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ITO Ushiro

Current Activities. Member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Election Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Fukuoka.

Background. Born 1894, Nagasaki; primary education; active in miners' unions, 1920-22; organized unions affiliated with Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; joined Nippon Rōnōtō, 1928; later a member of Shakai Minshutō, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō, and of Central Committee of Shakai Taishūtō; 1932-35, member of Fukuoka Prefectural Assembly; counselor of Fukuoka branch of IRAA and officer of Sampo (patriotic labor front); vice-president, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei, 1946-47; chairman, House of Representatives Mining and Industry Committee, 1947; chairman, Kyushu district committee, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei, 1947; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

IWAMOTO Iwao

Current Activities. Member, Control Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1911; graduate of Kobe Shinko Commercial College; arrested in 1932 for activities in proletarian cultural movements; 1933, joined Nippon Kyōsantō; 1935-45, imprisoned; candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946-47.

IWATA Eiichi

Current Activities. Candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō; member, Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly.

Background. Born 1906, Tokyo; graduated from Waseda Technical School, 1924; active in Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai and in organization of Shin Rōnōtō, 1928; representative of the People's Food Control Committee involved in Itabashi Incident, January 1946.

KAGAWA Toyohiko

Current Activities. Adviser, Nippon Shakaitō; president, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai.

Background. Born 1888, Kobe; attended Kobe Theological Seminary and Princeton University; active in Christian social work and trade-union organizations; 1922, one of organizers and adviser to Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; 1926, elected to Central Executive Committee of Rōdō Nōmintō, withdrew after November split; 1930, adviser, Zenkoku Taishūtō; president, Nippon Kyōikusha Kumiai, 1945-46; organizer and president, Nippon Kyōdō Kumiai Dōmei (Japan Federation of Cooperative Unions), 1945-47; member, House of Peers, 1946-47.

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KAJI Wataru

Current Activities. Member, Bunren; sponsor, League to Defend Democracy.

Background. Born c. 1905; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1927; joined Rōdō Nōmintō, did organizing work for the party; and was active in proletarian culture groups; imprisoned 1929-32; rearrested and released, 1937; fled to Shanghai; organized the Hansen Dōmei in China in 1939; returned to Japan, May 1946; unsuccessful independent candidate for House of Councillors, 1947.

KAMEDA Togo

Current Activities. Chairman of Education Section and vice-president, Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi; chairman, All-Japan Chemical Workers' Union; member, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1911; primary school teacher; employee of a chemical firm; unsuccessful Communist Diet candidate, April 1947.

KAMEYAMA Kozo

Current Activities. Member of Secretariat and of Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1911, Kagawa; 1932, joined Young Communist League; 1933, arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment; expelled from Kyoto Imperial University; imprisoned 1937-40; conscripted in 1940, discharged in 1942; appointed candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, February 1946.

KAMIMURA Susumu

Current Activities. Member, Jiyū Hōsō Dan (Free Bar Association); member, Bunren.

Background. Born 1883, Niigata; graduated from Waseda University, 1908; 1926, became member of Central Executive Committee, Rōdō Nōmintō; 1929, one of organizers of Shin Rōnōtō; arrested in 1933 as a member of Japanese Barristers' Organization for Farmers and Laborers; elected to Diet in 1928; unsuccessful Diet candidate in 1930 and 1946.

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KAMIYAMA Shigeo

Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1905, Yamaguchi; graduated from Tokyo Seijo Middle School, 1924; 1929, joined Nippon Kyōsantō; arrested 1935, released on probation 1937; imprisoned 1941-45; chairman of Labor Union and Farmers' Department, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1945; chairman, Publications' Department, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946.

KAN Makoto

Current Activities. President, Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi; chairman, All-Japan Machine Workers' Union.

Background. Born 1904; graduate of Ibaragi prefectural industrial school; taught at that school for nine years; mechanic in airplane factory, 1932-35; chief factory technician since 1945; unsuccessful independent candidate for House of Councillors, April 1947.

KANEMASA Yonekichi

Current Activities. Vice-president, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; commissioner, Holding Company Liquidation Commission, 1947-48; vice-president, National League of Textile Industry Workers' Unions; secretary, Osaka branch, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; member, National Public Safety Commission.

Background. Born 1892, Saga; primary education; joined Yuaikai, 1919; later became secretary of Osaka branch, manager of Kansai branch, and member of Central Committee of Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; 1930, accompanied SUZUKI Bunji to International Labor Conference; 1932, official of the Kansai Rōdō Dōmei (Kansai Area Labor Federation); unsuccessful Socialist Diet candidate, 1946 and 1947.

KANO (KANAE) Takashi

Current Activities. Director, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai; member, House of Representatives, from Osaka.

Background. Born 1908, Ehime; studied at Waseda University; chairman, Fuse chapter, Shakai Taishūtō; member, Central Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1946; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1947; seceded from Nippon Shakaitō, January 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

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KARASAWA Toshiko

Current Activities. Member, Sapporo District Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1911, Sapporo; graduate of Sapporo Girls' High School; 1932-33, chief of Women's Department and member of Sapporo Council of Nippon Rōdō Sō-Ryōgikai; arrested for Communist activity in 1933, 1936, 1938, and 1941; elected to Diet, April 1946; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1947.

KASUGA Shoichi

Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1907, Nagano; grammar school education; 1935, joined Musan Seinen Domei (Young Men's Proletarian Union); 1928-35, imprisoned for violation of Peace Preservation Law; 1940-45, imprisoned; candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1945-46; member, Organization Committee, Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi, 1946; unsuccessful Communist Diet candidate, April 1946.

KASUGA Shojiro

Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō; member, Sovieto Kenkyūsha Kyōkai.

Background. Born 1903, Osaka; expelled from Ritsumeikan Middle School for radical activities; 1924, organized Kanto Printers' Union, which was first affiliated with the Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei and, after the Sōdōmei split, with the Hyōgikai; 1924, studied in USSR; 1925, chief secretary, Kansai branch, Nippon Kyōsantō; 1926, member of Foreign Relations Section of Nippon Kyōsantō and a field organizer; arrested 1928, released 1937, but reimprisoned from early 1938 to October 1945; principal, Young Communist League School, Sendai, 1946; member, Political Bureau, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946-47.

KATAYAMA Tetsu

Current Activities. Chairman, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Kanagawa.

Background. Born 1887, Wakayama; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1912; 1920, became legal adviser to Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei and Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; 1926, elected secretary of Executive Committee of Shakai Minshutō; 1932, chief secretary of Shakai Minshutō; member of Executive Committee of Shakai Taishūtō and member of Abe faction; expelled from Shakai Taishūtō in 1940; a leader in the attempt to organize the Kinrō Kokumintō; president of Nippon Nōmin Kumiai Sōdōmei (General Federation of Farmers' Unions) from 1926 until its dissolution in 1940; secretary general, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945-46; elected chairman of Nippon Shakaitō, September 1946; Premier of Japan, May 1947-February 1948, elected to the Diet, 1928, 1930, 1936, 1937, 1946, and 1947; unsuccessful Diet candidate in 1942.

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KATO Kanju

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Aichi.

Background. Born 1892, Aichi; attended Nippon University; 1923, became executive secretary of Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; 1926, followed leadership of ASO Hisashi in seceding from Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei to set up Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei and Nippon Rōnōtō; 1930-32, member of Central Executive Committee, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; 1933, one of organizers of Association of Friends of Peace in the Far East; between 1933 and 1936 led the various left-wing trade unions supporting united front policies, which in 1936 united to form the Rōnō Musan Kyōgikai; one of organizers of Nippon Musantō in 1937; imprisoned 1937-39; member, Arrangements Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945; chairman, Aichi branch, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946; chairman, Shakaitō Labor Union Committee, 1946-June 1947; chairman, Labor and Hoarded Goods Investigation Committee, House of Representatives, June 1947-March 1948; Minister of Labor, March-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1936, 1937, 1946 and 1947.

KATO Ryozo

Current Activities. Member of Central Executive Committee and chief of Organization Department, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1899, Gifu; middle school graduate; member of Executive Committee and adviser of Gifu branch of Shakai Minshūtō; member, Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō; adviser, Gifu branch, IRAA; member, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; elected to the Diet, 1937 and 1946.

KATO Shizue (wife of KATO Kanju)

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo.

Background. Born 1897, Tokyo; graduated from Peers' School and from Ballard School in New York; as Baroness Ishimoto, active in the birth control and women's suffrage movements before the war; 1937, arrested for united front activities and detained for two weeks; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

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KAWAKAMI Jotaro

Current Activities. Purged.

Background. Born 1889, Tokyo; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1915; taught at Rikkyo, Meiji, and Kwansai Universities; 1928, became adviser to Kobe branch, Nippon Rōnōtō; member, Nippon Taishutō; member, Central Executive Committee, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishutō; executive secretary of Shakai Taishutō and a member of Aso faction; in 1939 favored merging the Shakai Taishutō with the Tōhōkai; director of IRAA and active organizer of IRAPS, 1942-45; member, Arrangements Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945; adviser, Nippon Shakaitō, November 1945-January 1946; purged January 1946, cleared May 1948, clearance withdrawn May 1948; unsuccessful Diet candidate in 1932; elected to Diet in 1928, 1936, 1937, and 1942.

KAZAHAYA Yasoji

Current Activities. Chief of Investigation Department and member of Akahata editorial bureau, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1899; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University Law School, 1922; Education Ministry representative in France, 1924; member of faculty of Kyushu Imperial University in 1926, suspended in 1927; joined Japan Proletarian Science Research Institute, 1929; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1932; imprisoned 1933-35; chief, Citizens' Countermeasures Department, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1947.

KIKUCHI Jusaku

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Ibaraki; chairman, Ibaraki branch, Nippon Shakaitō; treasurer, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai.

Background. Born 1898; graduate of Sanami Agricultural Institute (Ibaraki Prefecture); member, Central Committee, Shakai Taishutō, 1937-38; expelled from Shakai Taishutō for united front activities, 1938; chairman, Ibaraki branch, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1946; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47.

KIKUGAWA Tadao

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; secretary general, National Mine Workers' Union, affiliated with the Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei.

Background. Born 1901, Ehime; graduate of Tokyo Imperial University, 1926; member, Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei, 1926; member, Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei; president, Kanto Kawa Giko Kumiai (Kanto Leather Workers' Union), 1932; manager, Zen Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei, 1936; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47

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KIKUNAMI Katsumi

Current Activities. Labor representative, Central Labor Relations Committee; member, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1904; graduate of Kansai Gakuin; reporter and foreign correspondent, Asahi Shimbun; president, All-Japan Newspaper and Radio Workers' Union, 1946; president, Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi, 1946-47; unsuccessful candidate for House of Councillors, April 1947.

KIMURA Kihachiro

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency; member, Minshu Shugi Kagakusha Kyōkai; member, Temporary Central Executive Committee, Rōdōsha Nōmintō.

Background. Born 1900; graduate, Keio University; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1947; deputy chairman, Political Affairs Research Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1948; sponsor of Rōnō Renrakukai, May 1948; seceded from Nippon Shakaitō, July 1948; joined Independent Club, House of Councillors, October 1948.

KIMURA Sakae

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, Shimane; member, Shimane, District Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1910; middle school education; clerk in store and commercial firm; chief secretary, Shimane branch, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; sponsor of Rōnō Renrakukai, May 1948.

KIN Tenkai

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee and Political Bureau, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born c. 1900, Korea; arrived in Japan in 1920, entered Nippon University; 1927, director of Korean Labor Federation in Japan and of Japan Bureau of Korean Communist Party; imprisoned 1929-36 and 1937-45; chief of Korean Department, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1945.

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Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1904, Hyogo; primary education; 1925-26, studied in Moscow; 1926, joined Nippon Kyōsantō, became member of executive committee of Kanto branch; imprisoned 1932-39 and 1942-45; candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946; unsuccessful Communist Diet Candidate, April 1946.

KOIZUMI Hidekichi

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency; chairman, Zen Nippon Kaifu Kumiai (All-Japan Seamen's Union); chairman, Upper House Diet Members' Committee, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1879, Ibaraki; graduate of Tokyo Higher Merchant Marine School, 1902; became ship captain, Mitsui Trading Company, 1903; president, Society of Mercantile Marine Officers, 1935; visited the United States as a delegate to the International Labor Conference, 1937; president, Mitsui Wooden Shipbuilding Company, 1944; director, Mitsui Shipping Company, 1944; auditor, Nippon Shakaitō, 1947.

KONNO Yojiro

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee and Political Bureau, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1879, Yamagata; attended Yamagata Higher School; 1929, joined Nippon Kyōsantō; 1930 became member of Tokyo District Committee of Nippon Kyōsantō; June 1930, went to Moscow; 1931, attended meetings with Chinese Communist leaders in Shanghai; 1932, became member of Central Committee of Nippon Kyōsantō; 1932-45, imprisoned; member, Secretariat, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946-47; chief of Yawata branch, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1947; unsuccessful Communist Diet candidate, April 1946.

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KONO Mitsu

Current Activities. Purged.

Background. Born 1897, Chiba; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1922; taught at Osaka Labor School and Doshisha University, 1924-27; 1926, chief of Investigation Section, Nippon Rōnōtō; chief secretary, Nippon Taishūtō, 1928; 1930, member, Central Executive Committee, Zenkoku Taishūtō; 1933, chairman of Central Executive Committee, Zenkoku Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei; member of Central Executive Committee of Shakai Taishūtō and a supporter of ASO Hisashi; 1935, Japanese representative to International Labor Conference at Geneva; 1936, vice-president, Zen Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; 1939, leader of a group that seceded from the Zen Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei to join the government-sponsored labor front Sampo; director of Investigation Council of IRAPS; member, Arrangements Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945; elected to Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, November 1945; purged July 1946; elected to Diet in 1930, 1936, 1937, and 1942.

KURAHARA Korendo (Koreto)

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee and chief of Cultural Department, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1902, Tokyo; graduated from Russian Language section, Tokyo Foreign Language School, 1923; studied in Moscow, 1925-26; active in proletarian culture groups; went to Moscow in 1930; imprisoned 1932-40; sponsor, Shin Nippon Bungakukai; 1945; candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1945; unsuccessful candidate for House of Councillors, 1947.

KURODA Hisao

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Okayama; chairman, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; chairman, Temporary Central Executive Committee, Rōdōsha Nōmintō.

Background. Born 1889, Okayama; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1923; joined Rōdō Nōmintō, 1926; in July 1928, one of organizers of Musan Taishūtō; in December 1928, one of organizers of Nippon Taishūtō; expelled from Nippon Taishūtō, 1929; one of organizers of Nippon Musantō, of which he became secretary; 1931, joined Zenkoku Rōdō Taishūtō and became a member of its Central Committee; 1936, joined Shakai Taishūtō and became a member of its Central Committee; member, Central Executive Committee, Zen Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; 1937, arrested for participation in the united front movement and expelled from Shakai Taishūtō; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1946-47; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945-48; chairman, Youth Committee, Shakaitō; 1946-47; expelled from Shakaitō, July 1948; elected to the Diet, 1936, 1937, 1946, and 1947.

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MASAKI Kiyoshi

Current Activities. Member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Diet Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Hokkaido.

Background. Born 1900, Fukuoka; graduate of Ohara Business School; 1926, member, Executive Committee, Rōdō Nōmintō; 1927, arrested and sentenced to two years' imprisonment; 1931, president of Sapporo branch and member of Executive Committee, Shin Rōnōtō; 1936, member of executive committee of Hokkaido branch, Shakai Taishūtō; 1942, member of IRAPS; 1945, counselor, Hokkaido branch of IRAA; 1945, standing director, Hokkaido branch, Dai Nippon Seijikai (Great Japan Political Party); director, Hokkaido branch of Sampo (the patriotic labor front); elected to Sapporo assembly in 1934 and 1938; elected to Hokkaido assembly in 1936 and 1940; Shakaitō election secretary in Hokkaido area, 1947; chairman, House of Representatives Transportation and Traffic Committee, June 1947-April 1948; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry, April-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1942, 1946, and 1947.

MASUDA Kakunosuke

Current Activities. Member of Control Committee and national organizer in Tohoku area, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1910; graduated from Aoyama Gakuin, 1928; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1932; sentenced to five years' imprisonment, 1933.

MATSUMOTO Jiichiro

Current Activities. Adviser to Nippon Shakaitō; chairman Zenkoku Buraku Kaihō Renmei; vice-president, House of Councillors.

Background. Born 1887, Fukuoka; primary education; 1922, one of organizers of Zenkoku Suiheisha, a society for achieving equality for the eta; 1925, elected chairman of Zenkoku Suiheisha; 1938, adviser, Dai Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; member of Abe faction of Shakai Taishūtō; 1940, expelled from Shakai Taishūtō; May 1940, a leader in the attempt to organize the Kindō Kōkumintō; member, Arrangements Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945; purged in March 1946, order rescinded in April 1946; 1928, unsuccessful Rōdō Nōmintō Diet candidate; elected to Diet, 1930, 1937, 1942, and 1947.

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MATSUMOTO Junzo

Current Activities. Member of Central Executive Committee and chief of Shimane branch, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Shimane.

Background. Born 1894, Shimane; attended Keio University; 1923, active in proletarian cultural organizations; 1927, chief editor of Nippon Rōnōtō paper; 1930, chief of Education Section, Zenkoku Taishūtō; chief of Propaganda Section, Shakai Taishūtō, 1932; elected to Tokyo Prefectural Assembly in 1936; chairman, Culture and Education Committee, House of Representatives, 1947-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

MATSUMOTO Saneki (Mimasu)

Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō; leader, Okinawan League.

Background. Born 1904, Okinawa; discharged from job because of strike activities, 1924; arrested 1928; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1931; imprisoned 1933-35 and 1935-36; vice chief, Farmers' Department, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1947; unsuccessful candidate, House of Councillors, 1947.

MATSUMOTO Seichiro

Current Activities. Member, Control Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1906; expelled from college for radical activities, 1926; director, Yawata branch, Rōdō Nōmintō, 1926; sentenced to three years' imprisonment in 1928 and again in 1935; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1938; arrested and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, 1938.

MATSUNAGA Yoshio

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Saitama.

Background. Born 1891, Aichi; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1917; one of organizers of Shakai Minshūtō in 1926, became chief of its Investigation Section; 1932, member, Central Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō; elected to Tokyo Municipal Assembly, 1937; elected secretary of Nippon Nōmin Kumiai Sōdomei, 1942; member of Abe faction of Shakai Taishūtō; 1940, expelled from Shakai Taishūtō; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; vice-president of Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai and chairman of its Saitama branch, 1947; chairman, House of Representatives Justice Committee, June 1947-April 1948; Parliamentary Vice Minister, Attorney General's Office, June-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1932, 1937, 1946, and 1947.

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MATSUOKA Komakichi

Current Activities. Speaker of the House of Representatives; adviser, Nippon Shakaitō; president, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei.

Background. Born 1888, Tottori; elementary education; 1914, joined Yuaikai; 1918, became manager of Yuaikai central office; one of organizers of Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei in 1921, becoming its president; resigned the presidency in 1923 during the period of leftist domination of the Sōdōmei; one of organizers and member of Executive Committee of Shakai Minshutō in 1926; 1927, became manager and treasurer of Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; 1928, attended International Labor Conference at Geneva; 1932, became president of Nippon Rōdō Kumiai; 1936, president of Zenkoku Rōdō Sōdōmei; opposed movement for the dissolution of independent trade unions and their merger into a government-sponsored labor front; adviser, Shakai Taishūtō; was one of the leaders of the attempt to organize the Kinrō Kokumintō; 1945, member, Arrangements Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; labor representative, Central Labor Relations Committee, 1947; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

MATSUZAWA Hajime

Current Activities. Member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Lower House Members' Committee, Kakushin Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Yamanashi.

Background. Born 1895; elementary school education; 1946, chief secretary, Yamanashi branch, Nippon Shakaitō; 1946, chief of education committee, Kanto branch, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; joined Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; seceded from Shakaitō, January 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

MIKI Jiro

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from Kanagawa; chairman, Kanagawa branch, Nippon Shakaitō and Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei.

Background. Born 1885, Tokyo; elementary school education; joined Yuaikai while working at iron foundry, 1912; member, Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei, 1925; accompanied delegate MATSUOKA Komakichi to International Labor Conference, Geneva, 1929; member, Central Committee, Shakai Minshutō, 1931; mayor, Kawasaki City; member, Kawasaki Municipal Assembly; chief, Tokyo Steel Workers' Union; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; member, Central Screening Committee, 1947; secretary-treasurer, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei, 1947-48.

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MITAMURA Shiro

Current Activities. Labor representative, Cabinet Payroll Commission.

Background. Born 1896, Ishikawa; graduated from Osaka Policemen's Training School, 1916; 1921, joined a printers' union affiliated with Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; 1925, seceded from Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei and was one of organizers of Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai, becoming a member of its Central Committee; arrested in May 1926; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, December 1926; 1927, became a member of Central Committee of Nippon Kyōsantō; 1928, became Hokkaido district manager of Nippon Kyōsantō; arrested in 1929 and sentenced to life imprisonment; renounced Communism while in prison, 1933; released from prison, 1945; member, Central Executive Committee, Minshu Jimmin Resmei, 1946-47; business manager and president, Zen Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi, 1946-47; unsuccessful candidate for House of Councillors, 1947.

MIYAKI Shoichi

Current Activities. Chairman, Niigata branch, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1900, Gifu; graduated from Waseda University, 1923; joined Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1923; leader of Nippon Rōnōtō, 1926-28; leader, Nippon Taishūtō, 1928-30; member, Central Executive Committee, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō, 1931-32; member, Shakai Taishūtō, Aso faction, 1932-40; secretary general, Tokyo branch, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1938; purged 1940, cleared June 1948; elected to the Diet, 1937.

MIYAMOTO Kenji

Current Activities. Chairman of Control Committee and member of Central Committee and Political Bureau, Nippon Kyōsantō; editor of party organ Zen'ei (Vanguard).

Background. Born 1908, Yamaguchi; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1931; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, May 1931; active in proletarian cultural organizations; 1932, member of Propaganda Section of Nippon Kyōsantō; 1933, became chief of Propaganda Section, Nippon Kyōsantō; imprisoned 1933-45; chairman, Propaganda Department, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1945; chairman, Zen'ei and Culture Departments, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1947.

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MIZUHASHI Tosaku

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency; member of the Central Executive Committee and chief of the Shinjuku branch of the All-Japan Government Communications Workers' Union; member, Executive Committee, Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi.

Background. Born 1895; an employee of the Ministry of Communications for 30 years; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Labor, April 1948; seceded from Nippon Shakaitō, June 1948; joined Independent Club, House of Councillors, October 1948.

MIZUTANI Chosaburo

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Kyoto.

Background. Born 1897, Kyoto; graduated from Kyoto Imperial University, 1921; 1919, head of legal department, Kyoto branch of Yuaikai; 1925, adviser, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; 1926, member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Kyoto branch, Rōdō Nōmintō; 1929, organized a short-lived minor proletarian party; 1930, one of organizers of Zenkoku Taishūtō and member of its Central Executive Committee; Zenkoku Ronō Taishūtō; elected to Kyoto Municipal Assembly in 1933 and 1937; 1933, member, Central Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō, and member of Abe faction; expelled from Shakai Taishūtō in 1940; one of leaders of the attempt to organize the Kinrō Kokumintō; in 1940 joined IRAA and later IRAPS; 1945, president of Kyoto Bar Association; member, Arrangements Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945; chairman of Diet Committee and adviser to Political Affairs Research Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946; Minister of Commerce and Industry, May 1947-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1928, 1936, 1937, 1942, 1946, and 1947.

MORITO Tatsuo

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Hiroshima.

Background. Born 1888, Hiroshima; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1914; expelled from faculty of Tokyo Imperial University for essay on Kropotkin and imprisoned for three months; 1921-23, studied in Europe and United States; 1923, became affiliated with Ohara Institute for Research on Social Problems and later became chief of its Osaka office; politically affiliated with Zenkoku Taishūtō; chairman, Political Affairs Investigation Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; public representative, Cabinet Payroll Commission, 1947; adviser, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; Minister of Education, May 1947-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

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MUTO Unjuro

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Gumma; chairman, Control Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; chairman, Executive Committee, All-Japan Tenants' Association (Zen Nippon Shakuyarin Kumiai).

Background. Born 1902, Gumma; graduate of Waseda University, law department; 1927, joined Jiyū Hōsō Dan (Free Bar Association); member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; counselor, Jiyū Hōsō Dan, 1946; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

NABEYAMA Sadachika

Current Activities. Organizer, Central Political-Economic Research Institute.

Background. Born 1900, Fukuoka; joined Yuaikai and later became full time worker for Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; became member of Central Committee of Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Hyogikai, 1925; 1926, joined Nippon Kyōsantō and went to USSR; 1927, returned to Japan and became member of Central Committee of Nippon Kyōsantō; 1928, fled to Shanghai to avoid arrest; 1929, active in reorganization of Kyōsantō, arrested; renounced Communism while in prison, 1933; went to China; repatriated in 1946; one of organizers of Rōnō Zensitō, 1946 and 1947.

NAGAE Kazuo

Current Activities. Under indictment for complicity in Toyo Flour Mill bribery scandal.

Background. Born 1902, Gifu; graduate of Kansai Gakuin University (Hyogo); member, Hyogo Prefectural Assembly; chairman, Kobe Municipal Assembly; member of Central Committee and chief secretary of Hyogo branch, Dai Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; 1931-32, member, Central Committee, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; member, Central Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō; member, IRAA, IRA Youth Corps, and Dai Nippon Seijikai; chairman, Hyogo branch, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei, 1945; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Education, 1947-48; Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, March-October 1948; resigned from Nippon Shakaitō and House of Representatives, November 1948; elected to the Diet, 1937, 1946, and 1947.

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NAKAHARA Kenji

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Okayama; member, Temporary Central Executive Committee, Rōdōsha Nōmintō.

Background. Born 1897, Okayama; elementary education; member, central executive committee of Okayama branch, Rodo Nōmintō; member, central executive committee of Okayama branch, Shakai Minshutō; expelled from Shakai Taishūtō for popular front activities, 1938; imprisoned 1939-42; 1946, chairman of preparatory committee of Okayama branch, Rodo Kumiai Sōdōmei; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-48; expelled from the Nippon Shakaitō, July 1948.

NAKAMURA Takaichi

Current Activities. Purged.

Background. Born 1897, Tokyo; graduated from Waseda University, 1923; member, Rōdō Nōmintō, 1926; auditor, Shin Rōnōtō, 1929; 1930, member, Central Executive Committee, Shin Rōnōtō; member, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; member of Central Executive Committee and chief of Youth Section, Shakai Taishūtō; member of Aso faction of Shakai Taishūtō; member of Toa Renmei (East Asia League); adviser, Tokyo-to and Kanda ward branches of IRAA; elected to Tokyo Municipal Assembly, 1937; member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Youth Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, November 1945-June 1946; auditor, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946; member of Central Executive Committee and director of Legal Affairs Section, Nippon Nomin Kumiai, 1947; purged, April 1947; elected to the Diet, 1937 and 1946.

NAKANO Shigeharu

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency; member, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1902, Fukui; graduate of Tokyo Imperial University; member, Japan Proletarian Arts League, 1926; member, Shin Nippon Bungakukai (New Japan Literary Society); 1947, vice-chief of Cultural Department, Nippon Kyōsantō; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1946.

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NISHIMURA Eiichi

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Osaka; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; indicted for perjury, July 1948.

Background. Born 1904, Nara; Shanghai Higher National School; member, Sakai Municipal Assembly, 1932; branch manager, Showa Life Insurance Company, 1933-41; member, Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō; director, Osaka branch, Japan Asia Development League (Nippon Tōa Dōmei); chairman, Democratic Scientific and Economic Research Institute (Minshu Kagaku Keizai Kenkyukai); member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; vice chairman, Political Affairs Investigation Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1947; vice chairman, House of Representatives Currency Stabilization Commission, 1947; Parliamentary Vice Minister, Economic Stabilization Board, April-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

NISHIO Suehiro

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Osaka; under indictment for complicity in the Showa Denko scandal.

Background. Born 1890, Kagawa; higher elementary school graduate; 1914, joined Yuukai; 1921, arrested while participating in strike activities; 1924, member of Executive Committee of Kansai branch of Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei and a delegate to International Labor Conference at Geneva; elected headquarters manager and treasurer of Sōdōmei, 1924; 1925, as Sōdōmei representative on the committee preparing for the organization of a proletarian party, opposed admission of left-wing elements; 1926, one of organizers and member of Central Executive Committee, Shakai Minshūtō; 1937, vice-president of Zenkoku Rōdō Sōdōmei; expelled from Diet in 1938 for speech demanding a "strong man like Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin" as premier, but reelected in 1939 by-election; a member of Abe faction of Shakai Taishūtō; expelled from Shakai Taishūtō in 1940; active in the attempt to organize the Kinrō Kokumintō, but became a member of IRAA later in 1940; 1942, joined IRAPS; secretary general, Nippon Shakaitō, 1947-47; Chief Cabinet Secretary, May 1947-February 1948; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, January-September 1948; Deputy Premier, March-July 1948; resigned from Central Executive Committee, Shakaitō, September 1948; resigned from Shakaitō, October 1948; expelled from Sōdōmei, October 1948.

NISHIZAWA Ryuji

Current Activities. Member, Control Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1903; 1927, joined Communist Fine Arts League; 1928, active in Kanto Metal Workers' Union; 1929, imprisoned; 1931, joined Nippon Kyōsantō; imprisoned 1934-45; 1946, member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

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NOMIZO Masaru (Katsu)

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; secretary general, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; member, House of Representatives, from Nagano.

Background. Born 1898, Nagano; studied at Hosei University; 1926; an organizer and member of Central Committee, Shakai Minshutō; 1930, seceded from Shakai Minshutō and joined Zenkoku Minshutō; 1931, elected to Nagano Prefectural Assembly; member of Aso faction and of Central Committee of Shakai Taishutō; in 1939 a strong supporter of union between Tōhōkai and Shakai Taishutō; member, Arrangements Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1946; vice chairman and chief of Political Section, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; chairman, House of Representatives Agriculture and Forestry Committee, 1947-48; chairman, Diet Members' Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1947; Minister without Portfolio, March-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1937, 1946, and 1947.

NOSAKA Ryuko

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee and chief of Women's Department, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1896, Kobe; graduated from Tokyo Girls' Higher Normal School; married NOSAKA Sanzo in 1917, studied in London with him; 1923, joined the Nippon Kyōsantō; became a leader of women's department of Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; joined Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai after the split in Sōdōmei; arrested in 1928; went to Moscow, 1931; returned to Japan, January 1947.

NOSAKA Sanzo (OKANO Susumu)

Current Activities. Member of Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee, chief of Propaganda and Investigation Section, and principal of party school, Nippon Kyōsantō; member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo.

Background. Born 1892, Yamaguchi; graduated from Keio University, 1917; became member of Yuaikai staff; 1920, went to London as representative of Yuaikai to study the British trade-union movement; 1921, joined British Communist Party and was deported from England; 1922, went to Moscow, returned to Japan, and joined Nippon Kyōsantō; became head of Investigation Section of Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; 1923, imprisoned; 1925, active in Rōdō Nōmin and one of leaders of Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai after the split in the Sōdōmei; 1928-29, imprisoned; 1931, went to Moscow as representative of Nippon Kyōsantō; 1935, became member of Executive Committee of Communist International; arrived in Yenan, May 1943, and organized the Nippon Jimmin Kaihō Renmei (Japanese People's Emancipation League); returned to Japan, January 1946; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1946.

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OKADA Bunkichi

Current Activities. Member, Control Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1901, Tottori; primary education; 1931, became director of Central Committee, Japan Militant Atheists' League; 1932, joined Young Communist League; 1933-39, imprisoned; member of Secretariat and Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946-47.

OKADA Haruo

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Hokkaido, member, Temporary Central Executive Committee, Rōdōsha Nomintō.

Background. Born 1914, Hokkaido; graduate of Otaru Higher Commercial School; member, Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly, 1940-45; member, IRAA; vice chief, general affairs department, Hokkaido branch of IRAPS; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; deputy chairman of Shakaitō Youth Committee, 1947; chairman, Shakaitō Youth Committee, 1948; sponsor of Rōnō Renrakukai, May 1948; expelled from Nippon Shakaitō, July 1948.

OKADA Soji

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency; member, Nippon Shakaitō; member of Central Executive Committee and chief of Information and Propaganda Department, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai.

Background. Born 1902, Tokyo; graduate of Tokyo Imperial University; adviser, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute; member, Rōnō-ha; arrested for popular front activities, 1937; 1946, one of organizers of Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; unsuccessful candidate, House of Representatives, 1946.

OSHIMA Yoshiharu

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, Gunma; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai.

Background. Born 1894; higher elementary school education; chief, Gunma branch, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1946; vice-president, Gunma Prefectural Agricultural Association; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, April-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1947.

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OYA Shozo

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, Osaka.Background. Born 1893, Mie; graduate of Nishinoda Trade School; member, Osaka Municipal Assembly, 1929-46; member, Shakai Minshutō, Shakai Taishutō, and Osaka branch of IRAA; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; member, Central Committee, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdomei; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Labor, April-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

OYAMA Ikuro

Current Activities. Lecturer, Waseda University.Background. Born 1880, Hyogo; graduate of Kobe School of Commerce (1901) and Waseda University (1905); postgraduate study at the University of Chicago and the University of Munich; professor, Waseda University, 1915-17, 1921-27; president, Rōdō Nōmintō, 1926-28; organizer and leader of Shin Rōnōtō, 1929-30; fled to the United States, 1931; returned to Japan, October 1947; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1928; elected to Diet, 1930.

SANO Gaku (Manabu)

Current Activities. Director, Japan Political and Economic Research Institute.Background. Born 1892, Oita; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1917; 1922, assisted in organization of Suiheisha and joined Nippon Kyōsantō, becoming member of its Central Committee; imprisoned briefly in 1923; 1924, opposed the proposal for dissolution of Nippon Kyōsantō; attended Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in June and July 1924; 1925, managing editor of Communist paper Musansha Shimbun; 1926, imprisoned for ten months; 1928, attended Sixth World Congress of the Comintern; went to Shanghai, arrested there in 1929 and removed to prison in Japan; renounced Communism in prison in 1933; chairman of Rōnō Zensitō (Labor-Farmer Vanguard Party), and head of its Political Bureau, 1947; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1947.

SATAKE Haruki (Seiki)

Current Activities. Secretary general, Kakushin Shakaitō; vice-president, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai; member, House of Representatives, from Kochi.Background. Born 1896, Kochi; graduated from Chuo University, 1919; joined Shakai Minshutō, 1927; 1928, became president of Kochi branch of Shakai Minshutō; 1934, elected member of Central Committee of Shakai Taishutō and head of Kochi branch; 1944, chairman of Kochi Bar Association; elected to Kochi Municipal Assembly in 1933, Kochi Prefectural Assembly in 1935; counselor, Kochi branch, IRAA, 1941; member, Preparatory Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1946; member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Diet Members' Society, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946 and 1947; seceded from Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Justice, June 1947-January 1948; seceded from Nippon Shakaitō, January 1948; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1942; elected to the Diet, 1936, 1937, 1946, and 1947.RESTRICTED

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SATAKE Shinichi

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, Hiroshima; member Nippon Shakaitō; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; organizer, Shutaisei Kakuritsu Dōmei.

Background. Born 1900; graduate of higher school; member, Central Committee, Shakai Taishutō; expelled from Shakai Taishutō in 1938 for popular front activities; member, Central Committee, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; chairman, Hiroshima branch, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai.

SATO Satoji

Current Activities. Sentenced to four years' imprisonment for statements contrary to occupation policy; member of Central Committee and Hokuriku Regional Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1901, Niigata; primary education; joined Nōmin Rōdōtō, 1925; joined Nippon Nōmintō, 1926; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1928; imprisoned 1929-32 and 1940-44; member, Central Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1947.

SHIDA Shigeo

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee and Political Bureau, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1911, Hyogo; primary school education; became active in trade-union movement in 1931 and later joined Nippon Kyōsantō; imprisoned 1933-41 and December 1941-August 1942; candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946.

SEIGA Yoshio

Current Activities. Member of Political Bureau and Central Committee and joint chief of Akahata Department, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1901, Yamaguchi; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1925; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1923, 1925-26, served in army as volunteer; 1926, forced to resign from Central Committee of Nippon Kyōsantō as a follower of Fukumoto; 1927, became head of Political Bureau and editor of party organs Marrism and Musansha Shimbun; 1928-45, imprisoned; elected to Diet, 1946; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1947.

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SHIMAGAMI Zengoro

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; a leader of Tokyo Communication Workers' Union and of Federation of Communication Workers' Unions; chairman, Education Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo; labor representative, Central Labor Relations Committee.

Background. Born 1903, Akita; primary education; 1920-26, active in Tokyo transport workers' union; 1926, became member of Central Committee of Rōdō Nōmintō; 1937, member, Election Committee, Nippon Musantō; 1937, arrested for united front activities; 1947, member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; sponsor of Rōnō Renrakukai, May 1948; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1946; elected to Diet, 1947.

SHINDO Kanji

Current Activities. Member, Jiyū Hōsō Dan (Free Bar Association).

Background. Born 1897, Aichi; 1922, admitted to the bar; became member of Jiyū Hōsō Dan; 1926, joined Rōdō Nōmintō; one of organizers of Shakuyanin Kumiai (House Tenants' League); active in attempts to reorganize Rōdō Nōmintō in 1928; became treasurer of Shin Rōnōtō in 1929, resigned in 1930; imprisoned 1933-35; unsuccessful Communist Diet candidate, April 1946.

SHIRAKAWA Seiichi

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee and chairman of Tokyo District Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1902, Nagasaki; middle school graduate; joined trade-union movement, 1927; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1932; 1932-39, imprisoned.

SUGIYAMA Motojiro

Current Activities. Purged; member, Osaka branch, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai.

Background. Born 1885, Osaka; graduate of agricultural college and of Theological Seminary of Tohoku College; an organizer of Nippon Nōmin Kumiai in 1922 and its president from 1922 to 1928; active in organization of Nōmin Rōdōtō, 1925; president of Rōdō Nōmintō in 1926, but resigned to join Nippon Rōnōtō; 1928, one of organizers of Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, serving as its president; adviser to Nippon Taishūtō in 1928, Zenkoku Taishūtō in 1930; became president of Dai Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; member of Aso faction of Shakai Taishūtō; member of IRAPS; chief of Union Section, Nippon Shakaitō, and member of Central Executive Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai until his disqualification in February 1946; elected to Diet in 1932, 1936, 1937, and 1942.

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SUZUKI Mosaburo (Shigasaburo)

Current Activities. Member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Political Affairs Research Committee of Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo; chairman, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, May 1948.

Background. Born 1893, Aichi; graduated from Waseda University, 1915; after World War I, a member of the Japanese group of the American Communist Party in New York and sent to USSR as its representative; returned to Japan in 1919 and joined Nippon Kyōsantō; active in organization of Nōmin Rōdōtō in 1925 and Rōdō Nōmintō in 1926; chief secretary of Musan Taishūtō in 1928; December 1928, member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Taishūtō; 1929, expelled from Nippon Taishūtō, organized Tōkyō Musantō; 1930; member of Central Executive Committee and chief of Policy Committee, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; 1936, expelled from Shakai Taishūtō; an organizer and leader of Zenkoku Hyōgikai and its successor, the Rōnō Musan Kyōgikai; chief secretary of Nippon Musantō, February 1937; arrested December 1937; elected to Tokyo Municipal Assembly, March 1937; chairman, Economic Reconstruction Conference, 1947; chairman Political and Economic Research Institute, 1947; chairman, House of Representatives Budget Committee, June 1947-February 1948 and May-October, 1948; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1937; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

SUZUKI Seichi

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency; member, Temporary Central Executive Committee, Rōdōsha Nōmintō.

Background. Born 1904; elementary school education; employee, Tokyo Railway Company; chairman, Central Executive Committee, National Federation of Government Railway Workers' Unions (Kokutetsu Rōdō Kumiai) until May 1947; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, January-July 1948; seceded from Shakaitō, July 1948; joined Independent Club, House of Councillors, October 1948.

SUZUKI Yoshio

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Fukushima.

Background. Born 1894, Fukushima; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1919; 1919-40, taught law at various universities; 1940, defended J. R. Young of the Japan Chronicle when Young was tried for violations of the Army Criminal Code; 1942, campaigned for KATAYAMA Tetsu; chairman, Education Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; Minister of Justice, May 1947-February 1948; Attorney General, March-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

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TAHARA Haruji

Current Activities. Purged.

Background. Born 1900, Fukuoka; studied at Waseda, Missouri, and Denver Universities; 1932, member of Aso faction and of Central Committee of Shakai Taishutō; 1934, organizer and chief of Fukuoka branch of Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; 1943-44, employed by Japanese Navy to investigate immigration possibilities in Southeast Asia; 1946, member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Organization Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; president of Nippon Gyomin Kumiai (Japan Fishermen's Union); member of Central Executive Committee of Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; purged April 1947; elected to the Diet, 1937 and 1946.

TAKAKURA Taru

Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō; adviser, Nagano branch, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; arrested November 1948 for making speech contrary to occupation policy.

Background. Born 1891 Kochi; graduate of Kyoto Imperial University; active in proletarian literary groups; arrested 1933, 1939, and 1942; imprisoned, November 1944-October 1945; elected to the Diet, 1946; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1947.

TAKANO Iwasaburo

Current Activities. President, Japan Broadcasting Corporation; president, Fabian Society of Japan; member, Japan Academy (formerly the Imperial Academy).

Background. Born 1871, Nagasaka; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1895; studied in Germany, England, France, and United States; 1919 joined Yuaikai; 1920, became president of Ohara Institute of Social Research; 1926, member of Central Executive Committee, Rōdō Nōmintō; 1928, offered presidency of Nippon Taishūtō but declined; 1930, adviser, Zenkoku Taishūtō; 1932, adviser, Shakai Taishūtō; adviser, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945-46.

TAKANO Minoru

Current Activities. Secretary general, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; vice-president, National League of Metal Workers' Unions; member, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born c. 1900; member, Executive Committee, Rōnō Musan Kyōgikai; arrested for united front activities, 1937; chief of Research and Reconstruction Section, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei, 1946.

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TAKATSU Seido (Masamichi)

Current Activities. Auditor, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Hiroshima.

Background. Born 1893, Hiroshima; 1920, expelled from Waseda University for radical activities; one of organizers of Nippon Kyōsantō, 1923; fled to USSR in 1924 to escape arrest; apparently resigned from Nippon Kyōsantō because of his opposition to Fukumoto's doctrines; member, Rōnō ha; 1930, became a member of Zenkoku Taishūtō; 1932, member, Executive Committee of Association of Friends of Peace in the Far East; member, Nippon Musantō; arrested in 1937 for united front activities; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1947; May 1948, sponsor of Rōnō Renrakukai; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo

Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1909, Kyoto; attended Osaka Commercial College; 1929, joined Young Communist League; 1931, joined Nippon Kyōsantō, became an officer of Kyoto branch; imprisoned 1932-35 and 1938-45; candidate member of Central Committee and member of Control Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946.

TANAKA Kenkichi

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Akita; chief, Organization Department, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai; member, Kakushin Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1909, Akita; higher school education; member, Akita Prefectural Assembly; member, Nippon Taishūtō, 1928; imprisoned 1930; member, executive committee, Akita branch, Shakai Taishūtō; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; chairman, Akita branch of Nippon Shakaitō and Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; seceded from Nippon Shakaitō, January 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

TANAKA Shogetsu

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Fukuoka; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; chief secretary, Fukuoka branch, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1900, Fukuoka; graduated from middle school; member, Fukuoka Prefectural Assembly; priest (Hongan Temple); founder and leader of Kyushu branch, Zenkoku Suiheisha; private secretary to MATSUMOTO Jiichiro; member, Central Committee, Zenkoku Suiheisha; member, Shakai Taishūtō; member, Fukuoka branch, IRAA and Dai Nippon Seijikai; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47.

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TOKUDA Kyuichi

Current Activities. Secretary general, chief of Organization Guidance Section, and member of Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō; member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo.

Background. Born Okinawa, 1894; Nippon University law school graduate; in 1922 attended the sessions in Moscow and Petrograd of First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East; 1923, arrested and imprisoned for eight months; 1925, met with Communist leaders in Shanghai to discuss reorganization of Nippon Kyōsantō and favored its dissolution; 1926, attended meetings in Moscow; 1927, became chairman of Central Committee and secretary general of Nippon Kyōsantō, attended meetings in Moscow; 1928-45, imprisoned; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

TOMIYOSHI Eiichi

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Kagoshima.

Background. Born 1899, Kagoshima; arrested on various occasions in connection with tenant disputes; 1931, member of the Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; member of Abe faction, Shakai Taishūtō; member, Executive Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; chairman, Propaganda Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946; member, Preparatory Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1946; Shakaitō election secretary, Kyushu area, 1947; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry, June 1947-February 1948; Minister of Communications, March-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1936, 1937, 1946 and 1947.

TOSAKA Ryoichi

Current Activities. Candidate member of Central Committee and chief secretary of Ibaraki Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1912; middle school graduate; became active in farmers' movement, 1930; imprisoned 1932-35 and 1941-42; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1947.

WADA Ichizo

Current Activities. Member, Control Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō; chairman, Ishikawa branch, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai.

Background. Born 1910, Ishikawa; 1928, joined leftist group while a normal school student; 1930, joined Nippon Kyōsantō and became active in the farmers' movement; imprisoned 1930, 1932-34, and 1941; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1947.

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YAMAHANA Hideo

Current Activities. Vice-president, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; chairman, Education Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo.

Background. Born 1904, Hyogo; primary education; 1929, became member of Nippon Rōnōtō; 1931, member, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; 1934, chief secretary of Zenkoku Hyōgikai; active in Nippon Musantō; arrested December 1937; 1947, member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; defeated in 1946 Diet election but replaced purged Diet member; elected to Diet, 1947.

YAMAKAWA Hitoshi (Kin)

Current Activities. Writer.

Background. Born 1880, Okayama; attended Doshisha College; originally an anarchist; one of organizers and theoretical leaders of Nippon Kyōsantō; arrested in 1923; a leader of the group that favored dissolution of the party in mid-1920's; expelled from Nippon Kyōsantō sometime before 1929; reported to have lived in retirement after 1931; arrested December 1937; leader of Minshu Jimin Renmei, 1946-47; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1947.

YAMAZAKI Tsunekichi

Current Activities. Purged.

Background. Born 1891, Aichi; 1918, became active in the labor movement; 1926, joined Rōdō Nōmintō; 1930, became member of Central Committee, Shin Rōnōtō; 1931, member, Central Committee, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; 1936, member of Permanent Committee of Aikoku Rōdō Kumiai Zenkoku Konwa Kai (National Association of Patriotic Labor Unions); adviser of Nagoya branch of IRAA and member of IRAPS; auditor, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946; purged, October 1946; elected to Diet in 1937 as a representative of Patriotic Labor Party but expelled after convicted of illegal electioneering; reelected to Diet 1942 and 1946.

YASUHIRA Shikaichi

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Ehime; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1902, Ehime; elementary school education; member, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Musantō; member, Executive Committee, Zenkoku Rōdō Kumiai Kyōgikai; arrested for popular front activities, 1937; member, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; member, Tokyo Labor Relations Board; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; Shakaitō election secretary, Shikoku area, 1947; chairman, Labor Committee, House of Representatives, May-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

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YONEKUBO Mitsusuke (Manryo)

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; supervisor, Shakai Shimbun; member, House of Representatives, from Hyogo.

Background. Born 1888, Nagano; graduated from Tokyo Mercantile Marine College, 1914; 1922, joined Nippon Kain Kumiai (Seamen's Union); served as adviser to SUZUKI Bunji at International Labor Conference, Geneva, 1924; 1928, delegate to International Labor Conference; 1931-36, chief of International Section of Nippon Kain Kumiai; 1936-40, vice-president, Nippon Kain Kumiai; 1931-40, member of Shakai Taishūtō, Abe faction; 1940, one of leaders in the attempt to organize the Kinro Kokumintō; 1945, member, Arrangements Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; auditor, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945; chairman, Liaison Committee, Shakaitō, 1946; Minister without Portfolio, May-September 1947; Labor Minister, September 1947-February 1948; elected to the Diet, 1937, 1946, and 1947.

YOSHIKAWA Kanemitsu

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Chiba; member, of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Information Committee and Chiba branch, Nippon Shakaitō; chairman, Chiba branch, Japan Fishermen's Union.

Background. Born 1902, Fukuoka; graduate of Waseda University; postgraduate study in Europe and the United States; teacher and journalist; member of IRAPS; 1946-47, member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; 1947, leader of Chiba branch, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

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RESTRICTEDAPPENDIX BPRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE LEFT-WING PARTIES, 1945-48I. NIPPON SHAKAITOA. September 1945

Arrangements Committee:

ABE Isao
 ASANUMA Inajiro
 HARA Hyo
 HIRANO Rikizo
 KAGAWA Toyohiko
 KATAYAMA Tetsu
 KATO Kanju
 KAWAKAMI Jotaro
 KONO Mitsu
 MATSUOKA Komakichi

MATSUMOTO Jiichiro
 MIZUTANI Chosaburo
 NAKAMURA Takaichi
 NISHIO Suehiro
 NOMIZO Masaru
 SUGIYAMA Motojiro
 SUNAGA Ko
 SUZUKI Mosaburo
 TAHARA Haruji
 TAKANO Iwasaburo
 YONEKUBO Mitsusuke

B. November 1945

Secretary General: KATAYAMA Tetsu

Central Executive Committee:

ASANUMA Inajiro
 HARA Hyo
 HIRANO Rikizo
 KATO Kanju
 KONO Mitsu
 KURODA Hisao

MIZUTANI Chosaburo
 NAKAMURA Takaichi
 NISHIO Suehiro
 NOMIZO Masaru
 SUZUKI Mosaburo
 TAHARA Haruji

Auditors:

SUNAGA Ko
 YONEKUBO Mitsusuke

Advisers:

ABE Isao
 BABA Tsunego
 KAGAWA Toyohiko
 KAWAKAMI Jotaro
 MATSUOKA Komakichi

MATSUMOTO Jiichiro
 SUZUKI Bunji
 TAKANO Iwasaburo
 TOKUGAWA Yoshichika
 YAGI Hideji

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RESTRICTEDC. September 1946

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee: KATAYAMA Tetsu

Secretary General: NISHIO Suehiro

Chief Treasurer: HOSONO Michio

Central Executive Committee:

ARAHATA Katsuzo
 HIRANO Rikizo
 INOUE Ryoji
 ITO Ushiro
 KATO Kanju
 KATO Ryozo
 KURODA Hisao
 MASAKI Kiyoshi
 MATSUMOTO Junzo
 MATSUNAGA Yoshio

MIZUTANI Chosaburo
 MORITO Tatsuo
 NOMIZO Masaru
 SATAKE Haruki
 SUZUKI Mosaburo
 SUZUKI Yoshio
 TAHARA Haruji
 TOMIYOSHI Eiji
 YONEKUBO Mitsusuke
 YONEYAMA Hisako

Auditors:

ASANUMA Inajiro
 NAKAMURA Takaichi
 YAMAZAKI Tsunekichi

Advisers:

ABE Isoo
 KAGAWA Toyohiko
 MATSUMOTO Jiichiro

MATSUOKA Komakichi
 YAGI Hideji

Committee Chairmen:

Political Affairs Research Committee: MORITO Tatsuo

Advisers:

SUZUKI Mosaburo
 MIZUTANI Chosaburo

Labor Union Committee:

KATO Kanju

Diet Committee:

MIZUTANI Chosaburo

Election Committee:

HIRANO Rikizo

Diet Members' Society:

SATAKE Haruki

Organization Committee:

TAHARA Haruji

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Propaganda Committee:	TOMIYOSHI Eiji
Education Committee:	SUZUKI Yoshio
Cultural Committee:	MATSUMOTO Junzo
Civil Information Committee:	INOUE Yoshiji
Liaison Committee:	YONEKUBO Mitsusuke
Youth Department:	KURODA Hisao
Women's Committee:	AKAMATSU Tsuneko

D. Changes of June 1947

Acting Secretary General: ASANUMA Inajiro

Auditors:

KOIZUMI Hidekichi
II Seichi

Committee Chairmen:

Political Affairs Research Committee:	SUZUKI Mosaburo
Diet Committee:	MASAKI Kiyoshi
Election Committee:	ITO Ushiro
Diet Members' Society:	NOMIZO Masaru
Organization Committee:	KATO Ryoza
Propaganda Committee:	DOI Naosaku
Education Committee:	ARAHATA Katsuzo
Civil Information Committee:	YOSHIKAWA Kanemitsu
Liaison Committee:	HOSOKAWA Takamoto

E. January 1948

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee:	KATAYAMA Tetsu
Secretary General:	ASANUMA Inajiro
Chief Treasurer:	NAKASAKI Toshi

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RESTRICTED

Central Executive Committee:

AKAMATSU Tsuneko
 ARAHATA Katsuzo
 DOI Naosaku
 HARA Hyo
 HAYASHI Daisaku
 HORI Makoto
 HOSONO Michio
 INAMURA Junzo
 ITO Ushiro
 KATO Kanju
 KATO Ryoza
 KIKUGAWA Tadao
 KURODA Hisao
 MASAKI Kiyoshi
 MATSUMOTO Junzo

MIZUTANI Chosaburo
 MORITO Tatsuo
 NISHIMURA Eiichi
 NISHIO Suehiro
 NOMIZO Masaru
 OSHIMA Yoshiharu
 SUZUKI Mosaburo
 SUZUKI Seiichi
 SUZUKI Yoshio
 TANAKA Shogetsu
 TOMIYOSHI Eiji
 YASUHIRA Shikaichi
 YONEKUBO Mitsusuke
 YOSHIKAWA Kanemitsu

Auditors:

II Seiichi
 NAGAE Kazuo
 TAKATSU Masamichi

Advisers:

ABE Isao
 KAGAWA Toyohiko

MATSUMOTO Jiichiro
 MATSUOKA Komakichi

Committee Chairmen:

Political Affairs Research Committee:	SUZUKI Mosaburo
Labor Union Committee:	ARAHATA Katsuzo
Diet Committee:	MASAKI Kiyoshi
Election Committee:	ITO Ushiro
Organization Committee:	KATO Ryoza
Propaganda Committee:	AKAMATSU Isamu
Education Committee:	YAMAHANA Hideo
Cultural Committee:	MATSUMOTO Shichiro
Civil Information Committee:	YOSHIKAWA Kanemitsu
Liaison Committee:	HOSOKAWA Takamoto

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RESTRICTED

Youth Department:	OKADA Haruo
Women's Committee:	YAMAZAKI Michiko
Control Committee:	MUTO Unjiro
Living Conditions Committee:	MORI Mikiji
Publications Committee:	HOSODA Tsunekichi

II. NIPPON KYOSANTOA. December 1945

Secretary General: TOKUDA Kyuichi

Central Committee:

HAKAMADA Satomi
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
KIN Tenkai

KUROKI Shigenori
MIYAMOTO Kenji
SHIGA Yoshio

Central Committee Candidates:

INAMOTO Iwao
KASUGA Shoichi
KURAHARA Korendo

KASUGA Shoichi
MATSUZAKI Kumaji
MUNEKIYO Tetsu

Department Chairmen:

Organization Guidance Department:	TOKUDA Kyuichi
Publications Department:	SHIGA Yoshio
Trade Union and Farmers' Department:	KAMIYAMA Shigeo
Propaganda Department:	MIYAMOTO Kenji

B. February 1946

Secretary General: TOKUDA Kyuichi

Secretariat:

ITO Ritsu
KUROKI Shigenori
NOSAKA Sanzo

SHIGA Yoshio
TOKUDA Kyuichi

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Political Bureau:

HAKAMADA Satomi
KIN Tenkai
MIYAMOTO Kenji

NOSAKA Sanzo
SHIGA Yoshio
TOKUDA Kyuichi

Central Committee:

HAKAMADA Satomi
HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Kenichi
ITO Ritsu
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
KASUGA Shoichi
KASUGA Shojiro
KIN Tenkai
KONNO Yojiro
KURIHARA Koreto

KUROKI Shigenori
MATSUZAKI Kumaji
MIYAMOTO Kenji
MIZUTANI Takashi
NISHIZAWA Ryuji
NOSAKA Sanzo
OKADA Bunkichi
SHIGA Yoshio
TOKUDA Kyuichi
UCHINO Takechiyo

Central Committee Candidates:

BOKU Ontetsu
HATTORI Mugio
HOSAKA Hiroaki
ISHIKAWA Tomozasemon
IWAMOTO Iwao
IWAMOTO Shigeo
IWATA Eiichi
KAMEYAMA Kozo
KIN Toyo
KONISHI Masao

MATSUMOTO Ichizo
MIYAMOTO Yuriko
SEKIGUCHI Kinzo
SHIDA Shigeo
SHIINO Etsuro
SO Seitetsu
TADA Tomeji
TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo
TAKEUCHI Kiyoshi

Department Chairmen:

Organization Guidance Department:	TOKUDA Kyuichi
Publication Department:	KAMIYAMA Shigeo
Propaganda Department:	NOSAKA Sanzo
Research Department:	NOSAKA Sanzo
Business Department:	TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo
Culture Department:	MIYAMOTO Kenji
Finance Department:	KUROKI Shigenori
<u>AKAHATA</u> Department:	SHIGA Yoshio
<u>ZENEI</u> Department:	MIYAMOTO Kenji
Trade Union Department:	ITO Kenichi

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RESTRICTEDC. December 1947

Secretary General: TOKUDA Kyuichi

Secretariat:

HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Ritsu
KAMEYAMA Kozo

NOSAKA Senzo
TOKUDA Kyuichi

Political Bureau:

HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Ritsu
KIN Tenkai
KONNO Yojiro
MIYAMOTO Kenji

NOSAKA Senzo
SHIDA Shigeo
SHIGA Yoshio
TOKUDA Kyuichi

Central Committee:

HAKAMADA Satomi
HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Kenichi
ITO Ritsu
KAMEYAMA Kozo
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
KASUGA Shoichi
KASUGA Shojiro
KIN Tenkai
KISHIMOTO Shigeo
KONNO Yojiro
KURIHARA Koreto
MATSUMOTO Kuzumi

MATSUMOTO Saneki (Mimasu)
MIYAMOTO Kenji
NOSAKA Ryu
NOSAKA Senzo
SATO Satoji
SHIDA Shigeo
SHIGA Yoshio
SHIRAKAWA Haruichi
TAKAKURA Teru
TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo
TOKUDA Kyuichi
TOSAKA Kan

Central Committee Candidates:

BOKU Ontetsu
HARADA Choji
HOSAKA Hiroaki
IWATA Eiichi
KONISHI Masao

NISHIDATE Jin
SUNAMA Kazuyoshi
TADA Tomoji
TOSAKA Ryoichi
YAMAMOTO Hitoshi

Control Committee:

IWAMOTO Iwao
MASUDA Kakunosuke
MATSUMOTO Seichiro
MIYAMOTO Kenji
NISHIZAWA Ryuji

OKADA Bunkichi
SHIINO Etsuro
WADA Ichizo
YAMABE Kentaro

RESTRICTED

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RESTRICTEDAPPENDIX CGLOSSARY OF PRINCIPAL LEFT-WING ORGANIZATIONS

The English translations given here are those most frequently employed in standard English sources. For each Japanese term, however, a large number of other translations also exist.

I. PRE-1940 ORGANIZATIONSDai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei (Japan Labor Federation)

Successor to the Yuaikai; organized 1921; became the Zenkoku Rōdō Sōdōmei in 1936.

Kindō Kokumintō (National Labor Party)

Organized in 1940 as the result of a split in the Shakai Taishūtō; dissolved by the government in the same year.

Musan Taishūtō (Proletarian Mass Party)

Organized in 1928 by former members of the Rōdō Nōmintō; became part of the Nippon Taishūtō in the same year.

Nippon Kyōsantō (Japan Communist Party)

Organized 1922.

Nippon Musantō (Japan Proletarian Party)

Organized in 1936; dissolved by the government in 1937.

Nippon Nōmin Kumiai (Japan Farmers' Union)

Organized in 1922.

Nippon Nōmintō (Japan Farmers' Party)

Organized in 1926 as the result of a split in the Rōdō Nōmintō; became part of Nippon Taishūtō in 1928.

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RESTRICTEDNippon Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei (Japan Labor Union League)

Organized in 1926 as the result of a split in the Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; became part of the Zenkoku Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei in 1930.

Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai (Japan Labor Union Council)

Organized in 1923 as a result of a split in the Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; dissolved by the government in 1928.

Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi (Japan Trade-Union Congress)

Organized in 1932 as a congress of unions and federations; dissolved in 1940.

Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Sōrengō (Japan Labor Union Alliance)

Organized in 1925 as the result of a split in the Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei.

Nippon Rōdō Kurabu (Japan Labor Association)

A loose federation of the Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei, the Zenkoku Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei, and the Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Sōrengō formed in 1931.

Nippon Rōdō Sō-Hyōgikai (Japan Labor Council)

Organized in 1930 by former members of the Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai.

Nippon Rōnōtō (Japan Labor Farmer Party)

Organized in 1926 as the result of a split in the Rōdō Nōmintō; became part of the Nippon Taishūtō in 1928.

Nippon Taishūtō (Japan Masses Party)

Organized in 1928 as a merger of the Nippon Rōnōtō, the Nippon Nōmintō, and the Musan Taishūtō; became part of the Zenkoku Taishūtō in 1930.

Nōmin Rōdōtō (Farmer Labor Party)

Organized December 1925; immediately dissolved by the government.

Rōdō Kumiai Zenkoku Dōmei (Trade-Union National League)

Organized in 1929 as the result of a split in the Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; became part of the Zenkoku Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei in 1930.

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RESTRICTEDZenkoku Minshutō (National Democratic Party)

Organized in 1930 as the result of a split in the Shakai Minshutō; became part of the Zenkoku Taishūtō later in the same year.

Zenkoku Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei (National League of Labor Unions)

Organized in 1930 as the result of the merger of the Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei and the Rōdō Kumiai Zenkoku Dōmei.

Zenkoku Rōdō Sōdōmei (All Japan Labor Federation)

Organized in 1936 as the result of the amalgamation of the Dai Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei and ten other unions; dissolved in 1940.

Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō (National Labor Farmer Mass Party)

Organized in 1931 as the result of the merger of the Shin Rōnōtō and the Zenkoku Taishūtō; became part of the Shakai Taishūtō in 1932.

Zenkoku Suiheisha (National Equalization Society)

An organization to combat prejudice against the eta, established in 1922.

Zenkoku Taishūtō (National Masses Party)

Organized in 1930 as a result of the merger of the Tōkyō Musantō, the Nippon Taishūtō, and the Zenkoku Minshūtō; became part of the Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō in 1931.

II. POST-SURRENDER ORGANIZATIONSBunren (Nippon Minshushugi Bunka Renmei -- Japan Democratic Culture League)

Organized October 1947.

Jimmin Kaihō Renmei (People's Emancipation League)

Organized October 1945; disappeared shortly thereafter.

Jiyū Hōsō Dan (Free Bar Association)

Organized October 1945.

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RESTRICTEDKakushin Dōshikai (Reformist Comrades' Society)

Established March 1948.

Kantō Chihō Shokuryō Minshu Kyōgikai (Kanto Democratic Food Council)

Organized January 1946.

Kantō Chihō Rōdō Kumiai Kyōgikai (Kanto District Labor Union Council)Organized January 1946; absorbed into Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi in September 1946.Kokutetsu (Kokutetsu Rōdō Kumiai -- Government Railroad Workers' Union)

Organized February 1946.

Kyūkokū Minshu Sensen Renmei (Democratic Front to Save the Nation)

Organized July 1946.

Mindō -- see Sambetsu Minshuka Dōmei.Minshu Jimmin Renmei (Democratic People's League)

Organized February 1946; inaugurated July 1946.

Wichinō Sashin Dōmei (Japan Farmers' Union Reformation League)Established February 1947; became the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, May 1947.Minshu Shugi Kagakusha Kyōkai (Democratic Scientists' Association)

Organized January 1946.

Nippon Kyōsantō (Communist Party of Japan)

Revived in October 1945; inaugurated December 1945.

Nippon Nōmin Kumiai (Japan Farmers' Union)

Revived in October 1945; inaugurated February 1946.

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Nippon Shakaitō (Socialist Party of Japan)

Organized September 1945; inaugurated November 1945.

Renraku -- See Rōnō Renrakukai.

Rōdō Kumiai Minshuka Renmei (Trade-Union Democratization League)

Established January 1948.

Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei (National Federation of Labor)

Organized October 1945; inaugurated August 1946.

Rōdōsha Nōmintō (Labor Farmer Party)

Preparatory committee established September 1948.

Rōnō Renrakukai (Labor-Farmer Liaison Council)

Organized May 1948; inaugurated June 1948.

Rōnō Zeneitō (Labor Farmer Vanguard Party)

Organized August 1946; inaugurated March 1947.

Sanbetsu -- see Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi.

Sanbetsu Minshuka Dōmei (Sanbetsu Democratic League)

Established February 1948.

Seinen Kyōsan Dōmei (Young Communist League)

Revived November 1945.

Seitōha Dōshikai (Orthodox Comrades' Group)

Organized June 1948.

Shutaisei Kakuritsu Dōmei (League for the Establishment of Independence)

Organized April 1948.

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Sōdōmei -- see Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei.

Soviets Kenkyūsha Kyōkai (Soviet Study Association)

Organized May 1946.

Zenkankō (Zen Kankōchō Shokuin Rōdō Kumiai Renraku Kyōgikai -- Federated Council of Government and Public Office Workers' Unions)

Organized April 1946.

Zenkoku Buraku Kaihō Renmei (National League for the Emancipation of the Special Caste)

Originally Zenkoku Suiseisha; revived November 1945.

Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai (National Farmers' Union)

Organized May 1947.

Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi (National Congress of Industrial Unions)

Organized February 1946; inaugurated August 1946.

Zen Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi (Japan Trade-Union Conference)

Organized September 1946; inaugurated October 1946.

Zenrōren (Zenkoku Rōdō Kumiai Renraku Kyōgikai -- All Japan Trade-Union Liaison Council)

Established February 1947.

Zentei (Zen Teishin Jūgyōin Kumiai (All-Communications Workers' Union)

Organized February 1946.

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Action: EUR

Rec'd January 3, 1949
12:04 p.m.

Info :

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FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 9, January 3

PRESS

IZVESTIYA December 31 carries 1 1/3 column article by "observer" commenting on dissolution Jap parliament. Describing parliament elected 1947 as Reactionary and anti-Popular, proved by scandals involving leaders three most important parties, article states Jap Reactionary forces refuse dissolve parliament following disclosure scandals. MacArthur resolved dismiss parliament and force election new, even more slavish parliament, only after carefully preparing ground. This accomplished by such measures as law concerning Civil Service, MacArthur's letter Yoshida requesting temporary withdrawal "certain privileges and liberties free society", terrorist repression "democratic elements". These actions show US leaders, under influence events on Asiatic continent, intend force transformation Japan into military-strategic base American imperialism. Soviet press December 31 also carries brief New York Tass despatch reporting request December 30 by Soviet representative FEC for information on MacArthur's recommendations re re-establishment Jap army and rearmament Japan.

Repeated Tokyo as No. 1.

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OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE JAN 5 1949

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OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTION
is assigned to
FE

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, January 4, 1949.

No. 4

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
JAN 20 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

109/R

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Subject: General Headquarters Intervention in Japanese
Politics.

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pleted.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

894 . 00 / 1 - 4 4 9

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's
despatch No. 813 of December 29, 1948 concerning
left wing political realignments in Japan, and to
transmit herewith a memorandum of conversation between
an officer of this Mission and Mr. ICHIMADA Hisato,
Governor of the Bank of Japan, and Mr. ISHIKAWA Ichiro,
President of the Japan Economic Federation.

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Mr. Ichimada expressed considerable concern over
what he believes is unnecessary intervention in Japanese
politics by General Headquarters during the third and
fourth sessions of the National Diet. Mr. Ichimada
said that he is fully aware of the right of General
Headquarters to intervene at any length in Japanese
affairs under the terms of the Instrument of Surrender,
but he expressed the belief that the manner in which
intervention has been carried out in recent months has
been ill-advised and tends to slow down the desirable
development of democratic processes in Japan.

Mr. Ichimada referred particularly to General
Headquarters intervention in connection with the wage
bill, where apparently Headquarters support of the
Cabinet's proposed 5,300 yen base wage was suddenly with-
drawn near the end of the last session of the Diet in
favor of a 6,300 yen base advocated by the opposition
parties and favored by the National Personnel Authority.
This action, according to Mr. Ichimada, was taken without
warning and left Prime Minister YOSHIDA in a most untenable
position in which he was compelled to reconsider at the

last

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 4,
January 4, 1949.

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last moment complicated budget estimates in order to meet the demands of the higher base wage. Mr. Ichimada cited other examples in which he feels the Cabinet's position has been adversely affected by intervention in connection with the drafting and passage of the National Public Service Law, and the question of the dissolution of the Diet and the holding of a general election.

In Mr. Ichimada's opinion, democratic, parliamentary government cannot develop satisfactorily in Japan if parliamentary processes are frequently subject to outside interference. If it is necessary to take such extreme measures because of critical or emergency conditions, Mr. Ichimada expressed the belief that it might be better in the long run and certainly more efficient to suspend temporarily parliamentary processes of government and govern Japan solely through General Headquarters directives. Not only does outside intervention retard democratic development, but Mr. Ichimada also pointed out that such action tends to discourage able and responsible men from participation in political activity. Mr. Ichimada stated that he is convinced that recent acts of intervention were deliberately intended to weaken Prime Minister Yoshida's position because of his unpopularity with some sections of General Headquarters and his allegedly reactionary views.

Mr. Ichimada expressed himself with unusual frankness for an official in his position, which is believed indicative of the degree to which he has become concerned over this matter. Mr. Ishikawa fully shares Mr. Ichimada's views, and it is believed that most responsible Japanese leaders in government, finance, and business are equally concerned over this question. The role of a political force operating outside the constitutional framework of the government is not new to Japan. The Japanese are thoroughly familiar with the operation of extra-constitutional political pressures, and one of the fundamental lessons the Occupation has attempted to teach the Japanese is the serious extent to which such outside pressure jeopardizes the growth of real democracy. While there can be no denial of the supreme position of General Headquarters under the terms of surrender, it would seem desirable that the exercise of this supreme power be directed in a manner best calculated to promote democratic government rather than in a manner which appears to many Japanese to be identical with the undesirable extra-constitutional pressures experienced before the surrender. As Mr. Ichimada emphasized, the situation may be critical enough to warrant direct intervention, but if this is necessary, an effort should be made to clarify the need for such intervention, to regularize its application so

as to

SECRET

Tokyo's Despatch No. 4,
January 4, 1949.

SECRET

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as to avoid the confusion which has been occasioned by different sections of General Headquarters making conflicting demands, and to avoid giving the impression that we merely desire the form of democratic government without its actual substance.

It is also believed that another serious aspect of this question is the manner in which outside intervention has tended to discredit and undermine the position of the present government. It appears more than coincidental that the frequency of such intervention has increased during the tenure of the Yoshida Cabinet, for there is little doubt of Mr. Yoshida's unpopularity among some sections of General Headquarters. The Prime Minister's conservative attitude, his refusal to participate in a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party in 1947, his insistent demands for an election, and his general effort to resist advice and pressure from General Headquarters have made Mr. Yoshida unpopular and the subject of criticism. Intervention, however, not only undermines Mr. Yoshida's position, but in the present political situation primarily benefits the extreme left. As discussed at length in this Mission's despatch No. 813, the broad socialist middle group, from which we believe it would be desirable for a genuine labor party to emerge, is at present disintegrating. Much of this disintegration is represented by an increasingly large movement of left-wing socialists into the communist party. The extreme left wing in Japanese politics is therefore gaining strength at the expense of the more stabilizing middle element, while the conservative forces are being undermined by the intervention of General Headquarters.

While discounting certain of the points reflected in Mr. Ichimada's comments, this Mission does wish to emphasize its concurrence in the view that Headquarters' action vis-a-vis the Yoshida Government in a number of instances may well work to our long-term disadvantage. It is our belief that the most desirable and practicable pattern for democratic development in Japanese political life rests in a change of governments between a conservative party and a labor party as their majorities fluctuate in the National Diet, with the communist groupings at the extreme left remaining always a small minority. At the present stage of Japanese political development, however, there appears a tendency toward alignment between the extreme right and the extreme left. The more conservative elements are endeavoring to form a single conservative party, while the communists are exerting formidable leadership to organize an extreme leftist group. The important middle political area, from which a future labor party should develop, is unfortunately in a state of disorganization and disintegration.

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
Tokyo's Despatch No. 4,
January 4, 1949.

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In these circumstances, the intrusions by General Headquarters into Japanese politics can cause a particularly undesirable effect. Without the presence of a strong, sound labor party to serve as a political balance wheel to the conservative forces now represented by the Democratic-Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, we should avoid weakening the conservative position at a time when the only element which can profit by this action is the extreme left under communist leadership. Such intervention therefore is thus far having the effect of building up a communist-organized left as the only effective counterweight to the conservative right.

Respectfully yours,


W. J. Sebald

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation,
December 21, 1948.

Original and hectograph to Department.

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CNSpinks:mhp

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 4
dated January 4, 1949 from
the United States Political
Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on
the subject "General Headquarters
Intervention in Japanese Politics".

(COPY)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 21, 1948.

SECRET

SUBJECT: General Headquarters Intervention in
Japanese Politics.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. ICHIMADA Hisato
Mr. ISHIKAWA Ichiro
Mr. HOSHINA Zenshiro
Mr. NAKAJIMA, Interpreter accompanying
Mr. Ichimada
Mr. MATSUMOTO, Mr. Ichimada's secretary
FSO Charles Nelson SPINKS

The undersigned officer was invited to dinner by Mr. ICHIMADA Hisato, Governor of the Bank of Japan, on December 21, 1948, at the Governor's official residence. Mr. ISHIKAWA Ichiro, President of the Japan Economic Federation (a non-governmental organization for promoting Japanese economic development) was also present, along with ex-Admiral HOSHINA Zenshiro, Mr. MATSUMOTO, Mr. Ichimada's private secretary, and Mr. NAKAJIMA, his interpreter.

Mr. Ichimada discussed at some length the Supreme Commander's letter to Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru of December 19, 1948 concerning the interim directive from the Government of the United States with respect to steps to be taken by the Japanese Government to achieve economic stability. Both Mr. Ichimada and Mr. Ishikawa felt that Japan's economic rehabilitation is closely connected with developments on the Asiatic mainland, and they expressed fear that the vast communist gains on the continent may seriously handicap Japan's revival. Mr. Ishikawa said that business interests in Japan were wondering what policy the United States will adopt toward the Chinese Communists. There is some concern felt that the United States will cut off all its economic

relations

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Enclosure to Tokyo's
Despatch No. 4, January 4,
1948.

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relations with areas of China under communist control and may prevent Japan from trading with such areas. Mr. Ishikawa stressed that he has no sympathy for communists anywhere, but he is afraid that Japan's very existence may depend upon maintaining economic relations with a communist China. In his view, it is not so much a question of "We can do business with a communist China" as "We may have to do business with a communist China".

Mr. Ichimada then referred to the passage in the Supreme Commander's letter of December 19 which stresses that an effective recovery program "will call for increased austerity in every phase of Japanese life and for the temporary surrender of some of the privileges and immunities inherent in a free society." Mr. Ichimada wonders how far the temporary surrender of privileges and immunities will be interpreted. Will this mean, he asked, the temporary suspension of the constitution, or a suspension of parliamentary government whereby Japan would be administered entirely by directives of the Supreme Commander?

In Mr. Ichimada's view, there can be no doubt of the gravity of the situation facing Japan. He feels that it is necessary, however, to arrive at a clear understanding as to the governmental processes which may be necessary to overcome this emergency. If the situation warrants drastic measures which may impose temporary restrictions on the operation of democratic government, he would have no objection, provided that the necessity of such action were made clear and that the methods of achieving the desired end were set forth in a manner which will avoid confusion and misunderstanding.

Mr. Ichimada then stated that he wished to express himself very frankly on a matter which he believes is of utmost importance for the future of democratic government in Japan. With a directness and frankness unusual for an official in his position he criticized what he called ill-advised intervention of General Headquarters in Japanese parliamentary politics. He spoke with considerable feeling of the manner in which the Government Section of General Headquarters has intervened in the affairs of the present Cabinet and the Diet. He referred particularly to steps taken by General Headquarters with respect to the 6,300 yen base in the wage bill. He said that the Yoshida Cabinet's original plan for a 5,300 yen base had, so far as could be ascertained, met the approval of General Headquarters. The 5,300 yen base became therefore a fundamental principle of the Cabinet and calculations for the budget were made upon this basis. The National Personnel Authority, however, advocated a 6,300 yen base which was supported by the opposition parties. Near the end of the Diet session, however, General Headquarters suddenly

switched

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Enclosure to Tokyo's
Despatch No. 4, January 4,
1948.

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switched its position and supported the 6,300 yen base. Prime Minister Yoshida had no alternative but to accept this decision and endeavor to revise all budget calculations to meet the new demands. Mr. Ichimada also referred to other cases of direct intervention by General Headquarters on the matter of the Diet's dissolution and the holding of a general election, and the direct part played by the Government Section in the drafting and passage of the National Public Service Law.

Mr. Ichimada said that he recognizes fully the right of General Headquarters to take such action, but he objects to the manner and the circumstances in which intervention is carried out. He believes that General Headquarters should lay down certain broad principles of policy and support any cabinet which endeavors to carry out that policy. If the Cabinet or the Diet fails to carry out a certain policy adequately or if a piece of legislation does not incorporate necessary provisions, General Headquarters should point out the errors or discrepancies. On the contrary, Mr. Ichimada declared, apparent agreement was achieved with respect to the 5,300 yen base. Mr. Ichimada criticized the fact that the Japanese Government cannot always ascertain just what is General Headquarters policy on a particular question because different sections of General Headquarters have different policies which each section endeavors to impose upon the Japanese Government. The problem would be considerably simplified in his view if the sections of General Headquarters would get together and pursue a unified program.

Mr. Ichimada believes that General Headquarters intervention in Cabinet and Diet affairs is fundamentally wrong in principle. General Headquarters professes the desire for a democratic, parliamentary process of government, but then tends to nullify this process by its own acts. If conditions are so serious as to warrant such intervention, Mr. Ichimada declared that it would be far better to close up the Diet and let the country be run by directives from General Headquarters. Mr. Ichimada feels that General Headquarters is trying to have the best of two worlds, but that the type of intervention taking place is only making the Diet a rubber stamp for General Headquarters and undermining its prestige. He feels that able, responsible political leaders will become more and more reluctant to participate in such a government where they are deprived of responsibility and are merely called upon to serve as yes men.

Mr. Ichimada

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Despatch No. 4, January 4,
1948.

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Mr. Ichimada added that the type of intervention carried out in the last two sessions of the Diet has made Prime Minister Yoshida's position a most untenable and undesirable one. He personally does not see how Mr. Yoshida is able to face such a situation and continue to stay in office. His position as Prime Minister has been completely discredited not only in the eyes of the opposition but of his own party and the public generally. Mr. Ichimada stated that he was reluctant to express such a view, but he could not help but feel that much of this recent intervention was deliberately intended to weaken Mr. Yoshida's position because of his unpopularity with some sections of General Headquarters and his allegedly reactionary views.

Charles Nelson Spinks



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTION
is assigned to

FE

United States Political Adviser
for Japan
Tokyo, January 18, 1949.

~~DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS~~

~~FEB 11 1949~~

~~REPARTMENT OF STATE~~

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

FEB 11 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 30

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(For Department Use Only)

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1949 FEB 11 AM 10 03

DC/M
ACTIVITIES BRANCH

Subject: Hokkaido Independence Movement.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit a memorandum of conversation of an officer of this Mission with Mr. MITAMURA Takeo, formerly of the Police Bureau of the Japanese Home Ministry, concerning communist activities in Hokkaido and a Hokkaido independence movement which is reportedly being supported secretly by the Japanese communists.

The intensity of communist activity in Hokkaido has already occasioned considerable concern to the Japanese because of the close proximity of the island to the Soviet-occupied Kuril islands (this Mission's despatch No. 716 of November 9, 1948). According to Mr. Mitamura, who recently made a survey trip to Hokkaido, the Hokkaido independence movement which was organized at the end of the war is at present receiving secret communist support. Mr. Mitamura claims that the Japanese communists are endeavoring to link independence sentiment with popular discontent over the postwar economic stagnation of the island, and are accordingly disseminating propaganda to suggest that if the island were to become a "democratic people's republic" the Soviet Union would permit the incorporation of the Kuril islands and Sakhalin with its territory, and would also grant to Hokkaido extensive fishing rights in Soviet waters.

It has not been possible to verify this information or to check upon Mr. Mitamura's reliability as an informant. Confirmed reports have been received by this

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 30,
January 18, 1949.

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Headquarters, however, of a Hokkaido independence movement which was organized in 1946. Available evidence indicates that the movement is not a large one and has not stimulated much interest among the Hokkaido population generally. Moreover, there are indications that the movement has been organized by interested groups for ulterior political purposes rather than to achieve the actual independence of the island. Nevertheless, reports have also identified Hokkaido communists with the movement.

Communist propaganda in Hokkaido in recent months has stressed that this northern island will eventually be taken over by the Soviet Union. This propaganda line has reportedly been used in an effort to frighten Hokkaido residents into joining the Japan Communist Party whereby they could better prepare themselves for the eventual Soviet occupation.

If such communist propaganda can identify the communization of Hokkaido with economic access to adjacent islands formerly under Japanese control, along with valuable fishing rights, the communist appeal would conceivably be much greater. Although Hokkaido suffered little war damage, the island's recovery has been considerably behind the rest of Japan, and postwar restrictions on Japanese fishing in northern waters constitute an important cause of the present economic stagnation.

There is no indication whether the Soviet authorities have endorsed either a plan for an independent Hokkaido or the incorporation of adjacent islands now occupied by the Soviet Union with such an independent state. If it is true, however, that the Japanese communists are conducting propaganda activity in the manner described by Mr. Mitamura, it may be assumed that such tactics are approved by the Soviets.

In evaluating unverified reports of this kind, it is necessary to take into account the possibility that the Japanese are endeavoring to incite the Occupation against the communists by alarming accounts of alleged communist activity. It is also necessary to recognize that the Japanese have already indicated a desire to recover some insular territories adjacent to Japan. Realizing the popularity of such claims, even the Japanese communists in their so-called peace-term proposals advocated the return of "islands racially or historically belonging to Japan" (this Mission's despatch No. 606 of September 14, 1948). The reported communist suggestion that the Soviet

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
Tokyo's Despatch No. 30,
January 18, 1948.

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Union would cede the Kuril islands and Sakhalin to an "independent" Hokkaido could represent either a communist trial balloon or an effort of anti-communists to arouse interest in the return of these insular territories.

Respectfully yours,


W. J. Sebald

Enclosure: *att*

Memorandum of Conversation,
December 3, 1948.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 30
dated January 18, 1949 from the
United States Political Adviser
for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject,
"Hokkaido Independence Movement".

(COPY)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 3, 1948

SECRET

SUBJECT: Hokkaido Independence Movement.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. MITAMURA Takeo
FSO Charles Nelson Spinks

On December 3, 1948 the undersigned officer had dinner with Mr. MITAMURA Takeo, former official of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry and at one time a director of the Special Higher Police (Tokko-ka). Mr. Mitamura is a purgee because of his prewar Tokko Ka connections, but because of his intimate knowledge of communist affairs he has been in close contact with intelligence officers of this Headquarters.

Mr. Mitamura, who has just completed a survey trip in Hokkaido, discussed at length communist activities on the northern island. From the results of his investigation, Mr. Mitamura is convinced that the Japan Communist Party is far better organized in Hokkaido than in any other part of Japan. Party leaders in Hokkaido, even at district and local levels, are exceptionally well trained, and rank and file party workers for the most part have more enthusiasm and display more aggression than anything noted elsewhere.

Mr. Mitamura was asked why the party is so much better organized and has such superior leadership in that area. He replied that this situation can be explained by three factors: First, in as much as Hokkaido has a typical frontier atmosphere where traditional concepts and conservative views are far less effective than in other parts of Japan, the environment of the island lends itself to radical thought. Secondly, the island has been badly hit economically since the end of the war. The important fishing industry has been seriously curtailed because of restrictions on fishing areas as well as shortages of fuel and materials. The island's economy has also been weakened by transportation problems. Much of the island's prewar imports from and exports to other parts of Japan was handled by coastwise shipping which is now inadequate to meet minimum requirements. Rail transport is too costly

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Enclosure to Tokyo's No. 30,
January 18, 1949.

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and is handicapped by the serious bottleneck at the Hakodate-Aomori ferry. The frontier spirit of Hokkaido, combined with postwar economic stagnation, has contributed materially, in Mr. Mitamura's opinion, to the intensity of communist activity. Finally, Mr. Mitamura pointed out that in his belief the Japan Communist Party has deliberately attempted to capitalize on this favorable situation by sending its best organizers to Hokkaido and by making every effort to train local leaders and perfect local party organization.

Mr. Mitamura spoke at considerable length of the Hokkaido Independence Movement (Hokkaido Dokuritsu Undo). Even before the war there was occasionally some independence sentiment noted in Hokkaido, although it never acquired political significance. Nevertheless, Mr. Mitamura emphasized that Hokkaido, because of its comparatively large area and small population, has been organized administratively and governed politically in a different manner from the ordinary prefectures of Japan. Mr. Mitamura suggested that in some respects Hokkaido is still like an outlying territory rather than an integral part of Japan.

According to Mr. Mitamura, since the end of the war independence sentiment in Hokkaido has substantially increased to the point where an organized independence movement was launched. Mr. Mitamura claims that the Japanese communists are quietly supporting this movement, and that a number of persons affiliated with it are members of the communist party. He states that the communists are subtly attempting to link independence sentiment with widespread discontent over the economic stagnation of the island. Communist propaganda therefore suggests that the Soviet Union supports the Hokkaido independence movement, and that if Hokkaido becomes a "democratic peoples republic", the Soviets may permit the new state to incorporate the Kuril islands and Sakhalin with its territory. At the same time, it is suggested that the Soviet Union will accord a Hokkaido "people's republic" extensive fishing rights in Soviet waters.

Mr. Mitamura stated that such propaganda is likely to give the Hokkaido independence movement more appeal in view of the considerable extent to which the important fishing industry of Hokkaido was formerly dependent upon the Kuril islands and Sakhalin as well as fishing rights in Soviet waters.

Charles Nelson Spinks

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Confidential
HL
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NA - Mr. Bishop

DATE: January 24, 1949

FROM : NA - Mr. Lory *HL*

SUBJECT: Possible Reasons for Communist Successes in Election of January 23, 1949

From the latest election reports it appears that the Communists may have won 35 seats in the Diet or a gain of over 800% from their previous number of only four members. With Japan's economic condition improved over what it was at the time the previous election was held, these Communist successes should be viewed with interest and concern. This election result may be an indication that the Communists have, politically speaking, "hit their stride" which may result in their becoming the strongest left wing party. Some of their success may be attributed to the following reasons.

1. A less revolutionary program which had a more broad base of appeal, especially to the small and medium class business men. With Social-Democrats apparently winning only 48 seats, such tactics evidently won many votes for the Communists from the more moderate left wing elements.
2. With the Democratic-Liberal Party also making large gains, Japanese political thinking is evidently becoming more sharply drawn between the right and the extreme left.
3. Intensification of Communist infiltration into the ranks of labor thus swinging more labor votes to the Kyosanto.
4. Corrupt practices by high ranking Government officials with emphasis on Showa Denso scandal.
5. The Government's announced program to attract foreign capital by making some of their investments tax free.
6. Success of Chinese Communists.

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~~Mr. Acheson~~ Japan

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JH

JAPANESE POLICY
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON JAPAN

It is always difficult for a victor to think and act clearly toward a vanquished foe. There is the legacy of bitterness left by any war, and in the case of Japan, to this has been added the memory of the atrocities committed by the Japanese army, as well as everything expressed by the words "Pearl Harbor". It is always more difficult to win the peace than to win the war, although winning the peace should be the true objective of the war. Therefore, in his own interest, the victor must impose on himself enough political wisdom and restraint to override the passions aroused by the war.

It is thus in the hope of making some contribution toward a policy that will win the peace and at the same time lift the burden of supporting Japan from the American taxpayer that this paper has been prepared. It is deliberately critical since its purpose is to stimulate discussion, not of the phases where the occupation has succeeded, but of these phases that are unsuccessful or at least controversial. Neither the problem of a peace treaty nor of the difficulties posed by the Far Eastern Commission are dealt with since the United States has the power to settle by interim directives most of the problems herein discussed.

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OVERALL CONCLUSION

The conquest of Japan may have been unique in modern history. The mind of the nation was wrenched open by the surrender. It is very important to realize that it was not the physical blows of the war--the bombing and Japanese land, air and sea defeats--that did this. It was the Emperor's order to surrender that crumpled the Japanese will to fight and that destroyed all the ideas and ideals associated with Bushido, the tradition of never surrendering, Japanese superiority over all other nations, etc.

The Japanese are an extremely practical race, and unlike the Germans, self-pity has little place in their mental makeup. They concluded they had been beaten because the American system was better than the Japanese system. They, therefore, resolved to change the Japanese system. The militarists and all they stood for were utterly discredited. The Japanese turned to the American occupation for guidance with minds more open than possibly at any time since the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

That was the atmosphere and the opportunity General MacArthur found when he entered Japan in 1945. What do we find in 1949? The information received by the contributors of this paper leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the great opportunity has been missed. Why? Because instead of giving the Japanese guidance in working their own passage toward a new and better system, the occupation has tried to impose on them in minute detail a system they only dimly comprehend. Because in doing this--and this is the way the Japanese often put it--the occupation has seemed to them to show the very faults for which they condemned their own militarists: bureaucratic, inefficient, dictatorial, vindictive and at times corrupt. Because in their personal relations with the Japanese, occupation personnel do not--and under the circumstances probably cannot--practice the democratic virtues they preach.

Overall Conclusion (continued)

Because, above all, instead of being compelled, as they expected, to work unceasingly to make up for the destruction they caused during the war, the Japanese instead have had forced upon them reforms they don't understand but which they feel have contributed largely to the economic and moral stagnation of their country.

The result has been deep disillusionment with the occupation, particularly among those classes best fitted by education and background for understanding the West. It is impossible to say whether the opportunity that existed at the end of the war has entirely passed. The concensus is that it has not. But unless it is seized quickly, the Japanese mind will either revert to some traditional pattern or turn to the only alternative to Western democracy in the world today--Communism.

CONTROLS

The most insistent criticism of the occupation from both Americans and Japanese is that Japan's economy, politics, newspapers, education and nearly every other activity is supervised down to the minutest details by S.C.A.P. A well-informed Japanese writes: "The organization of the G.H.Q. has been very much enlarged with tens of sections, with tens of divisions and branches in each and hundreds of civilians and experts. These personnel are all 'hommes de bonnes volontés', eager and jealous to create a new Japan, and model of American efficiency. They thoroughly investigate and study all the Japanese questions with surprising rapidity and accuracy using scientific analysis and statistical charts. Each of these experts of course find something, if not everything, wrong with the Japanese practice in each field of their concern, and different advises and suggestions are given to the proper Japanese Authorities or through the press to the public.

"The Finance Division orders the balance of budget at all cost to cope with the rampant inflation; the Industrial Division urge increased production of coal and other raw materials at all cost; agriculture experts lay down a vast plan for redistribution of farm land, for reforestation, and for soil conservation; Education experts, a huge plan for school rehabilitation and reforms, for better pay for teachers; Judicial experts, complete reorganization of Japanese tribunals with increased salary for judges; Labor experts, the most advanced Labor legislation with creation of a large administration for Labor protection; Public Health experts, ... etc., etc.

"Frequent scene in a Cabinet meeting or in the Diet is this: A minister in the Cabinet or a party leader in the Diet stress that his plan or his bill have been suggested or approved by the 'higher authority' and that 'it is categorically imperative for the Japanese government to collaborate to the fullest extent with the Occupation authorities'. All other members are afraid to contradict and keep mum or one of them rush to whom he thinks competent person in the G.H.Q. (often not the same person who first suggested), explain his idea, get a nod and come back to say: 'My amendment

Controls (continued)

is exactly what General MacArthur wants and it is your duty to vote for it."

American businessmen in Japan find the same minute regulations. One businessman's report points out: "Approval and enthusiastic support for any constructive project is relatively easy to obtain from responsible Japanese. However, the approval of occupation authorities is another matter."

A great part of the failure of the occupation can be ascribed to this extraordinarily detailed supervision. The Japanese discovered at firsthand that American bureaucrats are little, if any, better than their own. Some American officials can be, and are bribed. Few S.C.A.P. officials have had any previous experience in Japan or knowledge about Japanese methods. They therefore try to impose American methods that are unworkable under Japanese conditions. Furthermore, S.C.A.P. for many reasons has been unable to attract American executives of high caliber.

The Japanese argue: How can we possibly develop democratically if every decision is either taken by S.C.A.P. or subject to S.C.A.P. approval? Instead, the Japanese not only take all their problems to S.C.A.P. but are able to place on it the blame for their own lethargy, inertia and failures. All legislation is cleared through S.C.A.P., and every political move of importance is referred to it. S.C.A.P. officials thus become deeply involved, and the use and mis-use of their authority has come to be an accepted part of Japanese politics.

General MacArthur has lately been reported making an effort to reduce this Japanese dependence on occupation whim, particularly by curtailing the authority of the Government Section. Premier Yoshida has fostered this tendency, by appealing successfully to General MacArthur over the heads of Government Section officials.

Recommendations: S.C.A.P. in its present form should be entirely abolished and a new system of top level controls worked out, by which the Japanese will have as much authority as is consistent with the achievement of the basic aims of the

Controls (continued - 2)

occupation. Every effort should then be made to attract top caliber Americans to serve with the new control board, and the Japanese should thereafter be held strictly responsible for the achievement of reasonable goals established in cooperation with the occupation.

RECOVERY

"Things are bad and getting worse--a crash is inevitable."

Nearly every Japanese at present will make this statement to American observers. Yet, under questioning, they will paint a picture of slow but steady improvement during the past year. Production has risen, although not so quickly as in Western Germany. Changes in the extreme plan for deconcentrating Japanese industry have clarified the picture for large companies. Living costs have increased by 59% since August 1947, but most wages, except for government employees, have kept pace. The release of blocked accounts has helped balance family budget deficits, although many are still selling goods or clothing in order to exist. There has been no serious food crisis since November 1947, and clothing has become easier to obtain. House construction has improved, although too much material and labor is still diverted into dance halls, clubs, theaters and resort hotels. Foreign trade has shown a large increase.

The other side of this picture is that Japanese recovery has nonetheless been so slow and inflation has increased so tremendously that the psychology of the public in general and businessmen in particular remains defeatist. Taxation, particularly the capital levy, has forced great numbers of middle and lower class people to sell their possessions, including their homes. For the first time since the end of the war, rice has piled up unsold in the stores. A rampant black market undermines legitimate activity. Capital has practically disappeared, and nearly all companies depend on government loans for current financing. The lack of an exchange rate for the yen hampers the expansion of foreign trade. The unsettled reparations question gives an element of uncertainty to all future planning. Labor laws and strikes have greatly reduced the productivity of labor. The occupation continues to absorb about one third of all Japanese production.

It is impossible to apportion the blame for these conditions between S.C.A.P. and the Japanese, because of the tight controls exercised over every economic activity by S.C.A.P. and the opportunity this gives the Japanese for putting the onus for everything on S.C.A.P. This extends to the recovery program that has been worked out for Japan in a "Blue Book" called "Plan for a Self-Supporting Japanese Economy." The

Recovery (continued)

aim of this plan is to make Japan self-sufficient by 1952, in line with the recommendations of the reports made by Overseas Consultants and the so-called Johnston Mission. The plan calls for an expenditure of \$165,000,000 for the fiscal year 1949-50. The Japanese were not consulted in the drawing up of this plan.

The recovery program is hampered by the extreme suspicion and distrust with which S.C.A.P. officials view all Japanese and most American businessmen. S.C.A.P. is loath to accept any project no matter how good which it does not originate. There is also an understandable but unfortunate emphasis on projects which will bring a return in dollars during the current fiscal year. This no doubt is inspired partly by a desire to make a good showing before the congressional appropriations committees. However, the achievement of self-sufficiency by 1952 is being jeopardized by this attitude and in the long run will cost the American taxpayer more money than if smaller returns were accepted during the immediate future.

Recommendations: Direction of the Japanese economy should be returned to the Japanese as quickly as possible and as completely as is consistent with the basic aims of the occupation. An exchange rate should be set for the yen, but if a currency reform similar to that in Germany is contemplated, it should be evolved and put in force by the Japanese alone so that the resentment of the millions who will be adversely affected will not be directed against the U. S. The Japanese should also be given latitude in changing labor laws and taking other measures to increase productivity.

Occupation costs should be drastically reduced and no longer made a charge on the Japanese government, thus ending the fiction that the Japanese are paying these costs whereas they actually eventually are paid by the U. S. taxpayer. The recovery program should be coordinated with Japanese plans. The funds due to be appropriated will not, however, in any case be sufficient to assure Japanese self-sufficiency by 1952. The gap must be filled by private investment.

INVESTMENTS

Under the 1942 laws called the "Enemy Properties Supervision Laws", enemy properties in Japan were taken over by the government or sold to Japanese, while bonds held by foreigners were declared invalid. Compensation for these properties and these bonds was paid into accounts held for the foreign holders in Japanese banks. During the war, foreign companies and Japanese companies in which foreigners had interests suffered damage of 3,000,000,000 yen, calculated on a pre-inflation basis. At the same time, most American companies wrote off their Japanese investments in order to reduce income taxes. On Sep. 22, 1946, directives were issued by S.C.A.P. to the Japanese government concerning the restoration of allied property, and in conformity with these directives, the Japanese set up various rules under which property could be restored. However, a request by the Japanese Finance Ministry in 1947 that American and British holders of bonds issued by Japanese electrical companies be compensated by being given mortgages on existing electrical installations has never been acted on by S.C.A.P. A number of American companies have considered repossessing their Japanese properties, and a number of others are at present in consultation with Japanese firms. However, some of the most important companies have decided against repossessing their Japanese properties at this time, and progress on new projects has been slow. So far, there has been little sign of the flow of private capital needed to supplement government funds if Japan is to become self-sufficient.

The reasons for this lack of interest in investing in Japan are inherent in the economic conditions reviewed in previous sections of this report. Furthermore, American corporations will not consider repossessing their Japanese properties until American laws and regulations have been enacted fixing their tax liability in such cases. Nor will most American companies seriously consider Japanese investment until certain Japanese laws have been repealed or amended. To mention only a few--the tax laws which make it almost prohibitive for foreign interests to carry on business, must be liberalized--the anti-monopoly law, which is too broad, must be

Investments (continued)

amended to conform to our own Sherman and Clayton Acts--the patent law, which fails to afford adequate protection, must be revised, and the deconcentration law, which is an extension of the anti-trust law, must be repealed.

Recommendations: Action should be taken in Washington to clarify the tax laws so as to make investment in Japan attractive. The Japanese, under proper supervision, should be allowed to make such compensation as is practical for foreign property damaged or otherwise lost during the war. Again, under proper supervision, the Japanese should be allowed to alter their laws so as to make foreign investment attractive.

Even these measures will probably not assure a sufficient flow of capital to Japan. In addition, American legislation should be enacted to allow the United States to guarantee the principal and interest in dollars of loans made to Japanese industry when in each case payment is adequately secured, and the loan has been approved by an appropriate government agency. To induce investments in equities, provision should be made to permit limited conversion of earnings into dollars. The U. S. Government, if called to make good on its guarantee, would be subrogated to the rights and remedies of the bondholders, and to the extent yen is converted into dollars, would become the owner of Japanese currency.

RAW MATERIALS

One of the chief obstacles in the way of increased Japanese production is lack of raw materials. The occupation has naturally stressed stepping up exports as the chief method of paying for raw material imports. It has made far less progress in developing Japan's own raw materials and fostering the exploitation of sources in non-dollar areas of the Pacific.

Coal, which is as basic to the Japanese economy as it is to any other, is a good example. At the end of the war, Korean laborers were necessarily released from Japanese coal mines. Japanese labor at the same time was unionized and given advanced working conditions and short hours. Little effort has been made to rehabilitate the run-down mines or install modern machinery, although funds in yen were made available in the summer of 1947 by the Japanese, while the Export-Import Bank has indicated it would give favorable consideration to a loan for this purpose.

S.C.A.P. has suffered from an almost complete lack of coal experts and has only recently shown enough interest to consider authorizing a very preliminary study of the problem. The present stress has been put on getting maximum production, regardless of the fact that working many Japanese mines in their present condition endangers future output. Furthermore, experts say that production has been increased only on paper. Actually, the coal produced has been of such a steadily deteriorating quality that, measured in terms of energy output, production has declined, not increased.

Recommendations: American recovery funds, both Governmental and private, should first be directed toward a rehabilitation of Japanese coal mines, even though immediate production is sacrificed. Arrangements should also be made to develop other Pacific raw material sources. For example, coal mines of high quality and large reserves are open for development in Dutch Borneo. The Hainan iron ore reserves amount to 80,000,000 tons and can be mined by open strip operations. South Malaya has undeveloped deposits of bauxite. The closed phosphate rock deposits in Anguar Island should be reopened. Southern Korea has neglected mines and other natural resources now being surveyed by E.C.A.

ARMY

The army of occupation has accomplished its mission of demobilizing and disarming the Japanese forces. However, it still performs many functions such as helping the Japanese collect taxes and the rice harvest. In some cases--for example, recent Communist inspired Korean rioting--only the Army's presence has enabled the Japanese to maintain civil order. With the perpetual disarmament of Japan set forth in the new constitution, the U. S. Army is looked upon by the Japanese as their only defense against aggression.

In the performance of its present essentially civilian functions, the Army is spread all over Japan. It does not have enough men adequately to guard the thousands of tunnels and bridges through and over which its communications run. It is encumbered by about 26,000 dependents. An estimated \$600,000,000 has been spent on housing for these dependents, and as pointed out previously, this has been a heavy drain on the Japanese economy. The highest officers fear that, if hostilities should develop in the immediate future, the Army in Japan might become a whole series of Bataans. Whether the Army could even cope with organized civilian resistance from the Japanese is doubtful in view of the opportunities for sabotage and the fact that it is dependent upon Japanese labor for operating much of its transport and in other vital ways.

Recommendations: The Army should be divorced as rapidly as possible from the economic and governmental aspects of the occupation. It should then be reorganized as soon as possible into combat units designed to repel possible invasion and to strike anywhere in Japan in case invasion succeeds. The number of dependents should be reduced as quickly as is consonant with the maintenance of morale.

The Japanese should be permitted a well-armed and well-trained constabulary of at least 150,000 men with a system of control and command such that it could be entrusted with guarding tunnels, bridges and similar installations. Only as a last resort should Japan be permitted otherwise to revive its armed forces, even under a most rigid American supervision. Language and other difficulties would make the Japanese

Army (continued)

army far harder to control than, say, a German army, and its revival might compromise the genuine revulsion toward war that has occurred in Japan.

THE EMPEROR'S POSITION

Emperor Hirohito is a man of moral and personal integrity, considerable personal courage, small intellectual gifts and sometimes irresolute character. His narrow interpretation of his constitutional prerogatives and the knowledge that he was a prisoner of the militarists led to his acquiescence in the attack on the United States. On the other hand, it was only by his personal intervention, arranged by Premier Suzuki and his associates, that made the surrender possible. The imperial authority is the chief and almost the only authority that holds Japanese society together at the present time. Without it Japan could be governed only by force majeure.

The occupation problem was to prevent an emperor from ever again being used as a channel of authority by a group such as the former militarists. The occupation approach was to make him a constitutional monarch. This coincided with Hirohito's own desires and those of his palace advisors. However, this approach has been compromised by occupation misunderstanding of the Emperor's so-called divinity. He is not regarded as divine in the Western sense of the word. He is Kami, which means that he is the symbolic link between living Japanese and the spirits of all dead Japanese, plus the several million Japanese gods. The occupation idea that his "divinity" would wither away if only he were obliged to show himself in public and become democratic was thus based on a fallacy. The proof is that never has the Japanese feeling for the Emperor been more mystic or more deeply rooted than it is today.

Recommendations: The Japanese should be allowed to work out the Emperor's future position--within the limits imposed by the new constitution--without interference from occupation authorities. High palace officials, who almost alone among Japanese have no illusions about the imperial system, shall then be held accountable for the results.

POLITICS

In the spring of 1947 General MacArthur publicly stated that democracy was sufficiently firmly rooted in Japan for the period of intensive allied tutelage to end. What the General presumably meant was not that Japan had suddenly turned democratic in the sense that the State of New Jersey is democratic, but that favorable conditions had been established for the development of a responsible and representative type of government.

In this development Japan has been both helped and hindered by the occupation. The new constitution, although written by occupation officials, has been generally accepted by the Japanese, although it is little understood by the masses. The three general elections have given the Japanese valuable experience in the mechanics of government, although, like the constitution, their purpose has often not been understood by the public, and interest in them has steadily decreased. Political parties have been ridden with corruption, but this was inevitable under post-war Japanese conditions and has affected confidence in the new political system far less than most foreigners imagine. Japanese thought has been constructively directed to the problems of civil liberties and legal procedure.

These hopeful developments are compromised by the extent to which all political decisions must pass through S.C.A.P. and the consequent involvement of S.C.A.P. officials in Japanese politics, sometimes of the most disreputable kind. It is because of this that Premier Yoshida has derived considerable political strength from his refusal to lean on S.C.A.P. advice in every particular. Censorship of the press has also often caused the Japanese to doubt the sincerity of S.C.A.P.'s professions of faith in liberalism. ✓

As in so many other fields, S.C.A.P. has also attempted to impose on the Japanese the details of the American political system without taking into consideration either conditions in Japan or the very considerable political sophistication of the Japanese when working in their own way. Rightly or wrongly, Japan will develop democracy along Japanese, not American, lines. //

Politics (continued)

The "purge" has unfortunately removed from the scene many of those best fitted by character and the experience of opposition to the militarists to aid Japan to develop along those lines. The chief effect of the purge was originally economic in that it removed many of the most experienced and pro-American businessmen and has thereby hampered Japanese recovery. Its principal effect now has become political, because it has embittered some of the ablest men in Japan and is forcing them underground. The record proves that business, particularly big business, plus some Army and Navy officers and diplomats constituted the only effective opposition to the militarists. But these often were the very individuals and classes singled out by the purge. For three years, they hoped for a change in policy, but recent information indicates plans at least have been mooted for forming an opposition to the occupation that would include these once well-intentioned, but now embittered men, plus unrepentant nationalists and extremists of the Left. The seriousness of such a development cannot be overstated. If it went so far as to include a link with the Communists, American strategy would be obliged to consider whether Japan would be a tenable military base in case of emergency.

All Japanese political considerations are affected by the rise of the Communist Party. It was originally fostered under Washington and occupation directives and has since then had the indirect but active backing of Moscow. Its 50,000 to 100,000 members form a well-knit, well-financed organization that still dominates the most important industrial unions. At the same time, the Communists appear to have shifted their major appeal to school teachers, farmers and particularly to youths. This may indicate a longer range policy than was implied by the previous emphasis on control of unions. Its probable aim would now seem not so much to harass the occupation by strikes and labor trouble as to build up a mass following that could exert a decisive influence sometime in the future if the current Japanese disillusionment with the occupation continues. The Communists have derived considerable strength from events in China. There are also many significant indications that the Japanese

Politics (continued - 2)

as a whole realize that because of what is happening in China and because of the cold war in general, they are regaining some bargaining power in their relations with the United States.

Recommendations: The Japanese should be allowed to develop their own political institutions with the aid of high level advice and control from the allied powers. The Government Section of S.C.A.P. should be abolished. Among other occupation sections, as well as among the Japanese, it has acquired an unenviable reputation for being arbitrary, wrong-headed, and misinformed. The plan to establish a purge appeals board, apparently with General MacArthur's approval, should be expedited. The Japanese should be permitted to deal with the Communists in their own way, since they profess confidence that they can handle the situation, providing it is not allowed to deteriorate much further.

Sir George Sansom, the greatest living authority on Japan, had this to recommend concerning the political problem as a whole: "We should do well not to fall into the error of preaching, prescribing, and dictating, but only to make it clear to Japan in general terms what kind of behaviour will secure our encouragement and help. There should be no difficulty in setting up a small control commission which would keep an eye upon political and economic trends in Japan and warn the Japanese Government if these showed signs of taking an undesirable course. An elaborate system of specific controls, with all the paraphernalia of departments and sections, and a great staff of experts, observers, inspectors, and advisers would defeat its own ends by evoking resentment and passive resistance. It would encourage nationalistic sentiment and might well lead to underground movements. It is best to give the Japanese as much untrammelled responsibility as possible in the conduct of their own affairs and to judge them by results. Any systematic controls must sooner or later come to an end, and their continuance will merely postpone in artificial conditions the day when the Japanese must stand on their own feet. "Remote control" is best,

Politics (continued - 3)

and that depends not upon machinery but upon the fixity of purpose of the Powers concerned.

"In the long run the development of political institutions in Japan will depend not upon what the Japanese are told or advised to do by others but upon their estimate of what is best suited to their own conditions and temperament. They will be influenced by example rather than precept, by the successful working of democracy in other countries and not by the mere professions of its exponents."

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Rec'd January 20, 1949
9:14 a.m.

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 21 1949
DIRECTOR
Department of State

FROM: Nanking
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 158, January 20

Following Morsecast north Shensi radio January 1:
"New China News Agency today issued following comment entitled 'Japanese elections and China'.
Japanese are likewise closely following events in Japan. These two great Far Eastern Nations can and should establish close friendship.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 10 1949
DCR
LIAISON OFFICE

In past, however, forces of Japanese imperialism obstructed development of such friendship. Japanese aggressors at first used economic and political means, and later military means to invade China. This gave rise to eight years anti-Japanese war of Chinese people. Result of war was defeat for Japanese imperialism. But in wake of this defeat came American imperialism. America extended its control over Japan, in violation of Potsdam declaration on wiping out Japanese militarism and democratizing Japan, published by China, Great Britain and US in July 1945 with agreement of Soviet Union. America continued to pursue reactionary policy, obstructing sino Japanese cooperation.

New perspective has now appeared for sino-Japanese relations, owing to fact that Chinese people will soon win nation-wide victory. Regardless of whether American imperialists and their Japanese pawns are willing or not, Peoples China will concern itself with control of Japan. Japan will have to conclude peace treaty with Peoples China and establish economic and political relations.

Beyond all doubt,

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-2-#158, January 20 from Nanking

Beyond all doubt, Chinese people are willing to establish genuine, close friendship with Japanese people. Such friendship is entirely different from gruesome 'friendship' spoken of by Japanese aggressive elements and bootlicking KMT government. Such genuine friendship will bring broadest benefits to peoples of (garble) own freedom will, in faithful compliance (garble) declaration, (garble) Japanese democratic cause and prevent revival of Japanese reactionary forces.

Chinese people not only have nothing for which they must rely on Japanese reactionary force, but furthermore have no cause to connive with and assist these forces, as American imperialism and KMT government do. These forces of Japanese reaction oppress Japanese people and menace peace in Far East.

Those best qualified to lead Japan and establish genuine, close friendship with new China are Japanese democratic elements, Japanese communists and other democrats who are not stained with blood of Chinese people. This simple truth must be carried to all Japanese.

On January 23, Japanese people will take part in third post-war general elections. These elections will, as in case of former two elections, be conducted under violent interference of American and Japanese reactionaries. They will therefore certainly be incapable of freely expressing will of Japanese people. Nevertheless, conscious voting Japanese working people and conscious voting Japanese cannot but take into account future of sino-Japanese relations and (garble) voice of Chinese people, when they consider future of Japanese.

American and Japanese reactionaries are repressing election campaign of Japanese Communist Party and other truly democratic elements. This manifests their hostility to (garble) fear of interests of Japanese people and genuine friendship between Chinese and Japanese nations.

All those sincerely interested in (garble) for Japanese people and for sino-Japanese (garble) should disregard this

repression and

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-3-#158, January 20 from Nanking

repression and elect (garble) more democratic (garble)
is beneficial from view point of Japanese situation,
both domestic and international."

Sent Department 158, repeated Tokyo 5, pouched Shanghai
(Department pouch Moscow).

STUART

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NOTE: Pouched to Moscow 1/21/49 CSB

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, January 20, 1949. *Dir*

No. 38

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6 DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
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Subject: Japanese Newspaper Prerogatives in Elections

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to transmit here-
with the enclosures listed below bearing upon a recent difference
of view with regard to the prerogatives of Japanese newspapers in
the matter of supporting and opposing individual candidates for
electoral offices.

Certain Japanese officials were at first inclined to interpret
the electoral law as prohibiting newspapers from engaging in per-
sonal campaigns for individual candidates. It will be noted from
the second and third enclosures that a spokesman of this Headquarters
expressed the view that a fuller participation by the press in
electoral activities is proper and that this view was accepted by
the National Election Management Commission.

*XR
894.911*

894.00/1-2049

Enclosures: *att.*

- ✓ 1. Excerpt from Law concerning Provisional Exceptions (English translation).
- ✓ 2. Statement of January 14, 1949 by Major Daniel C. IMBODEN.
- ✓ 3. Statement of January 18, 1949 by NEMC.

In original and hectograph to Department.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 38 of January 20, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Japanese Newspaper Prerogatives in Elections."

COFY OF TRANSLATION

Law concerning the Provisional Exceptions to Election Campaigns and Others, Articles 18 through 21

Article 18. A candidate for Diet membership and the representative of a political party or any other political organization or their branches may advertise concerning the election once during the period of election campaign, in a daily newspaper designated by the Metropolitan, Hokkaido or Prefectural Election Administration Commission for the respective constituency, using the same size of space as fixed by the Metropolitan, Hokkaido or Prefectural Election Administration Commission for each candidate.

The newspaper carrying the foregoing advertisement may be distributed in the usual way by the newspaper agents, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 19.

(Restriction on Writings and Pictures)

Article 19. No postal cards, hand-written letters, visiting cards or any other writings or pictures shall be distributed for the purpose of election campaign. Provided the same shall not apply to postal cards or unsealed letters only containing a notice of the establishment of election offices, a request to act as witness, necessary arrangements for speech meetings or necessary communications concerning election business.

The postal cards and unsealed letters mentioned in the foregoing proviso shall be limited to one thousand for each candidate and shall be marked by post offices indicating that it is used for election business.

Circulation of notice boards, and any other writings, pictures and sign boards (including placards) to a number of people for the purpose of election campaign shall be deemed to be a distribution within the meaning of the first paragraph. But circulation of the items provided for in Paragraph 2 of Article 14 and Paragraph 5 of Article 22 are sic not included in the foregoing provision.

Article 20. No writings and pictures for the use of election campaign shall be exhibited, except the following:

1. Posters

RESTRICTED

Enclosure No. 1 to
Tokyo's Despatch No. 38
of January 20, 1949.

-2-

1. Posters and paper lanterns used at the place where street speeches are made according to Article 14, Paragraph 2.

2. Placards, posters and paper lanterns used on motor-cars, loud-speakers and boats according to the provision of Article 22, Paragraph 5.

3. Placards, posters, sign-boards, paper lanterns, etc., used on the site of election offices to indicate their places.

Article 21. During the period of election campaign, no person shall, in the name of advertisement for writings or performances, or under whatever pretense calculated to evade the prohibition stipulated in the preceding two articles, distribute or exhibit writings or pictures chiefly indicating names of candidates, names of political parties or organizations, or purporting to recommend, support or oppose any candidates.

The Election Administration Commissions of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or Prefectures and City, Town and Village may remove or cause to be removed for the period of election campaign any writings or pictures that are considered to fall under the preceding Paragraph.

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 38 of January 20, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Japanese Newspaper Prerogatives in Elections."

COPY

Statement by Major Daniel C. Imboden, Chief of Press and Publications Unit Information Division, Civil Information and Education Section, General Headquarters:

"I have been asked the following questions by any number of metropolitan and provincial newspapers: 'Is it proper for this newspaper to support a political party, or candidates for office? Is it proper for this newspaper to condemn a political party that we do not like or condemn a candidate for political office that we do not like?'

"In answer to those questions, I state: It is the duty of the Japanese newspapers to comment upon, either favorably or unfavorably, any political party and its platform or any political party candidate. Japanese newspapers enjoy freedom of the press as guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution.

"As to the statements that Japanese election laws prohibit a newspaper from supporting a candidate for office, all I can say is: If there be such a law, it is clearly not in the public interest and is, on the face of it, a contradiction of the Japanese Constitution that sets up freedom of expression and of the press.

"My advice to the Japanese Press is to proceed to state what you think of the candidates and the parties. I invite your attention to the following statement contained in General MacArthur's New Year message to the Japanese people:

'THE GENERAL ELECTION JUST AHEAD WILL TEST YOUR WISDOM IN THE SELECTION OF A LEADERSHIP TO WHOM YOU WILL IN THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD ENTRUST THE SOVEREIGN POWER. THE TIMES REQUIRE GREAT DIGNITY AND CAPACITY FOR WISE STATESMANSHIP AND EACH SHOULD BE THE MEASURE OF YOUR CHOICE - MEN CAPABLE OF ELEVATING YOUR NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE FORUM TO THE STANDARD SET BY THE FINEST OF YOUR

TRADITIONSRESTRICTED

Enclosure No. 2 to
Tokyo's Despatch No. 38,
January 20, 1949

- 2 -

TRADITIONS. THEREAFTER, THE ISSUE
WILL REST SQUARELY UPON THE TYPE OF
LEADERSHIP THEY BRING TO THE COUNTRY
AND THE RESOLUTE WILL BY WHICH EACH
AMONG YOUR CITIZENRY ACQUITS HIS
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
GREAT TASK OF ENSURING THAT JAPAN
MAY LIVE.'

"Therefore I urge the Japanese Press to follow
General MacArthur's New Year message and point
out the wisdom of electing this man or woman,
this party or that party, and discuss thoroughly
the issues."

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 38
of January 20, 1949 from the United
States Political Adviser for Japan,
Tokyo, subject: "Japanese Newspaper
Prerogatives in Elections."

COPY

Announcement of the National Election Management Commission
13 January 1949

The National Election Management Commission, after obtaining Cabinet approval, made the following announcement regarding press reporting in connection with the election:

Needless to say, it is the true function of the press to report to the public all news freely and impartially. The Constitution guarantees the press freedom of criticism. This also is the spirit of the Press Code. It is therefore desired that the press at the time of an election especially demonstrate their true function and speedily and actively supply to the voting public fair and just criticism on political parties and candidates. We believe that in the administration of election laws also these principles naturally should be fully respected.

The foregoing imposes on the press the obligation to perform its function as a responsible media sic of public information, at all times giving paramountcy to respect for the interests of the people.

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Routing slip with checkboxes for various departments (EE, Info, SS, C, O, EUR, OLI, CIA, AAN, DCL, ITP, OFD, POS, EURX, DCR).

CONFIDENTIAL

Division of Chinese Affairs stamp: 'no action', 'JAN 24 1949', 'control 7097', 'file', 'Refile Jan. 22, 1949 5:43 a.m.' with handwritten initials.

FROM: Banking TO: Secretary of State NO: 191, January 22, 1 p.m.

Office of Far Eastern Affairs stamp: 'JAN 24 1949', 'Department of State'.

Embassy looks upon North Shensi broadcast January 19 entitled "Japanese elections and China" REEMBTEL 158, January 20, repeated Tokyo 5 and unnumbered Moscow as exceedingly important indication CCP fear that democratized Japan along US pattern would constitute serious threat consolidation CCP ideology throughout a Communized China. Broadcast interesting both as to substance and timing. It breaks silence concerning CCP outlook on Japanese problem. Also by singling out Japanese Communists and "other democratic elements" for support, it neatly aligns CCP and Soviet policies toward Japan. Moreover it suavely assumes new CCP dominated government to be formed in 1949 according to CCP New Year's Day message, will take over present Chinese representation on allied council for Japan.

Perhaps of even greater significance is promise of economic relations with Japan. It may well be that CCP planners are not expecting extensive economic support from USSR and are hoping to minimize their economic dependence on US by exports of Manchurian grains, coal and ores to Japan in return for capital goods, spares and technical aid from politically reliable Japanese advisors. As Japanese exploitation proved, the two areas are economically complementary. It will be difficult to reconcile our interest in making Japan economically self-supporting with the strengthening of a Communist controlled economic base in Manchuria and North China.

Sent Department, repeated Tokyo 7, Moscow 6.

STUART

WWA:RT

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861.20293 LIAISON OFFICE stamp with date MAR 10 1949 and handwritten initials.

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
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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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is assigned to



United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, January 24, 1949.

No. 50

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DJR

Subject: Transmitting text of United Press Interview with
Premier Yoshida

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UNITED STATES
LEGATION
TOKYO

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
File P. A. K.
FEB 8 - 1949

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's A-184 of
December 31, 1948, requesting the text of an exclusive interview
given by Premier Shigeru Yoshida to the United Press on December 27,
1948, and to transmit herewith the only record of that interview,
written by Miles W. VAUGHN, United Press General Manager for Asia.

1/

The Department will observe that Mr. Vaughn quoted Premier
Yoshida as being enthusiastic about General MacArthur's recommenda-
tions for economic reconstruction. In that connection he is quoted
as stating that his Government is planning the formation of a com-
mittee to review "the cases of a number of top-flight industrialists
who were purged, possibly unjustly".

This story was not distributed by the United Press to its cli-
ents in Japan.

In subsequent public statements on the same subject Premier
Yoshida has emphasized the need to reconsider the purge of village
and town headmen and allowed the reconsideration of purged indus-
trialists to appear as incidental (this Mission's despatch no. 22
of January 14, 1949).

Major Napier, head of the Public Administration Division,
Government Section, General Headquarters, SCAP, denied in the Eng-
lish language Nippon Times of January 12, 1949 that an amnesty from
the purge was being considered by SCAP.

2/

Apparently undeterred by the warning from Government Section,
the Japanese Government is reported proceeding with its plans for
a purge review committee. Mainichi on January 17 reported that
Justice Minister UEDA has finished drafting a plan for the establish-
ment of such a committee. It states also that the projected system

"will

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
Tokyo's Despatch No. 50,
January 24, 1949.

- 2 -

3/ "will liberate purgees only in those cases where the purge is recognized to be clearly unjustifiable", and that "nobody who should be purged on formal as well as substantial grounds will be cleared". A translation in full of this Mainichi report is enclosed.

4/ In an editorial on January 12, 1949, Mainichi (in the only editorial on the subject which has recently come to the attention of the Mission) adopts in effect the position taken by General Headquarters, i.e., that abandoning the categories of purgees for substantive charges opens the way to clearance of many persons who ought not to be cleared. Mainichi considered that, should the ban be lifted, "it would be difficult to find a yardstick by which to determine the men of high character and those who are not". It found that "the public's estimation of a man's ability has changed during the past few years" but it believed that "men who can work should be permitted to do so". This newspaper continued: "In political circles there is a big vacuum. In other fields, new men have filled the vacancies created by the purge. The only difference is that the new men lack experience and are less known. But in the political field, it is disheartening to find fledglings who, because they have been returned to the Diet once or twice, are being considered as competent candidates for cabinet posts. Should the purged politicians return, much activity can be expected, but we would rather see new men come up in the coming general election." A full translation of this editorial is enclosed.

Respectfully yours,


W. J. Sebald

Enclosures: *att*

1. Copy of United Press interview with Premier Yoshida, Dec. 27, 1948.
2. Copy of INS article on purge amnesty in Nippon Times January 12, 1949.
3. Translation of article on planned purge review committee in Mainichi, January 17, 1949.
4. Translation of editorial "On the Purge" in Mainichi, January 12, 1949.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 50 dated January 24, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Transmitting text of United Press Interview with Premier Yoshida".

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(C O P Y)

BY MILES W. VAUGHN

UNITED PRESS GENERAL MANAGER FOR ASIA

TOKYO, Dec. 27 -- (UP)-- The government is hastening formation of its special committees to draw up a concrete program to carry out General MacArthur's recommendations for a speed-up in the economic reconstruction of the country, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida told the United Press today in an exclusive interview.

The government also has obtained SCAP's assent to a plan for formation of a new board to hear appeals of those who feel they were unjustly purged under the Allied purge procedure, the Prime Minister said. Both the committee and the new appeal board should be completed within a few days and should begin functioning early next year.

The government is enthusiastic about General MacArthur's reconstruction recommendations and is determined to leave no stone unturned to carry out the Supreme Allied Commander's wishes in every detail, the Prime Minister said, adding that he is attempting to obtain the best brains in the nation to draw up a feasible plan for general economic recovery.

Part of the economic drive the Prime Minister implied, will be to reconsider the cases of a number of top flight industrialists and others who were purged, possibly unjustly. The services of some of these men would be of the greatest value in framing a recovery program because of their long experience in world trade and technical matters.

With regard to the situation in China, where communists are approaching the national capital in Nanking, the Prime Minister saw no immediate menace to this country. Communists everywhere, he said, naturally will be encouraged to greater efforts towards "world revolution" because of the Red victories in China, but there is no reason to believe that the Japanese Communist Party will receive any tremendous stimulation from the victories of their comrades across the China sea. Japanese are inclined to fear Russian communism a great deal more than they do its off-shoot in China, Mr. Yoshida believed.

The Prime Minister said his party looks forward to the coming general elections with full confidence and that he thinks there is a good chance he will head a new cabinet, after the elections, with effective support in the Diet.

One of the problems that will confront the new government, he said, is the need for legislation to control communist infiltration into the government's tax collecting organization and other government agencies. Some method must be found to prevent communists from attaining positions of power which will enable them to sabotage the reconstruction program, Mr. Yoshida said.

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 50
dated January 24, 1949 from the United
States Political Adviser for Japan,
Tokyo, on the subject "Transmitting
text of United Press Interview with
Premier Yoshida".

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(C O P Y)

PURGE AMNESTY IS NOT PLANNED

By HOWARD HANDLEMAN
INS Far Eastern Bureau Manager

A high Government Section official Tuesday labelled false the reports that an "amnesty from the purge" was being considered by SCAP.

Maj. Jack Napier, Executive Officer of Government Section and head of the Purge Division, told International News Service:

"I know of nothing under consideration within SCAP to in any way change the categorical definitions of the purge as they now stand.

"To my knowledge, there is no basis in fact for recent speculation of a change."

Major Napier made his statement after he was informed of press reports from Okayama which quoted Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida as saying:

"Generally speaking when the time comes a sort of amnesty may be expected."

Mr. Yoshida spoke specifically of the economic purge.

(C O P Y)

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 50 dated January 24, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Transmitting text of United Press Interview with Premier Yoshida".

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(C O P Y)

Definite Plan for Purge Review Committee Completed - Mainichi -
17 Jan 49. Translator: J. Aomi. (UG)

Full Translation:

Premier YOSHIDA, who is now on a stumping tour of KANSAI, has frequently talked of a plan to set up a committee to deal with appeals by purgees.

Justice Minister Ueda has recently finished working on a draft plan for the establishment of such a committee. The plan provides for the composition of the committee, the procedure required for the filing of appeals, etc.

The projected system will liberate purgees only in those cases where purge is recognized to be clearly unjustifiable. There will be no relaxation of the basic purge policy. Accordingly, nobody who should be purged on formal as well as substantial grounds will be cleared.

The committee will be composed of about seven persons. The Government is already selecting suitable members.

The plan is expected to materialize with Premier YOSHIDA's return to TOKYO on Sunday.

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(C O P Y)

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Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 50 dated January 24, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Transmitting text of United Press Interview with Premier Yoshida".

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(C O P Y)

On the Purge (Sub-Editorial) - Mainichi - 12 Jan 49.
Translator: Seki. (EB)

Summary:

Premier YOSHIDA has established a Screening Appeals Committee for purgees. As Mr. YOSHIDA stated there are undoubtedly many men of high character who distinguished themselves in promoting the sound development of the self-governing system among the town and village heads who have been purged merely because they held office during the war. Should the ban be lifted, however, it would be difficult to find a yardstick by which to determine the men of high character and those who are not.

Generally speaking, there are many top-ranking persons in Tokyo, who were purged for the sake of formality. Since their positions are now occupied by men who have become prominent since the war, it will only cause confusion if the purgees should be permitted to return. Moreover, the public's estimation of a man's ability has changed during the past few years. Nevertheless, we believe that men who can work, should be permitted to do so.

In political circles, there is a big vacuum. In other fields, new men have filled the vacancies created by the purge. The only difference is that the new men lack experience and are less known. But in the political field, it is disheartening to find that fledglings, who, because they have been returned to the Diet once or twice, are being considered as competent candidates for cabinet posts. Should the purged politicians return, much activity can be expected, but we would rather see new men come up in the coming general election.

In 1900, HARA, Kei became a Representative after he entered the Ito Cabinet. At the time of the Okuma Cabinet in the Taisho Era, HAMAGUCHI, Osachi and SHIMOOKA, Chuji became Representatives. In those days, however, it was considered risky for bureaucrats to become Representatives.

Are there any bureaucrats in the Democratic Liberal Party who will be as promising as the above mentioned persons?

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(C O P Y)

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INCOMING AIRGRAM

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AIRGRAM

Office of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 31 1949
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 Department of State

5737

FROM: USFOLAD, Tokyo

Date of mailing: January 25, 1949

Recd.: Jan 28, 1949, 3:11 PM

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

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Secretary of State,

Washington.

A-16, January 25, 1949.

Virtually complete returns for the Japanese general election of January 23, 1949 have given the conservative Democratic Liberal Party of Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru a commanding absolute majority of seats in the House of Representatives. Almost 32 million men and women voted in the election, seventy-four per cent of the 42,090,916 eligible voters. This figure far exceeds the fifty-one per cent who voted in the 1948 United States presidential elections, as well as exceeding the sixty-eight per cent and the seventy-two per cent participation respectively in the 1947 and 1946 Japanese general elections. The campaigning before the election was quiet because of the stringent electoral law and because of the recent scandals connected with political funds; this was consistently reported by the press as lack of popular interest. The figures convincingly prove that there is no lack of interest and no lack of sense of responsibility on the part of the Japanese people in their use of the ballot.

The results of the election should be appraised in definite relation to the mechanism of voting which is now in operation in Japan in accordance with the present election law. Although there are 466 seats in the House of Representatives, the country is not divided into 466 electoral districts but instead into 117 electoral districts. The various electoral districts control respectively not less than three and not more than five seats. The voter who proceeds to the polls casts a vote for only one candidate for the House of Representatives. The Japan Communist Party;

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Tokyo's A-16, January 25, 1949 -2-

desiring to make a spectacular minority showing, did not enter more than one candidate in any electoral district (and failed to enter a candidate in only two electoral districts). Communist support in any electoral district was therefore concentrated upon one name. The larger parties, aspiring to larger control in the Diet, entered numerous candidates, and in many electoral districts even entered more candidates than the number of seats available. This law, passed under Social Democratic leadership in apparent apprehension of future danger from the conservatives in choking off possible minority electoral strength, greatly favors the launching of highly organized minority parties. The communist popular vote of 985,000 (3.6%) in the 1947 general election was impressively increased to 3,275,000 (10.3%) in the present election, and at the same time this has resulted in a disproportionate increase in number of seats from four in the previous House to thirty-five in the new House. (Continued in A-17).

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January 25, 1949.

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The only old-line leader of any consequence to be reelected is Mr. ASANUMA Inajiro. The Social Democratic Party, which might normally be expected to play the leading role of an opposition force in the event of a conservative victory, now not only has a minority position but has lost its principal leaders. This disintegration of the Social Democratic Party may have far reaching repercussions (this Mission's despatch No. 813 of December 29, 1948).

2. The rise of communist power. Accompanying the serious disintegration of the Social Democratic Party is the remarkable increase in communist strength. It is the general consensus that the communists have gained primarily at the expense of the socialists. While many former supporters of the Social Democratic Party became disillusioned with its vacillating compromises and lack of decision or were disgusted with its many scandals and turned to the communists, the Japan Communist Party also unquestionably secured many new followers as a result of far-reaching repercussions on Japan of communist victories in China.

3. Right-Left alignment in the Diet. The general election has in effect created a powerful conservative majority faced by an opposition in which only the communists have shown increasing strength. The Diet has become divided between the two extremes as the principal centers of parliamentary political power, with the moderate middle group in a state of demoralized disintegration. While Mr. Yoshida has sufficient strength to form a single party cabinet and push through the Democratic Liberal Party's program, the communists are now in a position to make a determined bid for leadership of the opposition forces. It is certain, of course, that the communists will exercise this leadership in an aggressive manner.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DIVISION OF
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FEB - 1 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: USPOLAD, Tokyo.

Dated: January 25, 1949

Date of Mailing: Unknown

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Secretary of State,

Washington.

A-18, January 25, 1949.

Reference this Mission's A-16 and A-17 of January 25, 1949 reviewing the results of the Japanese general election of January 23, 1949.

In attempting to weigh the degree of the reactionary which has gone into the Democratic Liberal triumph, it should be carefully noted that events in the past year have tended to cause persons who are not of extreme conservative leaning to enter that party, and to vote for that party, for lack of practicable alternative. Large numbers of persons who have entered politics for the first time during present elections, many of them former Government officials, have chosen to form their political associations with the Democratic Liberals because of the extreme lack of organization and promise among the middle parties. It is the present state of Japanese politics which accounts for the adherence of large numbers of persons to the conservative party because nothing better is available.

Certain press correspondents may have placed an anti-Occupation interpretation upon the significance of the election as expressing Japanese public opinion. We consider this interpretation superficial and unwarranted. As to the large communist vote, there is of course no question that it voices sharp opposition to American policy. But conversely there is a widespread sense of apprehension among Japanese toward the communist trend as a great danger to the country, and many voters undoubtedly felt that the clearest anti-communist mandate which they could voice was a vote for Mr. YOSHIDA's party. This is a new way an adverse critique of the policies of the Occupation. We are inclined to think that the attitude of the people toward the Occupation found expression chiefly in the spectacular losses of the Democrats and the Social Democrats. Mr. KATAYAMA's cabinet was thought by the

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Tokyo's A-18,
January 25, 1949.

- 2 -

day detailed directions. Mr. ASHIDA's cabinet was thought of as scarcely less so. The involvement nevertheless of those parties in the financial scandals, and the apparently unpredictable vagaries of Headquarters in shifting and abandoning its support without notice, have been factors of disturbing confusion in the minds of the people. The Social Democrats and the Democrats were largely deserted in the resultant state of mind. The defections to the highly organized and tactically cunning communists were great; but even greater was the movement to Mr. Yoshida, a man not anti-Occupation but likewise clearly not a creation of the Occupation, a man obstinately disinclined to concessions to the compromises commonly accepted in Japanese party maneuverings, a man not muddled by the scandals, a man unreservedly against everything communistic. These factors, in our opinion, were the determining ones, not an expectation that he will oppose Headquarters policies. It should be noted that, whatever the difficulties of Headquarters in getting from Mr. Yoshida the cooperation it desired when the new Constitution was under consideration, General MacArthur never aired to the Japanese public this difference, and wisely has maintained a public impartiality with regard to Mr. Yoshida, no doubt anticipating the existing contingency as one which the indigenous logic of Japanese politics might well bring forward.

The large communist gains are conclusive evidence that communist penetration into the Japanese political and parliamentary scene is already of such proportions as to make it necessary that American policy bear constantly in mind the possibility of attempts at the use of political power along the lines which are familiar to the Department in those countries of Europe where the communists have similarly developed strong nuclear organizations.

? | An extremely important and valuable step has moved Japan forward in the direction of two-party government. The significance of this election is in having painted boldly the need of wise and restrained American policy which will succeed (where the Occupation has till now failed) in fostering the solid growth of a moderate and forward-looking party in the middle political area, to alternate with the conservatives in the conduct of the government of Japan.

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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FROM: Tokyo
 TO: Secretary of State
 NO: 31, January 26.

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 27 1949
 Department of State

PRIORITY

The following is General MacArthur's official report covering the general elections held on January 23, 1949. "Statistical summary of the general election, 23 January 1949.

1. Population: According to the ration census announced on 1 August 1948, the population of Japan was as follows: Male 39,365,452, female 40,851,444, total 80,216,896.
2. Voting age: The voting age figures (20 years and over) were given as follows: Male 21,046,824, female 22,941,823 total 43,988,647.
3. Registered voters: According to figures of the national election management commission, the registered voters in Japan on 23 January 1949 totalled 42,090,916, divided as follows: male 20,054,142 female 22,036,774, total 42,090,916.
4. Number of candidates: The number of candidates registered by the various political parties, according to the national election management commission, follows: Democratic Liberal Party 416, Democratic Party 212, Social Democratic Party 186, Peoples Cooperative Party 63, Social Renovation Party 30 New Liberal Party 12,

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-2- #31, January 26, from Tokyo

Japan Farmers Party 16 Farmer-Labor Party 45, Communist Party 115, Independent 211, minor parties 58, total 1,364.

5 Total votes cast: At 1800 hours on 23 January 1949, when the polls closed, a total of 31,168,625 votes had been cast in the general election for members of the House of Representatives. This represented a turn-out of 74.1 percent of the total 42,090,916 registered voters.

6. Election results: Tabulated according to political parties, the results of the general election were as follows: Party-total valid votes-number elected-percent. Democratic Liberal 13,381,610; 264; 43.8. Democrat 4,835,504; 68; 15.8. Social Democrat 4,129,724; 49; 13.5. Communist 2,984,583; 35; 9.6. Peoples Cooperative 1,042,123; 14; 3.4. Labor-Farmer 606,744; 7; 2.0. Social Renovation 387,214; 5; 1.3. New Liberal 187,208; 2; .6. Japan Farmer 232,833; 1; .8. Minor parties 795,308; 9; 2.6. Independent 2,007,328; 12; 6.6. Totals 30,590,179 plus invalid votes 578,446 total 31,168,625; 466; 100.0.

7. New faces in the Diet: 192 of the members of the House of Representatives are "new faces" elected for the first time; 243 were re-elected, and 31 were members of former Diets. Following is tabulation by party: party; new; re-elected; former; total. Democratic Liberal 121; 125; 18; 264. Democrat 23; 39; 6; 68. Social Democrat 6; 40; 3; 49. Communist 28; 4; 3; 35. Peoples Cooperative 0; 14; 0; 14. Labor-Farmer 0; 7; 0; 7. Social Renovation 1; 4; 0; 5. New Liberal 0; 2; 0; 2. Minor 2; 7; 1; 10. Independent 11; 1; 0; 12. Totals 192; 24; 31; 466.

8. Women in the election: A total of 44 women candidates ran for seats in the House of Representatives of these 12 women were successful.

A. Women candidates according to political parties:

Democratic

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-3- #31, January 26, from Tokyo

Democratic Liberals 5; Democrat 8; Social Democrat 9; Peoples Cooperative 1; Social Renovation 1; New Liberal 0; Japan Farmer 0; Labor-Farmer 1; Communist 3; Independent 14; minor parties 2, total 44.

B. Women elected according to parties: Party; number. Democratic Liberals 2; Social Democrat 5; Social Renovation 1; Communist 3; Labor-Farmer 1, total 12.

9. Eminent political personalities who failed in the election: Sadayoshi Hitotsumatsu, Democrat (former welfare minister); Tetsu Katayama, Social Democrat (former Prime Minister); Kanju Kato, Social Democrat (former labor minister); Shizue Kato, Social Democrat (feminist leader); Tetsuo Kudo, Democratic Liberal (former state minister); Kasuo Nagae, Social Democrat (former agriculture and forestry minister); Suehio Nishio, Social Democrat (former state minister); Kazuo Nomizo, Social Democrat (former agriculture and forestry minister); Wataru Narahashi, Democrat (former chief cabinet secretary); Giichi Takeda, Democrat (former welfare minister); Eiji Tomiyoshi, Democrat (former communications minister); Haruye Yamashite, Democrat (involved in "Izumiyama incident").

Analysis of election: The election was a smashing conservative victory. It gave practical assurance that the government would remain unchanged for the next four years, with a decisive mandate to one political party controlling a safe majority of the Diet seats. The most impressive result of the election was the gain of 112 seats by the Democratic-Liberal Party -- to a lesser degree the sharp reduction in the Socialist strength from 143 seats in the 1947 election to 49 seats resulting from the present election, and the Communist gain of 31 seats. Although even with such gain the Communist Party, in a strong one-party government, has not even a legislative bargaining position.

The Democratic-Liberals drew their increased strength from the Democrats, the Peoples Cooperatives and probably to some extent from other smaller groups with conservative leanings, while the Communists drew theirs almost entirely from the left-wing

Socialists

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