

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 189

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 30 October 1945.

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Capital Equipment and Construction.

SUBJECT: FUJI DENKI SEIZO CO.

PERSONNEL INTERROGATED AND BACKGROUND OF EACH:

WADA, T. -- Managing Director.
SHIMASUE, K. -- Head of Managing Dep't of Factories.

WHERE INTERVIEWED: Room 361, Meiji Building.

INTERROGATOR: Pfc Jacobsen

INTERPRETER: Lieutenant Love.

Allied Officers Present: Lieutenant Hart.

SUMMARY:

Discussion on the relative importance of power generating equipment in the war economy, bomb damage to the industry, and problems the industry had during the war.

1. Leading Heavy Electrical Equipment manufacturers are categorized as the Big Six: Tokyo-Shibaura, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Denki, Fuji Denki, Meidensha, and Yasukawa. These six firms make approximately 85% of Japan's power generating equipment/

2. Peak production of power generating equipment occurred in 1938 with production amounting to about 600,000,000 yen for the industry. Since then manufacture has been curtailed, with emphasis being placed on manufacture of lighter machinery for military use.

3. The past ten years were marked by continued expansion of the FUJI and other companies. New construction was confined to purely wooden structures, with concrete used only as a basis for machinery. No great quantity of steel was involved in construction. Some small textile factories were also purchased in the expansion of the concern. Building materials were scarce since 1942, and a great deal of difficulty was experienced even in the construction of wooden buildings.

4. Bomb damage to the heavy electrical equipment manufacturers is estimated at 30% of productive capacity.

5. The outstanding war product made by FUJI was submarine motors.

6. Demands of the Army and Navy were met to the extent of 70%. It was felt that the manufacturing quota given to the firm was higher than the armed forces could reasonably expect the company to fulfill, so that production plans are not too meaningful in this instance.

7. Peak production in the Communications Sector of the Industry is estimated to have occurred in 1943-44.

During that period the heavy equipment industry produced approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ billion yen in products, 70% of which is estimated by WADA to have gone to the Armed Forces.

8. During the war FUJI produced equipment for the Navy primarily.

9. No unified allocation or labor procurement program is evident. The company would go to the Army for army material allocations, to the Navy for navy contracts, and to the Control Association for others. Unskilled labor requirements were met through the Welfare Ministry with pressure on the Ministry exerted through the military agency for whom the product was made.

The concern had its own training school, which amounted to a two year course of study.

The armed forces occasionally loaned the company skilled labor from its Arsenal, or other personnel, for short periods to complete specific tasks for the Military Force quickly.

10. Dispersal began on a very small scale in 1943. No movement of heavy machinery was attempted. By the time large scale dispersal was ordered in 1944 transportation was not available, so very little dispersal was accomplished.

11. Production of small parts was a weak point of the firm. It purchased these from small firms which were burned out in the KAWASAKI fire raids.

An estimated 40% of small parts production was manufactured by plants with less than 100 employees.

12. Restrictions on the manufacture of goods for civilian industry were instituted in 1939 by the Electrical Concerns. This was described as a "voluntary" measure adopted by corporations to meet war production needs.