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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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Armed Forces

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by November 1972.



NIGERIA

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Armed Forces

A. Defense establishment

The armed forces of Nigeria, which provide a substantial power base for the nation's leadership, include the largest army in Africa—an estimated 256,400 men—and the largest naval and air forces in west Africa. The navy has 18 ships, the largest of which is a destroyer escort, and 2,200 men, while the air force has 95 aircraft—over one-third jets—and 5,500 men. These large forces, although lacking extensive professional training and experience and a developed, effective logistical and communications base, are capable of defending Nigeria against attack from outside forces other than those of an invading major power. They are also capable of contributing to the continued maintenance of internal security provided that any future challenges to national unity and stability are not of a tribal or regional nature supported by factions of the current leadership. (C)

Increasing Nigerian support for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its Defense Commission, a hardening line on African liberation, and a more assertive foreign policy in general reflect the interest of Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Head of the FMG, in expanding his country's influence in Africa. Gowon has already contributed moral and material support to insurgents in Portuguese Guinea through Guinea, which is also opposing the Portuguese. Plans to reorganize and reequip the armed forces should, if fulfilled, help maintain Nigeria's military preeminence in Africa. (C)

Although Nigeria is a member of the Commonwealth and the OAU, it has no known alliances or agreements requiring a formal commitment to military action. In 1962, with British concurrence, Nigeria abrogated the Anglo-Nigerian defense assistance agreement signed in 1960. Nevertheless, the colonial traditions of the forces, the naval training agreements signed in March 1968, and present overseas training conducted in the United Kingdom tend to perpetuate British influence within the armed forces, despite government pronouncements of nonalignment. During the civil war, Nigeria purchased considerable military equipment from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, but Soviet influence

within the military is minimal, mainly because of Soviet reluctance to support its equipment in the postwar period and because of the poor quality of its training both in Nigeria and the U.S.S.R. (including attempts at political indoctrination of students). (C)

1. Historical (S)

As British colonial forces, Nigerian military units established a creditable service record dating from the establishment in 1863 of a constabulary unit in Lagos. Constabulary units won their first Nigerian battle honor in the Ashanti expeditions between 1873 and 1896, and in 1899 the Nigeria Regiment became a formal part of the Royal West African Frontier Force.

During World War I, serving in British expeditionary forces, the Nigerian Regiment won five battle honors in actions that included the conquest of the Cameroons and the final defeat of the Germans in east Africa. The Nigeria Regiment's distinguished service in World War II brought some 19 additional battle honors. One brigade group conducted a sustained 1,000-mile drive (1940-41) to help defeat Italian forces in Somaliland and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, in the wartime expansion of the West African Frontier Force, the Nigeria Regiment brought its strength to 13 battalions while guarding the Nigerian frontiers against possible incursions by the Vichy French. Nigerian units served with British forces in the Middle East, in Morocco, and in Sicily. However, the most notable exploits were those of the 10 Nigerian battalions which served in Burma in 1944-45. Seven battalions, as part of the 81st and 82d West African Divisions, played a prominent role in the campaign, which culminated in the capture of Myohaug on 18 January 1944, a date observed in Nigeria as Remembrance Day.

After World War II, reduced strength Nigerian units remained part of the West African Frontier Force. In February 1956, Queen Elizabeth bestowed the designation "Queen's Own" on the then five-battalion Nigeria Regiment, and Nigeria for the first time assumed control of its own forces. In 1960, by invitation of the United Nations, Nigeria supplied two

battalions to the Congo peacekeeping mission. Similarly, shortly after the last battalion returned from the Congo in April 1964, another battalion was dispatched to Tanganyika to relieve the British force which had earlier quelled the Tanganyika army mutiny of January 1964.

The Nigerian Government negotiated an air force assistance agreement in 1963 with the Federal Republic of Germany, and several hundred Nigerians received training both in West Germany and in Nigeria under the German Air Force Assistance Group. Although the training program was effective, Nigerian impatience with the air force's rate of development under German guidance culminated in Nigerian assumption of control of the force in January 1966 and, subsequently, virtual suspension of the assistance agreement.

The established integrity of Nigeri's forces, after the departure of their last British General Officer Commanding in February 1965, proved to be short lived. The deteriorating internal political situation after the October 1965 elections and dissatisfaction with the civilian government's desire to use the army in stabilizing the internal situation deepened army dissidence. This culminated in the coup of January 1966 by middle-grade officers, mostly Ibo, who wanted to purge the government of corruption. A military government was established under Maj. Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding of the Nigerian Army.

To avoid exacerbating tribal differences within the officer corps Ironsi permitted central control of the army to decline. But fears of domination by one tribe, reinforced by the predominantly Ibo composition of the military government and Ironsi's attempt to decree a unitary structure for the federation, precipitated the coup of July 1966 by Ironsi's subordinates. This coup resulted in Ironsi's murder and the selection of Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, then Army Chief of Staff, for the position of Head of the Federal Military Government (FMG).

By reorganizing the armed forces and assigning areas of responsibility, Gowon sought to avoid further tribal friction and to achieve a balance between central authority and regional autonomy within the forces, thereby lessening fears of personal safety among the tribes. Prolonged negotiations failed to produce a satisfactory solution, and the Federal Military Government decreed a reorganization of the armed forces into four area commands under central control of Army Headquarters, Lagos. However, the bloody reprisals and massacres in the fall of 1966 in the former Northern Region against the Ibo and the

failure of the FMG to reach a satisfactory solution to the problems of personal safety and regional control of the armed forces resulted in secession of the former Eastern Region from the federation, the departure of Ibo military personnel from the ranks of the federal armed forces, and the declaration of Biafran independence in May 1967.

When civil war broke out in July 1967, the Federal Nigerian Army had already initiated intensive recruitment programs throughout Nigeria. Between July and December 1967, the Nigerian Army expanded from 13 to 45 battalions. Army personnel strength increased to almost 50,000, and navy and air force strengths to about 1,000 and 2,000, respectively.

In September 1967, the area command system was abolished as forces from the three regions which remained loyal to the federal government converged on Biafra. These commands were given divisional designations and reorganized into three division headquarters.

In July 1967, as a result of Nigeria's failure to secure military equipment from Western nations, the government signed its first agreement with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, which provided for the sale of MiG-17 (FRESCO) jet fighter and L-29 (MAYA) jet trainer aircraft, naval patrol boats, and other military equipment. Through five subsequent Soviet military agreements concluded in 1968 and 1969, the expanding armed forces—especially the air force—developed increasing dependence on the Soviet Union and Soviet technicians in Nigeria for supply and maintenance of equipment, spare parts, and ammunition.

Overall federal strategy during the war was to surround the Ibo heartland by occupying the two minority tribal states created from the old Eastern Region in May 1967. Federal leaders say they adopted this strategy to avoid incurring the loss of life that would have resulted from overrunning Iboland. Their inability to overcome stubborn Ibo resistance prolonged the war and forced some reorientation of federal military planning, particularly after they discovered how difficult it was to operate in Ibo territory.

Federal tactics were marked by lackluster performance by both troops and field commanders, and successes were in large measure attributable to superior firepower (Figure 1) as well as to the use of mercenaries and foreign advisers. Most federal advances were preceded by artillery barrages lasting several days, after which infantry troops, led by armored cars, advanced cautiously, firing indiscriminately. A major defect in federal tactics was the

FIGURE 1. Federal troops had superior firepower during civil war (U/OU)



inability to coordinate the activities of the three federal divisions because of poor staff work in Lagos and the use of independent-minded and often mutually hostile field commanders. In areas it occupied before the war's end, the federal army generally tried to treat civilians fairly and only occasionally dealt severely with a hostile local population.

Early in the war, the FMG effectively used its small navy and air force. Even before the war started, the navy imposed at least a partial blockade of the eastern coast to intercept gunrunners and restrict Biafran attempts to export cash crops. Later, the navy carried out small amphibious landings, first at Bonny and later at Calabar. The air force provided some tactical air support of ground operations, especially in the southern coastal areas, but generally it contributed little to the federal war effort.

The Biafrans, with a total military force of only about 60,000 men, were at a disadvantage in numbers as well as resources. For a long time these shortcomings were compensated by their superior internal lines of communication and the compactness of the area they defended, as well as their firmer resolve. From the beginning the Biafrans had better staff officers and more effective administration, both in the military structure and in civilian support of the war effort. Biafran strategy was primarily based on the defense of the Ibo homeland but also included bold and imaginative planning for offensive operations against the federal army.

Tactically, the Biafrans seldom fought pitched battles. Instead, they made extensive use of guerrilla and commando-type operations behind federal lines, often led by mercenaries. They usually chose to give up the cities and retreat into the countryside; however, toward the end, the Biafrans were often forced to stand and fight.

The initial federal invasion of the former Eastern Region along its northern borders was quickly contained by the Biafran defenders. The first major operation of the war was an amphibious landing undertaken in late July 1967 by the federal navy and army at Bonny, the key oil port at the mouth of the river leading to Port Harcourt.

The next major thrust was made by the Biafrans. On the night of 9 August 1967, Biafran Army units, loaded in trucks and Land Rovers, crossed the Niger River bridge at Onitsha and moved swiftly through Mid-Western State, reaching Benin City, the capital, the next morning. However, the FMG soon brought up reinforcements, and these forces defeated a Biafran effort to strike out toward Lagos in a bloody engagement at Ore on 20 August, a battle which marked a major turning point in the war.

During September and October 1967, the federal 2d Division under Col. Murtalla Mohammed moved slowly through Mid-Western State, pushing the Biafrans out ahead of them and finally capturing Asaba at the Niger River bridge on 6 October. Meanwhile, another federal force was driving south from Nsukka. This group occupied the Biafran capital of Enugu on 4 October 1967, and about 6 months later

it finally captured Onitsha. Also in October, another federal amphibious landing was made at Calabar, the last port still available to the Biafrans.

Although the federal forces captured the two major centers of Oron and Onitsha in March 1968, the Biafran Army promptly surrounded Onitsha and kept the 2d division bottled up there. In the south, the federal soldiers maintained their advance, finally capturing Port Harcourt at the end of May. Biafran resistance was beginning to stiffen, however, and it took the federal army until September 1968 to cover the few miles from Port Harcourt to Aba. From September 1968 to late 1969, the war remained virtually stalemated, with two notable exceptions. In April 1969 the federal 1st Division captured the provisional Biafran administrative headquarters at Umuahia. A few days later, however, Biafran forces recaptured the important road junction town of Owerri to the west and drove approximately 15 miles south along the main road to Port Harcourt. Finally in November 1969, after months of intense preparation the 3d Marine Commando Division began its offensive which ultimately overran Biafra and ended the Ibo secession in January 1970.

2. Command structure (C)

Under the FMG the chief executive is also Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and has direct control of both political and military affairs (Figure 2). He is assisted by two advisory bodies—the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council. The Supreme Military Council, the highest consultative body in the nation, is a joint-service organization that provides recommendations on military matters. The council includes the Commander in Chief, the Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of the three services, the Inspector General of Police and




FIGURE 2. Nigerian defense organization (S)

his deputy, 11 state Military Governors, and one civilian administrator of East-Central State. The council, however, meets infrequently, and the Commander in Chief often must obtain advice directly from the service commanders, tactical commanders, and the military governors. The responsibilities of the Federal Executive Council, which meets regularly on a weekly basis, are limited to administrative and civil matters.

Supreme Headquarters, Dodan Barracks, is directed by the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, who is directly responsible to the Commander in Chief. The position of General Officer Commanding, Nigerian Army, has been vacant since the assassination of Maj. Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi in the coup of July 1966; command is exercised directly by the Commander in Chief, General Gowon.

The Head of the FMG is concurrently Commissioner of Defense and controls the Ministry of Defense through his appointed Permanent Secretary of Defense. The Ministry of Defense performs administrative support functions, controls the Defense Industries Corporation, and prepares the defense budget. The ministry has no control of troops.

B. Joint activities (S)

1. Military manpower

As of 1 January 1973, Nigeria had 13,365,000 males between the ages 15 and 49; about 48% were physically fit for military service. Breakdown by 5-year age groups follows:

AGE	TOTAL MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15-19	3,481,000	1,905,000
20-24	2,921,000	1,500,000
25-29	2,121,000	1,050,000
30-34	1,521,000	720,000
35-39	1,261,000	555,000
40-44	1,100,000	450,000
45-49	960,000	295,000
Total, 15-49	13,365,000	6,475,000

Average number reaching military age (18) annually, 1973-77, will be about 720,000.

The civil war revealed Nigeria's excellent capability to mobilize for an emergency, resulting from the extensive resources of manpower available. In the past, the armed forces reflected the tribal population ratios of the nation; the forces still adhere to this policy informally, but men from minority tribes of Nigeria's Middle Belt probably form the largest single element within the army's enlisted ranks.

All enlisted personnel are volunteers, since Nigeria has no conscription system. Recruitment age ranges from 17 1/2 to 25 years of age. Enlistment is normally for 6 years for infantry recruits and 9 years for specialists; however, a short-term enlistment of 3 years was instituted to meet the manpower needs of the civil war. The abrupt conclusion of the civil war has left Nigeria with an army far too large for the country's needs. Thus, recruitment is limited to officer candidates and career personnel in specialized fields such as teaching, engineering and finance.

There is no formal reserve, although some former veterans, especially NCO's, were recalled to service to fill the wartime need for command personnel at all levels. Field commissions were given to warrant officers and enlisted men during the war to help meet increased officer personnel needs, although examinations now underway of the capability of these officers may result in a number of them reverting to their former ranks. The vast numbers of troops now in the army will eventually provide an extensive pool of semitrained personnel which could be drawn upon for emergency recall.

The Nigerian soldier is amenable to discipline and mentally adaptable to enlisted service. However, the urgency of civil war manpower demands did not allow time for adequate recruit training. Basic training is now adequate, although there are some shortcomings in technical skills.

Morale in the armed forces is generally satisfactory. While personnel seem imbued with a sense of purpose and many officers are committed to the concept of "one Nigeria," there have been signs of latent frustration among many middle-grade officers. Troop idleness, unfulfilled government promises to provide new equipment, training, and badly needed barracks have contributed to this condition. An increased level of overseas training and numerous selective promotions have satisfied many middle and senior army officers, but there has been increased concern over the high level of corruption. To date the senior officers have been spared open criticism and have not been implicated. The appointment of Major General Ejoor as Army Chief of Staff has evoked some discontent, especially among Northern officers. In some circles, General Ejoor was held responsible for the fall of the Mid-Western State during the civil war. As Army Chief of Staff, he replaced Maj. Gen. Hassan Katsina, a figure popular among northern personnel. Upon General Katsina's return from the Royal College of Defense at the end of 1972, some personnel rearrangement probably will have to be made to satisfy Northern officer elements.

The government has displayed considerable magnanimity toward former Nigerian military personnel who left the ranks to fight with Biafra, and a considerable number of former enlisted personnel of all services who had fought for Biafra were reabsorbed into the armed forces. Seventeen former air force cadets were reintegrated, while a board of inquiry and the Supreme Military Council agreed, despite some objections, to reinstate 65 former rebel army officers; 64 officers were discharged, and 30 remain in detention. This policy supported the "one Nigeria" concept and at the same time showed leniency toward the former rebels.

2. Strength trends

Estimated strengths of the armed forces since independence are shown in the following tabulation:

DATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
1960	7,000	500	...	7,500
1961	7,500	550	...	8,050
1962	8,000	650	...	8,650
1963	8,000	650	100	8,750
1964	8,500	840	100	9,440
1965	8,500	880	600	9,980
1966	10,000	920	1,000	11,920
1967	50,000	1,020	2,000	53,020
1968	65,000	1,500	2,500	69,000
1969	100,000	1,600	2,500	104,100
1970	260,000	2,150	5,500	267,650
1971	263,400	2,150	5,500	271,050
1972	256,400	2,200	5,500	264,100

... Not pertinent.

Political and economic factors will largely dictate the size and composition of the armed forces, which were so rapidly expanded that the war's abrupt end left actual strength figures unknown in some cases. Army strength figures in 1971 had been listed as 280,000, but preliminary results of an army census revealed that strength totals were too high and that many unit commanders had inflated their figures by 8% to 10%. The best estimate is now 256,400 personnel.

The present force levels in Nigeria far exceed the country's security needs. While some forces will be required to stabilize whatever political structure emerges in the future, some demobilization of the army will sooner or later be politically and economically necessary. The government has considered several methods of accomplishing this but fears the dangers of further swelling the ranks of the unemployed. Under a 4-year military reorganization plan approved by the Supreme Military Council in

December 1970, a new army force level of 150,000 was adopted. The Nigerian Army Resettlement Scheme (NARS) was approved as a plan to assist demobilization by providing educational and vocational training for wounded military personnel prior to their reentry into civilian life. This program originally envisioned retraining, over the next 5 to 6 years, some 100,000 personnel in four proposed NARS training camps; only Camp Oshodi, in Lagos, has been completed, and the program, slated to start in September 1971, is far behind schedule. The NARS program thus has made only limited progress and appears to be losing active government support. It is likely that completed facilities will be used primarily to train a small number of disabled veterans and will be of little significance with regard to demobilization.

Despite continuing discussions on demobilizing the army, it is likely that present force strength levels will be maintained at least for the immediate future. The army is expected to remain a light infantry force consisting of three numbered divisions and one independent garrison command. The combat troops, now concentrated primarily around the former secessionist region, are being redeployed to provide greater countrywide coverage. The navy and air force are expected to continue to expand, with the navy possibly reaching 5,500 personnel by 1979 and the air force leveling off at 10,000 by 1975. Navy and air force expansions are tied to the general program to reorganize and reequip the armed forces. With the navy and air force expanding and the political pitfalls inherent in significantly demobilizing the army, it is probable that the total armed force strength will exceed present levels before they decline and thus multiply the many administrative and logistical problems plaguing Nigeria's forces.

3. Training

Nigeria's only interservice training facility is the Nigerian Defense Academy located at Kaduna, North-Central State. The academy was opened in January 1964 and placed under the control of an Indian Army training team. It conducts a 3-year regular course of studies with a broad curriculum of academic and military subjects accredited by both Ibadan and Ahmadu Bello Universities. The first 2 years emphasize basic officer courses for all service cadets. The third year gives special attention to army officer trainees, while navy and air force cadets join their respective service institution for further training or complete their officer training abroad, usually in the United Kingdom or other Commonwealth countries. Since the retirement of the academy's Indian commandant in 1969, the school has had two Nigerian

commandants, the present one being Maj. Gen. A. Adebayo. The Indian staff increased from seven to 12 in the course of the civil war. An Assistance Group from West Germany gave initial training and assistance to the Nigerian Air Force, but this agreement was allowed to expire in the spring of 1967 after increasing difficulties between individual Germans and Nigerians. A maintenance contract with Dornier AG of West Germany provides for additional maintenance on Western aircraft.

Naval personnel received orientation training on the three Soviet-supplied motor gunboats from a small Soviet Navy training team which departed in November 1968. In March 1968 a training agreement between Nigeria and the United Kingdom was signed that provided for a Royal Navy training team to improve the navy's capabilities following the civil war.

Periodically, individuals or teams from the British Army have been in Nigeria on special training missions for short duration, but despite the desires of many army officers, there are no plans for establishing a British Army training program to assist the Nigerian Army in its reorganization.

4. Military budget

Proposed defense expenditures are prepared by the three branches of the armed forces and presented to the Ministry of Defense for review and coordination. The military budget is then submitted to the Ministry of Finance for examination and incorporation into the total national budget. The composite budget is reviewed by the Federal Executive Council before final approval by the Supreme Military Council.

The heavy expenses of the civil war strained federal finances. In 1968, defense allocations accounted for almost one-fourth of the national budget in sharp contrast to prior years, when military expenditures averaged less than 10%. Defense spending remained relatively high in 1971. Despite the successful termination of the civil war, the government has decided against a rapid reduction in military personnel in order to avoid an increase in the numbers of unemployed. Demobilization is to take place over an extended period during which vocational training is being given to men in uniform. Defense budgets for fiscal years 1967 through 1971 are shown below.

NIGERIAN DEFENSE BUDGETS (Millions of U.S. dollars)						
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Defense budget ..	35.0	149.8	227.9	504.0	378.0	300.3
Defense budget as a percent of national budget ..	5.8	24.0	32.3	45.6	28.4	17.6
Defense budget as a percent of GNP	0.7	3.0	3.9	7.2	5.9	4.4

5. Logistics

Nigeria's economy is basically agricultural, and the country is largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs. Although well endowed with strategic natural resources including vast oil deposits, it can produce only limited material support for its armed forces. Manufacturing is still on a small scale, and, except for simple quartermaster items, Nigeria is dependent on foreign sources for military equipment.

The materiel requirements of the armed forces increased sharply during the conflict in 1967-69 between the federal government and Biafra. Of approximately \$100 million in military assistance provided since 1954, over 75% was received during the war. From almost exclusive reliance on the United Kingdom for military equipment prior to the civil war, Nigeria expanded its sources of supply to include Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European countries. Major non-Communist suppliers have included the United Kingdom, which has supplied a variety of ground forces materiel, naval vessels, and aircraft valued at \$24.6 million; West Germany, which has furnished small arms, rifles, mortars, ammunition and aircraft valued at \$13.6 million; and the Netherlands, which has provided ammunition, plus naval craft valued at \$9.3 million. Soviet aid of \$25 million has included fighter and trainer aircraft as well as a variety of ground forces and naval materiel (Figure 3). Czechoslovakia has sent ammunition and trainer aircraft valued at \$7 million, Bulgaria has provided ammunition, and in 1971 Romania supplied trucks.

The logistics organization of the Nigerian armed forces has not developed as the forces expanded, and the various components normally operate on a week-to-week or mission-to-mission basis. Nigeria has no

joint logistics command; each service has its own logistics apparatus and generally competes with the others for new equipment or budget priorities. Procurement for the armed forces is handled by the Ministry of Defense under the guidance of Supreme Headquarters. The prolonged stalemate during the civil war was in some respects related to the inability of the federal forces to accurately estimate their needs for a campaign or to move stockpiled materiel to units on short notice.

The maintenance capability of the armed forces has gradually improved since independence, and the normal deadline rate of vehicles and aircraft has been reduced to about 45%. Vehicles and equipment nevertheless suffer from lack of spare parts and particularly from mishandling by improperly trained operators.

C. Army (S)

The army's primary mission is to defend Nigerian sovereignty and maintain internal security. As the largest army in Africa, it can resist attack from any neighboring country and can, except in circumstances involving challenges of a tribal or regional nature supported by elements of the current leadership, maintain internal security. Because of its size the army also is able to provide ready troop support to a potential U.N. or OAU peacekeeping force and to play an increasing role in "nation building." The engineers are already involved in civic action projects, particularly in the former secessionist areas.

The civil war left Nigeria with a very large, adequately equipped, combat-tested army. However, the loss of many experienced officers through the two military coups and subsequent Ibo defections was exacerbated by the rapid mobilization that multiplied the force over 25 times in the span of 4 years. Such an expansion placed a tremendous burden on the army's administrative, logistical, and operational systems and resulted in a considerable lowering of the force's professional standards, efficiency, and effectiveness. The quality of personnel still constitutes a major weakness within the force, and the army officer corps, due to its rapid growth, is far understaffed. The authorized officer strength of an infantry battalion is 56, but most battalions have fewer than 10 officers assigned. Efforts are being made to upgrade the rank structure, but many senior NCO's and junior officers continue to hold command authority disproportionate with their rank. An estimated 500 to 700 junior officers received field commissions during the war. Many of these personnel are ill trained, illiterate, and are not




FIGURE 3. Soviet-provided recoilless rifles (C)

carried on commissioned officer rolls. These personnel are being screened for retraining, return to enlisted grades, or discharge from the army. The general shortage of officers, limited logistical and administrative expertise, and virtually no training above squad level all serve to make the huge force less manageable and to limit its overall effectiveness.

Reorganization of the army under the 1970-74 development plan will impose additional administrative and logistical burdens. The reorganization will not only involve substantial new equipment purchases but will require major redeployments, construction of new barracks and facilities, improved and increased training, and more effective supply and maintenance procedures. The construction of new barracks and troop facilities is one of the most critical needs of the force, since most personnel live under extremely austere conditions. Moreover, the force redeployments will increase the shortages of local housing unless a massive construction plan is implemented.

Tribalism and, to a lesser extent, regionalism are by far the strongest factors influencing the army, especially the officer corps. Middle Belt minority tribesmen dominate Supreme Military Headquarters, and the influence of regional politics within the army command has decreased. The army, seeking to bridge old regional lines of East, West, and North, has decided that, under the reorganization, the three division boundaries will be such that the country is divided into three slices, north to south; however, implementation could be complicated by the poor communications network.

1. Organization

Army Headquarters is in the Ministry of Defense building in Lagos. Direct command of the army is exercised by the head of the Federal Military Government, General Gowon. The staff, under the Army Chief of Staff, includes elements for intelligence, training, armor, medical, administration, operations, and other services. The staff at division headquarters is similar to that at Army Headquarters.

During the war the divisions, in addition to base headquarters, established forward tactical headquarters in the vicinity of secessionist Biafra. However, under the army reorganization plan, which calls for a redeployment of forces on a countrywide basis, the following changes have or are scheduled to take place: 1st Division Headquarters relocated from Enugu to Kaduna; the 2d Division Headquarters relocated from Benin City to Ibadan; the 3d Division Headquarters scheduled to move from Port Harcourt to Jos in 1973.

Various independent garrisons and training centers are subordinate to Army Headquarters; the most significant of these are the Lagos Garrison Organization and the Abeokuta and Zaria Training Depots.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition

The army, as of late 1972, had a strength of about 256,400, including some 2,400 officers. It has no defined tribal representation, but past recruiting patterns seem to indicate that about 20% of the enlisted personnel are from the northern tribes, about 35% from Middle Belt tribes, about 33% from the Yoruba tribe in the west, 7% from Mid-Western State tribes, and 5% from tribes of Rivers, South-Eastern, and East-Central states. Most units are tribally mixed, and troops are not normally garrisoned in their home states.

The basic tactical unit of the army is the infantry battalion, which has an average authorized strength of 1,000 men. The battalion includes four rifle companies, an administrative company, and a support company; the rifle companies are the largest and are broken down into four platoons. The administrative company is charged with nontactical missions such as pay and resupply, while the support companies contain mortar support elements and machineguns. Battalion strengths vary from 1,150 men in the 1st Division to 1,690 men in the two remaining divisions. The army's 149 infantry battalions are subordinated to the three divisional headquarters through 24 brigade headquarters. Under the proposed reorganization and concurrent demobilization plan, the army would retain its three divisions, but the brigades and battalions would be reduced to nine and 54 from 24 and 149, respectively.

Various battalion-size units are attached to each division headquarters in support of the infantry, including reconnaissance, field artillery, field engineer, signal, and supply and transport. Divisional reconnaissance units each comprise four squadrons of Ferret, Panhard, and Saladin armored cars and Saracen armored personnel carriers. Divisional field artillery is divided into three batteries, each including 105-mm howitzers, mortars, and antiaircraft weapons. The 122-mm howitzers (Figure 4) are maintained directly under army control in a field artillery regiment headquarters.

The Nigerian Army suffered from few shortages in small arms during the war. The facility with which supplies and ammunition were obtained permitted combat units to become negligent in accounting for



FIGURE 4. Soviet-made 122-mm howitzers (C)

lost equipment and wasteful in expending ammunition. Standard infantry weapons include 7.62-mm NATO G-3 assault rifles, 7.62-mm NATO FAL rifles, 7.62-mm Cetme rifles, and a variety of submachineguns and other small arms, almost all of which came from Western European countries. Battalion support weapons in short supply during the war included 81-mm mortars, 40-mm RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, 84-mm Carl Gustav recoilless rifles, and 106-mm jeep-mounted recoilless rifles. Except for the grenade launchers which were supplied by the Soviet Union, these weapons came from Western sources. Divisional support equipment includes French- and Italian-supplied 105-mm howitzers and Soviet-supplied 122-mm howitzers.

In addition to the redeployment of the three infantry divisions, the reorganization envisions major equipment purchases to possibly include light artillery pieces, armored cars, light tanks, crew served weapons, ammunition, and small arms such as the Soviet 7.62-mm AK-47 assault rifle, popular with Nigerian troops. One of the government's main concerns is to replace war-worn equipment and standardize the varied inventory of arms. There is no indication of the exact mix of equipment to be ordered, but Western and Communist arms suppliers were both approached by Nigerian arms delegations in 1971.

As a result of these contacts, the U.S.-made V-100 armored car and several items of French-made military equipment were tested in Nigeria. The French equipment includes one Panhard AML-245 armored car, one Panhard VTT armored personnel carrier, one AMX-13 light tank with a 105-mm gun, one 120-mm mortar, and some military electronic and telecommunications equipment. It is very likely that Nigeria will continue to purchase equipment from varied foreign sources and thereby fail to achieve the desired equipment standardization.

3. Training

The army staff officer for plans and training is responsible for programing current and future army personnel requirements, and he establishes training guidelines for the army's training facilities. He also assists the Director of Training and Reorganization, Nigerian Armed Forces, in planning the reorganization of the armed forces.

The Nigerian Army had at least six operational recruit training facilities at the close of the war. There were two under Army Headquarters—the recruitment and training centers at Abeokuta in Western State and at Zaria in North-Central State—which constituted the normal peacetime recruit training depots. Each division had at least one independent training facility. Some limited training programs are still being conducted at the Abeokuta and Zaria depots as well as at the division training centers. Recruit training has been largely curtailed as a result of the army's rapid expansion, and, as previously stated, recruits are only being accepted in specialized technical and vocational career fields.

Recruitment is voluntary and normally for 6 years, although a short-service term of duty of 3 years was instituted to meet the national emergency. Historically, training was a 28-week program of basic academic studies, including English language and infantry training. During the war, however, this was streamlined, first to 12 weeks and finally to 3 or 4 weeks of training on basic weapons, camouflage, platoon movements, sanitation, some drill, and a few other related infantry matters.

Technical trainees receive some training at schools run by technical units such as the engineer school at New Bussa and the signal school at Apapa, or at technical training facilities in the United Kingdom or other Commonwealth and foreign schools. The number of graduates, however, are insufficient to meet the army's requirements, and shortages of skilled maintenance and technical personnel seriously hamper operational efficiency.

Basic and some advanced training for junior and noncommissioned officers is provided at the Nigerian Military Training College at Kaduna. Training includes 8-week courses in tactics, small arms, support weapons, administration, and general education. Further specialized training for junior and noncommissioned officers takes place abroad in U.K., Commonwealth, or U.S. schools.

Nigerian Army officer cadets attend the Nigerian Defense Academy for a 3-year course of instruction, along with cadets from the other services. In the first 2



FIGURE 5. Artillery and mortar concentrations at Kachia (C)

years of instruction heavy emphasis is placed on academic studies for all cadets. The final year is devoted to infantry officer courses such as military engineering, military law, administration, and small-unit tactics. Nearly all senior officers in the Nigerian Army have received further training at officer schools in the United Kingdom, notably at Mons and Sandhurst. Other courses for supplementary officer instruction have been attended in West Germany, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, and India. Since the close of the civil war, an increasing number of officers and enlisted men have been receiving instruction, primarily in the area of civic action, at U.S. military schools.

Armywide organizational training has generally been limited to platoon-level activities, such as close-order drill, weapons cleaning, and organized athletics. In July 1971, the first of what may be a series of periodic seminars on current world problems was provided. This seminar emphasized the role of the OAU and specifically the feasibility of establishing an African High Command. Aside from the annual artillery and mortar exercises known as concentrations (Figure 5), which occurred last at Kachia on 18 December 1971, no significant training or operational tasks have been assigned to the army. While the army engineers have been kept occupied with civic action projects, the remainder of the force has been generally idle, and boredom could threaten the morale of the large standing army.

4. Logistics

Procurement of major supply items is handled by the Quartermaster General, and funds are provided by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense.

Central storage and distribution of supplies are controlled by the army Director of Supply and Transport, who exercises authority over the central storage depots in Lagos and several subdepots in Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Benin City, Enugu, and Zaria.

Each division has a quartermaster charged with providing for the needs of the division, as approved by the division commander and Army Headquarters. Funds to purchase food and clothing, for example, are allocated to the divisions by Army Headquarters and are based on division reported strength figures. Army Headquarters, however, has only a limited capability to monitor and insure proper usage of these funds. Transportation of supplies within the division is accomplished by a transportation battalion assigned to each division. Supplies are primarily moved overland by truck, although some air and seairlift have been used in resupplying division elements. The logistics system is thus dependent on the state of the roads, especially the bridges in the delta areas, and is highly vulnerable to weather conditions.

Central maintenance takes place at the Base Workshops at Yaba and Kaduna, under the control of Army Headquarters. The divisions are equipped to handle field maintenance and have workshop detachments located near rear storage areas.

While the army's logistical organization is structurally sound, it is actually ineffective and can be described as somewhat chaotic. The system, designed to accommodate a 9,000-man army, has not been able to keep pace with rapid army expansion. Many of the army's logistical personnel are unskilled and ill trained in logistical and related administrative procedures. The control of spare parts is generally poor, and equipment maintenance is often performed on a "breakdown and repair" basis. The engineers, however, have had increasing success in implementing a U.S. AID-assisted maintenance management program. Generally, logistics officers seem to view logistics as a one-time stockpiling operation, rather than as a continuous resupply effort. They do not exercise foresight regarding needs, neglecting such basic procedures as rationing and detailed accounting. These faults are magnified by the great distances and lead time involved in all resupply operations. All army operations continue to be plagued by weak logistic support.

Supply vehicles seem abundant, but they are frequently mishandled or diverted for other uses and lack spare parts. The army seems to have sufficient equipment for land, sea, and air supply of troops, but

all transportation of troops and supplies is complicated by the size of the country and the wide dispersion of units.

There is a severe shortage of doctors, and to meet mounting medical needs, the army has had to recruit civilian doctors, both Nigerian and foreign, to staff its medical facilities. In March 1972, there were an estimated 21 doctors, many of whom were occupied with administrative assignments. Some 30 Soviet paramedical personnel, referred to as doctors by the Soviets, were assisting the Nigerian armed forces until early 1972. At that time these personnel were asked to leave because it became known that they were not doctors, after the Nigerians became dissatisfied with their low level of technical competence. There are military hospitals in Lagos, Kaduna, Enugu, and Ibadan under the Director of Medical Services on the army staff. Each garrison and division has medical facilities or field hospitals, and the divisions have an ambulance company attached to division headquarters.

D. Navy (S)

The mission of the Nigerian Navy is primarily to defend Nigeria's 500-mile coastline. This mission encompasses patrolling, transport, and supply operations, naval gunfire support for amphibious operations, and the prevention of smuggling. The force is also charged with surveying the coast and showing the flag in West African ports. The Nigerian Navy is the most powerful naval force of any west African state. Historically it was employed to supplement British convoy escorts and antisubmarine ships in the sea areas off western Africa; however, this concept faded with independence. During the civil war the navy demonstrated considerable operational efficiency, but this capability has been eroded by poor maintenance and a shortage of spare parts. Less than half of the navy's 18 ships are seaworthy.

The navy is probably the most loyal and stable of all the services. The presence of British and Indian personnel serving in its ranks provides it with a greater measure of professional competence in planning, operations, and administration. Under the navy's reorganization plans, between 1972 and 1979 the force should more than double its present strength, dispose of all unserviceable vessels, repair others, and possibly purchase 20 additional vessels. Gradual naval expansion, emphasizing quality rather than quantity, should do much to improve the navy's operational capability.




FIGURE 6. Dutch-built destroyer escort, N.N.S. *Nigeria*, flagship of the Nigerian Navy (U/OU)

1. Organization

The Nigerian Navy is commanded by a vice admiral, who also serves as Chief of Naval Staff and is a member of the Supreme Military Council of the FMG. He directs Naval Headquarters ashore, controls the navy base at Apapa through its commanding officer, and commands the flotilla. The Naval Headquarters is located in the Ministry of Defense at Lagos, and the Naval Staff includes officers for planning, gunnery, armament, operations, and supply. British and Indian officers serve in staff capacities at Naval Headquarters. The navy yard and base of operations are at Apapa in Lagos Harbor, and supporting naval stations are located in and around Lagos Harbor, Port Harcourt, and Calabar. The flotilla is based at Apapa and operates in the Gulf of Guinea.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition

The navy was developed under the aegis of the British Royal Navy and relies heavily on U.K. support for training, equipment, and stores. It has one principal surface combatant ship, the destroyer escort (DE) *Nigeria*, built in the Netherlands but fitted with British weapons (Figure 6). This vessel underwent major refit in Britain and arrived back in Nigeria in August 1972. Minor surface vessels include five sea-to-air defense launches (similar to U.S. PCS's) and three Soviet-built P-6 patrol vessels (PTC's), acquired in the fall of 1967. The navy also has one utility landingcraft (LCU), one inshore minesweeper (MSI), one cargo ship (AK), three surveying ships, and one harbor tug. All of the PTC's, one PCS, one surveying ship, and the harbor tug are unserviceable and are due to be scrapped or cannibalized. Several of the remaining vessels operate on a breakdown and repair



FIGURE 7. N.N.S. *Dorina*, the latest addition to the navy, displaces 650 tons, is 202 feet long, and draws 11 feet. Its two diesel engines give it a top speed of 23 knots and a cruising range of 3,500 nautical miles at 14 knots. Armament consists of a Mark 19 twin 4-inch mount forward, with automatic fire control, two 40-mm Bofors aft, and two Mark 7A 20-mm cannon—one on either beam. Sonar and ASW weapons can be fitted later, if desired. (U/OU)

basis and are scheduled for refitting. As part of the navy's reequipping program, two Vosper Thornycroft Mark 3 corvettes (Figure 7), included in the inventory, were purchased in the United Kingdom; the Nigerian Navy took command of N.N.S. *Dorina* in the United Kingdom in September 1972, and both this ship and the second corvette, N.N.S. *Otobo*, are expected to arrive in Nigeria in late 1972 or early 1973.

Personnel strength comprises 200 officers and 2,100 enlisted men, excluding 13 seconded Indian Navy officers and 14 members of the Royal Navy training team. Navy strength has been gradually increasing by about 120 men every 8 months in order to obtain the desired 5,500-man force level by 1979. Naval units are all based at Apapa, and their primary area of operations is the Gulf of Guinea.

Before the civil war, the navy reflected the tribal population ratios of the nation; 50% of the personnel were from the North, 25% from the West, and 25% from the East. However, Eastern personnel held most of the technical positions in the navy, and the departure of some 14 officers and 252 enlisted men of the Ibo tribe in late summer of 1967 was a serious setback to the navy's ability to participate in the war. Through intensive recruitment and training programs the deserters were replaced, primarily with Northerners. Since that time, other tribal cleavages have not surfaced, and the navy is not expected to compromise its political neutrality. Enlisted men who deserted for the rebel cause have been reabsorbed; however, no rebel officers have returned to the service.

The Nigerian Navy has no reserve of personnel or ships, although to meet the demands of the civil war, the navy was able to recall several retired officers and

warrant officers. The navy also chartered merchant and other nonmilitary ships for troop lift and cargo purposes in order to support the southern fronts by sea. The Nigerian National Shipping Line, Anansa Line, and the Nigerian Ports Authority are among the organizations furnishing ships for charter.

3. Training

The Nigerian Navy has no formal training facilities. All recruit training occurs on board ship or at the Apapa base. Technical trainees are usually sent to the United States, India, the United Kingdom, or to other Commonwealth countries. Considering that all Nigerian Navy vessels are manned solely by Nigerians, the navy appears to have enough technically qualified rates for shipboard duties.

While there is an abundance of volunteers for the navy, its high academic standards eliminate most of them. All are required to pass examinations in mathematics, English, and general knowledge. The navy normally has difficulty in acquiring recruits with technical skills meeting its requirements. Enlistment is for 6 years, and enlisted personnel receive 4 months of basic training at the naval base at Apapa. Specialist training is provided primarily in the United Kingdom, while on-the-job training is given aboard Nigerian ships in home waters.

After receiving 2 years of basic officer training at the Nigerian Defense Academy, naval cadets are usually sent to the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, England, or to the Commonwealth Naval Training School, H.M.C.S. *Venture*, at Esquimalt, Canada. These courses cover seven terms and are divided into

three phases of training, which include academic and naval subjects, practical sea experience, and fleet training. Upon graduation from these schools, cadets are commissioned sublieutenant in the Nigerian Navy. A few selected officers subsequently return to the United Kingdom for special training as required. Naval officers, as a result, are generally well educated and competent. However, attendance at these institutions does not orient the Nigerian student officer to the situation confronting his own navy, and even some senior officers do not fully appreciate the needs of a small navy. A widespread lack of experience in administration and planning is illustrated by the virtual absence of contingency planning and the inadequate stockpiling of stores prior to initiating operations.

An 11-man Soviet naval training team accompanied the three Soviet-built motor gunboats supplied to Nigeria in November 1967 to instruct Nigerian naval personnel in the maintenance and handling of the craft. The team was gradually reduced to seven and finally departed in November 1968, without provision for extension or renewal. Plans for ordering additional patrol craft from the Soviet Union were canceled, apparently because the Soviet craft did not meet the performance expectations of the Nigerians.

Future development of the Nigerian Navy will probably be guided by the Royal Navy. A naval training agreement between the United Kingdom and Nigeria, signed on 4 March 1968, provided for the 14-man British naval training team which began working with the Nigerian Navy upon conclusion of the civil war.

4. Logistics

Nigeria builds no naval ships. The ships in its navy were acquired from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Naval patrol boats formerly were repaired in the port of Lagos; however, periodic maintenance of naval ships was deferred during the civil war and has not resumed. A sufficient number of spare parts to keep all craft operational is not available. Refit and overhaul of the *Nigeria* is done in the United Kingdom.

E. Air force (S)

The Nigerian Air Force is the most recently established branch of Nigeria's armed forces, dating only from the middle of 1963. Its capabilities reflect its youth and rapid growth. The mission of the air force is to defend the country's airspace, provide tactical

support for ground and naval operations, and provide troop transport, liaison, and reconnaissance for the armed forces.

The air force is capable of defending Nigerian airspace against all neighboring west African air forces using African pilots and is also capable of preventing unauthorized overflights of Nigerian territory by propeller-driven transport aircraft during favorable daylight and weather conditions. Using Soviet radar equipment, the air force has marginal early-warning and ground-control intercept capability. Pilot proficiency is markedly poor, as are administration, logistics, and planning. The force has not been capable of performing its transport and supply missions due to the lack of serviceable transport aircraft.

When Nigerians took responsibility for the air force in 1966, they were almost totally inexperienced and unfamiliar with the mechanics of organizing and operating an air force. After operating without satisfactory organization in the early part of the war, the air force established three operational wings. Nevertheless, the organization still lacks competent staff officers, and logistics is a continuing problem, complicated by the variety of aircraft in the inventory.

While the air force more than doubled its aircraft inventory during the civil war, it has not proportionately increased the number of technically qualified personnel or pilots to permit effective maintenance or operation of its equipment. The air force relies extensively on foreign personnel from the U.S.S.R., Egypt, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Czechoslovakia both for maintenance and training. The use of foreign pilots permitted considerable participation by the air force in the civil war. However, the air force had little control over the conduct of missions flown either by Nigerian or foreign pilots, and it had few means of evaluating air strike effectiveness. Dependence on foreign pilots is gradually decreasing as more Nigerian pilots qualify in the Soviet- and Czech-supplied aircraft.

Aircraft are maintained about 55% operational through the efforts of the foreign technicians on whom the air force is expected to continue to rely for a considerable time.

Since the close of the civil war, the air force has been making a concerted effort to build its training capabilities, standardize its aircraft inventory, and increase the competence of its personnel. The reorganization of the air force under the 1970-74 development plan is viewed as a major vehicle to upgrade the force and overcome its recognized deficiencies.

1. Organization

The Nigerian Air Force is commanded by a brigadier general who also serves as Chief of Air Staff and is a member of the Supreme Military Council. The air staff, headquartered in Lagos, is responsible for intelligence, operations and training, logistics, personnel, and air-traffic control. The air force is organized into a Fighter/Bomber Wing, a Transport Wing, and a Training Wing. Each command includes two operational squadrons. The main air force facilities are located at Lagos, Kaduna, Kano, and Makurdi.

Under current reorganization plans, the air force intends to create a tactical "Strike Force" from the present Fighter/Bomber Wing and a Military Airlift Command from its Transport Wing. The Training Wing is expected to be retained as a Training Command. The shortage of trained administrators, planners, and logisticians could severely hamper the reorganization and limit operational efficiency.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition

The air force is a volunteer force of 5,500 officers and men. Seventeen Biafran cadets who fled to the east during the civil war were reabsorbed in June 1971. The air force reorganization objective for FY75 is to raise the force level to 10,000 officers and men.

In early 1972, the air force had a total of 54 pilots of whom about 40 were available for pilot assignments and only five were MiG-rated fighter pilots. Twenty-three pilot cadets were undergoing primary flight training at Kaduna, and some 12 cadets were receiving undergraduate pilot training in the United States under the Foreign Military Sales program.

Nigerian aircraft inventory includes three IL-28 (BEAGLE) light jet bombers, 16 MiG-17 (FRESCO) jet fighters, five MiG-15 (MIDCER) jet trainers, 12 L-29 MAYA (Delfin) jet trainers, three F-27 (Fokker Friendship), 11 DC-3 transport aircraft, one DC-4 transport aircraft, 12 P-149 (Piaggio) propeller trainer aircraft, and 24 additional utility aircraft. There are also eight helicopters in the inventory, but none are operational. Approximately half of the fixed wing aircraft are operational at any given time.

Under the reorganization, efforts are being made to scrap, overhaul, or replace old aircraft. The first three of six F-27 (Fokker Friendship) transport aircraft (Figure 8) arrived in early 1972, along with an additional six L-29 jet trainers. The original L-29's were acquired during the war and are in need of overhaul. The F-27's were selected by senior officers as a medium cargo transport; younger officers, however,




FIGURE 8. Dutch-built F-27 (Fokker Friendship), Nigeria's new transport aircraft (U/OU)

were critical of the selection, citing the plane's limited troop and cargo-carrying capability. Air force planners have also discussed acquisition of additional fighter and helicopter aircraft. The U.S.-made Northrop F-5 and the BAC 167 (Strikemaster) reportedly have been mentioned as possible fighter purchases, while funds have already been allocated for six Westland Wessex helicopters. No firm decision, however, has been made on specific aircraft to be ordered.


Each major air facility has a security company of airmen responsible for its safety. Tactical airfields have mobile anti-aircraft weapons and communications and radar equipment operated by Nigerian or Soviet personnel. Stationary radar facilities at Port Harcourt, Kano, near Bonny, and at Ikeja Airport afford Nigeria a marginal air-defense, early-warning, and ground-control intercept capability.

Nigeria's purchase of Soviet aircraft also included provision for Soviet instructors and technicians to accompany the aircraft to train Nigerian pilots and maintenance technicians. Soviet personnel are all stationed at Kano, where nearly all Soviet and Egyptian-supplied aircraft are maintained. Some 28 Soviet personnel instruct Nigerians and keep Nigeria's MiGs flying.

Similarly, Egyptian technicians and pilots accompanied Egyptian aircraft purchased by Nigeria, but, unlike the Soviet personnel, the Egyptians stationed at tactical airfields repeatedly flew combat missions for the air force. The Egyptians, however, seem uninterested in Nigeria's internal problems and do not readily respond to Air Force Headquarters.

In addition to the Soviet and Egyptian personnel, about five Czech technicians from a private Czech company have contracted to maintain and to instruct Nigerians in the maintenance of Czech-supplied aircraft. The Czechs are mainly located at the primary jet training school in Kano. A 12-man West German Dornier contract team, in Kaduna, performs

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F. Paramilitary forces (C)

Nigeria has no paramilitary force capable of making a substantial contribution to Nigerian combat strength in the event of a national emergency. During the civil

war, the 32,000-man Nigerian Police Force was unable to maintain civil order without army assistance. The nine Police Mobile Force battalions are more heavily armed than constables but cannot be considered a paramilitary force.

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