



GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF VIET-NAM

**COMMUNIST VIET-MINH
AGGRESSIVE POLICY
AND
COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE WARFARE
IN SOUTH VIET-NAM**

Period from May 1961 to June 1962

Saigon, July 1962

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INTRODUCTION

On June 25, 1962, Her Britannic Majesty's Government, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, made public a Special Report dated June 2, 1962, addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954 by the International Commission for Control in Viet-Nam regarding the situation in Viet-Nam (Annex 1).

This report, which comprises no less than 34 pages, is of capital importance. In dealing with the situation in Viet-Nam, the International Commission has recognized in the most formal manner the existence of an overt campaign of aggression and subversion carried on for many years against the Republic of Viet-Nam by the communist authorities of Hanoi, in flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement.

This report was adopted by the International Commission for Control following a long and patient study made by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Control on the basis of an impressive mass of evidence carefully gathered, screened, and presented to the International Commission for Control by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Thus the task of the International Commission for Control was not easy, especially as we know that, on the one hand, the communist authorities of Hanoi spared no effort to hide the aggressive and subversive activities in South Viet-Nam, and that on the other hand, even before the publication of the report, they carried on a virulent campaign to try to distort the truth and to influence the decision of the International Commission for Control.

After many months of study, the Legal Committee arrived at the following principal conclusions regarding the communist subversive activities in South Viet-Nam, conclusions which were completely accepted by the International Commission for Control :

1. *« Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed*

against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

2. « In examining the complaints and the supporting material, in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the P.A.V.N.* has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam. » (Special Report of the International Commission for Control, § 9).

These conclusions, clear and precise, need no commentary. They are sufficiently eloquent in themselves.

They leave no doubt whatsoever of the full responsibility of the Hanoi authorities and their true role regarding the present tension in Viet-Nam. They constitute a scathing denial both of the communist allegations of the existence in Viet-Nam of a spontaneous popular movement against the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and of their distortion of the legitimate defensive character of the military assistance measures that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam found necessary to request from the United States Government in order to fight against communist guerrilla warfare.

« The cause-and-effect relation between, on the one hand, the Communist campaign of subversion against the Republic of Viet-Nam over a period of several years, and on the other hand, the purely defensive measures quite recently taken by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to meet that campaign, is only too evident and is obvious to anyone », as the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam stated in its declaration of June 25, 1962 (Annex 2).

The same point of view was shared by the British Government, in its role as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, as well as having been reiterated by the South Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control in its letter of June 28, 1962 (§ 3), addressed to the International Commission for Control (Annex 3) :

« ... the Mission notes that, although the cause-and-effect relation that exists on the one hand between the campaign of subversion and aggression directed by the P.A.V.N.* against the

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

Republic of Viet-Nam and on the other hand, the increase of American military aid to South Viet-Nam was not mentioned in the International Commission for Control's report, international opinion cannot be mistaken either about the true causes of the present tension in South Viet-Nam because of communist subversion or about the defensive character of measures taken by the Republic of Viet-Nam to meet this subversion.

« Thus in its note of June 14, 1962, addressed to the Soviet Government, the British Government itself, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference declared in Paragraphs 4 and 5 as follows :

« Her Majesty's Government draw special attention to the dates quoted in the report relating to the illegal activities of the North Vietnamese authorities and to the intensification of United States assistance. It is evident that the complaints of Northern subversion are of long standing. Reference to them was made as early as the 10th Interim Report which deals with the period beginning February 1, 1959, whereas the intensification of United States assistance did not begin until December, 1961 — in other words, long after the threat from North Viet-Nam had developed and after the Government of Viet-Nam had felt obliged, in face of the extensive plan of subversion and terrorism deliberately embarked upon by the Hanoi authorities, to request the Government of the United States to furnish assistance of a military nature to meet this threat.

« The Report thus confirms the view expressed in Her Majesty's Government's Note of November 3, 1961, and their Aide-Mémoire of February 16 and April 19, 1962, that the activities of the North Vietnamese authorities were the root cause of the present troubles. » (Annex 4)

Therefore, the responsibility of the North Vietnamese authorities for the present subversive war in South Viet-Nam is fully established in the eyes of the International Commission for Control as well as in the eyes of the world.

But the cases of subversion examined by the International Commission for Control represent only a small part of the violations committed by the communist authorities of Hanoi. In fact, these innumerable violations touch all the provisions of the Geneva Agreement of 1954.

Aware of its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has never ceased to draw world attention to these violations, and three White Papers have been published on this subject, in 1959, 1960, and 1961 respectively.

In the third White Paper published in May, 1961, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam concentrated on the two most serious aspects of these violations, that is :

- the intensive reinforcement of the war potential of North Viet-Nam ;
- and the subversive activities of the Viet-Cong in South Viet-Nam.

Now, these two problems have taken on such dimensions and seriousness that they at present constitute a subject of world concern, as a threat to the peace not only in Viet-Nam but in all of Southeast Asia as well.

Completing the conclusions of the Special Report of the International Commission for Control, this fourth White Paper submits objectively to world opinion a dossier of the aggressive policy of the Hanoi communist authorities and of the subversive warfare which these authorities, powerfully supported by the communist bloc, are in the process of carrying out against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Furthermore, in this book the facts are shown as they have occurred in Viet-Nam since 1961, facts supported by formal and authentic documents showing the danger to world peace that is represented by the bellicose and expansionist aims of the communist regime of Hanoi, that is to say, International Communism.

CHAPTER I

COMMUNIST VIET-MINH AGGRESSIVE POLICY

Since the beginning of 1959, the Hanoi Communist authorities have been intensifying their war preparations. They no longer care to hide their activities in this respect and it is in broad daylight that their war preparations are made, in flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

These preparations are of two different kinds :

A) *In the diplomatic field*, in spite of fallacious propaganda about the implementation of the Geneva Agreement and the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam — propaganda aiming at misleading world opinion — the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam have contracted political and military alliances with numerous countries of the Communist bloc, in violation of Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement forbidding the signatories to this Agreement from entering into such military alliances.

Important military missions have been exchanged between North Viet-Nam and communist countries, particularly with Communist China and Soviet Russia.

Thus, by virtue of the military alliance signed with Communist China at the beginning of 1961, the latter agreed to supply North Viet-Nam with technical and military aid in personnel and war material of all types, including financial aid amounting to 24 million new rubles (Cf. letter No. 4274 of September 18, 1961 of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control — Annex 5).

On December 15, 1961, an important Chinese military mission, led by Marshal Yek Chien Ying and composed of 8 high-ranking officers including 6 generals and 1 vice-admiral, went to Hanoi to discuss the step-up of Chinese military aid to North Viet-Nam.

On March 22, 1962, the Chinese-North Vietnamese military alliance was further strengthened by a protocol in which Communist China agreed to renew entirely the system of strategic roads between South China and North Viet-Nam (Cf. letter No. 1691 of April 23, 1962, of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control — Annex 6).

In regard to Soviet aid, an ever-increasing number of Russian officers, instructors and technicians have been introduced into North Viet-Nam with the mission of forming and training units of the P.A.V.N. *, chiefly for guerrilla warfare, at Tien-Doai (12 kilometers from Thanh-Hoa), arranging and equipping new military bases such as the airbases of Cat-Bi, Dien-Bien-Phu, Muong-Thanh, and Phu-Nho-Quan (Ninh-Binh), and helping the P.A.V.N. * in forming a considerable naval and air force. (Cf. letter No. 4275 of September 18, 1961 of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control — Annex 7).

An important Russian military mission led by General Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army, visited North Viet-Nam in July 1961.

Moreover, an important Russian airlift has been organized and put into operation since the end of 1960, connecting Soviet Russia, Communist China, and North Viet-Nam by daily flights and unloading without interruption considerable quantities of war material and equipment, part of which has been dispatched via the Laotian corridor to be used for sustaining the campaign of aggression carried on by the P.A.V.N. * in South Viet-Nam.

These activities, far from lessening, have intensified day by day. Thus, from September 1, 1961 to April 30, 1962, there have been recorded :

— 489 flights carried out in the interior of the territory of North Viet-Nam by 649 airplanes ;

— 1070 flights between North Viet-Nam and Laos, carried out by 2128 airplanes (Cf. letters of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control :

No. 1241 of March 23, 1962	} (Annex 8).
No. 1958 of May 11, 1962	
No. 2488 of June 21, 1962	
No. 2809 of July 9, 1962	

B) *In the internal field*, the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam continue to do their utmost to convert North Viet-Nam into a powerful base of aggression against South Viet-Nam. Continually intensified war preparations have been verified north of the 17th parallel, in flagrant and continuing violation of Articles 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the Geneva Agreement. This aggressive policy is shown in the following manner :

1. The P.A.V.N. * continues to receive substantial quantities of war material and numerous military technicians whose intro-

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

duction into North Viet-Nam has never been notified to the International Commission for Control under the terms of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement. Furthermore, it has established important naval and air forces that it did not possess at the time of the 1954 armistice, and it has reinforced in very significant proportion the total strength of its regular and regional armed forces.

As compared to 7 Infantry Divisions making up the regular forces of the P.A.V.N. * in July 1954, date of the end of hostilities, the P.A.V.N. * possesses at the present time the following *known* total strength :

- 14 Infantry divisions
- 11 Infantry autonomous regiments
- 5 regiments specially assigned to frontier and coast defence
- 1 regiment of 3 battalions of parachutists
- 1 regiment of 4 battalions of marines
- 1 division of engineers including 1 autonomous regiment
- 1 division of anti-aircraft defence
- 2 artillery divisions
- 1 air-fleet : the P.A.V.N. * has illegally imported an increasing number of airplanes such as the YAK.18, IL. 14, LI.2, and MIG that it did not possess prior to the cease-fire. (Cf. letter No. 1241 of March 23, 1962 of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control — Annex 8/1)
- 1 naval force, particularly 30 gunboats : the P.A.V.N. *, which did not possess any naval forces before 1954, illegally introduced war-ships after the cease-fire and has formed an important navy unit (Cf. letter No. 1692 of April 23, 1962 of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control — Annex 9).

In addition to these regular armed forces, the P.A.V.N. * has formed into fighting units security forces and people's militia troops, which have undergone intense military training so as to permit them to be combined with the regular army when the time comes.

2. Thanks to Russo-Chinese aid, the P.A.V.N. * has in addition created numerous naval bases such as those of Dong-Hoi, Cap Lay and Con-Co, new airports such as those of Na-San, Muong-Thanh,

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Ho-Xa and Vinh ; it has undertaken the construction of a vast system of strategic roads, in particular those leading to the Chinese frontier and the Laotian border. Protocols were signed to this effect on March 10, 1962 and March 22, 1962, with Communist China and the Pathet Lao (Communist Laotians) respectively (Cf. letter no. 1691 of April 23, 1962 of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control — Annex 6).

The International Commission for Control has never been permitted to control or observe these bases and aerodromes, the frontier railway stations or the coastal region of North Viet-Nam.

3. In the demilitarized zone, troop units equipped with modern weapons have clandestinely been introduced into the Northern part of the zone and even into the Western area of the Southern part of the Zone, especially at A-Choc.

Moreover, there have been frequent incursions of military elements into the demilitarized zone, shooting of fire-arms, constant espionage, and terrorist activities, which constitute acts of provocation on the part of the P.A.V.N.* and flagrant violations against the «buffer» character ascribed to this zone by the Geneva Agreement.

Thus, during 1961 and the first 5 months of 1962, the following were reported to the International Commission for Control :

- 428 cases of illegal entry
- 44 cases of shooting of fire-arms
- 4 cases of flagrant violation of the territorial waters of the Southern demilitarized zone.

4. Finally, parallel with these war preparations carried on inside the territory of Viet-Nam, from its bases in the North, the P.A.V.N.* has sent and continues to send into South Viet-Nam, through Laos and the demilitarized zone or by sea, important regular units as well as a great number of cadres of all ranks, to wage subversive war.

These subversive activities form the subject of the following Chapter II.

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CHAPTER II

COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE WARFARE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

Simultaneously with the specific violations of the 1954 Geneva Agreement which they have perpetrated in North Viet-Nam, the Hanoi authorities continue to direct and foster in South Viet-Nam a diversified campaign of subversion which has continually intensified and developed until it has acquired the dimensions and the character of a true war of aggression.

This campaign, which aims at overthrowing by force the legal government of South Viet-Nam and at substituting a communist-controlled regime, constitutes an open denial of the Geneva Agreement on the cease-fire, which specifically prohibited acts of interference or hostility of one of the parties against the other party.

It shows itself as well in incessant acts of terrorism and sabotage and in overt attacks involving the engagement of armed units of greater and greater strength, all tied together with an insidious propaganda campaign aiming at misleading public opinion.

I. — Acts of Terrorism :

The acts of terrorism committed by Viet-Cong agents in South Viet-Nam go from threats of reprisals to assassinations through acts of banditism, money extortions, kidnappings and physical torture. They daily spread mourning and desolation among the population, especially in outlying villages and hamlets.

The Viet-Cong agents have indiscriminately struck down women, young girls, children and old men, bonzes and priests. Similarly, numerous civil servants, communal agents, teachers, chiefs of province and deputies were victims of the Viet-Cong terrorists. The year 1961 alone saw 11,391 cases of terrorism including 3,873 assassinations :

- simple inhabitants : 1062
- communal agents : 354
- village militia : 1001
- civil guards : 853

- soldiers : 499
- civil servants : 104 including 32 teachers and 6 health service agents belonging to the anti-malaria programme.

Described below are a few examples :

— On July 24, 1961, 2 deputies to the National Assembly for Darlac and Pleiku provinces were savagely assassinated in an ambush set by 2 sections of armed Viet-Cong (Cf. letter no. 3921 of August 24, 1961 of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control — Annex 10) ;

— On November 7, 1961, Lieutenant Le-van-Nghia, Chief of Cau-Ke district, Vinh-Binh province, with all his family — his wife, his two children aged 1 and 3, his niece aged 11 — were cowardly struck down by machine-gun fire from armed Viet-Cong elements ;

— On December 13, 1961, Father Bonnet, coming back from a mass at a montagnard village of Ngokrongei was attacked and assassinated by 20 armed Viet-Cong when there was no possible mistaking his identity (Cf. letter no. 1 of January 2, 1962 of the Mission — Annex 11) ;

— On January 15, 1962, a gang of Viet-Cong armed with cutlasses, executed Miss Pham-thi-Doi alias Giau, belonging to the Republican Youth of Phu-Hoa village, Chau-Thanh district, Binh-Duong province. The victim was found with her hands bound behind her back, her head and her right arm completely cut off, and her corpse bearing deep gashes from swords. The murderers left on the corpse a sentence of death (Cf. letter no. 659 of February 1st, 1962 of the Mission — Annex 12) ;

— But the most typical and most serious case was that of the abduction and murder of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam, Chief of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control, by agents in the pay of the Hanoi authorities, in October 1961. The tortures to which the victim was submitted before his death testify to the implacable and inhuman character of crimes of which only the terrorist Viet-Cong agents are capable. (Cf. letter no. 4660 of October 24, 1961, addressed to the International Commission for Control — Annex 13).

Parallel with these acts of terrorism, the Viet-Cong agents, obeying the directives of the Hanoi authorities, daily indulge in systematic activities of sabotage against the economic and social recovery and the achievements of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam for the welfare of the population. They attacked schools, hospitals, pagodas, and churches as well as agricultural development centers and handicraft and industrial installations, without even sparing institutions of charity or benevolence.

Stated below are some of their deeds in this connection :

— On March 15, 1961, armed Viet-Cong broke into the disabled soldiers' asylum located near the center of Lac-Thien district, Darlac province. They made a clean sweep of clothing and various other items as well as of the asylum cash-box ;

— On April 2, 1961, while nine disabled soldiers of the Lac-Thien asylum were going to the Ban-Me-Thuot market, they were attacked by armed Viet-Cong. Two of the victims were killed on the spot while two others were seriously wounded (Cf. letter No. 5152 of November 20, 1961 of the Mission — Annex 14) ;

— On May 4, 1962, at about 11:00 p.m., armed Viet-Cong, one thousand in number, attacked the agricultural development center of Tram-Chim, Thanh-Binh district, Kien-Phong province. They set 425 out of the center's 773 houses on fire, massacred 13 civilians including women and children, and wounded 38 others ;

— On May 6, 1962, at about 7:30 p.m., 3 Viet-Cong companies attacked with mortar fire the agrovillage of An-Hiep (Kien-Hoa province) where 150 families lived peacefully. They completely ransacked the center, set houses on fire and terrorized the population, inflicting on the latter damages assessed at several million piasters ;

— On May 30, 1962, at about 8:00 p.m., armed Viet-Cong broke into a leper hospital situated near Ban-Me-Thuot and managed by the « Christian Missionary Alliance ». After indulging in a systematic pillage of the institution and taking a substantial quantity of medicines, they carried away to an unknown destination 3 American civilians, one of whom was a woman doctor and the other two missionaries (Cf. letter No. 2341 of June 7, 1962 of the Mission — Annex 15).

II. — Armed Subversion :

On the military side, numerous Viet-Cong armed personnel specially trained in North Viet-Nam have been clandestinely introduced into South Viet-Nam through the Laotian corridor, by sea, or through the Demilitarized Zone. Similarly, huge quantities of war material and equipment of all kinds given as aid by the Communist bloc have been dispatched from North to South Viet-Nam, particularly via the Russian airlift through the territory of Laos, with the connivance of the Pathet-Lao (Communist Laotians) (Cf. letter No. 1893 of May 8, 1962 of the Mission — Annex 16).

Organized into regular fighting units, the armed Viet-Cong elements thus supplied have overtly indulged in attacks in force against the administrative and military installations of the Republic of Viet-Nam. In certain cases, the engaged forces have exceeded battalion strength.

Thus :

— On July 16, 1961, Viet-Cong battalion 502 reinforced by elements of regional companies, assumed the offensive in Kien-Phong and Kien-Tuong provinces (Cf. letter No. 3623 of August 10, 1961 of the Mission — Annex 17) ;

— On September 1, 1961, 2 Viet-Cong battalions simultaneously attacked the civilian guard posts of Poko and Dakha and the center of Toumerong district, Kontum province (Cf. letter No. 4174 of September 9, 1961 of the Mission — Annex 18) ;

— On the night of September 17-18, 1961, 2 battalions of Viet-Cong regular troops attacked the chief town of Phuoc-Thanh province and savagely executed the chief of province and his assistant as well as 10 civil servants and inhabitants including 1 woman and 1 child ;

— During August 1961, fierce attacks against the government forces were launched in Dinh-Tuong, Kien-Tuong, Tay-Ninh, Binh-Duong, Phong-Dinh and Ban-Me-Thuot, by Viet-Cong regular battalions Nos. 514, 506 and the battalion called Tay-Do (West Capital) ;

— On April 2, 1962, strongly armed Viet-Cong units attacked the chief town of Vinh-Thanh district and caused 13 dead ;

— On April 6, 1962, a Viet-Cong battalion attacked Tra-Hoa post, 37 kilometers North-West of the chief town of Quang-Ngai province, but they were repulsed by the post defenders. The Viet-Cong left on the spot 37 dead (including 2 Company commanders), arms and munitions as well as a great quantity of military equipment coming from Communist China ;

— On April 6, 1962, Viet-Cong battalions Nos. 3 and 104 launched a fierce attack against the An-Hoa post 32 kilometers North-West of Quang-Ngai. Their repeated assaults were broken by the post defenders. The Viet-Cong left on the spot 38 killed including Nguyen-ngoc-Son, commander of battalion 104. They left two 57^{mm} recoilless rifles, 2 Rebel machine guns, one 24/29 machine gun, 2 Thompson machine guns, 2 carbines, 2 MAT-49, 3 MAS-36, 14 mines, as well as substantial quantities of munitions, military equipment and documents.

The 57^{mm} recoilless rifles as well as cartridges (see annexed photographs) bear conspicuous Chinese Communist trademarks (Cf. letter No. 1893 of May 8, 1962 of the Mission — Annex 16).

— On April 9, 1962, 2 Viet-Cong battalions simultaneously attacked the Long-Khanh post and the Long-Toan communal council center, in Long-Toan district, Vinh-Binh province. At the same time they fired an artillery barrage against the chief town of the aforesaid district. After launching several assault waves,

the Viet-Cong had to withdraw with heavy losses, leaving on the spot 7 dead and an important quantity of arms and ammunitions including 1 Thompson, 1 MAT-49 sub-machine gun, 1 revolver, 6 mines, 50 grenades of local make, cutlasses, shovels, picks, etc...

III. — Political Subversion :

In conjunction with these activities of terrorism and aggression, the communist authorities of North Viet-Nam have launched an intensive campaign of fallacious propaganda aimed at concealing the true instigators of these activities.

In fact, the Lao-Dong Party (Communist Party of North Viet-Nam) created in December 1960 what it calls the « Front for Liberation of the South », a front organization designed to mislead public opinion and to pose as a movement of « spontaneous popular revolt » against the legal regime of the South.

The overt intervention of the Hanoi authorities in South Viet-Nam is also manifested in the political field by the creation in January 1962, within the aforesaid « Front for Liberation of the South », of a provincial committee of the Communist Party of the North (Lao-Dong Party) named « Revolutionary Party of the People ». The official radio of Hanoi has clearly defined the programme of this so-called new party which is exactly that of the Communist regime of the North, having the objective of overthrowing by force the legal regime in South Viet-Nam and establishing in this country a regime of « popular democracy » (Cf. letter No. 425 of January 27, 1962 of the Mission — Annex 19).

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has presented to the International Commission for Control documents of specific evidence establishing that the so-called « Revolutionary Party of the People », like the « Front for Liberation of the South », is in fact nothing but a puppet organization created by the Lao-Dong Party (Communist Party of North Viet-Nam) for the sake of the cause. Among these documents are the following highly confidential circulars Nos. :

510/AQ of December 7, 1961

511/AQ of December 7, 1961

512/AQ of December 8, 1961

addressed by the Ba-Xuyen Provincial Committee of Lao-Dong Party to district committees of the aforesaid province. Written in invisible ink, these documents contain the instructions of the Lao-Dong Party to its chief cadres, regarding the foundation of the « Revolutionary Party of the People. »

« *The creation of this new Party* » (says one of these documents) « *is but a manoeuvre of strategy. In reality, there is only one party which is the Lao-Dong Party unified from North to South, under the leadership of Ho-Chi-Minh.* » (Cf. letter No. 2209 of May 30, 1962 of the Mission — Annex 20).

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* *

Taken as a whole, the activities of terrorism, subversion and aggression being carried out at present by the communists in South Viet-Nam constitute not only grave violations of the Geneva Agreement but also a serious menace to world peace. They are the direct cause of the present tension in South Viet-Nam and jeopardize the very existence of Viet-Nam and the freedom of its people.

Therefore the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam felt it necessary to request for its own self-defence an adequate amount of support from the United States of America, with the sole purpose being to secure the protection of life and property of its population and to maintain order and legality. (Cf. letter No. 5486 of December 9, 1961 of the Mission — Annex 21).

This was no more than a simple measure of legitimate self-defence, and the International Commission for Control was fully informed of this in letters dated December 9, 1961 and April 3, 1962, from the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control. It was specifically stated that these special measures of aid can end as soon as the North Vietnam authorities will have ceased their acts of aggression and will have begun to respect the Geneva Agreement (Annexes 21 and 22).

Therefore, there should be no possible misunderstanding regarding the purely defensive character of the increased military aid which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested of the Government of the United States of America.

In his message to the President of the United States of America, published on December 15, 1961 (Annex 23), President Ngo-Dinh-Diem particularly stressed this point :

« ... *We need (runs the message) increased aid from the United States of America to be in a position to win the war launched against us. We can certainly assure Humanity that our action is purely defensive...* »

In his reply to President Ngo-Dinh-Diem's message (Annex 24), President Kennedy likewise emphasized :

« ... If the North Viet-Nam Communist authorities put an end to their campaign of destruction against the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking at the present time to back up your effort of defence will no longer be necessary... »

Every Communist effort aimed at covering up their aggressive activities and throwing the responsibility of the existing tension in South Viet-Nam on the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and that of the United States of America is therefore only a diversionary manœuvre to fool public opinion.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam felt obliged to inform the International Commission for Control of this situation and furnished it with the most tangible and irrefutable proofs concerning the Viet-Cong campaign of aggression against South Viet-Nam (Cf. letters No. 4660 of October 24, 1961 and No. 5486 of December 9, 1961 — Annexes 13 and 21).

An exhibition of these proofs was organized for the International Commission for Control in March 1962, in order to enable it to examine *de visu* the original documents and material, such as travelling notes, instructions, arms and munitions, etc... that the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam have captured from the Viet-Cong in the course of battles (see photographs in Annex).

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam was furthermore obliged to inform the British Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference as well as the member countries of the United Nations Organization of the menace to peace represented by the North Vietnamese Communist authorities' expansionist aims in South Viet-Nam (Cf. letter No. 129 of January 31, 1962 addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam to Her Britannic Majesty's Government — Annex 25 — and letters Nos. 414 and 415 of December 18, 1961 addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization in New York by Mrs. Tran-van-Chuong, Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the United Nations Organization in New York — Annexes 26 and 27).

Furthermore, on March 31, 1962, the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam made an appeal to the governments of 92 nations and to the Vatican pointing out the danger that the Communist menace in Viet-Nam represents (Annex 28).

The present aggravation of this menace has not escaped the attention of the Government of Great Britain which, by note of February 16, 1962, categorically rejected Soviet accusations that the cause for the increased tension in Viet-Nam was the interven-

tion of the United States of America ; this note condemned the « flagrant interference of the North Vietnamese authorities in South Viet-Nam » in these terms :

« ... Her Majesty's Government considers that the tension in South Viet-Nam results directly from the pursuit by the North Vietnamese authorities of the policy aiming at overthrowing by force the government established in South Viet-Nam. Her Majesty's Government is convinced that the rebellion in South Viet-Nam has been fomented, organized, partly supplied and entirely directed by the North... »

« ... Her Majesty's Government would like to draw attention to the abduction and murder by the Viet-Cong of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam, Chief of the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control, to the evidence relative to the intimate ties between the Lao-Dong Party in North Viet-Nam and the terrorist movement in the South, to numerous cases of infiltration of « cadres » by sea, through the Demilitarized Zone and Laos, as well as on the delivery of equipment by the North Vietnamese to their agents in the South... »

« ... Her Majesty's Government rejects the Soviet affirmation according to which the military aid of the United States of America aims at transforming South Viet-Nam into a strategic bridgehead in Southeast Asia... »

On April 16, 1962, the British Government reaffirmed its viewpoint in a new note addressed to Soviet Russia. In that note it pointed out :

« ... The British Government has noted with regret that the Soviet government has not taken the British request into consideration to jointly address to the North Vietnamese authorities a message in order to request them to put an end to their subversive activities in South Viet-Nam, activities which constitute a violation of the Geneva Agreement. According to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it is these activities threatening peace and stability in Southeast Asia, that are at the origin of the present difficulties in South Viet-Nam. »

The British note stressed, on the same occasion, that « the measures of American aid in South Viet-Nam were decided when the North Vietnamese authorities had launched their campaign aiming at weakening and overthrowing the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam... »

*
* *

No doubt is therefore possible as to the existence of the campaign directed by the North Vietnamese communist authorities against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

In his press conference of April 26, 1962, Mr. Vu-van-Mau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam, clearly defined the present situation in South Viet-Nam, as well as the position of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in face of this situation :

« ... It is now clearly demonstrated, and even the Communists do not try to deny it any more, that the campaign of aggression against South Viet-Nam is organized and directed by the Hanoi authorities with the support of Communist powers and with, as a final objective, the overthrowing and replacement of the legal Vietnamese government by a Communist regime. It has been no less explicitly proven that Communist military personnel and war material are regularly introduced into South Viet-Nam through the Laotian frontier, via the Demilitarized Zone and by sea, and that war supplies of Communist origin continue to be sent to North Viet-Nam...

« ... It is in order to meet such a situation that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, by virtue of its right of legitimate self-defence, has requested from the Government of the United States of America more substantial aid. Such aid is made necessary by the increase of communist military activities in South Viet-Nam, and can end as soon as the Viet-Cong will have ceased their present campaign of subversion and aggression against South Viet-Nam and the Communist powers will have ceased supplying North Viet-Nam with military arms and equipment. This is what the Government of Viet-Nam and that of the United States of America have emphasized on several occasions...

« ... With the concern of safeguarding peace in Viet-Nam, President Ngo-Dinh-Diem has despatched a message to the governments of 92 countries and to the Pope, requesting them to raise their voices so as to condemn Viet-Cong aggression and inviting the Communists to cease all subversive and aggressive activity in South Viet-Nam. »

Talking about propaganda activities which the Hanoi authorities carry out in an attempt to present the Vietnamese problem in another light to direct world attention away from their aggressive warfare, Mr. Vu-van-Mau clearly proclaimed :

« These intrigues, which have received the support of Communist countries, aim at provoking a second Geneva Conference

supposedly to settle the Vietnamese problem. There exists, however, no problem to settle but that of the Viet-Cong continuing to commit acts of aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

« ... In other words, it is the duty of the communists to put an end to a situation they themselves have created by their subversion and aggression against South Viet-Nam. This is moreover the viewpoint of the British Government, which, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, unquestionably reaffirmed in a message it has recently addressed to the Soviet Government.

« ... As far as we are concerned, we strongly denounce communist intrigues which speak of neutralizing South Viet-Nam but which aim at nothing less than transforming in no time South Viet-Nam into a Communist country.

« ... It is hardly necessary to stress that any declarations or appeals in favor of such a solution, addressed by the so-called « Front for Liberation of the South » or any other organizations of this nature, which are but pure Communist creation » could not be taken as the will of the people of Free Viet-Nam.

« ... We make a point of reaffirming our determination to safeguard with all our might the freedom of 13 million inhabitants living in South Viet-Nam and to face any situation created in the South by the Communists. »

ANNEXES

*International commission for supervision
and control in Viet-Nam*

**SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINA**

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SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam presents its compliments to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and has the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of their message of 8th May, 1956, in which the Co-Chairmen asked the Commission to inform them in case the Commission encountered any difficulties in its activities which could not be resolved on the spot and simultaneously had urged both the Parties in Viet-Nam to extend to the Commission all possible co-operation and assistance. The International Commission had assured the Co-Chairmen in its message of 27th May, 1956, that it would continue to persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Viet-Nam and affirmed its determination to perform its duties within the framework of the Geneva Agreement.

2. — The International Commission has, from time to time, submitted to the Co-Chairmen Interim Reports giving a resume of its activities as well as a brief review of the progress made by the two Parties in the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement. In these reports, apart from other things, the Commission had pointed out its difficulties, particularly with regard to the tendency of the Parties to refuse to accept and implement the Commission's recommendations and decisions and their persistence in maintaining their own stand in certain cases. The Co-Chairmen were also informed about the difficulties which the Commission's Fixed Teams were experiencing with

regard to the performance of their mandatory tasks of control and inspection in terms of their responsibilities under Articles 35 and 36(d) of the Agreement.

3. — In its 11th Interim Report, which covered the period from 1st February, 1960 to 28th February, 1961, the Commission had mentioned that, in spite of certain difficulties and the lurking dangers in Viet-Nam, the active presence of the Commission and its work had helped in preserving peace.

4. — Since the presentation of the 11th Interim Report, the situation in Viet-Nam has shown signs of rapid deterioration. The Commission is obliged to make this Special Report to the Co-Chairmen with regard to the serious allegations of aggression and subversion on the part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam against the Republic of Viet-Nam and the serious charges of violation of Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement by the Republic of Viet-Nam, in receiving military aid from the United States of America.

The Polish Delegation dissents from the views expressed in this Special Report. The Statement of the Polish Delegation is forwarded herewith.

5. — Reference is invited to paragraph 24 of the 10th Interim Report and paragraph 32 of the 11th Interim Report, in which mention was made of the concern which the Republic of Viet-Nam has been expressing over the problem of subversion in South Viet-Nam. Mention was also made in paragraph 61 of the 11th Interim Report to the complaints, which the Commission had received from the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, accusing the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam of aggression in the Kontum and Pleiku provinces during October, 1960. Complaints of this nature continued to increase during 1961. In June, 1961, the Commission made known its stand regarding its competence to entertain and examine complaints of this nature in terms of specific Articles of the Geneva Agreement.

6. — The Commission also received several complaints from the High Command of the People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) making serious allegations with regard to the increased introduction of U.S. military personnel into South Viet-Nam, along with substantial quantities of war material, in contravention of Articles 16 and 17. All these allegations were forwarded to the South Vietnamese Mission for comments. The Party in most cases denied these allegations. But the Commission was not in a position to make a precise assessment as to the correctness or otherwise of these allegations, as the Commission's Teams at most point of entry have not been able to carry out effective inspections and controls. However, the South Vietnamese Mission did state in

July, 1961, that whatever American aid its Government was receiving was meant to fight Communist subversion in South Viet-Nam, and in support of this contention it had also referred to the text of the communiqué published after the visit of the U.S. Vice-President Johnson to Saigon, in May, 1961.

7. — While the Commission continued to function in this difficult atmosphere, a communication was received on 9th September, 1961, from the Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam, alleging that the PAVN forces had launched another action in the Kontum region on 1st September, 1961. The letter containing these allegations was forwarded to the Liaison Mission of the PAVN High Command for its comments. In its reply under its letter N° 492/CT/I/B dated 11th December, 1961, the Mission stated that « the PAVN High Command will resolutely reject all decisions taken by the International Commission relating to the so-called 'subversive activities' in South Viet-Nam, a question which has no relevance to the Geneva Agreement. » It further informed the Commission that « henceforth the Mission would find itself constrained to resolutely reject all possible requests for comments of this kind. »

8. — In the meanwhile, in early October, 1961, the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam alleged that Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, the Chief of the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission, had been kidnapped. Later, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the Commission of the murder of Colonel Nam. The complicity of the authorities in the North in the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Nam was alleged. Reference is invited to the Commission's message No. IC/ADM/V-5/61/4097 dated 9th November, 1961, in this regard. Since the allegations were of a serious nature, the Commission requested the South Vietnamese Mission to furnish *prima facie* evidence to support their charge of the complicity of the Northern Party in this incident. The Commission received detailed communications from the Mission on October 24, 1961, and November 16, 1961, with a large number of documents and photographs, in support of their contention. The Mission also stated that the « Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is confident that the case of Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam should be taken, not as an isolated case, but as part of the extensive plan of subversion and terrorism deliberately decided by the Hanoi authorities, a plan which, with this assassination enters a new phase of execution and is designed for seizing power in South Viet-Nam. » In November, 1961, the Commission considered these letters containing numerous allegations, and referred them to its

Legal Committee for examination « with a view to determining whether the allegations and evidence therein *prima facie* attract any provisions of the Geneva Agreement. »

9. — The Legal Committee has made a careful examination of the various allegations and the evidence produced to support them, in the form of documents and other material evidence, and has made the following report, with the Polish Member dissenting :

« We have studied the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, the South Vietnamese Mission's letter No. 4660/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated the 24th October, 1961, and No. 5078/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated the 16th November, 1961, and related reference from the Commission together with the evidentiary material made available by the South Vietnamese Mission in connection therewith, and reached the following conclusions :

1. The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam proceeds on the principle of the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam, respect by either Party of the Zone assigned to the other, and the inescapable responsibility of the Parties for the fulfilment of the obligations resulting therefrom.

Article 10 of the Agreement states expressly the obligation of the two Parties to order and *enforce* the *complete* cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam.

Article 19 of the Agreement casts the obligation on the two Parties to ensure that the Zones assigned to them are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

Article 24 of the Agreement proceeds on the principle of the inviolability of the Demilitarized Zone and the territories assigned to the two Parties and states expressly that the armed forces of each Party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other Party and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other Party.

Article 27 of the Agreement affirms expressly the responsibility of the Commanders of the Forces of the two Parties of ensuring full compliance with all the provisions of the Agreement by *all elements* and military personnel under their Command.

It follows that the using of one Zone for the organisation or the carrying out of any hostile activities in the other Zone, violations by members of the Armed Forces of one Party of the territory of the other Party, or the

commission by any element under the control of one Party of any act directed against the other Party, would be contrary to the fundamental provisions of the Agreement which enjoin mutual respect for the territories assigned to the two Parties.

2. Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

3. In examining the complaints and the supporting material, in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in violation of articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

4. The Committee considers that further investigation is necessary to reach a final conclusion as to whether the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Nam, late Chief of the South Vietnamese Mission, was a part of the activities referred to in sub-paras (2) and (3) above and prohibited under Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement. The South Vietnamese Mission has furnished *prima facie* evidence to warrant such a full investigation of the case by the Commission.

5. We shall submit in due course a full report setting out in detail the complaints made by the South Vietnamese Mission, the evidence forwarded in relation to these complaints, and our specific observations thereon ».

10. — The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances. The Polish Delegation dissents from

these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case.

11. — Concurrently with the developments referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, and subsequently, the Commission received communications from the PAVN High Command and its Liaison Mission alleging direct military intervention in South Viet-Nam by the Government of the United States of America, and ever-increasing import of war material and introduction of military personnel in violation of the Geneva Agreement. The allegations, amongst others, were :

- (a) The conclusion of a bilateral military Agreement between President Ngo-Dinh-Diem and U.S. Ambassador Nolting ;
- (b) The gradual introduction of about 5000 U.S. military personnel into South Viet-Nam, « which will soon be increased to 8000 » ;
- (c) the arrival of 4 aircraft carriers — CORE, BRETON, PRINCETON and CROATON — on different occasions, bringing in helicopters, other aircraft, military equipment and military personnel ;
- (d) the introduction by the United States of America of approximately four companies of helicopters, many jet fighters, fighters/ fighter bombers and transport planes, along with military vehicles and other stores ;
- (e) the visits of a large number of high U.S. military experts and dignitaries to Saigon for inspection and guidance, particularly those of General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral H. Felt and General Lemnitzer ;
- (f) the establishment of a United States Military Assistance Command, with a four-star General, Paul D. Harkins, as its Chief.

12. — Since December, 1961, the Commission's Teams in South Viet-Nam have been persistently denied the right to control and inspect, which are part of their mandatory tasks. Thus, these Teams, though they were able to observe the steady and continuous arrival of war material, including aircraft carriers with helicopters on board, were unable, in view of the denial of controls, to determine precisely the quantum and nature of war material unloaded into South Viet-Nam.

13. — On the other hand, the Commission received a communication from Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam dated 9th December, 1961, stating that : « In the face of the aggression, directed by the so-called 'Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam'

against the Republic of Viet-Nam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested the Government of the United States of America to intensify the aid in personnel and material which the latter was already granting to Viet-Nam. The right of 'self-defence' being a legitimate and inherent attribute of sovereignty, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam found itself constrained to exercise this right and request for increased aid, since North Viet-Nam continues to violate the Geneva Agreement and to do injury to life and property of the free people of Viet-Nam.

« These measures can end as soon as the North Viet-Nam authorities will have ceased the acts of aggression and will have begun to respect the Geneva Agreement. »

14. — The Commission considered this communication from the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and drew the attention of the South Vietnamese Mission to the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement and the procedures laid down thereunder by the International Commission for the import of war material and the introduction of military personnel, and to the obligations resulting therefrom. The Commission also informed the Mission that its complaints regarding allegations of subversion and aggression by the North were under active examination of the Commission separately.

15. — In the light of the stand of the Commission as stated in paragraph 14 above, the numerous allegations received from the PAVN High Command have been receiving the attention of the Commission with a view to the strict implementation of Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement and the procedures laid down thereunder.

16. — A summary of the allegations made by the PAVN High Command, from December, 1961 up to 5th May, 1962, would place the number of military personnel and the quantum of important war materials introduced into South Viet-Nam at approximately 5000 personnel (« which are likely to increase to 8000 shortly »), 157 helicopters, 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 34 jet aircraft, 34 fighters/fighter bombers, 21 transport aircraft, 35 unspecified aircraft, 40 armoured and 20 scout cars, « numerous » armoured boats and amphibious craft, 3000 tons and 1350 cases of war material, and 7 warships (exclusive of 5 destroyers of the United States Seventh Fleet alleged to have come for training). Most of the letters containing the allegations, referred to in this paragraph and para II above, were sent to the Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam for its early comments; but no satisfactory replies have been received. Also, in some cases the Southern Party has been asked to state reasons, if any, why violations of Article 17 (e) relating

to prior notification, as well as violations of Articles 16 and 17 governing the introduction of military personnel and war material themselves, should not be recorded against it.

17. — As the Commission has been denied mandatory controls, as pointed out earlier in paragraph 12 above, it has not been able to make a precise assessment of the number of military personnel and the quantum of war material brought in. However, from 3rd December, 1961 up to 5th May, 1962, the Commission's Teams have controlled the entry of 72 military personnel, and observed but not controlled 173 military personnel, 62 helicopters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 jet aircraft, 57 fighters/fighter bombers, 25 transport aircraft, 26 unspecified types of aircraft, 102 jeeps, 8 tractors, eight 105 mm howitzers, 3 armoured carriers (tracked), 29 armoured fighting vehicle trailers, 404 other trailers, and radar equipment and crates, 5 warships, 9 LSTs (including 4 visiting LSTs), 3 LCTs, 5 visiting aircraft carriers and spares of various kinds. In respect of some of the instances of import of war materials between 3rd December, 1961 and 16th January, 1962, violations under Article 17 (e) as well as violation of Article 25, have been recorded against the Republic of Viet-Nam for its failure to notify arrivals and imports as required by the Geneva Agreement, and for not affording all possible assistance to the Commission's Teams in the performance of their tasks.

18. — In regard to claims for credits made by the Southern Party in justification of certain imports, the Commission wishes to point out that in so far as major items of war material are concerned, except in a limited number of cases, there is no established credit in favour of the Republic of Viet-Nam. On the other hand, for some of these items, there is already a debit against it. In this context, it must be borne in mind that, even where credit exists, according to Article 17 (b) of the Agreement, the Party can only import war material « piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics ». However, controls not having been permitted, the Commission is not in a position to satisfy itself whether this essential requirement has in fact been fulfilled even in cases where credit exists.

19. — As regards the allegation of the PAVN High Command that a U.S. Military Assistance Command has been set up in South Viet-Nam in violation of Article 19, the Commission requested the Party to furnish the following information :

- I) whether such a U.S. Command has been set up ;
- II) the basis on which it has been established ;
- III) the purpose for which it has been constituted ;
- IV) its strength ;
- V) the scope of its activities.

The South Vietnamese Mission in its letter dated 15th March, 1962, has not furnished the necessary information required by the Commission, other than stating that this Military Assistance Command is not a military command in the usual sense of the term, and that its only function is to supervise and manage the utilisation of American personnel and equipment. The Mission stated further that there was no military alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam as no treaty of this nature had been ratified by either Government.

20. — Taking all the facts into consideration, and basing itself on its own observations and authorised statements made in the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Commission concludes that the Republic of Viet-Nam has violated Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement in receiving the increased military aid from the United States of America in the absence of any established credit in its favour. The Commission is also of the view that, though there may not be any formal military alliance between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam, the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Viet-Nam, as well as the introduction of a large number of U.S. military personnel beyond the stated strength of the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group), amounts to a factual military alliance, which is prohibited under Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement.

21. — The Commission would also like to bring to the notice of the Co-Chairmen a recent and deliberate tendency on the part of both the Parties to deny or refuse controls to the Commission's Teams, thereby completely immobilising their activities and hindering the Commission in the proper discharge of its obligations to supervise the implementation of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement. During the last few months, there has been a near-complete breakdown so far as this important function of the Commission is concerned. The Commission considered the situation and addressed detailed communications to the two Parties recommending the resumption of normal controls immediately. (Copies of the letters sent to the two Parties are attached as Annexure 1 to this Report). The Commission, however, regrets to inform the Co-Chairmen that there has been no improvement in this regard.

22. — The International Commission wishes to draw the serious and earnest attention of the Co-Chairmen to the gravity of the situation that has developed in Viet-Nam in the last few months. Fundamental provisions of the Geneva Agreement have been violated by both Parties, resulting in ever-increasing tension and threat of resumption of open hostilities. In this situation, the role of the Commission for the maintenance of peace in Viet-Nam is

being greatly hampered because of denial of co-operation by both the Parties. The Commission, therefore, earnestly recommends to the Co-Chairmen that, with a view to reducing tension and preserving peace in Viet-Nam, remedial action be taken, in the light of this Report, so as to ensure that the Parties

- a) respect the Zone assigned to the other Party ;
- b) observe strictly the provisions of Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement in respect of the import of war material and the introduction of military personnel ;
- c) commit no act and undertake no operation of a hostile nature against the other Party ;
- d) do not allow the Zones assigned to them to adhere to any military alliance and to be used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy ;
- e) co-operate with the International Commission in the fulfilment of its tasks of supervision and control of the implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement.

23. — The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of its highest consideration to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

	<i>Signed</i>	<i>Signed</i>
(L. POHORYLES)	(G. PATHASARATHI)	(F.G. HOOTON)
POLAND	INDIA	CANADA

Saigon, 2nd June, 1962.

Letter to the South Vietnamese Liaison Mission

**INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION
AND CONTROL IN VIET-NAM**

No. OPS/VIII/I/1327

Saigon, 5-6 April 1962

The Secretary General presents his compliments to the Chief of the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control and has the honour to refer to the question of mandatory controls by the Commission's Teams as laid down in the Geneva Agreement and the Instructions for Teams.

2. — The Commission has observed that its Teams have been denied controls, and have not been afforded all possible assistance and co-operation necessary for the execution of their mandatory tasks. Certain specific instances are given as examples in the attached Appendix. Controls have been denied or rendered ineffective because

- a) documents and manifests were not made available for inspection and spot checks were not permitted ;
- b) transport was stated to be not available ;
- c) Teams were informed that controls were not permitted by higher authorities ;
- d) controls were not permitted on particular days being holidays ;
- e) restrictions were placed on the free movement of Teams for various reasons ;
- f) the LO * was reported to be sick and no replacement was provided ;
- g) the LO was not available to the Team ;
- h) the LO stated that he had referred the matter of the particular control to the Mission ;
- i) it was stated that security could not be provided ;
- j) no proof of internal movement was provided.

3. — It is of the utmost importance for the preservation of peace in Viet-Nam that the Parties afford all co-operation and

* Note : LO refers to the Liaison Officer of the Mission attached to the Commission's Teams.

facilities to the Commission's Teams in the execution of their mandatory tasks in terms of Article 25 of the Geneva Agreement. The Secretary General has been directed to state, therefore, that the Commission views with great concern that controls have been denied on various grounds listed in para 2 above, which are untenable or where remedial action could have been taken. The Commission also wishes to point out that recently it has found that the Mission has been consistently withholding notification and denying control of war material entering the country. Under the circumstances, the Commission may have to draw its own conclusions as to the number of military personnel and the quantum of war material that are being brought in.

4. — The Commission would urge the Mission to afford the fullest co-operation to enable the Commission to discharge its responsibilities under Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement. The Secretary General has been further directed to state that if the Mission fails to afford the necessary facilities and co-operation in this regard, the Commission shall be obliged to report to the co-Chairmen that the work of the Commission continues to be hindered by the Mission.

5. — The Secretary General takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of his highest consideration.

Sd/ — D.K. ROBERTSON
Lt Col
For Secretary General.

The Chief of the Vietnamese Mission
in charge of Relations with the I.C.C.
Saigon

SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONTROLS AND INSPECTIONS
HAVING BEEN DENIED OR RENDERED INEFFECTIVE

1. Documents/manifests were not made available for inspection and spot checks were not permitted

a) Qui-Nhon Team

On 17 Jan 62, the Team observed a Vietnamese ship in the harbour unloading cargo. The LO did not make the manifests/documents available to the Team.

b) Saigon Team

(i) On 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17 Feb 62, the Team observed several ships in the harbour. The LO did not produce documents/manifests in respect of any of these ships.

(ii) On these days the Team also observed some aircraft at Tan Son Nhut airfield. The LO did not produce documents/manifests pertaining to these aircraft.

c) Tourane Team

On 4 Dec. 61, the Team observed two transport and one fighter aircraft. On inquiry the LO said that they belonged to Tourane Air Base. The LO did not produce any documents relating to the aircraft and declined to take the Team closer on the ground that it was a military area.

2. Transport was stated to be not available

Cap St Jacques Team

a) During the weeks ending 27 Jan 62 and 10 Feb 62, the following controls could not be carried out due to transport not having been made available by the LO :

(i) The weekly control of the river Cua Dai.

(ii) The weekly control North up to Phan Thiet exclusive but including the main road/railway line.

(iii) The twice weekly control of the delta of the Mekong and Bassac rivers, the complete An Xuyen peninsula, the coastal area up to the Cambodian border and including the control of road Rach Gia and Ha Tien.

b) The weekly control of river Cua Dai was scheduled for 15 Mar 62 and due notice was given to the LO. He stated that no boat was available for the time being. The control could not be carried out.

3. Teams were informed that controls were not permitted by higher authorities

a) Cap St Jacques Team

On 23 Jan 62, the Team observed three vessels in the harbour. The LO declined to give any details and stated that no manifests would be made available here after to the Team and that he was not authorised to produce any manifests at the Customs Office for scrutiny by the Team.

b) Nha Trang Team

From 16 Jan 62 onwards the LO has not produced documents for ships and planes coming into Nha Trang. The reason given by him was that he had orders from higher authority not to produce documents.

c) Saigon Team

14 Dec 61 — The Team requested the LO while on harbour control to take them to the bank of the river at the small harbour to make observations. The LO replied that this harbour belonged to a private company and the company authorities would not permit the Team to use their harbour for observation.

4. Controls were not permitted on particular days being holidays

a) Qui-Nhon Team

Controls were not carried out on 5, 6 and 7 Feb 62 due to TET Festival.

b) Tourane Team

On 18 Mar 62, the harbour was closed as it was a Sunday and as such control could not be exercised.

5. Restrictions were placed on the free movement of Teams for various reasons

a) Saigon Team

(i) 26 Dec 61 — The Team observed one aircraft on the airfield. On enquiry the LO informed the Team that it was a US Embassy plane No. 706 which is included in the list of planes given to the Team. The Team asked the LO to take it nearer or bring the aircraft to a place from where the marking on the plane could be verified. The LO regretted that he was unable to accede to either of the requests.

(ii) On 25 Jan 62, the Team observed 10 aircraft with US markings at Tan-Son-Nhut airfield. The Team asked to be taken across the runway for better observation and

spot check of the aircraft. This was not permitted by the LO on the ground that the area of the hangars was a restricted military area.

b) *Tourane Team*

From 27 Jan 62, the Team has not been taken inside the airport. From this date onwards the Team has been asked to carry out the control from the airport waiting-room.

6. *The LO was reported to be sick and no replacement was provided*

Nha-Trang Team

Daily control of harbour and airport was not carried out on 22 Jan 62 due to LO's sickness and no replacement was provided.

7. *The LO was not available to the Team*

Saigon Team

At 1520 hrs on 3 Mar 62, the Team decided to carry out an emergency control of Saigon harbour. The control could not be carried out as no LO was available.

8. *LO stated that he had referred the matter of the particular control to the Mission*

Saigon Team

- a) On 16 Jan 62, the Team observed 6 ships and an aircraft carrier with a number of aircraft aboard. The Team asked the LO for manifests and documents relating to the ships. The LO stated that these manifests and documents were not available with him. The Team then asked for a spot check of these vessels. The LO expressed his inability to arrange this on the ground that this was not permitted by his authorities. The LO further stated that in so far as the berthing of the aircraft carrier in this area was concerned he would refer the matter to his superior authorities.
- b) On 24 Feb 62, the Team observed 5 ships. The Team requested the LO to produce the manifests and documents. The LO replied that no documents were available with him. The LO was asked to arrange for the spot check but he replied that this was not permitted by the Captain of the ship. The Team then asked about the unloading of the military aircraft from the Herkimer. The LO replied that no information was available with him and he would request his superior authorities for the required information.

9. *It was stated that security could not be provided*

a) *Saigon Team*

On 23 and 27 Jan 62 and 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17 Feb 62, the control of Nha-Be harbour was denied to the Team by the LO on the ground that security arrangements could not be made.

b) *Tourane Team*

The LO was given 48 hrs notice for South control upto Sa-Huynh exclusive. He said, « Regret, the local authorities could not make security arrangements ».

10. *No proof of internal movement was provided*

Tourane Team

Harbour — On 20 Dec 61, a ship Thanh-Long was unloading. The LO said that the ship had come from Saigon. The Team made a request for documents. The LO replied that he would ask for instructions from the Liaison Mission in Saigon. As such the Team requested that a spot check be carried out. He replied « It cannot be carried out and I refuse to allow ». The Team waited for some time but could not satisfy itself in regard to the reported internal movement.

Letter to the Liaison Mission of the PAVN High Command

**INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION
AND CONTROL IN VIET-NAM**

No. OPS/VIII/I/1328

Saigon, 5/6 Apr 62

The Secretary General presents his compliments to the Chief of the Liaison Mission of the PAVN High Command and has the honour to refer to the question of mandatory controls by the Commission's Teams as laid down in the Geneva Agreement and the Instructions for Teams.

2. — The Commission has observed that its Teams have been denied controls, and have not been afforded all possible assistance and co-operation necessary for the execution of their mandatory tasks. Certain specific instances are given as examples in the attached Appendix. Controls have been denied or rendered ineffective because :

- a) documents and manifests were not made available for inspection and spot checks were not permitted ;
- b) transport was stated to be mechanically defective or not available ;
- c) Teams were informed that controls were not permitted by higher authorities ;
- d) controls were not permitted on particular days being holidays ;
- e) restrictions were placed on the free movement of Teams for various reasons ;
- * f) the LO was reported to be sick and no replacement was provided ;
- g) the LO was not available to the Team ;
- h) the matter of a particular control was under correspondence with the Commission ;

* Note : LO refers to the Liaison Officer of the Mission attached to the Commission's Teams.

- i) local control was not arranged on particular days on the ground that a mobile control had been carried out the same day ;
- j) the frequency of control decided by the Commission was contested.

3. — It is of the utmost importance for the preservation of peace in Viet-Nam that the Parties afford all co-operation and facilities to the Commission's Teams in the execution of their mandatory tasks in terms of Article 25 of the Geneva Agreement. The Secretary General has been directed to state that the Commission views with great concern that controls have been denied on various grounds listed in para 2 above, which are untenable or where remedial action could have been taken. The Commission wishes to express its concern over the denial of controls on grounds of this nature particularly in view of the serious allegations made concerning the introduction of war material into North Viet-Nam.

4. — The Commission would urge the Mission to afford the fullest co-operation to enable the Commission to discharge its responsibilities under Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement. The Secretary General has been further directed to state that if the Mission fails to afford the necessary facilities and co-operation in this regard, the Commission shall be obliged to report to the Co-Chairmen that the work of the Commission continues to be hindered by the Mission.

5. — The Secretary General takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of his highest consideration.

Sd/ — D.K. ROBERTSON
Lt Col
For Secretary General.

The Chief of the Liaison Mission
of the PAVN High Command.
Hanoi

**SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONTROLS AND INSPECTIONS
HAVING BEEN DENIED OR RENDERED INEFFECTIVE**

1. — *Documents and manifests were not made available for inspection and spot checks were not permitted.*

a) *Dong-Dang Team*

(i) On 20 Nov 61, the Team controlled an incoming train from China. The Team proposed a spot check of one of the wagons to satisfy itself that the contents of the wagon were as specified in the manifest. The LO stated that he could not arrange for a spot check as he had produced all the manifests.

(ii) On 12, 13, and 14 Feb 62, the LO failed to produce manifests in respect of outgoing trains.

b) *Dong-Hoi Team*

On 29 Sep 61, the Team observed one LI-2 aircraft with registered number 58199 with North Viet-Nam Government markings of the Yellow Star on Red Background, land at Dong-Hoi airfield. 18 persons got down from the plane. No previous intimation was received about this plane. When asked the LO replied that it was a North Viet-Nam Government plane and it was on internal movement. He stated that it was on a test flight. The Team asked for documentary proof. The LO did not produce documents. The Team asked for a spot check which the LO refused.

2. — *Transport was stated to be mechanically defective or not available.*

a) *Haiphong Team*

The control North up to Campha Port inclusive and the control of River Tien-Yen, River Pho-Cu, Tien-Yen airport, road junction at Tien-Yen and road junction immediately West of Tien-Yen were scheduled for 22 Feb 62. The required notice of 24 hrs was given to the LO but the controls could not be carried out as he informed the Team that two out of three jeeps were out of order and the controls were not possible this week.

b) *Dong-Dang Team*

On 22 Feb 62, the Team was denied local control by the LO as transport was not made available on the ground that the drivers were tired after the mobile control.

3. — *Teams were informed that controls were not permitted by higher authorities.*

Do-Son area, observation from fixed Points 'A' and 'B' is a mandatory task for this Team. Since August 1961, this control has not been permitted. During the week ending 6 Jan 62, Do-Son area Points 'A' and 'B' could not be controlled as the LO stated that the military authorities had not given permission for the Team to enter that area.

4. — *Controls were not permitted on particular days being holidays.*

Laokay Team

a) On Sunday 28 Jan 62 and Sunday 18 Feb 62, local controls were not arranged by the LO on the ground that they were national holidays.

b) No controls were carried out at Laokay airfield on 11 Mar 62, as the LO expressed his inability to arrange for these controls on the ground that it was a national holiday.

5. — *Restrictions were placed on the free movement of Teams for various reasons.*

Haiphong Team

The control of Cat-Bi airfield has not been permitted since August 1961 on the ground that it was being utilised as a Sports Club by the Civil Aviation Department and as such entry was restricted to members only. For example this airfield was not allowed to be controlled during the week ending 6 Jan 62.

6. — *The LO was reported to be sick and no replacement was provided.*

a) *Vinh Team*

On 18 Jan 62, control could not be carried out due to the sickness of the LO and no replacement was provided.

b) *Dong-Dang Team*

On 9 Feb 62, the local control could not be carried out due to the sickness of the LO and no replacement was provided.

7. — *The LO was not available to the Team.*

Dong-Dang Team

- a) On 26 Aug 61, the control of the Railway Station could not be carried out owing to the absence of the LO who was reported to have gone to Lang-Son.
- b) On 27 Aug 61, at 1500 hrs the LO was given notice for control of the incoming train from China which was scheduled to arrive at 1600 hrs. At about 1630 hrs the LO sent a message with the hotel manager to inform the Team that he considered that the Team was still on mobile control. The Team sent word to the LO to come and discuss the validity of his reasoning but he did not turn up and the control was not carried out.

8. — *The matter of a particular control was under correspondence with the Commission.*

Haiphong Team

Mobile control South up to Sam-Son exclusive was not carried out during the week ending 2 Sep 61, as the LO stated that the matter was under reference to the Commission by the PAVN Liaison Mission.

9. — *Local control was not arranged on particular days on the ground that a mobile control had been carried out the same day.*

Dong-Dang Team

On 4, 9, 12 and 18 Jan 62, the LO did not arrange local control on the ground that on these days the Team had carried out mobile controls.

10. — *The frequency of control decided by the Commission was contested.*

a) *Laokay Team*

As per IC letter No. OPS/IV/(2)5894 dated 29 Dec 61, the control is to be carried out at least once a day. Pho-Moi Railway Station is to be controlled in accordance with Paragraphs 3 (b) and (c) of Appendix 'O' to the Instructions for Fixed Teams and their mobile elements. From 5 Sep 61 upto 20 Jan 62, controls were allowed only twice a week. From then on, controls have been allowed four times a week. PAVN letter No. 70/QT dated 15 Feb 62 states that instructions have been given to the Liaison Officer concerned requesting him to extend to the Laokay Team all possible assistance with a view to an

effective control of Pho-Moi Railway Station. Even after this date, however, controls have been permitted only four times a week, except for the week ending 17 Mar 62, when five controls were permitted as opposed to the full quota.

b) *Vinh Team*

As per the Commission's decision, the control of the road (CR 7) up to the Laotian border and river Nam-Mo is required to be carried out once a fortnight. This has been communicated to the Mission vide IC letters Nos. OPS/III(2)/2107 dated 26 Apr 61 and OPS/III(2)/3830 dated 14 Aug 61. However, no controls have been given since Dec 1960, as the frequency of control is still being contested by the Party.

On 6 Jan 62, for example, the LO expressed his inability to take the Team on the control as he had not received orders to do so from the PAVN

**STATEMENT ADDRESSED TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN
OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE BY THE POLISH
DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIET-NAM**

The Polish Delegation to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam presents its compliments to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and has the honour to state the following in connection with the special report submitted to them herewith by the Indian and Canadian Delegations which the Polish Delegation declines to sign :

2. — In their special report the Indian and Canadian Delegations have presented a picture of the situation in South Viet-Nam which in the opinion of the Polish Delegation does not correspond with the real state of affairs. It places on the same level doubtful and legally unfounded allegations of one of the Parties, on the one hand, and grave and undeniable violations of the Geneva Agreement substantiated by records and findings of the International Commission on the other. The majority report wrongly admitted unfounded allegation of aggression and subversion brought by the Republic of Viet-Nam against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in spite of the fact that they do not find any legal justification in the stipulations of the Geneva Agreement and furthermore are not substantiated and based on any evidence. These artificial allegations have been advanced in the report as a most important item before a problem described in insignificant terms of receiving military aid from the United States of America. This formulation hides serious and important allegations which have been brought out by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam namely the conclusion by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam of a military alliance with the Government of the United States of America, the introduction into South Viet-Nam of a great number of the United States military personnel, weapons and war material, the direct participation of this personnel in hostile activities against the population of South Viet-Nam as well as the establishing in South Viet-Nam of a special operational Military Command of the United States of America to direct the Vietnamese and American armed forces. These allegations have been substantiated by the findings of the Commission in previous reports as well as find expression in the current special report of the majority. In the opinion of Polish Delegation this development of the situation constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement, threatens peace in this area

and as such should be urgently considered by the International Commission for Supervision and Control and brought to the immediate attention of the Co-Chairmen with a request for action.

3. — Furthermore, the majority has ignored in its special report violation of Article 14 (c) of the Geneva Agreement by the authorities of the Republic of Viet-Nam by persecutions of former resistance members followed by the persecutions of all democratic elements which is certainly one of the most important causes of the wide-spread movement against the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam which recently has taken various forms of dissatisfaction and struggle.

4. — In the opinion of the Polish Delegation another cause of this movement is the refusal of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to act towards the reunification of Viet-Nam as foreseen in the Geneva Agreement in spite of the repeated proposals made by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and efforts of the International Commission in the past towards facilitating negotiations by the Parties.

5. — In order to cope with this wide-spread national movement the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has asked for military assistance of the United States of America which has of late reached a dangerous stage of direct participation of the American armed forces in military operations in South Viet-Nam. The Commission, being a serious obstacle in this development, has been put by the South Vietnamese Party under a constant and growing pressure which made it impossible for the Commission to discharge its duties effectively in accordance with the mandate given to it under the Geneva Agreement. The Commission had to express to the Co-Chairmen in its letter from the 9th November 1961 its grave concern for the future activities of the Commission in Viet-Nam if attempts are made to coerce it and requested the Co-Chairmen to impress on the Republic of Viet-Nam its solemn responsibilities towards the International Commission in Viet-Nam.

6. — The Polish Delegation is compelled to draw the attention of the Co-Chairmen to the gravity of the situation that has developed in South Viet-Nam and to the danger to peace in South-East Asia resulting therefrom. Fundamental provisions of the Geneva Agreement have been violated by the South Vietnamese Party, resulting in an ever-increasing tension, bloodshed and threat of the resumption of hostilities. This tension grows as a result of the operation in South Viet-Nam and neighbouring countries of a steadily increasing number of the armed forces of the United States of America. This danger has been recently high-lighted by the landing of the American troops on the Thai territory along the frontier of Indo-China. In this situation therefore the Polish Delegation requests the Co-Chairmen to take adequate and im-

mediate measures with the view to reducing tension and preserving peace in South Viet-Nam by the withdrawal of the United States armed personnel and war material, dissolution of the United States military assistance Command in South Viet-Nam as well as the observance by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam of Article 14 (c) and of all other provisions of the Geneva Agreement. This in the opinion of the Polish Delegation is the only means which shall enable the Commission to perform its mandatory tasks in full accordance with the Geneva Agreement and in the large interest of the Vietnamese people and of peace in South-East Asia.

7. — The Polish Delegation to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam takes this opportunity to renew to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Signed : **LEONARD POHORYLES**

Ambassador

*Representative of the Polish Peoples'
Republic on the International Commission
for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam.*

Saigon, 2nd June, 1962.

STATEMENT OF THE INDIAN DELEGATION

The Indian Delegation has considered the Statement of the Polish Delegation. It does not agree with many of the views expressed by the Polish Delegation in its Statement, nor with its interpretation of the Special Report. The Indian Delegation reiterates its stand and findings, as formulated in the Special Report, which are strictly in terms of the Commission's responsibilities under the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam. It is the fervent hope of the Indian Delegation that the Special Report will enable the Co-Chairmen to consider jointly the measures necessary to restore respect for the Geneva Agreement, relax tensions and improve the situation in Viet-Nam.

G. PARTHASARATHI,

*Representative of India on the International
Commission for Supervision and Control
in Viet-Nam.*

Saigon, 2nd June, 1962.

**STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF VIET-NAM**

on the

**Recent Special Report of the International Commission for Control
on the Situation in Viet-Nam**

The recent special report of the International Commission for Control on the situation in Viet-Nam, which has just been made public, formally acknowledges that the communist authorities of Hanoi have for several years been engaged in an open campaign of aggression and subversion against the Republic of Viet-Nam, a campaign prepared, directed, and executed by those authorities in flagrant violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the cease-fire in Viet-Nam.

Coming from the international body established by that Agreement to supervise the execution of the cease-fire, this report proves in a clear and irrefutable manner the existence of such aggression as well as the full and complete responsibility of the communist regime of North Viet-Nam.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Hanoi authorities, even before the report was made public, have launched against the Indian and Canadian delegations and the Chairman of the Commission a campaign the virulence and abusiveness of which betrays their confusion before such condemnation and only underscores further their bad faith and their guilty conscience.

But neither the mass demonstrations against the International Commission for Control organized by the Hanoi authorities, nor the legal quibblings they have resorted to in order to question the validity of the International Commission for Control's report, nor the hopeless efforts of the press of North Viet-Nam to turn back an irreversible wave of public opinion can in any way reduce the great importance of the International Commission for Control's decision.

This decision is based upon an impressive amount of supporting evidence which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has gathered with considerable difficulty, if one considers the efforts of the communists themselves to conceal their aggressive and subversive activities in order to mislead national and international opinion regarding the present situation in Viet-Nam.

In its letter to the International Commission for Control of October 24, November 16, and December 29, 1961, and January 27,

April 4, and May 8, 1962 — to cite only the most recent — the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam furnished such evidence, showing categorically that :

— the so-called « Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam » is following a policy of infiltration into South Viet-Nam of well-trained communist cadres and armed elements, war material, and arms and supplies of all kinds via Laos, the Demilitarized Zone, and by sea ;

— all subversive activities in South Viet-Nam, including those of the so-called « People's Revolutionary Party », which openly proclaims itself Marxist-Leninist, have been under the direction of the Communist authorities of Hanoi.

The cases of subversion presented to the International Commission for Control represent, furthermore, only a small portion of the violations committed by the communist authorities of Hanoi. In fact, aggression against South Viet-Nam by communist North Viet-Nam is continuing, and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam continues to send to the International Commission for Control new evidence and documents of communist subversive and aggressive activities. All this evidence, both old and new, consisting of documents as well as material, was shown to representatives of the Vietnamese and foreign press to see for themselves at a recent press conference held at General Staff Headquarters of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

Since the end of last year, the growing support given by the Sino-Soviet bloc powers to the so-called 'Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam' has constituted such a clear threat that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, for its own defence, found it necessary to resort urgently to more substantial outside assistance.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested increased military assistance from the United States in order to cope with such a situation. This is no more than simply a legitimate defence measure, and the International Commission for Control has been so informed in the Vietnamese Liaison Mission's letters of December 9 1961, and April 3, 1962. It was specified in those letters that these additional measures of legitimate self-defence can end as soon as the authorities of North Viet-Nam will have ceased their acts of aggression and will have respected the Geneva Agreement.

The cause-and-effect relation existing between, on the one hand, the Communist campaign of subversion against South Viet-Nam which began several years ago and which intensifies more every day, and, on the other hand, the recent and purely defensive

measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to meet that campaign is only too evident and is obvious to anyone. It is clearly evident from the International Commission for Control's report.

Thus, the authorities of North Viet-Nam are responsible in the eyes of the International Commission for Control and of the World as well for the present tension in South Viet-Nam.

It remains for the International Commission for Control now that it has recognized the existence of communist aggression against South Viet-Nam, to consider concrete measures called for in its mission of peace in Viet-Nam.

On its part, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is always ready to cooperate closely with the International Commission for Control to assist it in accomplishing its mission. In that respect, it has offered to that international body in its letter of May 10, 1962, all facilities, including helicopters as necessary, to permit the International Commission for Control to undertake control of the western part of the demilitarized zone and the Laos-Vietnam border region. Such a measure cannot, of course, by itself solve entirely the problem of infiltration of men and material from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam; it nevertheless proves the sincere desire of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to seek in any way it can peaceful means to defend its territorial integrity and to assure the security of its people from communist aggression.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam pays tribute to the remarkable efforts that the International Commission for Control has made in the examination of a crucial problem on which depends the peace not only of Viet-Nam but of Southeast Asia and possibly the world as well.

We appeal to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference that action be taken to force the communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to cease immediately their aggressive and subversive activities against the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the population living south of the 17th parallel.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam also requests the Governments of the Free World to raise their voices in condemnation of communist aggression against South Viet-Nam, aggression which the International Commission for Control itself has formally recognized in its report. In so doing they will serve the cause of peace, one and indivisible.

June 25, 1962

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, June 28, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 2607/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honour to refer to the Special Report dated June 2, 1962 addressed by the International Control Commission to the Co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference on the cease-fire in Indochina and which was published on June 26, 1962.

2. In the name of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Mission takes note with the greatest satisfaction of the findings of the International Control Commission admitting that there are definite proofs establishing that :

- a) armed and unarmed personnel, arms, ammunition and other military supplies were sent from North to South Viet-Nam with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks directed against the Armed Forces and the Administration of South Viet-Nam, in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam ;
- b) the P.A.V.N.* made use of the Northern zone to incite, encourage and support the hostile activities in the Southern zone with the object of overthrowing the legal authorities in South Viet-Nam, this in flagrant violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam.

The Mission pays tribute to the sustained efforts put forth by the Commission in examining different aspects of communist subversion in South Viet-Nam and to the foresightedness it has shown, despite the difficulties due to the unceasing manœuvres of obstruction on the part of the communist authorities of the North and to their attempts to conceal their subversive and aggres-

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

sive activities in South Viet-Nam and to distort the facts in order to mislead public opinion on their true role in the present tension in Viet-Nam.

The findings of the Commission touching on the problem of communist subversion fully confirm the concerns which the Mission had expressed on several occasions regarding the serious threat which the subversive and aggressive schemings of the Northern authorities for the peace in Viet-Nam represent. These findings justify also the repeated appeals which the Mission has addressed to the Commission to request the latter to safeguard peace by compelling the Hanoi authorities to respect the Agreement on the cease-fire.

These findings leave no doubt whatever of the full responsibility of the Hanoi authorities for the present disorders in South Viet-Nam as well as for the delay caused in the restoration of the peace without which the reunification of the country through truly free elections could not be envisaged.

3. As regards the Commission's findings contained in paragraphs 11 and 20 of the Special Report and relative to the reinforcement of the military aid of the United States in Viet-Nam, the Mission notes that, although the cause-and-effect relation that exists on the one hand, between the campaign of subversion and aggression directed by the P.A.V.N. * against the Republic of Viet-Nam and on the other hand, the increase in the American military aid in South Viet-Nam, has not been mentioned in the report of the International Commission for Control, international opinion cannot be mistaken, either on the true causes of the present tension in South Viet-Nam, due to communist subversion, or on the defensive character of the measures taken by the Republic of Viet-Nam in order to face this subversion.

Accordingly, in their note dated June 14, 1962 addressed to the Soviet Government, the British Government itself in its capacity as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference has stated, in paragraphs 4 and 5, as follows :

« Her Majesty's Government draw special attention to the dates quoted in the report relating to the illegal activities of the North Vietnamese authorities and to the intensification of United States assistance. It is evident that the complaints of Northern subversion are of long standing. Reference to them was made as early as the 10th Interim Report which deals with the period beginning February 1, 1959, whereas the intensification in United States assistance did not begin until December, 1961 — in other words long after the threat from North Viet-Nam had developed and

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

after the Government of Viet-Nam had felt obliged, in face of the extensive plan of subversion and terrorism deliberately embarked upon by the Hanoi authorities, to request the Government of the United States to furnish assistance of a military nature to meet this threat.

«The Report thus confirms the view expressed in Her Majesty's Government's Note of November 3, 1961 and their Aide-Mémoire of February 16 and April 19, 1962 that the activities of the North Vietnamese authorities were the root cause of the present troubles».

The Mission also notes that the Commission has taken into consideration the reasons for which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, in consideration of its right of legitimate self-defence, found itself constrained to request military aid from the United States, reasons which had been explained by the Mission in its letter No. 5486/PDVN/CT/TD/2 addressed to the Commission on December 9, 1961.

The Mission wishes to reaffirm again the defensive and temporary nature of this special aid, which will end, as had repeatedly been stressed on several occasions by the United States and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, as soon as the communist authorities of the North will have ceased their campaign of aggression and subversion in South Viet-Nam and will have respected the Geneva Agreement.

Considering the purely defensive purpose and essentially temporary nature of the measures of special military assistance of the United States in Viet-Nam, the Mission deems that such an assistance, which is neither directed against North Viet-Nam nor against any other country, cannot run counter to the spirit of the Geneva Agreement, as it has the sole purpose of preserving the peace and defending the freedom and the security of the population living South of the 17th parallel. It is, on the contrary, the authorities of North Viet-Nam who deliberately violated the fundamental provisions of the Geneva Agreement by increasing in considerable proportions their war potential since the signing of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. It was proved in fact, that the communist authorities of the North received extremely important military aid from the communist powers without conforming at any moment to the Geneva Agreement, and closely allied themselves with Communist China and other communist powers, alliance which can only have an aggressive nature, as North Viet-Nam is not the subject of any threat of aggression coming from outside.

4. Finally, by referring to paragraph 21 of the Special Report and Appendix 1 of the Report, the Mission would like to stress that

it has always extended all desirable cooperation to the Commission to help the latter to fulfil its peace mission in Viet-Nam. Thus, concerning the essential problem of the introduction of foreign military advisory personnel and the import of arms and munitions, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam always complied with the prescriptions of the Geneva Agreement, in contrast with the Northern authorities, who never sought authorizations to import arms and introduce foreign military personnel.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam also took care to bring beforehand to the Commission's knowledge the special assistance measures which it was led to request from the United States last December, in order to face the situation created by the increase in the aggressive activities of the North.

The most recent manifestation of this willingness to cooperate is the offer made by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to place at the disposal of the Commission the necessary means of transport, such as helicopters (Ref. letter No. 1937 dated May 10, 1962) for the supervision and control of the border between Laos and Viet-Nam, and of the Western part of the demilitarized zone, normal ways of infiltration of armed and unarmed elements and military supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam, and motor-boats for the control of the maritime part of this zone (Ref. letter No. 2489 dated June 6, 1962).

5. Regarding the allegations contained in the statement of the Polish Delegation attached to the Special Report, the Mission strongly protests against the partial attitude and the unfounded assertions of this Delegation concerning the causes of the troubled situation in South Viet-Nam.

The stand of the Polish Delegation vis-à-vis the findings of the Special Report relative to the violations of the Geneva Agreement committed by North Viet-Nam is fundamentally vitiated as it does not rest on an objective establishment of facts but proceeds from preconceived ideas. The Polish Delegation has moreover systematically refused despite the numerous invitations addressed to the Commission by the Vietnamese Liaison Mission, to examine the documents, arms, munitions, war material and other concrete proofs of the presence in South Viet-Nam of armed forces responsible to the Hanoi authorities and the open or camouflaged activities of these forces against the Government, the army and the population in South Viet-Nam.

In the face of such a mass of proofs which stand out from the very evidence, one should really be of bad faith not to admit the direct participation of the Hanoi authorities in the campaign of subversion and aggression against South Viet-Nam.

Concerning the allegations formulated by the Polish Delegation regarding the alleged violations of Article 14-c of the Geneva Agreement by the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Mission recalls that it had already the occasion of drawing the Commission's attention to the abusive interpretation given to this article by the Hanoi authorities with the purpose of covering the activities of their agents in the South, who, however, could not be mistaken with the true nationalists. It is regrettable that, by its tendentious assertions, the Polish Delegation thus encourages such activities manifestly contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Agreement.

As regards the problem of the reunification of Viet-Nam, if no progress has yet been made towards this end, the fault lies entirely with the Northern authorities who, instead of creating favourable conditions for a peaceful reunification of the country through free elections, indulged on the contrary in communizing North Viet-Nam on the one hand and in overthrowing by force the legal power in the South on the other, in order to merely extend their domination over the whole country.

The Mission notes with satisfaction that the erroneous views expressed by the Polish Delegation in its above-mentioned statement and the tendentious interpretation given to the Special Report by the said Delegation have prompted from the Indian Delegation the following remarks in its statement annexed to the said Report :

« The Indian Delegation has considered the Statement of the Polish Delegation. It does not agree with many of the views expressed by the Polish Delegation in its Statement, nor with its interpretation of the Special Report. The Indian Delegation reiterates its stand and findings, as formulated in the Special Report, which are strictly in terms of the Commission's responsibilities under the Agreement on the cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam. »

Far from altering the value of the Special Report of the International Commission for Control, the refusal by the Polish Delegation to sign this Report and the fallacious assertions of this Delegation towards the Republic of Viet-Nam only, vis-à-vis international opinion, strengthen the deep conviction deriving from the very terms of the said Report that the North Viet-Nam authorities are entirely responsible for the present tension in South Viet-Nam.

6. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S**N O T E****of June 14, 1962**

*Addressed to the Soviet Government concerning
the Special Report of the International Control Commission*

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and have the honour to draw their attention to the Special Report addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954 by the Chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam dated June 2, 1962.

2. Her Majesty's Government endorse the conclusions of the Commission's report and wish to draw the attention of the Soviet Union to certain important aspects of it. The Commission have decided that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the People's Army of Viet-Nam (i.e. the North Vietnamese) has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Cease-Fire Agreements in specific instances. The Report shows that the North Vietnamese have sent armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies into South Viet-Nam with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks directed against the armed forces and administration of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Furthermore the North Vietnamese have permitted the Zone in the North (i.e. North Viet-Nam) to be used for encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the South aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South (i.e. the Republic of Viet-Nam) in violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

3. While the report also refers to the violations of the Geneva Agreement by the Republic of Viet-Nam in receiving increased military aid from the United States it produces no evidence of any violation of the territory of North Viet-Nam by the Government of the South.

4. Her Majesty's Government draw special attention to the dates quoted in the report relating to the illegal activities of the North Vietnamese authorities and to the intensification of United States assistance. It is evident that the complaints of Northern subversion are of long standing. Reference to them was made as early as the 10th Interim Report which deals with the period beginning February 1, 1959, whereas the intensification in United

States assistance did not begin until December, 1961 — in other words long after the threat from North Viet-Nam had developed and after the Government of Viet-Nam had felt obliged, in face of the extensive plan of subversion and terrorism deliberately embarked upon by the Hanoi authorities, to request the Government of the United States to furnish assistance of a military nature to meet this threat.

5. The Report thus confirms the view expressed in Her Majesty's Government's Note of November 3, 1961 and their *Aide-Mémoire* of February 16 and April 19, 1962 that the activities of the North Vietnamese authorities were the root cause of the present troubles.

6. Her Majesty's Government, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, have twice requested the Government of the Soviet Union to join with them in appealing to the North Vietnamese to call a halt to their campaign in the South. The Soviet Union have however ignored those requests, which can now be shown to have been based upon a true interpretation of the situation. Moreover, the North Vietnamese authorities have, despite the overwhelming evidence, consistently denied responsibility for their activities in South Viet-Nam; these denials can now be seen in their true light. In contrast, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam have never sought to conceal the fact that they were obliged to call upon the United States Government for assistance to improve their defences to meet the threat from the North. In an exchange of letters, which was published on December 15, 1961, between the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the President of the United States, the defensive nature of this assistance and the reasons for it were clearly described. It is particularly significant that, in his letter President Kennedy stated expressly that if the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam would stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures the United States were taking to assist the South Vietnamese defence efforts would no longer be necessary. In a communication to the Commission dated December 9, 1961, the South Vietnamese Government stated *inter alia* « These measures can end as soon as the North Viet-Nam authorities will have ceased their acts of aggression and will have begun to respect the Geneva Agreement. » Furthermore, in a statement on March 1, 1962, the American Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, added that the United States have no desire for bases or other United States military advantages in Viet-Nam.

7. In the light of these assurances and of the findings of the Commission, Her Majesty's Government consider that the conclusion to be drawn in that urgent measures should be taken

to ensure that the North Vietnamese authorities return to the observance of the Cease-Fire agreement. Her Majesty's Government invite the Soviet Co-Chairman to consider the desirability of addressing a joint message from the Co-Chairmen to the Chairman of the Commission recommending that the immediate task of the Commission should be to ensure that further violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement are not committed by the North Vietnamese authorities. To this end it is suggested that the Commission should be invited to consider methods of dealing expeditiously with complaints by the Republic of Viet-Nam about current subversive activities and in order to put a stop to further infiltration of personnel arms and equipment, that the Commission should be invited to consider the stationing of mobile teams on the borders of Viet-Nam. It is also proposed that the Co-Chairmen should invite both sides to return to a policy of cooperation with the Commission.

8. Her Majesty's Government propose to circulate copies of the Commission's Special Report to the Governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos, France and the United States and that the report should be published in London and Moscow on June 21.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, September 18, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 4274/PDVN/CT/TD/11

Secretariat General

of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of Relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to draw the attention of the Commission to the military alliance that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has illegally established with the Chinese People's Republic. This agreement, concluded at the end of 1961, provides for military assistance in material of all types including financial aid from the Chinese People's Republic to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam for a period of 5 years.

2. This agreement has resulted in the introduction into North Viet-Nam of enormous quantities of military equipment and material of all kinds, coming from the Chinese People's Republic during the last 8 to 10 months. During the same period, a large number of military personnel from the Chinese People's Republic, including many technicians, entered North Viet-Nam illegally by plane, boat, and railroad through many crossing points. As usual, these arrivals escaped the control of the International Commission for Control for the good reason that they were never notified to the International Commission for Control according to the Geneva Agreement.

3. The military assistance pact between the Chinese People's Republic and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam covers a wide range of subjects and includes technical assistance for the establishment of military bases and the furnishing of military equipment. Among the numerous aid projects of the Chinese People's Republic, the following can be cited :

- a) The Chinese People's Republic will supply North Viet-Nam with 2,000 military trucks to be delivered in the next 5 years ;
- b) A huge military base is being constructed by the Chinese People's Republic in the area of Dien-Bien-Phu. This base is

composed of two parts, one 12 kilometers southeast of Dien-Bien-Phu and the other 7 kilometers from that locality ;

c) An airfield is under construction near Vinh, about 7 kilometers from Ha-Tinh, under the direction of technicians from the Chinese People's Republic.

4. It is also known that by virtue of this 5-year agreement, the Chinese People's Republic will contribute a sum equivalent to 24 million new rubles for North Vietnamese military expenditures.

5. As in the case of the military alliance concluded between Soviet Russia and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Mission protests strongly against this illegal military alliance between the Chinese People's Republic and North Viet-Nam, in violation of Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement. Such military alliances aim at helping North Viet-Nam prepare for aggression against South Viet-Nam and supporting the P.A.V.N.* in its present subversive activities in South Viet-Nam. The Mission requests the Commission to undertake urgently an investigation of these flagrant acts of aggression and to take immediate measures to end the intervention of military personnel of the Chinese People's Republic in the internal affairs of Viet-Nam and to expel these Chinese military personnel from North Viet-Nam.

The Mission also requests the Commission to immediately put an end to the illegal introduction of huge quantities of war material into North Viet-Nam by the People's Republic of China and order the ejection of the war material already received by the P.A.V.N. *

6. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : HOANG-THUY-NAM

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, April 23, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 1091/PDVN/CT/TD/11

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to draw to the attention of the Commission two protocols that the Communist authorities of Hanoi have just signed on the one hand with Communist China on the other with the Communist forces of the Pathet Lao, protocols that assume an open military character.

2. The signing of these two protocols was announced on the 11th and the 23rd of March 1962 respectively by Hanoi radio and press.

The first protocol signed in Hanoi on March 22, 1962 concerns railroad transport between Communist China and North Viet-Nam. By the terms of this agreement, Communist China undertakes to carry out important works in constructing and equipping the railroad network connecting China and North Viet-Nam, in order to facilitate and to intensify the furnishing of war material to the Communist authorities of Hanoi.

The second protocol, which supplements the first, concerns the question of forwarding war material coming from Communist China and from North Viet-Nam destined for the Communist forces in Laos. By this protocol, which was signed on March 10, 1962, North Viet-Nam undertakes to build new strategic roads and to repair existing ones in that part of Laos under Pathet Lao control.

3. The two protocols mentioned above, signed within 12 days' time by the Viet-Cong with its two neighbors of the North and of the Southeast, and both related to the improvement and the equipment of routes of strategic communication, fully prove the intention of their signatories. They merely confirm the information that the Mission has already sent to the Commission,

according to which the Hanoi authorities continue to receive from Communist China important quantities of war material, of which a great part is directed by the most rapid routes towards Laos and from there towards South Viet-Nam to supply the Viet-Cong troops in their attacks against the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The new agreements only confirm the existence of the military alliance between Communist China and North Viet-Nam, to which the Mission has already drawn the attention of the Commission (cf. letter No. 4274/PDVN/CT of September 18, 1961).

The Mission expresses its gravest concern at the intervention, more blatant each day, of Communist China in North Viet-Nam, and requests the Commission to register its opposition to the application of the above protocols, and to take all necessary measures so that strict control can be exercised at frontier terminals and the principal points of entry between Communist China, Laos, and North Viet-Nam.

5. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, September 18, 1961

Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.

N° 4276/PDVN/CT/TD/11

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

©

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to draw the attention of the Commission to the illegal presence in North Viet-Nam of a Russian military mission which is furnishing to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam advice and assistance on all military matters.

2. The P.A.V.N. * has introduced into North Viet-Nam a large number of Russian officers, instructors and technicians to train its troops in guerrilla warfare and to aid them in establishing new military bases and new airports. The military advisers and equipment arrive from Russia via Peking by train, by sea and by air, and enter North Viet-Nam by 3 points: Dong-Dang, Hai-Phong, and Gia-Lam.

These arrivals have never been notified to the International Commission for Control teams and controlled by the latter in accordance with established procedure.

3. More specifically, Soviet Russia has helped the P.A.V.N. * in the training of its troops and in the establishment of its military bases in the following places:

a) At the airport of Cat-Bi, Russian instructors train P.A.V.N.'s * pilots in the use of Russian aircraft such as the YAK 18.

This Mission has protested several times to the Commission against the use of North Vietnamese airports by Russian military

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

aircraft. In fact, it is known that Soviet Russia has placed at the disposition of the Hanoi authorities a large amount of war material including military aircraft and has helped them to create an air force illegally. In its letter No. 4175 of September 9, 1961, the Mission protested against the illegal transfer of 4 Russian aircraft to the P.A.V.N. * ;

b) an important guerrilla training center with huge storage facilities has been established with Russian assistance approximately 12 kilometers South of Thanh-Hoa, in the neighborhood of Tien-Doai ;

c) Russian military instructors train Viet-Minh guerrillas at an airport near Phu-Nho-Quan, west of Ninh-Binh. This airport also has large underground shelters for tanks and modern Russian jet aircraft.

4. The Mission protests strongly against this military alliance between the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and Soviet Russia, in flagrant violation of Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement.

It requests the Commission to urgently undertake an investigation and to take immediate measures to end the presence and the activity of Russian military personnel charged with the training of North Vietnamese troops, and to the illegal importation of huge quantities of arms and modern equipment, including jet aircraft, having the obvious purpose of aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

5. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : HOANG-THUY-NAM

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, March 23, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 1241/PDVN/CT/TD/11

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

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The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, in reference to its letters Nos :

4894/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of November 7, 1961

5109/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of November 18, 1961

5441/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of December 7, 1961

5738/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of December 29, 1961

450/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of January 31, 1962

has the honor to forward the following chronological lists of :

— round-trip flights made by Russian and Viet-Cong aircraft between Hanoi and different provinces and localities in Laos : Xieng-Khouang, Vang-Vieng, Tchepone, Phong-Saly, Muong-Sai, under Pathet-Lao control (period January 1-31, 1962) (*List 1*).

— flights made by Russian and Viet-Cong aircraft between airports in North Viet-Nam (period January 1-31, 1962) (*List 2*).

2. During the period noted above, that is, in 31 days, it was noted that :

— 78 flights were made within the territory of North Viet-Nam the most important being training flights conducted on 2, 3, and 18 January 1962 by 6 YAK-18's in the area of Haiphong ;

— 127 flights between North Viet-Nam and Laos, the most important being the flights made on 14 and 28 January, 1962 by formations of 8 and 7 Russian Ilyushins between Hanoi, Xieng-Khouang, and Hanoi.

During the same period :

— 242 planes provided the connection between North Viet-Nam and Laos, including :

- 171 IL-14 of Soviet Russia
- 10 AN-2 of Soviet Russia
- 1 MI-4 of Soviet Russia
- 38 LI-2 of the Pathet-Lao
- 21 LI-2 of the P.A.V.N.
- 1 AN-2 of the P.A.V.N.

— 109 planes made flights over North Viet-Nam, including :

- 15 IL-14 of Soviet Russia
- 6 MI-4 of Soviet Russia
- 2 MI-1 of Soviet Russia
- 18 YAK-18 of the P.A.V.N.
- 19 IL-14 of the P.A.V.N.
- 44 LI-2 of the P.A.V.N.
- 5 AN-2 of the P.A.V.N.

3. The Mission notes with regret that no action has yet been taken on its many letters of protest and reminder.

This has resulted in the intensification of activities by Russian aircraft flying from airports in North Viet-Nam in violation of Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement. For the single month of January 1962, up to 69 parachutings of personnel and war material were noted over the areas under control of the Pathet-Lao, particularly in the area of the Laotian-South Vietnamese border where one knows that Viet-Cong bases have been established for the purpose of infiltration into the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The P.A.V.N. * has further taken advantage of this situation to reinforce its war potential, in particular to import illegally a growing number of YAK-18, IL-14, LI-2, AN-2 and MIG aircraft which it did not have before the Cease-Fire, this in flagrant violation of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement.

4. The Mission expresses its gravest concern at this situation, which risks aggravating seriously the tension that presently exists in Viet-Nam. It strongly renews its request for control of North Vietnamese airports, particularly those of Gia-Lam, Dien-Bien-Phu, and Cat-Bi, by International Commission for Control teams.

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

It hopes that the Commission will not delay, in view of its mission of peace in Viet-Nam, in taking measures necessary to end the illegal activities of the Russian airlift and to make the North Vietnamese authorities respect the Geneva Agreement.

5. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYEN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, May 11, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

№ 1958/PDVN/CT/TD/11

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, referring to its letters Nos :

4894/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of November 7, 1961
5109/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of November 18, 1961
5441/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of December 7, 1961
5738/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of December 29, 1961
450/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of January 31, 1962
1241/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of March 23, 1962

has the honor to forward the following chronological lists of :

— round-trip flights made by Russian, Viet-Cong, and Laotian communist aircraft between Hanoi and different Laotian provinces and localities : Xieng-Khouang, Vang-Vieng, Tchepone, Phong-Saly, Muong-Sai, under Pathet-Lao control (during the period February 1-28, 1962) (*List No. 1*).

— flights made by Russian and Viet-Cong aircraft between the airports of North Viet-Nam (period February 1-28, 1962) (*List No. 2*).

2. During the period noted above, that is, in the space of 28 days, it was noted :

— 48 flights were made within the territory of North Viet-Nam ;

— 116 flights were made between North Viet-Nam and Laos, the most important being the flights made on February 9 and 12, 1962, by formations of 6 Russian IL-14's between Hanoi — Xieng-Khouang and Hanoi — Phong-Saly.

During the same period :

— 208 planes provided the connection between North Viet-Nam and Laos including :

144 IL-14 of Soviet Russia
1 MI-4 of Soviet Russia
23 LI-2 of the P.A.V.N.
2 AN-2 of the P.A.V.N.
20 LI-2 of the Pathet-Lao
16 AN-2 of the Pathet-Lao
2 MI-4 of the Pathet-Lao

— 58 planes made the above flights in North Viet-Nam, including :

16 IL-14 of the P.A.V.N.
24 IL-2 of the P.A.V.N.
2 AN-2 of the P.A.V.N.
15 IL-14 of Soviet Russia
1 MI-4 of Soviet Russia

3. The Mission requests the Commission to inform it of measures that it has taken or that it intends to take in order to put an end to these aggressive activities committed by the authorities of North Viet-Nam in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement.

4. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, June 21, 1962

Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.

N° 2488/PDVN/CT/TD/11

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

⑥

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, referring to its letters Nos. :

4894/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of November 7 1961
5109/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of November 18, 1961
5441/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of December 7, 1961
5738/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of December 29, 1961
450/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of January 31, 1962
1241/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of March 23, 1962
1958/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of May 11, 1962

has the honor to bring to the Commission's attention the following, relative to the Russian airlift in North Viet-Nam and Laos during the month of March, 1962 :

2. During the period March 1-31, 1962, it was noted that :

a) 46 flights were made within the territory of North Viet-Nam, by 53 planes including :

9 IL-14 of Soviet Russia
1 MI-4 of Soviet Russia
25 LI-2 of the P.A.V.N.
11 IL-14 of the P.A.V.N.
6 AN-2 of the P.A.V.N.
1 MI-1 of the P.A.V.N.

b) 173 flights were made between North Viet-Nam and Laos, the most important being the flight on March 7, 1962, by 7 Russian IL-14's between Hanoi — Xieng-Khouang — Hanoi.

For this connection, 374 planes were used including :

150 IL-14 of Soviet Russia
181 LI-2 of the Pathet-Lao
5 AN-2 of the Pathet-Lao
2 C-47 of the Pathet-Lao
2 MI-4 of the Pathet-Lao
31 LI-2 of the P.A.V.N.
3 AN-2 of the P.A.V.N.

2. The Mission strongly protests against this illegal functioning of the Soviet airlift, in flagrant violation of the terms of Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement. It once again requests the Commission to take urgently the measures necessary to put an end to these activities.

3. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYEN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, July 9, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 2809/PDVN/CT/TD/11

*Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission*

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, referring to its letters Nos :

4894/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of November 7, 1961
5169/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of November 18, 1961
5441/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of December 7, 1961
5738/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of December 29, 1961
450/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of January 31, 1962
1241/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of March 23, 1962
1958/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of May 11, 1962
2488/PDVN/CT/TD/11 of June 21, 1962

has the honor to bring to the Commission's attention the following :

During the period April 1-30, 1962, there have been :

a) 65 flights made within the territory of North Viet-Nam by 75 aircraft including :

6 IL-14 of Soviet Russia
21 IL-14 of the P.A.V.N.
32 LI-2 of the P.A.V.N.
15 AN-2 of the P.A.V.N.
1 MI-1 of the P.A.V.N.

b) 181 flights between North Viet-Nam and Laos, of which the most important were the flights on April 12, 1962, by 5 Soviet

Russian IL-14's and April 27, 1962, by 5 Pathet Lao LI-2's between Hanoi — Xieng-Khouang — Hanoi and Hanoi — Muong-Sai — Hanoi.

For this connection, 378 planes were used, including :

107 IL-14 of Soviet Russia

1 MI-4 —

186 LI-2 of the Pathet Lao

3 IL-14 —

2 MI-4 —

61 LI-2 of the P.A.V.N.

10 AN-2 —

2. The Mission requests the Commission to take urgently the necessary measures to put an end to the illegal functioning of the Soviet airlift that the P.A.V.N. * has at its disposal for the introduction of significant numbers of military personnel and great quantities of war material into South Viet-Nam via Laos.

3. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : LÊ-VAN-THANH

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, April 23, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 1692/PDVN/CT/TD/11

⑥

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission presents its compliments to the Secretary General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to inform it of the following :

2. According to information contained in « Jane's Fighting Ships », published in London (Edition 1961-1962), on the war ships of all the countries of the world, the sea forces of North Viet-Nam include at present (citation of the English text, page 429) :

« 25 to 30 Chinese-built « Swatow » class motor gunboats have been transferred to North Viet-Nam since 1958

« Naval personnel strength is reported to be about 2,000 officers and men. »

3. Thus, the P.A.V.N. *, which had no Navy before 1954, has illegally introduced war ships after the cease-fire and has formed a significant corps of naval personnel.

The information given by « Jane's Fighting Ships » reflects, however, only a part of the present naval forces of the P.A.V.N. * In fact, besides the 20 gun-boats illegally introduced and the creation of a naval corps, the P.A.V.N. * has received still other war ships, such as :

- 4 transport ships, each of 1,200 tons, from Communist China on September 28, 1957 ;
- 3 patrol boats (power 150 HP, speed 10 knots) from Communist China, put in service on October 18, 1958 and November 3, 1958 ;

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

- 4 tug-boats (power 200 HP) also provided by Communist China, put in service at Haiphong on March 14, 1958 and October 3 and 18, 1958 ;
 - 4 tug-boats offered by the U.S.S.R. after the cease-fire, the latest having been received on June 17, 1958 ;
 - 12 trawlers (power 100 HP, transport capacity 20 tons) from East Germany ;
 - 1 mine sweeper from the U.S.S.R. ;
 - 9 barges of different types given by Communist China and the U.S.S.R. in July and August, 1957 ;
 - 3 war ships of Russian origin equipped with radar seen at Haiphong on September 3, 1960.
- (cf. Mission's letters Nos :

4176 of November 3, 1958

5173 of December 27, 1958

4875 of October 4 1960).

The P.A.V.N. * has furthermore established an important naval training center at Vat-Chay (Hongay) and has constructed two new naval bases with Russian-Chinese aid at Dong-Hoi and the Island of Con-Co (Tiger Island) within the demilitarized zone respectively. It is from these bases that the P.A.V.N. * has launched armed incursions into the territorial waters of South Viet-Nam to introduce clandestinely there troops, political cadres, and subversive agents, or to commit actions of terrorism, such as the capture of South Vietnamese fishermen and their boats within the delimitarized zone last February. (Reference : Mission's letters No. 3364 of July 24, 1961 and No. 930 of March 3, 1962).

4. All the facts cited above constitute grave violations of Articles 16, 17 and 18 of the Geneva Agreement. The Mission again asks the Commission to take measures which will result in ending these violations, as well as the war preparations on which the P.A.V.N. * is embarking with the purpose of aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

5. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretary General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, August 24, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 3921/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to inform it of the following :

On July 24, 1961, a delegation composed of the Assistant Chief of Province of Darlac, two National Assembly Deputies for the provinces of Darlac and Pleiku, the Inspector of Primary Teaching of Darlac and the District Chief of Ban-Me-Thuot, left the provincial capital of Darlac about 9:30 A.M. for a trip to the regroupment centers for the montagnard population at Ea-Dong (AP.793.850). At about 1600 on the way back, the convoy of three vehicles, which was heading toward Ban-Me-Thuot, fell into an ambush about thirty kilometers South of that locality (AP.774.855) set by two sections of Viet-Cong armed with machine guns, muskets, spears, and cross-bows. The District Chief, the Deputy from Pleiku, and the Inspector of Primary Teaching in Darlac were killed at once. The Deputy from Darlac, two Civil Guard members of the escort and a driver were carried off by the attackers. The other occupants of the three vehicles in question were able to escape and hide in the forest.

Security forces were alerted and undertook pursuit of the Viet-Minh agents, who retreated toward the North, but they were unable to contact them. They found :

— the body of the Deputy from Darlac riddled with bullets and wounds inflicted in cold blood ;

- the bodies of the two Civil Guards tied to a tree and riddled with bullets ;
- the body of the driver also riddled with bullets.

2. Thus after innumerable assassinations carried out on village notables, civil servants, priests, teachers, etc..., the Viet-Cong now attack the montagnard population in the person of their representatives ; that is, they spare no one and use any means to cause terror to reign in South Viet-Nam.

These assassinations have provoked, both within and outside of Viet-Nam, strong feeling which has been expressed by the many motions of protest coming from all levels of the population and by messages of sympathy addressed to the National Assembly of the Republic of Viet-Nam by the parliaments of Free World countries.

The Mission protests most indignantly against such crimes deliberately perpetrated by armed Viet-Minh elements in violation of the Geneva Agreement. It requests the Commission to consider without delay, within the framework of its mission of peace in Viet-Nam and conforming to its decision of June 24, 1961, all possible measures and to use its authority with the rulers in Hanoi to make them respect the Geneva Agreement.

3. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretary General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : HOANG-THUY-NAM

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, January 2, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 0001/PDVN/CT/TD/2

*Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission*

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, following its letter number 4660/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of October 24, 1961, has the honor to bring to the attention of the Commission the following facts :

2. On November 7, 1961 at about 7 o'clock, returning from a visit to the villages under his jurisdiction, Lt Le-van-Nghia, district chief of Cau-Ke (Vinh-Binh province), fell into an ambush set by armed Viet-Cong elements about 2 kilometers from the district town. The latter exploded mines under the 2 vehicles and then fired machine guns at the occupants, killing one civil guard of the escort and wounding another. Himself wounded, the district Chief nevertheless fought back a few minutes longer but he too fell under the Viet-Cong bullets. The Viet-Cong took away arms and ammunition then massacred without pity and in cold blood the wife of the district Chief, his 2 children — aged 1 and 3 — and his 11-year old niece. They carried their savagery to the point of cutting off the heads of the youngest children.

The Mission forwards to the Commission the attached photos of members of the district Chief's family as seen on their death-bed as well as a petition voted by the representatives of different political, religious and professional groups of Vinh-Binh expressing their deep indignation regarding the Viet-Cong attack of November 7, 1961 and the savage murders that followed it.

3. On December 13, 1961, the Reverend Father Bonnet, returning to the provincial capital of Kontum after having held mass at the village of Ngokrongei, was attacked and savagely executed by 20 well-armed Viet-Cong, although there was no mistaking his identity.

4. On December 18, 1961 about 1830, a Viet-Cong battalion intercepted passing cars on the Saigon-Dalat road about 5 kilometers from Dinh-Quan (YT.614.424). About 10 vehicles were stopped and driven down a side-road where the Viet-Cong undertook systematic robbing of the travellers and of commercial freight including 16 tons of rice. A Japanese technician, Mr. Fukai, employed by the Mitsu Bussan Company, and his Vietnamese driver were carried off toward an unknown destination and the car was found burned several kilometers from the main highway.

5. The Mission indignantly protests against these acts of banditism and terrorism perpetrated by agents of the Viet-Cong, in violation of Articles 1, 10, 24 and 27 of the Geneva Agreement and without regard to the most elementary principles of humanity. The extreme barbarity with which the Viet-Cong attacked the wife and children of Lt. Le-van-Nghia, the savage murder of Father Bonnet, as well as the kidnapping of Mr. Fukai and his chauffeur, and the systematic pillage of travellers to Dalat demonstrate once again that the Viet-Cong do not shrink from any means, no matter how inhuman, to sow terror and insecurity in South Viet-Nam in order to carry out more easily their plan of aggression against this Republic.

6. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, February 16, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 689/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, referring to its letters Nos. :

4660 of October 24, 1961
5078 of November 16, 1961
5738 of December 29, 1961
403 of January 27, 1962
404 of January 27, 1962
605 of February 14, 1962

regarding terrorist and subversive activities of the Viet-Cong in South Viet-Nam, has the honor to bring to the attention of the Commission the following case :

On January 15, 1962 at about 1800 hours, a Viet-Cong squad armed with cutlasses descended upon the hamlet of Phu-Van, Phu-Hoa village, Chau-Thanh district, Binh-Duong province, and seized Miss Pham-thi-Doi, also known as Giau, of the Republican Youth of that village. They carried Miss Doi to a place located at XT.850.125 and savagely murdered her.

The victim was found with her hands tied behind her back, her head and her right arm completely cut off, and the body showing deep and numerous gashes made in cold blood. The murderers left on the body a death sentence accusing her of working for the Security Service of Phu-Loi.

2. The Mission sends to the Commission the attached copy of the death sentence signed by the « Liberation Forces of the South » as well as photos of the victim. The horrible scene of the head and right arm of Miss Doi completely severed from her body demonstrates all the barbarity and the atrocity of which the so-called « Liberation Forces of the South » are capable.

The Mission protests most indignantly against this new act of terrorism committed in violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement and without regard to the most elementary rules of humanity by Viet-Cong agents who, in their blind frenzy to carry out the orders of the Hanoi authorities, have not hesitated to find easy victories in cowardly attacking defenceless young women.

3. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN



Photograph of Miss Pham-thi-Doi of the Republican Youth of Binh-Duong province, savagely beheaded on January 15, 1961 by Viet-Cong terrorists.



Photograph of Miss Pham-thi-Doi of the Republican Youth of Binh-Duong province, savagely beheaded on January 15, 1961 by Viet-Cong terrorists.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, October 24, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 4660/PDVN/CT/TD/2

*Secretariat General of the International
Commission for Control*

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honour to refer to letters nos :

1196/DAP/C dated October 3, 1961

1296/DAP/C dated October 17, 1961 and

1298/DAP/C dated October 18, 1961

of the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam, concerning the abduction of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam, Chief of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control, committed by armed Viet-Cong elements, and requests the International Commission for Control to carry out an urgent investigation concerning this serious affair.

2. — By letter No. 3/PA/DSG/61 dated October 18, 1961, the International Commission for Control requested the Mission to provide it with the proof of the reported facts.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam deeply regrets that the International Commission for Control waited 17 days and after the confirmation of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam's death to acknowledge that it was ready only to examine the case, whereas the precise facts already reported to it were sufficient to undertake an investigation.

However, though late the investigation is, this government thinks that the Commission should conduct a serious investigation in order to establish the culpability of the communist authorities of North Viet-Nam concerning Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam's murder and to throw light on the atrocity committed by the communists.

3. — The kidnapping followed by the murder of Colonel Nam constitutes one of the most revolting cases of terrorism perpetrated

by the Viet-Cong in South Viet-Nam, which have already demonstrated the extreme savagery on the part of the authorities of Hanoi and their agents in the South who are determined to carry out their policy of terror and of force with a view to extending the communist domination to South Viet-Nam.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is convinced that the case of Colonel Nam must be taken not as an isolated one but as part of a vast plan of subversion and terrorism deliberately conceived by the Hanoi authorities, a plan which with this murder enters a new phase of execution, aiming at seizing power in South Viet-Nam.

This plan of invasion and conquest of South Viet-Nam constitutes a very serious menace for peace in South-east Asia. The intentions of the Communist authorities in Hanoi to annihilate by all means the Republic of Viet-Nam become more overt day by day. They have been clearly defined in a resolution taken in September 1960 by the Lao-Dong Party (Communist Party), of which the Hanoi regime is but an instrument. In this resolution it has been decided that a revolution should be conducted by the Party to overthrow the legal government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and «liberate the South» by all means, including the use of force. Since this date, the terrorist and aggressive acts deliberately perpetrated against the population as well as against the administration and the army of South Viet-Nam have become more and more numerous and intensified day by day in force and atrocity.

Therefore, to consider the case of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam's murder as an isolated one, separately from the program of subversion and aggression adopted by the Lao-Dong Party, would not mean to recognize the true significance of this crime.

4. — The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam firmly believes, in these circumstances, that the International Commission for Control is in duty bound to urgently examine and investigate, as a whole, the problem so raised in order to ascertain the tangible and irrefutable evidence of the direct participation of the communist regime of North Viet-Nam in all acts of terrorism and aggression committed by communist agents and troops in South Viet-Nam against the population, the Vietnamese administration and the national army.

These acts which are always premeditated and executed under the direction of the Hanoi authorities, constitute flagrant violations of the spirit and letter of the Geneva Agreement especially the provisions of Articles 10, 19 and 24 of this agreement which the International Commission for Control has formally admitted in its decision of June 24, 1961. They constitute moreover a long uninterrupted series of atrocities which shock the conscience and

degrade human dignity as shown by the savage murder of Colonel Nam.

It is in this spirit of indignation that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam solemnly requests the International Commission for Control to examine without any further delay the problem of communist subversion, terrorism and aggression in South Viet-Nam with a view to proclaiming the full responsibility of the Hanoi authorities and to condemning the latter for the atrocious crime committed on the person of Colonel Nam. This Government also requests the International Commission for Control to draw urgently the attention of the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to the extreme gravity of the communist subversive and aggressive plan in South Viet-Nam as well as to the serious consequences that this plan, deliberately conceived and executed under the direction of the Hanoi authorities, could present for the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia.

5. — To permit the International Commission for Control to successfully conduct its investigation, the Mission forwards to it the following documents and proof, sufficiently edifying, on the existence of such a plan as well as on the intimate ties between the Hanoi authorities and the so-called « Forces for Liberation of the South », which acts strictly according to the directives from the North :

**A) Policy of Viet-Minh subversion and aggression
against the Republic of Viet-Nam :**

This policy has been clearly defined as follows by Le-Duan, Secretary General of the Lao-Dong Party (Communist Party), during the Third Party Congress which was held in Hanoi on September 5-10, 1960 :

« There does not exist any other way outside that which consists in overthrowing the dictatorial and fascist regime of the American-Diemist clique in liberating completely South Viet-Nam, with a view to achieving national unity. »

(From *Nhan-Dan* (The People), Hanoi daily No. 2362 of September 6, 1960.)

The same *Nhan-Dan* of September 23, 1960, has commented on the resolution of the Lao-Dong Party third congress as follows :

« The immediate task of the revolution in the South as has been affirmed by the resolution of the Party Third Congress consists in... overthrowing the dictatorial clique in power in South Viet-Nam, in forming in South Viet-Nam a national democratic coalition government... »

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 5193 of October 20, 1960, attachment 1.)

Moreover here are some significant excerpts from the appeals directed at the montagnard population in South Viet-Nam by Hanoi Radio :

— *Broadcast of October 23, 1958 :*

« ... Compatriots ! unite yourselves and struggle fiercely to force the Government of the South to bestow on you autonomy... The Government and the whole population of the North are ready to support your struggle for liberty and autonomy ! »

— *Broadcast of October 26, 1958 :*

« ... the Government of our « venerated Ho » is behind you ; don't be afraid of death because we must know how to die to preserve our existence ; if you fear it, it will be imposed on you and you shall die all the same ! Compatriots, struggle to offer your life to the government of our « venerated Ho », as our montagnard compatriots of the North have already done. »

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 0041 of January 5, 1959, attachment 2.)

B) Front for liberation of the South :

In execution of this program, the « Front for Liberation of the South » as at once created by the Hanoi authorities with a view to pretending in the existence of a spontaneous popular movement against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Formal proof exists establishing the subordination of this Front to the Lao-Dong Party and its allegiance to the communist authorities of Hanoi. Stated below are some of such proof :

a) On the corpse of a Viet-Cong cadre killed at the front of Ban-Me-Thuot on August 16, 1961, whose identity has been designated simply under the initial « R », the following written instructions dated January 26, 1961 have been seized :

« In execution of the decision of the Lao-Dong Party third congress, the Front for liberation of the South has been created to unify the revolutionary struggle, overthrow the American-Diemist regime, and establish in South Viet-Nam a government of popular democratic union, with a view to the peaceful unification of the country.

« Without the direction of the Party, the revolution for liberation of the South could never succeed...

« In its political report read at the Party third congress, comrade Le-Duan, Secretary General of the Lao-Dong Party, said :

« The mission that the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam has before its eyes, consists in realizing a great national union, to overthrow the dictatorial clique of Ngo-dinh-Diem. »

(Reference photostats, *attachment 3*.)

b) Another proof of the subordination of the « Front for Liberation of the South » to the Viet-Minh Communist Party of Hanoi is provided by the following excerpts of the commentaries of the « Voice of the Front for Liberation of the South » :

« ... The Lao-Dong Party third congress has decided that the basic mission of the revolution in the South aims at liberating South Viet-Nam of despotism...

« In a general way, the above-mentioned decision of the Lao-Dong Party third congress concerning the revolution in South Viet-Nam has been correctly executed by the delegate of the Party for South Viet-Nam and the different echelons of the Party... »

(Broadcast of 2200 hours on May 18, 1961 of the Voice of the « Front for Liberation of the South ».)

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 3075 of July 8, 1961, *attachment 4*.)

« ... Through the instrumentality of its delegate for South Viet-Nam, the Central Committee of the Lao-Dong Party has ordered the revolutionary forces of the whole Southern region to launch a general offensive to strike vigorously and forcefully to keep in line with the evolution of the situation in Laos and other countries in Southeast Asia. The instructions of the Central Committee of the Party were to cut the supplying of the enemy forces and to disorganize their liaison. Therefore, it will be easier for us to destroy them and to achieve the seizing of power... »

« ... the delegate of the Party for South Viet-Nam has broadcast the decision of the Central Committee of the Party to all echelons of direction for study and execution. Most of the leaders of the Front as well as a certain number of units of the Forces for liberation have strictly and unconditionally executed the decision of the Central Committee of the Party... »

(Broadcast of July 6, 1961 of the « Voice of the Front for Liberation of the South ».)

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 3944 of August 25, 1961, *attachment 5*.)

c) Finally, here is the confession of the Hanoi authorities :

In its broadcast of 1930 hours on February 5, 1960, Hanoi Radio has publicly assumed responsibility for the « Forces for Liberation of the South » in the attack on a military post at Tay-Ninh (South Viet-Nam). The terms used in this broadcast : « our attack », « of our side » « our combatants », « we have », do not permit any question regarding the responsibility of the Hanoi authorities in this act of aggression.

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 909 of February 26, 1960, *attachment 6*.)

In its broadcast of September 23, 1961, Hanoi Radio also has broadcast a communiqué of the same so-called « Front for Liberation of the South », concerning the attack on Phuoc-Thanh, which presented this aggression as a victory of the Party. Finally, at the time of the last conference of the Interparliamentary Union held in Brussels in September 1961, the participating delegations each received an envelope mailed from Moscow, with the heading of the Embassy of North Viet-Nam in Moscow, containing a brochure of propaganda for the « Front for Liberation of the South ». Thus it would be difficult for the Hanoi authorities to deny that the « Front for Liberation of the South » is not their own creation.

C) Means of execution :

So the so-called « Front for Liberation of the South » is in reality the instrument of Viet-Cong aggression against South Viet-Nam. To permit this front to fulfil its mission, the Viet-Cong provide it with all means in men and material necessary for such a movement. This participation is manifested in the following ways :


1. Introduction into South Viet-Nam of Viet-Cong cadres.
2. Infiltration into South Viet-Nam of Viet-Cong military forces.
3. Introduction into South Viet-Nam of weapons, munitions and equipment of all kinds.

1 — *Introduction of Viet-Cong cadres :*

Well-trained Viet-Cong cadres have been illegally introduced into South Viet-Nam :

a) *by sea :*

— case of six Viet-Cong agents arrested on January 31, 1960 on board a junk drifting near the island of Ly-Son, Quang-Ngai province (reference the Mission's letter No. 2407 of May 20, 1960. *attachment 7*).



Five clandestine Viet-Cong agents captured on June 5, 1961, in the An-Hai Bay at Tourane (Quang-Nam province), on board a junk disguised as a fishing smack.

— case of five Viet-Cong spies arrested on board a fishing junk on June 5, 1961 in the An-Hai bay (Tourane).

— case of thirty-seven Viet-Cong arrested on board seven boats on June 14, 1961, off shore of Thuan-An (Central Viet-Nam).

— case of thirty-six Viet-Cong arrested on board seven boats on June 15, 1961 in the same area.

— case of twenty-nine Viet-Cong arrested on board six boats on June 17, 1961 at the mouth of the Thuan-An River.

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 3274 of July 19, 1961, *attachment 8*.)

b) through the demilitarized zone :

— case of Le-Kinh arrested on May 9, 1959, at the Cat-Son security post, in the Southern demilitarized zone. This man who came as a refugee from the North has confessed that he was sent on a mission of espionage in South Viet-Nam after a period of training in the North.

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 963 of March 1, 1960, *attachment 9*.)

— case of Vo-van-Kieu alias Cuong, arrested at Son-Thuan village, Quang-Nam province, on December 23, 1960. This man has crossed the Ben-Hai River at the same time as twenty-eight other Viet-Cong.

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 724 of February 20, 1961, *attachment 10*.)

*2 — Introduction of Viet-Cong armed elements
into South Viet-Nam :*

a) Via Laos :

After the 1954 cease-fire, Viet-Cong cadres had been introduced into South Viet-Nam on a small scale, but since the Viet-Cong have transformed Laos into an infiltration corridor, the situation has become more critical. The introduction of a great number of cadres as well as Viet-Cong regular units has increased the number of Viet-Cong in Central Viet-Nam from 1,000 at the end of 1959 to 5,000 towards the middle of 1961.

The declarations of Viet-Cong cadres, the regular Viet-Cong soldiers recently captured and the seizure of documents, afford sufficient proof of this infiltration via Laos :

— On September 3, 1961, a Viet-Cong soldier named Do-Luc was killed at Toumerong, Kontum province. His diary showed that he belonged to a Viet-Cong unit which had been recently fighting on the Laotian front.

At the beginning of 1961, he returned to North Viet-Nam. In May, 1961, he was assigned to a unit destined to operate in South Viet-Nam. He crossed the North Viet-Nam — Laos frontier with his unit on May 4, and his diary shows that he found himself on South-Vietnamese territory in the « Interzone V » in June.

— On September 18, 1961, Vo-van-Tan, Viet-Cong chief sergeant, was arrested in Saigon. He declared that his unit, Autonomous Battalion No. 2 composed of 250 men, after training in North Viet-Nam, had left Vinh (North Viet-Nam), and arrived at Quang-Nam province (South Viet-Nam) by passing through Thakhek situated in the Eastern part of Laos. His battalion continued on the route towards the High Plateaus of Central Viet-Nam and towards Ban-Me-Thuot where he deserted. (*Attachment 11.*)

— On September 26, 1961, a Viet-Cong captain named Nguyen-dinh-Kieu was killed at Dakakoi, Kontum province. According to the diary found on his corpse, Nguyen-dinh-Kieu and his unit left North Viet-Nam on June 11, 1961, walked on foot from Ha-Tinh towards Laos, penetrated into South Viet-Nam and arrived at Quang-Nam on July 18, 1961 and entered Kontum on August 13, 1961. According to this diary, Captain Kieu participated on September 9, 1961, in the attack against the post of Kondrai (Kontum).

— On October 3, 1961, a notebook belonging to a Viet-Cong physician named Mai-xuan-Phong was seized in the course of an engagement near Mewal, Ban-Me-Thuot province. According to this notebook, the unit, to which Phong belonged, left North Viet-Nam on April 22, 1961 and penetrated into Laos. After a stop at Muong-Phin (Laos), situated South of Tchepone (Laos), the unit in question reached a base situated along the Viet-Nam — Laos frontier on June 1. On June 10, this unit reached the Viet-Nam — Cambodia frontier and penetrated into Kontum province (Viet-Nam) on July 10. On August 7, this same unit entered Darlac (Viet-Nam) and on September 21, it participated in the attack against the agricultural development center of Quang-Nhieu, near Ban-Me-Thuot.

b) *directly from North Viet-Nam :*

— According to the documents seized in the Ca-Lu operational theatre (XY.959.470), on March 29, 1961, about 1,800 Viet-Cong soldiers, natives of the South and regrouped in the North, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam by passing through the territory of Quang-Tri province during the period between October, 1960 and March, 1961.

— According to the declarations of a Viet-Cong liaison agent made prisoner at Ba-Mao, the Viet-Cong company with which the

Ngày 17-6-1951 (Thứ 7)
 Ngày gần khỏ' thì 75"
 đã xuất p hát lúc 5 giờ
 45" tại khu rừng của tỉnh
 (Xa-ta-tha Khát, thuộc trung
 tâm) xuất p hát từ vị-phía
 Nam, và đi mất 10 giờ 30"
 đến một con suối, nghỉ trưa
 ăn trưa, rồi nghỉ đến 11 giờ
 15" lại đi tiếp!
 Đi mãi tới 2 giờ 30" thì tới tại
 trạm nghỉ gần rừng số 9.
 Và cũng là nơi nghỉ lại ngày
 hôm. Trong toàn rừng có
 trong ngày là đi như trên
 đường rừng và đường cái lùn!
 đi qua nhiều làng của đồng
 bào Lào, và qua nhiều
 con suối nước cạn, ngày
 đi trời nắng nhiều và rất
 nóng, đứng thì cũng là
 một ngày hành trình (đường
 Chả Khát và cũng hết (trung tâm)
 luôn là hành trình (đường)
 và nghỉ ở các bản làng
 ở đây (các bản xã của tỉnh
 (Xã-Bôn 12 km) một ngày hành
 trình (Hạ Lào)

Photostat of a page of a note-book of travel from North to South Vietnam,
 via Laos, kept by Nguyen-van-Luom, a Viet-Cong cadre, arrested on
 January 8, 1962 in the course of a military operation at Ky-Khuong
 village, Quang-Nam province.

(See translation on the next page).

TRANSLATION

17/6/1961

The 15th hard day of the trip — Starting at 5:45 hours from a forest in Thakhet province (Middle Laos) towards the South. At 10:30 hours, arrival at a brook, rest to prepare lunch — Departure at 11:15 hours.

At 14:30 hours, arrival at a relay post near road No. 9. Rest at this post for several days.

During the day we covered a distance of 25 kilometres of mountain track and highroad, across numerous Laotian villages and dry brooks.

Sunny and tiring day.

Last resting place on the territory of Thakhet province and at the frontier of Middle Laos — Preparations to enter Lower Laos — This relay post is 4 kilometres from the Air-port and 12 kilometres from Xe Bon province, a part of Lower Laos.

governmental troops had a violent skirmish on August 16, 1961, West of Ban-Me-Thuot (ZV.075.010), was composed of Viet-Cong regular elements recently introduced into South Viet-Nam through a secret passage situated west of Ban-Me-Thuot in the North-South direction. These elements were proceeded by other Viet-Cong regular troops composed of approximately two well-armed regiments.

All the Viet-Cong forces sent to the South have been intensively trained for the task which has been assigned to them. Let us cite as proof the declaration from Vo-van-Kieu, alias Cuong, captured on December 23, 1960. (*Attachment 10.*)

3. — *Introduction of weapons, munitions
and other materials into South Viet-Nam :*

a) *Weapons and munitions :*

— From the documents seized at Ca-Lu, during the period between October, 1960 and February, 1961, the Viet-Cong are shown to have transported the following armaments into South Viet-Nam, through the territory of Quang-Tri province, in addition to the quantities introduced illegally through the long frontier of Viet-Nam with Laos and Cambodia :

— *For Quang-Tri province :*

machine gun	:	40
sub-machine gun	:	80
pistol	:	12
carbine	:	308
grenade launcher	:	24
grenade	:	125

— *For Zone V :*

machine gun	:	115
sub-machine gun	:	78
carbine	:	2,342
cartridge for machine gun	:	75,054
— sub-machine gun	:	26,750
— carbine	:	488,388
grenade	:	421
bomb	:	2,292
gun powder	:	1,480 kilograms

— *For other sectors :*

machine gun	:	35
sub-machine gun	:	243
carbine	:	702 with cartridges

b) other material :

Provisions, medicines and materials of all kinds have been introduced into South Viet-Nam by sea as well as by mountain trails. Thus the cargo of the junk seized near the island of Ly-Son on January 31, 1960 consisted of nylon cloth, black cloth, white paper, medicines, electric wires, electric lamps, dry cell batteries, power equipment, duplicating machines printing ink, rice seeds, woollen under-clothes, with a total weight of about four tons.

(Reference the Mission's letter No. 2047 of May 20, 1960, *attachment 7*).

— According to documents seized at Ca-Lu, the Viet-Cong installed in the mountainous region of Quang-Tri province a provisioning center of 150 tons of rice, 100 tons of which had been bought in South Viet-Nam and the remaining 50 of which came from the North.


— Moreover, in the course of two engagements in the region of Ban-Me-Thuot on August 16-20, 1961, the governmental troops seized :

- weapons made by the Viet-Cong or of communist origin ;
- two P.38 pistols of East German make ;
- a number of fountain-pens, bearing the trademarks « Cuu-Long » and « Hong-Ha » made in North Viet-Nam ;
- anatomical drawings of the human body with annotations in Chinese characters edited in Communist China ;
- surgical instruments, syringes ;
- chemical products with labels from Hungary and Communist China ;
- khaki uniforms with accessories worn by soldiers of the North Vietnamese regular army ;
- maps, scaled 1/100,000, of the provinces of Hue, Quang-Tri and Binh-Thuan, edited in North Viet-Nam and showing military installations of these provinces marked with red and blue pencil (Photographs and documents attached, *attachment 12*).

D) Methods of execution :

How do the Viet-Minh execute this plan of subversion and aggression so carefully elaborated ?

Until the end of 1960, the principal objective of the Viet-Minh was to disorganize the administrative apparatus of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam by intensive fallacious propaganda and to create a climate of insecurity and terror among the population.



Photograph of a magnetic compass made in Shanghai (Communist China) seized at Ea-Wy front, Darlac province, on March 27, 1962.

On the directives of the Party, millions of subversive tracts were clandestinely distributed in various forms ; a campaign was simultaneously undertaken to spread false news destined to sabotage the morale of the population. For instance, a tract entitled: «Letter of the Provincial Committee of the Party at Long-An, addressed to peasant compatriots on the occasion of the kirthday of the Party's founding.» This tract bears the emblem of a red flag with a hammer and sickle and begins by these words : «The whole population of the South under the *direction of the Party...*» This constitutes a flagrant proof that directives came from the North. (Photostat, *attachment 13*).

Parallel with this subversive propaganda, the Viet-Cong daily launch acts of terror going from abductions to murders.

On October 2, 1961 the cases only most recently reported to the International Commission for Control by the Mission reached the figure of 806 deaths and 77 kidnappings, not including cases of serious mutilation committed by the Viet-Cong terrorists. These figures are far from reflecting the total number of innocent victims killed by Viet-Cong agents.

Most of the victims are simple and honest inhabitants, included among them many women and children. Such is the case of the attack on March 23, 1961 on a convoy of forty young women belonging to the Republican Youth of Phuoc-Tuy, in the course of which two were killed on the spot and nine others seriously wounded. One of these survivors was later savagely shot on April 1, 1961 at her dwelling. The Viet-Cong radio, in its broadcast of March 28, 1961 cynically claimed the responsibility for these reprehensible crimes. (Reference the Mission's letters No. 1437 of April 4, 1961 and No. 1552 of April 10, 1961, *attachment 14*).

The Viet-Cong terrorists have also assassinated numerous chiefs of district, village officials, teachers, rural sanitary service agents, etc... Recently, two deputies of the High Plateaus and the chiefs of Vinh-Long and Phuoc-Thanh provinces as well as the assistant chiefs of Phuoc-Thanh and Quang-Ngai provinces have fallen before Viet-Cong bullets.

Death sentences (specimen attached, *attachment 15*) are often left on the corpses of victims, bearing the signature and seal of the «Forces for Liberation of the South», a Viet-Cong created organization as noted above.

Also victims have often shown traces of savage tortures or have been cold-bloodedly beheaded, atrocities of which only the communist agents are capable. (Photos attached, *attachment 16*).

From the end of 1960, while intensifying their terrorist activities, the Viet-Cong implemented their plan of invasion of Souh Viet-Nam by overt acts of aggression against the territory

of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The policy of subversion of the northern authorities has shifted so that it has now become one of a true war waged openly against the Republic of Viet-Nam. Thus :

- On October 21, 1960, the Viet-Cong attacked the Kontum-Pleiku region. (Reference the Mission's letter No. 5567 of November 10, 1960, *attachment 17*).
- On July 16, 1961, Viet-Cong Battalion No. 502 reinforced by the elements of regional companies attacked Kien-Phong and Kien-Tuong provinces. (Reference the Mission's letter No. 3623 of August 10, 1961, *attachment 18*).
- On September 1, 1961, two Viet-Cong battalions attacked simultaneously civil guard posts of Poko and Dakha and the Toumerong district headquarters, Kontum province. (Reference the Mission's letter No. 4174 of September 9, 1961, *attachment 19*).
- On the night of September 17-18, 1961 two battalions of Viet-Cong regular troops attacked the provincial town of Phuoc-Thanh and savagely executed the chief of province, his assistants as well as ten civil servants and inhabitants among whom were included a woman and a child.
- On August 13-17, 1961, at the provincial boundaries of Dinh-Tuong and Kien-Tuong provinces, several engagements took place between governmental troops and Viet-Cong Battalion No. 514.
- On August 21-26, 1961, governmental troops were engaging with the elements of Battalion No. 506 on the boundary of Tay-Ninh and Binh-Duong provinces.
- On August 30, 1961, an engagement took place at Chuong-Lac, Phong-Dinh province, between governmental troops and two companies of Viet-Cong Battalion Tay-Do.
- On August 16-26, 1961, governmental troops had several skirmishes near Ban-Me-Thuot with armed Viet-Cong elements recently introduced into South Viet-Nam.

6. — The proofs which have just been presented demonstrate in an irrefutable manner that the present enterprise of subversion, terrorism and aggression in South Viet-Nam is in fact the work of the Lao-Dong (Communist) Party of North Viet-Nam, i.e. the Hanoi authorities, and that all the activities overt and covert of the so-called « Front for Liberation of the South », a creation of the Viet-Cong, have been obviously carried out on the directives of the same authorities. With a view to extending the communist domination and seizing power in South Viet-Nam, the authorities of the North have not stopped at any means, no matter how inhuman. Thousands of victims are killed on the spot and the



Photograph of medicines of Hungarian make, seized at Vinh-Binh front (South Vietnam).

security and the peace of South Viet-Nam are gravely menaced, a situation which endangers the peace in this part of the world.

Conscious of this grave menace, Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam, when he was living and during seven long years, spared no effort to draw the attention of the International Commission for Control and of world opinion to the Machiavellian plan of international communism. It is certain that this tenacity and this courageous attitude of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam has seriously impeded the plan of the Viet-Cong who saw in him an implacable foe. So, after having attacked with vehemence the International Commission for Control's decision of June 24, 1961, recognizing subversion as a violation of the Geneva Agreement, the Hanoi authorities decided to cold-bloodedly suppress Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam.

This odious crime which has profoundly moved and aroused the indignation of public opinion and which shocks the human conscience bears the indelible mark of the Viet-Cong terrorists.

In fact the declarations of Nguyen-van-Ninh, chauffeur of the car No. NBQ 285 of Colonel Nam, and those of the gardener Nguyen-van-Hon, caretaker of his farm at Di-An (Bien-Hoa), are explicit regarding the participation of armed Viet-Cong elements in the abduction of Colonel Nam on October 1, 1961.

It follows unhappily from the confessions of Nguyen-van-Hon that it was he himself who served as a source of information for the Viet-Cong Provincial Committee of Bien-Hoa province. A demobilized civil guard, Nguyen-van-Hon, over two years ago entered the service of Colonel Nam as a gardener-caretaker of his property located at Dong-Hoa village, Di-An district (Bien-Hoa). He has confessed having been contacted twice by Nguyen-van-Chang, a notorious communist, who was a native of the same village as Hon and whom Hon knew since 1953. Chang called on Hon the first time on February 5, 1961 at the farm of Colonel Nam, accompanied by eight armed Viet-Cong to exhort him to serve as an information agent of the Communist Provincial Committee of Bien-Hoa, under the menace of extermination of all his family if he refused. The information about the comings and goings of Colonel Nam were thus regularly furnished by Hon to Chang until June 29, 1961, the day on which the latter came the second time to contact Hon in order to inform him that he had received from his superiors of the Provincial Committee of Bien-Hoa the order to organize the abduction of Colonel Nam. On the basis of precise information given by Hon, an ambush was set for 1030 hours on October 1, 1961 on Colonel Nam's farm by a gang of ten well armed Viet-Cong, two of whom were dressed in black whereas the other eight wore khaki uniforms with helmets. All

of them wore the insignia of the Viet-Cong army, a yellow star on a red background, sewn on their chest and announced that they belonged to the « Front for Liberation of the South ». They acted swiftly under the direction of Chang ; three of them took Colonel Nam away in his own car under the threat of their weapons, while the remainder of the group vanished into the neighbouring forest. The chauffeur came back alone to the farm with the Colonel's car half an hour later.

The declarations of the gardener Nguyen-van-Hon are absolutely explicit : the abduction of Control Nam was definitely an operation planned and organized by the Viet-Cong forces commanded by Chang of the Di-An sector, on the directives of the Communist Provincial Committee of Bien-Hoa. Moreover the investigation has shown that Chang has been an active member of the Communist Party since 1947 and has always carried out his activities in the sector of Thu-Duc and Gia-Dinh ; embarked to the North after the armistice, this man received the order of the Party to come back to the South in order to operate in his old sector with the rank of company commander. (*Attachment 20*).

Therefore, there is not any doubt, under these circumstances, that the murder of Colonel Nam, whose corpse was discovered seventeen days after his abduction, was the work of the same individual and of his murdering accomplices. The report of the coroner certified that the victim was subjected to horrible tortures until his death and before his being immersed in the water : chest burned, intestines mashed, arms and legs hacked, jaws bound with an iron wire. (*Attachment 21*).

The Mission expresses its unspeakable indignation in the face of this barbarous crime and forwards to the International Commission for Control the attached photographs of the corpse of Colonel Nam. (*Attachment 22*). The Mission is convinced that none of the proofs is more edifying than these horrible pictures and that the International Commission for Control, conscious of its mission, will not fail to formally condemn the Communist authorities of the North not only for their cowardly murder of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam, which constitutes an act of challenge toward the International Commission for Control, but also for all other acts of subversion and aggression for which the Viet-Cong have rendered themselves guilty in defiance of the Geneva Accords and the most elementary principles of humanity.

7. — The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, November 20, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 8182/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to bring to the Commission's attention the following facts :

a) On the night of March 14-15, 1961, after having attacked the district town of Lac-Thien, Darlac Province, armed Viet-Cong broke into the wounded veterans' home in the vicinity. While one group of Viet-Cong assembled the wounded undergoing treatment in the home, another group sacked the dormitories and took clothing and other items worth 30,000 \$ as well as the home cash fund of more than 100,000 \$. Before leaving, the Viet-Cong wanted to set fire to the home buildings and to its vehicles, but they were deterred from their criminal project by the opposition of the occupants of the home.

b) On April 2, 1961, a Dodge truck carrying 9 war invalids from the home at Lac-Thien (Darlac Province) headed toward the central market of Ban-Me-Thuot to purchase food supplies. On arriving at the place called Buon Yang Reh (AP.998.823), the vehicle was the object of a cowardly attack by armed Viet-Cong, during which 2 war invalids were killed on the spot and 2 others were seriously wounded.

2. Profoundly disgusted with these odious murders, the Vietnamese Veterans' Association, meeting on April 16, 1961, at Phong-Dinh, voted a petition addressed to the International Commission for Control :

— denouncing before national and international public opinion the crimes committed by armed Viet-Cong elements against defenceless wounded veterans ;

— requesting the International Commission for Control to take adequate measures to put an end to these terrorist Viet-Cong activities prejudicial to the order and peace of South Viet-Nam.

The Mission encloses the above-mentioned petition and protests most energetically against such acts of banditism and terrorism perpetrated by armed Viet-Cong agents in violation of Articles 1, 10, 24 and 27 of the Geneva Agreement.

It takes this occasion to request again and most insistently that the International Commission for Control urgently examine the problem of Viet-Cong subversion in South Viet-Nam of which the International Commission for Control has been informed since 1955.

3. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, June 7, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 2341/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to inform it of the following :

About 8:00 p.m. on May 30, 1962, armed Viet-Cong broke into a leprosarium located near Ban-Me-Thuot and directed by the « Christian Missionary Alliance ». After having made a systematic pillage and taken a large quantity of medicines, the Viet-Cong carried away toward an unknown destination 3 American civilians, one a woman doctor and the other two missionaries of the above organization, who were part of the hospital staff :

Doctoress E.A. Vietty
Pastor A. E. Mitchell
Pastor Daniel Gerber

2. The Mission recalls to the attention of the Commission that already :

— on March 7, 1960, armed Viet-Cong attacked the Ben-San leprosarium (Cf. the Mission's letter No. 1318 of March 2, 1960) ;

— on March 15, 1961, other bands of armed Viet-Cong ransacked the war veterans' home at Lac-Thien (Cf. Mission's letter No. 5152 of November 20, 1961).

The recent pillage of the leprosarium at Ban-Me-Thuot and the kidnapping of 3 American members of the staff of this philanthropic establishment is a new crime to be added to the

already-long list of kidnappings, assassinations, and other acts of terrorism committed against religious figures, educators, rural health agents, etc... by the Viet-Cong in South Viet-Nam. This is not only in violation of the Geneva Agreements but also and above all in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity.

The Mission protests most indignantly against the unspeakable attack against the leprosarium at Ban-Me-Thuot and the kidnapping of 3 of its staff members. It requests the Commission to intervene urgently with the Hanoi authorities, who are responsible for this kidnapping, in order to secure the immediate liberation of the victims.

3. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, May 8, 1962

Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.

N° 1893/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to inform it that, during the night of April 5-6, 1962, strong Viet-Cong elements launched a violent attack against the post of An-Hoa, Quang-Ngai Province.

After the engagement, government troops seized an important amount of war material left on the battlefield by the Viet-Cong, including 57 mm SKZ cannons, heavy machine guns, machine guns, and sub-machine guns, several rifles, and a large quantity of ammunition of all calibers, among which was a large number of SKZ 57 mm shells and explosives of Chinese Communist manufacture.

This type of arms and ammunition of Chinese Communist origin was moreover used by the Viet-Cong troops in other attacks against the legal forces.

2. Examination of the captured arms is in progress. While awaiting the results, the Mission believes it necessary to inform the Commission at present of the facts that have so far been revealed regarding the SKZ cannons and ammunition utilized by the Viet-Cong troops in their attack of April 6, 1962.

A. — SKZ 57 mm Cannon (photos attached)

The troops of North Viet-Nam are equipped with these cannons which are manufactured in Communist China, according to the American model from which they differ only in minor respects. The characteristics of these cannons are as follows :

caliber : 57 mm
range : 4,000 yards
weight : 22 kgs
length : 1,57 meters
rate of fire : 15 rounds/minute

B. — SKZ 57 mm shells (High explosive anti-tank type)

They are of two categories :

a) Category 1 (See photo 1 and scheme 1)

Inscriptions in Chinese characters are visible at the end and on the casing of the shells, proving that they were made in Communist China.

b) Category 2 (See photo 2 and scheme 2)

This category is marked as made in the United States, but the markings are badly imitated and do not resemble the arrangement of markings on American anti-tank shells. These shells resemble, on the whole, those of Category 1 above in their casing, shellhead, and color.

C. — Explosives of Chinese Communist make (Photo 3)

These explosives resemble a pocketbook :

length : 10 cm
width : 5 cm
thickness : 2.5 cm

On one of the two faces of these explosives is found a label with the following in Chinese characters :

稀恩稀药块
(*Quyêt dược đê ân đê*)

which mean : « Explosive T.N.T. »



Weight : 200 grams

3. The evidence cited above establishes formally that :

— the North Vietnamese authorities have received important military aid from Communist China ;



Photograph of a 57 m/m SKZ cannon made in Communist China, seized on April 6, 1962 at An-Hoa front, Quang-Ngai province.



Photograph of 57 m/m SKZ cannon shells seized from the Viet-Cong on April 6, 1962 at An-Hoa front, Quang-Ngai province. Chinese characters are visible at the tip and the case of the shells category 1, proving that these shells were made in Communist China.

Category 2 is an awkward imitation from American shells.





Diagram of 57 m/m SKZ cannon shells of Communist Chinese origin, seized on April 6, 1962 at An-Hoa front, Quang-Ngai province.



Photograph of an explosive of Communist Chinese origin, seized on April 6, 1962 at An-Hoa front, Quang-Ngai province. The annotations in Chinese characters on one of the faces of these explosives mean :

« TNT explosive » — « Weight : 200 grs ».



7,9 m/m Mat. 49 shells seized on May 13, 1962, at Lac-Thien front (Darlac province).

The captured shells are of 2 categories :

- a) those made in Communist China bearing at the lower ring the Chinese character 来 as a trade-mark ;*
- b) those made in Soviet Russia or in communist countries bearing at the lower ring a 5-point star as a trade-mark.*

— a large part of this aid was introduced illegally into South Viet-Nam to reinforce the firepower of Viet-Cong units operating against the government forces.

The Mission renews its protestations against these flagrant violations of the provisions of the Geneva Accord committed by the Hanoi authorities. It requests the Commission to consider urgently adequate measures to end massive military aid from the Communist powers, particularly that of Communist China, to North Viet-Nam, and the introduction of Communist arms and munitions into South Viet-Nam intended to intensify the guerrilla war against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

4. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, August, 10, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 3823/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

©

The Mission in charge of Relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to inform it of the following :

On July 16, 1961, an engagement took place 7 kilometers Northwest of My-An district town, in the heart of the Plaine des Joncs, at the borders of Kien-Phong and Kien-Tuong provinces, between Viet-Minh battalion 502 reinforced by elements of regional companies, and Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces. During the battle which raged for 4 hours, the Viet-Minh were beaten into retreat across the swamps toward the Cambodian border. They nevertheless left 167 bodies on the battlefield, including one identified as that of the Commander of the 271st Company of Battalion 502.

Our forces captured 9 Viet-Minh and seized the following arms :

- 1 heavy 30-cal. machine gun
- 8 machine guns
- 17 sub-machine guns
- 38 rifles
- 8 carbines
- 4 pistols
- 3 locally-made rifles
- 1 tripod for a 60 mm mortar

as well as documents proving the connection between this unit and the Communist regime in the North :

— a flag of the Front for Liberation of the South ;

- slogans inciting the people to rebel against the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam ;
- a biography of Ho-chi-Minh ;
- the bulletin « Thong-Tin » (Information), propaganda organ of the Liberation Front for Kien-Phong Province ;
- « Lumière du Printemps » (poems to the Communist Party in the North) ;
- « Comrade Tran-Phu, first secretary of the Indochinese Communist Party » ;
- Manifesto of the Liberation Front ;
- Brilliant Victories of Friendly (communist) countries in 1960 ;
- Poems of To-Huu : « We have had the Party (communist) for 30 Years » ;
- 12 questions and answers concerning revolutionary directives for South Viet-Nam ;
- a few words on the Communist doctrine ;
- Resume of the Labor Youth statute of Viet-Nam ;
- Speech of Ho-chi-Minh at the general assembly of Labor Youth of Viet-Nam in Hanoi on March 24, 1961.

2. According to the captured documents and the testimony of the prisoners of war, Battalion 502, under the direct orders of the provincial Viet-Minh delegate for Kien-Phong, had to its credit numerous ambushes and attacks on rural militia posts during 1960 and 1961 :

- on February 14, 1960, at My-tra
- on March 1, 1960, at Nga-Chua
- on March, 1960 at Nhi-My
- on March 28, 1960, at Ca-Mac
- on March 28, 1960, at Ca-Lang
- on April 12, 1960, at Hoa-Binh
- on April, 1960, at My-Tho
- on May 10, 1960, at Phu-Tha
- on May 15, 1960, at Phong-My
- on June 8, 1960, at Dinh-Dien Sa-Lai
- on August, 1960, at Phong-My
- on August 2, 1960, at Dan-Lo
- on September, 1960, at An-Binh
- on May 25, 1960, at My-Quy
- on July 1, 1961, at My-Hoa
- on May 18, 1961, at Gay-Co-Den

The documents noted above furnish new evidence of the strict dependence of the Front for Liberation of the South on the Central Committee of the Lao-Dong Party (Viet-Minh Communist Party) which heads the so-called « Government of the Democratic Republic of North Viet-Nam ».

These documents also reveals that the Viet-Minh Communist Party has for its objective, after establishing and consolidating the Communist regime of North Viet-Nam, provoking by both political and military means trouble in South Viet-Nam with the aim of overthrowing the legal Government and substituting one headed by those obedient to communist direction.

Just at the attacks on posts in Kontum and Pleiku in October 1960, the presence in South Viet-Nam of Viet-Minh Battalion 502 under command of P.A.V.N. * officers constitutes another flagrant violation of Articles 1, 10, 24 and 27 of the Geneva Agreement.

In protesting strongly against these new acts of aggression by the Hanoi authorities against South Viet-Nam, the Mission requests the International Commission for Control to undertake an investigation, in accordance with its decision of June 24, 1961, and to take the necessary measures to end these aggressive activities of Northern agents.

3. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : HOANG-THUY-NAM

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, September 9, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 4174/PDVN/CT/TD/2

*Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission*

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to inform the International Commission for Control of the following :

On September 1, 1961, at 5:00 A.M. regular Viet-Minh forces estimated at 2 battalions simultaneously attacked civil guard posts at Poko (YB.909.335), Dakha (ZD.150.364), and the district town of Toumerong, in the province of Kontum.

The district town of Toumerong was resisting energetically, and the aggressors had to retreat. But the posts of Dakha and Poko, being too isolated and defended by numerically inferior forces, fell into the enemy's hands. Military authorities of the tactical region then sent reinforcements which reoccupied the Poko post on the forenoon of September 1. As for the Dakha post which had resisted heroically for 4 hours and fell only because of the enemy's superior numbers, it was not retaken until September 5 after bloody fighting, due as much to the difficult forest terrain as to the large number of Viet-Minh soldiers which had overrun it.

According to our information, the 2 Viet-Minh battalions that attacked these posts were made up of young men in khaki uniforms, with complete equipment. They were armed with machine guns, sub-machine guns, and grenade-launchers. Their means of transport were ultra-modern and directed by radio. It seems that the two units belonging to the 325th Division, whose presence in Laos and in the region of A-Choc and Tchepone (Northern and Southern demilitarized zone) has been reported to the Commission several times.

2. It is not difficult to explain why P.A.V.N.* forces launched such an operation in Kontum against these two civil guard posts. Actually, after the successive annihilation of its 502, 504, 506, 514, and «Tay-Do» battalions in the provinces of Kien-Phong, Kien-Hoa, Phong-Dinh, and Ban-Me-Thuot, the P.A.V.N.* felt the need to take revenge and to recover its lost prestige towards the population. It chose on that occasion the eve of its September 2 anniversary to restore the morale of its troops. But, not daring to venture into the Delta where its battalions have been defeated and where the risks were much greater, it preferred to attack the two isolated posts in Kontum which, because of their proximity to the Laotian border, could offer them an easier retreat on the other side of the border where they are based. These reasons also explain why the Communist authorities of Hanoi have always vehemently opposed investigations which the International Commission for Control has planned to make, on the request of this Mission, regarding the attacks in Kontum and Pleiku in October 1960 by regular Viet-Cong forces.

3. In bringing this early information to the attention of the International Commission for Control, the Mission wishes to draw the Commission's notice to the deliberate character of these attacks which constitute grave and flagrant violations of Articles 1, 10, 24, and 27 of the Geneva Agreement. It requests the Commission to undertake at once a serious investigation of the cited facts, in order to condemn the Hanoi authorities for these acts of intolerable aggression.

4. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : HOANG-THUY-NAM

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.



A wounded Viet-Cong war prisoner receives medical care at Kien-Tuong, Dinh-Tuong front. On his left was sitting the Chief of Section Hoang-van-Y, of Company 242, Viet-Cong Battalion 504, captured on May 23, 1962 at the same front.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, January 27, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 425/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to inform it that on January 18, 1962, the Viet-Nam News Agency of Hanoi announced that as a result of a conference of Marxist-Leninist representatives in South Viet-Nam held at the end of December, a new political party was created, the « People's Revolutionary Party of Viet-Nam » (Annex 1).

Radio Hanoi, in its broadcast at 1145 on January 19, 1962, officially broadcast this news as well as the declaration *in extenso* of the above Party, dated January 1, 1962 (Annex 2).

2. The Mission draws the attention of the Commission to the most significant passages as follows :

« ... In 1945 compatriots throughout the country — *under the leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party* — rose to overthrow the French-Japanese rule, carry out the August revolution successfully, set up the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam...

« The conference of *Marxist-Leninist* delegates in South Viet-Nam, meeting in the last days of December 1961, decided to set up the « People's Revolutionary Party of Viet-Nam », and approved a platform as well as the statutes of the Party.

« ... The immediate tasks of the People's Revolutionary Party are : to unite and lead the working class, the peasantry, the laboring people, and all compatriots in South Viet-Nam in struggling to *overthrow the rule of the imperialists and feudalists who are the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, the Ngo-dinh-Diem clique ; to liberate South Viet-Nam ; and to set up a broad democratic coalition government.*

« The Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party warmly supports the declaration and program of action of the National Liberation Front and volunteers to join the Front's ranks. It pledges to participate in the Front's activities and to unite and cooperate closely with all democratic parties, religions, and patriotic people's organizations in the National Liberation Front in order to struggle for the realization of the Front's program.

« It appeals to all Southern compatriots and overseas compatriots to tighten their ranks under the banner of the party and that of the Liberation Front, rise and overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys — the Ngo-dinh-Diem clique.

« It appeals to northern compatriots to do their best to build North Viet-Nam into an increasingly rich and powerful region and *turn North Viet-Nam into a firm base for the struggle for national unification* and to actively support Southern compatriots in carrying out their present revolutionary work. »

« It appeals to the socialist countries, etc... »

3. Thus, having created what they call the « Front for Liberation of the South » to serve as a façade for their subversive activities in South Viet-Nam, the Communist authorities in the North have just entered a new phase of their aggressive policy by establishing openly South of the 17th parallel, a new organization to fight for the seizure of power, in grave violation of the cease-fire Accords of 1954.

It is significant indeed that, in its declaration of January 1, 1962, the « People's Revolutionary Party of Viet-Nam » affirmed its adherence to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, recalled the Indo-chinese Communist Party, and pledged itself without reserve to follow the directives of the latter, making into its own the program of action of the « Front for Liberation of the South », which is a creation of the Lao-Dong Party with the aim of overthrowing the legal regime of South Viet-Nam and replacing it by a popular democratic government along the lines of popular democratic regimes of the socialist countries.

It is no less significant that, from its beginning, the new party has made an appeal to the socialist bloc for aid, i.e., to aid the Communist authorities in the North themselves to realize their ambitions.

Finally, in exhorting the Northern authorities to transform North Viet-Nam rapidly into a base of aggression for the seizure of power and the reunification of the country by force, the « People's Revolutionary Party of Viet-Nam » has only expressed faithfully

the very intentions of these authorities, i.e., of the Lao-Dong (Communist) Party itself, conforming to the directives announced by this party during its 3rd Congress in September 1960.

4. This new development dangerously aggravates the situation already made tense in South Viet-Nam by the subversive intrigues of the Viet-Cong.

In the name of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Mission protests most strongly against the illegal creation of the « People's Revolutionary Party of Viet-Nam » by the Northern authorities and solemnly appeals to the Commission to exercise its influence with them to demand the immediate dissolution of the above-mentioned Party.

5. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYỄN-VAN-AN

Red-Led « People's Revolutionary Party » Founded

Hanoi, January 18, 1962 (V.N.A.)

According to the South Viet-Nam Liberation Press Agency, a new political party — the Viet-Nam People's Revolutionary Party — was recently founded there. This followed a conference of representatives of Marxist-Leninists in South Viet-Nam held in late December 1961, it said.

The party « stands in the ranks of the South Viet-Nam National Liberation Front ».

L.P.A. also released a declaration of the party, dated January 1, 1962, on the occasion of its founding.

The declaration says that « for generations, the Vietnamese people from North to South have joined their efforts to build up their country, and they have united to oppose foreign aggression and to defend the national independence and territorial integrity of the fatherland ».

It recalls that though the Geneva agreements signed in 1954 recognize the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, the United States imperialists, regardless of their commitments at the Geneva conference, have interfered more and more deeply in South Viet-Nam. They have colluded with the most reactionary feudal and comprador capitalist administration represented by Ngo-dinh-Diem, carried out savage persecution, massacre, repression and exploitation of the South Viet-Nam people.

They seek to undermine the Geneva agreements and carry out their scheme to partition the country permanently to turn the Southern part of the country into a colony and military base of American imperialism and prepare for war.

As a result, it notes, « the reunification of our country has not yet been achieved, and Viet-Nam still remains divided into 2 parts, with 2 different social regimes. Therefore, the Vietnamese people also have 2 different revolutionary tasks ».

The declaration continues :

« To defend and wrest back their right to live and regain independence and human liberty, the South Vietnamese people have no other way out than to unite and rise up in struggle to throw off the barbarous U.S. — R.O.V. yoke, and liberate South Viet-Nam. That is the imperative task of all the people in South Viet-Nam. »

« To fulfil their glorious historic task at the present stage, the working class, peasantry and other toiling people in South Viet-Nam need a vanguard a thoroughly revolutionary political party of their own. »

The declaration says that « the Viet-Nam People's Revolutionary Party is the party of the working class and labouring people of South Viet-Nam, and also the party of all patriotic people in South Viet-Nam, a party wholeheartedly devoted to serving the fatherland, serving the people ».

The immediate task laid down by the party is :

« To unite and lead the working class, peasants, and other labouring people, all people in South Viet-Nam, to struggle to overthrow the imperialist and feudal yoke, at present the U.S. imperialists and the ROV clique — lackey of the United States —, liberate South Viet-Nam, set up a broad national coalition administration, achieve national independence, democratic liberty, improve the life of the people, bring back land to the tillers, develop industry and trade, expand culture and education, ensure adequate food and clothing for everybody, and advance toward peaceful reunification of the country, thereby contributing to the maintenance of world peace. »

The declaration adds :

« The Viet-Nam People's Revolutionary Party warmly responds to the manifesto and programme of action of the South Viet-Nam NLF, voluntarily stands in the ranks of the front, and pledges itself to take an active part in all the activities of the front, closely unite and cooperate with all organizations of the South Viet-Nam National Liberation Front, in order to struggle for the realization of the front's programme. »

« To achieve national solidarity, the Viet-Nam People's Revolutionary Party's stand is to respect the legitimate rights and interests of the various classes, parties and groupings, and of all strata of patriotic people, and to give all round assistance to the national minorities in a spirit of complete equality in rights, interests and duties. »

In foreign relations, the declaration points out : « the Viet-Nam People's Revolutionary party stands for solidarity and friendship with all peoples and countries, first and foremost with the neighbour countries, giving active support to the national liberation movement, making an active contribution to the struggle against war seeking colonialism and imperialism and for the safeguarding of world peace.

Carrying forward the glorious historic cause of the forerunner revolutionary parties, the Viet-Nam People's Revolutionary Party is

determined to overcome all difficulties, and struggle to the end to bring peace, independence, freedom and happiness to the people in South Viet-Nam, the declaration stresses, adding :

The People's Revolutionary Party

— Calls on the working class, the peasantry, and other working people in South Viet-Nam to unite closely around the party.

— Calls on all the people in South Viet-Nam and Vietnamese living abroad to close their ranks under the banners of the party and of the South Viet-Nam National Liberation Front, resolutely march forward to throw off the yoke of the U.S. imperialists and the ROV clique, lackey of the United States.

— Calls on the soldiers, officers and members of the ROV administration to stand, for the cause of national independence and freedom of the fatherland in the ranks of the people, and contribute to overthrowing the cruel yoke of the U.S. — ROV clique.

— Calls on the people in the North to strive to build an ever more prosperous and strong North Viet-Nam making it a solid basis for the struggle for peaceful reunification of the country, to give active support to their compatriots in South Viet-Nam in their present revolutionary struggle.

— Calls on the socialist countries, the nationally independent countries, and the working class and peace loving people throughout the world, to support the Vietnamese people in their struggle for national independence and for peaceful reunification of their country.

— Calls on the members of the party to devote all their revolutionary ardour to wholeheartedly serving the people and the fatherland, endeavour to carry out the programme of the party and the programme of action of the South Viet-Nam National Liberation Front, and strive to overcome all difficulties, brave all sacrifices and hardships, and march forward heroically under the glorious and certainly victorious vanguard banner of the party.

The declaration expresses the party's determination « to struggle to fulfill its glorious historic task — overthrowing the U.S. — ROV yoke, and regaining independence, democracy and peace for the South Vietnamese people, thereby contributing to the peaceful reunification of the country, and the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and throughout the world ».

BẢN TIN TỨC TRÍCH ĐÀI PHÁT THANH HÀ-NỘI

ngày 19-1-1962 — 11 g 45

Theo Thông tấn xã Giải phóng, Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt Cộng vừa được thành lập ở miền Nam. Ngày 1-1-1962, Đảng ra tuyên bố như sau :

Nước Việt-Nam là một, dân tộc Việt-Nam là một, từ bao đời nay dân tộc Việt-Nam, từ Bắc chí Nam, đã cùng nhau ra sức xây dựng nên nước Việt-Nam, cùng nhau đoàn kết chống ngoại xâm, bảo vệ độc lập dân tộc và toàn vẹn lãnh thổ của Tổ quốc. Trải qua gần 100 năm đoàn kết và đấu tranh bất khuất chống ách thực dân, năm 1945, dưới sự lãnh đạo của Đảng Cộng Sản Đông Dương, đồng bào cả nước đã vùng lên đánh đổ ách thống trị Nhứt, Pháp, làm cách mạng tháng 8 thành công, lập nên nước Việt-Nam dân chủ cộng hòa, và cùng nhau kháng chiến thắng lợi.

Hiệp nghị Genève năm 1954 được ký kết, công nhận chủ quyền độc lập, thống nhứt và toàn vẹn lãnh thổ của nước Việt-Nam, nhưng đế quốc Mỹ, bất chấp những điều họ đã cam kết ở hội nghị Genève, can thiệp ngày càng sâu vào miền Nam nước ta, cấu kết với chính quyền phong kiến, tư sản ngoại bán phản động nhứt hiện nay, đại biểu là Ngô-Đình-Diệm, tiến hành khủng bố, tàn sát, áp bức, bóc lột dã man đồng bào miền Nam, phá hoại hiệp nghị Genève, thực hiện âm mưu chia cắt lâu dài nước ta, biến miền Nam nước ta thành thuộc địa và căn cứ quân sự của đế quốc Mỹ và chuẩn bị chiến tranh.

Vì vậy, đến nay sự nghiệp thống nhứt nước nhà chưa được thực hiện, nước Việt-Nam còn bị chia làm hai miền, có hai chế độ xã hội khác nhau, nên nhân dân Việt-Nam cũng có hai nhiệm vụ cách mạng khác nhau.

Dưới ách thống trị tàn bạo của đế quốc và phong kiến, dưới chế độ áp bức, bóc lột và khủng bố tàn sát đẫm máu của Mỹ-Diệm, các tầng lớp nhân dân miền Nam đang sống trong cảnh vô cùng đen tối, nạn chết chóc, bần cùng đang uy hiếp mọi người.

Đề bảo vệ và giành lấy quyền sống, giành độc lập và tự do của con người, nhân dân miền Nam Việt-Nam không còn có con đường nào khác hơn là phải đoàn kết đứng lên đấu tranh, lật đổ ách thống trị dã man của Mỹ-Diệm, giải phóng miền Nam.

Đó là nhiệm vụ cấp thiết của toàn thể đồng bào miền Nam Việt-Nam. Để làm tròn nhiệm vụ lịch sử vẻ vang của mình trong giai đoạn hiện nay, giai cấp công nhân, nông dân và nhân dân lao động miền Nam Việt-Nam cần có một đội tiên phong, một chính đảng triệt để cách mạng của mình. Hội nghị đại biểu những người theo chủ nghĩa Marx, Lénine ở miền Nam họp trong những ngày cuối tháng 12-1961 đã quyết định thành lập đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt-Nam, và đã thông qua cương lĩnh và điều lệ của Đảng.

Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt-Nam là đảng của giai cấp công nhân và nhân dân lao động miền Nam Việt-Nam, đồng thời cũng là đảng của toàn thể nhân dân yêu nước ở miền Nam Việt-Nam.

Hội nghị trước mắt, nhiệm vụ trước mắt của Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt-Nam là đoàn kết, lãnh đạo giai cấp công nhân, nông dân, nhân dân lao động và toàn thể đồng bào miền Nam Việt-Nam đấu tranh đánh đổ ách thống trị của đế quốc và phong kiến, hiện nay là đế quốc Mỹ và tập đoàn Ngô-Đình-Diệm, tay sai của Mỹ, giải phóng miền Nam, thành lập một chính quyền liên hiệp dân tộc dân chủ rộng rãi, thực hiện độc lập dân tộc, tự do dân chủ, cải thiện đời sống của nhân dân, làm cho người cấy có ruộng, phát triển công thương nghiệp, mở mang văn hóa giáo dục, làm cho mọi người được cơm no áo ấm, tiến tới hòa bình thống nhất nước nhà. góp phần bảo vệ hòa bình thế giới.

Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt-Nam nhiệt liệt hưởng ứng tuyên ngôn và chương trình hành động của Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền Nam Việt-Nam, và tự nguyện đứng vào hàng ngũ của Mặt trận, tích cực tham gia các hoạt động của Mặt trận, đoàn kết và hợp tác chặt chẽ với các đảng phái dân chủ, các tôn giáo và các đoàn thể yêu nước trong Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền Nam Việt-Nam, để đấu tranh thực hiện chương trình của Mặt trận.

Để thực hiện đoàn kết dân tộc, Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng

Việt-Nam chủ trương tôn trọng quyền lợi chính đáng của các giai cấp, các đảng phái và các tầng lớp nhân dân yêu nước, giúp đỡ về mọi mặt cho các dân tộc thiểu số trên tinh thần bình đẳng hoàn toàn về quyền lợi và nghĩa vụ.

Về mặt đối ngoại, Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt-Nam chủ trương đoàn kết và hữu nghị với các dân tộc và các nước, nhất là các nước láng giềng tích cực ủng hộ phong trào giải phóng dân tộc, tích cực góp phần vào cuộc đấu tranh chống chủ nghĩa thực dân và đế quốc gây chiến, và bảo vệ hòa bình thế giới.

Thưa toàn thể Đồng bào yêu quý, và toàn thể các Đoàn viên thân mến,

Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt-Nam kể tục sự nghiệp lịch sử vẻ vang của các đảng cách mạng tiền bối, quyết vượt mọi khó khăn, phấn đấu đến cùng để đem lại hòa bình, độc lập, tự do và hạnh phúc cho đồng bào miền Nam Việt-Nam.

Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt-Nam kêu gọi giai cấp công nhân, giai cấp nông dân và nhân dân lao động miền Nam hãy đoàn kết chặt chẽ xung quanh Đảng.

Kêu gọi toàn thể đồng bào miền Nam và kiều bào ở nước ngoài hãy xiết chặt hàng ngũ dưới ngọn cờ của Đảng, của Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền Nam Việt-Nam, cương quyết tiến lên đánh đổ ách thống trị của đế quốc Mỹ và tập đoàn tay sai Ngô-Đình-Diệm của Mỹ.

Kêu gọi binh sỹ, sỹ quan và những người trong chính quyền miền Nam hãy vì sự nghiệp độc lập dân tộc và tự do của Tổ quốc, đứng về hàng ngũ của nhân dân, góp phần đánh đổ ách thống trị tàn bạo của Mỹ-Diệm.

Kêu gọi đồng bào miền Bắc ra sức xây dựng miền Bắc ngày càng giàu mạnh, làm cơ sở vững chắc cho cuộc đấu tranh để hòa bình thống nhất nước nhà, tích cực ủng hộ đồng bào miền Nam trong sự nghiệp cách mạng hiện nay.

Kêu gọi các nước xã hội chủ nghĩa, các nước dân tộc, độc lập, giai cấp công nhân và nhân dân yêu chuộng hòa bình trên thế giới,

hãy ủng hộ nhân dân Việt-Nam trong cuộc đấu tranh giành độc lập dân tộc và hòa bình thống nhất nước nhà.

Kêu gọi toàn thể đảng viên của Đảng, hãy đem hết nhiệt tình cách mạng, hết lòng hết sức phục vụ nhân dân, phục vụ tổ quốc, ra sức phấn đấu để thực hiện cương lĩnh của đảng và chương trình hành động của Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền Nam Việt-Nam, ra sức khắc phục mọi khó khăn, không quản hy sinh gian khổ, dũng cảm tiến lên dưới ngọn cờ tiên phong vinh quang và quyết thắng của Đảng.

Với ý chí cách mạng sắt đá của toàn thể đảng viên, với sức phấn đấu anh dũng của giai cấp công nhân, nông dân và nhân dân lao động, với sức đoàn kết và đấu tranh bất khuất của toàn thể đồng bào miền Nam, với sự đồng tình của đồng bào cả nước và kiều bào ở nước ngoài, với sự ủng hộ tích cực của các... và dân chủ trên của các lực lượng hòa bình và dân chủ trên toàn thế giới, Đảng Nhân dân cách mạng Việt-Nam quyết phấn đấu hoàn toàn thắng lợi nhiệm vụ lịch sử vẻ vang của mình, đánh đổ ách thống trị của Mỹ-Diệm, giành lại độc lập, dân chủ và hòa bình cho đồng bào miền Nam Việt-Nam, góp phần thực hiện hòa bình thống nhất Tổ quốc, giữ gìn hòa bình ở Đông Nam Á và thế giới.

Ngày 1 tháng 1 năm 1962

Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng Việt-Nam.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, May 30, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 2209/PDVN/CT/TD/2

*Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission*

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, referring to its letters Nos :

425 of January 27, 1962
1894 of May 8, 1962

regarding the « Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party », has the honor to bring to the Commission's attention the Viet-Cong documents cited below, which have just been captured by the military authorities in Ba-Xuyen Province.

2. They are highly-secret circulars Nos. :

510/AQ of December 7, 1961
511/AQ of December 7, 1961
512/AQ of December 8, 1961

addressed by the Lao-Dong Party provincial Committee for Ba-Xuyen to the district committees of this province.

Written in sympathetic ink, these documents concern the development, and contain Lao-Dong Party instructions relative to the founding of the « People's Revolutionary Party of South Viet-Nam ».

The Mission forwards to the Commission the attached copies of these documents and draws the Commission's particular attention to the following most important passages :

a) *Circular No. 510/AQ of December 7, 1961 :*

« To D2 and K,

« In regard to the foundation of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Viet-Nam, the creation of this party is only a matter of strategy ; it needs to be explained within the Party (Lao-Dong Party) ; and, to deceive the enemy, it is necessary that the new Party be given the outer appearance corresponding to a division of the Party (Lao-Dong Party) into two and the foundation of a new Party, so that the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda.

« Within the Party, it is necessary to explain that the founding of the People's Revolutionary Party has the purpose of isolating the Americans and the Ngo-dinh-Diem regime, and to counter their accusations of an invasion of the South by the North. It is means of supporting our sabotage of the Geneva Agreement, of advancing the plan of invasion of the South, and at the same time permitting the Front for Liberation of the South to recruit new adherents, and to gain the sympathy of non-aligned countries in Southeast Asia.

« The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence ; actually, our Party is nothing but the Lao-Dong Party of Viet-Nam (Viet-Minh Communist Party), unified from North to South, under the direction of the central executive committee of the Party, the chief of which is President Ho.

«

« ... During these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Viet-Nam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose...

« ... Do not put these explanations in Party bulletins... »

b) *Circular No. 511/AQ of December 7, 1961 :*

« To D2 and K,

« Regarding the changing of the Party's name, several points should be noted.

« The reasons for the change in the Party's name must be kept strictly secret. According to instructions of the Central Committee, one must not tell the people or Party sympathizers, that the People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao-Dong Party of

Viet-Nam are one. One must not say that it is only a tactic, because it would not be good for the enemy to know. (Don't repeat the contents of the preceding circular...)

c) *Circular No. 512/AQ of December 8, 1961 :*

« ... Study the instructions so that you will be able to execute them. In passing them to D2V, D2, and K, be very careful that the documents do not fall into enemy hands. After D2N/C has passed to the sections, destroy the written documents immediately... »

3. The three above-cited documents from the Ba-Xuyen provincial committee of the Lao-Dong Party leaves no doubt any longer either about the links between the Lao-Dong Party, which is to say, the Communist authorities in the North, and the so-called People's Revolutionary Party, or about the purpose behind the creation of this new Party.

By the admission of the Lao-Dong Party itself :

— the creation of the People's Revolutionary Party is only a strategic manœuvre ;

— « this new Party has only the appearance of an independent existence ; actually, there is only one Party, which is the Lao-Dong Party unified from North to South, under the leadership of Ho-Chi-Minh. »

— the main purpose of this strategy is to « sabotage the Geneva Agreement and to advance the plan for invasion of the South. »

The exceptional precautions taken by the leaders of the Party in Ba-Xuyen, such as the use of sympathetic ink for the drafting of the 3 messages in question, the instructions for absolute secrecy given to Viet-Cong cadres designated by the initials and not by their name, and the order to destroy the documents after reading, shows the importance that the Lao-Dong Party attaches to keeping its secret plan of aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam from being known not only by international opinion but also by the people of the South.

4. These documents are sufficiently explicit in themselves to prove that it is certainly the Lao-Dong Party or the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam that foments and directs all subversive activities in South Viet-Nam, whatever name that this Party wishes to rig up for itself to give it a legal appearance in South Viet-Nam.

In light of such formal evidence which has just been added to the mass of evidence already furnished to the Commission, the Mission is convinced that the Commission now realizes the direct and true link that exists between the Lao-Dong Party of North Viet-Nam and its phantom creations, the so-called « Front for Liberation of the South » and the « People's Revolutionary Party », as well as the plan of open and direct aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam by the Communist authorities of Hanoi.

5. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYEN-VAN-AN

Secret circulars
N^o 510, 511, 512,
of December 7, 8, 1961

Số 510 — AQ

KHẨN

Kính gửi Các D2 và K,

Việc thành lập Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng miền Nam.

Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng chỉ là một vấn đề sách lược cần giải thích trong Đảng, và để che mắt địch, cần có một hình thức bề ngoài tương xứng với việc tách đôi một Đảng và thành lập một Đảng mới để địch không có lý-do xuyên-tạc.

Trong Đảng cần nói rõ việc thành lập Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng là một sách lược nhằm cô lập thêm Mỹ-Diệm để bác luận điệu của chúng tố cáo miền Bắc xâm lược miền Nam. Vịn vào đó mà phá hoại Hiệp nghị Genève và đẩy mạnh xâm lược miền Nam đồng thời cũng đề Mặt trận giải phóng miền Nam tranh thủ thêm một số tầng lớp trên vào Mặt trận, tranh thủ sự đồng tình của các nước trung lập ở Đông Nam Á.

Việc thành lập Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng miền Nam chỉ là một thể chủ động bề ngoài, thực tế bên trong Đảng ta là Đảng Lao động Việt-Nam thống nhất từ Bắc chí Nam dưới sự lãnh đạo của Ban Chấp Hành Trung ương Đảng đứng đầu là Hồ Chủ-tịch.

Cần phải nhận rõ thực chất của vấn đề để không hoang mang bị quan, ngày càng ra sức tăng cường đoàn kết, chống đầu óc địa phương cục bộ.

Trong khi giải thích chú ý giữ bí mật tuyệt đối, như là ở miền Nam để địch không biết rõ mục đích của ta.

Ngay cả trong Đảng nên xét thấy giải thích đến đảng viên quá tẻ thì tìm cách giải thích đại ý thế nào cho hiểu được vấn đề, không nên nói hết.

Không được dùng giấy tờ đảng vào nội san giải thích. Trong nhân dân cần giải thích công khai dựa vào bảng tuyên bố công khai, nhưng phải khéo léo lãnh đạo tư tưởng của q.c.

Ngoài giấy tờ cần giải thích miệng cho quần chúng hiểu rằng Nam Bắc bao giờ cũng một nhà. Việc làm này chỉ có lợi cho C.M. miền Nam hơn, thúc đẩy cuộc đấu tranh thống nhất đất nước mau thành công hơn, cô lập Mỹ-Diệm hơn. Và miền Bắc bao giờ cũng tích cực ủng hộ miền Nam.

Ngày 7-12-61.

Số 511 — AQ.

Kính gửi Các D2 và K,

Vì việc đổi tên Đảng nhắc thêm mấy điểm.

Cần giữ bí mật tuyệt đối về đổi tên Đảng. Theo chỉ thị của Trung ương là không nói với q.c., cả q.c. gần Đảng là Đảng Nhân Dân Cách Mạng và Đảng Lao Động V.N. là một. Và cũng không nói đây là sách lược nếu lộ ra địch biết là không có lợi (không nói theo Điện trước).

Đối với q.c. thì dựa vào bản tuyên bố thành lập Đảng Nh/d CM miền Nam mà giải thích, nếu q.c. thắc mắc vì những điểm sau đây có thể nói :

Đảng Lao-động Việt-nam ở miền Nam thành lập ra Đảng Nh/d CM khi quần chúng hỏi về đảng viên Đảng Lao-động Việt-nam trước đây thế nào.

Hồ Chủ-Tịch là lãnh tụ của dân tộc của cả nước ta.

Đảng Lao-động Việt-nam làm Cách mạng xã hội chủ nghĩa. Đảng Nh/d CM lãnh đạo nhân dân miền Nam làm cách mạng dân tộc, dân chủ đánh đổ Mỹ-Diệm.

Đánh đổ Mỹ Diệm chủ yếu là do nhân dân miền Nam đấu tranh cho thống nhất nước nhà và tiến lên xã hội chủ nghĩa là nhân dân cả nước. Miền Bắc ủng hộ miền Nam, miền Nam tự giải phóng.

Cần tranh thủ giải thích cho đảng viên, tránh giấy tờ về ngày giờ ra bản tuyên-bố có thể chậm hơn trước để kịp chuẩn bị.

Ngày 7-12

Số 512 — AQ.

Kính gửi Các D2 và K,

AQ gửi đến các đ/c bức thư trên, nói thêm về vấn đề đổi tên Đảng và bức thư của AG nhắc và sửa đổi một số điểm tuyên-truyền giải-thích sắp tới.

Các anh nghiên-cứu để thi-hành. Trong việc phổ biến cho các D2V, D2, K cần hết sức cẩn thận tránh lộ liễu và lọt vào tay địch. Sau khi D2 n/c phổ biến xong cho Chi bộ thì thủ tiêu tờ giấy liền.

Thời gian sẽ nói thêm, các nơi cần tuyên truyền giáo dục cho thật kỹ trong nội bộ. Như trong bức điện trên có nói. Nếu thấy giải thích rõ trong đảng viên, đoàn viên mà không giữ được bí mật thì có kế-hoạch phổ biến khéo léo, không nói rõ hết mà nói đại ý thôi, hoặc đảng viên, đoàn viên nào thấy không đảm bảo thì càng lại không phổ biến theo nội dung bản tuyên bố trên gửi xuống.

Thời gian công bố có thể kéo dài thêm các nơi cần giữ bí mật triệt để trước khi ra q. c.

Được thư này các anh báo cáo cho đ/c AV công tác trong Huyện hay và trao cho đ/c xem thư này để góp ý-kiến trong việc thi hành.

Thân ái
Ngày 8 - 12
TTAQ.

TRANSLATION OF SECRET CIRCULARS

Nos. 510, 511, 512 AQ of 7, 8 December 1961

of the Lao Dong Party to its cadres in South Viet-Nam

Circular No. 510/AQ of 7 December 1961 :

« To D2 and K,

« Concerning the founding of the People Revolutionary Party of South Viet-Nam.

« The creation of the People Revolutionary Party is but a question of strategy ; it needs to be explained within the Party (Lao-Dong Party) ; and in order to deceive the enemy, it is necessary that the new Party (People Revolutionary Party) receives an outward form corresponding to the division of a Party (Lao-Dong Party) into two, and to the founding of a new Party in order that the enemy may not use it for their propaganda.

« Within the Party, it is necessary to explain that the founding of the People Revolutionary Party aims at isolating more the Americans and the regime of Ngo-Dinh-Diem, and at rejecting their accusations of invasion of the South by the North. That is a point d'appui which will enable us to sabotage the Geneva Accords, to accelerate the plan of invasion of the South, simultaneously to permit the « Front for the Liberation of the South » to recruit new partisans, to win the sympathy of non-aligned countries in Southeast-Asia.

« The People Revolutionary Party in South Viet-Nam has but an ostensible independent existence ; in reality, our Party is nothing but the Lao-Dong Party of Viet-Nam (Viet-Minh Communist Party), unified from North to South, under the direction of the Central Executive Committee of the Party whose chief is President Ho.

«

« In the course of explanations, take care to strictly keep it secret, chiefly in South Viet-Nam, in order that the enemy may not discern our aim...

« Do not insert your explanations in the Party's bulletins... »

Circular No. 511/AQ of 7 December 1961 :

« To D2 and K,

« As far as the change of the Party's name is concerned, it is relevant to remember some points.

« The reasons of the change of the Party's name must be strictly kept secret. According to the instructions of the Central Committee, we must not tell anyone even the Party's sympathizers that the People Revolutionary Party and the Lao-Dong Party of Viet-Nam are but hand in glove together. We must not tell either that this is only a question of tactic, for it is not good that the enemy know it. (Do not repeat the terms of the preceding circular)... »

Circular No. 512/AQ of 8 December 1961 :

« ... Examine these instructions for execution. In the diffusion to D2V, D2 and K, be very prudent so as to prevent the documents from falling into the enemy's hands. After the diffusion of D2 N/c to the sections, destroy the written documents immediately... »

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, December 9, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 5486/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, in the name of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, has the honor to inform the International Commission for Control of the following :

In the Mission's letter No. 4660 of October 24, 1961, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam furnished to the International Commission for Control detailed information on the flagrant violations of the 1954 Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement being committed by the so-called « Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam » through its campaign of terrorism and subversion in South Viet-Nam, a campaign which constitutes a direct if camouflaged case of aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam. In the above-cited letter, the Mission had particularly asked the International Commission for Control to undertake an urgent investigation of the shameful murder of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam, the Republic of Viet-Nam's accredited representative to the International Commission for Control, a murder committed by those who all the while pretended to respect that international organization. Further information and documents proving the presence in Viet-Nam of regular units of the « People's Army of Viet-Nam » were sent to the International Commission for Control in the Mission's letter No. 5078 of November 16, 1961.

These letters constitute only the most recent examples of the numerous appeals addressed by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the International Commission for Control to fulfil its responsibilities by inviting North Viet-Nam, signatory of the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreements, to cease its attacks against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

To say that all these appeals went unheeded, that the campaign of aggression, far from diminishing, has each day become a heavier burden for the people of Free Viet-Nam, is but to reflect on the absence of any response to these appeals as well as on the trend of recent events.

In the face of the aggression directed by the so-called « Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam » against the Republic of Viet-Nam in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested the Government of the United States to increase the aid in personnel and in material which it has accorded to Viet-Nam in the past.

The right of « self-defence » being a legitimate and inherent attribute of sovereignty, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is obliged, by North Viet-Nam's continued violation of the Geneva Accords and its contempt for the life and property of the free people of Viet-Nam, to exercise this right and to request increased assistance.

These measures can be terminated as soon as the authorities of North Viet-Nam will have ended their acts of aggression and will have begun to respect the Geneva Accords.

As one means of contributing toward the diminution of North Viet-Nam's unprovoked hostile acts against the Republic of Viet-Nam and to restore peace in this region, the Vietnamese Government has recently proposed to the International Commission for Control that it carry out effective controls in certain important areas now being used as avenues of infiltration into South Viet-Nam by the aggressors (Reference : Mission's letter No. 5482 of December 9, 1961).

The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYỄN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon April 3, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 1422/PDVN/CT/TD/11

⑥

*Secretariat General
of the International Commission for Control*

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and has the honor to refer to the Commission's letter No. OPS/III (5)-A/1010 dated March 9, 1962, and to the Mission's letters No. 5486 dated December 9, 1961, and No. 722 dated February 21, 1962.

1. By letter No. 722 dated February 21, 1962, the Mission has already dealt with most of the allegations contained in the four messages of the P.A.V.N. * mentioned in paragraph 6 of the Commission's letter referenced above. The Mission furnishes the following comments on the remainder of these allegations.

a) No jet-aircraft have been introduced into South Viet-Nam as has been alleged in complaint No. 477 of the P.A.V.N. * There are no jet-aircraft in Viet-Nam other than those which from time to time are here in transit or for a short visit.

b) Concerning the allegation contained in Message No. 202 of the P.A.V.N. *, that a new military accord has been signed by President Ngo-Dinh-Diem and the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Nolting, the Mission is prepared to state that no agreement of this kind has been concluded.

c) It is wrong to allege that the United States of America has introduced into South Viet-Nam troops belonging to various branches of the U.S. Army. In this connection the Commission is requested to refer to the declaration of President Kennedy during his news conference of March 14, 1962, in the course of which the

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

President of the United States of America has specifically stated that the Americans who are presently in Viet-Nam do not belong to the category of combat troops. The Mission emphasizes that these American military personnel are performing only the role of instructors and advisors to the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam in order to assist the latter to face the aggression directed by the Hanoi authorities against the Republic of Viet-Nam and in particular against the attacks carried out by regular troops of the P.A.V.N. * in South Viet-Nam.

d) It is absolutely inaccurate to maintain as the P.A.V.N. * has done in its message No. 202 that the « Blue Book » published by the Government of the United States of America is designed to apply pressure on the International Commission for Control to examine the question of Viet-Cong subversive activities in South Viet-Nam. The Mission continues to place complete confidence in the competence of this Commission to draw the conclusions which are required strictly on the basis of the evidence which has been sent to the Commission in the letters of the Mission No. 4660 of October 24, 1961 and No. 5078 of November 16, 1961.

2. With regard to the military equipment introduced in South Viet-Nam (including that observed by the Commission's Fixed Team at Qui-Nhon) the Mission requests the Commission to kindly refer to its letter No. 5486 of December 9, 1961. In this letter, the Mission has explained the reasons for which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has felt obligated as a measure of self-defence to request increased aid from the United States of America in order to defend itself against the intensification of flagrant actions of aggression directed and carried out by the authorities in North Viet-Nam.

3. In its letters No. 4660 of October 24, 1961 and No. 5078 of November 16, 1961 the Mission has already furnished to the Commission evidence of this campaign of aggression and subversive activities on the part of the authorities of the North. The cases cited in these letters though representing only a small part of the total number of cases of subversion perpetrated by the Viet-Cong in South Viet-Nam, demonstrate nevertheless that the authorities of North Viet-Nam have engaged continuously, during several years, in a campaign aimed at overthrowing the Govern-

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam by flagrant acts of aggression and armed subversion with the aid of regular forces, and cadres introduced illegally into South Viet-Nam. The Mission requests the Commission to condemn the authorities of North Viet-Nam for these repeated violations of the Geneva Accords and draw the attention of the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to the extreme gravity of these acts of aggression committed by the so-called « People's Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. »

4. The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has been compelled to seek additional assistance from the United States of America in order to defend its territory and its people against the Viet-Cong aggression and subversion. This increased assistance in personnel and materiel is only a measure of self-defence and contrary to the allegations of the P.A.V.N. * implies no aggressive intent against any people or any country.

It is therefore perfectly clear that there exists a cause-and-effect relation between the Viet-Cong subversion and aggression against South Viet-Nam and the increased assistance requested by the Republic of Viet-Nam for its defence. As it has said in its letters Nos. 5486 and 722 the Mission once again desires to assure the Commission that these additional measures of defence can be terminated as soon as the authorities of North Viet-Nam will have ceased their acts of aggression and will have begun to respect the provisions of the Geneva Accords.

5. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

Excerpt from Viet-Nam Press of December 15, 1961 — N° 2170

**MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT NGO-DINH-DIEM
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA**

December 15, 1961

Dear Mr. President.

« Since its birth, more than six years ago, the Republic of Viet-Nam has enjoyed the close friendship and cooperation of the United States of America.

« Like the United States, the Republic of Viet-Nam has always been devoted to preservation of peace. My people know only too well the sorrows of war. We have honored the 1954 Geneva Agreements even though they resulted in the partition of our country and the enslavement of more than half of our people by Communist tyranny. We have never considered the reunification of our nation by force. On the contrary, we have publicly pledged that we will not violate the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone set up by the agreements. We have always been prepared and have on many occasions stated our willingness to reunify Viet-Nam on the basis of democratic and truly free elections.

« The record of the Communist authorities in the Northern part of our country is quite otherwise. They not only consented to the division of Viet-Nam, but were eager for it. They pledged themselves to observe the Geneva Agreements and during the seven years since have never ceased to violate them. They call for free elections but are ignorant of the very meaning of the words. They talk of 'peaceful reunification' and wage war against us.

« From the beginning, the Communists resorted to terror in their efforts to subvert our people, destroy our Government, and impose a Communist regime upon us. They have attacked defenceless teachers, closed schools, killed members of our anti-malarial program and looted hospitals. This is coldly calculated to destroy our Government's humanitarian efforts to serve our people.

« We have long sought to check the Communist attack from the North on our people by appeals to the International Control Commission. Over the years, we have repeatedly published to the world the evidence of the Communist plot to overthrow our Government and seize control of all of Viet-Nam by illegal intrusions from outside our country. The evidence has mounted

until now it is hardly necessary to rehearse it. Most recently, the kidnapping and brutal murder of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam, Chief of the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission, compelled us to speak out once more. In our October 24, 1961 letter to the International Commission for Control, we called attention again to the publicly stated determination of the Communist authorities in Hanoi to 'liberate the South' by the overthrow of my Government and the imposition of a Communist regime on our people. We cited the proof of massive infiltration of Communist agents and military elements into our country. We outlined the Communist strategy, which is simply the ruthless use of terror against the whole population, women and children included.

« In the course of the last few months, the Communist assault on my people has achieved high ferocity. In October they committed more than 1,800 acts of violence and caused more than 2,000 casualties. They have struck occasionally in battalion strength, and they are continually augmenting their forces by infiltration from the North. The level of their attacks is already such that our forces are stretched to the utmost. We are forced to defend every village, every hamlet, indeed every home against a foe whose tactic is always to strike at the defenceless.

« A disastrous flood was recently added to the misfortunes of the Vietnamese people. The greater part of three provinces was inundated, with a great loss of property. We are now engaged in a nationwide effort to reconstruct and rehabilitate this area. The Communists are, of course, making this task doubly difficult, for they have seized upon the disruption of normal administration and communications as an opportunity to sow more destruction in the stricken area.

« In short, the Vietnamese nation now faces what is perhaps the gravest crisis in its long history. For more than 2,000 years my people have lived and built, fought and died in this land. We have not always been free. Indeed, much of our history and many of its proudest moments have arisen from conquest by foreign powers and our struggle against great odds to regain or defend our precious independence. But it is not only our freedom which is at stake today, it is our national identity. For, if we lose this war, our people will be swallowed by the Communist bloc, all our proud heritage will be blotted out by the 'socialist society', and Viet-Nam will disappear from the pages of history. We will lose our national soul.

« Mr. President, my people and I are mindful of the great assistance which the United States has given us. Your help has not been lightly received, for the Vietnamese are a proud people,

and we are determined to do our part in the defence of the Free World. It is clear to all of us that the defeat of the Viet-Cong demands the total mobilization of our Government and our people, and you may be sure that we will devote all of our resources of money, minds, and men to this great task.

◀ But Viet-Nam is not a great power and the forces of international Communism now arrayed against us are more than we can meet with the resources at hand. We must have further assistance from the United States if we are to win the war now being waged against us.

◀ We can certainly assure mankind that our action is purely defensive. Much as we regret the subjugation of more than half our people in North Viet-Nam, we have no intention, and indeed no means, to free them by use of force.

◀ I have said that Viet-Nam is at war. War means many things, but most of all it means the death of brave people for a cause they believe in. Viet-Nam has suffered many wars, and through the centuries we have always had patriots and heroes who were willing to shed their blood for Viet-Nam. We will keep faith with them. When Communism has long ebbed away into the past, my people will still be here, a free united nation growing from the deep roots of our Vietnamese heritage. They will remember your help in our time of need. This struggle will then be a part of our common history. And your help, your friendship, and the strong bonds between our two peoples will be a part of Viet-Nam, then as now. ▶

Signed : President NGO-DINH-DIEM

your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist your defence efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Communists to give up their attempts of force and subversion. In any case we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have fought so hard and so long. »

Signed : J.F. KENNEDY

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

N° 129/DAP/C



Saigon, January 31, 1962

*The Right Honourable the Earl of Home, P.C.
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,*

*Foreign Office
London*

Excellency,

By my letter dated August 17, 1961, I had the honour to draw the attention of Your Excellency, in your capacity of Co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference, to the subversion organized and undertaken in South Viet-Nam by the Hanoi authorities as well as to the campaign of aggression directed by the North Vietnamese communist regime against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

In the name of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, I have earnestly requested Your Excellency's intervention in order that appropriate instructions be sent to the International Commission for Control with a view to putting an end to such activities which seriously threaten peace and which, moreover, constitute flagrant violations of the Geneva Agreement.

Since the sending of the above-mentioned letter, the Hanoi authorities' subversive and aggressive activities against South Viet-Nam, far from diminishing, have considerably increased simultaneously with intensified infiltrations of North Vietnamese armed elements and political cadres through the frontiers of South Viet-Nam and the demilitarized zone.

The kidnapping and the odious murder of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam, Chief of the Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control, by the Hanoi authorities' agents, a crime which was brought to your knowledge under my letter of October 17, 1961, shows to what extent the North Vietnamese Communist regime has decided to sabotage the Geneva Agreement and to prevent the International Commission for Control from fulfilling its mission for peace in Viet-Nam.

The cases of terrorism and military attacks organized by the Hanoi authorities and their agents sent to South Viet-Nam have

increased in such proportions that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam felt constrained to ask, by virtue of its right of legitimate defence, an adequate amount of support from the Government of the United States of America with a view to protecting life and property of the population and to maintaining order and legality ; it should be clearly understood that this support can end as soon as the Communists will have ceased their subversive policy in South Viet-Nam.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has also thought it necessary to inform the countries which are members of the United Nations Organization of the menace to peace which is represented by the North Vietnamese Communist authorities' aims in South Viet-Nam.

Behind the masquerade of the so-called « Front for Liberation of the South », the Hanoi authorities pursue without respite their subversive and aggressive activities which, all without exception, aim at overthrowing by force the legal regime in South Viet-Nam

New tangible evidence of the Hanoi authorities' overt interference in South Viet-Nam on both the military and political plan is the recent creation within the aforesaid « Front for Liberation of the South » of the « People's Revolutionary Party » whose program the official Radio of Hanoi, announcing the news of January 19, 1962, has clearly defined as that of the North Communist regime, i.e. to seize power in South Viet-Nam and establish in this area a regime of popular democracy in imitation of North Viet-Nam.

In order that your Excellency can imagine the dangerous situation engendered in South Viet-Nam by the subversion and aggression directed and supported by the Hanoi authorities, I deem it necessary to annex to this present letter a copy of the following notes of protestations that the Liaison Mission with the International Commission for Control has sent to this organization following my letter of August 17, 1961 referred to above :

1. Note No. 4660 of October 24, 1961 concerning the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam ;

2. Note No. 5078 of November 16, 1961 forwarding to the International Commission for Control various proofs of the infiltration into South Viet-Nam of armed elements coming from North Viet-Nam ;

3. Note No. 5486 of December 9, 1961 informing the International Commission for Control of the Viet-Cong intensification of

subversive and aggressive activities and the decision of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to solicit an adequate support from the United States of America to face the situation ;

4. Note No. 5738 of December 29, 1961 forwarding to the International Commission for Control various documents seized by the National Army in the course of a battle with the Viet-Cong forces ;

5. Note No. 403 of January 27, 1962 forwarding to the International Commission for Control various documents of propaganda emanating from the « Front for Liberation of the South » ;

6. Note No. 404 of January 27, 1962 forwarding to the International Commission for Control further documents mentioned in the above-mentioned Note No. 4660 of October 24, 1961 ;

7. Note No. 425 of January 27, 1962 concerning the creation of the « People's Revolutionary Party ».

In face of the aggravation of this menace to peace and while awaiting a positive decision of the International Commission for Control, to which has been submitted this irrefutable evidence of the violation of the Geneva Agreement by the Hanoi authorities, it seems to me of capital importance that your Excellency has at his disposal the most complete documentation on these incontestable facts in order that he may take whatever action necessary to put an end to these subversive activities.

I take this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed : VU-VAN-MAU

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Saigon, August 17, 1961

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

The Right Honourable the Earl of Home, P.C.
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,

Foreign Office
London

Excellency,

In the name of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, I have the honour to draw your attention, in your capacity of Co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference, to the numerous violations of the Geneva Agreement perpetrated by the Hanoi Communist authorities and to the menace to peace constituted by the policy of subversion and aggression directed against South Viet-Nam by these authorities with the support of the Communist powers.

As early as the day after the signing of the Geneva Agreement, the Hanoi authorities showed, then as now, the small importance they attached to the implementation of this agreement to which they are a party.

Still more conspicuous was their intention to transform North Viet-Nam into an advanced front of the communist bloc and to prepare the invasion of South Viet-Nam, rather than create favourable conditions with a view to reunifying the country in peace and freedom to answer the Vietnamese people's aspirations as well as the wish expressed by the powers participating in the 1954 Geneva Conference.

The Hanoi authorities have established and carried out this plan of subversion and invasion of South Viet-Nam with the vigor of totalitarian regimes, as shown by events in Viet-Nam during the last seven years and especially since 1960.

I. — Violation of democratic liberties

After having swiftly suppressed the propertied and intellectual classes and dismantled the traditional structure of Vietnamese

society by means of the so-called « agrarian reform », the « people's tribunals » and other totalitarian methods, the Hanoi authorities finally made up their mind to suppress one by one all democratic liberties, contrary to the provisions of article 14-c of the Geneva Agreement, provisions which protect these liberties in behalf of the population living in both zones.

It would be enough to mention here the proceedings against the intellectuals accused of « deviationism », such as the « Nhan-Van » affair which ended in the sentencing of several non-conformist writers, i.e. non-communist partisans, to extremely severe penalties ; this affair had great repercussions in international public opinion.

In the field of religion, several catholic priests and Christians were persecuted, arrested and imprisoned, and a great many of them died under inhuman conditions in communist prisons in North Viet-Nam.

One should add that seven years after the signing of the Geneva Agreement, the Hanoi authorities continue to detain in North Viet-Nam, against the consent of those concerned and in violation of the provisions of article 14-d of this agreement, more than 80,000 persons who addressed within the proper time their requests to go South. These do not include hundreds of thousands of other persons who are natives of South Viet-Nam and who were regrouped by force in North Viet-Nam.

Similarly, the Hanoi authorities have always refused the proposal of exchange of 500 families on a trial basis made since 1959 by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam with the sole purpose of gathering divided families together.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has vainly protested up to now against these totalitarian methods and the breaking of promises made by the Hanoi authorities, at the time of the signing of the Geneva Agreement, to observe the freedom of choice between both zones and to safeguard the democratic liberties of the population living in their own zone.

II. — The subversive and aggressive policy of North Viet-Nam

Parallel with the founding of a regime of Communist dictatorship in North Viet-Nam, the Hanoi authorities have tried to extend their domination to South Viet-Nam by using the policy of both subversion and military action, whereas the Geneva Agreement (articles 1, 10, 19 and 24) obligates each Party to respect the territory placed under the control of the other Party and to commit no act against the other Party.

In fact, for the last seven years the Hanoi authorities have indulged in all activities in many forms which, without exception, aim at a single objective : to overthrow the regime of South Viet-Nam and so reunify the country in their own way, i.e. under the communist banner, without their proceeding to free elections, in other words, without taking into account the freely-expressed desire of the population.

Three stages can be distinguished in the development of the Northern authorities' plan :

1. First stage : Implantation in the South of Communist cells

In the period which immediately followed the regrouping of forces between both zones, the Viet-Minh authorities did their utmost to maintain in South Viet-Nam a Communist cell network consisting of political agents and military elements, in spite of the provisions of articles 1 and 2 of the Geneva Agreement which oblige each Party to completely evacuate the zone of which the administration is assigned to the other Party.

Disguised as peaceful citizens, Communist political cadres indulged in setting up Communist cells among the population, whereas military units penetrated into rather inaccessible regions while awaiting the opportunity to resume their activities.

Thus at least three regiments were maintained in the zone of Ca-Mau in the extreme Southern part of South Viet-Nam, and numerous armed elements settled in the regions of Binh-Dinh and Quang-Ngai in Center Viet-Nam as well as in the zone of the High-Plateaus bordering Lower Laos and Cambodia.

Before withdrawing North of the 17th parallel, the Viet-Minh not only left on the spot political and military cadres but also arms and munitions carefully buried in caches and at various strategic points.

The Vietnamese authorities have discovered, up to the present, more than 300 of these arms and munitions dumps. The importance of armaments found in these dumps, the care with which they have been kept as well as the choice of emplacements show clearly their final destination.

This first stage passed rather quickly.

2. Second stage : Intensification of activities and military preparations.

Being aware that their propaganda has not influenced the population of the South, and seeing that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had taken numerous measures such as

agrarian reform, agricultural credit system, the co-operative system, mechanization of agriculture, development of rural education and sanitation, etc... measures the result of which has been a perceptible improvement in the standard of living of villagers, — from 1958 —, the North authorities began to intensify their subversive and military activities in South Viet-Nam to counterbalance these successes and counteract the efforts of the Government in re-establishing security in the countryside.

a) *Increase of war potential in North Viet-Nam.*

In North Viet-Nam, the Hanoi authorities rapidly increased their war potential thanks to the technical assistance of foreign military advisers introduced subsequent to the cease-fire in violation of the provisions of Article 16 of the Geneva Agreement prohibiting the entrance of new foreign military personnel.

— *Army* : The effective strength of the P.A.V.N. *, which was only 202,000 regular troops and 150,000 para-military forces at the time of the cease-fire, increased in a few years from 7 to the equivalent of 20 divisions totalling 350,000 regular troops and 200,000 militia. In September 1959, the security corps of the people's army, the strength of which was unknown, was combined in turn with the regular army.

How could the Northern authorities raise such an important army in a few years' time ?

With armament and equipment supplied in great quantities by Communist powers, principally by Communist China and Soviet Russia.

— Communist China :

K-51 pistol
K-50 automatic pistol
« Chung-Ching » 7 mm 92 rifle
ZB-26 7 mm 92 automatic rifle
60 mm, 82 mm mortar

— U.S.S.R. :

« Maxim » 7 mm 62 machine-gun
82 mm mortar
3 ins 5 Bazooka
H-23 76 mm 2 cannon
H-24 —
H-25 —

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

H-29 100 mm anti-tank gun
H-30 37 mm anti-aircraft gun
DSHK and H-31 12 mm 7 machine-gun
Molotova lorries

However, up to the present time, the International Commission for Control, whose mission is to control the introduction of military personnel and the importation of arms and munitions, has neither been requested to give its agreement, as required by the terms of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement, nor been notified of the entry of military personnel and the introduction of new armaments.

In contrast, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, of its own accord and to prove its peaceful intentions, in 1955-1956 reduced its army from 242,000 men, the effective strength at the time of the cease-fire, to 150,000.

As regards the importation of armaments intended for replacing those reexported by the old French Expeditionary force in Indochina or which have been used up, these have always been carried out according to the provisions of the Geneva Agreement. These importations remain, however, far below the limit of credits which have been granted to the Vietnamese national Army.

— *Air forces* : Moreover, the P.A.V.N. *, which included only land forces at the time of the cease-fire, has now at its disposal an air-force equipped with numerous types of airplanes supplied by Communist powers.

To reinforce its military position, the P.A.V.N. * has built since the cease-fire a score of new aerodromes some of which — such as those of Cat-Bi, Na-San and Cao-Bang — are equipped with radar installations and other facilities for military use, and are big enough to receive all types of airplanes. These aerodromes are strategically located in an area forming a triangle the two vertices of which are pointed one towards North-Laos and the other towards South Viet-Nam.

— *Naval forces* : The North Vietnamese navy, equally non-existent in 1954, made its appearance at the time of the last military parade in North Viet-Nam. It has received from Communist countries numerous naval units, from Swatow-type gun-boats to troop-ships including landing-ships.

In addition, a great many naval bases have been established subsequent to the cease-fire — One of them is the Island of Con-Co (Tiger Island) located right in the mouth of the Ben-Hai river in the demilitarized zone.

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

As in the case of the importation of weapons, the International Commission for Control, in spite of several protests on the part of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, has not up to the present been able to carry out any control of military bases created in North Viet-Nam subsequent to the cease-fire.

While reinforcing their war potential, the Hanoi authorities have indulged in a veritable campaign of fallacious accusations against the Republic of Viet-Nam and friendly countries, a campaign the obvious aim of which is to divert international attention from the military preparations in North Viet-Nam and their more-and-more active subversive activities in the South.

b) Military alliance.

In spite of the Geneva Agreement (Article 19) which prohibits all military alliances, the Hanoi authorities have not hesitated to side with the Pathet-Lao in placing the North Vietnamese aerodromes, especially those of Gia-Lam and Cat-Bi, at their Russian and Chinese allies' disposal for the creation of the airlift which has continued to supply the Pathet-Lao with arms and munitions since the end of 1960.

Considerable quantities of arms and munitions of all kinds have thus been poured in Northern Laos via North Viet-Nam without the International Commission for Control's being able to verify the arrivals and departures through North Vietnamese aerodromes.

It is unquestionable that a part of this war material was diverted to the benefit of the P.A.V.N. *. Even if this material were sent entirely to Northern Laos, it would still constitute a grave menace for the security of the countries bordering on Laos, given the presence of North Vietnamese troops in that country.

c) Military implantation in the demilitarized zone.

Even before the events in Laos, North Vietnamese regular forces were established in the Southern part of the demilitarized zone, at Tchepone and A-Choc, on the frontier of Northern Laos.

Until now, the Hanoi authorities have used various pretexts to oppose the International Commission for Control's investigation as requested more than two years ago by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, which volunteered to supply the logistic means necessary to permit the Commission's teams to go to the areas in question.

Moreover, barracks, aerodromes and naval bases were built in the neighbourhood of the Northern demilitarized zone.

d) Infiltration of new communist cadres into South Viet-Nam.

New cadres specially trained in North Viet-Nam for the task of subversion and guerilla warfare were introduced into South Viet-Nam through the land frontiers, by sea, and even through the line of demarcation in violation of the provisions of Articles 1, 10 and 24 of the Geneva Agreement.

By land, the corridor of infiltration used more often than not by the Communists lies through A-Choc in the Southern demilitarized zone, Ca-Lu, Ba-Ngai, Bo-Ho-Su, through both Quang-Tri and Thua-Thien provinces.

The sea also constitutes an excellent route of infiltration for the Communists. North Vietnamese junks, either under convoy or singly, frequently sail in the territorial waters of the Republic of Viet-Nam, transporting cadres, arms and munitions. Their presence is reported all along the coast. Some of these junks have even succeeded in reaching Phu-Quoc island in the gulf of Thailand.

With the entry of new cadres, the Viet-Minh elements, which were retained in the South reconstituted their units, taking in remnants of the armies of the Cao-Dai, Hoa-Hao and Binh-Xuyen politico-religious sects after the annihilation of these feudal forces by the Vietnamese national Army.

From 1960, the infiltration of agents of the North through the land frontiers and the line of demarcation and by sea became more and more frequent.

According to Viet-Minh documents seized at Ca-Lu on March 29, 1961, the Hanoi authorities clandestinely sent to South Viet-Nam during the period from October 1960 to February 1961 alone :

- 1,800 cadres, most of them natives of the South regrouped in the North after the Geneva Agreement ;
- arms, munitions and materials in sufficient quantity to equip 30 companies ;
- 150 tons of rice for supplying depots.

According to the documents and the written declarations of a liaison-agent who was plying between Darlac and Quang-Duc, captured on July 15, 1961, from July 1, 1961 to July 15, 1961, 528 Viet-Cong coming from the North passed through this region.

These figures show the large increase of Communist infiltrations into the South which have lately reached truly startling proportions.

Likewise, the landing of political and military cadres of the North on the coast South of the 17th parallel has been intensified. Recently numerous junks coming from the North and transporting agents bearing false identity cards and armaments and subversive documents have been seized by the national authorities in the territorial waters of the South, as shown by some following examples :

- on June 5, 1961, a junk transporting 5 agents of the North including 1 lieutenant and 1 aspirant, was stopped for inspection at Da-Nang. Numerous documents and various materials such as a Minox camera for microfilm and a transistor radio set, were seized ;
- on June 14, 15 and 17, 1961, 20 Communist junks were stopped off the shore of Thuan-An (Thua-Thien) with 102 men on board carrying side-arms, signalling systems and special codes ;
- on July 4, 1961, a two-masted motor-junk was stopped by a unit of the Vietnamese national navy off the coast of Quang-Tri. On the junk, one found in addition to nine crew members, side-arms and cigarette-packets with the trade-mark : « Hoan-Kiem » (Hanoi) ;
- on July 9, 1961, North Vietnamese junks opened fire on the 11th flotilla of South coast-guard junks on patrol off the coast of Quang-Tri.

3. *Third stage : overt and covert aggression.*

On September 4, 1960, the Lao-Dong Party (Workers' Party) alias the Communist Party which identifies itself with the North Vietnamese regime, voted a resolution in which the Party gave itself the mission of liberating the South, overthrowing the legal regime by all means (naturally including the use of force) in order to establish in its place a regime similar to that now existing in North Viet-Nam.

This resolution signalled the recrudescence of terrorist activities and the armed struggle in South Viet-Nam.

a) *Appearance of the « Front for Liberation of the South »*

On December 22, 1960, the Hanoi authorities announced the creation of a « Front for Liberation of the South » which in reality is but a branch of the North Vietnamese Lao-Dong Party from

which it receives directives and whose orders it faithfully executes. Far from being a popular movement as pretended by communist propaganda, this Front, constituted by Northern agents, has instead the mission of holding the population under terror and overthrowing the legal regime of the South as decided by the Lao-Dong Party at the time of its party congress on September 4, 1960.

For the realization of its objectives, this Front uses forces called « Liberation Forces of the South » which are nothing but regular units of the P.A.V.N. * already existing in South Viet-Nam, reinforced by new cadres coming from the North, local elements recruited among former convicts, and young men deceived by Communist propaganda, hungering for romance, or simply kidnapped from their families.

Moreover, the clandestine Radio of the « Front for Liberation of the South, » a mere relay of the Radio of Hanoi, retransmits every day the habitual themes of Communist propaganda as well as exhortations addressed to the population of the South to revolt.

Tangible evidence shows however that all subversive, terrorist and military activities emanating from the « Front for Liberation of the South » many tracts and brochures of Communist propaganda seized by the legal authorities, « judgments » found on the victims of terrorism, receipts of the sums paid as ransom, taxes or rates so-called « voluntary », etc... — all bear without exception the signature of the « Front for Liberation of the South. »

The creation in South Viet-Nam of an organization strictly depending on the Hanoi authorities and which is assigned the mission of seizing power by all means — propaganda, terrorist activities, fomentation of disorder, armed attacks — constitutes without a doubt a flagrant violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Geneva Agreement.

b) *Recrudescence of terrorist activities*

The appearance of the so-called « Front for Liberation of the South » coincides with a new recrudescence of terrorist activities which have been intensified during the last two years. The victims of such activities are chiefly villagers and local administrative authorities.

Up to the present, the agents of the North have to their credit several thousand murders not including the kidnapping of persons, acts of brigandage, extortions of funds, illegal levy of taxes, acts of sabotage against means of communication, the attacks

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

of trains and common transport vehicles, and destruction of religious or charitable institutions such as the La-Ma church, the Ben-San leper-hospital in March and May 1960, (to make mention of these two cases only) ; i.e. all that is contrary to the aim proclaimed by this Front which is to « liberate » the population of the South from the imaginary « oppression » of the legal authorities.

To spread terror, the agents of the North spare neither religious persons nor old ones, nor women and children. Last March, young girls were shot down on the Saigon — Phuoc-Tuy road while they were returning from a youth meeting in the capital. Recently priests were savagely executed on the Saigon — Dalat and Saigon — Tay-Ninh road.

Refugee settlement and agricultural development centers created by the Government with a view to improving the peasants' living conditions have been ransacked and agricultural material destroyed or burned.

The « Forces for Liberation of the South » have not hesitated to attack as well the montagnard population simply because the latter refuse to assist them. Recently, agents of the North have forced the montagnard population to evacuate the frontier region between Lower Laos and South Viet-Nam with the open intention of using this region as a base of aggression against the South. The Vietnamese authorities had to parachute foodstuffs during July 1961 to several thousand montagnard refugees at Cheo-Reo, in Pleiku province, far from their villages and who, otherwise, would have been condemned to die of hunger.

On July 27, 1961, the « Forces for Liberation of the South » set an ambush killing two montagnard deputies, representatives of Pleiku and Darlac provinces, who came back from a visit at the agricultural development center specially created for the montagnard population. This barbarous act aroused a deep indignation not only in Viet-Nam but also among foreign parliamentary circles.

c) *Armed attacks — Attack in Pleiku-Kontum*

A few weeks following the resolution of September 4, 1960 of the Lao-Dong Party, 3 battalions of Division 325 of the P.A.V.N.* invaded the region of Kontum — Pleiku in October 1960, and then withdrew to Lower-Laos from whence they had come.

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.): Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

For the first time, the Northern authorities had overtly launched an attack against South Vietnamese territory, thus deliberately violating the cease-fire.

These troops, trained in communist camps, were strongly encadred by P.A.V.N. * officers ; this is confirmed by prisoners' confessions and numerous seized documents.

The attack in Kontum was however preceded by another attack on a large scale in 1960, in the Tay-Ninh region bordering on Cambodia, by Viet-Minh forces estimated at 400 — 500 men.

During the period preceding the presidential elections in Viet-Nam in April 1961, the Northern authorities ordered the « Forces for Liberation of the South » to launch a series of attacks of various sizes in Kien-Phong, Kien-Tuong, Kien-Hoa, Ca-Mau, and Quang-Ngai provinces... with the obvious purpose of preventing the election from being carried out and taking advantage of the disorders to penetrate villages.

However the elections took place orderly and calmly.

To cause this failure to be forgotten, the « Forces for Liberation of the South » doubled their aggressive activities, everyday, throwing more and more troops into the fray, as recently at Kien-Phong.

Kien-Phong battle

A full battle took place on July 16, 1961 in Kien-Phong province between the Vietnamese army and a unit of the regular army of North Viet-Nam, battalion 502, reinforced by Companies 207 and 209 also belonging to the regular army of the North.

Since the attack of Kontum-Pleiku, it was the first time such important Viet-Minh forces were engaged in the battle. In fact, the Viet-Minh forces at Kien-Phong were estimated at about 1,000 combatants, organized, armed and equipped like regular army troops.

The Vietnamese national army was able to destroy the greater part of the enemy's forces, to capture several prisoners and to seize numerous documents among which were brochures on Ho-Chi-Minh's biography, the directives of the Lao-Dong Party addressed to the « Front for Liberation of the South » and other irrefutable evidence on the Hanoi authorities' direct participation in the armed struggle in South Viet-Nam, this was also admitted without hesitation by the Viet-Minh combatants made prisoners by the national Army in the course of this battle.

Attempted landing of a flotilla of the North on the South coast

A few days before the battle of Kien-Phong, an attempted invasion of the South by sea was frustrated thanks to the intervention of the Vietnamese national Navy off-shore the demilitarized zone. A veritable flotilla including a score of small junks escorted by two big and well-armed junks coming from the base of the Con-Co Island (Tiger Island) tried to penetrate the territorial waters of the South, but was repulsed by a patrol of the Vietnamese Navy. These two events of Kien-Phong and Con-Co are particularly significant, because they took place subsequent to the International Commission for Control's decision of June 24, 1961 to consider as violations of articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Geneva Agreement the subversive activities as well as the armed actions undertaken by each of the Parties against the other and to institute henceforth an inquiry into complaints of this nature.

The fury with which the Hanoi authorities have attacked the International Commission for Control since the announcement of the aforesaid decision, like the inopportune campaign they carry out at the present time to render void this decision, proves that this subversion and military activity do come within the provisions of articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Geneva Agreement and are in fact being carried out by these authorities.

In informing the Government of her British Majesty of the above-mentioned matter, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam appeals to it to take steps to see that appropriate instructions are sent to the International Commission for Control in Viet-Nam by the Co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference with a view to giving full effect to the above decision of the aforesaid Commission and to putting an end to terrorist activities and to armed struggle undertaken by the Hanoi agents against the population of the South and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

In order to enable the Co-Chairmen to have an idea of the violations of the Geneva Agreement committed by the Hanoi authorities since 1954, we are taking the liberty of attaching to this letter three White-Papers published by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in July 1959, July 1960 and May 1961 respectively.

I take this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

Signed : VU-VAN-MAU

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, December 29, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 8738/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General of the
International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control, and following its letters No. 4660 of October 24, 1961, and No. 5078 of November 16, 1961, has the honor to send to the Commission herewith other documents establishing proof of the presence of Viet-Cong cadres and elements on the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam :

First document :

Excerpts from the transcript of the interrogation of Nguyen-van-Minh, Viet-Cong cadre of montagnard origin, coming from North Viet-Nam, and arrested August 9, 1961, in the demilitarized zone.

This individual presented himself on August 9, 1961, to the police post of Hai-Cu in the Southern demilitarized zone, attempting to pass as a refugee fleeing Viet-Cong extortion. This subterfuge was discovered and Minh finally confessed the following :

« Born in district of Huong-Hoa (Quang-Tri province) and a member of the Communist Party since 1956, I had the rank of Section Chief of Company No. 8, 516th Battalion, Viet-Cong Regiment 271. I was regrouped in North Viet-Nam with my regiment after the armistice. Demobilized in 1956 for reasons of health, I was admitted to a training course at the central school for montagnard cadres at Hanoi, then chosen to take part in a Viet-Cong delegation to Korea, East Germany, and Communist China in July 1957. In September 1959, I accompanied Y-Ngong, Viet-Cong montagnard deputy, on his trips in the montagnard zone of North Viet-Nam.

« In July 1959, on instructions from Le-Duan, Secretary General of the Lao-Dong Party (Viet-Cong Communist Party), Y-Ngong designated me to go on a mission to South Viet-Nam. I was charged with :

« — making contact with Viet-Cong montagnard cadres at secret bases situated South of the 17th Parallel at Huong-Hoa (Quang-Tri) and in the High Plateaus (Kontum and Pleiku provinces) :

« — making known to these cadres the plan of action of the Front for the Liberation of the South ;

« — recruiting young men of montagnard origin there, to be incorporated into Viet-Cong combat units in South Viet-Nam after a training period in North Viet-Nam.

« My travelling companion on the way to the South was Vo-Phuong alias Cho-On, Viet-Cong cadre in charge of the secret base at Quang-Tri, at that time on a temporary mission in Hanoi. On arrival at Bai-Ha village (Vinh-Linh), North Viet-Nam, I was hospitalized for ten days. Vo-Phuong went on without me. He left me a map (50 cm × 50 cm) to allow me to find the road toward my destination.

« ... Vo-Phuong and I left Hanoi July 2, 1961, going toward Bai-Ha (Vinh-Linh) aboard a military vehicle.

« ... After ten days of hospitalization at Bai-Ha, I left for Huong-Lap, but despite my efforts I was unable to find the secret Viet-Cong sector. I then decided to follow the old trail toward the region North of the 17th Parallel. One day at about 7:00 A.M., I found myself close to Hai-Cu post (Trung-Luong district, Quang-Tri province, South Viet-Nam). Unable to withdraw, I presented myself to this police post and tried to pass as a refugee fleeing the Viet-Cong... »

Nguyen-van-Minh, moreover, recognized that the plan of action for the « Front for the Liberation of the South », directed by the Viet-Cong, is to send as many cadres as possible to South Viet-Nam in order to make propaganda for the Northern regime, to recruit and arm young men destined to reinforce the ranks of the guerillas for the struggle against the Republic of Viet-Nam and for the seizing of power in South Viet-Nam.

The confessions of Nguyen-van-Minh thus constitute a new proof that the Lao-Dong Party (Communist Party of North Viet-Nam) continues to train political cadres and guerillas in North Viet-Nam and to introduce them into South Viet-Nam to serve its aggressive policy against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Second document :

Extracts from declaration of Dinh-tan-Hoang, Viet-Cong political cadre, arrested October 28, 1961, in Nghia-Thanh village, Nghia-Hanh District, Quang-Ngai province :

« Former Viet-Cong company commander of the 96th Regiment in 1954, I was regrouped in North Viet-Nam in August 1954.

« On April 4, 1961, I was chosen to follow a training course for cadres destined to be sent to South Viet-Nam. This course, which lasted one month, was organized under the responsibility of the Central Committee for Unification.

« The cadres here received complete training from the political as well as the military point of view, and, before their departure for the South, were given all equipment necessary to spies.

« My group, which was composed of eleven persons, received four P-38's, three sub-machine guns, and eight-hundred cartridges. We left Hanoi by car on May 24, 1961, destined for Vinh (North Viet-Nam) and from there for South Viet-Nam at the same time as the 126th Regiment and a special battalion.

« On June 2, 1961, we departed from Cua-Lo (Nghe-An), by Molotova, toward Ha-Tinh and Thanh-Lang. From highway No. 1 to the Laotian frontier we spent two days and one night. We went through Muong-Phin (Laos). We encountered no obstacles on Laotian soil because we were preceded by a special company which opened the road.

« Our trip through Laotian territory lasted twenty-five days. During this period, we were supplied by Russian airplanes which made drops all along the Laotian and Vietnamese frontiers. There were eight of these airplanes, painted black, based at Tchepone, which brought us rice, salt, brine, meat, milk, cigarettes, etc.

« The distance between two relay stations was one day's march. From relay station to relay station, we headed toward Quang-Nam (South Viet-Nam). On national territory, supplies became more difficult in the absence of Russian parachute drops. The march along the crest of the Annamite chain was also difficult. From Quang-Nam to Quang-Ngai (South Viet-Nam), we spent twenty days. We reached the mountainous part of Quang-Ngai on August 24, 1961. The provincial Viet-Cong committee of Quang-Ngai spread us out among several localities. I was sent to Nghia-Hanh, as chief of a group of armed propagandists.

« The armed forces that left for the South at the same time as I comprised the special battalion and the 126th Regiment. The special battalion, also called battalion C.K.I., was composed of five companies, six hundred men altogether. It was destined for the

TRÍCH LỤC

BIÊN BẢN HỎI CUNG TÊN NGUYỄN-VĂN-MINH

Hôm nay là ngày mười một tháng mười năm một ngàn chín trăm sáu mươi mốt.

Chúng tôi là Lê-văn-Pho, Ty Trưởng Công An tỉnh Quảng-Trị có viên Lục sự Nguyễn-văn-Thường ngồi giúp việc có hỏi cung tên Nguyễn-văn-Minh bí danh Chân, 24 tuổi, nghề nghiệp.

Tên cha : Nguyễn-văn-Chất và mẹ Nguyễn-thị-Chất, chánh quán Tam-Côi, quận Hương-Hóa, tỉnh Quảng-Trị. Trú quán : II/B đường Mê-Tri (Hanoi), Bắc Phần, Học lực : Biết chữ. Gia-cảnh : độc thân. Thành phần Tôn giáo : lương. Đảng phái : đảng viên C. S. Tiền án : không. Hiện can : Cán bộ Thượng cộng miền Bắc vượt tuyến vào Nam trá hàng xuất thú ngày 9-8-61.

H. — Anh cho biết quá trình hoạt động của anh qua các thời kỳ cho đến ngày vượt tuyến vào Nam :

Đ. — Thừa thời Pháp, Nhật thuộc tôi còn nhỏ ở với cha mẹ tại nguyên quán, thời Việt-Minh, năm 1951 làm liên lạc cho Ủy-ban kháng chiến Huyện Hương-Hóa (VC) đóng tại Trại Cá (miền sơn cước Ba-Long, năm 1952 tôi gia nhập Vệ Quốc Đoàn thuộc Đại đội 8 Tiểu đoàn 516, Trung đoàn 271 đóng tại Tchepone (Lào) và giữ chức Tiểu đội trưởng kể từ ngày đình chiến. Kể đó tôi theo Trung đoàn này ra Liên khu 4 (Vinh) trấn đóng hai năm. Tháng 6-56, tôi được kết nạp vào đảng viên Cộng Sản, do sự giới thiệu của tên Nguyễn-Trinh (đại đội trưởng) và Đinh-Sơn (trung đội trưởng), tôi lấy bí danh Nguyễn-văn-Chân. Vào hạ bán niên 1956, tôi được lệnh giải ngũ vì kém sức khoẻ, đồng thời được Ủy-ban Hành chánh Liên khu 4 đề cử đi dự khoá Huấn luyện đào tạo cán bộ thanh niên các dân tộc thiểu số tại Trung ương Hanoi trong thời gian 6 tháng. Mãn khoá được bầu làm bí thư ban Chấp Hành thanh-niên Lao-động kiêm giảng viên Trường này, lương tháng 370 \$. Tháng 7-57, tôi tháp tùng

Ông Y-Ngong đại biểu Quốc Hội các dân tộc thiểu số kiêm giảng viên chính trị tại trường kể trên, đi cùng phái-đoàn dân, quân chính (Việt-Cộng) gồm 36 người qua Triều-Tiên tặng hai con voi để tượng trưng lịch sử Tây Nguyên (tức miền Cao-Nguyên Việt-Nam), đồng thời ghé thăm các trường sinh viên dân tộc thiểu số tại Đông Đức 10 ngày, Trung cộng 3 ngày xong trở về Hanoi vẫn tiếp tục nhiệm vụ cũ. Vào khoảng tháng 9-59 tôi cùng Ông Y-Ngong, đại diện trường cán bộ dân tộc thiểu số trung ương đến thăm thôn tự trị Thái, Mèo (miền sơn cước Bắc Phần) trong thời gian một tháng rưỡi, xong về lại trường dân tộc Trung-ương cho đến ngày 2-7-61, tôi bắt đầu vào miền Nam cho đến nay.

H. — Anh vượt tuyến vào Nam có mục đích gì, cùng đi với anh gồm có những ai ?

Đ. — Thưa, nguyên ông Y-Ngong (Quốc hội Việt-Cộng kể trên), nhận chỉ thị của Lê-Duẩn, bí thư đảng Cộng sản Đông-Dương để có một đại diện của trường cán bộ dân tộc Trung ương vào miền Nam hoạt động, ông Y-Ngong chỉ định tôi làm nhiệm vụ ấy, với mục đích lấy danh nghĩa một đại diện Trường cán bộ trung ương vào Nam với nhiệm vụ thăm viếng các cán bộ Thượng cộng tại các mật khu từ Quận Hương-Hóa (Quảng-Trị) vào khu Tây Nguyên (Pleiku), (Kontum) đồng thời phổ biến cho họ thắm nhuần kế hoạch mật trận giải phóng miền Nam và tuyển dụng các thanh niên dân tộc thiểu số ra Bắc huấn luyện để bổ sung vào các đơn vị quân đội võ trang rồi đưa vào Nam hoạt động ; cùng đi với tôi có ông Võ-Phương tức Cho-On phụ trách mật khu Quảng-Trị nhân dịp ông này ra họp tại Hà-nội, nhưng khi vào đến xã Bãi-Hà (Vĩnh-Linh), tôi nằm lại Bệnh xá để chữa vết mổ ở bụng 10 ngày còn ông Võ-Phương vào trước. Ông này để lại cho tôi một cái bản đồ (cỡ 0,50 × 0,50) sau xem mà đi đường, nhưng sau tôi đã đi lạc vào đồn Hải-Cụ, quận Trung-Lương (Quảng-Trị).

H. — Anh kể rõ cuộc hành trình của anh từ Hà-nội vào đến Bãi-Hà (Vĩnh-Linh) như thế nào ?

Đ. — Thưa, tôi và ông Võ-Phương khởi hành ngày 2-7-61 bằng xe ca Hà-nội vào Vĩnh-Linh đến Bãi-Hà, chúng tôi đi nhờ xe quân đội.

H. — Anh cho biết kế hoạch mặt trận giải phóng miền Nam của Việt-Cộng đối với đồng bào Thượng như thế nào ?

Đ. — Thừa kế hoạch Mặt trận Giải phóng miền Nam mà Việt-Cộng đang thi hành là chúng tung cán bộ vào Nam rất nhiều để hoạt động tuyên truyền kêu gọi các dân tộc tin tưởng vào Chính quyền miền Bắc, xây dựng cơ sở quần chúng, võ trang tuyên truyền lôi cuốn các dân tộc tham gia mọi công tác của Việt-Cộng như tiếp tế, dẫn đường, bảo vệ cán bộ, một mặt tung ra các tài liệu truyền đơn, báo chí, nội dung xuyên tạc chỉ trích Chánh quyền miền Nam bán nước cho Mỹ quốc và đề cao Việt-Cộng miền Bắc, tuyền mộ thanh niên có sức khỏe ra Bắc để bổ sung vào quân đội chính quy, thành lập hàng ngũ du kích chiến, xâm lấn mở rộng căn cứ Việt-Cộng tại các vùng Thượng du, dần dần chuẩn bị cướp Chính quyền miền Nam.

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H. — Anh khai rõ lý do anh vào xuất thú tại đồn Hải-Cụ, quận Trung-Lương (Quảng-Trị).

Đ. — Thừa tại Bái-Hà (Vĩnh-Linh), sau khi nghỉ 10 ngày để chữa vết mổ ở bụng (vì tôi có mổ bụng để bớt một ruột thừa hồi tháng 7-60, nhưng vết mổ vẫn còn tái phát), trước khi ông Võ-Phương đi có để lại cho tôi một cái bản đồ, tôi xem bản đồ đi vào mặt khu Quảng-Trị tại Hương-Lập một mình bắt đầu đi lúc 7 giờ mai tại Bái-Hà đến lúc trời men tối tôi có gặp một cái chòi Thượng du (Bắc tuyến) ở giữa rừng tôi vào xin ngủ lại một đêm (nhà này chỉ có một bà già) sáng ngày tôi tiếp tục băng rừng lội suối để tìm đường vào mặt khu Việt-Cộng nhưng đi suốt ngày mà chẳng thấy đâu cả, trong ngày này tôi đã lội qua nhiều suối, khe, thác, tôi không biết đâu là sông Bến-Hải vì đã vào trong rừng sâu, như vậy tôi đã đi lạc không xử dụng được bản đồ, khi ấy gần tối một mình tôi giữa rừng sâu núi thẳm, nên tôi tìm con đường cũ trước khi trở lui ra Bắc tuyến, cả đêm tôi theo đường cũ ấy, thì rạng ngày (lúc 7 giờ mai) tôi thấy cạnh đồn Hải-Cụ, quận Trung-Lương, tôi trở lui sợ họ bắn, khi ấy tiến thối lưỡng nan, tôi đánh liều vào xin xuất thú, đóng vai một cán Cộng bất mãn với Việt-Cộng miền Bắc vượt tuyến vào Nam tìm tự do.

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Biên bản hỏi cung này lập xong cùng ngày tháng như trên, có đọc lại cho đương sự nghe rõ ràng, nhận đúng y như cung nên bằng lòng ký chỉ dưới đây để vi bằng.

Lục sự.

Ký tên : NGUYỄN-VĂN-THƯƠNG

Ty Trưởng Công an,

Ký tên : LÊ-VĂN-PHO

Người khai,

Ký tên : NGUYỄN-VĂN-MINH

TRÍCH LỤC

BẢN TƯỜNG THUẬT TỰ KIỂM ĐIỂM VỀ ĐẦU THỨ CỦA TÊN ĐÌNH-TẤN-HOÀNG

Tôi, Đình-tấn-Hoàng xin vô cùng thành khẩn trước cơ quan và Chính phủ đề tường thuật mọi việc tôi đã biết về tất cả chủ trương đường lối của Bắc-Việt cũng như những việc tôi định về đầu thú và đã làm trong việc đầu thú.

Tôi xin thề hết sức thành tâm thành ý có sao nói vậy, không dấu diếm để đoaí công chuộc tội, và nhờ cấp trên xét chiếu cố cho tội lỗi :

I. — *Căn-cước lý lịch :*

Họ và tên : Đình-tấn-Hoàng, tên thường gọi là O-Bắc để vào Nam (đổi tên) « Văn-Bằng ».

Ngày sinh : sinh ngày 15-8-1929.

Nghề nghiệp : đi buôn nhỏ (tiểu thương).

Học lực : lớp tám (Việt-Cộng).

Sinh trú quán : thôn Đông-Xuân, xã Nghĩa-Thành, huyện Nghĩa-Hành, tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi.

Tên cha : Đình-Văn (c) và mẹ Huỳnh-thị-Phát, còn, buôn bán.

Sinh trú quán : thôn Đông-Xuân, xã Nghĩa-Thành, quận Nghĩa-Hành, tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi.

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II. — *Quá trình hoạt động :*

Thời Pháp thuộc : còn nhỏ chỉ đi học và giúp việc cho gia đình.

Thời Nhật thuộc : —

Thời Việt-Minh : Tháng 1-1947, tôi nhập ngũ vào Tiểu-đoàn Cẩm tử quân làm đội viên. Năm 1948, làm tiểu đội trưởng Tiểu-đoàn

trên. 1949 làm trung đội trưởng ở Trung-đội 3, Đại-đội 1, Tiểu-đoàn 45. Năm 1950 như đơn vị trên. Năm 1951 về nhà làm ăn đến năm 1953 đi dân công mang đạn cho chiến trường Đông-Xuân (1953-1954). Tháng 3-1954 tái đăng vào Bộ-đội ở Trung-đoàn 96 mới thành lập vẫn giữ chức vụ trung đội trưởng đánh trận 229 xe hơi ở An-Khê (Bình-Định). Trong trận này tôi bị thương vì sức ép của bom nên ảnh hưởng đến thần kinh tâm và điếc.

Tháng 7-1954, tôi được trên cho về nhà luôn, kết hợp với nguyện vọng nên được trên đồng ý.

Tôi chỉ muốn ở nhà với vợ con làm ăn không ưa đời sống bộ đội vì xa nhà, thiếu tình cảm.

Tháng 8-1954, đình chỉ chiến sự Đông-Dương và được trên huyện, tỉnh cho đi tập kết ra đất Bắc.

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Lên đường đi tập kết ngày 28-9-54, ra đất Bắc tôi được điều trị tại bệnh viện Phủ-Doãn Hà-nội đến năm 1956 mới khỏi, lành hẳn như xưa.

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III. — *Hiện tại* :

Tháng 4-1961, tôi đang làm công tác được ở Ban Thống-Nhất Trung-ương về gọi danh sách để đi về Nam làm công tác, lúc này tôi sung sướng vì đã đạt được ý muốn, qua bao năm xa quê hương gia đình tình cảm thiếu thốn.

Sự chuẩn bị trước khi đi : Ngày 4-4-61, tôi đi về Hà-nội để học tập chính trị đường lối để về Nam. Học ở đây được một tháng vừa chuẩn bị vừa học chính trị lẫn quân sự. (Bắn súng lục và dùng các loại vũ khí khác).

Trước khi lên đường chúng tôi chuẩn bị hết sức đầy đủ như một người gián điệp :

- Thuốc men, quần áo, mền ra, vớng, mùng, thức ăn, vật dụng.
- Chúng tôi rời khỏi Thủ đô Hà-nội ngày 24-5-61 đi ô-tô vào

Vinh đề chuẩn bị đi với Trung-đoàn 126 và Tiểu-đoàn đặc biệt.

Ngày 2-6-61, đoàn quân dân chính lên đường đi từ Hà-Tĩnh đi lên nước Lào. Lúc bấy giờ có một Đại-đội đặc biệt đi trước để làm nhiệm vụ dọn đường sá và đánh các đồn bót dọc theo hành lang.

Đi từ Lào ở Mương-Phình đi dọc trên đất Lào 25 ngày đi (không kể ngày nghỉ). Qua mỗi trạm đều có gạo ăn, lương thực như đường, muối, thuốc, sữa do Nga-Sô tiếp-tế (mang danh nghĩa là cho nước Lào nhưng thực tế cho quân đội Việt-Bắc).

Đi 1 ngày đến 1 trạm : sáng từ 5 giờ 30 đến 7 giờ tối chiều. Qua từng trạm như vậy có liên lạc giao liên dẫn đường đến đường tế xuống Quảng-Nam, lúc bấy giờ ăn uống có phần khó hơn ở đất Lào vì sự tiếp tế của Nga-Sô không còn nữa. Ngày chỉ 2 lon gạo Cộng Thượng tiếp tế.

Đi đường ở đây lại còn khó hơn ở đất Lào vì nó phải đi trên dãy núi Tràng-Son đi trên gáy. Cứ như thế mà đi hết trạm này đến trạm khác sự dẫn đường cũng như trên, do anh em người Thượng dẫn.

Đi từ Quảng-Nam về đến Quảng-Ngãi phải đi 20 ngày (không kể ngày nghỉ). Theo thường lệ hành quân thì 1 giờ nghỉ 10 phút và đi trong hai hoặc ba ngày phải nghỉ 1 ngày tùy theo sức khỏe trong đơn vị.

Về đến tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi (trên núi) ngày 24-8-61.

Đoàn cán bộ dân chính của chúng tôi về đến tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi, song với nhiệm vụ mỗi người mỗi địa phương, quận khác nhau.

Tôi được sự phân công của tỉnh là về quận Nghĩa-Hành để làm đội trưởng vũ trang tuyên truyền.

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Lực lượng quân sự và dân chính đi vào Nam trên đường đi cùng một lượt với tôi.

Đoàn Dân-chính gồm có 11 cán bộ trong số này đủ các quận trong tỉnh về vũ khí trang bị thì có 4 khẩu súng ngắn P. 38, 3 tiểu liên, đạn cả súng ngắn và tiểu liên là 800 viên.

Lực lượng Quân-sự : Trên đường đi có 1 tiểu đoàn đặc biệt gồm 5 đại-đội, tên gọi tiểu đoàn này là C.K.I. dùng phần nhiều là bọc phá do Trung-cộng viện trợ.

Tiểu-đoàn này gồm 5 Đại-đội được 600 người. Về vũ khí trang bị trung-liên và tiểu-liên. Một Đại-đội 2 cây trung-liên và tiểu-liên chiếm 40 % còn lại bao nhiêu là bọc phá cả.

Tiểu-đoàn này ở Liên-khu 5 sẽ về 5 tỉnh một tỉnh 1 Đại-đội : Quảng-Nam, Quảng-Ngãi, Bình-Định, Phú-Yên và Khánh-Hoà.

Về chất lượng của Tiểu-đoàn này là Vạn-năng, đào tạo một chiến binh là 18 tháng có đầy đủ trình-độ văn-hoá, chính-trị, quân-sự, kinh-tế.

Về trang bị quân trang : Tiểu-đoàn này hầu hết là thô sơ chỉ 1 bộ quần áo quân phục và 1 bộ đồ cải trang.

— Vũ-khí đa phần là bọc phá,

— Lương thực đều tự túc để mà ăn.

Một Trung-đoàn 126 cùng đi trên đường, về quân số ước chừng 1.100 người. Đa phần người Thượng thuộc các quân miền núi. Trong đó có cả người Quảng-Nam, Quảng-Ngãi và Bình-Định.

Trung đoàn đó chia làm 3 tiểu-đoàn, 2 Tiểu-đoàn Bộ-binh và 1 Tiểu-đoàn súng cối ĐK. 57 của Trung-cộng. Hai Tiểu-đoàn Bộ-binh trang bị đầy đủ vũ khí có cả Đại-liên (4 cây đại-liên). Một Trung-đội là một Trung-liên và Tiểu-liên đầy đủ, cán bộ từ Chuẩn úy trở lên đều có súng ngắn P. 38.

Quân trang đều trang bị đầy đủ.

Quân lương hoàn toàn tự túc và dựa vào đồng bào Thượng.

Nơi cư trú các lực lượng trên, khi về đến tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi (núi) thì chúng tôi tách riêng đi một người một ngã, mỗi người một việc. Tiểu-đoàn đặc biệt của tỉnh nào thì về tỉnh ấy về làm nhiệm vụ. Riêng Trung-đoàn 126, tôi đoán biết là nó đang tập trung lực lượng để tấn công vào các quận miền núi và miền Tây của ta như Kontum, Mong-Đôn, Đát-Tô v. v...

Hiện nay chủ yếu các lực lượng ấy đang giải quyết, chỉ một số ít tình báo đi dò la tình hình thôi.

CUỘC HÀNH TRÌNH CỦA ĐOÀN CÁN BỘ DÂN CHÍNH CHUẨN BỊ ĐỂ VÀO NAM LÀM CÔNG TÁC

a) Chuẩn bị :

Ở đây có Ban Thống nhất Trung-Uơng chịu trách nhiệm chuẩn bị về mọi mặt để cho đoàn cán bộ đi công tác đặc biệt.

— *Vũ khí trang quân dụng.*

Ban Thống nhất chuẩn bị quân trang quân dụng cho mỗi một cán bộ đủ mặc đủ dùng tối thiểu mỗi người phải là hai năm.

Vũ khí : Đoàn cán bộ chúng tôi 11 người trang bị 4 khẩu P. 38. 3 khẩu tiểu liên và 800 viên đạn.

— Về công tác huấn luyện chỉ có học tình hình và nhiệm vụ tình hình thế-giới và nhiệm vụ hiện tại trong nước) trong thời gian 20 ngày.

— Số lượng học trường ở Hà Nội được 61 người chia đi các tỉnh ở Liên-khu V :

Quảng-Ngãi	11
Quảng-Nam	15
Bình-Định	15
Phú-Yên	10
Khánh-Hoà	10

— Số lượng quân đội được cử đi : (hông rõ).

— Vũ khí từng đơn vị và cách trang bị kể cả thuốc men và vật dụng trang bị cho mọi người dân chính (cán bộ) dùng trong hai năm.

— Bộ đội thuốc men dùng như thời gian trên còn quần áo ít hơn.

Lương thực : chỉ có lương khô ăn độ 3 tháng, gạo ăn đi đường thì qua trạm nào do trạm ấy cấp cho đi ăn.

— Vũ khí cho từng đơn vị (không rõ).

— Tên các cấp chỉ-huy (không rõ).

b) *Lúc đi đường :*

— Ngày khởi hành của Tiểu-đoàn đặc biệt và Trung-đoàn 126 : ngày 2 tháng 6 năm 1961 tại cửa lò Nghệ-An.

— Phương tiện khởi hành đi toàn bằng xe monotoba (Liên-xô).

Một xe đi chừng 15 người và hành lý.

— Các đoạn đường đi bằng xe : đường đi từ cửa Lò đến thị xã Hà-Tĩnh 50 cây số (quốc lộ 1) xong xe rẽ lên đường đi Thanh Lãng từ đường Quốc lộ 1 đến đất Lào 250 cây số, xe phải chạy trong 1 đêm và 2 ngày.

— Xong xe từ Mường Phin Lào chạy dọc theo đó được 40 cây số (khoảng đường chỉ bạc theo đôi trục).

— Những trở lực khi đi trên đất Lào : không gặp một trở lực gì cả vì trước đó đã có 1 Đại đội đã đi trước để dọn đường cho các đơn vị đi sau.

— Trên đường đi gần đến đất Quảng-Nam có ngang qua một cái đôn (không rõ tên) từ đó đến trạm đường chim bay chỉ độ 2 cây số. Đường xuyên sơn phải đi mất 3 tiếng đồng hồ.

— *Tiếp tế của Nga-sô :*

Nga-sô lấy danh nghĩa là tiếp-tế cho Lào về vũ khí lương thực. Thực tế thì cùng cố để giúp quân-đội Khong-Le đánh nhau với quân Phoumi. Trong lúc đó máy bay của Nga-sô đã tiếp tế cho quân đội Miền Bắc bằng đủ thứ như : gạo, muối, mắm, thịt, sữa, thuốc hút v. v... máy bay tô mẫu đen độ 8 chiếc đậu ở phi-trường Sê-Bôn Lào. Máy bay đó tiếp tế dọc theo biên giới Lào, chúng thả dù xuống đồng trống.

.....

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, 27 January 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 403/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

⑥

The Mission in charge of Relations with the International Commission for Control presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, referring to its letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961, and subsequent letters, has the honor to forward to the Commission the attached photostats of the following documents :

First document : A tract entitled « Letter of the Lao-Dong Party of Viet-Nam (the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam) of the regional sector of Saigon-Cholon-Giadinh, to comrade workers and laborers, on the occasion of International Labor Day. »

This tract, dated 1 May, 1961, is signed by one Le-minh-Chanh, in the name of the Saigon-Cholon-Giadinh regional sector of the Lao-Dong Party of Viet-Nam.

Second document : Study document for the use of cadres and fighters «To Fight for Whom ? »

This document, bearing the date 10 January, 1961, is divided into five chapters. The Mission forwards photostats of Chapter 5, which is the most significant, and which is entitled « Role of the Communist Party in the liberation of the people. »

Third document : Tract dated 10 February, 1961, announcing the creation of the « Front for Liberation of the South » and presenting the Front's flag.

2. The following is the translation of the most significant parts of the documents mentioned, to which the Mission draws the particular attention of the Commission :

a) *First document* (4th and 7th paragraphs) :

« *This year we celebrate International Labor Day at the time when, in South Viet-Nam, the struggle movement is intensifying,*

the enemy of the people, the U.S.-Diemist clique, undergoes a crisis, is weakened to the point where nothing can save it, and when the movement of workers, laborers, and other classes of the Saigon-Cholon-Giadinh population gain in strength and intensity. This movement is united into a vast front. On 19 March, 1961, the « People's Liberation Front » for the Saigon-Cholon-Giadinh region was formed, marking the victory of the people of Saigon-Cholon-Giadinh, and constituting one of the decisive elements of our final victory, the overthrow of the U.S.-Diemist regime. The Lao-Dong Party of Viet-Nam of the Saigon-Cholon-Giadinh region, Party of the workers' and laborers' class, earnestly welcomes the formation of the above Front, and pledges itself to be one of the ramparts of the Front and to fight according to the Front's program.

.....

« Faithful to the class to which they belong, all the members of the Lao-Dong Party of Viet-Nam tirelessly fight and mobilize the other classes of society to overthrow the U.S.-Diemist regime, in order to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, and prosperous Viet-Nam, and to banish the policy of the exploitation of Man on our beloved land. »

The preceding lines constitute proof :

- that the Front for Liberation of the South is a creation of the Lao-Dong Party (Communist Party of North Viet-Nam) with which it identifies itself ;
- that the fight that it carries on seeks to overthrow the legal regime in South Viet-Nam, in conformity with the directives of the Lao-Dong Party, that is, the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam.

b) *Second document : « Chapter 5 — Role of the Communist Party in the liberation of the people. »*

« At the present time in South Viet-Nam, the Party directs the masses in the revolutionary fight, in order to achieve the liberation of the South and to unify the country. For six years, the Party has directed the masses in the fight against the dictatorship and fascism of the U.S.-Diemist regime...

« Only the Communist Party has the force and the moral authority to direct the masses, to unite the workers, peasants, laborers, and the population of the South in the fight to overthrow the U.S.-Diemist regime, to realize the unification of the country, to achieve democratic independence, and to progress toward socialism. Thus, the leadership role of the Party is extremely important and assumes a decisive character. »

It is therefore perfectly clear that it is the Lao-Dong Party, that is the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam, that directs all the subversive activities in South Viet-Nam, with the aim of overthrowing the regime of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

c) *Third document* : The tract carries on its face and inside the flag of the Front for Liberation of the South (two red and blue horizontal bands with a five-pointed yellow star in the center).

« It is thus called : « *The Flag of the Front for Liberation of the South.* » On 20 December, 1960, the Front for Liberation of the South was born. Its mission is to gather all social classes, all races, all political parties, all groups, all religions... in order to overthrow the regime of domination by the American imperialists and the Ngo-Dinh-Diem clique. »

3. The tenor of the above-cited 3 documents shows that it is indeed the Hanoi authorities that direct the armed subversion in South Viet-Nam, behind the façade of the « Front for Liberation of the South » that they have created and that is nothing more than the Communist Party of the Viet-Minh itself.

Thus all the propaganda used up to the present time by the Hanoi authorities to give the impression that the « Front for Liberation of the South » is a spontaneous popular movement against the legal regime of South Viet-Nam is disapproved by the documents emanating from those authorities themselves, and the authenticity of which they cannot deny.

4. The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYEN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, 27 January, 1962

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C*

N° 404/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and referring to the Mission's letters Nos. :

4660/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of 24 October, 1961

5078/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of 16 November, 1961

5738/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of 29 December, 1961

and those of the Commission Nos. :

IC/FB/6/S/61/1039 of 12 December, 1961

IC/FB/6/S/62/38 of 16 January, 1962,

has the honor to convey herewith to the Commission the following supplementary documents in order to facilitate and accelerate its investigation of the policy of Viet-Cong terrorism and aggression in the national zone and of the case of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam :

1° Extract from the declaration of Le-Duan, Secretary General of the Lao-Dong Party (Viet-Minh Communist Party) during the Party's 3rd Congress at Hanoi on 5 and 10 September, 1960 (Newspaper « Nhan-Dan » No. 2362 of 6 September, 1960), (Cf. the Mission's letter No. 5193 of 20 October, 1960, attachment No. 1 of the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

2° Extracts of commentaries of the resolution of the Lao-Dong Party's 3rd Congress (Newspaper « Nhan-Dan » of 23 September, 1960), (Cf. Mission's letter No. 5193 of 20 October, 1960, attachment 1 of the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

3° Extracts of Radio Saigon monitoring bulletins and material relating to broadcasts on the 23, 26, 28 October, 1958 at 1130 hours by Radio Hanoi (see letter No. 41 of 5 January, 1959 from the Mission, attachment No. 2 to the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

4° Extracts from broadcasts of 18 May, 1 June, and 8 June, 1961, at 2200 hours from the « Voice of the Front for Liberation of the South. » (See letter No. 3075 of 8 July, 1961 from the Mission, attachment No. 4 to the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

5° Extract from the broadcast of 6 July, 1961, at 2200 hours of the « Voice of the Front for Liberation of the South. » (Cf. letter No. 3944 of 25 August, 1961 from the Mission, attachment No. 5 of the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

6° Extract from Radio Saigon monitoring bulletin regarding Radio Hanoi broadcast of 5 February, 1960 at 1930 hours (see Mission's letter No. 909 of 26 February 1960, attachment No. 6 of the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

7° Extract from the broadcast of 25 August, 1958, of the « Voice of the Front for Liberation of the South. » (See letter No. 909 of 26 February, 1960 from the Mission, attachment No. 6 to the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

8° Extract from the broadcast of 28 March, 1961 at 2030 hours from the « Voice of the Front for Liberation of the South. » (See letter No. 1971 of 12 May, 1961 from the Mission, which follows the Mission's two letters Nos. 1437 of 4 April, 1961 and 1552 of 10 April, 1961, attachment No. 14 to the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

9° Extracts from Radio Saigon monitoring bulletin regarding Radio Hanoi broadcast of 28 September, 1961, on the attack at Phuoc-Thanh. A typographical error was made regarding the date of the broadcast in paragraph B (c), second paragraph of Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961. The Commission is requested to note this and to read « 28 September, 1961 » instead of « 23 September, 1961. »

10° Copies of identity cards of Nguyen-Bat, Nguyen-Nua, Tran-Muc, Nguyen-Nu, Nguyen-Xanh and Huynh-Son, Viet-Cong cadres, arrested on 31 January, 1960, aboard a junk adrift near the island of Ly-Son (Quang-Ngai province). (See letter No. 2407 of 20 May, 1960, attachment No. 7 of the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

11° Copies of the interrogation record of the six Viet-Cong agents mentioned above.

12° Group photograph of the six agents.

13° Copy of the identity card of Le-Kinh, Viet-Cong cadre, arrested on 9 May, 1959, at Cat-Son (southern demilitarized zone). (See Mission's letter No. 963 of 1 March, 1960, attachment No. 9 to the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

14° Copy of the interrogation record of the above-named Le-Kinh.

15° Photostat of the Viet-Cong Lieutenant Vo-van-Kieu, arrested on 23 December, 1960 in Quang-Nam. (See Mission's letter No. 724 of 20 February, 1961, attachment No. 10 to the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961).

16° Copy of the declaration of chauffeur Nguyen-van-Ninh, driver of the car No. NBQ 285 belonging to Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam. (See Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961, paragraph VI, sub-paragraph 5).

17° Copy of the declaration of Nguyen-van-Hon, gardener of Colonel Hoang-thuy-Nam. (See Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961, paragraph VI, sub-paragraph 6).

18° Copies of the medical-legal report and the attestation of the Chief of the Identification and Analysis Bureau of the Directorate General of Police and Surety. (See Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961, attachment No. 21).

19° Photostat of a notebook for the distribution of food rations, captured at Ca-Lu (Quang-Tri) (XD.959.470) during the attack of 29 March, 1961.

According to the notes kept in this notebook, rice rations were distributed to Viet-Cong elements passing through Ca-Lu. It is possible to estimate that, during the period of October 1960 to March 1961, no less than 1,800 Viet-Cong cadres infiltrated into South Viet-Nam through the territory of the province of Quang-Tri. (See Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961, paragraph V-C, 2° (b).)

20° Photostat of a page of notebook-diary captured at Ca-Lu at the same time.

This notebook probably belonged to a Viet-Cong officer, commander of the Ca-Lu post. The Viet-Cong officer notes the quantity of arms brought to this center to be distributed to Viet-Cong forces stationed at Quang-Tri.

21° Photostat of a page of a notebook-diary captured at Ca-Lu at the same time.

This page shows, in the Russian language, the name and address of a Viet-Cong agent living in Moscow.

22° Photostat of documents found in the battlefield at Ben-Suc, Binh-Duong province, 25 and 26 October, 1961. (See Mission's letter No. 5738 of 29 December, 1961, third document) ;

- a) records of pharmaceutical distributions to military hospital G.25 during period 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 October 1961 ;

- b) schedule and regulations for the personnel of the above-mentioned hospital :
- don't make any noise, such as speaking loudly, laughing loudly, or clapping the hands ;
 - never leave the base without authorization ;
 - never reveal the secrets of the base in public ;
 - take in laundry drying in the sun at the approach of aircraft ;
 - in case of alert, following the pre-determined plan strictly.

23° Photostat of several specimens of pharmaceutical products made in North Viet-Nam and captured at the same time as the diary of Viet-Cong Dr. Mai-xuan-Phong. (See the Mission's letter No. 5078 of 16 November, 1961, third document).

The Mission takes this occasion to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

THE PERMANENT OBSERVER
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

18 December, 1961

N° 414



His Excellency U Thant
Secretary General of the United Nations
New York

Excellency :

On instructions from my government, I have the honor to forward to you the attached text of letter No. 5482/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of 9 December, 1961, in which the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission recalled its previous letters regarding infiltration into South Viet-Nam, across the demilitarized zone and the Laotian border, of spies, saboteurs, terrorists, and armed elements coming from North Viet-Nam, and which again requested the International Commission for Control to take the necessary measures to end these infiltrations which threaten the peace.

In order that the Delegations at the United Nations can be fully informed of this aggression against my country, I ask you, in the name of my government, to circulate to them the text of this letter as well as the letter mentioned above from the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed : Madame TRAN-VAN-CHUONG

Permanent Observer
of the Republic of Viet-Nam
to the United Nations
New York

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, 9 December, 1961

*Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.*

N° 5482/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General
of the International Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Control Commission presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Control Commission and has the honour to refer to its letters No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961 and No. 5078 of 16 November, 1961.

2. By the above-mentioned letters, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has submitted to the examination of the Commission the documents proving that spies, terrorists, saboteurs, and armed Viet-Cong elements have infiltrated into South Viet-Nam across the demilitarized zone and the Laotian border. This infiltration is one of the most important constitutive elements of guerilla warfare carried out at the present by the Viet-Cong against the Republic of Viet-Nam, in violation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement on the Cease-Fire.

3. In face of the aggravation of this situation, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam earnestly requests the International Control Commission, in the frame of its mission of peace in Viet-Nam, to take necessary measures in order to put an end to these illegal infiltrations, by extending its control to the Western part of the demilitarized zone and by establishing a strict control along the Laotian and South Vietnamese frontier.

With a view to helping the Commission in this essential task and to proving once more its sincere desire to cooperate with the Commission in the discharge of its mission of peace, the Govern-

ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam is ready to furnish the Commission with helicopters which will allow it to carry out a systematic control of the region bordering on the Laotian and South Vietnamese frontier and of the Western part of the demilitarized zone.

4. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Control Commission the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

THE PERMANENT OBSERVER
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

18 December, 1961

N° 415

⑥

*His Excellency U Thant
Secretary General of the United Nations
New York*

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

In reference to my letter No. 414 of 18 December, I have the honor to send you copies of :

1. Letter No. 4660/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of 24 October, 1961 ;
2. Letter No. 5078/PDVN/CT/TD/2 of 16 November, 1961 from the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control.

These documents might be circulated to the delegations of United Nations members at the same time as the documents I have already sent you.

Accept, Mr. Secretary General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

*Permanent Observer of Viet-Nam
to the United Nations
New York*

Signed : M^{me} TRAN-VAN-CHUONG

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Secretariat of State
for Foreign Affairs

Saigon, 16 November, 1961

Mission in charge
of relations with the I.C.C.

N° 8078/PDVN/CT/TD/2

Secretariat General of the International
Control Commission

The Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission for Control presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control and, in connection with its letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961, has the honor to forward to the International Commission for Control photostats of the documents cited therein, establishing evidence of the presence in South Viet-Nam of regular Viet-Cong troops that the P.A.V.N.* has introduced illegally through Laotian territory in order to fight against the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam under the name of the « Forces for Liberation of the South ».

2. The matter concerns travel notebooks taken from the body of the Viet-Cong soldier named Do-Luc and from that of the Viet-Cong captain Nguyen-dinh-Kieu, both of whom were killed during engagements with the army of the Republic of Viet-Nam in the province of Kontum, as well as the notebook of the Viet-Cong doctor Mai-xuan-Phong picked up on the battlefield at Ban-Me-Thuot, which case was described in Part V, paragraph C/2a of the Mission's above-cited letter.

1st Document. — Photostat of the journal of Viet-Cong soldier Do-Luc, killed during an engagement at Toumerong (Z.B.140.360), province of Kontum, 3 September, 1961, and from which is taken the following translation of several of the more significant passages :

« ... *Midnight, 4 May, 1961 : I leave beloved North Viet-Nam temporarily to return to the South where I was born and to deliver my native land from its misery under American-Diemist domination... »*

* People's Army of Viet-Nam (P.A.V.N.) : Name given by the Communist authorities of North Viet-Nam to their army.

« ... 4 May, 1961, 1:30 : here is the Laos-Vietnam border. »

« ... 17 June, 1961, 4:20 : after many years of separation, my heart beats faster at the sight of this piece of land of Interzone V (Quang-Nam) ... »

« ... 14 August, 1961 : « Memories » :

« ... 26 April, 1955, I left my family and friends to be regrouped in the North, heart gladdened by the victory. »

« ... 27 August, 1961 : « Memories » :

« ... I had to leave my beloved fatherland and my happy life 15 December, 1960, to go destroy the Phoumi-Boun Oum reactionaries, so that Laos and Viet-Nam can live in peace and happiness. The conflict in this friendly country finished, obeying the orders of the Party I returned to my beloved fatherland (North Viet-Nam) to take up again a normal life and to prepare myself daily for the purpose of protecting North Viet-Nam and of freeing South Viet-Nam. »

« But life still does not settle down that way for me. I returned to combat for the third time in order to free my Southern compatriots. »

« Responding to the appeal of the Front for Liberation of the South, I rejoin the ranks of the Liberation Forces. My life will be difficult, but I keep intact my faithfulness to the Party... »

.....
In addition to the journal, a photograph of two soldiers in uniform of the regular Viet-Cong army was also found on the body of the Viet-Cong soldier Lo-Luc (photostat attached).

2nd document. — Photostat of the journal of Viet-Cong captain Nguyen-dinh-Kieu, killed 26 September, 1961, during an engagement at Dakakoi (Kontum province), and from which is taken the following translation of several of the more significant passages :

« ... 15 June, 1961, 1500 hours, departure toward the South-East ; at 1800, stop 4 kilometers from Y-Ly ; at 2400 passage on the ferry at Huong-Khe (Ha-Tinh, North Viet-Nam) (WF.725.140) (1). »

« ... 16 and 17 June, 1961, stop at Thanh-Lang (Quang-Binh, North Viet-Nam) (WE.900.882). Lunch at the Laotian border. 18 June, 1961, leave for Phang-Kheng (Laos). »

(1) The coordinates are given by the Mission to permit identification of the localities on the UTM map of Indochina, scale 100,000.

« ... 21 June, 1961, stop at Thapachon Kham-Muon (Laos, WE.870.070) ; 22 June, 1961, 1500, arrive at Muong-Sen (Laos), that place having been burned and destroyed by the French troops and those of Phoumi ; 27 June, leave for Nam-Mi (Laos) ; 28 June, a day's rest at Nam-Mi (Laos, XD.090.600) recently liberated ; we then went to Ban-Ca-Den (Laos), toward the Southeast ; 29 June, arrive at Tchepone (XD.305.430, Laos) ; stop at Tchepone 30 June, 1 and 2 July, 1961. »

« ... 9 July, rest at Lam-Li-Cau (Laos) ; 10 July, rest at Capé (Laos). Then, en route to Touse (XC.950.750 Laos). Rest at Touse 12 July ; 18 July, arrive at the Western part of Quang-Nam province (South Viet-Nam), rest at the border between Laos and South Viet-Nam. »

« ... From 18 July began the new phase. The existence of relay posts on national territory permits us to reduce our provisions of rice to only 2 day's supply. We passed through the region controlled by the enemy and took route No. 14 toward Dakbley (Kontum, South Viet-Nam). In this region, the relay posts are further apart. We presented ourselves to the command post of the combat sector to receive instructions. »

« ... 18, 19 and 20 July rest at a relay post to the West of Quang-Nam (South Viet-Nam). 21 July, departure for interzones 1 and 2. »

« ... 5 August, stop at B.T.C. close to Tra-My (BS.020.970) (Quang-Nam province) for one day to prepare for departure for Quang-Ngai (South Viet-Nam). 13 August, arrival at Eo-Lo. Of the 37 men of the group, 4 are missing.


« ... 14 August, meeting of the Party committee, to discuss the mission to fulfill... »

« ... Mission to fulfil : With D5, activities on Highway No. 5 Konbrai (AS.970.010-Kontum province), Mang-Den, Kon-Rolong, in order to exhaust the enemy. In September 1961, attack Tama (Quang-Ngai, BS.350.465), surround Mang-Buk (Quang-Ngai, BS.000.430). »

« ... 9 September, 1961, after the victory of Konbrai (Kontum province), the morale of the troops is good, no sign of disarray or desertion. »

« ... 15 September, 1961, on the way to Konmongtu (Kontum province). »

There follows a map sketched by Nguyen-dinh-Kieu in his journal :



The preceding lines, extracted from authentic documents, prove irrefutably that regular Viet-Cong troops have been introduced into Viet-Nam via Laos, following an itinerary of which the main points that may be marked on a 1/100,000 scale map are :

- North Viet-Nam : Huong-Khe (Ha-Tinh province) ;
Thanh-Lang (Quang-Binh province).
- Laos : Thapachon, Muong-Sen, Nam-Mi, Tchepone,
Tousa.
- South Viet-Nam : Tra-My (Quang-Nam province) ;
Quang-Ngai, Dakbley, Konbrai (Kontum).

According to the dates taken from the journal, this long trip by foot across mountainous regions lasted more than two months, of which one was on Laotian territory.

Along this infiltration corridor, the Viet-Cong have installed relay posts. Spaced out in Laotian territory, these relays are closer together and better cared for on the soil of South Viet-Nam.

The journal of Viet-Cong Captain Nguyen-dinh-Kieu proves, moreover, that he had taken part in the battle of Konbrai, to the Northeast of Kontum, on 9 September, 1961, as was mentioned in § V/C/2-a of the letter No. 4660 of the Mission.

TRANSLATION

« ... On 21st June 1961, stop at Thapachon Kham Muon (Laos, W.E.870.070) ; on 22nd June 1961, at 15:00 hours, arrival at Muong Sen (Laos), this spot had been burnt down and destroyed by French troops and those of Phoumi ; on 27th June, departure for Nam-Mi (Laos) ; on 28th June, a day's rest at Nam-Mi (Laos, XD.090.600) newly liberated ; we passed afterwards to Ban Ca Den (Laos), towards the South-East ; on 29th June, arrival at Tchepone (XD.305.430, Laos) stop at Tchepone on 30th June, 1st and 2nd July 1961. »

« ... On 9th July, rest at Lam-li-Cau (Laos) ; on 10th July, rest at Capé (Laos). Then on the way to Touse (XC.950.750, Laos). Rest at Touse on 12th July ; on 18th July, arrival at the Western part of Quang-Nam province (South Viet-Nam), rest at the frontier between Laos and South Viet-Nam. »

« ... From 18th July, a new phase began. The existence of relay posts on the national territory permits us to reduce the provision of rice to only 2 days' supply. We passed across the area controlled by the enemy and we took road No. 14 in the direction of Dakbley (Kontum, South Viet-Nam). In this area, the relay posts are farther apart. We got to the command post of the combat-sector to receive instructions. »

The above map, reproduced from the journal in question, gives an idea of the zone of activity of Viet-Cong Captain Kieu and his troops at Konbrai and surroundings as well as along Highway No. 5 (Kontum).

3rd Document. — Photostat of the journal of Viet-Cong Mai-xuan-Phong, seized 3, October, 1961 in the course of an engagement in Ban-Me-Thuot province.

Notes have been taken specifying the itinerary followed by the writer from North Viet-Nam (via Laos) to penetrate the Southern zone, as well as his participation on 21 September, 1961 in the attack on the agricultural development center at Quang-Nhieu (Ban-Me-Thuot). These details were mentioned in the Mission's letter No. 4660 of 24 October, 1961, to which the International Commission for Control is respectfully requested to refer.

3. The Mission believes that it must draw the particular attention of the International Commission for Control to the importance of the above-cited documents, the tenor and significance of which leave no doubt as to the aggressive activities of the authorities in the North against the Republic of Viet-Nam and their plan to invade South Viet-Nam. With the connivance of the Pathet-Lao and with Russo-Chinese military aid, the authorities in the North have openly violated the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Laos and are using the territory of this country as a corridor for the introduction of regular troops and war materiel into the interior of the Republic of Viet-Nam, without regard for the Geneva Accords of 1954.

In this grave hour when the Communists are attempting to take up hostilities again in Laos and when the activities of the Soviet airlift between North Viet-Nam and Laos are considerably intensified (see the Mission's letter No. 4894 of 7 November, 1961), the Mission is convinced that the International Commission for Control will no longer remain indifferent to the threats of invasion that the Communists cause to weigh more heavily each day on South Viet-Nam.

4. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General of the International Commission for Control the assurance of its high consideration.

Signed : NGUYÊN-VAN-AN

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

The President

Message addressed by the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam to Chiefs of State or Chiefs of Government of 92 countries in the world.

Saigon, 31 March, 1962

I believe the facts of Communist aggression against the Vietnamese people are now well known to you. Despite Communist lies, the evidence on record cannot be hidden.

However, I would like to draw your particular attention to the 18 January Hanoi announcement of the founding of the so-called People's Revolutionary Party. This announcement is virtual admission of Hanoi's direction and control of the Viet-Cong rebels who are brutally attacking our people.

On 18 January, the Hanoi radio broadcast the declaration of the new Communist creation, the so-called Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party. This declaration states that in the last days of 1961 « Marxist-Leninists » in South Viet-Nam established a new party, with its « immediate tasks » being to unite the people and « to overthrow » the Government of Viet-Nam. It also declared that the party « calls on the people in the North to build an ever more prosperous and strong North Viet-Nam, making it a solid basis for the struggle for peaceful reunification of the country, to give active support to their compatriots in South Viet-Nam in their revolutionary struggle. »

Here at last is a public admission of what has always been clear — that the Viet-Cong campaign against my people is led by Communists.

The North Vietnamese admission that the Viet-Cong attacks on the free people of Viet-Nam — attacks which now average more than 400 per week and claim total casualties of nearly 800 per week — are henceforth to be openly Communist directed must be a matter of concern for all nations.

The Communists have now themselves made it clear that they are making another brutal attempt in their effort to achieve world domination.

This attempt is not new. For more than seven years the Communists have most cynically violated the Geneva Accords of 1954. The central purpose of these Accords, which established a cease-fire, is to ~~maintain the peace in~~ Viet-Nam. The Communist regime in Hanoi is violating this basic purpose by its direction and support of the expanding guerrilla war which it is carrying on in South Viet-Nam.

The Hanoi regime made clear its objective when the Communist (Lao-Dong) Party in North Viet-Nam stated at its 1960 congress that a strategic task of « the Vietnamese revolution » is « to liberate South Viet-Nam » — ~~the Communist jargon for conquering a country already free.~~ Evidence based on captured documents and prisoners shows that, in order to carry out this task, the Hanoi regime is infiltrating armed personnel by the thousands into South Viet-Nam to mount over increasing guerrilla war activities.

In view of this guerrilla campaign, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has been compelled to appeal for increased military assistance and support from Free World countries to help prevent it from being overwhelmed by massive subversion from Communist North Viet-Nam, backed by heavily increased support from the Communist bloc. Even the regime in Hanoi has recognized that the free world's increased assistance is needed and being used in South Viet-Nam for defensive purposes. In an interview broadcast over Hanoi Radio January 1, 1962, Major General Nguyen-van-Vinh, chairman of the so-called « National Reunification Commission », stated that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam supported by the United States is not now preparing for a « march to the North ».

On the other hand, the Communist bloc has conducted an extensive airlift of military supplies into North Viet-Nam for aggressive purposes for well over a year. Part of this military material has been sent on to Laos to support the rebels and Viet-Cong fighting the legitimate Government there, but much of it has been turned over to the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to build up its war potential against South Viet-Nam.

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A grave threat to peace thus exists and can be removed only if the Communist regime in Hanoi is forced to desist in its guerrilla war against the legal Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, of which I have the honor to be President. World opinion is likely to serve as an important factor in the future decisions of the Communist authorities about this guerrilla war. I am, therefore, writing to you, Excellency, to bring the facts about the serious situation in Viet-Nam to your attention and to request that you raise your voice in defense of freedom and peace in this area of the world by condemning the Communist aggression against the duly constituted Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Yours sincerely,

Signed : NGO-DINH-DIEM

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