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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

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ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: "Bound file," "China Policy Reference Materials"

Date: August 1932 - September 1933 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

MORISHIMA, Goro; HIROTA, Koki; YAMAMOTO, Tatsuo; ARAKI, Sadao; HATOYAMA, Ichiro; etc., (as responsible Cabinet Members)

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENTS APPLICABLE:

Agression in CHINA

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

This is the personal file of Mr. MORISHIMA, Goro, a member of the Foreign Ministry. It is interesting to note that he has classified the materials into four sections in order to distinguish the Foreign Ministry from the War Ministry.

The following explanations are given:

On 27 August 1932 the Cabinet decided on "The Fundamental Principle in Dealing with the International Diplomatic Affairs", filed here as "A".

After the truce of the North China Incident in May 1933, there arose an opinion to correct the contents of "A", so the provisional draft was made in June, filed here as "B".

But the Army gave its own opinion in July, viz. "The Outline of the Policy toward China" and asked the Foreign Office to decide if as Government policy, filed here as "C".

In regard with Army opinion "C", the Foreign Office made its own provisional draft in July. (but the copy filed here as "D" was the one corrected by MORISHIMA personally.)

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(i.e., The study of the following documents will show clearly that events leading to the Greater East Asia War were planned out immediately following the Manchurian success.)

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(A.N.: The study of the following documents will show clearly that events leading to the Greater East Asia War were planned out immediately following the Manchurian success.)

Contents of "A" -

Item 1. Draft of "The Principle of Dealing with Diplomatic Affairs from the International Standpoint"

1. To execute the pioneering of Manchukuo and Mongolia.
2. To facilitate the execution of the above, the following measures are to be taken:
 - a. Toward China proper. The policy should be to promote trades and markets (according to appendix A) with Manchukuo and Mongolia by disregarding China.
 - b. Toward the League of Nations. If it will interfere with our fundamental policy toward Manchukuo and Mongolia, we should deal with the matter according to the principle decided by the Cabinet on 25 March, and if it threatens our fate, we shall not stay in the League any longer.
 - c. Toward world powers. To maintain and better friendly relations with them (according to appendix B).

Appendix A - Policy toward China.

1. To respect the situation and the local regimes and guide them to our own side.

In order to execute this policy, the following measures should be adopted:

- a. In regard to the restoration of peace and order in Shanghai, diplomatic ways are to be adopted chiefly.
- b. If some emergency happens on the coast of China or on the Yangtze River, dangerous to the lives and properties of Japanese residents, their withdrawal to Japan may be executed, except those in SHANGHAI, TSINGTAO and HANKOW.

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c. In North China, the possibility of such danger is little, so peace and order should be maintained as much as possible. But in the event of some danger when it is absolutely necessary to protect the lives and properties of Japanese residents, troops shall be sent.

2. In order to promote trade and secure the livelihood of Japanese Residents in China proper, the Government of Japan shall lead matters to that way, and give financial aid.

Appendix B - Policy toward world powers.

1. Restoration of Anglo-Japanese friendship is keenly desired as Britain has strong interests and influences in China, especially in SHANGHAI, CANTON, and southern China. So if Japan will respect Britain's interests and rights there, it will certainly give a good influence to Japanese Manchurian policy.

2. To promote the conference to come to good understanding between France and Japan in matters of the Far East.

3. To guide the attitude of U.S.A. as to the advantage of our Manchurian policy because the strong cause of obstruction to Japan's Manchurian policy lies chiefly in U.S.A. If the Open Door Policy and equality of opportunity are sincerely acknowledged in Manchuria, U.S.A.'s attitude toward Japan might become better.

4. As Russo-Japanese relations seem to be tense lately, all possible measures must be speedily taken to avoid the the clash, and we should never resort to any step to aggravate the situation. But if the U.S.S.R. comes out to obstruct our Manchurian policy positively, we should courageously expel it.

5. With other Powers, friendly understandings are desired, especially with the Netherlands.

Item 2. Outline of "Principle for Dealing with the Problems of Manchukuo and Mongolia" decided by the Cabinet on 12 March 1932.

1. In politics, economics, defense and communication, to regard the matter as Japan's important factor of existence, under the assistance of Japan.

2. To lead Manchukuo and Mongolia as independent states, separated from the Chinese Regime.
3. Japan will undertake the maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo and Mongolia.
4. As Manchukuo and Mongolia is the first line of Japanese defense against U.S.S.R. and China, no disturbance from the outside is permitted.
5. Restoration of our rights and interests in Manchukuo and Mongolia shall be executed by negotiations with the new states only.
6. These procedures shall be better contrived to be in the form that they were the voluntary proposals of the new states.
7. In order to execute this Japanese policy, some organ of control is necessary to be established.

Item 3. The measure with which the Manchurian Question shall be dealt with, when it will be discussed in the Assembly of the League of Nations next time. Decided on 25 March 1932 by the Cabinet.

1. We should continue to reserve the right to insist that Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations should not be applied to the Sino-Japanese Incident.
2. As long as the Assembly is deciding the matters within the scope of the decisions of 30 September and 10 December, we should co-operate with the League in the same attitude as before.
3. If the Assembly goes further and dares to interfere in our action, we should explain our situation and withdraw our delegates from the Assembly and wait and see what the League would do.
4. These plans should be made known beforehand to all the powers in order to force the League to reflect on this matter.

Contents of "B"

1. Policy toward Manchuria. To develop it into a sound independent state, inseparable from Japan, as an important element of Japan in politics, economics, and defense, etc., and to set her as a good example for China and other oriental nations.

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2. The policy toward China is to lead China to follow the Japanese policy of maintaining oriental peace under the leadership of Japan; to develop the character of China's trade, and markets by securing the independence of China; and to persuade China to come to a friendly relationship.

3. Policy toward general peace. Though Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, she must do everything possible to promote the peace of the world.

4. Policy toward the world powers. To lead them to acknowledge Japan's policy and her leadership in the Far East, and to make them agree to the establishment of Manchukuo.

5. Policy of trade. To aim at the formation of the Oriental Economic Bloc, with Japan, Manchukuo and China as the axis.

6. Propaganda to the effect that Japan's policy is right, that her products and civilization are highly esteemed, etc., should be given within and without.

Contents of "CC"

1. To apply pressure to the NANKING government to make it abolish its anti-Japanese policy. (Until they are friendly to us, we will not be friendly to them; if they continue their anti-Japanese attitude, they shall perish.)

Contents of "D"

Policy toward China.

China's anti-Japanese policy is contradictory to Japan's foreign policy. If China continues this attitude, Japan should protest it, and let the Chinese people know that such policy would result in failure. Strong forcible measures should be avoided.

Addendum:

The addendum consisted of Mr. MORISHIMA's personal opinions regarding the China Policy. He said that Japan must have patience for a long time in order to suppress China's anti-Japanese movement.

Analyst: 1st Lt Fred Suzukawa

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The Cover.

Rechecked by J. Swallow

No. Hei. Matters decided upon as the opinion of the Army in the beginning of ~~Aug.~~ ^{July} 1933.

Hand writings on the first page.

Top Secret / Reference

No. Hei. Document received from Lt Col Suzuki on 12th July 1933, with the advise that the

~~unanimous opinion of the War Ministry~~ ^{unanimously} agreed on the following

~~agrees with the gist of the document,~~ ^{note.} it is desired that the Government ~~will~~ ^{will}

decide its policies along the lines of this document. (Initialed MORISHIMA) ~~26 July~~

6 July 1933 The gist of policies towards China.

The policies.

Through Availing ourselves of the indications ^{part of the implementation of} ~~appeared~~ ^{in North China} ~~for a time~~ ^{Truce Agreement} ~~its~~ ^{actually} ~~attitudes towards Japan, we have~~ ^{made} ~~to~~ ^{cast} ~~make it to~~ ^{its} ~~past policies~~ ^{away} ~~on~~ ^{anti-Japan and Manchukuo} ~~expand~~ ^{and destroy the actual influence} ~~the effect of the armistice~~ ^{agreement, and to induce} ~~of the National Party~~ ^{and extend} ~~this~~

tendency to the South,
that this state of things would extend to
the South by minimizing the actual
influence of the National party. On the

other hand, ~~we have to hold on our~~
~~unbasssed policies with strict and~~
~~immovable attitude as in the past, and~~
~~placing it under our pressure (to make~~
~~it to change its anti-Japan policies,~~
~~the past - or to cause it to spontaneously~~
~~undergo a self crumbling as the result of the~~
~~combined effects of~~
~~the pressure from the interior of China and~~
~~the rapprochement toward Japan of~~
~~self, the approaching Japanese general~~
~~public especially its economical elements~~
~~and our checking of the helps to China by~~
~~the foreign powers.~~

^{our attitude towards the Nanking}
^{towards the Nanking Government}
^{Government should be rigorous & determined}
^{between right and wrong as in the past and pressure}
^{by proper measures}
^{or to compel it to fall in self-collapse}
^{as a result of the}
^{of domestic problems}
^{the rapprochement toward Japan of}
^{especially economic}
^{circles}
^{prevention of foreign aids}
^{China}

The gist of measures.

Though we would tolerate, for the time being,
1. We ~~give our tacit consent~~
~~for the time being,~~

to the ~~existence of the North China Regime to~~
 remain as an extension of the Nanking Government,
 but we ~~shall insist upon~~ ^{should press} the faithful
^{fulfillment} ~~practice of the Armistice Agreement~~ ^{Truce}
 in its' broad sense, and ~~at the~~ ^{the extermination}
~~of the boycott on Japanese goods and~~
~~at the same time have to let it actually put~~
~~anti-Japanese activities, and~~ ^{the maintenance}
~~and expansion of such a situation,~~
~~an end to the boycott on Japanese~~
~~goods,~~ ^{such measures being} should be maintained and
 expanded.

2. We ~~have to~~ ^{must} make The North China
 Regime ~~to~~ suppress ^{the National Party's} the anti-Japanese
 activities in ^{North China} its territory by the National
 Party, and ~~at the same time~~ have
 to ~~gradually induce it to~~ ^{work on} dissolving

and ^{gradually reduce itself ^{until} to its} make the party ~~in the end~~ by gradually reforming
 final ~~intention~~, dissolution, and lessening.

3. We ^{must} ~~have to~~ give a positive guidance to the prominent persons, ^{thought bodies} economical elements and ~~parties~~ ^{in North China, desirous of the abolition} thoughts, ~~who are anxious to do away~~ ^{of the} with anti-Japan policies, and also to ^{encourage} ~~foster~~ the North China Regime to become pro-Japanese and ~~for its turning to pro-Japanism~~ ^{and} to make efforts for the restoration of ~~let it make efforts in restoring~~ its co-existing relation with ~~the co-existence with~~ Japan and Manchukuo

4. We ^{must} ~~have to~~ give appropriate assistance to the principal military

regimes which are supporting the
 North China Regime and others with
 a tinge of anti-Chiang ~~but~~ ^{who are}
 not anti-Japan in principle, ~~so as~~
~~to contribute towards~~ ^{make them} ~~helping~~
 which will ~~not~~ help the North China Regime ~~turn~~ ^{turn} pro-Japanese.
~~North China Regime in turning into~~
~~pro-Japanese.~~

5. We ~~have to~~ ^{must, through} the North China
 Regime, ~~to~~ endeavor ^{to} ~~so that~~
 the ^{situation} features in North China
~~would~~ propagate into Central China

^{Towards}
 6. ~~The~~ Nan King Government,
 we ^{should} ~~shall~~ strictly ^{reprimand} ~~call to account~~

and urge ^{it} ~~them~~ to ^{reconsider ~~the~~} ~~asking for~~ ~~their~~ ~~self-examination~~ and clearly

^{also} declare ~~tell it~~ our determination to

chastising ^{it} ~~resorting to arms~~ ^{even by force}

if necessary ~~case of necessity~~, ^{no cost to make ~~it~~} these measures being

~~for our guiding it towards the~~ ^{gradual} ~~suppression~~

^{suppression} of the anti-Japan activities ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{Party Organs}

~~National party~~ ⁱⁿ ~~which has its center in~~ ⁱⁿ Central

China and ^{make ~~from it~~} ~~let it to~~ actually

give up its policies ~~for~~ anti-Japan

and boycotting Japanese goods.

Unless ^{The Nanking Government} actually changes its past-

policies or ^{some} ~~one~~ who stands on

moderate and fair platform

~~shall~~ take its place, we

^{planned}
~~shall~~ neither approach it nor try
 to call for a positive negotiation ~~under~~
~~the initiation on our part.~~

With regard to the matters of this
 paragraph,
~~article~~ it is imperative to ^{the}
 each and every circles of our
 country to ^{co-operate} ~~take the united steps~~

~~and especially, it would be~~
~~to be appropriately distributed~~
 necessary for us to see ^{that} it ^{is} pertinent

Particularly, ~~appropriate~~ those who serve abroad must be
~~appointment of adaptable talents,~~
~~appropriate personnel.~~
~~to the offices abroad was made.~~

7. Either by our ^{guidance} ~~instruction~~ from
 behind the scene or some other
~~operation~~ we ^{must} ~~have to try~~

branches ^{civil} ~~and~~ ^{heads} military of the Nanjing Government
 to eliminate ~~the~~ pro-European and
 American elements, ^{so they would be} to be replaced by
 pro-Japan and Asiatic ^{control} ~~near~~ holders

~~Among the principal rankings and military
 cliques of the Nanjing Government.~~

By doing so we ^(must) ~~have~~ to make the
^{centre} nucleus of it to ~~emerge from the~~
~~from the tongue~~ ~~shadow~~ of the National party, thereby

~~reducing~~ ^{with} its influences over the
 government, ^{reduced} ~~so as to enable~~ ^{until the Nanjing Government}
~~it~~ ^{would neither stick to the traditional policy of}
~~to get rid of the~~
~~traditional party policies~~ ^{little by little also}
~~the National Party, which is~~ ^{influenced}
~~act independently from the anti-~~
^{nor be}

by anti-Japan elements other than the National
 party.

8. By giving ^{guidance} ~~instructions~~ and supports
 to our business concerns for their
 establishing and practising free handed
 transaction with China in defiance
 of the policies of the Nan King Government,
 we intend to realize ^{our} ~~the~~ substantial

~~economic advance of an economical power~~

~~into~~ ^{into} China which might ^{become a} ~~help~~ in
~~factor~~ to influence the Nan King Government to
~~one way~~ ~~the turning of the policies~~
~~change its policy towards Japan~~
~~of the Nan King Government~~
~~towards Japan~~

9. We shall take advantage
^{of the anti-Chiang}
~~over~~ ~~the activities of the anti-~~
~~Chiang movements in the South~~

Western ^{and other} districts ~~and others~~ ^{so} far
as they are not ~~for~~ anti-Japan ~~in~~

~~view of such a measure~~ would
encourage ~~and~~ ^{as they} promote the neutralization of
~~promote the mitigation of~~ anti-^{the}
Japan policies by the Nanking
Government

10. We ^{should} ~~shall~~ prevail on Chinese
settlers in ^{the} Southern Seas to ~~get~~

~~distract from~~ disaffected to the National Government

of the National Party and to
become ~~sympathized with~~ ^{inclined to} Manchukuo

~~with the~~ ^{with the} under the cover of Japanese
~~influence, which would~~ ^{in its background, so that they may} ~~contribute~~

~~contribute~~ ^{contribute} to the ~~accomplishment~~ ^{perfection} of

Manchukuo and the adjustment.

of the relations between Japan and China.

11. We shall ^{should} ~~endeavor~~ ^{make every possible effort} ~~to check~~ ^{as much as possible} ~~the expansion of the influences~~ ^{prevent} and the U.S.S.R. ^{from expanding their} ~~assistances~~ ⁱⁿ to China by the foreign influences over China and ^{firm} ~~giving~~ ^{support} powers especially those by The U.S.A. to it.

~~Britain and the U.S.S.R.~~ At the

same time we ^{must} ~~have~~ to impress upon ^{government} the Chinese people and the officials

the impoverished economical conditions of those foreign powers and ~~to~~ make them understand their ambitions over China, ^{and their} ~~in order to enlighten~~ ^{injustices} the Chinese

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~~that they are not to be relied upon.~~

12. The policies taken by the Nanking Government ^{up to now} ~~in the past~~ ^{based on} the platform of the National Party ^{have been} ~~are~~ permanently and fundamentally contradictory to the Empire's policies. ^{We, therefore, shall} ~~we~~ ^{proclaim} to the world that the Imperial Government as well as its people shall be hostile to the Nanking Government ~~to the last~~ ^{as long as it} ~~is not~~ ^{does not} alter its ^{past} attitudes towards Japan, ^{that we} but they are willing to shake hands with China and ^{her} ~~its~~ people under justifiable and ^{fair} ~~sound~~ conditions

at ~~the~~ ^{the} earliest-possible date.

13. If our government ~~was~~ ^{is} convinced
that the Nanking Government, ^{actually} gave
up its anti-Japan and ~~boycotting~~
Japanese goods ^{boycotting} policies and
approached us with good faith,
we ~~shall~~ ^{will} never be ~~shy~~ ^{hesitate to} from
proceeding on the solution of the
~~unsettled~~ ^{pending issues} problems between Japan
and China, of which

A separate study, ^{shall be made,} ~~as to the~~
programs for the solution of the
unsettled problems between Japan
and China, ~~shall be made.~~

(The end)