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1948

14267

# REPORT ON TRIP TO KOREA 7-12 MAY 1948

14267

09482

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AND
FAR EAST COMMAND

# ROUTING SLIP

Please return to G-2

FROM: G-2 DATE: 25 May 1948

To:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Commander-in-Chief | | Prov Marshal | |
| Aide-de-Camp | | Pub Info | |
| Chief of Staff | (1) XXXXXXXX | Quartermaster | |
| Deputy C of S FEC | | Signal | |
| Deputy C of S SCAP | | Sp Services | |
| Secy, General Staff | | Transp | |
| G-1 | | T I & E | |
| G-2 | | Civ Comm | |
| G-3 | (2) XXXXXXXXX | Civ I & E | |
| G-4 | | Civ Int | |
| JSPOG | | Civ Prop Cust | |
| Adjutant General | | Civ Transp | |
| Antiaircraft | | Diplomatic | |
| Cent Purch | | E & S | |
| Chaplain | | Gen Acct'g | |
| Chemical | | Gen Proc | |
| Civ Personnel | | Government | |
| Engineer | | IMTFE | |
| Fiscal | | Int'l Pros | |
| Hq Comdt | | Legal | |
| Inspector General | | Nat Resources | |
| Judge Advocate | | Public H & W | |
| Medical | | Reparations | |
| Ordnance | | Stat & Rpts | |

NOTED BY C/S

FOR:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Approval | | Note and Return | ✓ |
| Comment or Concurrence | | Dist'n Desired | |
| Information | XXXXXXX | Signature | |
| Initials | | Dispatch | |
| Issuance of Orders | | Attachment of Reference | |
| Necessary Action | | File | |

C.A.W.

FEC AGO Form No. 14 (1 Jan 48)

SECRET

# BRIEF

BRIEF

OF

REPORT ON VISIT TO SOUTH KOREA

7 to 12 May 1948

1. General: Report contains compilation of information obtained from personal observations and from occupation personnel in South Korea, during immediate pre-election and election periods.

2. Mission: The mission was to obtain information concerning election machinery in South Korea, observe conduct of elections with respect to freedom of atmosphere and mechanics involved, and to obtain information on civil disturbances in U.S. Zone.

3. Organization of Election: A National Election Committee was charged with responsibility of organizing election machinery. The Committee estimated that approximately 8,216,851 South Koreans were eligible to vote and an electoral headquarters was established in each province of South Korea. The U.S. Zone was divided into 200 electoral districts, each having a population of approximately 150,000, and a total of 13,407 polls were established. Approximately 95.9 per cent of those eligible registered, and 938 South Koreans announced their candidacy for 200 seats in National Assembly. No candidate ran on a Communist ticket, but some Communists were believed to have campaigned as non-partisans.

4. Activities at Polls: Polls were open from 0700 to 1900 hours and were protected by police, constabulary and coast guard personnel. These agencies were assisted by Community Protective Units, which were organized from personnel of Rightist Youth groups. Names and pictures of candidates were posted above entrances to polling places and the flow of voters into polls was regulated in an orderly manner. Atmosphere at polling places in Seoul area appeared free to extent that eligible voters were able to cast their ballots for candidates of their choice. Communist efforts to block election plans proved that protection of polls was necessary.

5. Civil Disturbances: As 10 May approached, Communists increased efforts to interfere with election plans. Civil disturbances were instigated throughout U.S. zone although no large scale disorders were reported. Disturbances consisted mainly of sabotage of communications, attacks on voting places, and clashes between Communist and Rightist groups. Approximately 96 people were killed in disorders occurring during period 8 - 10 May. Most of the disorders occurred in South Cholla Province, Cheju Island and the Taegu area, but sporadic outbursts of violence occurred throughout U.S. Zone.

6. Results of Elections: An announcement by the Office of Civil Administration stated that approximately 90 per cent of registrants voted. Official election figures are not available, but successful candidates will be charged with the establishment of a government in South Korea. Major governmental positions will be filled from ranks of assembly, but date of first meeting has not been announced.

7. Visit to Residence of Dr. RHEE Syngman: Dr. RHEE was elected as representative from East Gate District of Seoul without opposition and he appeared confident that election results would be favorable to Rightist faction. He said that Koreans were an analytical people and had a right to settle their own problems. He claimed that a few examples of forceful treatment would stop trouble instigated by Communists in South Korea. In commenting on the recent conference between North and South Korean political leaders, Dr. RHEE opined that Dr. KIM Kiu Sik was lost as a leader but that KIM Koo could be salvaged by the Rightists.

8. Military and Law Enforcement Agencies: The Department of Internal Security is charged with mission of maintaining internal security in South Korea and efforts are being made to increase efficiency of the Constabulary and Coast Guard Bureaus. The primary mission of the National Police is preservation of law and order south of the 38th parallel. The police are a potent force for action against sabotage and disturbances involving the civil population.

BRIEF

SECRET

NOTED BY C/S

FROM: G2 Ex G-2, GHQ FEC 10 June 1948

TO: FOR: 14267

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| AC of S, G-2 | | Information | |
| Executive | | Necessary Action | |
| Asst Executive SCAP | | Note & Return | |
| Asst Executive FEC | | Approval | |
| E/A Admin | | Signature | |
| E/A Radio Reports | | Initials | |
| E/A Misc | | Comment or Concurrence | |
| E/A CIS | | Dispatch | |
| E/A DAI Div | | Draft Reply | |
| E/A Hist | | Info on which to base reply | |
| Administrative Officer | | Distribution desired | |
| G-2 File Section | | File | |
| General Liaison | | | |
| Japanese Liaison | | | |
| Theater Intell Div | | | |
| Operations | | | |
| PDM | | | |
| Plans & Estimates | | | |
| DAI Div | | | |
| ATIS | | | |
| TID | | | |
| Targets Branch | | | |
| Historical Div | | | |
| Library | | | |
| Chief of CIS | | | |
| Executive | | | |
| Plans & Policy Br | | | |
| Chief of Opns | | | |
| Reading Panel | | | |
| Publications | | | |
| G/A Branch | | | |
| S/A Branch | | | |
| Compl Branch | | | |
| CIS Files | | | |
| Screening | | | |
| Public Safety Div | | | |
| Civil Censorship Det | | | |
| 441st CIC Det | | | |

REMARKS:

BR

FILE INITIALS

SECRET

VISIT TO SOUTH KOREA

7 May 48 - 12 May 48

REPORT ON RECENT KOREAN TOUR

Distribution:
2 - AC of S, G-2 FEC
1 - Director of Theater Intelligence
1 - Operations Branch
1 - Plans and Estimates Group
1 - Strategic Areas Section

SECRET

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
15 May 1948

SUBJECT: Visit to XXIV Corps

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, FEC.

: Director, Theater Intelligence Division, G-2 Section, GHQ, FEC.

1. Submitted herewith is a report covering my visit to South Korea for the purpose of observing the general election held on 10 May 48.

2. The trip required six days and necessitated approximately 1,880 miles of air travel and 85 miles of vehicular travel, or a total of 1,965 miles.

Harry B. Sewell
HARRY B. SEWELL
Maj. Cav.

SECRET

# INDEX

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
15 May 1948

SUBJECT: Directive for Visit to South Korea

TO : Maj. Harry B. Sewell

1. The following mission will be accomplished during your forthcoming visit to South Korea.

a. Contact in person the military intelligence officers of Headquarters XXIV Corps and obtain from them information concerning the organizational structure of election machinery in South Korea.

b. Obtain information concerning civil disturbances in the U.S. Zone during the immediate pre-election and election periods.

c. Observe conduct of elections with respect to freedom of atmosphere and mechanics involved in the casting of ballots.

d. Obtain information concerning processing of ballots and announcement of election results.

e. Accomplish such other military intelligence missions as may be advisable or determined by developments in the situation.

F. B. DODGE
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Director of Theater Intelligence

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AG 210.453 AGPO 2 May 48

SUBJECT: Order 114-12

TO: Officers concerned, GHQ FEC

1. Fol officers WP o/a 6 May 48 to Hq XXIV Corps, APO 235 on TDY for a period of approximately seven (7) days in connection with military intelligence activities. Upon compl will ret to present sta.

MAJ HARRY B SEWELL 045491 CAV
CAPT WALTER E DALEY 01308111 INF
CAPT ALFRED H FIERKE 01177793 FA

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail, govt mtr and surface transportation auth. TDN. 891-1001 P432-02 A2180425 S00-001. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth each officer while traveling by air. No per diem auth.

3. Physical inspection as prescribed by par 4, FEC Cir 79, 23 Jul 47 will be completed by each individual prior to departure.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

W. L. DAY
Major AGD
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
G-2 Sec (1)
3 off concerned (8 each) thru G-2 Sec
CG XXIV Corps, APO 235 (1)

## I SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES

7 May 48 - Lv TOKYO 0615; Av Tachikawa Field
- 0715. Lv Tachikawa 1012 via 317
- TC Squadron courrier; Av Kimpo,
- SOUTH KOREA 1430. Lv Kimpo 1500 via
- sedan; Av SEOUL 1600. Contacted G-2
- XXIV Corps.

8 May 48 - Contacted NORTH KOREAN and SOUTH KOREAN
- Sections of G-2 XXIV Corps.
- Discussed organization of elections
- with military intelligence officers.
- Obtained information on civil distrubances
- from flash reports received by
- G-2 XXIV Corps.
- Contacted U.S. Liaison officer to SOVIET
- Zone.

9 May 48 - Obtained information on current
- developments from SOUTH KOREAN Section
- of G-2 XXIV Corps
- Toured SEOUL area observing
- pre-election atmosphere.
- Contacted Dr. Harold J. Noble political
- advisor to Lt. Gen. Hodge.
- Visited G-2 7th Division
- Obtained information on civil disturbances
- from flash reports received by G-2
- XXIV Corps.

10 May 48 - Obtained information on current
- developments from SOUTH KOREAN Section.
- Observed polling places in SEOUL.
- Accompanied Dr. Harold J. Noble to
- residence of Dr. RHEE, Syngman.
- Obtained information on civil distrubances
- from flash reports
- Contacted Chief of Korean Intelligence Group

11 May 48 - Contacted G-2 and G-3 of 7th Inf. Div.
- Obtained information on current developments
- from South Korean Section.
- Discussed Military situation in North KOREAN Section of
- G-2 XXIV Corps.
- Observed post election activities in SEOUL.
- Contacted Chief of Foreign Broadcast Intercept
- Section of XXIV Corps.

12 May 48 - Obtained information on current
- developments from South Korean Section.
- Visited Headquarters Intelligence Detachment
- of XXIV Corps.
- Visited Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Station.
- Lv SEOUL 1430; Av Kimpo 1530 via sedan.
- Lv Kimpo 1615 via 317 TC Squadron
- courrier; Av Tachikawa 2230.
- Lv Tachikawa 2250; Av TOKYO 2330

II. GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH KOREA:

a. Organization of Elections:

The first general election in the history of Korea was held in the U.S. Occupation Zone on 10 May 48 under supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. A National Election Committee, composed of Koreans, was appointed by the U.S. Military Government and was charged with the responsibility of setting up the machinery for conducting the elections. Based on the last official census, which was taken in 1946, the Election Committee estimated that approximately 8,216,851 South Koreans were eligible to vote in the election. An electoral headquarters was established in each South Korean provincial capital and a separate headquarters was set up in the metropolitan area of Seoul. The U.S. Zone was divided into 200 electoral districts, each having a population of approximately 150,000 people, and a total of 13,407 polling places were established. Approximately 7,884,095 people, or 95.9 per cent of those eligible, registered for the election and 938 South Koreans announced their candidacy for 200 seats in the National Assembly. However, several candidates withdrew their names or were disqualified shortly before the election thereby decreasing slightly the total number of candidates. In approximately 12 districts, candidates had no opposition and throughout South Korea, Rightist and Non-partisan candidates were the most numerous. No candidate ran on a Communist ticket although it was suspected that some Leftists masked their political affiliations by campaigning as Non-partisans. Some Rightists and Moderates also apparently announced their candidacy as Non-partisans in areas where their parties did not enjoy dominant popularity.

b. Activities at Polls:

The polls opened at 0700 hours on 10 May and many eligible voters already were in line outside the polling places. The South Korean National Police were charged with responsibility of maintaining order and were assisted by Constabulary and Coast Guard personnel.

The organization of Community Protective Units was authorized by the U.S. Military Governor upon the recommendation of CHOUGH Byung Ok, Chief of the National Police. These protective units were composed of members of Rightist Youth Groups who volunteered to assist in maintaining order. The protection of voting places by protective units was considered as a voluntary, patriotic action and the Youth Group members did not function in an official capacity.

Available buildings scattered throughout the South Korean provinces were used as polling places and the names and pictures of candidates were posted above the entrance to the polling places. An area of approximately 20 square yards was roped off at the entrance to polling places in order to regulate the flow of traffic at the polls. Koreans desiring to vote formed in lines outside the blocked off area and only two or three voters were allowed inside the polling places at any given time. This action apparently was taken to insure that voting officials constantly outnumbered the voters inside the polls. Occasionally a voter was searched before being allowed to enter the polling places, and in one instance, a female voter was observed while being searched by a Korean woman. The processing of voters in and out of polling places was controlled by members of the Community Protective Units who were dressed in civilian clothes and wore brassards of various types. These men were armed with clubs, and upon casual inspection, it appeared that only three or four were on duty at each polling place. However, a more thorough examination revealed that additional guards were posted at nearby street intersections, in entrances to buildings, and at various obscure places near the polls. At one polling place which was observed at length, the commander of the protective unit assembled his guards for orders and 28 men were counted. When the polls closed he

again assembled them and approximately 50 men fell into formation.

One or two policemen and about the same number of Constabularymen normally were stationed near each polling booth. Police were armed with carbines or rifles and Constabularymen carried rifles with fixed bayonets. However, the Constabularymen were not allowed to approach closer than 30 yards to the entrance to the polls.

Additional constabulary or Coast Guard personnel, who appeared to form small reserve groups of from 10 to 20 men, were observed in obscure alleys near several polling places. It appeared that the same guards remained on duty throughout the day and most of them were fairly alert. No congregation of people who had voted were observed in the vicinity of any poll, and the general appearence of the Seoul area was one of preparedness. Police mounted on horses and in trucks patrolled the streets and auxillary police, who were deputized for the election, conducted bicycle patrols. The later were dressed in Japanese military uniforms. United Nations personnel toured South Korea to inspect election procedures and U.S. Military Police conducted normal patrols. U.S. troops were alerted, but few were on the streets, and U.S. personnel were prohibited from entering polling places.

The polls closed at 1900 hours and ballots were boxed immediately and transported to district headquarters for counting. Successful candidates are being notified unofficially of their election and voting results are being processed through provincial headquarters to the National Election Committee Headquarters in Seoul. The National Election Committee estimates that official results of the election will be announced on or about 20 May 48.

c. Atmosphere of Election:

The atmosphere at polling places observed in the Seoul area appeared free to the extent that eligible voters apparently were able to go to the polls unmolested and cast their ballots for candidates of their choice. However, Communist efforts to block election plans by sabotage, murder and attacks upon registration places had convinced those favoring the election that protection of polling places and ballots was necessary. This protection appeared to have been carried out in an orderly manner at the polls observed, and although some voters were searched, none were denied entrance to the polls.

d. Support of Election:

Although the official figures on the voting are not available as yet, an announcement by the South Korean office of Civil Administration indicates that approximately 90 per cent of the registrants voted. The percentage of registrants who voted in the various provinces and in the Seoul area are as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Seoul | 92% |
| Kyonggi Do | 90% |
| Chungchong Pukto | 94% |
| Chungchong Nando | 93% |
| Kyongsang - Pukto | 90% |
| Kyongsang Namdo | 96% |
| Kangwon - Do | 95% |
| Cholla Pukto | 93% |
| Cholla Namdo | 92% |
| Cheju Do | 70% |

e. Government to be Established:

The purpose of the general election was to elect a representative to the National Assembly from each of the 200 electoral districts in

South Korea. Since approximately one-third of the Korean population is located in the Soviet Zone, 100 seats in the assembly theoretically will be held open for North Koreans representatives.

A new government will be established by the National Assembly, which will be assisted by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. All important officials in the new government will be elected from the ranks of the assembly, but there are no indications as to when the elected assembly members will assume office or hold their first meeting. One major problem confronting the South Korean government is to find a place large enough for a body of this type to meet, since no suitable legislative chamber exists in South Korea at the present time.

f. Visit to Residence of Dr. RHEE Syngman:

On the morning of 10 May, Maj. H. B. Sewell accompanied Dr. Harold J. Noble to the residence of Dr. RHEE Syngman, prominent Rightist leader. Dr. RHEE lives in the East Gate District of Seoul, which is in one of the poorer sections of the city, and was a candidate for the National Assembly as a representative of the District. He initially was opposed by TCHEI Nung Jin, whose English name is Daniel Choi, but Choi was disqualified prior to the election for allegedly forging fingerprints on registration forms.

Dr. RHEE's residence was located on the side of a large hill and was surrounded by a brick wall approximately seven feet high. A guard house was located near the gate and rifles, which are believed to have been of Japanese manufacture, were stacked in racks in the guard house. The walled in area was guarded and Mr. Noble stated that additional guards outposted the hill in rear of the residence.

We were met at the gate by a policeman who asked for our names and requested that we wait while he obtained clearance from Dr. RHEE. He returned a few minutes later and escorted us toward the house where Dr. RHEE, Mrs. RHEE and Dr. PYONG, a political advisor, were sitting in a garden.

Mrs. RHEE, who is of Austrian birth, appeared much younger than her husband, but did not seem to be dressed for visitors and retired into the house after introductions had been made. Dr. RHEE was very cordial and both he and Dr. PYUNG discussed events of day with Dr. Noble. Dr. RHEE stated that he regretted that he had no opposition in the election and would have preferred to have one or two opponents. Dr. PYUNG stated that he did not vote in the election since Dr. RHEE had no opposition and did not need his ballot. Dr. RHEE said that he had been mistaken for a while and had opposed the South Korean election and had criticised U.S. policy, but had seen his error and was with the U.S. on the election issue. He appeared to be of the opinion that election day disturbances would not be widespread in South Korea, since Police Director CHOUGH had announced over the radio that police had been instructed to shoot those who resisted them and instigated disorders. Dr. RHEE appeared confident that election results would be favorable to his Rightist faction, but criticized the liberation of large numbers of "criminals", which he said was requested by the UN Commission in order to establish what they termed "a free atmosphere for the election." He said that Koreans were an analytical and thinking people and had a right to settle their own problems.

Dr. RHEE claimed that the Communists could not be dealt with by normal legal means and charged that a lawful country would not permit the murders committed by Communists in South Korea. He pointed out that all foreign Communists have a country of their own and stated

that they should stay at home "to stir up trouble." He advocated dealing with Communists more forcefully and stated that a few examples of forceful treatment would stop all trouble in South Korea. He cited the fates of Napoleon, Hitler, and Mussolini as illustrations that dictators of the past have failed, and predicted that Stalin also would fail to accomplish his ambitions.

Dr. RHEE also commented on the recent conference between North and South Korean political leaders which was attended by KIM Koo, a South Korean Rightist leader and Dr. KIMM Kiu Sik, prominent Moderate leader. Dr. RHEE said that he attempted to dissuade KIM Koo from attending the conference and told him that nothing could be accomplished by a discussion with the North Korean Communists. However, KIM Koo was opposed to a separate election in South Korea and could not believe that an attempt to unite the country would prove completely futile. Dr. RHEE pointed out that both KIM Koo and Dr. KIM Kiu Sik had a golden opportunity to demonstrate their patriotism when they returned from the conference by denouncing the Communists and supporting the South Korean election, but both declined to take this action. In spite of this unfortunate development, Dr. RHEE asserted that he believed that KIM Koo could be salvaged but that Dr. KIMM Kiu Sik was lost. Dr. PYUNG added that at the present time KIM Koo "couldn't see the trees for the woods."

Dr. RHEE appeared confident that South Koreans could take care of themselves but mentioned no plans for solving the future problems of Korea.

Korean Report - 13 May 1948

III. CIVIL DISTURBANCES

a. General:

As 10 May approached, South Korean Communists increased their efforts to interfere with election plans and to convince the outside world that a large segment of the Korean population opposed the UN supervised elections. Hand bills were distributed condemning the election and urging South Koreans to "fight to the death against imperialist efforts to divide their country." Civil disturbances were instigated by the Communists throughout the U.S. Zone although no large scale disorders were reported. These disturbances consisted mainly of sabotage of communications facilities, attacks on voting places and clashes between Communist and Rightist groups or police (See Chart No. 1). The majority of disorders occurred in South Cholla Province, Cheju Island and the Taegu area, but sporadic outbursts of violence occurred throughout the U.S. Zone.

b. Disorders on 8 May 48: Refer to Map No. 2

1. Seoul - (1) 8 May: Election official murdered by unknown persons near his home. Explosion at West Gate Police Station caused damage to walls of building.

2. Suwon - (2) 8 May: Group of Leftists stopped train just south of station and wrecked instruments in cab.

3. Hoensang - (3) 8 May: Telephone lines between Hoengsong and Hongchon cut twice.

4. Chonju - (4) 8 May: Two locomotives collided head-on.

5. Taejon - (5) 8 May: Two locomotives rammed head-on into each other.

6. Taeju - (6) 8 May: Electric power in city cut off. Railroad, telephone and telegraph lines between Taegu and Chongju cut. Power lines between Taegu and Kyongju cut. Leftist newspaper destroyed by explosion. Pistons and engine brakes of 14 locomotives stolen. Telephone lines cut by rioters; one rioter killed by police. Employees of power company dismantled power station and were arrested.

7. Kyongju - (7) 8 May: Group of men entered engine shed and took locomotive at point of gun; crashed locomotive into two other locomotives.

8. Mokpo - (8) 8 May: Train wrecked in tunnel four stations south of Mokpo where plates had been removed from tracks.

9. Myongsan - (9) 8 May: Train, with military coach attacked, derailed near the town.

10. Naju - (10) 8 May: Train enroute from Mokpo to Seoul derailed south of Naju.

11. Mayu-Up (11) 8 May: Unknown person shot and killed a Rightist leader.

12. Kwangju - (12) 8 May: Telephone poles and eight wires cut; power lines cut. Police telephone lines running out of city were cut.

13. Hwasun - (13) 8 May: Electric power lines cut.

14. Sunchon - (14) 8 May: Rail removed from roadbed five miles from city and six telephone poles cut at same location. Attempt made to burn telegraph station, fire extinguished before it did any damage.





Korean Report - 13 May 1948

15. Pusan - (15) 8 May: Telephone lines near city cut. Forty Communists attacked railroad engine house. Police lieutenant killed in mountains near city. Approximately 50 members of South Korean Labor Party arrested near city.

16. Tongnae - (16) 8 May: Railroad station attacked.

17. Ponsong - (17) 8 May: Power lines cut near town. Fifteen men attacked electric power station, destroyed equipment and stole vital parts. Water supply system damaged.

c. Disorders on 9 May: (Refer to Map No. 2)

1. Ongjin-(1) 9 May: Police sub-station attacked by 20 unknown raiders; two policemen wounded and one raider wounded.

2. Inchon - (2) 9 May: Telephone exchange set on fire by a girl member of South Korean Labor Party. Fire started with oil soaked rags.

3. Seoul - (3) 9 May: Homemade bomb dropped on roof of warehouse belonging to Rightist owned department store. Bomb thrown into Dai Dong Youth Headquarters, no damages

4. Kangnung (4) 9 May: Grenade thrown into home of election candidate near the town.

5. Koemongki- (5) 9 May: Twenty people armed with clubs attacked home of village leader; police guarding house were beaten but village leader escaped.

6. Naesong - (6) 9 May: One Rightist killed, one Leftist wounded in fight between the two political factions.

7. Chunyang-(7) 9 May: Four Rightists killed and five injured by mob of 40 people.

8. Kwangju - (8) 9 May: Head of election committee murdered.

9. Chinju - (9) 9 May: Homemade bombs thrown into election headquarters building; extent of damage unknown.

10. Chongju - (10) 9 May: Bottles of gasoline ignited and thrown into polling places; only damage was a broken window.

11. Kochang - (11) 9 May: Five ballot boxes and 6,000 blank ballots burned.

12. Taegu - (12) 9 May: Mob of 20 Communists attacked police station; police killed two and arrested eight. Two Rightists killed in fight between Right and Left; police intervened and killed two Leftists; 52 people arrested. Village clerk in suburb of city killed by four men with knives. Parts stolen from 18 locomotives. Man killed when glass bottle was thrown into his home and exploded.

13. Pusan - (13) 9 May: Attempt made to destroy polling place with dynamite; no casualites.

14. Ulsan - (14) 9 May: Election candidate killed and one member of his family had ear cut off by group who attacked house.

15. Topyang - (15) 9 May: Police killed four rioters.

16. Cheju Province - (16) 9 May: Ten South Korean Constabulary and 20 Coast Guard personnel attacked police sub-station and kidnapped 7 police and several villagers. Four police were wounded.





d. Disorders on 10 May: (Refer to Map No. 3)

1. Kaesong - (1) 10 May: Three police boxes attacked with hand grenades, one attacker killed and one policeman wounded.

2. Inchon - (2) 10 May: Voting booth attacked; ballots saved.

3. Seoul - (3) 10 May: Two charges of dynamite thrown into polling booth killing two Koreans. Four men attempted to burn polling place; police killed two and arrested two. Two men working in polling place killed by unknown person. Polling place bombed; no casualties, little damage. Two persons attacked polling place and wounded a Korean who was protecting the place; one attacker was killed by police. Five polling places attacked. Three Communists arrested.

4. San Sunae-Ri - (4) 10 May: One Rightist killed in disturbance in village.

5. Wolchong - (5) 10 May: Police station attacked; one attacker killed.

6. Chunchon - (6) 10 May: Polling place attacked by 20 Leftists who set fire to ballot boxes and beat a guard; undetermined number of ballots were destroyed but duplicates were used.

7. Chuminjin - (7) 10 May: Hand grenade thrown into voting district headquarters; one person slightly injured and building was damaged.

8. Wanchung-Ni - (8) 10 May: Twenty demonstrators attacked police box; one attacker killed.

9. Chunchon-Ni - (9) 10 May: Polling place attacked and registration records destroyed; one Rightist wounded; duplicate registration records used and voting continued. One Communist killed and one police wounded in disturbances in the village.

10. Changsong-Ni - (10) 10 May: Fifteen members of a group which had been assigned to protect election booth killed two policemen with spears.

11. Oktung-Ni - (11) 10 May: Voting place attacked and ballot boxes destroyed; one Communist killed and one Rightist wounded.

12. Namjon-Ni - (12) 10 May: Voting place attacked and ballot boxes destroyed.

13. Chujong-Ni - (13) 10 May: One ballot box burned.

14. Taegu - (14) 10 May: Police killed two demonstrators in dispersing mob; transformer sabotaged causing lights to go off. Members of mob fired into group of North West Young Men's Association members (Rightist) and wounded two men. Town head's home in outlying district burned. Rail removed along railroad to Chaichon. Polling place blown up; five men injured. Dynamite thrown near election place and one man was injured; building not damaged. One child of Rightist family killed and two Rightists wounded. Two polling places attacked and windows broken; 15 Communists arrested.

15. Mokpo - (15) 10 May: Molotov cocktail thrown into home of election official. house burned and official injured.

16. Sochang Myan - (16) 10 May: One polling place destroyed along with all ballots; two Rightists killed.

17. Kwanju - (17) 10 May: Mob of 50 persons attacked office of National Congress (Rightist); one member of mob killed and one man who was assisting police was killed. One Rightist killed.

Korean Report - 13 May 1948

18. Whanang Gun - (18) 10 May: Home of election committee chief attacked and election official beaten to death.

19. Chosu Myun - (19) 10 May: Twenty Leftists attacked voting booth with spears; ballot boxes and registration records destroyed.

20. Samdong Myon - (20) 10 May: Voting place attacked by crowd; one ballot box, one copy of registration records and 700 blank ballots taken.

21. Chilgok - (21) 10 May: Four voting places attacked by Leftists; one policeman killed.

22. Togan-Ni - (22) 10 May: Seven Communists killed and one Rightist wounded in disturbances in the village.

23. Cheju Province - (23) 10 May: Seven homes were burned; a wave of minor disturbances throughout the province resulted in a request by a military government official for assistance in restoring order.









CHART NO. I

VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KOREA DURING 08, 09, 10 MAY (REPORTS NOT ALL CONFIRMED)

| | Attacks On Police | | | Police Killed | | | Communists Killed | | | Rightists Killed | | | Voting Booths Raided | | | Strikes * | | | Sabotage ** | | | Sabotage *** | | | Sabotage **** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MAY | | | MAY | | | MAY | | | MAY | | | MAY | | | MAY | | | MAY | | | MAY | | | MAY | | |
| | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| SEOUL | | 1 | 6 | 1 | | | | | 3 | 1 | | 2 | | 1 | 10 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| KYONGGI DO | | 1 | 7 | | | 1 | | | 2 | | | 2 | | 1 | 5 | | | | 3 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| KANGWON DO | | | 1 | | | | | | 2 | | | 2 | | 1 | 4 | | | | 2 | | 1 | | | | | | |
| CHUNGCHONG NAMDO | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 2 | | | | | |
| CHUNGCHONG PUKTO | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| KYONGSANG PUKTO | 2 | | 2 | | | 1 | 10 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 2 | | | 12 | 10 | | | 3 | | 3 | 3 | | | | 2 | 2 |
| KYONGSANG NAMDO | 3 | 1 | | 2 | | 1 | | | | 2 | | | | 5 | 2 | 2 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| CHOLLA PUKTO | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 2 | | | | 3 | | | 2 | | | | | |
| CHOLLA NAMDO | | | | | | 2 | | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | | | | 4 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | |
| CHEJU DO | 1 | 2 | | | | 1 | 3 | 6 | 13 | 7 | 3 | 4 | | | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Daily TOTAL | 6 | 5 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 13 | 11 | 34 | 15 | 9 | 14 | 1 | 9 | 40 | 13 | | | 17 | 1 | 5 | 7 | | | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| 3 DAY TOTAL | | | 29 | | | 9 | | | 58 | | | 38 | | | 50 | | | 13 | | | 23 | | | 7 | | | 5 |

* Labor and Schools
** Communications and Power
*** Locomotives
**** Railroad Lines

SECRET

SECRET

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions are based upon personal observations of reporting officer and upon information obtained from U.S. Occupation personnel in South Korea:

a. That some Communists and Moderates probably were elected as representatives to the National Assembly on a non-partisan ticket.

b. That election procedures permitted free exercise of suffrage.

c. That protection of polls was necessary, and that law enforcement agencies generally functioned in satisfactory manner.

d. That U.S. personnel did not interfere with the casting of ballots.

e. That the atmosphere of the election was free to the extent that eligible voters were permitted to cast their ballots for the candidates of their choice without interference from election officials, law enforcement agencies or U.S. occupation forces.

f. That Communist instigated disorders failed to prevent the success of elections or to convince the outside world that the majority of South Koreans opposed the UN supervised elections.

g. That a large segment of the South Korean population is willing to support a government in South Korea even though a united Korea is impossible at the present time.

h. That the basis has been laid for the establishment of a government in South Korea which will be composed of elected representatives of the Korean people.

V. MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN SOUTH KOREA

a. General:

The military and law enforcement agencies of South Korea played a significant role in maintaining order during the general election and will be charged with important responsibilities in the new government to be formed under supervision of the United Nations. At present the militarized forces are controlled by the Department of Internal Security, and the National police form the principal law enforcement agency.

The Department of Internal Security is controlled by the U.S. Military Government and is charged with the mission of providing a police and marine force to assist the government in maintaining internal security. The Department is directed by Brigadier General RIU Tong Yul and is divided into a Constabulary Bureau and a Coast Guard Bureau.

b. Constabulary Bureau:

As of 1 May 48 the South Korean Constabulary Bureau had strength of 27,889 troops, which included 3,710 unsworn recruits. It is commanded by Colonel CHUNG Il Kwon, with headquarters in Seoul, and the organization consists of three brigades of three regiments each. Units of the constabulary are disposed as shown on Map No. 5.

Constabulary troops previously have been armed with rifles and carbines of Japanese manufacture but considerable U.S. equipment is now being issued to the Bureau. Allocations of U.S. weapons include the rifle 30 cal M-1, rifle cal 30 BAR M-1, carbine cal 30 M-1, submachine gun cal 45 M-3 and pistol cal 45.

Constabulary personnel generally is recruited from the provinces in which units are stationed. The troops are in excellent physical condition and are slightly above average in educational qualifications. U.S. advisors with the Department of Internal Security state that as a whole the status of training is good but only small unit training has been conducted. Approximately 140 U.S. officers are now assigned as advisors to the Constabulary and current training includes familiarization with weapons, drill, and field exercises involving units up to and including the battalion level. No command post exercises or maneuvers have been conducted. U.S. advisors estimate that the Constabulary, when fully equipped, will be capable of maintaining internal security but could offer only a token resistance if the borders of South Korea were threatened.

c. Coast Guard Bureau:

The headquarters of the South Korean Coast Guard is in Seoul and the organization is commanded by Commodore SOHN Won Yil. Present Coast Guard strength is approximately 3,000 and bases are located at the major South Korean ports. The Coast Guard Academy and Service Force Headquarters are located at Chinnhae. (See Map No. 6)

Since its inaguaration, the Coast Guard has made steady progress along sea going lines especially in deck training. Part of this training has been accomplished by placing Korean personnel aboard U.S. destroyers while patrolling waters off the coast of South Korea. Koreans are inapt mechanically, and engineering training has lagged behind, but U.S. advisors believe that the majority of Coast Guard officers are capable of handling their craft. The Coast Guard Bureau has been handicapped by a shortage of both enlisted and officer personnel and by the infiltration of Communists into the ranks, but a campaign is now underway to rid the service of undesirables and increase the efficiency of the Bureau.

The Coast Guard organization was established as a floating agency for enforcement of customs laws and has been developed for use as the

military forces afloat in event of an emergency. However, its limitations in technically trained personnel, armanent, and equipment render it impotent for other than minor naval operations.

d. National Police Department:

The National Police organization was established as the Bureau of Police in Sep 1945 and was reorganized as the National Police Department in Jan 1946. It functions under joint control of the U.S. Military Government and the South Korean Interim Government, and administrative authority is vested in Dr. CHOUGH Byung Ok, Director of the National Police. Dr. CHOUGH has authority to appoint and discipline personnel and is responsible for the general policy of the Police Department.

The primary mission of the Department is the preservation of law and order south of the 38th parallel, but at present the police are considered as the first line of defense against an invasion from the North and against subversive activities in South Korea.

The police organization is divided into ten divisions and one inspection command. The current strength is approximately 34,330 personnel, including 447 police women. Locations and strength of Police units are shown on Map No. 7.

Police personnel is recruited from Korean nationals who are thoroughly screened for previous criminal activities and contacts with subversive elements. Aside from normal police training, all policemen receive military training in care and maintenance and of weapons, familiarization firing, and some close order drill. When possible, this training is conducted or supervised by U.S. military personnel. Equipment of the National Police Department includes the following:

| Quantity | Type of Equipment |
|---|---|
| 18,984 | U.S. Carbines Cal 30 |
| 500 | U.S. Pistols Cal 45 |
| 4,594 | Japanese Rifles Cal 31 |
| 7,973 | Japanese Rifles Cal 25-7 |
| 50 | Japanese Machine Guns Cal 31-50 |
| 70 | U.S. Machine Guns Cal 30 |
| 1,575 | Japanese Pistols of Various types |
| 108 | $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton Trucks |
| 170 | 3/4 Ton Trucks |
| 35 | $1\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Trucks |
| 27 | $2\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Trucks |
| 29 | Ambulances |
| 1 | Radio SCR 188 |
| 3 | Radios, SCR 195 |
| 6 | Radios SCR 608 |
| 23 | Radios SCR 610 |
| 1 | Radio BC - 610 |
| 24 | Radios BC 342 |
| 10 | Power Units PE 75 |
| 10 | Power Units PE 95 |

The capabilities of the National Police are those normally found in a police force. The police are capable of using the weapons with which they are equipped and are a potent force for action such as riot control, strikes, civil disorders, and strife involving the civil population.













CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF TRIP TO

SOUTH EAST ASIA

12-25 MARCH 48



CONFIDENTIAL

# REPORT ON TRIP TO SOUTH EAST ASIA

1. Chronology:

## LOG OF FLIGHT

| | Date | Place | Time | Miles |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Departed | 12 Mar | Haneda, Tokyo | 0515 | 1,625 |
| Arrived | 12 Mar | Manila, P.I. | 1435 | |
| Departed | 13 Mar | Manila, P.I. | 0855 | 65 |
| Arrived | 13 Mar | Clark Field, Luzon | 0925 | |
| Departed | 14 Mar | Clark Field, Luzon | 0500 | 1,500 |
| Arrived | 14 Mar | Batavia | 1430 | |
| Departed | 16 Mar | Batavia | 0620 | 1,600 |
| Arrived | 16 Mar | Darwin | 1750 | |
| Departed | 17 Mar | Darwin | 0410 | 1,703 |
| Arrived | 17 Mar | Melbourne | 1525 | |
| Departed | 20 Mar | Melbourne | 0845 | 770 |
| Arrived | 20 Mar | Brisbane | 1310 | |
| Departed | 21 Mar | Brisbane | 0715 | 1,160 |
| Arrived | 21 Mar | Guadalcanal | 1645 | |
| Departed | 22 Mar | Guadalcanal | 1055 | 879 |
| Arrived | 22 Mar | Momote, Admir. Is. | 1605 | |
| Departed | 22 Mar | Momote, Admir. Is. | 1820 | 980 |
| Arrived | 23 Mar | Guam | 0020 | |
| Departed | 25 Mar | Guam | 0510 | 1,480 |
| Arrived | 25 Mar | Tokyo | 1240 | |
| | | TOTAL: | 74 Hrs. 40 Min. | 11,762 Miles |

2. General:

a. Officers contacted in the Philippines were Major Diercks, Commanding Officer, 29 Engineer Base Topographic Battalion (U.S.), and officers of his Battalion. Unofficial contacts were made with various officers of the 13 Air Force, Clark Field. The late hour of arrival at Manila and the early hour of departure from Manila to Clark Field prevented an official call being made to G-2, PHILRYCOM. (See Tab "A")

b. The following officers were visited in Batavia: Colonel Mayer, Chief, U.S. Army Observer Group, Java (USAOGJA); Colonel Mol, Chief, Topographic Branch, Netherlands East Indies Army (NEIA); Lt Col Ind, (USAOGJA); Colonel Mollohan, USAOGJA; Commander Hazelitt, Naval Observer, USAOGJA; and Captain Dejong, Topographic Branch, NEIA.

Co-operation received from the USAOGJA and the Dutch officers was of the highest order. (See Tab "B")

c. Points of contact in Australia were Darwin, Melbourne, and Brisbane. Colonel J. S. Sauer, Assistant Military Attache' stationed in Melbourne, was visited. (See Tab "C")

d. Officers contacted at Guadalcanal were: Colonel Carter, A-3, 7 Air Force; Lt Col Edwards, Major Linden, and other members of the 542 Engineer Base Survey Company (U.S.). (See Tab "D")

e. The two-hour stop-over at Momote, Admiralty Islands, was utilized for refueling and conferring unofficially with officers based on the island. (See Tab "E")

f. Lt Col Wallace, G-2, Marbo, was visited while at Guam. (See Tab "F")

g. Included as an annex is a "draft" of the "General Regulations and Instructions for Military Observers, GOC", obtained from Colonel Mayer, Chief, United States Army Observer Group, Java (USAOGJA). (See Tab "G")

Henry W. Kumpunen
HENRY W. KUMPUNEN
Captain, Infantry

TAB
A

TAB "A"

REPORT OF CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. Military:

Poor discipline outwardly seems to be manifested in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Violations of uniform regulations are common, and speeding in army vehicles with little regard for the rights of others is prevalent. Sentries on duty guarding vital pipelines were observed asleep. The Philippine Scouts (PS), although officered by the U.S., do not present a favorable picture. U.S. officers interviewed, however, stated that the PS are the best native soldiers, but that if they were to become completely led by Filipinos, rapid deterioration would probably ensue.

The U.S. Post Hostilities Mapping Program being conducted in the islands is approximately three and two-tenths per cent completed. Cebu and other southern islands are currently being surveyed due to the fact that according to the "Bases Agreements", U.S. Forces must evacuate from the southern islands in the near future. Inclement weather with persistent haze prevents the effective use of aircraft in Northern Luzon. The 29 Engineer Base Topographic Battalion (U.S.) with shortages of qualified personnel is rendering excellent service with the co-operation of the Air Forces.

Construction of permanent facilities for the 13th Air Force based on Clark Field, Luzon is proceeding quite smoothly; however, there is a dearth of accommodations for dependents.

The appearance and morale of the U.S. Forces observed on Luzon seem ~~to be~~ superior. Everyone apparently knows what his mission requires and work progresses to that end.

2. Economic:

Roads are in bad repair. According to an agreement between the U.S. and the Philippine Government, necessary repairs to roads built by the U.S. Army were to be accomplished by the Philippines; however, the terms of the agreement have not been fulfilled, resulting in consequent deplorable roadway conditions.

Consumer goods in Manila are evident in great quantity. It is stated

that one may purchase almost anything in the city, provided he has the necessary funds.

Many public and private buildings still show the evidence of war. Extensive repairs are necessary to rehabilitate these buildings. By comparison, Tokyo seems as well off, if not better than Manila and its environs. The three bridges spanning the Pasig River, separating North from South Manila, are still "Baileys". When the Government or municipal authorities will construct the necessary permanent bridges is still conjectural. A serious traffic bottleneck is created by these conditions. Ordinary traffic is seriously out of control in Manila. This situation may be caused by the lack of sufficiently trained police and the inherent characteristics of the people who do not seem to respect one another's rights to any great extent.

Generally, the people are poorly clothed, fed, and shod. Much former U.S. Government clothing and equipment is in evidence.

3. Sociological:

The people do not fully grasp the fact that they are an independent nation nor are they capable of self-government at present. The Filipino outwardly appears to be an easy-going type of fellow and he gives little thought to the future. The Chinese elements of the population are frowned upon by the other natives, primarily due to the fact that they are of a more aggressive type and have become the wealthier strata of society.

It is reported that most crimes are being committed primarily by people in the 17-21 year age group. It is at once evident that these youthful offenders are products of the Japanese occupation which was conducive in fostering such depredations by the populace in order that they might survive. Crimes are not being committed by any organized group such as the "Huks" but rather by youths desiring quick gains with no work. This tendency is normally present in any country following a war, but perhaps it is present in the Philippines to a greater degree than elsewhere.

Crime is rampant in Manila, with thievery of U.S. Government vehicles predominant. Many "jeeps" have channeled through illegal means to proprietors of bus concerns who have converted the vehicles into small buses or "jeepneys". Armed robbery is common. Travel between Manila and

Clark Field is extremely hazardous even during the hours of daylight. Travel after sundown on the Clark Field Highway is prohibited for U.S. personnel.

TAB
B

TAB "B"

REPORT OF CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

1. Military:

Reorganization of the Republican Army on strategical bases is being carried out by virtue of a decree of the Republican Vice-President Hatta and concurrently Defense Minister.

All defense formations will be taken up in the staff of the Army in the Defense Ministry and the headquarters of the mobile forces.

All regional army formations are taken up in the mobile units and in the territorial formation.

The decree aims at the formation of an Army under a single command, and a Military Police Corps for the whole army.

2. Political:

Implementation of the Truce is proceeding with little friction, although the work of the Good Offices Committee (GOC) is being hampered by lack of additional personnel for the USAOGJA. Additional personnel have probably reported to the GOC and this fault may be corrected at present. Reports of violation of the Truce have been tendered by both the Dutch and Republicans. These violations have been corrected, usually "on the spot", by each side, following the advice of the military observers. General quiet reigns throughout the island areas with sporadic outbursts, principally in West Java. Conditions on Sumatra may be termed good. The principal remaining task confronting the GOC is that the families of evacuees must be quickly and efficiently moved to their husbands. It can be stated that to date the work of the GOC has been successful and effective. Colonel Mayer stressed the fact that the GOC does not want to be known or inferred to as an intelligence gathering agency for any foreign power, but rather as an impartial body instituted by the UN to accomplish a specific task, namely, the arbitration of a dispute.

In Washington, Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Minister of Education of the Indonesian Republic, has protested against the composition of the interim government established there by the Netherlands.

At a press conference, he contended that as far as the Indonesian Republic was concerned, the "new government is merely the old Dutch Indies

Government in a new form."

He accused the Netherlands Government of attempting to set up a system of "puppet states" in Indonesia, which will make any future plebiscite "unfair and unrepresentative".

He said that with United States oil reserves rapidly becoming depleted, and in view of the possibility that Middle East reserves might be lost to the Western democracies as a result of upheavals there, petroleum and other natural resources in Indonesia could be expected to assume increasing importance to the United States and the democratic world.

3. Economic:

At present there are only two oil fields in south Sumatra in production. One belongs to Standard Vacuum and the other to Royal Dutch Shell. Shell's Pladjoe refinery near Palembang handles crude oil from their Talang (Djimar) field and has an output of 200,000 tons monthly. The target for the end of this year is 275,000 tons monthly. The Pladjoe's refinery output consists of 50 per cent from the Talang (Djimar) field and 50 per cent from other Shell fields elsewhere.

The principal export markets are Indochina, Siam, Malaya, Singapore, Australia, the Philippines, and, of course, the home market.

Standard's Soengei Gerong refinery has not yet come up to the Pladjoe level because it had very rough treatment during the Republican scorched-earth policy. Present production is 4,000 tons monthly and this is expected to be 6,000 by the end of this year. Soengei Gerong gets crude supplies from Pendopo Field.

Agricultural estates in the Palembang area are coming into production, having suffered little damage. Four rubber estates are producing satisfactorily but no figures are available. The recently opened palm-oil estate of "Oud Wassenaar" is expected to reach pre-war production next year, which will be 3,200 tons.

Despite police vigilance, the smuggling trade in East Sumatra, especially to Malaya, increased in February. An estimated 100 tons of rice were smuggled to Malaya in February, and large quantities of copra were smuggled and lesser quantities of rubber.

The shops and stalls of Batavia show an abundance of consumer goods. Leather goods and tinware are extremely plentiful and fruits and fresh vegetables are available.

Automobiles are present in great numbers. The transportation system seems orderly and efficient, quite unlike the situation in Manila. The street cars are supplemented by pedicabs, taxies and pony carts. Canals also furnish a mode of conveyance. The police seem well-trained and are obeyed by the populace.

The city of Batavia is unscathed by the war and is beautiful, clean, and modern. The population is now estimated to number about one million. The recent influx of people to the city has created a housing problem.

The official rate of exchange is about two and one-half guilders to one U.S. dollar, whereas the blackmarket rate on 15 March was around 16 guilders to one U.S. dollar. A flourishing blackmarket in dollars exists quite openly in the shopping center of Batavia. It is rumored that all the money transactions are conducted by the Chinese.

4. Sociological:

The people appear to be happy. The Indonesian seems to be an intelligent, industrious, clean person. Large numbers of the Javanese speak English as well as Dutch. General impressions in Batavia indicate that the population does not harbor enmity toward the Dutch, who, contrary to some reports, have so often blundered in their colonial administration. Contact observed between the natives and the Dutch is correct and courteous at all times.

TAB
C

TAB "C"

REPORT OF CONDITIONS IN AUSTRALIA

1. Military:

The armed forces of Australia are small in size and they are mainly equipped with wartime supplies. No organized reserves exist; however, the war-time trained civilians are available for a reserve force in an emergency. The morale of the Regular Army may be termed good in spite of measures preventing its expansion and organization of additional tactical units. The chief components of the Army remain the Regular Army and the Citizens Military Forces. The Regular Army at present is operating under two types of organization:

a. The Interim Army includes the occupation forces in Japan and Headquarters and Administrative Units scattered throughout Australia. The force in Japan, approximately of division size, is the only tactical unit. Formerly the Government had planned to withdraw its occupation force by June 1948; however, present indications point to a longer occupation period.

b. The Permanent Military Force, which is just being recruited, will eventually replace the Interim Army in all its functions. The strength of the Permanent Military Force is set at 19,000; however, after six months of recruiting, it numbers about 1,600.

The Citizens Military Forces have been planned and approved and recruitment and organization for a force of 50,000 will begin in July 1948.

The Semi-Military Organizations, consisting of officer training and cadet units in schools and rifle clubs, all afford a basis for better future military personnel. The total effect of semi-military units, however, remains small as far as members are concerned, and they cannot be considered as a strong military potential.

The armed forces are loyal and faithfully serve the present Government, but in case of internal strife, they are too scattered and small a force to prevent insurrectionists from greatly disturbing the economy and communications of the country, and insufficient to provide an adequate police force.

The Royal Australian Navy, like the Army, is undergoing a change-over from its post-war status to a permanent Navy. Recruiting is in progress for a total force of 14,000. The Navy has in commission, 46 ships as follows: three cruisers, five destroyers, four frigates, 10 minesweepers, six LST's, two LSI's, six survey ships, and eight sundry small craft. Two light aircraft carriers, built in Britain, are due to arrive by the end of 1948 or early 1949. They will be of the Majestic class of 17,720 tons, with a length of 694½ feet. Recruiting of personnel for these carriers has begun and selected personnel have commenced training.

A permanent Air Force Reserve will be formed this year, and the strength is to be between 5,000 and 8,000, supplemented by a Citizens Air Force Reserve. This force is necessary in order to bring existing units to war strength and to form auxiliary units to accompany any mobile task force overseas. The period of service will be five years, with an option of five additional years. Men will be recruited from the following sources: Wartime RAAF officers and men, officers and men of RAAF on completion of their RAAF service, aircrew and tradesmen of the commercial aviation industry, and men who have completed a period of service with the Citizens Air Force.

2. Political:

The Australian Labor Party intends to carry on with its campaign against the Communists. A resolution was submitted by the Central Executive on "Communist Activity to Destroy the Australian Labor Party (ALP)" and resolutions for and against the continuance of the ALP's industrial groups. A cleavage is occurring between the Right and Left Wings of the Labor Party.

It is expected that a Royal Commission will be appointed to inquire into and report on the activities of the Communist Party in Victoria. The annual conference of the Victorian Country Party may urge that the Government declare the Communist Party illegal and that Communists not be employed in any essential state service.

An attempt may be made by the State's Premiers that a uniform taxation system be inaugurated. All states agree that more money is needed by the governments.

Communist influence is behind many of the strikes which have disrupted Australian industry during the past few months. Although Communists are still infiltrating into unions and dominate some, all other political parties are taking action against them. Public opinion is not as apathetic as formerly. The unions themselves are beginning to fight.

Australians, generally, as well as the leaders, feel that Australia's interests are dependent upon the good will of the U.S. The Marshall Plan, as well as the coming U.S. Presidential campaigns, are closely followed and received wide coverage in the press.

Australia desires to conclude the Japanese peace treaty rapidly; however, she desires to sit as an equal at the conference. It is reported that she is in accord with Anglo-American attitudes on the proposed peace treaty.

3. Economic:

The Commonwealth Government, in co-operation with the States, has launched a nation-wide scheme to develop Australia's natural resources to their fullest. Search is being made for strategic materials consisting of uranium, oil, and coal deposits. Another coal area in Queensland has been uncovered--the Callide coalfield--which may have even greater reserves than the Blair Athol, which is estimated at 206,000,000 tons.

Extensive plans are underway to develop the food resources of Australia. A British Food Mission is in Australia to consult with the Commonwealth Government about means of developing food production. Plans are underway to increase the production of beef and other meat products in the Northern Territory.

Enlargement of the Kiewa hydro-electric project in north-eastern Victoria, increasing the total cost to more than $80,000,000, has been recommended to the Victorian State Government by the State Electricity Commission. This proposed plant would be one of the greatest construction feats undertaken in the Southern Hemisphere.

Australia has always in the past been dependent upon other countries for many basic commodities such as petrol, machinery, and manufactured goods. Her coal resources have been inadequate. Thus, her search for basic resources

is essential to further industrial progress. Drawbacks to the implementation of the above program are lack of manpower, trained personnel, and labor troubles.

The cost of living has not risen as sharply as in other countries following the war, due primarily to price control. Since the government relaxed wage controls, the cost of living has risen sharply. The purchasing value of the "pound" has fallen by 30 per cent since 1941.

4. Sociological:

Any plans for industrial or rural expansion are dependent upon an increase in the population of Australia. Migration in 1947 added a net total of 11,661 people to Australia's population, comprising 7,612 men and boys and 4,049 women and girls. It is expected that the net result in 1948 will be much larger as the rate of new arrivals is increasing, while the flow of Australians to new homes abroad is decreasing. Mr. Caldwell, the Immigration Minister, has said that improvement in the United Kingdom shipping position has made it possible to secure 30,000 berths for free and assisted passages in 1948. The Government expects that 20,000 displaced persons will arrive from Europe. It is expected that they will be mainly immigrants from the Baltic countries.

The general public has become alarmed and disturbed by the frequent strikes. The people blame the Communists and are in favor of any efforts to fight them; however, their efforts are passive rather than active. The people are tired of war-time restrictions, such as rationing of consumer goods, and their support for the Labor Government is fading.

All Chinese residents, including nurses, will be forced to leave the Continent due to a new Governmental decree.

TAB
D

TAB "D"

REPORT OF CONDITIONS ON GUADALCANAL

1. Military:

The short visit at Guadalcanal was spent in conferring with Lt Col Edwards, Major Linden, and other members of the 542 Engineer Base Survey Company. This unit has the responsibility of carrying out the mapping program for the entire Solomon Island Group. To date, approximately five and three-tenths per cent of the program has been completed.

Prior to take-off for Momote, a conference was conducted by Colonel Carter, the A-3, 7 Air Force, relative to air communication facilities on the island. Presently, all four (4) radio transmitters are "out" due to lack of trained operating and maintenance personnel and the lack of replacement parts. It was the opinion of the A-3, Colonel Carter, that the air base should either be closed completely or that immediate steps should be taken to correct this bad situation. Appropriate air commands will be notified of the situation existing, by Colonel Carter, 7 AF, and Lt Col Peck, FEAF.

Floods have caused considerable difficulty in travel and many bridges have become innundated, making overland travel between parts of the island impossible. Rain occurs frequently, causing further obstacles to the mapping program.

A nine-month tour of duty is required for personnel stationed on Guadalcanal. The morale of the officers and men noted seemed to be good.

TAB
E

TAB "E"

REPORT OF CONDITIONS ON MOMOTE, ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

1. Military:

During the two-hour refueling stop at this equatorial base it was learned that this excellent air base will be "rolled up" and closed. All buildings and equipment have been sold to the Chinese Government. Considerable amounts of machinery have already been transported to China.

The hard coral runways and ramps of the airfield could be readily rehabilitated into an operating airbase.

Although situated practically on the equator, the island is blessed with cool breezes making existence tolerable for people of the white race.

2. Political:

Rumors had been heard in Brisbane, Australia, that on Los Negros a band of 300 Chinese had armed themselves with machine-guns and small arms and were defying local police. It was reported that a defense perimeter had been established and that the local authorities had requested help from Australia to quell this uprising. The motives for the rioting were not clear; however, it might have resulted from labor conditions or possible expulsion laws. U.S. officers questioned at Momote had no confirmation of the rumors.

TAB
F

TAB "F"

REPORT OF CONDITIONS ON GUAM

1. Military:

Lt Col Wallace, G-2 Marbo, was visited. He inquired about the proposed all-inclusive FEC G-2 conference scheduled for the spring of 1948. A general discussion ensued with little information of interest to G-2, GHQ.

By comparison, with a visit to Guam in February, 1947, rapid strides have been made in cleaning up and assembling the hugh stockpiles of war material that existed after the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific.

Permanent housing construction is proceeding [redacted] and other facilities have been expanded considerably.

TAB
G

TAB "G"

MILEXBOARD
Directive No. 4

GENERAL REGULATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
FOR MILITARY OBSERVERS G.O.C.

13 March 1948

A. GENERAL INFORMATION:

1. Constitution of the G.O.C.:

The "Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question" was created by a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations to assist the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia in the pacific settlement of their dispute.

The GOC consists of three members. Each side, i.e. Netherlands and Republic, chose one Government as member (Netherlands the Belgian Government and Republic the Australian Government). These two in turn selected the U.S.A. as third member.

The GOC, together with the Netherlands and Republican delegations, forms "The Conference."

2. Organization of the Conference:

The Conference consists of three sections:

a. The Netherlands Delegation;

b. The Republican Delegation; and

c. The Committee of Good Offices (which includes an Australian, a Belgian and an U.S.A. Delegation).

The general organization of the Conference and the chain which controls the activities of the Military Assistants and Observers is shown in the diagram below:



a. The Steering Committee:

Consists of the Representatives in the GOC, plus the Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen of the Netherlands and Republican Delegations. The Steering Committee establishes the agenda for conferences, assigns agenda items to the Main Committees, and co-ordinates the work of the Conference.

b. The Main Committees:

Consist of representatives or representation of GOC, plus accredited members of the Netherlands and the Republican Delegations. The Main Committees consider and report on agenda items referred to them by the Steering Committee.

c. The Military Executive Board:

Is under the direction of the GOC which has directed that the Board shall also act under the Security Committee, which is one of the four Main Committees of the Conference.

The Board consists of the Senior Military Assistants (or their deputies) of the three members of the GOC., (Australia, Belgium, and U.S.A.). By common consent to preserve continuity, the U.S. member of MILEX has been made the permanent chairman of the Board. The military assistants of the six Nations represented in the Consular Commission, i.e. Australia, Belgium, China, France, United Kingdom and the United States of North America, are employed as military observers in the field.

It is a cardinal principle that the military personnel assigned for duty as Military Assistants and Observers with the GOC shall do nothing which in any way might jeopardize or even embarrass the mission of the GOC. The GOC Mission, on behalf of the United Nations Security Council, is to assist the Netherlands and the Republic in every possible way to reach a peaceful and fair solution of the problems confronting these two parties. Therefore, military officers on this duty should not engage in intelligence duties for their own governments and should also take particular care to avoid creating such an impression. These officers are, in fact, agencies of the United Nations while on this duty.

d. Senior Military Assistants:

The senior military assistant of each of the six Nations is

charged with the normal administrative responsibilities such as pay, billeting, discipline, and leave, with regard to the officers of his nation, giving due consideration to the tasks assigned such officers. Thus, these observer officers ("Milobs") are under the Senior Military Officer of their nation for administrative purposes, but with the agreement of the Senior Military Officer concerned, work under the operational control of MILEX.

Assignment of officers to specific tasks will be made by MILEX in consultation with the Senior Military Officer concerned.

The Senior Military Assistants of China, France and the United Kingdom attend, when invited by MILEX, the meetings of the Board, as observers.

B. FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY OBSERVERS (MILOBS):

1. General:

The general mission of the Milobs is to observe, in the field, the implementation of the military aspects of the Truce Agreement of 17 Jan 1948, to assist local commanders of both sides to reach agreements on these matters and to report to MILEX their observations, actions and recommendations on the above and such other matters as may be specifically assigned by MILEX. In order to carry out their duties, Milobs must familiarize themselves with the contents of the appendices to this directive.

Normally Milobs will be employed as members of teams which are located at intervals along the status quo lines in Java and Sumatra. At some important points, i.e. the Republican Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters at Jogjakarta and Bukittinggi, some Milobs will be employed as liaison officers for MILEX. As far as possible, teams will be composed of officers from different nations.

Where circumstances may show the necessity, i.e. in East Java, several teams may be placed under the co-ordinating authority of an area leader, who will be a senior officer and a direct representative of MILEX in the area concerned.

C. METHOD OF WORK:

1. Milobs Teams:

a. Organization:

Teams will establish a co-ordinator, known as the team co-ordinator, who will be responsible for the following:

(1) Location of team members and their rotation between the two sides.

(2) Collection of Milobs reports where necessary and the preparation of a team report summary before forwarding them to MILEX.

(3) Recommendation or otherwise of individual Milob's applications for leave of absence.

b. Principal Duties:

(1) To observe demarcation of the demilitarized zones and the location of police posts and of military outposts, both on maps (scale 1/250,000) and in the field.

(2) Observation of the civil police forces in the demilitarized zones, as outlined in the Netherlands and Republican "Regulations for Police Forces".

(3) Observe communication (wire and radio) between the Netherlands and Republican field commanders and civil authorities, with reference to efficiency thereof, frequency of traffic, and any other pertinent data.

(4) Assist in opening of lines of communication for vehicular traffic. Transportation facilities, in general, with particular reference to the implementation of agreements for the repair of roads, bridges, etc. Observation of the control of traffic.

(5) Conduct inquiries and investigations into local incidents of military character at the request of one of the parties.

c. Policy:

(1) Military Assistants will refrain from issuing an order or appearing to do so. It is emphasized that the GOC does not possess this authority, and accordingly, none of its representatives has such a right. Observers can best serve their duty by emphasizing that their function is to assist in bringing both parties into agreement through the use of initiative, a sense of fair play, ingenuity, and common sense--in other words, the basic instruments of the Committee of Good Offices.

This means, endeavoring at all times to develop and preserve the spirit of understanding and harmony. When difficulties arise that require reference to higher authority, either for study or decision, Milobs should be careful to report the facts impartially, together with the observer's suggestions for a solution of the problem as he sees it.

(2) Observers should avoid discussions of political, civil or economic matters outside their terms of reference, unless otherwise specifically authorized by MILEX. They should inform any complaining party that subjects not in the purview of MILEX should be referred through their own national channels to the GOC.

(3) Teams normally will act as units. While officers do not necessarily remain in each other's company on all occasions, they should agree on programs of individual action, and when these actions are completed, agree on decisions and further courses of action. Local circumstances and facilities will determine to a considerable extent how much they may act independently or as a unit of two or three officers. It is one of the main tasks of the area leaders to supervise this action. Regardless of the need for separate operations, the team officers will arrange for proper contact at all times with local commanders of both parties.

(4) Teams will visit both sides of the status quo line and in general will divide the time equally, except that local agreements can be made for spending more time with one party than another where it seems advisable. Again, care will be taken to insure that immediate communication is maintained between Milobs and the commanders on either side of the line. Team officers will be rotated so that each officer will spend approximately an equal amount of time on each side of the line.

(5) Milobs will remain on duty in the area assigned to them unless authorized to leave by MILEX or by the senior officer of the nation concerned, after consultation with MILEX.

(6) Applications for leave by Milobs will be recommended by the team co-ordinator and will be acted on by the senior officer of the nation concerned after consultation with MILEX.

D. REPORTS:

1. Observer and Team Reports:

a. Emergency Reports:

In case of emergency (serious incidents, matters that require a solution on higher level, etc.), Milobs must immediately inform MILEX and their Area Leader. Generally such report should be transmitted by telegram.

b. Routine Reports:

In ordinary circumstances, the teams will submit a weekly report to MILEX. This report is to be prepared with the co-operation of as many team officers as possible working as a unit. Milobs who cannot be present at this preparation will submit individual reports. The weekly reports must be brief and limited to the matters requiring special attention and/or action from higher level. The weekly reports will include:

(1) A brief log, indicating for each day, the important events, meetings, visits, etc. This must be considered as a log for the whole team.

(2) A concise account of the team activities during the week and all observations dealing with the following matters:

(a) Demilitarized area according to the Truce Regulations (paras B, C, and D).

(b) Communications by wire and radio between both parties and their maintenance.

(c) Important meetings between local commanders.

(d) Road and rail communications and civil traffic across the status quo line.

(e) Infringements and incidents. Action taken.

(f) Location of the Milobs and their proposed rotation.

(g) Important trips, etc.

(h) Projected activities for the following week.

(3) A short appreciation of the situation.

(4) Any constructive recommendations.

E. This directive cancels and supersedes all previous directives issued by the Military Executive Board.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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680.2 A

SECRET

10989

FROM: G-2 ADMIN. G-2, GHQ FEC 7 MAY 1948 1948

TO:

AC of S, G-2 . . . . . ( )
Executive . . . . . ( ) Posted
Asst Executive SCAP . . . . . ( ) SAC
Asst Executive FEC . . . . . ( ) Posted
E/A Admin . . . . . ( )
E/A Radio Reports . . . . . ( )
E/A Misc . . . . . ( )
E/A CIS . . . . . ( ) I
E/A DAI Div . . . . . ( )
E/A Hist . . . . . ( )
Administrative Officer . . . . ( )
G-2 File Section . . . . . ( ) 4
General Liaison . . . . . ( )
Japanese Liaison . . . . . ( )
Theater Intell Div . . . . . ( )
Operations . . . . . ( )
PDM . . . . . ( )
Plans & Estimates . . . . . ( )
DAI Div . . . . . ( )
ATIS . . . . . ( )
TID . . . . . ( )
Targets Branch . . . . . ( )
Historical Div . . . . . ( )
Library . . . . . ( )
Chief of CIS . . . . . ( )
Executive . . . . . ( )
Plans & Policy Br . . . . . ( )
Chief of Opns . . . . . ( )
Reading Panel . . . . . ( )
Publications . . . . . ( )
G/A Branch . . . . . ( )
S/A Branch . . . . . ( )
Compl Branch . . . . . ( )
CIS Files . . . . . ( )
Screening . . . . . ( )
Public Safetly Div . . . . . ( )
Civil Censorship Det . . . . . ( )
441st CIC Det . . . . . ( )

Completes action CAW 700

MAYNARD W. LEE
GHQ, USA

FOR:

Information . . . . . ( ✓ )
Necessary Action . . . . . ( )
Note & Return . . . . . ( )
Approval . . . . . ( )
Signature . . . . . ( )
Initials . . . . . ( )
Comment or Concurrency . . . ( )
Dispatch . . . . . ( )
Draft Reply . . . . . ( )
Info on which to base reply. ( )
Distribution desired . . . . ( )
File . . . . . ( )

REMARKS:

① Reference comment #4, attached (CAW chit # 700) Believe Gen. W. desired to bring this report to attention of CIS - CIC but do not believe he expects a reply.

② [redacted] CIC - CIS reply, comment #5 more or less follows same trend as comments 3 from Col Koster and comment #2 from Col Dodge [redacted] INITIALS Perry [redacted]

③ Reference par 9b of report and par 8a of comment #5 recommend no action be taken by this headquarters unless formal request for approval is received thru channels. Believe this would be unnecessary duplication as CIC agents are readily available to conduct investigations or could accompany tactical investigators if necessary

④ Recommend this report be filed.

SECRET

BRIEF

OF

REPORT OF STAFF VISIT TO

HEADQUARTERS 24th INFANTRY DIVISION, KYUSHU

17 to 26 MARCH 1948

1. General: Compiliation of information of staff visit to 24th Inf Div for report to AC of S, G-2, GHQ, FEC.

2. Mission: To observe MI training, MI processing, investigate possibilities of speeding up reports, inquire into additional duties performed by MI officers, and inquire into CIC Units and Troop G-2 or S-2 relationships.

3. Military Intelligence Officers: Most 24th Inf Div MI officers trained in I Corps MI school or 441 CIC Det school. Few enlisted men graduates of special schools. The MG drafts repeatedly taking officers from MI work.

4. Troop Disposition: Troops compressed in main camps with auxiliary stations under guard. No changes in Areas of Responsibility, none contemplated.

5. Strength and Reorganization: Troop strength comparable to 25th Inf Div and 1st Cav Div. Parallel staffs for Post and Tactical Headquarters cutting into personnel available to field.

6. Training: No formal training in MI being given and none contemplated due to personnel shortage. Officers and enlisted men being detailed to fill quota to 441 CIC school.

7. Military Government: Co-operation between MG units and tactical command very good except in views on control of smuggling and illegal entry.

8. Counter Intelligence Corps: Relationships between CIC and tactical command very good. The CG, C/S and G-2, 24th Inf Div, believe the placing of CIC personnel and mission at disposal of tactical commanders would be of benifit.

9. Air Forces: Co-operation between the ground and air forces is excellent. New rule keeping surveillence flights at an altitude of 1000 ft and 500 ft approach hindering ship identification.

10. Dissident Elements: Slight increase in Japanese Communist Party in Kyushu during last six month period. Korean element continues as sore spot. Believed Korean Rightest Groups would support Korean League in anti-U.S. action. "Fellow Travelers" of both groups three to four times the registered members.

11. Illegal Entries and Smuggling: Marked increase in smuggling expected in April 1948. Obsolete equipment used by Japanese Police and Maritime Bureau hindering supression of these activities. Un-confirmed rumors of arms smuggling in SHIMABARA area, being investigated.

12. TSUSHIMA (Island): Detachment of troops detailed to TSUSHIMA in early March 1948. Primary mission is suppression of smuggling and illegal entry. Communications and transportation being improved. Tactical, CIC and MG views vary on need of Island detail.

13. Personality and Organization Files: Building of dissident personality files started January 1948, by Ass't G-2, 24th Inf Div, with 1500 individuals filed.

14. Patrols: Limited personnel sharply reducing patrolling. Current task is checking explosive dumps and firms dealing in explosives.

15. Communications: MI personnel prone to overuse telephone for transmission of MI information. Little or no use made of teletype for this purpose. The 315th C.W., USAF, will furnish new radio and train TSUSHIMA personnel in its operation.

16. Confidential Funds: Allocation of confidential funds desired by G-2, 24th Inf Div, for own informant network. Believe it will aid in collation and evaluation.

17. Photographic Equipment: Use of photographic equipment needed to combat "repeaters" in illegal entry and apprehension of "wanted persons". Also used in photographing meetings, documents, assemblies and Party officials.

18. Special Credentials: Use of "special credentials" by MI personnel would clear standing with CIC, CCD and CID according to G-2, 24th Inf Div. G-2 would issue only when necessary and require return on termination of investigation.

19. Arrangements have been made for a staff visit to Hq 11th A/B Div and subordinate units in Hokkaido, 20 to 27 April 1948.

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STAFF VISIT TO

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS

OF

24th INFANTRY DIVISION

(KYUSHU)

Distribution:
2 - AC of S, G-2, FEC
1 - Operations Branch
1 - Plans & Estimates Group
1 - Japanese Section
1 - Training Section

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
17 April 1948

SUBJECT: Visit to 24th Inf Div.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, FEC.

: Director, Theater Intelligence Division, G-2 Section, GHQ, FEC.

1. Herewith is a report covering our liaison and training visit to Headquarters 24th Inf Div, 24th Inf Div Arty, 19th Inf Reg, 21st Inf Reg, 34th Inf Reg, 315th Comp Wing, CIC, and MG Teams, on the Island of Kuyshu from 16 to 26 Mar 48, incl.

2. The tour required 10 days. There were 175 miles of vehicular travel, 341 miles of rail travel, 1,276 miles of air travel, or 1,792 miles in all.

John P. Perlett
JOHN P. PERLETT
Lt Col Inf

Dale R. Buis
DALE R. BUIS
1st Lt Inf

# INDEX

RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
12 March 1948

SUBJECT: Directive for Staff Visit to Kyushu.

TO : Lt Col John P Perlett
Lt Dale R Buis

1. The following mission will be accomplished during your staff visit to Kyushu.

a. Contact in person the military intelligence officers of Hq 24th Inf Div, Hq 19th, 24th, and 34th Inf Reg's, and Hq 24th Inf Div Arty and learn in what way the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, FEC may better serve the field.

b. Explore the methods and systems by which the Military Intelligence section GHQ FEC may get more detailed and quicker reports from the field.

c. Observe and check the collection, collation, evaluation, and dissemination of military intelligence in the field, as well as the maps and records that are maintained.

d. Observe the military intelligence training schools as may be in operation. Report upon the status of military intelligence training, the progress and schedules relating thereto.

e. Check upon the status of military intelligence officers in regard to their assignment and performance of additional duties, and their qualifications for their basic assignment.

f. Inquire into the relationship of the local CIC units with the troop G-2 or S-2, in the area they operate with a view of placing the CIC personnel (and mission) at the disposal of tactical commanders.

g. Accomplish such other military intelligence missions as may be necessary or advisable as determined by developments in the situation.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General, G.S.C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2



RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AG 210.453 - AGPO 1 Mar 48

SUBJECT: Order 54-12

TO : Off concerned, GHQ FEC

1. Fol off WP o/a 15 Mar 48 to Hq 24th Inf Div APO 24 on TDY for a period of approximately ten (10) days in connection with military intelligence activities. Upon compl will ret to present sta.

Lt Col John P Perlett 028956 Inf
1st Lt Dale R Buis 0494655 Inf

2. Tvl by mil acft, rail and govt mtr transportation authorized. TDN. An alws of sixty-five (65) pounds personal baggage auth each off while traveling by air. No per diem authorized.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

W. L. DAY
Major AGD
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
G-2 Sec (1)
2 off concerned (7 each) thru G-2 Sec

## I TOUR SCHEDULE
(See Map No 1)

Wed. 17 Mar 48
- Lv Tokyo (Tachikawa) 0945 via Troop Carrier.
- Av Fukuoka (Itazuki) 1500.
- Lv Fukuoka 1515 via vehicle.
- Av Kokura (Hq 24th Inf Div) 1630.

Thur. 18 Mar 48
- Conference with AC of S, G-2, 24th Inf Div.
- Courtesy call, Lt. Col. Moody, C/S.
- Courtesy call, Maj. Gen. Smith, CG.
- Attended Staff School "Samuri Swords".

Fri. 19 Mar 48
- Inspection, G-2 Section.
- Lv Kokura 1253 via rail.
- Av Hakata 1510.
- Lv Hakata 1515 via vehicle.
- Av Camp Hakata (24th Div Arty) 1545.
- Conference, S-2, 24th Inf Div Arty.

Sat. 20 Mar 48
- Inspection, S-2 Section.
- Courtesy call, S-3, 24th Div Arty.
- Courtesy call, ExO, 24th Div Arty.
- Courtesy call, CO, 24th Div Arty.
- Lv Camp Hakata 1100 via vehicle.
- Av Kashi 1120.
- Lv Kashi 1135 via rail.
- Av Kokura 1310.
- Lv Kokura 1402 via rail.
- Av Beppu 1807.
- Lv Beppu 1810 via vehicle.
- Av Camp Chickamauga (19th Inf Reg) 1830.

Sun. 21 Mar 48
- Conference with S-2, 19th Inf Reg.
- Inspection S-2 Section.

Mon. 22 Mar 48
- Courtesy call, Col Lynch, CO 19th Inf.
- Conference with S-2, 19th Inf Reg.
- Lv Camp Chickamauga 1315 via vehicle.
- Av Oita 1345.
- Lv Oita via rail 1358.
- Av Kumamoto 1945.
- Lv Kumamoto 1950 via vehicle.
- Av Camp Wood (21st Inf Reg) 2010.

Tues. 23 Mar 48
- Conference, S-2 21st Inf.
- Courtesy call, Lt Col Stell, CO, 21st Inf.
- Courtesy call, Lt. Col. Shinaberger, CO, Kumamoto MG Team.
- Courtesy call, Capt. Finnegan, CO, 2d CIC Area.
- Inspection, S-2 Section.

Wed. 24 Mar 48
- Lv Camp Wood 0945 via L-5 plane.
- Av Camp Mower (34th Inf Reg) 1015.
- Conference with S-2, 34th Inf.
- Courtesy call, Col. Bing, CO, 34th Inf.
- Inspection S-2 Section.
- Inspection, Sasebo Boat Base (34th Inf).

I TOUR SCHEDULE (CONT'D)

Thur. 25 Mar 48 - Lv Sasebo 0930 via vehicle.
- Lv Dragon Field 1000 via L-5 plane.
- Av Brady Field (via Nagasaki) 1030.
- Lv Brady Field 1130 via vehicle.
- Luncheon, Camp Hakata (24th Div Arty).
- Courtesy call, Lt Col Sargent, CO, Kuyshu MG Region.
- Courtesy call, CO, Fukuoka MG Team.
- Courtesy call, Lt Beno, CO, CIC Det 3-A.
- Av Itazuki AFB (317th Comp Wing) 1600.
- Conference with A-2, 317th Wing.

Fri. 26 Mar 48 - Reconnaissance Flight (Lt Col Perlett) 0900 - 1215.
- Courtesy call, CO, 607th CIC Det (Lt Buis).
- Lv Itazuki AFB 1330 via Troop Carrier.
- Av Tokyo (Tachikawa) 1810.

Note: Bad weather from 19 Mar to 23 Mar, incl, caused the schedule to be changed since L-5 planes were grounded. This brought about the elimination of a contemplated trip by an LCT to and visit of Tsushima.



## II GENERAL INFORMATION

Transportation: Hq 24th Inf Div (KOKURA) can be reached either by courier plane (317th Troop Carrier Squadron) from Tachikawa or by rail. The plane lands at Itazuke Air Force Base outside of FUKUOKA and an approximate 40 mile vehicle ride must be made to the division headquarters. Local trains may be used, but it is a two hour or more trip. Allied coaches are available from KOKURA or FUKUOKA south as far as BEPPU, KUMAMOTO, and SASEBO. Rail travel East and West between BEPPU and KUMAMOTO is only be Japanese train (conductor's office of the baggage cars). Travel by allied railroad car South of this line is not always certain. If units are to be visited, using railroads as the medium of travel, then a full day must be allowed for all points out of FUKUOKA and KOKURA. The ideal means of travel for all points out of these points is by L-5 plane from BRADY FIELD near Camp Hakata, a few miles out of FUKUOKA on the spit which forms the harbor at FUKUOKA. Any tactical headquarters can be reached on an average flying time of 30 minutes out of Brady Field, or the same time between any two headquarters. At present, TSUSHIMA (Island) can be reached either by Japanese ferry out of HAKATA via IKISHIMA, or by the supply LST out of SASEBO, which leaves at 0400 Fridays (this trip takes about 18 hours). Vehicular transportation is required between all Air Fields and RR stations to all tactical headquarters.

Accomodations: The Hq 24th Div has several small cottages just outside the headquarters area gate, for visitors. They are clean, comfortable, but nothing spectacular. A BOQ is maintained near the Division Officers' Club.

The 24th Div Arty maintains two BOQ's, which are now shared with dependent families awaiting housing, in the rear of the headquarters buildings. These are former Japanese military quarters. They are clean, well cared for, but just a place to sleep. A small mess and club exists in one of the buildings.

The 19th Inf Reg maintains only one BOQ. Visitors are usually quartered in a Japanese Hotel (approved) some distance from the regimental area. The quarters are clean and well cared for. Breakfast is served at this hotel, but no other meal.

The 21st Inf Reg has three BOQ's that were one time Japanese officers' quarters. They are plain, clean, and well cared for.

The 34th Inf maintains BOQ's at Camp Mower and also at SASEBO. Visitors are usually quartered in the hotel (BOQ) in SASEBO. A club and a mess are maintained in the hotel. The rooms are fairly clean, but comfortable.

Mess: The bachelors and transient mess of the Hq 24th Inf Div is located just outside the walls of the divisional compound. It is about three minutes walk from the cottages and a few yards from the BOQ. The food and service is average.

The 24th Div Arty mess is in the first BOQ building on the first floor. The food was above average and the service average.

The 19th Inf Reg transient mess and the only bachelors' mess, since the regiment has an insufficient number of single officers to operate a single mess for them, is in the Officers' Club. The food generally is above average and the service is fair.

The officers' mess of the 21st Inf Reg has been combined with that of the Headquarters Company, but a small separate room is used. Service is fast and the food above average.

The Camp Mower mess of the 34th Inf Reg is very good. The mess in the SASEBO BOQ is typical of a hotel mess and service is fair.

Recreational Activities: Nothing unusual for a visiting officer and very limited for resident officers, if single.

## III LIAISON CONTACTS

Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division:

Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, CG, 24th Inf Div.

Lt. Col. George K. Moody, C/S (acting), 24th Inf Div.
Lt. Col. Marvin A. Kreidberg, AC of S, G-3.

Maj. W. L. Betsill, Lin O, CIC.

Capt. James B. Webel, AC of S, G-2 (acting).
Capt. Joseph A. Goldes, G-2 Opns O (acting ExO).
Capt. William B. Koons, PIO.

Lt. A. N. Valonakis, Ass't G-2.

24th Infantry Division Artillery:

Col. Charles C. Blanchard, CO, 24th Div Arty.

Lt. Col. Paul R. Walters, ExO, 24th Div Arty.
Lt. Col. J. H. Stangle, S-3, 24th Div Arty.

Maj. E. F. Whitney, AO, 24th Div Arty.

Capt. W. H. Brabson, Jr, AO, 24th Div Arty.
Capt. R. Q. Hennicke, T I & E O.

Lt. W. H. Cofer, S-2, 24th Div Arty.

19th Infantry Regiment:

Col. Charles P. Lynch, CO, 19th Inf Reg.

Lt. Col. Paul M. Cairns, Deputy CO, Camp Chickamauga.
Lt. Col. G. A. Mildonian, CO, 1st Bn.

Maj. W. A. Crawford, S-4.

Capt. P. K. Dilts, S-2, 19th Inf Reg.
Capt. J. A. Wesolowski, CO, Sv Co.

Lt. A. J. Yerks, Jr., Ass't S-2.

21st Infantry Regiment:

Lt. Col. Fred H. Stoll, CO, 21st Inf Reg.
Lt. Col. M. E. Schneider, CO, 1st Bn.

Maj. J. H. Ritts, S-2.
Maj. G. J. Tilker, FMO.

Capt. J. H. Smith, S-3.
Capt. C. K. Smith, Ass't S-3.

Lt. W. F. Schwab, CO, I & R Plat.

III LIAISON CONTACTS (CONT'D)

34th Infantry Regiment:

Col. Ralph C. Bing, CO, 34th Inf Reg.

Lt. Col. J. W. Strain, ExO.
Lt. Col. H. W. Fischer, Deputy, Camps Mower & Sasebo.

Capt. W. F. Ponzer, Post Adj.

Lt. H. E. Rollison, S-2 (Acting S-3).
Lt. J. R. Hobson, CO, I & R Plat.

Military Government:

Lt. Col. G. W. Sargent, ExO (acting CO), Kuyshu Region.
Lt. Col. H. Shinaberger, CO, Kumamoto Team.
Lt. Col. G. B. Goodrich, CO, Oita Team.

Maj. L. V. Wiggins, Legal & Govt O, Fukuoka Team.

Capt. J. P. Biggs, Legal O, Kumamoto Team.

Lt. C. F. Bachtel, Adj, Kuyshu Region.

Counter Intelligence Corps:

Capt. Nick Bariski, CO, 3d Area.
Capt. O. J. Squires, ExO, 3d Area.
Capt. K. R. Bene, CO, Det 3-A.
Capt. J. B. Finnegan, CO, 2d Area.

Lt. W. A. Smith, Opns O, Det 3-A.
Lt. S. L. Fraggee, ExO, 2d Area.
Lt. Darrell Miller, Agent, 3d Area.
Lt. J. A. Alexander, S-4, 3d Area.
Lt. I. A. Jablonski, Agent, 3d Area.
Lt G. W. Goetsch, CO, Det 3-B.

CWO A. L. Butcher, Investigator, 3d Area.

Mr. N. L. Wyndham, Agent, Det 3-B.

Miscellaneous:

Mr. P. T. Tien, Chinese Consul, Nagasaki office.

## IV BRIEF OF MISSION

1. General: The mission to Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division, at KOKURA, and its elements in KYUSHU, is given in a letter "Directive for Staff Visit to Kyushu", Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, FEC, 12 Mar 48, ("Directive, page ii"). The seven points of the mission and the results obtained, as follows:

a. Contact in person the military intelligence officers of the Hq 24th Inf Div, Hq 24th Div Arty, Hq 19th Inf Reg, Hq 21st Inf Reg, and Hq 34th Inf Reg and learn in what way the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, FEC, may better serve the field.

Comment: The summation of thoughts of better service to the field on the part of G-2, GHQ, were "need of qualified commissioned and enlisted personnel as replacements"; "allocation of confidential funds to set up a divisional informant service"; "issue of photographic equipment and supplies of Japanese information contained in the daily summaries and estimates of G-2 Sect, GHQ". ?

b. Explore methods and systems by which the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, FEC, may get more detailed and quicker reports from the field.

Comment: Currently, the recently opened system of "Daily Highlight Reports" from the field is the best system possible for the present. With an increase of personnel, whenever the proposed draft flow reaches this theater from the ZI, a wider coverage with other methods of reporting may be possible.

c. Observe and check the collection, collation, evaluation, and dissemination of military intelligence in the field, as well as the maps and records that are maintained.

Comment: The lack of personnel definitely reflects in the collection of information. While the collation and evaluation have not yet suffered, it can be anticipated that future reports from the field will reflect the personnel and experience lack. It is believed all field personnel are functioning to the best of their ability. Dissemination of information appears to move in "fits and starts", controlled somewhat in its movement by deficiencies in communications. There is a distinct feeling that communications systms have not been exploited to their maximum.

d. Observe military intelligence training schools as may be in operation. Report upon the status of military intelligence training, the progress, and schedules relating thereto.

Comment: There are no schools and likely to be none until there are officers and men in sufficient force to attend them and also to carry on the normal routine of work. Any training given now is by "practical experience" and details to the 441st CIC Det School in Tokyo.

e. Check upon the status of military intelligence officers in regard to their assignment to and performance of additional duties, and their qualifications for their basic assignment.

Comment: All military intelligence officers are performing additional duties. Generally, their schedule of additional duties appears no greater than those of the other officers. This condition is due to shortage of personnel, brought on by completion of foreign duty tours and heavy drafts taken by the military government units. It seems, however, that the duties as custodian of enemy property should be an S-4 detail and not an S-2 duty. Likewise, it is felt that an S-2 should not be the provost court prosecutor. A few of the military intelligence officers have had prior training, but most of them "learn by doing".

f. Inquire into the relationships of the local CIC units with the troop G-2 or S-2, in the area in which they operate, with a view of placing the CIC personnel (and mission) at the disposal of the tactical commanders.

Comment: The relationships and cooperation existing between the CIC and tactical troops are excellent. The Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and AC of S, G-2, all favor the placement of CIC personnel and their mission at the disposal of the Division Commander.

g. Accomplish such other military intelligence missions as may be necessary or advisable as determined by developments in the situation.

Comment: These were many and varied and are discussed to some length in the body of the following report.

## V PERSONALITIES, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

2. General: The background of the 24th Infantry Division military intelligence officers is well divided between those who have received formal training in the I Corps School or the 441st CIC Det School. Few of the enlisted personnel of the sections are graduates of special schools. There will be no great change in officers until late in the Fall of 1948. The military government drafts have taken more officers from intelligence work than any other single factor.

A brief of each officer's experience and time yet to serve in the Far East Command, follows:

a. 24th Infantry Division Headquarters:

Capt. James B. Webel: Assistant G-2. Section Executive Officer and currently acting G-2. He served as G-2 from August through December 1947, and began again in March 1948, when Lt. Col. Moody became acting chief of staff. Well qualified. Combat officer, ETO. Five years experience as S-3 and G-3. Graduate of C&GSS 18 June 1944. Security conscious. Has about one year to serve in FEC.

Capt. J. A. Goldes: Assistant G-2. Section Operations Officer. Combat Officer, ETO. Graduate of Ft Riley Intelligence School 1946, and of 441st CIC Det School. Has job well in hand. Has about one year to serve in FEC.

Lt. A. N. Valonakis: Language Officer. Operates card file system. Provost Court Prosecutor. Graduate University Minnesota Language School (Japanese). Graduate of 441st CIC Det School. Will probably extend his tour in FEC. Would like to have entered competitive tour for RA appointment but was rejected because of age, 28 years.

Lt. F. Asano: CO, 178th Headquarters Intelligence (Language) Detachment. Does routine language work. Will remain in FEC as long as possible.

Lt. K. Z. Ninomiya: Language Officer. Direct commission from enlisted status. Graduate of 441st CIC Det School. Does special investigations and classified translations. Will be in the FEC until early November 1948.

b. 24th Infantry Division Artillery:

Lt. W. H. Cofer: Group S-2. Combat Officer, ETO. No prior experience as S-2. Graduate of Artillery School, Ft Sill. Is doing a good job and learning by experience. Is also the PIO, Historian, Enemy Property Officer. Has about 18 months yet to serve in FEC.

Lt. R. Thorstensen: S-2, S-3, 13th FA Bn. Air Borne troop combat officer. No previous experience in intelligence and no prior training. Now on TDY with military government.

Capt. M. N. Riley: S-2, S-3, 52d FA Bn. Combat officer. No previous experience in intelligence and no prior training. Has about 1 year yet to serve in FEC.

Lt. E. D. Larsen: S-2, S-3, 11th FA Bn. Combat officer. Graduate of I Corps Military Intelligence School. Has about 90 days left to serve in FEC. Currently on TDY with military government.

V PERSONALITIES, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS (CONT'D)

c. 19th Infantry Regiment:

Capt. P. K. Dilts: S-2. No prior experience in military intelligence but was assigned May 1947. Combat company commander. Graduate class 27, C&GSS. Also regimental claims officer. Answers to most questions were very vague. Has about one year to serve in FEC.

Capt. E. W. Hunn: S-2, S-3, 1st Bn. Combat Officer. No prior experience in military intelligence. No prior training in this field. Has about 10 months remaining of his FEC tour.

Lt. A. J. Yerks, Jr: Assistant S-2, Reg. Also PIO and Provost Court Prosecutor. Combat Officer. No prior experience or training, but appears to have a better grasp of the intelligence picture than his chief. Will be in FEC until October 1948.

Lt. Pat Cullen: CO, I & R Plat. Has no platoon to command. Now on TDY with military government. Has about one year to serve in FEC.

d. 21st Infantry Regiment:

Maj. J. H. Ritts: S-2. No prior training nor experience in intelligence. Combat officer. Appears to have a good grasp upon the situation. Is also the provost court officer at Kagoshima, which takes about two days a month. Has varied other jobs and may be relieved if shortage of field grades continues for some other assignment within the regiment. Has 13 months left yet to serve in FEC.

Capt. R. A. Cuzick: S-2, 2d Bn. Also the ExO, S-1, S-3, S-4. Combat officer. No prior experience or training in military intelligence. Has eight months left to serve in FEC.

Lt. C. H. Lelong: S-2, 1st Bn. No prior experience or training. Now on TDY with military government. Has 14 months left of his tour in FEC.

Lt. V. T. Yensus: S-2, 3d Bn. Combat Officer. Graduate of I Corps Military Intelligence School. Has 16 months of this tour to serve in FEC. Now on TDY with military government.

Lt. W. F. Schwab: CO, I & R Plat. Graduate of I Corps Military Intelligence School. Has about one year yet to serve in FEC. Now on TDY with military government.

e. 34th Infantry Regiment:

Lt. H. E. Rollison: S-2. Combat Officer. One year experience as Bn S-2. Graduate I Corps Military Intelligence School. Now (8 Apr 48) attending 441st CIC Det School. Appears quite capable and has a thorough knowledge of his job. Has eight months to serve in FEC.

Lt. R. D. Thorpe: S-2, ed Bn. No prior experience or training. Has 15 months remaining of his tour in FEC. Now on TDY with military government.

Lt. J. R. Hobson: CO, I & R Plat. Graduate of Class of 1946. Has 18 months to serve in FEC.

## VI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS

3. Following are briefs upon the various military intelligence sections:

a. 24th Infantry Division:

Personnel: Both commissioned and enlisted personnel in the section have at least one year yet to serve in FEC. In May 1947, the continued loss without replacement was forcast and "long termers" were assigned to the section to meet it. The only factor disturbing the section is the frequency with which the AC of S, G-2, is called upon to act as Chief of Staff. This, however, has not upset the organization.

Offices: The section is located on the second floor of the left wing of the headquarters building. The general offices occupy one half of the room, with the PIO offices occupying the other half. Separate offices on the same floor are maintained for the files, the language detachment, and the G-2. They are clean and well organized.

Security: Security is adequate. Bright colored covers are used to indicate the classification of each document in circulation. However, it is believed that telephone security is inadequate.

Staff Co-ordination: Daily staff meetings are held by the Chief of Staff and upon call by the Commanding General. Weekly meetings are held at a luncheon attended by representatives of the CCD, CIC, PMO, MG, and A-2.

Reports: The section issues the normal periodic reports and telephones Spot Reports to Hq, I Corps. It receives the normal periodic reports from the regiments plus such Spot Reports as there may be, by telephone. The Daily Summary published by G-2 Section GHQ FEC reaches the 24th Inf Div Hq from five to seven days after publication usually arriving two at a time. This is believed to be due to operational deficiencies of the postal system.

Current Work: The current project is the completion of the card file system in which all nationals and organizations of interest to the section will be cataloged. About 1,500 individuals and the same number of organizations have been carded.

b. 24th Division Artillery:

Personnel: The personnel in this section are inadequate in number. The S-2 has 18 months yet of this tour in FEC. However, he has only two enlisted men left and will soon lose both of these. The battalion sections are down to zero and there is no experienced personnel to be drawn upon. Only one battalion S-2 (52d Bn) is on duty, two (11th and 13th Bn's) are on TDY with the military government, and there is no S-2 for the 63d Bn. All officers are carrying far more than their normal share of duties because of personnel shortage.

Offices: The general office is shared with the S-3. The offices are clean, but present a very worn appearance and could be improved. The offices are located on the second floor of the right wing of the headquarters building.

VI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS (CONT'D)

Security: Some improvement was indicated in physical security, but this has been taken care of by the AC of S, G-2, 24th Div. It is believed that security measures are now adequate, with the exception of telephone security.

Staff Co-ordination: The S-2 and S-3 have an open window between their desks. Co-ordination with other sections is effected at staff meetings. The S-2 meets weekly at luncheon with representatives of the PMO, MG, CIC, and A-2.

Reports: The section issues normal periodic reports and telephones spot reports to Hq, 24th Div. All patrols report directly to the S-2 as all battalion functions have been transferred to the group.

Current Work: The group SOP for patrols is being revised. Patrols are checking storage sites and makers of all forms of explosives.

c. 19th Infantry Regiment:

Personnel: Personnel in this section are inadequate. The S-2 will be on duty approximately one year, while the assistant, who is quite capable, will complete his tour in October 1948. Only the 1st Bn has an S-2 and his duties are combined with those of the S-3. The CO I & R Plat is on TDY with the MG, but has no personnel in the platoon. The section has no enlisted personnel. All clerical work is done by the S-2 and his assistant or by a clerk shared with the S-1 and S-3.

Offices: The section (two officers) is located in the left wing of the headquarters building. The office was slightly mussy in appearance, but this condition could be considered normal where two men must perform all duties from being clerk to chief of section.

Security: Security of the offices is adequate. Documents are filed in the S-1 Section. Telephone security is inadequate.

Staff Co-ordination: Co-ordination is effected at called staff meetings. Contact is made by the S-2 with the MG and CIC.

Reports: The section issues normal periodic reports and telephones spot reports to Hq, 24th Div. Patrols operate directly under the regimental section.

Current Work: Routine.

d. 21st Infantry Regiment:

Personnel: Personnel in this section are adequate. The S-2 has about one year to serve in FEC. Each battalion has an S-2, but no enlisted personnel. The I & R Plat has eight men and operates under the platoon sergeant, since the CO is on TDY with the MG. The section sergeant is quite capable and appearantly would make a good S-2 in his own right.

VI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS (CONT'D)

Offices: The section offices are located near the center of the headquarters building on the ground floor. The offices are well used and worn, but clean.

Security: Security of the offices is adequate. Telephone security is inadequate.

Staff Co-ordination: Close liaison exists between the S-2 and S-3. Co-ordination is direct and as required. Staff meetings are held at regular intervals.

Reports: The section issues normal periodic reports and telephones spot reports to Hq, 24th Div. Patrols operate directly under the regimental section. Officers on MG tax collection teams report intelligence information to the regimental S-2.

Current Work: Checking explosives storage and manufacture. Setting up detail to gather up bodies located during the graves registration search last spring.

e. 34th Infantry Regiment:

Personnel: Personnel in this section are inadequate. The S-2 has eight months to serve of this tour in FEC. Appears to be quite capable. Only the 3d Bn has an S-2 and he is on TDY with MG. Eight men remain in the I & R Plat which operates directly under the regimental section. There are no qualified enlisted personnel other than one sergeant in the section office.

Offices: The office is located on the second floor of the headquarters building. It is dark and gloomy, but clean.

Security: Security of the offices is adequate. Telephone security is inadequate.

Staff Co-ordination: Close liaison exists between the S-2 and S-3 and is direct. Staff meetings are held at regular intervals.

Reports: The section issues normal periodic reports and telephones spot reports to Hq, 24th Div. Patrols operate directly under the regimental section.

Current Work: Checking explosives storage and manufacture. Completing details and smoothing out Tsushima Detachment operation.

Comment: In general the physical appearance of the various regimental S-2 Section offices does not measure up to the standards set by the Divisional section. Of the three, the 21st Inf is the best. It would seem that no thought has been given to probable replacements for the S-2's. Through out the division there appears a tendency to unload an excess of extra duties on the military intelligence officers. It is believed that the S-4 is the proper officer to be the Enemy Property Officer and Custodian, not the S-2, as seems to be the rule.

VII COMMAND POST LOCATIONS & TROOP DISPOSITIONS

4. General: A general tightening up of troop dispositions is quite clear as losses continue. Troops are compressed within the main camps, while auxiliary stations are empty under guard. No changes have been made in the Areas of Responsibility and none are contemplated. (Map No. 2)

5. 24th Infantry Division Headquarters & Special Troops: The headquarters and troop quarters are located in a former Japanese arsenal in Kokura opposite the city railroad station. The site is designated as "Camp Kokura".

6. 24th Division Artillery: The entire group is located on a spit opposite the city of Fukuoka, approximately 10 miles from Hakata, which is the first stop on the Fukuoka - Kokura railroad North of Fukuoka. It can be reached only by air or vehicle, for the stub railroad from Fukuoka transports only freight. The site was formerly a Japanese naval air base. One battery is stationed in Fukuoka for military police duty. Brady Field, the artillery liaison plane field, lies between Camp Hakata and Fukuoka, but also on the spit. Dependent housing is included in the camp area.

7. 19th Infantry Regiment: The regiment, with the exception of Co B, is in Camp Chickamauga about three miles outside of Beppu. Co B is on duty at Kokura as "school troops" for the division specialist school. The camp was built new along state-side lines of design. Dependent housing is included in the camp area.

8. 21st Infantry Regiment: All troops are located in Camp Wood, about ten miles outside of Kumamoto and can be reached only by vehicle or camp bus. The site is that of a former Japanese army post, but has been enlarged by both the US Marine Corps and later by the army. Dependent housing is included in the camp area.

9. 34th Infantry Regiment: Two stations are operated by this regiment. The major portion of the troops are located at Camp Mower, about fifteen miles outside of Sasebo at Ainoura (or Yamaguchi). This site is a former Japanese navy training station. It can be reached by vehicle from Sasesbo or by air. Camp Sasesbo is located within the town and is a former Japanese munitions dump and army post. Two rifle companies and the Service Company were quartered at one time in Camp Sasebo. BOQ's are maintained at both posts. There are three dependent housing areas, all in Sasebo. The regimental sea base, location of its patrol ships and recreational boats, is also located at Sasebo. A small detachment is maintained at Hario Repatriation Center, approximately seven miles out of Sasebo. A provisional platoon is located on Tsushima.



## VIII TROOPS STRENGTH & REORGANIZATION
(Map No. 3)

10. General: The overall condition of strength in the 24th Inf Div is not good, but generally no worse than the 25th Inf Div or the 1st Cav Div. Commanders and staff officers both complained of the shortage of officer and enlisted personnel. TDY details to Military Government teams has reduced the average officer strength per regiment to approximately 25 percent for duty. The parallel staff for a Post Command and Station Headquarters that exists throughout the division has cut heavily into both commissioned and enlisted personnel. It would seem upon a superficial examination that a parallel command and headquarters is a waste of personnel.

11. 24th Infantry Division Headquarters & Special Troops: All staff sections are understrength. The 24th Div Rcn Trp is inoperative, except for 1 officer and 6 enlisted men. Recently the remainder of the Rcn personnel were assigned to the divisional military police platoon. Co's B & C, 3d Eng Bn are inoperative while the battalion has a strength of 120. The 24th Med Bn has a strength of 170. The 24th QM Bn, 724th Ord (MM) Co and 24th Sig Co are not much over their cadre strength.

12. 24th Division Artillery: The group has one battery (Btry A, 11th FA Bn) of 155mm howitzers effective. Btry C, 13th FA Bn, is a provisional MP unit located in Fukuoka. All elements of the 52d and 63d FA Bn's are inoperative as well as the remaining elements of the 11th and 13th FA Bn's. The group has a strength (20 Mar 48) of 22 officers and 360 men. There are an additional 17 officers on TDY with the MG.

13. 19th Infantry Regiment: Of this regiment only Co A, which includes a 25 man MP detachment, is operative other than the Hq Co and Sv Co. One sergeant remains of the I & R Plat. Co B, with a strength of 3 officers and 60 men, is on duty at the divisional specialist school at Kokura as "school troops". The regiment has 40 officers, including nine on TDY with the MG and the three detailed to Kokura. There are 216 enlisted men present at Beppu, but the rolls show 344. This larger figure includes Co B and those on TDY and SD elsewhere.

14. 21st Infantry Regiment: There are 22 officers and 272 enlisted men present for duty in this regiment. Eight men led by a sergeant, comprise the I & R Plat. The Hq Co, Sv Co, Co B, and Co D, the latter being the MP unit, are all that remain operative. The CO 1st Bn serves as the commander of troops. This regiment has approximately 20 officers on duty with the MG.

15. 34th Infantry Regiment: Since this command has a large number of islands to patrol, the Hario Repatriation Center to police, and an island (Tsushima) to garrison, efforts have been made to keep it up. It's current strength is 40 officers and 400 enlisted men. Operative are Hq Co, Sv Co, Co M (which is the Sasebo MP unit), Co K and the 3d Bn Hq and Hq Det (there is no Bn Hq Co). The Tsushima detachment is a provisional platoon from Co K consisting of 2 officers, 19 enlisted men agumented by two radio operators and an interpreter from Hq 24th Div. Eight men remain in the I & R Plat. A detachment of 1 officer and 9 men is maintained at Hario.

VIII TROOPS, STRENGTH & REORGANIZATION (CONT'D)
(Map No. 3)

16. Divisional Strength: The G-1, 24th Inf Div, on 18 Mar 48, reported 436 officers, 21 warrant officers, and 2,889 enlisted men on the rolls. This is an aggregate strength of 3,346.

17. Reorganization Plan: The minimum organization prescribed for the division is Hq and Hq Co, Sv Co, Bn Hq, 1 rifle Co per regiment; Div Arty Hq and Sv Btry, 1 Bn Hq and Sv Btry, 1 FA Btry, and Med Det Special troops are to be maintained at the lowest operational strength.