

Immediately after the great changes in organization, campaigning almost entirely ceased, and SAITO announced that nothing more would be done by Tokyo headquarters than the dispatch of circulars to branch offices, issuance of official pronouncements and the direction of a few speaking tours.

Prior to the purge about ¥150,000 had been collected, of which TSURUMI contributed ¥80,000, for a total campaign fund estimated to reach eventually the ¥5,000,000 mark. A second large donation, ¥50,000 came from TANAKA Takeo, ex-minister of transport and communication.

Tokyo Mainichi, never too reliable a journal in such matters, said that MACHIDA intended to draw money from the Yamaguchi Bank, Osaka, through his Osaka and Tokyo Zaibatsu connections. Whether or not this statement is true, the fact remains that following the purge contributions slowed down to such a point that SAITO declared that his party would not spend more than ¥200,000, "the smallest sum of any of the five big parties."

One contribution, of ¥100,000, to be made by OKADA Eitaro, president of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, through KOGURE, NODA and MATSUMURA, was to have been followed by MACHIDA's petitioning the Emperor to name OKADA to the House of Peers and by KOGURE and NODA's following OKADA's orders. Because arrangements were made through MACHIDA's clique, the OKADA deal was cancelled. SAITO "never heard of any OKADA contribution."

The lack of funds compelled the party to cancel at least a projected plan to allot from ¥1,000 to ¥5,000 to each recognized candidate (Yomiuri-Hochi had put the figure at ¥10,000).

The financial set-back was temporary. In mid-March, more activities became noticeable, in the form of street posters, and on 23 March, Jiji Press reported that the Progressive Party had a campaign fund of ¥839,322. This report indicated a four-fold increase in party funds within a ten days period.

POLICIES:

SAITO had a reputation as a liberal, but his attitude toward solutions for Japan's current problems did not indicate any definite ideas for either liberalization or reform. Following the purge, the party had a magnificent opportunity to stand for political regeneration, but, instead, it kept silent. The old MACHIDA-TSURUMI program was retained without modification.

Women voters, going to the polls for the first time, would cast at least half the votes in the election, but SAITO did not think it necessary to make any special appeal to this huge body of new voters. Relying upon his conviction that women are naturally conservative and thus, if they voted independently, they would support either the Progressives or the Liberals and believing, as did most Japanese observers that the women would merely duplicate the votes of their men, he had neither a program of legislation to be enacted in their behalf nor any special slogans to attract their interest.

Because SAITO expected his chief strength to lie among middle-class

city and rural voters, with little support to be found among artisans, factory workers or small farmers, he saw no need to implement his vague planks on farm or labor problems. The Progressive Party relied rather upon inertia than upon convincing argument in appealing for votes.

PARTY REFORMATION:

Failure of Japanese voters in the 1946 election to choose a party with a clear majority produced a Cabinet deadlock. The Liberals with 142 Diet seats shortly after the election needed at least 92 more votes to form a Government, and, since these could be picked up by an alliance with either the Social Democrats or the Progressives, while any other coalition would require at least a four-party agreement, a six-weeks delay resulted while politicians pulled wires and sought to arrange political deals.

In these movements the Progressives played an important role. Immediately following the resignation of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet on 22 April, Baron SHIDEHARA Kinjuro became head of the Progressive Party, a movement popularly interpreted to indicate his desire to enter a new Cabinet in which the Progressives would have large representation.

The immediate result was a series of internal readjustments arising out of the struggle for party control. It early became evident that SAITO personally had little strength or little force and that his replacement as party director would in no way affect the party policy. It also became clear that the real direction of the Progressive Party had fallen into the hands of INUKAI who, as SHIDEHARA's protege and as heir to the "youth" movement formerly headed by TSURUMI, had gained full control of party machinery. When, therefore, the YOSHIDA Cabinet came into existence with SAITO, HITOTSUMATSU and KAWAI as members, INUKAI found little difficulty in carrying a motion to elect all three men to the posts of party advisors. This removed them from active participation in party affairs and gave INUKAI virtually complete control.

OPPORTUNISM:

The Progressive Party began as a frankly tentative organization, formed for the express purpose of mobilizing the past loyalties of Seiyukai and Minseito followers and for holding together the surviving Diet members of those parties. To a degree greater than those of other contemporary Japanese political groups its history has been opportunist.

This policy was evident from the very beginning. Most of the founders sought a name implying a flavor of democracy. Their first suggestion was People's Party (Minhonto) but since this name carried a connotation that the people were the true basis of the state the title was rejected. The name Progressive (Shimpoto) was accepted because it sounded Occidental and democratic without conveying any commitment as to the locus of sovereignty.

The party's insincerity of principle showed itself clearly in the Cabinet crisis. Following the 10 April election, the SHIDEHARA Cabinet

resigned, but since no party owned a clear majority of Diet seats, political readjustments were necessary. The Progressives with 95 Diet members frankly shopped around seeking the best price for their support. When, at one juncture, it seemed likely that the Progressives would be an opposition party, three of the top leaders, SAITO Takeo, HITOTSUMATSU Sadakichi and INUKAI Ken, called on Baron SHIDEHARA to protest his acceptance of a new Cabinet post under the Liberals. SHIDEHARA at that time was nominal president of the Progressives and his action in joining the projected Cabinet seemed to the leaders a contravention of their purposes. His action, they said showed that he had only a slight conception of the function of a political party and that he was indifferent to the danger of bureaucracy. Yet, five days later, SAITO and HITOTSUMATSU themselves joined SHIDEHARA as Ministers without Portfolio in the same Cabinet which they had denounced. At the same time a third party leader, KAWAI Yoshinari, former Vice Minister of Agriculture and former vice mayor of Tokyo, became Minister of Welfare.

Indeed, SAITO, at the very time that he was criticising SHIDEHARA for co-operating with the Liberals, announced that the time was ripe for a Liberal-Progressive alliance because, as he said, there was no real difference in "party character" between the two organizations. This remark, it was later officially explained, was "misunderstood."

Nevertheless, at the next full meeting of the Executive Committee, SAITO, KAWAI and HITOTSUMATSU were removed from their positions on the Executive Committee and were made advisors. SAITO's place as chairman of the committee went to INUKAI while TANAKA Mitsugi replaced HITOTSUMATSU as secretary-general. A change also occurred among the committeemen.

NEW OFFICIALS:

TANAKA Manitsu, new Chief secretary of the party to succeed HITOTSUMATSU, is a veteran Diet member, having been chosen ten times as a Minseito representative. He has been parliamentary Vice Minister for Agriculture.

To replace the advisors as committee members, SHIDEHARA, acting through INUKAI and probably at the latter's instigation, named three new men; at the same time he availed himself of his privilege as president to add additional members. The present General Affairs Committee, therefore, under the chairmanship of INUKAI consists of:

MIYAZAWA Saikichi, former Nagano assemblyman, village chief and vice chairman of the Village Chiefs Association, and executive committeeman of the Nagano Agricultural Association. He is a former member of the Seiyukai.

HIBINO Minpei, vice chairman of the Political Affairs Investigation Committee, a Diet member since 1931, a four-term prefectural assemblyman, a village chief and an agricultural association executive.

HORIKAWA Kyohei, former Minseito prefectural assemblyman, director of a control society and former member of the Dai Nippon Seijikai.

KUDO Tetsuo, 76-year old Minseito member who has served for six terms in the Diet.

HARA Fujiro, seventy year old lawyer and former procurator and judge, was a Diet member for 8 terms, and, 1936, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Justice. He is a former IRAPS and Seijikai member, but his service in those organizations was nominal only. HARA was a student at Paris and Grenoble.

MATSUDA Shoichi, five times Minseito Diet member from Mie, who was affiliated with the Minseito, IRAPS and Seijikai.

TANAKA Mitsugi, third-term Diet member and former IRAPS secretary and Seijikai member. TANAKA was purged in June 1946.

SHIBATA Hyoichiro, member of the House of Peers and secretary of the Seijikai who was advisor to his local IRAA.

KOBAYASHI Kanae, a lawyer and third-term Diet member, formerly of the Seiyukai.

TSUCHIKURA Muneaki, four times a Diet member and formerly of the Seiyukai.

INUKAI Ken, fifth term Diet member, formerly a Seiyukai member.

NAKAGAWA Shigeharu, eight times Minseito Diet member, town head and IRAA Advisor, is one of the more influential shipping leaders in Akita prefecture.

NAGAI Gen, lawyer, third term Minseito member, advisor of IRAA, director of IRAPS and a Seijikai member.

NARUSHIMA Isamu, a Minseito farmer, formerly of IRAA and IRAPS.

YOSHIOKA Yayoi, president of Tokyo women's Medical College.

MURAOKA Hanako, graduate of the Anglo-Japanese Higher School.

KIUCHI Kyo, elementary school principal and former member of the IRAA Central Control Board.

KIMORA Tomiko, "an irregular city official".

An important characteristic of the new General Affairs Committee, supposedly representative of the "youth" movement sponsored by TSURUMI and INUKAI, is the overwhelming representation given to the former Minseito and Seiyukai politicians and to the former members of the Dai Nippon Seijikai, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association Political Society. The conservative nature of such individuals goes far toward negating the statement by the Progressive Party leaders that they represent a new and "stream-lined" policy and that their party favors liberalism and reform.

INUKAI Ken:

Whether it is true, as its opponents allege, that the Progressives reflect the wishes of such Zaibatsu as the Mitsubishi interests which have, in the past, been supposed to have close connections with Baron SHIDEHARA is a matter difficult to determine. INUKAI is, however, frank to admit that he regards SHIDEHARA as "a second father" to whom he will always apply for advice; he also professes to be extremely anxious to further the purposes which his father, the assassinated INUKAI Tsuyoshi, supported. Since the elder INUKAI was, with OZAKI Yukio, regarded as a "twin God of the Constitution", INUKAI Ken feels that he, too, should be active in securing for Japan a modernized and democratized basic law.

INUKAI's ambition and his firm hold upon Progressive Party machinery probably prevented the dissolution of the party following its disruption by the purge. At a time when it seemed probable that, save for the personal opposition of SAITO toward HATOYAMA Ichiro, the Progressives and Liberals would merge, it was INUKAI and SAITO who were chiefly responsible for its continuance. With SAITO's "promotion" to an advisorship and his subsequent withdrawal from such active direction as he held prior to the formation of the Yoshida Cabinet, INUKAI has come to wield almost complete power over the party.

Personally, INUKAI is scarcely a person who inspires great confidence concerning his personal devotion toward democratic principles. He gives the impression that he is too anxious to please, too ready to accept advice given him by others (though without carrying such advice into execution) and too smooth in method. His past history as Communications Ministry Councillor, 1937-1939, and as magazine editor, 1918-1931, has not been brilliant, but it has been unusual, in that, as private secretary to his father, INUKAI Tsuyoshi, he participated in secret conferences with CHIANG Kai Shek looking forward to the return of Manchuria to China. This resulted in the murder of the elder INUKAI and in the arrest of the son.

Against this, however, may be balanced his choice of old-time politicians as his committee associates and his tolerance of men with IRAPS and Seijikai affiliations. He himself, however, was never a member of these organizations.

In 1940 he was aide to the Japanese Ambassador at Nanking and was named a delegate to conclude a peace treaty with the puppet government, but, "because of differences of opinion", he resigned after one day's service. In April 1941 he was offered, but declined, an advisorship to the Nanking Government. From November 1945 until January 1946, INUKAI was parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. INUKAI insists that he has always insisted upon withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and for a repudiation of any Japanese territorial or financial claims on China.

The history of the Progressive Party is, for some time to come, likely to be the history of INUKAI himself.

MEMBERSHIP:

The party has little or no formal membership. Theoretically, machinery exists whereby applicants fill out blanks stating their desire to join the party but, except for the declaration of name, age, occupation, and public office held (which indicates the type of applicant anticipated) there is no further information. Two sponsors sign the blank. By mid-March 1946, only 400 applicants had filled out blanks, but of this number Tokyo possessed the names and addresses of only 77.

Membership is not, however, essential for acceptance as a candidate. In Akita-ken, but one member was known to central headquarters but there were five approved candidates for the Diet, none of whom was a party member. In Osaka, where SAITO claimed that the party was strong, there were nine candidates for office, but only two members.

Candidates are recognized by the central headquarters after being nominated by the branches but if the local candidate refuses to accept Tokyo dictation, he is free to break away without fear of serious reprisal. Recognition carries with it no material support, hence there is nothing to hold a candidate loyal if someone else offers better inducement.

BRANCHES:

Nothing is specified in the Rules and By-Laws concerning the nature or functions of local Branches, except that they shall be established in each Do, To, Fu and Ken. Up until election day, 1946, only 46 such branches had been established and only half of these were what the party leaders described as "strong". In each case they were set up by 20 to 30 people (not all of whom were dues paying members) who chose spokesmen empowered to conduct all Branch activities. The Tokyo city organization was completed late in December by a group of 37 individuals. There are no gun or other small locality groups.

Branch organizations receive no aid from central Headquarters and, theoretically, they are free to disregard, apparently with impunity, all policies to which they may object. In the event of serious conflict of policy, however, Tokyo reserves the right to veto local action, and although it has no power to enforce that veto except by withdrawal of recognition, such veto is evidently effective. The local Branch does not consider itself independent of the central Headquarters nor does it often presume to intrude its advice or to initiate policy upon the central officers.

PARTY ORGANIZATION:

Neither the Rules nor the By-Laws of the Progressive Party reveal truly democratic principles. The party is a Tokyo dictatorship, ruled from central Headquarters without any consultation with the voters nor even with the restricted group of so-called "party members" who are the local committeemen. Insofar as the party possesses principles, other than the attainment of office, the platform is drawn up in Tokyo.

Theoretically, a Party Council, summoned yearly and on such other occasions "as may seem necessary", constitutes the controlling agency.

Composed of an indefinite number of Headquarter' officials, Diet members belonging to the party and not more than five delegates from each branch, it is too unwieldy a body to act independently and it is, therefore, authorized to delegate its authority to a president which presumably it chooses.

In actual fact, the Party Council has never been fully convened although, at the close of December 1945, a group of 20 delegates (representing an even smaller number of branches) met at Tokyo to confer with the Diet members and with the office bureaucrats to confirm the selection of MACHIDA Chuji as president. When, however, as a result of the purge, MACHIDA gave up the post and was replaced, temporarily, by SAITO Takeo as interim chief, the Party Council was not called into session, nor did it meet to ratify the selection of Baron SHIDEHARA Kinjuro as president to succeed SAITO.

The president, theoretically elected for a four-year term, is assisted by a General Affairs Committee "of several members", chosen by the Council for one-year terms, but, as the By-Laws state, "when there are insufficient members or when anything happens to any of them", the president may himself name new members. He also appoints a secretary-general "who shall, under the direction of the president, conduct party business." Thus the president is, in theory, a one-man master of the party, while the secretary-general, in the event that the president is a figurehead, is the actual controller.

This development apparently presages a change in party machinery since, according to the By-Laws the president holds a position superior to that of the chairman of the General Affairs Committee while the secretary-general, as the presidential deputy would also seem to outrank the committee head. Yet, to those familiar with actual Progressive Party practice, it is obvious that at the moment the real authority is vested, properly or by common consent, in the hands of INUKAI and that TANAKA is subordinate. The situation is typical of the confusion reigning in Progressive Party circles and of the fact that neither democracy nor legality of party authority is taken very seriously at the party's Headquarters.

PLATFORM:

The statement of principles, drawn up by TSURUMI, the party's most experienced propagandist, with the assistance of OTA Masataka, former IRAA director, has never been ratified by any general action of the party members. It is possible that it may have been considered by the 20 delegate ken committee meeting held in December but the party leaders are vague upon the matter. There has been no meeting of the Party Council to approve the platform but the General Affairs Committee has approved the draft.

The platform features defense of the Imperial institution, a Diet with enhanced powers and "controlled economy within the system of private ownership."

Japan Progressive Party Platform 1946

Sovereignty exists in the Emperor but is exercised through the people.

Stabilization of economic livelihood by free economic activity. Advancement of national economy through the reconstruction of industry and agriculture.

(In explanation of this plank, TSURUMI attacked "false concepts of free economy which permit economic exploitation.")

Higher political, moral and social standards.

Respect for human rights, the improvement of women's standing and the establishment of basic security and happiness.

Protection of the national constitution and the establishment of responsible parliamentary government based on true democracy.

Cultivation of individual character based on co-operation and self-government, respecting the individual's freedom.

Promotion of active production and fair supply through an "independent work-for-all system" and the balancing of power among the industries.

Reformation of the judicial system.

To implement the above planks, the Progressives advocate:

Emergency legislation against starvation, inflation, unemployment and war-suffering.

Repatriation of Japanese still overseas.

Increase of the purchase price of rice to ¥500 per koku, together with the importation of food.

Elimination of war controls.

~~Certain suggestions, advanced by TSURUMI were unofficially accepted but never became a definite part of the platform:~~

~~Prohibition of political contributions by unions.~~

~~Opposition to Communists, Social Democrats and Liberals. (Anti-Communist opposition was, however, confirmed.)~~

~~NAKAJIMA Chikuhei and NAGATA Tadao, members of the General Affairs Committee also proposed nationalization of coal mines.~~

~~After the general election of 10 April 1946, when the various political parties were under severe press criticism for their alleged conservatism, the Progressive spokesmen allowed the impression to go forth that a new and~~

"stream-lined" platform would be published, containing more liberal platform planks than had hitherto been published. Two weeks later, an announcement was made that agreement had been reached to include nationalization of fertilizer as a feature of the Progressive creed—this, presumably, as a bait for farmer support—but Progressive leaders proved reluctant to announce other features of the revised statement of principles.

Soon thereafter, the Progressives and the Liberals completed a deal whereby the Progressives threw their support to the Cabinet headed by YOSHIDA Shigeru, and representatives of each party met to draw up a common statement of principles. When, at the close of May, this agreement was concluded, nationalization of fertilizer went by the board. Indeed, the joint statement of the two parties, issued on 29 May, stated specifically the Progressive-Liberal opposition to "the nationalization of fertilizer as proposed by the Social Democratic Party."

The shift in policy is typical of the Progressive Party's opportunism and of its failure to hold firm to specific principles.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Public Administration Division
Political Parties Branch

15 July 1946

CO-OPERATIVE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

(KYODO MINSHUTO)

ORIGINS:

The Co-Operative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto), a centrist organization with roots among prewar officialdom, was formed in late December 1945 by 27 Diet members and heads of national co-operative societies. Many of its members are landlords and chiefs of nationwide agricultural agencies, with a sprinkling of lawyers, insurance executives and old-line politicians.

The party supports the Imperial Throne as the essential feature of the Japanese governmental system and differs from its parent parties, the Progressives and Social Democrats, by favoring popular, rather than state, control of production, distribution and exchange. It supports small and medium sized business in preference to large industry and, theoretically, as its name implies, prefers co-operative methods based upon private mutual agreements to either monopolistic or individualistic solutions. Practically it has become a party of professional conservatives. It opposes Communism and socialism and has, accordingly, been inaccurately called Fascist or reactionary, but it is sufficiently advanced to add to its platform a recommendation, unique among Japanese political parties, for the recall of unsatisfactory officials.

The Co-Operative Party, as it was called prior to May 1946, was begun by SENGOKU Toratero, 73 year old Ibaraki dairy farmer, Agriculture Minister for Prince HIGASHI KUNI, and director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, whose experience as president of national sales federations has convinced him of the value of co-operative methods. Associated with him was KURASAWA Torizo, former Diet member and IRAPS councillor who, because of his extensive dairy interests is popularly known as the Hokkaido Butter King. His Snow Brand butter is known throughout Japan.

In conformity with Japanese political etiquette, both SENGOKU and KURASAWA should have remained in the background, acting publically only as advisors to the party. Two reasons, however, militated against this: the fact that KURASAWA had active ambitions that called for public recognition and the additional circumstance that a rift early developed between the two founders. SENGOKU wanted an aggressive party with progressive

social views; KURASAWA desired to harness the existing machinery of the Agricultural Associations, which during war time had been supervised closely by the Ministry of Agriculture.

SENGOLU lost out in this conflict, but KURASAWA's path did not thereby become easier. In the place of the progressive SENGOKU, a new element appeared in the person of FUJIYAMA Aichiro, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce, who was ambitious not only to link the rising party with the agricultural bureaucracy but also to attract the urban economic groups. FUJIYAMA expected to become Minister of Commerce.

FUJIYAMA operated through FUNADA Naka, chief director of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, deputy major of Tokyo, 1925, parliamentary councillor to the Foreign Office, 1937 and president of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau under Prince KONOYE, 1937-1939. FUNADA, formerly of the Seiyukai, and of the IRAA central committee, had been a Diet member since 1930. His idea, like that of FUJIYAMA, was that a purely agrarian base was too small for the erection of a nation-wide party and that only through the addition of industrial and commercial interests could the party become powerful.

Both the agrarian and the urban factions agreed, however, that the party should be primarily a centrist party, leaning somewhat to the right, and committed to the maintenance of the Imperial System. Each agreed, also, that the machinery of the Agricultural Associations was too effective an agency of regimentation to be discarded. In the Hokkaido, for instance, both groups used the co-operative farming, fishing and dairying co-operatives as a means of instructing members in the choice of Diet candidates.

Village chiefs, usually also high officials in local co-operatives, or of various agricultural or stock-raising associations, recommended to their constituents the proper persons for whom votes were to be cast. According to KAGAWA Kanekichi, himself a Diet member, advisor to the Agricultural Association, provincial assemblyman and president of the Horse Sales Association, "Villagers were expected to vote for the candidates thus named."

The success of such methods showed itself in the 10 April 1946 election when the agricultural co-operative machine elected seven Diet members and would, according to KAGAWA, have elected all 11 had there been more time for organizing the political machine.

The KURASAWA clique, is headed by KITA Katsutaro, former Diet member and large landowner. Because of his dynamic aggressiveness, KITA, formerly of IRAPS and Seijikai, is known as the Boar. The popularity of his clique is evidenced by the fact that 5 of the 7 successful Co-Operative candidates are allied to the KURASAWA-KITA forces.

SENGOKU also now belongs to this faction and has convinced it of the necessity of accepting more liberal organizational methods. KITA, for instance, much dislikes the policy whereby headmen, either of the co-

operatives or of the villages, dictate the choice of candidates; he prefers a method whereby party members (those subscribing five yen yearly) shall choose delegates to a party convention which will select candidates. He is not so firmly wedded to this idea that he would oppose the American primary system but he feels that the convention method is more efficient for Japan in the present state of political development. KITA also objects to the present policy by which party headquarters at Tokyo possess the right to veto local candidates or to impose candidates upon a local district.

Other early members of the Co-Operative Party, all of whom had war-time and prewar records of government experience, included:

YOSHIUE Shosuke, member of the Diet from Chiba and chief of the arts and literature section of Chuo Shimbun, and IRAA director.

WIKAWA Paul Tadao, Finance Ministry attache since 1917, secretary to Japanese finance missions to China, Russia and the United States, former director of customs at Moji, financial commissioner in New York and managing director of the Central Bank of Co-Operative Societies, who was Prince KONOYE's confidential envoy to Washington, 1941 and later advisor to Admiral NOMURA's peace-preservation mission. WIKAWA entered the House of Peers in June 1946.

KIMURA Torataro, a young landlord of one of the largest Gumma estates who, against his father's intention and the wishes of his relatives, distributed his lands among his tenant farmers. A former member of the Diet, he felt himself to be disqualified from further service because he had served as a member of a Japanese youth delegation to visit the Hitler Youth Movement in Germany.

NAKATANI Tokeo, former Wakayama Diet member. An excitable and easily angered individual whose jealousies and quick tempers are credited with having destroyed the party in Wakayama.

YOSHIDA Tadashi, managing director of the Tokyo Co-Operative Unions and director of a silk-exporting Co-operative.

In addition to the founders and to the 27 Diet members (most of them Progressive Party men from agricultural districts), Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika, KAGAWA Toyohiko and Count ARIMA Rainai were friendly to the new party. KAGAWA never actually joined, though he has consistently acted as advisor, and ARIMA, of the Social Democratic Party, was arrested before he could take any active part in the party's work, but TOKUGAWA,

after conflicting reports as to whether he was, or was not, a party member is currently regarded, June 1946, as a member in good standing.

In some degree, it is apparent, the Co-Operative Party is an out-growth of a somewhat mysterious group, the National Policy Research Institute (Kokusaku Kenkyukai), begun prior to the war as an investigation society. This group, which has been described as "almost a secret organization" existing for the purpose of "advising the army, and to a less extent, the government on policy", was a KONOYE sponsored agency. Originally it was liberal but later came under the influence of General UGAKI Kazushige. According to WIKAWA, its original sponsors then resigned, WIDAWA himself going to Washington on a secret KONOYE mission. At the conclusion of the war, WIKAWA and his colleagues reorganized the remnants of the Institute, or those members who were believed to be free of war guilt, as the nucleus of a political party.

Two weeks after the Co-Operative Party's formation, the 4 January 1946 "Purge Directive" removed from public life all members of the Executive Committee except WIKAWA and all Diet members except KITA. Although the original party sponsors continued to suggest policy from behind the scenes, thus assuring party continuity, an entirely new group of officials was required.

It is, however, evident that the forces which inspired the Co-Operative Party at its birth did not cease to operate following the purge. At the end of February, when at the initiative of local farm co-operatives national committeemen, Diet candidates and a few local representatives held a general meeting to choose a new central executive committee, new men, of a type similar to the old, were selected. In addition to WIKAWA and KITA Katsutaro, the following made up the new committee:

FUNADA Kyozo, brother of FUNADA Naka, and professor at Keijo Imperial University, whom WIKAWA says represents the Chamber of Commerce.

MIYABE Ichiro, former managing director of the Japan Agricultural Co-Operative Association.

MIYAGI Koji, managing director of the Co-Operative Fire Insurance Company.

YAMAMOTO Sanchiko, former Diet member, and former Minseito official, publisher of Kaizo magazine.

OKU Mumeo, a director of the Working Women's Club.

At the same time that the new central executive committee was formed, the party announced that it had admitted the Ishikawa-ken Civic Party (Kominto) to full membership. Seven hundred mayors, village headmen, presidents of agricultural societies, credit associations, chiefs

of control associations and factory managers were thus, according to the Civic Party's formal statement, added to the Co-Operative strength. If this official statement is correct, it indicates the type of adherents most desired by the Co-Operative leaders. WIKATA, the most vocal member of the party, is insistent that the Co-Operative group applies strict tests to all persons seeking membership. Because of the firm stand taken by the KITA brothers for agrarianism, only those applicants who are proved supporters of the farm co-operative principle were at first accepted; for this reason, he states, most applicants were refused admission.

Concurrently with the absorption of the Civic Party, the Co-Operatives announced that they would contest 150 Diet seats, with the full expectation of electing at least 100 members.

PLATFORM:

~~The major principles of the Co-Operative Party platform may be summarized in three general statements:~~

1946

DEMOCRATIC

1946
COOPERATIVE
PARTY

Note:

1947
PEOPLE'S
COOPERATIVE
PARTY

PLATFORMS

1. Preservation of the Imperial lineage, unbroken, with the Emperor possessing a veto power, similar to that of the President of the United States, in cases where the Diet fails to represent the popular will.
2. Establishment of a democratic form of government, under a democratic constitution, where the Diet representing the people's will, leads the nation in close co-operation between Emperor and people.
3. Re-organization of industry, economic life and culture according to the principles of co-operation in which all the people live in mutual reliance and assistance in all phases of their lives. The key words should be service, autonomy and fraternity.

POLICIES:

In order to achieve these general goals, the Co-Operative Party advocates the following basic policies.

GOVERNMENTAL:

Democratic parliamentarianism, with an upper house chosen along lines of vocational representation.

Abolition of the Privy Council, bureaucracy and Imperial Household Ministry.

Abolition of the peerage and all other social distinctions.

Popular election of local governor, with the right to recall officials after they have been elected.

An independent judiciary and a reformed police system.

Election by proportional representation.

ECONOMIC:

Destruction of capitalism and other feudal institutions.

Opposition to Bolshevism of industry but recognition of the right of Communism to exist.

Opposition of nationalization of industry, except for telephones, telegraphs and railways.

INFLATION:

Cut government subsidies and cease payment of compensation to munitions makers.

Postpone, or cancel payment of principal and interest on war bonds.

Establish a fair price system.

Establish progressive property and war-profits taxes.

Restore the coal and fertilizer industries as basic reconstruction for the rehabilitation of other activity.

UNEMPLOYMENT:

Establish a broad program of engineering, reclamation and reforestation in order to provide work for the unemployed.

Open unoccupied mansions and other vacant buildings as housing for war-sufferers and for the homeless.

FOOD:

Provision of three go of rice, or its equivalent, as a regular ration.

Co-operative agriculture and fishing, with mutual agreements between consumers and distributors co-operatives.

Reclamation of waste land.

Radical land reforms.

Opposition to compulsion in the fulfilment of rice deliveries, but administration through neighborhood food communities.

Increase of price paid to farmers, rice to be paid for at ¥500 and wheat at ¥350 per koku.

Capital of farm villages to be re-invested in fertilizer, farm tools and similar agricultural necessities.

SOCIAL:

Free, universal education that will respect truth and the rights of the individual.

Redistribution of population between towns and rural regions.

Scientific birth control.

FINANCES:

The Co-Operative Party funds have been drawn almost entirely from the pockets of the original founders. Of the ¥259,000 campaign fund, only ¥9000 came from outside sources, the balance coming from ¥50,000 contributions made by KUROSAWA, FUNADA, WIKAWA YOSHIDA and YAMAMOTO. Each of the officially recognized candidates was required to post ¥300 as a partial subsidization of election expenses and a program has been developed of assessing each of the 608,000 individuals claimed as party members a ¥10 annual membership fee.

Much of the original sum subscribed was paid out for printed matter, although ¥49,000 was spent for "inaugurating provincial chapters" and ¥22,000 for "entertainment." Salaries required ¥4000 and office expenses a slightly larger sum. "Investigation", however, called for but ¥2250.

ELECTION:

The claimed Party membership of 608,000 individuals affiliated with the party--a total more than twelve times larger than that claimed by any other political group in Japan--comes closer to representing the actual votes cast on election day than do the figures submitted by other parties. If anything, these Co-Operative figures are under-stated rather than exaggerated. In the two Hokkaido districts, for example, the Kyodo-to declared itself to have 100,000 members but cast 309,000 ballots; in Nara the party claimed 15,000 but gathered 36,000 votes, while in Kagoshima the party estimated a membership so small as not to be worth reporting but polled 123,000 votes. Nagano prefecture, however, is an exception; in that district 100,000 claimed membership yielded only 70,000 votes.

On election day the Co-Operatives elected seventeen Diet members headed by KITA Katsutaro. YAMAMOTO Sanehiko and FUNADA Kyozi were the only other successful committee members.

On a basis of these successes, the Co-Operatives later broadened their claims, insisting that some 48% of the Japanese population was affiliated with the party because they subscribed to its principles.

Because of his absence from the Diet WIKAWA, spokesman of the party since the purge, then retired from the party leadership in favor of YAMAMOTO. WIKAWA, however, remained in the party inner circles as secretary-general.

Since the election the party claimed an influence far beyond its numerical Diet strength. Within two weeks of the election, the Kyodo-to demanded a voice in the building of the new cabinet. "In accordance with democratic principles," it urged a four-party coalition by Liberals, Social Democrats, Communists and Co-Operatives for an immediate solution of the food crisis and declared that any compromise to be effective must be made along Co-Operative Party lines, "to the left of the Liberals and to the right of the Social Democrats."

It did not, however, confine itself to paper declarations. Even before it became evident that the confused political situation would result in a long prolonged Cabinet deadlock, the Co-Operative Party sought alliances with minor parties and with various independent Diet members.

Here, however, they ran into difficulties. A sharp split occurred between those who, like YAMAMOTO and WIKAWA, sought to broaden the base by admitting urban representatives and those like the KITA brothers who insisted that the party should maintain a primarily agrarian nature. Both groups agreed, however, that belief in co-operative activity should be the fundamental party policy. Neither side desired a final vote upon the issue, however, and so a compromise was reached whereby individual applicants for membership might be admitted after strict investigation of their Co-Operative principles. This opened the way for wholesale admissions.

No questions were raised, therefore, concerning certain Diet members who sought inclusion. Heads of prefectural agricultural associations were admitted without question, although some of these, admittedly, had cooperated during war-time with the militarist regime. The Hyuga Democratic Party of Miyazaki-ken, a group of four representatives supposedly controlled by General UGAKI Kazushige, and containing an ex-Seiyukai secretary, a prefectural official, a brewer and a former teacher, joined at once. The Japan Agricultural Party (Nippon Nohonto) and the Co-Operative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto) with a newspaper publisher and a Hiroshima city councilman, a former IRAPS official, gained admission. By 2 May it was freely predicted that the Co-Operative strength would soon reach 70 seats. WIKAWA announced that numbers of men supposedly allied with the Japan Democratic Party, the Shinko Club and other small parties, as well as several nominal Independents would also join the Co-Operative group.

This program, however, ran into opposition because of the internal quarrels between agrarians and urbanites. The former Department of Agriculture bureaucratic leaders, together with Agricultural Association managers, resented the intrusion of city delegates, asserting that these were not truly representative of the co-operative spirit.

The split widened when, in mid-May, negotiation was in progress for absorption of the Co-Operative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto), a small Hiroshima faction consisting of two Diet members chosen on that ticket together with a third, nominally independent, who had also been supported by the Co-Operative Democrats. This party, numerically insignificant

but important because it reflected the interests of the politically-minded General UGAKI, was purely agricultural and was therefore acceptable to the agrarians, but it was supposed also to represent special political influences opposed to the co-operative idea. To many Co-Operative members it seemed that the absorption of the little Co-Operative Democratic bloc spelled the intrusion into the party of professional politicians who had failed in their attempt to control the Progressive Party councils.

Nevertheless the merger was accomplished, on terms which have never been clearly stated. On 23 May, the name of the party was officially changed to the Co-Operative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto), a strange phenomenon in view of the relative size of the new entrants, but one which WIKAWA officially declared indicated the party's desire to demonstrate its democratic base. It is apparent, however, that this democratization is more in membership than in theory.

Almost simultaneously the Co-Operative Democracy announced the absorption of certain other minor party men who, for one reason or another, had been unhappy in their former affiliations.

This policy stirred considerable dissention. The KITA agrarians, for instance, objected to enrolling unattached politicians who sought entry merely for selfish advantage; calling such men "binjoshugisha", or opportunists, they protested that the party would thereby become just another conservative group varying little from the standard reactionary pattern.

YAMAMOTO, on the other hand, scented an opportunity for greater power. Using his wealth as a means for attracting experienced Diet members into the Co-Operative ranks, he lent money lavishly and gave expensive parties that enhanced his popularity.

Since, moreover, as party president he possessed the right to admit members almost at will, to name committeemen and even to appoint deputy chairmen, there was little opportunity for the agrarians to prevent the padding of the rolls in which YAMAMOTO proceeded to engage.

YAMAMOTO invited MIKI Takeo (Tokushima), director of the Metallurgy Industrial Company (Yakin Kogyo Kaisha) and former councillor to the Munitions Ministry. MIKI, a former Diet member, was one of those whom the "new faces" controlling the Democratic Club declared unacceptable to that organization. TANNO Minoru (Miyage), chosen as an Independent but later a Democratic Club member, also shifted his alliance, a week prior to being questioned by the police because of alleged election law violations. MOTO (Tokizo (Hiroshima), also a Democrat, joined his Co-Operative Democratic colleagues from that province; he had been claimed by the Progressives. WIKAWA and YAMAMOTO also recommended the admission of TANAKA Isaji (Kyoto) a NARAHASHI-ISHIGURO supporter, but on this they were over-ruled.

This reversal disclosed a deep-rooted objection both on the part of the agrarians and of the more devoted believers in the co-operative principle toward diluting party theory by the inclusion of professional

politicians, but the YAMAMOTO money and the supposed needs of the party in gaining the aid of experienced political managers over-ruled opposition.

These membership additions coincided with a decision on the part of Co-Operative managers to oppose the Liberal-Progressive coalition in which, only a few days earlier, WIKAWA had been considering a Cabinet position. Co-Operative Democracy, WIKAWA explained, could not participate in any government representing reactionary influences or allied with the old SHIDEHARA regime.

Realignment of membership brought with it a shift in party management. WIKAWA and YAMAMOTO retained their key positions but several new men were added to the executive committee. Several of these represented concessions that had been deemed necessary in order to raise the Diet membership to the 46 seats claimed by the middle of June.

The Co-Operative Democratic Party then relegated its former leaders to a 25-man Central Committee which, as WIKAWA explained, is "an honorary group with only nominal powers." Most of the members of the Managing Committee appear here also, but in addition, the KITA brothers, KAGAWA Kenkichi, MIYAGE, MIYABE, KOBAYASHI and NIKAIDO Susumu were enrolled in this relatively powerless section. It is noteworthy that while the Managing Committee contains but one Hokkaido and one Kyushu member there are no less than three representatives from the politically important Kanto; the central Committee, on the other hand, gives the Hokkaido seven members and Kyushu four while Tokyo and the rest of the Kanto are not represented.

The reorganization brought professional politicians into the lime-light. HAYASHI Heima, old-line manipulator whose knowledge of parliamentary procedure was essential, became vice-chairman and party whip. OMIYA Gosaburo, originally elected from Hiroshima as an original Co-Operative Democrat, took his place as WIKAWA's assistant. In the event that YAMAMOTO was purged from public life and was succeeded by WIKAWA, OMIYA was to assume a more important role; if WIKAWA were not selected as YAMAMOTO's successor, KASAI expected to take the party headship.

The changes represented a shift from co-operative theory to the practical application of political machine rule.

To accentuate the shift in emphasis, a new Managing Committee, a ten member executive group, replaced the former leaders. WIKAWA, FUNADA Kyoze, the Chamber of Commerce representative, and Mrs. OKU remained, but KITA disappeared into the relatively innocuous vice presidency, while MIYABE and MIYAGE of the original philosophic co-operative clique, retired from active management. KOBAYASHI Genzan, another of the pre-election leaders, retired to become the Party's auditor.

To replace the four discarded managers, seven new men were admitted to the Managing Committee. Four represented agricultural interests, two were teachers, through whom it was hoped to attract the other teachers of the Shinko Club, while the seventh was an automobile executive. The new committeemen were:

KINOSHITA Sakae, president of the Shinko Union Automobile Club and of the Hyogo Prefectural Automobile Charcoal Company.

YONEKURA Tatsuya, agricultural engineer for Nagano prefecture and chief of an agricultural school. He had been a local councillor for the Niigata IRAPS.

TAKEYAMA Yutaro, former engineer for the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry and a section chief of the National Agricultural Association.

AZUMA Takashi, managing director of the Hokkaido Agricultural Association and a prefectural engineer, also a former IRAPS advisor.

ASO Shozo, village headman and sub-chief of Toyama Agricultural Association, who had been elected on the Agricultural Society ticket.

HIRAKAWA Atsuo, a Hiroshima Independent who has been a primary school and normal school teacher.

KAJIMA Toru, sub-chief of the Japan Education Society, who was elected from Miyazaki prefecture by the efforts of a concerted teacher movement and who came into the Co-Operative Party after having participated in both the Daido Club and the Shinko Club movements.

KAJIMA's case is worthy of special notice. His election has been contested on the ground that the Great Japan Educational Association undertook a systematic campaign to elect a number of teachers to the Diet and that the machine methods thus said to have been employed were particularly noticeable in Miyazaki prefecture. KAJIMA was supposedly the chief of this pressure group activity; his presence in the Co-Operative Party is, therefore, a matter of some interest. KAJIMA was not formally a member of the Hyugu Democratic Party which chose four members of the Diet, all of whom swung over to the Co-Operatives but his presence on the Co-Operative Executive Committee is the only recognition accorded to the five Miyazaki members who affiliated themselves with the party. Similarly HIRAKAWA's membership on the Executive Committee, who was not an official candidate of the Co-Operative Democratic Party is the only nomination given to representatives of Hiroshima ken who joined the party.

Neither man pretends any exhaustive knowledge of Co-Operative theory. KAJIMA represents the most flagrant instance of proselytizing by Co-Operative managers. Never a member of any co-operative society, he became interested in the movement, he says, only after election when he learned that his former associates of the Independent and Shinko Club affiliations would be able to accomplish little under Diet regulations.

A teacher for two years and a principal for 18 years more, he was pushed, he says into politics against both his consent and his knowledge; he claims not to know what was discussed at the meeting of 70 teachers of Miyazaki prefecture to whom he made the opening address, nor was he aware until the campaign was well under way that he was their candidate. As President of the Miyazaki Prefecture Educational Society he feels it only natural that the teachers should have supported him actively in the campaign and that some of the students should have worked in his interests but he first heard of election law abuses from the newspapers and only then when a friend told him of the matter. Even after the police and the newspapers had expressed an interest in the political machine methods employed, he did not think the charge sufficiently serious to warrant his attention.

Now that he has been elected to the Diet, and in spite of his utter ignorance of Co-Operative principles has been made a member of the Executive Committee he intends to retire from teaching and to live permanently in Tokyo as manager of a lumber business. Nominally he will be Miyazaki Prefecture manager, but that will not require his residence in the ken.

HIRAKAWA, who unlike KAJIMA, is a puppet for other forces, is equally frank about his lack of information concerning co-operative theory. KASAI and MIKI joined the party because it afforded them wider scope for their experience.

Not all the Diet members are convinced believers in Co-Operative principles. HAYASHI Heima, for instance, a ceramics manufacturer who leased ten acres of land for a farming and forestry project, is an old-time Diet member, now in his sixth term, who joined the Co-Operative Party because he thinks that a firm Rightist Party is essential to the national stability. As a thorough-going conservative, he deplores the Socialistic spirit with which the entire party, as he sees it, is permeated--though he accompanies this statement by a declaration that the rank and file of the party is 80% opposed to Socialism.

HAYASHI incidentally, ran for office as a recommended candidate of the Progressive Party. He explains his present affiliation by declaring that although he knew that he was being recommended by the Progressives he did not have time during the campaign, to raise objections to the Progressive endorsement.

UDA Kunie (Kagoshima) elected on the Agricultural Party ticket, joined the Co-Operatives at the request of his friend, MOTONO Kensuke. UDA is not affiliated with any co-operative organization and prior to election, knew nothing of the movement. but as editor of the Shimbun Domei news agency, he has always been interested in politics. Nine years ago, in fact, he ran for the Diet as an Independent, with Churitsu support, but failed. Unlike HAYASHI he joined the Co-Operatives because the party stands definitely for anti-Socialistic ends. Of his former affiliation,

the Agricultural Party, UDA says that, while party president, he never knew how large its membership really was. Such matters, he explains, were in the province of the party treasurer who filled out a formal report to be sent to the Home Ministry. UDA signed the report but without having read it; he was not told, nor did he ask, what it contained.

UDA was one of those accused by the Communists of militarist tendencies, but he denies absolutely that he ever had militaristic connections. His news agency, he says, and his magazine, East Asia, did not, he declares, further the interests of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

This defence is similar to the explanation offered by YAMAMOTO himself when the latter was accused of having published anti-democratic propaganda. YAMAMOTO declared that his magazine, Kairo, had been definitely liberal, that it had printed undemocratic articles only under pressure and that he had not approved the contents of his periodical.

Similarly NIKAIDO Susumu, (Kagoshima), who also came under Communist attack, defends himself by saying that while he had been named a civilian advisor to the Front Line Propaganda Unit, under the supervision of the Naval General Staff, he was never a member of that staff, nor had he ever gone, as was charged, to Rabaul to conduct propaganda activities. It was impossible, NIKAIDO says, to have gone there because the Allies controlled both sea and air.

RIGHTIST THEORY:

Whether as a result of disappointment at failure to be included in the pro-Government coalition or because of ideological differences, the Co-Operative Party took a firm stand in opposition to the YOSHIDA administration. The Cabinet, according to an official press release from Co-Operative headquarters, is "bureaucratic and capitalistic."

Analysis of the Diet members allied with the Co-Operative Democratic Party indicates its strongly conservative nature. Sixteen of the original members are large-scale farmers whose holdings, by Japanese standards, are large while five of them are board members or chiefs of prefectural agricultural societies. The presence of two lawyers, three doctors, three publishers and a university professor evidence the party's intellectual basis while the absence of labor leaders of small shopkeepers and of urban representatives reflect the party's specialized interests.

Accessions to the party's pre-coalition ranks came chiefly from Kyushu and from the Hokkaido with a sprinkling of members from the Kansai but almost none from the big cities nor from central or northern Honshu.

This localization has given rise to a general belief that the Co-Operative Party aims at the protection of landlordism and large land

holdings. It is undoubtedly premature, if not entirely incorrect, to brand the party, as some radical groups have done, as "Fascist" or to state, as did KIKUTA Kazuo in the May 1946 edition of Genron Magazine, that Co-Operatives "camouflage themselves as democrats in order to maintain imperialism and feudalism" but they are undoubtedly conservative by preference.

EVALUATION:

The Co-Operative Democratic Party is largely an agrarian party representing the larger landowners, some of whom are absentee holders, rather than the tenant-farmers or the farm laborers. It is a conservative group supporting traditional Japanese ideas while cloaking those ideas in modernized terminology.

Superficially its program is progressive and, in the rare cases where the phraseology is not purposely vague, follows the line of pre-war Japanese Socialism. Its opposition to capitalism and to bureaucracy, its advocacy of progressive property and war-profits taxation, its insistence upon "radical land reforms", all give an appearance of radicalism.

It must be remembered, however, that these phrases and, specifically, the opposition to bureaucracy and capitalism, were the stock in trade of prewar totalitarian theorists and that the Co-Operative Democratic spokesmen are doing little more than reviving the slogans of those who sought to discredit the peace time industrialist group and their administrative allies. In using these slogans the Co-Operatives are not defending the militarist clique but they are using the same methods to attack the same interests that the militarists attacked in seeking to set up a totalitarian system.

The Co-Operatives follow the time-worn propagandist pattern of using Western terminology to describe their purely Japanese purposes. Advocacy of an Imperial veto "similar to that of the President of the United States" in cases where the Diet "fails to represent the popular will" is a thin veil to mask the theory that in the event of a conflict between Emperor and popular representatives, the Emperor himself is the best judge of what the people really wish. Such a veto is a negation of the subsequent clause stating that "the Diet represents the people's will." If the Co-Operatives really believed that the Diet actually represents the people then there would be no need for a veto "in cases where the Diet fails to represent the people's will."

Constant insistence upon the word "co-operation" is an instance of how western words are consistently used to venerate Oriental ideas. "Co-operation between Emperor and people" is a traditional phrase used by Japanese totalitarian spokesmen to justify "restoration to the Emperor" of power supposedly filched from him by politicians, bureaucrats and industrialists. It was a common slogan of the "Showa Restorationists", of anti-liberals and of militarists. Where the word means anything at all, as in the phrase "where all the people live in mutual reliance and

assistance in all phases of their lives on a basis of service, autonomy and fraternity", it implies subordination of the people to Imperial control. It has never in the past implied subjection of the Emperor, or compromise by the Emperor, to popular opinion, nor are there indications in Co-Operative theory that it now implies any such subjection or compromise.

The key-word "Co-Operation", which such spokesmen as WIKAWA consistently use to describe the party's cure for economic and social difficulties is intended to inspire connotations of the Danish systems by which small landowners and small entrepreneurs successfully compete with big business for the mutual advantage of producer and consumer to the disadvantage of unnecessary middlemen. In actuality, it is the same phrase used by Japanese totalitarians to justify the unification of the nation under Imperial supervision. Little is said to betray the fact that in Japan, co-operatives were officially inspired, governmentally aided and officially controlled by administrators named by the Tokyo government.

Since after the downfall of the political parties in the 1930 decade, it was the entrenched civil service and the business interests that resisted most earnestly against the encroachment of the totalitarians and the militarists the "bureaucrats" and "capitalists" were always cited by the propagandists as the evil forces of Japan. It is interesting, therefore, that these same bureaucrats, other than those of the Agriculture Ministry, remain the bugbear of the Co-Operatives also and that the Party solution, the setting up of national co-operative organizations, is in essence the same solution proposed by the prewar totalitarians.

In this connection, the close association of such Co-Operative leaders as WIKAWA, KITA Katsutaro, MIYABE and MIYAGE with officially tolerated co-operative industrial and agricultural associations is worthy of note. Not only were virtually all the sponsors of the party men with war-time records of friendly relations with totalitarian groups, but, following the purge that banned all but one of the original executive committee and all the former diet members except KITA the new officials were also men of previous official or semi-official connections. None, except YAMAMOTO have been active in liberal or democratic activities, and YAMAMOTO admits that he himself compromised with his militaristic opponents by permitting the publication of militaristic articles. For this reason he was purged by the Japanese in June 1946.

While, therefore, it is unfair to brand the Co-Operative Party as reactionary or as anti-democratic, it is nevertheless probable that, despite its protestations of progressivism, the Co-Operative Party as now constituted represents the right wing of Japanese political thought. In this connection may be cited the fact that the Co-Operative stand upon the matter of the Emperor System is the most conservative of all the major political parties and that the Co-Operative leaders are among the few who specifically proclaim, as an official party doctrine, their positive opposition to Communism. Other parties, such as the Liberals

and the Progressives, privately express unwillingness to participate in any anti-Communist movement, but only the Co-Operatives include the statement as part of their party principles.

A minor characteristic of the Co-Operative Party leaders, notably WIKAWA himself, is an unfortunate addiction to over-statement of claims. Again and again, the Co-Operative Party, in announcing its plans, has exaggerated its influence and its prospects, giving rise to the assumption that the leaders themselves have been misled concerning their importance, as when WIKAWA announced as a certainty that his party had been promised three Cabinet seats, including his own as Finance Minister, when, as a matter of fact, the party then possessed but seventeen Diet seats. The over-statements tend to weaken in some degree the cogency of other claims made on behalf of the party.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Public Administration Division
Political Parties Branch

29 June 1946

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
(SHAKAITO)

SOURCES:

The following study of the origin, development, aims and personnel of the Social Democratic Party has been prepared on the basis of the published statements, platforms, and officially approved press releases issued by Tokyo party headquarters, checked by analyses of the speeches of accredited leaders and by interviews with the party's high officials.

PARTY STRENGTH:

In the Diet elections of April 1946, the Social Democratic Party polled 8,988,000 votes, electing 92 candidates out of a total of 332 seats contested by the party. This indicates that the party won a Diet seat for each 96,645 votes cast, a rate lower than the average of 113,100 votes per seat in all Japanese election districts.

NAME:

The Japanese name Shakai-to means Socialist, or Social Party, but the official translation preferred by party leaders is Social Democratic Party.

THEORY:

The Social Democratic Party has as its slogan "Democratic Politics and Socialist economy."

A loosely organized combination of politicians of divergent views, the party acts as a bridge between extremist Leftists and cautious conservatives.

More topflight leaders belong to the Social Democratic Party than to any other. Inside the party they sometimes quarrel so bitterly that observers constantly anticipate an outright break, but contrary to expectations, the rival leaders have held together firmly.

FORMATION:

Basically, the Social Democratic Party is a Socialist group made up of former members of the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto), the Labor

Party (Rodoto), and the Proletarian Party (Musanto), all of which were disbanded before the war through police opposition.

Roughly speaking, these three sources explain the origins of the Left Wing, the Center, and the Right Wing factions of the present Social Democratic Party. Labor Party men, together with former Communists (who may or may not be "Disguised Communists") constitute a Left Wing; former Social Mass members are on the right while a middle-of-the-road group is comprised of more conservative laborites and proletarians. The general statement must, however, not be taken as an absolute guide, since exceptions are plentiful on both the Leftist and the Rightist sections.

These terms, moreover, are misleading since the Leftists are not necessarily Communists and the Rightists have no reactionary tendencies.

Within a week after surrender, MIZUTANI Chosaburo, leftist opponent of Imperial rule, and HIRANO Rikizo, an Emperor supporter, both of the Social Mass Party, summoned proletarian leaders to a preliminary meeting at which merger plans were discussed.

Difficulties appeared at the start. The proposed party divided on three important issues:

1. Emperor: Several important Leftists desired to abolish the Emperor System, while the Right Wing group was generally committed to its preservation under conditions limiting the Imperial power.
2. Co-Operation: Generally speaking, the Left Wing asked for a more or less formal union of all democratic groups in a common struggle against what they termed Fascist tendencies; the Right Wing saw little danger of Fascism and preferred independent political action for the common goal of democracy.
3. Leadership: ABE Isoo, 83-year old Waseda University professor of economics and long-time head of politico-labor movements, was preferred but he excused himself on account of age. KAGAWA Toyohiko and TAKANO Iwasaburo were second choices but neither was willing to stand in the forefront. Certain former Labor Party members, notably KONO Mitsu, KAWAKAMI Jotaro, MIYAKE Masaichi and FUNADA Chu, Tokyo Chamber of Commerce chief and Prince KONOYE's president of the Legislative Bureau, 1937-1939, favored Count ARIMA Rainei, former head of the IRAA Co-Operative Division but this was bitterly opposed by KATO Kanju, SUZUKI Mosaburo and others who condemned ARIMA for his supposedly nationalistic views. When the party chiefs rejected ARIMA's candidacy, MIYAKE and FUNADA quit the Social Democrats and helped in the founding of the Co-Operative Party (Kyodoto).

KATO then proposed Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika, a step that caused KATO to be accused of lacking political principles, but TOKUGAWA also was rejected. Although the Marquis did not leave the Social Democratic Party he too threw his support to the Co-Operatives.

Professor OYAMA Ikuo, former Waseda Professor, head of the Farmer-Labor Party (Ronoto) and currently attached to North-Western University, was also a presidential suggestion, as was KATAYAMA Tetsu, present chief secretary, MATSUOKA Komakichi, old-time labor leader, and NISHIO Suyehiro, ex-vice president of the Japan Trade Union Federation and of the Steel Workers Union.

The multiplicity of candidates was by-passed by the expedient of naming no one as president but, instead, appointing KATAYAMA as chief secretary and NISHIO as head of the Central Executive Committee. These were victories for the Right Wing faction which also controlled a two-thirds majority of the Executive Committee.

Under these agreements the party held an inaugural ceremony, 2 November 1945, under the slogan, "Capitalism or Socialism." The 150 proletarian and labor leaders who founded the party included 17 Diet members.

KATAYAMA TETSU:

The party is headed by KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary-general, a lawyer with a long experience as political organizer of radical labor groups. KATAYAMA has held official posts, usually secretary-ships, in ABE Isao's Proletarian Party (1925), the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshuto-1926), the Farmers' Union (from which he resigned when there was danger of its becoming reactionary), and the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto) which he represented in the Diet. The Social Mass Party, however, dropped him from its rolls when he voted to retain SAITO Takeo in the Diet. KATAYAMA headed the General Federation of Farmers' Unions from 1926 until its dissolution in 1940. He then attempted to form a National Labor Party (Kokumin Kinroto) but was prevented by the police from doing so.

KATAYAMA worked in co-operation with HOSHIJIMA Jiro (Liberal, and now Minister of Commerce and Industry) to establish the Central Legal Information Bureau and he has been legal advisor for several students accused of radicalism. He has served in the Diet since 1930, with the exception of the war period when he was defeated in the TOJO election of 1942.

A close advisor is MATSUMOTO Jichiro, treasurer of the party, who has been a contractor for buildings and public works and who is also a former Social Mass Party member. MATSUMOTO, however, is much better known as the Suiheisha leader. He, too, was a projector of the National Labor Party but later became an advisor to the IRAA and the IRAPS. MATSUMOTO was purged by the Japanese Government but was later reinstated.

LEFT WING:

The Left Wing (Saiyoku) aims at transforming the Social Democratic Party from its present status of "a lower middle class conservative group", which ARAHATA Kanson, a Left Wing chief, calls "pinch-hitters for the imperialistic bourgeoisie", into a militant proletarian organization. It would purge the extreme Right Wing of KONO, KAWAKAMI, MATSUOKA and others and, while favoring the coalition of the Social Democrats with other anti-reactionary elements (by which they mean the Communists), oppose co-operation between their party and the Liberals and the Progressives.

The chief Left Wing leaders are:

KATO Kanju, long-time labor leader who led the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and the Japan Council of Trade Unions (created November 1934 and dissolved by the police in 1937). He helped form the Labor Party in 1936, and the Proletarian Party in 1937. A Diet member since 1932, he is married to the former Baroness ISHIMOTO.

ARAHATA Katsuzo (Kanson), a former Communist who prides himself on having been jailed seven times for anti-militarism, and one time member of OYAMA's Ronoto, was long an ardent supporter of the United Front and as such an uncompromising opponent of the Social Democratic Right Wing (he demanded the expulsion from the party of KONO Mitsu and KAWAKAMI Jotaro). As organizer of the Japan Labor Union Federation (Rodo Kumiai Sodomei) and of the Kanto Metal Workers' Union, which is said to include 5,000 members, he is credited with strong influence over at least 20,000 unionists. Within the party he founded the Doshi-sha, or Brotherhood Group, which sought a more aggressive Leftist policy, and he opposed vigorously all alliances with the "bourgeois Liberals." Nevertheless, after Communists led an anti-SHIDEHARA demonstration breaking a pledge previously made to the Social Democrats ARAHATA protested the action. For this he was severely criticised by the Communist newspaper Akahata.

YAMAKAWA Hitoshi, another former Communist, and editor of Minshu Shimbun, is the most vocal United Front advocate. On at least three occasions he issued a supposedly non-partisan call for an all-democratic union. He heads a committee of 19 Leftist publicists and educators, pledged to work for the establishment of such a Front.

ONO Shunichi, former Minshu Shimbun editor, who resigned that post 19 January, also advocates the Democratic Front. He has protested the party decision to support the Emperor System.

SUZUKI Mosaburo, active in the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and

a former Proletarian Party secretary-general, is yet another Democratic Front pleader. He is in the curious position of being called both pro-Communist and pro-conservative. He is generally credited with being a KATO follower.

SHIMAGAMI Zengoro, labor organizer of the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and former Proletarian Party leader, who was jailed for anti-militaristic activity in 1928 and again, for a year, in 1937, favors democracy although, at the time the party was organized he confessed that he was not quite sure what democracy meant. He believes in the reduction of the Emperor to a position similar to that of the British king.

MIZUTANI Chosaburo, former Farmer-Labor and Social Mass member favors transfer of sovereignty from the Emperor to the people. An associate of OYAMA Ikuo, and a Democratic Front advocate he has been official party spokesman. He has been a Diet member five times.

RIGHT WING:

The conservative leaders of the Right Wing (Uyoku) are far more influential within the party than are the radicals. Some of them, perhaps, entered the party originally by arrangement with HATOYAMA Ichiro as his agents within the Social Democratic movement just as some of the Leftists were once described as "disguised Communists", but it is much more accurate to describe them now as old-line members of the former Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto). The three elder statesmen, ABE Isoo, KAGAWA Toyohiko and KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary-general, belong to this faction.

In addition, the Right Wing includes:

NISHIO Suyehiro, an iron worker in his youth who became president of the Osaka branch of the Japan Federation of Labor (Nippon Rodo Sodomei) and of the Kansai Labor League. Twice delegate to the Geneva Trade Union Congress, 1923 and 1928, and former vice-president of the Tokyo Steel Workers Federation, he has been a member of parliament since 1930. Expelled from the Social Mass Party, 1938, for failure to follow its militarist leaders, he has been under constant attack because of alleged, but thus far unproven, charges of complicity in the activities of SASAKAWA Roichi, of the old Kokusai Taishuto, in favor of the 8th Day Society (Hachinichi-kai). He is also alleged to have been a member of the dissolved Zenkoku Kinroshi Domei. Said by the Communists to have been a friend of FUJI Yoshio, a supposed Fascist, it is also charged that he was sent by air to China during the war for the increase of morale among the troops.

HIRANO Rikizo, publisher and former chairman of Kyodo and Rengo News Agencies a Waseda graduate of 1922 and an agrarian leader since that year, has been member of the Diet from Yamanashi-ken

since 1936. Former head of the Japan Farmers' Union and general secretary of the Japan Masses Party (Taishuto), as well as central executive committeeman of the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto) he is said to have used his influence to promote the interests of the ultra-nationalistic Imperial Way Association (Kodo-kai) formed in 1933 to encourage militarism among veteran servicemen's associations. HIRANO explains, however, that two organizations of the same name were in existence and that his Kodo-kai was so anti-militaristic that it was dissolved by TOJO's government. HIRANO a close friend of MATSUOKA Komakichi, hoped for a Cabinet in which MATSUOKA would be premier and he would be Minister of Agriculture.

MATSUOKA Komakichi, labor leader since his factory working days, 1914, and former president of the General Union of Workers, has been a labor delegate to the International Labor Organization. Campaigning on a slogan "Free labor from the tyranny of capitalism", he was, nevertheless, appointed committeeman for the Ex-Servicemen's Protective Association and councillor for the National Spirit Mobilization Movement. MATSUOKA's campaign slogan in the 1942 election was "to further the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

HARA Hyonosuke, a lawyer, and active supporter of the National Industrial Service Movement, by which all labor unions were to be amalgamated into one governmentally-sponsored organization.

YONEKUBO Mitsutsuke, ex-branch chief of the IRAA and chief director of the Great Japan Ocean League (Dai Nippon Kaiyo Remmei), a former member of the Diet.

Mrs. YAMAZAKI Michiko, now known as FUJIWARA Michiko, who ran for the Diet in 1946 as a replacement for her husband, YAMAZAKI Kenji, war-time governor of Borneo. Mrs. YAMAZAKI instituted suit for divorce just prior to election when her husband returned with a Borneo wife and two illegitimate children.

CENTER GROUP:

Between the extreme wings is a third group, most of them former Ronoto members, who lean to the right but who prefer to be officially included with a centrist group. Some of them, as former IRAA officials were barred from office-holding by the 4 January 1946 directive; others are under constant criticism by leftist organs.

SUGIYAMA Motojiro, retired committeeman, who has been a Farmer-Labor, Mass Party, IRAA, IRAPS and headquarters member of the Seijikai. A co-operative leader and a dentist, he was also active in the Fatherland Defense Association.

NOMIZO Katsu, also a former committeeman, and, like SUGIYAMA a former Diet member, who had been a Social Mass Party member and active in the Farmland Reform League (Nochi Seido Kai-kaku Domei).

KONO Mitsu, a lawyer who had been an executive committeeman for the Farmer-Labor and Social Mass Parties, and a member of the Great Japan Industrial Patriotic Society (Dai Nippon Snagyo Hokokukai). In 1941 he published "The Politics of National Defence" in which he implied that totalitarian Shintoism was the basic principle of the Japanese state; he praised the exploits of sailors in small submarines who attacked Pearl Harbor. An ex-editor of Asahi, and Diet member since 1937, he was a member of the Diet Examination Committee of IRAA. He is also said to have carried out certain missions for the Navy.

TAHARA Haruji, graduate of Denver University and of the University of Missouri School of Journalism and former Asahi writer, now head of the Fishermen's Union, has represented Fukuoka since 1937. He has been a member of Asia Reconstruction Society (Koa Sohombu) and of the Greater Japan Asia Reconstruction League (Dai Nippon Koa Domei). As a Navy attache, "with the assimilated rank of admiral", he was sent to New Guinea on a special mission.

KAWAKAMI Jotaro, ex manager for IRAA, and former professor of St. Paul's University a former executive committeeman of the Social Mass Party, served three terms as a Hyogo Diet representative.

ASANUMA Inejiro, former committeeman for the Japan Mass and Farmer-Labor Parties, is a former vice chairman of the Tokyo Assembly and twice member of Parliament.

KURODA Hisao, one of the few centrists with Leftist leanings, has been active in the Proletarian, Social Mass and Farmer-Labor Parties, and twice a member of Parliament.

MIYAKE Shoichi, formerly of the IRAA and of the Patriotic society, Doshikai, is a member of the Society for the National Protection (Gokoku Boshikai).

SUNAGA Ko, a farmer and weaver, and former member of Parliament, has been active in the Farmer-Labor, Social Mass, Labor Mass and Japan Mass Parties, and has also served as an officer of the Japan Farmers' Association (Nomin Kai Kuniai Jimbi In).

DEMOCRATIC FRONT:

Much of the Party's internal difficulties arise from the troublesome question of how to co-operate with other parties. Left Wing strategy

centered about the possibilities of an anti-reactionary alliance. As first projected, it was called a United Front, later modified into the Peoples' Front or Democratic Front, but, whatever the name, implying a common attitude to be taken against undemocratic (really anti-Communistic) or pro-capitalistic movements.

The Democratic Front idea was more tactical in nature than sincere in purpose but because it was put forward as a "liberal" and "democratic" movement for the prevention of reaction it gained much sympathy among progressive members of the community. The history of its development is, to a large degree, the story of Communist effort at infiltration into the Social Democratic Party.

As early as 19 October 1945, SHIGA Yoshio, Communist leader newly released from Fuchu Penitentiary, suggested to the organizers of the Social Democratic Party that they unite with the Communist Party for the promotion of democracy. The offer was promptly rejected as premature, by MIZUTANI Chuji, SUZUKI Mosaburo and HIRANO Rikizo because the Social Democrats, on the one hand, had not yet organized while the Communists had yet to announce a program.

The refusal was repeated by the Central Executive Committee, 4 December, on the ground that the Communists opposed the Emperor while the Social Democrats, as the committee said, believed "the power of the state to be vested in the sovereign."

The United Front invitation was declined, for a third time, 27 December, because the Central Executive Committee held that each party should produce its own program for the solution of the food problem.

Again, 15 January 1946, the Central Executive Committee refused a United Front because, except for generalities, "the Communists kept their principles secret." Moreover, according to MIZUTANI, when on a former occasion, about 1926, the Communists had proposed collaboration with the Farmer-Labor Party, they used unfair methods to gain exclusive control. In spite of the sincerity now professed by the Communists, MIZUTANI said, "The time is not ripe for blood brotherhood."

Privately the Right Wing leaders resented what they termed the effrontery of the Communists, a minor party in point of membership, in proposing amalgamation on equal terms with a party several times larger than themselves. They considered the repeated invitations of the Communists as purely strategic efforts to attract attention and to brand the Social Democrats as "conservative" for not joining in a "common front against reaction."

Bitter intra-party battles marked each of the refusals. On each occasion, ARAHATA violently attacked the Central Executive Committee as "dominated by reaction". YAMAKAWA published, in Minshu, an appeal for unity, and when the appeal failed to attract favorable publicity he repeated it to a press interview. KITADA Ichiro and YAMAHAMA Hideo supported YAMAKAWA's plea.

Indeed, at a rally honoring NOSAKA, KATAYAMA Tetsu, party secretary-general, went so far as to pledge the Social Democratic Party to a common front, but he added that since political matters were still in chaos it would be wiser to postpone decisions until after elections. This was the official party policy, intended to placate the Left while supporting the Right Wing's opposition to Communist alliances.

Generally speaking the collaborationist faction is composed of the Left Wing leaders plus MATSUOKA KURODA, YONEKUBO and MORITO Tatsuo, head of the Ohara Research Institute. The outstanding opponents are NISHIO, HIRANO KONO, ASANUMA, TAHARA and SUNAGA. Both groups claim to have the support of KATAYAMA.

Most of the local Branches support the Central Executive Committee's decisions but two of them, Aomori and Gifu, in each of which prefectures the Social Democratic Party is weak, raised objections. Both called for a United Front and each protested at the official party position concerning the Emperor. Aomori asked for a plebiscite on the Tenno System while Gifu called for outright abolition. The stand of these two Branches was particularly unusual in that both Gifu and Aomori are especially strong conservative constituencies.

Kyoto Leftists also proposed a coalition with the Communists but while this call drew extensive newspaper attention it appeared, upon close examination, to be a comparatively unimportant manoeuvre "by disguised Communists" to swing the party into the radical orbit.

Probably Yamanashi, a strongly conservative area, more truly represented the general party attitude when the Branch announced that it would expel all members participating in a United Front. No such expulsions proved necessary.

KYUKOKU MINSHU REMMEI:

True to the Party's promise that after election day the creation of a common anti-reactionary "front" would be considered, the Standing Executive Committee set up, in mid-May, a special committee to study the situation. This group, headed by MORITO Tatsuo and including OSAWA Hisaaki, NAKAHARA Kenji and ITO Ushiro, proposed the creation of a Democratic League for National Salvation (Kyukoku Minshu Remmei) which had for its dual aim, (1) Solution of the food problem through socialistic policies and (2) "Establishment through a constructive bloodless revolution of a democratic government with a democratic structure."

Although no one objected to the dual overall program, there was a violent difference over methods to be employed for its realization.

The first problem concerned the admission of Communists. Since the original proposal for such a front had stemmed from Communist sources and since the greatest pressure for such a group had been Communist inspired, much of the League's expected value would have been sacrificed by Communist exclusion.

Nevertheless, KATO Kanju, usually counted as a Leftist, astonished his colleagues by asserting that the Communists had been insincere in their advocacy of such a League--for this, he was blasted by Akahata, the Communist newspaper--while AKAMATSU Isamu (Aichi), a Right Winger, charged that the only reason the Communists made the proposal was to advertise Communism and to split the Social Democratic Party. Such representatives as KONO Mitsu, NIIZUMA Itoko (Hokkaido), ITO Ushiro (Fukuoka), MUTO Unijiro (Gumma), SAKAKIBARA Chiyo (Fukushima) and YAMAZAKI Tsunokichi (Aichi) agreed.

Others, such as MASAKI Kiyoshi (Hokkaido), TANAKA Shogetsu (Fukuoka) and OSAWA Kyumei (Aomori) insisted that the Communists be included. The Communists, incidentally, were dumb-founded to discover that one of their ardent supporters was TANAKA, a priest.

A second problem revolved about the question as to where and how the League should operate.

Right Wing spokesmen favored a working agreement among Diet members only, an arrangement which, by giving allies to the 95 Social Democratic representatives would greatly strengthen the minority position in the House. This would, in effect, submerge the 5 Communists into a democratic alliance and would rob them of much of their independence. Left Wingers, therefore, proposed the widening of the League into a broad agency including labor unions, farm organizations, cultural associations, discussion groups and other special councils.

A further complication appeared in the question as to how far such widened associations should operate. The conservatives disapproved the entire theory of expanded agencies and stood firm against them but they suggested that in the event they were over-ruled decisions should be made by majority vote of all member; the Leftists insisted on one vote for each group, regardless of its size. Since it was generally believed that Communists had set up a large number of tiny councils, each supposedly independent, such a program would afford the Communists a very effective voice.

The crux of the dispute was the question as to whether there should be extra-Diet supervision over legislation, especially one that would afford the Communists a greater control than their five Diet seats would justify.

Yet a third discussion centered about the League's programs. The narrow dual aim originally suggested seemed incomplete to Communists who desired to include the Emperor System, the replacement of the Diet by a Soviet system and other revolutionary ideas. The Social Democratic acceptance of the League had envisaged only the endorsement of a vague policy of democratization which would carry no ideological significance.

Long and heated discussion lasting more than a month threshed out these, and other problems, in great detail; it was not until mid-June that the Social Democratic Party eventually adopted the League program on a limited scale, with both a Diet group and an outside group--each to be governed by majority vote. The League idea, therefore, while highly acceptable to the conservative Right Wing faction repudiated the aims sought by its Communistic originators.

LIBERAL DEAL:

Post-election developments lent color to a prediction made in January by HATOYAMA Ichiro, Liberal leader, that a coalition agreement would be made between Liberals and Social Democrats. According to the HATOYAMA story, a secret agreement had been completed between himself and certain Social Democratic leaders, probably NISHIO and KONO, for an interparty alliance. Amplifications of the story, not made public by HATOYAMA, were that, in the event of electoral success, SUGIYAMA would be Agricultural Minister, and either NISHIO or MATSUOKA Welfare Minister.

The story was promptly denied by other Social Democratic leaders. KATAYAMA, in a formal statement endorsed by his party, declared that the Social Democrats has "never thought or hoped" for co-operation with the Liberals. NISHIO, denying a report that he, MIZUTANI and HIRANO had dined with HATOYAMA and had demanded "Cabinet positions relating to public welfare", said that the Social Democrats could not co-operate with HATOYAMA because the latter's "liberalism" was "contradictory to Socialism."

If, however, such a deal was ever made, the terms were purely an independent arrangement made by HATOYAMA personally since with the passage of HATOYAMA from the political scene, the close alliance between his branch of the Liberal Party and the Right Wing of the Social Democrats completely ended. Had HATOYAMA continued in public life the two parties would probably have drawn closer to each other, with perhaps a later merger of conservative elements into one party, but after his purging the Social Democrats became entirely an opposition party without agreements save on a common emergency food solution program.

CABINET CRISIS:

Immediately after election, when it was evident that no party commanded a clear majority, the Social Democrats seriously discussed the possibility of coalescence with the Liberals; but the Social Democratic Left Wing protested bitterly, alleging that the conservative Socialists were betraying the Party principles.

Simultaneously the Progressives invited coalition, offering, if the Social Democrats agreed to a coalition, to give the latter party the Commerce, Agriculture and Welfare Ministries. The offer was made by INUKAI Ken, chief political manipulator of the Progressive Party.

Had the Progressives been more generous, such a coalition might well have eventuated, but the Progressives, anxious perhaps to hold out other posts as bait for the Co-Operatives, declined to widen their offer. MIZUTANI therefore, unconditionally rejected the Progressive offer and announced that "Social Democrats will never co-operate with Progressives, nor with any other party that is not pledged to support our policies."

This attitude reflected the Social Democratic insistence upon principles, but it also had a more practical basis in that the leaders realized the tactical advantage of remaining in the opposition. At a time when imminent crises seemed impossible of quick solution, the party that headed the government must bear the blame if food supplies could not be increased and if reconstruction plans were difficult of fulfilment. An opposition party, on the other hand, might win support by voicing insistent demands for reforms for which it need not assume responsibility. The degree to which these two factors--principles and expediency--operated to color individual views varied according to the personality of executive committee members.

Nevertheless, at the same time that pride in Socialistic ideas contended with fear of failure, a certain degree of ambition also operated. Although well aware that immediate problems were incapable of solution, the lure of office appealed to certain politicians. NISHIO, HIRANO and TAHARA, the more conservative leaders, conjured up, with the assistance of MIZUTANI, KATO, SUZUKI and NOMIZO, a plan whereby the Social Democrats would collaborate with the Liberals provided certain exorbitant terms were met. These terms included the awarding to the Social Democrats of the Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, Welfare and Transport posts in addition to accepting KATAYAMA as prime minister.

Such a demand stunned the Liberals who, despite their 142 Diet seats, would thus have been reduced to the status of a minority party, but it is typical of the strange state of Japanese politics that the exorbitant demand was actually considered. But, as if this in itself was not enough, the Liberals went further by proposing that the arrangement be broadened into a four-party arrangement which would give recognition to the Co-Operatives and the Communists.

The suggestion collapsed. The Liberals, who needed only some 95 votes to form a majority, applied to the Progressives and made an alliance whereby Liberals and Progressives shared office on approximately equal terms. The Social Democrats, thus in the minority position where they had really always wished to be, did not regret the failure too much.

ORGANIZATION:

The party is undemocratically organized. Individual membership is decided upon a basis of applications submitted by those desiring to join on condition that they "adhere to party rules and pay the ¥4 annual party dues." They may not withdraw without submitting cause and must then surrender their membership cards. No provision exists for the expression of individual ideas, not even in the constitutional provisions concerning membership in branch organizations.

Party rules provide that a General Assembly shall be convoked yearly or by special call of one-third the Branches. This General Assembly, representing the Branches and chosen by them as they may desire, elects the secretary, treasurer and chairman of the Executive Committee, together with "several central committeemen."

Three committees are the actual party controllers. The Central Committee, described as the party's "deciding organ", is composed of headquarters officials and of an unspecified number of members elected by the General Assembly. An inner circle, the Central Executive Committee, is called the "executive organ", but a still smaller group, the Standing Central Executive Committee of the highest officials, "can over-ride the Central Executive Committee in cases where immediate action is necessary." Its head, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, "shall control all party affairs."

The chairman of the Central Executive Committee is NISHIO Suyehiro, and the secretary-general KATAYAMA Tetsu. These men, therefore, are the controlling party officials.

BRANCHES:

Fifty party members or more residing in any town or prefecture may form a Branch, provided their application receives headquarters approval, but other Branches may be formed whenever the Central Executive Committee chairman thinks such an establishment desirable. All names and addresses of party members, together with all contracts and other important documents must be forwarded to Party Headquarters for approval.

The purpose of such Branches is "to resolve to materialize the party's general principles, policies and purposes." All discussions, as well as all decisions, made in Branches must be reported for approval to Headquarters.

In addition to officially recognized Branches, other groups, called Supporting Groups, "whose political contentions shall not be in discord with our party platform", may be affiliated. Neither Supporting Groups nor Branches have any authority except that the latter may send delegates to the General Assembly. There is no provision, whatever, regulating the manner in which delegates may be sent nor the basis upon which they are apportioned among the Branches.

CANDIDATES:

Candidates may be suggested by local Branches but are not officially recognized until Tokyo Headquarters have approved them. Branch recommendation is not, however, essential. In the April 1946 campaign, Tochigi-ken protested the imposition upon them of what it termed "parachute candidates" (rakkan kohe) nominated directly by Party Headquarters without local consent. (These men were KIMIJIMA Sadakichi, former prefectural governor, and TAKASE Dan, who was accused by his local Branch of having sent false telegrams to Tokyo alleging that he was the unanimous Branch choice. TAKASE was elected).

Support given to candidates by Tokyo consists chiefly of such prestige as the Party name bears, together with the assistance of "name" speakers sent out in his behalf. Candidates pay ¥200 for the privilege of running but receive in return only supplies of placards, bulletins, pamphlets and the right to use the official Party slogans.

PLATFORM:

The Social Democratic platform is noteworthy both for what it says and for what it omits to say. Drawn up by expert public opinion manipulators, it seeks to satisfy everyone without antagonizing either the Right or the Left Wing.

Thus, while the founders of the Party, in their organizational call, announced themselves as favoring "preservation of the Imperial lineage", neither the platform itself nor the official statement submitted to the Home Office mentions the Imperial System or the dynasty. While the organizers specifically favored legalization of "scientific birth control", the redistribution of population between town and country, the postponement of interest on and the redemption of principal of war loans, and the imposition of heavy progressive taxation to recover war profits, none of these are included in the official platform as reported to the police.

On the other hand, the party went beyond original intentions by stressing plans for autonomous producers', merchants' and consumers' co-operatives, the abolition of the Privy Council and the confiscation, for public uses, of idle lands, unused mansions and crown estates and military grounds.

The essential features of the Social Democratic Party as reflected both in its platform and in approved public statements include the following:

↓
GOVERNMENT:

Social Democratic Party

1946

- Democratization of the Constitution.
- A two-House legislature, with the Upper House chosen by regional and occupational representation.
- Votes for all citizens over 18 years of age, on the system of proportional representation.
- Popular election of governors, mayors, and town and village headmen.

Abolition of the nobility, the Elder Statesmen and the Privy Council.

LABOR:

Joint employer-workmen co-operation in management.
Minimum wage laws.
48 hour work week.
Establishment of a Labor Ministry.

AGRICULTURE:

Establishment of large-scale farming, with mechanization and wider use of draft animals.
Increase of ceiling price of rice to be paid to farmers.
National control over feeds, fertilizers and tools.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION:

Unemployment, health and old-age insurance.
Priority in employment for veterans.
Relief of unemployment through reconstruction, housing and reclamation projects.
Democratization of the radio system and wider distribution of radio sets.
Increase of grain ration to 3 go daily.

WOMEN:

Equality of men and women in customs, institutions and laws.
Prohibition of prostitution.

CULTURE:

Creation of a new Japanese civilization.
Free, universal education on all levels.
Adoption of the metric system.
Adoption of Esperanto as a universal language.

end →
Following publication of the platform, authorized statements by responsible party leaders added other planks extending or clarifying the official statement of aims and purposes.

Thus, in late November, the party, through MIZUTANI, approved the public ownership of steel, coal and other essential industries such as electricity and fertilizer, together with the nationalization of banks, trust companies and insurance firms.

Later, MIZUTANI favored confiscation of all rice hoarded by farmers, and also suggested an increase in the property levy to 70 or 80 percent, together with a rise in the exemption level. MIZUTANI also advocated a reduction in the size of farms, cutting down the permitted holdings to three acres, even in the Hokkaido, with but one acre in Shikoku where it is possible to reap two crops per year.

Discussion of plans for a new Constitution afforded the Social Democrats an opportunity to revise and to extend their platform principles. The Party's Constitutional draft, as published on 23 February made the following suggestions:

EMPEROR:

The Emperor System should continue with the Throne enjoying reduced prerogatives. The Emperor, a politically irresponsible symbol, was to bestow honors and represent the state in foreign affairs. He was to have no other special powers and was expressly denied a veto.

Sovereignty was to rest in the state as a national co-operative body, and the Emperor was to be regarded as part of the state.

DIET:

Approves the succession and establishes regency.
Passes laws (a bill twice approved by Lower House (popularly elected by proportional representation) becomes a law without approval of Upper House (vocational representatives).
Approves all treaties and passes budget.
Exercises all supreme powers not held by Emperor.
Sits constantly but may be dissolved by popular referendum.

DIET PRESIDENTS:

Name prime minister for Imperial approval.

CABINET:

Suggests amnesties to the Emperor.
On advice of Presidents of both houses, names Supreme Court and Procurator General.
Appoints all other judges.
Administers laws.
Hires and discharges government officials.

PRIME MINISTER:

Appoints the Cabinet, which is then responsible to the Diet.

POPULAR RIGHTS:

In addition to the rights already demanded in the party platform etc., the Social Democrats asked that the

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

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