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THE FEASIBILITY OF INSTITUTING A DEPARTMENT HEAD SCREEN IN THE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY

by

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The Feasibility of Instituting a Department Head Screen In the Naval Special Warfare Community

by

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ABSTRACT

This effort explores the feasibility of establishing a Department Head Screen in the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Officer Community currently proposed by NMPC-413D, the NSW Detailer/Placement Officer. It looks at the current state of the NSW community, and through use of the Structured Accession Planning System for Officers (STRAP-O) model, projects the community from 1985 to 1991 both with and without a Department Head Screen, and compares the two. It reviews the response to the proposal from both Naval Special Warfare Groups and evaluates the pros and cons of the idea. Conclusions are then drawn and recommendations made.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is a thesis concerning the possible impact of creating a department head screen in the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) officer community. At the present, U.S. Navy unrestricted line (URL) officers of the same pay grade but of all warfare skills are considered as a single group for promotion purposes. Promotion selection boards are tasked with the job of picking the "best" officers for promotion to the next higher pay grade. These selection decisions are not made with regard for manpower requirements within specific URL subgroups or communities. [Ref. 1: p. 10]

Fitness reports are the basis of promotion decisions made by the selection board. In general, the Fitreps of Naval Special Warfare officers are substantially higher than personnel in other warfare specialties. This is due to the unique opportunities that Naval Special Warfare personnel are exposed to in the performance of their duties that their URL peers are not. Since Vietnam, Naval Special Warfare operations have become more strategic in nature and tasking. SEAL Platoon Commanders, Lieutenants (LT) and senior Lieutenant Junior Grades (LTJG), are assigned to virtually independent duty, representing Naval Special Warfare interests, often reporting directly to Flag Officers and Commander in

Chiefs. Relegating equivalent responsibility below the rank of Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) in other URL communities is an infrequent occurrence. Further, these Platoon Commanders repeatedly cross train and participate in major exercises with counterparts in NATO, SEATO, and other allied nations. This provides a steady flow of messages and letters of appreciation that are often routed through embassy and State Department channels who frequently add laudatory cover letters for jobs well done. Additionally, Platoon Commanders are called on to present demonstrations of operational capabilities for various members of the executive and legislative branches, and high level Department of Defense civilians. All of these positive factors are incorporated in Fitreps, and promotion boards have rewarded Naval Special Warfare Officers accordingly. The net result of this has created an excess of Lieutenant Commanders in the NSW rank pyramid.

Up to the current fiscal year (1985) this has not been a problem for the Naval Special Warfare community. Each unrestricted line community is "end strength" driven. As long as an individual URL community does not expand beyond its end strength the internal composition by rank may exceed the number of authorized billets for each rank, by using unfilled billets for a given rank from other URL communities. However, when a community approaches its end strength those pay grades with more personnel than authorized billets must be decreased. The Naval Special

Warfare community is at this point. The proposed solution is to institute a Department Head Screen in the NSW community. [Ref. 2] This will limit the number of NSW Lieutenants that will be able to fill department head billets. Not being assigned a department head billet will cause a greater number of Lieutenants to not be promoted to LCDR and if properly balanced with accessions will bring the number of NSW Lieutenant Commanders to within the authorized number and then remain at a steady state.

The present effort, using a systems perspective, will examine the size and structure of the Naval Special Warfare officer community and project rank strength from now thru 1991 using the Structured Accession Planning System for Officers (STRAP-O). STRAP-O is the model the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) currently uses to assess the feasibility of Navy officer manpower plans. [Ref. 3: p. 1] The proposal and the response to it by NSW community leaders will be examined in detail. Numbers of officers by rank from STRAP-O will be compared to current rank strength and the effect by rank will be shown. OP-413D estimates forty percent by year group at the Lieutenant level will be forced out of the NSW community. Career alternatives currently open to personnel in this 40% will be explored along with the effects on readiness and accessions in the Naval Special Warfare training pipeline and community.

It should be noted at the outset that the decision to create a Department Head Screen in the Naval Special Warfare Community was being debated throughout the writing of this thesis. Some points of view quoted or referenced were in a state of flux. Consequently, the final position of some commands/ commanding officers may be diametrically opposed to their original thoughts that are referenced herein. Due to time constraints this regretable situation was unavoidable. It is hoped the concerned commands understand this. Every effort was made to present an accurate picture of the subject with the information that was available at the time of writing.

II. BACKGROUND

This chapter presents the factors that form the setting for this effort in three sections: First, the Naval Special Warfare Officer Community as it is today; Second, an examination of the Department Head Screen proposal; Third, an explanation of the STRAP-O model and the reason it was used for this study.

A. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OFFICER COMMUNITY

Comprising less than 1% of the Unrestricted Line (URL) community the Naval Special Warfare Officer Community is rather unique compared to the other URL communities. A discussion of the Naval Special Warfare mission and community structure is relevant to understanding the type of individuals that make up this community. In any manpower decision affecting careers in the Naval Special Warfare community it is important to keep this in mind. The SEAL Team Mission Statement follows:

> "Conduct unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla, and clandestine operations in maritime areas and riverine environments; This includes but is not limited to the following: demolitions, intelligence collection, and training and advising friendly military and paramilitary forces in the conduct of naval special warfare. In particular, SEAL Teams are tasked with maintaining the capability to:
> 1. Destroy enemy shipping, harbor facilities, bridges, railway lines, and other installations in maritime areas and riverine environments.
> 2. Infiltrate and/ or exfiltrate agents, guerrillas, evaders, and escapees.
> 3. Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and other intelligence activities.

4. Accomplish limited counter-insurgence civic action tasks which are normally incidental to counter-guerrilla operations; possibilities include medical aid,elementary civil engineering activities, boat operations and maintenance, and basic education of the indigenous population.
5. Reconnaissance and clearance of the area from the 3.5 fathom curve to the high water mark on a prospective landing beach. Additional tasks include channel; location, marking and improvement, and assault wave guidance.
6. Organize, train, assist, and advise the United States, Allied, and other friendly military or paramilitary forces in the conduct of any of the above tasks." [Ref. 4: p. xiv]

This mission statement is a living document that continues to evolve as new taskings are received and new threats arise. This evolution is primarily driven by new technologies and new political situations.

While the general population has stereotyped the kind of individuals that voluntarily engage in this occupation as reckless and aggressive, research evidence suggests that team members are likely to be supportive of their superiors, have high emotional stability, are not aggressive, are outwardly friendly, are highly motivated in their work and in group efforts, and are not adverse to stressful situations. [Ref. 5: p. 8]

1. Naval Special Warfare Commands

The commands that make up the Naval Special Warfare community are shown in Figure 1. The Naval Special Warfare Groups and Units (NSWG's & NSWU's), Special Boat Squadrons and Units (SBR's & SBU's), and Naval Special Warfare Training Department (NSWTD) all have support of and to SEAL Teams as their primary Naval



Figure 1.

Naval Special Warfare Commands

Special Warfare mission. The SBR's actually have three primary Naval Special Warfare missions: SEAL insertion/ extraction support, Riverine Warfare, and Coastal Patrol and Interdiction (CP & I). It accomplishes this three part task with an assortment of specialized craft; 36-foot Seafox Special Warfare Craft-Light (SWCL), Mini-Armored Troop Carriers (ATC), rehulled River Patrol Boats (PBR), and 65-foot MK-III Sea Spectre Patrol Boats (PB). [Ref. 6: pp. 140,141] Due to the complexity of these platforms and their attendant propulsion and weapons systems officer billets in the SBR's and SBU's are jointly filled with Naval Special Warfare and Surface Warfare Officers. The significance of this will be seen in section III.

2. Naval Special Warfare Officer Billets

TABLE 1.

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY

RANK	INV	OVER	%OVER	BILT	PBILT	%INC	TOTAL
O-7	1	0	0%	1	0	0%	1
O-6	15	6	67%	9	5	56%	14
O-5	41	3	8%	38	4	11%	42
O-4	87	35	67%	52	7	13%	59
O-3	115	14	12%	101	69	68%	170
O-2	52	12	23%	84	47	56%	131
O-1	44	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	355*	70	25%	285	132	46%	417

INV = Current inventory
OVER = Current # of personnel over allowance
%OVER = Current % of personnel over allowance
BILT = Current # of authorized billets
PBILT = Profected billet increase FY86-FY90
%INC = % of billet increase
TOTAL = Total billets in FY90
* There are 34 non 1130 billets with 1130's assigned that are not counted against the Naval Special Warfare allowance of 285. Therefore, the community appears as 321. [Ref. 7]

The important facts to note from Table 1 are: The O-4 level is 67% overmanned now; The number of O-4 level billets will increase by only 13% thru 1990; The number of O-1 & O-2 level billets will increase by 56%; The number of O-3 level billets will increase by 68%. If the promotion system continues at its current rate the problem will increase.

3. Current Naval Special Warfare Career Path

A Department Head Screen can be seen in the current Naval Special Warfare career path shown in Figure 2. However, the term Department Head is a misnomer

in this instance. This tour is an Operations Officer tour in any one of the Teams, and although desireable for promotion, it is not mandatory. Assignment to one of these billets is on a first come first serve basis and is decided by the Naval Special Warfare Detailer/ Placement Officer. The billets are filled by senior Lieutenants and junior Lieutenant Commanders. Due to the small size of the Naval Special Warfare community both detailing and placement are performed by one individual. Executive Officer (XO) billets are filled by Lieutenant Commanders and Commanding Officer billets are filled by Commanders. Table 2 gives the current Department Head, Executive Officer, and Commanding Officer billets available to the Naval Special Warfare Community.

Since 1979 aspiring Naval Special Warfare officers in Year Group (YG) 1970 or junior have been advised to get as much operational (Platoon Commander) experience as possible, develop a subspecialty early, keep in the top 1% on Fitreps, and serve in an operations billet prior to screening for XO. [Ref. 9]

B. THE DEPARTMENT HEAD SCREEN PROPOSAL

The idea is to start, in the March 1986 ARS/ATS XO screening board for year groups 78-80, a Naval Special Warfare Department Head Screen. This initiative will modify the Naval Special Warfare career path and community structure. Each Lieutenant will be screened at the six, seven, and eight year point. [Ref.2] If successfully



Figure 2.

Naval Special Warfare Officer Professional Development Path [Ref. 8]

TABLE 2.

CURRENT DEPARTMENT HEAD, XO, CO BILLETS

Lieutenant Department Head Billets (18 Month Tours):

8 SDV/ SEAL Team Operations Officers
3 NSWU Operations Officers
3 NSWTD Department Heads
14 Billets/1.5 yr = 9.3 Billets/yr / 19 pers/YG = 49% opportunity

Lieutenant Commander CO/XO Billets (18 Month Tours):

8 SDV/ SEAL Team Executive Officers
3 SBU Commanding Officers (1)
3 NSWU Executive Officers
14 Billets/1.5 yr = 9.3 Billets/yr / 10 pers/YG = 93% opportunity

Commander CO Billets (27 Month Tours):

7 SDV/ SEAL Team Commanding Officers (2)
1 SBU Commanding Officer
3 NSWU Commanding Officers
11 Billets/2.25 yr = 4.8 Billets/yr / 5 pers/YG = 98% Opportunity

Captain Major Command Billets (24 Month Tours):

2 NSWG Commodores
2 Billets/2 yr = 1 Billet/yr / 3 pers/YG = 33% Opportunity (3)

Notes: (1) An XO tour.
(2) Does not include SEAL Team 6.
(3) Opportunities based on Year Group (YG) size which is based on historical attrition rates and promotion opportunities. [Ref. 10]

screened the Lieutenant will be assigned to a Department Head billet at the first opportunity. If the Lieutenant does not pass the screen he will be advised to remain operational and rescreen the following year. If the screen is failed three times the Lieutenant will not be competitive for advancement and would be advised to leave the service. Figure 3 depicts the proposed Naval Special Warfare career path.

Included in the main proposal is a second initiative to increase the current number of Naval Special Warfare CO/XO and Department Head billets by restructuring the Special Boat Units of each coast by making the Commanding Officer billets 1130 Lieutenant Commanders and the SBU Executive Officers 1130 Lieutenants. Table 3 is a list of the proposed billets based on the anticipated FY 1990 billet structure shown in Table 4.

C. THE STRUCTURED ACCESSION PLANNING SYSTEM FOR OFFICERS

The Structured Accession Planning System for Officers (STRAP-O) model was selected for this projection with the goal of confirming NMPC-413D's estimate. This estimate was arrived at through unique calculations based on information provided to NMPC-413D by NMPC-413. Other models could have been chosen, but due to the lack of data on, and not knowing the relationship between, all of the interrelated variables using a model other than STRAP-O could produce results with little or no creditability. On the other hand STRAP-O is a powerful, complex, tool that

RANK	YOS	TOURS
	26	
		SENIOR TOURS
CAPT	24	Major Shore Staffs Major Shore Command
		Subspecialty Utilization
	22	ADVANCED OPERATIONAL TOURS (4)
------		NSWG Commander Major UW Operational Staff
	20	THIRD SHORE/SENIOR OPERATIONAL TOURS
		Command of NSWU/SBR/SEAL TM/SDV TM
CDR	18	Major Shore Staff
		Senior Service College
	16	Subspecialty Utilization (3)
------		SECOND SHORE/INTERMEDIATE OPERATIONAL TOURS
	14	NSW/UW/Navy/Joint Staff Billets
		Postgraduate School/Junior Service College
LCDR	12	Subspecialty Utilization
		XO SEAL TM/SDV TM LCDR CO Billets (2)
	10	SECOND OPERATIONAL TOUR
------		Operations Officer SEAL TM/SDV TM/NSWTU
	8	Dept Head SBR/SBU/SDV/NSW/NSWTD
		FIRST SHORE TOUR
		Staffs PEP Postgraduate School
		SBR/NSWTD (Instructor)
LT	6	FIRST OPERATIONAL TOURS (1)
		Asst & Plt Commander SEAL and SDV TM
------	4	Special Boat Units
LTJG		
------	2	
ENS		SEAL Training NSWTD
------	0	

Notes: (1) NSW Department Head Screen years 6, 7, 8.
(2) XO Screen years 10-13.
(3) CO Screen years 15-18.
(4) Major Command Screen years 20-and on.

Figure 3.

Proposed Naval Special Warfare Officer Professional Development Path [Ref. 2]

TABLE 3.

PROPOSED DEPARTMENT HEAD, XO, CO BILLETS

Lieutenant Department Head billets (21 Month Tours):

9	SDV/ SEAL Team Operations Officers (1)
3	NSWU Operations Officers
6	SBU Executive Officers (2)
6	SBU Operations Officers
2	SBR Chief of Staff Officers (2)
2	SBR Operations Officers
2	SDV Material/Maintenance Officers
3	NSWTD Department Heads
33	Billets/1.75 yr = 18.8 Billets/yr = 59% Opportunity
	32 pers

Lieutenant Commander CO/XO Billets (18 Month Tours):

9	SDV/SEAL Team Executive Officers
6	SBU Commanding Officers (3)
3	NSWU Executive Officers
18	Billets/1.5 yr = 12 Billets/yr = 46% Opportunity
	26 pers

Commander CO Billets (27 Month Tours):

8	SDV/SEAL Team Commanding Officers (4)
2	SBR Commodores
3	NSWU Commanding Officers
13	Billets/2.25 yr = 5.7 Billets/yr = 32% Opportunity
	18 pers

Captain Major Command Billets (24 Month Tours):

2	NSWG Commodores
2	Billets/2 yr = 1 Billet/yr = 11% Opportunity (5)
	9 pers

Notes: (1) Includes SEAL Team 8, planned.
(2) A Department Head tour.
(3) An XO tour.
(4) Includes SEAL Team 8, doesn't include SEAL Team 6.
(5) Opportunities based on YG size which is based on historical attrition rates and published promotion opportunities. [Ref. 2]

TABLE 4.

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY FY 90

YOS	RANK	#/YG	X	#YRS	=	TOT/RANK	BILLETS	OVERAGE	%OVERAGE
30									
	O-6	9	X	8	=	72	13	59	453%
20									
	O-5	18	X	8	=	144	42	102	243%
14									
	O-4	26	X	5	=	130	59	71	120%
9									
	O-3	32	X	5	=	160	170	0	0
4									
	O-2/1	36	X	4	=	144	131	13	10%
0									
TOTAL							650	455	43%

Note: This is NMPC-413D's projection without the Naval Special Warfare Department Head Screen. Year Group size is based on historical attrition rates and published promotion opportunity. [Ref. 2]

was designed to solve just this sort of problem, and all of the actual data for the entire Navy Officer Corps is in the STRAP-O system. Finally, it's the model currently in use by NMPC to assess the feasibility of Navy officer manpower plans.

The main purpose of STRAP-O is to determine if a desired force level of officers is feasible in terms of expected or desired attrition, the number of accessions required to achieve the specified force levels, the available supply of officer candidates to support accessions, the promotion and lateral transfer plans required, pay grade limitations, the demands on the training establishment, and the manpower overhead (student, transients, patients, etc.) needed to sustain the force. Figure 4 is a flow chart of the STRAP-O model. [Ref.3: p. 2]

The following briefly describes the functions of the primary modules that make up the STRAP-O model:

OGOALS is a module that produces total strength and specific grade goals from the same requirement set used for AIDS. This ensures that both modules are driving toward consistent targets. [Ref. 3: p. 4]

AIDS is a linear goal programming model that determines the optimal number of officers to access each year from each commissioning source to achieve future force goals. [Ref. 3: p. 3]



Figure 4.

Structured Accession Planning System for Officers
[Ref. 3: p. 2]

OPRO, the force projection module, forecasts personnel flow behavior of officers as they are gained or lost to the system, promoted, or aged. It's a fractional flow model with foresight. It anticipates vacancies and accesses or promotes enough replacements to fill the vacated positions. It forecasts and summarizes the personnel flows in terms of continuation rates. These rates then become inputs to AIDS. [Ref. 3: p. 3]

ORFM, the officer retention forecasting module, estimates the changes in compensation policies. The model compares the officers expected life stream earnings from the decision to remain in the military and the decision to return to civilian life then relates the two earnings streams to the current and historical loss rates. Estimates of the future loss rates can then be made. [Ref. 3: p. 3]

III. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL

The proposal was submitted by the Naval Special Warfare Detailer/ Placement Officer (NMPC-413D) to the Commanders of Naval Special Warfare Groups One and Two for comments and recommendations. [Ref. 2] Based on their input NMPC-413D will decide if the Department Head Screen has sufficient support from the Naval Special Warfare community to institute. If so, NMPC-413D will request NMPC-413, the Surface Ship Placement/Surface Community Manager, to put the screen in the system. Figure 5 shows the NMPC Officer distribution. Officer community managers are also part of the Military Personnel Policy Division in OPNAV, specifically OP-130E. Community managers perform numerous duties.

> "Some of the matters which the community manager is responsible for include monitoring the number of accessions and the opportunity for augmentation/ lateral transfer; and overseeing promotion plans, strength plans and career development. Career development policies include: tour length; career pattern; department head, XO, CO and major command requirements and opportunity; training pipeline; and other detailing policy." [Ref. 11: p. 4]

A. COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP ONE RESPONSE

The Commander NSWG ONE solicited input from his subordinate commands. Their response is incorporated in the Commander NSWG ONE's letter to NMPC-413D. The Commander NSWG ONE concurred with establishing a Naval Special Warfare Department Head Screen, its timing



Figure 5.

Naval Military Personnel Command Officer Distribution
[Ref. 8]

(starting in March 1986), and made four recommendations:

(1) An additional Department Head billet for Officer in Charge SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Team ONE Detachment, Hawaii be included. [Ref. 12]

(2) Delete SDV Material/ Maintenance Officer from the Department Head billets. This position will be filled with Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Lieutenants (6130), a POM 86 fill. [Ref. 12]

(3) Increase tour length for Lieutenant Commander Commanding Officer billets to 24 months vice 18 months. [Ref. 12]

(4) Hold in abeyance the decision to down grade all Special Boat Squadron Command and Executive Officer billets until further consideration has been completed. [Ref. 12]

B. COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP TWO RESPONSE

The Commander Naval Special Warfare Group TWO rather than submitting one letter on the subject submitted the individual inputs received from each of his subordinate Naval Special Warfare commands. The following items are the individual command responses. They represent varied points of view that range from qualified concurrence [Ref. 13] to vehement disagreement [Ref. 14]. These views contain the factors that the individual team commanding officers considered in developing their positions.

1. SEAL Team TWO

The commanding officer vehemently disagreed with starting a Department Head Screen for the following reasons:

(1) Some officers are slow starters. [Ref. 14]

(2) Initial screening at six years would cause most

junior officers to shy away from First Shore Tour (Figure 3) assignments. Staff, Postgraduate and PEP tours that provide long term professional gains may place the junior officer in a not-observed status on their Fitreps. Only junior officers who screen at first look could afford not-observed Fitreps. Junior officers that did not successfully screen at first look would be advised to log time in an operational team and bring up their Fitreps. This makes the First Shore Tour option false advertising within the Naval Special Warfare professional development path, particularly for the officer that completes basic Naval Special Warfare training at the Lieutenant level. [Ref. 14]

(3) It should be well within the detailers ability to impartially and fairly pick which junior officers get detailed to Department Head billets and thus, perform the same function as a screening board without limiting the flexibility for internal command assignments. [Ref. 14]

(4) The Naval Special Warfare community is too small for another board. It would limit detailing flexibility. [Ref. 14]

(5) Tour lengths of 24-30 months were recommended aboard specific command with fleet up to an Operations Officer billet from Training Officer vice the 21 month tour, (Table 3), of the proposal. [Ref. 14]

(6) Naval Special Warfare Officer billet growth is projected to be 465 in FY 90 vice 650 detracting from the creditability of Table 4. [Ref. 14]

2. SEAL Team FOUR

The Commanding Officer felt it appeared to be a sound start toward effectively managing the growing Naval Special Warfare Officer Community. His thoughts on the issue were:

(1) Concurred with the proposed timing, and thought it would encourage non-screeners to resign, which would alleviate the overmanning projected in paygrades O-4 and above. [Ref. 13]

(2) Weeding out 40% of each O-3 level year group seemed

somewhat drastic. To increase the opportunity for an O-3 to get a Department Head billet including SEAL and SDV Training Officer billets as Department Head billets, and possibly SEAL Material/Maintenance Officer billets, were recommended. [Ref. 13]

(3) Commanding Officer tours should be reduced to 24 months vice 27 months to raise commanding officer assignment opportunity. [Ref. 13]

(4) Due to lack of billets, consider upgrading some Staff billets to keep senior officers in the community. [Ref. 13]

(5) Encourage sub-specialty development to divert excess officers. [Ref. 13]

(6) What impact will the screen have on attrition? [Ref. 13]

(7) Is OP-01 supporting our officer accession (and retention) requirements? [Ref. 13]

3. SEAL Team SIX

The Commanding Officer concurred with the Department Head Screen proposal and had the following comments:

(1) The screening board should be conducted by senior grade O-5 and above 1130 officers. [Ref. 15]

(2) Screening should not disqualify the individual from assignment to a leadership position (ie. Platoon Commander). [Ref. 15]

(3) Platoon Commander assignments should be reserved for proven leaders O-3/O-4 in grade possibly following a Department Head tour. Career planning should allow an officer to serve as an Assistant Platoon Commander, a Department Head, and then a Platoon Commander. [Ref. 15]

(4) Recommended 15 to 18 month Department Head tour lengths, vice the proposed 21 months,(Table 3), to increase opportunity. [Ref. 15]

(5) Concurred with downgrading Special Boat Unit Commanding Officer billets to 1130 O-4 and Special Boat Unit Executive Officer billets to O-3. However, disagreed that the Executive Officer billet must be

an 1130 to capture fleet experience lacking in 1130's. [Ref. 15]

4. Special Boat Squadron TWO

The Commander of SBR-2 felt there were flaws and inequities that pertain to the Boat Squadrons, and they were:

(1) With the exception of SEAL Team SIX, Special Boat Unit-20 is the largest Naval Special Warfare Group TWO operational command in terms of assigned capital assets, and with the realization of the current FYDP they will also have the largest inventory of manpower. Based on the associated leadership, fiscal, material, and managerial responsibilities of that command, officer rank structure should at least parallel in seniority that of SEAL and SDV teams. [Ref. 16]

(2) Approximately 40% of Special Boat Unit TWO assets come under the Naval Reserve system, and TAR officer expertise provides the interface to this system which is alien to most USN officers. Without the presence of TAR officers, the Squadron would not be as effective or efficient as it is currently. Potential for command of an Special Boat Unit is undoubtedly the reason Special Boat Unit receives top notch TAR officers. [Ref. 16]

(3) Special Warfare Craft Medium Navy Technical Projections (SWCM NTP) is aware that there will not be enough 1130's by 1990 to man SWCM OIC/AOIC billets. To gain surface warfare expertise those billets will be programmed 111x. If there is no career progression offered beyond OIC of an SWCM those positions may be regarded as a dead end and getting quality personnel will be a problem. [Ref. 16]

(4) Recommended that the Commanding Officer of Special Boat Unit TWENTY be upgraded to Commander, Executive Officer to Lieutenant Commander, and Operations to Lieutenant Commander. Where Special Boat Unit is within the chain of command should be deliberated in the future. [Ref. 16]

(5) Recommended that 111x billets (SWCM OIC/AOIC) at Special Boat Unit TWENTY be filled in part by 1117's, TAR-SWO qualified, and that they be eligible to return on a future tour to Special Boat Unit

TWENTY-TWO or TWENTY-FOUR as Commanding Officer or Executive Officer. Rotate those billets between 1130 and 1117. This would fill the SWCM program with top surface qualified TAR's who would have future command potential (SBU 22/24) which would provide incentive for top performance. [Ref. 16]

IV. THE STRAP-O PROJECTION

As previously stated the Structured Accession Planning System For Officers model was the analytical tool used to confirm NMPC-413D's projection of the Naval Special Warfare Officer community with a Department Head Screen in the career path at the 6, 7, and 8 year points. This required the identification of inputs. (The reader is referred to Chapter II. C. for an explanation of the STRAP-O model.)

A. SETUP OF THE STRAP-O MODEL

Since the number of Lieutenants advancing to Lieutenant Commander will be directly proportional to the number of Lieutenants passing the Department Head Screen, (i.e., an implicit assumption in the use of the Department Head Screen), the promotion rate at the O-3 to O-4 level was controlled. Four STRAP-O runs were made, one at default, and three with the O-3 to O-4 promotion rates controlled at 80%, 70%, and 60%. The latter, 60%, being the pass rate NMPC-413D calculated to be necessary to bring the number of Lieutenant Commanders to within the number of authorized billets for Lieutenant Commanders [Ref. 2]. The default run models the Naval Special Warfare community without the Department Head Screen and the O-3 to O-4 promotion is not controlled. Runs at 70% and 80% were made to see what effect a less drastic

no-pass rate would have on the Naval Special Warfare community.

STRAP-O, if accessions are not controlled, will output the number of accessions required to maintain the various communities at their authorized billet levels. The Naval Special Warfare accessions were controlled with the "best estimate" which is the number of accessions in the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). It was assumed these numbers are very close to what will actually occur. Like all strengths in the FYDP, Naval Special Warfare accessions are subject to change. However, the amount of variance is unlikely to be significant based on past experience [Ref. 17]. This forces the assumption that the Department Head Screen will not have a negative effect on accessions. On the three controlled runs STRAP-O included 1985 as a screening year so the results will appear more favorable to the Department Head Screen proposal, but by less than 2%.

All other variables were run at the default settings, and in the output data the Naval Special Warfare Department Head Screen had no noticeable impact on any other part of the system. This was expected due to the small relative size of the Naval Special Warfare community to the overall Navy Officer Corps (<.6%).

B. STRAP-O OUTPUT

The output from STRAP-O was four 121 page computer printouts containing information on all URL communities. Results relating to Naval Special Warfare were as follows:

Table 5 shows total end strengths by grade for the Naval Special Warfare community from 1985 thru 1991 for each run along with the projected number of authorized billets, the overage, and % overage. This table illustrates the O-4 rank will be trimmed down to within 3% of the target level. The target level is 0% overage, which is the authorized number of billets. However, due to the small size of the year groups, to actually hit the target level, 0%, would require decreasing the Department Head Screen pass rate to 50%. The 50% is an extrapolation based on trend from 95% (the default average) to 60%, a 50% run was not conducted. Note the current inventory in Table 1 does not match exactly with either the 1985 starting inventory or the 1985 end strength of Table 5. The reason for this discrepancy is that the model is accurate to the start and end dates of FY 1985 and the Table 1 inventory was accurate to manning levels on 23 May 1985, the date the data for Table 1 was collected.

The O-1 and O-2 levels remained constant for all runs. The O-3 level had a small increase due to the increase in O-3's being passed over. The O-4 level decreased to within 3% of the target level. The O-5 level decreased by 3% to 33% over manned. If the model had been projected to FY 2000 a greater decrease would have been realized. However, the inputs to STRAP-O past 1991 would have little credibility. The O-6 level remained constant at 121% over manned.

TABLE 5.

TOTAL END STRENGTHS BY GRADE

RUN	RANK	STINV	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	BILT	OVER	%OVER
DEF	O-1	44	54	59	56	62	65	65	65			
	O-2	57	51	42	48	55	53	56	59	131	-7	-5%
	O-3	106	114	115	114	112	115	108	109	170	-61	-36%
	O-4	77	81	81	84	86	88	89	85	59	26	44%
	O-5	41	40	45	48	50	54	56	57	42	15	36%
	O-6	12	17	21	24	27	29	31	31	14	17	121%
	TOT	337	357	363	374	392	404	405	406	416	-10	-2%
80%	O-1	44	54	59	56	62	65	65	65			
	O-2	57	51	42	48	55	53	56	59	131	-7	-5%
	O-3	106	115	118	118	112	116	111	111	170	-59	-35%
	O-4	77	80	78	78	82	83	81	78	59	19	32%
	O-5	41	40	46	50	50	52	54	54	42	12	29%
	O-6	12	17	20	23	26	31	33	31	14	17	121%
	TOT	337	357	363	373	387	400	400	398	416	-18	-4%
70%	O-1	44	54	59	56	62	65	65	65			
	O-2	57	51	42	48	55	53	56	59	131	-7	-5%
	O-3	106	117	122	121	117	118	113	113	170	-57	-34%
	O-4	77	78	74	72	74	74	72	70	59	11	19%
	O-5	41	40	45	48	49	53	57	57	42	15	36%
	O-6	12	17	21	25	28	30	30	29	14	15	107%
	TOT	337	357	363	370	385	393	393	393	416	-23	-6%
60%	O-1	44	54	59	56	62	65	65	65			
	O-2	57	51	42	48	55	53	56	59	131	-7	-5%
	O-3	106	118	122	122	119	121	115	115	170	-55	-32%
	O-4	77	77	73	70	69	66	62	61	59	2	3%
	O-5	41	40	46	50	52	55	60	56	42	14	33%
	O-6	12	17	20	23	26	31	31	31	14	17	121%
	TOT	337	357	362	369	383	391	389	387	416	-29	-7%

Run = Per Cent of control of the promotion rate of O-3 to O-4
DEF = Default = 95% on the average to O-4
STINV = Starting Inventory FY 1985
BILT = Authorized Billets 1990, 131 at O-2 is for O-1 + O-2
OVER = # of personnel over allowance in 1991
%OVER = % of personnel over allowance in 1991
TOT = Sum Total of the column for each run

Table 6 is a summary of losses including laterals. Losses at each rank are the sum of losses across all year groups within a given rank. Laterals are primarily individuals in the O-1 and O-2 level that fail to complete Naval Special Warfare training. Other laterals are those individuals that have changed to other URL or RL designators (an insignificant number). The Department Head Screen has no effect on the O-1 and O-2 level. As expected moving from default down to a 60% pass rate the Department Head Screen increases losses in the O-3 level. An additional 23 (96-73=23) personnel were not advanced to O-4 for the 1985 to 1991 period. Losses at the O-4 level have decreased by 8 (26-18=8) personnel, and the O-5 and O-6 levels were basically unaffected. The overall loss change to the Naval Special Warfare community was an increased loss of 15 (232-217=15) personnel.

Embedded in Table 6 are losses at the O-3 level due solely to not being selected for promotion to O-4. Table 7 shows losses from the O-3 rank due to being passed over for selection as a result of failing the Naval Special Warfare Department Head Screen. Where in Table 6 it appears that the Department Head Screen caused an additional loss of only 23 personnel Table 7 indicates that the additional loss for this reason was 30 (41-11=30) Lieutenants. This means that the Department Head Screen caused 7 [(73-11)-(96-41)=7] losses that would have occurred for other reasons without the Department Head Screen.

TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF LOSSES INCLUDING LATERALS

RUN	RANK	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	TOT
DEF	0-1	4	7	7	7	8	9	9	51
	0-2	9	7	6	4	5	6	5	42
	0-3	5	8	10	10	12	15	13	73
	0-4	4	4	2	1	3	6	6	26
	0-5	0	0	1	2	1	3	5	12
	0-6	0	1	1	1	2	4	4	13
	TOT	22	27	27	25	31	43	42	217
80%	0-1	4	7	7	7	8	9	9	51
	0-2	9	7	6	4	5	6	5	42
	0-3	5	8	11	13	12	16	15	80
	0-4	4	4	2	1	3	5	4	23
	0-5	0	0	1	3	1	3	6	14
	0-6	0	1	1	1	1	4	5	13
	TOT	22	27	28	29	30	43	44	223
70%	0-1	4	7	7	7	8	9	9	51
	0-2	9	7	6	4	5	6	5	42
	0-3	5	9	14	13	15	17	17	89
	0-4	4	3	2	0	3	4	3	19
	0-5	0	0	1	3	2	2	5	13
	0-6	0	1	1	1	2	5	4	14
	TOT	22	27	31	28	35	40	42	228
60%	0-1	4	7	7	7	8	9	9	51
	0-2	9	7	6	4	5	6	5	42
	0-3	5	10	14	14	17	19	17	96
	0-4	4	3	1	0	3	4	3	18
	0-5	0	0	0	3	1	3	6	13
	0-6	0	1	1	1	1	4	4	12
	TOT	22	28	29	29	35	45	44	232

TABLE 7

O-3 TO O-4 ZONE SIZE, PROMOTIONS, AND LOSSES BY YG

RUN DEF	YEARS 1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	TOT
ZONE	14	15	11	12	14	17	10	
PROMOTED	12	14	10	10	12	15	9	
LOSS	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	11
80%								
ZONE	14	14	10	17	15	16	11	
PROMOTED	11	11	8	12	11	12	8	
LOSS	3	3	2	5	4	4	3	24
70%								
ZONE	14	13	10	13	19	17	11	
PROMOTED	9	9	7	8	12	11	7	
LOSS	5	4	3	5	7	6	4	34
60%								
ZONE	14	16	10	11	15	16	11	
PROMOTED	8	9	6	6	8	9	6	
LOSS	6	7	4	5	7	7	5	41

Table 7 also gives the size of the promotion zone and the number promoted. Note the size of the zone may be greater or less than the year group size as the zone size is determined by number of personnel in the year group, lineal number, and billets available. The lineal number is a URL officers seniority position relative to all other URL officers.

Also note that STRAP-0 used the 60, 70, and 80 per cent advancement rates to 0-4 as maximums and approached them without exceeding them. This resulted in actual average rates of 74% for the 80% run, 65% for the 70% run, and 56% for the 60% run. These actual rates would have been much closer to the desired rates had the promotion zones been larger. However, with zone sizes of 10 to 19 personnel the actual rates are acceptable and do not affect the validity of the results.

Table 8 shows the accessions to the 0-1/0-2 level which was constant for all four runs.

Table 9 compares promotion opportunities to the 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6 levels for each run. Naturally, the rates to the 0-4 level are the controlled pass rates. It also compares them to the overall URL rates to the same ranks.

Table 9 answers the question; Does the Department Head Screen affect promotion opportunities at the 0-5 and 0-6 levels? It does not. It can readily be seen from Table 9 that the Department Head Screen would put Naval

TABLE 8

ACCESSIONS INTO THE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY

FY	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
# PERS	35	28	31	35	35	35	35

TABLE 9

PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES IN NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE

PERCENT BY RANK

RANK	RUN	1985	1986	1987	1988	1988	1989	1990	1991
O-4	DEF	92	95	95	95	95	95	95	94
	80%	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
	70%	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
	60%	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
	URL	85	85	85	80	80	80	80	80
O-5	DEF	70	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
	80%	70	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
	70%	70	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
	60%	70	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
	URL	75	75	75	70	70	70	70	70
O-6	DEF	100	60	67	67	67	67	67	67
	80%	100	60	67	67	67	67	67	67
	70%	100	60	67	67	67	67	67	67
	60%	100	60	67	67	67	67	67	67
	URL	60	60	60	60	60	60	58	60

Special Warfare below the URL average at the O-4 level, and with or without the screen the Naval Special Warfare O-5 and O-6 ranks are at a 15% (85-70=15) and 7% (67-60=7) advantage to the URL respectively.

This chapter has shown that the STRAP-O model confirms NMPC-413D'S calculations that a Department Head Screen in the Naval Special Warfare community will decrease the number of Lieutenant Commanders to within 3% of the authorized number of O-4 billets. It also shows the cost to accomplish this in manpower will be 41 careers.

V. EVALUATION OF THE DEPARTMENT HEAD SCREEN

Up to this point the problem, an excess of O-4's in the Naval Special Warfare rank pyramid, has been defined. The mission and officer structure of the Naval Special Warfare Community has been presented. The Department Head Screen has been laid out in detail. Response of the Naval Special Warfare Community to the proposal has been given. Confirmation of NMPC-413D's calculations that a Department Head Screen in the Naval Special Warfare Community will solve the problem has been provided by the STRAP-O model.

This chapter will show the relationships between the components, or subsystems (i.e., NSW mission, billets, inventory, accessions, and readiness), to each other and the system. The system, Naval Special Warfare, is a subsystem of the operating Navy. Impact that the Department Head Screen proposal may have will be presented, conclusions will be drawn, and recommendations made.

A. THE SYSTEM, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE

In peacetime the output from Naval Special Warfare is readiness to counter the perceived threat. In time of war readiness becomes combat operations to eliminate the threat. Figure 6 shows how readiness in Naval Special Warfare is attained with respect to officer manning levels. The meaning of readiness in this context is the ability to carry out whatever Naval Special Warfare mission



* = Promotion
Loss. Thru O-3 includes lateral transfers, discharges, medical disabilities, and retirement of ex-enlisteds.

O-4 and above is composed of medical retirements and retirements. Discharges, although possible, are historically non-existent in NSW.

Figure 6.

Readiness attainment in the NSW Officer Community

is assigned. Disregarded are the other essential aspects of readiness (i.e., logistics, men, funds, training, etc.) not germane to this effort.

The inputs to this system are mission and accessions. Mission is a function of the perceived threat. Chapter II. A. presents the current Naval Special Warfare mission statement. The mission drives the billet structure and creates the demand for a specified number of Naval Special Warfare qualified officers at each rank. The inventory is a result of the number of authorized billets, promotions, losses, and accessions. How well the inventory matches the billets determines the degree of readiness. The promotion system is within the inventory in Figure 6. Promotions are a result of: successful performance of NSW operations, administrative abilities, passing any required screens, serving in specific billets, attending schools, receiving good Fitreps, and being selected by the Promotion Board. Any requirement added to or subtracted from the promotion system will have a bearing on readiness.

B. IMPACT TO THE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY

The Department Head Screen will bring the number of Lieutenant Commanders to within the authorized level. The impact of this will be most noticeably felt by Lieutenants that do not pass the Department Head Screen. Without viable career alternatives it will cost 41 Naval Special Warfare Lieutenants their careers by 1991. Given this the question becomes: What will the effect of this loss be

on readiness and accessions? As seen in Figure 6 if the number of authorized billets are filled then readiness will be attained.

If the authorized number of O-4 billets are sufficient to attain readiness then the loss of personnel that would have filled excess O-4 billets will not degrade readiness. With a decrease in the number of Lieutenants to Lieutenant Commander competition for the available O-4 slots will increase. Greater competition breeds greater efficiency and better performance. Better more efficient performance will then lead to a higher degree of readiness. [Ref. 17]

With readiness assured will accessions be affected? NMPC-413D reasons that the type of individual that is attracted to Naval Special Warfare will not be affected by a decrease of probability of advancement from 90% to 60% at the O-3 to O-4 level, and therefore, accessions will not decrease. [Ref. 18]

An alternative viewpoint has the Department Head Screen cause a marked decrease in the number of available accessions which leads to a greater shortage of O-1 to O-3's than is shown in Table 5. It also indicates a loss of cohesiveness at the O-3 level due to the increased competition to the O-4 level. The net result of these actions is a decrease in readiness.

Unfortunately, neither point of view can be confirmed with the available information: The actual outcome will fall between the two extremes. Hopefully it will be

closer to the positive projection. However, assuming no decrease in readiness or accessions, what alternatives are open to the Lieutenants that will fail the Department Head Screen?

Officers that are not competitive in their own warfare specialty (i.e., an officer that has failed a Department Head Screen) will find no other community will accept them, and they will be passed over. Under the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) regulations, there are currently no other Naval career alternatives open to Lieutenants that have been passed over twice, they must be involuntarily discharged from the Navy in the year they were passed over for the second time [Ref. 19: p. 13].

This means the function of the Department Head Screen will be that of a pre-promotion selection board and will be faced with the same problem the selection board has. That is the problem of determining the "best fitted", as distinguished from "qualified". The Navy's standards for the original commissioning of an officer are high. Successfully completing Naval Special Warfare training is even more selective. Most of the eligible candidates for promotion have "good" to "outstanding" records, and would be qualified for promotion; however, there are not enough authorized billets to permit all "qualified" officers to be selected. [Ref. 20: p. 5] In this instance there will be 41 qualified non-selected officers. At a time of scarce manpower resources it seems inconsistent to

involuntarily discharge dedicated and highly motivated personnel.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The Department Head Screen in Naval Special Warfare will decrease O-4's to the authorized number of billets, but it will waste manpower in the process. It will waste manpower because there are no alternative career paths for the passed over members to pursue.

The decision making process in NMPC-413D and Naval Special Warfare commands appears to have taken a micro view of the problem. There is no overall coordinated plan to eliminate the shortages at the O-1 to O-3 level, or decrease the overage at the O-5 and O-6 levels (In the long run, after 1991, there will be some decrease due to the Depatrment Head Screen.) and balance the Naval Special Warfare community as a whole.

1. Possible Options

The objective of this effort is not to present a detailed manpower plan for the Naval Special Warfare officer community. The following is presented only as a rough example of an overall plan.

To decrease the shortage of O-1 thru O-3's without increasing the O-4 overage a Warrant Officer (WO)/ Limited Duty Officer (LDO) program could be explored. In the past WO and LDO billets have been talked about but discarded out of fear that too many WO and LDO's would clog the junior officer ranks and prevent regular officers from making

rank. Responsible, planned management of such a program would be able to prevent a jam from occurring. It is this writers opinion that enlisteds picked up with 8 to 12 years of service would probably not want to put in sufficient time over 20 years of service to attain the Lieutenant Commander rank. This would fill out the junior officer shortage and not effect the overage at the O-4 and above levels.

The excess of O-4's, O-5's, and O-6's can be trimmed by the XO/ CO screens and decreased promotions. This would certainly be disappointing to the individuals involved, but sub-specialties and Material Professional options would be available, or, worst case, forced retirement at the 20, 26, and 30 year points respectively. This worst case compared to involuntary discharge for Lieutenants is the much lessor evil.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

The problem should be re-examined and a whole community approach should be taken to shape the Naval Special Warfare community into the authorized configuration. The plan should be run through the STRAP-O model to confirm calculations and ensure compatibility with the rest of the URL community and DOPMA constraints. Both Naval Special Warfare Groups should be included in the formulation of the plan. The resultant plan should be given strong support from the top down during implementation. It should be

explained so the most junior Ensign understands the system and can develop a long range career plan.

The advantage of using a systems approach is that it will create a Naval Special Warfare officer career path that will be an optimum design as opposed to a disjointed series of stop gap measures.

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