


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# JOURNALS

OF THE

SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY,

13 118

YEARS 1817, 1818, AND 1819,

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OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEM, ACCOMPANY TO WHICH

SUCH OPERATIONS HAVE USUALLY GEN CONDUCTED

# INDIA, Se

AND A STATEMENT OF THE IMPROVEMENTS

THAT APPEAR NECESSARY.

BY EDWARD LAKE,


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1825.



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G.C.B. AND K.L.S.

AT WHOSE SUGGESTION IT WAS UNDERTAKEN.

### THIS WORK,

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
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54. line 4 from bottom. For (e). Road (d).

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69, http: 3. For South-Westerly. Road South-Easterly.

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178, line 5 from bottom. For West side. Road North side of the Upper Fort, by the gaus placed in battery(k) of the West attack.

185, line 12. For (2 and 6). Real fa and b).

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IN the Work now committed to the indulgence of the public, the Author does not profess to relate any thing new, regarding the events of the late Mahratta War, which are already sufficiently known, through the medium of the different histories of it, that have been published : his object has been to present. in detail, particular operations, which the nature of those histories has obliged their Authors to treat in a cursory manner, but of which, as forming a most important branch of the war, it is essential that an account should be given ; not only as a record of the past, but as it may also be made a land-mark for the future. It is with this view, that he has added to the journals of the different sicges, a few remarks upon the operations carried on, and that he has treated · the whole subject at large, in his preliminary and concluding Chapters. In the former of these, the Author has hazarded some observations and reflections on the Native Fortresses

of Iadia, latveces which rand the Fortresses of Europe, he has an endersoured to draw a counparison. In the concluding Chapter, he has considered the best method of attack, and the means at present possessed by the Engineer Department, for carrying such a system liko vescueion, and he has done so in hoyes, that whatever objections may be raised to flut system, and however defactive it may he, the discussion will be of use, in drawing more attaing to the sub-pick- and that it may add in giving a more decided and energetic shape to our future size operations.

It was the Author's original intention to have included in this Work, the sicges which took place under the other Presidencies, and an application was accordingly made for the accounts of those carried on by the Bengal army, from a quarter which he hoped would have met attention ; but in this he was disappointed : and he has therefore unwillingly been obliged to confine himself to the sieges undertaken by the Madras Divisions. It may be observed, that an official Journal of every operation of the kind, containing cach day's work, as entered at the time, was kept, wherever an Engineer Officer of the Madras Establishment was present, and transmitted with the Plans, &c. to the chief Engineer's Office. The liberal access to these, which has been granted to him by the

Madras Government, and which has afforded him every opportunity and information he could desire, demands his warmest acknowledgements. The Journals therefore, from which the following have been taken, are all official, and he has strictly followed them, except in one or two instances, where having been present himself, and having taken memorauda on the spot, he has viewed the operations in a different light. These deviations, which however are very few, are remarked in the notes. The accounts of the sieges, at which there was no Eugineer Officer present, have been extracted from Licut.Col.Blacker's Memoir<sup>4</sup>, to which he is also indebted for much valuable information, regarding the strength of the different Corps, and the general movements of the Divisions and Troops, although these, it may be observed, are only noticed, so far as they are connected with the object of the present work. There are one or two instances, in which the Author has found himself obliged to dissent from the conclusions drawn by that distinguished Officer : and this difference of opinion is only noticed, that he may at the same time mention, that it is offered with diffidence. The Plans of the Forts, at the sieges of which Engineer Officers were present, were executed by them, and the Views, which

 Of the operations of the British Army in India, during the Maleratta War of 1817, 1818 and 1819.

A 2

are introduced, to illustrate more fully the nature of some of the places attacked, laves been copied from the drawings of different Findes and Brecher Officers. The Author thinks it right to mention, that his Work has been considerably dedayd, in consequence of the difficulty he experienced, in obtaining the information necessary for combining the Journals of the several sieges into a connected Narrative.

Having thus stated his authorities for the facts recorded in the following Work, none of which are brought forward as such, but what he either knows or firmly believes to be true, it only remains to say a few words on the opinions the Author has expressed, regarding the inefficiency of the Engineer Department, and of the improvements he considers necessary in consequence. These opinions have been houcstly formed, after long reflection, and he has been strengthened in them by knowing, that they are the unanimous sentiments of his Brother Officers, and that they all join with him, in an anxious wish, to see the Corps to which they have the honor to belong, placed on a footing of equal efficiency with the rest of the Army, He has expressed himself with confidence, because from the anxiety which the Court of Directors have always shown, to have this brauch of their Army equal to the performance

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CALIFORNIA TO AND THE TANK

19 × 140

of its dutes, and the likerality with which they enable their Engineer Officers to perfect themselves in their profession, he is certain, that it is only necessary that these defects should be elearly pointed out, in order that they may be immofilately remedied. He is aware, that part of the system of attack he has had down may be open to objection, but be trusts that the princibe on which it is grounded will be acknowledged to be correct, and therefore, that the whole will be inducently received.

The Author has great pleasure in publicly acknowledging the assistance he has received from all his Brother Officers, who have had it in their power to forward his present object, and in particular he must express the objections he is under to the hate Gaptain Gowenty, and to Captain Addenoo, of the Engineers, who have provided him with nuck valandle information on different points, since the commeencement of his undertaking, and of whose avive he has largely availed himself.

Whatever opinion may be formed of the present Work, the Anthor trasts, that the motive, which induced hin to undertake it, will be considered praiseworthy. It was an ardent desire to see the Arny, he feeds it a pride to leading to, as distinguished in one branch of warfare as another; as victorious, when set down before the strongest Forts of the Naïves.

as they have always been, when charging the most overwhelming Battery on the plain; and his anxiety is increased by a conviction, that the deficiency in the Department to which he belongs, has been the only obstaele to this desirable object. He regrets that the subject has not fallen into hands (of which in his own Corps there are many) who would have done it more justice, but it is to be hoped, that so good a cause will not suffer from the weakness of the advocate. He has only to observe in conclusion, that as this Work would not have been undertaken, but for the kind and flattering assurances of the distinguished Officer, under whose command he was then serving, so would it never have seen the light, but for the encouragement received from him and other Friends. whose opinion in favour of it may, he fears, have been too much biassed by feelings of personal regard towards the Author.

MADRAS, February 14th, 1822.

## SIEGES OF THE

# MADRAS ARMY,

#### Sc. Sc. Sc.

#### CHAPTER I.

OF AN INTRODUCTORY NATURE.—THE PROGRESS OF FORTHPICATION IN EMPOPE TRACED.—ITS INPER-PRCT STATE AMONGST THE NATIVES OF INDIA.— GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFECTS OF THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT IN THE COMPANYS SEE-VICE, AS FRA AS ECOAMIS THE DUTY OF SIDES.

THE Author of this short work, although CA2P. young in his profession, has had some exporience himself, and has always been anxions to profit by that of others. A strong sense of the benefit, he would have derived, even from such a collection, as that, which he has now been able to make, first suggested to him the idea, that his kineric hours might be well employed, in endesyoning to give that advantage to others, which he had so often regreted on the possessing himself. Sloudd he socceed in adding to the Library of him military friends, as short Tract, in which they will find, in a portable form, that information, which would otherwise have reCRAF: mained shut up in portfolios, or in offices, and L, which consequently would have been unavailable at the moment of emergency. It is doign will be fully accouplished. But he has said enough: its subject is fortunately one, which demands conciseness, and would be injured by an attempt a fune composition, to which he is usequal. He proceeds therefore directly to his task.

> The variety of construction in the Fortresses of India, the character of the Garrisons, sometimes bold, obstinate, and enthusiastically brave, at other times timid, irresolute, and disbeartened by triffing reverses, together with our own frequently imperfect means of attack, are circumstances, which have constantly obliged us to depart from the established rules laid down for the attack of fortified places; and are the causes that our Siege History in . this country so often exhibits results, different from what would be calculated upon, by those who are only accustomed to the regularity of this warfare, as carried on in Europe. The Science of Fortification is here almost in its infancy. With the exception of those built by ourselves, or by other European Powers, who have at different times obtained a footing in India, and of a few, belonging to Native Princes, which have been constructed, or improved, by European Engineers in their service,

## INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

the Forts in India, are nearly what places of GUAP. defence were in Europe, four centnies ago; and and, therefore, a brief review of the rise and progress of the art of Fortification, in the latter quarter of the Globe, may serve to illustrate the comparison lysis to make, butween Indian and European Fortresses, so far as regards their relative strength at the present moment.

In periods of remote antiquity, when the means of attack were as rude as the defences which they were meant to destroy, a town surrounded by high walls, gave its inhabitants ample security against an enemy; but when some degree of science was introduced in the attack, these defenses were of little avail, and an improvement was found necessary. The first step towards it was the addition of round or square towers, to the angles and other parts of the walls ; but these towers, though they commanded the enemy's approaches while at a certain distance, eeased to be of use when he reached the ground at their base, which they left undefended, except by the uncertain fire of small arms through loon-holes. They therefore gave place, after the introduction of artillery, first to Redans, and afterwards to Bastions, which by establishing a flanking fire remedied this defeet; but which were at first made very small, and generally at a great distance from each other, and were therefore unable

CRAF: long to resist with success the rapidly improv-\_\_\_\_\_ing science of attack. Indeed, neither the size, ner relative position of these works were regnlated by any catabilished rules, buit frequently depended on the caprice of the individual, by whom they were rected, audi in process of time, the different Continent landson adopted peculiar systems of their own, all differing from each other, and all more or less defective.

> . Such was the state of Fortification in Europe. in the middle of the seventcenth century, when Pagan undertook, in a Treatise published in 1645, to reduce to order these various and opposite theories, and to free them from the errors and intricacies with which they abounded; and it was not until this period, when he laid down on sound principles, certain rules for the dimensions and relative position of the different parts of a Fortress, that Fortification could be said to have become a science. Since that period, such great and rapid improvements have taken place in this art, that it may now be allowed to have reached a very high degree of excellence, although no method has yet been discovered of rendering a fortress impregnable.

> The natives of India have made but little progress towards this perfection. They do not seem to be aware of the importance of that maxim, which is the ground-work of European

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Fortification, namely, "that every work of a CHAP. Fortress should be defended or flanked by some other." Their system, if such it can be called, is that of a simple inclosure, consisting of a continued wall, with round towers at intervals, the defects of which have already been noticed. There appear to be no determined rules for the profiles of these works, nor for the distances to be preserved between the several towers ; which particulars vary so much, in almost every Fort, that it would be impossible to attempt to fix a standard for either. Such are the works, by which almost every village in India is protected, but to some of their more important places, they have added one and sometimes two ditehes, together with outworks, which render regular approaches necessary. The great depth of these ditches might constitute an obstacle, not to be overcome without some difficulty, were not this advantage in a great measure neutralized, from the circumstance of the bottom generally containing dead ground close to the searp, to which the besiegers, after having made their descent into the ditch, may therefore attach their miners with perfect safety. But defective as the Forts of India are in their construction, and inferior as they are to those of Europe, it is far from my intention to represent them as contemptible. Experience, which we have bought at some places by dc-

## SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP. feat, and at others by the loss of many gallant L. soldiers, has too fully proved, that they are not to be despised; but I wish to show, that they have been formidable only from our own inefficiency.

There are no traces of the Indians having ever constructed Fortifications different from those of the present day, and as they are in all things the slaves of eustom, it would perhaps be no casy matter to induce them to alter a method, sanctioned by the practice of their forefathers : but the successful, or at least, prolonged defences, which their Forts have almost always made against native attacks, and sometimes even when assailed by Europeans, possessed of superior science and conjourents, afford a better and more probable reason for their reluctance to change ; and these would almost warrant the fallacious conclusion, that they need no improvement, were it not, that we have sometimes called forth all our energies, and by the speedy capture of the most esteemed native Fortresses in India, have proved how unequal they are to their object.\* It is to be

<sup>4</sup> These energies, however, it must be observed, hove generally been displayed, not in the scientific, but in the overwhelening character of our totacks, and we seen in these very instances to have acknowledged the suparior coastruction of the Native Forts, and to have admitted our inhibity to take them in the normal method, by binging

## INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

regretted, that instances or this kind are comoparaticly area, and while we can lowell with prout astification on the sieges of Scringapatum, Ilarasa, and Asserghar, there are on the other side of the pieture but too many places, from the strongers. Forts to the ruleat Village Ghurrise, in the attack of which, whether from a contempt of our commiss, or from an II-timed spirit of economy, we have neglected to employ the propor means of effecting our object; and have in consequence experienced repulses, or purchased our success with an unnecessary

against them an enormous train of artillery, much beyond what is deemed necessary for the attack of the strongest European Fortress, as if the only way to reduce them were by making the place too hot for the Garrison to live in. This remark is more particularly applicable to Hatrass, of which the reduction was literally effected in this way ; but it would be impossible (putting aside all considerations of the expense attending such a method of attack) to bring a train, such as was displayed there, aminst every other fort which was disposed to resist us; and the Natives of India have fair ground to suppose, that without the aid of such a train, we are unable to reduce them. There cannot be a doubt, but that this idea prevails to a certain extent, and it is a general opinion, that, bowever superior we are to them on the plain, we are only on an equality when we have walls to attack; and our repulses at Bhurtpoor, are to this day brought forward, as a proof of our inferiority in this branch of way. It is the object of the present work to show that it remains with ourselves to dostroy this opinion.

\* Keeps or small citadels,

CHAP: succifice of lives; but it would be painful to \_\_\_\_\_ pursues this subject, nor in it necessary for me we have generally followed in the attack of Jadian Forts, as it will be fully exemplified in the sigges about to be recorded. The Native method of carrying on such operations, if heidy stack, may, however, be interesting as it will show how completely in this, as in other commities, the arts of attack and defence have keep pace with each other, in their general efficiency.

> The Natives appear to be utterly ignorant of the advantage to be derived from attacking a salient angle, and of the art of conducting approaches by Sap ; and, generally speaking, they arc also unacquainted with Mining. When one of their armics sits down before a place, the object appears rather to be to harrass the besieged. and weary them out by a strict blockade, than to effect an entrance by breaching the walls; for although guns are used, they are placed at such a distance from the town, out of musket shot, and not always in battery, that their effect is uncertain, and even this desultory fire' is only kept up at intervals during the day; for at night, to guard against the consequences of a sally, the guns are always withdrawn to the camp; and this ridiculous process is continued till the besieged are tired out, and a compromise

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is entered into." The Natives of Hindostan, CHAP.

\* An amusing account of the siege of Doonor, a small fort, earnsound by two or three hundred Rainoots, which resisted successfully for upwards of a month, the atmost efforts of Dowlut Row Sindiah, backed by a numerous artillory, and an overwhelming force, is given in "Broughton's Letters from a Mahratta Camp." At the commencement of the siere, the operations were order the direction of Bantiste. who commenced a mine, and as there was no gan in the place, established posts round it within musket shot; but Baptiste being ordered away on some other duty, the mine was abandoned. After this the earrison made several sallies. in one of which they succeeded in carrying off into the fort two gans : after which, to avoid a similar accident, the besinters withdrew their gups every night from their batteries. When the shot at length began to tell on the walls, and to destroy more than the garrison could build up at night, they commenced a ditch on that side, and carried it on in the face of, and in density of the besterrers. This creditable defence was at last brought to a close, in the usual way, by a composition being entered into with the brsiegers. The siege of Darwar, in 1797, is too well known to require recapitulation, and the following accoust of the siege of Beescondah, a town surrounded by a pretebol mud wall, situated in the Nizam's dominions, and attacked by a part of the Prince's force, and related in the words in which it was given to the author, by a friend who happened to be an eve-witness of the commercement, will well complete this picture of Native attacks. "The " hosieging army consisted mincipally of house, and about " four guns, and arrived before the place the same day on " which we were passing it, in January, 1815. They had no " defences for their guns in the shape of battery, or trenches, " which were drawn out in the open plain, at the dista-

## SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP: expert Miners, and the Artillery statehed to ... Sensitably regular brigades being well organized, more science may have been displayed where these have been employed; but the picture I have dnawn is sertainly not an coagerated one, as far as regards the system unually parmout by other Native Powers, who have not had these advantages. Hyder and Trippo had French Engineers in their service, by whom their siges were generally conducted, but whom this wan not her each, the same ridiculous and impotent mode of proceeding. that has been described, was oblowed by them.

But to return to the subject : It is evident

" about 50 yards asauder. The besiegers' camp was placed " in low ground some distance in rear. They had a Poets-" guese, who levelled each gas himself, and appeared to " have the direction of the attack. They facel about once in " a quarter of an hour, and if by chance a shot struck any " part of the wall, so as to raise a dust, the air resounded " with acclamations in praise of the old Portuguese, who " seemed in no small degree flattened thereby. After about " three days, the inhabitants of the town, by a masterly " maneuvre, broke down the bund of a tank, and swamped " the camp of the besiegers, who were obliged to move their " ground. The siege was brought to a conclusion in a conions " way. A small puty of Europeans were pitched near the " place about three weeks after, and five or six of them stole " out of camp at night, to assist the bosicgers, and fired the " gues so fast, that the town was found evacuated next " merning. Two of the Europeans were wounded in this " frolic."

A How of a Party

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that without proper means, science in the CHAP. attack of places can be of no avail, and when it is considered how utterly unprovided with these the siege department of the three Presidencies has, until very lately, been ; it will be found less extraordinary that reverses have happened, than that we should have ever been successful. These means were formerly as much neglected in England, as they have been in our Eastern possessions, so that whenever we eame in collision with the Continental Powers, our inferiority in this branch was severely felt. During the Peninsular campaigns, the inefficiency of a body of officers, when unassisted by men trained to sicce duties, was more fully displayed; and in consequence of the representations of the Duke of Wellington. a Corps was raised, and an Establishment formed for their instruction, under the superintendance of one of the ablest and most distinguished officers in the Boyal Engineers. By the excellent system pursued at this Institution at Chatham, every man is made practically acquainted with the nature of his duties, before he is sent abroad, and the Corns of Royal Sappers and Miners now certainly yields to none of the older established ones, of the same nature, in other services, either in science, or in any other requisite for soldiers of this description.

CHAP. The Directors of the East India Company are not ignorant of the advantages that would be derived, from having this branch of their army on a more efficient footing, than it has hitherto been ; for of late years all their Officers of Engineers, before leaving England, have been placed under the orders of the Officer above alluded to, in order that they may be more fully instructed in that part of their duty, which relates to the attack of places; and recently a few recruits, trained at Chatham, have heen seut out to Bengal, where a permanent Corps of Sappers and Miners has been raised. and a large increase made to the Engineer Corps. The sister Presidencies have not, as vet, shared in these benefits, although the principle has been established, and the necessity of improvement (in time of war at least) acknewledged; for, during the last campaien in the Deckan, Lieutenant Davies, the Senior Engineer of the Madras Establishment, with Sir Thomas Hislop's army, was allowed (as a temporary measure) to recruit 30 Europeans, and 50 Pioneers, for this Service, who were denominated Sappers and Miners. These men, it must be observed, who only volnutecred from the inducement of increased pay, were, when they joined that Officer, wholly important of the duty they were to be employed on, and the European part of them were so far from feeling

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that Esprit de Corps, which should be the main CHAP. spring of a soldier's actions, that they at first seemed to look on their duty as a degrading one; but, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and numerous others, attendant on every Corps, professedly raised only for a temporary object, they were brought to a state of considerable efficiency, by the exertions of their. Commanding Officer; and limited as was their number, it may be fairly said, that the service derived from them the greatest advantage, and the favourable testimony of all the officers, under whom they were employed in the field, as to their utility, shows how much more might be expected from a regular Establishment of Engineer Soldiers. The Madras Pioneers, who (with the above exception) were, during the late war, the only men at the immediate disposal of the Engineers, for the duties of that department, possess, in a peculiar degree, every necessary physical qualification; but being never (except in times of actual warfare) employed in Military Works, at least of this description, their instruction in these duties commences, at the very moment that practised men are required ; and if the experience of a campaign may have made them somewhat more perfect, another war finds them as ignorant as beforc, or perhaps replaced by a fresh set of men; and the trenches again become the school of

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CHAP. instruction for the most simple works of a siege. It is but too common a fceling, to ascribe a failure against a Fort, to want of skill in the Engineer, who conducts the operations; but let it be remembered, that in his plan of attack, not only the quantity of stores necessary, but also the qualifications and skill of the men who are to act under his orders, must be taken into account ; and, from a deficiency in both, we have frequently been obliged to remain and breach at a distance, when we ought to have been at the foot of our enemy's walls. It is surely no argument, that because these Forts are rude, we should not employ against them the greatest science, and every means in our power ; that because our successes have hitherto been as numerous as our reverses, we should be content with this mediocrity of fortune : and should continue to incur the risk of adding to our failures, by a neglect of means, which would insure a certain and successful result to all our siege operations; and finally, that we should hazard, before every petty place we attack, our reputation, and the lives of our soldiers, upon the chance of the Garrison not possessing a due degree of courage and resolution. Let the two essentials be united. Let Science be aided by efficient Mcans, and we shall render our enemies' situation as pusafe when sheltcred by walls, as it is when opposed

### INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

to us on the plain: we shall prevent that gal. GRAF. lastry, which neverlook difficulties, from dev. stroying itself; and this page of our Indian History, which has hitherto been a chequered one, and sullied by defeats as often as it has been adorned by victories, will then become like every other, an unwarying record of success.

The system which should be followed in besigging the Native Forts of India, must of course differ, in some degree, from that which would be necessary in the attack of more regular Fortresses. The reasons have been stated in the beginning of this Chapter, nor can any thing tend more to show all the varieties best suited to this warfare, than an accumulation of facts, from which every officer, who may be employed in this service, can draw his own conclusions, and adapt them to his own case. To furnish these is the chief object of the Journals contained in the body of the present Work, to which the Anthor has added a concluding Chapter, containing a few reflections on the nature of the operations, which would, in his opinion, generally insure success, and also on the formation of a Corps of Engincer Soldiers for the Madras Establishment.

# CHAPTER II.

### FORMATION OF THE ARMY OF THE DECKAN.-SLIGE OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND DIVI. SIGNE.-NACFOOR.-TAINER.

CHAP. IT is well known that the object of the war II. undertaken in 1817, by the British Government 1817. in India, was the destruction of the Pincharries. These people have been so often and so well described by different writers, that it is needless, nor would it indeed be within the scope of the present Work, to enter juto a particular account of their rise and origin. It may be Brief acobserved of them in a few words, that almost the Pindurvice. from time immemorial, they have been attached as a distinct class to Native Annies, which they have followed, without receiving pay, or being actuated by patriotism (the general inducements of people to become soldiers), and that they have been so far from wishing to be distinguished for their prowess as fighting men. that they have never songht even for plunder, their sole occupation, but where it could be obtained without danger. Such was the humble origin from which the Pindarries rose, to assume the character and features of a distinct and separate nation, governed by Chiefs independent of each other, but acting in concert, and to subdue whom, the whole weight of the British power was called forth

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Two causes had combined to operate this CHAP. change, and to raise a despicable horde of plunderers into importance-1st. The neutral 1817. and unintefering system of policy prescribed by the British Legislature to the Indian Government, and closely pursued after Lord Wellesley's administration, by which we were prevented from checking the growth of this tribe, till we had suffered from their inroads in the devastation of some of our finest provinces. 2nd. The weakness of the Native Princes. whose standard the Pindarries nominally followed, and by whose policy they were fostered and encouraged, not only for the sake of the booty in which these Princes shared, but as being the only means by which they could weaken, or perhaps destroy the British power in India, for to that pitch had their hopes soared

To crush them the whole energy of that, power was patic forth, and had the Pindarries stood alone and unassisted in the context, there efforts on the one band, to escape from the net, which we had drawn round then, and our combinations and and endevour to a coloce them on the other. But the opportunity which was thos offered to the Native Princes was too favourable to be neglected. By the destruction of the Pindarrise Be firstis apprenage yould CHAP. be established and secured beyond their power II. to subvert, and it was therefore resolved to sup-1817. port them.

This containation, to which all the Mahrata many powers subscribed, had them for its object to free themserves from the bondage of the Britha yoke, and to assert and maintain the Mahrata independence. As Baglishum's heart, though the interests of his ecountry would suffer by their success, must pronounce thir object a legitimate one, and their struggle for independence praiseworthy, but not so the measus which they employed to further it: these would couver digrace to the worthist ecouse, and must next with universal and unqualified condemantion.

> It is difficult indeed, to imagine a scene of greater treachery and (aplicity, than was ochibited in all the Native Courts, up to the very nonment when they have off the mask of friendship, by which they had endeavoured to descive our residents, and under which they had hoped to conceal their armity. Fortunately the unanore which had been taken to give effect to the campaign, enabled us to resist successfully, in very instance, their treacherous commensement of hostiphies; and their treacherous to some of the most splendid achievements which have gread the progress of the Sprink arms in

## PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

India. Seldom indeed, or never, had a British CHAP. army of such magnitude been assembled, as was put in motion on the present occasion, 1817. when the forces of the three Presidencies com. Great prebined, to secure the destruction of the Pindar- for yas ries, and to provide against any attempts of the by the Native Powers to protect them. The Bengal General army, to whose share it was expected that the most active part of the operations would fall, is estimated by Colouel Blacker, to have consisted of more than 40,000 fighting men; and being strength commanded by the Governor-General in person, Grand was denominated the Grand Army. The Madras troops took the field under the designation of the Army of the Deckan, while a part of the Bombay Army was put in motion from the side of Goozerat, to co-operate in the general objects of the campaign ; and in the course of the war, after our rupture with the Peishwah, another division of the Bombay Army was employed in reducing that Prince's territories in the Concan.

For reasons which have been sufficiently detailed in the Preface, this Work has been confined to a relation of the Sieges undertaken by the Aray of the Deckan; so that an account of the formation and movements of the Bengal and Bombay Armies would be irrelevant, nor will those of the Deckan Aray be detailed, for ther than as they may be necessary to profarther than as they may be necessary to pro-

CHAP. serve a connection between the different sieges п. which were undertaken. ----

The Army of the Deckau was composed of 1817 six divisions; of these the first was under the Detail of personal command of His Excellency Sir T. Hislop, the Commander-in-Chief of this army; the second was under the command of Brigadicr-General Dovcton; the third division was commanded by Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm, who was also Agent to the Governor-General, and had charge of our political interests throughout the Deckau; Brigadier-General Smith had the command of the fourth division. consisting of Bombay and Madras troops ; and the fifth division, which was almost entirely composed of Bengal troops, was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams. The reserve division was commanded by Brigadier-General Munro. The strength of these divisions at the opening of the campaign was as follows :

### FIRST DIVISION.

Commanded by His Excellency Lientenast-General Sir Thomas Hislon, Bart.

- 7 Companies of Europeans.
- 6 Regiments of Native Infantry,
- 1 Squadron of Drarpons
- 2 Regiments of Native Cavalry,
- 2 Horse Artillery Guns.
- 8 Foot Artillery Guns.
- 4 Companies of Pioneers.

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of the

### ARMY OF THE DECKAN.

### SECOND DIVISION.

### Commanded by Brigadier-General Doveton.

80 Suppers and Miners.

8 Companies of Europeans.

6 Regiments of Native Infantry.

1 ditto ditto Cavalry.

4 Companies of Pioneers.

8 Horse Artillery Guns.

30 Foot Artillery Guns.

### THIRD DIVISION,

Communded by Brigadier-General Sir J. Malcolas, K.C.B.

2] Roginsents of Native Infantry. 1 ditto ditto Cavalry. The Mysore Horse. Horse Artillery, 4 Guns. Foot Artillery, 6 Guns.

#### FOURTH DIVISION.

Commanded by Brigadier-General Swith, C.B.

2 Regiments of Europeans. 8 ditto Native Infantry, 1 ditto ditto Cavahy. The Poonah Auxiliary Horse. Horse Artillery, 10 Guns. Foot Artillery, 17 Guns. 4 Companies of Pionectrs.

#### FIFTH DIVISION.

Commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, C.B.

8 Regiments of Native Infantry.

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CHAP. 3 ditto ditto Cavalry. II. Horse Artillery, 4 Guns. 1817 Foot Artillery, 18 Guns.

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### RESERVE DIVISION,

Commanded by Brisadier-General Manro.

European Flank Battalion.
Regiments of Native Infantry.
Companies of ditto Rifles.
Squadrons of Dragoons.
Regiment of Native Cavalry.
Horse Artillery, 10 Guns.
Foot ditto 18 Guns.
4 Companies of Pioncers.

The total Army of the Dockan, including the Goozent Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Sir W. G. Keir, a brigade at Secunderabad, His Highness the Nigam' troops cilled the Berar Dirigade, and the irrs gular and auxiliary troops, which have not been essumerate in the above detail, is stated by Colonel Blacker to have amounted to 70,400 fabriary men.

The Battering Train and the Engineer Departnent sloc, were utterly disproportionel to the strength of thé army, to its general completeness, and to the magnitude and importance to the service on which it was to be employed. There or the deficiency in the former it would be "may difficult to account. The long rows of un-

## ARMY OF THE DECKAN.

mounted cannon of different calibres, laving CHAP. useless in all directions, along the ramparts of II. our Fortresses, sufficiently attest that there is 1817. no want of guns to form the largest Battering Train, if it were thought advisable to make use of them; and to a person acquainted with the wealth of our well-stored Arsenals, it will appear matter of astonishment, as well as regret, that what was dignified, with the appellation of a Battering Train, with the first, second, and third divisions of the Army of the Deckan, consisted of only two 18-pounders and two 12pounders, two 8-inch mortars and two 8-inch howitzers.

The Engineer Department with these divisions was similarly constituted. A few scaling ladders, intreaching tools for fifty men, with and of the two or three platform carts containing small Depart stores, formed the Engineer Park. None of the peculiar tools or implements required in Mining, or in the Sap, were provided. Nor was there any equipment of Pontoons, or of other stores useful for the Military Passage of Rivers. These, although thought indispensable in Europe, have never been supplied in India, either because they have been deemed unnecessary. or because it may have been thought that the advantage to be derived from them would not sufficiently repay the expense of transporting them

# SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. To those, who are acquainted with the large proportion of Engineer's stores of every description, usually carried with the Continental armies,

and recently with our own, towards the close of the Peninsular war, and subsequently in the operations of the Duke of Wellington in France, the above detail of stores, accompanying the Madras divisions, must appear insignificant

In the other divisions, composed partly of Bengal and Bombay troops, and furnished with equipments from those Presidencies, the Battering Train and Eugineer Department, although very imperfect, were more respectable than with the three former divisions. The Battering Train with the fourth division and reserve, consisted of six 18pounders, the same number of 12-pounders, besides heavy mortars and howitzers, and the

beyond expression.

the Leginear Dr. partment.

Engineer Park was also tolerably supplied. The want of Engineer Soldiers at the opening of the campaign, and the steps which were taken to obviate this evil, by embodying a few Europeans and Native Pioneers, have been detailed in the preliminary Chapter; but it may not be amiss to repeat here, that the Europeans knew nothing of the duties they were thus suddenly called on to perform, and that the Natives. although accustomed to work, were as ignorant of every branch of Engineering as the Europeans. In the fourth, fifth, and reserve divisions, even

## FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE TROOPS.

this assistance was wanting, and the Engineers CHAP. had to depend for all siege operations solely on U. the Pioneers. 1817.

The first movements of the troops in A negark, wand brought into proviment utice, the imperfect above state of the Department in one of its most in the portant bronches, and the third Chapter of Colored Blacker's Memoir abounds in instances of the progress of the troops being delayed by the numerous small strans which intersect this part of the Deckam. The aid of the Eaginere Department to overcome their solutators was only called for in one instance, when they were sets forward in September, by prepare means for throwing the advanced division over the Taptor.

As there were no Postoons, and no timber for forming the superstructure of a bridge, if it had been attempted to construct one with the common construct yoats, which were to be procared on the river, a flying bridge was the only atoms given the access the river, along which the boats plied. But even this bridge porord seeless, for the advanced division was stopped inits progress from Jauhah towards the "Taptee" a passage across which, no means had been provided.

Immediately after this operation, the Engi-

CITAP, neer Department returned to Mulkapoor, where they remained with the Battering Train, in readiuess for the siege of Asserghur, which was 1817 then in contemplation; but the hostilities, commenced by the Rajah of Nagpoor, obliged Brigadier-General Doveton to recal them, and they joined that officer at Oomaroottee, in full march to Nagpoor, which place they reached on the 12th by forced marches; the Battering Train having been thrown into Ellichipoor. The repulse received from our handful of troops at Sectabuldee, had induced the Rajah to negociate for terms, and after considerable delay, he had come in to the Resident on the morning of the 16th, promising that his gross should be delivered by twelve o'clock : but his troops, who were in possession of the city, and had occupied a position outside, defended by unward of fifty pieces of cannon, seemed resolved to try their fortune once more.

The British Force was brigaded as follows;

Cavalry Brigade 6th Bengal Native Cavalry. 6th Madras Native Cavalry.

Right Brigade . 6 Companies II. M. Royals. 2d Batt. 13th Native Infantry. Ist Batt. 22d Bengal Native Infantry Flank Comp" 1st Batt, 2d N. Infant"

## MOVEMENTS OF THE TROOPS.

Center Brigade	1 Company H. M. Royals. 2d Batt. 24th Native Infantry. 1 Brigade Horse Artillery.	CHAP. II. 1817.

ers and Miners. 

The baggage and stores of the division were placed at Sectabuldee, under the protection of two battalions of Madras Native Infantry, and a battalion of the Nizam's Infantry, while the Berar Infantry in the service of our Ally the Nizam, was stationed in rear of the line.

The enemy on the 15th (the day before the name of Rajah came in) occupied a position with their right flank terminating on the Rajah's arsenal PLATE I. (two inclosed squares of masonry) and defended by a battery of 14 guns: their left, which was thrown forward at right angles to their general front, rested on the village of Baboolkairah, and was also defended by a heavy battery, and their whole line was strengthened by a Pettah in their rear, which might be reckoned part of the suburbs of the eity. The arrangements for the attack of the enemy while in this position, and while it was doubtful whether the Rajah would accept the proffered terms, were as follows :- The left brigade was ordered to storm the Arsenal, which was to be effected by turn-

CHAP, ing the flank of the troops occupying it, and II. taking it in reverse. The center brigade was 1817, to attack the enemy's center, and to endeayour to occupy the Succaderry, a pagoda, and extensive wallod garden, with a tank, which was immediately in rear of the Pettah which the enemy occupied; and the two brigades when in possession of the Arsenal and Succaderry, were to establish a communication with each other. At the same time, the cavalry and right brigade were to attack the enemy's left, ou which their horse were posted, and the cavalry were also to try to gain the Specaderry tank. in order to attack the enemy in flank and rear. This-plan, however, was not carried into execution, for on the 16th the enemy abandoned this ground, with the exception of the Arsonal and 14-gun Battery, of which they still retained possession, and occupied a much weaker position with their right on the Nag Nuddee, a small stream which runs to the South of the City, having the Succaderry garden and tank in their front. They had also batteries distributed along their line, in the center, and on both flanks, On the signal being given for moving forward, the Arsenal was occupied almost without onnosition by the left brigade. On the heads of the other columns crossing the avenne which leads from the Succaderry to the City, the enemy's center battery near the tank opened on them.

# OPERATIONS BEFORE NAGPOOR.

and immediately afterwards the batteries on the CHAP. enemy's right. The latter were stormed by the U. right and center brigades ; and the reserve, at 1917 the same time carried the battery near the tank. The cavalry attacked the enemy's left flank, and, having carried the battery defending it. pursued the enemy, who fled in all directions, seven miles

Immediately after the battle which has been Prethus briefly described, a body of the Nagpoor the stuck Infantry, estimated at 6000 men, and of whom pass one third were Arab mercenaries, occupied the city, and as they refused to evacuate it, but on very unreasonable terms, it became necesisary to dislodge them by force of arms.

Nagpoor is situated in an extensive plain, The City and is, strictly speaking, an open city. A rampart in the usual Native style, with occasional rdund Towers' had on source fortney occasion been commenced, but has in no place been carried to a greater height than eight feet, and is in general less. The extent of the city, as defined by this unfinished rampart, is scarcely three miles, but the suburbs, which run close up to the city wall, are not less than seven miles in circumference, extending chiefly on the North and East sides, and not exceeding 400 yards in depth on the West and South. (See PLATE II).

The strength of this position, and on which the Arabs depended. consists in the numerous

CHAP, stone huildings, situated in different parts of the city and suburbs, most of which arc capable of defence. Of these the most important is 1817 the old Palace, an extensive square work flankcd with towers, and of a considerable height. It is situated towards the S. W. angle of the city, at a distance of about 250 yards from either the South or West side ; and as from its central position, and superior height, it in some degree commands the whole city, it necessarily became the object of our attack. From the foregoing description of its situation, and the extent of the suburbs around it. the choice of the direction of the attack evidently lay between the South and West sides.

> On the former, inmediately ontaide of the unfinished will, the Pootse Baug, as inclosure with some strong buildings, which could be easily gained, rootal afford considerable facility to an attack; but from that point the advance would be difficult, through narrow winding attrest, defended by a number of strong houses on both sides, and it would be precisionly nocessary to carry the Grand Fort (marked O), and Of Giadel capable of defence, which fanks the right of any approach directed on the Phales from this quarter.

On the West side, the bank of a large Lake called the Jooma\* Taloo, affords an advantage

\* Jorna significs Friday, and Taloo is the Hindostance wood for a Lake.

# OPERATIONS BEFORE NAGPOOR.

to assailants not to be overlooked This Lake, CHAP. or as it is termed in Indian phraseology, this Tank, which extends from the base of the 1817. Sectabuldec hill to the suburbs on the West side of the city, is in shape nearly a parallelogram, about 1300 yards long and 500 wide. The banks or bunds, formed of masonry and earth, are sufficiently high to afford cover to troops, especially on the eity side, where they command the whole intermediate space between the Tank and the Palace. The principal and widest street in the eity runs immediately from the East bund to the Palace, and at about 350 vards from the former, passes through an arched gateway of brick, called the Jooma Durwasee, which is situated immediately behind the city wall, in a portion of an old rampart which remains complete. The main street, leading through this sateway, is bordered only by low shops, and affords a comparatively easy access. This side was therefore considered the most eligible for the attack, although it would be neccssary to breach and occupy the Jooma Durwasee, which intervened between the bund and the Palace.

## PROJECT OF ATTACK.

Under these eircumstances, it was proposed, that the first approach should be made along the Southside of the Tank, and having intreuch-

CHAP, ed the East bund of it, to convert part of it II." opposite the Jooma Darwasee into a battery for 1817 destroying that work; and this was deemed essential, although the city wall, 100 yards to the right and left of it, was not eight feet high. and might have been easily occupied, because, from the gateway the revetment of the Paluce was seen to the very bottom, while from any other part it could hardly be seen at all. The Jooma Darwasee being breached, it was proposed to make a lodgment on its ruins, and in the walls and houses on either side. and from thence to batter the Palace. This edifice once in our hands would in all probability oblige the enemy to evacuate the city ; but in the event of their persevering to hold possession of any other principal buildings, it would then become necessary to reduce them by bombardment, or by breaching, according to arrangements to be subsequently formed, the information regarding the interior of the city being only sufficient for the formation of a plan to gain possession of the Palace. All the hattering train, except a few howitzers, having been thrown into Ellichipoor; on the rapid advance of the Division from that place, a certain number of the enemy's guns, taken on the 16th, were selected for the operations about to commence. They were of inadconate calibre, being orfacipally 6 and 7 pounders, as the large gans were considered pusate.

# JOURNAL OF THE ATTACK OF NAGPOOR

December the 19th

CHAP. The requisite materials having been prepared, the first advance was made during the 1817 morning, from the Seetabuldce hill, to the point where a battery for two howitzers for bom-Pum II barding the city, and an intrenchmont for a sufficient number of men for its scentity, were constructed. This work, which brought us to within about 1000 yards of the Palace, was completed in four hours without any loss.

# December 2014

This morning a second advance was made along the bund of the Tank ; this showed how very inadequate the means in the Engineer Department in this country are to the duties of a siege, for the operation, though simple, was nerformed with difficulty, owing to the Pioncers\* on the working party, who could not be brought forward with the requisite materials to com-

\* The Author is obliged, in justice, to state that this (which with the rest of these details, is extracted from the Journal of the Senior Engineer) is the only instance he has heard of any mishchaviour on the past of the Madras Pioncess, who have long been distinguished for their cool steady bravery ; and on one or two trying occasions, in which he has hunself had an opportunity of seeing them capiloved, they have sustained that character in a way that could not be surpassed by Europeans, or any troops in the world. The present can only be accounted for by supposing that they were new to their work. unpractised, and unaccustomed to the Engineer Officers, ander whom they were employed.

entare piece the Eatablishment, until the European Lin Sappers and Miners haid interacted discassive. During this day, the whole of the East lund point of the Tank was interacted and Battery No. 1: the ensure from filters that hubilings, was traced the ensure from filters that hubilings, was traced at and completed; and in the operation an Engineer Officer was slightly wounded. When the battery opened, the detachments under Colouel Sort and Major Pittuna, advanced and occupied the positions s and c, and a company mered from s to A.

During the night, Battery No. 2, to lay open the gate and destroy the defences in its neighbourhood, was completed for five of the enemy's captured guns.

## December 21st.

All operations were suspended during some negociations which were carrying on.

## December 22nd.

The trenches were perfected, and the cuenty dialogical from the hooses typing between the bond and the gateway. During the evening, Battery No.2 openet on the defonces of the wall of the city, opposite the trenches, and on the gateway, to latter it. Although the guns were equal to this, it was erioden, after a fow salvos, that it would be impossible to breach the Palace with them, at that distance.

## ATTACK OF NAGPOOR

December 9.8ed.

The breach of the Jooma Durwasee was ren-11. dered practicable, and materials prepared for 1817 forming a lodgment in it. A good deal of rain fell this night.

# December 94th

Materials for forming a lodgment having been prepared, an attack was ordered to be made on the Jooma Durwasce, at 12 o'clock. Colonel Scott and Major Pitman were directed to make a simultaneous advance at the same hour, to dispossess the enemy of several strong houses in their front, and to procure better cover for their troops. For this purpose the former was to occupy Toolsee Baug, and the latter a large extensive building (No. 5).

The column for the storm of the breach Arong consisted of 23 European Sappers and Miners, thesault one company H. M. Royal Scots, and five companies of Native Infantry, with the Pioneers provided with the necessary materials and intrenching tools for forming a lodgment; in the trenches was a reserve of one company of Europeans, and four companies of Native Infantry.

On the signal being given, the different par-rating of ties advanced, and Colonel Scott and Major Pitman succeeded in occupying the positions assigned to them ; but the attack on the breach failed, notwithstanding it was perfectly practicable, as the Pioneers who carried the mate-

41 CHAP

CHAP, rials got into confusion, and the Europeans who led, could not be persuaded to pass the top of п. ---the breach to annihilate the Arab party guard. 1817 ing it, who were so completely surprised, that they were found drinking coffee and warming themselves around a fire; but they soon collected in great bodies, and obliged the column, after remaining at the top of the breach for some time, to retire with considerable loss ; the Officer who commanded the company of H.M. Royals, and the only one with them, being killed in the inside of the breach, the Senior Engineer severely wounded, and a large proportion of the Sappers and Miners disabled.

The enemy agree to avacuate the place.

After this failare, it was decided to wait for the battering guns, and is the interim the Araba negocisted to evacuate the city, receiving all their arrears of pay; and it was agreed that a British Officer should be sent with them as a side conduct to the fontiers of Khandesh.

The state of the Engineer and Artillery Dopartment, at the attack on Nagpoor were-

### ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Licut. Davies, Commando Eugineer, severely wounded. Ensign Nattes, - - Staff - - slightly wounded.

### SAPPERS AND MINERS.

3 Serjeants 3 Corporats Europeans. -28 Privator

# ATTACK OF NAGPOOR

3	Havildars 7	
$^{2}$	Naigues	Natives.
28	Privates	•

11 ~ 1817.

The Engineer stores consisted of 1400 saud bags, and the only intrenching tools were such as could be collected from the Regiments of the Line.

### ARTILLERY.

Lieutenant, Colonel Crosdill, Commanding, Major Weldon, Commissary of Stores. Major Gorcham, wounded slightly. Cantain Poignand, Brigade Major. Licutenant Maxwell.

Coull, wounded severely.

6 Scriegants.

69 Rank and File.

2 Heavy 53-inch Howitzers.

1 Light ditto.

7 6-pounders

4 brass 7-pounders

the onemy's guns in Battery. 1 ditto 12-pounder

1 ditto 15-pounder

150 shells for the 51-inch Howitzers, besides the complement in the Tumbrils.

The ammunition used, besides the shells above-mentioned, was what had been taken from the enemy, which proved to be of a very bad quality.

Ley.

King.

## REFLECTIONS.

CHAP. II.

1817

The failure before the open city of Nagpoor has given rise to great discussion, and the wisdom of the operations pursued has been much called in question, but it is to be apprehended, that these doubts have originated solely in the had success which attended it, and not in any due examination of the merits or demerits of the plan.

The principal reasons, which induced the for attack. Commanding Engineer to propose the West Westate, side for the direction of the attack, in preference to approaching by the low ground which surrounds the rest of the city, were-1st. The excellent approach offered by the bund (or embankment) of the Tank, which afforded natural cover to within 550 yards of the Palace. 2nd. That owing to the superior height of the bund, the houses between our trenches and the city wall would be rendered untenable by the Garrison. 3rd. That the first batteries could he easily constructed by merely cutting cinbrasures through the bund ; a consideration which, in the innerfect state of the Engineer Department, was of no small importance. There is no doubt that the Palace was the object to be gained, not only as the principal post, but as the easiest to be assailed, and if the propriety of opening trenches against it be conceded, the above considerations must appear conclusive.

### ATTACK OF NAGPOOR.

as to the superior advantages offered by an ap-CHAP. proach on the West side ; but it is against an ..... ulterior part of the plan, that the strongest ob- 1817 jections have been urged, and one writer, of deservedly high authority, has not scrupled to assert, not only that the occupation of the Jooma Durwasee was injudicious, but that it was undertaken against the Commanding General's better indement, at the carnest solicitations of his Engineer. The first part of the question, as to the propriety or otherwise of the measure, affords reasonable matter for argument, but we may pass over the latter, as a gratuitous assertion, in direct contradiction to the tenour of the General's public dispatches, and which, even if founded on fact, could only tend to prejudice the fair investigation of the subject.

Lient.-Colonel Blacker, the author to whom  $L_{Pert}$  of 1 Bluels, and who has bactored upon the tatack mixed cosmo, appear to honor with his approbament. The the second second second second second tion the previous operation of occupying the band of the Tank, and also the interior object of obtaining possession of the Palse. Now as the Palsee could not be breached from the band itself, one from any other point on that side, excepting the intermediate position of the Joom Durvases, an attack apon that position because an indispensable part of the general plan of operation, which seems to have been CHAP, approved by Colonel Blacker himself. He has п. not favoured his readers by explaining what he himself would have suggested in preference to 1817. the mode of attack actually attempted ; but it is evident, that after the bund was occupied with a view to operations against the Palace, it would have been the height of absurdity to have remained idle and inactive in the former position. In fact, after having beaten the enemy's army in the field, General Doveton had only one alternative : either to wait until the whole of his battering train and Engineer stores were brought up, which would have occasioned a delay of at least fifteen days; or to commence an immediate attack with the intperfect means he had upon the spot. He chose the latter, in preference, as the more vigorous measure, and after having made this decision, he could not, with any degree of consistency, have acted otherwise than he did

To receptulate, and state more in detail, the reasons in favour of the attack on the Jooma Durvasie, they were so follows:-18. It was the only spot, from whence the bottom of the walls of the Palace could be distinctly seen, as at every other part a large mass of houses intervenes, without previously levelling which, it would have been impossible to effect a practicable breach. 2nd. There were no large buildings in front of the Jodina Durvasee sufficiently near to it, from whence our troops, GFIAP, after occupying that work, and lodging them. It, selves also an theright and left of it, could have been annoyed by the enemy. 3rd. The establishment on the Joina Durwasee could be made under the protection of our battery and trenches on the bund of the Tank.

It has been asserted, on the other hand, that even had the assault of that position succeeded. the troops would have found no cover, but at the gateway, a very confined space, and within the city walls. But it has been forgotten by those, who urge this objection, that the space between the bund and the gateway was a suiburb composed of low mud houses, every one of which would have afforded cover; that this suburb extended on both sides of the road sufficiently to lodge the whole Division, had it been thought advisable to occupy it; and that the low wall of the city itself, not eight feet high. was excellent cover, and could easily have been improved, so as to answer every purpose of a parallel.

 The friends of Lieut. Colonel Blacker, and of Lieut. Davies, the Commanding Engineer before Negpoor, who was killed next year in the execution of his duty, must equally lament, that the former, in stating his objections, to the plan of attack now under discussion, should have expressed himself in language by no means respectful to the memory of the latter. Whils the acknowledges some of

The foregoing considerations will possibly CHAP. П. lead to the conclusion, that the general plan ~ 1817, was the most judicions, perhaps the only one that could be adopted. To some of the details Remarks objections might be raised. The utility of the could execution lodgement made on the first day (at A), might of the place of struck, be called in question ; and the time which was spent on this operation, might perhaps have been better employed, by occupying at once the East bund of the Tank. Another arrangement of the storming party might have led to a different result. The leading men should have been directed to occupy, and obtain cover in the houses between our trenches and the gateway, and to the right and left of the latter; and

> supported, and even if repulsed, much ground those high military qualities, by which Lieut. Davies was distinvished, he andres to him the enithet " petulant," on an occasion, and in a manner, which to the general reader, maccuainted with either of the parties, will probably appear unworthy of the dignity of Military history. Lieut. Davies . certainly possessed great firmness and docision; and when called upon as the Commanding Engineer of the Division, to give his opinion on points of duty, he did so with that plain dealing and energy, which characterised his manly and ardent mind; but assuredly no man was less deserving of the implied reproach of want of temper or of manner, which Col. Blacker has thus gratuitonsly thrown out against inm, and which no doubt that distinguished Officer will be riad to cancel, for his own credit, if a second edition of his useful work should be required.

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the storming party would then have been better

## ATTACK OF NAGPOOR.

would still have been gained. The party of CHAP. Europeans should have been stronger, and they should have been fresh men. The company 1817. employed had been on duty twenty-four bours. and had been exposed during the whole of a cold night, in wet trenches, to a heavy rain ; and these two circumstances, their small number, and the fatigue they had undergone, will perhaps he thought more naturally to account for their backwardness, than the reason assigned by Colonel Blacker, that "they saw no " advantage to be obtained," in going forward : a feeling fortunately little known to British troops, and which if a common one, would oblige a General, before he attempted any manœuvre, to submit the propriety of it, to the wisdom of his army for their decision. The misbehaviour of the Enropeans on this occasion may be thought a delieate subject, and it would he so, if the reputation of one of the most distinguished Regiments in the service could be supposed to suffer, by the misconduct of a few of their number; and if that misconduct had not been nobly redeemed by the gallantry of their leader, which called forth from his enemics the highest encominnus, and to which they paid the only homage in their power, that of sending out a flag of trues, that his remains left in the inside of the breach might be carried away.

If we had been successful in obtaining pos-

CITAP session of the Palace, it might have been diffi-H. cult and tedious to dispossess the Arabs of ستش 1817, other parts of the eity, for we must have trusted to the effects of bombardment; had the service been provided with efficient Miners, a speecher termination might have been anticipated, for brave as the Arabs are, the destruction of a few of their strong holds by mines, would doubtless have convinced them of the inutility of further resistance. The defence they made would have done credit to European troops, and, but in one instance, do they appear to have neglected taking every advantage which the nature of their position afforded them; they might have retarded our occupation of the East bund of the Tank, which they allowed us to intrench, almost without opposition.

> These reflections on the conduct of the siege of Nagpoor, cannot be closed better than by the following extract from a letter from Brigadier-General Doveton, to the Adjutant-General of the army.

Extract from Brigadier-General Dovetor's official letter, <sup>1</sup> I avail myself of this opportunity also of <sup>1</sup> bringing to his Excellency the Commander-<sup>1</sup> in-Chief's favourable notice, the exemplary <sup>2</sup> conduct and exertions of the corps of Suppers <sup>2</sup> and Miners, and of the detachment of Poot <sup>3</sup> Artillery, during the several operations <sup>3</sup> against the city of Nagpoor, subsequent to <sup>3</sup> the action of the 61th of Decoupler.

### ATTACK OF NAGPOOR.

<sup>10</sup> Had it solt been for the uncommon exerc G(A). <sup>10</sup> ideas of Lientemats Davies and Natters of the 11. <sup>10</sup> Exgineers, and of the men of the former of 1818. <sup>10</sup> these corps, we should never have been able <sup>10</sup> to carry on our approaches in the rapid man-<sup>10</sup> arc they were. Their consequent futgues and <sup>11</sup> excitions were therefore proportionably great, <sup>12</sup> and prove to up entire conviction, that this <sup>10</sup> particular arm only requirts an adequate in-<sup>11</sup> the paulici interest.<sup>10</sup>

The Arabs, agreeably to treaty, evacuated the city early in the month of January, and were accompanied by a British officer\* to the Eastern frontier of Khandesh, which province. though nominally divided under the rule of the different Mahratta Powers, was in reality, almost entirely in the possession of these hold and enterprising adventurers. They were followed by the Second Division, which broke up from Nagpoor on the 22d of January, and procoeded by slow marches to the Westward. through the valley of Berar, by the route of Ellichipoor. In their progress, the two hill Fortresses of Guyalghur and Naualla, situated on the summit of the lofty mountains which form the Northern boundary of that valley, and

<sup>4</sup> Lieutenant Sheriff. The Arabs on parting with him, in a manner equally incomable to both partine, forced on his acceptance a present, in testimony of their regard and extern.

CHAP, belonging to the Rajah of Nagpoor, were summoned and surrendered. Both of these places H. 1818, are formidable from their situation, and the former was always considered impregnable by the Natives, till it was taken by storm by the English Army under Colonel Wellesley, in the

Mabratta war of 1802; and this doubtless was the cause of the ready obedience which was paid to the Rujah's order for their surrender. of which Brigadier-General Doveton was the bearer. After occupying these places, and some others on the plain, which belonged to the Rajah, and which at first showed symptoms of resistance, the Division entered Khandesh, and reached Ootran, a place in that province, in the middle of February, where they remained to await the approach of the first Division, with which a junction was to be formed.

Victory of The first and third Divisions, it is almost unnecessary to relate, had crossed the Nerbuddah, and entered Malwa, the latter in the middle of November, and the former in the beginning of December, 1817, and shortly afterwards the combined Divisions encountered and defeated the Army of Mulhar Row Holkar at Mahidpoor. This decisive and glorious victory, which rendered unnecessary any further operations in this part of India, except to pursue the flying and broken bodies of Pin-

poor.

### OPERATIONS IN MALWA.

darries, was quickly followed by the Treaty of CHAP. Mundissoor, negociated by Sir John Malcohn, 11. between the British Government and Mulhar 1818 Row Holkar, by which that Prince's territories were greatly reduced, and the British supre- And Tranmacy acknowledged and secured. By one of the discorthe Articles in that Treaty, all Holkar's possessions in Khandesh, were ceded to the English, and orders for the surrender of the different places were delivered to Lieutenaut-General Sir Thomas Hislop, the Commanderin-Chief; who, shortly after it was ratified, returned with the first Division to the Deckan. The Division crossed the Taptee on the 20th of February, and a copy of the order for its surrender, was sent to the Killedar of Talneir, one the Killedar of the places in question, situated on the banks Tabeir of this River. The order, however, was dis- infrast to regarded, and the Garrison having fired on the karkonic advanced guard, which came within reach of during it the guns of the Fort, all hopes, of passing it by mellion without notice, were at an end; and as the Division was without a battering train, the Commander-in-Chief determined to attempt its reduction by a coup-de-main.

## ATTACK OF THE FORT OF TALNEIR.

The Engineers, on reconnoitring the Fort, beschothered found it situated on a knoll, but with the ground different around it so intersected by ravines, through Pare II.

## SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

OIAAR which reads generally run, that cannon might II. be brought under cover to within 100 yards of 186, the place. The Taptee defineds one side, and on the other three, there is a hollow way about 130 yards wide. The inclosure is a wall of masoary, about 60 feet high, flanked by square and roand torser. The entrance is on the East side, of difficult access, having several traveness of mud and masoary, and free gates. The huts of the town approach to within musket shot of the walls.

About 10 o'clock A. M. an emplacement was formed, and two 6-pounders; and two 5 $\pm$ -inch howitzers, protected by the piquets of the Division, were brought up to (a), to play on the defence near the gateway.

About 2 **2** . **n**. two 6-ponders were placed at  $(\delta_{0}, \mathbf{at}$  120 args/ds biasence, to rain the thin parapets of the traverses of the gateway, and render them nationable; shortly after, a how/tzer was removed, and placed at (c), and a few rockets were thrown into the place. The storming party, consisting of three gauss of the Horse Artillery, consisting of the egues, the flank companies of the Royal Scois and Mafras European Reginent, and the detachment of the Kille Corps, was formed at the same time, at (a); the firing and considerable effect on the mult parapets, and between 4 and 5 r. s. the essent paraying called for quarter, the storming party advanced,

### ATTACK OF TALNEIR.

and met the Killedar in the gateway, coming CHAP. out to negociate terms; he was sent on to Head Quarters, and the party advanced. Two 1010 gates were barst open without any resistance being offered, two were altogether unelosed, and at the last, some officers and grenadiers entered by the wieket, and the latter attempting to disarm the Arabs by force, who are remarkably punctilious in the preservation of their arms, an affray took place, in which all our party who entered, were killed or wounded. At length, the remainder of the storming party succeeded in forcing their way through the wieket, and every man in the Fort was put to the sword.

## ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Licut. Anderson, Madras Engineers, severely wounded.

- " T. H. Elliott, Royal Engineers, doing duty.
- ,, Purton, Madras Engineers.

### REFLECTIONS.

This operation offers little subject for profersional reflections. The Fort of Talueris iso' triffing strength, owing to the brokenness of the ground around it, which affords cover in every direction, and on the side of the river, up to the very walls of the Fort; and with this defect, it could make little defence against a regular attack with auffeient means. Its principal strength lies µ the construction of the interior

## SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP, of the Fort, which (as is often the case with places similarly situated), is a solid mass of 1818 earth, much higher than the surrounding country; upon which, the rampart and parapet, nerhans 11 feet high, are raised, and these are the only parts not solid; so that in battering the exterior walls, which are 60 feet high, the shot would bury themselves in an enormous mound of earth. But this would have been no obstacle against Mining, and this method, which would have been as expeditious as the one pursued, might have been tried on the present occasion, but, there being neither a Miner, nor a mining tool in the Division, nor even a sealing ladder, there was no resource but to attempt an entrance by the gateways. Like most of the Forts in this part of India, the gateway was the

in-poss strongest part, and (as will be seen by reference the the plan of it) considerable pains had here. bestowed, and apparently with great success, on preserving a proper flashing defines on the different passages; and if the gateway had been defended with the useal obstinacy and resolution of the Arabs, it seems doubtful how far a passage coeld have been forced through, the four inner ones, even after the outer gate lumb, hall been thread year.

A structure for the strong presumption against the treachery at fine the first structure structure in the first structure in the structure structure in the structure structure in the structure str

#### ATTACK OF TALNEIR.

could hope to gain from it, were not to be curate compared to what they might expect, by an open resistance from the ramparts, which command the passages between the outer and inner gates. By the former, they might destroy the first few, who entered the wicket. By the latter, supposing the gates to have been shut, the whole of the principal Staff of the Army, who were pent up with the storming party in this narrow space, must have remained exposed to the uncrring aim of the Arab matchlocks, while a gun was dragged up this steep ascent, to blow open the successive gateways. On the justice of the sentence passed on the Killedar and his Arab Commander, and on our right to inflict it, were I qualified to pass an opinion. I should feel little disposed to do so; but I may he permitted to deplore, in common with all friends of humanity, that some Ambassador more polished than a British Grenadier, and one acquainted with the language and customs of the Arabs, had not preceded the storming party, to explain to them the terms on which they were to be admitted to quarter, and to prevent the possibility of such an affray as that which took place, and the loss of lives that necessarily resulted from it.

After the reduction of Talucir, a junction Farther was effected between the first and third Divi-of the sions, and they proceeded through Khandesh Dividual

37 TL. 1818

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP into the valley of the Godavery, which they entered by the pass of Chandore. The Fortress which guards this pass, together with that of 1818 Gaulna, both belonging to Holkar, surrendered to the British Army without resistance. After an ineffectual attempt to come up with the Peishwah, the Head Quarters proceeded to Aurangabad, when His Excellency Sir Thomas Arres of Hislop resigned the chief command, and the brekenup. Army of the Deckau was broken np.

The second Division reverted to its old de-Preparas signation of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and as such. the main part of it was employed edading the Peish in the pursuit of the Peishwah, while a detachment, amounting to about 900 firelocks, with the battering train, was ordered to undertake the reduction of that Prince's Fortresses, and their operations will form the subject of a subsequent Chapter.

## CHAPTER III.

SIRGE OPERATIONS OF THE DESERVE DIVISION. SINGHUR-BRIGAUM-SHOLAPOOR ----

THE hostilities commenced by the Peishwah in November, 1817, had given ample employment since that time to the fourth and reserve Divisions, composed of Madras and Bombay troops ; and they had given him, on several

## ATTACK OF SINGHUR.

occasious, but particularly at the battle of CHAP. Kirkee, and the defence of Corygaum, a lesson, which probably convinced him, that his best 1818. chauce of success rather lay in harrassing our troops by the rapidity of his movements, than by attacking even our smallest bodies on the plain. Shortly after the gallant defenders of Corvgaum had effected their retreat to Serroor, the combined Divisions had proceeded against Sattarah, which surrendered without opposition : and immediately afterwards the fourth Division commenced anew their pursuit of the Peishwah. while the Reserve was ordered to undertake the reduction of such of his Fortresses, as lay in their line of operation, for which service they were particularly organized.

The strength of the Reserve was as follows :

Artillery, Madras and Bombay - 194 Madras Native Infantry - - - 1775 Bombay Native Infantry - - - 1776 Pioncers, Madras and Bombay - 350 Forming a Total of - 4095

#### ATTACK OF SINGHUR.

The first object of their attack was Singhur, which place they reached on the 20th February, 1818, and immediately invested it; the main body taking up its ground in the valley to the Southward of the Fort, with the exception of the 2d battaliou of the 9th Regiment of Bombay

# SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP. Native Infantry, and a party of Horse, who U., were sent to invest the Northern side.

1818. The Fort of Singhur is situated about fifteen

miles South of Poonah, on the summit of a mountain, which forms the Western extremity Destriarise of the of one of the ranges of hills, running between Singhur. Poonah and the Neerah river. It is of irregular form, being about 1000 yards in its greatest length, and 800 in extreme width. It is of great strength, particularly on the North front, nature having rendered it nearly inaccessible in almost every point. The Poouah gate is the only road of approach on this side, and consists of three separate inclosures, at some distance asunder. The Fort contains abuudance of excellent water; and although there are no regular bombproofs, the ledges of the rocks afford shelter for a small body of men. The garrison consisted of 1200 men.

#### RECONNOISSANCE.

Immediately on the investment, the place was reconnoitred, and it was determined to establish a mortar battery on the Eastern hill, about 800 yurds distant from the Fort.

February 22d and 23d.

WORKING PARTY .- 360 Pioneers, 300 Doolybearers.

The working party was employed in collecting materials for gabions and faseince. One mortar and one howitzer were placed in position on the Eastern hill, as also four mortars and

#### ATTACK OF SINGHUR.

these howitzers, under cover of a hill S.E. of CIAP, the Fort, marked (a) in the plan. On the montling of the 23d, a reconnoissance was under exlisit. the Western side of the Fort, and possession having breat takes of an eminance in that quarter, after a alight resistance on the part of the cumpr ; it was detrained to maintain this position, and to erect a two-gun battery. The ground between the Western and Eastern posts were also reconnoited, and an eligible point discovered for a twoching battery.

February 23d, at Night. WORKING PARTY.--100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 200 Pioneers.

Men were employed in making a road from the park to the Western post. The Eastern post was cularged, to contain 2 six-pounders, and the guns were placed in battery.

February 24th.

WORKING PARTY .- 100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 100 Pioneers.

Men were employed during the day in making a road to the center hill post.

February 24th, at Night. WORKING PARTY.--100 Europeans, 100 Sepays, 160 Pioneers.

The road to the Western post was finished. A two-gan battery (a) was completed, and armed with twelve-pounders, which opened their fire at day-break.

# SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP.

February 25th.

The carriages of the twelve-pounders broke 1818 down after a few rounds, but were replaced in the course of the day.

> The 25th at Night. WORKING PARTY .-- 100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 960 Pioncers.

The battery at the Western post was repaired, and enlarged for 2 six-pounders, which onened their fire next morning. The breaching battery (c), intended for 3 eighteen-pounders, was commenced, and two-thirds of it prepared for two guns. The European detail, with 60 of the Natives, by some mistake omitted to attend,

### February 26th.

WORKING PARTY .-- ... Buroneans, 100 Senovs. ... Pioneens.

The road to the center post breaching battery was completed.

## The 26th, at Night.

WORKING PARTY .- 100 Europeans, 200 Schove, 960 Pioneers.

The breaching battery for two of the eighteennounders was finished, and armed, and a royetment of gabious for the third was placed and filled; but owing to the rockiness of the soil, nothing further could be added to the thickness of the parapet.

## February 27th.

A further reconnoissance was made, and a

# ATTACK OF SINGHUR.

spot to the South East (marked  $\upsilon$  in the plan) CHAP. was fixed upon, for two additional eighteenpounders, to assist in making the breach.

## The 27th, at Night.

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WORKING PARTY .--- 100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 200 Pioncers.

The new battery (D), for 2 eighteen-pounders, was nearly constructed.

## February 28th.

WORKING PARTY .-- ... Europeans, ... Sepoys, 60 Pioneers.

The new battery was completed, and armed with 2 eighteen-pounders, which opened their fire about 10 o'clock next morning. A howitzer was also added. A brisk fire was still kept up by the enewy.

## The 28th, at Night.

## WORKING PARTY .- 100 Europeans, 100 Sepays, 100 Pioneers.

The center post breaching battery was repaired, and completed for three guns.

## March 1st.

About 9 A. X. a white flag was hoisted by the Garrison, and two Deputies were sent to the Brütish eamy, for the purpose of negociating. Articles of capitulation were drawn up, with which they returned. During the interval the fire from our batteries had been suspended, but was re-opened from the breaching batteries a little after noon, no rephy having been received CHAP, from the Fort. About 3 P. M. a messenger III. arrived with a letter, stating that agents, vested | 1818, with full powers to treat, would beinmediately dispatched, and they accordingly arrived be-

inspace a, and b o'clock; but the Articles could not be arranged, and a second communication with the Fort took place.

During this time a partial fire was kept up by our batteries, excepting the Eastern post.

## March 3rd.

The batteries, except the Eastern one, opened as usual about 8 A. M. A third party from the Fort arrived, and the terms were finally arranged.

### ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Captain J. Nutt, Bombay Engineer, Commanding. Ligutenant Grant, Mudras Engineers.

- Mucleod, Ditto.
- Athill, Bombay Engineer.

#### ORDNANCE.

- 4 Iron 18-pounders.
- 2 ditto 12-pounders.
- 2 brass 12-pounders.
- 1 ditto 10-inch Mortar.
- 4 ditto 8-inch Mortars.
- 2 ditto 54-inch Howitzers.

There were expended during the siege, 1417 shells, and 2300 eighteen-pound shot.

## REFLECTIONS.

As is generally the case with similar For-

## ATTACK OF BELGAUM.

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tresses, there remained to the Engineer no Grave. choice as to the point to be attacked, and the III. positions of the batteries, absoarequired the exersist, cise of professional talents. These appear to have been well alected, and fortunately our fire had the shown more resolution, they might have detained us much longer, but the definee they made was unworthy of the mane.

While pirt of the Reserve Division was thus opencoccepied, the rominder of it, commanded by games Brigatier-General Munco, was employed in reducing the Southern Mahrata country, which ducing the Southern Mahrata country, which was wholly in the goarsalis first operations were crowned with very brillant success. The attack of Badaumee may, in particular, he noticed as a remarkable instance of the effect produced by the bravery and resolution of our troops, in intimitating their ensury, when occupying an impregnable position. After the fall of this place, the Division marched to Belgauna, a Port situated near the Western Ghanta, and which they reached on the 20 to f March.

The strength of the Division for the siege consisted of-

2 Squadrons of Dragoons.

3 Troops of Native Cavalry.

11 Companies of Native Infantry.

4 Companies of Mysore Regular Infantry,

4 Companies of Pioneers.

в

CHAP. The battering train was composed of-111. \* 2 from 18-pounders. 1818. 2 Brass 12-pounders.

2 Heavy Mortais.

## ATTACK OF BELGAUM.

On arriving before the place, the Pettah was towing occupied, and the Fort reconnoitred. Its shape tion of the For af is an irregular oval, in circumference about 2600 Pran VI, yards ; its greatest length being about 900 vards. from the Flag-staff Bastion to the Southward. It is surrounded by a deep wet ditch, and a regular sloping glacis, with a clear esplanade around it of 600 yards. The Engineer, by whom the Fort was built, has, apparently, trusted entirely to the ditch for the defence of the East and West fronts, for the greater part of them has been left without any round towers, which are only placed on the North and South fronts; in the former of which is the gateway. The other defences of the Fort consist of two or three cavaliers, prepared for batteries; one of which is at the North-West angle behind the Flag-staff Bastion, and has apparently been placed there for the further protection of the

> <sup>1</sup> In one place Colonel Blacker mentions two 18-pounders as the complement, but in his subsequent remarks to says, <sup>11</sup> the three inon 18-pounders were so run in the west, &e.<sup>2</sup> I have adopted the former, as this agrees with the number stated to have been in battere.

### ATTACK OF BELGAUM.

entrance into the Fort, which is situated near CHAP. the North-East angle. There are three gate- 111. ways, which, after the Fort was taken, were 1818 found to have been built up, and barricaded, PLANKIL Between the inner and middle gateways, there is a narrow causeway across the ditch, protected by a small outwork, with a tolerably thick rampart, and a dry ditch and glacis in front of it. The Pettah lies opposite to the West front of the Fort, but extends some distance to the Northward, where are the remains of an old wall, which, after covering part of the Pottah on that side, takes a South-Easterly direction. and terminates on the glacis of the Fort, opposite to the Flag-staff Bastion. The garrison consisted of 1600 mcn. The works were well supplied with ordnance and stores, and the walls, which are very substantially built of granite, and which vary from 35 to 60 feet

## March 20th.

in height, were in good repair.

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A battery for 3 twelve-pounders was commenced near a mosque, opposite to the North face, about 900 yards distant from the Fort, and in order to create a diversion, a five-and-ahalf-inch mortar, and a six-pounder, opened from the Pettah.

#### March 21st.

The battery (A) opened, and was answered by five guns from the enemy, but notwithstand-

CHAP ing this superiority, the enemy's fire was III. almost silenced by the next morning. IBIS. March 22d, and 23d.

During the night, an enflading battery (a) was completed, situated in the Pettah, about 600 yards from the Flag-staff Battion, for the purpose of enflading the North face and gateway. A gun opened on it from the caralier behind the Flag-staff Bastion, and the fire of the battery ( $\lambda$ ), was returned from the cartain on the left of the zate.

### March 24th.

An approach was commenced from the North-East, behind the old Pettah wall, about 900 yards distant from the Fort, and was earried 140 yards to the Eastward, in the direction 9.9.

## March 25/h.

The approach was continued 120 yards, and the enemy's five appeared nearly silenced.

## March 26th.

The enemy opened from the Flag-staff Battery, which was supposed to have been nearly distroyed by the twelve-ponneler hattery  $(\lambda)$ ; and they fired also from a gun on the right of the gate. The approach was continued 100 vards over very hard ground.

#### March 27th.

The mortar was moved from battery B to A. ' During the night, the trench was continued 100 yards.

## ATTACK OF BELGAUM.

## March 28th.

The approach was continued 120 yards, in a 111. South-Westerly direction, clearing the salient angle of the outwork, in front of the gateway. The enemy only fired from two guns.

### March 30th,

The approach proceeded 120 vards.

## March 31st.

The magazine belonging to battery ( $\lambda$ ) blew  $\mu$ p, and the garrison sallied to take advantage of the confusion, but were niet 100 yards from it, by the battery guard and Artillery detail, who drove them back into the Fort.

# April 1st.

The twelve-pounder battery (A) was repaired, and an eight-inch mortar opened its fire. The 54-inch mortar was carried back again to the enfilading battery. The approach was continued 50 yards in advance.

## April 2d.

A breaching battery (c) for 2 eighteenpounders was commenced, and completed, at, the distance of 600 yards from the gateway, and 550 from the Flac-staff Bastion.

### April 3d.

The battery opened, directing its fire on the left of the gateway, with great effect. It was answered by two guns of the enemy, which caused some annoyance, and a battery (p) was therefore constructed for 2 twelve-pounders, to CHAP silence them, 150 yards nearer the Fort, than

1818

April 4th, 5th, and 6th.

The batteries all continued firing without intermission till the 6th, when a battery (%) for I twelve-pounder, about 200 yards from the outer work of the gateway, was completed.

# April 7th.

The battery (E) opened this day, but the gun burst after a few rounds firing.

The breach of the curtain to the left of the gateway was continued, but the fire of the garrison was by no meaus got under.

# April 8th.

The 1 twelve-pounder battery  $(\varepsilon)$  was lengthened for 2 guns, and was armed with the iron guns from battery A, which was dismantled.

## April 9th.

Battery is opened with great effect on the curtain near the gate, which had not been destroyed, and which gave cover to the eneury's ginjals' and small arms. A practicable breach was also made in the outwork, in front of the gateway, which induced the Killedar to open a negociation.

\* Long matchlocks, of various calıbres, med us wall pieces by the Natives of India, which are commonly fixed like swirels, and carry iron balls not exceeding a pound is weight. In the field, they are sometimes carried on the backs of canada.

## ATTACK OF BELGAUN.

# April 10th.

The batterics fired as usual, till the garrison surrendered at discretion, when the British 1818. troops took possession of the outer gateway, and on the 12th the garrison marched out.

#### REFLECTIONS.

The foregoing account of the Siege of Belgaum has been extracted from Colonel Blacker's Memoir, and before commencing the reflectious which I am about to offer on it, I must be allowed to join in the full tribute of praise, which that officer has paid to the zcal and perseverance, with which the attack was carried on, and all the obstacles arising from inefficient means surmounted ; and if in the spirit of impartial investigation, which in these discussions it has been my endeavour to pursue, some objections should arise to the general details of the works carried on, and to the spot selected for the breach, they will be urged rather to show, what might have been done with a well orranized department, than to call in question the abilities of the distinguished and respectable officer" who, in the absence of an Engineer. directed the attack

The first point to which the attention is directed, on an examination of the Plan, is the

' Lientenant-Colonel Newall of the Madras Infantry.

CHAP, number of batteries, which appear to have been somewhat needlessly accumulated; and some III. 1818, of them, if we may judge by their effect as de  $\sim$ tailed in the Journal, apparently at too great a distance to have made the desired impression on the works. This remark is particularly applicable to the batteries, marked a and c, which might perhaps have been dispensed with, and the guns in them placed more advantageously at once, in battery at D and E. The nosition for the battery at B, was most judicionsly chosen, but it might have had still more effect in enfilading the North front, if it had been placed a little to the right, in the prolongation of the general line of that front. The direction of the trenches, marked F F F, was probably regulated by some localities, with which the Plan does not make us acquainted ; and it is therefore suggested with diffidence. that if a trench had been made from a to g, connecting these two points, instead of following the line p p, represented in the Plan, 200 vards of trench work would have been saved, and the garrison would have been more effectually confined ; or a part of the old Pettah wall, to the Northward, marked in the Plan 7 8, might have been converted into a parallel, and the only trench necessary would then have been from 8 to s, which would have reduced the quantity to 400 yards, instead of 750 yards\* CHAP, actually executed.

If it was intended to carry on any sap in ad-1918 vance of E. from whence to assault the breach, the breaching battery was established too soon, as the enemy might, in the time which it would have required to make such a sap, have retrenched or cut off the breach. If it was intended that the storming party should attack from the trenches at E, 200 yards distant, without any place to be occupied in the immediate vicinity of the breach, the result of the storm must have been doubtful. It will appear by reference to the Plan of the gateway and breach (see Plate VIL), that the besiggers would have had no small obstacles to surmount in attempting it : and if the garrison had behaved with resolution, access to the breach, without some further operations, would appear impossible. The spot near the gateway, which was selected for the breach, was, in fact, the best defended point of the Fort : but in this as in other justances during the war, the be-

<sup>4</sup> Coloned Bincker's Mesonic states 750 yards of treach to have been the quantity executed, but the Plan shows easily 1000. The distances, stated by Colonel Bincker, of the batteries from the Fort are generally inconsistent with the Plan, which will account of the difference is the distances given by mc, from these contained in Colonel Bincker's Memoir. GIAP, siegers were obliged to breach that part of the wals, near which there was a causeway across the ditch, without reference to its comparative wakness or strength, for in the imperfect state of the sign department, it would have been heyond their means to have effected the passage of the ditch at any other point.

> It is a great and undeniable proof of judgement, to regulate the project of attack of a Fortress, by the means at hand to carry it into effect, and judged by this rule, the plan pursned on the present occasion was judicious; but with sufficient means for common siere operations, an Engineer Officer, in all probability, would rather have attacked the Fortress of Belganm on the West side, immediately opposite to the mosque (marked 5), where there is a salient point, without any flanking defence on it whatever : and a similar one is to be found on the East front, but the cover afforded by the Pettah would ensure a preference to the former. One approach, connecting the Pettah with the mosque (5), another of 200 yards from thence (towards 9), and a third of the same length, directed clear of the South-Western salient angle of the Fortress, would have brought the assailants to the foot of the slone of the glacis, from whence the descent juto the ditch might have been carried on. When the trenches had advanced thus far, a breaching

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### ATTACK OF BELGAUM.

battery might have been constructed on the CH<sub>2</sub>H<sub>2</sub>F simular ising ground, on which the monque is 11 situated, and there is no doubt that operations 160 fink isidal might, with a very laupplied Dopartment, have been brought to a certain termination in less time, than was employed in the present instance, in breaching a point, which, if defended it was uncertain whether we could gain.

But it would have been madness to have attempted unch a course as I have described, under existing circumstances, and it must be allowed, that the Commanding officer, from his experience at Badaumee, had good reason to depend on the valuer of the troops, in surmounting the obstacles, which the breach in the projected appt would have presented to them; and the triffing loss we experienced, of only 25 men, during a siege of trenty days open trenches, aftorNs in itself the highest eccontions on the manner in which the signess conducted.

Shordly after the capture of Belgaun, n junch - ne astion was formed with the remaining part of the result (Gueral Prizher, which, after the fall of Sin-yearghur, had been secensfully employed in reducing the Forts, lettween Sattarahand Poonah. On receiving this reinforcement, the Dirision immediately marched against the Fortress of Sholapon, ear which a part of the Peialwah's force occupied a position. The force of the Dirision was as follows.

# STEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP.	Right & European Flank Battalion Brigadel Rifle Corps	31060
III.	Brigade? Rifle Corps	5
$\sim \sim \sim$	Center ( 4th Madras Native Infantry	2
1818.	Center § 4th Madras Native Infantry Brigade 2d Batt. 9th Madras Native Infantry	5
	Left §1st Batt. 7th Bombay Native Infantry Brigade 2d Batt. 12th Madras Native Infantry	2.cm
	Brigade 2d Batt. 12th Madras Native Infantry	5.000
	2 Squadrous II. M. 22d Dragoons	. 180
	Artillery-123 Rank and File.	

Pioneers-4 Companies.

The Division arrived before Sholapoor on the 9th of May, and took up its ground about two miles and a half from the Fort, on its Western side. The Fort being much covered by trees, its figure was not distinctly observed: but the enemy's Infantry and guns were seen, drawn up with their right upon the glacis, and their line extending to the Southward, along the bank of a Tank, which covered them breast high. The British force amounted to about 4000 men, as detailed above. The enemy (who were commanded by Gunput Row, one of the Peishwah's principal Chiefs) were about 6000 men, with 14 guns, independent of the Garrison, who were estimated at 900 more.

Sholapoor is situated in an extensive plain of Descrip- black soil, intersected here and there by rivushapor. lets of brackish water. The ground immediately to the Sonth is gently elevated and undulating. of a hard reddish soil. It is a large commercial town, inclosed by a strong mud wall, with towers of masonry on all sides, excepting to-

wards the Sonth-West, where it is bounded by CHAP, the Fort, to which it is contiguous, at the distance of about 300 yards.

South of the Fort is a large Tank, which washes the ramparts, and part of the wall of the Pettah, and supplies the ditch with water, through a shnice cat in a low wall of masoary, which bounds the ditch at its extremity nearest to the Tank.

#### ATTACK OF THE PETTAH OF SHOLAPOOR.

May the 9th, and 10th.

A strong reconnoiting party was sent out at 9 a. M. onder the command of General Pritzler, round the Northern and Eastern faces of the Pettah, to examine the valls and the gateways; and in the eventing, another party was sent round the Fort to the Southward, to reconnoitre the enery's position, and, as far as possible, the 'Tank and Pettah on that side.

The recommotiving party in the unorning was interactioned by a large hody of the encomy, who came round the Western face of the Fort with a few guns; but as they kept pretty close to the walls, and the reconnoiring party had accouplished its purpose, nothing further took place than a slight skrimsh between the riflemen, who acted as a covering party to the Engineers, and the enemy's advanced parties of Horse.

It was now determined to assault the Pettah,

CHAP, previously to any operations being undertaken against the Fort. A strong column accordingly III. left camp for that purpose, at 3 o'clock on the 1818

morning of the 10th, composed of the whole of the Right and Center Brigades, and the flank Autority companies of the Left Brigade, with 2 brigades deg ming of six-pounders, a brigade of howitzers, and 90001 the galloper guns of His Majesty's 22d Dragoons, 3 troops of whom accompanied the guns as a Reserve.

When within 1600 yards of the Pettah wall on the North face, the column was divided into two parties for the assault, as sketched on the Plan (see Plate VIII), leaving a small detachment, to reinforce the Reserve. The two columns moved forward at break of day, under cover of a sharp fire, oncued at the same time from the gallopers, to keep down the matchlock firing, which had now commenced from the wall.

The scaling ladders were applied, and both which is columns assaulted about the same instant, with contate; little opposition, driving the defenders from the wall and along the street, and pursuing them to the farthest extremity of the Pettah. the gate of which was immediately occupied. and a musketry fire was soon after opened, from this point, upon the enemy, who were observed to be moving in force, with some of their guns, along the Southern face of the Pettah, appa-

taken by

rently with a view to enter by the Eastern CHAP, gates, or to attack the Reserve, stationed on UL that side. 1818.

The Petth being now completely occupied, focured Munor resolved to charge the ensure, that who were by this time drawn up, and had the methy openion marked (2) on their artillery, at the pestion marked (2) on the Plan Two companies were called out from the Petth as a reinforceureri, and at the same time a heavy fire was opened from the artillery, while the troops were forming into grand divisions for the elarge.

A tumbril at this instant like w up in the enemy's hnes, which threw them into some confusion, and the charge taking place seon after, they broke and fiel in all directions round the Southern glacis, and took abelier in the coveredway, and about the Western and Northern faces of the Fort; leaving 3 guns in our possession, and throwing others into the ditch, to prevent thier failing into our hands.

A smart fire of nusketry was kept up between our most plavanced particles in the Pettah, and bodies of the enemy, who had sheltered themselvesin the coveredway, and behind a new wall, thrown up on the glacis, which being pierced for matchlock firing, occasioned numerons ensuities anong our toops. The enemy, however, must have suffered secretly, as he was observed, at 4 o'tock in the after-

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP, noon, to abandon his position in the covered-III. way, and take to the plain, in an Easterly . 1818, direction.

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# ATTACK OF THE FORT OF SHOLAPOOR.

## May the 11th.

The environs being now cleared, no obstacle romained to the commencement of the sign. The Engineers were therefore employed all the morning of the 11th, in reconnautring the Fort. The troops of the line had been almost all on day the preceding day, and the remainder being for guard to day, no orsking party of Europeans, or Sepoya, could be had. The Fjoneers, however, and about 200 Coolles from the Pdtah, were employed in collecting materials for the batteries.

#### RECONNOISSANCE.

The Fort was found to be covered by the gains on the Northern, Western, and Easten sides, to within å feet of the top of the wail; the scarp of the rampart, and althat of the ditch, appeared to be well built, of a blinish granite or elay alter, the walls to be about 25 feet ligh, with builteness ta top, inthe Messenham style. The ditch was of great breadth and depth, and hose parts of it, which could be seen, were supplied with water. It was, however, ascetimed flowninformation, that part of the Western

#### ATTACK OF SHOLAPOOR.

and Southern fronts were dry, and as the retain- CHAP. ing wall of the Tank on the last-mentioned side, appeared to be very thin, it was supposed rea- 1818 sonable to conclude, that there was a mound of earth behind to sustain the pressure. This circunstance, together with the difficulty and delay, which would necessarily be incurred in cutting through the glacis by san, induced the Senior Engineer to recommend that the batteries should he established in the hed of the Tank. The revetment of the rampart could be seen from that spot nearly to the very bottom; and by directing the fire, over the low retaining wall, where the revetment could be seen behind the covered way and glacis, a breach might be very soon effected, at a spot where the ditch was said to be dry; and where, at all events, a passage could be effected by means of the retaining wall, or bund of the Tank.

A battery of 1 mortar, 1 howitzer, and 2 sixpounders, was this day established behind the band of the Tank, near the South gate of tie-Petah, as shown on the Plan. This was done with a vice to keep the energy within the walls, and to afford some cover to the working parties, and advanced posts. The battery opened in the forenoon, and effectually confined the energy within the walls.

## May the 12th.

In the course of the afternoon this battery

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CHAP. was enlarged for 3 more mortars, which were III. ordered to be sent out next morning.

 WORKING PARTY.-50 Europeans, 100 Sepoys, 150 Pioneers.

> The mortar battery opened this morning, with considerable effect. Several honses were burnt in the Fort, and the enenry's fire was somewhat kept under.

> > May 12th, at Night.

At sun-set the working party was reinforced to the following strength, and as soon as it was dark, the breaching battery of four guus was commenced.

100 Europeaus, 100 Sepoys, 180 Pioneers.

# May 13th.

This morning, at day-break, the breaching battery, and a small branch of approach to it, were nearly completed; but as the distance from the Fort was only 400 yards, nothing for the was done to it during the day.

The mortar battery played upon the Fort today, with much effect. The practice was admirable; and the enemy's fire was silenced in several of the towers, where it had been most troublesome.

An enfilading battery, for 2 twelve-pounders and 2 six-pounders, was marked out early this morning, near the mortar battery, and the work commenced about 7 o'clock.

### WORKING PARTY .- 30 Europeans, 50 Sepoys, 60 CHAP. Pioneers. 111.

The enemy kept up a constant fire in this direction, and upon the breaching battery. Not a single workman, however, was wounded. At sun-set the battery was about half finished.

A company of Riffermen were this day posted at the Pagoda in the Tank, very close to the wall, to core the working party in the breaching battery; and to prevent the enemy from opening the sluice, which a man was discovered attempting to do.

In the afternoon, the Garrison was actively employed in forming retrenchments and traverses upon the towers, and curtain, opposite to our batteries.

# 13th, at Night.

At sun-set, the working party was assembled for completing the batteries, as below.

80 Europeans, 100 Sepoys, 200 Pioneers.

This evening, the Senior Engineer mude a close reconsolusces of the rangent and dick, near the intended breach; the dick was seen to be dry, and the wall of a monoth and britle species of granite. Having soon discovered him, the energy directed muskery and grape towards the spot where the reconsoluscent was made, and prevented any forther observations in that quarter. About 11 o'clock at night, the breaching battery was completed, platforms hid, and

CHAP, the guess brought up, for the purpose of being III. rnu in. The cnflading battery was finished 1818. about 4 in the morning, and both of them armel and equipped before daylight.

May the 14th and 15th.

At sun-rise, both batteries opened upon the Fort, the breaching battery firing occasionally in salvos, and bringing down largo fragments of the wall. The breach was ucarly practicable at noon, but the Garrison sent out a Vakcel to treat for a surreader. The terms proposed were agreed to, and on the following day about 8 o'clock the place was in our possession.

#### ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Lieutenant A. Grant, Madras Engineer, Commanding.

- , Ainsworth, H.M. 34th Regt. Acts. Engineer.
- " Wahab, Rifle Corps, do. slightly wounded,

### ORDNANCE.

- 2 Iron eighteen-pounders.
- 3 Iron twelve-pounders.
- 3 Brass twelve-pounders.
- S Brass six-pounders.
- 3 Eight-inch Moriars.
- 1 Five-and-a-half-inch Mortar.
- 3 Ditto Howitzers.

The amount of casualties in the assault of the Pettah, and during the siege, was 97, of all ranks, killed and wounded; among the latter, 4 officers.

About 40 guns, swivels, and ginjals, were found on the ramparts.

### ATTACK OF SHOLAPOOR.

The Force baving halted one day after the CHAP. fall of the place, marched in the direction of UL Nipaunee, on the morning of the 17th.

## REFLECTIONS.

The Commanding Engineer's reasons for attacking Sholapoor on the South front have been mentioned in the Journal; and the surrender of the Fortress, before the breach was oracticable, affords a reasonable presumption that the Garrison thought the part attacked indefensible; but although this fact alone may appear conclusive of the propriety of selecting it for the attack, it cannot be denied, that the besiggers would have had many obstacles to surmonnt, if the Garrison had determined to wait an assault. The breaching battery, which was our most advanced post, was placed in the bed of the Tank, and the troops, in marching from thence to attack the breach, must have made a considerable detonr of some hundred yards, and would have been exposed to a heavy fire, till they reached the counterscarp. It may, nerhaus, have been intended, if the Garrison had continued to hold out, to push on approaches across the intermediate space, but the besieged, in all probability, would then have been able to retrench, or cut off the breach, before these approaches could have been completed. The Journal does not state in what way the

CRAFT, dicki, was to be crossed, if the enery had deter-11. mined to defend the breach. The retaining wall, the dicki, in represented to have been very thin, and as it was commanded by the whole of the South front, a passage by it along the top, sere if andiciently bread, would have been difficult and hazardons. As the plan does not shew the depth of either scarp or constrencery, it is of come impossible to promounce on the fassibility of a passage across the ditch in any other way.

> With the means possessed by the besieging force, the point of attack was undoubtedly well chosen, and that where success was most likely to be obtained; for the ditch there was dry, and the necessary time could not probably have been spared to make a passage across a wet one. even if the means had been sufficient for the operation, and if the besiegers had accomplished a lodgement on the glacis; but the weakest point of the Fort, and which with means more respectable, the Engineer would perhaps have chosen in preference for his attack, appears to be the North-West angle, where (if the Plan, which is on a very small scale, is correct) the wall of the Pettah, which is indefensible, and which, in this instance, was in our possession, gives a ready-made approach to the edge of the counterscarp ; and where a descont into.

## ATTACK OF SHOLAPOOR.

The former might have been commenced from behind the Pettah wall, where it terminates on the counterscarp, opposite the North-West angle, and the latter might have been placed some distance in rear. It might, perhaps, have been necessary to destroy a part of the glacis, which is described as covering all but eight feet of the rampart of the body of the place, by mines, to enable the guns of the breaching battery to bear sufficiently low; but no parallel, or trenches, would have beeu required, as the Pettah wall would have afforded sufficient cover for the troops; and, as the soil is said to have been favorable, a few days, with sufficient means, would have brought these operations to a termination.

### CHAPTER IV.

SIEGE OPERATIONS OF LIEUT.COLONEL M'DOWALLS DNTACHMENT, AND OP LIEUT.COLONEL ADAMS'S DI-VISION.-RAIDEIR-TRINBUCK.-MALLIGAUM-CHANDA.

IT has been already stated, that after the Army of the Deckan was broken up in March, 1818, the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, which had formed the second Division, was employed

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CHAP. in the purshit of the Peishwah, who had moved IV, to the Eastward towards Nagpoor; while a delists, tachnean from it was formed to reduce that Prince's Fortresses in Klandesh. It was commanded by Lieutenan-Colonel M-Dowall, and was composed as follows:

> 2 Companies of His Majesty's Royals. 3 Companies of the Madrus European Regiment. The 1st Batt. 2d Regiment Madras N. Infantry. 4 Companies of the 2d Batt. 13th Regt. N. Infantry.

This small force, amounting to about 1000 firelocks, was supplied with the lattering train of the first, secoud, and thrite Divisions of the twi- Army of the Deckan. The Sappers and Muers, amounting to 300 mer, and five companies of Pioneers, were also attached to it, for the furtherance of the particular service about to be mudertaken.

Liest. Colorel M'Dowall's Deinclosent arrives before Uskye Tunkye.

The detectionest nucleid from throughtom: hood of Auroughtod on the soft of Marsh, and arrived before Unkye Tunkye, the farst in the line of Portesses, which it was intended to reduce, on the 3d of April. These Fortresses are situated in the range of monutarius, which form the Southern boundary of Klanndesh, and which drived enth Porvince from the Gongthora, (a district so called, from lying between the Gouge on Godavery River and these hild); and as the general features are the same in all, it as the general features are the same in all, it may not be considered nairs before meter-

## HILL FORTS DESCRIBED.

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ing on the particulars of the operations carried CHAP. on, to attempt a description of these extraordinary Works of Nature.

The reader must imagine a series of hills, rising very abruptly from 600 to 1100 feet above General the plain, and only connected with each other, fin of the and with the range of which they form part, by in the very low and narrow uccks of land ; and he must Keanlesh further imaging occasional bluff rocks, perfectly perpendicular, and varying in height from 80 to 100 feet, to rise from the summit of these hills. The range is evidently primitive, and the rocks which rise from them in this manner, basaltic, being so beautifully and regularly scarped, as to assume the appearance of having been formed by the chisel ; and the number of them scattered throughout this range, which is much greater than could be required for the defence of the country, is the only fact, which makes the supposition of their having been formed by art incredible; for the excavation of the ditches at Dowlatabad, out of the same species of granite rock, is a proof of what difficulties the persoverance of the Natives of India is capable of surmonating.

Those hills, which contain water on their summit, have been fortified by the Natives, in periods of the most remote antiquity, for there is no record of their first occupation; and the space contained within the rocky scarp before

CHAP, described, which often assumes a very fantastic 15 form, such as only could have been traced hy the hand of nature, constitutes the interior of 1818 the Fort. There is seldom any work raised on them, or indeed any thing done, farther than to cut flights of steps out of the solid rock, and to construct a number of gateways over them; and great ingenuity has been exerted to render these as intricate as possible. Nothing is necessary, but a determined Garrison to render such positions perfectly impregnable. Fortanately for us, this latter requisite was wanting, and Unkye Tunkye set an example, which was Uskys Tankye surrenders generally followed, of surrendering without opposition, the Killedar being intimidated by the determined language held out to him. Plate IX exhibits a view of this singular Fortress.

> On the 7th of April, the Detachment marched from Unkyer Tunkye by the Clanadore paus to Rajdeir, a Fortress situated a few miles to the Northward of Chandore. As the Garrison refused to surrender, on the aunmons which had been despatched with the reconnoitring party, the force took up its ground for the siege, in the valley, which lies to the South-East of the Fort.

The Fortress of Rajdeir, like those I have Descipation attempted to describe, is formed by nature, being simply an inaccessible rock, on the sum-Parase Number of a very high and steep hill, with no works

### DESCRIPTION OF RAJDEIR.

hat such as have been constructed for the de- CHAP. fence of the gateway (a), which is judiciously placed on the South side, in a re-entering an- 1818 gle of the natural scarp; and the pathway to it, after reaching the Eastern angle, runs immediately under the rock, exposed to stones and other missiles from above. The hill itself, on which the Fort stands, is so steep as to be inaccessible on the North and West sides, and is nearly so on a great part of the South side. On the Eastern side, a level space of small width juts out from the angle of the Fort. to the distance of 330 vards, where the descent, to the plain begins, and the extremity of this peninsula (if it may be so called), had been occupied by the garrison, and the extremity of it at (c) appeared to be fortified by au advanced work, for the further defence of this, the easiest ascent to the Fort. The side of the hill between this point (the clevation of which is 1100 feet) and the plain below, is broken at intervals into two steps, or flat ledges, the ascent to each of which is extremely steep and difficult. The valley in which the British camp was placed, continues round the South side of the Fort, and a small stream which runs through it, divides Rajdcir from the Fortress of Indrye, a place exactly similar. and considered a dependency of Rajdeir. The lowest of the two ledges I have described, as

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1818

work (c), after encircling the East side of the hill of Raideir, turns to the Northward, and continues to run alous the side of another hill (c) opposite to Raideir, but not of equal height, which forms the boundary of the valley to the Northward. On the top of this ledge, where the two hills meet, in a sort of hollow way, or chasm, formed by the sides, is a Bheel village (See Plate X).

Their Engibett's eronit ce tilor Nu-

The Engineer, in reporting to the Commanding Officer the result of his reconnoissance, declared his opinion, that, from the great natural strength of this rock, a Garrison of 200 determined men, supplied with the requisite provisions, &c. might bid defiance to the largest and best appointed army; and that its fall must therefore depend on some fortunate occurrence. which might infinidate the Garrison into a surrender " But although this be my opinion." the Eugineer continued. " I am far from cou-" sidering that it should prevent our under-" taking its reduction : for if to instify the attack " of any particular Fortress, it were considered " necessary that we should be able to calculate " on success beyond a doubt, such is the in-" efficiency of our means in this Department in " India, that not a siege could be undertaken; " it therefore appears to use, that as long as " this deficiency exists, we must trust for suc-" cess in our siege operations to good fortune,

#### ATTACK OF RAJDEIR.

" as we have hitherto done, applying in the CHAP. " best manner possible, the means in our pos-" session."

Under this view the following plan was proposed.

#### PROJECT OF ATTACK.

The whole of the heavy guns, mortars, and howitzers to be placed at once in position, at the point  $\vec{F}$ .

Under the protection of the fire of this hattery, the point of the hill (c) above and overlooking the Bheel village, and the point (g) on the uppermost of the two ledges of Rajdeir Hill, to be occupied immediately, and the parties to intreach themselves.

When these positions have been taken possession of, our fire to be concentrated on the advanced work ( $\phi$ ), and the works of the Fort defanding the galeway ( $\phi$ ), which may make the enemy request terms, but if they continue resolute, exertions to be made to establish a battery on the point of the hill ( $\phi$ ), and the rest to depend on circumstances.

### ATTACK OF RAJDEIR.

### April 11th.

At 7 A. M. the detachment took up its ground before the Fort, and the whole of the materials and intrenching tools collected for the siege, were haid ont at the Engineer dep<sup>6</sup>t.

CRAP. In consequence of its being impossible to get W. the heavy gues monted, so as to commoney 1818. operations at once, any proposed, it was deened 1818 desirable to occupy the point of the hill (*j*) without delay, especially as the eneury altered a disposition to do so themselves. A company of Native Industry, and the attropean Officer, accompanied by an Officer of Engineers, with a working party, and the requisite materials.

moved from eamp in the evening, occupied this point, and by 11 o'clock of the same night, a lodgement was formed there, with the loss of only one man, a Pioneer, wounded.

The ground at (F) was likewise prepared during the night, for receiving 4 heavy guns, 3 mortars, and 4 howitzers.

# April 12th.

The above ordnance was, at dxy-light, in position at (F), ready to open, so as to cover the advance of the column to occupy the point (g), which it did without opposition. The column was accompanied by materials for the formation of a lodgement, but this the natural cover afforded by the ground, rendered mnecessary.

Being in possession of the point (g) an opportunity was afforded of ascertaining the exact strength of the advanced work (c). It was found to be by no means strong, and as the greater part of the enemy had withdrawn into

### ATTACK OF RAJDEIR.

the body of the place, and as it was assortained (CIAP, to be praticable to conver light contance to 1<sup>11</sup>). that point, by taking the carringes to pieces, 1818, and carrying them up by hand, it was deternined to attack this work, as soon as the necessary preparations were made, and to estoblish a battery on its reverse, at (0, b) consist of 3 sixpounders, 2 threand-shalf-inch howitzers, and 1 firs-and-shalf-inch mortar.

The following were the arrangements for carrying the advanced work (c), and for forming the battery.

The party on the point ( $\phi$ ) was sugmented to 120 Sepoys ; a detachment of Sappers and Miners, with scaling ladders, under an Eagineer Officer, was attached to it; and they were directed to occupy the point (d), on the opposite side of the bollow way, or chasm, and to remain there, under cover, until the signal for the advance was made.

The party at (g) consisted of 170 Europeaus and 80 Natives. To it were attached 2 Engineer Officiers, and the romainder of the Sappers and Miners, with a working party of 100 Pioneers, and 200 Dooly Bearers, carrying 100 gabions and 3000 sand bags.

While the above arrangements were in progress, an incessant fire from F was kept up on the advanced work (c), and when all was ready, the signal was made, and the columns CHAP: of attack, headed by the Sappers and Miners, <u>IV</u>: advanced with the greatest regularity, and, at 1818. the same moment, got possession of the advanced work.

> The working party immediately commenced to adogment at  $(d_i)$  within 269 yards of the Fort and as seen as it becaute durk, the sume may exemployed, with 100 additional Fionerra, in completing this logment, and in converting part of it into the intraded battery to its ponder gun was brought up by hand, by mine o'clock n,  $m_i$  and the battery would have been ready to open at  $dn^{-1}_{int}$  it, but the energy surreadered at clerce, and thus put a step to any further proceeding:

### ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Lientenant Davics, Commanding Engineer. Ensign Nattes, Staff.

- " Purton.
- " Underwood.
- " Lake.

STORES, &c.

1000 Sand Bags.

180 Gabions.

40 Fascines.

And sufficient intrenching tools for the use of the Sappers and Miners.

#### ATTACK OF RAJDEIR.

# ORDNANCE. CHAP.

2 Eighteen-pounder Iron Guns. 2 Twelve-pounder ditto. 97 CHAP. IV. 1818.

8 Six-pounders.

2 Eight-inch Mortars.

1 Five-and-a-half-inch Mortar.

2 Eight-inch Howitzers.

2 Five-and-a-half-inch ditto.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Eighteen-pound Shot			. 90
Twelve-pound ditto .			. 41
Eight-inch Shells			 . 38
Five-and-a-half-inch	ditte	, ,	. 2
Gunpowder, lbs			200

The immediate cause of the surrender of the Fortress, was a quarrel which took place in the Garrison, briginating in the Brahmin Killedar's refusal to pay to the families of three men who had been killed, the arrears of pay due to them. In revenge for this, the Garrison sct fire to his house, and the manner in which the flames spread, alarmed them so much, that they were induced to capitulate. Our bold and resolute advance must also have had its effect in intimidating them, and an inspection of the Fort after its capitulation, gave us ample cause for congratulation on its early surrender. The scarp of the rock is in general 120 feet in height, and the entrance to it from below, is similar to that of the famed Dowlatabad, being flights of steps cut in the inside of the rock, with occaCHAP, sional openings, through which stones can be IV. pourcd from above, and the top is closed by an INI. iron grating, intended to receive a fire. Our loss was very triffing, seven men only being wonneled.

Indry, Indry, Doorss, and several other Forts Views and State and State and State and State and Views and State and State and State and State and Networks for the several several several several several Networks, principal ones, but it is unnecessary, and it would be tedious, to repeat the description which has been already given, and which apubics could be a several to all.

Was interferent and interferent in the second se

The Net The Detachment marched from Nassuck on market the 24 of April, and halter half way between proceeded to reconsolite the Fort, and to carry a summous for its surreader. As the reconnoiring party approached the Pethal of Trinhuck, the energy rescueded it, and opcored a for from the gaus on the North side of the Fort, which were numerous and well served; and they afterwards made a sally on the party, but were immediated wires the sale. A reconsolite

> sance was the same evening effected of the gateway on the Sonth, that is on the contrary side

### ATTACK OF TRIMBUCK.

of the Fort, and at a considerable distance from CHAP. the Pettah.

510

The extent of this Fort, as bounded by the 1010 rocky scarp which defends it, is not less than Descripfive miles, and the stupendous appearance of the of the the place is much increased by some very high Trimboth. hills, which occupy a great part of its interior PLATE area. The scarp, which varies in height from xin. two to four hundred feet of perpendicular rock, surrounds the hill in every part, and leaves only the gateways as assailable points. Trimbuck has two gateways. That on the South side is the principal one, of easiest ascent, and is that by which the Garrison admit their provisions and stores; that on the North side is only a single gate, the passage to which is by narrow steps, cut out of the rock, and only wide enough for one person to ascend at a time. The head of this passage is defended by two towers, connected by a curtaiu, in which is the gateway. The height of the hill is not so great on the North as on the South side, but it rises more abruntly, and the ascent is steeper.

Besides the gateways, there are a few towers and works on different parts of the hill, but their position appears to have been dictated by caprice, rather than with any view to the graster security of the Fortress. The magazines and almost all the houses of the Garrisos are excavations in the rock. At the foot of the scarp,

### STEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

### PROJECT OF ATTACK.

The Commanding Engineer recommended an attack on the North gate, for the following reasons-

First: That although the ascent to it was more difficult, than to the South gate, there was on the other hand but one line of works to destroy; a point of great consequence, as we had only six-pounders with which to effect a breach, it being impossible to carry guns of a heavier ealibre up the hill on either side.

Secondly: On account of the advantages offered by the ruined village at the foot of the searp, in constructing batteries, and giving cover to the troops, and by the Pettah of Trimluck, at the bottom of the bill.

Thirdly: The road leading to the Sonth side of the Fort was impracticable for guns, nor were the means, possessed by the besieging force, sufficient to overcome this obstacle; in addition to which the enemy had poisoned all the wells on that side.

#### ATTACK OF TRIMBUCK.

The following was the plan of states. To ensure since the first of the energy regums parcicularly <u>10</u>, those which hore on the rained villags, and for this purpose, to erect a hattery at the bettom of the hill on the Northern side of it (at A), for parcel the hill on the Northern side of it (at A), for parcel occupy, and form a lodgement, in the village, at the foot of the North gate (at B), and in it to erect a batter for 6 wiscponders, to batter the gateway; and to earry the guas up to it hy hand, as lual before been precision at Rajdoir.

At this short distance, about 100 yands, it was hoped that the towers, and certain at the gateway, might be demolished, and that the troops might advance to the storm of the breach, under cover of the fire of the batteries, and of musketry, from the post in the village; at all events, that a lodgment, so immediately under the gateway, might have the effect of alarming the Garrison, and inducing them to surrender.

In order to cut off all hopes from the energy of effecting their escape by the Sonth side, and to distract their attention, 2 six-pounders, and a howitzer, were to be detached, and established as high up the hill, and as near to the Sonth gate, as the nature of the ground would allow.

ATTACK OF TRIMBUCK.

April 23d.

At eight, A. N. the detachment took up its

CHAP. ground before the Fort, and the whole of the <sup>IV</sup>, intrenching tools and materials, collected for 1818, the siege, were immediately earried to the spot chosen for the Enzineer depth; in the Pettah.

> At four p, x, a detachment of 50 Europeans, So Selencies, and 10 Blores, with x is r-pounders, marched from camp to take up a position opposite to the Soath gateway. They were accompanied by a working party, under an Offero of Engineers, ecousisting of a small detail of Suppers and Miners, 30 Pionesry, and 50 Dooly bearesrs, provided with 40 q2bions, and 3000 sand bags. A battery for the troops, were constructed during the inity, within 500 yards of the gateway and one of the gauss was earried up, and placed in battery by day-light.

A working party for the operations on the North side, was ordered to parale at an-aet, at the Engineer depth, of the following strength: inal the express of Sappers and Miners, 50 Enroppenas, 80 Pioneers, 100 Dooly beavers, and nbont 100 Laesers, Re. As soon as it was dusk, the battery and place of arms (A) were PLALER liaid out; and when it became dark, the working partyadramed, and commenced operations. The ground, on which this work was formed, unofrumthy proved to be a hed of rock, a

\* Irregular or Provincial troops,

### ATTACK OF TRIMBÜCK.

At twelve v. N. the relief for the working party arrived in the remeak-size, the remaining half of the Sappers and Miners, 60 Sepoys, 400 Pioneers, and 200 Doly basers; but as it was necessary to earry the earth for the hattery from a distance, woing to the recky matter of the ground, which of course delayed in completion considerably, it was deemed alwisablenot to relieve the old working party, but to keep hoth at work; and we were thus enabled, by great labour, to complete the works a little border delyfight, and to get 4 heavy guns, 2 night-inch mortars, and 2 sight-inch howitzers into battery.

The enemy, during the night, fired occasionally on the working party, from their different guns, but no casualties occurred.

April 24th.

The battery opened at daylight, and with great effect, so that in three hours the enemy's CHAP. guns were all silenced; and it was found on IV. reconnoitring it, that they had evacuated the

reconnoiring it, that they had chicanad inc

1818. Officer to attempt a lodgement there at mid-day, instead of waiting till hight, as had been originally intended; and the working and covering parties for this service, were ordered to hereally parade at 12 a. M. in care of the work (A). The

working party consisted of the Sappers and Miners, 80 Pioneers, and 100 Dooly bearers, under two Engineer Officers, and they were provided with 100 gabions and 2000 saud bags.

From some misconception of orders, however, the covering party consisting of this Majesty's Royals, and the 1st Battahino of the 1sth. Regiment of Madras Native Infantry, advanced three quarters of an hour before the time ordered, and before the working party were ready; and induced of remaining quiet under the cover, which the walls and houses of the gateway, and the bluff rock, 200 feet in perpendicular beight.

The Europeans, who (in checkingere to the orders of the OBGere community gives a product share the inspreticable attempt, were the anno rece who had failed at Nageour, and the blind courage they viniced, showed that they did sot, on this occasion, meth consider that "in ond-' varianges wood the pained by going forward;" the neason arsigned by Colonel Blacker, as the cause of their hesistation on the breach as Nageour.

### ATTACK OF TRIMBUCK.

The enemy immediately opened a very heavy CHAP. fire, of ginjals, rockets, and matchlocks, on the village, and rolled down large stones on the 1918 assailants. Consequently, when the working party arrived, they in vain attempted to establish themselves : and as our battery discontinned firing at this time, owing to the Artillery men being completely worn out, by twelve hours' incessant labour, without a relief ; the working party were obliged to retire with some loss behind the walls of the village till night. when a battery for 4 six-pounders was completed. April 24th.

This advanced position, together with that on the South side, had the desired effect, for at six A. M. the Killedar expressed a wish to treat. and the Garrison were allowed to march out with their arms and private property.

## ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Lieutenant Davies, Commanding Engineer. Ensign Nattes (Staff).

Purton.

Underwood.

Lake ( severely wounded ).

European Sappers and Miners . . . . . 27 

### STORES, &c. Sand Bags . . . 8000

Gabions . . . . 260 Fascines . . . .

Intrenching tools sufficient for the use of the Sappers and Miners.

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

### ORDNANCE.

CHAP. IV.

1 14 X 10 W.

2 Eighteen-pounder Iron Guns.

2 Twelve-pounder ditto.

8 Six-pounders.

2 Eight-inch Mortars.

2 Five-and-a-half-inch ditto.

2 Eight-inch Howitzers.

2 Five-and-a-half-inch ditto.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Eighteen-pound Shot			254
Twelve-pound ditto .			66
Eight-inch Shells			un
Five-and-a-half-inch S			40
Gunpowder, Ibs			2200

#### REFLECTIONS.

The reputation of Trimbuck for strength, was deservedly greater than that of any of the Forts, with which this constry abounds, and being considered as a place of peculiar sauctity, from containing within its walls the source of the Godavery, one of the most sacred of Hindoo Biyers, an obstinate resistance was anticipated. The Garrison, indeed, did not seem deficient in judgment, for the practice of their ordnance (of which they had seventeen pieces mounted), was very good, and they moved them about to different points, in a mapper which showed that they knew where they could be most effective. During the course of the onerations, they constructed a battery for two guns on the South side of the Fort, which enfiladed

#### TRETANDEDN POSLIC LIBRARY

### ATTACK OF TRIMBUCK.

our entreachment on that side, and rendered it GHAP, necessary to give it a shoulder, and to open an UV, embrawner for a gun to keep them in check. 1818. The buildings were so few, and the place so extensive, that our bombardment had but little effect.

The plan of attack was the best, or rather the only one, that could be adopted, but had the Garrison resisted with firmness, success could scarcely have been anticipated. The old village itself, if occupied by the enemy, could not have been carried without a great sacrifice of lives ; after the capture of which, even if the light ordnance employed had succeeded in destroying the tower and gateway, still greater obstacles remained to be overcome. For the storming party must have advanced by a flight of steps, so very steep, that in many places it requires a man to climb them by the assistance of both his hands, and at the same time so narrow, that there is not room for two persons abreast. Under such circumstances, stones rolled from above would have sufficed to baffle the assailants.

It is difficult to account for the want of resolution displayed, in the defence of this impregnable Fortress. The reasons for it must be sought, in the effect produced on the minds of the Garrison, by our rapid advances to the foot of the scarn, and by seeing their seque pre-

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CRAF reacted by the works on the South side. The We absence of their Prince, at this time a fugitive surrounded by British Armies, and the extreme improbability of his ever returning to his own dominions, must also have produced nu unfavorable effect on the spirit of the Carrison, and prevented then from attempting a more protracted resistance. Severence outber Forsfell on the surrender of Trimbuck, and the whole of this country, perhaps the strongest in the world, cause into our bands in a few weeks, almost without a struggle.

> In contemplating such pusillaninous conduct, even on the part of our enemics, it is difficult to repress a feeling somewhat resembling disappointment. The idea unavoidably arises, that nature intended these hills for other men, and other deeds. She seems to have marked them out as a theatre, on which the battles of freedom and independence might be successfully fought: for amongst them the undisciplined and half-armed Native would be on a par with the most skilful and experienced veterau ; and even in the stories which cover these nature has furnished abundant arms for their defence. If these ideas, and the stern character of the scenery, which gave rise to them, seem little consonant with the habits and dispositions of the Natives, it should be remembered, that even in India the assertors of liberty have been

#### REFLECTIONS ON THE HILL FORTS.

found; and that it was from these very hills, CHAP. that Sevajec first endeavoured to break the iron bonds, in which his countrymen were held 1818 by Annungzebe. It was amongst these hills, that his enterprises were planned, and from them, that his " living cloud of war was poured forth." It was here, that he laid the foundation of that Power, which in after times retaliated, upon the fallen Emperor of Delhi, the injuries, which the intolerant spirit of that Prince's succestors had inflicted on the Hindoo world : and here, the last Mahratta Sovereign might have made an effectual struggle for independence : but the spirit was wanting, with which the great founder of the tribe had armed his people for eouquest. Thirty Fortresses, cach of which, with a Sevaiee as a master, would have defied the whole Anglo-Indian Army, fell unresistingly in a few weeks; and this vast Mahratta Empire, which had overshadowed the East, and before which the Star of the Mogul had become pale, was destined to furnish in its turn, another great example of the vicissitudes of fortune; and of the justability of the mightiest thrones, the foundations of which are not laid in the affections of the people.

Here it may not be amiss to notice an attempt Trim made by the notorious Trimbuckiee, about attempts two months afterwards, to retake Trimbuck Trimbuck by surprise. A Garrison, composed of a few mee-

#### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP, men of the 13th Madras Native Infantry, com-V. manded by a Subadar, had been left in the 1818. Fortress, and the sentries at the North gate, in

the dask of the morning in question, were requested to admits some people, who professed themselves to be pilgrims, withing to pay their devotions at the Pagoda, which is built over the source of the Goldavery. They were admitted without suspicion, but before the whole sentires, who contrived to close the gates, but at the expense of this life. The Garrison was immediately alarmed, and succeeded in overpowering the few who had gained admittance, while the enzemside of steps, leading to the North gate, suffered severaly from the stones which were thrown upone them from above.

Proceedings after the capture of

After the fail of Trimbuck, the season scenared to for advanced to advait a hope of being able to continue operations, and Lient.-Coloued M'Dovall prepared to take up a position for the monsoon, in the neighbourhood of Chaslong-while the Engineer Department moved to Nassnek, preparatory to proceeding to Boubay, where it was sintended to try, during the approaching rains, some experiments in pootooring, suggested by Lieutenan Davies, he Commanding Engineer, but the policical Autorities desened to disput and the policical Au-

#### DESCRIPTION OF MALLIGAUM.

footing in Khandesh (the greater part of which C11Ar.) province was in possession of the Arabo, be. <sup>1V.</sup> fore the monscom set in ; and the Detachment 1818. accordingly marched for Malligaum, before which place they arrived on the 16th of May, the Engineer Department having rejoined them, by forced marches, on the preceeding day.

Thestrength of the Detachment at this period, several isolution gas best and those wounded at Time . Cannot huck, probably amounting to 50, was as follows : where the several several several several several file Majesty's Royal Scots . . . . 100 Rank & File meaning Madres Europeon Regiment . . . . 90 July 20 Bat. 100 Regiment . . . . 90 July 20 Bat. 100 Regiment . . . . . 90

Forming a Total of . . . . . 983

But the effective strength of the Detachment must have been below 950 firelocks. There were besides 270 Pioneers, and a small detail of European Artillery, barely sufficient to furnish the necessary reliefs for the batteries.

The Fortress of Maliguan is situated on the "the " field bank of the Kirer Moassum, a little above kinetic its junction with the Glitma. The river, which at the counseccencent of the singer, was every where forthable, runs under the West, and round a great part of the. North and South sides. The Fort consists of three distinct lines of works, with a ditch in front of the middle line. The body of the Place is an exact square of 120 yards, finalked by a round

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP tower at each angle, and one in the centre of each side. The middle line, which is a kind of 1818, faussebray, is also quadrangular, running parallel to, and at a short distance from. the inner work : but assuming an oblong shape, from the distance between them being greater on the East, than on the other sides. The outer line is of an irregular form, running parallel to the body of the Place on the West side only ; and extending to some distance on the other sides, where it embraces a large space of ground. It is strengthened throughout its whole extent, by round towers, at irregular intervals. Towards the East, and also on part of the Northern side of the Fortress, there is an additional line of works, formed of mud, but old and much decayed, between the ditch of the faussebray, and the onter line that has been described. It extends from the South-East angle of the ditch, as far as the works of the gateway on the Northern side, with which it is connected. The interior line and faussebrav are built with stone, and of excellent masonry; and so is the outer line on the South side, and towards the River, but those parts of it, which face towards the Pettah, are of mud. and somewhat decayed.

> The height of the inner wall, measuring to the top of the parapet, is 60 feet: the thickness of the parapet at top is 6 feet, and the breadth of

#### DESCRIPTION OF MALLIGAUM.

the terreplein 11 feet, making the total thick- CHAP, ness of the rampart at top 17 feet.

The breadth of the space between the body 1818 of the Place and the faussebray, on part of the North, and on the West and South sides, is about 40 feet, of which 10 feet are appropriated to stabling. The roof of these stables, which is 10 feet high, forms the terrepleiu of the faussebray, and is surmounted by a parapet of 5 feet. Thus the faussebray is 15 feet high interiorly, but exteriorly the scarp of that work is 40 feet in extreme height, including the depth of the ditch, which is for the greater part out of the solid rock, immediately below the scarp revenuent of the fanssebray, without an intervening berm. This revetment is 5 feet thick. The width of the ditch is 25 feet : its depth varies, but is greatest on the river front, where it is 25 feet. The space between the counterscarp and the exterior line of works varies, as was before mentioned. It is least on the West side, where it is only 60 feet, and greatest on the East side, where it is 300 feet wide. The height of the outer line of works is 14 or 15 feet, the thickness of its parapet being 3 feet, and that of its rampart varying from 10 feet, on the West and South sides, to 14 feet on the East side, of the Fort.

The gateways are nine in number, very intrieate, and all containing excellent bombproofs.

CHAP The outer ones are on the North, the inner ones on the Eastern side. The Fortress is much IV. ىنىت weakened, on this last mentioned side, by the 1818. Pettah, which extends to within close musket shot of the outer line of works. But the Pettah itself is capable of defence, as it contains a great many strong and lofty buildings; an old decayed rampart surrounds the greater part of it, and, on the present oceasion, the Garrison had barricaded all the cutrances into it, with large beams of timber. Besides the disadvantage of the Pettah running so close to the works, the defences of the Fort arc further impaired by a village, called Sumnaree, situated on the left bank of the river, nearly opposite to the outer gate of the Fort, which communicates with the Pettah. A thick grove of mango trees, 400 yards in depth, also runs along the same bank of the river opposite to the South-West angle. The country is perfectly flat to a considerable distance around the Fort. The soil on the left bank of the river is a black mud, about one foot in depth, resting on a white sandy rock, soft and easily worked at the surface, but increasing in hardness in proportion to its depth. The opposite bank of the river is entirely a shelving rock covered with loose sand, in many places to some depth. The Fort is said to have been built about sixty years, and the works to have been loopholed by an Eugineer, who came from Delhi for

### ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

the purpose. The Garrison, from the best infor- CHAP, mation that could be collected, was estimated, <u>IV</u>, when we arrived before the place, at 700 men. <u>INFR</u>

In the reconnoissance which the Engineers made, the Garrison allowed them to ride along the right bank of the river, immediately opposite the Fort, without interruption, as some negociations were going on at the time, and thus a good view was obtained of the defences of the inner and outer lines, on the South and West sides ; but nothing could be seen of the ditch or fanssebray, the existence of which was only known from the reports of the Natives, who all differed in their accounts of the situation and dimensions of these works, describing the faussebray merely as a range of stabling. Very little could be ascertained regarding the strength of the Fort on the East and North side, as the Garrison occupied the Pettah, and the village of Sumnaree,

### PROJECT OF ATTACK.

From the limited information which was thus obtained, the Commanding Engineer recommended in a ppreach from the right bank of the river, against the South-West angle, for the following reasons; First, because in order to attack the East front, it would be necessary to earry the Pettah, which in all probability could so the effected, without suffering such loss as would eripple our future oparations. Secondly,

#### 116 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP. the same objections existed to an attack on the

IV. North side, and to the Southward the ground 1818, on the left bank of the river was too confined for the necessary operations. Thirdly, that the

ground on the right bank of the river was the most favorable for the construction of the necessary works.

The following was the plan he proposed; to construct the hatterics (1) and (2) in the prolongation of the West and South faces, and at the distance of about 500 yrafe from them, in order to destroy the defances of those fronts, and to enfihilde them. Each hattery to have guns, besides which. No. 1 hattery was to be aread with 2 morts and 3 howingst for 500 harding the plase. A parallel (B) for 200 um was to be constructed the same neight, in the mange grove, between these two enfialsing batteries.

From the parallel (b) he proposed to advance by the zigrags B C D E F, to the bank of theiriver, along which the second parallel was to be established, and on its right flank the breaching battery (3) for 4 guns. This was to be armed with the same guns, which were to be withdrawn from the batteries (1) and (2), as soon as the defences of the Fort were runned.

The bottom of the revetments of the towers (y) and (z), which were supposed to be of mud

### ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM. 11

faced with stone, to be loosened by the breach- CHAP. ing battery, for the purpose of enabling the Miners to form chambers for destroying them; 1918 and when this was effected, lodgments to be established in their ruins, and the intermediate curtain to be converted into a parallel; that portion of it, which was in the line of fire of the breaching battery, being levelled, in order that the bottom of the inner wall might be seen over it. From behind this lodgment, he proposed to sink a shaft, and working from thence, to blow in the counterscarp opposite to the enriain (f) which was to be breached; and he projected some further mining operations on that side, which were to ruin the scarp of the ditch, and to destroy one of the interior towers.

As much depended on confining the Garrison, he proposed that an establishment should be made opposite to the outer gate on the North side of the Fort, but it was necessary to postpone this till a reinforcement arrived.

# ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

May the 18th.

All the intreaching tools and materials collected for the singe, having been carried down at 5 r. m. to the Engineer Depót, which was established in even of the mango grove, the working particles for the night assembled. At dask the Engineers marked out the cafilading latteries (1) mad(2) about 500 yards distant 118

CHAP, from the South-West angle of the body of the Place, and in the prolongation of the South IV. 1818, and West faces. The former was intended for 2 eighteen-pounders, 2 eight-inch howitzers, and 2 eight-inch mortars: the latter for 2 twelvepounders. The parallel (B) about 200 yards in length, and 300 distant from the bank of the river, was also marked out. As soon as it was dark, the working partics filed off to their respective works, and commenced their operations. About eight P. M. the enemy made a sortie from their own left, along the bank of the river, and attacked the covering party posted in the grove, in front of the working party, constructing the parallel. This sortie was supported by a sharp fire from the guns in the Fort, and of matchlocks from the lower wall. The Arabs behaved with great gallantry, fighting from tree to tree, and were engaged hand to hand with a detachment of the Madras Enropean Regiment, who could not form line, owing to the nature of the ground, but who succeeded in repulsing them, after a short and sanguinary conflict, in which Lieutenant Davies, the Commanding Engineer, was unfortunately killed.\*

> \* This Officer has scarcely left his equal behind hiar in zeal, perseverance, and activity. His whole noul was devoted to the service. In the presence of an enouty, he almost denied himself the necessary support of food and sleep; no difficulty seemed to appal hum; and he carried the plans he

### ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

### May the 19th.

The batteries (1) and (2) opened on the Fort at day-light, the former with tolerable effect: but the truebe-pounders in the latter were found to make little or no impression on the defences of the inner Fort. The cancup returned the for from 7 or 6 gauss, of all callshres, from nine-pounders downwards, the greater part of which were diablest and alleveed by ourgann in the course of the morning. During the night, the greater of the morning. During the night, the greater of the morning, and particular dipolect of during, cover, and is small portion of the second parallel at the head of the igrags

had formed into execution with a courage and perseverance, which deserved success if they could not always command it. Whennot actively employed, his time was entirely given up to the study of his profession, and to the instruction of his little body of Sapaers and Miners: nor can higher proof of his merit be desired, than the proficiency attained by these men, during a period of active service, in duties entirely new to them. Having alluded in a former note to the reflections thrown out by a cotemporary writer, against his temper. I shall only add, that it was too often tried by the vexations opposition, which he experienced to his enlightened views. whilst endeavouring to place his Department on a more efficient footing. His brother Officers of the Corps of Eneineers have determined to creet a mountment to his memory. and to that of Lientenant Nattes, who fell shortly after, housing that this record of their estrem and uspect, whilst it perpetuates the names of those distinguished Officers, may also serve as an incitoment to others, to follow their example, and musicity their forme

OHAP. IV

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CIAP, were opened to protect the left flank of the L<sup>T</sup>, paralle. A battery for 2 six-pounders was lasg gardens were occupied. Atten P. m. the enemy made a wortio, to attack this post, but were required without loss on our part. The smallness of our force did not admit of our taking possession of the whole village.

# May the 20th.

The village (H) on our left, which had been deserted by the inhabitants during the night of the 19th, was occupied by a party of Arabs, who at 10 this morning made a hold attack ou our outposts, but were soon repulsed and driven out of the village by a charge of the Sepoys of the 13th Madras Native Infantry. under Captain Robson. The eighteen and twelve-poppders, in batteries (1) and (2) were fired but seldom, on account of a scarcity of shot. The approaches were completed to the proper width, and 2 six-pounders were placed in the battery at (F), to scour the river and destroy the defences of the lower work. During the night the parallel was extended, without loss, about 140 vards to the right, along the bank of the river, and at the distance of 150 yards from the exterior works of the Fort.

# May 21st.

The right of the parallel was extended 150 yards, along the bank of the river; and the

reaching battery (3), of four guns, was on: CHAP. varted at the distance of about 160 yards. To m the enemy's exterior line of works, on the statery, one contrar was placed, and at the exusers right a return was forned, for the protection of this finds of the trenches.

# May 22d.

The guns were brought up from the batteries (1) and (2), and were placed in the breaching battery after day-light, the enemy's fire being kept under by a continued fire of musketry from the trenches, and by the six-pounders placed at (F) on the left of the parallel, which enfiladed the South face of the exterior line of works. In prosccution of the proposed plan of attack, the battering guns opened immediately afterwards. for the purpose of destroying the defences of the lower work, and forming holes in the towers (y and z), for the Miners to lodge themselves. These towers, however, proved to be of solid stone and chunam, so that it appeared impossible to effect this object. Hence a change in the plan of attack became necessary, and it was therefore resolved to breach the lower wall, and form a lodement on its rampart.

From the arrival of a small reinforcement, we were enabled, during the night, to take possession of the village of Sumnaree, and the adjoining gradens, and to occupy a strong posi-

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP. tion (1) on the bank of the river, opposite to the IV. principal gateway of the Fort.

1818

On the right of this position, a small place of mans, and halter (q) der 2 six-pomders, were constructed, into which the grans from the hattery (G), which was about 170 yards in rera of this position, were brought np, and that battery was dismanuled. This new post, beside dhitracting the energy viaterionio, put as stop to the free ingress and egress, by the gateway, which hey hal dometry possessed; and consequently caused them to be more exposed to our sleds, than heretofrom

#### May 23d.

The bracking guns effected a good breach in the cartin of the lower vall, so as to discover a part of the fasseshersy. The ramparta the branch proved to narrow to admin of forming even a tolerable lodgment on it, and information led us to beliere that there was an cover between it and the ditch. It was there fore resolved to breach the fastespring and inner wall, by fring over the breach in the exterior work. During the day a five and-half-lack howitzer was placed in the lasttery (F), and interes some shells between the works, which annayed the energy much, and entirely keep lown their fire from the outer vall.

#### May 24th.

The breaching gons brought down the top

### ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

of the fanssebray, and commenced firing upon CHAP, the body of the place, as low as possible.  $IV_{,}$ About four P. M. a shell from battery (F) blew 1818, up a small powder magazine in the Fort.

### May 25th.

The breach was extended to the right and left. In the afternoon, the parapet and npper part of the revenuent fell down, in consequence of the lower part being ruined.

### May 26th.

At four P. M. the breaching guns succeeded in making a hole through the center of the curtain. The breaching battery was enlarged during the night, to receive a howitzer. This day the 17th Chicacole Light Infantry joined the Detachment.

### Moy 27th.

The battering continued with the eighteenpounders only, as the twelve pound shot were sepended. All the guns ran at the vent, in consequence of the continued firing, and land lisecome almost unserviceable. Al four 1-w, more of the upper part of the rampart field down, forming to all appearance an excellent breach. Guns were fired at intervals during the night to keen the breach clear.

## May 28/4.

The battering gnus were employed in cutting away the sides of the breach, so as to form an ascent on each side for mounting the rampart. CHAP. The breach was then reported practicable; and <sup>1V.</sup> it was determined to assault the Fort at day. ISIS light, next morning.\*

### ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ASSAULT.

Three simultaneous attacks were ordered to be made, on different sides of the place ; one on the Pettah, the second on the exterior line of works, and the third and principal one on the breaches. The first had for its main object the occupation of the Pettah, to prevent the escape of the Garrison into it, on the assault of the Fort. The second party were to take possession of the outer walls by escalade, between the great gate and the ditch, and to establish themselves there, and as it was supposed that they would be able to find cover and command the passage of the ditch, no difficulty was contenplated in effecting their lodgment. Both of these attacks it was hoped would distract the attention of the Garrison, and would enable us. if repulsed at the breach, to have recourse to extensive mining operations.

. The party for the attack of the Pettah con-

<sup>1</sup> Before the assant was faulty decided upon, the expridences of courses a todapaset on the neutrer brench, and of establishing a battery there against the inner works, had been discussed; but this measure was over-neich in cosmequence of the option of Liotensart Natter, who represented that these operators would probably be attached with as heavy a loss, as was likely to result from the immediate assant of the whole of the oxids on that aids.

sisted of 500 Sepoys, accompanied by 50 CHAP. Pioneers, not including the men who carried 5  $V_{\rm c}$ scaling ladders, the whole led by an Engineer 1818. Officer.

The party for the escalade of the outer wall consisted of 50 Europeans, 250 Sepoys, and 50 Pioneers, with 5 scaling ladders; and was also led by an Engineer Officer.

The storming party for the assault of the breach was led by Lientenant Nattes, the Commanding Engineer, and was composed of the European Sappers and Miners, and a Serjcant's narty of Europeans, each carrying besides his arms, a bundle of grass for filling up the ditch. They were followed by the Native Sappers and Miners with scaling ladders, 75 Europeans with hundles of grass, and 80 Sepovs: 125 Senovs were ordered to file to the right and left on passing the outer breach, and to scour the outer ramparts, taking possession of the huts hetwcen the walls. A reserve of 50 Europeaus and 300 Scpoys were to follow this party, and 'had orders also to extend to the right and left, if it should appear necessary; otherwise they were to remain under cover, without the exterior walls.

At seven o clock P. M. the several parties for the assault occupied the positions pointed out to them, in the vicinity of their respective attacks. The party for the breach remained

CIAP. during the night, in the breaching battery and V. adjoining parallel. That for the Pettah bi-ISIR. vonaccel on the left bank of the river, about 800 yards North of the Pettah. The party for the outer wall were stationed during the night in the gardens of the village of Sumaree.

## May 29th.

At half-past three 5. w. a briek fore from the breaching lattery (3), and from the mortur lattery (1), was directed against the horseh, and the space between the walks. At broad dayfight, the storming party advanced in the prescribed order. The Dagineer who led, on reaching the summit of the breads on the first wall, waved his hand to his party, the meaning of which it is impossible to accertain, as immediately afterwards he received several shots from a retreendencet (c) that half been constructed by the ensemy for the defence of the breach, by which was mortally wounded.

<sup>1</sup> Leisman Natter van alles Animkle tes an Offere, a Gentemm, and a Chrishen. With the seriesce and and, a wilde hoozee the military classate, he combined the winking of missare, the Bernh accomplements, and the varith of bernt, that constitute the ornamest and the bool of private life, together with these virtues, which are the finits at flasmess devision. Noting could be non-elimenticity and and maximum generity were based proceed, just as has only a for bours boffers he finds, he constituted in hongings to puper, in which we entry offer, which he honges.

#### ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

The Officer commanding the storwing party CHAP, afterwards mounted the breach, but on letting  $\underbrace{VV}_{1}$ down his scaling ladders, on the other side of  $\underbrace{1818}_{1818}$ , the wall, it is said that they all fell out of the men's hauds, who held them.

This eircumstance being reported, orders were given for the whole party to retreat to the trenches, which was effected in a steady manner. Immediately afterwards the Garrison hung out a flag of trace. that we might carry awa our dead and wounded.

Meanwhile the party for the attack of the Petithadvanced at aquartlevelor sam o' dock, took possession of a considerable part before adapting that the scene of the same of the possession of it, with a trifing loss. The other party did not excalled the outer wall of the Fort, as intended. There was some difficulty if first, in adjusting the length of the halders, and after this was rectified, a delay occurred, whils the Officer commanding the party was employed in posting sharpabooters to keep lown the came's first. Bother this was effected

that is deer parcents and some valued leienb would feel, in case of his fill, worthe only consideration, that weighted apon this mind, in sateligating the probability of sach as over. In regrated to his own feeldings, he concluded by quoting some energietic lines from an admixed modern Breitish Poet, expressing a decided performance is the dath of the warrier in battle, as constanted with the lingering illaress of a sick hed. CHAP, to his satisfaction, the failure of the storming IV. party at the breach became known, and the 1818, attempt was of eourse abandoned, having exnerinecad a trifling loss, in placing the ladders.

> During the night temporary barricades were constructed across the principal streets of the Pettah, upon which the enemy made several attacks, but was eonstantly repulsed.

# May the 30th.

After the failure of the assault on the Fort, it was recommended that the attack on the West side should be abandoned, for the following reasons. First, the total ward of guns and ammunition, the breaching guns having become unserviceable, and all the shot being expended. Secondly, the length of time that would probably elapse before the arrival of a reinforce ment of artillery. Thirdly, on account of the threatening state of the weather, and the expected approach of the monsoon, which might render the river an insurmountable obstacle to our operations on that side.

It was therefore proposed to commence as entirely new attack on the East face of the Fort, as the possession of the Pettah afforded our troops ample cover, and a safe approach, on that side, to the outer wall, the nature of which was now for the first time ascertained, as also a facility of mining, to which the river on the West side was an insurmountable obstach.

### ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM, 129

In order to confine the Garrison as much as CHAP possible, it was proposed to leave a battalion of Scpoys on the West side of the river, which 1818. might take up its quarters in the village (H). whence parties to be relieved occasionally might be sent to the post (1), and to a redout, which it was recommended to construct near the breaching battery. The streets of the Pettah, communicating with the Fort, to be barricaded, by which means an excellent parallel would be obtained, along the whole extent of that side of the Fort. It was then proposed to establish mines under the three towers (l,m, and n) of the outer wall, and for this purpose to sink shafts within the houses immediately opposite to them, and eventually to form lodgments on the breaches caused by these mines, in consequence of which it was expected, that the enemy would be driven from the outer wall.

Having proceeded so far, it was not expected that much more could be donc till the arrival of a reinforcement of artillery.

# May 31st.

Working parties were employed in preparing materials. Battery (1) was dismantled, and during the night, permanent barricades (o, p, q,and  $\tau$ ) were constructed across the principal streets of the Pettah.

### June 1st.

The Detachment encamped in a new position

ORAP: to the North-East of the Pettah, at the distance, V of about two miles from it. A redout (L) for 1816. 100 men was commenced at uight. Two batalions of Native Infantry, 60 Europeans, and the Sappers and Miners, remained on the old ground, during the construction of this redout. *Inve vel*.

The same work was continued during the night.

## June 3d.

This day 2 iron eighteen-pounders, from the Hill Fort of Unkye Tuukye, arrived in camp: and the redout was completed in the course of the night.

## June 4th.

The party on the West side of the river, with the exception of one battalion left for the defence of the post (I), and of the redout, joined Head Quarters. During the night, an approach to the redout, from the parallel, was constructed.

# June 5th.

All the Sappers and Miners, nuclei an Engineer Officer, took up their quarters in the Pettah, and immediately commenced sinking shafts, opposite to the towers (l, m, and n) of the outer wall.

### June 6th.

The mines were continued this day and night, without intermission.

### June 7th.

The two mines opposite to the towers (m & n)

## ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

were abandoned, on meeting with a stratum of CHAP. hard rock, within 5 feet of the surface. The  $\frac{IV}{IV}$ mine opposite to the right tower (*l*) proceeded 1818. slowly, the soil being rocky and hard.

## June 8th.

The mine opposite to the right tower was contined, and about 30 fet of gallery completed. This morning, a little beforeday-light, the mine fell in, in consequence of the little depth of soil abore, and of a heap of stones under which the gallery ran, which gave way, and buried the European Miner, who wn fixing the shoeting bands. Fortumately, the gallery was covered over, without being percised but the ensw.

# June 9th.

During the night, battery (5) on the North side of the Fort, for all the mortars, and 2 gans expected from Seroor, was commenced about 400 yards from the tower (1) was this night 'correctly ascertained by actual measurement, by carrying a line across.

# June 10th.

Battery (5) was completed during the uight. The Bombay detachment arrived, consisting of 1 battalion of Native Infantry, and a detail of Artillery, with 4 eighteen pounders, 2 brass twelve-pounders, 1 ten-inch, 4 eight-inch, and 1 fire-and-a-halfeinch mortar. The mine proCIAP. coeled very slowly, in consequence of the rocky IV. nature of the ground, and of the men not hav-ISHs, ing been sufficiently practised beforehand in the fixing of gallery frames.

# June 11th.

Battery (5) opened at daylight with I teninch, and 5 eight-inch mortars, and 2 five-anda-half-inch howitzers. At eleven A.M. two of the enemy's powder magazines blew up in quick succession, bringing down a large portion of one of the curtains of the body of the place from the very foundation, and exposing the whole interior of the Fort. In consequence of the extent and apparent practicability of the breach caused by the explosion, it was resolved that no time should be lost in taking advantage of it. Accordingly, during the night, the battery (6) for 2 eighteen-pounders, was constructed in a Mussulman's barying ground, 320 yards from the works, in order to destroy the defences of the inner wall. Another battery (7) for 4 cighteen-pounders, was commenced on the bank of the river, opposite to, and 600 yards distant from the outer wall, which it was resolved to breach, in front of the spot, where the explosions above-mentioned had laid open the interior line of works

### June 12th.

Negociations being entered into, we were enabled to proceed with battery (7), which was

# ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM. 133

completed in the course of the day. This night CHAP, the gallery reached the foundation of the tower  $\underbrace{1, \dots, 1}_{l(l)}$ .

#### June 13th.

The Garrison surrendered. A Jemidar's party of Native Infantry was admitted into the Fort, and the British flag was hoisted upon one of the towers at noon.

### June 15th.

The Garrison marched out of the Fort at a quarter past nice *A.m.*, and grounded their arms before our troops, who were drawn up to roceive them in front of the principal gateway. They were afterwards marched off to a part of the Pettha, allotted to them for quarters.

The Garrison marched out only 250 men, for a party made their eacago, when the Pettah was laken. They acknowledged to have lost 35 killed and 60 wounded during the sign.<sup>6</sup> Our loss was much more assers, being 5 officers all wounded. These counties were principally occasioned by the skill of the Araba, who are very expert marksmen, in the neo of their matchlocks, with which they picked off those use, who exposed themselves in the trenches. They certainly made a very gallant defence, and their consideration in allowing us to carry off

 This is so unusual a proportion, that in all probability it must have been a missepresentation. CHAP, our dead and wounded, as well as their respect IV. for flags of truce, and of negociatious entered ÷. into, do them no less credit." 1818. ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Licut, Davies, Commanding Engineer (killed), Nattes. - - - Staff - - - - (killed). Ensign Purton, (severely wounded). Underwood, (slightly wounded). Lake. 27 European ) Sappers and Miners 45 Native STORES, &c. 10.277 Sand Bars. 500 Gabions. 470 Fascines And sufficient intrenching tools for the use of the Sappers and Miners. ORDNANCE At the commencement of the Siege. 2 Iron eighteen-pounders ? rendered 2 Iron twelve-pounders ) unserviceable. 8 Brass six pounders. 1 Eight-inch morfar. 1 Five-and-a-half-inch ditto. 2 Eight-inch howitzers. 2 Five-and-a-balf-inch ditto

Joined on the 3d of June.

4 Iron eighteen-pounders.

<sup>4</sup> After they had laid down their aums, in front of our troops, Lientenant-Colonel M\*Dowall showed a laudable regard for good conduct is an energy, by restoring their side atom, an indegence so gratifying to their feelings, that many of them acknowledged it with team.

ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

Joined on the 9th of Jane.

- 4 Iron eighteen-pounders,
- 3 Brass twelve-pounders.
- 1 Ton-inch mortar

4 Eight-inch ditto.

2 Five-and-a-half-inch howitzers.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Eighteen-pound shot	3462	
Twelve-pound shot	2395	
Ditto grape	21	
Six-pound shot	500	
Ditto grape		
Ten-inch shells		
Eight-inch ditto		
Five-and-a-half-inch ditto	233	
Eight-inch carcasses		
Gunpowder, Bs	\$5,500	
REFLECTIONS		

If it were not for the Pettah, which weakens the East front so materially, Malligaum might he considered a perfect specimen of the strongest kind of Native Forts, so far as regards the size and disposition of the works, and also in reference to the rockiness of the soil, on which it is placed.

The chief objection to the original project of attack is, that even if it had been possible to destroy the towers (y and z) by mining, as proposed, the intervention of the river between them and the trenches, must have proved an insuperable obstacle to that species of uninterrupted and comparatively secure communica-

CHAP. IV 1818

CULAP tion, at all hours, which is desirable, if not indis-IV. nensably necessary to a besieging army, in the نیٹ 1818 event of an obstinate and protracted resistance. in which every successive work is disputed inch by inch. Accordingly it has been asserted, that the Fort was attacked in its strongest side: but it must be remembered, in justice to the excellent Officer now no more, by whom the plan was formed, that he had only a choice of difficulties. The side actually attacked, but for the obstacle that has been noticed, was far from being the strongest. On the contrary, if success could have been anticipated on any side, from distant breaching batteries, without the necessity of progressive approaches, the side actually attacked, or the West side, which like it can only be approached by crossing the river, may undoubtedly be considered the most favourable for such an operation; for on the two other sides of the Fortress, the intricate works defending the gateways, and one extra inclosure. offer additional difficulties to an assault. But the chief reason which induced Lientenant Davies to commence his operations from the opposite side of the river, was the reluctance which he felt to an attack on the Pettah, which otherwise must have been an indispensable preliminary. For in the event of a vigorous resistance, which there was every reason to anticipate, he thought that Licutenant-Coloncl

## ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

M Dowall's original force would be as much crar, weakneed, by the loss in must necessarily sustrain in the capture of the Pettah, as to become tains in the capture of the Pettah, as to become suitout to those ulterior operations, without which the fall of the Fortress itself could note expected. Under this impression, having decided upon opening the trenches from the opposite is def of the river, I shall only remark, that if the could have forescen the impossibility of detrophysic the effort, would be all probability the trenched any other part of the South shido, so some part of the West side of the outer wall, in preference to the re-entreing angle balvene these two towers.

If, on the contrary, we had arrivel before Miligram, in sufficient numbers to have rendered a unce vigorous mode of proceeding abrinble, the Pettuh would have been immediately assaulted, after the capture of which, the towers (i, w and a) night have been distrotion of by mines, either by driving galleries under them for that perpose, or by attaching the Miners to thirs earce, for if the former method proved impracticable, on account of the redetness of the soil, the latter might have been effected without difficulty, as the towers were constructed of much. After these were ruined by mining, lodgements on the breaches might have driven the construction of more line, and cRAP. confined him to the body of the Place and W, founcehry. The Sorth side of the outer line has falling into our possession, might have lines been converted into a conventient parallel, extending from the Petath to the tower market (2) in the plan, next ow builts in breaching has, tery might have been constructed to breach the front (α, b), either in the spraw where the breach was actually effected in the present instance, or in the contain, near the lower (b).

> It was before-mentioned, that Licutenant Nattes, when on the summit of the breach, was seen to wave his hand and that when the storming party who followed him monuted it, immediately afterwards, the ladders dropped out of the hands of the men, whilst in the act of lowering them, for the purpose of descending the wall in rear of the breach. It has been confidently asserted, that the motion made by Lient. Nattes, was a signal for the storming party to retire, in consequence of his having discovered from that elevated position, certain insuperable obstacles, previously unknown;\* and it has also been of course implied, that the ladders were considerably shorter, than the height of the wall alluded to, and consequently that they proved unserviceable, at the very moment when required for use. Of these assertions, I consider the one more than doubtful, the other decid-

> > See Liest.-Colonel Blacker's Memoir.

## ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

edly erroneous. For, on the most minute ex- CHAP. amination of the works, after the place surren- IV. dered, the surviving Engineers found, that the 1818 only obstacle to the success of the assault, and certainly a very formidable one, was the faussebray. But Lieutenant Nattes fell on the breach, from whence he could not possibly have seen more than 5 or 6 feet of the ditch of that work, the actual depth of which can no where be ascertained without advancing to the very crest of its counterscarp. It is evident, therefore, that nothing seen by him, on mounting the breach, could give him a more formidable notion of that work, than he entertained before, for although the precise strength of the faussebray was not known, its depth was by no means an unforescen obstacle, but one considered, and in a certain degree provided for, in the plan of assault." In regard to the breach itself, it is truc

\* Extract of an official letter, written the day before the assault, from Lieutenant Nattes to Lieut-Colonel M'Dowali.

" That a ditch does exist, and that behind it there is a " loop-holed fasseebaay, are facts. That there are obstacles " is equally ture, but I do not consider them insuperable. " Similar obstacles in Spain were overcome by the means " which I records," So. So.

The above opstation sufficiently proves the incorrectness of the association, that Liesdeauxt Natics discovered certain unforcesses obstacks, on mounting the bench of the outse wall. He had, however, in calculating the quantity of materials for illing up the director, estimated its depth at 20 feet, whereas it was afterwards found to be 25 feet.

#### 140 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CRAF that the original wall in the reverse of it, remainbiling of nearby entry, but this was only 8 feet bills, high, and the hadders carried to the spot were 18 feet long; and the ensuing had made no actempt whatever to searp away the ground at the bottom of the wall subsect to 1. In fact, the only work, constructed by them behind the plan, which searedly deserves the name, for it consisted of a trench, not 4 fect in width and depth, and of a parapet equally insignificant. (See the Section through e et in P hat XV)

As the wall before described in the reverse of the breach, was a little lower towards the left, than on the extreme right, where Lientenant Nattes himself had ascended, it is possible that the waving of his hand may have been intended to eaution the storming party to incline a little to their left; but for my part, as he must have despised the paltry obstaeles at and in the immediate vicinity of the breach. I have not the smallest doubt but that the waving of his hand was a signal to the troops to advauce without loss of time, in the hone of their being able to close with the Arabs in their retreuchment, before the latter could effect their retreat into the faussebray. That the storming party did not advance further, as they certainly might have done, is, however, no discredit to them, for bcsides the loss of the Engineer who led the as-

# ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM.

sault their own Commanding Officer was badly CHAP. wounded, and the second in command killed on the breach," where the head of the column 1818. remained with great coolness, exposed to a destructive fire, until they received directions to retire, which they did in good order. If these unfortunate casualties had not paralized the efforts of the troops at the breach, which caused the escalade on the outer line on the other side of the Fort also to be relinquished, it is not altogether impossible, but that the three simultancous attacks, vigorously conducted, might have produced such an effect upon the enemy, as to lead to the immediate surrender of the place.

After the capture of Malligann, as the rains <u>low-</u> had already commenced, Leutenne-Colone Maroual M'Dowall's detachment took np their quarters have for the unasson. In the near time, the force instants ander Lieut-Colonel Adams had been employed in the signs of Chanda, which we shall now proceed to relate, after briefly noticing the previous operations.

Subsequently to the defeats sustained by the twowest to Peishwah in November 1817, in the neighbour- de-Peishwah hood of Poonah, he no where attempted to after la make head against our troops in force, but would be wandtered abont as a fugitive, always accom-

\* Lieutenant Kennedy of the 17th Native Infantry, an Officer of great merit.

# SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP. panied, however, by a considerable number of IV. armed followers. In the month of March 1818.

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1818. he was induced to move towards Nagpoor, by invitation of the Rajah, but being closely pursued and nearly overtakeneby Brigaulere General Doveton, on marching to the Northward to avoid that General, he was intercepted by Licetenant-Colonel Adams, who with his division had for some time occupied a position at

Hinghinghaut, South of Nagpoor. By making His troops a forced march from that place on the night of are diare dis-accessible the 16th of April. Licentenant-Colonel Adams Lieut.-Col. fell in with the Peishwah's troops next morning, near the village of Scunce, and instantly attacked marches them. Those who attempted to resist were immediately routed, and the whole dispersed in great confusion. After this affair, Colonel Adams returned to Hinghinghaut, where he remained until he was joined by the Hussingabad battering train, and the Madras Artillery under Major Gorcham. On the 5th of May he marched towards Chanda, the only place of importance in the Southern part of the Nagpoor country, and encamped hefore it on the 9th, about three miles to the North-West of the eity.

> The force of Lieut.-Colonel Adams's Division was as follows:

BENGAL TROOPS. 2 Brigades of Native Horse Artillery.

# DESCRIPTION OF CHANDA. 14

The 5th Regiment of Native Cavalry. The 6th ditto. 1 Squadron of the 8th ditto.

1 Company of Foot Artillery.

The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regt. of N. Infantry.

The 1st Battalion of the 23d ditto.

4 Companies of the Grenadier Flank Battalion.

5 Companies of the Light Infantry ditto.

1 Company of Pioneers.

#### MADRAS TROOPS.

Half a Troop of European Horse Artillery. 1 Company of European Foot Artillery. The Ist Bathalion of the Ist Regt. of N. Infantry. The Ist Bathalion of the Hith ditto. 4 Companies of the Flank Bathalion. 1 Company of Pioneers.

1000 Reformed Horse of His Highness the Nizam's.

The city of Chanda is situated on a plain, at buoptic distance of 8 unles from the confluence of classidise are two considerable submitts, the Lal and Begum Pettalas, the former of which is very large, and extends appredix of an unle to the East. Part of the North side is covered by a large Task, which supplies abundance of water at all seasons. Two Nullabs, dry in the hot season, run along the East and Wert sides, and extends along the Worth and East sides, in some places within half's mile, and there, purters of a nulle of the walls, close to which there are also zardness on these two sides. On the CHAP, other sides the ground is open (See Plate XVII). The inclosure of the place consists of a ran-IV. in 1818 part from 8 to 12 feet high, and from 12 to 16 feet thick, surmounted by a loop-holed paranet. And of its 8 feet high and 4 feet thick, and flanked at moderate but irregular distances by round towers. The whole is constructed of excellent masonry. of a species of sand stone with chunam, in a high state of repair, and complete every where, excepting that part of the wall, which bounds the Southern side of the Tank, which has no narapet. The Bala Killa, or Citadel, is situated about the middle of the East side, 170 vards from the rampart. The height of its wall is 45 feet, and though apparently of a more ancient construction than that of the city, it was still in a good state of repair. An incomplete outer rampart of masonry surrounded this work. There are but few substantial houses within the walls of the city, the Palace being the only stone building of any importance.

# ATTACK OF CHANDA.

May 10th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Adams personally reconnotred the North and East sides, protected by a considerable detachment of Cavalry and Infantry, which the distance from camp, and the strength of the Garrison (reported to be 3000 men), rendered necessary. The Pioneers were complored in preparing materials.

# ATTACK OF CHANDA.

### May 11th.

The reconscissance was completed on the <sup>177</sup>. West and South sides, and it was determined <sup>1818</sup>. that the attack should be made on the South-East angle, this point being preferred, on account of the corer affordid by the Fukh tops,<sup>4</sup> to the atvanced detachments, and by a raine offering a good approach to within half musket shot of the angle. During this day's reconuoissance, the energy were driven from a small hill (a) on which they were constructing a redout. The Phoneners, and a working party of 100 Dooly-bearers, were employed as on the preceding day.

# May 12th.

The Pioneers and working party of Doolybearers were still employed as before.

# May 13th.

The troops moved their camp to a new position, at the distance of 2 miles to the Southward of the city.

The hill from which the enemy was driven on the 11th, and to which they had not returned, was occupied; and the Bengal Native Horse Artillery, and a troop of Cavalry, took possession of the Begum Pettah.

The company of Madras Pioneers, and 100 Dooly bearers, were sent out at twelve o'clock, to collect and prepare materials. At eight P.M.

145 CHAP. CRAFT the company of Bengal Pioneers, and a work-We impary of 100 Sepays, commenced a sught attery for 2 guns, and a position for 1 howitzer, and the fill (a) about 650 years from the South East angle, to siltene some large guns on the South face, which obstructed our communiestions with the advanced databanced our communiestions with the advanced databanced meaning Matras Pioneers, and a free working party, releved them at three o'deak in the morning, but the soil proving screensively rocky, the work was not finished at daybank, and was accordingly masked.

# May 14th.

During the day the Bengal Pioneers, and 100 Dooly-bearers, collected materials. The Madras Pioneers finished the battery at night.

# May 15th.

The battery opened at daybreak, and had the desired effect.

The Bengal Pioneers, and 100 Dooly bearers, prepared and collected materials.

# March 16th.

The whole of the Pioneers, and the same number of Dooly bearers, employed as yesterday.

### May 17th.

The Pioneers, and 130 Dooly-bearers collecting materials, filling sandbags, &c. The Pioneers ceased work at twelve o'clock. A sufficient quantity of materials having now been

#### ATTACK OF CHANDA.

prepared, the following hatteries were com- CHAP, menced at eight F. M. by the two companies of UV. Pioneers, and a working party of 300 Sepoys; 1918

First, A battery (b) of 5 embrasures, at the distance of about 400 yards, for 4 twelve-pounders, to fire on the defences to the right of the Sonth-East angle, the point selected for the breach.

Secondly, A sunken battery (c), at the same distance, for 3 six-pounders, to enfilade those defences : and

Thirdly, A battery (d), at the distance of 630 yards between the above, for two howitzers.

The working parties were discovered, and the enemy opened a fire, which, however, did not obstruct the progress of the work.

# May 18th.

The batteries opened at adybreak. The light trele-ponders proving insufficient to rain the parapst. 2 of the eighten-ponders were brought into the lattery, and the whole played with good effect. A trench of communication was to have been opened from the Petah ito endlading buttery; but it was now considered nuncessary, as the fire of the enemy, both from guns and matchlock, swascompletely kept ander; the gate by which they night have allied, nevers to the battery, and saccritande to be blocked up; and the party of infanty for its protection, found ocod over behind the bank of

#### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

ORAP, the Nullah. A working party of 150 Dooly. We beares filled and bagdwing thedrs. At eight have bear set filled and bagdwing thedrs. At eight have bear set of the set of the set of the set of the have bear set of the have bear set of the set of the

## May 19th.

The breaching battery opened at seren A.u.The working party of Sepoys had been withdrawn at daybreak, but the two companies of Pioneers continued working till ten A.u., conpleting a communication with the ravine, and enlarging the shoulder of the battery for a twolve-pounder, to play on the defences flanking the South-East tangle. At four r.u. a good and practicable breach of 106 fett was effected, but owing to the distance the troops had to work form cannu, the assult was delayed.

The 6 howitzers were brought down at dusk, to the flank of the breaching battery, and a continued fire of round shot, grape, and shells, was kept up during the night, on the breach and adjacent works.

# May 20th.

The Cavalry and reformed Horse having been distributed around the place to intercept 1818 fugitives, the storming party, under the command of Lientenant-Colonel Scott, debouched from the Begun Pettah at half-past five A.M. It consisted of two columns, the right composed of Bengal troops, the left of Madras troops, and was supported by a reserve, consisting of a soundrop of dismounted Cavalry, 2 light group and the Bengal Light Infantry Battalion. The breach was speedily crowned by both columns at once, when they diverged to the right and left, and at seven A. M. all resistance ceased. A small party of the Garrison had shut themselves up in the Bala Killa, but surrendered without resistance. The enemy had endeavoured to raise a platform during the night, to fire over the breach, but our batteries had prevented them from completing it.

# ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Lieut, Anderson, Commanding.

, Crawford, Bengal Artillery, Acting Engineer. ORDNANCE.

3 Eighteen-pounder iron guns.

4 Twelve-pounders, brass.

4 Six pounders.

6 Five-and-a-half-inch bowitzers.

The defence of the Garrison during the siege was spirited, but did little injury to the assailants, from the bad management of their ordCHAP, nance. The small guns were mounted on the *IV*. towers, and those of larger calibre were placed using the rangest. the rangest.

> Chanda can hardly be considered as a place of strength, the great extent of it alone rendering it indefensible, unless garrisoned by an army. Without a ditch or an outwork, protected only by a single rampart, in no place higher than 20 feet, and surrounded on all sides by Pettabs, and broken ground, to within a few yards of its walls ; no European Garrison would think of standing a siege in it against battering guns, and it affords a striking proof of the inconsistency of the Native character, that while they constantly, during the war, surreudered impregnable Fortresses without a blow, they should have thought not only of defending this walled town, but of standing the assault, after a practicable breach was made.

> In the attack of a place, which was almost equally valuesbillow energy side, there was of course little scope for the display of profissional kill, yet it may be remarked, that the advantage taken of the ground by the Eugencer, who contrived to thing the troops put to vitilia half musck shot of the valls, without trenches, was highly to his revill. The position selected for the bracking battery is also descring of prake; and the advantage of enablishing it at as

#### ASSEERGHUR.

short a distance as possible, was proved by the CLAP. circumstance of the ramport, which was a very 1good onc, being breached in nine howrs after 1-1616. The opening of this bottery, although the fring was constantly interrupted by the heating of the metal. The duty in the traceles was anusually severe, in consequence of the heat of the weather, and anongst the vicines of it was Major Gorehan, a very distinguished officer of the Madras ArtHery.

# CHAPTER V.

THE SIEGES OF ASSEERGHUR, NOWA, AND COPAL DROOG.

THE Siggs, which form the subject of the present Chapter, were undertaken after the termination of the War, and two of them, Novar, and Copal Droog, were sliogether unconnected with it. The Fortress of Assecrytur had cagaged our attention at different periods, but the attack of it has been postponed, in the first instance, in consequence of the healtlike conmenced by the Nagnow Rajh, and afterwards, perhaps, from a consideration of the inadequacy of our means to refuee it. The Kilder Jeswunt Row Lar, was a wara supporterofthe Pindarry system, and creanifier its matter Sindhal

## SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CIAP, had signed the Treaty of the 5th of November, be showed a determination to support it, by ISB, offering the protection of his Fortress to the Pisibwah, when that Prince, after a pursuit by Brigadier-General Doveton, which for rapidity and distance is, perhaps, unexampled in India, fiel there in June 1016.

Bajec Row Fortunately Bajec Row accepted the terms services offered him by Sir John Malcolm,\* and with <sup>Malcolar,</sup> his Arabs, who had adhered to him to the last,

surrendered to that General. Jeswuch Row The second secon

> Circumstances did not allow us, to resent this insult at the time,† and the following year, be-

> On the receipt of Bajes Row's overture, that General had proceeded by forced marches with his Division to Assecrghur, having left patties to block up the fords of the Nerbuddah, in the event of the Peishwah trying to got to the Northward.

> † It must be conformed that if Bigles Row hain refused the terms which were offered to hum, we should have been celifcally situated, and the War might have been greatly protroated. It would have been impossible to besinge the forthess at that time, for in anishes of the Division was there a gut larger than a six-ponnel (Brigdies-Consert) Doveton's and latticing intra having been conserted massric-scale before

#### ASSEERGHUR.

fore our preparations for the purpose vere coars. CIARpleted, the Lar was again enabled to display V. his hostility to the English, and to mark his idetermination to uphold any power that promised opposition to them, by offering and alfording protection to Appa Saih, their only remaining energy: who, since his secarge from captivity, had been collecting adherents in the Maladco hills, and had fer from tilen to Asserghar, just as Licetenant-Colond Admarks preparations to attach him were early completed.

In this attempt, some of his followers were byen killed and taken, and Appa Sabi himseff unsernational estimates and an estimate and an estimates tachinest from Brigadier-General Doreton's Division, commanded by Lietteman.Colonel Pallock, which was stationed for the purpose, on the reads North of the Fortness. As soon as he had reached Asserciptur, Brigadier-General Doreton's Division encamped a few milles to

Mullgraum, which at the time at II had and), and the miser our join the consomering. The carshuld Division were not then softic-rafty strong to Morkala the jater effectivity, on a to percent the carson of the 20-black, and they must have remained for its months, black stage and have conmoned active operation, shell up between the frients Numeration between the strength strength and the black and trajers, in a transmission with the first strength black and the strength strength strength and the strength strength strength strength strength strength the strength strength

#### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

OLLAF. the Southward of it, in the neighbourhood of Y. Boorhapport, while Brigginfer-General Sir John Malcolm, who was the bearer of nm order 1819. From Sindhah, for the Laro to proceed to Gwalior, took up in ground to the North. As the Kilksdar refused compilance with his master's requisition, multer the most frivoloss predext, preparations were made for the singe, and they were greater, as regarded the number of men and ordnance, than had been assembled before during the campaixa.

The following is a statement of the force before the siege:

BRIGADIER-GENERAL DOVETON'S DIVISION. Bengal Trans.

6th Regiment of Light Cavalry.

1st Battalion 15th Regiment of Native Infantry.

2nd Battalion 15th Regiment ditto.

300 Pioncers.

Madrat Troops.

1 Troop of European Horse Artillery.

2nd Regiment of Native Cavalry.

7th Regiment ditto.

His Majesty's Royal Scots.

30th Regiment (one wing).

67th Regiment.

Madras Buropean Regiment.

1st Battalion 7th Regiment of Native Infantry.

1st Battalion 12th Wallajahabad Light Infantry.

2d Battalion 17th Chicacole Light Infantry.

2d Battalion 13th Regiment of Native Infantry.

2d Battalion 14th Regiment ditto.

A Detachment of Pioneers,

#### DESCRIPTION OF ASSEERGHUR. 155

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1819

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR JOHN MALCOLN'S DIVISION. CHAP.

Madras Troops.

Half a Troop of European Horse Artillery.

Camel Howitzer Battery.

3d Regiment of Native Cavalry.

2d Battalion 6th Regiment of Native Infantry.

1st Battalion 14th Regiment ditto.

A Detachment of Pioneers.

Bonday Troops.

Ist Battalion Grenadier Regt. of Native Infautry.

1st Battalion Sth Regiment ditto.

A Detachment of Pioneers.

This respectable force was afterwards in creased by a part of the Saughur Division, under the command of Brigatien-General Watson, consisting of some Pengal Miners, two Battalions of Bengal Native Infantry, the £ud Battalion of the 13th Regiment, of Native Infatty, and South Arilley and thexy gans.

The Fortress of Assecryptur is situated about by the two miles from the end of one of the great needs two miles from the end of one of the great needs is taken miles North of the city of Boortmapport. Workern ranges of the Statuportah hills, and years about a seaking of the status of the Mogal power in the Deckan, and passed from the hands of the Massultane to the Mainratus about sevent years ago, spreadby to a treaty made at Aurungabad A. D. 1760, between Salahut Jung the Nizan of the Deckan, and

#### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP, the Peishwah Ballajee Row. It was also surrendered to the English in the Mahratta War of 1803, but was restored to Sindiah imme-1819. diately afterwards. Being situated in one of the great passes from the Deckan into Hindostan, the possession of this Fortress has always been considered of importance, and the natural defence, which it receives from a precipice of rock, in almost every part, has been increased by a thick and lofty rampart of masonry, which is built on the summit of the rock, and by large cavaliers placed in different parts of it, mounted with enormous guns, which commanded the country around in every direction.\* The general height of this position above the plain is 750 feet. Its greatest length is 1100 vards, and its greatest breadth 600. Nearly one half of the rock towards the Westward has been forther protected by a second inclosure of good masoury immediately below it, and following the curved outline of the natural scarp, from which circumstance, it has been aptly styled Kuminurgah (or the belt); and on the same side, but not covering so much of the Northern face of the rock, a third inclosure has been added of an irregular form, containing a space

> One of these guns is pompously styled the Lord of the Boorkaupoor Bazar, which the Natives firmly believe it will reach, although fourteon miles distant in a direct line. It is of iron, and carries a ball of 344 pounds.

#### DESCRIPTION OF ASSEERGHUR.

nearly equal to the area of the upper or prin  $CH_{21}$ cigal Fort. This third inclosure, which is  $\frac{N}{N}$ called Mallighur, constitutes the lower Fort. The The Patth his situated still momento the Westward, in a hollow intersected by numerous ravines, and lios immediately under the lower Fort, the works of which overlook and comuma it throughout its whole extent.

The entrance of the lower Fort is from the Pottah, and the road to it, which forms a gettle ascent, is well flanked by the works on each side. In every other part the ascent from the Pettah towards the lower Fort is exceedingly steep.

The principal entrance into the upper Fort, can't the Vestern extremity of the rock, is by steep flights of stone steps, secured by five gatavays of eccellant masory, by means of which it communicates with the lower Fort, and protected by five traverses, which alfords a direct communication from the upper Fort to the country on that ids. The second indessrebefore described has likewise a direct communication with the country, to a wark wicket or small agreemy at its right extremity, under the model of the Northern side of the rock.

On the same side, but more to the Eastward, after a descent of about 250 feet, a nearly level

# 158 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

OBAD. space juts out from the North-East angle of the V, rock, to the distance of about 400 yards, which and perlapse connected with the works of the second incleaser: for an old gateway of masonry still remains at the extremity of this level, inunclinately above the descent into the plain; and the road, which lead sittered for months.

the road, which leads directly from the country towards the second inclosure, actually passes through this gateway.

The rock, which is the natural boundary of the upper Fort, fails in three places, where of course more attention has been paid to the masonry, than in other parts. First, on the North side, at the part marked (o) in the plan, where a very thick double rampart has been built to supply this deficiency. Secondly, towards the East, not far from the North-East angle, at the head of a ravine, which commences in the interior of the Fort, and runs from thence into the plain, extending wide, and branching out into several ramifications in its descent. Across the top of this ravine has been thrown a casemated rampart, nearly 50 yards in length and 40 feet thick : below which at the distance of 50 yards, there is a second wall, which appears to have been intended chiefly for the purpose of preventing the earth from being washed away during the rains. Thirdly, near the South-East angle, where are the works of the

PLATE XVD1

### ATTACK OF ASSEERGIUR.

sally-port before-mentioned; in front of which  $\operatorname{CHAP}_{V}$ a low wall has been built, to prevent this entrance into the Fort from being seen from the ISIB.

There are a good many lualiting in the Fort, and some fine tasks and wells. On the North and Somth sides, the country below the Forti s pin and generally level, but intersected by two or three Nullahs.<sup>4</sup> At the foot of the hill, on the North side, are event grapheness and vincryarks, all supplied with wells of water. On the East and West sides, the country is interting and the side of the side of the side of the which on one side extend as far as the rivewhich on one side extend as far as the riverer, that every enimence within long cannon shot is considerably lower than the commanding position of Asseerghar.

# ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR.

A large depôt of materials had been forming for some time previous to the sizey, at a village hetween Brigadiér-General Doveton's Head Quarters, and the advanced post under Lient-Colonel Pollock, whost seven miles distant from the Fort. On the 17th of March, all attempts at an amicable adjustment having failed.

 Nullahs are water courses generally dry, except in the rainy season, when they present the appearance of mountain torrents, and sometimes even of rivers. CHAP, the necessary orders were issued for the assault V. of the Pettah.

### March 18th.

The ground having been previously reconnoitred, and the necessary arrangements made. the Pettah was taken at daybreak, by a simultaneous attack of two columns from the two Divisions, of Brigadier-General Doveton, and Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm, which were encamped North and South of the Fortress. Brigadier-General Doveton's column. commanded by Colonel Fraser, and led by His Majesty's Royal Scots, entered the Pettah by the South-West gate, at the head of the Battukcerah Nullah. Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm's column, entered by the high road from Boorgaum and Choulkan, through a gap in the hills, which cover the Pettah on the North-West. The enemy were taken by surprise, and made but little opposition. flying as the attacking party advanced, and our troops soon established themselves under cover of the houses, with a triffing loss, occasioned by the fire from the lower Fort, which opened as soon as the enemy's party had evacuated the Pettah. A battery (a) for 6 light howitzers, to keep down the enemy's fire, was completed during the day. The Engineer Depôt was established in the large bombproof Pagoda in the centre of the Pettah, and the troops occupied the street

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## ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR.

in advance, which runs parallel to the Fort. CHAP. The enemy's guns from the upper Fort, which were depressed to play on the Pettah, made 1819. good practice. During the night it was intended to construct the battery (b) for 6 eighteen-nounders, and 2twelve-pounders, to breach the North-West angle of the lower Fort; to advance our posts to (d), to prevent the enemy's sallies, and to barricade those streets enfiladed by the enemy's fire. Owing, however, to the difficult nature of the soil, and a deficiency of materials, the battery, although commenced, was not continued. A secure post at (d) was completed, but in consequence of the flank. ing fire of the lower Fort, as it was impossible to make an approach to it, without going through the tedious operation of the double sap, it was determined always to withdraw the troops at daylight to (c), that post answering the same purpose during the day. The streets were barricaded, in the openings leading to the lower Fort, so as to afford a safe communication along the whole extent of the main street of the Pettah. The enemy fired during the night at the respective working parties, but without effect.

## March 19th.

The post at (c) was this morning completed. The enemy made a sally at sun-set, under cover of a heavy fire of matchlocks from the lower

CHAP. Fort, and drove in our troops from this post, which was the key to the whole position, and from which the advance of the enemy might 1810 have been effectually checked. They succeeded in burning some houses about the post at (d), which was apparently the object of their sally, as they immediately afterwards retired. The battery (b) was finished during the night. 400 yards from the North-West salient angle of the lower Fort; and another was commenced at (e), on the rising ground above the Pagoda, for eight mortars and howitzers. The ground on which the mortar battery was placed, was so hard, that the fascines (the only materials at hand) could not be picketed sufficiently strong. The revetment, therefore, gave way when nearly completed, and the work was left unfinished. The enemy did not fire this night, or attempt any annovance, after being heat back in their sally.

### March 20th.

The guns opened at daylight with great effect, immediately allencing the enemy's far-By evening they had effected a practicable breach in the salient angle of the lower Fort, The morthr bettery was this night completed with snad bags. Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm's Division mored to a position North-West of the Fort, and that General's Head Quartery were exhibilised in the Lai Banch

## March 21st.

The enemy, expecting an assault evacuated the lower Fort at four A. M., as was ascertained afterwards from a deserter. At seven A. M. the expense Magazine of battery (b), which was placed against the perpendicular bank of a deep ravinc. 30 yards to the left, and in rear of the battery, exploded, from some unfortunate accident. It contained 130 harrels of powder. A Native Officer, and 34 rank and file, of the Bengal Native Infantry, were killed, and a Native Officer, and 65 rank and file, wounded by the explosion. The enemy immediately returned in great numbers to the lower Fort, and re-opened their guns. These were soon silenced, the parapets in front of them being completely destroyed. The mortar battery (e) opened at three p.M. This day orders were issued, for the defence of the Pettah being made over to Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm's Division

### March 22d.

During the day, 130 shells were thrown into the Fort from battery (c), and at night two additional embrasures were prepared, each for a twelve-pounder, about 200 yards to the right and left of the kattery (d); the one on the right, to destroy some defences of the lower Fort, from whence the troops in the Petth were annoyed by the enemy's masketry; that on the

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L 2

CHAP, left, to silence the large gun in the centre bas- V, tion of the North face of the upper Fort, which  $V_{B10}$  bore on the battery (b).

## March 23d.

The Engineer Department moved, under the protection of the Recard Brights, chrocomonitres the East front of the Fort, and to decide on the ground of encampment. for Brigadier-General Doctorios Division. The mortrain in the Pettah continued playing upon the Fort. A 4-lineh howitzer was placed in the Pettah, at the top of the barriscahe, thrown across the principal wrest elaking to the gateway of the lower Fort, to prevent the enemy's sortice in that direction. Marcle S446.

The Engineer's reconvoissance being completed, the East front was decided to be the most favourable for the attack of the upper Fort, and the following is an extract from the Commanding Engineer's letter to Brigadier-General Doveton on the subject:

" The irregular nature of the ground, and the cover afforded by ravines, render extensive parallels unnecessary. A communication, however, should be opened from the Ram Bangh, to a ravine on the left of the attack, to enable the working particis to arrive under cover.

"As the approaches are to be carried up a ravine, exposed to a direct fire in front, and a flanking fire on each side, it becomes an object

of the first importance to knock off the defences CHAP. of the flanks, and to prevent the enemy from  $\underbrace{V}_{.}$ rolling down stones. I recommend that these 1849. works should be destroyed from their foundation.

"This, I conceive, can be effected by placing lattries on the prolongation of the fanks, in such manner as will enable as to breach the opposite, and enables the association of the second the same battery. The fanks being destroyed, and the defences of the cartain wall knocked off, the bottom of the retaining and cartain walls is to be loosened, to enable the Miners to establish themselves; or should this found impunctisable, a breaching battery to be constructed, and the cartain wall fails open. I and orginnio, that by once others of these means, we shall be enabled to form a practicable breach.

" The mortar batteries to be disposed as represented in the plan, and, if practicable, a brigade of six-pounders to be placed in battery on the detached hill opposite to the South-East angle, so as to command the high ground in rear of the front attacked.

"To distract the enemy's attention from the real point of attack, it is advisable, that the venning previous to constructing the batteries, possession should be taken of the lower works on the Petth side, and a battery constructed to play upon the gateways.

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CHAP. "By these means the Garrison will be dc-V. prived of all hopes of escape, and their uncer-1819, tainty as to the true point of attack will wcaken their efforts to oppose us.

> " On the same principle, I recommend that the South-East face should be breached where the rock fails, with a view to such advantage being taken of it, as circumstances may require."

> The point (a) on the North face was afterwards selected for the second breach, instead of the South-East angle, as here recommended. On the Pettah side a hattery for 2 eight-inenhowitzers, and 2 sive-and-al-hil-lenih mortarys, was creeted, 350 yards to the left of the breaching battery (b). The enemy kept up a smart fare from the lower Ford during the night.

# March 25th.

WEST ATTACK .- Employed in destroying the defences to the right and left of the breach, and bombarding the upper Fort.

## March 26th.

WEST ATTACK.—Employed as yesterday. The Pioneers and public followers collecting materials for a new battery, for 1 cighteen and 1 twolve-pounder, intended to make a breach in the South face of the lower Fort. During these two days, Brigadier-General Doreton's Divisiou was moving to occupy a position, for the projected operations on the East Fourt.

### March 27th.

East Artzex.—The Ram Baugh, a govien situated under the North-East angle of the upper Fort was occupied, and the Engineer's Dept established thore. The ensure lyonght a large gun on the North-East baselon using earringes, which were exposed for a short time to their fere. During the day batter for 2 twelvepounders was thrown up in fout of the gavden to silence this gun. A communication was commenced from the Depto, in the direction of the urpoared batteries.

WEST ATTACK...—The battery ( $c_i^{0}$  for 1 eighters and 1 tev-dv-ponder, for forming a breach on the South face of the lower Fort, was commenced, and the guns taken to the spot; but as the battery could not be completed before morning, they were placed under cover, 100 yards from the battery. 2 six-ponders were also carried upon dephants to the eminence, called the Moguell's Gan.

#### March 28th.

EAST ATTACK.—The communication to the proposed batteries Nos. 1 and 2 was completed, and a good road prepared for the grus up the side of the hill, through the old gateway already mentioned.

WEST ATTACK .- The breaching battery on the South side of the lower Fort, was com-

#### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP. pleted, and the eighteen-pounder placed in it, V. during the night. The twelve-pounder broke 1819. down.

### March 29th.

Easy Arrace.—Two batteries Nos. 1 and 2 were constructed during the night, to destroy the defences of the fanks, to the right and left of the certain of the upper. Fort, which it was intended to breach. No. 1 was made to contain 5 dighten-ponnelser, and No. 2 don't eightenponnelser; the former was 300 yards from the Ponth-East angle, and 350 from the opposite fank, which it was intended to destroy; the latter was 350 yards from the point of the Fort ismefailety above it, and 600 from the oppoiste fank.

Were Arrack,—The lattery (b) re-commenced fringithm norming to perfect the breach in the salicat angle of the lower Fort, previous to the approaching assubt. The goans in hottery (g) opened at day light, and by evening efficient a preciscible breach. A four and a-half-inch howizer was established on a height to the right of this hattery, commanding the gataway of the upper Fort. The breaches in the lower Fort bing reported practicable, orders were issued for the assault to take place the following morning.

### March 30th.

EAST ATTACK .- Owing to the great labour

of carrying the guas up the heights, out) 3 (1LHZ) guas were got into battery No. 1, during the V. day, ulthough a Regiment of Europeans, and 1819, one of Sepoys were employed as a working party, to drag them up 1; and were assisted by elephants. A battery for 2 heavy mortars, was made immediately on the left of No. 1.

Wext Arrace.—The sense or equated Mailighter (the lower fort) during the moring, and it was immediately occupied by our troops, who established thumslets there with very trifling loss, as the energy did not open from the gauss of the apper Port till the assistants were well under cover. Battery (b) was dismatted. During the night, all the mortans but no cow very taken from the Pettah, and placed under cover in the lower Fort.

#### March 3 ist.

Easr Arracs.—During this day all the gumin Nos. 1 and 2 were placed in hastray, and commenced fring on the defences of the flanks with good effect. A lattery for 8 is norman and howitzers was thrown up in front, and to the right of the flam. Baugh, immediately moler the hill. The eccemy kept up as assure fire of matchlocks from the second Port on the working party, but with little effect. A twelvepounder-was placed in hattery on the right of No. 1, to keep down the matchlock fire from the North-East angle, which annoyed our propic in No. 1 battery.

CHAP. WEST ATTACK.—Two eight-inch and 2 five. V. and a-half-inch howitzers were placed in battery 1819. at (f) on the North side of the Fort, and 2 fiveand a-half-inch howitzers were placed on the Moreu's Cap.

# April 1st.

EAST ATTACK.—The embrasures of battery No. 1 wera repaired and widened. The eightmortar battery opened this day. A battery for 10 mortars was thrown up to the left and in rear of No. 2. Batteries Nos. 1 and 2 continued firing to destroy their opposite finals.

WENT ATTACK.-A battery (k) for 6 guns was constructed, about 600 yards from the upper Fort, to breach the wall of the middle or second Fort. An eighteen-pounder and a twelve-pounder were placed in the Pettah, to destroy the Westerndefences of the second Fort.

### April 2nd.

EAST ATTACK.-A magazine was formed for the ten-mortar battery, and the whole of the mortars brought in. The other batterics continued firing with good effect.

WEST ATTACK.-The guns were got into the six-gun battery, and opened on the North-West curtain of the second Fort, at two o'clock P. M.

### April 3rd.

The Saughur battering train and Bengal Miners arrived this day. EAST ATTACK.—The ten-mortar battery CHAP, opened this morning. A battery for 4 mortars  $V_{-}$ was thrown up, about 100 yards in front, and 1819. to the right of No. 1, immediately under the first descent from the North-East angle.

Wesr ATTACK.—The defences, to the right of the intended breach, were destroyed, but the fare on the corner basicon being two obligns, 2 eighteen-pounders were drawn out at night, to the right of the battery. A parapet was thrown up for a covering party, on the ridge (abore battery (A), in front of the intended new battery (A), in mont of a reward having bean offered for shot, many were picked up and brought in be the camp followers.

## April 4th.

East ATTACK.—The defences of the flanks, being almost wholly destroyed, a breaching battery, No. 3, for 2 twenty-four-pounders and d eighten-pounders, was commenced; and as the ground would not allow sufficient space for more than two combrasures in a line, the guus were placed on three different small levels, our above the other, forming an inclusion battery. 3 eighten-pounders were placed in battery to the right of No. 1, to bear upon and destroy the North-East bastion, from whence the camp careful amoved our troops.

WEST ATTACK .- Employed in making a mine under the rampart of the lower Fort, in

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP, order to open a road for the guus, to the new V. battery on the ridge (k). During the night 2 1819, eighteen-pounders, intended for this battery, were dragged up from the Pettah, and lodged in the lower Fort.

## April 5th.

East Arrace. – Battery No. 3, 400 yand from the relationistic well. and 450 from the eartain, was completed this revealing. A magazine was formed for it, and a real for the gues made. The front ON. 9 was thrown forward, to convert it into a breaching battery, to bear on the retaining wall No. 4. The memoary of the North-East angle was destroyed, and the arge gue on the top of it, a one-lum/dreamforty-pounder, rolled from thence half way down the hill.

Where Arracke,-The breach in the second Forthein completed, a four gan breaching taktery, for the upper Fort, was commenced, on the ridge in front of, and shore battery (A). Theo more eighten-pounders were draged up into the lower Fort during the night; the union was sprung in the morning, and a good road opened by it, through the ramparts for the gans. A for good marksmon were punked forward up the hill, from the lower Fort, to keep the energy's michtlook men in check.

#### Amil 6th.

EAST ATTACK .- The 2 twenty-four-pounders

and a cighteen-pounders were placed in lattery GLAP. in the course of the day, under a heavy fire of  $\frac{V}{V_{c}}$ matchlocks, but with triffing loss, as the incesting the from battery No. 1 kept the enemy moder. The two-nortar battery was repaired during the night, and an approach was opened from No. 1, in the direction of the breach.

WEST ATTACK .- The breaching battery was completed, a magazine made for it, and the guns got into battery.

## April 7th.

Intelligence was this day obtained, from a man who had been allowed to visit the Lar, that he began to despond, and that his Garrison looked on further resistance as almost hopeless.

EAST ATTACK.—Breaching batterics (Nos. 3 and 4) opened on the retaining wall with great effect, and with the assistance of an oblique fire from No. 1, a practicable breach was nearly effected in the course of the day. The approach to the breach was continued.

WEST ATTACK.—The gans opened against the rampart of the upper Fort at ten a. m., with good effect. These operations certatel great aharu in the Garrison, and in the evening, two Vakeels came from Jeswurt Row Lar, with offers of surrender, but wishing to stipulate for the Garrison retaining their arms, they were immediately ordered lack into the Fort.

## April 8th.

CHAP. V.

# The breaching batteries re-opened at day

1819.

light. About cleven o'clock a.w., orders were received from Engindier General Dovaton to cease firing. Jeswunt Row Lar having agreed to an unconditional surrender, on the part of himseff and Garrison. The read to the breach on the East attack was continued during the night. The rock at the North-East angle was also reconnitred, and it was assertiable, disat there was a good path for troops, immediately moder the rock, to assault the breach.

### April 9th.

The Garrison marched out at sun-rise, and delivered up their arms. The Fort was occupied by British troops, and the union flag hoisted, under a royal salute from all the batteries.

### ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Licut. Coventry, Madras Engineer, Commanding.

.. Cheape, Bengal Engineer,

" Purton, Madras ditto.

Ensign Lake, Madras Engineer, Staff.

Warlow, Bengal ditto.

35 European Sappers and Miners ? Madras

48 Native Sappers and Miners SEstablishment. 125 Native Bengal Miners.

1000 Pioneers (Bengal, Madras, and Bombay), and about the same number of Dooly Bearers and Lascars.

Irvine, Bengal ditto.

STORES, &c.	CHAP.		
95,000 Sand Bags.	v.		
675 Gabions.	$\sim$		
500 Fascines.	1819.		

#### ARTILLERY.

Lieut. Col. Cresdill, C. B. Madras Artillery. Major Weldon, Matras Artillery Commissary. Captain Poignand, Brigade Major. 1 Troop and a half of European Horse Artillery. 4 Companies of Foot Artillery. 1 Company of Native Golundazue.

#### ORDNANCE.

At the commencement of the Siege.

15 Eighteen-pounders, iron guns.

3 Twelve-pounders, ditto.

4 Twelve-pounders, brass.

1 Ten-inch Mortar.

5 Eight-inch Mortars.

1 Five-and-a-half-inch Mortar.

4 Eight-inch Howitzers.

2 Five-and-a-half-inch Howitzers, heavy.

5 Five-and-a-half-inch Howitzers, light.

2 Five-and-a-half-inch Howitzers, on beds.

4 Four-and-a-half-inch Howitzers, on beds.

Arrived during the Siege on the 3rd of April.

2 Twenty-four-pounders, iron.

4 Eighteen-pounders, ditto.

3 Ten-inch Mortars.

3 Eight-inch Mortars.

2 Five-and-a-half-inch Mortars.

2 Eight-inch Howitzers.

#### REFLECTIONS.

Owing to the failure of the rock in three dif-

CHAP, ferent places, Asseerghur may certainly be con-V. sidered much weaker than the Fortresses of Khandesh described in the preceding Chanter 1819 and it partakes largely in the defect of all Hill Fortresses, in being surrounded by ravines and broken ground, affording cover in various parts almost to the foot of the walls. Yet from its character and from local circumstances, it was expected to offer great resistance ; and if the magnitude of the preparations against it he considered, it was certainly more respectably defended, than any of those which possessed greater advantages of position ; but the Killedar, though he had received secret instructions to defend the place to the utmost, knew that his Master had openly given us orders of a different tendency; and doubtful nerhans, how far this duplicity would be avowed, and fearing that his personal safety might be compromised, he surrendered before he had cause for alarm. His feeling of doubt as to what course to pursue, was strongly expressed in a conversation he held with Sir John Malcolm, the day before the surrender of his Fortross He told that General "that Sindiah would be very angry with him:" and on heine answered that, "he had just cause" he said, "Yes, he will reproach me much for having fought so hadly with so fine a Fort, he will say I ought to have died." On General Malcolm

asking him, "If he had not an order from his CHLAP. Master to evacuate the Fort," he said "11  $\underbrace{V}_{V}$ with the Usage annograf. Europeans, but 1819. with the Mahrattas, Forts like that, (pointing to Assocrybur) were not given up upon orders."

The vigour, with which both of the besiegers' attacks were pushed forward, and the manner in which their guns were carried to heights, which the Garrison had deemed inaccessible, must have made a great impression; and the besieged were further disheartened, by the death of their principal Jemidar of Artillery, who was killed on the 28th of March, while laying a gun in the North-East bastion. Had a practicable breach been effected in the casemated curtain on the East front, the storning party might possibly have gained it, by keeping close to the rock, after reaching the North-East salient angle of the Fort; and, in their progress, they would then have only been exposed to the opposite flank, the defences of which were completely destroyed, and the fire of it had once, even before that period, been kept under by the excellent practice of No. 1 battery, at the time that the guns were taken into the breaching battery. They would, however, have suffered from stones, which might have been thrown down on their heads from the rock, under which the path to the breach lay,

CHAP, and it cannot be supposed, that under any cirv. cumstances the attack of such a position, if well defended, could have been made without great loss.

> If there be any part of the operations, to which the praise that they generally merit, cannot be given, it is the delay which took place in the assault of the lower Fort. It was a principal object, of course, to confine the Garrison within as narrow limits as possible, in order to give greater effect to our bombardment : but they were left in possession of the lower Fort, ten days after a practicable breach was made in it. without any apparent reason. Nor was this the only inconvenience, for the delay, which took place, afforded the enemy ample time for retrenching the breach, of which indeed they did not avail themselves; but an apprehension that they might have done so, caused the additional laborions attack on the South front, which would otherwise have been unnécessary.

> An examination of the Fort, two years after it was besieged, has raised doubts in the Author's mind, whether a practicable breach could ever have been effected on the West side. The two subsequent Monsoons, which had washed away all the masoury in some of the battered parts of the Fortress, had made no impression on this: and by a reference to the section

through this part, (see Plate XVIII), it will GHAP. the scen, that except about 10 feet of sumport, <u>V</u>, and of oparapet, this wall, seventy feethigh, is huilt against the rock; and the part immediately local tagainst the rock; and the part immediately local tagainst the rock; and the part immediately local tagainst the rock is and the part index of huilt against the rock is and the part index of would in all probability have rolled too far down the hill, to admit of a practicable ascent to the summit of the breach.

The third place, where the rock fails, which forms a part of the sally-port, near the South-East angle, appears to present a more assailable point, than either of the other two. It is not flanked, like the retaining and inner wall, on the East attack : nor, if we may judge by the sally-port being open to the top immediately behind it, is the rampart built against the rock. as at the part attacked on the North side. The breaching battery, in an attack on this point might be established at (A), within 350 yards see Plane of the point B, and the besiegers would have XX. the benefit of a level space to traverse, between it and the breach. The outer work in front of this is only a breast wall, apparently made to hide the door of the sally-port, which here opens to the country, and indeed the only apparent objection to such an attack, is the great difficulty which would attend the carrying heavy guns up to that height. The senior EnGRAP gince with the Division, on the first recon-Venoisance of the Fort, was of this opinion, and would erea have preferred if for the principal attack, but that a memoir, drawn up by an Officer of experience, who had been stationed in the Fortess whilin enorposets ion 10023, described this as one of the strongest points, and particularly specified the ravies on the East front, as being the only part where there was any roubality of attacking with effect.

> Assecrahur has, since its capture, been coded to the British Government : and its nossession will perhaps enable us to restrain the excesses of the Bheel Tribes, who inhabit the neighbouring range of hills; and will, at all events, prevent it from becoming a strong hold of plunderers. It is a question however deserving consideration, how far these advantages will repay the expense of garrisoning it, and keeping its now decayed works in repair. Its central situation, between the Deckan and Malwa, seems to fit it admirably for a general Depôt, but this it can never become : for the access to the upper Fort is too difficult, for the constant passage up and down of heavy stores ; and the lower Fort, which might be used for the purpose, is commanded on every side ; besides which the sum it would require, to complete it as a place of strength for this purpose.

1810

would go far towards building a new Fort, on CHAP. better principles, on the plain.\*

## ATTACK OF NOWA.

The Fort of Nowa which is situated about porris-24 miles North-East of Nandair, a City on the lien of the Godavery, is in shape an oblong square, of Nova. which the longest side is 46 yards, and the XXI. shortest 36. The body of the place is defended by a rampart 20 feet thick, and the flanking defences consist of a circular tower, about 30 feet in diameter, at each angle. The outworks are, a fausschray and ditch, running parallel to the body of the place, and a sloping glacis on the European system; but it is without a covered way, except round the North, and part of the East front, as far as the communication with the country. The interior area of the Fort is raised, so as to form a solid mound. to within about 6 feet of the terreplein of the rampart, the exterior height of which, including a parapet of 6 feet high, is nearly 30 feet.

The faussebray runs at about 29 feet distance from the body of the place, and consists of a casemated rampart, 20 feet thick, surmounted

• It would be anjust to close those reflections or the Siege of Assessmptour, without adverting to the exercitions of the Artillery, both Officers and Men, throughout the siege. The former in many instances, particularly in battery No. 1, and the mostra battery on the Noth front, were without relief, and actually lived in those batteries, from the time they were first opened. CHAP by a parapet 5 feet high. At the angles, it follows the form of the circular towers of the hody of the place, by which the ditch is much 1819 better defended, than is generally the case with Native Forts. The faussebray is further protected by traverses, which are placed in different parts, to prevent it from being enfiladed. There is no berm between the faussebray and the scarp of the ditch, and the height, from the top of its parapet to the bottom of the ditch, is 35 feet. The height of the counterscarp, from the bottom of the ditch to the crest of the glacis, is 25 feet ; and as this latter work is raised 12 feet above the surrounding country, the whole depth of the excavation of the ditch is 13 feet: and it is 35 feet wide.

> The principal gateway is on the East forque, which is one of the Congest, and it as us woult very well danked, by two circular projections, which gring from this front, in addition to the circular towers at the angle. The communication with the comtry is by means of a bridge, over the dicthe, casily renoveable; and a road across the glacis. There is also a all'y-port on the West front, communicating with the country in the same manner. The environs are perfectly dear and level, to a considerable distance.

> Nowa is altogether an excellent specimen of the strongest style of Native fortification, but it is too confined in size, and the works are on

too small a scale. The West, South, and part CIART of the East fronts, are also weakened by being  $\frac{1}{2000}$ , and  $\frac{1}{2000}$ , and  $\frac{1}{2000}$ , and  $\frac{1}{2000}$ , be unable to make a sorier, against lodgement on the glacis of either of these fronts, without a construct the besieger's first. The Garnion consisted of about 600 nen. The besigning force, being HB slighness the Nizara's Toops, disciplicated by British Officers, was composed, at the commencement of the sings, as follows, but a part of it was detached during the operations.

### Troops present at the commencement of the Siege.

		Offices.			Attached.				Officers & Frivates.		
Artillery		-	1	-	-	10	-	-	-		136
Infantry											
Reformed	ы	m	ie 5			0					2006
	Tot	al	18			15					4378

## January 7th, 1819.

The several corps forming this detachment, under the command of Major Pitnan, assembled at Tomsa, 3 miles South-East of Nowa. In the afternoon, the Commanding Officer proceeded to reconnoitre the Fort, from a hill 900 yards South of it.

## January 8th.

The detachment took up a position, near Nowa; the Infantry encamping at the distance of 1 mile to the North-East of the Fort, and the Reformed Horse at about the same distance

cIGAP: to the North, and West of it. At mid-day a Yea, Risaha arrived nucle Licetacant Subtraland, Small particle average based from the lift of the Infuntry. Small particle average based from this Risahado and these South and South-West, so as to communicate with these provinously stationed on our right. The energy during the day threw a few also into or eamb, but without doing any injury. The Piencens were employed throughon the day in entiting brandwood.

## January 9th.

A working party of 150 men from the line, with the Pioneers and Golaudauze, were cuployed in making fascines and gabious.

# January 10th.

It having been resolved that the North side of the Fort should be attacked, as it presented a small front, and was understood to be weaker were brought to a place 700 yards distant from it, and a working party of 10 new were employed in constructing battery (No. 1) for 4 discovered to (wing to the jungle) till towards discovered to (wing to the jungle) till towards monitors. The energy dia to a paper to have discovered to (wing to the jungle) till towards monitor. The gravity of the start of the people. They were immoliately driven in hytain Hare. This battery was completed driven the night, and nother battery (No. 2), 100

yards in advance, formed with faseince and CHAP. sand bags, was ready to open at day break. January 11th.

Both batteries opened at daylight. 2 sixnounders were employed in keeping down the enemy's fire, and the eighteen-pounder being directed against the left bastion of the face attacked, brought down a considerable portion of the wall. Throughout the day, the enemy kept up a brisk fire from matchlocks, wall nieces, and a gun placed in the work before the gate. At sun-set posts of Infantry (2 and 6) were established to the right and left of the hattery, at the distance of about 500 yards, At the latter post, battery (No. 3), was constructed in advance, at the distance of 430 vards from the gateway. Sentries were placed from both positions, so as to communicate with those of the batteries. The Risalahs in a similar manner, threw out their vedettes, and supported them with strong bodies of horse, at regular intervals, in order to prevent the exneeted attempt of the Garrison to escape. The mortars were removed during the night, to the advanced battery.

# January 121h.

The mortars played oceasionally during the day, with tolerable accuracy. Men were employed in cutting brashwood. During thenight, a cavalier (c) was constructed, 100 yards in CHAP advance, and to the right of battery (No. 3), V, 1819, between them. This was extended considerably to the rear, for the protection of the troops, The enemy's horse attempted to pass out, but were driven back by Captain Hollis's vedetles.

# January 13th.

Men were employed in cutting brashwood. The mortar physical a systerdray, and a sharp fire of matellocks and marketry was kept up between the Garrison and our Jhantry at the eavalier. A little after dark, a party of the encours attempted to pass the post (o), killing the advanced sentry ; but a free bring opened upon them, they retreated into the Fort. The working party was employed in improving the communications.

#### January 14th.

A few shells were thrown, and some grape. The eneny remained tolerably quiet, their geu being silenced. At night, battery (No. 4) for 2 eighteen-pounders was constructed, 330 yards in advance, and a communication was made, between it and the eavaier.

#### January 15th.

Batteries (1 and 2) were dismantled. Our Artillery began to knock off the defences of the front attacked. The enemy being very troublesome, a few shells were thrown with considerable effect. Working parties were

employed in entring brushwood. The trench CHAP of communication between the battery and caralier was rendered more secure, and another was run out on the right of the battery, near to the post (a). A few shells were thrown during thenight.

## January 16th.

The eighteen-pounders fired as yesterday. 9 mortars and I howitzer were removed to battery (No. 3), from whence they played occasionally during the night. Sixty yards of sap were finished, commencing at (d), and being directed so as to clear the works on the right of the front attacked. A communication between the sap and battery was completed. The eneur remained very quict

### January 17th.

The sap was widened and deepened. At night 40 yards of a zig-zag, to the right, were fonished, and a small place of arms was established to the right and left, at the bead of the sap. Some shells werethrown during the uight. January 18th.

Yesterday's work was widened and deepened. During the night 30 yards were run out in the same direction. The besieged attempted no annoyance, seeming not to understand, or to care for our operations. At daybreak a sharp fire was opened upon the head of the sap, which did no injury. CHAP.

January 19th.

1810

Yesterday's sap was widened and decpened. During the night 30 yards were run out in the same direction, and a return was made. The Garrison kept blue-lights burning nearly the whole night and occasionally threw stones from a mortar. About ten o'clock an attempt was made by the Robel Chief Howajec, with a party of horse, to surprise our camp from the rear, but the sentries being on the alert, the piquets soon turned ont, and after a little firing, he retired ; and was pursued some miles by Lieutenant Sutherland, and a party of Reformed Horse, but owing to the darkness of the night, he effected a safe retreat. Working parties were employed during the day in making fascines.

## January 20th.

The map was widened and deepened. The comp had brought two piaces to have upon it, bot a few shots from our battery soon silenced them. A contineed alwave of matchlock hulls amoyed us the whole day, but the trench being secure, little harm was done. Working parties wave employed in making fascines. At a party from the Garrison nude a sortie apon the head oft, diringin lut working party, and destroying a little of our work; hut the guard of the tranches obliged them to retire. The

fire from the Garrison was exceedingly hot, CHAP, and some loss was sustained : cover was however obtained, in spite of all their efforts.

# January 21st.

The sap was widened and deepened : during the night it was turned to the right, and extended 20 yards. A place of arms was made at the head of it.

# January 22nd.

At time *s*. w, the encouy made *s* sortie upon the sap, which three our working parties into great confusion, and prevented the guard of the trencless from beating them back, so soon as they would otherwise have done. We sustained some loss. The work of yesterday was wideced and depended, and during the night the sap was extended 16 yards in the same direction.

# January 23rd.

Yesterday's work was widened and deepened, and the sap was advanced 10 yards. This day a European, attached to the Engineer, was mortally wounded at the head of the sap. During the night, the work was advanced to the erest of the glacis.

# January 24th.

Yesterday's work was rendered more seeure, and returns were made to the right and left. At four o'elock P. M., the Garrison sent a messenger to the Commanding Officer: and by mu-

#### 190 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP, tual agreement all firing ceased till his return.

V. Our works went on during the night, and a

1819, lodgment on the glacis was completed. A

six-pounder was brought up and kept in readi. ness.

# January 25th.

The enemy having refused to accele to the terms proposed, the trace was at an end; great part of the glacis within the lodgment was eat away, with a view to the commencement of a mime. Towards evening, the shaft was begun, and during the night was such 12 feet. The soil being stiff clay, was found to stand without support. A working party was employed in making faceines.

## January 26th.

The shaft was sunk 14 feet deeper, so as to make its depth 26 feet from the erest of the glacis. A gallery was commenced to the left, the object being, to blow in the counterscarp, opposite to the left tower of the front attacked.

### January 27th.

A mortar was got into the lodgment, and proved of great service. The gallery at midday measured 15 feet, and a branch was rem out to the right, to the distance of 10 feet from the shaft. Working parties were employed in making fascines.

### January 28th.

The gallery measured 28 feet, and a return

of 6 fect was made to the right. The branch CHAT had been extended as far as the disk, for the Vparpose of obtaining a view of it, and also to welliate the mine. The gallergy proved to be 1850 on the same level with the bottom of the disch. A small branch to the fett, was leptom from the center of the great branch, in order to form chamber, and was carried 6 feet, after which a return was made to the right. The enemy anored us with notes.

## January 29th.

Both chambers being completed, were loaded; the one on the left with 900, and that on the right with 315 lbs. of gunpowder. The hose was laid, and part of the mine tamped.

## January 30th.

At day break the batteries opened, with 2 cighteen-pounders, I six-pounder, and 2 mortars; the mortars and the six-pounder being placed in the lodgment. By two o'elock the remainder of the mine was tamped. In the evening the breaches assumed a very respectable appearance. Shells and grape were thrown into them, during the night.

## January 31st.

The firing from our batteries continued as yesterday. At eight A. N. the Garrison sent two men to negotiate. They were desired to inform the Commandant, that he must surrender at discretion. They returned to the Fort, CHAP, and no answer was received. At ten, the V. breaches having been reported practicable, or-1810 ders were issued for the assault.

At 20 minutes before two a. w., the migwas sprung. The explosion was very caniderable, making an excellent descent into the left, and filling up part of i ( $3 \times 10^{-1}$  km s^{-1} km s^{-1} km s^{-1} the air for for or for ke minutes, under cover of which the ladders were planted, and the frospascended the breach before the Garrison had recovered from their counternation. To minutes after the explosion, the inner Fert was carried, and in the course of an hour, he holes of the emply works were in our passession. Our loss in the storm was small, beine a killed and 27 wonded.

The loss during the whole siege was 24 killed and 180 wounded.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

The only Engineer Officer was Ensign Oliphant, of the Madras Engineers, who had three Europeans attached to him, one of whom was killed and another wounded, during the sizes.

There were also about 70 Pioncors more immediately under his orders, from whom less assistance was derived than could have been wished, owing to their previous ignorance of the requisite duties. Out of the number there

193

1619

were, however, about 20, who had some little CHAP. knowledge of mining.

### STORES, &c.

120 Intreaching Tools.

1350 Sand Bags.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Eight-inch sl	ells	213			
Five-and-a-h	alf ditto	1040			
n	1380				
Round Shot.	Eighteen-pounder Six-pounder				
	GEighteen pounder	2			
Grape Shot.	Six-pounder	67			
D CEL DOEL O MR					

## REFLECTIONS.

The Fort of Nowa, though it can hardly be called a formidable place of defence, owing to the small extent of its fronts, and to two faces being altogether without a covered way, is, perhaps, as strong as a square Fort of this size could be made, under any system of fortification ; and the arrangement of the traverses, the glacis, and the clear esplanade around it, scem to warrant the conclusion, drawn by the Engineer who conducted the signed that others than Natives must have assisted in building it. Fortunately the soil was favourable for the operations, which the Engineer had the holdpess, with such means as he possessed, to conceive, and to carry into execution. It must be confessed, that few would have ventured. with only 70 men as a working party, of whom but a small proportion knew any thing of the

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4

e

d

CHAP. requisite daties, to attempt to crown the glacis, V. with a sap; but no operation, less efficient than

1830 this, would, with an enemy no resolute as the Garrison of Nova proved themselves to be, have effected the reduction of the Fort; and although his progress was no necessarily alow; they rent fully justified the during mode of proceeding, adopted by the Engineer. The siege of Nova indeed deserves, in its georant features, to be held forth as a model of naivenal prastiee, and the objection witch has been hitherto raised to operations of this kind, that they consume more time, than eaa commonly be spared for singes in Indin,<sup>4</sup> is proved to be altogether fulle.

The first ground was broken on the 10th, and the place was storated on the 31st, and this period might have been much shortened, if the Engineer had had the assistance of an efficient Department, and if the parallel, which appears to have been much more extensive than seessary, before a Port, of which the front attacked was only hirty-styrids, had been contracted; but from the time that the first sap commence, all the contercency and

<sup>4</sup> The singe of Tanjore by General Smith, A.D. 1773, which was conducted by Colonel Ross, then Chief Engineer, at which still more extensive purallels and approaches were carried on, and where the ditch was crossed by sap, was brought to a close in twenty-five days.

blown in, was only thirteen days under all the CHAP. disadvantages of working with mcn, who had V.

The great extent of the parallel, which was from right to left no less than 1000 yards, appears the only objection, which can be offered; if it had been reduced to half **dbt** extent, from (d), to unid-way between battery No. 4, and the caratiler (c), three would have been ample space to embrace the whole front attacked, and to give ever to the whole guard of the trenches; and an approach of 100 yards from behind No. 4, would have placed the troops in their road to the trenches, under cover from the musketry of the Garrison. By this reincidon, three of four days labour would have been aved.

The South front, which is of a small extent, as the one attacked, is weaker, in bains without a covered way, and if the attack had been directed against this front, the energy would not have been able to sally on our lodgments, which, as it ways on hey twice offected. But the information, obtained on these points from Natree, is always so imperiedt, that the Engineer could not, without actual examination, which was of course imposible, have accrutined that this defect existed; and perhaps the ground was so unek more fravyurable for the

CHAP, approaches on the North front, as to counter-

Nothing appears to have been overlooked. 1910 that could insure a successful result to the siege. The breach was not formed, till the mine that was to open a road to it, was ready for explosion : and such was the consternation of the Garrison at this novel method of attack. that no resistance was offered by them, whilst our men were placing the ladders, which were required to mount the breach of the faussebray; although they had evidently determined to resist to the last, for many of our shells which had not exploded, and a quantity of 18lb. shot were found at the top of the breach, ready to hurl on the assailants when they should attempt to mount it. Indeed any further praise of these operations would be superfluous. The complete success which attended them, resulting from no accident, and against an enemy as resolute to the last, as any we have encountered in India, forms in itself the highest encomium that could be passed.

### ATTACK OF COPAL DROOG.

Description of Copel Droog, PLATE XXII, The works of Copal Droog are of extraordinary magnitude and strength, and (as will appear by the plan) very complicated. The hill, which forms the upper Fort, is about 600 feet high above the plain, and is totally inaccessible on three-aides. The forth, or Bastern

### ATTACK OF COPAL DROOG.

side, is encircled with walls to the very base, CRAP. where a strong rampart terminates the hill for- V. tifications : below which there are, on this side, 1919 two additional inclosures, each consisting of a very respectable rampart with towers. The inner line of defence of these two embraces the hill in the form of an irregular semicircle, and is built of stone. The outer one is of mud, and surrounds the former every where excepting at the East end, where the two ramparts are united. In approaching the lower Forts, eover is every where afforded, to within 350 yards of the walls, by the Pettah on one side, and by a rauge of rocks on the other. The main strength of the place is at the point D, on the hill, where the flight of steps, leading to the upper Fort, turns to the left, behind a rock; and being completely hid from breaching guns, the progress of an enemy is checked by a gate, which presents itself, and where the assailants would he exposed on both sides to musketry, and to stones thrown from above.

### May 8th, 1819.

Partof Brigadics General Pritzler's Division, consisting of the following eorps and detachments, encamped before Copal Droog this morning. The Brigadier-General commanded in person. Lient-Colonel Fraser's brigade was employed.

### SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP. V.	CORPS, &c. No. of Supplicing, Mrs.
<u>ن</u>	Capt. Tew, H. M. Flank Battalion 6 480
1819.	Major Knowles, C. B. Rifle Corps 10 630
	Capt. Hall, 2d Batt. 4th Regt. Native Infantry 5 346
	Capt. Green, 2d Batt. 12th ditto 10 683
	Capt. Mills, H. M. 22d Dragoons 2 179
	Capt. Kemble, 1st. Light Cavalry 2 370
	Major Cleaveland, Artillery 2 74
	Gun Lascars - 97
	Capt. Smithwaite, Pioncers 3 200
	3,059

A reconnoitring party proceeded at 9 A.M. to examine the works, and it was determined that the whole column should attack the out-posts of the enemy in the evening, and take possession of the Pettah, with a view to creeting batteries during the night.

At a cilcak r. s. the troops off duty movies towards the Pettah, but being met by a brother of the Rajah, who came out with his retinuce of dutices up the place, they halted i: auf four companies were detached to take possession of the gateways, but on approaching the walls they were warned off, and ultimately refaued admittance. Whilst this partcy was going on, the column was ordered back to came, excepting about 300 men, under the command of LineL-Colonel Praser, who remained to support the four companies in case of accessity. At the close of the erening LineL-Colonel Praser

### ATTACK OF COPAL DROOG.

withdrew the four companies, and took up a CHAP. position in the Pettah, where he was reinforced by the galloper guns of the 22d Dragoons.

During the night a mortar battery was prepared at y (see Plate XII.); and nine mortars opened their for from it at indinght upon the lower works. The gallopers opened at the same time with shrapuels, from the position in the Pettah.

# May the 9th.

The two gallopers were renoved from the Petths, and, together with a howitzer, were placed in position on the hill post (2) to the right of the notra battery, where they were of considerable mse, in silecting the fire from the upper works. 2 brass twelve/posumders were placed in the Petths, in lise of the gallopers, and daring the night a battery area constructed for 2 eighteen-ponders at (2) to breach the North cortain of the lower Fort.

# May the 10th.

The fire from the breaching battery, and the whole of the other posts, commenced at sun-rise, and continued with little intermission throughout the day.

During the night the breaching battery was enlarged for 2 more eighteen-pounders.

May 11th.

The 4 guns opened at daylight, and with so much effect, that the breach was reported prac-

CILAP. licable at noon. Arrangements were conse-V- quently made for the storming of the lower sites. Forts at daybreak next morning; and the brass studie-populates were reasonal, and, together with a howitzer, were placed a little in advance of the mortar battery, at (w), for the purpose of covering the attack.

> These arrangements were reudered nunceossary, in consequence of the surrender of the lower Forts, which took place in the evening. The Garrison, to the annoant of 1400 men, marched out, and the place was taken possession of by our troops. Overtures were at the same time made for delivering up the upper Fort.

### May 12th.

Hostilities ceased in consequence of the neoptions which were pendigs. These, however, on the part of the Rajah, second to be entered into for the sole purpose of gaining time. The whole day was wasted without coming to any decision, and a farther period, till 9 o'dock of the morning of the 13th, was allowed, to bring them to a conclusion. Advantage was taken of this interval, to examine the nature of the remaining defences.

#### May 13th.

The period fixed upon having arrived, and it appearing that no reliance could be placed upon the Rajah's professions and promises,

#### ATTACK OF COPAL DROUG.

the following plan of attack was decided upon. CHAP. Two columns, of 4 comparise each to escalade V. the walls at the points G and H; and lawing allow gained admittance, to support each other. A significant of the support each other. A support each day to be taken of the confusion of the energy, to follow them to the confusion of the energy, to follow them to the summit of the hill, if possible. A reserve of 3 companies to advance from the wortar battery, to ruinforce the edumn which should free stabilities a forcing.

At twelve o'elock precisely, both eolumns advanced to the assault. The right under Captain Cappage, of His Majesty's 53rd Regiment; the left under Captain Tew, of His Majesty's 34th Regiment; the whole eommanded by Licutenant-Colonel Fraser, of the 12th Nativ Infantr.

Both secalables successels, and the gateway was how on open at the same instant. The troops ranked in, and effected a junction at the gateway C, which dired ever to considerable number of men. At this point, they were checked by a treemendous shower of stones, which was hurled from the recks above, and occusioned a number of examilies. Amonget the sufferers was Lieutenstat Elliott of the Rife Groups, avery promising young Officer, who had only joiged his Regiment the preceding day.

CHAP, teered to accompany the strong party. After a short pause, a party rushed forward, led by -Lieutenant Silver of the 53rd Regiment, which 1819 after a gallaut contest, succeeded in foreing the gateway D, driving the defenders before them. who retreated to the right and left, as our men entered. The main body of the assailants moved to the right, and immediately carried the line of works extending in that direction. A small party also went to the left, but being much exposed, and their amujunition expended. were obliged to retreat. A second rush was however made in this direction, and the enemy intimidated by the perseverance and gallantry of the attack, called for quarter, which was granted ; and the Garrison, to the amount of 500 men, were marched out prisoners of war,

> Our loss in the siege and assault amounted to 4 Officers and 57 men killed and wounded.

# ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Licutement Grant, Commanding,

Oliphant.

#### ORDNANCE.

4 Iron eighteen-pounders-

2 Iron twelve-pounders.

2 Brass diffo

8 Eight-inch Mortars.

1 Five-and-a-quarter-juch Mortar.

2 Howitzers.

The assaulting columns were on this occasion, as on every former one during the eam-

#### ATTACK OF COPAL DROOG.

paign, led by Officers of Engineers, who well CRAP, asported the reputation of their Corps. The <u>v</u>right point of escalade was 20 fect high and the 181 9, the laddess were 25 fet long, and were found to be just sufficient. They were carried by Pioneers, and planted by the Engineer Officers, assisted by Volunteer Artillery men. Ropes were attached to the laddess near the top to recere them when up, and bamboo poles with its on fork were used in areaing them.

No particular notice has been taken of the strength of working partics, as no dighting near were required for that purpose. The cover user the Fortwass os excellent, that nothing remained but to throw up a parapet, at any point required, for which the Flomenes, Dooly Bearers, and Bamboo Coolies, were found to be quite sufficient. The branching battery was used (in a plonghed field) in four hours, and the other batteries constructed with equal facility. The galleper to blow if open, the first a blank carritice, the second a round shot, and the third a double shot: the secolating party vere just over the wall when the gate opend.

## CHAPTER VI.

EXTRAORDINARY STERIORI OF THE ANTU- INI-PORTS, CONTARTE WITH THE WEAKINGS OF THE OTHER FORTHASSIS OF INDIA.-THE CAUSES OF OUR-UNEBOORS TAULUSE, IN A TATACKING THE LATTRE, INVESTIGATED.-THE SYSTEM OF IMPEOURLAS SERVICE, AND THE TOO FERCIDET 100, OF RASH ASAAUDS, AND THE TOO FERCIDET 100, OF RASH ASAAUDS, DOOPTION, TO, INSUES SUCCESS, IN THE EVENY OF PUTYLINE SEARCH IN INDIA.

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CHAP. THE foregoing journals prescut a curious V1 anomaly. We have taken apparently without المش difficulty the formidable Hill Forts of India 1819. Fortresses formed by nature, as if in proof of her superiority over the most laboured works of science; whilst ou the other hand. places on the plain, that would not delay an European Army, fully equipped for more than a week, have not only resisted our efforts with success; but, in the opinion of the mass of mankind, who seldom look deeper than the surface, have even brought discredit on our military character. According to the ulan laid down in the introductory Chapter, where the causes, which have led to such discordant results, have already been partially noticed, it

> now only remains to imprire more minutely into this question, and to consider the best mode of avoiding similar disasters, in the event of future wars in the East.

#### REMARKS ON THE HILL FORTS.

In regard to the Hill Forts of India, I shall CHAP, again most pointedly repeat the opinion ex- VI. pressed or implied in former parts of this work, 1819 that many of them, if properly defended, may he considered absolutely impregnable. Those vast precipices of lofty granite may equally bid defiance to the battering Gun, and to the Mine, the latter of which. Vauban the great master of the Art of Sieges, recommends as the most powerful agent for the attack of mountain Fortresses. And in fact there seems no certain mode of reducing them, if vigorously defended, but the tedious operation of strict blockade. Having given such a character of these Fortresses, it may be asked, from what cause or by what means we eame to reduce the whole of them with such facility, in the late war?

The reader will have observed, that the node of preceeding a skeys adopted, was to occupy without delay one or more positions as close to the reack as possible; and to carry ap field pieces to the spot by hand. This plan of operation was purposely recommended by the conterprising and skillel Engineer caployed with Lieutennat-Colonel M Dowall's Division, in the hope of intimidating the defenders, at the same time that be officially stated in signification if this attempt at working upon their minds by a salwor drigent "should", the exp-

CHAP, ture of these strong holds was absolutely im-VI nossible.\* Without, however, supposing any <u>س</u> extraordinary degree of pusillanimity on the 1910 nart of the enemy, at the period alluded to. another cause must have had an equal or perhans a greater share, in leading to the almost immediate surrender of these formidable Fortresses. The Commanders and their Garrisons were perfectly aware, that the Peishwah had been totally defeated, and that the state of his affairs was absolutely hopeless. They could therefore entertain no rational prospect of retrieving their Master's fortanes, by a determined opposition to the British arms, which eventually might be injurious or even ruinous to themselves. Under such impressions, it is more than probable, that they only waited for the opening of the first battery, to afford them a decent pretext for surrendering.+

> See the Report of the Commanding Engineer on the Fortress of Rajdeir (Page 92).

> 1 In forces ware we have bail similar instance of mesons against moly these, respectively in the word of 2103 against the Makouskan Dynasty of Myrsen, when there of the temport Hill Forch 4th Columpty, Neuhylarog, Sterndrong, and Orienzborg, were researchingly and Mohagil these phores were infined in strength to those of the Dynkan, and their imparts when below gave, converged to paintime their methods of the processing of the phone and their imparts when below gave, converged to paintime or successes at that period excited the strengt stantistic energy, and excited the taken stantistic of the difference of the Orient energy and the phone of the difference of the Orient energy and the orient of the difference of the Orient energy and t

#### REMARKS ON THE HILL FORTS.

Having thus attempted to account for the CHAP. poor resistance made by the Hill Forts of VI. Khandesh, I shall not presume to lay down any 1819 fixed rules for the attack of such Fortresses in future ; as it must be evident, from the description of them, that no certain result can be calculated upon, under all circumstances. great deal of cover is usually found near them, owing to the inequalities of the ground :\* but the little depth of soil is a great impediment to the construction of batteries, and trenches, especially as the parapets of these works reonire an extraordinary height to protect them from such very commanding Fortresses.† We risons by the recent fall of Bangalter. On the other hand, it is proper to notice the repulses we received in the two successive attacks of Kistnapheiry, in 1789 and 1791, which is both instances, were effected by simply rolling down stones and large master of granite on the assailants.

It Reportly eccan that sums of the lower loss of works of the holds. IIII Frost softed cover the storening party, even as far as the tray four of the hosted, as was the party of the store of the hosted, as the store of the hosted, as the store of the hosted and the hosted of the

+ When the Artillery of the Gantson can be kept and ar, the old expedient, described in the coatmon elementary

CHAP did not however suffer much from this circum-VL stance in the late war, as our batteries were 1819, placed out of musket shot; and the enemys fire of Artillery was slow, and ill directed.

> After admitting the extraordinary strength of the Hill Forts of India, I shall observe, that the Fortresses on the plain may be pronounced exceedingly weak, and that the result of our operations against them ought to be certain. beyond every other kind of warfare. In Europe, so much has the science of attack and defence heen studied, and to such efficiency has the Engineer Department in most services been brought, that even the number of days to be consumed in a siege may be calculated, with some degree of accuracy, and a failure against the strongest places, however bravely defended. seldom occurs, except from uncontrolable causes. In India, the duration of a siege depends on the bravery displayed by the Garrison; and although instances of Native Forts being resolutely defended, are comparatively rare ; yet, when so defended, it is impossible to say how long we may be detained, or how many reverses we may experience. Whence

> writers on the attack of Foitified Places, of Chundeliers, or wooden frames filled with factines, may be used to advantage, as was done by Hyder's Freuch Engineers at the Siege of Vellose, in 1781, who, by means of these, carried part of their approaches to within 20 yards of the walk.

then do these different results arise? Is it, CHAP because the Forts in India are stronger? On the contrary, both from the general description 1810 of them, which was given in the Introductory Chapter, and from the special descriptions of those besieged in the late war, as contained in the body of this Work, it will be evident, that they are much weaker than those of Europe, Is it, because the Garrisons are composed of braver or better men than ourselves? Undoubtedly not, for they have never been able to resist us in the open field. It must therefore be, that greater skill and superior means have been directed against European Fortresses. Now, although we are not disposed to admit that the Company's Engineers of the present day, are deficient in that degree of science, which is necessary for conducting such operations,\* they

\* In the early wars, which took place between the English and French on the coast of Coronaudel, it must be admitted that the superiority in the method of conducting siteges, evidently lay with the latter, for although no details are given, we read constantly of their having carried on their approaches in a respectable manner. In the English lattacks on fortified places, there was, on the contrary, a marked want of science, with the exception of one or two rare instances, creditable to men of superior talcut. At the sieges of Ariancopang and Pondicherry, attacked by us, in 1748, Orme expressly ascribes the failure that took place, to the incapacity of the Engineers, who, according to his account, were utterly nnqualified for the enterprize.

CHAP, have not yet been provided with the proper VI. means for employing that science to advantage; 1819. and as an obvious comparison, it may be asked of what use is the skill of the Artificer, if he cannot procure tools to work with?

> Owing to the lamentable want of means alluded to, instead of working up to the breach by sap, with comparative safety to our own troops, and with a well grounded confidence of overcoming every intervening obstacle, by a method leading to certain success; we have generally, in our sieges, effected breaches in the body of the place by means of distant batteries. and marched to the assault, over the interincliate space, like Mahommedan Fatalists. apparently without considering, or at all events leaving to providence, how the ditches and untouched walls between the outer works and the breach were to be passed. Hence, a vicious system has been adopted, uncertain and hazardous in the extreme; and from the want of all experience of a more perfect mode, the great body, composing the Military Public in India, have scarcely even contemplated the propriety of resorting to a more judicious mode of attack.

> In fact, on many occasions, it has been usual to attack the enemy's Fortresses by sudden assault, in preference to going through the ceremony of opening even a common battery.

# SYSTEM OF BLOWING OPEN GATES. 211

Nay, to such a degree has this rage for pre- GRAP. cipitate measures been carried, that, the only former Author, who writes professedly on the 1819 Attack of Indian Fortresses, has recommended the method of blowing open the gates of a large well garrisoned Fortress, with a gun in broad day light, in preference to besieging it.\* He mentions some instances, in which this extraordinary mode of attack has succeeded, and I am aware that many similar ones might be added; but we shall find in the numerous instances, in which it has failed, abundant reason for not adopting too hastily, as a general rule, a method, the success of which, I do not scruple to say, depends entirely upon the Garrison being devoid of common resolution, and of common sense.†

It would swell the present Volume too much, to enumerate all the varieties of fortune, by

By way of example, he states his opinion, that this mode of attack would have insured the capture of Bhurtpoor.

+ The Natives often build on the gateway, which number the blowing it open with a gain inprotection. This had here parailally done at Catteck, when attacked by us in 1000; when the whole of the gateway was built up, with the excepttion of the widset. Ten or sheven sheets were fired, before that was blow open, sher which the assultate regrit in, owe must at a time, and neceevale in taking the place, having provinsily mathined a considerable loss by the emony fire, whilst their peoprem was stopped at the wicket. This statek was made at some-sher.

CHAP, which those headstrong assaults have been VI. attended - but the attempt to blow open the gates of the fortified Pagoda of Chillambaram. 1819 in 1781, affords too striking an example, to be passed over in silence, of the ease with which such attempts may be repulsed, by a little indgement on the part of the besieged. The attack on this post was made at night, with four battalions of Sepoys, 2 twelve-pounders, 4 six-pounders, and 2 howitzers, under the personal command of Sir Evre Coote. The Pettah and the gate of a second inclosure, which surrounded the place, at the distance of 100 vards, were immediately carried. After this, it was necessary to force open three more gates, strengthened by intermediate traverses. before the body of the place could be entered. The troops succeeded in breaking through the two first of these, but the space between the second and the third (or inner) gate, which was commanded by the ramparts of the body of the place, was filled with thatched huts; and a few lighted portfires dropped on these from above, assisted by hundles of straw, and jars of oil, thrown down to increase the conflagration. formed a barrier, which it was found impossible to pass ; so that the assailants were obliged to retreat with great loss, leaving a gun behind them

It is to be abarried, that although the Anthor-

### OF ATTACKS BY ESCALADE. 213

alludel to describes the gateway as the wasket CHAP. John in the Native Fortesses of Hindean, <u>W.-</u> this is far from being the case, on the Western 1810, and the second and the second second second is of a lind, when the gates are as ways very y intricate and numerous, and they are also (at least the interior ones) the only parts, where any attention appears to be paid to a flanking defence; and if occasional success in any method of attack be sufficient to recommend it for general alongino, the Native way offeraking open a gate with an Elephant, which was practiced by ourselves in two instances in the late war, possesses equal claims to such distinction.

An escalade is equally objectionable as a general system, but as a coup de main, is more tikely to succeed than the former method; for an enemy may be taken by surprise, and his attention distructed from the real point of attrack; which is impossible, when a gate is to be blown open. The noise and preparations necessary to bring up guns, at once prevent

\* Ja 1305, at Compta, splace in the Negrour Bajah's dominions, where it moreould, and at Lariga, a Fort, in the same Constry, and attacked shout the zame time, where it failed. In 1763, Arest, when defaulded by the immedia Greener dephasas, with plates of iron long on their formleash to break show the grains; and line the shared consequence of such an attempt ensuel, for the sainab long wounded, turond round, and teamble of their ow provides.

#### SIBGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAPE emprises, and as there is selform more than one VL entruster to a Fort; to that point, the attention An attempt at surprise, however, which is essential to the success of an establish, or of any other corps de mains may be frustrated by the slightest accident. The secalate of Madura, in 1757, although adminishly plaumed, was repulsed through the barking of a dog, which alarmed the garnises."

> \* If the defenders are aware of the phint, which is to be assailed, specess can hardly be expected. The attack on Bobiles by the French, under Mousiour Bussy, in 1767. whilst it proves this, exhibits the Native Indian churacter in such an extraordinary light, that I shall, perhaps, be pardoned for introducing it. This was a petty square Fort, with a round tower at each angle, having its walls only 20 feet high, with a rampart of 12 feet, and was gardsoned by 200 Polyetrs. The French attacked it with a force of 750 Europeans, and 1100 Pcons, divided it into four bodies, with a field-piece attached to each. They commenced their overations at daybreak. By nine o'clock, the field-ninces and battered the parapet, which was only 3 feet thick, difficiently to admit of the acting ladders being annlied. After vainly attempting for an hour to mount by them, the attack ceased till the breaches of the parapet were increased. Another attempt was then made, but proved as finitless as the first; and at two o'clock, not a man having been able to mount the ransport, a second cessation was ordered. At this period, the Polygar Chieftain despaining of success, summoney his heavy followers, and represented to them the only niternative, by which their wives and families could be saved from dishonour. This cruel measure was instantly acted

## OF ATTACKS BY MINING.

It, from wait of time for carrying on regular  $G_{HAF}$ , operations, of from other circumstances, a coup VII. downish te considered necessary, and such 1 am sarare will often be the case; inning, where there is only one line of works, and those of mud, appears to me preferable to any of the methods which have been in general me; as a being equally expeditions, more cartain, and less hazardous the sanahular. In blowing open a gate, or in an ceslalade, the exposure of a number of troops is indispensible. In mining, the work is done by two or three, mer are they in much danger, for a miner working in front of a tower, could not be touched against it werty; r and a samell sumtle, placed

upor; and the whole of the women and children were excifiede to these high best mistakan noises of boson. During this trajet scenes, the availants took advantageof the absence of those mon who were employed in it, and forced their way into the place, where the Garrison indichising to accord of quarter, contained their resistance, until every max was put to the stord.

• The best and bravet mum is as Arey as generally most expand in this sort derives: a treatment at the gate of Bounghere, in 1794, one of the most important of the kind cover gatiet, was early purchand by the line of Colosie Monthemes, who fall on that cocapion. At the statek of the generary of the Popula, of Congerrens, in 1794, to which there were no gates, and which was defended only by small nearly however, buy the French before: is, so hus that four Officier were killed and free wounded by one direlarge of a run, after the washars that carried the wrells.

+ The Author had an opportunity of associating this, at

CHAP, at a sufficient angle, would protect him from VI. stones or other missiles from above, till he had 1819 lodged himself in the work, where he would be perfectly secure from any approvance but that of sallies, which, of course, covering parties would be so placed, as to prevent: and, with workmen at all expert in mining, the whole might be effected in one night. The only instance, which I can find of this having been attempted, was in 1752, at the Pagoda of Velore, in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, and where it was completely successful. The walls of this Pagoda were of stoue, and a large gateway was built up with mud, to prevent it from being blown open. A small party of Enropcans, having marched in a dark night, concealed themselves in a neighbouring water course ; and one man having advanced, dug under the wicket, which was left in the gate, and having placed a barrel of powder in the chamber he formed there, the explosion brought

> the Sign of Malligum, where he sat with a Rampsan, and there or for Plenser, for half as lower in brend shyplich, in first of one of the towers, against which scaling halders had been reserved for the escalade of the outer work, on the Plath lokel. The energy reach accuse the mark to share be then with weakenty, and the labelwe heig placed at an angle, and covering them, variel of the stores which were therows from above. A portable smaller for the mism on this principe, maths the invested for general gue.

### OF IRREGULAR ATTACKS IN GENERAL 21

1879

down the mud work and terrace of the gateway, CHAP, and formed a practicable entrance,\* VI.

I cannot conclude my remarks on the rash assaults, which have been in such general use in India, better than by quoting the opinion advanced on the same subject by Bousmard, a deservedly esteemed writer, on the Attack and Defence of Fortified Places. He observes that the arguments in favour of such rash attempts, when thoroughly analyzed, do not merit the smallest attention ; that if they be discussed by a due consideration of the means necessary for carrying them into effect, and of the difficultics which oppose their success, they usually evaporate, without leaving in the crucible any other deposit, than the caput mortuum, of the ignorance and folly of the proposer.†

The Author of the Observations on the Attack of Mud Forts in India, to whose Work I

<sup>4</sup> Tabler, the states of which, has led to so much discussion, and where we loats a may Oliver, night certainly have been taken by the medical I have here neggented. The gaterny of his Fort was the strongest part of it, while degrant additional facilities to the minute, and have afforded could have been adopted, but, strange as in may spacer, here was not a single miner, or a single mining tool in the whole of the First Diriche.

+ See Bourmard's Essai General de Fortification, Liv. vi. Chap. v. " Des attaques inegulieres et brusqueés de Places Fortes, et des moyens de defense à y opposer."

# SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

CHAP have before alluded, deserves the praise of

VL.

having been the first writer, who exposed to 1819 public notice, the very imperfect and vicious mode of attack, hitherto generally pursued. He states, that out of seven storms, at which he was present, he has seen no less than five nnsuccessful, in which, unwards of 120 British Officers and 3000 men were killed and wounded. This simple fact speaks volumes as to the necessity of some improvement, whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the peculiar plan that ought to be adopted. The same Work contains several useful surgestions, in one of which I entirely agree with him, as to the expediency of introducing the use of hand grenades, which are at present almost nuknown in India."

> Having allowed this Author the morit to which he is justly entitled. I must now enter upon the less pleasing task of pointing out his errors. Whilst he laments, as I have done, the disastrons results of many of our sieges, he seems to think that the works of the rude Natives of Hindostan are stronger (not weaker) than those

> . The use of hand grenades as a branch of instruction. has recently been restored in Eardand, not only in the Revil Engineer Department, which was the first to adopt it, but also in several Regiments of Infantry, whose Greendin Conpanies have been practised in this long forcotten art, from which alone they derived their title.

### SYSTEM OF THE AUTHOR ON MUD FORTS. 219

of the most scientific modern Engineers; and CHAP accordingly, under this extraordinary impression, he rejects the sap and the mine, which 1819. have triumphed over the strongest Fortresses of Europe, and proposes in lieu of them to substitute a new method of attack of his own, to commence immediately after the establishment of the third parallel. To quote his ownwords, " the assault (he says) must not be made till " the Ronnee wall\* be as completely destroyed. " as we have before recommended, that the pa-" ranet of the rampart and bastions should be: "so that no cover for musketry may remain " upon it, and this can only be done by a bat-" tery on the crown of the glacis, (which is ex-" tremely difficult to construct, and liable to " he blown up by the enemy's countermines,) " or by an elevated battery, the guns of which " would bear upon the parapet of the rounce " wall over the glacis, with such a plunge, as " to destroy the whole of its defences. Suppos-"ing such a battery to be placed at the dis-" tance of eighty yards from the counterscarp ; " that the ditch is ten wards wide, that the " glacis is ulne feet high, (which is more than

 The roance wall, so styled in some parts of India, is a low faustaching will, assally serromoting the rampert of the body of the place of an Indian Fortress, and isameilately over the scarp of the main dich, as at Malligann. See the description of that Fortress (Page 111).

# SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

ORAP. They generally are) and the rounce wall is, Y... two for higher than the crown of the glass, "or elsens fact higher than the common level " of the ground, the elsevation of the platform." " of the battery, so as to enable its guns is " lear upon the rounce wall, three fact below " the crown of the parapet, ought to be abent " fourthen fact."

In considering this plan, it may be asked in the first place, whether the destruction of 3 feet, helow which the battery he describes cannot bear, would answer the Author's intention. I apprehend not. The parapets of such works are often 7 feet high, from which if 3 feet be taken, 4 fect will remain, a height which affords cover more than sufficient to defeat his object Now if we suppose that 4 fect of paranet are to be destroyed instead of 3, and with this slight alteration, take every other dimension stated by the Author for correct his conplatforms will require to be elevated 25 feet above the natural ground ; but if it be supnosed that 5 feet are to be destroyed, they will require an elevation of no less than 30 feet above that level. Moreover, in all eases, these batteries must be protected by a parapet of at least 7 fect high. Hence by adopting such a system, an Engineer would have to undertake a battery of from 21 to 32 and 37 feet, in total height, in proportion as he might find it necesSYSTEM OF THE AUTHOR ON MUD FORTS. 221

sary to destroy 3, 4, or 5 feet of the Rounce CHAP, parapet. VI.

1819

Thus the plan of the Author alluded to will not hear being looked into in detail, since it involves works of such enormous magnitude, as may be compared with the great mounds or caraliers raised by the ancients in their itiggs; and the execution of which would waste a quantity of time and halows; that could ill hue spared, and might be much better employed, at secha niteresting period of the operations?

After destroying the rounce wall by these immense cavalier batterics, the Author proposes to storm the place by means of flying

 This method of attack has been sensibly interaptively by Matters of John, posteriol and the site of Tellistery, in 1989, considered by new of Hydra's Gostrech, who after the site of the site is taken of the site of the site of the site of the site is taken of the site of the site of the site of the site is taken of the site of the site of the site of the site at the site of the site

Another example of this mode of attack occursed about 30 years before, when Circ use besinged in Aroot by Chunda Saib. A hones in the Petho, such the rampart, served as the base of a moned, which was made by the batigers, sufficiently light to see into every put of the Fort. The Gamison waided, small is was completed, and then a few risk income the work the wise. or an e ladders, forming a bridge across the dich. Any YL, person conversant with the practice of mescheme to be perfectly impracticable, unless the Garrison will consent to remain passive and unconcerned, whils the besidgers are working at their ropes, to get the various parts of this compter machine, into the proposed positions.

Having thus stated the defective system dishas searably been followed by us in the stated of Fortresses in India, and exposed the errors, of the only Writer, who has beretofore considered the subject. The reader will naturally expect us to substitute something latter. Forturately the task is far from difficult, and involves nothing doubtful, nothing experimeal, nothing, that properly specific, can erea be considered new. All that is required resolve: itself into two heads.

First, to follow, in our future sieges, those old, established, well known rules, which have prevailed in Europe for more than 120 years; namely, to work up to, and crown the cress of the glacis by sap, to blow in or pierce the coun-

<sup>1</sup> It is not my intention, absolutely to condent a cosp of moir, or an inregular singe, under all cicemstances. But stury in the attack of Forteneses, gurmoned by mose of any resolution and in sufficient samelses to man the words, fui endod of proceeding should not be the general rule, as has unfortunately here the case with as in Endia, but as acception to it, adhasible our mode mode recent pricomstances.

# IMPROVEMENTS SUGGESTED.

terscarp; and to fill up, if necessary, or other- CHAP. wise to provide for the effectual passage of the VI. ditches, hefore the breaches, effected hy the 1819. battering gun, or by the mine, be assaulted.

Secondly, to organize the Engineer Depart, munt of each Presidency in India, in such a nummer, as to enable the Officers to act upon the above system, with a fair and reasonable hope of ancess, which has no fullerob been the case. This again involves an one we matried like. It merely requires tikes Officers to be assisted by a body of Engineer soldiers, trained to the field duise of their Department; and no Army in Europe, excepting perhaps the Turks, a is unprovided with a corps of this kink, which, innonst services, is considered the user trainable.

The principles, thus announced, will be further developed in another Chapter, which will conclude the Work.

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# CHAPTER VII.

THE SAURE SUBJECT CONTINUED. MODIFICATIONS IN THE USALG STREAM OF ATTACKS, THAT SHOULD BE ADOUTED, IN EFFERENCE TO THE FREULIAR COS. STRUCTION OF UNDAIN FOITTESSS. THE SINCESSITY OF HAVING A "CORIS OF ENGINEEINS EDILDIERS AT. ACCHED TO IS LACH OF THE COMPANYS ASILILIERS AT. REMARKS ON THE BEST OBGANIZATION OF SUCH CORISE, CONCLUSION OF THE WORK.

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- CHAP. OF two important improvements suggested in
- VII., the preceding Chapter, having urged in the first
- 1819. place, the necessity of abandoning these irregular moles of proceeding, which have led to auch tamentable futures in our Indian signs, and having recommended the adoption in future of that approved and scientific system of attack, which has been crowned by mahling success in Eurone; it is not nr intention to
  - describe in detail the operations of a regular siege, which as far as such matters can be learned by more theory, form a part of the course of instruction at all Millitary Academias, and are explained more or less clearly in a great number of clementary writers. I shall only attempt briefly to point out those modifcations of the rules alluded to, which the peenhiar construction of the Native Fortresses, may render adviseable.

### CONCLUDING CHAPTER

In besieging an Indian Fortress, it may CHAP. appear scarcely necessary to observe, that a VII. salient angle should be chosen as the point of Matient attack ; that the Pettah, or any other ground tominthe near the place, capable of affording cover, two of at should he occupied, in order to diminish the storid he labour of making parallels and approaches; to the proand that ricochet batterics should be estab- collar con struction lished ; and the approaches pushed on towards of lotion the exterior line of works by the flying sap, and continued by the regular sap, as soon as that more cautions mode of proceeding is found necessary. These rules, in fact, are precisely the same that would be followed in attacking every Fortress, let its nature be what it may, and therefore 1 shall not enlarge upon this part of the operations, remarking only in resnect to the enfilading fire, that two well appointed ricochet batteries, placed in the prolongation of those two faces of the Fort, which form the angle attacked, will generally suffice." By these simple operations, which may be completed in

 The foregoing journals have been frequent testimory to the excellence of the Markov Arthler, who are perchasopal to any in the world. If there he are point of their dary, in which there is none for improvement, the pactice of insteads thing, as a regular branch of insteadon, any negocietod. This archived, forminable us it is signite every species of rangent, would be pacellarly no, if applied to the straight fined sampurts of the Native Forts, which are and/on anyoled with threases to construct the effects.

CHAP: a few days, the besiegers will have advanced to VII. within close musket shot of the exterior line of defence, after which, expert Sappers will be required for executing the regular single or double sap, the progress of which is at the rate of about 3 or 4 yards an hour.

At this period of the siege, the peculiar nature of the exterior line of works first begins to influence the operations. Some Indian Fortresses have a glacis in front of the main ditch. as at Nowa, which had also a partial or imperfect covered way. From the statement of the Author on the attack of Mud Forts before quoted, it appears that most of the Native Fortresses of Hindostan, arc provided with a glacis, in the manner now under consideration. In the attack of these, the practice of crowning the crest of the glacis by sap, must be followed as in Europe, and batteries may be constructed there for the purpose of breaching the low faussebray or ronnee wall, which almost invariably surrounds the principal rampart of the body of the place. It is possible, however, that batteries, so placed on the crest of the glacis, and firing across a very deep and narrow ditch, may not be able to bear sufficiently low, to effect a practicable breach in the scarp revetment of the faussebray. In this case, therefore, it may sometimes be proper to blow in the counterscarp and part of the

# CONCLUDING CHAPTER.

glacis by mining, in order to lay open the faussebray to the fire of batteries, placed in a more viii.

If on the contrary, the Fortress besieged should have no glacis, but an exterior inclosure, consisting of a simple rampart, beyond the fausschray and the main ditch, as at Malligaum, the mode of proceeding must be somewhat different. Whilst the san' is advancing towards this rampart, which is usually of moderate height, and constructed of mud. Miners must be sent forward, to lodge themselves in the lower or solid part of three or four of the prineipal towers, in which they will prepare chambers for blowing them up. But if this rampart should be built with solid masonry, then instead of attaching the miners to the wall at once, it may be necessary to commence the mines requisite for the demolition of the towers, by means of galleries carried under the level of the foundation. On the explosion of the mines thus prepared, troops must be in readiness to move forward immediately, and occupy the exterior line of works of the Fortress, which will then be laid completely open to assault, and from which, in all probability, the enemy will retire, without waiting the issue of a personal conflict. This will form an excellent parallel for the ulterior operations, provided that in certain parts of it a parapet CHAP, be formed on the reverse of the terreplein VII. towards the eneny, either by taking down the original parapet, and turning it, as it were, inside out, or otherwise.

The next consideration is the passage of the dich, and the formation of a practicable breach in the rounce wall, for which purpose, if the exterior rampart, now suppored to be in the possession of the assailants, should be too near to the countersneary, to shuft of a breaching buffer, being backed in the interval, it must be eleared away by mines, fired for this express purpose. If on the contrary there should be a considerable space of ground intervening, this space must be occepted, and the space extended to the brink of the dich, and a proper breaching buffer, in the sume mancer, as was before described, in the sume mancer, as

It is possible, however, that under peniliar circumstances: It may not appear a valisable to attempt to breach the fuseschray by battering gans. In this case, galleries for the descent of the ditieh must be excernized, and the counterscape retenent piereed, after which the pasage of the ditie must be excerned by samp, and the ronnee wall or searp-revenment of the fuseschray must be breached by parties of Minner, pushed forward for that parpose. At the same time, a buffery must be constructed

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to breach also the high interior line of defence CHAP. or principal rampart of the body of the place, VII. immediately above the breaches in the faussebray; and mines must be prepared to blow in the counterscarp opposite to these breaches." The explosions should be so timed, as to take place, as soon as the breaches in the body of the place are practicable, but not before ; and the storming party must be in readiness to push forward across the ruins, the very moment that these are fired, as was done at Nowa, where the explosion of the mines was the signal of assault. These operations, perilons and difficult to men ignorant of such duties, are casy of exceution to properly trained Sappers and Miners, as has been proved by the numerous sieges of Europe, where the deep and broad ditches of well flanked Fortresses have

• The quartity of province to be used in these mises will oppear upon the matter of the countercent, and also upon whether it is reseted. The dischar of Naive Formas are foregoardly whether restances in the foregoard oppear the second se

CITAP: been passed, and their scarp revetments VIL breached by mining, in spite of all the efforts of defenders, much excelling the Natives of India in discipline and military skill, and certainly not inferior to them in personal courage.

To pretend, like the Author of the Book on Mad Forts, hofer quoted, hat the same process could not be applied, with at least equal success, to the passage of the imperfectly fanked ditches of the rade fortifications of the Natives of Italia, is 1 concive, a most glaring and periations error, that could only have arisen from the limited experience of the irregular sigges, and views system of attack, of which that Author was a wincess.

Having thus briefly described a mode of tanke, which by taking airkanagies of the dcfocts of the Indian system of fortifying, and by bringing into play the seience and experience attained by Europeans in the art of signs, would place the rolaction of the strongest Natire Fortrease beyond the power of chance, and would render unavailing the most desperate valour and the greatest exercision of their Garrisons; before I proceed to another branch of my subject; it may be poper to notice some points already treated of, a little more in detail.

First, in regard to the proper distance for breaching batteries, it may be remarked, that even

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when they are not from circumstances obliged to CHAP. be advanced to the crest of the glacis, or to the VII. counterscarp, I should not recommend them to be established at more than 150 yards from the wall, that is to be battered. At the siege of Chingleput, in 1752, four twenty-four-pounders at 500 yards distance, were found to have no effect. At 200 vards, a practicable breach was afterwards made with the same gons, both in the outer and inner walls, in the space of four days. and had the distance been still further diminished to about 100 yards, the breach would in all probability have been effected in half that time. If the ramparts of an Iudian Fortress are of stone, the curtain should generally be battered in preference to the towers, as the shot are apt to be reflected from the latter, owing to their circular form, and the hardness of the material of which they are built. The propriety of this rule was exemplified in a remarkable way at the siege of Palghaut, in 1761, where the besiegers in vain attempted to breach one of the round towers of the Fort, which was composed of very large blocks of granite, laid in the manner technically called "headers," in architecture, so as to present their ends, not their sides to the shot. In 1790, when the Fort was again attacked, one of the curtains was breached in a few hours.

If all the works of a Fort be constructed of

CHAP mud, the breaches in each inclosure or line of VII. defence will be better and more quickly effected by mining, than by battering guns, for such is the nature of these earthen revetments, that the shot bury and lodge themselves in the mud, without bringing it down. Live shells, the effect of which against earthen works, has been proved in Europe to be much greater than that of shot, may also be used to advantage; but it may justly be asserted, that there is no country in the world, in which mining may be used for the purposes of attack, to so much advantage as in India, where the ill flanked outline cuables the Miner to lodge himself at once, in the face of the rampart, without the necessity of approaching it by subterraneous galleries, and where the mnd, of which the works are composed, is soft enough to be negetrated with ease, and yet of sufficient tenacity to stand without woodwork of any description.\*

Captain Coventry, of the Madras Engineers, tried an interesting experiment, connected with this subject, in the year 1818, at Anninoir. It was his intention, in the attack of that Fort, to have breached the rampart by mining; but as the place surrendered without resistance,

 This would of course render the progress of the Miner more expeditions, than in soil, where regular mine frames and sheating are necessary, in which the work proceeds soldom faster than at the average rate of one foot per hear.

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he resolved, on receiving an order to destroy the GLAP. works, to pat to the test, the plan of operation, "I'll that he had previously determined to parsate, if the raw a gallery under one of the circular towars, and placed 11001bs, oppowdro in the chamber, the line of least resistance being 22 fest, and although the powdre was of inferior quality, being made by the Natives, the effect of the suplexity of the work of the theory of the suplexity adjacent cortis, "I'll and the suplexity of the suplexity of the dispert of the wheele of the tweer, and a part of the adjacent cortis,"

It may further be remarked, that it is better to offect a breach by mining, than by battering guns, so far as regards the expenditure of shot, not so much, however, on account of the ex-

\* The Author of the Book on Mud Forts thinks Mining use. tess as an agent of attack, because when it has been attempted he has seen it fail, the besiegers being twice effectually comtermined. Instead of this circumstance operation as a discouragement, it ought to be an incentive to us, not to allow ney of the Natives of India to excel us in so important a branch of the art of War. However expert the Natives of Hindostan, where that Author served, may have been in the umetice of Mining, it is absolutely impossible, that their Chiefs could have directed them with the same science as the Company's Engineers, to whom they were opposed. If the latter had been at the head of a body of well trained Miners. the result of their labours must therefore have undoubtedly been success, instead of failure. In those parts of India, where I have served, the Natives have little or no knowledge of Minister.

CHAP. pense,\* as the difficulty of conveying a sufficient VII. quantity of this most essential article of store.

In regard to the best hour of storming a Fortress, after practicable breaches are effected by the battering gau, or by the mine, opinions are divided. The morning, noon,† and night,†

 Even this is a matter of some consecutore, if it he considered, that it may require three months to convey the shot to the advanced Divisions, and that it may be a year more before they are used : that in the Madras service they are always transported on bullocks, each of which carries only 4 eighteennound shot, and involves an expense of nearly five runger a mouth, over and above the prime cost of the animal. Thus if the value of the shot, and of Sea carriage to India, he also taken into consideration, some idea may be formed of the sum, which every cannon ball costs the State before it is fired. There has reverally been a deficiency of sher especially towards the close of our sieges, when rewards, of from one quarter of a rupes to two rupees a piece. have been offered for the shot brought in, according to the exirencies of the service, and the number of cump followers who may have been disposed to hazard their lives in this prosuit. It is remarkable, that at the siege of Assterghur, Sr John Malcolm's Division carried away more shot than they brought with them, owing to the reward offered being a triffe higher, than in the other Divisions,

1 The storning of Swingspatan took place in the wald is of the day; but it appears that the anomal basel of the propertions in the transfers, attacted the notice of several of Typors's principal Officers, who were fully aware of the intended small, and requested him to prepare for it, but in value; as a blad fathing seens to have characterized all his actions, towards the close of his filts and regis.

1 Orme gives a strong opinion in favous of night attacks.

have each their advocates. For my part, I CHAP should be inclined to recommend as a general VII. principle, subject however to such variations as local circumstances may require, to commence the assault in the very early part of the morning, before there is sufficient light for the enemy to distinguish objects correctly. At this time, they will also have had the fatigue of watching all night, and to exhaust the Garrison the more, a false alarm in the course of the night may previously be resorted to. Had the advance to the storm at Malliganm taken place half an hour carlier, as was originally intended, there is reason to believe that many valuable lives might have been saved, and that the result might have been very different.

I have thus attempted to describe a line of operations, which would place the reduction of the strongest Native Fortresses byond the power of chance, and which by being grounded on the principle of taking advantage of the fulls and inferiority of construction, observable

After relating the extensionsary success of the Forneth under Moniteur Boary, in 1150, in the assault of Giago, while was considered the strongest IIII Fort in the Carnatic, be observes, that " had the stateck been mode in depigdle, it " *alases*, often defined themselves avery obstitutely behind " *alases*, others defined the store with which " " mumbers or situation, can counterval the terms with which "

in the Oriental system of Fortification, and of CHAP. bringing into play the science and experience (mar attained by Europeans in the art of attack. would render unavailing and nugatory the most desperate valour, and the greatest exertions of their Garrisons. But with all the advantages. that this improved system of attack will undoubtedly offer, it can never be expected, that it shall generally be acted upon in Iudia, until the Army of each Presidency shall be provided with the proper means for carrying it into effect, with a fair prospect of success, which ing Orpet the consideration of the second improvement, where before-mentioned and the second improvement, ing a well trained Corps of Engineer Soldiers. herein to cosh of or of men properly instructed and exercised pmy's beforehand, in all the operations of a siege, to assist the Engineer Officers in their arduons duties in the field. Of all the defects, that have hitherto led to those lamentable disasters, with which many of our Indian sieges have been attended, the want of such a Corps has been the most glaring and permissions; and if that defect be remedied, all the minor arrangements and improvements necessary will follow, as a matter of course.

> During the whole of the wars, that have hitherto been carried on in India, the Company's Engineer Officers have never had a man ou-

ployed under them, who understood before- CHAP, hand any one of the duties, which he was VII. required to execute.

Now, if we were told, that the Artillery of any Power consisted of a body of Officers, with an establishment of guns 'and stores, and sufficiently instructed in the theory of their duties, but who, instead of having a permanent Corps of skilful Gunners under their orders. were only supplied with men to fight their gans on the day of battle; and that they were under the necessity of teaching these men how to load, and fire, and to perform all the other necessary manœuvres of Artillery, in the presence of the enemy; every military man would naturally laugh at such an arrangement as the height of absurdity, and one that must lead to the certain loss of every action, in which the fire of Artillery was of the smallest importance. Yet, absurd as it may appear, such is a correct picture of what has hitherto been the actual state of the Engineer Department of the Company's Armies. The only men generally available for the duties of that Department have heen the Pioneers, and as these men have never been cuployed in military works of this description, excepting upon actual service, it has been the hard fate of the Engineer Officers, to be obliged to teach them every thing that was to be done, either when exposed to fire, or at ORLAP, least when in the presence of the enemy, and VII. thus to wait chose precision moments when in the irksome and laborizons orlargery of an perintending a multimade of little details, which in other services would be the duty of a Private, or, at the units, of a Corport of Sappers. It is a fact, that in our sieges, the Officer of Bagueers in person, has offen had to teach a Pioneer low to make a gabion or a fascine, and to stand over him in the execution of the work?

> \* It may be said, that the Pioneers, after having been enployed in several successive sloges, must necessarily have acquired some portion of that skill, in which they were at first deficient, and on this plea it may be urged, that the character I have given of their inefficiency is too strong. In teply, I used searcely success to the reflecting reader, that the knowledge thus acquired by some individuals out of a large body, without any systematic instruction beforehand, must necessarily be of a most imperfect nature, and if there be no regular practice afterwards to perpetuato it, it must of course evaporate almost instantaneously, and become lost to the service for ever, And, after all lot us ask, what did the Pioneers actually do, or what did they learn in those size os. Weer they in the labit of crowning the counterpeak by sap ? No ! Did they ever work across a dry ditch, or fill up a wet out "ander firs? Never! Did they over breach au enemy's scarp revetments by mining? Never! And yet these are the dation of Europeer Soldiers. Poor, indeed, would the Supper and Miner be considered in Europe, whose skill fike that of our most experienced Native Pioneers, extended no for then the makine of a fascine and a subion, and having some notion of the nature of a battery. By these observa-

The confusion, the difficulties, the loss of time, CHAP. and the consequent loss of lives, which have VIL attended, and which accessarily must attend such an imperfect mode of proceeding, may easily he conceived. Even in the first and simplest operations of an irregular sizere, such as the construction of a portion of a parallel. with a common battery or two, these difficulties have always been sufficient to exhaust the bodies, if they could not subdue the spirit of the Engineer Officers. What prospect of success, therefore, could an Engineer have had in contemplating the long protracted labours. attending the ulterior operations of a regular siege, such as the execution of the san under close musketry fire, without Sappers, and the execution of mines, without Miners? The prospect was certainly appaling, and unless the evils of which I now complain he remedied. tions. I am far from wishing to descretate that respectable hody of men. It has been their misfortune, not their fault, that they have been constantly called upon to perform duties in the field of a most difficult nature, for which they were not qualified, like other soldiers, by previous exercise and instruction. So fa from blaming them, every Engineer who has witnessed their exertions, must admit that they deserve great credit for having shown so much seal, under such very discouraging circumstances. But the opinions of those Officers of the Army, for some there are, who maintain, that the present Pioneers have always been a perfect model of a Military Working Corps, and comal to all the wants of the Service, caunot he too highly reproduted

in the event of new wars, very few Engineers CHAP VII indeed, however scientific or enlightened they <u>نہ</u> may be, will venture to attempt much more than a small portion of a parallel, and a common breaching battery. For the bravest and most zealons men, will scarcely darc to incur the responsibility of recommending a regular siege. when they know that the Army has not the means of executing it with proper vigour, or even with a reasonable hope of success; and that from the general ignorance of such subjects, which unfortunately prevails amongst the Officers of the British Army, any failure that might happen afferwards would be ascribed, not to the want of means, which caused it, but, to the obstinaey of the Engineer, in proposing an impracticable mode of attack. It is true, that from time to time, some very strong-minded man may follow the just rules of the Art. and do his best, without adequate means, in spite of every difficulty, and regardless of the consequences to his own reputation : and it is not impossible, that an Engineer, acting upon such high-toned principles, may succeed: but instances of this kind are very rare indeed in the history of our Indian Campaigns. In the late war, the Siege of Nowa, conducted by Ensign Oliphaut, is the only example of this nature: upon which it may be remarked, that if that enterprising and skilfel. Officer had been

provided with a body of properly trained Sap-CHAP. pers and Miners, the place might undoubtedly VII. have been taken in half the time.\*

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Another cause in some degree contributes to the inefficiency of the Engineer Department of the Company's Armies on actual service: that is the inadequacy of the Officers in point of numbers, arising from the various duties of a more civil nature, intrusted to their charge, and which leave but a very small proportion disposable for the field. In the British Service, in

 The size of Taniore, in 1773, was mentioned in a former note. That of Caroor, in 1760, in which the operations were conducted by Captain Richard Smith, is another instance of an attack upon a similar principle, which also proved successful. The Fort was square, with a bastion at each angle, and square towers in the curtains, and had stone revolments, with a day ditch, but no faussebray. In every bastion there was a cavalier, consisting of a round tower. Cantain Smith commenced his attack by occupying the Pettah, which he connocted by trenches with some mud buildings in front of it, which offered advantageous cover to the assailants on one side. From thence he pushed his approaches in the direction of one of the solicat angles of the Fort, to within 40 yards of the ditch, when the enemy's musketry forced him to have recourse to the double sap, by means of which he reached, and crowned, the counterscarp, and sorung a mine, which blew the sevetment into the ditch. after which the Garrison capitulated. The highest praise is due to the method, and perseverance, with which he brought this siege to a close, with men so very ignorant and inexperienced in such operations, that they were seven days and nights in completing about 200 yards of sap.

CHAP, other parts of the world, where the Corps of VII. Royal Engineers is employed, ten or cleven officers are considered indispensable for a siege of the smallest magnitude, in order to furnish the necessary reliefs, and to provide for the unmerous easualtics incident to this branch of service. But the number I have mentioned is could to one-third of the whole Corps of Madras Engineers ; and although the elimate of India renders impossible such continued personal exertions, as may be made in Europe, and therefore would seem to require rather a streater number of Engineer Officers than otherwise, for a service of a similar nature ; this cirenunstance has been so little attended to, that there have seldom been present at a siege in India, sufficient Engineers to furnish a proper relief.4

> "The remark is equily applicable to the Attiller Q Olices, of show there is never were afficient employed in the same sings to finnish a while": and at the Singe of Assessreption is equivalent, but Olices of the Markon Attillary is earling it ned experimentations and the same single and the same single and A targe suggestations, howevere, which this Corphana sections that period, and a same single and the same single and the one of the same single and the same single and of the same singles in body case of the same single and the Olices couplesyst, will place the start inadepungs of the Olice to the test of the start inadepungs of the Olices to apply which the start inadepungs of the Olices to apply which place the start inadepungs of the Olices to couple syst, will place the start inadepungs of the Olices to apply one start in the start inadepungs of the Single Si

At the Sieges of Belgaum and other places CHAP in the Southern Mahratta Country, there were VII. no professional Engineers present; nor were there collected together at any time during the late campaigns, more than five; and at one period, four out of these five were disabled. But besides the usual duties of Engineer Officers during a siege, which ought to be those of general superintendence only, the labour of instructing the working parties, which is peeuliar to the Indian scrvice, and which as I before remarked, ought to be the office of a Corporal or Private of Sappers, has also been thrown upon the Engineer Officers, so that they have actually been obliged to live entirely in the trenches, and to take food and sleep there, at such moments as they could snatch. These are not represented as hardships. It is not too much to say, that they have always been cheerfally born; nor would such temporary inconveniencies be thought of, if the Engineer Officers

ing point of view. Out of elsewa Ragineer Officers aroning in the field with different Divisions, and a tofficerus times, drawing the war, trees were killed, after laving hern both wounded to forcare contains: "to one ideal of ference, ilse were wounded to use one solitogat to quist the field from Hisen, and have times become suit, to as a fit the recovery of the relativity, and more recently Captain Coventry, who conducted the Signs of Assergimer, has fitted as starifies to the restaries of the restart and the signs of forcer, to which he became subject in consequence of data servers service.

CHAR: who experience them, could look forward with VL: any certainty to the prospect of their halows: being crowned with success. But this has accerleven the case. What their bolies tave been harased by unnecessary futgres, their minds have been torauxed by the anticipations of the failure of every operation of difficulty and importance, in which they have been capged, wring to the want of properly instructed Enritary Soldies, to assist them in their during.

> I have, perhaps, said enough to convince every impartial and reflecting person of the accessity of this important improvement, being immediately adopted in our Indian Army. In one Presidency only (the Bengal Government), steps have actually been taken, for carrying this measure into effect, as was before remarked in the Introductory Chapter." and it is to be hoped, that ere long this salutary example will be followed at the other Presidencies. If however, any other grounds than its own merits were required to prove the advantage that would accrue to the State, from a better organization of the Engineer Department of our Indian Armies, recourse might be had to other examples for anthority; and the course pursucd by all the powers of Europe, with regard to this branch of their war equipments, might be eited as a proof of the high importance that

See Page 18.

is attached to it. But without entering into a CHAP. detail of the Exhabithment adopted by any VII. other nation, I shall only remark, that towards the close of the Peninsular War, the Corps of Royal Sappers and Miners in our own Service, consisted of no less than four Battalions of eight Companies each.<sup>4</sup>

Let us now consider the objections, that are likely to be urged against this important improvement. To those, who assert, that as we have done without Engineer Soldiers hitherto. we may do without them still; and who object to every change, however beneficial, merely because it is a change ; no answer is necessary . for it is vain to oppose by argument, those oninions which have no pretension to be founded upon reason, and which can only be resolved into a blind coulidence of the continuance of that good fortune, which has so often befriended us in our Indian Sieges. If it be said, that although a Corps of this description may he occasionally useful; yet that a siege occurs so seldom in this country, that their ser-

<sup>4</sup> This Gorps has subsequently had its share it the general reductions, which have effected the whole of the fibilith array, since the Pence. The formation into Battalions has been set able allagether, and the protect stytem is to number the Companies, which will publish years and years of the event of great subsensition which all packs hereface. Breay Company is commanded by a Second Capitals, and two Subditters, of the Noral Engineer.

CHAP, views may, as heretofore, be dispensed with; VII. to this I shall briefly reply, that the same reasoning, if valid, would do away the Artillery. and indeed the whole of the Army, in time of Peace: for a battle happens as soldom as a siege, and we ought to be as well prepared to meet the one as the other. Besides, let it be remembered, that it is not merely during a siege. that a Corps of this kind would be aseful. They would also afford means for the military passage of rivers, the want of which is so much felt by every army, that attempts to move in India during the Monsoons, and although the particular organization and equipments most proper for this peculiar branch of the Engineer Denartment, in reference to the nature of the Rivers in India, is too extensive a subject for me to enlarge upon in this Work,\* yet I may

• Every one who has marched with Hone Arelling years in infan during Sharoon, must be storek with the efficiency, if as the impossibility which would stated the transport of a transport of a probability which would stated the transport of a probability of the store weight the combined or store of the store weights of the store of the store weights of the store weight of the store weig

Without attempting, therefore, to organize a Postnon Train of such immense magnitude, it has occurred to me, that

be permitted to advert to the perfection attained CHAP, in this particular branch in the King's service, VII. and to express my hope, that the day may soon

the following system might be substituted in lieu of it, which resolves itself into two distinct measures.

First, Jovaler to provide for the paragos of Rivers of the tion magnitude (of which there are an unaxy), let a small fatticide post the exhibited an high up the River a possible, to serve an a duplic of two situation, eads, or other fancing, holdes if for the purpose of unlikely tradegis, together that a afficient properties of all the other taxes accuracy for scening and ferming the superstructure of the bidley. The same ground is a situation of the other taxes are also been apprecised on the structure of the other taxes are tradegistic to the structure of the other tax and the properties of the scenario magnitude of the other taxes are to first order of the scenario magnitude, in purpose to Rivers of the scenario magnitude, and the structure of the scenario tax (Second and Second anguitation, such as the Tapter, Mair result, Second and Second anguitation.

5 scouldry, The parage of all Rivers of any impertence, being thus provided for, and all utility reliefs expirage ingight be encoded with the study in the field, for the parage of any study of the study of the study of the parage of study of the parage of the larger Rivers, if required, a study large in order of the material the parage, encoded of version or eight paratosis, of the nature single space of the study and the study of the larger Rivers, if required, a study of the study of the study of the study of the study and mathematical study of the study of the study of an equilation of the study of the

The above suggestions are, of course, only the reagh and

CILAP, arrive, when the remark of the Principal Au-VII, thor of this improvement at home, namely, " that the Officers and Men of the Royal Ba-" ginese Department, may enter into competi-" tion with the most expert Ponteoners of any " of the Continental nations," will be equally applicable to the Engineer Departments of the Indian service.

The principal objection, which in all probability will be urged against the proposed improvement, is the additional expense; but when the utility, or rather the indispensable necessity, of any measure is established, the expense becomes a secondary consideration. There are, however, many advantages to counterbalance it. The better founded prospect of success, the great saving of time and of lives, in every siege, and the consequent power of employing greater means against the enemy, in all other operation, in the course of each campaign. Take these circumstances into consideration. Estimate the value of the lives of the European Troops, so lavishly exposed under the present system : together with the increased expen-

crude outlines of a system, which practice and experience alone could bring to perfortion. One preliminary, however, is indispensable for this, and for every other improvement in Bagiseering—a Corps of Soldiess to work with.

<sup>5</sup> See the Preface to Liest.-Colonel Pasley's Elementary Fortification, Note C.

diture occasioned by those failures, which CHAP. must necessarily arise from the wast of Eugineer VII. Soldiers : and the policy of having such a Corps will be admitted, even in an economical point of view. In Peace they may be employed to no less advantage, by following the example of the Royal Engincer Department, in which, so far as it can be done without injury to their efficiency, discipline, and instruction as Soldiers, they are made to assist in the execution of those public works and repairs, which are always going on under the direction of the Engineers, and which otherwise would be entirely performed by hired Artificers and Labources, a set of men not much loss expensive than a Military Corps in Peace, and not available for the public Service, in time of War,

Admitting thencessity of Engineer Soldiers, many on the grounds that have been stated, it will have belong to abler judgest opuint out, and to higher bewhich and an Zestahishment should be carried in fadia, and on the matchia, of which it should be composed: be that abstahing from a full discussion of this part of the subject. I may not be through the subject, I may not be through to apple figure would open a field for employees the full casts, in which I have or Ragineer Soldiers would open a field for the employment of Half Casts, in which they might be brought to part to advantage, such the prescribed to brought to part of a dvantage, such the prescribed to brought forward to advantage, such the prescribed of the field of the state of the subject. CHAP, liar qualifications, if properly directed, appear VII. to render them particularly fit for this branch of service : and thus a race of men, who are daily increasing in numbers, and consequence. instead of being a burthen to the community. as too many of them now are, might be made useful and respectable; and would, by being thus brought into its service, be furnished with a powerful motive of attachment to the State: at the same time, that they would contribute to its defence.\* But whatever class or classes of men may be selected for this duty in India, I cannot help expressing my hope, that they may be organized on the model of the British, not of the French Service. In France, Sapping, Mining, and Pontooning, are all distinct duties: and there are Battalions of Sappers, Companies of Miners, and Companies of Pontooners, each having their respective Officers, and limited to their own peculiar employments. On the great scale of Continental warfare, carried on by the vast Armies, that followed the banners of Napoleon. it is possible that no inconvenience

> \* The idea of employing Hulf Casts (or the descendants of Europeans by Native mothers) is not original, having been suggested by Sir John Malcolm, in a letter addressed by him, in 1817, to Colonel Young, them Military Secretary to Lord Hastings; and it has since been brough before the Madras Government in an official shape, by Major de Haviland, in a report made by him, as acting Chief Engineer, on the state of the Bagineer Department of that Presidence.

may have resulted from that subdivision of CHAP. labour; but it was justly considered, that in the VII. British service, it would be preferable to have all the Soldiers of the Engineer Department disposable for the general duties of the Corps, without distinction: and, therefore, every man is equally instructed and exercised in Sapping, Mining, and Pontooning; so that in every part of the world, the exertions of every Company of the Corps may be commanded, in the manner most useful to the State, according to the nature of the Service going on. A system, also, has been adopted in the Royal Sappers and Miners, of granting extra pay, called working pay, to the men, only on those days when they are employed in actual labour for the public Service, and in three several rates. in which they are classed according to their merit, which is estimated partly by their skill and exertions as workmen, and partly by their regularity and good conduct as Soldiers. This system seems no less worthy of imitation, for by duly proportioning the mean rate of extra pay to the service performed, it involves no additional expense, but is of the highest utility by promoting emulation, and affording encouragement to deserving men, at the same time that it supersedes, in a great measure, the necessity of personal punishment, by acting as a powerful check to idleness and misconduct. +

In urging the necessity of such an Establish-CHAP. VIL ment, I have rested solely on the inconve-سم niencies, we have experienced in being without it, in our recent Wars, in which we have ' always been the attacking power : but the time may come, and the occurrences now taking place in Europe bring the question at least within the bounds of possibility, when we may be brought into collision with European Powers, and be obliged to fight, not for aggrandizement. but for preservation. It is not intended to argue this question, nor indeed is it introduced for any purpose, but to show, that if ever the day should arrive, when we find ourselves opposed to Europeau science, the necessity of an efficient Engineer Department, whether for the · defence of our maritime and other frontiers or for attack, or for the passage of rivers, will become still more imperative. This idea may be thought visionary, and they who are unable to see amid the calm which surrounds them, the presages of a storm, or the element of future convulsions. may think it ridiculous, now that Peace reigns throughout India, to prepare for wars, which may never happen, or which at all events they trust may be far distant; but let such shortsighted persons at least remember, that Peace is the season for organizing an Army, and preparing it for the hone of emergency. Let them also remember, that it is uncertain when that

hour may arrive, or with what Power we may CHAP next have to contend ; and when it does arrive, if we are still unprovided with an efficient Engipcer Department, greater losses, and more numerous reverses, will be experienced than heretofore ; for we must not always expect to be opposed to Powers as irresolute and ignorant of their own strength, as our enemics have proved themselves to be, in the last War. The experience of all ages should convince us of the contrary. Carthage was overcome on her own element, by an enemy, whom she at first desnised. In more modern times, Charles XII. with the finest and best disciplined army in the world, was overthrown at Pultowa, by men, who, but a few years before, had been a horde of barbarians, inferior to the Mahrattas of the " present day, in military skill: and in some of the actions, that took place in our late Naval War with America, we have seen convincing examples of the fatal effects that may result, from holding an enemy too cheap.

In reference to a former part of this Chapter, in treating of the operations of a siege, I purposely avoided entering into any discussion of the duties of the Troops of the Line, in order to confine the undyided attention of the reader to other points, of more urgent importance. In fact, if the defects of the Engineer Department of our Indian Armies be removed, no diffently

CITAT. will be found in employing the other troops, VII. co-operating with them in a size, to the utmose port his character, and to preserve his supporority in every part of the globe; and as far as my experience goes. In an very for from joining the desponding opinion of those, who auticipate our detair, as soon as our Scoper shall considned the second structure of the globe of the source curst, I took forward with condisence othersult, if the day should ever arrive, when they shall be derawn np to meet the hardy myriands of the North. I ann convinced that it only requires Officers at their head, veron they how they be

 I canade, howevere, forbar remarking the great downlaps, that might be diveried in a size from a small properties of Rifleneae, but as the Rifle Corpt is not stufficiently large, and as it night to at cased with the discipline to detath parties from it, to every places, where this kind of nervice is gring on, perhaps forwarder main each Corps might be sured and an pretired with the arthe, whelever the large the same and a pretired with the arthe, whelever the large the same and a pretired of this description, whenever the large light be transition.

+ Although the unmenous instances on record of the high displicity, values, and attachments to their Officans, valueded your Support, are sufficient to establish their military character, the hand-actived fames of our Narker Ahary, has not hole allowed togo undispated; and ouce writer, in particular, goesso fars to using the monotomorpopointion, and those have highaxiaded muss, the Narires of our Provinces, who here makes the protection of our bars, and who in Engling for m, fight absorb for either own families and denset interests, shall be excharged for meneury Arshy, and Mahy.

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steen, for the Markas Native troops to follow CHAP. to the most daring, or even desperate outer-VII. prizer. Largard to their employment at singes, I shall only observe, that notwithstanding the very high optimion I entertain of them, they appear to me, when acting singly, to be wanting in that confidence, and presence of mind, which is the characteristic of the British Soldier; and therefore the advanced satirist thrown on from the covering parties at a sings, should be select Europeans, in preference to Spoys.

THE END.

a carl Davill, Chat

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