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Zaire

April 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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Government
and Politics

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
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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by January 1973.



Zaire

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Government and Politics

A. Introduction (S)

President Mobutu Sese Seko, the army leader who assumed control of the government in November 1965, has brought Zaire greater political stability than the troubled country has known since independence, but its governmental institutions remain fragile. The paternalism of the Belgian colonial regime stifled political development, and Congolese were unprepared for self-rule when they suddenly achieved independence in June 1960. Zaire, one of the largest and most heterogeneous countries in Africa, had no national political institutions, no national political leadership, and very few people with experience in running either the government or the economy. Independence was followed by an army mutiny, debilitating political infighting, fragmentation of the country along ethnic lines, three regional secessions, and eventually a series of peasant uprisings. Although the uprisings were largely suppressed by late 1965, the competition for political primacy between the forces of President Joseph Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe (whom Kasavubu had dismissed as Premier) brought the government to a standstill. On 25 November 1965, the then Lt. Gen. Joseph Mobutu seized control, summarily dismissed Kasavubu, and installed himself as President. With the support of the military and selected civilian political allies, Mobutu replaced the disorganized parliamentary system, which had existed since independence, with centralized autocratic rule.

Mobutu has evolved a highly personal style of rule virtually devoid of an institutional framework. In June 1967 a new constitution, drafted at Mobutu's request and containing provisions which would legitimize the centralized regime he had developed, was approved nearly unanimously by a popular referendum. Although a majority of the voters probably would have approved the new constitution in a free vote, the referendum offers little guide to popular acceptance of the new institutions because the vote was thoroughly rigged. The provisions of the constitution for transfer of political power have so far been untested. Presidential and legislative elections were held in late 1970, but Mobutu was the only candidate for

President, and all candidates for the National Assembly (now National Legislative Council) were members of his official party, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR). When the legislature convened in December 1970, it passed a constitutional amendment declaring the MPR to be the supreme national institution as well as the sole legal party. By mid-1972 the legislature had taken shape as an arm of the MPR, serving to reinforce Mobutu's centralized control of the party's nationwide structure rather than representing local interests.

Mobutu has neutralized opposition political activity, and there do not appear to be any individuals or groups strong enough to challenge him as long as he retains the support of the army. Guerrilla activity, once troublesome, has been reduced, and there remain only small bands of rebels engaged mostly in banditry. Neither Mobutu nor the MPR has generated widespread enthusiasm, but popular discontents are scattered and unorganized.

The army is the indispensable mainstay of the Mobutu government, yet Mobutu's control of the army depends on the continual balancing of divisive elements. It was antagonism among these same groups which fractured the *preindependence Force Publique* into several competing armies shortly after independence in 1960. Mobutu has managed to restrain traditional ethnic rivalries among officers by keeping his old cronies from the *Force Publique* in key command positions, but each year pressures intensely from the younger, better educated officers for a change. Mobutu met these pressures head on in July 1972 by retiring nine of the army's 16 general officers and proceeding with an extensive shakeup of the high command, apparently calculated to tighten his leverage over the younger men assuming key commands. Military discipline, however, remains generally lax, and troops reinforcing meager police units in rural areas commonly abuse civilians.

Mobutu's foreign policy is motivated by a fear of Communist support to Zairian dissidents, as well as by economic need. Although professing nonalignment in accordance with his wish to assert leadership over other more radical African countries, he depends

primarily on the West for economic and military aid. Mobutu is extremely wary of Communist support to Zairian dissidents. Nevertheless, in early 1973 he was openly cultivating more cordial relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European Communist countries, but he appeared as determined as ever to limit the scope of Communist missions in Zaire. At the same time, Belgian-Zairian relations are solidly constructive, despite Mobutu's occasional propaganda ploys against Belgian residents and his persistent efforts to diversify Zaire's sources of official aid and private investments. The United States continues to provide important economic and military assistance.

In African affairs Mobutu has shown a tendency to meddle in the internal affairs of nearby countries, particularly Congo. While he has condemned continued white rule in southern Africa, his government has been realistic in its actions, usually viewing liberation movements in light of Zairian self-interest. Zaire's relations with Portugal are a good example of Mobutu's usual pragmatism. For several years Zaire has given safe haven and training facilities to Holden Roberto's Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA), whose goal is to free Angola from Portuguese control. Zaire depends to some extent, however, on the Benguela Railroad through Angola for the export of copper from Shaba Region. For this reason, Mobutu has tried to avoid conflict with Portugal, and in the spring of 1970 Zaire restored partial diplomatic contacts with the colonial power, although formal diplomatic relations, severed in 1966, have not been resumed.

On the economic front the Mobutu government has sought to stimulate economic development through fiscal and monetary reform and the encouragement of foreign private investment. By 1968 the currency had been stabilized, the national budget was balanced, and foreign exchange reserves were steadily increasing. In 1969 the Zaire Government promulgated a favorable investment code and also reached an amicable settlement of the bitter dispute arising from Mobutu's abrupt nationalization of Belgian-owned copper mines in early 1967.

Since early 1970, however, Zaire's strong financial position has been eroded by the decline in world market prices for copper—Zaire's principal export product. The drop in copper earnings caused a loss of some \$30 million in Zaire's net foreign assets by the end of 1970, and a small surplus in the government's budget in 1969 has given way to a budgetary deficit of about \$150 million in 1971. Mobutu has responded with a series of belt-tightening measures which show

his determination to prevent a spiraling budgetary deficit and monetary inflation. If austerity measures are fully enforced, however, they inevitably will create appreciable increases in unemployment on the part of urban dwellers, among whom political consciousness is greatest.

Although it appears that the adverse financial trend can be overcome by 1975, present financial pressures may seriously aggravate Zaire's chronic social and political problems. The government has been unable significantly to improve living standards for the majority of the people. Tribal animosities simmer beneath the surface. The regime's main prop—the army—is poorly trained and disciplined and is hated in the countryside. The administrative centralization of the government, although an improvement over the previously chaotic situation, has not greatly increased efficiency. Coordination between the central government and certain provinces is lacking, and provincial governors often feel neglected, isolated, and powerless to act as effective surrogates for the government. The inadequacies of the transportation system have allowed such an extensive loss of contact with local authorities that in some outlying areas, the people feel themselves abandoned by the national officials. Perhaps the most serious flaw is the absence of any effective successor to Mobutu. If he is suddenly removed from the scene, chaos may result until another strongman emerges.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (C)

Although the trappings of constitutional representative government have been preserved in Zaire, the political reality since 1965 has been one-man, authoritarian rule. Although Mobutu commands a degree of power which far surpasses that of his predecessors, his regime has faced an uphill task in providing an administrative structure approaching the highly centralized and efficient system which existed under the Belgians. The size of Zaire (905,000 square miles), the ethnic and social diversity of its people, and the poor internal communication and transportation facilities have created barriers to the exercise of central government authority. Zairian leadership still tends to govern by improvisation rather than set principles and laws. *Ad hoc* actions and endless political maneuvering remain important methods of operation, although the overall trend has been toward increased concentration of power in Mobutu's hands.

Much of the political instability of the first years of independence sprang from disagreement over the

relationship between the central government and the provinces. Under the Belgian colonial system the six provinces were considered administrative subdivisions of the colony rather than separate political entities. At independence some Zairian political leaders wanted to retain the centralized system, but others advocated a federal system with a high degree of provincial autonomy. This dispute was a factor in the secession in 1960 of Katanga Province (now Shaba Region) and of the eastern part of Kasai Province (now Kasai-Oriental Region). By 1963 the number of provinces had been increased to 21, and in 1964 the federal system was codified in a new constitution.

After assuming the presidency, Mobutu forcefully exerted the central government's authority over the local political institutions. By the end of 1966 he had successfully consolidated all significant political control in the central government. The number of provinces was reduced to eight, and provincial political institutions, such as cabinets and assemblies, were abolished, although advisory provincial councils were permitted. All provincial governors and high officials were made civil servants of the central government, appointed by and directly responsible to the President.

In June 1967, Zaire promulgated its third constitution in just over 7 years. This constitution provides for a unitary and republican form of government. The provincial fragmentation which had developed after independence and which was codified in the 1964 constitution was officially abolished, and those powers previously retained by the autonomous provinces were centralized in the presidency. Although the constitution establishes three branches of government at the national level (Figure 1)—executive, legislative, and judicial—and provides a semblance of checks and balances among them, in practice the legislature and judiciary have exercised no real restraint on the President.

The section of the constitution dealing with fundamental rights is taken largely from the 1964 constitution. The new section is much shorter than the previous one, as it tends toward a general definition of basic rights instead of a specific inventory. Articles protecting religious freedom, family structure, the right of the individual to fair trial, and humane treatment after arrest are included, along with several other freedoms prescribed by the U.N. human rights conventions. The constitution guarantees the right to form labor unions and to strike as long as these rights are exercised in conformity with the law. Ethnic and racial discrimination in employment and education is forbidden, and for the first time women are granted the right to vote.




FIGURE 1. Structure of government (U/OU)

1. National government

a. Executive

According to the 1967 constitution, the President of the Republic is elected to a 7-year term by direct universal suffrage, with an absolute majority of the ballots cast required for election. In practice, the popular election is a mere formality, as the presidential candidate must be nominated by the Political Bureau of the MPR, the only legal party. Although Mobutu seized power and declared himself President in November 1965, he was not duly nominated and elected until November 1970. The constitution does not provide for a vice president. In the event of the President's death, resignation, or impeachment, the president of the National Legislative Council is to act as President until a new chief executive is elected. The election to fill an

unexpired term must take place within 90 days after the office has been vacated.

The constitution vests in the President extensive executive and legislative powers. By way of comparison, the Zairian President in effect is delegated all those powers vested in the U.S. President, all the prerogatives reserved to the separate states by the U.S. Constitution, and significant legislative powers which in the U.S. system are granted to the Congress and to the legislative bodies of local governments. Under the Zairian system the President has the power to appoint and dismiss all high officials of the central and local governments, all officers of the military and national police, and all magistrates of the criminal and civil courts without recourse to legislative or judicial review or approval. He also has an extensive legislative role. While the constitution provides for a two-thirds vote in the legislature to override a presidential veto, Mobutu has the political force to smother any such attempt. In addition the President can bypass the National Legislative Council by submitting important legislation to a popular referendum. In determining foreign policy, the President has complete freedom and does not have to submit treaties or agreements reached with other nations for review or ratification by the legislature.

The constitution provides for the impeachment of the President, but the machinery for doing so has never been completed. Although he has immunity from criminal liability for his official acts, this immunity does not extend to high treason or the intentional violation of the constitution. If two-thirds of the National Legislative Council vote that impeachment proceedings be brought, the President must be tried by a constitutional court. The constitution provides that a separate law shall define high treason and willful violation of the constitution and shall establish the procedure to be followed by the constitutional court. Neither the court nor the legal requirements had been created by late 1972.

The President's cabinet, according to the 1967 constitution, consists of an unspecified number of ministers appointed by and directly responsible to the President, who defines their areas of responsibility. In a cabinet reorganization in March 1969, Mobutu introduced the concept of four "superministers"—the Ministers of State—each charged with coordinating certain specific activities of the full cabinet. Mobutu, however, became increasingly distrustful of the stronger personalities in the cabinet and was reluctant to delegate a coordinating role to anyone. By December 1970, when the position of Minister of State was abolished, the cabinet had lost all pretensions of

formulating national policies, and cabinet ministers were essentially the senior executive of their respective departments. In successive reshuffles since 1970, Mobutu has tended to select new ministers from the higher echelons of the civil service, to rotate the more competent ministers before they gain firm control of a particular department, and to remove obviously incompetent executives. Although the net result has been a distinct trend toward higher technical competence, Mobutu also has carefully maintained a geographic and an ethnic balance among cabinet ministers.

In August 1972 the Political Bureau of the MPR announced that the cabinet and the party's National Executive Committee would be combined to form a National Executive Council.¹ This reform is intended to consolidate the supremacy of the MPR over the national government in accordance with a December 1970 constitutional amendment. The National Executive Council has primary responsibility for implementing all policy directives of the Political Bureau concerning the party as well as the executive components of the government. President Mobutu presides over both the Political Bureau and the National Executive Council, and the difference in their functions appears to be one of degree, with the new Council more directly concerned with concrete administrative matters. According to a presidential decree issued in October, the former government ministries were redesignated departments, the heads of departments became known as state commissioners, and deputy state commissioners were included in the National Executive Council. Although the formation of the new body has not involved a basic reorganization of the principal executive components, the former Interior Ministry is now the Department of Political Affairs and has assumed the additional function of coordinating MPR activities with government administrative functions at regional and local levels.

b. Legislature

Under the provisions of the 1967 constitution, the parliament was converted from a bicameral legislature to the unicameral National Assembly. In October 1972 the Political Bureau of the MPR announced that henceforth the National Assembly was to be known as the National Legislative Council and its members as People's Commissioners. Presumably only the official

¹For a current listing of key government officials, consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

title of the legislature and its members have been changed, and other provisions of the constitution regarding the former National Assembly now apply to the National Legislative Council.

All members of the legislature are elected to a 5-year term by direct and secret universal suffrage on the basis of one member for 50,000 citizens. An additional member can be elected for any remaining fraction of population of 25,000 citizens or more. The legislature elected in November 1970 has 420 members, all of whom belong to the MPR. Although the 1967 constitution originally authorized two political parties, an amendment passed in December 1970 states that the MPR is the only legal party. In addition, the amendment sanctions previous regulations which in effect preclude anyone from being elected to the legislature as an independent candidate. The constitution also stipulates that a member of the legislature who leaves his party also forfeits his seat in the legislature.

According to the constitution, legislative authority is shared by the National Legislative Council and the President of the Republic, but the President's particular prerogatives enable him to virtually control the whole legislative process. Although the legislature as well as the President can initiate legislation, the legislature's initiative is limited to specific areas, including civil rights, electoral regulations, and military obligations. In each case actual implementation of the law is dependent on presidential initiative. The legislature may also establish "basic principles" in certain areas, but legislation in these fields can be effected only by presidential decree. Included in this group are labor legislation, finances, national defense, and administration of the local governments. The legislature does have the right to discuss the government budget, but it must defend to the satisfaction of the President any changes it proposes.

The initiative for revision of the constitution is likewise shared by the National Legislative Council and the President. An affirmative vote by two-thirds of the legislature is required for a constitutional amendment, but the President may submit a proposed amendment to a popular referendum—requiring only a simple majority for acceptance—without approval of the legislature.

When the National Assembly convened for the first time in December 1970, it became apparent that Mobutu would control the legislative process through members of the MPR Political Bureau whom he appointed to key positions in the legislature. Most important were the president of the National Assembly and the chairmen of three permanent

committees for political, administrative, and judicial functions, economic and financial functions, and social and cultural affairs. The three permanent committees are made up of 25 subcommittees, each of which was allotted an area of responsibility corresponding to that of a ministry or other major executive agency. During the first two regular sessions of the assembly, which convened in April and October 1971, five constitutional amendments and 11 ordinary laws proceeded smoothly from the President through the Political Bureau and the legislative committees to the floor of the legislature, where they were passed with some debate over details and a few dissenting votes.

By the end of the National Assembly's first year the legislature, through this process, had become established as essentially responsive to Mobutu's directives but distinctly more than a rubberstamp. Although some of the constitutional amendments and laws were merely empty proclamations, the national budget was scrutinized and discussed for 2 months before passage without significant revisions, and the various legislative subcommittees diligently worked out the details of other substantive measures. Apparently the subcommittees were assuming genuine monitoring functions over the central government ministries, and individual members of the legislature, as they plodded through the mandatory semiannual tours of their electoral districts, were likewise monitoring the performance of local administrators.

Mobutu has taken precautions to ensure that the National Legislative Council is a reliable and businesslike body. His decision, made prior to the legislative election in 1970, that candidates could not represent their home districts has tended to prevent a reemergence of the tribalism and regionalism which prevailed in the former parliament. At the same time, Mobutu's directive that each member must visit his electoral district semiannually and submit a full report of his activities has made the people's commissioners more aware of their representative functions, although the typical commissioner on tour has slight incentive for creating genuine rapport with the populace. Further, Mobutu's emphasis on the commissioner's watchdog functions encourages the member to snoop on government and party officials in the field, thereby initiating a new check on the local levels of the established hierarchy.

On the whole, the legislature appears to be serving Mobutu fairly well as a supplementary channel for dispensing largesse to loyal citizens of some local standing, for disseminating his directives to the countryside, and for reporting the more flagrant derelictions of lower echelon bureaucrats.

c. Judiciary

The judiciary is largely a holdover from the colonial past, although important reforms have begun. A 1967 ordinance called for an general overhaul of the system within a 10-year period. Two important reforms, the creation of a Supreme Court and the establishment of a third court of appeals (in Kisangani), have already been implemented. Additional planned reforms are designed to create a more workable system by integrating traditional and modern court structures and by setting up an organized legal profession.

The Belgian colonial administration grafted the metropole's legal system onto the various networks of traditional indigenous jurisprudence. In the lower courts the result was a dual system of law, one for Europeans and one for Congolese. At the bottom of the dual system tribal courts dispensed customary law in disputes affecting relations between tribal members; they also had jurisdiction over minor criminal offenses. Trial for more serious offenses was reserved to the European system. Under the planned reforms a system of peace tribunals will replace the myriad of tribal chief courts, sector courts, communal courts, police courts, and zonal courts which are still operating. According to the 1968 ordinance which created the peace tribunals, a minimum of one tribunal in each zone and city will have jurisdiction over all disputes falling under traditional law and in criminal disputes where the maximum penalties are 2 months imprisonment or a fine of 2 zaires (1 zaire equals US\$2).

Above this level the reform calls for a simplified hierarchy with subregional courts, courts of first instance, courts of appeal, and a Supreme Court in Kinshasa. The subregional court is a formal law court, consisting of three judges and a public prosecutor, which operates in each subregional capital. Cases involving a maximum prison term of up to 5 years or fines exceeding 2 zaires fall under the jurisdiction of the subregional courts. The subregional courts also have jurisdiction over cases normally handled by the peace tribunals when the disputes or infractions involve a police officer, tribal chief, or mayor. The capitals of the regions maintain courts of first instance which try cases involving penalties ranging from 5 years servitude to capital punishment. The courts of first instance also have appellate jurisdiction over the subregional court. The courts of first instance are staffed by a chief judge, two other justices, and a public prosecutor. Three judges are needed to hear criminal cases. Capital criminal cases involving political figures, however, are rarely brought before the courts of first instance. The Mobutu government

has preferred to use military courts for such cases, in violation of the provisions of the 1967 constitution. Courts of appeal are located in Lubumbashi, Kinshasa, and Kisangani.

The Supreme Court of Justice, which was set up in November 1968, is the highest appellate tribunal in Zaire. The Supreme Court's decisions are binding upon all the lower courts and tribunals. It also judges cases involving ministers, members of the National Legislative Council, counselors of the yet-to-be-created Constitutional Court, and magistrates of the Supreme Court. Pending the formation of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court is the repository of constitutional review power, making the court the equivalent of its U.S. counterpart.

The projected Constitutional Court is not a court in the normal sense but, rather, a commission charged with interpreting the constitution and upholding its supremacy as the law of the land. The court, when created, will be composed of nine counselors serving nonrenewable terms of 9 years, with one-third leaving office each 3 years. One-third of the counselors are to be chosen by the President, one-third by the National Legislative Council, and one-third by the Supreme Council of the Magistrates (see below).

Formal criminal investigation procedures in Zaire are a legacy of the Belgian system. Officers of the court handle criminal investigation as well as prosecution. The National Gendarmerie is used primarily to maintain civil order and has little investigative authority. Under the Mobutu regime the National Documentation Center (CND) and its predecessor, the *Surete Nationale*, and the army usurped many of the powers of the courts and the local police authorities. Both the CND and the army engage in arbitrary measures against suspected opponents of the regime, and both Zairians and foreigners are subject to searches, arrests, detainments, and punishments without recourse to formal judicial procedures. In several cases involving corruption in government or having heavy political overtones, such as the trials in June 1966 of four former ministers accused of plotting a coup, military tribunals have been substituted for the regular civilian courts.

The judicial system suffered severely from the departure of Belgian magistrates in 1960. For over 2 years The Congo was left without any trained jurists or magistrates, except for a few in secessionist Katanga Province (renamed Shaba Province in 1971 and now designated Shaba Region). Under a U.N.-sponsored program in 1962, a number of foreign jurists and legal advisers were recruited to assist in keeping the court system going. The foreign personnel and the few

qualified Zairian magistrates, however, are not able to administer the judiciary effectively over the entire country, and in many areas formal judicial procedures have been nonexistent for prolonged periods.

There are Zairian judges at all levels of the magistrature, but presiding judges, especially in the courts, of first instance, are mostly foreigners. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is Zairian, but at least two associate justices are not. The government hopes that by the time the reforms are completely implemented, Zairians will have occupied these positions.

The judicial reform provides that new magistrates will be chosen by the President on the advice of the Supreme Council of the Magistrates, which has not yet been created. It is expected that this council will give the President dominant power over the magistrates and, therefore, over the entire system of justice. A 1968 ordinance created a Zairian bar and regulated its membership. Several terms of the document, however, are not expected to be put into effect until Zaire has developed its own body of lawyers.

2. Local government

As President Mobutu has progressively tightened centralized control, territorial components of the government have become mere administrative subdivisions, rather than autonomous political entities. In order to emphasize the primacy of the central government, in July 1972 the official designations for all territorial components except the lowest echelon were changed, although the boundaries of each component remained the same. Following are the former and the present designations for territorial components along with the number of existing units at each level:

FORMER	PRESENT	NUMBER
Province	Region	8
District	Subregion	24
Territory	Zone	131
Local collectivity	Local collectivity	446

Zairians gained their first practical experience in self-government from the commune system which the Belgians established in urban areas in 1957. The cities were divided into communes, and each commune elected its own mayor and council. The elected commune officials, in turn, acted as an advisory group to the city mayor, who after independence was appointed by the President. A 1968 ordinance, however, eliminated the communal councils and centralized urban decisionmaking in the city mayor

and his appointive council. Since 1968 the communes have continued to exist, but as mere administrative subdivisions of the cities. Their loss of autonomy was fully recognized in July 1972, when communes were redesignated as urban zones.

From the zonal administrative level upward, the government is staffed largely by presidential appointees in supervisory positions and by career civil servants on the working level. These officials are charged with numerous duties, including the maintenance of law and order, supervision of education and the mails, and implementation of the government's welfare programs.

The administrative centralization of the Mobutu government, although an improvement over the previously chaotic situation, does not appear to have greatly increased administrative efficiency. There is a lack of coordination between the central government and certain regions, leading regional officials to feel neglected, isolated, and powerless to act as an effective part of the governmental mechanism. Regional administrations have been deprived of their independent revenue base and planning autonomy. Although this has probably cut down on local corruption, matters of regional and local interest must be decided in Kinshasa, where there is considerable bureaucratic redtape and corruption, although corruption is not as flagrant as it was in the early 1960's. On the subregional level, central government administrators often have trouble getting around in their areas because of inadequate transportation; this has led to a breakdown of central government contact with local authorities in some areas. Frequently, and especially at the zonal level, the central government official is isolated from the inhabitants because of his ignorance of the local language or customs. Cultural gaps have widened since 1966, when Mobutu began to assign administrative officials to posts outside their home regions in order to make it more difficult for them to acquire personal influence within their jurisdictions.

The inability of administrative officials to deal effectively with local inhabitants has resulted in the placing of greater reliance on traditional authorities that was the norm during the colonial era. A 1969 ordinance on local administration reflects Mobutu's realistic acceptance of existing conditions. As called for by the ordinance, the traditional village chiefs within each collectivity comprise a local administrative council, which has primary responsibility for law enforcement, road maintenance, and other basic services. Each local council nominates its own leader, but the latter's appointment must be confirmed by

higher authorities, from the zonal commissioner up to the Minister of Interior (now State Commissioner of Political Affairs). Higher authorities can also appoint to the local councils additional members who are not traditional chiefs, and the council leader need not be a traditional chief. Since the ranking officials at higher zonal echelons also hold equivalent positions in the MPR, their power of appointment enables them to pack the local councils with party activists, thereby exerting firm control over the councils. In more remote areas, where local party cadres are still embryonic, a local party official may hold the title of council leader, but he functions merely as an intermediary between traditional chiefs and administrative officials at the zonal headquarters.

3. Civil service

As a result of the abrupt departure of the Belgian administrators in July 1960, the top Zairian civil servants were forced to assume duties far beyond those for which they were trained. The efficiency of the civil service was decreased further by the introduction during that same year of inexperienced and incompetent political appointees into the central and provincial government ministries. By late 1966 the ranks of the civil service had swelled from the 12,000 employed in 1960 to some 20,000 permanent employees and an estimated 105,000 persons hired under contract. Many of the new government employees were political appointees. By an ordinance promulgated on 30 March 1966, teachers were also given civil service status. An official announcement in August 1970 that there were 45,000 persons, including teachers, in the career civil service reflects the government's effort to streamline and improve the quality of the system.

During 1966 and early 1967 the Mobutu regime instituted reforms designed to reduce the number of political appointees and to attract educated personnel to government service. A basic reform was the rule that civil administrators in the interior were to be assigned to areas outside their native regions. This attack on tribalism, regionalism, and the regional political personality has been effective. The regional commissioners now look to Kinshasa for support rather than to local sources. The subordination of the regional administrations to central authority has also limited the opportunities of local leaders to pad the local civil service with their political supporters. There has been some sacrifice in administrative efficiency in the interest of political neutrality. Regional commissioners have to spend a great deal of time gaining a rudimentary knowledge of their regions, and

they are subject to frequent transfer. Moreover, on the zonal level, which is usually a relatively homogenous ethnic unit, the civil administrator is often viewed as an outsider. The effect has been to alienate rather than encourage local identification with the Kinshasa government.

To increase the number of educated personnel in the civil service the Mobutu government imposed a 2-year mandatory service obligation on university graduates. After the 2-year tour, the graduate can choose to remain in government and receive seniority and pension rights for the time served, or to leave government service without having accrued such benefits. Mobutu instructed ministry and department heads to utilize the graduates in responsible positions wherever possible as an incentive for them to remain after their 2-year tour. Almost 350 graduates had completed their service in 1970, helping to bring about a noticeable improvement in upper level administrative services. In addition to its recruitment of university graduates, the Mobutu government has sought to strengthen the National School of Administration, which began in 1961 to provide short, specialized courses for civil service personnel. By mid-1971, when the school was incorporated with the National University, it was providing a 4-year program for prospective administrative officers.

C. Political dynamics (S)

The primary political factors in Zaire are Mobutu's supreme authority, sanctioned in the national constitution adopted in 1967, and the tenacity of tribal and regional ties which tend to limit presidential power in practice. Despite Mobutu's unchallenged political supremacy, the executive agencies he commands have only limited effectiveness. Although Mobutu employs many stratagems for closing the gap between authority and practice, he has come to rely increasingly on the MPR. Mobutu formed the MPR in 1967 and immediately employed it to gain popular approval for his new constitution. The presidential and legislative elections of 1970 confirmed his control of the MPR and the party's monopoly of all overt political activity. Since 1970, Mobutu has sought to consolidate the primacy of the MPR over the civil government, the army, organized labor, and even the various religious institutions in Zaire.

Zairians, however, have not forgotten that Mobutu was able to declare himself President in November 1965 without open resistance primarily because he was supreme commander of the armed forces. This historic event is still relevant, despite Mobutu's early removal

of army officers from high civil positions, because the nationwide structure of the MPR has not yet developed the mass popular support that would be required to maintain its nominal predominance over the army without Mobutu's backing. Since Mobutu has tamed organized labor and suppressed all former oppositionist groups, it appears that whoever holds effective command of the army upon Mobutu's departure from the scene could declare himself President and encounter no more resistance than did Mobutu in 1965.

Mobutu, however, has maintained his essentially personal control of the army by counterbalancing rival senior officers as well as rival factions among younger officers. This strategy has succeeded so well that it is scarcely conceivable that any individual could quickly acquire the solid army support that Mobutu developed from 1960 to 1965. In the absence of a military leader who commands broad respect or genuinely professional discipline throughout the army, Mobutu's demise could trigger a recurrence of the army schisms or sheer paralysis which accompanied the secessionist movements in the early 1960's.

Mobutu's persistent undercutting of potential rivals in the army and in the civilian components of the government has tended to gloss over but also perpetuate an intrinsic lack of institutional cohesion. Zaire has a new generation of at least technically qualified executives in many pivotal positions, but almost none has had extensive experience at making independent decisions. In the absence of an obvious successor to Mobutu, it is possible that a few strong personalities could collaborate sufficiently to maintain the minimum essentials of a central government—as did Mobutu and several key civilian officials in the early 1960's. But the centrifugal forces of tribalism and regionalism, which produced the tumultuous events of the 1960's discussed below, would almost certainly be revived to some degree.

1. Tribalism, regionalism, and insurgency (1960-65)

Belgium's sudden grant of independence to its Congo colony in 1960 precipitated 5 years of turmoil, with one insurgent movement after another engulfing large sectors of the country. Although these movements adopted the trappings of modern secessionist governments, the underlying forces were traditional tribal loyalties and various regional interests which had grown up during the colonial era. For instance, the secessionist regime in Katanga Province which lasted from July 1960 to January 1963, drew its strength from an anti-Luba tribal alliance as

well as the vested interests of a modern industrial complex, all held together by the Westernized Moise Tshombe. By contrast, the "Simba" revolt, which overran eastern and northeastern Congo from mid-1964 to mid-1965, was essentially a series of spontaneous peasant uprisings, spearheaded by local youths who had absorbed just enough Western culture to resent their inability to advance through modern vocations. This movement was exploited by Communist-oriented politicians who proclaimed a short-lived "Popular Revolutionary Government" in Stanleyville (now Kisangani), but the politicians failed to gain effective control of the peasant guerrillas. Consequently there was far more bloodshed and chaos than had occurred during the Katanga secession, and the central government's control is still relatively weak in the areas devastated by the Simbas.

This epoch of rampant tribalism is now seen as the inevitable result of Belgian paternalism, rigorously maintained until it was far too late for impatient Congolese politicians to develop parties of sufficient breadth to maintain a strong national government. Following World War II, while Britain and France veered toward accommodation of nascent African nationalism, Belgium ignored political advances for the Congolese in favor of increasing social services. By 1960 a full 50% of indigenous children were attending primary school, yet no Congolese had attained officer status in the *Force Publique* or in the civil service. Although tribal cultural associations were encouraged, nationalistic organizations were banned until 1959, when hitherto tight controls on the press and on public meetings were finally repealed. As late as 1958 most Belgians were convinced that independence for their colony could be deferred at least 30 years after it was attained in neighboring French and British territories.

Belgian complacency was abruptly shattered by the January 1959 riots in Kinshasa, and colonial authorities, who also were reacting to shifting political pressures in Belgium, reconciled themselves to a transitional program which could lead to independence in 5 years. In early 1960 roundtable conferences were held in Brussels with Congolese leaders of 21 embryonic political parties, mostly tribal or regional in composition. Ignoring Belgian suggestions for interim measures, the Congolese demanded full independence on 30 June 1960, and the Belgians yielded. The hastily organized provincial and national elections in May were contested by nearly 100 parties, mostly focused on local issues.

The one party which operated on a national level—Patrice Lumumba's Congolese National Movement (MNC)—won 33 of 137 seats in the Chamber of

Deputies, more than any other party. Lumumba became Premier by including in his cabinet representatives of almost all the 15 parties that had won seats in parliament. Joseph Kasavubu, leader of the Kongo tribal association, was elected President by parliament following a similar bargaining process. The flimsiness of this facade of unity soon became evident. Within 3 months of Independence Day, the army mutinied, the country's two richest areas—Katanga Province and the eastern half of Kasai Province—seceded, Kasavubu and Lumumba dismissed each other, and Colonel Mobutu, then the strongest of competing army commanders, assumed control of the central government.

In February 1961 Mobutu bowed out to Kasavubu, who remained President until Mobutu's bloodless seizure of full power in November 1965. During this period Kasavubu maintained a semblance of constitutional government in Kinshasa while four secessionist governments were put down through the cumulative efforts of a United Nations task force, a partially reformed Congolese army, several white mercenary units, and military assistance missions from Belgium, the United States, Israel, and Italy. The Kinshasa government also came to rely heavily on foreign technical and financial assistance to keep its central ministries functioning and to restore civil administration in areas where virtual anarchy had prevailed. Under these circumstances the executive ministries, with foreign consultants in key positions, supplanted parliament as the effective arm of government. Successive premiers, however, occasionally felt compelled to elicit votes of confidence from the legislature for their more significant measures. Many members still wielded some influence in their home areas, and parliament retained a measure of popular respect as a symbol of independence from foreign domination.

The halting, partially disguised shift of political power from parliamentarians to holders of key executive positions was manifested in the rise and fall of Prime Minister Adoula, who held office from August 1961 to July 1964, far longer than any other prime minister. Adoula, who had received his start as a labor leader before independence, emerged as the only individual who could get a nearly unanimous vote of confidence from a special reconciliation session of parliament, held at Lovanium University under the protection of United Nations troops. Adoula was acceptable to otherwise bitterly divided factions because he was an adroit mediator without a popular following of his own. Yet even Adoula could not maintain an effective coalition in such a fragmented

body. President Kasavubu finally dissolved parliament in September 1963, when a stalemate developed over the projected constitution.

With parliament dissolved, the Adoula government retained full legislative power—theoretically by presidential decree, in fact by consensus of the "Binza group"—a discreetly inconspicuous group composed of army commander Mobutu and four civilian officials whose key positions gave them effective control of the other security services, government finances, and foreign affairs, particularly the vital flow of foreign aid. Shortly after Adoula formed his large, unwieldy cabinet in August 1961, these five men had begun meeting regularly in Binza, a suburb of Kinshasa, to coordinate their activities as Adoula's closest advisers. Two of the four civilians not only wielded extensive executive power in Adoula's behalf but contributed some political leverage of their own. Justin Bomboko, Minister of Foreign Affairs from independence until April 1963, was also leader of a tribally based party in Equateur Region. Victor Nendaka not only took firm command of the former colonial *Surete*, but molded it into an effective political instrument with much broader geographic range than any regular party.

The Adoula government, with massive foreign assistance, succeeded in suppressing three secessionist regimes by January 1963 and made a good start toward reconstructing disrupted public services in some sectors of the country. Adoula failed, however, to cope with peasant uprisings which started in Bandundu Region in January 1964 and in eastern Congo in April. These new emergencies impelled President Kasavubu to dismiss him and install Moise Tshombe as Prime Minister in July. Despite Tshombe's notoriety as leader of the ill-fated Katangan secession, his impressive capabilities made him acceptable to many deputies from other provinces. Yet the changeover took place in the absence of parliament, and the decisive factor was the Binza group's withdrawal of support from Adoula.

By the time the first parliamentary elections since independence were held in April 1965, the peasant uprisings had been largely suppressed, and Tshombe had assembled a coalition party which won a majority of seats in the new parliament. By mid-1965, however, tension had developed between Kasavubu and Tshombe, primarily because they had become rivals for the presidential office called for in the new constitution. In October, Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe, but Tshombe's coalition in parliament held firm enough to deny a majority vote for Kasavubu's choice of a new premier. Mobutu broke the impasse

on 25 November, when he declared himself President for 5 years and named Colonel Mulamba as Premier along with a broadly representative civilian cabinet. On 28 November parliament unanimously approved the Mulamba cabinet, and on 1 December Mobutu adjourned parliament and announced that he would legislate by decree until the next regular session.

Mobutu's takeover of supreme authority without any open opposition manifested not only the success of his long struggle to harness an unruly army but also the collective failure of civilian leaders to establish a workable political structure. The abject surrender of parliament to Mobutu in November was surprising because the constitution promulgated in August 1964 had appeared to bridge the worst gaps between the European parliamentary system tentatively adopted in 1960 and the actual political conditions in Zaire. The new constitution legalized the 21 largely autonomous provinces which had emerged during 1962-63, yet the centrifugal forces appeared to be offset by a strong national presidency with sufficient executive authority to ride out irresponsible opposition in parliament. This constitution might have been made to work if Kasavubu and Tshombe had functioned as true partners, but their eventual confrontation revealed each to be standing on hollow legalisms. President Kasavubu did not command a really disciplined army or civil service, and the Binza group did not choose to exercise executive power for Kasavubu as it had done for Adoula.

As for Premier Tshombe, his parliamentary coalition did not hold firm for a full month after Kasavubu dismissed him. Mobutu's coup showed that Tshombe's supporters represented merely a caucus among politicians who lacked real popular support. In fact, the rapid spread of the Simba rebellion in 1964 had already revealed the extent and depth of popular alienation against the politicians who had won election in 1960 by encouraging naive expectations of the material rewards of independence. For the bulk of the populace, independence had in fact brought privation which most of the grassroots leaders had escaped by going to Kinshasa or the provincial capitals to sit in ineffectual legislative bodies or fill newly available sinecures in the ministries. Consequently by 1964 peasant resentment against high-living politicians had sharply intensified deep-rooted tribal and regional antipathies toward the central government. By mid-1965 most of the peasant guerrillas had been militarily defeated, but Tshombe and his new allies in Kinshasa had done very little to counteract the underlying popular alienation.

2. Mobutu's consolidation of executive authority (1966-7. J)

Mobutu was able to proclaim himself President without incurring real opposition in November 1965 because he held unrivaled control of the army, and most politicians realized that they had no other power structure capable of challenging the army. Yet the army was intrinsically incapable of maintaining stable government. Lacking real professional discipline, the officer corps was still subject to factional splits. The troops were notorious for brutal mistreatment of civilians whenever they were deployed on quasi-police missions. Mobutu, who had aspired before independence to be a journalist or a politician, recognized the limitations of the army as a political instrument and proceeded to consolidate his authority by building an alternative power structure.

By 1970, Mobutu had constructed a political system based on the primacy of a single political party, which in some ways resembles the pattern in Communist countries. His official party, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), monopolizes political activity and is predominant over the civil government as well as the labor and youth organizations. The party, however, is essentially an artificial creation, as it is not a mass movement shaped through a genuine struggle for independence. In fact, during his first years in power Mobutu focused his prime efforts on rebuilding the centralized administrative structure of the former Belgian Congo. Although the present civil administration is still far less effective than the Belgian model, Mobutu's authority to appoint, dismiss, and transfer government employees throughout the country gives him more real leverage over educated and politically conscious Zairians than does his control of the MPR.

When Mobutu assumed control in Kinshasa, he had to deal with 21 provincial governments, each with elected assemblies and governors who were responsible primarily to these assemblies rather than to the central government. As the provincial governments had become bastions of tribal and regional interests, an abrupt cancellation of their autonomous powers would have precipitated a much more perilous test of strength than Mobutu's showdown with parliament. His alternative was to gradually reduce the power of the politicians who had gained some standing in their own homelands. His most decisive single move, a decree reducing the number of provinces from 21 to 12, was deferred until April 1966, when army units were fully deployed to quell resistance. The consolidated provincial assemblies then elected governors for the new provinces in accordance with

the 1964 constitution, but Mobutu soon transferred most of the newly elected governors to other provinces.

The transfer of provincial governors from their local bases was accompanied by a gradual reanimation of central government agencies operating in the provinces. In July 1966 Mobutu nationalized the provincial police forces, which had been autonomous for several years. By late 1966 the *surete*, firmly directed from Kinshasa since independence, had become the major instrument at the local level for showing provincial politicians that presidential decrees could not be ignored with impunity, with army units ready to intervene whenever concerted resistance appeared. In September, Mobutu finally ordered local army commanders to assume administrative control in Tshombe's former stronghold of Sud-Katanga Province and in traditionally unruly Sud-Kivu. Hence the critical tests of strength had been won by January 1967, when a presidential decree reduced the existing 12 provinces to the present eight, replaced the remaining elected governors with career civil servants, and reduced the provincial assemblies to mere consultative status. By late 1968 the process of regularly rotating all senior administrative officers in the provinces had largely curtailed their opportunities for developing significant influence with local inhabitants.

Compared with Mobutu's reassertion of the central government's authority over the provinces, his piecemeal dismantling of the parliamentary system in Kinshasa was a mere theatrical production. In March 1966, when parliament reconvened for the first time since Mobutu's takeover, he gained confirmation of his authority to rule by decree for the duration of his presidency. In October, Mobutu simply informed parliament that he had dismissed Prime Minister Mulamba and henceforth would serve as Prime Minister as well as President. In April 1967 he announced that a new constitution, confirming a strong presidential system, would be submitted to a popular referendum. In June the referendum was conducted with such fanfare that the 92% affirmative vote became a great psychological victory for Mobutu over the politicians. Then he dissolved parliament, and elections for the reformed National Assembly (now the National Legislative Council) were deferred until November 1970.

From Mobutu's takeover until his final dissolution of parliament, he encountered only one serious challenge from the politicians in Kinshasa. In May 1966 a plot to overthrow him was detected which involved four relatively minor politicians who apparently thought they had support from some

elements of the army. The officers they contacted, however, reported them to Mobutu, and he promptly had them hanged in a public square. There were rumors that public executions might touch off a popular uprising, as one of the plotters was a fairly popular member of the Kongo tribe, which predominated in the area around Kinshasa. But the Kongo tribesmen remained sullenly quiet, and the net result was enhanced respect for Mobutu's decisive use of power.

The belated convening of the National Assembly in December 1970 marked the complete subordination of tribal and regional interests under Mobutu's new political system. The central Political Bureau of the MPR made the final selection of the party's slate of candidates, who ran unopposed in the so-called elections, and no candidate was permitted to run in his home area. Although members of the National Legislative Council must visit their electoral districts regularly and are supposed to heed the needs of local inhabitants, the typical legislator is as culturally isolated from his constituents as are the government administrative officers who serve in the provinces. This system does indeed dampen ethnic tensions in the legislature, but such a thoroughly insulated body scarcely counteracts the notorious unresponsiveness of provincial administrative officers to local needs. Mobutu's compulsion to neutralize tribalism is still a heavy impediment to the restoration of effective public services in the countryside.

Mobutu still feels compelled to maintain an ethnic balance in the National Executive Council (cabinet) and in the higher echelons of each ministry of the central government. This compulsion frequently precludes placing the best qualified individual in an important post. Yet Mobutu has not succeeded in eliminating obscure pockets of tribalism within particular ministries which sometimes generate quietly obstructive tensions. In the national capital as in the countryside, Mobutu's conquest of historically divisive forces is still superficial and inconclusive.

3. Mobutu and his top aides

During the first years of his rule, while consolidating centralized control over the provinces and neutralizing popularly elected politicians, Mobutu also was building up his supreme authority over ministers and other individuals holding important executive positions. To accomplish this, he began to weed out persons who had been named to the cabinet because they already held some element of power or influence when Mobutu declared himself President and replace them with men who were technically competent but

devoid of any independent power base. Mobutu's assertion of full authority over all cabinet ministers was a decisive political victory which completed the essential foundations for an effective presidential system. However, the subordination of key executives to Mobutu's will has been pushed so far as to stifle initiative within particular ministries and to prevent any kind of teamwork on the most difficult national problems.

Mobutu's failure to delegate sufficient authority to his top aides also reflects a defensive attitude toward outstanding executive talent. Despite his control of the army, his actions betray a tendency to regard anyone who wields high civil authority effectively as a rival for supreme power. While the level of competence in the cabinet has risen markedly, Mobutu has tended to assign the more sensitive tasks to special aides, to avoid frank consultations with the cabinet or any other regular group, and to make critical decisions in deepening isolation.

Mobutu's compulsion to put down potential rivals has been starkly epitomized in his dealings with former comrades in the Binza group—the "kitchen cabinet" which not only sustained Prime Minister Adoula from 1961 to 1964 but paved the way for Mobutu's unchallenged assumption of power in 1965. Once in power, Mobutu maintained for a while some semblance of his former collaboration with all members of the group, but their individual positions were switched sufficiently to neutralize much of their former leverage. Adoula, the most durable leader of coalition governments since independence, was kept overseas on ambassadorial assignments until 1969, when he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Damien Kandola, who had virtually controlled the Interior Ministry, was consigned to a lucrative sinecure. Albert Ndele, the internationally respected Governor of the Zaïre National Bank, was retained there and functioned as Mobutu's chief financial adviser until 1970. Then he was abruptly dismissed because Mobutu suspected him of collusion with Belgian mining interests.

The two members of the Binza group who entered Mobutu's cabinet in November 1965—Victor Nendaka and Justin Bomboko—were reputed to be indispensable because of their exceptional influence and talents, qualities which eventually triggered Mobutu's mistrust and his increasingly extreme efforts to neutralize them. Nendaka's outstanding executive talent as well as his extensive leverage, derived from his years as *Surete* chief, qualified him particularly for the politically vital Interior Ministry. Mobutu, however, assigned him to Transport and Communica-


tions and subsequently to Finance. Bomboko, on the other hand, was kept in Foreign Affairs, where he had already served for over 3 years. His experience in this field was useful to Mobutu, while his past record as leader of a Mongo tribal party made Mobutu see him as a potential rival in the domestic arena. Bomboko's political assets, however, were not as formidable as Nendaka's, and this consideration probably impelled Mobutu's distinct favoring of Bomboko over Nendaka. Nevertheless both Bomboko and Nendaka were ousted from the cabinet in the sweeping shakeup of August 1969; apparently Mobutu wanted to dramatize his total eclipsing of the former Binza group.

The cabinet shakeup of August 1969 was the first and most dramatic evidence that Mobutu had turned from a policy of selecting men primarily for their standing in various local groupings to choosing officials having technical competence. Subsequent cabinet changes—occurring at least once a year—have maintained a distinct trend toward the selection of younger men with higher educational credentials and several years of relevant professional experience. This significant step toward more effective government has been possible, despite the compulsion to maintain ethnic balance, because the recent increase in the number of Zairians completing professional training before entering the civil service has provided Mobutu with more candidates who meet both the professional and the ethnic criteria.

Mobutu has replaced each member of the Binza group with an individual who is at least as well qualified to manage his own ministry. It is doubtful, however, that Mobutu's present cabinet, or any inner group of key aides, provides him with such realistic counsel or concerted action as the Binza group afforded former Prime Minister Adoula. Mobutu has not delegated to anyone an authority comparable to that exercised by each member of the Binza group during the near-anarchy of the early 1960's.


Since Mobutu has consolidated full power, he has recognized the need for increased coordination among ministries, but his attempts so far have foundered on his underlying mistrust of the individuals involved. From March 1969 to December 1970 four cabinet members were named Ministers of State, and each was assigned coordinating authority over several functionally related ministries. Mobutu reportedly intended to meet frequently with these four, thus reanimating an inner council roughly comparable to the Binza group, but the implication of special trust was shattered only 5 months later when two of the four superministers were dropped from the cabinet.

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4. Popular Movement of the Revolution

Mobutu announced the formation of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in April 1967, when he finally dissolved parliament and promised that a new constitution, establishing a strong presidential system, would soon be submitted for a popular referendum. Although the 1967 constitution authorized two political parties, opposition leaders soon found that Mobutu intended the MPR to monopolize all political activity. In December 1970 he put through a constitutional amendment which declared that the MPR was not only the sole legal party, but the supreme national institution. This means, from Mobutu's standpoint, that the MPR's role is to supplement the civil administrative structure as a channel for manipulating the masses and also providing sinecures for former politicians and other locally influential figures who loyally support Mobutu. The party's propaganda constantly embellishes a mystique of nationalism, attempting to override divisive domestic factors and recounting Mobutu's largely mythical struggles with sinister foreign forces. Yet Mobutu's dispensation of favors through party channels reflects the same strategy of accommodating and counterbalancing tribal or regional interests that he has employed in the army and civil government. The freedom with which Mobutu handles party affairs, as compared with his caution toward institutions which already had some substance when he became President, reflects the clear reality that the MPR is indisputably his creation, to shape and extend as he pleases.

The nationwide organization of the MPR parallels the government administrative structure: in fact, the same individual ordinarily holds corresponding positions in each hierarchy. For example, the regional commissioner is also president of the party's executive committee for the province, and the village chief is also president-treasurer of the local party subcell. Each village chief is supposed to conduct monthly meetings with ordinary party members, who are encouraged to present resolutions about local problems to higher authorities. Only certified party officials, however, attend the periodic party conclaves at local and provincial levels and the biennial national party congresses. All officials are dependent on the party headquarters at Kinshasa for their appointments, pay, occasional invitations to Kinshasa, and the assorted material benefits that they are supposed to distribute among party militants—the certified active members, as opposed to all adult citizens, who are nominal members.

The Political Bureau of the MPR is the supreme policy formulating body for the Republic as well as the party. Mobutu, who is president of the MPR, carefully selects the membership of the Political Bureau and regularly presides at its frequent meetings. Thus it is fully under his control and serves to formalize his directives and convey them to other party organs. According to the MPR constitution, a national party congress, to be convened at least every 4 years, has the power to revise or cancel a directive from the Political Bureau. In fact, however, the special party congress in May 1970 and the first regular party congress in May 1972 merely ratified unanimously the resolutions of the Political Bureau on a wide range of national policy issues.

The size of the Political Bureau has varied, from 17 in 1967 to a maximum of 35 in 1969 and again in late 1971, and a minimum of only 15 from February 1972 to date. The only ex officio members of the Political Bureau are the President of the Republic and the president of the National Executive Council. In early 1969, shortly before the dismissal of Nendaka and Bomboko from the cabinet, the Political Bureau was considerably enlarged to include a broad spectrum of politicians who had gained some prominence before Mobutu became President. In December 1970, following the presidential and legislative elections, many of these old-line politicians were replaced with younger university graduates. The net result of Mobutu's deliberately unpredictable selection process is that Political Bureau membership has been the ultimate sinecure for senior party militants and also for other persons who have too much influence in their home districts to be safely neglected.

Mobutu pruned the Political Bureau from 35 to 15 members in February 1972 and announced a reduction in its members' salaries from 2,000 zaires a month to 500—the same salary drawn by National Legislative Council members. Perhaps the sharpness of the February cuts in both membership and salary was Mobutu's response to rumors that certain members of the Political Bureau had put too many of their cronies on the final list of candidates—selected personally by the Political Bureau during a weekend cruise hosted by the President—in the 1970 legislative elections. Whatever Mobutu's immediate motives for the February purge of the Political Bureau, it appears that he intends to continue using the reduced bureau as a command post for directing the legislature's various committees, which during 1971 diligently worked out the details of legislation initiated in the Office of the President.

The shrewdly phased emergence of the MPR as the sole legal party has been accompanied by Mobutu's efforts to bring within its ranks all other significant special interest groups or professional rankings. A case in point is offered by the party's youth wing, the JMPR. When it was formed in 1967, the JMPR was a clearcut party auxiliary which merely sought to coordinate other student organizations. In 1969 it was transformed into the only permissible campus organization, and all students have been compelled to join it. By contrast, Mobutu forced several competing labor federations to merge in 1967 but did not explicitly subordinate the labor movement to the party at that time, although key labor leaders became party officials.

As for the army and police, Mobutu strove to keep their leaders isolated from the party until late 1971. A directive issued in October of that year called for integration of the army, police, the court system, and the national labor organization with each echelon of the MPR. The ranking officer for each of these organizations in each region, subregion, and zone was assigned a seat on the party's executive committee for each geographic entity. At first this arrangement was regarded as no more than a means for expediting routine coordination, but in November 1971 the acting army commander, the police inspector general, the Supreme Court president, and the Attorney General were declared to be members of the party's National Executive Committee. This body was responsible for implementing the directives of the Political Bureau until August 1972, when it was merged with the cabinet to form the National Executive Council. Hence, the assigning of service chiefs to the National Executive Committee appeared to make them directly subordinate to the Political Bureau, and this move drew enough grumbling to provoke an indefinite period of heightened tensions between the MPR hierarchy and the officers of the security services. New misgivings that Mobutu may seriously intend to give the party some security duties were aroused in March 1972, when he assigned some 100 members of the party youth wing's Disciplinary Brigade to a police training course despite protests from police authorities.

On the other hand, Mobutu's handling of the issue during the MPR National Congress in May 1972 suggests that he has not really abandoned his underlying strategy of keeping the MPR, the army, and the police as separate power bases, each responsive primarily to him. The published resolutions of the party congress stressed the integration of the MPR with all national institutions and also declared

that army and police personnel should be allowed to vote in national elections. Mobutu, however, reportedly assured senior army officers shortly before the congress that no party executive committee would be formed within army units, and army field commanders were to attend party meetings in their geographic areas as observers, not directly subordinate to party officials. Hence the avoidance of direct clashes in the provinces presumably depends on the continued efficacy of Mobutu's usual counterbalancing tactics.

The prospect of heightened rivalry among field components of the MPR, the army, and the police reemphasizes a perennial enigma: to what extent has the party taken root in the countryside. The vastness of the Zairian interior, the extremes in local geography, and the spotty nature of local reporting all mitigate against generalization. Until 1970 it was widely observed that the MPR lacked popular participation; relatively few village chiefs really formed subcells, and the cells in the smaller towns seldom contained members other than the salaried officials. Cultivating grassroots support for the party, however, was the underlying purpose of the presidential and legislative elections of 1970, and the prolonged campaigning gave extensive public exposure to local officials as well as touring candidates for the legislature.

The net impact of the election campaign is still problematical. Possibly typical is the aftermath of the elections in central Bandundu Region, as reported by a touring U.S. official in December 1970. Many local inhabitants expressed disillusionment with an election that presented no real choices and remarked that most candidates resembled the old-line politicians who did them no real good during the parliamentary era. Nevertheless, many inhabitants expressed some faith in Mobutu's good intentions and a belief that his single-party concept was more capable of dispensing material benefits or punishing opponents than would be possible with many competing parties. Of possibly more importance were the indications that the party was providing tangible linkage between local inhabitants and government officials on rotating assignment. Continuity was coming particularly from long-time local residents on the party's lower echelon executive committees. Subsequent reports indicate that the party youth wing's Disciplinary Brigade may be enforcing government authority fairly effectively in some localities where police are absent, despite the brigade's reputation for rowdyism. Although there is only slight evidence that local party units are generally popular, in many rural areas they may be extending

the reach of the regular administration in various ways which significantly strengthen Mobutu's control of the countryside.

5. Army

The 35,000-man Zairian Army is the main prop of the Mobutu regime. Mobutu has kept the army out of government because he wants to keep it subordinate to civilian rule, at least nominally. Accordingly, Mobutu himself has cultivated an image that is disassociated from his army post. Nevertheless Mobutu has used the army directly as an instrument of coercion, applied heavy handedly and at times indiscriminately. Consequently the army is feared by the general populace, and any potential challenger is at an enormous disadvantage as long as the army continues to back Mobutu. Although Mobutu has not yet restored the rigorous discipline of the colonial era, he has achieved a mastery of army politics through shrewd balancing of rival officer factions and by providing the troops with a relatively good living, compared with ordinary civilians. As of late 1972 there was no evidence of organized plotting against Mobutu within the army.

The army is crisscrossed by tribal and regional allegiances and riddled with tribal prejudices. The Belgian colonial administration sought to suppress tribalism in its predecessor, the *Force Publique*, by a policy of ethnic mixing which prevented the formation of ethnically homogenous groups and by assigning units outside their home areas. Although these measures repressed overt manifestations of tribalism, they did not destroy the personal sense of tribal identity. Events after independence strengthened these primordial loyalties, and once the restraints imposed by the Belgian officer corps were removed, the army split into tribal and regional factions.

Mobutu emerged in September 1960 as senior officer of the troops who remained loyal to the Kinshasa government, and as the secessionist regimes collapsed one by one he consolidated his position as commander in chief of the reintegrated national army. His success was due largely to a combination of foreign military aid, early support from a cadre of officers who came from his home region of northern Zaire, his discreet accommodations with officers from other regions, and the backing of the Binza group against competing politicians who sought support among army officers. Since becoming President, Mobutu has had to continue an uphill struggle to rebuild in the army the firm military discipline of the *Force Publique*, and he has given highest priority to isolating the officer corps from civilian politicians.

The political neutralization of the officer corps, however, has been offset by Mobutu's strategy of tacit accommodation to ineradicable remnants of tribalism within the army. The actual interplay of tribal and regional loyalties in all phases of army life is still a basic deterrent to genuinely impersonal military discipline. Because Mobutu and most of the officers who rallied to him in 1960 were from northern Zaire, officers from that area (Equateur and Haut-Zaire Regions) predominate in the senior grades. Officers from western Zaire are less prominent and influential, but they remain a cohesive force in the army. Both groups discriminate against officers from other regions. Prejudices based on regional origins are deeply resented by the southern and eastern officers and could lead some day to a major split in the army.

Until mid-1972 the army high command was still comprised largely of the older officers who had rallied to Mobutu in 1960. These former sergeants of the colonial *Force Publique* who had risen to senior command within months of independence were very poorly qualified, compared with the middle generation of officers, who had received some specialized training in foreign military schools, and the junior officers, who had graduated from Belgian or French military academies. Mobutu kept the older officers in key tactical commands or staff positions despite their limited qualifications and waning vigor, because he relied on their personal loyalty. By 1970 it had become apparent that the discrepancy between grade levels and professional training was having a demoralizing effect on the younger, better qualified officers—particularly the middle generation who have become eligible for the more important commands.

This chronic problem worsened in November 1970, when General Bobozo, then Commander in Chief of the army, suffered a severe stroke and Mobutu appointed an acting commander who was second to Bobozo in seniority but notoriously incompetent. Bobozo is a member of Mobutu's Ngbandi tribe, yet he was widely respected as a strong disciplinarian who nevertheless spoke up to Mobutu on behalf of the loyal veterans of all ranks. As Bobozo was regarded as kingpin of the old guard, his staying on as nominal army commander since his stroke aroused speculation that Mobutu could not install a new commander without upsetting the delicate factional balance in the officer corps.

The lack of a strong army leader since 1970 in turn stimulated feuding among second-echelon officers that often surfaced during Mobutu's extended international junkets. The sharpest clashes occurred between Brigadier General Bumba, the flamboyant

paratroop commander, and Brigadier General Nkulufa, the senior officer at the Defense Department, who doggedly resisted Bumba's efforts to increase the autonomy of the elite Airborne Division. The paratroopers are Mobutu's first line of defense against mutinies or riots, and Bumba is a member of the Ngbandi tribe. Mobutu's special reliance on Bumba despite his abrasive conduct toward nonparatroop officers has been widely resented.

In July 1972, Mobutu announced that nine of the army's 16 generals would retire soon, thoroughly reshuffled the remaining senior officers, and also made significant changes in the command structure of the army and other security services. Bumba was promoted to Commander in Chief (now Captain General) of the army, while Nkulufa was consigned to a diplomatic post. The army's six gendarmerie battalions and the civil police were merged to form a unified National Gendarmerie, to be responsible for all local law enforcement throughout Zaire. Then Mobutu created a special Presidential Special Staff for the security services, which includes one senior officer each from the army's ground and air components, from the National Gendarmerie, and from the Coast, River, and Lake Guard.

As of late 1972 it was apparent that these moves amounted to the most extensive shakeup of the army high command since Mobutu took power in 1965, although their full significance was not yet clear. While Mobutu had sloughed off his oldest cronies, the overall pattern appeared carefully calculated to tighten his leverage over the younger, more effective men assuming key commands. Although Bumba is expected to generate more friction as army commander than Bobozo had done, it also appears that Mobutu's other moves would in effect counterbalance Bumba's promotion. The new commander of the airborne division, Brigadier General Danga, also is a member of the Ngbandi tribe and reportedly did not get along with Bumba while commanding a paratroop brigade. The commander of the newly formed National Gendarmerie is under the control of the Defense Department, which Mobutu has headed since 1965. Furthermore, Mobutu is expected to rely increasingly on the new Presidential Special Staff, rather than on Bumba, for tightening his control of the army's tactical units.

In fact, within a month of Bumba's promotion to Commander in Chief his title was changed to Captain General. According to the announcement, the title "commander in chief" is to be reserved for the officer who exercises command of a military theater during combat operations. Meanwhile, official publicity

stresses that President Mobutu is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Apparently the net result is to accentuate Mobutu's power to distribute actual authority among senior officers, and he is continuing his usual tactics of counterbalancing several key military figures. Although the retirement of the old guard and the formation of a new presidential staff may well foster an overall tightening of professional discipline, individuals from northern Equateur Region—Mobutu's home area—still predominate in key positions.

It is also fairly apparent that most army officers resent Mobutu's buildup of the MPR to the point of nominal supremacy over the army as well as the civil government. The doctrine of MPR supremacy badly flouts the military legend that Mobutu assumed power on behalf of the whole officer corps, and soldierly griping has grown audible at every new embellishment of the party's prestige, from the lavish party congress in May 1970 to the appearance in late 1971 of a new national flag resembling the party emblem. Nevertheless Mobutu has so effectively cloistered the army from civilian affairs that key officers are not likely to take seriously mere propaganda ploys aimed at the civilian populace.

On the other hand, the officer corps conceivably might close ranks against Mobutu if such measures as the strengthening of the JMPR Disciplinary Brigade or the October 1971 directive for local integration of party, army, and civil administrative functions were actually pushed to the point of clashes between party officials and tactical commanders. There is no solid evidence, however, that Mobutu has in fact abandoned his tacit strategy of favoring the troops over civilians in the tangible ways that really affect their morale. Typical of this strategy was the across-the-board promotion of most senior officers in January 1971—within a month of the constitutional amendment which declared the MPR to be the supreme national institution.

As early as 1970, however, adverse financial trends had made it apparent that Mobutu could not indefinitely mollify disgruntled army officers by granting more promotions, fringe benefits, or informal largesse. In fact, by late 1971 Mobutu had switched from vague promises of raising overall army strength as high as 80,000 to an explicit personnel ceiling of only 40,000 for 1972. Strict enforcement of this ceiling could cause serious resentments. Such gaps between Mobutu's recognition of the financial exigencies and the limited tolerance of the officer corps for actual economies appear to be the most sensitive factors in the overall balance of army morale.

In late 1972, Mobutu was still temporizing the belt-tightening measures that might seriously alienate the officer corps and also was tolerating lax enforcement of disciplinary measures governing relations between troops and ordinary citizens. For instance, in early 1971 Mobutu recognized that the army's intensive mopping-up operations against rebel remnants in an isolated sector of eastern Zaire were inflicting far more hardship on local peasants than on the ever-elusive guerrilla bands. Hence he authorized a civic action program intended to make the troops stop abusing peaceable inhabitants and start lending a hand with rehabilitation measures. By late 1972, however, the civic action program was virtually inoperative because of a lack of logistical support and of vigorous enforcement measures.

6. Labor

The labor movement in Zaire has never been a cohesive political force. As long as several labor federations were operating independently, their leaders were successful in mobilizing their union membership on bread-and-butter issues, but they were never able to translate union loyalty into any long-term political support for themselves or their policies. On political questions the union members' loyalties had remained with their tribal and regional political leaders.

In 1967, Mobutu pressured the three existing labor federations into a single labor organization, now known as the National Union of Workers of Zaire (UNTZ, formerly UNTC). The UNTZ received substantial government subsidies and remained primarily dependent upon them until 1970, when a compulsory dues checkoff system was extended to government employees as well as those in private industry. Meanwhile Mobutu's virtual control of the UNTZ had been reinforced by appointing senior labor leaders to various offices in the MPR. Labor leaders have acquiesced in Mobutu's decree making all strikes illegal unless approved by the UNTZ general secretariat.

The fairly frequent recurrence of small wildcat strikes since mid-1969—over the government's failure to pay on time and other grievances—shows that the UNTZ officials do not in fact command the full loyalty of their roughly 900,000 dues-paying members. Nevertheless the UNTZ ranks second only to the MPR as a potential mechanism for mass action. Indeed, the UNTZ hierarchy may well exert more effective control over a larger portion of regular wage earners than the MPR hierarchy, as the trade unions that were amalgamated in the UNTZ had been organized earlier

and had generated some sense of voluntary solidarity among their members. Although this sense of solidarity has been eroded by the complacency of many labor officials despite declining real income for ordinary workingmen, the UNTZ still retains a real degree of autonomous strength which makes the actual working relations between the MPR and the UNTZ a matter of considerable political significance. Full collaboration between party and labor officials would significantly strengthen Mobutu's grip on the schoolteachers, other civil service personnel, and skilled industrial workers whose morale largely determines the effectiveness of any government.

Such considerations presumably motivated Mobutu's directive in October 1971 which placed UNTZ officials on the MPR executive committees for each echelon of the government along with judicial officials and field commanders in the security services. Some senior UNTZ officials have definite misgivings about the directive; they fear that such visible subordination to the party hierarchy will eventually compromise local labor leaders in the eyes of ordinary workingmen. Yet prospects for open resistance to Mobutu's dictates have been minimal since December 1970, when he made Bo-Boliko Lokonga, the former leader of the UNTZ, president of the National Assembly. Bo-Boliko has been more widely respected than any other Zairian labor leader as a stalwart advocate of workingmen's interests, which may have been a factor in Mobutu's decision to lure him away from direct command of the UNTZ. The present secretary general of the UNTZ, Ferdinand Kikongi, is a protege of Bo-Boliko but lacks his personal influence. In fact, rivalries among senior labor leaders became more audible shortly after he assumed command, adversely affecting morale through the lower echelons.

7. Students

The university students have been the most vocal critics of the Mobutu regime. Their grievances range from those concerning conditions of academic life to complaints—from a radical minority—that the Mobutu regime is neocolonialist. Many students criticize Mobutu's policies as pro-Western and too moderate and resent the government's incompetence and corruption. By and large, however, student differences with the regime are not ideological. They mainly concern such university matters as increased scholarship stipends and better living conditions. Some 90% of the students are dependent on government scholarships and can look forward eventually to elite positions in the civil service. The majority tend to be conservative and prudent in their

confrontations with the government. Mobutu has used the carrot-and-stick treatment with the students, forcibly putting down strikes, imprisoning leaders, and later granting amnesty and concessions.

The General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC), which was the principal student organization in 1965, at first gave cautious support to the Mobutu regime. In November 1967, however, the UGEC organization at Lovanium University, then the preeminent institution of higher learning in Zaire, published a manifesto which attacked the regime as neocolonialist. In January 1968 the Lovanium UGEC organized a demonstration against the visit of U.S. Vice President Humphrey; the president of the UGEC was subsequently arrested and the UGEC executive committee dissolved. In 1968 and early 1969, there were several student strikes aimed at securing better food and living conditions.

In June 1969 a campus strike to protest the government's failure to produce a promised increase in student monthly subsidies led to a student demonstration in Kinshasa. Police and army units forcibly intervened, killing at least a dozen students. The deaths and the temporary closing of Lovanium University prompted sympathy demonstrations at Zaire's two smaller universities and several technical schools. Mobutu responded by bringing to trial and giving stiff sentences to 31 students accused of fomenting the demonstrations and by expelling hundreds of others. He also banned all existing student organizations except the Youth of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (JMPR) and insisted that all university students join the JMPR.

Mobutu later granted a liberal amnesty to allay student disaffection and reinstated the expelled students. JMPR elections in December 1969 generally took place quietly, the students reacting with resignation and apathy. At the university in Lubumbashi the elections had to be postponed several times because of rivalries among various regional factions. By early 1970 the student scene was fairly quiet, although a small group of outlawed UGEC members was reportedly meeting clandestinely, and there was considerable discontent simmering beneath the surface.

Such was the apparent campus stalemate in June 1971, when most students at Lovanium University participated in a demonstration commemorating the students who had been killed by troops in June 1969. Although their demonstration was nonviolent, it was staged independently of the JMPR leaders, and some speeches, placards, and leaflets implied disrespect for Mobutu and his recently deceased mother. Next day

Mobutu ordered the acting army commander and the university rector to curtail further demonstrations; students threw stones at the general's car and held the rector hostage; and Mobutu announced the induction of all Lovanium students into the army for 2 years. In August, 10 former students were sentenced to life imprisonment following a trial which scarcely substantiated Mobutu's initial charges of a serious plot to overthrow him. Most student conscripts, however, were returned to campus as soon as they completed basic training and assigned to a special militia which keeps them under lenient military discipline with full corporal's pay, which is higher than their former scholarships.

The net results of this confrontation were a sharp reduction in student dissidence and renewed popular respect for Mobutu's overall handling of the affair—a shrewd blending of firmness with restraint. The avoidance of another fatal clash similar to the tragedy of 1969 was largely attributable to careful planning by security authorities, manifested in the generally cool conduct of police and troops during the crisis. The subsequent reorganization of higher education, which was occasioned by the Lovanium demonstrations, has caused the transfer of social science students, who have been relatively articulate politically, from the Lovanium campus near Kinshasa to remote Lubumbashi. In late 1971 Mobutu also ordered JMPR leaders to intensify their indoctrination efforts among all students, down to the primary level. By late 1972, most university students appeared to be adjusting to the overall tightening of controls with minimal resistance and some with positive interest in the JMPR.

8. Religious organizations

Although less than half of the Zairian population is estimated to be Christian, Christian churches and affiliated organizations in Zaire have considerable political importance, largely because they are providing vital services which the government is not yet capable of replacing. As of 1970 roughly 80% of all Zairian primary students and 50% of secondary students were attending schools that were operated by Catholic or Protestant organizations. Although the government supports these schools financially, the foreign-based sponsoring organizations provide qualified teachers and other essential administrative support. Lovanium University and the Free University of the Congo at Kisangani were originally sponsored, respectively, by Belgian Catholics and American Protestants, and the incorporation of both institutions into Zaire National University has not entirely

eliminated their reliance on the original sponsors. Christian missions also operate at least two-thirds of all medical clinics in the countryside, providing facilities and medicines that are often lacking at government clinics.

Roughly 6 million Zairians are Catholic, 2 million belong to some 70 international Protestant denominations, and perhaps as many as 3 million belong to the predominantly Zairian Kimbanguist sect. Catholics are dispersed fairly evenly across the country, but Protestants are clustered in such a way that certain denominations exert a strong influence in particular localities. Kimbanguism is predominant among Kongo tribesmen and significantly influential throughout Bas-Zaïre Region and adjacent areas of Congo (Brazzaville). As a result of the educational activities of Christian religious bodies, Christian cultural influences are more pervasive among educated Zairians following modern professions than among the general populace. Although the Kimbanguists lack the foreign support afforded other Christian bodies in Zaïre, they have emulated their sponsorship of schools and clinics. In fact, the spreading of Kimbanguism during the colonial era despite the repressive measures of the Belgian authorities exemplifies the potentialities of an African religious movement for resistance to secular authority. By 1972 the other Christian churches in Zaïre were becoming sufficiently Africanized to eventually evoke comparable popular loyalty, although they were still receiving substantial material support from their international affiliates.

Until 1971, Mobutu's dealings with clergymen and other leaders of church-sponsored organizations reflected a pragmatic recognition that tolerance for diverse religious groups brought material benefits and generally stabilizing cultural influences to the Zairian people which in turn tended to underpin his government. The declaration of fundamental rights in the 1967 constitution guarantees religious freedom, and Mobutu usually has sought to depict himself as a devout Catholic who was nonetheless appreciative of the constructive role of Protestant missions. In fact, ever since independence Mobutu has publicly expressed his respect for Kimbanguism, as have other Zairian politicians who wished to ingratiate themselves with Kongo tribesmen. This tolerant approach has created a generally favorable attitude toward the Mobutu government from most religious leaders—Catholic, Protestant, and Kimbanguist.

In December 1971, however, the legislature—at Mobutu's behest—passed a law to the effect that no religious organization could conduct public worship or

other activities in Zaïre unless it met certain criteria. Most important were the stipulations that the officers of the organization must be Zairian citizens, that the organization must have at least \$200,000 on deposit in Zaïre, and that the founder must not be a "dissident" priest or pastor. The only religious bodies to qualify for legal status by April 1972 were the Catholic Church, the Church of Christ of Zaïre (ECZA), the Kimbanguist Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Islamic Community, and the Jewish Community. Legal status was explicitly denied to the Protestant Council of Churches in Zaïre (CEPZA), which included over 30 internationally affiliated denominations which had refused to join the ECZA.

This outcome enables Mobutu to employ the ECZA as an instrument for controlling the activities of the Protestant organizations in Zaïre, but it apparently has also demoralized many of the foreign missionaries who opposed affiliation with ECZA. As the deadline for registration under the new law approached, many missionaries who objected to merging their missions with ECZA prepared to leave Zaïre. An exodus was averted by belated assurances that every denomination which affiliated with ECZA could retain its own "legal personality." As of late 1972 it remained unclear whether the denominations which affiliated with ECZA under duress could maintain sufficient autonomy to meet the criteria of their foreign sponsors for continued support.

Mobutu's motivation for taking this stand remains obscure. Official explanations for the new registration law cite administrative problems which compel the government to stop the proliferation of schismatic sects, which has become a serious problem. Hundreds of new religious bodies have emerged since independence and gained legal recognition under previously lenient rules, which in turn has enabled them to draw government subsidies for their schools. The leaders of established religious bodies concede the need for some accreditation standards, at least for church-sponsored social services, in order to prevent chaotic competition and abuse of subsidies. Mobutu's insistence, however, that long-established Protestant missions join the ECZA or withdraw suggests an additional, essentially political motive—to depict himself as champion of the Protestant organization which has blended an ecumenical appeal with repudiation of traditional ties with foreign-based churches, some of which have indeed been slow to replace foreign clergy or lay executives with Zairians. Furthermore, Reverend Jean Bokeleale, Secretary General of the ECZA, is not only an ardent Zairian nationalist, but a highly articulate admirer of

Mobutu. Hence Mobutu's eagerness to score an immediate propaganda ploy and to enhance the influence of a reliable advocate appears to take priority over the eventually adverse effects of expelling missionaries who have in fact provided a major portion of the schools and medical services in eastern Zaire, where local government services are relatively ineffective.

Shortly after the rigorous new criteria for official sanctioning of religious bodies was issued, Mobutu became involved in his first serious conflict with the Catholic hierarchy in Zaire. In January 1972 Cardinal Malula, the senior Zairian prelate, published a pastoral letter denouncing Mobutu's recent call for Zairians to adopt African personal names instead of Christian names of European origin, and also implying that the glorification of Mobutu in official publicity verged on idolatry. Mobutu's spokesmen retorted with threats of prosecuting Malula for subversion, but a direct clash was avoided by Malula's acceptance of the Pope's invitation to visit Rome shortly before Mobutu returned to Zaire from a European vacation.

In March the Zairian Council of Bishops petitioned Mobutu to rescind various restrictions he had placed on Catholic institutions during his altercation with Malula. This opportunity for quiet negotiation was rebuffed with a harshly worded announcement from the MPR Political Bureau that all Catholic seminaries must accept JMPR units among their students or face closure. The Catholic hierarchy responded by accepting JMPR units in minor seminaries but closing the major seminaries. In April, Mobutu resumed negotiations with a delegation of four Zairian bishops, and they finally agreed to accept JMPR units in the major seminaries with assurances that the JMPR executive committees in each seminary would be composed exclusively of seminarians and that the JMPR would have no jurisdiction over religious instruction. The bishops' acceptance of the Political Bureau's ultimatum was then announced with no mention of Mobutu's concessions. Having won this basic assertion of his authority, Mobutu announced in May that he had pardoned Malula, who returned to Kinshasa in June and quietly resumed his functions as archbishop.

The official publicity accompanying Mobutu's confrontations with both Protestant and Catholic leaders has accentuated nationalistic themes—Mobutu's opposition to foreign domination of Zairian Protestants and to the baptism of Zairian Catholic children with European names. Yet the whole trend of his confrontation with the Catholic hierarchy suggests

that his strongest incentive for tightening his controls over Protestant and Catholic institutions may be that Africanization has proceeded far enough to make each a genuinely popular organization, and therefore potentially threatening, in Mobutu's eyes, to his supreme authority.

9. Elections

All Zairians 18 years of age or older have the right to vote, except members of the armed forces, the National Gendarmerie, mental patients, and citizens away from their normal voting place on election day. In May 1972 the MPR National Congress passed a resolution that military and police personnel should have the right to vote in national elections, and the National Legislative Council is expected to pass legislation to that effect during its next session. Voting is mandatory; citizens who do not vote are subject to a fine. The voter marks his ballot in favor of, or opposed to, a single list of National Legislative Council candidates or a single presidential candidate.

Citizens of either sex over 25 years of age are eligible to be members of the legislature. Excepted categories established by the April 1970 electoral ordinance are: criminals in jail more than once in the previous 5 years or three times in the previous 10 years; persons who are not active members of the MPR; persons not endorsed by the MPR Political Bureau; and persons who do not pay the 100 zaire candidature fee. Also, members of the armed forces, National Gendarmerie, and civil service must submit their resignations before standing for election.

The most important part of the election process is the selection of the lists of candidates, as only one approved list for each electoral district is presented to the electorate. This list is the slate of MPR candidates for the National Legislative Council seats allotted to the particular electoral district; there is only one candidate for each seat. In preparation for national legislative elections, local party units submit several nominees for each seat to the Political Bureau, which makes the final selection. For the legislative elections of 1970, the Political Bureau selected a final list of 420 candidates from some 2,500 nominees submitted by local party units. Although the 1967 constitution originally authorized two political parties, an amendment passed in December 1970 states that the MPR is the only legal party and gives final sanction to previous regulations which in effect preclude anyone from running as an independent candidate.

Precautions have been taken to downplay regional sentiment in the legislature. Deputies do not represent regions or even the election district in their home area.

No member of the MPR Political Bureau is permitted to be on a list of candidates in his own native region. In an additional move to lessen regional ties, electoral districts are not identified with the regional units but consist of 12 cities and 24 subregions.

There have been only two genuinely contested national elections in Zaire—in 1960 and 1965. Although some individuals—notably Lumumba and Tshombe—developed important public followings, popularity at the polls has usually been less important than the ability to organize and control political power at the top. The Zairians did not vote at all until 1957 when the commune system was established in the urban areas. Since most city dwellers tended to live in areas formed on the basis of tribal affiliation and voted accordingly, the commune leadership usually represented the majority tribe in its sector. When national elections were held in 1960 and 1965, this tendency to vote along tribal lines was evident in the country as a whole. In addition to the tribal factor, elections also have been marked by the administrative breakdowns, corruption, and coercion that have characterized other facets of political life.

Although balloting fraud and coercion to get out the vote were the rule rather than the exception, there is good evidence to suggest that the 1967 constitution would have been approved by a majority of the voters even if these methods had not been used. While most of the voters had little or no understanding of the provisions of the new constitution, they recognized that the referendum was really an expression of confidence for the Mobutu regime. On this basis a majority—but one much lower than the 92% registered in the referendum—probably would have backed Mobutu.

According to the official returns for the 1970 presidential elections, Mobutu won 100% of the votes cast in all but two of the 24 electoral districts, where some ballots were declared void. According to reliable observers, however, officials presiding at the polls commonly issued only the green cards, which signified an affirmative vote, or employed various procedures which prevented genuinely secret balloting. Apparently the coercive tactics were somewhat relaxed at the elections for National Assembly candidates 2 weeks later, as it was announced that the unopposed slates of MPR candidates were approved by only 98.3% of the voters. Nevertheless either a very intensive roundup of voters or extensive falsification of results must have been employed to achieve a nationwide ballot total of 9,854,517, which is 96.3% of the adult Zairian citizens tabulated in the 1970 census.

D. National policies (S)

I. Domestic

In 1972, Mobutu was providing a greater measure of political stability and internal security than the country had known since independence. Mobutu has skillfully, albeit ruthlessly, imposed one-man rule, and through local government reforms and appeals to nationalism he has tried to replace the tribal and regional loyalties with a sense of allegiance to the central government and the President. Although government institutions are still fragile and there are persistent popular discontents and frustrations, the forceful expression of central authority has apparently met with the approval of most Zairians.

In the financial and commercial areas, two goals of the Mobutu government have been to stabilize the economy and, at the same time, change the nature of Zaire's relationship with those foreign financial interests—notably Belgian—which have dominated the economy since independence. A major step in the direction of the announced goal of economic independence was nationalization in 1967 of the UMHK—also known as *Union Minière*—the Belgian copper and cobalt mining operation in Shaba Region. This action was followed by the establishment of a national insurance company and by a break between the operations of Air Zaire and the Belgian Air Service, Sabena. In early 1968 expatriate technicians were invited back to run key industries and utilities. In 1969 an investment code designed to encourage foreign investment from a variety of countries was promulgated. Mobutu soon realized that no other country could easily replace Belgium and that the economy and public services were being damaged by the absence of key Belgian technicians. At the same time, Mobutu has sought to offset Belgian influence by encouraging persons from other nations to open businesses or provide professional services. In 1970, Mobutu awarded a management contract for Air Zaire to Pan American World Airways, which in effect replaced the services originally provided by Sabena.

A long-term aim of the Mobutu government is to further the economic development of Zaire's potential wealth. Little overall economic planning has been done, however. In June 1967 the government introduced a number of monetary and fiscal reforms sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) intended to improve the long-range economic outlook. These reforms, which involved a devaluation of the currency and sweeping tax reforms, were successful in

slowing the rate of price increase and generally strengthening the government's financial position.

In agriculture, the government's aim has been to raise agricultural production to preindependence levels. President Mobutu designated 1968 as the year of agriculture, and at all levels government authorities appealed to farmers to increase output. The campaign, plus the return of political stability and peace to Zaire's rural areas, resulted in a comeback in some areas for agriculture, although cassava and plantains, the primary food crops for the rural population, are estimated to be below the 1959 levels despite the substantial increase in the population.

Agricultural recovery, however, has been obstructed by such a deterioration of local roads as to prevent the marketing of cash crops throughout much of the countryside. Moreover, the preindependence transportation network, which was designed to serve only the plantation and mineral export trade, is not adequate for present interregional marketing needs. Agriculture is the most extreme instance of a generally uneven pattern of economic recovery and development as a result of infrastructural deficiencies. Since 1966, lending agencies and major foreign aid donors have given priority to efforts to improve, modernize, and extend all forms of transport. The government, however, has allocated a disproportionate share of resources to nondevelopmental expenditures, such as military hardware and prestige projects.

Zaire's chronic economic problems have become sharply intensified as a result of the decline since early 1970 in world market prices for copper, Zaire's principal export product. The drop in copper earnings caused a loss in Zaire's net foreign assets from nearly \$250 million in early 1970 to around \$218 million in December. In turn, a small surplus in the government's budget in 1969 gave way to a \$24 million deficit in 1970, and the budgetary deficit for 1971 is estimated to be about \$150 million.

Mobutu has responded with a series of belt-tightening measures which show his determination to prevent a spiraling budgetary deficit and monetary inflation. These new stringencies, however, are apt to place considerable strain on administrative discipline in both civil and military services, where the prevalent practice is to rely on informal largesse to get subordinates to do anything and to retain their loyalty. If economizing measures are enforced, they inevitably will create morale problems in the army and appreciable increases in unemployment among the most politically conscious element of the population.

Mobutu's adoption since mid-1971 of several measures to dramatize his authority and, through intensified propaganda, to promote the cult of his invincibility probably is evidence of his concern over deepening economic problems and the related popular malaise. First came a series of repressive measures against sundry known or suspected opponents: the drafting of university students in June 1971 for merely impudent demonstrations; the arbitrary expulsion of 20 Communist diplomats in July; the subversion trials in August of student demonstrators, a former guerrilla leader, and an obscure pro-Communist group; the expulsion of some 3,000 west African "diamond smugglers" in September; the arrest of two former cabinet ministers for an alleged coup plot in October; and the crackdown on street crime in Kinshasa throughout late 1971. Next came Mobutu's campaign for the adoption of "authentic" Zairian names, from the sudden switch to Zaire as the official country title in October to the passage in January 1972 of a Nationality Law which in effect prohibits Zairian citizens from retaining foreign surnames. Cardinal Malula's denunciation of Mobutu's call for Zairian children to be baptized with Zairian rather than Christian names of European origin precipitated Mobutu's fully publicized confrontation with the Catholic hierarchy in Zaire, climaxed in April 1972 by his installing committees of the party's youth wing in all Catholic seminaries.

Such propaganda ploys have been typical of Mobutu's style of public relations since he became President. His preindependence experience as a journalist impressed him with the potentialities of publicity as a political weapon, and his official acts usually have been calculated with a view to propaganda exploitation and impact on the Zairian populace. Until 1971, however, Mobutu had rarely pursued popular courses of action which he considered in serious conflict with his material interests. For instance, his support of Angolan nationalists has never been extended to the point of provoking damaging Portuguese reprisals.

Since mid-1971, however, some of Mobutu's tactics may have been counterproductive. His lashing out at alleged public enemies has stimulated unfounded rumors of imminent coups, creating a vague but widespread sense of insecurity despite the limited capabilities of known subversive elements. As for Mobutu's confrontation with the Catholic hierarchy, the resulting concordat with the bishops, publicized as a triumph for Mobutu, may discourage Zairians from challenging Mobutu's supreme authority over any popular institution. It is also likely to discourage

further foreign support for the extensive Catholic social services in Zaire. This result would scarcely resolve Mobutu's underlying problem—his inability to provide the decade of material and social progress which he promised in his inaugural address following the uncontested elections of 1970.

The maintenance of internal security, rather than defense against foreign attack or invasion, is the principal aim of Zaire's defense policies. With the exception of the Portuguese troops in Angola, the Zairian Army is potentially a good deal stronger than the armies of Zaire's immediate neighbors.

Even within the country, most of the effective fighting on behalf of the central government has been done by foreign troops, such as the U.N. force in 1960-63 and the mercenaries recruited in Europe and southern Africa during the rebellion of 1964-65. With the decline of the rebellion, the problem of maintaining internal security showed signs of diminishing to the point where the armed forces could cope with it. Mobutu therefore began in early 1967 to phase out the mercenaries, whose presence inside the country was an embarrassment to his regime. By early summer of 1967 there were fewer than 200 mercenaries left in the country, and it was these troops who mutinied on 5 July for a variety of reasons—a fear that they would be disbanded without receiving their back pay, anger over the kidnaping of Tshombe, and, perhaps for some, a desire to overthrow Mobutu. The armed forces, with logistical support from Ethiopia, Ghana, and the United States, chipped away at rebel strength until by November 1967 the rebels eventually were forced across the border into Rwanda. There have been no mercenaries in Zaire since November 1967.

2. Foreign

Mobutu's forays into foreign affairs have been erratic—particularly in the area of African politics—but the thrust of his foreign policy is essentially moderate and Western oriented. Mobutu's foreign policy is motivated primarily by his manifold needs for financial aid and technical assistance from industrialized countries and his fear of foreign support for Zairian dissidents. Most of the vital foreign aid for Zaire has come from Belgium, the United States, and other Western states, while the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist states have provided only intermittent aid to his government and, in some instances, encouragement to various dissident groups. Nevertheless, Mobutu has espoused a policy of nonalignment and rhetorically played down his reliance on Western states in order to maintain his stature as an African nationalist.

a. Relations with African states

The overall pattern of Mobutu's relations with other African leaders reflects his primary concern for Zaire's exposed location, surrounded by eight independent states and Portuguese Angola. He has taken a more active role in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) than any of his predecessors and has made gestures to dramatize Zaire's solidarity with southern African nationalist movements. For instance, Zaire provides sanctuary for Holden Roberto's Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) and for its guerrilla army. (In June 1972, President Mobutu and Congolese President Ngouabi arranged a "reconciliation in principle" between GRAE and its stronger rival, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.) By repudiating former Prime Minister Tshombe's "neocolonialism," Mobutu has been able to induce most of the surrounding independent governments to curtail support for Zairian refugee rebels. When Mobutu declared an amnesty for former rebels in December 1970, most of the neighboring governments cooperated with Zairian embassies in efforts to persuade the remaining refugees to return home.

The outstanding exception to Mobutu's warily bland relations with leaders of neighboring states is his extreme sensitivity—and erratic reaction—to the threat of subversion from Brazzaville, directly across the Congo River from Kinshasa. Since the early 1960's leading opponents of the Kinshasa government have taken refuge in Brazzaville, and Communist envoys to Congo have not only aided refugee rebels but cultivated Zairian students and other dissidents, who can readily visit Kinshasa as long as normal communications are maintained. From Mobutu's standpoint, this situation has been barely tolerable since September 1968, when Major Ngouabi emerged as the shaky leader of an army-leftist Congo Government which has been particularly receptive to Chinese support. Relations between the Zaire and Congo Governments were severed in October 1968 following the execution of Zairian rebel leader Pierre Mulele, who had been residing in Congo and had been returned to Zaire under a guarantee of amnesty. In June 1970, after two anti-Ngouabi coups having transparent backing from Kinshasa had failed, Mobutu and Ngouabi signed a declaration of reconciliation and resumed normal communications. Their respective embassies were reopened in the following December, but Mobutu expelled Ngouabi's envoys in August 1971, following *Radio Kinshasa's* highly exaggerated accounts of their subversive activities. In February 1972, Mobutu congratulated

Ngouabi for crushing a leftist coup, but this return to cordial relations apparently has merely lessened Mobutu's abiding preoccupation with the Brazzaville menace.

Mobutu has got along relatively well with the Portuguese authorities in Angola, as significant material interests have compelled mutual accommodations. The Portuguese authorities have reacted to GRAE guerrilla thrusts from Zairian territory by repeatedly blocking copper shipments on the rail line from Shaba Region to the Angolan seaport at Benguela. Mobutu, in turn, has veered toward unpublicized collaboration with Portuguese authorities, and Brazzaville's vaunted aid for GRAE guerrillas has been offset by obstructions of their border-crossing operations. In March 1970, two Portuguese representatives were accepted in Kinshasa with the proviso that they be located in the Spanish Embassy and conduct themselves unobtrusively. In addition to their mutual interest in maintaining the flow of Zairian copper through Benguela, Mobutu and the Portuguese are anxious to stabilize their extensive land frontier between Zaire and Angola. In fact, Zairian and Portuguese security officials have been quietly cooperating on various measures since early 1969 to reduce tensions caused by the presence of about 370,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire and several thousand former Katangan (Shaban) gendarmes in Angola. For instance, the Zaire-Angola border was reopened for normal trade at several points a full year before the reopening of a Portuguese mission in Kinshasa.

Mingled with Mobutu's primary concern for Zaire's security is a personal ambition to achieve recognition as an international leader, and this aspiration has occasionally distorted his pragmatic regard for material interests. In early 1968 Mobutu drew Chad and the Central African Republic into a mini-common market, apparently to challenge France's economic predominance in central Africa. His persistent efforts to forge economic links with Burundi and Rwanda have been at least partially motivated by a desire to supplant Belgian influence, although neither venture has produced solid links. Mobutu withdrew from the French-sponsored Afro-Malagasy Common Market in April 1972 amidst rhetorical assertions of Zaire's destiny to bridge the remaining neocolonial barriers between its French- and English-speaking neighbors.

In May 1972, Mobutu sent a Zairian paratroop unit and two jet fighter planes to Burundi in response to President Micombero's plea for help against a Hutu tribal revolt. Apparently, Mobutu was primarily concerned with maintaining his personal influence

with Micombero, and the Zairian paratroopers merely performed guard duty in the capital, while the aircraft were used for reconnaissance. Later, when the extent of Tutsi reprisals against the Hutu rebels became obvious, Mobutu stopped supplying Micombero with ammunition.

b. Relations with Western nations and the U.N.

Belgium remains the major foreign presence in Zaire, although the relationship has fluctuated greatly during the years since independence. The two countries will probably never again be as close as they were, and certain issues—such as compensation for Belgian losses during the early postindependence years—remain unresolved. However, both countries appear to realize that it is in their mutual interest to stay on good terms. Since Zaire's independence, Belgium has maintained a higher level of official bilateral aid programs than any other country—roughly \$534 million during 1960-68, compared with \$420 million from the United States and \$16 million from West Germany.

Mobutu's fling at economic independence from Belgium began in mid-1966 and culminated in the seizure of UMHK mining assets in January 1967. Mobutu had hoped to destroy UMHK's position—part real and part fancied—as a political force in Zaire and prove his position as an African nationalist. When he created a Zairian company, the General Congolese Ore Co. (GECOMINES)—now General Quarries and Mines Company of Zaire (GECAMINES)—to run the mines, the UMHK in retaliation blocked the sale of Zairian copper by threatening prospective purchasers with legal action and withheld payments to the Zairians on the copper then in the pipeline. In February 1967 an agreement was finally reached between the Zaire Government and the General Ore Co. (SGM), an associate company of UMHK, under which SGM would mine and market minerals produced by GECOMINES under a contract. The broader issues in the dispute, such as UMHK's claims for compensation, were not settled until late 1969 on terms which a Belgian spokesman called most generous.

Belgium, for its part, undertook a gradual disengagement from its former colony. The trend took on added momentum following racial incidents which accompanied the mercenaries' mutiny of July 1967. Some 10,000 Belgians left Zaire at that time, and Belgian aid programs were reorganized to focus on program assistance and purely technical tasks, notably education. In addition, technical assistance teams in many parts of the country were withdrawn, but

Mobutu's policy in early 1968 of encouraging foreigners to stay on stemmed the flow. Foreign experts were reinstated in the management of mining, transport, power, and the public utilities, and Belgian teachers, who had not been allowed entry during the mercenary crisis, returned to Zaire. Relations improved steadily. Mobutu's visit as head of state to Belgium in November 1969 topped off a series of exchange visits by high-level officials, and King Baudouin visited Zaire in mid-1970. There are now some 40,000 Belgians in Zaire, compared to more than 90,000 at independence and as few as 10,000 in 1967.

As of late 1972, official relations between Brussels and Kinshasa were still firm and effective despite Mobutu's continued use of Belgian groups in Zaire as prime targets for monetary shakedowns or psychological coups. For instance, in March 1971 a Zairian appellate court upheld charges that several Belgian executives of Socobanque, an internationally financed corporation, had helped some Zairian nationals evade paying taxes. Prison sentences were imposed on two Belgian executives, while Socobanque, which included Belgian shareholders, was in effect nationalized by imposing a ruinous fine of \$4.9 million dollars. Nevertheless, 3 months later Brussels quietly agreed to provide \$1 million a year in pensions to Zairian veterans of the colonial *Force Publique* and also to assume some \$125 million of Zaire's foreign debts.

The debts were owed mostly to Belgian nationals, which suggests the underlying and usually efficacious rationale of Mobutu's double-edged approach to the Belgian "neocolonialists." In March 1972 the Belgian Foreign Minister visited Kinshasa to discuss such matters as a new Zairian property law ostensibly aimed at Belgian absentee landowners, the involvement of Belgian priests in Mobutu's confrontation with the Catholic hierarchy, unfavorable Belgian press coverage of Mobutu's official actions, and the failure of Belgian authorities to stop Zairian students in Brussels from openly criticizing Mobutu. The most tangible results of the Belgian Foreign Minister's visit were some \$25 million in new technical assistance programs and liberalized credit terms for Zairian purchases of Belgian goods. It was also agreed to hold regular consultations at the foreign ministers' level in order to resolve future problems before they became critical.

The United States has been deeply involved in Zaire through its political and financial support of the U.N. military and civilian operations in the early 1960's and through its bilateral program of technical, military, and economic assistance. The United States has extended over \$650 million in various forms of aid and support to Zaire since 1960. In line with the improved

political, economic, and security situation, the United States in FY70 shifted to development loans and to P.L. 480 programs making U.S. surplus commodities available on easy terms. For FY72, the total value of all U.S. bilateral aid programs for Zaire, including military, was roughly \$5 million in grants or excess stock and \$5 million in loans. Transportation and agriculture have the highest priority under the program emphasizing development.

Zaire's relationship with the United Nations has been complex and varied. The most dramatic development was the U.N. military presence and operations from July 1960 to June 1964. Less dramatic, but equally important, was the U.N. civilian aid program, which was still in operation in 1972. In the first days of this program, personnel recruited by the United Nations filled almost all the crucial positions in the judicial system and in the fields of medicine, transportation, communications, education, and government administration. The U.N. personnel were a major factor in staving off total collapse in the early chaotic days of independence. As other countries increased their bilateral assistance and qualified Zairian replacements were trained, the number of U.N. advisers decreased. The United Nations sponsors a greatly reduced aid program involving about \$5 million annually.

The armed forces continue to depend on technical and administrative support from Belgium, the United Kingdom, Italy, Israel, and the United States. In late 1971 there were about 250 Belgian military advisers stationed in various parts of the country. There were also nine Israeli military technicians, who have trained most of the Zairian paratroopers, and nine British military advisers with the army. An Italian military assistance program conducts pilot training for the air force, which is a component of the army. In July 1972 this program involved some 80 Italian pilots and other technicians in Zaire, while 70 Zairians were receiving advanced flight and other training in Italy. The U.S. military assistance program has emphasized training in communications, administration, and logistics. The United States provided materiel amounting to \$29.1 million on a grant basis from 1963 to 1971. Although the U.S. grant aid program had been phased out by mid-1972, military loans were continuing at a rate of roughly \$2 million a year.

c. Relations with Communist countries

Zaire's relations with the Soviet Union are marked by a mutual wariness. Soviet representatives were expelled from Zaire in 1960 and again in 1963 because Moscow supported elements which opposed the central government. Since December 1967, when

Mobutu agreed to resume normal diplomatic relations. Soviet envoys in Kinshasa have had their ups and downs. Although a regularly assigned TASS correspondent and occasional good-will tours of Soviet athletes and artists have been welcomed, Mobutu has never allowed a Soviet cultural center or accepted Soviet offers of technical assistance which would result in the employment of Soviet personnel in Zaire for extended periods or would require Zairians to go the Soviet Union for training. In early 1970 four Soviet Embassy aides and the TASS correspondent were expelled amid local press accounts of their proselytizing activities among Zairian government employees. In July 1971, 20 diplomats from Soviet and other Communist embassies were expelled in retaliation for their alleged complicity in the demonstrations at Lovanium University.

In January 1972, however, evidence of a new cordiality began with an invitation for a Soviet parliamentary delegation to visit Zaire and meet with Zairian legislators. In March, Mobutu held a widely publicized luncheon with the Soviet ambassador, his warmest gesture toward a Soviet envoy since becoming President. Announcements followed that a Soviet delegation would attend the MPR congress in May and that Foreign Minister Gromyko would visit Zaire in July. However, the Gromyko visit has been continually postponed, and in late 1972 there was no indication that Mobutu seriously intended to accept substantial aid from the Soviet Union or to relax his vigilance against potential Soviet subversion in Zaire. Rather, the whole pattern suggests that Mobutu is using his public dealings with the Soviets as propaganda, primarily intended to impress others—to show Zairian dissidents that they do not have the full support of their foreign backers or to show his international audience his determination to maintain a nonaligned stance despite primary dependence on the West for material support.

In November 1972, Kinshasa announced that Zaire and the People's Republic of China had decided to exchange ambassadors soon, and in January 1973 Mobutu visited Peking. During the visit he signed a trade pact and an agreement for technical and economic cooperation. Apparently, Mobutu took these steps to maintain Zaire's nonaligned position and to enhance his reputation as a leading African statesman. There was no indication that Mobutu intended to allow Peking to establish an extensive presence in Zaire.

In addition to the Soviet Union, five other Communist countries have diplomatic missions in Kinshasa: Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania,

and Czechoslovakia. Most of them have modest commercial and cultural agreements with Zaire, but their influence is negligible compared with that of the non-Communist countries. Mobutu's dealings with these states have roughly paralleled his tactical line with the Soviet Union. He has tended to show some partiality for Yugoslavia and Romania, and he visited their capitals in August 1970, following his first state visit to the United States. Nevertheless, Yugoslav and Romanian diplomats were included on the blacklist of "Communist provocateurs" expelled in July 1971. Zaire's relations with Bulgaria were suspended in August 1969 following student demonstrations in Kinshasa; Mobutu accused the Bulgarian consul of helping students involved in the demonstration to escape to Bulgaria. In August 1970 the Zaire Government announced its decision to resume diplomatic relations with Bulgaria.

E. Threats to government stability (S)

1. Discontent and dissidence

The foremost impression derived from a review of the potentialities for subversion in Zaire is the contrast between the almost complete absence of articulate opposition to the Mobutu government and the prevalence of underlying malaise. Mobutu has adroitly neutralized all organizations having an intrinsic capability of overthrowing his one-man rule, but he has done relatively little to remedy adverse economic conditions which appear to be worsening Zaire's chronic social tensions. In fact, the tactics which have effectively neutralized resistance to his supreme authority also have stunted the growth of constructive capabilities throughout the government and other institutions that are vital for economic and social progress.

Because Mobutu has given more attention to entrenching his personal influence than building an effective command structure, the worst threats to the viability of the Zaire Republic appear to be Mobutu's incapacitation or death through illness, accident, or assassination. Although it is unlikely that any presently identifiable opponents will challenge Mobutu as long as he remains in good health, his persistent undercutting of potential rivals also makes it unlikely that any foreseeable successor could simply take over the tangled reins of his administration and maintain comparable control.

Although Zairians still vividly recall their long history of intertribal strife, the population is divided into so many tribal groups that traditional ethnic

animosities tend to prevent the emergence of a cohesive revolutionary movement as much as they impede the development of a strong national state. The most important single source of social tensions since the ebbing of the peasant uprisings of 1964-65 is the massive influx of peasants into Zaire's principal urban areas. Ironically the mingling of people from diverse tribal backgrounds in government offices, industrial shops, and urban shantytowns has usually intensified traditional animosities, but the resulting tensions in work situations and occasional inter-neighborhood riots are not likely to produce or sustain an effective urban revolt. Nevertheless, the continual rural-urban migration reflects the government's failure to stimulate sufficient agricultural expansion to support the growing rural population. More important politically is the failure of the typical urban newcomer to fulfill his material desires, because industrialization has lagged far behind urbanization in creating new jobs and because housing and social services are extremely inadequate.

Within most urban areas, unemployment is the prime cause of severe privation for a large portion of the populace. Job hunger is potentially exploitable by any demagog who dares raise his voice, because the local historical context has conditioned Zairians to regard the government as the prime source of employment and to blame those in authority for failing to provide a desired job. Belgian paternalism inculcated this attitude during the colonial era, and it has been reinforced since independence by the swelling of the government payroll to a point where almost half of all regular wage earners are employed by government agencies.

Furthermore, many skilled industrial jobs are unattainable for Zairians and are held by foreigners; technical training is the weakest link in the Zairian educational system. Mobutu has exploited this grievance to the extent of making unrealistic promises to provide many jobs for Zairians by expelling aliens. This propaganda line, coupled with the prevalent inclination of Zairian officials to favor fellow tribesmen in hiring and firing, encourages popular inferences that anyone who is jobless must be the victim of ethnic discrimination and that such grievances might be redressed through a revolt. Many of the present urban inhabitants are chronically unemployed and may be injured to their plight, but currently adverse financial trends confront Mobutu with the need for severely pruning the government payroll, thus risking criticism among a highly articulate part of the population.

Mobutu's primary claim on the loyalty of the urban wage earners—that by 1971 he had reversed a 10-year rise in their cost of living—may be canceled if there is a sharp decline in the real value of wages as a result of monetary inflation. The substantial statutory wage increases in 1970 and 1971 have only partially offset an overall decline since independence in living conditions for ordinary urban wage earners. Lower echelon government employees have repeatedly suffered long delays in being paid as a result of chronic administrative snarls or malfeasance on the part of their superiors. Although schools, medical facilities, and other social services are concentrated in urban areas, they are inadequate for the rapidly expanding urban population, and sanitary housing is particularly limited. Although urban wage earners comprise a fortunate minority by comparison with the urban unemployed and rural populace, ordinary wage earners feel aggrieved by conspicuous gaps between their lot and that of high-level government officials who flaunt luxuries derived from Mobutu's informal largesse. Generally poor morale among lower echelon government employees is suggested by the fairly common occurrence of wildcat strikes for short periods in particular offices or shops.

The great majority of Zairians are peasants whose overall material condition is still appreciably worse than it was during the last decade of the colonial era. In 1959 a large portion of the rural population was getting some cash income from a highly productive system of commercial agriculture. Although most peasants continued to practice subsistence agriculture on their tribal lands, the Belgians enabled them also to grow and sell cash crops through effective local administrative support and a transportation system which linked most of the countryside with river and rail routes to foreign markets. Much of this infrastructure collapsed during the early 1960's, and by 1972 production of cash crops was merely approaching the level of 1959, although the rural population had increased by roughly a third. The net result for most peasants has been chronic underemployment and denial of a number of amenities previously gained. Furthermore, previously rudimentary but generally available social services, such as local medical clinics, have deteriorated or ceased in most localities.

Material recovery has been especially slow in the sectors of eastern Zaire which were overrun by the Simba revolt in 1964—sectors that could never be completely closed to subversive infiltrations from Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, or Uganda. Although the waning of the Simba revolt shows that a peasant

uprising in this area cannot congeal into a solid secessionist regime without substantial foreign support, it has also become evident that minimal foreign support can sustain diehard guerrilla remnants indefinitely. In mid-1972, at least 4 years after the cessation of regular support for the Simba remnants, nine Zairian army battalions were still chasing small guerrilla bands and disturbing thousands of peasants in the mountainous terrain near Lake Tanganyika.

Because local administration is barely adequate to meet the basic needs even of those settled in their tribal homelands, any influx of refugees from adjacent countries could have a seriously disruptive impact on the Zairian inhabitants of frontier zones. Hence the ever-present possibility of large-scale peasant migrations across Zaire's nine international borders may constitute as serious a threat to internal stability as the possibility of infiltration by foreign-based opponents of the Zaire Government. As of late 1972, at least 500,000 refugees from adjacent countries were living in Zaire's frontier zones, including roughly 400,000 Angolans, 50,000 Sudanese, 25,000 Burundians, and 24,000 Rwandans. It is significant that fairly severe tensions between these refugees and local inhabitants have occurred from time to time, but serious disturbances have not ensued, primarily because of favorable factors that are largely beyond the control of Zairian authorities. For instance, the Angolan refugees have gotten along fairly well with local Zairian peasants because they are fellow Kongo tribesmen, while Zairian authorities have relied primarily on a U.N. agency to move some of the Sudanese refugees away from frontier sectors where they were most troublesome.

On the whole, prospects appeared poor in late 1972 for alleviating within the next few years the adverse economic and social conditions which had bred unrest among most elements of the Zairian population since independence. Nevertheless, Mobutu has succeeded not only in stifling overt opposition but also in reducing known subversive organizations to negligible proportions. Presumably, therefore, the presently muffled tensions and grievances are more likely to be expressed through existing popular organizations that Mobutu has sponsored than to suddenly emerge as newly formed subversive movements. There are no indications that any elements of these organizations—the MPR, its youth wing, or the national labor union (UNTZA)—will offer serious resistance to Mobutu as long as he maintains his present vigor. His controls, however, are so essentially personal as to make it appear dubious that any of these organizations could effectively stifle or restrain urban or rural dissidence

following Mobutu's sudden death or incapacitation. Hence the survival of Zaire as a unitary national state may hinge on how each of these popular organizations, as well as the army react to the resurgence of centrifugal forces that probably will ensue from Mobutu's demise.

It is significant that university students have been Mobutu's most articulate critics. The fatal clash between Lovanium University students and troops in June 1969, and the ensuing sympathy demonstrations on other campuses, was the most impressive show of civilian discontent since Mobutu assumed power in 1965. The memorial demonstrations at Lovanium in June 1971, despite the banning of independent student unions and mandatory enrollment of all students in the JMPR in late 1969, show that student potentialities for spontaneous protests are indeed irrepressible. Although the induction of Lovanium students into the army in June 1971 had an immediately sobering effect, the subsequent reorganization of higher educational institutions has at least temporarily delayed the genuine strengthening of inadequate facilities resulting from rapid expansion of higher education. The net result appears to be a quiet demoralization of some 10,000 postsecondary students. Hence some possibilities remain that spontaneous student protests may gain support from lower echelon UNTC leaders or spark urban riots, particularly in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, if economic conditions worsen significantly.

2. Subversion

For most of the decade since independence, Zaire has been unstable. The authority of the central government over its more than 22 million people and 905,000 square miles of territory has been tenuous, and large parts of the country have been totally outside the government's control for long periods. In late 1962 and 1963 the central government, with substantial help from the United Nations, ended the 2-year secessions of Katanga and eastern Kasai provinces, two of the country's richest areas, only to be faced in 1964 with a rebellion in eastern Zaire which at its peak in the fall of 1964 denied the central government control over about one-third of its territory. Although this insurgency and a smaller one in western Zaire were for the most part contained by the end of 1965, further instability was generated by a brief mutiny in mid-1966 of former Katangan gendarmes who had been taken into the Zairian Army and by a mutiny of some 150 white mercenaries in mid-1967.

Since late 1967, when the rebel mercenary band withdrew to Rwanda to await evacuation to Europe, Zaire has suffered no major outbreaks of violence, and political stability has prevailed. In remote areas scattered bands of rebels and brigands continue to forage, but they avoid contact with army units and are primarily concerned with simple survival. Aside from guerrilla remnants, as of late 1972 there were no known organized groups within Zaire that were openly opposing the Mobutu government or actively seeking to overthrow it. Presumably there were some covert oppositionists in Zaire who were still in contact with small groups of anti-Mobutu emigres or receiving cautious encouragement from Communist embassies in Kinshasa or Brazzaville, just across the Congo River. Since the reduction of organized subversive activities to a negligible level is largely the result of Mobutu's personal leadership, it might prove to be a mere interlude in the event of his early demise, before vital national institutions firm up and attain intrinsic durability.

The greatest internal threat to the government since the end of the Katanga secession in early 1963 was the outbreak of insurgency in late 1963 and early 1964 in old Kwilu Province (now part of Bandundu Region) and in northeastern Zaire. The leader of the Kwilu revolt, Pierre Mulele, was a revolutionary who had received Chinese training and who was, to some extent, ideologically motivated. For most of his followers, however, tribal discontent, dissatisfaction with the central government, and personal ambitions were more important than ideology. The Mulele forces, composed mainly of Bapende and Babunda tribal elements, were initially successful against the government troops, but when the traditional tribal boundaries of the Bapende and Babunda were reached, the rebellion lost steam and Mulele was forced to retreat.

Mulele was executed in October 1968, and by 1970 the rebellion was reduced to scattered pockets of poorly armed rebels. As of late 1972, the small guerrilla bands remaining in central Bandundu Region appeared to be cut off from foreign channels of supply, preoccupied with the problems of survival in a difficult physical environment, and engaged principally in banditry.

The rebellion in the north and east—the so-called Simba rebellion—differed from the Mulele revolt in that the political leaders of the rebellion did not actually foment the revolt but, instead, exploited local conflicts and discontent already in existence. Dissatisfaction with the central and provincial governments, coupled with jealousy of apparent

government favoritism for rival tribal groups, prompted members of several ethnic groups, particularly the Bakusu, Batetela, Basonge, and Bafulero, to revolt in early 1964. The success of the rebels attracted the attention of the National Liberation Committee, a group of Zairian dissidents formed in late 1963. The ambitious politicians in the National Liberation Committee soon usurped the leadership of the rebellion and established their own "government" at Kisangani with Christophe Gbenye as president. The fanaticism of the rebel troops, who were indoctrinated by witch doctors to believe in their own invincibility, plus the complete collapse of most army units in the area, led to the rapid advance of the rebel units.

Realizing the obvious deficiencies of the Zairian troops, Premier Tshombe imported white mercenaries to assume the main burden of coping with the rebels. By September 1964 the rebellion had reached its military peak, and the government forces began retaking rebel-held territory. In November 1964, confronted by increasing evidence of rebel brutality to European hostages in the northeast, Belgian paratroopers transported by U.S. aircraft dropped on the rebel capital of Stanleyville (now Kisangani) and later on Paulis (now Isiro). Faced with defeat, the leaders of the Stanleyville rebel regime fled from Zaire.

Nevertheless the Simbas—the peasant guerrillas who had started the revolt and comprised its real driving force throughout—continued such stubborn resistance that a full year was required for Zairian troops and several white mercenary units to clear them from the vast sectors of eastern and northeastern Zaire which they held after losing Stanleyville. By the end of 1965 the diehard Simba remnants had withdrawn to a relatively small sector facing the northwestern coast of Lake Tanganyika, where the combination of rugged terrain, badly deteriorated roads, and the infiltrating of supplies from Tanzania and Burundi enabled them to hold off government forces. Meanwhile almost 100,000 Zairian peasants who had been more or less responsive to Simba leaders, or had been swept along between retreating Simbas and advancing government forces, took refuge in Uganda, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sudan, and Tanzania.

Consequently the prime subversion threat confronting Mobutu when he assumed power was that foreign aid to diehard Simba bands among Zairian refugees in neighboring countries might enable them to return to Zaire in sufficient strength to mount a counteroffensive. By 1970 this threat had been reduced to negligible proportions through Mobutu's multifaceted strategy of exerting persistent military

pressure against active guerrillas, making repeated offers of amnesty to those who turned themselves in, and inducing neighboring governments to restrain Simba activities among Zairian refugees, to interdict Communist aid to Simbas, and to facilitate voluntary repatriation of Zairian refugees. The failure of a "Revolutionary Front" to disrupt Zairian national elections in late 1970 discredited the few guerrilla leaders in eastern Zaire who still asserted ideological motivation, in contrast with the bulk of Simba remnants who had settled down to subsistence by banditry. In late 1972, small guerrilla bands northwest of Lake Tanganyika were still evading capture and scoring occasional minor strikes against pursuing troops despite the discontinuance of substantial external support.

The specter of a significant anti-Mobutu movement among Zairian emigres was finally dispelled by Mobutu's highly publicized amnesty offer in December 1970. This induced the return within a few months of two of the three principal leaders of the short-lived Stanleyville rebel regime—"President" Christophe Gbenye and "General" Nicholas Ologa—as well as a dozen or so former politicians of lesser prominence. Although inadequate administrative support limited the return of ordinary Zairian refugees to no more than several thousand, the overall psychological impact of the amnesty offer has discouraged further efforts on the part of Communists or African radicals to mobilize Zairian refugees against the Mobutu government. In August 1971, Ologa and other former rebels were accused of starting a new revolutionary movement, abetted by Congo President Ngouabi's envoys. The televised trial, however, was so lacking in evidence of concrete subversive actions or tangible foreign aid as to leave foreign observers wondering whether Mobutu had resorted to loose accusations in order to discourage Zairians from contact with foreign envoys, or to mollify army officers who resented his amnesty for a notorious guerrilla leader.

Foreign Communist activities have not had significant results in Zaire since the Simba revolt fizzled out. Soviet and other Communist embassies in Kinshasa have met Mobutu's vigilance with what appears to be a long-range strategy—cautiously cultivating Zairian officials, students, and others who may eventually become politically exploitable in the event of Mobutu's demise or loss of power. Chinese embassies in surrounding African countries likewise have tended to withhold substantial aid for Zairian emigres until they prove their capabilities for effective action within Zaire.

There has never been a Communist party in Zaire. In the period immediately preceding independence, the Belgian Communist Party contacted many Zairian politicians and attempted to organize a Zairian Communist Party, but the attempt failed. Communist ideology has had limited appeal to most Zairians, partly because of its non-African and irreligious characteristics. Lacking a recognized political organ through which to channel their doctrine, the Communists attempted to use existing political factions and to establish front groups.

The U.S.S.R.'s moves to establish a strong Communist presence in Zaire began in the first days of independence when the Soviet Union actively supported Premier Patrice Lumumba in the internal political conflicts which then paralyzed the country. In September 1960, Zaire expelled the U.S.S.R. diplomatic mission on the grounds that it was interfering in the country's internal affairs and subverting the legitimate government.

Relations were restored in August 1961, and U.S.S.R. representatives returned, only to be expelled once more in November 1963 for engaging in subversive activity. Zairian authorities had proved collusion between the members of the Soviet Embassy and the Zairian rebel movement, the National Liberation Committee, based in Brazzaville. The U.S.S.R. continued to give substantial support to the Stanleyville rebellion during 1964. The Zairian troops seized Soviet-made weapons on several occasions, and in September 1964 rebel leader Christopher Gbenye claimed on *Radio Stanleyville* that several of his officers had been trained in Moscow. Zaire and the U.S.S.R. decided to resume diplomatic relations in December 1967, and by mid-1968 the U.S.S.R., as well as Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, had diplomatic missions in Kinshasa. The Communist missions tread warily, placing emphasis on building an image of friendly cooperation. The U.S.S.R. continues, however, to shelter several Zairian rebel leaders.

The Chinese have supported rebellion in the country through their embassies in neighboring African nations. During the insurgencies of 1963 through 1965, the Chinese missions in Brazzaville and in Bujumbura (Burundi) were particularly active in aiding the rebels, and there were unconfirmed reports that Chinese advisers were among the rebel forces as they moved across northeastern Zaire.

Cuban involvement in Zaire, which began in 1961 with the training of Zairian dissidents outside the country, in Cuba and Congo (Brazzaville), reached its zenith during the 1964-65 rebellion when Cuban

advisers served with the rebel forces. Although there were still a few Cuban advisers in Brazzaville in mid-1972, there were no indications that they were engaged in activity directed at the Zairian Government.

With the collapse of the 1964 rebellion, Communist aid to Zairian insurgents decreased sharply. Earlier Communist support had depended on the cooperation of neighboring African states in providing bases from which to supply the Zairian rebel groups. With the removal of Tshombe, despised by most African leaders, and the success of Mobutu's efforts to improve Zaire's relations with other African states, African cooperation in the Communist effort to overthrow or subvert the Zairian Government practically came to a halt. Neighboring countries still continue, however, to give safe haven to Zairian rebels. The existence in Brazzaville of a radical, openly pro-Communist regime continues to offer the Communists a base close to Zaire, but this base seems to be used primarily to send pro-Maoist and other Communist propaganda into Kinshasa. Brazzaville provides haven to Zairian students and trade unionists who have left Zaire because of suspected pro-Communist activities, and it also gives sanctuary to various exile and rebel groups.

The fronts organized by Communist sympathizers have never had wide appeal in Zaire. The only significant organization which could have been considered an operating Communist front was the pro-Communist General Federation of Congolese Workers (CGTC). It was supported by the Soviet Union through the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and by China. The limited effectiveness of this organization was further curtailed by the arrest of the CGTC first secretary general, Jean Joseph Malhonga-Allias, in November 1966 and the proscription of CGTC activities by the Mobutu regime. Five former members of the CGTC who had joined the national labor federation, UNTZ, were dismissed in May 1968 from the UNTZ and subsequently imprisoned for their financial and ideological dependence on a foreign trade union, namely the WFTU. Although there are undoubtedly additional ex-CGTC members in the UNTZ, they do not play a key role.

F. Maintenance of internal security

1. Police (C)

The National Gendarmerie (GN) has primary responsibility for law enforcement and maintenance of public order throughout all territorial components of Zaire. This new service, according to a presidential

decree of 31 July 1972, incorporates the former National Police and the former army gendarme battalions. The National Police had been nominally responsible for maintenance of law and order throughout the nation, and a large portion of its personnel—roughly 22,600 in mid-1972—had been thinly distributed across the countryside. The police, however, had proved so ineffective in rural areas that local administrative officers usually had to call upon local detachments from the six army gendarme battalions to cope with even minor disorders.

The basic organizational structure of the GN, as formulated in the initial presidential decree, clearly is intended to supplant the former rivalries and overlapping jurisdictions of the army gendarmes and civil police with a unified service, more directly responsive to President Mobutu's control than either service had been. The GN is a component of the army, under the control of the Department of Defense, which has been headed by Mobutu since 1965. Furthermore, a senior officer of the GN is included on the Presidential Special Staff for the security services, which was formed in early August 1972. This staff, chaired by the senior military aide in the Office of the President, provides Mobutu with an alternate channel for bypassing Major General Bumba, the newly appointed Captain General of the army.

The GN is expected to have a numerical strength of about 30,000 when the process of consolidating the former National Police and the army gendarme battalions is completed. As of late 1972, a detailed table of organization for the GN reportedly was under review and the process of integrating personnel from the former two services was still incomplete, causing some demoralization, especially among former police officers. The official announcement of the merger implied that all the former army gendarmes would be subject to selection. In fact, the newly appointed commander of the GN, Brigadier General Singa Boyenge, is a career army officer, as are the senior GN officers in each administrative region of the country. By late September 1972 most of the higher officers in the former National Police had been downgraded within the GN or transferred to other departments. On the other hand, the representative of the GN on the newly formed special presidential staff for the security services is a highly qualified former police official, and there were other indications that Mobutu intends to retain the more competent of the former police officers in responsible positions.

As of November 1972 it was still problematical how much time would be required for the GN to overcome the temporarily demoralizing effects of such a

sweeping reorganization and to attain its potential for becoming much more effective than either of its predecessors. An important factor would be the eventual balance between former gendarmes and former police in key positions. The former army gendarme battalions had a reputation for brutal treatment of civilians, due largely to their being treated as reserve infantry units and receiving minimal training in nonviolent techniques for maintaining order. On the other hand, the disbanded National Police had made a good start toward effective mobile patrol units in major urban areas; it is unclear whether this progress will be seriously eroded by the sweeping personnel changes resulting from the reorganization.

Belgium has long provided the principal technical aid mission to the police. A Belgian advisory group averaged about 40 personnel, but when it was sharply reduced as a result of strained relations between the two countries in 1967, the Belgian mission comprised only 20 personnel, 10 of whom were instructors at the Lubumbashi and Lubumbashi police schools. The Belgian personnel were serving as consultants or instructors, and the police are continuing these functions with the GN.

The United Nations formerly provided technical assistance. Particularly helpful to the Zairian force was a Nigerian police detachment which was sent under U.N. auspices and served during the period 1960-66. An additional nine-man U.N. advisory mission was terminated at the close of 1967.

The United States has had a team of police advisers and instructors in Zaire since 1964. In addition to its role in helping set up mobile brigades and rural mobile training, the team was instrumental in organizing and supplying the efficient police radio network linking the major regions. The United States also has provided considerable materiel assistance. The U.S. training programs and other technical assistance activities that were being conducted with the National Police in mid-1972 have proceeded with minimal interruptions while most of the Zairian participants were being integrated into the GN.

The most encouraging result of U.S. assistance for the National Police has been the recently developed capability of the Kinshasa metropolitan police for responding rapidly and effectively to serious street crimes, ranging from muggings to auto thefts and reckless driving. Until this program was initiated in 1969, Kinshasa police had negligible capabilities for pursuit of criminals. By mid-1971 a Mobile Brigade, comprising radio-equipped motorcycles, jeeps, and sedans, was winning occasional encounters with armed thugs in the course of regular patrols. More

important, the Mobile Brigade was responding quickly to emergency calls as a result of effective teamwork with regular traffic control and investigative units, coordinated through a modernized central command post for Kinshasa's seven police districts. In early 1972 a project for establishing a mobile brigade with similar support facilities in Lubumbashi was well under way.

2. Intelligence (S)

There are three primary intelligence and security organizations in Zaire: the National Documentation Center (CND, successor to the *Surete Nationale*); the Information and Military Security Directorate (DGRSM) in the Department of Defense; and the G-2 section of the army. To a very limited extent, the intelligence section of the GN also adds to the government's intelligence effort.

Mobutu has tended to entrust various countersubversion tasks to individuals who have regular positions outside the security services. For instance, Jean Manzikala, who was designated state inspector in the Interior Ministry from 1968 until his indictment on murder charges in early 1972, reportedly functioned as Mobutu's foremost special investigator, primarily concerned with disloyalty on the part of senior officials in the provinces. Such informal assignments have generated loose networks of informants whose activities sometimes overlap the functions of the regular security services.

In order to reduce the resulting confusion, Mobutu assigned Lt. Col. Raymond Omba, formerly chief of the CND Domestic Operations Directorate, to a new intelligence and security position on the presidential staff in October 1971. Although it is not apparent in Omba's official title, that of Private Secretary to the President, he reportedly functions as an intelligence coordinator responsible for all security matters. He is also considered Mobutu's principal intelligence adviser.

a. National Documentation Center

The CND is responsible directly to the President. In late 1972 the service reportedly had a total work force of approximately 550, including 500 in the Domestic Operations Directorate and a maximum of 50 in the Foreign Operations Directorate. The CND maintains its headquarters in Kinshasa, with posts in each regional capital, subposts in other larger towns, and representatives in a few foreign diplomatic posts such as in neighboring African countries, Brussels, and Paris.

The CND's responsibilities include the collection of information on possible subversives and surveillance of suspected enemies of the state. In practice, these functions involve monitoring and countering any political activity which in the opinion of the CND presents a potential threat to the government. The CND has powers of arbitrary arrest and interrogation, as well as *de facto* power to detain political prisoners without bringing legal charges against them. Because military officers hold key posts in the CND, this power of detention is widely employed against members of the armed forces, even though counterintelligence within the military services is technically the responsibility of the DGRSM.

The CND has three major directorates: Domestic Operations, Foreign Operations, and Administration. Most of the operational activities fall under the Domestic Operations Directorate. The Foreign Operations Directorate was not formed until 1969, although the CND had been assigning operatives to foreign diplomatic posts for several years previously. The formation of this directorate represents a scaled-down version of Mobutu's original plan to establish a separate foreign intelligence agency. As late as late 1972 the Foreign Operations Directorate was still relatively unorganized, and there were no signs that it was functioning with real effectiveness.

The capabilities of the CND have varied greatly since independence as a result of personnel changes which in turn have reflected diverse political pressures. The service had grown to an unwieldy size by 1969, and a resulting loss in efficiency was apparent. Subsequently many of the less competent personnel have been weeded out, and the remaining staff employees have been better trained. Although there has been a net gain in effectiveness since 1969, the CND still is not capable of performing all its assigned functions. It is subject to the caprices of individual officers and to the obstructive effects of interservice rivalries.

b. Directorate of Information and Military Security

DGRSM is an agency of the Department of Defense but reports directly to President Mobutu. DGRSM has a charter which gives it a wide range of responsibility and authority, but limited funds and personnel preclude the effective execution of any of its assigned responsibilities. In 1969 it was reported to have only about 20 commissioned officers. In early 1970, DGRSM started giving more intensive training to its officers in an attempt to build up its effectiveness and capabilities.

DGRSM's basic responsibility is to counter within the military establishment any activity which it deems harmful to the state. It has a military investigative counterintelligence function and has the power of arrest within the armed forces, although normally such arrests are carried out by military police, on orders from the DGRSM chief. In carrying out its basic responsibility, DGRSM can also arrest civilians, although technically a CND officer is supposed to be present when this occurs. DGRSM can detain suspects up to 24 hours without charge, but in practice this time limit is frequently ignored. In addition, DGRSM is responsible for information programs designed to improve the morale of military personnel. Until mid-1972, DGRSM was responsible for the administration of a small unit which provided bodyguards and other physical protection for President Mobutu and the army commander in chief. The newly formed special presidential staff for the security services reportedly has assumed direct responsibility for Mobutu's personal protection, while DGRSM has continued this service for the army Captain General.

DGRSM technically controls the budget and training of the army G-2 section and theoretically could exercise command authority over it. In practice, there is considerable overlap and duplication between DGRSM and G-2 units in the field, with no clear delineation of responsibility or authority. Each army territorial grouping has both a G-2 and a DGRSM information officer, the major difference being that DGRSM communications bypass the military chain of command and go directly to the Department of Defense. DGRSM has its own code systems but not its own communications equipment. G-2 units are responsible for collecting tactical combat information and for reporting on general political matters in their respective provinces.

DGRSM is responsible for military intelligence on foreign countries, particularly the countries adjacent to Zaire. Military attaches are assigned to DGRSM for the duration of their foreign tours, and DGRSM is responsible for their administration. Since most military attaches are senior in rank to the director of DGRSM, they address their reports to higher echelons, although all military attache reports pass through DGRSM.

3. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities (S)

Metropolitan police in Kinshasa and other large cities have been fairly effective during recent years in controlling peaceful crowds and in dispersing student demonstrators with a minimum number of serious

injuries. In rural areas, however, the police showed negligible capabilities for handling minor terrorist incidents or even sudden gatherings of any sort. Consequently, local army units frequently were the first resort in any rural disturbance. Even in urban situations, troops sometimes were deployed against unruly crowds before police capabilities were fully exhausted because of the basic predominance of the armed forces over the police. Although military action in such situations has been effective in the immediate sense of crushing resistance, the usual brutality on the part of troops has tended to amplify popular resentments against the government.

President Mobutu's awareness of such potentially dangerous inadequacies in the existing security services apparently motivated his decision to form the National Gendarmerie (GN) in July 1972. This basic reorganization, according to qualified observers, clears the way for the development of a nationwide law-enforcement service that is of sufficient strength to cover the countryside as well as urban areas and is properly trained in nonviolent techniques for maintaining order. As of late 1972, however, the GN was still in a formative phase, and the observed performances of its predecessors are still the only realistic indications of present countersubversive capabilities.

During the colonial era some metropolitan police units received special training in riot-control techniques, but resulting capabilities were largely dissipated by 1965. Subsequent training in this field has been limited, and as of mid-1972 no police units were equipped with riot shields or other special equipment for crowd control except limited supplies of tear gas. Nevertheless, foreign observers report some recent improvement in crowd-handling performances on the part of Kinshasa police, possibly because they have had much practice from Mobutu's frequent staging of such mass turnouts as MPR rallies and receptions for visiting dignitaries. During student riots which occurred in June 1969 at Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Kisangani, regular police units showed fair capabilities for dispersing unruly crowds through such nonviolent techniques as selective arrests of ringleaders and slowly advancing skirmish lines. Although the new mobile brigades are not designed primarily for riot control, they have substantially enhanced the capabilities of metropolitan police for stopping street brawls before they explode into riots.

On the whole, however, the capabilities of metropolitan police are marginal, compared with the potential for concerted or spontaneous manifestations of dissidence within the extremely congested, rapidly

growing urban areas. Furthermore, Mobutu's need to mollify army officers on whom he has relied for basic security has disposed him to call upon military units for conspicuous exercises against civilian targets instead of fully exploiting police capabilities. Although police units managed to contain student demonstrators at Lovanium University in June 1971 without fatal clashes, only a few months later Brigadier General (now Major General) Bumba's paracommandos were deployed on sudden sweeps through the poorer residential districts of Kinshasa as part of the highly publicized crackdown on crime. Possibly the newly formed GN will become so effective in handling unruly crowds as well as ordinary street crimes that Mobutu will no longer feel compelled to deploy army combat units against civilians. Meanwhile, the army's reputation for brutal treatment of civilians may still have an adverse impact on popular morale whenever an upsurge of dissidence provokes Mobutu into intensive countermeasures.

The most notorious instance since 1965 of the military's mishandling of a popular gathering in an urban situation was the fatal clash with Lovanium University students on 4 June 1969. At least a thousand students who had participated in nonviolent demonstrations on the suburban campus decided to present petitions to government authorities in downtown Kinshasa, despite a ban on off-campus demonstrations. As their procession approached a government building, gendarme units who were ordered to disperse them opened fire. At least a dozen students were killed in the resulting melee, and many others were wounded.

The contrasting performances of gendarmes and civil police involved in the same situation highlights the fact that senior army officers usually have regarded the army's gendarme battalions as second-rate infantry units; they have been neglected, rather than specially trained for coping with disorderly civilians through techniques that minimize bloodshed. When troops have been deployed in rural areas on counterinsurgency operations, their uneven discipline and their traditional contempt for civilians have been compounded by more concrete factors. The logistical inadequacies of the armed forces often compel troops in the field to forage for food, to commandeer housing, and sometimes to press local peasants into service as porters. Mobutu generally has encouraged efforts on the part of officers to make troops adopt constructive approaches toward peaceable inhabitants of operational zones. Although some promising starts have been made, they usually have bogged down under the chronic impediments of lax discipline and ineffective logistics.

The most recent example of this took place along the northwest shore of Lake Tanganyika—an inaccessible but nonetheless populated area—where the armed forces had been conducting intensive search-and-destroy operations against Simba guerrilla remnants since late 1969. By early 1971 reliable observers were reporting that the troops were inflicting far heavier casualties on the local peasants than on the ever-elusive Simbas. For instance, in January 1971 some 100 peasants reportedly were shot by paracommandos because they had insisted on back pay for porter service before accompanying the troops on another operation. In March, Mobutu, having belatedly learned that thousands of peasants were starving in the countryside because they had fled from troops, ordered the acting commander of the army to initiate a civic action program in the Lake Tanganyika area. According to hastily prepared plans, teams comprising both military and civilian personnel, including physicians, veterinarians, and agronomists, were to undergo a 2-week indoctrination course and be deployed at eight rehabilitation centers, where presumably the peasants could be aided and then encouraged to return to their villages and resume farming or fishing under military protection. The program was largely a failure because of the unwillingness of qualified civilians to serve in a desolate area, the failure of food, medicine, and other relief supplies to arrive where needed, and generally inadequate support from field commanders. Mistrust of the military probably played a major part, as the troops reportedly had not abated their mistreatment of the peasants who remained within reach.

G. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU)

Brausch, Georges. *Belgian Administration in the Congo*. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. A review of Belgian policy for the former colony during the decade preceding independence by a former

Belgian administrator and anthropologist who gives personal evaluations derived from direct experience.

Cornevin, Robert. *Histoire du Congo Leopoldville-Kinshasa*. Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1966. The standard full-length history of Zaire from the precolonial era; the final chapter presents a more comprehensive narrative of the period from independence to Mobutu's takeover of the presidency than is available in any English-language account.

Hopessy, Maurice N. *The Congo: a Brief History and Appraisal*. New York: Praeger, 1961. An eminently crisp history of the Belgian colonial administration and the first year of independence.

Kitchen, Helen A. (ed.) *Footnotes to the Congo Story: An Africa Report Anthology*. New York: Walker, 1967. Reprints of 18 articles from the magazine *Africa Report* dealing with the more important developments from independence to Mobutu's takeover of the Presidency. Crawford Young's "Significance of the 1964 Rebellion," which analyzes the dynamics of the Mulele and Simba uprisings, is especially noteworthy.

Merriam, Alan P. *Congo. Background of Conflict*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961. The first three chapters provide a quick introduction to the country's ethnic makeup, and the fourth chapter presents a concise overall description of the many political parties which emerged shortly before independence.

O'Brien, Conor. *Cruise to Katanga and Back: A U.N. Case History*. London: Hutchinson, 1962. Controversial analysis of U.N. operations in Congo.

Young, Crawford. *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. The standard scholarly analysis of political dynamics from the origins of the independence movement through 1963, with emphasis on political and social institutions rather than historical narrative.

Chronology (u/ou)

1885

Congo Free State is established as personal domain of Belgian King Leopold II.

1906

Belgian Parliament assumes control of Congo Free State after international scandal over conditions.

1959

January

First African riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).

1960

June

Congo becomes independent under President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Patrice Lumumba.

July

Congolese National Army mutinies and Belgians flee. Katanga Province (now Shaba) under Moise Tshombe and eastern Kasai under Albert Kalonji both secede. U.N. troops arrive at request of central government.

September

Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba. Col. Joseph Mobutu and army take over and remain in control until February 1961.

1961

January

Lumumba is killed.

August

Cyrille Adoula approved as compromise Premier by near-unanimous parliamentary vote.

1962

September

Secession in Kasai ended by Congolese armed forces.

1963

January

Secession in Katanga ended by U.N. forces.

September

Kasavubu adjourns parliament indefinitely and begins to rule by decree with support of "Binza group," comprising army commander Mobutu and four key civilian officials.

December

Peasant uprising led by Pierre Mulele begins in central sector of present Bandundu Province.

1964

April

Simba uprising in eastern Congo begins to spread northward.

July

Moise Tshombe named Premier by Kasavubu with concurrence of "Binza group" and many members of still-adjourned parliament.

August

President Kasavubu promulgates new constitution ratified by referendum in June-July.

Simba guerrillas capture Stanleyville (now Kisangani).

September

Refugee politicians join Simbas in Stanleyville, declare "Popular Revolutionary Government" and gain support from radical African and Communist states.

November

U.S. planes drop Belgian paratroopers at Stanleyville and Paulis (now Isiro) to rescue white hostages held by rebels.

1965

Congolese army units with white mercenaries retake rebel-held territory as rebel leaders flee.

March-April

Parliamentary elections are held. Moise Tshombe's CONACO party gains majority.

October

Kasavubu dismisses Tshombe. New government appointed by Kasavubu fails to get parliamentary approval.

November

Mobutu seizes control of central government, announces plans to remain as president for 5 years.

December

Mobutu assumes power to rule by decree.

1966

May-June

Four former cabinet ministers are accused of plotting to overthrow Mobutu, found guilty by military tribunal, and publicly hanged.

July

Katangan units in northeastern Congo mutiny, subdued several months later by white mercenaries loyal to the government.

1966

October

Mobutu dismisses Premier Leonard Mulamba, popular army colonel, and declares himself Premier as well as President.

1967

January

Congolese Government seizes UMHK Congo-based assets and establishes its own company to run UMHK copper mines. UMHK retaliates by threatening prospective copper buyers with court action.

February

Government reaches compromise agreement with UMHK affiliate, ending for time being dispute over control of UMHK operations.

April

Mobutu publishes a new constitution, legalizing strong presidential system, and forms new party, Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR).

June

New constitution promulgated following popular referendum.

IMF-sponsored monetary reform instituted.

July

White mercenaries and Katangan troops mutiny in eastern Congo.

November

Mercenary mutiny ends with mercenaries withdrawing to Rwanda.

1968

April

Mercenaries airlifted from Rwanda to Europe.

September-October

Mulele flees to Brazzaville, is returned to Kinshasa under amnesty guarantee, and executed. Brazzaville government breaks diplomatic relations with Kinshasa.

1969

June

Lovanium University students demonstrating in Kinshasa are shot by troops; sympathy demonstrations at other universities and schools are greatest show of civilian discontent since Mobutu became President.

August

Mobutu bans independent student unions and requires all students to join MPR youth wing.

Mobutu dismisses large portion of cabinet ministers, including Victor Nendaka and Justin Bomboko, most influential members of former Binza group.

September

Final settlement of dispute between Congolese Government and UMHK.

1970

June

Mobutu and Congo (B) President Nguabi sign Manifesto of Reconciliation, agreeing to phased resumption of normal communications, trade, and diplomatic relations; their respective embassies are reopened in December.

King Baudouin attends 10th anniversary of Congolese independence, climaxing gradual return to solidly constructive relations between the two countries.

1970

August

Mobutu makes his first state visits to the United States, Romania, and Yugoslavia; he negotiates substantial industrial investments and military purchases in the U.S. while reasserting nominal policy of nonalignment.

November

Presidential and National Assembly elections complete constitutional basis for Mobutu's rule.

December

Mobutu declares amnesty for all refugee rebels, at home or abroad, who turn themselves in to authorities; two principal leaders of Stanleyville rebel regime of 1964 and some less notorious emigres accept amnesty by 31 January deadline.

1971

March-April

Mobutu makes state visits to France, Japan, and Taiwan, gaining fairly substantial increases in long-term economic aid.

June

Lovanium University students stage unauthorized demonstration commemorating students shot by troops in June 1969; Mobutu declares entire student body must serve in army for 2 years.

August

Mobutu announces that student draftees will return to campus militia units after rugged basic training; Lovanium and two other universities at Lubumbashi and Kisangani are amalgamated into the National University.

Highly publicized subversion trials are conducted for student demonstration leaders, a former rebel "general" who accepted Mobutu's amnesty, and a mixed bag of obscure dissidents.

October

Nendaka and Bomboko, who were ousted from cabinet in August 1969, are publicly accused of plotting to assassinate Mobutu and put under indefinite detention without trial.

SECRET

October

Mobutu changes official title of country from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Republic of Zaire; his "return to authenticity" campaign is soon extended to the Congo River, several provinces, and other place names.

1973

January

"Authenticity" campaign is extended to personal names; the President declares himself Mobutu Sese Seko and orders subordinates to do likewise.

Cardinal Malula, leading Catholic prelate in Zaire, criticizes Mobutu's name-changing campaign; Mobutu threatens Malula with prosecution for treason and suspends a leading Catholic publication.

March

Belgium agrees to \$25 million in additional technical assistance and credits for Zaire, one of largest single aid packages since independence.

April

Mobutu's public confrontation with Catholic Church in Zaire winds down, with Malula sojourning at Vatican and church accepting MPR youth cadres in its seminaries.

August

Mobutu retires many senior generals and tightens the command structure of the security forces.

1973

January

Mobutu visits Peking and prepares to exchange ambassadors between China and Zaire.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	FOREIGN	ENGLISH
CGTC	<i>Confederation Generale des Travailleurs Congolais</i>	General Confederation of Congolese Workers
CND	<i>Centre Nationale de Documentation</i>	National Documentation Center
DGRSM	<i>Direction Generale du Renseignement et de Surete Militaire</i>	Directorate of Information and Military Security
DIA	<i>Agence de Documentation et d'Information Africaine</i>	African Documentation and Information Agency
GEGAMINES	<i>La Generale des Carrieres et des Mines du Zaire</i>	General Quarries and Mines Company of Zaire
GRAE	<i>Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio</i>	Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile
INBEL	<i>Institut Belge d'Information et de Documentation</i>	Belgian Information and Documentation Agency
JMPR	<i>Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution</i>	Youth of the Popular Movement of the Revolution
MPR	<i>Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution</i>	Popular Movement of the Revolution
MNC	<i>Mouvement Nationale Congolaise</i>	Congolese National Movement
SCM	<i>Societe Generale de Minerais</i>	General Ores Company
UGEC	<i>Union Generale des Etudiants Congolais</i>	General Union of Congolese Students
UMHK	<i>Union Miniere du Haut Katanga</i>	Mining Union of Upper Katanga
UPA	<i>Uniao das Populacoes de Angola</i>	Union of Angolan Peoples
UNTZA	<i>Union Nationale des Travailleurs de la Republique du Zaire</i>	National Union of Zairian Workers

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