

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Statement of
TANAKA, Ryukichi

1. Q: Do you know the accused General HATA?
A: Yes, I have known him very well since December 1924 when he was working on the General Staff and our relations privately and officially have been very close.
2. Q: Did you know General HATA during the time he was War Minister in the ABE and the YONAI Cabinets?
A: Yes, I was Section Chief of the Military Service Bureau in the War Ministry during that period. My duty was to supervise the actions of military personnel and so I knew General HATA well and was very conversant with the workings of the War Ministry.
3. Q: What, if you know, was the position of General HATA with reference to the proposed Tripartite Pact?
A: I know that General HATA was very strongly opposed to it. In fact, it was very well known in army circles that HATA strongly opposed the proposed Tripartite Pact.
4. Q: Do you know whether or not the army agreed with General HATA's position with reference to the Tripartite Pact?
A: I know that the army were in favor of the Tripartite Pact and because of HATA's opposition to the Tripartite Pact, HATA was so strongly opposed by those around him that his orders in the War Ministry were not being obeyed. In fact, at the time of his fall, General HATA was War Minister in name only because a successor had already been decided upon in army circles.
5. Q: How do you know that others in the War Ministry opposed General HATA?
A: On the 14th of February 1945, I met General ANAMI and at that time he told me that he regretted very much the part he had played in opposing General HATA and in bringing about the resignation of General HATA as War Minister in the YONAI Cabinet and he also told me the details of the opposition within the War Ministry against General HATA. General ANAMI had been Vice Minister of War under General HATA in the YONAI Cabinet.

6. . Q. Do you know if there were any other reasons why the army opposed General HATA as strongly as you say you know they did?

A. Yes, there were several reasons. The hatred and dislike of General HATA persisted from the day when he first supported the re-adjustment plan of the army when General UGAKI was War Minister and increased when he became War Minister in the ABE Cabinet, which Cabinet preceeded the YONAI Cabinet. Two incidents served to heighten the hatred and dislike for HATA. The first was that another man had been recommended by the Three Chiefs' Council to be War Minister in the ABE Cabinet but the Emperor ordered that HATA should become the War Minister and the post was given to General HATA. A further incident which served to aggravate the antipathy felt by those in high army circles was the following: General HATA was strongly opposed to the participation by army officers in politics and when he became War Minister for the first time, he addressed all the officers in the War Ministry Building. The gist of the speech was as follows:

The present army is not trusted by the Emperor and it is the first duty of the army to endeavor to recover the Emperor's trust. In order to achieve this objective, all military personnel should absolutely cease any participation in politics and return to their regular duties of soldiering.

7. Q. Can you give any example of HATA's enforcing the order of "no politics" by War Ministry officers while he was War Minister?

A. Yes, in 1939 when General HATA learned that a certain colonel made a speech in Sendai attacking the United States and England saying "Down with those countries", he became indignant and ordered me to have that officer brought back to Tokyo. When I had him brought back to Tokyo, General HATA reprimanded him and then transferred him to an outlying post as punishment.

8. Q. While HATA was War Minister and you were a section chief under him, do you know if General HATA took any action with reference to the China Incident?

A. Yes. In the fall of 1939 when HATA was War Minister in the ABE Cabinet, I began, under instructions from General HATA, negotiations with Chiang-kai-Shek for a peaceful settlement of the China Incident. HATA told me that he wanted to bring about peace with China by the reduction and then the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China. HATA told me that because of the opposition around him to his plan, we would have to work undercover and unofficially. General HATA gave me two points on which to work. One was to arrange the dates and place for the two messengers, one from HATA and one from Chiang-kai-Shek, to meet, and the second was that the basis of the peace treaty would be the evacuation of all Japanese troops from China. HATA told me that while the

negotiations were going on he would show his good faith to the Chinese by reducing the Japanese troops in China from 900,000 to between 500,000 and 600,000 when he made the next budget as War Minister, and I know that in his 1940 budget he did reduce the number of Japanese troops in China to approximately 600,000. However, there was great opposition from within the War Ministry and the General Staff to any withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. It was insisted that Japanese troops should be permanently kept in the Shanghai and North China Areas. HATA opposed this. He stated that we must evacuate all troops from China. He stated that if we did not evacuate Japanese troops from China there would be absolutely no hope of concluding a peace treaty with Chiang-kai-Shek. The necessary negotiations with Chiang-kai-Shek were so secret that at first the preliminary steps had to be carried out with signal codes. It was very difficult to convince the side of Chiang-kai-Shek that a sincere attempt was being made to bring about peace. Gradually, however, they were convinced and came to believe that a peace treaty was possible and they started deciding on dates and places for future meetings.

9. Q. Was a peace treaty concluded?

A. No, after General HATA suddenly resigned his office, the negotiations ended.

10. Q. Do you know what General HATA's position was with reference to the Wang Ching Wei Government in China?

A. Yes, I do know. I know that General HATA did not approve of it at all because he had been secretly carrying out peace negotiations with the Chungking Government and also because he planned to evacuate the whole of the Japanese troops from China. The preparations and plans for the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government had already been decided upon as the national policy during the first KONOYE Cabinet and only the formalities of its establishment took place during the YONAI Cabinet. General HATA had no connections with the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government.

11. Q. After General HATA became Commander of the Japanese Forces in China while you were still a Bureau chief in the War Ministry, do you know of any statements made or any actions taken by General HATA with reference to the Pacific War?

A. Yes. In September 1941, when General HATA was commander in China and when relations between America and Japan were steadily deteriorating, General HATA sent his Chief of Staff, Lt. General USHIROGU, to Tokyo to see me and tell me that he, HATA, wanted to withdraw all Japanese troops from China in order to avoid a war with America. HATA asked me to help push this plan of his in the War Ministry.

12. Q. Then what happened?
- A. General USHIROGU told me HATA had instructed him to go to the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and the Prime Minister and give the same message to each of them.
13. Q. Then what happened?
- A. After General USHIROGU had seen them, he came and told me the answers he received from each of these men, before he left for China again, to report to General HATA.
14. Q. At any time while General HATA was War Minister and while you were a section chief under him in the War Ministry, did the question of the use of Chinese prisoners in coal mines in Japan come up?
- A. Yes. In the spring of 1940, it was proposed to use Chinese prisoners in the coal mines of Japan. General HATA opposed it and as a result of his opposition the plan did not go into effect.
15. Q. At any later period while you were still a member of the War Ministry as a section chief, did the question of use of Chinese prisoners in coal mines in Japan come up?
- A. Yes. In 1942, the question of using those prisoners in the coal mines of Japan again came up and General HATA who was then Commander of the Japanese Forces in China again strongly opposed the plan and because of his opposition the plan was not carried out.
16. Q. Do you know if Chinese prisoners were ever used in the coal mines in Japan?
- A. Yes. I know that in 1944 Chinese laborers were brought to Japan and it was through the Greater East Asia Ministry. General HATA had nothing to do with it and he did not have any control over it because the supervision of labor had already been detached from army control and had come under the Greater East Asia Ministry.

On this 25th day of September 1947

At Tokyo

/s/ TANAKA, Ryukichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth without holding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ TANAKA, Ryukichi (seal)

On this 25th day of September 1947

At Tokyo.

I, KANZAKI, Masayoshi, hereby certify that the above
statement was sworn to by Deponent who affixed his signature and
seal thereto in the presence of the Witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

WITNESS: KANZAKI, Masayoshi (seal)