d, headquarters moved to

Cold Harbor. On the 24th, we carried the village of Mechanicsville, but the enemy destroyed the bridge on which the Mechanicsville Turnpike crossed the river. On the same day our left advance secured a position at Seven Pines, the point of junction of the Nine-Mile Road with the Williamsburg road, which last road crosses the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge. . . . It is difficult to account for, or justify the slowness of McClellan's march. The distance from Williamsburg to the middle of a line drawn from Bottom's Bridge to Cold Harbor, measuring by the road, is about 40 miles. That from West Point to the same point, measuring in the same way, is considerably less. One might almost say that, in the three weeks which McClellan took to accomplish this distance, he might have marched his army all the way in order of battle, bridging streams, felling trees, making roads, and supplying his army as he advanced. 'I had hoped,' he says, 'by raid movements to drive before me, or capture, the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James River and press on to Richmond, before he should be materially re-enforced.' What was there to hinder his making the attempt? Instead of that he followed him at the average rate of rather less than two miles a day."—F. W. Palfrey, *After the fall of Yorktown (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, v. 1, pp. 95-114)*.

ALSO IN: J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of military operations, ch. 5.—Report of Joint Commission on the conduct of the War, 38th Congress, 2d session, v. 1.—Official Records, series 1, v. 11, pt. 1.* —J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, pp. 126-127.*

1862 (May: Virginia).—Evacuation of Norfolk by Confederates.—Destruction of the *Merrimac*.—The Federal fleet "with the supply ships passing up the York seized White House Landing, twenty miles from Richmond, and made it a base of supplies for the army which was thrown out to the Chickahominy, ten miles from the city. This was the situation on May 16. The Federal advance into the interior [together with Burnside's successes and captures in North Carolina] made Norfolk unsafe for the confederates, and they evacuated it, destroying the ram *Virginia (Merrimac)*, which they could not remove. This left the federal fleet without opposition in these waters, and it ascended the James to Drury's Bluff, six miles from Richmond. Here it encountered strong batteries, beyond which it did not go. A coöperating land force could have taken this position, but McClellan was on the York, which allowed him to keep his army between the Confederates and Washington."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States, p. 546.*

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, *American conflict, v. 2, p. 127.*

1862 (May: Virginia).—Peninsular campaign: Fair Oaks or Seven Pines.—"While the operations . . . [under Jackson] had been going on in the Shenandoah Valley [see below: 1862 (May-June: Virginia)] Johnston had leisurely fallen back to the neighborhood of Richmond, followed, still more leisurely, by McClellan. Between May 20th and 24th, Keyes's corps, the 4th, crossed the Chickahominy by the ford near Bottom's Bridge, which the enemy had destroyed. The 3d corps soon followed, under Heintzelman, and the bridge was immediately rebuilt. The other three corps, the 2d, 5th, and 6th, took position on the north side of the Chickahominy, the 5th under Fitz John Porter, in advance, then the 6th under

Franklin, then the 2d under Sumner. Trestle-bridges were immediately commenced, and rapidly pushed to completion, to establish free communication between these corps and the 3d and 4th corps, under Heintzelman and Keyes. . . . The Government refused to allow McDowell to join McClellan by water, and insisted on his marching on Richmond by way of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad. This obliged McClellan, when he approached Richmond, to take up a position on both sides of the Chickahominy, so that he might extend his right wing to co-operate with McDowell's advancing column; and now, although McDowell had been sent off to the Shenandoah Valley, McClellan made no change in his arrangements. The base of the army was established at White House, on the Pamunkey, up to which point that river was navigable for vessels bringing supplies and from thence the Richmond and York River Railroad was made use of to convey them to the army. . . . Johnston, as we need hardly say, had kept himself informed of McDowell's movements. . . . As soon as he found that McDowell had moved off to the Valley, he . . . [devoted himself to the] project of destroying the two Federal corps, the 3d and 4th, which McClellan had pushed across the Chickahominy and had caused to take position within a few miles of Richmond. Of these troops, the 4th corps, under Keyes, was in the advance. Casey's division occupied some rifle-pits and a redoubt about three quarters of a mile west of Seven Pines, a tavern on the Williamsburg Stage road. The other division, under Couch, was a little to the right and rear of Casey's. Heintzelman's corps, the 3d, had not advanced much beyond the Chickahominy. In fact Hooker's division was guarding White Oak Bridge and the passes of White Oak Swamp lying to the southward, and the division of Kearney was at Bottom's Bridge. Kearny was more than five miles from Casey's advanced line, and Hooker more than seven miles from it. Each of these four divisions numbered about 8500 men. It is apparent that General Heintzelman, who was in command of both corps, had not sufficiently concentrated the force at his disposal."—J. C. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War, pt. 2, pp. 133-134, 137-138.*—"Johnston selected the divisions of Gens. Longstreet, Huger, G. W. Smith, D. H. Hill, and Whiting. His plan was that Gens. Hill and Longstreet should advance by the road to Williamsburg and make the attack in front, and that Gen. Huger should move on the road to Charles City and attack in flank the troops assailed by Gens. Hill and Longstreet. Gen. Smith was ordered to the junction of the New Bridge Road and the Nine Mile Road, and to be in readiness to fall on the right flank of Gen. Keyes and to cover the left of Gen. Longstreet. The forces of Gens. Hill, Longstreet, and Smith were in position early on the morning of Saturday, May 31, and waited until afternoon for Gen. Huger to get into position. Prince de Joinville . . . thus describes ('Campagne de l'Armée du Potomac, Mars-Juillet, 1862') the scenes which followed this attack: 'At the moment it was thus attacked the Federal army occupied a position having the form of a V. The base of the V is at Bottom's Bridge. . . . The left arm stretches toward Richmond, with this railroad and the road from that city to Williamsburg. There stood the left wing, composed of four divisions echeloned, one behind the other, between Fair Oaks and Savage stations, and encamped in the woods on both sides of the road. The other arm of the

V, the right, follows the left bank of the river; that is the right wing. There are these five divisions and the reserve. Should one desire to communicate from one extremity to the other of those two wings, going by Bottom's Bridge, the way is very long, not less than 12 or 15 miles. In an air line the distance, on the contrary, is very trifling, but between the two arms of the V flows the Chickahominy. . . . It was against the left wing of the army that every effort of the enemy was directed. That wing had its outposts at Fair Oaks station, on the York river railroad, and at a place called Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg road. . . . About one o'clock in the afternoon, the weather being dark and gloomy, a very spirited fusilade is heard. The pickets and sentries are violently driven in; the woods which surround Fair Oaks and Seven Pines are filled with clouds of the enemy's sharpshooters. The troops rush to arms and fight in desperation; but their adversaries' forces constantly increase, and their losses do not stop them. The redoubt of the Seven Pines is surrounded, and its defenders die bravely. . . . Meanwhile Heintzelman rushes to the rescue with his two divisions. As at Williamsburg, Kearney arrives in good time to reestablish the fight. Berry's brigade, of this division, composed of Michigan regiments and an Irish battalion, advances firm as a wall into the midst of the disordered mass which wanders over the battle field, and does more by its example than the most powerful reinforcements. . . . At 6 o'clock in the evening—new actors appear on the scene. Gen. Sumner, who has succeeded in passing the Chickahominy, with Sedgwick's division, over the bridge constructed by his troops . . . arrived suddenly on the left flank of the column with which the enemy is endeavoring to cut off Heintzelman and Keyes. . . . At nightfall [the Federals] valiantly led by Gen. Sumner in person, throw themselves upon the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and drive him furiously, with frightful slaughter and fear, back as far as Fair Oaks Station. Night put an end to the combat. On both sides nothing was known of the result of the battle but what each one had seen with his own eyes. . . . [Sumner, however, had saved the day.] The river rose suddenly . . . and continued to swell with rapidity, carrying away the new bridges, tearing up and sweeping off the trees which formed the planking of Sumner's bridges, and covering the entire valley with its overflowing waters. Nothing could cross.'"—W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history of the Rebellion, ch. 19* (quoting Prince de Joinville's "*Campagne de l'Armée du Potomac*").—"About seven o'clock [of the 31st] General Johnston was severely wounded, and Major-General Gustavus W. Smith succeeded him in the command of the Confederate army. But before this happened, Johnston had announced to his officers that the battle was over for the day. . . . [On the morning of June 1 General G. W. Smith] desired to continue the battle. He ordered Longstreet, whose troops had been so successful the day before, to renew the engagement, and to direct his attack towards the north, that is, towards the railroad, instead of pushing farther east, towards Bottom's Bridge. . . . Longstreet's performance of his orders on this morning of June 1st was singularly lacking in energy and dash. . . . [His] appeals for help induced General Smith to send orders to the troops which were stationed along the upper Chickahominy to march to Longstreet's assistance; but . . . he remained

quiet with Whiting's division until he should hear what Longstreet could accomplish on the right when these fresh troops had reached him. General McClellan arrived on the ground early in the forenoon, but made no changes in the dispositions of the Federal forces and gave no orders looking to an attack. About two o'clock in the afternoon General Lee arrived at General Smith's headquarters, and in compliance with an order of President Davis, assumed command of the Confederate army. He allowed the troops to remain where they were during the remainder of the day, and in the night withdrew them to their former positions in the immediate neighborhood of Richmond. . . . The net result of the battle, in spite of . . . captured trophies, was undoubtedly favorable to the Federal arms. The retirement of the Confederates to their original positions was naturally interpreted by the Federal troops as an acknowledgement either of defeat, or inability to make a sustained and successful resistance in the open field to the advance of the United States forces. The morale of the Federal army had been on the whole heightened. . . . It remained for General McClellan to utilize the force at his disposal, to lead this large army of brave men, all of whom were devoted to him, to the achievement of the success which it would seem was really at this period of the campaign within his grasp. . . . In spite of the example which had been so recently afforded him of the treacherous character of the Chickahominy River, General McClellan made no immediate preparations for transferring his army to the James. He employed his troops in building bridges to connect the wings of his army. These bridges had to be long enough to cross not only the Chickahominy itself, but the bogs and marshes through which it flowed, and their construction was a task of no ordinary labor and difficulty. It was, moreover, aggravated by the bad weather which prevailed during the first half of June. It consumed nearly three weeks; and during these weeks the army made no forward movement of any consequence."—J. C. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, pt. 2, pp. 149-151, 156-159.

ALSO IN: G. W. Smith, *Two days of battle at Seven Pines (Battles and leaders*, v. 2, pp. 220-263).—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 11, pt. 1.—W. Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia in 1862*, ch. 7-8.—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, pp. 131-132.—J. C. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, pt. 2, pp. 131-133.

1862 (May-June: Virginia).—Stonewall Jackson's second campaign in the Shenandoah valley.—Winchester.—Cross Keys.—Port Republic.—Before the opening of the Peninsular campaign, Lincoln, losing his fears for Washington's safety, ordered McDowell to Fredericksburg, and thence to the aid of McClellan, with whom he was to cooperate in the attack on Richmond. "After numerous delays, the time of advance of this column was at length fixed for the 26th of May, a date closely coincident with the arrival of the Army of the Potomac on the Chickahominy. The head of McDowell's column had already been pushed eight miles south of Fredericksburg; and McClellan, to clear all opposition from his path, sent forward Porter's corps to Hanover Junction, where he had a sharp encounter with a force of the enemy under General Branch, whom he repulsed with a loss of 200 killed and 700 prisoners, and established the right of the Army of the Potomac within fifteen miles, or one march, of

McDowell's van. McDowell was eager to advance, and McClellan was equally anxious for his arrival."—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 123.—On May 24, the order for McDowell's advance "was reversed on account of unexpected developments in the Shenandoah Valley. This region furnishes a safe approach to Harper's Ferry, sixty miles from the capital and seventy-five from Baltimore. Stonewall Jackson was in its lower part with 17,000 men, watched by Banks with 10,000 near Strasburg, and Frémont with 15,000 in the mountains to the westward,—all within easy distance. Besides these there were 700 men at Harper's Ferry. Milroy, under Frémont, stood with 3,000 men at McDowell, 25 miles west of Staunton, so that if Jackson advanced on Banks, Milroy might close in on his rear."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 546-547.—"While McClellan dallied before Richmond, Robert E. Lee planned, and Stonewall Jackson conducted, a series of manœuvres in the course of which, playing on Lincoln's anxiety for Washington, they succeeded in bringing to naught the plan for the reinforcement by McDowell of the Army of the Potomac. On May 8, Jackson defeated a detachment of Frémont's, sending this word to Richmond, 'God blessed our arms with victory.' Having bigger game in sight than Frémont's army, he retraced his steps for the purpose of cooperating with Ewell in an attack upon Banks in the Shenandoah Valley; when he made this junction he had 17,000 men. . . . [With these he began a campaign which was truly Napoleonic.] On May 23, he swooped upon a detachment of Bank's Force at Front Royal and put it to rout, capturing a large part of it. Banks himself was then at Strasburg with 6,800; but next day, fearing that his retreat would be cut off, he 'ran a race' with Jackson to Winchester. The pursuit was hot, but the fighting of his rearguard prevented his capture, and he reached Winchester first. During these two days, however, Jackson had produced big results. . . . Reinforcements were ordered to Banks from Baltimore; Harper's Ferry sent him a portion of its garrison. Until May 24, the faulty disposition of the Union forces was largely due to orders from the War Department, in Stanton's name. Now the President . . . directed Frémont to move into the Shenandoah Valley to a point in Jackson's rear. . . . [Although McClellan urged that the reason for Jackson's activity was to prevent reinforcements from reaching him,] Lincoln suspended the order which had been given McDowell to unite with McClellan and instructed him to send 20,000 men to the Shenandoah Valley to assist Frémont in the capture of Jackson. . . . At daybreak, on Sunday, May 25, Jackson routed Banks at Winchester, gave hot pursuit to the 'mass of disordered fugitives' was at one time on the point of destroying the entire force and finally drove them across the Potomac river."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 127, 129.—"Jackson continued the pursuit as far as Halltown, within two miles of Harper's Ferry, where he remained till the 30th [at the moment that Johnston was preparing to attack McClellan], when, finding heavy forces converging on his rear, he began a retrograde movement up the Valley." McDowell moved from the east and Frémont from the west in a converging movement on Strasburg. "The two columns moved rapidly; they had almost effected a junction on the 31st, but that very day Jackson, falling back from

Harper's Ferry, slipped between the two, and made good his retreat up the Valley. . . . The pursuers did their best; they pushed on, Frémont following in the path of Jackson up the Valley of the Shenandoah; while McDowell sent forward Shields' division by the lateral Luray Valley, with a view to head him off when he should attempt to break through the gaps of the Blue Ridge." On June 8th Ewell's division of Jackson's army "repulsed Frémont, while Jackson held Shields in check. Early next morning, drawing in Ewell and concentrating his forces, Jackson threw himself across the river, burned the bridge to prevent Frémont from following; fell upon Shields' advance, consisting of two brigades under General Tyler, and repulsed him, capturing his artillery. The former of these affairs figures in history as the battle of Cross Keys, and the latter as the battle of Port Republic. In this exciting month's campaign, Jackson made great captures of stores and prisoners; but this was not its chief result. Without gaining a single tactical victory he had yet achieved a great strategic victory; for by skilfully manœuvring 15,000 men he succeeded in neutralizing a force of 60,000. [Rhodes and Henderson give figures as 17,000 and 40,000.] It is perhaps not too much to say that he saved Richmond."—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 122-128.

ALSO IN: J. D. Imboden, *Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah (Battles and leaders, v. 2, pp. 289-301)*.—J. E. Cooke, *Stonewall Jackson: A military biography, pt. 2, ch. 8-17*.—F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson, v. 1, pp. 207-548*.

1862 (May-July: On the Mississippi).—First undertakings against Vicksburg.—"After his capture of New Orleans, Farragut had proceeded up the river, receiving the surrender of Baton Rouge, the capital of Louisiana, [Natchez], and other towns; but on the 18th of May his progress had been stopped at Vicksburg, 400 miles above New Orleans by water and 400 below Memphis. The position of that town was such that it could not be taken without the coöperation of a larger land force than Butler was able to spare, and so it became necessary to wait for the fall of Corinth. But after that event, as before it, Halleck dawdled instead of striking. On the 28th of June Farragut's fleet ran past the guns of Vicksburg without serious damage and effected a junction with that of Commodore Davis just above the town. Nothing could be done without an army, and Farragut asked Halleck for troops, but could not get any. Precious time was thus slipping away, while the enemy was putting every minute to good use. General Van Dorn, detached from the army which Beauregard had withdrawn to Tupelo, made all haste to Vicksburg, taking Breckinridge and his division along with him, and worked day and night building fortifications and collecting cannon. Moreover, so far from losing heart on account of their crushing naval defeats at New Orleans and Memphis, the undaunted Confederates were making ready to attack the victors upon their own element. Fifty miles up the Yazoo river, . . . they were building a formidable ironclad ram. . . . This famous ram, the Arkansas, was built like the Merrimac, though smaller in size, and if her engines had been sufficiently powerful, she might have wrought fearful havoc to the Federal fleet. At her first appearance, on the 15th of July, she attacked and put to flight the Tyler and Carondelet, and, running under the friendly guns of Vicksburg, where

Commander William Porter, with the Essex, tried in vain to destroy her, she became a perpetual menace to . . . [the Federal] ships. By the end of July, as no troops could be obtained . . . Davis withdrew his ships 300 miles up the river to Helena, while Farragut returned to New Orleans. The energetic Van Dorn at once sent Breckinridge with 6,000 men and the Arkansas to recover Baton Rouge and bring back the state government, besides securing the mouth of Red river. The capital was defended by a detachment of 4,000 of Butler's troops, with the ram Essex and a couple of gunboats. In the fight which occurred on the 5th of August at one o'clock in the morning, the Confederate troops were repulsed with a loss of 500 men, the machinery of the Arkansas broke down, and when she was attacked by the Essex, her commander ran her ashore, landed his crew, set her on fire, . . . turned her adrift. . . . Nothing daunted, however, by this reverse, Van Dorn seized and fortified the village of Port Hudson, a few miles above Baton Rouge but below the mouth of Red river. By thus holding Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the Confederates controlled the 250 miles of river between them, and through the Red river obtained their supplies from the trans-Mississippi region as promptly and securely as ever. Corinth had fallen on the 29th of May and Memphis on the 6th of June. Halleck had 100,000 men elated with success, while his adversary, Beauregard, had 50,000 dispirited by a long series of reverses. At any time between the first of June and the middle of July a force of 20,000 men coöperating with the fleets of Farragut and Davis, which were ready and waiting for them, might easily have taken Vicksburg and saved a whole year of anxious and arduous work in this quarter. . . . But Halleck's mind was not large enough to take in the whole theatre of war between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies. Thus far the advance of the Union armies from Fort Donelson up the Tennessee river to Corinth had operated directly to open the Mississippi river by taking its fortified places in flank; and with New Orleans now in our possession, nothing but the occupation of Vicksburg was necessary to complete the conquest. But in this vast theatre of war, there was another region that needed to be looked after; there was another strategic point scarcely less important than Vicksburg. This was the mountain fastness of Chattanooga, commanding eastern Tennessee."—J. Fiske, *Mississippi valley in the Civil War*, pp. 137-141.—Farragut "in compliance with orders from Mr. Welles, had abandoned his contest with the Vicksburg works on the 20th of July, and made down stream for New Orleans, whence he proceeded with his squadron to carry on operations along the coast of Texas, where the chief posts were (for the time) recovered to the Union by his detachments in the course of a few weeks. 'All we want,' he wrote on the 15th of October, 'is a few soldiers to hold the places and we will soon have the whole coast. It is a more effectual blockade to have the vessels inside instead of outside.'"—C. C. Chesney, *Essays in military biography*, pp. 169-171.

ALSO IN: L. Farragut, *Life of David G. Farragut, ch. 20*.—D. D. Porter, *Naval history of the Civil War, ch. 21*.—R. B. Irwin, *History of the 19th Army Corps, ch. 2-3*.

1862 (May-December: Louisiana).—New Orleans under General Butler.—The army which accompanied Farragut's naval expedition against

New Orleans, to assist its operations and to occupy the city and the lower Mississippi region when taken, was placed under the command of General Benjamin F. Butler. It consisted nominally of 18,000 men, but is said to have actually mustered less than 14,000. It was composed of regiments which had been raised by Butler in New England especially for the enterprise, his preparations having commenced as early as September, 1861. These troops were partly gathered at Ship island, in the gulf, some time before Farragut made ready his fleet; the remainder were at the rendezvous in good time, and the whole were in waiting, on board transports, at the passes, when Farragut carried his fleet past Forts Jackson and St. Philip. "General Butler . . . brought his forces into the rear of St. Philip, Porter keeping up a bombardment. On the 27th of April the garrison had become so demoralized as to refuse to fight any longer. The forts were therefore surrendered on the next day. . . . On the 1st of May New Orleans was formally occupied by United States troops. The loss on the national side in achieving this great victory was 40 killed and 177 wounded. . . . General Butler now entered on the difficult task of governing New Orleans. Its population, though greatly diminished to strengthen the Confederate armies in the Border States—a cause of bitter complaint to the inhabitants—still numbered about 140,000. Almost one half of it was of foreign birth. . . . By firmness, strict yet considerate, he controlled the municipal authorities; by severity he put down the mob. He was a terror to tricky tradesmen, a benefactor to the starving poor. He cleaned the streets, enforced sanitary regulations, and kept out yellow fever. He put an effectual stop to the operations of Confederate agents, who were illicitly obtaining supplies for their cause. . . . He arrested Mumford, the person who had hauled down the national flag at the Mint [where it had been raised by one of Farragut's officers before the arrival of the troops], brought him before a military commission, convicted and executed him." This execution of Mumford (by hanging) drew from the Confederate President, Davis, a proclamation denouncing Butler as "an outlaw and common enemy of mankind"; directing that, if captured, he should be immediately hung; declaring the commissioned officers of his command "not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals"; and ordering that "no commissioned officer of the United States taken captive shall be released on parole before exchange until the said Butler shall have met with due punishment for his crimes." "Some women of New Orleans, relying on the immunity of their sex, gratified their animosity by insulting national officers in public places. One of them ventured so far as to spit in the face of an officer who was quietly walking in the street. Hereupon was issued 'General Order No. 28' [known as 'the Woman Order,' which gave notice that] . . . 'hereafter, when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her vocation.' . . . The feeling of personal hatred to Butler grew daily more and more intense. He was accused of improper tampering with the banks, speculating in sequestered property, and, through the agency of his brother, carrying on illegal but profitable transactions in sugar and cotton. In

South Carolina a reward of \$10,000 had been offered for his assassination. Throughout the Confederacy he received an ignominious surname, and was known as 'Butler the Beast.' The government felt constrained to send a commission to New Orleans to investigate his transactions. Its conclusion was that he had evidently acted 'under a misapprehension, to be referred to the patriotic zeal which governs him.' [In December General Butler was recalled and General Banks was sent to take his place].—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 52.

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 13.—J. Parton, *General Butler in New Orleans*, ch. 11-32.—G. S. Boutwell, *Reminiscences of 60 years*, v. 2, pp. 14-15, 204-205.—C. F. Adams, *Life of Charles Francis Adams*, pp. 240-260.

1862 (June: On the Mississippi).—Capture of Memphis.—Naval fight before the city.—After the evacuation of Corinth by Beauregard, "Fort Pillow, 40 miles above Memphis, was no longer of any account, for the Union army could take it from the rear. The Confederates, therefore, spiked the guns, burned their barracks and what supplies they could not take away; and the Confederate gunboats went down the river to Memphis, where several of the boats had been built. . . . [Commodore Montgomery who commanded the Confederate fleet had eight vessels.] . . . The Union fleet is at anchor three miles above the city. 'Drop down below the city and see if you can discover the Confederate fleet,' is the order to the captain of the Jessie Benton. We sweep around the majestic bend of the river and behold the city. The first rays of the sun are gilding the spires of the churches. A crowd of people is upon the levee—men, women, and children—who have come out to see the Union fleet sent to the bottom. . . . Suddenly a vessel with a black cloud of smoke rolling from the chimneys shoots into the stream. It is the Little Rebel, Commodore Montgomery's flag-ship. One by one the other vessels follow, forming in two lines of battle. . . . 'Round to; head down stream; keep in line with the flagship,' was the order which we on board the Jessie Benton carried to each boat on the line. In an hour's time the Confederate fleet was annihilated. . . . It is not known how many men were lost on the Confederate side, but probably from 80 to 100. Colonel Ellet was the only one injured on board the Union fleet. . . . The victory opens the Upper Mississippi from Cairo to Vicksburg."—C. C. Coffin, *Drumbeat of the nation*, ch. 10.

1862 (June: Virginia).—Peninsular campaign: McClellan fortifying and Lee preparing for a bold attack.—"The strength of the Confederate force was always greatly overestimated by McClellan, and his frequent and urgent calls for reinforcements exposed his want of confidence in his own strength. General Lee [who took command of the Confederate army June 1, General Johnston being disabled], knowing this uneasy, insecure feeling of his antagonist, and McDowell's force, which had always been a thorn in his side, being about this time withdrawn from Fredericksburg for the support of Banks and Shields in the Valley, prepared . . . to assume the offensive. He conceived the bold plan of crossing the Chickahominy, and, attacking the Federal right wing, to force it back and seize McClellan's line of communication with his base of operations. This plan being successfully executed, the Federal

general would be compelled to save his army as best he could by retreat. Preparatory to the execution of this plan General J. E. B. Stuart was ordered to make a reconnoissance in the rear of the Federal position. This officer, with a force of about 1,000 cavalry, executed his instructions with great boldness and success. He made the entire circuit of the Federal army and gained much important information, . . . captured many prisoners and destroyed Federal stores to the value of \$7,000,000. . . . His design being confirmed by Stuart's successful reconnoissance, Lee proceeded to organize a force requisite for the accomplishment of his proposed enterprise. The troops that could be conveniently spared from North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia were ordered to Richmond. . . . At the same time General Jackson was ordered to withdraw secretly from the Valley and proceed with such expedition as would enable him to reach Hanover Junction by the afternoon of the 25th of June. In order to mask his designs from the Federals, Lee directed Whiting's division and Lawton's brigade to proceed to Staunton, apparently with the view of reinforcing Jackson, but really under orders to return immediately and join that general on the 25th at Hanover Junction. This movement further strengthened McClellan in his opinion of Lee's vastly superior force, and completely blinded him in regard to the real intentions of that general. General Lee determined to attack the Federal right wing on the morning of the 26th of June."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, p. 169.—"The coöperation of Jackson's command being evidently essential to the success of . . . [Lee's movements] the first thing to be done was to reinforce it so that that active officer might be able to dispose definitely of the Federal troops which had forced him to retreat from Winchester to Port Republic. . . . [In all he received some 25,000 men which raised the Confederate force in Virginia to about 90,000 men] about the 11th of June. . . . However, it appearing certain that the Federal troops in the Valley had retired and given up further operations for the time being, Jackson was ordered on the 16th to make arrangements for uniting his force with the main army as soon as he could. . . . On June 17th, Jackson, with his accustomed promptness, put his troops in march towards Richmond, leaving his cavalry and one battery near Harrisonburg. His command consisted of . . . perhaps 25,000 men in all. Preceding his command, and riding on horseback the last fifty miles for fear of being recognized as a passenger on the train . . . he attended a council of war in Richmond on the afternoon of the 23d. . . . Here he was informed that another plan had been decided on. The four commands of Longstreet, Jackson, and the Hills, accompanied by Stuart's cavalry, were to operate on McClellan's communications on the north side of the Chickahominy, while the divisions of Magruder and Huger were to hold the lines in front of Richmond on the south side of the Chickahominy."—J. C. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, pt. 2.—*Campaign of 1862*, pp. 164-166.

1862 (June-July: Virginia).—Peninsular campaign: Seven Days' Battle and retreat.—Mechanicsville.—Gaines' Mill.—Savage Station.—Glendale.—Malvern Hill.—"Since the battle of Fair Oaks the Second Corps (Sumner) had remained on the right bank of the Chickahominy, where it had been followed the month of June by

the Sixth Corps (Franklin). So that only the Fifth Corps (Porter) remained on the left bank, recently reinforced by McCall's division. All the efforts of the enemy were made there, and there the great seven days' contest commenced. On the 26th of June, A. P. Hill, preceding Jackson by twenty-four hours, endeavored to force the passage of Beaver Dam Creek, defended by the Pennsylvanians under McCall. He was repulsed with considerable loss on the Mechanicsville road. But, during the night, Porter was compelled to fall back to a position more tenable against a force become much superior to his own, Jackson and Longstreet having united against his lines. On the 27th, then, the Fifth Corps, with about 25,000 men, was assailed by 70,000 Confederates on Gaines' Mill Heights, and defended itself there obstinately, until our own cavalry came fatally to the enemy's aid. Unskilfully handled and roughly repulsed, it fell back in disorder on our lines, where it put everything into confusion. . . . The Confederates, coming on at the charge, finished the overthrow, and the Fifth Corps would have been destroyed if the coming of the night had not enabled our decimated troops to cross to the right bank of the Chickahominy, destroying the bridges behind them. [This battle, called Gaines' Mill by the Federals, was named Cold Harbor, or Chickahominy, by the Confederates.] . . . As soon as Porter had crossed safely on the 28th, the general retreat commenced. Keyes crossed White Oak swamp first, and took position to protect the passage of the immense army trains and the great herds of cattle. Then, on the 29th, after having repulsed a cavalry attack, he continued his way towards the James, where he arrived on the 30th at the same time that Porter reached Haxall's Landing. Much less favored, the three other corps suspended their march only to fight and ceased to fight only to march. But all this was done without any general system, in the absence of superior supervision, and of orders in accordance with circumstances. On the 29th the enemy crossed the Chickahominy to unite all his force on the right bank; Franklin advised Sumner, and the two, acting together, fell back on Savage Station, where they took up position, with the intention, aided by Heintzelman, of repelling the dangerous attack which menaced them. But Heintzelman, adhering to his general instructions, after destroying the material of the railroad, the provisions, munitions of war, arms and baggage that there was neither time nor means of carrying away, hastened to cross White Oak swamp, uncovering Sumner's left. The latter learned of the retreat of the Third Corps only from a furious attack by the enemy on the very side which he believed protected by Heintzelman. He did not the less sustain the shock with an unshakable solidity, and fought all the afternoon with four divisions without being broken at any point. The enemy, worn out by the useless attacks, retired at nightfall. Then only did he receive any news from McClellan, under the form of an order to Sumner to fall back, along with Franklin, to the other side of White Oak Swamp, abandoning our general hospitals at Savage Station, and the 2,500 sick and wounded in them. On the morning of the 30th, Jackson presented himself, to cross the swamp after us. He found the bridge destroyed, and endeavored to force a passage at several points. He was everywhere repulsed and kept in check the whole day by the obstinate resistance of Franklin, while farther on,

towards the James, Longstreet was held by Heintzelman and McCall, who prevented him from cutting our army in two at Glendale. This was not done without hard fighting. The Confederates, arriving by the New Market road at a right angle to the Quaker road, which was our line of march, struck, in the first place, the Pennsylvania reserves, broke their line, outflanking it on the right and on the left, captured a battery of artillery, and pushed resolutely on through that dangerous breach. They then struck Hooker's division, which threw them obliquely on Sumner's Corps. Soon afterward, Kearney occupied the vacant space, and, as on the evening before, the sun set with the rebels unsuccessful. [This day's battle is variously named after Glendale, New Market, Frazier's Farm, and Nelson's Farm.] But the same evening, Franklin, left without orders, and seeing his position was becoming more and more dangerous, abandoned White Oak swamp and fell back towards the James. At that news, which was promptly sent to him from several directions Heintzelman sent in vain to headquarters to ask for instructions. Left to his own devices, he concluded that the wisest course was to follow the retrograde movement, and retreated with his corps. Sumner still remained, and, seeing himself alone and without support, he decided, in his turn, to do as the others had done. On the morning of the 31st, he arrived on the Malvern Heights, where the three corps, the Second, Third, and Sixth, found themselves united, not, as has been benevolently said, by the wise combinations of General McClellan, but by the fortunate inspiration of the commanders, who had received no orders to that effect. 'At daylight,' said General Sumner, in his testimony before the Congressional committee, 'I called on General McClellan, on the banks of the James. He told me that he had intended that the army should hold the position it had the night before, and that no order for retreat had been sent; but that, since the rest of the army had fallen back, he was glad that I had done the same.' It was found that the plateau of Malvern Hill was admirably formed for a defensive position. General Humphreys . . . traced a formidable line with the left resting at Haxall's Landing on the James, where it was protected by the gunboats, while the right was thrown back on some fields covered with thick woods, and cut up by marshy streams. The summits and slopes of the plateau were bristling with cannon, sweeping the plain over the head of our infantry deployed in front of them. In that position, the army awaited a last attack. The enemy played there his last card, and lost the game. . . . He tried his fortune and gave battle July 1. On every point his columns were thrown back in disorder, crushed in every attack by the double fire of artillery and infantry. Dash was not enough now. On this occasion, the enemy was compelled to acknowledge himself beaten and incapable of pursuing us any further. But our men were slow to believe in success. On receiving the order a few hours later, after night had put an end to the contest, to retire to Harrison's Landing, they naturally concluded that we were not strong enough to hold out long against the enemy. . . . Worn out by fatigue and fighting, exhausted by privations and by vigils, discouraged, and suspecting that it was not fortune alone that had betrayed them, they dragged themselves along without order . . . during that last night march, which had all the character of a rout."—R de

Troбрианд, *Four years with the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: W. Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia in 1862*, ch. 12-17.—A. S. Webb, *Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 3: *Peninsula*, ch. 9.—F. J. Porter, W. B. Franklin, D. H. Hill, et al., *Seven days' fighting (Battles and leaders)*, v. 2.—G. B. McClellan, *Complete report*, pt. 2.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 11, pt. 1-2.—*Report of Joint Commission on the conduct of the War (Senate reports, 37th Congress, 3d session, v. 2, pt. 1)*.

1862 (June-October: Tennessee-Kentucky).—Ineffective dispersion of Western armies.—Failure to secure Chattanooga and Vicksburg.—Bragg's invasion of Kentucky.—Race for Louisville.—Battle of Perryville.—End of Buell's campaign.—"We left the Federals in possession of Corinth and Memphis, the army of Beauregard disappearing in the depths of semi-tropical forests where the Tombigbee takes its source, and Montgomery's ships lying at the bottom of the Mississippi. [See above: 1862 (April-May; Tennessee-Mississippi); (June: On the Mississippi).] The part to be played by the Federal fleets was fully laid out; Farragut, by ascending the river, and Davis, by descending it, were to endeavor to join hands and destroy all the obstacles which still obstructed its course. . . . [The army at Corinth] had allowed Beauregard to escape at the very moment when it felt sure of crushing him; but it could yet strike some decisive blows either to eastward or westward, the Confederates being nowhere sufficiently numerous to make any strong opposition. Eastward, Mitchell had forced open the way to Chattanooga and approached the gap which opens south-east of that town [see above: 1862 (April-May: Alabama)]. . . . He was master of the passes of the Tennessee, and the Federals, stationed at Corinth, could reach Chattanooga much more speedily than their adversary encamped at Tupelo. . . . [Everything] was in favor of prompt and vigorous action. But Halleck divided his army, and notwithstanding the resources he had at his disposal, allowed his adversaries to forestall him everywhere. . . . The army of the Ohio left Corinth on the 10th of June, and Buell was ordered to proceed with it in the direction of Chattanooga, where Mitchell was beginning to be sorely pressed; but this movement was slowly executed. Sherman, at the head of his own division and that of Hurlbut, proceeded toward Memphis, dropping detachments of troops as far as Holly Springs to cover his left flank."—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 2, bk. 2, ch. 3.—"Next after Richmond and Vicksburg, the mountain fastness of Chattanooga was the most important strategic point in the Southern Confederacy. It was the centre of great lines of railroad radiating in every direction to the Mississippi, the Ohio, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Gulf of Mexico. Situated at the lower end of that huge mountain defile known as East Tennessee, . . . it guards the only avenue by which Virginia can be approached directly from the southwestern states. Its possession by a Federal army would practically isolate Virginia and North Carolina on the one hand, and lop off Mississippi and Alabama on the other; and by opening the way into the interior of Georgia would throw what was left of the war entirely into the Atlantic region. Its possession by the Confederates gave them control of eastern Tennessee, enabled them easily to move reinforcements between Virginia and the West, and was a perpetual men-

ace to middle Tennessee and Kentucky. Besides this great strategic importance, Chattanooga had its peculiar political value. . . . This whole area of the Alleghanies was a loyal area, and to clear it of Confederate armies, as had already been done in West Virginia, was to set it free. Thus political and military reasons combined to make Chattanooga the great objective point of the Army of the Cumberland, as Vicksburg was the goal of the Army of the Tennessee, and as Richmond was the goal of the Army of the Potomac. . . . In the summer of 1862 . . . Chattanooga might have been seized and held. As the Federals had that spring concentrated all their forces west of the Alleghanies for the great movement upon Corinth, so the Confederates had gathered together all their strength to oppose them, and Chattanooga was left well-nigh defenceless, so that a single Federal brigade was able to begin bombarding it. After the fall of Corinth, the prize of Chattanooga was for him that should move quickest. Buell might have taken it, had not Halleck insisted upon his employing the precious hours in mending a railroad."—J. Fiske, *Mississippi valley in the Civil War*, pp. 248-251.—"The rebuilding of the Mobile Railway, which had been completely destroyed by the enemy, was a considerable undertaking. Begun on the 9th of June, it was only finished on the 26th. The Confederates had profited by this delay. The new general-in-chief, Braxton Bragg [who had superseded Beauregard, had boldly divided his army and abandoned the position of Tupelo, which Halleck still believed him to occupy. He had determined to cover at once . . . Chattanooga and Vicksburg. He proceeded toward the first with all the old army of Johnston, consisting of the corps of Hardee and Polk, as rapidly as the difficulties of communication in that portion of the Southern States allowed. He had the merit and good fortune to reach Chattanooga before Buell. It was not too soon, for a few days previous, the 7th of June, the Federal General Negley, with his single brigade and some cannon, had nearly taken possession of this city by surprise. Bragg found it of great advantage to transfer the war to the vicinity of Chattanooga. Master of this position, indeed, he could menace either Tennessee or Kentucky, Nashville or Louisville and wrest from the Federals all the conquests they had achieved during the last few months by taking them in rear. He was also drawing near Virginia."—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 2, bk. 2, ch. 3.—"Halleck soon leaves for Washington to assume supreme control of the Union forces from the War Department. Grant is left in command of the Army of the Tennessee, Buell of the Army of the Ohio, Pope of the Army of the Mississippi. Every one is without definite instructions; there is no one head; and the Western armies are practically put upon the defensive. Rosecrans succeeds Pope, who is transferred to Virginia, and to Grant's lot now fall the armies of the Mississippi and Tennessee, 42,000 effectives, with which to keep open his communications with Buell and guard the railroad from Memphis to Decatur. While Grant and Sherman devote their energies to the line of the Mississippi, Buell is ordered to regain East Tennessee, where the loyal population is in extreme suffering. . . . [Mitchell's capture of Huntsville, and some hundred miles of the Memphis and Charleston railroad], had been full of possibilities. Had he but received the authority, he might readily have anticipated Bragg in taking possession of

Chattanooga, and have saved much subsequent blood and treasure. For this town is the key to that entire strategic field. . . . Buell supposed that Bragg would attempt to turn his right in order to obtain possession of Nashville. He therefore concentrated the bulk of his force at Murfreesboro. . . . By a sudden movement, Bragg steals a march around Buell's left, through the Sequatchie Valley [August 28], and marches straight toward Louisville, while Kirby Smith turns Cumberland Gap, defeats Nelson at Richmond, and makes for Cincinnati. . . . Thoroughly alarmed, as is also the country, Buell at once swings his left in pursuit of Bragg, while he endeavors to retain his grasp on Nashville with his right. Bragg has the shorter line and the start. But he is delayed a day or two [September 16-17] by the capture of Mumfordsville, and by scattering his forces instead of pushing home. This is a serious fault on Bragg's part. He fairly holds success in his hand, but forfeits it by this delay. After some rapid marching and manœuvring, Buell enters Louisville just ahead of his opponent. The authorities in Washington have lost all confidence in Buell. He is summarily relieved from command and Thomas appointed to succeed him. But this magnanimous soldier, though far from always agreeing with the methods of his chief, declines the proffered honor, and, at his earnest solicitation, Buell is reinstated. The Army of Ohio marches to meet Bragg, with Thomas second in command. Bragg expects to defend the line of the Kentucky and Duck rivers, but divides his forces, leaving Kirby Smith near Frankfort. Buell makes a demonstration upon Bragg's communications. After some cautious feeling, Buell comes upon Hardee with only 15,000 men, at Perryville, where, had he at once attacked, he could have punished Bragg severely for this division. But, owing to lack of water, one-half of Buell's army is distant from the field, and he in turn pays the penalty of lack of concentration. Polk joins Hardee, and the latter [October 8] falls heavily upon McCook, who holds Buell's left, and bears him back. But he cannot break the Union centre; and after a stubborn conflict Bragg retires, leaving to our forces the field. Our left has not been engaged. The loss is nearly 5,000 men on either side, a quarter of the numbers actually engaged. On being followed up, Bragg retreats through Cumberland Gap, and leaves Kentucky and Tennessee once more in our possession. His retreat ends only at Chattanooga. What Bragg expected to obtain in Kentucky was a vast accession of recruits and horses, as did Lee in Maryland. Both fell short of their calculations, though Bragg carried off a goodly train of supplies. Forgetful of what he had really done, the South was bitter in its criticism of Bragg's failure to hold Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. . . . Halleck now insists that Buell shall undertake a campaign in East Tennessee, still occupied by the enemy. But Buell alleges the utter impossibility of subsisting his troops so far from the railroad; and again concentrates at Nashville. Here he is relieved [October 30] and Gen. Rosecrans is appointed to the command."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye view of our Civil War*, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: D. C. Buell, J. Wheeler, and others, *Perryville campaign (Battles and leaders)*, v. 3.—T. B. Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, v. 1, ch. 12-15.—J. B. Fry, *Operations of the army under Buell*.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 16.

1862 (July).—Three hundred thousand more.



—On July 2, 1862, the president issued his proclamation calling for 300,000 volunteers. See below: 1863 (March).

1862 (July).—Land grant for agricultural and mechanical colleges.—Morrill Act. See EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States: Land grant colleges; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1862-1886.

1862 (July).—Prescription of Ironclad Oath. See IRONCLAD OATH.

1862 (July).—Fitting out of the rebel cruiser, *Alabama*, at Liverpool. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: 1862-1864.

1862 (July).—Confiscation of the property of Secessionists.—Exchange of prisoners.—Immediately on the assembling of Congress at its regular session in December, 1861, "Mr. Trumbull of Illinois, introduced a bill, providing that the slaves of all who take up arms against the United States should 'become forever thereafter free, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.' . . . On the 25th of February it came up for general debate, which was very extended. . . . Divergencies of views, even among those who had been most prominent and pronounced in their anti-slavery action, and the general drift of the discussion seemed to preclude any reasonable hope of agreement upon any motion or measure then before the Senate. It was therefore moved by Mr. Clark of New Hampshire to refer the whole matter, the original bill, and all motions, amendments, and substitutes, to a select committee. This, too, gave rise to a sharp debate. . . . The motion was carried by a vote of 24 to 14. . . . The committee reported 'a bill to suppress insurrection, and punish treason and rebellion'; and on the 16th of May it came up for consideration. Its main provision was that at any time after the passage of the act, the President might issue his proclamation that the slaves of persons found, in arms against the government, will be free, any law or custom to the contrary; that no slave escaping from his master shall be given up, unless the claimant proves he has not given aid or comfort to the Rebellion, and that the President shall be authorized to employ persons of African descent for the suppression of the Rebellion. . . . The bill was further debated, but did not reach a vote. In the House a substantially similar course was pursued. On the first day of the regular session Mr. Eliot of Massachusetts introduced a resolution confiscating the property and freeing the slaves of those engaged in the Rebellion. . . . A motion was finally made and carried to refer the whole subject to a select committee of seven. . . . On the 14th of May Mr. Eliot from the committee reported two bills,—the one confiscating Rebel property, and the other freeing the slaves of Rebels,—and opened the debate on 'the twin measures of confiscation and emancipation.' . . . On the 26th of May [the two bills] were brought to a vote. The first, or that providing for the confiscation of Rebel property, was passed by a strong majority. The second, or that freeing the slaves of Rebels, coming up for action, . . . [the] bill was lost by a vote of 74 to 78. That vote was, however, reconsidered and the bill was recommitted. On the 18th of June Mr. Eliot moved a substitute for the bill reported by the committee, which was accepted by the House, and the bill, as thus amended was passed by a vote of 82 to 54. The gist of this bill consisted in the provision, that all slaves of persons found in rebellion 60 days after the Presi-

dent shall issue his proclamation should be free; and the President should appoint commissioners to carry its provisions into effect. The House confiscation bill was taken up in the Senate on the 23d of June. An amendment was moved by Mr. Clark combining confiscation and emancipation. The amendment . . . was adopted on the 28th. The bill as amended was adopted by a vote of 28 to 13. The bill as thus amended was taken up in the House on the 3d of July, and the House non-concurred in the Senate's amendment. . . . A committee of conference was appointed, which reported, on the 11th, in substance the Senate amendment. The report was accepted by both bodies, . . . and the President gave it his approval on the 17th. It provided that all slaves of Rebels coming into the possession or under the protection of the government, should be deemed captives of war, and made free; that fugitive slaves should not be surrendered; that no person engaged in the military or naval service should render fugitives on pain of being dismissed from the service; and that the President might employ persons of the African race for the suppression of the Rebellion in such manner as he might deem best."—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power in America*, v. 3, ch. 25.—"An important matter in the conduct of the War was settled on July 22nd, when a regular Cartel of Exchange was arranged between the two Governments. Previous to this, the Union Government, though unable in practice to treat prisoners as rebels, had refused officially to recognize them as prisoners of war, but in 1862 the Confederates held the greater number of prisoners, and the obstinacy of the North was injuring their own people. Prisoners had been exchanged before this arrangement, but the negotiations were irregular and uncertain."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, p. 149.

ALSO IN: F. N. Thorpe, *Constitutional history of the United States*, v. 3, pp. 16-26.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 1, pp. 373-377.—E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Rebellion*, pp. 196-203.

1862 (July-August: Virginia).—End of the Peninsular campaign.—Army at Harrison's Landing.—Results of the seven days' fighting.—Withdrawal from the Peninsula.—"On reaching Harrison's Landing there were scarcely 50,000 men in the ranks, but on the 4th of July, when the corps commanders made their reports, it was found that the net losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted to 15,249 men, of whom 1,582 had been killed, 7,700 wounded, and 5,958 missing. This last figure comprised, besides prisoners, all the soldiers who had been left on the field of battle, whose fate, whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to this number may be added, without exaggeration, 6,000 sick or lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence of the excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan therefore found himself with about 84,000 men under arms, not counting those who had just joined him. The losses of Lee's army during the seven days amounted to 20,000 men, to which number must also be added at least 5,000 rendered unfit for active service by the same causes which had operated with his adversaries; this army, therefore, had undergone a diminution of 25,000 men. This was more than one-fourth of its effective force on the 26th of June. An interlude was to follow this great struggle. While McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison's Landing, Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of subsisting his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the

environs of Richmond."—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, bk. 1, ch. 4.—"Thus were the Federal aggressive campaigns in the spring of 1862 brought to a close. McClellan, withdrawn from the neighborhood of Richmond, was resting with his army within the lines of Harrison's Landing on the James River, waiting until he should receive sufficient reinforcements to enable him again to take the offensive. Halleck, apparently satisfied with the barren success of the capture of Corinth, dispersed his fine army of more than 100,000 men, allowed the Confederates to recruit their strength without molestation. . . . For a time, both in the East and in the West, the war was at a standstill; the force of the Federal attack had apparently spent itself; an opportunity was presented to the Confederates in the West of retrieving their disasters; and the distrust which the Washington administration entertained toward McClellan made it doubtful whether he would be permitted to resume his campaign against Richmond. But before we proceed to describe the operations of the summer, we must say a word about the military situation in the North. The losses of both the contestants in the last few months had been great; but while the Confederate authorities had adopted a system of conscription for filling the gaps in their wasted battalions, the Northern Government with inexcusable fatuity had in April actually stopped recruiting, and nothing was thought of, at least in the Eastern States, in the summer of 1862, but raising new organizations. . . . The old regiments, which had acquired military discipline and knowledge of warfare by the arduous experiences of the camp, the march, and the battle-field, were actually allowed to waste away; the invaluable schools of the soldier which they furnished for the raw recruits were almost entirely neglected; few were the accessions of fresh men received by their diminished ranks; popular enthusiasm was mainly directed to the raising and equipment of brand-new regiments, none of which could possibly be of such service until months had been passed in learning the elements of military life and conduct. In some of the Western States a healthier standard prevailed; in several of them the efforts of the authorities were chiefly directed to the reinforcement of the existing organizations; and the young men who filled the gaps in the lines of the veteran battalions of Illinois and Wisconsin learned their trade in half the time which was required to make the new regiments of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts capable of efficient service in the field. Nor was this the only mistake made by the Federal Government in the summer of 1862. Levies of troops engaged to serve only for nine months were accepted; and several of the Eastern States were unwise enough to adopt this shallow scheme, and to send the flower of their fighting men into organizations which from the necessity of the case could hardly be made fit for active service until the day of their disbandment was plainly within sight."—J. C. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, pt. 2, pp. 218-220.—"In the East, the Union object was clear, to cover Washington and the retreat of the Army of the Potomac, and stop Lee, measures of defence, pure and simple, though the politicians should have seen that their order of importance ought to have been inverted. The same course had to be adopted in the West owing to the dispersion of Halleck's great army, which gave the Confederates a chance of invading Union soil here also; but both here and in the East they made the fatal mistake of mixing political and military objects, and expecting men to

rise with help who would not do so without it. . . . Chattanooga had now become a vital strategic point, in Missouri and Tennessee guerilla warfare was going on, and on the Mississippi things were in statu quo. . . . McClellan made his position at Harrison's Landing very strong, and there he remained for some six weeks. Lee watched him with a brigade of cavalry, and on the night of July 31st bombarded his camps: he concentrated the army nearer to Richmond, where it could act in any direction. Pope [see below: 1862 (July-August: Virginia): Beginning of Pope's campaign] had taken up his new command just at the beginning of the Seven Days' battles before Richmond, and began with an able disposition, which covered the ground well, watching both the important junctions at Gordonsville and the Shenandoah Valley. His line was along the Rappahannock, with a division at Fredericksburg to keep open the line to Aquia Creek, an isolated position, which was ordered from Washington against his wish."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, p. 1501.—"Planted on the James, McClellan could, either by ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, strike much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his army lay across the Chickahominy, far from any water communication. Such was the position of the two armies about the 7th of July. On this day the steamer coming from Fortress Monroe landed a passenger at Harrison's Landing, whose dress, as simple as his manners, did not at first attract any attention, but in whom people soon recognized President Lincoln. He had come to consult with the commander of the army of the Potomac about the measures to be adopted under those grave circumstances. . . . On the occasion of his interview with McClellan at Harrison's Landing, the latter had so thoroughly demonstrated the importance of that position that [the President] went back fully determined to allow the chief of the army of the Potomac full freedom of action. But General Halleck . . . claimed for himself, as commander-in-chief [lately so appointed], the exclusive direction of all the armies in the field, and Mr. Lincoln, conscious of his own incompetency, submitted to this new authority. [Measures taken during July for placing the army of the Potomac again upon the offensive were altered on August 3, when Halleck gave orders to McClellan to transfer his army with all possible expedition to Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, for the support of General Pope and the Army of Virginia.]"—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 2, bk. 1, ch. 4 and bk. 3, ch. 1.—"It seems strange that it had not been realized in 1862, that the position astraddle both rivers at the junction of the James and Appomattox was the key to Richmond. For it would force Lee to hold an exterior line of such enormous length—from the Chickahominy River to the south of Petersburg, nearly 30 miles—that it could not be long maintained. As McClellan selected the York River line before the James River was opened (by the loss of Norfolk and of the ironclad *Merrimac*), he is entitled to the credit of having selected the best route available at the time. After his retreat from Richmond, he very nearly had stumbled into the key position itself. His army was recalled to Washington by the Executive, against his strong protests and appeals."—E. P. Alexander, *American Civil War*, p. 61.

Also in: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 5, ch. 24.

1862 (July-August: Virginia).—Beginning of Pope's campaign.—Cedar Mountain or Cedar

Run.—“While McClellan was still before Richmond the Government determined to unite in one command the corps of Banks, Frémont, and McDowell, which were moving about ineffectually between Washington and the Shenandoah Valley. General John Pope, who had captured Island No. 10, was called from the West [in June] and made commander of the new organization, which was named the Army of Virginia. Frémont refused to serve under a commander who had once been his subordinate, and his corps was then given to General Franz Sigel. This army contained about thirty-eight thousand men, besides those in the fortifications of Washington. On assuming the command General Pope issued a most unfortunate general order. It had three capital defects: it boasted of his own prowess at the West, it underrated the enemy, and it contained a touch of sarcasm pointed at McClellan, with whose army his own was to cooperate. When it became evident that these two commanders could not act in harmony, or support each other heartily, the President [after the Seven Days' Battle] called General Henry W. Halleck from the West to be General-in-Chief and command them both. This appointment was probably the most serious mistake ever made by Mr. Lincoln. Halleck had an abundance of military learning, and there could be no doubt of his patriotic intentions; but in practical warfare he proved to be little more than an habitual obstructor. He had been the bane of the Western armies, preventing them from following up their victories, and he had almost driven General Grant out of service. From the day he assumed command at Washington [July 23] the troubles at the East became more complicated. McClellan had a strong position at Harrison's Landing, where if he accomplished nothing else, he was at least such a menace to Richmond that Lee dared not withdraw his army for service elsewhere. McClellan planned to cross the James and strike at Richmond's southern communications—as Grant did two years later—and for this he asked to be heavily reinforced and was promised the troops of Burnside and Hunter, which were on the Carolina coast. Lee's great desire was to get McClellan off the peninsula, so that he might move out toward Washington. To effect this he sent a detachment to bombard the National camp from the opposite side of the James; but McClellan threw across a force that swept it out of the way. Then he sent Jackson to demonstrate against Pope and create alarm at Washington. . . . Pope intended to move southward and cut off Lee's communications with the Shenandoah Valley. He began by ordering Banks to send his whole cavalry force to destroy the railroads and bridges near Gordonsville. But General John P. Hatch, commanding the cavalry, took with him artillery, infantry, and a wagon-train, and consequently his progress was so slow that Jackson reached Gordonsville before he could get there, and the plan was thwarted. Hatch was therefore relieved, and General John Buford, an able cavalry leader, succeeded to the command.”—R. Johnson, *Fight for the republic*, pp. 128-130.—“After ascertaining that the enemy were in large force under General Pope . . . Jackson applied to General Lee for reinforcements. The division of A. P. Hill was immediately sent to him, and, with this accession to his small army, Jackson . . . [advanced] on the 7th of August. Before taking this step, it was observed that he was much in prayer, but this was his custom previous to every battle. . . . Pope's army was gathering in all its strength at Culpepper Court-House, and

on the 9th of August Jackson's little army came in contact with his advance-guard about six miles from the Court-House, on the borders of a little stream called Cedar Run. Here hostilities began by a furious cannonade on both sides, lasting two hours, when, about five o'clock in the afternoon, the infantry of both armies became hotly engaged. The conflict was fierce and stubborn, but the overwhelming numbers of the enemy swept down with such impetuosity that the weaker party were forced to yield, and it looked as if it were doomed to destruction. Ewell, Early, A. P. Hill, Winder, and other commanders all fought their bravest and best—the gallant Winder receiving a mortal wound—and still they were pressed back. ‘It was at this fearful moment,’ says his late chief-of-staff, Dr. Dahney, ‘that the genius of the storm reared his head, and in an instant the tide was turned. Jackson appeared in the mid-torrent of the highway, . . . he drew his own sword (the first time in the war), and shouted to the broken troops with a voice which pealed higher than the roar of battle: “Rally, brave men, and press forward! Your general will lead you! Jackson will lead you! Follow me!” This appeal was not in vain, and the Federals, startled by this unexpected rally, were driven from the field.’ . . . This battle of Cedar Run [called Cedar Mountain by the Unionists] Jackson himself pronounced the most successful of his exploits. . . . In this battle the Confederates had between eighteen and twenty thousand men engaged, while the Federals, according to their own returns, had thirty-two thousand. Jackson, however, had one incalculable advantage over the enemy, which he gained by his promptitude in seizing and holding Slaughter Mountain—an elevation which commanded all the surrounding plains, and enabled him to overlook the whole scene of action. . . . By this victory Pope received such a blow that he was deterred from making another advance until he could gather reinforcements. . . . General Lee was convinced that McClellan was incapable of further aggression, and that the most effective way to dislodge him from the Peninsula was to threaten Washington! He therefore determined to move his army from Richmond to Gordonsville. He began his march on the 13th, and four days after, on the 17th, McClellan evacuated the Peninsula and removed his troops to the Potomac.” Pope's army was withdrawn behind the Rappahannock. “General Lee now ordered Jackson to cross the Rappahannock high up, and by a forced march go to Manassas and get in Pope's rear. . . . While a fierce artillery duel was going on across the river between A. P. Hill and the enemy, Jackson left the river-bank a few miles, and marched to the village of Jeffersonton. He was thus lost sight of by the Federals, and to Longstreet was given the task of amusing Pope by the appearance of a crossing at Warrenton Springs. Jackson was now preparing to obey Lee's order to separate himself from the rest of the army, pass around Pope to the westward, and place his corps between him and Washington at Manassas Junction.”—Mrs. M. A. Jackson, *Life and letters of General Thomas J. Jackson*, ch. 17.—See also below: 1862 (August: Virginia).

Also in: W. Allen, *Army of Northern Virginia in 1862*, ch. 20.—G. H. Gordon, *History of the campaign of the Army of Virginia*, ch. 1-3.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 4, ch. 19.—S. P. Chase, *Diary (Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1902, pp. 46-62)*.

1862 (July-September: Missouri-Arkansas).—

Guerilla warfare.—“When Curtis withdrew to the Mississippi, and left Arkansas and Southern Missouri open to the operations of guerrilla bands, then numerous in the western part of the former State . . . [General J. M. Schofield, military governor of Missouri] found his forces inadequate to keep down the secessionists in his district. When Price crossed the Mississippi, early in May, he sent back large numbers of Missourians to recruit guerrilla bands for active service during the summer, and these, at the middle of July, were very numerous in the interior, and were preparing to seize important points in the State. To meet the danger, Schofield obtained authority from the Governor to organize all the militia of the State. . . . He soon had 50,000 names on his rolls, of whom nearly 20,000 were ready for effective service at the close of July, when the failure of the campaign against Richmond so encouraged the secessionists in Missouri that it was very difficult to keep them in check. Schofield's army of volunteers and militia were scattered over Missouri in six divisions, and for two months a desperate and sanguinary guerrilla warfare was carried on in the bosom of that Commonwealth, the chief theater being northward of the Missouri River, in McNeill's division, where insurgent bands under leaders like Poindexter, Porter, Cobb, and others, about 5,000 strong, were very active.” They were also aided by incursions from Arkansas, under Hughes, Coffey and other leaders. With the cooperation of General Blunt, commanding in Kansas, the Arkansas invasion was driven back. “Missouri was now somewhat relieved, but the Confederates were gathering in force in Arkansas, where they were joined by conscripts from Southern Missouri and a large number of troops from Texas. Their entire number was estimated to be 50,000 at the middle of September, with General T. C. Hindman in chief command. . . . So threatening was this gathering that Schofield took the field in person, and General Curtis succeeded him in command of the District of Missouri.” Schofield's vanguard, under General Salomon, encountered the enemy at Newtonia, September 30, and was defeated; but the Confederates retreated before the united forces of Schofield and Blunt and “were chased about 30 miles into Arkansas.”—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 20.

Also in: Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 2, bk. 4, ch. 3.

1862 (August).—Draft of militia for nine months.—By proclamation, August 4, the president ordered a draft of 300,000 militia, for nine months service unless sooner discharged.

1862 (August: Virginia).—General Pope's campaign: Stonewall Jackson's movement into the rear of the Federal army.—“By the capture of Pope's papers [effected in a raid of Stuart's cavalry to the Federal rear] Lee gained an accurate knowledge of the situation of the Federal army. Acting on it, he ordered Jackson to advance his corps to Jeffersonton and secure the bridge over the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs. . . . Jackson, on arriving at Jeffersonton in the afternoon of the 22d, found that the bridge on the Warrenton turnpike had been destroyed by the Federals. . . . On the 23d Lee ordered Longstreet's corps to follow Jackson and mass in the vicinity of Jeffersonton. The headquarters of the army was also moved to that place. . . . General Longstreet made a feint on the position of Warrenton on the morning of the 24th, under cover of which Jackson's corps was withdrawn from the front to the vicinity of the road from Jeffersonton to the

upper fords of the Rappahannock. Jackson was then directed . . . to turn the Federal position and seize their communications about Manassas Junction. . . . It was the object of Lee to hold Pope in his present position by deluding him with the belief that it was his intention to force a passage of the river at that point, until Jackson by a flank movement could gain his rear. Longstreet, on the morning of the 25th, resumed his cannonade with increased energy, and at the same time made a display of infantry above and below the bridge. Jackson then moved up the river to a ford eight miles above; crossing at that point and turning eastward, by a rapid-march he reached the vicinity of Salem. . . . The next morning at dawn the march was resumed by the route through Thoroughfare Gap. . . . Pressing forward, still keeping the cavalry well to the right, Jackson struck the railroad at Bristoe Station late in the afternoon, where he captured two empty trains going east. After dark he sent a detachment under Stuart to secure Manassas Junction, the main dépôt of supplies of the Federal army. . . . The next morning, after effectually destroying the railroad at Bristoe, Jackson . . . moved his main body to Manassas, where he allowed his troops a few hours to refresh themselves upon the abundant stores that had been captured [there]. About 12 o'clock the sound of artillery in the direction of Bristoe announced the Federal advance. Not having transportation to remove the captured supplies, Jackson directed his men to take what they could carry off, and ordered the rest to be destroyed. General Ewell, having repulsed the advance of two Federal columns [at Bristoe Station], rejoined Jackson at Manassas. . . . Jackson retired with his whole force to Bull Run, and took a position for the night, a part of his troops resting on the battle-field of the previous year. Pope, . . . upon learning that Jackson was in his rear, . . . immediately abandoned his position on the Rappahannock and proceeded with all despatch to intercept him before he could be reinforced by Lee. His advance having been arrested on the 27th by Ewell, he did not proceed beyond Bristoe that day. Lee on the 26th withdrew Longstreet's corps from its position in front of Warrenton Springs, covering the withdrawal by a small rear-guard and artillery, and directed it to follow Jackson by the route he had taken the day before. . . . Meanwhile, nothing further had been heard from Jackson, and there was a natural anxiety in regard to his position and possible peril. . . . Under these critical circumstances General Lee made every effort to find some available route over the mountains,” and had already succeeded in doing so when his adversary saved him further trouble. “Pope . . . had ordered McDowell to retire from the Gap and join him to aid in the anticipated crushing of Jackson. McDowell did so, leaving Rickett's division to hold the Gap. In evident ignorance of the vicinity of Longstreet's corps, this force was also withdrawn during the night, and on the morning of the 29th Lee found the Gap unoccupied, and at once marched through at the head of Longstreet's column. . . . The cannonade at the Gap on the 28th had informed Jackson of Lee's proximity. He at once took a position north of the Warrenton turnpike, his left resting on Bull Run. . . . About three o'clock the Federals bore down in heavy force upon Ewell and Taliaferro, who maintained their positions with admirable firmness, repelling attack after attack until night. The loss on both sides was considerable. . . . Jackson, with barely 20,000 men, now found himself confronted by the greater part of the Fed-

eral army. Any commander with less firmness would have sought safety in retreat. But having heard the Confederate guns at Thoroughfare Gap, he knew that Lee would join him the next day. Therefore he determined to hold his position at all hazards."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: R. L. Dabney, *Life and campaigns of General Thomas J. Jackson*.—G. H. Gordon, *History of the campaign of the Army of Virginia*, ch. 4-10.—W. B. Taliaferro, *Jackson's raid around Pope (Battles and leaders, v. 2, pp. 501-511)*.

1862 (August-September: Virginia).—End of General Pope's campaign: Groveton.—Second Bull Run.—Chantilly.—"On August 29 occurred the sanguinary battle of Groveton. Pope was anxious to crush Jackson before he could be reinforced by Longstreet, who was fast approaching. He ordered McDowell to fall back toward Gainesville, and from here he arranged his whole army in a semicircle, several miles long, to Bull Run. But Longstreet had arrived, and the battle was general all along the line—a series of heavy skirmishes rather than a pitched battle. The fight, especially in the afternoon, went against the Federals. Pope blamed Fitz-John Porter for this. He had sent Porter word to support McDowell, but, as Porter claimed, the word did not reach him till night. Pope had been worsted on this day, but he prepared for a new attack the following morning. Lee's whole army was now in his front. He imagined Lee to be in retreat, and sent McDowell to follow him; but McDowell was driven back, and Porter, who charged Jackson's right repeatedly, was driven back with great loss. The Federals were at length forced back over Bull Run toward Centreville. This battle, in which Pope was again defeated, has been called the second battle of Bull Run, as it was fought on almost the same ground as that on which the Army of the Potomac was defeated thirteen months before. Two days later another fierce battle occurred, known as the battle of Chantilly. Lee had sent Jackson around Centreville to the north, and the divisions of Hooker, Reno, and Kearney were sent against him. The Federals were at length forced to retire, and the brave General Kearney, who had lost an arm in the Mexican War and had just passed through the peninsular campaign, was among the slain. Pope now led his army back to the defense of Washington. The campaign had cost him at least fifteen thousand men; the Confederate loss was probably above ten thousand. If McClellan had failed on the peninsula, Pope, with all his glowing promises, had made a far more dismal failure. On the same day that he reached Washington he was relieved of command at his own request, and McClellan was restored to the command of the army of the Potomac."—H. W. Elson, *History of the United States of America*, v. 4, pp. 200-202.—"Pope was retired to fight Indians on the north-west frontier. The public demanded a victim for the disaster at the Second Battle of Bull Run and found him in Fitz John Porter who, in November following, was tried before a general court-martial and sentenced 'to be cashiered and to be forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States.' Lincoln approved the finding of the court. . . . Finally, Congress, in 1886, nearly twenty-four years after the original condemnation, passed a bill for Porter's relief which President Cleveland signed. Porter was restored to the rank of colonel of infantry in the regular army, from May 14, 1861."—F. N.

Thorpe, *Civil War: A national view (History of North America, v. 15, p. 278)*.—"The Second Battle of Bull Run . . . was a severe defeat for General Pope; but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor anything like a rout. . . . Lee claims to have captured in these engagements 30 pieces of artillery and 7,000 unwounded prisoners."—J. C. Ropes, *Army under Pope (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 4, pp. 218-220)*.

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon, *History of the campaign of the Army of Virginia*, ch. 11-13.—*The Virginia campaign of General Pope (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, v. 2)*.—J. Pope, *Second battle of Bull Run (Battles and leaders, v. 2, pp. 449-494)*.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 12, pt. 2.

1862 (September: Maryland).—Lee's first invasion: His cold reception and disappointment.—"The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from Richmond. . . . [He] determined to advance into Maryland—the fortifications in front of Washington, and the interposition of the Potomac, a broad stream easily defended, rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. On the 3d of September, therefore, . . . General Lee moved toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to the music of the bands playing the popular air, 'Maryland, my Maryland,' advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on the 7th of September. . . . His object was to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia. . . . The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says, 'encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide for contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend,' and to cross the Potomac 'might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty.' It may be said, in summing up on this point, that Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared this expectation. . . . [Moreover] by advancing into Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross . . . the South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies, while his own communications would remain open by way of the Shenandoah Valley. . . . The Southern army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Frederick City by the 7th of September, and on the next day General Lee issued an address to the people of Maryland. . . . This address, couched in terms of . . . dignity, had little effect upon the people. Either their sentiment in favor of the Union was too strong, or they found nothing in the condition of affairs to encourage their Southern feelings. A large Federal force was known to be advancing; Lee's army, in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his standard, the population in general remaining hostile or neutral. . . . Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his own

men for success in his future movements [and] resolutely commenced his movements looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the invasion of Pennsylvania."—J. E. Cooke, *Life of Robert E. Lee*, pt. 5, ch. 1-2.

ALSO IN: A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 12.

1862 (September; Maryland).—Lee's first invasion: Harper's Ferry.—South Mountain.—Antietam.—"On the 2d of September the President went to General McClellan's house in Washington, asked him to take command again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of Miles's force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said, it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force. All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. . . . Miles, a worthy subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland, McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on the 12th, and met with a . . . flattering reception. [But this] was not the best fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his arrival in the town General McClellan came into possession of a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in which the whole campaign was laid out."—R. Johnson, *Short history of War of Secession*, ch. 12.—"Lee was hoping to place the Confederacy in a position to propose peace to the Northern government and people on the condition that the independence of the Southern States should be recognized. . . . He purposed to attack neither Washington nor Baltimore, but he probably aimed at Harrisburg and the destruction of the long bridge of the Pennsylvania railroad across the Susquehanna river, which, as communication by the Baltimore and Ohio had been severed, would leave no land communication between the eastern and western States except the railroad line along the lakes. . . . At no time during the war were Confederate prospects so bright. Kirby Smith had defeated a Union force in Kentucky, had occupied Lexington and was threatening Louisville and Cincinnati. . . . Bragg with a large army had eluded Buell, and was marching northward toward Louisville. . . . [The North was greatly alarmed. Stanton feared that communications might be cut off. The president was "sadly perplexed and distressed."] McClellan acted with energy but not with the energy that Lee or Jackson would have shown under similar circumstances. He marched his army forward, and on September 14 won the battle of South Mountain [which is known by the Confederates as the battle of Boonsboro] securing a passage over the South Mountain range to the field of Antietam. . . . He did not, however, relieve the Harper's Ferry garrison which fell without a struggle."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 166, 169.—Jackson and McLaws took possession of the heights commanding the town, where Miles waited to be trapped. "A bombardment the next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to attack. General Miles was mortally wounded by

one of the last shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation, with 73 guns."—R. Johnson, *Short history of the War of Secession*, ch. 12.—"Jackson and McLaws now hastened to join the main army, which had taken a strong position [near the village of Sharpsburg] on the south bank of Antietam Creek, a little stream that flows into the Potomac above Harper's Ferry. It was evident that a battle of vast magnitude was imminent, one that must decide the issue of Lee's campaign. If Lee won, he would push northward into Pennsylvania, or strike Baltimore; if he lost, he must return to Virginia. After an artillery duel at intervals, and a sharp attack by Hooker on Lee's left wing, the two great armies bivouacked on the field for the night and sought a little rest and strength for the fearful business of the coming day. At sunrise of the 17th Hooker, who commanded the Union right, opened his cannon on the enemy's left under Jackson. Jackson answered with fury, but an enfilading fire from Hooker's batteries pressed his lines back, when he received fresh masses of troops and was about to drive Hooker from his position. Hooker was painfully wounded and was borne from the field, and Sumner crossed the creek and threw his corps into the contest. Thus for hours the Union right and the enemy in its front surged to and fro. . . . Meantime the left and center under Burnside and Porter remained inactive till afternoon, when Burnside charged upon the enemy. As evening approached the two armies ceased fighting as if by mutual consent. Both had suffered severely. More than 23,000 men lay dead or wounded on the field, divided almost equally between the two armies. This day has been pronounced the bloodiest day in American history. McClellan reported a loss of 12,640. For twenty-four hours the two armies rested, glaring at each other. McClellan meant to attack on the second day, but during the preceding night Lee escaped across the Potomac in the darkness. Antietam [also known as Sharpsburg] was a drawn battle; but in another sense it was a complete victory for McClellan, for it ended Lee's proposed invasion of the North. Lee had started north with a fine army of over 50,000 men just two weeks before; now he returned with little over half the number, having lost greatly by straggling as well as in battle. Had McClellan known that on the day after the battle Lee was nearly out of ammunition and his army was greatly disorganized, he could have overwhelmed and crushed him. His pursuit of Lee was long delayed; it should have been immediate and vigorous. He alleged that his army was short in horses, short in wagons, rations, clothing, etc.; but he should have remembered, for he certainly knew, that the retreating enemy was shorter in everything than he was."—N. W. Elson, *History of the United States of America*, v. 4, pp. 204-205.

ALSO IN: F. W. Palfrey, *Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 5)*.—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 2, bk. 3, ch. 4.—F. A. Walker, *History of the 2nd Army Corps*, ch. 4.—A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 6th Army Corps*, pt. 2, ch. 2-3.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 19.—G. B. McClellan, *McClellan's own story*, ch. 33-38.—D. H. Hill, J. D. Cox, J. Longstreet, and others, *Lee's invasion of Maryland (Battles and leaders, v. 2)*.—W. Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia in 1862*, ch. 37-48.—J. C. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, pt. 2, pp. 325-377.

1862 (September).—President Lincoln's preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation.—Atti-

tude of northern parties on slavery question.—“When the border States refrained from accepting the principle of compensated emancipation, Lincoln determined that he must go along without them, and that at a suitable time it would be expedient to rally the North and discourage the Confederacy by executive emancipation. The first draft of his proclamation was written early in July [immediately after he had made a final vain appeal to the border States to adopt his policy] but it was not communicated to the cabinet until towards the end of the month, after Congress had adjourned. Then it was presented for information, not for debate. The man whom Seward had accused of having neither policy nor ability to frame one, had reached his conclusion, and had announced it at his own time. Verbal amendments to the proclamation were made, but the only serious criticism came from the Secretary of State, who questioned the expediency of issuing such a proclamation after as disastrous a campaign as the Peninsula had been. Issued in July or August, it would appear as a desperate effort in a forlorn cause. Convinced by the suggestion, Lincoln withheld the proclamation and prayed for such a victory as might give it a proper appearance. When Pope collapsed at second Bull Run, his disappointment was great. When McClellan managed to check Lee at Antietam with nearly twice the latter's force, it was decided that a good-enough victory, at least the only one in sight, had been attained.”—F. L. Paxson, *American Civil War*, pp. 107-108.—“The secret of . . . [the July] conference was well kept. The radical Republicans, ignorant of the President's determination to strike at slavery when the proper time should arrive, continued their criticisms of his policy. His order of August 4 for a draft of 300,000 nine-months militia combined with the general gloom that deepened as the summer went on, to intensify this fault-finding, which culminated in The Prayer of Twenty Millions, written by Greeley and printed in the New York *Tribune* of August 20. All who supported your election, he said, and desire the suppression of the rebellion, are sorely disappointed by the policy you seem to be pursuing with regard to the slaves of rebels. ‘We require of you, as the first servant of the republic, charged especially and preeminently with this duty, that you EXECUTE THE LAWS. We think you are strangely and disastrously remiss in the discharge of your official and imperative duty with regard to the emancipating provisions of the new Confiscation act. . . . We complain that the Confiscation act which you approved is habitually disregarded by your generals, and that no word of rebuke for them has yet reached the public ear. Frémont's proclamation and Hunter's order were promptly annulled by you, while Halleck's No. 3, with scores of like tendency, have never provoked even your remonstrance. . . . I close as I began, with the statement that what an immense majority of the loyal millions of your countrymen require of you is a frank, declared, unqualified, ungrudging execution of the laws of the land, more especially of the Confiscation act.’ Lincoln did not read this open letter, which was addressed to him only through the columns of the New York *Tribune*, until August 22. He replied at once in a letter which was printed the next day in the *National Intelligencer* of Washington, and was also telegraphed to Greeley, appearing in the evening edition of the *Tribune*.”—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 4, pp.

72-73.—The president said: “Dear Sir: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York *Tribune*. If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I ‘seem to be pursuing,’ as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored the nearer the Union will be ‘the Union as it was.’ If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere should be free. Yours, A. Lincoln.”—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 227-228.—“On the 22nd of September, he summoned his Cabinet to announce his conclusion. It was my good fortune, on that same day, and a few hours after the meeting, to hear, from the lips of one who participated, the story of the scene. As the chiefs of the Executive Departments came in, one by one, they found the President reading a favorite chapter from a popular humorist. He was lightening the weight of the great burden which rested upon his spirit. He finished the chapter, reading it aloud. And here I quote, from the published Journal of the . . . Chief Justice, an entry, written immediately after the meeting, and bearing unmistakable evidence that it is almost a literal transcript of Lincoln's words: ‘The President then took a graver tone and said: “Gentlemen, I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought all along that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. . . . I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have

determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in any minor matter which any of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other observation I will make: I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he

failed . . . [that the president determined to decree emancipation in the seceded states by a military order]. To Mr. Seward and myself the President communicated his purpose, and asked our views, on the 13th of July, 1862. It was the day succeeding his last unsuccessful and hopeless conference with the representatives in Congress from the border slave states, at a gloomy period of our affairs, just after the reverses of our armies under McClellan before Richmond. The time, he said, had arrived when we must determine whether the slave element should be for or against us. Mr. Seward . . . was appalled and not prepared for this decisive step, when Mr. Lincoln made known to us that he contemplated, by an executive order, to emancipate the slaves. Startled



PRESIDENT LINCOLN READING THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION TO HIS CABINET,  
SEPT. 22, 1862

Left to right are: Secretaries Stanton and Chase, President Lincoln, Secretaries Welles, Smith, Seward (seated), Blair and Bates.

(After painting by F. B. Carpenter, in the National Capitol)

could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take." The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went on, and showing that he had fully considered the subject in all the lights under which it had been presented to him. The Proclamation was amended in a few matters of detail. It was signed and published that day.—J. A. Garfield, *Works*, v. 2, pp. 538-540.—"It was after all efforts for voluntary emancipation by the states interested, with pecuniary aid from the national treasury, had

with so broad and radical a proposition, he informed the President that the consequences of such an act were so momentous that he was not prepared to advise on the subject without further reflection. . . . While Mr. Seward hesitated and had the subject under consideration, the President deliberately prepared his preliminary proclamation, which met the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the whole Cabinet, though there were phases of opinion not entirely in accord with the proceedings. Mr. Blair, an original emancipationist, and committed to the principle, thought the time to issue the order inopportune, and Mr. Bates desired that the deportation of the colored race should be coincident with emancipation. . . . Aware that there were shades of difference among his counsellors, and hesitation and doubt with some, in view of the vast responsibility and its consequences, the President devised his own scheme, held himself alone accountable for the



act, and unaided and unassisted, prepared each of the proclamations of freedom."—G. Welles, *Lincoln and Seward*, pp. 210-212.—The preliminary or monitory Proclamation of Emancipation, issued on September 22, 1862, was as follows:

"I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States and each of the States and the people hereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tending pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued. That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Then, after reciting the language of 'An act to make an additional article of war,' approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9 and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military and naval service, the proclamation concludes: 'And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States, who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and the people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be compensated for all losses by acts of the United

States, including the loss of slaves.'"—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 6 and 8.—"The North was taken by surprise when the emancipation proclamation appeared, and misunderstood its bearings then, as it has, generally, ever since. Slavery was not affected by the preliminary proclamation, or by the final proclamation, which appeared on January 1, in any of the border States, or in any portion of the Confederacy, not in actual resistance to the United States. Over citizens of the United States not engaged in insurrection the President could have no control, and claimed none. So far as his act had legal weight, it applied only to persons within what he designated as the rebellious area in his final proclamation. Yet so long as these remained rebellious and continued to acknowledge only the jurisdiction of the Confederate government, they could not be reached and the proclamation could not be enforced against them. After they had submitted in any portion of the area, and become peaceful, it is highly doubtful whether any act of the President sequestering their property was lawful. Only impeachment could punish him for not aiding them to recover their property, but it is hard to believe that any United States court would have decided that their title to their slaves was extinguished. The emancipation proclamation did not free the slaves; but it served notice that the war had become an attack upon slavery as well as disunion, while legal steps sanctioned the policy announced by Lincoln in less than three years."—F. L. Paxson, *American Civil War*, pp. 109-110.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 20.—N. W. Stephenson, *Lincoln and the Union*, p. 188.—H. W. Elson, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 207-213.—N. F. Thorpe, *Constitution of the United States*, v. 3, p. 28.

1862 (September - October: Mississippi).—Union successes under Grant.—Iuka and Corinth.—In July, when Pope was ordered to Virginia, and Halleck was assigned to the command of all the armies, "Grant was directed to establish his headquarters at Corinth. Grant's jurisdiction was not, however, enlarged by the promotion of Halleck: on the contrary, the new general-in-chief first offered the command of the Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Robert Allen, a quarter-master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to remain under Grant. He was, however, left somewhat more independent than while Halleck had been immediately present in the field. Four divisions of his army (including Thomas's command), were within the next two months ordered to Buell, who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, unwieldy snake, from Eastport to Decatur, and from Decatur towards Chattanooga. This subtraction put Grant entirely on the defensive. He had possession of Corinth, the strategic point, but was obliged to hold the railroads from that place and Bolivar, north to Columbus . . . [his base of supplies]. He remained himself eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the enemy, who, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, harassed and threatened him continually. During this time, he directed the strengthening and remodelling of the fortifications of Corinth. . . . Van Dorn at last determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee and reinforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of

his intention to prevent it. . . . On the 13th [of September], Price advanced from the south and seized Iuka, 21 miles east of Corinth. . . . Grant had called in his forces some days before to the vicinity of Corinth, . . . and when the enemy's cavalry moved towards Iuka, and cut the railroad and telegraph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven miles to the westward, Grant began his operations. Price was at Iuka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the southwest, threatening Corinth. Grant's object was to destroy Price, before the two could concentrate, and then to get back to Corinth and protect it against Van Dorn. He accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Rosecrans, whose troops were posted south of Corinth, to move by way of Rienzi, along the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and attack Iuka from that direction; while Major-General Ord, with a force brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jackson, was to push towards Burnsville, and from there take roads on the north side of the railroad, attacking Iuka from that quarter. . . . Rosecrans's movement was delayed, and he was attacked (September 19) in heavy force as he neared Iuka, Ord's advance having been held back waiting for him. He kept his ground, but lost in the action a battery of artillery, besides 736 men, killed and wounded. That night the enemy retreated from Iuka, over a road which Rosecrans was expected to occupy, but did not. . . . On the 2nd of October . . . [the Confederates] under Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villedieu, and Rust, appeared in front of Corinth. . . . On the 3rd the fighting began in earnest. Rosecrans had about 19,000 men, and the enemy had collected 38,000 for this important movement, which was to determine the possession of northern Mississippi and West Tennessee. Rosecrans pushed out about five miles, toward Chewalla, . . . but the enemy began the fight, and, on the afternoon of the 3rd, the battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rosecrans was driven back to his defences on the north side of Corinth, and it was found how important was the labor bestowed on these fortifications, by Grant's order, a month previous. The enemy was checked until morning; but, early on the 4th, the whole rebel army, flushed with the success of the day before, assaulted the works. . . . Again and again, they advanced to the works, but each time were received with a determination equal to their own. Once, the national troops came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied them in person, and the rebels were finally repulsed before noon, with a loss admitted by themselves to be double that of Rosecrans. The national loss was 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 prisoners and missing. Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at 1,423, and took 2,225 prisoners. . . . The repulse was complete, by 11 o'clock in the morning, but unfortunately was not followed up by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels, however, started off in haste and disorder immediately after the fight; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were struck in flank, as Grant had planned, by Hurlbut and Ord, and the disaster was rendered final. This occurred early on the morning of the 5th, at the crossing of the Hatchie river, about ten miles from Corinth. . . . A battery of artillery and several hundred men were captured, and the advance was dispersed or drowned. . . . Had Rosecrans moved promptly the day before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this defile [six miles up the

stream, where Van Dorn finally made his crossing.] In either event, the destruction of the rebels must have been complete. . . . These two fights relieved the command of West Tennessee from all immediate danger."—A. Badeau, *Military history of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 1, ch. 4.—"Satisfied that the enemy was retreating [on the 4th], I ordered Sullivan's command to push him with a heavy skirmish line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required rest, but they could not rest longer than was absolutely necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early next morning for the pursuit."—W. S. Rosecrans, *Battle of Corinth (Battles and leaders*, v. 2, p. 753).

1862 (October–December: Virginia).—Final removal of McClellan.—Burnside at Fredericksburg.—"Both armies [in Virginia] . . . felt the need of some repose; and, glad to be freed from each other's presence, they rested on their arms—the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the vicinity of Winchester, and the army of the Potomac near the scene of its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and vales of Southwestern Maryland. The movement from Washington into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion was defensive in its purpose, though it assumed the character of a defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of grand offensive operations directed at the Confederate army and towards Richmond. The completion of this work, including the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc., required upwards of a month, and during this period no military movement occurred, with the exception of a raid into Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers, crossed the Potomac above Williamsport passed through Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg, where he burnt considerable government stores, and after making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the Potomac below the mouth of the Monocacy. He was all the way closely pursued by Pleasonton with 800 cavalry. . . . On the recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan hastened to seize the débouché of the Shenandoah Valley, by the possession of Harper's Ferry. . . . At first McClellan contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the Shenandoah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being removed by the coming of the season of high-water in the Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the Potomac by a pontoon-bridge at Berlin, five miles below Harper's Ferry. By the 2nd November the entire army had crossed at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge, and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to retain Jackson in the Valley. With such success was this movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose McClellan's advance in that direction, the other half was still

west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike across obliquely westward and interpose between the severed divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was prevented from taking by his sudden removal from the command of the Army of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton."—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 6, sect. 2-3.—"On November 7, as he sat in his tent with his friend Burnside, he [McClellan] received a despatch from the President relieving him of the command and giving it to Burnside. Why McClellan was removed at this time the historian has no power to determine. Some attribute the removal to the inner political councils at Washington. . . . From a military standpoint, however, the removal of McClellan was a serious mistake. It is certain that he was a growing man, and that with his extreme caution and his wonderful powers of organization a great defeat of the army under him was scarcely possible. Thus closed his career as a soldier."—H. W. Elson, *History of the United States of America*, v. 4, pp. 204-206.—According to General Meade, Burnside was the "most distressed man in the army" over his promotion. He said openly that he was "not fit for the position." C. E. Norton wrote, "Burnside may be able to command one hundred thousand men in the field, but is he?" "It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, and our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates'; it is more dangerous to change the plans of troops moving in the vicinity of the enemy. But as if impelled to do some new thing . . . the new commander of the Army of the Potomac determined upon a flank movement by his left on the north of the river towards Fredericksburg. . . . Only by movements equally wary and rapid, as well as by sure means of crossing the river, could Burnside's manœuvre possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on Halleck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. Arrived at Fredericksburg Burnside still might have crossed by the fords, for the water was low. And once in possession of the heights beyond the city he could afford to wait. But, slower than even his predecessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his movement, by forced marches concentrated his army on the opposite bank, and prepared to erect impregnable defences in his front. . . . Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, Marye's Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been crowned by a triple line of works, and Lee had brought together nearly 90,000 troops to man them. Two canals and a stone wall in front of the left, as well as open, sloping ground on both flanks, served to retain an attacking party for a long period under fire. To assault these works in front was simple madness. To turn them below necessitated the crossing of a wide and now swollen river, in the face of a powerful enemy in his immediate front. . . . To turn them above was practicable, but it was a confessed return to McClellan's plan. Burnside chose the first. Preparations for crossing were begun. The better part of three days [December 11-13] was consumed in throwing the bridges and putting over the two Grand Divisions of Franklin and Sumner, all of which was accomplished under fire. But Lee was

by no means unwilling to meet the Army of the Potomac after this fashion. Such another happy prospect for him was not apt soon again to occur. He did not dispute the crossing in force. Burnside's one chance in a hundred lay in a concentrated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy could oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained attack, or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered away this single chance by putting in Franklin on the left and Sumner on the right, without concerted action." Both assaults were bloodily repulsed. "Hooker is ordered across. Under protest, and yet Hooker lacked not stomach for a fight, he obeys the useless order, and leads his men into the slaughter pen. . . . All is in vain. Even the Army of the Potomac cannot do the impossible. The defeated troops are huddled into Fredericksburg, and gradually withdrawn across the river. Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault next day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him to desist. No such useless slaughter, with the exception, perhaps of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and 13,000 men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but one in three of ours."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye view of our Civil War*, ch. 21.

ALSO IN:—A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pt. 2, ch. 4-8.—F. A. Walker, *History of the 2nd Army Corps*, ch. 5-6.—B. P. Poore, *Life of Burnside*, ch. 18-19.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 21.—J. Longstreet, D. N. Couch, and others, *Burnside at Fredericksburg (Battles and leaders*, v. 3).—F. W. Palfrey, *Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 5, pp. 129-135).—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, pp. 181-186.

1862 (November).—Elections.—Opposition to war by Peace Democrats.—"The hope of Lincoln that the emancipation proclamation would consolidate the North behind him was not realized at once. Abroad, the feeling towards the United States immediately grew better, but at home his act only widened the cleavage among factions, and brought him rebuke at the congressional elections of 1862. Seward had believed in the loyal outburst after Sumter, that all party lines in the North were gone; but they were only submerged in a tide of emotion that ebbed away in the second year of the war. At best, Lincoln was supported by a temporary fusion of diverse elements. The abolitionists were the radicals among his backers and had Chase as their spokesman in the Cabinet. Seward represented the moderate Republicans who were unionists above all else. The war Democrats, who had voted for Douglas, and like him had stood by the Union, claimed McClellan as one of their number and were reached by Stanton, Secretary of War. Bates and Blair were border State Democrats, whose friends expected the Union to be maintained without damage to slavery. No single faction could control a majority in the North, and it was not certain that any single one could be spared. Yet to harmonize their interests was an almost impossible task, and more nearly broke down in the fall of 1862 than at any other time. Always among the avowed opposition were conservatives who sympathized with the South, and denied the constitutionality of coercion. 'Copperheads,' as they came to be called, they harassed the President in his every act, and varied in conduct from open support of the Confederacy to severe criticism of the policy of the administration. Lincoln was

never a good executive chief or disciplinarian. He rarely thought in terms of efficient administration. More than once he tried to save law-breakers whose friends were necessary to his policy. But the fact that he managed, in any way, to conduct the Union cause, with the sort of backing that he had, placed him at the head of the world's consummate politicians. The immediate result of the Emancipation proclamation was discouraging. Its critics shouted its supporters in the North. In the elections conservatives everywhere gained a hearing and unseated numerous Republicans. In 1860 Lincoln had carried every northern State except New Jersey. In 1862 his party was ousted in a solid tier of States north of the border;—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Only by a bare majority did the Republicans retain their control of Congress; and it is fair to regard the election as a general vote of censure implying lack of confidence in the administration. The backwoods lawyer, whom political manipulation had seated in the White House, had not yet convinced his country of his essential greatness. His followers were only just beginning to identify the Republican party with the Union, and to maintain that the defeat of either would involve the downfall of the other. The war, however, had to go on. McClellan was dismissed immediately after the election, and the country entered upon the darkest eight months in its history.”—F. L. Paxson, *American Civil War*, pp. 110-112.—“A portion of the northern Democracy, especially large in the Old Northwest, openly opposed the prosecution of the War by the Administration. Because of the fact that the movement demanded that the Administration stop the war, and that the membership was drawn from the old Democratic party the name the Peace Democratic Party has been given it. Breckinridge received 279,211 votes in the free states in 1860: this element was a natural nucleus of a northern party of opposition. The opponents sneeringly called its members ‘copperheads,’ or identified them with the Confederates by the common appellation of ‘butternuts.’ Fernando Wood, Mayor of New York, and his brother, Benjamin Wood, publisher of the *New York News* and a member of Congress, made themselves spokesmen of a faction of Peace Democrats in the East. . . . But the chief elements of the Peace Democrats were located in the Ohio valley, decreasing in density of numbers as the distance northward from the Ohio river increased. The evidence connects the class with the immigration stream which had moved like an overflowing flood from the South to the north side of the Ohio River. . . . The rank and file of the Copperheads were the smaller farmers and poor artisans of the region, if measured by accumulated wealth. They like the poor whites of the South saw another vision from that which the followers of Lincoln saw. The latter saw the expansion of their agricultural system across the fertile prairie of the plains balked by expanding slave areas. The former saw a black horde of freedmen, a veritable black peril, sweeping from the southland across the Ohio into the free farming regions of the Ohio Valley. All those social forces which count with a people—environment, tradition, decades of teaching from platform, press, and pulpit—were bearing their natural fruit in the Ohio Valley.”—E. J. Benton, *Movement for peace without a victory during the Civil War* (*Collections of the Western Reserve Historical*

*Society*, publication no. 99, issued December, 1918, pp. 10-11).

1862 (December: On the Mississippi).—Second attempt against Vicksburg.—General Sherman and Admiral Porter.—Miscarriage of Grant's plans.—“For ten months after October, 1862, Grant was on trial, and knew it. . . . Army contractors, whose speculations he exposed, cotton brokers, whose pernicious influence upon morale he attacked, temperance advocates who thought him dissipated, co-operated to place him under suspicion and keep him there. . . . Grant brought upon himself much of this. He was a wretched correspondent, and his military reports were brief and general, . . . and the quiet persistence with which he followed up his own counsels often left the administration in doubt as to his real intent. He bore with Dana, with a modesty unusual in major-generals, and won him for a friend. Vicksburg, Grant's first goal, would have been inconvenient in approach, even if it had not been fortified in long anticipation of attack. Set on the Mississippi, just below the Yazoo Valley and its marsh lands which protected it on the north, it was perched at the northern extremity of a long range of high bluffs. These rose directly from the water's edge, making the town almost inaccessible from the west. The guns of its forts commanded long reaches of the river, above and below, making an assault impossible. Only on the east and south-east were dry approaches available, and these were heavily entrenched. Against these Grant started in the early winter, with Memphis as his base and Holly Springs as his supply station. It was to be a joint attack on Vicksburg, like that of the early spring on Forts Henry and Donelson. Sherman was to drop down the river from Memphis, convoyed by the fleet, and try the fortifications by the water routs. Grant, meanwhile, was to march overland against the rear, to drive the defending army of Pemberton back upon his entrenchments.”—F. L. Paxson, *American Civil War*, pp. 138-310.—“Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi squadron in October, 1862. . . . Up to this time the gun-boats had, strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army, but now all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all the other naval forces, was brought directly under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. . . . The new arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy Department. . . . Before Admiral Porter left Washington he was informed by the President that General McClernand had been ordered to raise an Army at Springfield, Ill., to prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. . . . But as Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on General McClernand's raising an Army sufficient for the purpose, the Admiral, immediately on his arrival at Cairo, sent a message to General Grant, at Holly Springs, Miss., informing him of McClernand's intention; that he, Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where the services of the Navy could be useful. A few days afterwards General Grant arrived at Cairo and proposed an expedition against Vicksburg, and asking the rear-admiral, if he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats, to accompany it. . . . Grant had left Holly Springs with a large Army at the time

he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing Pemberton from Vicksburg and thus helping Sherman in his attack on that place. . . . Grant moved towards Granada, and everything looked well; but the Confederate General, Earl Van Dorn, dashed into Holly Springs, 28 miles in the rear of the Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores. At the same time General Forrest pushed his cavalry into West Tennessee, cutting the railroad to Columbus at several points between that place and Jackson. . . . Due precautions had been taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind at Holly Springs, but the commanding officer was not on the alert and his capture was a complete surprise. In this raid of the Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were destroyed. Under the circumstances it was impossible for Grant to continue his march on Granada, which Pemberton perceiving, the latter returned to Vicksburg in time to assist in Sherman's repulse. . . . on the 29th of December, 1862."—D. D. Porter, *Naval history of the Civil War*, ch. 24.

Also in: S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, *Sherman and his campaigns*, ch. 7.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 11.

1862 (December).—State of the war at the end of the year.—"The close of the year 1862 found the boundaries of the Confederacy much contracted. . . . Nearly the entire Atlantic coast, except between Charleston and Savannah and one or two points in North Carolina, were lost to the Confederacy. . . . Norfolk and Yorktown were in . . . [Federal] hands. A powerful blockade operated to the South, while Grant in Mississippi and Rosecrans in Tennessee threatened communications necessary for the support of the Confederate armies. The Northern forces had closed in their lines everywhere. And yet, in the field, the advantage had not been on the side of the Union. The victories of Lee and Jackson over the mighty armies of the Federals had . . . inspired the Southern soldiers with the belief that their prowess would yet achieve Southern independence."—W. R. Garrett and R. A. Halley, *Civil War from a Southern standpoint*, p. 321.—"At the end of the year, nothing could be more uniformly gloomy than the Union prospects. In the East, the Army of the Potomac had just received another stunning blow, and was helpless for the time being; but Lee was not in a position to follow up his success, and President Davis made a fatal mistake of acting as if the war were practically ended, instead of straining every nerve to finish off his opponents. Neither Lee, Johnston, nor Bragg was deceived on this point in the least. In the West and South, Grant was helpless, his troops dispersed, and his communications destroyed; Farragut had had to retire on New Orleans, having failed in his attempt on Vicksburg, and the Confederates had strengthened their line on the Mississippi: Sherman, isolated from Grant, had just been heavily defeated before Vicksburg, and Rosecrans, at Stone's River, was driven back and beaten to his knees, but still unconquered. At sea, the blockade of Galveston was raised on January 1st, 1863, the famous *Monitor* went down in December, and the *Florida* and *Alabama* were left loose, the latter preying actively on Northern commerce."—J. Forby, *American Civil War*, pp. 179-180.

1862-1863 (December-January: Tennessee).—Bragg and Rosecrans.—Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough.—"The Confederate government

was greatly disappointed with the issue of Bragg's campaign. Scarcely had he reached Chattanooga when he was ordered to move northward again. Rosecrans, on assuming command of Buell's army, . . . concentrated his forces at Nashville, and there accumulated large supplies. . . . Bragg had already reached Murfreesborough on his second northward march from Chattanooga. Rosecrans had given out that it was his intention to take up his winter quarters at Nashville, and Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent out strong detachments of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest, the former being ordered to break Rosecrans's communications. . . . Suddenly, on the 26th of December, Rosecrans moved."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 53.—"Rosecrans moved out of Nashville the day after Christmas with the intention of attacking the Confederates. For a number of days he advanced, skirmishing as he went, and finally took up a position within three miles of Murfreesborough, Tennessee, where Bragg's army had gone into winter quarters. On the last day of the year he determined to make the attack; but Bragg had resolved to take the offensive at the same time, and obtained the advantage of the initial onset. The bloody battle of Stone's [Stone] River [or Murfreesborough] ensued, wherein 41,000 Union troops were pitted against 34,000 Confederates. The Confederates won the day, but Rosecrans stubbornly maintained his ground. On January 2, 1862, Bragg again attacked the Union Army and met with repulse. On the night of the following day, his troops being somewhat demoralized, he retreated from Murfreesborough. This gave Rosecrans a chance, of which he at once availed himself, to claim the victory in the campaign. The President telegraphed to him 'God bless you.' Halleck called it one of the most brilliant successes of the war. Throughout the North it was proclaimed a victory. At last, ran the sentiment of the people, our great general has appeared. The loss on both sides was heavy and both armies were so crippled that a long time was required to repair the damage. Although the casualties of Rosecrans were the larger, the superior resources of the North inclined the balance against the Confederates, who sustained moreover the loss in morale. In 1865, however, Grant declared that 'Murfreesborough was no victory' for the North; and William T. Sherman wrote at the time that Rosecrans's 'victory of Murfreesborough is dearly bought.' If the student confines himself to the literature of this campaign alone, he will feel that the extensive claims of a victory made by the President and the people of the North were a clutching at straws; but if he looks ahead he will see that they were wiser than they knew, for he will then comprehend that to hold Tennessee Bragg needed a decisive success, and that his failure and the serious crippling of his army opened the way for the Union advance to Chattanooga the following summer. The campaigns of Perryville and Stone's River were moreover a favorable augury to the cause of the North, inasmuch as they showed that in the Army of the West an education of generals was going on, that native military talent was in the process of development. George H. Thomas, a Virginian of the same good stuff as Washington and Robert E. Lee, was serving as second in command to Buell and to Rosecrans; he joined to ability in his profession and a scrupulous loyalty to his superiors, a conviction of the justice of the cause

which, contrary to the example of his State, he had espoused. . . . Philip H. Sheridan had distinguished himself at Perryville and now did gallant work at Stone's River. The immediate result of the campaign were not sufficiently important to lift Congress and the country for more than a brief period out of the dejection into which they had fallen. Sumner, although he realized the peril, had not lost heart. 'These are dark hours,' he wrote to Lieber. 'There are senators full of despair,—not I. . . . But I fear that our army is everywhere in a bad way.'—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 199-201. —"The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far—only behind Duck River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma—and but little endeavor was made to follow him. Indeed, we were not in condition to pursue, even if it had been the intention at the outset of the campaign. . . . The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest, destroyed the hopes of the secession element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping spirits of the East Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in Middle Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned the result of the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have planned the battle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive, remain entirely on the defensive, and that it was necessary only to push forward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro'. . . . Had Bragg followed up with the spirit which characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee on our right wing—and there seems no reason why he should not have done so—the army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville, but it would have been depleted and demoralized."—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 12-14.

ALSO IN: A. F. Stevenson, *Battle of Stone's river*.—T. B. Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, v. 1, ch. 16-17.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 20.

1862-1864.—Loyalty of Arkansas to Union. See ARKANSAS: 1862-1864.

1862-1864.—Great Sioux outbreak.—War on the frontier.—"After the occupation of Corinth, the military movements west of the Mississippi, except as they were involved in the Vicksburg campaigns of 1863, ceased to be an important part of the main strategy of the war. Never had they been decisive, but all along the frontier, from Sante Fé to St. Paul, there were episodes, locally interesting and more or less connected with the war. On the extreme border of Texas, the mining regions and the old communities along the Rio Grande necessitated a campaign in 1861 and 1862. Confederate forces actually possessed themselves of New Mexico and part of Arizona, only to be driven out by a combined attack from Colorado and California. In Colorado territory, an enthusiastic governor, Gilpin by name, believed he saw a conspiracy to take the Pike's Peak camps over to the Confederacy. With great vigour he enlisted the young prospectors of the territory into volunteer regiments, which certainly saved it from whatever danger threatened it. Farther north, the new State of Minnesota was afflicted towards the end of the year with a serious Indian uprising. The Sioux of the Minnesota Valley, above St. Paul, had been accumulating grievances against the United States for more than ten years before the war began. A casual frontier row in August, 1861, developed into a general attack that drove the settlers from the valley in wild distress. Nearly a thousand were slain;

others [about 2,000] were captured; and the occasion called for greater strength than Minnesota possessed. Her militia was augmented, and Pope, relieved of the Army of Virginia after the second battle of Bull Run, was sent to restore confidence on the northwest border. [Of the captured Indians, 303 were condemned to death by court-martial, 38 were hanged in December, 1862, and the remainder repressed by President Lincoln.] In Missouri, Arkansas, and Kansas, the fighting was more orderly, but had little more permanent consequence than that on the outlying frontiers of Minnesota or New Mexico. [See also DAKOTA TERRITORY: 1862-1865.] In these three States the sentiment of the population had run high through the fifties when the fight over slavery was before Congress. When war came, many entered each army; while the least reputable of either side formed guerrilla bands that plundered and murdered at pleasure. Quantrill is the most notorious of these raiders. Price, in his attack upon Missouri, and Banks, in the Red River campaign of 1864 [see below: 1864 (March-May: Louisiana)], conducted the most notable of the formal campaigns. But none of these affected the general outcome. . . . [After Vicksburg] the Mississippi became a Union river, and Confederate operations in the trans-Mississippi ceased to be important."—F. L. Paxson, *American Civil War*, pp. 132-133.

ALSO IN: S. Niles, *History of civil government of Minnesota*, pp. 83-84.—L. F. Hubbard and R. I. Holcombe, *Minnesota in three centuries*, v. 3, p. 269.

1862-1913.—Regulation of Asiatic immigration into the United States. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1862-1913.


1863.—Establishment of national banking system. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1836-1914.

1863.—Emigration into Idaho.—Organization of Idaho as territory. See IDAHO: 1863-1864; DAKOTA TERRITORY: 1862-1865.

1863.—Shimonoseki affair in Japan. See JAPAN: 1863-1868.

1863.—Use of submarines by Confederates against Union fleet. See SUBMARINES: 1863.

1863 (January).—Final Proclamation of Emancipation.—The immediate practical effect of the warning Proclamation of Emancipation issued by President Lincoln on September 22, 1862, "did, perhaps, more nearly answer the apprehensions of the President than the expectations of those most clamorous for it. It did, as charged, very much 'unite the South and divide the North.' The cry of 'the perversion of the war for the Union into a war for the negro' became the Democratic watchword, and was sounded everywhere with only too disastrous effect, as was plainly revealed by the fall elections with their large Democratic gains and Republican losses. Indeed, it was the opinion of Mr. Greeley that, could there have been a vote taken at that time on the naked issue, a large majority would have pronounced against emancipation. But Mr. Lincoln did not falter. Notwithstanding these discouraging votes at the North, and the refusal of any Southern State to avail itself of the proffered immunity and aid of his Proclamation of September, he proceeded, at the close of the hundred days of grace allowed by it, to issue his second and absolute Proclamation, making all the slaves of the Rebel States and parts of States forever and irreversibly free." It was in the following words:



ABRAHAM LINCOLN

(From painting by William Marshall)





Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit: "That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and part of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof, shall on the day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States." Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate, as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are and henceforth shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. And I further declare and make known that such per-

sons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

"Though the immediate effects of the Proclamation might not have answered all that was expected of it, it was not many months before its happy influences became manifest. Its tendency from the first was to unify and consolidate the antislavery and Christian sentiment of the land, to give dignity and consistency to the conflict. . . . It strengthened, too, the cause immensely with other nations, secured the sympathy and moral support of Christendom, and diminished, if it did not entirely remove the danger of foreign intervention."—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power*, v. 3, ch. 28.—"Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under his guidance as to render the conception practical and the decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force, leaguely liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision, the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 19.

ALSO IN: J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 163-169.—O. J. Victor, *History of the Southern Rebellion*, v. 3, div. 10, ch. 9.—W. P. and F. J. Garrison, *William Lloyd Garrison*, v. 4, ch. 3-4.

1863 (January: Arkansas).—Capture of Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman.—Sherman withdrew his troops from the attempt against Vicksburg on January 2, and on January 4 he relinquished the command to General McClellan, who had come down the river with orders to assume it. On that same day "the expedition sailed on the same transports that had brought them from Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post [50 miles from the mouth of the Arkansas and 117 below Little Rock]. . . . By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and the troops were on the march to invest the post. . . . The gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops were in position." Next morning a combined attack began, which the garrison endured until 4 o'clock P. M. when the white flag was raised. "Our entire loss in killed was 129; in wounded 831; and in missing, 17; total, 977. . . . By the surrender there fell into our


hands 5,000 men. . . . After sending the prisoners to St. Louis, having destroyed the defences and all buildings used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon, Arkansas, whence on the 17th . . . they returned to Milliken's Bend."—S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, *Sherman and his campaigns*, ch. 7-8.

1863 (January-April: Virginia).—Command given to Hooker.—President Lincoln's letter to him.—Demoralized state of the Army of the Potomac, and its improvement.—"General Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to the satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personal regard of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was relieved at his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became senior general officer, and succeeded to the command. No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. . . . His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank, manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his appearance always attracted attention; and he was as well known to almost every regiment as its own commander. He was a representative man. . . . 'I have placed you [wrote the President] at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence for him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness! Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward, and give us victories!' . . . Hooker [who] was appointed January 26, 1863, . . . was to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of this weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at once began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the power of organization—were accepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded speed-

ily to what had been almost a defiant obedience. The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingled with camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with an entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomac to accomplish anything, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at the rate of 200 a day. . . . Hooker states that he found 2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rolls of the army, a large portion from causes unknown. . . . The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concurs in awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which he improved the condition of the troops during the three months he was in command prior to Chancellorsville. . . . On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, consisted of about 130,000 men under the colors,—'for duty equipped,' according to the morning report. . . . While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth [opposite Fredericksburg], awaiting orders to move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks's Ford above to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck), below Fredericksburg, a line some 15 miles in length as the crow flies. . . . Lee's forces numbered about 60,000 men, for duty."—T. A. Dodge, *Campaign of Chancellorsville*, ch. 3-4.


ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, *History of the 2d Army Corps*, ch. 7.—R. De Trobriand, *Four years with the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 20.—S. P. Chase, *Diary*, pp. 90-95.—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War of the United States*, pp. 190-191.

1863 (January-April: On the Mississippi).—Grant's campaign against Vicksburg.—Futile operations of the first four months.—"Grant then ordered the troops back to the Mississippi, since they were intended for the attack of Vicksburg, and took command himself. . . . The army now consisted of four Corps, the XIIIth, XVth, XVIIth, under McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson, respectively. The XVIIth remained at Memphis as depot. Soon after the fall of Arkansas Post, Admiral Porter attacked the Red River, which the Confederates controlled, by sending three of his vessels down past the Vicksburg batteries, but one was sunk in action, and the others taken. On hearing of it, Farragut determined to move, came up with his fleet, and attacked Port Hudson, nominally in co-operation with Banks, but the land force was not able to take part: the ships were very severely handled, the *Mississippi* being destroyed, and only the flagship *Hartford* and one other getting past, but they were able to gain control, and close the Red River to the Confederates. Farragut then came up to the south of Vicksburg, and got into communication with Porter and Grant. To open the campaign against Vicksburg, Grant ordered the canal to be enlarged which had been cut the year before, but when he came, saw that this would be useless, as the enemy had established a battery which enfiladed it. He then tried to turn the position by the bayous of the Yazoo and its tributaries, but the distances were great, the work slow, and the Confederates forestalled and defeated all his attempts. He spent February and March in vain endeavours to turn the right flank of the defences, and then had to devise something else; but what? There seemed a choice of three plans: (1) To assault the batteries. (2) To go back to Memphis and



**Map of VICKSBURG and VICINITY**  
 SHOWING ROUTES OF THE ARMY UNDER  
 GEN. GRANT, April-May 1863.

FROM THE "ATLAS TO ACCOMPANY THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES"  
 Routes followed by the Armies of the Tennessee  
 U. S. Force  
 Confederate Force  
 Confederate Works and Defenses



start afresh, along the Mississippi Central Railway. (3) To move round opposite Vicksburg, cross the river below it on the high land, and attack it in rear. The first would almost certainly be defeated. From a military point of view the second was the best, but Grant chose the third, though it was most risky, and even the supplies depended on success, because if successful it would be decisive, and political considerations forbade even the semblance of retreat. The war was at a standstill, generally, and many clamoured for his removal from command. It was the turning-point of his career. The detail of the plan was to move down the bayous to the west of the river to New Carthage, some thirty miles below Vicksburg, run the gunboats and transports past the batteries, make a combined attack on Grand Gulf, and bring the army over; then to move along the valley of the Big Black, and attack the land side of Vicksburg. The original plan appears to have been for Banks to co-operate from the South, but this was nullified by the unexpected strength of Port Hudson. The Confederate line was very long, there being several outlying works such as Fort Pemberton, up to Yazoo to the north, but the main line began at Haines' Bluff, a detached position north of the town, and ran with intervals to Grand Gulf, 30 miles away by land, 60 by water. To Port Hudson, also in Pemberton's command, the line was 200 miles long, and was held by about 50,000 effective men. . . . Fort Pemberton and Grand Gulf were the outworks of the main line: to the north stretched the Yazoo watershed, a district of swamp, tangled forest, and bayou, from where the high land receded from the Mississippi, 180 miles away, to where they met again at Vicksburg, each curving outwards till there was a breadth of some 50 miles between them in the centre. Fort Pemberton was in the middle of this almost impenetrable tangle, through which Grant vainly tried to force his way. The river front on the Vicksburg fortifications was three miles long, and the works were carried round in rear at a distance of about two miles from the town. Some nine miles back from the Mississippi ran the Big Black River, coming out by Grand Gulf, 30 miles below. There were also strong works at Warrenton on the Mississippi, a few miles south of Vicksburg. The garrison was commanded by Stevenson, the district by Pemberton. From Vicksburg a railway ran eastward, connecting it with two important lines, the New Orleans and Memphis, and the Mobile and Ohio, at Jackson and Meridian respectively. A relieving force was being assembled to the north-east, but Johnston, the Confederate commander from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, was at this time at Tullahoma with Bragg. On the Union side, McClernand's Corps moved on March 28th, and reached New Carthage on April 20th, the gunboats passing the batteries on the 16th. The ground was swampy and the work of moving the army very slow but all were ready by the 29th, opposite Grand Gulf."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, pp. 221-224.

ALSO IN: F. V. Greene, *Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 8, ch. 4.)*—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs, v. 1, ch. 31-32.*—G. W. Brown, *Mississippi squadron and the siege of Vicksburg (Personal recollections of the War: New York Commandery, Lloyd Legion of the United States).*

1863 (February).—Proposal for mediation by France.—Influence on country.—"Greeley in his

journal advocated the mediation of a European power between the North and the South, and to further this end he held private interviews and opened a correspondence with Mercier, the French Minister, intimating that the people would welcome any foreign mediation which should look to a termination of the war. . . . An offer of mediation between the two sections from Napoleon, the Emperor of the French, was communicated on February 3, 1863, to the Secretary of State. It was declined at once by the President, the offer and response being published at the same time. Despite the rumors which had somehow prepared the public mind for this step, the actual fact that a powerful nation impelled by motives of material interest was eager to interfere in the struggle startled the people and deepened the gloom. 'The President tells me,' wrote Sumner to Lieber, 'that he now fears "the fire in the rear,"—meaning the Democracy especially at the Northwest—more than our military chances.' Governor Morton, of Indiana, telegraphed to the Secretary of War, 'I am advised that it is contemplated when the Legislature meets in this State to pass a joint resolution acknowledging the Southern Confederacy, and urging the States of the Northwest to dissolve all constitutional relations with the New England States. The same thing is on foot in Illinois.' The legislatures of these States were Democratic, having been chosen the previous autumn during the conservative reaction. Morton's grave apprehensions were far from being realized, but his legislatures quarreled with him and refused its support to his energetic measures for carrying on the war. The Republican members took his part, and the wrangle became so bitter that finally the legislature adjourned without making the necessary appropriations for the maintenance of the State government during the next two years. In Illinois, resolutions praying for an armistice and recommending a convention of all the States to agree upon some adjustment of the trouble between them, passed the House, but failed to obtain consideration in the Senate. This legislature likewise fell out with its Republican governor."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 201-202.

1863 (February-April: Tennessee).—Engagements at Dover and Franklin.—"The army of the Cumberland, after its victory at Murfreesborough, [see above: 1862-1863 (December-January)] did not resume the offensive for several months. The railroad from Nashville to Louisville had been greatly damaged by Morgan's raid and the line forward from Nashville to Murfreesborough also required repairing. It was with the greatest difficulty that Rosecrans guarded his extensive line of communication against the raids of the Confederate cavalry, who greatly outnumbered the mounted troops in the Federal army. . . . In February Bragg had been reinforced by Van Dorn with the bulk of the cavalry of Pemberton's army. Rosecrans vainly urged his government to send him additional cavalry, and when they turned a deaf ear to his appeals, proceeded to organise a brigade of mounted infantry. . . . After his defeat at Murfreesborough, Bragg had withdrawn his army to the railway, which branches off from the main line at Wartrace and runs to Shelbyville. . . . Bragg had also constructed a second entrenched line at Tullahoma. . . . The two armies were about twenty-five miles apart, and Bragg's second line of entrenchments about twenty miles

in the rear of his first. The operations on both sides during the first half of 1863 were of but minor importance, consisting mainly of cavalry expeditions against each others' lines of communication. [Sheridan swept down toward Shelbyville, and around toward Franklin.] Towards the end of January Bragg despatched Wheeler on an expedition against Fort Donelson, but the Confederate cavalry were repulsed [at the village of Dover], with considerable loss. In March a Federal force, some 3,000 strong [under Granger], marched from Franklin, where Rosecrans' right rested on the Nashville-Decatur Railway, to reconnoitre Van Dorn's front towards Columbia. This force suddenly found itself in the presence of 10,000 Confederate troops under Van Dorn himself. The artillery and cavalry made good their escape, but nearly all the infantry were captured. [Van Dorn abandoned his attempt to capture Franklin, and retired to Spring Hill.] In April Rosecrans organised a brigade of mounted troops for a raid against the Confederate depôts in Georgia. Though a considerable amount of damage was done, and the Round Mountain Iron-works (about thirty miles south-east of Guntersville), one of the most important manufactories of war material in the South, were destroyed, the whole brigade was eventually captured by Forrest's cavalry."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, pp. 274-275.

Also IN: B. J. Lossing, *Pictorial history of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 4.—T. B. Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, v. 1, ch. 18.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 23.

1863 (March).—Conscription Act.—Nine Hundred Million Dollar Loan Act.—Opposition to Seward.—"Stanton made at least one great blunder. Though he had been three months in office, and McClellan was still inactive, there were already several successes to the credit of the Union arms. The *Monitor* and *Virginia* (*Merrimac*) had fought their famous duel, and Grant had taken Fort Donelson. The latter success broke through the long gloom of the North and caused, as Holmes wrote, 'a delirium of excitement.' Stanton rashly concluded that he now had the game in his hands, and that a sufficient number of men had volunteered. This civilian Secretary of War, who had still much to learn of military matters, issued an order putting a stop to recruiting. Shortly afterwards great disaster befell the Union arms. McClellan, before Richmond, was checked in May. Early in July, his peninsula campaign ended disastrously in the terrible 'Seven Days' Battle.' Anticipating McClellan's failure, Lincoln had already determined to call for more troops. On July 1st, he called upon the Governors of the States to provide him with 300,000 men to serve three years. But the volunteering enthusiasm—explain it as you will—had suffered a check. The psychological moment had passed. So slow was the response to the call of July 1st, that another appeal was made early in August, this time for 300,000 men to serve only nine months. But this also failed to rouse the country. A reinforcement of only 87,000 men was raised in response to this emergency call. The able lawyer in the War Department had still much to learn about men and nations. . . . If there could be such a thing as a true psychological history of the war, one of its most interesting pages would determine just how far Stanton was responsible, through his strange blunder over recruiting, for the check to enthu-

siasm among the Northern people. With this speculation there is connected a still unsolved problem in statistics. To what extent did the anti-Lincoln vote, in 1862, stand for sympathy with the South, and how far was it the hopeless surrender of Unionists who felt that their cause was lost? Though certainty on this point is apparently impossible, there can be no doubt that the opening of 1863, the Government felt it must apply pressure to the flagging spirits of its supporters. In order to reinforce the armies and to push the war through, there was plainly but one course to be followed—conscription."—N. W. Stephenson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Union (Chronicles of America Series, v. 29, pp. 152-154)*.—"After very hot and acrimonious debate for about a month, Congress, on March 3, 1863, passed a national conscription law, under which all male citizens between the ages of twenty and forty-five were enrolled to constitute the national forces, and the President was authorized to call them into service by draft as occasion might require. The law authorized the appointment of a provost-marshal-general [whose office formed a separate bureau of the War Department], and under him a provost-marshal, a commissioner, and a surgeon, to constitute a board of enrollment in each congressional district; who, with necessary deputies, were required to carry out the law by national authority, under the supervision of the provost-marshal-general. [Hitherto the troops had been raised by the states.] For more than a year past, the Democratic leaders in the Northern States had assumed an attitude of violent partisanship against the administration, their hostility taking mainly the form of stubborn opposition to the anti-slavery enactments of Congress and the emancipation measures of the President."—J. G. Nicolay, *Short life of Abraham Lincoln*, pp. 353-354—"Anyone drafted could furnish a substitute or pay three hundred dollars to the Government as an exemption. Financial legislation was equally drastic. One year before the country had been started on the road of irredeemable legal-tender paper: there was now no turning back. The maw of our voracious treasury was again clamoring to be filled. Spaulding, who spoke for the Committee of Ways and Means, . . . made it clear to the House that in the next eighteen months \$1,000,000,000 must be borrowed. The expenses of the Government were \$2,500,000 a day, Sundays included. The receipts from customs taxes and other sources would not probably exceed \$600,000, leaving the balance, a daily deficit of \$1,900,000, to be met by borrowing of some kind. Congress, in what is known as the nine hundred million dollar loan act, authorized more bonds, more Treasury notes, bearing interest, which might be made a legal tender for their face value, more non-interest bearing United States legal-tender notes and a large amount of fractional currency to replace the existing imperfect substitutes issued for silver change, silver having long since disappeared from circulation. This act gave large discretionary powers to the Secretary of the Treasury. Before the constitutional meeting of the next Congress, he might issue of the different forms of paper obligations authorized a total of \$900,000,000. Congress, in pursuance of the recommendation of the President and Secretary of the Treasury, also passed at this session an act creating National Banks, which was the nucleus of our present system. It is easier to criticise the legislative body of a democracy than to praise it. . . . As a whole the work of the Republican majority

of Congress at this session deserves high commendation. They realized that only by victories in the field could the prevailing gloom be dispelled and confidence revived and that they must show the country an agreement among themselves upon such measures as might contribute to military success. Their distrust of the President's ministers did not cease with the termination of the so-called Cabinet crisis of December. Thaddeus Stevens thought at one time of moving in a Republican caucus of the House a resolution of want of confidence in the Cabinet. The Radicals were far from being reconciled to the retention of Seward, and continued their efforts to have him removed, but, in spite of the President's firm resolve to keep him, they voted the Administration ample powers. Most of the Republicans in Congress were of the mind of John Sherman, whose views inclined for the most part to moderation. 'I cannot respect some of the constituted authorities,' he wrote to his brother the general, 'yet I will cordially support and aid them while they are authorized to administer the Government.' Military success could be obtained only by giving the President extraordinary powers, and both senators and representatives perceived the inevitable and submitted to it. . . . The country's response to the work of Congress was heard in enthusiastic 'war' or 'Union' meetings held in many cities and towns of different States. Those in New York were characteristic. Distinguished and popular Democrats addressed a 'magnificent uprising of the people' at Cooper Institute. 'Loyal National Leagues' or 'Union Leagues' were formed of which the test for membership was a brief emphatic pledge that was subscribed to by many thousands. . . . To this period belongs the organization of the Union League Clubs of Philadelphia and New York and the Union Club of Boston, the object of their formation being distinctly patriotic. 'But nothing will do for the country,' wrote Norton to Curtis—'neither Clubs nor Conscription Bills nor Banking Bills—nothing will do as much good but victories. If we take Charleston and Vicksburg we conquer—but if not?' Nevertheless, a feeling of comparative cheerfulness began to manifest itself, owing to the energy with which Congress had buckled to the task of rescuing the country from the depression which followed Fredericksburg, to the excellent reorganization of the Army of the Potomac and to the known confidence of the President and his Cabinet in ultimate success. When Congress had assembled in December, the nation's finances were at a low ebb. Many of the soldiers had not been paid for five months, and to them all the paymaster was at least three months in arrears, so that by January 7, 1863, the amount due the army and navy had probably reached the sum of sixty millions. The bonds of the government were not selling. Now all was changed. The Secretary of the Treasury had devised a plan for offering the five-twenty bonds to popular subscription through the employment of a competent and energetic general agent, who, by a system of sub-agencies, wide advertising, and other business methods, appealed to the mingled motives of the patriotism and self-interest and induced the people to lend large sums of money to the Government. An impetus was given to this process by the general character of the financial legislation of Congress, and in particular by the clause in the nine hundred million dollar loan act which limited to July 1 the privilege of exchanging legal-tender notes for five-twenty bonds.

Immediately after the adjournment of Congress the confidence of the people began to show itself through the purchase of these securities. By the end of March, Chase told Sumner that he was satisfied with the condition of the finances, and ere three more months had passed, he could see that his popular loan was an assured success. The subscriptions averaged over three million dollars a day. The Germans were likewise buying our bonds. On April 26, Sumner wrote to the Duchess of Argyll: 'The Secretary of War told me yesterday that our rolls showed eight hundred thousand men under arms—all of them paid to February 28, better clothed and better fed than any soldiers ever before. . . . Besides our army, we have a credit which is adequate to all our needs.'—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865*, pp. 203-207.

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 2, ch. 21.

1863 (April: South Carolina).—Naval attack on Charleston.—'The engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned had given to the government and the public a high opinion of their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets. It was supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its surrender. . . . On the 7th of April [1863] Admiral Dupont made the experiment. He had seven Ericsson Monitors, the frigate Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the Monitors. . . . No ship was exposed to the severest fire of the enemy for more than forty minutes, yet in that brief period five of the iron-clads were wholly or partially disabled. In these forty minutes the battle was substantially over, the question settled. The damage inflicted on Fort Sumter was comparatively insignificant. It was Dupont's belief that, had the iron-clads been in action half an hour longer, they would all have been disabled. 'To my regret,' he says, 'I soon became convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force under my command.' . . . The iron-clad fleet had therefore been unable to pass the first line of obstructions, or to get out of 'the first circle of fire.' The slowness of its fire was no match for the rapidity and weight of that of the forts. . . . The government, thus satisfied that its iron-clad fleet was insufficient for the forcing of Charleston Harbor and the capture of the city, now changed its purposes, restricting its attempts to a more complete blockade, the detention of a large confederate force in the vicinity by continually threatening military operations, and the destruction of Fort Sumter for the sake of a moral effect. [No further action was taken until July.]"—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 72.

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, *Naval history of the War*, ch. 33.—C. B. Boynton, *History of the Navy during the Rebellion*, v. 2, ch. 33.—W. C. Church, *Life of Ericsson*, v. 2, ch. 21.—A. Roman, *Military operations of General Beauregard*, v. 2, ch. 30.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 14.

1863 (April-May: Virginia).—Hooker's disastrous movement.—Chancellorsville.—Stonewall Jackson's last flank movement.—'Being now [April 28] fully prepared for active operations, Hooker determined to take the initiative by mov-

ing on the left of his opponent's position. By careful study of Lee's position he correctly concluded that his left was his most vulnerable point. In order to mask his real design he sent forward a force of 10,000 cavalry under General Stoneman to operate upon Lee's lines of communication with Richmond, and sent Sedgwick with a force of 30,000 men still further to mask his movement. Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th, and Sedgwick appeared on the 28th on the heights below Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken, Hooker proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton . . . tells us 'that on the afternoon of the 30th of April four corps of the Federal army had gained the position of Chancellorsville [a farmhouse on the edge of a dense thicket of second growth], where Hooker at the same time established his headquarters.' Chancellorsville is situated ten miles southwest of Fredericksburg. . . . [The] thicket extends for miles in every direction, and its wild aspect very properly suggests its name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while in reality a more unfavorable place for military operations could not well be found. Hooker, however, seemed well pleased with his acquisition, for on reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced that 'the enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.' . . . General Lee was fully aware of the preparations that were being made by his adversary, but calmly awaited the complete development of his plans before exerting his strength to oppose him. . . . On the 28th . . . Lee ordered Jackson to concentrate his whole corps in the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg. Early on the morning of the 29th Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below the mouth of Deep Run, but made no other aggressive movement on that day or the day following. On the night of the 30th, Lee was informed of Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. He had been previously informed of Stoneman's movements against his line of operations by General Stuart, and was now satisfied that the main attack of the enemy would come from the direction of Chancellorsville. Therefore on the morning of the 1st of May he made the necessary preparations to meet it. Accompanied by his staff, he took a position on a height where one of his batteries overlooked the Rappahannock. He there observed carefully the position of Sedgwick, while waiting for information from the direction of Chancellorsville. . . . Very soon the sound of cannon indicated that the work had begun. At the same time couriers arrived from Stuart and Anderson informing the general that the enemy were advancing on the old turnpike, the plank road, and on the river roads, and asking for reinforcements. McLaws was immediately ordered to the support of Anderson, and shortly after Jackson was ordered to follow with three of his divisions, leaving . . . a force of about 9,000 men and 45 pieces of artillery in observation of Sedgwick. When Jackson joined McLaws and Anderson a lively skirmish was in progress, in which he immediately participated. When General Lee arrived he found the Federals were being driven back to Chancellorsville. At the close of the afternoon they had retired within their lines. General Lee occupied the ridge about three-quar-

ters of a mile south-east and south of Chancellorsville. The opposing armies were hidden from each other by the intervening thicket of brushwood. . . . It was obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore Lee proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no danger was apprehended by the Federal commander. . . . The execution of a movement so much in accordance with his genius and inclination was assigned to General Jackson. . . . At dawn on the morning of the 2d, Jackson's corps, 22,000 strong, was in motion, and while it was making one of the most famous flank movements on record, General Lee, with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, with 20 pieces of artillery, a force not exceeding 12,000 men, occupied the position he had assumed the previous evening, and General Hooker, with 90,000 men, lay behind his breastworks awaiting the Confederate attack. . . . After making a circuitous march of 15 miles, Jackson reached a point on the Orange Courthouse road three miles in the rear of Chancellorsville. . . . Howard's corps was first assailed [at 6 P.M.]. This corps, being surprised, was panic-stricken and fled precipitately, and in its flight communicated the panic to the troops through which it passed. Jackson's forces followed, routing line after line, until arrested by the close of day. The rout of the Federal army was fast becoming general, and it was only saved from entire defeat by the interposition of night. When compelled to halt Jackson remarked that with one more hour of daylight he could have completed the destruction of the Federal army. This, the most famous of all Jackson's brilliant achievements, closed his military career. After his troops had halted, and while the lines were being adjusted, he rode forward with several of his staff to reconnoitre the Federal position." The party were mistaken by some of their own men for Federal horsemen and received a volley which struck down Stonewall Jackson. He was wounded in both arms by three bullets, and died from the effects eight days afterward. "Early on the morning of the 3d the attack was resumed by the Confederates with great vigor. Hooker, taking advantage of the night, had restored order in his army and strengthened his position; his troops regained courage and contested the field with great stubbornness until ten o'clock when they yielded at every point and rapidly retreated . . . within the strong line of defences which had been previously constructed to cover the road to the United States Ford. . . . While the operations above described were in progress at Chancellorsville, General Early, by skilful manœuvring, had detained Sedgwick at Fredericksburg until the 3d, when that general, by a determined advance, forced back Early, carried Marye's Heights, and proceeded toward Chancellorsville. The condition of affairs was communicated to General Lee during the forenoon. Wilcox's brigade, then at Banks's Ford, was ordered to intercept Sedgwick and retard his advance, while McLaws's division was ordered to support him. Wilcox on reaching Salem Church, six miles from Chancellorsville, encountered the Federal advance, and after a sharp conflict he repulsed it with loss. The success of Wilcox delayed Sedgwick until Anderson and McLaws could come up. The premeditated attack on Hooker being thus interrupted, Lee, on the forenoon of the 4th, repaired to the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. A

combined attack was then directed to be made by Early on the rear, while McLaws and Anderson bore down upon the front. The battle was hotly contested during the afternoon, in which the forces of Sedgwick were defeated, and were only saved from destruction by a night-passage across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford. On the 5th Lee collected his forces at Chancellorsville to give the 'coup de grâce' to Hooker, but that general, under cover of a dark and stormy night, effected his retreat beyond the Rappahannock at the United States Ford.—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 14.—“On both sides the losses were very heavy; the Federals lost 17,000 and the Confederates 13,000. On the Federal side these losses were very unevenly distributed. The 1st and 5th Corps together lost less than 1,000. Sedgwick's Corps suffered most severely, losing nearly 5,000, and Sickles' Corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting on the 3rd, lost over 4,000. In the Confederate ranks the losses were more evenly distributed, though the heaviest punishment was suffered by the three divisions which accompanied Jackson on his flank march. . . . In a way the battle of Chancellorsville proved the turning-point of the war, in as much as it was won at the cost of Stonewall Jackson's life. Lee's great lieutenant breathed his last on May 10th. His loss was simply irreparable to the Confederate cause. . . . His fall converted the hard-won victory at Chancellorsville into a barren triumph. Never again after his death did Lee venture on those great flanking movements which decided two campaigns. Jackson was but thirty-nine when he died. In two short years of warfare he won for himself an abiding place among the great soldiers of all time. By his death the South suffered a loss which she never recovered.”—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, p. 211.


ALSO IN: A. Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 6, ch. 8)*.—T. A. Dodge, *Campaign of Chancellorsville*.—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, ch. 8*.—D. N. Couch, O. O. Howard et al., *Chancellorsville (Battles and leaders, v. 3)*.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln, v. 7, ch. 4*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 25*.

1863 (April-May: Mississippi).—Grierson's raid.—Reporting to headquarters at Washington, on May 5, 1863, General Hurlbut, commanding at Memphis, Tennessee, said: “As the spring opened, I was daily more and more impressed with the feasibility of a plan, long entertained, of pushing a flying column of cavalry through the length of Mississippi, cutting the Southern Railroad. By consent and approval of General Grant, I prepared a system of movements along my entire line from Memphis to Corinth for the purpose of covering this cavalry dash. At the same time General Rosecrans proposed to me to cover a movement of 1,800 cavalry from Tusculumbia down into Alabama and Georgia. . . . I commenced the movement from Corinth on the 15th [April]. . . . On the 17th, Col. B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, with his own regiment, the Seventh Illinois, and Second Iowa, moved from La Grange, by way of Pontotoc, with orders, after passing Pontotoc, to proceed straight down, throwing one regiment to the left toward Okolona, and to push for and destroy the Chunkey River Bridge and any others they could reach, and either return, or proceed to Baton Rouge, as might be found advisable. On the same day, April 17, a column of infantry

1,500 strong, and one battery, moved by railroad from La Grange to Coldwater, with orders to push rapidly between Coldwater and the Tallahatchee, and take Chalmers in flank and rear while attacked in front by three regiments, a battery, and 200 cavalry from Memphis, which left here on the 18th. . . . Grierson, on the 19th, detached the Second Iowa below Pontotoc, which fought its way gallantly back to La Grange and came home well mounted. The main cavalry column (Sixth and Seventh Illinois) proceeded, without loss or engagement, to Newton, on the Southern Mississippi Railroad, and there destroyed bridges.” It was not until May 2d that Grierson and his small force reached the Union lines at Baton Rouge. The total accomplishments of the expedition—aside from the important revelation it made of the condition of things in that region of the Confederacy—are summed up in the Colonel's report as follows: “During the expedition we killed and wounded about 100 of the enemy, captured and paroled over 500 prisoners, many of them officers, destroyed between 50 and 60 miles of railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over 3,000 stand of arms, and other army stores and Government property to an immense amount; we also captured 1,000 horses and mules. . . . Much of the country through which we passed was almost entirely destitute of forage and provisions, and it was but seldom that we obtained over one meal per day. Many of the inhabitants must undoubtedly suffer for want of the necessaries of life, which have reached most fabulous prices.”—*Official Records, series 1, v. 24, pt. 1, pp. 520-520*.

1863 (April-July: On the Mississippi).—Grant's campaign against Vicksburg.—Final operations.—His personal account of the siege and capture.—“Sending Sherman up the river to create a diversion on the Confederate right [see above: 1863 (January-April: On the Mississippi)], Grant put his army on transports,—river steamers of all sorts, manned mostly by volunteers from the ranks,—and, with the fleet as convoy, ran the batteries in April, through a bombardment that was more spectacular than dangerous. Until this moment, Pemberton, the favourite of Davis, who commanded at Vicksburg, had been in the dark as to the Union intention. Now the plan was clear. Reinforcements were called for and the Confederate left was prepared to drive the invader back into the swamps. ‘Joe’ Johnston, with an army in eastern Mississippi tried to help. On the last day of April, Grant put his army back on the left bank of the Mississippi, at Bruinsburg, and began his march inland and to the north.”—F. L. Paxton, *American Civil War, p. 141*.—“April 30th was spent in transporting troops across the river [to Bruinsburg]. The troops were moved out towards Port Gibson as fast as they were landed. On the 1st of May the advance met the enemy under Bowen about four miles west of Port Gibson, where quite a severe battle was fought, resulting in the defeat of the enemy who were driven from the field. On May 2d our troops moved into Port Gibson, and, finding that the bridges over Bayou Pierre were destroyed, spent the balance of the day in rebuilding and crossing them, and marching to the North Fork, where we encamped for the night. During the night we rebuilt the bridge across the North Fork, which had also been destroyed, and the next day (the 3d) pushed on, and, after considerable skirmishing, reached the Big Black, near Hankinson's Ferry, and the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. . . . Here I [General Grant] . . .





GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT WITH HIS STAFF  
Outside of headquarters near Richmond, Virginia, 1863



received a letter from Banks stating that he could not be at Port Hudson [Grant had intended to join Banks in attacking, before he turned against Vicksburg] for some days, and then, with an army of only 15,000 men. As I did not regard this force of as much value as the time which would be lost in waiting for it, I determined to move on to Vicksburg. The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May were spent in reconnoitering towards Vicksburg, and also in crossing Sherman's troops over to Grand Gulf. On the 7th, Sherman having joined the main body of the army, the troops across the Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement was commenced to get in position on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad so as to attack Vicksburg from the rear. This occupied the army from the 7th to the 12th, when our position was near Fourteen Mile creek, Raymond being our right flank, our left resting on the Big Black. To obtain this position we fought the battle of Raymond. . . . As the army under Pemberton was on my left flank, and that under General Joseph E. Johnston on my right at Jackson, I determined to move the army rapidly on Jackson, capturing and destroying that place as a military depot; then turn west and destroy the army under Pemberton, or drive it back into Vicksburg. The 13th was spent in making the first of these moves. On the 14th Jackson was attacked with Sherman's and McPherson's corps. The place was taken, and all supplies that could be of service to the enemy were destroyed, as well as the railroad bridge. On the 15th the troops were faced to the west and marched towards Pemberton, who was near Edwards's Station. The next day, the 16th, we met the enemy at Champion's Hill, and, after a hard-fought battle, defeated and drove him back towards Vicksburg, capturing 18 guns and nearly 3,000 men. This was the hardest-fought battle of the campaign. On the 17th we reached the Big Black, where we found the enemy entrenched. After a battle of two or three hours' duration we succeeded in carrying their works by storm, capturing much artillery and about 1,200 men. . . . We crossed on the morning of the 18th, and the outworks of Vicksburg were reached before night, the army taking position in their front. On the 19th, there was continuous skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better positions. . . . At two o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops, . . . where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy, and the siege of Vicksburg began. . . . Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. They had had an abundance of food, however, but had begun to feel the want of bread. . . . By the night of the 21st full rations were issued to all the troops. . . . I now determined on a second assault. . . . The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A. M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. . . . The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy. . . . but at no place were we able to enter. . . . As soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg. A regular siege was now determined upon. . . . The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi river up to this time was less than 43,000 men. . . . The

enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, quite 60,000 men. . . . My line was more than 15 miles long, extending from Haines's Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson in our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defense, facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man this. General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked for reinforcements, forwarded them with all possible dispatch. . . . Johnston. . . . abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of loosing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston."—U. S. Grant, *Siege of Vicksburg* (*Century Magazine*, Sept., 1885).—"Pemberton surrendered unconditionally, and Grant generously directed that the surrendered men should first be fed and then paroled and permitted to return to their homes. One event which belongs rather to biography than to history may perhaps be mentioned here in illustration of General Grant's delicacy of sentiment,—a trait of his character often overlooked. When it was arranged that the surrendered Confederates should march out, General Grant issued an order to forbid all demonstrations that might wound a conquered enemy's pride or sensitiveness. 'Instruct the commands,' the order read, 'to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, and to make no offensive remark.'"—G. C. Eggleston, *History of the Confederate War*, v. 2, p. 167.—"The Mississippi was the great road of the West; it was the pride of the West, the symbol of greatness. If the South could hold the mighty river, the Union would be foiled everywhere: it must give up the contest. If the Union could take the river from the South, it could, sooner or later complete the conquest of the seceded states. People sensed, if they did not put in words, the supreme importance of the Mississippi in the struggle. . . . The whole lower South knew what the loss of the Mississippi meant. The cotton states began to despair while the army of Virginia was nearly as confident as ever. If the man power of the South had been sufficient to replace the losses of the summer, Gettysburg would not have been considered much more decisive than Fredericksburg, a battle it rather resembled. On the other hand, the capture of Vicksburg was the greatest success won on either side in the whole war. An army of 30,000 men; a strong fortress, the check to the Union navigation of the Mississippi; and the severance of the Confederacy—such were the fruits of Grant's memorable victory, won by audacity and resolution. The whole lower South was now at the mercy of a vigorous offensive. Vicksburg was the turning point of the struggle."—H. J. Eckenrode, *Jefferson Davis, President of the South*, pp. 207, 234-235.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 31-39.—*Vicksburg year* (*Battles and leaders*, v. 3).—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of military operations*, ch. 6-8.—F. V. Greene, *Mississippi* (*Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 8, ch. 5-6).—W. Swinton, *Twelve decisive battles of the War*, ch. 7.—W. T. Sherman *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 12.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 24.

1863 (May-June).—Arrest of Vallandigham.—President Lincoln to the “Copperheads.”—“The United States had never encountered cases of treason and sedition on a large scale and had had no experience in handling them. The Confederacy was to all intents a military dictatorship; in the Union the government had the Constitution always to consider. Under the Constitution, it was extremely difficult to convict of treason. There were no precedents to show how far the minority, in time of war, was to be allowed to obstruct the national purpose. Yet now, the minority showed its sympathy with the South by opposing war measures, by denouncing acts of government as illegal, and by giving secret aid directly to the Confederacy. At times it seemed as though Democratic resistance would tie the hands of Lincoln, and let the Union be broken. Lincoln faced his opponents in the rear more boldly than even his adherents always approved. Early in the war, he suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the North, on his own authority, in order that arrests that appeared necessary to him might not be nullified by the courts. The Constitution declares that ‘The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.’ But it does not say who shall suspend the writ. Lincoln took the responsibility as his own; and though Congress regarded the act as an usurpation of its own authority, it passed, in 1863, a law indemnifying him in case he had violated the Constitution, and enacted general rules for the suspension in the future. Lincoln disregarded these rules when he believed it expedient. There are no exact figures to show how many persons were arrested arbitrarily in the North during the crises of the war. The number ran into the thousands and was increased by unauthorized acts of zealous subordinates and military commanders. Every conspiracy that was discovered or secret society that was brought to light, seemed to the department commander on the ground to need repression. The aggregate number of conspirators was large. Most numerous in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, they affected ritualistic organization, and drilled in secret when they could. Their very numbers drew their teeth. So many Union spies were in their ranks that Lincoln knew their plans as soon as they were formulated. They never had a close organization, or were more than an aggravating nuisance. Their most serious influence was in slandering the public credit, dissuading enlistment, and encouraging desertion. The draft might not have been necessary but for them. More than 2,500 deserters were returned to the ranks from Indianapolis, alone, in a single month in 1862. When the President was called upon to sign death warrants for desertion, he generally declined the duty. Only 141 men were shot or hung for this crime throughout the war, and leniency increased the trouble. But Lincoln made the excuse that has been more satisfactory to his fellow-citizens than it was to the disciplinarians of the war department: . . . The most famous arbitrary arrest was that of Clement L. Vallandigham, an Ohio lawyer and journalist, who had represented his district in Congress since 1857. From the beginning of the war Vallandigham denounced the usurpation of power by the President, and the wickedness of coercion. A brilliant speaker, with handsome figure and great courage, he led the most violent wing of the opposition.

The term ‘copperheads,’ which was bestowed upon his followers in reproach, they finally accepted with pride; and they wore the liberty-head, cut from the old copper cent, as an emblematic badge. . . . When Wade called him a traitor, he denied the charge and called its author ‘a liar, a scoundrel, and a coward.’ Through 1862, he fought the administration steadfastly. In the fall of that year, he lost his seat in Congress through a rearrangement of his district; but the military failures of the year, and the rebuke to Lincoln at the polls, encouraged him and others to keep up their opposition, and their assertions that peace, with union, was within the reach of an honest administration. In May, 1863, Vallandigham was arrested at his home in Dayton, by order of the military governor commanding in Ohio, A. E. Burnside. The latter had recently drawn the fire of the copperheads by proclaiming in a general order that ‘treason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department.’ Vallandigham had led in denouncing the order. He was arrested by troops, denied a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus by the United States court, tried before a military tribunal at Cincinnati, and condemned to imprisonment. His alleged crime had been committed in a State where ordinary courts were in regular session. The utterances on which he was condemned were highly partisan, but by no means traitorous. The action of the administration in his case, declared the Democratic governor of New York, Horatio Seymour, ‘will determine in the minds of more than one-half of the people of the loyal States whether this war is waged to put down rebellion at the South, or to destroy free institutions of the North.’ Although he doubted the wisdom of the arrest of Vallandigham, Lincoln did not disallow the verdict in his trial. He whimsically commuted the sentence from confinement to banishment within the Confederate lines, and ordered Vallandigham to be escorted thither under guard. Protesting all the way, and seeing none of the humour of the situation, the leader of the copperheads was taken by way of Murfreesboro to the front, and abandoned, under a flag of truce, within the outer line of Confederate pickets. The case of Vallandigham marks the height and decline of the activities of the copperheads. The disastrous year, 1862, convinced many that it was safe to fight the Union, and that Lincoln was tottering. It emboldened many to a freedom of speech that would have passed unnoticed in time of peace, but which now provoked the administration to a method of defence that sober lawyers have been reluctant to justify. If, however, the Constitution had been allowed to fall because of its own restrictions upon the freedom of its defenders, it would have been a sad commentary upon the effectiveness of popular government. Vallandigham in exile was more effective than Vallandigham at large. He left the Confederacy, and took up a residence at Windsor, in Ontario. His party nominated him for governor of Ohio in 1863, and he conducted his campaign from Canadian territory. The administration threw its whole influence into the campaign to defeat him, and both Unionists and copperheads were surprised when the final vote brought out a majority of more than 100,000 for his opponent. On the whole the best antidote for the teachings of the copperheads was their own speech and actions. Vallandigham was released from his pose of martyr after the election, and was per-

mitted to come home, unnoticed by the government."—F. L. Paxson, *American Civil War*, pp. 216-221.—See also below: 1864 (October): Disloyal associations in the North; CENSORSHIP: United States; COPPERHEADS.—To the New York Democrats, Lincoln said: "It is asserted in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried 'for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the general.' Now, if there be no mistake about this, if this assertion is the truth and the whole truth, if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the administration or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence. I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy. If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them: in other words, that the Constitution is not in its application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended

by the meeting, that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life. In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting speak as 'Democrats.' Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to designate themselves 'Democrats' rather than 'American citizens.' In this time of national peril I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one step higher than any party platform, because I am sure that from such more elevated position we could do better battle for the country we all love than we possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other. But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful for the country's sake that not all Democrats have done so. He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me, and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none such."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 349-350.—To the Ohio Democrats, the president wrote on June 29 as follows: "You claim, as I understand, that according to my own position in the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions or otherwise; and that if he had he should have been turned over to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically and by direct language advised against enlistments and in favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrolment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. Vallandigham

has been engaged in a greater degree than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other one man. These things have been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they originated with his special friends and adherents. With perfect knowledge of them, he has frequently if not constantly made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one of which as yet I am totally ignorant. When it is known that the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it. With all this before their eyes, the convention you represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for governor of Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of course they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide what are constitutional means; and, unlike the Albany meeting, you omit to state or intimate that in your opinion an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so. After a short personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by consequence a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false hope and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the way exceedingly easy. . . . It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this because he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to speak for him; and because I should expect that on his returning he would not put himself practically in antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of immense value to the army—thus more than compensating for the consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public safety may seem to require. I have the honor to be respectfully yours.”—*Ibid.*, pp. 362-363.—“American politics during the war form a wildly confused story, so intricate that it cannot be

made clear in a brief statement. But this central fact may be insisted upon: in the North, there were two political groups that were the poles around which various other groups revolved and combined, only to fly asunder and recombine, with all the maddening inconstancy of a kaleidoscope. The two irreconcilable elements were the ‘war party,’ made up of determined men resolved to see things through, and the ‘copperheads’ who for one reason or another united in a faithful struggle for peace at any price. Around the copperheads gathered the various and singular groups who helped to make up the ever fluctuating ‘peace party.’ It is an error to assume that this peace party was animated throughout by fondness for the Confederacy. Though many of its members were so actuated, the core of the party seems to have been that strange type of man who sustained political evasion in the old days, who thought that sweet words can stop bullets, whose programme in 1863 called for a cessation of hostilities and a general convention of all the States. . . . With these strange people in 1863 there combined a number of different types: still stranger, still less creditable visionary; . . . the avowed friends of the principle of state rights; all those who distrusted the Government because of its anti-slavery sympathies; Quakers and others with moral scruples against war; and finally, sincere legalists to whom the Conscription Act appeared unconstitutional.”—W. W. Stephenson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Union*, (*Chronicles of America series*, v. 29, pp. 156-157).

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 7, ch. 12.

1863 (May-July: On the Mississippi).—Siege and surrender of Port Hudson.—Opening of the Great River.—The fall of Vicksburg brought in its train the surrender of Port Hudson (or Hickey’s Landing), which had been invested by Banks. “About the middle of May all the available force near the river was concentrated at Baton Rouge, to assist in the attack on Port Hudson. Thence Gen. Augur and Sherman moved to the south and east of that position, to cooperate with Gen. Banks. From Simmesport Gen. Banks moved his army to invest Port Hudson. . . . It was on the 21st of May that Gen. Banks landed, and on the next day a junction was effected with the advance of Maj.-Gen. Augur and Brig.-Gen. Sherman. . . . On the 25th, the enemy was compelled to abandon his first line of works. On the next day Gen. Weitzel’s brigade, which had covered the rear in the march from Alexandria, arrived, and on the morning of the 27th a general assault was made on the fortifications.” Port Hudson was strongly fortified and well defended by Colonel Frank Gardner. The artillery of General Banks opened fire on the 27th, and at ten o’clock the same day an assault was made, in which the colored soldiers showed much firmness and bravery. The assault failed and the losses in it were heavy. “A bombardment of the position had been made by the fleet under Admiral Farragut, for a week previous to this assault. . . . The upper batteries on the river were attacked by the Hartford and Albatross, which had run the blockade, and the lower by the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex. On the 14th of June, after a bombardment of several days, another assault on Port Hudson was made. . . . All the assaulting columns were compelled to fall back under the deadly fire of the enemy, and the fighting finally ceased about 11 o’clock in the

morning. The loss of Gen. Banks was nearly 700 in killed and wounded. . . . After these two attempts to reduce Port Hudson by a land assault, on the 27th of May and 14th of June, the purpose to make another was given up by Gen. Banks, until he had fully invested the place by a series of irresistible approaches. He was thus engaged in pushing forward his works when Vicksburg was surrendered [and upon hearing the news Gardner surrendered also].—W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history of the Rebellion*, ch. 29.

ALSO IN: F. V. Greene, *Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 8, ch. 7)*.—R. B. Irwin, *Port Hudson (Battles and leaders, v. 3)*.—Idem., *History of the 10th Army Corps*, ch. 15-18.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 26*.

1863 (June).—Call for six-months men.—A call for 100,000 men to serve six months, for the repulse of the invasion of Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and Ohio, was issued June 15.

1863 (June).—West Virginia admitted to Union. See WEST VIRGINIA: 1863.

1863 (June: Virginia).—Lee's second movement of invasion and the inducements to it.—Northern invitation and Southern clamor.—Southern view.—After the defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville, for the first time there seemed to be "a possibility of inducing the Federal Government to relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate authority in the South. The idea of the formation of a Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had, up to this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the Federal arms in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt whether the South could be coerced to return to the Union; and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of President Lincoln, declaring the slaves of the South free, and placing the United States virtually under martial law, aroused a violent clamor from the great Democratic party of the North, who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was disappearing. This combination of non-success in military affairs and usurpation by the Government emboldened the advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the liberties of the country. . . . A peace convention was called to meet in Philadelphia. . . . On all sides the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard raising their importunate voices."—J. E. Cooke, *Life of General Robert E. Lee*, pt. 6, ch. 9-12.—"For just a month the two armies remained facing each other on opposite sides of the Rappahannock. Hooker, after his costly failure at Chancellorsville, was not disposed to resume the offensive. The next move must come from Lee. It has been said that Lee's hesitation to make that move was owing to the heavy losses which he had suffered at Chancellorsville. But heavy as those losses had been, they had been made good by the arrival of Hood's and Pickett's divisions of the 1st Corps. His real reason for not moving sooner was the reluctance of his Government to abandon its defensive policy. After Chancellorsville high hopes were entertained in the Government circles at Richmond that peace would quickly ensue. It was expected that the peace party at the North . . . would soon be strong enough to force President Lincoln into rec-

ognising the independence of the South, and it was believed, too, that foreign intervention might shortly be looked for. Holding these views, President Davis and his Cabinet were not disposed to make any attempt to improve the victory just gained. A second reason which detained Lee on the south side of the Rappahannock was his weakness in cavalry. He was not willing to undertake an offensive campaign until he had gathered together a sufficient force of that arm. From a military point of view there was every reason why Lee should take the initiative. A purely defensive war, if fought out to the bitter end and converted simply into a struggle of endurance, must result disastrously to the weaker side. Only by taking great risks and winning great victories was there any chance of forcing the North into conceding peace. An invasion of the North would, as in the previous year, do much to lighten the strain upon the Confederate commissariat, and would bring home to the Northerner in visible shape the horrors of war. There was another reason, which perhaps weighed even more with the Confederate Government than with Lee. The fate of Vicksburg was trembling in the balance; an invasion of the North might possibly have the effect of recalling Grant's army from the Mississippi, and if its fall was inevitable, then it was highly desirable that some brilliant success should be gained in the East as a set-off to so heavy a blow in the West."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, p. 216.—"The country [Southern] was elated with the two great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and the people were clamorous for active operations against an enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern steel. The army, which had been largely augmented by the return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal victory and a treaty of peace. Lee yielded to this view of things rather than urged it. . . . Throughout the month of May, Lee was busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations and improvements in the army. It was divided into three 'corps d'armée,' each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet remained at the head of his former corps, Ewell succeeded Jackson in command of Jackson's old corps, and A. P. Hill was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two others. . . . On the last day of May, General Lee had the satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped and admirably officered army of 68,352 bayonets, and nearly 10,000 cavalry and artillery—in all, about 80,000 men. . . . Lee began his movement northward on the 3d day of June, just one month after the battle of Chancellorsville. . . . Pursuing his design of manœuvring the Federal army out of Virginia, without coming to action, Lee first sent forward one division of Longstreet's corps in the direction of Culpepper, another then followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of June, Ewell's entire corps was sent in the same direction—A. P. Hill remaining behind on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near Fredericksburg, to watch the

enemy there, and bar the road to Richmond. These movements became speedily known to General Hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below Fredericksburg, and crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite Hill. This threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by Lee to arrest his own movements. . . . He continued the withdrawal of his troops, by way of Culpepper, in the direction of the Shenandoah Valley." On the morning of the 9th of June, "two divisions of Federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of 'picked infantry,' were sent across the river at Kelly's and Beverley's Fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the quarters of Stuart and find what was going on in the Southern camps. The most extensive cavalry fight [known as the battle of Brandy Station, or the battle of Fleetwood], probably, of the whole war, followed. . . . This reconnoissance in force . . . had no other result than the discovery of the fact that Lee had infantry in Culpepper. . . . This attempt of the enemy to penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley. The Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, still remained facing General Hill, and, two days after the Fleetwood fight, General Hooker moved up the river with his main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near Beverley's Ford. But these movements were disregarded by Lee. On the same day Ewell's corps moved rapidly toward Chester Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of the 13th, having in three days marched 70 miles. The position of the Southern army now exposed it to very serious danger, and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of soldiership in the general commanding it. In face of an enemy whose force was at least equal to his own, Lee had extended his line until it stretched over a distance of about 100 miles. . . . When intelligence now reached Washington that the head of Lee's columns was approaching the Upper Potomac, while the rear was south of the Rappahannock, the President wrote to General Hooker: 'If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road, between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere—could you not break him?' . . . It would seem that nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an attack upon Hill at Fredericksburg, which would certainly have checked Lee's movement by recalling Longstreet from Culpepper, and Ewell from the Valley. But . . . instead of reinforcing the corps sent across at Fredericksburg and attacking Hill, General Hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall back toward Manassas."—J. E. Cooke, *Life of General Robert E. Lee*, pt. 6, ch. 9-12.

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 2, ch. 21.—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 9.

1863 (June-July: Pennsylvania).—Lee's invasion.—Battle of Gettysburg.—"Hooker started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper's Ferry. There is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not


occupied them but was farther to the East, Lee desired to do so, for it would give him a strong position on Hooker's flank and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction. Stuart's reconnoitering party met the Union cavalry at Aldie, and after a hard battle retreated. A series of cavalry combats ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart's cavalry behind the Blue Ridge. Hooker was strongly posted east of the Bull Run range and could not be attacked with much chance of success. As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart's cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Lee reached Chambersburg with Longstreet's and Hill's corps. Ewell's corps was in advance at Carlisle [June 27] and York," and advance bodies of cavalry were threatening Harrisburg. The militia of Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland were called out in force, but arms and ammunition for them were inadequate. Ewell, with Early's cavalry, reached the Susquehanna, the most northern point of the Confederate advance. He was about to attack, when General Lee, who had reached Chambersburg with Longstreet and Hill, recalled him on June 29. "On June 28th, Hooker determined to send Slocum's corps and the garrison of Harper's Ferry—the latter about 10,000 strong—to operate against Lee's rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker's superior, General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops from Harper's Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the command of the army." He was accordingly relieved and the command was given to Major-General George G. Meade, of the Fifth Corps. Meantime (June 25-27) the Union army had crossed the Potomac and advanced to Frederick, Maryland. Late in June, Stuart started with his cavalry on a raid upon Washington, but, finding it protected, moved on to Pennsylvania. Not finding Ewell at Carlisle, he followed him rapidly to Gettysburg, but arrived on July 2, with his horses in such a state that they were unfit for service. Thus Lee was deprived of his main cavalry arm when he most needed them. "On June 28th, Lee learned from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his communication with Richmond was seriously endangered. . . . In this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a preliminary measure, he directed his entire army to move on Gettysburg. This he hoped would induce Meade to concentrate in his front and leave his rear free; which was precisely what Meade did do. . . . Under the impression that Lee's army was spread out along the Susquehanna from Carlisle to York, Meade threw out his own forces fan-shaped to march in that direction. . . . The advance of Hill's corps, on the morning of July 1st, struck Buford's division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of Gettysburg, and in spite of a stout resistance forced it slowly back towards the town. The First Corps at this time was five miles south of Gettysburg. General Reynolds went to the support of Buford with the nearest division of the First Corps—Wadsworth's—and directed that the others follow. While forming this line of battle




# Map of the Battle-Field OF GETTYSBURG

July 1-3, 1863.

FROM THE "ATLAS TO ACCOMPANY THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES".


 Union Lines      Union Defenses  
 Confederate Lines      Confederate Defenses

SCALE OF MILES  
 THE MATTHEW-NORTHROP CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.



he was killed. . . . Before the Eleventh Corps came up the enemy could have walked right over the small force opposed to them, but owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry they had not been kept informed as to the movements Meade was making, and fearing that the whole Union army was concentrated in their front they were overcautious. There was now a lull in the battle for about an hour. The remainder of the First Corps came up and was followed soon after by the Eleventh Corps under General Schurz. About the same time the Confederate corps of General Ewell arrived and made a junction with that of Hill. General Howard assumed command of the Union forces. Repeated attacks were now made against the First Corps by Ewell from the north and Hill from the west; but the Confederate charges were successfully repulsed. . . . Ewell's attack also struck the Eleventh Corps on the right and front with great force. . . . General Meade, when he heard of Reynold's death, was 14 miles from Gettysburg at Taneytown, preparing to form line of battle along Pipe Creek. He at once sent General Hancock forward with orders to assume command of the field. Hancock, perceiving that Cemetery Ridge [about half a mile south of Gettysburg] was an admirable position for a defensive battle, determined to hold it if possible. . . . [and] directed Doubleday to send a force to Culp's Hill on the right, while he instructed Buford to parade up and down on the extreme left with his cavalry. The enemy were thus led to suppose that the Union line was a long one and had been heavily reinforced. As the losses on both sides had been tremendous, probably not exceeded for the same number of troops during the war, the enemy hesitated to advance, particularly as some movements of Kilpatrick's cavalry seemed to threaten their rear. They therefore deferred action until Meade concentrated the next day. On General Hancock's recommendation General Meade ordered his entire army to Gettysburg. . . . Most of the troops, though worn out with hard marching, arrived by midday of July 2d. The Sixth Corps had 34 miles to march and came later in the afternoon. . . . The attack as ordered by General Lee was to begin with Longstreet on the right and be made 'en échelon.' That is, as soon as Longstreet was fairly engaged, Hill's corps was to take up the fight and go in, and as soon as Hill was fairly engaged, Ewell's corps on the right was to attack. The object was to keep the whole Union line in a turmoil at once, and prevent reinforcements going from any corps not engaged to another that was fighting; but Hill did not act until Longstreet's fight was over, and Ewell did not act until Hill had been repulsed. . . . The enemy . . . failed in every attack against Meade's main line, with the exception of that portion south of Culp's Hill. Elated by the fact that he had made a lodgement there Ewell determined to hold on at all hazards and sent heavy reinforcements to make an attack in the morning. . . . So ended the battle of the second day. At day dawn [July 3] General Warren, acting for General Meade, established a cordon of troops and batteries which drove Johnson out of his position on the right. . . . Lee having failed in his attacks both on Meade's left and right had to decide at once whether he would give up the contest and retreat, or make another attempt to force the Union line. As he had been reinforced by Stuart's cavalry, and as a fresh division under Pickett was avail-

able, he determined to try to pierce the left center of the Union army and disperse the force opposed to him. To this end he directed Longstreet to form a strong column of attack to be composed of Pickett's division and Pettigrew's division and two brigades of Pender's division, under Trimble, of Hill's corps. To create confusion and prevent General Meade from sending reinforcements to the menaced point Stuart was ordered to ride around the right of the Union army and make an attack in rear. And still more to facilitate the attack 135 guns were to concentrate their fire against the Union center and disperse the forces assembled there. About 1 P. M. the terrific cannonade began and lasted for two hours, by which time the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted. . . . Stuart's cavalry attack proved abortive, for it was met and frustrated by two brigades of Gregg's cavalry aided by Custer's brigade, after a severe battle, which was hotly contested on both sides. Stuart's further progress was checked and he was forced to retreat. . . . Pickett formed his great column of attack and came forward as soon as the fire from the Union batteries slackened." Fresh guns had, however, been brought into position and swept the ground over which Pickett moved. His charge, one of the most desperately determined of the whole war, was heroically met by Gibbon's division of the Second corps and by part of the First corps, under the personal direction of General Hancock, who was severely wounded in the terrible conflict. Pickett was forced to retreat with the survivors of his onslaught, and "the whole plain was soon covered with fugitives; but, as no pursuit was ordered, General Lee in person succeeded in rallying them and in re-forming the line of battle. The next day, July 4th, General Lee drew back his flanks and at evening began his retreat by two routes—the main body on the direct road to Williamsport through the mountains, the other via Chambersburg, the latter including the immense train of the wounded. Gregg's division (except Huey's brigade) was sent in pursuit by way of Chambersburg, but the enemy had too much the start to render the chase effective. Kilpatrick, however, got in front of the main body on the direct route, and, after a midnight battle at Monterey, fought during a terrific thunder storm, succeeded in making sad havoc of Ewell's trains. . . . Lee concentrated his army in the vicinity of Williamsport, but as French had destroyed his pontoon bridge, and as the Potomac had risen, he was unable to cross. He therefore fortified his position. Meade did not follow Lee directly, but went around by way of Frederick. After considerable delay the Union army again confronted that of Lee and were about—under orders from President Lincoln—to make an attack, when Lee slipped away on the night of July 14th to the Virginia side of the Potomac. This ended the campaign of Gettysburg. The Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded, 5,434 missing. Total, 23,003. The Confederate loss was 2,502 killed, 12,700 wounded, 5,150 missing. Total, 20,451."—A. Doubleday, *Gettysburg made plain*.—On the same day that the battle of Gettysburg was won, Vicksburg had fallen, and Bragg was driven back on Chattanooga. "The summer of 1863 presented the most interesting epoch of the war. The baffling of Lee's second attempt to invade the North left the struggle in Virginia about as it had been before, except that Lee's veteran army continued to grow steadily

stronger in morale and weaker in numbers. The operations at the West, however, had been very disastrous to the Confederates. . . . Some critics, writing at a later time, have held that these conditions demanded the abandonment of the Confederate cause, and called for a suit for peace on the part of the Southerners, upon whatever terms the Federal Government might be willing to grant. Those who take this view do so, it would seem, upon inadequate conceptions of the conditions and the facts. . . . The South was still possessed of a vast area unplatted for military purposes, abounding in obstacles that might be made effective against any adversary's advance. Still more important, there remained the spirit of the army and an unconquerable determination on the part of the people. . . . It was their fixed belief that their own cause in this Confederate war was identical with that of their Revolutionary forefathers, and they would have held themselves in contempt had they shown a readier spirit of surrender than that of the earlier Americans. . . . Finally, there remained the Army of Northern Virginia, under command of Robert E. Lee. For them to have abandoned their cause while such an army under such a commander was still in the field would have been a confession of weakness and cowardice wholly beyond conception by such men. The war was not yet over. The men who were fighting it on the side of the South were still so potent in arms that in that very month of July, 1863, the Government of the United States found it necessary to resort to an enforced draft in order to raise the 300,000 men called for three months before, to reinforce armies that already outnumbered those of the South by two to one and more. So far was the Confederacy at that time from defeat and the necessity of surrender that for a space it was exceedingly uncertain whether or not the north would furnish the quotas now called for. . . . On both sides [North and South] men professed and honestly believed that their supreme concern was for the maintenance—in Mr. Lincoln's phrase—of a 'government of the people, by the people and for the people.' Yet on each side there existed, and men consented to it, a military despotism as arbitrary, as unreasoning, and as tyrannical as that of Russia itself. On either side no man could travel without permission of some provost authority which there was nowhere any power to question or any court to curb. On either side that military power which our Constitution requires to be always subordinate to the civil arm, had laid its iron hand without even the disguise of a velvet glove upon the fate and fortune and life of every citizen of a land supposed to be the freest on earth. . . . The despotism thus established at the South was more perfect and more arbitrary than that which fell upon the North because at the South there was practically no party in existence that antagonized the powers that were, while at the North there was such a party that must in some ways be reckoned with. Moreover, at the North the citizen who felt that he could not endure the despotism had at any rate the option to flee from it, and take up his residence in some foreign country . . .; while the Southerner who felt himself equally oppressed and wronged was completely shut in and compelled to submit. . . . These were the conditions of the war at midsummer, 1863, after Lee's retirement from Gettysburg, and after the loss of Vicksburg, Port Hudson and the Mississippi river

by the Confederates. They were certainly not conditions suggesting an abandonment of the struggle by either of the contestants, or at all clearly foreshadowing its end in victory for either. Anything in the way of results still remained possible. To hopeful minds on either side everything of good seemed likely to happen. So the war went on."—G. C. Eggleston, *History of the Confederate war*, v. 2, pp. 171-173, 178-180.

ALSO IN: A. Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 6, pt. 2)*.—J. Longstreet, H. J. Hunt and others, *Gettysburg (Battles and leaders, v. 3)*.—F. A. Walker, *History of the 2nd Army Corps, ch. 8*.—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, ch. 15*.—Comte de Paris, *History of the American Civil War, v. 3, bk. 3, ch. 4*.—D. X. Junkin and F. H. Norton, *Life of General Hancock, ch. 11-13*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 27*.—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the Constitution, v. 2, ch. 25*.—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States, pp. 558-562*.—G. Bradford, *Portrait of General George Gordon Meade (American Historical Review, Jan., 1915)*.

1863 (June-July: Tennessee).—Tullahoma campaign.—"Both Grant and Halleck were anxious that Rosecrans should advance against Bragg to prevent him sending reinforcements to Vicksburg. Rosecrans, however . . . considered that as long as he continued to occupy his lines at Murfreesborough, Bragg would keep all his army united in his front, because the possession of Middle Tennessee seemed to the Confederates of sufficient importance to justify Bragg's whole army remaining inactive, until the Army of the Cumberland should resume its advance. If, on the other hand, he succeeded in driving Bragg from his works at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, then the Confederate general would be very likely to move westwards, at any rate with part of his forces, and reinforce Johnston, who was operating against Grant's rear. . . . Bragg, for his part, was quite satisfied to remain where he was, so long as his presence there prevented Rosecrans from sending reinforcements to Grant's aid. It was not till the end of June that Rosecrans resumed his long-interrupted advance against Bragg. The movement was to be made in co-operation with an advance of the Army of the Ohio under Burnside into East Tennessee against Knoxville. If Rosecrans was slow to move, he proved himself a strategist of great ability when the campaign was actually begun. His army had been organised by an order of the War Department into three Corps, the 14th under Thomas, the 20th under McCook, and the 21st under Crittenden. In February reinforcements had reached him under General Gordon Granger, which were formed into a reserve Corps under that commander. His plan of campaign was to make a feint with Granger's Corps and most of his cavalry against Polk's force at Shelbyville, whilst the three main Corps made a flanking movement round Bragg's right by way of Manchester, a point on the branch line between McMinnville and Tullahoma, and within twelve miles of the latter place. The movement commenced on June 23rd, and met with complete success. [General Thomas, in command of the Fourteenth Corps, drove the Confederates from Hoover's Gap. General McCook, with the Twentieth Corps, took Liberty Gap, after severe fighting. The Twenty-first Corps (General Crittenden in command) met with little opposition.] In spite of the incessant rain, which rendered marching very difficult, the 14th Corps was concentrated at Manchester on

the night of the 27th. On the same day some brilliant work by the Federal cavalry on the right revealed the fact that Bragg had abandoned his lines at Shelbyville. . . . On July 1st it was discovered that Tullahoma had been evacuated, and the troops . . . were pushed to the front in vigorous pursuit. Bragg, however, safely withdrew his army, retarding the pursuit by destroying the bridges over the swollen streams. He crossed the mountains and took up a fresh position at Chattanooga on the eastern bank of the Tennessee. Rosecrans's operations so far had been brilliantly successful. In a nine days' campaign [which terminated on July 4] he had manœuvred the enemy out of two strong positions and forced him to retire behind the Tennessee. He had captured eleven guns and 1,000 prisoners, whilst his own loss only amounted to 560 in all."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, pp. 276-277.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, *Life of General Geo. H. Thomas*, ch. 5.—Idem, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, v. 1, ch. 10.—H. M. Cist, *Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War*, v. 7).—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 14.—D. S. Stanley, *Tullahoma campaign (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery Loyal Legion of the United States*, v. 3).

1863 (July: On the Mississippi).—Defence of Helena.—"One of the most brilliant of the minor victories of the war was gained at Helena, Arkansas, on the west bank of the Mississippi, on the 4th of July. General Holmes [Confederate] had asked and received permission to take that place, in the middle of June, and had mustered for that purpose an army of nearly 10,000 men. The garrison of Helena consisted of a division of the Thirteenth Corps and a brigade of cavalry numbering in all 4000 men, commanded by Major-General B. M. Prentiss. Holmes . . . assaulted at daylight with converging columns, two of which made considerable impression upon the outworks, but never reached the town. The defense of the Union troops was singularly skilful and energetic, and, after a few hours of fighting, Holmes, finding himself utterly defeated, retired at half-past ten. The little army of Prentiss was, of course, too small to pursue. The last Confederate attempt to hold the Mississippi River thus ended in a complete and most humiliating repulse."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 7, ch. 11.

1863 (July: Mississippi).—Capture and destruction of Jackson.—When Vicksburg surrendered, Johnston was hovering in the rear of Grant's army, and Sherman was watching his movements. On the very day the surrender was completed the latter marched rapidly upon Jackson, with 50,000 men, Johnston retreating before him. The city was invested on the 10th, and defended by the Confederates until the night of the 16th when they evacuated with haste. General Sherman, writing to Admiral Porter on the 19th of July, said: "We . . . have 500 prisoners, are still pursuing and breaking railroads, so that the good folks of Jackson will not soon again hear the favorite locomotive whistle. The enemy burned nearly all the handsome dwellings round about the town because they gave us shelter or to light up the ground to prevent night attacks. He also set fire to a chief block of stores in which were commissary supplies, and our men, in spite of guards, have widened the circle of fire, so that Jackson, once the pride and boast of Mississippi, is now a ruined town. State-house, Governor's

mansion, and some fine dwellings, well within the lines of intrenchments, remain untouched. I have been and am yet employed in breaking up the railroad 40 miles north and 60 south; also 10 miles east. My 10-miles break west, of last May, is still untouched, so that Jackson ceases to be a place for the enemy to collect stores and men."—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 24, pt. 3, p. 531.

ALSO IN: J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of military operations*, ch. 8.

1863 (July: Kentucky).—John Morgan's raid into Ohio and Indiana.—"The most famous raid of this time was that made in July by John Morgan across the Ohio River. General Buckner was then in East Tennessee, near the borders of Kentucky, getting ready to make another dash toward Louisville, and Morgan went ahead to prepare the way. He crossed the Cumberland River into Kentucky with about 3,000 mounted men, sacked Columbia, captured Lebanon with 400 prisoners, and rode on through Bardstow to Brandenburg on the Ohio River, plundering and destroying as he went. Many Kentuckians had joined him on the way, and he then had 4,000 men and ten pieces of artillery. The advance of Rosecrans's army just at that time prevented Buckner from joining him, and Morgan determined to cross into Indiana. There were two gunboats in the river, but he kept them off with his artillery while his men crossed on two captured steamboats. Morgan then rode through Indiana toward Cincinnati fighting home guards, tearing up railroads, burning bridges and mills and capturing much property. The whole State was aroused by the danger, and thousands of armed men started after the bold riders. Morgan became alarmed, and after passing around Cincinnati, almost within sight of its steeples, turned toward the Ohio to cross again into Kentucky. A large Union force was following, others were advancing on his flanks, and gunboats and steamboats filled with armed men were moving up the river to cut him off. The people aided the pursuers all they could by cutting down trees and barricading the roads to stop Morgan's march. He was so delayed by these and other things that he did not reach the Ohio until July 10th. He hoped to cross at a place called Buffington Ford, but the Union men were upon him and he had to turn and fight. After a severe battle, in which the Union troops were helped by gunboats which cut off the raiders from crossing the ford, about 800 of Morgan's men surrendered, and the rest, with Morgan himself, fled up the river fourteen miles to Belleville, where they tried to cross by swimming their horses. About 300 men had succeeded in getting over when the gunboats came up and opened fire on them. A fearful scene ensued, for it was a struggle of life and death. . . . Some got across, some were shot and some drowned. Morgan was not among the fortunate ones who escaped. With about 200 men he fled further up the river to New Lisbon, where he was surrounded and forced to surrender. This was a wonderful raid, but it did not do the Confederate cause any good. A large part of the property destroyed was private property, and this roused the anger of all the people of the Border States. . . . Morgan and some of his officers were sent to Columbus and confined in the penitentiary, from which he and six others escaped in the following November by making a hole through the bottom of their cell and digging a tunnel under the foundations of the building."—J. D. Champlin, Jr.,

*Young folk's history of the War for the Union*, ch. 31.

ALSO IN: B. W. Duke, *History of Morgan's cavalry*, ch. 14-15.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 23.

1863 (July: New York).—Draft riots.—Although the opposition to the administration declared the Conscription Act to be unconstitutional, and there was some local excitement, the draft proceeded quietly until Saturday, July 11, the day appointed for the first drawing in New York City. There was little or no agitation on that day; but discussion of the first day's draft produced a violent outbreak on the Monday following. (See NEW YORK: 1863.) In his diary, under date of July 15, Gideon Welles, secretary of the navy, said: "The papers are filled with accounts of mobs, riots, burnings and murders in New York. There have been outbreaks to resist the draft in several other places. This is anarchy,—the fruit of the seed sown by the Seymours and others. In New York, Gov. Horatio Seymour is striving—probably earnestly now—to extinguish the flames he has contributed to kindle. Unless speedy and decisive measures are taken, the government and country will be imperiled. . . . Seward called on me to-day with the draft of a Proclamation for Thanksgiving on the 29th inst. With Meade's failure to capture or molest Lee in his retreat and with mobs to reject the laws, it was almost a mockery. . . . July 16th. It is represented that the mob in New York is about subdued. Why it was permitted to continue so long and commit such excess has not been explained. Governor Seymour, whose partisans constituted the rioters, and whose partisanship encouraged them, has been in New York talking nambypamby. This Sir Forcible Feeble is himself chiefly responsible for the outrage."—Gideon Welles, *Diary*, v. 1, p. 372.

ALSO IN: J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 320-322.—J. B. Fry, *New York and the conscription of 1863*.

1863 (July: South Carolina).—Lodgment on Morris island.—Assault on Fort Wagner.—In the South Carolina district, "attention was centered on the operations against the defences of Charleston on the south side, especially Fort Wagner on Morris Island, by the army and navy combined. . . . General Gillmore had been making preparations for it in June, and on July 6th Admiral Dahlgren came to relieve Dupont. Gillmore, a first rate engineer . . . after the failure of the naval attack on April 7th, . . . [was] consulted as to the silencing of Sumter so that the ironclads could go up the harbour. He thought that it might be done by rifled guns from Morris Island, but said that with the small force available no advance could be made against the city from the swampy islands at the mouth of the harbour against the Confederate works and forces on James Island. The army work was to be restricted to taking Morris Island and silencing Fort Sumter. . . . The creeks of the inland waters behind the coast islands communicated with the waters held by the Union fleet and were strongly fortified, where they approached Charleston. Several Union attacks here had been beaten. The Union held the coast islands, except Morris Island. By adding the little garrisons to the Port Royal force, there would be 11,000 men available; they had some 200 pound Parrott guns, and some heavy mortars. Much of the ground was deep swamp, while Battery Wagner, the principal objective, was a very strong work, which had been closed in rear during the siege, and made into a small

fort. It extended right across the island, which was a low neck in front, often awash at high tide, and all approach was over absolutely open ground, flanked by the Confederate batteries on James Island. The first move was a demonstration up Stono Inlet, when a landing was effected on Morris Island on July 10th. Next day an unsuccessful attack was made on the fort. Batteries were made, armed and opened, and another attempt made on the 18th, which was beaten by a terrible musketry fire at close range. On the first occasion, four monitors supported the attack, on the second the flagship and five monitors."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, pp. 255-256.—General Israel Vogdes, who had fortified the southern end of the island, "under Gilmore's direction, constructed ten powerful batteries near its southern extremity. . . to protect the debarkation of the troops, and to cover their retreat in case of necessity. Most of this work was done at night, and all of it as silently as possible. . . . Alfred H. Terry's division of 4,000 and George C. Strong's brigade of 2,500 were quietly brought together on Folly Island, and on the afternoon of the 8th of July the former force was sent up the Stono to make a demonstration against James Island, while Strong's brigade was ordered to descend upon Morris Island at daybreak of the 9th. Colonel T. W. Higginson of the First South Carolina Volunteers, colored, was ordered at the same time to cut the railroad between Charleston and Savannah; a duty in which General Gillmore says he 'signally failed.' . . . Terry's feint against Stono was so imposing as to be taken for the real attack, by Beauregard, who hastily gathered together a considerable force to resist him, and paid little attention to the serious movement on the beach." The Confederate troops on Morris island, taken by surprise, were "speedily driven out of all their batteries south of Wagner, and abandoned to Gillmore three-fourths of the island, with 11 pieces of heavy ordnance. The next day he ordered Strong's brigade to assault Fort Wagner, an attempt which failed, with slight loss on each side. On the 16th Terry . . . [repulsed an attack, but] was recalled to Folly Island, the purpose of his demonstration having been accomplished. Although General Gillmore had as yet no conception of the enormous strength of Fort Wagner, the assault and repulse of the 11th of July convinced him that it could not be carried off-hand. He therefore determined, on consultation with Admiral Dahlgren, to establish counter-batteries against it. . . . By the morning of the 18th, exactly one week after the first assault." General Gillmore was ready for the second. The batteries and the fleet opened fire on the fort at noon of July 18; its defenders were soon driven from the parapets, and "in the course of the afternoon the whole work seemed to be beaten out of shape; [but, being constructed of fine quartz sand, it had suffered damage only in appearance. At twilight, the storming party, headed by Colonel Robert G. Shaw and his Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment of colored troops, made a most brave and resolute assault, actually climbing the parapet of the fort, but only to leave 1500 dead, dying and wounded upon its treacherous sands. The heroic young Colonel Shaw fell dead among the foremost men; General Strong, Colonel Chatfield and Colonel Putnam were killed or mortally wounded; General Truman Seymour was wounded severely, and many other excellent officers were in the lists of the slain or the sadly disabled]."—J. G.

Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 7, ch. 15.

ALSO IN: T. W. Higginson, *Army life in a black regiment*.—G. W. Williams, *History of the negro troops*, ch. 9.—M. V. Dahlgren, *Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren*, ch. 14.—A. Roman, *Military operation of General Beauregard*, v. 2, ch. 31.—D. Ammen, *Navy in the Civil War*, v. 2: *Atlantic coast*, ch. 7.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 28.—L. F. Emilio, *History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers*, ch. 4-5.

1863 (July-November: Virginia).—Meade and Lee on the Rapidan.—Bristoe Station.—Rappahannock Station.—Kelly's Ford.—Mine Run.—July 18 found the whole army of General Meade once more on the Virginia side of the Potomac. "His plan for the pursuit of Lee was not unlike that of McClellan a year before, but although he displayed much greater expedition and energy in the execution of it than were shown by his predecessor, the results, through no fault of his own, were unimportant. General French, who had taken no part in the battle of Gettysburg, had been placed in command of the Third Corps; he was an old officer of the regular army, excellent in drill, in routine, and all the every-day details of the service, but utterly unfit for an enterprise requiring great audacity and celerity. He was assigned upon this expedition to the duty of throwing his corps through Manassas Gap and attacking the flank of the enemy as he moved southward by Front Royal. Meade succeeded in getting French into the Gap in time to have broken the rebel army in two; but when he attacked, it was in so inefficient a manner, and with so small a portion of his force, that the day was wasted and the enemy made their way down the Valley to the lower gaps. This failure was a source of deep mortification to General Meade. . . . The pursuit of the enemy was not continued further. . . . The months of August and September were a period of repose for the Army of the Potomac. It was in fact in no condition to undertake active operations; a considerable body of troops had been taken from Meade for service in South Carolina, and a strong detachment had been sent to the City of New York for the purpose of enforcing the draft there. General Lee had retired behind the Rapidan for several weeks of rest; neither army was ready at that time to attack the other." Early in September Longstreet's corps was detached from Lee's army and sent west to strengthen Bragg at Chattanooga, and in the latter part of the same month about 13,000 men (Eleventh and Twelfth Corps) were taken from Meade and sent, under Hooker's command, to the same scene of pending conflict. "But even with this reduction of his command, after the return of the troops detached to the North, Meade found himself with an army of about 68,000 men; and, knowing this force to be somewhat superior to that of the enemy, he resolved to cross the Rapidan and attack him; but again, as so often happened in the history of the contending armies in Virginia, Lee had formed the project of a similar enterprise, and began its execution a day or two in advance. He had learned of the departure of two corps for the West." On October 9 "he began a flanking movement to the right of the Union line."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 9.—"Conceiving that the Confederates would move by the Warrenton pike, in order to cross Bull Run and get possession of Centreville—thus to interpose between the Federal army and Washington—Meade retired as speedily as possible. He had, in reality, the

start in the race, notwithstanding the day's loss in the return movement. . . . On the morning of the 14th, Lee advanced from Warrenton in two columns, but not by the 'pike.' The left, under Hill, moving by the turnpike to New Baltimore, was ordered to strike the railroad at Bristoe Station; the right column, under Ewell, taking a more easterly route, was directed to effect a junction at the same point. When Hill approached Bristoe, Meade's army, with the exception of Warren's corps, had passed that point. As the head of this column came up, the 5th Corps, under General Sykes, had just crossed Broad Run. Hill at once formed a line of battle to attack the rear of that corps, when Warren came up, and, by a bold onset, drove the enemy back, securing 450 prisoners and 5 guns. The National army, having won the race for position, and obtained possession of the heights of Centreville, Lee's movement was at an end, and he had but to retire to his old line again. . . . and, on the 18th, began his retrograde movement. The following day Meade commenced pursuit, with the intention of attacking the enemy on his retreat, but did not overtake him, being detained by a heavy rain storm, which so raised Bull Run as to render it unfordable. . . . On the 7th of November the whole army was put in motion toward the Rappahannock, along which river the enemy was in position at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford. In two columns Meade advanced toward these points. General French, commanding the left wing—composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d Corps—was directed to cross at Kelly's Ford, while the right wing—comprising the 5th and 6th Corps, under General Sedgwick—marched upon Rappahannock Station. The 3d Corps, under Birney, led the advance on Kelly's Ford. Reaching that point, without waiting for pontoons, Birney crossed his own division by wading, carried the rifle-pits, captured 500 prisoners and prevented the enemy re-enforcing their troops at the Ford, by means of batteries which he planted on the hills that commanded the crossing. At the same time the right wing was contending against more formidable obstacles at Rappahannock Station. Early's division of Ewell's corps occupied a series of works on the north side of the river. . . . Gaining a good position, commanding the fort from the rear, Sedgwick planted his guns and opened a fierce cannonade upon the enemy's several batteries. Under cover of this fire, the temporary works were assaulted and carried at the bayonet's point. Over 1,500 prisoners, 4 guns and 8 standards were captured. Sedgwick's loss was about 300 in killed and wounded. The right column now crossed the river, without opposition, and, uniting with French's forces, advanced to Brandy Station. November 8th was lost in getting forward the trains, and in reconnoitering. Under cover of that night Lee withdrew across the Rapidan. Taking position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, Meade remained quietly and undisturbed for two weeks. Finding Lee indisposed for action, the Federal leader resolved once more to try and bring on a general engagement. . . . The Confederate army having gone into winter quarters, was located over a wide extent of country. . . . This separation of the enemy's corps, led Meade to hope, that, by crossing the lower fords of the Rapidan, and advancing rapidly on the plank and turnpike roads to Orange, C. H., he could concentrate his army against Ewell's corps, cripple or destroy it, and then be able to turn upon Hill, and in this way break Lee's army in

detail." But delays occurred which "frustrated the object of the movement; . . . disclosed Meade's intention to the enemy, who at once concentrated his entire force [in a strong position]. . . . In front was Mine Run, a shallow stream, but difficult to cross on account of its deep banks, the marshy nature of the ground, and the dense undergrowth with which it was flanked. . . . This was the end of a movement, which, like Hooker's advance to flank Fredericksburg, opened with fair promise of success, and, like that advance, was a failure from incidents which the situation permitted rather than asserted."—O. J. Victor, *History of the Southern Rebellion*, div. 12, v. 4, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 10.—J. E. Cooke, *Life of General Robert E. Lee*, pt. 7.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 29.—A. A. Humphreys, *From Gettysburg to the Rapidan*.

1863 (August: Missouri-Kansas).—Quantrell's guerrilla raid.—Sacking and burning of Lawrence.—After the fall of Vicksburg, many confederate soldiers returned from "Arkansas to their homes in Western Missouri, and under the secret orders so frequently sent from commanders in the South into that State, the guerrilla bands along the Kansas border suddenly grew in numbers and audacity. Though the whole region was patrolled almost day and night by Union detachments and scouts, a daring leader named Quantrell, who had been for some weeks threatening various Kansas towns, assembled a band of 300 picked and well-mounted followers at a place of rendezvous near the line, about sunset of August 20. His object being divined, half a dozen Union detachments from different points started in chase of him; but skilfully eluding all of them by an eccentric march, Quantrell crossed the State line, and, reaching the open prairie country, where roads were unnecessary, pushed directly for Lawrence, Kansas. [He pillaged the town and set fire to a large number of buildings before he retreated. Between 150 and 200 of the inhabitants lost their lives in the attack, and about 100 of Quantrell's men were cut off and killed in the pursuit by the Federals.]—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, p. 211.

1863 (August-September: Tennessee).—Burnside's deliverance of East Tennessee.—Union army in Knoxville.—"Ever since the Federals had become masters of Kentucky [see above: 1862 (January-February: Kentucky-Tennessee)] they had projected an expedition into East Tennessee. . . . Early in the year 1862 the Federals had taken the defile of Cumberland Gap, the principal door to East Tennessee; but drawn into pursuit of their adversaries in other directions, they had very wisely renounced proceeding beyond the gap, and shortly thereafter the Confederates had retaken the defile. In 1863 the rôle of liberator of East Tennessee was reserved for General Burnside: it was an honorable compensation accorded to the unfortunate but gallant soldier vanquished at Fredericksburg. Two divisions of the Ninth Corps designated to undertake this campaign having been, on June 4th, sent to the aid of Grant, it became necessary to commence new preparations. The scattered troops in Kentucky, several regiments recruited in that State or composed of refugees from East Tennessee, and a part of the fresh levies made in Ohio and Indiana, formed the Twenty-third Corps, under the orders of General Hartsuff. At the end of June . . . this little army was in readiness to move, when Morgan started on his

raid [and Burnside's troops were sent in the pursuit]. Six weeks were lost. It was the beginning of August. The Ninth Corps was coming back from Vicksburg. But the men, worn out by the climate, had need of rest. Burnside could not wait for them." He set out upon his movement into East Tennessee with about 20,000 men, leaving Camp Nelson, near Lexington, on August 16. The Confederate General Buckner opposed him with an equal number, including 3,000 under General Fraser at Cumberland Gap. Instead of attempting to force the passage of the gap, Burnside "determined to make a flank movement around the defile, by traversing more to the south, in the State of Tennessee, the high table-land which on that side bears the designation of Cumberland plateau. The roads which Burnside would have to cross were long and difficult to travel, and that portion of the country was little known, besides being bare of resources; but the very difficult character of the roads warranted the belief that the Confederates would be illy prepared for defence in that region. No precaution was neglected to ensure the success of this laborious and perilous march," and the success achieved was perfect. "One can understand with what joy the Federals, after eleven days of toilsome march, entered the rich valley, a kind of promised land, which stretched out before them. Public rumor had greatly exaggerated their numbers. . . . Bragg, fearing with reason lest by its flanking movements it [the division which Burnside led in person] should separate him from Buckner and then fall upon Chattanooga, had sent his lieutenant an order to evacuate Knoxville." Buckner withdrew and Burnside made a triumphal entry into Knoxville on September 3. "According to the testimony of eye-witnesses, the joy of the people was beyond description. Innumerable Federal flags which had been preserved in secret were displayed at the windows. [Fraser, who had not been withdrawn from Cumberland Gap, found himself entrapped, when, on September 9, Burnside appeared before his works, and he surrendered without a shot.]"—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 4, bk. 1, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pt. 3, ch. 4-5.—T. W. Humes, *Loyal mountaineers of East Tennessee*, ch. 13.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 30, pt. 2.—J. Fiske, *Mississippi valley in the Civil War*, p. 257.

1863 (August-September: Tennessee).—Rosecrans's advance to Chattanooga.—Evacuation by Confederates.—Battle of Chickamauga.—Since his success in the Tullahoma campaign (see above: 1863 [June-July: Tennessee]), Rosecrans had been urged from Washington to pursue his attack and dislodge the enemy from the mountains. But he delayed further movements for a month, repairing his railroad communications, asking for reinforcements, and waiting for corn to ripen for food and forage. "For a proper appreciation of the difficulties with which Rosecrans had to contend, a brief mention must be made of the topography of the region in which he was about to operate. The general course of the Alleghany Mountains is from north-east to south-west. The Cumberland Mountains form the most westerly range of the great chain, and separate the upper waters of the Cumberland and Tennessee. On the eastern bank of the latter river a succession of parallel mountain ranges confronted him. The first range, which runs parallel and very close to the river, is known as Raccoon Mountain. Parallel to this

range is Look-out Mountain, a hundred miles in length, and reaching the Tennessee about two miles south of Chattanooga. The valley between these two ranges is drained by Look-out Creek and is traversed by a railway branching off from the main line at Wauhatchie and terminating at Trenton. East of Look-out Mountain rose Missionary Ridge, some forty miles long and running up to the river above the town. These two ranges enclosed the Chattanooga Valley, drained by the Chattanooga Creek, near whose mouth the town of the same name is situated. [The name Chattanooga was popularly believed to mean 'hawk's nest.'] East of Missionary Ridge come Chickamauga Valley, drained by the West Chickamauga Creek, and Pigeon Mountain. Still further east rise Chickamauga Hill and Taylor's Ridge, drained by the Middle and East Chickamauga Creeks. Last of the series comes Chattanooga Mountain, and be-



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yond it runs the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, which formed Bragg's line of supplies. From Winchester Rosecrans commenced his movement across the Cumberland Mountains. The 14th and 20th Corps reached the river near Stevenson and Bridgeport, whilst the 21st Corps moved through the Sequatchie Valley and part of it appeared opposite and above Chattanooga, thus confirming Bragg in his anticipation that the crossing would be above the town."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, p. 279.—"As soon as the railroad to Stevenson was in thorough repair, and a sufficiency of supplies accumulated there, Rosecrans crossed the Cumberland Mountains and descended into the valley of the Tennessee river. The more effectually to hoodwink Bragg, he kept his left wing thrown out so as to menace Chattanooga from the north; and on the 20th of August he began shelling the town from across the river. . . . Between the 29 of August and the 4th of September, still keeping up his demonstra-

tions on the left, Rosecrans moved the great bulk of his army across the river and began his march over Raccoon Mountain. . . . These movements were completed by the 8th of September. When Bragg first began to hear of them he was incredulous, but at length, on the 7th and 8th of September, taking in the situation and seeing his communications threatened, he evacuated Chattanooga and moved twenty-five miles south of Lafayette, where he covered the railroad and hoped to fall heavily upon the Federal columns as they debouched from the mountain passes. On the 9th Crittenden's corps marched from Wauhatchie into Chattanooga and took possession of that long-coveted town."—J. Fiske, *Mississippi valley in the Civil War*, pp. 261-262.—"Thus the first object of Rosecrans's campaign was accomplished; the important strategic point Chattanooga was obtained. . . . Rosecrans, believing himself perfectly secure in Chattanooga, and being convinced that Bragg was fleeing southward, did nothing to fortify himself. Taking measures to pursue his antagonist, he directed Crittenden to leave one brigade at Chattanooga as a garrison, and with the rest move forward to Ringgold. Thomas was to march to Lafayette, and McCook upon Alpine and Summer Creek. But Bragg, so far from continuing, had stopped his retreat—he was concentrating at Lafayette. He had received, or was on the point of receiving, the powerful reinforcements directed to join him. He was strictly ordered to check the farther advance of the Army of the Cumberland. . . . Rosecrans had separated three corps of his army by mountain ridges and by distances greater than those intervening between each of them and the enemy. Bragg had concentrated opposite his centre, and was holding such a position that he could attack any of them with overwhelming numbers. He had caused deserters and citizens to go into Rosecrans's lines to confirm him in the impression that the Confederates were in rapid retreat. . . . On the 11th of September, Crittenden, not stopping to fortify Chattanooga, pushed on toward Ringgold to cut off Buckner, who he had heard was coming from East Tennessee to the support of Bragg. Finding that Buckner had already passed, he turned toward Lafayette to follow him, going up the east side of the Chickamauga, but meeting a steadily increasing resistance he took alarm, and fell back across that stream at Lee and Gordon's Mills. The forces he had encountered were Cheatham's and Walker's divisions. Thomas, who had now discovered Bragg's position, directed McCook, who was advancing on Rome, to fall back instantly and connect with him. Rosecrans's troops had thus become scattered along an extended line from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Alpine, a space of about forty miles. By the 17th they were brought more within supporting distance, and on the morning of the 18th a concentration was begun toward Crawfish Spring, but it was slowly executed. At this time the two armies were confronting each other on the opposite banks of the Chickamauga, a stream which, rising at the junction of Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain . . . empties into the beautiful Tennessee River above Chattanooga. In the Indian tongue Chickamauga means 'The Stagnant Stream,' 'The River of Death'—a name, . . . of ominous import. Rosecrans was on the west bank of the Chickamauga. . . . On the 18th his right was . . . at Gordon's Mills, his left near the road across from Rossville. Bragg's intention was to flank this left



and interpose between it and Chattanooga. . . . On the 18th Longstreet's troops were arriving from Virginia, and Bragg was ready . . . The battle of Chickamauga commenced on the morning of the 19th." Bragg's flanking movement, executed under General Polk, and directed against the left of Rosecrans's line, where Thomas had command, did not succeed. "The centre was then assailed and pressed back, but, having been re-enforced, it recovered its ground. Night came, and the battle was thus far indecisive. . . . The night was spent in preparation. Thomas constructed abatis and breastworks before his lines. . . . Bragg was still determined to flank the national left, and intervene between it and Chattanooga. He had ordered Polk to begin the battle as soon as it was light enough to see," but Polk delayed and it was not until ten o'clock that "Breckenridge's division, followed by Cleburne's, advanced against the breastworks of Thomas, which were mostly in Cleburne's front.

Everything depended on his firmness. . . . In the flight of the right and part of the centre from the field, Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden were enveloped and carried away. . . . Rosecrans . . . went to Chattanooga, and thence telegraphed to Washington that his army had been beaten. Thomas still remained immovable in his position [and at a critical moment he was saved from a movement into his rear, by General Gordon Granger, who pushed to the front with some reserves]."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, ch. 67, v. 3.—"After dark Thomas withdrew his troops to Rossville, where a strong position was taken up. So skilfully was the retirement conducted, that Bragg was not aware of it until the following morning. Throughout the 21st Thomas held his position at Rossville Gap, in order to secure time for Rosecrans to put Chattanooga into a state of defence, and the same evening withdrew his forces unmolested into the



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA, GEORGIA, SEPT. 19-20, 1863

(From a sketch by J. F. Hillen)

. . . With so much energy were these attacks made, that Thomas had to send repeatedly to Rosecrans for help. The Confederates had been gaining ground, but with these re-enforcements Thomas succeeded in driving back Cleburne with very great loss, and even in advancing on the right of Breckenridge." But, presently, by some blunder in the giving or construing of an order, one division—that of General Wood—was withdrawn from Rosecrans line and posted uselessly in the rear. "By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which Hindman, of Longstreet's corps, took instant advantage, and striking Davis in flank and rear, threw his whole division into confusion. . . . That break in the line was never repaired. Longstreet's masses charged with such terrible energy that it was impossible to check them. The national right and centre were dispersed, flying toward Rossville and Chattanooga. Sheridan, however, at length succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of his division, and managed to reach Thomas. On Thomas, who, in allusion to these events, is often called 'The Rock of Chickamauga,' the weight of the battle now fell.

town. . . . The fruits of the victory remained with the Confederates in the shape of some forty guns and the possession of the battlefield. But the victory itself was a barren one. It is probable that if Rosecrans, instead of returning to Chattanooga, had gone forward to Thomas and had seen for himself the condition of affairs, the order to retire to Rossville would never have been given."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the American Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, p. 285.—"During the heavy fighting of the 20th, Thomas was the only general officer on the field of rank above a division commander. . . . There is nothing finer in history than Thomas at Chickamauga. All things considered, the battle of Chickamauga, for the forces engaged, was the hardest fought and the bloodiest battle of the Rebellion. . . . The largest number of troops Rosecrans had of all arms on the field during the two days' fighting was 55,000 effective men. . . . Rosecrans's losses aggregated killed, 7,687; wounded, 9,304; missing, 5,255. Total loss, 16,336. Bragg, during the battle, when his entire five corps were engaged, had about 70,000 effective

troops in line. . . His losses, in part estimated, were 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing, a total of 20,950. A full report of the rebel losses was never made."—H. M. Cist, *Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 7, ch. 11-12)*.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America, v. 4, bk. 1, ch. 2-6*.—T. B. Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland, v. 1, ch. 20*.—Idem, *Life of Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, ch. 6-7*.—W. B. Hazen, *Narrative of military service, ch. 8-9*.—D. H. Hill, E. Opydycke, and others, *Chickamauga (Battles and leaders, v. 3)*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 30*.—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs, v. 1, ch. 15*.—D. Piatt, *Memoirs of the men who saved the Union, pp. 222-232*.

1863 (August-October: Arkansas-Missouri).—Breaking of Confederate authority in Arkansas.—Occupation of Little Rock by National forces.—Confederate raids into Missouri.—"After the surrender of Vicksburg, the Federal Gen. Steele was sent to Helena, with a considerable force, and instructed to form a junction with Gen. Davidson, who was moving south from Missouri, by way of Crowley's Ridge, west of the St. Francis, and with the combined force drive the Confederates south of the Arkansas River. Having effected this junction and established his depot and hospitals at Duvall's Bluff, on the White River, Gen. Steele, on the 1st of August, advanced against the Confederate army, which fell back toward Little Rock. After several successful skirmishes, he reached the Arkansas River, and threw part of his force upon the south side, to threaten the Confederate communications with Arkadelphia, their depot of supplies, and flank their position at Little Rock. Gen. Marmaduke was sent out with a cavalry force to beat the Federals back, but was completely routed. Seeing what must be the inevitable result of this movement of Gen. Steele, the Confederate Gen. Holmes destroyed what property he could, and after a slight resistance retreated with his army in great disorder, pursued by the Federal cavalry, and on the 10th of September, Gen. Steele, with the Federal army, entered the capital of Arkansas. His entire losses in killed, wounded and missing, in this whole movement, did not exceed 100. He captured 1,000 prisoners, and such public property as the Confederates had not time to destroy. The Federal cavalry continued to press the retreating Confederates southward; but a small force, which had eluded pursuit and moved eastward, attacked the Federal garrison at Pine Bluff, on the Arkansas, south of Little Rock, hoping to recapture it and thus cripple the Federals and break their communications. The attempt, which was made on the 28th of October, was repulsed with decided loss on the part of the confederates, and the same day the Federal cavalry occupied Arkadelphia, and the Confederates retreated toward the Red River. This completely restored Arkansas to the Federal authority, except a small district in the extreme southwest, and the region of Northwest Arkansas, over which the guerrilla and other irregular troops of the Confederates continued to roam, in their plundering excursions into Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian Territory. Some of these were conducted on a large scale. . . . The Confederate Gen. Cabell, collecting together as many of the guerrillas and Indians as possible, and some of the routed troops driven from Little Rock and its vicinity, started with a force variously estimated at from 4,000 to 10,000, in the latter part of September, from the Choctaw settlements of the

Indian Territory, crossed the Arkansas River east of Fort Smith, and, on the 1st of October, a detachment of his troops, under Gen. Shelby, joined Coffee at Crooked Prairie, Mo., intending to make a raid into Southwestern Missouri. This combined force, numbering 2,000 or 2,500 men, penetrated as far as the Missouri River at Booneville, but were pursued by the Missouri militia, and finally brought to a stand about eight miles southwest of Arrow Rock, on the evening of the 12th of October. Gen. E. B. Brown, who commanded the Federal troops, fought them till dark that evening, and during the night, having detached a small force to attack them in the rear, renewed the battle the next morning at eight A.M. After a sharp contest they fled, completely routed and broken up, with a loss of several hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. They were pursued to the Arkansas line and prisoners gleaned all the way. . . . With these last convulsive throes, the active existence of the Confederate authority in Arkansas died out. On the 12th of November a meeting was held at Little Rock, to consult on measures for the restoration of the State to the Union, and was succeeded by others in different parts of the State."—W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history of the Rebellion, ch. 36*.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America, v. 4, bk. 3, ch. 3*.—W. Britton, *Memoirs of the Rebellion on the border, ch. 21-22*.

1863 (August-December: South Carolina).—Siege and reduction of Fort Wagner.—Bombardment of Fort Sumter and Charleston.—After the unsuccessful assault and bloody repulse of July 18 (see above: 1863 [July: South Carolina]), General Gillmore began against Fort Wagner the operations of a regular siege. "Trenches were dug, and by the middle of August the batteries were within a quarter-mile of Wagner and within two and a half miles of Sumter. The work on these batteries had to be done mostly by night, for the forts kept up a heavy fire. Another battery was also begun in the marsh on the west side of Morris Island."—J. D. Champlin, Jr., *Young folk's history of the War for the Union, ch. 32*.—"The silencing of Sumter being the principal object, it was decided to attack it, and besiege Fort Wagner, at the same time, since Sumter was within the range of the guns mounted in the parallels for the attack of Wagner. The fire of the defence, in front and flank, was most severe, but the approaches moved forward steadily, and on August 17th the attack on Sumter began with such effect that it was soon a mass of ruins, having only one gun serviceable on the 24th.: it was reduced to an infantry outpost. Meanwhile the approaches to Wagner, aided by fire from the ships, were advancing, but the narrow neck in front was so difficult to pass that mortar fire was largely used, and the 'new Ironsides' came close in on September 5th. . . . Though the defenders' flank fire from James Island was maintained with great effect, the sap was close to the ditch on September 6th and the work was evacuated that night. This brought the fall of Battery Gregg . . . just opposite Sumter. Wagner was very strong, and practically uninjured. Fort Sumter was summoned to surrender, but [General Beauregard, who was in command in Charleston] refused, and on the 8th a boat attack was made on it, which failed. To put pressure on Charleston a sandbag battery was constructed on the swamp . . . armed with a 200-pound Parrott 'The Swamp Angel' which threw shells into the town at the then great range of 8,000 yards, but

burst after a few rounds, after which a pair of heavy mortars were put there, to attack James Island. . . . Sumter was heavily bombarded on October 26th, and at different times afterwards, to prevent guns being re-mounted. There were no more aggressive operations against the defences of Charleston."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, pp. 256-257.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 4, bk. 3, ch. 2.—A. Roman, *Military operations of General Beauregard*, v. 2, ch. 32-34.—C. B. Boynton, *History of the navy during the Rebellion*, v. 2, ch. 35.—L. F. Emilio, *History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers*, ch. 6-7.

1863 (October-November: Tennessee).—Raising of the siege of Chattanooga.—"Battle above the Clouds," on Lookout Mountain.—Assault of Missionary Ridge.—Rout of Bragg's army.—After its defeat at Chickamauga the National army was practically besieged on Chattanooga. Bragg acquired strong positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and was able to cut off all of Rosecrans routes of supply, except one long and difficult wagon-road. Longstreet proposed a move which would compel Rosecrans to come out and fight at a moment when the Confederates were in a stronger position than the Federal army; but the cautious Bragg preferred to sit down and try to starve him out. For a time the fates seemed to favor his project. The autumn rains came on, making the rough mountain roads almost impassable. It became more and more difficult for the Federals to move supplies through the mountains over the one road which was left to them. Army mules and horses died in large numbers for want of food, and the beleaguered army, which was almost faced with starvation, became unable to move for lack of sufficient transport. Burnside, only a hundred miles away in Eastern Tennessee, was ordered to Rosecrans's aid, but failed to move. The eleventh and twelfth corps were then detached from Meade, who was still watching Lee. These troops, under Hooker, were carried by train round through Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky and, on October 3, at the end of a week's journey, arrived at Stevenson, where headquarters were established, and means were taken to open communications with Rosecrans. Grant had been ordered, before Chickamauga was fought, to send re-inforcements to Rosecrans. Two divisions were on their way, and two others were about to follow, under command of Sherman; but news of their despatch had not yet reached the President and his advisers. Meantime, it became evident that his defeat had, for the time at least, destroyed Rosecrans's nerve, and that he was unable to extricate himself from his dilemma. On October 17 an important re-organization of the Union armies in the West was effected. "The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, were united under the title of Military Division of the Mississippi, of which General Grant was made commander, and Thomas superceded Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland. . . . Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23rd of October, and found affairs in a deplorable condition. . . . Grant's first care was to open a new and better line of supply. Steamers could come up the river as far as Bridgeport, and he ordered the immediate construction of a road and bridge to reach that point [for which Thomas had already given directions. By a clever piece of strategy, in which G. W. Smith distinguished himself, Brown's Ferry


was seized, and the river, which at this point makes a great loop, was spanned by pontoon bridges. Across the river, the hills, which dominated the road around the point of Lookout, were occupied by a strong Federal force. Hooker then brought his troops into the valley.] The enemy attempted to interrupt the work on the road; but Hooker met them at Wauhatchie, west of Lookout Mountain, and after a three-hours' action drove them off [with a loss of 416 killed and wounded, the Confederate loss being unknown]. Chattanooga was now no longer in a state of siege; but it was still seriously menaced by Bragg's army, which held a most singular position. Its flanks were on the northern ends of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, the crests of which were occupied for some distance, and its centre stretched across Chattanooga valley. This line was twelve miles long, and most of it was well entrenched. Grant ordered Sherman [coming from Memphis] to join him with one corps, and Sherman promptly obeyed, but as he did considerable railroad repairing on the way, he did not reach Chattanooga till the 15th of November. Meanwhile Longstreet with 20,000 troops had been detached from Bragg's army and sent against Burnside at Knoxville. After Sherman's arrival, Grant had about 80,000 men."—R. Johnson, *Short history of the War of Secession*, ch. 20.—"My orders for battle," writes General Grant, "were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival, except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into Chattanooga Valley. The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross at Brown's Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. [Remaining in his concealed position until the time of attack, Sherman's army was then, under cover of night, to be rapidly brought back to the south side of the Tennessee, at a point where Missionary Ridge prolonged would touch the river, this being done by pontoons ready provided at a spot also concealed. The execution of the plan was delayed by heavy rains until November 23, when Burn-

side's distress at Knoxville forced Grant to begin his attack on Bragg by an advance of Thomas's army, at the center, before the flanking preparations were completed.] This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about 1,100 killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. . . . By the night of the 23rd, Sherman's command was in a position to move," and by daylight two divisions of his command were on the south side of the river, "well covered by the works they had built. . . . By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga . . . and all the infantry and artillery were on the south side of the Tennessee. Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. . . . By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. . . . Artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. . . . But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. . . . While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, [Hooker had three divisions west of Lookout Creek]. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and entrenched. . . . The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms. . . . Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. . . . By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. . . . Hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. . . . The day was hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at the moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. . . . At four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. . . . The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view. . . . Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion." The fighting was severe for hours, and Bragg moved heavy masses of troops to resist Sherman's advance, while a division from Thomas was sent to reinforce the latter.


"It had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also. The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. . . . But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once." In this splendid charge the Union troops drove the Confederates from the first line of their works and then pushed on, with no further orders, to the second line, with the same success. "The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. . . . To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small arms that day. . . . The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. . . . Hooker [pushing on to Rossville as soon as he had succeeded in getting across Chattanooga Creek] . . . came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. . . . The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position."—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 42.—Pursuit of the retreating Confederates began early in the morning of the 26th, and considerable fighting occurred on that day and the next. At Ringgold, Hooker was checked by Cleburne's division, which held an easily defended gap while the main column with its trains were moved beyond reach. In this battle at Ringgold Hooker lost sixty-five killed and 377 wounded. He took three pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners. "If Chickamauga, on account of the number of forces engaged and the heaviness of the losses suffered by either side, is reckoned the great battle of the West, Chattanooga, from the point of view of its far-reaching consequences, must be considered the most important. Desperate as had been the fighting at Shiloh, Murfreesborough, and Chickamauga, in not one of these three battles had a decisive success been won by either combatant; but at Chattanooga Bragg's army was badly beaten, and his continued presence with it as its commander rendered impossible. The Federal losses were under 6,000 in an army which numbered in round figures about 60,000. Bragg, after weakening himself by sending detachments into East Tennessee, had not more than 33,000 troops in line on November 24th and 25th. His actual losses in killed and wounded were probably considerable less than those suffered by the Federals, as his troops were mostly fighting behind entrenchments; but he lost 40 guns and over 6,000 prisoners. By his victory

Map of the Battle-Field  
OF  
**CHATTANOOGA**  
1863.

FROM THE "ATLAS TO ACCOMPANY THE OFFICIAL RECORDS  
OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES"



THE MATTHEW SYNGER CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.



— Union Force  
- - - Confederate Force  
— Line of Movement

at Chattanooga Grant supplemented and completed the success which he had gained earlier in the year at Vicksburg. Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in two along the line of the Mississippi; Chattanooga cut the eastern half of it in two along the line of the Alleghanies. The net result of the two campaigns was to recover the Mississippi Valley for the Union [and as events turned out, to open the way for the destruction of the Confederate arms in the Atlantic states. Chattanooga opened the door to Atlanta].—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, 1851-1865*, pp. 293-294.

Also in: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 5.—H. M. Cist, *Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 7, ch. 13-14)*.—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, v. 4, bk. 2.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 13.—P. H. Sheridan, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 16.—T. B. Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, v. 1, ch. 21-22.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 31.—B. F. Taylor, *Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain*.—M. H. Fitch, *Chattanooga campaign*.—J. Fiske, *Mississippi valley in the Civil War*, pp. 281-316.—A. Badeau, *Military history of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 1, ch. 11-12.

**1863 (October-December: Tennessee).—Siege of Knoxville.**—While the drama at Chattanooga was being played out, Longstreet with his division was before Knoxville, where, to his astonishment, he found a strong Union sentiment. "Burnside had by this time spread his force very widely, holding innumerable points and places southward and eastward of Knoxville by brigades and detachments; and Longstreet advancing silently and rapidly, was enabled to strike heavily [October 20] at the little outpost of Philadelphia, held by Colonel F. T. Wolford, with the 1st, 11th, and 12th Kentucky cavalry and 45th Ohio mounted infantry—in all about 2,000 men. Wolford . . . was at length obliged to cut his way out; losing his battery and 32 wagons, but bringing off most of his command, with 51 prisoners. . . . The enemy advancing resolutely yet cautiously, our troops were withdrawn before them from Lenoir and from Loudon, concentrating at Campbell's Station—General Burnside, who had hastened from Knoxville at the tidings of danger, being personally in command. Having been joined by his old (9th) corps, he was now probably as strong as Longstreet; but a large portion of his force was still dispersed far to the eastward, and he apprehended being flanked by an advance from Kingston on his left. He found himself so closely pressed, however, that he must either fight or sacrifice his trains; so he chose an advantageous position and suddenly faced the foe. . . . [In the late afternoon he] fell back to the next ridge, and again faced about; holding his position firmly till after night-fall; when—his trains having meantime obtained a fair start—he resumed his retreat, and continued it unmolested until safe within the sheltering intrenchments of Knoxville. . . . Longstreet continued his pursuit and in due time beleaguered the city [November 17,] though he can hardly be said to have invested it. . . . Bragg having been defeated by Grant before Chattanooga, and a relieving force under Sherman being close at hand—Longstreet necessarily abandoned the siege, and moved rapidly eastward unassailed to Russellville, Virginia: our entire loss in the defense having been less than 1,000; while his must have been twice or thrice that number. Sherman's advance reached the city, and Burnside officially announced the

raising of the siege, December 5th."—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 2, ch. 18.


Also in: A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army corps*, pt. 3, ch. 6.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 31, pt. 1.—T. W. Humes, *Loyal mountaineers of East Tennessee*, ch. 14-16.

**1863 (November).—President Lincoln's address at Gettysburg.**—"By the retreat of Lee from Gettysburg and the immediate pursuit by Meade, the burial of the dead and the care of the wounded on that great battlefield were left largely to the military and local authorities of the State of Pennsylvania. Governor Andrew G. Curtin gave the humane and patriotic duty his thoughtful attention; and during its execution the appropriate design of changing a portion of the field into a permanent cemetery, where the remains of the fallen heroes might be brought together, and their last resting-place suitably protected and embellished, was conceived and begun. The citizen soldiery from seventeen of the loyal States had taken part in the conflict on the Union side, and the several Governors of these States heartily cooperated in the project, which thus acquired a National character. This circumstance made it natural that the dedication ceremonies should be of more than usual interest and impressiveness. Accordingly, at the beginning of November, 1863, when the work was approaching its completion, Mr. David Wills, the special agent of Governor Curtin, and also acting for the several States, . . . wrote the following letter of invitation to President Lincoln: 'The several States having soldiers in the Army of the Potomac, who were killed at the battle of Gettysburg, or have since died at the various hospitals which were established in the vicinity, have procured grounds on a prominent part of the battlefield for a cemetery, and are having the dead removed to them and properly buried. These grounds will be consecrated and set apart to this sacred purpose, by appropriate ceremonies, on Thursday, the 19th instant. Hon. Edward Everett will deliver the oration. I am authorized by the Governors of the different States to invite you to be present and participate in these ceremonies, which will doubtless be very imposing and solemnly impressive. It is the desire that after the oration, you, the Chief Executive of the nation, formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks. It will be a source of great gratification to the many widows and orphans that have been made almost friendless by the great battle here, to have you here personally; and it will kindle anew in the breasts of the comrades of these brave dead, who are now in the tented field or nobly meeting the foe in the front, a confidence that they who sleep in death on the battlefield are not forgotten by those highest in authority; and they will feel that, should their fate be the same, their remains will not be uncared-for. We hope you will be able to be present to perform this last solemn act to the soldier dead on this battlefield.' President Lincoln expressed his willingness to perform the duty requested of him. . . . At the appointed hour on the 19th a vast procession, with military music, moved to the cemetery grounds where, in the midst of a distinguished auditory, the orator of the day, Edward Everett, made an address worthy alike of his own fame and the extraordinary occasion. . . . Mr. Everett ended in a brilliant peroration, the echoes of which were lost in the long and hearty

plaudits of the great multitude, and then President Lincoln arose to fill the part assigned him in the programme. . . . Then and there the President pronounced an address of dedication so pertinent, so brief yet so comprehensive, so terse yet so eloquent, linking the deeds of the present to the thoughts of the future, with simple words, in such living, original, yet exquisitely molded, maxim-like phrases that the best critics have awarded it an unquestioned rank as one of the world's masterpieces in rhetorical art. He said: 'Four-score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether

they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.'—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 7.

1863 (December).—Union gains during 1863, and war policy.—Disunited counsels in the South.—Southern finances.—“The end of 1863 saw the positions of the two sides almost reversed, from those of the end of 1862; for the North were then beaten at all points, the only question being whether the South could maintain their advantage: now, the North had opened the



LINCOLN DELIVERING HIS ADDRESS AT THE DEDICATION OF THE GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD, NOV. 19, 1863

that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us,—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which

Mississippi from end to end, cutting the Confederacy in two, and had also won the battle which Lee elected to make decisive for political reasons. Though Chickamauga was a set-back, yet the battle of Chattanooga finally secured the advantage gained and placed the Union in a winning position, from which it could go forward and finish the war. The end was now in sight. . . . In the East [the Union had won] the northern half of Virginia proper; for the line of the Rapidan and Rappahannock, east of the Blue Ridge, was never again lost; in the West and South, the country as far south as the line Vicksburg-Ringgold, also the southern half of western Louisiana. . . . The year 1863 was remarkable for the first employment in the war of two weapons which, even in the opening of the twentieth century, were hardly developed, viz, the Submarine Torpedo-Boat and the Breechloading Magazine Rifle, and also for the first use of Machine Guns.”—J. Forby,

*American Civil War*, p. 274.—The government had already unified the forces in the West under Grant, who was about to be made commander-in-chief of all the forces in the field in order to produce the unity required to end the great struggle. "At this critical time, when the Federal Government was making strenuous efforts to insure unity of action and co-operation in the forthcoming campaign, the Confederate camp was distracted by divided counsels and personal jealousies. The appointment of General Bragg to the post of Commander-in-Chief near the President was not likely to commend itself to the other general officers serving either in the East or West. Furthermore, Davis was known to be prejudiced against both Joseph Johnston and Beauregard. . . . The war policy of the President also was very far from finding favour in the eyes of the best Confederate officers. . . . It was in vain that Lee and other officers had urged the advisability of concentrating all available forces for a vigorous offensive at some carefully selected point. . . . The President had refused to allow any considerable body of troops to be drawn from the garrisons in the Carolinas and along the Atlantic coast, in order to form a second army of invasion under Beauregard. . . . [A plan for a campaign in Kentucky, which was suggested by Longstreet and approved by Lee, was rejected by a Council of War in favor of a scheme, proposed by Bragg for a campaign in Tennessee.] This plan of campaign, which was approved by the President, was ultimately abandoned in consequence of Johnston's objection that he could not adequately supply his army in the mountainous country through which he would have to march before turning west for the invasion of Middle Tennessee. The net result of the Council of War was that no plan for an offensive campaign was definitely adopted, and Lee and Johnston, in command of the two principal armies of the Confederacy, were left to do the best that either could independently of the other against the superior numbers which the Federal Government was threatening to bring against the isolated forces of the enemy."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, pp. 309-310.—"As one looks to-day over the sources of the history of the great Civil War, it seems plain that the responsible spokesmen of the Confederacy should have made overtures to the North for peace on the basis of an indissoluble union of the warring sections in the autumn of 1863. But the Southern leader who proposed reunion at that time would have been regarded as untrue to his cause or unduly timid. Neither Jefferson Davis nor General Lee had any thought of surrender, though from the attitude of representatives of the United States it was plain that an offer to return to the Union would have been met with ample guaranties to the owners of slaves and full amnesty to those who had brought on the war. Alexander Stephens alone foresaw the outcome and began now to ask for a new national convention in which terms of restoration and permanent union should be fixed. Stephens was, however, already out of harmony with President Davis; and the State of Georgia, led by Joseph E. Brown, the Governor, and the Confederate Vice-President himself, was regarded by loyal Southerners as recalcitrant and therefore not authorized to propose solutions of the problem. The cup of Southern defeat and humiliation had not been drained to the bottom. The Confederacy owed,

at the end of the year 1863, \$1,221,000,000; the State Governments, the counties and cities, probably owed as much more. Paper money, the only medium of exchange, was fast giving way to barter. One dollar in gold was worth twenty dollars in Confederate currency. The monthly wage of a common soldier was not sufficient to buy a bushel of wheat. . . . The planters no longer produced cotton and tobacco, but supplies for 'their people' and for the armies. The annual export of cotton fell from 2,000,000 bales in 1860 to less than 200,000 in 1863, and most of this came from areas under Federal control. The yearly returns to the planters from foreign markets alone had fallen from the huge returns of 1860 to almost nothing in 1863, and with the disappearance of gold, or international money, from the South, the Governments, Confederate and State, found their system of taxation breaking down."—W. E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict*, p. 309.

1863 (December).—President's message to Congress.—"Towards the reconstruction of the Union Lincoln had early taken tentative steps by appointing, in the spring and early summer of 1862, military governors of Tennessee, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Sumner, at the same time, had formulated the doctrine of 'State suicide' as a definition of the status of the seceded States. This meant that the States had ceased to exist, and that Congress had the same power over them which it had over the Territories. Lincoln did not deem it necessary to affirm or deny this thesis. Outlining his plan in his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, and his Message of December 8, 1863, he wrote in the original draft of the message that he considered 'the discussion as to whether a State had been at any time out of the Union as vain and profitless. We know they were, we trust they shall be in the Union. It does not greatly matter whether in the mean time they shall be considered to have been in or out;' but this he did not allow to stand, deeming the admission that the States might have been out of the Union dangerous."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States, from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 4, p. 484.—The proclamation of amnesty follows:

"Whereas, in and by the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that the President 'shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment;' and Whereas a rebellion now exists whereby the loyal State governments of several States have for a long time been subverted, and many persons have committed and are now guilty of treason against the United States; and Whereas, with reference to said rebellion and treason, laws have been enacted by Congress declaring forfeitures and confiscation of property and liberation of slaves, all upon terms and conditions therein stated, and also declaring that the President was thereby authorized at any time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare; and Whereas the congressional declaration for limited and conditional pardon accords with well established judicial exposition of the pardoning power; and Whereas, with reference to said rebellion the President of the United States has issued several



proclamations, with provisions in regard to the liberation of slaves; and Whereas it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said rebellion to resume their allegiance to the United States, and to inaugurate loyal State governments within and for their respective States: Therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare and make known to all persons who have directly, or by implication, participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and in property cases where rights of third parties shall have intervened, and upon the condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate; and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following, to wit: 'I, ———, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the union of the States thereunder; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court. So help me God.' The persons excepted from the benefits of the foregoing provisions are all who are, or shall have been, civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the so-called Confederate Government; all who have left judicial stations under the United States to aid the rebellion; all who are, or shall have been, military or naval officers of said so-called Confederate Government above the rank of colonel in the Army, or of lieutenant in the Navy; all who left seats in the United States Congress to aid the rebellion; all who resigned commissions in the Army or Navy of the United States, and afterwards aided the rebellion; and all who have engaged in any way in treating colored persons, or white persons in charge of such, otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war, and which persons may have been found in the United States service as soldiers, seamen, or in any other capacity. And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that whenever in any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia [Virginia?], Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, a number of persons, not less than one tenth in number of the votes cast in such State at the presidential election of the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty, each having taken the oath aforesaid and not having since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election law of the State existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, and excluding all others, shall re-establish a State government which shall be republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true government of the State, and the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional provision which declares that 'the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on ap-

plication of the Legislature, or the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.' And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that any provision which may be adopted by such State government in relation to the freed people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the national Executive. And it is suggested as not improper, that, in constructing a loyal State government in any State, the name of the State, the boundary, the subdivisions, the constitution, and the general code of laws, as before the rebellion, be maintained, subject only to the modifications made necessary by the conditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if any, not contravening said conditions, and which may be deemed expedient by those framing the new State government. To avoid misunderstanding, it may be proper to say that this proclamation, so far as it relates to State governments, has no reference to States wherein loyal State governments have all the while been maintained. And for the same reason, it may be proper to further say, that whether members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive. And still further, that this proclamation is intended to present the people of the States wherein the national authority has been suspended, and loyal State governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the national authority and loyal State governments may be re-established within said States, or in any of them; and, while the mode presented is the best the Executive can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable." In the message Lincoln gave his reasons for the proclamation, and explained the grounds on which he rested the policy declared in it, as follows: "On examination of this proclamation it will appear, as is believed, that nothing is attempted beyond what is amply justified by the Constitution. True, the form of an oath is given, but no man is coerced to take it. The man is only promised a pardon in case he voluntarily takes the oath. The Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute discretion; and this includes the power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial and other authorities. It is also proffered that if, in any of the States named, a State government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such government shall be recognized and guaranteed by the United States, and that under it the State shall, on the constitutional conditions, be protected against invasion and domestic violence. The constitutional obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and to protect the State, in the cases stated, is explicit and full. But why tender the benefits of this provision only to a State government set up in this particular way? This section of the Constitution contemplates a case wherein the element within the State, favorable to republican government, in the Union, may be too feeble for an opposite and hostile element external to or even within the State; and such are precisely the cases with which we are now dealing.

An attempt to guarantee and protect a revived State government, constructed in whole, or in preponderating part, from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements so as to build only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness. But if it be proper to require, as a test of admission to the political body, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and to the Union under it, why also to the laws and proclamations in regard to slavery? Those laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their fullest effect, there had to be a pledge for their maintenance. In my judgment they have aided, and will further aid, the cause for which they were intended. To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I may add at this point, that while I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress. For these and other reasons it is thought best that support of these measures shall be included in the oath; and it is believed the Executive may lawfully claim it in return for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights, which he has clear constitutional power to withhold altogether, or grant upon the terms which he shall deem wisest for the public interest. It should be observed, also, that this part of the oath is subject to the modifying and abrogating power of legislation and supreme judicial decision. The proposed acquiescence of the national Executive in any reasonable temporary State arrangement for the freed people is made with the view of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must at best attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole States. It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people in those States may be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their affliction, if, to, this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves; while no power of the national Executive to prevent an abuse is abridged by the proposition. The suggestion in the proclamation as to maintaining the political frame-work of the States on what is called reconstruction, is made in the hope that it may do good without danger of harm. It will save labor, and avoid great confusion. But why any proclamation now upon this subject? This question is beset with the conflicting views that the step might be delayed too long or be taken too soon. In some States the elements for resumption seem ready for action, but remain inactive, apparently for want of a rallying-point—a plan of action. Why shall A adopt the plan of B, rather than B that of A? And if A and B should agree, how can they know but that the General Government here will reject their plan? By the proclamation a plan is presented which may be accepted by them as a rallying-point, and which they are assured in advance will not be rejected here. This may bring them to act sooner than they otherwise would. The objection to a premature presentation of a plan by the national Executive consists in the danger

of committals on points which could be more safely left to further developments. Care has been taken to so shape the document as to avoid embarrassments from this source. Saying that, on certain terms, certain classes will be pardoned, with rights restored, it is not said that other classes, or other terms, will never be included. Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specific way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way. The movements, by State action, for emancipation in several of the States, not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, are matters of profound gratulation. And while I do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain unchanged; and I trust that Congress will omit no fair opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation. In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sight of the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that power alone we can look, yet for a time, to give confidence to the people in the contested regions, that the insurgent power will not again overrun them. Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done anywhere for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest care must still be directed to the army and navy, who have thus far borne their harder part so nobly and well. And it may be esteemed fortunate that in giving the greatest efficiency to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably recognize the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them, and to whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home of freedom disenfranchised, regenerated, enlarged, and perpetuated. Abraham Lincoln.”—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 442-456.

1863-1864.—Foreign complications.—“Hitherto, Washington had been very discreet about Mexico. Adroit hints not to go too far had been given Napoleon in full measure, but there was no real protest. The State Department now continued this caution and in the most polite terms declined Napoleon's offer [of mediation]. Congress, however . . . passed the first of a series of resolutions which expressed the will of the country, if not quite the will of the President, by resolving that any further proposal of mediation would be regarded by it as ‘an unfriendly act.’ Napoleon then resumed his scheming for joint intervention, while in the meantime his armies continued to fight their way until they entered Mexico City in June, 1863. The time had now come when Napoleon thought it opportune to show his hand. . . . To raise funds for the Confederacy the great Erlanger banking-house of Paris negotiated a loan based on cotton which was to be delivered after the breaking of the blockade. . . . In June an English politician of Southern sympathies, Edward Roebuck, went over to France, was received by the Emperor, and came to an understanding with him. Roebuck went home to report to the Southern party that Napoleon was ready to intervene, and that all he waited for was England's co-operation. A motion ‘to enter into negotiations with the Great Powers of Europe for the purpose of obtaining their coöperation in the recognition’ of the Confederacy was introduced by Roebuck in the House of Commons. The debate which followed was the last chance of the Southern party and, as events proved, the last chance of Napoleon. How completely the British ministry was now committed to the North appears in the

fact that Gladstone, for the Government, opposed Roebuck's motion. . . . But there were still the ironclads at Liverpool. . . . Earlier in the war, the carelessness of the British authorities had permitted the escape of ship 290, subsequently known as the Confederate commerce-destroyer, *Alabama*. The authorities did not wish to allow a repetition of the incident. But could it be shown that the Laird ships were not really for a French purchaser? It was in the course of diplomatic conversation that Mr. Adams, speaking of the possible sailing of the ships, made a remark destined to become famous: 'It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war.' At last, the authorities were satisfied. The ships were seized and in the end bought for the British Navy. Again Napoleon stood alone. . . . Yet he had gone too far to recede, and what he had been aiming at all along was now revealed. An assembly of Mexican notables, convened by the general of the invaders, voted to set up an imperial government. . . . And now the Government at Washington was faced with a complicated problem. What about the Monroe Doctrine? Did the Union dare risk war with France? Did it dare pass over without protest the establishment of monarchy on American soil by foreign arms? Between these horns of a dilemma, the Government maintained its precarious position during another year. Seward's correspondence with Paris was a masterpiece of evasion. He neither protested against the intervention of Napoleon nor acknowledged the authority of Maximilian. Apparently, both he and Lincoln were divided between fear of a French alliance with the Confederacy and fear of premature action in the North that would render Napoleon desperate. Just how far they comprehended Napoleon and his problems is an open question. Whether really comprehending or merely trusting to its instincts, Congress took a bolder course. Two men prove the antagonists of a parliamentary duel—Charles Sumner, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Henry Winter Davis, chairman of the corresponding committee of the House. Sumner played the hand of the Administration. Fiery resolutions demanding the evacuation of Mexico or an American declaration of war were skillfully buried in the silence of Sumner's committee. But there was nevertheless one resolution that affected history: it was a ringing condemnation of the attempt to establish a monarchy in Mexico. In the House, a joint resolution which Davis submitted was passed without one dissenting vote. When it came to the Senate, Sumner buried it as he had buried earlier resolutions. None the less it went out to the world attended by the news of the unanimous vote in the House. Shortly afterwards, the American Ambassador at Paris called upon the Imperial Foreign Secretary, M. Drouyn de L'huys. News of this resolution had preceded him. He was met by the curt question, 'Do you bring peace or war?' Again, the Washington Government was skillfully evasive. The Ambassador was instructed to explain that the resolution had not been inspired by the President and 'the French Government would be seasonably apprized of any change of policy . . . which the President might at any future time think it proper to adopt.' . . . Though Washington did not formally protest against the presence of Maximilian in Mexico, it declined to recognize his Government, and that Government continued unrecognized at Washington throughout the war."—N. W. Stephenson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Union*

(*Chronicles of America Series*, v. 20, pp. 226-232).  
—See also MEXICO: 1861-1867.

1863-1864 (December-April: Tennessee-Mississippi).—Winter operations.—Sherman's Meridian expedition.—Longstreet's withdrawal from East Tennessee.—"Sherman, with the Army of Tennessee, was directed to march from Vicksburg against Meridian . . . and destroy the railroads in its vicinity. At Meridian, which is near the eastern border of Mississippi, the railroad runs east and west from Vicksburg to Montgomery, and beyond crosses the line running north and south from Mobile to the Ohio. A thorough destruction of the railway system at that point would close to the Confederates Northern Mississippi as a possible theatre of war for some considerable period. Experience had shown that a large force, if engaged in protracted operations, could not subsist far from a railway or some line of water communication. Sherman's expedition, if successful, would free the Federal authorities from any fear during the next campaign of a movement in force from Northern Mississippi either in the direction of the Mississippi or towards Nashville, and thus allow a larger force to be concentrated for the offensive movements into Georgia, which Grant and Sherman were planning. Sherman proposed to march with about 20,000 men from Vicksburg to Meridian, whilst General Sooy Smith was to move with a strong cavalry force simultaneously from Memphis and break up the Mobile and Ohio Railroad southward from Corinth, and then join Sherman at Meridian. There was a Confederate force in Mississippi under the command of Polk, but it was not strong enough to cope single-handed with Sherman's army, and the Confederate commander at Dalton was prevented from marching to Polk's aid by the consideration that Thomas at Chattanooga would then have a clear course to Atlanta. Consequently Sherman himself encountered no opposition: he reached Meridian on February 14th, and completely destroyed the railroads in the neighbourhood. Smith, however, was not so fortunate. Before he could carry out his share of the work, he had to reckon with Forrest, the ablest cavalry commander in the West. He was badly beaten and driven back to Memphis."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, pp. 302-303.—"When Meridian was reached its defenders were nowhere to be seen. Sherman took possession and waited for Smith. Days passed without any word coming from the cavalry column. After a week in Meridian, Sherman set the torch to the public buildings and retraced his steps toward Vicksburg. He had taken 400 prisoners, destroyed 150 miles of track, 67 bridges, 20 locomotives and 28 cars; had burned several thousand bales of cotton, a number of steam mills, and over 2,000,000 bushels of corn. Over 1,000 Union white refugees and 8,000 negroes followed in his wake. In 1866, the historian Lossing, passing through Meridian asked the Mayor of the town if Sherman had done the place much injury. 'Injury!' was the emphatic reply, 'Why, he took it away with him.'"—W. J. Abbott, *Battle-fields and victory*, ch. 1.—In East Tennessee, during the winter little was done by either army. A slight encounter occurred at Dandridge, in January, between Longstreet's forces and those of the Union General Parke. In April Longstreet was recalled by Lee, and the Ninth Corps, with Burnside again in command, went back to the army of the

Potomac.—Based on J. D. Cox, *Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 9, ch. 1-2)*.

ALSO IN: A. Badeau, *Military history of Ulysses S. Grant, v. 1, ch. 13*.—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America, v. 4, bk. 4, ch. 1*.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs, v. 1, ch. 14*.—W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history, ch. 38*.

1863-1864 (December-July).—President Lincoln's plan of reconstruction, and its application to Louisiana.—Opposing Congressional plan.—“The proclamation which accompanied the Annual Message of the President for 1864 embodied the first suggestions of the Administration on the important subject of reconstruction the Governments of those States which had joined in the secession movement. The matter had been canvassed somewhat extensively by the public press, and by prominent politicians, in anticipation of the overthrow of the rebellion. . . . A considerable number of the friends of the Government, in both houses, maintained that, by the act of secession, the revolted States had put themselves outside the pale of the Constitution, and were henceforth to be regarded and treated, not as members of the Union, but as alien enemies:—that their State organizations and State boundaries had been expunged by their own act; and that they were to be readmitted to the jurisdiction of the Constitution, and to the privileges of the Union, only upon such terms and conditions as the Federal Government of the loyal States might prescribe. . . . After the appearance of the President's proclamation, the movement towards reconstruction in Louisiana assumed greater consistency, and was carried forward with greater steadiness and strength. On the 8th of January a very large Free State Convention was held at New Orleans, at which resolutions were adopted indorsing all the acts and proclamations of the President, and urging the immediate adoption of measures for the restoration of the State to its old place in the Union. On the 11th, General Banks issued a proclamation, appointing an election for State officers on the 22nd of February, who were to be installed on the 4th of March, and another election for delegates to a convention to revise the Constitution of the State on the first Monday in April. The old Constitution and laws of Louisiana were to be observed, except so far as they relate to slavery. . . . Under this order, parties were organized for the election of State officers. The friends of the National Government were divided, and two candidates were put in nomination for Governor, Hon. Michael Hahn being the regular nominee, and representing the supporters of the policy of the President, and Hon. B. F. Flanders being put in nomination by those who desired a more radical policy than the President had proposed. Both took very decided ground against the continued existence of slavery within the State. . . . The election resulted in the election of Mr. Hahn. . . . [who] was inaugurated as Governor on the 4th of March. On the 15th he was clothed with the powers previously exercised by General Banks, as military governor. . . . The party which elected Governor Hahn succeeded also in electing a large majority of the delegates to the convention, which met in New Orleans on the 6th of April. On the 11th of May it adopted, by a vote of 70 to 16, a clause of the new Constitution, by which slavery was forever abolished in the State. The Constitution was adopted on the 5th of September, by a vote of 6,836 to 1,566. Great umbrage was taken at these proceedings by some of the

best friends of the cause, as if there had been an unauthorized and unjustifiable interference on the part of the President. . . . In Arkansas, where a decided Union feeling had existed from the outbreak of the rebellion, the appearance of the proclamation was the signal for a movement to bring the State back into the Union. On the 20th of January, a delegation of citizens from that State had an interview with the President, in which they urged the adoption of certain measures for the re-establishment of a legal State Government, and especially the ordering of an election for Governor. . . . Meantime, a convention had assembled at Little Rock, composed of delegates elected without any formality, and not under the authority of the General Government, and proceeded to form a new State Constitution, and to fix a day for an election. . . . The convention framed a constitution abolishing slavery, which was subsequently adopted by a large majority of the people. It also provided for the election of State officers on the day appointed for the vote upon the constitution; and the legislature chosen at that election elected two gentlemen, Messrs. Fishback and Baxter, as United States Senators, and also Representatives. These gentlemen presented their credentials at Washington. . . . The whole matter was referred to the Judiciary Committee, who . . . reported on the 27th of June that on the facts it did not appear that the rebellion was so far suppressed in Arkansas as to entitle the State to representation in Congress, and that therefore Messrs. Fishback and Baxter were not entitled to seats as Senators from the State of Arkansas. And the Senate on the next day adopted their report by a vote of 27 to 6. In the House, meanwhile, the Committee on Elections, to whom the application of the Arkansas members had been referred, reported to postpone their admission until a commission could be sent to inquire into and report the facts of the election, and to create a commission for the examination of all such cases. This proposition was, however, laid on the table, and the members were not admitted. . . . The cause of the rejection of these Senators and Representatives was, that a majority in Congress had not agreed with the President in reference to the plan of reconstruction which he proposed.” —H. J. Raymond, *Life and services of Abraham Lincoln, ch. 16*.—See also LOUISIANA: 1863-1867.—Although the President's message of December 8, 1863, had at first “received enthusiastic commendation from both conservatives and radicals, it was soon evident that the millennium had not yet arrived, and that in a Congress composed of men of such positive convictions and vehement character, there were many who would not submit permanently to the leadership of any man, least of all to that of one so reasonable, so devoid of malice, as the President. Henry Winter Davis at once moved that that part of the message be referred to a special committee of which he was chairman, and on February 15 reported a bill whose preamble declared the Confederate States completely out of the Union; prescribing a totally different method of reëstablishing loyal State governments, one of the essentials being the prohibition of slavery. Congress rejected the preamble, but after extensive debate accepted the bill, which breathed the same spirit throughout. The measure was also finally acceded to in the Senate, and came to Mr. Lincoln for signature in the closing hours of the session. He laid it aside and went on with other business, despite the

evident anxiety of several friends, who feared his failure to indorse it would lose the Republicans many votes in the Northwest. In stating his attitude to his cabinet, he said: 'This bill and the position of these gentlemen seem to me, in asserting that the insurrectionary States are no longer in the Union, to make the fatal admission that States, whenever they please, may of their own motion dissolve their connection with the Union. Now we cannot survive that admission, I am convinced. If that be true, I am not President; these gentlemen are not Congress. I have laboriously endeavored to avoid that question ever since it first began to be mooted, and thus to avoid confusion and disturbance in our own councils. It was to obviate this question that I earnestly favored the movement for an amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery, which passed the Senate and failed in the House. I thought it much better, if it were possible, to restore the Union without the necessity of a violent quarrel among its friends as to whether certain States have been in or out of the Union during the war—a merely metaphysical question, and one unnecessary to be forced into discussion.' . . . Convinced, after fullest deliberation, that the bill was too restrictive in its provisions, and yet unwilling to reject whatever of practical good might be accomplished by it, he disregarded precedents, and acting on his lifelong rule of taking the people into his confidence, issued a proclamation on July 8, giving a copy of the bill to Congress, reciting the circumstances under which it was passed, and announcing that while he was unprepared by formal approval of the bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration, or to set aside the free-State governments already adopted in Arkansas and Louisiana, or to declare that Congress was competent to decree the abolishment of slavery; yet he was fully satisfied with the plan as one very proper method of reconstruction, and promised executive aid to any State that might see fit to adopt it."—J. G. Nicolay, *Short life of Abraham Lincoln*, pp. 454-456.—The proclamation follows:

"Whereas, at the late session, Congress passed a bill to 'guarantee to certain States, whose governments have been usurped or overthrown, a republican form of government,' a copy of which is hereunto annexed; And whereas the said bill was presented to the President of the United States for his approval less than one hour before the sine die adjournment of said session, and was not signed by him; And whereas the said bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known, that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared, by a formal approval of this bill, to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration; and, while I am also unprepared to declare that the free-State constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for nought, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort, or to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish

slavery in States, but am at the same time sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, nevertheless I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people, so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such States, and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases military governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this eighth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-ninth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, p. 545.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 3.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 16-17.—W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, political and economic*, pp. 13-16.

1864.—Nevada admitted into the Union. See NEVADA: 1848-1864.

1864.—Censorship of newspapers. See CENSORSHIP: United States.

1864 (January-February: Florida).—Battle of Olustee.—"The important towns on the Atlantic coast of Florida had for some time been in the Federal grasp. With the false idea that a Union sentiment existed in the interior, which might be encouraged by the advance of any army thither, Gilmore, commanding the department at Charleston, was allowed to despatch such an expedition. General Truman Seymour, a brave and experienced officer, was put in charge; he entered upon the task with misgivings, and soon met with misfortune. Florida was not ripe for a Union movement; and at Olustee, February 20, 1864, Seymour was repulsed, losing eighteen hundred and sixty men in his vain effort."—J. K. Hosmer, *Outcome of the Civil War, 1863-1865*, pp. 77-78.—"The forces were equal in numbers, about 5,500 on each side; the advantage to the Confederates [under General Joseph Finegan] was that they were in a strong position selected by themselves and ready for the fight. General J. R. Hawley, who commanded a brigade of infantry in the battle, says: 'We rushed in, not waiting for the proper full formation, and were fought in detail.' . . . Seymour's attack was constantly repulsed with heavy loss, until at nightfall he fell back to a new line. He was not pursued, and retired in good order and unmolested to Jacksonville. . . . This misadventure put an end for the moment to the attempt to occupy Florida."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: Jones and J. R. Hawley, *Olustee (Battles and leaders*, v. 4).—L. F. Emilio, *History of the 54th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers*, ch. 8.

1864 (February - March: Virginia).—Kilpatrick's and Dahlgren's raid to Richmond.—"Public feeling throughout the North had been greatly excited by the deplorable condition of

the prisoners of war held at Richmond. Early in the year, before the opening of the great campaign, some expeditions had been undertaken both from the Army of the Potomac and from Fortress Monroe, with the intention of relieving them. On February 27th, Custer, with 1,500 horse, had crossed the Rapidan on a feint to the west of the Confederate army, while Kilpatrick, starting on the following day, moved down on its opposite flank, by Spottsylvania Court House, to within  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Richmond, passing its first and second lines of defenses [March], but being obliged to fall back from its third. Pursued by a force of the enemy, he was compelled to cross the White House Railroad and move down the peninsula. A detachment of Kilpatrick's force, 400 strong, under Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, leaving the main body at Spottsylvania, had gone to the right through Louisa and Goochland Counties, intending to cross the James River and enter Richmond from the south, while Kilpatrick attacked it on the north. But the river was found to be too deep to be forded. Dahlgren passed down the north bank to the fortifications of Richmond, forcing his way through the outer works, but being repulsed from the inner. Finding that Kilpatrick's attempt had miscarried, he moved toward King and Queen Court House; but after crossing the Mattapony at Dabney's Ferry, he fell into an ambuscade [March 3], his command being scattered, and himself killed. Under a false pretense that papers were found upon him showing an intention to set fire to Richmond, and take the lives of Davis and his cabinet, his corpse was insulted and the place of its interment concealed. At the time of his death he was but 21 years of age."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 82.

1864 (March-April).—General Grant in chief command of the whole army.—His plans of campaign.—“It is worth while to note that each of the four cardinal victories which restored the supremacy of the United States government in the West was won under the leadership of Grant. Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga,—these names are the landmarks in that mighty story. If we may liken the whole war to one stupendous battle of four years' duration, it is evident that the United States was gradually defeating the Confederacy by turning its left flank. At the beginning of the year 1864 the Confederate right in Virginia still held its ground. Three years of warfare had apparently accomplished nothing. Lee was still midway between Richmond and Washington, defiant and apparently unconquerable. It was not strange that to the general who had done so much this last and most difficult problem should be entrusted. . . . In March, 1864, a bill was passed through Congress reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General, which heretofore had been held only by Washington and Scott [the latter by brevet]. Grant was promoted to this rank, and made general-in-chief of all the armies of the United States. Thus he was enabled not only to begin operation in Virginia with hands untrammelled, but also to control the whole field of war, so that a victory in Tennessee or Georgia should exert its full effect upon the situation in Virginia. . . . When Grant was made general-in-chief of the armies of the United States, Sherman succeeded him in the chief command at the West, and under Sherman were three armies with three superb commanders: The army of the Tennessee, under McPherson; the Army of the Cumberland, under

Thomas; and the Army of the Ohio, formerly under Burnside, but now commanded by Schofield. At the beginning of May, 1864, this triple army covered a line about twenty miles in length, a little south of Chattanooga: McPherson on the right, with 25,000 men, Thomas in the centre, with 60,000, and Schofield on the left with 15,000; in all 100,000 men, with 260 guns. Opposed to this force was a Confederate army of 65,000 men strongly fortified at Dalton, under command of Joseph Johnston, who among the southern generals ranked next in ability to Lee. Johnston had superseded Braxton Bragg, whom Mr. Davis had called to Richmond to be chief of his general staff.”—J. Fiske, *Mississippi valley in the Civil War*, pp. 317-319, 324.—“Grant's commission as lieutenant-general of the Army of the United States was formally presented to him by President Lincoln on the 9th of March. . . . The next day he was placed in command of all the armies by orders from the War Department; . . . [and] started West again on the evening of the 11th of March. . . . He had relinquished the purpose he had hitherto firmly held of leading the Western armies on the great campaign to Atlanta and the sea, and had decided to take the field with the Army of the Potomac. . . . Sherman at his request was promoted to command the Military Division of the Mississippi, McPherson succeeded to Sherman's command of the Department of Tennessee, and Logan was promoted to the command of McPherson's corps.” The necessary arrangements were quickly made. General Sherman assumed his enlarged command on the 18th of March, and General Grant a few days later was with the Army of the Potomac. He “established his headquarters at Culpeper Court House near the end of March, and spent a month in preparations for the great campaign which he, in common with the entire North, hoped would end the war. . . . The plan of the Lieutenant-General, as set forth in his report, was extremely simple. So far as practicable, the armies were to move together and towards one common center. Banks was to finish his operations in Louisiana [which had already begun (see below: 1864: March-May: Louisiana)], and, leaving a small garrison on the Rio Grande, was to concentrate an army of some 25,000 men, and move on Mobile. Sherman was to move simultaneously with the other armies, General Johnston's army being his objective, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. Sigel, who was in command in the Shenandoah, was to move to the front in two columns, one to threaten the enemy in the Valley, the other to cut the railroads connecting Richmond with the Southwest. Gillmore was to be brought north [from Florida] with his corps, and in company with another corps, under W. F. Smith, was to form an army under General B. F. Butler to operate against Richmond south of the James. Lee's army was to be the objective point of Meade, reinforced by Burnside. As to the route by which the Army of the Potomac was to advance, Grant reserved his decision until just before he started upon his march. . . . The two armies lay in their intrenchments on both sides of the Rapidan. The headquarters . . . of Lee [were] at Orange Court House; the Army of Northern Virginia guarded the south bank of the river for 18 or 20 miles, Ewell commanding the right half, A. P. Hill the left. The formidable works on Mine Run secured the Confederate right wing, which was further protected by the tangled and gloomy thickets of the Wilderness. Longstreet

had arrived from Tennessee with two fine divisions, and was held in reserve at Gordonsville. . . . The strength of the Army of the Potomac, present for duty equipped on the 30th of April, was 122,146; this includes the 22,708 of Burnside's Ninth Corps. The Army of Northern Virginia numbered at the opening of his campaign not less than 61,953."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 13-14.—When Grant "assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: The Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the Northwest north of that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington, and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal, and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West, and Pensacola in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. . . . In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations toward each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capital. It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina; but beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army. . . . The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of one another, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of the Potomac as the center, and all west to Memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing; the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing; and all the troops south as a force in the rear of the enemy. . . . My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman, who was still at Chattanooga. Besides these main armies the Confederates had to guard

the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force, making a larger command necessary to hold what he had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy, because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the West, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts, when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. . . . I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective points. Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect his communications, or see them destroyed, and a large amount of forage and provision, which he so much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective. . . . Sheridan . . . was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac."—*Personal memoirs of U. S. Grant*, v. 2, pp. 53-60.

ALSO IN: J. H. Barrett, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, pp. 475-488.

1864 (March-May: Louisiana).—Red river expedition.—"After Vicksburg, the capture of Mobile seemed a natural and feasible sequence, but Grant and Sherman were diverted, as has been seen, to Chattanooga. Banks, in Louisiana, also would willingly have gone eastward against the only Confederate port left between Florida and Texas, but the government formed another plan. A French army was making progress in Mexico, and French intrigues were already on foot designated to affect Texas. To thwart Napoleon III, a firm hold on Texas seemed necessary; yet at the moment the North held nothing in that state. Banks was therefore ordered to Texas, where, in the fall of 1863, after a failure at Sabine Pass, he made important lodgments along the coast at Brownsville on the Mexican border, and at Matagorda Bay. It was thought in Washington that a more satisfactory point of occupation would be found in the interior, to be approached by the Red River. Banks accordingly, in 1864, much against his will, made preparations for such a campaign as the spring approached, the only season when the Red River is navigable. Meantime, the programme of the year's battles opened elsewhere. . . . Grant's policy was to avoid wasting strength in outskirt operations, and concentrate upon two main lines of effort. The campaign of Olustee came before he was in charge; and Banks's expedition up the Red River could not well be checked in March, when Grant assumed his wider duty. Divisions from the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Corps were detailed, all that could be spared after making secure the widely extended

Federal conquests in Louisiana and Texas; and in addition a fine body of ten thousand men under A. J. Smith was sent down from Vicksburg. Steele, also commanding in Arkansas, was ordered southward to co-operate; while Porter's fleet of gun-boats was to ascend the stream on the flank of the advancing army."—J. K. Hosmer, *Outcome of the Civil War, 1863-1865*, pp. 77-78.—"Fort De Russey was captured [March 14], the enemy retiring before our troops, and Alexandria and Natchitoches fell into our hands as the joint force advanced. Banks put in an appearance a week later. There was more or less skirmishing with the enemy's horse and outposts along the entire route; and near Mansfield, at Sabine Cross-Roads, the vanguard met the enemy in force. Sufficient care had not been taken to keep the several bodies concentrated. It was on Smith that the attack fell [April 8], and though this general's record for endurance is of the best, he was nevertheless badly worsted with a loss of 2,000 men out of 8,000 engaged, and some twenty guns. Retiring to Pleasant Hill, another stand was made for the possession of what had been so far gained. . . . The fleet had meanwhile reached Grand Ecore. High water was coming to an end, and Porter was obliged to return down river, to Alexandria. Here it was found that most of the vessels were of too heavy draught to pass the falls below the town; and the loss of most of them would have been certain, but for a dam and waterway ably constructed by Colonel Bailey, an engineer remarkably fertile in expedients. By means of this device the fleet was safely floated over. On the retreat, Alexandria was burned [May 15] by accident, traceable to no particular cause, though, naturally enough laid by the Confederates to our spirit of revenge."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye view of our Civil War*, ch. 31.—"We prefer not to enter into the bitter discussions to which this disastrous campaign gave rise on both sides of the line. A life-long quarrel sprang up between Kirby Smith and Taylor, between Banks and Porter, while Franklin, Charles P. Stone (Banks's chief-of-staff), and Albert L. Lee, all of whom relinquished their commands, added their quota of misunderstanding and resentment. . . . The Committee on the Conduct of the War made an investigation of the matter in the year 1865, at the time when the antagonism between Mr. Lincoln and the Radicals in relation to the subject of reconstruction had assumed an acute form. . . . The charge was made by the committee against Banks, that what he had in view was to carry out measures for the establishment of a State government in Louisiana, and to afford an egress for cotton and other products of that region, and that the attention directed to the accomplishment of these objects exerted an unfavorable influence on the expedition. . . . The honorable poverty in which General Banks has passed his subsequent life is the best answer to the reckless charges of his enemies."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, *Naval history of the Civil War*, ch. 41-42.—*Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*, 38th Congress, 2d session, v. 2.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 34.—R. B. Irwin, *History of the 19th Army Corps*, ch. 23-28.

1864 (March-October: Arkansas-Missouri).—Last important operations in the West.—Price's raid.—"During the winter of 1863-64 the forces of Generals Steele and Blunt held the Arkansas River as a Federal line of advance. . . . During this period of inactivity, however, Steele was making

preparations for a vigorous spring campaign. It was decided that the column under General Banks and the columns under General Steele from Little Rock and Fort Smith should converge toward Shreveport, Louisiana. The Federal columns under Steele left Little Rock and Fort Smith the latter part of March, moved toward the Southern part of the State, and after some fighting and manœuvring drove General Price's forces from Camden, Arkadelphia and Washington. In the midst of these successful operations, Steele received information that Banks' army had been defeated and was retreating [see above: 1864 (March-May: Louisiana)], and that Price had received reinforcements from Kirby Smith of 5,000 infantry and a complement of artillery, and would at once assume the offensive. Not feeling strong enough to fight the combined Confederate forces, Steele determined to fall back upon Little Rock. He had scarcely commenced his retrograde movement when Smith and Price began to press him vigorously. A retreating fight was kept up for several days, until the Federal army reached Jenkins's Ferry on the Saline River," where Smith and Price made an energetic attack on the Federal army (April 30) and were repulsed with heavy loss. "After the battle of Jenkins's Ferry, instead of making preparations to attack the Federal forces at Little Rock and Fort Smith, Price commenced organizing his forces for an expedition into Missouri. . . . Price's army for the invasion of Missouri numbered some 15,000 men and 20 pieces of artillery before crossing the Arkansas River, and consisted of three divisions, commanded by Generals Fagan, Marmaduke and Shelby. . . . About the 1st of September, while strong demonstrations were being made against Fort Smith and Little Rock, Price, with his army, crossed the Arkansas River . . . at Dardanelle, and marched to the northern part of the State without opposition, and, in fact, without his movements being definitely known to General Rosecrans, who then commanded the Department of the Missouri at St. Louis," to which he had been appointed in January. At Pilot Knob, where they arrived September 26th, the Confederates were opposed by General Thomas Ewing, Jr., with a small force of 1,051 men. The fortifications at Pilot Knob were strong and Ewing held them against the vigorous attacks of Price throughout the 27th, but evacuated that night, blowing up the magazine and retreating safely. The Confederate invaders then marched on St. Louis and attacked the outer defences of the city, some miles to the south of it, but found themselves opposed by the veterans of General A. J. Smith's division, which had been opportunely stopped on its way down the Mississippi River to join Sherman. Foiled at St. Louis, Price then moved upon Jefferson City, the State capital, but was closely pursued and driven off. Advancing westward, he was met at Lexington, October 20th, by forces from Kansas, under General Blunt, but forced the latter to retire from the town, after severe fighting. Thence to Independence his progress was steadily resisted by Generals Blunt and Curtis, with volunteers and militia from Kansas. At Independence, on the 22d, Pleasonton's cavalry, of Rosecrans's army, came up and formed a junction with the forces of Curtis, and the next day they engaged Price in battle near Westport. "The opposing armies fought over an area of five or six square miles, and at some points the fighting was furious. . . . About the middle of the afternoon Price's lines began to give way, and by sundown the



entire Confederate army was in full retreat southward along the State line, closely pursued by the victorious Federal forces." At the crossing of the Marais des Cygnes River he lost ten pieces of his artillery and a large number of prisoners, including Generals Marmaduke and Cabell. "At Newtonia in south-west Missouri, on the 28th of October, Price made another stand, and was attacked by the pursuing forces . . . and finally driven from the field with heavy loss. . . . Blunt, and some of the Missouri troops, continued the pursuit to the Arkansas River, but Price did not again attempt to make a stand. . . . Most of the noted guerrilla bands followed him from the State. The 'Price raid,' as it was called in the West, was the last military operation of much consequence that took place in Missouri and Arkansas. It is certain that Price lost more than he gained in war material, and that the raid did not tend to strengthen the Confederate cause in the West."—W. Britton, *Résumé of military operations in Missouri and Arkansas, 1864-65 (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.—"In General Price's report occurs the following summary of the campaign: 'I marched 1,434 miles, fought 43 battles and skirmishes, captured and paroled over 3,000 Federal officers and men, captured 18 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of small-arms, 16 stand of colors . . . and destroyed property to the cost of \$10,000,000. I lost ten pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,000 small arms, while I do not think I lost 1,000 prisoners. . . . I brought with me at least 5,000 recruits.'"—*Editor's note to above*.

1864 (April: Tennessee).—Massacre at Fort Pillow.—After General Sherman's return from his raid to Meridian, and General William Sooy Smith's return to Memphis, the Confederate cavalry leader Forrest advanced into Tennessee, devastating the country. "He captured Jackson in that State, on the 23d of March, and moving northward, appeared before Paducah, held by Colonel Hicks with 650 men. His demand for a surrender was accompanied with a threat: 'If you surrender, you shall be treated as prisoners of war; but if I have to storm your works you may expect no quarter.' he made three assaults, and then retired, having lost 1,500 men. On the 12th of April he was at Port Pillow, which was garrisoned by 19 officers and 538 men, of whom 262 were negroes. This force was not a part of the army, but a nondescript body in process of formation. . . . It had been left in violation of Sherman's peremptory orders. The attack was made before sunrise; and after some severe fighting, Major Booth, the commanding officer of the garrison, was killed. Major Bradford, who succeeded him, drew the troops from the outer line of intrenchments into the fort and continued the contest until afternoon."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War, v. 3, ch. 74*.—"They were at first supported by a gun-boat in the river, but for some reason, . . . the boat drew off in the midst of the fight. Forrest demanded a surrender, but Bradford refused. He then carried the works by storm, when what was left of the garrison threw down their arms. The assailants now refused to spare them, and massacred them almost to the last man. They afterward sought to excuse themselves by pointing to the refusal to surrender, but this refusal was made by the Federal commander before the Confederates got into the fort. The cry of the men for quarter they chose not to consider as a surrender. The truth of the matter undoubtedly was that the Confederates were excited to this horrible deed

by the presence of negroes in the service of the United States. They recognized no duty of protecting such foes when captured, and they regarded white men when taken with them as also outlawed."—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution, 1859-1865, v. 2, pp. 235-236*.—On the same day General Forrest dispatched a report to Assistant Adjutant General Jack, in which he states: "Have dispatched by telegraph of the capture of Fort Pillow. Arrived there on the morning of the 12th and attacked the place with the portion of McCulloch's and Bell's brigades, numbering about 1,500 men, and after a sharp contest captured the garrison and all of its stores. A demand was made for the surrender, which was refused. The victory was complete, and the loss of the enemy will never be known from the fact that large numbers ran into the river and were shot and drowned. The force was composed of about 500 negroes and 200 white soldiers (Tennessee Tories). The river was dyed with the blood of the slaughtered for 200 yards. There was in the fort a large number of citizens who had fled there to escape the conscript law. Most of these ran into the river and were drowned. The approximate loss was upward of 500 killed, but few of the officers escaping. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." "His words have since been construed to mean a blood-thirsty antagonism to the negroes. That construction may be correct, but General Forrest himself contended to the end of his life that he meant only to point out the ease with which Southern soldiers conquered and destroyed this negro force as illustrating the inefficiency of black men in fighting white men."—G. C. Eggleston, *History of the Confederate War, v. 2, p. 220*.—"He stopped the slaughter as soon as he came up. Sherman acquits him from blame, saying that the policy, which he himself had always opposed, of raising troops from their own slaves to keep them in order in their own districts, made the Confederates 'fearfully savage'; that they became quite uncontrollable on such occasions."—J. Formby, *American Civil War, p. 302*.

ALSO IN: *Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (30th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives Report no. 65)*.—Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America, v. 4, bk. 4, ch. 1*.—*Report of Acting Master W. Ferguson, United States Steamer Silver Cloud (Official Records, series 1, v. 32, pt. 1, pp. 571, 609-610)*.

1864 (April-May: North Carolina).—Exploits of the ram *Albatross*.—Surrender of Plymouth.—"In the squadron [of the Confederates] we were gladdened by the success of our iron-clad ram *Albatross*, which vessel, under Captain James B. Cooke, had (after overcoming innumerable difficulties) succeeded in descending the Roanoke river, April 19th [1864], and dispersing the Federal squadron off Plymouth, N. C. She sunk the steamer *Southfield*, and drove the other vessels off; and her presence led to the recapture of Plymouth by the Confederates. On the 5th of May the *Albatross* started from Plymouth with the small steamer *Bombshell* in company, on what was called a secret expedition. I think it probable the intention was to destroy the wooden men-of-war in the sounds, and then tow troops in barges to Hatteras and retake it. If this could have been done the *Albatross* would have had it all her own way, and Roanoke island, Newbern and other places would again have fallen into the

hands of the Confederates. Shortly after leaving Plymouth the Albemarle fell in with the Federal squadron, consisting of the steamers Mattabesett, Sassacus, Wyalusing, Whitehead, Miami, Ceres, Commodore Hull and Seymour—all under the command of Captain Melancton Smith, and after a desperate combat was forced to return to Plymouth.”—W. H. Parker, *Recollections of a naval officer*, p. 339.

ALSO IN: J. R. Soley, *Blockade and the cruisers (Navy in the Civil War, v. 1, ch. 4)*.—D. Ammen, *Atlantic coast (same series, v. 2, ch. 9)*.—C. B. Boynton, *History of the navy, v. 2, ch. 36*.

1864 (May).—Creation of Territory of Montana. See DAKOTA TERRITORY: 1862-1865.

1864 (May: Virginia).—Grant's movement on Richmond.—Battle of the Wilderness.—“The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major-General Mead, pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across the Rapidan—the Fifth and Sixth Corps crossing at Germanna Ford, and the Second Corps at United States' (Ely's) Ford, the cavalry under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,—with the greater part of its trains, numbering about 4,000 wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The average distance traveled by the troops that day was about 12 miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the Fifth, Maj. Gen. G. K. Warren commanding), met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest [see above: 1863 (April-May: Virginia)], and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was, at the time the Army of the Potomac moved left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By 6 o'clock of the morning of the 6th, he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness tavern.”—U. S. Grant, *Official Records, series 1, v. 36, pt. 1, p. 18*.—“Grant had not expected to encounter his enemy here. He had supposed that Lee would move out of the Wilderness and choose more favorable ground upon which to receive the assaults of his enemy. Accordingly, the Federal commander had already pushed a part of his army under Hancock toward the edge of the Wilderness, hoping by a rapid march to place it between the Confederate army and the Confederate capital. No sooner, however, was Lee's assault developed than Grant saw clearly that he must fight a determined battle here on this most unsuitable ground. Lee had decided this in the obvious expectation of finding Grant unready. But readiness under all circumstances was a part and an important part of Grant's character and intellectual make-up. It was his habit of mind to take things as he found

them and to do the best he could in every case. He hurriedly called Hancock back and accepted battle in the jungle. The fighting was desperate throughout the day, and at the day's end no decisive advantage rested with either party. Lee had been fighting with only a part of his army, for the reason that Longstreet with that first corps upon which Lee always relied for the more desperate work of war did not reach position in time to take part in the struggle of that day. At nightfall it was obvious that the contest must be resumed in the morning. . . . Grant ordered an assault all along the line to be made at five o'clock in the morning [of the 6th]. Lee, still more alert struck out with his left an hour earlier. He was still weak on his right wing, for lack of Longstreet, who had not yet come up. Grant recognizing this fact, planned to hurl Hancock upon the Confederate right at the appointed hour of five o'clock in the morning. By an adroit handling of Rosser's cavalry, the Confederate managed to deceive Hancock into the belief that Longstreet was making a flank movement against the Federal left, similar to those which Jackson had made with such destructive effect in former battles. To meet this and to avoid a disaster like that which had befallen Hooker at Chancellorsville, Hancock promptly detached a considerable part of his force, and sent it to his left, thus weakening his column of attack. Nevertheless he struck hard enough to drive back the weak Confederate right for more than a mile. Then Longstreet, who had undertaken no such flanking expedition as that which Hancock had supposed came up and threw his veterans precipitately upon his foe. . . . Hancock was driven back and the losses on both sides were great, including a conspicuously large loss of officers from the lowest to the highest grade. General Wadsworth on the Federal side, and General Jenkins on the Confederate, were killed, and Longstreet himself was shot through the neck and shoulder so that he had to be carried from the field. Having thus lost his great lieutenant, General Lee went to that quarter of the field and took personal command in Longstreet's place. . . . The Confederates made an assault of desperate determination, and at one point broke through the Federal lines. . . . But the result was achieved at tremendous cost of life, and their further efforts to dislodge Hancock was bloodily repelled. By some means—probably by reason of the fierce firing on either side—a forest fire now broke out in Hancock's front, and the flames quickly communicated themselves to the log retentments of his fortifications. The heat and the smoke forced the Federals to retreat, fighting as they went against the Confederates who pursued them with fury. Sadly enough, besides the dead there were large numbers of wounded men, both Federal and Confederate, lying among the burning bushes and underbrush of that mile-wide stretch of wilderness over which the flames swept. . . . Night ended the struggle, and the men on both sides retired to their entrenchments to await the events of the morrow. On neither side was there the least suggestion of demoralization or of shrinking from the work that was yet to be done. . . . The war school had perfectly educated its pupils. The losses in these two days of fighting in the Wilderness have never been accurately ascertained, and never will be. The best estimates fix them at about 15,000 or 16,000 men on either side. These losses included, as has already been said, a remarkable number of officers

of high grade on both sides. Nothing could be more significant than this of the determination with which the battle was fought. In the strictest sense of the military term this had been a drawn battle. Neither side had overcome the other and neither had driven the other into retreat. Yet each side has claimed it as a victory upon grounds which are logical enough in themselves. The Confederates held that by checking Grant and baffling his plan of marching out of the Wilderness, and forcing Lee to fight in the open, they had accomplished a very distinct victory. The Federals held, that, as they had succeeded in placing their army securely south of the Rapidan and in a position to carry on a further campaign, . . . they were entitled to regard the general result of the two days' fight as a victory for themselves. There is no doubt whatever that at the end of this struggle the Confederates expected Grant to retire to the northern side of the river, as all his predecessors had done after similar conflicts. When the next morning dawned and Grant still stood firm in their front they were astonished to find him there. . . . In the mind of Lee there was an explanation ready and sufficient. The great Confederate general is reported to have said to his staff on that morning, 'Gentlemen, at last the Army of the Potomac has a head.'—G. C. Eggleston, *History of the Confederate War*, v. 2, pp. 230-236.

ALSO IN: E. M. Law, A. S. Webb et al., *Wilderness campaign (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 50-51.—W. Swinton, *Twelve decisive battles of the war*, ch. 9.—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 17.—M. Schaff, *Battle of the Wilderness*.

1864 (May: Virginia).—Sheridan's raid to Richmond.—"When the Army of the Potomac emerged from the Wilderness, Sheridan was sent to cut Lee's communications. This was the first of the remarkable raids of that remarkable leader, in Virginia, and, though short, was a destructive one. He took with him a greater portion of the cavalry led by Merritt, Gregg and Wilson, and, cutting loose from the army, he swept over the Po and the Ta, crossed the North Anna on the oth, and struck the Virginia Central railway at Beaver Dam Station, which he captured. He destroyed ten miles of the railway; also its rolling stock, with a million and a half of rations, and released 400 Union prisoners, on their way to Richmond from the Wilderness. There he was attacked in flank and rear by General J. E. B. Stuart and his cavalry, who had pursued him from the Rapid Anna [Rapidan], but was not much impeded thereby. He pushed on, crossed the South Anna at Ground-squirrel Bridge, and at daylight on the morning of the 11th, captured Ashland Station, on the Fredericksburg road, where he destroyed the railroad property, a large quantity of stores, and the road itself for six miles. Being charged with the duty of not only destroying these roads, but of menacing Richmond and communicating with the army of the James, . . . Sheridan pressed on in the direction of the Confederate capital, when he was confronted by Stuart at Yellow Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond, where that able leader, having made a swift circuitous march, had concentrated all of his available cavalry. Sheridan attacked him at once, and after a sharp engagement, drove the Confederates toward Ashland, on the north fork of the Chickahominy with a loss of their gallant leader, who, with General Gordon, was mortally wounded. Inspired by this success, Sheridan

pushed along the now open turnpike toward Richmond, and made a spirited dash upon the outer works. Custer's brigade carried them at that point and made 100 prisoners. As in the case of Kilpatrick's raid, so now, the second line of works were too strong to be carried by cavalry. The troops in and around the city had rallied for their defense, and in an attack the Nationals were repulsed. Then Sheridan led his command across the Chickahominy, at Meadow Bridge, where he beat off a considerable force of infantry sent out from Richmond, and who attacked him in the rear, while another force assailed his front. He also drove the foe on his front, when he destroyed the railway bridge there, and then pushed on southward to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he rested three days and procured supplies. Then, by way of White House and Hanover Court House [having made a circuit of Lee's army] he leisurely returned to the Army of the Potomac, which he rejoined on the 25th of May."—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 18-19.—H. B. McClellan, *Life and campaigns of Major General J. E. B. Stuart*, ch. 20.—J. B. Jones, *Rebel war clerk's diary*, v. 2, pp. 202-208.—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, pp. 77-80.

1864 (May: Virginia).—Grant's movement upon Richmond: Spottsylvania Court House.—Bloody angle.—"Throughout the entire day succeeding this first great conflict [in the Wilderness], General Lee remained quiet, watching for some movement of his adversary. His success in the preliminary struggle had been gratifying, considering the great disproportion of numbers, but he indulged no expectation of a retrograde movement across the Rapidan, on the part of General Grant. He expected him rather to advance, and anxiously awaited some development of his intention. There was no indications of such a design up to the night of the 7th, but at that time, to use the words of a confidential member of Lee's staff, 'he all at once seemed to conceive the idea that his enemy was preparing to forsake his position, and move toward Hanover Junction via the Spottsylvania Court House, and, believing this, he at once detailed Anderson's division with orders to proceed rapidly toward the court-house. General Anderson commenced his march about nine o'clock at night, when the Federal column was already upon its way. A race now began for the coveted position, and General Stuart, with his dismounted sharpshooters behind improvised breastworks, harassed and impeded the Federal advance, at every step, throughout the night. This greatly delayed their march, and their head of column did not reach the vicinity of Spottsylvania Court-House until past sunrise. General Warren, leading the Federal advance, then hurried forward, followed by General Hancock, when suddenly he found himself in front of breastworks, and was received with a fire of musketry. Lee had succeeded in interposing himself between General Grant and Richmond. On the same evening the bulk of the two armies were facing each other on the line of the Po. . . . General Lee had taken up his position on the south bank of one of the four tributaries of the Mattaponi. These four streams are known as the Mat, Ta, Po, and Nye Rivers, and bear the same relation to the main stream that the fingers of the open hand do to the wrist. General Lee was behind the Po, which is next to the Nye, the northernmost of these water-courses. Both were difficult to cross, and

their banks heavily wooded. It was now to be seen whether, either by a front attack or a turning movement, General Grant could oust his adversary, and whether General Lee would stand on the defensive or attack. All day, during the 9th, the two armies were constructing breastworks along their entire fronts, and these works, from the Rapidan to the banks of the Chickahominy, remain yet [1871] in existence. On the evening of this day a Federal force was thrown across the Po, on the Confederate left but soon withdrawn; and on the 10th a similar movement took place near the same point, which resulted in a brief but bloody conflict, during which the woods took fire, and many of the assaulting troops perished miserably in the flames. The force was then recalled, and, during that night and the succeeding day, nothing of importance occurred, although heavy skirmishing and an artillery-fire took place along the lines. On the morning of the 12th, at the first dawn of day, General Grant made a more important and dangerous assault than any yet undertaken in the campaign. This was directed at a salient on General Lee's right center, occupied by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, and was one of the bloodiest and most terrible incidents of the war. For this assault [made by three divisions of Hancock's corps] General Grant is said to have selected his best troops. These advanced in a heavy charging column, through the half-darkness of dawn, passed silently over the Confederate skirmishers, scarcely firing a shot, and, just as the first streak of daylight touched the eastern woods, burst upon the salient, which they stormed at the point of the bayonet. The attack was a complete surprise, and carried everything before it. The Southern troops, asleep in the trenches, woke to have the bayonet thrust into them, to be felled with clubbed muskets, and to find the works apparently in secure possession of the enemy before they could fire a shot. Such was the excellent success of the Federal movement, and the Southern line seemed to be hopelessly disrupted. Nearly the whole of Johnson's division were taken prisoners—the number amounting to more than 3,000—and 18 pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the assaulting column. The position of affairs was now exceedingly critical. . . . The Federal army had broken [Lee's] line; was pouring into the opening; and, to prevent him from concentrating at the point to regain possession of the works, heavy attacks were begun by the enemy on his right and left wings. It is probable that at no time during the war was the Southern army in greater danger of bloody and decisive disaster. At this critical moment General Lee acted with the nerve and coolness of a soldier whom no adverse event can shake. . . . Line of battle was promptly formed a short distance in rear of the salient then in the enemy's possession, and a fierce charge was made by the Southerners, under the eye of Lee, to regain it. . . . The word ferocious best describes the struggle which followed. It continued throughout the entire day, Lee making not less than five distinct assaults in heavy force to recover the works. The fight involved the troops on both flanks, and was desperate and unyielding. . . . The fighting only ceased several hours after dark. Lee had not regained his advanced line of works, but he was firmly rooted in an interior and straighter line, from which the Federal troops had found it impossible to dislodge him."—J. E. Cooke, *Life of General Robert E. Lee*, pt. 8, ch. 4.—"For the distance of nearly a mile, amid a cold, drenching

rain, the combatants [on the 12th, at the salient] were literally struggling across the breastworks. They fired directly into each other's faces, bayonet thrusts were given over the intrenchments; men even grappled their antagonists across the piles of logs and pulled them over, to be stabbed or carried to the rear as prisoners. . . . Never before, since the discovery of gunpowder, had such a mass of lead been hurled into a space so narrow as that which now embraced the scene of combat. . . . If any comparisons can be made between the sections involved in that desperate contest, the fiercest and deadliest fighting took place at the west angle, ever afterwards known as 'The Bloody Angle.' . . . All day the bloody work went on. . . . The trenches had more than once to be cleared of the dead, to give the living a place to stand. All day long, and even into the night, the battle lasted, for it was not till twelve o'clock, nearly twenty hours after the command 'Forward' had been given to the column at the Brown House, that the firing died down, and the Confederates, relinquishing their purpose to retake the captured works, began in the darkness to construct a new line to cut off the salient."—F. A. Walker, *History of the 2nd Army Corps*, ch. 15.—General Humphreys estimates Grant's losses in killed and wounded on the 12th at 6,020; missing, 800. Lee's losses that day in killed, wounded, and prisoners he concludes to have been between 9,000 and 10,000. His estimate of losses on the 10th is 4,100 (killed and wounded) on the Union side, and 2,000 on the Confederate side. Major General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Army corps, was killed in the skirmishing of the 9th.—Based on A. A. Humphreys, *Virginia campaign of '64 and '65*, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: C. N. Galloway, *Hand to hand fighting at Spottsylvania (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 36.

1864 (May: Virginia).—Grant's movement upon Richmond: From Spottsylvania to the Chickahominy.—"The lines of Spottsylvania remained still intact, and General Grant, who might easily have turned the position and manœuvred his antagonist out of it, seemed bent on carrying it by direct attack. Accordingly, during the succeeding week [after the battle of the 12th], various movements of corps were made from flank to flank, in the endeavor to find a spot where the lines could be broken. These attempts were skillfully met at every point—the Confederates extending their line to correspond with the shiftings of the army; so that wherever attack was essayed, the enemy bristled out in breastworks, and every partial assault made was repulsed. Day by day Grant continued to throw out towards the left, in the hope of overlapping and breaking in the Confederate right flank; so that from occupying, as the army did on its arrival, a line extending four or five miles to the northwest of Spottsylvania Court-House, it had at the end of ten days assumed a position almost due east of that place, the left resting at a distance of four miles at Massaponax Church. After twelve days of effort, the carrying of the position was seen to be hopeless; and General Grant, abandoning the attempt, resolved by a turning operation to disengage Lee from a position seen to be unassailable. Preparations for this movement were begun on the afternoon of the 10th; but the enemy, observing these, retarded its execution by a bold demonstration against the Union's right. . . . This attack somewhat disconcerted the contemplated movement, and delayed it till the following night,

May 20th, when the army, moving by the left, once more took up its march towards Richmond. Before the lines of Spottsylvania the Army of the Potomac had for twelve days and nights engaged in a fierce wrestle, in which it had done all that valor may do to carry a position by nature and art impregnable. . . . The two armies once fairly on the march . . . neither . . . seems to have sought to deal the other a blow . . . and both headed, as for a common goal, towards the North Anna. . . . The advances of the 21st and 22d brought the different corps [of the Army of the Potomac], which had moved on parallel roads at supporting distance, within a few miles of the North Anna River. Resuming the march on the morning of Monday, May 23d, the army in a few hours reached the northern bank of that stream. But it was only to desecrate its old enemy planted on the opposite side." Warren's corps crossed the river at Jericho Ford without resistance, but was furiously assailed late in the afternoon and held its ground, taking nearly 1,000 prisoners. The left column, under Hancock, forced a passage in the face of the enemy, carrying a bridge by storm. But nothing was gained by these successes. "While Lee, after the passage of Hancock on the left, threw his right wing back from the North Anna, and on the passage of Warren on the right threw back to his left wing, he continued to cling with his centre to the river; so that . . . his army took up a very remarkable line in the form of an obtuse-angled triangle. . . . The game of war seldom presents a more effectual checkmate than was here given by Lee; for after Grant had made the brilliantly successful passage of the North Anna, the Confederate commander, thrusting his centre between the two wings of the Army of the Potomac, put his antagonist at enormous disadvantage, and compelled him, for the re-enforcement of one or the other wing, to make a double passage of the river. The more the position of Lee was examined, the more unpromising attack was seen to be; and after passing the two following days in reconnoissances, and destroying some miles of the Virginia Central Railroad, General Grant determined to take up a new line of advance. The withdrawal from the North Anna was begun at dark on the 26th of May, when the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps retired by different bridges to the north bank. . . . The Second Corps held position till the morning of the 27th, when it covered the rear. From the North Anna the line of march of the army made a wide circuit eastward and then southward to pass the Pamunkey. This river is formed by the confluence of the North and South Anna; and the Pamunkey in turn uniting with the Mattaponi forms the York River, emptying into Chesapeake Bay. Thus the successful passage of the Pamunkey would not only dislodge Lee from the lines of the North and South Anna, but would bring the army in communication with a new and excellent water-base." The crossing of the Pamunkey, at and near Hanover town, was accomplished without difficulty on the 27th and 28th, "and the routes to White House, at the head of York River, being opened up, the army was put in communication with the ample supplies floated by the waters of Chesapeake Bay. Grant's new turning movement was met by a corresponding retrograde movement on the part of Lee, and as he fell back on a direct line less than half the distance of the great detour made by the Army of the Potomac, it was not remarkable that, on crossing the Pamunkey, the Confederate force was again encountered, ready to accept the gage of

battle. Lee assumed a position in advance of the Chickahominy. . . . Reconnoissances showed Lee to be in a very strong position covering the approaches to the Chickahominy, the forcing of which it was now clear must cost a great battle." —W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pt. 11, ch. 3-5.—"On the 15th [May] news came from Butler and Averell. The former reported the capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on the Danville road; and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. The next day news came from Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defenses of Richmond. The prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. This condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. . . . On this day . . . news came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market badly, and was retreating down the valley. . . . Further news from Butler reported him driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in his place. . . . All this news was very discouraging."—*Personal memoirs of U. S. Grant*, v. 2, pp. 140-142.

ALSO IN: A. Badeau, *Military history of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 2, ch. 18-19.

1864 (May: Virginia).—Coöperative movement of the army of the James.—In the plan and arrangement of General Grant's campaign, General Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe, was instructed "to collect all the forces of his command that could be spared from garrison duty, estimated at not less than 20,000, and operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being his objective. To his force 10,000 men from South Carolina, under Gilmore, were to be added. He was ordered to take City Point as soon as notification of movement was given, and fortify it. By this common advance from the Rapidan and Fortress Monroe the two armies would be brought into co-operation. . . . As arranged, Butler moved from Fortress Monroe on May 4th, Gilmore having joined him with the 10th Corps. The next day he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the night of the 9th he received dispatches from Washington informing him that Lee was retreating to Richmond and Grant in pursuit. He had, therefore, to act with caution, fearing that he might have Lee's whole army on his hands. On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling. The time thus consumed from the 6th left no possibility of surprising and capturing Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defense of these places. On the 16th the Confederates attacked Butler in his position in front

of Drury's Bluff, forced him back into his entrenchments between the forks of James and Appomattox Rivers [in the district called Bermuda Hundred], and, intrenching strongly in his front, not only covered the railroads and city, but completely neutralized his forces. . . . Butler's army being confined at Bermuda Hundred, most of the re-enforcements from the South were now brought against the Potomac Army. In addition to this, probably not less than 15,000 men, under Breckenridge, arrived from the Western part of Virginia. The position of Bermuda Hundred being easy to defend, Grant, leaving only enough to secure what had been gained, took from it all available forces under W. F. Smith, and joined them to the Army of the Potomac."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 3, pp. 368, 382-385.

ALSO IN: A. A. Humphreys, *Virginia campaign of '64 and '65*, ch. 5.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 36, pt. 2.—G. H. Vaughan-Sawyer, *Grant's campaign in Virginia*, 1864.

1864 (May: Georgia).—Sherman's movement upon Atlanta: Johnston's retreat.—Sherman now held command of the three armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, having McPherson, Thomas and Schofield for their subordinate commanders, respectively. Joe Johnston commanding the main Confederate army in the west was at Dalton, northern Georgia, confronting Thomas at Chattanooga. "Grant and Sherman had agreed to act in concert. While the former should thrust Lee back upon Richmond, his late lieutenant was to push Johnston towards Atlanta. And Banks was to transfer his forces from New Orleans to Mobile and thence move towards and join hands with the Western armies. Sherman devoted his earliest energies to the question of transportation and railroads. Baggage was reduced to the lowest limits, the higher officers setting the example. . . . Probably no officer in such high command ever lived so entirely from hand to mouth as did Sherman and his military family during the succeeding campaign. The entire equipment of his army head-quarters would have shamed the shabbiest regimental outfit of 1861. Spring was to open with a general advance. It was agreed to put and keep the Confederates on the defensive by a policy of constant hammering. Bragg had been removed to satisfy public opinion in the South, but was nominally called to Richmond to act as Mr. Davis' chief-of-staff. Johnston, as commander of the Department, had personally undertaken to hold head against Sherman. But the fact that he possessed neither the President's good will nor that of his new adviser, militated much against a happy conduct of the campaign. Sherman's forces occupied a front sixteen miles in advance of Ringgold, just south of Chattanooga. McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee was on his right with 25,000 men and 100 guns. Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland held the centre with 60,000 men and 130 guns. Schofield and the Army of the Ohio formed the left wing. His command was 15,000 men and 30 guns. This grand total of 100,000 men and 260 guns formed an army of as good stuff as ever bore arms, and the confidence of the leader in his men and of the men in their leader was unbounded. Johnston himself foresaw the necessity of a strictly defensive campaign, to which his far from sanguine character, as well as his judgment as to what the existing conditions demanded, made him peculiarly suited. Counted after the same fashion as Sherman's army, Johnston had some 75,000 men. . . . He intrenched

every step he took; he fought only when attacked; he invited battle only when the conditions were largely in his favor. Subsequent events showed how wise beyond his critics he could be. Sherman took the measure of the intrenchments at Dalton with care, and, though he outnumbered his antagonist, preferred not to hazard an engagement at such odds when he might force one on better ground. This conduct shows in strong contrast with Grant's, when the latter first met his opponent at the same moment in Virginia. Sherman despatched McPherson towards Resaca, on the railroad in Johnston's rear, with instructions to capture the town if possible. Combined with this flanking movement, a general advance was made upon the Confederate lines, and after tactical manœuvring of several days in front of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston concluded to retire from his stronghold. McPherson had . . . failed to seize Resaca, and at this place the Confederate army took up its new stand. . . . Sherman faced his antagonist on the line of Camp Creek in front of Resaca, with his right flank resting on the Oostanaula. From this position he operated by unintermitted tapping upon Johnston's defenses at constantly varying points, without, however, bringing on a general engagement. . . . Sherman's uniform tactics during this campaign, varied indefinitely in details, consisted, as will be seen, in forcing the centre of the army upon Johnston's lines, while with the right and left he operated upon either flank as chance or ground best offered. Johnston did not propose to hazard an engagement unless all conditions were in his favor. He attempted a stand at Adairsville, twenty miles south of Resaca, but shortly withdrew to Kingston and Cassville. Each captain manœuvred for a chance to fight, the other at a disadvantage. . . . From Cassville, Johnston retired across the Etowah. So far this campaign had been one of the manœuvres. Neither combatant had suffered material loss. Like two wrestlers, as yet ignorant of each other's strength or quickness, they were sparring for a hold. . . . The Union army was growing skillful. . . . Bridges were uniformly burned and railroads wrecked by the retreating Confederates. To save delays in rebuilding, so far as possible, trestles were fitted in the rear to a scale with interchangeable timbers, so that bridges could be constructed with a speed never before dreamed of. No sooner had the Confederates put torch to a bridge, than a new one arose as by magic, and the whistle of the locomotive always followed hard upon the heels of the army."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye view of our Civil War*, ch. 42-43.

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 15.—T. B. Van Horn, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, v. 2, ch. 25-28.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 38, pt. 1.—J. Fiske, *Mississippi valley in the Civil War*, pp. 325-327.—J. E. Johnston, *Opposing Sherman's advance to Atlanta (Battles and leaders of the Civil War*, pp. 260-270).

1864 (May-June: Virginia).—Grant's movement upon Richmond: Battle of Cold Harbor.—"The passage of [the Pamunkey] had been completed on May 28, and then, after three days of marching, interspersed with the usual amount of fighting, the army found itself again confronted by Lee's main line on the Totopotomoy. The operations which followed were known as the battle of Cold Harbor. On the afternoon of May 31st, Sheridan, who was on the left flank of the army, carried, with his cavalry, a position near the old well and cross roads known as Old Cold Harbor, and, with his men, dismounted be-

hind rough breast-works, held it against Fitzhugh Lee until night. To this point, during the night, marched the vanguard of the Army of the Potomac. . . . About 9 the next day (June 1st) the head of the column reached Sheridan's position, and the cavalry was withdrawn. The enemy, who had been seriously threatening Sheridan, withdrew from our immediate front within their lines and awaited us, occupying a strong outer line of intrenchments in front of our center, somewhat in advance of their main position, which included that on which the battle of Gaines' Mill had been fought two years before. It covered the approaches to the Chickahominy, which was the last formidable obstacle we had to meet before standing in front of the permanent works of Richmond. A large detachment, composed of the Eighteenth Corps and other troops from the Army of the James, under General W. F. Smith, had disembarked at White House on the Pamunkey, and was expected to connect that morning with the Sixth Corps at Cold Harbor. A mistake in orders caused an unnecessary march and long delay. In the afternoon, however, Smith was in position on the right of the Sixth Corps. Late in the afternoon both corps assaulted. The attack was made vigorously and with no reserves. The outer line in front of the right of the Sixth and the left of the Eighteenth was carried brilliantly, and the enemy was forced back, leaving several hundred prisoners in our hands. . . . This left the well and the old tavern at Cold Harbor in our rear, and brought us in front of the most formidable position yet held by the enemy. In front of him was a wooded country, interspersed with clearings here and there, sparsely populated, and full of swamps. Before daylight the Army of the Potomac stood together once more almost within sight of the spires of Richmond, and on the very ground where, under McClellan, they had defended the passage of the river they were now endeavoring to force. On the 2d of June our confronting line, on which the burden of the day must necessarily fall, consisted of Hancock on the left, Wright in the center, and Smith on the right. Warren and Burnside were still farther to the right, their lines refused, or drawn back, in the neighborhood of Bethesda Church, but not confronting the enemy. . . . No reconnoissance had been made other than the bloody one of the evening before. Every one felt that this was to be the final struggle. No further flanking marches were possible. Richmond was dead in front. . . . The general attack was fixed for the afternoon of the 2d, and all preparations had been made, when the order was countermanded and the attack postponed until half-past four the following morning. Promptly at the hour named on the 3d of June the men moved from the slight cover of the rifle-pits, thrown up during the night. . . . No great portion of the advance could be seen from any particular point, but those of the three corps that passed through the clearings were feeling the fire terribly. Not much return was made at first from our infantry, although the fire of our batteries was incessant. The time of actual advance was not over eight minutes. In that little period more men fell bleeding as they advanced than in any other like period of time throughout the war. A strange and terrible feature of this battle was that as the three gallant corps moved on [necessarily diverging, the enemy's line forming an arc of a circle, with its concave side toward them] each was enfiladed while receiving the full force of the enemy's direct fire in front. . . . No troops

could stand against such a fire, and the order to lie down was given all along the line. At points where no shelter was afforded, the men were withdrawn to such cover as could be found, and the battle of Cold Harbor, as to its result at least, was over. . . . Shortly after midday came the order to suspend for the present all further operations, and directing corps commanders to intrench, 'including their advanced positions,' and directing also that reconnoissances be made 'with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular approaches.' . . . [When night came some of the wounded] were brought in by volunteers from our intrenchments, but remained for three days uncared for beneath the hot summer suns and the unrefreshing dews of the sultry summer nights. . . . An impression prevails in the popular mind, and with some reason perhaps, that a commander who sends a flag of truce asking permission to bury his dead and bring in his wounded, has lost the field of battle. Hence the reluctance upon our part to ask a flag of truce. In effect it was done at last on the evening of the third day after the battle, when, for the most part, the wounded need no further care and our dead had to be buried almost where they fell."—M. T. McMahon, *Cold Harbor (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.—"I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. . . . At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. . . . This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared."—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs, v. 2, ch. 55*.—*Official Records, series, 1, v. 36*.

1864 (May-June: Virginia).—Campaigning in the Shenandoah valley, and Sheridan's raid to Trevillian Station.—"In the spring of 1864, the Department of West Virginia, which included the Shenandoah Valley, was under the command of Major-General Franz Sigel. A large portion of his forces was in the Kanawha region, under Brigadier-General George Crook. . . . In opening his Virginia campaign, Lieutenant-General Grant directed Sigel to form two columns, whereof one, under Crook, should break the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at the New River bridge, and should also, if possible, destroy the salt-works at Saltville; while the other column, under Sigel himself, proceeding up the Shenandoah Valley, was to distract attention from Crook by menacing the Virginia Central Railroad at Staunton."—G. E. Pond, *Shenandoah valley in 1864 (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 11, ch. 2)*.—"Early in May, General Sigel entered the Valley with a force of 10,000 or 12,000 men [6,000 or 7,000, according to Pond], and proceeded to advance toward Staunton. The Valley at that time was occupied only by a small force under General Imboden, which was wholly inadequate for its defence. General Breckenridge was therefore withdrawn from South-Western Virginia to oppose Sigel. On the 15th of May, Breckenridge with a force of 3,000 men [4,600 to 5,000—Pond] encountered Sigel at Newmarket and defeated him and compelled him to retire behind Cedar Creek. The cadets of the Virginia Military Institute formed a portion of Breckenridge's division, and behaved with distinguished gallantry. . . . After the battle of Newmarket Breckenridge was withdrawn from the Valley to reinforce Lee


. . . in the neighborhood of Hanover Junction. In the meantime Crook and Averill had reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, where they inflicted some damage, but were compelled to retire by a force sent against them by General Sam Jones. They then proceeded to join the main column operating in the Valley. After the battle of Newmarket, Sigel was relieved by General David Hunter, who was instructed by General Grant to advance upon Staunton, thence to Charlottesville, and on to Lynchburg if circumstances favored that movement. Breckenridge having been withdrawn, General W. E. Jones was ordered to the Valley to oppose Hunter, who slowly advanced, opposed by Imboden with an almost nominal force. About the 4th of June, Imboden was joined by General Jones in the neighborhood of Harrisonburg with a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 men, which he had hastily collected in Southwestern Virginia. . . . Although greatly outnumbered, he [Jones] engaged Hunter near Port Republic [at the village of Piedmont, which gives its name to the battle], where he was defeated and killed. . . . The affairs in the Valley now began to attract the attention of the commanding generals of both armies. It was evident that if Hunter could succeed in taking Lynchburg and breaking up the canal and Central Railroad, it would only be necessary to tap the Richmond and Danville and the Petersburg and Weldon railroads to complete a line of circumvallation around Richmond and Petersburg. On the 7th of June General Grant detached General Sheridan, with a large cavalry force, with instructions to break up the Central Railroad between Richmond and Gordonsville, then proceed to the James River and Kanawha Canal, break that line of communication with Richmond, and then to co-operate with Hunter in his operations against Lynchburg. About the same time General Lee sent General Breckenridge with his division, 2,500 strong, to occupy Rockfish Gap of the Blue Ridge to deflect Hunter from Charlottesville and protect the Central Railroad as far as practicable. A few days later General Early was detached by General Lee to oppose Hunter, and take such other steps as in his judgment would tend to create a diversion in favor of Richmond. General Sheridan, in compliance with his instructions, proceeded by a circuitous route to strike the railroad somewhere in the neighborhood of Gordonsville. This movement was, however, discovered by General Hampton, who, with a considerable force of cavalry encountered Sheridan on the 12th of June at Travillians [or Trevillian's] Station. After much severe and varied fighting Sheridan was defeated, and in order to escape was obliged to make a night-retreat. [In his 'Memoirs,' Sheridan claims the victory, having forced Hampton back and taken 500 prisoners; but learning that Hunter would not meet him, as expected, at Charlottesville, he turned back to re-join Grant south of Richmond]. . . . This was one of the most masterly and spirited cavalry engagements of the war. Hunter, finding Rockfish Gap occupied in force, . . . continued his march up the Valley, with the view of reaching Lynchburg by way of some one of the passes of the Blue Ridge south of the James River. In the neighborhood of Staunton he was joined by Crook and Averill, increasing his force to about 20,000 men, including cavalry and artillery. From Staunton he advanced by way of Lexington and Buchanan, burning and destroying everything that came in his way, leaving a track of desolation rarely witnessed in the course of civilized warfare." Before Hunter's ar-

rival at Lynchburg, General Early, who withdrew his corps (formerly Stonewall Jackson's, and lately commanded by Ewell), from Richmond on June 13, had reached that city and was prepared to defend it. "Hunter, finding himself unexpectedly confronted by Early, relinquished his intended attack upon the city and sought safety in a rapid night-retreat."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 18.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 21.

1864 (May-September: Georgia).—Sherman's movement upon Atlanta: New Hope Church.—Kenesaw.—Peach Tree Creek.—Siege and capture of the city.—From Cassville, for reasons given in his memoirs, Johnston continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to Allatoona. "Pausing for a few days," writes General Sherman, "to repair the railroad without attempting Allatoona, of which I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, I resolved to push on toward Atlanta by way of Dallas; Johnston quickly detected this, and forced me to fight him, May 25th-28th, at New Hope Church, four miles north of Dallas, with losses of 3,000 to the Confederates and 2,400 to us. The country was almost in a state of nature—with few or no roads. . . . Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received reinforcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far from our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident, and not the least alarmed. He then fell back to his position at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his right, Kenesaw his center and Lost Mountain his left. His line of ten miles was too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and concentrated on Kenesaw. We closed down in battle array, repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared for the contest. Not a day, not an hour, not a minute was there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute contact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June 27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full cooperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, McPherson and Schofield; . . . but we failed, losing 3,000 men to the Confederate loss of 630. Still, the result was that within three days Johnston abandoned the strongest possible position and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River. We were on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the 4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee on the 10th, covered and protected by the best line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance. . . . We had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a single-track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food, ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000 animals. The city of Atlanta, the gate city, opening the interior of the important State of Georgia, was in sight; its protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had to go. . . . We feigned to the right, but crossed the Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy behind his first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek. . . . At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate army [July 18]. Hood was known





Map of the  
**ATLANTA**  
**CAMPAIGN**

USED BY PERMISSION OF  
 Joseph M. Brown, Esq.,  
 AUTHOR OF "THE MOUNTAIN CAMPAIGNS IN GEORGIA".

SCALE OF MILES

THE MATTHEWS-NORTHTRUP CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

to us to be a 'fighter' . . . and I confess I was pleased at this change. . . . I was willing to meet the enemy in the open country, but not behind well-constructed parapets. Promptly, as expected, General Hood sallied from his Peach Tree line on the 20th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps (Hooker), which had just crossed Peach Tree Creek by improvised bridges. The troops became commingled and fought hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the Confederates were driven back within their lines, leaving behind their dead and wounded. These amounted to 4,796 men, to our loss of 1,710. We followed up and Hood fell back to the main lines of the city of Atlanta. We closed in, when again Hood, holding these lines with about one-half his force, with the other half made a wide circuit by night under cover of the woods and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank 'in air,' a movement that led to the hardest battle of the campaign. He encountered the Army of the Tennessee—skilled veterans. . . . The battle raged from noon to night when the Confederates baffled and defeated, fell back within the intrenchments of Atlanta. Their losses are reported 8,490 to ours of 3,641; but among our dead was McPherson, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. While this battle was in progress, Schofield at the center and Thomas on the right made efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts, but found them too strong to assault. The Army of the Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (Howard), from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach if possible, the railroad by which Hood drew his supplies, when, on the 28th of July, he repeated his tactics of the 22d, sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4,632 men to our 700. These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor, General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive. Thereafter the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to its parapets. I never intended to assault these, but gradually worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies. . . . Our extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to the rear, and move with the other five to a point (Jonesboro) on the railroad 26 miles below Atlanta, not fortified. This movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted in our occupation of Atlanta, on the 2d of September, 1864. The result had a large effect on the whole country, at the time, for solid and political reasons. . . . But I had not accomplished all, for Hood's army, the chief 'objective,' had escaped. Then began the real trouble. We were in possession of Atlanta, and Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, 30 miles south-east, on the Savannah Railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war, and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies, independent of the railroads."—W. T. Sherman et al., *Atlanta (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs, v. 2, ch. 15-18*.—J. D. Cox, *Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 9, ch. 7-16)*.—C. C. Chesney, *Atlanta campaign (Fortnightly Review, November, 1895)*.—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative, ch. 9-11*.—*Official Records, series 1, v. 38*.—J. B. Hood, *Advance and retreat, ch. 12-13*.

1864 (May-November).—Twentieth presidential election.—Renomination and reëlection of Abraham Lincoln.—"Preparations for the nomination of candidates had begun to be made, as usual,

early in the spring of 1864. Some who saw most clearly the necessities of the future, had for some months before expressed themselves strongly in favor of the renomination of President Lincoln. But this step was contested with great warmth and activity by prominent members of the political party by which he had been nominated and elected four years before. Nearly all the original Abolitionists and many of the more decidedly anti-slavery members of the Republican party were dissatisfied, that Mr. Lincoln had not more rapidly and more sweepingly enforced their extreme opinions. Many distinguished public men resented his rejection of their advice, and many more had been alienated by his inability to recognize their claims to office. The most violent opposition came from those who had been most persistent and most clamorous in their exactions. And as it was unavoidable that, in wielding so terrible and so absolute a power in so terrible a crisis, vast multitudes of active and ambitious men should be disappointed in their expectations of position and personal gain, the renomination of Mr. Lincoln was sure to be contested by a powerful and organized effort. At the very outset this movement acquired consistency and strength by bringing forward the Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, a man of great political boldness and experience, and who had prepared the way for such a step by a careful dispensation of the vast patronage of his department, as the rival candidate. But it was instinctively felt that this effort lacked the sympathy and support of the great mass of the people, and it ended in the withdrawal of his name as a candidate by Mr. Chase himself. The National Committee of the Union Republican party had called their convention, to be held at Baltimore, on the 8th of June." Those who opposed Lincoln's nominations issued a call for a convention to be held at Cleveland, Ohio, on May 31. The Cleveland convention, attended by about 150 persons, put in nomination General John C. Frémont, for president, and General John Cochran, of New York, for vice president. "General Frémont's letter of acceptance was dated June 4th. Its main scope was an attack upon Mr. Lincoln for unfaithfulness to the principles he was elected to defend, and upon his administration for incapacity and selfishness. . . . He intimated that if the Baltimore convention would nominate any one but Mr. Lincoln he would not stand in the way of a union of all upon the nominee. . . . The Convention, the nomination and the letter of acceptance, fell dead upon the popular feeling [and Frémont withdrew his candidacy in September]. . . . The next form which the effort to prevent Mr. Lincoln's nomination and election took was an effort to bring forward General Grant as a candidate." But this was decisively checked by General Grant, himself. The convention at Baltimore, when it assembled on June 8, showed no hesitation in nominating Abraham Lincoln for reëlection, and it associated with him, Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, as its candidate for vice president. The national convention of the Democratic party was held at Chicago, beginning August 29. The second resolution which it adopted in its platform declared that, "after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of

the Federal Union of the States." On this issue, having nominated General George B. McClellan for president, and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, for vice president, the opponents of the war went to the country in the election, in November, and were overwhelmingly defeated. "Of all the States which voted on that day, General McClellan carried but three—New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky."—H. J. Raymond, *Life and public services of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 18.—The electoral vote was for Lincoln 212, for McClellan twenty-one. The popular vote cast was, for Lincoln 2,213,665, for McClellan, 1,802,237. Many of the states had made provision for taking votes of soldiers in the field, and the army vote was 116,887 for Lincoln against 33,748 for McClellan.—Based on E. Stanwood, *History of presidential elections*, ch. 21.

ALSO IN: J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 4, pp. 517-539.

1864 (June).—Repeal of fugitive slave laws.—At every session of Congress from 1861 to 1864 ineffectual attempts were made in the Senate and in the House of Representatives to accomplish the repeal of the fugitive slave laws of 1793 and 1850. It was not until June of the latter year that the necessary bill was passed—by the House on the 6th, by a vote of eighty-two to fifty-seven, and by the Senate on the 22nd by twenty-seven to twelve. The president approved it on the 28th, and it became a law.—Based on H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power*, v. 3, ch. 29.

1864 (June).—Revenue measures.—Morill Act.—War tariff and internal taxes. See **TARIFF**: 1860-1883.

1864 (June).—Destruction of the *Alabama* by the *Kearsarge*. See **ALABAMA CLAIMS**: 1862-1864.

1864 (June).—Virginia).—Grant's movement to the south of James river.—Siege of Petersburg.

—"In consequence of the check at Cold Harbor, a restlessness was becoming general among the people, which the government in vain pretended not to notice. . . . Public opinion, shaken in its confidence, already began to listen to the sinister interpretations of the opposition journals, when, in the last half of June, it learned that the lieutenant-general had boldly crossed the James and laid siege before Petersburg. . . . This passage of the James was . . . a very fine movement, as ably executed as it was boldly conceived. It inaugurated a new phase in the campaign. . . . Henceforth, the battering not having produced the expected effect, Grant was about to try the resources of military science, and give precedence to strategic combinations. In the first place, he took his measures so well to conceal his intentions from the enemy that the latter did not recognize the character of the movement until it was already executed. Warren was ordered to occupy Lee's attention by the menace of an advance on Richmond from the direction of White Oak Swamp, while Smith (W. F.) reëmbarked from White House to return to Bermuda Hundred, and Hancock, with the Second Corps, would be transferred to the right bank of the James by a flotilla of large steamers collected at Wilcox Landing for that purpose. At the same time, a bridge of boats was thrown across a little below, where there were thirteen fathoms of water in the channel, and where the river was more than 2,000 feet broad. The Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed over on the bridge. Grant hoped to get hold of Petersburg by a 'coup de main.' If he had succeeded, the fall of Richmond would have soon followed in all probability. Unfortunately, delays occurred and

contretemps which caused the opportunity to fail and completely modified the course of events. General Smith (W. F.), after having carried the first line, which was defended by militia only, did not know how to take advantage of his first success. . . . Hancock, in his turn, debarked on the right bank, . . . and went astray in his march owing to false indications on a map which had been sent to him as correct. In short, he lost precious hours in the afternoon of June 15, and on the morning of the 16th it was too late; Lee's troops had arrived. . . . In the morning, a fresh attack, with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, met with some success, but with no decisive results. In the afternoon, the Ninth Corps having arrived, the attempt was renewed on a greater scale, and it ended by carrying the line at sundown, after a hard fight and considerable loss. On the next morning, a new assault, always by the Second Corps, supported by the Ninth. The enemy lost more ground and a redoubt of importance. In the evening, he succeeded in surprising the intrenchments which Burnside had taken from him. All these fights were not without cost; the loss of that day alone, on our side, amounted to 4,000 men. The Confederates . . . retired [to new lines] in the following night, and during the whole of the 18th they sustained in them a series of attacks which met with no success. From that day, the siege of Petersburg was resolved upon, and regular works were begun. It must be remarked that this siege was not a siege, properly speaking. The place was never even invested. It lies 22 miles south of Richmond, on the right bank of the Appomattox, eight miles southwest of City Point, where that river empties into the James, and where the new base of supplies of the army was naturally established. So that we had turned Richmond to put ourselves across a part of the enemy's communications with the South, and directly threaten the rest. These communications were: the railroads to Norfolk, Weldon and Lynchburg, and the Jerusalem and Boydton roads, all ending at Petersburg. Besides these, the Confederate capital had only the James River Canal, to the west, and the Dansville railroad, to the south. The latter did not extend beyond the limits of Virginia, but it crossed the Lynchburg railroad at Burksville, which doubled its resources. If, then, we succeeded in enveloping Petersburg only on the right bank of the Appomattox, the population and the Confederate army would be reduced to draw all their supplies from Richmond by a single-track railroad. To accomplish that was our effort; to prevent it, the enemy's: that was the point towards which all the operations of the siege were directed for nine months. On the day on which we finally succeeded, Petersburg and Richmond fell at the same blow, and the whole structure of the rebellion crumbled with these two cities."—R. de Trobriand, *Four years with the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 28.

ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, *History of the 2nd Army corps*, ch. 19-23.—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 56.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 40.

1864 (July).—Greeley and Jaques-Gilmore peace missions.—"The apathy and discouragement throughout the country took the shape of a yearning for peace, and this found an emphatic expression in much of the public and private writing of Horace Greeley, who in the month of July made an attempt to initiate negotiations which should bring the war to an end. On questionable authority he had received information that 'two ambassadors of Davis & Co.' were in Canada, 'with

full and complete powers for a peace.' Placing this intelligence before the President, and writing that 'our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country longs for peace, shudders at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, of further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human blood,' he urged Lincoln to make 'a frank offer . . . to the insurgents of terms which the impartial will say ought to be accepted,' and to invite 'those at Niagara [Canada] to exhibit their credentials and submit their ultimatum.' Lincoln replied: 'If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you.' Such a mode of prosecuting the business was not in accordance with Greeley's idea; therefore it was not until after further correspondence and some pressure from the President that he with reluctance accepted the mission and proceeded to Niagara Falls, where, on the American side of the river, he began negotiations with the Confederates in Canada. He exceeded his mandate, but ascertained that the Confederates were without authority from the Richmond government. This compelled him to ask for fresh instructions, upon which the President sent to him his private secretary, John Hay, with the famous paper of July 18: 'To Whom it may Concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways. Abraham Lincoln.' This was transmitted to the Confederates, and stopped all further negotiations, prompting from them an indignant manifesto, and from Greeley a sad, discouraged, reproachful letter."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 4, pp. 513-514.—"Another negotiation—even more irregular and wholly clandestine—had simultaneously been in progress at Richmond, with a similar result. Rev. Col. James F. Jaques, 73d Illinois, with Mr. J. R. Gilmore, of New York, had, with President Lincoln's knowledge, but without his formal permission, paid a visit to the Confederate capital on a Peace errand; being allowed to pass through the lines of both armies for the purpose. Arrived in Richmond they addressed a joint letter to Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of State, requesting an interview with President Davis, which was accorded; and a long, familiar, earnest colloquy ensued, wherein the Confederate chief presented his ultimatum in these terms: . . . 'The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the war came; and now it must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for Slavery, we are fighting for Independence; and that or extermination we will have.' . . . Thus it was not only incontestably settled but proclaimed, through the volunteered agency of two citizens, that the War must go on until the Confederacy should be recognized as an independent power, or till it should be utterly, finally overthrown. The knowledge of this fact was worth more than a victory to the

National cause."—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 2, ch. 30.

ALSO IN: E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 301-307.

1864 (July: Virginia-Maryland).—Early in the Shenandoah valley.—His invasion of Maryland and approach to Washington.—"When Early had forced Hunter into the Kanawha region [see above: 1864 (May-June: Virginia)], far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could not again be threatened from that direction, he united to his own corps General John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of Generals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland, B. T. Johnson and J. D. Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and western Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with the column thus formed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower Shenandoah Valley. At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to move north at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Maryland and threaten Washington. . . . By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and on the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that place the same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreat through the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia. Early was thus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, moving around Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, he found his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had been collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederates till the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capital from Petersburg could be brought up. Wallace contested the line of the Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally toward Baltimore. The road was then open to Washington, and Early marched to the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrations [July 11-12] which were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main purpose in front of Petersburg. Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused some concern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was looked upon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the Confederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the alarm and consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of the capital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing among the different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginary dangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed out to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in hand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement; and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury, retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by some Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early retired through Winchester toward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this place he found that he was being followed by General Crook with the combined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned to Washington under order to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. This reduction of the pur-

suing forcè tempting Early to resume the offensive, he attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded in administering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat to Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawal restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing this stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes [July 30] leaving 3,000 non-combatants without shelter or food. . . . This second irruption of Early and his ruthless destruction of Chambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grant looking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among the Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions. . . . Finally the manœuvres of Early and the raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance though Grant had somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against Early. On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as his commander."—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 23.

ALSO IN: G. E. Pond, *Shenandoah valley in 1864*, ch. 4-6.—F. Sigel, *Sigel in the Shenandoah valley in 1864 (Battles and leaders*, v. 4).

1864 (July: Virginia).—Siege of Petersburg.—Failure of mine and assault.—"All this time the siege of Petersburg went steadily on, and a great mine was run under the Confederate works by the Ninth Corps. On July 30th it was to be fired and the works rushed, but Burnside made poor dispositions, and the misconduct of the officer commanding the assault completed the failure. The troops on the flanks did their best, but the attack, both here and in other places, was defeated with heavy loss, for Beauregard had detected the tunnelling and cut off the threatened point with works in the rear, posting batteries specially to deal with the attack. Though Grant sent Hancock and Sheridan, with the Second Corps and three cavalry divisions, to make a dash at Richmond, and draw troops away, this also had been guarded against."—J. Formby, *American Civil War*, pp. 337-338.—"There was some delay about the explosion of the mine, so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. When it did explode it was very successful. . . . Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, . . . covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. Ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions, their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the rifle-pits. . . . There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode."—*Personal memoirs of U. S. Grant*, v. 2, pp. 202-203.—"The plan was to assault through the breach in the moment of confusion caused by the explosion, and reach a certain commanding position which had been designated, and from which the city, it was thought, could be easily captured. After a little difficulty with the fuse, the mine exploded, blowing up the fortifications above it, together with some pieces of artillery, and quite a number of men. The Federal assaulting column rushed into the opening, but as they did not ad-

vance promptly enough, the Confederates poured a murderous musketry fire upon them in their embarrassed position, and finally drove them to retreat with very heavy loss, some four to five thousand men being *hors de combat*."—J. W. Burgess, *Civil War and the constitution, 1859-1865*, v. 2, p. 256.—"Thus the great assault, by which Grant had hoped to gain possession of Petersburg and to cross to the north bank of the Appomattox, turned out a costly fiasco. The Federal loss nearly reached 4,000, whilst that of the Confederates was probably not more than 1,200. Meade requested that a Court of Enquiry should be held to examine into the causes of the disaster. The finding of the Court exonerated him, and laid the blame, where it justly belonged, upon Burnside and his divisional commanders, with the exception of Potter. . . . Ledlie was allowed to resign, and Burnside was succeeded in the command of the 9th Corps by General Parke."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, pp. 356-357.

ALSO IN: W. H. Powell et al., *Battle of the Petersburg crater (Battles and leaders*, v. 4).—A. Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pt. 4, ch. 5.—A. A. Humphreys, *Virginia campaign of '64 and '65*, ch. 9.—*Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War (38th Congress, 2d Session*, v. 1).


1864 (August: Virginia).—Siege of Petersburg: Weldon Road.—Reams's Station.—Dutch Gap canal.—After the failure of the attempt at Petersburg, to prevent reinforcements from being sent from Richmond to Early who was then operating in the Shenandoah valley, Grant gave orders for another move to threaten Richmond. "Hancock's corps, part of the Tenth Corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of 13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing. . . . General Meade was left in command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the Valley. . . . While most of Lee's force was on . . . [the north] side of the river, Warren had been sent with most of the Fifth Corps to capture the Weldon railroad. . . . From our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon railroad. A division was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River to take its place. This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies he got thereafter from that source. It was on the 21st

that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recapture it. Again he failed, and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. But the Weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of August to the close of the war. . . . We had our troops on the Weldon railroad contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting through to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges, and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being strengthened in the Valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt."—*Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, v. 2, pp. 209, 211-213.*—"For about a month after the battle of Reams's Station there was comparative quiet along the lines of the opposing armies. . . . A strong party of colored soldiers had been set to work by General Butler on the north side of the James, under cover of a battery on that side mounting 100-pounder Parrott guns, in digging a canal across the narrow isthmus of a peninsula formed by a sharp bend in the river, called Farrar's Island. By this canal it was intended to secure a nearer base of operations against Richmond, and afford a passage for the National war vessels, by which they might flank several important works of the Confederates. [The Dutch Gap Canal, as it was called, did not prove successful, the necessary depth of water never being secured during the war, though the canal has been brought into use since.]"—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War, v. 3, ch. 13.*

Also in: P. S. Michie, *Dutch Gap canal (Battles and leaders, v. 4, p. 575).*—O. B. Willcox, *Actions on the Weldon railroad (Battles and leaders, v. 4, p. 568).*

1864 (August: Alabama).—**Battle of Mobile bay.—Capture of Confederate forts and fleet.**—"Mobile was the most important port held by the Confederates on the Gulf after the fall of New Orleans and the evacuation of Pensacola. The city stands at the head of a bay which is thirty miles long and from six to fifteen miles broad. The main entrance lies between Dauphin Island on the west and Mobile Point on the east, and is nearly three miles broad. But from Dauphin Island a sand-bank runs out, narrowing the deep water channel to less than 2,000 yards. On Dauphin Island was Fort Gaines, too far distant, however, to constitute a serious obstacle to a fleet trying to enter the Bay. On Mobile Point was Fort Morgan, mounting forty heavy guns with seven others mounted in a water battery thrown up close alongside. Another entrance into the Bay from Mississippi Sound was protected by Fort Powell, mounting six guns, but was not practicable for ships of heavy draught. A line of piles had been driven in from Fort Gaines across the sand-bank to prevent any light vessel from entering, and where the line of obstructions ceased a triple line of mines extended as far as a red buoy, which was little over 200 yards from the guns on Mobile Point. This narrow passage had been left for the benefit of blockade runners, and by it

alone could a Federal fleet enter the Bay. Farragut, who had resumed the command of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron in January, 1864, was anxious to take possession of Mobile Bay as quickly as possible. He knew that Mobile itself could not be reduced except by a considerable land force, but he also knew that the Confederates were building ironclads in the river above the city, and he wished to gain possession of the Bay before these formidable antagonists should be completed. Once in possession of the Bay he could prevent the ironclads from being brought over the Dog River Bar, and enforce the blockade more effectively than was possible from without; but to accomplish his purpose he required the coöperation of one brigade of troops to reduce the forts, after he had run past, and isolated them, and of at least one ironclad to aid his wooden vessels in their encounter with the works on Mobile Point. The task was a far harder one than that which he had so successfully surmounted two years earlier in the Lower Mississippi. Then the fall of New Orleans was inevitable, if once the fleet passed the Mississippi forts. But Mobile City was impregnable against a purely naval attack, and to maintain himself inside the Bay it was necessary for the forts commanding the entrance to be reduced. But the Government turned a deaf ear to his entreaties. The ironclads were required for blockading purposes at other points, and no land force could be spared, as the ill-fated Red River Expedition [see above: 1864 (March-May: Louisiana)] absorbed all the available troops in the Department. Meanwhile the Confederates were pushing on the construction of their great ironclad, the *Tennessee*, with all speed. She was unquestionably the most powerful war vessel ever possessed by the Confederacy. . . . By August Farragut's repeated demands for troops and ironclads had been at length answered. On the 3rd General Gordon Granger with a division of troops appeared off Dauphin Island, and four monitors had either arrived or were on the point of doing so. Two of these, the *Chickasaw* and *Winnebago*, came from the Mississippi; they carried four 11-inch guns in two turrets protected by eight and a half inches of armour. The other two, the *Tecumseh* and *Manhattan*, came from the Atlantic coast, and were larger vessels, carrying two 15-inch guns in a single turret protected by ten inches of armour. It had been intended to make a joint attack on the 4th, and on that day Granger disembarked his troops, but Farragut was unable to coöperate, as all his vessels had not yet arrived. On the morning of the 5th the fleet steamed in to attack. As at Port Hudson, the wooden vessels were lashed together in pairs. The monitors formed a starboard squadron slightly in advance of the *Brooklyn*, the leading wooden vessel."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, pp. 495-497.*—"At six o'clock on the morning of the 5th of August the fleet started with the flood tide. The Admiral took up his position in the port main rigging of the *Hartford*, so that he might have a good post of observation. [According to accounts given by officers who were on board the *Hartford*, Admiral Farragut climbed the rigging, after the battle began, in order to get above the thickest of the smoke, and Captain Drayton sent a man to lash him where he stood, so that, if wounded, he might not fall to the deck]. . . . Above the fort, and just beyond the obstructions, lay the Confederate ram *Tennessee* and her three attendant gunboats [commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan].



FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY

Naval victory of the Federal Fleet under Farragut in Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864

(From the painting by W. H. Overend)





. . . Soon after half-past six the *Tecumseh* [the leading monitor] fired the first two shots at Fort Morgan. For half an hour after this, the ships advanced in silence. Then the fort opened on the Brooklyn, and presently the whole line of vessels were hotly engaged. Their concentrated fire kept down that of the enemy, and all seemed at this time to be going well with the fleet. The *Tecumseh*, though all the while advancing, was now silent, reserving her fire for the *Tennessee*, which lay beyond the obstructions. Captain Craven saw the red buoy, but it seemed so close to the beach that he thought there must have been a mistake in his orders; and altering his course, he headed straight for the *Tennessee*, passing to the westward of the buoy right over the line of torpedoes. Suddenly there came a frightful explosion; . . . and she sank to the bottom of the channel. Of 120 men on board only 21 were saved. . . . From the Brooklyn, leading the main column, something was now desecrated in the water ahead which resembled torpedo-buoys, and the sloop, with the *Octorara* lashed to her side, suddenly stopped, and in a moment they were backing down on the vessels astern of them. The bows of the two ships turned, falling off towards the fort, so that they blocked up the channel. The *Hartford*, the Admiral's flag-ship, which was next astern, also stopped to prevent a collision, but she was drifting fast with the *Metacomet* toward the two vessels ahead, and the *Richmond* and *Port Royal* were close upon them, followed by the others. At that moment it seemed as if nothing could save the vessels of the fleet from being thrown into hopeless confusion, massed together as they were directly under the guns of the fort. It was in that moment, at the crisis of the battle, that the calm and dauntless spirit of the Admiral rose to its greatest height. . . . 'Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!' came the command, in clear, ringing tones from the Admiral's place in the rigging. In a moment the *Hartford* had turned, and dashing with the *Metacomet* past the Brooklyn, rushed straight over the barrier. Snap, snap, went the primers of the torpedoes under the bottom of the ship,—the officers and men could hear them,—but no explosion followed, and the *Hartford* passed safely into the waters above. Meanwhile the four ships lay entangled under Fort Morgan. A collision seemed inevitable, but Captain Jenkins of the *Richmond*, . . . backed away from the others, and began a furious cannonade on the fort with the whole broadside, driving the enemy out of the water-batteries. The Brooklyn was by this means able to recover, and presently she steamed ahead, followed by the *Richmond* and the rest of the fleet. . . . No sooner was the battle with the fort over than a new battle began with the *Tennessee*. The moment that the ships had fairly entered the bay, the Confederate ram . . . came charging down the whole line, taking each vessel in turn," but doing no serious injury to any. On the arrival of the monitors, which had lagged behind, "the *Tennessee* took refuge under the guns of the fort, and the fleet rejoined the *Hartford*, now four miles up the bay." Meantime the *Hartford* and the *Metacomet* had disposed of two of the Confederate gunboats: the *Selma*, which surrendered, and the *Gaines*, which had been run ashore and set on fire. The third, the *Morgan*, took shelter, with the *Tennessee*, near the fort. "The *Hartford* had by this time come to anchor, and her crew went to breakfast. The other ships gradually joined her. But the battle was not yet over. It was now a little before nine o'clock, and suddenly the

*Tennessee* was reported approaching." In the battle which ensued, the stout iron-clad was rammed repeatedly by the *Monongahela*, the *Lackawanna*, the *Hartford* and the *Ossipee*, and pounded by the terrible guns of the monitor *Chickasaw*, until, with her commander wounded, her tiller-chains and smoke stack gone, her port shutters jammed, and her armor starting from the frame, she raised the white flag. "A few days later the forts surrendered, and Mobile, as a Confederate port, ceased to exist. The fall of the city did not come until some time afterward; indeed no immediate attempt was made upon it, for the capture of the forts and the occupation of Mobile Bay served every purpose of the Federal Government."—J. R. Soley, *Sailor boys of '61*, ch. 13.—"This great victory cost the Union fleet 335 men. . . . The losses in the . . . [Confederate] fleet were 10 killed and 16 wounded—confined to the *Tennessee* and *Selma*—and 280 prisoners taken. The loss in the forts is unknown."—L. Farragut, *Life of David Glasgow Farragut*, ch. 27.

ALSO IN: J. C. Kinney and J. D. Johnston, *Farragut at Mobile bay*.—Idem, *Ram Tennessee at Mobile bay (Battles and leaders*, v. 3).—A. T. Mahan, *Gulf and inland waters (Navy in the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 8).—Idem, *Admiral Farragut*, ch. 10.—*Official Records*, series 1, v. 39.

1864 (August-October: Virginia).—Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah valley.—Winchester.—Fisher's Hill.—Cedar Creek.—Famous ride.—"The events of July showed the urgent need of unity of command in Northern Virginia, and the lieutenant-general, in August, consolidated these four departments [of Washington, the Susquehanna, West Virginia and the Middle department] into one, named the Middle Military Division, under General Hunter. That officer, however, before entering on the proposed campaign, expressed a willingness to be relieved, and General P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the command of the forces in the field under Hunter, was appointed in his stead." General Sheridan was appointed to the command on August 7, and took the field with an effective force (which included the Sixth and Nineteenth corps) of 40,000 men, 10,000 being cavalry. "His operations during that month and the fore part of September were mainly confined to manœuvres having for their object to prevent the Confederates from gaining the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Valley. But after once or twice driving Early southward to Strasburg, he each time returned on his path towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant had hesitated in allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, as defeat would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania before another army could be interposed to check him. Finding, however, while on a personal visit to General Sheridan, in the month of September, that that officer expressed great confidence of success, he authorized him to attack. At this time the Confederate force held the west bank of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force lay in front of Berryville, twenty miles south of Harper's Ferry. The situation of the opposing armies was peculiar: each threatened the communications of the other, and either could bring on a battle at any time. It would appear that General Early had designed assuming the offensive." He made a movement which General Sheridan was prompt to take advantage of, on the morning of September 10th, and a battle ensued—known as the battle of Winchester, but some times called the battle of Opequan Creek—

which resulted in a victory for the latter. "It is due to state that there was a great disparity in the numbers engaged—Early's force consisting of 8,500 muskets and 3,000 sabres, while Sheridan's strength was thrice that of the aggregate Confederate force. Sheridan's preponderance in horse enabled him to extend far beyond and overlap the Confederate left, and when, after several hours' of indecisive fighting between the infantry, a general advance was, at four P. M., made by the whole line, the cavalry, by an impetuous charge, carried the fortified heights: the Confederates . . . broke in confusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester, with the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented Sheridan from following up the victory, among the trophies of which were 2,500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine battle-flags. . . . After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not pause in his southward retreat till he reached Fisher's Hill, near Strasburg, 30 miles south of Winchester. This is a very defensible position, commanding the débouché of the narrow Strasburg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah River and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on the morning of the 22d and formed his force for a direct attack, while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavalry by the parallel Luray Valley, to gain New Market, 20 miles in Early's rear. After much manœuvring, and several ineffectual efforts to force the position, an attack of cavalry was made from the right. Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry was moved to that flank, and by an impetuous assault carried the Confederate left resting on the North Mountain. A general attack in front then disrupted Early's whole line, and the Confederates retired in great disorder, leaving behind 16 pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. . . . Early's retreat was not stayed until he reached the lower passes of the Blue Ridge, whither he retired with a loss of half his army. Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as Staunton, and operating destructively against the Virginia Central Railroad, returned and took position behind Cedar Creek near Strasburg. Previously to abandoning the country south of Strasburg, it was laid waste by the destruction of all barns, grain, forage, farming implements, and mills. The desolation of the Palatinate by Turenne was not more complete. On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, and being re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and 600 cavalry from Lee's army, again marched northward down the Valley, and once more ensconced himself at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan continued to hold position on the north bank of Cedar Creek. Nothing more important than cavalry combats, mostly favorable to the Federal arms, took place, until the 19th of October, when Early assumed a bold offensive that was near giving him a victory as complete as the defeat he had suffered. . . . The army was, at this time, temporarily under the command of General Wright—Sheridan being absent at Washington. The position held by the Union force was too formidable to invite open attack, and Early's only opportunity was to make a surprise. This that officer now determined on, and its execution was begun during the night of the 18th-19th of October." A flanking column, "favored by a heavy fog . . . attained, unperceived, the rear of the left flank of the Union force, formed by Crook's Corps . . . and rushed into the camp—the troops awaking only to find themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their bewilderment

was impossible, and Crook's Corps, being thoroughly broken up, fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy. As soon as this flank attack was developed, Early, with his other column, emerged from behind the hills west of Cedar Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass, against which the Confederates directed the captured artillery (18 guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the main turnpike. Such was the scene on which the light of day dawned. The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. With this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front, throwing it forward at right angles to its former position, and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service, was however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force. . . . At the first good position between Middletown and Newtown, Wright was able to rally and reform the troops, form a compact line, and prepare either to resist further attack or himself resume the offensive. It was at this time, about half-past ten A. M., that General Sheridan arrived upon the field from Winchester ["twenty miles away"], where he had slept the previous night. Hearing the distant sounds of battle rolling up from the south, Sheridan rode post to the front, where arriving, his electric manner had on the troops a very inspiring effect. General Wright had already brought order out of confusion and made dispositions for attack. . . . A counter-charge was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon. . . . A large part of Early's force, in the intoxication of success, had abandoned their colors and taken to plundering the abandoned Federal camps. The reflux wave was as resistless as the Confederate surge had been. . . . The retreat soon became a rout. . . . In the pursuit all the captured guns were retaken and 23 in addition. The captures included, besides, near 1,500 prisoners. . . . With this defeat of Early all operations of moment in the Shenandoah forever ended, [and most of the troops on both sides were recalled to the main field of operations, at Petersburg].—W. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 12, pt. 8.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 1-4.—G. E. Pond, *Shenandoah valley in 1864*, ch. 7-13.—M. M. Granger, *Battle of Cedar Creek (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery, Loyal Legion of the United States, v. 3)*.—W. Merritt, *Sheridan in the Shenandoah valley*.—J. A. Early, *Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.—R. B. Irwin, *History of the 19th Army Corps*, ch. 33-34.—H. C. King, *Battle of Cedar Creek (Personal recollections of the war: New York Commandery, Loyal Legion of the United States)*.

1864 (September-October: Georgia).—Atlanta cleared of its former inhabitants.—Sherman's preparations for the march to the sea.—Hood's raid to the rear.—"During the month of September, Sherman's army remained grouped about Atlanta. . . . The Army of the Cumberland, under Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Howard, was at East Point; and the Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. . . . Sherman now determined to make Atlanta exclusively a military post. On the 4th of September he issued the following orders: 'The city of Atlanta belonging exclusively

for warlike purposes, it will at once be vacated by all except the armies of the United States and such civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments of the Government.' . . . This order fell upon the ears of the inhabitants of Atlanta like a thunderbolt." To a remonstrance addressed to him by the mayor and two councilmen of the city he replied: "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses. . . . My military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. . . . War is cruelty and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. . . . You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war." A truce of ten days was arranged, during which "446 families were moved south, comprising 705 adults, 860 children and 70 servants, with an average of 1,651 pounds of furniture and household goods of all kinds to each family."—S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, *Sherman and his campaigns*, ch. 18.—"Gen. Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in the neighborhood of Jonesboro, receiving his supplies from the Macon road. His army numbered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the Georgia militia; and, as if to show that no immediate offensive movement was contemplated, the latter were withdrawn from him by Gov. Brown after the evacuation of Atlanta. . . . To allow their principal Southern army to rust in inactivity was not, however, the intention of the rebel authorities. . . . Something must be done, and that speedily, to arrest the progress of the Federal army, or Georgia and perhaps the Gulf States, would be irretrievably lost. . . . The whole army of General Hood, it was decided, should rapidly move in a compact body to the rear of Atlanta, and, after breaking up the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee River at that place. . . . In connection with this movement, General Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry officer, was already operating in Southern Tennessee."—W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history of the Rebellion in the United States*, p. 609.—"At this time in the Shenandoah Valley the War was assuming a severer aspect than before; Grant prescribed and Sheridan carried out a policy of devastation that was new. The spirit in the West was no milder, a foretaste of what was to come appearing in an order for the destruction of Atlanta and the deportation of its people. Whatever the city contained that could be made useful to the Confederacy—factories, storehouses, machine-shops, mills—whether distinctly public property or the possessions of individuals which might be used for public purposes, was to be sacrificed. . . . the order meant a wiping out of the city; its population must go elsewhere, the Federal general undertaking no more than to conduct the exodus humanely. . . . It was, however, a time for weapons rather than words. Jefferson Davis appeared in September in the camp of Hood, to concert plans and apply incitements. Beauregard, too, who had done excellent service about Petersburg, after his successful defence of Charleston, came

once more to the West as commander-in-chief, soon making his headquarters in the familiar camp at Corinth; while leaving Hood free in the field, he was near at hand for counsel, his jurisdiction including also the region farther west and south throughout Alabama and Mississippi, over which Dick Taylor had been placed. Passing around Atlanta, Hood was presently on Sherman's communications, breaking up the railroad to Chattanooga and compelling an advance by the Federal army northward to the neighborhood of Marietta. October 5, the important position at Allatoona was in great danger; but Sherman, giving and receiving signals over the heads of the enemy, from Kennesaw Mountain, to a station eighteen miles distant, was at last assured of the arrival of the division of John M. Corse, and that Allatoona would be held. Hood made another attempt at Resaca; but the duplicates were close at hand for every part of the railroad that might be destroyed, and Colonel Wright quickly made good every loss. Hood soon marched farther west into northern Alabama, fixing himself at last near Florence, on the bank of the Tennessee River. Sherman followed, being at the end of October at Gaylesville, near the Georgia line, a point beyond which he did not pursue."—J. K. Hosmer, *Outcome of the Civil War, 1863-1865*, pp. 202-203.—"For several days subsequent to the fight at Allatoona, Gen. Sherman remained in the latter place, watching the movements of Hood. . . . Gen. Hood, however, crossing the Etowah and avoiding Rome, moved directly north, and on the 12th Stuart's corps of his army appeared in front of Resaca, the defences of which were held by Col. Weaver with 600 men and three pieces of artillery. . . . No serious attack was made upon the garrison, the enemy being more intent upon destroying the railroad toward Dalton. . . . [which they reached on the 14th]. The 14th and 15th were employed by the enemy in continuing the destruction of the railroad as far as Tunnel Hill. . . . The approach of the Federal columns now warned General Hood to move off to the west, and the 16th found him in full retreat for Lafayette, followed by General Sherman. . . . From Lafayette the enemy retreated in a southwesterly direction into Alabama through a broken and mountainous country, but scantily supplied with food for man or beast; and passing through Summerville, Gaylesville, and Blue Pond, halted at Gadsdens, on the Coosa River, 75 miles from Lafayette. Here he paused for several days, receiving a few reinforcements brought up by General Beauregard, who had on the 17th assumed command of the Confederate military division of the West. . . . General Hood still retained his special command, subject to the supervision or direction of General Beauregard, and his army, after remaining a few days in Gadsden, moved, about the 1st of November, for Warrington, on the Tennessee River, 30 miles distant. General Sherman meanwhile remained at Gaylesville, which place his main body reached about the 21st, watching the enemy's movements. . . . Hood's flanking movement, . . . had entirely failed to interrupt the Federal communications to a degree that would compel the evacuation of Atlanta."—W. J. Tenney, *Military and naval history in the United States*, ch. 45.

Also in: J. D. Cox, *Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil war, v. 9, ch. 17)*.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs, v. 2, ch. 10*.—T. B. Van Horne, *Life of Major-General George H. Thomas, v. 2, ch. 12*.—J. B. Hood, *Advance and retreat, ch. 15*.—*Official Records, 1st series, v. 39*.

1864 (October).—Disloyal associations in the North.—“A large number of Democrats during the Civil War became members of a secret society which at first was called Knights of the Golden Circle but in the autumn of 1863 took the name of the Order of American Knights, continuing the use of bombastic oaths, passwords, grips and signs. . . . [It was also known as the “Mutual Protection Society,” “Circle of Honor,” or “Circle or Knights of the Mighty Host.”] Owing to certain revelations the name of the order was changed early in 1864 to the Sons of Liberty, which was generally adopted throughout the West, although some localities adhered to the designation of [Order of American Knights. Its members were also sometimes called “Butternuts,” in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. (See also INDIANA: 1861-1865.)] Vallandigham while still an exile was elected supreme grand commander. The organization attained its maximum membership sometime in the year 1864 which Joseph Holt, judge-advocate-general, thought might number 500,000, although measured by the Democratic vote of 1864 this was an obvious exaggeration. . . . The members for the most part looked upon the order as an efficient adjunct to the Democratic party and a counter movement to the Union Leagues which the Republicans had formed. The more extreme . . . believed that the organization might be used to resist arbitrary arrests and to interfere with the draft, and the most daring had dreams of Northwestern Confederacy which should compel the war to cease. These were willing to discuss plans of an armed rising to free the Confederate prisoners in different parts of the West who in turn should assist the Sons of Liberty in the establishment of the Northwestern Confederacy. But this scheme of rebellion and treason was confined to talk and to the taking of darkly mysterious oaths. When the time for action came, armed men did not appear. Indeed few of them wished for the military success of the Southern Confederacy. . . . The number of members of this organization in Indiana had been estimated all the way from 17,000 to 100,000. Here as in the other States the order had a military department; and the number of armed men in Ohio, Indiana and Illinois who could be mobilized for effective service was supposed by certain timid people to be very large. While many of these estimates were absurd it is true that a few Sons of Liberty had agreed to assist by force some Confederates whose base was Canada in an effort to free the prisoners of war confined . . . [in Ohio and Illinois.] Negotiations were opened with Jacob Thompson who had been sent as a commissioner to Canada by Jefferson Davis to further the interests of the Confederate States; and Vallandigham had an interview with him at Windsor. . . . [But] while smarting from his arrest, trial and banishment . . . [Vallandigham] made it clear that he could not identify himself with the Southern cause nor take any part in a war against the national or State governments. . . . The real harm which the Sons of Liberty and kindred organizations did was to discourage enlistments and to foster resistance to the draft. ‘I have not been a believer,’ wrote Halleck to Grant, August 11, 1864, ‘in most of the plots, secret societies, etc., of which we have so many pretended discoveries; but the people in many parts of the North and West now talk openly and boldly of resisting the draft. . . . Commanding generals of the departments . . . [were disturbed by] plots the magnitude and gravity of which

were exaggerated in the reports of their detectives. The despatches of the summer of 1864 reflect constant and genuine alarm; and the report of Judge-Advocate-General Joseph Holt is an example of the astounding things believed by some in authority. Holt, credulous to the extent of accepting as truth nearly all the statements of the detectives and alarmists, gave under the date of October 8, 1864, a historical account of these secret organizations in an official report to the Secretary of War. This secret order, he asserted in the summing up, is the ‘echo and faithful ally’ of the ‘rebellion.’ ‘The guilty men engaged [in these movements] after casting aside their allegiance seem to have trodden under foot every sentiment of honor and every restraint of law human and divine.’ . . . Despite the many almost crushing burdens of the summer of 1864 which might have warped the sanest mind Lincoln’s judgment was true and could not be perverted by these disclosures which to many seemed so alarming. ‘The President’s attitude,’ write Nicolay and Hay, ‘in regard to this organization [the O. A. K. or Sons of Liberty] was one of good-humored contempt.’ It was probably in view of one of the estimates that there were a hundred thousand Sons of Liberty in Indiana that Lincoln made the remark to McDonald: ‘Nothing can make me believe that one hundred thousand Indiana Democrats are disloyal.’—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 5, pp. 317-321.—See also COPPERHEADS.

ALSO IN: J. Holt, *Judge Advocate General’s report on secret associations and conspiracies against the government*.—E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Great Rebellion*, appendix, pp. 445-454.—J. A. Logan, *Great conspiracy*, p. 499, and appendix ch. B.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 1.

1864 (October).—St. Albans raid.—“Along the Northern border . . . the rebel agents, sent thither on ‘detached service’ by the Rebel Government, were active in movements intended to terrify and harass the people. On the 10th of October, a party of them made a raid into St. Albans, Vermont, robbing the banks there, and making their escape across the lines into Canada with their plunder, having killed one of the citizens in their attack. Pursuit was made, and several of the marauders were arrested in Canada. Proceedings were commenced to procure their extradition [which were protracted until after the close of the war]. . . . The Government received information that this affair was but one of a projected series, and that similar attempts would be made all along the frontier. More than this, there were threats, followed by actual attempts, to set fire to the principal Northern cities.”—H. J. Raymond, *Life and public services of Abraham Lincoln*, p. 611.—See also MONTREAL: 1860-1901.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 8, ch. 1.—*Correspondence relating to the Fenian invasion and the rebellion of the Southern states (Ottawa, 1869)*, pp. 117-138.

1864 (October; North Carolina).—Destruction of the ram *Albemarle*.—The ram *Albemarle*, which had proved in the spring so dangerous an antagonist to the blockading vessels in the North Carolina Sounds (see above: 1864 [April-May: North Carolina]), was still lying at Plymouth, in the Roanoke river, and another attack from her was feared by the fleet. “She was finally destroyed by a brave young lieutenant, William B. Cushing,

who blew her up with a torpedo. Though only twenty years old, he was one of the most daring officers in the navy, and he had become noted for his fearlessness in the expeditions in the sounds and rivers of North Carolina. One dark night (Oct. 27) he set out from the fleet in a steam launch—a long open boat used by naval vessels—with a crew of thirteen officers and men. The launch was fitted with a torpedo which could be run out forward on the end of a long boom so as to be thrust under the vessel to be attacked. Cushing got within sixty feet of the *Albemarle* before his boat was seen. The guards then shouted the alarm, rang the boat's bell, and began firing their muskets at the launch. There was a raft of logs thirty feet wide around the *Albemarle* to protect her from just such attacks, but Cushing ran the bow of the launch upon the logs, lowered the boom so that the torpedo came right under the side of the vessel and fired it. At the same moment a shot from one of the great guns of the ram crashed through the launch and it was overwhelmed by a flood of water thrown up by the explosion of the torpedo. The Confederates called out to Cushing to surrender, but he refused, and ordering his men to save themselves as they best could, he sprang into the water amid a shower of musket balls and swam down the river. He succeeded in reaching the shore, almost exhausted, and hid himself during the next day in a swamp, where he was cared for by some negroes. From them he heard that the *Albemarle* had been sunk by his torpedo. The next night he found a small boat in a creek, paddled in it down the river, and before midnight was safe on board one of the vessels of the fleet. Only one other man of the party escaped, all the rest being either drowned or captured. The *Albemarle* being thus put out of the way, Plymouth was recaptured a few days afterward."—J. D. Champlin, Jr., *Young folks' history of the War for the Union*, ch. 33.

Also in: W. B. Cushing, E. Holden, et al., *Confederate Ram Albemarle (Battles and leaders*, v. 4).

1864 (November: Tennessee).—Hood's advance northward.—Battle of Franklin.—When General Sherman started on his march to the sea General Thomas was left to oppose Hood. "The force Thomas had for this purpose was curiously small, considering how formidable Hood's army had been in the Atlanta Campaign, and still was. All Thomas had for immediate field service were the Fourth and Twenty-Third Corps, numbering together about 22,000 infantry, and also about 3,000 cavalry. These troops were sent to Pulaski, Tennessee, in command of General Schofield, Thomas, himself remaining at Nashville. A little after the middle of November, 1864, Hood crossed the Tennessee River and inaugurated his campaign by a flank movement. He made a rapid march upon Columbia, with the view of getting in behind Schofield, who was at Pulaski. But Schofield retired to Columbia in time to frustrate Hood's plans. The two armies remained in close proximity to each other at Columbus until November 28th, when Hood made another skillfully-planned flank movement . . . to Spring Hill, in rear of Schofield. Again Hood was foiled. . . . General Thomas at Nashville wanted the Confederates held back as long as possible, in order that he might have time to receive there his expected reinforcements of A. J. Smith's corps. It was, therefore, Schofield's duty to check Hood's advance as long as he could. . . . He started Gen-

eral Stanley, with a division of 5,000 men, and a great part of his artillery, to Spring Hill (12 miles north of Columbia) early in the morning. He put two other divisions on the road. He held one division in front of Columbia, and prevented the enemy from crossing the river during the entire day, and also that night. Stanley reached Spring Hill in time to prevent Hood from occupying that place. He skirmished and fought with Hood's advance troops at Spring Hill during the afternoon of November 29th. . . . Schofield . . . accomplished exactly what he believed he could accomplish. He held back his enemy at Columbia with one hand and fenced off the blow at Spring Hill with the other. . . . The beneficial result of all this bold management of Schofield, November 29th, was apparent the next day in the battle of Franklin. Hood fought that great battle practically without his artillery. He only had the two batteries which he took with him on his detour to Spring Hill. Those two he used. . . . But his vast supply of artillery had all been detained at Columbia too long to be of any service at the end and place it was most needed. . . . The Federal troops left Spring Hill in the night for Franklin, ten miles distant. Early in the morning of November 30th they began to arrive at Franklin, and were placed in position covering the town. Early the same morning the Confederates moved up from Spring Hill, following hard upon the rearmost of the Federals. . . . General Stanley says, in his official report: "From one o'clock until four in the evening, the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack. Yet, in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during the campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault." The assault was made, however, with a terrible persistency which proved the ruin of Hood's army, for it failed. "The [Federal] troops were quietly withdrawn before midnight. A silent rapid march brought them to Nashville the next morning, and weary with fighting and marching they bivouacked in the blue grass pastures under the guns of Fort Negley."—T. Speed, *Battle of Franklin (Sketches of war history, Ohio Commandery, Loyal Legion of the United States*, v. 3).—"The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing."—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, p. 255.

Also in: T. B. Van Horne, *Life of General George H. Thomas*, ch. 13.—J. B. Hood, *Advance and retreat*, ch. 16-17.

1864 (November).—Arizona organized as territory. See ARIZONA: 1864 (November).

1864 (November-December: Georgia).—Sherman's march to the sea.—"It was at Alatoona [see above: 1864 (September-October: Georgia)] probably, that Sherman first realized that, with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communications with the North would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. . . . Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I

myself [writes General Grant] was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2nd of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed; that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga. . . . Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. . . . The army was expected to live on the country. . . . Each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which

consisted in round numbers of 60,000 men. . . . He had thoroughly purged it of all inefficient material, sending to the rear all organizations and even all individuals that he thought would be a drag upon his celerity or strength. His right wing, under Howard, consisted of the Fifteenth Corps, commanded by Osterhaus, in the absence of John A. Logan; and the Seventeenth Corps, commanded by Frank P. Blair, Jr. The left wing, commanded by Slocum, comprised the Fourteenth Corps, under Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, under A. S. Williams. [He had also 5,000 cavalry under Judson Kilpatrick and sixty-five guns.] In his general orders he had not intimated to the army the object of their march. 'It is sufficient for you to know,' he said, 'that it involves a departure from our present base and a long, difficult march to a new one!'—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 9, ch. 20.—"Communication



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA

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Sherman's Army Destroying the Railroads in Georgia.

(After painting by J. P. Fitch)

they belonged. . . . The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army 'hummers,' in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous."—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 50.—All preparations being completed, General Sherman caused the foundries, mills and shops of every kind in Rome to be destroyed on November 10, and "started on the 12th with his full staff from Kingston to Atlanta. . . . As Sherman rode towards Atlanta that night he met railroad trains going to the rear with furious speed. He was profoundly impressed with the strange aspect of affairs: two hostile armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in the great war. 'I was strongly inspired,' he writes, 'with a feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though a full thousand miles of hostile country intervened; and that for better or worse it would end the war.' The result was a magnificent vindication of this soldierly intuition. His army

with Chattanooga was broken November 12, 1864, Atlanta was left behind on the 16th. . . . To the relentlessness of the spirit in which Sherman set forth for Savannah—for he determined upon the eastward march—he gave the fullest and frankest expression: 'If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war.' To Governor Brown, of Georgia, whom he hoped to detach from the Confederacy, he sent a message that, 'If you remain inert, I will be compelled to go ahead and devastate the State in its whole length and breadth.' He telegraphed Grant, October 9: 'Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, horses, and people will cripple their military resources. I can make this march and make Georgia howl.' On October 19 he telegraphed to his commissary, Beckwith: 'I propose to sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring up on the sea-shore. Make all dispositions accordingly.' The formal field orders, issued November 9, were

less truculent in tone. While the army was 'to forage liberally on the country,' order was to prevail. Each brigade was to have its foraging party, properly organized and commanded by discreet officers. Soldiers were forbidden 'to enter dwellings or commit any trespass,' while taking what they might find in gardens. Corps commanders alone had power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc. Where the army was unmolested, no destruction of such property was to be permitted; but if roads were obstructed or bushwacking occurred, 'army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less unsparring, according to the measure of such hostility.' . . . The army set out in perfect autumnal weather, in the highest spirits, and it soon became apparent that their enterprise was to be in the nature of a cheerful excursion, rather than a course of peril and hardship. The country teemed from an abundant harvest. Howard struck southeast towards Macon. Slocum, whom Sherman accompanied, marched towards Augusta, the diverging directions of the wings perplexing the foe as to the destination. Indeed, no effective opposition was possible for the South: a skirmish took place near Macon between Georgia troops and one brigade of the Fifteenth Corps; and the left wing was aware of the neighborhood of Wheeler on its flank with a small body of cavalry. In the main, the progress was quite unimpeded, excepting that the negroes trooped from far and near, young and old, sick and well, in a vague, childlike hope of being led into some promised land of plenty and freedom. Receiving a certain number of able-bodied men as pioneers, Sherman turned the rest back: they must patiently await the good time to come. Three hundred miles lay between Atlanta and Savannah: after a week the two wings were to rendezvous at Milledgeville. Marching from twelve to fifteen miles a day, this was easily accomplished by November 23.—J. K. Hosmer, *Outcome of the Civil War, 1863-1865*, pp. 205-209.—"Before leaving Atlanta . . . [Sherman] pointed out to one of his principal subordinates that a National army at Columbia, S. C., would end the war unless it should be routed and destroyed. Deprived of the material support of all the States but North Carolina, it would be impossible for the Confederate Government to feed its army at Richmond, or to fill its exchequer. The experience it had with the country west of the Mississippi proved that a region isolated from the rest of the Confederacy would not furnish men nor money, and could not furnish supplies; while anxiety for their families, who were within the National lines, tempted the soldiers from those States to desert, and weakened the confidence of the whole army. . . . If Sherman, therefore, should reach Columbia with an army that could resist the first onslaught of Lee, the last hope of the Confederacy would be crushed between the national forces meeting from the east and west. . . . The extent of line destroyed was enormous. From the Etowah River through Atlanta southward to Lovejoy's, for a hundred miles nothing was left of the road. From Fairburn through Atlanta eastward to Madison and the Oconee River, another hundred miles, the destruction was equally complete. From Gordon southeastwardly the ruin of the central road was continued to the very suburbs of Savannah, a hundred and sixty miles."—J. D. Cox, *March to the sea, Franklin and Nashville*, pp. 21-22, 36.—Sherman invested the city from the Savannah to the little Ogeechee river, on December 10. On the 13th, Fort McAllister, which

commanded the Ogeechee river, was stormed and taken by Hazen's division, and communication was opened with Admiral Dahlgren, and with General Foster, the Union commander at Port Royal. On the 17th, General Hardee, the Confederate commander at Savannah, refused a demand for the surrender of the city, but on the night of the 20th he escaped, with his forces, and on the 22nd General Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln: "I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition; also about 25,000 bales of cotton." "So far as Europe is concerned, it is safe to assert that no other operation of the entire war was productive of a moral effect in any way comparable with that caused by the march to the sea. Indeed, coming as it did and when it did, it is not too much to say that it was an epochal event in that it marked the turning of the tide of European and especially of English opinions as respects the United States and things American. . . . One day the tidings came that the beads of Sherman's columns had emerged on the sea-coast, that they had made short work of the forces there found to oppose them, and that Savannah had fallen. The Union army and the Union navy had struck hands! The announcement seemed absolutely to take away the breath of the foreign critics,—social, military, journalistic. An undeniably original and brilliant strategic blow had been struck; an operation, the character of which could neither be ignored nor mistaken, had been triumphantly carried through to a momentous result; the thrust—and such a thrust!—had penetrated the vitals of the Confederacy."—C. F. Adams, *Studies, military and diplomatic*, pp. 262, 264-265.—"This march through the heart of Georgia so alarmed the Confederates lest either Macon or Augusta or both might be attacked that they divided their forces; and, when it finally became clear that Savannah was the point aimed at they found it impossible for various reasons to concentrate a large number of troops for defence. By December 10, the enemy was driven within his lines at Savannah, the march of 300 miles was over, the siege began. . . . Destruction was a part of the march, especially as Lee's army drew its supplies of provisions from Georgia. . . . It became of the utmost importance to sever the railroad communications between the Gulf States and Richmond and to this Sherman gave his personal attention. The bridges and trestles were burned, the masonry of the culverts blown up. In the destruction of the iron rails mechanical skill vied with native ingenuity in doing the most effective work. . . . [The rails were heated, twisted and warped] so that they were useless except as old iron and, even as such, in unmanageable shape for working in a mill. About 265 miles of railroad were thus destroyed. . . . Stations and machine shops along the line were burned. Many thousand bales of cotton and a large number of cotton gins and presses were destroyed. At Milledgeville, Sherman reported, 'I burned the railroad buildings and the arsenals; the state-house and Governor's mansion I left unharmed.' . . . In the main, the General forbore destroying private property but, in nearly all his despatches after he had reached the sea, he gloated over the destruction along the line of his march, writing from Savannah: 'We have consumed the corn and fodder in the region of the country thirty miles on either side of a line from Atlanta to Savannah as also the sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs, sheep and poultry and have also carried away more

than 10,000 horses and mules as well as a countless number of their slaves. I estimate the damage done to the State of Georgia and its military resources at \$100,000,000; at least \$20,000,000 of which has enured to our advantage and the remainder is simple waste and destruction.' . . . Various orders given from time to time show that there was not only lawless foraging but that there was an unwarranted burning of buildings. A more serious charge against these men of the Western army is pillage. Sherman admitted the truth of it as did likewise General Cox. After the campaign, Sherman heard of jewelry being taken from women and was of the opinion that these depredations were committed by parties of foragers usually called 'bummers' . . . [a name by which Cox designated habitual struggles]. But the commander and his officers sincerely desired to restrain the soldiers within civilized usage. The lofty personal character of most of the men in high command and the severity of the punishment threatened for breaches of punishment are evidence to this. . . . [To this general characterization one exception—that of Kilpatrick—must be made.] His escapades were demoralizing to the army at the time, and have since tended to give it a bad name."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1863-1865*, pp. 403-407.

ALSO IN: J. D. Cox, *March to the sea (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 10, ch. 3)*.—O. O. Howard et al., *Sherman's march (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.—W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs, v. 2, ch. 20*.—G. W. Nichols, *Story of the great march*.—W. B. Hazen, *Narrative of military service, ch. 21-22*.

1864 (December: Tennessee).—**Battle of Nashville and destruction of Hood's army.**—After the battle of Franklin (see above: 1864 [November: Tennessee]) Hood went forward to Nashville, with his badly shaken army, and invested that place. Thomas was strongly fortified, and quietly took his time to make ready before striking his audacious antagonist, unmoved by repeated demands for an advance, from the war office, the president, and General Grant. "With all just confidence in Thomas' ability, the entire North insisted on instant action, and Grant finally ordered Thomas either to move upon Hood at once or else turn over the command to Schofield. Thomas quietly replied that he would cheerfully do the latter, if directed, but would not attack Hood until he was satisfied that the time was ripe. . . . But the enemy was devastating a considerable part of Tennessee and was forcing all the young men into their ranks; and every one was fearful of a repetition of Bragg's march to Ohio in 1862. Logan was finally ordered to Nashville to supplant Thomas. But before he could reach the ground, Thomas had struck his blow. His preparations had been two weeks before substantially completed. Small detachments were at Murfreesboro', Chattanooga, and along the railroad. This latter had been, however, interrupted by Hood for a number of days. A heavy storm of sleet and ice had made the country almost impassable and would render the operations of the attacking party uncertain. Thomas had made up his mind to wait for clearing weather. Finally came sunshine and with it Thomas' advance. Hood lay in his front, with Stewart on his left, [S. D.] Lee in the centre and Cheatham on the right, while a portion of Forrest's cavalry was operating out upon his left. He had some 44,000 men, but his check and heavy losses at Franklin had seriously impaired the 'morale' of his army as well as thinned his ranks. Hood could, how-

ever, not retreat. He was committed to a death-struggle with Thomas. It was his last chance as a soldier. The Union general had placed A. J. Smith on his right, the Fourth corps in the centre, and Schofield on the left. He advanced on Hood, bearing heavily with his right, while sharply demonstrating with his left. The position of the Confederate Army had placed A. J. Smith's corps obliquely to their general line of battle, an advantage not to be neglected. Smith pushed in, later supported by Schofield, and successively capturing the field-works erected by the enemy's main line and reserves, disastrously crushed Hood's left flank. Meanwhile . . . [A. J. Wood, in command of the Fourth corps,] was making all but equal headway against Hood's right, and the first day closed with remarkable success for the amount of loss sustained. Still this was not victory. Tomorrow might bring reverse. Hood's fight promised to be with clenched teeth. Hood seriously missed Forrest, whom he had detached on a raiding excursion and without whose cavalry his flanks were naked. Cheatham he moved during the night over from the right to sustain his left, which had proved the weaker wing. On the morning of the next day he lay entrenched upon the hills back of his former line, with either flank somewhat refused. Thomas sent Wilson with his cavalry to work his way unobserved around the extreme left flank thus thrown back. At 4 P. M. a general assault was made all along the line. Upon our left, Wood's advance did not meet with success. On the right, however, A. J. Smith's onset, concentrated at the salient of Hood's left centre, proved heavy enough to break down the Confederate defense. Sharply following up his successes, allowing no breathing time to the exultant troops, Smith pushed well home, and overcoming all resistance, drove the enemy in wild confusion from the field. Meanwhile Wilson's troopers, dismounted, fell upon the Confederate flank and rear and increased the wreck tenfold. This advantage again enabled Wood to make some headway, and with renewed joint effort the rout of the enemy became overwhelming. Almost all organization was lost in Hood's army as it fled across the country towards Franklin. Pursuit was promptly undertaken, but though seriously harassed, Hood saved himself beyond the Tennessee river with the remnants of his army. Thomas' losses were 3,000 men, Hood's were never officially given, but our trophies included 4,500 prisoners and 53 guns. Thomas had settled all adverse speculation upon his slowness in attacking Hood by the next to annihilation he wrought when he actually moved upon him. No army was so completely overthrown during our war."—T. A. Dodge, *Bird's-eye view of our Civil War, ch. 58*.—The battle of Nashville "was the last, as the battle of Mill Spring was the first, of the great victories of the southwest. In each, General Thomas was in chief command. The plan and execution of both were his. As they were the only battles for which he alone bore responsibility, his chief claim to generalship must rest upon them. Without going into a decided analysis, it is enough to say that, in each, he annihilated his opponent. . . . The impression that the enemy did not fight with spirit and determination at Nashville is not sustained by the facts. It is true, the loss of life was less than in many other battles not so persistently fought. This argues the greater skill on his part, in the planning and execution of the work, so as to produce decisive result with com-



paratively little bloodshed. The capture of over 10,000 prisoners,—nearly one-third the enemy's whole force,—with seventy-two guns, is, I think, unprecedented during the war of the Rebellion, in an open field fight, between nearly equal numbers, and where the enemy had command of more than one line of retreat. . . . [It is true, Thomas did not completely cut off Hood after the battle. He had but] a single line of pursuit, which the enemy had already desolated; he had at least two formidable streams to cross before reaching the Tennessee River. It was midwinter and the weather was freezing cold; his pursuing force was scarcely superior to that of the enemy in numbers, and his pontoniers were untrained and soon became benumbed in the icy streams. Besides that, his most promising plan for the capture of Hood's army came to nought, through causes entirely beyond his control. . . . [General Steedman who had been sent to occupy the South bank of the Tennessee was detained at Murfreesboro' for nearly forty-eight hours.] . . . On the 27th his whole force was across the river, within striking distance of Hood's place of crossing, but it was just too late. The main rebel army was already over, and the rear guard crossed that night and made good its escape. . . . Next to the surrender at Appomattox, the one blow under which the Rebellion reeled and tottered to its fall was that delivered by Thomas at Nashville. When that battle ended, but a single army remained to vex the peace of the Republic. The gigantic Colossus which had so long bestrode the land henceforth had but one foot left to stand upon; the other had been crushed to pieces."—H. Stone, *Major-General George Henry Thomas* (T. F. Dwight, ed., *Critical sketches of some of the Federal and Confederate commanders, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, v. 10, pp. 191, 192-193, 208*).—"This battle, in its conduct, immediate results, and remote effects, takes rank with the great battles of the world. Each distinct operation was a connected part of the whole, measured and adjusted in the mind of him, who not only planned the battle, but gave it unity and force by special instructions to his corps commanders before it occurred, and during its progress. By it one of the two great armies of the Confederacy was eliminated from the final problem, and with the total overthrow of that army, the very cause which it had so long and so gallantly sustained was lost. . . . General Grant thus referred to the battle of Nashville in his 'Report of the operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to command': 'Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient, over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. . . . After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City I received General Thomas' despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.'"—T. B. Van Horne, *Life of Major-General George H. Thomas, pp. 336, 341*.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland, v. 2, ch. 35*.—W. Swinton, *Twelve decisive battles of the war, ch. 11*.—J. D. Cox, *March to the sea, Franklin and Nashville (Campaigns of the Civil War, v. 10, ch. 6-7)*.—H. Stone, *Repelling Hood's invasion (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.—H. Coppée, *General Thomas, ch. 11-12*.

1864-1865 (December-January: North Carolina).—Capture of Fort Fisher.—"In the latter part of 1864 two ports only, Wilmington and Charleston, remained to the Confederates. . . . The northward march of Sherman would cut off Charleston, too, so that the Confederates would have to abandon it. The National government now desired to complete its work by capturing Fort Fisher, and thus finally shutting off the Confederacy from all communication with the foreign world. The accomplishment of this task was in no wise easy. . . . The army and navy co-operated in the attempts to reduce Fort Fisher. There were more than 50 men-of-war tossing on the waves before the lowering sea-front of the work. Six thousand five hundred men were in the military force. They were in command of General B. F. Butler, whom we saw last at New Orleans. The General's active and ingenious mind conceived a plan for destroying the fort without sacrificing a single Federal soldier. They procured an old gunboat, painted it white and otherwise disguised it, so as to look like a blockade runner, stored 250 tons of gunpowder in its hold with fuses penetrating every part, ran the craft in within 1,500 feet of the works and exploded it. Butler expected that the shock would demolish the seaward face of the fort altogether, and perhaps bury the guns under great masses of sand, but in this he was mistaken, for the heavy bastions were not in the least disturbed by the shock. . . . The navy then took its turn, and for some hours the heavy vessels of Admiral Porter's fleet poured so rapid and well aimed a fire upon the work, that the garrison were driven from their guns, and only the occasional report of a heavy cannon told that the fort was still tenanted. But secure in their heavy bomb-proofs, the garrison minded the storm of shells and solid shot no more than the well-housed farmer heeds a hail-storm. It was very clear that Fort Fisher could not be taken at long range. . . . The original plan had contemplated an assault as soon as the fire of the fleet should have silenced the guns of the fort, and in pursuance of this 700 men had been landed from the army transports. But the weather was too rough to permit of landing more troops that day, and the next morning General Butler concluded that Fort Fisher was impregnable, without his men already landed, and sailed away, greatly to the disgust of the navy. This was on the 25th of December, 1864. The chagrin of the whole North over the failure of the expedition was so great that it was speedily determined to renew the attempt. January 13th saw the new Federal force, this time under command of General A. H. Terry, landing on the shore of the sandy neck of land above the fort. . . . At early dawn of the 15th the attack was begun. The ships arranged in a great semicircle poured their fire upon the fort, dismantling guns, driving the garrison to the bomb-proofs, and mowing down the stockade. A line of sharpshooters, each carrying a shovel in one hand and a gun in the other, spring forward to within 175 yards of the fort and dig pits for their protection before the

Confederates can attack them. Then the sharpshooters and the navy occupy the attention of the enemy, while Curtis's brigade dashes forward and digs a trench within 500 yards of the fort. By this time too a party of 2,000 sailors and marines has been landed from the fleet. They are to storm the sea-wall of the fort while the army attacks its landward face. Suddenly the thunder of the naval artillery is stilled. There is a moment of silence, and then the shrill scream of the whistles rises from every steamer in the fleet. It is the signal for the assault. The sailors on the beach spring to their feet and dash forward at a rapid run; they fire no shot, for they carry no guns. Cutlasses and pistols, the blue-jackets' traditional weapons, are their only arms. Toward the other side of the fort came Terry's troops. . . . The fate of the naval column is quickly determined. Upon it is concentrated the fire of the heaviest Confederate batteries, Napoleon guns, Columbiads, and rifles shotted with grape and cannister. The blue-jackets, unable to reply to this murderous fire, and seeing their companions falling fast around them, waver, halt, and fall back to the beach, throwing themselves upon

the ground to escape the enemy's missiles. But though repulsed they have contributed largely to the capture of the fort. While the chief attention of Confederates has been directed toward them, the troops have been carrying all before them on the other front. Colonel Lamb turns from his direction of the defense against the naval column to see three Union flags waving over other portions of the work. . . . The Confederates were determined, even desperate. Long after the fort was virtually in the hands of its captors they stubbornly clung to a bomb-proof. Finally they retreated to Battery Buchanan and there maintained themselves stoutly until late at night when, all hope being at an end, they surrendered themselves, and the National victory was complete."—W. J. Abbott, *Battle-fields and victory*, ch. 15.


ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, *Naval history of the Civil War*, ch. 49-51.—W. Lamb and T. O. Selfridge, Jr., *Capture of Fort Fisher (Battles and leaders*, v. 4).

1864-1921.—Universal manhood suffrage.—**Methods in the South after Civil War.** See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1864-1921; VIRGINIA: 1901-1906.





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