

October 20, 1951

indicated and if our activities are ever to be expanded. I have also attached the British Ministry of Defense's bibliography on the drugs concerned.

In the attached report I have included statements as to why I believe this work should go forward at least as actively as at present and possibly should be pursued more extensively. To my mind the least pressing reason for this is to know what the Russians are doing. A somewhat more pressing reason, but still not the most pressing one, is to obtain a body of information about newly synthesized agents as well as information concerning the comparative merits of the established agents so that we might have a fuller understanding than at present of what the possibilities inherent in such drugs might be for our own purposes within the Army. To my mind the most pressing reason for work in this field is to get a better appraisal of how great the security hazard may be. For example, we already have excellent evidence that a discreet man of the highest integrity can be made indiscreet and to lose his integrity, without his knowledge by the secret use of some of the drugs we are studying. Naturally the man who holds top level information has enough sense not to drink. The drugs in question have powers far beyond those of alcohol, and if they are administered without the subject's knowledge it is entirely possible that the subject could be made indiscreet without his knowledge.


It is perhaps fortunate that these agents have (we know in the cases already studied) certain side actions which would make it possible for the properly informed security officer to detect himself that he might be in an abnormal state. To take one example: mescaline produces insomnia of severe degree.

While I am not skilled in security matters, discussion with high level security officers (see attached report) have indicated that it would be desirable for us to prepare an outline of signs and symptoms of the use of such drugs for the use of such officers.

The possibility came up in various discussions as to whether it might be possible, for example, to tamper with the food of an expert physicist at Los Alamos with the result that he might become indiscreet without being aware of it. The answer to this is almost certainly "Yes." These and other problems are mentioned in the attached report.

I should be very remiss indeed if I failed to acknowledge the many courtesies that were extended to me in and through the Office of the Surgeon General, courtesies which extended to the Military Attaché's office in our Embassy in London as well as to Heidelberg, where General Denit, in the Surgeon's Office, and Colonel C. M. Adams, Colonel Henry H. Rogers, Lieutenant Colonel Lerette, Major Hart, Major Hufford, and many others in G-II who did all that they could to facilitate my observations.

Very sincerely,



Henry K. Beecher, M.D.

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Enclosures