

314.7

"1946"

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Authority 795006

By ED NARA Date 10-19-11



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS G-2 FAR EAST COMMAND

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AFD 500
25 November 1946


TO : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.
FROM : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
SUBJECT: Japanese Operational Histories.

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government dated 12 October 1945, subject: "institution for war records investigation", and Memorandum dated 15 December 1945, subject: "Japanese Operational Histories".

2. In order that the Japanese Operational Histories will present a "complete historical war record" it is desired that the Japanese First and Second Demobilization Bureaus be as extensive and as specific as possible in their treatment of any given military campaign or operation. It is particularly desirable to have more clarification and documentation on the planning phase of military operations, on the over-all strategy of any given campaign and on the specific reasons for the particular strategy that was employed. It is necessary to have not only complete answers to the question of why a certain operation or campaign was undertaken, but also an explanation of why the military did not try something else. Whenever two or more alternative operational plans were considered it is desired that all plans be included in the documentation regardless of whether they were executed or not.

3. It is also desired that whenever political, economic, diplomatic or psychological factors bear directly upon military operations either in the planning or operational phase that such influences be specifically and thoroughly stated. This will necessitate a review in part of some of the documents which have already been submitted and may necessitate a change in the presentation of those documents which have not yet been received.

4. It is further desired that the First and Second Demobilization Bureaus retain sufficient staff after the initial work of compiling the documents is finished to answer all general and specific questions which will arise during the editing, processing and final publication of these documents. There are any number of general questions which will arise as each study is being prepared for publication. These include historical



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G-2 Admin File Copy
HOS/GWP/mh

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3/4.7 Battle histories

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15948

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AFS 500
22 November 1946

TO : General Liaison Office, Tokyo.

FROM : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

SUBJECT: Japanese Operational Histories.

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government dated 12 October 1945, subject: "Investigation for War Records Investigation", and Memorandum dated 12 December 1945, subject: "Japanese Operational Histories".

2. In order that the Japanese Operational Histories will present a complete historical war record, it is desired that the Japanese first and second mobilization systems be as extensive and as specific as possible in their treatment of any given military campaign or operation. It is particularly desirable to have more clarification and documentation on the planning phase of military operations, on the over-all strategy of any given campaign and on the specific reasons for the particular strategy that was employed. It is necessary to have not only complete answers to the question of why a certain operation or campaign was undertaken, but also an explanation of why the military did not try something else. Whenever possible, the Japanese Operational Histories should include all the plans that were considered if it is desired that the Japanese Operational Histories be as complete as possible.

3. It is also desired that whether tactical, strategic, diplomatic or psychological factors were directly or indirectly involved in the planning or operational phase of any military operation be specifically and thoroughly stated. This will necessitate that in part of some of the documents which have already been submitted and any necessary changes in the presentation of those documents which have not yet been received.

4. It is further desired that the Japanese Operational Histories contain sufficient detail to answer all the questions which will arise during the editing, reviewing and publication of these documents. There are any number of general questions which will arise as each study is being prepared for publication. These include historical

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
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HQS/GMP/WU

See 1

3/4/7 Battle history



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Basic: Ltr GHQ, SCAP, dtd 25 Nov 46, subject: Japanese Operational Histories.

inaccuracies, ambiguities in the text, omitted place names, lack of proper explanations on operational maps, insufficient facts, inadequate campaign progression, misspelled names, references to military commanders without their name or proper military designation and the like.

5. As an indication of the clarification that is necessary in this documentation the following questions on the Aleutian Campaign are typical:

a. From Army (First Demobilization Bureau):

1. What was Lieutenant Colonel YONEKAWA's first name? Did he command the NORTH KURILE Fortress Infantry Unit? Were the NORTH KURILE Fortress Infantry Unit and the YONEKAWA Unit synonymous?
2. What was Major WATANABE's first name? What unit did he command?
3. Why was there such little air support during the course of the Attu battle?
4. Who was the Deputy Chief of Staff, Imperial General Headquarters? NORTH KURILE Fortress Area Commander? OMINATO Guard District commander?
5. What were the limits of the area for which the OMINATO Guard District was responsible?
6. Names of geographic places and military installations to which reference is made in the documents but which are not shown on maps.
7. What is meant by "the South Fortress"?
8. Accounts of the day by day fighting in Attu Battle.

b. From Navy (Second Demobilization Bureau):

1. Who was the Commander of the MAIEURU 3rd Special Naval Landing Force?
2. Who was the 5th Naval Guard Unit Commander?
3. When was Vice-Admiral HOSOGAYA relieved of command of the FIFTH FLEET?
4. What was the FIFTH FLEET order of 10 November 1942 concerning land and air defense on Kiska?
5. What Naval Air Unit was stationed in the northern Kuriles in February 1943?

Basic: 1st GHQ, SCAP, dtd 25 Nov 46, subject: Japanese Operational Histories.

inaccuracies, ambiguities in the text, omitted place names, lack of proper explanations on operational maps, insufficient facts, inadequate campaign progression, misspelled names, references to military commands without their name or proper military designation and the like.


As an indication of the clarification that is necessary in this documentation the following questions on the Alaskan Campaign are typical:

a. First Day (First Demobilization Bureau):

1. What was Lieutenant Colonel TERAKAWA's first name? Did he command the NORTH KUNIAI Force Infantry Unit? Were the NORTH KUNIAI Force Infantry Unit and the KUMAKAWA Unit synonymous?
2. What was Major WAKABARA's first name? What unit did he command?
3. Why was there such little air support during the course of the AKA Battle?
4. Who was the Deputy Chief of Staff, Imperial General Headquarters, NORTH KUNIAI Force Area Command? GOROKAWA Guard District commander?
5. What were the limits of the area for which the GOROKAWA Guard District was responsible?
6. Names of geographic places and military installations to which reference is made in the documents but which are not shown on maps.
7. What is meant by "the South Portents"?
8. Accounts of the day by day fighting in AKA Battle.

b. First Day (Second Demobilization Bureau):

1. Who was the Commander of the KAWAKAWA 2nd Special Naval Landing Force?
2. Who was the 2nd Naval Guard Unit Commander?
3. What was Vice-Admiral HOSOGAWA's relieved of command of the 11TH FLEET?
4. What was the 11TH FLEET order of 10 November 1942 concerning land and air defense on AKA?
5. What naval air unit was stationed in the northwest corner in February 1943?



Basic: Ltr GMR, SCAP, dtd 25 Nov 46, subject: Japanese Operational Histories.

6. Further directives will be issued from time to time covering additional requirements which may arise concerning any operation or campaign.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

C. S. MYERS
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive



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G-2 Admin file
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APC 500
10 October 46

SUBJECT: Requests for Historical Data.

TO: Colonel A. F. Clark Jr., Deputy Chief, Historical Division
War Department Special Staff, Washington, D. C.

1. This section has been requested to interview the principal Japanese Officers who took part in the Guadalcanal Campaign. The request came informally, through the Historical Division of G-3 of this Headquarters, in your name.
2. The strength of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, which conducts interrogations of the nature entailed by your request, has been reduced drastically.
3. As a matter of procedure it is requested that any possible future similar requirements for information be routed through official channels.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

C. S. MYERS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Executive

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314.7 Battle Histories

1282

APO 500
9 October 1946DRAFT *OK*

SUBJECT: Requests for Historical Data

TO : Colonel A. F. Clark Jr., Deputy Chief, Historical
Division War Department Special Staff, Washington
D. C.

1. This section has been requested to interview the principal Japanese Officers who took part in the Guadalcanal Campaign. The request came informally, through the Historical Division of G-3 of this Headquarters, in your name.

2. The strength of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, which conducts interrogations of the nature entailed by your request, has been reduced drastically.

3. As a matter of procedure it is requested that any possible future similar requirements for information be routed through official channels.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

C. S. MYERS
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Executive

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

APO 500

9 OCT 46

SUBJECT: Requests for Historical Data.

TO : Colonel A. F. Clark Jr., Deputy Chief, Historical
Division War Department Special Staff, Washington
D. C.

1. This section has been requested to interview the principal Japanese Officers who took part in the Guadalcanal Campaign. The request came informally, through the Historical Division of G-3 of this Headquarters, in your name. ~~Undoubtedly this is a War Department Intelligence Target. However, because of the shrinkage in our personnel and the resultant pressure of work, it is requested that future requests from your Division be made in writing to this office.~~

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

2. In order The G-2 Section

C. S. MYERS
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Executive

2. Because of the reduction in the strength of the Allied ~~Interpreter and Translation~~ Translator and Interpreter Section, which conducts interrogations of the nature entailed by your request, has been reduced drastically. ~~For this~~

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~~Reason it is suggested that~~
~~as a matter of procedure~~
it is requested that of future
similar requirements for information be
~~submitted~~ routed through official
channels.

EXECUTIVE
COLONEL G. S. ...
G. S. ...

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

be made in writing to this office.
It is requested that future requests from your Division
of the staff be in one person and the recipient presence of
this is a military intelligence matter. However, presence
Division of G-3 of this Headquarters in your name. Unofficially
complain. The request came informally through the Historical
Principal Japanese Officers who took part in the Guadalcanal
I. This section has been requested to interview the

D. C.
Division for Department Special Staff, Washington
Colonel A. E. Clark Jr., Deputy Chief, Historical
SUBJECT: Requests for Historical Data.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1 Oct. 1946

SUBJECT: Information on the Guadalcanal Campaign

TO : Cols. Ring.....Action ✓ **ACTION**
Svenson... "
Bethune...Info-(pass info to Svenson)
Myers..... "

1. Col Ring sized this up correctly: This is another "extra curricular" job, in which G-3 Historical Section passes the buck and gets all the credit. Write a letter to this bird Clark (under G-2 presumably) and advise him to address his inquiries on interrogation of Jap ex prisoners or warriors, as a customary G-2 function, thru customary ATIS procedure. You can even send a radio, if you want to, to avoid duplication.

2. Furthermore, I want no more informal chits. I want a checksheet request, by G-3, the chief of section or his Executive, to request for work: this is a drain on the shrinking man-power of ATIS, as reduced by the action of G-3, in cutting the troop basis, of interrogation and translators teams.

3. Send this stuff by letter indorsement to MID (Att Col Clark) and advise him who does the translations.

lehu
C.A.W.

P.S. If you have any questions on this I will be glad to give my version of what is desired and who is to do it. *lehu*

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MEMO FOR RECORD
SUBJECT:

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ACTION COMPLETED
DATE
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SUSPENSE DATE
30 Sep 46
4 Oct

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CONFIDENTIAL

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GHQ SCAP

G-2

BRIEF

27 September 1946

SUBJECT : Information on the Guadalcanal Campaign 2858

TO : General Willoughby

THRU : (1) Colonel Ring
(2) Colonel Myers

1. Colonel A. F. Clark, Jr., Deputy Chief, Historical Division War Department Special Staff, on 9 August 1946, wrote to Colonel W. J. Niederpruem, G-3 Historian, requesting that principal Japanese officers who took part in the Guadalcanal Campaign be interviewed in order that specific questions be answered (see attached). The letter, questions, a list of Japanese officers and a map of Guadalcanal were forwarded from G-3, Historian to G-2.

2. Four former Japanese officers, Generals HYAKUTAKE Fusayasu, CG, 17th Army, MIYAZAKI Shuicho, C/S, 17th Army, MARUYAMA Masao, CG, 2nd Division, and TAMAKI Harukazu, C/S, 2nd Division, were interrogated. The interrogations as well as General MIYAZAKI's notes of his personal experiences during the Solomons Campaign, answers to questionnaire on the Guadalcanal operations by the First Demobilization Bureau, and maps of Guadalcanal and the Solomons were forwarded to Colonel Niederpruem for transmittal to Colonel Clark. It was also stated that, when obtained, additional information would be forwarded.

3. This check sheet forwards interrogations of General SUMIYOSHI Tadashi, Army Artillery Officer, 17th Army, and Colonels SAKAI Yoshitsugu, C.O. 16th Infantry Regiment, and OBARA Shigetaka, C.O. 29th Infantry.

PMB
P.H.B.

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QUESTIONS ON GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

1. What was the Japanese estimate of American troop strength on Guadalcanal in October 1942? Did they realize that our ground forces in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area totaled nearly 30,000 men?
2. Was the bulk of the 38th Infantry Division held in the northern Solomons in October 1942 because it was believed that the 2nd Division could recapture the Lunga Delta on Guadalcanal unaided?
3. What was the exact location of the supply trail that the 2nd Infantry Division cut through the jungle in October 1942 to a point near the Lunga River south of the American perimeter defense protecting Henderson Field?
4. How much artillery, if any, was the 2nd Division able to get into position south of Henderson Field for the attacks on 25-27 October 1942?
5. Why did the 4th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Tank Company attack east across the Matanikau River mouth on 23 October instead of waiting to attack simultaneously with the 29th and 16th Infantry Regiments on 25 October?
6. Maj. Gen. KAWAGUCHI led a force composed of battalions from the 230th and 124th Infantry Regiments to cover the right flank of the 16th and 29th Infantry Regiments in their attacks on 25-27 October. Did KAWAGUCHI's force attack the American lines at that time? If so, what happened? If they did not, why not?
7. Is the Japanese October 1942 counteroffensive correctly shown on the attached map of the Lunga Delta?
8. Lt. Gen. MARUYAMA is reputed to have planned an offensive to seize the east bank of the Matanikau River on or about 20 November 1942. What were his operational plans? Troop movements? Artillery support?
9. Where were the Japanese observation posts located on Mt. Austen and in the Matanikau area in November and December 1942?
10. Is there a complete Japanese OB for Guadalcanal. Can we have a copy? Is there a complete casualty list? Can we have the figures?
11. How many Japanese troops of all services were stationed in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area on 7 August 1942?
12. What did the Japanese think of American weapons, equipment, tactics, and troops on Guadalcanal?

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Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is arranged in several paragraphs and is difficult to decipher due to its low contrast and ghosting.



48679

DO NOT DETACH

G-2, GHQ AFFAC, APO 500

FROM: WPI

30 Sept. 1946

TO: Col. Ring

FOR:

- AC of S, G-2 _____
- Executive _____
- Asst Executive _____
- Exec Asst, Admin _____
- Exec Asst, CIS, WDI, Misc _____
- Exec Asst, J/L, F/L, ATIS _____
- Exec Asst, Radio Reports _____
- Exec Asst, Radio Reports _____
- Genl Liaison Section _____
 - British _____ Russian _____
 - Chinese _____
- Japanese Liaison Section _____
- Coordinator, Theater Intel _____
 - Operations _____
 - Plans & Estimates _____
 - Publ, Drafting, Maps _____
- WDI _____
- ATIS _____
- CIS _____
- Chief Clerk _____

- Nec Action by _____ 46
- Information _____
- Note & Return _____
- Approval _____
- Signature _____
- Initials _____
- Comments or Concurrence _____
- Other _____
- File _____
- Dispatch _____

✓ General Willoughby: This appears to be another extra-curricular job. 1 Oct 46

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KYLE R. JACKSON DO NOT DETACH
MAJOR, AGD, G-2, GHQ, AFPAC, APO 500
ASST. EXEC. FOR ADMINISTRATION

10 Oct 1946

TO:

- AC of S, G-2.....()
- Executive.....(2)
- Asst Executive.....(10/11/46)
- E/A, Adm.....()
- E/A, Radio Epts.....()
- E/A, Miscl.....()
- E/A, WDI & ATIS.....()
- E/A, CIS.....()
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- Plans & Estimates... ()
- P D M()
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- CIS.....()

- Chief Clerk.....()
- Message Ctr.....()
- File Clerk.....()

FOR:

- Information.....()
- Necessary Action....()
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- Comment or
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- Dispatch.....()
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Recommend dispatch.

Settled

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Authority 795006

By ED NARA Date 10-19-11

