

EXHIBIT No. 542

(9)

"Telegraph

"St - S. No. 609

Berlin, 1 August 1940

"The Japanese Ambassador, with whom I carried out current business today, in the end brought the talk to the role that the new Japanese cabinet would have to play in big politics. KURUSU declared from the beginning that he had not yet received any instructions from his new government; he was of the belief that they should not wait too long for, the definition of the general lines of the new Japanese foreign policy. For his, KURUSU's, own work two methods could be considered: either he is to wait until his government gives him instructions, or he is to take up a position in accordance with the outlook here so as to advise his government, before it finally fixes its position/. In both cases a talk with us is necessary whether it be with the Foreign Minister of the Reich or with me.

"The Ambassador did not go into details but gave some of his own observations which might correspond to his personal view of the situation. He believed that Japanese politics must now be orientated by taking a long view. Apparently KURUSU is not thinking of a speedy end to the war and reckons at any rate on a state of tension which has to be estimated to last for years in which the relations of Japan with Russia and the USA are naturally most important. The Ambassador told me that he is conscious of the fact that the Foreign Minister of the Reich had suggested repeatedly to Japan agreement with Russia. Such an action as well as the Japanese attitude towards USA should be harmonized with the German and also Italian intentions. The Ambassador reminded/ of the fact/ that the Reichs Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the visit of Minister SATO, had pictured the German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important.


"Nevertheless, he, KURUSU, did not know exactly how this cooperation is pictured by us in detail, especially if and at what time we wish to see the Japanese weight thrown on the scale of the present conflict. If, for instance, Japan would push, on her part, towards a war and enter into the war against America, while, on the other hand, Germany believed the end of the war near, expecting a quick victory, Japan would, probably, be acting contrary to German wishes. If, however, Japan would not intervene now, the factor Japan, and, especially her fleet, in the triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokyo would by all means have great potentialities in the future

"I had the feeling that KURUSU expects of the new course in Tokyo a tendency towards intervention in the war but wished to hear from me, that this /intervention/ would not be quite timely according to German opinion.

"The Ambassador would certainly be grateful if he could obtain a hint in the near future - either through the Reichs Foreign Minister personally or through me - as to which advice he should give his government. He is clear about / the fact / that this / advice / must fully lie within the framework of the German-Japanese policy of friendship. He may not be quite certain, however, whether we still regard the Japanese-Russian rapprochement as equally important / as hitherto / and whether the new Japanese cabinet should follow its anti-Anglo-Saxon course with an accelerated or, possibly, at first with a moderate speed.

"Fundamentally, I just accepted the statements of the Ambassador and did not anticipate a reply, to be given to them. I opposed his opinion that the war may still last a very long time and may be followed by a still longer period of tension.

"To
The Reichs Foreign Minister


Signed WEISAECKER

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)