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U. S. S. SAN JACINTO

GVL30/416-3 Serial: 0010

(1) BEDUESEMENT to: VI-45/A9-8 0111-acc Serial: 065 dated 23 January 1945.

c/o Fleet Post Office. San Francisco, California, 26 January 1945.



From

To:

Commanding Officer.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Viat

(1) Commander Task Group THIRTY-BIGHT POINT THREE.

(2) Commander Task Force THIRTY-BIGHT.

(3) Commander Third Fleet.
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject!

Aircraft Action Report - Strikes on Formosa and Ie Shima, 21 January and 22 January 1945.

1.

Forwarded.

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In Reply Refer To:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AIR FORCE FIGHTING SQUADRON FORTY-FIVE

VF-45/A16-3/A9 Serial: (006) c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

SECRET

25 January 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT: to VT-45 Secret Ltr. file A9-8/ Ofll-acc, serial (065), dated 23 January 1945

Fromt

Commander Carrier Air Group FORTY FIVE.

To :

Commander-in-Clief, U.S. Fleet.

Via :

(1) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SAN JACINTO.

(2) Commander Task Group THIRTY-EIGHT FOINT THREE.

(3) Commander Task Ferce THIRTY-EIGHT.

(4) Commander Third Floot.

(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subjects

Aircraft Action Report - Strikes on Fermesa and

Te Shima, 21 Jenuary and 22 January 1945.

1. Ferwarded.

G. E. SCHECTER.

VT-45/A9-8 Of11-acc

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE

TORPEDO SQUADRON FORTY-FIVE

Serial: 065

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

23 January 1945.

SECRET

From:

The Commanding Officer.

To :

The Commender-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Via t

(1) Commander Carrier Air Group FCRTY-FIVE.

(2) The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SAN JACINTO.

(3) Commander Task Group THIRTY-EIGHT POINT THREE.

(4) Commander Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT.

(5) Commander Third Floet.

(6) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subjects

Aircraft Action Report - Strikes on Formess and Ic Shime, 21 January and 22 January 1945.

References:

(a) CominCh Serial 7152 of 29 October 1943.

(b) PacFit Confid. Ltr. ICL-45 of 1 January 1945.

Enclosures:

(A) Aircraft Action Report #12, VT-45, Strike on Reigaryo Airfield, Formosa, 21 January 1945.

(B) Aircraft Action Report #13, VI-45, Strike on Shipping at Takno, Formosa, 21 January 1945.

(C) Aircraft Action Report #14, VT-45, Strike on Te Shima Airfield, 22 January 1945.

(D) Aircraft Action Report #15, VT-45, Strike on Ie Shima, 22 January 1945.

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosures (A) through (D) are forwarded herewith.

J. G. PIEGARI.

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OPNAV-16-V-#S37 Form ACA-1 Sheet 1 of 5

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify w) filled out)

I. GENERAL

S	E	C	R	E	T	

-, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -	f: Date 21	January :	1945	Γime (LZ	1/	707	(Zone); L	at. 22 -	28 N	_Long.122	-08 E
	Bombing	Reigaryo	Airfield,	Formos	la.						-9
Mission								f) lime o	t Retur	1010	(Zor
II. OV	VN AIRCRA	AFT OFFICIA	ALLY COVER	RED BY T	HIS REP	ORT.			1		
TYPE	SQUADRON	TAKING		ATTACKING			AND TORPEDOES	5		FUZE, SETTI	NG
(a)	(b)	OFF (c)	ENEMY A/C	TARGET (e)		Critici	(f)			(g)	
M-lo	VT-45	2		0	Pour	500#	G.P.		Nose		
	VT-45			1	Pour	500#	G.P.		Nose		
211-3	V1-47			*		2004	~ ~ ~		Tail	.025	
							-				
^	TILED 11 C	00 411150	ALDCDAET	ELADI OVE	D IN TH	IIC ODE	DATION				
TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE	77	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	T	BASE	
6F-5	VF-45	4 0	.S.S. SAN	JACINT	0						
				1							
				··							
	T	CRAFT OBSE	RVED OR EN	IGAGED ((By Own	Aircraft	Listed in II	Only).	T	(g)
TYPE	NO. OBSERVED	NO. ENGAGING		LOCA	ATION OF		BOMBS, TORPE GUNS O	DOES CARRIEI BSERVED	D;	CAMOUFLA	AGE AND
	. A		(ZONE))							
		F			1						
			(ZONE))							
			(ZONE)								
	ent Enemy M		(ZONE)								
			(ZONE)		cribe Clou						
Did An Encour	y Part of iter(s) Occu	ur in Clouds?			cribe Clou		(BASE IN	FEET, TYPE		THS OF COVER)	
Did An Encour Time o		ur in Clouds?	(ZONE)	If so, Desc		uds	(BASE IN			:	
Did An Encour Time o of Sun	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Brown or Moon —	ir in Clouds?	(ZONE)	If so, Desc	Y, OVERCAS	r; etc.)	(BASE IN	FEET. TYPE(k) Vis	ibility	;	
Did An Encour Time of Sun V. EN TYPE	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Broon	r in Clouds? illiance RAFT DESTR	(YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIGHT ROYED OR D GED BY:	If so, Descar	IN AIR	T; ETC.) (By Owr	(BASE IN	FEET. TYPE (k) Vis	ibility	(MILE	
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Did An Encour Time o of Sun V. EN	y Part of Iter(s) Occur of Day and Brown — IEMY AIRCI (b) DESTRO	r in Clouds? illiance RAFT DESTR	(YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIGHT ROYED OR D GED BY:	If so, Descar	IN AIR	T; ETC.) (By Owr	(BASE IN	FEET. TYPE (k) Vis	Drily).	(MILE	(d) DAMA

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

REPORT No. 12

VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only). CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C,
TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE (e)
EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE,
(Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed) (b) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit) TYPE OWN A/C SQUADRON Operational - Tab Minor - Repairable frozen in neutral on board. position - impossible to hold nose in a target in glide. Operational - hole in Minor - Repairable exhaust - could not on board. 8 get full power. 9 10 12 14 VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left). (b) (c) (a) (d) NAME, RANK OR RATING SQUADRON CAUSE CONDITION OR STATUS

<i>)</i> .	SQUADRON	NAME, KAIN OR KATING	CAUSE	CONDITION OR STATUS
	41 (None		
		•		
	La p	1/3		

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING AV. HOURS IN. AIR (c) MILES AV. FUEL AV. FUEL (a) (g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED MILES TYPE RETURN LOADED CONSUMED MM

(h) NO. OF PLANES A/C 20MM RETURNING 182 130 300

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over		V		
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm			V	*
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	T			

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB, at various altitudes

TURNS DIVES CEILINGS RANGE

PROTECTION

ARMAMENT

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

	BEQRET							
4	4		1			REPORT	No	2

XI. ATTACK ON EN	NEMY SHIPS OF	R GROUND OBJECT	IVES (By Own Aircraft Listed	d in 11 Only).
(a) Target(s) and Locatio		yo Airfield PS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA	UNDER ATTACK) (b) Time Ov	er Target (s	0850 (Zone)
(c) Clouds Over Target	1/10 at 9500	Foot	ONDER ATTACK)		
		(BASE IN FEET	TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)		
(d) Visibility of Target	Clear, HA	ZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED	BY CLOUDS, ETC.)	Visibility	20 MLLes
(f) Bombing Tactics: Type	Glide Bom	(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE)	Bomb Sight U	sed Mark	
Bombs Dropped per Ru	n NUMBER	JUGCIIIU	Select Altitude	of Bomb Re	lease 5000 Poot (FEET)
(g) Number of Enemy Air	craft Hit on Gro	ound: Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Unknown	
(h) AIMING POINT	DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	NO. HITS On Aiming Point	
Main Runway	5000°	7T-45	10	4	
N.W. end of field	30001	1			Sentous
N.E. end of field	8001	VT-45		2	Serious
4 Hangars and	15001	VT-45	2	2	Serious
installation off	X 8001	VT-45		1.	Uncoserved
of South side of				-	
6 Tunway			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
7					
8 ~					

made in the main runway and are apparent in photographs taken after the attack.

At least six yellow single engine planes were observed in revetuents at N.W. end of field. One plane dropped two bombs directly on these revetments. Both bombs exploded in revetment area and one hit directly on a revetment, but it is not known whether or not this was one of he occupied revetments.

Two hits were observed in barracks area at N.E. end of field, but damage to specific buildings was not observed.

Four bombs were dropped on and resulting explosions were seen in hangar and installation area at S.E. side of field, but the smoke and dust from the explosion prevented observation of exact installations hit.

⁽o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)



SECRET REPORT No. 12

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" , Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" , Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

This strike set out with the objective of attacking shipping in Takao and Toshien harbors, Formosa. When the planes reached the Takao-Toshien area there were only a few ships still afloat in the harbors and these were already under attack by numerous planes. The target coordinator directed incoming planes to find other targets. No other shipping targets were observed in a flight along 20 miles of the adjacent coastline. Therefore the strike attacked Reigaryo Airfield, it being one of the larger enemy air bases in the Takao area.

The four VT-45 planes, piloted by Lieutenant Piegari, Lieutenant Osborne, Lieutenant Riley and Ensign Dysert, approached Reigaryo Airfield at 12,000 feet, selected individual target areas and made glide bombing attacks. Bombs were dropped at an average altitude of 5000 feet and the pull out was accomplished at an average altitude of 4500 feet. An average glide angle of 45° and an average speed of 315 knots was attained during the glide. Intense heavy A/A fire was observed over Takao, but during the attack on Reigaryo only a moderate amount of medium A/A fire was encountered. This came especially from the area between the main E/W runway and the smaller NM/SE runway.

O SECRET

REPORT No. 12

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.

Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes Life Belts, Life Rafts Safety Belts Emergency Kits Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

No bombs hung up during this attack on Reigaryo Airfield. All bombs were dropped select instead of automatically by intervalometer setting. It appears that difficulty with bombs hanging up which has been experienced in the past is associated with the automatic dropping mechanism, since consistently better results in this respect are attained by dropping select.

APPROVED BY:

DATE