

Dep Doc No. 11787

I M T F E

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA & etc.

V.

ARAKI, Sadas & etc.

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent :

SAWADA, Shigera.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.



1. I was born at No. 4, KAMOBE, KAMODA-Village, TOSA-County,  
KŌCHI-Prefecture, on March 29, the 20th Year of Meiji. (1887)

My permanent and present <sup>address</sup> ~~residence~~ is at No. 47, ASAGAYA  
5-chome, SUGINAMI-Ward, TOKYO, ~~Metropolis.~~

2. Gist of my <sup>official</sup> career is as follows:—

- June, the 39th Year of Meiji (1906) Commissioned  
~~Appointed to~~ Second Lieutenant.
- March, the 10th Year of Showa (1935) Promoted to the rank of  
Major General.
- March, the 13th Year of Showa (1938) " Lt. General.
- June, the same year. Appointed the  
" (Commander of  
the Fourth Division.
- October, the 14th Year of Showa (1939) " Vice-Chief of  
the General Staff.
- December, the 15th Year of Showa (1940) " Commander of  
the Thirteenth Army (Shanghai)
- October, the 17th Year of Showa (1942) Relieved of the post of  
~~Dismissed~~ (the Commander of) of  
the Thirteenth Army
- November 15, the same year Transferred to the first reserve.  
(Service)



While in active duty I served mostly at  
~~I spent most part of my service on the active list in~~

the General Staff, the Military Staff College or as military  
attaché abroad.

3. I <sup>served as the</sup> ~~was in office of~~ Vice-Chief of the General Staff from  
October, 1939 to November, 1940. During ~~my~~ <sup>the</sup> tenure of ~~the~~ <sup>my</sup>

office, the Chief of the General Staff was H. I. H. Prince KAN'IN.

The Minister of War in YONAI Cabinet was General HATA, Shunroku.

~~Now, I will hereby relate what I happened to know by~~

~~personal contact about the~~ details of ~~the process to the~~

downfall of YONAI Cabinet ~~caused by~~ <sup>the</sup> War Minister's resi-

gnation, which came to my knowledge because of my participation  
in the affair.

<sup>an</sup> ~~earlier~~ <sup>y</sup> settlement of <sup>the</sup> China Incident was <sup>a</sup> consistent

desire of our country and the capture of NANKING was

~~conceived with the view to foster the trend to it, but~~  
planned for creating an opportunity for such a  
settlement. The objective was not attained, however.

~~in vain~~ Then, ~~it was devised to capture~~ HANGKOW ~~as a~~  
was reduced with a view toward paving way for peace.

~~means to cut way open to peace.~~ This hope, however,



Its reduction too failed to bring about the termination of the  
~~was betrayed too, and it could not be made a motive~~

~~to terminate the Incident,~~ <sup>however.</sup> <sup>it was</sup> Consequently ~~an opinion to~~  
 (generally held  
~~the following effect arose~~) within the Army circles

that brisk diplomatic activity <sup>ies should</sup> shall be <sup>(relied upon for the</sup> ~~stayed as it is~~  
 settlement of  
~~difficult to settle~~ the China Incident, <sup>(since armed forces alone</sup> ~~solely by virtue of~~  
 could not attain the objective.  
~~armed forces.~~

<sup>was then having conducted</sup>  
 I had been ~~secretly conducting~~ liaison conference to  
<sup>(Chinese and Japanese)</sup> ~~representatives for the purpose of~~  
~~cease fire between~~ <sup>military</sup> ~~delegates of Japan and China,~~  
 concluding an armistice

with the permission of H. I. H. Prince KAN'IN, <sup>the</sup> Chief of the General  
 Staff <sup>(Prince KANIN</sup> <sup>General Hata</sup> and War Minister) ~~understanding.~~ <sup>(also fell through later.</sup> This, ~~however,~~ ended  
<sup>the understanding by the</sup>

~~in failure, too, afterwards.~~

Because around the <sup>(of</sup> ~~About~~ Spring of 1940, when Germany <sup>(was winning extraordinary</sup> ~~were gaining unusual~~

victories and <sup>(her</sup> ~~success~~ national prestige was greatly enhanced that the view  
~~glared so brilliantly~~ <sup>opinion</sup>  
 became predominant in Army circles that Japan should  
 to take advantage of Germany's influence to <sup>(bring</sup> ~~induce quick~~  
~~termination of the Incident)~~ <sup>(to a speedy termination</sup> ~~became predominant coincidentally~~



~~in the Army circles. At that time, the Army circles were~~ <sup>That the</sup> ~~(desirous of~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~eagerly seeking to make)~~ <sup>is well known by</sup> ~~peace with China, (War Minister~~

HATA, ~~know it well~~ and he himself ~~was always~~ <sup>(maintained</sup> ~~saying~~  
that it <sup>was most urgent</sup> ~~is grave and urgent business to manage and settle~~  
the <sup>China</sup> ~~Sino-Japanese Incident.~~

~~Toward the end of~~  
~~Around the last decade of June, 1940, when I was staying~~  
in China ~~on my journey to~~ <sup>observe the ICHANG operation</sup> ~~see the operations around ICHANG,~~

I received an urgent telegram <sup>-phic summon</sup> ~~from TOKYO, ordering instant~~  
~~returning.~~ <sup>Upon my hasty return to</sup> ~~On arriving TOKYO with haste~~ I found that

the Cabinet <sup>was inclined not to establish close relations with</sup> ~~had shown inclination disliking to approach~~

Germany) <sup>contrary to the</sup> ~~in opposition~~ to the desire of the Army circles

and <sup>that</sup> the Cabinet's policy was <sup>(turning counter to the Army's prevailing</sup> ~~right opposite to the leading~~  
~~opinion.~~

~~opinion of the latter.~~

~~The Chief of Army General Staff~~

~~H. I. H. (Prince KAN'IN told me that he wished to see~~

the War Minister) <sup>(should do</sup> ~~doing his utmost effort to manage and~~



break the political deadlock; but since it was  
and cut through the present serious political situations.

<sup>h</sup> His ardent desire, ~~however, was to~~ <sup>accelerate the movement for</sup> try to further peace  
between Japan and China <sup>through</sup> Germany's mediation. ~~So,~~  
~~he continued, you~~ <sup>(</sup> should <sup>carefully</sup> confer deliberately upon this  
~~matter with~~ <sup>the</sup> War Ministry <sup>with this end in view.</sup> ~~personnel taking my desire into~~  
~~your account.~~



Accordingly I called on <sup>Lieutenant</sup> ~~Vice~~ general

A NAMI, (the Vice Minister of War) and

discussed the matter between <sup>two of us.</sup> ourselves.

The Vice Minister finally said that

there was no alternative but a

ministerial change, unless the Chief

of the General Staff <sup>would</sup> modify his views

to <sup>utilize</sup> ~~make~~ use of Germany to <sup>accelerate</sup> further

peace between China and Japan;

<sup>(in view of</sup> that) the character of the present cabinet

~~showed~~ that it was impossible to

comply with <sup>(attain</sup> his <sup>(objective</sup> desire even if some

changes were ~~to be~~ made <sup>(among</sup> its members.



When I tried to ascertain <sup>or not</sup> ~~whether~~ it was <sup>private opinion</sup> ~~secret intention~~ the War Minister HATA's opinion, <sup>to</sup> ~~which question he~~ answered in the <sup>but</sup> negative, though he added that it was the <sup>view of the personnel of the Ministry including himself</sup> ~~general intention of his staff~~, including the Vice Minister himself.

<sup>pointed out</sup> I said that the matter was of extreme importance, and as the opinions of the Army <sup>(in general)</sup> <sup>that</sup> and of the Cabinet were <sup>in</sup> ~~opposed~~ <sup>-ity on</sup> to each other, we had better meet again after I <sup>(asked once more the view of)</sup> ~~met~~ the Chief of the General Staff once more.

The Chief of the General Staff, having heard my report commented that ~~as follows:~~ <sup>i</sup> ~~if~~ <sup>his</sup> my opinion agree



represented) with that of the majority of the War Ministry Army,  
 he wanted me to <sup>further</sup> (for <sup>ing</sup> the objective;  
 make more efforts to) carry out ~~out~~  
<sup>that according to the</sup> purpose. The vice minister now says

there <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ no other way but a <sup>Cabinet</sup> ministerial  
 change) <sup>and he was truly</sup> ~~which would truly be an unusual~~ sorry for the War Minister  
 if such an extreme measure was to be taken,  
 measure. But <sup>one</sup> ~~we~~ must <sup>bear this against</sup> of necessity,  
 such a vital national affair as the settlement of the  
 take that unusual step to settle this

incident of national importance,  
 although I am very, very sorry for  
 the present ministers. I called

again on the Vice Minister and <sup>(stated</sup> ~~told~~  
<sup>the opinion of</sup> him what the Chief <sup>of the General Staff.</sup> ~~had said.~~

On the following day the Chief  
 of the General Staff handed me a letter  
 bearing his signature and stating his view, and wated me  
 to the above-stated purpose which he



~~told me to deliver~~ <sup>it</sup> to the War Minister  
 HATA. I delivered the letter <sup>(immediately)</sup> to HATA. ~~the War Minister~~  
~~or rather,~~ according to my <sup>recollection</sup> ~~memory,~~  
 I delivered the letter to HATA through <sup>the Minister</sup>  
 the Vice Minister ANAMI, <sup>have an impression</sup> I think  
<sup>and was told by</sup> ~~that I remember~~ ANAMI said that  
 he had handed the letter to the Minister  
 HATA, but <sup>I</sup> ~~it~~ might have been that I  
 handed the letter directly to HATA, instead.  
 Though I can't remember exactly <sup>(in</sup>  
<sup>manner,</sup> ~~which,~~ <sup>there is no mistake that</sup> the letter was ~~surely~~ delivered  
 to HATA, at any rate.

~~For the above-stated reason,~~ as  
<sup>(Having</sup> <sup>(from</sup>  
~~the War Minister HATA~~ received) the  
 letter <sup>of</sup> ~~from~~ the Chief of the General Staff



the letter bearing) <sup>(the War Minister Hata)</sup>  
 with (his august signature, ~~on it~~), he  
 tendered his resignation <sup>(immediately)</sup> on the following  
 day - or) ~~on the day following; and~~  
~~two days later, and the~~

YONAI Cabinet) <sup>(resigned en masse.)</sup> ~~at last ended in~~  
 general resignation.

As I have stated, <sup>(that)</sup> the War  
 Minister HATA <sup>so</sup> ardently desired  
 to settle the China Incident, <sup>(and to</sup>  
~~much wanted for)~~ <sup>restore</sup> peace with China -  
 This I <sup>directly</sup> ~~have personally~~ heard <sup>(from)</sup> him.  
~~speaking~~. There is <sup>(room for)</sup> no doubt about it.  
~~the fact.~~

It is true, ~~however~~ <sup>(the personnel of)</sup> that the  
 General Staff were <sup>(in perfect accord)</sup> ~~agreed among~~  
~~themselves concerning~~ <sup>(as to)</sup> the <sup>(method)</sup> ~~way to~~ whereby



6  
11.  
~~to utilize~~ <sup>should be utilized</sup>  
~~make use of Germany~~ and ~~to attempt~~  
~~to be settled~~ <sup>to be</sup> ~~the Incident~~ through <sup>her</sup> ~~German~~  
mediation; and I believe that all  
the <sup>members</sup> ~~staff~~ of the War Ministry including  
the Vice Minister were of the same  
opinion, as the Vice Minister ANAMI  
expressely told me. <sup>(so. However)</sup> ~~But whether~~ <sup>(or not)</sup>  
the War Minister HATA himself <sup>(was entirely)</sup> ~~agreed~~  
<sup>in accord</sup> with us ~~in every point~~ concerning <sup>(the)</sup> ~~this~~  
<sup>acceleration</sup> ~~furthurance~~ of peace through German  
mediation, I cannot state <sup>(definitely)</sup> ~~clearly~~  
here, <sup>I</sup> for I have ~~never~~ <sup>neither</sup> asked personally  
<sup>the Minister</sup> ~~HATA~~ whether he agreed with us on  
~~concerning~~ this subject, nor have I  
heard any ~~express word~~ of the Vice Minister



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(definitely say) The Minister was of the same opinion ~~concerning HATA~~ as HATA is concerned ANAMI in the affirmative, though ANAMI the entire personnel said all the staff of the War Ministry including himself were <sup>in accord as to</sup> agreed on this proposal point.

Because the

The character of YONAI cabinet was a conservative one, and it was against <sup>(saving)</sup> settling the situation by acting <sup>in</sup> concert with, and making use of, Germany, ~~so~~ the majority of the Army <sup>(personnel)</sup> <sup>(the)</sup> YONAI cabinet was too weak to ~~take~~ <sup>(bear the brunt)</sup> charge of <sup>(difficult)</sup> the situation, <sup>and</sup> <sup>to</sup> for settling the China Incident. They were <sup>(in favour of utilizing)</sup> strongly ~~for cooperation with~~ Germany <sup>(for the restoration of peace, even if it was necessary)</sup> and did not care if ~~the~~ cabinet might collapse. for doing so.



The War Minister HATA, as a member of  
 the cabinet, <sup>was</sup> ~~had ever been~~ cooperating  
 with the rest of the cabinet <sup>(members)</sup> in carrying  
 out its <sup>policies</sup> ~~principles~~, and <sup>(there was no indication)</sup> ~~nobody was~~  
 able to perceive <sup>(that he was making)</sup> ~~his efforts or ability~~ <sup>(having)</sup>  
 to comply with the general <sup>(wishes)</sup> ~~request~~  
 of the army concerning <sup>(the promotion)</sup> ~~this~~ <sup>request</sup> furtherance  
 of peace <sup>(by way of)</sup> through German mediation.  
<sup>t</sup> There was Indeed, ~~strong~~ fervent  
 desire among the Army <sup>(circles)</sup> ~~in general~~ to  
 change the War Minister. This general  
<sup>opinion</sup> ~~request~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~of the~~ Army <sup>(circles)</sup> was <sup>(reflected upon)</sup> ~~communicated~~  
 to the Chief of the General Staff, <sup>(who)</sup> ~~took~~  
 formed his <sup>own</sup> ~~opinion~~ accordingly and communicated it to  
~~a definite form~~ of the letter of the  
 the Minister Hata. <sup>This caused</sup> the War Minister  
~~Chief, which, being delivered,~~  
 to resign immediately.  
~~compelled HATA immediately to resign~~  
~~the post.~~ - (The end)



On this 16th day of January, 1947

At SUGAMO Prison.

DEPONENT SAWADA, Shigeru (Signature)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature ~~and seal~~ thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same dte

At the same place

Witness: (signed) KOKUBU, Tomoharu (seal)



OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding  
nothing.

SAWADA, Shigeru. (Signature)



To check,

not special

Jap. Doc. No. 5/5

HATA

Subject.

環田 茂の供書

Reference Group 神系 Phase

Individual

Certification.

is attached to this.

~~will be later completed.~~

Priority

III

(A) ~~Copy only~~

~~(The official translation is attached to this.)~~


(B) Translate and copy.

(Translation for reference is not attached to this.)

Date

23rd Jan. 1947

Sign

T. OK 

Note



Ref Doc No 1707

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫

其他

宣誓口述書

供述者 澤田茂

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り

宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

一 私ハ明治二十年三月二十九日高知縣土佐郡

鴨田村字鴨部四番地ニ生レ本籍地及現住

地ハ東京都杉並區阿佐ヶ谷五丁目四十七番地

デアリマス

二 私ノ經歷ハ大要次ノ通りデアリマス

明治三十九年六月

少尉任官

昭和十年三月

少將任官

昭和十三年三月

中將任官

同 年七月

第四師團長

昭和十四年十月

參謀次長

昭和十五年十二月

第十三軍司令官(兼)

昭和十七年十月

第十三軍司令官ヲ更ゼシ

同 年十一月十五日

豫備役

現役中ハ參謀本部大少將在外武官ニ主トシテ服務ス

✳



三、私ハ一九三九年十月カラ一九四〇年十一月マデ  
參謀次長ノ職ニ在リマシタガ其ノ時ノ參謀總長  
ハ閑院宮デアリマシタ

米内内閣ノ陸軍大臣ハ畑俊六大將デアリマシタガ  
同大臣ガ辭職シ米内内閣ガ崩壊シタ經緯ニ付テ  
私ガ關係シテ知ツテ居ル事情ヲ述ベマス

支那事變早期解決ハ我國ノ一貫シタ希望デ  
アリ南京攻略ハ其ノ機運ヲ醸成スル爲デアリマシタ  
ガ其ノ目的ハ達セラレマセンデシタソコテ漢口攻略ヲ  
爲シ之ヲ動機トシテ和平ヘノ道ヲ打開スル考ヘテ  
アリマシタガ之レ亦事變終結ノ動機トナリ得ナカ  
ツタノテ陸軍部内ニ於テハ支那事變ヲ武力ノミ  
デハ終末ヲツケルコトハ困難デアルカラ活潑ナ外交  
活動ニ待タネバナラヌトノ輿論ガ起リマシタ

私ハ閑院宮參謀總長ノ許可ヲ得又畑陸軍  
大臣ノ了解ヲ得テ密カニ日支双方ノ軍事代表ニ  
ヨル和平停戦ノ連絡會議ヲ行ハシメテ居タノデ  
アリマスガ之<sup>真像</sup>ニ成功ニ終リマシタ

然レ一九四〇年春頃獨逸ガ異常ノ戦果ヲ  
擧ゲ隆々タル勢デアリマシタ爲ニ獨逸ヲ利用シ  
テ速カニ支那事變ヲ終局ニ導コウトスル考ヘガ  
期セズシテ陸軍部内ニ横溢シタノデアリマス。當

三ノ字  
三ノ字  
三ノ字

用



時陸軍が和平ニ熱心デアツタコトハ畑陸軍大臣モヨク  
承知シテ居ラレルシ大臣自身モ常ニ曰支事変ノ処理  
解決が刻下ノ重大急務デアルト言ツテ居ラレタノデアリ  
マス

一九四〇年六月下旬頃私が宜昌作戰視察ノ爲  
支那滞在中東京カラ至急帰京セヨトノ招電ニ接シ  
大急ギテ帰京シテ見ルト内閣ハ陸軍部内ノ希望ニ  
反シテ獨逸ト接近スルコトヲ欲セザル意向ノ様デアリマ  
シテ内閣ノ方針ト陸軍部内ノ輿論トが對立シテ  
居ルトイフ様ナ実情デアリマシタ

閑院宮參謀總長ハ私ニ對シテ目下ノ險惡  
ナ政局打開ニ付陸軍大臣ノ大努力ヲ望ム然レ獨  
逸ノ仲介ニヨリ曰支和平ノ促進ヲ計ルコトハ余ノ  
熱心ナル希望デアルカラ其ノ積リテヨク陸軍省ト  
相談スル様ニト申サレマシタ

私ハ陸軍次官阿南中將ヲ訪ネテ二人限リテ此  
問題ヲ討議シマシタが結局阿南次官ハ參謀  
總長が獨逸ヲ利用シテ和平促進ヲ計ルトイフ  
御意見ヲ緩和サレナイ限り内閣更迭ニ出ヅル  
ノ外方法ハナイ現内閣ノ性質上之ヲ改造シテ  
見テモ到底其ノ希望ヲ達成スル事ハ出來ナイ  
トノ意見デアリマシタ



一は訂正  
母

私ハ之レハ畑陸軍大臣ノ内意デアルカ否カラ確メタ  
トコロ阿南次官ハ之ハ畑陸軍大臣ノ内意テハナイガ  
次官以下ノ者考ヘデアルト申シマシタ。ソコテ私ハ事  
ハ極メテ重大デアル陸軍ノ輿論ト内閣トが對立シ  
テ居ルノダカラ今一度參謀總長ノ御考ヘヲ聞  
イタ後ニ又會合シ様ト言ツテ別レタノデアリマス  
參謀總長ハ私ノ報告ヲ聞イテ余ノ意見ガ陸  
軍部内ノ大多数ノ意見デアルトイフナラバ此ノ  
意見ノ貫徹ニ更ニ努力シテ貫ヒタイ。次官ノ考ヘ  
テハ内閣更迭ノ外ニ手ハナイトイフ事デアルガ若シ  
内閣更迭トイフ非常手段ニ出ヅルトスレバ大臣ニ對  
シテハ眞ニ氣ノ毒デアルケレドモ事變解決トイフ國  
家ノ大事ノ爲ニハ忍バネバナラヌト仰セラレマシタ  
私ハ再ビ次官ヲ訪ネテ參謀總長ノ御考ヘヲ述ベ  
テ置キマシタ

ニは訂正  
母

其ノ翌日參謀總長カラ畑陸軍大臣ニ渡スト  
右ノ趣旨ヲ書イタ御署名ノアル書面ヲ私ニ御  
渡シニナリマシタノデ私ハ直チニ之ヲ畑陸軍大  
臣ニ渡シマシタ。私ハ右ノ書面ヲ阿南次官ヲ通  
ジテ畑陸軍大臣ニ渡シ同次官カラ之ヲ畑大臣  
ニ渡シタトイフコトヲ聞イタ様ニ記憶シテ居マス  
ガ或ハ私ガ直接畑陸軍大臣ニ手交シタノデア

母



ツタカモ知レマセヌ、其ノイツレデアツタカ判然シマセ  
ンケレドモ之ヲ確カニ畑陸軍大臣ニ渡シタ事ハ間違  
ナイ事実デアリマス

右ノ様ナ次第デ畑陸軍大臣ハ參謀總長ノ御  
署名ノアル書面ヲ戴カレタノデ其ノ翌日デアツタ  
カ其翌々日デアツタカ直チニ辭表ヲ提出サレマシテ  
米内内閣ハ遂ニ總辭職ヲスルニ至ツタノデアリマ  
シタ

前述ノ如ク畑陸軍大臣が早急ニ支那事變  
ノ解決、和平ヲ執望シテ居ラレタ事ハ私が直接  
同大臣カラ聞イタ事デアリマシテ疑問ノ余地ノ  
ナイ事実デアリマス

然レトウ獨逸ヲ利用シ之ヲ仲介者トシテ事  
變解決ヲ計ラントスル其ノ方法ニ付テハ當時參  
謀本部ニ於テハ意見が一致シテ居タコトハ確カ  
デアリマスレ又陸軍省内ニ於テモ次官以下ノ者が之  
ト同一意見デアツタ事ハ阿南次官が私ニ明言シ  
テ居リマシタカラ私ハ之ヲ信ジテ居リマスケレドモ  
畑陸軍大臣が獨逸利用ノ和平促進ニ付テ吾々  
ト全然同意見デアツタカ否カニ付テハ私トシテ  
ハ茲ニ明言スルコトハ出來マセヌ、何トナレバ私ハ  
畑陸軍大臣ニ對シテ獨逸利用ノ和平促進ニ付



同意ナリヤ否ヤニ関シ直接意見ヲ求メタストモナク  
又阿南次官カラモ陸軍省ノ次官以下ハ同意見ナ  
ルコトヲ聞キマシタガ畑陸軍大臣モ亦同意見デア  
ルカ否カトイフコトニ付テハ明答ヲ受ケタコトガナイ  
カラデアリマス

元來米内内閣ハ保守的性格ヲ有シ獨逸ト提  
携シ之ヲ利用シテ時局ヲ收拾スルコトニ反對ノ意  
見ヲ有シテ居リマシタ爲ニ陸軍部内ノ大多數米  
内内閣ハ支那事變解決ニ對シテハ弱力テ時局  
擔當ノ能力ガナイト認メ米内内閣ヲ倒壞セシメ  
テモ獨逸ヲ利用シテ和平促進ヲ計ラントスル意  
向が強カッタデアリマス且又畑陸軍大臣ハ米内  
内閣ノ閣僚トシテ同内閣ノ方針ニ協力シテ居  
リ陸軍部内一般ノ輿論トモイフベキ獨逸利用  
ニヨル和平促進ノ要望ニ應ヘントスル努力ノ見込  
キモノナク又其ノ能力ナキモノトシテ陸軍大臣ノ交  
迭ヲ希望スル聲が強カッタデアリマス斯カル  
部内ノ輿論ガ參謀總長ニ反映シテ右ニ述ベ  
ル様ナ參謀總長ノ意見トナフテ之ヲ畑陸軍  
大臣ニ傳ヘタ爲ニ畑大臣ハ直ニ辭表ヲ提出  
サレシニ到ツタモノデアリマス

一九四七年一月十六日於巢鴨監獄

澤

日

茂

田



右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓ス

<sup>ニテ</sup>署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明ス

同日於同所

立會人 國分友治





自誓書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ヘ何事ヲモ黙秘セ  
ス又何事ヲモ附加セサルコトヲ誓フ

澤田 茂  
母



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA & etc.

- vs -

MIKI, Sadao & etc.

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: SAWADA, Shigeru.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follow.

1. I was born at No. 4, KAMOBÉ, KAMODA-Village, TOSA-County, KOCHI-Prof. on March 29, the 20th year of Meiji, (1887)

My permanent and present address is No. 47, ASAGAYA 5-Chome, SUGINAMI-Ward, TOKYO.

2. Gist of my official career is as follows:--

June, the 39th year of Meiji (1906) Commissioned Second Lieutenant.

March, the 10th Year of Showa (1935) Promoted to the rank of Major  
General.

March, the 13th year of Showa (1938) Promoted to the rank of Lt. General

June, the same year. Appointed the Commander of the  
Fourth Division.

October, the 14th year of Showa (1939) Appointed the Vice-Chief of the

General Staff.



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December, the 15th Year of Showa (1940) Appointed the Commander of  
the Thirteenth Army (Shanghai)

October, the 17th Year of Showa (1942) Relieved of the post of the  
Commander of the Thirteenth  
Army.

November 15, the same year Transferred to the first  
reserve.

While in active duty I served mostly at the General Staff, the Military  
Staff College or as military attache abroad.

3. I served as the Vice-Chief of the General Staff from October, 1939 to  
November, 1940. During the tenure of my office, the Chief of the General  
Staff was H. I. H. Prince KAN'IN. The Minister of War in YONAI Cabinet was  
General HATA, Shunroku. I will hereby relate details of the downfall of  
YONAI Cabinet caused by the War Minister's resignation, which came to my  
knowledge because of my participation in the affair.

An early settlement of the China Incident was a consistent desire of  
our country and the capture of NANKING was planned for creating an oppor-  
tunity for such a settlement. The objective was not attained, however.  
HANGKOW was reduced with a view toward paving way for peace. It's reduction  
too failed to bring about the termination of the Incident, however.  
Consequently it was generally held within Army circles that brisk diploma-  
matic activities should be relied upon for the settlement of the China Incident,  
since armed forces alone could not attain the objective.



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With the permission of the Chief of the General Staff Prince KANIN and the understanding by the War Minister General Hata, I was then having conducted secretly liaison conferences between Chinese and Japanese military representatives for the purpose of concluding an armistice. This also fell through later.

Because around the spring of 1940, Germany was winning extraordinary victories and her national prestige was greatly enhanced that the view came predominant in Army circles that Japan should take advantage of Germany's influence to bring the Incident to a speedy termination. That the Army was desirous of peace with China is well known by War Minister HATA, and he himself always maintained that it was most urgent to settle the China Incident.

Toward the end of June, 1940, when I was in China to observe the ICHANG operation I received an urgent telegraphic summon from TOKYO. Upon my hasty return to TOKYO I found that the Cabinet was inclined not to establish close relations with Germany contrary to the desire of the Army circles and that the Cabinet's policy was running counter to the Army's prevailing opinion.

The Chief of Army General Staff Prince KANIN told me that he wished the War Minister should do his utmost to break the political deadlock; but since it was his ardent desire to accelerate the movement for peace between Japan and China through Germany's mediation, I should carefully confer with the War Ministry with this end in view.



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Accordingly I called on the Vice Minister of War Lieutenant General ANAMI, and discussed the matter between two of us. The Vice Minister finally said that there was no alternative but a ministerial change, unless the Chief of the General Staff would modify his views to utilize the Army to accelerate peace between China and Japan; that in view of the character of the present cabinet it was impossible to comply with his objective even if some changes were made among its members.

When I tried to ascertain whether or not it was the War Minister HATA's private opinion. The Vice Minister Anami answered in the negative, but added that it was the view of the personnel of the Ministry including himself. I pointed out that the matter was of extreme importance, and as the opinion of the Army in general and that of the Cabinet in opposition to each other, we had better meet again after I asked once more the view of the Chief of the General Staff.

The Chief of the General Staff, having heard my report commented that if his opinion represented that of the majority of the Army, he wanted me to make further efforts for carrying out the objective, that according to the Vice Minister there was no other way but a Cabinet change and he was truly sorry for the War Minister if such an extreme measure was to be taken, but one must bear this against such a vital national affair as the settlement of the incident. I called again on the Vice Minister and stated the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff.



On the following day the Chief of the General Staff handed me a letter bearing his signature and stating his view, and wanted me to deliver it to the War Minister HATA. I delivered the letter immediately to the War Minister HATA. According to my recollection I delivered the letter to the Minister HATA through the Vice Minister ANAMI, and was told by ANAMI that he had handed the letter to the Minister HATA. It might have been that I handed the letter directly to HATA instead. Though I can't remember exactly in which manner, there is no mistake that the letter was delivered to HATA.

Having received from the Chief of the General Staff the letter bearing his signature, the War Minister HATA tendered his resignation immediately on the following day-- or two days later, and the YONKI Cabinet resigned en masse.

That the War Minister HATA so ardently desired to settle the China Incident, and to restore peace with China. I directly heard from him. There<sup>is</sup> no room for doubt about it.

It is true that the personnel of the General Staff were in perfect accord as to the method whereby Germany should be utilized and the Incident be settled through her mediation; and I believe that all the members of the War Ministry including the Vice Minister were of the same opinion, as the Vice Minister ANAMI expressly told me so. However, whether or not the War Minister HATA himself was entirely in accord with us concerning the acceleration of peace through German mediation, I cannot state definitely here. For I have neither asked personally the Minister HATA whether he



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agreed with us on this subject, nor have I heard Vice Minister ANAMI say definitely the Minister was of the same opinion. Though ANAMI said the entire personnel of the War Ministry including himself were in accord as to this proposal.

Because the YONAI Cabinet was conservative, and was against saying the situation by acting in concert with, and making use of, Germany, the majority of the Army personnel/<sup>through</sup>YONAI Cabinet was too weak to bear the burden of the difficult situation, and to settle the China Incident. The Army men were strongly in favour of utilizing Germany for the restoration of peace, even if it was necessary to cause the downfall of the YONAI Cabinet, for doing so. War Minister HATA, as a member of the cabinet, was cooperating with the rest of the cabinet members in carrying out its policies and there was no indication that he was making effort or having ability to comply with the general wishes of the army concerning the promotion of peace by way of German mediation. Indeed, there <sup>was</sup> fervent desire among the Army circles to change the War Minister. This general opinion in Army circles was reflected upon the Chief of the General Staff who formed his opinion accordingly and communicated it to the Minister Hata. This caused the War Minister to resign immediately.

On this 16th day of January, 1947

at SUGAMO Prison.

DEPONENT /s/ SAWADA, Shigoru



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I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness : /S/ KOKUBU, Tomoharu

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SAWADA, Shigoru.