


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
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IN

**AMERICAN HISTORY**

SERIES 1, Diplomatic History

Nos. 4, 5 and 6

**Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy**

BY JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN



DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

**West Virginia University**

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# West Virginia University Studies

## IN AMERICAN HISTORY

SERIES 1, Diplomatic History

Nos. 4, 5 and 6

### Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy

#### I. Pre-bellum Shadows of European Intervention in Mexico

The French intervention in Mexico during the American civil war was an event which cast its shadows before—in the many Mexican struggles between federalism and centralism which made republican government a farce, weakened the political organization, and burdened the country with heavy debts and claims for damages. To Seward, the question of European intervention in Mexico was no new danger in 1861. It had been a source of some concern in the United States since the days of Napoleon I, and especially after the recognition of Mexican independence and the establishment of the Monroe doctrine. This concern was greatly increased after 1841-42 during the agitation of the Texas question and especially after the close of the Mexican war (under Pierce and Buchanan) when the extension of the American empire from the Rio Grande to the Pacific gave enlarged views of America's future responsibility and manifest destiny. After the negotiations of the Gadsden purchase, the despatches from Mexico are full of rumors of projected or impending interventions or a discussion of the conditions which might invite foreign intervention and the establishment of a protectorate.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time border relations between the United States and Mexico were full of danger. Mexicans remonstrated against the occupation of the Mesilla valley and made complaints against Gadsden, the American minister. There were many rumors of threatened filibustering expeditions for the invasion of Mexico from Texas and California. In some instances there were actual invasions of Mexican territory, such as Walker's expedition against Lower California in 1854 and Captain Callahan's raid across the Rio Grande from Texas in the latter part of 1855. Induced by the unsettled condition of Mexican affairs and through the influence of leaders of the South, the Buchanan administration continued to negotiate for the acquisition of additional Mexican territory until the secession of the southern states precipitated the beginning of the civil war.

During the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, the possible

1. 17 Instr. Mex., No. 2, Apr. 6, 1861.

necessity of intervention in Mexico and the establishment of a protectorate was considered on both sides of the Atlantic and the danger of European intervention steadily increased.<sup>2</sup> The idea of a protectorate to remedy the political conditions of the republic was discussed by the French and American ministers in Mexico soon after the *coup d'état* by which Louis Napoleon became emperor of France—as early as the latter part of 1852, at the time of the revolution in Sonora. Early in the following year Seward, in the Senate, offered a resolution for enforcing the Tehuantepec grant, on the ground that Mexico in meeting the demands of the grant would become dismembered and disorganized and would necessarily fall to the United States.<sup>3</sup>

After the beginning of the brief dictatorship of General Santa Anna who had been recalled by the revolutionists in 1853 to take the place of President Arista, who had resigned his office to prevent civil war, there was a growing distrust of the United States which was fostered by the official paper. Gadsden, who had just negotiated for the strip south of the Gila, urged that his government should make some naval and military demonstration “to create an impression that in the obligations and policy of the United States the Monroe doctrine is no abstraction.”<sup>4</sup>

Early in 1855, during the Crimean war, when the Mexican minister of relations “injected anti-slavery sentiments into his official correspondence,” Gadsden, writing that European influence was preparing for “possible alliance of Mexico with those European interferences in Cuba threatening to take part in the political adjustments of the Americas,” said that if further territory or other grants were not acceptable as a means of the settlement of the American claim against Mexico, the United States must again resort to the sword and direct a war which would end in the absorption of the entire republic—a consummation which he said “the European allies had better encourage than resist in their sensitive interference to arrest the progress of the American system on its own domain.” He stated that the monarchical influence (of the triple alliance) on the reigning government was so strong that it had “even dreamed of the restoration of the legitimacy in one of the royal families of Spain, and had received no check except from Santa Anna who in spite of their secret diplomacy had opposed their design to make Mexico the exponent of the monarchical European element in America, antagonistic to liberal

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2 Ib.

3 29 Index Desps. No. 7 Conkling, Dec. 24, 1852; 3 Seward's Works, p. 626.

4 29 Index Desps., No. 33, Aug. 16, and No. 38, Sept. 2, 1854.



progressive government and for readjustment of national balance." "It is imperative," he urged, "that United States anticipate possible events in the East which may leave the allies at liberty to concentrate their power in the American seas and relieve the Mexican rule from apprehension of a premature alliance in designs not limited to one continent."<sup>5</sup>

Six weeks later, writing that Santa Anna was drifting into an alliance with England, France and Spain on the Cuban issue and to check the growth of the United States, he advocated that the United States as the exponent of liberal government in the Americas should coalesce with the liberals whose government had been violently expelled by a "one man military despot" and interpose to prevent alliances hostile to the American system and to save Mexico to the Americas.<sup>6</sup>

After Santa Anna's brief dictatorship was succeeded (in August, 1855) by the new liberal government which had "American predilections," Gadsden informed Secretary Marcy that the allies were doubling their energies to win the new government in favor of the "Europeanization" of Mexico, and that it might falter and succumb to European influence if the United States failed to interpose for its rescue. "I feel obliged," said he, "to reaffirm that another crisis at this capital is threatened which may give a triumph to European recolonization and expel American influences from Mexico until recovered by another revolution and the sword."<sup>7</sup> From London in the following summer, Dallas wrote Marcy: "The rumored Spanish movement against Mexico—a movement which should put General Gadsden and our home squadron on the alert—involves an ulterior purpose of Louis Napoleon either to send a scion of his imperial house to the hall of the Montezumas \* \* \* or so to involve Spain and Mexico in war as to furnish to the former a plausible reason for transferring Cuba to England."<sup>8</sup>

In his valedictory despatch at the time of his recall, near the close of the Pierce administration, Gadsden, writing that fleets from France, England and Spain threatened to visit Vera Cruz in a few months to adjust issues with Mexico by a threat of war, still urged that French diplomacy, in the ascendancy in Mexico, was in close affiliation with British and Spanish diplomacy to consolidate and perpetuate the Mexican executive in one absolute head, and was planning an alliance with Mexico to check the progress of American

5 19 Desp. Mex., No. 60, Apr. 3, 1855.

6 *Ib.*, No. 63, May 18, and No. 77, Nov. 25, 1855.

7 *Ib.*, No. 77, Nov. 25, 1855.

8 Dallas: Letters from London, vol. 1, p. 46 (No. 22, June 6, 1856).

ideas in Spanish America, to control Tehuantepec, to guarantee Cuba to Spain and to oppose various objects of American foreign policy.<sup>9</sup> Early in Buchanan's administration, writing to Cass from Charleston and offering suggestions as to the policy of the United States toward Mexico which he said had "never since the revolution reposed on a legitimate government," Gadsden again asserted that the threatened expedition against Vera Cruz was a diplomatic deception and a part of long-meditated plans to bring Mexico into harmony with European ideas, and to antagonize American progress.<sup>10</sup>

Forsyth, who succeeded Gadsden, considering the conditions in Mexico and the dangers from European expeditions, suggested an Americano-Mexican alliance by the infusion of Americans in the Mexican army.<sup>11</sup> He continued to report the danger of war between Mexico and Spain and the alleged complicity of France and England in the complications, and to suggest the policy that the United States should pursue in her relations with Mexico.<sup>12</sup> Contemplating the possibility of war between Spain and Mexico, he early wrote to Cass: "There are many eventualities to such a contest once begun of which the United States can not be indifferent spectators. The triumph of Spain here would be the triumph of principles, opinions and purposes wholly at variance with the interests and settled policy of the United States. With that moral and financial support which she can only get from the United States, there is room to hope that Mexico might emerge from a successful conflict with her old oppressor improved and strengthened by the ordeal."<sup>13</sup> Soon thereafter he reported that new clouds of revolt were gathering and thickening around the Comonfort government and that Santa Anna was exerting all his energy to ferment troubles and to solicit aid from Spain. "What Mexico wants," said he, "is a firm and good master to hold her destinies in his hands and to save her from herself. Mexico can not furnish such a master and may welcome one from abroad." Again, two months later, referring to the swift recurring revolutions which were increasing the dangers of European intervention in Mexican politics, he wrote: "Mexican institutions are crumbling to pieces and interposition, to gather up the wreck, from some quarter, is as certain as it is indispensable."<sup>14</sup>

On December 16, 1857, Comonfort, by a *coup d'etat*, assumed dic-

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9 19 Desp. Mex., No. 97, Oct. 4, 1856.

10 20 Desp. Mex., March 22 and 23, 1857.

11 *Ib.*, No. 5, Nov. 8, 1856.

12 *Ib.*, No. 40, June 1, and No. 43, July 2, 1857.

13 *Ib.*, No. 43, July 2, 1857.

14 21 Desps. Mex., No. 51, Sept. 26, and No. 58, Nov. 25, 1857.

tatorial powers and overthrew the constitution which had been proclaimed on March 5 and inaugurated on December 1. Three parties armed and the palace was soon in a state of siege. Comonfort, though in a critical position, refused to accept mediation; but came to terms with the Puros and released Juarez the president of the supreme court who in default of the president-elect became president. The contest ended by the overthrow and expulsion of Comonfort by the *Pronunciados* forces under Osollo and Miramon, but the presidency was not given to Juarez to whom it really belonged. Forsyth at once recognized the Zuloaga administration, which was wholly dependent for support on the church which, knowing that the Puros party of Juarez would attempt to nationalize the church property, had lent its credit to support the new administration.<sup>15</sup> Juarez, driven from the capital and utterly without support or means to establish his government, went first to Guadalajara and later via the Pacific coast to Panama and then via New Orleans to Vera Cruz where he established the constitutional government and supported it by customs duties.

In the spring of 1858 the subject of a United States protectorate for Mexico was discussed in both countries. Many Mexicans, with whom Forsyth agreed, believed that foreign intervention was necessary to establish public order. Some favored a tripartite protectorate by England, France and the United States—which Forsyth said was impracticable. While many favored any protectorate that would sustain the administration in power and furnish it money to squander, they were opposed to any foreign voice in the government. The Liberals especially, who were out of power, favored an American protectorate, and it was understood that the Juarez government sent Colonel Mata to Washington with a protectorate proposition. Forsyth wrote Cass that indecision and imbecillity rendered Juarez unfit for the head of such a protectorate, and suggested that Lerdo de Tejada, who favored the disbanding of the Mexican army and the substitution of American troops, would make a better head for the Liberal government.<sup>16</sup> Anxiously watching for a new political change that would bring in a new administration and give him an opportunity to master the situation and to negotiate a treaty that would "result in making our country the undisputed arbiter of the destinies of Mexico if our government chooses to accept the office," he said: "Another revolution founded upon new ideas can alone reunite the dismembered party, and my firm belief is that this can only be effected by the inter-

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15 *Ib.*, No. 62, Dec. 17, 1857; "Private," Jan. 14, 1858; No. 66, Jan. 29 and No. 67, Jan. 30, 1858.

16 *Ib.*, Private, Apr. 15, 1858.

position of the influence of the United States." In view of all the disturbed conditions in Mexico, he wrote: "Its regeneration if it comes at all can only come from abroad, in the shape of new ideas and new blood."<sup>17</sup>

In the meantime the government of Spain had begun to urge France and England to unite with it in a joint intervention in Mexico to sustain the conservative government of Miramon which had monarchial sympathies and was under strong clerical influences.<sup>18</sup> French influence was also increasing. In June Forsyth wrote Cass that M. de Gabriac, the "scheming, unscrupulous, ambitious" French minister was the open partisan of the Zuloaga government and was spending a large part of his time at the palace. "His head is filled with dreams of a European protectorate to be followed by a Mexican kingdom or empire," said he. "He is intensely anti-American." Writing of his quarrels with the secretary of relations, the numerous signs of a new revolution, and the inability of the Miramon government to master the situation, he urged that the time and occasion were opportune for shaping Americo-Mexican policy. A few weeks later, reporting that the conditions became worse each week and that the government was resorting to desperate political and financial expedients, he said: "The rulers of the Palace have turned into robbers of the people."<sup>19</sup>

By July, Forsyth had suspended relations with Mexico; but, although Cass directed him to withdraw the legation from Mexico and return via Vera Cruz to the United States,<sup>20</sup> he delayed his departure for several weeks. In September, after he had requested and received his passports, he received a call from Mr. Lettson of the British legation who asked, "What is to be done with these people?" Mr. Forsyth replied: "I have been long convinced that severe chastisement is the only earthly remedy." Mr. Lettson had already expressed this opinion to his government and added to Forsyth: "Either you or we will have to administer it, and as you are the nearest to Mexico, I hope you will do it." Two weeks later, referring to the high-handed acts of Miramon, Forsyth wrote Cass: "The truth is some power must take the people in hand and teach them to respect the rights guaranteed by treaties—and under the protection of foreign powers." Again, just before leaving for Vera Cruz, writing of the universal corruption and lack of patriotism and integrity in

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17 *Ib.*, No. 73, Apr. 16, 1858; 22 *Desps. Mex.*, No. 74, May 2, 1858.

18 H. L. Wilson in the *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July, 1900, p. 700.

19 22 *Desps. Mex.*, No. 80, June 25, No. 81, July 1, No. 85, Aug. 1 and No. 87, Aug. 12, 1858.

20 17 *Instr. Mex.*, No. 49, July 15, 1858.

Mexican politics, he said: "I see no hope for Mexico. She is like an old hulk, rotten to the core \* \* \* breaking to pieces in the surf of universal corruption."<sup>21</sup>

In view of the rumored alliances of European powers, many thought the Executive and Congress should make a clear and emphatic enunciation and inflexible maintenance of the Monroe doctrine and American control on the American continent. The London *Herald* (which Dallas thought was the government paper) urged the necessity of European intervention to preserve demoralized Mexico "from sinking into the athletic embrace" of the United States. Dallas, writing that "Spain may yet under the auspices of England be tempted to make a spasmodic effort for the restoration of her Mexican dominion," urged that a statement importing American unanimity and inflexibility on the subject of the Monroe doctrine "would crush the egg shell project forever."<sup>22</sup> Cass, having heard the rumor from Europe that Spain planned to attack Mexico to secure political ascendancy, had instructed Dodge that the United States "will not consent to the subjugation of any of the independent states of this continent by European powers, nor to the exercise of a protectorate over them, nor to any other direct political influences to control their policy or institutions." It has been said that but for this firm instruction to Spain the latter would have invaded Mexico to push private claims. The president in a message of December 5, referring to American interests in Mexico said: "We have never hitherto interfered with its internal affairs, and it is a duty which we owe to ourselves to protect the integrity of its territory against the hostile interference of any other power."<sup>23</sup>

Before deciding on the next step in its Mexican policy, the Buchanan administration sought further information. Anxious to keep in touch with the situation, in the absence of a diplomatic agent Cass sent (December 27) William M. Churchwell as special agent to Mexico to inquire especially into the conditions of parties. After Forsyth's resignation at Washington in February, 1859, Robert M. McLane, who was appointed to succeed him, was sent to Vera Cruz where he soon presented his credentials and recognized the Liberal or Constitutional Juarez government—which Mr. Churchwell had reported (February 22, 1869) was "disposed to exercise its powers in a spirit of cordial friendship to the United States" and which claimed

21 *Ib.*, No. 90, Sept. 18 and Private, Oct. 1, 1858.

22 *U. S. Dem. Rev.*, Aug., 1858, p. 369; 2 Dallas' Letters from London, p. 62 (No. 227, to Cass, Nov. 12, 1858).

23 15 *Instr. Sp.* pp. 187-90, Confidential, No. 66, Oct. 21, and Dec. 2, 1858; *The Nation*, Feb. 5, 1880; 5 *Mess. and Paps. of Presidents*, p. 512.

to be recognized by sixteen of the twenty-one states of Mexico and openly resisted by only three cities. This government seemed to have greater prospect of stability than that in the City of Mexico whose chief (Miramon) was at the head of the army retreating from Vera Cruz.<sup>24</sup>

Ocampo, secretary of foreign relations, in notifying the governors of the provinces of the recognition of the Juarez government by the United States, and referring to its great importance, said: "It marks a new era in the relations of the two countries whose mutual prosperity lies in the interests of both—who now begin to understand that united they may defy the world and regulate the destinies of the rising generation whilst by opposing each other they would facilitate the dictatory pretensions of the common enemy of democracy and would thus only lead, not to its overthrow, which is now fortunately an impossibility, but would fetter and retard its rapid and unflinching success."

McLane urged the Juarez government to take prompt, decisive action in vindicating its dignity and protecting the lives and property of American citizens throughout Mexico.<sup>25</sup> He contemplated the possibility of alliance with the constitutional government against the Mexican violators of treaty obligations. He continued to hope that the Juarez government, which was proposing to nationalize the church property<sup>27</sup> (the principal resource of the Miramon government), would establish with the United States a political relation that would give character and force to end the strife which was destroying the empire—and to prevent the schemes of the clergy to procure European intervention, which were especially favored by the French minister as a means to circumvent the "dangerous expansive designs of the Colossus of the North" in its relation with the Juarez government

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24 23 Desps. Mex., Tel. Apr. 7, and No. 1, Apr. 7, 1859.

25 Supplement to *Ei Progress*, Apr. 6, 1859.

26 23 Desps. Mex., No. 8, Apr. 21, 1859.

27 Mathew, the British charge, wrote the American consul (Black) that the only course for the Juarez government to adopt was an immediate decree nationalizing the church property and pledging the state to perpetually support the priesthood and the churches and the monks and nuns for life only.

(*Ib.*, No. 18, June 15, 1859 enclosing Mathew's private note of c. May 31 to Black). On July 12, 1859, Juarez issued a proclamation disestablishing the church and confiscating its property, establishing civil marriage and registration and transferring to the civil courts many cases over which the ecclesiastical courts had hitherto exercised jurisdiction. This was enforced in Vera Cruz at once and supplied him with much needed funds.

and its political policy on the American continent.<sup>28</sup> It was feared that the British minister, wearied by fruitless efforts to get a settlement of claims at the City of Mexico, would join his French colleague in recommending to their governments that they should assume a hostile position against Vera Cruz to crush the Juarez government—a first step toward European intervention. Rothchild's agent was secretly negotiating with the Miramon government which hoped to get \$4,000,000 on the hypothecation of church property with the guarantee of the ministers of England and France. Black, the American consul at the City of Mexico, urged that the United States as a precautionary step should get possession of Castle de San Juan de Ulua and float the stars and stripes over its battlements with the consent of the constitutional government at the earliest possible moment, in order to prevent trouble and annoyance which would result from its seizure by France.

Although England had threatened to enforce at Vera Cruz, by whatever party occupied, the payment of all outstanding claims of British subjects—an act which would have destroyed the Juarez government by depriving it of its revenues and its seat of government—the British squadron dispersed, as did the French, without any action.<sup>29</sup> About the same time, at the City of Mexico, Mathew, the British charge (who thought McLane should not venture to stay at Vera Cruz), declaring that neither of the Mexican parties could destroy the other without foreign aid, suggested (May 31) that the British minister acting in accord with McLane should induce both Mexican leaders to submit to a conference of the three allied powers at Washington with power to revise the constitution and name a first president for eight years.<sup>30</sup>

A few days later the Juarez government submitted a project of a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive for protection and consolidation of democratic principles and constitutional government. McLane also submitted a project, but declined to consider the subject of a general treaty of alliance for interference with the domestic administration of Mexico except for America's own security and in connection with the protection and defense of rights that should be established between the United States and Mexico. He told Ocampo that the United States would not undertake the general obligation proposed, so far as the relations of Mexico with other nations might be at issue (involving the United States in a foreign war), nor guarantee the territorial integration of the republic. On the more general

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28. 23 Desps. Mex., No. 12, May 7, 1859, (Enclosure "C").

29. *Ib.*, No. 8, Apr. 21 (Enclosure "D") and No. 12, May 7, 1859.

30. *Ib.*, No. 18, June 15, 1859 (Enclosure).

proposition of alliance for the support of republican institutions in America, which Ocampo had repeatedly urged (but with little appreciation of the relative condition and power of Mexico and the United States), McLane had said that, after the negotiation of a satisfactory treaty in relation to transits and the cession of Lower California, the United States might be expected to enter cordially into some arrangement that would give steadiness and security to the interests thus established between the two republics and which could be extended with propriety to the maintenance of constitutional law and order in the entire republic. Finally, convinced that on account of the feeling in the northern provinces the constitutional government could not at that time negotiate a treaty embracing the cession of Lower California, McLane wrote Cass that a treaty on transit routes (the Tehuantepec, the routes from the Rio Grande via Monterey to Mazatlan, and from Rancho de Nogales to Guaymas) with an additional article authorizing the United States to use its military power to enforce the treaty stipulations, would secure the ascendancy of American influence in Mexico and establish a government of constitutional freedom there.<sup>31</sup>

Cass insisted that the United States should have the right to use her discretion without waiting for the consent of Mexico for using military force to protect the transit routes. He also disapproved the suggested military alliance between the United States and Mexico, perhaps especially because it was "intended not for a temporary emergency but as a part of a general treaty whose failure it might endanger."<sup>32</sup> The Juarez government at first treated Cass's demand as an insurmountable obstacle to negotiations, but finally realized the importance of taking advantage of its opportunity, especially when informed that sooner or later the United States government would be compelled to act without reference to Mexico or any other government.

By December 15, McLane concluded a treaty of transits containing the desired stipulations by which the United States without incurring the obligation or necessity of a general intervention in the domestic affairs of Mexico was given a right to intervene in the support of its own treaty rights and for the security of its own citizens whenever Mexico should be unable to guarantee such rights.<sup>33</sup>

In submitting his work to his government and urging its ratifica-

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31 *Ib.*, No. 20 of June 22, "Unofficial" of June 25 and No. 23 of July 10, 1859.

32. 17 *Instrs. Mex.*, pp. 245-61, No. 16, July 30, and No. 21, Nov. 4, 1859; 24 *Desps. Mex.*, No. 30, Aug. 27, 1859.

33. 24 *Desps. Mex.*, No. 57, Dec. 15, 1859.



tion by the Senate, he said if the United States should decline the responsibility of the convention the continuation of anarchy in Mexico would result in direct intervention from some quarter and perhaps expose the United States to the "responsibility of a general war and a conquest that few would desire to undertake or consummate."<sup>34</sup>

Though the Miramon government at once published a vigorous and offensive protest, and a later pronunciamiento,<sup>35</sup> McLane thought it would submit at once and accept the diplomatic mediation of the United States in the settlement of the domestic strife if the Senate should promptly ratify the treaty and convention and authorize the president to use the naval and military power of the government to establish the constitutional government in Mexico and enforce treaty stipulations. "When it is ratified," said he, "I can easily dictate terms to the Miramon government, obtain redress and pacify this country. If it is rejected, anarchy will be the order of the day and American influence will cease here." Later, referring to Miramon's expression of a willingness to exchange internal strife for a foreign war against the United States, and to his intimation that Mexico should exchange republicanism for some other form of government, and at the same time referring to the possibility of the capture of Vera Cruz by Miramon's forces, McLane urged that the president should authorize him to adopt a decisive policy and act as though the treaties had already been ratified. He continued to urge that it should be the obligation and duty of the United States naval authorities in the port of Vera Cruz to act in concert and conjunction with the Vera Cruz government to protect the lives and property of American residents and to prevent the entrance of Miramon's forces. "Let us take the constitutional government firmly by the hand," said he, "and we will in a twelve-month drive out of Mexico every anti-American element and pave the way for the acquisition of Cuba. Indeed if Spain should execute the threats she is now making through the captain general of Cuba against Vera Cruz, American privateers will soon make their anchorage under the Moro." A few days later (January 23) he left on a visit to New Orleans; and a month later Captain Jarvis did not feel authorized to interfere with the Miramon

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34 In his annual message of December the President had already asked Congress for power to enter Mexico with military forces of the government, at the call of the constitutional authorities of Mexico, in order to protect the American citizens and enforce the treaty rights of the United States (and to prevent the future necessity of interference for the maintenance of the established American policy against intervention of European nations in American political affairs.)

35 *Diario Oficial*, Jan. 10, 1860.

expedition to satisfy expectations which McLane's cordial intercourse with the constitutional government had created.<sup>36</sup>

The president approved the suggestions for the protection due American citizens at Vera Cruz. On March 8 Cass wrote the following instructions: "If a hostile force approach that place and you consider American citizens in danger, you will request the commanding officers of our ships of war upon that coast to land such force as is necessary and employ them for protection. You will communicate these instructions to the Mexican government which has expressed willingness that such a course should be adopted." Two days later he wrote that no blockade of ports of the gulf by the Miramon government would be recognized by the United States.<sup>37</sup>

On March 30, McLane, having returned to Vera Cruz which was then invested with Miramon's forces, and fearing that the British government was making efforts to secure peace by foreign intervention,<sup>38</sup> wrote Cass that Mexican anarchy would never terminate except through the influence of foreign intervention and urged that the president should persevere in the policy presented in his latest annual message and embodied in the treaty of December, 1859. In case the Senate and Congress should fail to sustain this policy—by which the president would be able to anticipate and counteract foreign intervention—he felt sure that England, France and Spain would interfere in the affairs of Mexico, and therefore advised withdrawal from all active responsibility and diplomatic intercourse with that country.<sup>39</sup> Cass replied (on April 28) that the president could not adopt any measures materially changing relations with Mexico until the Senate should act on the treaty and until Congress should definitely act on his recommendation to employ force for defense of American rights in Mexico. Therefore he deferred all consideration of withdrawal. He did not anticipate that France and England would pursue in

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36 24 Desps. Mex., No. 63, Dec. 22, 1859; No. 66 of Jan. 7, Private and "Confidential" of Jan. 21, No. 68 of Jan. 21, 1860; and "Private" of Dec. 21, 1859, and "Private" and Confidential, March 6, 1860.

37 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 28, March 8, and No. 29 of March 10, 1860.

38 Late in January, Dallas had reported from London that Lord Russell, expressing little confidence in any of the public men of Mexico except Juarez, and solicitous to avoid even the appearance of attacking the Monroe doctrine by intermeddling with their distracted conditions, but unable to see how to infuse energy for an executive government without foreign aid, was at a loss as to what to do in regard to the Mexican question.

[Dallas: Letters from London, vol. 2, p. 186, No. 313, Jan. 27, 1860.]

39 Desps. Mex. (No. 72) March 30 and Aug. 20, 1860. On the French and British propositions for mediation in Mexico, see No. 78 of Apr. 20, No. 80 of Apr. 26, and No. 83 of May 28, 1860.

Mexico a course of interference that would be in hostility to the American system which had been laid down, or that would justify any complaint by the American government. He conceded to all nations the right to intervene to demand redress for wrongs and to enforce such demands.<sup>40</sup>

While the McLane-Juarez treaty was before the Senate, the Spanish government increased its efforts to induce France and England to join it for intervention in Mexico. On April 18, 1860, the Spanish minister of state declared that "Spain could not consent to the absorption, or even the protectorate or to the exclusive preponderance of any nation whatever over the vast and rich continent discovered and civilized by our ancestors." He urged that the ratification of the treaty would secure domination of the great oceanic routes to the people who preach the political and commercial exclusion of Europeans from America, and would produce complications which would affect every commercial nation. On May 4, the French government announced its decision to postpone any resolution in regard to intervention in Mexico until after the vote of the American Senate.

Three weeks later (May 24), Cass announced to McLane the failure of the Senate to approve the treaty. At the same time he wrote that if the Senate should adjourn without placing relations with Mexico on a basis proposed by the treaty, American affairs there would assume a grave aspect and would receive the careful consideration of the president. The Senate adjourned without definite action, having finally (after a vote to reconsider) postponed further consideration till the first Monday of December, 1860. Buchanan, probably suspecting the designs of the Emperor of France, and doubtless foreseeing that an attempt by the French to colonize any part of Mexico would almost necessarily involve the United States in a war with France to vindicate the Monroe doctrine, was much disappointed. In his last annual message (of December 3), speaking of the refusal of Congress to give him power to use the military forces of the United States in Mexico, he said: "European governments would have been deprived of all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concerns of Mexico. We should thus have been relieved from the obligation of resisting, even by force, should this become necessary, any attempt of these governments to deprive our neighboring republic of portions of her territory—a duty from which we could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people."<sup>41</sup>

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40 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 32, Apr. 28, 1860.

41 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 34, May 26, 1860 (p. 290): *ib.*, No. 36, June 30, 1860 (pp. 300-01) 5 Messages and Papers of Presidents, p. 646.

As the war of parties in Mexico continued, the outrages of Miramon increased in face of the protest of the French and British ministers who were forced to suspend intercourse at the City of Mexico. In July, Lord Lyons submitted a proposition inviting the United States to join France and England in addressing an identical note to Miramon and Juarez advising the call of a national assembly to settle their domestic difficulties. When Lyon called again on July 16, Trescot (the new assistant secretary) replied that the general policy of the United States was opposed to any interference of other powers in the domestic affairs of an independent nation—and especially in Mexico where the president had recognized the Juarez government as a constitutional one. Elgee, acting as *charge d'affaires ad interim*, was requested to report the purport of this conversation orally to the government at Vera Cruz.<sup>42</sup>

On August 20, McLane, in conversation with Cass at Washington, referring to the advice contained in his despatch of March 30, and quoting the reply of April 28 in which Cass had conceded the right of all nations to intervene in Mexico to enforce demands for redress for wrongs, said: "It was precisely such intervention as this that I anticipated and which I believed would be followed by further European intervention to determine the political destiny and future government of Mexico. I still entertain this opinion." And, therefore, he and the Juarez government had desired to know what would be the decision of the executive as to his own discretion and power in such an emergency. He had felt convinced, and had so advised in his despatches subsequent to his No. 72, that Spain—with or without the concurrence of Great Britain and France—would go so far as to insist on the due execution of the treaty which had been concluded in Paris by Miramon's ambassador (Almonte) and the Spanish ambassador to France.<sup>43</sup>

On September 1, 1860, at another conference with Cass, McLane, referring to the previous conference and to the correspondence since March 30, and to the fact that England, France and Spain had given notice of their determination to intervene to restore peace and enforce demands for redress, now proposed that the United States minister in Mexico should confer with the British, French and Spanish ministers in Mexico at his own discretion and opportunity in order to advise them: (1) that he would use his best offices to facilitate all efforts to restore peace provided the right of the people of Mexico to establish and regulate their own government and political destiny should be

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42. 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 38 of Aug. 8 (Trescot to Elgee) 1860, (pp. 302-04); 26 Desps. Mex., No. 99, Sept. 17, 1860.

43. *Ib.*, Aug. 20, 1860.

respected and treated as a fundamental element of the proposed pacification of Mexico; (2) that while the right of all powers to demand redress for all wrongs and injuries and to enforce the demand was fully admitted, yet the wrong complained of must be properly the subject matter for international reparation, and in enforcing the demand the political institutions of Mexico must be respected and not overthrown or changed—in other words, the right in question must be exercised bona fide and not capriciously as a pretext to change and control the political destiny and institutions of the country.<sup>44</sup>

Cass replied: that notwithstanding the President's good wishes and desire for the exemption of Mexico from all foreign possession or control, the United States could not lend the aid requested by the Juarez government; that France, England and Spain knew our policy and had disavowed any design to act in opposition to it, and that the department had no information to confirm McLane's opinion that they meditated projects incompatible with that policy; that the United States would not oppose advice by the European powers to induce the contending parties in Mexico to enter into an amicable arrangement and establish a stable free government sustained by a majority of the Mexican people; but that, if they should undertake to extort assent and establish European ascendancy, the United States would meet the attempt by armed action—in case Congress should adhere to the policy which had so long been avowed and publicly proclaimed; that while the policy embodied in the rejected treaty and recommendations of McLane, for empowering the executive to act with vigor, would have placed our relations with Mexico in a most satisfactory situation, and although the executive was disappointed in his expectation of Congress, there should be no abandonment of watchfulness of American interests in Mexico; and that McLane should go to Vera Cruz without delay, establish friendly relations with the Juarez government, ascertain what objects the foreign powers had in contemplation, give them to understand that the American policy against foreign interference would be adhered to with firmness, and be guided by circumstances as they should occur.<sup>45</sup>

McLane returned to Vera Cruz as directed and soon reported that Pachecos the Spanish minister had confirmed the previous disavowals of Spain, France and England to Cass—that, while suggesting plans for the adjustment of the pending difficulties in Mexico, he had disavowed for his government any desire or intention to hold possession of any part of the country or to control its political destiny. On his

44 *Ib.*, Sept. 1, 1860.

45 17 *Instrs. Mex.* (pp. 306-38), No. 39, Sept. 20, 1860.

part, McLane informed the Spanish minister that he would excite no expectation of undue opposition to any legitimate operation. Reporting that President Juarez had steadily resisted all suggestions for signing a supplemental article for extending the time for exchanging the ratification of the treaty, he promptly requested to be recalled (November 5) and two weeks later offered his resignation and recommended the withdrawal of the mission. The president accepted his resignation and approval his course; but, considering it advisable to withdraw the mission, he appointed John B. Weller of California to succeed him.<sup>46</sup>

In December, before his return, McLane was requested by the French, Prussian and Spanish ministers to interpose to stop the war and to co-operate with the European powers in favor of mediation. This he declined to do. Hearing that through the influence of some of the European governments the Liberal leaders had been told that the United States abstained from co-operation in a policy of mediation because she desired the continuation of the existing civil war, he sent Mr. La Reintrie as a special agent of the legation on a mission to the interior to deny the allegations, to ascertain the situation and to declare to the Liberal leaders and to the foreign representatives the policy of the United States in regard to foreign interference:— that the United States had declared to the European powers her determination to resist any forcible attempt to impose a particular adjustment of the existing conflict against the will of the Mexican people, and that while she desired the pacification of the country she denied the right of the European powers to interfere directly or indirectly with the political independence of Mexico (and had gotten from them a disclaimer of any such purpose).<sup>47</sup>

In his special communication to the ministers of all foreign powers in Mexico, sent from San Angel (near Mexico) December 20, 1860, La Reintrie, after reviewing the situation in Mexico, and the failure of the intervention or mediation by the English, and subsequently by the French and Spanish, stated that the United States approved the policy of the Liberals in regard to the peace negotiations of the European powers, and "was determined to resist any forcible attempt to impose a particular adjustment of the existing conflict against the will and sanction of the people of Mexico, and also any forcible intervention, by any foreign power, which looks to the control of the political destiny thereof." Stating that this determination had already been explicitly declared to all the powers

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46 26 Desps. Mex., No. 104 of Nov. 5, and No. 106 of Nov. 12, 1860;  
17 Instrs. Mex., No. 42 of Nov. 20, 1860.

47 26 Desps. Mex., No. 113, Dec. 21, 1860.

of Europe, he said: "The government of the United States does not deny to European powers the right to wage honorable warfare for a sufficient cause \* \* \* \* ; but it does deny them the right to interfere, directly or indirectly, with the political independence of the republic of Mexico, and it will to the extent of its power defend the nationality and independence of said republic."<sup>48</sup>

A few days later (December 28) he announced the capture of Mexico by the Liberal forces whose success in the desperate struggle against the privileged classes had given Juarez undisputed control over the whole of Mexico. At Calpulalpam, on December 24, 1860, after a three-day battle, Miramon was defeated and forced to leave the country. Three days later the army of Juarez entered the City of Mexico and began to execute there with brutal severity the decree of sequestration. The diplomatic agents of Spain, Guatemala, the Holy See and Ecuador were dismissed. Though the finances were in a deplorable condition, measures were taken to restore order along the roads which were infested with bands of robbers and to pursue the reactionary forces which were now led by Zuloaga. Weller, the new American minister, who arrived at the City of Mexico, in January, 1861, with many claims of United States citizens to press, and presented his credentials to Juarez, wrote that the United States and England should interpose to secure a permanent government under the constitution of 1857 with which the people were satisfied. A month later he referred to the confidence of the masses in Juarez who had just been re-elected to the presidency. He felt that it was an auspicious moment for the negotiation of treaties with a view to the encouragement of immigration.<sup>49</sup>

What Juarez most needed was time and a period of peace in which to complete his reforms at home, and amicably to adjust relations with foreign governments to whom the exiles of the monarchical party were applying for aid against the republican government. He also needed money for the legitimate expense of a progressive government and to enable him to pay the enormous foreign debts and other bills of credit which Miramon and his predecessors had left as souvenirs of their reckless stock-jobbing at government expense. Although he secured \$20,000 by the closing of the monasteries and the expulsion of church orders, he derived no permanent benefit. In the war which these reforms precipitated, he soon spent the church funds which they had produced; and in a critical moment, when the

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48 4 exec. doc. 100, vol. 8, 37-2, Apr. 14, 1862.

49 26 Desps. Mex.; (Elgee) No. 2, Jan. 1, 1861, (Weller) No. 2 of Feb. 18, and No. 3 of March 18, 1861; V. W. Kingsley's "French intervention in America" (N. Y., 1863, 22 pp.)

arbiter of the Monroe doctrine was occupied by a war of secession, he was forced by circumstances (and in order to pay the army in pursuit of the remnants of the vanquished forces of Miramon, now led by General Manquez) to suspend (July 1861) for two years all payment on the public debts—an act which furnished the excuse for the European intervention which culminated in the establishment of the Franco-Maximilian monarchy.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Sen. exec. doc. 11, vol. 1, 38-1, p. 146 and p. 290 (Thiers historical review in Corps Legislative, Jan. 24, 1864.)



## II. America's Division is Mexico's Peril

At the beginning of the American civil war, when the Dominican republic rejected republican government to establish Spanish authority and the adherents of the Miramon party were inviting European intervention, there was a feeling expressed in certain quarters of Europe that all America was disgusted with its governments and would willingly return to their connection with the mother countries.<sup>1</sup> Seward, the fortunate choice of Lincoln for secretary of state, somewhat familiar with the questions which had arisen on both sides of the Atlantic for several years, was fully alive to the possibilities and dangers of European intervention in American affairs—both those of the United States and those of the other countries of the continent.<sup>2</sup>

Confronted with the serious problems of domestic insurrection, Seward was anxious to solve them by grappling with the serious problems of international politics. On April 1, after hearing of Spanish movements in the Dominican republic and in Cuba to introduce Spanish authority within the territory of the Dominican republic, and possibly suspecting that Louis Napoleon had plans which might prove a menace to the American policy, in submitting "some thoughts for the President's consideration," he said: "I would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically, at once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to arouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France (I) would convene Congress and declare war against them." On the following day, desiring to obtain explanations<sup>3</sup> of the purpose of Spain, he wrote Tassara (the Spanish minister) as follows: "You will not be surprised I am sure when I add that this reported attempt to introduce Spanish authority within the territory of Dominica, if it should prove to be authentic, cannot fail to be taken as the first step in a policy of armed intervention by the Spanish government in the American countries which once

1 Thiers in Corps Legislative, Jan. 26, 1864. Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, vol. 1, p. 291.

2 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 2, Apr. 6, 1861.

3 Tassara two days later agreed to make further explanations after communication with Madrid. (7 Notes to Spanish Legation, p. 205).

constituted Spanish America, but have since achieved their independence." Referring to the fixed policy of the United States for half a century to respect the Spanish title to Cuba and Porto Rico, he said: "We have adhered to this policy principally because Spain was not expected to be an aggressive neighbor. The President cherishes a policy of peace, however it must not be anywhere supposed that he is less jealous of dangers to the republican system of government of which this continent is the principal theatre." Expressing profound concern in regard to the actions of the Spanish authorities in Cuba, he continued: "I am directed to inform you and also the government of His Catholic Majesty in a direct manner, that, if they should be found to have received at any time the sanction of that government, the President will be obliged to regard them as manifesting an unfriendly spirit toward the United States, and to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican republic or any other part of the American continent or islands with a prompt, persistent and if possible, effective resistance."<sup>4</sup>

At the same time he wrote to the ministers of Mexico, Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras and New Granada confidentially enclosing a copy of his note to Tassara. To Romero, the Mexican minister, he wrote: "The President suggests that you bring this subject to the government of Mexico to the end that it may adopt such measures in this exigency as the safety and the welfare of the respective states existing on the American continent, and its islands, including perhaps Mexico, shall seem to require."<sup>5</sup> On April 4, he received Romero's written reply: "I flatter myself with the hope that in Mexico the attitude taken by the United States on this occasion will be considered in the same light in which I see it; that is, not as taken merely to prevent the subversion of the liberties of the citizens of the Dominican republic, which might disturb the direct peace in America and destroy the present political equilibrium of nationalities now existent, but also as a frank declaration of the matured and firm resolution of the government of the United States to oppose the increase on this continent of any European influence which would do so much prejudice to the progress of the systems of republican government, in the preservation and development of which all humanity is interested."<sup>6</sup> Later, Seward was assured by Romero, after the latter had communicated with Juarez, that the policy of the Mexican government was to approve the principles of

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4 7 Notes to Sp. Leg., pp. 200-4.

5 *Ib.*, pp. 156-8, Apr. 2, 1861.

6 9 Notes from Mex. Leg.

and to "give its adhesion to the doctrine of sustaining American nationalities in their existing autonomy."<sup>7</sup>

The Lincoln administration, though it found the archives full of complaints against Mexico, desired to give that unhappy country time to establish order and security to enable it to maintain its complete integrity and independence against the dangers from foreign powers and against the visionary aggressive schemes of the filibustering confederates who while seeking to destroy the union had conceived designs "to effect either a partial dismemberment or a complete overthrow of the Mexican government with a view to extending over it the authority of the newly projected Confederacy."<sup>8</sup> It promptly took steps to show its friendly feeling for the unfortunate country. It commissioned as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to that country Thomas Corwin who, on February 11, 1847, had delivered a famous speech in the Senate in opposition to the war against Mexico. It exercised prompt vigilance to prevent confederate filibustering expeditions which Romero feared might attack Lower California and Sonora.<sup>9</sup>

Seward, in his instructions to Corwin, deprecating the chronic reign of disorder in Mexico, and referring to its influence in producing the contention which led to the secession movement in the United States, declared that the President had no sympathy with the schemes of foreign powers to intervene in Mexico to establish a protectorate, nor of the Southern discontents to prepare some further revolution in Mexico. "The President \* \* \* \* \* is fully satisfied," said he, "that the safety, welfare, and happiness of Mexico would be more effectually promoted by its complete integrity and independence than by dismemberment, with transfer of diminution of its sovereignty, even though thereby a portion or the whole of the country or its sovereignty should be transferred to the United States themselves."<sup>10</sup> Later, after receiving information of fresh Confederate designs to gain possession of Lower California and parts of northern Mexico,<sup>11</sup> Seward wrote Corwin that the United States, though she desired no part of Mexico, would buy Lower California to save it from the Confederates, if Mexico would name the price, and sent him full powers to treat; but these instructions were later superseded.

7 7 Notes to Mex. Leg., pp. 169-70, June 10, 1861.

8 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 2, Apr. 6, 1861.

9 9 Notes from Mex. Leg., Apr. 1 and Apr. 3; 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 2, Apr. 6; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 1 of May 29 and No. 9 of June 15, 1861.

10 17 Instrs. Mex.

11 Letter of May 3, 1861, from Thomas Sprague who had been a commercial agent of the United States.

The constitutional government of Mexico, fearing that one of the purposes of the secession movement at the South was to acquire the largest possible part of Mexico for the further extension and development of slavery, authorized Mr. Romero to express to Mr. Seward its good disposition to negotiate a political treaty which would guarantee the existing boundaries of Mexico and the integrity of her territory and prevent the introduction or spread of slavery into it—which the Confederates might seek to accomplish either by open war or filibustering expeditions.<sup>12</sup>

In thus seeking treaties for the "definite regulation of a question which had caused so many complications to the country," Mr. Romero significantly stated the reason for requiring as "an indispensable condition" that the nations of Europe should not be invited to participate in any way. "The government of Mexico," said he, "considers that whatever interference might be conceded to European powers in such conventions might be converted into a motive or pretext for the intervention of that continent in the affairs of the republic in particular or of America in general, and desires on its part to avoid the possibility of such a thing happening, because it entertains the conviction that the intervention of Europe on this continent would be fatal to the preservation and development of democratic institutions on which are founded the hopes of the progress and social welfare of humanity." A month later, referring to the occupation of San Domingo by Spain, he expressed his conviction that no consent should be given to any influence of European policy on the continent and that the American nationalities should be sustained in their existing autonomy.<sup>13</sup>

Corwin on his arrival in Mexico promptly reported the situation. Within forty years the country had had thirty-six forms of government and seventy-three presidents. In her disorder she still sought the help of other nations, and was greatly in need of money to meet the demands of England, France and Spain for payment of debts, and to establish a permanent government that could prevent disruption. It appeared quite probable that the European powers might begin against the coasts and ports a war of joint reprisal which after a rapid acquisition of the ports might result in the conquest of the whole country. Corwin, fearing that European intervention would overthrow the constitutional government and substitute another which would be the mere instrument of the intervening parties and perhaps result in a dissolution of the Mexican states and new combinations

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12 9 Notes from Mex. Leg., May 4; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 2, June 29, 1861.

13 9 Notes from Mex., June 6, 1861.

which would be highly prejudicial to the United States, declared that the American government was bound to sustain Mexico. He suggested that the purchase of Lower California, which might become indispensable to the Pacific possessions of the United States, would save Mexico from partition or subjugation by Europe—and at the same time terminate the secession movement, secure American interests, and promote successfully the cause of human progress on the entire continent. A month later, (after the Juarez government had suspended payment of all indemnities for a period of two years and England and France had both terminated diplomatic intercourse, and when England was preparing to resort to a distress by seizure of the custom houses at the ports of Tampico and Vera Cruz), he urged that it was the duty of the United States to prevent the aims of European powers in regard to intervention in American affairs, and recommended that the American government with proper pledge of territory as a guarantee, should arrange to negotiate a loan to pay the interest on the Mexican debt for five years. By this plan he said all Southern hopes of extending a separate southern confederacy over that quarter of Central America would be extinguished; that any further attempt to establish European power on the continent would cease to occupy the minds of Europe; and that the United States, destined to be the only safe guardian of the independence and true civilization of the continent, would be benefited in all time to come.<sup>14</sup>

Seward, although recognizing that it was not prudent to provoke debates with foreign countries by formal reassurances of the American policy in relation to foreign nations,<sup>15</sup> and not willing to commit his government to all the opinions which La Reintrie by direction of McLane had expressed in his circular of December 20, 1860, to representatives of foreign powers in Mexico, did not hesitate to affirm the American desire for Mexican independence and freedom from all foreign political interference or control, nor did he doubt that United States would be willing to take decided measures favoring that independence.<sup>16</sup> Though busy with active measures to preserve the integrity of the Union, he was alarmed by the developing complications and had a lively desire, in the threatening emergency, to take some action which would "prevent the overthrow of republican liberty

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14 28 Desps. Mex., No. 2 of June 29, No. 3 of July 29, No. 4 of Aug. 28 and No. 5 of Sept. 7, 1861.

15 Dayton feared a break with France at that time. Among other reasons for seeking to secure the continuation of the friendly feeling of France, he suggested the danger of a French attempt to set up a protectorate over Louisiana. [50 Desps. Fr., No. 29, Aug. 19, 1861.]

16. 17 Instrs. Mex. No. 16, Aug. 24, 1861.

and American independence in Mexico." Regretting that, as a result of the secession movement started by "infatuated" leaders, all Spanish America was threatened with the evils of past centuries, and alluding to the increasing responsibilities which prevented the United States from intervening to aid the reorganization of Mexico, he wrote Corwin: "We may perhaps prevent her extensive territories \* \* \* from falling into the possession of powers which it is only reasonable to expect would manage them for their own aggrandizement, inconsistent equally with the principle of government there and with our own dignity and even our own safety."<sup>17</sup> With this purpose, and by direction of President Lincoln, he authorized Corwin to negotiate with Mexico a treaty by which, provided the European powers would consent to forbear from resort to hostilities in Mexico on account of her refusal to pay the interest on her debts, the United States on her part would agree to pay the interest (at three per cent) on the funded debt of Mexico (\$62,000,000) for five years from the date of the decree by which payments had been suspended, and Mexico on her part would pledge the reimbursement by a lien on the public lands and mineral rights in Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa, which would become the property of the United States at the end of six years in default of reimbursement.<sup>18</sup> This seemed to him to be the best course to guard against the extinction of the Mexican republic.<sup>19</sup>

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17 *Ib.*, No. 17 of Sept. 2 and No. 15 of Aug. 24, 1861.

18 *Ib.*, No. 17 of Sept. 2, 1861.

19 When he wrote these instructions, Seward had on his desk a dispatch from St. Petersburg in which Clay, writing a month earlier had submitted some "hints on foreign policy, suitable to the condition of international complications and American destiny in the Pacific" in which he declared that the United States should form an alliance with Mexico, assume the lead in the liberal governments of the West, and co-operate with Russia in restricting the dominating policy of England in both hemispheres. [19 *Desp. Rus. No. 5, Aug. 3, 1861*].

Seward courteously replied that Clay's "interesting remarks" were very interesting and would be "given due weight in forming any determination which might be required as a result of the rapid course of political events in Mexico; but he suggested that if it were compatible with his many cares, at that critical moment, to furnish American ministers a full knowledge of the conditions of negotiations and discussions with all foreign powers, Clay would probably admit that he was laboring under apprehensions of some imaginary foreign dangers. Then he added: "I must be content to advise you, when necessary, of the President's wishes, in regard to your mission, and leave you, as to the rest, to await ultimate and yet seasonable developments." [14 *Instr. Rus. No. 13, Sept. 3, 1861*].

Twenty days later, he again wrote Clay a note of caution. Enclosing an extract from the New York Evening Post which was attributed

In taking this step to strengthen the Juarez government, the Lincoln administration was doubtless influenced in part by a desire to circumvent the plans of the government of the Southern Confederacy, (with which many of the hold-over United States consuls in Mexico were in sympathy) which, taking advantage of the divided condition of Mexico, had been ready and willing to recognize any and every government, state or national, and ready to make treaties with governors or with presidents to suit the exigencies of the occasion—and had endeavored especially but in vain to induce the constitutional government to refuse to grant permission for the transit of United States troops from Guaymas to Arizona and to reconsider its refusal to entertain any propositions which might seem to recognize the Confederate States in any way except as a part of the United States.<sup>20</sup>

Pickett, whom the Confederate leaders sent to secure an alliance with Mexico, and who sought in vain to open communications with the Juarez government, was watching for a "golden opportunity" which would enable the Confederate States to fulfill speedily "a portion of that inevitable destiny" which impelled them to seek more acquisitions toward the South and an outlet on the Pacific. When Mexico (in the face of the Southern threats to make it a pretext for an invasion to secure territory) granted to the United States the right to pass troops to Arizona, he said privately: "If this decree is not annulled Mexico will lose the state of Tamaulipas in sixty days" and in an unofficial communication to the Mexican government he threatened the invasion of the northern states of Mexico. He especially sought to prevent any treaty arrangement which would relieve the embarrassment of Mexico and prevent the foreign interference which would furnish the opportunity for filibustering in northern Mexico; and in the vain endeavor to interfere with Corwin's negotiations, he warned the constitutional government of Mexico that the Confederates would never consent to any sale or hypothecation of lands to any

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to a person in Clay's employment and which excited some uneasiness, he added that persons in the Legation should not be permitted to write what might irritate at home or abroad. [14 Instr. Rus. No. 14 (p. 219) Sept. 23, 1861].

<sup>20</sup> Callahan: Diplomatic history of the Southern Confederacy, p. 76; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 4 of Aug. 28, No. 5 of Sept. 7, No. 6 of Sept. 29, No. 7 of Oct. 29, No. 2 of June 29 (Enclosure "D"), and No. 3 of July 29, 1861. Dayton reported to Seward a conversation with Gen. Almonte in relation to the effort of John S. Cripps of South Carolina to arrange with the Mexican party in power to agree to the union of Mexico and the Confederate states as one power or some other basis of intimate relations against the United States. [50 Desps. Fr., No. 17, July 11, 1861].

government not in amity with the Confederacy. In a letter to Toombs, stating that the United States plan possibly contemplated the hypothecation of the Mexican lands and the establishment of a line of United States military posts through Mexican territory, he suggested that the Confederates should take military possession of Monterey and hold all that region till all questions with the United States were amicably adjusted. "Such an occupation," said he, "would ensure to us the permanent possession of that beautiful country."<sup>21</sup> While threatening retaliation, Pickett proposed to Mexico to recede to her Upper California and New Mexico including California on condition that she would agree to negotiate a treaty of free trade with the Confederacy. He could get no satisfaction, and in explaining the unfriendliness of the Juarez government he said that the native Mexicans feared that the South, if successful in secession, would try to conquer the entire country and enslave the dark skinned population in each of its twenty-two states. Smarting under the pain of his complete failure, and confident that the Confederate revolution had emasculated the Monroe doctrine, he made friendly approaches to the Conservatives who favored the restoration of Spanish rule; and, acting more like a bully than a diplomat, he apparently endeavored to force the Juarez government to recognize him as a pernicious intriguer who was anxious to precipitate a crisis that would give the Confederacy an opportunity to form a "natural" alliance with Spain which would secure the partition of all Mexico and "tend to check the expansion of the North"(!) After serving a brief period in jail for a brutal attack on an American citizen, he reached Vera Cruz with the French minister in December, in time to witness its occupation by Spain<sup>22</sup>—delegating the duty of furnishing the Confederacy reports of passing events in Mexico to John S. Cripps (of South Carolina), who soon reported that the Mexican government had become full of animosity towards the Southern States.<sup>23</sup>

In the meantime Seward, hoping to satisfy foreign creditors, had kept in close touch with the situation. Late in September, hearing rumors of the proposed tripartite expedition against Vera Cruz to make demand on Mexico, he wrote Dayton that the United States, desiring peace in "this hemisphere," looked with deep concern on the

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21 28 Desps. Mex., No. 4 of Aug. 28, No. 5 of Sept. 7 and No. 7 of Oct. 29; Confederate Correspondence, Package 44, Pickett's No. 12 of Oct. 29, 1861.

22 28 Desps. Mex., No. 7 of Oct. 29 and No. 3 of July 29; Pickett's No. 13 of Nov. 29, and No. 14 of Dec. 24, 1861.

23. Confederate Correspondence, Package 50, Cripps' No. 1 (from Mexico), Apr. 22, 1862.



threatened expedition and was not unwilling to tender its good offices to prevent it. Although he was informed that the French government in its conference with Dayton disclaimed all idea of territorial acquisition, and although feeling confident of the restoration of "our national integrity" and therefore that the effects on the interests of the United States of a triple movement against Mexico were "likely to be only incidental," he was still anxious to prevent further complications. Hearing that Spain meditated a demonstration against Mexico, he instructed Adams to ask Earl Russell whether the United States could make to Spain any proposition which would receive the favorable consideration of Great Britain. As the situation became more threatening, Corwin proposed that the United States should advance five or ten million dollars to the Mexican government, but Seward, declaring this plan impossible even if it were wise, confined his efforts to the proposition which seemed to him more feasible—a loan to pay the interest on the Mexican debt.<sup>24</sup>

Before negotiating the proposed treaty it was necessary to obtain from the English and French governments an agreement to refrain from operations against Mexico until the President could submit the treaty to the Senate and obtain its ratification. Seward promptly and informally communicated his plans to both these governments, but received no favorable reply. Neither France nor England approved. They probably feared that the plan was "preliminary to an entry for foreclosure," rather than an effort to maintain the abstract principle announced in the Monroe doctrine.<sup>25</sup> Thouvenal thought France ought not in any way to recognize the transaction. The British government stated that the unpaid interest was not the only cause of complaint with Mexico, and Lord Lyons suggested that the difficulty and the dangers of intervention might be most satisfactorily met by

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<sup>24</sup> 16 Instrs. Fr., p. 57, No. 60 of Sept. 24, and p. 83, No. 79 (in reply to Dayton's No. 62 of Oct. 16); 50 Desps. Fr., No. 51, Sept. 25; 18 Instrs. Gr. Br., Oct. 10, No. 99; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 7, Oct. 29; 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 23, Oct. 2, 1861.

<sup>25</sup> 16 Instrs. Fr., p. 61, No. 67 of Oct. 11, 1861; H. exec. doc. 100, 37-2, p. 201; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 14, Jan. 26, 1862. At the beginning of 1862, Clay—still furnishing from St. Petersburg surveys of the conditions of the United States at home and its relations abroad—wrote Seward as follows: "England has always regarded us with jealousy on account of our government and our expansion, and thinks we threaten the Isles of the West Atlantic, Canada, the Isthmus, Mexico and South America. They fear our power will soon give us inclination to interfere with European governments. So they think of extending their system of balances of power to America." [19 Desps. Rus., No. 15 of Jan. 7, 1862].

the co-operation of the United States, Great Britain and France with Spain in some distinctly defined policy.<sup>26</sup>

While Corwin was negotiating with Mexico, Sir Charles Wyke had negotiated with Mexico a treaty to satisfy British claims but it failed to obtain the approval of the Mexican Congress and of the British government. France sent her ultimatum, and Corwin believed that the independence of Mexico was seriously threatened. In the meantime Spain, France and Great Britain had signed a convention exacting from Mexico the performance of her obligations, but disclaiming any purpose to seek acquisition of territory or to control the internal affairs in any such way as to prejudice the rights of Mexico to choose and constitute freely the form of her government. Agreeing to begin demonstrative operations as soon as their combined forces could unite in the vicinity of Vera Cruz, they invited the co-operation of the United States. On December 4, Seward declined on several grounds: inexpediency of seeking satisfaction at that time; traditional policy confirmed by experience; and the desire to cherish a good will toward a neighboring republic on the American continent. He also referred to his plan to aid Mexico by a loan which would enable her to meet her obligations to the European allies and avert the war which they had agreed to levy—and the object of which Romero said was to establish a monarchy in Mexico.<sup>27</sup>

When the Spanish fleet arrived at Vera Cruz in December, Corwin, realizing the seriousness of the situation and still hoping to obtain permission to make the loan, was anxious to know whether the American policy was to join the three powers against Mexico. Believing that both Spain and France had covetous eyes on the Spanish American republics and that Spain desired the reconquest of her lost colonies, he urged Seward to take measures to secure the representation of every South American republic in Mexico to meet the Spanish and French while they were making their first demonstration.<sup>28</sup>

Concerning the exact purpose and probable result of the allied expedition there was considerable conjecture and difference of opinion. Adams wrote from London that the purpose to advance to the capital and to establish a firm government "with the consent of the people at that place" was no longer concealed, though the British government was hesitating in its support, and that the expedition might

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26 50 Br. and For. State Papers, p. 375.

27 28 Desps. Mex., No. 8 of Nov. 29, 1862; H. exec. doc. 100, 37-2, pp. 136-7, 187 and 190; 9 Notes rom Mex. Leg., Nov. 28, 1861.

28 28 Desps. Mex., No. 11, Dec. 24, 1861; 52 Br. and For. State Papers, p. 381.

not stop until it reached the heart of the Louisiana purchase. Though the Mexican people continued to fear that the allies had designs to conquer the whole country and establish a monarchy, Corwin, relying upon the liberalism of Marshal Prim who led the Spanish force of 6,000, felt satisfied that they had no such intention; but he still said that the country could be saved by nothing but the aid of the United States.<sup>29</sup> The French government had authorized the admiral of the French expedition (of 2,500) if necessary to advance into the interior and against the capital, and even to encourage any attempts by the "sane portion of the people" to establish a strong, stable government, and there were reports that a large part of the Mexican people would invite Maximilian to take the throne of Mexico; but the British government, which sent only 700 marines, instructed its agent to decline to join in any advance into the interior and stated that England could be no party to a forcible intervention for the purpose of placing the Austrian prince on the throne.

A month after landing (January, 1862) they issued a proclamation announcing to Mexico that they had come neither to conquer nor to revolutionize, but to settle claims. At a conference each nation was allowed to produce its claims. England demanded eighty-five million francs, Spain forty million, France sixty million and other nations twenty million. In the face of the embarrassment caused by the announcement of this enormous amount, Saligny the French minister to Mexico then produced the famous usurious Jecker debt of seventy-five million which had been contracted in February, 1859, by decrees of Miramon who needed money to defeat Juarez (and who left bankruptcy as a souvenir of his rule) and to which the representatives of England objected on the ground that it was a manifest robbery against the Mexican people and their government—because no more than one-third of the amount of the Jecker loan had ever been advanced to Miramon by his Swiss associate (Jecker) who, having received far more money than he disbursed was really in debt to Mexico. On February 19, 1862, at Soledad the ministers of Spain, Great Britain and France signed with the secretary of state of the Juarez government a preliminary convention recognizing the Juarez government and disclaiming all designs against the sovereignty and integrity of the Mexican republic, and agreeing to negotiate at Orizaba a settlement of their claims.<sup>30</sup>

Corwin expected affairs to be settled favorably to Mexico; but,

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29. Desps. Gr. Br., Jan. 24, 1862; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 15 of Feb. 5, No. 14 of Jan. 25 and No. 16 of Feb. 18, 1862.

30. Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, vol. 1, pp. 178, 146 and 159; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 17 of Feb. 22, 1862.

a month later, referring to the refusal of France and England to accept the guarantee of the United States, and the French request for more troops, he decided that the settlement of the Mexican complications would be greatly influenced by the result of affairs in the United States. Believing that the allies (who said they had come to establish order and restore peace) were waiting only for a plausible reason or pretext to aid one party or the other, and fearing that they might decide to set up a church party and hold Mexico as a European colony, he urged that he should be authorized to furnish the Juarez government financial aid at once pending the negotiations. "The conditions on which I am instructed to aid Mexico," said he, "will forbid me to do anything which Mexico can accept because if the allies are to be satisfied and to leave before the desired aid is given, the public lands must be given to the allies as security, leaving the United States no security for the loan."<sup>31</sup>

Early in April, after a stormy conference at Orizaba, the triple alliance was dissolved. Unable to agree on the interpretation of the treaty of London, the allies announced their resolution to adopt separate action. Other causes doubtless contributed to produce this disagreement.<sup>32</sup> When the French extended protection to General Almonte and other notorious intriguing leaders of the clerical or reactionary party (who openly advocated the erection of a monarchy under Maximilian, and who had been banished), both England and Spain favored the Mexican demand for their dismissal. Both were also opposed to the injection of the Jecker claim and to the duplicity of the French commissioners who refused to confer with the Juarez government at Orizaba as arranged by the Soledad convention. The Spanish forces returned to the coast where the British marines had remained; and both England and Spain soon withdrew their troops from Mexico.<sup>33</sup>

The French government, now free to pursue its own policy, though it emphatically assured the United States that it had no designs on the independence of Mexico and no intention to establish Maximilian on the throne of a Mexican monarchy, proceeded to

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31 28 Desps. Mex., No. 18 of March 20 and No. 19 of March 24, 1862.

32 John S. Cripps writing from Mexico to Richmond said that the disagreement was probably due to the jealousy of French preponderance on the soil of new Spain—"together with the ostentatious reports of a treaty offensive and defensive between this government and that now reigning at Washington." [C. S. A. Corres., Pkg. 50, Cripps to Secy. of State of C. S. A.] No. 1, Apr. 22, 1862.

33 28 Desps. Mex., No. 21, Apr. 16, 1862; H. exec. doc. 54, 37-3; Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, vol. 1, pp. 291 and 294-96 (speech of Thiers, Jan. 26, 1864.)

reinforce the Mexican expedition, placed General Forey in command to conduct the advance against the Juarez government and pushed forward the preparations which were to end in an attempt to establish a monarchy. Corwin was certain that it had become the Mexican policy and duty to give the allies no further pretext for seizing the country and for dictating its government. "I trust our government will remonstrate firmly against all idea of European conquest on this continent," he wrote, "and in such tone as to have its influence on the position of France in Mexico." Referring to the dangers to the Pacific possessions of the United States, he urged that to prevent the threatened occupation of Mexico would be less expensive than to secure the necessary dislodgement thereafter.<sup>34</sup>

Seward had already formulated a clear expression of the views of the administration in the form of a circular letter. At the close of January, at the request of Peru, (who had recently initiated a Spanish-American movement toward founding a union or league for mutual protection against European attacks upon their independence), he had been invited confidentially by Romero to authorize the American minister at Lima to "agree to a secret pact in relation to the defensive attitude that it is convenient for all the American republics to take with a view to avoid that the Europeans be over-limited in this continent." He prepared no written reply, but a few weeks later, after Romero had written him again in regard to the designs of the French, he submitted to him confidentially a copy of the resolutions of the committee of foreign relations of the Senate on Mexican affairs, and later showed his interest and concern by submitting extracts of Dayton's correspondence.<sup>35</sup> Finally, at the close of the first year of the Lincoln administration, he addressed the following letter to the several American legations abroad:

"Washington, March 3, 1862.

"Sir.—We observe indications of a growing impression in Europe that the demonstration made by the Spanish, French, and British forces against Mexico is likely to provoke a revolution in that country which shall bring about the introduction of a monarchical government, and the assumption of the crown by a foreign prince. Our country is deeply interested in the peace of the world, and desires to preserve loyal relations as well with the Allies as with Mexico. The President has, therefore, directed me to submit to the parties interested his views on the new aspect of affairs.

"The President has relied upon the assurance given his government by the Allies that they were in pursuit of no political object,

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34 Desps. France, Apr. 22, 1862; T. M. J. in Merchants' Mag., June, 1864; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 21, Apr. 16, 1862.

35 10 Notes from Mex. Leg., Jan. 28, Feb. 16 and Feb. 21, and Apr. 17, 1862.

but simply the redress of their grievances. He entertains no doubt of the sincerity of the Allies; and if his confidence in their good faith has been disturbed, it would be restored by the frank explanations given by them that the governments of Spain, France and Great Britain had no intention of interfering to procure a change in the constitutional form of government now existing in Mexico, or any political change which should be in opposition to the will of the Mexican people. In short, he has cause to believe that the Allies are unanimous in declaring that the revolution proposed to Mexico is solely prompted by certain Mexican citizens who are now in France.

Nevertheless the President regards it as his duty to express to the Allies, in all kindness and candour, that a monarchical government established in Mexico, in the presence of foreign fleets and armies, occupying the waters and the soil of Mexico, has no promise of security or permanence; in the second place, that the instability of such a monarchy would be enhanced if the throne were assigned to a person alien to Mexico; that in these circumstances the new government would instantly fall unless sustained by European alliances, which, under the influence of the first invasion, would be practically the beginning of a permanent policy of armed intervention by monarchical Europe, at once injurious and inimical to the system of government generally adopted by the American continent.

"These views are based upon some knowledge of the opinions and political habits of American society. There can be no doubt that in this matter the permanent interests and the sympathies of our country would be on the side of the other American republics.

"We must not be understood as predicting on this occasion the course of events which may ensue, both in America and Europe, from the steps which are contemplated. It is enough to say that in the opinion of the President the emancipation of the American continent from the control of Europe has been the principal characteristic of the past half century. It is not probable that a revolution in the opposite direction can succeed in the age which immediately follows this period, and while the population of America increases so rapidly, while its resources develop in the same proportion, and while society forms itself uniformly to the principles of the American democratic government.

"It is necessary to indicate to the Allies how improbable it is that the nations of Europe would accept a policy favorable to a similar counter-revolution, thus incompatible with their own proper interests. Nor is it necessary to point out that, notwithstanding the care of the Allies to avoid aiding, by means of their land and maritime forces, the internal revolutions of Mexico, the result would be none the less due to the presence of their forces in the country, however different the object they may have proposed; for without their presence it may be considered as certain that such revolution would probably not have been attempted or even conceived.

"The Senate of the United States has certainly not accorded its official sanction to the precise measures proposed by the President, to lend our aid to the actual Mexican government, in order that the latter might, with the approbation of the Allies, extricate itself from its present embarrassments; but this is strictly a question of internal administration. There could be no greater error than to see in this

disagreement a divergence of opinion in our government, or in the American people, in regard to their cordial wishes for the safety, welfare, and stability of the republican government in that country.

"I am your obedient servant,  
"W. H. Seward."

Seward continued to give careful attention to the affairs in Mexico and was confident that the political designs of Europe would fall—through disagreement of the European powers, unlooked for resistance in Mexico, and the changed aspect of the situation in the United States. He did not hesitate to instruct Dayton that the United States could not look with indifference on armed European intervention for political ends in a country so near us. Though France had disclaimed such designs, Seward promptly informed Dayton of reports from the United States consul at Havana which indicated that France aimed at the subversion of republican institutions (the American system) in Mexico. Later he received Thouvenel's explanations and disclaimers and promptly communicated them to Romero.<sup>36</sup> On April 6, Corwin had finally negotiated a treaty granting to Mexico a well secured loan, of which \$2,000,000 was payable at once—a treaty which he said was "to manifest to European powers that we are the friend of Mexico and resolved to use all peaceable means to prevent forcible intervention" which might result in the acquisition of the Mexican territory. The United States Senate, however, had already declined (February 25) to approve any policy that would require the assumption of any part of the Mexican debt (principal or interest) or the concurrence of the European powers, and the President decided that it would be useless to submit for ratification a treaty providing for a loan to Mexico made at the time when the French forces occupied a portion of the territory of Mexico.<sup>37</sup> Thanking Seward for the "ability and sagacity" displayed by him in the management of our European difficulties, Corwin continued to urge the "imperative necessity" of securing the ratification of his treaty as the only means left to prevent helpless Mexico from falling into the hands of France (and England). Romero also continued to press his fears that the purpose of the European intervention was to establish a monarchy.<sup>38</sup>

86 H. exec. doc. 100, 37-2, p. 218; 16 Instrs. Fr., p. 125, No. 126 of March 10, p. 135, No. 135 of March 31 and p. 164, No. 158 of May 12, 1861.

37 28 Desps. Mex., No. 22 of Apr. 28 and No. 21 of Apr. 16, 1862; 6 Sumner's Works, pp. 365-75.

38 28 Desps. Mex., No. 22 of Apr. 28, "Private" of May 22, No. 23 of May 5, No. 25 of May 28, and No. 32 of Aug. 28; 10 Notes from Mex. Leg., May 10, June 2, June 8 and June 18, 1862; also, H. exec. doc. 54, 37-3, (802 pp.), Feb. 4, 1863. In reply to a resolution of the House, President Lincoln (on Apr. 14, 1862) submitted 484 pages of corre-

Seward, after stating that he approved Corwin's negotiations, and informing him of the final decision of the Senate against his treaty,<sup>39</sup> at the same time mentioned the friendly assurances with which France had disclaimed any designs which had been attributed to her. Two weeks later probably influenced by several notes from Romero, which he told the latter would be submitted to the Senate with the Corwin treaty, he again warned France in a letter to Dayton. While recognizing the right of France to make war against Mexico, and reposing faith in the disclaimers which Thouvenel had given in reply to direct and explicit inquiries, he distinctly expressed the right of the United States to insist that France should not take advantage of the war "to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and anti-American government or to maintain such a government there." Engaged in a contest for the integrity of the Union, relying on the French explanations and regarding the war in Mexico as a French policy involving only the collection of claims, he avoided intervention between the parties and announced to Dayton that if the United States should engage in a foreign war it would be purely one of self-defense.<sup>40</sup>

The mystery of the French movements left the Mexican government in a state of uncertainty, but there was an increasing belief that the fate of Mexico hung on the successful termination of the civil war in the United States. Referring to the protest of the French against the Mexico-American treaty, Corwin suggested that Napoleon aimed to aid the South and realize the dream of recovering Louisiana.<sup>41</sup> Early in the autumn, referring to recent events in France and Europe which might tend to render the French conquest of Mexico quite impracticable, he said that the people of Mexico, more united than ever before and strongly opposed to foreign inter-

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spondence [H. exec. doc. 100, 37-2] but later (May 27) he stated that it was inexpedient to comply with the request for further correspondence.

39 The resolution against the Mexican negotiations carried by a vote of 28 to 8. Some feared that a loan would result in annexation of Mexico in whole or in part—a result which many thought ought never in any contingency to be favored. Others desired to treat with no foreign power on the subject. [17 Instr. Mex., No. 50 (confid.) June 24, 1862].

40 17 Instrs. Mex., No. 49, June 7, 1862; 7 Notes to Mex. Leg., p. 196, June 21; 51 Desps. Fr., No. 131 of March 31 and No. 146 of Apr. 22; 16 Instrs. Fr., p. 186, No. 170, June 21, 1862; N. Y. Herald, Dec. 23, 1862, and London Times, Dec. 27, 1862; 16 Instrs. Fr., p. 224, No. 201 of Aug. 23, and pp. 230-34, No. 204 (circular) of Aug. 8, 1862.

41 28 Desps. Mex., No. 31, July 28, 1862. The idea that France might set up a protectorate over Louisiana had been suggested by Dayton a year earlier. [50 Desps. Fr., No. 29, Aug. 29, 1861].



vention, seemed to entertain a sad and profound conviction "that the failure of the United States in the civil war would be the doom of free government everywhere on the earth."<sup>42</sup>

For several months there was little change in the situation. The French were gradually gaining ground, however; and their preparations for increasing their forces and other activities, were regarded as an indication that Napoleon intended to make a prolonged occupation of the country and perhaps usurp the government—against the will of the Mexican people, who Corwin reported were unanimously opposed to the intervention. Romero, continuing to declare that France was using the question of claims as a mere pretext and that the real purpose was conquest and the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico, urged the advisability of a general congress for mutual defense.<sup>43</sup> The French operations developed features more and more inimical to the United States. The immense force of the expedition, the shipment of railroad iron, the invitation for immigrants and the schemes for working the Mexican mines created the impression that France, taking advantage of the hour of trouble and discord in the United States, intended to steal a hold upon the American continent and retain possession until the people of the United States should be able to drive them out. Seward, politely hinting that the sincerity of Napoleon's assurances was contradicted by his actions, said that "circumstances tend to excite misapprehensions and jealousies between France and this government in spite of all the prudence we can practice on our part." It was seen that Napoleon, through the subjugation of Mexico, knowing that war with the United States would be the inevitable result, would naturally be tempted to aid the secessionists to secure the independence of the Southern States. It was even suspected that Napoleon himself furnished the inspiration for a French pamphlet by a trusted counsellor of the Emperor which made the startling declaration that part of the purpose of the French in Mexico was to prevent the restoration of the American union, to check its advance toward the south, and to reaffirm the position of Europe against the arrogance of the American democracy and against

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42 28 Desps. Mex., No. 33, Sept. 28, 1862.

43 28 Desps. Mex., No. 34, Oct. 27; 12 Notes from Mexico, Sept. 6, Oct. 2 and Oct. 20, 1862. Romero's note of October 2 on the historic background of French intervention (in reply to the discourse of M. Billault in the French legislative body on June 26, 1862) forms an entire volume in the manuscript archives at the Department of State. A reprint of it from the *Diario Oficial* contains 259 pages. *Historia de las intrigas europeas que ocasionaron la intervencion francesa en Mexico*. [Mexico, J. M. Sandoval, 1868].

its acts perpetrated in the name of the Monroe doctrine.<sup>44</sup> Mr. Romero urged Seward to consider that the blow aimed by Napoleon regarded the expedition to the American continent as an insult to the American people. Urging that the United States must set afloat such a navy as the world never saw, sufficient not only to crush the rebellion but to cope with and defeat all foreign intervention or armed aid from the south, they said: "We can not brook the interference of any European power on this continent, and those who take advantage of our present troubles to intrude will some day reap the whirlwind they are surely sowing."<sup>45</sup>

Just after Napoleon's attempt to mediate in the war between the United States and the secessionists, some in the United States regarded the expedition to the American continent as an insult to the American people. Urging that the United States must set afloat such a navy as the world never saw, sufficient not only to crush the rebellion but to cope with and defeat all foreign intervention or armed aid from the south, they said: "We can not brook the interference of any European power on this continent, and those who take advantage of our present troubles to intrude will some day reap the whirlwind they are surely sowing."<sup>46</sup>

The government at Washington, bending every energy to preserve the Union, endeavored to pursue a policy of strict neutrality in the Franco-Mexican war; but naturally this policy did not relieve it from criticism. For awhile, as the French advanced, the Mexican cabinet, observing the export of mules, wagons and other supplies from the United States for the use of the expedition, directed Romero to make complaints of partiality—which were made the subject of inquiry by the Senate at the beginning of 1863 and again in 1864.<sup>47</sup>

Early in 1863, a Spanish paper in New York published an article with the evident purpose of inducing the American nations to believe that the United States had abandoned its earlier principles in regard to intervention. In the summer of 1862, at the time of internal strife in New Granada, Seward had been requested by the Granadian government to land troops to enforce the American guarantee of the neutrality of the transit routes under the treaty of 1846. Under the existing conditions, he hesitated to take any hasty or independent action that might seem to indicate a desire for exclusive or special advantages in New Granada, and therefore asked the advice and cooperation of the governments of England and France—both of which discouraged interference at that time. This proposal was regarded

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44 Michel Chevalier: *La France, Le Mexique et Les Etats-Confederes*. [Reviewed by V. W. Kingsley: *French intervention in America*, New York, 1863, 22 pages]. Also, see the *Nation*, February 5, 1880, page 90 [The United States government and the Panama canal]. Also, 130, *North American Review*, May, 1880 [Koerner: *The true Monroe doctrine*].

45 12 Notes from Mex., Dec. 27, 1862.

46 *N. Y. Herald*, Dec. 13, 1862.

47. 12 Notes from Mex., Dec. 10, 1862 and Jan. 14, 1863; 28 Desps. Mex., No. 38, Jan. 27, 1863; Sen. exec. doc. No. 24 of 37-3, No. 47 of 38-1; also, Sen. exec. doc. 33, 38-2, vol. 1, Feb. 4, 1865.

by the Mosquera party of New Granada, and by the Juarez government of Mexico, as an invitation of European intervention. The writer of the newspaper article declared that the Washington cabinet did not consider itself capable of fulfilling alone the obligation which it alone contracted, that it had abdicated its sovereignty by consulting with England and France, that it had renounced the Monroe doctrine by consenting to (and even inviting) interference by European powers in the internal affairs of America, and that by giving aid to the reactionists at the solicitation of the ex-Minister Almonte it had offered the French emperor a palliation of the assault committed against the independence and liberty of Mexico. When Harlan called his attention to it, Seward refused to depart from the usage of the department by noticing any anonymous communication or careless newspaper comments upon the policy and external relations of the United States.<sup>48</sup>

About the same time, efforts were made to induce the administration to adopt a bolder, more belligerent policy. In New York, at a meeting "addressed principally by speakers who were foreigners by birth," steps were taken to call a "grand mass meeting to protest against the intervention of Europe in the American republics, to reaffirm the principles of the Monroe doctrine and to insist upon its rigorous application." On January 19, McDougall, a democrat of California, presented resolutions in the Senate in favor of sustaining the Monroe doctrine by rendering assistance to Mexico. On February 3 they were taken up for consideration, by a vote of 29 to 16, against the opposition of Sumner who counselled prudence in our foreign relations and urged that "the suppression of the rebellion" was the first step to arrest the return of empire in Mexico, New Granada, and San Domingo. Although, after an executive session, the resolutions were laid on the table by a vote of 34 to 10, they promptly attracted the attention of the watchful eye of Napoleon who expressed a hope that there was no danger in them,<sup>49</sup> and they were the source of

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48 El Continental, Jan. 1, 1863; 2 Notes from New Granada, June 26; 16 Instrs. Fr. No. 180, and No. 205 of Aug. 25; Instrs. Gr. Br., No. 296, July 11; Sen. exec. doc. 112, 46-2, vol. 4, p. 4; 3 Communs. from Agents of U. S. of Colombia (Herran), Jan. 6, 1863; 6 Notes from U. S. of Colombia, No. 141, Jan. 12, 1863.

49 National Intelligencer, March 11, 1863; Sen. misc. doc. 13, 37-3; London Times, Feb. 4, 1863; 7 Sumner's Works, pp. 257-61. A few weeks later Napoleon himself in a personal letter to General James Watson Webb, (March 22) said that the war which he was compelled to wage so far from France was not for the purpose of taking possession of the mines of Sonora and that his intention was to withdraw as soon as honor and the interests engaged would permit.

some anxiety to Dayton who feared that their passage in the form reported would be almost equivalent to a declaration of war. Lhuys, busy with the Russo-Poland question, remained reticent, but in April he furnished Dayton a memorandum of his policy in regard to America and suggested how the United States could avoid war with France and other European powers.<sup>50</sup>

In the meantime Romero had submitted to his government a printed copy of Seward's correspondence with England and France in regard to the security of the Panama route; and at the close of the winter, acting on his recent instructions and rejoicing at the final resolution of the United States by which the danger of European intervention in New Granada had disappeared, he informed Seward that Mexico—always in full accord with the traditional policy of the United States against European intervention in the domestic affairs of the American continent—could "not see with indifference the events in other parts of the continent which might result sooner or later in European intervention." The fate of the American nations are linked together," said he, "so that if European encroachments succeed with one, they might succeed with others." Seward, regretting that Mexico had misunderstood the character of the correspondence and had been led to direct the communication to be made, replied on the following day in a note which Romero hoped would set at rest the fears in Mexico. "The United States have no disposition to controvert the general views of Mexico in regard to foreign intervention in the political affairs of the American continent," said he, "but confesses its sympathy with those views."<sup>51</sup>

Seward kept his bearings in a middle course. Careful to avoid any unnecessary action which might give offense to France he had occasion to disapprove an unauthorized remark of Koerner, the American minister at Madrid where the French expedition was very unpopular. The French papers had recently published Napoleon's famous letter of 1861 to General Forey in which was foreshadowed his intention to establish a government in Mexico and to protect the Latin peoples in America from the encroachments of the United States. Koerner, in a conversation with Serrano of the Spanish government, expressing surprise in regard to the French proceedings and policy and congratulating Spain on her withdrawal from Napoleon's schemes, had unofficially said that the United States would prevent these schemes and declared that in his opinion there was

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50 53 Desps. Fr., No. 265 of Feb. 5, No. 292 of March 27 and No. 302 of Apr. 27, 1863.

51 12 Notes from Mex., March 19; 7 Notes to Mex., pp. 235-6, March 20, 1863.

a possibility of a reunion in the United States to drive the French from Mexico. While Seward said he did not question the views that were expressed, he wrote Koerner that he regretted the language used and reminded him that the United States was neutral. For effect he sent a copy of this to Dayton who read it to Lhuys.

At the same time he did not deceive France in regard to the American attitude toward the Mexican affair nor conceal his earnest solicitation for the well being of Mexico. Writing Dayton, he said: "The President confidently believes that the Emperor has no purpose of assuming the government of the Republic. Difficult as the exercise of self government there has proved to be, it is, nevertheless, quite certain that the attempt to maintain foreign authority there would encounter insurmountable embarrassment." Referring to the fact that for more than one hundred years no foreign state had successfully planted a new colony in America, nor strengthened its hold on its old ones, and that Mexico and the other Spanish-American states by inviting foreign labor and capital to develop their resources and lands (and without foreign attempts to acquire by force) were steadily advancing toward the establishment of permanent institutions of self government, he added: "It is the interest of the United States to favor this progress and to commend it to the patronage of other nations." He steadily adhered to the policy of non-intervention and neutrality in American affairs, as he consistently declined the invitation to co-operate with France, England and Austria in an appeal to Russia in regard to affairs in Poland. In the closing days of May, Dayton, after a conference with Lhuys, wrote Seward that it was rather hard that France complained of the policy which the United States had pursued in regard to the Franco-Mexican troubles when Romero was also complaining.<sup>52</sup>

Meantime, in the spring of 1863, General Forey had been pushing military operations, and his investment of the City of Mexico in June caused Corwin to urge that Texas should be cleared of Confederates in order to prevent co-operation between them and the French.<sup>53</sup> Just before he occupied the capital, he organized a tem-

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52 The Nation, Jan. 30, 1906 (article by Koerner on "Seward and the Monroe Doctrine"); Polit. Sc. Quart., vol. II (1896), pp. 30-43; 15 Instrs. Sp., No. 32 of Feb. 28 and No. 39 of Apr. 20, 1863; The Nation, Jan. 5, 1882 (article by Koerner on "The True Monroe doctrine"); 16 Instrs. Fr., p. 367, No. 336 of Apr. 24 and pp. 376-80, No. 342 of May 11; 53 Desps. Fr., No. 311, May 29, 1863.

53 Desps. Mex., No. 42, June 26, 1863. During the summer of 1863, while Romero had temporarily withdrawn from the United States, Seward had been approached by ex-General D. Jose Domingo Cortes (claiming to represent the northern states of Mexico) with a proposi-

porary government for Mexico. The French minister selected thirty-five Mexican citizens to form a supreme junta. These chose an executive composed of three regents, (of whom Almonte was at the head), and then chose 215 citizens of Mexico to associate with themselves to form an assembly of notables (245 in number), nearly all enemies of Juarez, to which was assigned the authority to establish a permanent government. On July 11, the day after the occupation of the capital, this assembly voted in favor of an empire-monarchy, and decided (with only two votes in the negative) to offer the crown to Maximilian of Austria and his descendents, or, in case he should not accept, to any other Catholic prince whom Napoleon should indicate for the Mexican nation.

In the United States the news from Mexico was regarded as a rude shock to the Monroe doctrine. There was considerable criticism of "Seward's diplomatic rosewater" by those who believed that at a time when he should have demanded explanations from the scheming Napoleon who was feeling the American pulse, he had maintained "the silence that gives assent." "If the United States had at any time had the courage to declare to Napoleon the fixed determination to maintain the Monroe doctrine," said they, "his ambition would have been checked." One writer, who declared that there had been some European conspiracy or concerted action to encourage the secession movement and thus to make an opportunity to overthrow the Monroe doctrine and secure for the European political system a footing on the American continent, said that "if there had been in 1861 a firm and fearless reaffirmation of the Monroe doctrine \* \* \* and had our government put to each of the governments concerned in the coalition against Mexico a direct and categorical question as to the objects of the invasion and the methods proposed for their attainment with the explanation that we expected a frank and explicit answer—our title to which had been recognized in years gone by [e. g. by France in 1825-26]—it might have caused a hitch in the progress of the negotiations, and would at any rate have placed us right on the record before Europe whenever the crisis should come, and would have given proof to the world of our continued confidence in the stability of our institutions and in the inherent strength of

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tion to annex Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Durango and Lower California in order to free them from French intervention; but he did not accept the invitation to open negotiations, and in November he promptly notified Romero, who denied that Cortes was the authorized agent of any portion of the Mexican republic or that any of the states had either the constitutional right or the desire to annex themselves to any foreign country. [Dip. Cor. 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 577. Notes from Mex., July 9, 1864.

our government to maintain itself \* \* \* \* ; and we might have been spared many a supercilious affront \* \* \* \* if at the lowest point of our disaster we had taken occasion to reassert our highest self respect as the leading republic of the New World and the ready representative of the political system of America, with which European politics had no business to interfere." Opposed to any timidity which would regard the Monroe doctrine as a *brutum fulmen* which struck no blow and made no mark, he said: "If Europe, instead of withdrawing, make war on us, we shall meet her and fight against the European political system. If by their machinations or aggressions we are once involved in their conflicts against our will there will be no more peace for us or for them until the American ideas of national independence spread over the countries of the Old World, and the doctrines of national interference and the balance of power have been cast among the rubbish."<sup>54</sup>

In Europe, the romantic establishment of monarchy in Mexico was regarded as a notable and significant violation of the Monroe doctrine, and the position of the French as a protector of the weak empire was regarded as one of the permanent elements of both hemispheres and a permanent source of antagonism between France and the United States.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> N. Y. World, July 28 and 30, 1863; Joshua Leavitt's "The Monroe doctrine" (1863).

<sup>55</sup> London Times, Aug. 11, 1863.

### III. America's Reintegration, Mexico's Dawning Hope

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The immediate bearing of the new Franco-Mexican empire upon the future politics of the continent, and especially on the American national struggle against secession, became a subject of much speculation and concern. The recovery of the Mississippi river by the capture of Vicksburg had just clipped the wings of Confederate imperialistic ambition by which she might have aspired to dominion over possessions of the Pacific. But the possible preponderance of the American union on the continent was essentially modified by establishment of the Franco-Mexican empire which, conceived as a direct blow at the Monroe doctrine (at a time when Napoleon supposed the United States was ruined), might ally with the weakened Confederacy in order to erect a counterpoise to the growing strength of the United States<sup>1</sup> and proceed to extend French dominion southward from Mexico to the gateway of the isthmus where it might construct a canal and lay tribute upon the commerce of the world. Should Napoleon proceed in such a career of territorial ambition, it was suggested that the United States, in the inevitable war which would follow, might secure allies from European states seeking to preserve their own independence from future French aggression. The London Times said Napoleon had done great political service by confirming the previous action of Spain in extinguishing the Monroe doctrine; but Edward Everett replied that Spain had really acquiesced in the doctrine by following the example of England in withdrawing from Mexico after the stormy conference of Orizaba. Among Americans there was a general opinion that as soon as expedient "the Monroe doctrine ought to be vindicated. Some feared that the danger of French occupation of Texas was imminent and urged that the United States should occupy the territory along the Rio Grande at once, sustain the loyal population in Texas, and establish it as a barrier between the French and the Confederates. Clay, at St. Petersburg, apprehending the recognition of the Confederacy by France, anxiously urged the necessity of the reunion of the "insurgents"

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1 Mason, hoping that some change in Russian policy toward Poland might leave France free from apprehension of European war, suggested that the authorities at Richmond should define their policy with a view of securing France and Mexico as allies against the supposed future designs of the United States. Callahan: *Diplomatic history of the Southern Confederacy*, page 196].



with the established government at Washington for resistance or defense against foreign encroachment. Anxiety in some of the Spanish-American countries was relieved by the rumored unfriendly aspects of relations between France and Russia which induced the opinion that France would soon release its hold on Mexico and be prevented from interference in favor of the Confederacy.<sup>2</sup>

Seward promptly instructed Corwin not to address the new provisional government inaugurated under the protection of French forces, and granted him leave of absence. At the same time he instructed Dayton to ask Lhuys for information in regard to the intentions of the Emperor in his latest military interference with the rights of the people of Mexico, and in regard to his designs on the adjoining territory of the United States. Dayton had already been assured that France, having had enough colonial experience in Algeria, contemplated only temporary intervention, and, departing after her grievances were satisfied, would leave no puppet behind her. He promptly presented Seward's inquiry to Lhuys who again disclaimed all intention to hold permanently, or to colonize, any part of Mexico, or to interfere with the right of the people to choose or maintain their own form of government, or to interfere with the United States or its adjoining territory. A week later, speaking with Lhuys in regard to the report that the United States only awaited the end of the war to drive France from Mexico, he frankly stated that although the United States, relying on the constant assurances of France, had made no formal protest and had no purpose to interfere in the quarrel, yet she had not concealed her earnest solicitation for the well being of Mexico and her sensitiveness of foreign intervention.<sup>5</sup>

Whether he had determined to drive France from Mexico at the

2 N. Y. World, July 29, and London Times, Aug 11, 1863; 20 Desps. Rus., No. 21 of Sept, 19, and No. 19 of Sept. 2, 1863; Pamphlets of Loyal Pub. Society, No. 34, Oct., 1863; 19 Desps. Peru, No. 140, Nov. 9, 1863.

3 17 Instrs. Mex., p. 452, No. 82, Aug. 8; 16 Instrs. Fr., No. 332 ("Confidential"), Aug. 8, 1863; Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, vol. 1, p. 461; 53 Desps. Fr., No. 336, Aug. 21, 1863.

4 "These intimations by France amount to but little," said Dayton, "for she can easily manage to get up an apparent expression of public sentiment in Mexico. Yet Mexico proposes, if France consents, to accept Maximilian!" [53 Desp. Fr., No. 342, Sept. 7, 1863]. "You very correctly intimate," replied Seward, "that French explanations do not afford a reliable guarantee for the future \* \* \* \* As you say she will be largely influenced by her estimate of our power. You may make discreet explanations of our strength." [16 Instr. Fr., p. 451, No. 406, Sept. 26, 1863].

5 53 Desps. Fr., No. 345, Sept. 14, 1863.

first favorable opportunity, Seward was frank to say that the introduction of a monarchical form of government supported by French arms, would threaten the continuance of free republican institutions in America which were required for the safety of the institutions of the United States and therefore might lead to war between the United States and France. He wrote Dayton that relying on the assurances of France that her occupation was not permanent, the United States continued to be neutral; but aware that many in the United States and in Mexico doubted the French assurances that the occupation would be only temporary, and finding it hard to secure rigid observation of the neutrality laws, he urged that the interests of the United States and France required an early solution of the complications on a basis of the unity and independence of Mexico—at the same time disclaiming any desire of the United States to control or annex any part of the country. Again, stating that the United States practiced non-intervention in Mexico as elsewhere, but at the same time referring to the preference of Mexico for a government republican in form and domestic in organization, and the opposition to monarchical institutions imposed from abroad—resulting largely from the influence of American public opinion “which is essential to the progress of civilization on the American continent”—he said: “This government believes that foreign resistance or attempts to control American civilization must and will fail before the ceaseless and ever increasing activity of the material, moral and political forces which peculiarly belong to the American continent. Nor do the United States deny that \* \* \* \* their own safety and the cheerful destiny to which they aspire are intimately dependent on the continuance of free republican institutions throughout America.”<sup>6</sup>

Feeling sure of the future vindication of the supremacy of republican institutions upon the American continent, for the time he was willing to pursue a policy of “masterly inactivity.” Although he knew “that normal opinion in Mexico favored a republican government and although he admitted the war between France and Mexico had continued longer than he had expected, he said the United States adhering to the principles of neutrality had “neither the right nor the disposition to interfere by force in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether to establish or maintain a republican (or even a domestic)

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<sup>6</sup> 16 Instrs. Fr., p. 406, No. 400 of Sept. 21, and pp. 451-8 of Sept. 26, 1863; 5 Works of Seward, pp. 339 and 402.

government there or to overthrow an imperial or foreign one if Mexico should choose to establish or accept it."<sup>7</sup>

To Motley, who had reported (August 17) that Austria was recruiting troops to accompany Maximilian to Mexico and had suggested the enforcement of the Monroe doctrine to prevent it, and who a few weeks later had reported that he had submitted to the Austrian government his views against the establishment of the Mexican monarchy by European armies and had read to Count Rechberg a copy of Seward's instructions of March, 1862 (to Dayton) which seemed to indicate the impossibility of recognition of the Mexican empire by the United States,<sup>8</sup> Seward replied that as Austria had neither explained that she had any interest in the subject nor expressed any desire to know the American views, he did not consider it necessary for the representative of the United States to engage in a political debate which the unsettled aspect of the war had elicited—and later he added that the Monroe doctrine had no application in the cases of recruiting which he had mentioned.<sup>9</sup>

Though not apprehensive of the rumored intentions of France to seize Texas or form an alliance with the Confederates, Seward, pointing out the danger of collision between France and the United States (and other American republics) which might result from the adoption by France of a policy in Mexico antagonistic to American opinions, stated that the American government, "not unobservant of the progress of the events" would not likely neglect such protective measures as every sovereign state should provide for use "when nations \* \* \* cease to respect their moral and treaty obligations." Though instructions were issued (November 23, 1863) to the army in the Southwest enjoining forbearance from intervention in Mexico, Seward suggested that the Emperor should make a reliable guarantee of the informal statements of Lhuys. Consistently adhering to the policy of neutrality, and the Monroe doctrine, which would leave the destinies and sovereignty and independence of Mexico in

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7 Desps. Switz., No. 50, Oct. 2; 1 Instrs. Austria, No. 45, Oct. 9, 1863; Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, vol. 1, pp. 481-83.

8 Desps. Austria, No. 31, Aug. 17, 1863. At the same time he reported rumors of an impending recognition of the Confederacy by the new Mexican government, and an arrangement of the French government with the Confederacy to obtain Texas—possibly with the desire to precipitate with the United States a war which would give France an opportunity to interfere in favor of the Confederacy. [Desps. Aus., No. 34, Sept. 21, 1863; Dip. Cor. 1865-6, vol. 3, pp. 784-86].

9 1 Instrs. Aus., p. 193, No. 41 of Sept. 11; ib., No. 45, Oct. 9, 1863—copies of which were sent by Seward to the American ministers at Paris, Madrid and Brussels. [The Nation, Jan. 5, 1882 and Jan. 30, 1896].

the keeping of her own people, and still maintaining kind relations with the Juarez government in the face of its misfortunes and its increasing weakness, and not expecting an easy and permanent establishment of monarchy in Mexico, when he received Lhuys' intimation that the recognition of the proposed empire by the United States would hasten the withdrawal of the French troops he declined to accede to the proposal (preferring to err on the side of strict neutrality in marked contrast to the authorities at Richmond who—bold and inventive in their political expedients—on January 7, 1864, appointed Preston envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the government of Maximilian with the vain hope of new conditions or complications which would enable him to secure some sort of recognition.<sup>10</sup>

At the beginning of 1864, there was considerable popular agitation in favor of a more aggressive policy against the French in Mexico. Romero and ardent spirits in Congress were disappointed that Lincoln entered into no discussion of the Monroe doctrine in his annual message of December, 1863, and thought that Seward had not been vigilant enough. Romero, at a dinner in New York (on December 16) expressed his surprise that Napoleon, whose plans were aimed against the United States as well as against Mexico, had been allowed to collect his large army and navy in the gulf "without any remonstrance, without any protest, or even without any demonstration of interest or concern on the part of the United States." Early in 1864 he complained that the United States was not observing strict neutrality between the parties to the war in Mexico.<sup>11</sup>

On March 29, at a private banquet given to Romero at Delmonico's by distinguished citizens of New York—including William C. Bryant, Hamilton Fish, David Dudley Field and George Bancroft—there was a strong expression of sentiment against what Bryant called the atrocious attempt of the French Emperor "who, taking advantage of the civil war of the United States, and the wearied Mexico republic, had sent from the other continent an army of adventurers, with the object of overthrowing the republican institutions which the Mexican people had given to themselves by virtue of their sovereignty, and

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10 Desps. Mex., No. 48, Oct. 26; 53 Desps. Fr., No. 361, Oct. 9; 16 Instrs. Fr., p. 466, No. 417, Oct. 23; 1 Instrs. Aus., No. 41, Sept. 11; 17 Instrs. Mex., p. 464, No. 93, Feb. 20, 1863. 5 Works of Seward, pp. 410-11.

11 M. Romero: The situation in Mexico (12 pp.), N. Y., 1864; Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, p. 402; Sen. exec. doc. 47, 38-1, May 28, 1864; 66 Cong. Globe, pp. 3339 and 3359, Jan. 28 and 29, 1864.

establishing a monarchy by force, placing at its head one of the most absolute and despotic families."<sup>12</sup>

The sentiments of the speeches may be indicated by the following extracts: "Mr. Bryant said: "We may say of this Maximilian of Austria, that in accepting the crown of Mexico from the hands of Napoleon, he has accepted, not an empire, but a quarrel—a present quarrel with the people of Mexico and a prospective quarrel with the people of the United States."

Ex-Mayor Opdyke: "The sentiment of all classes and all parties \* \* \* is entirely hostile to any armed intervention of Europe on this continent, and more especially that which seeks to overthrow a republic to erect a monarchy."

Ex-Governor Washington Hunt: "The time approaches when our government will reassert and maintain its well-defined policy \* \* \* that no European power shall be allowed to subjugate the people or destroy republican institutions on any part of the American continent."

Frederick De Peyster, President of the New York Historical Society: "In due season our rebels will have to 'succumb' to the loyal will. Then the republics of North America will shake hands in brotherly sentiment and alliance, and unitedly maintain inviolate the Monroe doctrine."

George Bancroft: "Let Europe place at Maximilian's feet the weak lamp of monarchical power. It will not burn in the free atmosphere of our continent."

Romero, not doubting that the United States in time would meet the issue in regard to European interference in Mexico, said: "In the meantime, however, I consider it of the highest importance that the delusion prevailing throughout Europe that the United States do not oppose, and rather favor, the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico, by French bayonets, should be dispelled \* \* \* \* The war against Mexico would be ten times more unpopular in France than it is now—in fact it could not be maintained any longer, if the French people were made to understand that the people of the United States will never tolerate, much less favor or encourage, the establishment, by force of arms, a European monarchy upon the ruins of a sister republic."

David Dudley Field, responding to a toast to the President of the United States: "The spirit of freedom is stronger than the lauces of France. Maximilian \* \* \* \* will return at some earlier or later day, a fugitive from the New World \* \* \* \* and the renewed country, purified by blood and fire, will resume its institutions and be free."

Charles King, President of Columbia College: "Mexico never can, with the assent of the people of the United States, become the appendage of a European nation, or furnish a peaceful throne to any scion of a European imperial house. The opportunity \* \* \* \* is eagerly embraced \* \* \* \* to give emphatic expression to the declaration that, 'biding our time,' we will, at all hazards when the time comes, assert and uphold the doctrine that on this continent we will not permit the interference by arms of any European nation to

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<sup>12</sup> Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, June 16, 1864.

overthrow republican institutions and to establish monarchy \* \* \* True \* \* \* we are at this moment unable to give to our firm purposes \* \* fitting outward manifestation; but \* \* in the restoration of our national unity and territorial integrity, we shall have disposable such a force on sea and land as will impart unlimited power of persuasion to the diplomatic declaration we shall then make that Mexico must and shall be Mexican, that Mexico must and shall be American, and not European."

Congress in the meantime had been assuming a more restless attitude. In the Senate January 11, 1864, McDougall of California had renewed his resolution declaring that "the occupation of a portion of the territory of Mexico by armed forces of the government of France is an act unfriendly to the republic of the United States of America," and that it was the duty of the United States government to demand withdrawal. Though this resolution was never reported from the Senate committee of foreign relations to which it was referred, the House committee on foreign affairs—possibly influenced in part by the rumor that Mercier in Paris pretended to have the assurances of President Lincoln that the United States would recognize the Maximilian government in Mexico if France would not recognize the Confederate government at Richmond—revived the question of directing foreign policy by the legislative assembly. On April 4, H. W. Davis reported from the committee a resolution which was accepted by the House (yeas 109) without a dissenting vote, declaring against the policy of acknowledging "any monarchical government in America under the auspices of any European power. The same resolution was offered in the Senate, but it was referred to the committee where Sumner allowed it to sleep.<sup>13</sup>

Seward, who had often warned France that American popular opinion was opposed to the French policy in Mexico,<sup>14</sup> and who was alert in preventing any American diplomatic representative from entering into any intercourse with any representative of any revolutionary government in Mexico antagonistic to the Juarez government,<sup>15</sup> was somewhat embarrassed by the resolution. In response to a note from Geofroy (the French charge) requesting an explana-

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13 C. S. A. Corres., Mason to Benjamin, March 16, and Sildell to Benjamin, May 2, 1864; 64 Cong. Globe, Apr. 4, 1864, p. 1408.

14 Seward, seeing that popular opinion was against France [16 Instr. Fr., p. 613, No. 463, Feb. 1, 1864], when the resolution was first offered wrote Dayton: "May these impressions not prepare the way for France to consider it wisdom to end the hopes which are the main support of the Confederates?" [16 Instr. Fr., p. 504, No. 456, Jan. 12, 1864].

15. Instrs. Sp. No. 81, Apr. 7, 1864.

tion<sup>16</sup> of it, he instructed Dayton to inform the French government that, although the resolution was a true interpretation of the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States, the action of the House alone could not determine the policy of the government—and that France would be seasonably notified of any change of policy which the President might think proper to adopt in the future. For this instruction he was severely criticised: (1) by a report of the House committee, written by Mr. Davis, which presented historical precedents of the rights of the House, and declared the right of Congress to prescribe the foreign policy of the United States—and also a few months later (2) by a resolution offered by Mr. Davis, asserting (a) the right of Congress to a voice in the recognition of new powers as well as in other matters and declaring (b) that “the propriety of any declaration of foreign policy by Congress is sufficiently proved by the vote which pronounces it, and that such a proposition while pending and undetermined is not a fit topic of diplomatic explanation with any foreign power.”<sup>17</sup>

It was in the face of increasing opposition at home, in addition to the growing antagonism in the United States, that Napoleon continued to cling to his costly imperial Mexican policy. Much of the French opposition was based on the fear that at the close of the American war of secession “the republic or republics of the United States would regard with evil eye the establishment of a monarchical flag on their frontiers.” Thiers, in the *corps legislative*, on January 26-27, 1864, after a historical survey of the circumstances by which France was tempted to intervene and later to undertake the founding of a monarchy in order to arrest the further progress of the United States, solemnly warned his colleagues that the United States, although she had shown respect for France, would not accept the results of the Mexican enterprise—from which he thought that France

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16. On April 3, Geofroy desiring to avoid complications on the frontier where he feared invasion by General Banks, informed Seward that French troops had been sent to Sonora to prevent occupation by immigrants from California under grants from Juarez. Without assuming to judge the effect of the war upon titles to land, Seward promptly informed Banks of the French purpose, and enjoined him to observe the instructions of November 23, 1863 requesting him to forbear from any form of intervention, but also informed Geofroy that peaceful emigration from the United States was free from all restraint. (Dip. Cor. 1865-6 Vol. 3 p. 357).

17. 16 Instrs. Fr., No. 525, Apr. 7, 1864; H. rp. 129, 38-1, Vol. 2. June 27, 1864; Dip. cor., 1865-6, Vol 3, p. 357 et seq.; 67 Cong. Globe, Dec. 19, 1864, p. 67. On the first part of the resolution the vote stood 118 yeas to 8 nays (56 not voting); on the second part the vote was 68 yeas to 58 nays (56 not voting).

should withdraw as soon as possible without making any engagement to found a monarchy in the new world. Berryer, referring to the unhappy division in the United States, warned his colleagues that, whatever might be the result of the war, the Northern states, to whom the French expedition to Mexico was a source of offense, would continue to constitute a nation of great power and influence throughout the American territory, and to feel the deep rooted vital national sentiment (the Monroe doctrine) of impatience and hostility toward the intervention of European powers in the affairs of America.<sup>18</sup>

Nevertheless, the Emperor's policy was sustained by a large majority of the members of the *corps legislative*, many of whom probably were influenced by motives similar to those expressed by Count de la Tour who (speaking January 17, 1864, in opposition to a proposal for a resolution expressing a desire for the speedy end of the inauspicious Mexican expedition in order to prevent sacrifices and complications) said France should try to maintain a sort of equilibrium in the New World "because it would be dangerous hereafter, for the peace of Europe itself, that Mexico should belong to a power so important as the United States which would soon, by taking in the five little republics of Central America, reach from the Gulf of Darien and the isthmus of Panama, whence they would rule the commerce of both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans."<sup>19</sup>

The popular feeling in France on the eve of Maximilian's acceptance of the Mexican throne was probably as described by Slidell on March 16 in a letter to Benjamin. "It is impossible to exaggerate the unpopularity of the Mexican expedition among all classes and parties in France," said he. "It is the only subject upon which public opinion seems to be unanimous. \* \* \* \* The Emperor is fully aware of this feeling and is, I believe, very anxious to get rid of the embarrassment as soon as he conveniently can. The Archduke may be obliged to rely on his own resources at a much earlier period than he expects."<sup>20</sup>

On April 10, at Miramar, near Trieste, Maximilian formally accepted the crown offered by the Mexican deputies; and, with an agreement from Napoleon to uphold him with French troops for five years, accompanied by his wife he promptly departed for Rome en route for Mexico. What could have induced the brilliant and experienced young Maximilian, the flower of the reigning family of the

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18. Notes to Fr. Leg., Apr. 3, and April 6, 1864; Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, vol. 1, June 16, 1864, pp. 300, 309, and 307.

19. Sen. exec. doc. 11, 38-1, p. 314.

20. C. S. A. Corres., Slidell to Benjamin, No. 68, March 16, 1864.



Hapsburgs, to accept the Mexican Empire was a mystery. Perhaps as some one said his purpose was pecuniary; for, although in 1857 he had married the richest heiress in Europe—the accomplished daughter of King Leopold of Belgium, and grand-daughter of King Louis Philippi—he had been a princely spendthrift. Perhaps he had the “romantic yet laudable belief that the descendant of Ferdinand and Isabella, the patrons of Columbus, could consolidate the empire of the New World and give an impulse to civilization that \* \* \* \* would make his name immortal.” Dayton had already said: “We cannot afford a war with France for the Quixotic purpose of helping Mexico. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.” In reporting to Seward the acceptance, Dayton declared: “Nothing has happened since I came here which so much foreshadows future differences with France \* \* \*. France has not kept faith with us, but it is needless to complain now—not till we are able to enforce reparation. France knows the conditions on which we have announced to her our policy of non-intervention.” A few days later, when the news of the House resolution reached Europe, the Confederate agents became very active in circulating it. When Lhuys asked if it meant war, Dayton replied that there was no reason to draw that inference from a resolution which contained nothing more than the basis of the American attitude of which France had been informed frequently before. After he had explained the meaning of the resolution to Lhuys, however, he wrote Seward: “This Mexican question is the point of danger between the United States and France.”<sup>21</sup> When he heard that Maximilian had accepted, Seward, referring to the “new duties” which would “devolve upon us,” wrote Dayton: “I remain now firm, as heretofore, in the opinion that the destinies of the American continent are not to be permanently controlled by political arrangements that can be made in the political capitals of Europe.”<sup>22</sup>

Although clubs were formed, and other efforts were made, to urge the government in favor of a more active policy in the maintenance of the Monroe doctrine, Seward knew that intervention against France in Mexico at that time would have been dangerous to the safety of the United States. Writing to Adams (May 3) in regard to the Mexican situation and the European jealousy of the United States, he said: “I know no way but to contemplate the situation calmly, do our duty faithfully and meet every emergency as it rises. Domestic perils crowd out the consideration of foreign and remote

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21. 54 Desps. Fr., No. 442 of March 25, No. 454 of Apr. 22, and No. 461 of May 2, 1864.

22. Instrs. Fr., No. 538, Apr. 30, 1864. 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, p. 759.

dangers now." Two days later, confident of the remedial virtues of time he wrote confidentially to Bigelow, consul-general at Paris:

"I might say to you confidentially, if it were entirely wise to say anything unnecessary, that those who are most impatient for the defeat of European and monarchical designs in Mexico might well be content to abide the effects which must result from the ever-increasing expansion of the American people westward and southward. Five years, ten years, twenty years hence, Mexico will be opening herself as cheerfully to American immigration as Montana and Idaho are now. What European power can then maintain an army in Mexico capable of resisting the martial and moral influences of emigration?"

Later, he wrote Adams that the belief that all the European powers except Russia had agreed to recognize the Mexican government had induced the President to think it "proper to practice especial circumspection in regard to the war between France and Mexico;" but, fully informed of South American apprehensions of the designs of other European powers, and cognizant of the general discontent manifested in the United States against his forbearance, he informed Koerner that a demand of public opinion for reconsideration of the American policy of neutrality might produce complications which would endanger the general peace of nations.<sup>23</sup>

France soon had an opportunity to observe new indications that the presence of her troops in Mexico was irritating to the American people. The Radical Republican convention (at Cleveland on May 31) declared that "the national policy known as the Monroe doctrine has become a recognized principle and that the establishment of any anti-republican government on this continent by any foreign power can not be tolerated." On June 7, 1864, the platform of the Republican national convention at Baltimore approved the views of the government—"that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any republican government of the Western Continent, and they will view with extreme jealousy, as menacing to the peace and independence of their own country, the efforts of any such power to obtain new footholds for monarchical governments, sustained by foreign military force in near proximity to the United States." Lincoln in his letter of acceptance (June 27) construed this resolution as an approval of the course that Seward was then taking—and had been taking for some time,

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23. 5 works of Seward, p. 124; Bancroft's "Life of Seward," p. 423; 19 Instrs. Gr. Br., p. 307, No. 965 ("Confidential"), May 28, 1864; Instrs. Sp., No. 95 ("Confidential"), May 19, 1864.

as indicated by a large volume of correspondence submitted to the Senate on June 16.<sup>24</sup>

Benjamin, who was urging General Preston to send Mr. Ford from Havana to Mexico to induce the Maximilian government to signify a desire to open intercourse with the Confederacy without waiting for a response from the overtures made to the United States government, had excellent reasons for considering that the Confederacy had been deceived by the double dealing of Napoleon who had "not hesitated to break his promise" to Slidell "in order to escape the consequences resulting from his unpopular Mexican policy." Writing Slidell of the indications of "an entente between the cabinets of Washington and Paris," he said:

"The game played by the cabinet of the United States with the French government in relation to Mexico is so transparent that the inference is irresistible that the latter desire to be deceived. The acceptance of Mr. Lincoln of his nomination by the Baltimore convention commits him openly to refusing acknowledgement of the Mexican Empire; and the platform of that Convention, of the Cleveland convention which nominated Fremont, and the platform which will undoubtedly be adopted by the Democratic convention at Chicago show a feeling in the United States perfectly unanimous in the determination to overthrow the schemes of the French government in Mexico and to resist the occupation of the throne by Maximilian. It thus becomes evident that the safety of the new empire is dependent solely upon our success in interposing a barrier between Northern aggression and the Mexican territory."<sup>25</sup>

Though there were some who, stating that the United States was reaping the fruit of her inefficient and dog-in-the-manger policy toward the Spanish American republics and that there was no reason to fear the results of the establishment of the Maximilian empire in Mexico, advocated the recognition of any strong, stable government that might be able to develop and reorganize the country, the general American sentiment was better represented by those who, while admitting that Mexico had not shown a fitness for self government, believed that the French attack on Mexico was a strike at the United States and were opposed to any European establishment or encroachment in America that would make it impossible to avoid the necessity of immense armies and fleets. One writer, referring to the long preparation of Napoleon in the art of deception, and of his probable ulterior designs to secure the control of the keys (the Isthmian routes) of the continent, said of the Mexican intervention: "There can not be any settled peace on this continent, there can be no permanent, pacific

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24. Sen. exec. doc. 11, 33-1 (496 pp.).

25. C. S. A. corres., Benjamin to Preston, No. 6, June 20; ib., Benjamin to Slidell, No. 40, June 23, 1864.

relations between the United States and Europe until this indignity is done away, until the Monroe doctrine is recognized as the law of nations between the continents."<sup>26</sup>

On July, Seward, still considering the various and uncontrollable consequences of the civil war abroad, wrote (to Motley): "All that can be done in regard to them is to practice prudence and good faith in our foreign relations, and at the same time make preparations for self defense, if, notwithstanding our best efforts, we find ourselves involved in new complications." A further reason for his apparent neglect of the Mexican question for the next six months may be found in a despatch of July 13 from Dayton, who, referring to the unofficial effort of France and England to terminate the American civil war, wrote: "Still, I can hardly believe that England will attempt interference, or that France will do so alone unless she is more pressed than at present by her Mexican complications. But, as I have repeatedly said, with a dynasty like that which governs France, hostile in all its parts to our republican system, we can never feel secure. No reliance can be placed on the conduct of France if a disaster should befall the United States."<sup>27</sup>

In December, just after the arrival of Lincoln's annual message which contained the Monroe doctrine "colled up for a spring," John Bigelow, who had succeeded to the duties of the American legation in Paris and who carefully guarded the interests of the United States and conducted the delicate and difficult negotiations for the next two years, was anxious to secure "a reconciliation of the national policies" of France and the United States on the Mexican question. One of his first duties was to ask explanations in regard to the reported plan of Maximilian to cede Sonora to France. He was assured that the proposition, upon which no action had been taken, had contemplated only a lien on the mineral products of Sonora as security for the Mexican debt to France; and, early in February, the Emperor, through the Moniteur, officially denied the cession.<sup>28</sup>

Meanwhile Seward had received from Romero a formal and explicit protest against the proposal of Maximilian to settle the French claims against Mexico by a cession of Lower California and the northern states of Mexico (north of the Yaqui on the Pacific and the Panuco on the Gulf) to France—who had objected to the hypotheca-

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26. A. K. Sheppard in *Merchant's Mag.*, July, 1864; T. M. J. in *Merchant's Mag.*, June and Aug., 1864; *New Englander*, July, 1864.

27. *Dip. Cor.*, 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 783; *Instrs. Austria*, No. 78, July 14; 55 *Desps. Fr.*, No. 510, July 13, 1864.

28. *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 25 and 27, 1865; *Desps. Fr.*, No. 8, Jan. 20, 1865.

tion to the United States in April, 1862, and whose purpose was to establish in it a military colony. On February 25, he notified Romero that the protest had been filed in the archives "for such uses and purposes as future events may render it necessary to apply it to."<sup>29</sup> On February 7, he promptly instructed Bigelow that "such a cession, or even creation of a lien upon the mineral resources of Sonora could not be regarded with favor by the people of the United States." At the same time, referring to the recent projects of the Confederates to suspend or end the war of secession by a combined war against France,<sup>30</sup> he said that the United States preferred to fight the civil war to the end on previous lines in case no foreign state should interfere in behalf of the insurgents.<sup>31</sup>

While the Confederate fortunes were rapidly waning, Bigelow, assured that Napoleon had abandoned the hope that the American Union would be dissolved, and informed by the French minister of finance that Mexico was the only possible remaining source of war between the United States and France, at first endeavored to disarm

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29. Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 500; Notes from Mex. Leg., Feb. 6, 1865.

30. In the Confederate Congress in November, 1864, and again in January, 1865 at a time when there were plans for an armed immigration of Confederates into northern Mexico to sustain Maximilian, [Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, pp. 498-9,] and probably for the purpose of inducing Napoleon to take some action favorable to the Confederacy, resolutions were offered in opposition to European intervention in Mexico and to all apparent violations of the Monroe doctrine. (McPherson: Political history of the United States during the great rebellion, pp. 617-18). On December 27, 1864 Benjamin, declaring that the Confederacy was fighting the battles of France and pitifully appealing to France to name the terms or conditions upon which she might be able to recognize the Confederacy, pointed out the "contemptuous disdain" and "insolent irony" with which Lincoln had referred to France in his recent message and solemnly predicted that Lincoln, after success against the Confederacy would not long delay the inevitable aggressive war with France which would result from the execution of the platform principles on which he had been elected. An editorial in the Richmond Enquirer declared that the Confederacy, if it should yield, would join the North in applying the Monroe doctrine from Bering Strait to the Isthmus of Darien. (Callahan: Diplomatic history of the Southern Confederacy, p. 254). On February 3, at the Hampton Roads Conference, Stephens favored an arrangement for a joint invasion of Mexico. (Ibid p. 257). "The Confederate states alone could never have been in a position to command any respect whatever for the pretensions which give the Monroe doctrine some consequence when proclaimed from the seat of government at Washington by the whole nation." (Letter of John Bigelow, April 3, 1901).

31. Instrs. Fr., No. 33, Feb. 7, 1865; Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 363.

apprehensions that the United States was destined to be a dangerous neighbor to the Franco-Maximilian empire—assuring him that the Americans never had much interest in Mexico, were disinclined to wage any war on account of wounded pride or anything except for national existence, and would have no difficulty in disbanding the large armies which were completing the work of suppressing secession.<sup>32</sup>

Impressed with the conviction that, but for the Mexican entanglement, the insurgents would receive very little further countenance or sympathy from the French government, he wrote Seward in substance: "I do not know your views as to the policy to pursue toward Europe. Our only hostile act will be to withhold recognition of Maximilian and perhaps we may later even recognize him. Mexico is to be conquered by immigration and not by the sword. No nation can afford to be so indifferent as ours to the efforts of Mexico to found an empire. We have nothing to do but to set the example of a good popular government. All else shall be added to us. \* \* \* The propagation of these views in the United States will lead to more pleasant relations with the European powers."<sup>33</sup>

A few days later, after an interview with Napoleon in regard to the recent Hampton Roads Conference ("negotiations"), he reported that the Emperor, fearing above all a reunion of the secessionists with the unionists to sustain the Monroe doctrine, evidently expected the United States, at the close of her civil strife, to use her arms in Mexico, where he (Napoleon) declared that the honor of France was engaged to support Maximilian. Later still, in March, he enclosed an article from the *Memorial Diplomatique* (of March 12) which, denying that the Monroe doctrine hung suspended like the sword of Damocles, and expressing a general expectation that Lincoln would recognize officially the new Mexican empire at the opening of his second term on March 4, said the initiative tending to prop up the Monroe doctrine came from the South and that the North could not afford to risk war with France who was determined not to leave unfinished the work begun by Napoleon III. in Mexico.<sup>34</sup>

Seward was not yet ready to take a more aggressive stand. He had just obtained possession of a despatch of a Confederate emissary in Canada which seemed to indicate that the Confederate authorities proposed the Hampton Roads Conference, at which they suggested alliance as a basis for sustaining the Monroe doctrine, as a bait in order to induce the French Government to offer immediate assistance,

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32. 56 Desps. Fr., No. 30, Feb. 14, *ib.*, No. 29, Feb. 14, 1865.

33. *ib.*, No. 30, Feb. 14, 1865.

34. 56 Desps. Fr., No. 37 (Confidential.) of Feb. 23, No. 52 of March 10, and No. 55 of March 14, 1865; *Dip. Cor.*, 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 380 et. seq.

or recognition to the Confederacy. The despatch stated that, in response to a certain "proposition" or inquiry from Richmond which had been sent to Europe from Canada by Clay and Thompson, a reply had just been received from Paris stating that a certain "M. B." (Marquis de Buarreville?) speaking for the Emperor had said that "no such alliance or course between the two American countries would be permitted," that Napoleon "would punish any attempt on the part of the United States to pursue the Monros doctrines, and that if it could be made sure that the Federal government would accept such an offer from the states in revolution, and there were sufficiently fair prospects of the inauguration of such a course, and this made the issue of intervention," he would not hesitate to recognize the Confederacy as a nation.<sup>35</sup>

Early in March, two days after Lincoln's second inauguration, while he was expecting "important things" to be effected by a change at Richmond, Seward wrote Bigelow a private note which contained the following:

"Congress has adjourned, and the policy of this government toward Mexico as hitherto made known by the President remains unchanged. It rests with France to decide whether this is satisfactory. If we have war with her, it must be a war of her own making either against our ships or upon our territory. We shall defend ourselves if assailed on our own ground. We shall attack nobody elsewhere. All subordinate and collateral questions ensuing out of the war are left by us to the arbitration of reason under the instructions of time. Our press and legislative tribunes will not say this now, and they can not be expected to say it under the insults and irritations of the European press and of hostile policies in European centers. But the nation will nevertheless support the President in the policy I have defined. Forbearance and liberality toward the United States in Europe will relieve the situation."<sup>36</sup>

Early in 1865, the Maximilian government had taken steps to obtain recognition from the United States. Senor Luiz de Arroyo, Maximilian's secretary of state, early in March wrote Mr. Corwin a confidential note inviting his advice and requesting his influence in obtaining an interview with Mr. Seward to solicit two points—one of which was the recognition of Maximilian's consuls. This overture was submitted by Corwin to Seward who promptly stated (March 13) that it was the United States government's "fixed habit to hold no official intercourse with agents of parties in any country which stand in an attitude of revolution, antagonistic to the sovereign authority in the same country with which the United States are on

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35. 56 Desps. Fr., No. 65, March 28; 17 Instrs. Fr., pp. 275-77, "Very Confidential," March 1, and pp. 277-99, "Private," March 6, 1865.

36. 17 Instrs. Fr., pp. 277-99, March 6, 1865.

terms of friendly diplomatic intercourse," and "to hold no unofficial or private intercourse with persons with whom it can not hold official intercourse." At the same time he wrote Bigelow that Maximilian might be informed through the French government that no exclusion of American consular agents from Mexico would have any influence in inducing the United States to change its political attitude toward Mexico.<sup>37</sup>

Four days later, Seward analyzed the American policy on the Mexican situation more fully and more carefully. Though he had striven to be neutral, he held that the United States could not renounce the doctrine, which was a living sentiment of the people, that the continuance of free republican institutions throughout America was required for the safety of the institutions of the United States.<sup>38</sup>

Replying further to Bigelow's suggestions of February 14, he said: "This government foresaw the present embarrassment and expressed itself frankly to the imperial government before it intervened in Mexico. It is that embarrassment which now affects the political situation in regard to that country. Even if it were necessary on our part to labor for its removal, the traditions and sympathies of a whole continent could not be uprooted by the exercise of any national authority and especially could it not be done by a government that is purely democratic like ours. The Emperor's persistence implies that he yet believes it to be certain what we have constantly told him that the people of the United States, reasoning upon preconceived sentiment and national principles, can not even apprehend to be possible, namely: that a new European monarchical system can and ought to be permanently established on the American continent and in territory bordering on this Republic. It would seem that all parties must abide the trial of the experiment, of which trial it will be confessed that the people of Mexico must ultimately be the arbiters. This government has not interfered. It does not propose to interfere in that trial. It firmly repels foreign intervention here and looks with disfavor upon it anywhere; therefore, for us to intervene in Mexico would be only to reverse our own principles and adopt in regard to that country the very policy which in any case we disallow. I remain, however, of the opinion I have often expressed, that even this vexatious Mexican question in the end will find its solution without producing any conflict between the United States and France. The future of Mexico is neither an immediate, nor even a vital question, for either the United States or France. For both of them it is a foreign affair, and therefore time and reason may be allowed their due influence in its settlement. \* \* \* So long, however, as France holds us to be a divided nation and allows her aid and sympathy to be ostentatiously solicited by rebel slave holders, so long will it be apprehended by portions of

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37. *Dip. Cor.* 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 484, and p. 378; 17 *Instrs. Fr.*, No. 70, March 13, 1865.

38. 5 *Works of Seward*, p. 27.



the American people that the policy of France in setting up an imperial system in Mexico is not confined to that unfortunate country, but embraces the overthrow of republican institutions here and throughout the American continent. It is not this government that under such circumstances can dispel popular fears or repress their utterance in popular assemblies. \* \* \* \* France, while she can not have the sympathies of this country in regard to Mexico, has no ground for that reason to apprehend hostility in any form from this government. It remains for France to decide for herself whether by manifesting her acceptance of the integrity of the American Union and the indivisibility of the American people as facts established, she will once more come into the friendly relations which were mutually cherished \* \* \* \* until the breaking out of the civil war.<sup>39</sup>

One week later (March 28), informed by Bigelow that the sudden death of Duke de Morny and the prospect of the early end of the American civil war had almost produced a panic in Paris where the future American attitude toward Mexico was a source of anxiety, Seward promptly replied that the United States, though seeking its national rights and consistent in its political convictions, sought no ulterior national advantages or aggrandizement and desired no occasion for retaliating in any form of hostility against any foreign state.<sup>40</sup>

A week before the instructions of March 17 were written, and perhaps even later, Bigelow, still uncertain what course affairs might take, was inclined to place some credence in the reports that President Lincoln might decide to recognize the Maximilian government. After the reception of Seward's instructions, and after the news of the evacuation of Richmond (which reached Paris by April 18), he still felt doubtful of the future position of the United States on the Mexican question.<sup>41</sup>

In May, when the French were apprehensive of the plans of the Juarez party for recruiting United States soldiers for emigration to Mexico—and when there were rumors of a projected alliance between France, Austria, Italy and Spain to maintain Maximilian on the throne in Mexico even at the cost of a war with the United States—Bigelow, in connection with a conversation with the French minister of state on the subject of the withdrawal of belligerent rights from the Confederates, made some reference to Mexican affairs which was misapprehended favorably to the Maximilian government by the French minister and required later explanation. On June 9, M. Rouher, in the French assembly, after referring to the declarations

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39. 17 Instrs. Fr., pp. 300-3, No. 71, March 17, 1865.

40. 56 Desps. Fr., No. 55, March 14, 1865; Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, pp. 380-86 and 388.

41. 56 Desps. Fr., No. 52 of March 10, No. 63 of March 21, and No. 88 of May 5, 1865.

of Rosecrans at Boston in regard to the alleged recruiting of American soldiers for the Mexican army, asserted that Bigelow, while stating the American preference for republican government, had said to Lhuys: "We understand that Mexico, which has long been governed by the monarchical form, may desire to return to that state of things, and we are not going to make war upon a question of form of government." Bigelow promptly (June 12) informed Lhuys that this was an erroneous interpretation of his conversation and asked him to correct it.<sup>42</sup>

Bigelow's dispatch to Seward contained the following passage which indicated his opinion at the time. "What I stated that may have given the impression which has misled the minister of state was this, in brief—that now the experiment had been begun the Americans wished it to be fully tried under circumstances best calculated to determine finally and forever whether European systems of government suited the Mexican people best; if it should appear that they did, and public tranquility was restored, no nation was more interested in such a result than her immediate neighbors. I added that the success of republican institutions in the Spanish-American states had thus far not been such as to encourage us to attempt the propagation of them there otherwise than by example, and that whatever government was acceptable to the Mexican people would be satisfactory to us."

When Seward returned from a visit to Auburn, New York, on July 3, he promptly wrote Bigelow as follows: "It is thought that the argument which you have recited in the passage thus extracted is not warranted by the instructions of this department. It will be well at your convenience to make this explanation to Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys. So far as our relations are carried, what we hold in regard to Mexico is that France is a belligerent there in war with the Republic of Mexico. We do not enter into the merits of the belligerents, but we practice in regard to the contest the principles of neutrality as we have insisted on the practice of neutrality by all nations in regard to our civil war. Our friendship toward the republic of Mexico and our sympathies with the republican system on this continent, as well as our faith and confidence in it, have been continually declared. We do not intervene in foreign wars or foreign politics. Political intervention in the affairs of foreign states is a principle thus far avoided by our government. I attach no great importance to this matter. It is right and proper nevertheless that the French government should not misunderstand the case and so be suffered to fall into a belief that we have entertained any views favorable to it as an invader of Mexico, or that we at all distrust the ultimate success of republican systems throughout this continent."<sup>43</sup>

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42 28 Notes Fr. Leg., May 5; 56 Desps. Fr., Private of May 19 and No. 107 of May 26; Desps. Italy, (Marsh) No. 119 of May 15, 1865; Dip. Cor., 1865-6, part 3, pp. 144 and 394-97; 56 Desps. Fr., No. 117, June 13, 1865; 17 Instrs. Fr., p. 392, No. 184 of June 26, 1865.

43 17 Instrs. Fr., pp. 393-5, No. 187, July 3, 1865; Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 389.

#### IV. America's Strength, Mexico's Independence

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At the close of the civil war Seward, the sagacious statesman, soon discovered a new field for his diplomacy in the peaceful solution of the problems for which the war furnished the occasion. Still anxious that Napoleon should be given no reason to believe that the United States had changed its views expressed to France—in reply to which the latter had repeatedly disclaimed all purpose of interfering with the government or sovereignty of Mexico—and at the same time apprehending that a war to drive France from Mexico might strengthen Napoleon by enlisting the French national spirit and by the realization of a long threatened alliance of France with the Confederates, he decided that peace and time with a series of diplomatic negotiations would secure the best settlement of all questions without reviving the danger of American disunion.<sup>1</sup>

Though still confident of the ultimate success of republican institutions in Mexico and still hoping to secure by peaceful diplomacy what others were anxious to obtain by active military intervention, Seward was stimulated by the course of events to reiterate, then to emphasize, and finally boldly to insist upon what he had so often hinted or suggested before—the necessity of the withdrawal of the French from Mexico.

For several months after the close of the civil war by the defeat of the Confederates, circumstances indicated a growing demand in some quarters to find or to make a *casus belli* with a view to the solution of the political situation in Mexico. As early as the middle of April, General Carvajal, the newly appointed governor of Tamaulipas, whom Juarez had authorized (November 12, 1864) to accept the services of 10,000 foreigners and to provide for their equipment, arrived in New York (at the suggestion of General Lew Wallace) on a fruitless mission to negotiate a loan with which to provide men and means for the enforcement of the Monroe doctrine and for raising the credit of the Juarez government.<sup>2</sup> General Grant, the self-confident soldier, favored forcible measures to drive the French from Mexico, and perhaps was anxious to provoke hostilities that would have made war with France unavoidable. In May, Grant had sent General Sheridan to Texas with orders to assemble a large force on the Rio

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1 McCullough: Men and Measures, p. 387.

2 17 Instrs. Fr., June 17, 1865; H. exec. doc. 33, 40-1, July 10, 1867.

Grande; and later, in order to prepare for the possible future necessity of acting against the French army in Mexico, General Schofield was given a leave of absence for a year with permission to go beyond the limits of the United States—where it was expected he would organize an army from disbanded United States soldiers and Confederate soldiers, who by orders from Grant were to be supplied with arms by General Sheridan who was anxious to use his army on the Rio Grande for driving the French from Mexico. The policy of enforcing the American doctrine was urged by many other prominent men—notably in the speeches of General Wright at Sacramento (June 11), General Lew Wallace at Washington (June 15), General Banks at New Orleans (July 4), Montgomery Blair at Hagerstown (July 12), Secretary James Harlan (of the department of the interior) at Washington (July 13), and in the farewell order of General F. P. Blair at Louisville (July 11). The last issue (August 16), of the *Index*, a Confederate organ published at London, referred to these utterances as “official declarations” of American policy.

The danger from those who sought a *casus belli* was aggravated by reports that the French authorities at Matamoras had received into their service a “large detachment of the late rebel soldiers with their arms.” On July 12, Seward received from the war department information that General Meijia (the commander of Maximilian’s forces at Bagdad on the Rio Grande) had encouraged a new secessionist movement in Texas (by stating that he considered the Confederates in Texas a “recognizable power”), that these Confederates who still intended to continue the contest against the United States were the friends of the imperial government of Mexico and co-operating with it, and that the imperial government was endeavoring to get the support of the people of west Mexico by creating the impression that Texas would be annexed or that a protectorate would be extended over it. Ten days later he instructed Bigelow promptly to notify Lhuys and ask the proper explanations.<sup>3</sup>

Seward, desiring to allay apprehensions and prevent difficulties, promptly asked Bigelow to suggest prudence to the French government and to state that the encouragement of Dr. Gwin’s schemes by either Maximilian or Napoleon would tend to produce the impatience of the American people who would regard the schemes as a menace to the United States. “Nor can it be necessary to say,” said he, “that after having expelled the insurgents from our own borders, the United States government could not look with satisfaction upon their reorganization as martial and political enemies on the opposite banks of

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<sup>3</sup> 17 Instrs. Fr., No. 205, July 22, 1865; Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, pp. 404-5.

the Rio Grande." On August 1, Bigelow brought these speculations to the attention of Lhuys and stated that the American government, refusing to discredit the disclaimers made by France at the beginning of the war with Mexico, confidently expected "in some form an assurance that all the pretences of Dr. Gwin, and his associates, are destitute of any sanction from the Emperor of France." Lhuys, (on August 7), betraying considerable sensitiveness in regard to what he called "vague allegations based on documents of a dubious character," and stating the resolution of France to observe in all the internal questions which may agitate or divide the Union an impartial and unscrupulous neutrality, significantly added: "We have nothing to offer as pledge of our intentions but our word, but we deem the word of France a guarantee which will satisfy any friendly power (in spite of certain recent manifestations) as we ourselves are satisfied with the words pledged to us by the Federal government to remain strictly neutral with regard to affairs in Mexico." In the meantime, Seward had information from Mexico indicating that the schemes and speculations had altogether failed; but he continued to receive information of the policy of Maximilian to encourage immigration into Mexico from the states which had recently been in insurrection against the United States, and notified Romero that measures had been adopted to meet the exigency and that the subject would receive the proper attention later.<sup>4</sup>

In the meantime another unsuccessful effort had been made to induce Seward to recognize the Maximilian government. A prominent New York paper, in its issue of July 4, contained a contributed article which, after justifying the interference of France in Mexico and stating that Maximilian was really elected by the people, closed with the following: "The Monroe doctrine has in no way been concerned in the recent history of France, Mexico and the United States, and the frank, temperate policy of the United States is based on this policy."<sup>5</sup> Two weeks later, Seward, having been informed by Marquis de Montholon that a special agent of Maximilian had arrived at Washington with a letter for the President, promptly replied that the President declined to receive the letter or the agent, stating that the

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4 Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, pp. 518-35; 17 Instrs. Fr., No. 195 of July 13 and No. 231 of Aug. 24; 56 Desps. Fr., No. 157 of Aug. 10; Notes from Mex. Leg., Oct. 20 and Dec. 31, 1865.

5 New York Times, July 4, 1865. The Times continued to advocate the policy of "peace and time" for the settlement of the Mexican problem [Ibid., Aug. 26 and Dec. 4, 1865], and to declare that a policy of propagandism for the spread of republicanism throughout the world was not in harmony with the principles upon which the United States government was founded. [Ibid., Aug. 2, 1865].

United States was on friendly terms with the republican government of Mexico. About the same time, Arroyo, claiming to be consul of the Maximilian government, and acting as commercial agent at New York, published in a New York newspaper a decree of the Maximilian government ordering the agents appointed by the Juarez government to discontinue their functions and prescribing the terms upon which foreign commerce might be carried on with Mexican ports (most of which were in the hands of the Maximilian government). Seward, in response to a question from Romero, stated that, though under the circumstances the United States could properly take no effective measures against a decree requiring that invoices and manifests must be certified by a commercial agent of the government which held the ports to which the goods were destined nor prohibit such a commercial agent from attending invoices and manifests, she could prevent such agents from performing any consular act relating to the affairs of his countrymen in the United States. Early in August he assured Romero that the reception of commercial agents of the Maximilian government was not regarded as a recognition of the Maximilian government.<sup>6</sup>

At the same time there were various private enterprises organized professedly to develop the resources of Mexico by immigration and "to enforce the Monroe doctrine." Late in July, General Carvajal, claiming authority from the Juarez government, surprised Romero by entering into a contract with Daniel Woodhouse, the financial agent of the somewhat shadowy and unknown company pompously called the "United States. European and West Virginia Land and Mining Company," receiving from it an agreement to negotiate the sale (at not more than 60 per cent discount) of interest-bearing bonds with a face value of \$50,000,000, secured by 106,800 acres of select mineral lands in Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosi, and by eighty per cent of all federal and state revenues from port dues, imposts and taxes aggregating about \$3,000,000 per annum. The contract also granted the company 500 square leagues of vacant agricultural land in Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosi and privileges of colonization, and the right of way and accompanying privileges for the construction of a double track steam railway from Matamoras to the western limit of San Luis Potosi, and branch lines. It also agreed to urge the national government to grant similar privileges for the continuation of the road westward to Mazatlan. On August 6, Carvajal submitted the general terms of the contract to Romero, who refusing to ratify it promptly wrote his government a despatch stating that Carvajal had exceeded his powers and that the contract was invalid,

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6 Moore: *Internat. Law Digest*, vol. 1, p. 238.

pointing out the defects in the terms of the contract and their conflict with national interest, and recommending that the supreme government of Mexico should "adopt in the future the system of intrusting its affairs (relating to loans) to a single person, instead of appointing several persons entirely independent of each other and with different instructions.

General Carvajal, although he stated that General Wallace had assured him of the reliability of the company and that Secretary Seward had approved (or offered no objection to) the contract, tried in vain to get the approval of Romero, who after further investigation of the Woodhouse company and after receiving (August 18, 1865) further instructions from his government authorizing him personally and exclusively to negotiate a loan of \$100,000,000 by pledging all the revenues of the nation, endeavored (August 27) to induce Carvajal not to put on the market the bonds which were being printed—and took steps to prevent their delivery to Woodhouse. On August 31, Romero received from General Wallace, who was ready to start for Mexico as soon as arrangements for funds and arms could be made, a note containing the following: "The fiasco of the United States, Europe and West Virginia Land and Mining Company is complete; but thank heaven it has resulted in two things: the bonds are engraved and willing men stand ready to put them in the market *couleur de rose*. I feel no disposition to despair. \* \* \* \* \* A united effort will make us all right. Please consider me fully committed to your cause."

In the meantime, Carvajal, embarrassed by the failures of the Woodhouse contract, and by debts and other obligations, and, finally admitting that he had been deceived by unworthy speculators, had opened negotiations with John W. Corlies and Company for a second contract, which after some objection from Romero was signed (on September 11) with the consent of Romero with whom Carvajal, by order from the Mexican government, consented to act in concert—although he still claimed powers plenipotentiary as an agent of the Supreme government equal to the powers of Romero. This contract contained no grant of privileges for railways, telegraphs, and colonization, and thus differed from the first (Woodhouse) contract which had been certified by the Mexican consul general (J. W. Navarro) and which under various reorganizations of the Woodhouse company continued to be an obstacle to the success of the new plan for a bond issue, and a source of trouble even after the French had evacuated Mexico.<sup>7</sup>

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7. H. exec. doc., 33, 40-1, (July 10, 1867), pp. 32, 41, 43, 49, 85, 111, 129 and 56-65. In February, March and again in September, 1866, after

Interpreting the pulse of the American people through public speeches and the press, foreseeing the large attention which Congress probably would give to foreign affairs, and anticipating the dangers which might arise from the irritations and annoyance liable to be produced by the military forces confronting each other across the Rio Grande, Seward saw that France in the interests of future peace should not long delay her withdrawal from Mexico. Anxious that the French government should "not be suffered to fall into the belief" that the United States government while practicing neutrality between belligerents had entertained any views favorable to France as an invader of Mexico, or had in any degree changed its friendship toward the Mexican republic in which it had continually declared its faith and confidence, (in a private note <sup>8</sup> of August 7) he again asked Bigelow to make such explanations as might be necessary to remove any misapprehensions or hopes which Lhuys might have obtained from the interview with Bigelow in the previous May and which the latter had never yet had an opportunity to correct.

In reply he received from Bigelow a long "unofficial" despatch,<sup>9</sup> written at Dieppe on August 21, which was substantially as follows: "I have had no opportunity to see Lhuys for four weeks to transact business—nor am I likely to have one for three weeks to come (as he expects to be absent from Paris). If I can avoid it, I would prefer not to write to him about Mexican affairs again until I have had opportunity of conversing with him very fully on the subject. It will be more satisfactory to both you and me—and no harm can come from the delay.

I shall leave upon his mind a distinct impression of our future policy toward the interventionists in Mexico, as your instructions authorize. In absence of anything more explicit from you I shall feel

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the failure of Corlies and Company to float the bonds, Woodhouse, (who had continued to urge the validity of the first Carvajal contract and had actively endeavored to induce Congress to approve it and guarantee the "Monroe doctrine" bonds as a measure to ensure the success of the Monroe doctrine by encouraging emigration), vainly resorted to various strategic manoeuvres to secure the interest and co-operation of Romero and the Mexican government in his plans financial and international. Finally, on February 11, 1867, he presented the House of Representatives a petition asking the United States government for a guarantee of the \$50,000,000 of fraudulent bonds. Through the press, Romero warned (March 16) the public that the Woodhouse contract was null and void and, after a series of inquiries resulting in a collection of overwhelming evidence of the unreliable character of Woodhouse and the Company, on April 20 he submitted to Seward a long statement of the whole affair with accompanying documents. [Ib., pp. 76-81, 110 and 132-67].

<sup>8</sup> This note does not appear in the official record book of instructions.

<sup>9</sup> 58 Desps. Fr., (part of No. 153), Aug. 21, 1865.



it my duty to avoid saying anything which would commit our government to extreme measures in any contingency: (1) because I do not understand that the President has determined to abandon the policy of a passive for one of an active armed resistance to French intervention in Mexico in any emergency; and (2) because I am unable to see how such a policy can commend itself to his judgment hereafter.

Of course the tone of conventions and of Congress will at first be belligerent—but the people rely on you and the President to regulate their foreign policy. Notwithstanding the letter of General Sheridan and the speeches of Judge Blair, and of the secretary of the interior, I have no evidence at all conclusive that the people are more disposed now than ever before to depart from their traditional policy of non-intervention in the affairs of foreign states—nor do I see more signs of coveting Mexico than in 1847. \* \* \* \* \* They are too sagacious to transfer to their own shoulders a burden which is crushing the Emperor of France and from which they shrink in 1847.

I think you will find, when the question is raised in practical shape with all its attendant responsibilities before our people, that with them the opposition to the extension of European influences in the Western Hemisphere is a sentiment which they cherish but not a policy for which they will fight. A war for such a purpose would become unpopular.

The abstract folly of making ourselves the armed champions of all or any of the Spanish American states whose people belong to a different race from ours, who speak a different language, who profess a different religion and who have been trained under social and political institutions having very little in common with those of the United States, would be aggravated now by the state of our finances which are likely for many years to tax all our resources to the utmost. The Spanish race in our hemisphere will require for many years a much more centralized government than we can offer them under our present constitution, and, therefore, it is hardly worth our while, under pretext of defending republican institutions, to get ourselves into a war with one and perhaps several of the most powerful states of Europe.

I doubt if there is a power in Europe that would formally sustain our pretensions under what is called the "Monroe doctrine"—while England, France, Spain, Denmark, Austria and Brazil would lend their moral support, and some of them probably material support, to any sovereign that would resist them. The mere apprehension of such pretensions would impair our credit in Europe, postpone our reduction of tariff and check European emigration to America.

In a war \* \* \* \* \* to redress the wrongs of Mexico or to propagate republicanism by the sword, we would in my opinion be likely to fail. Such a contest would accomplish for the Emperor of France what he has sought in vain to accomplish hitherto, \* \* \* \* \* it would speedily arm and equip in the Southern states more rebels than General Lee had under his command on the day of his capitulation, and end in our humiliation by the recognition of Maximilian.

Our recent war was only for national existence. \* \* \* \* \* Our government is based on the will of the people, who will not prosecute an expensive war for so distant republics.

\* \* \* \* \*

My notion of my duty here as I understand it to be now prescribed

to me is substantially this, to say nothing and do nothing which would require us in honor to compel France to leave Mexico if she does not choose to yield to peaceful arguments and on the other hand to avoid saying or doing anything which would lead the Emperor to suppose we would not resort to force if ultimately necessary for the liberation of Mexico.

I had, and \* \* \* \* \* have still, a somewhat different view of our policy towards France. Short of recognizing Maximilian I would give France every possible evidence of our friendship. \* \* \* \* \* As long as she keeps an army in Mexico, she is weaker all over the world, and the United States will have more power at Napoleon's court than she could ever hope to have if he had no such embarrassment. \* \* \* \* \* Of course he will fail. \* \* \* If he is to fail we do not need the credit of having caused his failure. Mexico will get emigrants from the United States anyhow and finally become annexed to the United States.

Though by my policy the United States can improve her credit and strengthen her position with all Europe \* \* \* I assume from the tone of your recent notes that this policy does not commend itself to the public men of the United States. I bow to their superior wisdom, and shall endeavor to carry out your instructions with fidelity.

\* \* \* \* \*

I beg you will not forget that the American people have never seriously considered the question we are now discussing as a live, practical question. \* \* \* \* \* When it does come up as a practical question I feel convinced they will sustain the statesmen who take the longest view of the true interests of the country, and who pay least heed to the passing sentiments of the hour.

Though this letter is marked unofficial, and is written for your own eyes, you are requested to make whatever use you choose of it, for I am perfectly willing to be held responsible for any opinions I have expressed.

By the time his despatch of August 21 had reached Washington, Bigelow had written another despatch (August 31) reporting the details of a conversation in which he had corrected the views of Lhuys who in return had freely stated his opinion of Seward's recent instruction of July 3 and had objected to the expression of sympathy for the Juarez government.<sup>10</sup> Seward, who in the meantime had information that Maximilian felt that his prospects were discouraging, replied to Bigelow at length, and in a more decided tone, in confidential instructions of September 6—significantly stating that the United States, no longer troubled by civil war, might be expected to devote considerable attention to foreign problems, the chief of which was relations with France connected with the Mexican policy.<sup>11</sup>

10 58 Desps. Fr., No. 166, Aug. 31, 1865.

11 Desps. Mex., No. 12, Aug. 15; 17 Instrs. Fr., pp. 432-37, No. 259, Sept. 6, 1865 (5 Works of Seward, pp. 422-24).

These instructions, a copy of which were to be read or given to Lhuys in case the latter should request explanations of President Johnson's opinions or policy, contained the following views: "On this subject [relations between the United States and France as affected by Mexico] this government does not think itself called upon to volunteer opinions, counsel or advice, or gratuitously to offer explanations to the governments of Europe; on the contrary we have been content to stand upon what we have already very frequently set forth, while every proper care has been taken to prevent or allay irritations which might tend to bring about unexpected and undesired collisions. It is possible nevertheless that the French government may think it proper to ask you for explanations, to some extent, of the President's opinion and policy. \* \* \* \* \* [After referring to the character of the United States constitution and the state constitutions, and to the belief that surrounding American nations should have the same peculiarities of government] \* \* \* \* \* I think it not improper to add that although the constitution of this government, and the habits of the American people formed under it, disincline us from political propagandism, and, although they still more strongly disincline us from seeking aggrandisement by means of military conquest—yet that the nation has, at various times since its organization found necessity for expansion, and that the like necessity may reasonably be expected to occur hereafter That expansion has thus far been effected by the annexation of adjacent peoples, who have come into the Union, through their own consent, as constituent Republican states under the constitution of the United States. To these two facts may be added the general one that peace and friendship between the United States and other nations on this continent, and consequently the advance of civilization in this hemisphere, seem to us more likely to be secured when the other American states assimilate to our own. It is hardly necessary for me to indicate wherein the present attitude and proceedings of the French government in regard to Mexico seems to be variant from the policy and sentiment of the United States which I have thus described. I may remark however in general terms that France appears to us to be lending her great influence with a considerable military force to destroy the domestic republican government in Mexico and to establish there an imperial system, under the sovereignty of an European prince who until he assumed the crown was a stranger to that country.

We do not insist or claim that Mexico and the other states on the American continent shall adopt the same political institutions to which we are so earnestly attached, but we do hold that the people of those countries are entitled to exercise the freedom of choosing and establishing institutions like our own if they are preferred. In no case can we in any way associate ourselves with the efforts of any party or nation to deprive the people of Mexico of that privilege.

Passing by all historical questions connected with the subject, as not now necessarily requiring discussion I have next to remark that this government finds itself neither less obliged nor less disposed at the present moment than it has hitherto been to adhere to its settled policy—which depends on public opinion and therefore is probably essential to the safety and welfare of the Union.

The intense popular interest which was awakened by the prevalence

of a civil war of vast proportions, during a few years past, has tended in some degree to moderate the solicitude which the situation of foreign affairs was calculated to create; but that interest is now rapidly subsiding, and it may be reasonably anticipated that henceforth the Congress of the United States, and the people in their primary assemblies, will give a very large share of attention to questions of extraneous character, and chief among these is likely to be that of our relations toward France with regard to Mexico.

This paper is intended to enable you \* \* \* \* \* to submit to the Imperial government in an earnest and yet altogether friendly manner, certain views which the President has taken of the political situation in Mexico. Those views are by no means new, and they are as distinct and as full as the present condition of the question involved enables us to express. \* \* \* \* \* [After referring to the traditional friendship between France and the United States]. It is perceived with much regret that an apparent if not a real, a future if not an immediate, antagonism between the policies of the two nations seems to reveal itself in the situation of Mexico. \* \* \* \* \* The United States have at no time left it doubtful that they prefer to see a domestic and republican system of government prevail in Mexico rather than any other system."

Napoleon injected into the negotiations for withdrawal a proposition for a basis of *quid pro quo*. In August, Lhuys expressed a strong desire to withdraw the French troops "as soon as circumstances would allow it," and in September, stating that France was ready to adopt a basis of understanding, he said the United States could greatly facilitate the departure of the troops by adopting toward the Maximilian government "an amicable attitude, which would aid to the consolidation of order, and give evidence of security for the interests which had induced France to cross the Atlantic." Late in September, Bigelow, after a conversation in regard to the withdrawal of the French troops, wrote to Seward that Lhuys was satisfied with Montholon's report of the disposition of the United States and promised that the reduction of French forces would go on as fast as possible—the Emperor being anxious to retire as soon as French interests in Mexico could be properly protected. Two weeks later, he submitted the explanation of the French position which Lhuys had furnished in reply to Seward's despatch of September 6. After another two weeks he sent (October 19) a confidential note stating the views of Lhuys who admitted that the Mexican question could be simplified by the withdrawal of the French troops and suggested a peaceful basis by which the withdrawal could be secured. At the same time Lhuys sent (October 18) to Montholon instructions which he said were in reply to a question by Bigelow in his own name (and without prejudging the opinion of his government) "whether the recognition of the Mexican empire by the United States might facilitate and hasten the recall of the French troops." Lhuys had

wished the United States to recognize the Maximilian government as a preliminary to the withdrawal of France. Bigelow, however, had said clearly that American recognition of any government in Mexico, so long as it was sustained by foreign arms, was impossible. He had asked whether Maximilian would be able to sustain himself without aid of France if his authority were recognized by the United States. Though he had suggested the possibility that Maximilian might determine to press the return of the French soldiers if the United States showed a disposition to recognize his government after the French evacuation, he had in no way compromised the position of the Washington government.<sup>12</sup>

In the meantime, Seward had kept himself informed of the serious conditions in Mexico which he had foreseen would result from the establishment of an exotic government upheld by a European power. Maximilian issued two decrees one of which probably shortened his tenure of office, and the other his tenure of life. The one encouraged the immigration of Confederate planters into Sonora with their slaves under plans of Dr. Gwin and others to colonize the frontier as a hostile barrier which with the co-operation of French troops would prove formidable in resisting all attempts against Maximilian from the Texas side of the Rio Grande where the United States troops still hovered. The other, issued several months later (October 3) and aimed directly against the forces of the Juarez government which the United States recognized as the constitutional government, ordered that in the future "all persons belonging to armed bands, not legally organized, whether they proclaim or not any political principles" should be tried by court-martial and condemned to decapitation "within twenty-four hours following the sentence." That the independent and civilized government of the United States could ever recognize the dangerous and desperate government which issued these decrees there remained no lingering hope of probability or possibility. To whom then could it protest or apply for redress in case of future violations of American rights? Could it present its case through France? Lhuys replied, "Go to Juarez with your griefs."<sup>13</sup>

Still mindful of Napoleon's earlier promises to evacuate Mexico, Seward continued to grow bolder in extending to France a courteous and friendly, but persuading, invitation of exit from Mexico couched in pressing and admonishing language, which the Emperor was

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12 Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, pp. 416 and 811-12; 58 Desps. Fr., No. 177 of Sept. 21, No. 180 of Oct. 6, No. — of Oct. 19, 1865, and No. 268 of Feb. 9, 1866; 17 Instrs. Fr., No. 405 of March 2, 1866.

13 Desps. Mex., No. 10 of July 11, No. 11 of July 22, No. 13 of Sept. 10, No. 14 of Oct. 28; 14 Notes from Mex., July 8, Oct. 5 and Nov. 4, 1865.

finally induced to accept. By his suggestion and authority—in order to thwart Grant's project for organizing an American army in Mexico—General Schofield sailed from New York (on November 19) to ascertain (in a private capacity) whether there was any way by which to induce Napoleon to withdraw his troops in order to prevent the possibility or necessity of their expulsion by force.<sup>14</sup> With a firm decision against the suggestion of Lhuys that the American government might favor or assist the Emperor's desire to withdraw by giving some assurance that the United States would recognize the *de facto* government of Mexico, and stating that "political relations at present supersede those of commerce in the consideration of the American people," he instructed (November 6) Bigelow that the President adhered to the views expressed two months before. "French authority in Mexico is in direct antagonism to the policy of this government and on basic principles," said he, "the United States have hitherto practiced frankness and still regard the French effort to establish permanently a foreign and imperial government in Mexico as disallowable and impracticable. Therefore they can not compromise their previous position. They are not prepared to recognize any political institutions in Mexico which are in opposition to the republican government with which we have so long, and so constantly, maintained relations of amity and friendship."<sup>15</sup>

When Bigelow read this instruction to Lhuys at the close of November, the international situation indicated that the expulsion of the French from Mexico was necessary for the development and security of the Americas. It was the evident purpose of France by operations in Mexico, and Spain by operations in South America, to limit Anglo-Saxon influence and assert the right of the Latin to expand to the New World. Lamartine had just asserted, in a published article, an anti-American pronunciamento in contradiction to the Monroe doctrine, that the continent of America was the property of Europe—an article that attracted the attention of the

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14 J. W. Robinson in *N. Am. Rev.*, July, 1866: It appears that General James Watson Webb had gone to Paris at the solicitation of the Emperor Napoleon and that at an interview (on November 10) he received from Napoleon a secret agreement, subject to the approval of the President, providing for the withdrawal of the French army in twelve, eighteen and twenty-four months and also proposing the purchase of French Guiana by the United States. The President approved the withdrawal from Mexico, but proposed to negotiate for the purchase of Martinique or St. Pierre instead of French Guiana. [Sen. exec. doc. 52, 43-1, p. 204].

15. *Dip. Cor.*, 1865, p. 429; 17 *Instrs. Fr.*, pp. 467-69, No. 300 of Nov. 6, and also No. 332 of Dec. 16, 1865.

American press<sup>16</sup>. In his interview with Bigelow in regard to the instruction of November 6, Lhuys seemed much displeased with Seward's frank expression. He regarded it as a "menace to the authority which France was trying to establish in Mexico for the benefit of the world." "The language practically claims that the whole American continent belongs to the United States," said he, "and that governments and institutions there must correspond to your wishes. You feel strong now and assert erroneous pretensions which you have not given to the world before." Asserting that France was not timid nor much accustomed to flinch from a policy once begun he said, "If you mean war why not say so frankly." Bigelow replied that, although Seward had not threatened armed intervention in behalf of Mexico, his instructions had asserted that the effort to establish a foreign and imperial government in Mexico was "disallowable and impracticable" and therefore that he could not compromise his previous position by recognizing political institutions in Mexico which were in opposition to republican government. "The United States has not changed position," said he, "nor been wanting in its ingeniousness in discussing it with the Imperial government." Lhuys said France had taken no territory from Mexico as the United States did in the Mexican war. Bigelow replied that Mexico in 1846 began the war against the United States and that the latter followed the retreating army to the Mexican capital because she could get satisfaction no sooner, and that she left Mexican laws and institutions in full force. Lhuys said it was not fair to say that France had imposed a government on Mexico. Urging that France should follow the golden rule in diplomacy and look at the question from the American standpoint, Bigelow stated that while the United States desired to continue the friendship with France the American national feeling was opposed to a government founded on our borders for the avowed purpose of limiting the diffusion of the Anglo-Saxon race on the American continent," and that it was "idle to contend against national feeling." Lhuys replied with a smile that Napoleon's letter in regard to limiting the Anglo-Saxon was designed for home rather than for foreign consumption, and was rather an assertion of the right of the Latin race to expand—a principle first presented by Guizot in reply to Thiers in 1846 apropos the annexation of Texas to the United States. In reporting the conference with Lhuys, Bigelow said: "He would probably consider it a relief if we could find some adequate pretext to take Mexico off the end of their spear with our own. Though he spoke with warmth, he seemed to imply

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16. *La France*, Nov. 19; 59 *Desps. Fr.*, No. 199 of Nov. 21 and 212 of Dec. 5; 17 *Instrs. Fr.*, No. 333, Dec. 16; *N. Y. Times*, Dec. 12, 1865; *Dip. Cor.*, 1865-6, p. 430.

that if we insisted, it would be the end of their Mexican experience—that he would not attempt to defend Mexico in a war with the United States.”<sup>17</sup>

In his interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, the President, in his annual message of December 4, precisely reflected the feeling of the nation. A foreign monarchy forced on a sister republic on the American continent, and at the time chosen, was regarded as an insult and a standing challenge to the United States.<sup>18</sup>

A few days before Congress met, Montholon had furnished Seward a confidential instruction (November 29) stating that, if the United States by opening diplomatic relations with the Maximilian government should furnish assurance that she had no intention of impeding “the consolidation of the new order of things founded in Mexico,” France “would see no difficulty to enter in arrangement for the recall of troops within a reasonable period.”<sup>19</sup>

In his reply of December 6, explaining the causes of American sentiment on the Mexican question, Seward said: “The Emperor suggests that France is willing to retire from Mexico as soon as she may; but that it will be inconvenient unless the United States first give assurances of a friendly and tolerant disposition to the Maximilian government. \* \* \* \* \* The chief cause [of the discontent prevailing in the United States in regard to Mexico] is not that there is a foreign army in Mexico; much less does that discontent rise from the circumstances that the foreign army is a French one. We recognize the right of sovereign nations to carry on war with each other if they do not invade our right or menace our safety or just influence. The real cause of our national discontent is, that the French army which is now in Mexico is invading a domestic republican government there which was established by her people, and with whom the United States sympathize most profoundly, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it and establishing upon its ruins a foreign monarchical government, whose presence there, so long as it should endure, could not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions.

I admit that the United States do not feel themselves called upon to make a war of propagandism throughout the world, or even on this continent, in the republican cause. We have sufficient faith in the eventual success of that cause on this continent, through the operation of existing material and moral causes, to induce us to acquiesce in the condition of things which we found existing here, while our own republic was receiving its shape and development.” [After a statement of the American policy of non-intervention]. \* \* \* \* \* “We should think it wrong as well as unwise, on the part of the United States, to attempt to subvert by force monarchical governments

17 59 Desps. Fr., No. 209 (18 pp.), Nov. 30, 1865.

18 N. Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1865.

19 See Lhuys to Montholon, Oct. 18, 1865. (Dip. Cor., 1865-6, p. 449).



in Europe for the purpose of replacing them with republican institutions. It seems to us equally objectionable that European states should forcibly intervene in states situated in this continent to overthrow republican institutions and replace them with monarchies and empires."<sup>20</sup>

Seward saw that Congress was preparing to take action in directing the national policy in regard to Mexico. On December 11, the Senate called for information concerning the "barbarous decree of the so-called Emperor of Mexico (of October 3) ordering all Mexicans who bravely defend the sacred cause of their independence to be shot without form of trial." It also requested correspondence relative to the occupation of Mexico by French troops and the establishment of monarchy.<sup>21</sup>

At the same time, Van Horn of Missouri, asserting the duty of the United States to protect other republican governments and firmly to oppose the Maximilian empire which had been established by foreign arms in violation of American principles, offered to the House the following resolution which, being opposed by Stevens and Kasson on the ground that Congress should not affirm the principles embodied in the preamble, was referred to the committee on foreign affairs: "Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Relations be instructed to inquire into and report what measures and means may be necessary on the part of the United States to restore to the Mexican people the free and unrestricted right to choose their own form of government, and of giving effect to the unanimous voice of the people of this nation that no foreign power shall impose despotic government upon any state or people of this continent."<sup>22</sup>

Mr. Orth, by unanimous consent, also offered a resolution requesting the President to furnish correspondence showing the "steps taken at any time by the so-called Emperor of Mexico" to obtain from the United States a recognition of the "so-called empire of Mexico, and the action of the administration thereon."<sup>23</sup>

In fresh instructions to Bigelow, approving his remarks to Lhuys and declaring that the United States could not agree to recognize the Maximilian government, Seward requested him to inform the French government that the American legislative department in session was also "interested and concerned in the question whether the present condition of things shall be continued in Mexico" and was "authorized by the constitution to direct by law the action of

20 5 Works of Seward, p. 426; Dip. Cor., 1865-6, pp. 450-51. Seward's note of Feb. 12 (1866) to Montholon appears in H. exec. doc. 73, 39-1, p. 549.

21 Sen. exec. doc. 5, vol. 1, 39-1, Dec. 13, 1865, (20 pp.); Sen. exec. doc. 6, vol. 1, 39-1, Dec. 21, 1865, (100 pp).

22 69 Cong. Globe, 39-1, part 1, Dec. 11, 1865, p. 20 and p. 172.

23 *Ib.*, Dec. 18, 1865, p. 70.

the United States in regard to that important subject"—and that the policy of the United States executive to continue friendship with France "would be brought into imminent jeopardy, unless France could deem it consistent with her interest and honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico, to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there, and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country."<sup>24</sup>

In the meantime, Schofield—whose presence in Paris attracted considerable newspaper comment—in unofficial conversations, which were reported faithfully to the Emperor, had found an opportunity to make known to Prince Napoleon and high officers of the Emperor's staff the views and purposes of the United States. He found that, although the Mexican policy of France was unpopular, the national pride hesitated to withdraw under menace.<sup>25</sup>

Bigelow, considering the different aspects of the French policy and desiring to facilitate French withdrawal, had already (December 14) in a private note suggested the presentation of an admonitory resolution in Congress—relating to the repugnance of the American people toward monarchical institutions on the American continent, and inviting the Emperor to leave Mexico. A week later (December 21), stating that the President's message had placed the American government and policy before the world in an attitude of command and respect, he announced that France, anxious to solve the Mexican question, had determined to leave; and he recommended that Congress should occupy itself with domestic questions. He felt sure that the President's reference to American relations with France and Mexico, if properly interpreted by the French government, would result either in an early change in relations between France and Mexico or in a still graver change in relations of France with the United States.<sup>26</sup>

The Emperor, assured that the United States would not deviate from its traditional policy of non-intervention unless forced by the aggression of European powers, was considering the feasibility of a plan to adjust the Mexican question satisfactorily by personal correspondence between himself and the President. Though Bigelow, taking Christmas dinner at the Palace, informed him that the President seemed resolved to do nothing that would embarrass him, the Em-

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24 17 Instrs. Fr., No. 332, Dec. 16, 1865. (Dip. Cor., 1865-6, p. 429).

25 *Ib.*, p. 465, Confidential, Nov. 4, 1865.

26 59 Desps. Fr., No. 228, Dec. 21, 1865. (Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 725).

peror had some anxiety in regard to the appointment of General Logan as minister to Mexico. He also made inquiry in regard to the status of General Schofield. The Empress, though satisfied with the President's message, feared what the American people or Congress might do.<sup>27</sup>

On January 4, 1866, Bigelow received from Lhuys a proposal for a plan of adjustment providing that, as a condition of the French withdrawal, the United States should (1) secure as an equivalent the payment of the French debt in Mexico (2) allow France to hold Sonora and sell it to the United States to indemnify herself, and (3) agree not to interfere in Mexican affairs. Though he could not see why the United States should secure the French debt and could not recognize the legality of a title given through Maximilian, he asked for a memorandum of the last proposition stating that the United States had no disposition to interfere with any authority which was acceptable to the Mexican people. This memorandum he received (January 10) from Lhuys who agreed, on receipt of assurance of scrupulous neutrality on the part of the United States, to make known the result of negotiations with Maximilian for guarantees which were to complete the purpose of the French expedition; but he declined to specify exactly what guarantees he hoped to obtain from Mexico, or the form of the assurance which he expected from the United States. Though Bigelow doubted whether a formal covenant was consistent with the dignity of either nation, he decided to request Seward to send fresh instructions on the American policy of intervention which might be read to Lhuys as a possible means of getting the two governments at a point where they could begin to act in concert for stopping hostilities in Mexico between Juarez and Maximilian. On January 11, he proposed to Seward to test the sincerity of the Emperor's offer, to withdraw his forces, by agreeing to observe strict neutrality between the Juarez and Maximilian governments—it being understood that Maximilian would form his army entirely from naturalized Mexicans, and that the French troops and flag would not be replaced by those of any other nation.<sup>28</sup>

Two weeks later—writing that, as soon as he could receive instructions giving assurances of non-intervention by the United States in Mexico, he expected to receive a report of negotiations between Napoleon and Maximilian in regard to French withdrawal—he proceeded to give two reasons why the Emperor erred in desiring an

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27 *Ib.*, No. 228 (and three private notes) of Dec. 21, Private of Dec. 29 and No. 229 of Dec. 26, 1865.

28 *Ib.*, No. — of Jan. 5, No. 240 of Jan. 11, Private of Jan. 11; 60 *Desps. Fr.*, No. 272, Feb. 15, 1866.

American promise of neutrality: (1) the Emperor had desired his retirement to appear to be entirely voluntary; (2) no private engagement with France could add strength to those already announced to the world to respect all independent nationalities.<sup>29</sup>

At the same time, in another despatch to Seward, he wrote: I told Lhuys there were some objections to our giving a formal assurance that we would not disturb the status quo of Mexico on the withdrawal of the French army. I closed by informing him that United States in the ninety years of their existence had never attempted by arms to interfere with or modify the government of any other nation; that our first President on laying down his office made a parting request, the wisdom of which none of his successors has ever questioned, that as a government we should avoid all unnecessary responsibility for the political institutions of other countries; \* \* \* \* \* and finally that no prominent statesman in the United States had ever advocated a policy of intervention in the government of other independent states. In view of these facts and in view of the language held by you during the last four years in your correspondence with the diplomatic representatives of the United States, I thought that the Emperor would find every assurance he would require of our disposition to respect the independence and nationality of Mexico. Lhuys replied that he would look through the correspondence \* \* \* \* \* and if he could find the assurances \* \* \* \* \* he would submit them to the Emperor."<sup>30</sup>

In the meantime, negotiations had been transferred to Washington. Surrounded by difficulties, and observing that the French people (who were still ignorant of recent negotiations) did not question the propriety of the American demand and showed much solicitation concerning the rumors afloat, the Emperor wrote (January 15) to his commander in Mexico that he had concluded to recall all troops within a year. At the same time in maturing his new plans he was resolved to continue diplomatic negotiations with Seward for the purpose of securing every advantage possible. On January 9, in a despatch which was carefully prepared by direction of the Emperor in reply to Seward's instructions of December 6, (and which reviewed the French policy in Mexico and attempted to justify it), Lhuys directed Montholon to assure Seward: (1) that the French expedition, to establish a regular Mexican government which would be disposed to keep its engagements, had in it nothing hostile to the institutions of the New World and still less to the United States; (2) "That the French army in entering Mexico did not carry monarchical traditions in the folds of its flag." He also instructed Montholon to endeavor to overcome antagonism to the monarchical

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29 60 Desps. Fr., No. 247, Jan. 25, 1866.

30 1b., No. 251, Jan. 25, 1866.

government of Maximilian by citing the monarchy of Brazil with which the United States was holding friendly relations. On January 29, a copy of Lhuys instructions were submitted to Seward by Montholon.<sup>31</sup>

On February 12, in a note reviewing the Mexican question and the United States policy, and inviting the Emperor to give definite information of the time when the French operations in Mexico might be expected to cease, Seward replied to Montholon. He plainly stated that the United States did not reproach Mexico on account of her past calamities.

Referring to Lhuys denials, he said: "Nevertheless, it is my duty to insist that, whatever were the intentions, purposes and objects of France, the proceedings which were adopted by a class of Mexicans for subverting the republican government there, and for availing themselves of French intervention to establish on its ruins an imperial monarchy, are regarded by the United States as having been taken without authority, and prosecuted against the will of the Mexican people. \* \* \* \* The people of the United States have not seen any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico have spoken and have called into being or accepted the so-called empire. \* \* \* \* I can not \* \* \* properly exclude the observation that, while this question affects by its bearings, incidentally, every republican state in the American hemisphere, every one of these states has adopted the judgment which, on the behalf of the United States is herein expressed. Under these circumstances it has happened, either rightfully or wrongfully, that the presence of European armies in Mexico, maintaining a European prince with imperial attributes, without her consent and against her will, is deemed a source of apprehension and danger, not alone to the United States, but also to all the independent and sovereign republican states founded on the American continent and its adjacent islands. France is acquainted with the relations of the United States toward the other American states to which I have referred, and is aware of the sense that the American people entertain in regard to the obligations and duties due from them to those other states."

While declining to be drawn into a discussion in regard to Brazil, Seward said. "Where the people of any country, like Brazil now, or Mexico in 1822, have voluntarily established and acquiesced in monarchical institutions of their own choice, free from all foreign control or intervention, the United States do not refuse to maintain relations with such governments, or seek through propagandism, by force or intrigue, to overthrow those institutions. On the contrary, where a nation has established institutions, republican and domestic, similar to our own, the United States assert in their behalf that no foreign nation can rightfully intervene by force to subvert republican institutions and establish those of an antagonistic character."<sup>32</sup>

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31 Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, pp. 805-8.

32 5 Works of Seward, pp. 428-43; H. exec. docs. 73 (p. 549) of March 20, and 93 (p. 27) of Apr. 23, 1866; Moore's Internat. Law Digest, vol. 6, pp. 502-3.

The following resolution, offered to the House, (by Whaley) only one day after Seward wrote his reply, though not passed nor even taken up for consideration, is significant: "Whereas, this House at last session interpreting the sentiment of the American people, passed a resolution indorsing the traditional policy of this government toward the republics of this continent and reprobating in unmistakable language the erection of a monarchy upon the ruins of the neighboring republic of Mexico; and whereas, the flagrant infraction of this American continental policy occurred while this nation was in a conflict for its own unity, which conflict is now happily ended; therefore

Resolved, (1) That this House do hereby affirm the resolution of the last session, and declare that the establishment of a political protectorate by France in behalf of an Austrian prince, over the republic of Mexico, and the introduction of a scheme of policy which carries with it a right to interfere with our own as well as in the affairs of all the republics of this continent is a measure to which this country can never submit, and which should be resisted by all the means in our power. (2) That to the end of making good this resolution, the President solicit the alliance of all the republics of this continent, and the use of all the means at their command."<sup>33</sup>

Meantime the Emperor had shown a disposition to calm the American people by his speech at the opening of the French legislative chambers. He had also eased the public mind in France by publishing (January 29) recent correspondence in regard to the Mexican problem—including Lhuys' instructions of January 9. He was soon more strongly impressed with what he had already known: that the French journals did not question the propriety of the American request for withdrawal from Mexico. He was further impressed by the news of an American raid on Bagdad, south of the Rio Grande, which indicated the possibility of war between France and the United States and which caused Lhuys to suggest that he "hoped the United States if she intended to make war would do it openly." On February 22, he made the first general public announcement of his purpose to withdraw his troops from Mexico, at the same time expressing his hope that it would allay the emotions in America.<sup>34</sup>

His decision indefinitely announced, Napoleon saw that he must not long delay a definite program. Van Dorn of Missouri introduced in the House a resolution (which was referred to the committee on foreign affairs) accepting the Emperor's declaration of his purpose, insisting as a guarantee for its fulfillment that the French troops in Mexico should be used only to preserve the

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<sup>33</sup> 69 Cong. Globe, 39-1, part 1, p. 811, Feb. 13, 1866.

<sup>34</sup> 60 Desps. Fr., No. 255 of Feb. 1, No. 248 of Jan. 25. (Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 3, p. 805), No. 253 of Feb. 21 (Dip. Cor., 1865-6, vol. 2, pp. 368-9) and No. 269 of Feb. 9, 1866.

*status quo* until the period of withdrawal, and asserting that the use of the troops for further conquests should be regarded as a violation of the pledge.<sup>35</sup> In spite of the "imperialistic" views of Marshall Forey, the French government could not counteract the useful influence which the American treatment of the Mexican question was exerting in Europe. By March 6, M. Rouher informed the corps legislative that the Emperor would soon withdraw. The reply to Seward's note of February 12 Lhuys furnished in his instructions to Montholon under date of April 5. Abstaining from the prolongation of the discussion of assertions on points of doctrine or history, and confiding in the assurances of non-intervention which he regarded as a sufficient guarantee, he said France was ready to adopt measures for the return of the army—in three detachments, November, 1866, March, 1867 and November, 1867. On April 5, the *Moniteur* definitely announced that the troops would be withdrawn in the three detachments (as stated by Lhuys), and a week later Napoleon directed Bazaine to that effect.<sup>36</sup>

Seward, vindicating his policy, expressing his great satisfaction that an agreement had been reached, and hoping France possibly might "find it convenient and consistent with her interests and honor" to abridge the time limit, frankly suggested that, as even the continuance of the intervention would "necessarily be regarded with concern and apprehension by the masses of the people and perhaps by Congress," the United States "army of observation must also be continued in some proportion on the southern bank of the Rio Grande."<sup>37</sup>

At the same time Seward was endeavoring to prevent Austrian aid to Maximilian. Hearing that the French troops were to be replaced by volunteers from Austria, levied by the Emperor's brother with Austria's consent, he instructed Motley to inform the Austrian government that the United States would feel at liberty to regard the hostile operations of such troops with great concern, and that the United States could not engage to remain silent and neutral spectators of such hostilities. Motley hesitated to act on what seemed to him a departure from Seward's earlier policy; and, in a despatch which he showed to the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, questioned the right of the United States to protest against these pro-

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35 70 Cong. Globe, 39-1, part 1, Feb. 27, 1866, pp. 1067-8.

36 60 Desps. France, No. 270 of Feb. 12, Private of Feb. 23, No. 282 of March 6; Notes from Fr. Leg., Apr. 21, 1866 (Dip. Cor., 1866-6, vol. 3, p. 828; Schouler in N. Am. Rev., Apr., 1866.

37 103 N. Am. Rev., Oct. 1866, p. 498; Notes to Fr. Leg., Apr. 15 and 25, 1866 (Dip. Cor., 1866, vol. 1, p. 378; and Moore's Internat. Law Digest, vol. 6, p. 603).

ceedings—which he said were clearly within the sovereign rights of Austria. On April 30, Seward, promptly disapproving Motley's delay, directed him to file the protest and "at once to withdraw from Vienna" in case Austria, without discussing the matter with the United States, should permit the departure of the volunteers. In the meantime the recruiting had become languid; and, after Motley presented Seward's protest, the Austrian government (preparing for the approaching war with Prussia) promptly replied that necessary steps had been taken to prevent the departure of the troops.<sup>38</sup>

Although there were still those who, remembering the history of conditions in Mexico for twenty years, said there was "no danger of war with France or any other nation in defense of Mexican republicanism, the Monroe doctrine, or any other doctrine that is half as absurd," Seward's increasing persistent attitude met with general popular approval. Although he had reaffirmed the purpose of the United States to adhere strictly to the principles of non-intervention and neutrality, there was still a strong feeling in favor of some more effective expression of the warm sympathy felt for the republican government of Juarez, which it was feared might be crushed out by the intrusive empire of Maximilian while we waited. The popular demand was partly satisfied (on May 4) by the appointment of L. D. Campbell as minister to the Juarez government to fill the vacancy which had remained unfilled since the withdrawal of Corwin; but the radicals still wished to make the moral power of the United States felt among nations by prompt energetic maintenance of the Monroe doctrine. Stevens in the House, on the ground that France was no longer a belligerent in Mexico, and in order to give practical force to the American policy called the Monroe doctrine, proposed to the committee of foreign affairs "to inquire into the propriety of loaning to the republic of Mexico, on proper security (a mortgage of Lower California, Senora, Sinaloa, or Chihuahua), \$20,000,000 to enable said republic to prevent the overthrow of its government and the establishment of a monarchical government on the continent of North America." Though he said such a measure could no longer be a breach of neutrality at which France could take offense, he agreed that it "might be justly considered by Maximilian as a cause of war, for which we would be responsible to him"—and to him alone. "If it should provoke a war with Maximilian," said he, "I suppose no one would be much alarmed; it would give the great

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<sup>38</sup> 1 Instrs. Aus., pp. 187 and 189, No. 167 and No. 169 of March 9, and p. 292, No. 173 of Apr. 6; *ib.*, p. 302, No. 181 of Apr. 30; H. exec. doc. 73, 39-1, part 2, pp. 583, 587 and 589; Sen. exec. doc. 54, 39-1, pp. 13, 18 and 20.



republic an opportunity to vindicate her honor, which has become dim under the Micawber policy of our foreign secretary. By vindicating that honor we should increase and consolidate the strength of the nation."<sup>39</sup>

In the meantime, Santa Anna, who in 1864 had returned to Mexico but had not been allowed to stay, and who was known to have an unfriendly attitude toward the Juarez government, was watching for an opportunity to try new projects. Arriving in New York in the summer to solicit aid for a new military scheme, he soon formed an alliance with one of the Fenian factions of the city, and endeavored to obtain resources to further his plans by issuing a series of bonds (\$750,000) secured by a mortgage deed of trust upon what he considered his personal property—378 square miles of land in Vera Cruz and two palaces, one on Saint Thomas Island and the other in Turbaco, New Granada. It appeared that his agent (according to Hiram-Barney, ex-collector of the New York custom house) was Daniel Woodhouse. On June 19, 1866, the *New York Herald*, which had previously favored the cause of Santa Anna, published a letter representing that General Ortega as lawful president of Mexico was acting in concert with all the governors of the states and with the chiefs of the national powers, that he was animated with the best desires to make a treaty with the United States highly advantageous to the latter, and that he had submitted his plans to President Johnson and General Banks. In August, in response to an inquiry, Seward declined to receive Santa Anna who was contemplating a visit to Washington.<sup>40</sup>

For a time Maximilian was inclined to believe Napoleon's decision had been announced for diplomatic reasons and would soon be modified, but he was soon disillusioned. In vain did his wife, the youthful, energetic Princess Carlotta, go to Paris to plead his cause. Already mourning the loss of her father Leopold of Belgium, and shocked at the crushing defeat of the Emperor of Austria, she completely failed in her mission to France and soon became insane while negotiating with the Pope at Rome. Napoleon, unable to retreat from what he had promised under pressure of simple, patient, frank and optimistic American diplomacy, and at the same time disturbed by prospects of trouble on his eastern frontier where Prussia was preparing to dispute with France the position of arbiter of Europe, politely but coldly and obstinately refused to sustain the

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39 *Nat. Quart. Rev.*, June, 1866, pp. 114-37. ("The S. A. republics and the Monroe doctrine"); 72 *Cong. Globe*, 39-1, June 16, 1866, p. 3917.

40 59 *Desps. Fr.*, No. 240, Jan. 11, 1866; H. *exec. doc.* 33, 40-1, pp. 88, 91 and 212; 74 *Domestic Letters*, p. 27, Aug. 16, 1866.

pleading prince whom he had lured into the turmoils of Mexico. In the early autumn he sent his aid, Castelnau to Mexico to express his decision that the limit of French sacrifice has been reached. At the same time he notified the American government that he would do nothing to persuade Maximilian from abdication in case the latter should consider it impossible to overcome all difficulties with his own resources.<sup>41</sup>

Seward anxiously observed the situation in Mexico where new complications were threatened by the attempts of Santa Anna and Ortega to organize armed expeditions in the United States for the overthrow of the national government of the republic of Mexico. Hearing that there were doubts in some quarters whether the French troops would be withdrawn at the time stipulated, and contemplating the possibility of some disposition of the United States forces which "would be useful in the restoration of law, order and republican government \* \* \* without interfering within the jurisdiction of Mexico or violating the laws of neutrality," he prepared fresh instructions for Campbell, who had not yet started on his mission, and who it was now determined should be accompanied to Mexico by General Sherman in order to render the formal recognition of Juarez more impressive. Stating that the United States desired not the future conquest of Mexico, but only to see her relieved from all foreign interference, he directed Campbell to go to Chihuahua or to any other place in Mexico (not occupied by the French) where he might be able to find Juarez, to ascertain whether the latter desired the good offices of the United States to aid in the restoration of order, to forward all news that could be obtained, and to await further orders. Two days later he wrote additional instructions giving his views of the Monroe doctrine and the American policy in Spanish America.<sup>42</sup>

In November, Campbell, accompanied by Sherman, sailed from New York, and, finding that the main gulf ports of Mexico were still held by the French, went to New Orleans to watch developments from a distance. In a later attempt to find Juarez or his government, they were unsuccessful.<sup>43</sup>

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41 61 Desps. Fr., No. 337 of June 14 and No. 358 of Aug. 17, 1866; Dip. Cor., 1866, part 1, p. 387.

42 H. exec. doc. 17, 39-2, vol 6, (Dec. 20, 1866, 179 pp.); 59 Desps. Fr., No. 240 of Jan. 11, and No. 391 of Dec. 13; 18 Instrs. Fr., p. 34, No. 545 of Oct. 9 and p. 493, No. 3 of Oct. 23, 1866; 5 Works of Seward, pp. 470-73.

43 H. exec. doc. 16, 39-2, pp. 377-85; Sen. exec. doc. 30, 40-1 (July 11, 1867).

On November 23, Seward, having received from Bigelow a despatch stating that the French evacuation had been postponed until spring, promptly sent a copy to Campbell, and seeking more definite information cabled a protest to Paris. "The United States expects an early withdrawal of France from Mexico," said he. "Delay would seriously conflict with the plans of the United States." General Dix, who had received appointment (on September 24) as successor of Bigelow, on December 11 reported his arrival in Paris and the satisfactory state of the Mexican question. The Emperor had agreed to withdraw all his troops in the spring, and had advised Maximilian to abdicate. He also made a proposition (which Seward declined on January 18, 1867) that a new provisional government should be formed, excluding both Maximilian and Juarez. On January 8, Seward telegraphed Campbell: "We wish you to remain at New Orleans while events ripen in Mexico. It now seems that it may be so long as March. But we can not anticipate events. It may be much shorter."<sup>44</sup>

Napoleon withdrew more quickly than he had promised. The departure of troops, begun in December, continued regularly until March 12 when the last detachment was withdrawn—while the stage was rapidly being prepared for the last tragic act of the drama of the Mexican empire.

It only remained to be seen whether the exotic monarchical government of Maximilian, which Seward had claimed had been dependent on the support of French bayonets, would now "vanish like chaff before the wind" as the Americans had predicted. It was after some hesitation that the unfortunate prince decided to remain after the withdrawal of the last foreign forces. He soon discovered that the intolerant, conservative, clerical party which had clambered for the restoration of the confiscated church property, was powerless to uphold him. His tottering empire went to pieces in two months and a week. Seward foreseeing the early collapse of the empire, promptly telegraphed Campbell to transmit to Juarez the hope that captured prisoners would receive humane treatment. The special messenger whom Campbell sent returned with a reply which intimated that Maximilian and his leading supporters, if captured, would be executed in retaliation for the harsh decrease which they had proclaimed. On June 1, hearing that they had been captured on May 15, and in response to the appeals of Austria, France and Great Britain to endeavor to avert the execution of Maximilian, he tele-

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44. Instrs. Mex., No. 4 of Nov. 23; 18 Instrs. Fr., p. 38, No. 550 of Nov. 23, p. 42, No. —, of Nov. 27; 62 Desps. Fr., Dec. 11, 1866; Instrs. Mex., p. 508, No. — of Jan. 8, 1867.

graphed Campbell to hasten to Mexico and earnestly to urge Juarez to adopt a policy of clemency. Under various pretensions Campbell delayed his departure until June 15, when Seward telegraphed for his resignation and requested Romero to notify his government promptly that the United States seeking no undue advantage in Mexico and apprehending no future European intervention there, strongly recommended clemency toward Maximilian—who had developed into a Mexican partisan chieftain. On the same day, the Juarez government confirmed the court-martial sentence of death upon Maximilian, who was promptly shot four days later—and whose remains after some delay were surrendered to his relatives and carried to Vienna where the funeral was celebrated in great pomp in the Cathedral, on January 18, 1868. In failing to commute Maximilian's sentence, doubtless Juarez was influenced by the passions of the army and by certain views connected with the future security of the country. In subsequent cases he practiced clemency which was gratifying to Seward.<sup>45</sup>

The French empire never recovered from the shock of the expensive<sup>46</sup> Mexican failure. After eating the pie of humiliation and defeat which Seward's shirt sleeves diplomacy prepared for him, the Emperor continued to lose prestige in Europe. Urged along slippery paths by fame-seeking generals and ambitious Jesuits, and finally by his wife, the Empress Eugenia, in 1870 he entered into a war against Prussia which resulted in his defeat and capture at Sedan, the collapse of his empire, and the shattering of the Napoleonic legend, and the establishment of the French republic.<sup>46</sup>

The subsequent government of Mexico was successful beyond all expectation. The Liberal forces soon crushed all armed opposition, and reestablished the constitutional government. Santa Anna, who returned to Mexico in the "Virginia" in the early summer to promote an insurrection, was arrested after his feeble, futile attempt and sent into banishment—from which he was finally allowed (1874) to return to the Mexican capital where he died in poverty and obscurity in 1876. On July 15, Juarez entered Mexico City which had been occupied by Diaz, his main commander. Elected president (on October 12), he inaugurated policies which started Mexico on a new era of development, and which after his death in 1872 were contin-

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45 Schouler in *N. Am. Rev.*, Apr. 1866; *Instrs. Mex.*, Apr. 6, 1867; *Dip. Cor.*, 1867, part 2, p. 560; M. Romero's "Correspondence de la Legation en Washington durante la intervencion extranjera, 1860-68. [Mexico, 1870-85] Tome IX; *Instrs. Mex.*, (Otterbourg) No. 10, Aug. 8, 1867.

46 *Dip. Cor.*, 1867, pp. 598-613 and 624-65. (Speeches in the French Corps Legislative, on July 9 and 10, by Thiers, Favre, and Rouher).

ued by Lerdo till 1876 and later by Diaz, who had headed a rebellion against both Juarez (1871) and Lerdo (1876) and has been president continuously since 1884. Plumb, who arrived at the Mexican capital on October 6, found that the Juarez government, receiving congratulations on the triumph of republican institutions, was entirely satisfied with the policy of the United States—though there was a lingering prejudice against all foreigners. Romero, returning to his country in a public vessel of the United States, and taking with him Morton and Banks, in expressing to Seward his deep gratitude said: "I shall do all possible to promote the best understanding between the two republics."<sup>47</sup>

Though there had been predictions that the expulsion of Maximilian would result in the "grateful annexation of Mexico" to the United States, or the satiation of the expansion ambitions by acquisitions beginning with the purchase of Lower California and Sonora,<sup>48</sup> Seward continued to adhere to his declaration that the United States desired to see the Mexicans relieved from all foreign military intervention to the end that they might assume the conduct of their own affairs, and desired no aggrandizement by conquest of Mexico or by purchase of land or dominion. Partly with a hope of helping to remove Mexican prejudices against Americans, he visited Mexico in the fall of 1869, after his term of office had expired, and made several public addresses which interpreted the significance of past events and were full of optimism for the future of the nations and peoples of the American continent.<sup>49</sup>

At Colima (on October 12), he said: "The experience of the eighteenth century indicated to mankind two important changes of society and government on the continent of America. First, that all American states must hereafter be not dependent European colonies, but independent American nations. Second, that all independent American nations thereafter have, not imperial governments, but republican governments constituted and carried on by the voluntary agency of the people themselves. \* \* \* \* A third improvement \* \* \* \* consists in the continuation of the many, or several contiguous nations or states, which are weak of themselves, into united states—distinct nations. \* \* \* \* One additional principle remains to be adopted, to secure the success of the republican system throughout the continent: \* \* \* That the several American republics, just as they constitute themselves, while mutually abstaining from intervention with each other, shall become, more than ever heretofore, political

47 *Ib.*, vol. 2, pp. 557-84, 613-20, 668 and 684; *Desps. Mex.*, Oct. 9 and No. 22 of Oct. 23; *Notes from Mex.*, Oct. 4, 1867.

48 M. D. Conway in *Fortnightly Rev.*, Jan. 1866; *Phil. N. Am. Gazette*, Apr. 12, 1867; *H. exec. doc.* 177, 40-2 (Feb. 17, 1868).

49 17 *Instrs. Mex.*, p. 493, (to Campbell) No. 3, Oct. 23, 1866; *Desps. Mex.*, (Nelson) No. 165, Jan. 28, 1870.

friends through the force of moral alliance. This in short, is the policy which I have inculcated at home, and which \* \* \* \* I shall commend, as far as possible, to the republics of Mexico, Central America, and South America." At Guadalajara (on October 23), after speaking of the difference between Germanic and Latin colonial civilization, he continued: "What remains, and all that remains now necessary is the establishment of entire tolerance between the North American states and the South American republics, and a creation of a policy of mutual moral alliance, to the end that all external aggression may be prevented, and that internal peace, law and order and progress may be secured throughout the whole continent." On November 30, in a speech at Mexico to the President of Mexico and the assembled people, he closed as follows: "The people of the United States \* \* \* ..have comprehended better than even their government has ever yet done, the benignant destinies of the American continent, and their own responsibility in that important matter. They know and see clearly that although the colonization in all parts of the continent was assigned to European monarchical states, yet that in perfecting society and civilization here, every part of the continent must sooner or later be made entirely independent of all foreign control and of every form of imperial or despotic power—the sooner the better. \* \* \* To the people of the United States the universal acceptance of republicanism is necessary, and happily it is no less necessary for every nation and people on the continent."<sup>50</sup>

## BRIEF NOTICES OF SOME NEW BOOKS.

**Neglected Neighbors.**—By Charles W. Weller. (John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, \$1.50). A description of the living conditions of the poorer classes in Washington. The author gives startling and shocking information of the qualor and misery of the alleys, tenements and shanties of the National Capitol, and suggests remedial measures. The book contains an introduction by President Roosevelt.

**The Government of American Cities.**—By Horace E. Deming, of the National Municipal League (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York., \$1.50 net). A timely, compact and illuminating study of municipal organization which is especially valuable for its historical survey of the development of intelligent municipal rule in Europe and its significant comparison of the working of intelligent foreign systems and the frequently clumsy local government machinery in the United States. The experiences of foreign cities are brought to bear upon American problems of to-day. In discussing the relation of the city to the state the author points out the evils of state interference and makes a plea for local self government.

**The Romance of American Expansion.**—By H. Addington Bruce. (Moffat Yard & Co., New York). A "biographical history of the territorial growth of the United States." The author writes of eight famous historical personages, Daniel Boone, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Sam Houston, Thomas H. Benton, John C. Fremont, William H. Seward, and William McKinley—and in telling their personal achievements creates the historical period to which they severally belong.

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**The Story of the Great Lakes.**—By Edward Channing and Marion Florence Lansing. Illustrated. (The MacMillan Co., N. Y., \$1.50), and their relation to western history. This interesting book tells the story of the inland waterways and their relation to western history for three centuries, with special emphasis upon the picturesque aspects of history which appeal to the general readers. It depicts the im-

portant events and the customs and life of each period from the days of discovery to recent days of great industrial achievements. It is largely a story of western development, centering about the lakes—from the days of the Indian trail to the days of turnpikes and canals and railroads and inland steamship lines.

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