

very attached to the land they work or own (through the second generation). They like their own business, they do not work at industrial jobs nor for other except as a stepping stone to becoming independent.

The Kibei, educated from childhood to seventeen, are still the element most to be watched.

WHAT WILL THE JAPANESE DO

SABOTAGE

Now that we have roughly given a background and a description of the Japanese elements in the United States the question naturally arises - what will these people do in case of a war between the United States and Japan? As interview after interview piled up, those bringing in results began to call it the same old tune. Such it was with only minor differences. These contacts ranged all the way from two-day sessions with Intelligence Services, through businessmen, to Roman Catholic priests who were frankly not interested in the United States and were only interested in making as many Catholics as possible. The story was all the same. There is no Japanese 'problem' on the Coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will undoubtedly be some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents or agents already imported. There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 'crackpot'. In each Naval District there are about 250 to 300 suspects

1 under surveillance. It is easy to get on the suspect list,
2 merely a speech in favor of Japan at some banquet, being
3 sufficient to land one there. The Intelligence Services
4 are generous with the title of suspect and are taking no
5 chances. Privately, they believe that only 50 or 60 in each
6 district can be classed as really dangerous. The Japanese
7 are hampered as saboteurs because of their easily recognized
8 physical appearance. It will be hard for them to get near
9 anything to blow up if it is guarded. There is far more
10 danger from Communists and people of the Bridges type on the
11 Coast than there is from Japanese. The Japanese here is
12 almost exclusively a farmer, a fisherman or a small businessman.
13 He has no entree to plants or intricate machinery.

14 ESPIONAGE

15 The Japanese, if undisturbed and disloyal, should be well
16 equipped for obvious physical espionage. A great part of
17 this work was probably completed and forwarded to Tokio years
18 ago, such as soundings and photography of every inch of the
19 Coast. They are probably familiar with the location of every
20 building and garage including Mike O'Flarety's out-house in
21 the Siskiyou with all trails leading thereto. An experienced
22 Captain in Navy Intelligence, who has from time to time and
23 over a period of years intercepted information Tokio bound,
24 said he would certainly hate to be a Japanese coordinator
25 of information in Tokio. He stated that the mass of useless

1 information was unbelievable. This would be fine for a
2 fifth column in Belgium or Holland with the German army
3 ready to march in over the border, but though the local
4 Japanese could spare a man who intimately knew the country
5 for each Japanese invasion squad, there would at least have
6 to be a terrific American Naval disaster before his brown
7 brothers would need his services. The dangerous part of
8 their espionage is that they would be very effective as
9 far as movement of supplies, movement of troops and movement
10 of ships out of harbor mouths and over railroads is concerned.
11 They occupy only rarely positions where they can get to
12 confidential papers or in plants. They are usually, when
13 properly so placed, a subject of perpetual watch and suspicion
14 by their fellow workers. They would have to buy most of
15 this type of information from white people.

16 PROPAGANDA

17 Their direct propaganda is poor and rather ineffective
18 on the whole. Their indirect is more successful. By
19 indirect we mean propaganda preaching the beauties of Japan
20 and the sweet innocence of the Japanese race to susceptible
21 Americans.

22 SUMMARY

23 Japan will commit some sabotage largely depending on
24 imported Japanese as they are afraid of and do not trust
25 the Nesei. There will be no wholehearted response from

1 Japanese in the United States. They may get some helpers
2 from certain Kibei. They will be in a position to pick
3 up information on troop, supply and ship movements from
4 local Japanese.

5 For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the
6 United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they
7 can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs. We do
8 not believe that they would be at the least any more disloyal
9 than any other racial group in the United States with whom
10 we went to war. Those being here are on a spot and they
11 know it. This is a hurried, preliminary report as our boat
12 sails soon for Honolulu. We have not had a moment even to
13 sort out our voluminous material since we came west. Your
14 reporter is very satisfied he has told you what to expect
15 from the local Japanese, but is horrified to note that dams,
16 bridges, harbors, power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded
17 everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire
18 completely by four men with hand grenades and a little study
19 in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California
20 might actually die of thirst, not to mention the damage to
21 the food supply. One railway bridge at the exit from the
22 mountains in some cases could tie up three or four main
23 railroads. The Navy has to crawl around San Pedro on its
24 marrow bones from oil company to oil company, from lumber
25 yard to harbor board, to city fathers, to politicians in lieu

1 of a centralized authority, in order to strive albeit only
2 partially to protect the conglomeration of oil tanks, lumber,
3 gas tanks and heaven knows what else. And this is the
4 second greatest port in the United States! This is the home
5 base of at least the South Pacific Fleet! This is the
6 greatest collection of inflammable material we have ever
7 seen in our lifetime concentrated in a small vulnerable area!
8 We do not suspect the local Japanese above anyone else or as
9 much as the Communists or the Nazis, but before or on the
10 outbreak of war in the South Pacific someone will set fire to
11 this. If they do not they are fools. The Navy or some
12 unified authority should have complete control of the harbor
13 of Los Angeles, known as San Pedro and Long Beach, from
14 the water's edge in a twenty-five mile radius inland, before
15 the outbreak of war with Japan. That time is now.

16 We will re-work this report for final submittal later.
17 We have missed a great deal through haste. We believe we
18 have given the high points to the best of our ability. The
19 Japanese are loyal on the whole, but we are wide open to
20 sabotage on this Coast and as far inland as the mountains,
21 and while this one fact goes unrectified I cannot unqualifiedly
22 state that there is no danger from the Japanese living in
23 the United States which otherwise I would be willing to
24 state.
25

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON LOWER CALIFORNIA
AND NORTHWESTERN MEXICO

1
2
3 In a conference with the U. S. Consul from Tijuana, he
4 stated that there was no Japanese problem in his district as
5 there were very few Japanese left there. One Rodriguez, former
6 Governor for many years of Lower California, and very partial
7 to the United States, abetted by the American Navy, has set
8 up a shrimp fishing monopoly in the Gulf of California thereby
9 eliminating Japanese fishing (Japan-controlled) in this area.
10 The Consul states that he has sent full reports to the State
11 Department covering the situation there. There is evidently
12 nothing in the Japanese problem across the border about which
13 to be exercised.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON BRITISH COLUMBIA

14
15 The following information was furnished by a reliable
16 source but it has not been verified and cannot be vouched for.

17 The total population of Japanese in Canada is estimated
18 as between 25,000 and 30,000 of whom 23,000 reside in British
19 Columbia. A few of these Japanese are naturalized but the
20 great majority are either native born Canadians or immigrants.

21 The Japanese population is suspected of having a pre-
22 dilection for Japan although the exact feelings of most of
23 them is unknown. They are not believed to be a serious
24 threat from a standpoint of armed uprisings in the event of
25 war although there are probably a number of individuals in

1 the group who would engage in subversive activity.

2 From a strategic point of view these Japanese are
3 dangerously located in event of war between Canada and Japan.
4 They are situated at the mouths of important rivers and around
5 the entrances of harbors. There are many of them located in
6 the vicinities of important air bases in British Columbia.
7 Japanese communities exist at most of the strategic points
8 throughout the province. They own a total of 2,144 vessels
9 in Provincial waters, 211 of these vessels being over ten tons.
10 As a race they generally look to the Japanese Consul for
11 their guidance in matters pertaining to their welfare and
12 political position in the community.

13
14 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS

15 REGARDING HANDLING JAPANESE QUESTION

16 ON THE COAST

17 Los Angeles, Calif.
18 December 20, 1941
(C. B. MUNSON)

CONFIDENTIAL

19 This report should be read in conjunction with your
20 observer's pre-war report on the "Japanese on the West Coast",
21 and his report entitled "Report on Hawaiian Islands." Our
22 report on "Hawaiian Islands" should be attached to and become
23 part of our report on "Japanese on the West Coast." We did
24 not repeat many basic statements originally embodied in the
25 first report ("Japanese on the West Coast") in the later

1 report ("Report on the Hawaiian Islands") as these statements
2 had already been made and held good in both cases.

3 We desire respectfully to call attention to a statement
4 of the Secretary of the Navy evidently made to some reporter
5 on his return to Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack as
6 printed in the Los Angeles Times of December 18th and the
7 Los Angeles Herald and Express of December 16th, (marked in
8 red, slipping enclosed.) This release was a U. P. and A.P.
9 release.

10 We quote, "I think the most effective Fifth Column work
11 of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the possible
12 exception of Norway," Secretary of the Navy Knox said. We
13 suggest that this paragraph creates the wrong impression
14 in that it uses the term "Fifth Column." This term is loose
15 and has been widely abused. Should not the term "complete
16 physical espionage" have been used instead? "Physical
17 espionage" is supplied unwittingly by the gabble of Navy
18 wives, by the gabble of loyal second generation Japanese,
19 by the gabble of the postman and the milkman and classified
20 by definite agents of a foreign government. To this may be
21 added years of photographing, sounding and "look seeing"
22 by disloyal and paid American people for the last twenty
23 years. Fifth Column activities, such as in Norway, impugnes
24 the loyalty of a certain large proportion of a population.
25 Your observer still doubts that this was the case in Honolulu.

1 He doubts, for instance, that outside of sabotage, organized
2 and paid for by the Imperial Japanese Government beforehand
3 (i.e. professional work), that there was any large disloyal
4 element of the Japanese population which went into action as
5 a Fifth Column, running around and intentionally disrupting
6 things on their own hook. We draw attention to the remark
7 in the Secretary's report that people of Japanese ancestry
8 employed at Pearl Harbor burnt their hands on machine gun
9 barrels firing at Japanese planes.

10 What makes this physical espionage so effective and
11 dangerous on the West Coast and in Honolulu, as we printed
12 in our first report, is simply that there are a lot of
13 Japanese in these districts and have been for years. For
14 instance, we are given to understand that the best maps on
15 the Aleutian Islands were and still are Japanese.

16 Some reaction of an undesirable nature is already
17 apparent on the West Coast due to this statement of the
18 Secretary's. In Honolulu your observer noted that the
19 seagoing Navy was inclined to consider everybody with slant
20 eyes bad. This thought stems from two sources; self-interest,
21 largely in the economic field, and in the Navy usually from
22 pure lack of knowledge and the good old "eat 'em up alive"
23 school. It is not the measured judgment of 98% of the
24 intelligence services or the knowing citizenry either on
25 the mainland or in Honolulu. An observer can only report

1 what he observes. Your observer must note without fear or
2 favor that 99% of the most intelligent views on the Japanese,
3 by military, official and civil contacts in Honolulu and
4 the mainland, was best crystalized by two Intelligence men
5 before the outbreak of the war. These two men are Lieutenant
6 Commander K. D. Ringle of the 11th Naval District in Los
7 Angeles and Mr. Shivers in Honolulu of the F. B. I. Mr.
8 Shivers in Honolulu, since the attack on Pearl Harbor, should
9 know whether he was right or wrong, and we believe he is
10 big and loyal enough to be only interested in finding out
11 in what regards he was wrong and immediately notifying his
12 superiors. In our first report we quoted Alice in
13 Wonderland,

14 "If seven maids with seven mops
15 Swept it for half a year,
16 Do you suppose, the Walrus said,
17 That they could get it clear?"

18 The best measured judgment on the local Japanese may
19 be wrong. Mr. Shivers in Honolulu holds the key. An attack
20 is the proof of the pudding. His hindsight should be of
21 inestimable value in shaping policy toward these people on
22 the mainland where an attack has not yet occurred. Your
23 observer guesses by mental telepathy that Mr. Shivers has not
24 changed his point of view. Your observer suspects that
25 Secretary Knox's comparison to the Fifth Column in Norway

1 stems from either of two things: First, a very busy man
2 being caught by the coattails by a reporter; and second, from
3 the unknowing "eat 'em up alive" element amongst whom of
4 necessity he was largely exposed in his hurried visit to
5 determine responsibility.

6 Your reporter, fully believing that his original reports
7 are still good after the attack, makes the following observations
8 about handling the Japanese "problem" on the West Coast.

9 If Shivers says he was wrong, your observer is wrong
10 too, and this report should be thrown in the ashcan and
11 something much tougher substituted.

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SUGGESTIONS

1
2 A. The loyal Japanese citizens should be encouraged by
3 a statement from high government authority and public attitude
4 toward them outlined.

5 B. Their offers of assistance should be accepted
6 through such agencies as:

- 7 1. Civilian Defense
- 8 2. Red Cross
- 9 3. U. S. O., etc., etc.

10 This assistance should not be merely monetary, nor should
11 it even be limited to physical voluntary work in segregated Nisei
12 units. The Nisei should work with and among white persons, and
13 (be) made to feel he is welcome on a basis of equality.

14 C. An alien property custodian should be appointed to
15 supervise Issei (first generation-alien) businesses, but encour-
16 aging Nisei (second generation-American citizen) to take over.

17 D. Accept investigated Nisei as workers in defense
18 industries such as shipbuilding plants, aircraft plants, etc.

19 E. Put responsibility for behavior of Issei and Nisei
20 on the leaders of Nisei groups such as the Japanese American
21 Citizens League.

22 F. Put the responsibility for production of food (vege-
23 tables, fish, etc.) on Nisei leaders.

Enlargement of Foregoing Suggestions

24
25 A. "High Government Authority," i.e. President or Vice

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President, or at least almost as high.

C. Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production and Distribution Situation in the Los Angeles Area following December 7, 1941

The immediate results at the revocation of all licenses authorising Japanese Nationals to engage in business was a sharp curtailment of the movement of vegetable produce into the Los Angeles market. This was due to the closing of a number of houses in the local produce market owned or controlled by Japanese Nationals and to a fear on the part of the Japanese Nationals on the farms that their produce would not be received or handled if they brought it in; also due to the immediate blocking of all bank accounts of Japanese Nationals.

It was at once obvious that some provisions must quickly be made to relieve the stoppage of food production and distribution. Under the assumption that they would be asked for advice for a plan of reopening the several closed Issei produce houses under Federal control, a plan was discussed and tentatively drawn up by a group of local produce dealers.

In anticipation of a lessening of these restrictions a press release was issued on December 11th calling upon Japanese farmers to bring their products to market as evidence of their loyalty to the United States and assuring

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1 them that these products would be received by American
2 firms for marketing. Issuance of the General License
3 No. 77 under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940
4 as amended and Regulations issued pursuant thereto relating
5 to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the
6 Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of
7 December 11, 1941, granted a general license under strict
8 banking control for certain Japanese Nationals to engage in
9 the production, marketing and distribution of food products
10 in Continental United States.

11 As a result of the press release and the issuance of
12 General License above referred to, the local produce market
13 which on December 11th had a total volume of only 30 percent
14 of normal, received 75 percent of normal on December 12th
15 and was virtually normal on December 13th. In spite of the
16 apparent severity of the banking controls set up by this
17 General License, it was generally accepted by all concerned
18 as a necessary thing and discussions were immediately under-
19 taken as to the most effective means of operating under its
20 terms without severe dislocation of the food production
21 program.

22 Since the new license No. 77 immediately allowed the
23 Issei produce houses to open under their former management
24 in a manner more lenient than had been expected, it was
25 still believed that these houses would be promptly taken

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over directly or indirectly by the Federal Government so as to transfer their operations to the control of American citizens. This was particularly expected because of the belief that operation of these houses had been strongly influenced and directed previously by the Japanese Government.

"As discussions were proceeding looking to the setting up of a successful program for gradually taking over these essential businesses by American citizens and as clarification of a few points in the General License above mentioned were being requested, these discussions running over into Monday, December 15th, we were suddenly surprised to receive copies of General License No. 68a under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940, as amended and regulations issued pursuant thereto, relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 15, 1941. We assume that this order may have been issued as a result of the wave of query and protest that may have arisen immediately following the realization of the total freezing situation which occurred immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. At any rate, the effect of General License No. 68a which appears to open wide the doors so far as Continental transactions are concerned, and puts a great number of Japanese nationals back in control, rather than the loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage, many of whom we had expected would be

put in control of these essential businesses.

"It has been and is our belief that the objectionable features of the old control system have operated by virtue of control over consignments of merchandise and credits exercised by the Issei produce houses against the Japanese on the farms. Of prime necessity then is the complete elimination of Japanese National control of the produce houses. How far into the farms the elimination of Japanese National control should extend depends upon the individual circumstances. In some cases on the farm, control has already passed -- in some cases perhaps several years back -- into the hands of the American citizen children of Japanese parents. It is believed that in many other cases there are on the farms Nisei children capable of assuming complete control and who would have assumed that control very promptly if it had not been for the issuance of License No. 68a previously referred to.

"There are unquestionable a number of Japanese National farmers eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. Some of these have minor children who are not yet capable of taking over the control of the farm. There are also unquestionably instances of Japanese Aliens on farms whose capable sons of American birth are in the United States Army and hence not available for control or operation of the farm. These are some of the reasons why the matter must be approached from the point of view of con-

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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sideration of the individual cases.

"The statement is made by authoritative sources that Japanese National firms have in the past appropriated for their own use funds that were due Japanese National farmers in one locality in order to extend credit to Japanese National farmers in other localities so that American citizen farmers competing with them could be driven out of business and in turn this second group having been established would be used as a source of funds to repeat the operation in another locality.

"Although there are California statutes providing ample redress for any farmer who believes he has not received proper returns from the commission house, it is reported that Japanese National farmers never made a complaint nor will they allow their names to be used to enable the California officials to properly enforce these statutes. It is extremely doubtful if this condition would exist in relations between Japanese American citizens if they are found ready to avail themselves of the protection and the machinery set up by American laws for preventing such abuses in business transactions.

"The fact that some of the Japanese Aliens are operating as commission merchants without proper license and bond in violation of these California statutes are some of the reasons for placing emphasis on the necessity for proceeding as

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1 promptly as possible toward elimination of the alien con-
2 trolled distributor houses and in this field there are a
3 great number of loyal American citizens of Japanese paren-
4 tage capable of taking over with or without immediate
5 control and governmental direction of the operation of
6 these houses."

7 Fishing Industry

8 Fishing and produce are the two major industries
9 of the Japanese. Shopkeeping comes third, but is much
10 smaller than the other two. There are many little indus-
11 tries such as sign painting. It is our belief, however,
12 that if the two major industries are reorganized to function
13 properly in safe hands that the other minor industries will
14 either be satisfactorily adjusted to the change along the
15 same line or can be taken up later.

16 There are distinct differences between produce and
17 fishing. Fishing provides an opportunity for direct con-
18 tact with the enemy and transmission of information,
19 probably to submarines, although transmission of informa-
20 tion to surface vessels is not an improbability. The
21 general practice is that the Nisei do not own or captain
22 fish boats. Japanese and those of Japanese descent own
23 the nets and tools for fishing and organizes into gangs while
24 the fish boat operators hire the gangs with their nets.
25 We consider it very dangerous to send all Japanese or all

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1 Nisei crews to sea. The real danger in this lies in the
2 fact that all Japanese crews in the intense competition of
3 following the fish might get into battles with Scandanavian,
4 Czechoslovakian and Italian crews. The fishing people
5 would like to use part Nisei crews -- i.e., mixed crews.
6 For this purpose a clearing house of loyal Nisei should be
7 established (Japanese American Citizens League) to guarantee
8 and give clearance to those who fish. Incidentally, the
9 fuel might be limited to the amount necessary for the trip.
10 Of course this is equally true of all Italians and other
11 nationalities who are fishing. Unlike the produce industry
12 less than 25 percent of the fishing is in Japanese hands.
13 There has been issued from Washington an order which keeps
14 all Japanese, including American citizens of Japanese
15 ancestry from fishing. This is palpably hysteria as they
16 are not any much more of a danger than the Italians who
17 are still quite freely fishing.

18 E. & F. In case we have not made it apparent, the
19 aim of this report is that all Japanese Nationals in the
20 continental United States and property owned and operated by
21 them within this country be immediately placed under absolute
22 Federal control.

23 The aim of this will be to squeeze control from the
24 hands of the Japanese Nationals into the hands of the loyal
25 Nisei who are American citizens. As there may be a small

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percentage of these Nisei who are not loyal, it is also the intention that those Nisei who are put in positions of trust will be passed upon by the unquestionably loyal Nisei who focus in some organization such as the Japanese American Citizens League. It is the aim that the Nisei should police themselves, and as a result police their parents. Whatever organization (Japanese American Citizens League?) wields this influence, it in turn must be rigidly approved by and under the thumb of our government or some group which fully understands the Japanese on the Coast and is appointed by our government. THIS BODY SHOULD BE ON THE PACIFIC COAST, FULLY CONVERSANT AND IN TOUCH WITH LOCAL PROBLEMS AND PREFERABLY OF A MILITARY OR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE TEXTURE.

Likewise there are many technical aliens (legally Japanese citizens who are loyal to U. S. but prevented by our laws from becoming naturalized). The control should be sufficiently flexible to encourage these on the basis of performance in each individual case.

To illustrate such a case there are two Japanese ministers in the city of Bakersfield, California; one Christian, one Buddhist. The Christian minister is an alien. He came to the United States in infancy, grew up here, and is thoroughly loyal to the United States. The Buddhist minister is legally a U. S. citizen. He went to Japan in infancy, grew to manhood there, and returned to the United

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States within the last two years. He cannot speak good English. Which is really the American?

REPORT ON HAWAIIAN ISLANDS by Curtis B. Munson

Your reporter, after a four weeks' survey of the Japanese problem on the Pacific Coast, sailed for Honolulu, where he spent nine days. There he received the full cooperation of Army and Navy Intelligence Services and the F.B.I. He also contacted British Intelligence based on Singapore. In the civilian field he had many personal interviews with first and second generation Japanese, police chiefs, school teachers, businessmen, contractors, rural officials, etc. The F.B.I. seem to hold the leading place in Honolulu, due to the fact that they have been set up longer on the Japanese question and also due to the personality of Mr. Shivers, their Agent in Charge. He has gone far to develop the confidence of the Japanese and others in himself and his organization there. The Army got going next, and as they have to live with the Japanese on land while the Navy sails the seas, they have earnestly thrown themselves into the task under an able Reserve officer who brings experience in intelligence service in the last war and decided business acumen to bear upon his assignment. The Naval Intelligence, though a late starter, is silently and ably developing an organization whose real power will not reach its peak for

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four or five months yet. There is the same cooperation between the Services that is evidence on the mainland.

The consensus of opinion is that there will be no racial uprising of the Japanese in Honolulu. The first generation, as on the Coast, are ideologically and culturally closest to Japan. Though many of them speak no English, or at best only pigeon-English, it is considered that the big bulk of them will be loyal. This is especially so, for in Hawaii the first generation is largely on the land and devoted to it. It may be well to state here in a general way that everyone in Hawaii, especially in the dark-skinned laboring classes, places loyalty to Hawaii first, and the United States second. This is not meant to impugn their loyalty -- but they love the Islands. The second generation is estimated as approximately ninety-eight percent loyal. However, with the large Japanese population in the Hawaiian Islands, giving this the best interpretation possible, it would mean that fifteen hundred were disloyal. However, the F.B.I. state that there are about four hundred suspects, and the F.B.I.'s private estimate is that only fifty or sixty of these are sinister. (In all figures given on suspects only aliens are considered. Should it be possible to pick up citizens, this figure would have to be materially increased.) There are also a few Germans and Italians in the Islands who should be picked up. We

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do not at the moment remember the exact number, whether it was seven or seventeen. The Army Intelligence showed this reporter a secret map with pins of different colors to denote first generation, second generation, and other nationalities who are suspect, and their distribution in the Islands. Each one of these men's address is known and they showed me that it would be a comparatively easy job to pick them up almost in a few hours, should the necessity arise. There is not the same danger as in Continental United States that if they escaped the first grab that they will completely escape, as of course they have nowhere to go but the Pacific Ocean. There will be, undoubtedly, planted Japanese and agents who are there for the purpose of sabotage. Though sabotage may be expected, it is a self-evidence fact that the main things to sabotage in the Islands are the Army and Navy installations, and these are under the protection and complete control of the two services. However, materials are sometimes lacking to build, say protecting guard fences. Outside of the services' installations there are only two things open to sabotage; the commercial waterfront (this does not include Pearl Harbor), and the power stations and power lines. However, these power lines are especially important, for if one transformer is damaged in the Islands there are no replacements, and it would be a considerable time before a replacement could be secured

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from the mainland. Hawaii is particularly fortunate as regards water supply, possessing a large artesian flow along with numerous reservoirs. Fortunately, in the Islands there would be no "White" sabotage which could be purchased by the Japanese, as there is on the Coast, outside of the imported white defense workers. There are very few whites who would be anything except loyal.

The danger of espionage is considerable. This is especially the case as many Navy wives are over-garrulous with regard to their husbands' departures and where they are going. We believe that the Naval Intelligence Service is looking to put a curb on this, and we are sure they can be trusted to police their own family. However, facts can be easily compiled from mail piling up, milk and grocery orders cancelled, along with knowledge of what officer is on what ship and other private information, which might indicate the length of the ship's visit and where headed. This is almost unavoidable in such a compact and small community, though the services bear this in mind. The bottleneck in the Japanese espionage would not be in the gathering of data but how to transmit it to Japan. This was easy when Japanese vessels were touching at the Hawaiian Islands. Now it is very far from easy. It has been suggested that fishing boats might drop oilskin packages at sea to be picked up by Japanese Naval vessels. This has

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1 more the elements of rumor, especially as no such parcels
2 have ever been picked up at sea by the numerous American
3 vessels. It is suggested that the transmittal may be
4 going East instead of West, probably to Mexico or some
5 such likely point. From there it would be an easier task
6 to forward it to Japan. In this connection there is also
7 some suggestion that rumors with sufficient basis in fact
8 to cause the Naval Intelligence to look into it, emanate
9 from Mexico City to the Islands. A sample of this was
10 the story pointing to Mexico City as a source that the
11 Japanese were running submarines off the shore of a certain
12 Island, the crew submerging them and going ashore. With
13 them they brought an end of an electric wire on shore.
14 On M day they would press a button which would set the
15 submarine mechanism to work so it would again come to the
16 surface. The grain of truth which made the rumor interest-
17 ing was the fact that the shores of the Hawaiian Islands
18 are notoriously deep, rocky, and unsuited for this purpose.
19 The one spot in all the Islands which the chart showed was
20 suitable was the small spot indicated by the rumor. Investi-
21 gation by the Navy proved there were no submarines sunk
22 on this one sandy-bottom shoal. However, it wasted a good
23 deal of their time, as did some other rumors of this nature.
24 All these rumors had one basic local fact which was true and
25 all seemed to start from Mexico City.

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One important difference between the situation in Hawaii and the mainland is that if all the Japanese on the mainland were actively disloyal they could be corraled or destroyed within a very short time. In the Hawaiian Islands, though there are sufficient American troops and Navy present to overwhelm the Japanese population, it would simply mean that the Islands would lose their vital labor supply by so doing, and in addition to that we would have to feed them, as well as import many thousands of laborers to take their place. Since a large part of the vital and essential work of the Islands is ably carried on by the Japanese population, it is essential that they should be kept loyal -- at least to the extent of staying at their tasks. If Imperial Japan were wise, she would devote all her energies in the Hawaiian Islands to trying to induce a spirit of mind which would cause a universal Japanese sit-down strike. She evidently has not thought of this as there is no sign of this type of propaganda. Propaganda, by Japan, is practically non-existent on the Islands.

No report on Honolulu should start anywhere but with the "Big Five." The "Houies" or white people at the head of Island affairs centralize in the Big Five. The native whites who own the Islands are in a general way descendants of white missionaries and traders. Due to these two facts, they had an interest in their labor -- Japanese, Philippine,

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Hawaiian and Portuguese -- and treated them well. Though they paid low wages and made money out of the Islands, there was hardly ever any absentee management. They sent their sons to Yale, Harvard and Princeton, and these sons returned to carry on the work of the Islands. There was never the abuse of labor in the Islands by rich, low white trash which made Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, or the bull pens of Idaho famous and contributed so to the rise of the 'isms.' You never see today a pair of patched pants in any of the Islands, and a short stroll through the streets of Honolulu -- if one eliminates the defense workers imported from the mainland -- convinces one that the faces are the fairly contented faces of people who have been, on the whole, not badly treated.

The Islands are really a huge monopoly, centralized under the ownership of five families and an independent or two. These five families are called the "Big Five." The "Howies" include the sons, the management and less fortunate whites of long residence -- in a word, all those who go to make up the directing business force of the Islands. These whites, especially the "Big Five", are intelligent and see the handwriting on the wall. They know that this last oasis of paternalistic capitalism is doomed. Naturally they are determined to hold onto it 'til the last ditch. Due to the fact that the Japanese have always voted either as

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WART. A PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Democrats or Republicans, the whites control the Islands
 2 politically. If the Japanese ever voted on racial lines,
 3 it is they who would control politically. However, it
 4 must be said to their credit and the credit of the white
 5 owner class that they have never done this. The politics
 6 are really controlled in a last analysis by the "Big Five".
 7 The people of these Islands have become accustomed to
 8 being controlled thus, and as a result it must not be
 9 overlooked as a factor of safety in the control of the
 10 Japanese "Problem" in the Islands. The "Big Five" see
 11 in the ascending power of the Army and the Navy, due to
 12 war, a factor which is sure to hasten the end of this "last
 13 oasis of paternalistic capitalism" previously referred to.
 14 Thus we have in the Islands the development of three lines
 15 of thought. One is exemplified in the sea-going branch of
 16 the Navy. This leans to a slight lack of regard for the
 17 civilian life on the Islands, or possibly is best expressed
 18 by saying that it regards the Islands as a Naval Base and
 19 wants them to be a darn good base, regardless. Of course,
 20 this point of view is wholly unofficial, but it exists in
 21 unthinking elements of the Navy. The second thought exem-
 22 plified is the thought of the extreme element of paternal-
 23 istic capitalism which desires to keep control in their own
 24 hands to the "nth" hour as far as safety of the Navy or the
 25 Army forces is concerned. The heads of the F.B.I. and,

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1 we believe, the Intelligence Services generally, as well
2 as most responsible service people, take the well-balanced
3 middle view. This view is the one which we desire to
4 make apparent in our report. The well established and really
5 kindly paternalism of the Islands has a definite contribu-
6 tion to make and deserves credit as a considerable factor
7 in the safety of the Islands.

8 The general background and characteristics of the
9 Japanese are the same in the Islands as they are on the
10 mainland. However, certain differences in the situation
11 have tended to ameliorate these in some particulars. We
12 believe that the best over-all method of expressing this
13 is by the following observation: This reporter believes
14 there is this fundamental difference between the Japanese
15 "Problem" on the Coast and the Japanese "Problem" in the
16 Hawaiian Islands. On the Coast, the Japanese are discrimi-
17 nated against on a racial basis. In Hawaii it is really
18 only on a social and economic basis. This is peculiarly
19 American. In our materialistic civilization one fits in
20 socially largely on an income basis, provided he is willing
21 to wash his neck and give up eating with his knife. In
22 Hawaii, the Japanese fit in thus among the bulk of the
23 inhabitants because the bulk are dark-skinned of one kind
24 or another. The whites generally are on a higher economic
25 plane than they are on the mainland. The few Japanese who

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1 reach a position economically where they can mix with
2 the whites are not numerous enough to make much impression
3 even if they do resent not being asked to tea. The bulk
4 of the whites in Hawaii would not mix socially anyway with
5 stevedores or dock laborers, black or white. On the main-
6 land there are plenty of "Okies" to call the Japanese a
7 "Yellow-belly," when economically and by education the
8 Japanese may not only be their equal but their superior.

9 The result of this is that the Hawaiian Japanese does
10 not suffer from the same inferiority complex or feel the
11 same mistrust of the whites that he does on the mainland.
12 While it is seldom on the mainland that you find even a
13 college-educated Japanese-American citizen who talks to
14 you wholly openly until you have gained his confidence,
15 this is far from the case in Hawaii. Many young Japanese
16 there are fully as open and frank and at ease with a white
17 as white boys are. In a word, Hawaii is more of a melting
18 pot because there are more brown skins to melt -- Japanese,
19 Hawaiian, Chinese and Filipino. It is interesting to note
20 that there has been absolutely no bad feeling between the
21 Japanese and the Chinese in the Islands due to the Japanese-
22 Chinese war. Why should they be any worse toward us?

23 The extreme Japanese "lover" in Hawaii is probably
24 motivated frequently by self-interest. This is because he
25 knows that the economic status quo is built largely on the

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1 fine industry of the Japanese labor, and he wishes to keep
2 control of this as long as possible and is very loath to
3 suggest to the Army or Navy that there is any danger from
4 the Japanese. Any extreme anti-Japanese thought in Hawaii
5 is probably due either to an unthinking element of the Navy
6 which wants its base to be secure and of good service re-
7 gardless of other consequences, or it is extremely anti-
8 "Big Five" thought.

9 Imperial Japan has attempted to do the same things in
10 Hawaii that she has attempted to do on the mainland. Anyone
11 interested in the Imperial Japanese picture visualized on
12 paper should refer to secret documents in the office of the
13 F.B.I. in Washington entitled "Japanese Charts of Hawaiian
14 Office." This will show the same network of Reserve
15 officers, Shinto and Buddhist priests, language schools,
16 prefectural clubs and associations, etc., as will be found
17 in the Navy Department in Washington in secret charts entitled
18 "Japanese Organizations and Activities in the Eleventh Naval
19 District." This reporter did not visit any other Island
20 than that of Oahu, in which is found the city of Honolulu.
21 The Service theory is that this is the only really good harbor
22 and so all the defenses have been concentrated on this Island.
23 In order to attack this Island Japan would first have to
24 seize one of the other Islands and then be strong enough
25 to seize, from there, Oahu. If she were strong enough to do

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1 this she would be strong enough to seize one of the other
2 Islands first anyhow. Therefore there has been no spread-
3 ing of defenses thin over the whole group. There is only
4 one other harbor at Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii, and
5 this is a poor one. Of course, surveillance and small
6 garrisons are maintained on the other Islands of this group.
7 This reporter was advised that he would be more or less
8 wasting time to visit these other islands. There is possibly
9 only one that he was negligent in not visiting, though
10 advised that it was unnecessary. That was the Island of
11 Kausi. The Japanese Communists are more strongly organized
12 on this Island than on any of the others. We believe
13 Japanese Communism is purely economic and on this Island
14 it is not considered a really serious factor. However,
15 this is the Island that Japan would be most likely to seize
16 in the case she felt herself strong enough to have a base
17 for an assault on Oahu.

18 The best consensus of opinion seemed to agree that
19 martial law should be proclaimed now in Hawaii. We believe
20 that under appointment from the President, the Governor of
21 Hawaii is empowered to declare martial law when he feels the
22 need. Many people in Hawaii felt that the Governor was
23 fairly spineless and would not do anything soon enough.
24 However, the Army Intelligence Head told your reporter con-
25 fidentially that the Governor would be pretty well guided

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1 by what General Short (Commanding General, Army Forces,
2 Hawaii) told him to do. In other words, he said the
3 Governor was under General Short's thumb. If this is the
4 case, your reporter sees no need to worry on this score,
5 and in line with this, read in the newspapers since leaving
6 Hawaii that the Governor had made some official move which
7 envisaged the posting of guards at all vulnerable points.
8 Your reporter is not in a position to say definitely one
9 way or the other whether the Governor is spineless, whether
10 he is a man of determination or whether (which would be
11 ideal) he is under the thumb of General Short.

12 There is some danger in Hawaii of race riots. This is
13 largely due to four elements. The Filipinos are intensely
14 anti-Japanese and if they were attacked on the Philippine
15 Islands they have threatened they would kill every Japanese
16 in the Hawaiian Islands. The Intelligence Services, however,
17 have made particular note of this and in conjunction with
18 the sugar plantations, by whom most of the Filipinos are
19 employed and controlled, have lectured the Filipinos kindly
20 but firmly on this point. They have pointed out that if
21 there is to be interference with any of the inhabitants of
22 the Islands it must be by the properly authorized officials of
23 the American Government. The Filipinos seem to have appre-
24 ciated this and considerably toned down their patriotism.
25 There is a type of Japanese who may be termed the "bright

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1 young thing," a bit loud, and liable to be openly resentful
2 of insult. He is the prototype of his brother on the mainland.
3 He has broken away from the fine character and parental
4 control of his Japanese background while becoming too
5 Americanized without fully comprehending what Americaniza-
6 tion means. Fortunately, he represents a small group in
7 the second-generation Japanese and contributes most of the
8 juvenile delinquency which is found in this race. He gets
9 drunk and frequents pool halls. There is danger that drunk
10 sailors may push him off the street and call him a "Yellow-
11 belly," especially if they have just returned from some
12 Naval battle with the Japanese. Where other Japanese would
13 take this in silent anger, this bright young thing might
14 hit back and start some racial trouble. However, it must
15 be said that the Army and Navy have this fully in mind and
16 are very efficiently policing their own families. The
17 sailors are extremely well behaved and it is a matter of
18 common comment and approval. The real danger of racial
19 trouble comes from the defense workers who have been imported
20 from the mainland. Most of these come from the Pacific Coast
21 and contain the dregs of the waterfront element. If they had
22 been able to secure a job on the mainland they would not have
23 gone to Hawaii. They include many of the "Okie" class and
24 to them any brown-skin is "Nigger". They do not like the
25 Islands and are only there because they could not get a job

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1 on the mainland. They already have insulted many Kanakas
2 by calling them "Negroes" and treating them as such. To
3 them every Japanese is a "Yellow Peril" and to be treated
4 accordingly. There is fear in the native white element in
5 the Islands that these people will create a problem after
6 the emergency or war is over. The controlling plantation
7 and business class would prefer to bring in Filipino labor
8 to take care of the shortage of labor on the plantations
9 caused by the former plantation workers going into defense
10 work. In fact, they feel that all labor for the Islands
11 should be imported from the Philippines. Of course, the
12 reasons are pretty selfish as the Filipinos are more docile,
13 and easily handled and create no problem for the future.
14 Besides, the construction labor recruited from the Coast
15 is additional handwriting on the wall pointing to the final
16 destruction of paternalistic capitalism. Your reporter is
17 not in a position to state, nor is he able to make up his
18 own mind, as to what is the best course to pursue. Those
19 who desire Filipino labor will say there is absolutely no
20 danger from the Japanese, and, in the next breath, argue
21 that the importation of Filipino labor would offset the
22 Japanese danger, as the Filipinos are so anti-Japanese.
23 In our mind this is not an argument, however, as soldiers
24 stationed in the Island of Oahu are more than sufficient
25 to take care of the Japanese population if it all were

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disloyal, without the aid of any Filipinos. Still, we must confess we see the danger of the imported coastal riff-raff and do not find ourselves any too partial toward them. Besides, a Social Security number entitles a man to work while he may change his name twenty times and no information may be secured from Social Security. Many men with very bad records are hiding under this. The Intelligence have uncovered many men with very bad records among these workers. On second thought your reporter casts his vote for the Filipinos.

Due to the preponderance of Japanese in the population of the Islands, a much greater proportion of Japanese have been called to the draft than on the mainland. As on the mainland they are inclined to enlist before being drafted. The Army is extremely high in its praise of them as recruits. The Japanese seems to be chiefly afraid that their boys will not be given the same chance at promotion as the whites. Frankly, at first this discrimination existed. A Japanese still had to be better than a white to gain promotion. The Army is gradually eliminating even this discrimination. They have been giving them a chance at becoming officers. Recently they picked out a few of the very best of these and put them in charge of white troops. The Army officers confessed that they held their breath. Much to their surprise and relief there was absolutely no reaction from the white

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1 troops and they liked these officers very well. Of course,
2 these were especially good officers, but the Army is going
3 to try more. This has been a great thing in strengthening
4 the loyalty of the Japanese in the Islands. They are
5 beginning to feel that they are going to get a square deal
6 and some of them are really almost pathetically exuberant.

7 In summarizing, we cannot say how loyal the Japanese in
8 the Hawaiian group would be if there were an American Naval
9 disaster and the Japanese fleet appeared off the Hawaiian
10 Islands. Doubtless great numbers of them would then forget
11 their American loyalties and shout "Banzai" from the shore.
12 Under those circumstances if this reporter were there he is
13 not sure that he might not do it also to save his own skin,
14 if not his face. Due to the fact that there are more than
15 enough soldiers in the Islands to take care of any Japanese,
16 even if not so inclined, the Japanese will doubtless remain
17 quietly at their tasks. However, in fairness to them it
18 is only right to say that we believe the big majority anyhow
19 would be neutral or even actively loyal.

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1 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I have one suggestion.
2 We have had some difficulty in getting certain memorandums
3 in relation to the Atlantic conference and the Far East.
4 I want to suggest to the committee that there is one man who
5 now knows most about that subject, Mr. Churchill, and he is
6 in the country and I suggest that he be requested to appear.
7 He has appeared on several occasions before Congress and given
8 his views and I am sure that he would be glad to answer ques-
9 tions in relation to those conferences as it relates to the
10 Far East.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. NOTENHAW, JUAN & DRAV

11 Mr. Murphy: I want to say for the record, Mr. Chairman,
12 that Mr. Churchill has been a great figure in this world over
13 a great many years and that he has come to this country as a
14 place of rest, he so stated in the papers when he arrived in
15 the country, and I think it ill behooves this committee when
16 a great citizen of the world comes to this country for rest
17 that we cannot let him have the rest and instead of that we
18 are going to ask him about the Atlantic Conference when we have
19 an abundance of material on the subject now, with all American
20 officials present.

21
22 I don't think it is showing much courtesy to a great citi-
23 zen of the world.

24 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, the other day when I read
25 into the record the statement of Mr. Hornbeck in relation to

1 the parallel action, it was suggested even by the chairman of
 2 this committee that we should get the records from Britain on
 3 what that parallel action was and we haven't learned yet from
 4 our State Department whether or not any parallel action was
 5 taken. In a democracy such as we have here it is up to the
 6 people to have all of the facts.

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Senator Lucas: Does the Senator think it is fair to suggest that Churchill be subpoenaed here, a citizen of another country who happens to be here?

Mr. Murphy: It makes good headlines.

Senator Ferguson: I certainly do or I would not suggest it to the committee.

Mr. Murphy: I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to be more concerned with what happened at Pearl Harbor instead of just putting out headlines. I think this Churchill business is not fair to a great citizen of this world.

Senator Ferguson: No one is above coming in and telling the facts on as great a catastrophe as we have had at Pearl Harbor. This committee is laboring to get the facts, and when I say "laboring" I mean just that, and if we can get the facts it is up to the committee to get all of the facts.

The Vice Chairman: With two members of the committee having temporarily retired, would it be agreeable, Senator, to carry this question to the full committee?

Senator Ferguson: I do not care to press it at this moment.

The Vice Chairman: It would be agreeable then to carry it over until the other members are present?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Senator Lucas: Just another fishing expedition, that

Witness Kimmel

is all.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I want to say a word on this fishing expedition. I know I have endeavored to obtain some records on occasions and it has been a month or six weeks from the time certain records were requested until they were obtained.

Now if that is a fishing expedition then of course that is what it is.

Senator Lucas: I am talking about the Churchill request, that it is employed for the benefit of the press and is a fishing expedition, and I repeat it.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I, as one member of this committee, regret the entirely unparliamentary comment of the Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas: I don't care what you think.

Senator Brewster: I think if we were proceeding under any sort of parliamentary rules he, of course, would be immediately subject to being silenced. Now the request of the Senator from Michigan is entitled to receive the consideration of this committee without reflection upon his motives or his purposes, which, in the first place, have been demonstrated by a long record of public service and, in the second place, have been demonstrated, I think, in this committee by citations of evidence produced which even

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2 the Senator from Illinois has been pleased to cite with
3 approval after they have been produced over very serious
4 objection.

5 So, with that in mind, I have a request that I hope will
6 not be subject to a similar charge, which I have had pending
7 for two months and I have not so far had a reply.

8 I filed a written request with this committee early in
9 November asking the State Department for the records in the
10 Kent Case, and I have not had a word on it.

11 Mr. Murphy: Will not the gentleman admit that a member
12 of this committee says the Tyler Kent testimony has absolutely
13 nothing to do with this inquiry after talking with Tyler Kent
14 for two hours?

15 Senator Brewster: I shall be very happy to say also
16 that the matters with which I am concerned have nothing to
17 do, as far as I understand, with what the gentleman discussed.
18 I have never had the privilege myself to discuss it with
19 Mr. Kent, and I do not know that I care for it. I think
20 that members of this committee, or members of the Senate,
21 are entitled to a reply to a respectful request through the
22 proper channels of this committee as to whether or why these
23 records can or cannot be produced. The records can then
24 speak for themselves.

25 I do not care to take the opinion of anybody else regarding

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that. I would like to have the opportunity to look at them for myself.

I think even the gentleman on my left has exhibited great diligence and might very likely like to look at the records himself.

Mr. Murphy: I might say, Mr. Chairman, that counsel for this committee, the eminent counsel who has retired, said there were 1500 stolen documents by Tyler Kent and, in his judgment and the judgment of the State Department, they have absolutely nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. With over a million and a half words in the record already, as well as thousands upon thousands of other pages, I see no reason why we should go into that matter, which is not pertinent, and in view particularly also of a public declaration by Tyler Kent that he knows absolutely nothing about Pearl Harbor and can contribute nothing.

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Senator Brewster: I appreciate what the gentleman contributes. I have not even had the privilege to be told as much as apparently the gentleman has. But, unfortunately, neither the State Department, the eminent counsel who has retired, nor Tyler Kent are under the mandate of the Congress of the United States, under which we are operating, to form our own independent judgment as to whether or not matters of this kind are or are not relevant.

I have not indicated at any time a desire to introduce them into the record. I have simply asked for permission to examine these records in order that I might carry out my legislative mandate to determine for myself whether they have any relevance, and the more persistently the gentleman opposes that examination, the more one suspects that perhaps that these may be matters of concern.

Mr. Murphy: I will say the gentleman is back in the committee and we are having trouble all over again.

Senator Brewster: I would like an answer. I would like someone to tell me what the answer is.

The Vice Chairman: Obviously several of these matters mentioned will have to be considered in executive session.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: I do not intend to inject myself into the

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1 discussion that has been had, but in view of the fact
2 that counsel has offered a number of exhibits that have
3 heretofore been asked for, I would like to inquire whether
4 or not the written request which I made, which was approved
5 by the committee as a fair request, and approved by the
6 counsel of the committee, which purported to request corres-
7 pondence between the late President and Mr. Churchill,
8 between certain specific dates, whether or not, after the
9 lapse now of a couple of months, that material has been
10 made available, and is there any answer that can be given
11 to the request which I made?

12 The Vice Chairman: Let the Chair inquire, does that
13 relate to the letter received from Mr. Acheson of the State
14 Department?

15 Mr. Keefe: No, it is a different matter. The Senator
16 from Illinois will recall the request which I made, and
17 the Chairman was kind enough to state it was a fair re-
18 quest at that time.

19 The Vice Chairman: Is counsel prepared to give any
20 reply now to Mr. Keefe's question?

21 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, we have received a letter from
22 the War Department which you have asked for. The Navy
23 advised me this noon they will have a similar letter over
24 here tomorrow morning. I was on the telephone with the
25 State Department asking them to expedite their delivery of

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2 the information that was requested, to have it here tomorrow
3 or the next day. We have been following that up practi-
4 cally every other day.

5 Mr. Keefe: I realize counsel has been diligent in
6 the matter, and I have endeavored not to inject myself
7 into it too frequently, but time marches on. It is like
8 a lot of other things we have requested here. We just
9 simply do not get them.

10 I was going to say, Mr. Chairman, I am going to be
11 insistent on having a statement from Mr. Acheson or whoever
12 is responsible, sometime pretty soon to my request for the
13 Salisbury report, so we may determine that issue. We
14 have witnesses coming on, and I do not have the report,
15 and I cannot decently and intelligently ask questions in
16 the absence of having the evidence before us.

17 When can we have an executive meeting when Mr. Acheson
18 can come down and present this Salisbury report so we
19 may determine whether it has anything in it that is rele-
20 vant and that the committee ought to have?

21 The Vice Chairman: I am sure the gentleman remembers
22 the report made to him in committee meeting here by the
23 Chairman of the committee.

24 Mr. Keefe: At some future time, or at some time
25 agreeable to the committee, Mr. Acheson himself can come

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1 down and bring those reports and allow us to look at them.

2 The Vice Chairman: It is apparent that the committee
3 will have to have an executive session sometime very soon.
4 We can convey these matters that have been brought up here
5 to the Chairman of the committee and request an executive
6 session.
7

8 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make
9 one request of the counsel which I think is probably
10 material to a proper finding of the committee in the final
11 analysis.

12 There has been much information coming from witnesses
13 with respect to the amount of traffic that was received by
14 the Intelligence Department in Hawaii, as well as the Intel-
15 ligence Department here in the Army and Navy.

16 I believe if we could have just the number of communi-
17 cations of all types and kinds, including Magic, diplomatic
18 exchanges, messages from the attaches, in various parts
19 of the world that came into the Naval Intelligence Depart-
20 ment from, say, November 1st to December 7th, as well as
21 the messages in the Military Intelligence Department, and
22 then have the same thing with respect to the Navy and Army
23 Intelligence Departments in Hawaii, it would expedite
24 matters.

25 In other words, we heard witnesses say, and we know

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2 the immense responsibility that devolved upon men here
3 in Washington.

4 It struck me it might be of some value just to know
5 how many messages from November 1st up to the 7th of
6 December they received here in Washington, and how many
7 in Hawaii.

8 The Vice Chairman: The committee will stand adjourned
9 until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

10 (Whereupon, at 4:13 o'clock p. m., the committee
11 adjourned, to reconvene tomorrow morning, Friday, January
12 18, 1946, at 10:00 o'clock a. m.)
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