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Government
and Politics

Nigeria

February 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by November 1972.



NIGERIA

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Government and Politics

A. Summary and background (S)

Nigeria, under military rule since 1966, is governed by Gen. Yakubu Gowon, youthful Commander in Chief of the nation's 264,000-man armed forces. Gowon rules by decree with the support and advice of an unofficial group of predominantly military leaders. The military government is not ideologically minded, and most questions of policy are taken up as they arise, with decisions reached more or less informally. The routine functioning of the government is in the hands of the increasingly powerful senior civil service. Civilian politicians, who play little role in governing, are left to find consolation in the promise of the Federal Military Government (FMG) to return the country to civilian rule by 1976 and in the prestige of their status as commissioners in the FMG. The current military regime, although authoritarian, nevertheless allows a relatively open society—Nigeria is decidedly not a police state. Although the Gowon regime ostensibly follows a nonaligned foreign policy, it has held to an essentially pro-Western, if anticolonialist, posture.

The sequence of political events in Nigeria since independence in 1960 has continued to reflect two vastly different heritages: the sizable indigenous, traditional, political and social entities; and the cultural, commercial, and political legacy of over half a century of British colonial rule. The two traditions were wedded when the British practice of indirect rule solidified imperial domination through the support of indigenous rulers. Indirect rule was implemented with less success among Nigeria's eastern Ibo and western Yoruba than among the northern Hausa-Fulani, where it tended to reinforce the traditional social and religious hierarchy. Under a British-written federal constitution, the former Northern Region dominated postindependence electoral politics and controlled the central government until the first 1966 coup, which transferred effective power to military figures from the former Eastern Region. A second coup by northerners later in 1966 resulted in the ascendancy of Middle Belt militia leaders from minority tribes, who continue to

control Nigeria, and led indirectly to secession by the East and civil war.

The "Republic of Biafra," headed by the Ibo military governor of the Eastern Region, declared its independence in May 1967. Two months later the Nigerian federal forces invaded the east, and by August 1968 they had occupied the non-Ibo areas that had been controlled by the secessionists, but the Ibo heartland proved to be impenetrable until the end of 1969. A vigorous federal drive launched at that time against the exhausted Ibos led to the surrender of Biafra in January 1970. During their 2½ years of independence, the secessionists proved to be resourceful as soldiers and civilian administrators and were able to keep most essential public services operating throughout the war.

Since the end of the civil war in early 1970, the Gowon government has enjoyed unquestioned strength and general stability, although both rest on an inherently insecure complex of military-political relationships. The strength of the regime is based on the army's huge size, experience, and firm control. The army leadership is plagued by seemingly endemic personality, career, and regional interest conflicts, but in spite of a succession of coup rumors, the FMG has faced no real challenges to its authority and holds the allegiance of the vast bulk of the army and police.


A moratorium on politics continues under FMG decrees banning all tribal organizations and political parties and forbidding strikes or labor disturbances by the unions. The public and the former politicians accepted these collective deprivations in the name of national unity during the civil war, and since the end of the war the country has enjoyed a petroleum-based economic boom that has served to undercut the appeal of any antigovernment moves. In time, however, the enthusiasm and the speed of economic recovery will slow, quarrels over the distribution of development funds will begin in earnest, and the economically neglected will again turn their attention to politics. Part of the public may then come to feel that the FMG's ban on political and union activity is oppressive and no longer justifiable in terms of national unity.

The Gowon regime is beset by an inability or a calculated unwillingness to make decisions on difficult issues. For example, the FMG pursues a war of rhetoric against corruption but has avoided taking steps to eliminate it for fear of offending powerful persons and interests. Additionally, Gowon has diverted public and press attention from persistent domestic problems through his extensive travel abroad and personal involvement in international diplomatic missions. As a result, he has maintained the loyalty of everyone, but his indecisiveness and frequent absences from the country have led to frustration among the senior officials who have the responsibility for running the country. Disaffected individuals are found in the army, the civil service, the police, and among the politicians, but there is no evidence that these individuals are fundamentally disloyal.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (S)

The Federal Republic of Nigeria has been ruled by decree since January 1966, when a small group of military officers ousted the civilian government which had been in power since independence and suspended the complex system of federal and regional executives and parliaments which had been provided for in the independence constitution of 1960 and the republican constitution of 1963. In May 1966 the military government replaced the federal system with a unitary one, but these officers were themselves ousted 2 months later by another military coup whose leaders reinstated the federation. In April 1968 the four regions that had made up the federation were replaced by a 12-state system, which the government has since indicated will not be altered before 1974.

The FMG has announced that it will return Nigeria to civilian rule by 1976, provided that by this time it has carried out a program of reforms outlined during the country's celebration of its 10th anniversary of independence in 1970. In the interim, the government will continue to be run by the military with the aid of some civil servants; politicians are virtually excluded. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Head of the FMG, announces government decrees, which are formulated by him with a small group of advisers and confirmed by the military hierarchy. The institutions used for carrying out these processes in 1972 are shown in Figure 1. On many crucial matters the government appears hesitant to make firm decisions, but it has reached a workable solution to the major problem of revenue distribution, has introduced structural reforms in local government,



— Formal line of authority Military elements in blue.
 - - - Informal line of authority Civilian elements in red.

FIGURE 1. Structure of the Federal Military Government (U/OU)

and is working to complete the staffing of the state courts and civil services.

I. Federal government

a. Gowon and Dodan Barracks advisers

All executive and legislative power is vested in the FMG. Laws are made and implemented through decrees signed by the Head of the FMG, General Gowon (Figure 2), who is also Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), and Chairman of the Federal Executive Council (FEC). The absolute supremacy of the military government was publicly asserted in a May 1970 decree and an accompanying statement which abolished judicial review of governmental decisions and affirmed that the authority of the military derived from the "bloody revolution" which gave it "unlimited powers to rule this country." In practice, the power of the FMG is largely that of General Gowon personally, whose strength is based first on his ability to retain the allegiance of the military leadership through compromise and



FIGURE 2. General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government (U/OU)

consensus, and second on his unique and neutral background as a Hausa-speaking Christian from a small Middle Belt tribe. Gowon came to power through a process of negotiation within the army which was obviously not foreseen by the constitution. There are no known provisions for the transfer of executive authority, but were he to be replaced for any reason, power almost certainly would continue to be held by senior military officers.

Gowon does not reach decisions in isolation but is influenced in policymaking by a relatively institutionalized group of top military and police advisers. Those regularly attending the meetings of this group, which are held at Supreme Headquarters, located at Dodan Barracks in Lagos, include the Inspector General of Police and his deputy, plus several high-ranking military figures stationed in Lagos. These men sometimes are joined by colleagues from the field who happen to be in town. The military professionalism of the regular participants is illustrated by the fact that they are typically older, higher ranking, and more exclusively militarily educated than the majority of members of the larger and more formally constituted SMC. Significantly, over half of those attending the evening meetings at Supreme Headquarters are members of minority tribes.

During the civil war the Dodan Barracks meetings were held three times a week, with some sessions

devoted entirely to military problems. Since the war, this group has been meeting progressively less frequently—in fact, it did not meet at all for several months in 1972—but there is no evidence that its political importance has eroded. Gowon continues to chair the meetings and push for consensus among the group, but he depends on its members to argue the merits of various policy options and substantive proposals. This process is thought to involve relatively candid discussion, open disagreement, and only loose adherence to a prepared agenda. Neither Gowon nor the military participants at the Dodan Barracks sessions appear eager to bring civilians into the group on a permanent basis. Senior civil servants frequently are invited to attend when the discussion centers on matters in which they have special expertise, but the civilian commissioners are present only rarely.

b. Supreme Military Council

The SMC was created following the first military coup in 1966. After 6 years of gradual evolution, its membership has come to include: the Head of the FMG; the governors of the 12 states; the heads of the army, navy, and air force; the Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters; the Commandant of the Nigerian Defense Academy; the Naval Officer in Command, Lagos Command; former army chief of staff Major General Katsina; and the two top police officials. Almost all members of the SMC who are based in Lagos—i.e., not military governors—are also among the regulars at the Dodan Barracks meetings; hence proposals formally approved by the SMC have in large part already been debated by the same persons acting in their unofficial capacity as advisers to Gowon. The effect of having the military governors in the SMC is to make it a larger, younger, better educated, and more northern-oriented group than that which meets at Dodan Barracks. Most important, the SMC is relatively heterogeneous, in that each governor's personal background reflects that of the state to which he is posted; it is homogeneous in that all members except one (the administrator of East-Central State) are from the military or police.

At its inception, the SMC was by decree wholly subservient to the head of the FMG, having no independent prerogatives. In early 1967, hoping to forestall the secession of the Ibo-controlled former Eastern Region, Gowon theoretically vested in the SMC all legislative and executive powers over important matters by providing that decisions of the FMG could be reached only with the concurrence of all governors. That tactic failed, partly because the terms of the decree were too ambiguous to satisfy the

eastern leaders, and shortly before the secession Gowon again assumed almost complete control of the government. The SMC continued to function, however, and met at more or less monthly intervals to consider war policy and to confirm FMG decrees.

Since the civil war the SMC has met less often, partly because a majority of its members are dispersed throughout a very large country. The SMC does not initiate policy and offers only a limited check on the use or potential abuse of executive power. Nonetheless, the SMC performs a variety of significant functions: it provides a formally constituted body to confer legitimacy on the decrees of the FMG; its membership provides the link between the federal and state levels of government; it provides positions for those military and police officials most likely to threaten Gowon's position, thereby enabling him to control them better; and it provides an effective mechanism for retaining military supremacy over potentially rival civilian political groups. On the last count the SMC has been especially adamant, at one point in 1968 insisting that the Head of the FMG hold final legislative power, thus allowing no independent action by the predominantly civilian FEC.

c. Federal Executive Council

Like the SMC, the FEC was created in early 1966, but it existed only on paper until 1967, when Gowon appointed civilian commissioners to head all but three ministries.¹ The FEC has a firm civilian majority which is somewhat older and more highly educated than either the SMC or the Dodan Barracks group. Gowon originally was careful to appoint at least one person from every state to the FEC. More recently he has attempted to make the FEC representative of articulate interest groups as well; for example, in October 1971 he appointed two commissioners from the academic world. Although the FEC is the single civilian body at the federal level, it does not follow that its membership is unified or antimilitary; indeed, after the resignation of its vice chairman, Yoruba leader Obafemi Awolowo, in 1971 the FEC has been notable for its lack of cohesiveness and leadership.

Prior to January 1968 the FEC theoretically possessed the power to legislate on its own initiative. This potential was never used or tested to the fullest, however; with the reemergence of Chief Awolowo as a figure of consequence in Nigerian politics, the SMC curtailed the power of the FEC by rendering its

¹For a current listing of key government officials, consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

actions immediately subject to Gowon's veto, and thus indirectly subject to control by the FMG as a whole. Nevertheless, although subordinate to the SMC, the FEC retains considerable influence, because it meets regularly on a weekly basis, gives greater consideration to the details of running the government, lends civilian respectability to the FMG, provides civilian leaders with access to the government at the highest levels, and is ordinarily the first of the two official governing bodies to receive and comment on Dodan Barracks proposals. Additionally, the agenda of the SMC in its infrequent meetings tends to be drawn from the more important items faced by the FEC.

The FEC performs some of the functions of a cabinet, giving special attention to foreign affairs and to monetary and fiscal matters. In 1971 it played a significant role in setting civil service salaries. The government's action in determining the levels of such remuneration sheds some light on the role of the FEC in relation to other segments of the governing apparatus: policy was in effect suggested by the civil service, reviewed by the FEC, and only finally submitted to the SMC for determination. Despite its clearly second-echelon role and its rather ambiguous legal position, the FEC, with its able commissioners, is thought to have considerable influence on General Gowon. Because of its regular Wednesday meetings it is continually in the public eye, and it could provide a forum for Gowon to create and develop a nonmilitary image for an ultimate transition to civilian rule.

The functioning of the ministries is only theoretically in the hands of their largely civilian commissioners. With changes made in late 1971, the civilian leadership took on a somewhat more capable and technocratic cast, but as a group the commissioners still remained weak by comparison with their pre-1966 counterparts. On a day-to-day basis the commissioners' ostensible subordinates, the permanent secretaries, retain the greatest responsibility and *de facto* policymaking authority. The highest positions in the civil service were reshuffled at the end of 1970, and although a few new men were brought in, the real success of the changes was the transfer of some of the best career civil servants to the country's most important ministries.

Permanent secretaries served as the heads of ministries from the time of the January 1966 coup until Gowon appointed civilian commissioners in June 1967. Since then, however, permanent secretaries have continued to deal directly with the FMG and Gowon on a daily basis and through their frequent attendance at the Dodan Barracks meetings, bypassing the commissioners and in so doing creating a measure of ill

will. Thus in all areas the importance and power of the permanent secretaries, traditionally based on their technical expertise, have been steadily augmented by much of the decisionmaking authority which had been held by ministers in the previous civilian government.

Civil servants have attempted to take upon themselves the task of working directly with the FMG to implement the 4-year development plan announced in October 1970. Their direct access to Gowon and the latter's preference for contacts of this type suggest that civil servants will continue to occupy strong positions relative to their nominal political superiors and to the military. This role is resented because, as a practical matter, civil service strength—particularly at lower levels—still means Yoruba strength, even though the post-civil war predominance of westerners is becoming increasingly balanced by Ibo reintegration. At the decisionmaking level (permanent secretary and deputy permanent secretary), however, the civil service is generally representative of the country's many ethnic groups, with the exception of the Ibo.

d. Quasi-government bodies

At the federal level there are a number of statutory corporations which collectively are of some importance in the administration of the government and the economy. In the past, the most significant have been the Nigerian Railway Corporation, the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, and the Ports Authority. Most of the country's public corporations are notoriously corrupt and inefficient by Western standards, but the FMG is regulating them in the same casual manner as did the former civilian executives and parliamentary committees.

One potentially significant new body is the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC), whose board of directors held its first meeting in September 1971. Creation of the NNOC was authorized by the FMG as a means of coordinating and controlling increasingly sizable Nigerian interests in all phases of petroleum exploitation. Although still in an embryonic state, the NNOC is recruiting extensively at very high salaries in anticipation of rapid expansion and has begun exporting limited amounts of crude oil through contractual agreements. The creation of the NNOC exemplifies the complexity of the interrelationships of governing bodies and personalities at the federal level—the chairman of its Board of Directors is also the Permanent Secretary for Mines and Power and a frequent adviser at Dodan Barracks evening meetings.

2. State government

a. Federal-state relations

Nigeria's 12-state federal structure is the product of a long series of constitutional and extraconstitutional

maneuvers designed to achieve a balance of power between the central government and the country's diverse regional interests. At independence in 1960, Nigeria consisted of three regions with a central government so weak that prestigious politicians almost without exception preferred regional to federal posts. In 1963 a fourth region was created as a political expedient, but interregional conflict continued until the old federation collapsed following the 1966 military coups. The January revolt resulted in such an increase in political instability that the new national leader, General Ironsi, decreed the creation of a unitary state after 4 months in office—an ill-advised move that led to his assassination and the institution of the Gowon government, which reintroduced the federal system. The regions were replaced by 12 states in May 1967, but in reality the state system did not begin to function until April 1968, and even at that date two of the 12 states were run by governments "in exile" owing to the civil war.

Pending a long-promised constitutional review, the 12 states theoretically possess the same powers granted each of the previous regions by the independence constitution. That document listed the powers belonging exclusively to the federal government and those to be exercised concurrently with the regional governments; residual power lay with the regions. The federal government had exclusive power over such matters as defense, foreign affairs, interregional and foreign trade, and commerce. The federal and regional governments held concurrent power over labor affairs, public order, industrial development, and public works; in cases of conflict in power, federal authority prevailed. Regions held exclusive power in such fields as education, health, and agriculture.

With the coming of the military government, the exclusive and concurrent lists were maintained, but it was established quite early that the regional governors could legislate on matters on the concurrent list only with the prior permission of the FMG. Decree 1 of 1966 claimed for the FMG the authority to make laws "with respect to any matter whatsoever." In practice, a substantial duplication of ministries at the two levels of government has occurred, with the federal government impinging on much of what was previously thought to be regional or state prerogative, especially in the field of education. As a result, there have been relatively discreet but pointed protests by state-level officials objecting to the "federal centralization of power."

The federal-state relationship was never really clear in practice under the civilian government and has become much less so since the advent of military rule. In terms of real power there is no question that the

hand of the central government has been strengthened, if only because the individual states have neither the political power nor the economic resources of the former regions. The dilution of state power has not been uniform, however; Mid-Western State is simply the region renamed, and Western State, although it lost two provinces to Lagos, is substantially unchanged from the previous region.

Disparities among the states have led many separatists, primarily from among minorities in North-Eastern, Western, Kwara, and South-Eastern States, to call for the creation of still more ethnically based units. To discourage such sentiments, the FMG has indicated that the present state structure is the basis of the 1970-74 development plan and that no more states will be created before completion of the plan. The way the FMG has handled the states issue—exemplified by the dormant States Boundaries Delimitation Commission—suggests that the government is hoping that the current boundaries will somehow become permanent before the promised transition to civilian rule.

The real crux of the federalism issue in Nigeria has always been the distribution of revenues between the center and the states. No single factor has so influenced the viability of the states or regions as the money available to them, for the majority are not economically self-sufficient. Complicating the basic problem of how much money the federal government is willing to give up is the even greater problem of how to distribute available funds among the several states with different needs and resources. Kwara, for example, is desperately poor compared to its neighbor, Mid-Western; the former has neither mineral nor agricultural products to export, while the latter has both. The pre-1966 civilian government was always northern dominated; hence more funds tended to flow north, with the rationale that the principle of need should predominate over the state-of-origin theory.

In its typically pragmatic manner, the military government acted in March 1970 to effect a compromise of the revenue question by dividing the distributable funds half according to population and half equally among the states. Additionally, the FMG decreased the federal share of petroleum revenues by two-thirds. The 1970 decree served to distribute funds more evenly among the states, with relatively wealthy East-Central, Western, and Mid-Western receiving less vis-a-vis their poorer neighbors.

On a short-term basis the financial strength of the states has been bolstered; the fact that almost 70% of the states' budgets comes from the federal treasury has allowed even the poorest state to expand both

recurrent and capital expenditures with a manageable deficit. In the long run, however, the FMG stands to benefit from the current revenue distribution system, since the important and ever-growing corporate profits tax goes into the central coffers. These revenue changes indicate that the federal government is willing to use as it sees fit its undisputed power to redistribute wealth. The exercise of fiscal and budgetary power within Nigeria points to continued strength for the FMG; the states will continue to be its clients.

b. Political power within the states

The East-Central State (the heart of former Biafra) is governed by a civilian administrator; all others have military governors. In every case, the state executive officer owes his job and his allegiance to the FMG rather than to any presumed local constituency. This in turn extends the influence of the FMG throughout the states' governing apparatus, since governors have the power to appoint their civilian commissioners and to dictate promotions and transfers in the state civil service. Figure 3 outlines the formal and informal relationships connecting the governor and the various state and local governmental institutions. Despite occasional rumors that transfers of governors are planned, the FMG has allowed almost all of the governors to retain their posts, even though a few are extremely corrupt and incompetent. Some have proved to be little more than messenger boys of the FMG, but this helps guarantee their political life.

In nearly every case, the military and the state civil service have together imposed their will on state policy and programs, relegating the civilian commissioners to a distinctly secondary position. Like many of the governors, most of the political commissioners are weak and previously unknown figures who are dependent on the FMG for their power base. Thus, with the commissioners weak and the governors of uneven quality and administrative skill, the civil servants have assumed much of the initiative in running the state governments—despite the fact that the civil service has been both qualitatively and quantitatively diluted with the proliferation of governments to be staffed.

3. Local government

a. Indirect rule precedent

The British system of indirect rule over colonial dependencies was widely applied in Nigeria, particularly in the Northern Region. It was found to be an effective and economical method of providing local administration for large numbers of geo-




FIGURE 3. Structure of state and local government (U/OU)

graphically dispersed and politically unsophisticated peoples. The governmental administrative structure, originally established by colonial governor Lord Lugard, consisted ultimately of regions divided into provinces and of provinces split into districts. Effective power at the provincial level was in the hands of the provincial secretary and at the district level in the hands of the district officer, both of whom were highly trained, university-educated civil servants.

The district officer (both before and after Nigerianization) was responsible for a large area and often for tens of thousands of people. As a result, the average citizen had no dealings with the civil service arm of the government, but instead relied for assistance and justice on the native authority (later called local authority), the traditional structure headed by a chief or emir which was the embodiment

of all judicial and fiscal power at the local level. The point of contact between the two systems was the relationship of the district officer with the heads of the native authorities, who were legally bound to follow his direction in significant matters. To facilitate this program, the British created both native authority councils and heads in many areas where none existed traditionally. One result of British support for the traditional leadership was the augmentation of the powers of that leadership to include authority over modern education and public works.

A key to the success of the indirect rule system was the ability of the native authority to govern effectively. The capability of the individual unit, in turn, was determined largely by its size, revenue, and population. There were vast differences among authorities, both before and after independence. For example, the native administration of Kano had a 1965 budget of US\$6,575,000, employed more than 5,000 persons, and contained 800,000 taxpayers; in contrast, the local authorities of southern Nigeria spent as little as \$5,000 and employed only a small office staff. In short, the system of local government existing up to 1965 was marked by vast disparities in effectiveness and importance.

The importance of local government in Nigeria has varied greatly between the north and the south. In the north, indirect rule was perfectly suited to the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri social systems and therefore was correspondingly efficient. In the south the traditional social structure was not amenable to incorporation into the indirect rule system, with the result that local government was much less important and efficient.

Local governments have always had responsibility for primary education, health services, administrative duties, the local judiciary, and the police. In the north far more attention and money are given to agriculture, forestry, and the police while in the urban areas greater expenditures are devoted to public welfare. These relative priorities are continuing, although the FMG has tended to assume steadily greater administrative and financial responsibilities at the expense of local autonomy, particularly in matters involving the police, the court systems, and primary education.

b. Local democracy

Efforts at local government reform and reorganization have had only limited success in cultivating popular participation and democratic procedures. Power in the far north remains to a large degree in the hands of local emirs and chiefs. Legal provisions for democratic involvement notwithstanding, few, if any,

persons or institutions carry on any programs contrary to the wishes of the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir of Katsina, or the Shehu of Bornu. Traditional social and religious loyalties are simply too effective as determinants of human behavior, whatever a government or governor may decree.

Nonetheless, basic changes had begun to occur prior to the military government's efforts at local reform. Some of those basic changes were of a potentially democratic nature and provided starting points for the most recent reforms. Beginning in 1963, for example, all native authorities were compelled to include a proportion of elected members; by the time of the first military coup, a few authorities were wholly elected and well over half had elected majorities. Progress proceeded at different rates within the north, naturally, and was fastest in those parts of the northern provinces—almost half the area—which were outside the traditional emirate system.

Elective local councils were introduced most enthusiastically in southern Nigeria, with the Western Region leading the way during the early 1960's. Paradoxically, however, the democratic reforms which were designed to strengthen local government proved to contribute to its downfall. A combination of financial difficulties, corruption, and political intrigue had rendered the councils useless for administering to local needs, and by late 1965 not a single elected council functioned in either the Western or the Mid-Western Region. In the north, where the local authorities were least democratic, local government continued to be fairly efficient, while in the west, increased democracy was not accompanied by greater viability or participation by the bulk of the population. When the FMG took over, therefore, local government everywhere was either undemocratic or hopelessly inefficient.

c. FMG reforms

Basic reform in local government was encouraged by the FMG during the 1968-70 period, but the military government did not seriously threaten the existence of the traditional rulers or governing practices. The federal government has clearly adopted the strategy of backing up the state governors in their efforts at reorganization, but it has made every effort to avoid antagonizing the traditional leadership. The most fundamental changes have occurred in the north, primarily because it is there that traditional authority has been most engrained, but also because the 1966 coup eliminated a number of northern personalities and institutions that had blocked earlier efforts at

reform. Progressive northern elements are now more free to initiate changes under the present military government, which is much less subservient to traditional northern interests.

Benue-Plateau in June 1968 became the first state to announce basic reforms, and by late 1972 all 12 states had taken some steps toward local government reform. Each state has been left to implement reforms as it sees fit, however—which in practice has meant as the governor desires and is able to implement. For Nigeria as a whole, the consequence of this method has been a lack of uniformity of institutions and terminology. Nonetheless, the typical pattern which is emerging is one in which each state is separated into divisions, divisions into administrative or development areas, and areas into districts and villages. In most cases the state and the administrative area appear to be the most important units; the other levels frequently exist only on paper. Sometimes they have been announced by a governor and then, in effect, forgotten.

Considered in terms of the former system, an administrative area often corresponds to a former district, emirate, or local authority. Immense variation occurs, however, as when a large emirate such as Kano is involved. Kano emirate has been organized into five administrative areas, whereas the other three emirates in former Kano Province constitute one area each, giving the new Kano State a total of eight administrative units. The state-appointed head of the administrative areas is often known in popular parlance as the D.O. (District Officer), but in fact the new areas often are smaller than the former districts, theoretically allowing their officials to become more acquainted with the development needs of the local population.

Most states have announced an intention to replace the traditional local authority, headed by a chief or emir, with an elected area council whose members are or will be appointed by the governor pending the end of military government. In fact, however, no state has abolished the former structure, although some have suspended it and reappointed substantially the same persons under the new framework. In many cases the area councils are obliged to report to the emirs' councils, which retain real power locally. Particularly in the rural areas, the emirs' continued possession of the power of taxation would challenge the success of the parallel administrative councils, were it not that they are provided staff and financial support from the state government, which in turn receives the bulk of its money from Lagos. The major impediment to reform, despite these cooperative arrangements, is the dearth of trained manpower to staff the proliferating levels of

state and local government. To some extent this problem is being alleviated by hiring southerners to staff northern bureaucracies, but this strategy is now being followed less frequently than prior to 1966. Many northerners have both anti-Yoruba and anti-Ibo feelings, and nearly all are eager to reserve jobs for their fellow Hausa-Fulani.

Success in making local administrative reform work seems to depend partly on the availability of funds and personnel, and partly on the personalities of the persons involved in pushing it. The effectiveness of reform in Kano has differed from that in North-Central, for example, largely because the governors' personalities differ. In Kano a modern enlightened governor, supported by an emir with similar views, has helped to get reform off to a rapid start. In North-Central a weak governor has been unable to overcome the traditional resistance to change of the Emir of Katsina.

Amon; the northern states, Kwara and Benue-Plateau were the first to announce reforms, but they have not in fact progressed any faster than has Kano, or even North-Central. The North-Western and North-Eastern States have been distinguished by a lack of change and by the success which the traditional rulers have had in controlling such limited reform as has been enacted. In North-Western State, for example, the Sultan of Sokoto was able to insure that the new administrative divisions correspond almost exactly to the old emirate divisions. Moreover, when the new units were finally implemented in mid-1971, their heads were obliged to rely on the local authorities for much of their staff and service. Similarly, in North-Eastern State an original proposal for 14 areas which would report to the state was changed to allow for 31 areas reporting to the local authorities; the largest authority, Bornu, had its council changed only through the addition of a few appointed members.

Considering the impediments to local government reform in northern Nigeria, some considerable gains have been achieved since the advent of military rule. Among the first moves was the federalization of courts and prisons at the time of the creation of new states in 1968. Later steps toward reduction of the power of the local authorities have included almost complete absorption of the Native Authority Police into the Nigeria Police Force, elimination of the absolute control of the emir over his council, enforced contribution to the state treasuries of part of the taxes collected by the emir, and, most important, assumption of administrative power at the lowest levels by civil servants directly trained, paid, and

controlled by the state. When adequately financed and staffed, this direct involvement of the civil service in the affairs of the village will mean the demise of the indirect rule system and will ultimately reduce the emir's position to that of a religious and social leader. In political terms, the emir's status over the long run will become that of a figurehead or constitutional monarch.

Local government reform has taken a somewhat different twist in western Nigeria, where the size of the groups paying allegiance to traditional rulers is much smaller than is the case in the north. Prior to the most recent round of reforms, the position of the chief, or *oba*, had already been reduced to basically parochial matters, with the role of the government (district officer and staff) the leading one even at the local level. The southern regions of Nigeria did not experience indirect rule in the literal form in which it was applied in the north. As a result of this different historical heritage, the reform goal in the west has often been to create larger, more useful councils rather than to dilute the power of traditional councils. Accordingly, the Western State governor in 1972 proposed that the "hodgepodge" of 114 councils be reduced to 40 which would be given sufficient authority to make them viable. According to the proposal, the new district councils would be entirely elected but the local *oba* would preside over their meetings, thus providing contact between the traditional and modern systems of authority. It was also suggested that the Western State government pay a salary to the more important *obas*, thus completing the process of making traditional authority dependent on the state military government.

In the eastern states local government reform has proceeded unevenly but generally slowly. In the whole of the east, the divisional officer or his equivalent exercises authority at very low levels, leaving little room for either traditional authority or modern councils to maneuver. When East-Central State began to establish community and urban councils in late 1970, it was the divisional officer who oversaw the election or selection of their members. Significantly for one of the most advanced areas of the country, the community councils are being created to represent collections of villages coterminous with existing traditional social and political units; each includes from 1,000 to 50,000 persons. The community councils are to be represented in divisional councils, which will in turn report to the state government. Until the whole structure is established, however, the function of the community council is merely to advise the divisional officer on local development needs, thus underscoring

the councils' secondary status. The councils have modest powers of taxation, but they have little executive authority.

In all states, the trend in local government reform is toward the assumption of more and more political and administrative power by the state bureaucracy. Corresponding to this change is the inevitable diminution of the power of the traditional leadership, whether it is paid by the state and asked to assume figurehead status (as in the west), allowed to advise at the lowest local level (as in the east), or gradually contained by a parallel state civil service (as in the north). The new format has been easiest to introduce in the south, and almost impossible to introduce in the ultraconservative far north. The FMG is careful not to offend established interests in its program of local government reforms and, therefore, has had only limited success, but it seems determined to see the project through.

4. Judicial system

a. Impact of FMG politics

The FMG has not changed the basic structure of the judiciary, although FMG control over it is substantially more direct and regular than was that of the previous civilian regime. The highest court of appeal continues to be the Federal Supreme Court in Lagos (Figure 4), consisting of a chief justice and five other justices; all are appointed and removed by the head of the FMG. Gowon has not hesitated to use his powers of appointment, as in 1971 when he waived by decree the previous constitutional age limit to allow additional service by the chief justice. The extent of executive primacy over the federal judiciary was brought to light in 1970, following a decision by the court that both an FMG decree and a Western State edict were unconstitutional. Within a month of the verdict, the SMC issued a decree stating that any decision purporting to overturn an enactment of the FMG would be "null and void and of no effect whatsoever."

The existing distribution of legal authority is such that the 1963 constitution applies in all areas not covered by FMG decrees. The scope of the constitution has been increasingly circumscribed, however, as the military government has taken steps to limit the independence of the press, the legal profession, and citizens in general. A state of emergency was declared in 1966, and comments made by Gov.on at the end of 1971 indicated that it would remain in force indefinitely. In practice the FMG has not interfered to any unusual degree with the freedom

of private individuals; the only special courts which it had created by 1972 were the special state-level tribunals to try cases of armed or forcible robbery, and that action had public support. In early 1972 the government appeared to be considering establishing similar courts to combat the problem of corruption.

The special robbery tribunals were originally composed of one representative each from the judiciary, military, and police services and were headed initially by state magistrates. By late 1971 the legal community had convinced the FMG that such tribunals were compromising basic rights, in that conviction carried the death penalty and appeal was possible only to the governor. A subsequent decree eliminated mandatory capital punishment in certain cases and provided that High Court judges must sit on all tribunals to upgrade their judicial status and the general quality of their proceedings. The success of the legal community in gaining modification of the robbery tribunals has not been paralleled in other areas, however, even though prestigious figures such as the president of the Nigerian Bar Association have publicly criticized the government for limiting basic freedoms and for issuing decrees protecting itself from suits initiated by private citizens. In November 1971 the press gave considerable attention to a government action creating a committee to revise Nigerian laws, but as of mid-1972 it appeared likely that the committee would merely update the existing code to reflect decrees already promulgated; it was not expected to limit in any way the growing judicial prerogatives of the FMG. Despite the FMG's expanded influence on political matters, it has not acted to interfere with the standards of the judiciary, which has a reputation for fairness and impartiality.

b. State-level judiciary

Apart from its establishment of the special tribunals, the military government has done little to alter the state-level judiciary. The Head of the FMG appoints the state High Court justices, but other appointments are left either to the northern chief justice or to the state Public Service Commissions. There have been more instances of government or press interference with the state courts than with the federal, but the judges involved have exhibited striking audacity and success in defending their independence, particularly against the influence of the state governors.

The several levels of lower courts are variously named among the different states, but a typical arrangement is that of South-Eastern State: High Court, Senior Magistrates Courts, Magistrates Courts, Customary Courts of Appeal, Customary Courts, and




FIGURE 4. Supreme Court building (U/OU)

(in the rural areas) Justices of the Peace. The significant exception to this pattern is Western State—Nigeria's largest—where there also is a Court of Appeal which is senior even to the High Court.

In the six northern states of Nigeria the modern, British-oriented legal code is applied by the District Courts (with civil jurisdiction) and by the Magistrates Courts (with criminal jurisdiction); their decisions are subject to appeal to the state High Courts. The modern court system was long accompanied, however, by a hierarchy of traditional Native Authority Courts, culminating in the Sharia Court, which is empowered to decide questions of Islamic law. The Native Authority Courts provided judicial processes in even the most remote areas, but they were (by European standards) arbitrary and corrupt. Through the issuance of identical edicts in April 1968 the northern state governors created, by consolidation, roughly 400 Area Courts to supplant nearly twice as many Native Authority Courts. These Area Courts handle 95% of all litigation and handle both civil and criminal cases under modern law.

The establishment of the Area Courts has represented fundamental and genuine reform, as it has placed the administration of justice at the local level under the authority of the state bureaucracy and has weakened or removed former links with the traditional leadership. Owing to an acute lack of legally trained personnel, the Area Courts are often staffed by the same persons who were formerly employed by the Native Authority Courts, but the most aged and corrupt officeholders have been eliminated and a portion of the others have been given at least a minimum of legal training. Most important, however, is the fact that the Area Courts and their personnel are under the ultimate direction of the Chief Justice of the

High Court and are administered and supervised by the Commissioner for Area Courts. These changes, plus the possibility of appeal to the state High Courts, have substantially improved the impartiality of justice and partially reduced the high amount of corruption previously found at the local level.

5. Civil service

a. Governing role

Reflecting its British heritage, the Nigerian civil service possesses a carefully systematic formal and legal structure. Its organization includes a Public Service Commission, a complicated grading system, extensive personnel regulations, competitive entrance examinations, and a functioning pension system. The internal management of the civil service and its administration of the country are theoretically independent of political influence, subject only to the policy directives of the commissioners heading each ministry. Despite this heritage, recent years have transformed the ideal arrangement into one where the FMG has assumed rather direct control over the federal civil service, and the state governors have assumed greater control over the state services. Accordingly, the federal Public Service Commission has lost to the FMG much of its control over appointments, discipline, promotions, and firings, and the state commissions, where they exist, are inferior replicas of their former regional counterparts. In August 1972 the FMG established a Public Service Review Commission with comprehensive powers to "examine the organization, structure, and management of the public services" and to recommend reforms within 24 months.

The comparative inexperience of the military leaders with the process of governing, coupled with their effective suppression of politicians, has created a situation where the higher civil service is considerably more important than it was under civilian rule. The resulting tendency of civil servants to deal directly with the FMG has inevitably "politicized" their work to an extent previously unknown and has had the effect of creating considerable civil service support for the continuation of military rule, particularly among the few highest ranking heads of the bureaucracy who are confidants of Gowon himself. Fortunately, Gowon seems to be relying on the most able career officers. In late 1970, for example, he reshuffled all but five of the permanent secretaries, putting the three who often attend Dodan Barracks meetings and who drafted his widely noted 1970 anniversary speech in the most crucial substantive positions.

The single structural alteration of the civil service by the FMG was embodied in a 1971 decision to establish a police council independent of the Public Service Commission—a move designed to improve the morale of an underpaid police force frustrated by the problems of coexistence with a pervasive and more favored army.

The military government has also been obliged to become more involved in civil service affairs as a result of the administrative disruptions stemming from the civil war and the shortage of trained personnel at the state government level. Prior to the civil war in 1967 the federal public service included nearly 69,000 employees and had an annual rate of growth of 14%. A much more rapid growth following the war was partly a result of a policy decision in September 1971 to recruit federal employees with the express aim of seconding them to the states. This represented direct federal involvement and a degree of interservice mobility never before seen in Nigeria, but it seemed to be the only method of overcoming the low pay, lack of tenure, and antirural mentality on the part of civil servants that had inhibited the states' efforts to recruit for their civil service positions. State and federal employees combined were believed to number almost 200,000 in late 1972.

b. Recurrent problems

A number of problems relating to the public service continue to plague the government, among them the perennial issues of Nigerianization, salary levels, and corruption. Efforts at Africanizing the service were begun early, but in late 1972 expatriates were still holding some of the most prestigious positions in a few states, largely as a result of their educational and technical qualifications in financial matters. Ironically, the FMG is contemplating hiring even larger numbers of foreigners for lesser positions as a result of its failure to induce Nigerians resident abroad to return home and its inability to persuade other trained Nigerians to take rural posts.

The salary question is part of a package of administrative problems which have arisen primarily because of a lack of systematic consultation among the several federal, regional, state, and local governments in the past on wage and staff policies. An April 1971 decree sought to clarify procedures for transfers from one service to another and to provide uniform pension benefits. The issue of greatest concern to government workers, wages, was largely taken care of by a decision in October 1971 to allow the 10% to 30% increases which had been recommended by a government-appointed commission for public sector employees.

Despite mild protests on specific issues, there has been no serious labor unrest; the civil service and the police have a history of reliability and allegiance.

The most persistent problems facing the civil service are those of corruption and incompetence. In 1972 the government was considering establishing corruption tribunals to insure prompt punishment for dishonest practices, but there is little chance that even the strictest measures will eliminate such pervasive behavior. Widespread corruption has had the effect of deterring foreign companies from following through with investment plans and has served to further reduce the generally low level of efficiency domestically. Bureaucratic efficiency has also been inhibited by ethnic bias and by the military government's indecisiveness on certain basic matters. The leadership vacuum and a general reluctance to assume responsibility have accelerated the already disruptive practice of passing all decisions to the highest levels for resolution. Nevertheless, by African standards the civil service as a whole functions tolerably well, and Gowon's fairly extensive personnel changes of late 1970 were cause for hope for the future.

C. Political dynamics (S)

Political activity has been banned in Nigeria since the January 1966 military coup, which overthrew the constitutional government and substituted rule by decree. The government has outlawed political parties, but the former politicians continue to meet quietly and to plan strategy in anticipation of the return to civilian rule, targeted by the military for 1976. General Gowon has listed nine goals which must be met prior to the return to civilian government, but the FMG has taken few tangible steps to realize any of them. In late 1972 power remained firmly in military hands, with the civil service exercising considerable influence in governing the country. The FMG has eliminated many of the civilian era problems of ethnic separatism and minority frustrations, but in so doing it has prevented popular civilian leaders and interest groups from participating in government.

1. Tribal politics

The country's regional and ethnic diversity was the major factor responsible for the vast and violent political changes that characterized Nigeria's first decade of independence. During the first half of the 1960's this diversity was reflected in the power machinations of the largest tribal-linguistic groups, pitting the interests of the Hausa-Fulani, the Ibo, and

the Yoruba against one another. The latter half of the decade witnessed the emergence of the power of small tribes in espousing their interests vis-a-vis those of the larger groups previously in power. The personification of this historic transformation is Gowon himself; whether this small-tribe, Middle Belt, military figure will allow a return to civilian rule and to elective politics dominated by big tribes is the major question of the 1970's.

The importance of the few largest ethnic groups in Nigerian politics is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the states in which each major tribe is dominant; the four largest tribal groups together constitute nearly two-thirds of the national population. Of particular significance are the Hausa and Fulani, which have been virtually identical since the early 19th century conquest of the indigenous Hausa by the nomadic Fulani in a Muslim military-religious campaign. Fulani expansionism was checked in the far northeast by the Kanuri, in the south by the Yoruba, and in the southeast by the terrain and social structure of Iboland. Within these limits, however, the Hausa-Fulani amalgam covered most of what later became the Northern Region, comprising roughly half of Nigeria's population and constituting the largest political force in the country. Similarly, because they were the largest single tribal groups in their respective areas, the Yoruba controlled the Western Region and the Ibo the Eastern Region at independence. The subsequent creation of the Mid-Western Region also reflected tribal predominance, in essence giving the sizable Edo group a political home.

The 1966 coups resulted in part from the inability of the large tribes to coexist: the benefits of those upheavals were enjoyed primarily by the smaller tribes, which found new power in the highest national leadership and through the creation of the 12-state structure. The dissolution of the regions had the effect of freeing the smaller groups from the pervasive regional power of the big tribes. In the former Northern Region, for example, the government of North-Eastern State has been established in the Kanuri area; Kwara State is governed by the Yoruba; and Benue-Plateau is controlled by a Tiv-Doma coalition. Only three states remain securely in the hands of the Hausa-Fulani: Kano, North-Western, and North-Central. Similarly, in the former Eastern Region—where it took a civil war to settle this and related issues—the Ibo are now reduced to control over the East-Central State; South-Eastern State is controlled by the Ibibio-Efik, and Rivers State by the Ijaw. The latter group, particularly, continues to be very anti-Ibo; their zeal to remain autonomous permeates all other political issues for them and leads them to support the FMG with atypical enthusiasm. The institution of the state system was felt least in the Western and Mid-Western Regions, which with relatively minimal changes were transformed into states of the same names.

The state-oriented distribution of political power has effectively limited overt Hausa-Fulani dominance of Nigerian politics, and the civil war ended a period of Ibo ascendancy in the civil service and commerce. Ironically, these changes did not end large-tribe influence but in some ways contributed to a new phenomenon, the Yoruba problem. The Yoruba are invariably described as "inveterate political maneuverers" and have in fact augmented this reputation through the actions of their colorful military figures, their continuing partisan activity, their predominance in the federal judiciary, their active participation in the FEC, and their popular demonstrations in the Western State and in Lagos, the federal capital and a Yoruba city. Most important, Yoruba predominance is felt in politically significant ways—Yoruba-speaking students win a strikingly disproportionate number of federal scholarships, and Yoruba occupy lower and middle civil service jobs at the federal level and in the growing services of the northern states. These gains, when accompanied by the widely noted aggressiveness of the Yoruba personality, have led in the northern states to an anti-Yoruba feeling which in many areas is stronger than the previous anti-Ibo sentiment. Tribal prejudices show no sign of diminishing and constitute both

FIGURE 5. Dominant tribes in state governments (C)

TRIBE	PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION	STATES OF POLITICAL DOMINANCE
Hausa-Fulani	28	North-Western, North-Central, Kano.
Ibo	17	East-Central.
Yoruba	17	Lagos, Kwara, Western.
Kanuri	4	North-Eastern.
Ibibio-Efik	3	South-Eastern.
Tiv	3	Benue-Plateau.
Edo	2	Mid-Western.
Ijaw	1	Rivers.

psychological and political limits within which any future return to civilian government must be carried out.

An important element in the Yoruba problem is the fact that the predominant Yoruba state, Western, is by far the most populous in Nigeria. This has led to calls for giving the state's minorities greater autonomy or for splitting the state into two or even three entities. The carving up of Western State appeared likely for a time, if only to assuage the fears of non-Yoruba that the state was going to dominate federal politics, but the FMG announcement that no new states will be created until at least 1974 has had the effect of cutting off debate. Ironically, the Yoruba themselves disagree on the pros and cons of dividing Western State, with views on the issue corresponding almost exactly to former party allegiances.

2. Political parties

Before political parties were banned, party allegiance in Nigeria corresponded almost universally to tribal background. Basically, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) was the political arm of the traditional Hausa-Fulani leadership in the north; the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) represented the Ibo of the east; and the Action Group (AG) represented the Yoruba of the west. The liabilities of being in opposition against an NPC-NCNC coalition led in 1962 to a split in the AG in which the progressive, southern Yoruba parent party lost members to the more conservative Muslim, northern Yoruba Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).

In addition to these four large-tribe political groups there were smaller, less important parties based primarily on minority-tribe sympathies but secondarily on ideological positions. Among the smaller groups were the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the United Middle Belt Congress. In the 1964 federal elections these two small parties joined the AG and NCNC in an electoral coalition to oppose an NPC-NNDP combination.

The patterns of electoral alliances formed by the major parties during Nigeria's early years underscored the fact that the paramount goal of the politicians was to advance personal and tribal interests by linking their followers to a winning team. Thus eastern, western, and Middle Belt figures all allied themselves at various times and in varying circumstances with the politically powerful NPC. Political opportunism and not ideology provided the basis for these arrangements, as is exhibited in the fact that the leftist

elements in the NCNC made it Nigeria's most ideologically conscious party, yet it combined with the conservative NPC to form the first postindependence government. Among the major parties, only the Yoruba AG was never part of a federal government.

Although political parties remain illegal in late 1972, maneuvering and negotiation in anticipation of the return of civilian rule continue to take place among former party leaders, who are drawing on long-established followings and organizations. The leaders of the FMG are mindful of their self-imposed responsibility to create a permanent alternative to regional self-centeredness: they are cultivating replacements for traditional loyalties; they are hoping that the current state boundaries will become permanent; and they are insisting that future political parties be nationally oriented rather than based on parochial tribal or regional interests. They have not, however, eliminated regional forces or aspirations.

But despite the FMG's preferences, subterranean partisan activity continues. Such activity increased at the end of the civil war in January 1970, but it dropped off sharply when Gowon announced in October of that year that civilian rule would likely be 6 years in the future. A late 1971 announcement that a census will be held in 1973 has led some observers to expect elections and a return to civilian rule shortly thereafter. If such expectations spread, an increase in party activity will undoubtedly follow.

In the interim, organizational efforts seem most advanced among the perennially political Yoruba, somewhat less vigorous among northern and Middle Belt groups, and least in evidence among the easterners. In the latter case politics has obviously been deemed secondary to postwar economic reconstruction, and in any event the relatively thorough replacement of discredited political leaders has left an organizational and leadership vacuum. In other regions the bulk of the political maneuvering continues to be by politicians active in the decade up to 1966.

The best known civilian politician during the period of military rule has been Chief Obafemi Awolowo, founder and leader of the AG who served as vice chairman of the FEC until his resignation in 1971. Both during and after his participation in government, Awolowo has sought to expand AG influence and organization, with the result that it is the single party enjoying both a meaningful structure and a coherent policy. Even the AG remains little more than Awolowo and his Western State apparatus, but limited success has been achieved in eliciting support from key figures in all 12 states, with potential electoral support limited

to the non-Hausa north and elements in Mid-Western, Rivers, Lagos, and South-Eastern States. In 1970 Awolowo considered forming a truly national party, but Gowon's speech that October caused him to deflect his ambitions in the direction of simply polishing his contacts with like-minded leaders in other states while concentrating on organizing in Western State.

The importance of Awolowo and of Western State is reflected in the strategies and policies of the NNDP and NCNC. The two established a tentative alliance in 1970, based largely on an anti-Awolowo platform, but that combination was dealt a severe blow by the announcement of the prolongation of military rule. The resulting lack of rationale for unified action not only ruined the two-party alliance but by late 1971 had reduced the NNDP to a number of factions of indefinite leadership. The party retained a following among opponents of Awolowo in Western State, but it appeared unlikely that prospective leaders in the north would again try to cultivate an alliance with the NNDP.

To an even greater extent than the NNDP, the NCNC suffers a severe leadership problem and has almost no organization in its home area, East-Central State. In late 1971 the NCNC leadership was inclined to concentrate on organizing in Western State; it had no plans to move into its traditional strongholds in the mid-western and eastern areas.

Political activity continues in the northern states, although in a less obvious manner than in the west. The northern states' Interim Common Services Agency provides an opportunity for meetings of the northern military governors, but the organization's subservience to the FMG insures that it has no independent political future. Unofficial associations of former leaders do exist, but these are comparatively amorphous groups having little modern political organization behind them. Despite the current lack of party structure, however, traditional loyalties remain strong in the north, will continue so regardless of the success of the local government reforms, and will be drawn on when parties are reestablished.

The history of Nigerian political parties and recent efforts at reorganization confirm that the creation of parties with larger than regional bases is at the same time the greatest problem and the most essential requisite for a successful return to civilian rule. The national parties which emerge are almost certain to be combinations of merely renamed regional parties. Western State is presently the unofficial testing ground for the strength of the former leaders' organizational skills, but the disposition of the north will determine which party is ultimately successful.

3. Elections

Elections at the federal level were last held in 1964, and at the regional level in 1965. Early in 1966, following the first military coup, parliament was abolished, and the states which replaced the regions have appointed rather than elected leadership. By 1971 there was some evidence that local and largely informal elections were being held in the creation of local government bodies in East-Central State, but that process was decidedly embryonic and atypical. The FMG announcement that a census would be held in November 1973 caused speculation that general elections would come as early as 1974, but there is no evidence that the FMG has in fact decided on a date or planned any electoral machinery.

The electoral laws which existed prior to the military takeover allowed for universal suffrage except in the Muslim Northern Region, where voting was a male prerogative. Throughout the country, voter registration and participation were very high by democratic standards—both were about 80%. Despite the progressive laws and widespread participation, however, elections were tarnished by government corruption and voter resentment at both the federal and the regional level: official manipulation, party boycotts, strong-arm tactics, voter intimidation, public disorders, registration irregularities, and voting frauds, with no effective remedies for them. The impact that such abuses had on the results of the 1964 and 1965 elections is still open to debate; what is not debatable is that the FMG must take considerable pains to provide legal assurances of fair elections before public confidence can be restored and the results can become genuinely representative.

With political parties still officially banned, there is no basis on which to project future election results, but it can be safely assumed that the key factor in popular voting behavior will continue to be tribal loyalty. In the past this phenomenon has led to major-tribe control of the government; in 1959 the NPC was the senior partner in a successful coalition including the NCNC, and in 1964 it was joined by the NNDP. Given the military government's insistence on preserving the state system, however, the small-tribe electorate is likely to play a substantially more important role in determining the composition of the next government.

4. Ethnic separatism

a. 1966 military coups

Although the irregularities of 1964 and 1965 did much to erode popular trust in the electoral process,

they did more to undermine support for the northern-dominated federal government. This erosion led ultimately to the military coups of 1966 and the eastern secession of 1967.

Relations between the north and the east first became seriously strained when the NPC turned to the NNDP as a coalition partner in 1964. The federal government's role in installing the NNDP in control of the Western Region in the 1965 regional election alienated the AG, which was the popular preference, and also brought the NCNC to realize that it had no hope of regaining national political power through the constitutional process, which was becoming grossly fraudulent.

In January 1966 a group of young, idealistic, and predominantly Ibo army officers overthrew the northern regime, in the process assassinating a number of the top political and military leaders from the north and west. The commander of the army, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Ibo, took control and organized a southern-based military regime that relied essentially on Ibo personnel in the federal military and civil service. Encouraged by advisers who saw an opportunity to create a strong central government under Ibo leadership, Ironsi began by decree to erode the autonomy of the regions, finally issuing a directive unifying the regional and federal civil services and abolishing the federal structure. Northern dissatisfaction with Ironsi and fear of Ibo domination led in mid-1966 to the murder of Ironsi as part of a second coup in which Gowon came to power. Shortly after that coup, thousands of Ibo resident in the Northern Region were slaughtered.

b. Civil war

The military governor of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, who had been appointed by Ironsi, consistently refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Gowon's regime and attended only one meeting of the SMC—the one which was held in Ghana in early 1967 to settle outstanding constitutional issues. Gowon made limited concessions in an effort to keep the east in the federation, including his proposal to make the SMC a collegial body requiring the governors' unanimous approval on crucial issues. According to Ojukwu as well as most independent observers, Gowon later reneged on some points which had been settled, but even if he had acted in good faith Gowon could not have consented to the degree of financial, military, and political autonomy ultimately demanded by the east. In May 1967 the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly gave Ojukwu a mandate to secede at any "early practicable date."

Faced with what he judged insubordination, Gowon issued decrees abolishing the regions and reorganizing Nigeria into 12 states, putting the Ibo into a single, landlocked state, and creating individual states for the larger eastern minorities. Ojukwu thereupon announced secession.


The new republic, Biafra, existed from May 1967 until January 1970, at various times controlling East-Central, South-Eastern, Rivers, Mid-Western, and a small portion of Western states. Mobilizing a very large army, the FMG conducted a war of attrition which finally reduced Biafra to a small Ibo enclave and surrender. During its 2½-year life the secessionist state was run by a government with an organizational format very much like that of Nigeria itself. Most public services were kept functioning. The government was to some degree representative of all eastern ethnic groups, although the non-Ibo exhibited much less enthusiasm for the separatist cause than did the Ibo and were among the first to be "liberated" by advancing FMG armies. Ironically, the surrender document was signed by a Biafran military leader, Philip Effiong, who was a member of a tribe (the Efik) which had strong anti-Ibo feelings.

Although human suffering inside Biafra was great during the war, it was not so extreme as the astute Biafran propagandists suggested, and elite groups emerged relatively unscathed. More important, fears that the FMG was engaged in a genocidal war proved completely unfounded, and the federal government immediately set upon a course of reconstruction for the east. Federal aid to East-Central State was so extensive, in fact, that by late 1971 northerners were complaining of the comparative neglect of their areas. Within a year and a half of the end of the war it was estimated that as many as 50,000 Ibo had left the east to take up residence in the north; although this figure represented only a fraction of the 350,000 who had fled the 1966 purges, it reflected substantial Ibo trust in the FMG. Reintegration and the reclamation of property proved to be much more difficult in Rivers State, but considerable progress was evident there too by the end of 1971. Nevertheless, the political and commercial role of the Ibo community remains much diminished from its prewar level.

c. State minorities


The civil war demonstrated that military separatism has no future, but it did not settle the perennial problem of minority politics. In North-Eastern State, for example, the Kanuri are free from the previous Hausa-Fulani domination, but they in turn must deal with the 50% of the state's population who are from

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advance planning, for electoral pandemonium, and for regional factionalism.

In early 1971 the police Special Branch uncovered evidence of Soviet subversion in the NTUC, and as a result several of the union's leaders were detained for more than a year. By the end of 1971 the organization was in desperate financial straits, as it was denied access to its bank account without the authorization of its leaders, and the Soviet Embassy had supplied no funds for over 6 months.

The NTUC poses no security threat to the military government and lacks widespread popular support, but with its affiliated unions it can make the implementation of government policies very difficult, such as in 1971, when it led the opposition to the FMG's wage policy. The leadership of the NTUC overlaps that of two other radical organizations, the Nigerian Committee of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization and the Nigerian-Soviet Friendship and Cultural Association (NSFCA). Particularly in the latter case, identical leadership constitutes a connection of the radical groups to the political establishment; for example, in East-Central State a commissioner chaired an organizational meeting of the NSFCA, most of whose members were from the NTUC. The consistent supporters of both the labor and friendship organizations are students seeking scholarships, unemployed workers, market-women, and others motivated by personal advantage. Few have ideological motivations.

c. Student politics

Dissident students create the same kind of difficulties for the FMG as do the labor unions—i.e., they are a hindrance to the implementation of specific policies but are not a basic threat to the stability of the regime. Whatever the validity of their complaints, the students' ability to confront the government is inhibited by the fact that their organizations are fragmented in the same way as are those of their labor counterparts. The largest student group, the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS), held a convention in 1970 which was so disorganized that it dissolved before it could elect officers for the following year. The national NUNS organization was reunited in late 1971, but it failed to take any concerted action on public issues. Leadership posts in the NUNS and similar groups are sought chiefly because they lead to opportunities for foreign travel, budget manipulation, and political publicity for the individuals involved, not because the organizations themselves are politically significant.

Demonstrations by youth groups have concentrated on such issues as university admissions quotas and stipend levels rather than on national or international political topics. The relative lack of student enthusiasm for the anti-British demonstrations following the announcement of the terms of the Rhodesian settlement provided further evidence of this preoccupation with specifically student concerns.

Early in 1971 students and unions were simultaneously protesting to the government on separate issues, and the FMG feared that the two would unite to form a serious threat. Although concerted action was not taken in this case, mutual sympathies and the potential for future joint action were clearly demonstrated. Student and labor groups do pose a serious long-term problem for the government; the two groups share economic grievances and a much less tribally based organizational framework than do the traditional political parties.

d. The press

Among established nongovernmental groups and institutions, the press is one of the more effective in influencing public policy. Top FMG officials appear to value the usefulness of the press in disseminating information to the people and are in turn responsive to questions on public issues brought up by the more prestigious newspapers. Neither of Nigeria's two major dailies is owned by the central government—both are independent to an extent unique in Africa. Unofficial censorship provided effective if unsystematic guidelines of government control during the civil war, but since that time the press has sought to expand its freedom to criticize the government. Newspapers in the eastern states have not recovered from the effects the civil war had on their circulation and prestige; therefore they are relatively parochial and not very effective nationally. The northern states' newspaper, the *New Nigerian*, was founded in 1966 but already has a wide circulation and comparatively professional standards. It vigorously boosts northern interests, and occasionally criticizes the FMG when those interests seem threatened. The prodding most sensitive to the military government has come from the press in Western and Lagos states, where in early 1971 editors from three different newspapers were detained briefly on Gowon's instructions for writing editorials critical of the government.

Uncertainty about the FMG's limits on press freedom created such a furor that Gowon met personally with newspaper figures later in 1971, and in October of that year the government sought to define its policy of "orientation without censorship" at a

meeting of the state information commissioners. Proposals have been made to create a national news agency, a press code of conduct, a press council to insure observance of the code, and a national broadcasting authority. The press almost unanimously condemned the government's proposals, with the result that none has been implemented. It remains clear, however, that the FMG and Gowon are irritated with growing press attacks on the army and the military government and that continued regulation in some form is a virtual certainty.

e. Business and the professions

Two groups which have some influence with the FMG are the legal profession and the leaders of private and public corporations. Reflecting the struggle which still exists in the top echelons of Nigerian business between expatriates and Africans, such executives and their organizations usually do not present a united front to the government. Despite this limitation, legal and illegal contacts are common between government figures and individual businessmen at both the federal and state levels, and organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce show signs of life in many of the larger cities. The national president of the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce in 1972 was the country's most widely known African businessman and a man who has consistently and publicly decried government interference in the economy.

Lawyers are much better organized and more explicitly political than are businessmen; the president of the Nigerian Bar Association, R.O.A. Akinjide, for example, is a leading NNDP politician, a public critic of the FMG, and a potential civilian leader. The legal profession has been especially critical of the lack of due process alleged to exist in the special robbery tribunals, and in 1971 lawyers conducted a one-day strike to protest a summary execution. Lawyers' groups are likely to increase their influence, and will do so even more quickly if civilian rule becomes a reality. Other professional groups, notably doctors and teachers, have their respective organizations which are very vocal and are sometimes influential when policy questions relating to their specialties arise.

f. Farmers and other traditional interests

Farmers are predictably less well organized than are urban wage earners. Only the cocoa producers are a political force, and this predominantly Yoruba, Western State group is important because of the delicacy of its relationship with the marketing boards, the police, and government budgetary policy. Rural

workers' interests are primarily economic; the perennial task of the FMG is to overcome a depressed world market and to keep prices at acceptable levels that will forestall demonstrations, minimize the problems of noncooperation and smuggling, and prevent political grievances and movements from springing up. In other agricultural fields—e.g., peanuts, cotton, and rubber—neither landowners nor workers are organized in a manner which would make them important in national politics.

Traditional organizations are increasingly losing their importance as forces in federal politics, although some, particularly in the north, retain regional influence. One genuinely traditionalist group is the Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI), a Muslim organization receiving moral and political support from the northern emirs and financial support from the Middle East. The JNI is dedicated primarily to spreading Islam through the schools and religious institutions, but secondarily to building a base for future political activity. Established by the former Sardauna of Sokoto, a powerful northern ruler who was killed in the first 1966 coup, the JNI will continue to be an influence on northern political leaders, particularly after the promised return to civilian rule. Another northern organization whose membership includes many traditional leaders is the Barewa Old Boys Association, a group of roughly 2,000 graduates of the north's most prestigious secondary school, Barewa College. With political parties outlawed, the association's public activities concern alumni-related matters, but its influential members are in a position to raise a powerful voice for traditional northern interests in the future.

Traditional and modern ethnic interests are also made known to the FMG from time to time through nongovernmental representatives of tribal groups. Self-appointed and unofficial as these leaders are, they still are numerous and influential and are sometimes referred to as tribal caucuses. The importance of these caucuses is difficult to judge, but they do serve to espouse the interests of the tribes which are minorities within their states as well as to bypass certain governors who are not members of the state traditional or commercial elite.

D. National policies (S)

1. Domestic

Nigeria's domestic policies since independence have been geared toward the pursuit of two main goals: national unity and economic development. The

outbreak of the civil war underscored the country's failure to achieve the former, and the pursuit of the war prevented progress in the latter by disrupting all nonessential programs and expenditures from 1967 to 1970. Since the hostilities, absolute power has been in the hands of Gowon and his close advisers, none of whom is accustomed to thinking or acting in systematic, policy-oriented terms. On the occasion of Nigeria's 10th anniversary celebration in October 1970, however, Gowon finally took the bull by the horns in proposing nine tangible steps as prerequisites to the return to civilian rule by 1976. Comprising his nine aims were two essentially economic goals (the institution of a national development and reconstruction plan, and the implementation of a permanent formula for revenue distribution among the states and the central government); four administrative or organizational goals (the reorganization and redeployment of the army, the resolution of state boundary problems, the elimination of corruption, and the holding of a national census); and three wholly political goals (the writing of a new constitution, the creation of national and nontribal political parties, and the holding of free elections). These nine points have formed the backbone of the government's domestic policy since they were formulated in 1970. In most public appearances since that time Gowon has sought to demonstrate that the FMG is making progress toward achieving this program. In reality, the military government has taken some steps to implement Gowon's economic policies, but except for scheduling a census in 1973, it has avoided facing problems with political implications.

a. Economic goals

Gowon's Second National Development Plan (1970-74) was a general, albeit uneven, success during its first years. By 1972, Nigeria's rapidly increasing oil revenues had balanced the federal budget, provided adequate foreign exchange for increased imports, and eased the burden posed by continued high military expenditures. Most important, Nigeria in 1971 achieved an estimated 12% growth rate. By mid-1972 the government had succeeded in retarding general inflation, but it was not as successful in its attempts to check rising food prices. In spite of substantial FMG efforts and successes, politically significant economic-based grievances remain: unemployment is a problem; many development projects are stalled owing to administrative bottlenecks; and expenditure priorities favor elite groups and the military. Development expenditures to

date have concentrated on rehabilitation of the worst of the war-afflicted areas, but in other parts of the country the masses of the population feel ignored and are generally cynical about the government's alleged improvements in such fields as transport and communications.

Progress by the FMG in implementing its declared policy on other economic matters has been slow. Gowon called in October 1970 for the formulation of a permanent plan for revenue distribution to replace the interim plan announced by the FMG the previous March, but by 1972 no steps had been taken to devise a new system. Because all states receive a larger allocation of nonpetroleum revenue under the interim plan, however, and because the FMG provides budget and reconstruction assistance to the states, many of them appear reconciled to the interim plan as a workable compromise.

The most politically successful of Gowon's economic policies—one not explicit in his nine-point program—is that of Nigerianization. The FMG is trying to secure full employment for Nigerians and to place effective control of all major industries in Nigerian hands. A decree issued in 1972 will prohibit foreign investment in retail trade, service industries, and simple manufacturing after 1974. Larger and more heavily capitalized industries continue to be open to foreign ownership, but only through partnership arrangements with Nigerian nationals. The FMG has acquired varying degrees of participation in the existing oil concessions, and it is expanding the role of the Nigerian National Oil Company (NNOC) in all phases of petroleum production and marketing. Nigeria is taking an increasingly assertive stand in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and in its own negotiations with the major oil-producing companies. The trend toward economic nationalism accelerated rapidly in 1971 and 1972.

b. Administrative goals

In 1970 Gowon indicated that a reorganization of the army was necessary to keep the troops efficient, loyal, and happy—his prescription for political stability. Occasional grumbings from senior officers notwithstanding, the FMG has the loyalty of the army, a loyalty buttressed by foreign training and new equipment to placate the officers and by relatively good pay and popular prestige for enlisted men. This policy of keeping the military content, however, has drawn heavily on the national economy, which must maintain an army of roughly 260,000 men. The hope expressed at the end of the civil war

that the army would be a force in economic reconstruction has failed to materialize; soldiers have played a minimal role in civic action projects. Perfunctory training programs are limited primarily to the lower ranks, although an extensive athletic program helps occupy the troops. Fortunately, the underoccupied army has rarely antagonized the civilian population and is quite well disciplined. In fact, demobilization would create more social problems than it would solve.

Overall, Gowon's relations with the army are good, his policies are effective, and the public is cooperative, although civilian politicians complain about the size of the defense budget. Gowon has moved slowly and with extreme care in reorganizing and redeploying the army. However, in 1972, the anticipated transfer of the headquarters of three divisions of the army to permanent locations in Kaduna, Ibadan, and Jos, plus Gowon's appointment of a new chief of staff, appeared to be paving the way for more rapid change.

Although the FMG has stuck to its policy of not creating new states before 1974, active developments on the states issue have included a willingness to consult on border disputes and a forceful dedication to the principle of unlimited mobility of people from state to state. In his 1972 New Year's message Gowon observed that growing reconciliation among Nigerians and their movement across state borders had culminated in greater mutual understanding. The government's policy of stimulating unity among the various elements of the population appears to be working and to be welcome to the public.

On the issue of corruption the government has waged its war primarily through propaganda in the newspapers. In early 1972, however, the FMG approved an anticorruption decree which would enable the government to take firm action against dishonest civil servants and their contacts in the private sector.

The most tangible step toward the implementation of Gowon's administrative goals came in his announcement that a census will be held in November 1973. Gowon reassured the country that the census would be a purely technical operation, but the political implications were obvious to everyone, as the 1963 census had created insuperable problems among the regions. If the census is carried out as promised, it will be the first publicly obvious accomplishment of the nine-point program and will be received by the public and the press as hard evidence that Gowon is prepared to take on other political problems.

c. Political goals

Concerning political issues, the schedule announced by the regime in 1970 provides that within 6 years the

FMG will have drafted a new constitution, permitted the creation of national and nontribal political parties, and provided for free elections. By 1972 no steps had been taken toward implementing any of these goals, with the government having adopted the practice of periodically renewing the ban on political activity and minimizing the political aspects of various economic and administrative problems. The public has been sympathetic to the FMG's apolitical approach, in recognition of the seriousness of the country's postwar economic and administrative problems. The public's superficial disinterest in partisan politics may disappear as the civil war psychology fades and as 1976 draws nearer, however, and its support for the FMG may begin to disappear as well unless tangible progress is discernible.

Gowon probably announced his nine-point program in good faith, but the following years have revealed that he is reluctant to make the hard decisions and to take the unpopular steps necessary to implement it. In his major public addresses he has established a pattern of rhetoric which has not been complemented by a substantive program. His tendency toward personal and governmental inaction is most pronounced when political issues are involved, but it can be seen also in the economic field. In fiscal, monetary, and budgetary matters, where careful planning and integrated administration are required, the FMG has a poor record. Reflecting the government's lack of concerted behavior, newspapers in 1972 began to refer to a "loss of faith in public organs" and to a "gap between public pronouncements of men in authority and action required to make pronouncements meaningful."

2. Foreign

Nigeria's civilian government pursued a theoretically nonaligned foreign policy. In reality the largely European-educated civil servants and the traditionally oriented politicians were led by their own conservative backgrounds, by Nigeria's colonial heritage, and by a pervasive preoccupation with domestic affairs to construct by default a basically pro-Western but almost isolationist policy. General Gowon is similarly well disposed toward the West and is suspicious of the motives of Communist states, but he has created an international posture which is more genuinely nonaligned than was that of his predecessors. Moreover, the exigencies of the civil war and Gowon's personal taste for foreign travel have contributed to an increasingly independent, neutral, and assertive foreign policy, in keeping with Nigeria's size and relative importance among black African states. The result of this continuing evolution has been to enhance

the FMG's standing in Africa, weaken its ties to the United Kingdom, and put relations with the superpowers on a pragmatic, issue-oriented basis almost devoid of ideology.

a. Relations with other states

Nigeria's relations with other black African states have usually been good, but in some instances they were marred for a time by recognition of or support for the rebels on the part of several African governments during Nigeria's civil war. Niger and Chad—among Nigeria's immediate neighbors—offered strong support for the federal position, and relations with them have been excellent. Dahomey briefly assisted international relief operations helping the rebels, but it reversed its position when Nigeria showed its displeasure by closing the border between the two countries. Relations with Dahomey have improved steadily since the war. Cameroon supported the FMG during the civil war, but border and fishing disputes have kept relations with Nigeria on a relatively formal level. Further afield, Nigeria's relations with Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia have nearly returned to normal in spite of those nations' recognition of former Biafra. Rapprochement with Gabon proved to be more elusive, but a substantial step was achieved in the successful negotiations leading to the return in 1971 of the Nigerian children evacuated during the civil war. By the middle of 1972 Gowon had met with Gabon President Bongo, and steps were being taken to regularize relations between the two states. The FMG

also has periodically had difficulty protecting its nationals working in and occasionally expelled from such states as Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and Zaire, but in general terms Nigeria has very extensive, rapidly expanding, and consistently cooperative diplomatic relations with its fellow African states (Figure 6).

One of Gowon's top foreign policy priorities is to stimulate coordinated economic development and regional unity in west Africa, and in pursuing this goal he has met with the leaders of nearly every neighboring country since 1970. Both his visits and the public statements resulting from them have often been superficial and platitudinous, yet the visits have achieved tangible successes in agreements on projects to improve transportation and communications systems. Any limitation to further cooperation will be caused by the duplication of the economies involved rather than by a lack of political congeniality. In his bilateral endeavors Gowon has stressed that Nigeria has no territorial ambitions and that it respects the sovereignty of its smaller neighbors—he is mindful that Nigeria's strong economy, size, and military capability make the country potentially intimidating and that its policies run the danger of being resented by less favored neighbors.

The most publicized developments in Nigeria's African policy have been its acceptance of the usefulness of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its shift to a hard line on the question of European disengagement from colonial rule. During its civilian era Nigeria was lukewarm toward the OAU, and the country's limited role in that body was far overshadowed by the rhetoric of the leaders of Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania. Partly in appreciation for an OAU resolution supporting the FMG during the civil war, however, Nigeria recently has participated more actively in the OAU and in its Defense Commission. In June 1971, Gowon spectacularly used an OAU summit meeting to call for the "liberation of at least one colonial territory in the next 3 years." The head of the FMG has contributed limited military and unlimited moral support to the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde and to Guinea itself in their anti-Portuguese campaign, and has invited representatives of Angolan, Rhodesian, and South-West African insurgent groups to visit the FMG in Lagos. Gowon's support for these revolutionary movements, a marked departure from past Nigerian practice, is designed to bolster Nigeria's position as leader of the progressive African states, as well as ultimately to assist the challenge to white governments. The FMG has declined opportunities to



FIGURE 6. General Gowon meeting President Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, May 1971 (U/OU)

contract formal military alliances, but it has left no doubt that Nigeria seeks preeminence as black Africa's acknowledged economic, military, and political leader.

Nigeria's closest international ties continue to be with the United Kingdom. The basically good relations which were built up during the colonial era and the early years of independence were strained at the onset of the Biafran secession when the British hesitancy to support and supply the FMG irritated the military government and set it off in search of new friends. Relations between the two states later improved substantially, however, and Britain continues to be Nigeria's most important single partner in the fields of defense, foreign trade, private investment, and technical assistance. Nevertheless, Nigeria's political relations with Britain are still somewhat restrained, primarily because of their differing stands on a number of international issues—differences which stem largely from Gowon's campaign to promote his progressive image in Africa. Nigeria was the first Commonwealth member to withdraw from the study group on Indian Ocean security in response to the British decision to sell arms to South Africa, for example, and the FMG attempted to take the lead in protesting the terms of the Rhodesian settlement. On all such issues, however, Gowon has been careful not to permanently impede cooperation with London.

The civil servants in the military government appreciate the need for good relations with the United Kingdom, but they are noticeably more anti-British than are the army leaders. Civil servants' attitudes are important in light of Gowon's practice of leaving more policymaking authority to the Ministry of External Affairs than did the previous civilian government.

Trade with the European Communities (EC) as a whole surpasses trade with the United Kingdom. Nigeria's exports are especially heavy to France and the Netherlands (petroleum), and it imports heavily from West Germany. In political terms, Nigeria's relations with all of the major European countries are good, although ties with the French continue to be delicate because of the latter's active support for Biafra.

Gowon has extended his personal involvement in international politics beyond Africa. He was a principal figure in the 1971 OAU "Wise Men" mission to explore the possibilities for peace in the Middle East, and he offered advice to both sides during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. By early 1972 Nigeria had some level of diplomatic relations with 72 countries. Additionally, Nigeria has become more involved in a

variety of international forums, including the United Nations and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Although Nigeria is a signatory to most major international conventions, it does not have any significant military or political agreements with any country.

The U.S. Government's official policy of noninvolvement in the Nigerian civil war, its very low key support for the federal cause, and the widespread pro-Biafran sympathies of the U.S. public offended the FMG and brought relations between the United States and Nigeria to a low point. Since the end of the war the atmosphere has improved, although this process has been inhibited because the foreign policies of the two governments do not have much in common. Differences on such questions as the Middle East and the Law of the Seas have provided temporary frictions; in the long run the United States' chief problem is to avoid being identified with the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Portugal on the issue of colonialism in southern Africa.

In economic terms the United States is heavily involved in Nigeria: U.S. private investment totals \$800 million, virtually all in petroleum; the United States has been among Nigeria's primary sources of economic assistance, with total economic aid of approximately \$41.7 million in 1971; and the United States is Nigeria's third largest foreign market and its second most important source of imports. Nigeria continues to offer opportunities for U.S. foreign investment, but such investment is increasingly subject to restrictions, such as requiring Nigerian public and private participation. The United States has no cultural agreement with Nigeria but has had a limited exchange program. Nearly 2,000 Nigerian students study in U.S. universities annually, and the total American official and nonofficial presence includes almost 5,000 persons.

Nigeria's relations with the Soviet Union have varied inversely with Lagos' relations with the West. When potential Western arms suppliers balked at the outbreak of the civil war, the U.S.S.R. stepped in to fill the gap. Although Nigeria was paying cash for nearly all the arms deliveries, the Russians were building up a reservoir of political goodwill. The FMG appreciated the Soviets' unequivocally favorable stand during the war but has since remained skeptical of Communist motives, with the result that relations have cooled since 1970. The Soviet Embassy in Lagos incurred Gowon's displeasure through its funding and support of a variety of leftist organizations and publications, and from early 1971 to early 1972 Gowon detained three especially important Nigerian labor leaders for

collaboration with the Soviets. Soviet funding and other quasi-subversive activities were then apparently reduced, leaving Soviet Embassy personnel to lament in private their lack of progress in Nigeria. A trade agreement between the two countries was signed in October 1971 in Moscow, but trade and aid continued to be minimal during the early 1970's. Cultural contacts were also minimal, although more than 1,000 Nigerian students were studying in the U.S.S.R. in 1971. The U.S.S.R. is planning to expand its participation in Nigeria's petroleum industry and its projected iron and steel industry.

In 1972 Nigeria had diplomatic relations with all Eastern European Communist countries except East Germany and Albania. Moreover, in its effort to appear nonaligned the FMG has signed trade agreements with each of the Communist states, but collectively such trade—including that with Moscow—amounts to only 5% of Nigeria's total. Cooperation with Eastern Europe was at its height during the civil war, when Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria supplied varying amounts of arms. By 1972 Communist military aid to Nigeria had become negligible, development aid was minimal, and Gowon was confidentially expressing disappointment over the meager results of the previously signed trade agreements. All of the Eastern European states with which Nigeria has diplomatic relations maintain small diplomatic missions in Lagos. No cultural or exchange agreements have been negotiated since 1970, but several Communist countries do host small numbers of Nigerian students.

The single recent noteworthy development in Nigeria's generally routine relationships with Communist countries was its regularization in 1971 of ties with the People's Republic of China. Nigeria had long recognized and dealt with both Chinas without opening diplomatic relations with either, but in practice the FMG tended more and more to take a pro-Peking stance internationally. Formal diplomatic relations were established with the People's Republic in February 1971, but it was not until the end of that year that the Nigerian Government announced its selection of an ambassador. The obvious Chinese determination to establish a sizable presence in Lagos has received a warm welcome; Nigerian press coverage of the Chinese has been fairly extensive and uniformly favorable. Nigerian-Chinese friendship and commercial societies have appeared throughout Nigeria, partly at the expense of the membership of existing pro-Soviet groups. In their initial statements the Chinese expressed an interest in expanding trade, aid, and cultural contacts, and they have consistently

avoided associating with potentially subversive groups and individuals. In November 1972, the FMG signed a trade pact as well as an economic and technical cooperation agreement with Peking.

b. Domestic implications of foreign policy

The Nigerian public—to the extent that it is politically conscious—is undoubtedly proud of Gowon's growing stature as a statesman and of Nigeria's increasingly progressive image in Africa. The head of the FMG has received good press coverage through his meetings with other heads of state both at home and abroad, distracting Nigerians from their more persistent domestic problems and therefore relieving pressure on the military government.


Civilian and military leaders, however, frequently grumble that Gowon deprives himself of sufficient time to consider domestic problems. To defuse this opposition Gowon has sought to include top military leaders, especially the state governors, in all his foreign trips, ostensibly to give them experience and exposure, but this tactic has not been completely successful. In short, Gowon's preoccupation with foreign policy has yielded very good results, but at some cost domestically.

E. Threats to government stability (S)

1. Discontent and dissidence

Almost no active discontent is apparent among social and political groups that have any organization or ability to challenge the government. Moreover, such limited dissidence as exists among the politically conscious elite is not amenable to conversion into subversive or mass violence. The old guard politicians, the newly emerging leftist leaders in the state governments, the unions, and the intellectual and academic groups are all sympathetic to the FMG's increasingly "progressive" foreign policies. These groups are individually disenchanted with several specific domestic policies, but they are neither uniformly antigovernment nor in agreement among themselves; hence they are politically disorganized and largely quiescent. The secession issue which threatened the government's stability and the country's unity is now dead. Biafran leader Ojukwu is in the Ivory Coast and for practical purposes out of the picture entirely; more important, there is no discernible separatist sentiment remaining in the east. Tribalism persists in the form of occasional calls for autonomy by the state minorities and as an irritant within the army, but it appears to be strictly a latent

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FIGURE 7. Major General David Ejoor, Army Chief of Staff (U/OU)

from the Soviet Embassy of up to \$140,000. Since the FMG ban on political parties, SWAFP has pursued its activities through the NTUC, the Nigerian-Soviet Friendship and Cultural Society, and the Nigerian Committee of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization.

Both the Nigerian Youth Council and SWAFP were formed by J. O. Otegbeye, Nigeria's leading Communist until his resignation as secretary general of SWAFP in August 1970. Otegbeye's resignation was symptomatic of the declining fortunes of the Nigerian Communist movement, which has lost adherents since political parties were outlawed in 1966. Estimates of SWAFP's membership have ranged from 1,000 to 5,000 since the mid-1960's; the smaller figure is probably accurate for 1972 strength.

The several leftist political, labor, cultural, and friendship organizations are not in fact distinct entities, as an overlapping leadership serves all. In general, that leadership has not been impressive or concerted; most of the top figures have been inclined toward financial mismanagement and political opportunism. None of the leftist groups has been able to recruit widely, and the members have tended to be

as self-centered, opportunistic, and nonideological as the leaders. The numerous but ephemeral pro-Chinese, Cuban, and East European groups have been no more successful than their pro-Soviet counterparts and similarly constitute no threat to the FMG.

The leaders of Nigeria's former non-Communist parties continue to be frustrated at their exclusion from the political arena and from the spoils of office, but there is no evidence that any of them has subversive aims or capabilities.

The U.S.S.R. has remained determined to control and strengthen the NTUC. The NTUC took over publication of the weekly Communist newspaper *Advance* in 1968, formally affiliated with the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions in 1969, and received sizable cash support from the Soviet Embassy as the front group for the banned SWAFP. In early 1971, labor disturbances and the documented collaboration of NTUC leaders with the Soviets led Gowon to detain the union's top leaders. In response to this blow, and reflecting the impotence of the leaderless movement, Soviet funding for the NTUC dropped to virtually nothing by mid-1971, and the organization's activities were sharply curtailed.

Despite these setbacks, the NTUC in early 1972 organized a highly professional 3-day strike of one of its minor labor union affiliates. Although economically inconsequential, this strike appeared to signal the reemergence of NTUC activity and was considered evidence that a new and possibly more aggressive leadership was emerging.

Soviet actions in Nigeria make it apparent that Moscow's strategy is to maintain the goodwill created by the U.S.S.R.'s pro-FMG stand during the civil war, to strengthen the NTUC, and to bolster the cultural and friendship organizations through an expansion of contacts with students and other young, progressive groups. The Soviet Embassy provides financial and organizational aid to newly formed Friendship Society branches, and it is attempting to create and back a unified, socialist-minded, pro-Soviet political movement which could assert itself after a return to civilian politics. This long-term plan has been dictated by Gowon's security measures, which have foreclosed all opportunities for active subversion. Even this subtle strategy, however, appears unlikely to result in an expansion of Soviet influence.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

1. Police

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) has provided an element of continuity and stability in the national

political system since independence. The 32,000-man NPF (plans have been made to expand the force to 40,000) is legally a centralized institution, but in practice the Force Headquarters in Lagos must coexist with 12 somewhat autonomous state commands. Thus the NPF has provided an example of the way in which authority and responsibility can be shared between the central government and the 12 state governments in Nigeria's federal system. Within most states the NPF continues to reflect its colonial heritage through its organizational levels: province, division, district, and local station. On paper, if not always in fact, each of the levels in the state organization consists of five departments: administration, operations, supply and works, criminal investigation, and domestic intelligence.

The NPF, through its state commands, has fully incorporated the former Local Government Police of Western State and has substantially completed its integration of the former Native Authority Police of the northern states. Some of the aged or uneducated police in the north have been dismissed, and others have been retrained and redeployed, despite the opposition of most traditional rulers and a few state governors. This FMG-sponsored process has created a better trained national force with fewer factional tendencies and parochial loyalties.

Outside the main structure of the NPF there exists a variety of autonomous organizations performing specialized security functions. The Police Mobile Force, for example, receives special training in riot control and serves as an elite strike force under the direct control of the police Inspector General (IG). The army's Federal Guard was created by General Gowon as a personal bodyguard of roughly 1,500 men responsible only to him. It is probably the best and most trustworthy security organization. During the civil war a number of localities established Home Guard units, composed of volunteers who get something resembling military training and serve part time as auxiliaries to the police and the army. Finally, there are the supernumerary constables, who guard government buildings, and the police forces of the Railways Corporation and the Ports Authority. The latter two groups are virtually independent police forces protecting only their own property, but their personnel are seconded from the NPF and are ultimately controlled by the IG. With the exception of the Police Mobile Force and the army's Federal Guard, these groups do not have the prestige of the basic NPF, nor is their morale as high.


The command structure of the NPF centers on the IG, who receives his orders directly from the Head of

the FMG and controls the tactical disposition and the operational use of the police. In consultation with the military governors of the states, the IG appoints the 12 state commissioners of police. Each state commissioner reports to the IG, but he is also subject to the authority of his governor and is a member of the governor's cabinet. The IG has the final authority to resolve disputes arising from conflicting orders, and in practice he exercises fairly close, direct control over his subordinates in the states. In 1972 the IG was Kam Selem, a Hausa-speaking Shuwa from the North-Eastern State. In addition to being Inspector General, Selem was a member of the FEC by virtue of his being Commissioner for Internal Affairs, a member of the SMC, and an intimate of Gowon at the Dodan Barracks evening meetings. Although the practical ability and personal inclination of the IG to control the day-to-day functioning of the state and subordinate commands are limited, he remains a figure of paramount importance in national politics. He enjoys strength in his own right and as an associate of Gowon in all governing bodies.

The operational methods and responsibilities of the NPF have changed substantially since 1966. Prior to that time the police operated in the British tradition: they were unarmed and confined themselves to the maintenance of civil order. With the two military coups in 1966 and the outbreak of the lengthy civil war in 1967, however, the police took on additional responsibilities. As a result they continue to possess special emergency powers by FMG decree, carry weapons for a wide variety of purposes, exercise greater prerogatives in searching and questioning suspects, and perform a number of quasi-military duties. Although the FMG has neither rescinded its emergency decrees nor made any effort to curtail the power of the police, the NPF is not omnipresent or pervasive, apparently does not abuse its expanded legal privileges, and continues to respect individual liberties.


The NPF was substantially weakened by the large-scale loss of Ibo policemen to the east in the 1966 crisis and by the added burdens forced on it by the civil war. In spite of the subsequent rapid expansion with less thorough training, however, the NPF remains well trained, well organized, and well equipped by African standards. The full range of police services is often not available in the rural areas, but in the urban jurisdictions the police are able to draw on the technical and specialist resources characteristic of a large, modern police force, including photographic, fingerprinting, recording, and detective services (Figure 8). Motor traffic divisions exist in all larger

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SECRET

Chronology (U/OU)

1553

First English ships reach Bight of Benin.

17th century

Nigeria becomes a center of west African slave trade.

1849

First British consul appointed for Bights of Biafra and Benin.

1861

Lagos is annexed as British colony.

1896

Royal Niger Company is granted royal charter.

1912

Frederick Lugard named governor of Nigeria.

1914

Lagos colony and interior protectorates amalgamated as Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.

First Legislative Council established.

1923

First elected members join Legislative Council.

1947

Houses of Assembly created for each province.

1954

Federation of Nigeria created.

1956

Oil production begins.

1959

December

First direct elections for House of Representatives are contested by the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG).

1960

October

Nigeria becomes independent under NPC-NCNC coalition government.

1962

First National Development Plan adopted.

1963

August

Mid-Western Region formed out of eastern part of Western Region.

1964

February

Government announces controversial results of 1963 census.

December

Parliamentary elections held; boycotted in Eastern Region.

1965

March

Government formed including representatives of all regions and all major parties except AG.

October

Western Region parliamentary elections held, followed by violence over election irregularities.

1966

January

Army coup led by Ibo; parliament is dissolved and Federal Military Government is established; political parties are abolished.

July

In military coup against Ibo leadership, minority tribesmen gain power.

1967

January

Federal military leaders meet in Ghana in an effort to agree on powers of federal and regional military leaders.

May

Federal government decrees 12 states will replace former four regions; state of emergency declared.

Eastern Region secedes as Republic of Biafra.

July

Federal forces invade Biafra and civil war begins.

1968

July

France announces support for Ibo "right to self-determination."

1970

January

Civil war ends with Biafran surrender.

October

General Gowon reveals "nine-point program" and sets 1976 as target date for return to civilian rule.

November

Second National Development Plan announced.

1971

July

Nigeria joins Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

October

General Gowon appoints reconstituted Federal Executive Council.

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