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Description of contents

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- (2) Folder title/number: **(4)**
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(3) Date: **Feb. 1945 - Mar. 1945**

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(5) Item description and comment:

(6) Reproduction: Yes No

(7) Film no. _____ Sheet no. _____

D.I.R. #126

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

31 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 30 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY(a) GENERAL. Light activity continues to be the general rule among 35 ARMY units.(b) CEBU originated no Army traffic during the period under review, although messages were addressed to that ARMY HQS. by BACOLOD, BACUIO, TOKYO and API (37 ARMY HQS).As the radio station serving 35 ARMY HQS, here has not been heard since it closed down in order to move, it would seem that this HQS. has not yet been able to establish itself in any sort of a fixed position. IMPALUTAO tried in vain to contact CEBU.(c) IMPALUTAO. Routine traffic was addressed to DAVAO, BACUIO and TOKYO. And for the third consecutive day messages were originated for HELJO, (30 DIV. HOME DEPOT), which would seem to indicate some possible developments within 30 DIV., especially as TOKYO has been joined as co-addressee of all this traffic.(d) DAVAO. The only regular connections remaining are with IMPALUTAO and BACUIO. However for the past three days, traffic has passed between CAGAYAN and DAVAO, indicating some activity among the ground forces at CAGAYAN.

CEBU has disappeared from DAVAO'S activity and ZAMBOANGA makes, at best, a very irregular appearance.

(e) ZAMBOANGA. The radio station here was in operation during the period under review, having established contact with DAVAO. Messages were originated for IMPALUTAO, BACUIO and DAVAO, and probably consisted of reports on the situation at ZAMBOANGA.2. ARMY AIR(a) BACOLOD. For the past three days traffic here has steadily declined and during the period under review it reached one of the lowest levels yet observed. Interest is almost exclusively centered in MINDANAO, principally with DEL MONTE, and to a lesser extent MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and LASANG.

The ARMY AIR HQS. at BACOLOD and CEBU were in communication during the current period.

(b) NAGTAN. There was some evidence that the radio station serving the ARMY AIR base here attempted to call CEBU during the period under review but no contact was established. The last time this NAGTAN radio station was heard was sometime in February. Whether this is the same identical station is not known at present.~~SECRET~~
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SECRETTHUMB**SECRET**Z. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(c) DEL MONTE. Originated traffic was confined to LASANG, MALAYBALAY, DALIAO, BACOLOD and ZHAGUE.

External PHILIPPINE connections would indicate that, at the moment, DEL MONTE is the controlling ARMY AIR ADMINISTRATIVE HQS. in the Central and Southern PHILIPPINES.

The now almost daily occurrence of traffic addressed to BACOLOD being redirected to DEL MONTE suggests the evacuation of BACOLOD is near completion.

One of the messages which was redirected from BACOLOD to DEL MONTE was originated at SINGAPORE and was addressed to the "CHIEF OF STAFF, 2 F.D."

(d) GENERAL. During the period under review, COTABATO, DALIAO, LASANG, MALAYBALAY and VALENCIA were all active either among themselves or in some instances with BACOLOD.

NOTE. In D.I.R. #121, Para. 2 (a) part of the text is unreadable. The following is reprinted for the benefit of those whose copies were blurred:

(a) BACOLOD. The volume of traffic here reached one of the highest levels yet observed.

The bulk of the messages were addressed to DEL MONTE, LASANG and VALENCIA. This would seem to indicate that whatever movement is to be made from BACOLOD it is already or very shortly will be underway. And that this movement will involve the MINDANAO bases of DEL MONTE, VALENCIA and LASANG seems evident not only from the increased tempo of communications among these places themselves and from the volume of traffic generally, but also from the number of messages co-addressed to these three bases. The appearance of messages for DUMAGUETE and BANGUIRO would seem to indicate that these bases are also connected with the withdrawal. Army Air Traffic was also addressed to JOLO.

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I.O. 112 Sig, Rad Int. Co.
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
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D.I.R. #125

SECRETTUMB**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

30 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 29 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) GENERAL. Doubtless as a result of the many allied operations, communications among 35 ARMY units were on a somewhat reduced scale, and several of the radio stations serving these Army units were not heard.

(b) CEBU. The radio station serving 35 ARMY HQS. was silent for the third successive day. However some delayed Army traffic addressed to BACOLOD, BAGUIO, SAIGON and TOKYO was handled on the ARMY AIR link between CEBU and BACOLOD.

From this it would appear that the movement of the ARMY radio station did not proceed according to schedule and it became necessary to use the ARMY AIR communication system.

LA ANSA ARMY addressed a substantial number of messages to CEBU, one (1) of which was addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 102 DIV." This message had been sent to BACOLOD WEST where it was redirected to CEBU.

In a message from SAIGON, "THE CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" was addressed at CEBU. The following traffic, indicative of continued shipping activity, was sent to CEBU:

1. From HIROSHIMA and addressed "TO NO. 3 SHIPPING BRANCH"
2. From BACOLOD, addressed: "35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT."

(c) DAVAO. The connection with CAGAYAN appeared again during the period under review.

(d) IMPALUTAO. In a day of light activity, messages were addressed to DAVAO, BACOLOD, SAIGON, TOKYO and HELJO, (home depot of 30 DIV.)

(e) ZAMBOANGA. The radio station serving 54 I.M.B. was not heard during the current period.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) BACOLOD. Activity here was light. DEL MONTE was the principal recipient of traffic. But a substantial number of messages were addressed to CEBU.

CEBU, SAN JOSE and DUMAGUETE were the only Central PHILIPPINES air bases in contact with BACOLOD.

The message from BACOLOD to SAN JOSE was addressed: "C.O. YOSHIOKA UNIT."

At 1802, 29 March the BACOLOD radio station said it was "being attacked," but there was no indication as to the nature of the attack, (ie. land, sea or air).

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2. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(b) DEL MONTE. Traffic here remains at a high level. Connections were widespread both within and outside the PHILIPPINES.

Messages addressed to CEBU and to BACOLOD were redirected to DEL MONTE, indicating that withdrawals from the Central PHILIPPINES to MINDANAO are continuing.

(c) DALIAD received a message from PINRANG for the first time.

(d) VALENCIA. The connections with DEL MONTE has been particularly active during the past three (3) days.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from VALENCIA to BACOLOD, from LASANG to DEL MONTE, from DEL MONTE to SANDAKAN and BACOLOD, from BACOLOD to LASANG, VALENCIA and BAHAGUE and from MALAYBALAY and SAN JOSE.

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D.I.R. #125 (a)

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125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

30 March 1945

SUPPLEMENT

TO

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 125
(Information Derived from PEARL sources)

The following messages dealing with the situation at NEGROS and CEBU are interesting.

1. From CEBU to BACOLOD, 28 March at 1200: "Para. 2. The enemy at 0500 with a force of tanks (pushed through to) the airfield Morale of all personnel high." (This message was later relayed from BACOLOD to DEL MONTE).
2. From CEBU to BACOLOD OTSU (The first appearance of this suffix since 2 February 1945) and later relayed to DEL MONTE, 29 March at 1510: "Time 1500. The enemy with ten (10) cruisers and destroyers is shelling violently from WACTAN ISLAND AREA. -- Am burning all code books(with the exception of) the code book now in use. Morale of all personnel is high."
3. From BACOLOD to CEBU, 29 March, at 1715: " we are praying that you may fight bravely. (signed) C.O. 9942 BUTAI (NO. 6 AIR SIGNALS REGT)."
4. From BACOLOD to DEL MONTE, (later sent to SANDAKAN, CEBU, JOLO, SAN JOSE, all ARMY AIR bases having associations with BACOLOD), 29 March, at 1836: "The enemy landed at BACOLOD with about 100 airplanes supporting his shipping. Although this station may temporarily break off communications, please pardon it. Still please stand by for we shall certainly endeavor to maintain contact till the last."

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I.R. # 124

SECRETTHRU**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

29 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 28 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) CEBU. For the second consecutive day the radio station serving the elements of 35 ARMY HQS. at CEBU was not heard although it was called by IMPALUTAO, by the LEYTE garrison and by the VINAYAN elements of 55 I.M.B.

Some delayed traffic, originated by CEBU for BAGUIO, was passed by DAVAO to BAGUIO.

With the allied attack against CEBU all associations with MINDANAO seem to have been abandoned for the most part and contact only with BAGUIO is maintained. Traffic from 14 AREA ARMY HQS. to CEBU continues to be heavy.

(b) IMPALUTAO was more active during the current period. Messages were addressed to the higher commands at BAGUIO, SAIGON and TOKYO and to the MINDANAO commands at DAVAO and ZAMBOANGA.

Traffic for HELJO would indicate that 39 DIV. HQS. is also still at IMPALUTAO. Messages to BACOLOD, some of which were co-addressed to BAGUIO and SAIGON probably concern elements of 102 DIV. in the NEBROS area.

(c) DAVAO. Routine traffic was originated for BAGUIO and IMPALUTAO.

(d) CAGAYAN. Evidence of some activity involving the ground forces here was seen in messages originated for DAVAO. During the past seven days traffic has passed intermittently between DAVAO and CAGAYAN.

(e) ZAMBOANGA addressed traffic for BAGUIO, duplicates of which were previously sent to IMPALUTAO.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) BACOLOD. While traffic declined during the period under review, the MINDANAO bases, especially LASANG, VALENCIA and DEL MONTE, continue in prominence.

CEBU, DUMAGUETE and BANQUERO seem to be the only connections maintained with any degree of regularity outside the Southern PHILIPPINES and BONNE bases.

During the past few days ARMY AIR activity has been noted between JOLO and BACOLOD and during the current period BACOLOD addressed a substantial number of messages to JOLO.

(b) DEL MONTE. For the second consecutive day, activity was very heavy and VALENCIA was again the principal connection.

A substantial number of messages were addressed to MALAYBALAY and traffic was originated also for CEBU, BACOLOD, SILAY, LASANG and DALIAO which may concern evacuation by air.

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SECRETARMY AIR (cont.)

It is interesting to note that most of the messages to MALAYBALAY were also addressed to VALENCIA. These bases are strategically situated between DEL MONTE and LASANG.

In connection with the possible evacuation from CEBU to DEL MONTE, a message from BACOLOD to CEBU was there redirected to DEL MONTE.

(c) LASANG. With rare exceptions traffic is confined to BACOLOD and DEL MONTE.

(d) VALENCIA. The principal connection was with DEL MONTE but messages were also addressed to SILAY, MALAYBALAY and DALIAG.

The message to SILAY was also co-addressed to DEL MONTE.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to VALENCIA and LASANG, from DEL MONTE to BACOLOD and SANDAKAN and from ECHAGUE, DEL MONTE, LASANG and VALENCIA.

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I.O. 112 Sig. Rad. Int. Co.
Central Bureau, Adv. Sch.
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D.I.R. # 123

SECRETTHUMB**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

28 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 27 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) GENERAL. Once again communications among 35 ARMY units were on a very reduced scale.

(b) CEBU. The radio station serving 35 ARMY HQS. was not heard during the period under review. The move mentioned in our previous report (D.I.R. # 122, Par. 1 (b)) appears not to have been completed.

A small number of messages were addressed to CEBU and included those from BAGUIO, HIROSHIMA and the VISAYAN elements of 55 I.M.B.

The message from HIROSHIMA was addressed: "TO NO. 3 SHIPPING BRANCH."
The traffic from BAGUIO was co-addressed to IMPALUTAO.

(c) IMPALUTAO. Activity was confined to messages for ZAMBOANGA and DAVAO.

(d) DAVAO. Traffic for DEL MONTE for the first time was the only noteworthy item, the only other connection being with IMPALUTAO.

(e) ZAMBOANGA originated messages only for IMPALUTAO during the current period.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) BACOLOD. Activity here increased considerably during the period under review.

The MINDANAO bases of LASANG, DEL MONTE and VALENCIA received the bulk of the traffic, the emphasis being on LASANG. That this activity concerned all three bases is seen from the number of messages co-addressed to LASANG, DEL MONTE and VALENCIA.

Central PHILIPPINES connections were observed with DUMAGUETE and SAN JOSE. A message which SAN JOSE sent to BACOLOD was addressed to "C.O. 2 F.D. UNIT. # 6 AIR SECTOR COMMANDER (WASHI BUTAI CHU 6 KO CHIKU SHIREI KAN)

Messages addressed to IMPALUTAO probably concerned the withdrawals to MINDANAO. From PEARL sources it was learned that on 24 March 1945 a WASHI (2 F.D.) Staff message from BACOLOD was addressed to "CHIEF OF STAFF TSUBASA BUTAI (4 HIKOSHIDAN)" at ECHAGUE.

(b) DEL MONTE. Most of the messages originated here were for BACOLOD and VALENCIA with some also for LASANG.

There also was traffic for SILAY, CEBU, DALIAO and MALAYBALAY.

(c) JOLO addressed ARMY AIR traffic to BACOLOD.

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3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to API, ECHAGUE and SAN JOSE, from VALENCIA to BACOLOD, from SAN JOSE to BACOLOD, and from BACOLOD, DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and TAGIBILARAN.

TAGIBILARAN, on BAHOL ISLAND, appeared for the first time as an originator of warning messages.

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I.O. 112 Sig. Rad. Int. Co.
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
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D.I.R. #122

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~125 SIGNAL BATTAL INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

27 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 26 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) GENERAL. As indicated by traffic from LA AREA ARMY, CEBU, IMPALUTAO and DAVAO were the only active military bases of any importance.

(b) CEBU. The feature of the activity here was the very large number of messages from BAGUIO. For the past three days traffic from BAGUIO has been quite heavy and probably concerns plans for evacuation of CEBU. Some messages were co-addressed to IMPALUTAO, BAGUIO and SAIGON.

At 2010 on 26 March, CEBU told IMPALUTAO: "Am moving from here now. Please listen in for certain from 0800 on 27th." This message would indicate an evacuation from CEBU CITY. But as the move would take about twelve (12) hours, it would appear that the new HQS will not be very far from CEBU CITY.

The "CHIEF OF STAFF, LA AREA ARMY" was addressed at CEBU by SAIGON during the current period.

The only other connection of any importance was with the LYNTE garrison at CANQUIPOT and with the Visayan elements of 55 I.M.B.

(c) IMPALUTAO. Activity on MINDANAO centered around here with substantial traffic passing between DAVAO and IMPALUTAO.

Messages were also addressed to the ZAMBOANGA forces.

(d) ZAMBOANGA. sent the following message to IMPALUTAO via DAVAO: "Owing to shortage in expendable equipment, we regret that our transmission is bad and communication is impossible. We thank you for your co-operation."

It is interesting to note that IMPALUTAO did not call ZAMBOANGA during the period under review.

(e) JOLO. A very interesting development occurred during the current period. IMPALUTAO told CEBU: "I cannot hear JOLO." There is evidence at hand of the existence of a radio circuit between JOLO and IMPALUTAO. The fact that 35 ARMY is still taking an interest in activity at 55 I.M.B. HQS seems significant.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) BAGUIO. While the high level of activity observed during the preceding period was not maintained, traffic was none the less very substantial and as before, DEL MONTE was the principal addressee with LASANG and VALENCIA also receiving a large number of messages

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SECRET**2. ARMY AIR (cont)**

Some traffic was also sent to CEBU, SAN JOSE, BANGUERO and SANDAKAN.

Messages continue to pass between this ARMY AIR HQS and JOLO.

The following message was sent by BACOLOD to LA ARRA ARMY HQS: "Enemy ships departed ----- things here are all right as yet, but soon -----(corrupt)."

(b) DEL MONTE. Traffic with BACOLOD and LASANG constitutes about the entire activity for the period, with one (1) message going to SINGAPORE.

(c) LASANG'S connections are confined to DEL MONTE and BACOLOD.

(d) ERRACURTE. In a day of very light activity messages were addressed to BACOLOD and BANGUERO.

(e) SAN JOSE received a message from BACOLOD WEST, addressed: "C.O. 'YOSHIOKA' UNIT"

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to SAN JOSE and DEL MONTE from DEL MONTE to CEBU from BACOLOD WEST to SAN JOSE and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, CEBU and BACOLOD.

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I.O. 112 Sig. Hqd. Int. Co.
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
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125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500F. T. Drumby
F. Lambert
psm McCaughey
McLaughlin Fil

26 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 25 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

- (a) GENERAL. Activity at the MINDANAO Headquarters of IMPALUTAO AND DAVAO appeared to be routine and probably somewhat below normal. The bulk of the traffic passed between DAVAO and IMPALUTAO. 14 Area ARMY addressed a substantial number of messages to CEBU and ZAMBOANGA.
- (b) CAGAYAN. Traffic from DAVAO again appeared, giving indications of some ground activity at CAGAYAN.
- (c) ZAMBOANGA. During the period under review ZAMBOANGA was in communication only with DAVAO but no traffic was originated by ZAMBOANGA.
- (d) CEBU. Army activity in the Central PHILIPPINES appears to be controlled by CEBU and is on a very reduced scale. The LEYTE garrison at CANQUIPOT and the, as yet, unlocated elements of 55 I.M.B. produce the only active traffic connections. A message from BACOLOD to CEBU was addressed to "CAPT. YOSAF the "CHIEF OF STAFF", 102 DIV was addressed at CEBU by BACUIG. Messages from BACOLOD had the following addresses:
1. "35 ARMY STAFF SECTION, SPECIAL BRANCH".
2. "DIN SMI SAN THU".
- (e) BACOLOD TR. This Shipping Headquarters here was again in contact with BACUIG.
- (f) ILO ILO. The radio station serving the Army Hqs. here has not been heard since 17 March.

2. ARMY AIR

- (a) BACOLOD. The volume of traffic here reached one of the highest levels yet observed. The bulk of the messages were addressed to DEL MONTE, LASANG and VALENCIA. This would seem to indicate that whatever movement is to be made from BACOLOD it is already or very shortly will be underway. And that this movement will involve the MINDANAO bases of DEL MONTE, VALENCIA and LASANG seems evident not only from the increased tempo of communications among these places themselves and from the volume of traffic generally, but also from the number of messages addressed to these threats. It these bases are also connected with the withdrawal. Army Air Traffic was also addressed to JOLO.

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2. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(b) DEL MONTE addressed a message to IPO during the period under review.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent out from BACOLOD to SINGAPORE from DEL MONTE, from CHEN to DEL MONTE and BACOLOD and from DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and BACOLOD.

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D.I.R. #120

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125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

25 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 24 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. After a period of inactivity, traffic increased considerably during the period under review. BAGUIO and DAVAO were the principal addressees. And as both these places were joined as co-addressees of a substantial number of messages originated by IMPALUTAO, it would appear that IMPALUTAO and DAVAO constitute the principal centers on MINDANAO with IMPALUTAO as the Headquarters under 14 ARMA ARMY.

The very low volume of traffic with CEBU suggests that it has no control over MINDANAO operations.

(b) DAVAO'S principal contact now is with IMPALUTAO.

(c) ZAMBOANGA. During the period under review, delayed traffic was observed passing from the ARMY HQS. here to IMPALUTAO and BAGUIO, its superior commands.

(d) CEBU. Activity here was very light. CEBU'S chief concern now appears to be with the LETTE elements at CANQUIPOT and the elements of 55 I.M.B. located somewhere in the VISAYAS.

Cebu did receive a very substantial number of messages from BAGUIO.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) DALIAO. Traffic for MACASSAR SOUTH appeared for the first time.

(b) DEL MONTE. The "CHIEF OF STAFF, 2 F.D." was addressed here by MACASSAR EAST and by KUCHING.

A substantial number of messages were received from MACASSAR SOUTH, a connection which appears to be new.

(c) BACOLOD. Substantial activity was observed during the period under review, but no unusual connections appeared. MINDANAO bases, especially at DEL MONTE and LASANG, are the principal connections. And a message was addressed to JOLO for the first time in over ten (10) days. This message was also co-addressed to BANQUENO and DEL MONTE.

From PEARL sources it was learned that BACOLOD radio station was experiencing a fuel shortage and advised JOLO to this effect.

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2. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(d) DUMAGUETE. Traffic, principally with BACOLOD, increased considerably.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to CEBU, from CEBU to DEL MONTE, from DEL MONTE to CEBU and from MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and BACOLOD.

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- Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
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D.I.R. 119

SECRETTHUMB**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

24 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 23 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) GENERAL. During the past week there has been a gradual decline in communications throughout 35 ARMY.

Traffic from 14 AREA ARMY HQS. to IMPALUTAO and CEBU is fairly steady. Activity with DAVAO appears to be declining, but this may be only temporary. JOLO and the "ORMOC UNIT" have been dropped from the list of addressees of BAGUIO'S traffic and ZAMBOANGA receives only an occasional message.

As for the Central PHILIPPINES, elements of 55 I.M.B. in the VISAYAS area, appear to be the only unit giving evidence of any noteworthy activity, and these come under the direct control of CEBU.

(b) IMPALUTAO. Reoccurrence of traffic for API (HQS. 37 ARMY) was the only noteworthy item in a day of very light activity.

(c) CAGAYAN. After a week's silence CAGAYAN reappeared in the traffic with messages for BAGUIO and from DAVAO.

(d) ZAMBOANGA. During the period under review no traffic was originated here, nor was the ZAMBOANGA radio station heard, but messages were addressed to ZAMBOANGA by IMPALUTAO and BAGUIO.

(e) JOLO'S only contact is now with CEBU.

(f) CEBU. Activity here was very light with IMPALUTAO the principal connection.

(g) REF. D.I.R. #115, Par. 1 (d). RENATE therein referred to appears to be a corruption for "LEYTE." This suggests that some elements of 55 I.M.B. may have been on the move from LEYTE.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) COTABATO joined LASANG WEST and VALENCIA as co-addressees of one (1) of its messages. And the interesting feature of this traffic is that the message which VALENCIA received was first sent to DEL MONTE and there redirected to VALENCIA, which significantly is between DEL MONTE and LASANG.

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SECRET2. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(b) BACOLOD. Activity here has, in general, gradually declined. Except for routine and sometimes irregular contacts with ECHAGUE, BANQUERO, CEBU, BAGUIO, DUMAGUETE and SAN JOSE (PANAY), BACOLOD'S main connections are with DEL MONTE, LASANG and VALENCIA. This would indicate the trend of PHILIPPINE ARMY AIR activity and the bases involved.

(c) MACTAN. The connection with BANQUERO made one of its very rare appearances.

(d) ECHAGUE. The radio station serving the ARMY AIR HQS. here closed down at 2000 on 23 March.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from LASANG to DEL MONTE, from CEBU to DEL MONTE, from SAN JOSE to BACOLOD and from MALAYBALAY and BACOLOD.

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D.I.R. #118

SECRETTHUMB**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

23 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 22 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) GENERAL. Again communications within 35 ARMY were on a reduced scale and with some exceptions, produced only routine traffic.

(b) DAVAO. A message from COTABATO was noteworthy. And traffic from ZAMBOANGA reappeared after a lapse of four (4) days.

At 1425, IMPALUTAO sent the following message to DAVAO. "Enemy have landed at COTABATO."

DAVAO appears to share with IMPALUTAO the direction of ground operations in MINDANAO.

(c) JOLO. For the first time in several weeks JOLO was joined with IMPALUTAO as a co-addressee of traffic from CEBU. This possibly could be advice to IMPALUTAO of JOLO'S situation.

(d) ZAMBOANGA. The radio station serving the ARMY units at ZAMBOANGA, although called, was not heard during the period under review.

(e) BACOLOD TE. Traffic was addressed to BAGUIO, probably concerning shipping activities in the Central PHILIPPINES.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) LASANG. Three (3) items stand out in the activity here during the period under review:

1. Traffic was addressed to IMPALUTAO for the first observed time, and probably for purposes of liaison.

2. The volume of incoming messages was the largest yet recorded and they principally came from BACOLOD.

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
SECRET2. ARMY AIR (cont.)(a) LASANG.

3. A message was received from MACASSAR SOUTH and was addressed: "C.O. METEOROLOGICAL COMPANY", (KI SHO CHUTAI TEU). This same message was observed earlier in the period bearing the same address and was being sent from MACASSAR SOUTH to DAVAO.

Because of the close geographic position of DAVAO and LASANG, it is believed that this message was intended for LASANG. MACASSAR'S contact with the METEOROLOGICAL UNIT at LASANG becomes interesting as it suggests possibly the exchange of weather information between LASANG and MACASSAR. If there was to be any air transport between MINDANAO and the CELEBES such information would be important.

(b) BACOLOD. Activity was the heaviest since 15 March. LASANG and DEL MONTE were the principal recipients. This would seem to indicate pending developments in ARMY AIR matters and in which both DEL MONTE and LASANG are concerned.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from DEL MONTE to BACOLOD and from DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, JOLO and BACOLOD.



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D.I.R. #117

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

22 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 21 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) GENERAL. During the period under review activity at 35 ARMY HCS, and all its subordinate units was very light. For the most part only routine connections were observed.

While 14 AREA ARMY addressed messages to IMPALUTAO, DAVAO, and ZAMBOANGA, its principal association was with CEBU.

(b) ZAMBONGA. Traffic now is confined to IMPALUTAO and BACUIG. First JOLO, then DAVAO and now CEBU seem to have disappeared from the list of addressees of ZAMBONGA's traffic, although there are communication links between ZAMBONGA and CEBU and ZAMBONGA and DAVAO.

(c) CEBU's importance appears to have gradually declined, and its sphere of activity is practically confined to the immediate CEBU-NEGROS-PANAY area.

(d) BACOLOD TE. Further evidence of shipping activity between PANAY and NEGROS is seen in traffic addressed to ILO ILO and ILO ILO TE, this latter making its second appearance in the past four (4) days.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) GENERAL. With few exceptions ARMY AIR activity, like ARMY activity, was routine.

(b) LASANG ranks second to DEL MONTE as an ARMY AIR ADMINISTRATIVE base in MINDANAO.

LASANG's most regular contact is with DEL MONTE.
Interesting was a message from HSDINKING AIR addressed to BACOLOD and there re-directed to LASANG. This may suggest that LASANG will play an important part in the move of 2 FD out of the PHILIPPINES, a likely development in view of ZAMBONGA affording an Allied base for thrusts against the BORNED bases.

(c) HALAYBALAY. Heavy traffic for BACOLOD and a message for VALENCIA for the first time in several weeks were the only noteworthy items.

(d) DUMAGUETE. The association of BANQUERO and DUMAGUETE was observed during the period under review for the first time since early February. At 1455 DUMAGUETE sent the following message to BANQUERO: "Best wishes. No orders yet."

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3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to SAN JOSE, from CEBU to DEL MONTE, from DEL MONTE to CEBU and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA AND BACOLOD.

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D.I.R. #117 (a)

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PEARL

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

11 MARCH 1945

SUPPLEMENT

TO

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 117
(Information Derived from PEARL Sources)

BRIGADE.

1. SAN JOSE. A message from SAN JOSE to RACOLON mentioned the 77th

2. RACOLON sent the following message to SAN JOSE at 1050 on 21 March:

"We thank you heartily for your efforts. Please endeavor to communicate till the last. Of the PANAY stations we are praying for the efforts of your station alone."

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- Central Bureau, Adv. Sch.
- File

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D.I.R. #116

SECRET125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500W
21 March 1945**DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT**
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 20 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. As was true of 35 ARMY HQS. and all subordinate units, traffic here during the period under review was somewhat lighter than usual and for the most part included normal routine connections.

For the second successive day a message was addressed to API.
After a lapse of about a week traffic was originated for JOLO.

(b) ZAMBOANGA originated no traffic during the period under review although its radio station was in contact with CEBU and DAVAO but not with IMPALUTAO.

(c) JOLO. The connection with the LYTTE remnants of 55 I.M.B. appears to be a daily one. ✓

The radio station at DAVAO advised the radio station at IMPALUTAO that it had no communication with JOLO. Then the IMPALUTAO station replied that there was communication "BAGUIO-API-JOLO."

The establishment of a link between API and JOLO appears to be a very recent development and may indicate that 55 I.M.B. will cease to be under the control of 35 ARMY and will operate as a unit of 37 ARMY. In view of allied operations at ZAMBOANGA this is a logical move.

The following message passed from CEBU to JOLO: "Has NOGUCHI BUTAI arrived?" JOLO replied: "It has not arrived. However everyone is well and we are holding fast." (NOTE: D.I.R. #115 Par. 1 (d), message that Capt. INOSE was with NOGUCHI BUTAI. These statements appear to be conflicting).

(d) CEBU. Two (2) messages were received from BAGOLOD DEN (Message Center) addressed as follows:

1. "C.O. 35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT."
2. "C.O. CEBU MESSAGE CONTROL OFFICE."

(e) BAGUIO. HQS. 14 AREA ARMY was in contact with CEBU, IMPALUTAO and DAVAO. ✓

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SECRET**2. ARMY AIR**

(a) BACOLOD. In a day of brisk activity, the MINDANAO ARMY AIR bases at DEL MONTE and LASANG, and LA ARRA ARMY HQS. were the principal addressees. Traffic for SAN JOSE appeared for the first time in several weeks.

BACOLOD called the radio station at IPO for the first time since 10 March.

At 1345 the BACOLOD radio station told SAN JOSE that ILO ILO was being attacked.

All other ARMY AIR bases within the PHILIPPINES produced only routine connections.

(b) CABATUAN. The radio station serving the ARMY AIR base has not been heard since it closed down at 1530 on 19 March.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from DEL MONTE to LASANG and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, JOLD and BACOLOD.

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D.I.R. 7245

SECRETTHUMB**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

20 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 19 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. Activity was brisk with traffic for the higher commands and also for DAVAO and ZAMBOANGA. Again messages were co-addressed to TOKYO, SAIGON, BAGUIO and BACOLOD, indicating, as before suggested, that the MINDANAO operations center around IMPALUTAO, with BACOLOD being kept advised as to developments.

Interesting was one (1) message sent to API, probably reporting to the 37 ARMY command there the MINDANAO situation.

Five (5) delayed messages which JOLO sent to CEBU were there redirected to IMPALUTAO. In connection with the suggested move of part of 35 ARMY HQS. from CEBU to IMPALUTAO, this is very significant, for these messages were addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY JO (INTELLIGENCE)."

(b) DAVAO. The high level of activity of the preceding period was maintained. For the third day no messages were addressed to ZAMBOANGA.

(c) ZAMBOANGA. Traffic was very light and was confined to messages for IMPALUTAO and BAGUIO.

(d) JOLO. Activity was the heaviest yet recorded, and included traffic for CEBU and IMPALUTAO and a message apparently intended for those 55 I.M.B. elements which survived the LEYTE campaign and are now somewhere in the Central PHILIPPINE area.

The joining of these LEYTE remnants with JOLO as co-addressees of traffic from CEBU is interesting.

JOLO sent the following message to CEBU: "Capt. INOSE has arrived from RENATE and is at present with NOGUCHI SECTION." (NOTE: The meaning and/or location of RENATE is not known here).

(e) CEBU. Messages from JOLO to CEBU were addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY." Duplicates of these were sent to IMPALUTAO, addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY JO (INTELLIGENCE)." (See Par. 1 (a) above.)

CEBU SHIPPING. Traffic from FABRICA gives added evidence of shipping activity in this area. A message was addressed: "C.O. NO. 3 SHIPPING TRANSPORT COMMAND (UNIT)."

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2. ARMY AIR.


(a) DEL MONTE. Traffic was heavy and worthy of notice was the reappearance of the connection with YHO. This message was redirected to DEL MONTE by BACOLOD suggesting the location here of some ARMY AIR personnel who were at BACOLOD.

(b) CABATUAN. The radio circuit between the ARMY AIR base here and the HQS. at BACOLOD closed down 19 March at 1530. Just before this happened, BACOLOD sent the following message to CABATUAN: "I pray that you fight bravely."

(c) BACOLOD. The following message was sent by BACOLOD to BANQUERO and later to DUMAGUETE: "The enemy has made a landing on PANAY ISLAND. We will report the situation hourly without fail."

(d) GENERAL. During the period under review ARMY AIR activity in the PHILIPPINES appeared to be normal and gave no indications of any immediate developments.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from DEL MONTE, VALENCIA and MALAY-BALAY.



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D.I.R. #114

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

19 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 18 March 1945)

1. 35 ARMY

- (a) IMPALUTAO. Traffic for CEBU, DAVAO, ZAMBOANGA and the "ORMOG UNIT" comprised the total activity for the period under review. The following message which passed from CEBU to IMPALUTAO is interesting as it suggests preparations for IMPALUTAO'S increasing importance: "We are in direct communication with your place. Make a special report of unit call sign and equipment."
- (b) DAVAO. Activity was the heaviest it has been in almost two months. DAVAO too plays an important role in the MINDANAO operations.
- (c) CAGAYAN. A substantial number of messages from DAVAO was interesting. Activity here has increased and regular connections have been observed with DAVAO and CEBU.
- (d) ZAMBOANGA continues to have traffic for IMPALUTAO, CEBU, the "ORMOG UNIT" and BAGUIO.
- (e) JOLO. Again traffic was co-addressed to CEBU and the "ORMOG UNIT."
- (f) CEBU received a message from ILO ILO which was addressed: "C.O. 10678 UNIT."
- (g) BACOLOD TE. Further evidence of shipping activity in the NEGROS-PANAY-CEBU area is seen in the traffic from this SHIPPING HQS.. A rather lengthy message was addressed to CEBU and messages were also addressed to ILO ILO and ILO ILO TE. This first appearance of the suffix "TE" in connection with ILO ILO is interesting and seems to indicate the establishment there of a branch Shipping Office which will act in concert with BACOLOD TE in conducting troop movements in this area.

2. ARMY AIR

- (a) BACOLOD. During the past three days, activity has remained steady with no unusual connections appearing. Generally throughout the PHILIPPINES, ARMY AIR traffic produced normal activity with routine associations.

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3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from JOLO to CEBU and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and BACOLOD.

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D.I.R. # 113

SECRETTHUMB125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

18 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 17 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. Very heavy traffic from this HQS. was the outstanding feature of 35 ARMY activity during the period under review.

Generally the pattern was messages for 100 DIV. at DAVAO, 54 I.M.B. at ZAMBOANGA, and the higher HQS. at CEBU, BAGUIO, SAIGON and TOKYO, with BACOLOD apparently being kept advised of all developments.

HQS. of 35 ARMY now appears to be split between CEBU and IMPALUTAO, with the forward HQS. at IMPALUTAO. It is peculiar however that during the period under review CEBU addressed no traffic to IMPALUTAO.

(b) ZAMBOANGA produced only the regular connections with IMPALUTAO, DAVAO, CEBU and BAGUIO.

It now seems that ZAMBOANGA has resumed normal communications with both DAVAO and CEBU, but peculiarly enough, not with IMPALUTAO.

(c) JOLO. Activity here was particularly brisk. The bulk of the traffic went to CEBU. But most interesting were two (2) messages addressed to the "ORMOG UNIT", copies of which also were sent to CEBU. The connection between JOLO and this "ORMOG UNIT" may possibly concern elements of 55 I.M.B. which were engaged in the LEYTE campaign.

(d) CEBU. Traffic again was on a reduced scale and included connections with 14 AREA ARMY and most all of the 35 ARMY units. The association with CAGAYAN now makes a daily appearance.

A message from ILO ILO to CEBU was addressed: "C.O., 20678 UNIT." While "2" was quite definitely part of the address, it may be an error and that "10678" was the code number intended. This was previously suggested as the code number for a unit of 105 DIV. (See D.I.R. #110, Par. 1 (d)), but later information was received here to the effect that "10678" is the code number of 78th INFANTRY BRIGADE, 102 DIV. This unit has been addressed at CEBU, where it appears to have moved from BACOLOD.

(e) ILO ILO. It would appear from the traffic that troop movements between PANAY, NEGROS and CEBU are continuing.

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2. ARMY AIR

(a) DEL MONTE. Traffic for SILAY made one of its irregular appearances. This, together with messages addressed to UJIYAMA were the only noteworthy items of the activity.

(b) MALAYBALAY addressed traffic to LASANG, possibly for the first time.

(c) VALENCIA. Connections were more widespread than usual and included LASANG WEST, DALIAG and TALISAY, the latter being rather rare.

Interesting was the joining of DALIAG and TALISAY as co-addressees of a message originated here.

(d) BACOLOD. Routine traffic to regular addressees appeared to be the substance of the activity during the period under review.

Messages sent to BACOLOD possibly from BANQUERO, had the following addresses:

1. CHIEF OF STAFF RO SHI (RO DIV.7)
2. C.O. NO. 6 (?) AIR SIGNALS REGT. (RO KU KOKU TSU SHIN REN TAI TSU).
3. C.O. NO. 6 SECTOR.
4. C.O. NO. 5 CHUTAI.
5. C.O. NO. 32 AIRFIELD (CO. ?)

At 0751, on 17 March, the BANQUERO radio station said to BACOLOD: "Communication impossible. Busy condition unknown." However BANQUERO continued to be in contact with BACOLOD.

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D.I.R. 112

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THUMB125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

17 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 16 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

- (a) ZAMBOANGA was the most active of all 35 ARMY HQS. during the period under review. The traffic was chiefly addressed to CEBU, IMPALUTAO and BAGUIO, with messages also originated for DAVAO, JOLO and the "OIMOC" UNIT. ZAMBOANGA continues to received a very large amount of traffic from BAGUIO. Considering the situation at ZAMBOANGA this activity is what would be expected.
- (b) CAGAYAN. Reappearance of the link between CEBU and CAGAYAN during the period under review, and the now regularly appearing traffic associations with DAVAO, CEBU and BAGUIO suggests that CAGAYAN may again become a base of some importance.
- (c) CEBU. JOLO sent a message to CEBU, addressed "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY SHIPPING."
- (d) BAGUIO. During the past four days, traffic from LA AREA ARMY HQS. to 35 ARMY units has been very heavy and during the current period CEBU and ZAMBOANGA were the principal recipients.

2. ARMY AIR

- (a) DEL MONTE. While activity was brisk, it was confined to the usual recipients, (the MINDANAO ARMY AIR bases at COTABATO, DALIAO, LASANG, MALAYBALAY and VALENCIA) and BACOLOD.
- (b) BACOLOD. Traffic was about equally divided between the regular PHILIPPINE addressees and the external bases.

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3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to DEL MONTE and to JOLO, and from DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

1501 - BANQUERO

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TUMB125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

16 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 15 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. Traffic returned to very substantial levels. The now regular connections with CEBU, BAGUIO, SAIGON and TOKYO appeared along with messages for the commands at DAVAO and ZAMBOANGA.

For the second consecutive day traffic from BAGUIO was very heavy.

Multiple address messages to the higher HQS. at BAGUIO, SAIGON and TOKYO give further indication of IMPALUTAO'S importance as a HQS. And it is to be noted that in several of these messages BACOLOD is also joined as a co-addressee. Possibly this means that HQS., 2 F.D. is being kept advised as to operations in MINDANAO.

(b) CAGAYAN. Messages addressed to DAVAO, CEBU and BAGUIO, with the number to DAVAO being particularly large indicates activity among the ground forces at CAGAYAN.

(c) DAVAO. Traffic was heavy and IMPALUTAO was the principal recipient.

(d) ZAMBOANGA. For the second consecutive day BAGUIO addressed a large number of messages to ZAMBOANGA.

The only traffic originated here was co-addressed to IMPALUTAO and CEBU. During the period under review ZAMBOANGA was in communication with CEBU and DAVAO.

(e) CEBU. Activity here has steadily declined during the past three days.

(f) BAGUIO. A message from JOLO was addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 14 AREA ARMY."

2. ARMY AIR

(a) BACOLOD. After two days of light activity, traffic rose sharply during the period under review. A substantial volume of traffic was addressed to DEL MONTE, but other than that only the usual connections in the CENTRAL PHILIPPINES, MINDANAO and BORNEO were observed.

Generally throughout the PHILIPPINE ARMY AIR bases only routine activity was observed.

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3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to JOLO, and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, ZAMBOANGA and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERTS:

- 0905 - BANQUERO
- 1020 - CEFU
- 1027 - BANQUERO
- 1339 - DAVAO
- 1215 - DUMAGUETE

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1st Lt. Sig. C.
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D.I.R. #110

SECRETTHUMB125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

15 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 14 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. Activity here was very light during the period under review, with traffic confined to CEBU, BACOLOD and BAGUIO. The volume of incoming traffic continues at very substantial levels.

(b) CAGAYAN. A message was co-addressed to DAVAO and BAGUIO.

(c) ZAMBOANGA. For the second consecutive day activity was brisk. The principal addressees of traffic were CEBU and IMPALUTAO, with messages also for JOLO and DAVAO. A very substantial number of messages was received from BAGUIO.

During the period under review ZAMBOANGA was in contact with the DAVAO radio station, but not with CEBU or JOLO.

(d) CEBU. Traffic was light and was principally addressed to higher headquarters.

The "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" was addressed at CEBU both by JOLO and SAIGON.

An interesting message was sent by ILO ILO to CEBU, for it was addressed: "C.O. 10678 UNIT" (HI RE MU NA YA BUTAI TEU). No. 10678 is the code number for a unit of 105 DIV., whose HQS. are in the WAWA area.

Both the "CHIEF OF STAFF, 102 DIV.", and the "C.O., 102 DIV. UNIT" were addressed at CEBU by BAGUIO.

A message from BAYOMBONG to CEBU was addressed: "C.O., CEBU DETACHMENT, MESSAGE CONTROL OFFICE."

(e) ILO ILO continues to evidence some activity.

(f) BAGUIO'S traffic for 35 ARMY was the heaviest yet recorded. CEBU, IMPALUTAO, DAVAO, ZAMBOANGA and JOLO shared about equally and in the majority of cases messages were co-addressed to all five places, giving every indication of the formation of plans for operations in MINDANAO.

The "CHIEF OF STAFF, 14 AREA ARMY" was addressed at BAGUIO by JOLO.

(g) "ORMOC" UNIT. It is suggested that the "KAGIHOTSUTO" referred to in previous reports may be MT. CANGUIPOT, on LEYTE, approximately two (2) miles southeast of VILLABA.

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2. ARMY AIR

(a) CAGAYAN SOUTH appeared as the recipient of traffic from LIMBOENG during the period under review.

(b) DEL MONTE. Activity continued to be brisk, with MALAYBALAY and VALENCIA as the principal addressees. Traffic was sent to SILAY for the first time in over a week.

(c) MALAYBALAY. A connection between MALAYBALAY and LASANG WEST was observed apparently for the first time.

(d) BACOLOD. Traffic with LIMBOENG for the second time in three (3) days and traffic from SARAVIA for the first time were the only items of interest. During the period under review BACOLOD was in contact with the ARMY AIR radio station at ZAMBOANGA.

Generally ARMY AIR activity indicates some realignment of forces both in the Central PHILIPPINES and on MINDANAO.

(e) CABATUAN told BACOLOD that there was an "ATTACK" at 1530. (The nature of the attack was not indicated, i.e., land, sea or air).

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to JOLO and from DEL MONTE, DEL MONTE EAST, LASNAG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO, BACOLOD and BAGUIO.

AIR ALERTS:

0630 - CAGAYAN
0916 - BANQUERO
1057 - BANQUERO
1643 - BANQUERO

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D.I.R. # 109

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

14 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 13 March 1945)

1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. Activity remained about the same as that for the preceding period and again included connections with TOKYO, SAIGON, BACUIO, CEBU, DAVAO and BACOLOD.

The connection with BACOLOD began to make a regular appearance on 9 March, the date on which IMPALUTAO gave indications of importance as an advance HQS. of 35 ARMY. Steady traffic with BACOLOD has always been characteristic of CEBU'S activity. And now its appearance with IMPALUTAO fits in with the suggestion of an enlargement of IMPALUTAO'S control.

(b) DAVAO. A very substantial volume of traffic was originated at DAVAO. IMPALUTAO was the principal addressee with the balance going to BACUIO and CEBU.

(c) ZAMBOANGA re-established communications with DAVAO during the period under review. Traffic was very heavy and included messages for IMPALUTAO, DAVAO, JOLO and CEBU, probably giving advice on the current ground situation and any contemplated moves. However it appears to be certain that ZAMBOANGA is out of communications with IMPALUTAO, CEBU and JOLO.

(d) JOLO. After a silence of one (1) day, messages were addressed to CEBU. ~~There is evidence that on 13 March, some time before 1255, communications between JOLO and IMPALUTAO ceased.~~

(e) CEBU. Activity was light. Shipping traffic for UJINA was the only interesting feature. At 0019, 13 March, CEBU sent the following message to BACOLOD: "Strength not known, only sound of gunfire (heard)."

(f) BACUIO. Traffic from 14 AREA ARMY HQS. to the 35 ARMY commands was very heavy. DAVAO, CEBU and IMPALUTAO were the chief recipients, with ZAMBOANGA and JOLO next in line. This evidences considerable concern by 14 AREA ARMY in the MINDANAO situation.

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2. ARMY AIR

(a) CAGAYAN. A most interesting connection was observed when LIMBOENG addressed a message to CAGAYAN.

LIMBOENG is closely associated with 7 F.D. and was regularly in contact with BACOLOD. The probable move of 2 F.D. from BACOLOD to MINDANAO and this traffic makes CAGAYAN a possible location for 2 F.D.. However there is also some evidence to suggest that the HQS. of 2 F.D. may move to DEL MONTE.

(b) DAVAO KO. The suffix "KO" appeared in connection with DAVAO for the first time during the period under review.

The suffix "KO" has been seen with BAGUIO as a code name for 14 AREA ARMY, and also it has been considered to be an ARMY AIR suffix. In the instant case, traffic was originated by HEITO (4 P.A. HQS.) and addressed to "DAVAO KO." It is suggested that "KO" as here used signifies an ARMY AIR HQS. at DAVAO.

(c) DEL MONTE. A connection with YHO was the only noteworthy item.

(d) BACOLOD. The high level of activity of the preceeding period was not sustained. Heavy traffic for LASANG and VALENCIA for the second consecutive day was interesting.

From PEARL sources the presence of YAMAMOTO HUNTAI at JOLO and WASHI BUTAI at BACOLOD was confirmed.

(e) BANQUERO. Traffic for MACTAN appeared for the first time in almost a month.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to DEL MONTE and JOLO and from DEL MONTE EAST, MALAYBALAY and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERTS:

- 0933 - JOLO
- 1035 - BANQUERO
- 1040 - BANQUERO

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D.I.R. #109 (a)

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

14 March 1945

SUPPLEMENT
TO
DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 109
(Information Derived from PEARL Sources)

The following messages, derived from PEARL sources are interesting:

1. From JOLO, 13 March at 0940:
"At 0155 what appeared to be two torpedo boats minesweeping 1000 metres off the shore, fired on --- and headed west. SHO ATTACK UNIT (SHO KOGEKI BUTAI)."
2. From BACOLOD, 13 March at 1915:
"----- sound of gunfire in intensity. At 1510 one P.T. boat patrolling on the horizon off the right tip of ----."
3. From JOLO, 14 March at 0600:
"Time. 0600. 2 enemy torpedo boats after shelling ground positions proceeded east distance 2 kilos."
4. From ZAMBOANGA, 14 March at 1030:
"At 2200 on the 9th, the enemy landing began. At 0200 on the 10th this station moved into the KAPI MOUNTAINS, 15 kilos north of ZAMBOANGA. As we were gathering the signal equipment together, communication was broken off."

(NOTE: Although "KAPI MTS." have not been located, "15 kilos north of ZAMBOANGA" gives the approximate re-location of this radio station.)

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D.I.R. #108

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THUMB125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

13 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 12 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. Activity declined considerably during the period under review, but this seems to be a reflection of the generally light volume of traffic observed among 35 ARMY units.

DAVAO, CEBU, BACOLOD and BAGUIO were the only addressees of messages.

(b) GAGAYAN. Worthy of notice was the very large volume of traffic addressed to CEBU which possibly may concern transportation activity.

(c) ZAMBOANGA. The radio station serving the ARMY HQS. here was active but no traffic was originated. Messages however were received from BAGUIO.

The station serving the ARMY AIR units was silent for the second consecutive day.

There is some evidence that both the ARMY and ARMY AIR units have combined with the NAVY for communication purposes, and further that a move may be underway.

(d) JOLO. For the first time at least in a month, no traffic was originated here, although JOLO was in communication with CEBU.

(e) CEBU. Activity increased considerably, but no new connections were observed.

The "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" was addressed at CEBU by API.

SAIGON sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "C.O., 35 ARMY MEDICAL SECTION."

"C.O., 35 ARMY (18200) UNIT" was addressed at CEBU by ILO ILO.

(f) BACOLOD. Of particular interest were the following multiple address messages:

1. CEBU originated traffic co-addressed to TOKYO, SAIGON, BAGUIO and BACOLOD.

2. IMPALUTAO co-addressed messages to DAVAO, BACOLOD and BAGUIO, to DAVAO, CEBU, BACOLOD and BAGUIO, and to CEBU, BACOLOD and BAGUIO.

This traffic seems to indicate an interest by BACOLOD in ARMY activity, especially as it pertains to MINDANAO, and it may suggest the presence, possibly only temporarily, at BACOLOD of some ARMY authority, whose duty it may be to co-ordinate troop movements.

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1. 35 ARMY (cont.)

(g) "CHMOC" UNIT continues to evidence considerable activity, the principal connections being with CEBU and BACUIO.

The name KAGIHOTSUTO has appeared in traffic, and while its location, if it be a place name, is not known, it may possibly have some connection with this unlocated 35 ARMY unit.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) DALIAO co-addressed traffic to BACOLOD and COTABATO apparently for the first time.

(b) BACOLOD. Activity was the heaviest in two weeks, the principal addressees being CEBU, DEL MONTE, LASANG and VALENCIA.

This traffic indicates that the bulk of the ARMY AIR activity within the PHILIPPINES is now in MINDANAO.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to JOLO and from BACUIO, BACOLOD, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and JOLO.

AIR ALERTS:

0948 - BANQUERO
1205 - BANQUERO
1520 - BANQUERO

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D.I.R. #107

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125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

12 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 11 March 1945)

1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. For the third successive day traffic was substantial and again included connections with CEBU, BAGUIO, SAIGON and TOKYO, as well as with DAVAO, JOLO and the "OHMOU" unit. Thus we continue to see evidence that IMPALUTAO'S control extends beyond 30 DIV. matters.

(b) DAVAO. Traffic for CAGAYAN was the only noteworthy item.

(c) ZAMBOANGA. During the period under review, neither the radio station serving the ARMY HQS., nor the one serving ARMY AIR HQS. was heard. While no attempt was made to contact the ARMY AIR station, the ARMY station was called without any answer.

(d) CEBU. Traffic was again very light and produced only routine connections. According to information passed between IMPALUTAO and CEBU, it appears that on 11 March, the CHIEF OF STAFF, 14 ARMA ARMY was at BAGUIO.

(e) BACOLOD TEL. Traffic continues to suggest some shipping activity being directed from here, and in it ILO ILO and DAVAO are interested.

(f) "OHMOU" UNIT is still active and a connection with IMPALUTAO is now making a regular appearance.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) DEL MONTE. Traffic for BACOLOD was very heavy, otherwise only routine connections within the PHILIPPINES occurred.

However of interest was a message originated by DEL MONTE for MUTANKIANG. This was the first appearance of this association seen here, and its exact significance is not known. Elements of 2 F.D. were known to be at MUTANKIANG, and possibly this may explain the connection.

A message from BACOLOD to DEL MONTE was addressed: "C.O. NO. 1 SIGNALS UNIT."

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2. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(b) BACOLOD. Activity was the lowest it has been in two weeks and all addressees were regular ones.

BACOLOD received traffic from TUGUEGARAO for the first time in two weeks.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to DEL MONTE, from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, JOLO and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERTS:

0712 - BANQUERO
0906 - CEBU
0925 - DUMAGUETE
1045 - BANQUERO
1143 - JOLO
1415 - BANQUERO
1420 - BANQUERO

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Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
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2. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(b) BACOLOD. Activity was the lowest it has been in two weeks and all addressees were regular ones.

BACOLOD received traffic from TUGUEGARAO for the first time in two weeks.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to DEL MONTE, from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, JOLO and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERTS:

- 0712 - BANCORO
- 0906 - CEBU
- 0925 - DUMAGUETE
- 1045 - BANCORO
- 1143 - JOLO
- 1415 - BANCORO
- 1420 - BANCORO

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D.I.R. #106

SECRET**SECRET**THUMB125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

11 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 10 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. Activity continues at very substantial levels. Traffic connections were maintained with CEBU, BAGUIO, TOKYO and SAIGON and with all 35 ARMY units.

The volume of traffic plus the nature of the addressees indicates that IMPALUTAO has assumed an importance greater than that of DIVISIONAL HQS. Witness the co-addressing of traffic to TOKYO, SAIGON, BAGUIO and CEBU. Also it is worthy of note that IMPALUTAO now addressees traffic to BACOLOD and to the "OFMOC" unit.

(b) DAVAO. Traffic from BAGUIO was particularly heavy.

(c) ZAMBOANGA originated the largest number of messages yet recorded, with the bulk of it being addressed to IMPALUTAO.

The major MINDANAO ARMY HQS., together with JOLO and CEBU, were joined as co-addressees of several messages from ZAMBOANGA, probably outlining plans to meet the allied attack.

On 10 March at 1631, the radio station serving the army command at ZAMBOANGA told CEBU: "I am closing down. I expect to communicate on the 11th."

There was no ARMY AIR traffic observed coming from or addressed to ZAMBOANGA during the period under review.

(d) CEBU. Activity here dropped to a very low level.

BACOLOD WEST again sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY." BACOLOD DEN addressed the "C.O., 35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT" at CEBU.

(e) ILO ILO. While the number of messages originated was small, the associations were interesting. They included BAGUIO, DAVAO (for the first time at least in several months) and BACOLOD TE.

Connecting ILO ILO with the MINDANAO ground activity, possibly the movement of troops to MINDANAO, were messages originated by BAGUIO and co-addressed to ILO ILO, DAVAO and IMPALUTAO.

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2. ARMY AIR

(a) BACOLOD. Activity was normal and included the usual MINDANAO, CENTRAL PHILIPPINES and BORNEO ARMY AIR bases.

Generally through the PHILIPPINES, ARMY AIR traffic produced only normal routine connections.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to JOLO and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and BACOLOD.

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D.I.R. #106 (a)

SECRET**SECRET**PEARL125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

11 March 1945

SUPPLEMENTDATE TO
DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 106
(Information Derived from Pearl Sources)

In connection with the ZAMBOANGA situation, the following messages originated on 10 March, are of interest:

1. From JOLO at 2000:

"Part 2. It continued until 1100.

0845-1030: 80 B-24's bombed the airfield area.

0945: The enemy commenced landing on the center of the coastline of the old airfield (T.N. ARMY airfield).

It is confirmed that by 1130, 8 tanks and about 1500 men had effected a landing."

2. From JOLO at 2020:

"Part 1. Battle position of 33rd GARRISON UNIT (KEI BI TAI).

JOLO 10th March.

Enemy battleships from a force of 3 battleships, 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 10 minesweepers, 70 transports (10 large, 60 small), 90 landing craft began bombarding ISABELA from 0557 and the environs of the airfield from 0637. From 1145 the cruisers also took up the bombardment.

3. From JOLO at 2240:

"In view of the fact that the enemy bombardment has shifted from SANTA MARIA, 3 miles North from the sea coast (6 degrees 55 minutes North, 122 degrees 5 minutes East) to PASOHANCA, (122 degrees 5 minutes East, 7 degrees North) 5 miles from the coast, and that a bombardment is developing in that sector, it appears that the enemy intends to make a thrust into the same area, which is in the hands of Naval forces, meanwhile he is strictly withholding his dispositions."

4. From JOLO at 2300:

"Part 4. At 1000, 2 enemy P.T. boats burst into ISABELA (HARBOR) (BASILAN ISLAND) according to a message from ZAMBOANGA NAVAL GARRISON to JOLO NAVAL GARRISON.

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A/C of S, C-2, Eighth Army
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Central Bureau, Adv. Sch.
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SECRET125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

10 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 9 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) IMPALUTAO. Outstanding in the ARMY activity for the period under review was the fact that IMPALUTAO originated the largest number of messages yet recorded. Traffic was addressed to 35 ARMY HQS. at CEBU, to all subordinate 35 ARMY units (DAVAO, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO BACOLOD and the "ORMOG" unit), and to the higher commands at BAGUIO, SAIGON and TOKYO.

It seems almost certain that this activity was the result of and concerns plans for meeting the allied threat at ZAMBOANGA.

The fact that IMPALUTAO is originating traffic for TOKYO and SAIGON and is co-addressing messages both to the higher commands (TOKYO, SAIGON and BAGUIO) and to all the 35 ARMY units seems to indicate that it is at the moment the controlling ARMY HQS. in MINDANAO, and probably acts an advance HQS. of 35 ARMY.

In connection with the above suggestion a message from ZAMBOANGA to IMPALUTAO was interesting for it was addressed: "35 ARMY INTELLIGENCE" (SEU ZHU HOU).

(b) DAVAO. Activity at IMPALUTAO affected other 35 ARMY units and during the period under review traffic increased substantially at DAVAO. A connection with ILO ILO was observed for the first time in over a month.

(c) ZAMBOANGA. Traffic here was also heavy. It was confined to messages for 35 ARMY units and for BAGUIO. It is interesting to note that there were no ARMY AIR connections. But it is to be expected that ZAMBOANGA'S chief interest will now lie in ARMY activity.

(d) JOLO. As with all other 35 ARMY units the volume of traffic here also increased.

(e) CEBU. Since activity here did not increase materially, it would seem either that control of MINDANAO has been delegated to IMPALUTAO or possibly that a forward HQS. of 35 ARMY had been established there.

Only the usual connections were observed, at CEBU.

The recurrence of traffic from CEBU to PARRIGA, addressed: "35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT" indicates that there must be considerable shipping activity between CEBU, NEGROS and PANAY.

Messages were sent to CEBU by BACOLOD WEST, addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" and "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY GROUP."

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SECRET**1. 35 ARMY (cont.)**

(f) ILO ILO evidenced some ARMY activity in traffic from BAGUIO and DAVAO.

(g) BACOLOD. Interesting was a message co-addressed to the 35 ARMY units at IMPALUTAO, ZAMBOANGA and JOLO.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) DEL MONTE. Traffic continues at substantial levels, with the only new connection being COTABATO.

A message from DEL MONTE to TOKYO was addressed: "CHIEF OF WAR MINISTER'S STAFF", (RIKUGUN DAI SHI SAN BO SOU TEI).

(b) CERU. A connection with SILAY, possibly for the first time was the only noteworthy item.

(c) BACOLOD. Activity here was the heaviest in two weeks. Only the regular connections were observed. However traffic to ECHAGUE was the largest in well over a month.

Again we see messages being redirected from BACOLOD to ECHAGUE. This together with the heavy traffic from BACOLOD to ECHAGUE may indicate some move of Headquarters personnel to ECHAGUE.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from DEL MONTE to BACOLOD and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

1050 - IMPALUTAO
1625 - INMACUETE

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D.I.R. #105 (a)

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125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

10 March 1945

SUPPLEMENT
TO
DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 105
(Information Derived from Pearl Sources)

1. Message from ZAMBOANGA at 2000 on 9 March: "1400. Although landing craft attempted to land they were repulsed.
1500. Although landing craft were patrolling and attacking to the South West of the Southern Airfield, they were repulsed.
Morale is high."
2. Message from DEL MONTE to BACOLOD, originated 9 March at 2200:
"The landing began at ZAMBOANGA at 2177. Details unknown." From WASHI STAFF OFFICER at DEL MONTE; To CHIEF OF STAFF, WASHI BUTAL.

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D.I.R. #104 (a)

PEARL125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

9 March 1945


SUPPLEMENT

TO

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 104
(Information Derived from Pearl Sources)

The following messages are interesting in that they throw further light on the reactions of the enemy when attack is imminent.

1. From DEL MONTE to ZAMBOANGA, 08 1615: "For C.O. MATSU HUNTAI. I pray that you may fight bravely, placing your trust in the eternal righteousness of our cause, and banded together in the avowed brotherhood of the army."
2. From DEL MONTE to ZAMBOANGA, 08 1750: "We are greatly satisfied with the courage displayed in your letter. Regarding the deterioration of the position -- you will display the characteristics of close cooperation between signals units. Please pass to all personnel. C.O., SIGNALS UNIT. To 2nd Lieut. TAKASHIMA."
3. From DEL MONTE to ZAMBOANGA, 08 1820: "After the suspension of communications, you will transmit to this station at 1300, 2000 and 2200, and we will listen at the usual times. During the movement, you will move with units (T.N. NAVAL SIGNALS STATIONS) which have chargers for your transmitters."
4. From ZAMBOANGA to DEL MONTE, 08 1930: "We thank you heartily for your warm encouragement. We will go forward resolutely to our signals duty under the command of the C.O. of all signals stations. The bombing and strafing is increasing in intensity."
5. From ZAMBOANGA to DEL MONTE, 08 (Time?): "I have no transmitter. I am merging with the NAVAL SIGNALS OFFICE at this place. I would like you to receive (my) messages from the NAVY....."



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3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to JOLO and ZAMBOANGA, from DEL MONTE to LASANG and ZAMBOANGA and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, ZAMBOANGA and JOLO.

AIR ALERT:

0808 - BAGUIO
0843 - BANQUERO
0915 - ZAMBOANGA
0922 - BANQUERO
1245 - BANQUERO

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D.I.R. #104

THUMB125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

9 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 8 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) CEBU. For four (4) days activity at 35 ARMY HQS. has been considerably reduced. All connections are routine ones and include the superior commands at BAGUIO, SAIGON, EASTERN ARMY and TOKYO, with traffic also for KUMAMOTO, (a 102 DIV. association). Traffic for subordinate units indicates no change.

BACOLOD WEST sent a message to CEBU addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY."

ILO ILO sent a message to BACOLOD where it was redirected to CEBU. This message was addressed: "C.O. 18200 (35 ARMY) UNIT."

BACOLOD TE, which now seems definitely to be a SHIPPING HQS., sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "35 ARMY SHIPPING."

SINGAPORE SHIPPING addressed the "C.O., NO. 1 FIELD REPLACEMENT DEPOT, SHIPPING ENGINEERS", at CEBU.

(b) ZAMBOANGA. In addition to a small amount of routine traffic, the radio station here was very active during the period under review, broadcasting sightings of allied activity off ZAMBOANGA.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) DALIAO. Traffic was addressed to COTABATO, probably for the first time.

(b) DEL MONTE. Activity here continues to be brisk and the principal connections are with BACOLOD and LASANG.

(c) LASANG and LASANG WEST. The connection with ECHAGUE was noticed here for the first time.

(d) BACOLOD. While activity has continued at steady and substantial levels, there are no new traffic associations.

The "C.O. of 67th F.R." was addressed at API by JOLO.

The amount of traffic received at BACOLOD and there redirected, to ECHAGUE especially, suggests the movement of ARMY AIR personnel from BACOLOD. It could be that some of these are going to FORMOSA via LUZON.

(e) GABATUAN addressed a message to SAN JOSE, apparently for the first time.

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D.I.R. #103 (a)

SECRETPEARL**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

8 March 1945

SUPPLEMENT

TO

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 103
(Information Derived from Pearl Sources)

The following messages dated 8 March and given in chronological order of origination, clearly indicate the enemy's reaction to allied operations at ZAMBOANGA.

1. From ZAMBOANGA at 0920: "0920. Transports and assault boats. Indication of a landing." Later the same message was broadcast by DEL MONTE and also passed by DEL MONTE to MALAYBALAY and to LASANG.
2. From BACOLOD to ZAMBOANGA at 0943: "Has the enemy landed?"
3. From ZAMBOANGA to BACOLOD at 0950: "All possible preparations have been made. We will fight to the last man." This message was sent by BACOLOD to CEBU, and to SANDAKAN and by DEL MONTE to MALAYBALAY.
4. Probably from DEL MONTE for ZAMBOANGA at 0950, (being relayed from DEL MONTE to BACOLOD): "I will make every endeavor to insure contact with you until communication ceases, indeed until the very end. I pray that you will put up a heroic fight. C.O. SIGNALS UNIT."
5. From ZAMBOANGA to BACOLOD at 1000: "Enemy landing craft are approaching." This message was later sent from BACOLOD to CEBU and to SANDAKAN from DEL MONTE to MALAYBALAY, and it was also broadcast from DEL MONTE.
6. From ZAMBOANGA to BACOLOD at 1035: "1030. Large number of enemy large, medium and small type airplanes are bombing and strafing. Many landing craft are approaching."
7. From DEL MONTE to ZAMBOANGA at 1120: "Fight bravely in close cooperation with one another, having confidence in your worthy leader and in the certain victory of the IMPERIAL ARMY. I am praying for your lasting success. I am praying that you may fight fiercely for certain victory and for your lasting success."
8. From ZAMBOANGA to BACOLOD at 1130: "1125. The enemy intends to land in an area ten (10) kilometers Northwest of ZAMBOANGA. The landing will probably take place after 1500."

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9. From ZAMBOANGA to DEL MONTE at 1140: "Twenty (20) miles from BASILAN ISLAND, proceeding Northwest, there are one (1) Aircraft Carrier, four (4) Destroyers, fifteen (15) (T.N. may also be twenty-four (24) or twenty-five (25), not certain) Transports, twenty (20) Assault Boats."

10. From ZAMBOANGA to BACOLOD at 1240: "The enemy has dropped anchor on the sea to the West of BASILAN ISLAND." Later this message was sent from DEL MONTE to BACOLOD and to LASANG.

11. From ZAMBOANGA to BACOLOD at 1300: "As when this station moves, receivers and batteries are being taken along. We want you to continue sending if contact is broken."

12. From ZAMBOANGA at 1330, (being sent from DEL MONTE to BACOLOD: "1330. The code books and secret documents were all burned with the exception of the AIR-GROUND LIAISON SUBSTITUTION TABLE", (KUCHI RENRAKU KANJI HYU).

13. From DEL MONTE to ZAMBOANGA at 1330: "Do your utmost to insure communication. How have you received reports thus far?"

14. From DEL MONTE to ZAMBOANGA at 1410: "From the 8th (March) please report details on the position regarding attacks by enemy airplanes giving type of airplane, number, altitude and objective. C.O. of BUTAI."

15. From ZAMBOANGA to DEL MONTE at 1500, (later relayed by DEL MONTE to BACOLOD): "Thus far we have received reports from the ZAMBOANGA DEFENSE UNIT, (BOEI TAI)."

16. From ZAMBOANGA at 1545, (being sent by DEL MONTE to MENADO): "1535. The enemy is landing on the Northwest of BASILAN ISLAND." (T.N. a Naval landing)

17. From ZAMBOANGA at 1740: "1730. Part of the enemy force has passed through the BASILAN STRAITS. It is heading North East. At present two (2) Battleships, three (3) Cruisers and ten (10) and more landing craft are at anchor. Over ZAMBOANGA there are six (6) P-38's circling.

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D.I.R. / 103

SECRETTHUMB**SECRET**125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

8 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 7 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) CHHU. Activity between 35 ARMY HQS. and the higher and lower commands appeared to be routine and on a somewhat reduced scale. However an urgent message was addressed to CHHU by MONTALBAN.

Messages were sent to SAIGON by CHHU, addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, SOUTHERN ARMY", (NA HO CUN SO SAN HO THU).

BACOLOD WEST sent messages to CHHU, addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY GROUP", (SHO SHU U DAN SAN HO THU) and: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" (SHO SAN HO TR U).

(b) DPAIUTAQ. Once again a message was originated for HAIMANERA. CHHU sent a message to DPAIUTAQ addressed: "30 DIV." (HUU).

(c) ZAMBOANGA. A message from DAVAO was addressed to the "54 I.M.B.", (HAGI).

(d) ORHOC and TACLOBAN. The continued appearance of these names in traffic is interesting. As before "ORHOC" originated traffic for BAGUID during the period under review and "TACLOBAN" received a message from TAIHOKU AIR. In the case of "TACLOBAN" it may be remaining elements of ARMY AIR personnel now stationed at or in communication with CHHU.

(e) BACOLOD TR. Activity continues to suggest troop movements directed from this headquarters. In addition to what appears to be reports to higher commands, connections were observed with DAVAO and ILO ILO.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) MALABANG was observed in traffic for the second consecutive day, receiving messages from DEL MONTE. Since it was joined with ZAMBOANGA and LASANG as co-addressees of a message from DEL MONTE it appears to be one more MINDANAO air base coming under the control of DEL MONTE.

(b) CHHU. Several ARMY AIR connections were noted during the period under review. They included BACOLOD, BACOLOD WEST, TANZA (near SILAY), DUMAGUETE, TALISAY, GAGAYAN and TOKYO AIR.

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SECRET2. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(c) BACOLOD. Traffic continued at substantial levels. While only the usual recipients were observed, a large number of messages were sent to DEL MONTE. BACOLOD received a message from ZAMBOANGA, addressed to "CHIEF OF STAFF, 2ND F.D., 58 DOKURITSU HIKO CHUTAI."

(d) INMACUETE confirmed the fact, for BACOLOD, that it was attacked on 6 March.

(e) ZAMBOANGA was quite active during the period under review and kept in constant contact with BACOLOD.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to ZAMBOANGA and JOLO and from DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

0630 - CAGAYAN
0750 - CEBU
0845 - BANQUERO
1016 - ZAMBOANGA

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D.I.R. # 102

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125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

7 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 6 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

(a) CENI. For the second successive day, traffic has been very light and produced only routine connections with higher headquarters and subordinate units. The decline in activity is to be expected in view of allied operations.

Some evidence of the troubles which CENI is experiencing is seen in the following message sent by IMPALUTAO to CENI: "I pray that you fight bravely."

CENI DENISEI OFFICE appeared in traffic for the first time, receiving a message from GAGAYAN. It will also be noted that DENISEI OFFICES were seen in the activity at DAVAO and ZAMBOANGA, where a message was originated at "DAVAO DENISEI OFFICE" and sent to "ZAMBOANGA DENISEI OFFICE." These appear to be special sections within the signal centers at these locations.

(b) "OHMOG". Messages continue to appear bearing this designation as the originator and are always addressed to BAGOIO. But as yet no definite location has been determined for this "OHMOG" unit.

(c) TACLOBAN. A message originated by TAJHOKU AIR and addressed to "TACLOBAN" appeared in the traffic.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) DEL MONTE. During the past three days, activity here has been brisk. Connections were maintained principally with the MINDANAO AIR bases (MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA, LASANG and ZAMBOANGA) with MALABANG appearing for the first time as a recipient of DEL MONTE'S traffic. The joining of ZAMBOANGA, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and MALABANG as co-addressees of its traffic indicates the operational control of DEL MONTE.

The growing importance of DEL MONTE is interesting in view of the changes taking place in the ARMY AIR organization.

BACOLOD sent a message to DEL MONTE addressed: C.O. No. 1 SIGNAL UNIT."

(b) DEMACUTE. At 0837 on 6 March, the DEMACUTE radio station told both BACOLOD and BAKUENO: "Enemy sighted at 0740. Two (2) enemy warships off DEMACUTE."

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3. GENERAL: Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to ZAMBOANGA and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYMALAY, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

1045 - BANGUERO
1112 - BANGUERO

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Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
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D.I.R. #101

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125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

6 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 5 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

Activity from LA AREA ARMY HQS. indicates that no major change has taken place in the 35 ARMY organization. The co-addressing of traffic, all of which was urgent, to CEBU, DAVAO, IMPALUTAO, ZAMBOANGA and JOLO locates the existing bases.

(a) CEBU. Traffic from 35 ARMY HQS. was very light and presented nothing new. Messages were sent to CEBU from BACOLOD TR, BACOLOD and SAIGON, all addressed to "C.O. 35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT."

Also the "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" was addressed at CEBU in a message from EASTERN ARMY.

(b) BACOLOD TR. Outstanding in the day's activity was the very high volume of traffic coming from this headquarters. Messages were addressed to BAGUIO, CEBU, DAVAO, ZAMBOANGA and CAGAYAN.

It will be recalled that about the middle of February BACOLOD TR produced a number of shipping connections and involved activity with CEBU and ILO ILO. Now during the period under review we find a sudden interest in the MINDANAO bases. And BACOLOD TR has joined as co-addressees of its traffic, DAVAO, CAGAYAN and ZAMBOANGA. This would suggest that BACOLOD TR is acting as some sort of a headquarters connected with the movement of troops in the Southern PHILIPPINES.

(c) DAVAO. A message from LA AREA ARMY was sent to DAVAO, addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF KYO GROUP" (KYO HEIDAN SANBOTSU). "KYO" is the code name for 100 DIV.

(d) CAGAYAN. In connection with the traffic from BACOLOD TR, it is interesting to note that DAVAO addressed messages to CAGAYAN for the first time in several weeks.

(e) IMPALUTAO. Activity was light, but included a message for HAIMAHERA.

(f) ZAMBOANGA continues to be quite active. Incoming traffic produced messages from PINRANG.

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2. ARMY AIR

(a) CEBU. Interesting was the association of CEBU with MALANG as co-addressees of ARMY AIR traffic from SANDAKAN.

(b) BACOLOD. Activity here appeared to be normal.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to ZAMBOANGA and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, JOLO and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

- 0846 - BANQUERO
- 1038 - BANQUERO
- 1133 - ZAMBOANGA
- 1350 - BANQUERO
- 1430 - BACOLOD
- 1610 - CEBU

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D.I.R. #100

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

5 March 1945

THUMB

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 4 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

Activity at DAVAO, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO and from the "ORHOC" unit appeared to be normal and routine.

(a) IMPALUTAO. Traffic here has continued at substantial levels for the past two days. Messages are addressed to 14 AREA ARMY HQS. and to 35 ARMY HQS. and its subordinate commands.

The inclusion of BACOLOD as a co-addressee of messages sent to DAVAO, JOLO and ZAMBOANGA may suggest the withdrawal to MINDANAO of ground personnel from the BACOLOD area.

(b) CEBU. Activity remained steady.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) DEL MONTE. Traffic here was the heaviest yet recorded. Messages were addressed to about all the active ARMY AIR bases on MINDANAO, (DALIAG, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, VALENCIA and ZAMBOANGA) and to BACOLOD and ECHAGUE.

This activity would indicate that DEL MONTE controls ARMY AIR matters on MINDANAO.

(b) CEBU. ARMY AIR traffic was addressed to FABRICA, CAGAYAN and BACOLOD.

(c) BACOLOD. Activity continued at substantial levels and included connections with the usual MINDANAO, CENTRAL PHILIPPINE and BORNEO bases.

Traffic gives every indication of considerable movement between the SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES and BORNEO.

Messages, one (1) of which was of some considerable length, were sent by BACOLOD to SANDAKAN where they were redirected to MALANG. Traffic between BACOLOD and SANDAKAN has made a regular appearance and probably concerns 2nd HIKOSHIDAN and its movement to BORNEO. However 7 HIKOSHIDAN operates from MALANG. Thus the redirecting of this traffic from SANDAKAN is most interesting.

(d) JOLO. Of interest in ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE were messages from ISHII, SGT/MJR, 67 SENTAI at JOLO addressed to "C.O. of 67 HIKOSENTAI" at API.

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3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to LASANG, and from LASANG, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

- 0824 - BANQUERO
- 0953 - BANQUERO
- 1155 - DEL MONTE
- 1439 - CHEU
- 1514 - JOLO
- 1535 - JOLO
- 1730 - BANQUERO



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- G-2 Adv. Ech. GHQ
- G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Masley)
- G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
- Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
- A-2 F.E.A.F.
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D.I.R. #99

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SECRET125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

4 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 3 March 1945)1. 35 ARMY

Routine activity was observed at DAVAO, ZAMBOANGA and JOLO.

(a) "OHMOC" UNIT. This address continues to appear quite regularly, and messages always are sent to BAGUIO.(b) DIPALUTAO. Traffic here was the heaviest ever observed. Connections were with BAGUIO, CEBU, DAVAO and ZAMBOANGA. This activity suggests that enemy operations in MINDANAO now center around DIPALUTAO.(c) CEBU. Activity was normal both in volume and connections. Almost daily messages are sent to CEBU, usually from BACOLOD, addressed: "35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT."
ILO ILO sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "35 ARMY HUTAI, SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY."

There is also evidence of shipping activity at FABRICA for a message addressed: "35 ARMY SHIPPING" was sent to FABRICA by CEBU.

The following message was sent from JOLO to CEBU at 0935 on 3 March: "Advise point of enemy landing."

2. ARMY AIR(a) LASANG WEST addressed traffic to COTABATO for the first time.(b) VALENCIA. Brisk activity was observed here with messages originated for DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, BACOLOD and TALISAY.(c) BACOLOD. Traffic declined considerably from that of the preceding period and connections were confined to MCHAGUE, CEBU, IMMACULATE, DEL MONTE, DALIAO and JOLO. There is some slight indication that ARMY AIR personnel have gone from BACOLOD to CEBU.(d) PUERTO PRINCESA. The radio station here was not heard during the period under review.

Of interest was the following message (derived from PEARL sources) which PUERTO PRINCESA addressed to BACOLOD on 2 March 1945: "Between 1500 and 1800 on 28 February all code books, covers included, were completely burned at a spot 20 kilometers from PUERTO PRINCESA." (Signed) 2nd Lt. HOBBA.

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3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to JOIG and from ZAMBOANGA, DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY, LASANG and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

0900 - DUMAGUETE
1034 - ZAMBOANGA
1415 - SAN JOSE
1515 - DUMAGUETE

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D.I.R. #98

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

3 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 2 March 1945)

NOTE: Commencing with this Report comment on enemy radio activity will be divided into two parts, as follows:

1. Circuits serving 35 ARMY HQS. and its subordinate units.
2. Internal PHILIPPINE ARMY AIR circuits.

At some later date it may be possible to add information on internal CHINA radio activity.

Because of a change in assignments this center will no longer be in a position to supply intelligence derived from enemy radio traffic from LUZON stations. This information will be compiled at other centers.

1. 35 ARMY

Routine activity was observed at DVAO, IMPALUTAO, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO, BACOLOD, ILO ILO and the "CHINOC" unit, and from 14 ARKA ARMY HQS.

(a) CEBU. After the very brisk activity of the preceding period, traffic returned to more normal levels. Messages were addressed to subordinate units and to higher headquarters at BAGUIO, SAIGON and TOKYO.

BACOLOD SIGNALS OFFICE sent messages to CEBU addressed: "35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT", and "C.O. CEBU DETACHMENT DENSEI UNIT", (DENSEI TAI SEBU SHITAI TBU).

CEBU also received a message from ILO ILO, addressed: "C.O. SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY # 10678 BUTAI", (I ICHI MARU ROKU WANA HACHI BUTAI TBU).

The "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" was addressed at CEBU by BACOLOD TE and APL.

2. ARMY AIR

(a) VALENCIA joined BACOLOD and LASANG as co-addressees of some of its traffic, apparently for the first time.

(b) ZAMBOANGA. Activity continues at a substantial level and connections were observed with other PHILIPPINE air bases plus a number of external bases. This indicates that withdrawals to BORNEO are continuing daily, with ZAMBOANGA activity as one of the control points.

(c) BACOLOD. The usual addressees appeared in the traffic. These included TUGUNGARAO and ECHAGUE on LUZON, DALIAO, DEL MONTE, LASANG and ZAMBOANGA on MINDANAO and CEBU, DUMAGUETE and CABATUAN in the central PHILIPPINES. These, and to a lesser extent SILAY and TALISAY, are the most active ARMY AIR centers in the PHILIPPINES.

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2. ARMY AIR (cont.)

(d) PUERTO PRINCESA. The radio station serving this ARMY AIR base was active during the period under review, passing warnings of allied activity.

3. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to PUERTO PRINCESA and ZAMBOANGA and from DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO, BACOLOD and PUERTO PRINCESA.

Henry M. Leen

Henry M. Leen
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Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

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A-2 P.E.A.F.
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D.I.R. #97

SECRET125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

2 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 1 March 1945)1. MINDANAO

(a) DALIAO. Brisk activity was observed, with traffic for BACOLOD, DEL MONTE and VALENCIA.

(b) ZAMBOANGA. Traffic, particularly ARMY AIR, continued at a high level. The following message was received at ZAMBOANGA from JOLO: "Please pass to Capt. YUKIZANE of 67 SENTAL. Only one airplane, that of Sgt. SAK AMOTO, has arrived. Tomorrow (ie 2 March), First Lieut. UENO intends to depart for API."

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. Activity was the heaviest ever observed. Traffic was addressed to 14 AREA ARMY HQS., to the lower commands of 35 ARMY, and to external bases. BACOLOD sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT." BACOLOD and TOKYO addressed messages to the "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" at CEBU.

3. NEGROS

(a) BACOLOD. ARMY AIR traffic for KENINGAN, BORNED, was observed for the first time.

A message, which JOLO sent to BACOLOD asking immediate information on the situation of all airfields in North BORNED, strongly suggests movement of personnel from the PHILIPPINES by air via MINDANAO and JOLO bases.

BACOLOD in turn sent the following message to JOLO: "Owing to the enemy landing, the airfield situation in the PALAWAN area is not known."

BACOLOD TE, which previously produced all ARMY AIR traffic associations, has now developed ARMY connections. And during the period under review traffic for HOJI and HIROSHIMA, along with SAIGON and BAGUIO, seems to indicate shipping activity, probably involving the movement of ARMY ground personnel.

4. PALAWAN

(a) FUERTO PRINCESA. Although traffic was addressed to PUERTO PRINCESA by ECHAGUE, only messages concerning sightings of allied activity were originated during the period under review. However the FUERTO PRINCESA radio station was active during the period under review.

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5. LUZONSECRET

(a) BAGUIO. Traffic rose to very substantial levels. But as usual activity was confined to 35 ARMY units and LUZON bases. Traffic with DVAO was particularly heavy.

On LUZON a large number of messages were addressed to WAWA and LAL-LO. DUPAX and SAN JOSE were the other addressees.

BAGUIO co-addressed a message to DUPAX and DVAO.

According to traffic received at BAGUIO, the CHIEF OF STAFF, 14 AREA ARMY appeared to be there during the period under review.

(b) BALETE PASS used the address "MANILA", on a message which it originated.

(c) BAMBANG. BAGUIO and LAL-LO were the only addressees seen.

(d) DUPAX originated traffic for BAGUIO.

A message which BAGUIO sent to DUPAX was addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 2nd ARMORED DIV.", who presumably is at DUPAX.

(e) LAL-LO. Activity consisting of messages for BAGUIO and BALETE PASS, appeared to be light. This was in some measure due to technical troubles.

(f) MORONG addressed traffic to WAWA.

(g) SALAT originated messages for LAL-LO.

(h) SAN JOSE'S only observed connection was with BAGUIO.

(i) TANGADON sent messages to BAGUIO.

(j) WAWA. BAGUIO, BAMBANG and TOKYO were the only recipients of WAWA'S traffic.

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6. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to PUERTO PRINCESA, JOLO and ZAMBOANGA and from BACOLOD, DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY and PUERTO PRINCESA.

AIR ALERT:

0746 - DUPAX
0835 - BANQUERO
0843 - DUMAGUETE
1035 - BANQUERO
1117 - ZAMBOANGA

NOTICE: Beginning with the next DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT, no internal LUZON connections will be discussed.

Henry H. Leen
Henry H. Leen
1st Lt. Sig. C.
Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin
G-2 GHQ
G-2 Adv. Ech. GHQ
G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Easley)
G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
A-2 F.E.A.F.
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D.I.R. #96

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

1 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 28 February 1945)1. MINDANAO.

(a) DEL MONTE received a message from ECHAGUE, addressed to "NO. 1 SIGNALS UNIT", (HI TSUSHIN TAI).

(b) ZAMBOANGA. ARMY AIR connections are increasing. During the period under review, traffic from TAIHOKU AIR appeared for the first time. Messages redirected to ZAMBOANGA by TALISAY and SARAWIA suggests the growing importance of ZAMBOANGA in ARMY AIR activity.

ZAMBOANGA also addressed traffic to LAHAD DATU (118 degrees 20 minutes East, 05 degrees 02 minutes North), south of SANDAKAN.

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. A substantial rise in activity was noted, and many of the messages originated here were of urgent priority.

However only the usual ARMY, ARMY AIR and SHIPPING connections were observed.

The regular connection with KUMAMOTO indicates the HQS. of 102 DIV. is still at CEBU.

Both BACOLOD and API addressed messages to the "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" at CEBU.

ILO ILO sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPT., 35 ARMY BUTAI."

At 2102, on 28 February, CEBU sent the following message: "CEBU is at present undergoing a naval bombardment."

CEBU sent an urgent message to API addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, BORNEO GARRISON ARMY," (NADA SAN BO THU), which possibly concerned advice on allied ground activity.

3. NEGROS

(a) BACOLOD. Traffic returned to more normal levels after the high totals of the preceding period, and the usual addressees appeared.

ZAMBOANGA sent a message to BACOLOD, addressed: "ISHIKI UNIT OF SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY BUTAI NO. 16724", (I DAI HI MU NA HU YO BUTAI ISHIKE TAI).

4. PALAWAN

(a) PUERTO PRINCESA. Activity seemed to be confined to messages for BACOLOD, MACASSAR, HEITO and SANDAKAN, probably reporting on allied operations.

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125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

1 March 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 28 February 1945)1. MINDANAO.

(a) DEL MONTE received a message from BEHAGUE, addressed to "NO. 1 SIGNALS UNIT", (HI TSUSHIN TAI).

(b) ZAMBOANGA. ARMY AIR connections are increasing. During the period under review, traffic from TAIHOKU AIR appeared for the first time.

Messages redirected to ZAMBOANGA by TALISAY and SARAWIA suggests the growing importance of ZAMBOANGA in ARMY AIR activity.

ZAMBOANGA also addressed traffic to LAHAD DATU (118 degrees 20 minutes East, 05 degrees 02 minutes North), south of SANDAKAN.

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However only the usual ARMY, ARMY AIR and SHIPPING connections were observed.

The regular connection with KUMAMOTO indicates the HQS. of 102 DIV. is still at CEBU.

Both BACOLOD and API addressed messages to the "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" at CEBU.

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CEBU sent an urgent message to API addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, BORNED GARRISON ARMY," (NADA SAN BO THU), which possibly concerned advice on allied ground activity.

3. NEGROS

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ZAMBOANGA sent a message to BACOLOD, addressed: "ISHIKI UNIT OF SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY BUTAI NO. 16724", (I DAI HI MU NA HU YO BUTAI ISHIKE TAI).

4. PALAWAN

(a) PUERTO PRINCESA. Activity seemed to be confined to messages for BACOLOD, MACASSAR, HEITO and SANDAKAN, probably reporting on allied operations.

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5. LUZONSECRET

(a) BAGUIO. While not as high as the preceding period, traffic was nevertheless very heavy. The usual ARMY connections appeared and these included 35 ARMY HQS. and its subordinate commands, and on LUZON, LAL-LO, WAWA, DUPAX and SAN JOSE. During the period under review traffic for MONTALBAN also appeared.

Worthy of notice was a message from BAGUIO co-addressed to LAL-LO, WAWA, SAN JOSE and IMPALUTAO.

(b) BAMBANG. Messages were addressed to WAWA and BAGUIO.

(c) BATAN ISLAND originated a delayed message for LAL-LO.

(d) DUPAX. The only observed connection was with BAGUIO.

(e) ECHAGUE. Traffic was addressed to PUERTO PRINCESA and in substantial numbers to DEL MONTE.

(f) LAL-LO. Activity continued at very substantial levels and connections were with BAGUIO, BAMBANG, TOKYO and SAIGON.

(g) MOUNT MALEPUNYO was active for the first time in about a week, originating a message for BAGUIO.

(h) MORONG. Messages were addressed to BAGUIO and to "BAGETO", (unidentified).

(i) SAN JOSE. Traffic was originated for BAGUIO.

(j) TANGADON now has a regular connection with BAGUIO.

(k) WAWA. Observed activity was light with messages for BAGUIO and BAMBANG.

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6. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to JOLO and SANDAKAN and from DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA, BACOLOD and PUERTO PRINCESA.

AIR ALERT:

0830 - BANQUERO
0845 - BANQUERO
0352 - BANQUERO
0931 - DUPAX
1021 - BANQUERO
1715 - BANQUERO

Henry M. Leen

Henry M. Leen
1st Lt. Sig. C.
Intelligence Officer

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G-2 GHQ
G-2 Adv. Ech. GHQ
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Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
A-2 F.E.A.F.
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D.I.R. #95

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

28 February 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 27 February 1945)

1. MINDANAO

(a) DAVAO. After a lapse of three (3) days, activity here returned to levels consistent with its being a HQS. base.

(b) ZAMBOANGA. Traffic here was the highest yet observed and included both ARMY and ARMY AIR connections, with the latter predominating. This gives evidence of ZAMBOANGA'S growing importance as an ARMY AIR base. The repeated redirecting of traffic from TALISAY to ZAMBOANGA lends support to this suggestion, especially as it concerns 45 INDEPENDENT HIKOCHUTAI.

The large volume of traffic for BORNEO AIR bases and the number of multiple address messages originated by ZAMBOANGA for these bases links the ARMY AIR activity at ZAMBOANGA with BORNEO.

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. It appears that the decline of the preceding period may be attributed to allied air activity because traffic approached more normal levels.

Included were connections with 14 AREA ARMY HQS. at BACUID, with the subordinate commands of 35 ARMY, with the HOME DEPOT of 102 DIV., with the ARMY AIR bases at BACOLOD and FABRICA, and with EMPIRE SHIPPING bases.

The C.O. 35 ARMY SHIPPING was addressed at CEBU by BACOLOD.

3. NEGUROS

(a) BACOLOD. Traffic reached the highest totals since 27 January. However no new connections appeared. Messages were addressed to the MINDANAO ARMY AIR bases (DEL MONTE, LASANG and ZAMBOANGA) to the central PHILIPPINE bases (CEBU, DUMAGUETE, SAN JOSE, CABATUAN and PUERTO PRINCESA, the last mentioned place receiving a very large volume of traffic), to the higher HQS. at BACUID, BACHAGUE and IPO and finally to the BORNEO bases (API, KUDAT and SANDAKAN). This has become the usual pattern of BACOLOD'S traffic.

A message from HAMAMATSU was redirected at BACOLOD to CAGAYAN, suggesting the presence at CAGAYAN of ARMY AIR personnel from BACOLOD.

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4. LUZON

(a) BAGUIO. There was a very substantial increase in activity during the period under review.

The traffic gives a clear picture of the ARMY organization within the PHILIPPINES for messages were addressed as follows:

1. To CEBU (35 ARMY HQS.), DAVAO (100 DIV. HQS.), IMPALUTAO (30 DIV HQS.), ZAMBOANGA (54 I.M.B. HQS.) and JOLO (55 I.M.B. HQS.).
2. To the LUZON bases at LAL-LO (103 DIV. HQS.), TANGADON (103 DIV. elements), SAN JOSE (10 DIV. elements), DUPAX (2 ARMORED DIV. elements) and WAWA (8 DIV. and 10 DIV. elements).

Traffic with LAL-LO was particularly heavy.

(b) BAGABAG addressed a message to LAL-LO.

(c) BALETE PASS. An association with 10 DIV. HOME DEPOT was the only observed activity.

(d) BAMBANG originated traffic for LAL-LO.

(e) DUPAX addressed messages to BAGUIO.

(f) LAL-LO. While acting as HQS. of 103 DIV., activity here has gradually increased in volume and connections and suggests other ground force units may be present here.

Traffic with BAGUIO was the heaviest yet observed. Other connections were with BAMBANG, SALAT and SAIGON, EASTERN ARMY and TOKYO.

(g) SAN JOSE. Traffic was addressed to BAGUIO.

(h) TANGADON. Messages were originated for BAGUIO.

(i) WAWA. The connections with BAGUIO and BAMBANG are now regular ones.

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5. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to ZAMBOANGA and from DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

0820 - CEBU
0912 - DUMAGUETE
0938 - BAGUIO
0945 - SAN JOSE
1020 - CEBU
1025 - ZAMBOANGA
1135 - BACOLOD

Henry M. Leen

Henry M. Leen
1st Lt. Sig. C.
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G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
A-2 F.E.A.F.
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. #94

125 SIGNAL BATTAL INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

27 February 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 26 February 1945)1. MINDANAO(a) CAGAYAN received a message from HAMAMATSU addressed to the "C.O. 31 AIR SECTOR UNIT."(b) LABANG WEST. Traffic for VALENCIA was observed for the first time.(c) ZAMBOANGA. A message from BACOLOD was addressed to "32 HIKOJŌ DAITAI."2. CEBU ISLAND(a) CEBU. Traffic here was at the lowest level it has been in two (2) weeks. No EMPIRE connections were observed.

Generally during the period under review, activity on the circuits serving 35 ARMY HQS. at CEBU and its subordinate units was very light. The next forty-eight (48) hours should indicate whether or not this is a temporary decline due to allied aerial activity.

CAGAYAN again sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "C.O. DETACHMENT OF DENSKI UNIT", (DENSKI TAI SHI TAI TEU).

3. NEGHROS ISLAND(a) BACOLOD. While no new connections appeared, traffic remained at a very substantial level.

Interesting however was traffic co-addressed to CEBU, DEL MONTE, SAN JOSE, BUMAGUETE, CABATUAN, PUERTO PRINCESA, SANDAKAN, API and KUDAT. This includes about every important ARMY AIR HQS. with whom BACOLOD is regularly in contact and may indicate some pending movement out of BACOLOD.

4. LUZON(a) BACUIC. Activity here was also the lowest in two weeks. However the usual addressees appeared. Those included 35 ARMY and its subordinate units, without any change. And on LUZON, LAL-10, WAWA, DUPAX, SAN JOSE and BAMBANG were the only recipients.

It is interesting to note some multiple address messages in which SAN JOSE and DUPAX were joined with 35 ARMY units.

(b) BAMBANG addressed its traffic to LAL-10.**SECRET**

SECRET4. LUZON (cont.)

(c) BOHACUE. During the last two (2) days incoming traffic has been particularly heavy, especially with SAIGON. This may suggest withdrawal of personnel by air from the PHILIPPINES.

(d) LAL-10. Activity consisted of traffic for BAGUIO and BAMBANG.

(e) SAN JOSE addressed all its traffic to BAGUIO.

(f) TANGADON. A substantial number of messages were originated for BAGUIO.

(g) WANA. BAGUIO and BAMBANG were the only recipients of traffic from WANA.

5. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to ZAMBOANGA and from DEL MONTE, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

0918 - BANQUERO
 0925 - DUMAGUETE
 0955 - BANQUERO
 1005 - DUMAGUETE
 1055 - BAGUIO
 1125 - DUMAGUETE

Henry M. Leon
 Henry M. Leon
 1st Lt. Sig. C.
 Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

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 G-2 GHQ
 G-2 Adv. Ech. GHQ
 G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Basley)
 G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
 Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
 A-2 F.E.A.F.
 File

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D.I.R. #93

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

26 February 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 25 February 1945)1. HINDANAO

(a) DAVAO. Although activity was very light, traffic for "ONMOC" was interesting, although it has occurred before, during the LEYTE campaign.

(b) ZAMBOANGA. A message again sent by SANDAKAN to TALISAY and there redirected to ZAMBOANGA gives additional weight to the suggestion that some ARMY AIR elements have moved to ZAMBOANGA from TALISAY.

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. Activity was normal and connections included the subordinate units of 35 ARMY, ARMY AIR bases, (DEL MONTE, FABRICA and BACOLOD) and EMPIRE SHIPPING HQS., (HIROSHIMA and ISHINAKI).

The rather regular traffic now being co-addressed to SAIGON, HIROSHIMA and ISHINAKI indicate continued shipping activity between CEBU and EMPIRE bases. That this activity also includes BACOLOD is indicated by a very lengthy message from BACOLOD to the SHIPPING COMMAND at CEBU.

The following addresses appeared on traffic received at CEBU:

1. From BACOLOD TE - "C.O. 35 ARMY SHIPPING."
2. From BACOLOD - "C.O. "O" BRIGADE", (O HYODAN TEU - The meaning of the code letter "O" is not known here).
3. From ILO ILO - "C.O. 35 ARMY (#18200) INTENDANCE DEPARTMENT", (ICHI HACHI NI KKI REI BUTAI KEIRIYU TEU).
4. From PALEMBANG - " #3 SHIPPING TRANSPORT HQS., (DAI SAN SENPAKU YUSOU SHIRIYU).
5. From BACOLOD TE - "SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY, 3rd SHIPPING TRANSPORT COMMAND", (1 #2944 BUTAI).
6. From CAGAYAN - " C.O. DETACHMENT of "DENSKI"UNIT", (DENSEI TAI SHITAI TEU - meaning of DENSEI not known here).

3. MACTAN ISLAND

(a) MACTAN. Having made only very infrequent appearances since 8 February, MACTAN appears to have dropped out of ARMY AIR activity. It is possible that some elements may have moved to CABATUAN.

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4. NEGROS

(a) BACOLOD. Traffic returned to more normal levels. But other than traffic for VALENCIA and from DALIAO, observed here for the first time, all connections were regular ones.

VALENCIA'S association with DEL MONTE and LASANG as co-addressees of traffic from BACOLOD may indicate some revival of activity there.

5. PALAWAN

(a) PUERTO PRINCESA. BACOLOD addressed a message to "C.O. Q BAYASHI UNIT" at PUERTO PRINCESA. This may be an ARMY unit which is and has been at PUERTO PRINCESA since this unit has been previously addressed here.

6. LUZON

(a) BAGUIO. Activity declined considerably from the high level of the preceding period. Traffic fell into a very organized pattern, as follows:

1. 35 ARMY HQS. at CEBU, and its subordinate units, DAWAO, BIPALUTAO, ZAMBOANGA, JOLO and "ORISOC" unit.

2. LUZON bases, WAWA, LAL-LO, DUPAX and SAN JOSE.

(b) BALETE PASS. Traffic for HMEJI indicates 10 DIV. elements are still in this area.

(c) BAMBANG originated a message for BALETE PASS.

(d) DUPAX'S only connection was with BAGUIO.

On the radio circuit from BAGUIO to DUPAX, the code names "GEKI/UTSU" were used. As "GEKI" is the code name for 2nd ARMORED DIV., and "UTSU" is an alternative reading, this ~~was~~ additional evidence to the presence of 2nd ARMORED DIV. at DUPAX.

(e) LAL-LO. Traffic was addressed to BAGUIO and BAMBANG, regular connections, and also to ANTIFOLO and WAWA for the first time.

(f) SAN JOSE. Activity was confined to traffic with BAGUIO.

(g) WAWA. BAGUIO and TOKYO were the only recipients of WAWA'S traffic.

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7. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from DEL MONTE to BACOLOD, from LASANG to DEL MONTE, from BACOLOD to ZAMBOANGA and from BACOLOD, LASANG WEST, DEL MONTE, LASANG and MALAYBALAY.

AIR ALERT:

0820 - DUMAGUETE
0830 - DUMAGUETE
0945 - BANQUERO
1520 - CEBU
1555 - DUMAGUETE
1600 - CEBU
1608 - BANQUERO

Henry M. Leen
Henry M. Leen
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Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

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G-2 Adv. Ech. OHQ
G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Hasley)
G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
A-2 F.E.A.F.
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D.I.R. #92

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

25 February 1945

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 24 February 1945)1. MINDANAO

(a) DALIAO. Traffic indicates some ARMY AIR activity between this base and CAGAYAN, and VALENCIA.

(b) DEL MONTE. A message which passed from LASANG to DEL MONTE was addressed: "TO C.O. NO. 1 SIGNALS UNIT" (TSUSHIN TAI), FROM "C.O. 23 WIRELESS SIGNALS UNIT" (TSUSHIN MUSEN TAI).

(c) ZAMBOANGA. During the period under review the number of multiple address messages originated by MINDANAO bases in which other MINDANAO bases were included, seems to indicate some activity among these bases.

DAVAO co-addressed a message to BAGUIO, CEBU, IMPALUTAO and ZAMBOANGA. JOLO joined ZAMBOANGA and CEBU as co-addressees. ZAMBOANGA originated a message for JOLO, IMPALUTAO and CEBU. And IMPALUTAO co-addressed a message to CEBU, DAVAO and ZAMBOANGA.

Interesting were two messages originated by SANDAKAN and sent to TALISAY where they were redirected to ZAMBOANGA. This traffic was addressed: "45 INDEPENDENT HIKOCHUTAI." It is assumed that this unit is now located at ZAMBOANGA.

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. Traffic remained steady, with no unusual connections. HIROSHIMA addressed "C.O., 35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT" at CEBU.

There were four messages which SAIGON sent to CEBU, addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY."

A message was originated by BACOLOD TE for CEBU, addressed: "I" 2944 HUTAI, (3 SHIPPING TRANSPORT COMMAND, SOUTHERN AREA ARMY).

3. NEGROS

(a) BACOLOD. There was a considerable decline in activity here.

4. PALAWAN

(a) PUERTO PRINCESA. Traffic was again addressed to TUGUEGARAO.

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5. LUZON

(a) BAGUIO. Activity reached the highest level since 27 January.

Traffic was addressed to about every principal HQS. under the command of LA AREA ARMY. This included 35 ARMY HQS. at CEBU, and the, as yet, unlocated "ORHOC" unit, DAVAO, IMPALUTAO, ZAMBOANGA and JOLO. On LUZON approximately an equal number of messages were addressed to LAL-LO and WAWA. DUPAX and SAN JOSE also received traffic from BAGUIO.

BAGUIO originated a substantial number of multiple address messages, of which the following associations of co-addressees are interesting:

1. LAL-LO, DAVAO, JOLO and ZAMBOANGA;
2. LAL-LO, WAWA, SAN JOSE and DUPAX;
3. LAL-LO and CEBU;
4. DUPAX, SAN JOSE and the "ORHOC" unit of 35 ARMY.

It will be noticed that LAL-LO makes a frequent appearance, indicating its increasing importance.

The principal enemy HQS. on LUZON appear to be at LAL-LO, WAWA, SAN JOSE and DUPAX, nothing much having been heard of late from Southern LUZON.

The connection between DUPAX, SAN JOSE and the "ORHOC" unit is interesting.

(b) BALUTE PASS. The most regular connection is now with LAL-LO not BAGUIO.

(c) BAMBANG originated traffic for DAVAO for the first time.

(d) ECHAGUE. Interesting was traffic for BAMBANG and NORTH BAMBANG.

(e) LAL-LO. Traffic was addressed to BAGUIO and BAMBANG.

(f) SALAT originated a message for LAL-LO.

(g) SAN JOSE. Traffic with BAGUIO was substantial.

(h) TANGADON. A regular connection with BAGUIO has developed.

(i) WAWA. Traffic with BAGUIO was heavy. A message was also addressed to MONONG.

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6. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from CAGAYAN WEST, DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY and BACOLOD.

AIR ALERT:

0813 - WAWA
0925 - PUERTO PRINCESA
1002 - DUMAGUETE

Henry M. Leen

Henry M. Leen
1st Lt. Sig. C.
Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin
G-2 GHQ
G-2 Adv. Ech. GHQ
G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Masley)
G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
A-2 F.E.A.F.
File

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D.I.R. #91

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.,
APO 500

24 February 1945

DAILY INFERENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 23 February 1945)1. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. For six consecutive days, activity has remained at very substantial levels.

The redirecting of messages from BACOLOD suggests that some ARMY AIR personnel have moved to CEBU from BACOLOD.

BACOLOD SIGNAL OFFICE originated a message for CEBU, which was addressed as follows: "SE HU DEN SEI KIYOKU SI TAI THU FUKU HUN NIN GEN", (Possible translation: "C.O., DETACHMENT of CEBU (? Message) OFFICE.....")

SAIGON also sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "C.O. 35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT."

2. 35 ARMY

(a) "ORIMOC". During the period under review, messages appeared which purported to have been originated by "ORIMOC" and they were addressed to BACUID. This traffic came from the unidentified radio station serving some subordinate unit of 35 ARMY, which was mentioned in previous reports.

Messages also received at this station from CEBU.

It is believed here that the name "ORIMOC" is used, because this unit probably comprises those elements which escaped from LETEE. The exact location of the HQS. of this "ORIMOC" unit is not known, but there is some slight indication that it may be at MABATE or TICAO or on one of the islands in that area.

3. NEGROS

(a) BACOLOD. The volume of traffic originated here remains steady and heavy. Multiple address messages indicate the two general directions in which BACOLOD'S control of ARMY AIR activity extends. During the period under review messages were co-addressed to DEL MONTE, CAGAYAN and LASANG, linking the ARMY AIR bases in MINDANAO. (BACOLOD also originated traffic for ZAMBOANGA). In addition BACOLOD joined as multiple addressees SANDAKAN, KUDAT, API, PUERTO PRINCESA and DUMAGUETE and also CEBU, CABATUAN, SANDAKAN, KUDAT and API.

CEBU originated a message for BACOLOD, with the following address: "61 (BU HI) ANCHORAGE BRANCH."

(b) PARRICA. CEBU originated a message for PARRICA addressed: "35 ARMY SHIPPING UNIT C.O." This was an unusual address for a place whose activity concerned ARMY AIR matters.

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4. LUZON

(a) BAGUIO. A substantial number of messages were originated here. While some traffic was addressed to Hqs. of 35 ARMY, CERSU and its subordinate units at BACOLOD, DAVAO and IMPALUTAO, the bulk of the messages were sent to the LUZON bases at LAL-LO, WAWA, SAN JOSE and DUPAX. As these four (4) places received approximately the same number of messages, it indicates that they are the principal headquarters on LUZON.

(b) BAMBANG addressed a message to LAL-LO.

(c) DUPAX originated traffic for BAGUIO and BALETS PASS.

(d) IPO. The following message which passed from BACOLOD to IPO and presumably intended to be a message from BACOLOD to IPO is interesting as confirmatory information on the location of enemy units:

"For 2nd Lt. SAIYO, C/O 12 AIR SIGNALS REGIMENT"

Reference the following personnel from your platoon:

Sgt. KONDO, MACHICHI of No. 4 Company

Sgt. OKU, SUKURA of No. 6 Company

An immediate reply is requested as to whether these two men have or have not been with your unit and where they are located at present.

Please advise whether they have been killed in action, and (Y.N. if not) how they came to be given a status higher than that of SIGNAL Clerk (signed)
C.O. 9942 "I" BUTAI."

(e) LAL-LO. During the past few days, substantial activity has been observed here. The principal connection is with BAGUIO and there appears to be regular connections with TOKYO and BAMBANG. During the period under review traffic was also addressed to DUPAX.

(f) MONTALBAN. Activity here produced a connection with LASANG, which was new. However as MONTALBAN and IPO are in very close proximity, the association is understandable and may indicate that the ARMY AIR Hqs. may be split between IPO and MONTALBAN.

(g) TANGADON addressed a message to BAGUIO.

(h) WAWA. Activity was entirely with BAGUIO.

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5. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from DEL MONTE to MENADO and from MALAYBALAY, PUERTO PRINCESA, ZAMBOANGA, DEL MONTE, LASANG and BACCLOD.

AIR ALERT:

- 0956 - CEBU
- 1120 - JOLO
- 1220 - ZAMBOANGA
- 1419 - CEBU

Henry M. Lean
 Henry M. Lean
 1st Lt. Sig. C.
 Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

- Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin
- G-2 CHQ
- G-2 Adv. Ech. CHQ
- G-2 Sixth Army (Maj Easley)
- G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
- Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
- A-2 F.B.A.F.
- File

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D.I.R. #90

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

23 February 1945

DAILY INFERENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 22 February 1945)1. MINDANAO

(a) DAVAO. With rare exceptions, activity here has settled down to almost daily routine connections with CEBU, DMPALUTAO, ZAMBOANGA and BAGUIO.

(b) MALAYBALAY made one of its rare appearances in traffic with messages for DEL MONTE.

(c) ZAMBOANGA. A message originated here and co-addressed to BACOLOD and KUCHING, was the only interesting feature of the activity.

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. Traffic has remained at very substantial levels for the past few days, and it indicates CEBU'S interest in pending ARMY and SHIPPING activities.

The regular connections with 14 AREA ARMY HQS. and the subordinate commands of 35 ARMY appeared. Also were observed associations with SHIPPING HQS. at PALEMBANG, HIROSHIMA and ISHINOMAKI. CEBU co-addressed some messages to BAGUIO, HIROSHIMA and ISHINOMAKI.

CEBU originated messages for SAIGON, addressed: "C.O. DAI A SHIPPING TRANSPORT" (DAI A PA KU SO SI REI KAN), and "C.O. DAI A SHIPPING", (DAI A SENPAKU SI REI KAN).

CEBU also sent a message to HIROSHIMA, addressed: "C.O. SHIPPING" (SENPAKU SI REI KAN).

CEBU addressed a message to PALEMBANG as follows: "C.O. SUMATRA BRANCH (SHIPPING)", (SU MA TO RA SI BU TEU).

CEBU sent messages to SAIGON addressed to "CHIEF OF STAFF, SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY", (I SANBŌ TEU).

A message was sent by BACOLOD to CEBU, with the following address: "C.O., BRANCH OF SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY", #2944 BUTAI (I DAI NI KYŪ YO N YON BUTAI SIBU TEU).

NOTE: #2944 is the code number for "3 SHIPPING TRANSPORT COMMAND."

API addressed a message to CEBU for "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY", (SHŌ SANBŌ TEU).

3. NEGROS

(a) BACOLOD. While activity continues to be brisk, no new PHILIPPINE connections appeared. However, of interest was a multiple address message sent by BACOLOD to SANDAKAN, API, KUCHING, PITSANULOK, (THAILAND) and SINGAPORE.

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3. NEGROS (cont.)

(b) TALISAY. Recently CABATUAN and ZAMBOANGA have been the only regular PHILIPPINE connections observed.

4. PALAWAN

(a) PUERTO PRINCESA. Traffic for TUGUEGARAO was interesting.

5. LUZON

(a) BAGUIO. The great majority of the messages originated here were addressed to LUZON bases. LAL-LO replaced WAWA as the principal addressee of BAGUIO'S traffic. Also receiving traffic were WAWA, SAN JOSE, BAMBANG and DUPAX.

A message originated by BAGUIO was co-addressed to WAWA and ZAMBOANGA, an unusual association.

(b) BALETE PASS. Traffic for LAL-LO and 10 DIV. HOME DEPOTS was observed.

(c) BAMBANG. The only internal PHILIPPINE connections were with BAGUIO and LAL-LO.

(d) LAL-LO. Traffic was addressed to BAGUIO and BALETE PASS, as well as to TOKYO and SAIGON.

(e) NAGA appeared in the traffic for the first time in over a week, receiving a message from TOEN, addressed: "C.O., 30th AIR INTELLIGENCE SIGNAL STATION", (SAN JU KO KU JO HO TU SIN SHO TEU).

(f) TANGADON again appeared in the traffic, addressing messages to BAGUIO.

(g) TUGUEGARAO originated messages in which BAGUIO and BAYOMBONG were joined as co-addressees.

(h) WAWA. Significant is the fact that traffic from here is now regularly addressed to BAGUIO and BAMBANG and during the period under review to MORONG (in the BAGABAG area).

6. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from MALAYBALAY to DEL MONTE, from JOLO to BACOLOD, from BACOLOD to JOLO, to CEBU and to ECHAGUE, and from

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6. GENERAL (cont.)

MALAYBALAY, DEL MONTE, BACOLOD, LASANG and ZAMBOANGA.

AIR ALERT:

0730 - BANQUERO
0950 - BANQUERO
1013 - BANQUERO
1215 - BANQUERO
1435 - DUMAGUETE
1521 - CEBU
1609 - BANQUERO
1637 - BANQUERO

Henry M. Leen

Henry M. Leen
1st Lt. Sig. C.
Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

Maj. Gen. S.B. Alcin
G-2 GHQ
G-2 Adv. Ech. GHQ
G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Easley)
G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
A-2 F.E.A.F.
File

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D.I.R. #89

125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

22 February 1945

DAILY INFERENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 21 February 1945)1. MINDANAO

(a) DAVAO. Activity, although confined to BACUIO, CEBU, IMPALUTAO and ZAMBOANGA, returned to more normally active levels.

Significant also was the fact that DAVAO was included with the other subordinate commands of 35 ARMY in multiple address messages from CEBU.

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. Activity continues at a brisk level. Traffic was addressed to 14 AREA ARMY HQS. and to the units under the control of 35 ARMY, i.e., DAVAO, IMPALUTAO, JOLO, BACOLOD and an unidentified HQS.

An interesting association of headquarters was seen in multiple address messages from CEBU to SAIGON, HIROSHIMA and ISHINOMAKI and CEBU to SAIGON, ISHINOMAKI and YANAI. This traffic suggests considerable shipping activity involving CEBU and the EMPIRE bases.

In connection with this traffic from CEBU, the following addresses occurred:

- (1) At SAIGON: "DAI A SENPAKU SHIREIHO."
- (2) At ISHINOMAKI: "TU HU DAI KA BUTAI THU."
- (3) At YANAI: "SEIHO DAI (A?) BUTAI THU."
- (4) At HIROSHIMA: "SENPAKU SHIREIHO."
- (5) At SAIGON: "DAI A SENPAKU YUSO SHIREIKAN."

BACOLOD sent traffic to CEBU, addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF 35 ARMY" (SHO SAN HO THU), and also to: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY GROUP" (NAO SHUDAN SAN HO THU).

CEBU sent a message to the radio station serving elements of 35 ARMY, but as yet unlocated, which had the following address: "SEU HITESOU."

3. PALAWAN

(a) PUERTO PRINCESA. A message originated by PUERTO PRINCESA was co-addressed to BACOLOD, ECHAGUE and HEITO, indicating the chain of command up to 4 P.A. HQS.

4. LUZON

(a) ARITAO addressed a message to MINULLI.

(b) BAGUIO. Traffic remains at substantial levels. Excepting for messages addressed to CEBU and IMPALUTAO, the traffic associations were with LUZON bases at WAWA, LAL-LO, BAMBANG, SAN JOSE, DUPAX, BAYOMBONG and DEGUDEGU (unlocated). This activity indicates that area in which the enemy forces seem to be most active, and that lies between SAN JOSE and BAYOMBONG. Since LAL-LO is joined as co-addressee of traffic from BAGUIO to BAMBANG and SAN JOSE, it suggests that elements of 103 DIV. are present in the BAMBANG - SAN JOSE area.

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4. LUZON (cont.)

(c) BAMBANG. Messages were addressed to CEBU, WAWA, and in some volume to BALETE PASS.

(d) BANQUED originated traffic for BAGABAG.

(e) BATAN ISLAND. (North of LUZON). The only connection was with LAL-IO.

(f) DUPAX, (16 degrees 16 minutes North, 121 degrees 05 minutes East) addressed messages to LAL-IO, giving another indication of elements of 103 DIV. in the area south of BAMBANG.

(g) BAL-IO. Substantial activity was observed. Traffic was originated for BAGUIO, BAMBANG and BALETE PASS.

(h) MONTALBAN. A connection with BAGUIO was observed.

(i) MORON (possibly MONONG) addressed a message to BALETE PASS.

(j) SAN JOSE originated traffic for BAGUIO and TOKYO.

(k) TANGADON (17 degrees 30 minutes North, 121 degrees 31 minutes East) originated traffic for BAGUIO, a new and interesting connection.

(l) TUGUEGARAO evidenced some air activity in traffic for BACOLOD.

(m) WAWA. Traffic remains steady with the bulk of messages going to BAGUIO and BAMBANG.

5. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to CEBU, from PUERTO PRINCESA to SANDAKAN and from DEL MONTE, BACOLOD and ZAMBOANGA.

There is some evidence at hand of the existence of an enemy radio station at BONGAO ISLAND (5 degrees North, 119 degrees 45 minutes East) which possibly acts to transmit sightings of allied activity.

NOTE: Reference D.I.R. #85, Par 3 (a). Later information received here indicates that the phrase: "HQS. 7 AIR ARMY", as it appeared in the message was incorrect.

AIR ALERT:

0812 - DUMAGUETE

0950 - DUMAGUETE

1210 - LAMANG

1435 - BANQUERO

DISTRIBUTION:

Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin

G-2 GHQ

G-2 Adv. Ech. GHQ

G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Easley)

G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)

Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.

A-2 F.E.A.F.

File

Henry M. Leen
Henry M. Leen
1st Lt. Sig. C.
Intelligence Officer

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D.I.R. #88

SECRET125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

21 February 1945

DAILY REFERENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 20 February 1945)1. MINDANAO

(a) DEL MONTE. The following message passed from DEL MONTE to LASANG: "I pray that you may fight bravely in the increasingly fierce struggle which lies ahead."
CPL. TAKAGU

(b) ZAMBANGA. A new connection noticed was with KUNORSH, JAPAN.

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. Originated traffic rose to the highest level yet observed. External connections were maintained with TOKYO, EASTERN ARMY, SAIGON, KUMAMOTO, (102 DIV HQS.), FUKUOKA and APL. The internal PHILIPPINE addressees included BACUJO and the subordinate commands of 35 ARMY at DAVAO, CAGAYAN, BIPALUTAO, ZAMBANGA and JOLO and also ARMY AIR traffic for BACOLOD, BUNAGUETE and DEL MONTE.

During the period under review the "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY" was addressed at CEBU by SAIGON and BACOLOD. BACOLOD also sent messages to CEBU, addressed: "C.O., 35 ARMY SHIPPING."

3. MINDROS

(a) BACOLOD. Of interest was a message signed by the CHIEF OF STAFF, 2ND RIKOSHIDAN" (SHU/WASHI), requesting the weather and airfield situation at JOLO. It is unusual for such an inquiry to be signed by the CHIEF OF STAFF and suggests his personal interest in this matter.

4. LUZON

(a) ARITAO addressed a message to SAN JOSE, suggesting the presence of elements of 10 DIV. at ARITAO.

(b) BACUJO. (17 degrees 35 minutes North, 120 degrees 35 minutes East) Messages were sent to BACUJO and to BAGABAG.

(c) BACUJO originated a very substantial volume of traffic. LUZON addressees included IAL-LO, WAWA, SAN JOSE, PINGKIAN (north of ARITAO) and BAMBANG (south of BAYOMBONG).

Traffic suggests that the enemy ground forces are assembled along the North-South road from SAN JOSE to BAYOMBONG with concentrations at SAN JOSE, ARITAO-PINGKIAN and BAMBANG. The trend seems to be northward.

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(d) BALETE PASS. Only one (1) message was observed and that was addressed to LAL-IO.

(e) LAL-IO. Traffic was originated for BAGUIO, BAGABAG, BAMBANG and "DEGUBEGU", (unlocated, possibly in PINGKIAN area).

(f) MORON (see D.I.R. #87, Par. 4 (G).) originated a message for WAWA.

(g) SALAT addressed traffic to LAL-IO.

(h) WAWA. In a day of substantial activity, messages were originated for BAGUIO, BAMBANG, NCHACUE and TUGUEGARAO. This was the first observed connection with TUGUEGARAO.

5. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to LASANG, and to CEBU, and from BACOLOD, DEL MONTE, JOLO, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA and PUERTO PRINCESA.

AIR ALERT

0837 - ILMAGUETE
0907 - DEL MONTE
1000 - 1300 - PUERTO PRINCESA
1210 - DEL MONTE
1350 - BAGUIO

Henry M. Leen

Henry M. Leen
1st Lt. Sig. C.
Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin
G-2 CHQ
G-2 Adv. Ech. CHQ
G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Easley)
G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
A-2 P.E.A.F.
File

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D.I.R. #87

SECRET
SECRET125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

20 February 1945

DAILY INFERENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 19 February 1945)1. MINDANAO

(a) DEL MONTE. During the past few days activity here has been brisk. Traffic for IPO was observed for the first time during the period under review, although there has been, recently, established a link between DEL MONTE and IPO.

2. CEBU ISLAND.

(a) CEBU. Traffic closely approached the highest recorded totals of 5 February. Very heavy traffic with CAGAYAN and some 35 ARMY station, as yet unlocated, were the only interesting features in the activity. Three messages to this unlocated station were addressed: "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY." However, SAIGON sent a message to CEBU, addressed to the "CHIEF OF STAFF, 35 ARMY." Because of the messages from CEBU mentioned above, it is believed that the CHIEF OF STAFF may have been at this unidentified HQS. on 19 February.

SAIGON originated a message for CEBU SHIPPING, addressed: "C.O. SHIPPING SIGNAL SECTION," (TAI SHINDAKU TSUSHIN SIYO TEU).

ILO ILO sent a message to CEBU, which was addressed: "C.O. 10678 BUTAI." (This code number is unknown here.)

ILO ILO also sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "ADJUTANT GENERAL ASA (Group unknown) BUTAI", (ASA - BUTAI KO KI U FUKU KAN).

3. NEGROS

(a) BACOLOD. Brisk activity continues, principally with the MINDANAO bases.

An interesting multiple address appeared when BACOLOD joined DEL MONTE, IPO and MENADO as co-addressees of a message.

(b) TALISAY. During the past few days, regular connections have appeared with GABATUAN, DEL MONTE, ZAMBOANGA and SANDAKAN.

4. LUZON

(a) BAGUIO. While activity continues at a substantial level, the same pattern appears. Traffic is addressed to CEBU and its subordinate commands at DAVAO, IMPALUTAO, ZAMBOANGA and JOLO; also to the LUZON bases at LAL-IO, WAWA, SAN JOSE and MORON. (See Par. 4 (g).)

BAGUIO SHIPPING. For the second consecutive day, a very large number of messages were addressed to CEBU.

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4. LUZON (cont.)

(b) BALETE PASS. The only observed connections were with LAL-LO and OKAYAMA, which is a HOME DEPOT of elements of 10 DIVISION.

(c) BAN BAN. Messages were addressed to BAGUIO and ECHAGUE.

(d) BATAN ISLAND (North of LUZON) originated three (3) messages for BAGUIO.

(e) ECHAGUE. Traffic was addressed to BACOLOD and DEL MONTE.

(f) LAL-LO. A very substantial number of messages was sent to BAGUIO.

(g) MORON appeared in the activity of the current period. It originated traffic for MONTALBAN, BAGUIO and GIRON, FORMOSA and received a message from BAGUIO.

There are two possibilities involved: (1) MORON, on BATAN PENINSULA, (14 degrees 40 minutes North, 120 degrees 16 minutes East), and MONONG, on the road from BAYOMBONG-ECHAGUE to TUGUEGARAO (16 degrees 56 minutes North, 121 degrees 37 minutes East). It is suggested that MONONG is the correct identity.

(h) NAVA. Substantial traffic was addressed to BAGUIO and BAN BAN, while ECHAGUE received messages for the first observed time.

5. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to LASANG and from BACOLOD, DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA and PUERTO PRINCESA.

AIR ALERT:

- 0820 - CEFU
- 0947 - BANQUERO
- 1121 - BANQUERO
- 1135 - LAL-LO
- 1147 - DEL MONTE

Henry M. Leen
 Henry M. Leen
 1st Lt. Sig. C.
 Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

- Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin
- G-2 GHQ
- G-2 Adv. Ech. GHQ
- G-2 Sixth Army (Maj. Masley)
- G-2 Eighth Army (Capt. H.D. Flory)
- A-2 F.E.A.F.
- Central Bureau, Adv. Ech.
- File



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D.I.R. #86

SECRET125 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE CO.
APO 500

19 February 1945

DAILY INFERENCE REPORT
(Report of Enemy Radio Activity for
Period ending 2359, 18 February 1945)1. MINDANAO

(a) DEL MONTE NAKA (CENTER) appeared for the first time and originated traffic for ECHAGUE and BACOLOD.

(b) DIPALUTAO. A message sent by DVAO to DIPALUTAO was addressed: "30 DIVISION" (HYO).

2. CEBU ISLAND

(a) CEBU. While a substantial volume of messages was originated during the period under review, incoming traffic was the heaviest yet observed, and included a large number of messages from BAGUIO SHIPPING. During the past few days CEBU has developed a number of EMPIRE connections, (HEITO, MIRI, TAKAO, TAIHOKU, KIMAMOTO, KANAZAWA, FUKUOKA and EASTERN ARMY.)

CEBU originated a message for CAGAYAN, addressed: "ANCHORAGE BRANCH" (TEI NAKUBA SHIBU).

ILO ILO sent a message to CEBU, addressed: "ADJUTANT GENERAL of SHUDAN" (SHU DAN KO KI U FUKU KAN. The particular SHUDAN was not designated.)

3. NEBROS

(a) BACOLOD. Traffic remained steady, with no unusual connections appearing.

(b) BAGO AIR appeared in the traffic for the first time receiving a message from PUERTO PRINCESA.

Although the PUERTO PRINCESA - BAGO connection has appeared before, the use of the suffix "AIR" may indicate the establishment of a ARMY AIR HQS. at BAGO.

(c) LA CARLOTA addressed a message to ECHAGUE for the first observed time.

(d) TALISAY. A new connection observed was with DEL MONTE.

4. LUZON

(a) BAGUIO. While activity continued at substantial levels, the usual recipients were observed. On LUZON this included WAWA, LAL-LO, BAN BAN, MONTALBAN and SAN JOSE.

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SECRET4. LUZON (cont.)

(b) BAN BAN originated a substantial number of messages for BAGUIO and also addressed traffic to LAL-LO.

(c) LAL-LO. Traffic was sent to BAGUIO, SAN MIGUEL, BAN BAN and to KUMAMOTO, a HOME DEPOT of 103 DIVISION.

(d) MALEPUNYO originated a message for BAGUIO. Traffic here has declined during the past few days.

(e) SAN JOSE'S only observed connection was with BAN BAN.

(f) WANA. During the period under review activity was the highest yet recorded. With very rare exceptions, traffic is confined to BAGUIO and BAN BAN.

Since the connection WANA-IRIGA has not appeared for over a week, it is assumed that the majority of 105 DIV. has now left IRIGA.

5. GENERAL. Sightings of allied activity were sent from BACOLOD to LASANG and from BACOLOD, DEL MONTE, LASANG, MALAYBALAY, ZAMBOANGA and PUERTO PRINCESA.

AIR ALERT:

1420 - BAGUIO
1555 - DUMAGUETE

Henry M. Leen

Henry M. Leen
1st Lt. Sig. C.
Intelligence Officer

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