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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 22, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

SHORT, Major General Walter C.
U. S. Army

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- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

PEARL HARBOR REPORT
Vol. 42 (5)

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Tuesday, January 22, 1946

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A. M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman) Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

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2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3 General, will you hold up your hand?

4 TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT

5 United States Army, Retired

6 (General Short was duly sworn by the Chairman.)

7 The Chairman: General, the Chair understands that
8 you have a statement here which you desire to read, or to
9 have read, due to the fact that you have been somewhat in-
10 disposed.

11 If you would like to have someone else read it, it
12 would be entirely agreeable to the committee, or if you
13 wish to read it yourself, why, you may proceed.

14 General Short: Mr. Chairman, I have been in the
15 hospital with pneumonia, and have not entirely recovered
16 by strength, but I shall make every effort to go through
17 my testimony before this committee without interruption.

18 I prefer to read it myself.

19 The Chairman: You may proceed.

20 General Short: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and
21 and the members of the committee for giving me, after four
22 long years, the opportunity to tell my story of Pearl Harbor
23 to the American public. I appeared before the Roberts Com-
24 mission but was not permitted to hear the other witnesses
25 nor given the privilege of cross-examination. I was not

Witness Short

1
2 given the opportunity to read the evidence taken before
3 the Roberts Commission until August, 1944. I appeared
4 before the Army Pearl Harbor Board but again was not per-
5 mitted to hear the other witnesses nor given the privilege
6 of cross-examination. However, I was furnished a copy
7 of the hearings except for the part considered top secret.
8 The Army Board labeled certain evidence top secret and I
9 was never permitted to see that until this Committee was
10 about to meet. Both Boards took testimony off the record
11 which has not been made available to me.

12 Before taking up my statement in detail, there are
13 a few points that I would like to mention for emphasis.
14 These will be elaborated upon later.

15 1. On Pearl Harbor Day I was carrying out orders
16 from the War Department as I understood them.

17 2. At no time since June 17, 1940 had the War Depart-
18 ment indicated the probability of an attack on Hawaii. In
19 none of the estimates prepared by G-2 War Department was
20 Hawaii mentioned as a point of attack but the Philippines
21 was mentioned repeatedly.

22 3. There was in the War Department an abundance of
23 information which was vital to me but which was not furnished
24 to me. This information was absolutely essential to a
25 correct estimate of the situation and correct decision.

h3

D. B. HODGKINS, JR. & GRAY

Witness Short

1
2 My estimate of the situation and my decision were made
3 without the benefit of this vital information. Had this
4 information been furnished to me I am sure that I would
5 have arrived at the conclusion that Hawaii would be attacked
6 and would have gone on an all-out alert.

7 4. When I made the decision, based on the information
8 available to me, to go on alert to prevent sabotage (No. 1),
9 I reported measures taken as follows: "Reurad 470 27th
10 Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison
11 with the Navy." The War Department had nine days in which
12 to tell me that my action was not what they wanted. I
13 accepted their silence as a full agreement with the action
14 taken. I am convinced that all who read the report thought
15 that my action was correct or I would have received in-
16 structions to modify my orders.

17 I would like to pass out at this time a chart, copies
18 of these charts, in colors, will be placed on the bulletin
19 board. They are not large enough to be very readily seen
20 from there.

21 I have had several charts prepared that may be of
22 assistance to this committee in the course of my testimony.

23 Chart No. 1 is a Chronological Summary. It shows
24 my appointment to Hawaii in December 1940, my conversations
25 in Washington in January, 1941, and the period of my com-

1 Witness Short

h5 2 mand for ten months from February 7, 1941 to December 17,
3 1941.

4 It traces my ten months of effort to strengthen Hawaiian
5 Defense. As I mention these efforts in the course of my
6 testimony, a glance at this chart will show how the parti-
7 cular matter fitted into the chronological picture.

8 At the foot of the chart are listed the various requests
9 and requisitions I made of the War Department, most of which
10 were disapproved. An "X" on the chart indicates the date
11 of disapproval of my request. The committee may see at a
12 glance that by December 7th, the picture clearly showed that
13 the War Department was not favorably considering my efforts
14 to strengthen the great Hawaiian outpost.


15 The Chronological Summary also shows the "alert" mes-
16 sages and the replies, beginning July 8, 1941. It shows the
17 step-up in traffic from the 24th to the 28th of November.
18 And it portrays graphically the 9 days of silence which the
19 War Department maintained after I sent my second sabotage-
20 alert report.

21 It shows also the December 4th sabotage report, which
22 was sent by General Martin from Hawaii on December 4th, but for
23 some reason never reached the War Department until December
24 10th.

25 (The chart referred to is as follows:)

WARD & BYRD, JUNIOR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY



1940

OCT NOV DEC

1941

JAN FEB MAR APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC

1942

JAN FEB MAR APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC

1943

JAN FEB MAR APRIL

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

MESSAGES FROM WASHINGTON

MESSAGES TO WASHINGTON

REQUESTS

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follows
Shack 10:15
AL-1

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Witness Short

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2 General Short: Introduction. 1. Appointment to
3 Hawaii.

4 The Chief of Staff selected me as the Commanding
5 General of the Hawaiian Department. I was first notified
6 in December, 1940. I held conferences in Washington, D. C.,
7 with General Marshall the first week in January, 1941. I
8 also conferred with General Gerow in the War Plans Division.
9 I talked with some officer about the equipment of the Hawaiian
10 Department. I talked with Colonel (now General) Spaatz about
11 the Air Corps problem.

12 2. Assumption of Command.

13 At the time I assumed command on February 7, 1941, the
14 Hawaiian Department was amply prepared for defense against
15 the submarine danger and against sabotage and espionage,
16 but was not adequately prepared for defense against an air
17 raid, either by bomber or by torpedo planes or both.¹

18 On February 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff sent me a letter,
19 detailing his policies regarding the Army mission in Hawaii
20 and stressing his interest in strengthening our air power
21 and anti-aircraft defense. In that letter he deplored the

22
23 ¹ See Ltr, Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War, dated 24
24 Jan. 1941, and reply by the Secretary of War, Joint
25 Committee, Daily Record, vol. 5, pages 720-728.

Witness Short

1
2 fact that all defenses would be inadequately equipped because
3 of the overall shortage of aircraft and anti-aircraft equipment.²

EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSES

3. Ten Months' Efforts.

4
5
6 During the ten months immediately following my assumption
7 of command, in full cooperation with the Navy, I made strenuous
8 efforts to improve the defense system of the Hawaiian Islands.

4. Agreements with Navy.

9
10 A joint agreement with reference to the employment of
11 the Air Forces was concluded with the Navy, and has heretofore
12 been called to the attention of this committee. Pertinent
13 extracts have been selected by the Counsel for the committee
14 and introduced here as Exhibit 44. Committee Exhibit 13,
15 the Air Study dated August 20, 1941, is also before the
16 committee. These agreements specifically placed the re-
17 sponsibility for distant reconnaissance upon the Navy and
18 provided that the Army, when called upon, should furnish to
19 the Navy any available aircraft for assisting in this re-
20 conaissance. It specified also that when Army planes were
21 detailed to assist in the distant reconnaissance they would
22 act directly under the orders of the Navy and report to the Navy

23
24 2 Ltr, Marshall to Short, 7 Feb. 1941, Committee Exhibit
25 No. 53, "Correspondence between General Marshall and
General Short", pages 1 to 3.

Witness Short

1 the results obtained in carrying out the mission.

2
3 4. Statement to Roberts Commission.

4 At the time that I was called before the Roberts Commis-
5 sion, I prepared and submitted to them a large document
6 marked as their Exhibit No. 7. I am submitting a copy of
7 this long document to this Joint Congressional Committee, in
8 order that you may have it available in your own records and
9 in order that I may refer to it in this statement.

10 6. Statement to Roberts Commission.

11 At this time I want to call attention to pages 28 to 48,
12 inclusive, of Exhibit 7 of the Roberts Commission and to the
13 exhibits lettered "V" through "Z", and "1A" through "1R", as
14 annexed to that Exhibit 7. On those pages and in those
15 exhibits, I developed at some length and in considerable
16 detail, the nature of my effort to improve Hawaiian defense.

17 The Vice Chairman: General, pardon an interruption.

18 Do we have before us this exhibit from the Roberts
19 testimony that the General is referring to?

20 Mr. Kaufman: Yes, sir. Reference was made to it the
21 other day, Mr. Chairman, and indication was made by Mr. Masten
22 that there were only five copies available.

23 The Vice Chairman: That is the one, is it?

24 Mr. Kaufman: That is the one.

25 The Vice Chairman: All right.

Witness Short

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2 Go ahead, General.

3 General Short: 7. Statement to Roberts Commission.

4 I think it unnecessary at this time to read all the
5 factual data that I previously collected for the Roberts Com-
6 mission. Those who wish to check the details are referred to
7 the statement which I made to the Roberts Commission. I
8 believe that it will be sufficient if I summarize briefly my
9 efforts to increase the defenses of Hawaii.

10 8. Letter to General Marshall 19 February 1941.

11 My initial study of the problem was incorporated in a
12 letter to General Marshall on February 19, 1941, and is copied
13 on pages 4 to 9, Committee Exhibit No. 53, "Correspondence
14 between General Marshall and General Short."

15 9. Airfield Bunkers.

16 On February 19, 1941, a letter was sent to the War
17 Department recommending that \$1,565,600 be allotted for the
18 purpose of providing protective bunkers and the necessary
19 taxiways and hard standings for our aircraft. On September
20 12, 1941, the War Department promised \$1,358,000, but these
21 funds were not to become available until January 1, 1942,
22 nearly 30 days after the attack. As a result of the delay
23 of this project, on December 7, 1941, it was impracticable
24 to disperse the planes adequately at Hickam Field or to
25 protect them from an air raid. Bunkers at Wheeler Field

Witness Short

1
2 had been constructed with soldier labor.³

3 10. Military Roads and Trails.

4 On February 19, 1941, I requested \$1,370,000 for con-
5 struction of military roads and trails. Up to December 7,
6 1941, only \$350,000 had been allotted to us.⁴

7 11. Coast Artillery.

8 On February 18, 1941, I requested two regiments of mobile
9 coast artillery. As a result, the War Department, in May 1941,
10 authorized certain increases in the coast artillery garrison,
11 to be gradually furnished us between June 1941 and March 1942.
12 The War Department, however, disapproved our request of
13 February 25, 1941, for an increase in enlisted men of the
14 251st Coast Artillery Regiment from 1181 to 1450.⁵ This was
15 an anti-aircraft regiment.

16 12. Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

17 In February 1941, the Army assumed responsibility for
18 the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay. General
19 Marshall concurred with this change in the defense plan. On
20 April 14, 1941, a letter was sent to the Adjutant General
21 recommending procurement of a 12-inch gun battery for the
22 Kaneohe Bay area. I requested an increase of the War Strength
23

24 ³ See Exhibit "W" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission.

25 ⁴ Exhibit "LA" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission.

⁵ Exhibit "LJ" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission.

Witness Short

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2 Garrison to 71,500 to provide appropriate defenses for
3 Kaneohe Bay and for station complements. This request, as
4 well as our subsequent letters, did not receive favorable
5 consideration from the War Department.⁶

13. The Infantry.

6
7 As early as April 25, 1941, I requested the organization
8 of two triangular divisions in place of the Hawaiian Division
9 (Square), the formation of station complements at Schofield
10 Barracks and Fort Shafter, and the activation of an Air Defense
11 Command. At this time the Square division was outmoded and
12 no longer in use in the mainland units. On May 29, 1941, the
13 War Department reduced our initial war garrison to 58,000.
14 I immediately protested and asked that the allotment be in-
15 creased to 71,500 and repeated my request for station comple-
16 ments. These requests met with disapproval, except that
17 authority was granted in July for the organization of the
18 two triangular divisions,⁷ with a reduced overall strength
19 remaining at 58,000 instead of 71,500 as requested by me.

20 14. Additional Airfields.

21 Proper air defense and training urgently required the
22 construction of additional airfields. Numerous letters were
23

24 ⁶ Exhibit "1C" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission; Ltr, Mar. 13,
1941, Gen. Marshall to Gen. Short, page 13, Committee
25 Exhibit No. 53.

⁷ Exhibit "1L" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission.

Witness Short

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dispatched between April 5, 1941, and May 14, 1941, with specific recommendations for ten airports. Up until the time of the attack, no funds had been specifically allotted by the War Department, although plans had been approved. By directing that an air field be constructed at Kahuku, delay was occasioned by protracted negotiations. In an effort to start fields without waiting for the receipt of funds, I directed the use of soldier labor at Molokai, Burns, Morse and Barking Sands. I considered the immediate improvement of Bellows Field vital for the protection of Oahu and so informed the War Department. The War Department approved plans for the project but did not immediately allocate funds. However, the District Engineer was directed to take all possible steps until such time as the specific funds were made available. By this makeshift means gasoline storage tanks were completed and a 5000-foot runway was half completed on December 7, 1941.⁸

15. Landing Strips.

On June 21, 1941, the War Department's attention was directed to the necessity for landing strips at Wheeler Field. In spite of a prolonged exchange of communications on this subject, no funds were allotted or received for this

⁸ Exhibit "1B" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission.

Witness Short

1
2 purpose. Limited improvements were made by soldier labor.⁹

3 16. Radar.

4 The Aircraft Warning Service was regarded as probably
5 the most important single defense project. The priorities
6 granted to us, however, made it impossible to complete the
7 permanent radar stations prior to the time of the attack.¹⁰

8 17. Priorities.

9 The priorities situation also rendered it impossible to
10 obtain supplies except from the mainland, with delivery
11 delayed six to eight weeks even under the most favorable
12 conditions. We made repeated efforts to correct this situation,
13 but no success had been made up to the time of the attack.
14 In this respect, as well as all others, the War Department
15 reserved to itself full control of the determination of the
16 strategical importance of the various defense projects and
17 in the case of aircraft warning material did not favorably
18 consider my request that a higher priority be granted to us.¹¹

19 18. Camouflage of Airfields.

20 On July 15, 1941, we requested funds for camouflage
21 treatment of airfields. The War Department, apparently acting
22 upon their estimate that air attack was improbable, had
23 furnished us no funds for this purpose prior to December 7,
24 1941. The effectiveness of camouflaging which we were able

25 9 See page 33 and Exhibit "1D" of Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission.
10 Exhibit "1E" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission.
11 Exhibit "1F" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission.

1 Witness Short

2 to do was limited by our inability to buy the necessary
3 materials.¹²

4 19. Field Fortifications.

5 Along the same line, our request for funds for field
6 fortifications and camouflage was also denied by the War De-
7 partment. No funds were given us for this purpose.¹³

8 20. Advance Procurement Funds.

9 On July 28, 1941, we requested a revolving fund allotment
10 of \$1,000,000 to permit advance procurement of essential
11 materials. In September the Deputy Chief of Staff allotted
12 \$500,000 for this fund, but before any materials could be
13 secured the War Department diverted the money for housing
14 at Kaneohe Bay. As a result, no reserve supplies, except
15 lumber, had been accumulated.¹⁴

16 21. Air Depot.

17 Our Air Depot at Hickam Field was extremely vulnerable
18 to attack. Therefore on September 10, 1941, I recommended
19 that bombproof facilities for aircraft repair be constructed,
20 costing \$3,480,650. On October 27, the War Department
21 informed me that:

22 "*** it is a policy that such facilities will
23 not be provided."¹⁵

24
25
12 Exhibit "Z" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission
13 Exhibit "Y" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission
14 Exhibit "1G" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission
15 Exhibit "X" to Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission

Witness Short

1
2 During the attack, this Air Depot was a main target and
3 suffered tremendous damage. Immediately after the attack,
4 funds were provided, and underground, bombproof facilities
5 were begun.

22. May 1941 Maneuvers.

6
7 During our May 1941 maneuvers, it was found that our
8 then existent defensive field orders were too cumbersome.
9 On July 14, 1941, a tentative Standing Operating Procedure
10 was issued. In letters dated October 10 and 28, General
11 Marshall suggested certain changes in this defense plan,
12 relative to the air corps mission, which suggestions we
13 adopted in the final draft of the S.O.P., dated 5 November
14 1941.¹⁶ Due to this plan and the familiarization of all
15 units with it, all personnel down to the last man were able
16 to act promptly in the execution of their missions when
17 the raid took place. This they did in a most creditable
18 manner.

19 23. Standing Operating Procedure. The Standing
20 Operating Procedure of November 5, 1941, was issued to comply
21 with paragraph 159, FM 100-5, issued by the War Department
22 on May 22, 1941, which states:

23 "In every unit, standing operating procedure is
24 prescribed by the commander whenever practicable.

25 16 See pages 42-45, Domm. Ex. No. 53, "Correspondence
between General Marshall and General Short".

Witness Short

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"This procedure covers those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The adoption of such procedures will save time in the preparation and issuance of orders, minimize the chances for confusion, and errors when under stress of combat, and greatly simplify and expedite the execution of operations in the field."

The value of having a Standing Operating Procedure was fully demonstrated at the time of the attack.

I wish to pass out Chart No. 2 at this time.

The Vice Chairman: This (indicating) is the chart you refer to, General?

General Short: That is correct.

The Vice Chairman: I believe all members of the committee have it.

General Short: This chart will summarize for the committee the requests I made of the War Department and the amount I was granted.

It shows that I requested a total of some \$22,953,697 for projects which the responsible officers in Hawaii considered vital for national defense.

It shows that the War Department granted us only \$350,000 -- for roads and trails.

The grants totaled about 1-1/2 percent of the requests. That situation speaks for itself.

I want to add that beginning December 7, 1941, right after

Witness Short

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the attack, I was given a blank check for everything I needed.

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(The chart above referred to is as follows:)

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
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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON
5 5 NORTHINGAW JEAR 6 DRAW

DEFENSE FUNDS - REQUESTS & GRANTS 7 FEB TO 7 DEC 1941



7906

NON - FISCAL REQUESTS

18 FEB. - TWO REGIMENTS OF MOBILE COAST ARTILLERY • 25 APR. - ORGANIZATION OF 2 TRIANGULAR DIVISIONS

25 FEB. - INCREASE OF STRENGTH OF 261st C.A. REGIMENT • REQUESTS FOR PRIORITIES ON MATERIALS

CHART NO 2

Witness Short

General Short: PREPARATION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION FOR DEFENSE.

24. Civilian Defense Program.

From page 43 through page 48 of the statement which I submitted to the Roberts Commission, I discussed the Civilian Defense Program of the Islands. The committee may examine that statement for an outline of this phase. The defensive measures to enable the civilian population to meet any emergency which might arise were covered under the following headings:

- (1) Production and storage of food,
- (2) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded,
- (3) An agreement with the Red Cross for it to purchase and store in Honolulu \$200,000 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment for use in any possible emergency,
- (4) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage,
- (5) Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries.

D. G. NOTDINHAW - JUAN & DRAW

Shefner follows 10:35

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Witness Short

2 Governor Poindexter's Letter. I think the best summary
3 of my work in preparing the civilian population to meet any
4 emergency is found in the letter of Governor Joseph B.
5 Poindexter, dated December 23, 1941 which I should like to
6 quote in full:
17

7 "SEAL
8 OF THE
9 TERRITORY OF HAWAII
10 Executive Chambers
11 HONOLULU

12 23 December 1941

13 Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
14 Fort Shafter, T.H.

15 My dear General Short :

16 Having noted in the public press that an investigation
17 is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army
18 and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appro-
19 priate that I make to you a statement as to the state of
20 preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for
21 war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked
22 on December 7, 1941.

23 The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always ap-
24 preciated that these Islands were important to National De-

25 17- See Exhibit 7, Roberts Commission, page 47a to 47c.

Witness Short

1
2 fense from a military standpoint, but it has only been since
3 your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it
4 has been brought home to the civil population the importance
5 of the part it would play in the event of a war in the
6 Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands
7 met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me
8 proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your
9 foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the
10 possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the
11 Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this
12 emergency was magnificently rewarded.

13 It may be of interest to point out in detail some of
14 the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7,
15 1941:

16 (1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by
17 a special session of the Legislature called for that purpose.
18 This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire
19 civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National
20 Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this Act,
21 civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were
22 brought to such a point of preparation that they were able
23 to go into action immediately and to function effectively
24 on December 7, 1941.

25 (2) The production and conservation of food:

Witness Short

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2 Householders were persistently urged to stock their
3 shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted
4 in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian
5 Islands by more than twenty per cent. Federal appropriation
6 was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve.
7 This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been author-
8 ized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made
9 for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of
10 certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agree-
11 ments were also made for the growing, in normal times, of
12 these crops not usually grown in marketable quantities.
13 In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced
14 to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use
15 of the Army although the price was above that of mainland
16 potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies
17 of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a
18 certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse
19 to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the
20 storage of food supply when it arrives.

21 (3) The medical facilities for the care of the
22 injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first
23 things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an
24 emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical
25 profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities.

Witness Short

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2 Approximately three thousand persons were given training
3 and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross.
4 The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous
5 tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized,
6 each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and
7 twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty impro-
8 vised ambulances were organized. The performance of their
9 tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil
10 defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

11 (4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children
12 and the preparation of shelters for workers in essential
13 industries had reached a high state of perfection on December
14 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas
15 attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

16 (5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities
17 and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in
18 our preparation and it was able to function instantly when
19 called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work
20 of this force was exceptional and excellent.

21 (6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted
22 at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It
23 was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home
24 guardsmen could be and were placed on duty thereby relieving
25 members of the Army for other military duty.

Witness Short

1
2 (7) There were many other matters too numerous to
3 detail here which were planned and accomplished at your in-
4 stigation. Important among these was the bringing home to
5 the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public
6 service in times of emergency.

7 All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the
8 part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military
9 authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since De-
10 cember 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and
11 all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles
12 and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior
13 planning and training.

14 It is my belief that the public has confidence in the
15 military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese
16 Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has
17 not in any way diminished the faith of this community in
18 your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magni-
19 ficent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem
20 in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your fore-
21 sight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of
22 the Territory.

23 You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which
24 you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,
(S) J. B. POINDEXTER

GOVERNOR OF HAWAII."

Witness Short

PRE-WAR ALERTS

1
2
3 Marshall-Herron Alert. Prior to the time that I assumed
4 command in Hawaii, General Marshall had definitely indicated
5 his intention to direct personally any genuine pre-war alert.
6 As Commanding General and as a matter of training I was, of
7 course, fully authorized to conduct drills, maneuvers and
8 practice alerts. Numerous maneuvers, general and special
9 practice alerts were, in fact, held. However, as a part of
10 my orientation, on the day before I assumed command, General
11 Herron, my predecessor, acquainted me with the relation which
12 had existed between himself and General Marshall during the
13 all-out alert which began June 17, 1940.¹⁸ In that alert,
14 General Marshall had directed the alert and had closely
15 supervised its continuance, as disclosed in Committee Exhibit
16 No. 52, "Communications between War Department and General
17 Herron Concerning 1940 Alert". The following message began
18 the alert:

19 "June 17, 1940. No. 428. Immediately alert com-
20 plete defensive organization to deal with possible
21 trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without
22 creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity
23 of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis.

24
25 18-Affidavit of General Herron, page 212, Clausen Report.

1 Witness Short

2 Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for
3 secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be
4 furnished you shortly. Acknowledge. ADAMS."

5 Supervision by Chief of Staff. The record is clear
6 that at the time of the 1940 alert the Chief of Staff had
7 sufficient time and sense of personal responsibility toward
8 the Hawaiian Department to order and to supervise the Hawaiian
9 alert. In addition, he had information which caused him to
10 state that --

11 "*** In any event it would have been foolhardy
12 not to take special precautions."¹⁹

13 Expected Action of Chief of Staff. It was my expecta-
14 tion that if the Chief of Staff once again had information
15 causing him to expect a "trans-Pacific raid" against Oahu,
16 he would follow the course he had previously set as an exam-
17 ple. I felt that a Chief of Staff who had personally super-
18 vised the long-continued 1940 Alert would certainly have the
19 time and interest not only to read and to understand my suc-
20 cinct report "Reurad four seven two 27th Report Department
21 alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy", but
22 to send further word in the event that he disagreed in any
23 way with the measures I had taken in obedience to his November

Witness Short

27 directive. At the time that the previous alert had been modified, on July 16, 1940, the Chief of Staff had thought that the sabotage menace continued, even though the air raid danger had subsided. He had said that he wanted the Air Corps training resumed in such manner that the "aerial patrol measures" could be reestablished on short notice.²⁰

THE WAR PLANS

Rainbow Five. The basic war plan was called Rainbow Five by the Army and WPL-46 by the Navy. This plan could be put into effect only by the War and Navy Departments.²¹

Local Defense Plan. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan for Hawaii was approved by Admiral Bloch and me on 11 April 1941, based, of course, on the Rainbow Plan. Under this plan, the Navy undertook responsibility for "distant reconnaissance".²² No part of this Joint Plan would take effect until the War Department ordered M-day under the Rainbow Plan, unless it was ordered in effect from Washington or by mutual agreement of the Army and Navy in Hawaii.²³ Due to my knowledge of the attitude of the War Department, I would never have ordered any part of the plan into effect

20 - Page 18, Committee Exhibit No. 52

21 - Section IX, par. 53, Rainbow Five; Sec. VIII, par. 40a, Rainbow Five.

22- Par. 18, 1, Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan 18 April 1941

23- Par. 15, 9, (2), Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, 18 April 1941.

Witness Short

1
2 without consulting it, as long as communications were open
3 and time permitted. Under the circumstances preceding the
4 attack, the War Department, with far more intimate knowledge
5 of the nature of the Japanese situation, had not ordered
6 M-day, had not put the Rainbow Plan into effect, in whole or
7 in part, and had expressed no dissatisfaction with my report
8 of a sabotage alert. The only conclusion I could draw was
9 that it did not want the war plans implemented because of
10 the possible alarm to the public or the danger of provoking
11 the Japanese. Their silence I took as concurrence with the
12 degree of alert I had adopted.


INFORMATION FURNISHED HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

13
14 Information in General. I want to outline for the
15 Committee the information which the War Department furnished
16 me during the critical ten-day period preceding the attack.

17 Pass out chart No. 6, please.

18 (The Chart above referred to
19 is as follows, to-wit:)

20
21
22
23
24
25



Witness Short

1
2 Chart No. 6 is an attempt to show on the map the import-
3 ant factors which entered into my estimate of the situation --
4 the things which led me to think that the Japanese were not
5 going to attack Hawaii.

6 1. The last official prediction of an imminent trans-
7 Pacific raid on Oahu was the Marshall-Herron Alert of 1940
8 (shown by a broken line on the map from Japan to Honolulu.)

9 2. The current information in November 1941 from Wash-
10 ington pointed to a Jap attack on Russia, Siam, Kra, the
11 Philippines or Borneo (shown by heavy dark arrows stemming
12 from Japan).

13 3. The current information also indicated that the
14 probable danger in Hawaii, Guam and Samoa was "internal at-
15 tack"; that is, hostile action in the form of sabotage and
16 subversive activities.

17 4. Meantime, Hawaii was a focal point in transporting
18 troops, B-17's and air crews to the Philippines. The planes
19 were always sent to Hawaii unarmed, but when sending them out
20 to the more dangerous area of the Philippines, we were in-
21 structed to arm them.

22 5. Discussion was going on about army troops moving
23 out to Christmas and Canton to relieve the Marines (shown
24 by a dotted line on the map).

25 6. The Marshalls were the nearest Jap territory.

Witness Short

1
2 With such a picture, the Committee can get a better idea
3 of the considerations which weighed on my mind.

4 Background since 1940 Alert. As a matter of brief
5 background, the committee should recall the precedent set by
6 the Marshall-Herron Alert of 1940. They should also bear in
7 mind the message from the Adjutant General on July 25, 1941
8 which is shown in committee exhibit No. 32 (Reading):

9 "WASHINGTON DC 152A July 8, 1941

10 "C G

11 HAWN DEPT FORT SHAFTER TH

12 "NINE TWO FOUR SEVENTH AGMC FOR YOUR INFORMATION
13 DEDUCTION FROM INFORMATION FROM NUMEROUS SOURCES IS THAT
14 JAPANESE GOVT HAS DETERMINED UPON ITS FUTURE POLICY
15 WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY ALL PRINCIPAL JAPANESE POLITICAL
16 AND MILITARY GROUPS PERIOD THIS POLICY IS AT PRESENT
17 ONE OF WATCHFUL WAITING INVOLVING PROBABLE AGGRESSIVE
18 ACTION AGAINST MARITIME PROVINCES OF RUSSIA IF AND WHEN
19 SIBERIAN GARRISON HAS BEEN MATERIALLY REDUCED IN STRENGTH
20 AND IT BECOMES EVIDENT THAT GERMANY WILL WIN A DECISIVE
21 VICTORY IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA PERIOD OPINION IS THAT JAP
22 ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH WILL BE FOR THE PRESENT CONFINED
23 TO SEIZURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL ARMY AND AIR BASES
24 IN INDO CHINA ALTHOUGH AN ADVANCE AGAINST THE BRITISH
25 AND DUTCH CANNOT BE ENTIRELY RULED OUT PERIOD NEUTRALITY

1512

Witness Short

1
2 PACT WITH RUSSIA MAY BE ABROGATED PERIOD THEY HAVE
3 ORDERED ALL JAP VESSELS IN US ATLANTIC PORTS TO BE WEST
4 OF PANAMA CANAL BY FIRST AUGUST PERIOD MOVEMENT OF JAP
5 SHIPPING FROM JAPAN HAS BEEN SUSPENDED AND ADDITIONAL
6 MERCHANT VESSELS ARE BEING REQUISITIONED

7 ADAMS."

8 This is the only message sent direct by the War Depart-
9 ment to me which indicates that "magic" sources were being
10 used by the information center. It also is the only message
11 received from the War Department that made a definite estim-
12 ate as to probable Japanese action.

13 I should like also to read the message of July 25, 1941
14 received through Naval Intelligence, shown in committee exhib-
15 it No. 32. This is addressed to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral
16 Stark. (Reading)

17 "THIS IS A JOINT DISPATCH FROM THE CNO AND THE CHIEF
18 OF STAFF US ARMY X APPROPRIATE AGENCIES DELIVER COPIES
19 TO COMMANDING GENERALS HAWAII PHILIPPINES AND CARIBBEAN
20 DEFENSES COMMAND AND TO GENERAL CHANEY IN LONDON XX
21 YOU ARE ADVISED THAT AT 1400 GCT JULY TWENTY SIXTH
22 UNITED STATES WILL IMPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST
23 JAPAN X IT IS EXPECTED THESE SANCTIONS WILL EMBARGO
24 ALL TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES SUBJECT TO
25 MODIFICATION THROUGH A LICENSING SYSTEM FOR CERTAIN

Witness Short

1
2 MATERIAL X IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT EXPORT LICENSES WILL
3 BE GRANTED FOR CERTAIN GRADES OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
4 COTTON AND POSSIBLY SOME OTHER MATERIALS AND THAT IMPORT
5 LICENSES MAY BE GRANTED FOR RAW SILK X JAPANESE ASSETS
6 AND FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES WILL BE FROZEN EXCEPT
7 THAT THEY MAY BE MOVED IF LICENSES ARE GRANTED FOR SUCH
8 MOVEMENT X IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT EXPECTED THAT JAPANESE
9 MERCHANT VESSELS IN UNITED STATES PORTS WILL BE SEIZED
10 AT THIS TIME X UNITED STATES FLAG MERCHANT VESSELS WILL
11 NOT AT PRESENT BE ORDERED TO DEPART FROM OR NOT TO
12 ENTER PORTS CONTROLLED BY JAPAN X CNO AND COS DO NOT
13 ANTICIPATE IMMEDIATE HOSTILE REACTION BY JAPAN THROUGH
14 THE USE OF MILITARY MEANS BUT YOU ARE FURNISHED THIS
15 INFORMATION IN ORDER THAT YOU MAY TAKE APPROPRIATE PRE-
16 CAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES X
17 ACTION BEING INITIATED BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY TO CALL
18 THE PHILIPPINE ARMY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE AT AN EARLY DATE XX
19 THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE KEPT SECRET EXCEPT FROM IMMEDIATE
20 NAVY AND ARMY SUBORDINATES X SPENAVO CINCPAC CINCLANT
21 CINCAF COM FIFTEEN SPENAVO LONDON XX."

22 The Vice Chairman: General, would you pardon an inter-
23 ruption there? What is the page of that which you just read?

24 General Short: That is on page 2 of exhibit No. 32.

25 The Vice Chairman: And what was the page of the other

Witness Short

1

2

one you read?

3

General Short: The other was page 1.

4

The Vice Chairman: Page 1?

5

General Short: Yes, sir.

6

The Vice Chairman: Thank you, sir.

7

Mr. Gearhart: May I have the page number which you

8

are reading from now?

9

General Short: Page 2 of exhibit 32.

10

Mr. Gearhart: No, I mean of your statement.

11

General Short: Page 16 of my statement.

12

Also, on October 20, 1941 the Army had informed me that they expected "no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy"²⁵ in spite of the fact that the Navy Department had predicted possible hostilities on October 16, 1941.²⁶

15

16

These two messages are so diametrically opposed in their views that I should like to read them.

17

18

The Vice Chairman: Will you please give the page every time you read one?

19

20

General Short: Yes, sir. On page 3 of exhibit 32 a message sent by Ingersoll to Admiral Kimmel dated October 16, 1941.

22

23

24

25 - Radiogram 20 Oct. 1941, Adjutant General to Short, page 4, Committee Exhibit 32.

25

26 - Radiogram, 16 Oct. 1941, CNO to CINCPAC; page 3, Committee Exhibit 32; Page 20-B, Exhibit 37.

1 **Witness Short**

2 "THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CRE-
 3 ATED A GRAVE SITUATION X IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT
 4 WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC AND ANTI
 5 AMERICAN X IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL
 6 BE THAT IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL
 7 NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US X IN EITHER CASE
 8 HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A STRONG POS-
 9 SIBILITY X SINCE THE US AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE
 10 BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS
 11 ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO
 12 POWERS X IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE
 13 DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS
 14 AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE
 15 PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST JAPAN X SECOND AND THIRD
 16 ADEES INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL DISTRICT
 17 AUTHORITIES X ACKNOWLEDGE XX."

18 That was a quite definite prediction of hostile action
 19 on the part of Japan.

20 Now, the Army message reads as follows; page No. 4,
 21 exhibit 32:

22 "WASHN DC 1234P OCT 20 1941

23 "20th FOLLOWING: WAR DEPT ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE
 24 SITUATION FOR YOUR INFORMATION STOP TENSION BETWEEN
 25 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO REPEAT

1 Witness Short

2 NO ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY APPEARS
3 IMMINENT

4 ADAMS."

5 Sabotage vs. Air Danger. General Marshall's testimony
6 made a strong point of the fact that in the correspondence
7 between him and the Hawaiian Department, sabotage was not
8 mentioned but that the letters were confined largely to air-
9 craft and anti-aircraft defense. He stated that he did not
10 understand the reason why sabotage then should later be em-
11 phasized. The reason that sabotage was never discussed in
12 my letters to General Marshall was the fact that we had in
13 Hawaii all of the equipment necessary to prevent sabotage.
14 Our letters were written to emphasize the need of aircraft
15 and anti-aircraft defense. The Secretary of the Navy had
16 stated in his letter to the Secretary of War on January 24,
17 1941, that defense against sabotage had been provided for
18 satisfactorily. I agreed fully with this statement. There
19 was therefore no reason to make requests upon the Chief of
20 Staff with reference to equipment or material for anti-
21 sabotage measures.

22 Nov. 24 Message to Kimmel. On November 24, 1941, Ad-
23 miral Kimmel received the following message from the Chief
24 of Naval Operations, concurred in by the Chief of Staff:

25 "There are very doubtful chances of a favorable

Witness Short

1
2 outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation,
3 coupled with statements of Nippon Government and move-
4 ments of their naval and military force, indicate, in
5 our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any
6 direction, including an attack on the Philippines or
7 Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen
8 this dispatch and concurs and requests action. Inform
9 senior Army officers in respective areas. Utmost secre-
10 cy is necessary in order not to complicate the already
11 tense situation or precipitate Japanese action." 27

12 This message indicated possible movement in the direction of
13 the Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy.

14 Nov. 27 Message to Kimmel. On November 27th the Chief
15 of Naval Operations sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
16 Fleet the following message which was made known to me:

17 "Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negoti-
18 ations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions
19 in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an
20 aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious
21 expedition against either the Philippines, or Kra Penin-
22 sula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and
23 equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of

24
25 27 - Message 24 Nov., Navy to Kimmel, page 28-B, Exhibit 37.

Witness Short

1
2 of their naval forces. You will execute a defensive de-
3 ployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks as-
4 signed in WPL 46. Guam, Samoa, and Continental Districts
5 have been directed to take appropriate measures against
6 sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War
7 Department. Inform naval district and army authorities.
8 British to be informed by Spenavo." 28

9 You will notice that whereas the message of the 24th
10 indicated a possible attack on Guam, by this time they had
11 decided that the movement was entirely to the south and they
12 indicated only sabotage arrangements on the Island of Oahu.

13 While this message is headed "War Warning", it should be
14 noted that Navy War Plan 46 was not placed in effect by the
15 Navy Department, but a defensive deployment was ordered in
16 preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned under Navy
17 War Plans 46. This indicated that later directions would be
18 received if it became necessary to carry out this plan.

19 Japanese action towards the south was indicated. I want to
20 emphasize the following sentence from the message:

21 "You will execute a defensive deployment in pre-
22 paration for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46."

23
24 28.- Message 27 Nov., Navy to Kimmel, page 31B,

25 Exhibit 37.

1919

Witness Short

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Such defensive deployment would necessarily include distant reconnaissance.

Do-Don't Message. On November 27th I received the following radiogram from the Chief of Staff which, on account of its conflicting instructions, the Army Pearl Harbor Board called the "Do-or-Don't message":²⁹

"No. 472. Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they

Line 5, Page 123, Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; also line 20, page 1, Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

WARD & BURN WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHY

1 Witness Short

2 pertain to Japan. Limit the dissemination of this highly
3 secret information to minimum essential officers." ³⁰

4 The impression conveyed to me by this message was that the
5 avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the
6 War Department was that some international incident might
7 occur in Hawaii and be regarded by Japan as an overt act.
8 That this opinion was in accordance with the views of General
9 Marshall is shown by the following quotation from his testi-
10 mony:

11 "So far as public opinion was concerned, I think the
12 Ja Japanese were capitalizing on the belief that it would be
13 very difficult to bring our people into a willingness to
14 enter the war. That, incidentally, was somewhat con-
15 firmed by the governmental policy on our part of making
16 certain that the overt act should not be attributed to
17 the United States, because of the state of the public
18 mind at the time. Of course, no one anticipated that
19 that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacific
20 Fleet." ³¹

21 No mention was made of a probable attack on Hawaii since
22 the alert message of June 17, 1940. An examination of the

23 _____
24 30-Message 27 Nov., No. 472, from Marshall; page 7, Exhibit 32

25 31 - Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, Vol. A, page 41.

Witness Short

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various Military Intelligence estimates prepared by G-2 WD, shows that in no estimate did G-2 ever indicate the probability of an attack on Hawaii.³² There was nothing in the message directing me to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack. "Hostile action at any moment" meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action.

Sabotage Emphasis. The only additional information received from the War Department after the receipt of message No. 472 (November 27) was contained in three messages on sabotage and subversive measures. The first from G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiian Department received November 27th read as follows:

"Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only."³³

This message was erroneously paraphrased in the Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, page 133, to indicate that hostilities were "probable".

Report by General Short. I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff November 27th:

³² - Exhibit 33

³³ - Message 27 Nov., No. 473, War Dept G-2 to Hawn. Dept. G-2; Page 10, Exhibit 32.

1 **Witness Short**

2 "Chief of Staff, War Department

3 Washington, D. C.

4 "Reurad four seven two 27th Report Department
5 alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

6 SHORT" 34

7 I wish to point out that this message reporting measures
8 taken referred by number to the message which I had received
9 from the War Department. If the War Department had checked
10 the message carefully, there could have been no possible
11 mistake that it was in reply to War Department message No.
12 472 which directed a report of the measures taken. War De-
13 partment Message No. 472, November 27th was the only message
14 addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
15 signed "Marshall". The message of November 27th, No. 473,
16 signed "Miles", was addressed to G-2, Hawaiian Department,
17 and did not call for a report. My message No. 959, November
18 27th, was addressed to the Chief of Staff, referred by num-
19 ber to No. 472, and stated that I was reporting measures
20 taken. It is difficult to see how there could have been any
21 possible confusion as to the message which was being an-
22 swered. Failure to check my message No. 959 to determine to
23 which War Department message it was a reply probably came about
24 only because all who read the message believed the action

1 Witness Short

2 was correct. General Marshall, in his testimony before the
3 Army Pearl Harbor Board, stated:

4 "We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese move-
5 ment in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against
6 the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on
7 the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, an-
8 ticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we
9 thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that
10 the defenses there would be sufficient to make it ex-
11 tremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an
12 attack."³⁵

13 Nov. 28 Sabotage Message and Report. On November 28th
14 the following message, relating entirely to sabotage and sub-
15 versive measures, was received from the War Department:

16 "HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

17 "482 28th Critical situation demands that all pre-
18 cautions be taken immediately against subversive activi-
19 ties within field of investigative responsibility of
20 War Department (see paragraph three MID SC 30-45). Also
21 desired that you initiate forth all additional measures
22 necessary to provide for protection of your establish-
23 ments, property, and equipment against sabotage, protec-

24
25 ³⁵ - Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, Vol. 1, page 9.

W itness Short

1
2 tion of your personnel against subversive propaganda and
3 protection of all activities against espionage. This
4 does not, repeat not, mean that any illegal measures are
5 authorized. Protective measures should be confined to
6 those essential to security, avoiding unnecessary pub-
7 licity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission
8 identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations
9 but this does not, repeat not, affect your responsibility
10 under existing instructions. ADAMS." ³⁶

11 When this message was received from the War Department
12 I felt that it had been prepared after consideration had been
13 given to my message reporting measures taken pursuant to
14 War Department message No. 472. I sent the following message
15 in reply and was careful to refer directly to the War Depart-
16 ment number "482":

17 "THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
18 WAR DEPARTMENT
19 WASHINGTON D. C.

20 "Re your secret radio 482 28th, full precautions
21 are being taken against subversive activities within the
22 field of investigative responsibility of War Department
23 (paragraph 3 MID SC 30-45) and military establishments
24 including personnel and equipment. As regards protection

25 36 - 28 Nov. Message No. 482 from The Adjutant General;
Page 13, Exhibit 32;

Witness Short

1
2 of vital installations outside of military reservations
3 such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway
4 bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated
5 June 19, 1941, requested the Governor of the Territory to
6 use the broad powers vested in him by Section 67 of the
7 Organic Act which provides, in effect, that the Governor
8 may call upon the commanders of military and naval
9 forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii
10 to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, in-
11 surrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the
12 Governor on June 20th confidentially made a formal writ-
13 ten demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue
14 to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary
15 to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection
16 therewith, being committed against vital installations
17 and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the fore-
18 going request appropriate military protection is now be-
19 ing afforded vital civilian installations. In this con-
20 nection, at the instigation of this headquarters the
21 City and County of Honolulu on June 30th, 1941 enacted
22 an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian
23 Department to close, or restrict the use of and travel
24 upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu,
25 whenever the Commanding General deems such action neces-

Witness Short

1
2 sary in the interest of national defense. The authority
3 thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with
4 FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are
5 and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been
6 given on all pertinent matters.

7 SHORT".³⁷

8 General Arnold's Radiogram. On November 28th General
9 Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, sent to the Commanding General,
10 Hawaiian Air Forces, a message relating entirely to sabotage
11 and subversive activities, similar in tone to War Department
12 message No. 482, signed "Adams".³⁸ General Martin, replying
13 to this message on December 4th, gave a detailed report of
14 measures taken by him against sabotage and subversive acti-
15 vities and added:

16 "This entire department is now operating and will
17 continue to operate under an alert for prevention of
18 sabotage."³⁹

19 We received no reply disagreeing in any way with the ac-
20 tion reported.

21 Nov. 28 to Dec. 7, 1941. From November 28, 1941, until
22

23 37 - Page 17, Exhibit 32

24 38 - Page 14, Exhibit 37

25 39 - Message, 4 Dec., No. 1033, Gen. Martin to Gen. Arnold;
Page 19, Ex. 32.

1 Witness Short

2 the war began, I received only one more message from the War
 3 Department, that of November 29, 1941, regarding preparations
 4 to move two Army pursuit squadrons on short notice, and in-
 5 forming me that the Army would take over the defense of ad-
 6 vance Pacific bases, except for furnishing anti-aircraft
 7 equipment. This message stated that Christmas and Canton
 8 Islands would be garrisoned from Hawaii, and replacements
 9 would be sent from the United States.⁴⁰ This was the last
 10 information from the War Department until the final message
 11 from the Chief of Staff of December 7th, which arrived seven
 12 hours after the attack.

13 I do not believe that message has been placed in evi-
 14 dence.

15 Sher--
 16 Shaok
 17 fls

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WASH DC JUL 1945
 PHOTOGRAPHY UNIT

Witness Short

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Mr. Kaufman: Counsel for General Short has suggested that we offer in evidence at this point a telegram from the War Department to General Short dated November 29, 1941. The request was made by counsel for General Short.

The Vice Chairman: Do we have copies for the committee?

Mr. Kaufman: We have photostats; and I think they have been handed around to the members of the committee this morning.

The Vice Chairman: Does counsel desire that the message be read at this time?

Mr. Kaufman: Either read into the record, or marked as an exhibit. I suggest it be read into the record.

The Vice Chairman: Suppose you read it into the record.

Mr. Kaufman (reading):

Witness Short

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"Standard Form No. 14A [Stamped] SECRET FROM WAR DEPARTMENT

Approved by the President BUREAU A. G. O.

March 10, 1926. AG 381(11-29-41)MC-E

TELEGRAM EHB/cdm - 1712

Official Business--Government Rates NOVEMBER 29 1941

CABLEGRAM

"COMMANDING GENERAL SENT NO. 489, 11/29

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER T H

"CONSULT C IN C PACIFIC FLEET REFERENCE HIS DISPATCH
 NUMBER TWO EIGHT ZERO SIX TWO SEVEN TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERA-
 TIONS PERIOD IN VIEW OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ABOVE
 DISPATCH COMMA THE MOVEMENT OF THE TWO ARMY PURSUIT SQUAD-
 RONS AS INDICATED IN WAR DEPARTMENT CABLE NUMBER FOUR SIX
 SIX COMMA NOVEMBER TWO SIX COMMA ONE NINE FOUR ONE COMMA
 WILL BE SUSPENDED PERIOD THESE SQUADRONS SHOULD HOWEVER
 BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON SHORT NOTICE PERIOD PARAGRAPH WAR
 DEPARTMENT HAS OFFERED TO TAKE OVER DEFENSE OF PACIFIC
 ADVANCE BASES FROM THE NAVY EXCEPT FOR FURNISHING ANTI-
 AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT PERIOD CONSULT C IN C PACIFIC FLEET
 REFERENCE REQUIREMENTS AND AREAS TO BE DEFENDED PERIOD
 WAR DEPARTMENT HAS ALSO ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE
 OF CHRISTMAS AND CANTON PERIOD IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT YOU
 WILL FORM BASE DEFENSE UNITS FROM THE HAWAIIAN GARRISON

Witness Short

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SPECIALLY ORGANIZED AS TASK FORCES FOR PARTICULAR AREAS
PERIOD IF THESE UNITS ARE MOVED FROM OAHU COMMA NECESSARY
REPLACEMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES WILL BE FURNISHED
PERIOD REPORT YOUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
WAR DEPARTMENT AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE

ADAMS

BASED ON: WPD 4571-5,
11/29/41.

OFFICIAL: SECRET

Signature illegible

Green cy w/d & destroyed
by burning. 12/30/41,
CDM - 1705.

ADJUTANT GENERAL.

[STAMPED] SECRET."

Senator Ferguson: What is the name of that man at
the bottom of the telegram?

Mr. Kaufman: The notation here is "Signature illegible."

General Short: I think it was General Wall.

The Vice Chairman: It does not look like "Wall" on
my copy. It looks more like "Williams."

Mr. Murphy: Does the record now show there is a
notation that the signature is illegible?

Mr. Kaufman: There is a notation on the mimeographed
copy. On the photostatic copy there is a signature, but
I cannot make it out.

General Short believes that it is the signature of

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

2 General Wall.

3 General Short: I may be wrong, but it looks like
4 "Wall," the last four letters.

5 Senator Brewster: What are his initials?

6 General Short: I do not know.

7 Senator Brewster: Isn't there somebody that can
8 clarify that? I think there is somebody in the War Depart-
9 ment that can tell whose signature it is.

10 Mr. Kaufman: Somebody suggested "Sullivan." We will
11 make an effort to find out whose signature it is.

12 Mr. Murphy: I was wondering, Mr. Chairman, what dif-
13 ference it makes who signed it, as long as it came from
14 the Adjutant General.

15 The Vice Chairman: That is what I was going to ask.
16 General Adams was the man who sent it?

17 General Short: General Adams was the man who sent it.

18 The Vice Chairman: Adams' name on it meant to you
19 that the Adjutant General of the Army sent it to you?

20 General Short: That is correct.

21 The Vice Chairman: And this other signature did not
22 mean anything to you at the time, did it?

23 General Short: That is correct.

24 Senator Brewster: I think in view of the fact that
25 it has appeared at some times that the Chiefs in the

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Witness Short

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offices did not always know what their subordinates were doing, we certainly ought to establish, at any rate, who signed this. It does not seem that would be beyond the possibility of determination.

The Vice Chairman: The counsel has stated he will endeavor to secure that information. You may continue, General.

Senator Ferguson: May I make one inquiry of counsel? In the lower left-hand corner of the telegram, the "green cy W/D and destroyed by burning 12/30/41 cdm-1705," what is that?

Mr. Kaufman: I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is there any character that that refers to?

Mr. Kaufman: I am told the "green cy" refers to green copy.

Senator Ferguson: Will you ascertain what that means?

Mr. Kaufman: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: All right, proceed, General. Give us the page where you will resume.

W. D. HORTON & PAUL J. QUAY & GRAY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

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2 General Short: I am resuming on page 24 of my statement.

3 The message sent by the Chief of Staff of December 7,
4 which arrived 7 hours after the attack, was as follows:

5 "HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

6 529 7th Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P.M. Eastern
7 Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also
8 they are under orders to destroy their code machine
9 immediately. Just what significance the hour set may
10 have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. In-
11 form naval authorities of this communication.

12 MARSHALL"⁴¹

13 42. Delay of December 7 Message.

14 The message was filed at 12:18 P.M., December 7th,
15 Eastern time (6:48 A.M., December 7th, Honolulu time). It
16 was received by the R.C.A. in Honolulu at 7:33 A.M., December
17 7th, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at
18 11:45 A.M. (Delivery was undoubtedly delayed by the Japanese
19 attack.) The deciphered message was delivered to the Adjutant
20 General, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 P.M., December 7th.

21 Delay in deciphering due to not being marked "priority"
22 in Washington. Thus, this vital message was received 7
23 hours after the attack.

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41 Page 21, Exhibit 32.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

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2 If this message had been sent by scrambler telephone
3 there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them
4 in the air, thus, at least, avoiding a large loss of planes
5 in the initial attack at 8:00 A.M. This would not necessarily
6 have lessened the naval losses. The fact that the War De-
7 partment sent this message by radio in code instead of
8 telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the
9 minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department,
10 even as late as 6:48 A.M., December 7th, Honolulu time,
11 did not consider an attack on Honolulu as likely enough to
12 warrant drastic action to prepare the islands for the sneak
13 attack.

14 Senator Lucas: Pardon me, General Short. There is one
15 statement you made there with respect to the word "priority"
16 that I do not find in my copy.

17 General Short: That is not there. Since writing the
18 statement I have seen the photostatic copy of the message as
19 it was received in Hawaii and there is no indication of any
20 mark of priority or urgency, or anything.

21 Senator Lucas: Will you kindly refer to page 24 and
22 read that statement again, in order that I may correct my
23 copy here?

24 General Short: The deciphered message was delivered to
25 the Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 P.M.,

1 Witness Short

2 December 7th. Delay in deciphering due to not being marked
3 "priority" in Washington.

4 Senator Lucas: Thank you, sir.

5 General Short: I might say that General Powell, who
6 is one of the witnesses and who was the Signal Officer in
7 Honolulu, will have a photostatic copy of the message as
8 received. I believe also that it is shown in the Clausen
9 Report in that condition.

10 43. Staff Procedure re Communications.

11 It is standard staff procedure and doctrine that all
12 important or emergency messages should be sent by all available
13 means of communication, which in this case would have included
14 the scrambler telephones which had been frequently used
15 between the War Department and Fort Shafter. Colonel Phillips
16 and General Marshall did confer by scrambler phone later in
17 the day on December 7, 1941. If security would be violated
18 by sending the information by phone, then the War Department
19 should have issued the necessary alert orders which they
20 would have known that I would have issued at once if I had
21 the information which they possessed. In support of this
22 position, I quote from the War Department Field Manual on
23 Signal Communication:

24 " * * * Choice of the means employed in each instance
25 depends on the situation. Exclusive reliance upon

Witness Short

any one means is unwise because special and unforeseen circumstances may render that means inoperative when most needed. Plans of all commanders will make advance provision for prompt employment of effective and reliable alternate means; and the simultaneous operation of several means will minimize the ill effects of complete interruption in any one. * * *⁴²

ACTION TAKEN - NOVEMBER 27 to DECEMBER 7, 1941

44. Alert Plans.

The Standing Operating Procedure, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941, provided for the following alerts:

"SECTION II - ALERTS

"13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack.* * *

"14. ALERT NO. 1. a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without. * * *

(I want to make clear that under Alert No. 1, we had skeleton crews at all anti-aircraft guns, capable of conducting fire on the enemy, and that .30 cal., .50

⁴² Underscoring supplies; par. 8b, FM 24-5, page 4.

1 Witness Short

2 cal., and pistol ammunition was immediately at hand
3 for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine
4 guns. Three-inch ammunition was readily accessible
5 to all but four batteries. This ammunition was in
6 casemates from 20 to 75 yards from the batteries.

7 As part of Alert No. 1, the Interceptor Command and
8 the Aircraft Warning Service functioned from 4:00 A.M.
9 to 7:00 A.M., the most dangerous hours for an air raid.)

10 "15. ALERT NO. 2. a. This alert is applicable to a more
11 serious condition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks
12 from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition
13 to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is
14 provided. * * *

15 "16. ALERT NO. 3. a. This alert requires the occupation
16 of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum
17 defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.

18 * * *

19 45. Conferences November 27.

20 When I received the November 27, 1941 message, signed
21 "Marshall", I immediately talked it over with my Chief of
22 Staff, Colonel Phillips, and then made my decision to order
23 Alert No. 1. This decision was then communicated to G-2 and
24 to the echelon commanders. On that same afternoon, I conferred
25 on the matter with General Martin and with General Burgin.

Witness Short

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The general contents of the radiogram were also made known to the two Division Commanders through staff officers. In view of the restrictive orders against wide dissemination of the information, I withheld it from the other Army personnel. At the same time that I ordered Alert No. 1 into effect, I directed that the Interceptor Command, including the Aircraft Warning Service and Information Center, should operate from 4:00 A.M. until 7:00 A.M. daily. In addition, the six mobile stations operated daily, except Sunday, from 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M. for routine training and daily, except Saturday and Sunday, from 12:00 noon until 4:00 P.M. for training and maintenance work.

46. Alert No. 1: Consideration.

In making the decision for Alert No. 1, I considered several matters:

a. Navy Conversations. From repeated conversations with the Navy, I knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding south. I had no information suggesting that some ships might have been detached to proceed eastward. Our information also indicated that Japan had no land-based bombers capable of proceeding from their nearest island, some 2100 miles away.

b. Task Force Reconnaissance. It was known that the Navy usually had two or three task forces at sea. The carriers

Witness Short

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2 with the task forces normally scouted 300 miles at each side,
3 a total width of 600 miles. Two task forces would thus cover
4 1200 miles of ocean in the vicinity of Oahu. The Navy also
5 had reconnaissance from Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston
6 islands. I thus felt that air attack was highly improbable.
7 On the morning of November 27th, I conferred with Admiral
8 Kimmel concerning the messages we had each received from
9 Washington with reference to Wake and Midway. Admiral Kimmel
10 and I discussed reinforcement of the Wake and Midway garrisons
11 by Army planes. Such reinforcement would have weakened the
12 Oahu defense. The Admiral asked his War Plans officer,
13 Captain McMorris, what he thought were the chances of a
14 surprise attack at Honolulu. The captain answered, "None".
15 General Martin and Colonel Mollison were present with me
16 at this conference. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, who
17 were present, expressed no difference of opinion with
18 Captain McMorris. ⁴³ Reconnaissance, as directed in message
19 No. 472, November 27th, was a function of the Navy under
20 the Joint Agreement approved March 28th by Admiral Bloch
21 and me. That the Chief of Staff recognized that this was the
22 case is shown by the following quotations from his testimony:

23
24 ⁴³ Compare, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr., vol. 4, pages
25 284, 285.

Witness Short

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2 "General Marshall. Distant reconnaissance. -- was a
3 naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to
4 furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose
5 that could be provided." ⁴⁴

6 "General Marshall. * * * As I recall the matter, the
7 only way the Army would have been involved in the deep
8 reconnaissance would have been in detaching units to
9 serve under the Navy. * * *" ⁴⁵

10 "General Russell: Well, is it your view that both
11 having seen the message of November 27, without more
12 ado the Navy should have started their distant re-
13 connaissance?

14 "General Marshall: That is right. That is my view." ⁴⁶

15 c. Training Mission. The factor of training was also
16 considered. Use of Alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously inter-
17 fered with our training mission. The soldiers and officers
18 of my command were in large part relatively new to the Army
19 and to their specialized tasks. Regular training was essential.
20 The War Department message had not indicated in any way that
21 our training mission was modified, suspended or abolished,
22 or that all troops were to go immediately into tactical status.

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44 Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr., vol. A, page 26.

45 Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr., vol. 1, page 43.

25 46 Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr., vol. 1, page 47.

Witness Short

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The Hawaiian Air Force in particular had the mission of training combat crews and of ferrying B-17's to the Philippine Islands. On September 8, 1941, we sent nine trained combat teams to General MacArthur. Before November 27th, we had sent 18 trained teams to the mainland and we had 17 more teams ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes. Twelve more combat crews had to be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early date. Only six of our 12 Flying Fortresses were in condition and available for this important training. It was thus imperative that General Martin be allowed to make maximum use of these planes for training. If war were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, these considerations would give way. But every indication was that the War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the far Pacific and not at Hawaii. In fact, on November 26, 1941, a radiogram from the War Department had ordered me to equip two B-24 airplanes for a special photographic reconnaissance mission over Truk and Jaluit in the Caroline Islands, with particular attention to the location of naval vessels, submarines, airfields, airplanes, barracks and camps. If attacked, the crews were directed to use all means in their power for self-preservation. These planes were to be sent to Honolulu unarmed, but I was directed to insure that both were "fully equipped with gun

Witness Short

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2 ammunition upon departure." ⁴⁷ The first of these two planes
3 did not arrive in Hawaii until December 5, 1941. Presumably,
4 had the War Department in the meantime decided that Hawaii
5 was a zone of danger, they would have armed the plane before
6 sending it to me. General Martin wired back a request that
7 the second B-24 bring necessary equipment other than the
8 guns and ammunition which we could supply.⁴⁸

9 I would like now to pass out Chart No. 4. I want this
10 committee to see graphically the picture as I had it in my
11 mind and as all of us in Hawaii saw it at the time.

12 There was a large number of Japanese aliens and of
13 citizens of Japanese extraction. There were thousands of
14 these people all around us and near to every military and
15 naval installation.

16 Most of these Japanese were loyal. Many were disloyal.
17 Sabotage was "first to be expected in point of time", as
18 General Marshall put it.

19 Chart 4 shows the major installations. Each black
20 square represents an important camp, airfield, or naval yard.
21 Each round black dot represents 1000 persons of Japanese
22 extraction. Each grey dot represents 1000 other residents.

23 My figures are taken from a 1943 Census study based

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25 ⁴⁸ Message, 5 Dec. 1941, to General Arnold.

Witness Short

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on the population figures of 1940.


(The chart referred to is as follows:)

Hook follows

WARD & PAULI WASHINGTON, D. C.

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE POPULATION - OAHU

- MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
- 1000 JAPANESE
- 1000 OTHERS



BASED ON 1940 CENSUS

Witness Short

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2 General Short: d. Sabotage Danger. The danger of
3 sabotage was paramount in my mind and seemed to me to be
4 the chief danger which the War Department feared. Sabotage
5 had long been considered our primary danger in Hawaii,
6 because of the large Japanese population, many of whom were
7 under suspicion of disloyalty. ⁴⁹ Thirty-seven percent of
8 the population was of Japanese descent, or probably
9 161,000. Of these about 40,000 were Japanese aliens.
10 Many of the Japanese lived in very close proximity to air
11 fields and other defense installations. Sabotage might
12 reasonable be expected for several months prior to the
13 outbreak of hostilities. Anti-sabotage defense is best
14 carried out where there is little dispersion of the command.
15 Planes must be grouped on landing mats and on the apron.
16 The fact that man-proof fences and searchlights had not
17 been installed around the air-fields made the protection
18 of the planes from sabotage much more difficult when the
19 planes were dispersed in bunkers. Funds for fencing air-
20 fields had been finally allotted by the War Department but
21 too late for installation of fences prior to attack. That
22 the War Department was equally conscious of the danger of

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24 Compare, Hawaiian Defense Project Revision 1940, Committee
25 Daily Record, Vol. 6, pages 966, 967; also Exhibit 44.

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1 Witness Short

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2 sabotage is shown by the following quotations:

3 In the Aide Memoire handed to the President by the
4 Chief of Staff May 3, 1941, was the statement --

5 "* * * In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be
6 expected and may, within a very limited time, cause
7 great damage. On this account, and in order to assure
8 strong control, it would be highly desirable to set
9 up a military control, of the islands prior to the
10 likelihood of our involvement in the Far East."⁵⁰

11 General Marshall in his letter to me of February 7,
12 1941, stated:

13 "* * * The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a
14 surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the
15 real perils of the situation. * * *"⁵¹

16 e. Herron Alert Precedent.

17 The precedent of the Herron Alert of 1940, to which I
18 have already alluded, and the general War Department policy
19 of centralization were important factors in my mind. I
20 felt and I still feel that if the Chief of Staff wanted
21 an all-out alert in Hawaii, he would have ordered it him-
22 self and not expected me to make the decision, knowing as
23 he did how relatively limited was my information as com-

24 _____
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25 Exhibit 59; Daily Record, vol. 17, page 2388.

51

Exhibit 53, pages 1 to 3.

1 Witness Short

h3 2 pared to that available to him. Questioned by Mr. Keefe,
3 General Marshall gave the following testimony before
4 this committee:

5 "Mr. Keefe: Well, when you issued the alert on the
6 17th of June 1940, you used the language, 'To deal with
7 possible trans-Pacific raid.'

8 "General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

9 "Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, now, then, let us put it
10 this way without splitting words: General Marshall, on
11 the morning of the 28th of November you had tremendously
12 more information as to the possibility of an attack by the
13 Japanese than you had in June 1940?

14 "General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

15 "Mr. Keefe: If you had information in June 1940 as
16 to the possibilities of a trans-Pacific raid, you had a
17 mountain of evidence on the 27th of November, did you not,
18 to the same effect?

19 "General Marshall: That is correct."⁵²

20 Message No. 472, November 27th, was referred to so
21 frequently by General Marshall as a command directive that
22 I feel there should be a comparison of this message with
23 the Herron message and with the Navy message of November 27th.

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Dailt Record, vol. 22, page 3713

1 Witness Short

h4 2 I have prepared a chart for comparison of these
3 three messages and have attached it as Annex "A" to
4 this prepared statement. An inspection of the chart
5 comparing the three Alert Messages makes it readily ap-
6 parent by the Army Pearl Harbor Board designated Message
7 No. 472 of November 27th as the "Do-Don't Message."

8 I would like you to turn to that chart. I would
9 like to make some remarks in reference to it.

10 Taking up the comparison of the three alerts --

11 The Vice Chairman: Will you give us the page,
12 General?

13 General Short: It is the very last thing in the
14 statement, Annex "A".

15 At the time of the Herron alert, there were no negotia-
16 tions going on between Japan and the United States, so
17 no information was given on that subject. The Navy message
18 stated, "Negotiations have ceased. Aggressive move by
19 Japan expected within next few days." That was a very
20 positive and definite statement. The Army message stated,

21 "Negotiations appear to be terminated to all practical
22 purposes with only the barest possibility will be resumed."

23 Now, the papers indicated that they had been resumed
24 on December 1st, 2nd, and 5th. However, I had no informa-
25 tion from the War Department. The War Department knew that

1 Witness Short

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2 while they had outwardly been resumed, they were de facto
3 ruptured, and the Japanese emissaries had been told to
4 keep up the illusion that the negotiations were going on,
5 so that we would be misguided. That information was not
6 in my hands.

7 The alert message of June 17 made an estimate of
8 Japanese action as a possible trans-Pacific raid. That
9 is what they probably thought the danger was. The Navy
10 Message of November 27 stated:

11 "Amphibious expedition against Philippines, Thai,
12 Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo indicated by known Jap
13 task forces."

14 This message also made a direct estimate of the pro-
15 bable Japanese action.

16 The Army message stated:

17 "Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile
18 action possible at any moment."

19 Now, this was not in any sense an accurate statement
20 as to the probable Japanese action considering the informa-
21 tion that was known in Washington. Mr. Hull stated that he
22 considered the document from the Japanese of November 20
23 as an absolute ultimatum, and from then on, it was just
24 a question of putting it off. They knew that that meant
25 war.

Witness Short

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2 General Stark stated before this committee that he
3 made up his mind in the fall that war was inevitable. The
4 "future action unpredictable" in this message did not re-
5 flect those two opinions in any way.

6 Now, I will take up the question of missions and
7 orders as given in the three messages. The alert of June
8 17, 1940, stated:

9 "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to
10 greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria
11 or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers and agents.

12 "Maintain alert until further orders."

13 It stated exactly the type of alert that was desired,
14 which were defensive missions.

15 The Navy message stated:

16 "Consider dispatch a war warning. Execute appropriate
17 defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks
18 assigned in WPL 46."

19 Again, a definite directive.

20 Take a look at the Army message. It states:

21 "US desires Japan commit first overt act. This
22 should not be construed as restricting you to a course of
23 action that might jeopardize your defense. Take such re-
24 connaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but
25 these measures carried out so as not to alarm civil popula-

1 Witness Short

2 tion or disclose intent. Should hostilities occur, carry
3 out tasks Rainbow Five."

4 Everything is qualified. No definite directive with-
5 out qualification.

6 All messages contain certain miscellaneous instructions.

7 The Herron message stated:

8 "Instructions for secret communications with Chief of
9 Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

10 The Navy message stated:

11 "Inform District and Army authorities. Guam, Samoa
12 directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

13 The Army message of November 27 stated:

14 "Report measures taken. Limit dissemination to minimum
15 essential officers."

16 Those are the only two unqualified statements in the
17 message. The "report measures taken," when that report
18 was made, no attention was paid to it.

19 Now, analyze the last:

20 "Limit dissemination to minimum essential officers."

21 It does not say to limit to minimum essential officers
22 and men. It says "to minimum essential officers."

23 Now, if you took up alert No. 2 or No. 3, under No.2
24 you could not send a plane in the air to shoot down Japanese
25 planes without telling the crew that they were to shoot

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WARD 9 PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

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2 down Japanese planes, and telling them why. You could
3 not put your anti-aircraft in position and tell them to
4 shoot down Japanese planes without giving them a definite
5 order, and telling them why.

6 Alert No. 3 would have sent every man to his battle
7 position. You do not send soldiers into battle without
8 telling them why they are there. So that instruction alone
9 literally interpreted would have prevented the use of alert
10 No. 2, or alert No. 3.

11 We come now to the follow-up of these messages, which
12 is a very important factor. The Herron alert of June 17,
13 1940 states:

14 "Frequent instructions and request for information from
15 War Department for several weeks."

16 The committee exhibit No. 52 shows those in detail.

17 The Navy message of November 27:

18 On December 3rd two messages with reference to Japanese
19 instructions to destroy codes were sent. On December 6th
20 authority was granted for outlying islands to destroy all
21 secret and confidential documents.

22 Now, as to the Army message of November 27th, no check-
23 up was made to even find out what my report of measures
24 taken meant. No additional instructions were given from
25 the 28th of November under after the attack.

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1 Witness Short

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2 The Vice Chairman: General Short, it has been sug-
3 gested that we might recess until 2 o'clock. You might
4 possibly get a little tired.

5 General Short: Thank you very much.

6 The Vice Chairman: We will recess at this point to
7 two o'clock this afternoon.

8 General Short: Thank you, very much.

9 (Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the committee recessed
10 to reconvene at 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same
11 day.)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Yesterday, at the beginning of my examination of Admiral Kimmel, I made the statement, which I quote from the record:

"In your testimony you have acquitted yourself magnificently."

My attention has been called to the city edition of the New York Times which reports that incident as follows:

"The Admiral was applauded by spectators when Representative Keefe, Republican of Wisconsin, told him, 'In your testimony you have acquitted yourself insignificantly.'"

I want the record to show that I have discussed this matter with Mr. White, who wrote the article, and I am certain that he sent the quote correctly, and either in transmission or in composition some error was made which completely changes the statement to such an extent that I feel it is necessary to have the matter corrected. I hope that in the later editions of the New York Times that very serious error will be noted, and that it would not be sent out to their readers as indicating that I have accused Admiral Kimmel of acquitting himself insignificantly, which caused the audience in the

D. J. HODGINSAW JUN 8 1962

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WAS 8 BY: WASHINGTON, D. C.

room to voice their approval by spontaneous applause. The whole thing just does not make sense, and I know the New York Times will see that it is properly corrected.

The Chairman: The committee can correct its own mistakes but it cannot correct those made outside. However, I am sure that the great newspaper, New York Times, will make the necessary correction in this case.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, at that point, I am wondering what the committee is doing about protecting itself, because there are a great many misquotations in the record itself. I know there are a great many in my own questions. I am wondering if we have anybody proof-reading the record, and what steps we will take to correct the misquotes in the record, because there are a lot of misquotes in the record.

Senator Ferguson: I have noted some misquotes in the record.

The Chairman: It might be advisable for members of the committee to read over their own questions in the daily record and call the attention of the reporters to any mistakes that may be made.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, in the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives each member is furnished a copy of the daily record with the pages marked on the back where his name appears, or his corrections. He can

Witness Short

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turn through the pages under his name and very readily take out his own without having to read everything that is in the whole record. I do not know whether anything like that is practical here or not, but that is the practice that is followed there.

The Chairman: It would not be difficult for each member of the committee to find his own interrogation, and if there are any mistakes to call the attention of the reporter to them.

The Chair is advised that General Short wishes to be excused for the remainder of the day after he finishes his written statement, because of his recent illness. That is entirely agreeable.

The Chair wishes also to announce that immediately following that there will be an Executive Session of the committee, at which he hopes all members will be present.

Go ahead, General.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT, U.S. ARMY

(Resumed)

General Short: Proceeding on page 33:

(H) follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHERS

1 Witness Short

2 47. Confirmation of Sabotage Alert.

3 After making my decision for the anti-sabotage alert,
4 several other things occurred which confirmed my opinion
5 that I was complying exactly with the wishes of the War
6 Department.

7 a. Report to and Acquiescence by War Department.

8 As directed, I reported that I had alerted the Depart-
9 ment to prevent sabotage and had established liaison with
10 the Navy. ⁵³ No reply disagreeing with my report was sent
11 to me. If the War Department felt upon receipt of my report
12 that my alert against sabotage was not sufficient to meet the
13 situation, it should have immediately ordered me to provide
14 against an air raid or against an all-out attack. No steps
15 of this kind were taken by the War Department, and I had
16 every reason to believe that they approved fully of the
17 measures I had taken, inasmuch as they had nine days before
18 the attack in which to give me additional instructions or
19 direct that an all-out alert against an air raid or an all-
20 out alert be put into effect. General Marshall, when
21 asked by Mr. Keefe, if it wasn't his responsibility to
22 check up on the measures taken by General Short as reported
23 in reply to message No. 472 of November 27th, stated:

24 53

25 Message 27 Nov., Short to Marshall, Exhibit 32, page 12.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

h2 2 "General Marshall: Now, in this particular case, a
3 very tragic thing occurred, there is no question about that ,
4 there is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief
5 of Staff, I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do
6 not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you
7 have expressed yourself."⁵⁴

8 When questioned further by Mr. Keefe with regard to
9 General Gerow's responsibility in the matter, General Marshall
10 stated:

11 "He had a direct responsibility and I had the full
12 responsibility."⁵⁵

13 As shown in the following quotation, General Marshall
14 admitted that since no objection was being raised by the
15 War Department, I had the right to assume that my action
16 was approved:

17 "Senator Ferguson: Well, would this be true from an
18 Army viewpoint, that when an overseas commander is ordered
19 to take measures as he deems necessary and to report mea-
20 sures taken to you, is he correct in assuming that if his
21 report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that
22 you would thereafter inform him specifically of the dif-
23 ference?

24 "General Marshall: I would assume so."⁵⁶

25 54 - Daily Record, vol. 22, page 3726.

55 - Daily Record, vol. 22, page 3728.

56 - Daily Record, vol. 22, page 3443.

1 Witness Short

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2 With reference to my report that the Department was
3 alerted to prevent sabotage, General Marshall testified:

4 "It did not register on Colonel Bundy, it did not
5 register on General Gerow, it did not register on me and
6 it carries Mr. Stimson's initials also."⁵⁷

7 For nine days from November 27 to December 7th this
8 reply apparently did not register on any of the responsible
9 officers.

10 I want to emphasize also that my report was clear and
11 concise, as required by War Department rules:

12 "General Gerow: (Reading) 'The merit of a report
13 is not measured by its length. A concise presentation
14 of important points usually is all that is required.'

15 "Senator Ferguson: Would General Short's reply comply
16 with that regulation?

17 "General Gerow: Yes, sir."⁵⁸

18 In spite of General Gerow's confession that this report
19 of mine was in conformity with directives, he still con-
20 tended that somehow he had misunderstood it. When asked how
21 it should have read in order to be clear to him and his
22 staff, he answered:

23 "Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply,

24 57 - Daily Record, vol. 22, page 3732.

25 58 - Daily Record, vol. 25, pages 4356-4357; quoting par.
46, FM 101-5, page 30.

Witness Short

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2 'alerted against sabotage only', it would have been per-
3 fectly clear."⁵⁹

4 The one little word "only" seems to have been the
5 missing link in General Gerow's mind. He was unwilling to
6 read my message and admit it meant what it said, no more
7 and no less.

b. Further Sabotage Messages.

8
9 The three messages on sabotage and subversive acti-
10 vity convinced me that the War Department was cognizant
11 of the measures I had taken, approved of the action, and
12 wanted to be sure that my measures against sabotage and
13 subversive acts were complete but that no illegal acts
14 were committed in carrying them out. I believed, and I had
15 good reason to believe, that since the War Department speci-
16 fically mentioned subversive activities as a threat to
17 Hawaii, they would also mention a "trans-Pacific raid" if
18 they had thought it to be one of our immediate dangers. The
19 fact that the War Department sent to the Hawaiian Department
20 three separate and distinct messages on November 27th and
21 28th with reference to sabotage is conclusive evidence that
22 the War Department considered it as a very serious threat.
23
24

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59 - Daily Record, vol. 25, pages 4420-4421

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

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2 c. Ferrying Unarmed Planes. As late as December 6,
3 1941, the War Department was ferrying planes to Hawaii,
4 unarmed and unprepared to fight. In fact, twelve B-17 air-
5 planes under orders from the War Department left Hamilton
6 Field, California in two squadrons at 9:30 P.M., December 6,
7 Pacific Time (12:30 A.M. December 7, Eastern Time), and at
8 10:30 P.M. December 6, Pacific Time (1:30 A.M. December 7,
9 Eastern Time). None of these planes was equipped with
10 ammunition or defensive armament. The machine guns were
11 cosmolined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews
12 were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator,
13 engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable
14 of manning the machine guns even if the guns had been
15 properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition.
16 It cannot be imagined that the War Department wished to
17 send these planes to Honolulu unarmed when they already
18 had information of a pending Japanese attack. The only
19 inference that can be drawn is that while the War Department
20 had information of a pending attack, General Arnold, the
21 Chief of Air Corps, who ordered these planes to Honolulu,
22 and who I understand was present at Hamilton Field at the
23 time of their departure, did not know of the critical
24 situation in the relations between the United States and Japan.⁶⁰

25
⁶⁰ Compare Marshall's Test., Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr.,
vol. A, pages 20-21.

Witness Short

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2 These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the
3 midst of the first attack. Four of the 12 planes were de-
4 stroyed or damaged without being able to fight.

5 d. Conferences with Navy. In my conferences with
6 Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch between November 27, 1941
7 and December 7, 1941, nothing further developed to indicate
8 that an attack might be expected in our coastal frontier
9 sector. The Navy War Warning message of November 27th,
10 shown to me by Admiral Kimmel, indicated that in the conti-
11 nental districts and at Guam and Samoa the Navy Department
12 feared chiefly the sabotage danger.⁶¹ On December 1, 1941,
13 we conferred for a long while regarding the suggestion from
14 Washington that army troops relieve the Wake and Midway
15 Marine garrisons, to make them available for landing operations.
16 On December 2, Admiral Kimmel came to my quarters with an
17 8-page letter he had prepared on this Wake and Midway problem.⁶²
18 On December 3, we conferred at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters
19 on a radiogram I was sending to the War Department with
20 reference to the relief of Wake and Midway.⁶³ During this
21 period, November 27 to December 7, the Navy made no request
22 for Army planes to help conduct long distance reconnaissance.
23

24 ⁶¹ Exhibit 37, page 31B.

25 ⁶² Compare page 301, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr.

⁶³ Compare pages 301-302, 394, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr.

Witness Short

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At that time I was convinced that the Navy either knew the location of the Japanese carriers or had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt that they could handle the situation.⁶⁴ My liaison officer to the Navy, Major Fleming, held another conference with Colonel Pfeiffer of the Marine Corps on December 4, 1941.⁶⁵

Will you pass out Chart No. 5, please.

(Chart No. 5 is as follows:)


WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

64 Compare page 303, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript.

65 Compare pages 302, 394, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript.

7 DEC. 1941

PEARL HARBOR



Witness Short

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General Short: This chart collects the time data on a 24-hour clock. It shows the December 7 "1 P.M." message which was received in the War Department about 9 A.M. Washington time, which was 3:30 A.M. Hawaiian time.

The events of the submarine sinking, the radar mis-interpretation, and the action at the time of the attack are charted.

After the third attack, the "1 P.M." message arrived. It had been delayed by the coding, by the commercial transmission, by the attack, and by the fact that it was not marked "urgent" or "priority". Other priority messages were first decoded by my Message Center.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

2 This time element was so important that I would
3 like to run over this chart in some detail.

4 We notice first on the chart the fact that the War
5 Department had in its possession at 3:30 a.m. Honolulu
6 time, the 1 p. m. message stating that the other matter
7 was to be delivered at that hour. It was three hours and
8 15 minutes from that time before anything happened in
9 Honolulu.

10 Then we had the destruction of the two-man submarine.

11 About this same time, at 6:48 a.m. General Marshall
12 wrote a message which was not delivered until after the
13 attack.

14 Seven-twenty a. m. planes reported. The Opana radar
15 station picked up the planes from the north, and it was
16 misinterpreted by the Control Officer.

17 Seven-fifty-five a.m., the first attack in Hickam
18 Field and other installations.

19 Eight a. m., the first of the unarmed B-17's from
20 Hancock Field, California, arrived at Hickam Field.

21 Incidentally, the first plane to land, the pilot
22 was killed by the Japanese.

23 At 8:03 a. m. my Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips,
24 reported the attack.

25 At 8:05 a. m., the first enemy plane was shot down.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

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2 At 8:10 a. m. the alert by that time had been trans-
3 mitted to all of the major echelons, and Schofield Barracks
4 had been attacked, and a plane was shot down there.

5 By 8:30 a. m. the infantry divisions were proceeding
6 to their battle positions.

7 At 8:50 a. m., the first of the pursuit planes took
8 the air to combat the Japanese.

9 At 9 a. m., the second attack struck. At the same
10 time the Civilian surgical teams started reporting at a
11 hospital for work.

12 By 10:30 a. m. the third attack took place.

13 When this was over, at noon, the Civilian ambulance
14 teams started evacuating women and children from the
15 threatened-attack places, and it was not then until 2:50
16 p. m., that Marshall's warning message was received,
17 practically 11-1/2 hours after the War Department had its
18 information, the information in its possession when we
19 received this vital information.

20 48. Events Early on December 7, 1941. Two events
21 occurred early on the morning of December 7th, which, if
22 interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very
23 decided effect upon the action that followed.

24 49. Submarine in Pearl Harbor.

25 About 6:45 A.M. a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

1
2 was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the naval authorities
3 foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack or
4 notified the Army, time would have been available for the
5 dispersion of the planes. However, the naval authorities
6 did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general
7 attack. The Army was not notified until after the attack.

50. Radar Schedule.

8
9 After the Aircraft Warning Service Information was
10 closed at 7:00 A.M., December 7th, the Opana station remained
11 in operation. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, 2d Lieutenant
12 Grove C. White, Jr., 0396182, Signal Corps, had obtained
13 permission of the Control Officer to have all stations
14 operate from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. only on Sunday, December 7,
15 1941.

51. Misinterpretation of Radar.

16
17 At 7:20 A.M., December 7, 1941, the telephone operator
18 at the Information Center received a call from the Opana
19 radar station stating that a large number of planes were
20 heading towards Oahu from North 3 points East. Lieutenant
21 Kermit A. Tyler then talked on the telephone with Private
22 Lockard of the Opana station and said that it was not
23 anything of importance. At 0700 all the men at the Informa-
24 tion Center except the telephone operator had folded up
25 their equipment and left. When the Opana operator phoned

Witness Short

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at 0720, Lieutenant Tyler thought the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombers or possibly some B-17's from the United States.

52. Misinterpretation of Radar.

If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of this matter to me and as far as I know did not report the incident to the Control Officer, Major Tyndall, after the Information Center was manned about 8:30 A.M. This matter was not brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late to be of value. Had this incident been reported to the Control Officer at 8:30 A.M. on the 7th, he would have informed the Navy and it might have enabled them to locate the carriers.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

2 I might say at this point, at that time there was
3 no device in existence for determining whether a plane
4 picked up by the radar was friend or foe. A few months
5 later such a device was put on the planes.

6 ACTION AT THE TIME OF ATTACK

7 53. Beginning of Attack.

8 At 7:55 a.m., December 7th, the enemy planes attacked
9 Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field. At 9:00
10 a. m., a second attack was made, and a third about 10:30
11 a. m., each lasting approximately 15 minutes. At 8:03
12 a. m., the Chief of Staff reported the attack, and by 8:10
13 a. m., an order had been given to all units (major
14 echelons) by telephone to put Alert #3 into effect.

15 54. Anti-aircraft Artillery.

16 All anti-aircraft batteries had skeleton crews
17 guarding them. These crews were able to conduct anti-
18 aircraft fire. All units had in their possession ammuni-
19 tion for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine
20 guns. Three-inch ammunition had been placed in positions
21 accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the
22 64th C.A.C.(AA).

23 55. Automatic Weapon Batteries.

24 The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha,
25 Pearl Harbor and Capt Malakole fired on the enemy planes

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

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2 during the 8 o'clock raid. The first enemy plane was shot
3 down at 8:05 a. m.

4 56. Hawaiian Air Forces. During the first attack
5 men started pulling planes out of the fire, and at 8:50
6 the serviceable pursuit planes took off.

57. 24th Division.

7
8 Troops of the 24th Division at Schofield were attacked
9 at 8:10 a. m. The troops of this division promptly re-
10 turned the fire and with success -- one plane being shot
11 down with a rifle. At 8:30 a. m., the Division started moving
12 to its battle positions to repel a possible landing attack.

58. 25th Division.

13
14 The 25th Division opened anti-aircraft fire almost
15 immediately. It also moved into battle positions at
16 8:30 a. m.

59. Value of Prior Training.

17
18 All movement and action of troops was carried out as
19 prescribed in the Standing Operating Procedure, with pre-
20 cision and with remarkable speed. The value of our prior
21 planning and training, which had made everyone familiar
22 with the plans, was brought out very clearly.

60. Civilian Surgical Teams.

23
24 At 9:00 a. m., the first civilian surgical teams
25 began reporting at Tripler General Hospital.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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61. Civilian Relief Committee.

at 12;00 noon the Civilian Relief Committee beg an the evacuation of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school buildings, altjough a few from these posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Trioler, Ordnance Depot and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incompleted underground Interceptor Command Post.

62. Seizure of Foreign Agents.

During December 7th the foreign agents previously listed by F.B.I. and G-2 were arrested and confined at the Immigration and Quarantine Stations as follows:

Japanese	370
Germans	98
Italians	<u>14</u>
Total	482

Incidentally, there were only four of the listed agents that were not picked up on this first day.

62. Clearing Airfields.

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field just as soon as the first attack diminished.

64. Creditable action of Command. Every officer and

D. G. NOTDINHAW JULY 8 1945

1 Witness Short

h4 2 and man under my command performed his duty in a most
3 creditable manner. The deeds of courage on the part of both
4 the military and civil population is a matter which I hope
5 that history will eventually disclose.

6 INFORMATION NOT SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT

7 65. Policy to Withhold Information.

8 As this Joint Committee's investigation has already
9 revealed, there was a vast amount of highly significant
10 information available in the War Department which no respon-
11 sible military man could exclude from consideration in
12 forming an estimate of the situation. The War Department
13 was aware of the fact that I did not have this information
14 and had already decided that I should not get this informa-
15 tion. ⁶⁶ It was therefore their duty not only to make the
16 estimate of the situation but to make the decision as to
17 what military action it required, and to give me orders
18 to go on an all-out alert instead of permitting my sabo-
19 tage alert to stand. This was in line with their centralized
20 peacetime control system. It is my firm conviction that
21 they did estimate the situation, that they expected only
22 sabotage and subversive activities in Hawaii, and that on
23 reading my report "Department alerted to prevent sabotage.
24 Liaison with the Navy," they dismissed the matter from
25 their minds because I had done exactly what they desired.
66 Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, vol. C, page 199.

Witness Short

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2 66. No Magic to Hawaii.

3 A definite decision had been made by the War Depart-
4 ment that neither the Japanese intercepts nor the substance
5 of them should be given to the Commanding General in Hawaii.
6 The following testimony of General Miles make such deci-
7 sion clear:

8 "Mr. Gesell: What steps were taken to distribute the
9 intercepted messages to the Commanding Officer at Hawaii?

10 "General Miles: There were no steps taken to distri-
11 bute these messages to that General.

12 "Mr. Gesell: Do I understand from your answer that
13 these messages as intercepted and translated were not sent
14 to Hawaii by the Army?

15 "General Miles: They were not. In some cases the
16 substance, of some messages, were sent to Hawaii, and
17 almost always in naval code, I think always in naval code,
18 because the naval code was considered to be more secure
19 than the Army code.

20 "Mr. Gesell: Who made the decision that these mes-
21 sages should not be sent to Hawaii as they were inter-
22 cepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?

23 "General Miles: That followed from the general policy
24 laid down by the Chief of Staff that these messages and the
25 fact of the existence of these messages or our ability to

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1 Witness Short

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2 decode them should be confined to the least possible
3 number of persons; no distribution should be made outside
4 of Washington.

5 "Mr. Gesell: Was that determination by the Chief
6 of Staff in writing or simply an expression of policy?

7 "General Miles: As far as my recollection goes, it
8 was simply an expression of policy.

9 "Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted in connection with the
10 formulation of that policy?

11 "General Miles: I do not now remember but I imagine
12 that I was."⁶⁷

13 67. Hindsight Evaluation.

14 I do not want to attempt to summarize or even to list
15 all the information here which the War Department had but
16 which I did not have. I want to refrain from hindsight
17 evaluation of this information. But I also want to call
18 the committee's attention to some very obvious items which
19 had they been given to me, would have necessarily changed
20 the picture which I then had of the crisis between the United
21 States and Japan.

22 68. Military Commitments in Far East. I did not know
23 that U. S. Army officers at Singapore had made tentative

67 - Daily Record, vol. 12, pages 2091-2092.

68 - See Marshall-Stark Report to Roosevelt, 27 Nov. 1941; Army
24 Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, vol. 1, pages 9-12; compare
25 Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, vol. 5, pages 449-450.

Witness Short

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2 military commitments, not approved by the President, that
3 the United States would fight, along with the Netherlands
4 and the British, to defend the Dutch East Indies and
5 Singapore.
68

69. Japanese Knowledge of U. S. Policy.

7 I did not know that the War Department knew that the
8 Japanese suspected or had somehow learned of this joint
9 military program. Intercept No. 1243, dated 3 December 1941,
10 published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1, page 227, dis-
11 closed to the War and Navy Departments, at least by
12 December 5th, that the Japanese did realize that such
13 joint military action would occur. As early as November 12,
14 the people in Washington had in their hands Intercept No.
15 1066, printed on page 111 of Committee Exhibit No. 1, which
16 disclosed that Japan had been semi-officially told that --

17 "If Japan invades again, the United States will fight
18 with Japan,"

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WARD & PAUL - WASHINGTON, D. C.

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... of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
... the report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
... only one of the many...
... testimony of Mr. Hull, Joint Committee Daily Record,
... Nov. 23, 1941, vol. 7, pages 1186, 1191.
... testimony of Mr. Hull, Joint Committee Daily Record,
... Nov. 23, 1941, vol. 7, page 1186.