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IPS Doc No 4199

INTERROGATION OF

General UMEZU, Yoshijiro

Date and Time: 19 March 1946, 1015-1215 hours

Place : Room 753, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : UMEZU, Yoshijiro  
Mr. E. M. Hyder Interrogator  
Mr. J. F. Barry Interrogator  
Lt. Paul Fujii Interpreter

Oath of Interpreter, administered  
by Mr. Hyder:

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty  
God, that you will truly and accurately  
interpret and translate from English  
into Japanese and from Japanese into  
English, as may be required of you,  
in this proceeding?

Lt. Fujii : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, an investigation was made by the Japanese  
Army of the Mukden Incident in 1931. Is that not  
correct?

A. Inasmuch as I was attached to an administrative branch,  
I did not see the report.

Q. By reason of that fact you did see the report, did you  
not?

A. I believe the only reports that came through my hands



(UMEZU, Yoshijiro 19 March 1946 Cont'd)

- A. were the railway attack by the Chinese and subsequent battle reports. Since it was ten years ago, I do not remember well.
- Q. It was not the Chinese that bombed the railway, was it?
- A. It was reported that they did - by the Army.
- Q. You learned subsequently that that was not correct, did you not?
- A. That was the only report I received on it.
- Q. I am not talking of reports now. I am talking of what you learned.
- A. I did hear much stories, but none from responsible parties.
- Q. From whom did you hear these stories?
- A. I am not able to list the individuals. The place where the railway was bombed still remains.
- Q. It was the Japanese who bombed that railway, was it not?
- A. Since I was not directly responsible for the Incident or Command, I wish that you would interrogate someone who was.
- Q. You knew, General, that the Incident was planned by the Kwantung Army in order to occupy Manchuria?
- A. No.
- Q. It is self-evident from the facts, is it not? A small explosion and the whole of Manchuria subsequently occupied.
- A. The occupation was because of scattered incidents. You would do best to get some information from the 1st Demobilization Bureau as they would know who was there at the time.
- Q. General, when the Mukden Incident happened you discussed it with investigators who had investigated the Incident, did you not?



(UMEZU, Yoshijiro 19 March 1946 Cont'd)

- A. I did meet some of the individuals who investigated but received no report. It was all in generalities. The only thing I did hear was the fact that Japanese troops were placed in action to protect the immediate area of the bombing. Otherwise, any reports were on operations.
- Q. The Japanese troops were placed in action according to a plan beforehand, were they not?
- A. In view of the fact that Japanese forces were small as compared to Chinese, they did have alternative plans in case of action.
- Q. What were those plans?
- A. Since I was not in operations, I do not know.
- Q. You received later operations reports. You must have known of the plans.
- A. I was in position to handle operations plans. Reports came to me as a matter of course. Plans for operations were by the Kwantung Army - not in Tokyo.
- Q. Did you see the plans?
- A. I never heard of nor saw the plans.
- Q. Did you see the order of General ARAKI that ordered the completion of occupation of Manchuria?
- A. No.
- Q. You heard of it, did you not?
- A. I never heard of nor saw such an order. As War Minister he was not in a position to issue such an order. The War Minister cannot issue such an order. He could make his personal recommendation. I could believe such an order was issued.
- Q. An order having been issued by the War Minister to complete the occupation of Manchuria, everyone on the Staff knew of it, including you.
- A. I would have known of it with other subordinates. ARAKI could not have issued it as an order. He could



(UMEZU, Yoshijiro 19 March 1946 Cont'd)

- A. have issued it under other circumstances. I still do not know of such an order. Since the Army was overseas, the movement of troops could only come through the Emperor.
- Q. Since the occupation was a matter of policy decided on by the Cabinet only, the policy could be conveyed only through order of the War Minister to the Chief of Staff, is that not correct?
- A. The War Minister would confer with the Chief of Staff and he would go to the Emperor for the order which would come back to the Staff.
- Q. When you became Commander of troops in North China the Japanese had completed the occupation of Jehol Province, had they not?
- A. Jehol was completely occupied before I became Commander.
- Q. The Japanese Army overran into Jehol, did they not?
- A. Prior to assuming my command, the Japanese troops had gone into Hopei but withdrew later.
- Q. How far into Hopei had they gone?
- A. I am not sure of the exact distance but believe it was about 1/3 of the distance to Peking.
- Q. Where were you stationed in May 1935?
- A. In Tientsin until August 1935.
- Q. In May 1935, the Japanese Army was south of the Great Wall and threatened to advance in Peking, did they not?
- A. While I was in Tientsin, nothing like that occurred.
- Q. On May 30, 1935, Japanese military commanders made demands on the Administration (Chinese) at Peking to suppress all anti-Japanese feeling?
- A. There was a conference similar to that.
- Q. Please tell me the demands made by the Japanese commanders.



(UMEZU, Yoshijiro 19 March 1946 Cont'd)

- A. The talks centered around anti-Japanese activities and suppression of bandits.
- Q. Who represented the Japanese Government in their demands?
- A. No one from the Government. The Chief of Staff represented the Army--The Chief of Staff of the occupation troops in Tientsin.
- Q. You knew quite a bit about that conference then, did you not?
- A. As far as this meeting was concerned, demand was made that the Administration stop the support of all bandits. It was a Gentlemen's Agreement, then was reputed to be an agreement written, but then was not.
- Q. Who represented China?
- A. Ho-Ying Ching.
- Q. As a result of the Agreement, Chinese troops withdrew, did they not?
- A. In accordance with the Agreement, troops which aggravated terrorism were withdrawn. The regular troops were allowed to remain.
- Q. Where did they move their troops?
- A. They withdrew far enough south so that they would not become again involved. They did not go over 250 miles.
- Q. What had the troops you designated "bandits" done that made you want them withdrawn?
- A. The main points, in addition to stirring up anti-Japanese feeling, they bothered trade caravans and murdered two pro-Japanese journalists.
- Q. You forced, as a result of the Agreement, how many Chinese troops to be withdrawn?
- A. I would estimate 3,000 to 5,000.
- Q. How did you know that Chinese troops had murdered the two Chinese (pro-Japanese) journalists?
- A. Through police reports. One was discovered in his



(UMEZU, Yoshihiro 19 March 1946 Cont'd)

- A. hotel dead. The other was killed on the road. The hotel was in the Japanese zone.
- Q. How did you know that Chinese troops murdered them?
- A. There were many such incidents. As to this, evidence pointed to the Chinese as the murderers.
- Q. General, the one killed in the hotel within the Japanese zone, looks like he was killed by Japanese, does it not?
- A. Although he was in the Japanese zone, there were Chinese in there.
- Q. You don't know whether Chinese or Japanese killed the two journalists, do you?
- A. Investigation was carried out by police and the Army. The hotel proprietor stated a Chinese had visited the journalist. Although the culprit was not identified, request was made that he be tried.
- Q. General, on what authority were you to adjudge that Chinese troops should be withdrawn simply because one Chinese killed another?
- A. I did it arbitrarily as an individual, as it might have political implications. I took it on myself as my duty was to protect the residents there.

Questions by: Mr. Barry.

- Q. While you were Chief of Staff, did you order the destruction of any secret documents or documents relating to prisoners of war?
- A. I issued no such order but I heard a subordinate had. Prisoner of war records were not under the Chief of Staff.
- Q. What subordinates do you know of that did this?
- A. I do not know of anyone specifically. I don't believe there was any reason for destroying those documents other than for pulp, etc. I heard the War Ministry



(UMEZU, Yoshijiro 19 March 1946 Cont'd)

- A. discussed the destruction of records of no value.
- Q. What did you hear?  
A. I just heard the story.
- Q. Do you know General Heitaro KIMURA?  
A. There was a Commander of the Burma theater named that.
- Q. Where is he now?  
A. In Thailand.
- Q. Is he there now?  
A. Yes.
- Q. While you were Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria did you ever make a request for prisoners of war.  
A. No.
- Q. Did your Chief of Staff make a request for 1,500 prisoners of war?  
A. Those requests did not come from the Kwantung Army. We did not have an insufficiency of labor.
- Q. Did you receive any requests from War Ministry for 1,500 prisoners of war?  
A. I never made a request nor received a request for 1,500.
- Q. Have you made or received any requests for prisoners of war?  
A. War regulations permit prisoners of war working.
- Q. Are you familiar with the Manchurian Machine Tool Company?  
A. I do not recall that particular one.
- Q. Do you recall the one that used prisoners of war?  
A. There were quite a number using prisoners of war.
- Q. How many prisoner of war camps were there in Manchuria?  
A. Since I was not directly concerned, I am not familiar. There was one in Hoten.



(UMEZU, Yoshijiro 19 March 1946 Cont'd)

Q. Is that all?

A. All that was there while I was there.

Q. That camp is the only one you inspected?

A. I have seen this.

Q. What time did you inspect the camp and how many prisoners were there?

A. I was there only about ten minutes all together. I do not know the number - less than 1,000.

Q. Do you know of any correspondence in September 1942 regarding the use of war prisoners for any kind of work?

A. I have not heard of any.

Q. Do you recall while you were Commander in Chief the execution of three prisoners of war for attempting to escape?

A. No.

Questions by: Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, while Commander in Chief did you ever make any declaration regarding the punishment of enemy pilots?

A. No. There was no cause for it.

Q. General, you declared in July 1942 that enemy pilots, who invade the Nippon Empire, the Manchukooan Empire, or Japanese battlefields will be punished until death for violation of international law.

A. I have no recollection of such an order.



Certificate of Interpreter

I, Paul Fujii, 2nd Lt. 01339627  
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 8 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Paul S. Fujii

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16 day of March, 1946.

Elton M. Hyder  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, \_\_\_\_\_, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) Mr. E. M. Hyder, \_\_\_\_\_,  
and Mr. J. F. Barry, \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on the 19th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before ~~me~~ (us) General Yoshijiro, UMEZU and according to Lt. Paul Fujii, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein, taken in English by Mr. Hyder and Mr. Barry.

Room 753, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan  
Place

19 March 1946  
Date

Elton M. Hyder  
J. F. Barry



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INTERROGATION OF

GENERAL UMEZU, Yoshihiro

(continued)

DATE AND TIME: 16 March 1946. 1000-1215 hours.

PLACE : Room 753, Meiji Building, Tokyo.

PRESENT : General UMEZU, Yoshihiro

Commander B. M. McMullin, USNR Interrogator  
 J. F. Barry and E. M. Hyder Interrogators  
 2nd Lt. Paul Fujii, AUS; Interpreter

(assisted by Mr. MAKI, Itsu of the Japanese First Demobilization Ministry, Ichigaya Ushinone-ku, Tokyo).

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Commander B. M. McMullin to 2nd Lt. Fujii:

Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Lt. Fujii: I do.

STATEMENTS BY GENERAL UMEZU:

As to General DOIHARA, I had an opportunity to be with him on several occasions. When I was Commander of the Kwantung Army, General DOIHARA served under me as Commander of the 5th Army, which was in 1939. When I was in China as Commander of the 1st Army, General DOIHARA was Division Commander of the 14th Division. He had been in China for a long time. Just before the outbreak of the Chinese-Japanese conflict he was engaged in some political activities, the names of which I do not clearly know, except that he had a connection with TOKUMO KIKAN, or Special Duty Agency, the purpose of which I do not know, and the headquarters of which were in Mukden. When General DOIHARA was a young officer he was in China for sometime and was well versed in Chinese affairs. I had no close connection with him. He started his career in China under General BANZAI, Rihachiro, who was Military Attache at Peking.

As to General UGAKI, he was my senior by some 14 or 15 years; he is now 77 or 78 years of age. He was well known as a War Minister and occupied the office twice; the second time was about 1912. He had no connection with the China incident; and about that time he was the

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Governor General at Chosen. SUGIYAMA was a younger man than I, and about 1937 and 1938 was Minister of War and was Minister of War again about 1940. From 1940 to 1943 he was Chief of Staff, and was out of office about a half year, during which time General TOJO served as Chief of Staff. As to General MOTO, he is about 2 years my junior and held the position of Inspector General of Military Training in Japan. He became Commander of the Kwantung Army and was at the same time Japanese Ambassador to Manchuria, having been the first person to occupy these two offices at the same time. He had no connection with any political activity, and was in that respect quite different from General UGAKI.

As to SATO, I do not remember him.

As to HOSHINO, he was in Manchuria as Chief of General Affairs, Bureau of the General Staff. As to OKA, he was a Vice-Admiral, and was Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, a bureau concerned with the administration of naval affairs.

As to TENAKA, Shinichi, he served as Chief, Department of the General Staff, concerned with operations, under General SUGIYAMA, for 2 years from about 1941 to 1943.

I have no information concerning the fortification of the Mandate Islands.

HIROTA was put out of the cabinet in 1938 due to inharmony within the Cabinet, arising from a question as to whether the Diet should be dissolved.

I wore my uniform for approximately one month after the war, as it was the custom to do so until formally demobilized.

My ideas as to the surrender of Japan were that as a soldier my honor compelled me to fight to the end, and for that reason I did not favor the surrender, but as Chief of Staff, my position was different. I could see that the war was very difficult and that it should be settled with diplomacy. On board the U. S. S. MISSOURI with me was Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru.

My idea as to the future of Japan's maintaining a military force is that for offensive purposes it is not necessary to keep military forces, but to maintain peace and neutrality it is necessary to keep some military power. As we look over the whole world, as in the case of Belgium and Switzerland, we see that the facts prove that statement. If there were such an organization as the United Nations, we could maintain our neutrality without armed forces. The big problem, even in the United Nations Organization, is to maintain harmony among the powers. At the present moment, we notice some inharmony. As to the future of Japan internationally, I believe it will be better for her to maintain a position of neutrality among the great powers, such as the United States, the Soviet, and China, and become a buffer State. This is a most difficult matter to accomplish. As to the



(UNEZU cont'd 3-13-46)

economic future of Japan, many difficulties lie before us. Our population is too great to permit us to maintain a policy of economic self-sufficiency. To solve our economic problems, it will be necessary to depend upon imports and exports in the exchange of goods. Economic stability will be difficult to restore, but we will have to restore it. If every country in the world would adopt a policy of peace and permit the exchange of goods and make plans for the enjoyment of happiness by the peoples of the world, why should not Japan enjoy happiness and restoration also?

I do not remember who had charge of prisoners-of-war when I was Commander of the Kwantung Army. Prisoners-of-war were under the supervision of the 1st Section, which between 1939 and 1943 was under the command of TAMURA, and after 1943 of MATSUMURA, the dates given being approximate. The treatment of prisoners-of-war was governed by regulations prescribed by the Minister of War. These regulations dealing with prisoners-of-war were general. I also told them to observe international regulations and treat the prisoners kindly. I did not give definite instructions. Some Allied prisoners were captured by the Kwantung Army. None of these were air troops, but all were ground troops who were captured in Manchuria. They were American and British and numbered about two or three hundred. The prisoners were still in Manchuria when I left there. They had been captured in the south and sent to Manchuria on orders of the Minister of War, and were kept at a prison camp in Mukden. Things at this camp went smoothly. I inspected it once, and conditions were such that the prisoners were satisfied. Most of them worked in factories. I do not remember what they were making in the factories; they were not making war materials; possibly they were working in textile factories. There were no air raids while I was in Manchuria. Kwantung was remote from the war and no Allied flyers came there. I never issued any instructions regarding the treatment of Allied flyers, if any should be forced down. The regulations regarding prisoners were international regulations fixed by the Geneva Convention and, therefore, prisoners-of-war should be treated according to those covenants. Of course, we should prevent their escape and protect them. The Japanese officers were instructed to obey these orders, and no orders were issued by me concerning this. Copies of the regulations contained in the Geneva Convention were contained in a file of regulations which was possessed by each unit; this was a comprehensive file covering the whole field of administrative matters. There is also a separate set of regulations concerning the treatment of prisoners-of-war, a new one issued by the War Minister, which the Demobilisation Minister can supply to you. I do not know whether these last instructions regarding prisoners-of-war were received after the commencement of the war with the United States, or not.

Report was required to be made to the Minister of War as to prisoners received; special men were responsible for such matters. I was informed that such a report was made. It was a record of names, rank and origin of the men, a complete record, and it was forwarded to the Minister of War, stating the number, nationality, and where they were kept. An inspection of prisoners-of-war was made while I was there. I do not remember who made it. On the whole, such matters



(UNREZU cont'd 3-13-46)

belong to the Minister of War, who has direct connection with it. I had no occasion to deal with prisoners-of-war. I was in a position quite different from that of commanders of overseas units in areas where prisoners are captured. A special bureau, the Military Affairs Bureau, promulgated the regulations regarding prisoners-of-war. The Foreign Ministry naturally deals with international affairs, but has no immediate connection with the treatment of prisoners-of-war. When the Red Cross asked Japan about prisoners-of-war, such a question comes through the Foreign Office so that the Foreign Minister knows about it. It then goes to the War Minister, which is the department dealing with prisoners-of-war. The Chief of Staff has nothing to do with prisoners-of-war. In 1942 I was Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army. I do not remember whether I ever issued an order regarding the treatment of Allied flyers, if they should become prisoners-of-war. There was no occasion for me to issue such an order. I never thought of prisoners being sent to Manchuria, as this place was remote from the field. I gave no authority to any one else to issue orders for me regarding prisoners-of-war, and do not believe that this was done.

Some regulations regarding the treatment of prisoners-of-war were issued by the Vice-Minister of War and some by the Minister of War himself. I cannot tell you which were issued by the Minister and which were issued by the Vice-Minister; I can, however, refer you to the Minister of War. The Chief of Staff has nothing to do with prisoners-of-war, and so did not issue any orders. When I was Chief of Staff I issued no such orders; I never was concerned with such matters. The Chief of Staff has no authority on the subject. The Army, Division or Regimental Commander is responsible for prisoners-of-war immediately upon their capture. The Chief of Staff has nothing to do with such affairs; staff officers have no authority to command. The chain of command does not go through the Chief of Staff; it goes through the Army. I do not know whether the Foreign Minister inspected, or was required to inspect, camps of prisoners. I can give you no information regarding such matters. The Foreign Minister can get his information regarding prisoners-of-war from the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau of the Minister of War. The man in charge of this bureau was Lt.-General TANURA; I do not know who held this office before him. The War Ministry is dealing strictly with obtaining information; the handling of prisoners is a matter which is controlled by the chain of command. This chain of command extends through regimental division and army commanders up to the Emperor. I did not see the pictures of the death march of Bataan.



INTERROGATION OF  
GENERAL UMEZU, Yoshihiro  
(continued)

DATE AND TIME: 13 March 1946. 1000-1145 hours.

PLACE : Room 753, Meiji Building, Tokyo.

PRESENT : General UMEZU, Yoshihiro

Commander B. M. McMullin, USNR Interrogator  
2nd Lt. Paul Fujii, AUS; Interpreter

(assisted by Mr. MAKI, Itsu of the Japanese  
First Demobilization Ministry, Ichigaya  
Ushinome-ku, Tokyo).

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Commander  
B. M. McMullin to 2nd Lt. Fujii:

Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you  
will truly and accurately interpret and translate  
from English into Japanese and from Japanese  
into English, as may be required of you, in this  
proceeding?

Lt. Fujii: I do.

STATEMENT BY GENERAL UMEZU:

A complete chronological statement of my military and official  
record is as follows:

- 1904: Appointed Second Lieutenant upon graduating from Military  
Academy and at once went to the front and served during the  
Russo-Japanese War, being promoted to the rank of First  
Lieutenant and then Captain, and at the close of the war  
being made Company Commander.
- 1912: I was assigned to duty with the General Staff at Tokyo in  
connection with Intelligence and Maneuvers, during which  
period I rose from captain to major and to lieutenant colonel.
- 1924: I was promoted to Colonel and became Commander of the Third  
Infantry Regiment.



(UMKZU cont'd 3-13-46)

- 1926: I was assigned to the General Staff and was engaged in preparing organizational plans.
- 1928: I was sent to the War Ministry in connection with this same work.
- 1930: I was promoted to the rank of Major General and was given command of the First Infantry Brigade, First Division, Tokyo.
- 1931: I was sent to the General Staff and was made chief of its General Affairs Department, dealing with administrative affairs, personnel and finance.
- 1934: I was made commander of the China Expeditionary Forces, the forces first sent to China following the Boxer Rebellion for the purpose of preserving peace and protecting residents there, headquarters of which were at Tientsin.
- 1935: I was promoted to Lt. General and was made Commander of the Second Division.
- 1936: I was made Vice-Minister of War.
- 1938: I was made Commander of the First Army in China, and was stationed at Taiyuan in Shansi Province.
- 1939: I was made Commander of the Kwantung Army and at the same time Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo.
- 1940: I was promoted to the rank of General. During all this time I was on duty in Manchukuo, my chief purpose being to prevent war between Russia and Japan until the signing of the Neutrality Agreement between those countries, and after that, to see that the treaty was preserved, and that peace was maintained in the north.
- 1944: July 18 1944 I was made Chief of Staff. This appointment is not made at the request of the individual concerned, but the War Minister, having made a preliminary selection, then confers with the then Chief of Staff, and with the Director of Military Education (KYOIKU SOKAN), and subject to the approval of the Emperor, makes the appointment. The person selected is then notified by telegram and is obliged to accept the appointment.

At this time, General TOJO was the Minister of War and was acting as his own Chief of Staff both for the Army and Navy. The Chief of Staff is normally in charge of operations, and the people felt that the duties of Chief of Staff should not be commingled with the duties of the War Minister who is charged with administration. The populace was aroused because of the duplicity of the positions held by General TOJO, dissatisfaction



(UMEZU cont-d 3-13-46)

being aroused because of the unsatisfactory progress of the war. The particular or immediate event which brought about the change was the SAIPAN campaign.

1945: I remained as Chief of Staff until the end of the war.

September 2, 1945 together with the Minister for Foreign Affairs who represented the government, I signed as the representative of the Armed Services, the terms of surrender aboard the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

I have received as decorations:

The Fifth Order of the Golden Kite for services in the Russo-Japanese War as a First Lieutenant;

The First Order of the Rising Sun, largely for length of service;

The First Order of the Sacred Treasure for meritorious service as Commander of the Japanese Army at Tientsin.

The Second Order of the Golden Kite was given to me for my services in connection with the China Incident, but I understand that has been repealed.

There were many reasons why Japan failed to win the war. The most important one, in my opinion, being the insufficiency of her natural resources of power, materials and personnel. The population and those who participated in the war did not know of this lack of material strength. When the populace realized that the materials of the enemy were vastly superior, they lost confidence. Freedom of speech was suppressed and this, together with heavy restrictions placed upon the people, resulted in dissatisfaction and caused an internal breakdown. From a strictly military standpoint, the war was lost because of the inferiority of Japanese Ordnance equipment, particularly lack of adequate planes and transportation facilities.

Our manufacturing proceeded satisfactorily until Guadalcanal but we lost so many ships in connection with this operation that from this point forward we were not able to transport our materiel out to the fighting units.



(UMEZU cont'd 3-13-46)

We broke down in the field of Logistics whereas the Americans were able to transport their materials where they wished. The breakdown was in sea transportation and this was the fundamental cause of our defeat. We did not have air transportation in sufficient amounts to affect the lack of sea transportation.

Labor was obtained by ordering people to Government plants and even by the employment of school children. If Japan had had limitless natural resources however, our plant capacity was not sufficient to keep us supplied.

Manchuria's industrial strength was relatively infantile; it was all in the future and could not be used at that time by Japan. Manchuria's production was primarily production of raw material. There was some transportation difficulty between Manchuria and Japan but it was not great, until near the close of the war, when it was threatened.

The Russians entered Manchuria only during the last two or three days of the war during which time our troops, owing to the fact that the war was known to be about over, offered little opposition.

My instructions to the Manchurian Army were always to do the right thing.

INTERROGATION ADJOURNED UNTIL

FRIDAY, at 10. A.M.



INTERROGATION OF

GENERAL Yoshihiro UMEZU (Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 11 March 1946. 10.15-1200 hours  
PLACE : MEIJI BUILDING, Room 753, Tokyo, Japan.  
PRESENT : General Yoshihiro UMEZU  
John F. Barry Interrogator  
Mr. Mahr Itsu Interpreter  
(of the Japanese First Demobilization  
Ministry) supervised by  
Hoshimiya Dave T/4

Additional Statements made by General UMEZU.

Oath of Interpreter administered by Mr. Barry:

Mr. Barry : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English as may be required of you in this proceeding?

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ )  
T/4 HOSHIMIYA ) I do.

Additional Statements made by General UMEZU :

There were no records of the Ho-UMEZU agreement even though the newspapers have reported there were records. That in 1938 I was Commanding General of the First Army in North China, I had no connection with forming the Peking Provisional Government. I heard about it that a Chinese Wang Ku Bin came to Peking and created a Provisional Government and that he was to be in charge of the administration. I met him when I was commander of Japanese troops through Wang Fu who was Charge d'Affaires under Wang Ku Bin. I had no dealings with the Peking Provisional Government although the Commander of the Area Army Commanding General SUGIYAMA had dealings.



I was never in Manchuria as Commanding General of the 8th Infantry Division. I went there as Commanding General of the Kwantung Army in 1939. At the same time I was concurrently Ambassador to Manchuria. My chief duty as Ambassador was to handle diplomatic relations with Manchuria. My monthly salary was 16.0 yeh. I received my salary from the army. About half came from the foreign office as my salary for Ambassador. I received no special funds either in my capacity as Ambassador or as General. Business expenses at the embassy for housekeeping and salaries were contributed by the Japanese Counsel; a man named HANAWA. I do not know anything about the expense of the embassy or the amount of the fund. I received no fund for entertainment purposes or any special funds. I received no other money besides my salary except the bonus given by the Emperor at the end of the year to all officers. No taxes were collected from Japanese soldiers or the personnel of the embassy.

As Ambassador to Manchuria I reported to the Foreign Office. After the Ministry for Greater East Asia was created I reported to that office in place of the Foreign Office because Manchuria came under the jurisdiction of the new ministry. I do not know the purposes of the formation of the Greater East Asia Ministry. The only thing I know is that Manchuria came under its jurisdiction. I knew that one reason was to simplify the management of affairs concerning China and Manchuria. I still made some reports to the foreign office but all reports I made there I also made to the Greater East Asia Ministry.

When I went to Manchuria there was a conflict called the Nomonhan affair between the Japanese and the Russians - a question of whether they trespassed across the border between outer Mongolia and Manchuria. I settled the matter though diplomatically speaking the affair was settled between the Japanese Foreign Office and Moscow though on the spot Commanders of both armies had negotiations. The first duty I had was to settle the conflict and after that my duty was to maintain neutrality between Japan and Russia - thereafter during my tenure in Manchuria everything was peaceful and no fighting broke out. The terms of the agreement were first an Armistice stopping fighting and then a demarkation of the boundary line. Committees were created by the Japanese and Russians in order to determine boundary line. The fighting was actually stopped about the 16th or 18th of September 1939. Where I said Russians above, I meant Mongolians. At the conference held on the Armistice there were Russians and Japanese officers, it was held near Nomonhan, no representatives of Manchurians were present. In December 1939 I came back to Tokyo and discussed with the foreign minister the question of the boundary between outer Mongolia and Manchuria - the whole boundary between Manchuria and Russia. Through diplomatic agencies the question of boundaries was taken up with Russia. I made no concrete proposal to the foreign minister only the principle that settlement of boundaries would avoid conflict. The actual boundary discussions were held about a year later. The representatives of the Manchurian Government at these boundary discussions was the one in charge of political affairs. Manchuria and outer Mongolia actually



UMEZU continued

the borderline. The Russians and Japanese participated as Technical advisers. The Japanese Technical Advisers were army officers of the Kwantung army under my command. I do not remember who they were - they were not very important.

I am not as powerful a person as referred to in books but I exerted myself to create peace in Manchuria and tried to satisfy Manchuria.

On May 25, 1945, I became ex-officio a member of the Supreme War Council. I learned about the terms of the Potsdam declaration when I was chief of staff sometime about August as a result of a translated broadcast from San Francisco. I read the terms - they were discussed before the War Council consisting of Prime Minister SUZUKI, War Minister ARAMI, Navy Minister YONAI, Minister of Foreign Affairs TOGO, Chief of Navy TOGODA and myself Chief of Army Staff. Frequent meetings were held sometimes at the Premier's official residence and sometimes at the Imperial Household Dept. Everybody knew the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The term War Criminal as it appears in the Declaration was discussed sometimes, though not too much attention was paid to it because these people whose duty it was to fight who would not fight would be punished by the Government. I mean soldiers - I mean that if there were such people who mistreated prisoners of war or those who violated international custom or those who acted against humanity by which I mean plundering or murdering etc. those people should be punished by Japan herself, without waiting for the others to take care of the matter.

I was present at the War Council Conferences but no others when the Emperor sometimes attended but no discussion of the term "War Criminal" took place while he attended. The others on the War Council to my mind had the same opinion as to my understanding of the term "War Criminal" - No one was mentioned as being a war criminal. I know no one directly under me who should be considered a war criminal. I do not know about Field Commanders.

Adjourned to 10 o'clock Wednesday  
March 13, 1946.



CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Yoshijiro UESU

Date and Time: 7 March 1946, 0930-1130 hours.

Place : Room 753, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo, Japan.

Interrogators: Commander B. M. McCallin, USNR  
Mr. John F. Barry

Interpreter : Mr. Denis Kildoyle  
(Mr. Kildoyle was assisted by Mr. MAKI Itsu, of the  
Japanese First Demobilization Ministry, Ichigaya  
Ushinma-ku, Tokyo.)

Interpreter sworn.

Additional statements:

The Ho-Uesu Pact did not involve an exchange of documents, but was merely verbal. I was at that time the Commander of the Japanese Army stationed at Tientsin, and Ho Ying Chin was the Chairman of the Military Branch stationed in North China. We knew each other very well and we conferred as friends. The main purpose was to make North China well ordered and free from terror and intrigue. That is what we talked about. We had informal talks about this. At that time in North China there were many cases of looting and plundering of Japanese and Chinese who were friendly to the Japanese, and we wanted to stop this. At that time, there were in North China Chinese troops belonging to the central army, and there was a "political training department" /Seiji Kuren-bu/ and there were Chinese gendarmarie. Chinese belonging to such groups instigated Chinese civilians to commit atrocities, sometimes employing bribery. As long as such an instigation existed North China could not be peaceful, so Ho Ying Chin and I agreed that we should remove the cause of such undesirable elements and such darkness from North China. In 1900, at the time of the Boxer Uprising, China realized that it was wrong to exclude foreigners from the country, so they promised to purge the bad elements and severely punish them. In view of this agreement, I proposed to remove the undesirable elements from North China. I never proposed to drive away the regular Chinese Army from regions in which China had sovereignty. The regular Chinese troops remained. The troops which were withdrawn were the Central Second Division and the Third Corps of Gendarmarie. They were withdrawn



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Interrogation of General Yeshijiro Umesu - 7 March 1946

- 2 -

on the orders of Ho Ying Chin from the regions around Peiping and Tientsin. This was done on the orders of Ho Ying Chin himself. I had from 2,000 to 3,000 troops, and Ho had from 20,000 to 30,000. The Central Section Division which moved out had about 10,000 men, and the Third Corps of the Gendarmerie had about 100 to 200 men. The civilian wrongdoers were rounded up and punished by China. This occurred on June 4, 1935. I did not force this matter. In that same year, in August, I came back. There may have been some bad Chinese who put undue emphasis on this matter. I assume this because after I came home political matters became more complicated in North China. My desire was to ask the Japanese residents to respect the Chinese. The area involved was in the province of Hebei in the neighborhood of Peiping and Tientsin. There were no battles between the Chinese and the Japanese, as I was in hearty cooperation with Wang Fu, Chinese statesman, and Ho Ying Chin, the head of the military branch. Ho Ying Chin is still living, and only the other day I heard from him - he talked to a friend of mine who stays in Peiping, a newspaper man named ISHIKAWA, who conveyed to me his message. He is now living in Nanking, I believe.

There were many suspected war criminals, and that started us talking about prisoners of war. This matter of ill-treatment of prisoners of war is really a matter contrary to what I have in mind. I was surprised, because in the past war prisoners were well treated, as, for instance, the Russians in the last war, who appreciated our kind treatment. I could therefore not understand how such atrocities could occur. The matter has now come out in the trials. I talked with the two generals named at the last examination during the war. I never knew about the atrocities during the war. One case came up when I was talking to General ANAMI. According to the principals of Japanese chivalry, as well as international custom, prisoners must be well treated. I was just discussing general principles - the topic came up that there would be trials of those who had ill treated prisoners. When this was mentioned I said that if such cases were really brought about, I advised the War Minister to punish the offenders severely. We were not waiting for the Allies to act - we were acting independently. I talked about this topic two times. I never expected such a thing as atrocities. It was not my duty to investigate such matters. The head of



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Interrogation of General Yoshijiro Umesu - 7 March 1946

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each camp is in charge of the prisoners of war there. I do not know who appoints the heads of the camps. As Chief of Staff, I was concerned with operations, not with administration. The care of prisoners of war came under the Minister of War. I heard nothing concerning prisoners of war from the Minister of War. The Chief of Staff is not, as to this matter, superior to the Minister of War. From the standpoint of administration, the Minister of War is chief. I always entertained the principle of treating well people who have done their duty to their homeland. The care of prisoners of war was entrusted to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau /Furyo Joho Kyo-ku/ in the outer circle of the Ministry of War, not in the regular military organization. The Military Affairs Section /Gunsu Kyoku/ has joint responsibility. I am, however, in no position to give you the facts as to this; SATO, Kenryo, was Chief of the Military Affairs Section /Gunsu Kyoku/, and I cannot clearly describe his functions. I can refer you to Lt. General YOSHIZUMI at the Demobilization Ministry for information as to this. Lt. General TAMURA is now head of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau; it is now known as the Prisoners of War Investigation Department /Furyo Chosabu/. There were two Lt. Generals HYEMURA, both in charge of Army commands, one in the Kanto, the other in the Kyushu district. Both are living. I cannot tell you what records were kept with reference to the Prisoners of War. These records were kept in the Prisoners of War Information Bureau /Furyo Chosabu/. I do not know whether the records are there now. I never received any protests or complaints about the treatment of prisoners; such complaints may have been made to other departments. I never inspected any Prisoner of War Camps, nor did any of my subordinates do so. When General TOJO was War Minister, I was in Manchuria, so I do not know as to any declaration made by General TOJO as to the Geneva Convention. In the Japanese Army instructions were given, in the course of ordinary training, that the Geneva Convention be observed. I never had a liaison with the Red Cross myself. That comes under the War Minister. I became Chief of Staff in July 1944. This was when General TOJO quit as Prime Minister. I got reports from and issued orders to field commanders. The Chief of Staff got only reports connected with operations - as to administrative matters the reports go to the War Minister. Such reports do not all come to me. I received some reports, of course, as for example reports concerning the supply of munitions. I never received reports from field commanders concerning prisoners of war, although I did get reports concerning the number of prisoners of war. Such matters go to the War Minister, and to me only by the way. I do not remember issuing any orders concerning prisoners of war, although I may have issued orders as to the transportation



Continued

Interrogation of General Yoshijiro Umezumi - 7 March 1946

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and movement of prisoners of war; as to that, I do not really remember. In the field the field army commander has the responsibility of sending prisoners to a safe place; I have no clear memory, but I do not think I ever gave any orders regarding the movement of prisoners of war. When I was Chief of Staff there were no facilities for the transportation of prisoners of war. In regions, such as New Guinea, there was difficulty in feeding our own soldiers, hence it may be possible that the prisoners there were not fed properly. If such cases happened, all should have equal amounts of food. I took it for granted that this would be done. The problems concerning prisoners of war were not discussed by the War Ministers; during my tenure of office no case concerning them arose. The matter of prisoners of war and the observance of the Geneva Convention was mentioned to Generals ANAMI and SHIMOGUCHI casually and incidentally. If I had heard of any violation of the rules regarding prisoners of war I would have gone to the Minister of War concerning it, as he would be responsible.

I issued no orders for the destruction of any records regarding prisoners of war.

The interrogation was then discontinued, to be resumed on Monday, 11 March 1946, at 9:30 A. M.

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CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Yoshijiro UMEZU

Date and Time: 5 March 1946, 1000-1140 hours.

Place : Meiji Auditorium, 7th Floor, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo, Japan.

Interrogators: Commander B. M. McMullin, USNR  
John F. Barry

Translator : Mr. Denis Kildoyle.

Additional statements made by General UMEZU:

I was born in Kiushu in 1882; I was educated at the Japanese Military Preparatory School and at the Japanese Military Academy, having been at the latter institution in 1902 and 1903, graduating in 1903. I then went to the Army as a probationary officer. After six months, I was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry with the 3rd Regiment of Infantry. I was in China during the Russo-Japanese War. I then attended the War College for two or three years, and was then, in 1912, attached to general headquarters as a captain. I went to Europe in 1913, and traveled in various countries, including France, England, Denmark, and Germany. I was in Germany at the outbreak of the war. I was in Denmark during the year 1916 and was in Switzerland as Military Attache. I then returned to Japan. I then made two or three additional trips to Europe. I was then in General Headquarters at the War Office. I became a Major General in August 1930, and was made brigade commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and remained in command for one year. The brigade was stationed at Tokyo during this period. I then went to General Headquarters and was Chief of General Affairs /Sombu/ and remained there for two years. During this period the trouble started in Manchuria. According to reports sent by the Kwantung Army, Chinese troops had attacked railway lines, and the Kwantung Army took measures in self-defense. This trouble began very soon after I became Chief of General Affairs /Sombu/. The operation and intelligence sections would know more about the facts of the outbreak - I do not remember who was in intelligence, but Lt. General TATEKAWA, who died just a few days ago, was in operations. I think that Major General HASHIMOTO was in the Intelligence Section. Officers of lower grade who were then in Intelligence were a Colonel MATSUMOTO. I cannot supply any additional names. Without looking at the records I do not



Continued

Interrogation of General Yoshijiro Umesu - 5 March 1946

- 2 -

remember the facts well. The Commander of the Kwantung Army was a Lt. General HONJO, and the Chief of Staff was Major General MIYAKE. The cause of the Manchurian trouble was the anti-Japanese actions of the Chinese, and their oppression of the Japanese business men, which gradually expanded and resulted in the outbreak. The Lytton Commission investigated this matter, and I consider that the cause of the outbreak given in their report is fairly accurate. However, I have not read the Lytton Commission's report closely and completely, and what I have said is largely hearsay. I know Captain NAKAMURA, who was killed in Manchuria. The assassination of Captain NAKAMURA had a great effect upon the younger element in the Army, and in Japan generally. Captain NAKAMURA was on a mission to observe conditions in northwestern Manchuria near the Mongolian border. This was being done with the permission of CHIANG Tso Lin, the war lord of Manchuria. Conditions were peaceful there, and NAKAMURA must have thought that he was on a peaceful mission. It was said that he was killed by Chinese irregulars. Captain NAKAMURA went to observe the geographical features, the inhabitants, etc. Since he was killed, no report was received from him, so that it is not possible to say exactly what he was doing. I do not know what information as to general conditions was wanted by the Army, nor do I know why Captain NAKAMURA was sent to Manchuria. I know nothing about the Mukden Incident except that there was a report which stated that the train had been attacked and that the Japanese Army was taking defensive measures, which I thought was natural and unavoidable at the time.

I was later in command of the Kwantung Army. I had nothing to do with the so-called Taku Peace Pact, and can give no information concerning it. The Ho-Umesu Pact was negotiated through the Commander of the Japanese Forces in Tientsin, and there were no actual documents signed. The Ho-Umesu Pact covered the withdrawal of Chinese troops and the elimination of anti-Japanese activities and terrorism from the district. The Chinese were advised that the Boxer Treaty provided for the elimination of all anti-foreign activities by the Chinese. Ho-Ying Ching on the Chinese side would be able to give you more details concerning this pact. Negotiations were carried on by my chief of staff; I was in Tientsin and Ho Ying Ching was in Peiping. Colonel SAKAI was Chief of Staff. There was actually nothing written - the Chinese merely agreed to accept the advice tendered to them as previously mentioned, and this was called the Ho-Umesu Pact. I kept no diary and have no record of the matter. A report was made, I believe, to Tokyo, by cable, mentioning the terms of the agreement.



Continued

Interrogation of General Yoshijiro Umesu - 5 March 1946

- 3 -

AS to the Comintern Pact, I had no connection with that. I was appointed Vice Minister of War about March 1936 and held that office about two years. The Anti-Comintern Pact was negotiated during this period. It was negotiated by the Foreign Office. I was not consulted with regard to it. I do not remember being present at a dinner given by Prince KAN-IN commemorating the signing of this pact. I have been to several dinners by Prince KAN-IN, however. The reasons which brought about the execution of the pact was the protection of peace in Japan against the inroads of Communism.

I became Chief of Staff in July 1944. As such, I had no connection with prisoners of war, as it is the War Ministry which is concerned with such matters. The Minister of War was General SUGIYAMA; later General ANAMI was Minister of War. I do not know just what the policy of Japan with relation to prisoners of war was, but believe Japan tried to adhere as closely as possible to the international treaties and to treat her prisoners kindly. From ancient times, the Japanese have considered that prisoners should be treated as guests. These prisoners were all heroes whose war duties had ended, and I do not think that any high Japanese officer would condone ill-treatment of prisoners. Prisoners of war were handled by the Prisoners Bureau in the War Ministry. I advised the War Minister, at one time, that ill treatment of war prisoners should not be tolerated and that the perpetration of atrocities should be severely punished. These matters were mentioned to General ANAMI and to General SHIMOMURA when they were in the War Ministry.

The interrogation was suspended at this point, to be resumed on Thursday, 6 March 1946, at 9:30 A. M.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION OBTAINED IN  
INFORMAL INTERVIEW WITH GEN. Yoshitiro UMEZU

Date: 27 February 1946  
Place: Room 753, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo.  
A. W. Woodcock, Interrogator  
H. Teshima, Interpreter  
(Member of Liaison Committee for Demobilization  
Ministry)

In an informal interview with General UMEZU on this date, he stated that he was born in 1882. In September 1931 at the time of the Mukden incident he was Chief of the Administrative Division of the General Staff at Tokyo. He learned of the advance of the Japanese troops after the Mukden incident by telegram.

His Division had nothing to do with troop movements.

His understanding is that the Chinese started the trouble and that the Japanese acted in self-defense.

Being shown the comment of Mr. USHIRA to Mr. Doonan, Councillor of the American Embassy on October 17, 1941 as contained at page 691 of Volume II of the "Foreign Relations of the United States with Japan, 1931-41," to wit: "In his opinion General UMEZU, Chief of the Kwantung Army, was the most influential man in the Army and would come forward when needed," General UMEZU stated that he was not familiar with that statement, but thought he was not so important as Mr. USHIRA believed.

He continued Chief of the Administrative Division through 1931-32-33.

From March 1934 to August 1935 he was Chief of Garrison Troops, about 3,000, with headquarters at Tientsin.

In August of 1935 he was appointed to command the Second Division in Northern Japan, in which position he continued until March of 1936 when he went to the War Department as Vice Minister of War.

He continued as such until June of 1938 when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the First Army in North China. The purpose of this command, consisting of three to five divisions, was to garrison occupied territory in North China, particularly in Shansi Province. (The General sketched on the attached map the location of his command. The cross-lines indicate the position to which it was contracted.)



Gen. Yoshijiro UMEZU, 27 Feb 46

In September 1939 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, which he continued to be until July 1944, when he returned to the General Staff and continued there through 1945.

He was appointed to command the Kwantung Army when the Nomonhan Incident (a clash between Russian and Japanese troops between Mongolia and Manchuria) was nearing completion. He settled the clash about September 18, 1939.

While in command in Northern China his troops participated in minor engagements with the Chinese.

Direct Questions by Mr. Woodcock:

- Q. During your career in the Army have you been in Japanese politics at all?
- A. No.
- Q. Have you been associated with any factions in the Japanese Army which were attempting to influence the foreign policy of Japan?
- A. By nature I don't like to touch politics. I was away from the Central Government, and it is my firm belief that a soldier should have no connection with politics. I had no connection at all with political affairs.
- Q. Were you at all familiar with General ARAKI?
- A. As an officer I have known him, but he was not especially close to me.
- Q. What do you say about General MASAKI?
- A. Just the same as General ARAKI. Some people say that I was in the other group to the ARAKI and MASAKI group, but I joined no group at all, and I had been serving as a soldier only.
- Q. Did you favor the occupation of China by the Japanese troops at the time that you were appointed to the command of the Army in North China in June of 1938?
- A. I had the firm belief that Japan should not fight against China and at the time when the China incident occurred I was of the opinion that the fighting must be stopped, and I tried to do my best to settle the incident locally. Unfortunately the result was quite contrary to my expectation.
- Q. When war broke out with the United States you were Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. Did you have any opinion as to Japan's wisdom in attacking the United States at that time?



Gen. Yoshijiro UMEZU, 27 Feb 46

- A. I personally had no connection with the war between Japan and America. I did not know anything about the war until after it was started. I came to know about it after it was started, and at the time I was of the opinion that Japan should not fight against America. My firm belief was that Japan was out of the war against China and to fight against America also was very dangerous. As I told you, I went to Kwantung and Manchuria to settle down the Honanhan incident. Even the war against China I thought should be stopped. I was quite against war between Japan and America.
- Q. What were your relations with General TOJO?
- A. I am senior to him by two or three years, but I had no connection with TOJO's Cabinet or TOJO himself, because when the Cabinet was formed I was away from Tokyo and knew nothing about it.
- Q. Were you friendly with Prince KONOYE?
- A. No.
- Q. At the time of the Shanghai Incident in the summer of 1937 I notice you were serving as Vice Minister of War. Will you state whether you approved that incident and what was your attitude towards it.
- A. I had the opinion that the incident must be settled locally and should not be enlarged. There was some objection to this policy to settle locally and not to enlarge, but from the very beginning to the very last I had this opinion.
- Q. Will you state if you know why in June of 1938 you were appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the First Army in North China?
- A. There was no special reason, but at the time the Minister was changed so, accordingly, the Vice Minister had to be changed and I had the new post. That may be the only reason.
- Q. Who was the Minister who went out of office at that time? And who was his successor?
- A. The Minister was General SUGIYAMA, and his successor was General ITAGAKI.
- Q. I have asked you about your career since September 1931. Will you describe briefly your military education and your life prior to September 1931?
- A. (For the detailed outline of his life, Mr. Woodcock summarizes, with the approval of General UMEZU, the following:  
He graduated at the Military Academy in 1903.

Attained the grade of Major General in 1930, having served extensively as Military Attache, Language Student, and on the General Staff in the meantime.



March 5, 7, 11, 13, 16, 27, 1946

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Yoshijiro UMEZU

Date and Time: 5 March 1946, 1000-1140 hours.

Place : Meiji Auditorium, 7th Floor, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo, Japan.

Interrogators: Commander B. M. McMullin, USNR  
John F. Barry

Translator : Mr. Denis Kildoyle.

Additional statements made by General UMEZU:

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Interrogation of General Yoshijiro Umezu - 5 March 1946

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Continued

Interrogation of General Yoshijiro Umezu - 5 March 1946

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The interrogation was suspended at this point, to be resumed on Thursday, 6 March 1946, at 9:30 A. M.

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CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Yoshijiro UMEZU

Date and Time: 7 March 1946, 0930-1130 hours.

Place : Room 753, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo, Japan.

Interrogators: Commander B. M. McMullin, USNR  
Mr. John F. Barry

Interpreter : Mr. Denis Kildoyle  
(Mr. Kildoyle was assisted by Mr. MAKI Itsu, of the  
Japanese First Demobilization Ministry, Ichigaya  
Ushimome-ku, Tokyo.)

Interpreter sworn.

Additional statements:

The Ho-UmezU Pact did not involve an exchange of documents, but was merely verbal. I was at that time the Commander of the Japanese Army stationed at Tientsin, and Ho Ying Chin was the Chairman of the Military Branch stationed in North China. We knew each other very well and we conferred as friends. The main purpose was to make North China well ordered and free from terror and intrigue. That is what we talked about. We had informal talks about this. At that time in North China there were many cases of looting and plundering of Japanese and Chinese who were friendly to the Japanese, and we wanted to stop this. At that time, there were in North China Chinese troops belonging to the central army, and there was a "political training department" /Seiji Kunren-bu/ and there were Chinese gendarmerie. Chinese belonging to such groups instigated Chinese civilians to commit atrocities, sometimes employing bribery. As long as such an instigation existed North China could not be peaceful, so Ho Ying Chin and I agreed that we should remove the cause of such undesirable elements and such darkness from North China. In 1900, at the time of the Boxer Uprising, China realized that it was wrong to exclude foreigners from the country, so they promised to purge the bad elements and severely punish them. In view of this agreement, I proposed to remove the undesirable elements from North China. I never proposed to drive away the regular Chinese Army from regions in which China had sovereignty. The regular Chinese troops remained. The troops which were withdrawn were the Central Second Division and the Third Corps of Gendarmerie. They were withdrawn



Continued

Interrogation of General Yoshijiro Umezu - 7 March 1946

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on the orders of Ho Ying Chin from the regions around Peiping and Tientsin. This was done on the orders of Ho Ying Chin himself. I had from 2,000 to 3,000 troops, and Ho had from 20,000 to 30,000. The Central Section Division which moved out had about 10,000 men, and the Third Corps of the Gendarmerie had about 100 to 200 men. The civilian wrongdoers were rounded up and punished by China. This occurred on June 4, 1935. I did not force this matter. In that same year, in August, I came back. There may have been some bad Chinese who put undue emphasis on this matter. I assume this because after I came home political matters became more complicated in North China. My desire was to ask the Japanese residents to respect the Chinese. The area involved was in the province of Hepei in the neighborhood of Peiping and Tientsin. There were no battles between the Chinese and the Japanese, as I was in hearty cooperation with Wang Fu, Chinese statesman, and Ho Ying Chin, the head of the military branch. Ho Ying Chin is still living, and only the other day I heard from him - he talked to a friend of mine who stays in Peiping, a newspaper man named ISHIKAWA, who conveyed to me his message. He is now living in Nanking, I believe.

There were many suspected war criminals, and that started us talking about prisoners of war. This matter of ill-treatment of prisoners of war is really a matter contrary to what I have in mind. I was surprised, because in the past war prisoners were well treated, as, for instance, the Russians in the last war, who appreciated our kind treatment. I could therefore not understand how such atrocities could occur. The matter has now come out in the trials. I talked with the two generals named at the last examination during the war. I never knew about the atrocities during the war. One case came up when I was talking to General ANAMI. According to the principals of Japanese chivalry, as well as international custom, prisoners must be well treated. I was just discussing general principles - the topic came up that there would be trials of those who had ill treated prisoners. When this was mentioned I said that if such cases were really brought about, I advised the War Minister to punish the offenders severely. We were not waiting for the Allies to act - we were acting independently. I talked about this topic two times. I never expected such a thing as atrocities. It was not my duty to investigate such matters. The head of



Continued

Interrogation of General Yeshijiro Umezu - 7 March 1946

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each camp is in charge of the prisoners of war there. I do not know who appoints the heads of the camps. As Chief of Staff, I was concerned with operations, not with administration. The care of prisoners of war came under the Minister of War. I heard nothing concerning prisoners of war from the Minister of War. The Chief of Staff is not, as to this matter, superior to the Minister of War. From the standpoint of administration, the Minister of War is chief. I always entertained the principle of treating well people who have done their duty to their homeland. The care of prisoners of war was entrusted to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau /Furyo Jeho Kye-ku/ in the outer circle of the Ministry of War, not in the regular military organization. The Military Affairs Section /Gummu Kyoku/ has joint responsibility. I am, however, in no position to give you the facts as to this; SATO, Kenryo, was Chief of the Military Affairs Section /Gummu Kyoku/, and I cannot clearly describe his functions. I can refer you to Lt. General YOSHIZUMI at the Demobilization Ministry for information as to this. Lt. General TAMURA is now head of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau; it is now known as the Prisoners of War Investigation Department /Furyo Chosabu/. There were two Lt. Generals UYEMURA, both in charge of Army commands, one in the Kanto, the other in the Kyushu district. Both are living. I cannot tell you what records were kept with reference to the Prisoners of War. These records were kept in the Prisoners of War Information Bureau /Furyo Chosabu/. I do not know whether the records are there now. I never received any protests or complaints about the treatment of prisoners; such complaints may have been made to other departments. I never inspected any Prisoner of War Camps, nor did any of my subordinates do so. When General TOJO was War Minister, I was in Manchuria, so I do not know as to any declaration made by General TOJO as to the Geneva Convention. In the Japanese Army instructions were given, in the course of ordinary training, that the Geneva Convention be observed. I never had a liaison with the Red Cross myself. That comes under the War Minister. I became Chief of Staff in July 1944. This was when General TOJO quit as Prime Minister. I got reports from and issued orders to field commanders. The Chief of Staff got only reports connected with operations - as to administrative matters the reports go to the War Minister. Such reports do not all come to me. I received some reports, of course, as for example reports concerning the supply of munitions. I never received reports from field commanders concerning prisoners of war, although I did get reports concerning the number of prisoners of war. Such matters go to the War Minister, and to me only by the way. I do not remember issuing any orders concerning prisoners of war, although I may have issued orders as to the transportation



Continued

Interrogation of General Yoshijiro Umezumi - 7 March 1946

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and movement of prisoners of war; as to that, I do not really remember. In the field the field army commander has the responsibility of sending prisoners to a safe place; I have no clear memory, but I do not think I ever gave any orders regarding the movement of prisoners of war. When I was Chief of Staff there were no facilities for the transportation of prisoners of war. In regions, such as New Guinea, there was difficulty in feeding our own soldiers, hence it may be possible that the prisoners there were not fed properly. If such cases happened, all should have equal amounts of food. I took it for granted that this would be done. The problems concerning prisoners of war were not discussed by the War Ministers; during my tenure of office no case concerning them arose. The matter of prisoners of war and the observance of the Geneva Convention was mentioned to Generals ANAMI and SHIMOGURA casually and incidentally. If I had heard of any violation of the rules regarding prisoners of war I would have gone to the Minister of War concerning it, as he would be responsible.

I issued no orders for the destruction of any reports regarding prisoners of war.

The interrogation was then discontinued, to be resumed on Monday, 11 March 1946, at 9:30 A. M.

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INTERROGATION OF

GENERAL Yoshijiro UMEZU (Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 11 March 1946. 10.15-1200 hours

PLACE : MEIJI BUILDING, Room 753, Tokyo, Japan.

PRESENT : General Yoshijiro UMEZU

John F. Barry Interrogator  
 Mr. Mahr Itsu Interpreter  
 (of the Japanese First Demobilization  
 Ministry) supervised by  
 Hoshimiyea Dave T/4

Additional Statements made by General UMEZU.

Oath of Interpreter administered by Mr. Barry:

Mr. Barry : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English as may be required of you in this proceeding?

T/4 HOSHIMIYEA )  
 ) I do.

Additional Statements made by General UMEZU :

There were no records of the Ho-UMEZU agreement even though the newspapers have reported there were records. That in 1938 I was Commanding General of the First Army in North China, I had no connection with forming the Peking Provisional Government. I heard about it that a Chinese Wang Ku Bin came to Peking and created a Provisional Government and that he was to be in charge of the administration. I met him when I was commander of Japanese troops through Wang Fu who was Charge d'Affairs under Wang Ku Bin. I had no dealings with the Peking Provisional Government although the Commander of the Area Army Commanding General SUGIYAMA had dealings.



UMEZU continued

I was never in Manchuria as Commanding General of the 8th Infantry Division. I went there as Commanding General of the Kwantung Army in 1939. At the same time I was concurrently Ambassador to Manchuria. My chief duty as Ambassador was to handle diplomatic relations with Manchuria. My monthly salary was 1600 yeh. I received my salary from the army. About half came from the foreign office as my salary for Ambassador. I received no special funds either in my capacity as Ambassador or as General. Business expenses at the embassy for housekeeping and salaries were contributed by the Japanese Counsel; a man named HANAWA. I do not know anything about the expense of the embassy or the amount of the fund. I received no fund for entertainment purposes or any special funds. I received no other money besides my salary except the bonus given by the Emperor at the end of the year to all officers. No taxes were collected from Japanese soldiers or the personnel of the embassy.

As Ambassador to Manchuria I reported to the Foreign Office. After the Ministry for Greater East Asia was created I reported to that office in place of the Foreign Office because Manchuria came under the jurisdiction of the new ministry. I do not know the purposes of the formation of the Greater East Asia Ministry. The only thing I know is that Manchuria came under its jurisdiction. I knew that one reason was to simplify the management of affairs concerning China and Manchuria. I still made some reports to the foreign office but all reports I made there I also made to the Greater East Asia Ministry.

When I went to Manchuria there was a conflict called the Nomohan affair between the Japanese and the Russians - a question of whether they trespassed across the border between outer Mongolia and Manchuria. I settled the matter though diplomatically speaking the affair was settled between the Japanese Foreign Office and Moscow though on the spot Commanders of both armies had negotiations. The first duty I had was to settle the conflict and after that my duty was to maintain neutrality between Japan and Russia - thereafter during my tenure in Manchuria everything was peaceful and no fighting broke out. The terms of the agreement were first an Armistice stopping fighting and then a demarkation of the boundry line. Committees were created by the Japanese and Russians in order to determine boundary line. The fighting was actually stopped about the 16th or 18th of September 1939. Where I said Russians above, I meant Mongolians. At the conference held on the Armistice there were Russians and Japanese officers, it was held near Nomarban, no representatives of Manchurians were present. In December 1939 I came back to Tokyo and discussed with the foreign minister the question of the boundry between outer Mongolia and Manchuria - the whole boundry between Manchuria and Russia. Through diplomatic agencies the question of boundaries was taken up with Russia. I made no concrete proposal to the foreign minister only the principle that settlement of boundaries would avoid conflict. The actual boundary discussions were held about a year later. The representatives of the Manchurian Government at these boundary discussions was the one in charge of political affairs. Manchuria and outer Mongolia actually



UMEZU continued

the borderline. The Russians and Japanese participated as Technical advisers. The Japanese Technical Advisers were army officers of the Kwantung army under my command. I do not remember who they were - they were not very important.

I am not as powerful a person as referred to in books but I exerted myself to create peace in Manchuria and tried to satisfy Manchuria.

On May 25, 1945, I became ex-officio a member of the Supreme War Council. I learned about the terms of the Potsdam declaration when I was chief of staff sometime about August as a result of a translated broadcast from San Francisco. I read the terms - they were discussed before the War Council consisting of Prime Minister SUZUKI, War Minister ARAMI, Navy Minister YONAI, Minister of Foreign Affairs TOGO, Chief of Navy TOGODA and myself Chief of Army Staff. Frequent meetings were held sometimes at the Premier's official residence and sometimes at the Imperial Household Dept. Everybody knew the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The term War Criminal as it appears in the Declaration was discussed sometimes, though not too much attention was paid to it because these people whose duty it was to fight who would not fight would be punished by the Government. I mean soldiers - I mean that if there were such people who mistreated prisoners of war or those who violated international custom or those who acted against humanity by which I mean plundering or murdering etc. those people should be punished by Japan herself, without waiting for the others to take care of the matter.

I was present at the War Council Conferences but no others when the Emperor sometimes attended but no discussion of the term "War Criminal" took place while he attended. The others on the War Council to my mind had the same opinion as to my understanding of the term "War Criminal" - No one was mentioned as being a war criminal. I know no one directly under me who should be considered a war criminal. I do not know about Field Commanders.

Adjourned to 10 o'clock Wednesday  
March 13, 1946.



Certificate of Interpreter

I, HOSHIMIYA, Dave T/4, 39935310  
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the ~~original~~ **statements** ~~and~~ ~~statements~~ given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such **statements** ~~statements~~, consisting of 3 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

H Dave Hoshimiy

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13 day of March, 1946.

John F Barry  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, JOHN F. BARRY hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing ~~statement and that the~~ **statement and that the** transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

J F Barry

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (✓) JOHN F. BARRY, Civilian,  
and \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on 11th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (✓) GENERAL Yoshijiro UMEZU, and according to HOSHIMEYIA, Dave T/4, Interpreter, gave the foregoing ~~and~~ **statement** set forth therein.

March 13 1946

Place

TOKYO

Date

John F Barry



INTERROGATION OF  
GENERAL UMEZU, Yoshijiro  
(continued)

DATE AND TIME: 13 March 1946. 1000-1145 hours.  
PLACE : Room 753, Meiji Building, Tokyo.  
PRESENT : General UMEZU, Yoshijiro  
Commander B. M. McMullin, USNR Interrogator  
2nd Lt. Paul Fujii, AUS; Interpreter  
(assisted by Mr. MAKI, Itsu of the Japanese  
First Demobilization Ministry, Ichigaya  
Ushimome-ku, Tokyo).

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Commander  
B. M. McMullin to 2nd Lt. Fujii:

Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you  
will truly and accurately interpret and translate  
from English into Japanese and from Japanese  
into English, as may be required of you, in this  
proceeding?

Lt. Fujii: I do.

STATEMENT BY GENERAL UMEZU:

A complete chronological statement of my military and official  
record is as follows:

- 1904: Appointed Second Lieutenant upon graduating from Military Academy and at once went to the front and served during the Russo-Japanese War, being promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant and then Captain, and at the close of the war being made Company Commander.
- 1912: I was assigned to duty with the General Staff at Tokyo in connection with Intelligence and Maneuvers, during which period I rose from captain to major and to lieutenant colonel.
- 1924: I was promoted to Colonel and became Commander of the Third Infantry Regiment.



(UMEZU cont'd 3-13-46)

- 1926: I was assigned to the General Staff and was engaged in preparing organizational plans.
- 1928: I was sent to the War Ministry in connection with this same work.
- 1930: I was promoted to the rank of Major General and was given command of the First Infantry Brigade, First Division, Tokyo.
- 1931: I was sent to the General Staff and was made chief of its General Affairs Department, dealing with administrative affairs, personnel and finance.
- 1934: I was made commander of the China Expeditionary Forces, the forces first sent to China following the Boxer Rebellion for the purpose of preserving peace and protecting residents there, headquarters of which were at Tientsin.
- 1935: I was promoted to Lt. General and was made Commander of the Second Division.
- 1936: I was made Vice-Minister of War.
- 1938: I was made Commander of the First Army in China, and was stationed at Taiyran in Shansi Province.
- 1939: I was made Commander of the Kwantung Army and at the same time Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo.
- 1940: I was promoted to the rank of General. During all this time I was on duty in Manchukuo, my chief purpose being to prevent war between Russia and Japan until the signing of the Neutrality Agreement between those countries, and after that, to see that the treaty was preserved, and that peace was maintained in the north.
- 1944: July 18 1944 I was made Chief of Staff. This appointment is not made at the request of the individual concerned, but the War Minister, having made a preliminary selection, then confers with the then Chief of Staff, and with the Director of Military Education (KYOIKU SOKAN), and subject to the approval of the Emperor, makes the appointment. The person selected is then notified by telegram and is obliged to accept the appointment.

At this time, General TOJO was the Minister of War and was acting as his own Chief of Staff both for the Army and Navy. The Chief of Staff is normally in charge of operations, and the people felt that the duties of Chief of Staff should not be commingled with the duties of the War Minister who is charged with administration. The populace was aroused because of the duplicity of the positions held by General TOJO, dissatisfaction



(UMEZU cont-d 3-13-46)

being aroused because of the unsatisfactory progress of the war. The particular or immediate event which brought about the change was the SAIPAN campaign.

1945: I remained as Chief of Staff until the end of the war.

September 2, 1945 together with the Minister for Foreign Affairs who represented the government, I signed as the representative of the Armed Services, the terms of surrender aboard the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

I have received as decorations:

The Fifth Order of the Golden Kite for services in the Russo-Japanese War as a First Lieutenant;

The First Order of the Rising Sun, largely for length of service;

The First Order of the Sacred Treasure for meritorious service as Commander of the Japanese Army at Tientsin.

The Second Order of the Golden Kite was given to me for my services in connection with the China Incident, but I understand that has been repealed.

There were many reasons why Japan failed to win the war. The most important one, in my opinion, being the insufficiency of her natural resources of power, materials and personnel. The population and those who participated in the war did not know of this lack of material strength. When the populace realized that the materials of the enemy were vastly superior, they lost confidence. Freedom of speech was suppressed and this, together with heavy restrictions placed upon the people, resulted in dissatisfaction and caused an internal breakdown. From a strictly military standpoint, the war was lost because of the inferiority of the Japanese Ordnance equipment, particularly lack of adequate planes and transportation facilities.

Our manufacturing proceeded satisfactorily until Guadalcanal but we lost so many ships in connection with this operation that from this point forward we were not able to transport our materiel out to the fighting units.



(UMEZU cont'd 3-13-46)

We broke down in the field of Logistics whereas the Americans were able to transport their materials where they wished. The breakdown was in sea transportation and this was the fundamental cause of our defeat. We did not have air transportation in sufficient amounts to affect the lack of sea transportation.

Labor was obtained by ordering people to Government plants and even by the employment of school children. If Japan had had limitless natural resources however, our plant capacity was not sufficient to keep us supplied.

Manchuria's industrial strength was relatively infantile; it was all in the future and could not be used at that time by Japan. Manchuria's production was primarily production of raw material. There was some transportation difficulty between Manchuria and Japan but it was not great, until near the close of the war, when it was threatened.

The Russians entered Manchuria only during the last two or three days of the war during which time our troops, owing to the fact that the war was known to be about over, offered little opposition.

My instructions to the Manchurian Army were always to do the right thing.

INTERROGATION ADJOURNED UNTIL

FRIDAY, at 10. A.M.



Certificate of Interpreter

I, PAUL FUJII, 2nd Lt. AUS, 0-1339627  
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the ~~question~~ ~~statements~~ ~~and~~ ~~answers~~ given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such ~~statements~~ ~~and~~ ~~answers~~ consisting of Four pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Paul S. Fujii

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of March, 1946.

B. M. McMullin Comdr USNR  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, B. M. McMullin hereby certify that I acted as my own as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing ~~statements~~ statements and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (v/p) B. M. McMullin Commander, USNR.

and \_\_\_\_\_

certify that on 13th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (v/p) GENERAL Yoshijiro UMEZU and according to 2nd Lt. Paul FUJII, Interpreter, gave the foregoing ~~and~~ ~~answers~~ ~~and~~ ~~statements~~ ~~set~~ ~~forth~~ ~~therein.~~ statements

Tokyo, Japan

Place March 13, 1946.

Date \_\_\_\_\_

B. M. McMullin, Comdr, USNR 122  
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INTERROGATION OF

GENERAL UMEZU, Yoshijiro

(continued)

DATE AND TIME: 15 March 1946. 1000-1215 hours.

PLACE : Room 753, Meiji Building, Tokyo.

PRESENT : General UMEZU, Yoshijiro

Commander B. M. McMullin, USNR Interrogator  
J. F. Barry and E. M. Hyder Interrogators  
2nd Lt. Paul Fujii, AUS; Interpreter

(assisted by Mr. MAKI, Itsu of the Japanese  
First Demobilization Ministry, Ichigaya  
Ushimome-ku, Tokyo).

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Commander  
B. M. McMullin to 2nd Lt. Fujii:

Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you  
will truly and accurately interpret and trans-  
late from English into Japanese and from  
Japanese into English, as may be required of you,  
in this proceeding?

Lt. Fujii: I do.

STATEMENTS BY GENERAL UMEZU:

As to General DOIHARA, I had an opportunity to be with him on  
several occasions. When I was Commander of the Kwantung Army, General  
DOIHARA served under me as Commander of the 5th Army, which was in 1939.  
When I was in China as Commander of the 1st Army, General DOIHARA was  
Division Commander of the 14th Division. He had been in China for a  
long time. Just before the outbreak of the Chinese-Japanese conflict  
he was engaged in some political activities, the names of which I do not  
clearly know, except that he had a connection with TOKUMO KIKAN, or  
Special Duty Agency, the purpose of which I do not know, and the head-  
quarters of which were in Mukden. When General DOIHARA was a young  
officer he was in China for sometime and was well versed in Chinese  
affairs. I had no close connection with him. He started his career  
in China under General BANZAI, Rihachiro, who was Military Attache  
at Peking.

As to General UGAKI, he was my senior by some 14 or 15 years;  
he is now 77 or 78 years of age. He was well known as a War Minister  
and occupied the office twice; the second time was about 1912. He had  
no connection with the China incident; and about that time he was the



(UMEZU cont'd 3-13-46)

Governor General at Chosen. SUGIYAMA was a younger man than I, and about 1937 and 1938 was Minister of War and was Minister of War again about 1940. From 1940 to 1943 he was Chief of Staff, and was out of office about a half year, during which time General TOJO served as Chief of Staff. As to General MOTO, he is about 2 years my junior and held the position of Inspector General of Military Training in Japan. He became Commander of the Kwantung Army and was at the same time Japanese Ambassador to Manchuria, having been the first person to occupy these two offices at the same time. He had no connection with any political activity, and was in that respect quite different from General UGAKI.

As to SATO, I do not remember him.

As to HOSHINO, he was in Manchuria as Chief of General Affairs, Bureau of the General Staff. As to OKA, he was a Vice-Admiral, and was Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, a bureau concerned with the administration of naval affairs.

As to <sup>TANAKA</sup>TENAKA, Shinichi, he served as Chief, Department of the General Staff, concerned with operations, under General SUGIYAMA, for 2 years from about 1941 to 1943.

I have no information concerning the fortification of the Mandate Islands.

HIROTA was put out of the cabinet in 1938 due to inharmony within the Cabinet, arising from a question as to whether the Diet should be dissolved.

I wore my uniform for approximately one month after the war, as it was the custom to do so until formally demobilized.

My ideas as to the surrender of Japan were that as a soldier my honor compelled me to fight to the end, and for that reason I did not favor the surrender, but as Chief of Staff, my position was different. I could see that the war was very difficult and that it should be settled with diplomacy. On board the U. S. S. MISSOURI with me was Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru.

My idea as to the future of Japan's maintaining a military force is that for offensive purposes it is not necessary to keep military forces, but to maintain peace and neutrality it is necessary to keep some military power. As we look over the whole world, as in the case of Belgium and Switzerland, we see that the facts prove that statement. If there were such an organization as the United Nations, we could maintain our neutrality without armed forces. The big problem, even in the United Nations Organization, is to maintain harmony among the powers. At the present moment, we notice some inharmony. As to the future of Japan internationally, I believe it will be better for her to maintain a position of neutrality among the great powers, such as the United States, the Soviet, and China, and become a buffer State. This is a most difficult matter to accomplish. As to the



(UMEZU cont'd 3-13-46)

economic future of Japan, many difficulties lie before us. Our population is too great to permit us to maintain a policy of economic self-sufficiency. To solve our economic problems, it will be necessary to depend upon imports and exports in the exchange of goods. Economic stability will be difficult to restore, but we will have to restore it. If every country in the world would adopt a policy of peace and permit the exchange of goods and make plans for the enjoyment of happiness by the peoples of the world, why should not Japan enjoy happiness and restoration also?

I do not remember who had charge of prisoners-of-war when I was Commander of the Kwantung Army. Prisoners-of-war were under the supervision of the 1st Section, which between 1939 and 1943 was under the command of TAMURA, and after 1943 of MATSUMURA, the dates given being approximate. The treatment of prisoners-of-war was governed by regulations prescribed by the Minister of War. Those regulations dealing with prisoners-of-war were general. I also told them to observe international regulations and treat the prisoners kindly. I did not give definite instructions. Some Allied prisoners were captured by the Kwantung Army. None of these were air troops, but all were ground troops who were captured in Manchuria. They were American and British and numbered about two or three hundred. The prisoners were still in Manchuria when I left there. They had been captured in the south and sent to Manchuria on orders of the Minister of War, and were kept at a prison camp in Mukden. Things at this camp went smoothly. I inspected it once, and conditions were such that the prisoners were satisfied. Most of them worked in factories. I do not remember what they were making in the factories; they were not making war materials; possibly they were working in textile factories. There were no air raids while I was in Manchuria. Kwantung was remote from the war and no Allied flyers came there. I never issued any instructions regarding the treatment of Allied flyers, if any should be forced down. The regulations regarding prisoners were international regulations fixed by the Geneva Convention and, therefore, prisoners-of-war should be treated according to those covenants. Of course, we should prevent their escape and protect them. The Japanese officers were instructed to obey these orders, and no orders were issued by me concerning this. Copies of the regulations contained in the Geneva Convention were contained in a file of regulations which was possessed by each unit; this was a comprehensive file covering the whole field of administrative matters. There is also a separate set of regulations concerning the treatment of prisoners-of-war, a new one issued by the War Minister, which the Demobilization Minister can supply to you. I do not know whether these last instructions regarding prisoners-of-war were received after the commencement of the war with the United States, or not.

Report was required to be made to the Minister of War as to prisoners received; special men were responsible for such matters. I was informed that such a report was made. It was a record of names, rank and origin of the men, a complete record, and it was forwarded to the Minister of War, stating the number, nationality, and where they were kept. An inspection of prisoners-of-war was made while I was there. I do not remember who made it. On the whole, such matters



(UMEZU cont'd 3-12-46)

belong to the Minister of War, who has direct connection with it. I had no occasion to deal with prisoners-of-war. I was in a position quite different from that of commanders of overseas units in areas where prisoners are captured. A special bureau, the Military Affairs Bureau, promulgated the regulations regarding prisoners-of-war. The Foreign Ministry naturally deals with international affairs, but has no immediate connection with the treatment of prisoners-of-war. When the Red Cross asked Japan about prisoners-of-war, such a question comes through the Foreign Office so that the Foreign Minister knows about it. It then goes to the War Minister, which is the department dealing with prisoners-of-war. The Chief of Staff has nothing to do with prisoners-of-war. In 1942 I was Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army. I do not remember whether I ever issued an order regarding the treatment of Allied flyers, if they should become prisoners-of-war. There was no occasion for me to issue such an order. I never thought of prisoners being sent to Manchuria, as this place was remote from the field. I gave no authority to any one else to issue orders for me regarding prisoners-of-war, and do not believe that this was done.

Some regulations regarding the treatment of prisoners-of-war were issued by the Vice-Minister of War and some by the Minister of War himself. I cannot tell you which were issued by the Minister and which were issued by the Vice-Minister; I can, however, refer you to the Minister of War. The Chief of Staff has nothing to do with prisoners-of-war, and so did not issue any orders. When I was Chief of Staff I issued no such orders; I never was concerned with such matters. The Chief of Staff has no authority on the subject. The Army, Division or Regimental Commander is responsible for prisoners-of-war immediately upon their capture. The Chief of Staff has nothing to do with such affairs; staff officers have no authority to command. The chain of command does not go through the Chief of Staff; it goes through the Army. I do not know whether the Foreign Minister inspected, or was required to inspect, camps of prisoners. I can give you no information regarding such matters. The Foreign Minister can get his information regarding prisoners-of-war from the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau of the Minister of War. The man in charge of this bureau was Lt.-General TAMURA; I do not know who held this office before him. The War Ministry is dealing strictly with obtaining information; the handling of prisoners is a matter which is controlled by the chain of command. This chain of command extends through regimental division and army commanders up to the Emperor. I did not see the pictures of the death march of Bataan.



Certificate of Interpreter

I, Paul S. Fujii, 2d Lt. Inf. (AUS) 0-1339627  
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the ~~statements~~ <sup>statements</sup> ~~and answers~~ given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of four pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Paul S. Fujii

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March, 1946.

Bentley M. McMullin Cdr USNR 122297  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Comdr. Bentley M. McMullin, hereby certify that I acted as my own ~~as~~ stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing ~~questions and answers~~ <sup>statements</sup>, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Bentley M. McMullin

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) Bentley M. McMullin, Comdr., U.S.N.R. 122 297  
and John F. Barry, Elton M. Hyde Civ.

certify that on the 16 day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (us) General UMEZU, Yoshijiro, and according to 2nd Lt. Paul Fujii, AUS, Interpreter, gave the foregoing ~~answers to the several questions~~ <sup>statements</sup> set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan  
Place

March 16, 1946  
Date

Bentley M. McMullin Cdr USNR 122297  
John F. Barry



SUMMARY OF INFORMATION OBTAINED IN  
INFORMAL INTERVIEW WITH GEN. Yoshijiro UMEZU

Date: 27 February 1946  
Place: Room 753, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo.  
A. W. W. Woodcock, Interrogator  
H. Teshima, Interpreter  
(Member of Liaison Committee for Demobilization  
Ministry)

*/Sōmu Buchō/* In an informal interview with General UMEZU on this date, he stated that he was born in 1882. In September 1931 at the time of the Mukden incident he was Chief of the Administrative Division\* of the General Staff at Tokyo. He learned of the advance of the Japanese troops after the Mukden incident by telegram.

His Division had nothing to do with troop movements.

His understanding is that the Chinese started the trouble and that the Japanese acted in self-defense.

Being shown the comment of Mr. USHIBA to Mr. Dooman, Councillor of the American Embassy on October 17, 1941 as contained at page 691 of Volume II of the "Foreign Relations of the United States with Japan, 1931-41," to wit: "In his opinion General UMEZU, Chief of the Kwantung Army, was the most influential man in the Army and would come forward when needed," General UMEZU stated that he was not familiar with that statement, but thought he was not so important as Mr. USHIBA believed.

He continued Chief of the Administrative Division through 1931-32-33.

From March 1934 to August 1935 he was Chief of Garrison Troops, about 3,000, with headquarters at Tientsin.

In August of 1935 he was appointed to command the Second Division in Northern Japan, in which position he continued until March of 1936 when he went to the War Department as Vice Minister of War.

He continued as such until June of 1938 when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the First Army in North China. The purpose of this command, consisting of three to five divisions, was to garrison occupied territory in North China, particularly in Shansi Province. (The General sketched on the attached map the location of his command. The cross-lines indicate the position to which it was contracted.)



Gen. Yoshijiro UMEZU, 27 Feb 46

In September 1939 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, which he continued to be until July 1944, when he returned to the General Staff and continued there through 1945.

He was appointed to command the Kwantung Army when the Nomonhan Incident (a clash between Russian and Japanese troops between Mongolia and Manchuria) was nearing completion. He settled the clash about September 18, 1939.

While in command in Northern China his troops participated in minor engagements with the Chinese.

Direct Questions by Mr. Woodcock:

- Q. During your career in the Army have you been in Japanese politics at all?
- A. No.
- Q. Have you been associated with any factions in the Japanese Army which were attempting to influence the foreign policy of Japan?
- A. By nature I don't like to touch politics. I was away from the Central Government, and it is my firm belief that a soldier should have no connection with politics. I had no connection at all with political affairs.
- Q. Were you at all familiar with General ARAKI?
- A. As an officer I have known him, but he was not especially close to me.
- Q. What do you say about General MASAKI?
- A. Just the same as General ARAKI. Some people say that I was in the other group to the ARAKI and MASAKI group, but I joined no group at all, and I had been serving as a soldier only.
- Q. Did you favor the occupation of China by the Japanese troops at the time that you were appointed to the command of the Army in North China in June of 1938?
- A. I had the firm belief that Japan should not fight against China and at the time when the China incident occurred I was of the opinion that the fighting must be stopped, and I tried to do my best to settle the incident locally. Unfortunately the result was quite contrary to my expectation.
- Q. When war broke out with the United States you were Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. Did you have any opinion as to Japan's wisdom in attacking the United States at that time?



Gen. Yoshijiro UMEZU, 27 Feb 46

- A. I personally had no connection with the war between Japan and America. I did not know anything about the war until after it was started. I came to know about it after it was started, and at the time I was of the opinion that Japan should not fight against America. My firm belief was that Japan was out of the war against China and to fight against America also was very dangerous. As I told you, I went to Kwantung and Manchuria to settle down the Nomonhan incident. Even the war against China I thought should be stopped. I was quite against war between Japan and America.
- Q. What were your relations with General TOJO?  
A. I am senior to him by two or three years, but I had no connection with TOJO's Cabinet or TOJO himself, because when the Cabinet was formed I was away from Tokyo and knew nothing about it.
- Q. Were you friendly with Prince KONOYE?  
A. No.
- Q. At the time of the Shanghai Incident in the summer of 1937 I notice you were serving as Vice Minister of War. Will you state whether you approved that incident and what was your attitude towards it.  
A. I had the opinion that the incident must be settled locally and should not be enlarged. There was some objection to this policy to settle locally and not to enlarge, but from the very beginning to the very last I had this opinion.
- Q. Will you state if you know why in June of 1938 you were appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the First Army in North China?  
A. There was no special reason, but at the time the Minister was changed so, accordingly, the Vice Minister had to be changed and I had the new post. That may be the only reason.
- Q. Who was the Minister who went out of office at that time? And who was his successor?  
A. The Minister was General SUGIYAMA, and his successor was General ITAGAKI.
- Q. I have asked you about your career since September 1931. Will you describe briefly your military education and your life prior to September 1931?  
A. (For the detailed outline of his life, Mr. Woodcock summarizes, with the approval of General UMEZU, the following:  
He graduated at the Military Academy in 1903.

Attained the grade of Major General in 1930, having served extensively as Military Attache, Language Student, and on the General Staff in the meantime.