

Doc. 3130 Evid.

Folder 24

(84)



C. Copy to Mr. Crowe

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3130

Date 8 September 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Mimeographed Pamphlet, "Draft Explanation of the Foreign Minister Regarding Japanese - AMERICAN negotiations", 1 Dec. 1941, marked State Secret.

Date: 1 Dec 1941 Original ( ) Copy (X) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

IPS Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Japanese Foreign Ministry

TOJO, Hideki; TOGO, Shigenoru

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Relations with the U.S. - Japanese - American negotiations; Decision for War

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

/T.N. This document is an explanation apparently intended for the Imperial Conference of Dec. 1, 1941, nowhere so stated /

The foreign minister relates the history of the negotiations from the Spring of 1941 and points out the controversy over the June 21 proposal of the U.S., culminating in a "virtual deadlock" after the

Analyst:

Evelyn T. Garden

Ward

Doc. No. 3130



American statement of October 2, which caused the withdrawal of the 3<sup>rd</sup> KONOYE Cabinet."

TOGO concludes with an enumeration of the disadvantages of Japan's acceptance of the American proposal which, he says, is aimed "at obstructing the construction of the new order." ~~Among~~ The disadvantages he lists are

- (1) Regarding CHINA, the Empire's relations with the National Government will be lost, friendship between CHINA and JAPAN will be "demolished", and JAPAN would be forced to "retreat from the continent" making <sup>execution of the</sup> CHINA Incident a failure and threatening the position of MANCHUKUO.
- (2) ENGLAND and AMERICA will assume leadership of the PACIFIC and JAPAN'S position as "stabilizing power" will be overthrown.
- (3) "Faith in the Empire" will fall as the TRI-PARTITE PACT will become a "dead letter".
- (4) A collective organization, "excluding the Soviet", will restrict the Empire and "increase our troubles on the Northern frontiers."
- (5) Re commercial non-discrimination, TOGO states that "we are not necessarily opposed to the principles" advocated but to "their intention to apply it only to the PACIFIC AREA."



~~To 80 concludes~~

The following excerpt from the close of the explanation, reveals ~~that TO 80, regarded as futile~~ ~~position regarding the~~ ~~futility of further negotiations.~~ → That TO 80, on Dec 1st 1950 before, regarded further negotiations as futile.

(Typist - see last page of attached notes & type paragraph marked in blue brackets).



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3130

8 Sept 47

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Mimeographed Pamphlet, "Draft Explanation of the Foreign Minister Regarding Japanese-American Negotiations," 1 Dec 1941, marked State Secret.

Date: 1 Dec 1941 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: IPS Document Division.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Foreign Ministry.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOJO, Hideki; TOGO, Shigenoru.

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with the U.S. - Japanese-American Negotiations - Decision for War.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

/TW This document is an explanation apparently intended for the Imperial Conference of 1 Dec, though nowhere so stated/

The Foreign Minister relates the history of the negotiations from the Spring of 1941 and points out the controversy over the June 21 proposal of the U.S., culminating in a "virtual deadlock" after the American statement of October 2, which caused the withdrawal of the 3rd KONOHE Cabinet."

TOGO concludes with an enumeration of the disadvantages of Japan's acceptance of the American proposal which, he says, is aimed "at obstructing the construction of the new order." The disadvantages he lists are:

Doc. No. 3130

Page 1



1. Regarding CHINA, The Empire's relations with the National Government will be lost, friendship between CHINA and JAPAN will be "demolished", and JAPAN would be forced to "retreat from the Continent", making the execution of the CHINA Incident a failure and threatening the position of MANCHUKUO.

2. ENGLAND and AMERICA will assume leadership of the PACIFIC and JAPAN'S position as "stabilizing power" will be overthrown.

3. "Faith in the Empire" will fall as the TRI-PARTITE PACT will become a "dead letter".

4. A collective organization, "including the Soviet", will restrict the Empire and "increase our troubles on the Northern frontier."

5. Re commercial non-discrimination, TOGO states that "we are not necessarily opposed to the principles" advocated but to "their intention to apply it only to the PACIFIC AREA."

The following excerpt from the close of the explanation, reveals that TOGO on Dec 1st or before, requested further negotiations as futile.

"In short, the proposal mentioned above cannot possibly be accepted by us. And as we think it almost hopeless to have the above proposal revised in favor of Japan in further negotiations, I regret to say that the Imperial Government considers it inevitable to break off the present negotiations."



31 30

State Secret

Full analysis.  
Copies to Mr. Crowe

Draft explanation of the Foreign Minister regarding the Japan-America negotiations.

(T.N.) <sup>no explanation</sup> Apparently interested for Imperial Conference though nowhere so stated)  
Dec. 1, 1941

The foreign minister states that the negotiations were started in Washington about ~~last~~ spring of 1941. He explains the <sup>American</sup> tentative draft of June 21, which the American government persisted. Much discussion was carried on regarding the June 21 draft, and on September 25, the Japanese government presented a draft which revised America's June 21 proposal. Then the negotiation came to a virtual deadlock after the American statement of October 2, which caused the withdrawal of the 3rd KONOYE cabinet.

only summarize



Manchukuo will necessarily be shaken  
and the means for the thorough  
execution of the China Incident  
will be completely lost.

2. England and America will reign  
over the region as leaders and  
the dignity of the Empire will fall  
to the ground and her position  
as stabilizing power will be  
overthrown and our great task  
of establishing new order in the  
East Asia will break down.

3. The Tripartite Pact will become  
a dead letter and the faith  
of the Empire will fall.

4. Her attempt to restrain the  
Empire by a collective organization  
including the Soviet will increase  
our troubles on the northern  
frontier.



444  
He relates the development of the negotiations and concludes with the following remarks.

The American policy toward Japan is aimed at obstructing the construction of the new order. If we were to accept the American proposal, the international position of the Empire would fall far below that before the Manchurian Incident and its very existence would be endangered. etc.

1. Namely, China under Chiang Kai-shek's rule will be more inclined to depend on England and America, the Empire will lose its faith with the national government, the friendship between Japan and China will ~~be~~ be demolished for a long time, and in the end, we shall have to make a retreat from the continent. As a result, the position of



411  
5. We do not necessarily oppose to the Principles they advocate - such as commercial non-discrimination ~~are not necessary to be opposed~~ but their intention to apply it only to the Pacific area)

T.W. The rest is ~~nothing~~  
~~the same thing~~  
is the same thing

is after all a means to execute the selfish policies of England and America, and <sup>it</sup> will give us a great obstacle in acquiring important materials

"In short, the proposal mentioned above can not possibly be accepted by us. And as we think it is almost hopeless to have the above proposal revised in favor of Japan in further negotiations, <sup>I regret to say that</sup> the Imperial government considers it inevitable to ~~stop~~ break off the present negotiations."





195 Doc  
#3130

53

日米交渉ニ關スル外務大臣説明

昭和十六年十二月一日



本日ハ主トシテ十一月五日御前會議以後ニ於ケル日米交渉ノ經過  
ニ付御説明申上ケマスカ其以前即チ十月末ニ於ケル交渉ノ狀況ヲ極  
メテ簡單ニ要約致シマスルト米側ハ國際關係ノ基礎トシテ

一 一切ノ國家ノ領土保全及主權尊重

二 他國ノ内政不干涉

三 通商上ノ無差別待遇

四 平和手段ニ依ルノ外太平洋ニ於ケル現状ノ不變更

ノ四原則ヲ堅持シ之カ適用ヲ強要セムトシ、尙帝國ノ平和的意圖  
ニ關シ疑惑ヲ表示シ、支那ニ於ケル駐兵ニ異議ヲ唱ヘ、通商上ノ無  
差別原則ヲ無條件ニ支那ニ適用スヘシト主張シ、又三國條約問題ニ



付テモ之ヲ事實上死文タラシムコトヲ求メ、交渉ハ之カ爲難關ニ逢著シ遂ニ停頓セル次第テアツタノテアリマス。

斯クノ如ク兩國ノ見解對立ヲ來シタル所以ノモノハ、米國カ國際關係處理ニ付其ノ傳統的ニ堅持スル原則的理念ヲ強硬ニ固執シ、東亞ノ實情ヲ顧ミス之ヲ其儘支那其他ニ適用センコトヲ主張シ居ルコトニ起因スルモノテ、米側ニシテ右ノ態度ヲ改善セサルニ於テハ、本交渉ノ妥結ハ極メテ困難ナリト認メタノテアリマス。

然シ乍ラ現内閣トシマシテモ公正ナル基礎ニ於ケル日米國交調整ヲ計ルヲ妥當ト認メ、帝國トシテ能フ限りノ讓歩ヲ試ミ以テ日米衝突回避ニ最後ノ努力ヲ傾ケルコトニ致シタノテアリマス。即チ右ノ見地ヨリ當時交渉ノ主要難點タリシ三國條約ニ基ク自衛權ノ解釋、



遼瀋無差別原則並ニ支那及佛印ヨリノ撤兵ノ三問題ニ付從來ノ帝國  
 提議即チ九月二十五日案ヲ緩和シ、(一)三國條約ニ基ク自衛權問題ニ  
 付テハ米側カ自衛權ノ概念ヲ不富ニ擴大セサルコトヲ言明セシメ其  
 場合我万ニ於テモ同様ノ言明ヲナスコトトシ、(二)無差別原則ニ付テ  
 ハ右原則カ全世界ニ適用セラルルモノナルニ於テハ右カ支那ニモ適  
 用セラルルコトニ異議ナキコトトシ、(三)撤兵問題ニ付テハ支那事變  
 ノ爲支那ニ派遣セラレタル日本軍隊ハ北支蒙疆ノ一定地域及海兩島  
 ニ留シテハ日支間平和成立後所要期間駐屯スヘク、爾餘ノ軍隊ハ平  
 和成立ト同時ニ日支間協定ニ從ヒ撤去ヲ開始シ、治安確立ト共ニ二  
 年以内ニ撤兵ヲ完了スヘク、又佛印ニ付テハ領土主權ノ尊重ヲ約シ  
 佛印ニ派遣セラレ居ル軍隊ハ支那事變解決スルカ又ハ公正ナル極東



平和確立スルニ於テハ直ニ之ヲ撤去スハシト修正スルコトトシ、右  
八十一月五日ノ御前會議ニ於テ御決定ヲ待マシタ次第デアリマス。

政府ハ右ノ御決定ノ次第ニ基キ野村大使ニ對シ事態急迫セル此際  
倭寇ニ瀕セル日米國父ノ局面ヲ轉換スル爲ニハ本案ニ依リ急速妥結  
スルノ外ナク、帝國ハ難キヲ忍ビテ最大限ノ讓歩ヲ敢テシタルモノ  
ナルニ鑑ミ、米國側モ猛省シテ太平洋平和ノ爲我方ト協調センコト  
ヲ切望スル旨甲入万訓令致シマシタ。爾後交渉ハ華府ニ於テ行ハレ  
タルカ東京ニ於テモ右交渉ヲ促進スル意味ニ於テ本大臣モ屢々在京  
米英大使ト折衝ヲ遂ケマシタ。而シテ野村大使ハ七日「ハル」國務  
長官トノ會見ヲ手初メトシ、十日「ローズヴェルト」大統領十二日  
及十五日「ハル」長官ト會談ノ畢ネ、銳意交渉進捗ニ努力スル所カ



アリマシタ。此間政府ハ時局ノ重大ナルニ鑑ミ外交上十全ノ努力ヲ  
 試ミンカ爲、五日來樞大使ヲ米國ニ急派スルコトトシ、同大使ハ十  
 五日華府到着、十七日ヨリ對村大使ヲ援助シテ交渉ニ參加致シマシ  
 タ。交渉ハ當時既ニ齟ニシテ米側ハ七日以來我方ニ對シ幾多ノ點ニ  
 付質疑ヲ提出シ帝國ノ真意ヲ探ラントスル様子ヲ示シマシタ。米側  
 ハ夙ニ所謂「ヒットラー」主義ノ打倒ヲ標榜シ、帝國ニ對シ武力政  
 策ノ拋棄ヲ要求シテ居リマシタカ、三國條約トノ關係ニ於テ帝國ノ  
 政策ニ對シ依然疑惑ヲ抱キ居リシモノノ如ク、今回モ帝國ノ平和的  
 意圖ニ付前述ノ八月二十八日帝國政府ノ平和的意圖ノ聲明ニ付再確  
 認ヲ要求スルト共ニ、日米協定成立セハ帝國ハ三國條約ヲ保持スル  
 ノ要ナカルハク右ハ消滅若ハ死又トナルコトヲ希望スル旨反復力説



致シマシタ。通商無差別原則ニ付テハ我方ノ提案セル「全世界ニ適用セラルルコト」云々ノ條件除去ヲ希望シ、米國カ由來自由通商回復ノ爲勞力シ來レル次第ヲ強調致シマシタ。同時ニ米側ハ別ニ「經濟政策ニ關スル共同宣言案」ナルモノヲ提議越シ、兩國協力シテ全世界ニ通商自由ノ回復ヲ計ルコト、日米通商協定ノ締結ニ依リ正常通商關係ヲ回復スルコトノ外交ヲニ於テハ經濟財政通實ニ關スル完全ナル統制權ヲ支那政府ニ回收スヘキコト、列國協同ノ下ニ支那ノ經濟共同開發ヲ行フコト等ヲ提案致シマシタ。尙又支那ヨリノ撤兵問題ニ付テハ特ニ深ク之ヲ論議セス唯亦久ク至不確定期間ノ駐兵ニ對シ難色ヲ示スニ止マリマシタカ、帝國カ平和政策ヲ採ルニ於テハ米國ニ於テ日支直接交渉周旋ノ用意アル次第ヲ甲出テマシタ。政府



ハ右ニ對シ八月二十八日ノ帝國ノ平和的意圖闡明ニ關シ米側カ確認  
 ヲ希望スル點ハ九月二十五日附我提案中ニ包含セラレ居リ、從テ現  
 内閣モ其趣旨ニ於テ之カ確認ニ異議ナキコト、又通商上ノ無差別原  
 則ニ付條件ヲ附シタルハ我方ニ於テハ同原則カ全世界ニ一律ニ適用  
 セラルルヲ希望シ、右希望ノ實現ニ順應シテ支那ニ對シテモ同原則  
 ノ適用ヲ承認ストノ意味合ナルコト、共同宣言案ニ付テハ右カ支那  
 ノ現實ヲ無視シ殊ニ支那共同開發ノ提案ハ支那國際管理ノ端緒トナ  
 ル惧アルヲ以テ受諾シ難キコト、及米側ノ日支和平局庭申入レニハ  
 異議ナキ旨回答セシメタノテアリマス。來栖大使ハ此段階ニ於テ交  
 渉ニ參劔セルモノテアリマシテ、野村來栖兩大使ハ十七日大祝領ト  
 十八日、二十日、二十一日、二十二日、二十六日ト引續キ、「ハル」



長官ト會見ヲ重不タノテアリマス。然ルニ十七、十八兩日ノ會見ニ於テハ大槻領ハ日米平和ヲ希望スル旨ヲ述ヘ、支那問題ニ付テハ干涉モ幹旋モスル意圖ナク單ニ「紹介者」タラント欲スルモノナリト言ヒ、他方「ハル」長官ハ帝國カ獨逸ト提携シ居ル限り日米交渉ハ至難ナルヲ以テ、先ツ此ノ根本的困難ヲ除去スル必要アリト屢々力説シ、双方論議ヲ盡セルモ難關ハ依然トシテ三國條約、無差別原則及支那問題ニ在ルコト明カトナリマシタノテ、二十日ニ至リ我方ハ從來交渉ノ基礎タリシ案又カ宣傳的色彩ニ滿チ居タルヲ簡略化シ、且意見容易ニ一致セサル無差別原則問題ヲ除去シ更ニ三國條約問題ハ先方ヨリノ提案ニ俟ツ趣旨ヲ以テ是又一應我提案ヨリ除去シ尙又支那問題ハ主トシテ之ヲ日支直接交渉ニ移スノ趣旨ヲ以テ米側ニ於



テハ單ニ日支和平妨礙ヲ差控ヘシムルコトトスル新提案ヲ提出致サセマシタ。即チ同案ノ内容ハ左ノ通りテアリマス。

一、日米兩國政府ハ孰レモ佛印以外ノ南東亞維亞及南太平洋地域ニ武力的進出ヲ行ハサルコトヲ議約ス

二、日米兩國政府ハ蘭領印度ニ於テ其ノ必要トスル物資ノ獲得カ保障セララルル様相互ニ協力スルモノトス

三、日米兩國政府ハ相互ニ通商關係ヲ資産凍結前ノ狀態ニ復歸スヘシ米國政府ハ所要ノ石油ノ對日供給ヲ約ス

四、米國政府ハ日支兩國ノ和平ニ關スル努力ニ支障ヲ與フルカ如キ行動ニ出テサルヘシ

五、日本國政府ハ日支間和平成立スルカ又ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル公正ナル平和確立スル上ハ現ニ佛領印度支那ニ派遣セラレ居ル日本軍隊ヲ撤退スヘキ旨ヲ約ス  
日本國政府ハ本了解成立セハ現ニ南部佛領印度支那ニ駐屯中ノ日本軍ハ之ヲ北部佛領印度支那ニ移駐スルノ用意アルコトヲ闡明ス



右ニ對シ米側ハ帝國カ三國條約トノ關係ヲ明カニシ平和政策採用ヲ確言スルニ非サレハ援將行爲停止ハ困難ナリ、大統領ノ所謂「紹介者」ヲラントノ提案モ日本ノ平和政策採用ヲ前提トスルモノナル旨ヲ述ヘマシタカ、之ニ對シ我方ハ米側申出ノ趣旨ニ基キ大統領ノ紹介ニ依リ日支直接交渉開始セララルニ於テハ、和平ノ周旋者タル米國カ依然援將行爲ヲ繼續シ、平和成立ヲ妨碍スルハ矛盾ナルヲ指摘シ米側ノ反省ヲ要望致シマシタ。然ルニ其後モ米側ハ日米兩國カ夫々東亞及西半球ニ於テ指導的立場ニ立ツニ異議ナク親善裡ニ太平洋協定ヲ結ビ度シト述ヘ乍ラモ支那ニ付米國ハ蔣介石援助打切ヲ應諾セサルノミナラス三國條約ニ關スル從來ノ主張ヲ固執反覆シ、更ニ讓歩ノ色ヲ示サナカツタノテアリマス。



此間米國政府ハ英濠蘭及重慶代表ト協議スル所アリ、二十二日「ハ  
ル」長官ハ右諸國ハ日本カ平和政策ヲ採ルコト明確トナラハ通商常  
態復歸ヲ實行シ待ヘギモ差富リ漸進的ニ之ヲ行フ意圖ノ如ク、又南  
部佛印ヨリノ撤兵ノミニテハ南太平洋方面ノ急迫セル情勢ヲ緩和ス  
ルニ足ラストナシ居レリト述ヘ、更ニ大統領ノ日支間「橋渡シ」ハ  
時機未タ熟セスト思考スル旨ヲ洩ラスニ至リマシタ。

然ルニ米國政府ハ其後モ右諸國代表ト協議ヲ重ネツツアツタノテ  
アリマスカ、二十六日「ハル」長官ハ兩大使ニ對シ二十日ノ我新提  
案ニ付テハ慎重研究ヲ加ヘ關係國トモ協議セルモ遺憾乍ラ同意シ難  
シト述ヘ、米側六月案ト我方九月案トノ調節案ナリト稱シテ第一所  
謂四原則（但シ第四項ハ紛争防止ノ爲ノ國際協力及調停ニ變更セラ



- ル）ノ確認ヲ求ムルト共ニ、第二別ニ兩國政府ノ採ルヘキ措置トシ  
 テ
- 一、日米兩國政府ハ英帝國、蘭、支、蘇、泰ト共ニ多邊的不可侵條約  
 ノ締結ニ努ム
- 二、日米兩國政府ハ日、米、英、支、蘭、泰國政府トノ間ニ佛印ノ領  
 土主權ヲ尊重シ佛印ノ領土主權カ脅威サルル場合必要ナル措置ニ  
 關シ即時協議スヘキ協定ノ締結ニ努ム
- 右協定締約國ハ佛印ニ於ケル貿易及經濟關係ニ於テ特惠待遇ヲ排  
 除シ平等ノ原則確保ニ努ム
- 三、日本政府ハ支那及佛印ヨリ一切ノ軍隊（陸、海、空及警察）ヲ撤  
 收スヘシ
- 四、兩國政府ハ重慶政府ヲ除ク如何ナル政權ヲモ軍事的、政治的、經  
 濟的ニ支持セス
- 五、兩國政府ハ支那ニ於ケル治外法權（租界及團匪議定書ニ基ク權利



- ヲ含ム）ヲ拋棄シ他國ニモ同様ノ措置ヲ懲滯スヘシ
- 六 兩國政府ハ互惠的最惠國待遇及通商障壁低減ノ主義ニ基ク通商條約締結ヲ商議スヘシ（生絲ハ自由品目ニ据置ク）
- 七 兩國政府ハ相互ニ資産凍結令ヲ廢止ス
- 八 圓弗爲替安定ニ付協定シ兩國夫々半額宛資金ヲ供給ス
- 九 兩國政府ハ第三國ト締結シ居ル如何ナル協定モ本協定ノ根本目的即太平洋全地域ノ平和確保ニ矛盾スルカ如ク解釋セラレサルコトニ付同意ス
- 一〇 以上諸原則ヲ他國ニモ懲滯スルコト



等ノ各頃ヲ包含セル米ヲ爾今交渉ノ基礎トシテ提案越シマシタ。右ニ付爾大使ハ其ノ不富ナルヲ指摘シ、強硬ナル懸斷ヲナシマシタカ「ハル」長官ハ讓歩ノ色ヲ示サナカツタ由テアリマス。越エテ二十七日爾大使カ更ニ大統領ト會見セル際ニハ大統領ハ今猶日米交渉ノ妥結ヲ希望スト述ヘ乍ラモ云ル七月本交渉進行中日本軍ノ南滿洲印進駐ヲ見タル爲冷水ヲ浴セラレタルカ、最近ノ情報ニ依レハ優々冷水ヲ浴セラルル懸念アルヤニ考ヘラルト云ヒ、暫定的方法ニ依リ局面打開ヲ訂ルモ兩國ノ根本主義万針カ一致セサレハ一時的解決モ結局無效ト思フ旨ヲ述ヘタ越テアリマス。

然ルニ右米側提案中ニハ通商問題（第六、七、八各頃）乃至支那治外法權撤廢（第五頃）等我方トシテ容認シ得ヘキ項目モ若干含まマ



レテ居リマスカ、支那印關係事項（第二・三項）國民政府否認（第四項）三國條約否認（第九項）及多邊的不可侵條約（第一項）等ハ何レモ帝國トシテ到底同意シ待サルモノニ屬シ本提案ハ米側從來ノ諸提案ニ比シ著シキ退歩ニシテ且半歲ヲ越ユル交渉経緯ヲ全然無視セル不富ナルモノト認メサルヲ得ヌノテアリマス。

要之米國政府ハ終始其傳統的理念及原則ヲ固執シ東亞ノ現實ヲ没却シ而モ自ラハ容易ニ實行セサル諸原則ヲ帝國ニ強要セムトスルモノニシテ、我國力屢々或多ノ讓歩ヲ爲セルニ拘ラス七箇月餘ニ亘ル今次交渉ヲ通シ當初ノ主張ヲ固持シテ一步モ讓ラナカツタノテアリマス。

惟フニ米國ノ對日政策ハ終始一貫シテ我不動ノ國是タル東亞新秩



序建設ヲ妨碍セントスルニ在リ、今次本備向答ハ俄ニ之ヲ受諾セン  
カ帝國ノ國際的地位ハ滿洲事變以前ヨリモ更ニ低下シ、我カ存立モ  
亦危殆ニ陥ラサルヲ得ヌモノト認メラレノテアリマス。即チ

一 蔣介石治下ノ中國ハ愈々英米依存ノ傾向ヲ増大シ帝國ハ國民政府  
ニ對スル信義ヲ失シ日英友誼亦將來永ク毀損セラレ延テハ大陸ヨ  
リ全面的ニ退却ヲ斷行ナクセラレ具ノ結果滿洲國ノ地位モ必然動  
搖ヲ來ス也王ルヘク斯クノ如クニシテ我英事變完遂ノ万途ハ根  
底ヨリ復没セララルヘク

二 英米ハ此等地域ノ指導者トシテ君臨スルニ至リ帝國ノ權威地ニ墜  
チテ安定勢力タル地位ヲ復滅シ東亞新秩序建設ニ阻スル我大業ハ  
中途ニシテ瓦解スルニ至ルヘク



202  
Proc. 3114

duplicate of

3130



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
Document Division

*check II*  
20 Aug 1947

To LANGUAGE DIVISION:

Attached is Doc. No.

3014

for

Taverner

Arrange for translation as follows:

*see 3130*

*Translate in entirety*

*Top Priority*

*Okay for processing?*

*Refer  
not needed  
material*

*UB*

(Note: Do not remove from attached material)

*Explanation in exhibit 2955*

*12*



Shi Kamechi 20/8/47.

Scanning Unit partial trans.

Explanation relating to the Japan-  
U.S. negotiation by the Foreign  
Minister, on 1. Dec. 1941.

The last clause (page 23)

~~Generally speaking this [America] proposition is unadmissible for us after all, and ~~and~~ it seems almost disappointing to make feasible modifications in continuing further negotiations, this proposition as basis. We take it quite regrettable that the Imperial Government deems it inevitable to discontinue further negotiations.~~

(p. 23) It may be said that AMERICAN policy towards JAPAN has consistently been to obstruct the building of EAST ASIA New Order, which is our unswerving national policy. Suppose we accept the present AMERICAN reply. Then <sup>it must be admitted that</sup> our international status will become even lower than prior to the MANCHURIAN Incident, and that our existence will be in grave danger.

/ 5 points of contention omitted /

B. 23 In short, AMERICAN proposal is one that we can never accept, and it seems almost hopeless to have the proposal revised in our favour, even if we further continue the negotiations on the basis of that proposal. So the Imperial Government, to its regret, regards it as unavoidable to break off the present negotiations herewith.



IPS Doc. No. ~~3114~~ 3114

S. ISHIKAWA

~~Draft~~ For The Foreign Ministers

<sup>Draft</sup> Explanation Re. Japanese - American Negotiations

on Dec. 1, 1941.

Japanese-American

The negotiations between Japan and

were opened

America has been carried on in <sup>or thereabouts</sup> some time

Washington since this spring, and

in the middle of April the <sup>U.S.</sup> government

of America presented us with its

non-official tentative plan as a

basis for general agreement ~~connected~~

~~for~~ adjustment

with the regulation of diplomatic relations.

The

To this our Imperial government



~~1~~

sent a counter-proposal in the middle of May and on June 21, another ~~proposal~~ <sup>made</sup> the United States government. ~~proposal~~ was given by ~~America~~. This proposal of June is the one to which the United States government has firmly ~~maintained~~ <sup>adhered to</sup> ~~America~~ has strictly adhered throughout the present negotiations. The contents <sup>include</sup> ~~have~~ a variety of items of the said proposal go into details,

including the following:-

- (1) ~~National and international ideas~~ held cherished by the two countries
- (2) ~~Attitudes toward the European War~~ the a
- (3) ~~Attitudes toward the China Incident~~ the a
- (4) ~~Commercial intercourse between the~~ trade



two countries (5) Economic activities  
 in the Pacific Ocean Area (6) ~~Stabilization~~<sup>the s</sup>  
~~of the~~ <sup>stabilization</sup> political situation in the  
 Pacific Area (7) ~~Neutralization~~<sup>the n</sup> of the  
 Philippines, etc.

The problem of the attitude towards the European War refers to,  
 Paragraph 2 is a problem in which the  
~~Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite~~ <sup>T</sup> Pact <sup>between</sup> ~~agreement~~  
 Japan, Germany and Italy, and aims chiefly at preventing the  
~~arming at keeping America from the~~  
 Empire from menacing the safety of the United States from behind,  
~~threat of Japan's attack in the rear~~  
 in case the United States <sup>should</sup> participate in the war under the pretext  
~~in case of America's entry in the war~~  
~~under the name of self-defence;~~  
 Regarding with regard to the China Incident,  
 A paragraph 3 it is provided for  
 that the President of <sup>the United States</sup> America should



~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> Chinese ~~that it undertake~~  
~~suggest the government of China to~~  
~~make~~ <sup>in accordance with</sup>  
~~have~~ peace negotiations according to  
~~the~~ fundamental general conditions based  
~~upon the Konde Declaration;~~ <sup>with regard to</sup> ~~paragraph~~  
~~the trade between the two countries;~~ <sup>Regarding</sup>  
~~the restoration of,~~ <sup>their</sup> ~~normal commercial~~  
~~intercourse and the supply~~ <sup>of</sup>  
~~resources necessary for~~ <sup>mutually needed</sup> ~~by the two~~  
~~countries, are guaranteed;~~ <sup>Regarding</sup> ~~paragraph~~  
~~with regard to economic activities in the Pacific Area,~~ <sup>the two</sup>  
~~it is provided for that~~ ~~both~~  
~~countries should observe the principle~~ <sup>take peaceful policies and</sup>  
~~of commercial~~ <sup>non-</sup> ~~discrimination;~~ <sup>through</sup>  
~~the peaceful policy.~~ <sup>with regard to the political</sup> ~~paragraph~~  
~~stabilization in the Pacific Ocean,~~ <sup>Regarding</sup>  
~~it is~~ <sup>declared</sup> ~~stated that~~ ~~both countries~~  
~~the two~~



should cooperate in securing ~~the~~ <sup>world</sup> peace and <sup>have</sup> ~~no~~ territorial ambitions in <sup>with regard to the Philippines,</sup> the said area; ~~with the mutual~~ cooperation for the ~~maintenance of~~ <sup>Regarding</sup> ~~peace.~~ <sup>provided</sup> ~~in~~ paragraph 7 it is ~~decided~~ that an agreement should be concluded to neutralize the Philippines after their independence and <sup>at</sup> <sup>a</sup> ~~in~~ the time desired by <sup>the United States</sup> ~~America~~ after the realization of the independence of the said islands.

The <sup>said</sup> ~~presented~~ proposal <sup>in its</sup> ~~has~~ an <sup>and</sup> <sup>in</sup> official documents / notes / exchanged; annex ~~of an exchange official document,~~ (1) declares that with regard to the European War, ~~the contents of which are as follows:~~

~~The~~ <sup>policy of the United States</sup> ~~principles of America~~ for the European War is based upon the right



its self-defense,   
 the United States will take for

~~of self-defense and~~ <sup>that's</sup> ~~the Imperial~~ <sup>with regard to measures which</sup> ~~government affirms that she has not~~ <sup>promise</sup> ~~made any international agreement~~ ~~conflicting with the aim of this~~ ~~agreement~~ ~~arrangement, that is, the maintenance~~

of peace <sup>in</sup> of the Pacific Ocean; ~~in view~~

~~of self-defense measures taken by~~

America <sup>(2)</sup> <sup>demands that, with regard to</sup> ~~As to the economic~~

cooperation between Japan and China,

~~the followings are desired:~~

- (a) <sup>the</sup> Elimination of preferential <sup>or</sup> ~~and~~ monopolistic enterprises <sup>for instance,</sup> ~~(various~~ state-policy companies, ~~for example)~~



the 2)  
(b) Removal of the trade and travel control of the third-country person~~nel~~s;  
and to ~~make~~ <sup>permit</sup> the Chinese government to recover ~~rights~~ <sup>rights</sup>

and (c) ~~Transfer of the~~ ~~perfect~~ rights of complete control over matters connected with trade, currency and the ~~currency~~ exchange of foreign ~~traders~~ to the government of China and provides that,

(3) ~~As to the commercial intercourse~~ (with regard to the trade) between the two countries, it is provided the United States can for that America would be able to exercise the export control <sup>(the exports of)</sup> on the ~~national defence resources~~ <sup>such</sup> as she needs for her national defense as long as the present abnormal ~~to herself.~~ <sup>necessary</sup> The <sup>two</sup> governments of both situation continues in ~~the~~ international relations. ~~countries~~ have thus made successive The two governments) (been continuing



with  
discussions mainly on the above-mentioned  
proposal at their center.



Translated by Seiichi OHTA

~~Nevertheless~~ <sup>In</sup> ~~on~~ July this year, <sup>however,</sup> ~~soon after~~ the 3rd <sup>Kongō</sup> ~~Kongō~~ <sup>came about</sup> ~~it happened~~ that our forces  
 Cabinet was established, ~~the situation was changed upto~~ ~~the~~ <sup>stationing</sup>  
~~of Japanese army to~~ ~~French Indo-China.~~ <sup>The</sup>  
~~was that~~ <sup>As a result</sup>  
~~of this~~ <sup>Japan and the United States deteriorated</sup> ~~the relations between~~ ~~America and Japan~~ ~~gradually~~ ~~it~~  
~~abruptly,~~ <sup>they</sup> ~~froze~~ <sup>each other's</sup>  
~~at once.~~ ~~Both countries~~ ~~froze~~ ~~their~~ ~~assets,~~ ~~and~~ ~~finally~~  
~~was brought about~~

~~developed to a virtual rupture~~ <sup>their</sup> ~~of economic relations.~~  
~~In view of~~ <sup>situation</sup> ~~Seeing this~~ <sup>Kongō</sup> ~~conditions,~~ Premier ~~Konoe~~ <sup>Kongō</sup> despatched a "Message"  
~~to President Roosevelt on 28~~ ~~August,~~ ~~and~~ ~~delivered~~ ~~pre-~~  
~~cisely~~ ~~the~~ ~~peaceful~~ ~~intentions~~ ~~of~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~Government,~~ ~~and~~  
~~proposed~~ ~~the~~ ~~meeting~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~heads~~ ~~of~~ ~~both~~ ~~countries~~ ~~in~~ ~~order~~  
~~to~~ ~~facilitate~~ ~~the~~ ~~negotiations.~~ <sup>The</sup> ~~dispatch~~  
~~By~~ ~~the~~ ~~proposal~~ ~~of~~ ~~this~~

(P. 4)

<sup>led to the</sup>  
~~"Message"~~ ~~the~~ ~~state~~ ~~of~~ ~~affairs~~ ~~was~~ ~~brought~~ ~~to~~ ~~reopening~~ ~~the~~  
~~negotiations.~~ <sup>both sides</sup>  
~~But~~ ~~the~~ ~~opinions~~ ~~of~~ ~~each~~ ~~country~~



were ~~not~~ easily reconciled.

The United States,

10

~~was not settled easily.~~ ~~the~~ ~~attitude~~ ~~that she could not accept the said~~ ~~of inability to meet Japanese proposals,~~ unless an agreement was reached on the main problems, - in particular, on ~~the compromising grounds on these principal problems.~~

of the interpretation of <sup>Tripartite Pact</sup> ~~especially on the problems~~ how to explain the duties <sup>of the triple treaty</sup> ~~and its performance,~~ and on the problem <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>continued presence</sup> ~~stationing~~ of <sup>under</sup> ~~the~~ forces there <sup>in</sup> ~~on~~ the problem of <sup>China</sup> ~~discriminate~~ treat-

ment of international commerce, <sup>a</sup> ~~And she did not~~ <sup>give</sup> ~~any attitude of giving Japan some grounds,~~ <sup>firmly</sup> ~~adhering closely to~~ <sup>draft</sup> ~~June Policy~~ mentioned above.

So on September 25th, Japan offered one proposal which <sup>was based</sup> ~~inserted Japanese assertions~~ <sup>draft</sup> ~~and which included our~~ <sup>contentions</sup> ~~in it.~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Based upon~~ <sup>American June Policy.</sup> ~~This proposal~~ <sup>is the one</sup> ~~needed~~ <sup>draft</sup> ~~as mentioned below:~~

That is to say this

With regard to (1) <sup>the two</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>towards</sup> ~~Attitude of Both Countries~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>European</sup> ~~War,~~ they should co-operate for restoring ~~the~~ world peace,



19

~~Before the restoration of the world peace; they should act from their~~  
~~the standpoint, protection~~  
~~point of view of defence and self-guard.~~ defence before the restoration of peace;  
~~the United States joins,~~ and in case of America's  
~~entry in the war,~~ <sup>ies, (Tripartite Pact</sup>  
~~the explanation of the duty of the triple treaty~~  
~~should be interpreted and performed / by Japan /~~ <sup>added upon / under</sup>  
~~and its performance should be put in practice by their own free~~  
~~will.~~ <sup>of her own free will</sup>  
~~independently~~ as she sees fit.



[P. 5-]

Translated by T. AZUMA

(2) With regard to "the peaceful settlement between Japan and China," the said governments should make efforts to promote the settlement of the China Incident, the American government should understand the efforts and sincerity of the Japanese government in settling the incident, should mediate so as to induce the Chungking government to negotiate quickly with the Japanese government for the restoration of peace, and should not take any measures which may hinder Japanese measures to settle the incident.

The Japanese government declares

[OVER]



(3) With regard to "the trade between the two countries," they should agree to take without delay measures necessary to recover the normal trade relations, should immediately ~~now~~ <sup>cease</sup> the ~~step~~ of freezing ~~of~~ each other's assets and guarantee that they will supply each other with <sup>the</sup> resources they need.

(4) With regard to "the economic problem in the Pacific area," we ~~swear~~ <sup>mutually</sup> to each ~~other~~ <sup>pledge</sup> that the economic activities of Japan and the United States should be carried out by peaceful means and on the principle of <sup>non</sup> indiscriminate treatment.

(5) With regard to "the political

[OVER]



the Philippines <sup>under</sup> ~~on~~ the condition of ~~the~~  
~~non~~ <sup>non</sup> discriminate treatment of Japanese,

Though subsequent negotiations were  
made ~~about~~ <sup>on</sup> the said two proposals (the  
American June proposal and our September  
proposal), barriers still remained mainly  
in the above mentioned three problems.

On the 2nd of October, however, the  
American government presented a long note  
and asked us to accept the following  
four principles as the basis of international  
relations:

1. The integrity of the territories of all  
countries and the respect of the sovereignty

[OVER]



There was no trace of compromise / on its side / and the opinions of the two differed very much especially on the problem of the withdrawal of / Japanese / troops from China. On this account the negotiations bogged down ~~met with a difficult situation~~, and came at last to a standstill, while the third KONO<sup>Y</sup>E Cabinet was forced to resign about the middle of October.



What thus brought <sup>(the two)</sup> to such  
~~The reason~~ thus, both countries arrived at  
 conflicting <sup>views</sup> was recognized as  
 ascribable <sup>fact that the United States,</sup>  
 due to the U.S.A's adherence <sup>to</sup> ~~of her~~ the  
 fundamental <sup>(firmly)</sup> principle ideal which ~~she~~ had <sup>been</sup> <sup>(maintaining)</sup>  
~~holding~~ traditionally and firmly in  
<sup>managing</sup> dealing with ~~the~~ international relations,  
 and that ~~she~~ insisted <sup>on</sup> ~~to~~ apply <sup>it</sup> her ideal  
 to CHINA and other countries without  
 taking <sup>into</sup> any consideration about the actual  
 circumstances in ~~the~~ East Asia. And  
<sup>it was thought</sup> ~~we~~ came to a conclusion that unless the  
 United States changed ~~the~~ said attitude for the better  
 attitude of the U.S.A ~~was not~~ altered,  
 it would be very difficult to bring these negotiations  
~~the negotiation would be very difficult~~



a successful end,  
to be reached at.

2  
17

The present Cabinet, however, <sup>thinking</sup> recognizing  
<sup>proper</sup> it ~~was~~ our duty to adjust the diplomatic  
relations between Japan and the <sup>United States</sup> ~~U. S. A.~~ <sup>standing</sup>  
on <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ fair <sup>basis</sup> foundation, decided to <sup>make</sup> ~~do~~ the  
~~best~~ <sup>~ its</sup> and the last <sup>efforts</sup> endeavor to <sup>avoid</sup> ~~get rid~~  
of a clash between Japan & the <sup>United States</sup> ~~U. S. A.~~,  
making <sup>all</sup> ~~possible~~ concessions <sup>that</sup> as our country  
could. <sup>From</sup> ~~in~~ the above-mentioned <sup>frame</sup> ~~point~~

<sup>of mind,</sup> ~~of view,~~ we moderated our former proposals  
(the September 25th draft),  
(~~the proposals made on the 25th of September~~)

concerning the three <sup>main</sup> ~~principle~~ problems: the  
<sup>interpretation</sup> explanation of the rights of self-defense <sup>based on</sup> in accordance  
with the <sup>Tripartite Pact</sup> ~~three power treaty~~, the principle of



~~non~~ discrimination in trade  
~~equality, including equality of commercial~~

3  
18

~~opportunity and treatment, and the evacuation  
of our troops from CHINA and French INDO-CHINA,~~

which had been the most difficult points <sup>in</sup> to  
the negotiations at that time <sup>revised them</sup>  
~~be agreed by both parties, and altered as follows:~~

With <sup>based</sup>  
(1) In regard to the rights of self-defense <sup>in</sup>  
<sup>on</sup> <sup>Tripartite Pact</sup>  
~~accordance with the three-power treaty, making~~

to make it be <sup>(the United States)</sup> <sup>extend</sup>  
the U.S.A. declared that ~~she~~ would not enlarge  
<sup>improperly of the idea of</sup>  
~~her ideal~~ <sup>and</sup> the rights of self-defence, <sup>excessively</sup>

our country would <sup>also</sup> make a ~~the~~ similar  
declaration as the U.S.A.

With <sup>non</sup> <sup>discrimination</sup>  
(2) In regard to the principle of equality of

~~commercial opportunity and treatment, we~~  
did <sup>object</sup> <sup>to</sup>  
would not ~~have any objection against the~~



application of the principle to China if it <sup>said</sup> would <sup>was</sup>  
be applicable ~~to the whole world~~ <sup>to the whole world</sup>

(3) <sup>With</sup> In regard to the evacuation of our

troops, Japanese troops despatched to China <sup>because for the sake of</sup> <sup>I.</sup> <sup>should</sup> <sup>would</sup> stay in  
certain districts of North China, <sup>and Mengchiang</sup> ~~mongolia~~

Hsin Chiang and <sup>on</sup> HAINAN Island for a  
necessary <sup>the establishment of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>peace</sup> <sup>was</sup> <sup>made</sup>  
considerable period after

between Japan and China, <sup>all the</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>other</sup> <sup>troops</sup>  
should <sup>simultaneously</sup> <sup>as</sup> <sup>soon</sup> <sup>as</sup>  
would commence evacuation

<sup>with</sup> the establishment of peace <sup>in</sup> <sup>accordance</sup> <sup>with</sup> <sup>treaty</sup> <sup>according</sup> <sup>to</sup>  
the ~~Japan-China~~ <sup>agreement</sup> <sup>between</sup> <sup>Japan</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>China</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>would</sup>  
negotiations <sup>should</sup>

evacuate all of them within <sup>should</sup>  
and in two years, <sup>as</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>public</sup> <sup>peace</sup>  
<sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>establishment</sup> <sup>of</sup>  
might be established; <sup>in</sup> <sup>French</sup> <sup>Indo-</sup>  
<sup>as</sup> <sup>to</sup>



5  
20

China, <sup>we</sup> our government ~~would~~ <sup>should</sup> make a ~~promise~~ <sup>promise</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> respect ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> the <sup>sovereignty of the territory</sup> territorial rights and <sup>should evacuate</sup> the troops ~~despatched~~ <sup>despatched</sup> to French Indo-China ~~would be~~ <sup>would be</sup> evacuated as soon as the China Incident ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> settled or ~~a~~ <sup>a</sup> fair peace ~~of the~~ <sup>of the</sup> Far East ~~Asia~~ <sup>Asia</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>was</sup> established <sup>in the Far East</sup>.

Thus the above ~~draught~~ <sup>draft</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> decided <sup>Imperial</sup> in the ~~state~~ <sup>state</sup> council in the presence <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ the Emperor ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> was held <sup>on</sup> the 5th of November.



Checked by  
H. H. H.

On the grounds of the said decision,  
the Government of ~~Japan~~ <sup>instructed</sup> Ambassador NOMURA

~~instructions to~~ <sup>instructing him</sup> ~~to~~ inform the  
~~U.S. Government~~ <sup>in this tense situation,</sup>  
~~of the fact that~~ <sup>on this emergency occasion</sup>

there is no alternative but to reach a  
way that the speedy compromise <sup>through</sup> by this plan  
was ~~left to~~ <sup>in order to</sup> better improve the standing  
situation of Japan <sup>and</sup> U.S. relations on

~~the verge of a break-down~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>had</sup> Japan ~~desired~~  
~~to make a maximum~~ <sup>braved</sup> compromise, ~~having~~

enduring what <sup>was almost unendurable,</sup> ~~it had to~~ <sup>reflecting gravely on the</sup>  
~~side~~ <sup>U.S.</sup> ~~also desired~~ <sup>to act</sup> cooperation with  
Japan in maintaining <sup>in</sup> the

peace in the Pacific. Henceforth, negotiations  
were carried ~~on~~ <sup>parallelly</sup> ~~mainly~~ <sup>mainly</sup> in Washington,  
and subsidiarily in Tokyo.



~~WAKABAYASHI,~~

I myself ~~made~~ frequently negotiated ~~ed~~ with the  
~~Ambassadors~~ of British and the U.S.A. <sup>Ambassadors</sup> in TOKYO,

while Ambassador NOMURA did his best <sup>To</sup>

advance ~~the~~ negotiations, <sup>beginning with his</sup> interview <sup>ON THE 7<sup>th</sup></sup> with

Mr. ~~HALL~~ Secretary of State <sup>HULL,</sup> ~~the 4<sup>th</sup>~~, to begin

and following it up with ~~the~~ interviews: with

~~with~~ President ROOSEVELT on the 10<sup>th</sup>, and

with Secretary HULL

Mr. ~~HALL~~ on the 12<sup>th</sup> and <sup>ON</sup> the 15<sup>th</sup>. <sup>During the</sup>

In the meanwhile,

interceded our Government, <sup>decided, on the 5<sup>th</sup>, to</sup> ~~taking the situation~~

in order to perfect diplomatic endeavours, as  
~~into a great importance and in order to make~~

the situation was indeed very grave.

~~the utmost diplomatic endeavours, devoted to~~

despatch Ambassador KURUSU to Washington

urgently. Thus The Ambassador <sup>reached</sup> ~~arrived at~~

Washington on the 15<sup>th</sup>, <sup>and</sup> participated in the

negotiations from the 17<sup>th</sup>, <sup>ASSISTING</sup> ~~helping~~ Ambassador



NOMURA.

The negotiations were at height.

and since the 7<sup>th</sup>

United States of

giving close

at that time

~~and~~

the

American side

was

deliberating

study to

our proposals

since the 7<sup>th</sup>,

and during this

course

Government

of the U.S.

showed

~~an~~

attitude

~~to find out~~  
of sounding

the true intentions of our

Empire,

making inquiries in

~~various~~ various respects.







~~abrogated~~ ~~abolished~~ ~~or~~ ~~be~~ ~~made~~ ~~dead~~, <sup>a</sup> <sup>letter</sup> Regarding the principle  
of indiscriminate ~~commerce~~ <sup>trade</sup>, the U.S. <sup>Government</sup> wished <sup>for</sup> the  
exclusion of the term 'to be <sup>applicable</sup> ~~applied~~ throughout  
the world' and so <sup>forth</sup>, <sup>our side,</sup> proposed by ~~us~~ <sup>and</sup> <sup>stated</sup>  
~~that she has been heretofore endeavoring~~  
~~with~~ ~~stress~~ ~~that~~ ~~it~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~endeavouring~~  
for the ~~restoration~~ <sup>tion</sup> of <sup>the U.S.</sup> <sup>(at the same time, a separate</sup>  
~~draft~~ <sup>introduced</sup> <sup>Draft</sup>  
for joint  
~~of the~~ ~~China~~ ~~Declaration~~ ~~on~~ ~~Economic~~ ~~Policy~~ <sup>separately</sup>  
and <sup>to work for the restoration of</sup>  
~~proposed~~ ~~that~~ ~~free~~ ~~trade~~ ~~be~~ ~~restored~~  
<sup>(with</sup>  
throughout the world <sup>through</sup> the cooperation of the two  
<sup>the re-establishment of</sup>  
countries, ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~regular~~ ~~commercial~~ ~~relations~~  
<sup>through</sup>  
~~be~~ ~~re-established~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~conclusion~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~proposed~~  
<sup>to</sup> <sup>U.S.</sup> <sup>Commercial</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>complete</sup> <sup>with</sup> <sup>return</sup>  
~~of~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~Agreement~~; ~~that~~ ~~a~~ ~~perfect~~  
~~and~~ ~~transfer~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~Chinese~~ ~~Government~~, <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup>  
~~rights~~ ~~of~~ ~~control~~ ~~over~~ ~~economy~~, ~~finance~~ ~~and~~  
<sup>Chinese</sup>



(3)

~~currency in China~~ ~~be transferred to the Chinese~~  
the carrying out of joint economic  
~~Government~~ and ~~that economic~~ development, etc.  
~~of the Chinese economy~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~be made by~~ <sup>through</sup> the cooperation  
of the powers.



by Takusano  
checked by K. Horii

As ~~for~~<sup>to</sup> the evacuation problem, they did not particularly go into deep discussion, ~~emphasis on their part~~ especially ~~much arguments~~. They only showed ~~disapproval~~<sup>their</sup> ~~of the permanent or indefinite~~ ~~period of occupation~~ ~~over of an indefinite term~~. However they expressed their readiness to ~~use good offices for~~<sup>mediate</sup> negotiations between Japan and China if Japan would ~~take~~<sup>adopt a</sup> peaceful policy. To this ~~the Japanese Government had~~<sup>instructed a</sup> ~~replied~~<sup>to the effect</sup> that the points ~~which~~<sup>which</sup> the U.S. wanted us to confirm in regard to the declaration of Japanese peaceful intentions made ~~on~~<sup>of</sup> August 28 were included in our proposal ~~and~~ therefore the present cabinet had no objection to confirm ~~them in this report~~<sup>the principle of the declaration</sup> that the reason ~~why we attached~~<sup>for our</sup> ~~ing~~ a condition to the principle



of indiscrimination was that we desired the  
<sup>said</sup> principle <sup>to</sup> be applied indiscriminately to the  
whole world, <sup>and it</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>meaning</sup> that we would agree to  
the application of that principle to China  
in conformity with the realization of our desire;  
that as ~~for~~ <sup>to</sup> the proposal of a joint declaration,  
we could not accept ~~it~~ <sup>the above</sup> for it ignored the  
<sup>situation</sup> actualities in China, and especially <sup>as there was fear of</sup> the proposal  
of joint development in China <sup>in fear</sup> was in danger  
~~of~~ leading ~~to~~ <sup>the</sup> international control of China;  
and that we had no objections to the <sup>V.S.</sup> proposal  
of good offices to bring <sup>about</sup> peace between Japan  
and China. Ambassador KURUSU took part  
in the negotiations ~~at~~ <sup>in</sup> this phase. Ambassa-  
dors NOMURA and KURUSU <sup>had an interview</sup> ~~talked~~ with



the President on <sup>the</sup> 17th, and with Secretary  
 of State Hull on <sup>the</sup> 18th, <sup>the</sup> 20th, <sup>the</sup> 21st, <sup>the</sup> 22nd and  
<sup>the</sup> 26th successively. However, at the interviews  
<sup>both</sup> on <sup>the</sup> 17th and <sup>the</sup> 18th, the President stated, <sup>that</sup> he  
 desired peace between Japan and America,  
 and ~~that~~, as for the China problem, he had  
 no intention to interfere or to ~~use force~~ <sup>intermeddle</sup>,  
<sup>but that</sup> ~~of acts~~ he only wished to be an "introducer".  
 (On the other hand) Secretary Hull stated emphatically <sup>in details</sup> the  
 menace of Hitlerism and <sup>repeated</sup> that <sup>it was impossible for</sup> the U. S.  
 peace policy <sup>to coexist</sup> ~~could not~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>the above,</sup>  
<sup>and</sup> therefore, <sup>Long as the Empire acted in concert with</sup> ~~it was~~ <sup>Germany</sup> almost impossible to  
 continue the Japan<sup>ese</sup>-American negotiations. ~~so~~  
~~long as Japan~~ ~~acted~~ <sup>acted</sup> in concert with



Germany, <sup>Firstly</sup> ~~first~~ it was necessary <sup>in the first place</sup> to eliminate

this fundamental difficulty. ~~All arguments~~ <sup>Through exhaustive arguments</sup> ~~were put forward from~~ both parties,

~~and~~ it became clear that the difficulties had been in ~~fact~~ the Tripartite Pact, the principle of indiscrimination and the China problem.

~~Therefore~~ <sup>the</sup> on 20th, we introduced a new proposal,

in which <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ sentences were simplified, ~~excluding~~

~~all elements of~~ <sup>propagandizing tendency</sup> ~~more~~ <sup>draft</sup> ~~previous~~

proposal which had <sup>heretofore</sup> been the basis of the negotiations ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> simplified.

Also, the principle of indiscrimination <sup>on which both parties found it difficult to agree</sup>

<sup>the problem of</sup> and <sup>for the time being</sup> the Tripartite pact ~~was~~ <sup>exempted</sup>

And as for the China problem, <sup>the U.S. was requested</sup> ~~with the~~ only to refrain from interfering in the Japanese Chinese peace negotiations,

with the object of ~~transferring~~ <sup>the problem</sup> ~~to~~ chiefly to the direct

negotiations between Japan and China, ~~to~~







Translated by  
H. Hattori

1. Both Governments of Japan and the U.S.A.  
will <sup>positively agree to</sup> ~~ascertain~~ each other not to make any  
military advancement into ~~the~~ South-East Asia  
and South Pacific areas, excluding French Indo-China.

2. Both Governments of Japan and the U.S.A.  
will ~~cooperate~~ <sup>with</sup> each other <sup>so</sup> ~~as to~~ <sup>guarantee the</sup> ~~acquisition~~  
of ~~their~~ <sup>these materials deemed</sup> ~~necessary materials~~ <sup>will be required</sup>  
in French Indo-China.

3. Both Governments of Japan and the U.S.A.  
will <sup>reciprocally restore</sup> ~~return~~ their commercial <sup>relations</sup> ~~intercourse~~  
into the <sup>old former</sup> ~~condition~~ <sup>that is, the situation</sup> before the ~~freezing~~ <sup>freezing</sup>  
of assets, <sup>were carried out</sup> ~~were carried out~~. <sup>The Government of the U.S.A. will</sup> ~~agree~~ <sup>agree</sup>  
promise to supply necessary oil to Japan.  
(over)



4. ~~The~~ <sup>Government of</sup> ~~The~~ U.S.A. will not ~~make~~ <sup>take</sup> any ~~move to throw obstacles~~ <sup>action</sup> which would interfere with our efforts to ~~bring~~ <sup>bring</sup> about peace between Japan and China.

5. <sup>Japanese</sup> The ~~Government of~~ <sup>Government of</sup> Japan <sup>will</sup> agree to withdraw the Japanese forces, <sup>now</sup> stationed in ~~French~~ <sup>French</sup> Indo-China after ~~a conclusion of~~ <sup>the restoration of</sup> peace between Japan and China or ~~on the~~ <sup>on the</sup> establishment of <sup>equitable</sup> peace <sup>in</sup> the Pacific Area.

<sup>Japanese</sup> The ~~Government of~~ <sup>Government of</sup> Japan <sup>will</sup> declare that she is ready to transfer the Japanese forces <sup>now</sup> stationed in the South <sup>French</sup> Indo-China to the North <sup>French</sup> Indo-China <sup>on conclusion of the present treaty.</sup>

Language	Page No.	Line No.	Doc. now reads:	Suggested correct:
RETURN TO:				CHECKED BY:
FROM:				DOC. NO. :
TO:				DATE :

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
CORRECTION SLIP



To this, the U.S. government stated that  
it would be <sup>for her</sup> difficult ~~to step~~ <sup>the move to aid the</sup> ~~in action~~

~~the~~ Chiang Government unless Japan would ~~make~~  
clarified <sup>with</sup> its relation ~~of~~ the Tripartite Pact and  
ascertained its <sup>peaceful</sup> ~~the latter's adoption of peaceful policy would~~  
~~be ascertained,~~ ~~be assured,~~

and ~~so~~ that the President's proposal to  
act as an "Introducer" is also on the assumption  
~~of a so-called arbitrator~~ ~~also presupposed~~  
that Japan would <sup>peaceful</sup> ~~the adoption of peaceful policy by Japan~~

To this <sup>Japan</sup> ~~side~~ requested the U.S. ~~side~~ to  
if a direct negotiation between Japan and China is commenced through the  
mediation of the President, on the principle of the American proposal,  
reconsider, ~~pointing out that~~ ~~it would~~

be contradictory <sup>for</sup> ~~that~~ the U.S. ~~as~~ as a mediator  
of peace <sup>to</sup> ~~would~~ interfere with the esta-  
blishment of peace <sup>by</sup> ~~and~~ continuing <sup>its</sup> ~~its~~  
(over)



MOVE TO AID ~~the~~ <sup>towards the</sup> Chiang's Government, ~~after~~  
~~the starting of Japanese-Chinese direct negotiation~~  
~~through the President's mediation based on~~  
~~the proposal by the U.S. side.~~ <sup>However, even</sup> ~~that~~  
~~the U.S. side expressed that she would drop~~  
~~out of the Tripartite Pact the main object of the present negotiations~~  
~~was objection to that Japan and the U.S. A~~  
~~would assume the leadership in East Asia and~~  
~~concerning the Tripartite Pact, although stating that she had no~~  
~~objections to Japan and the U.S. respectively holding a~~  
~~leading position in East Asia and the Western Hemisphere~~  
~~and was hoping for a friendly conclusion of a Pacific Treaty.~~  
~~in her former standpoint concerning the~~

Language	Page No.	Line No.	Doc. now reads:	Suggested correct
RETURN TO:				CHECKED BY:
FROM:				DOC. NO. :
TO:				DATE :

CORRECTION SLIP

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION



Translated by  
H. H. H.

P. 16

However, as a result of the earnest negotiations in both Washington and in Tokyo since 7 November the United States of America gradually began to express her true intentions, and the coordination of opinions of both sides in whatever points, compared to past days ~~clearly~~ became more coordinated and ~~more~~ apparently clearer. It also seemed that the U.S. opinion was tending to become <sup>more</sup> practical, to ~~some extent~~ <sup>a certain degree</sup>, and in this sense, it can be said that the negotiations had made <sup>considerable</sup> progress. However, with this, hopes for a ~~successful~~ conclusion of the negotiations seemed to diminish.

In the meanwhile, the United States Government conferred with the representatives of <sup>great</sup> Britain, Australia,

P. 17

Netherlands, and Chungking; and on the 22nd, Secretary Hull stated that although the above-men-



2

Traded Powers are able to carry out. The restoration of trade to normal conditions within several days if it becomes evident that Japan would adopt a peaceful policy. Their intentions seem to be to carry this out gradually for the time being, and that they looked upon the evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo China, <sup>alone</sup> as insufficient to mitigate the present tense situation in the Southern Pacific Area. He further revealed his opinion that <sup>he thought</sup> the time was not yet ripe for the President's mediation between Japan and China.

However, the United States Government continued its conferences with the representatives of the above-mentioned Powers, and on the 26th, Secretary Hull <sup>Notified</sup> ~~notified~~ our two Ambassadors that although he had carefully studied our new proposal of the 20th and had consulted with the other countries <sup>concerned</sup> ~~concerned~~, he greatly regretted that he was unable to consent to it.



3

He requested our affirmation of the so-called four principles which he said was a compromising proposal of the American June proposal and the Japanese September proposal.

However, the fourth article of the four principles was changed to international cooperation and arbitration for the prevention of conflicts.

P. 18  
as well as also proposed a suggestion including the following items, as a basis for future negotiations. ~~The items are as follows:~~ Separately to the above, the measures to be adopted by both Governments are:

1. Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will endeavor to work for the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression treaty with Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, Russia and Thailand.

2. The Japanese and the United States Governments will endeavor to work for the conclusion of a treaty between



411

Japan, the United States of America, <sup>Great</sup> Britain, China,  
Netherlands and Thailand which ~~preserves~~ <sup>RESPECTS</sup> the  
territorial integrity of French Indo China and  
when its territorial sovereignty is ~~endangered~~ <sup>threatened</sup>, to  
confer without loss of time <sup>NECESSARY</sup> measures to be taken  
in such a case.

The <sup>above</sup> signatory powers will give up all specially  
favoured treatments in commercial and economic  
relations in French Indo China and will make  
efforts to secure the principle of equality.

3. The Japanese Government will evacuate ~~all her~~  
<sup>entire</sup> troops (Army, Navy, Air Forces and Police) from China  
and French Indo China.

4. Both Governments will refrain from supporting  
any other government besides the Chungking Government



499  
militarily, politically or economically.

5. Both Governments will relinquish their ~~respective~~  
extraterritorial rights <sup>(including concessions and</sup>  
<sub>in China</sub> rights based on the Boxer Protocol.) and will per-  
suade other powers to adopt similar measures.

6. Both Governments will negotiate ~~for~~ the conclu-  
sion of a commercial treaty based on the principles  
of reciprocal <sup>treatment of</sup> ~~at~~ most favoured <sup>country</sup> ~~treatment~~ and the  
mitigation of commercial obstacles. (raw silks will  
19. be left a free ~~to~~ item.)

7. Both Governments will <sup>MUTUALLY</sup> ~~respectively~~ abolish the  
ordinances ~~of~~ <sup>for</sup> freezing assets.

8. Both Governments will <sup>NEGOTIATE FOR</sup> ~~bring~~ the stabilization of  
dollar-yen exchange rate and will respectively  
furnish half the funds.



9. Both Governments will agree not to interpret ~~the~~  
any existing treaty between either of the signatory  
powers and a third power as ~~to be~~ contradictory  
to the fundamental object of the present treaty,  
that is, the securing of peace in the whole Pacific  
area.

10. Both Governments will persuade other powers to  
accept the above mentioned principles.

Both our Ambassadors pointed out the impropriety  
of the above proposal and responded unyieldingly, but  
Secretary Hull is said to have shown no sign of con-  
cession. On the following 27<sup>th</sup> when the Ambassadors  
he voiced his desire for a ~~successful conclusion of the~~  
~~Japanese-American negotiations~~, but on the other hand,  
had an interview with the President, he is said to  
have stated that according to the ~~most~~ latest infor-  
mation, he was fearing another shivery experience, some-



419  
what like the one he had when the Japanese troops invaded  
Southern French Indo China in July, <sup>during</sup> the midst of  
the present negotiations. It seems that he also stated  
to the effect that even though the two countries ~~were~~ <sup>planned</sup>  
for a development of the situation by provisional means,  
such temporary settlements would be ~~inefficient~~ <sup>essentially</sup> ~~ineffective~~  
~~the end~~ if the fundamental principle and policy  
of the two countries do not agree.



No. 1

translated by

J. Komakaya Sei

checked by  
K. Hori

However, there are <sup>some</sup> ~~such~~ items in the  
above mentioned <sup>U.S. proposal</sup> American suggestion which  
we can admit, <sup>such</sup> as <sup>the</sup> commercial <sup>problems,</sup> ~~affairs,~~ (items  
6, 7, 8), <sup>and</sup> ~~or~~ the abolition of extraterritorial  
rights in CHINA (item 5) etc., but  
<sup>relating</sup> matters, ~~to~~ to CHINA and FRENCH INDO-  
CHINA (items 2, 3), <sup>non-recognition,</sup> ~~denial~~ of the  
NATIONAL Government (item 4), <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~  
<sup>non-recognition</sup> of the tripartite pact, ~~(item 9)~~ ~~and~~ the  
multilateral non-aggression pact (item  
1) etc. <sup>matters to</sup> ~~are~~ all belonging to, which  
<sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ Empire can not possibly give  
agreement, and this <sup>proposal</sup> ~~suggestion~~ is  
very retrogressive, <sup>compared to</sup> ~~in comparison with~~



No. 2

The American former <sup>proposals</sup> ~~negotiations~~, and we cannot help to ~~recognize~~ <sup>considering</sup> it <sup>as an</sup> unreasonable proposal, completely ~~but they are perfectly ignoring~~ <sup>the particulars</sup> ~~of the~~ <sup>of over half a year.</sup> ~~negotiations and circumstances.~~

This shows, in short, that ~~The sum of the matter is that~~ <sup>The American</sup> U.S. ~~will consistently~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~adhering~~ <sup>adhering</sup> to its traditional ideology and principle, <sup>and</sup> ~~effacing~~ <sup>the</sup> reality of ~~the~~ EAST-ASIA <sup>and furthermore</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>is persistently demanding</sup> the Empire to fulfil <sup>the various</sup> principles which they <sup>themselves</sup> hardly ~~ever~~ ~~carry out~~.

~~the fact that~~ ~~ourselves~~ and in spite of ~~the fact that~~ <sup>had often</sup> our country ~~made many concessions~~ they held fast to their first assertion throughout <sup>the</sup> 7 months of ~~the~~ <sup>the present</sup> negotiation and refused to budge an inch.

|| | | | |



No. 3

I suppose ~~that~~ the American policy towards  
<sup>consistently obstruct</sup> the establishment of a New Order  
Japan is to ~~destroy~~ to build <sup>the</sup> EAST-  
ASIA, ~~New Order~~ which is our fixed  
national policy. If we <sup>were to</sup> admit  
to ~~receive~~ <sup>the</sup> American reply, the  
inter-  
national position of ~~the~~ <sup>our</sup> Empire ~~should~~ <sup>would</sup>  
fall lower than before the MANCHURIAN  
Incident, and <sup>we cannot but acknowledge</sup> ~~it should be considerable~~  
that <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>very existence</sup> of ~~the~~ <sup>our</sup> Empire ~~should not~~ <sup>would also be</sup>  
endangered. In other words:  
~~help to be in danger~~ That is to say:

1 The Republic of CHINA under the reign  
of CHIANG KAI SHEK <sup>would</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>increasing</sup>  
<sup>its</sup> ~~a~~ tendency to depend <sup>great</sup> upon Britain and



No. 4

~~The U.S. and our~~ ~~America, the Empire~~ ~~lost~~ ~~faith~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~National~~ ~~Government,~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~friendship~~ ~~between~~ ~~Japan~~ ~~and~~ ~~China~~ ~~would~~ ~~be~~ ~~broken~~ ~~forever,~~ ~~which~~ ~~would~~ ~~compel~~ ~~our~~ ~~to~~ ~~long~~ ~~in~~ ~~future,~~ ~~and~~ ~~thus~~ ~~the~~ ~~Empire~~ ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~compelled~~ ~~to~~ ~~evacuate~~ ~~entirely~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~continent~~ ~~in~~ ~~a~~ ~~wholesale~~ ~~way.~~ ~~As~~ ~~a~~ ~~result~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~situation,~~ ~~of~~ ~~MANCHUKUO~~ ~~will~~ ~~inevitably~~ ~~become~~ ~~unsettled,~~ ~~and~~ ~~it~~ ~~would~~ ~~frustrate~~ ~~our~~ ~~disposition~~ ~~of~~ ~~to~~ ~~completely~~ ~~the~~ ~~CHINA~~ ~~Incident~~ ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~overthrown~~ ~~from~~ ~~its~~ ~~foundation.~~



2. England and America would rule these areas as

leaders, and in consequence, <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ empire would <sup>entirely</sup> lose

its power, <sup>entirely,</sup> its position as a stabilizer in the Orient

would ~~be~~ <sup>upset</sup> ~~the~~ ~~work~~ and our great work of <sup>concerning the</sup> establishment <sup>of</sup> a new

order in the Far East <sup>Asia</sup> would be <sup>frustrated</sup> ~~abolished~~ ~~halfway~~.

3. The Tripartite Treaty would be <sup>come</sup> ~~at~~ a dead letter

and <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ empire would lose its reputation to the world.

4. To restrain <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ empire by <sup>group constructive system</sup> ~~such~~ organization including

<sup>U.S., S.R.</sup> ~~the~~ ~~South~~ ~~Russia~~ as a new <sup>member</sup> ~~partner~~ would ~~mean~~

<sup>increase</sup> ~~the~~ ~~more~~ troubles <sup>in</sup> the northern areas of the empire.

5. Although <sup>indiscriminate</sup> ~~the~~ ~~impartial~~ trade and other fundamental

principles <sup>are</sup> ~~now~~ <sup>strongly</sup> ~~advocated~~ <sup>(are matters)</sup> ~~should~~ <sup>to be</sup> not ~~entirely~~

~~be~~ <sup>fully</sup> rejected, the intention to apply them <sup>firstly</sup> only to



J.M

The Pacific Area would <sup>(2)</sup> ~~prove~~ <sup>is essentially</sup> more than England's ~~but~~ <sup>rather</sup>

and America's ~~ways~~ <sup>method of</sup> carrying out their selfish policies, and <sup>as for our part,</sup> it would <sup>bring about much</sup> give enormous difficulties in the acquisition <sup>of</sup> important materials.

<sup>it is quite impossible for us to accept</sup>  
In short, the <sup>above</sup> ~~said~~ proposal ~~by America~~ is not acceptable at all. <sup>and even</sup> if we ~~were to~~ <sup>continue</sup> further this negoti-

ation <sup>further, based on</sup> ~~based on~~ this proposal, it would leave almost no <sup>(therefore)</sup> hope for us to ~~have~~ <sup>make any</sup> favourable amendments. It is ~~very~~ <sup>with many</sup>

regrettable that the Imperial Government <sup>admits</sup> ~~should~~ the necessity of breaking off the ~~negotiations~~ <sup>think it unavoidable to give up the</sup> negotiations.

The severing of negotiation as unavoidable.  
(the end)