МОРЕ НЕ СПИТ.

UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIET NAVY: A HANDBOOK

by

Robert B. Bathurst

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PREFACE

Although everything in this book, one way or another, is about the Soviet Navy, much of it may seem to wander far afield. That is because the object of this study is not just to provide a history of the Soviet Navy and a review of current tactics and strategic doctrine, but also to provide a basis for predicting how the Navy will be used—a guide to action, as it were.

Prediction is a military necessity. The strategist cannot afford the intellectual security of traditional scholarship, that of being able to analyze events after the passage of time. The military leader, like everyone else, must learn from the past but his professional competence is determined by his ability to manipulate his resources in the present and to be prepared for the future.

It is presumptuous, perhaps, but possible to write about the employment of the Soviet Navy in the future. Because of rapidly changing policies and administrations, one hardly could, and then only with too many qualifications to make it meaningful, write about the future of the U.S. Navy or that of many of the major navies in the free world. However, in the Soviet Union changes occur slowly within a system that sets up a series of absolute limitations. The variables within those limitations may be numerous but they are controlled by an ideology that makes them more easily predictable. It is the thesis here that once one understands the operations of the culture and ideology, one can make reasonably accurate predictions about the composition and use of the Soviet Navy in future years.

Understanding those elements of Soviet ideology that pertain to the use of the navy also prepares one to understand patterns of response that may occur in crises. In crisis management one must not only know patterns of an adversary's response but also how he views *his* adversary and what decisions he is likely to make on the basis of his assumptions about that adversary's behavior. For example, Americans usually think of themselves as logical, rational, and rather conservative in their decisionmaking. The Soviets, however, appear to view Americans as impetuous, emotional, and easily angered. Whether that is justified is not particularly important. The point is that those are the qualities

that the Soviets will take into consideration when deciding how to respond to situations with a crisis potential.

In understanding the Soviet Navy it is practical to stop reacting to the veracity of Soviet claims and to ask only if a given notion is an operative concept. Whether true or false, does it seem to influence Soviet behavior? For example, the Soviet line is that skillful Soviet diplomacy and restraint kept the Cuban missile crisis from becoming more serious than it was and that Soviet intervention caused the Japanese surrender in 1945. In view of the complete Soviet control of information, one must accept those versions of history as "operative" within the Soviet Navy. No one within the Soviet Navy would dare to argue otherwise.

This study will try to avoid organizing naval activities into discrete categories, paired opposites, such as offense and defense, coastal and blue-water, etc., for two reasons. First, there are certain emotional responses that have become attached to these terms that tend, by standardizing responses to them, to channel thought too narrowly. For example, "offensive" is widely considered to be much better and more honorable than "defensive." When the Soviet Navy was considered a "defensive" navy, it was not taken very seriously and the radical developments that were occurring and that laid the foundations for the modern "offensive" Soviet Navy tended to be ignored or inaccurately appraised. As we shall see, the Soviet concept of warfare is such that these terms are at best misleading and in Soviet epistemology only partially applicable.

The second reason for avoiding such terms is that in trying to understand the Soviet Navy as a dynamic force, it is undoubtedly wise to avoid—as much as possible—the language of mechanistic categories. In doing so one can more easily see new combinations and escape one of the major pitfalls of current and past analysis, that of translating Soviet reality into our own terms and then responding as if Soviet concepts were identical to ours—the mirror-image problem.

There are excellent studies of the Soviet Navy by Robert Herrick, Michael MccGwire, and John Moore, among others, that tell us nearly all of the facts that we can hope to learn from available sources. This book is intended to fill a different gap. To date there have been no studies by Western analysts of the Soviet Navy as a Marxist-Leninist force. In fact, there are few studies in any of the disciplines related to political science that focus on Soviet naval developments through Soviet ideology. As a result, few of those whose business it is to react to the Soviet Navy realize

how much of Soviet behavior can be predicted, how dissimilar its goals are from ours, and how unlike its decisions are from our decisions.

Understanding the Soviet Navy is not easy. The Soviet Government, like the Imperial Russian Government before it, makes considerable use of false information—disinformation. (Anyone from the Premier on down, including the admiral of the fleet, may be lying as a matter of official policy.) Second, the language that is used is basically incomprehensible to those who have not studied the concepts of Marxism-Leninism (which is perhaps why many assume that the Soviets surely do not mean what they say). And finally, what is said is based upon a very different hierarchy of values from our own.

As the reader will have guessed, there will have to be some lengthy discussions before we get to the crux of the matter. However, to win at chess, or in war, the victor will be the one who has had the foresight to move his assets to the right initial positions. Ideas can be like that, too. It is difficult to figure out what someone is doing until you have watched him from all sides. This book is intended to give the view from some of the missing angles.

INTRODUCTION

THINKING ABOUT NAVIES

When one reads a Soviet analysis of war—that it is the result of the class hatred, that its cause is economically determined, or that naval power is related to an attempt to control the means of production—one wonders if the Soviets really believe that. We see the world so much as a reflection of our own notions that we doubt others' realities. This becomes extremely serious when one government tries to convey a threatening signal to another but when the signal is interpreted to have a different meaning. Such a signal was our proposed evacuation of refugees from Bangladesh by aircraft carrier in 1970, interpreted by the Indian Government as a signal of hostility, approaching an act of war. Relations between the two countries have not been the same since.

Navies can be used to convey signals. In fact the chief function of a navy, or any military force for that matter, is not to fight, but to convey signals that are so clear that battle becomes unnecessary. Admiral Gorshkov acknowledged that when he wrote:

> Many examples from history attest to the fact that under feudalism, as well as under capitalism, problems of foreign policy have always been decided on the basis of the military strength of the "negotiating" sides, and that the potential military strength of one state or another, created in accordance with its economic resources and taking into account its political orientation, frequently made it possible for it to implement an advantageous policy to the detriment of other states not possessing commensurate military strength.[1]

(That Admiral Gorshkov put quotations around the word "negotiating" is significant. One of the somewhat ominous arguments running through his book is that sufficient power can bring rapid change.)

The idea of a naval ship as a sign was specifically stated by Engels when he said, "A modern naval ship is not only the product of a major industry, but is at the same time an example of it."[2]

Gorshkov concludes that a "Navy can be a graphic affirmation of this and an arbitrary indication of the level of development of the country's economy."[3]

Of course, in a political system of signals a navy is not just a deterrent—for deterrence means preventing someone from doing something that he wants to do—but part of a large group of signs that may actually define a nation's view of its political reality. Those things that a nation sees as quite vital are easily influenced by its system of interpretation, which is to say by its peculiar pattern of signals.

For example, in the United States it is widely assumed that an attack against one of our naval ships would be tantamount to an attack against the country itself. That is part of the U.S. system of interpretation. Through our foreign policy, we teach other countries "to respect" our system of values. It is probable that the U.S.S.R. would not interpret such an event in a similar way. The Soviet system is different.

How enormously different a system of signs can be is illustrated by the fact that Iceland, with no significant navy whatsoever, would undertake a so-called "cod war" against Great Britain, an infinitely greater power; or that another small island, Malta, would challenge, as it did in 1970, not only Great Britain but all of NATO. These countries were responding not only to signals but also to the absence of signals that had existed in the first half of the 20th century. At that time, they would not have dared to defy the great powers.

Obviously, signals are interpreted according to cultural differences. A "rational" analysis can be very unimportant in predicting behavior. The problem is that signals are always part of a cultural system, a code, and one has to be able to decipher the code from within that system to assign values accurately. If one is outside the system, then one reacts only to the signals that one perceives and assigns values to them in accordance with one's own system. For example, the importance of the adaptation of the surface-to-surface missile to the small torpedo patrol boats was for many years not generally perceived in the West. For Western navies, signs had to have a certain dimension to attract attention. We were reacting to big ships, big guns, and big kill ratios. We tended not to react to mere words, either. We did not understand until 1975 the significance of Admiral Gorshkov's statement, first made in 1967, that the navy should serve in defense of state interests.

It is perhaps helpful to think of the Soviet Navy as a mass of signs about power relationships, some of which we will interpret

correctly, some of which we will not understand, and many of which we will not perceive at all. For example, when in the 60s the Soviets shadowed U.S. Atlantic carrier crossings, they were conveying signals that we did not understand. It was only later, when we understood that the Soviet aircraft were part of a system meant to prove that the carrier "problem" was solved, that the reason for the shadowing became clear.

Of course, no one even within the system can respond with consistent accuracy to these signs that are always confusing, frequently contradictory, and sometimes purposefully false. Even when one does respond one is also conveying signals that, of course, immediately alter all of the values. Reading the code is a dialectic game with infinite variations. It never ends.

Whether they like it or not, military leaders are in the business of reading the signals and devising a system for conveying their own. They must determine the code to which the signals relate (in this case it is Soviet military strategy that is the result of a very different mentality).

The problem is always to understand the alien code, the foreign system of signals. For instance, after years of denigrating the aircraft carrier as being obsolete, a floating coffin, an easy target, the Soviets have built two. What is the signal to foreign navies? What is this change in their strategy that has made the aircraft carrier a justifiable undertaking? In reversing their position, what are the Soviets telling their own people, their navy, their allies?

Understanding the Soviet system of signals is not easy because it is very different from our own. Sometimes the Soviets seem irrational; they do not properly understand their own vital interests, we think; they misjudge us; and they lag behind in what we consider important fields. That is to say that the Soviets do not choose, whether they wish to or not, the same system of signs. It is surely a commonplace notion, but one almost always forgotten in asking our favorite question—"Who is ahead?", that with a different perception, one has a different code. That is a double-edged sword. We tend to ask the wrong questions and are satisfied with the wrong answers. We do not recognize what they are up to because our code is different. The first video-data link between submarine, bomber, and missile was such an example. It took us some time to read because that was not our way. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the expulsion of poets were others. We could not comprehend the Soviet logic.

In order to get a handle on the different systems, let us make a comparison of the codes, signs, and signals used by the United

States and the Soviet Union, not in order to say who is ahead, but in order to grasp how the two systems work. First, let us consider military strategy. Here the Soviet code is quite clear. There are at least two major aspects. The first is that war with the capitalist nations is probably inevitable although there is some possibility that it may be avoided. The first strategic principle for the Soviet Union is that now the main law of war is to attack first with a surprise and devastating blow. The objective has to be complete victory which means that one must have superiority of forces and destroy the warmaking potential—both industrial and human—of the enemy. Obviously, deception is one of the principal rules of war and intimidation is one of the primary rules of peace. The late Marshal Malinovsky, the Soviet Minister of Defense, explained this when he said:

> The best method of defense is to warn the enemy of our strength and readiness to smash him at his very first attempt to commit an act of aggression . . . . This is why we do not hide our points of view on the nature of future war and the means of conducting it and present them in this book *Military Strategy*.[4]

A second implication of this overall military strategy of the Soviet Union is that as the leading socialist power it will inevitably be the object of attack. It follows that the defense of the Soviet Union is in part the defense of the future of socialism for all mankind. Therefore, the various sacrifices that are to be made both at home and abroad to insure the military victory of the Soviet Union are both moral, justified, and assumed to be obvious to the international proletariat. A second major implication of this strategic doctrine is that since this war that will take place is a class war, its nature will not be limited to national boundaries. Just as the Soviet Union is the leader of the workers' movement, so the United States is the leader of industrialists. Therefore, the distinction between the United States and its "cohorts" and satellites becomes somewhat blurred. This concept was behind the situation that emerged in the SALT talks in which the Soviet Union wanted to lump the British and French nuclear submarines together with those of the United States. Soviet strategy gravitates toward emphasis on people's (primarily workers') rebellions and guerrilla warfare and assumes that ours concentrates on coordinated armed conflict directed by governments composed of the servants of the capitalists.

The United States, on the other hand, in spite of its alliances in NATO and other organizations, tends to think of itself as

strategically alone in its military calculations. It recalls with difficulty that the Soviets might take a war with Western Europe, but without the United States, seriously or that Soviet cruise missiles may have to be considered strategic weapons in France.

Part of the problem in adjusting our concepts is that Soviet strategy is not an aggressive strategy in the sense that Napoleon and Hitler had aggressive strategies. This is because of its class nature and its domination by the rules of "scientific" Marxism. Scientific Marxism argues that until the proletariat is ready for a socialist revolution, it is premature to try to force it into action. This idea of Marx was extremely annoying to Lenin and to Communist theoreticians who were impatient for the advent of socialism. But it has been a useful, face-saving device in such embarrassing situations as the Egyptian debacle and the Sudan. One could always argue that conditions were not ripe for socialist power. But although this feature of Marxism is not in its nature aggressive, it always contains within itself a plan for aggression. The Soviet Union's duty is always to support the progressive proletariat whenever the Soviet center, socialism's heartland, is not threatened and to thwart the capitalists' designs. A corollary that promotes aggressiveness is that because socialism is the wave of the future, it is always moral. Those things done to advance its interests, including war and aggression, are justified and those capitalist efforts to thwart or delay the advent of socialism are immoral. Thus, any action taken against capitalism is ethically justified.

If we turn to the basic strategic doctrine of the United States, we have an immediate problem. An overall strategic code is difficult to cite. The Soviet principles provide a kind of grand strategy. In the United States, there is nothing comparable unless it is the idea of maintaining the current balance of power, the international *status quo*. This is not evolutionary doctrine. Since Vietnam, our previously messianic code calling for world democracy has been in a decline. Certainly we do not view international relations as dynamic, developmental, or dialectical. Such a code is quite sensible for a rich and comfortable nation, but it does not translate into any clear military, much less naval, strategy. This is reflected in the American Navy's mission statement that primarily outlines the Navy's functions or capabilities. The signals that this and the counterpart statements by the Army and Air Force give are that they are flexible, useful, and reliable instruments of executive policy. Such mission statements are what the Soviet military writers would call "operational art." They relate not

to strategy but to problems that would require tactical planning for their implementation.

Our major strategic goal is largely negative—that of deterrence. It is important to note that the two basically different understandings of deterrence lead to two different interpretations. The United States and its armed forces, through their expenditures and planning, intend to convey the signal that war is impossible. In conveying this signal, they tend to minimize or ignore the nuclear aspects of modern war which the Soviets emphasize. We concentrate on the feasibility of limited war and practice for that.

The Soviets, who have a doctrine that war with the United States is very difficult to avoid, if not inevitable, emphasize the need to fight and win that war under nuclear conditions. Therefore, Soviet training and exercises stress nuclear war and only secondarily take into account the possibility or importance of limited war. Given the Marxist/Leninist interpretation of history, this is very reasonable. Only through a nuclear war with a nation of the magnitude of the United States could the advent of world socialism be seriously delayed. Other wars, so long as they can be contained, are only of transitional historic importance.

Soviet naval officers study operational art in addition to strategy. The primary task of the Soviet Navy is to intercept the threat as far from the shores of the Motherland as possible. Massive naval exercises, such as *Okean* I and II, were designed to signal the Soviet Navy's superior ability to accomplish this task. Through the construction of an enormous number of submarines, the Soviet Navy signaled its plan to prevent the resupply of NATO.

Because of their defensive nature these demonstrations of Soviet naval operational art are sometimes interpreted in the West as signs of the inferiority of the Soviet Navy.[5] Such an evaluation is not invalid but it is a projection of Western values based upon the Western system of thought. In any case, such judgments are the prime reason that the true nature of Soviet militarism has been so largely misunderstood for so many years in the West where a defensive role is considered an inferior one.

On the other hand, Western demands for aggressive codes reflect, quite naturally, the competition between the services for leading roles. They also derive from strategic ideas that date from the 18th and 19th centuries in which political and social units were thought of as occupying distinct spacial and temporal areas. They do not consider ideas such as the international proletariat for example. They assume that control of the seas, or at least control

of the sea lines of communication or of specific colonial territories, are definite goals that can be realized by one service acting alone. Such notions are based on the idea of balances of power and the assumption of the possibility of a conclusive victory. Obviously, the origin of such ideas is extremely different from that based on class warfare. Whatever the strategic problems the West thinks it faces, they are not the kind that Marx defined, the kind of problems the Soviets are trying to solve, or the sort with which Lenin dealt.

Other goals of operational art may not seem military at all at first glance. They are the kinds of problems that for the success of the socialist revolution are by far the most crucial and that our Navy, with its offensive orientation, largely ignores. They are those that Gorshkov referred to as carrying out state interests. They may range from largely military—such as the various shows of force during military crises off the coast of Israel and Lebanon—to largely cultural such as the former Imperial Navy Day Celebrations in Ethiopia. These are all part of the Soviet concept of operational art because a navy, as a sign, cannot divest itself of its military, and political significance.

For the Soviet Navy these signs have an economic significance as well. From the Marxist/Leninist point of view, the navy, as a class symbol, conveys an economic signal to the proletariat of any country that it is a means of liberation from exploitation.

All of these signs that the Soviet Navy conveys tend to be very different from those of the U.S. Navy. That is because ships, even if exactly equal by every standard measurement, are totally different because of the things they represent. They are signs that relate to a national past as well as to the present and future. The interpretation of those signs, either the intention of the originator or the understanding of the recipient, is not easy. For example, the Japanese objection to nuclear-powered U.S. ships visiting their ports does not relate to the ships themselves or perhaps even to the United States but to associations with the nuclear bombs of the Second World War. In the same way, U.S. visits to African ports, where the United States has never been a colonial power, may crystallize hostility rather than reduce it because of African associations of periods of European economic exploitation.

The appearance of an extremely sophisticated U.S. naval ship in the port of an undeveloped nation probably does not have much of a technological impact because the United States is known to be the world's technological leader. However, the appearance of a Soviet ship with sophisticated radars and weapons may convey the

idea of the extraordinary achievements of the proletariat and peasants of a backward nation in catching up with, and possibly overcoming, the technological superiority of the former colonial powers. The propaganda literature that the Soviets on these occasions dispense is clearly meant to support that idea. It is not a question of who is superior but of who seems to be so.

It would be extremely shortsighted to underestimate the importance of the state interests that the Soviet Navy is serving for, in the end, the competition will be won or lost by the battle for men's minds, as it was in Vietnam. The Soviets are aware of this. Their strategic doctrine states that one of the most important factors in war is the morale, the level of the people's spirit, in the struggle. Elements of Soviet strategic planning relate to the morale of not only their own people but also those in the target nation. This is what we call psychological warfare and in doing so we set it aside as a category reserved for specialists, but by giving this operational category a central place in their doctrine, the Soviets make it a part of the navy's principal (and thus more aggressive) concepts.

The problems of "showing the flag" are extremely complex and studying them yields enormous dividends as Cable's book, *Gunboat Diplomacy,* and Ken Booth's articles show. Particularly important is understanding that in this kind of operation the signal conveyed and the signal received may fit two different codes of meaning and be very differently understood. For example, the easy relationship and informality between officers and their superiors and between officers and enlisted men as well as the mixture and quality of races in the U.S. Navy do not go unnoticed throughout the world. The Soviets, too, are aware of the importance of public opinion. They greatly modify their behavior for foreign visits in order to try to convey a democratic aspect and to mask the totalitarian and class relationships that in fact have been reestablished in the Soviet Union. But the subtle signs of authoritarianism are easily detected.

Finally, we must also compare the two navies in terms of tactics. The postwar U.S. Navy has had, roughly, three tactical periods: from 1945 until about 1960 tactics that had been developed in World War II were perfected; from about 1960 until 1973 the tactics of the Navy's new strategic mission were extrapolated from the presumed role of the aircraft carrier and strategic ballistic missile submarines; and finally, since 1973, the Navy, after the decline of the strategic role of naval aircraft, has had the problem of finding a new mission.

The role of our navy in modern warfare is in doubt but that only reflects the fact that the nature of modern warfare is in doubt. This contrasts rather fundamentally with Soviet strategic goals and concepts that have never been in doubt, although the tactics of implementation have changed. Our assumptions and goals were different from those of the Soviets and led to a very different kind of naval strategy. Take the concept of sea lines of communication, the foundation of Mahan's theory of sea control. Mahan's theory was that a strike against the communications of a country, across the seas, was a strike at the power of that country itself. It was not at all unlike Lenin's theory of the weakest link, that to seize control of the source of raw materials in the colonial nations was to emasculate the industrial powers. But given two somewhat similar ideas, we concentrated on control of the seas as an end in itself and the Soviets concentrated on control of the emerging nations.

In recent years, a new dimension has been added. It is no longer obvious that a strike against one element of the power of a country is necessarily a strike against the country itself. The *Pueblo* incident, the Cuban missile crisis, the rescue of the *Mayaguez,* and the cod war off Iceland have demonstrated that threats to the integrity of a nation do not necessarily lead to war. This has greatly weakened traditional naval strategy that depended more on presence—the art of symbolic warfare—than it realized.

The United States has been concerned in a traditional way with its ability to maintain sea lines of communication to Europe for the resupply of NATO. The Soviets, who have had no experience of "sea lines of communication" as being different from "land lines of communication" have understood this as simply part of the overall strategy of preparing for the decisive war to destroy the socialist camp. Consequently, Soviet tactics involved moving out the perimeter of their defense in accordance with a strategic theory of defense zones. It was the kind of theory that one might adopt for defending mountain passes or water barriers.

In the West it was not assumed that the Soviets really believed what they were saying about our intention to unleash a war for the destruction of the socialist camp. Other explanations were required, and most often they centered on the assumption that the Soviets themselves were preparing for an aggressive war, primarily one to break our sea lines of communication. The fact that they did not construct ships that seemed suitable for that mission was a constant mystery. They did give, however, some encouragement to such theories in about 1963-64 when they reconstituted the naval

infantry and began constructing amphibious ships. However, unfortunately for the proponents of Soviet aggression, the amphibious ships were only used in the Baltic and Black Seas in conjunction with exercises that the Soviets could view as defensive—that is, gaining control of access routes through the straits—and that the West would see as aggressive acts against other states.

As the Soviets could not be credited with believing the reality of their own positions—it was assumed that they were operating with perceptions that fit our assumptions and not theirs—it was widely believed that they could not be serious about what they said. That assumption underlay much of our strategic and political thinking. It stemmed from the naivete of those who did not fully comprehend the degree to which "reality," or the perception of "reality," could be very relative.

How it can be so widely assumed that individual Soviet military, or political, thinkers adopt privately reasonable and logical, therefore Western, conclusions in spite of party, censorship and propaganda is quite a mystery. Even in our own service, juniors jeopardize their careers by questioning forcefully the positions of their seniors. In the Soviet Union much more is at stake than one's career. The welfare of one's family, one's freedom to live in cities, even one's life is dependent upon supporting the party line and that has always been that the West wants a war of aggression.

In any case, there have been, roughly, three periods of postwar Soviet strategy. The first was the initial aftermath of the war when the Soviet Union was in a condition of strategic and economic inferiority. The Soviet Navy was limited to the mission of protecting the flanks of the army and of patrolling Soviet waters and coastlines because of extreme shortages in manpower and in the economy. (Even under such conditions the gauntlet was thrown down in Berlin and elsewhere to distract and to divert the West.)

After 1953, planning for a change in missions was begun. It was based upon the adoption of nuclear power and heavy emphasis on missile warfare. Tactics were developed for moving the defense perimeter further out to sea. The threat from aircraft and naval ballistic missile submarines had led to the need to establish zones of defense further from Moscow, even at the 1,500 kilometer mark, to develop successful antisubmarine warfare and to provide air cover for theaters of action far from Soviet air bases.

With the successful development of missiles and rockets—the revolution in military affairs that the Soviets emphasize con-

stantly—they began introducing new tactics for the destruction of Western fleets in specific areas and new strategies for winning, or at least breaking up and neutralizing, the Third World. The object was to seriously disturb the world order and to introduce confusion, at least, into concepts of the ownership of the means of production.

The Soviets had foreseen the political advantages that would result not just from nuclear parity but from superiority and superiority in conventional weapons as well. With superiority, with the ability to extend military zones of operation, with dictatorial control of a mobilized population and a servile industrial and scientific base, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union saw itself in a position to increase the momentum of international change.

Signals were initiated in such exercises as *Okean 70*, which was meant to show the world (and perhaps Soviet political leaders) that the correlation of forces had indeed changed, that former concepts of seapower were outmoded, and that the revolution in military affairs, preceded by a revolution in the control of the means of production, would be followed by a revolution in the relations of states.

At the 24th Party Congress in April 1972 Brezhnev enunciated the new line.

> The armed forces of allied states are in a high state of readiness and in a position to guarantee the peaceful labor of fraternal peoples.
>
> Protection of socialism under present conditions has taken on a clearly expressed international character . . . .

Under this line socialist armed forces had an international role. Soviet forces in Egypt, Somalia, and the Sudan and Cuban forces in Angola all helped to confirm what had become obvious from the navy: the Soviet Armed Forces had a new strategic mission, but not one that depended upon traditional campaigns ending in signed documents of victory. Rather it was a new role of helping to smash the weakest link.

In view of the fact that any reasonable theory of modern nuclear warfare must assume that it begins with a surprise and devastating attack, it is essential—certainly for anyone concerned with crisis management, which must include all military men—to understand the Soviet code in order to read the signals. Under conditions of modern warfare, one will not have time to learn the code after the action has begun.

PART I

A MARXIST/LENINIST STRATEGY

CHAPTER I

EAST VS. WEST: THE TWO LANGUAGES OF WAR

Writing about the Soviet Union is very easy in one way and very difficult in another. It is easy in the sense that the Soviet Union is a country that has powerfully resisted any intellectual growth (except within very narrow limits) for the last 60 years and that has had a policy of resisting intellectual change for many of the last 300 years. However unpleasant that resistance was for Russian citizens, it considerably simplified the work of the historian and analyst. A country subject to rapid change, even when it is controlled change as in Japan, for example, is relatively more difficult to explain.

The Soviet Union is a country in which official policy is not only to keep its own citizens (and therefore its own leaders, too) ignorant of some of the things that happen in the world outside but also in which policy dictates going to enormous and expensive lengths to keep the outside world from knowing what is happening internally. Not only does this involve not revealing information—such as the number of deaths in airplane crashes or earthquakes—but also in issuing misinformation or official government lies.

These attitudes toward truth cannot be dismissed as unimportant national idiosyncrasies. They indicate differences in understanding reality. In the United States, the suppression of truth is taken to be a corruption of the spirit for it is believed that by concentrating on the negative and unpleasant aspects of life one can comprehend reality. In czarist and Leninist Russia, reality is understood officially as that which is planned by the supreme authority; therefore, that which is negative and ugly is transitory and of no intellectual importance. It is obvious that with two such different views of reality, interpretations of concrete events are very different as well.

The lack of information about the Soviet Union has some curious results. People in the West tend to ask the kinds of questions that reflect their view of reality in the West but have little meaning in the Soviet Union—"how much does it cost; is this or that leader on the right or the left; who is in line to succeed?"

Because those who ask such questions seldom have time for a short course in Russian history or Leninist thought, they are impatient for the answers that are, quite often, supplied by people who know that they are distorting Soviet reality in order to answer them.

For example, it is frequently argued that the growth in the Soviet Navy is the result of Admiral Gorshkov's very effective maneuvering within the Soviet hierarchy—there is even one far-fetched argument that holds that it is because he and Brezhnev were on the same front during World War II that the Navy is receiving the biggest share of the budget!—and not because there is any state policy requiring a larger navy. There is not a shred of evidence that the enlarged Soviet Navy has anything to do with Admiral Gorshkov's personality. Nor does anything we know about how policy is formed in the Soviet Union suggest that that could be true.

It is therefore very important to understand how we know anything about the Soviet Union; how valid concepts can be formed. In Soviet usage, "propaganda" is not a negative word. It is used to refer to an idealized truth, and as any other kind may be a defamation of the state, idealized truth is the only kind that can be printed. Thus, Gorshkov in his book *Sea Power of the State* deals with an idealized truth. He does not hesitate to rewrite history or to omit such significant events as the Kronshtadt Rebellion or the role of the atomic bomb in the defeat of Japan.

This concept of idealized truth derives from a theological way of looking at the universe; truth—whether political, social or historical—is considered to be revealed by the documents of Marx, Engels and Lenin, by the pronouncements of the Communist Party through its spokesmen in the Politburo, and increasingly through its supreme high priest, the General Secretary, President and Marshal Leonid Brezhnev. The function, then, of propaganda organs (which include such journals as the Soviet equivalent of Naval Institute *Proceedings,* the *Morskoy sbornik*) is to raise morale, comment on revealed truth, illustrate doctrinal concepts, and inform, but they are not a forum for objectivity on any question. (An American equivalent would be if one could not discuss the negative implications of SALT I in the *Proceedings* or *Military Review* or even *The New York Times* because the official position was favorable to the treaty, or if one could not discuss the arguments against the *Trident* submarine because the Chief of

Naval Operations had officially declared that Navy policy was to support it.)

That does not mean that in Soviet publications there never is controversy. Arguments do occur, although rather seldom and in a ritualized format. There is hierarchy for discussions and debates that, when one understands it, reveals at what level of the government or the party a question is being considered.

In a typical situation, a question may be raised by a leading admiral about whether or not large surface ships are necessary. This officially opens the subject for debate that will then take place both in printed form and in party and cell meetings throughout the navy. Many of the discussions will be led by the party political workers, the Communist chaplains, whose job it is to whip up interest and enthusiasm for the discussion at hand.

During such periods there is apparently a comparatively free debate in which leading admirals and officers even visit ships and units to develop interest at the lowest levels. However, once a decision is made (it will be announced in unmistakable terms either by a senior official or a party worker) debate is cut off. Ranks are closed behind the party. The matter then becomes doctrine and further discussion may expand upon it, interpret or apply it, but will not question it. This is what is known as "democratic centralism."

For example, in 1975 the Soviet CNO, Admiral Gorshkov, began publishing a series of articles entitled, "Navies in War and Peace." They could not have indicated, as so many Western writers suggested, an argument within the Ministry of Defense about the need for a larger navy. Such arguments never take place publicly. Nor could they have suggested that Admiral Gorshkov was turning to the public to get support for his position. Such a process would be totally alien and meaningless in the Soviet Union where the general public would not consider that it had any part whatsoever in making such a decision and where the government and party would not allow the public to think that it even had the right to adopt a position. (In the Soviet Union, a popular saying is that there is only one kind of vote and that is with your feet. This means that as a citizen you have the choice of either accepting or leaving, although leaving is not usually an option either.)

This kind of process was the same during Lenin's life and even under Stalin's reign. Lenin allowed controversy but after a decision had been made, there could be no more debate and he, like Stalin, ruthlessly exterminated all opposition. During Stalin's

dictatorship, controversy was sometimes encouraged such as one about a big-ship as opposed to a small-ship navy; however, he who expressed himself on what later turned out to be the wrong side, usually did not live to repeat his error. Stalin had those who had disagreed with him, even when he had asked for free discussion, liquidated.

The Western reader has difficulty understanding the kind of influence that such a history of tyranny introduces into the decisionmaking process. That it is seldom taken into account is an extraordinarily grave error. Obviously one could not be very outspoken in circumstances such as those. For instance, imagine how free a discussion would be in the U.S. Navy if it were learned that because they had opposed the President's budget proposal, three of the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been shot! Yet that is what happened in Russia 40 years ago and explains why Gorshkov became an admiral at age 31. Most of the officers senior to him were liquidated which helped to clear the way for him to be promoted to the Soviet Chief of Naval Operations at age 45. The current generation of Soviet rulers and military leaders are those who survived and cooperated with Stalin during that period.[1]

A second important element affects public discussions of military matters. Soviet concern with security and alertness to the danger of espionage exceeds all bounds of what, in the West, would be considered sane. This is one of the great constants in Russian history, observed by Elizabethan visitors to the court of Ivan the Terrible, French visitors to the court of Nicholas I and ordinary tourists who stray from the prescribed path in the Soviet Union today. (To a Russian citizen, it seems perfectly normal that a captain in the Soviet Navy should spend 20 years in a prison camp, as Captain Buinovskiy did in Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* because he had been mailed a gift, which he had not solicited, from an English admiral for whom he was the officially designated liaison officer during World War II. Instead of complaining, the officer should have considered himself lucky not to be shot.)

The result of what seems abroad to be a national paranoia, in terms of military discussion, is that for a Soviet officer it is not safe to speak about any aspects of the Soviet Navy unless he is absolutely certain that what he is saying is approved not only by the Navy, but also, and most importantly, by the party and the government organs. Every article, every speech, every meeting with foreigners is controlled. There are layers upon layers of

censorship. There are censors for security, for political content, for military content and for general party content. Although information may appear that is inadvertently revealed, one cannot reliably identify it and one certainly cannot assume that anything written or said by a high official in the Soviet Military Establishment represents a purely private and not officially approved point of view.

While information that is new to us may sometimes appear, we should assume that it is being released for official reasons. It is totally naive to pretend that published statements by major, much less minor, figures in the Soviet Military Establishment represent individual positions not approved by the party unless they occur during the period of officially encouraged debate. Such audacity would, at the very least, jeopardize one's career and at the very most, be a flirtation with death. Furthermore, in a society that is almost totally controlled, publicly expressing one's opposition about matters of national security would be foolishly stupid. There would be no chance, in the face of the party's opposition, of having one's opinion ever reach the public, and even if it did, there would be no possibility of any kind of public support. In the Soviet Union decisions are made behind closed doors and are eventually "revealed." Even Solzhenitsyn who wrote very oblique criticisms of the Soviet Government in fictional form, was accused of "fouling his own nest," was called a traitor and enemy of the people, and eventually feared for his own life. It has been said that the Soviet Union is the only country in the world that has executed its own poets.

Some mention should be made of the "closed doors." Because of recent revelations, "bugging" is a very sensitive issue in the United States. However, in the Soviet Union it is not. The reason that it is not is that a private individual dares not object to it as that would only imply that he had something to hide that would result in redoubling the number of electronic devices focused on him. Surveillance, not only of diplomats, tourists and visitors, but also of Soviet citizens, is absolutely ubiquitous, and is not limited to electronic means. It is also conducted visually. Everywhere, in one's apartment, office, ship, or club there are people who have as a secondary responsibility that of reporting suspicious or unusual behavior or even a lack of enthusiasm for party policies and politics. Young Pioneers, members of the Young Communist League, and those of the Communist Party are constantly being harangued to be vigilant and to be on guard against the "wreckers" of the Soviet reality. Telephones are widely monitored and

long-distance connections are controlled from central city offices; the receipt of foreign mail is still dangerous enough to jeopardize a military or civilian career; repeated contact with foreigners is certain to cause interrogation by the secret police; it is even dangerous to show much interest in life abroad and one must hide any suggestion of a wish to visit or live in a foreign country. (Even the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, that brilliantly successful confidence man, frequently prefaces his remarks with a complaint about the "sacrifice" he is having to make by living abroad.)

As the chief party ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, said to Svetlana Stalin when she requested permission to take the ashes of her deceased husband to India, "What is it that attracts you so much abroad? Why, my family and I never go abroad and don't even feel like going. It is not interesting."

How then is information about life abroad absorbed and disseminated? Technical and scientific information is rapidly translated and widely available, but only on the basis of a "need to know." Soviet scientists, especially those in military institutes and factories, are served with a vast network of information about foreign sources. When new developments are discussed, such as those, for example, in connection with antisubmarine warfare, the medium used is that of foreign publications. In other words, the author will tell his readers what the U.S. Navy is doing and what its technical experts are writing about new methods of using underwater sound. It is presumed that appropriate Soviet personnel will know what to make of that information in connection with Soviet developments.

In the United States, a great quantity of what the Soviets would handle as top secret information is disseminated in the open press. What in the Soviet Union would be the very most important information—our foreign policy, the budget, military strategy and assessment of the balance of military power—is a matter of public record. However, much, much more is revealed. The details of defense contracts, of deficiencies in the fulfillment of military specifications, of personnel movements, promotions and assignments are widely known.

It is almost impossible to get a telephone directory for the city of Moscow; it would be unthinkable to get a telephone directory for the Ministry of Defense such as one can easily acquire for the Pentagon. So conscious of security are the Soviets that even on foreign visits only designated naval officers are authorized to reveal their family names—many of which must be assumed to be

false—and to do so, they are given specific permission by the party political workers, or the secret police.

Because the Soviets use foreign publications to discuss military matters of concern to their own navy, one must estimate their tactical and strategic concerns by inference. Obviously, in making such assumptions, there is a far greater possibility for error than in a similar discussion based upon the *Proceedings.* However, it is so difficult to know what is safe to discuss in the Soviet Union that whenever anything is authorized, it naturally becomes everyone's favorite subject. By the sheer weight of repetition in the press, one can know, with reasonable accuracy, what is the authorized, new line. For example, Admiral Gorshkov's articles were correctly understood to be a signal for propagandizing the international role of the Soviet Navy. There were a great number of articles in *Morskoy sbornik* and elsewhere related to this theme. Read in isolation, these articles suggested that extraordinary emphasis was being put upon naval developments in the Soviet Union; however articles with similar themes about the changed balance of power appeared widely in the military press as well as in many other organs.[2] What was appearing was an advertising campaign for a new "line." The new line stressed the decline of the West, the brotherhood of socialist parties and workers, and the obligation of the Soviet Union to support radical movements throughout the world. It tested international opinion and followed the tactic of gradually accustoming imperialist powers to bolder Soviet actions. (The lessons of the famous Russian psychologist, Pavlov, have been well understood. Man can be taught to become indifferent, as well as to salivate, when the bell is rung.)

While the internationalist theme was developed everywhere, it was forcefully restated by Brezhnev, most recently at the 25th Party Congress. Having asserted in his report on the success of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, for those who thought they could escape the march of revolution, that "there is probably no spot on the earth where the state of affairs has not been taken into account in one way or another in the formulation of our foreign policy," Brezhnev gave one reason why:

> In the developing countries, as everywhere, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence and we treat them as our friends and comrades-in-arms. Our Party is rendering and will render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom. The Soviet Union is not looking for any benefits for itself, it is not hunting for

> concessions, is not trying to gain political supremacy and is not seeking any military bases. We are acting as our revolutionary conscience and our communist convictions permit us.[3]

Besides giving a slightly more vague but no less distinct argument for protecting state interests throughout the world—we shall see later what the nature of "state interests" is from a Soviet communist point of view—Brezhnev was making it clear that there would be many more "Angolas", and that perhaps the next time the trend would not be reversed in Chile. Clearly, the navy is well designed to play an important part in the new phase of promoting the internationalist momentum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as Gorshkov confirmed in *Sea Power of the State* and obviously that was not news to Brezhnev.

To sum up, then, when a new line is adopted it is normally signaled by a major speech or declaration that gives key formulations of the main points. These key formulations will then be repeated—endlessly and often verbatim—in a variety of approved contexts. This usually signals that a process of education and information is going on aboard ships and in shore units. There will be a series of party meetings to disseminate and discuss the new "line" and to prepare the naval personnel for the implications of the policy. The point of these meetings is to insure compliance, to mobilize support, and, incidentally, to give any "wreckers" of socialist unanimity an opportunity to identify (and therefore to destroy) themselves. Certainly that idea was important in the Gorshkov papers. It was stated in the preface:

> In the opinion of the editorial board and the editorial staff the publication of these articles will foster the development in our officers of a unity of views on the role of navies under various historical conditions.[4]

To state unequivocally that the Soviet Navy will continue to grow in sophisticated equipment is not, now, a controversial prediction in view of the massive outpouring of information about the current Soviet assessment of the prospects for a socialist revolution throughout the world vis-à-vis the decline of imperialism and the crisis of capitalism. A great number of articles discuss how the navy supports that movement, how the Soviet Navy is to be used politically, and how it is likely to develop. Obviously surface ships are the ticket for protecting state interests in Angola.

If one were to analyze the navy only in terms of weapons and capabilities, ignoring its international role, one would overlook one of its primary missions. And finally, if one were to try to analyze the Soviet Navy without reference to what is happening in the other services and/or to the Communist Party line, one could not make very accurate predictions about its future.

It is, however, this process for achieving a unanimity of views that gives us an opportunity to know the outline of Soviet intentions. On the whole, the main lines of development have been surprisingly consistent since the Revolution, much more consistent and more predictable than those of the United States or many other countries, for that matter. Paradoxically, foreign analyses of Soviet intentions have been surprisingly erroneous. The Soviets by official position encourage the erroneous interpretations. (We will discuss this further in naval tactics as deception is not only the prime artifice of war but also of politics.) As Lenin said, "Our morality is deduced from the class struggle of the proletariat . . . . Communist morality is the morality which serves this struggle . . . ."[5]

Concerning their concept of war, however, the Soviets have seldom been misleading. Much of the misinterpretation of Soviet intentions originates from ignorance of the language of Marx and Lenin and from incorrect assumptions about the nature of Russian culture and society. For example, confusion about the word "détente" has been rampant and dangerous. Whatever was meant in English by détente, the Soviets had a totally different concept. First of all, the Soviets never used the French word at all. They used a Russian word that is not an equivalent (*razryadka* which means "relaxation"). The Russian word shares only one implication with the French word *détente* and that is in its literal sense. It does not imply "friendship," "cooperation," "change of policy" or "agreement" of any kind. In the Soviet usage, it means *only* "relaxation of tensions" and *only* in the context of the policy of "peaceful coexistence" that has been, for the most part, Soviet policy since the time of Lenin. In other words, détente in Russian meant essentially nothing new at all. Nevertheless, as long as the U.S. Government and press chose to misuse the nature of the "new" relationship to Soviet advantage, it was not in the interest of the Soviet Government to make any important corrections. (The party and government officials did remind their citizens, however, that the danger of war remained and that the class struggle continued. They simply omitted suggesting that those circumstances caused any "tension.") But

when President Ford announced that he would no longer use the word détente but rather would refer to "a policy of peace through strength," there was a considerable Soviet retroactive correction. Spokesmen went so far as to explain that Americans all along had been using the word to mask their aggressive intentions. Nevertheless, an underlying theme of Soviet propaganda during the entire phase of détente, and one for which the tactical implications will be examined shortly, was that the United States was forced into the position of adopting a policy of détente because of the change in the "correlation of forces" brought about by Soviet superiority after the military buildup and the successful, far-reaching policies of the Communist Party, formulated by its leader, Brezhnev. In short, the Soviets have been saying that the world balance of power has changed in the Soviet's favor. Whether or not that is true, it has obviously become part of the operational code of the Politburo (with rather alarming implications) and therefore of the Soviet Navy as well.[6]

The code for the use of words is obviously critical in East-West relations. There is evidence that U.S. negotiators at SALT I did not understand the Soviet concept of war and, as so often has happened, analyzed what was assumed to be the Soviet position, based upon what would be the American position given the Soviet circumstances, and then reacted to that. Ethnocentrism could go no further. It was as if our side was negotiating with itself.

One of the basic positions at the SALT talks was that the Soviets not only did not share our concepts about nuclear warfare and deterrence—"assured destruction," "damage limitation," "limited war," "destabilization," etc.—but specifically, and *repeatedly,* rejected them as a masquerade. (The reasons for this rejection will be discussed in the chapter on the Soviet concepts of war.) Nevertheless, the American side did not take the Soviet ideology seriously, perhaps not understanding the language of Marxism as we shall see.

An interesting and sound observer of Soviet affairs, Roman Kolkowicz, wrote an estimate of Soviet intentions in 1971 based very much on a projection of "rational" rather than Soviet arguments. It is very interesting to see now what an intelligent and informed observer, using that kind of methodology, concluded. His overall assessment was that the Soviet Union was going to seek an accommodation with the United States that would enable it, on the basis of strategic parity, to wind down the arms race and pursue political goals elsewhere, a not very dangerous prediction since that is what was going on at the time. However, his reasons

for coming to that conclusion are instructive. This Soviet policy he had postulated was based on the following considerations:

> a. The strategic arms race is expensive and does not add objectivity to the security of the Soviet Union once parity is obtained.
>
> b. The political utility of strategic arms increments is insignificant because, as the Soviets themselves point out, it cannot easily be applied to non-nuclear contexts, i.e., its extra deterrence value is questionable.
>
> c. A stabilization of U.S.-Soviet strategic capabilities at parity levels would still give the Soviet Union a wide range of options for the pursuit of policy objectives by means of conventional forces . . . .[7]

All of that makes admirable sense; however, it makes American, not Soviet, sense. It was not what the Soviets thought about it or subsequently did. They began pursuing the buildup of conventional forces, but dual-equipping them with nuclear weapons, preparing the population for nuclear war, and pursuing the qualitative and quantitative improvements of their strategic forces wherever possible. In short, they were pursuing a policy of maximizing the change in "the correlation of forces" on every level while externally trying to pacify the United States with discussions of "peaceful coexistence" and "détente." Their point was that the struggle was to continue and was, in every sense of the word, strategic. The fight was for the overthrow of the capitalist system and its sources of power. While Professor Kolkowicz was not arguing unreasonably, his terms of reference were not from the Soviet system of thought. His overall conclusion, that the utility of a preponderance of strategic weapons was "insignificant," did not square either with the Soviet past or the Soviet present.

A significant statement about the degree to which Soviet concepts were *not* taken into account was made by the chief U.S. delegate to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a negotiator of two strategic arms accords signed in Moscow in May 1972, Ambassador Gerard Smith. Ambassador Smith, in a Senate hearing, said:

> I think the Soviets, as a result of the SALT negotiations, have moved toward accepting the concept of assured destruction. I would say that I don't know. I have no way of judging whether their doctrine, their national doctrine, says that this is their national strategic concept. I just don't know.[8]

The most basic, widely defended and discussed Soviet military concept is that once the imperialists begin the war (and there is a corollary that seems to justify preemption on the basis of a Soviet assessment of U.S. intentions) rapid obliteration of the enemy's strategic forces and defenses, economic capability and the reserves of the rear will be required inasmuch as the war will be fought to the finish and will result in the triumph of socialism and the total destruction of capitalism. It is extraordinary that our chief negotiator did not know that and that Soviet doctrine repeatedly rejects "assured destruction" as simply not relative to class war.

A major problem, then, is that there is a widespread tendency to pay little attention to what the Soviets are saying and to attribute American preconceptions to their side. Of course, the Soviets do the same for us which creates something of an *Alice in Wonderland* world.

To dismiss what the Soviets write about war is very strange (perhaps schizophrenic) when one considers how many billions are spent on defense, intelligence, news coverage and diplomacy. The Soviets make no secret of their concepts, attitudes and intentions about the West. Perhaps more ominous, their mirror can be just as one-way as ours. The difference is that they are locked into their vision. In matters of security, deviations are not permitted. Everyone must support the same line and we must assume that almost everyone does.

Perhaps the West tends to ignore the Soviet's dogma because two realities are so far apart; however, the party line is massively expounded and repeated in all forums, whether by Brezhnev, Admiral Gorshkov or a military correspondent. One example can serve for many. Here is a passage from *The Officer's Handbook*, published by the Ministry of Defense.

> Contemporary capitalism is not only an obsolete reactionary system slowing down historical progress, but also a dangerous aggressive force which threatens world civilization. The struggle of the working class and all workers against imperialism is a historical necessity. Only by considering this objective regularly is it possible to approach correctly an

> understanding of all types of contemporary wars, the culprits of which are the imperialists. They unleash both world wars and local wars directed toward the strangling of liberation movements, the seizure of foreign soil and the enslavement of the peoples of other countries.
>
> Bourgeois armies always and in all circumstances bear the stamp of the ruling class and protect its interests . . . . Life itself shows that a bourgeois army is the tool of the imperialist state and defends the rotten foundation of capitalism.
>
> In order to force the people to wage war, the imperialists process the troops in an intensified manner in a spirit of anti-communism and they bring them up on misanthropic ideas of racism. Developed especially persistently among the servicemen is a feeling of cruelty with respect to the peaceful population and an aspiration for personal profit. The results of such "upbringing" were graphically manifested in the behavior of the American militarists in Vietnam. They even exceeded the Hitlerites with their atrocities.[9]

It is a fool's paradise to pretend that these are not operative concepts. What and who is to contradict them? For instance, when one reads the following:

> The employment of two atomic bombs also did not play a decisive role in the capitulation of imperialist Japan, since total victory over Japan was achieved as a result of the destruction of its Kwantung Army by the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.[10]

one may react with indignation but one may also be assured that such a statement does not find contradiction within the Soviet Union. It is necessary to take into consideration the fact that such concepts are shaping Soviet thinking and it is beside the point to argue that they are not true. Marxism and the Soviet censorship have insured the relativity of truth.

Under these circumstances, our estimate of the Soviet Navy cannot be simply derived. Because the object of a massive system of security, censorship and disinformation is to keep us from knowing or to mislead us about the nature of what we know, without sources of intelligence information we would be almost helpless in the hands of the Soviet propaganda machine.

That being the case, America's reaction to intelligence is odd. As the Soviets want the outside world to know very little of what happens in their country (they want their own citizens to know very little, too) nearly everyone who shows an interest in the Soviet Union is, willy-nilly, an intelligence operative. At least the Soviets respond that way. To keep them under surveillance, diplomats, correspondents, tourists, students and exchange professors are all controlled through elaborate organizations and systems. There are coordinated efforts to keep them from knowing more than that which is authorized.

As one acute observer said:

> If better diplomats are found among the Russians than among highly civilized peoples, it is because our papers warn them of everything that happens and everything that is contemplated in our countries. Instead of disguising our weaknesses with prudence, we reveal them with vehemence every morning; whereas, the Russians' Byzantine policy, working in the shadow, carefully conceals from us all that is thought, done and feared in their country. We proceed in broad daylight, they advance under cover; the game is one-sided. The ignorance in which they leave us blinds us; our sincerity enlightens them; we have the weakness of loquacity; they have the strength of secrecy. There, above all, is the cause of their cleverness.[11]

That was written in 1839 by a French traveler, the Marquis de Custine, who, after his journey to Imperial Russia warned that although the future was obscure, one thing was certain, that the world would witness strange things done by "this predestined nation." What seems to be insufficiently appreciated now, as it was in Custine's time, is the degree to which Russia's different concepts cause distortion both here and there. The ubiquitousness of the misconceptions about the Soviet Union, the degree to which commentators simply project their own cultural assumptions, is undoubtedly, in part, the result of the very incomprehensibility of what they see, and a desire to impose some familiar order on a significantly different world.

It is obviously of paramount importance that both sides read the signals correctly and that each side know how certain acts will be interpreted. We cannot afford to misunderstand crises, such as the Czech uprising in 1968, in which the Soviet Union regarded its vital interest as dangerously threatened by a "savage attempt to

inflict damage on socialism . . . by international reactionary forces and internal anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary elements in Czechoslovakia in their 1968 intrigue."[1 2]

On our own side, perceptions of even quite concrete facts, no matter how significant, can be ignored. The problem is always one of focus, of recognition, of having a context or system into which information can be meaningfully placed. For example, the Soviets have been writing for more than 15 years about the fundamental changes in the nature of war, the revolution in military art, the radical requirements placed upon strategic planning by the new technology. Yet many in the West most concerned with defense and security are sometimes only vaguely aware of the implications of such doctrines.

Most war plans appear to start with the rather absurd assumption that the Soviets will give 30 days warning of their intention to launch an attack. (How such notions can persist after the occupation of Prague in 1968 is a mystery.) Soviet practice is, of course, to minimize signals, disguise preparations, misinform and mislead. According to their own doctrine, if they could not attack almost without warning they would not attack.

A very brief sketch of the difference in the two mentalities—Soviet and American—may be helpful in explaining how critical questions can be often misunderstood or overlooked.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTS OF WAR, EAST AND WEST

The eminent authority on Soviet Russia, Harvard's Professor Richard Pipes,[1] observed that because both Russia and America, although offshoots of different aspects of European civilization, reject that civilization (although for different reasons) they have a superficial resemblance that seems to give rise to the theory of convergence—that the two societies are bound to come together. There were some grounds for arguing that that was happening before 1917, but the Bolshevik Revolution reversed that trend so that a theory of divergence would now make more sense. What happened was that the country's Western-oriented element, the intellectuals, the administrators, the educators, were eliminated and those who came into power were the small tradesmen and provincial workers—Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, et al.—who represented the forces of xenophobia, anti-intellectualism, and who rejected the West with all of its political baggage of enlightenment, democracy, and individualism. The new power center, although atheistic and antireligious, perpetuated the cultural responses of old Moscow in a new form. Its orientation is theological in the sense that it accepts beyond proof, beyond question, and on faith, a complete set of Marxist-Leninist principles about the nature of reality, the meaning of the universe, man's mission, and the nature of paradise. The role of the theoretician, like the role of the priest, is to show how these truths are manifested in society. He is to find evidence of proof but he is not to be objective about it. To question this state of affairs is to identify oneself as a heretic, and the fate of heretics, in recent memory, was no less severe, cruel and merciless than the fate of the victims of the Spanish Inquisition.

What is important in understanding the Soviet Navy in the context of the Russian mentality is to grasp that this state of mind, consistent with its own terms, does not necessarily lead to acts that the West would judge, in its ignorance, as wise, rational and in Russia's self-interest. In any militantly self-righteous movement, such as even America's in Vietnam, the conviction that

one is serving a higher cause inevitably has tended to affect restraint and rational perspective.

In Soviet terminology, there is no concept of a "balance," of a "stable community of nations," or "convergence." The Soviet Government can only look at the idea of any "equilibrium" as a tactical maneuver employed on the way to achieving the "workers' paradise," a concept so strong that it is used to justify the sacrifices demanded of the Soviet people.

One of the major and most obvious differences between the Soviet and American mind is that of the understanding of time. There is no date by which the workers' paradise has to be achieved. There can be great patience in the attainment of goals and there can be failures without the loss of face. Lenin accepted the reality of one step forward and two back. Since the goal of mankind is to serve this great cause, individual lives tend to be unimportant. Egos do not have to be assuaged by rapid promotion. Gorshkov and Brezhnev and most of the rest of the political and military leaders will probably serve until they die. Like monks, their commitment is forever. Under the czars, too, the state's interests were protected by a service class (which the Soviets have reconstituted in the form of the military hierarchy and Communist Party members) that in return for its loyalty and complete lifetime dedication was given special privileges and concessions.

The fact that the Western press and analysts are constantly predicting the retirement or death of Communist leaders is indicative of the temptation to make ethnocentric projections based upon our own experience. Unlike Russians, Americans expect rapid changes. Because our Presidents are elected every 4 years, officers face new billets every 3 years, and executives change jobs periodically we are all attuned to the need for our elite groups to make their mark, achieve some distinction, reorganize some department, or "solve" some problem so that they can make their next promotion or election. This, of course, affects our military estimates, our politics, our defense posture, and our negotiating techniques. According to Pipes, the Soviets are fully aware of the fact that we are in a hurry and will make concessions; that every few years the team will change; that possibly the head of the American negotiating team will not have had time to do his homework.

As opposed to the integrated, all-embracing social concepts of the Soviets, Americans are educated to think more in mechanistic terms—that there are all-inclusive laws that govern, quick solutions

to behavioral problems, and stable contracts in human affairs. Quite often reality is viewed in terms of either/or. You have peace or war; defense or offense; democracy or dictatorship; a balance between "for" or "against"; tactics or strategy; and so on. The customary question is, "Who is ahead; who is winning?" The communist menace is either an aggressive threat or it isn't. We seem to have to decide between being in a hot or cold war. We strive for categories of definition—a clean sort of the cards.

Our tendency is always to compromise, not only because that is the language of commerce but also because our "supersalesmen" need to come home with a deal. We begin our negotiations by "sweetening the kitty" and then settle down to making concessions.

Russia has not been a commercial nation but an agrarian and feudal one until very recent times. At the time of the Revolution, 90 percent of the population lived in rural communities and even now 40 percent do. Russians have a mentality not based upon theories of enlightened self-interest. Instead, officially at least, they have adopted the powerful weapons of Marx's economic analysis to enforce unified values on mankind.

If the Soviets make a practice of trying to deceive us and if we seem to cooperate by wanting to deceive ourselves, how then can we know the truth? That is an either/or question and the answer is that we probably cannot know the truth. What we can know, however, is what they say and, to a certain extent, what they do. If there is a correlation, then that suggests a degree of confirmation that we should take seriously. To that end a study of the Soviet Navy is very useful as its comparatively recent rebuilding must reflect current Soviet strategic goals and concepts. Without question, the Soviet Navy must conform to the current concepts of war. It should first be examined from that point of view.

The formula about the danger of war hardly ever changes. It argues that:

> . . . the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression, which have not given up their attempts to undermine the process of strengthening peace and normalizing the international situation, still exist and are actively operating on our planet. These forces have not been neutralized, and the danger of war has still not been eliminated. The Party teaches that as long as imperialism, whose aggressive nature has not been altered, remains, the real danger of an outbreak of a new world war continues to exist. In the capitalist states,

> preparation of the material base for warfare has not eased, military budgets are growing, and new armament systems, above all the latest nuclear-missile submarine system, are actively being developed.[2]

This is a quite straightforward statement that differs little from the party line for the last 15 or so years. Certainly it reaffirms Marshal Grechko's statement in 1972 that:

> While firmly and consistently defending the principles of peaceful coexistence, the party at the same time teaches us not to forget that the nature of imperialism and its aggressive essence remains unchanged.[3]

Like all official Soviet language, however, these statements are Aesopian—they have to be interpreted—for they rely on a fairly large body of doctrinal pronouncements. In essence the Soviet view of the East-West struggle clearly is modified but not abandoned. There are circumstances in which the Soviets would engage in war, circumstances that might not be obvious to Western strategists.

Arguing that a Soviet concept of war exists is neither warmongering nor raising the specter of the cold war. Soviet publications are extensively devoted to war, its horrors, its imminence and its demands. War and revolution for years have been the staple subject for the majority of TV programs that are not about sports or music. War is the subject of a comprehensive civil defense program that even reaches into the kindergartens. War and the danger of war are part of nearly every major speech by government and party leaders. Anyone who reads Russian knows, then, that war is a major preoccupation of the Soviet communications media, the government and the party. That is not surprising as a theory of war is one of the basic concepts of Marxism-Leninism.

Western analysts routinely point out that Lenin was greatly influenced by Clausewitz and that the Soviets have adopted the maxim that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Unfortunately, that is an enormous simplification of the Soviet position which, if left uncorrected, leads to mistaken notions. According to the Soviets, war in the 20th century is fundamentally different from wars in the past because of technological changes and the intensification of the class struggle. This leads to radical changes in strategy and operations.

The war in Vietnam has been interpreted by Soviet theoreticians as an ideal example of the new class war and the inevitable victory of the proletariat over the imperialist aggressors. The Vietnamese won, they argue, for conceptual, as well as for military reasons. The United States did not understand that it was fighting a class war. It assumed, so the explanation goes, that when overwhelming power was applied against inferior power, the inferior power would be defeated and subside. But the center of power was not in the arms. Instead it was in the class consciousness of the fighting men, their knowledge that destiny was on their side, that the forces they were fighting were doomed and that they were backed by the solidarity of working men everywhere, even those in the enemy camp whose consciousness merely had to be awakened. That is not Clausewitz.

Clausewitz' ideas, interpreted by such writers as Mahan, tended to see the world in mechanistic terms: lines of communication, specific nations and groupings of nations, concentrations of power and colonial dependencies. Of course such terms carry over into the writings of Lenin and modern Soviet commentators, but in that context those words function differently, as we shall see.

The concept is both Marxist and deeply Russian, that life—people, nature, the elements, ideas—is in a constant state of struggle, an idea opposite to the usual Western preconception that matter can be brought into balance and that political harmonies can be achieved and maintained. For the Russian peasant, as well as for the Marxist, such harmonies come about only in paradise, whether it is God's paradise or the workers' paradise. For the rest of life, which is tenuous and not individually significant, there is constant struggle.

The idea that there can be peace short of that paradise occurs nowhere in Soviet Marxist literature. What does appear is the idea of a continuation of the struggle on various levels. The essential point, so often overlooked, is that there is no possibility in Marxist doctrine for an accommodation of or convergence with the social orders of Western capitalistic democracies. To put it in Western, mechanistic terms, the ideas in each "camp" are destined to repel. This being the case (and it will shortly be shown why it must be so), any idea of détente can only be considered with the mental reservation that it is a temporary tactic in what is seen as a cosmic battle between forces that are either good or evil.

The interpretation here of the religious nature of the Soviet theory of war may come as a surprise; nevertheless, if one reads what the Soviets write then one quickly sees that the basic conceptions revolve around a core of ideas that are derived deductively (a central "truth" is accepted on faith and the

world is shown to support that "truth") instead of inductively (in the manner of science). Let us examine a few cases.

The foreword to a book on Lenin's treatment of the problems of contemporary war, which is recommended reading for soldiers and sailors and probably required reading for all officers of the Soviet Armed Forces, begins:

> The entire revolutionary era in human history is associated with the name and activity of Vladimire Il'ich Lenin—the brilliant successor to the revolutionary teachings of K. Marx and F. Engels, and the founder of our Party and the Soviet state. . . . Having absorbed all of the wisdom of the history of mankind, V.I. Lenin was able with all dialectical comprehensiveness to embrace the objective logic of the development of social events; and by the force of his brilliant intellect to expound on a new field of social processes to the most profound depths.[4]

The theme of Lenin's godlike omniscience continues throughout the foreword making it clear that he understood not only "all of the wisdom of history" but also foresaw all aspects of modern strategy and tactics. This obeisance to Lenin's genius is a standard element of all discussions, including Gorshkov's.

In *The Officer's Handbook,* the role of Marxism-Leninism in determining the loves and hates of the Soviet people is stated without equivocation.

> The communist ideology, which has become the ideology of the entire Soviet people, the communist morals which come forward as the stimulating motive for the behavior of our people, high political consciousness and selfless devotion to the ideas of communism comprise the foundation of the spiritual world of the Soviet man and engender a feeling of ardent love for the socialist Motherland and a burning hatred for its enemies and an indestructive steadfastness in defending the socialist homeland.[5]

This is the rhetoric of religion. It is an invocation to a higher communist spirit.

What is presented is not a unique selection from a small sample. Nearly everywhere and on any level one meets this kind of language whether from the former Minister of Defense, the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, or the General Secretary

of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For example, one opens the December issue of the *Morskoy sbornik* for 1975 and reads:

> The Soviet people, having successfully completed the 9th Five Year Plan, is worthy of greeting the 25th Congress of the Communist Party.
>
> "One can say with confidence" remarked the General Secretary of the CC CPSU Comrade Brezhnev at the preelection meeting of the workers of the Bauman sector of the city of Moscow on 13 June 1975, "that the forthcoming Congress will mark new, important guideposts on the road to the great goals for which our party fights, achievements for which we give our entire strength."[6]

Patriotism, too, is a kind of religion and generates an emotional fervor that gains strength from faith. A patriotic appeal to the motherland is used in Russia but takes second place to the appeal to the party which obviously, in a multinational land, has priority. It is the party that is the unifying force, not only internally but also externally, with the proletariat of all nations.

Obviously, such statements, issued on such an enormous scale, say something about the Soviet attitude toward war, how and when it might be waged, and on what basis. They clearly reflect very basic information about crisis decisions not only in the Military Establishment but also in the Central Committee. We would be remiss in not trying to understand what they are telling us.

The most basic notion about war held by the Soviet Communists is that it is a struggle on class lines. As previously stated, this suggests a fundamentally new way of thinking about war that dictates new concepts of strategy. An idea of the "class nature" of war suggests that the Soviets do not expect to fight nations but groups or coalitions determined by economic functions. The explanation for the fact that the Soviet Union must make treaties and agreements with nations (rather than with the classes) that are her natural enemies is simply that the ruling groups, although condemned by history, are in control and are able to deceive the masses about the nature of their true interests.

This all leads to a theory of war that is not based upon some grand strategy for *lebensraum,* or colonial dependencies, or foreign markets. The strategy is to defeat the ruling classes who are

preserving "outmoded" economic systems. The first priority for protecting the interests of the worldwide revolution is to insure the inviolability of the center (Moscow), the sacred bastion of orthodoxy, and the armory of the international proletariat. The second priority is to promote and protect socialist movements elsewhere. With such precepts for strategy, it is obvious that the causes of war for the Soviet Union would not be the same as those that would incite the United States to take up arms.

In the communist idiom war is not, of itself, bad. There are times when it is justified. One lesson of history, according to Lenin, is that war accelerates change from outmoded social systems to the new order of mankind. In fact, until the capitalist system is eradicated, a violent struggle, if not a war, is considered to be almost inevitable because, according to the Marxist doctrine,

> . . . the aggressive policy of the imperialist states which is directed toward the preparation and unleashing of predatory, marauding wars, is caused by the basic economic law of contemporary capitalism according to which the goal of capitalist production under imperialism is obtaining the maximum profits by the monopolists.[7]

Once the United States, the leader of the capitalist system, is eliminated, it is likely that mankind will be freed from the scourge of war inasmuch as "imperialism was and remains the only source of military danger."[8]

Violence, then, is a handmaiden of history. It can be used, according to Lenin, incorrectly—Marxists argue that that was the case in Vietnam—"but then it is doomed to death by history. But it is possible to use violence relying on the leading class and on the higher principles of a socialist system, order and organization. Even then it may temporarily experience failure, but it is invincible."[9]

Although Soviet leaders ritually condemn nuclear war and war in general as a danger to mankind, they do not condemn either violence or struggle. For example, such statements as the following are customary:

> Conscious of its internationalist duty, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will continue to pursue a line in international affairs which helps further to invigorate the world-wide, anti-imperialist struggle, and to strengthen the fighting unity of all its participants.[10]

For those who look forward to a period of peace and friendship, the Premier made himself very clear about the conditions in which it would have to thrive: "The full triumph of the socialist cause all over the world is inevitable. And we shall not spare ourselves in the fight for this triumph, for the happiness of the working people!"[11] Although expressed in somewhat less vitriolic terms, the same intentions were affirmed in the 25th Party Congress. What was being argued was that in the international sphere the Soviet Union was continuing to try to consolidate its alliance with the forces of socialism, the international working-class movement and "people's liberation movements."

The temptations for communists in this struggle are very great indeed because imperialism, the stage the Western World is now in, is considered to be the highest and the *last* stage of capitalism. It will be followed by socialism. According to Lenin, and therefore to current Soviet doctrine, there are five characteristics of imperialism that have finally developed:

1. The concentration of the means of production and capital to create monopolies.

2. The union of finance capital with industry to create a financial oligarchy.

3. The export of capital rather than the export of goods.

4. The formation of international capitalistic monopolies and combinations that divide up the world.

5. A legalistic division of the world by capitalistic governments.

The idea of the stages of imperialism may seem very far from a discussion of the Soviet Navy, but it is of direct, immediate importance. It affects how part of the navy is to be used and therefore built as well as the Soviet Government's military priorities. For example, the Soviet Government's reading of the degree of maturity of the imperialist order affects its estimates of the imminence of war and therefore of the order of priorities in budgetary allocations.

If Mahan was the strategist of imperialism then Lenin was clearly the strategist of its demise, for many of his writings are not theoretical and abstract but explore concrete tactics for the

breakup of the power of Western governments. A summary of his conclusions follows:

1. The new epoch is the epoch of imperialistic wars and proletarian revolutions. Wars are inevitable as are revolutions.

2. In this stage of development, there is not a "national" capitalism but a worldwide imperialistic chain.

3. Before the chain can be broken, revolution and socialism will have to conquer in one or a few countries.

4. The country in which socialism is victorious will serve as the worldwide base for revolutions.

5. It is necessary to break the imperialist chain at its weakest link, the source of its raw materials. That must begin in the East and in the colonies and will lead to the destruction of the whole chain.

Therefore: the area for prime concentration is in the emerging nations with critical raw materials. The methods for cutting the link must not be limited but will be political, commercial, economic, cultural and military.

Throughout Soviet literature one finds these ideas affirmed and elaborated upon in all disciplines. They are clearly used as a guide for current action and for the interpretation of current events. For example, the Soviets claim that all wars since World War II have been started by the imperialistic powers with the United States in the vanguard. According to Major General Milovidov, the United States is responsible for "thirty aggressive wars and military conflicts of various scales."[1 2]

Given such views, combat readiness takes on a more realistic meaning and although high Party officials may talk about the danger of nuclear war receding (they are always very careful in their terminology about the kind of war they mean) they, as well as others, balance such statements with concern about the heightening of tension that ensues as imperialism moves toward its demise. Almost always the authority of Lenin in invoked:

History has confirmed the correctness of the methodological position taken by Lenin, based on analysis of the class struggle with imperialism: " . . . The force of the revolution,

> the force of the impact, the energy, decisiveness and triumph of its victory at the same time heighten the force of resistance by the bourgeoisie. The greater our victory, the greater the extent to which the capitalist exploiters learn to unite and shift to move resolute attacks."[13]

The Marxists-Leninists see two factors limiting the power of imperialism and both are militant: the growing political power of socialism and the development of its military strength.

In the West, fashions in ideas change rather rapidly. We tend to equate the passage of time with the notion not only of political and economic progress but also progress in comprehension. Thus we tend to assume that ideas held 10 or 15 years ago, much less 20 or 50, are interesting but no longer operational. The strategic ideas of the Soviets are, at least in their major thrust, timeless in the sense that there is no evolution of concepts; there is only the fulfillment of a predetermined plan. The supreme leader's genius is displayed by the correctness of his estimate of the economic stage of civilization on its predetermined march and the brilliance of his tactics in dealing with international imperialism and internal economic growth. But the basic elements of the doctrine remain unchanged. Lenin is considered to have said it all. His modern interpreters are allowed only limited scope for maneuver. This was clearly displayed by Brezhnev when he said:

> Following Lenin's behests, we shall continue to strengthen our country's defense, to furnish our army with the most sophisticated weapons. Our army has been, is now and will continue to be an army of peace, a dependable bulwark of security for all peoples.[14]

Much of the Western analysis of the Soviet Union is questionably based upon the preconception that the Soviet leaders really want to live like us, maintain the *status quo* and would prefer not to *go through* all of this ideological fuss. Leaders are commonly thought to be political pragmatists, like ours tend to be, who are forced sometimes to make ideological pronouncements for tradition's sake. Such notions are quite irrational in themselves. Among the many systems of political thought, there is nothing inevitable about pragmatism. Even the idea that man should be happy, which most of us assume as the preconception of political action, is not a Soviet assumption.

Why is the dialectic so often ignored when Soviet intentions are discussed? It is an official doctrine that is considered scientific. It

has such force that, until recently, Einstein's theory of relativity could not be studied because it contradicted Marxism. Even now, theories of anthropology, Freud's theories in psychoanalysis, and nearly all Western schools of history or literature are forbidden. Great poets, musicians and artists are hounded even to their deaths for not creating in approved modes. As the dialectic dominates the universities and intellectual life, it also dominates foreign policy and strategic planning. It is the thread that provides sense and continuity to thought and provides the source for bureaucratic rationalization. How then can it be avoided?

The entire Marxist concept of the universe is based upon struggle. As Marx wrote in the *Communist Manifesto,* the history of human society is the history of class warfare. This basic law is related to three of Marx's dialectical laws, fundamental to the Soviet view of war. They are summarized as follows:

a. The law of the unity and struggle of opposites.

b. The law of the transformation from quantity to quality.

c. The law of the negation of the negation.

The first law is the major basis for the communist idea of class warfare and has formed the foundation for the idea of constant struggle. The law is that all things are organically tied together but that all things are in conflict; all have their negative and positive sides; their past and future; their contradictions between the old and the new, the dying and being born. This is the most important law for it leads to the understanding that development is not harmonious, progressive and sequential. Change occurs through violence as a resolution of opposites. The expulsion from Egypt or the retreat from Cuba may not be agreeable but they can be explained by this theory. In this theory the United States is, of course, the contradiction, the opposite, one of the causes of struggle.

This law, emphasizing struggle rather than harmony, makes a mockery of the Western notion of "destabilization." Officially, the Soviets cannot assume that a harmonious relationship is possible with the United States.

The second law, that of the transformation from quantity to quality, is also important and has military applications. The idea is that things accumulate or change gradually, by addition or

subtraction, in a quantitative way, but once this change exceeds that which the nature of the thing dictates, then there is a sudden qualitative transformation. The thing becomes something else on a different level.

This law has been very influential in shaping Soviet policy and in determining the theory of war, for it says that if the law of development dictates a sudden transformation then the change of social classes from oppressed races into independent socialist entities does not come about through small accommodations and reforms such as labor unions and social security, for example, but explosively, by revolution.

This law, too, justifies violence and insures that the arms race does not abate, for the quantitative accumulation of arms can lead to a qualitative change in war. That was one of the lessons of the Battle of Stalingard—which has become a model of Soviet military thought—where the massing of armament turned the tide. Now the advent of nuclear weapons has made warfare totally new and qualitatively different. This law also reinforces the historic Russian experience of the importance of mass in battle. The rapid recognition and acceptance of the revolution in military affairs, which led to a very dynamic change in Soviet military thinking, almost certainly was influenced by a knowledge of this law of the transition from quantitative to qualitative change.

The law of the negation of the negation forces military analysts to keep rethinking military art as the old is constantly giving way to the new. This law gives Soviet military theorists the authority to criticize American military concepts for being outmoded and inflexible. Without this guide to an understanding of the universe, thought is unscientific and backward. It is, in short, historically dead.

Admiral Gorshkov was referring to this law when he said: "The qualitative transformations which have taken place in naval forces have also changed the approach to evaluating the relative might of navies and their combat groupings . . ."[15] The negation of the negation is the basic law of the dialectical reasoning. The thesis, capitalism, gives rise to its antithesis, communism, and through the battle of the two there is a temporary synthesis, some form of socialism. (There are a great number of possible variations on this theme.) What happens, however, in any dialectical argument is that "synthesis" is eventually negated and the process begins again in a never-ending chain of development. (The logical flaw that Marxists cannot resolve is the question of what comes beyond communism in the endless change.)

This law, too, has been applied to warfare, as we shall see, and reinforces the historic Russian patience. It can be used to justify even political failure as every manifestation of a historic process is an indication of forward movement even when it appears that the opposite is true. With such a philosophy it is difficult to become discouraged.

This, like the other "laws," is also a cruel law. Manifestations in history that can be labeled as "an antithesis" can be negated without moral qualms. That can be applied to whole societies and classes. It has been used to justify the liquidation of people and even nations. The elimination of ruling classes—men, women and children—would be and has been considered a morally justified act.

The dialectic then justifies war and revolution. What it cannot tolerate is any peaceful relationship with capitalism. Its laws *cannot* be rejected because if they were, any possible basis for legitimacy of the Soviet Government and the power of the Communist Party would disappear. While it is possible to argue that the severity of change can be somewhat diminished, Marxist dialectic insists that the imperialist order will never submit peacefully to its own liquidation. Although the change in the correlation of forces causes the imperialists to be cautious and intimidated, violence is likely, probably unavoidable.

Western observers have long been puzzled that Soviet leaders talk about the necessity of avoiding nuclear war and yet all of their war games and their new war materiel show that they are preparing for nuclear war. The laws of the dialectic give an explanation. Violence is assured and stability is not. Mere human reason and leadership cannot abrogate that condition. The imperialist governments, in spite of all of their assurances, once they realize the imminence of their defeat, may resort to nuclear war. From the Soviet point of view, one must respond to the scientific laws of history. The arguments of Western diplomats, ignorant of those laws, can be of little more than transitory interest.

There are many other aspects of Marxism that are important for understanding the Soviet view of war and revolution; however, we shall discuss only two more: the doctrine on revolution and the theories of the crisis of the old order.

According to Marx and Lenin, and to the undisguised glee of the Soviet commentators in the modern media, capitalist systems are doomed to undergo ever increasingly severe economic crises. These crises are "good" as they mark phases toward the ultimate

collapse of imperialism altogether. The crises are economic and social in nature. Increasing unemployment, lessening demand, inflation and recession and depression are all among the indicators. Marxists, and of course Soviets, argue that one should not do anything to help to reduce these problems or to ease the suffering of the masses in foreign countries as that would reduce the momentum of change. It is through the exacerbation of these conditions that progress occurs in the form of the awakened consciousness of the proletariat and therefore they are to be encouraged. But economic problems must be carefully monitored not only in order to measure the speed of the decline of the West but also to ensure the proper degree of military preparedness. Because the Soviets expect the crisis of capitalism to lead to an increase in the number of conflicts and an increase in the danger of war, such periods heighten their own sense of danger and alarm.

The doctrine on revolution is also important because it adds another dimension to our understanding of the Soviet theories of war. It also relates to the primary source of the breach between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China which indicates the extraordinary importance of ideological arguments in the preparations for war.

In the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx and Engels held that revolution would come about through the organization and leadership of the working class. Later, that doctrine was modified in *The Critique of Political Economy* and more clearly in *Das Kapital.* In the latter, Marx held that socialism would arise dialectically; that is, through the conflict of the contradictions within the capitalist system. It was argued that there were stages of development and that until the contradictions had "ripened" sufficiently, there would not be the qualitative change to the new system.

But such a theory was too passive for Lenin. He could not wait for the "ripening" and called for taking up arms. His final position on revolution has replaced Marx's as the classical doctrine for the world communist movement. Lenin held that the revolution had to be organized. A great body of his writing deals with the tactics of bringing about the violent overthrow of the old regime. Above all else, Lenin, though Machiavellian certainly, was a brilliant tactician. In any case, as a result of the success of the Bolshevik Revolution achieved against overwhelming odds, Lenin became the foremost authority on the subject.

The Leninist theory, however, was modified during the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and it was this modification that led to the

charges by the Chinese of "revisionism" and ultimately contributed to the major ideological basis of the Sino-Soviet split.

The new Khrushchevian doctrine, which Brezhnev has not repudiated, was formulated because of the advent of nuclear weapons. This was the stimulus for the new tactic of "coexistence" and a new formula for seizing power. It was proclaimed that the proletariat could take power by achieving a parliamentary majority as well as through revolution. The Chinese fulminated against the new doctrines as anti-Leninist and revisionist. That led them to deny the supremacy of the Moscow priesthood and to the split. But the basic doctrines about the destruction of capitalism do not change with changes in supreme leaders. Any sensible Western observer realizes that the Chinese/U.S. accommodation is at best a very temporary one doomed by history.

Because the Leninist tactics for the seizure of power have become the doctrine for most of the world's communist parties, it is well to review them briefly. They can be summarized as follows:

a. Remain steadfast to the principles of Marx but flexible in tactics.

b. To achieve the final goal (the seizure of power) all political gambits are permitted.

c. In the interests of ultimate success, it is necessary to know how to change course radically.

d. It is necessary to know how, at the proper time, to retreat, to take different paths, use different methods and to take advantage of a breathing space for the preparation of a new attack.

e. It is necessary to know how to penetrate the organization of the enemy in order to destroy it from inside and to win its members over to the socialist side.

f. One must penetrate bourgeois parliaments and institutions not for constructive work but in order to destroy them from inside.

g. It is necessary to conclude political compromises with the enemy in order to lead him into a trap and to prepare the conditions for his liquidation.[16]

As no major move is made without reference to the teachings of Lenin, it can be assumed with confidence that these general tenets, gleaned from his work and thought, are the basis of current policy. And current policy is very much influenced by the doctrine on war.

Marxism-Leninism focuses its primary attention on the economics of defeating the capitalistic nations. It is not surprising that many of the major clashes have occurred in the Third World and it is easy to predict that after Africa is in full turbulence, America will become an increasingly important arena. The Leninist objective is to attack the United States at its "weakest link," the source of its raw materials and trade. In a very significant way, Lenin has stood Mahan on his head: instead of concentrating on attacking the lines of communication (although that, too, would be done) he has advocated cutting off the supply at its source. In the Leninist strategy, there would be no commerce for the time it takes to bring the imperialists to their knees. With that kind of focus it is obvious why the Soviets did not, at first, place a higher priority on large surface ships and why that is now the apparent policy.

Within the Soviet Union, economics takes the primary place in policy as well inasmuch as economic development is to cause a transformation and revolution in military affairs. The dominant idea is of a quantitative accumulation that will enable a qualitative leap. Perhaps no other viewpoint more dramatically underscores the differences between our two systems. The United States, both internally and in its foreign aid, is more or less dedicated to finding ways to improve the quality of life. Therefore, it tends to focus its attention on the consumer at home and abroad. The Soviet Union, however, concentrating on the future and the proletarian paradise to come, tends to ignore the consumer in favor of heavy industry that provides the kind of accumulation that may support qualitative leaps.

Because of its doctrinal and oracular nature, the language of the texts on contemporary war, like the language of the Party Congresses, has a religious quality that is greeted in the West with some embarrassment and tends to be dismissed. Nevertheless, taking the total body of Soviet writings on war into account, there can be no doubt that the Leninist doctrine is still fully functional. According to Milovidov,

> The military-philosophical heritage of V.I. Lenin comprises the richest theoretical basis for development of military

> theory and practice under contemporary conditions . . . . The military-philosophical ideas of V.I. Lenin have withstood the test of time. They are convincingly confirmed by our brilliant victories in the Civil War, the Great Patriot War [World War II], and by the steadily increasing might of the army and navy in the post-war period.[17]

The Soviet doctrine on war, then, is internationalist in scope. Even the idea of defense is translated into international terms, for the purpose of defense is to maintain the Soviet Union as the bastion of the world proletarian movement. For:

> If the armies of the capitalist states serve as an instrument of aggression and attack on other peoples, the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. and the other countries of socialist systems threaten no one; they exist in order to ensure the security of their states, and the peaceful building of socialism and communism. They are the most important factor for the preservation of peace in the entire world.[18]

The object is obviously to achieve solidarity with the armies of fraternal socialist countries "for the joint defense of the world socialist system against imperialist aggression."[19]

> The principle of internationalism is also manifested in the fact that our army is built and brought up as an army of liberation . . . this principle also envisages aid to young national states in assuring their security from the intrigues of the colonizers and aid in military construction (the training of national military cadres, provision of weapons for defense against the attack of the imperialists, etc.).[20]

American political leaders and military strategists talk about the impossibility of nuclear war if civilization is to continue. In practice, military preparedness in the United States assumes that nuclear war and therefore war with the Soviet Union, is an unacceptable solution. The Soviets assume that war is likely, although they try to avoid it, and in the case of war that nuclear war is almost inevitable. Therefore, they plan and train for the worst case. That is the lesson of dialectics.

Because they believe that history is the new god, the Soviets are able to attach moral definitions, in addition to class descriptions, to war. This determines the nature of the Soviet response to war. There is the additional factor, taught by the dialectic, that one

kind of war can be transformed into another; a war of national liberation into an imperialistic war; an imperialistic war into a civil war; etc.

With this kind of definition, it is obvious that the Soviets cannot possibly fight an unjust war. By virtue of their economic stage of development, any war they fight is necessarily dictated by history and any conflict the United States enters is necessarily in opposition to the course of history. Or, as officially defined:

> Condemning predatory, imperialistic wars, Marxist-Leninists consider as just and support wars in defense of the achievements of peoples against imperialist aggression, for national liberation, and wars of the revolutionary classes which reflect the attempts of the reactionary forces to retain or to restore their supremacy with the use of weapons. A war of the workers for their social liberation and for the strengthening and development of socialism and communism is the most just war. For this very reason, by the concept of "just war," we imply primarily revolutionary, liberation wars since these wars are truly progressive and further historical development.[21]

On the other hand, unjust wars include:

> 1. Counterrevolutionary wars—the bourgeoisie against any revolutionary movement of the proletariat.
>
> 2. Any aggression by the imperialist states against a socialist country.
>
> 3. Wars of the imperialists to restore the colonial system.
>
> 4. Predatory wars of the imperialists against nonaggressive bourgeois countries.
>
> 5. Wars between imperialist powers for spheres of influence.[22]

The basis for war is philosophically, politically, and historically established.

> Contemporary capitalism is not only an obsolete reactionary system slowing down historical progress, but also a

> dangerous aggressive force which threatens world civilization. The struggle of the working class and all workers against imperialism is a historical necessity . . . They [the imperialists] unleash both world wars and local wars directed toward the strangling of liberation movements, the seizure of foreign soil, and the enslavement of the peoples of other countries.[2 3]

That the Soviet Union would consider initiating a war (it would certainly be defined in different terms) is made almost explicit in the definition of the goals of a socialist war:

1. To defend "the most just social system in history."

2. To defend the freedom and independence of socialist nations including their territory, culture and existence.

3. To give aid to other socialist states and allies.

4. To give aid to the working class of capitalist countries and their colonies.

Considering the ease with which this formula is adapted—the argument already cited explaining the need for invading Czechoslovakia is a case in point—it is really not correct to assert that the Soviet Union pursues a policy of avoiding war, or some dimension of war. It is the policy of the Soviet Union to avoid certain kinds of wars, or wars under certain circumstances. Theoretically, a socialist or proletarian army is, by definition, an implement of justified violence. In fact, if it were not for the danger from the imperialistic system, then there would be no army and no violence. It is the unrighteous bourgeoisie that forces the army and navy not only into existence but also into action.

Although Marxists argue that war does not change policy, and argue that nuclear war must be avoided, they do find a positive value in war. It was the October Revolution, according to Soviet Marxists, that marked the beginning of the final phase of the transition from capitalism at its highest stage, imperialism, to socialism. Through wars by surrogates in Korea, Vietnam and Egypt, the Soviets have already dealt the West serious blows in the Third World. The Soviets believe that through their leadership and support, the momentum of change has been developing irrepressibly and the contradictions within the capitalist system have

been festering increasingly. These signs lead in one direction with two important aspects: increasing power for the socialist side and increasing conflict and danger of war as the bourgeois class begins to comprehend its danger. It is for this reason that a reduction in tension makes good politics. The West, with its rational and pragmatic interpretations, understands détente as a means of stabilization, and, since it thinks primarily of the present, détente is a goal that it finds satisfactory; for the Soviets, whose primary reality is in the future after the defeat of imperialism, détente makes excellent sense in order to deflect the attention of the bourgeoisie from its imminent danger. It provides a tactical pause.

The specific application of the principles of war will be examined in the next chapter; however, to summarize, war on any level, nuclear, local or limited, is to be judged on its class nature, not on its destructiveness, and its outcome is predetermined.

As Colonel Kondratkov wrote,

> The fact that the use of means of mass annihilation makes for world war fraught with disastrous consequences certainly does not mean that its class content and social character disappear, that it ceases to be a continuation of a certain policy. New weapons do not disrupt and cannot disrupt the connection of war with politics, they do not and cannot abrogate the social and class character of war.[24]

CHAPTER III

THE SOVIET NAVY IN MARXIST STRATEGY

For most observers, the Soviet Navy is an enigma. The purposes for which the navy is designed are unclear. If the Soviets plan worldwide domination, where are the amphibious ships? If the Soviets intend to control the seas, where are the airplanes? What is the need for so much firepower on such small ships and why are there so many submarines? The questions are endless, and the answers are seldom satisfying.

Gorshkov's many pronouncements are, to a degree, clarifications but we must suspect them as including what such statements have always included in the past: some truth, much propaganda, some disinformation, much boasting, some bullying and a confusion of future and present. What they do confirm is what most observers had always known: that the Soviet Navy's primary interest is on the land. They also show the degree to which official pronouncements are tied to economic and political capabilities. At each stage of its development, the Soviet Navy has been praised as the last word in the analysis of naval warfare and all more complex navies, with aircraft carriers for instance, have been denigrated as useless and retrograde.

Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov's memoirs furnish evidence that in 1937 the Soviet Union decided, certainly at Stalin's direction, to build a big navy consisting of "battleships, heavy cruisers, and other surface war ships . . . not excluding aircraft carriers."[1]

The memoirs show that the Soviet high command was fully aware of the need for air cover, even in the 1930s, and for a fleet operating in the open ocean. Commenting on the building program of large numbers of battleships, without a single aircraft carrier, Stalin asked, "Then how far out at sea could they have gone?"[2]

Stalin would have maintained the same position with respect to a large oceangoing fleet composed of capital ships but without air protection before and after the war. As Kuznetsov said, "Stalin has a special and curious passion for heavy cruisers."[3] And apparently Stalin's views did not change, according to Kuznetsov, even after the war. As far as we know, the same attitudes lasted

until approximately 1970 or whenever it was decided to construct the first aircraft carrier.

As we do not know about how decisions are made, we must look for a continuity in the decisionmaking process. Throughout the Soviet and even imperial period of Russian history there has been an attachment to the idea of an open-ocean fleet without any clear strategy for its use, although apparently with a clear perception of its limitations because of the geographical choke-points surrounding Russia.

Admiral Gorshkov's comment in an article of 1967 is extremely revealing. Speaking of the period when it was decided to construct a high-seas fleet without air cover far at sea he said, "Even then, when the country was creating a big oceanic navy, the strategic principles on which its use was based were not revised and, as a result, they were left just the same as those which guided our armed forces in the period of the rehabilitation of the navy."[4]

We need to know what were "the strategic principles" on which the navy's use was based for that period and for the postwar period so that we may make some kind of estimate about the strategic principles that have changed the Soviet Navy in our own era.

Herrick is almost certainly correct when he says that the reasons for this kind of postwar fleet were deterrence and prestige.[5] Until approximately 1970 the Soviets could not afford the luxury of an aircraft carrier for the purpose of prestige and deterrence when other more flexible and less costly military means could fill that gap and when priority of state interest required that the main pressure be kept in contiguous geographical zones. The fleet was not to be on the high seas far from Soviet shores, showing off to the United States, but in contiguous waters, for the benefit of Europe. The recent growth of the Soviet Navy into an open-ocean fleet has been a natural accompaniment of the proliferation of Soviet interests from the Eurasian zone into all the world's oceans.

Most analysts of the Soviet Navy (e.g., even the very capable editor of *Janes*, Capt. John Moore) sooner or later argue that events have taught the Soviet leaders the value of a navy and that they are now bound to become aggressively oriented toward the sea. For instance, Captain Moore refers to the lessons of the Second World War that "must have been apparent to the few competent senior officers who had survived the purges—the importance of aircraft and submarines, the demise of the battleship, the vital place of A/S warfare" and so on.[6] In other words, he argues that the Soviets learned they needed a fleet exactly like the Royal Navy; that is, a mirror image.

It should be recalled that the Soviets had the largest submarine fleet in the world prior to the Second World War and resumed building it immediately after the war. Furthermore, they were not engaged in building battleships and they immediately established one of the largest naval air arms in the world. The evidence simply does not support the usually ethnocentric explanations of who taught whom. The Soviets, while influenced by what was happening abroad, were usually responding to the beat of their own drum. In fact, the Soviets might with some justification argue that they taught Western navies about the application of modern technology to naval warfare.

The Soviets were the first to begin building submarines modularly (that is in sections that were then welded together); in the early fifties the Soviets perfected the air-to-surface missile carried by the *Badger* bomber and introduced by 1956 a reconnaissance and strike aircraft with a range of 3,500 miles without refueling; in 1956 the Soviet *Zulu*-class submarine put to sea with a 250-mile ballistic missile to be followed by the first of a series of nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines, the *Hotel* class; in November 1957 the first *Sputnik* flew, and it was obviously designed for military, including naval reconnaissance uses. It was not until 1959 that *George Washington,* the United States first nuclear submarine FBM, was launched with sixteen 1,100-mile Polaris A1 missiles. The world's first surface-to-surface missile on a surface ship appeared on the *Kildin* which became operational in 1959. The first submarine with surface-to-surface missiles was the *Whiskey* class that appeared in 1958 and went through some modifications before the more sophisticated version, the *Juliet,* appeared in 1962.

Furthermore, it should be recalled that the Soviets had begun writing about the revolution in military science at least as early as 1960. They were quite obviously oriented to the technical and operational changes that the possibility of missiles had introduced into naval warfare long before some Western navies, including our own, fully accommodated them.

One erroneous argument holds that the land-oriented Soviet leadership learned about the importance of navies through the Spanish Civil War that began in 1936. The Soviet Union played an important role in that war as a supplier for the Republican forces. The Soviets faced a problem in getting supplies to the Republicans through seas dominated by Germany and Italy. The contention is that the Kremlin leaders learned the need for seapower in doing so. As we saw, Stalin was already fully aware of the problems;

however, the industrial capabilities of the country would not sustain the luxury of a bigger navy.

The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 was thought to be another lesson. The Soviet Union found itself unable to intervene because of the lack of seapower. This happened again in the Lebanese crisis of 14 July 1958, when American troops played a pacifying role. Of course the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was assumed to be the crowning blow to those in the Soviet hierarchy resisting an expansion of seapower.

While it would be foolish to argue that the Soviet leaders were not learning to use the navy in these experiences, one could, with similar logic, argue that the United States was forgetting how to use its navy in such crises as the Angolan Civil War, the *Pueblo* incident, or permitting establishment of a Soviet air base at Conakry. Both statements are the kind of oversimplification that results from a tunnel vision when one tries to judge the world from one perspective such as naval science. We must seek far more complex explanations.

There has seldom been a time in Soviet history when the Soviet Government was not building armaments as rapidly as it could, and since the twenties the Soviet Navy has been building submarines on a massive scale. In addition, it was always building inshore defenses and constantly perfecting mine warfare. The naval air arm, like all Soviet air forces, was rapidly expanded after the war. Even before the war there was recognition of the need for an enlarged air force.

Stalin probably was not taught a lesson by the problems of aiding the Spanish Republicans. All Soviet leaders had been keenly aware of military problems since the inception of Soviet power. In fact, the test of their leadership was in being able to mobilize and militarize the whole state. The problem was not demand but supply.

As a comparatively young Marxist in the 1930s, Stalin assumed that the European and American imperialist powers would not permit a successful republican government to be established in Spain. Only a few years before, the Soviet Government had been threatened by foreign intervention. Some years later Stalin proved his awareness of the limits of naval power in confrontations with capitalist nations. He said to Milovan Djilas, commenting on Yugoslav support for the revolution in Greece soon after the Second World War,

> What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States—the United States the most powerful state in the

> world—will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea? Nonsense! And we have no navy. The uprisings in Greece must be stopped and as quickly as possible.[7]

Furthermore, in the 1945 Navy Day address Stalin announced that the postwar Soviet Navy was to be used to aid revolutions throughout the world. The idea of the navy as a support for revolutions was to be picked by Admiral Gorshkov later but, as an obvious political move, it must have been frequently considered in the new circumstances following World War II. In 1967 Admiral Gorshkov, in an article entitled "The Development of the Soviet Navy," criticized Stalin for having made an idol out of the Second World War. He wrote that the acceptance of such preconceptions as the basis for the postwar planning

> without taking into account the changes in the correlation of forces in the international arena, consolidated the dominating position of the defensive tendencies among views on the strategic employment of the navy. These were propagated in the postwar years so that the navy was tied down even more than it had been before to the coastal zone which is controlled by the ground forces. In this manner the role of the navy as merely an assistant to the army was confirmed.[8]

Yet, while Gorshkov's statement no doubt has considerable validity, leading officers of other branches of the services made similar statements. All had to operate under the dominance of Stalin's strategic ideas that were said to be based upon a repetition of the victories of the Second World War. But there is the apparent contradiction that in those years when Stalin was thought to be holding back modernization, the Soviet Navy was rapidly moving operationally and scientifically in novel and imaginative directions. One only need recall that 1 year after Gorshkov's article appeared the first nuclear-powered *Charlie*-class submarine became operational. It was armed with a subsurface launched surface-to-surface missile, the unique and most advanced naval weapon of its time. In the year of the publication of that article, sea trials were carried out in the Baltic by the first *Kresta*, a surface ship with many innovations in weaponry and electronics. In addition, the totally new design for helicopter carriers, the *Moskva*, appeared and nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines were launched.

While the Soviet leaders were certainly learning about the use of the navy they were apparently also learning about the use of an air force, an army, rocket troops, intelligence services and security organs. While production was lagging on the collective farms, inadequate quantities of fertilizer were being unevenly distributed throughout the countryside and wasteful methods of harvesting, storing and distributing grain were being permitted, the armed forces were taking giant strides on all fronts.

The *Okean* exercises of 1970 and 1975 were a stunning show of naval force on a very sophisticated level, explicitly demonstrating a threat to several European governments. These scientific, political and cultural demonstrations certainly proved that the Soviet Government did understand and promote seapower.

The conceptual framework notwithstanding, the origins of these imaginative and physical accomplishments deserve close examination. They seem to defy all of our "old saws" that under a totalitarian regime there is an inevitable lack of leadership, initiative, and innovation. For an explanation we can designate two groups of factors: one ideological and the other cultural and historical. Among the ideological factors, clearly the doctrine of the inevitability of war has played an enormous role. It has been used as a justification for the sacrifices of the present in order to gain the paradise of the future. The extensive exposure of the Soviet people to the constant recapitulation of the details of the Second World War reinforces the demand for that sacrifice.

The second major ideological stimulus probably comes from the Leninist tactical doctrines for the defeat of the imperialist nations, the most important of which is the doctrine of the weakest link—that sophisticated industrial nations will be most easily conquered by cutting off their raw materials in the emerging nations. This doctrine has quite obviously been a major plank in Soviet foreign policy since the Revolution and, broadly speaking, it is an obvious factor in many foreign policy moves: the military support for Somalia and Conakry; penetration of the Mideast; and intensified activity in the emerging African nations. The demands of such a policy obviously lead to requirements for a large merchant navy and a high-seas fleet. The strategy is not for a 19th-century style colonial war but for supporting what is ultimately to be the expropriation of the means of production.

A final factor of considerable importance in influencing allocations is the materialistic and scientific base of Marxism. Its goal, the liberation of man, is to be achieved through production. Turning resources into productive channels is almost a moral

obligation. Finally, there is the synthesis that binds all of these tendencies together, the theory of the dialectic through which the world is known, understood, manipulated and controlled. Because the Soviet naval analysts study military science in terms of the dialectic, they see each principle of operational art giving way to a new situation that then creates its new position of instability. Unlike their Western counterparts, they are not likely to be maneuvering for balances and then trying to maintain the *status quo*.

Among the cultural factors that undoubtedly have influenced innovation in the navy, the most important is certainly the universally observed paranoia of the Russian people. ("Paranoia" is not meant here in a derogatory term. Any people who have suffered as much as the Russian people would be fully justified in thinking of the world around them as a threatening and dangerous place. For them, it has been.) The paranoia, however, is heightened by their ignorance of the outside world. Even for the leaders it must be like Plato's cave. They must create an interpretation of the world from the shadows seen through their prison window. Fears are easily exaggerated and rumors can become nightmares. Such an intellectual climate certainly creates a very distinctive basis for crisis decisions. The rational model of calm and logical leaders guarding their "vital interests" will not help us to explain much of Soviet behavior.

A second cultural influence of considerable importance is the Soviet Union's technological inferiority. This has generated an atmosphere in which Western ideas have been easily, in fact automatically, exploited and absorbed and in which Russian pride expresses itself by requiring a degree of innovation and improvement in the foreign model. The Russian intelligentsia has always been aware of the technical backwardness of the masses; therefore, it has had to develop systems that can withstand the punishment and abuse of the ignorant. These cultural and ideological tendencies have reinforced each other and have inspired the propaganda about the extraordinary achievements of Russians—the backward Slavic people, led by the party, marching toward its brilliantly productive workers' paradise. That is what Gorshkov meant when he said:

> We may assert that a state bounded by the sea, which does not have a navy corresponding to its importance in the world, thereby shows its relative economic weakness. Thus, each ship of a navy is a relative indication of the level of

development of science, technology, and industry in a given country and an indicator of its real military might.[9]

This indicates the primary significance of the high-seas navy that the Soviets have built. It is a visible sign, an embodiment of a national and Marxist triumph, a promise of the glorious future and of the possibility of solidarity in the present through the protection of the military machine. The Soviet Navy is a challenge to the West because it asks, "Who indeed rules the seas?" In this extraordinarily important competition it is saying, "Anything you can do I can do better."

The Soviet Navy's challenge to the U.S. 6th Fleet and the French and Italian Navies did not begin with a shot across the bows. According to Admiral Kasatonov, the Soviet Navy was in the Mediterranean to "consolidate international peace and security." Admiral Gorshkov wasted no time in plugging his favorite theme that the Soviet warships were "fulfilling the responsible state interests of the Soviet Union in this region."[10] The Mediterranean also furnished an opportunity to test combat readiness, to be in the vicinity of the enemy and therefore to introduce a degree of realism that the Black Sea did not afford. The many indignant reports by the U.S. 6th Fleet of Soviet missile batteries being trained on its ships were an indication that the Soviet Navy was not practicing détente.

Perhaps even more interesting, certainly more ominous at that time, military leaders began to speak about another of the major themes, that the balance of power and the correlation of forces had shifted from the West and was permanently altered in the Mediterranean. In 1968 Vice Admiral Smirnov referred to the change in the balance of power and the fact that the NATO fleet no longer had "unrestricted freedom to threaten countries in the Mediterranean."[11]

There was one element of these naval moves that has been consistent with a Soviet cultural pattern generally and about which it is useful to be aware. Because of the scientific nature of Marxism, the certainty of the model for the future, and the inexorable turning of the planning cycle, Soviets often confuse present reality with future plans. That which is planned, once it is promulgated, takes on a degree of reality that gives it an immediate existence. Or putting it another way, something that is planned is a sign of the future, and therefore it takes on such a reality that Soviet leaders begin to give premature signals about its existence.

Such, of course, was the reason for the Soviet boasts about the change of power in the Mediterranean. It was still very clearly a NATO sea; the balance of power had not shifted; the correlation of forces was hardly changed. Nevertheless, contrary statements were signals of Soviet intentions and plans as were the signals about the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and Angola.

Another element was operating, too. Khrushchev in Cuba and Stalin in the Berlin blockade adopted a policy for testing the wind. If they succeeded, they would have repeated the action in order to habituate their opposition to a new order of international relations as they later did by their presence in Egypt.

The Soviet practice has been to try to find a solution for the kind of naval threat that the United States posed and then to make it clear to us that it had the solution. This was not just a deterrent; this was also psychological warfare. Through the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, the Soviets made a point of reconnoitering nearly every aircraft carrier crossing of the Pacific or the Atlantic. True, a percentage was missed, but the point was being made that the probability of detection was extremely high.

The semiannual relief of the submarine squadrons in the Mediterranean was a demonstration of a similar sort. Replacements transited on the surface to the Straits of Gibraltar in an obvious display of naval presence, and then submerged to begin the game of ASW in earnest.

Okean 1970, the most powerful naval exercise the world had ever seen, with its massive display of naval power at the southern edge of the Norwegian Sea, challenged the concept of resupplying NATO by sea. In case Western naval forces did not get the point, 5 years later in *Okean 1975,* although fewer naval forces were involved, the operation was repeated. Various "convoys" were simulated and attacked in the Azores, the Sea of Japan and the Eastern Atlantic. With aerial reconnaissance by IL-38s over the Indian Ocean and Northern Pacific and TU-95s flying from Somalia and southern Russia, it became apparent that the Soviet Navy was in an exercise to show that it could sink Western shipping, break lines of communication, and attack at the weakest link over a vastly expanded range.

The important question is: are the Russians coming or not? The answer is really rather easy: not if the world socialist revolution (the Soviet dominated part of it, of course) seems to the Soviet leaders to be spreading satisfactorily. If it is, they can point to themselves as Marx's true interpreters. If it is not, then we are probably in trouble.

Such a formula may seem too facile and perhaps it is, but its implications are not. Marxists everywhere believe that they cannot survive in a world, dominated by imperialists, that is not moving toward socialism. They are probably right. The temptation, if the correlation of forces is interpreted as swinging more heavily in Soviet favor, will be to facilitate the momentum of the transition to socialism by eliminating, where possible, reactionary forces. On the other hand, in our either/or mentality, the idea of "eliminating reactionary forces" suggests fears of the big bomb. Marxists, with their greater patience and scientific theories, are likely to see many more possibilities.

The problem of discussing the willingness of the Soviets to go to war is that one is confronted with the need to know a great deal about the emotional makeup of the leaders, and that information is denied us. Regarding the kinds of war they would fight if they felt threatened, however, we have enough information to speak with considerable certainty, and Soviet naval tactics to confirm it.

Moscow, as a kind of "New Jerusalem," must be inviolable. It is the center for support of the worldwide socialist movement and the bastion protecting the gains of the Soviet people at home. It is the place where ideological, cultural and emotional reactions reinforce each other. It is the mecca of the socialist movement and of Russian nationalism. Should the Soviet leaders feel Moscow and any part of the Soviet land threatened they would almost certainly retaliate. In 1972, this concept of Moscow as the arsenal for the Warsaw bloc was expanded to suggest a great variety of alternatives.

In case anyone was missing the point, Brezhnev, in his foreign policy speech at the 24th Party Congress, and later in his visit to Hungary in 1972, emphasized the internationalist nature of the Soviet Armed Forces. The armed forces, he said, would defend the achievements of peaceful labor in fraternal countries. The whole new internationalist policy of the Soviet Armed Forces was summed up in a speech repeated, in part, widely by other military figures, by General of the Army V. Kulikov, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces:

> A basic principle underlying the military policies of the Soviet state and our Soviet military doctrine and one that serves to guide the armed forces in carrying out their assigned tasks is the fact that our country is neither prepared for nor thinks about conducting a war for the purpose of gaining political rule throughout the world or for changing the

> existing social systems in other states . . . . But it will defend very decisively everything that has been accomplished or created by our Soviet people. In like measure, we will defend the accomplishment of other friendly socialist countries with whom we have signed appropriate agreements.[12]

This is a kind of echo of the period after the war when America was the defender of democracy. In that role, we went to Lebanon, Korea, and Vietnam. As the defenders of socialism, where might the Soviets not go?

This new internationalist role for the armed forces must certainly bring about an expansion in the traditional Soviet concept of perimeter defense, a concept that gets quickly translated into offense, as Finland discovered in the winter of 1939 when she did not recognize her obligation to contribute to the defense of Leningrad by giving up her territory. From the Soviet point of view, the threat to Soviet defenses brought on by the liberalizing movements in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 justified the fury of Soviet repression.

The navy's basic tactics, discussed in Section III, are geared to this concept too. Perimeter lines are drawn at intervals from Moscow. The crossing of each line by a threatening force automatically triggers a predetermined response. From what Gorshkov and others have said, we may assume that this response is authorized in advance.

With the increased range of missiles, the defensive perimeters must be extended so that appropriate action can be taken at safer distances. The evidence indicates that the Soviets do, indeed, see the Mediterranean as an extension of the Black Sea, a point they have been making for years.[13] Now the Indian Ocean has clearly become a new threat sector.

This whole concept is an excellent example of the dialectic for it dictates a series of quantitative changes in the Soviet Navy that have led to a qualitative leap and a transformation of relationships. The qualitative shifts have led to an enormous transformation in the potential for influencing political, economic, cultural and other variables.

Whether or not the Soviet actions appear to be defensive to great powers outside of their perimeter, they are highly offensive and extremely threatening to those within the circumference of the defensive ring. Inevitably, relationships are altered by these new forces and the new perceptions which follow them.

Some of the changes this concept provokes are even geographic.

In solving their problem, the Soviets achieved a greater coordination between the armed forces and even the foreign service. Diplomacy enabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to present Conakry to the Defense Department as a kind of aircraft carrier. The outward reach demanding new operational scenarios, increased forces and logistics seems to have had the effect of reducing the importance of the geographic separation of the fleets or the influence of the geographical bottlenecks. As it is, the Soviets can bring more naval power to bear in the Indian Ocean faster than can any other nation. By now, the Black Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and some of the Arctic are *de facto* Soviet.

What about other scenarios?

The one about an accidental naval battle somewhere in the world's oceans would seem to be the least likely, given the scientific nature of Marxism and the Russian cultural values about human life and human egos. The loss of Soviet lives, while not viewed with equanimity, would probably not excite the same kind of response that it would in the United States. And certainly, a random event, having nothing to do with the march of socialism, would not justify endangering the Soviet Union. Its sense of honor would not, in all likelihood, demand its suicide.

The strategy for naval war is, of course, to marshal such overwhelming force that the opposition, upon observing the correlation of forces, will simply crumble. This is undoubtedly the kind of calculation that has led to the buildup of forces in the Mediterranean where Western powers will apparently no longer intervene.

The Soviets are not obviously changing the correlation of forces in the Indian Ocean, for the price is to be able to strike at industrial Europe and Japan through the weakest link, oil. As these goals can be achieved more easily through the air and by land, however, it is likely that the Soviet Navy will not have a major role here.

Although Marxism does dictate that the world will become socialist, it does not establish a timetable; nevertheless, the Soviets plan to increase the momentum of that transformation through, among other weapons, their military might. Why else do they need so many submarines, tanks and bombers? And having such forces will certainly lead to bullying. The Soviets have never been reluctant to follow that line when they had the power as Finland, Poland and the rest of the bloc can testify. These are the kinds of strategic problems that our war games do not like to have to anticipate. It is like a very slow, complex game of chess going forward on many levels. If a disaster comes, it will be because the United States continues to think that it is playing checkers.

PART II

THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

Contemporary Soviet concepts of strategy and ship design did not spring only from the critical review and strategic realignment of the post-Stalin period. Those decisions formed a new synthesis based on past experiences of future strategic demands on the Soviet Navy.[1] Its great emphasis on preparedness, for example, was intensified by history: the Soviet and Russian Navies from the Crimean War to the Second World War have not been ready for the engagements in which they first fought.

Even geographically, the dialectical process has worked. The extremes of climate, the shallow seas, the lack of natural barriers and the vastness and basic self-sufficiency of the land have worked as an antithesis to any inclination to build a navy in imitation of foreign models. When that did happen—Stalin's plans in the thirties were for a blue-water navy—disaster or inaction resulted.

The geography of the land dominates Soviet maritime concepts as it must do, for the space to be defended is where the narrow seas give way to the land. The range and speed of modern weapons only emphasize that relationship, reducing the importance of the medium in which battles are fought and increasing the importance of the logistical base.[2]

The concept of the battle against the shore as the primary mission of the Navy was also inevitable. Historically, amphibious operations have been those in which the Russian and Soviet Navies have excelled but those for which, in recent times, the Soviet Navy has never been ready.

The multiplicity of cultures in the U.S.S.R. also plays a part. It promotes the recognition of the need to invest the land in order to secure a victory. Russian domination, whether in military art or in political control in Estonia, Egypt or Czechoslovakia, has not been welcome. Command and control cannot end, it is realized, with the destruction of the enemy navy but only when the rear is secure, when nationalities are merged and men are reshaped according to the Soviet interpretation of the Marxist mold.

Any understanding of the dynamics of the Soviet Navy must include a knowledge of its past, for there has been a continuity with the present. Some of the historic battles have, still, an influence on naval operations of the present. For example, the destruction of the Russian Fleet at Tsushima is often cited as good evidence for the need to exercise in all seas, in all kinds of weather in order to be prepared for all possible conditions. The mutinies of the early 20th century and at Kronshtadt must influence the heavy role of political indoctrination and personnel control. These and other characteristics came out of Russia's past. Concepts of naval power were shaped by forces very different from those that formed the preconceptions for Mahan.

The absence of any mention of Russian naval engagements in Alfred Thayer Mahan's classic, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*,[3] is not surprising, although his writings have been widely studied in the Russian and Soviet Navies. (The book was first translated into Russian by HIH the Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, the son of Emperor Alexander II.) Although the Imperial Russian Government was building a fleet second in size only to that of the United Kingdom during the period Mahan was writing, the Russian Navy had made few excursions out of home waters in the 19th century and had won only one battle—against the Turkish Black Sea Fleet off the port of Sinop in 1853. (Apparently Mahan was not interested.) Its most famous activity in the 19th century was a disgrace. In answer to the imminent attack of a Franco-English force, in a sad effort to be useful, it was ordered to sink its ships across the harbor entrance at Sevastopol, the beginning of the Crimean War, in 1854.

After such an undistinguished record for that century, there was a crowning disgrace. The Baltic and Pacific Fleets were defeated in 1904-05 by the Japanese, not only newcomers to industrial power and technology, but also a nation whose fleet was inferior in size to either of the Russian fleets it defeated.

What was particularly instructive about these naval engagements was that the problems they involved, while not ignored in Mahan's works, were the kind that were peripheral. Although Mahan did not draw attention to them, these episodes had some important and original features.

At the Battle of Sinop, the guns of the Russian ships fired explosive projectiles for the first time in history. Most contemporary naval experts thought that naval warfare would no longer be possible. In this battle, which was very brief (but hardly

just the five minutes Frederick Jane claimed),[4] nine Turkish ships and one steamer were sunk, although under the protection of the shore battery at Sinop, by six Russian ships with 540 guns. The battle was comparable in importance to the sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* in 1967 by a surface-to-surface missile. Both engagements ushered in a new era in naval warfare. In the Crimean War, after the Black Sea Fleet was sunk across the harbor, the naval officers and men joined the army in manning the ramparts. This versatility has usually marked the Russian use of men and weapons. One exception was the disaster of the Russo-Japanese war. That taught the Russian Navy a lesson that it has not forgotten. Because of the logistics problems on the long voyage and the rapid and excessive growth of marine encrustations on the hulls that greatly slowed the ships (to the Japanese advantage), the Russian and Soviet Navies have taken it for doctrine that ships must sail in all seas and operate in all waters in order to know the conditions under which they might have to fight. And finally there was another episode in the Battle of the Tsushima Straits in 1905 that was probably not lost on modern Soviet historians. The Japanese admiral, Togo, used destroyers and torpedo boats that had been positioned in advance to attack the Russian Fleet in the night while it was repositioning the ships of the line for a renewal of the battle the next day. However, the Russian Fleet surrendered in the morning.

There were some features of these events that were characteristic of the sporadic pattern of the Russian Navy. Largely antiquated at the time, it could still score a stunning victory at Sinop and 2 years later be at the bottom of the harbor entrance at Sevastopol. Then it grew from the ruins of the Crimean War again into a formidable force. Its naval budget was exceeded only by Great Britain, the United States, and France. But that did not prevent it from suffering a defeat with political and psychological repercussions that still influence the Soviets today.

The missions of the Russian Navy, then, were different from those of the United States and England. The geographical considerations (using the term in its broadest, non-Haushofer, sense) that formed the preconceptions for Mahan's thought—industrialized nations expanding their commerce and foreign trade—simply did not fit Imperial Russia. His basic premise, that seapower was essential to national growth, that national growth was based upon expanding commerce that in turn required imperial power and control, did fit Russia, but in a different way.

Imperial Russia's colonies were all contiguous. The northern Black Sea coast had been taken from the Ottoman Turks in the reign of Catherine the Great; the Caucasian kingdom of Georgia had willed itself as an inheritance to the Russian czar; and Armenia and Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea had been absorbed and subdued in the 19th century. The conquest of the frontier regions—for Russia for four centuries the motto has been to go east—that had begun in the 16th century reign of Ivan the Terrible has only ended in this century militarily (although Red China and Japan would dispute that).

Without overseas territories, the forces that Mahan saw impelling nations to the sea were simply turning Russia inward for the exploitation of its enormous landmass and its extraordinarily varied population. In addition, Russia's foreign trade was largely by land. It was a great importer of European technology and an exporter of grain and raw materials, goods that had been carried by water but by the end of the 19th century were being shipped by rail.

Mahan was aware of the inroads that rail transport was making into the need for navies and wrote about it in *Problems of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies* which was published in 1900, too early for a treatment of the fascinating problems of the Russo-Japanese war. Nevertheless, he understood that railroads and other means of transportation and communications were eroding the importance of sea lines of communication. His arguments were not unlike those of today in defense of navies: that shipping by sea in large quantities and for great distances was cheaper and more efficient; that sealanes constituted a line of communication that gave the decisive military advantage; and therefore, that control of the seas was indispensable.

Interestingly enough, these ideas came to have an enormous European influence and eventually even changed, apparently, American concepts of seapower, although at the time Mahan was writing American strategic ideas shared much in common with traditional Russian ones. First and most obvious, neither nation had strategically essential overseas commerce; second, both fleets were geographically divided and there were questions of the control of a contiguous sea, for us the Caribbean; third, as relatively poor powers with long coastlines, there was a serious problem of dividing scarce resources for multiple objectives; and finally, both countries thought of their navies as defensive. (There was an additional Mahanian analogy: both the United States and

Russia had such a wealth of internal resources that they were constantly tempted to turn inward, away from the sea.)

However long our navy may have been satisfied to continue in the 19th century its mission of preventing the sacking and shelling of harbors and coasts (a mission that Admiral Gorshkov considers primary even today), the new strategic concepts and imperialistic mania interfered. By that time, the last decade of the 19th century, we had no overseas colonies and were not exporting philosophical concepts. But the acquisition of command of the Caribbean, the opening of the Panama Canal and new strategic responsibilities in the Pacific for the defense of the Philippines in 1898 and Hawaii in 1899 changed all of that. "Control of the Seas" became an accepted doctrine and, coupled with Mahan's warning that a small navy on the defensive would always eventually be defeated by a large navy, became the foundation of American naval thought. In the course of this shift the United States lost sight of a quite important Mahanian distinction between defense in the political sense (a navy prepared to go to war if the nation is attacked) and in the military sense (a navy that awaits attack and is only prepared to defend its own, according to its priorities).[5] Defense, without control of the seas, was not seriously considered as a concept. For the United States, sea control became a strategic concept; for Russia, it is a tactical one, or as Gorshkov would call it, a question of operational art.

In reviewing some of the main points of Mahan's doctrine one sees that there are differences in ways of thinking about navies, and about seapower. Western navies, which have generally followed Mahan's strategic concepts, have developed along different lines and for different purposes from the Russian Navy or even the German Navy. For those two powers Mahan's strategic concepts have had a kind of reverse validity. Their problem was to protect and develop land lines of communication and to control certain routes in order to gain the decisive advantage. Furthermore, whereas Western naval strategists have been able to think of navies as somewhat separate entities with separate missions, Russian strategic thinkers have not. Until quite recently, until they acquired overseas socialist responsibilities comparable in their military demands to those of the old colonial empires, the Soviets studied Mahan for insights into Western naval thought and preconceptions. However, since 1970 the Soviet Navy, having demonstrated its preparedness for worldwide operations, has been formulating a new theoretical base finally summarized in Admiral Gorshkov's writings. This has helped to promote the idea that the

Soviet Navy is really modeled on our own and has similar missions. However, even a brief review of the Imperial Russian and Soviet development of seapower makes it clear that Russia, while only intermittently emphasizing seapower, has nearly always been innovative and unique in its naval application and has consistently pursued knowledge of the sea through science. We should have been amply prepared for the fact that the Soviet Navy is not an imitation of Western navies. The Russians, even in periods of great technical dependency on the West, have usually adapted foreign ideas to their own needs but they have also been very inventive. While much of his naval history simply served the party line Gorshkov was quite accurate when he wrote:

> In the quest for ways of developing our Navy, we avoided simply copying the fleet of the most powerful sea power of the world. The composition of the navy, its weapons, ship designs and organization of forces were determined primarily by the missions which the political leadership of the country assigned to the armed forces and consequently also to the navy, by the country's economic resources, and also by the conditions under which the navy had to accomplish these missions.[6]

This tended to be true of czarist Russia as well.

The two most common preconceptions about Russia's maritime strategy are: that the czars engaged in a relentless drive for a warm-water port and that the navy was used in the grand strategy of the Russian bear, the unremitting conquest of new lands. As we shall see, neither of these notions is completely correct. Nor is the idea, promoted by the Soviet Government, that the Soviet Navy, organized as the Red fleet, marked a new beginning from the czarist fleet. The continuity with its past has been maintained and even proudly emphasized by Admiral Gorshkov and the innovations of the present continue an Imperial Russian tradition of inventiveness. A review of some aspects of Russia's naval history proves very useful in interpreting the present and predicting the future.

That the Soviet Navy wears much the same uniform and is largely structured in the same way as the Imperial Russian Navy should be taken as a minor, perhaps, but nevertheless important sign that the Soviet Navy recognizes and insists upon the continuity with its imperial past. Immediately after the revolution, when the Red army and the Red navy were being created, Russia's

military traditions, including the normal signs of rank and the ranks themselves, were rejected. The readoption of these symbols of ranks and tradition must have marked the end of revolutionary idealism in the military and a return to a society of classes. There was also a return to study of the historic doctrine in the use of the fleet.

Everyone knows that Peter the Great is the father of the Russian Navy but not everyone knows how he got that name. Whether or not the records were destroyed inadvertently or on purpose in order to flatter the ego of the autocrat, the absence of documents prior to Peter the Great serves to enhance the impression, which is also an official position, that the Russian Navy was his personal creation. Certainly there can be no doubt that Peter's reforms, innovations, and decrees had a fundamental and long-lasting effect on the Russian Navy as they did upon all of those aspects of the Russian life that could be controlled by the Romanov prince. However, there was a long Russian maritime tradition before him.

According to the legends, the earliest settlers in what is now Central Russia were thought to have been seafaring folk, Vikings, who established the line of Rurick which lasted until the advent of the Romanovs. Water was the primary means of transportation in some regions and even today during certain seasons it still provides the only means of access. The great inland waterways formed a network that literally determined the course of Russian history itself. It was on these waterways that the cities developed. Kiev in the south on the Dnieper River and Novgorod in the north were both essentially maritime cities as their communications with Europe and Asia were largely by water. Kiev maintained close and constant communications—commercial, cultural and religious —with Constantinople by means of the Dnieper River and the Black Sea. Novgorod in the north was a Hanseatic city whose lifelines reached across the Baltic to Western Europe.

Russia's inland waterways formed one of the major lines of communication between Europe, Asia and the Near East and Russia was the primary transit zone for supplying goods and trade between Northern Europe, the Far East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Most Russian towns and villages at that time were located along these waterways and we can presume that nearly the whole Russian population was acquainted with transportation by water, whether on rivers, lakes or seas.

The geographical conditions—inland seas and a network of rivers and marshes frequently requiring portages—must have determined

the preference of the Slavs for light boats that were rowed and not sailed. That further resulted in the fact that they skirted coastlines and avoided the open ocean. However, Slavs were familiar with other kinds of ships and seamanship for they were highly valued by the Byzantine emperors and served in both the army and the navy. The Roman Emperor Mauricius wrote in his memoirs at the beginning of the 7th century A.D. that the Slavs were brave, particularly on their own soil, hardy, and easily bore heat, cold rain, and lack of food and clothing. These were similar to comments made by all observers, German, English, and American, during the Second World War. They certainly echo a statement made by the German General, Ruge, that is quoted by the Soviet Commander in Chief of the Northern Fleet during World War II, that against overwhelming odds, the Soviet fighting man could initiate an attack and that when his ammunition was gone, he would use his weapon as a club and when the clubs were gone he would fight with his bare hands and his teeth.[7]

In succeeding years there were additional elements of Slavic warfare that became legend. The Slavs were long known to be masters of camouflage, of forcing passage through seemingly impossible terrain and across rivers, and of preferring death to retreat. Apparently the Slavs did not try to adopt Byzantine techniques or equipment, but used their own or those adapted to their conditions. It is sometimes argued that their skill in deception and ambush came from the Byzantines, but that was a universal characteristic of war and it is impossible to make any specific attribution.

After the Mongols captured Kiev in 1253 the trade routes between north and south were cut and apparently commerce came to an abrupt end. Merchants at that time were not willing to endanger their lives by going into the territory held by the Mongols. The next three centuries marked not only a "dark ages" for Russian culture and development but also to some extent its decomposition. Its economic and cultural axis from the Byzantine Empire on the south and the Hanseatic cities on the north—which connected it quite firmly with the major cultures of that period—was switched to an east-west axis as the population, reduced by the cruel conditions of the Mongolian occupation, gradually shifted to the protection of forests and cities and towns of the north. But the rivers and lakes continued to serve as essential links between towns and villages and it was along these rivers that the princely towns such as Moscow began to appear.

Obviously, if the towns and villages were located along rivers then military engagements had to involve the use of boats. We do know that two of the great battles in Russian history, connected with the defeat of the Mongols, were fought from the rivers as well as the land. One was the battle fought by Alexander Nevskiy in the north and the other was fought by the Moscow Grand Prince, Ivan IV, at Kazan on the Volga. Once Kazan, where the Volga turns south, was cleared, the Russian forces had the relative advantage of the speed and momentum that the southward flowing current gave their boats in helping to clear the country of the remaining Mongol hordes.

Obviously, the Russian Navy, far from having been born just at the time of Peter the Great, had a long history. The evidence suggests that this naval tradition was not totally confined to rivers and lakes but also involved the sea. Archangel, for example, was always a trading post and a major seaport for whatever Russian power was in existence. That was where English shipwrights in the 17th century reign of Alexey Romanov constructed an imperial yacht. Some of them were probably shipwrights who had been hired by Boris Godunov in about 1598. Czar Boris carried on a tradition that had already been initiated by the grand princes of Moscow of hiring foreign experts and bringing them in large numbers to Russia. For example, he hired two to three thousand foreigners from maritime countries, primarily England, Scotland and Holland, to come and work in the Russian shipbuilding and maritime industries.

Excessive emphasis on these early beginnings in discussing the Soviet Navy might be misleading but there are some interesting parallels. For example, in 865 A.D. a fleet of small Slavic ships attacked Constantinople. The ships were described as about 60 feet long and with a freeboard of 12 feet above the water level. This was a curiously high freeboard and particularly interesting in view of the fact that Russian and even now Soviet-built ships have always had an unusually high freeboard. In addition to the military protection it gives, a high freeboard is very useful against wind and spray, two elements of considerable importance in Russia's very bad climate. The high freeboard also indicated the intent of the Slavs to navigate the Black Sea and, perhaps, beyond.

A second element of continuity was probably determined by geography. The Russians have always claimed an interest not only in the Black Sea and free passage through the Dardanelles but also into the Mediterranean. Any consideration of their geography

makes the reason quite clear: the whole commercial and cultural life of the Russian people was determined by the flow of rivers from north to south, into the Black Sea, and to Constantinople.

In the same way that the shape of the Austrian Empire was to some extent formed by the flow of the Danube River, so the Russian Empire was greatly influenced by the flow of its rivers. When the Urals were crossed and Lake Baikal was settled, Russian civilization was almost impelled by the current of the Amur River to flow eastward to the Pacific resulting in the conflicts with China and Japan.

The transition from the pre-Petrine Navy to that of Peter the Great was somewhat similar to the transition that we see going on in the Soviet Navy today. Although there was a qualitative and quantitative change, the new navy was built very firmly on the experiences of the old.

The navy that Peter commanded was really born of necessity created by a new strategic situation. The Swedish invasions from the north, considering the coastline to be defended, meant that Peter's only maritime choice was to cut their lines of communication and supply and to intercept them as far offshore as he could. This has always been Russia's problem. With its enormous coastline, its long common border with many European and Asian nations, and its lack of natural barriers it has always had to agonize over how to protect itself from a possible thrust by land or by sea over distances that could only be partially defended. The extraordinary fortifications, constant sea patrols, and barbed wire entanglements that now surround the whole of the Soviet Union were made possible by the economic might of the nation and are a triumphant, and perhaps barbaric, response to that centuries-old problem.

But Peter's turn to the sea was not, after all, so radical. The navy that he built was constructed under the supervision of many shipwrights who were already working in Russia and the ships themselves were hardly more than a continuation of the kind that had been built in Archangel and Voronezh, the two shipbuilding centers of the Russian state at that time. Indeed, one of the inspirations for the Russian Fleet of Peter the Great was provided by Elizabeth of England. She had sent to Ivan IV—known in the West as Ivan the Terrible—perhaps in consolation for not accepting his proposal of marriage, a small sailboat that Peter saw in 1688. Peter sent for a shipwright from Archangel, who might have been English, to put the boat to rights and to build several more. It was in this boat that Peter first experimented with sailing.

The heir to the grand princely throne in those days was given a first-class education not in reading or writing but in the military arts. Peter, like his forebears and his descendants, was not given toy soldiers to play with but real human beings.

Peter's palace, like nearly all princely palaces, was on one of the rivers that was a tributary to the Volga. Along the banks of the river Peter had fortifications constructed and then held exercises with his personal soldiers in which he experimented with various tactics. As with most things that he did, Peter went about it very seriously and with excess. For example, in one of his exercises 30,000 soldiers took part. Tactics were apparently realistic. Twenty-four men were killed and at least 50 were wounded.[8] Involved in his maneuvers were amphibious landings along the banks of the river.

The whole operation was a sort of preliminary exercise for Peter's first campaign in 1695, the siege of the fortress of Azov on the Black Sea, that was the first Russian naval operation of the modern era. The fleet was constructed with the speed that only the absolute Russian control over allocations could make possible. Hundreds of ships were built in one winter in the shipyards at Voronezh.

The Russian Navy grew out of the need to protect the flanks of the army and to provide for landings on distant shores. It was natural to extend the kinds of boats designed for the inland waterways because the seas in which the navy operated—such as the Sea of Azov, and the Gulf of Finland—were not only shallow but also narrow and did not require either ships or the art of navigation to be significantly different from that ordinarily experienced within Russia itself.

Another precedent, established by Peter through his own example, was that the leader should first master the military arts that he expected his subordinates to know and then teach them how to accomplish their tasks. Peter built boats with his own hands and he learned the mathematics necessary for military and maritime science.[9]

Converted riverboats, used in the siege of Azov were not sufficiently adaptable to the conditions of the Baltic Sea and certainly not any match for the Swedish Fleet. However, in Archangel, Peter, with the large cadre of English and Dutch shipwrights, was able to build a fleet more than adequate for the Bay of Finland and the Baltic. In fact, one of Peter's last acts on his European trip when he was summoned home from Holland in order to put down a rebellion, was to hire over 900 sailors and shipbuilders from vice admirals to ships' cooks.[10]

It was probably not a desire for territorial aggrandizement that caused Peter the Great to found the city of St. Petersburg, at least not aggrandizement in the 19th-century colonial sense, but the need to solve the strategic problem of securing the northern boundaries. It was this same kind of strategic sense that made the Soviets demand Finnish territory in 1939 and that was behind many territorial acquisitions to be discussed later.

The "window on Europe" that Peter founded, St. Petersburg, was a natural terminus for both east/west and north/south trade. (Novgorod, 120 miles to the south of St. Petersburg, had grown rich on its trade with Baltic nations, trade which had been conducted with apparently little difficulty through portages across the swamps and lakes to the north with exits into Lake Ladoga that feeds the Neva, the river on which St. Petersburg was founded.) The strategic threat that made this imperative came from Sweden and its king, Charles XII. Peter's strategy for defeating Charles XII was not unlike that of his descendant Alexander I in defeating Napoleon or of Stalin in defeating Hitler's armies. It was to cut off the source of supply from the rear while destroying the foreign forces in the interior.

A significant difference between the Swedes and the German and French invading armies was that they came by sea. Peter, therefore, was faced with the problem of cutting them off from the sea. In doing so, his fleet discovered that it could undertake greater and more daring activities than it had performed before, such as venturing further into the Baltic and raiding the Swedish mainland. As a result, by 1723 Peter was the lord of the Baltic having engaged, after the defeat of Charles XII, in unclassical naval warfare by having his fleet conduct amphibious raids in which cities and towns were sacked and devastated, in the style of the Vikings and the old Slavs.

In one of the early demonstrations of naval presence, in July 1723, Peter sailed the Baltic at the head of a squadron of 24 ships-of-the-line and ten frigates in addition to a large coastal flotilla. For this occasion Peter appointed himself a vice admiral.

When Peter died in 1725 Russia was a great Baltic seapower; Sweden never again attempted an invasion. In fact, large-scale landings never again have been made on Russia's Baltic coast.

Peter's legacy for the Soviet Navy was an important one. While there have been many discussions of Peter's strategy in securing the "window on Europe," it is important to note that Peter was a great military tactician. He planned every detail with a view of achieving concrete tactical and strategic advantages in an age when

military operations were often grand gestures without any apparent strategic significance. Furthermore, Peter showed the importance of the leader knowing the basic operation of his equipment and leading his men, with heavy emphasis on training, a planning phase, and extensive exercises for the operations that were to take place.[11]

In making his estimate of the situation, Peter was fully aware of the capabilities of his men and the need to adapt foreign technology and equipment to their use. This understanding led Peter to establish a rule for tactical engagements that has carried considerable weight in Russian strategy. The rule is that the enemy must not be engaged unless Russian forces possess substantial superiority.[12] Specifically, Peter did not engage the Swedish Fleet unless he had at least one third more ships than they. This rule of Peter's acquired the force of law in Russian warfare. For example, in May 1743 when the Swedish Fleet was again attacking the Russian Fleet at the Battle of Hango Point, the Russian Admiral Golovin refused to engage the Swedes on the grounds that he did not have the majority that Peter the Great would have required.

Peter's concern for education and training was so great that he established a naval school for the study of mathematics and navigation in 1701, 6 years before the official foundation of the Russian Navy. Peter's interest in the naval school was not casual. He was personally involved in preparing lessons and in supervising students to insure that they were taught according to his ideas.

The first teacher at this school was an Englishman.[13] In fact one could argue that much of the Russian Navy at that period was foreign. Many of the admirals and officers were foreign; shipwrights were foreign; and there were many foreign sailors in the crew. Great Britain, as the foremost maritime nation, was the prime source for recruitment. The custom of hiring foreign military, even very high-ranking military, was not unusual as Europe was filled with soldiers of fortune seeking employment. Our own Revolution owed not a little to these soldiers of fortune such as John Paul Jones, a Scotsman, who ended his naval career as a vice admiral under Catherine the Great of Russia.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that whatever successes the Russian Navy achieved were owed to foreign leadership and technology and whatever defeats it suffered were because of the backwardness of the Russian people and industry. At its best, the absorption and melding of foreign technology and knowledge with the Russian inventiveness and persistence had led to works of genius such as the first use of exploding projectiles or,

in our own time, the practical development of submarine launched surface-to-surface missiles. (Germany had begun this in World War II.)

Reference is often made to the great swings in the interests in the Russian Navy depending upon the autocrat in power. The "swings," of course, were dependent upon the political situation of the time and problems of the budget. Until late in the 19th century ships were built from pine taken from the Russian forests. Pine did not have a very long life, especially in salt water, so that periodically the Russian fleets simply disintegrated. This was the case with the flotilla that was given to John Paul Jones to command when he served Catherine the Great in 1787. A fellow officer described it as a "motley collection of detestable boats of all sizes and shapes armed by men who were neither sailors, soldiers, nor officers but Russians and no cowards."[14] In fact, the flotilla was made up of leftover boats that had been used for Catherine's royal progress down the Dnieper to survey her new lands. It is probably fortunate for his reputation that John Paul Jones only had to fight engagements with the Turkish Navy whose ships were even worse than his boats.[15]

Until the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia had no fleet in the Black Sea. In 1736, when Russian forces tried to take the Crimea in a series of operations that were largely amphibious, a naval force that consisted of flat-bottomed boats, gunboats, and armed rafts as well as casks and rafts used to cross shallow inlets and bays was assembled. The whole operation showed the Russian talent for making use of what was at hand.

Whether or not it was because she was German and not Russian, Catherine's naval policies added a new dimension to those of her predecessors and her successors. In her reign, the Russian Fleet engaged in operations for specific maritime ends—not always directly in support of the army.[16]

Catherine also used her navy for rather grand gestures that seemed to have a clear strategic purpose although the execution was a bit random. For example, in 1769 she ordered one of her lovers, Orlov, whom she raised to a count and promoted to admiral, to take the Baltic Fleet into the Mediterranean in the first operation of the Russian Navy outside of its contiguous waters. Its mission was to distract the Turkish Navy during a Russian Army attack.

The Turks, who had not learned to have a high regard for the Russian Navy from what they had seen in the Black Sea, considered the whole expedition impossible. They were, therefore,

astonished when they discovered that the Russian Fleet had passed the Straits of Gibraltar. Count Orlov's first operation was to make some attacks in the Greek Islands and abet some revolts. But he did create a diversion and drew off the Turkish Fleet.

Catherine sent Count Orlov reinforcements under the command of English admirals in the Russian service in July 1770. They engaged the Turkish Fleet and scored an enormous victory. The Turkish Fleet had taken refuge in the Bay of Tchesme and Admiral Elphinstone attacked with four fire ships, a tactic used by the English against the Spanish Armada but apparently new to both the Russian and Turkish crews themselves.

The very conditions of the growth of the Russian Navy, and the Russian military as a whole, insured its genius for absorbing and adapting foreign techniques. Being led by soldiers and sailors of fortune from all over the world, it had a quality of mind that assumed that there would always be something more advanced that ought to be adapted and assimilated as quickly as possible. In any case, in the battle of Tchesme the Russian admirals, far from preventing their British colleagues from undertaking this very new tactic, apparently encouraged it, and, in addition, absorbed it into standard Russian tactics as evidenced by their becoming the masters of the use of fire ships and their modern equivalent, the torpedo boats.

The result of Count Orlov's first Russian naval expedition to the Mediterranean was that the Turkish Fleet was diverted and unable to assist the Turkish Army from the shores of the Black Sea during Catherine's drive to take the Crimea. The battles on the land were as victorious as those on the sea and in the end, in 1774, Russia won the right to send merchant ships through the Bosporus and also, significantly, the right to have a permanent Black Sea Fleet. With that success, Count Orlov's expedition to the Mediterranean came to an end, although its historical ramifications continue until the present. Count Orlov's expedition, as well as those of Admiral Ushakov later, provided Admiral Gorshkov with the basis for arguing that the Soviet Navy had a historic right to be in the Mediterranean.

With the need to build a Black Sea Fleet in the south and renewed threats from Sweden in the north, Catherine undertook a very large shipbuilding program and in this she relied heavily on English officers. The reputation of John Paul Jones had reached her ears and she urged her ministers to do everything possible to secure his service. According to a Russian historian, when Catherine heard that Jones had accepted service, she was delighted

and is reported to have said, "He will get to Constantinople."[17]

After the Empress had secured John Paul Jones' service she never let him out of her sight and kept him under watch by her agents. However, by the time Jones arrived, a large faction against him had developed. There were fortunes to be made in Russia by pleasing the Empress, as the wealth of her lovers showed, and they did not look with favor upon new rivals. Furthermore a predominant influence in the Russian Navy was exerted by English and Scottish officers in the Empress' service and they looked upon Jones as a pirate. Apparently, John Paul Jones, who had been hired to be the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, was regarded as a threat for he was given command of sailing ships in their last stages of obsolescence for operations in very narrow and shallow waters, while his senior, a French nobleman with no nautical experience, was given the more manageable galleys. To make matters worse, all of these forces were under the command of Catherine's former lover and chief minister, Prince Peter Potemkin, who also had no naval experience. There followed a contest between the serious and rational (one assumes) Admiral Jones trying to restore morale and equipment and coordinate tactical plans on the one hand and the Empress' jealous lovers on the other.

Jones, employing a recognizable bureaucratic technique, set about writing memoranda to his superiors, but his many plans of action appear to have been largely ignored. Certainly they were frustrated. One engagement, for which Jones' senior took credit, involved capturing several large Turkish ships-of-the-line. The plan had been formulated by Jones to deceive the Turks into running aground in the Liman Narrows. The ships that Jones' senior "captured" were already either aground or sunk.[18]

The leadership of Prince Potemkin was not exceedingly straightforward. Either he gave no orders and failed to respond to Admiral Jones' requests and proposals or he issued directives such as the following warning that the Turkish commander might try something. He wrote, "I request your Excellence, the Captain Pasha [the Turkish CO] having actually a greater number of vessels, to hold yourself in readiness to receive him courageously and drive him back. I require that this be done without loss of time; if not you will be made answerable for every neglect."[19]

Admiral Jones' reply to this order was his last act in the Black Sea Fleet for he so enraged Prince Potemkin that he was relieved and sent to St. Petersburg to await further orders. Jones replied,

"A warrior is always ready and I had not come here an apprentice." Obviously, Prince Potemkin did not want any lessons in professionalism.

The account of Jones' stay in czarist Russia indicates that he was subjected to false accusations, a not infrequent experience for visitors to Russia. Not only was he kept under the observation of agents but also the letters that he wrote in Russia were intercepted and confiscated without his knowledge. Finally, in order to make him leave, either the secret police or Catherine's or Jones' enemies probably fabricated an accusation that he had violated a 14-year old girl. The accusation was made by a prostitute. He was denied the right to a lawyer and advised that his situation was very serious and that he should depart. His professional and personal reputation blemished, he spent much of the rest of his life trying to understand or vindicate what had happened to him during those few months serving Catherine. He concluded that in a free society with a free press no one could play the "hypocrite" for long.[20]

The second Russian naval squadron in the Mediterranean entered in the year 1798 during the brief Turkish/Russian alliance in opposition to Napoleon, but the Russian Admiral Ushakov and the British Admiral Lord Nelson did not develop a harmonious relationship. Lord Nelson accused Admiral Ushakov of spending more time trying to capture miscellaneous harbors than in trying to fight the French. On the other hand, he, Lord Nelson, seemed to have spent an inordinate amount of time concerning himself with Lady Hamilton and the Neapolitan royal family. Although Ushakov's undertakings were perhaps mysterious to Lord Nelson, they were probably explained by a Russian desire to have two or three islands in the Aegean for the purpose of logistics supply. At least that is how Catherine explained Admiral Ushakov's erratic maneuvers to the Hapsburg Crown Prince, Joseph, in 1792 while assuring him that Russia had no further imperial designs and adding, with pious Russian orthodoxy, that her primary concern was for the fate of the Christians under Moslem rule. Catherine had had a grand design that was greatly encouraged by Prince Potemkin. The plan called for reorganizing Greece, the Aegean Islands, and Constantinople into a new empire with her grandson as emperor. The only practical outcome of this intention was that her grandson was christened Constantine.[21]

Lord Nelson also suspected that the Emperor Paul wanted to take Malta. (A similar alarm developed when Mintof was elected the Premier of Malta and brought into power a leftist government

in 1970. At that time, incidentally, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron was standing off Valletta; however, in Nelson's time, the Russian squadron under Admiral Ushakov failed to materialize when needed.) The only imperial Russian interest in Malta, however, was the half-mad Emperor Paul's masquerade in playing Grand Master of the Knights of Malta.[22]

On the basis of his Mediterranean observations Lord Nelson certainly did not have a high opinion of the Russian Navy. When he expected to engage it in battle he believed that he could sink all of the ships-of-the-line at Reval, now Tallin. That would have been an extraordinary accomplishment as Reval was a highly protected harbor with large shore batteries. Nelson was going to accomplish this with only ten of his own ships, one or two fire ships, and a bomb ship.[23] His tactic was to use the Russian winter to his advantage: to get to Tallin before the ice melted in order to keep the force from joining that of the larger one at Kronshtadt. However, the ice melted and on 2 May the fleets were joined, making a force of 43 ships-of-the-line. Nelson still boasted that he could defeat them with only 25 of his own ships.

Oddly enough, although Admiral Ushakov had been celebrated as a naval hero, the Russians called Lord Nelson "a young Suvorov," referring to the famous Russian field marshal who defeated the Turks and engaged the Napoleonic forces in Switzerland. Evidently the Russians even then did not think of military genius as separated into categories according to land or sea.[24]

The Russian squadron in the Mediterranean did little more than threaten several islands and then devoted itself to the support of Marshal Suvorov. The navy did not see much more action even during the Napoleonic wars. Significantly, during Napoleon's invasion of Russia the Russian ships remained in the island fortress of Kronshtadt, but in the Slav tradition the officers and crews joined the army to fight on land in the defense of the motherland.

The succeeding years, until the Crimean war, were marked by fairly continuous battles with the Turkish Navy which seemed to have been one of low capability and efficiency. The climax was, however, the Battle of Sinop in which all of the surviving Turkish ships were destroyed by the Russian Navy's use of explosive projectiles. This was an event of far-reaching importance not lost upon other Europen navies. It was also then predicted that naval warfare was no longer possible.

The introduction of this projectile did mean that navies as they had been built were outmoded. Certainly sailing ships made of

pine could no longer withstand the heat of battle. The Russian Navy had begun converting to steam when that was introduced earlier.

Perhaps the knowledge that their ships were outmoded may have played a significant part in the decision to sink the Black Sea Fleet across the harbor entrance at Sevastopol at the beginning of the Crimean war but the legacy of the military disaster at Sevastopol had many more far-reaching effects than the importance of that war warranted. The Russian Fleet probably could have defeated the British Fleet, which was standing guard during the landing at Balaklava below Sevastopol, and was preparing to do so. However, the commander in chief countermanded the order to attack as he intended to fight, in the traditional Russian manner, primarily on land and use the fleet in its usual supporting role. As a result the fleet was bottled up and useless.

The disgrace of the defeat reverberated throughout the empire and was a major shock to the imperial throne. Not only that, the English participation in the war—the reasons for which were very obscure at best—proved to the Russians an enormous duplicity that led to the still prevalent emotion that if the English talk about peace, that meant they are planning for war.[25] In any case, there was a surge of anti-British propaganda including rather violent denunciations of the parliamentary system. In the midst of this unfortunate atmosphere, the revolutionary parties and factions were becoming solidified and most of them took it on faith, right up to the eve of the October Revolution, that the English system was antithetical to the Russian spirit. Such can be the unforeseeable result of a naval engagement.

In rebuilding her fleet Russia, of course, turned to steam and iron. But interestingly, while the rest of the world's navies adopted heavier and heavier guns, the Russian Navy for many years employed a much lighter one as more easily handled. Here again, Russia was showing an ability to absorb foreign technology without being overawed by it. This happened again in 1864 when, impressed by the "monitors" that took part in our Civil War, the Russian Navy built six of its own although they were seldom used.

Russian naval invention during these years was certainly on a par with that of any country. For example, Russians were the first to design what was called an "armored cruiser." The idea of the armored cruiser, quickly adopted by other countries, was to protect it at the waterline with armor but not elsewhere. In that way, it would have greater speed. Another invention was ingenious

but a failure. In 1873 two ironclads of 2,500 tons that were perfectly circular were launched. The idea was that the circular construction would deflect any shell. The guns were retractable, an idea that returned with the retractable antiaircraft missile system used today. These circular ships might have caught on but on a trial run up the Dnieper, able to make only 8½ knots, they were caught by the current and whirled like merry-go-rounds down to the sea. The crews were put out of action by dizziness.

In listing Russian "firsts," it must be mentioned that in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 a Turkish ship was sunk by a Russian torpedo—the first successful torpedo attack in history. In a later development the Russian Navy armed a merchant ship and equipped her with six torpedo boats of small enough size to be carried. The maneuver was to sail the merchant ship into position, lower the torpedo boats and attack. At the same time, the Russian Navy was advancing the use of mine warfare and showing great innovation in mine design.

Mines were used at the mouth of the Danube to bottle up the Turkish Fleet. The Russians were quite inventive in the use of torpedos and when they acquired a kind for which they had no suitable ship, they lashed them onto barges or suspended them from the hull and somehow made them effective. In these engagements the Russians were literally inventing the tactics for torpedo warfare. Torpedos were almost totally new in naval inventories.

The result of this Turkish War was that the Russian Navy had found the torpedo boat an extremely effective instrument and devoted, thereafter, a great deal of attention to building large numbers and kinds of torpedo boats. In 1902 the Russians also had planned, according to the naval editor and Russian visitor Frederick Jane, to build at least 50 submarines that would apparently have carried at least torpedos but would have been only semisubmersible. They were to submerge only at the moment of attack. The possibility of a submarine battleship was not regarded as a remote dream even then.

By 1904 at least four submarines were operational and four more were on the way. There was some evidence that they were being built in sections (an innovation the Soviets have perfected) so that they could be transported on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Brilliant technical innovation, however, could not elevate the Russian Navy beyond the limits of geography and the capabilities of its personnel. By the end of the 19th century, European navies were playing an aristocratic game. Perhaps because there had been

no major engagement since the Crimean war, Russian officers paid more attention to their increasingly elegant regalia than to the requirements of warfare. The fleets were in commission only 3 months of the year and had only 25 percent of their full complement the rest of the year.

While the rise of Japan in the Far East was not ignored by the army or foreign office, it is apparent that few, certainly not the naval leadership, appreciated the change in the correlation of forces. That a nation, until recently feudal and technologically ignorant, could mount an offensive against the largest country in the world, with the largest standing army and the third largest navy, seemed absurd. Nevertheless, the blow was struck and the Russian Navy, without a Pacific Fleet, was faced with its first war at sea in the Mahan mold. Logistics and morale brought defeat even before the Japanese delivered the *coup de grace*.

Because of the Treaty of Paris (1856), the Black Sea Fleet had become inactive. No Russian or Turkish warships could sail there until 1871 when Russia revoked that limitation in the treaty. However, nothing was done to build up the fleet. The Baltic Fleet, therefore, had to make the long journey. The heat and the privations—Baltic sailors had never before experienced temperatures of 115° in the shade—would alone have guaranteed a very inefficient fighting force. Political unreliability and lack of experience guaranteed a degree of failure, but logistics absolutely insured it.

As the defeat of the Russian Navy at Tsushima was a trauma that affected even the Soviet Navy, it is necessary to get some understanding of this naval battle from the Russian point of view. Although Western historians credit the Russian Second Pacific Squadron with little distinction, Russian writers look upon the defeat at Tsushima on 26 and 27 May 1905 as the first major battle lost by the Russian Navy in its 200-year history. Among naval disasters there are few to compare with it. Of 37 Russian ships only 13 survived: one cruiser and two destroyers reached Vladivostok; five ships were captured by the Japanese; and five, which reached foreign ports, were interned for the duration of the war. From having been the world's third naval power, Imperial Russia plummeted in the course of 2 days to sixth.

Even though the Soviet Navy is still embarrassed by this defeat—there is reason to believe that it is studied minutely for the purpose of lessons learned—it should be instructive for all navies, for it showed the importance of understanding logistics, an often neglected aspect of naval warfare.

Originally, the fleet was sent in order to make it impossible for the Japanese to land troops, reinforcements, and supplies for the siege of Port Arthur. But Port Arthur had fallen. The Russian squadrons there and at Vladivostok had proved ineffective in preventing Japanese resupply and amphibious landings. The czar, however, did not change the squadron's mission, apparently planning to use it in the role of support for the Army.

But by the time the Russian Navy had sailed 18,000 miles from the Baltic, having left on 15 October, it was in no condition of readiness to do anything but to make a dash for port. The only port left or open was Vladivostok. No other power would give aid to the Russian ships.

Slowed by marine growth on their hulls, the Russian ships were no match for the newer and faster Japanese Navy. In making a dash through the Straits of Tsushima the Russian ships presented a broadside target for the Japanese guns. Although Admiral Rozhdestvenskiy, the commander in chief, has been severely criticized for his tactics, no one has suggested what other decision he could have made. What is often forgotten is that the Japanese Navy was a new force in the world, untested and untried against European navies. It is likely that every Western navy would have underestimated Japanese capabilities and met the same fate in the Straits of Tsushima.

In spite of the disgrace of the Russo-Japanese War, the great Russian naval leaders of the 20th century were all present during the battle. Admiral Makarov was a commander in chief of a naval squadron; Commander Essen was given command of a battleship; and later promoted to the Commander in Chief of the Baltic Fleet; and Lieutenant Kolchak, Captain of the destroyer *Serditiy* ("furious" in English), became the Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet and was the last hope for a non-Marxist government after the Russian Revolution.

The Romanov throne, already tottering, was dealt a severe blow by this disgrace. This was the second defeat in 60 years suffered by a government that justified its repressive measures on the grounds that it needed to be the most powerful nation in the world. Furthermore, it was now protected by only one fleet, confined to the Black Sea and beset with mutiny.

Even so, the Russian Navy began to rebuild and to rebuild with imagination. It began construction of a destroyer, the *Novik* class, that was years ahead of the rest of the world in speed (it could make 37.3 knots in 1913!) gunpower and the size of the torpedo battery. (It carried fifteen when British destroyers carried

two.) The navy had developed the world's best mine and the world's first submarine minelayer called the *Krab,* although industrial problems prevented its completion. Thus, on the eve of the First World War, the Russian Navy reflected the contradictions of the Russian nation itself: advanced design and backward production.

The naval architects for a building program that started in 1912 were ahead of their time on paper, or at least ahead of other planners in their designs for battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. They planned to build 32,000-ton ships with the speed of cruisers and the armament of battleships. They were to have twelve 16-inch guns, more than any other ship in the world. Quite clearly there was a recognition at that time that speed was an essential element in modern navies, a prediction that was to prove fateful in the Black Sea engagements of the First World War. They also developed a concept of a light cruiser that was both heavily armed and fast like the *Novik* class.

In the Turkish wars the Russian Navy had discovered the importance of torpedos and in the Russo-Japanese War the tactics of mine warfare. The need for underwater protection had made such an indelible imprint on Russian naval architecture that this feature of Russian warships has been emphasized in Soviet design down to the present.

Russian design genius was not quite as brilliant as the Soviets normally claim but it was, nevertheless, one of the most inventive and imaginative of its time. For example, Russia had the first electrified city, Tsarskoe Selo (now Pushkin), and one of the first commuter railroads. (Of course everyone knows that the Soviets also produced the first *Sputnik.*) It is significant that these achievements were not the product of the whole economy but of the ability of the supreme leader, whether emperor or dictator, to demand sacrifices in one sector in order to have great achievements in another. (For all of their faults, the last Romanovs were possibly unable, but certainly unwilling, to force the cruel and inhuman kinds of economic dislocations and industrial slavery that Stalin and his successors have inflicted upon the Soviet people.)

It has been a great burden for Russia that throughout its history forward leaps in industrial production have usually been decreed from above rather than produced from below, even when it meant having commerce with the enemy. Thus, with the Imperial Russian Navy, even on the eve of World War I orders were still being placed for ships with foreign firms that would undoubtedly be in German hands.

When Czar Nicholas II took the supreme command at Mogilev in 1916 the Naval Directorate, similar to a naval ministry, was disestablished. Instead a naval staff was formed that was attached to the Supreme Command. The Baltic Fleet at that time was subordinate to the Commander of the Northwestern Front. The mission of the Baltic Fleet was

> to tightly defend the approaches to the capitol from the sea and in order to effect that to prevent any breakthrough of the enemy into the Gulf of Finland and also to defend the right flank of our front from an attack from the sea and in order to effect that to prevent a breakthrough of the enemy into the Bay of Finland on which that flank depended.[26]

In 1916, four new battleships were received by the Baltic Fleet, greatly strengthening it and permitting an increase in its activity until the revolutionary events overwhelmed it.

The Baltic Fleet provided considerable support to the right flank of the front by shelling shore objectives. The minefields established at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland were completely successful in preventing a breakthrough by the German Fleet, although one was tried in the fall of 1916. A major operation was to curtail German trade with Sweden. Minefields were laid and in this the Russian submarines cooperated with British submarines.

It is frequently charged that the Imperial Russian Command was ignorant of the importance of communications security. One naval incident in the war makes it clear that that was not the case. In fact, Admiral Bubnov claims that Russian awareness of the importance of communications security lead to a great discovery that made it possible for the English to win the Battle of Jutland.[27] Early in the war, the German cruiser *Magdeburg* went aground on an island at the mouth of the Bay of Finland. A detachment was sent under the command of Lieutenant Hamilton, a descendant of an English sailor hired by Peter the Great, to take command of the cruiser. When Lieutenant Hamilton reported to the Commander in Chief that the cruiser was essentially intact, he was ordered to send divers overboard to search for codes and signal books. The books were found and throughout 1915 and 1916 German communications could be deciphered. According to Admiral Bubnov, the codes were also given to the British who were then able to anticipate and attack the German Fleet off Jutland forcing it to withdraw for the duration of the war.

Immediately after the Battle of Jutland the German Command realized that its code was known and apparently changed it; however, according to the Russian admiral the British were able to decode the new system as well.

If one considers the history of the Russian Navy up to the First World War, one is struck by the paradox of the frequently brilliant tactical and technical leadership but faulty strategy and bad planning which so often left the navy helpless. The Russian Navy was seldom disposed to advantage for the action it had to take. This failure has, so far, characterized the Soviet Navy as well. In view of the massive Soviet and Imperial Russian espionage networks, that situation would seem absurd. Of course the Soviets have learned from the past and tried to correct these faults. Many patterns, however, persist about which our naval strategists should not afford to remain ignorant.

CHAPTER V

WAR AND REVOLUTION

The Russian Navy reached its lowest ebb on the eve of the First World War. The Pacific Fleet, as a result of the disasters of the Russo-Japanese war, no longer existed. There was no Northern Fleet and not even a developed port at Murmansk. The Baltic Fleet consisted of four rather old battleships, five cruisers, and several other capital ships in various stages of completion. The building program that had been initiated in 1909 had hardly gotten off the ground. The Black Sea Fleet however was in good physical condition. It had been unable to participate in the Russo-Japanese war and the new ships were being delivered. However, its crews were mutinous. At the outbreak of the war it had 5 old battleships, 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, and 17 torpedo boats. In addition, there were four submarines, gunboats and minelayers. Personnel numbered only 47,000 men.[1]

So much has been made of the incompetence of the Russian war ministry and system of industrial production that it comes as a surprise to learn that in the 3 years from the start of the war until the revolution 4 dreadnoughts, 26 destroyers and 28 submarines were completed. On the ways, there were 75 submarines and a good many capital ships. Even then, when navies were assessed according to their capital ships, the Russians were giving a very high priority to submarines.

Although the Russian Navy by no means distinguished itself during the First World War, there are several facets of its operation that are interesting either because they illuminate modern Soviet naval concepts and strategic thinking or characterize Russian maritime attitudes.

There was a paradox. The Imperial Naval Staff had no other plans for the strategic employment of the Russian Navy, apparently, than that the Baltic Fleet should guard the approaches to St. Petersburg and the Gulf of Finland, and the Black Sea Fleet should protect Russia's Black Sea shores. There was no plan to force the Bosporus prior to the First World War. The plans for naval construction in the Baltic alone called for the production by

1930 of 24 battleships, 12 battle cruiser, 24 cruisers, 108 destroyers and 36 submarines.[2] This would not have been, by normal standards, a purely defensive force. The size of this force, like the size of the "defensive force" the Soviet Navy constructed in the fifties and sixties gives us some notion of the Russian conception of their requirements.

The German High Command expected that the Russian Navy would be employed as it had been in past wars and battles in amphibious operations and raids. In the south, it was assumed that there would be some threat to Turkey, most likely in the region of the Bosporus, as the Germans shared the preconceptions of other naval analysts—that the Russians were always driving toward the sea. It was expected that the sea lines of communication between Sweden and Germany, so important for German ore imports, would be seriously threatened.

But no such actions took place. In the Baltic the naval war disintegrated into one of mining operations. Both the Russians and the Germans mined and countermined the Gulfs of Riga and Finland and tried to interfere with each other's shipping by means of mine barriers.

There was no attempt to remove the Baltic Fleet to a more advantageous position. Instead it was left in the Gulf of Finland, bottled up behind its own minefields. Second, in spite of the many assertions in the West about the Russian centuries-old drive for warm-water ports with free access to the sea, there had been no effort to develop Murmansk until well into the First World War. And, indeed, in spite of the centuries-old fears in Europe about the territorial lusts of the "Russian Bear" such as voiced by the British Prime Ministers Pitt and Palmerston, there was not in the Imperial Staff any clear concept that a blockade by sea or land would do harm to Russia economically. One is inclined to suspect that territorial aggrandizement was not an objective of Nicholas II. In fact, the need to protect sea lines of communication became apparent only in World War I.[3] In the period before the First World War 80 percent of Russia's exports went by sea, and 60 percent of those from the Black Sea—a figure that reflected the huge grain exports from the Ukraine. Thirty-five percent went through the Baltic and only five percent on the remaining seas.

With the main transportation routes cut, the alternative ones were badly overloaded. Supplies could not be gotten to the front nor even distributed within the country. This situation was to repeat itself in the Second World War under the Soviet regime.

In view of the widespread assumption that Russia had as its primary foreign policy objective the acquisition of the Bosporus, it must seem strange that no move was made to keep open that vital waterway. In fact, in 1912 Nicholas II had had a clear warning. Turkey was in a war with Italy and illegally closed the Strait to Russian shipping. The economic effects of the closure were immediate and violent. After a short time, through international pressure, the Strait was opened again to Russian shipping but the czar either did not learn his lesson or felt helpless to do anything about it. Alternative routes for imports were not developed.

The results of the neglect of logistics and supply plans were to be staggering. Ninety-seven percent of Russia's imports came either by land or through Baltic and Black Sea ports. But after the outbreak of World War I, only 3 percent of Russia's normal imports were being received as the other lines of communication were cut. The two remaining shipping lines were via the comparatively remote ports of Archangel on the White Sea and Vladivostok on the Pacific.

The problems were horrendous. Previously only about one tenth of 1 percent of foreign imports had come by way of Archangel. The facilities were so poor that only one or two steamships could be unloaded per week; there was no dock; there were no icebreakers; and at the beginning of the war, there was a loading capacity for only two or three trains per day between Archangel and St. Petersburg.

Transshipment through Vladivostok, while an alternative, was not a very good one. For 3 months of the year that port was frozen and could be kept open only with great difficulty. There was no question of the Trans-Siberian Railroad's inability to handle the huge volume of foreign imports, especially as the section across Lake Baikal had not been completed.

Vis-á-vis its presumed opponent, the Turkish Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet was in an incomparably better condition than the Baltic Fleet. Its mission was to "provide defense of the shore and security of the lines of communication."[4] The Turks, however, did not venture to engage the fleet and it saw little action. However, in August 1914 the German High Command sent two cruisers to join the Turkish Fleet and a number of officers to occupy command positions and to undertake the training of personnel and exercising them in various tactics.

The Germans apparently assumed that much more than two cruisers were needed in order to engage elements of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and therefore a task group was formed to try to

harass shipping and supply in Black Sea ports. The German Command, however, need not have been disturbed as the Russian Navy did not try to engage their cruisers, which were regarded as too fast. Instead, the Black Sea Fleet confined its operations to a few not very effective raids on the Turkish coast. The Imperial Navy apparently lacked any strategic plans whatever and, according to Admiral Bubnov on the czar's staff at Mogilev, even considered impractical any attempt to mine the entrance to the Bosporus. The Navy's inaction eventually so disturbed even the mild-mannered Nicholas II that he removed his passive commander in chief and replaced him with Admiral Kolchak from the Baltic.

That the Imperial Russian High Command did not have plans for seizing the Bosporus is surprising and in view of the traditional reading of Russian history is difficult to credit. Apparently, however, at that time naval intelligence was the only agency of the Imperial Government that had serious thoughts about the Bosporus. According to Admiral Bubnov, intelligence had made fairly exact reports on the deteriorated state of Turkish fortifications and suggested that a breakthrough to the Dardanelles should be made before repairs and supplies could be brought in and before the two German cruisers, after a prolonged cruise in the Mediterranean, could achieve a high state of readiness.[5] But there were no amphibious forces, and there was no equipment for amphibious forces located in the region of the Black Sea at that time.

The czar's government was so passive about expansion to the south that it heard about the plans for the Gallipoli campaign not directly from the English but through the Russian Ambassador's agents in Paris! An amphibious force was quickly formed in Odessa from three divisions of the Caucasian Army. There was no naval infantry. Then it was discovered that there was hardly any of the equipment needed for amphibious operations and there was not even transport in the whole Crimea sufficient to effect the operation. Furthermore, priorities were such that troops were gradually transferred from the "naval infantry" to the southwestern front and thus the amphibious task force came to a gradual end.

The Russian Fleet performed effective action, however, in the mining of the Bosporus as well as of Bulgarian and Rumanian ports in the Black Sea. Another traditional role was that of escorting the Russian troops to the southern front.

The Imperial Russian Black Sea Fleet came to an end in June 1917 when the Sailors' Soviet ("soviet" means council) on board

ship forced Admiral Kolchak not to lay down his sword but to throw it overboard. It is generally reported that Admiral Kolchak was forced from his command by the revolutionary threats.[6] That is not correct. The Sailors' Soviet, which at that time were supporting the Provisional Government, had demanded that all officers give up their pistols and weapons. They included in their demands that Admiral Kolchak should give up a golden sword that the Emperor had awarded him for his outstanding performance in the Russo-Japanese war. Admiral Kolchak refused but the demand was pressed for several weeks. In the end, to avoid a confrontation, Kerensky recalled Admiral Kolchak to St. Petersburg to avoid a more serious incident and rather than submit to the Soviet, he threw the sword overboard.

The advancement of Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy's youngest admiral, to Commander in Chief of the Fleet, has been interpreted as proof of his exceptional ability. Although his way was smoothed by the purges (there will be more discussion of that later) his rapid advancement was not unique in Russian history. Promotions in Russia had not always taken place according to strict seniority. Perhaps this was because Russia was a country always subjected to the whim of the supreme ruler. In any case where favorites can come to the fore, age is no barrier.

Admiral Kolchak, as an example, was promoted from commander of destroyer and torpedo divisions in the Baltic to the Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet at the age of 42. He was the youngest admiral ever to be promoted to a commander in chief.

In the czarist government it was not even essential to be well-born. The brilliant naval strategist, acquaintance of Admiral Luce and visitor to the Naval War College in Newport, Adm. Stefan Makarov had risen from the ranks of the peasantry. Admiral Makarov had already shown great imagination in tactics, when as a lieutenant he introduced the startling innovation of torpedo warfare in the Turkish war of 1877.

It is very likely that Makarov is Admiral Gorshkov's model as there is much similarity between them. For example, Admiral Makarov had a slogan "you must feel at home at sea" which Admiral Gorshkov frequently recalls in his articles on navies, and which he introduced in practice by long sea voyages and an increased tempo of operations and exercises. In addition, Admiral Makarov was extremely interested in oceanography and in the North Sea route as was Admiral Gorshkov. (He was in command of a ship called the *Vitiaz*. A ship of that name exists today.)

Finally, Admiral Makarov did pioneering work in the design and use of icebreakers.

The spirit of innovation has long characterized the Russian and Soviet Navies. The trauma of the Russo-Japanese war caused the Russian Navy to build the world's first minelayers and minesweepers, started in 1910. They also experimented with balloons in the Baltic as early as 1903. In 1909, a design was developed for a ship with a speed of 30 knots to carry aircraft that would be launched from a catapult. The project, although never realized, was apparently quite serious because naval aviation schools were established for the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. Operating on the Black Sea were two Russian seaplane carriers, the *Nicholas I* and *Alexander I,* whose airplanes actually attacked the Turkish port of Zonguldak and dropped 40 bombs.[7] Having used seaborne airpower for reconnaissance, bombing and convoy escort, the Russian Navy was in advance of all other navies with the exception of the British. The paradox remained, however, that although the ideas were brilliant, the execution almost never was.

The Marxist idea that a navy is not just a military force but also an economic, cultural, and political force was never more thoroughly demonstrated than at the time of the Russian Revolution. To say that the Revolution would not have been won without the participation of the navy might be an exaggeration. The course of the Revolution, however, undoubtedly would have been very different, for the Baltic sailors played a crucial role in the fall of the czarist government and in the Bolshevik seizure of power.

Being close to the capital on the island of Kronshtadt, the Baltic sailors were subjected to far more political agitation than were other forces. They also were largely idle. In fulfilling their mission of defending the Gulf of Finland they saw far less action than the Black Sea Fleet or the Army on the German front. In addition, as Admiral Bubnov suggested—an idea that appears to be a constant in Russian and Soviet psychology—the Baltic sailors having seen advanced foreign countries on official visits were far more critical of Imperial Russia's backwardness and far less satisfied with their lot than the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. Although the most famous mutiny occurred in the battleship *Potemkin* in June 1905 in the Black Sea, even more serious revolutionary movements were gaining momentum in the Baltic Fleet in which conspiracies had been discovered in 1911 and 1912.

The signal for the fall of the Provisional Government was the blank charge fired at the winter palace from the cruiser *Avrora,* a

survivor of the battle of Tsushima. The Kronshtadt sailors had been the most active in the formation of the Soldiers and Sailors Committees (Soviets). Later they served as elite guards protecting the Bolsheviks from counterrevolution and it was they who carried out Lenin's order to prevent the seating of the Constituent Assembly, the only democratically elected body in the whole of Russian history.

It was also, quite uncharacteristically in Russia's military history, the navy that took over from the Imperial Staff. The supreme commander in chief designated by the Bolshevik government was an ensign named Krylenko who arrived with a naval battalion to occupy the headquarters at Mogilev and presumably run the war. As a matter of fact, during this period the Baltic Fleet was mostly operating ashore, for the sailors were acting as commissars, members of the secret police, agitators, and militia. But the real end of the Baltic Fleet had come earlier with the receipt of "Order Number 1" of the Petrograd (St. Petersburg) Soviet of Soldiers and Workers Deputies that declared that troops were no longer subordinate to their officers. Having been transmitted openly over the wireless, the information went uncontrolled to the whole front and the fleet. Military discipline collapsed immediately. That led to the collapse of the front, the collapse of Russia's war effort, and eventually the collapse of the Provisional Government. Quite clearly this must have influenced Stalin to say that the first principle of war is the morale of the rear.

Ironically, the Bolsheviks who had come to power on a platform of ending the war and securing an immediate peace, were the ones who had to reverse that policy almost immediately because the garrison at Riga assumed that it was not necessary to resist the German advance and the previously unbreachable fortifications quickly fell, exposing the road to Petrograd.

The Bolsheviks did everything possible to undermine the Imperial Army in 1917. Lenin seized power with only 25,000 (largely reserve) troops in the capital and sailors from Kronshtadt, 1/560th of the Russians under arms!

Marxist theory rejected the idea of a standing army. At first, the Bolsheviks remained orthodox. The concept they devised to replace the army was that of a "people's militia." Having destroyed the Imperial Army and Navy and demanded a peace platform, Lenin could not immediately form new armed forces. However, like so many other Marxist or Bolshevik promises of those days, that one was almost immediately repudiated. In 1918 a war commissar, Trotsky, was appointed and compulsory military

service was introduced. In order to reform the army and navy Trotsky had to take 80 percent of the commanders from the former czarist ranks. As a concomitant of that, party cells were established in the army to oversee morale and to enforce devotion to duty but they also served as a base for spies and informers insuring the continuation of civilian control. As a final move Communist commissars were placed in every regiment next to the commanders to maintain complete military control.

Lenin officially disbanded the Imperial Navy on 29 January 1918[8] and created the Red Navy of Workers and Peasants based on elected commanders and a volunteer service. Although leaders were to be elected, the Communist Party members remained in control. It was recognized that naval art required some knowledge of the sea. The first chief of the Soviet Navy was a czarist rear admiral.

Aside from its policing and subversive action, the navy's participation in the civil war was not unlike its participation in previous wars. It was employed to defend the Gulf of Finland, and to protect the army's maritime flanks. It carried out this mission using traditional Russian operations. Fields of 7,605 mines were laid from 1918 to 1920.[9] Showing its traditional amphibious versatility in the civil war, the navy formed a number of river flotillas in which the sailors fought very much like their cossack forebears conducting raids from their boats, expropriating supplies, and cutting off normal communications.

The period of the civil war and the allied intervention has provided the Soviet Government with an endless amount of material for propaganda. The events of that period are used as examples of the rapaciousness of capitalist governments against the lonely heroism of the young Bolshevik state. As far as the navy was concerned this was the state of affairs. After the civil war in 1921, 3 battleships, 10 cruisers, 64 destroyers and 30 submarines plus many auxiliary ships and transports were taken away by the retreating White forces and foreign governments. The only fleet that survived was the Baltic Fleet. The Pacific, Northern, and Black Sea Fleets simply ceased to exist. The ships that remained were in a bad state of repair. There were no spare parts; there was no fuel; and most of the ship-repair facilities had been destroyed or seriously damaged. Even those that remained were no longer staffed adequately as specialists had also gone into exile and those who remained were suspected of ideological unreliability.

The Baltic sailors had been so important to the Bolshevik seizure of power that Lenin called them "the glory and the pride

of the Revolution." However, their "glory" became a problem. Having helped to make a revolution, they mistakenly thought of themselves as having a right to participate in its direction. That was never agreeable to Lenin. The sailors had formed their own organizations such as their Revolutionary Military Council and their Revolutionary Center. They assumed the right of inspectors and critics of military and revolutionary developments. This was not the Bolshevik way. Lenin, like Stalin after him, tolerated no other centers of power.

Control of the Baltic sailors' organizations was becoming increasingly difficult as the Bolsheviks among them had been appointed to other important posts such as that of the commander in chief of Russian forces. Thus a natural control mechanism was weakened and the sailors resisted efforts to increase party supervision. By 1920 unrest in Petrograd was becoming serious. Not only were there protests against the hardships of life, but more ominously against the betrayal of the aims of the Revolution.

The explosive forces met. The Kronshtadt sailors supported the Petrograd workers. Indignant at the increasing efforts to bring them under control and at the central government's refusal to consult them, they rebelled in March 1921.

The mutiny was viciously, ferociously and definitively suppressed by units of the Red Army led by Trotsky and including participants from the Tenth Party Congress. The Congress had been in session in Moscow but was hastily adjourned upon receipt of news of the defection of the "glory and pride of the Revolution."

The sailors' demands were not exorbitant. They consisted primarily in requiring that the promises of the Bolsheviks for legal and political reforms, made at the time of the Revolution, be fulfilled and that decisions be made on a democratic basis. Lenin's government, however, was terrified because if the Baltic sailors rebelled, then it was quite probable that the entire nation would rebel against the Revolution. The first wide-scale purge was the Bolshevik answer. The Navy was reduced from 180,000 men to 39,000 by the end of 1921. But Lenin did retreat. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was instituted restoring a measure of private enterprise to a suffering country. A degree of prosperity returned. At the same time, Bolshevik sailors who had been given other positions in the party and government administrations were returned to the Baltic Fleet and the power of political workers was "strengthened."[10]

In 1922 a school was organized to train political officers.[11] Another act was to organize a massive infiltration of the navy with

loyal party members. As the result of a propaganda campaign, between 1922 and 1924, over 10,000 Young Communist League members joined the navy's educational institutions. However, the navy went into a decline because the government did not trust it. The shore fortifications were changed to army subordination and it was not until 1927 that full-scale Baltic and Black Sea naval exercises—and with the participation of the Red army—were reinstituted.

The design of the Soviet Fleet at this time was a function of several priorities: 1) the collapsed state of the country's economy and industry; 2) the sense of isolation and containment and the constant threat from a hostile world; 3) the hope for an international Communist movement directed from Moscow; and 4) the Bolsheviks' distrust of the navy as a result of the Kronshtadt uprising. Between 1921, the year of the Kronshtadt Rebellion, and 1928 the year of Stalin's consolidation of power, according to the official history, the navy was being restored "within the general condition and material resources of the country."[12]

Lenin was concerned in those years with having a navy that would be capable of filling the requirements for political and economic objectives; that meant one ready for international tasks or "state interests" as Gorshkov would put it.[13] In 1922, at an All-Union meeting of Communist Seamen, the policy was reaffirmed that the mission of the Soviet Navy was to incorporate all classes of surface ships, submarines and aviation, in order to work aggressively "in cooperation with the Red Army."

In spite of the demands of worldwide revolution and the problem of the country's security, the highest priority in naval administration and planning was given to educational institutions and securing the loyalty of the sailors. In effect the navy was, on party orders, turned over to the Young Communist League which acted as a political patron and ideological supervisor.

There were, of course, no "officer" training programs as rank had been abolished, but there were "command personnel" schools that had been organized in 1918 with an 8-month program. A political school was opened to provide cadres who would insure that no more Kronshtadts would take place.

Already in those years the young Communist power, expecting to lead a worldwide revolution, was concerned with its international image. Although the navy was in a low state of readiness, visits were made in 1923 to Bergen and Trondheim, Norway, and to Canton, China. The next year, there were visits to Norway, Sweden, Italy and Turkey.

The main tactical problem at the time, however, was to sweep the mines left over from World War I. The ports in the Baltic, Black Sea and Sea of Azov were not declared free for shipping until 1925. Primary attention was also given to patrolling the maritime borders. Patrols were established on the Baltic, Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, in the Far East, on the Amur River and in the north.

One of the legacies of the Kronshtadt rebellion was a system for political control that was and remains extremely unpopular with the military. A political commissar was appointed for ships and units. He had equal authority with the commanding officer. In addition, the commissar had a chain of subordination that ended directly in the Politburo and not the Ministry of Defense. The commander of the navy at that time had a chain of command that was extremely diffuse. Fleets were subordinated to shore commands or simply reported to the Central Revolutionary Military Soviet and the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. The problem was not, however, one of a rational organization and standard subordination but one of party control and loyalty. Only 27 percent of naval "leaders" were Communist Party members and there was a very high proportion of former czarist naval officers serving as specialists in the Soviet Fleet, a higher proportion than in the other armed forces.[14]

Compulsory military service became law in September 1925 although according to Marx the military should have disappeared. Conscripted naval service was set at 4 years where it remained until the new law of 1969.

Beginning with the Conscription Law in 1925, there was a movement away from the unpopular dual command system except for the navy in which it was exercised until 1933.[15]

Finally, a naval building program was begun as determined by the First Five Year Plan of 1928. First priority was given to building submarines, then torpedo boats and finally escort destroyers. The Soviets began solving the problem of interfleet transfers in a way that was to become more and more sophisticated. M-class submarines were constructed in sections that could be transported by railroad. Finally, in 1932, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was reorganized and the next year the Northern Flotilla became operational. (The Northern Flotilla was changed to the Northern Fleet in 1937.)

The continuity between the czarist and Soviet Navies, the navy's helplessness during the period of civil war and foreign intervention, and the internationalist policies of the Bolsheviks all

trained the leaders of the new state to be aware of the importance of seapower. The Marxist-Leninist doctrines on war insured that naval strategists could not have a narrow vision.

The Spanish civil war provided the Soviets with the first major opportunity to promote state interests abroad and at the same time focused attention on the navy. In that war the Soviet Government did its best to support the Republican Armies but had no means to protect the merchant ships delivering supplies. Several Soviet merchant ships were sunk or captured by German and Italian forces operating in support of Franco. Admiral Kuznetsov referred to that period as a time when it became "particularly apparent how important the sea is for us and how much we need a strong Navy."[16]

Response to the Spanish civil war, however, was not what caused the Soviet Government to begin a shipbuilding program in 1937. That project provided a formidable assignment for Soviet industry, calling for increased numbers of submarines and destroyers as well as construction of battleships, heavy and light cruisers and minesweepers. Soviet leaders, whose Marxist vision was necessarily international, were limited in their military construction by the catastrophic state of the country's economy and industry. The naval construction problem that the Soviet Union faced in the 30s was far worse than even the naval construction problem that all czarist governments had faced before. Requirements, inventiveness, and desires far exceeded the capacity of industry to fulfill them. There were at that time extreme shortages in every field. And while the leaders of the government were aware of the need for a large fleet, and expressed the desire for large ships, industrial limitations were apparent.[17] Plans were delayed because of many kinds of inadequacies. The crucial problems were intensified by the purges and the universal fear in which Soviet citizens lived, but they were primarily owing to a lack of productive capacity.[18]

One solution to these problems was also traditional, the employment of foreign technology. Since the Treaty of Rapallo (in 1922), there was close Soviet-German military cooperation. With some design changes, the Soviets began building in serial production a submarine designated type "S" which was based on improved plans for the German "B-3" submarine. French and Italian designs were also influential, as they had been in the czarist navy, especially with the construction of surface ships. And propulsion machinery was bought in England.

By 1939 the arms race was at a phrenetic tempo. The Soviets requested blueprints from the Germans for a battleship and from the United States and Germany for the blueprints of an aircraft carrier. The requests were rejected. By 1938 the objective situation was such that the Soviet Government undoubtedly realized that it had no choice but to accelerate the development of an oceangoing navy. Not only was there a growing threat on the European front but also there were clashes with Japan, in August 1938, on the Pacific front, promising a two-ocean war and raising the specter of another Tsushima.

The answer, clearly perceived at that time, was for a blue-water navy, and such grandiose plans had existed from the start. The Foreign Minister, V.M. Molotov, in a statement to the First Session of the Supreme Soviet, in 1938, publicly confirmed "the mighty Soviet state should have an open sea and ocean navy corresponding to its interests and worthy of its great tasks." (The words "great tasks" mean what Admiral Gorshkov means by the "protection of state interests.")

With the war clouds gathering and the threats from both the East and the West, and perhaps with renewed confidence after the slaughter of the purges, the navy was "rehabilitated" in 1937 when the Commissariat of the Navy, a kind of navy department, was established. That did not mean, however, that Stalin was prepared to trust his military leaders. Dual command was restored through the creation of the Main Political Directorate which meant that Communist commissars would be making final military decisions on ships and in all units. (To be denounced by a party member in those days was tantamount to summary execution.) Further control was ensured through the creation of an organization called the Main Naval Military Council. One of Stalin's closest henchmen, Zhdanov, was appointed the chairman. Of course, similar control measures existed in the army as well. Stalin insured that he would not suffer the indignity of being challenged by an army or navy Bonaparte.

The information about the Soviet Navy in the thirties available in the West is largely from Soviet sources which means that it cannot be taken at face value. (*Jane's Fighting Ships* for 1938-1939 despaired of giving any accurate information about the Soviet Navy at all.) According to Soviet sources, the Soviets had certainly made remarkable progress, considering the situation, in rebuilding a navy between 1920 and 1941. They claim to have laid down 533 warships and to have completed 4 cruisers, 37 destroyers of various types, 8 river monitors, 18 patrol ships, a

minelayer and 206 submarines. There were 219 ships on the ways at the beginning of the war, including 3 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 8 cruisers, 45 destroyers, and 91 submarines.[19] (The number of submarines is not short of extraordinary and proves a completely independent mind in the Soviet Union about naval warfare, for no other nation in the world had so many.)

Cdr. Robert Herrick, in his meticulously researched and pioneering work on the Soviet Navy[20] found evidence that there had been two schools of naval strategy in those years: a "young school" that rejected any notion of command of the seas and argued for a large submarine navy supported by small surface ships, and the old school that argued for the traditional concepts of a balanced navy.[21] The importance of these debates is not just historical. It is assumed that if there were such debates, similar ones could be occurring now.

The problem with this argument is that those who are hoping to prove that the Soviet Union is moving toward a "balanced blue-water" navy have as a preconception that if that is true, the Soviets will build a navy like that of the British or Americans and give it similar assignments. In other words, it tends to be an ethnocentric argument projecting one's own images, causing naval analysts to stop focusing on the differences and to find justification in the similarities.

Dr. Nicholas Shadrin, a lifelong observer of the Soviet Navy, wrote with great commonsense, "The debates neither resulted in an officially approved theory nor influenced any shipbuilding program. The theory of 'small war' which was most widespread since the mid-1920s up to the beginning of the 1930s, reflected the pragmatic recognition of the weakness of the Soviet Navy at that time."[22]

One should add that the debates also reflected the weakness of the Soviet economy and heavy industry at that time. What such decisions did not represent, apparently, was the consensus of the naval leadership. At least Admiral Kuznetsov, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet who became the Commissar of the Navy after the naval leadership was exterminated in the purges, said that he first learned of the plans for new ships in 1937, not through the naval chain, but from the head of the shipbuilding industry.[23] Although he was to lead the navy, his opinion was not solicited by the Main Naval Council. Such procedure shows an important mode of operation, critical for the understanding of decisionmaking in a dictatorship.

According to Admiral Kuznetsov, an unwritten rule was that the navy could decide on important matters only after consulta-

tion with Stalin, although Molotov (the Foreign Minister) and Zhdanov (the Naval Commissar) were sometimes allowed to make preliminary decisions before being examined by Stalin. Stalin and Admiral Kuznetsov, incidentally, were fully aware of the importance of a large navy in the political arena and Stalin (according to Kuznetsov) was the one who demanded a big navy. He also understood the importance of access to the open sea for apparently he personally inspected possible ports and building yards for the Northern Fleet and chose Severomorsk and the river north of Murmansk for major naval bases. His building program suggested that Stalin did not expect a war with Germany (these were the years of the Stalin-Hitler alliance) but rather that he was concentrating on a navy that could divide the spoils of war.

Stalin's preparations for World War II seem to have been based upon his military experience as a revolutionary and party official during the civil war, his mania for population control, and his belief that Hitler would not attack.[24] All of that illustrates the disasters that can ensue from a doctrinaire leadership sealed off from objective information. Certainly no sane argument can be made that the Soviet Union, in the months preceding the war, was pursuing its vital interests. Driving the population mad with fear and privation and eliminating all but a fraction of the experienced and technically trained military leaders is hardly anyone's formula for success in battle, and that was proved in the winter war (1939-1940) with Finland.

Whether or not Khrushchev's memoirs are completely authentic, his account of the Soviet Navy in that war is consistent with the facts and is in his usual colorful prose:

> Our navy was engaged against the Finnish fleet. You wouldn't have thought that the Finns would have the advantage at sea, but our navy couldn't do anything right. I remember hearing at Stalin's in Moscow that one of our submarines had been unable to sink a Swedish merchant vessel which it had mistaken for a Finnish ship. The Germans observed this incident, and gave us a teasing pinch by offering their assistance . . . .[25]

The German conclusions from their observations may have sealed Russia's fate and ultimately Germany's as well. In the attack on Finland, Stalin intended to show the Germans the invincible might of the Soviet forces. It is almost certain that the ensuing debacle contributed to Hitler's plan to open a second

front and his assumption that he could take Moscow by October, before his troops needed warm clothing.

Later analysis, according to Khrushchev, showed that intelligence sources had not been consulted and were probably not allowed to speak. They were, of course, blamed, but Marshal Timoshenko admitted that faulty intelligence had not been the cause. Everything was known about the Mannerheim Line. The first strike was directed to the middle of it at the strongest point. As Khrushchev said: "If we had only deployed our forces against the Finns in the way even a child could have figured by looking at a map, things would have turned out differently for both the Soviet Union and Finland."[26]

Whatever the strategic ideas Stalin had for the navy in a war with Germany, they were ineffective. The answer to what 200 submarines could do in the shallow waters surrounding the Soviet Union turned out to be almost nothing.

Although one is arguing from hindsight, the experience of the Soviet Navy at that time had extended over 20 years. It had underscored the importance of protecting convoys, both in the Spanish civil war and in the First World War, and of the vulnerability of shallow seas, like the Black and Baltic, to mine warfare. But the lessons learned were ignored and the Baltic Fleet was bottled up by German mines so that it could do little more than serve as antiaircraft batteries to protect Leningrad, and the Black Sea Fleet was paralyzed by the rapid German advance.

Stalin's Navy may have been designed to promote state interests and revolution but it was not designed for war with Germany. No doubt the navy's rather sad showing in the Second World War was because of the maritime ignorance of Stalin as much as of any deficiencies in operational planning and design. Certainly, it suffered gravely from the purges and the atmosphere of paranoia.

Admiral Golovko wrote that at the beginning of the war, German reconnaissance airplanes would fly over the Northern Fleet at Murmansk and no one would shoot them down even though orders had been issued to do so. The reason was that the penalty for a much less serious mistake in those years was death, although Admiral Golovko does not say so.[27] The sailors were paralyzed by fear.

For a war in so many respects similar to the First World War, the Soviet Navy proved itself very inadequately prepared. While most of its ships were equipped for minelaying, there was only one minelayer and there were an inadequate number of minesweepers and ships for antisubmarine warfare. There were no amphibious

ships, although amphibious operations dominated naval wartime operations. Naval aviation was grossly inadequate.[28] In addition to the other deficiencies, no ships had radar and there were few antiaircraft guns.[29]

In spite of Admiral Kuznetsov's claim that the Soviet naval intelligence staff gave enough advance warning of the German war plans for the Soviet Navy to go into readiness state number two on 19 July 1941, and to readiness state number one (meaning war) at 2335 on 21 June, the preparations taken did not suggest any knowledge of German courses of action.[30] The commander in chief of the Northern Fleet inferred the danger of war from the flow of refugees. He had no direct information.

The German plan of operation was for a defensive war in the Baltic as the major portion of its fleet would be occupied with the far greater British Navy in the West. The principal mission for the German Navy was to protect the sea lines of supply between Finland and Germany. Apparently naval support for land operations was not planned. As far as the naval war was concerned, it was expected that the rapid German advance would deprive the Russians of their bases and the ships would be sealed into the harbors by rapid mine warfare. Thus, although the Soviet Navy was on alert status, it apparently did not put to sea and the Germans laid their minefields with little opposition.[31] While the Soviets claim that in the initial attack there were no losses of Soviet ships, the Germans claim that the largest Soviet ships sustained serious damage. In view of the supremacy in the air of the *Luftwaffe,* the latter account is probably correct. The rest of the war was largely one of Soviet attempts at minesweeping and counteroffensives in mine tactics and several heroic and a few successful attempts by submarines to break through the mine barriers across the Gulf of Finland.

In any case, the history of naval operations in the Baltic during the first months of the Second World War is a story largely of retreat, escape, and evacuation. The Baltic Fleet was put in a far worse position than it had ever been since the time of Peter the Great, bottled up in the Gulf of Finland between Kronshtadt and Leningrad. In those shallow waters many of the ships ceased to function except as fortress gun turrets in the defense of Leningrad, until they were sunk. Some, resting on the bottom, continued to operate even afterwards.

Because the Germans controlled both shores of the Gulf of Finland, they were able to immobilize the Baltic Fleet with minefields, shore batteries and air defenses. Naval aviation had

been made subordinate to the army so all that was left for operations was the vast number of submarines.[3 2] Action was then confined to Soviet submarines which scored some successes against German shipping. Their main targets were the ships engaged in transporting Swedish ore to Germany. The submarines were only effective enough to force Germany to introduce the convoy system briefly in 1942, but not again until the second half of 1944.

Of the navies in the Black Sea, the Soviet was by far the largest but it was not very useful. In the initial action of the war the German advance was so rapid that the Soviet Navy's mission was limited to resupply and evacuation at the fortress bastions that remained at Odessa and in the Crimea. The Soviets showed the ingenuity of their predecessors in the time of Peter the Great and Catherine by using numerous small craft and barges to land troops, usually at night in order to avoid attacks by the *Luftwaffe,* and under the protection of support gunfire from cruisers and destroyers. On one occasion a whole division was transported in this manner. However, by September 1942 the few repair facilities at Novorossiysk were lost and with that the Soviets had little opportunity to maintain their ships.

The war in the Black Sea at this stage was one of submarine warfare in which the Soviet submarines proved effective only at interfering with the shipping along the coast from the Crimea to Rumania and Bulgaria. The major surface action engaged torpedo boats; this evolved a tactic not unlike that of John Paul Jones in the same waters. Minefields were sewn in shallow waters of the Kerch Strait in the Sea of Azov through which shallow-draft motor torpedo boats could operate. They could harass the flanks of the army and decoy larger German ships into the minefields.

For the most part, the Soviet surface ships remained inactive so that even after the German land-supply routes were cut, Germany maintained the flow of supplies across the Black Sea to the Crimea until April 1944. The Germans were able to evacuate 137,000 troops from Sevastopol, long after the evacuation should have been made, and under attack from the air. The troops were transported to Constansa, 200 miles away, without significant interference from the Soviet Navy. In the same way, vast numbers of troops were evacuated from Odessa without significant Soviet surface interference.

The British Naval Liaison Officer with the Black Sea Fleet said that he was constantly urging the Soviet Naval Command to attack German shipping but without success. The excuse was that it had

no adequate air cover for such operations.[33] In the first 18 months of the war, 24 out of the 63 submarines in the Black Sea Fleet were lost. The British Liaison Officer attributed this to inadequately trained crews.

In the Arctic the Soviet Naval Air Force first appeared in 1942 and was employed mainly in reconnaissance. However, the sea war was confined to submarine attacks against German shipping. Russian destroyers were never used against German convoys but were used in the final stages as escorts for allied convoys to Murmansk. The Soviet destroyers used for escort duty limited their range to 430 miles from their own base.

A senior British naval officer, who was in the Soviet Union for liaison at that time, described their seagoing efficiency as poor and their tactical behavior as erratic, with the result that the British preferred to station the Soviet ships astern of the convoys in order not to endanger the allied ships and for the possible benefit of picking up survivors.[34]

The nature of the war was such that there were several unusual developments. First of all Soviet planners, whether Stalin or the Naval Commissars, who had been weaned away from traditional Russian concepts of naval warfare, received a sharp rebuff. Except for convoy escort duty in the north, and the harassment of rather short and not very distant sea lines of communication in the Baltic and Black Seas, the Soviet Navy's mission in the war was certainly that of supporting the army on its flanks. For that task, the navy was singularly unprepared. Its experience with mine warfare seems to have been abandoned. The navy was inadequate and untrained in antisubmarine warfare. The use of naval aviation and its dominant role in warfare was apparently and properly understood at the beginning of the war and given considerably more attention by the end. There were no preparations for amphibious warfare except by the Pacific Fleet and that was at the end of the war with amphibious ships provided by the United States. Nevertheless, the Soviet Navy showed great inventiveness in making several dozen amphibious landings. There were naval rifle brigades formed from sailors and naval shore units totaling 405,000 men who were often incorporated into the ground forces and used as shock troops. As in the days of Ivan the Terrible, there were numerous naval flotillas on the rivers conducting semiamphibious operations.

The poor showing of the Soviet Navy in the Second World War seems to have led many naval critics to the assumption that the Soviets learned some lessons that transformed their thinking into some Western configurations. Nothing could be more misleading.

The war did not teach the Soviets that they needed capital ships. Indeed, how could they have used them in either the Baltic or Black Seas? In fact it taught them just the reverse. In two world wars their battleships and cruisers had remained helpless in the Gulf of Finland. But the requirement to protect the flanks of the Soviet Army was a supremely important mission which, in a war to the death, could in no way be denigrated.

While acknowledging the value of aircraft carriers and of big oceangoing, blue-water navies, the Soviets in writing about their experience in the war make it clear that they recognized that these would not have been answers to Soviet tactical or strategic questions of that time.

The poor showing of the Soviet Navy in the Second World War, quite obviously, owes a considerable amount to the Stalinist purges that preceded it. By the time the war began, the Soviet Navy simply did not have an experienced leadership or a cadre of trained officers and technicians. Nearly all living senior Soviet admirals were promoted to that rank as very young men, not just Gorshkov. The purges had eliminated the ranks above them.

In the fourth quarter of the 20th century one has extreme difficulty comprehending the effect of Stalin's purges on the armed forces. That act defies the formula that we generally apply to history, that assures us that nations act in their own self-interest. A conservative summary would be that the Soviet Union entered the war having almost wiped out its party leadership, its civil and regional administrations, enormously weakened its technological and intellectual faculties, and nearly eradicated experienced officers of its armed forces. The defeats of the winter war in Finland were an early indication of the consequences of that terror.

Another problem the Soviet Navy faced was similar to the one it had faced in the First World War. Critical supplies and spare parts were not available and early in the war main repair bases and shipyards fell into enemy hands or, as in Leningrad, were immobilized by enemy actions. The Soviet High Command, composed of young officers who survived the purges, was not experienced or trained in the tactical employment of naval forces and did not have time to learn.

Soviet military literature, with its almost exclusive emphasis on "heroism" and "military brilliance," does not discuss the effects of the purges on the military campaigns of the Second World War. Consequently, too little weight has been given to that period in assessing Soviet decisionmaking. There can be no escaping the fact

that nothing has changed in the Soviet system to prevent a repetition of the Stalinist period. And as we have seen, a rational approach to a nation's vital interests did not dominate Soviet war preparations.

CHAPTER VI

A SOVIET/RUSSIAN SYNTHESIS

The Peoples' Commissariat of the Navy, created in 1921, was abolished on 25 February 1946 and was reinstated as the Naval Ministry of the U.S.S.R. on 25 February 1950. In the interim, the navy was subordinated to the ground force-oriented War Ministry. On 15 March 1953 the Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R. was created and the navy and the army were then united under the command of the Minister of Defense.

Stalin's attitude toward the navy was not very stable, even after the war. In 1947 Stalin demoted the then Soviet CNO, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, to rear admiral and sent him to the Pacific Fleet. The three deputy CNOs were court-martialed and sentenced to prison where one of them, a former Chief of the Main Naval Staff, died. As Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Kuznetsov was promoted to vice admiral (having achieved that rank for the second time after having been demoted) and in 1951 was recalled to Moscow to become the Minister of the Navy.[1] Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov made vice admiral for the third time in 1956 when he was removed as the Minister of the Navy and again demoted to make way for Admiral Gorshkov.

Although a Ministry of the Navy was created in February 1950 (before Stalin's death) "to emphasize the growth of the navy,"[2] the major intellectual stimulus for the new navy began in 1956 when Soviet military strategy was basically changed to accommodate the age of nuclear missiles.

In 1956 and 1957 more than 500 generals, admirals, and officers met in a military scientific conference to discuss the steps that were necessary to prepare for combat under nuclear conditions.[3] The result was that the navy was given an equal footing with other services and at the same time its usefulness in a broader more international mission was fully recognized.

From the Stalinist period comes the rather confusing terminology of referring to the branches of service as "army" or "navy." This is meant to distinguish between those who serve on land or sea. The administrative and command chain, however,

recognizes the five service arms: air force, strategic rocket forces, ground forces, naval forces and air defense forces. Each, and now also the civil defense force, has a chain of command up to a commander in chief who is also a deputy minister of defense and who sits in the military council. The staff organization is shown in Figure 1 while the fleet organization is shown in Figure 2.

Ever since 1933 there have been four fleets, and ironically the Northern Fleet, which was the last to be established, is now by far the largest. In addition, during the war, there were five flotillas that would probably be quickly reformed in the event of hostilities. The largest and most active was the Danube River Flotilla. Now there remains only the Caspian Sea Flotilla which, in addition to watching the Iranian Navy, has the missions of patrol and support of scientific and technical research. (There are also some naval schools in Baku whose training programs the flotilla also undoubtedly supports.)

The widespread geographical separation of the fleets dictates a command structure that includes control of the shore establishment, hence the fleet commander in chief also controls the coastal defense forces, naval aviation and infantry, the bases, and the logistical, training and support services including hydrography and meteorology.

The Soviet submarine force is considered the first arm of the navy and aviation is ranked second. Such distinctions are made annually in the Navy Day speeches (Navy Day is the last Sunday in July and is celebrated with naval parades and demonstrations in all of the major naval ports: Leningrad, Sevastopol, Vladivostok, Murmansk, Baku, Tallin and others) which speeches are a key to changes in the naval thinking, and therefore strategy.

Such, for instance, was the speech of Fleet Admiral Sergeev reported in *Morskoy sbornik* in July 1975. When he said that the main striking force of the navy was "atomic submarines and aviation,"[4] he was certifying a conceptual framework that receives a yearly, ritual confirmation. The least change in the order of forces would be noticed and would signal a major shift. Actually, in 1972, the year the aircraft carrier *Kiev* was launched, the commander of Soviet Naval Air was promoted to the rank of Marshal of Naval Aviation. This suggested that several more aircraft carriers would be built; also, that naval air was fulfilling significant, new naval missions. As Admiral Sergeev put it, "Jet rockets and ASW aviation have been expanded to include the most modern kinds of airplanes capable of resolving problems in distant



Fig. 1—Soviet Navy Organization



Fig. 2—Fleet Commands

regions of the ocean. The crews have mastered extended flights at great ranges as well as new locating and targetting devices."[5]

The officers of the naval air force, the naval infantry and technical and logistical services have army ranks. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Admiral Gorshkov's rank, is the equivalent of a marshal of the Soviet Union. The marshal of naval aviation is two ranks below that and the equivalent of a marshal of tank troops. A fleet admiral, the rank of the first deputy commander in chief, Fleet Admiral Smirnov, is the equivalent of a general of the army.

Organization of the Armed Forces. Under Article 132 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union universal military service is required. All citizens between the ages of 19 and 50 are subject to compulsory military training. In addition, there is preservice training in schools and paramilitary organizations outside of the schools, the primary one being DOSAAF which stands for, roughly, "Friends of the Fighting Forces." DOSAAF is a kind of super Boy Scout and Girl Scout organization combined with the Veterans of Foreign Wars and Lions Clubs. It seems to control all of the hobbies that require specialized equipment such as the airplane clubs, scuba diving organizations, radio clubs, and many others. The result is that the one million men drafted yearly for 2 to 5 years are already somewhat prepared for their military life. After their period of active service they are in the reserves until the age of 50 with periodic training. There is a second line reserve for women in some specialties and for those men who have been deferred for education or other reasons. The Minister of Defense who, since Trotsky and until Ustinov, has always been a military officer, has two positions, one in the government and the other in the party. He is a member of the Council of Ministers in the government line and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. The admiral of the fleet, currently Admiral Gorshkov, is a deputy minister of defense as are the chiefs of staff of the other military components. The minister of defense is, in fact, the commander in chief of the armed forces. Directly under him is the first deputy minister for general affairs and next is the chief of the general staff. The general staff was patterned after the German general staff. Authority flows through six departments: (1) operations, (2) intelligence (GRU), (3) communications, (4) organization and mobilization, (5) topography, (6) history including doctrine.

The navy, like the other services, also has a general staff. It is

under the chief of the staff for operations and implements the directives of the general staff itself. The historical administration works closely with the military academies and besides publishing books and studies formulates strategy and doctrine.

The term of first enlistment in the navy, until 1956, was 5 years, 1 year longer than in the other services. It was reduced finally to 3 years except for aviation personnel who serve 2 years only. The reduction in the years of service reflects a decline in the popularity of enlisted careers. There was some expectation that a reduction in the initial enlistment together with an improvement in the standard of living would lead to more reenlistments.

After active service all Soviet citizens are enlisted in the reserves and must have active-duty training periodically, depending on their category and age, until they are 50. At that time, their obligation is considered to be paid.

Until they are 35, reservists are subject to four periods of training which can last as long as 3 months each. Pilots are subject to five flight training sessions of 40 days each. All enlisted reservists can be called up at any time for "examination sessions" which may last up to 10 days. Reserve officers can be called up for training duty much more frequently and for considerably longer periods. Reserve officers can be assigned in peacetime to active duty for 2 to 3 years if they are less than 30 years of age. This is not an uncommon practice. However, training for all Soviet citizens begins prior to induction. At the age of 15, whether at school, in a factory or on a collective farm, youths must begin their military education. Time, by law, is set aside for it.

The romanticization of the military as well as practical indoctrination begins at an even earlier age, however. Soviet literature contains references to training students in the work of civil defense in the fourth through the seventh grades. During competitions in military games these young students get badges such as "young rifleman," "marksman," "radio enthusiasts" or "young sailor." The training becomes even more formalized in the summer when the Young Pioneers, of whom there are some 16 million from the ages of 10 to 15, conduct military exercises in their summer camps. These games are taken quite seriously and are even given military sponsorship. For example, in the Vladivostok area the Young Pioneers engaged with the navy in assault landings and the repulse of an "enemy" naval assault force. At the end of this exercise some 6,500 Young Pioneers passed in review.[6]

Furthermore, children engage in civil defense drills. References are made to the problems of presenting the reasons for civil

defense to children in grade schools without causing them nightmares. Teachers have resisted talking about weapons of mass destruction or explaining why it is necessary to wear gas masks. At the same time that the civil defense authorities were trying to get the teachers to give the children selected stories on "military patriotic themes," the civil defense lessons were obviously meant to glorify military service also, as the advice is that "one cannot talk about the methods and means of protection against weapons of mass destruction in classes with the fifth and ninth grades and not mention our armed forces, their combat might and the heroism and courage of the Soviet fighting men."[7]

The size of the Soviet Armed Forces including the border guards and internal security troops is put at approximately 3.7 million.[8] There are an estimated 450,000 in the navy. Of the total in the armed forces, approximately 700,000 (using the basis that one fifth of the armed forces) are officers and 400,000 are enlisted men on extended service. The conscript force is approximately 2,700,000. As only 1,300,000 draftees are required each year, it is estimated that this is one half of the 18-year olds available.

The various changes in personnel policy as well as the frequency of articles about making military life more attractive suggest that service in the Soviet Armed Forces is not popular with Soviet youth. The period of enlistment was reduced and a reenlistment incentive was introduced by making it possible to acquire quasi-officer status as a kind of warrant officer. This move apparently was not successful and regulations were changed to make it possible for an enlisted man to become a warrant officer and then move on to officer status after 3 years of service by entering a higher military school. Various other inducements such as longer leaves and better living conditions were introduced in order to try to improve reenlistment ratios in the enlisted and warrant officer ranks. According to current practice, new navy enlistees are trained in special schools after which they advance to petty officers. Those who reenlist and choose a permanent career in the navy are then selected for a rank more or less equivalent to that of warrant officer, known in the navy as *michman*. This change in the enlisted rates which took place in 1971 reflected the new awareness of the advanced technical and scientific nature of a modern navy.

A conscripted sailor does not receive pay but rather an allowance of from 3 to 5 rubles a month. His pay is about 50 rubles a year which buys far less than would $50. This is sufficient for cheap cigarettes or a few chocolate bars. The low pay is a

means of control. It is insufficient for a sailor to buy a bottle of vodka or to have a night on the town.

The post exchanges carry little beyond the necessities and are a constant subject of complaint. They suffer from the Soviet problem of inadequate distribution which results in one store being criticized (in *Red Star*) for not having a single box of matches.[9] One thing that is abundant is reading material. According to *Red Star* approximately 40 million books a year are distributed through the military system. That is at least 10 books per man.[10] They are not the entertaining stories enlisted men read in the West however. There are no "skin" books, news magazines or diverting mystery stories. Instead, the men get largely the classics—Tolstoy, Chekov and Dostoevsky—the works of Lenin and other socialist leaders and modern "inspirational" socialist fiction.

The problem of inducing youth into the military is one that does not fit the ideology of the "new Marxist man." Service life is idealized. Such a degree of lyricism was reached in a description of military life in *Red Star:*

> The happiness that is found in books does not exist. Neither the comfort of large cities, nor the comfort of restaurants, nor endless pastimes make up the romance of a normal, full-blooded life. Romance is born in far away garrisons where mad storms wander, where all around you is the taiga arctic landscape or sunny desert which, in another era, only a plane could reach. In my opinion, romance lives unique, light and pure in the hearts of those who subordinate everything to the formula—myself, my collective, my motherland. This formula gives birth to heroes. Subordinate the personal to the collective; live for the motherland! Remember always that no matter what you might do, the collective has formed you and the motherland has given you happiness.[11]

However stirring these calls to arms may be they have been notably unsuccessful in maintaining the attractiveness of the military career. In terms of prestige, a 1969 study placed the military occupation in popularity below nearly all scientific and technical occupations and that of aircraft pilot on a 10-point scale. The most desirable occupation was to be a pilot. Physicians rated 5.3. Below physicians came writers and artists at 5.2, university teachers at 4.5, and finally the professional military at 4.3 followed by "social scientists in philosophy" at 4.2. ("Social

scientists in philosophy" means, of course, Marxist theoreticians.) Below them came primary school teachers at 2.5 and so on.[1 2]

In the popularity contest among the services, the navy is probably well ahead. One of the great dreams of most Soviet citizens is the forbidden one of foreign travel. The navy offers almost the only opportunity to visit foreign countries. Admiral Gorshkov and other admirals undoubtedly have this advantage in mind when they make a point of mentioning in most speeches and articles the frequency of foreign visits.

Officers are paid according to their rank and according to their job or billet. For example, a lieutenant would receive 60 rubles a month and if he were the commanding officer of a minesweeper, he might receive an additional 75 rubles. On top of that if he had already served for 5 years, he would receive 10 percent additional, and the end of 10 years, 15 percent and so on. For long voyages at sea, there is another percentage added and for service in remote areas of the Soviet Union there is still another.

Officers' uniforms—including underwear, socks, and even handkerchiefs—are supplied by the navy. Officers must pay for their apartments and do not receive an allowance for that purpose, but rent is a small sum, about 15 rubles per month. Soviets also pay income taxes. All of their medical services and vacations at sanatoriums and resorts are free. However, medical treatment for families of officers is not provided by the military but must be obtained at the civilian facilities. The military does pay 50 percent of the cost of travel to a military resort for the family of an officer.

To get some idea of the inflated pay of the military, here are the salary ranges per month for some skilled occupations: engineers, from 80 to 400 rubles; doctors, from 80 to 150 rubles; factory managers, from 400 to 500 rubles; secretaries for regional Communist Party Committees (equivalent to governors of state), 350 to 500 rubles.

While it is difficult to compare wages because of the different scales according to billet, a typical example might be as follows: a lieutenant commander, captain of a destroyer in Magadan, would receive

Base pay	90 rubles
For CO	95 rubles
Seniority	10 rubles
Food	20 rubles
Climate	45 rubles (approximately)
	260 rubles

An officer, serving on a ship in Magadan, would receive the highest bonuses in pay and probably 2 years for each one he served toward retirement, because of the severity of the climate. A lieutenant commander makes basically about three times as much as the average worker. The base pay of a captain is 130 rubles and of a full admiral is 220 rubles per month. Of course, both would receive other allowances and the admiral would have the use of special housing possibly including a *dacha* (summer home or cottage in the woods).

There is considerable competition to get to sea because the rewards for sea duty are quite high and deployments and operational periods away from port are not normally as long as in the U.S. Navy.

Age limits for various ranks were established in 1967. A lieutenant may serve to the age of 40; commanders until 45; captains until 50; and admirals until 60. There is no age limit for marshals of the Soviet Union or admirals of the fleet who normally serve until they die or become incapacitated.

Evaluations of officers are done as part of a kind of inspection review by a special commission formed for that purpose once a year. The commission makes decisions, which are revealed to the officer after confirmation by higher authority, which can determine his promotion or demotion, release to the reserve, or even "spot" promotion outside of the normal rotation.

A fixed rotation of ship to shore assignments does not appear to exist. Officers may serve in various billets for very prolonged periods. The most obvious example is Admiral Gorshkov himself who has been the Admiral of the Fleet since 1955. (Incidentally, the frequent predictions of Admiral Gorshkov's imminent retirement are another example of the projection of U.S. customs.)

The standard length of tour aboard ship is 3 or 4 years. On ships the size of destroyer escorts or large minesweepers, an officer serves as a department head or a commanding officer for about 3 years and on larger ships and submarines for 4 years. On major ships it can be 5 years or longer.

In the Soviet officer corps there is an unusual feature. Position is more important than rank. For example, it is not uncommon for the commanding officer of a ship to be junior in rank to his executive officer. Many combinations are possible. Perhaps this is a carryover from the early days of the Revolution when a leader could be advanced because of his relatively greater political reliability.

Attaining the billet of a commanding officer marks a naval officer out for particular respect and those who have been selected

and have served as commanding officers are given special training and education for their future careers.

Military life is not easy. According to the regulations enlisted men must be given 8 hours of sleep and have 2 hours a day for relaxation with their comrades; however, energetic political officers use the rest and relaxation periods for giving the militarily edifying lectures on Marxism/Leninism or the dangers of imperialistic aggression.

Drunkenness is a major problem within the Soviet Union and within the armed forces as well. Attempts are made to associate it with a carryover from the capitalists and bourgeois past. Nevertheless, some of the relaxing discussions organized for the sailors' free time with his comrades are on the subject of "Drunkenness, a Cause of Crime and Enemy of Health." Films with such titles as "Wine Begets Guilt" are also shown.[15]

For naval personnel, military life introduces some particular problems. The ports in the Pacific and Northern Fleets are not only located in remote areas but also where extremely adverse climate affects the quality of a life already quite dull. In the region around Murmansk the ground is covered with snow except for about a month in late July and early August and the Arctic nights last for half the year. Although conditions are somewhat better on the Pacific, it is at the end of the line for the distribution of goods (although efforts are made to give it a priority) and far from most families and sources of entertainment.

The stern nature of Marxist ideology coupled with the conservative and narrow outlook of the Russian peasant culture (which now having power dictates taste) means that there are few sources of relaxation or entertainment that are not meant to be improving. Life in Russian towns, outside of the Western capitals of Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad, is incredibly dull. For most people there is nothing light and diverting to read (newspapers are devoted largely to party exhortations) or amusing to do. There are few bars and dancehalls (and they are difficult to get into and barred to peasants in that egalitarian society) and no cabarets or nightclubs. There are supposed to be no prostitutes. Only large towns have restaurants, and they are always crowded and generally serve food of poor quality by Western standards. (At one time, the plan called for restaurants, no matter what their size, to spend only 5 rubles a day on vegetables.) In any case, without money from home, draftees cannot afford to pay for one meal out a month.

While the navy does hold out the promise of a chance to see foreign ports, that is not a promise for everyone. It is used to

extract increased sacrifice from the sailors. If the political officer has anything against them, they will not get ashore or will be transferred to the inevitable tender that lies off the coast. In any case, the navy now means long voyages, long separations, and an absence of the rewards in foreign ports to which sailors are accustomed. Sailors are given very little foreign exchange, very little time for sightseeing and are required to return by the evening mess.

In naval training, repeated drill is greatly emphasized not only for groups but also for individuals. It is believed that continuous training is absolutely essential both at sea and when the ship is in home port as well.[14] It is in this light that long cruises are justified and viewed as essential. They promote not only experience in unfamiliar waters but also endurance and the ability to develop flexible responses to rapidly changing climatic conditions. This justification for long cruises is frequently mentioned in naval writing. As Fleet Admiral Kasatonov said:

> Ocean cruises have become the main means of training our Red Banner Fleets. In cruises of vigilance, the sailors get a general perspective on their training, acquire sound knowledge and naval tempering, and practice solving operational training tasks under complex conditions on the seas and oceans.[15]

One of the major purposes of training is to prepare soldiers and sailors for nuclear war. There is much in Soviet military literature about the psychologically disabling effects of nuclear weapons and the need to harden the military to conduct combat operations under conditions of "tremendous tension and accompanied by collosal destruction and mass losses of people and equipment," as Army General Kulikov said.[16]

Under conditions of mass destruction the military will have to operate in a state of shock and in recognition of that reality much Soviet training is directed toward hardening them for that circumstance. Great emphasis is put on combat realism such as in the naval exercises in *Okean 1970* and *Okean 1975*.

The impossibility of duplicating nuclear realism was regretted by General of the Army Epishev, the Head of the Political Directorate, who said,

> Certainly, as much as we might wish, we are not able to demonstrate the full effect on nuclear explosion and its

> consequences, or to accustom the men to the effect of its injurious factors in the exercises. But in the future, it is essential to improve these simulators . . . the soldiers and sailors must be ready to accept unexpected complex and dangerous situations.[17]

According to the Soviet press one of the favorite methods of approximating these stresses and hardening crews is through the device of frequent alerts and calls to quarters, apparently even just after coming home from long cruises.

The Soviet doctrine on war, which gives considerable weight to seizing the initiative and the speed of attack, dictates an extremely great emphasis upon combat readiness. Consequent requirements are that weapons must be in excellent condition, that specialists must be highly trained and that the strictest discipline and organizational procedures must be observed and that all of these elements are interdependent. One element essential to combat readiness is precise computation of time. For that reason, stopwatches are often used by naval commanders and inspectors during naval training. Because of these demands for speed and accuracy, constant readiness and alertness, observers frequently suggest that naval squadrons and crews, even in peaceful circumstances, live and work under the laws of battle conditions. (It is surely absurd of NATO to think it will have 30-days warning of the imminence of hostilities.)

The stopwatch frequently determines the winner in socialist competition. For example there are regular naval competitions for the championship in finding and destroying enemy submarines. According to *Red Star,* an outstanding submarine exceeded the norm for tracking an enemy submarine by two and one half times.[18]

The heavy emphasis on the morale factors for winning the war is connected with combat readiness. Military writers obviously would believe in the importance of the weight of the collective, bravery, self-sacrifice, and the willingness to take risks as essential elements of the modern fighting man.

Sailors are expected to bear any hardships and to show an insurmountable will for victory and to "withstand the severe stress of war without losing the will to win."[19] Because of these severe stresses, Soviet military policy apparently dictates a very strict adherence to regulations and routines of procedure. This of course is in conflict with the demands of initiative and independent judgment, especially under conditions of nuclear warfare. Never-

theless, frequent references are made to the need for absolute adherence to regulations. As stated in *Red Star,*

> The secret of turning a collective into a monolith lies in a source accessible to us all—military regulations. The most important lever in uniting a collective is strict and undeviated fulfillment of the regulations and maintenance of exemplary order in the units and sub-unit.[20]

The belief is that through Soviet collectivism, the Soviet people and Soviet fighting men will prove greatly superior to the populations of imperialistic and capitalistic nations and that therefore they will prevail.

In the drab Soviet reality, rituals of various sorts are created to make military life seem more acceptable. All of the organs of the media devote a very large percentage of their time to glamorizing life at sea, life on submarines, life in remote garrisons, and the heroism of death for the motherland. When they start their service, inductees are given an elaborate sendoff in village ceremonies with speeches, bands, reminiscenses by veterans, and bouquets of flowers. There is also a ritual reception when the new enlisted men, or officers, are greeted with ceremony upon their arrival in their units.

> The ritual begins with a meeting of all the officers in the unit. In solemn surroundings, the commander introduces the newly arrived officers, and talks to them about the combat path and tradition. Such meetings are organized in such places as the museum of combat glory.[21]

There is a special ceremony for the initiation of submariners in an obvious effort to emphasize the submarine service as the leading arm of the navy. But it is also meant to reinforce the will and harden the characters of the new sailors. As *Red Star* said, "Naturally, this has a great emotional influence on a man and engenders in him the aspiration to endure the difficulties of life steadfastly."[22]

One function of the ritual is to create as quickly as possible the sense of a collective through which behavior can be controlled. The collective is extremely important both in the rewards and the punishments of sailors and officers. For example, expressions of praise for enlisted men and warrant officers are delivered to the serviceman in the presence of his unit, or entries are made in the

"Book of Honor" of the unit or ship. The serviceman's collective farm or former place of work is notified of his performance. In general, honors are publicly conferred and special achievements are celebrated with a dignified reception amid flowered wreaths and ribbons.

In addition to the awards of badges and titles of "outstanding" which are given for exceptional competence and performance, a ship or unit that has shown unusual courage in the face of the enemy is granted the title "Guards Unit." Ever after, it is referred to by its guards title, and it is given special colors and insignia.

At the same time, punishment is also severe and also involves, quite frequently, bringing to bear the pressure of the collective. If a serviceman is sentenced to punishment in a disciplinary battalion, the allowances paid to his family are stopped, no matter what hardships that might inflict. A serviceman who has been accused of bad behavior is threatened with having his family or collective informed of his poor performance. Trials are normally held publicly and on shipboard a trial probably is used as a spectacle and is made into an all-hands evolution. When a case is decided to be sufficiently representative, it is given publicity and coverage in *Red Star*. No one's personal dignity is spared. Names are named and free play is given to accusations of behavior inconsistent with *Red Star*'s interpretation of proper collective attitudes. In this way, the press acts as another judge and jury.

The collective will is not just a Marxist one but is deeply seated in Russian culture. Nevertheless, it is being used as a powerful tool of party control and manipulation. The party is represented as the soul and core of Soviet collectives.

Although there is a great effort made to form collectives out of crews servicing airplanes, units firing certain weapons, crews of submarines or ships, there is also the other side of the coin: the fear of loss of control over what might become a "microcollective." In other words there is fear that a loyalty will be developed to an individual unit or ship at the expense of the collective as a whole and especially of the party. There is then this dilemma between driving units to higher excellence through competition and at the same time avoiding the formation of unit egotism leading to it a sense of independence from the controls.

In discussing the role of the collective in determining a Soviet sailor's effectiveness in war, the important point is that whether or

not he supports the ideology, whether or not he supports the current regime (both questions which Soviet sailors would probably never ask themselves in any concrete terms, much less discuss with their colleagues), historic and cultural traditions within Soviet society exert enormous pressures that can be expected to produce or form predictable patterns of behavior. Through the weapon of approval or condemnation of the collective, powerful Soviet authority can be asserted to maintain a kind of conformity that still allows within it much innovative behavior. The idea of the collective, which shares many similar aspects of the idea of collective morale as practiced in our armed forces, has, however, a wider, deeper and more persuasive meaning in the Soviet Union. Because everything is organized into collectives, because the members of the armed forces grow up in collectives, because personality and goals are defined in terms of the collective, exclusion from a collective carries with it some connotation of being excluded from life as well. Therefore the pressures of collective behavior patterns are not only positive, as they are in the United States, but are also and perhaps primarily negative. While there are few examples of this kind of pressure known to the West, the most famous and obvious one is that of the Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn who, although in danger of his life and certainly of his freedom within the Soviet Union, fought long and valiantly in order not to be excluded from the Soviet Union, from his language, heritage and collective.

Another kind of pressure is a collective sense of responsibility to the motherland. The military is always being reminded of its obligations to the country. The massive media coverage of the Second World War, the horrors of starvation and destruction, are kept before the eyes of the whole civilian and military population. In addition there is rarely a speech or article by any Soviet military authority in which the sudden German invasion is not cited in order to prove the need for constant and unceasing vigilance. As the former Minister of Defense, Marshal A.A. Grechko, expressed it in one of the infinite variations on the same theme,

> Our problem is to increase the military preparedness of the troops, and the fleet to the highest level to adopt every means for raising vigilance of the staff, to perfect the conduct of military watches in order that no sneakiness of the enemy could possibly throw us into confusion.[2 3]

All of the organs of press and propaganda are constantly reminding the armed forces of the will of the party and the militant spirit of the nation. The lines of communication are almost overwhelming in their multitude. Besides the military press, radio, television, films, and newspapers, there is also fiction in the form of novels, plays and poems that are produced by the Military Establishment, published in military organs, and read by military readers. Lines also from political, social, security, and educational organizations reaching every ship and unit of the Soviet Navy throughout the world also stress the party will.

The third form in which the collective spirit is used to control the behavior of the Soviet sailors is the unit traditions of heroism generally associated with the Second World War. Unlike the U.S. Navy, where billet rotation means that every organization is in a constant state of flux, there is relative stability in the Soviet Navy with respect to leadership and personnel assignment. Of course, officers rotate and fill different billets; nevertheless, it is not unusual for the commanding officers of a ship to have that command for many years, for teaching staffs to remain relatively unchanged, and for crews to have long periods on the same ship. In any case, there appears to be a high incidence of long service within one or another of the fleets.

The effect of this comparative stability appears likely to facilitate the use of the heritage of past victories to control or at least to influence the behavior of the officers and men. A large portion of Soviet military propaganda is directed toward that end, and not only the military crews but also the civilian population, schoolchildren, workers and foreign tourists are lectured about the fearless and heroic traditions of this or that unit or ship. The award of medals and orders from World War II alone seems to have been in sufficient quantity to keep military historians occupied for the foreseeable future. For example, 78 ships and units of the fleet were given the highly coveted honor of being called "Guards" in their title, which in effect designated them as an elitist unit. In addition, some 238 other units and ships of the fleet were given honorary orders. All four fleets, the Northern, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific, have been awarded the order of the Red Banner, the Baltic Fleet having won that honor twice. During the war 350,000 sailors, petty officers and officers received awards and medals for bravery and heroism and 580 sailors received the highest honor, Hero of the Soviet Union, seven of whom received it twice.[24]

These titles, honors and orders are not allowed to become mere empty phrases. In the official Soviet language when you want to

refer to the Baltic Fleet, you must say "Two Time Winner of the Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet." If you are referring to the Frunze Naval Academy you will refer to it as "The Higher Naval Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Ushakov Academy named after N.V. Frunze." The uninitiated would have difficulty recognizing under that ponderous appellation the institution founded by Peter the Great in 1702.

One cannot help questioning how seriously this should be taken. To the Western reader such a blatant political and patriotic indoctrination would seem absurd. Perhaps that condition of absurdity is the very measure of the seriousness with which it should be judged. It certainly is a measure of the distance between our two cultures. Such patriotic political propaganda could be published hardly anywhere in the West without exciting laughter. Yet, it occupies millions of pages of newsprint daily in the Soviet Union.

One useful approach to understanding this facet of the Soviet political and military mind is to regard it as working somewhat like a religion; that is to say, to think of it as using a theological rather than a logical cognitive process. In the Soviet Union, the intended result is the thing that must determine the selection and interpretation of information. For example, the triumph of the Communist Party and the Soviet state determines what facts of current history may be recognized and what facts must be ignored. A history of the Second World War as seen from the Soviet point of view is not a history of events in chronological order, of battles won or lost, but a history of the triumphs of the leadership of the Communist Party and the heroism of the Soviet collective. In the official history of the Soviet Navy in the Second World War,[25] there is no analysis of any defeats. In fact the word is hardly ever mentioned. In the whole history of the war, the role in the final victory of foreign supplies and materiel is not discussed. When the subject of the convoys to Murmansk could not be avoided, it was merely said that the goods they brought were in exchange for Soviet raw materials that they carried back. One reads that the few small ships lent by the United States were returned at the end of the war. So much for lend-lease.

There is an allusion to the importance of the convoys but not from the Soviet position in this official naval history. Instead the point of view is that of Hitler. The Soviet line asserts that he made a mistake in thinking that the convoys were of extreme importance to the Soviet Union and therefore erroneously decided to use surface ships and submarines to achieve a victory in the East.

In exaggerating the significance of this aid, he "assumed that the delivery to the Soviet Union of goods, materiel, and ammunition from America and England would significantly strengthen the Red Army."[28]

If one tries to read Soviet history or Soviet political commentary as if it were written with all of the academic and scholarly precepts for truth and accuracy that are characteristic of writing in the West, one simply dissipates one's intellectual ability in indignation. For example, such is a likely reaction to the tribute paid to the heroism and bravery of the Americans who died on the Murmansk run during the war. In a history praising every minor Soviet action as sheer genius, the U.S. aid and its sailors' sacrifices are referred to as follows: "During the whole period of the War, 738 transport ships in 41 convoys arrived and 726 transports in 36 Allied convoys left."[27]

If on the other hand one understands that these versions of history are meant to be in part parables, that they are in fact lessons for right conduct and proofs of the miraculous results of right thinking, then one can begin to understand the paradise that is promised and the demanding path toward salvation.

The hurdle is to realize that truth here is simply deductive, conceived through the same process as a religious truth. Negative events such as defeat and calamities simply have no place in the big plan. For this reason the observer needs special tools or preparations to be able to read and to understand Soviet publications and to perceive intimations of strategic intentions conveyed in a ritual language.[28]

In Western ports Soviet sailors have been observed to go about only in groups. (In the 1960s, until adverse publicity forced the political officers to change their orders, Soviet sailors at liberty in a foreign port were required to hold hands.) What is not generally known is that the pressure for this kind of group evolution takes place in the Soviet Union as well. It is part of a whole system of surveillance and group control that the party has made a ubiquitous part of Soviet life. For example, soldiers or sailors who go to the theater or on an excursion are required to move in formation under the command of the senior in the group.[29]

Soviet officers are encouraged to take their vacations in groups and efforts are made to form collectives out of the families. Crews and units are kept under the constant surveillance of political officers and party activists.

Although 200 separate languages are recognized in the Soviet Union, only Russian is used in the Soviet Armed Forces. The authorities are obviously not pleased that minority languages exist and the military apparently brings considerable pressure, no doubt on the basis of national security, to enforce the standards for reading and writing Russian at the secondary school level.

Indications are that the linguistic and cultural differences are not only persisting but are also increasing. A study of the 1970 census indicated that Russians in the Soviet Union will be in a minority by 1985, and that Slavs which includes Great Russians, White Russians and Ukrainians, will be in a minority by the year 2000. Nevertheless, the principle of multinational crews is adhered to, at least for publicity purposes. One submarine crew was said to contain men from 22 republics and regions representing 11 nationalities.[30]

The fact of the class differences represented by the military structure in a Communist state is glossed over in Soviet writing. Differences between ranks are strictly enforced, apparently to a greater extent than in capitalist military organizations.

After the Revolution, the idea of ranks was not considered consistent with the aims of the Communists and ranks were abolished. In 1935, they were largely restored. In 1950, the various ranks of generals and admirals were reintroduced. The rank of marshal, which did not exist in czarist Russia, was introduced and the special rank of generalissimo, which had never before existed, was formulated for Stalin.

The distinction between ranks is maintained in spite of the Marxist goal of a classless society. As it was put in one military journal, "On official service matters military personnel must address each other in the impersonal form." The "impersonal form" is, of course, the formal means of address between superior and inferior.

The class origin of generals and admirals serves to emphasize the changing nature of Soviet society. Fifty-four percent of flag officers are of peasant descent, but about 85 percent of young officers are the children of manual and office workers. Only 15 percent come from the ranks of agricultural workers. Nor are they the sons of the proletariat, the workers, in whose name the Revolution was fought and who give the Soviet Communist Party's worldwide aspirations their Marxist legitimacy.

The transformation of the Red Navy into a modern bureaucracy with inherited self-interest is not surprising. Neither is it surprising that many dominant Russian cultural traditions and czarist concepts have reasserted themselves. After all, man is the creature of his preconceptions.

In very broad terms, there were two great currents in Russian life which converged to bring about the Revolution, one political and the other social. The major justification for the repressive measures of the czarist regime was that such sacrifices were required if Russia was to be the most powerful state in the world. The defeats of the Crimean, Russo-Japanese and First World Wars disastrously undermined that argument and made the government a laughingstock.

It appears that these factors are again—although slowly and erratically--reappearing in Soviet society. The distance between the classes is growing and the repressions, which continue, some with increased severity, are weakly justified by the needs, to use Gorshkov's words, for "the power of the state." In the meantime, the gap between depressing Soviet life and foreign standards grows. In an age of mass communications, even with Soviet censorship and jamming, it is impossible to keep the people ignorant of their suffering and deprivation. That plus the official fear and ignorance of the outside world creates terrible internal tensions.

Those on watch and responsible for crisis decisions can gain little comfort from this state of affairs. It is necessary to consider the Soviet policy as originating from an internal code that few in America can interpret correctly.(The projection of some American concept of "the reasonable thing" onto Soviet leaders is, of course, absurd.) The Soviet Union, having destroyed the fabric of its social structure and normal relations between men, lives in a mental world of its own creation. It is ruled by autocrats who, ignorant of the outside world and with few internal checks and balances—far fewer than Nicholas II had, certainly—are capable of religious madness in the role of the vicars of Marx, the terrible, inhuman violence of the righteously unbalanced. The world has no choice but to wait in fear and on guard for a return to sanity.

PART III

ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

CHAPTER VII

THE TACTICS OF WAR

It may be debatable that there is a "national" approach to strategy, i.e., that the British and Americans tend to be pragmatic, the French spirited but erratic, and the Germans careful and methodical. About Soviet military thought, however, there can be no argument. It is conceived, developed and implemented as a national science. Discussions of military doctrine are tied to a firm theoretical and scientific base.

While the Soviets like to trace the ideal of the systematization of military knowledge back to Henry Lloyd, who served in Russia under Catherine in the 19th century, the introduction of Marxist dialectics led to a major refinement of the method of military thought and to some new formulations in military science. Russian thought characteristically searched for a totality. The idea of Marx and Engels that there were scientific laws governing all phenomena, which were all interrelated in a material universe, found a very sympathetic audience. Undeniably, Marxism brought about different ways of looking at the universe and yielded new concepts about science, including military science.

A key concept was that war had evolved into a complex national undertaking not only because of the introduction of new weapons and techniques but also because of the development of new industry and of the participation of the working masses. The idea of military strategy, it was argued, was no longer sufficient to explain war. Instead, it was understood as a social phenomenon with an economic base. The Soviets criticized Western theoreticians for thinking that the problems of war could be placed within the framework of strategy alone and explained that this backwardness was caused by the egocentric orientation of Western concepts, their emphasis on individual strokes of genius.[1]

Instead the Soviets devised a theoretical and unitary "science" of the practice of war in which there was a continuing dialectical modification between strategic theory and strategic practice; that is, each affected the other in a continuing relationship that ensured a constant, never-ending interaction.

The Soviet idea of military science leads to some very fixed categories, however, that characterize Soviet thought. For example, the dictates of military science require that there be exact classifications of various military disciplines and a whole series of hierarchies in which relative positions are assigned that then determine the weight of various military capabilities. For example, the speeches of the Minister of Defense on an anniversary of the Great War of the Fatherland (World War II) designate the relative importance of the various services and in turn, the ranking of the weapons systems within each service; e.g., long-range strategic submarines take precedence within the navy.

In the elaboration of their system, the Soviets have devised two terms that are somewhat confusing: military science and military art. Although they appear sometimes to be used interchangeably, the two terms refer to different methods of analysis. Military science is the theoretical study of war. Its object is to discover those laws that are universally valid. The theory of military art, on the other hand, applies to the actual practice of war itself. It is divided into the studies of strategy, operational art, and tactics.

By strategy the Soviets mean roughly the same as we mean in the West. The only difference is that their use of the term is more encompassing in the sense that it emphasizes the role of the political and civilian sectors and the psychological preparation of the masses. Military strategy is always emphasized as being closely connected with all other social and natural sciences as it must absorb quickly new scientific discoveries and achievements when formulating its own goals.

Another way in which the study of strategy differs from the general practice in the West is in its emphasis on future war. Although certainly all strategic concepts relate, by implication, to future wars, Western strategic emphasis is upon deterrence (the impossibility of war—its "unthinkableness"—is a widespread preconception), while the Soviet concept looks toward the probability of war and its victorious conduct. The Soviet perception, therefore, lays enormous stress on the civilian and industrial sectors of the economy and on morale or as it is called "the spiritual state of the masses." In other words, the Soviet concept of strategy is never very far from the practical problems of preparing the country for war. Also, it deals with the laws of war as an armed conflict in the name of certain class interests. War is always political and being political implies a hierarchy of moral values including the destruction of backward social systems, a legitimate undertaking as it is historically inevitable.

The foregoing obviously means that Soviet strategic concepts about war must include nuclear missile warfare. The theoretical approach to war clearly drives it in the direction of all-out nuclear strikes; and tactics must be able to implement nuclear strike theory.

Naval strategy cannot be separated from overall strategy that is dictated by politics and is that part of military art concerning itself with the fundamentals of preparing for and waging war as a whole. By denying an individual strategic role to any of the services, the theory insures a conceptual coordination. This idea is stated in the *Officers' Handbook*. "Coordination of the actions of all the services of the armed forces in war is possible only within the framework of a common military strategy."[2]

Military thought is divided basically into three sections and our concern with these sections is partly the result of our understanding the degree to which they can be known outside the Soviet Union. The three sections are: military science, military art, and military doctrine. Military science, the examination of the technological nature of weapons, specifically the scientific principles governing them, is generally open for discussion within the Soviet Union and is reflected in numerous articles in journals received abroad. Many scientific articles relate to foreign equipment. By implication one assumes that they relate also to Soviet technology.

Military art is about the employment and coordination of weapons. As long as the discussion is theoretical and abstracted from specific Soviet systems it may take place also in unclassified journals.

The third category is military doctrine that results from the assessment of the political situation in the world and is determined at the highest levels. Changes in military doctrine, which are matters of considerable secrecy, are only known by their reflection in changes in military tactics, equipment or theories. For example, until about 1965 Soviet military doctrine was believed to hold that any war with NATO or the United States would immediately escalate into a nuclear war. But in 1965 an article by Colonel-General Lomov[3] argued that local conventional wars could occur in Europe in which tactical nuclear weapons might or might not be used and that the U.S.S.R. should be prepared to fight such wars. The implications were that such wars could remain conventional. Soon after, new equipment in the Soviet divisions in Europe seemed to indicate that the possibility of flexible response had become part of the military, and therefore

the political, doctrine of the Soviet Union. The third edition of Marshal Sokolovskiy's *Strategy* contained a number of revisions that seemed to underscore the concepts of flexible response; however, that was a side issue.[4] Conventional weapons, like aircraft carriers, would be useful in many ways but against the main enemy, the United States, it was the doctrine (at least in practice) that nuclear weapons would certainly be used.

The *Officers' Handbook* is clear about the role of military doctrine. Doctrine is established only after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has formulated its conclusions and interpretations about the current stages of development of socialism with respect to the historical level of imperialistic powers; that is, their degree of disintegration. All of this, of course, is interpreted in the light of the "scientific" laws of Marxism translated into Leninist tactics pointing toward the "inevitable" victory of the socialist system. There is no question that when pronouncements are made about doctrine they are no longer subject to debate. Doctrine is "a single system of views and directions free from private views and evaluations."[5] But in military science contradictory points of view are permitted and varying hypotheses can be presented.

Officially defined, military doctrine is:

> A system of guiding views and directions of a state on the character of wars in given specific historical conditions, the determination of the military tasks of the states, the armed forces and the principles of their structuring and also the methods and forms of solving all these tasks, including the arms struggle which flows from the goals of war and the socio-economic and military technical possibilities of a country.[6]

When, as is frequently now the case, official Soviet spokesmen make the statement that the correlation of forces has changed in the the favor of the socialist camp, we may assume (1) that this is a reflection of a change in military estimates and (2) that there are consequent changes in concepts of military strategy. When such statements are connected with other pronouncements concerning the economic decline of the West and the crisis of capitalism, comments frequently found in the Soviet press, we may be sure that strategic assessments have been revised and should not be surprised to see new and more aggressive political and military initiatives.

The other way in which we can assess Soviet military strategy is through its historical development, and statements in contemporary journals.

Commander Herrick's book, *Soviet Naval Strategy*, illustrates the extreme difficulty involved in trying to determine Soviet strategy on the basis of evidence that appears in the press. He could prove his thesis that there was serious interest in a blue-water navy in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. What was not revealed, however, was how serious that interest was, what strategies were influenced by it or what caused the idea to be dropped. The kind of material that Commander Herrick analyzed is not defined by the Soviets as naval strategy at all but naval art. Soviet naval art has to do with the use of weapons. It is the translation of theoretical decisions into practice and is generally treated as classified information.

The Soviets have named three stages in the development of military art since World War II.[7] These stages undoubtedly also reflect changes in Soviet military strategy. The first stage was from 1945 to 1953, the second from 1953 to 1959, and the third began in 1960 and has lasted presumably until the present. (Some would probably argue that at least in naval art there was another period that began just before 1975. They would point to the articles of Admiral Gorshkov. But Admiral Gorshkov only elaborated ideas that he had expressed in 1967 and that were the fulfillment of Stalinist concepts of 1945. Although the basic direction remained the same, the doctrines around 1975 recognized to a greater degree the possibility of limited war and the use of military presence only under conditions of the changed correlation of forces.)

The first period, ending in 1953, was clearly one dominated by Stalin. Nevertheless, the major principles of that time were not totally different from those that succeeded them. The massive forces that remained mobilized, the plans for construction of many major capital ships, and the enormous sacrifices demanded of the civilian sector of the economy differed in degree but not in kind from decisions made after Stalin's death. Construction of nuclear submarines began in 1953 and that was the dominant direction of the Navy for the next 20 years. A major difference was that under Stalin decisions were not made on what would now be called a scientific basis.

The major strategic concern both of that period and of the one that succeeded it was that the imperialistic coalition, with the United States in the lead, would use its superiority to unleash a war to destroy the socialist camp. Given Stalin's paranoia, the propaganda about the warlike intentions of the West, and the experience of the ferocity of the Nazi invasion, a Soviet citizen

would have come to no other conclusion. Nevertheless, until 1953 the Soviet Union was too weak economically to have any other reasonable strategy. It had to depend on morale of the rear—that consisted of a terrorized population, numb from privation, deception and secrecy.

After Stalin's death, the study of strategy was reorganized, so it was said, to prepare for nuclear war under the new technological conditions. This also involved preparing the population for its dispersion, for methods of civil defense, and for education for survival.

In 1959 a major decision regarding strategy was apparently made by Khrushchev and his advisors and approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee. That decision almost certainly had to do with defining the nature of nuclear war, the inevitability of war with the West, and the possibility of the Soviet camp surviving. A concomitant decision was to drive to achieve nuclear parity. But in Soviet terms it was axiomatic that nuclear parity was not enough. The Soviet Union would of course seek nuclear superiority in all fields as well as superiority in the conventional fields of military art. Ironically, this decision was made at the time of "the thaw" in domestic affairs when Khrushchev was talking about an increase in consumer spending, although he must have known that the economic and technological demands of the decision meant a continuation of economic scarcity for the people.

The revolution in weaponry was to incorporate in operational art new developments in missilery and rocketry, primarily surface-to-surface missiles. In 1959 the *Styx* missile was placed on a small torpedo boat, a combination of platform and weapon designated by NATO as the *Komar*.[8] It is ironic that the little *Komar* marked a change in naval warfare as significant as the employment of the aircraft carrier at Midway, or of torpedoes (exploding projectiles) at Sinop. It meant the end of conventional naval tactics and the end of conventional assessments of navies by tonnage and firepower. The later placement of a surface-to-surface missile on the *Echo* submarine confirmed that naval balances had become unhinged.

Analysts are fairly certain that overall Soviet strategy between Stalin's death and the major decisions of 1957-1959 was to engage and stop Western forces far from Soviet shores. That had always been Russian strategy—protect the center. The heavy submarine construction, which probably would have taken place under any circumstances, could have been justified as a means of interdicting the resupply of NATO, of challenging the strategic use of aircraft

carriers and of moving the line of defense further to sea by cutting lines of communications. The idea of the use of the navy to support state interests, which caused such a stir in the Gorshkov papers of 1975, was already part of naval concepts in 1964, for Soviet ships increasingly began making formal visits to foreign ports.

This was announced in *Red Star* in 1963:

> the party has reached the conclusion that the armed forces and the country as a whole must prepare for a war in which nuclear weapons will be widely used; which will present a decisive, classic version of two opposed world social systems; and which will be distinguished by unprecedented violence, *dynamic force and high* maneuverability of combat operation.[9]

Admiral Kuznetsov had reopened the question of naval tactics in 1953 in an article in which he said that World War II experience was no longer a sufficient guide for military strategy. This was after Stalin's death and was the first public challenge to Stalin's famous dictum that winning a war depended on (1) the stability of the rear, (2) the morale of the troops, (3) the quantity and quality of divisions, (4) the efficiency of armament, and (5) the organization and ability of the general staff. Stalin's principles—placing the human element above the mechanical—dominated Soviet military thought during his lifetime. After his death, to reawaken discussion, the first tentative and somewhat timid suggestions began appearing in the press in 1956. Suddenly, Stalinist precepts were replaced by arguments that atomic weapons, missiles, helicopters, nuclear warships, and radar had so affected war that military thought was out-of-date.[10] Theoretically, at least, an effort began to turn strategic thinking away from World War II and toward the future.

Marshal Zhukov, in 1956, argued that in any case large forces would be necessary as the occupation of enemy territory, even after a nuclear exchange, would be essential. Admiral Gorshkov accepts that concept and uses it to support his idea about the priority of action against the shore.[11] This also justified the need for large reserves and the necessity for the three states of readiness that characterized Soviet forces; that is, first, line units ready for immediate operations; second, backup units not quite up to strength in men or equipment; and third, line units that could be made ready in short order.

The mental paralysis induced by Stalinism and the growing need to define new doctrines for the accommodation of the new weapons brought about an exceptional concession in the extraordinarily secretive Soviet Union; that is, publication in 1962 of a book on military strategy under the editorial direction of a Soviet military leader and theoretician, Marshal Sokolovskiy.

The main thrust of the first edition of this book was to discuss the changes brought about by nuclear warfare. The second edition incorporated the idea of the preemptive strike and discounted the idea of sparing cities (counterforce) as impractical (after all the United States has many more large cities than the Soviet Union and can therefore presumably spare more). The third edition mentioned the possibility of nonnuclear war and considered that nuclear strategy was only one of many possible strategies. However, in all editions a premise taken for granted was that war would end in a massive nuclear exchange and that the decisive battle could only be won with occupation of foreign territory.

The third edition, published in 1968, was also significant in that the Soviet Navy was mentioned for the first time as playing a strategic role. This was because of the advent of strategic submarines. In 1971, similar ideas were reiterated by the Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, who said, "We are aware that in the future world war, if the imperialists start it, nuclear missiles will be decisive means of armed combat. Along with this, conventional weapons will find their use, and under certain circumstances the units and subunits may conduct combat actions only with conventional means."[1 2] Statements like this, echoed in Soviet military publications, clearly showed that the armed forces were prepared or being prepared for an intense nuclear exchange, although the possibility of other kinds of warfare continued to be recognized.

The Soviets had exploded a hydrogen bomb in 1953 and had first successfully tested ballistic missiles during the period of 1955 to 1957. Exercises for nuclear warfare began at that time and increased in sophistication.

Even if the Soviets had adopted a policy of flexible response, military and political analysts could hardly find that a sign of the lessening of tensions between the two camps. Soviet military doctrine, in emphasizing the class nature of war, showed little concern for the degree of destruction. In fact, in emphasizing the need to wipe out the strategic and economic base of the enemy in the first minutes of war, the policy promised vast population losses.

Military doctrine insures that Soviet concepts are always aggressive. Because all war is "class" war, there is no provision for passivity or assumption of good will. Soviet military art, in which such questions as estimates of the preparedness and intentions of capitalist nations, their plans for preemptive strikes and the significance of their military expenditures are analyzed for the political leaders, starts with an assumption of the danger of war. As we shall see in a short review of Soviet military thought, even in the period of the policy of détente, the dialectics of the permanent nature of the conflict with capitalism formed the basic analytical preconception.

One place in which the Soviets have recognized the possibility of flexible response has been in the navy. (It should be added that the use of satellite troops as surrogates, the sale of arms, and economic support are also weapons of a flexible response.) Admiral Gorshkov has advertised the Soviet Navy as a flexible instrument of state power. This has been apparent in the use of the navy, particularly since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. With the rapid growth of the Soviet Mediterranean force and the tactic of shadowing U.S. ships during crises, the Soviet Navy advertised Russia's challenge to the naval balance.[13]

Since the Second World War, the Soviet Navy has not suffered in the party's allocation of new technology. It is also apparent that the party has been aware of the navy's role as an advertisement of the economic sophistication of the nation. As Admiral Gorshkov wrote, "The navy, having always been the focus of the latest achievements in science and technology, was the first of the branches of the armed forces to see the large scale and widespread introduction of nuclear missiles, radioelectronics and nuclear propulsion."[14]

The pace of innovation in the Soviet Navy has been nothing short of remarkable. Since the Second World War no less than 17 different classes of submarines have been built and if one considers various modifications then that figure would reach 28. It is obvious that in submarine construction the Soviets have been aware that their technology lags behind the West but they have compensated for that with numbers. As their technology improved, they built more sophisticated submarines and traded reduced quantity for improved quality.

In the 1960s, as a result of new technology, an independent role was assigned to the navy in strategic operations, undoubtedly because of ballistic missile submarines and a recognition of the importance of limited wars.[15] Interestingly, the Soviets concen-

trated on the navy's ability to attack the land while America concentrated on the autonomy of naval elements at sea: the attack aircraft carrier, the ballistic missile submarine, the amphibious task force.

The development of heavy aircraft armed with missiles and electronics was the Soviet alternative to the aircraft carrier. That was a recognition that long-range airpower of various sorts fitted not only the Soviet concept of war, but also the Soviet geographic position. Heavy aircraft filled a tactical need very quickly (major land and sea objectives were within range) and certainly more cheaply than the aircraft carrier could have done and gave the Soviet Navy both flexibility and range. The late development of *Kiev* with its VSTOL aircraft only underscores the degree to which the Soviet Navy has become luxurious.

The next logical step, begun in the late 1960s and early '70s, was to develop foreign airbases so that the zones of offense/defense could become greatly extended. The results were the bases in Egypt, Somalia, Guinea, and eventually in Cuba. As Lt. Gen. S.A. Gulyayev, the Commander of Baltic Fleet Aviation wrote in 1965:

> Naval aviation armed with missiles with nuclear warheads can use its powerful weapons outside of the operational range of shipboard surface-to-air missiles and almost beyond the potential range of fighters directed against these aircraft. This permits missile-carrying aviation to carry out effectively the mission of destroying enemy warships and transports at sea, regardless of their anti-aircraft defense systems. Modern naval aviation has great possibilities for conducting successful combat operations not only against large surface warships but also against submarines including nuclear powered ones . . . and in many instances aircraft have many advantages over surface combat ships and even more over modern submarines. With their great range and speed they can strike quickly against enemy forces found at sea. Aviation units and forces can be transferred to other operational areas quickly (for example large groups of aircraft can be redeployed from one continent to another in a day without any loss of combat capability).[16]

As part of the change caused by forward deployment, the Soviet Navy recognized the need for greatly increased air cover. Many older units were reequipped with surface-to-air missiles in

addition to surface-to-surface missiles and new ships were designed with SAMs.

The history of Soviet ASW efforts does not begin until the late 1950s because until then there was no real ASW problem. There was no requirement to protect convoys in coastal zones and there was not any great prospect of a submarine threat. Because there was no need to protect shipping on the high seas there was no concept of sea control except for the defensive rings in the Baltic, Black and Okhotsk seas. The Polaris threat abruptly forced the Soviet Navy to expand its operational art. New classes of ships, submarines, and airplanes were developed and became operational in the second half of the 1960s as the Soviets, to meet the threat, adopted an operational doctrine of combined systematic employment of all existing forces for antisubmarine warfare.[17] The totally new ship design, the *Moskva*-class ASW cruiser that was commissioned in 1967, bears witness to the attention that was devoted to that problem.

Basic to the new tactics of that decade was the idea that one did not achieve superiority through a concentration of weapons platforms but through a concentration of missiles.[18] The new tactics deemphasized the importance of maneuvering the platform because with the new missile technology it was the maneuvering of the trajectory that was important. Furthermore, with the greatly expanded ranges, the navy's support on the flanks of the army was recognized to be at such a distance that the navy would be accomplishing other tasks as well.

As the decade progressed technology was increasingly sophisticated. It became apparent that the tactics of naval maneuver were not just those of controlling the missile but also of electronic maneuver. In fact, the range of electronic detection and reconnaissance can control modern warfare, as Admiral Gorshkov admitted.[19]

These new concepts brought the amphibious forces back into play. The necessity to invest the land with troops in a nuclear attack finally was recognized. An amphibious force would be needed. With their organic concepts the Soviets could go in several directions, increase their amphibious forces, or augment the training of paratroops to fill that need. Demanding an individual dedication would not be characteristic.

An important consideration was that the Soviets regarded the era of large ships as ended. However, this did not eliminate the aircraft carrier as a useful platform in other kinds of wars, or for

other purposes. After all, the Soviet Union faces other maritime problems than those posed by the United States.

The new tactical orientation involving the concentration of missiles and electronics but not of carriers was thought to mean the end of large ships. Admiral Gorshkov said in 1960 that "the significance of aircraft carriers has fallen sharply. Like battleships, they have already had their day and are inevitably moving into the past."[20] By 1969, that tune was changed when he said, "Of course, one should not minimize the combat potential of aircraft carriers, especially when they are brought to bear against fully armed countries."[21] By 1972, the renewed use of aircraft carriers was fully elaborated. In an article in *Morskoy sbornik*, the rationale was stated as follows:

> In connection with revolutions in military affairs, during the last fifty years and the development of navies, the role and missions of the various forces and ships have changed. Large gun ships have almost lost their value in naval battles. Aircraft carriers have again become one of the strike forces against surface ships and also can be useful in solving several other problems such as ASW and shore bombardment, etc.[22]

The new priority for aircraft carriers should not disguise the fact that the Soviets thought they had resolved all the naval problems they faced before 1970 in terms of naval science and operational art. The one exception was the ballistic missile submarine. (That is not to say that they could have successfully implemented all of their solutions.) The renewed interest in aircraft carriers represented the new naval problem; the increased complexity of antisubmarine warfare and the vastly increased scope of Soviet naval activity. The scene of action was no longer confined to shallow contiguous seas under the umbrella of Soviet land-based aircraft. The navy had to solve the problems of forward deployment.

Between the end of World War II and 1955, the Soviet Navy greatly emphasized the importance of aircraft, but tactics and operational concepts seemed to repeat the experience of the Second World War rather than changed conditions of the modern era. There was heavy emphasis on fighters. There were no long-range naval aircraft but only some light bombers, torpedo carriers and reconnaissance airplanes. The first regiments of TU-16 *Badger* bombers were transferred to the Navy in 1965 along with some long-range *Bears*. In 1960 Air Defense Service (PVO) was

given responsibility for supporting the navy in the coastal zone and therefore all navy fighters were transferred to it. Soviet naval aviation suddenly dropped from approximately 3,500 airplanes to 800. In 1966 there were three combat branches of naval aviation: reconnaissance, strike (meaning missile launching), and antisubmarine.[23] Together with the training and transport commands, Soviet naval aviation probably numbered about 2,000 aircraft.

Heavy emphasis was put on air refueling. Now practically all naval air long-range missile bombers and reconnaissance planes are capable of air refueling. This gives them practically unlimited range in the northern hemisphere. The critical role of aircraft in naval maneuvers was demonstrated in exercises *Okean 1970* and *1975*. To consider the Soviet naval aviation potential as limited by that service alone, however, would be a mistake. Establishment of smooth cooperation in command and control with the Long Range Air Force has been well advertised and demonstrated. The first vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, the *Freehand*, was exhibited as early as 1967 at the air show at Domodedovo near Moscow. The claim was made that the aircraft was operational in 1972, a claim that should probably be discounted. Nevertheless, it is now providing some of the striking power for *Kiev*.

Subordinate to the Soviet Navy is a sizable shore defense force that provides defense along the vast coastline and particularly around Soviet naval bases. The defense force is now missile equipped. One of its early missiles was a coastal version of the *Styx* missile, which shows the adaptability of Soviet concepts. The major element of the shore defense force has traditionally been the naval infantry proper, which was reformed prior to 1964. It has remained at approximately 15,000 men in spite of the strategic notion of the need to conquer and invest the land. The number of amphibious forces can remain small because of the close coordination with other branches of the service. The operations of the naval infantry appear to be essentially similar to those in Western navies except that the Soviet Navy's lack of shipborne air cover is supplied by land-based air cover and missiles on various platforms. To soften up beachheads, the tactic to be employed is to use submarines, aviation, surface ships, and even land-based missile units all with nuclear weapons, of course, "in an attempt to destroy and neutralize missile installations, air defenses, and air fields in the coastal defense zone."[24] For this purpose cruise-missile-firing submarines and cruise-missile-firing patrol boats, such as the *Osas* and *Nanuchkas* could probably be

used. Considerable use is also made of airborne troops which are delivered both by parachute and by helicopter and whose mission is to secure the rear while the naval infantry secures the coastal zone.

The spirit and elan of the naval infantry apparently is very like that of the U.S. Marines. It considers itself to be an elite group, able to perform all missions and whose motto is: "Advance, advance, advance, advance." As one advertisement put it:

> Our marines can do everything. They can blow up bridges and remove mines from harbors. If necessary, just two of them can disrupt an entire platoon in the rear of the enemy. They can also jump from [sic] parachutes, they can climb mountains like mountaineers and they make excellent snipers.[25]

All the naval infantry units are guards (elite) units. They probably retain their traditional brigade organization. A brigade is divided into three or four battalions, one of which is a tank battalion. The brigades probably are distributed among the four Soviet fleets and there is a total of perhaps seven brigades.[26]

Soviet faith in the ability to solve naval problems includes boasts that convoys cannot be defended. Emphasizing the dual capability of Soviet weapons systems, tacticians write about the difficulty of planning an effective defense of convoys:

> Under modern conditions, convoys have to disperse widely in order to minimize losses from a nuclear strike which could be launched by attacking submarines. But attacking submarines welcome this dispersal. They carry torpedoes which have acoustic guidance systems and the warhead can be either conventional or nuclear.[27]

With so much emphasis upon aircraft and submarines, the key concept for the design of the new Soviet surface fleet has been that it was, tactically speaking, an auxiliary fleet. Its all-purpose design was to make it able to solve other problems, primarily ASW but also to provide support for shore bombardments and landings, to patrol and to convey political signals.

The design of some ships, *Kara* for instance, was also most likely influenced by a political requirement for it to advertise the industrial and scientific success of the Soviet people.

A Marxist concept, widely reflected in military thinking, is:

> Ideological conviction based on the study of the theory of Marxism/Leninism is one of the most powerful controllers of human behavior. Ideas having sunk into the consciousness of a person cause him to act in a certain way. Ideas become transformed, as Karl Marx said, into a physical force.[28]

Certainly, Soviet naval commentators think of their navy as the embodiment of ideas. Soviet military designers are constantly being harangued to design for the future. Marshal Grechko said that military science must "always be ahead of practice, always look further ahead, reveal possible paths for development . . . ."[29]

There is little doubt that Soviet military critics mean what they frequently say about large ships making good targets. The fact that the Soviets have continued their major surface shipbuilding program while at the same time criticizing the usefulness of surface ships would logically indicate the following: the recognition of the possibility of limited naval engagements at sea (probably with nations other than the United States); a recognition of the role that surface ships must play in destroying submarines, primarily FBMs; and a recognition of the importance of surface ships for deterrence, presence and politics. It also may have been a propaganda cover for their deficiencies.

Some Western commentators, in arguing that the Soviet Navy has been designed under the assumption that it is expendable, have called it a "throw-away" navy. While such hyperbole is intriguing, it masks the fact that the Soviets consider many things expendable if they contribute toward the achievement of their ideological goals.[30]

The lessons of World War II, so constantly reiterated, are that people are expendable; that they must die for the motherland if required to do so; that if they allow themselves to be captured they will be considered traitors unless there is proof that they were unconscious at the time. This finds expression in one of the laws of operational art that holds that the enemy must be located and immediately attacked with all means and maximum force. The implication is always quite clear that loss of life and equipment are not important considerations if the attack has been decided upon.

When Admiral of the Fleet Isakov called aircraft carriers "floating mortuaries" in 1963, one may be sure that he was engaging in psychological warfare because the Soviets had no carriers. Such a concept would not be likely to occur to Soviet planners about their own forces. After all, death is the business of war. The lessons of the Arab-Israeli wars were quite clear: in

modern warfare everything has to be expendable; even such comparatively small objects as tanks make extremely easy targets. The idea that Soviet ships are expendable is a condition of modern war. It emphasizes Soviet operational art which is to strike first and devastatingly. The effect of this condition of naval warfare is well known to the Soviets, as Admiral Gorshkov wrote:

> . . . one must not forget that in contrast to past wars, under nuclear warfare conditions the replacement of naval forces will be very difficult or practically impossible. Consequently, the problem of building a modern balanced navy can be resolved mainly in the process of building in peacetime.[31]

The design of Soviet surface ships is also dictated by their concept of command-at-sea that stems from a different theoretical framework from ours although the practical execution may prove tactically similar. For the Soviets, the idea of command-of-the-sea, until recently, has been non-Mahanian. Economic limitations dictated a sector concept. The sea was to be controlled in a specific area to the degree necessary to insure the success of the operation underway. As described by a Soviet naval theoretician:

> Based on Lenin's teaching on war, our naval art correctly considered that to be everywhere equally strong was impossible, and therefore, to insure success, it was essential to regroup forces and means for achieving a superiority in the primary direction . . . . [In the Second World War] while confirming the principle of achieving superiority over the enemy in the main direction, Soviet naval theory did not reject the principle of command of the sea but thought of it not as a goal but as a means of creating favorable conditions for the successful conduct of operations. In a course of lectures at the Naval College at that time, it was put as follows: "To achieve superiority of force over the enemy in the main direction and to pin him down in the secondary directions during the time of the operation—that is the meaning of achieving *command of the sea* in a theater or in part of a theater; that is, creating such a situation that the enemy will be paralyzed or inhibited in his actions or weakened and therefore thrown into confusion by us in the fulfillment of his operation or in solving his operational plan." The principle of achieving command at sea, from that point of view, was applied in the last war and is still valid today.[32]

That, however, was the "line" for limited and defensive wars under the condition of an unfavorable correlation of force. One application was for the support of guerrilla movements. This was described as follows:

> In connection with the task of preventing local wars and also in those cases where military support must be furnished to those nations fighting for their freedom and independence against the forces of international reaction and imperialist intervention, the Soviet Union may require mobile and well trained and well equipped armed forces. In some situations the very knowledge of a Soviet presence in an area in which a conflict situation is developing may serve to restrain the imperialist and local reaction, prevent them from dealing out violence to the local populace and eliminate the threat of overall peace and international security. It is precisely this type of role that ships of the Soviet Navy are playing in the Mediterranean.[33]

This is practically a mirror image of the missions of the 6th Fleet in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s and it does define the politico-military role of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron.[34]

The new line inevitably led to a new posture and to the danger that the Soviet Union would play the role of the bully in international affairs. Warnings and boasts, such as the above, have become more frequent and are likely to increase in aggressiveness.

A second implication is that there is a change in operational art that must also indicate a change in strategic policy. A plan for increased capability in the Soviet Union is often the signal for increased boasting and aggressiveness. It is not, therefore, surprising that Admiral Gorshkov, in his book, strikes a new line for naval warfare. The ominous part is that we will probably see the increased forces in the years ahead. The boast will be made real. The new line is that the Soviet Navy must strive for sea control, not in the old sense of sector control but in the even older sense of Mahan's concept of sea control.

This is a logical outcome of the Leninist doctrine on the method for defeating imperialism: to seize the means of production; to cut off the source of supply for industrial production. Two things have reinforced the validity of those ideas in recent years: the Arab oil embargo in the winter of 1975 and the increasing intensity of competition for the resources of the oceans. The Gorshkov pronouncements on sea control suggest that the

Soviet strategy will be to intensify the battle for control of those resources. The Soviet Navy will be ready, as it was not during the Cuban missile crisis and sugar boycott, to defend the sea lines of communication. If it has been the preponderant power in strategic forces, it will be able to pose a threat of alarming dimensions. The nuclear umbrella makes sea control, again, a valid concept in naval warfare.

A second, operational, factor has reinforced the idea of sea control. Modern warfare will be fought with enormous speed. Timing is critical. Large surface targets cannot hope to survive. Therefore, they must be positioned where they can quickly perform their assigned task in a coordinated attack. Defense can no longer play a prominent role because of the power, accuracy, and destructiveness of missiles. Modern naval warfare has changed, in that it is not so much concerned with the formation of a task force as with the placement of missile and electronic platforms. (Needless to say, whether the platforms belong to the navy, army or air force is only of administrative interest so long as it fulfills its functions.) Gorshkov recognized this in saying:

> The maneuver will be carried out on the basis of data received from various electronic systems, even under conditions of the most intensive electronic warfare, which, when correctly organized, can fully paralyze data acquisition and monitoring systems.[35]

Because of the importance of electronics, and of timing, the nature of naval warfare has totally changed. In fact, much greater authority must inevitably be given to the separate units that are maneuvering for position in order to execute their electronic or missile attack roles.

> The nature of naval warfare is distinguished by its global scale, the briefness of its engagements, and the considerable increase in the effectiveness of its combat operations in comparison with operations of the past. This circumstance greatly increases the responsibility of every commanding officer in making decisions and carrying them out without delay, and confronts him with the need to display exceptional operational efficiency appropriate to the dynamics of the events taking place.[36]

The implications of such a concept of naval warfare, given the Soviet orientation, are anything but comforting. They suggest that

the only kind of successful war—because of timing and logistic factors—will be one that is preemptive.

In Soviet military art the navy, like all branches of the service, must be designed for flexible uses. Western tactics are frequently criticized in Soviet literature for the competition between the branches of the service. In contrast, Soviet military writers think of themselves as not having discovered but having more fully understood the need and nature of coordinated attack in the modern era. As one writer put it,

> . . . Soviet naval art was the first to take into account the sharply increased significance of coordination which to a considerable degree was the result of the stormy development of aviation and the increased effectiveness of air operations at sea. Our naval theory emphasized that it is incorrect to interpret coordination simply as delivering attacks by a variety of forces at one moment on some objective. It can include attacks at different times and even in different places. But it is important that these variously delivered attacks, at different times and different places, be operationally connected and subordinate to the solution of one problem.[37]

Unity in the Soviet Navy implies considerably greater forces than are at the disposal of most other navies. Because the Soviet Government owns everything, the merchant and fishing fleets, the hydrographic fleet and any other resource necessary for naval warfare, all can immediately be put at the disposal of the armed forces. The nation, which already operates on the basis of wartime mobilization, can quickly be converted to total military support.

While such notions are not new, they are part of the concept of "operational art" that the Soviet theoreticians formulated in the thirties and that helped them to "move significantly and tactically."[38] These concepts lead to vast exercises in coordinations, such as *Okean* and, most importantly, affect Soviet naval estimates. The unity of views in the armed forces is certainly supported by all military leaders. Admiral Gorshkov reflected in greater detail that concept which in his book was more softly stated, when he wrote in 1972:

> The place and role of each of the branches of the armed forces of a country can change both in peacetime as well as in war, depending on the technical transformations, on the enemy who is opposed, the geographic conditions,

> etc., . . . As is clear, in all cases, one aspect remains unchanged: the results of the victory in a campaign or war can only be secured by ground forces capable of proving the reality of it by their actual presence.[39]

It is not surprising that the navy's main tactical mission is again against the land.

Soviet military art dictates many operational doctrines shared by all of the services. Briefly, they are the following:

1. Surprise is frequently considered the most important tactical element insuring victory under modern conditions. The doctrines of all of the services often state that because of the nature of nuclear war, he who achieves the greatest surprise is most likely to win. Essential to achieving surprise are, as Admiral Gorshkov noted, intelligence and reconnaissance, automated information systems, and successful maneuver of missile and electronic platforms. Combat readiness is stressed above all else in the name of achieving tactical surprise which, under nuclear conditions, may mean strategic victory. Maintaining a sense of nervousness about the dangers of war is useful for promoting combat readiness and to do this Soviet naval training officers have the services of all of the nation's organs of information, propaganda and censorship.

2. Speed, certainly a corollary to surprise and combat readiness, is also frequently mentioned as essential to victory. The speed of decision and action and the rapidity with which circumstances change help to confuse the enemy and assure victory. This factor increases in importance with each development of technological change and causes greater demands on personnel, advancing technical knowledge and absolute loyalty.

3. Joint action of all the services is being emphasized now, perhaps, more by the navy than by others. In any case, because of its historic lack of air cover the navy has been more acutely aware of its need for coordinated operations. By drawing from all of the services a force can be composed that is specifically designed to solve a particular problem and that will be more effective than a force from just one service. Smooth joint operations have characterized Soviet forces for years. There really is no evidence to support arguments that the forces compete, as ours do, for allocations, unless they are perceived as competing with the civilian sector of the economy.

4. The characteristic strike in Soviet tactics has not changed significantly from the days of Catherine's brilliant General Suvorov. It is to attack with maximum surprise, maximum speed

and maximum force. As in all of these concepts there have to be trade-offs—maximum force may reduce the possibility of surprise —so one must analyze a situation to estimate to which element Soviet tacticians will give the greatest weight. The history of Russian warfare suggests that priority is often on the side of maximum force. That may have something to do with the Soviet submarine force that is of spectacular size and, on the whole, fast, but not very quiet.

In any case, the Soviet naval theory of the strike is to attack the main or critical target first with maximum force. What has changed is that the targets must be attacked over much greater distances, and with greater destructive force. The size of the attacking platform no longer matters. Because of its power, the strike may be decisive; thus it has become a strategic factor.

The differing combinations of arms in the Soviet Navy since World War II reflect responses to the threat, the economic capability of the country, and the theory of balanced forces. By "balance" the Soviets do not mean a navy that is equally proportioned according to some sort of abstract design, but a navy designed to meet the presumed threat and carry out a nation's missions in a given geographic area. This is naval science in the purest sense. Balance does mean, for the Soviets as for the United States, achieving the greatest degree of versatility with the forces available.[40]

On the basis of the composition of the Soviet Navy and current doctrine, the following are the major modern tactical concepts:

a. Soviet surface ships are not likely to operate in large groupings. Missiles and means of detection and destruction make the use of a task force unlikely. The Soviets think that they have solved the problem of reliably sinking large ships; therefore, surface ships will be used for ASW to attack the shore, for gunboat diplomacy and for patrol and shadowing other forces in both a strategic role and a tactical one.

b. A primary task for surface forces in conjunction with ASW air forces, is to seek out and destroy enemy submarines. In addition, submarines are taking a more important role in this operation. Whether it is in advance of the reality or not (which would be typical) the Soviets are already boasting that they can detect and destroy nuclear subs.[41]

c. In *Okean 1975* the Soviets appeared to show that they could destroy convoys. Their vast submarine fleet would

surely be used in hunter-killer operations for blockades and interdiction and to destroy surface ships. The submarine fleet will also be used in various peacetime and aggressive roles in support of Soviet foreign policy. It is also to be used against the land in both a strategic role and a tactical one.

d. Whether or not it is able to accomplish all of the above successfully, the Soviet Navy will always have an important role in support of army operations on the land. This is a function of the geographic problem. The emphasis on the idea of investing the land may suggest that the naval infantry will grow and that there will be increased production of amphibious ships. Considerable innovation in naval technology for attacking the land and guerrilla operations is likely including air-cushion and hydrofoil ships.

The Soviet concepts of military doctrine, military science and military art seem, in fact, to have insured that the Soviet solutions to military problems, far from being tradition-bound and paralyzed by controls, are innovative, imaginative and oriented far more toward the future than the past and toward concrete adversaries.

While Admiral Gorshkov has obviously been an effective naval leader of the modern Soviet Navy, it is certainly not the result of his genius alone. Other branches of the service, having a similar discipline for military thought, have been extremely innovative as well. Furthermore, theirs is a society in which priority is given to the military and one that exacts great sacrifices from all of its citizens to insure maximum military preparedness, a society that considers peace as one of the battles in a permanent conflict. Admiral Gorshkov has had a considerable number of resources at his disposal.

Russia has a long history of thinking itself invincible and then, in war, proving that the system does not work. The thesis of the use of power—a Romanov as well as Leninist idea—has, in practice, often given way to its antithesis, a collapse of power. We must examine some of the problems.

CHAPTER VIII

PREPARING THE MIND

The October Revolution destroyed many things in Russia but not the naval officer educational system which, in spite of all the years of war, civil strife, chaos, privation and purges, resumed its functions and many of its traditions in the same buildings and with the laboratories and many of the teaching personnel of the Imperial Navy.[1] The Imperial Naval Cadet College, founded by Peter the Great—who even taught there—on the banks of the Neva in St. Petersburg became the Frunze Higher Naval School. The buildings are the same. The cadets before the Revolution were exclusively the sons of the nobility. For a brief period after the Revolution, they were the sons of workers and peasants. Now, however, many of the cadets are the sons of naval officers in a kind of hereditary nobility of the sea. A class structure appears to be reasserting itself.

One of the traditions of the Imperial Russian Navy was to lay great emphasis upon education. That continues to be true in the Soviet Union where the naval officer spends a good percentage of his service career in formal schools, a large percentage of his sea time training, instructing, and testing. The tradition established by Peter that the leader must know the details of the equipment that his subordinates operate remains in force and must pay big dividends under Soviet conditions.

Leningrad is the focus of naval education. The naval schools renamed Frunze and Dzerzhinskiy, an engineering school, were reopened in 1922 and were elevated to the status of institutions of higher learning, on a university level, in 1939.

There was a considerable expansion of training for the Soviet Navy in the years just before World War II when schools modeled after Frunze and the engineering school were opened on the Pacific at Vladivostok, at Baku on the Caspian, and in the Crimea. In addition, in specialized schools for naval communications and gunnery, the curricula were expanded to 4 years.

In 1944 a 7-year prep school was organized—the Nakhimov School—for young cadets under the age of 15. They then enter

the Frunze Academy where the curriculum is concentrated on a technical naval education.

After graduation and completion of 2 or 3 years in their first assignment, officers are customarily sent for an additional year of training at a specialized officers' technical school. Upon completion of the year an officer is assigned as the head of a department on board ship.

In 1967, a banner year for fundamental changes in the Soviet Navy, the higher line schools were combined with the engineering schools to form a higher naval command and engineering schools system with curricula of between 5 and 5½ years. This was in recognition of the greater technical and scientific demands of modern naval science. The result is that all Soviet naval officers are now graduates of these schools and hold diplomas as engineers. Vice Adm. V.A. Krenov explained that the longer period of training was necessary because of the enormous increase in the volume of scientific, technical, and specialized knowledge that was necessary not just to maintain but to improve the quality of naval and command training.[2]

All of the officers on *Yankee*-class submarines have received a higher education. Of the officers entering the forces, according to the late Defense Minister Marshal Grechko, more than 50 percent have a higher education. This compares with the fact that only seven percent of Soviet officers at the outbreak of WW II had a higher education.[3] Although a military career does not stand very high in the list of choices of Soviet youth, there are nevertheless several applications for every vacancy at the naval cadet academies.

At the present time there are in the Soviet Navy at least ten higher naval schools; five in Leningrad, two in Sevastopol, one in Kaliningrad, one in Baku, and one in Vladivostok. The higher naval political school is in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine and there is an auxiliary fleet maritime school in Lomonosov, a town on the mainland just across from Kronshtadt.

In addition, there are many other schools for such common technical services as naval medicine. Naval aviators are appointed to the navy from air force higher schools and officers for the naval infantry come from the ground forces higher school.[4]

There are three sources for officers in the Soviet Navy. All graduates of the Nakhimov school system are assured of an entrance to one of the higher naval schools without examination. For others there are competitive entrance examinations for admission to the higher naval schools with preference given to

qualified servicemen. Finally, civilian candidates who are graduates of the Soviet equivalent of our high schools may apply, but they first must undergo a period of observation aboard ship.

The curriculum of each school is scientifically oriented with heavy emphasis on mathematics, electronics, physics, chemistry, engineering, and ordnance. In addition, a specific period of time (15 percent of the time is one estimate) must be spent on political indoctrination.

Beyond the higher naval institutes are military academies[5] and the period of study lasts for 3 to 5 years.

The courses are varied according to the specialty being studied; however, it is these schools, of which there are about 40, that produce many of the theoreticians of Soviet military art and science. In addition there are specialized short courses for future admirals and generals.

The highest level of education for senior officers and admirals is the Higher Naval Academy where courses of instruction in operational art are given. This school is directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff of the Military Council of the Soviet Union. Those who attend are approved by the Minister of Defense and are not called "students" but *slushateli* or, literally, "listeners." The period of education is about a year.

The course of education for a Soviet naval officer, then, might be as follows:

Age	School	Length of Study
15	Nakhimov Institute	3 years
18	Higher Naval Institute	5 years
26	Special School	1 year
34	Military Academy	3-5 years
40	Higher Naval Academy	1 year

Morskoy sbornik, a kind of equivalent of the Naval Institute *Proceedings* (although much more narrowly technical and professionally oriented), has been published almost continually since 1848. It is part of the vast military publishing enterprise that includes the publication of novels, poetry, and even music.

Morskoy sbornik is a monthly with (usually) nine sections as follows:

a. An introductory section. The leading article is often by a prominent military or political leader. Included are inspirational sections such as pictures of naval heroes of the Soviet Union.

b. Naval Art—A "how to" section with examples often based on historical experience.

c. Military and Political Preparedness—A catchall section for both propaganda and information about technical developments in the naval service.

d. Pages of History. Stories of the Second World War, referred to as "The Great War of the Fatherland" (the U.S. and England are hardly considered to have played a part) dominate this section.

e. Armaments and Technology—A hardware section in which, because of security, foreign technology is usually discussed and one assumes that Soviet developments are often being referred to (for those "in the know") by implication.

f. Phenomena of Nature and Life of the Ocean—A section on oceanography written on a technical level.

g. Foreign Fleets. Pictures and information about foreign navies are published in a kind of continuing intelligence program. For example, details of the SOSUS system may be published or the capabilities of a new ship.

h. Criticism and Bibliography. Here are recommendations for study on such subjects as underwater sound.

i. Literary Section. This usually contains a short story or excerpts from a book and reviews of new books.

From an even cursory examination of nearly any *Morskoy sbornik* it is quite obvious that Soviet naval officers are very well informed about developments in NATO navies and particularly the U.S. Navy. Much of the information presented (such as about SOSUS) is the kind that in the United States would be considered classified and not widely disseminated.

The contents of *Morskoy sbornik* reflect the highly educated, technical level of Soviet naval officers. Many of the articles take a knowledge of electronics, physics, and higher mathematics for granted. They are nearly all written by officers who are military scientists and specialists, graduates of the military academies, including retired and reserve officers. A high percentage of the military authors have doctoral and predoctoral degrees in naval or technical sciences.

Political activity in the armed forces is supervised by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The Political Directorate does not report to the Minister of Defense whose subordination is in the government chain. Instead, the Political Directorate is directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In other words, it is directly supervised by the Communist Party. There is a chief

political directorate of the Navy which, of course, is subordinate to the Main Political Directorate. The chief of the Political Directorate makes his views known in the operational chain of command through his position on the Military Council of the Navy.

Each fleet has a Fleet Political Directorate and also, in its operational chain, a Fleet Military Council. The Political Directorate, of course, acts in both. Following down the line, each subdivision of the fleet such as flotillas, units in fleet aviation, naval bases and so on have political departments. On each ship of destroyer escort size and larger there is a deputy commander for political affairs called the *zampolit* and for smaller units and aircraft squadrons there is a division *zampolit*.

The political officers serve two major functions: on the one hand they are a kind of Communist chaplain performing morale and political functions, agitation, and interpretation of the party line; on the other hand, they are secret agents who watch carefully for any signs of political disloyalty or even questioning of party decisions. In foreign ports the *zampolit* and his staff determine who may go ashore, who may have contact with foreigners, and what may be discussed.

The party puts enormous emphasis upon the need to prepare officers and men for the conditions of modern warfare and for the sacrifices they are expected to make for the fatherland and the future workers' paradise. It is through the indoctrination by the political workers that these tasks are accomplished and it is for this reason that they have been labeled, "true engineers of the sailors' souls."[6]

Line officers are forced to participate in political indoctrination as their fitness reports reflect the degree of their enthusiasm for party political work, their knowledge of Marxism/Leninism, and their ability to inspire a high state of political-moral preparedness in their command.

Partly because of the unpopularity of the political officers and the boredom with which their lectures on the party line are received, there have been numerous efforts to try to upgrade them in the eyes of the regular navy. Political officers are required to undergo much of the same military training as the regular line, to stand watches at sea, to be able to fly aircraft, and to navigate. They are given constant military training.[7]

The amount of time devoted to political indoctrination is considerable. Each officer must attend 50 hours of lectures or seminars per year solely on Marxism/Leninism. However, that is

not all that he is expected to do. He is expected to attend theoretical conferences, debates, and lectures after regular duty hours.

Enlisted personnel must attend two or three so-called political information periods of 20 minutes duration in addition to the 3 hours of political instruction each week.[8]

With the navy's all-ocean obligation for the protection of state interests has come an enormously increased pressure on the political officers. The men of the Soviet Navy are being exposed to foreign cultures and influences and are more able to observe alternative ways of life.

During the Second World War the experience of seeing Eastern Europe had a very dramatic effect on Soviet troops who had been led to expect that they would find only impoverished masses who were oppressed and exploited. Many who saw the West were forced to undergo a long period of reindoctrination after the war. Now, before visiting the foreign ports, sailors are told what they will see. After their visit what they *did* see is given the correct Marxist interpretation. This tells them what they may say about their impressions when they arrive home. Any show of enthusiasm or undue interest in a foreign port would probably insure that a sailor would never again make a foreign visit.

There is little doubt that the party political work is boring but that it is an effective instrument of control and discipline. The problems of the past when the political officer and the senior operational officer vied for control have been resolved in favor of the authority of the commanding officer. However, he only gets to be a commanding officer if he himself functions, to an important degree, in the role of a political officer as well.

The history of party/military coexistence, as we have seen, has been an uneasy one. This is probably not simply a function of the military alone for it appears to be a Soviet institutional procedure to have strict lines of organization—a clear-cut wiring diagram—and then to confuse the picture by assigning multiple responsibilities. For example, in 1971 the 24th Party Congress greatly increased the number of party organizations having a right to supervise the establishments with which they were associated. The supervision is accomplished through a kind of "control commission" which is made up primarily of party members but also with an admixture of knowledgeable persons with appropriate qualifications. One would expect that in an important factory, the plant manager would have final authority. This is not the case. Through the control commission the manager can be overruled or brought to account.

This system, of course, has caused some problems. For example, one secretary of a party group asked, "How can I, the assistant to the department head, supervise the work of my chief?"[9] This duality exists throughout the government where there is a party control commission, of some kind, for every important governmental function. This is true also throughout the armed forces. And, although Soviet military writers assert the principle of *edinonachal'e*—the principle of the right of the military commander to command—the traditional Russian paranoia, the institutional functioning of the Soviet state, and the party's watchful fear of all deviation combine to insure that their principle is only partially followed. In any case, even if the captain has final authority, the party shares control at all echelons below him.

The party manifests supervisory power through the party cell structure, the Komsomol (Young Communist League), the system of the political deputies, the control commission, and finally even through the military press. The CO cannot be in complete control of his own ship.

While the party has greatly extolled the military and allowed it a very privileged position in Soviet society, at the same time it has been very wary if not suspicious of the power the military can wield. It has a fear of Bonapartism (the fear that a military leader will gain sufficient power and popularity to take over the government, the fear that led to Marshal Zhukov's being removed as Minister of Defense and exiled in 1957. Marshal Zhukov's disgrace was almost certainly the retribution for his moves to relax party control of the military.[10])

Because the military is clearly within the government (as opposed to the party) chain of command with a clear organizational structure and a fixed philosophy of subordination in the military chain, how does the party exert its control? The answer is that the party exerts control from the top down through a parallel structure.

Admiral Gorshkov, like all other military leaders, affirms and reaffirms the leading role of the party in all of his public speeches and articles. One might think that this control and leadership of the party would be in matters of policy, morale, and education but the party's role is not limited by that. There appears to be no military question, however technical, from which the party would consider itself excluded. As stated in an authoritative party publication:

> Party leadership over the Armed Forces is carried out in all areas . . . determining the main direction for the development

> of types of Armed Forces, their organizational structure and equipping with modern technology and weapons, the training and indoctrination of military personnel, and the taking of specific measures related to further raising the level of Party political work . . . in essence, there is no area of military affairs in which the leading role of the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee would not be manifested.[11]

Comrade Brezhnev, in consolidating his power as the first among equals, has become an authority on military questions. Military readers refer to him with increasing deference, a trend that has been formalized by his appointment as a general of the army and marshal.

The party control of the military undoubtedly begins with the august and rarely mentioned Military Council. This is a group composed of the highest leaders of the government and party with selected military representation. Little is known about the actual membership. (Only through his obituary was it confirmed that Marshal Grechko was a participant.)

This is the level on which military policy, reflecting strategic political decisions, is made. This body apparently can concern itself with technical questions as well as those of the roles of the services. Khrushchev must have "sunk" his cruisers and Stalin must have planned his aircraft carriers during meetings of the Military Council.

Considering the kind of control that such a body exerts in the absence of interest groups with a political constituency, one can be reasonably certain that service factions do not play a competitive role in the public formation of policy. Information about naval policy is revealed only with this body's permission. Certainly, Sokolovskiy's and Gorshkov's books and articles would have been approved for publication on this level.

The commanding officer of a ship would necessarily be a member of the Communist Party. As such, he would be subordinated in two party chains. In one, he would be a member of the Peoples' Control Group where he would be subjected to the rule requiring open criticism of all members. Questioned even by his subordinates, he could face some kind of discipline through the party chain.

In the other chain, he would participate in the Military Council through which he would have to justify his decisions to the party political apparatus. In addition, his command would be weakened by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the officers and

men (90 percent for the navy) are either Communist Party members or in the Komsomol.

Through the party chain, these members are subjected to party discipline and party leadership. At party meetings they have the right to criticize their seniors and the duty to express doubts about party loyalty or honesty of any of the personnel, seniors or juniors, in their unit.

The military press, such as *Red Star,* is a means of control. "Citizens'" letters of complaint are published (obviously after careful selection). Names are named and accusations are made. The reporters and editorial staff of *Red Star* constitute a kind of disciplinary court, for they take it upon themselves to investigate suggested abuses and to decide questions of guilt.

Finally, there is the traditional Russian system of informers, spies, and agents of one sort or another. All members of the Communist Party and Komsomol are frequently exhorted and admonished about their sacred responsibility to report abuses wherever they see them. In addition, there are the agents of the KGB and the Military Intelligence Service, the GRU, placed throughout the armed forces.[12]

Although the principle of the CO's leadership and independence is frequently affirmed, obviously he cannot function without party support. Quite clearly command is subject to debate, criticism, and revision. It is almost certain that under conditions of stress, decisive leadership would be impaired. A very close correlation is maintained between success in combat readiness and success in party political work. Thus, success in military training is attributed to success in party work and failure is a failure to maintain party controls. Either way the party wins. As stated in the *Soviet Military Review*:

> One of the fundamental features of our armed forces and the basic source of their insuperable strength is the high political consciousness of the Soviet fighting men.[13]

Possible political indoctrination was easier when the world was divided between East and West. The appearance of many alternatives makes political officers' duties very much more difficult, for by even denouncing alternative theories of communism and socialism they are suggesting possibilities of which Soviet citizens heretofore would not have been aware.

Those who have not lived under such a system would have difficulty taking seriously the intensity of the party political

workers; however, one must remember that the Soviet Union is a nation of 250 million people who are taught to believe that there is no alternative to their system and that no right-minded person has ever entertained any alternative ideas. When Secretary Brezhnev says, as he did to the 24th Party Congress, that, "We are living under the conditions of an unceasing ideological war that is being waged against our country . . . by imperialist propaganda using refined methods and powerful technical media," the Soviet citizen is not supposed to know any of the facts of the ideological war being waged "against our country" and yet he is supposed to support Comrade Brezhnev's indignation. Obviously, such absurdities are difficult to manage. Under these conditions it is obvious that "bourgeois ideologists are trying to weaken the combat might of our armed forces and influence the political-moral state of the Soviet soldiers."[14] The only reasonable response is, of course, redoubled vigilance, and intensification of party political work, and a call on all to unmask those who would weaken the unity of the collective.

The West, and primarily the United States, becomes the convenient whipping boy for all problems in the Soviet Union. The fact that there is a problem with ideological deviation among Soviet youth is caused by the United States where insidious ideological sabotage is aimed "first and foremost at our youth." It is:

> The bosses of monopoly capitalism [who] are betting particularly on the ideological degeneration of Soviet youth and are endeavouring to weaken its revolutionary enthusiasm and to dull class awareness. We cannot help but consider this since the young people are the predominant majority among army and navy personnel; and in moral, political and psychological terms, we are preparing precisely the young people for skillful actions in modern war.[15]

Characteristic of the demand for purity is the idea that anything connected with foreign taste or ideas is subversive. Parents of those girls who wear eye makeup or boys who have hair down to their shoulders and wear tight-fitting trousers were admonished as being those "who do not stop to consider that youngsters sometimes go from trying on foreign fashions to trying on foreign ideals."[16]

One of the nightmares the party political workers must face is the fear that the spirit of the Kronshtadt rebellion could resurface

and citizens could begin demanding the rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution. For example, when the Secretary of the Komsomol was confronted by the fact that two young recruits admitted to being devout Moslems, he answered, "We have freedom of conscience in our country." But the reporter commented in *Red Star* with indignation that the Komsomol secretary did not seem to understand that "freedom of conscience in our country also implies an obligation on the part of each citizen to participate in anti-religious propaganda work."[17] *Red Star* was equally scandalized that the wife of a warrant officer was a Baptist and did not intend to renounce her religion and that the party political worker accepted the Baptists as a "sect that was authorized."

Examples of titles of political lectures for naval personnel in the long hours of indoctrination at sea are: "The Ideas of Marxism/Leninism"; "Boundless Devotion to the People"; "The Homeland, the Communist Party, and the Soviet Government"; "The Invincible Unity and Fraternal Friendship Among the People of the U.S.S.R."; "Proletarian Internationalism and Combat Cooperation with the Armies of Fraternal Socialist Countries"; "The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism"; "The Spirit of High Vigilance"; "Class Hatred for the Imperialists and All Enemies of Communism"; "Personal Responsibility for Defense of the Soviet Homeland"; "Readiness to Give One's Life Itself if Necessary to Achieve Full Victory"; "The Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Communist Party"; "The Revolutionary Combat and Labor Traditions of the Party, the Soviet People and its Armed Forces"; "The Successes of Building Communism in the U.S.S.R. and the Building of Socialism in the Fraternal Countries"; "The Advantages of Socialism Over Capitalism"; and "Pride in the Homeland, Its Great Achievements, and Its Noble History."[18]

The West is pictured in such a way as to support the combat readiness of forces. For example, a commonly repeated statement is that hatred for the enemy "is the most important component part of the perseverance and heroism of Soviet troops."[19] "The Communist Party educates the troops to hate enemies of the Soviet Union and always to be ready to destroy them."[20] The subject "hate for the enemy" is one which is formally recognized as appropriate for lectures, indoctrination and special studies. Indoctrination must include teaching hatred for imperialists and the enemies of communism. Soldiers and sailors are expected to have a burning hatred for their enemies. Whenever possible this spirit of hate is related to specific objectives. For example, the sailors on a

Soviet missile cruiser in the Mediterranean were given a lecture on "The U.S. Sixth Fleet: A Weapon of Aggression and Plunder."[21]

The purpose of the massive exposure to the horrors of the Nazi invasion and the Fascist movement is in part to imply that the Government of the United States and the leading citizens of America share such destructive and cruel aspirations and intentions toward the Soviet Union.

Détente, the exchange of visits by heads of state, and signing of treaties and agreements such as SALT I and II, have created some, but comparatively minor, problems for the political propagandist. The line currently adopted seems to be the obvious one: because of the change in the correlation of forces, the imperialist nations led by the United States are aware that should they attack the Soviet Union the results would be catastrophic for them. Nevertheless, the argument maintains that capitalist forces that dominate the United States are pressing for a war of revenge and that in any case war and aggression are necessary to make the capitalist system work.[22] The distinction is always made that in the ideological sphere there is not and never can be peaceful coexistence.

The high U.S. budgets for military expenditures provide very convenient propaganda for the Soviet Government and Communist Party. By calling attention to this, they are able to justify the obviously high expenditures within the Soviet Union under conditions of public privation. The West, with the United States in the lead, has singlehandedly started the armaments race. The increase in the Soviet published military budget from 13.4 billion rubles in 1966 to 17.9 billion rubles in 1970 are justified by pointing out the dangerous new U.S. strategic doctrines such as "assured destruction" and "counterforce."[23] The current line is that communism is the wave of the future and that the Soviet Union is in the vanguard, that the correlation of forces has changed and that if the danger of capitalist aggression is somewhat lessened it is because of the successes of the Soviet Union.

The naval officer corps is an elite group and apparently a stable one. There is no officer retention problem.[24] Soviet society provides very few alternatives in terms of position and rewards better than the life of an officer. Furthermore, switching to an alternate profession with the same pay, not to mention the same privileges, is very difficult if not impossible once a career is underway.

Adding to the prestige of a naval career is the fact that a Soviet officer has the possibility of having one of the most coveted prizes

in the Soviet Union, a visit to a foreign country. Only officers and crews, however, who have been screened for political reliability are permitted in ships visiting foreign ports. Reliability ratings reflect somewhat the possibility of contact with foreigners. Even permission to live in one of the open ports of the Soviet Union where foreign tourists or ships visit—Leningrad, Odessa, Tallin, or Riga, for example—or even in Moscow for that matter, is dependent upon political reliability. Any shadow of doubt, even about close relatives, may limit a sailor's career opportunities.

Nearly all Soviet foreign naval attachés are officers from the military intelligence organization, the GRU, or from the KGB, the government intelligence organization. The practice for all personnel serving or visiting abroad is to hold at least one immediate member of the family hostage in the Soviet Union to insure that there are no defections. This is routinely done with all diplomatic families as well. Everyone knows that if a father defects, his wife and children will suffer at home.

Such controls, however bizarre to an American, are so much a part of Soviet life that they are probably taken for granted. While the Soviet line officer who supports the system with enthusiasm is rare, an officer who supports it out of ignorance of the alternatives appears to be the norm. In any case, professional training and the increasing prestige in the Soviet Union of the naval service insure that the Soviet officer is competent and dedicated. What would happen if he were given free alternatives and the chance to experience some other life is the nightmare with which the Politburo constantly wrestles.

CHAPTER IX

A SUMMING UP

Commenting on the Winter War with Finland, Khrushchev said, "You wouldn't have thought that the Finns would have the advantage at sea but our Navy couldn't do anything right."[1]

Admiral Golovko, Commander in Chief of the Northern Fleet, was so uninformed about the political situation that he had to infer the possibility of the Nazi invasion from the flow of refugees, the massing of enemy troops, and the increase in aerial reconnaissance.[2]

These and other anecdotes suggest that the Soviet Navy shares not only many of the traditions but also many of the problems of its czarist predecessor. It has brilliant theories and brilliant practitioners, but the characteristics of the Soviet system and the Russian culture keep it from being, by any stretch of the imagination, perfect operationally.

In many ways, Admiral Golovko's memoirs about the Second World War provide a kind of textbook of Soviet naval thought even today. Then the fate of the navy was determined by Stalin. Those now in charge of the Soviet system are men who not only survived Stalin but also who were promoted by him. The new look of the Soviet Navy should not disguise the fact that it has taken place under the old leadership.

The suppression of information, which makes the Soviets so difficult to understand, also makes them vulnerable to their own propaganda. Historically, Russian and Soviet leaders, who—through their dictatorial internal control—lull themselves into a false security, have made the grossest miscalculations about war.

Golovko illustrated the most important one: he was not even informed that war with Germany was imminent, nor was the Commandant of the Leningrad Naval District.

Although the problems of dual command stemming from having a government and a party chain are said to be resolved in favor of the commanding officer, the system makes decisive command inherently impossible. In many tactical exercises, a command appears to be clear and direct but when situations are new or unexpected, the lines of authority in the Soviet Union are blurred.

The party, of course, has the last word and that knowledge alone undermines the authority of the military chain of command. There is always a question of who speaks for whom.

Soviet citizens, even their admirals, are so controlled, the information they receive is so censored, that the rest of the world is a composite of their dreams, government propaganda and a few facts. This makes them subject to unpredictable behavior in the face of situations that do not correspond with their expectations. In spite of all of the emphasis on combat readiness, the Soviets cannot possibly be prepared as the world they are informed about is the artificial construction of the political organs.

Although the *Officers' Handbook* calls for "burning hatred of the enemy," the Soviet sailor has difficulty developing such hatred for something so abstract and so remote. Furthermore, because the culture he is to hate is the producer of the goods he desperately wants—the going rate in the black market for secondhand blue jeans is well over a hundred rubles ($110)—he has trouble thinking of it as all bad. In fact, being subjected to a barrage of political propaganda about places they are not allowed to visit and not daring to discuss the party line except to agree with it, Soviet citizens have become indifferent to politics and not easily moved by hate literature.

The refusal of the Northern Fleet soldier to fire at German airplanes indicates another problem in the system. In the Soviet Union, justice is extremely arbitrary. No one can be assured a fair trial, or even a trial. Those who offend the system may simply disappear. Thus, although unquestioning fulfillment of orders is required, everyone learns to consider whether disobeying an order would be more dangerous than obeying it. The chain of command can work smoothly but it is frequently interrupted by competing authorities such as secret police or political officers. For this reason, orders—even on the bridge of a ship—may be questioned and challenged, as foreign observers have noticed. If reality were to penetrate the preconceptions of the collective with too great a shock, the whole fabric of control would probably collapse as it did in the October Revolution. One only need remember the millions of Soviet citizens who greeted the invading German troops as liberators. Had Hitler understood Russian culture, he could indeed have taken Moscow.

The Westerner has difficulty appreciating the degree to which the Soviet system can be self-destructive. For instance, the theory that a nation acts in its vital interests must be questioned when one considers the behavior of the Soviet Government in the

thirties. After the purge, in the Northern Fleet, when the war began there was no officer on the staff over 35 years of age. Therefore, there was no one who had ever seen military action before unless it was against the Finnish Navy. Admiral Golovko became the commander in chief with only 13 years of active duty behind him, much of it in schools.[3] While there have not recently been purges, the conditions that made them possible still exist. The Soviet system facilitates the possibility of erratic, irrational, and unbalanced behavior in its leaders. (They themselves characterized Khrushchev, who fell only in the last decade, as an unstable adventurist and Stalin was undoubtedly insane.)

Five days after the Nazi invasion, Admiral Golovko had no more fuel for his ships. There was only the oil in the tanks. The problems of supply and resupply in Soviet Russia, as in old Russia, are apparently never-ending. (A former fishing fleet captain has said that because there was not space on the Trans-Siberian railroad, he customarily had to dump up to half of his fishing catch.) Central planning may be a rational idea but it leads to miserable shortages. The simplest items—shoelaces, screws or flour—disappear from the shops for months. In logistics, it means an enormous supply problem and in an economy such as that of the Soviet Union, there are not duplicate products; there are few off-the-shelf items. Although there have been enormous improvements since the Second World War, there have also been great increases in the complexities. Ships may become ineffective for want of parts.

For these reasons, Soviet military systems must be built to be rugged, interchangeable, and enduring. Although they seem crude, they are meant to be good enough for the job. Designers realize the importance of trying to avoid the problem of resupply altogether. Nevertheless, under conditions of war much equipment and many systems would not be operational for lack of a bolt.

At such a point the Soviets would fall back on the traditional answer—the use of the masses. The Stalinist dictum that it is people, not equipment, who win battles was, of course, a rationalization for the materiel deficiencies of the Soviet Armed Forces. Nevertheless, it said something about the Russian mentality. Historically, in wartime and in peace, it has been national policy to sacrifice human lives with less concern than one sacrifices equipment. For instance, Admiral Golovko tells the story:

> We had no marine infantry in the Arctic at that time. The first so-called naval detachments of volunteer sailors, most of

whom were skilled ship's specialists with four or five years' service were formed in literally so many hours.[4]

But the losses were horrendous because the sailors were totally untrained and even went into battle upright. They had not been taught to crouch down.[5]

On the other hand, the permanent condition of scarcity encourages a degree of physical hardness and endurance as well as a great degree of innovation. Soviet forces can make do with far less than their Western counterparts, judging by their history. Again, Admiral Golovko gives an illustration. Because amphibious forces were essential to holding the front around Murmansk, and there were no amphibious ships, the troops were delivered in fishing vessels. That took place in freezing waters on rocky shores held by hostile forces with superior arms and inadequate reconnaissance. After Gallipoli, most Western nations would not have considered such an operation feasible. Because of the incredible Russian sacrifices, the German forces never broke through to Murmansk. Leningrad and the Northern Fleet including the critical supply line were saved.

Although the Soviet Union has had some spectacular technological achievements, it is a nation only recently industrialized and in which technology is very unevenly distributed. Many of its sailors come from collective farms, forests, and industrially primitive regions of the Soviet Union. The heavy emphasis on education obviously suggests both a pragmatic and a cultural rationale. Soviet crews are far less sophisticated, technically, than their Western counterparts. As ships spend more time further from their bases, their problems in repair and maintenance are likely to become more serious.

Finally, there is the enormous problem of reality versus scientific theory or plan. The Soviets' difficulty in distinguishing between what actually exists and what is planned has already been mentioned. An example of such a mentality comes from the former Minister of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, who died in office in 1967. In 1959, he said:

> Our navy has become in the fullest sense a modern navy capable of resolving any strategic mission in its area of responsibility. Overseas, they quite frequently speak and write that the U.S. Navy is capable of delivering an attack and landing at any point along our coastline. But as the saying goes, "it is easy to boast but also easy to fail." It

> seems to me that the people overseas should be thinking of the fate of their own coast and their extended lines of communication, whose vulnerability is now monstrously bared and about the traditional invulnerability of America which has been forever eliminated.[6]

In 1959, the Soviet Navy was far from being a modern navy capable of resolving any strategic mission; however, that was the plan and the new navy was beginning to be built. Whether or not Malinovsky believed what he said, his subordinates had to and they had to hurry.

New operational systems, under such pressures, appear before they are fully tested. This is partly owing to the ability of the planning cycle to produce a false reality, partly owing to the waste which the Soviet military system permits, and partly because of the velocity of technological change in the Soviet Union. In any case, the West, and no doubt the Soviets themselves, are frequently giving credit to the Soviet Navy for a new system or a new capability that in fact is not proving effective in action.[7]

Deception and bluff, as well as incorrect predictions, characterize the Soviet life. Lenin was a master of deceit. Many of his lessons in tactics employ deception as a matter of course. Because of the Soviet system of political controls and repression, like the comparatively mildly repressive czarist system before it, a necessary cultural characteristic of Soviet peoples is to develop the art of deception. Khrushchev used deception so openly, so often and with such little art that in the end he came to be considered something of a buffoon even by his own people. Nevertheless, his techniques were very effective in influencing the behavior of Western governments.[8]

With respect to the navy, Khrushchev told the world that large ships were outmoded and that cruisers were only good for state visits. That was in 1959 and 1960. But in those years, he negotiated the right to build a naval base in Albania and must have authorized plans for the considerable expansion of the Soviet Navy. He approved plans for new and radical weapons to be carried on large naval platforms.

His biggest game of deception was during the placement of missiles on Cuba, an act that might well have been influenced by the fact that a navy was being planned that could protect the delivery of the missile-carrying freighters. The confusion between present and future was clearly illustrated. In any case, the Cuban action was a gross miscalculation that should have taught the West

two important lessons: (1) that the degree of thought control and censorship within the Soviet Union means that one cannot depend upon their making realistic appraisals of foreign situations; and (2) that a leader can acquire the power to engulf the world in war with few checks or balances.[9]

Trying to browbeat the world with its missile superiority was not an isolated Soviet tactic in international diplomacy. Boasting, bluffing, and deceiving are weapons that are almost constantly used to try to make the world, including the Soviet people, believe that the advent of Soviet-style socialism is inevitable. The current massive campaign to convince us that "the correlation of forces" has changed, or that the balance in the Mediterranean has shifted to the side of the Soviet squadron are elements of that same campaign. Admiral Gorshkov's articles and speeches about the Navy are similar moves. Otherwise they would not be published, quoted, and referred to in such a variety of Soviet publications for foreign consumption. He is, to some degree, being used as a voice of propaganda. That, however, only emphasizes the degree to which the new Soviet Navy is prepared for gunboat diplomacy.

Historically, Soviet bluff and bluster have not been always successful, for when the Soviets have tried to take the lead in some aspect of technological development they have often only fallen behind. The exploration of space is an obvious example. An even more critical failure centered on agriculture after all of Khrushchev's bluster about the virgin lands and increased productivity. Ultimate sorts of discouragement come from the fact that the Soviet Union cannot feed itself, after 60 years of spectacular advancement in agricultural machinery and chemicals in the rest of the world, and that the Soviet leaders have all had the experience of seeing people starve to death during the war if not during the thirties. Such failures must set limits on strategic planning. Without food and with endless problems in spare parts, the Soviet Union is unlikely to plan for a long war.

One of the most amusing annual games of deception is the Soviet budget. In this game, the United States is particularly vulnerable because one of our national characteristics is to have trouble understanding the importance of something fully until we know how much it costs. Whenever the specter of the Soviet Navy is raised, it is necessary to try to say how much the new ships are worth in order to make it clear that there is a valid naval threat.

The joke is that no one, not even the Soviets, knows how much the new ships cost and if you could assign a value, it would no more be a measure of the ship's worth than if you could calculate

the value of a teaspoonful of dust picked up on Mars. First of all, rubles are not money. They are a kind of scrip or voucher used, among other purposes, to allocate scarce goods internally. Labor is exploited on an enormous scale, compared to the rest of the world, and paid an artificially low rate. The cost of materials is assigned and does not represent either competitive bids, intrinsic worth, or scarcity. Thus, if one somehow does calculate the cost of labor and material in rubles, the resulting sum reflects absolutely nothing comparable beyond the Soviet borders. Finally, much of the Soviet Defense Establishment is not reflected in the budget at all. Research and development, some equipment, and many services are placed under a variety of other headings.

Recent defense budgets were—in 1966, 13.4 billion rubles; in 1968, 16.7 billion rubles; in 1970, 17.9 billion rubles; and in 1971-72 the defense budget was said to have leveled off without increase. But in 1970, Marshal Grechko referred to "a further strengthening of our country's defenses"[10] and in 1973 there was a statement that the Central Committee had taken steps to bring "troops up to strength"[11] implying that troop strength had increased. Although *Red Star*[12] denied that Soviet expenditures were increasing, these were the years of the massive naval exercise *Okean 1970,* the reequipping of the Soviet forces with modern weapons, the introduction of a series of new atomic submarines, and the construction of Soviet aircraft carriers. That expenditures had not increased could only have been meant for the naive.

But deception can work two ways and the greatest danger to U.S. Forces is probably not so much from Soviet deception as from our self-deception.

Theories of convergence and peaceful coexistence (by which *we* mean the nonexpansion of Communist domination) ignore the realities of the Soviet system. The greater the domestic economic and foreign failures, the more the danger that the Soviet leaders will turn to military power in their frustration. With no time to prepare in modern war, we must correctly read the signals. We are in a new era of Soviet military expansion which means military bullying such as the world experienced during the various Berlin maneuvers of Stalin and Khrushchev. The difference now will be that the Soviets will have vast forces to play with on a worldwide scale.

Most important will be understanding the role of the Soviet Navy in the dialectics of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that pretends—with its enormous powers of destruction—to see a world that, in a mirror of unreality, is a world like the following:

Facing the future, socialism offers a specific alternative to the misfortunes and horrors of capitalism. A qualitatively new, historically international basis of the people's struggle for peace, democracy, national freedom and social progress is emerging. Socialism's enormous successes are a key turning point in the development of all aspects of the world revolutionary process and in the formation of a communist civilization throughout the globe.[13]

NOTES

FOREWORD—THINKING ABOUT NAVIES

1. Sergei G. Gorshkov, *Sea Power of the State* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. iv.
2. Friedrich Engels, cited in Gorshkov, p. 314.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Rodion Malinovsky, "Introduction," in Marshal Sokolovskiy, ed., *Military Strategy,* 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963).
5. Such a critique of the Soviet Navy was apparent in a work so recent as Edward Wegener's *The Soviet Naval Offensive* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975).

CHAPTER I—EAST VS. WEST: THE TWO LANGUAGES OF WAR

1. Of course, nothing on the scale of the purges of the thirties has recurred. For example, Marshal Zhukov, the World War II hero and the nearest thing to a popular figure in the Soviet Union, was removed from office in 1957 and allowed to retire. Even so, he was publicly disgraced and prevented from enjoying the honors that were his due because "he followed a course of curtailing the work of Party organizations and military councils and for the liquidation of management and control of the armed forces by the Party." (From a Decree of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU.) That, in the strange Soviet doubletalk, translates to mean that besides arguing for greater independence in military decisions, Zhukov had gained sufficient power and popularity to become a political danger. Admiral Kuznetsov, Admiral Gorshkov's predecessor as the Soviet CNO, was demoted and disgraced and had to make his promotion to admiral twice. He was not mentioned in Admiral Gorshkov's book although other naval leaders of that period were.
2. This more aggressive internationalist theme was clearly stated by Brezhnev in his plenary speech of the 24th Congress of the CPSU and restated, with increased emphasis at the 25th Party Congress in 1976. (See *Reprints from the Soviet Press,* 15 April 1976.) The theme was taken up by numerous officials. (For a recent version, see Marshal I. Yakubovskiy, "Victory was Forged by the People," *Moscow Pravda,* 8 May 1976, p. 2.)
3. L. Brezhnev, *Stenograficheskii otchet XXV S'ezd KPSS* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), v. I, p. 35.
4. Sergei Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," *Morskoy sbornik,* February 1972, p. 20.
5. V.I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1967), v. 9, pp. 475-479.
6. For example, at the 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev attributed the recognition by the world of the German Democratic Republic and the inviolability of its borders to united strength of the socialist countries and pointed to the series of agreements with the United States as having a decisive influence on the decline of threats to the socialist system. See *Morskoy sbornik,* May 1976, p. 4, for a review of the most important aspects of the conference from the navy's point of view.
7. Roman Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives," *World Politics,* April 1971, p. 449.
8. For directing attention to this testimony, I am indebted to Roger W. Barnett's article, "Shattering the U.S./S.U. Mirror Image." The quote may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972), p. 383.
9. S.N. Kozlov, *The Officer's Handbook* (Moscow: Ministry of Defense, 1971), pp. 74-79.
10. V. Ye. Savkin, *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics* (Moscow: Ministry of Defense Press, 1972), p. 109.
11. Phyllis P. Kohler, ed., *Custine's Eternal Russia* (Coral Gables: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976), p. 114.
12. A.S. Milovidov, ed., *The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War* (Moscow: Ministry of Defense Press, 1972), p. 19.

CHAPTER II—CONCEPTS OF WAR, EAST AND WEST

1. Richard Pipes, "Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," Memorandum, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, U.S. Senate (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972), no. 71-039.
2. Sergei G. Gorshkov, *Sea Power of the State* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 362.
3. Marshal A.A. Grechko, *Krasnava Zvezda,* 12 July 1972, p. 1.
4. A.S. Milovidov, ed., *The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War* (Moscow: Ministry of Defense Press, 1972), pp. 1-2.
5. S.N. Kozlov, *The Officer's Handbook* (Moscow: Ministry of Defense, 1971), p. 6.
6. A. Kormil'tsev, "Concern for the Good of the Nation—The Highest Law of the Party," *Morskoy sbornik,* December 1975, pp. 3-8.
7. Kozlov, p. 71.
8. *Ibid.*
9. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960), v. 38, pp. 369-370.
10. Leonid Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* 30 March 1971, translated in *Reprints from the Soviet Press,* 14 May 1971, p. 27.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Milovidov, p. 19.
13. *Ibid.*
14. L.I. Brezhnev, *Lenin's Cause Is Alive and Is Triumphing* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), p. 211.
15. S. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," *Morskoy sbornik,* February 1972, pp. 20-30.
16. For this list of Leninist tactics, I am indebted to Doctor Kunta of the Army Institute of Advanced Slavic and East European Studies.
17. Milovidov, p. 4.
18. Kozlov, p. 79.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 11-12.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
24. T. Kondratkov, "The Social Character of War," *Red Star,* 16 December 1970, p. 2.

CHAPTER III—THE SOVIET NAVY IN MARXIST STRATEGY

1. Nikolai Kuznetsov, *Nakanune* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), p. 258. Robert Herrick, in his book, *Soviet Naval Strategy; Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1968), points out the interesting fact that references to the big-ocean navy, including the aircraft carrier, were not published in the serialized version of either the English language journal, *International Affairs,* or in the widely circulated Soviet magazine, *Oktyabr'.* It is apparent that the memoirs were censored at least three times: once by the Military Publishing House; once by the domestic censorship service; and once by the censors for foreign disclosure.
2. Kuznetsov, p. 259, quoted from Herrick, p. 33.
3. Herrick, p. 34.
4. S.G. Gorshkov, "The Development of Naval Art," *Morskoy sbornik,* February 1967, pp. 12-13. (Hereafter "Development.") The comment about "the period of the rehabilitation of the navy" refers to the late twenties when a new period of construction was begun after the long period of suppression after the Kronshtadt rebellion.
5. Herrick, p. 35.
6. John E. Moore, *The Soviet Navy Today* (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), p. 25.
7. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations With Stalin* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1962), p. 182.

8. Gorshkov, p. 15.

9. Sergei G. Gorshkov, *Sea Power of the State* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 315.

10. "Komandir," *Red Star,* 11 February 1967, p. 1.

11. Nikolay Smirnov, "Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean," *Red Star,* 12 November 1968, p. 1.

12. V. Kulikov, "Modern Missions and Tasks of Soviet Air Defense Forces," *Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony,* April 1973, p. 1.

13. See, for example, V. Kasatonov, "The Mediterranean is not an American Lake," *Soviet Military Review,* January 1969, pp. 53-55.

CHAPTER IV—THE HISTORICAL SETTING

1. It is interesting that Admiral Gorshkov, in all of his writing, emphasizes the continuity between the Russian and Soviet Navies and their ties even to the distant Slavic past. In his book, *Sea Power of the State* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), (hereafter *Sea Power*), he uses the past—glorified, censored and distorted to be sure—for two purposes: to emphasize the heroic traditions of the present and to justify and support current strategic concepts.

2. These relationships are recognized by Admiral Gorshkov who gives the battle against the shore primacy for the navy. Gorshkov, p. 283.

3. The Russo-Japanese war actually caused Mahan to revise his theory in such a fundamental way as almost to abrogate it. In 1911, in *Naval Strategy,* he wrote, "There is one further conclusion to be drawn from the war between Japan and Russia, which contradicts a previous general impression that I myself have shared, and possibly in some degree have contributed to diffuse. That impression is that navies depend upon maritime commerce as the cause and justification of their existence. To a certain extent, of course, this is true; and just because true to a certain extent, the conclusion is more misleading. Because partly true, it is accepted as unqualifiedly true. Russia has little maritime commerce, at least in her own bottoms; her merchant flag is rarely seen; she has a very defective seacoast; can in no sense be called a maritime nation. Yet the Russian Navy had the decisive part to play in the late war; and the war was unsuccessful, not because the navy was not large enough, but because it was improperly handled. Probably, it also was intrinsically insufficient—bad in quality; poor troops as well as poor leadership. The disastrous result does not contravene the truth that Russia, though with little maritime shipping, was imperatively in need of a navy." From Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), p. 445.

4. Frederick T. Jane, *Imperial Russian Navy* (London: Thacker, 1904), p. 136.

5. Alfred T. Mahan, "Current Fallacies upon Naval Subjects," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine,* June 1898, pp. 44-45.

6. Gorshkov, p. 359.

7. See Arseni G. Golovko, *With the Red Fleet* (London: Putnam, 1965) for an account of how you fight a war without information, trained troops, equipment or fuel.

8. V.K. Klyuchevskiy, *Kurs russokoy istorii* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1937), v. IV, p. 20.

9. One is tempted to push comparisons too far; however, it is not difficult to understand why Peter the Great is such a hero for the Soviet proletariat. On his way to Holland to learn how to build ships—and incidentally during that excursion through Europe he did not allow himself to be diverted to see any major artistic objects whatsoever—he called at the court of the Duke of Bradenburg in Konete, now Kaliningrad. He was, at first, shy but soon collected himself, began to chat, charmed everyone, made his host and their retinue drunk with toasts, admitted that he did not love music or hunting but loved sailing, building boats, and fireworks. He showed the host the callouses on his hands and took part in the dancing but thought that the corsets the German women wore were their ribs and lifted the future mother of King Frederick the Great up by her ears and kissed her, thereby absolutely destroying her hairdo. (Klyuchevskiy, *ibid.*)

10. It is tempting to observe that like many modern Soviet visitors abroad, Peter the Great affected not to admire aspects of contemporary foreign life but concentrated almost entirely on technology, production, and craftsmanship. His primary diversion was not foreign cultural activities but alcohol.

11. Klyuchevskiy, p. 22.

12. Interestingly, Soviet military commentators including Admiral Gorshkov, attribute a similar strategic requirement to Americans. It is probably characteristic of all military leaders to want overwhelming forces. Perhaps too much is made of this so-called Russian strategic law.

13. Brokgaus i Efron, eds., *Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar* (St. Petersburg: Brokgaus i Efron, 1902), v. 38, p. 906.

14. N. Boyev, "Memoires du Comte de Langeron," *Russkiy vestnik,* No. 4, 1878, p. 19.

15. Catherine's evaluation of her fleet was even lower. She wrote that she had seen the fleet "fire all day without once hitting it [the target] and it maneuvered more like a fleet of herring boats than a naval squadron." Frances Gribble, *The Comedy of Catherine the Great* (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1912), pp. 169-170.

16. The Empress had concrete imperial intentions. She told the Hapsburg heir apparent in 1782 that "all" she wanted was a port on the Black Sea and two or three Greek islands for *entrepot* purposes. Alexander Brückner, *Istoriya Ekaterinoj Vtoroj* (St. Petersburg: A. Suvorin, 1885), v. III, p. 38.

17. In discussing John Paul Jones' experience in Russia one is torn between the brilliance of his tactical and strategic plans on the one hand and the fascination of the court intrigues and the machinations of Catherine's favorites against him on the other. Actually, one should not try to separate the two for in Russia they went hand in hand. It was not enough to be a tactical genius. One also had to know the strategy even of the boudoir.

18. John Paul Jones, *Memoirs* (London: Washbourne, 1943), v. II, p. 87.

19. *Ibid.,* p. 84.

20. *Ibid.,* pp. 151-153.

21. An incidental result of this royal christening was that during a rebellion against Nicholas I, the peasants were incited to adopt the slogan "Constantine and Constitution." It is said that when later interrogated, they explained that they thought that "Constitution" was Constantine's wife.

22. Lord Nelson was sufficiently aware of this to induce Paul to give Lady Hamilton the Order of St. John of Jerusalem which was bestowed in a letter from the Emperor of Russia to Lord Nelson dated 12 December 1799 and written in Paul's hand.

23. Horatio Nelson, *Memoirs of the Life of Lord Nelson* (Boston: William Norman, 1806), v. II, p. 5.

24. Letter of Lord Nelson to Lady Hamilton, 5 May 1801 in Nelson's *Memoirs,* p. 63.

25. Jane, p. 142.

26. A. Bubnov, *On the Czar's Staff (V tsarskoy stavke)* (New York: Chekov Press, 1955), p. 219.

27. *Ibid.,* pp. 222-223.

CHAPTER V—WAR AND REVOLUTION

1. M.G. Saunders, ed., *The Soviet Navy* (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 53.

2. *Ibid.,* p. 45.

3. The necessity for developing the port of Murmansk and increasing the capacity of the dockyards at Archangel made those ports important targets and the northern sea lines vulnerable to German attack. The result was the organization of the Northern Flotilla in July 1916 to protect those sea lines of communication. Shipping on these lanes increased enormously from a negligible figure to 1,800 ships delivering 5,475,000 tons between 1915 and 1917. K.A. Stalbo, *The History of Naval Art (Istoriya voennomorskogo iskusstra)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), p. 128.

4. A. Bubnov, *On the Czar's Staff (V tsarskoy stavke)* (New York: Chekov Press, 1955), pp. 1-3.

5. *Ibid.,* p. 124.

6. Saunders, p. 56.

7. T.G. Martin, "A Soviet Carrier on the Horizon?" U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings,* November 1970, p. 47.

8. That Lenin never intended any sort of disarmament is fairly certain as he made many pronouncements against it of which the following is an example: "Disarmament (universal and total) can be implemented only as a result of the victory of the socialist

revolution in the entire world . . . . The disarmament idea is a utopia in a society based on class contrasts . . . . This disarmament slogan was used by the bourgeois pacifists and was taken up by the Second International to deceive the working masses thirsting for peace . . . ." From the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia,* 1st ed., v. XLVIII (Moscow: Goslit, 1941), p. 158.

9. Stalbo, p. 156.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 168.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 153.
12. *Ibid.,* p. 168.
13. V.I. Achkasov, et al., *Combat Path of the Soviet Navy (Boevoy put' sovetskogo Voyenno-morskogo flota)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), p. 148. (Hereafter *Combat Path.*)
14. *Ibid.,* p. 196.
15. *Ibid.*
16. N.G. Kuznetsov, *Nakanune* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), p. 257.
17. *Ibid.,* p. 94.
18. Sigfried Breyer, *Guide to the Soviet Navy* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1970), pp. 21-37.
19. *Voenno istoricheskiy zhurnal,* No. 6, 1971, pp. 36-37.
20. Robert Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy; Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1968).
21. Other references to these debates are found in: Kuznetsov, p. 49 and S.G. Gorshkov, "The Rise of Soviet Naval Art," *Morskoy sbornik,* February 1967, pp. 9-12.
22. Nicholas Shadrin, "The Development of Soviet Maritime Power," Unpublished Dissertation, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 1972, v. I, p. 51.
23. Kuznetsov, p. 221.
24. After the conclusion of the nonaggression pact in August 1939 with Nazi Germany, Stalin went to the extreme, considering his paranoia with respect to revealing military information, of placing the naval base at Murmansk at the disposal of the German Navy and of even agreeing to the passage on the North Sea route of a German armed merchant cruiser transiting to Japan. Such largess is yet another proof that he really did not expect war.
25. Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 153.
26. *Ibid.,* p. 155.
27. Arseni G. Golovko, *With the Red Fleet* (London: Putnam, 1965), p. 22.
28. In *Combat Path* the authors wish to pass off the inadequacy of the development of aviation as a function of foreign influence. "However, at that time, our military thought—like even that of foreign countries—greatly underrated the enormously increased possibilities of aviation which had become at the beginning of the Second World War a powerful striking force in battle at sea. Soviet military doctrine at that time was based on comprehensive conceptions of the strategic use of naval forces in their contiguous waters which led to a well-known contradiction between tactics and operational art," pp. 9-10. What all of that means is that the Soviets were simply unprepared for defensive warfare.
29. Stalbo, pp. 171-174.
30. N.G. Kuznetsov, "Second Book of Reminiscence, The War Years," *Oktyabr',* December 1968.
31. Saunders, p. 59.
32. Kuznetsov, "Second Book of Reminiscence, The War Years," p. 118.
33. Saunders, pp. 79-80.
34. *Ibid.,* p. 78.

CHAPTER VI—A SOVIET/RUSSIAN SYNTHESIS

1. N.G. Kuznetsov, *Nakanune* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), p. 579.
2. V.I. Achkasov, et al., *Combat Path of the Soviet Navy (Boevoy put' sovetskogo Voyenno-morskogo flota)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), p. 539.
3. P. Bashurin, "Frunze Military Academy," *Voyennyy vestnik,* December 1968, p. 66.
4. N. Sergeev, "The Ocean Fleet of Our Fatherland," *Morskoy sbornik,* July 1975, p. 7.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 8.

6. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), p. 71. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Goldhamer for his well researched illustrations from the Soviet press.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

8. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1977-78* (London: 1977), pp. 8-9.

9. A. Chernomys, "The Far-flung Orbit of Voentorg," *Red Star,* 29 June 1971, p. 4.

10. "The Culture of the Military Town," *Red Star,* 28 September 1971, p. 1.

11. Goldhamer, p. 32.

12. Zev Katz, "Sociology in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1971, p. 37.

13. P. Ushakov, "The Collective in Work and Personal Responsibility," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil,* January 1971, pp. 53-55. (Hereafter *KVS.*)

14. A. Fedoryk, "The Inertia of Habit," *Red Star,* 14 October 1971, p. 2.

15. Goldhamer, p. 108.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

22. *Red Star,* 5 February 1971, p. 2.

23. Cited in editorial "A High Level of Training—The Basis of Military Readiness," *Morskoy sbornik,* June 1975, p. 3.

24. S.G. Gorshkov, "The Navy Fulfilled Its Duty to the Motherland Up to the Very End," *Morskoy sbornik,* p. 15.

25. Interestingly, in Gorshkov's resume of history in *Sea Power of the State* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976) (hereafter *Sea Power*), there is no mention of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, the Kronshtadt rebellion, the importance of convoys to Murmansk or many other critical historical events. Gorshkov reaches a height of absurdity in dismissing the Battle of Trafalgar as of no great importance, p. 81.

26. Achkasov, p. 231.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 243. There is an additional note that the officers and sailors of the English merchant and Royal Navies fulfilled their duties bravely and well. There is no mention of other allied participation. America did not even rate a footnote.

28. Another indication that Soviet history is serving religious purposes is that of frequent digression in nearly all Soviet military writing, including that of Admiral Gorshkov, to list names of heroes or heroic acts. These digressions are particularly interesting because they have a very close parallel in classical literature, specifically in the works of Homer and Virgil. These lists are very like the catalog of heroes in the *Iliad.*

In the modern Soviet state, being listed is somewhat the equivalent of achieving sainthood. Another technique in discussing major battles is to list who was present among the subsequently important Soviet leaders. Through such lists one learns, for example, that Admiral Gorshkov served in the Black Sea Fleet during the war and shared some experiences with Marshal Grechko. As details of their exploits in these engagements are usually not told—except in the case of Stalin in which the details were simply fabricated for his greater glorification—the effect is a religious one of conferring a kind of benediction for proximity to a great event. Presence at the Battle of Stalingrad has become a kind of mystical requirement in the current Soviet leadership, as already pointed out.

In any case, these catalogs of heroes and battles are proof of the promise of immortality for those who have sacrificed themselves for the Soviet state. Though one cannot say to what degree this observance inspires the modern Soviet sailor, one can at least affirm that the official Soviet effort to create shrines and tributes to those who fell in a state of Communist grace is massive and unstinting. Others die without a trace, even a telegram to their families, and those disgraced are blotted out of history.

29. V. Leskov, "Military Character," *Red Star,* 10 February 1972, p. 2; Goldhamer, p. 149.

30. V. Konopolev and V. Kovalev, "On the Role of the Armed Forces in Modern Society," *KVS,* February 1971, pp. 27-34.

CHAPTER VII—THE TACTICS OF WAR

1. See Marshal Sokolovskiy, ed., *Military Strategy,* 2nd ed. (Moscow): Voenizdat, 1963), p. 6 and Sergei G. Gorshkov, *Sea Power of the State* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 198-212. (Hereafter *Sea Power.*)

2. *Officers' Handbook* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), p. 68. (Hereafter *Handbook.)*

3. S. Lomov, "The Influence of Military Doctrine on the Development of Military Art," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil,* November 1965, pp. 15-25.

4. Gorshkov speaks of the "flexibility" of the navy but his discussions of its capabilities leave few doubts that its response in battle is geared to the nuclear age. Such, for example, is the following: "The steady increase in the range and power of naval weaponry is fostering the further development of this trend, [the use of missile weaponry] which permits the accomplishment of tactical missions under certain conditions, not through prolonged and stubborn fighting, but by a single unilateral action against the enemy." Gorshkov, p. 286.

5. *Handbook,* p. 294.

6. *Ibid.,* p. 73.

7. These stages were identified by A.A. Strokov, ed., *History of Military Art* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), p. 590. There were many references to the same period by such men as M.I. Cherednichenko, "On the Details of the Development of Military Art in the Post-war Period," *Military History Journal,* June 1970, p. 19 and others.

8. This was not without precedent. As Gorshkov observed, during the war the "Katyusha," multiple rocket launcher, was put on torpedo boats, p. 555.

9. N.A. Sbytov, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Meaning," *Red Star,* 15 February 1963, p. 2.

10. Maneuvers, taking into account the use of atomic weapons, were conducted as early as 1954. See Sokolovskiy, p. xix.

11. Gorshkov, p. 272.

12. Marshal A.A. Grechko, *On Guard Over the Peace and the Building of Communism* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp. 52-57.

13. See Robert G. Weinland, "The Changing Mission of the Soviet Navy," *Survival,* May/June 1972, pp. 129-134, and a general study of naval policy by Ken Booth, "Navies and Foreign Policy," Department of International Politics, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, March 1974. In addition, see Thomas Wolfe, "Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and Its Influence on Soviet Naval Development," *Soviet Naval Developments* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1972), p. 62. Also see Richard T. Ackley, "The Soviet Navy's Role in Foreign Policy," *Naval War College Review,* May 1972, p. 48.

14. S. Gorshkov, "Guarding the Achievements of the Great October," *Morskoy sbornik,* October 1967, p. 7.

15. See V.A. Alafuzov, "On the Study of Military Strategy," *Morskoy sbornik,* January 1963, pp. 88-96.

16. S.A. Gulyayev, "The Role of Aviation in Combat Operations at Sea in Contemporary Conditions," *Morskoy sbornik,* June 1965, pp. 36-43.

17. V.G. Efremenko, "The Rise and Development of the Submarine Force and Its Tactics," *Morskoy sbornik,* October 1970, pp. 16-23.

18. This is Nicholas Shadrin's clarification. See his "The Development of Soviet Maritime Power," Unpublished Dissertation, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 1972.

19. Gorshkov, *Sea Power,* p. 289.

20. S. Gorshkov, "True Sons of the Fatherland," *Pravda,* 31 July 1960, p. 3.

21. S. Gorshkov, "The Ocean Guards of the Fatherland," *Pravda,* 27 July 1969, p. 2.

22. V. Germanovich and N. Klimov, "The Destruction by Aviation of Large Surface Ships at Sea," *Morskoy sbornik,* March 1972, p. 45.

23. V.V. Mikhajlin and Ya. G. Pochupajlo, "The Path of the Avrora," *Morskoy sbornik,* October 1967, p. 18.

24. V.V. Vlagin and M.V. Patrikejtsev, "Rockets in the Navy," *Morskoy sbornik,* August 1922, p. 92.

25. "Naval Guards: Report from on Board a Landing Ship," *Komsomol'skaya pravda,* 18 September 1966, p. 1.

26. Shadrin, p. 181.

27. Bol'shakov and Chuprikov, "Submarines Against Capital Ships at Sea," *Morskoy sbornik,* June 1972, p. 35.

28. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), p. 207.

29. M. Kozlov, "An Important Factor in the Power of the Armed Forces," *Red Star,* 21 April 1976, pp. 2-3.

30. Expendability has long been one of the principles of the Russian Navy. At the turn of the century, a Russian naval tactical genius wrote, "If ships only busy themselves about supporting one another in battle, the enemy who is in no way hindered, will invariably win." S. Makaroff, *Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics,* trans. by John B. Bernadow (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1898), p. 25.

31. Gorshkov, *Sea Power,* p. 324.

32. N.P. V'yunenko, "Soviet Naval Art on the Eve of the Great War of the Fatherland," *Morskoy sbornik,* June 1971, pp. 29-35.

33. Vasily M. Kulish, *Military Force and International Relations* (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1972), p. 103.

34. The change in the "correlation of forces" of course produced a change in naval politics, a new line. The new, more aggressive, posture which Brezhnev struck at the 24th Party Congress was reflected in more positive statements about the role of the navy such as "Our fleet is now fulfilling an important international mission. By its presence on the expanses of the seas and oceans, it shackles the aggressive intentions of the imperialists. The USA, whose naval forces are often used as a billy club by the Pentagon against people who are fighting for their freedom, independence and democracy, has to take it into account." V'yunenko, p. 35.

35. Gorshkov, *Sea Power,* p. 289.

36. *Ibid.,* p. 264.

37. V'yunenko, p. 31.

38. *Ibid.,* p. 32.

39. Sergei Gorshkov, "Navy Missions," *Morskoy sbornik,* February 1972, p. 22.

40. Gorshkov, *Sea Power,* p. 324.

41. Gorshkov wrote, "Today the navy is capable of successfully carrying out strategic missions not only by destroying important targets in enemy territory, but also by destroying submarine platforms for nuclear weaponry at sea." *Ibid.,* p. 260.

CHAPTER VIII—PREPARING THE MIND

1. See Nicholas G. Shadrin, "Development of Soviet Maritime Power," Unpublished dissertation, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., June 1972, v. I, p. 212. Naval officers' schools were given the status of higher educational institutions in 1939 and their enrollment was increased. However, while increased numbers of officers were coming into the navy from below, the numbers of experienced officers at the top were being drastically reduced in the purges. Again, the former czarist naval officers maintained the standards of the navy, for many of them staffed the educational and scientific institutions, and in the general slaughter of Soviet trained officers, in the purges, two of them emerged as fleet admiral and full admiral. See Robert Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy; Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1968), p. 45.

2. V.A. Krenov, "Forge of Naval Officer Cadres," *Morskoy sbornik,* January 1971, pp. 17-21.

3. I.I. Gusakovskiy, "Develop and Educate Military Cadres According to Lenin," *Red Star,* 20 January 1970, p. 2. It is not known how much of that low level of education was due to the purges.

4. A.E. Orel, "The Ushakov Naval Academy," *Morskoy sbornik,* March 1969, pp. 69-72.

5. The Russian cognate for academy, *akademiya,* causes translators and writers difficulty. Whereas in English, academy means a college-level education, in Russian it always means an advanced-level institute. Only officers with the highest recommendations and usually with 2 years' command experience are admitted. The general age limit is 38 years (although officers up to 45 years of age may be admitted to the extension schools for study).

6. N.M. Zakharov, "The Authority of the Ships Political Worker," *Morskoy sbornik,* January 1970, pp. 41-46.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Shadrin, p. 210.

9. For a discussion of the problems of dual control in the military see Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), pp. 295-307.

10. Until Marshal Zhukov became a full member of the Politburo in 1957 (also the year in which he was dismissed from all of his posts) no professional military officer had had membership in that leading body. (Trotsky is a semiexception.) Marshal Grechko, 15 years later, in 1973, was the second officer to achieve that distinction. He undoubtedly learned from Marshal Zhukov's experience not to try to weaken party controls.

11. N. Goncharov, "The Meaning of the Decisions of the 24th Party Congress . . . ." *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil,* November 1971, pp. 59-64. (Hereafter *KVS.*)

12. The KGB is far greater in size and complexity than the CIA. In addition to performing all of the functions of the CIA, it operates a considerable armed force of its own. It controls the border guards which involves an army, navy and air force and at various times has maintained a uniformed force for internal security and control as well.

13. V. Pustov, "NATO Designs Against the Arab East," *Soviet Military Review,* January 1970, pp. 52-53.

14. G. Zavizion, Yu. Kirshin, "Soviet Military Science: Social Role and Function," *KVS,* September 1972, pp. 9-16.

15. Goldhamer discusses Soviet charges of subversion of youth, soldiers and security, pp. 212-223.

16. *Ibid.,* p. 217.

17. V. Devin, "When One Forgets About Anti-Religious Propaganda," *Krasnaya zvezda,* 22 August 1972, p. 2.

18. P. Efimov, "Documents of Great Political Significance," *KVS,* April 1973, pp. 16-26.

19. Goldhamer, p. 224.

20. V. Matsylenko, "Operational Disguise of Soviet Troops," *Military Historical Journal,* June 1972, pp. 11-21.

21. Goldhamer, p. 225.

22. Such an argument seems to be the basis of an article in *KVS:* S. Bartenev, "Imperialism—The Cause of Wars," *KVS,* November 1972, pp. 71-76.

23. M. Cherednichenko, "Modern War and Economics," *KVS,* September 1971, pp. 20-28.

24. Shadrin, v. I, p. 212ff.

CHAPTER IX—A SUMMING UP

1. Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 153.

2. Arseni G. Golovko, *With the Red Fleet* (London: Putnam, 1965), p. 22.

3. *Ibid.,* pp. 11-12.

4. *Ibid.,* p. 47.

5. *Ibid.,* p. 49.

6. R.Y. Malinovsky, *Izvestiya,* 4 February 1959, p. 1.

7. Michael MccGwire has written very convincingly on the degree to which the Soviet Navy uses bluff and deception to make the world believe that it is far more capable than it is. See his excellent book, *Soviet Naval Development* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

8. Khrushchev's false statements published in *Pravda,* 28 July 1959, that the Soviet Union had taken the lead in the production of ICBMs threw the United States into something of a panic in 1959.

9. After Nixon's years, the world can say the same thing about the U.S. Presidency. Perhaps it is a consolation that the world will not, normally, be kept ignorant of its danger from the United States in advance.

10. M. Cherednichenko, "Modern War and Economics," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil,* September 1971, p. 20. (Hereafter *KVS.*)

11. P. Efimov, "Documents of Great Political Significance," *KVS,* April 1973, pp. 16-26.

12. "Answers to Questions Asked of the Editors of *Red Star*," *Red Star*, 10 July 1973, p. 3. The editors not only flatly denied that the Soviet defense budget had increased but also they claimed that it had actually declined and stressed that armaments were only produced to satisfy the needs of *defense.*

13. A.I. Sobolev, "The Revolutionary Transforming Activity of the Working Class," *Rabochiy klass i sovremenniy mir*, 16 March 1976, p. 19.

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Scott, William F. *Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy.* New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1975. An excellent critical bibliography, this has the advantage of containing Colonel Scott's very informed comments.

Periodicals in Russian

Kommunist vooruzhennyk sil'. (Communist of the Armed Forces.) This is a doctrinaire monthly journal, an important source of information on changes in strategy and tactics. One must be prepared, however, to spend hours of tedious reading for a few gems of information.

Krasnaya zvezda. (Red Star.) This is a daily newspaper that repeats the leading articles of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya,* the Party and government newspapers respectively. One does not read it for the news, however, but for the speeches of leading military figures. The obituary column in *Red Star* is the most popular among Kremlinologists who keep card files on who went to whose funeral. That is the means by which they determine who is advancing in the hierarchy. Such close analysis also, sometimes, reveals the probability of some disaster, such as a nuclear explosion.

Morskoy sbornik. (Naval Gazette.) This is a monthly, the rough equivalent of the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings.* It is far less informative and written in an exceedingly dry style. Significant articles are translated into English by the U.S. Navy Scientific and Technical Center.

Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. (Military-historical Journal.) An exceedingly wordy rewrite of history, this journal occasionally contains some information that throws some light on an event or operation of interest.

Books in English

Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy*. New York: Praeger, 1971. Whether or not one agrees with Cable's conclusions, this is an indispensable book because of its methodology.

Chomeau, John B. *Seapower as a Political Instrument: The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1974.

Goldhammer, Herbert. *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level*. New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1975. This is a comprehensive compilation and analysis of the information available from the Soviet press on Soviet military life. All scholars must be deeply grateful to Dr. Goldhammer for his painstaking research of Soviet periodicals—an exceedingly tedious undertaking.

Gorshkov, S.G. *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva*. (The Military Might of the State.) Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976. This has become the new bible for the study of the Soviet Navy. It is, of course, very significant; however, it contains much that Gorshkov has been saying for years and much misinformation.

Herrick, Robert W. *Soviet Naval Strategy*. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1971. This is one of the first books to try to formulate the strategy of the Soviet Navy. It is particularly valuable for showing the problems connected with the study of the Soviet military. Herrick's research remains valuable and many of his conclusions remain valid.

Jane, F.T. *The Imperial Russian Navy*. London: W. Thacker & Co., 1904. This history, by the founder of *Jane's Fighting Ships,* is still a primary source in English of information about the history of the Russian Navy. The author had the advantage of visiting Russia under the protection of one of the grand dukes.

Kilmarx, Robert A. *Soviet-United States Naval Balance*. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975.

Kolkowicz, R. *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Kozlov, S.N. *Spravochnik ofitsera*. (Officer's Handbook.) Wright Patterson: Foreign Technology Division, USAF, 1971. This is a basic document on standards of service conduct, regulations, and doctrine.

Martin, L.W. *The Sea in Modern Strategy*. New York: Praeger, 1967.

MccGwire, Michael. *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context*. New York: Praeger, 1973. This is by far the most

significant current scholarly work on all aspects of the modern Soviet Navy.

Milovidov, A.S. *The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and the Problems of Contemporary War.* Translated by the USAF. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., #0870-00343. This series of translations by the Air Force is under the general title of "Soviet Military Thought." This series makes available in English the best of what is available in Russian and is quite indispensable.

Mitchell, Mairin. *The Maritime History of Russia.* London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1949. This history summarizes available information for the period 1848-1948.

Moore, John E. *The Soviet Navy Today.* New York: Stein and Day, 1975. This is the best unclassified source of information on Soviet naval ships and weapons. The author brings very expert knowledge to bear on the subject both as the editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships* and a former director in British naval intelligence.

Polmar, Norman. *Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 1970's.* New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1972. This is an extremely useful, short study of the Soviet Navy by an author with a broad range of interests and experience. The book is kept current through revised editions.

Saunders, M.G. Editor. *The Soviet Navy.* New York: Praeger, 1958. This is a basic textbook on Soviet seapower until the 60s. It is now rather dated, but there are many articles of lasting value in this volume.

Shadrin, Nicholas George. *Development of Soviet Maritime Power.* Washington: George Washington University Microfilms, 1972. This book, an unpublished dissertation, is one of the best works available on the whole of Soviet maritime expansion and development. It is written by a very sensitive observer.

Sokolovskiy, V.D. Editor. *Soviet Military Strategy.* Translated by Harriet Fast Scott. New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1975. This is the most important and only published full statement of Soviet military doctrine. The introduction and commentary by Mrs. Scott are particularly valuable.

Soviet Watch Officer's Guide. Translated by W.B. Cramer. Washington, NavSTIC, 1973.

Theberge, James D. Editor. *Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications.* New York: Praeger, 1972.

Wegener, Edward. *The Soviet Naval Offensive.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975. This is important because it presents a

view of Soviet seapower as seen in Europe. The concepts, however, appear to be highly conventional.

Woodward, David. *The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy.* New York: Praeger, 1966.

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