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Hearing held before

Joint Committee
on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
S. Con. Res. 27

November 29, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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VOL. XII

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21 MAY 46

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

GREW, Joseph Clark (resumed)

1960

MILES, Major General Sherman

2054

E X H I B I T S

NUMBERS

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Thursday, November 29, 1945

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murray,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

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Before proceeding the Chair wishes to announce that the committee has been officially advised that General Marshall will be able to testify before the committee prior to his departure for China. As soon as his schedule in this respect is definite he will advise the committee in ample time to arrange for his testimony before he leaves the country.

I might say, in that connection, that General Marshall is just as anxious to testify before the committee as the committee is to have him testify.

When we recessed I believe that Senator Ferguson announced that he wanted to ask some questions.

Senator Ferguson: I believe that Senator Brewster was ahead of me.

The Chairman: All right.

Mr. Grew: Mr. Chairman, may I --

Senator Ferguson: I can go ahead if you want me to.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Grew has something to say.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Mr. Grew: Might I clear up two or three points, Mr. Chairman, concerning information which was asked of me?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Grew: One question raised was as to whether I had been informed of the consideration in Washington of a modus vivendi with the Japanese at the end of November. I could not recollect whether I was informed of that in the mass of

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew:

correspondence and events that occurred at that time, but I now have found a telegram from the Secretary of State to me in which he tells me the whole story. I can submit that to counsel or read it, as you wish.

The Chairman: Go ahead and read it.

Mr. Grew: All right.

Mr. Keefe: May I ask a question?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: Does it relate to the question which I asked Mr. Grew yesterday?

Mr. Grew: I think you asked the question, Mr. Congressman.

The Vice Chairman: It is about the modus vivendi.

Mr. Keefe: Is that telegram published?

Mr. Grew: I do not think it has yet been published.

Mr. Keefe: It is not included in your diary?

Mr. Grew: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And it is not included in any of these publications of the State Department?

Mr. Grew: I haven't checked it but I do not think it is.

Mr. Keefe: And where did you get the telegram?

Mr. Grew: From the files of the Department of State.

Mr. Keefe: You went to the Department of State after

Questions by Mr. Keefe

Witness Grew:

your testimony?

Mr. Grew: No, I did not go myself but several requests have been made to see if certain things took place during that period, whether I had been informed of this or that. This is one of the points raised and I instituted a search to see if I was informed of the modus vivendi plan and I have only this morning, just now, just five minutes ago received this telegram.

Mr. Keefe: Very well.

Mr. Grew: (Reading):

"November 28, 1941.

"Washington.

"Ambassador Tokyo, Japan, 796. Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counsellor only."

This is from Mr. Hull.

"Following the Japanese proposals of November 20, the Department gave consideration to a number of alternate proposals and counter-suggestions or combinations thereof which suggested themselves to the Department for possible presentation to the Japanese Government. At one time the Department considered the question of presenting to the Japanese Government simultaneously with the proposal which was actually given them on November 26, an alternate plan for a temporary modus

Witness Grew:

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vivendi. The draft under consideration at that time called for a temporary modus vivendi to be in effect for a period of three months during which time conversations would continue toward the working out of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. At the end of the period of the term of the modus vivendi both Governments would confer at the request of either to determine whether the extension of the modus vivendi was justified by the prospects of reaching a settlement of the sort sought.

"The draft modus vivendi which we were considering contained mutual pledges of peaceful interest, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement in northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number should not be subject to replacement and Japan should not in any case send additional naval, military or air forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifi-

Witness Grew:

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cations, raw cotton up to \$600,000 monthly, a small amount of petroleum within categories now permitted general export on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general provided that raw silk constitutes at least two thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures.

"At a certain point in our consideration of the draft modus vivendi the representatives in Washington of the British, Dutch, Australian and Chinese Governments were consulted.

"After careful consideration of all factors in the situation within the United States and in the general world situation, including the reaction and replies of the Governments mentioned above, it was decided that we should drop the draft modus vivendi which we had had

Witness Grew:

under consideration. That draft modus vivendi was not handed to the Japanese, and the fact that this Government had considered a modus vivendi was not mentioned to them.

"The Department has informed you in separate telegrams" --

Mr. Keefe: Pardon me just one minute. Will you read that last sentence again?

Mr. Grew: (Reading):

"That draft modus vivendi was not handed to the Japanese, and the fact that this Government had considered a modus vivendi was not mentioned to them.

"The Department has informed you in separate telegrams of the documents handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 26 and of the conversation which took place on that date."

Signed "Hull."

Mr. Keefe: What is the date of that telegram?

Mr. Grew: That telegram is dated November 28, 1941, seven P.M., Washington. I will turn that over to the committee.

The Chairman: Does that conclude your statement?

Mr. Grew: I have one more point, sir.

The Chairman: Proceed.

Witness Grew:

Mr. Grew: I was also asked whether I had been instructed to burn our codes prior to the outbreak of war.

I have been given a telegram which was sent to me in Tokyo on December 5, 1941 but which appears to have gone via Peiping via naval radio. I do not think I ever received this telegram in Tokyo before the break. I do not think I received it at all.

It is a fairly long message, of many pages. Do you wish me to read it or shall I merely turn it over to general counsel?

The Chairman: Well, the chair suggests that it be submitted to counsel and that it be put in the record, too.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, that was my question that I had asked. I wonder whether he could read the part relating to the destruction of codes.

Mr. Grew: I think there are two paragraphs which are very pertinent, which I could read.

The Vice Chairman: Put the whole telegram in the record.

The Chairman: We will have the whole telegram inserted but you may read the paragraphs in question.

Mr. Grew: All right, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Just read the two paragraphs which relate to this.

Mr. Grew: (Reading):

Witness Grew:

"Strictly Confidential.

"1. The following instructions are applicable to all offices in Japan, Japanese occupied areas in China, Hong Kong, Indo China, and Thailand, and are intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in case communications with the Department are delayed or severed, to take appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees, archives, leases, the evacuation of the American members of the staff, et cetera."

Now, the paragraph which applies to our codes would appear to be as follows: (Reading)

"7. It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained."

I think that is all in this telegram, so far as I know, that applies to codes but, as I say, I do not think that I ever received this message.

The Chairman: Well, it will be made part of the record.

(The telegram dated December 3, 1941 is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:)

Insert 25

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

The Chairman: All right. Is that all?

Mr. Grew: That is all, sir.

The Chairman: All right, Senator, go ahead.

Senator Brewster: You were also, Mr. Grew, going to look to see whether you had been at any time consulted or informed in advance regarding the retention of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, any time before the May 7th date.

Mr. Grew: Yes, Senator. That is now being looked for but it has not yet been found, and the belief is expressed that I never was informed of that movement.

Senator Brewster: So unless we do receive --

Mr. Grew: So unless you hear to the contrary you may assume that I was not informed.

Senator Brewster: Now, I venture to ask this question because of its possible bearing on the situation and you are speaking perhaps with more authority than anybody else regarding this Japanese psychology and I venture it because it was a hypothesis advanced by Arthur Kroch in the New York Times which, of course, vouches for its respectability.

He advanced the theory that the Japanese may have desired to have the Fleet retained at Hawaii for their own purposes and thought that the American mentality of officialdom would be more likely to retain it there if the Japanese made some strong representations about its removal.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

1 I do not know whether you noted that suggestion but I
2 would be interested in your comment as to whether or not that
3 was a possible hypothesis.

4 Mr. Grew: I think that is a perfectly possible hypo-
5 thesis, Senator. I do not believe anybody could answer the
6 question with any assurance. I was aware of the sometimes
7 devious workings of the processes of Japanese mentality,
8 they were perfectly capable of doing that sort of thing, but
9 you will recollect that I said so far as I could remember no
10 official representations had ever been made to me that the
11 Fleet should be withdrawn.

12 The only notation that I have come across was my talk
13 with Arita, Foreign Minister on a certain date, but it was
14 labeled "informal and off the record." In other words, we
15 occasionally got together, generally at the house of some
16 mutual friends to avoid any publicity which was always
17 splashed in the press and those conversations were distinct-
18 ly off the record and informal.

19 Senator Brewster: It was at that time that he did in-
20 dicate that they were somewhat irked by the presence of the
21 Fleet there?

22 Mr. Grew: Yes. That record I think has been read al-
23 ready.

24 Senator Brewster: Yes, I recall it. So you would think
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Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

that was a possible hypothesis as to their state of mind?

Mr. Grew: I think that was a possible hypothesis. I do not think I would want to go further than that.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Senator Brewster: Now the modus vivendi which you have testified about this morning, you had indicated previously that you thought it was rather doubtful if they would have agreed to any modus vivendi along the lines that were being discussed at the time, in November.

You recall in that connection the inquiry of Kurusu on that morning whether or not they would consider -- his exact language is on page 76b --

"Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi."

You still feel, in spite of that, that he was not serious in that suggestion?

Mr. Grew: I am inclined to feel, Senator, that the conclusion of a modus vivendi at that time would probably not have prevented the attack; but there again that is a supposition.

Senator Brewster: It was at approximately that time that the Germans were turned back from Stalingrad, in what was the beginning of their retreat and ultimate rout, was it not, early in December?

Mr. Grew: I think it was approximately at that time.

Senator Brewster: You have indicated in your early report -- I am not sure whether you have this incorporated, but

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 on page 702 of your report you comment on the effect on the
3 Japanese of the varying fortunes of war in Europe. The exact
4 quotation is:

5 "For example, in Japan the pro-Axis element gained
6 power following last year's Germany victory in Western
7 Europe; then Japanese doubt of ultimate German victory
8 was created by Germany's failure to invade the British
9 Isles, this factor helping to reinforce the moderate
10 element; and finally Germany's attack on the Soviet
11 Union upset the expectation of continued Russo-German
12 peace and made the Japanese realize that those who
13 took Japan into the Tripartite Alliance has misled
14 Japan."

15 Indicating, as I gather, that Japan was keenly conscious
16 of what was going on in other parts of the world and the effect
17 it might have on them.

18 By the end of the three months' period which is contem-
19 plated in the modus vivendi, although I think President
20 Roosevelt indicated he preferred six months, but by the end
21 of the three months' period the Germans were in full retreat
22 on the Russian Front, and I would like to ask you whether or
23 not, if that had occurred -- and here again it is hypothetical --
24 whether that would have had a material influence on the Japanese
25 position?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 Mr. Grew: I doubt very much if that had any direct
3 bearing on Japanese procedures at that time. The Japanese
4 were pulling away more and more from the Germans. While the
5 Germans were constantly egging them on and doing everything
6 they could to prevent the Washington conversations from
7 succeeding and to prevent a settlement between Japan and the
8 United States, the Japanese did not like the Germans, a great
9 many of them resented being tied up with them in the Axis Pact.

10 The Germans, as they had in other capitals, swarmed
11 into Tokyo and more or less tried to control things, and the
12 Japanese did not like it, so they were pretty unpopular there.

13 I do not believe the events which you speak of had
14 any direct bearing on the event which occurred.

15 Senator Brewster: I of course recognize after the die
16 was cast that was the end, but I am now speaking of the
17 possible modus vivendi in connection with the events, that on
18 December 1, 1941 the Germans had reached the peak of their
19 power, they were at the gates of Stalingrad, had been for
20 some time, and two weeks later they were turned back in a
21 rather decisive retreat that turned into a rout. The co-
22 incidence of the two affairs had always impressed me, that
23 Japan struck at the height of German power and it seemed
24 almost as though the Germans had come on to Stalingrad for
25 the purpose of getting the Japanese in.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

(2)

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 So my question is not as to what happened but as to what
3 might have happened if the modus vivendi had been in effect
4 and at the end of three months the Japanese, surveying the
5 situation, had found their German friends in a very different
6 position? I think you have hitherto emphasized that the
7 Japanese had never believed they could conquer the world alone
8 but that they were dependent on the success of the Axis armies
9 in Europe for any final plan.

10 Mr. Grew: My belief, Senator, was that at that time
11 the Japanese were pretty independent. They were certainly
12 very cocky. They had complete self-assurance, and I rather
13 doubt whether any fluctuations in the war in Europe would
14 materially have altered their procedure.

15 But that is something that of course cannot be proved.
16 It is only supposition.

17 Senator Brewster: Yes. Now what did you feel, Mr.
18 Grew, as to the consequences of any further southern expansion,
19 moving into the Kra Peninsula, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies,
20 as to it requiring that we should, at all odds, take action,
21 or whether we could have tolerated any further movement safely
22 for the sake of gaining time?

23 Mr. Grew: The Japanese program, Senator, was constantly
24 expanding. In the beginning they talked about the Greater
25 East Asia co-prosperity sphere, and later that developed into

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 the co-prosperity sphere for Greater East Asia including the
3 South Seas, and that included Australia.

4 In other words, their visions of grandeur were constantly
5 increasing.

6 Senator Brewster: You called it delusions.

7 Mr. Grew: It was constantly increasing.

8 Senator Brewster: You felt that at some point the line
9 must be drawn, you could not let them go on indefinitely?

10 Mr. Grew: Very decidedly so.

11 Senator Brewster: That meant some parallel of latitude
12 or some other definite spot beyond which you could not permit
13 them to pass?

14 Mr. Grew: I never thought of it in terms of precise
15 geography, Senator. It was the general movement which was
16 threatening what I considered our vital national interest.
17 It was not a question of arriving at any particular point or
18 crossing any particular line, it was simply the general move-
19 ment.

20 Senator Brewster: Now one other question, for the
21 purpose of the historical record.

22 You spoke yesterday about the encouragement which was
23 given to the war-like spirit of Japan by the publication of
24 statements of an isolationist or pacifist character in this
25 country, and that those were frequently featured in the

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 Japanese press during the year 1940 for the purpose of stimu-
3 lating the Japanese attitude that they could safely attack us.

(3) 4 Mr. Grew: It was for the purpose of creating in the
5 Japanese mind a totally erroneous conception of the spirit of
6 the American people.

7 Senator Brewster: In order to do complete justice I
8 want to read the most distinguished publication on that score
9 and I want to ask you whether or not it was published in Japan.
10 This was on September 16, 1940, a statement which I took from
11 Volume IX of Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt,
12 President Roosevelt, on page 434, and I quote:

13 "And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers,
14 I give you one more assurance.

15 "I have said this before, but I shall say it again
16 and again and again.

17 "Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign
18 wars. They are going into training to form a force so
19 strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the
20 threat of war far away from our shores."

21 That is the end of the quotation. Do you recall whether
22 or not that was published at that time in Japan?

23 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I would not recall whether that precise
24 statement was published in Japan at that time.

25 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Senator Brewster: Yes, I will yield.

Mr. Murphy: In view of the fact that the Senator from Maine has brought out the quotation, I want to state in the record that there were a number of other speeches made by the same distinguished gentleman from which any fair-minded person would take a proper construction.

I would like also to say that on yesterday there was reference made by a member of this committee to certain things connected with politics, and now we have a reference to another political speech. I hope we will keep politics out of this investigation.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I certainly share the hope of the gentleman.

The Chairman: In order that politics may be kept out, the Chair suggests that the whole speech from which the quotation was read be made a part of the record.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, at the proper time the Senator from Illinois --

Senator Brewster: That is entirely agreeable.

The Chairman: As I understand it, you have concluded?

Senator Brewster: Yes, that is all.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the Senator from Maine brings up this one quotation, the Senator from Illinois, at the proper time, will proceed to insert other

Witness Grew

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2 speeches made by this distinguished President upon that same
3 question, and those quotations will not be the same as the
4 Senator from Maine quoted. I think the Senator from Maine,
5 if he wanted to do real justice to the cause, would use more
6 than that one quotation.

7 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I might well have taken
8 a single sentence, but I did not, I took the entire quotation.
9 I think those concerned will point out the language which the
10 President there used regarding the defense. In other speeches
11 he used the words "unless we are attacked".

12 In this speech he used the words that is for our defense,
13 which may be considered as moderating its implication. However,
14 I think the question is quite fair, and I certainly have no
15 objection to any other statements of any kind being inserted,
16 which I hope certainly are not in conflict or contradiction.
17 I would expect a continuity of policy.

18 The Chairman: The speech from which the quotation was
19 read may be made a part of the record.

20 (The speech referred to is as follows:)
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CAMPAIGN ADDRESS AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

"WE ARE GOING FULL SPEED AHEAD!"

OCTOBER 30, 1940

(Rebuilding the navy and naval bases -- Expending
and training the army -- Defense contracts --
Defense housing -- Our Air Power is growing --
Planes for Britain -- Production capacity --
Progress of agricultural recovery -- Republican
opposition to aid to the farmers.)

Mr. Mayor, my friends of New England:

I've had a glorious day here in New England. And I do not
need to tell you that I have been glad to come back to my old
stamping ground in Boston. There's one thing about this trip
that I regret. I have to return to Washington tonight, without
getting a chance to go into my two favorite States of Maine
and Vermont.

In New York City two nights ago, I showed by the cold print
of the Congressional Record how Republican leaders, with their
votes and in their speeches, have been playing, and still are
playing politics with national defense.

Even during the past three years, when the dangers to all
forms of democracy throughout the world have been obvious, the
Republican team in the Congress has been acting only as a
Party team.

Time after time, Republican leadership refused to see that what this country needs is an all-American team.

Those side-line critics are now saying that we are not doing enough for our national defense. I say to you that we are going full speed ahead!

Our Navy is our outer line of defense.

Almost the very minute that this Administration came into office seven and a half years ago, we began to build the Navy up -- to build a bigger Navy.

In those seven years we have raised the total of 193 ships in commission to 337 ships in commission today.

And, in addition to that, we have 119 more ships that are actually under construction today.

In those seven years we raised the personnel of our Navy from 106,000 to 210,000 today.

You good people here in Boston know of the enormous increase of productive work in your Boston Navy Yard. And that is only one of many Navy yards -- one of the best. There are now six times as many men employed in our Navy yards as there were in 1933. The private ship-building yards are also humming with activity -- building ships for our Navy and for our expanding merchant marine.

The construction of this Navy has been a monumental job. In spite of what some campaign orators may tell you, you cannot buy a battleship from a mail-order catalogue.

We have not only added ships and men to the Navy, we have enormously increased the effectiveness of Naval bases in those outlying territories of ours in the Atlantic and Pacific.

For our objective is to keep any potential attacker as far from our continental shores as we possibly can.

You here in New England know that well, and can well visualize it.

And within the past two months your Government has acquired new naval and air bases in British territory in the Atlantic Ocean; extending all the way from Newfoundland in the north to that part of South America where the Atlantic Ocean begins to get narrow, with Africa not far away.

I repeat: Our objective is to keep any potential attacker as far from our continental shores as we possibly can.

That is the record of the growth of our Navy. In 1933 a weak Navy; in 1940 a strong Navy. Side-line critics may carp in a political campaign. But Americans are mighty proud of that record and Americans will put their country first and partisanship second.

Speaking of partisanship, I remind you -- when the Naval Expansion Bill came up in 1938 the vast majority of Republican members of the Congress voted against building any more battle-ships.

What kind of political shenanigans are these?

Can we trust those people with national defense?

1 Next take up the Army: Under normal conditions we have
2 no need for a vast Army in this country. But you and I know
3 that unprecedented dangers require unprecedented action to
4 guard the peace of America against unprecedented threats.

5 Since that day, a little over a year ago, when Poland was
6 invaded, we have more than doubled the size of our regular Army.
7 Adding to this, the Federalized National Guardsmen, our armed
8 land forces now equal more than 436,000 enlisted men. And
9 yet there are armies overseas that run four and five and six
10 million men.

11 The officers and men of our Army and National Guard are
12 the finest in the world.

13 They will be, as you know, the nucleus for the training of
14 the young men who are being called under the Selective Service
15 Act. 800,000 of them in the course of this year out of nearly
16 17,000,000 registered -- in other words, a little less than 5
17 per cent of the total registration.

18 General Marshall said to me the other day that the task of
19 training those young men is, for the Army, a "profound privi-
20 lege."

21 Campaign orators seek to tear down the morale of the Ameri-
22 can people when they make false statements about the Army's
23 equipment. I say to you that we are supplying our Army with
24 the best fighting equipment in all the world.

25 Yes, the Army and the Defense Commission are getting things

done with speed and efficiency. More than eight billion dollars of contracts for defense have been let in the past few months.

I am afraid that those campaign orators will pretty soon be under the painful necessity of coming down to Washington later on and eating their words.

I cannot help but feel that the most inexcusable, most unpatriotic misstatement of fact about our Army -- a misstatement calculated to worry the mothers of the Nation -- is the brazen charge that the men called to training will not be properly housed.

The plain fact is that construction on Army housing is far ahead of schedule to meet all needs, and that by January fifth, next, there will be complete and adequate housing in this Nation for nine hundred and thirty thousand soldiers.

And so I feel that, very simply and very honestly, I can give assurance to the mothers and fathers of America that each and every one of their boys in training will be well housed and well fed.

Throughout that year of training, there will be constant promotion of their health and their well-being.

And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance.

I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again:

Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.

1 They are going into training to form a force so strong that,
2 by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war far away
3 from our shores.

4 The purpose of our defense is defense.

5 The Republican campaign orators who moan and groan (laughter)
6 about our Army and Navy are even more mournful about our strength
7 in the air. But only last year, 1939, the Republicans in the
8 Congress were voting in favor of reducing appropriations for
9 the Army Air Corps.

10 What kind of political shenanigans are these?

11 Can such people be trusted with national defense?

12 I stress particularly what every Army and Navy flier tells
13 us -- that what counts most in sustained air power is the produc-
14 tive capacity of our airplane and engine factories. That ought
15 to be almost a first-grade lesson.

16 We are determined to attain a production capacity of 50,000
17 planes a year in the United States. And day by day we are work-
18 ing and making very rapid progress toward that goal.

19 You citizens of Seattle who are listening tonight -- you
20 have watched the Boeing plant out there grow. It is now producing
21 four times as many planes each month as it was producing a year
22 ago.

23 You citizens of Southern California can see the great Douglas
24 factories. They have doubled their output in less than a year.

25 You citizens of Buffalo and St. Louis Can see the Curtiss plants

1 in your cities. Their output has jumped to twelve times its
2 level of a year ago.

3 And, of course, we are training our young men, and training
4 them successfully in sufficient numbers, to fly these planes as
5 soon as they come off the lines.

6 But planes won't fly without engines. You citizens of Hart-
7 ford, who hear my words: look across the Connecticut River at
8 the whirring wheels and the beehive of activity which is the
9 Pratt and Whitney plant which I saw today. A year ago that
10 plant was producing airplane engines totaling one hundred
11 thousand horsepower a month. Today that production has been
12 stepped up tenfold, stepped up to one million horsepower a
13 month.

14 And you citizens of Paterson, New Jersey, you can see the
15 Curtiss-Wright plant which a year ago produced two hundred
16 seventy thousand horsepower a month and this October is pro-
17 ducing 859,000 horsepower.

18 In ten months this Nation has increased our engine output
19 for planes 240 per cent; and I am proud of it.

20 Remember, too, that we are scattering them all over the
21 country. We are building brand new plants for airplanes and
22 airplane engines in places besides the Pacific Coast and this
23 coast. We are also building them in centers in the Middle West.

24 Last spring and last winter this great production capacity
25 program was stepped up by orders from overseas. In taking these

orders for planes from overseas, we are following and were following hard-headed self-interest.

Building on the foundation provided by these orders, the British on the other side of the ocean are receiving a steady stream of airplanes. After three months of blitzkrieg in the air over there, the strength of the Royal Air Force is actually greater now than when the attack began. And they know and we know that that increase in strength despite battle losses is due in part to the purchases made from American airplane industries.

Tonight I am privileged to make an announcement, using Boston instead of the White House: The British within the past few days have asked for permission to negotiate again with American manufacturers for 12,000 additional planes. I have asked that the request be given most sympathetic consideration by the Priorities Board. I have asked the Priorities Board to give it that consideration -- the Board made up of William S. Knudsen, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and Leon Henderson. When those additional orders are approved, as I hope they will be, they will bring Britain's present orders for military planes from the United States to more than 26,000. They will require still more new plant facilities so that the present program of building planes for military purposes both for the United States and Great Britain will not be interrupted.

Also large additional orders are being negotiated for artillery, for machine guns, for rifles, for tanks with equip-

ment and ammunition. The plant capacity necessary to produce all this military equipment is and will be available to serve the needs of the United States in any emergency.

The productive capacity of the United States which has made it the greatest industrial country in the world, is not failing now. It will make us the strongest air power in the world. And that is not just a campaign promise!

I have been glad in the past two or three days to welcome back to the shores of America that Boston boy, beloved by all of Boston and a lot of other places, my Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Joe Kennedy.

Actually on the scene where planes were fighting and bombs were dropping day and night for many months, he has been telling me just what you and I have visualized from afar -- that all the smaller independent nations of Europe -- Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Ireland and the others -- have lived in terror of the destruction of their independence by Nazi military might.

And so, my friends, we are building up our armed defenses to their highest peak of efficiency for a very good reason, the reason of the possibility of real national danger to us; but these defenses will be inadequate unless we support them with a strong national morale, a sound economy, a sense of solidarity and economic and social justice.

When this Administration first came to office, the foundation of that national morale was crumbling. In the panic and misery

of those days no democracy could have built up an adequate armed defense.

What we have done since 1933 has been written in terms of improvement in the daily life and work of the common man.

I have discussed the falsifications which Republican campaign orators have been making about the economic condition of the Nation -- the condition of labor and the condition of business.

They are even more ridiculous when they shed those old crocodile tears over the plight of the American farmer.

Now, if there is anyone that a Republican candidate loves more than the laboring man in October and up to Election Day, it is the farmer.

And the first one that he forgets after Election Day is the farmer.

Do I have to remind you of the plight of the farmer -- not just the Western farmer, but the New England farmer -- during the period between 1920 and 1933 -- declining income, accumulating surpluses, rising farm debts -- ten-cent corn, twenty-cent wheat, five-cent cotton and three-cent hogs?

But before 1933 the Administration did nothing to stop that slide. But, of course, before every Election Day they always uncork the old bottle of soothing syrup and spread it thick.

(Laughter)

The farmers of America know from the record what the state

of American agriculture is today.

Farm income this year is just about double what it was in 1932.

Farm buying power this year is greater than it was even in 1929.

Tens of thousands of farmers have had their farms saved from foreclosure.

More than 800,000 low income farmers have been able to obtain credit from the Government which they could get nowhere else. And, incidentally, credit which they are repaying.

Over a million farms have been electrified since 1933.

Over 6,000,000 farmers have received benefit payments of more than three and a half million dollars.

What does it all add up to? It means an agriculture that is strong and vigorous.

And we all know how much this is due to the patient efforts and practical vision of Henry Wallace.

The people of New England, whether they live in the city or out in the country, know that if the farmers' income in this Nation had remained what it was in 1932, they would be buying fewer shoes, fewer watches and ice boxes, less woolen goods and cotton goods, than they are buying now. Prosperous farmers mean more employment, more prosperity for the workers and businessmen of New England and of every industrial area in the whole country.

1 Parity -- the proper relationship between agriculture and
2 the rest of our economy -- will continue to be our guiding princi-
3 ple.

4 We now have great stocks of wheat, corn and cotton -- in a
5 sense really strategic materials in a world that is threatened by
6 war.

7 Surpluses not needed for reserves are now being used to feed
8 the hungry and the ill-nourished and that is a fact that is diffi-
9 cult for the old Republican orators to deny.

10 Our school luncheon program will this year reach three mil-
11 lion children with milk and other foods. And milk does those
12 children more good than political soothing syrup.

13 While this was being done, what were the Republican leaders
14 doing? Here is the record:

15 In 1933, Republicans in the Congress, in both houses, voted
16 against the first Agricultural Adjustment Act, 88 to 52.

17 In 1936 they voted against the Soil Conservation and Domes-
18 tic Allotment Act, 75 to 25.

19 In 1938, they voted against the second Agricultural Adjust-
20 ment Act, 84 to 15.

21 And even in 1940, this year, they voted against parity pay-
22 ments to farmers by 143 to 32.

23 In the spring of this year, they voted overwhelmingly against
24 the Stamp Plan to distribute food to needy people through pri-
25 vate grocery stores.

The American farmers will not be deceived by pictures of Old Guard candidates, patting cows and pitching hay in front of moving picture cameras.

And even since the Convention in Philadelphia, all the sweet words of the Republican leaders in that Convention have not been worth the paper they were written on.

For listen to this: Last summer, only a few weeks after the Republican National Platform had been adopted endorsing commodity loans for the farmers, the Republican members of the House marched right back into the Halls of Congress and voted against commodity loans for the farmers, 106 to 37.

Among the Republican leaders who voted against that bill and against practically every other farm bill was the present Chairman of the Republican National Committee, that "peerless leader," that "farmers' friend" -- Congressman Joe Martin of Massachusetts.

I would not single him out except that he is of national interest now, because at the time of his appointment as Republican National Chairman this handsome verbal bouquet, this expensive orchid, was pinned upon him: "In public life for many years Joe Martin has represented all that is finest in American public life."

Considering the source of that orchid, Martin must be slated for some Cabinet post. So let's look for a minute at the voting record of this representative of what they call, "all that

is finest in American public life."

Martin voted against the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, the National Securities Exchange Act, and the extension of the Civilian Conservation Corps Act. He voted against practically all relief and work relief measures, and against the appropriation for rural electrification.

Martin voted against the Civil Service Extension Act and against the United States Housing Act.

What I particularly want to say on the radio to the farmers of the Nation, and to you here in this hall, is that Republican National Chairman Martin voted against every single one of the farm measures that were recommended by this Administration. Perhaps Brother Martin will be rewarded for this loyal service to the principles of his party by being appointed Secretary of Agriculture.

He is one of that great historic trio which has voted consistently against every measure for the relief of agriculture -- Martin, Barton and Fish.

I have to let you in on a secret. It will come as a great surprise to you. And it's this:

I'm enjoying this campaign. I'm really having a fine time.

I think you know that the office of President has not been an easy one during the past years.

The tragedies of this distracted world have weighed heavily on all of us.

But -- there is revival for every one of us in the sight of our own national community.

In our own American community we have sought to submerge all the old hatreds, all the old fears, of the old world.

We are Anglo-Saxon and Latin, we are Irish and Teuton and Jewish and Scandinavian and Slav -- we are American. We belong to many races and colors and creeds -- we are American.

And it seems to me that we are most completely, most loudly, most proudly American around Election Day.

Because it is then that we can assert ourselves -- voters and candidates alike. We can assert the most glorious, the most encouraging fact in all the world today -- the fact that democracy is alive -- and going strong.

We are telling the world that we are free -- and we intend to remain free and at peace.

We are free to live and love and laugh.

We face the future with confidence and courage. We are American.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

3 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, the telegram which you
4 brought in this morning, dated December 5, in the typewriting
5 it is December 3, and across the "three" is marked in pen "5".
6 You say you do not have any recollection of ever receiving
7 this telegram?

8 Mr. Grew: That is the one regarding the destruction
9 of the codes?

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

11 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I have no recollection of having
12 received it.

13 Senator Ferguson: Where did you get this copy?

14 Mr. Grew: This telegram?

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16 Mr. Grew: This was one of the telegrams -- you remember
17 the question was asked me at the hearing --

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes. I am asking you, did you get
19 it from the Secretary of State's office?

20 Mr. Grew: I asked that an exploration be made of the
21 Archives to see whether such telegram existed, and it was
22 found and brought to me this morning.

23 Senator Ferguson: Could you tell me, Mr. Grew, not-
24 withstanding whether you received the telegram or not,
25 whether any codes were destroyed? I am not asking you

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 the kind of codes, but were there any of the American codes
3 or code machines destroyed prior to the 7th?

4 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. As I think I have already said,
5 some of our codes were destroyed shortly before the break.
6 I do not know, frankly, how long before they were destroyed
7 or how many were destroyed. I remember simply taking steps
8 to see that at least one code was left for last minute
9 communication with Washington in case of necessity.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, I notice that affidavits
11 were to be filed, according to this message.

12 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Were such affidavits prepared and
14 filed?

15 Mr. Grew: They presumably were, but I could not answer
16 that question because this was really a matter of more or
17 less routine which I probably have nothing to do with. It
18 might have been the counsel of the Embassy; it might have
19 been the First Secretary who would have taken charge of
20 this particular matter.

21 Senator Ferguson: The Secretary of State's office
22 would have those affidavits?

23 Mr. Grew: The affidavits?

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

25 Mr. Grew: If they were kept, they were undoubtedly

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 brought back by us to Washington when we came back on the
3 Gripsholm in August, 1942.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you bring the papers back?

5 Mr. Grew: I brought a good many papers back, but I
6 do not recollect, Senator, whether those particular papers
7 were among them. It would have to be looked up.

8 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand then you want to
9 convey to the committee that the destruction of the codes
10 was a routine matter?

11 Mr. Grew: Well, the actual act of the destruction --

12 Senator Ferguson: I appreciate that the actual des-
13 truction would be routine after your instructions, but you
14 do not wish to convey to the committee that the giving of
15 the orders to destroy the codes is a routine matter?

16 Mr. Grew: Oh, no, that is perfectly true.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, if you did not receive this
18 message, and your memory is you did not -- from what did
19 you get the information to destroy the codes prior to
20 the 7th? When I use the "7th" I am using the day of the
21 attack, the time of the attack is what I have in mind.

22 Mr. Grew: I do not recollect having acted on any docu-
23 ment or any report, but we knew the way things were shaping
24 up at that time. This destruction of the code may have
25 taken place very shortly before the final break. I shall

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 have to check up on that to answer your question.

3 Senator Ferguson: Could you check up on that, as to
4 just when they were destroyed?

5 Mr. Grew: I will, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Would your diary give that?

7 Mr. Grew: No, I do not think it is mentioned there.

8 Senator Ferguson: Have you conferred recently with
9 the military or naval attaches that were with you?

10 Mr. Grew: As far as I know they are both absent from
11 Washington.

12 Senator Ferguson: Would you give them orders for the
13 destruction of other codes or code machines?

14 Mr. Grew: That would have been undertaken by them-
15 selves on the basis of their own instructions.

16 Senator Ferguson: Would those instructions come through
17 your embassy?

18 Mr. Grew: In a matter of that kind I assume that they
19 would have come direct to the attaches.

20 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand then that your opin-
21 ion, from what you had in Japan, was such that you considered
22 it advisable to destroy some codes and code machines and only
23 retain one code? Is that correct?

24 Mr. Grew: That is correct, Senator, but I am not clear
25 about the timing. I do not like to answer that question

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 categorically until I look into it.

3 Senator Ferguson: But you will look into it and re-
4 turn?

5 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I will.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, the quotation that I used the
7 other day, that I could not find at that time is on page 701
8 of Foreign Relations. My phrasing was not quite accurate,
9 and it could have been misleading, so I want to quote what
10 I had in mind.

11 It is the message of November 3, or two messages of
12 November 3, one is a long one and one is a short one. It
13 is the first one. I had phrased it something like this:

14 "What is the significance of the message that the
15 Cabinet had made up its mind and told the Emperor?"

16 Then I asked you whether or not that had caused you to
17 send the November 3 message. I had in mind the long message.

18 Now, at the top of the page there is a quotation in the
19 message, "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan. Tokyo,
20 November 3, 1941." It is signed by you.

21 "The Foreign Minister had told him" -- that is your
22 friend, the reliable informant, as you called him -- "that
23 during the past few days he had been constantly in conference
24 day and night with the Prime Minister and the Minister of the
25 Navy, and that as a result, the Government had reached a

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 definite decision as to how far it was prepared to go in
3 implementing the desires of the Emperor for an adjustment
4 of relations with the United States. This decision, which
5 was being held in strictest secrecy, had been communicated
6 by the Prime Minister to the Emperor on the afternoon of
7 November 2.

8 "The Foreign Minister had conveyed to my informant the
9 impression that he expected to ask me to call for an extended
10 conversation within a few days."

11 Now, what significance has that had; that they in effect,
12 as I read it, had told the Emperor what they were going to
13 do?

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WARD E. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Mr. Grew: Well, that is really an assumption, Senator.
3 There again is one of those things that cannot be proved.

4 Senator Ferguson: I just want to know what you mean by
5 this sentence, what you were conveying to the State Department.
6 All I am after in these questions is merely to ascertain what
7 knowledge the State Department had, what knowledge you had,
8 and sometime we will get to the question as to what knowledge
9 they had in Hawaii, to ascertain how this attack could have
10 been as successful as it was at Pearl Harbor.

11 Mr. Grew: You spoke a moment ago about my telegram of
12 November 3 and asked me whether this conversation with the
13 Japanese informant had brought about the sending of that tele-
14 gram. I do not think so because that telegram had been elaborated
15 over a period of time. It represented our thoughts in the Embassy
16 in Tokyo at the time it was sent.

17 With regard to this particular conversation he says that
18 the Foreign Minister expected to call me for an extended con-
19 versation within a few days. That Foreign Minister was Mr.
20 Togo. I don't recollect whether he did call for me or not.
21 I shall have to go through the files to see.

22 Senator Ferguson: It goes farther and says the Government
23 had reached a definite decision as to how far it was prepared
24 to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an adjust-
25 ment of relations with the United States. That indicated that

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 the Government, the warlords, were dictating to the Emperor
3 just what they were going to do.

4 Mr. Grew: That is a fair assumption, certainly.

5 Senator Ferguson: I mean that is a fair statement from
6 what you said?

7 Mr. Grew: Yes.

8 Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that these warlords
9 had at that time, as far as your informant was concerned, had
10 taken the matter out of the Emperor's hands and they were going
11 to dictate or decide what they were going to do; is that what
12 you were conveying to the State Department?

13 Mr. Grew: I think that is a plausible assumption.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, how are we going to get what you
15 were trying to convey to the State Department? I don't want
16 to construe it. I want you to construe it.

17 Mr. Grew: Senator, I think the construction of that
18 telegram of mine of November 3 to the Secretary of State is
19 self-explanatory. It is a very long telegram. It goes over
20 the whole ground and it indicates our feeling at that time
21 based on what information came to us through various channels,
22 but I can't put my finger on any one piece of information that
23 led to that telegram.

24 Senator Ferguson: Do you know why you separated these
25 two telegrams and sent two telegrams instead of putting it all

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 in one, when you sent it the same day?

3 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. There is a distinction there. This
4 telegram before us, on page 700 of Foreign Relations, is re-
5 porting a specific instance. My telegram of November 3rd, the
6 long telegram of November 3rd, is not reporting a specific
7 instance. It was an analysis and survey of the whole situation.
8 That is why the telegrams were separated.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, did the Foreign Minister call on
10 you as indicated in this first telegram that "he expected me
11 to call for an extended conversation within a few days"?

12 Mr. Grew: That I shall have to look up the records on
13 to see. The Foreign Minister did occasionally call for me. I
14 cannot now recollect the dates.

15 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that shortly after this
16 that we had intercepted messages indicating that the 25th of
17 November was the deadline date, as they called it?

18 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I did not know that fact. As I have
19 already said, Senator, I knew nothing about any of those
20 intercepted messages.

21 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any information that what
22 the Prime Minister and the Government had done was to tell the
23 Emperor what the deadline had been?

24 Mr. Grew: No, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: You had no such information?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Grew: I had no information whatsoever to that effect.

2

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, did you get any information that we had changed the course of our ships, that Admiral Stark had issued an order about -- counsel, can you give me the date of that order?

4

5

6

Mr. Murphy: November 25.

7

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Senator Ferguson: Was it November 25?

9

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Mr. Mitchell: It was in October, I think.

Senator Ferguson: Was it October?

11

12

Mr. Mitchell: The order shifting the Fleet? October 16, I think. My recollection is it is October 16, but we will check.

13

14

Senator Ferguson: That is the same date as the fall of the Cabinet and I don't associate the two together.

15

I will get the date for you later, Mr. Grew.

16

17

Mr. Grew: In any case I shall have to look that up, Senator, and see.

18

19

Senator Ferguson: You don't recall it now?

20

21

Mr. Grew: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that we had withdrawn certain shipping from the Japanese area?

22

23

Mr. Grew: My recollection is that I didn't know that but there again --

24

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Senator Ferguson: You want to look that up?

Mr. Grew: Yes.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: I will get you that date, Mr. Grew, in relation to Admiral Stark's notice of changing the route of shipping.

Mr. Grew: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

Senator Ferguson: I thought it was November 25.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The Chairman: Will the Senator yield to the Congressman?

Senator Ferguson: I yield.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, in the record within the past several days the Senator from Michigan in questioning the witness on the stand made reference at various times to the note of August 17 handed by the President of the United States to the Japanese representative as being an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I just interrupt to say --

Mr. Murphy: Not that the gentleman called it an ultimatum but whether or not the witness did not think it was an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I have given no opinion whatever on that note.

I wish to convey on the record that I have not purported to convey any opinion whatever upon that note. I used the language of Captain Schuirmann in a War Committee Meeting, on the instructions of Admiral Stark, as the note reads. But

Witness Grew

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2 I have no intention whatever of saying that this is an ulti-
3 matum or conveying to anyone that I even think that this is
4 an ultimatum. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Chairman, by
5 these questions is what knowledge they had here in Washington
6 and what knowledge they had in Japan and what knowledge they
7 had at Pearl Harbor.

8 This statement came from the "Joint Board, Washington,
9 Secret Minutes of a Meeting, November 3, 1941, at the call of
10 the Senior Members, weekly meeting scheduled for November 5,
11 1941 was held today, 2003 Munitions Building, meeting called
12 to order at 3:40," and this is a statement of action of the
13 United States in the Far East in support of China, at the
14 request of Admiral Stark Captain Schuirmann gave a statement
15 of the action, and it is in that statement that that word was
16 used.

17 The Chairman: All right.

18 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I am glad to hear the Senator
19 from Michigan say that because the question was asked on
20 several occasions as to whether or not this was an ultimatum
21 and reference made to Captain Schuirmann's statement that it
22 was an ultimatum.

23 And so that no one will make any mistake, since the Senator
24 has said he didn't think it was an ultimatum, I ask that there
25 be inserted in the record a paper also handed to the Japanese

Witness Grew

1
2 representative by the President of the United States on the
3 same day, in which the following sentence may be found:

4 "The program envisaged in such informal discussions
5 involved the application in the entire Pacific area of
6 the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and
7 treatment. It would thus make possible access by all
8 countries to raw materials and to all other essential
9 commodities."

10 I am not going to go on and read it all, but I ask that
11 it be inserted in the record.

12 Senator Ferguson: I think that is already in the record.

13 The Chairman: The Chair's recollection might be at fault
14 but he thinks that was included as part of the record. If it
15 is not included, it may be included now.

16 Mr. Murphy: If it is not I would like to have it made
17 a part of the record so I can ask Captain Schuirmann how the
18 note of the 17th would be an ultimatum.

19 Mr. Mitchell: May we have the page?

20 Mr. Murphy: Page 558. The statement commences on page
21 557 of Volume II, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931
22 to 1941.

23 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I hope the time never
24 comes when the asking of a question will assume that the
25 questioner believes that the thing is true. He is asking for

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 information from the witness as to whether or not the witness
3 believes it was true or not.

4 The Chairman: Go ahead.

5 Senator Ferguson: It is for the purpose of trying to
6 get information.

7 The Chairman: Are there any further questions?

8 Mr. Mitchell: I would like to answer Senator --

9 Senator Ferguson: No, Mr. Chairman, I have no other
10 questions except this one:

11 Mr. Grew, did you find that May 1939 instrument, the
12 definite instrument from the Prime Minister to the President
13 of the United States or the Secretary of State, in relation
14 to an over-all settlement of all matters?

15 Mr. Grew: No, sir. A search is being made for that
16 document. It has not yet come to me.

17 Senator Ferguson: Thank you.

18 The Chairman: Does counsel wish to make a statement?

19 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

20 Senator Ferguson, you asked about the date of the order
21 putting the merchant shipping out of the normal lines through
22 Torres Straits. I am not sure whether that document is in
23 evidence, but I missed the date by one day. I said October
24 16, but this message, which will be presented shortly, was
25 dated October 17, 1941. It is addressed to the Commander in

Witness Grew

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Chief of the Asiatic Fleet with information to all the other Pacific Commanders and directs they immediately route all trans-Pacific U.S. Flag shipping, and so forth, through the Torres Straits. That is the one you had in mind?

Senator Ferguson: That is the message. Who is that signed by?

Mr. Mitchell: It is from the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Ferguson: That is right.

Mr. Mitchell: To the Commander in Chief at Naval District 12; I think that is the Pacific Coast -- with copies to all the other Pacific Commanders.

Hook follows

D. D. MONTGOMERY, JUAN S. ORAZ

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Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman?

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The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

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Senator Lucas: Before the Ambassador leaves the witness stand, I should like to obtain permission from the committee to make a statement with respect to the personal private diary of Mr. Grew.

I have seen some of the headlines in the press overnight, and in view of the fact that the question had been raised I gave it some thought and study, and would like at this time to make a statement on it.

12

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman -- may I interpose?

13

Senator Lucas: Yes.

14

The Chairman: The Senator from Maine.

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Senator Brewster: I fully concur with what the chairman said yesterday that it is a matter that should receive the most careful consideration of the committee. Thus far I have simply been asking about it. Before I arrive at an opinion, I should welcome a full discussion among the members of the committee on this question. I had hoped that that discussion would be in a somewhat more private form.

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The Chairman: The chair has no information as to what the statement is that the Senator from Illinois wishes to make. It seems to be based upon some newspaper publication.

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Senator Lucas: No it isn't based on a newspaper

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2 publication. It is based on what the Senator from Maine
3 said in this public forum and which got into the newspapers
4 on the question of the private diary being admitted in the
5 public record.

6 The Chairman: If it is a question of law, that is to
7 be discussed, it might well be relegated to an executive
8 session of the committee for discussion; if it is a matter
9 of law to be thrashed out by the committee.

10 Senator Lucas: It is not a question of law.

11 The Chairman: If it is a correction of any impression --

12 Senator Lucas: That is exactly what I contend it is,
13 a correction of an impression made.

14 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman --

15 The Chairman: Will the Senator from Illinois yield
16 to the Congressman from Wisconsin?

17 Senator Lucas: I yield.

18 Mr. Keefe: If statements of that character are to be
19 interjected in the record at this time, I would like to reserve
20 the right also to make a statement with respect to this diary
21 at this time.

22 I had understood that the whole question as to the admis-
23 sion of this diary in evidence before this committee was a
24 matter that was going to be discussed by the full committee
25 in executive session, and it would seem to me highly improper

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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2 for members of the committee to now indulge in statements
3 with reference to the propriety or lack of propriety of
4 bringing this diary before the committee. I think it is a
5 matter that ought to be discussed by the committee in execu-
6 tive session. Therefore, I refrained yesterday, in connection
7 with my examination, --

8 Senator Lucas: I yield just for a question, not a long
9 speech. If the Congressman from Wisconsin will just restrain
10 himself a few moments, he will discover that in this state-
11 ment I am not attempting to say anything about what the
12 committee should or should not do with respect to bringing
13 this diary before the committee. I am attempting to answer
14 the Senator from Maine, who, on yesterday, said in his opinion
15 that this diary of the Ambassador would be subject to a sub-
16 poena duces tecum to be brought into the record.

17 I don't think it is material or relevant to this hearing
18 one way or the other, and I so stated, but in view of the
19 fact that it has been raised, I desire to answer that point.
20 Not whether or not the committee should have the diary
21 before it.

22 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

23 Senator Lucas: I yield.

24 Senator Brewster: I am certainly sorry if any question-
25 ing by me of Mr. Grew, or the letter which I wrote, conduced

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2 to any extraneous discussion. I assured the Senator from
3 Illinois privately yesterday that I had no final views on
4 the matter, and I repeat that now, but I would comment that
5 while I did mention the question of private court procedure,
6 I wouldn't pretend to be as good an authority as the Senator
7 from Illinois on that.

8 I think the chairman very correctly stated that irres-
9 pective of that, there would be no question regarding the
10 power and authority of this committee; or, at any rate, it
11 was a subject that could be considered by the committee. I
12 won't say that the chairman expressed any final conclusion.

13 The Chairman: The chair did not do so.

14 Senator Brewster: I share the opinion of both the
15 Representative from Wisconsin and the chair that we ought
16 to deliberate on this matter carefully, and with regard for
17 Mr. Grew and his rights and interests, and for the high
18 public interest involved.

19 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman --

20 The Chairman: The chair cannot pass on something that
21 isn't before him and which has not been read, and the
22 nature of which he does not know.

23 The chair might express a sort of ex-cathedral opinion
24 that Mr. Grew took pretty good care of himself in his answers
25 to these questions about his diary, and the chair thinks he

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2 is capable of doing that not only on that subject, but on
3 most any subject about which he might be interrogated.

4 But the chair would certainly wish to discourage any
5 discussion as to the legal power of this committee to
6 summons Mr. Grew to bring his diary, or any other witness
7 to bring his diary, his private property, before this com-
8 mittee. without considering the legal aspects of it after
9 a discussion in executive session. That is the chair's view.

10 Senator Brewster: Will the Senator yield?

11 Senator Lucas: If the chair does not want me to pro-
12 ceed with this memorandum I shall not do so.

13 The Chairman: The chair is not expressing any objec-
14 tion to that. There is this one thing we might keep in
15 mind. The newspapers every day in reporting these proceedings
16 I have discovered are not always accurate, and the temptation
17 is constant to say something here that would refute some
18 impression of a newspaper reporter about what the witnesses
19 have said.

20 Senator Lucas: I find there is a temptation also around
21 this table to suggest certain things that do make headlines.

22 The Chairman: Well, there is no way to control that.

23 Senator Lucas: No. there is not.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Grew has a short
25 statement of his own views, a one-page statement that he

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 would like to read in supplementing his reasons already
3 given for not producing the diary. I think it fair that
4 he be given an opportunity to read it.

5 The Chairman: The chair would be glad to have him do
6 that at the conclusion of his testimony. I wouldn't want
7 it to interfere with the questioning.

8 Senator Lucas: I do not propose to ask Mr. Grew any
9 further questions and I will defer the reading of this state-
10 ment until Mr. Grew gives to the committee what he has with
11 respect to his personal diary. It may be that it coincides
12 with what I have here, but I doubt that it does.

13 The Chairman: All right.

14 Does any member wish to ask any further questions?

15 Mr. Keefe: I have one question, Mr. Chairman.

16 The Chairman: All right.

17 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Grew, in connection with the examination
18 by Senator Ferguson, reference was made to a telegram which
19 you may or may not have received with respect to the destruc-
20 tion of the code material in the Embassy and certain other
21 documents.

22 In that telegram it was suggested that when this des-
23 truction was undertaken, that it be witnessed by two witnesses
24 who would place in affidavit form the fact of the destruction.

25 Now, whether under your direction or the direction of

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 some other official of the Embassy, certain code material
3 was destroyed at some time, and I assume that it was cus-
4 tomary for an affidavit to be filed, and you were asked
5 about that affidavit and I believe you stated that you do
6 not have the affidavit but that you will search the records
7 of the State Department to see if they are to be found;
8 is that right?

9 Mr. Grew: That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

10 Mr. Keefe: I want counsel to understand that we
11 are requesting that those affidavits be presented.

12 Now, do you know a man by the name of Lawrence Salisbury?
13 I believe you referred to him, or some witness did, in
14 testimony here.

15 Mr. Grew: Yes, I know him.

16 Mr. Keefe: Didn't he occupy a position in the State
17 Department?

18 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. He was formerly in the office
19 of Far Eastern Affairs. He has been in our Foreign Service
20 for many years.

21 Mr. Keefe: He retired or resigned about a year ago?

22 Mr. Grew: That is true.

23 Mr. Keefe: Were you in the State Department at the
24 time he left the service?

25 Mr. Grew: I was technically in the State Department. I

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 may have been out in the field somewhere because I was
3 moving around a great deal.

4 Mr. Keefe: I don't mean whether you were physically
5 there.

6 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. Technically, I was in the State
7 Department.

8 Mr. Keefe: In what capacity were you acting at the
9 time he left?

10 Mr. Grew: I don't recollect the exact status; I don't
11 know whether I had then become Director of the Office of Far
12 Eastern Affairs, or whether Mr. Salisbury's retirement took
13 place prior to that date. I will have to check the dates.

14 Mr. Keefe: Do you recall that prior to Mr. Salisbury's
15 retirement, he wrote and delivered to the State Department
16 a document of about 40 pages stating the reasons for his
17 resignation and leaving the State Department?

18 Mr. Grew: I don't recollect that document now,
19 Congressman. I should have to check the records.

20 Mr. Keefe: May I ask counsel then to undertake a search
21 of the records of the State Department in an effort to find
22 what I am very definitely and reliably advised was about a
23 40-page statement prepared by Mr. Lawrence Salisbury and
24 filed with Secretary Hull shortly prior to the time that he
25 (Salisbury) retired from the State Department. Whoever

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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undertakes it, I don't care whether it is Mr. Grew or

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counsel.

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Mr. Gesell: We will undertake it. Do you have the
date of the resignation?

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Mr. Keefe: I don't have the exact date, but it was
sometime during 1944. I do not have the exact date he
left.

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The Chairman: Is that all?

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Mr. Keefe: Now, I asked you yesterday, Mr. Grew,
with respect to the proposal that was submitted by the
Japanese Foreign Minister in 1939, and about which Senator
Ferguson had likewise inquired into, wherein a proposal was
submitted to the President and our State Department for an
over-all review of the world situation just prior to the
outbreak of war in Europe. Do I understand a search is
being made for that document?

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Mr. Grew: That is correct.

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Mr. Keefe: You have not yet discovered it?

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Mr. Grew: Not yet found it.

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Mr. Keefe: You were familiar with the instrument that
I am requesting and that Senator Ferguson has requested?

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Mr. Grew: Familiar with what?

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Mr. Keefe: You are familiar that there was such an
incident?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Grew: Oh, yes, I am.

3 Mr. Keefe: I understood you to say during my examina-
4 tion of you yesterday you are not certain that you were at
5 the Embassy at that time, or whether Mr. Dooman was there.

6 Mr. Grew: That is correct. I should like to look
7 up the record on that before I make a categorical statement.

8 Mr. Keefe: You have not refreshed your recollection
9 since yesterday on that point?

10 Mr. Grew: I have not had an opportunity as yet.

11 Mr. Keefe: Very well.

12 The Chairman: Is that all?

13 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman --

15 The Chairman: Mr. Gearhart?

16 Mr. Gearhart: There are one or two points that I
17 would like to better understand.

18 Mr. Grew, do you now remember vividly the receipt of
19 the telegram instructing the Embassy to destroy its codes?

20 Mr. Grew: Congressman, I think I have already stated
21 that I have no recollection of having received that tele-
22 gram. I am not sure whether it ever came or not.

23 Mr. Gearhart: You have since verified that such a
24 telegram was received?

25 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. A copy has been found and placed

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 in the hands of general counsel.

3 The Vice Chairman: "Received" or "sent"?

4 Mr. Gearhart: You have verified that such a telegram
5 was sent.

6 Mr. Grew: Yes.

7 Mr. Gearhart: After reading that telegram which was
8 sent, the copy, does that bring back to your mind anything?

9 Mr. Grew: Not at this moment, no.

10 Mr. Gearhart: You can't even remember that any code
11 machines or codes were destroyed; is that correct?

12 Mr. Grew: I have already stated, Congressman, that it
13 is my impression that several of our codes were destroyed
14 at about that time. I cannot give you the definite date
15 because I don't recollect it. As you know a great many
16 things were happening at that time of a political nature.
17 And, frankly, the act of destroying the codes would not
18 have lain with me. It would have lain with the subordinate
19 officers, presumably the counselor at the Embassy. I would
20 have to look up the whole episode and find out just how it
21 was done and when, and by whom, in order to give a clear
22 report on it.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Then I take it you can't remember at
24 this date whether the codes were destroyed on your order
25 or upon the order of a subordinate?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Grew: They were certainly destroyed on my order.

3 They were destroyed on my order.

4 Mr. Gearhart: You are sure of that?

5 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I am sure of that. As I say, I
6 cannot give you the dates without looking them up.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Can you remember the incident?

8 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, certainly I remember the incident.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Why did you order them destroyed if you
10 didn't have a message from Washington.

11 Mr. Grew: Congressman, things were coming to a stage
12 at that time where, I realized it was fully it was wise to
13 take precautions, but before stating exactly why that order
14 was given, I would like to check up on the actual time,
15 which is of great importance, and without looking up those
16 records, I don't feel that my testimony would be very help-
17 ful.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Well, at that time, and during that
19 period, the tension was running pretty high; there was a good
20 deal of suppressed excitement in the Embassy?

21 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. Tension was high.

22 Mr. Gearhart: And do you mean to tell us that you are
23 not clear as to why you destroyed code machines; That is an
24 unusual thing in an Embassy, is it not?

25 Mr. Grew: I have made no such statement, I believe, Mr.
Congressman. The codes, when they were destroyed, were des-
troyed in view of the tenseness of the situation.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Grew

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2 Mr. Gesell: Congressman Gearhart, I think I can throw
3 some light on this which will be helpful.

4 Mr. Gearhart: I am really exploring the condition of
5 mind of the Ambassador. I am wondering how they could do such
6 an out-of-the-usual thing as to destroy code machines and his
7 not being able to remember vividly what transpired.

8 Mr. Gesell: I think we have the partial answer.

9 Mr. Gearhart: I will be glad to hear it.

10 Mr. Gesell: There is a naval dispatch, which we had
11 proposed to introduce at the time Admiral Wilkerson takes the
12 stand, dated December 4, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Opera-
13 tions to the Naval Attache at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, and
14 Shanghai, for the information of the Commander in Chief of the
15 Asiatic Fleet and the Naval Attache at Chungking and the
16 Commander of the 16th Naval District. That is dated December
17 4, 1941 and reads as follows:

18 "Destroy this system at discretion and report by
19 word 'Jabberwock'. Destroy all registered publications
20 except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system
21 and report execution by sending in plain language
22 'boomerang'."

23 That suggests that on December 4 the Chief of Naval Oper-
24 ations is sending instructions to the Naval Attache at Tokyo,
25 instructions to destroy certain codes.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 I thought that might be helpful.

2 Mr. Gearhart: Would instructions to your Naval Attache
3 or your Military Attache to destroy codes result in their
4 destruction without an order from you?

5 Mr. Grew: Yes, Congressman, I would have nothing to do
6 with the decision of the Military or Naval Attaches to destroy
7 their own codes. That lay entirely with them.

8 Mr. Gearhart: In view of what has been read by counsel,
9 are you still sure that the destruction of the codes which
10 occurred in the Embassy was done under your order?

11 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. The codes could not have been
12 destroyed without my instructions. There would be no question
13 about that.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Now, do you remember whether or not you
15 were making destructions and the Naval Attache was making de-
16 structions simultaneously?

17 Mr. Grew: I cannot recollect the actual instance, that
18 was a long time ago, and, as I say, a great many things have
19 happened since then, and I was exceedingly occupied at that
20 moment with very large affairs of a political nature. I cannot
21 recollect at just what moment the codes were destroyed or
22 which codes were destroyed.

23 As I say, I would have to look it up before I could give
24 a categorical answer.
25

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Now, you had at that time a large battery of files in the office of the Embassy?

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Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, we did.

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Mr. Gearhart: Those files contained a lot of information which would have been very valuable to the enemy if they had been able to seize them?

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Mr. Grew: That is true.

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Mr. Gearhart: Did you take any steps to destroy the secret files of the Embassy at about the same time?

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Mr. Grew: Those secret files of the Embassy were destroyed, as I recollect it, immediately after the word came that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. We had those files in such a situation that they could be destroyed in a very few minutes and that step was taken, as I recollect it, immediately after the announcement of Pearl Harbor.

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Mr. Gearhart: Then so far as you now recall you never received any directions from any source to destroy your highly secret files prior to the actual bombing of Pearl Harbor?

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Mr. Grew: I should like to have a search made before I give a categorical answer and I shall have the files in the State Department examined in order to be able to give an answer on that point.

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Mr. Gearhart: I will now ask you did you accomplish the complete destruction of all secret papers and codes before the

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart
The Chairman

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Japanese came into the Embassy?

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Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, we did.

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Mr. Gearhart: And the Japanese obtained no information of value to them from our secret files after war was declared?

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Mr. Grew: None whatsoever.

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Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

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The Chairman: The Chairman would like to ask you a question to clear up a point.

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These codes, these diplomatic codes and messages, were entirely separate from any naval or military messages or codes between the Navy Department and the Naval Attache and the War Department and the Military Attache?

14

Mr. Grew: That is true.

15

The Chairman: And the State Department and you?

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Mr. Grew: That is a fact. The Naval Attache and the Military Attache had offices in what we called our Chancellery Building. They kept their own files and their own codes separate and apart from ours.

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The Chairman: Now, when you came back in August 1942 you made this report to Secretary Hull and in that report I presume you canvassed pretty much the ground, the events that had transpired immediately prior to your capture by the Japanese. You had no communication with the Secretary directly while you were in captivity?

Witness Grew

Questions by: The Chairman

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Mr. Grew: None whatever.

The Chairman: So when you got back in August 1942 the natural thing for you to do was to report to the Secretary and go over with him any pertinent things that occurred in regard not only to events leading up to Pearl Harbor but what had happened after Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew: That is a fact.

The Chairman: When did you go to Tokyo first?

Mr. Grew: You mean officially?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Grew: Officially I arrived in Tokyo June 6, 1932.

The Chairman: Who was Secretary of State at that time?

Mr. Grew: Mr. Stimson.

The Chairman: Do you recall who was Secretary of the Navy?

Mr. Grew: Charles Adams. Charles Francis Adams.

The Chairman: Do you recall who was Secretary of War?

Was it Mr. Hurley?

Mr. Grew: Mr. Patrick Hurley.

The Chairman: Were you familiar with the Manchurian incident? Did you become familiar with it?

Mr. Grew: I was familiar with it after the event. The Manchurian incident occurred in September 1931. I arrived some six months later.

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Witness Grew:

Questions by The Chairman

The Chairman: What post did you occupy immediately prior to your assignment to Tokyo?

Mr. Grew: I was Ambassador to Turkey, to the Turkish Republic, for five years prior to that period.

The Chairman: Do you know whether at the time of your arrival in Tokyo in June 1932 or thereafter the Navy of the United States was in Hawaiian waters not in any way connected with the Manchurian incident?

Mr. Grew: No, sir. Frankly, I cannot recollect whether the Navy was there then or not.

The Chairman: The chair would like to read a couple of pages from the book that Mr. Stimson published shortly after his retirement as Secretary of State in regard to that to see whether that will refresh your recollection. The page is 137 and 138 of Mr. Stimson's book called, "The Far Eastern Crisis," under heading, "The American Fleet at Hawaii."

(Reading)

"Under plans which had been made and published the preceding summer, long before the outbreak of the trouble in Manchuria, the American navy had been ordered to hold its annual maneuvers in the Pacific between the California coast and the Hawaiian Islands. The prosecution of these maneuvers brought the fleet in natural course to Hawaii. Soon after the outbreak in

Witness Grew:

Questions by The Chairman

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2 Manchuria we discussed whether the plans should be
3 changed, but decided that, in view of the fact that it
4 was so well known that they had not originated as a
5 threat to Japan, the maneuvers would be allowed to con-
6 tinue. Thereafter, just when the Japanese were making
7 their attack on Shanghai, the American fleet in the
8 course of these maneuvers came to Hawaii on February
9 13th" -- that is 1932. "After further careful consider-
10 ation it was allowed to remain in that neighborhood and
11 was not dispersed or sent back to the Atlantic on the
12 conclusion of the maneuvers. During the tumultuous and
13 uncertain times which followed we were glad of that deci-
14 sion. With events showing that the Japanese government
15 was falling completely into the control of militaristic
16 leaders, backed by a populace inflamed to a state of
17 fanatical excitement by the events which had occurred,
18 it was impossible to tell what coup might not be at-
19 tempted. During that winter responsible foreign observ-
20 ers stationed in the Far East were informing their re-
21 spective governments that in their opinion there was a
22 real possibility of a Japanese attack being suddenly
23 launched at the possessions of European and American
24 governments in the neighborhood. In such a situation
25 the presence of the entire American fleet assembled at

Witness Grew:

Questions by The Chairman

3 a port which placed it on the flank of any such out-
4 break southward towards Hong Kong, French Indo-China or
5 the Philippines, undoubtedly exercised a steadying
6 effect. It was a potent reminder of the ultimate mili-
7 tary strength of peaceful America which could not be
8 overlooked by anyone, however excited he might be."

9 Does that passage from Mr. Stimson's book refresh your
10 recollection in any way as to the presence of the Fleet out
11 in the Hawaiian waters?

12 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. Well, it refreshes my memory with
13 regard to those maneuvers. Can you tell me when those
14 maneuvers took place? I have forgotten the precise date.

15 The Chairman: Apparently the maneuvers took place prior
16 to February 1932.

17 Mr. Grew: Prior.

18 The Chairman: Because this passage from Mr. Stimson's
19 book recites the fact that the Fleet appeared in Hawaii on
20 the 13th of February, 1932, but it states that the plan for
21 the maneuvers had been agreed to prior even to the Manchur-
22 ian outbreak or the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 by Japan.
23 That was in 1931, was it not?

24 Mr. Grew: Yes, that was in September 1931. That all
25 happened before I arrived at my post.

The Chairman: It happened before you arrived there but

Witness Grew:

Questions by The Chairman

1 I was wondering after you arrived whether you became ac-
2 quainted with the fact that the Fleet was in Hawaiian waters
3 and remained there, according to Mr. Stimson's statement here
4 in his book, on account of the outbreak in Manchuria and the
5 general feeling that Japan might attack the territory of
6 European and American governments in that part of the world.

8 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I do recollect that.

9 The Chairman: Now, just one question about the de-
10 struction of the codes. In view of your long experience in
11 the diplomatic service I would like to ask you whether there
12 would be anything unusual about the destruction of codes
13 that might exist in an embassy under circumstances that might
14 bring about at any time an imminent breach between govern-
15 ments and might even result in hostilities?

16 Mr. Grew: Yes, Mr. Chairman, the destruction of the
17 codes would take place only under a very tense situation.

18 The Chairman: It would take place as a matter of pre-
19 caution?

20 Mr. Grew: As a matter of precaution.

21 The Chairman: And would it necessarily require any
22 instructions from the State Department in a case like that,
23 if the Ambassador representing the country felt that the
24 situation had arrived at a critical state so that it might
25 result in the breach of diplomatic relations or even hostili-

Witness Grew:

Questions by the Chairman

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2 ties? As a matter of precaution would he not do that anyway?

3 Mr. Grew: I think in a situation of that kind the re-
4 sponsibility would lie entirely with the Ambassador todo
5 that on his own initiative.

6 The Chairman: Yes. In your testimony the other day
7 you stated that you did not receive information with respect
8 to these intercepts that the American government were making
9 of Japanese messages to Washington?

10 Mr. Grew: That is true.

11 The Chairman: And the chair understood you to say that
12 it would have been indiscreet if you had been notified of
13 that fact because if the Japanese were intercepting our mes-
14 sages or were in any way advised of the intercepting by our
15 government of their messages, it might have resulted in their
16 changing their code so that we could no longer get the in--
17 formation which the messages were conveying. Is the chair
18 correct in that?

19 Mr. Grew: I am not sure that I made that precise state-
20 ment but I entirely agree with it.

21 The Chairman: The chair got the impression from what
22 you said that it would have been indiscreet on the part of
23 the State Department to have advised you at that time of the
24 intercepting of these Japanese messages.

25 Mr. Grew: I think that is true.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

The Chairman: That is all.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I just have a few questions owing to the Chairman's question.

Was there any other means of getting to you this information than by wire? Weren't there personal messengers coming back and forth?

Mr. Grew: We received regular pouches from the State Department which arrived every fortnight. They came out by American vessels, American ships, but the material in those pouches was, of course, very old, sometimes as old as three or four weeks, so we depended a great deal on telegrams.

Senator Ferguson: They did not pass through any Japanese hands so that that would have been a secret means.

Mr. Grew: They passed through no Japanese hands. They were taken charge of by the captain of the ship, an American. They were turned over to an American officer on arrival of the ship in Yokohama and brought up to our embassy.

Senator Ferguson: I spoke to you this morning that I thought that the message that I had in mind in relation to the route of shipping was on the 25th of November 1941. I have before me now the message that I did have in mind and I read it to you. (Reading)

"TOP SECRET

"25 NOVEMBER 1941

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

"FROM: OPNAV
 ACTION: COM 12
 INFO: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14, COM 16
 252203

ROUTE ALL TRANSPACIFIC SHIPPING THRU TORRES STRAITS. CINPAC AND CINCAF PROVIDE NECESSARY ESCORT. REFER YOUR DISPATCH 230258."

There were two messages on that. And would you look up and see whether or not you ever received that information on the 25th of November 1941?

Mr. Grew: I will look into that, sir, yes.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask counsel when he received this 4th of December 1941 reading:

"DESTROY THIS SYSTEM AT DISCRETION AND REPORT BY WORD JABBERWOCK. DESTROY ALL REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS EXCEPT CSP 1086 AND 6 AND 1007 AND 1008 AND THIS SYSTEM AND REPORT EXECUTION BY SENDING IN PLAIN LANGUAGE 'BOOMERANG'."

How long has counsel had this in his possession?

Mr. Gesell: We have had it only a short time. We received it, as I recall it, about a week ago and immediately sent it back to the Navy Department to be mimeographed for distribution to all members of the committee. It is in a

Witness Grew:

detailed folder that we received this morning while the hearing was in session, that has got the compendium of Navy messages, so we have been making them up and we will distribute them to the committee as soon as we have copies.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, can counsel explain whether or not he knew of this message last night, when I was asking Mr. Grew these questions?

Mr. Gesell: No, I did not know about that then.

Senator Ferguson: Counsel had no knowledge of it, then, at that time?

Mr. Gesell: No.

Senator Ferguson: He had knowledge, however, when I was asking Mr. Grew these questions this morning?

Mr. Grew: I did not get that question.

Senator Ferguson: I asked counsel if he had this. I asked counsel if he had this at the time I asked Mr. Grew these questions.

Mr. Gesell: No, we did not have any knowledge of that message and I have no recollection of it, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: This morning, I mean, when I asked Mr. Grew the question. Is there any reason why counsel did not call it to my attention so that we could have the record and not take the time up with the witness?

Mr. Gesell: Well, I think there is a reason, Senator.

Witness Grew:

Senator Ferguson: What is the reason?

Mr. Gesell: The reason is, as I stated, this mimeographed publication did not come to my hands until the hearing was in progress and I did not have it placed before me to bring to the committee's attention until after you had finished your examination.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I want to assure counsel I will appreciate the cooperation, if he has any information when I am questioning a witness, that if he has it it may save considerable time.

Mr. Gesell: We have endeavored to do that from the start.

The Chairman: Is that all?

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: My curiosity is still with me.

In the Japanese intercepts which directed the Washington Japanese embassy to destroy their codes, they also directed the Japanese at the embassy to use certain acids which they already had on hand. That suggests to me that the matter of destroying codes might be a somewhat intricate matter.

Did we use acids in the destruction of our codes and code machines in Japan?

Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield before the question

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Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

is answered?

The Chairman: Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. Gearhart: I will yield.

Mr. Murphy: I just cannot see, Mr. Chairman, why we should reveal how we destroy our codes and how we could consider spreading that on the public records, or how it would help the inquiry. It may be that there is an excellent reason but I do not think that the satisfaction of curiosity is enough. I don't mean to be impertinent.

Mr. Gearhart: I assure the gentleman from Pennsylvania that I have a very excellent reason. It has to do with the credibility of the witness and the fitness of his memory on a very, very important affair.

I am asking the question if it is an intricate process to destroy codes and code machines, or is it a matter as simple as the word suggests to an ordinary person's mind, of using an axe and chipping them up?

Mr. Grew: My answer to that question, Mr. Congressman, would be that in the case of certain codes it would be a very simple matter. In the case of other codes it would be an intricate matter.

Mr. Gearhart: Did we have some of each type of codes in our embassy at Tokyo?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

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Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

1 Mr. Gearhart: Then it was not a simple matter to de-
2 stroy all of our codes and code machines?

3 Mr. Grew: I cannot tell you, Mr. Gearhart, just how
4 intricate that process was or would be, or how long it took
5 or would take. Frankly, I had a good many duties in the em-
6 bassy and the mechanics of our coding was one matter in which
7 I had not gone into in technical detail. I am not in a
8 position, really, to give you very much information on that
9 general subject.
10

11 Mr. Gearhart: Well, isn't the matter of the destruction
12 of codes and code machines of sufficient importance to en-
13 gage the attention of the Ambassador, especially when he is
14 called upon to supply affidavits that the result had been
15 achieved?

16 Mr. Grew: I have already stated, Mr. Congressman,
17 those codes would not have been destroyed without my in-
18 structions without any question; and as to the affidavits,
19 in all probability they were contained in the papers that I
20 brought home to the State Department and a search will be
21 instituted for this and we will see if we can find them. We
22 probably can.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Didn't the suggestion that the codes and
24 the code machines should be destroyed immediately create in
25 your mind the idea that hostilities were imminent?

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart
Sen. Lucas

Mr. Grew: As I have already stated, Mr. Congressman, a step of that kind would only be taken in a very tense situation, but I also say that I am not at the present moment in a position to tell you the precise day and time at which that step was taken. I should like to look it up before I give you any further information on it.

Mr. Gearhart: I subscribe until we can have further information upon it.

The Chairman: Is that all?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

Senator Lucas: What would have happened to you, Mr. Grew, had you not taken the necessary reasonable precautions that you should have taken as Ambassador with respect to those codes?

Mr. Grew: They might well have fallen into Japanese hands. I think it would have been quite possible that they might have done something with them.

Senator Lucas: Supposing you had done nothing and they had fallen into the hands of the Japanese? Then when you returned to this country what would have been your status down in the State Department?

Mr. Grew: Well, it would have caused a ferment. If those codes had fallen into their hands, why those codes would have to be abandoned and new codes substituted, which

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

would have been a very expensive and complicated matter.

Senator Lucas: What would have been your position with the State Department in view of the fact that you failed to carry out those particular destructions in view of the tense situation that you described?

Mr. Grew: I think it would have been a very embarrassing situation, a very embarrassing position.

The Chairman: Is that all?

Senator Lucas: Yes.

The Chairman: Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly in an effort to be clear on a point, Mr. Grew, with respect to the message of November 26, 1941 from the State Department to Japan.

Am I correct in my understanding of your statement that that message of November 26, 1941 from the United States Department of State to Japan was not carried in any of the Japanese press?

Mr. Grew: It was not carried in any of the Japanese press. It was not allowed to be carried. And, as I said to the committee, one paper, as I recollect it one paper published the document after Pearl Harbor and that paper was promptly confiscated. Whether the document was ever published completely and freely, that I do not know.

Witness Grew:

Questions by the Vice Chairman

The Vice Chairman: But am I also correct in understanding you to say that the impression was conveyed to the Japanese people that an ultimatum had been received from the United States to Japan?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, definitely.

The Vice Chairman: Although the message itself was not an ultimatum, the Japanese officials in charge of the government at that time sought to convey the information to the Japanese people that it was an ultimatum?

Mr. Grew: That is true, and in the case of one prominent Japanese, a very prominent Japanese, after I had told him the contents of the memorandum he said that if that were so, as I had related, he felt that the Japanese people if they knew those facts would be very much opposed to an intransigent attitude on the part of their government.

The Vice Chairman: I thank you.

The Chairman: The chair understands Mr. Grew has a statement he wishes to read. Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Grew: Mr. Chairman, as the question of the diary has been considerably discussed in the committee and possibly as being helpful to the committee in considering the question in executive session, I would like to submit one further point.

In these hearings the question of the submission of my

Witness Grew:

diary kept in Japan has been raised. In my letter of November 12 to the general counsel certain reasons why, in my opinion, the diary should properly be regarded and treated as a purely private document were set forth. I believe those reasons to be controlling. I should like, however, now to advance another reason for taking this position, a reason which I do not believe can be open to question.

American diplomatic officers abroad, as in the case of diplomatic officers of other countries, depend in considerable measure among their sources of intelligence upon those foreign diplomatic colleagues with whom they have been able to establish relations of mutual confidence. This is not always easy to do, but once done, the trust must be mutual and complete. The result of such a relationship is often of the highest value to our national interests. It was of special value in Japan where friendly Japanese were in general prevented by the secret police from imparting information of any character to foreigners.

My diary, kept during my years in Japan, as probably is the case with every diary kept by any diplomatic officer contains the records of many talks with foreign diplomatic colleagues, sometimes of a nature the confidential character of which I am in honor bound to respect. In most cases these records are interwoven with the comments in my diary and

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Witness Grew:

could not be separated therefrom. To reveal these records would not only place me in a position to which, I respectfully submit, no former American ambassador ought ever to be subjected, but would inevitably place all American representatives abroad in an invidious situation in establishing their own future contacts on a basis of mutual trust. I could not willingly subject our future representation abroad to the prejudice that would surely arise from the revelation of these private records.

I cannot believe that the American people would wish their representatives abroad to be placed in such a position, or that they would wish one of their former representatives to compromise on what, to him, is clearly and unquestionably a point of honor.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The committee will undoubtedly give consideration to that statement.

The chair on behalf of the committee wishes to thank you for your appearance here and for your obvious frank effort to give it all the information that you possess in this inquiry and the committee is under great obligations to you for your appearance and willingness to testify. Thank you very much.

Mr. Grew: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like to express on my part my full appreciation of the courtesy and

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Witness Grew:

patience of the committee in listening to me during these last several days. I thank you, sir.

The Chairman: The patience is mutual.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement made by the Ambassador and in deference to the wishes of the distinguished chairman of this committee, I shall refrain at this time from making the statement that I informed the committee I would make.

The Chairman: All right. We will proceed, gentlemen, with another witness.

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Mr. Gosoll: Before calling the next witness, Mr. Chairman, we think we should read into the record two documents among those submitted in Exhibit 13, because of their direct pertinence to matters which were considered by the committee during its examination of Mr. Grew.

These documents in Exhibit 18 relate to the modus vivendi.

The first is the message to Lauchlin Currie from Lattimore, at Chungking under date of November 25, 1941, and it reads as follows:

"After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any 'Modus Vivendi' now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either

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2 past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the
3 feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo
4 has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his
5 consistent policy but I must warn you that even the
6 Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation
7 together if the Chinese national trust in America is under-
8 mined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by
9 diplomatic victory."

10 The other is a message of the same date, transmitted
11 to Secretary Stimson by Mr. T. V. Soong under cover of a
12 letter dated November 25 which was obtained both from the
13 War Department and State Department files.

14 Mr. Keefe: May I ask counsel if those messages are
15 included in Exhibit 18?

16 Mr. Gesell: They are.

17 Mr. Keefe: It is part of Exhibit 18 that you are now
18 reading for the record?

19 Mr. Gesell: That is correct.

20 "Telegram from General Chiang Kai Shek to Dr. T. V.
21 Soong dated Chungking, November 25, 1941.

22 "I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of
23 my telegram yesterday. Please convey contents of the message
24 to Secretaries Knox and Stimson immediately.

25 "Please explain to them the gravity of the situation.

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2 If America should relax the economic blockade and freezing
3 of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States
4 is considering this should gain currency, the morale of
5 our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two
6 months the Japanese propoganda have spread the belief that
7 in November an agreement will be successfully reached with
8 the United States. They have even come to a silent but
9 none the less definite understanding with the doubtful ele-
10 ments in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxa-
11 tion of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief
12 of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider
13 that China has been completely sacrificed by the United
14 States. The morale of the entire people will collapse
15 and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer
16 such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic
17 epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army
18 will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry
19 through their plans, so that even if in the future America
20 would come to our rescue the situation would be already
21 hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

22 "We could therefore only request the United States
23 Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the
24 withdrawal of Japanese armies from China is not settled,
25 the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could

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2 not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American
3 attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily
4 perform its fell purpose so that at no cost to them this
5 propaganda will effect the breakdown of our resistance.
6 Our more than four years of struggle with the loss of
7 countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled
8 in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse
9 of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to
10 the world, and I do not indeed know how history in the
11 future will record this episode."

12 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman.

13 The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

14 Mr. Gearhart: May I request counsel to have the re-
15 cords of the State Department searched to see whether or
16 not any instructions were sent to the American consuls in
17 Japan during the last one-third of November, and first seven
18 days of December, 1941, directing the destruction or disposi-
19 tion of codes and code machines and secret papers?

20 Mr. Gesell: We will do that, Mr. Congressman.

21 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

22 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

23 Senator Ferguson: So the record will be clear, as
24 I understand it, counsel now has the Army message to the
25 attache and will produce it sometime later, so we may put it

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2 in as part of Mr. Grew's testimony where I have asked
3 about the Army?

4 Mr. Gesell: The Army is getting it and we will produce
5 it Senator.

6 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could it appear in the
7 record at the time I was questioning Mr. Grew, so as to make
8 the record clear?

9 The Chairman: The reporter will transpose this at
10 the proper place. That record has already gone to the trans-
11 cription stage and may have been typewritten by now, but
12 the reporter will make an effort to put it in the place
13 where the Senator asked it to go.

14 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman.

15 The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

16 Mr. Murphy: At the time I asked for the paper under
17 discussion, the chairman said it was his impression that it
18 was already in the record. I want to make the statement
19 that the paper of August 17, on which the Senator from
20 Michigan was questioning, is separate and distinct from the
21 one to which I refer. In other words, in one volume of
22 Foreign Relations there is one outlined on page 554, one
23 on page 556 and one on page 557, all on the same date. I
24 want to make certain that the one on page 557 is copied
25 into the record.

1 The Chairman: All right.

2 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I have no objection.

3 In fact, I would like to have it copied into the record.

4 The Chairman: It is the unanimous view of the committee
5 that that ought to be done.

6 (The matter referred to is as follows:)

rlk 1

Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the
Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on August 8 during a conversation with the Secretary of State whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoe and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is made also to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on August 16 that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two Governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

When the Japanese Ambassador brought up these suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the Government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this Government had

rlk 2

1 received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Govern-
2 ment was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on
3 which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and
4 the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed
5 out also that the Japanese press was being constantly
6 stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United
7 States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated
8 to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it
9 clear that he did not see how conversations between the two
10 Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be dis-
11 cussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese
12 press contended that the United States was endeavoring to
13 encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United
14 States.

15 On two occasions officers of the Department of State,
16 pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called
17 on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the
18 reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of
19 force military and naval bases in French Indochina. Subse-
20 quently, on July 21 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State
21 raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese
22 Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to
23 French Indochina and pointed out that the Government of the
24 United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan
25 of French Indochina or the acquisition of military and naval

rlk 3

bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

The Government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this Government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of

rlk 4

the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this Government and this Government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirms that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential

rlk 5

character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the Government of the United States would expect to use its influence to see that all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the Japanese Government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views. The Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or proceeding

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with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell
The Chairman

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2 The Chairman: Will counsel go ahead now?

3 Mr. Gesell: We would like to call as the next
4 witness. General Miles.

5 TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES
6 (being first duly sworn by the Chairman)

7 The Chairman: Counsel will proceed.

8 Mr. Gesell: General, will you state for the record
9 your full name and your present rank, and duty, please, sir?

10 General Miles: Sherman Miles, Major General, Army
11 of the United States; stationed in Boston, Massachusetts.

12 Mr. Gesell: You were head of G-2, were you, General,
13 on December 7, 1941?

14 General Miles: I was, sir.

15 Mr. Gesell: How long have you had that duty?

16 General Miles: I reported on May 1, 1940.

17 The Chairman: Will the counsel permit the chair, for
18 the purpose of identification, to ask General Miles if he
19 is the son of General Nelson A. Miles, who was head of the
20 United States Army.

21 General Miles: I am, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I think counsel might
23 also, for the benefit of the record, show what "G-2" is.

24 Mr. Gesell: That was my next question.

25 The Vice Chairman: I beg your pardon.