

No. 2578



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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ETC.

-VERSUS-

ARAKI, Sadao, ETC.

AFFIDZVIT

SUBMITTED BY:

ISAMU TAKEDA

BORN: 31ST JULY 1893. (26TH MEIJI)

2932 MINAMIHAMA, ISEMACHI, KAMAKURA-CUN,

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE

I hereby submit this affidavit according to Japanese form, after having been sworn in as per attached sheet.

(1) I am a former rear-admiral. From December 1936 (12th Showa) till December 1937 (13th Showa) I was senior staff officer of the Shanghai special landing force and continued in office from that date till December 1938 (14th Showa) as chief of staff.

(2) As I was senior staff officer at the time of the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on August 13th I was informed of the causes of the outbreak of the incident and of its progress.



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I did my utmost to prevent an incident occurring in Shanghai, but the repeated efforts of the Japanese proved of no avail and despite the prayer of third party nationals and Chinese resident in Shanghai external pressure caused war to break out.

(3) The prime causes of this incident are the Chinese violation of the Sino-Japanese agreement of May 5th 1932, in the increase of forces, consolidation of defenses and construction of military installations in the prohibited zone and their boast to wipe out at one blow the Japanese landing force and Japanese residents, the gradual encirclement of the Japanese landing force and Japanese residents, the gradual encirclement of the Japanese sector, their general attitude of defiance and challenge. The force of the Peace Preservation Corps had been determined by the armistice agreement at 2,000 and at first had been despatched from Peiping to be stationed at Shanghai. But from about 1936 onwards the force of the Peace Preservation Corps was gradually increased in violation of the armistice agreement till they were equipped with small cannons, this again in violation of the agreement, before the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7th July 1937. Meanwhile military installations such as pill-boxes and barbedwire entanglements were constructed inside the prohibited zone. The barbed-wire entanglements were so set up as to encircle the



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Japanese area and vicinity, while the pill-boxes were erected at various points inside the prohibited zone. A typical example of an open-typed pill-box was the one built on the western edge of Kiangwan Chin and representative models of the camouflaged regular type were those built in the vicinity of Hungjao aerodrome and those found at various points constructed by utilizing farm houses. Complete pill-boxes were being gradually constructed.

However peaceful conditions still prevailed at this time and when we met the Peace Preservation Corps units on the road greetings were mutually exchanged and officers of the two forces were on a footing where they would joke and drink together.

(4) On 23rd June 1937, (12th Showa), at the request of consul-general Okamoto a committee meeting based on the Armistice Agreement concluded on May 5th 1932 (7th Showa), was convened at the French Consulate General. I attended the same meeting in the capacity of military committee member for the Japanese side. The object of this committee meeting was the investigation of the facts of the construction of military installations especially of the alterations and repair of Woosung Fort and the increase of troops. However no conclusions was arrived at, and the investigations proved fruitless.



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(5) With the outbreak of the Marco Polo bridge incident on 7th July in Northern China, things began to take on a new aspect.

That is, from about this time, the 87th and 88th divisions consisting of 30,000 men and considered crack troops of the Nanking Government began to occupy the prohibited zone fitted out in dark blue uniforms. At that time the uniform of the regular army was of khaki colour, those of the Peace Preservation Corps being light yellow, but these troops now began to filter in specially fitted out in dark blue. These divisions were thoroughly instructed in Japanese-resistance and anti-Japanese education, very strong in their combat consciousness and ready for combat with the Japanese. Simultaneously with the moving in of the above troops the Chinese began hurried construction of installations and positions around the Settlements.

(6) Shortly thereafter a new phase was entered upon which was radically different from the situation in the early days of August and may be characterized as an outgrowth of the Kuling Conference held by the Chinese High Command at that time. Namely, the papers in one voice reported "China has arrived at the last pass. She will have to meet the situation with extraordinary resolution," and began to assume a tone as though they had determined on a fight with Japan. Especially



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the Anti-Japanese newspapers and the Commander of the Weesung-Shanghai defense garrisons Lieut. General Yang Hu expressed full confidence in such bombastic language as the following: "If hostilities are once opened we will overwhelmingly rout the entire Japanese population into the Whang-Ho inside two days."

From about this period, Chinese planes began to be stationed at Hungjao aerodrome and other places within the prohibited area fixed by the armistice agreement. They began to fly occasionally over the landing party in intimidation flights. In actual fact the strength of the landing party at this time was a standing force of 2,000 plus 300 troops which had accompanied Japanese civilian evacuees down the Yangtze from the Hangkew area, a total of 2,300 (to which 1,000 were added after the Oyama incident to bring a total up to 3,300). Opposed to this an estimated 60,000 crack Chinese troops lay in preparedness in the close vicinity at Shanghai. Hence their full confidence in their strength was justifiable under the circumstances.

The increase of troops from about this time was conducted openly, units dressed in regular army uniforms being sent in as reinforcement. The situation had become such that Japanese military and civilian and third party national strength could no longer



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cope with this outside pressure and it hourly began to take on the aspects of a quasi-state of war. Civilian Chinese living on the outskirts of the settlements began to feel misgiving for the occupation and construction of positions by the Chinese regular troops and following the directives of the officials began evacuation starting a stampede for the settlements. In the first place, third party nationals and civilian Chinese, not to mention Japanese residents in Shanghai had learnt their lesson from the tragedy of the first Shanghai incident of five years ago, so that it was their mutual prayer that no other incident take place, not at least in Shanghai. We too, following the policy of non-extension of hostilities of the Central Command did our utmost absolutely to prevent an incident breaking out in Shanghai.

(7) In the afternoon of August 9th the following incident took place. Lieut. J.G. Oyama, defence commander of the western sector while passing through the sector under his command in an automobile was shot by machine-gun fire on Monument Road in the Extension by Chinese regular troops, together with his driver First Class Seaman Saito and cut to death by Chinese soldiers.

(8) It was decided to settle this incident through diplomatic negotiations, following the policy of non-extension



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of hostilities of the central command.

Consul-General Okamoto undertook the diplomatic negotiations in general and for the moment an on-the-spot investigation was conducted and the corpses received.

As the result of the above investigation which was made by Japanese and Chinese interested parties together with third party national newspaper men, it was made evident that Lieut. J. G. Oyama and his driver were suddenly fired upon by Chinese regular troops with machine-guns and cut to death with Chinese swords; the whole constituting an illegal act. The chief of staff admitted this fact and extended an apology.

(9) Mayor Yu called on Consul-general Okamoto and deplored that the situation was entirely out of his control. The Chinese headquarters which was at Lung Hwa immediately moved to Chen Lu Chin and prepared to assume the duties of a combat command, trucks and civilian ships in the vicinity of Shanghai were mobilized as were railways and all manner of other transportation facilities for the quick advance of the 200,000 troops laying in wait outside the boundary fixed by the armistice, to the outskirts of the settlements.

(10) The landing party in the midst of this commotion conducted the funeral rites of Lieut. J. G. Oyama and First



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Class Seaman Saite from 1.00 p.m. of the 12th in the inner grounds of the landing party headquarters.

(11) The rush of Chinese regular troops to the outskirts of the settlements reached its high-water mark on the 12th. On the morning of the 12th, the 77th and 78th divisions passing through North Station had advanced to the western sector of North Szechuan Road, and in the course of the morning a Kempei soldier was killed and a civilian abducted.

Third party nations too, to meet the situation began to take up defense positions in their several sections according to the Shanghai Defence plan, which had been agreed upon and was in existence since 1927 (2nd Showa). The defense of Toyoda Textile factory was delegated to the British garrison following defence plan agreed upon.

(12) In the middle of the funeral ceremony of Lieut. J.G. Oyama there was a telephone message from Consul-general Okamoto to the effect: "As I have requested a meeting of the joint committee of the settlements to impeach the illegal action of the Chinese, I would like you to attend at all costs." I attended the joint committee meeting held at the Municipal Council after the funeral rites were concluded. The Chinese there already being unable to contact the military, there were no officers present, only Mayor Yu attending.



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The conference attended on the Japanese side by Consul-general Okamoto and myself by Mayou Yu on the Chinese side and by Consul-general and military attached of all the other nations, lasted till around 6 o'clock. Consul-general Okamoto disclosed the facts of the violations of the agreement by the Chinese i.e. of their increase of military strength, their rush to the outskirts of the Settlements, and construction of military installations in the area around the settlements, and stressed the retirement of the Chinese troops to a certain line to ease the tense situation. But Mayer Yu stated he was already powerless to cope with the situation. Further, the joint committee could propose no concrete plan to break the dead-lock.

(13) Nothing occurred during the night of the 12th but around 9 o'clock of the morning of the 13th, the settlement garrison of the Japanese landing party was fired upon from the building of the Commercial Press Warehouse.

At 1 p.m. the commander of the landing Party called an emergency meeting of all officers above the rank of Battalion Commander and gave them among others the following instructions, again stressing the policy of non-extension of hostilities: "All efforts to be made to prevent spreading of hostilities to Shanghai. Unless attacked by Chinese, absolutely to refrain from fighting." From after 4p.m. the Chinese opened artillery



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fire on the landing party from the direction of Pa Tsu Chiao (8th Character Bridge).

Up to this time every possible effort was made and everything was patiently endured, but the landing Party could no longer calmly look on without endangering the lives and properties of the Japanese community; and further, as there was danger of the landing party itself falling into a critical condition, the order "All hands on the alert", was given. The time was 4.30 p.m. August 13th. The troops of Japan and other countries then assumed their positions. There were about 3,000 British Troops, 2,000 American Marines, and 2,000 French Troops.

The Chinese strength of the first line alone at this time was estimated at 200,000. The Japanese landing party was a weak force of 3,300. The fighting reached its peak on the 16th of August, when the landing party was in a critical position and the whole Japanese community resigned itself to the worst.

(14) The situation in Shanghai being of such a critical nature, a section of the army forces was dispatched by warships. These units which arrived Aug. 23rd were troops hastily mobilized in the emergency and their equipment was of an extremely make-shift nature and they arrived without sufficient munitions and military stores. Thereafter further reinforcements arrived to equalize the situation.

15th  
This day of April 1947

*Statement* - (signed) Isamu, TAKEDA (seal)



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I, Tatsuo Inagawa hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at TOKYO

Witness: Tatsuo INAGAWA

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Isomu Takeda