

EXHIBIT No. 3068

(19)

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Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Depoent: SUGITA, Kazuji.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my
country I hereby depose as follows.

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Affidavit of SUGITA, Kazuji

1. I am SUGITA, Kazuji, by name, born on 31 March 1904, living at present at No. 174 Kitazawa 2 Chome, Setagayaku, Tokyo. I entered the preparatory course of the Military Academy and besides studying in the U.S. and Britain, I served various posts before the outbreak of the Pacific War, when I became a staff officer of the 25th Army under the command of General YAMASHITA and kept the post till I got a new appointment as a staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters on 23 April 1942.

During that period, I held the post of the Chief of the Intelligence Staff till 16 March 1942 and then the officer with the British Army for about a month after the fall of Singapore.

Since the middle of March 1942, till my transference to Tokyo I was the Chief of the Operation Staff.

2. The instructions issued by the Commanding General of the Army YAMASHITA at the start of the Malayan Campaign emphasized the foremost principle of making friends with the native people. On the fall of Singapore we were made to see to it that an exemplary occupation work should be carried out with no hitch in taking over the city in consideration of the great repercussion of the fall of the city

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not only over the southern native people but to every nation in the world. (His instructions were burned up). While we were acting upon the instruction, the General urged General Percival to surrender early instead of going on with their resistance that involved so much bloodshed of townfolks in his written summons to surrender, which, I think is in the hands of the British Army. A promise was also made on the occasion of the interview between General YAMASHITA and General Percival that the British noncombatants and womenfolk would be protected.

3. During the attack on Singapore, the Japanese Army also sustained much loss (50% of that throughout the whole Malayan Campaign) and tension between Britain and Japan was so intense after the fall of Singapore, general sentiment of our soldiers against Chinese merchants grew worse as the Chinese obstructed our operations a great deal as the operation proceeded.

The following are examples of Chinese merchants obstruction:

a. Toward the end of December 1941, a hundred or more of armed Chinese merchants took stand in a northern forest with the aim of disturbing commissary lines and burning our munitions as well.

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B. In the end of December 1941, during the battle near Cambar, frequent signal shells were seen shooting in the night from around our troops. And upon investigation it was learned that this was done by Chinese merchants.

c. In the middle of January 1942, in the battle near Guemasa (TN?) and Seganot (TN?) as well as at the time of the enemy air raids on Kuala Rumpur, signal shells were again shot up to show the way for enemy fire and planes, which were later made clear also to have been the tricks of Chinese merchants.

Also in the middle of January 1942, when the Japanese Imperial Guards Division was crossing river, they helped to guide enemy planes on night raids.

d. In the middle of January 1942, when the aforesaid Division was fighting near Maracca and Batbahat (TN?), Chinese merchants aided enemy submarines lying off the coast. They sheltered, guided and defended the secret agents who came from the submarines, making the enemy fire from the Maracca Sea easy and advantageous.

e. At many places military communication wires were cut up. All through the while the commanding General of the Army did not make any change in the instruction given at the start of war, but only put more stress on the strict punishment

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of those whose obstructions of our operations were beyond doubt.

And his attitude was stern toward ill behavior of Japanese officers and men. An investigation made after the termination of war disclosed that the army commander issued an order on 17 February 1942. This order was purely an operational one with the aim of mopping up the Chinese merchants of enemy character lurking in and around the city, and intending to deal them a decisive blow.

As for me, I witnessed neither the actual mopping up nor even a single corpse. I have heard that there was some evidence that 5,000 Chinese were killed but Japanese officers told me that 5,000 was a much too large an estimate. I heard later that the General Headquarters of the Japanese Forces in the Southern Regions thought that the mopping up tactics should not have been used and was not ordered by them. Lt. General MUTO, who came to the Southern Area in the latter part of March 1942, expressed his view that the mopping up tactics should not have been used, also.

I don't remember anything of my interview with Major General Newbegin (TN) and Colonel Wilde on 22 February 1942 about which Colonel Wilde testified.

Immediately after the fall of Singapore conferences and arrangements were so frequent in order to prevent mishaps,

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divergences, and misunderstandings between Japan and Britain (in view of lack of experience of occupation works on our side and language difficulty) that it was the latter part of February before the occupation operated smoothly.

In the island of Singapore, the British Forces were allocated for internment to Changi and Indian soldiers to Nieson (TN) and other areas and there existed considerable confusion.

It was highly difficult task to concentrate the British soldiers stationed on separate islands, but efforts were made to prevent accidents in conformity with the order of the Commanding General of the Army. The British Forces, if my memory serves me right, carried foodstuffs in good quantity for themselves, using their own automobiles (some 10), trucks (some 50) and hydro-automobiles (some 10).

They were driving about 20 trucks a day to carry foodstuffs by themselves from the wharf of Singapore, but those trucks (except a few) were, I heard, confiscated about the middle of March.

The ordinary townsfolk as well as womenfolk detained in private houses in the northern part of Singapore at the beginning were taken toward the end of February to the Changi Prison. At that time Japanese Forces were so pressed in the preparations for the next operation while British POW's were quite at leisure that some of the Japanese soldiers asked, "Which is the winner?"

I remember, too, of General YAMASHITA's inspection

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in the camps about the beginning or middle of March 1942, when he shook hands with Lt. General Percival who expressed thanks to General YAMASHITA. Till the first part of February or March 1942, the great majority of the prisoners were engaged in improving the prison and in preparing for cultivation of crops to support themselves, bathing at intervals in the sea. Since the beginning of March hundreds of prisoners were coming back and forth by autos from Changi all the time for the purpose of cleaning the city of Singapore, which proved so inconvenient that the plan was changed so as to transfer part of them to the city from Changi and preparations for it were under way. What became of it, however, I cannot tell, for then I shifted to different post and in addition I travelled to Sumatra on official business.

5. Of the Hospital Alexander incident, I got no information at that time. About 12 or 13 March, the date on which Colonel Wilde testified that this occurred, the front line was not advanced as far as the said hospital.

6. I acknowledge the Exhibit 476, namely the document consisting of "Outline of the investigation on inhumanities during the Malayan Campaign" and other four parts, except the part made of two leaves of Japanese paper copied from excerpts of Diary of 18 February. These documents were availed of by the 4th squad of Prisoners Investigation

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Committee. Among them, "the State of Punishment of Chinese merchants at Singapore (23 October 1942)" was written mainly by myself at first. But as it proved insufficient further study was made and it was revised as "Outline of the investigation on inhumanities during the Malayan Campaign of 23 November written chiefly by myself, assisted by Major HASHIZUME,

But a number of insertions and cancellations on the documents were made by other hands. I drafted them and presented them, as noted on the first page, to the Central Prisoners Investigation Committee and to the Prisoners Investigation Board. Whether these organs adopted them or not I cannot ascertain from the documents. I am not sure of whose hands are those notes such as "deleted" or "see attached papers" entered with pencil on the documents.

On this 24th day of July, 1947
At Defense, I.M.T.F.E., ICHIGAYA,
Tokyo.

DEPONENTS: SUGITA, Kazuji (seal)

No. 174 KITAZAWA NI-CHOME, SETAGAYA*
Ward, Tokyo-City.

I, SUGITA, Kazuji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Defense, I.M.T.F.E., ICHIGAYA,
Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KORETSUNE, Tasumi (seal)

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OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUGITA, Kazuji (seal)