

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO 234  
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 187

PLACE: Tokyo  
DATE : 19 October 45  
25 October 45

Division of Origin: Manpower, Food, and Civilian Supplies.

SUBJECT: Manpower Requirements of Navy.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

YOSHIDA	- Captain	- Materials Division
MIZOTA	- Mr	- Materials Division
UEDA	- Comdr	- Labor Division

Where interviewed: Navy Department

Interrogator: Lt B. A. Bagdon

Interpreter: Lt Deane and Mr Nelson

Allied Officers Present: Lt Deane

- SUMMARY:
1. General Outline.
  2. Review of Outline
  3. Number of Workers.
  4. Training Programs
  5. Deferrals.
  6. Utilization of Overage Men and Students.
  7. Utilization of Prisoners of War and Foreigners.
  8. Inducements to attract workers.
  9. Production stimulation.
  10. Wages and hours.
  11. Results of War.
  12. Miscellaneous.
  13. Evaluation.



## I N T E R R O G A T I O N

### Interview with Captain YOSHIDA:

1. GENERAL: In its efforts to investigate the importance manpower played in the Japanese Navy's production and maintenance requirements during World War II, the Manpower Division of the Survey has requested detailed statistics covering the Navy's labor requirements, during the period 1931-1945, information concerning measures taken to insure a plentiful supply of labor, data on wages, hours, working conditions, living conditions, and information on methods used to attract workers and stimulate production.

2. REVIEW OF OUTLINE: Captain YOSHIDA, Chief of the Materials Division, Commander UEDA, Chief of the Labor Division, Mr MIZOTA, Assistant to Captain YOSHIDA, Lt Deane, USSBS interpreter, and the writer reviewed the request in detail. Explanations were given for each phase of the request and it was agreed that Captain YOSHIDA assemble and furnish this information in Japanese by Thursday, 25 October. It was further agreed that Mr MIZOTA assist Lt Deane and another USSBS interpreter translate the information and documents which will be furnished.

3. NUMBER OF WORKERS: Captain YOSHIDA estimated the number of workers employed by the Navy Department with the use of an index number as follows:

- Base Year - 100 - Before China Incident (1937)
- 200 - Just before the Great East Asia War (end of 1941).
- 300 - End of war (summer of 1945)

Detailed statistics of the Navy's civilian manpower requirements during the period 1931 to 1945 were not available. Records had been destroyed both by Allied bombing and by the Japanese Navy Department. However, in August, 1945, there were 687,658 workers which included 48,349 Koreans and 34,715 Formosans.



Of these, 481,358 had been commandeered (drafted or conscripted). The division by sex was 570,957 male and 116,701 female.

4. TRAINING PROGRAMS: Apprenticeship schools were established at every Naval activity for the training of skilled workers, foremen and supervisors. Non-commissioned officers, naval assistant engineers and other non-commissioned staff officers were trained at schools established at the Kure Navy Yard, the First Naval Technical Arsenal and the First Naval Fuel Depot. At these schools the workers were taught the various techniques of ship building, engineering construction, ordnance and lubrication engineering. The course of study required approximately 3 years. Other training courses required from 1 to 2 years. The general employees were usually trained by spot coaching and quality testing. All training programs were discontinued in August 1945.

5. DEFERMENTS: The Navy took second place to the Army as far as authority for the deferment of civilian workers from military service was concerned. As a result of the Army's broad authority, the Navy suffered a manpower shortage especially in the fields of ship building and aircraft production.

6. UTILIZATION OF OVERAGE MEN AND STUDENTS: The Navy established a policy of requesting no workers over the age of 45 years. Students, comprising a major portion of its manpower pool, were trained in groups at Navy Arsenals and plants under the guidance of their school teachers and the Navy's skilled workers. After thorough training, the students were assigned to light jobs; heavy labor and dangerous work were excluded whenever possible. After one year of experimentation, a work day of 10 hours was established. Wages were paid in a lump sum to the school teacher who indirectly supervised the work of the entire group of students. The rate of pay varied



from 40 yen a month for students of the first or second year class of middle schools to 70 yen a month for students of college and universities. After the first year, students became an important source of labor and performed very satisfactorily when their skill improved. At the Kawatana Navy Yard and the Omura Arsenal, students comprised a majority of the workers. In order to maintain their morale and stimulate production, special awards were made to groups and to individual students. According to Captain YOSHIDA, students were more productive when their teacher "pitched in" (worked). Female students were more reliable and productive than male students.

7. UTILIZATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND FOREIGNERS:

Prisoners of War were employed only in public work projects and at Kawaminami Ship Yards; no prisoners of war were employed in Navy Yards. Approximately 48,000 Koreans and 36,000 Formosans were employed in various Naval establishments. A majority was assigned to various construction corps and Naval fuel depots throughout Japan. Approximately 7,500 Formosans were given special technical training at the Koza Arsenal and were afterward employed there, at the Aeronautical Research Arsenal and the Yokusuka Naval Yard. No special distinction was made between foreigners and Japanese laborers as far as pay was concerned; in the case of coal mining, they were granted better treatment than the Japanese miners in order to make them settle down. Although Koreans proved to be a very valuable source of labor supply, the shortage of transportation facilities reduced the rate at which they were brought to Japan after June, 1945.

8. INDUCEMENTS TO ATTRACT WORKERS: In order to attract civilian workers to Naval establishments, various inducements such as overtime pay, extra food allotments, free transportation, medical attention and recreation were introduced by the Navy. Generally, overtime was paid at the same rate of pay as for regular hours. According to Captain YOSHIDA, this



was one mistake which was made by the Navy - he felt that a bonus or time and a half for overtime would have attracted more and better workers to the Navy. Breakfast and supper were provided to the workers at a minimum charge, but meals served at midnight and on special duty days were issued by the Navy at no charge at all. Free transportation for the workers from home to the factory was furnished. The Government also furnished free transportation for the student workers; seasonal tickets at a discount were available to all other workers. When factories were far distant from the homes of the workers, the Navy commandeered train, boat or bus transportation for this purpose. Various forms of recreation were established in each Navy Yard and plant; plots of grounds were made available for vegetable gardening; movies, plays and various types of sports were promoted for the welfare of civilian workers. Finally, the Navy established the Mental Training Society for the purpose of developing culture among its workers.

9. WAGES AND HOURS: All Naval Arsenals and plants were operated on a 10 hour shift which was made up of  $9\frac{1}{4}$  hours of actual work and 45 minutes for lunch and rest. Female employees worked  $8\frac{1}{2}$  hour shifts which consisted of  $7\frac{3}{4}$  hours of actual work and 45 minutes for lunch and rest. The average overtime worked by both male and female employees was 2 hours and for all night work or 7 hours continual overtime work, one days rest was granted. The scale of pay ranged from 40 sen a day for the lowest class unskilled worker, to 5 yen 50 sen a day for the first class worker; the maximum daily wage for skilled workers and foremen was approximately 15 yen a day.

11. RESULTS OF WAR:

(a) Casualties: According to Captain YOSHIDA, the number of casualties was insignificant. There are no statistical data to support his statement.



(b) Number Made Idle and Man Hours Lost: During Allied bombings, whenever an air raid signal was sounded, plants, arsenals and Navy Yards would completely suspend operations and workers would seek shelter. There were instances when factories would shut down for the duration of an entire shift and sometimes for full days. This was especially true when raids were made by Allied Carrier Task Force planes. After April 1945, however, the dispersal of plants into the country and the gradual conversion to underground factories greatly reduced the number of workers made idle and man hours lost.

(c) Dislocation of Labor: Workers of bombed and damaged plants were usually retained for the purpose of repair and the debris clearance work. Transporting workers to other plants and the reallocation of manpower after air raids never became a difficult problem for the Navy. However, the inadequacy of housing, food and transportation constituted a major problem. Also the problem of housing workers after their families were evacuated into the country developed into a major problem as bombing raids became more frequent. As a solution, the plan of keeping a majority of the workers within the premises of the factory was adopted; it proved very effective.

(d) Morale: Although difficulties in housing, food and transportation were brought about by Allied bombing, morale was always high; there was little terror caused by bombing.

(e) Labor Shortage: Shortages of manpower existed in all fields of Naval activity during the war and particularly in factories producing special attack weapons and aircraft motors. These shortages were usually a result of skilled workers in electric welding and finishing being drafted into the Army.



(f) Labor Surpluses: Although temporary surpluses existed as a result of changes in war plans, workers were usually retained at various plants for the purpose of resuming production. When more and more plants were destroyed in 1945, a surplus of skilled and unskilled workers developed.

12. CONCLUSIONS: According to Captain YOSHIDA, the Navy did not experience any major difficulty in maintaining a sufficient supply of labor; in fact, during 1943 and 1944, he claimed that they were operating at approximately 93 percent of requirements. Although they had numerous cases of laborers leaving to enter "black market" jobs, they did exercise a rigid control of labor. Absenteeism was a major problem which developed after our bombing raids were started.

13. EVALUATION: Since there were no statistical data submitted, the information given in this report should be considered the opinions of the Navy officials interviewed. The officials seemed very cooperative.