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Guinea

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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
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
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This General Survey supersedes the one dated July 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.





Country Profile

Guinea

The Decline of a Revolution 1
Promises, Problems, and Paranoia • The
Guineans and Their Country • Unique
Leader, Unique System • Nonalignment
With a List to Port • The Years Ahead

Chronology 15

Area Brief 17

Summary Map *follows* 17

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The Decline of a Revolution

The Republic of Guinea, formerly French Guinea, celebrated the 14th anniversary of its independence—and of the sociopolitical “revolution” initiated by its durable ruler, President Ahmed Sekou Toure—on 2 October 1972. Of the 29 black African states that have made the transition from colony to independent state in the postwar era, only Ghana achieved full sovereignty earlier and few have attracted so much attention at the time of their birth. Indeed, Guinea's emergence on the international scene marked something of a turning point in African history. (U O U)

Two events set the stage for Guinea's bold break with France in the fall of 1958. First, Paris passed a law in 1956 granting its overseas territories in Africa—still colonies in all but name—a considerable degree of autonomy within the framework of the 10-year-old French Union. Guinea's first general elections, made possible by the provisions of this law, swept Sekou Toure's radical nationalist Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) into power in March 1957. The PDG's overwhelming margin of victory—56 out of 60 seats in the Territorial Assembly—enabled Toure to effect a number of administrative changes that undercut the authority of French officials and tightened his party's control over Guinea's domestic affairs. The second critical development was General de Gaulle's accession to power in mid-1958. Sensitive to the growing tide of nationalism in Africa but firmly bent on preserving France's traditional sphere of influence on that continent, de Gaulle decided to replace the French Union with a new and somewhat looser form of association between his country and its overseas possessions: the French Community. This change was incorporated into the draft constitution of the Fifth Republic, which was submitted to referendum in

metropolitan France and all overseas components of the French Union on 28 September 1958. France's African subjects were free to reject the proposed constitution and thereby acquire immediate and complete independence. But de Gaulle made it clear during a tour of French Africa prior to the referendum that a “no” vote would also result in unpleasant economic consequences. (U O U)

De Gaulle's threats did not sway Toure. From the outset, the Guinean leader had indicated that his support for the French Community project rested on the condition that the new organization be a free association of equal partners that would not subordinate African interests to those of Paris. When de Gaulle balked at this demand, Toure threw the full resources of the PDG into organizing a “no” vote in the constitutional referendum. His campaign, organized under the slogan of “We prefer to be poor in freedom than rich in slavery,” yielded dramatic results. In a massive and orderly turnout, Guinean voters rejected de Gaulle's draft constitution and chose the risky alternative of immediate independence by a 20-to-1 majority. (U O U)

Guinea stood alone among France's African dependencies in making this choice. Overnight, it became a beacon for African nationalists everywhere and a testing ground for the viability of a uniquely African path to social and economic development. At the same time, Toure's socialist philosophy and expressed willingness to establish cordial political and economic relations with the Soviet bloc, coupled with France's sudden pullout, opened the way for the extension of Cold War competition into sub-Saharan Africa. In short, Guinea abruptly assumed a political importance on the world stage far out of proportion to its size, resources, or geographic location. (U O U)



Despite the French Government's action in promptly cutting off all financial assistance and withdrawing its administrative and technical personnel, the Guinean experiment got off to an encouraging start. For the Guineans, it was a time of excitement and general euphoria. They were told that their country was to be a socialist-revolutionary state, an arch-enemy of colonialism and a champion

of African liberation and independence. "Revolution" became the new nation's byword, its rallying cry, and the psychological context within which all national policy was conceived and implemented. Touré's enthusiasm and his conviction that "where there's a will there's a way" were contagious. Not only was his assault on colonialism immensely popular, but his promises to build a modern, unified, and egalitarian

society grounded on the more progressive aspects of African culture and tradition struck a responsive chord among the Guinean people—particularly among those groups which had been most disadvantaged by preindependence tribal customs and colonial practices. Hopes for the future were further buoyed by knowledge that Guinea possessed considerable mineral wealth and by timely offers of economic assistance from the Soviet bloc.

Toure's bold rhetoric was matched by equally bold action. His highly organized PDG was able to capitalize on popular enthusiasm and nationalistic fervor to launch a program of radical political and economic change in remarkably short order. Justification for potentially controversial moves was readily found in the broadly accepted imperative of national unity. All opposition political parties were either disbanded or absorbed into the PDG. For its part, the PDG moved to insure its continued supremacy by tightening its control over all aspects of political and social life. The process of staffing responsible positions at all levels of the governmental bureaucracy with party militants was pushed to completion. In order to weaken old tribal and regional allegiances and to develop a pervading sense of national identity and pride, the PDG's leaders pressured virtually everyone—young and old, literate and illiterate, Europeanized urbanities and back-country peasants—to assume an active role in the affairs of the country. Nationwide youth and women's organizations were established to complement the work of the party. The PDG's own grassroots structure was greatly expanded, and no town or village was neglected by its organizers. Within 2 years, some 8,000 party cells were in operation, and by 1964 Toure could boast that one out of every 11 persons in Guinea held a government or party post of some kind.

The emphasis on popular involvement spilled over into the economic field, where the regime was seeking ways in which to resolve the basic contradiction between its commitment to revolutionary principles, including rapid "decolonization," and its continued need for financial and technical assistance from the West. Both to compensate for the country's shortage of investment funds and to impress foreign observers, the PDG organized an extensive program of voluntary labor—the so-called *investissement humain*. Their standard of living still largely unaffected by their country's break with France and generally persuaded that preservation of their revolution merited almost any sacrifice, the Guineans flocked to contribute their time and energy to a number of ambitious public works projects. The program's initial results were

encouraging, and the government promptly accorded *investissement humain* a major role in its first development plan. Fully 20% of the total budget allocation for the 1960-63 planning period was slated to be contributed by voluntary labor.

Revolutions, however, have a way of running out of steam, and the Guinean revolution soon proved to be no exception. Toure simply could not fulfill the promises he had made. For one thing, Guinea's new one-party system did not live up to advance notices. Popular enthusiasm gradually gave way to apathy as more and more Guineans concluded that rather than providing them with a means for effective participation in the management of national affairs, Toure's political reforms had saddled them with a vast and expensive new bureaucracy. Moreover, this bureaucracy not only was totally subservient to the Toure regime but was beset by inertia, incompetence, and petty graft.

The regime's inability to deal with Guinea's economic problems was—and still is—another major factor contributing to popular disillusionment. By mid-1960, Toure's tendency to subordinate the economic implications of his policy choices to generalized political goals was beginning to have an adverse effect on living standards and efficiency. His haste in extending the public sector had outrun his ability to find or train competent Guinean replacements for departing European managerial and technical personnel. Moreover, fear that their firms might be nationalized—or, at the very least, be subjected to ever more burdensome new governmental controls—prompted many foreign businessmen to close their doors, thereby aggravating an already serious urban unemployment problem. Toure's action in withdrawing Guinea from the French franc zone—a step he deemed necessary to both the appearance and exercise of full national sovereignty—had an even more disruptive impact. Introduction of an inconvertible Guinean franc discouraged new and much-needed Western investment, induced a shift in Guinea's pattern of trade toward barter deals with the Soviet bloc, and placed the ambitious goals of Conakry's 1960-63 development plan hopelessly beyond reach. Smuggling became a major problem, affecting both internal and foreign trade. Domestic shortages of foodstuffs and consumer commodities, compounded by mismanagement in the state-operated distribution system, bred inflation and black marketeering.

Toure's response to these problems and to the malaise which was spreading over the country was to tighten party discipline, impose further curbs on civil

liberties, and appeal for greater effort and vigilance against "counterrevolutionary elements." As the country's economic situation continued to deteriorate, PDG charges of "counterrevolution" became more frequent. Guinea's failures were attributed to the machinations of reactionary, neocolonialist, and imperialist enemies at home and abroad. Proclaiming a virtual state of seige, the government moved steadily toward a harsher and more authoritarian style of rule, and Guineans were urged to inform on one another. Local traders and private businessmen became the object of particular abuse and discrimination. Purges and political trials underscored the hazards of even mild opposition to Toure's policies.

From the capital in Conakry came still more declarations of determination to create a socialist and egalitarian society. For many Guineans, however, Toure's revolution had long since become a matter of words rather than substance. *Investissement humain* degenerated into a program of forced labor and then gradually faded into obscurity. Disgruntled Guineans began to flee abroad on a scale comparable to the westward exodus of East Germans before the erection of the Berlin Wall. By 1971, at least 600,000 people—a figure equal to one-fifth of Guinea's estimated total population at independence 13 years earlier—had emigrated by legal or illegal means. A few thousand exiles ventured as far as Nigeria and even France, but most settled closer to home—in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Portuguese Guinea. Their proximity reinforced Toure's growing obsession with the threat of counterrevolutionary conspiracies. The exposure during the 1960's of several antiregime conspiracies, allegedly involving foreign backing of domestic enemies and hostile Guinean exiles, convinced Toure that his government was the object of a "permanent imperialist plot."

The attack on Conakry launched in November 1970 by a small Portuguese military force augmented by Guinean exiles seemed to bear out his worst suspicions.¹ The effect of this episode on Guinea's foreign and domestic policies was dramatic. In the international field it resulted in even closer ties with

¹Portugal, angered by Toure's support of insurgents fighting in Portuguese Guinea, collaborated with dissident Guineans in organizing a small 300-400 man seaborne attack for the purpose of freeing Portuguese prisoners, striking at the insurgents' headquarters in Conakry, and, hopefully, toppling Toure. The first two objectives—Lisbon's primary goals—were swiftly accomplished. The Portuguese elements of the raiding force withdrew to waiting ships with the liberated prisoners within 24 hours of the initial landing. The Guinean dissidents, however, waited ashore for a popular uprising which never materialized. It is likely that all were eventually either killed or captured.

the Communist states, including the stationing of a small protective Soviet naval force just over the horizon from Conakry. At home it led to a reign of terror which completed the transformation of Guinean socialism from a single-party populist affair into a hardened leftwing dictatorship.

Toure blamed his security forces' inability to deal with the invaders with greater dispatch on the existence of a fifth column comprised of surviving bourgeois elements. Accordingly, he launched a sweeping purge of party and government officials, many of whom apparently were guilty of little more than favoring more moderate political and economic policies. This was followed by mass arrests, forced confessions, show trials, and scattered executions. According to his own statements, Toure imprisoned 17 of 21 Cabinet members, 90% of the senior officers in the armed forces and security services (including the commanders of the principal military garrisons), and 11 of 29 provincial governors. He also jailed two former ambassadors to Washington, the chief of his own bodyguard, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Conakry, and scores of civil servants, doctors, engineers, and other educated people.

The impact of Toure's frenzied housecleaning campaign was twofold. On one hand it strengthened his grip on the levers of power and either cowed or destroyed all visible potential rivals. On the other hand, it resulted in the elimination of a very large portion of the body of politically, administratively, and technically experienced Guineans which had been developed at great cost since 1958. This loss, together with the paralysis generated by an atmosphere of fear and denunciation, soon led to new difficulties—particularly in the economic field.

But Guinea's slide toward political dictatorship and economic stagnation should not obscure some of Toure's successes or his country's basic potential for viable—if not prosperous—statehood. Few other African leaders have done so well in overcoming divisive tribal and regional loyalties or in creating disciplined and truly national political institutions. No other radical regime in black Africa has proved so durable. And, despite his potentially inhibiting commitment to socialism and economic independence, Toure has sought and secured the assistance of private Western capital in the development of Guinea's mineral wealth. Because of huge new bauxite mining projects, Conakry can at least look forward to a helpful rise in export revenues, no matter how great the assortment of the other problems it must face in the years ahead.

The Guineans and Their Country (1960)



Forest region village

Except for their postindependence political and economic system, there really is rather little that distinguishes the Guineans—or their country—from their immediate neighbors on the southwestern edge of the great bulge of west Africa. Guinea's size (it is slightly smaller than Oregon) and population (about 4 million) are closely comparable to those of Senegal and Ivory Coast. Although it is a partial heir to the series of west Africa empires which stretched from the Atlantic coast to the Sudan between the 10th and 15th centuries, the country has no distinctive unifying historical traditions of its own. Indeed, as in the case of many other African states whose size and shape were determined by the rivalry of European powers during the colonial era, Guinea's frontiers were drawn with scant regard for natural terrain features or the homogeneity of the population. Bordered on the north by Portuguese Guinea and Senegal and on the east by

Mali and Ivory Coast, its territory curves inland in a thick arc which surrounds much of Sierra Leone before reaching its southernmost limits along the borders of Liberia. It is an awkward configuration and one which has contributed to Toure's obsession with the threat of foreign intervention.

Guinea's enervating tropical climate and its swampy, delta-like coastline have tended to discourage would-be colonizers, investors, and tourists alike. But despite the country's modest size, it is a land of considerable diversity and natural wealth. Four major topographical and climatic regions can be distinguished, three of which coincide with areas in which one tribe is predominant over a host of lesser peoples.

Basse Guinee, also referred to as Maritime, Coastal, or Lower Guinea, consists of a 30- to 60-mile wide coastal plain with an average elevation of less than 300 feet above sea level. Bisectioned by meandering rivers

which empty into broad estuaries and tidal creeks bordered by mangrove swamps and marshes, the region was dubbed *les Rivières du Sud* by early French explorers—a name it retained until the late 19th century. Although it is characterized by extreme humidity, heavy rainfall (well over 150 inches annually), oppressive temperatures, and dense broadleaf evergreen forests, it is one of Guinea's more thickly populated areas. Pockets of rich alluvial soil permit the cultivation of a wide variety of tropical crops, and the movement of produce to ports and urban markets along the coast is relatively easy. Villagers grow rice, millet, corn, kola nut trees, and oil palms on thousands of small plots carved out of the forests and swamps. Large-scale agriculture, however, is limited to a few pineapple and banana plantations founded by Europeans in the preindependence period. And despite the fact that few places in Guinea are better suited for raising food crops than the coastal plain, prospects for markedly increasing production there—either by increasing the acreage under cultivation or by achieving higher yields per acre through the introduction of more advanced farming methods—are far from bright. At best it seems likely to be a long time before Conakry has the financial and human resources needed to deal effectively with the problems created by the area's heavy rainfall: excessive ground moisture, flooding, leaching, and the formation of alkaline pans.

Moyenne-Guinée (Middle Guinea) rises abruptly from the coastal plain in a series of steep ascents which culminate in the massif of Fouta Djallon. It extends to the eastward reaches of that massif—a fact which has given rise to the widespread practice of using Moyenne-Guinée and Fouta Djallon as interchangeable regional designations—and embraces about one-third of Guinea's total land area. Although the terrain is relatively rugged—much of it consists of scrub-covered hills and plateaus ranging from 1,500 to over 5,000 feet in altitude—living conditions are much more pleasant than along the coast. Rainfall is not so heavy, and there are wider daily and seasonal variations in temperature. Because of this, and because the region is generally well suited to both agricultural and pastoral pursuits, population densities tend to be high. The area's economic significance, however, is not limited to the livestock, citrus fruits, coffee, bananas, wheat, maize, and rice which are raised there. Some of west Africa's largest rivers—including the Gambia and Senegal—rise in the Fouta Djallon and provide Guinea with considerable hydroelectric potential as they plunge downward in picturesque rapids and falls toward more gently

sloping tablelands. More important, the country's largest known deposits of bauxite—those at Kindia, Fria, and Boko—lie in the hilly terrain where Moyenne-Guinée meets the coastal plain. Other promising deposits have been found at Tougue and Dabola on the Fouta Djallon massif itself, but these have yet to be fully evaluated.

Haute-Guinée (Upper Guinea) lies to the east and south of the Fouta Djallon. It is Guinea's largest—and least favored—geographic region. Consisting primarily of gently rolling savanna plains which average about 1,000 feet in altitude and which are almost devoid of mineral resources, Haute-Guinée is a sparsely settled and relatively arid area. The southwesterly monsoons sweeping in from the coast have lost much of their moisture by the time they reach the savanna. There are occasional heavy rainstorms in the summer, but from November through March dry, dusty winds blow across the area from the Sahara, creating a hot, withered desert environment. The sun is obscured throughout much of the year—in the wet season by clouds and in the dry season by dust and smoke from brush fires. Daily variations in temperature and humidity can be extreme. The area's inhabitants tend to cluster along the forest-lined banks of the Niger and its tributaries, eking out an existence by raising cattle, hunting, and, during the wet season, growing cassava—the tropics' thick-rooted counterpart of the Idaho potato—millet, peanuts, tobacco, sweet potatoes, and a little rice.

Guinée Forestière (Forest Region), which occupies the southernmost corner of the country, is Guinea's most primitive area. Far from Conakry and served only by a sparse network of unpaved roads, it is characterized by mountainous terrain, a hot and humid climate, and lush vegetation. The rounded hills and scattered peaks of the Guinea Highlands traverse the region from northwest to southeast. Most of the area is 1,500 feet or more above sea level, and on the Liberian frontier Mont Nimba—Guinea's highest mountain—rises to over 6,000 feet. Except for a few of the higher hills and ridges, the land is covered with a dense rain forest which extends across Guinea's borders into the neighboring states of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. Game and wild fruit abound, and crops are easily grown on cleared land. Hence, while portions of the rain forest are virtually uninhabited, Guinée Forestière as a whole is rather densely populated. Most of the inhabitants earn their livelihood by collecting kola nuts, palm oil kernels, and quinine bark in the forests and by raising rice, corn, and cassava in the river valleys. But despite the general backwardness of the area, it is of considerable

potential importance to the Guinean economy. Its timber resources—as yet untapped—are vast. Extensive iron ore deposits have been found in the Souloumandou (Simandou) mountain area and on the northern slopes of Mont Nimba. With additional investment and tighter controls on smuggling, the region's coffee plantations and diamond fields could yield substantial export revenues.

Guinea's population is as diverse as the terrain it inhabits. There are at least 18 distinct tribes, many of which spill over onto the territory of one or more neighboring states. More than two dozen related—but generally not mutually intelligible—languages or dialects are spoken. Some three-quarters of the people are Muslims, but animism flourishes in parts of Basse-Guinee and Guinee Forestiere, and nearly 40,000 Guineans—most of whom live in or near Conakry—are Christians.

The country's three largest tribes, the Fulani, Malinke, and Susu, together include more than 70% of Guinea's population and continue to enjoy a corresponding preponderance of social and political power. The predominantly Muslim Fulani, some 1.6 million strong, hold sway in Moyenne-Guinee. Primarily a pastoral people and relatively recent arrivals in the area (the Fulani did not enter the Fouta Djallon in force until the 18th century), they are Guinea's largest tribe, even though they constitute only one-fourth the total number of their kinsmen scattered elsewhere throughout west Africa. The Fulani gained their dominant position in Moyenne-Guinee through a series of holy wars waged against nonbelievers. By the early 19th century, most of the area's original inhabitants had been killed, converted, or expelled, and a Fulani elite was firmly established at the helm of a feudal and tightly organized Islamic domain. While the influence the Fulani subsequently came to wield throughout much of what is now Guinea was curtailed—and the sociopolitical system they had established in the Fouta Djallon area disrupted—by the advent of French colonial rule, they remained the country's most powerful and privileged tribe until the eve of independence. And although they now enjoy a much less exalted status, neither the preindependence changes in the traditional political order nor Toure's postindependence egalitarianism have completely erased the Fulani's elitist outlook. In fact, Toure has never really trusted the Fulani, and Fulani officials have generally been among the first to feel the impact of Guinea's recurrent purges and internal crises.

Haute-Guinee is dominated by the Malinke tribe, half of whose members reside in Mali and Upper

Volta. The Malinke are Guinea's second largest tribal group, accounting for approximately 19% of the country's total population. Like the Fulani, they are Muslims—in fact they were among the first Negroid peoples in west Africa to come in contact with Arab civilization and culture. But unlike the Fulani, the Malinke adhere to a highly localized version of Islam, and their traditional society was characterized by autonomous village units rather than by centralized political control. Proud descendants of the founders of the vast Mali empire which reached its zenith in the 14th century, the Malinke eventually fell under Fulani domination. Although they proved to be remarkably adaptable to modern influences during the colonial era—developing a reputation as a hard-working people willing to try their hand at anything from agriculture to retail trading and soldiering—the Malinke were unable to compete with the Fulani for power and prestige before Toure came to power. Now, however, the two groups' relative positions have been reversed. Toure is part Malinke, and his tribesmen have received a disproportionately large share of the important posts in his regime.

The third of Guinea's major tribes, the Susu, dominates Basse-Guinee. Constituting something less than 12% of the national population, the Susu are far less numerous than the Fulani and the Malinke, but their concentration in and around Conakry, their aptitude for farming and trading, and their ability to assimilate small neighboring tribes have given them a degree of political and economic influence far out of proportion to their numbers. The Susu originated in the former French Soudan, drifting into Moyenne-Guinee about 500 years ago and remaining there until forced to move to the coastal area by Fulani expansionism. Except for the fact that they lack a hereditary aristocracy, they are quite similar to the Malinke in their social customs. The Susu's commitment to Islam is more tenuous, however. While most of them profess to be Muslims, many Susu engage in traditional animist practices.

With about 250,000 members, the Ngere tribe is the largest of the half-dozen or so primitive tribes which inhabit Guinee Forestiere, but it does not dominate the area. Isolated from each other and from outsiders by mountains and dense vegetation, most of the forest peoples still live in scattered self-governing and self-sufficient communities. They tend to be quite independent and resistant to change. Not only was Guinee Forestiere the last part of Guinea to fall before French colonial troops, but Islam has made only limited inroads in the area. The forest tribes remain predominantly animist.

As the troubled histories of a number of Africa's new states attest, a heterogeneous population can present a particularly formidable obstacle to the nation-building process. In Guinea, however, the disruptive effects of ethnic and linguistic diversity have been minimized by the interplay of a number of factors, not the least of which has been the political skill of Toure himself. For one thing, French colonial rule blurred traditional societal relationships, accustomed the Guineans to firm centralized control from Conakry, and furnished them with a language which—in its rudimentary form—is at least understood by many people in all parts of the country. Then too, Guinea's preindependence ethnic rivalries were not as deep-seated and bitter as those in some other parts of west Africa. Memories of Fulani expansionism still rankle, but—except in Guinea Forestiere, where the resident tribes are too small to aspire to much influence or autonomy—common adherence to Islam constitutes an important factor favoring national unity and intertribal cooperation. For his part, Toure has waged a relatively successful campaign against the more divisive and feudal aspects of tribalism while drawing on his countrymen's religious preferences and natural pride in their own cultural and historic achievements to strengthen their sense of revolt against their colonial past and to encourage them to unite under a banner of militant nationalism.



Unique Leader, Unique System (c)



President Sekou Toure

Unlike their political counterparts in most other African nations that gained independence in the late 1950's or early 1960's, Toure and his principal lieutenants were not members of a favored tribal or Europeanized elite. Instead, they were leaders of Guinea's labor movement, for the most part men who were strong on organizational skills but weak in formal education. Their Marxist leanings, acquired through close contact with French Communists, marked them as potential troublemakers in the eyes of the colonial

administration. In fact, the French not only gave Toure no support but repeatedly tried to thwart his political ambitions.

Toure rose to prominence at an early age. Born in Farama on the upper Niger River in 1922, he was only 23 when he organized Guinea's first trade union, 24 when his union activities cost him his job as a postal clerk with the French administration, 25 when he became one of the founders of the PDG, 28 when he was named secretary general of the coordinating

committee of the General Confederation of Labor (CCT) for all of French West Africa, and 30 when he assumed the top post in the PDG. He began running for political office in 1951 but met defeat at the hands of French-supported opponents until January 1956, when he was elected to the post of deputy in the French National Assembly. Thereafter, his rise was meteoric. In rapid succession he became mayor of Conakry, vice president of Guinea's Executive Council, and a member of the Grand Council of French West Africa. Following the PDG's sweeping victory in the 1957 territorial elections, Toure became Guinea's *de facto* premier. And as soon as his country had gained its independence, he was unanimously elected its President by the National Assembly.

While Toure's claim to be the grandson of Guinea's most revered national hero—the Malinke warrior chief Samory Toure—adds a certain luster to his popular image, he likes to be regarded as a man of the people. He is, in fact, a self-made man with a reputation for toughness and honesty. He pursued his education by correspondence after completing his rather limited formal studies at French and Koranic schools in Faranah. Intelligent and articulate, he soon proved himself to be a gifted orator with a talent for translating his thoughts into lively images and parables which appealed to his generally unsophisticated audiences. On the negative side, Toure tends to be emotional and impetuous. But although he sometimes overreacts to events, his durability attests to his basic political skill.

An avowed socialist, Toure has set down the ideological guidelines for the development of his country in some 18 volumes of his thoughts. In general terms, he is committed to African unity, to emancipation of his country from all forms of foreign domination, to a one-party system, and to state control of the economy. His overall philosophy consists of a unique amalgam of concepts drawn from African values, non-Marxist French philosophers, and Communist tenets. Whatever its flaws, its strongly nationalistic overtones appeal to most Guineans. And it has served Toure well in his efforts to stamp out parochial tribal and regional loyalties and to make his countrymen more receptive to the "revolutionary" authority of the PDG.

Indeed, the hybrid political system which Toure has established rests more heavily on ideological than legal foundations. Guinea's constitution makes no mention of the PDG. It does provide for a conventional and highly centralized republican form of government,

complete with a strong President, a Cabinet, a National Assembly, and a full complement of regional and local governmental bodies. It goes on to spell out jurisdictional relationships and to guarantee all Guineans an extensive list of civil rights. But most of these latter provisions are little observed in practice.

Invoking overriding revolutionary principles, Toure has curtailed the rights of his countrymen and has set the PDG above all other Guinean institutions. Party organizations parallel—and monitor—governmental bodies down to the *arrondissement* (county) level. Below that, in villages and urban wards, local government is handled entirely by bodies created and staffed by the PDG's 8,000 basic cells. In Conakry, the party and government hierarchies converge—to the detriment of the nominal prerogatives of most ranking government officials. The seven members of the PDG's highest executive body, the National Political Bureau (BPN), also hold the highest posts in the Guinean Cabinet. The BPN is chaired by Toure—who as President of the Republic, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Secretary General of the PDG stands at the apex of both the government and party structures—and its decisions have the force of law. The Cabinet's second echelon ministers—currently 28 in number—serve primarily as executors of policies formulated by the BPN. Predictably, the 75-member National Assembly plays little more than a rubberstamp role.

While the PDG's organizational structure and emphasis on "democratic centralism" are borrowed from orthodox Communist practice, its mass nature is a distinctly local innovation—one well suited to Guinean circumstances. Toure's success in rapidly replacing traditional chiefs and elders with party cadres was in no small part the result of his decision to draft virtually all Guineans into the ranks of the PDG and its affiliated youth and women's organizations. Over time, the well-disciplined and broadly based PDG has succeeded in extending the span of its control over all potential institutional rivals, including the trade unions and the military establishment. Nevertheless, Toure's version of one-party rule has a number of serious drawbacks. For example, the inaccessibility and insulation of the top leadership have given the PDG an increasingly elitist cast and has hastened Guinea's drift toward outright dictatorship. Equally important, the centralized nature of the system and the tendency of lower ranking officials to refer almost every decision to the BPN have made that body a bottleneck. The adverse effects of this development have been most apparent in the economic field.

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Toure invariably blames his problems in the economic areas on imperialists abroad and bourgeois elements at home. They are, however, largely of his own making. Prior to independence, Guinea's economic prospects were bright. It possessed one-fifth of the world's known reserves of bauxite as well as extensive iron deposits, and ambitious plans for the expansion of mineral production—including the creation of one of the largest industrial complexes in Africa—were in an advanced stage. Agricultural production was growing steadily, and the country seemed to be well on its way toward achieving both self-sufficiency in its principal food crops and a substantial increase in its exports of bananas, coffee, palm oil, and peanuts. A parallel increase in livestock and fishing yields seemed likely, and untapped reserves of timber, hydroelectric power potential, and arable land gave promise of new areas of economic growth in the future.

Despite this favorable situation, Toure could not reconcile his ideological beliefs with the basically capitalistic economic structure he had inherited from the colonial era. Further disenchanted with the capitalist world by the abrupt withdrawal of French assistance and the failure of other Western nations to pick up where France left off, he moved rapidly to transform the Guinean economy into a centrally planned and somewhat radical socialist system. His haste, his readiness to adopt orthodox but unsuitable socialist solutions, and his overriding concern with the political implications of his reforms triggered an economic decline from which his country has yet to recover. Once rising encouragingly, Guinea's per capita GDP has hovered in the vicinity of \$80 for over 10 years now—a level comparable to that of impoverished and backward Mali but only one-quarter to one-half that of any other bordering state.

Ironically, the economic system which Toure has created is neither truly socialist nor truly planned. Nor is it any more independent of foreign aid or politically motivated special trade arrangements than it was before Guinea pulled out of the French franc zone. It is an inefficient mixture of private enterprise and state ownership which suffers from many of the disadvantages of centralized government control while

benefiting from few of the redeeming aspects of such an approach. Above and beyond the heavy private foreign investment in the mining sector, it has taken over \$500 million in grants and credits from both East and West simply to keep the economy afloat. And if Conakry had not been able to turn to the Soviet bloc as a market for its less competitive exports after the loss of French trade preferences, Guinea's current economic problems would unquestionably be even more acute.

The Toure regime has built an elaborate structure of interlocking ministries, established a development planning apparatus, and nationalized most industry and finance. Yet it has failed to produce the economic incentives, skilled cadre, and rational programs needed to give life and direction to the economy. Whether because of a lack of high-level interest or a shortage of expertise, Conakry's first two development plans have been little more than lists of public investment to be made in various sectors of the economy. The lack of clearer guidance, a marked reluctance to allocate much in the development funds to agriculture, and pure bureaucratic inefficiency have all contributed in a major way to Guinea's current economic ills.

But even though Conakry's hand rests heavily on all economic activity, private initiative continues to play a crucial role in the Guinean system. Early plans for the forced collectivization of agriculture ran into trouble and were abandoned. Despite the subsequent introduction of a voluntary collectivization program, most of Guinea's crops still are raised on small family plots. Similarly, President Toure has been enough of a pragmatist to continue to encourage private foreign investment in the exploitation of Guinea's minerals. And unlike agriculture—where production has stagnated or declined as the result of transportation and marketing difficulties, soil exhaustion, plant disease, and a lack of fertilizers and spare parts—the prospects for the bauxite industry are fairly bright. Already the dominant source of foreign exchange, bauxite may generate as much as \$100 million a year by the early 1980's—twice the sum earned by all exports in 1971.

Nonalignment With a List to Port (s)



Tito toasts Guinea's President in Belgrade

Not surprisingly, Guinea's diplomacy bears the stamp of President Toure's personal assertiveness, reflecting his militant anti-imperialism and continued efforts to promote African integration along lines which would sharply curtail the influence of outside powers. These are key elements of his campaign to foster a sense of national identity and pride, to maintain the momentum of the Guinean revolution, and to strengthen the foundations of his country's sovereignty. As in the domestic field, however, there have been some rather basic contradictions between the radical philosophy of the Conakry regime and pragmatic considerations of self-interest. Its record in resolving them has been mixed. Despite Toure's aspirations to a leading role in regional affairs, he has

been considerably more successful in managing his relations with most of the leading Communist and Western nations than in dealing with many of his African neighbors.

Although Toure is ideologically ill disposed toward the capitalist world, he has boldly exploited his credentials as a charter member of the nonaligned movement to take full advantage of the opportunities for economic and political gain offered by East-West and Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Third World. Despite some sobering experiences, he seems to retain boundless confidence in his ability to play one contender for influence in Guinea against another. Under his leadership, the Conakry regime has acted as if it carried more weight than it does—believing in

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effect, as though beggars could be choosers. Thus, although Toure's ideological views place Guinea alongside the Communist nations on most international issues, he has repeatedly demonstrated his determination to avoid political or economic domination by any foreign power—Communist or otherwise. Sparing only China among its major economic benefactors, Conakry has alternately charged both East and West with attempting to meddle in Guinea's internal affairs. Western businessmen and diplomats have borne the brunt of these attacks, but on two occasions—in 1961 and 1969—Toure ordered Soviet ambassadors to leave because of alleged involvement with Guinean dissidents. A Soviet vice consul was quietly expelled in January 1972, presumably for the same reason.

Conakry has generally sought to reduce the risks involved in thus antagonizing a major power through a combination of private assurances of continued good will and open overtures to rival states designed to deter (or, if necessary, to offset) punitive sanctions. So far, at least, these tactics have worked reasonably well. Despite cutbacks and delays occasioned by Toure's intemperate behavior, Guinea has received more foreign economic assistance on a per capita basis than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa. Aid on this scale may not be forthcoming in the future, however, for the easing of Cold War tensions has limited Toure's ability to exploit East-West rivalries to his advantage. Nevertheless, flagging Soviet interest in Guinea was revived by the windfall opportunity for influence-building brought about by the Portuguese-directed attack on Conakry. And although Guinea's relations with the West have been severely strained since that affair, continued U.S. aid seems probable, and Toure is likely to continue to welcome sizable U.S. private investment in his country's mineral industry.

In Africa, on the other hand, Toure's brash behavior and close ties with Communist states have reinforced misgivings about his domestic policies and have eroded the prestige and influence he originally enjoyed. He has alienated the more moderate African states by his radicalism on African unity and by his criticism of their maintaining close ties with former colonial rulers. He has further alienated neighboring Senegal and Ivory Coast by accusing them of involvement in plots to overthrow his government. Another factor contributing to Guinea's occasional political isolation has been Toure's practice of harboring dissidents or exiles from other African countries. Ghana's late President Kwame Nkrumah, who was granted asylum following his ouster in 1966 and resided in Guinea until shortly before his death in


Romania in 1972, is a notable example. Another is Siaka Stevens, who successfully engineered the overthrow of Sierra Leone's military regime in 1968 from a haven in Guinea.

Stevens' accession to power in Freetown—and the assistance Toure gave him in putting down an attempted counter coup in 1971—quite naturally has resulted in a marked improvement of Conakry's relations with its small neighbor to the south. And thanks largely to the conscious efforts of Presidents Tubman and Tolbert, Guinean-Liberian relations have long been relatively cordial. But in general, Toure's repeated efforts to break out of his relative isolation have met with little lasting success. He first tried to link his country to other radical states through the Ghana-Guinea-Mali "union" and the Casablanca Group (composed of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the UAR, and the Provisional Government of Algeria). Neither organization functioned effectively, and both were dissolved in 1963. Toure next pinned his hopes on the Organization of African Unity (OAU) but was quickly disappointed by that organization's lack of militancy and its failure to exert firmer leadership over African affairs. He has not attended an OAU summit since 1965.

The overthrow of the two radical west African presidents who generally shared Guinea's pan-African anticolonial views—Nkrumah in February 1966 and Modibo Keita of Mali in November 1968—placed Toure in an even more isolated position. Some months prior to Keita's downfall, Toure had begun to advocate regional cooperation among both French- and English-speaking countries in west Africa. But his support for this idea was halfhearted, and progress was stymied by larger political considerations involving France's relations with its former colonies. In any event, Guinea's relations with Senegal and Ivory Coast—as well as with Paris—were soon strained anew in the wake of the raid on Conakry in late 1970.

The 1970 attack won Toure considerable sympathy and material aid from other African states, but much of this good will was dissipated by the harshness of the domestic purges that followed. The need to refurbish his government's image prompted Toure to embark on a new fence-mending campaign in early 1972. As a result, there has been some improvement in Guinea's relations with Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Ghana—diplomatic relations with the latter were reestablished in early 1973. Conakry and the post-Keita regime in Mali have publicly buried the hatchet. Additionally, Toure seems to have found a new friend and potential economic benefactor in President Mobutu of Zaire.

The Years Ahead (s)



It is possible that a new and more encouraging turning point in Guinea's postindependence development was reached in the late spring of 1972. By then the worst of the purges and mass arrests were over, and Toure had regained sufficient confidence in the security of his regime to turn his attention to his country's mounting economic problems. He declared that the time had come to build the material base of

socialism in Guinea, and for the first time there were indications that he might be willing to give economic objectives precedence over short-range political considerations.

If Toure is successful in improving Guinea's economic performance and thereby in reducing popular dissatisfaction, he might feel secure enough to relax the harsher features of his authoritarian system and thus breathe new life into the Guinean revolution. However, it is far from certain that Toure has actually embarked on a more moderate and pragmatic course. He has taken some steps during the past year to improve relations with his ideological "enemies" in Africa and, to a lesser extent, in the West, and he has introduced a number of new economic policies. But by charging, in September 1972 and again in February 1973, that preparations were once more underway for a foreign-backed invasion and by renewing his warning that he would respond to aggression by killing all political prisoners plus all resident nationals of any country implicated in the attack, Toure served notice that his old phobias still exercised a strong influence on his behavior.

In time, of course, continued failure to achieve and maintain a more rational balance between ideological predilections and the cold realities of Guinea's domestic and international circumstances could have disastrous consequences for the Conakry regime. But it is difficult to predict what it might mean for Guinea if Toure were to be abruptly removed from the scene. Even if inclined toward more liberal and pragmatic policies, his successors would inherit a host of political and economic problems which could severely limit their freedom of maneuver. Hence, unless sustained by substantial infusions of foreign aid, a new Guinean revolution could run out of steam as quickly as the old.

Chronology (u/ou)

1945

October

France grants political rights to African colonies, and Guinea elects representatives to French parliament for first time.

1946

October

African Democratic Rally (RDA) is founded by left-of-center African politicians from French colonies.

1952

Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), Guinean branch of the RDA, is reorganized and Sekou Toure becomes secretary general.

1957

March

PDG wins 57 of 60 seats in Territorial Assembly and forms territorial cabinet. This assembly later becomes first National Assembly of the Republic of Guinea.

1958

September

In referendum Guinea rejects membership in French Community.

October

Guinea proclaims independence.

1960

February

FRIA (now FRIGUIA) alumina processing complex begins operations.

July

Three-Year Plan inaugurated.

1961

January

Sekou Toure elected to 7-year term as President of Guinea.

November

Leftwing "teachers plot" against government is exposed, followed by subsequent loosening of Guinea's close ties with Communist countries.

1964

November

In response to continuing economic decline, Toure decrees Guinea's "fundamental law of the revolution," which calls for greater state control of economy.

1965

October

Plot to overthrow the Toure regime is uncovered. Toure charges Ivory Coast and France with complicity and breaks relations with both.

1966

March

President Toure offers Kwame Nkrumah haven in Guinea after Nkrumah is overthrown by Ghanaian Army.

October

Guinea's Foreign Minister is detained in Accra by Ghanaian officials as hostage for return of Nkrumah to Ghana. Toure holds United States responsible because minister was taken from U.S. commercial airliner. Issue resolved through OAU mediation.

1968

January

National elections held; Sekou Toure reelected President of Guinea by near-unanimous vote.

September

Guinea signs \$64.5 million loan with IBRD to finance exploitation of Boke bauxite deposits by Western consortium.

1969

January

Toure establishes political committees in Guinean Army, deemphasizes its military role, and increases its involvement in civic action programs.

March

About 40 military and civilian officials arrested in connection with alleged coup plot.

June

Toure narrowly escapes assassination during state visit of Zambian President Kaunda. Assailant is killed by security forces.

1970

November

Guinean exiles and Portuguese forces stage commando raid on Conakry, hitting the headquarters of the rebel movement opposed to Portuguese rule in Portuguese Guinea and freeing Portuguese prisoners captured by the rebels and held in Guinean Army camps.

December

Soviet naval vessels take up patrol off Guinea coast in response to Toure request.

1971

January

Toure charges West Germany with complicity in the 1970 attack on Conakry; all West German nationals are expelled from Guinea and relations are broken.

National Assembly sentences 92 persons to death and 72 to life imprisonment for their alleged part in 1970 attack.

March

Guinea and Sierra Leone sign mutual defense agreement. Guinean troops immediately sent to Freetown to protect President Stevens from mutinous army troops.

June

Hundreds of Guineans and some foreigners arrested and interrogated. *Radio Guinea* airs extensive confessions which assert that U.S. and major Western powers were engaging in spying and subversion.

1972

April

Ninth National Congress of PDG announces government reorganization and points to economic development as principal concern for 1972.

April-May

Two brief visits to Liberia by President Toure mark first time in several years he has ventured outside Guinea.

May-July

Unusually large number of foreign dignitaries visit Guinea, including Cuban Premier Castro and Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny.

1973

January

PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral assassinated in Conakry.

Area Brief*

SECRET

LAND:

Size: 95,000 sq. mi.
Use: 10% arable, 20% potentially arable, 4% forest reserves, 66% savanna and woodlands
Land boundaries: 2,160 mi.

WATER:

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 130 n. mi.
Coastline: 215 mi.

PEOPLE:

Population: 4,068,000, average annual growth rate about 2.3%
Military manpower: Males 15-49, 959,000, of whom 48% fit for military service
Ethnic divisions: 96% African (3 major tribes—Fulani, Malinke, Susu; and 15 smaller tribes)
Religion: 75% Muslim, 24% animist, 1% Christian
Language: French official; each tribe has own language
Literacy: 5% to 10%; French only significant written language
Labor force: 1.8 million, of whom less than 10% are wage earners; most of population engages in subsistence agriculture
Organized labor: Virtually 100% of wage labor force loosely affiliated with the National Confederation of Guinean Workers, which is closely tied to the PDG

GOVERNMENT:

Legal name: Republic of Guinea
Type: Republic; under one-party presidential regime
Capital: Conakry
Political subdivisions: 29 administrative regions, 209 arrondissements; about 8,000 local entities at village level
Legal system: Based on French civil law system, customary law, and presidential decree; constitution adopted 1958; no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Branches: Executive branch dominant, with power concentrated in President's hands and a small group who are both ministers and members of the party's politburo; unicameral National Assembly and judiciary have little independence
Government leader: President Ahmed Sekou Toure, who has been designated "Supreme Leader of the Revolution"
Suffrage: Universal, age 18 and over
Elections: Approximate schedule—5 years parliamentary, latest in 1968; 7 years Presidential, latest in 1968
Political parties and leaders: Only party is Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), headed by Sekou Toure
Communists: No Guinean Communists have been identified, although there are some sympathizers
Member of: ADB, ECA, FAO, ICAO, ILO, ITU, Niger River Commission, OAU, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO

*The material in this Area Brief is Unclassified/Official Use Only unless otherwise indicated.

ECONOMY:

GDP: \$275 million (1965 estimate); about \$80 per capita
Agriculture: Main cash crops—coffee, bananas, palm kernels, pineapples, citrus fruits; main food crops—rice, cassava, corn, fonio, sweet potatoes, peanuts, sorghum; livestock raised in some areas
Major industries: Alumina, light manufacturing and processing industries, bauxite mining
Electric power: 99,700 kw. capacity (1968); 450 million kw.-hr. produced (1971); 112 kw.-hr. per capita
Exports: \$50 million (f.o.b., FY71); alumina, bauxite, coffee, pineapples, bananas, palm kernels
Imports: \$80 million (c.i.f., FY71); petroleum products, metals, machinery and transport equipment, foodstuffs, textiles
Major trade partners: Communist countries, Western Europe, United States
Aid: Communist countries, \$309 million extended through December 1972; United States, \$118 million through FY71; West Germany, \$35 million through 1970
Monetary conversion rate: Prior to 13 February 1973, 22.7 sylvia equal US\$1
Fiscal year: 1 October-30 September

COMMUNICATIONS:

Railroads: 505 miles; 500 miles meter gage (3'3/4") and 5 miles standard gage (4'8 1/2"); additional 85 miles standard gage completed but not yet operational
Highways: 4,725 miles; 465 miles paved; 2,610 gravel and improved earth; 1,650 unimproved earth roads
Inland waterways: 1,115 miles navigable
Pipelines: None
Ports: 1 major (Conakry), 3 minor
Merchant Marine: 1 ship of 1,000 g.r.t. or over, the *Simandou* at 10,764 g.r.t. or 15,290 d.w.t.
Civil air: 5 major transports
Airfields: 16 usable and 4 sites; 2 with permanent surfaced runways; 3 with runways 8,000-11,999 feet and 5 with runways of 4,000 to 7,999 feet; 2 seaplane landing areas
Telecommunications: Inadequate system of open-wire lines, small radiocommunication stations, and one radio-relay link; principal center Conakry, secondary center Kankan; 7,500 telephones; about 100,000 radio receivers; 1 AM, no FM or TV stations; 3 submarine cables

DEFENSE FORCES:

Personnel: Army, 5,000; navy, 300; air force, 200; militia, 8,000; gendarmerie, 1,000 (C)
Major ground units: 4 infantry battalions, 1 special battalion, 1 armored battalion, 1 engineer battalion, and 1 paracommando battalion (S)
Ships: 10 (4 patrol boats, 2 motor torpedo boats, 1 motor gunboat, 2 motorboat submarine chasers, 1 mechanized landing craft) (C)
Aircraft: 36 (18 jet, 16 prop, 2 helicopters) (C)
Supply: Military equipment primarily of Soviet origin (C)

SECRET

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
Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u/ou)

		COORDINATES				COORDINATES	
		° 'N.	° 'W.			° 'N.	° 'W.
Bafatá, Portuguese Guinea	12 10	14 40	Kourémalé, Mali	11 57	8 47		
Balé (strm)	9 52	9 43	Kouroussa	11 28	9 13		
Ballay (rr sta)	10 31	11 55	Labé	10 39	9 53		
Bambadinea, Portuguese Guinea	12 02	14 52	Lébékéré	11 19	12 17		
Basse-Guinée (region)	10 00	14 00	Maceuta	12 07	12 24		
Benti	9 10	13 13	Makona (strm)	8 33	9 28		
Beyla	8 41	8 38	Mali	6 59	11 36		
Boffa	10 10	14 02	Mamou	12 05	12 18		
Boké	10 56	14 18	Méli (strm)	10 23	12 05		
Buchanan, Liberia	5 53	10 03	Mélikhouré (strm)	8 17	10 41		
Camayenne, Presqu'île de (peninsula)	9 33	13 40	Milo (strm)	9 10	13 10		
Cap Verga (cape)	10 12	14 27	Monrovia, Liberia	11 04	9 14		
Conakry	9 31	13 43	Moyenne-Guinée (region)	6 19	10 48		
Dabola	10 45	11 07	Niandan (strm)	11 00	12 30		
Dakar, Senegal	14 40	17 26	Niger (strm)	10 39	9 41		
Dalaba	10 42	12 15	Nimba, Mont (peak)	5 33	6 33		
Danané, Ivory Coast	7 16	8 09	Nimba, Monts (mts)	7 37	8 25		
Dinguiraye	11 18	10 43	Nunez, Rio (strm)	7 35	8 28		
Dubrêka	9 48	13 31	Nzérékoré	10 50	14 32		
Faranah	10 02	10 44	Pita	7 45	8 49		
Fodécontéa	10 50	14 22	Pongo, Rio (estuary)	11 05	12 24		
Forécariah	9 26	13 06	Port-Kakandé	10 03	14 04		
Fouta Djallon (region)	11 30	12 30	Samou (strm)	10 39	14 37		
Freetown, Sierra Leone	8 30	13 15	Sangaredyi (mine)	9 56	13 14		
Fria	10 27	13 32	Sankarani (strm)	11 06	13 46		
Ganta, Liberia	7 14	8 59	Sansalé	12 01	8 19		
Grandes Chutes	9 55	13 07	Sérédou	11 07	14 51		
Guéckédou	8 33	10 09	Sigui	8 23	9 17		
Guinea Highlands (upland)	9 30	10 00	Sisséla (rr sta)	11 25	9 10		
Guinée Forestière (region)	8 30	9 00	Sougéta	10 50	10 38		
Haute-Guinée (region)	10 30	9 30	Souloumandou (mts)	10 09	12 32		
Kambia, Sierra Leone	9 07	12 55	Tamara, Île (isl)	9 10	9 10		
Kankan	10 23	9 18	Télimélé	9 29	13 49		
Kamsar	10 40	14 36	Tinguilinta (strm)	10 54	13 02		
Kassa, Île (isl)	9 29	13 45	Tinkisso (strm)	10 56	14 18		
Kédougou, Senegal	12 33	12 11	Tombo, Île (isl)	11 21	9 10		
Kérouané	9 16	9 01	Tougué	9 31	13 43		
Kimbo	10 24	13 33	Victoria	11 27	11 41		
Kindia	10 04	12 51	Vridi, Ivory Coast	10 50	14 33		
Kiniéro	10 24	9 45	Wassou	5 15	4 02		
Kissidougou	9 11	10 06		10 02	13 39		
Kobeya	10 44	10 22					
Kogon (strm)	11 01	14 42					
Kolenté (strm)	8 55	13 08					
Koliba (strm)	11 57	15 06					
Konkouré (strm)	9 58	13 42					
Konkouré	11 59	12 06					
Koundara	12 29	13 18					

Selected Airfields			
Conakry	9 35	13 37	
Faranah	10 02	10 46	
Kankan	10 24	9 18	



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Population and Selected Ethnic Groups




Persons per square miles
 0 25 75
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 Persons per square kilometer
 TOMA Subdivided tribe






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
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