

U.S.S. RANDOLPH CV-15

14626

ACTION REPORT

5 April 1945 through 31 May 1945

OKINAWA SUPPORT & ASSOCIATED OPERATIONS



1. IE SHIMA, OKINAWA GUNTO: Support strike 14 April 45. Rocket attack on IEGUSUGU YAMA enemy strong point. (933 CV-15)

2. KAKEROMA SHIMA, AMAMI GUNTO: Strike 14 April 45. Bombing buildings at suspected submarine base near MIURA TOWN. (1022 CV-15)

3. SHINCHINA TOWN, SOUTHERN OKINAWA: Support strike 20 April 45. Bombing artillery positions. (5 CV-15 23)

4. AWACHA TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 20 April 45. Bombing [illegible] area. (13 CV-15 22)

5. SHINCHINA TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 20 April 45. Area bombing of town. (24 CV-15 21)

6. SHINCHINA TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 20 April 45. Area bombing of town. (13 CV-15 21)

7. EAST OF DAKESHI TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 29 April 45. Bombing of gun positions. (11 CV-15 28)

8. EAST OF DAKESHI TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 29 April 45. Bombing of transportation area. (12 CV-15 28)

9. DAKESHI TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 28 April 45. Bombing of command post. (3 CV-15 26)

10. EAST OF DAKESHI TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 29 April 45. Bombing of troop concentrations. (10 CV-15 28)

11. East of SHURI TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 30 April 45. Bombing of troop concentrations. (4 CV-15 29)

12. East of SHURI TOWN, OKINAWA: Support strike 4 May 45. Bombing of troop concentrations. (5 CV-15 33)

13. KAKEROMA SHIMA, AMAMI GUNTO: Shipping strike 7 May 45. Rocket attack on luggers. (4 CV-15 42 FO)



14. WAN A/F, KIKAI JIMA: Fighter bomber patrol 7 May 45. Bombing and incendiary attack on military headquarters. (5 CV-15 40 LO)

15. WAN TOWN, KIKAI JIMA: Strike 9 May 45. Bombing and incendiary attack on buildings and installations. (27 CV-15 48 LO)



16. WAN TOWN, KIKAI SHIMA: Strike 9 May 45. Direct hits on warehouses by boat basin. (45 CV-15 48 LO)

17. KIKUCHI A/F (T-2518), KYUSHU: Fighter sweep 13 May 45. Strafing attack on planes in revetments. (3 CV-15 52 VF)

18. KIKUCHI A/F (T-2518), KYUSHU: Fighter sweep 13 May 45. Plane fired by fighter sweep. (5 CV-15 51 FO)



19. KUMAMOTO AREA, KYUSHU: Fighter sweep 13 May 45. Locomotive exploded by strafing attack. (5 CV-15 56 FO)



20. KIKUCHI A F (T-2518), KYUSHU: Strike 13 May 45. Destruction of hangars and other facilities. (4 CV-15 62)

21. KIKUCHI A/F, KYUSHU: Strike 13 May 45. Post-strike photo showing extensive damage in building area. (7 CV-15 59 LO)

22. TAMANA A/F (T-2544), KYUSHU: Strike 13 May 45. Bombing of buildings southwest of field. (9 CV-15 52 VF)



23. MITSUBISHI KUMAMOTO Engine Plant (P-531), KYUSHU: Pre-strike reconnaissance photo 13 May 45. (35 CV-15 52 VF)



24. MITSUBISHI KUMAMOTO Engine Plant (P-531), KYUSHU: Strike 14 May 45. Bomb damage to buildings. (19 CV-15 69 VF)



25. AMAKUSA NADA, KYUSHU: Fighter sweep 13 May 45. Motor torpedo boats maneuvering against rocket and strafing attack. (40 CV-15 60 FO)



26. AMAKUSA NADA, KYUSHU: Fighter attack on motor torpedo boat 13 May 45. (43 CV-15 60 FO)



27. SESO TOWN, KAKEROMA SHIMA: Strike 18 May 45. Attack on storage depot. (13 CV-15 83 FO)



28. NAZE KO, AMAMI O SHIMA: Fighter patrol 18 May 45. Fuel dump aflame after rocket and strafing attack. (4 CV-15 84)



29. Off OKINAWA 17 April 45. Direct hit on enemy suicide plane. (969 CV-15)

30. Off OKINAWA 17 April 45. Wing and tail assembly gone from direct hit - enemy pilot bails out. (953 CV-15)

31. Off OKINAWA 17 April 45. Enemy suicide plane hit and crashing to water after dropping bomb near RANDOLPH. (973 CV-15)



32. Off OKINAWA 17 April 45. Enemy suicide plane splashes close to Pasadena CL- 65 after direct hit from Task Group guns. (957 CV-15)



33. Off OKINAWA 11 May 45. BUNKER HILL afire after surprise crashes by two enemy suicide planes. (1131 CV-15)

34. Off KYUSHU 14 May 45. Explosion of enemy suicide plane on ENTERPRISE. Number one elevator at top of explosion. (1096 CV-15)



35. Off KYUSHU, 14 May 45. Enemy plane shot down near screen. (1108 CV-15)



36. Off KYUSHU 14 May 45. Enemy plane shot down by ship's AA within formation. (1110 CV-15)



37. Off KYUSHU 14 May 45. Splashes from three crashing enemy suicide planes, hit by Task Group gunfire, bracket ESSEX. (1103 CV-15)

CV-15/A16-3
Serial 0018

U. S. S. RANDOLPH (CV-15)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.

95/aa

12 JUN 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 58.3.
(2) Commander Task Force 58.
(3) Commander FIFTH Fleet.
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Action Report - OKINAWA Support and Associated Operations, for period 5 April 1945 through 31 May 1945.

Reference: (a) CinCPac Conf. ltr. 1CL-45.

Enclosure: (A) Subject action report.

1. In compliance with reference (a) and the directives referenced therein, Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. Transmission by registered guard mail or U. S. registered mail is authorized in accordance with article 76(15)(e) and (f), U. S. Navy Regulations.

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

SECRET

U. S. S. RANDOLPH (CV-15)

PART I - BRIEF SUMMARY

1. This report covers operations against the enemy from 5 April 1945 through 31 May 1945, during which period the U. S. S. RANDOLPH (CV-15) participated in strikes, sweeps, and patrols against enemy positions in the NANSEI SHOTO, KYUSHU, and MINAMI DAITO JIMA.

2. The primary purpose of the operation was to assist our amphibious forces in the occupation of OKINAWA, NANSEI SHOTO. Therefore, much air activity, particularly during the early half of the period, was devoted to strikes in direct support of ground troops on Southern OKINAWA. Of equal and perhaps greater importance, however, were the fighter sweeps and patrols regularly flown over the island chain, extending northward as far as KYUSHU airfields. These, plus interdiction strikes against enemy airfields, were designed to prevent the enemy from completing successfully his constant and aggressive airborne attacks against our ships and ground forces in the OKINAWA area. Destruction of the suicide bomber, multiplied manyfold over past appearances, was a paramount objective. For the first time, the piloted, or "BAKA", bomb was seen in action.

3. In spite of bad weather which interfered frequently with scheduled operations, a large amount of successful photographic reconnaissance was completed in all operating areas.

PART II - PRELIMINARIES

1. At 0800/K 5 April 1945 departed ULITHI ATOLL in TG 58.2 (Rear Admiral G. F. BOGAN), a group of TF 58 (Vice Admiral M. A. MITSCHER). RANDOLPH, Flagship, accompanied by DD's OWEN, THE SULLIVANS, STEPHEN POTTER, TINGEY, and LEWIS HANCOCK, cleared swept channel at 0810. Remainder of Task Group sortied about two hours later.

Composition of the Task Group:

CV Group 58.2.1 (Rear Admiral G. F. BOGAN)

RANDOLPH
ENTERPRISE

Screen (Captain J. P. WOMBLE)

DESDIV 103	DESDIV 104
OWEN (F)	HICKOX
MILLER	HUNT
THE SULLIVANS	LEWIS HANCOCK
STEPHEN POTTER	MARSHALL
TINGEY	

2. Upon departure from ULITHI the destroyers formed a bent-line screen and the group proceeded on a northwesterly course. Routine combat air and anti-submarine patrols were conducted, together with practice air operations and anti-aircraft firing. At 1800/K time was changed to Zone Minus 9(I). All times hereafter are Item time.

3. At 0615 6 April ENTERPRISE, HUNT, MARSHALL, and MILLER joined. The Task Group assumed formation Five Roger conducting routine combat air and anti-submarine patrols and engaging in air training exercises.

4. On 7 April the Task Group fueled and replenished gasoline from CHICOPEE in approximate Latitude 23° 30' N; Longitude 132° 30' E. INDEPENDENCE, FLINT, and OAKLAND joined. Routine combat air and anti-submarine patrols were conducted. In addition a special 325-mile 18-plane fighter search covered six sectors between 340° and 040° with negative results.

5. The mission of the RANDOLPH was to participate in the support of the amphibious landings on OKINAWA. Heavy enemy air attacks and submarine attacks were expected; preparations within the ship were made accordingly.

6. Own forces were TF 58, composed of a carrier striking force, supported by BB, CA, CL, and screened by DD. TF 58 operated usually in formation 5-W with axis into the wind, individual TG's operating in formation 5-R or 5-V as the situation dictated.

PART III - CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTION (Times used throughout are Minus 9 Zone Time)

8 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0605; Sunset: 1840)

1. At daylight Task Group 58.2 joined Task Force 58 and operated throughout the day in the vicinity of Latitude 26° 00'N, 129° 45' E. Weather was overcast with a slight sea. Operations consisted of VF target combat air patrols over TOKUNO and KIKAI ISLANDS, over radar pickets, and over own Task Group.

9 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0606; Sunset: 1840)

2. Operations in the vicinity of Latitude 26° 00'N, Longitude 130° 00' E. Consisted of target combat air patrols over TOKUNO and KIKAI ISLANDS, radar pickets, and own Task Group. In addition, anti-snooper anti-submarine patrols were conducted. Weather was cloudy with a slight sea.

Results of this day's operations:
Enemy planes destroyed on ground - 1

10 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0606; Sunset: 1834)

3. Operating area remained in the vicinity of 26° 50'N; 130° 00' E. Combat air patrols over own task group, radar pickets, and with a Dumbo rescue search were conducted, together with anti-snooper anti-submarine patrols. BENHAM and STEPHEN POTTER were fueled.

4. ENTERPRISE and OAKLAND with screening destroyers left Task Group 58.2 formation. Task Group retired on a southeasterly course during the night to fueling rendezvous. Sea calm, sky partly cloudy.

11 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0554; Sunset: 1837)

5. Weather overcast with rain squalls and moderate sea. Fueled and replenished gasoline from CACHE in approximate Latitude 23° 30'N, Longitude 132° 30'E. An anti-submarine patrol was conducted. During night proceeded on northwesterly course to join Task Force 58.

12 April 1945 (Sunrise 0559; Sunset: 1840)

6. Operating in vicinity Latitude 26° 30'N, Longitude 130° 00' E. At 0829 many enemy planes reported to northwestward. Additional fighters were launched to augment the combat air patrol. One bogey was pursued and shot down north of MINAMI DAITO SHIMA. Throughout the day several other bogeys were reported but none approached within 25

miles of the ship.

7. Dawn and dusk combat air patrols were maintained over the Task Group with VF(N), as well as regular combat air patrols throughout the day. The one target CAP which flew over OKINAWA brought down one enemy plane.

Results of this day's operations:
Enemy aircraft destroyed in air - 2

13 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0558; Sunset: 1841)

8. Friday the 13th was clear, calm, cloudless, and uneventful. Combat air patrols and a VF(N) dusk patrol were flown over own Task Group. Two destroyers were topped off. The area of operations remained as for the previous day.

14 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0558; Sunset: 1844)

9. Weather clear and cloudless, sea calm. Operations remained in the same area as on previous several days. A VF(N) dawn combat air patrol shot down an enemy float plane near the Force. During the day, combat air patrols were maintained over the task group, one of which shot down six enemy planes which attacked the Force destroyer screen in the early afternoon. The VF(N) dusk patrol accounted for one additional enemy plane.

10. At 0522 an air support strike of 8 VFB and 7 VT was launched to hit mortar installations on Southern OKINAWA as directed by the target coordinator. Good results were reported.

11. At 0845 a strike of 8 VFB, 6 VB, with 2 VF(P) was launched against a suspected midget submarine base on KAKEROMA ISLAND, south of AMAMI JIMA. No indications of submarine activity were detected but buildings 300 feet inland from the suspected position were hit heavily with bombs and rockets.

12. At 1310 another air support mission to OKINAWA, consisting of 8 VF and 8 VT, was launched to hit enemy artillery positions on IE SHIMA. Accurate target coverage was reported.

13. At 1945 enemy aircraft were reported. A single plane closed to about six miles and showed a red light which remained burning until a string of about ten closely bunched flares had been dropped. No attack developed while these flares were burning. At about 2020 another plane showing a red light dropped similar flares in about the same relative position. In both cases the red light was extinguished as soon as flares were dropped. At about 2025 an enemy plane made

what appeared to be a torpedo attack from the side of the formation opposite the flares, evidently against the silhouetted ships. The plane, at about 150 feet altitude, crossed about 500 yards forward of RANDOLPH under heavy fire, but escaped unscathed. As it crossed over a destroyer on RANDOLPH's starboard quarter it was hit, burst into flames, and crashed. Shortly thereafter a destroyer of the screen in that position reported a heavy underwater explosion close aboard. It is presumed that this was the enemy torpedo exploding at the end of its run. A third string of flares was dropped in about the same area as the first two but no attack developed. At 2115 the screen was clear.

14. Results of this day's operations:
Enemy aircraft destroyed in air - 8

15 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0554; Sunset: 1843)

15. Operations were continued in the same area where a VF(N) dawn patrol was flown and Task Group combat air patrols were maintained throughout the day.

16. At 0530 an air support mission of 8 VF, 5 VB, and 5 VT was launched to support ground forces on OKINAWA as directed by the target coordinator. Several areas were hit with emphasis on mortar positions, buildings, and caves.

17. At 1315 a 20-plane fighter (VFB) sweep was launched against KUSHIRA Airfield, KYUSHU. Little airborne opposition was encountered and few planes were found in the target area. All planes returned safely. Fires were started in a large double hangar at the field.

18. At 1825, WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, and one destroyer division departed from the formation. Formation axis was rotated to 180° (T), new stations were assumed in formation 5-V, and at 1911 the Task Group set course 180° (T) for the fueling rendezvous.

19. Results of this day's operations:
(a) Enemy planes destroyed in air - 1
(b) " " damaged " " 1
(c) " " destroyed on ground - 2
(d) " " damaged on ground - 10/12
(e) Fire started in large double hangar, KUSHIRA

16 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0550; Sunset: 1835)

19. Weather clear, sea calm. At 0645 effected rendezvous with logistics group in Latitude 23° 45'N, Longitude 132° 30'E. Fueled and replenished gasoline from ATASCOSA and replenished 5" projectiles

and aircraft rockets from FIREDRAKE. Combat air and anti-submarine patrols were maintained.

17 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0555; Sunset: 1842)

20. Weather clear, sea calm. Task Group proceeded on a northwesterly course to rendezvous with Task Force 58. At 0512 Task Group was directed by CTG 58.2 to proceed with DesRon 52 and report to CTG 58.3. Task Group 58.2 was thereby dissolved. INDEPENDENCE and FLINT were detached to report to CTG 58.4.

21. At 0514 a bogey was reported bearing 340° (T), distance 10 miles, closing rapidly. At 0520 an enemy plane was sighted on the starboard quarter and taken under fire by the 5" batteries which were followed by the 40mm batteries as the plane closed in a fast glide. The plane headed for the stern strafing and apparently attempting a suicide attack. As the pilot missed the ship and proceeded along the port side, close aboard and about 50 feet above the water, he was taken under fire by the port 20mm batteries, crashing in the water about 100 feet off RANDOLPH's port bow.

22. At 0616 a target combat air patrol was scrambled and vectored to AMAMI GUNTO where it encountered about 20 enemy single-engine planes airborne, shooting down 14.

23. At 0645 RANDOLPH joined Task Group 58.3, taking station 2000 in formation 5-R, axis 010° (T).

24. At 0829 an air support mission of 10 VF, 2 VF(P), 9 VB, and 11 VT was launched to strike gun positions, buildings and tanks as directed by the target coordinator on Southern OKINAWA. Results were pronounced good by ground forces.

25. At 0855 bogeys were reported to the northward at a distance of 35 miles. At 0926 enemy planes were sighted. Two dived at RANDOLPH from about 6000 feet. They were in column and, as they passed through clouds at about 3000 feet proceeding at very high speed, were taken under very heavy fire. The leading plane exploded, the pilot bailing out. The second plane continued its run to a point very close to the ship where its right wing was shot off and it spun into the water. A bomb, estimated to have been of 250-kg. size, continued travel from the first plane, hitting the water and exploding about 100 yards off RANDOLPH's starboard beam. It is believed that 5" gunfire accounted for the first plane and 40mm for the second. Another enemy aircraft attempted a suicide dive on PASADENA. It was taken under fire by our starboard batteries and crashed, narrowly missing PASADENA's stern. It is not known whether or not this plane was hit. At 0928 a high-speed diving attack was made by a single plane on ships to southward of ESSEX. Taken under fire by all ships of the Group, it crashed into the water. Still another suicide run was made at 0931 on

ships in the southern part of the formation. Heavy gunfire from all ships did not disturb a 20-degree high-speed dive but, when about 150 feet from the water and between two heavy ships, an apparent hit during a wingover caused it to crash in the water. Additional bogies were reported but none closed the formation and, at about 1100, the screen was clear.

26. At 1428 another support mission of 12 VF, 10 VB, and 12 VT hit gun positions and miscellaneous objectives on OKINAWA.

27. BATAAN left the Task Group at 1730 after which CV's assumed new stations and took departure for the fueling rendezvous.

28. Results of this day's operations:

(a) Enemy planes destroyed in the air -
By aircraft - 14
By ship's AA - 3

(b) Enemy planes probably destroyed on ground - 1

18 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0546; Sunset: 1836)

29. Fueled and replenished gasoline from PATUXENT and replenished 500-lb. bombs and fuzes from LAS VEGAS VICTORY in Latitude 24° 00'N, 132° 30'E. Combat air patrols were flown over the Task Group.

19 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0600; Sunset: 1850)

30. Partly cloudy, visibility excellent, sea calm. OKINAWA support operations continued in approximate area 25° 30'N, 128° 30'E. Army forces in Southern OKINAWA launched an "all out" attack against strongly fortified lines with support of naval surface and air units. Target, Task Group, and radar picket combat air patrols were flown throughout the day.

31. At 0526 a special support strike of 12 VF, 2 VF(P), 12 VB, and 12 VT was launched to hit targets designated by the target coordinator. Towns of ZAWA, SHINGAWAKU, and a small town between them were well covered with bombs, rockets, and strafing.

20 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0600; Sunset: 1852)

32. Partly cloudy, good visibility, sea calm. Support for Army "all out" offensive was continued from same operating area. A dawn combat air patrol of VF(N) was flown over AMAMI and throughout the day target, Task Group, and radar picket combat air patrols were maintained.

33. At 0656 an air support mission of 4 VFB, 11 VB, and 12 VT was launched to hit towns, artillery positions, barracks, and other enemy

installations designated by the target coordinator on Southern OKINAWA.

34. At 1129 a similar mission consisting of 4 VF, 12 VB, and 11 VT supported OKINAWA ground forces with good results.

35. RANDOLPH broke her previous record of flight deck activity with 165 take-offs and 164 landings for the day.

36. At 2013 bogies were reported closing the Force from the North. During the night enemy planes scouted the formation almost continuously. Ensign E. G. HOWARD, VF-12, one of four night fighters launched during the night, shot down 2 BETTY's for which a "well done" was given by CTG 58.3.

37. Results of this day's operations:
Enemy planes destroyed in air - 2

21 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0555; Sunset: 1846)

38. Partly cloudy, good visibility, sea calm. Operations continued in same approximate area. Combat air patrols were maintained over the target and the Task Group.

39. At 1430 4 VFB, 12 VB, and 11 VT took off to hit targets on OKINAWA. OROKU and OROKU MURA were hit together with other small towns in the area. Results were good.

40. Results of this day's operations:
Enemy planes destroyed on the ground - 1

22 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0555; Sunset: 1846)

41. Partly cloudy, good visibility, calm sea; operations in approximate Latitude 26° 00'N, Longitude 130° 00'E. Dawn and dusk combat air patrols and four day patrols were flown over KIKAI. Target (OKINAWA) and Task Group combat air patrols were also maintained. One KIKAI patrol encountered an estimated 20 enemy planes, shooting down 7 certain, 1 probable, and damaging 1. One of the target combat patrols at OKINAWA shot down 4 of an unknown number of enemy planes north of the island.

42. At 1118 an air support mission of 4 VF, 2 VF(P), 10 VB, and 12 VT was launched to strike targets in Southern OKINAWA designated by the target coordinator. Cave entrances shielding guns, blockhouses, and buildings were well covered.

43. During the afternoon the Force was scouted by several enemy planes which dropped window as they circled the formation. One was

shot down about 4000 yards astern of this Task Group by a combat patrol plane from another group.

44. At dusk Task Group 58.3 departed the area for fueling rendezvous.

45. Results of this day's operations:

(a) Enemy planes destroyed in air - 12
(b) " " probably destroyed in air - 3
(c) " " damaged in air - 2

23 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0555; Sunset: 1840)

45. Fueled and replenished gasoline from NANTAHALA; replenished bombs and rockets from VESUVIUS in approximate Latitude 25° 00'N; Longitude 132° 00'E. Flew combat air patrols over Task Group. At dusk took departure for operating area to northwest.

24 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0552; Sunset: 1843)

46. Operating in area about 26° 30'N; 129° 30'E. Overcast with mist and rain; visibility variable 1 to 6 miles, sea moderately rough. Scheduled operations cancelled except for 2 combat air patrols over radar pickets.

25 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0550; Sunset: 1850)

47. Operating in vicinity of 26° 50'N; 129° 00'E. Weather overcast with occasional heavy rain squalls. Scheduled operations cancelled except for combat air patrols over KIKAI JIMA and own Task Group.

26 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0549; Sunset: 1854)

48. Operating in vicinity of 26° 30'N; 129° 30'E. Weather overcast with frequent heavy rain squalls. A low ceiling and poor visibility rendered operations abortive. Combat air patrols were maintained at OKINAWA, over own Task Group, and in the KIKAI - AMAMI area. A strike and a sweep reached WAN Field at KIKAI but were unable to hit targets accurately or observe results.

27 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0541; Sunset: 1847)

49. Fueled and replenished gasoline from NECHES in vicinity 24° 30'N; 132° 30'E. Replenished 500-lb. bombs from MAUNA LOA. NORTH CAROLINA left the Task Group. Routine combat air patrols were flown.

50. At 2330 while on northwesterly course returning to the operating area, Task Group was scouted by an enemy aircraft which closed until

taken under fire by other ships of the Group, then retired. Night fighters launched during the night reported negative results.

28 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0553; Sunset: 1850)

51. Operations resumed in vicinity 26° 30'N.; 129° 30'E. Weather fair with scattered clouds and moderate sea. Combat air patrols were maintained over own Task Group and over OKINAWA. Two patrols to KIKAI destroyed a grounded single-engine plane and damaged three others at WAN Field. Two support missions were over OKINAWA to hit a dock at YONABARU as well as bridges, railroad line, and road intersections between KUBAKURA and TAIRA. A special shipping sweep searched a 14-mile track for about 150 miles due north of AMAMI O SHIMA where an enemy transport had been reported but found no trace of the vessel.

52. At 2026 bogeys were reported closing the Task Group. Formation 5-V was assumed and the ships made smoke and maneuvered to meet the impending attack which did not develop. At 2125 the screen was clear.

53. Results of this day's operations:

(a) Enemy planes destroyed on ground - 1
(b) " " damaged " " - 3

29 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0546; Sunset: 1852)

54. Operating in vicinity 26° 30'N.; 129° 30'E., with fair weather, scattered clouds and calm sea. A dawn combat air patrol was stationed over KIKAI, target patrols were maintained over OKINAWA, and combat air patrols over own Task Group. Two support strikes, each consisting of 4 VF, 7 VB, and 8 VT, hit miscellaneous military objectives on Southern OKINAWA as directed by the target coordinator.

55. The late afternoon target CAP over OKINAWA assisted in intercepting an enemy attack and shot down 3 ZEKES and 1 TOJO in the air North and East of OKINAWA.

56. Refueled STEPHEN POTTER and AULT. While the latter was alongside at 1701, enemy planes were reported closing the formation. AULT was cast off and the enemy plane, which passed overhead at very high altitude, was taken under fire. No hits were scored and no attack was forthcoming.

57. During the evening one of 4 VF(N) which had been launched as a dusk CAP over KIKAI sustained damaging hits from enemy AA which precluded a carrier landing. Lt. HYPES was told to make a water landing within the formation, which he did safely, being rescued by TINGEY.

58. Results of this day's operations:

Enemy planes destroyed in the air - 4

30 April 1945 (Sunrise: 0546; Sunset: 1851)

59. At 0047 while in the vicinity of 26° 30'N.; 130° 00'E., a bogey was reported closing the Group. An enemy plane scouted the Group from about five miles but did not attack.

60. During the day two sixteen-plane target combat air patrols were over OKINAWA and one support mission hit mortar positions, caves, and enemy troops as directed. The target coordinator commended this mission highly. A CAP was maintained over the Task Group.

1 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0545; Sunset: 1849)

61. Fueled and replenished gasoline from AUCILLA in vicinity 23° 45'N.; 130° 30'E. Replenished 500-lb. bombs from VESUVIUS. Weather generally fair with occasional rain squalls and moderate sea.

62. One combat air patrol of 8 VF was flown over own Task Group. Sleeves were towed by 2 VT for 5" and 40mm firing practice.

2 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0545; Sunset: 1850)

63. Operating in vicinity 26° 30'N.; 129° 30'E., with low clouds, rain, restricted visibility, and moderately rough sea. Some scheduled mid-day missions cancelled by weather.

64. A KIKAI dawn patrol of 4 VF(N) shot down 1 TONY taking off at WAN Field. Another escaped. Two members of the patrol departed to search AMAMI and were not seen afterward. A special search encountered an extremely low ceiling with poor visibility and failed to find any trace of the missing pilots, Lt. J. WOOD and Ens. L. O. WOODS.

65. Combat air patrols were maintained over own Task Group. An OKINAWA support mission of 4 VF, 8 VB, and 8 VT hit caves and trenches under the direction of the target coordinator.

66. Results of this day's operations:
Enemy planes destroyed in air - 1

3 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0545; Sunset: 1855)

67. Operating in vicinity of 26° 30'N.; 129° 30'E., with low clouds, rain squalls, and a moderately rough sea. Early flights were cancelled. OWEN and LIND were fueled.

68. At 0830 a strike consisting of four fighters, eight bombers, and eight torpedo planes was launched against installations on WAN Field, KIKAI. Depth bombs were carried by the VT planes for purpose of blasting wooded revetment areas. Subsequent fighter patrol missions carried Napalm bombs which were effective in starting good fires in these areas.

69. Ensign L. L. COLIN on first KIKAI fighter patrol went in water after being hit by enemy A.A. Rescue facilities were set in motion, one of the SB2C pilots returning from the strike dropped a two-man raft accurately, and a Dumbo PBM from KERAMA picked him up about 3 hours after he ditched.

4 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0543; Sunset: 1855)

70. Operating in vicinity 26° 30'N.; 129° 30'E., with weather clear and cloudless and sea calm.

71. During the early morning hours bogeys were reported at extreme ranges from the Task Group. RANDOLPH's fighter director was successful in vectoring a YORKTOWN night fighter in a series of difficult interceptions resulting in the shooting down of 3 BETTYS. Commander Task Force 58 sent the following message, "YORKTOWN's accomplishments were made possible by RANDOLPH's excellent direction". STEPHEN POTTER sent the following, "The STEPHEN POTTER extends her congratulations and thanks for insuring a quiet and peaceful night".

72. An early air patrol to the AMAMI-KIKAI area intercepted about 15 enemy fighters near WAN Field, KIKAI, shooting down 10 and damaging 1. Two pilots of the next patrol ditched due to mechanical failures, both being rescued by radar picket destroyers. The second AMAMI-KIKAI patrol dropped Napalm bombs on revetment areas starting good fires.

73. A support mission over OKINAWA consisting of 8 VF, 11 VB, and 12 VT blasted troop concentrations. For the first time in many days enemy AA was intense from several positions, holing several planes and wounding a VT crewman seriously.

74. Combat air patrols were maintained over OKINAWA throughout the day.

75. Results of this day's operations:

(a) Enemy planes destroyed in the air - 10
(b) " " damaged " " " - 1

5 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0544; Sunset: 1857)

76. Operating in vicinity 26° 00'N.; 129° 00'E. Weather clear with scattered clouds, excellent visibility, sea moderate to moderately rough. MISSOURI joined Task Group.

77. A dawn combat air patrol of 4 VF(N) was launched at 0300 and patrols were maintained over the Task Group throughout the day. A support mission to OKINAWA, consisting of 8 VBF, 12 VB, and 10 VT, hit AA positions as directed. One patrol of 12 VF covered KIKAI and AMAMI dropping Napalm bombs on wooded areas near the taxiways at WAN Field. Fires were started which burned for more than an hour. One F6F-5 was hit by AA and was escorted to a safe landing at OKINAWA.

78. A TBM-3 ditched on take-off for the OKINAWA support mission, staying afloat for 1 minute 40 seconds. All occupants were able to climb in a raft from which they were rescued expeditiously by ERBEN.

6 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0540; Sunset: 1843)

79. Fueled and replenished gasoline in vicinity 24° 00'N.; 130° 30'E., under cloudy skies with good visibility and moderately rough sea. ENTERPRISE joined the Task Group. Fuel and gasoline were taken from MILLICOMA, aviation lubricating oil from CHICOPEE, bombs, fuzes, 20mm and 50 cal. ammunition from VESUVIUS and WRANGELL. Replacement aircraft and pilots were received.

80. Operations consisted of one combat air patrol over Task Group and launching of tow planes for Group gunnery practice. RANDOLPH was unable to fire, being alongside logistic ships throughout the firing period.

7 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0542; Sunset: 1855)

81. Operating in vicinity 26° 00'N.; 129° 00'E., with cloudy weather, which deteriorated to light rains in the late afternoon, and a smooth sea.

82. At about 1045 a bogey was reported at a distance of 12 miles, cruising about the Task Group just out of gun range. A target combat air patrol returning from OKINAWA was vectored to intercept and reported promptly shooting down 1 FRANCES at a distance of 17 miles from the ship.

83. Combat air patrols were stationed over own Task Group and at OKINAWA. One support mission of 4 VF, 12 VB, and 12 VT was launched to hit supply buildings, troop and artillery positions, and other targets as directed by the target coordinator on Southern OKINAWA. Several buildings were blasted and others burned. AMAMI-KIKAI patrols used Napalm bombs effectively in destroying buildings around military headquarters at WAN Field, KIKAI. 8 VF joined a special strike group from BATAAN to attack reported shipping at KAKEROMA but were unable to locate target.

84. Results of this day's operations:
Enemy aircraft destroyed in air - 1

8 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0544; Sunset: 1856)

85. Operating in vicinity 26° 30'N.; 129° 00'E., with weather rainy, low clouds, and rough seas. All flight operations were cancelled.

9 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0540; Sunset: 1858)

86. Operations were resumed in vicinity 26° 30'N.; 129° 30'E.,

with weather partly cloudy.

87. Combat air patrols were maintained over own Task Group and over OKINAWA. Patrols of fighters to the AMAMI-KIKAI area attacked luggers and small boats in coves at KAKEROMA SHIMA burning a lugger and starting fires on others.

88. Four VF, 11 VB, and 11 VT accompanied by a photo section struck the northern half of WAN Town, KIKAI, with Napalm bombs, incendiary and frag clusters, and GP bombs starting good fires and causing considerable general damage.

89. At dusk the Task Group departed for the fueling rendezvous.

10 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0540; Sunset: 1843)

90. Fueled and replenished gasoline from GUADALUPE, obtained fresh provisions from ALDEBARAN, and replenished 500-pound bombs and rockets from WRANGELL, in vicinity 23° 30'N., 130° 30'E.

91. One combat air patrol was flown over own Task Group. In the afternoon a strike of 10 VF and 10 VT, with a photo section, was launched against MINAMI DAITO SHIMA. Runways were cratered extensively and one heavy AA position was believed destroyed.

11 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0540; Sunset: 1849)

92. Operating in vicinity 26° 15'N., 129° 00'E. While enroute to the operating area at 0203, a bogey was reported at 14 miles. Night fighters were vectored out but failed to make contact. The enemy plane closed to within about 6 miles scouting the formation, and was taken under fire by ships of the screen which failed to register a hit.

93. At 1010, without warning, two Japanese planes made suicide dives on BUNKER HILL, one hitting aft and one amidships on the flight deck. BUNKER HILL fell out of formation burning fiercely. Many men were observed in the water to whom life jackets and belly tanks were thrown with float lights to mark positions for destroyers engaged in rescue. Four F4U's and 2 F6F's from the damaged ship landed aboard.

94. During the day there were several alerts but no attacks on the Task Group. Combat air patrols over own Task Group were launched throughout the day, one of which was vectored to the radar picket area where it shot down 2 TONYS and 1 ZEKE. Combat patrols were also maintained at OKINAWA where a strike group of 4 VF and 8 VT hit caves and mortar installations and fired an ammunition dump in support of ground forces. One patrol of 16 VBF covered WAN Field, KIKAI, and strafed luggers at KAKEROMA. A dusk patrol of four VF(N) covered the Task Group.

95. At 1630 SOUTH DAKOTA left the Task Group.

96. Results of this day's operations:
Enemy planes destroyed in the air - 3

12 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0538; Sunset: 1859)

97. Operating in vicinity 26° 00'N.; 129° 15'E., with overcast skies and a morning drizzle, improving during the day to clear and cloudless conditions with calm sea.

98. Fueled HUNT, STEMBEL, and WALKER. MONTEREY and ALABAMA joined the Task Group.

99. Combat air patrols over own Task Group and at OKINAWA as well as KIKAI-AMAMI patrols were maintained. Two support strikes were launched to assist ground troops at OKINAWA by rocketing and bombing artillery positions, pill boxes, and troop concentrations.

100. Commander Ralph A. EMBREE, Air Group Commander, who was leading the afternoon support strike, was hit by heavy AA over the target area. His plane disintegrated and his parachute was seen to open partially at 300 feet from the ground approximately 3 miles behind the Japanese lines. Immediate inspection of the position by planes of the flight created grave doubt that he survived.

13 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0525; Sunset: 1853)

101. At 0332, while en route to attack KYUSHU airfields, the Task Group was scouted by an enemy plane which closed to six miles astern and was taken under fire by ships of the Group. The plane withdrew and disappeared from the screen.

102. The first fighter sweep was launched at 0443 from position 30° 01'N., 132° 30'E., with weather good, partly cloudy skies and calm sea. KUMAMOTO, KIKUTOMI, TAMANA, and KIKUCHI Airfields in West Central KYUSHU were strafed with particular attention to the few aircraft which were found in and around the fields. A locomotive near KIKUCHI was exploded.

103. At 0527 a strike was launched against installations at TAMANA Airfield. Sixteen VBF, fourteen VB, and thirteen VT conducted a very successful attack in which hangars and other buildings were almost completely destroyed.

104. The next 2 fighter sweeps returned to the area covered by the first sweep and also hit OMURA. Near NAGASAKI a number of motor torpedo boats were attacked, 4 large and 4 small boats being left dead in the water. A merchant ship, 1500 to 2500 gross tons, was set afire by rockets and strafing.

105. At 1115 the second strike, consisting of 15 VF, 15 VB, and 11 VT, was launched against KIKUCHI, where hangars and other buildings were hit effectively.

106. Photo missions covered 11 different fields throughout the day and also secured damage-assessment photos of those attacked by strikes and sweeps. Fighters were detailed to rescue patrol duty throughout the day. Combat air patrols were maintained over own Task Group.

107. The absence of airborne enemy activity was noticeable. During the several attacks no such opposition was encountered and not more than 1 or 2 enemy planes were observed in the air. A combat air patrol launched at 0758 shot down a MYRT near the Task Group and thus accounted for the only airborne tally for the day.

108. 189 take-offs and 31 consecutive landings at one time without a wave-off made new RANDOLPH flight deck records.

109. Results of this day's operations:

(a)	Enemy	aircraft	destroyed	in the air	- 1
(b)	"	"	"	on the ground	- 6
(c)	"	"	damaged	" " "	- 2

14 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0519; Sunset: 1853)

110. At 0050 enemy planes commenced scouting the formation remaining at a safe position about 10 miles outside the Force until shortly before daylight. At 0630 a group of bogeys was reported closing from the North. When 2 were sighted visually at 0644 the formation executed evasive maneuvers. At 0659 an enemy plane diving at a steep angle hit the forward end of the ENTERPRISE flight deck, causing an explosion, fires, and heavy smoke. Word was received a very short time later that the fires had been brought under control. Enemy air attacks were resumed at 0804 when several enemy planes started runs on the Task Group. One approaching on the starboard quarter was shot down before reaching the screen. Another attempt attack on either ESSEX or MONTEREY but was taken under heavy AA fire by several ships and, after executing violent evasive movements, crashed close aboard the starboard beam of ESSEX. Immediately after this crash another enemy aircraft headed for MONTEREY but was hit and burst into flames crashing short of the target. A total of 4 enemy planes were shot down by AA fire in which RANDOLPH participated.

111. During the enemy attacks, combat air patrol pilots reported destroying 8 ZEKES, 1 JUDY, and 1 FRANK near the force.

112. The first of 3 fighter sweeps was launched at 0442. Again these sweeps encountered no airborne enemy aircraft and concentrated on destroying such planes as could be found on airfields throughout the assigned area. MYAZAKI, KIKUCHI, OMURA, SADOHARA, NITTAGAHARA, and TOMITAKA were visited throughout the day. In addition to strafing planes, a locomotive was hit near KIKUCHI, a merchant vessel, 1000 to 2500 gross tons, was set afire near AMAKUSA JIMA, a railway station was burned near SADOHARA, and a nearby factory set afire. Ensign R. WELTY

was hit by AA at SADOHARA and crashed with a violent explosion near the airfield.

113. The day's first strike of 8 VF, 8 VBF, 14 VB, and 13 VT, launched at 0526, found ESSEX planes at the target, USA Airfield, when it arrived, but proceeded to deliver an effective attack. One of the bombers, piloted by Ensign J. MORRIS, with crewman PHEGLEY, ARM3c, was hit by enemy AA and forced to make a water landing in SUO NADA about 15 miles northeast of the field. This position, within the INLAND SEA of Japan, set the scene for a thrilling rescue, during which enemy destroyers bore down on the raft of the survivors and were driven away by the strafing of fighters who stayed above them until rescue was effected. Air-sea rescue procedure functioned smoothly and in a minimum of time 2 OS2U's from ASTORIA, despatched by the Task Group Commander and escorted by fighters from the Group, made a landing, picked up the survivors, and returned them safely to base in spite of enemy AA and the inherent hazards of the location. While orbiting the raft RANDOLPH fighters shot down 1 DINAH and a biplane of unidentified type, also setting afire 2 merchant ships, 1000 to 2500 gross tons, and a lugger as well as sinking a 30-foot motor boat.

114. At 1209, 16 VBF, 12 VB, and 12 VT took off to hit the KUMAMOTO Airframe and Engine Plant. At the direction of the strike leader from the BATAAN Air Group, the majority of RANDOLPH planes were diverted to KIKUCHI Airfield where the remaining buildings and planes in the revetment area were bombed effectively. Planes which remained at KUMAMOTO reported all bombs hitting the target.

115. Rescue combat air patrols were maintained and successful photo missions flown during the day. One of the photo flights shot down a NICK soon after take-off.

116. At 1636 a bogey was reported boaring 251° at 17 miles. The combat air patrol was vectored out and reported shooting down one enemy plane.

117. RANDOLPH exceeded previous flight deck records with 199 take-offs and 197 landings.

118. At dusk the Task Group retired at high speed on course 215° for the fueling rendezvous.

119. Results of this day's operations:

(a)	Enemy aircraft destroyed in the air	-13
(b)	" " " on the ground	- 7
(c)	" " probably destroyed on ground	- 8

15 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0528; Sunset: 1857)

120. Fueled and replenished gasoline from PLATTE in vicinity 24° 00'N., 130° 00'E., effecting rendezvous with logistics group about 1100.

Weather was overcast with frequent heavy rain squalls and a smooth sea. Three hospital patients were transferred to BOUNTIFUL. One combat air patrol was flown over Task Group.

121. During the afternoon Commander Task Force 58 (Vice Admiral M. A. MITSCHER, USN) transferred his flag to RANDOLPH from ENTERPRISE.

16 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0539; Sunset: 1859)

122. Continued to replenish in vicinity 24° 00'N., 130° 00'E., with overcast skies and rain squalls in the morning, clearing throughout the day to a clear and cloudless evening with smooth sea. Rockets, bombs, and 20mm ammunition were loaded from WRANGELL, fresh provisions from ALDEBARAN, and gasoline from CHICOPEE.

123. One combat air patrol over Task Group was uneventful.

124. ENTERPRISE was detached from Task Group for further routing by logistics group. At sunset Task Group took departure for operating area.

17 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0537; Sunset: 1903)

125. With weather clear and sea calm operations were resumed in vicinity 26° 00'N., 129° 00'E.

126. Combat air patrols were maintained over Task Group, 2 12-plane fighter groups were sent to patrol between AMAMI, YOKOATE, and YAKU, and 1 8-plane fighter patrol was stationed between KIKAI and TOKUNO. A radio station at TAKARA SHIMA was thoroughly destroyed but otherwise patrols were uneventful. Photo missions covered airfields.

127. One enemy aircraft was reported closing the formation at 2100. Night fighters from RANDOLPH dusk combat air patrol were unable to make contact as the bogey faded from the screen.

18 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0533, Sunset: 1903)

128. Operations continued in vicinity 26° 00'N., 129° 30'E., with calm sea, few clouds, and general haze.

129. Combat air patrols were maintained over own Task Group, 1 8-plane KIKAI-TOKUNO patrol was negative, and 3 12-plane AMAMI-YOKOATE-YAKU patrols hit miscellaneous targets starting fires in a town on the eastern side of YAKU and damaging a bridge and sawmill in the same area. Ensign C. L. WHITE crashed at high speed with an explosion in the water near TOKUNO Airfield. A thorough search failed to reveal any indication of survival. Two photo missions were flown, one photographing all of the possible harbors on AMAMI in a search for camouflaged shipping.

130. At 0830 4 VBF, 8 VB, and 9 VT were launched to strike a storage depot on KAKEROMA (28° 07'N., 129° 15'E.). Early reports

indicates that facilities had been entirely destroyed by the strike but photographic assessment showed few buildings badly damaged. One explosion which sent smoke 1000 feet in the air was thought to have been caused by a direct hit on an ammunition dump.

19 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0535; Sunset: 1859)

131. With a heavy overcast, frequent rain squalls, and smooth sea, refueled and replenished gasoline from TALLULAH in vicinity 23° 00'N., 129° 15'E. Fresh and dry provisions were loaded from ALDEBARAN and ammunition from LASSEN. Five replacement aircraft were landed aboard.

132. One combat air patrol over Task Group was uneventful. Three VT towed sleeves for Group gunnery exercises. At dark Task Group took departure for the operating area.

20 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0535; Sunset: 1906)

133. Operations resumed in vicinity of 26° 15'N., 129° 15'E., with cloudy skies, good visibility, and a smooth sea. Weather over OKINAWA was generally bad, low visibility preventing execution of the majority of scheduled support missions.

134. Combat air patrols were maintained over own Task Group and over OKINAWA. One support mission of 4 VF and 9 VT was unable to hit its primary target which was covered with mist but did find good targets in another area where two ammunition dumps were fired and a direct hit scored on the power plant at HANAGUSUKU.

21 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0535; Sunset: 1906)

135. Weather in operating area, vicinity of 26° 15'N., 129° 30'E., was hazy and partly cloudy but OKINAWA was completely closed in, cancelling all scheduled support missions. Combat air patrols were stationed at target. Destroyers were fueled during the afternoon.

136. At 1730 4 VF(N) were launched as a dusk combat air patrol. At about 2100 a transmission was heard from Ensign D. G. HOWARD, Jr., saying that he had collided with another plane and was bailing out. No word was received from Lieutenant (j. g.) LEVIS, pilot of the plane with which he was believed to have collided, and no further transmissions were received from Ensign HOWARD. The Task Group proceeded immediately to the location of the accident but a search was negative.

22 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0535; Sunset: 1904)

137. Overcast skies with occasional rain squalls and a moderate sea limited operations in the vicinity of 26° 30'N., 129° 30'E., to a special rescue search for the night fighters downed the previous night. Twelve VF conducted a 4-hour search of the area without results. The Task Group, in company with Task Group 58.1, took departure for the

fueling rendezvous at dusk.

23 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0534; Sunset: 1903)

138. At daylight rendezvous was effected with logistics group in latitude 24° 00'N., longitude 130° 00'E. Weather was cloudy with light rain in the afternoon, decreasing visibility, and a choppy sea. Refueled and replenished gasoline; also conducted 5" AA firing practice during the morning.

139. At 1155 16 VF, 3 VB, 12 VT, and 3 VF(P) were launched to crater the runways on MINAMI DAITO SHIMA. Due to a complete overcast at 3500 feet over the target the bombers and torpedo planes bombed with radar, the fighters diving through and releasing at 1500 feet. One TBM made a water landing 7 miles west of the target, due to water in gasoline. Lieutenant J. H. NEWBY, H. A. HERBERT, ARM1c, and L. L. COMSTOCK, AOM1c, were picked up and returned safely to base by two OS2U's sent from the Task Group. A few minutes later Lieutenant C. HAMILTON ditched his TBM with crewmen G. D. BOTHELL, ACRT, and E. H. WHITE, AMM2c, near the ship for the same reason. All were picked up by one of the destroyers of the Group.

140. At 1400 the Task Force took departure for the operating area.

24 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0534; Sunset: 1907).

141. Operations were curtailed upon return to vicinity 26° 00'N., 129° 30'E., because of a low ceiling and restricted visibility with frequent heavy rain squalls.

142. Combat air patrols were maintained over own Task Group and 3 patrols of fighters took station in the KIKAI-AMAMI area. The Group was scouted by 2 enemy planes which missed the formation by 15 miles to northward. At 2315 2 VF(N) were scrambled, 1 of which intercepted a BETTY several miles from the Group, hitting it and setting one engine afire. The contact was subsequently lost in heavy clouds.

25 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0534; Sunset: 1908)

143. Another stormy day with frequent rain squalls resulted in the cancellation of scheduled operations, while the ship remained in the vicinity of 25° 30'N., 129° 15'E.

144. Four VF(N) were launched for dawn patrol over Task Group at 0300 and regular combat air patrols were maintained throughout the day. One enemy plane scouted the formation, remaining just outside the range of visibility and eluding pursuit.

145. ERBEN, THE SULLIVANS, STEPHEN POTTER, and BORIE were topped off during the day.

26 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0531; Sunset: 1906)

146. Continued foul weather in the vicinity of 25° 30'N., 129° 00' E., restricted air operations to combat air patrols over own Task Group. In late afternoon took departure for fueling rendezvous.

27 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0534; Sunset: 1906)

147. Refueled and received replacement aircraft in vicinity 22° 30' N., 128° 30'E.

148. Vice Admiral MITSCHER transferred via destroyer to SHANGRI-LA for conference with Vice Admiral MC CAIN (ComSECONDCarTaskFor), returning prior to noon.

149. At 2400 Commander THIRD Fleet (Admiral W. F. HALSEY, USN), relieved Commander FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R. A. SPRUANCE, USN), and all Task Force and Task Group designations became THIRD Fleet designations.

28 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0533; Sunset: 1908)

150. Operations resumed with Task Group 38.3 in vicinity 25° 00'N., 128° 00'E., under scattered low clouds with occasional light rains. At about 0350 an enemy plane scouted the formation.

151. Combat air patrols were maintained over own Task Group and 3 patrols were stationed over OKINAWA as directed by the target fighter director.

152. Vice Admiral MITSCHER departed via destroyer at 0730 for a conference with Admiral HALSEY in MISSOURI, returning about noon.

29 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0535; Sunset: 1852)

153. In vicinity 25° 00'N., 128° 30'E., skies were clear with few scattered clouds and a smooth sea.

154. ComFIRSTCarTaskForPac (Vice Admiral M. A. MITSCHER, USN), was relieved by ComSECONDCarTaskForPac (Vice Admiral J. S. MC CAIN, USN), the former remaining in RANDOLPH for passage to GUAM.

155. At 1000 RANDOLPH was detached from Task Group 38.3 and with LEWIS HANCOCK, MARSHALL, and HICKOX was designated Task Unit 38.3.9. This unit was directed to proceed directly to GUAM to arrive prior dark 31 May. Departure was taken on course 123° (T) at a speed of 27 knots.

30 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0521; Sunset: 1810)

156. En route GUAM with generally clear weather, few scattered clouds, and smooth sea. Combat air and anti-submarine patrols were maintained. Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted morning and afternoon.

31 May 1945 (Sunrise: 0558; Sunset: 1844)

157. Weather mostly clear with few scattered showers. One combat air patrol and one anti-submarine patrol were flown before making landfall on GUAM at 1030. At 1230 entered APRA HARBOR and moored to buoy.

ACTION SUMMARY - April, 1945

Date	8	9	12	14	15	17	19	20	21	22	25	26	28	29	30	Total
Enemy planes destroyed in air			2	8	1	17		2		12				4		46
By aircraft			2	8	1	14		2		12				4		43
By ship's AA						3										3
Enemy planes probably destroyed in air										3						3
Enemy planes damaged in air					1					2						3
Enemy planes destroyed on ground		1			2				1				1			5
Enemy planes probably destroyed on ground						1										1
Enemy planes damaged on ground					11	1							3			15
Total enemy planes destroyed		1	2	8	3	17		2	1	12			1	4		51
Total enemy planes probably destroyed						1				3						4
Total enemy planes damaged					12	1				2			3			18
Tons bombs dropped on target				18	8	32	17	36	16½	17	4	12	23	25	25	233½
Napalm bombs dropped on target							12									12
Rockets expended on target	118	57		112	131	154	92	122	51	69	61	156	182	99	51	1455
Own pilots missing in action over enemy territory																
Own crewmen missing in action over enemy territory																
Own pilots landing in water	1			1		2								1		5
Own crewmen landing in water																
Own pilots rescued			1	1		1								1		4
Own crewmen rescued																
Own pilots missing - cumulative	1	1				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Own crewmen missing -cumulative																

ACTION SUMMARY - May, 1945

(Continued from April).

Date	2	3	4	5	7	9	10	11	12	13	14	17	18	20	21	23	24	25	Grand Total*
Enemy planes destroyed in air	1		10		1			3		1	13								75
By aircraft	1		10		1			3		1	13								72
By Ship's AA																			3
Enemy planes probably destroyed in air			1															1	5
Enemy planes damaged in air																			3
Enemy planes destroyed on ground										6	7								18
Enemy planes probably destroyed on ground											8								9
Enemy planes damaged on ground										2									17
Total enemy planes destroyed	1		10		1			3		7	20								93
Total enemy planes probably destroyed			1								8							1	14
Total enemy planes damaged										2									20
Tons bombs dropped on target	13	12	24	14	26	18	11¼	9	18	51	53	175	838	10		12.675			524.23
Napalm bombs dropped on target		28	14	24	10	6													94
Rockets expended on target	56	80	91	93	87	59	60	24	43	111	177	180	253	23		94			2891
Own pilots missing in act. over enem. terrtry.	2								1		1		1						5
Own crewmen missing in act. over enem. terrtry.																			0
Own pilots landing in water		1	2	1							1				2	2			14
Own crewmen landing in water				2							1					4			7
Own pilots rescued		1	2	1							1					2			11
Own crewmen rescued				2							1					4			7
Own pilots missing - cumulative	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	6	6	8	8	8	8	8
Own crewmen missing - cumulative																			0

* Grand total for entire period covered by action report.

PART IV - ORDNANCE

A. Performance of own ordnance material and equipment.

1. Detailed information on ship's gunnery.

(a) During the period covered by this report the following quantities of ammunition were expended by the ship -

	In Action	Training	Total
5"/38 cal. AA common Mk 18 fuze	178	519	697
5"/38 cal. VT fuze	595		595
40mm	2331	10143	12474
20mm AA	3760	9855	13615

(b) In the great majority of cases, full radar control was used. In one or two instances, fire was directed by optics. 40mm firing was controlled by Mk 51-2 directors. Gunnery communications were maintained in good order without interruption of any nature. Fire discipline was satisfactory. IFF gear has been installed in both Mk 37 directors and has proved very valuable in supplementing information from CIC. In one instance it was the only means of identifying a target as enemy, as CIC had no plot. This occurred at approximately 0500, 17 April 1945, while this ship, in company with 3 destroyers, was proceeding to rendezvous with Task Group 58.3. An aircraft was detected visually for an instant on the starboard side of the ship. CIC could give no information on this airplane, and it was picked up and tracked by the forward director, using Mk 22 radar. The after director was coached on and tracked the target with Mk 12 radar. This airplane did not show code to the IFF gear in either of the directors, and "commence firing" was ordered, the computer having a good solution. At "commence firing", the target was bearing 110° relative, at a distance of 7500 yards, altitude 550 feet, and a speed of 160 knots, and was on a parallel course, going aft. The target made a turn, circling into a position directly astern and closed to about 500 yards, when the port 40mm mount on the fantail opened fire. At this time the enemy attempted to strafe the ship as he passed close aboard the port side in a shallow glide until he hit the water 250 yards ahead of the ship. The target was identified by ship personnel as a ZEKE.

(c) Ammunition used was observed to detonate and its effectiveness is adjudged satisfactory.

2. Performance of aircraft bombs, rockets, ammunition, and other aviation ordnance material and equipment:

(a) Performance of aircraft bombs, rockets, and ammunition was

satisfactory. Previous difficulties with Napalm were completely overcome (see ANNEX (G)).

(b) Pre-belted 50 caliber ammunition has been a welcome development. It is estimated that a 10 to 15 percent reduction of handling personnel has been effected together with an increase in efficiency in other respects. The 2:2:1 ratio is satisfactory; any local objections to a fixed ratio should not stand in the way of extending the program. Gaging and corrosion have not been sources of complaint.

(c) Highly satisfactory experience with ammunition transfer at sea eliminates the need for loading full ammunition allowances where the allowance would jeopardize the efficient handling of ammunition in the magazine. Ammunition requirements of this ship have been submitted on the basis that the ship will be alongside the AE for about three hours.

(d) No malfunctioning of aircraft guns, not related to maintenance, was reported. Stoppages in .30 and .50 caliber and 20mm guns were minimized through a good maintenance program. A tendency toward excess oiling was stopped before guns started to give serious trouble at high altitudes. It was not necessary to use gun heaters in this operation.

(e) The Mk 1-1 bomb skid is a distinct contribution to mobility, so essential in carrier aircraft operations. A minimum of 200 should be standard equipment for all CV's. In this connection, it is recommended that more emphasis be given to design of the skids so that they will be adaptable for all types of ammunition and that new ammunition developments include proper and adequate handling equipment.

(f) Racks and shackles performed satisfactorily when maintained properly. Discussions with pilots together with minor adjustments corrected all complaints of "hung" bombs. 100% release of bombs from F6F-5 racks is noteworthy and confirms the opinion that the Mk 51 rack, as modified, is a reliable piece of ordnance equipment.

(g) For aviation ordnance expenditures, see ANNEX (B).

B. Performance of enemy ordnance and equipment.

1. In general enemy AA fire was not a serious threat to the pilots during this operation. Ten VF and two VB were destroyed by enemy AA, all personnel but 2 pilots being saved. In only one of these instances was the fatal hit believed to be from heavy AA. Four aircraft casualties occurred over WAN A/F, KIKAI, where a large number of sorties were flown, 1 at KAKEROMA, 3 over OKINAWA, and 4 at KYUSHU fields where AA fire was more intense and accurate than in the other

areas. The probability of encountering AA fire in areas where many sorties were flown was unpredictable. On some days there would be none and on others it would be intense. Pilots' reports indicate that OMURA A/F, KYUSHU, displayed the most intense and accurate AA fire of all types encountered throughout the operation.

C. For special ship's AA Action Reports, see ANNEX (E).

PART V- DAMAGE.

There was no battle damage to own ship, and none was inflicted on enemy units by surface action. For damage to and by aircraft, see PART VI, B.

PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS AND INFORMATION

A. Surface gunnery operations (not applicable).

B. Air Operations.

1. Table of sorties and plane availability by days (see ANNEX (A)).

2. Table of bombs, rockets, torpedoes, and mines dropped at the target by strike (including strafing sorties) (see ANNEX (B)).

3. Own losses and rescue operations (see ANNEX (C)).

4. Damage to enemy (see ANNEX (D)).

5. Night aircraft operations: During this operation VF(N) pilots flew 37 dawn combat air patrol sorties, 32 dusk combat air patrol sorties, and 13 night sorties. The dawn patrol was credited with shooting down 2 enemy planes, the dusk patrol with 1, and the night patrols with 2 plus 1 probable. Both of the twin-engine planes destroyed by the night patrol were shot down in a single night by the same pilot. Four night fighter pilots were lost. In one instance two pilots who were in the dawn patrol over the AMAMI-KIKAI area left the third member of the patrol to make a search and were not heard from afterward. In the other, a message was received from one pilot saying that he had collided with another plane and was bailing out. Thorough searches failed to reveal any trace of survivors and it is believed likely that in both cases the losses were due to collision of planes in the same flight.

6. Searches: Only 2 searches were flown during period covered by the report:

(a) 7 April 1945, 18 VF launched from position 24° 04'N., 133° 04' E., at 0534 searched five 325-mile sectors between 010° and 060° (T) for a suspected sortie of enemy warships. No contacts of any kind were reported upon landing at 1100.

(b) 17 April 1945, 8 VF and 4 VB launched from position 26° 40'N., 129° 32'E., at 0531 searched four 300-mile sectors between 025° and 065° (T) for enemy shipping, reporting negatively upon landing at 1013.

7. Photographic activity:

(a) During the period covered by this action report 74 photographic sorties were flown and 99 rolls of film used. Complete vertical coverage was obtained on 19 airfields and seaplane stations, partial air-crewman coverage on 6 fields, and complete oblique coverage on 1 field. The fields are located as follows: 4 on OKINAWA, 4 on AMAMI GUNTO, 1 on MINAMI DAITO JIMA, 16 on KYUSHU, and 1 emergency landing ground in TOKARO GUNTO.

(b) OKINAWA: 15 sorties were flown over OKINAWA during support missions for the purpose of damage assessment.

(c) AMAMI GUNTO, WAN AIRFIELD: 11 sorties were flown on 8, 9 April, 3, 4, 7, 9, 17 May for the purpose of counting aircraft, determining condition of airfield, assessing damage, and recommending new targets. Comparative and flash photographic interpretation reports were submitted on each of these dates.

(d) TOKUNO A/F: 7 sorties were flown on 8, 9 April, 17, 18 May for the same purposes as the missions to WAN AIRFIELD.

(e) SHITOOKE A/F: 5 sorties were flown on 9 April, 4, 9, 17 May.

(f) KONIYA S/S: 4 sorties were flown on 14 April, 9, 17, 18 May.

(g) AMAMI O SHIMA and KAKEROMA SHIMA: 17 sorties were flown on 8, 9, 14 April, 7, 9, 17, 18 May. These were primarily for shipping reconnaissance and for damage assessment. On 17 and 18 May complete coverage was obtained on every cove and harbor of these two islands and a shipping count was made and distributed. Additional targets covered were the radio station at AKAOGI TOWN, KONIYA TOWN, NAZE TOWN, KOMINATO TOWN, light house at SATSUKO ZAKI, supply depot at SESO TOWN, and reported submarine base.

(h) YORO SHIMA: complete coverage was obtained on 14 April which disproved report of an emergency landing strip.

(i) TOKARO GUNTO: 1 reconnaissance sortie on 17 May was flown over TOKARA SHIMA.

(j) MINAMI DAITO JIMA; KITA JIMA: photographic coverage of MINAMI DAITO JIMA was obtained on 10 and 23 May for damage assessment. Reconnaissance photos were obtained on KITA JIMA on 23 May.

(k) KYUSHU: on the two-day strike of 13-14 May the following photographic coverage was obtained using 4 photo planes. On 13 May 14 sorties were flown, covering 12 airfields and seaplane stations and 4 industrial areas. Photographic interpretation reports were prepared on NITTAGAHARA A/F, SADOHARA A/F, HITOYOSHI A/F, KUMANOSHO A/F, KUMAMOTO A/F and A/C Assembly Plant, KIKUTOMI A/F, MIYAJI A/F, KIKUCHI A/F, TAMANA A/F, ISAHAYA A/F, OMURA A/F, and OMURA S/S. Industrial areas covered were OMUTA TOWN, NOBEOKA TOWN, OMURA area, and KUMAMOTO A/C plant.

(l) On 14 May 8 sorties were flown covering 9 airfields and 4 industrial areas. Photographic interpretation reports were submitted on USA A/F, MIYAZAKI A/F, KIKUCHI A/F, KUMANOSHO A/F,

KUMAMOTO A/F, KUMAMOTO A/C Assembly Plant, and KARASEHARA A/F. Industrial areas covered were NAKATSU TOWN, SAGANOSEKI PENINSULA, NOBEOKA TOWN, and KUMAMOTO A/C Assembly Plant.

(m) During this operation a new type package camera was developed under the direction of CinCPac personnel. This package holds a K-25 camera and can be fastened on the bomb rack of any fighter in 5 minutes. The camera plugs into the regular gun camera circuit directly above the bomb rack and is automatically put into operation when the pilot fires his machine guns or rockets. It can also be operated manually. As this package camera is boresighted with the guns and fires automatically at the rate of 2½ pictures a second, the pilot needs no previous instruction of any kind and will bring back a clear series of damage assessment pictures. (See the following package camera photos in this action report: 1, 5, 6, 13, 18, 19, 25, 26, 27, and 28.)

(n) The photo laboratory has developed a method for delivering complete dry prints of photographic sorties within an average period of one hour and twenty minutes from the time the planes land aboard. To do this the wet negative is printed on the Sonne printer, a hub having been enlarged to accommodate the negative. The Sonne print is given a minimum fixing and washing and then dried on the hangar deck with chamois and sponge. The negative is then completely washed and dried and is ready for captioning by the time the data for selected prints is furnished by the photo interpreters.

(o) When BUNKER HILL retired from the operating area due to battle damage on 11 May, 2 photo planes were transferred to this ship, making it possible to form a full photo division which could carry vertical and oblique cameras of varying focal lengths as well as additional K-18 cameras. Without this flexible arrangement it would have been impossible to have obtained 100% coverage on 12 airfields and 4 industrial areas on KYUSHU on 13 May. The 4-plane photo division appears to be a desirable complement for CV's as it permits the plane or planes with the proper cameras to take photos while the other planes fly as escorts and allows the instantaneous exchanging of position and duties when different cameras are needed. Moreover, when feasible the two sections can obtain vertical and oblique area coverage simultaneously.

8. Comments:

(a) During this operation it was evident once more that the SB2C-4E cannot operate comfortably on extended missions which are entirely within the capacities of F6F-5's and TBM-3's. The necessary addition of a wing tank in such instances curtails the bomb load proportionately.

(b) The fighter-bomber continues to be an asset to fast-carrier operations with its ability to carry bombs for neutralizing targets and then taking station on patrol. During present phase operations its bombing accuracy has been adequate for designated targets.

(c) The following aircraft complement is recommended for current CV operations:

82 VF and VBF

6 VF(N) This number is necessary to maintain 4 in full operational status.

4 VF(P) It has been found desirable to assign 2 photo planes to a mission and the other 2 as escorts loaded with alternate cameras. With this arrangement missions can be accomplished successfully regardless of varying ceilings or types of coverage required.

16 VT To be used for all general bombing missions. This number may include 6 VT(N) which are operable on day or night missions.

In the period covered by this report 74 VF averaged 175 hours each of flying time, 15 VB averaged 75 hours, and 15 VT averaged 96 hours. It is considered that these figures furnish convincing proof of the need for revision of aircraft complement in current type operations so that the assigned duties may be more equitably alloted within the Air Group.

(d) When a CV is not required to both launch and land aircraft at night, it is considered well within its capacity to operate night aircraft. Designation of a night duty CV and another CV with night ready deck simplifies operating and personnel requirements.

(e) To improve training of night fighter pilots, it is recommended that the task group VF(N) predawn combat air patrol be launched daily, weather and operations permitting.

(f) On several occasions during this operation the arming plans called for long-delay fuzes. This ship has not been able to procure any long-delay fuzes.

(g) It would be of direct benefit to all if the returning strike leader might land aboard the flagship when he returns from a mission with critical information. The advantages in time saved and accuracy of complete reporting would compensate for any inconvenience involved, and provision for this procedure is recommended.

(h) During current prolonged operations adequate replenishment of aviation ordnance equipment is not possible unless the ship is well stocked at the outset. It is recommended that an aviation ordnance replenishment program be emphasized in the Logistics Support Group, perhaps by designating one CVE as an aviation ordnance equipment supply ship, so that not only will ordnance replacements be available but there will be an immediate Fleet outlet for distribution of new equipment.

C. Amphibious Action (not applicable).

D. Special Comment.

1. Combat Information Center.

(a) General.

(1) From 5 April to 17 April the flag of Task Group 58.2 was in RANDOLPH and from 17 April to 30 May this vessel was a part of Task Group 58.3 (flag in ESSEX). Task Force 58 flag was in RANDOLPH from 15 May to 31 May. Operations during this period consisted of DCAPS, TCAPS, RAPCAPS, DADCAPS, NCAPS, support missions over OKINAWA, strikes and fighter sweeps over KYUSHU, and numerous patrols over KIKAI, AMAMI, and other islands in the Northern Ryukus Chain.

(2) CIC in Ship Control.

Under current operating practices CIC provides very limited and tardy information to Ship Control. With gunnery, fighter director, and flag having prior call on CIC, needed information can usually be obtained by the bridge more promptly from other sources. With consequent little use, percentage of error and difficulty of communication increases. Confidence in CIC for ship control will not be obtained under present divided control and diverging duties and responsibilities.

(3) Employment and performance of radars.

a. Tracking.

SM and SG radars were used extensively in tracking surface contacts, especially during retirement to and return from fueling areas. There were no enemy surface contacts. Material performance of both sets was good, and initial pickups of large task groups, consisting of CV's, BB's, CA's were consistently made at 33 to 35 miles on SM and at 28 to 30 miles on SG. Unusual weather conditions sometimes accounted for

greatly increased ranges, a single ship being picked up at 50 miles on one occasion.

b. Air ans surface search.

Maximum range obtained on air contacts was 145 miles. The target, a large group of enemy planes proceeding from KYUSHU to OKINAWA, was tracked on both SC4 and SK2. SM performance during most of the period was excellent, with many good tracks to maximum range (80 miles). Altitude information supplied by SM was also extremely reliable on targets within 40 miles and in many instances where a target (usually CAP) whose altitude was known was checked against SM readings the difference was as little as 500 feet. Beyond 40 miles, however, SM altitude information was much less accurate, although it was possible to determine whether a target was at low, medium, or high altitude. Neither SK2 nor SC4 on the RANDOLPH has ever given the performance which should be expected of this gear, and while results during this period showed some improvement over previous operations, we were constantly outranged by battleships, cruisers, and other carriers in the Task Group. RANDOLPH's SK2 and SC4 also appeared to develop wider fades than the gear aboard accompanying ships. It is considered possible that the location of CIC and the receiver indicators on the 7th deck of this carrier may have caused some appreciable loss in operating efficiency.

c. Fire control (See Part IV, A, 1, (b).)

d. Shore bombardment (not applicable).

e. Navigation.

Since the course to the fueling area during the period passed quite close to several small islands, it was possible to provide frequent navigation checks. MINAMI DAITO JIMA and BORODINO ISLAND were picked up on several occasions by SM at ranges of 31 to 35 miles.

f. Station keeping.

SG was used extensively by the Flag in checking the positions of pickets and other task groups as well as individual ships within this formation. SQ radar was used by the bridge for station keeping.

g. Targets tracked ranged from single planes to groups of 100 or more.

(4) Special Operational Technique.

While enemy night hecklers were in the immediate vicinity and during daylight attacks, one VC unit was set up on the 20-mile scale and the SC4 was kept on continuous sweep. This gave an excellent picture of plane movements in the immediate area and proved invaluable to gunnery in coaching on fire control radar and warning lookouts of sectors of anticipated attack. Flag Plot also reported that this information was employed in maneuvering the Task Group. Even when a considerable amount of enemy "window" showed up on the PPI, there was no difficulty in detecting and tracking planes on the 20-mile scale. The VF unit in CIC was also effectively used by the gunnery liason officer.

(5) IFF Performance.

IFF performance showed a considerable improvement over the previous (TOKYO) operation but heavy interference poses a major problem. While planes were turning up on the flight deck, interference was so heavy that it was virtually impossible to read the scope on either SC4 or SK2. SM was affected in a lesser degree.

(6) Maintenance of Radar - Effect of Weather.

Unusual weather conditions, notably on 17 May, produced surface contacts out to 90 miles on SK2. Other ships in the Force reported similar results. Land was picked up at 135 miles on both SK2 and SC4 on this date. While these conditions persisted, VHF and TBS transmissions were also picked up at abnormal ranges -- 70 to 80 miles, ship to ship. However, it was not noted that ranges on air contacts at high altitudes increased perceptibly at this time.

(7) External and Internal Communications.

VHF communications were consistently excellent, even at ranges in excess of 100 miles. MAN-1 and 2 performed well, as did MHF which was used on many occasions. Communications between CIC and Flag Plot, Bridge, Air Plot, etc., were almost entirely by sound-powered telephone, except for a few emergency transmissions by "squawk box". It has been found that the "squawk box" is the least satisfactory means of communication because of the high level of background noise in CIC and because its use may

divert the attention of the FDO or Intercept Officer at a critical time during an interception.

(8) For photographs of typical intercepts, see ANNEX (H).

(b) Fighter Direction.

(1) Although numerous bogey contacts were tracked during this period, a large percentage proved friendly upon investigation. Enemy planes on night heckler missions were common, however, and many of the contacts definitely established as "bandits" were made at night.

(2) First "splash" by the Task Group 58.2 CAP was made during the afternoon of 7 April when a single bogey was picked up at 290°, 45 miles, on a course of 150°, speed 180. One division of ENTERPRISE CAP, with ENTERPRISE controlling, was vectored to intercept. One FRANCES was tallyhoed and splashed at 1450/I on a bearing of 210°, 40 miles.

(3) On the afternoon of 12 April, when several enemy planes were shot down over the radar picket line to the North, RANDOLPH CAP was designated to cover TF 58.2 and did not have an opportunity to participate in the actions as none of the bandits broke through.

(4) Shortly after midnight on 13 April, several enemy planes were in the vicinity of the Task Group, conducting "heckler" operations. Four separate raids were designated, all apparently single planes. All dropped "window", but only one closed the Force. A BENNINGTON night fighter, under RANDOLPH control, was vectored to intercept and contact was made 20 miles North of this vessel with the bogey still on a closing course. It was necessary to break off the VF(N), however, as one of the destroyer pickets was about to open fire. This enemy plane closed to 6 miles, dropping window intermittently, and then opened to the Southeast. Another bogey was picked up at 045°, 50 miles, on course 180°. This plane was tracked to 150°, 60 miles, where it faded. Window was dropped intermittently. A third plane popped up at 090°, 40 miles, dropped window, then opened to the East and faded. The fourth heckler first appeared at 175°, 75 miles, closed to 60 miles, dropped window, then reversed course and faded.

(5) RANDOLPH's night fighter group scored their first kill the morning of 14 April, when NAN-1 splashed a single PAUL. (See photograph of intercept plot, ANNEX (H)). This contact was first picked up at 0405 by INDEPENDENCE, at 243°, 62 miles, on course 090°, angels 8. At 0427

NAN-1 was launched to intercept and contact was made 14 minutes later at 150°, 40 miles. The bogey had by this time dropped down to angels 2, and had changed course to 000°. The RANDOLPH's SM radar had a good track on the bogey throughout and provided reliable altitude information as the enemy plane decreased altitude. However, the VF(N) lost contact, then regained it, and finally splashed the PAUL at 0509 on a bearing of 090°, 40 miles from the formation. NAN-1 was controlled by three different bases during the interception -- by RANDOLPH up to the time of the first contact, then by INDEPENDENCE, and finally by YORKTOWN, which was 15 miles closer to the scene of action and had better radar information as the VF(N) chased the Jap float plane on the deck.

(6) The RANDOLPH night group got a second kill early in the evening of 14 April, this time a FRANCES. NAN-6, under control of bases in Task Group 58.1, made contact at 2036 and splashed the FRANCES 3 minutes later on a bearing of 012°, 18 miles from TG 58.2.

(7) Between 1330 and 1430 on 14 April many scattered bogies were reported by TG 58.1 which was to the Northeast of TG 58.2. Because of the presence of many friendly divisions in the same general area, it became impossible to maintain a coherent plot of these raids but RANDOLPH divisions on CAP were vectored North to the vicinity of the radar picket line which was again bearing the brunt of the attack. In the melee which followed, RANDOLPH Division 11 shot down 2 TONYs, 1 BETTY, 2 MYRTs, while Division 3 splashed 1 ZEKE. This attack, made by several different types of enemy planes operating at various altitudes and featuring a liberal sprinkling of suiciders, presented a most confusing picture. Friendly divisions were distributed throughout the attack area and it became almost impossible to maintain any kind of track on the various split raids. Under the circumstances, the only possible action was to send additional divisions to the area in the hope that they would sight some of the bandits, as they did.

(8) It is now recognized that the Japs have a considerable knowledge of the "fades" inherent in our shipborne radar gear and that they are taking advantage of these blind areas to position suicide planes at high altitudes over our forces. On several occasions, small groups and single "high-flyers" were able to sneak in undetected and in some other cases when a few plots on approaching bogies were obtained the information was not complete enough to effect successful interceptions. One very definite need is for a satisfactory "Zenith Search" radar. An attempt

to employ the equipment from a VF(N) as a makeshift on this ship was unsuccessful and the need for a radar specifically designed for this type of search is indicated. The need for an air search radar less subject to fades than the present SC4 and SK2 models is also indicated, although it is realized that there may be insurmountable obstacles. Meanwhile, however, it is felt that one or two SP's or SM's in each task group should be assigned to high-altitude search, particularly when the force has been well scouted and the probability of air attacks exists. And in this connection it should be pointed out that directional IFF on SP and SM radars would help immeasurably in identifying air contacts. The present system is unreliable, at best.

(9) The coordination of efforts by task force and task group fighter directors provided a good flow of information to all ships throughout the operation. The exchange of information between task groups inquestionably saved the effort of many needless interceptions of friendly aircraft which might be showing "bogey" to some more distant bases. Attempted interception of the same bogey by two or more task groups caused confusion in several instances.

(10) Another source of confusion, when bogies were known to be in the vicinity, was the reporting by all bases, including this one, of contacts which had not been checked carefully enough. Side lobes, ships of the screen, and weather were often reported as bogies when a closer check might have established them for what they were.

(11) Although this ship had some unusually bad luck in its night fighter group -- four pilots were lost -- it is believed that the night fighters definitely proved their worth. RANDOLPH VF(N) shot down 5 enemy planes during the operation. What can be accomplished by night fighters under good conditions was demonstrated on the morning of 4 May when a single YORKTOWN VF(N), under RANDOLPH control, splashed 3 twin-engine planes, (2 BETTYs and 1 PEGGY or BETTY) in the space of less than 1 hour. In this instance, radio communication was excellent, radar information was good, and the night fighter pilot displayed exceptional ability not only in establishing and holding "contact" but also in burning the enemy planes with a minimum of delay once he had gotten into position. Photographs of these three splashes, which were made between 0353 and 0446 on 4 May at ranges of 45, 50, and 90 miles, are attached; see ANNEX (H).

(12) Except for those shot down by night fighters, the number of enemy planes destroyed by RANDOLPH planes on CAP over

the Task Force was small in relation to the total number shot down by the ship's air group. The group had its best hunting while on target CAP near OKINAWA, and on patrols and sweeps over the Northern Ryukus and Southern KYUSHU. This experience was typical of other air groups, as well. Nevertheless, a number of enemy planes were shot down by RANDOLPH's CAP's, both in the vicinity of the Task Group and over the radar picket line. Included in this total were 2 MYRTs, both intercepted at angels 23 while on probable reconnaissance missions near the group.

(c) Radar Countermeasures.

(1) No signals definitely established as enemy were intercepted by RANDOLPH receivers during this period.

(2) No evidence of electronic jamming by enemy was experienced. RANDOLPH did no electronic jamming during this period.

(3) Frequent use of "window" by enemy night hecklers and attack groups was noted. On at least one occasion a "gull" was dropped by an enemy bomber under attack by a VF(N) of an adjacent task group. This remained on RANDOLPH's radar screens for approximately 40 minutes and, except that its course and speed corresponded with that of the wind, it gave an indication very similar to that produced by a single, large plane. On the PPI, this "gull" showed up as a perfect "sausage", a pattern very much unlike that produced by "window". In every case, enemy deceptive tactics were quickly identified by radar operators and, even when considerable quantities of "window" were dropped, there was little difficulty in following the enemy planes. Nothing approaching complete saturation of any sector was achieved by Jap "window" during this operation, and it is felt that enemy efforts at deceptive tactics were more of a minor nuisance than a major threat. Unless "window" is employed in much greater quantity, it cannot be effective.

2. Communications.

(a) Radio.

The shortage of radio transmitters caused by destruction of Radio III and Radio V by explosion on 11 March limited the speed and flexibility of operating radio circuits. The limited number of transmitters remaining available in Radio II made it necessary to use only one transmitter in

a standby status for two circuits. Pending yard availability and the re-installation of equipment in Radio III and V, it is proposed to remedy the transmitter shortage by temporary installation of three TCZ transmitters in Radio II. Excellent use of available equipment was made and no unsurmountable difficulties were experienced due to the limited equipment. A complete allowance of transmitters, however, is required to provide normal speed and flexibility in circuit operation. When acting as flagship more circuits are required and shortage difficulties are more acute.

(b) Visual.

In general, the performance of visual signalling equipment and personnel was excellent. However, visual circuits were not utilized to normal capacity. At times this condition existed when the group VHF channel was overloaded. Tests of NAN equipment, using the X2A beacon, were made early in the operation and reports from other ships of the group indicate non-uniform radiation in all sectors. It is proposed to correct this situation during next availability.

(c) Intercepts.

Reception of intercepts was satisfactory. Occasional garbles and missing groups resulted in decryption difficulties. These were caused by.

a. Inaccurate reception by operator.
b. Interference and occasional jamming.

The first item is controllable and has been effectively reduced by constant training of operators and insistence that supervisors maintain a taut and fully-qualified watch on all circuits.

(d) TBS and VHF (Channel T).

Operation of these circuits was satisfactory. The increasing use of the Task Group VHF circuit for traffic which required distribution and action, either immediate or future, by ship's officers other than those on the bridge, indicates the need of:

a. Definite doctrine for originators to indicate which dispatches require write-up and routing; e. g., use or non-use of d/t group.
b. Quick means of delivery of voice dispatch copy from bridge to Communication Office.

During this operation the first difficulty above was solved by periodic review of TBS and VHF log by ship's CWO. Installation of a pneumatic message tube has been requested to effect more rapid delivery of voice dispatches from bridge to Communication Office.

3. Smoke concealment was used on the occasion of a Jap night air attack in bright moonlight on 28 April. It is considered that this smoke would have been most effective in hampering a torpedo attack.

4. No particular navigation problems or difficulties were encountered. In handling the ship it was found that when fast turns were made the heel of the ship was considerable and occasioned some difficulty in handling planes and bombs on the flight deck. It is believed that this ship and presumably other CV-9 Class carriers which have recently been completed have more top hamper than the earlier ships and as a consequence have more tendency to heel in turns.

5. Engineering. No comments.

6. Supply.

Refueling and replenishment were accomplished at sea under consistently favorable weather and sea conditions. When such conditions prevail and fueling days are spaced at intervals of four or five days, replenishment of fresh and dry provisions in a single day is considered entirely feasible. Average hourly loading figures were governed principally by time available alongside, increasing sharply as the time alongside increased, due to the decreased effect of time consumed in preliminaries, such as approach and rigging. Over-all figures for the period show the following averages and maximums:

	Average loading per hour	Maximum loading per hour
Fuel oil	169,000 gals.	190,000 gals.
Gasoline	30,000 gals.	40,000 gals.
Ammunition	35 tons	41 tons
Stores	20 tons	24 tons

The first replenishment of stores took place on 10 May, over a month after leaving base, by which time certain items were substantially depleted. Had stores been replenished on each fueling day from the beginning of the operation, less time alongside would have been required to keep well ahead of the ship's needs. Refueling and replenishment of gasoline consumed the largest proportionate amount of time due to the limited pumping capacity of the oilers and the greater depletion of the gasoline supply.

7. Medical.

(a) At the completion of this action, it was necessary to transfer eight enlisted men because of combat fatigue. These men had spent their ability to suppress the feeling of fear which affects everyone to a more or less degree in the combat zone. As a result of this uncontrollable fear, these men were not only worthless as members of the crew, but in time of action were a definite menace. From observation, it appears that there is a definite accumulative effect of this stress and strain and the fifty-odd days spent under combat conditions exhausted these individuals. To further burden their nervous systems would have been disastrous.

(b) It is felt however, that if these men were shore-based in areas removed from combat pressure they could do a noteworthy job. Such a procedure would also have a positive effect on the morale of the crew because it places no premium on weakness, whether moral or physical. The term "premium" is intended to mean duty within the continental limits of the United States.

(c) Besides these eight men who were transferred, there were approximately fifteen others who were under medical observation for the same condition, but whose conditions did not warrant transfer at the time. It is expected that a period of recreation will go a long way in rehabilitating these individuals.

PART VII - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Reports of casualties are contained in ANNEX (C) and ANNEX (F). For comments on personnel performance by the Medical Officer, see Part VI, D, 7.

SECRET

TABLE OF SORTIES AND PLANE AVAILABILITY..

DATE	AVAILABILITY				AT TARGET STRIKE & SWEEP					SEARCH			Ships CAP	ASP			OTHER		
	VF	VF(N)	VB	VT	VF	VF(N)	VB	VT	CAP	VF	VB	VT		VF	VB	VT	VF	VB	VT
5 Apr.	51	4	15	15									16		4	4			2
6 Apr.	40	4	13	12									16		4	4	4		
7 Apr.	60	4	13	13						18			16		4	4			
8 Apr.	55	4	15	14					79				32				21		
9 Apr.	58	4	16	15					76				32				24	8	
10 Apr.	57	4	13	15									80				28	8	
11 Apr.	48	4	12	14												2			
12 Apr.	65	4	15	15					4				68						
13 Apr.	64	4	15	15									69						
14 Apr.	65	4	15	15	26		6	15					86				7		
15 Apr.	64	4	15	15	28		5	5					82						
16 Apr.	57	4	15	15									28		8				
17 Apr.	65	6	15	15	24		19	23	36	8	4		30						
18 Apr.	68	6	15	15									16						
19 Apr.	60	4	14	14	14		12	12	56				44						
20 Apr.	62	6	14	14	8	4	23	23	56				48						
21 Apr.	62	6	15	15	4		9	11	48				59						
22 Apr.	62	6	13	14	6	4	9	12	80				24						
23 Apr.	62	6	12	14									20						
24 Apr.	57	6	15	15									8						
25 Apr.	62	6	15	15	16								41						
26 Apr.	56	6	15	14	56								32						
27 Apr.	62	6	14	14									8						
28 Apr.	67	6	15	14	16		16	8	47				37						
29 Apr.	62	6	15	14	8		14	16	52				21						
30 Apr.	67	6	13	14	4		7	8	36				24						
1 May.	57	5	13	14									8						
2 May.	62	5	14	14	4		8	8	4				48				8		
3 May.	60	4	14	14	4		8	8	26				28						
4 May.	57	3	14	14	10		11	12	60				24						
5 May.	56	4	12	10	8		12	9	12				60						
6 May.	52	4	12	11									8						
7 May.	62	4	14	13	12		12	12	47				36						
8 May.	60	5	14	14															
9 May.	64	6	14	14	6		11	11	44				36						
10 May.	60	6	13	13	12			10					8						
11 May.	60	5	14	13	4			8	40				76						
12 May.	63	5	14	12	8			16	40				52						
13 May.	60	6	15	15	86		29	24					44				6		
14 May.	60	6	15	13	75		26	25					53				14		
15 May.	54	6	12	12									8						
16 May.	54	6	12	12									8						
17 May.	64	6	14	14	4				36				56						
18 May.	64	6	15	15	12		8	9	44				56						
19 May.	63	6	15	15									8						
20 May.	64	6	15	15	4			9	60				38						
21 May.	64	6	15	15	40								4						
22 May.	60	4	15	15													12		

SECRET

TABLE OF SORTIES AND PLANE AVAILABILITY.

DATE	AVAILABILITY				AT TARGET STRIKE & SWEEP				AT TARGET CAP	SEARCH			Ships CAP	ASP			OTHER		
	VF	VF(N)	VB	VT	VF	VF(N)	VB	VT		VF	VB	VT		VF	VB	VT	VF	VB	VT
23 May	62	4	15	13	19		3	12					8						
24 May	62	4	15	15					40				48						
25 May	62	6	15	13									46						
26 May	64	6	15	13									16						
27 May	58	6	15	13									8						
28 May	64	6	15	15					52				32						
29 May	66	6	15	14									32			8			
30 May	66	6	14	14									32			16			
31 May	66	6	14	14									8			4			

SECRET

TABLE OF ROCKETS, BOMBS, AND TORPEDOES, ETC., DROPPED AT TARGET BY STRIKES AND SWEEPS (INCLUDING STRAFING SORTIES)

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES AT TRGT.			BOMBS AND ROCKETS		FUZING	
			General	Specific	VF	VB	VT	No.	Type	Nose	Tail
TCAP #1	8 Apr.	0622	TOKUNO and KIKAI ISLANDS	A/C and Air Facilities	16			32	5" HVAR		
TCAP #2	"	0756	as above	as above	14			27	5" HVAR		
TCAP #3	"	1025	as above	as above	16			31	5" HVAR		
TCAP #4	"	1257	as above	as above	15			28	5" HVAR		
TCAP #1	9 Apr.	0524	TOKUNO ISLAND	Radio Station	16			31	5" HVAR		
TCAP #2	"	0758	as above	as above	14			26	5" HVAR		
Support Strike 2A	14 Apr.	0522	OKINAWA	Mortar instal-lations	8		7	27 32	500# GP 5" HVAR	8-12 Sec	
MIURA Strike	"	0845	KAKE-ROMA SHIMA	Suspected Sub Base	10	6		48 11 5	5" HVAR 500# GP 250# GP	.1 .1	.025 .025
Support Strike 3C	"	1310	OKINAWA	IE SHIMA Artillery Positions	8		8	20 32 12	3.25/5" HE 500# GP 5" HVAR	8-12 Sec.	
Support Strike 2A	15 Apr.	0530	OKINAWA	Mortar and Artillery Positions	8	5	5	20 32 30 4	3.25/5" HE 5" HVAR 500# GP 250# GP	.1 .1	.025 .025
Special KYUSHU Strike	"	1313	KYUSHU	A/C and Facilities No. 313, KUSHIRA	20			79	5" HVAR		
Support 3	17 Apr.	0829	OKINAWA	Artillery Positions	12	9	11	35 40 60	3.25/5" HE 5" HVAR 500# GP	8-15 Sec.	

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TABLE OF ROCKETS, BOMBS, AND TORPEDOES, ETC., DROPPED AT TARGET BY STRIKES AND SWEEPS (INCLUDING STRAFING SORTIES)

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACKED General	Specific	AT TRGT. VF	VB	VT	BOMBS AND ROCKETS No.	Type	FUZING Nose	Tail
Support 6	17 Apr.	1428	OKINAWA	Gun Positions, Misc. Installtns.	12	10	12	33 48 67	3.25/5" HE 5" HVAR 500# GP	8-15 Sec	
Support Strike 1	19 Apr.	0526	OKINAWA	Town of CHAN, Tank concentratns.	12	12	12	48 44 6 11 10	3.25/5" RP 5" HVAR 500# GP 1000#GP 2000#GP	.1 4-5 Sec 4-5 Sec	.1
Support 1	20 Apr.	0656	OKINAWA	Towns, Artillery Positions, Barracks, Tanks	4	11	12	43 16 64	3.25/5" RP 5" HVAR 500# GP	4-5 Sec	
Support 4	"	1129	OKINAWA	as above	4	12	11	47 16 69	3.25/5" RP 5" HVAR 500# GP	4-5 Sec	
Support 3	21 Apr.	1428	OKINAWA	OROKU & OROKU MURA Buildings, etc.	4	9	11	35 16 66	3.25/5" RP 5" HVAR 500# GP	Inst.	.1 Sec
Dawn KIKAI CAP	22 Apr.	0300	KIKAI	A/F Installations	4			16	3.25/5" RP		
Support 3	"	1118	OKINAWA	Caves, Blockhouses, Buildings	6	9	12	35 18 69	3.25/5" RP 5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1
KIKAI CAP 1	25 Apr.	0902	KIKAI	A/F Installations	8			31 8	5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1
KIKAI CAP 5	"	1129	KIKAI	A/F Installations	8			30 8	5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1
KIKAI-KONIYA Patrol 1	26 Apr.	0526	KIKAI-AMAMI	Revets. and Seaplane Base	8			32 8	5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1
KIKAI-KONIYA Patrol 2	"	0657	as above	as above	8			32 8	5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1

SECRET

TABLE OF ROCKETS, BOMBS, AND TORPEDOES, ETC., DROPPED AT TARGET BY STRIKES AND SWEEPS (INCLUDING STRAFING SORTIES)

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACKED		AT TRGT.			BOMBS AND ROCKETS		FUZING	
			General	Specific	VF	VB	VT	Nb.	Type	Nose	Tail
KIKAI-KONIYA Patrol 4	26 Apr	1000	KIKAI-AMAMI	Underground Hangars, etc.	8			32 8	5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1
KIKAI-KONIYA Sweep	"	1427	KIKAI-AMAMI	as above	16			60 16	5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1
KIKAI CAP 1	28 Apr	0511	KIKAI-AMAMI	WAN Field	8			20 8	5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1
Support 1	"	0656	OKINAWA	Docks, roads, railroads, etc.	4	8	8	32 16 52	3.25/5" RP 5" HVAR 500# GP		4-5 Sec
Support 4	"	1128	OKINAWA	Command post areas		8		32 16	3.25/5# RP 500# GP		4-5 Sec
KIKAI CAP 6	"	1258	KIKAI-AMAMI	WAN Field	8			26 8	5" HVAR 500# GP	.1	.1
Special Shipping Sweep	"	1427	NAZE KO	Beached ships-Towns	14			8	500# GP		4-5 Sec
Support 2	29 Apr	0827	OKINAWA	Bridge, barracks & gun posits.	4	7	8	51 50	3.25/5" RP 500# GP		4-5 Sec
Support 5	"	1256	OKINAWA	Troops, guns, Power plant	4	7	8	48 49	3.25/5" RP 500# GP		4-5 Sec
Support 3	30 Apr	1124	OKINAWA	Troops, Mortars, Caves	4	7	8	51 50	3.25/5" RP 500# GP		4-5 Sec
Strike B	3 May	0828	KIKAI	Covered revetments WAN Field	4	8	8	48 28 20	3.25/5" RP 350# Dpth. Ch. 500# GP	Inst .1	.025
KIKAI Patrol 3	"	0828	KIKAI	as above	10			32 8	3.25/5" RP 500# GP	.1	.025

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TABLE OF ROCKETS, BOMBS, AND TORPEDOES, ETC., DROPPED AT TARGET BY STRIKES AND SWEEPS (INCLUDING STRAFING SORTIES)

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACKED		AT TRGT.			BOMBS AND ROCKETS		FUZING	
			General	Specific	VF	VB	VT	Nos	Type	Nose	Tail
KIKAI Patrol 5	3 May	1159	KIKAI	Wooded area around WAN Field	8			13	Napalm 58-gal.		
KIKAI Patrol 7	3 May	1502	as above	as above	8			15	Napalm 58-gal		
AMAMI Patrol 2	4 May	0642	as above	as above	12			24	500# GP	.1	.025
Support 1	4 May	0758	OKINAWA	Troop concentrations	8	11	12	91 44 28	3.25/5" RP 500# GP 500# GP	.1	4-5 Sec .1
AMAMI Patrol 5	4 May	1126	KIKAI	Wooded areas, revetments, WAN Field	12			14	Napalm 58-gal		
Support 2	5 May	0957	OKINAWA	AA positions	8	12	9	93 56	3.25/5" RP 500# GP	.1	.1
AMAMI Patrol 7	5 May	1458	AMAMI	Wooded areas along Taxi-way	12			24	Napalm 58-gal		
KIKAI Patrol 1	7 May	0512	AMAMI-KIKAI	WAN Field	8			16	500# GP	.1	.1
KIKAI Patrol 2	7 May	0645	as above	as above	11			14	500# GP	.1	.1
Support 2	7 May	0956	OKINAWA	Supply bldgs. - troops - artillery	4	12	12	66 69	3.25/5" RP 500# GP		4-5 Sec
KIKAI Patrol 6	7 May	1328	AMAMI-KIKAI	Shipping at KAKEROMA; revetments at WAN A/F	16			21 6 10	5" HVAR 500# GP Napalm 58-gal	.1	.025
KIKAI-AMAMI Patrol 4	9 May	0957	AMAMI-KIKAI	Small boats and LST at KAKEROMA	12			23 6	3.25/5" RP 500# GP	.1	.1

SECRET

TABLE OF ROCKETS, BOMBS, AND TORPEDOES, ETC., DROPPED AT TARGET BY STRIKES AND SWEEPS (INCLUDING STRAFING SORTIES)

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACKED General	TARGET ATTACKED Specific	AT TRGT. VF	AT TRGT. VB	AT TRGT. VT	BOMBS AND ROCKETS No.	BOMBS AND ROCKETS Type	FUZING Nose	FUZING Tail
KIKAI-AMAMI Patrol 5	9 May	1141	AMAMI-KIKAI	Small boats and LST at KAKEROMA	8			20	3.25/5" RP		
								7	500# GP	.1	.01
KIKAI Strike	9 May	1313	KIKAI	WAN Town, northern half	4	11	11	16	3.25/5" RP		
								6	Napalm, 58 gal		
								103	Inc. Clus.		
								12	260#Frag.	Inst.	N.D.
								22	250# GP	.1	.01
								22	500# GP	.1	.01
Special MINAMI Strike	10 May	1647	MINAMI DAITO SHIMA	MINAMI Airfield	12		10	24	3.25/5" RP		
								36	5" HVAR		
								45	500# GP	.1	.025
Support 2	11 May	1153	OKINAWA	Caves, mortar installations, ammo. dump	4		8	24	3.25/5" RP		
								36	500# GP	.1	.025
Support 2	12 May	0644	OKINAWA	Ammo. dump, artillery in caves	4		8	24	3.25/5" RP		
								4	500# GP	.1	.025
								32	500# GP		4-5 Sec
Support 5	12 May	1143	OKINAWA	Troop concentrations, pill boxes, mortar empl.	4		8	24	3.25/5" RP		
								4	500# GP	.1	.025
								32	500# GP		4-5 Sec
Sweep 1	13 May	0443	KYUSHU Airfields	332 KUMAMOTO 333 KIKUTOMI 334 KIKUCHI 335 WAIFU	16			47	3.25/5" RP		
								16	260#Frag	Inst.	N.D.
Sweep 2	13 May	0911	as above	332 KUMAMOTO	15			16	260#Frag	Inst.	N.D.
								32	3.25/5" RP		
Sweep 3	13 May	1451	as above	353 OMURA, MTB's AMAKUSA NADA	16			32	3.25/5" RP		
								16	260#Frag	Inst.	N.D.
Strike ABLE	13 May	0527	as above	334 KIKUCHI	16	14	13	125	100# GP	Inst.	.025
								11	260#Frag	Inst.	N.D.
								56	500# GP	Inst.	.025
Strike BAKER	13 May	1115	as above	335 WAIFU	15	15	11	131	100# GP	Inst.	.025
								12	260#Frag	Inst.	N.D.
								59	500# GP	Inst.	.025

SECRET

TABLE OF ROCKETS, BOMBS, AND TORPEDOES, ETC., DROPPED AT TARGET BY STRIKES AND SWEEPS (INCLUDING STRAFING SORTIES)

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACKED General	TARGET ATTACKED Specific	AT TRGT. VF	AT TRGT. VB	AT TRGT. VT	BOMBS AND ROCKETS No.	BOMBS AND ROCKETS Type	FUZING Nose	FUZING Tail
Sweep 1	14 May	0442	KYUSHU A/F's	310 MYAZAKI 335 WAIFU	16			48 16	5" HVAR 260#Frag	Inst.	N.D.
Sweep 2	14 May	0929	as above	353 OMURA	12			47 15	5" HVAR 260#Frag	Inst.	N.D.
Sweep 3	14 May	1445	as above	364 SADOHARA 303 NITTAGA-HARA 307 TOMITAKA	15			82 7	5" HVAR 260#Frag	Inst.	N.D.
Strike ABLE	14 May	0526	as above	302 USA	16	14	13	155 10 58	100#GP 260#Frag 500# GP	Inst. Inst. Inst.	.025 N.D. .025
Strike BAKER	14 May	1209	as above	KUMAMOTO Air-frame Plant	11	12	11	9 70 12	260#Frag 500# GP 1000#GP	Inst. .1 .1	N.D. .025 .025
AMAMI-YOKOATE Patrol 3	17 May	0827	YOKOATE	Radio Station	12			66	3.25/5" RP		
KIKAI-TOKUNO 3	17 May	0827	TOKUNO	New caves at northeast end of island	8			48	3.25/5" RP		
AMAMI-YOKOATE Patrol 7	17 May	1459	YOKOATE	Radio Station	12			66 7	3.25/5" RP 500# GP	.1	.025
AMAMI-YOKOATE Patrol 2	18 May	0643	YAKU	Town and Bridge	12			64	3.25/5" RP		
KIKAI-TOKUNO Patrol 2	18 May	0643	KIKAI-TOKUNO	Airfield Installations	8			46	3.25/5" RP		
AMAMI-YOKOATE Patrol 5	18 May	1141	TANEGA-YAKU	Hangars, Barracks	12			61	3.25/5" RP		
AMAMI-YOKOATE Patrol 6	18 May	1312	YAKU	Town, Sawmill	12			58	3.25/5" RP		

SECRET

TABLE OF ROCKETS, BOMBS, AND TORPEDOES, ETC., DROPPED AT TARGET BY STRIKES AND SWEEPS (INCLUDING STRAFING SORTIES)

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACKED		AT TRGT.			BOMBS AND ROCKETS		FUZING	
			General	Specific	VF	VB	VT	No.	Type	Nose	Tail
KAKEROMA Strike 1	18 May	0830	KAKEROMA	Storage Depot	4	8	9	24 105 5 14	5" HVAR 100# GP 250# GP 500# GP	.1 .1 .1	.025 .025 .025
Support 6	20 May	1312	OKINAWA	Targets of opportunity	4		9	23 40	3.25/5"RP 500#GP	.1	.025
MINAMI STRIKE	23 May	1155	MINAMI DAITO SHIMA	Runways A/F	16	3	12	52 42 72 22 14	3.25/5"RP 5" HVAR 100# GP 500# GP 500# GP	.1 .1	.025 .025 8-15Sec
KIKAI AMAMI Patrol 6	24 May	1358	KIKAI	Runways, WAN A/F	16			8 8	500# GP 500# GP	.1	.025 8-15Sec
KIKAI AMAMI Patrol 7	24 May	1526	as above	as above	16			8 8	500# GP 500# GP	.1	8-15Sec .025

OWN PLANE LOSSES AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

(a) Aircraft, Pilots, and Aircrewmen Lost

DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TYPE AIRCRAFT	CIRCUMSTANCES, PLACE, AND CAUSE OF PLANE LOSS	NO. PILOTS LOST	NO. AIR CREW LOST	NO. PILOTS SAVED	NO. AIR CREW SAVED
5 Apr		F6F-5	Structurally damaged beyond repair by high G pull-out				
7 Apr		F6F-5	as above				
8 Apr	1257	F6F-5	Hit by enemy AA at WAN A/F, KIKAI, made water landing			1	
9 Apr		SB2C-4E	Barrier crash landing				
10 Apr	1201	F6F-5	Mechanical failure, made water landing within force			1	
14 Apr	0845	F6F-5	Hit by enemy AA over KAKEROMA, bailed out within Task Group			1	
14 Apr		F6F-5	Damaged beyond repair by blast from ship's 5" guns				
14 Apr		F6F-5	as above				
14 Apr		F6F-5	as above				
14 Apr		F6F-5	as above				
14 Apr		F6F-5	as above				
17 Apr	0938	F6F-5	Mechanical failure on take-off, went in water			1	
17 Apr	0938	F6F-5	Tail hook pulled out on landing, went over side	1			
17 Apr		F6F-5	Damaged beyond repair by blast from ship's 5" guns				
21 Apr	0828	F6F-5	Burned when belly tank dropped on deck in landing				
21 Apr	1428	SB2C-4E	Mechanical failure, went in water on take-off			1	1
21 Apr		SB2C-4E	Barrier crash landing				
22 Apr	1427	F6F-5	Hit by AA at WAN A/F, KIKAI, landed at YONTAN A/F, OKINAWA				
24 Apr		F6F-5	Damaged beyond repair by collision on board				
27 Apr		F6F-5	Damaged beyond repair by blast from ship's 5" guns				
27 Apr		F6F-5	Wrinkled fuselage, stripped, and jettisoned				
29 Apr	1730	F6F-5	Hit by enemy AA over WAN A/F, KIKAI, ditched near ship			1	
29 Apr		F6F-5	Damaged beyond repair by blast from ship's 5" guns				
29 Apr	0827	SB2C-4E	Barrier crash landing				
30 Apr	0644	F6F-5	" " "				
2 May	0300	F6F-5N	Believed to have been collision of 2 VFN dawn pat.-facts unknown	1			

OWN PLANE LOSSES AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

(a) Aircraft, Pilots, and Aircrewmen Lost

DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TYPE AIRCRAFT	CIRCUMSTANCES, PLACE, AND CAUSE OF PLANE LOSS	NO. PILOTS LOST	NO. AIR CREW LOST	NO. PILOTS SAVED	NO. AIR CREW SAVED
2 May	0300	F6F-5N	Believed to have been collision of 2 VFN dawn pat.-facts unknown	1			
3 May	0828	F6F-5N	Hit by enemy AA over WAN A/F, KI-KAI, down in water South of KIKAI			1	
4 May	1126	F6F-5	Mechanical failure, ditched 45 miles from ship			1	
4 May	1126	F6F-5	Mechanical failure, ditched near radar pickets en route target			1	
4 May	0642	F6F-5	Barrier crash landing				
4 May		F6F-5	Structural corrosion, stripped and jettisoned				
5 May	0957	TBM-3	Mechanical failure, landed in water on take-off			1	2
5 May	0957	SB2C-4E	Barrier crash landing				
5 May	0957	SB2C-4E	Hit by AA over OKINAWA, crashed in barrier on landing				
5 May		F6F-5	Fuselage buckled, stripped and jettisoned				
5 May		F6F-5	as above				
11 May		F6F-5	Wrinkled fuselage and tail section, stripped and jettisoned				
11 May		F6F-5	Buckled fuselage, stripped and jettisoned				
12 May	1143	F6F-5	Hit by enemy AA over OKINAWA and crashed behind enemy lines	1			
12 May	1143	F6F-5	Hit by enemy AA over OKINAWA, damaged beyond repair				
13 May	0527	TBM-3	Hit by enemy AA near KIKUCHI, damaged beyond repair				
14 May	0526	SB2C-4E	Hit by enemy AA over USA A/F, ditched in SUO NADA			1	1
14 May	1445	F6F-5	Hit by enemy AA and crashed at SADOHARA A/F	1			
14 May	1445	F6F-5	Hit by AA over KYUSHU, damaged beyond repair				
18 May	1312	F6F-5	Crashed off shore SW of TOKUNO A/F, cause not known	1			
21 May	1730	F6F-5N	Wrinkled fuselage, stripped and jettisoned				
21 May	1730	F6F-5N	Collided in air with other member of flight	1			
21 May	1730	F6F-5N	as above	1			
23 May	1155	TBM-3	Ditched 7 mi. West of MINAMI, water in gasoline			1	2
23 May	1155	TBM-3	Ditched near ship returning from mission, water in gas.			1	2

OWN PLANE LOSSES AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

(b) Rescue methods and facilities employed

(1) 8 April 1945, F6F-5, Launched at 1257

Hit by enemy AA over WAN Field, KIKAI; was not seen to go down by other members of flight. A search in bad weather conditions failed to locate any trace of survivor. Subsequent searches equally negative. On 12 April survivor, who had been in his raft drifting in a northerly direction since bailing out, managed to attract the attention of 2 PBM search planes with his signal mirror. One landed and took the survivor aboard. He was subsequently returned to the ship.

(2) 10 April 1945, F6F-5, Launched at 1201

Ditched because of mechanical failure and was promptly picked up by a destroyer of the Task Group.

(3) 14 April 1945, F6F-5, Launched at 0845

Hit by AA at AMAMI, bailed out making a satisfactory landing. A Dumbo PBM summoned by organized air/sea rescue procedure landed and picked up survivor in about 2 hours.

(4) 17 April 1945, F6F-5, Launched at 0938

Went off side of flight deck on take-off due to trouble with brakes. Rescued by destroyer in Task Group.

(5) 17 April 1945, F6F-5, Launched at 0938

Tail hook pulled out after a fast landing and plane went over side. Pilot was not seen afterward, although destroyers made a thorough and prolonged search of the area.

(6) 21 April 1945, SB2C-4E, Launched at 1428

Ditched immediately after take-off. Pilot and crewman got out of plane and in raft from which they were picked up by a destroyer of the Task Group.

(7) 29 April 1945, F6F-5N, Launched at 1730

Hit by enemy AA over WAN Field, KIKAI. Returned and ditched near Task Group where a destroyer effected rescue.

(8) 2 May 1945, F6F-5N, Launched at 0300 (Two planes)

Two of four night fighter pilots separated from other two and were not seen subsequently. Several air searches during same and succeeding days failed to reveal any trace of survivors.

(9) 3 May 1945, F6F-5, Launched at 0828

Hit by enemy AA at WAN Field, KIKAI; ditched plane south of that island. Rescue procedure followed. SB2C returning from strike dropped 2-man life raft. Survivor got in and was picked up by Dumbo PBM about 3 hours after ditching.

(10) 4 May 1945, F6F-5, Launched at 1126

Ditched due to mechanical failure on way to target. A radar picket destroyer about 10 miles away hastened to a successful rescue.

OWN PLANE LOSSES AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

(b) Rescue methods and facilities employed

(11) 4 May 1945, F6F-5, Launched at 1126
Ditched due to mechanical failure while on a target air patrol over AMAMI-KIKAI area. Pilot was able to land near radar picket destroyers which picked him up in a very few minutes.

(12) 5 May 1945, TBM-3, Launched at 0957
Ditched immediately after take-off. Plane stayed afloat 1 minute and 40 seconds. Pilot and 2 crewmen rescued from raft by a destroyer of the Task Group.

(13) 14 May 1945, SB2C-4E, Launched at 0526
Hit by AA at 302 USA. Made water landing in INLAND SEA (SUO NADA) and pilot and crewman got into raft. Two OS2U's sent by CTG 58.3 over 200 miles away made landing in INLAND SEA and rescued both, returning them safely to base.

(14) 23 May 1945, TBM-3, Launched at 1155
Made water landing 7 miles west of MINAMI DAITO SHIMA while on strike to crater runways. Pilot and two crewmen got into raft and were rescued by Kingfishers sent by CTG 58.3. Forced landing was due to water in gasoline.

(15) 23 May 1945, TBM-3, Launched at 1155
Ditched near ship on return from strike on MINAMI DAITO SHIMA due to water in gasoline. Pilot and two crewmen got in raft and were rescued immediately by destroyer.

SECRET

(a) ENEMY PLANES DESTROYED IN COMBAT ON LAND OR WATER AND ENEMY SHIPS SUNK, PROBABLY SUNK, AND DAMAGED BY STRIKES

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	LOCATION	AIRCRAFT DESTROYED		SHIPPING DESTROYED		
				In Air	Ground or Water	SUNK	PROBABLY SUNK	DAMAGED
TCAP #2	9 Apr	0758	TOKUNO A/F		1 S/E *			
CAP	12 Apr	0523	30 mi. N. of MINAMI DAITO JIMA	1 JUDY				
TCAP #1	12 Apr	1359	OKINAWA	1 DINAH				
DADCAP	14 Apr	0505	Near force	1 PAUL				
CAP	14 Apr	1400	Near force	2 TONY 2 MYRT 1 BETTY 1 ZEKE				
DADCAP	14 Apr	2030	18 mi. N. of Task Force	1 FRANCES				
Special KYUSHU	15 Apr	1500	N. 113 KUSHIRA	1 TOJO	2 U/I * Singles			
TCAP AMAMI-KIKAI	17 Apr	0616	S. KIKAI and E. of AMAMI	8 ZEKE 5 OSCAR 1 GEORGE				
NIGHT CAP	20 Apr	0037	Near force	2 BETTY				
AMAMI CAP	21 Apr	1127	AKAOGI on AMAMI		1 JACK *			
Support #3	22 Apr	1118	Near KIKAI	2 TONY 5 ZEKE				
TCAP #7	22 Apr	1427	Near OKINAWA	4 NATE 1 VAL				
KIKAI CAP #6	28 Apr	0511	KIKAI		1 Single *			
TCAP #7	29 Apr	1425	OKINAWA	3 ZEKE 1 TOJO				
KIKAI DAWN CAP	2 May	0300	KIKAI	1 TONY				
AMAMI Pat. #1	4 May	0642	AMAMI KIKAI	9 FRANK 1 ZEKE				
TCAP #3	7 May	0757	Returning OKINAWA	1 FRANCES				
KIKAI Pat. #2	7 May	0642	AMAMI				2 Small Craft	Small craft, Several
KIKAI-AMAMI Pat. #5	9 May	1141	AMAMI				1 Lugger	1 LST 1 LCI
CAP 2	11 May	0841	Over Force Rad. Pickets	2 TONY 1 ZEKE				
CAP 2	13 May	0758	Near Force	1 MYRT				

* Pilot Report.

SECRET

(a) ENEMY PLANES DESTROYED IN COMBAT ON LAND OR WATER AND ENEMY SHIPS SUNK, PROBABLY SUNK, AND DAMAGED BY STRIKES

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	LOCATION	AIRCRAFT DESTROYED		SHIPPING DESTROYED		
				In Air	Ground or Water	SUNK	PROBABLY SUNK	DAMAGED
Sweep 1	13 May	0445	KIKUCHI A/F		2 BETTY * 3 U/I Sing.			
Sweep 2	13 May	0911	KUMAMOTO A/F		1 TOPSY *			
Sweep 3	13 May	1451	AMAKUSA NADA North of NAGA-SAKI				4 MTB's 4 Small Motor Craft	1 SB
CAP 1	14 May	0442	Force	7 ZEKE 1 JUDY 1 FRANK				
Strike ABLE	14 May	0526	USA A/F	1 DINAH 1 U/I Bi-plane		1 30-foot motorboat		1 Lugger 2 SAS
CAP 2	14 May	0757	Force	1 ZEKE				
Photo 1	14 May	0757	Force	1 NICK				
Sweep 2	14 May	0929	AMAKUSA JIMA					1 SAS
Sweep 3	14 May	1445	SADOHARA NITTAGA-HARA TOMITAKA		2 T/E * 1 S/E 1 S/E, 1 T/E			
Strike BAKER	14 May	1209	KIKUCHI A/F		3 U/I *			

* Pilot report.

(b) DAMAGE TO LAND TARGETS.

(1) OKINAWA - During the period covered by this report, 23 strikes, involving 506 sorties, were launched against land targets in support of the ground forces. In all cases assignment of targets was made by an airborne or ground based target coordinator when the planes arrived on station. Usually only areas on gridded charts, with landmarks for closer identification, were designated to the strike leader, the targets themselves not being visible from the air. Visual assessment of damage was impossible but favorable comment from the coordinator was common. Targets included pill boxes, gun emplacements, mortar installations, artillery positions, ammunition dumps, troop concentrations, barracks, block houses, caves, supply buildings, towns, transportation areas, tanks, trucks, strategic roads, railroads, bridges, docks, and communications facilities. It is likely that many targets were hit several times by different striking groups. See Photos Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

(2) 14 April, SUSPECTED SUBMARINE BASE, KAKEROMA - No midget submarines were discovered but buildings about 300 yards inland from the suspected base were hit with 5 bombs and numerous rockets, causing heavy damage. See photo No. 2.

(3) 15 April, KUSHIRA AIRFIELD, KYUSHU - 1 double hangar left burning.

(4) 3 May, WAN AIRFIELD, KIKAI - Depth charges and Napalm bombs dropped on covered revetments and wooded areas about the field, suspected of being plane hideouts. Good fires were started throughout the area.

(5) 4 May, WAN AIRFIELD, KIKAI - Napalm treatment of covered revetment areas continued with good fires started.

(6) 5 May, WAN AIRFIELD, KIKAI - More Napalm dropped along main taxiway northeast of field. Fires started in buildings burned for over an hour.

(7) 7 May, WAN FIELD, KIKAI - GP and Napalm bombs dropped in military headquarters area where several buildings were destroyed and fires started. More fires started in covered revetment areas. See photo No. 14.

(8) 9 May, WAN TOWN, KIKAI - Northern half of town, north of airfield, hit with GP, Napalm, and incendiary bombs and frag clusters. Good fires started and direct hits scored on buildings near shore believed to be warehouses. See photos Nos. 15 and 16.

(9) 10 May, MINAMI DAITO SHIMA - Bombed and cratered runways, 1 of which was already well cratered. Destroyed 1 heavy AA position in a small wooded area near field with 1 direct bomb hit and rockets.

(10) 13 May, TAMANA AIRFIELD, KYUSHU - 80% of bomb load dropped on building area at southwest corner of field, causing heavy

(b) DAMAGE TO LAND TARGETS.

destruction. See photo No. 22.

(11) 13 May, KIKUCHI AIRFIELD, KYUSHU - Many buildings destroyed at southwest end of field. See photos Nos. 20 and 21.

(12) 14 May, USA FIELD, KYUSHU - All bombs dropped in building area which was obscured by smoke and dust as a result of a strike made by planes from U. S. S. ESSEX which had hit this field in error. Amount of damage not known.

(13) 14 May, KUMAMOTO ENGINE PLANT, KYUSHU - This target had already been damaged by other strikes but additional heavy damage was inflicted as indicated by photos. Planes from U. S. S. BATAAN participated in the strike. See photos Nos. 23 and 24.

(14) 17 May, TAKARA SHIMA RADIO STATION - Installation completely destroyed by bombs and rockets.

(15) 18 May, YAKU SHIMA - Fighter patrols armed with rockets set fires in a town on the east side of the island, damaged an important bridge, and fired a sawmill.

(16) 18 May, NAZE KO, AMAMI - Fighter patrol set a fuel dump afire on a small island. See photo No. 28.

(17) 18 May, KAKEROMA STORAGE DEPOT - 2 small buildings destroyed, 1 large storage building 60% destroyed, 2 large storage buildings damaged. Damage to target estimated at 5 to 10 percent. See photo No. 27.

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REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A. A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

Location of ship (area) 26°-54' N. 130°-20'.5 E U.S.S. RANDOLPH (CV-15) TG58.2
Zone Time 1948 (-9) Date 14 April 1945

NOTES

(a) REPEL ATTACK FIRST - then collect data for this report
(b) Do not "Gun Deck" this report. If data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy, enter dash in space for which not data is available.
(c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed with data available from ship's log, memory, and consultation with ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data are of doubtful accuracy, fill in with general terms.
(d) Forward under separate cover to Readiness Division, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

1. Surprise attack(yes or no) No Day or night Night
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar
3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10, less than 5 miles) 50 miles
4. Total number of planes observed four (4) Type Unknown
5. Number of planes attacking own ship three (3) Type Unknown
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship Three (3)
   (a) Of those attacking own ship three (3) Type ---
   (b) Others None Type ----
7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet 1. 163 kts 13,000 ft.
   2. 220 kts 1,700 ft.
   3. 180 kts 11,600 ft.
8. Number of guns firing 14 by caliber 10-5"/38; 1-40MM quad.
9. Ammunition expended by caliber and type 40MM-120 rds., Mk40-199, Mk18-45
10. Percent service allowance expended 40MM-less than 0.5%, Mk40-8.3%, Mk18-0.9%
11. Method of control Mk37 Director Full radar Method of spotting None
    Method of ranging Radar Method of firing Rapid fire
12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 1 - 4 min., 2 - 1 min., 3 - 2 min.
13. Approximate time of first hits None observed.
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot 1-30 seconds, 2-1 minute, 3-1½ min.
15. Approximate position angle open fire 1-20°; 2-5°; 3-20°
16. Approximate position angle cease fire 1-60°; 2-60°; 3-70°
17. Approximate bearing first shot 1 - 145°; 2 - 300°; 3 - 120°
18. Approximate bearing last shot 1-045°; 2-300°; 3 - 180°
19. Approximate range first shot 1 - 8,200; 2 - 11,000, 3 - 12,400
    Altitude of plane 1 - 13,000 ft., 2 - 1,700; 3 - 11,600 ft.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 1-4,700; 2-3,200, 3-3,500
    Altitude 1-13,000; 2-1,700; 3-11,600.
21. Approximate range last shot 1 - 4,700; 2 - 3,200; 3 - 3,500
    Altitude of plane Same as 20.
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release ---- Size of bomb ----
23. Approximate range torpedo release ---- Size of torpedo ----
24. Number of hits on ship by bombs ---by torpedoes - Was ship strafed? No.

24. Cont'd
Size gun ----
25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship -----
26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship)	SURE (Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship	- - -	1	- - -	- - -
(b) Other aircraft	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -

(An aircraft is considered destroyed "Sure", when, as result of own ship's fire: 1. It is seen to crash. 2. It is seen to disintegrate in the air or be enveloped in flames. 3. It is seen to descent on friendly territory and be captured. 4. Pilot and entire crew are seen to bail out.)
(A "Sure-Assist" may be claimed when plane is destroyed as result of own ship's and assisting fire by friendly planes, shore batteries, or other ships.)
(An aircraft is considered probably destroyed when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to have less than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely.)
(An aircraft is considred damaged when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to require repair before beginning another mission, but has better than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely. Claims shall be based on careful interrogation by proper authority, and every effort should be made to eliminate duplication of claims.)

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" 5"/38
28. Performance of ammunition(excellent,good,bad,poor) Excellent
29. What failures in material occured in this action ? None
30. Sketch:
    (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
    (b) Show relative position of sun.
    (c) Indicate own maneuvers.



Note. -- Add descriptive text on additional sheet if required to clarify report.

Location of ship (area) 26°-40'N 129°-32'E U.S.S. RANDOLPH (CV-15)
Zone Time 0520 (-9) Date 17 April 1945.

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night Night
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Visual
3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10, less than 5 miles) Less than 5 miles.
4. Total number of planes observed 1 Type Zeke
5. Number of planes attacking own ship 1 Type Zeke.
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship 1
   (a) Of those attacking own ship 1 Type Zeke
   (b) Others - Type -
7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet 160 kts. - 500 ft.
8. Number of guns firing 12 by caliber 8 - 5"/38; 1 40MM Quad,
9. Ammunition expended 66by caliber and type Mk 40 -75 rds; Mk.18-25 40MM - 10

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10. Percent service allowance expended Mk 40-3.1%; Mk 18-0.5%; 40MM-Negligible.
11. Method of control - 5"-Mk 37 - Full Radar - 40MM, Mk 51-2 - Method of spotting -.
    Method of ranging Radar Method of firing Rapid fire
12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 20 seconds.
13. Approximate time of first hits --.
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot 10 seconds.
15. Approximate position angle open fire 0°
16. Approximate position angle cease fire 0°
17. Approximate bearing first shot 110°
18. Approximate bearing last shot 165° for 5"; 180° for 40MM.
19. Approximate range first shot 7500 Altitude of plane [illegible] Ft.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 100 yds. Altitude [illegible] Ft.
21. Approximate range shot 100 yds. Altitude of plane 50 Ft.
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release - Size of bomb [illegible]
23. Approximate range torpedo release - Size of Torpedo [illegible]
24. Number of hits on ship by bombs -- by torpedoes -- War ship sunk? No.
    Size gun -
25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship --.
26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship)	SURE (Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship.	1	-	-	[illegible]
(b) Other aircraft	-	-	-	[illegible]

27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" --
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent,good,bad,poor) Excellent
29. What failures in material occured in this action ? None
30. Sketch:
    (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
    (b) Show relative position of sun.
    (c) Indicate own maneuvers.

Location of ship (area) 27°-03'N 131° -22'E USS RANDOLPH (CV-15)TG 58.3
Zone Time 0928 (-9) .....Date 17 April 1945

1. Surprise attack (yes or No No Day or night Day.
2. Method of picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar
3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10, less than 5 miles) Over 50 miles
4. Total number of planes observed 4 Type [illegible]
5. Number of planes attacking own ship 2 Type [illegible]
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship [illegible]
   (a) Of those attacking own ship 2 Type 1 Judy, 1 Hill.
   (b) Others 1 Type [illegible]
7. Spood and altitude of approach in knots and feet 180 kts., 7000 ft.
8. Number of guns firing 66 by caliber (8) 5"/38; (8) 40 MM Quads; (26) 20 MM

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9. Ammunition expended --by caliber and type Mk. 40 - 63 rds; 40 MM - 1319 HEIT Mk 18 - 36 rds; 20 MM - 975 HET; 975 HEI.
10. Percent service allowance expended - Mk. 40 - 2.7 %; 40 MM - 1.2 % Mk. 18 - 0.7 %; 20 MM - 0.4 %
11. Method of control - Mk. 37 - Optical - Mk. 51-2 -- Mk. 14 Sight. Method of spotting. _____. Method of ranging Radar Method of firing Rapid Fire.
12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 1 Minute
13. Approximate time of first hits 15 seconds
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot 30 seconds
15. Approximate position angle open fire 30°
16. Approximate position angle cease fire 50°
17. Approximate bearing first shot 090°
18. Approximate bearing last shot 090°
19. Approximate range first shot - 6000 yds. Altitude of plane - 6000 Ft.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 2500 yds. Altitude 3000 Ft.
21. Approximate range last shot 2500 yds. Altitude of plane 3000 Ft.
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release -- Size of bomb --.
23. Approximate range torpedo release ---- Size of Torpedo ----
24. Number of hits on ship by bombs --- by torpedoes ---. Was ship strafed? ---.
    Size gun --
25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship --.
26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own Ship)	SURE (Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship.	2	--	----	----
(b) Other Aircraft	--	--	--	--

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" 5"/38.
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad, poor) Excellent.
29. What failures in material occured in this action? None
30. Sketch:
    (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
    (b) Show relative position of sun.
    (c) Indicate own maneuvers.



Location of ship (area) 26°-39'N .....130°-07'E...U.S.S. RANDOLPH (CV-15)TG 58.3
Zone Time 1430 (-9) // ..... Date 22 April 1945.

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night Day
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Naked eye
3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10, less than 5 miles - 8 Miles
4. Total number of planes observed 1 Type Judy.
5. Number of planes attacking own ship ---- Type --.
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship. 1

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(a) Of those attacking own ship -- Type --.
(b) Others 1 Type Judy

7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet 250 knots - 25000 Ft.
8. Number of guns firing 2 by caliber 5"/38.
9. Ammunition expended --by caliber and type Mk. 40 - 4
10. Percent service allowance expended Mk. 40 - 0.2 %
11. Method of control - Mk.37 Director, Optical. Method of spotting --, Method of ranging Radar Method of firing Barrage.
12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 5 seconds.
13. Approximate time of first hits -----.
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot 2 seconds.
15. Approximate position angle open fire 60°
16. Approximate position angle cease fire 60°.
17. Approximate bearing first shot 225°.
18. Approximate bearing last shot 225°.
19. Approximate range first shot 12,000 yds. Altitude of plane 25,000 Ft.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 10,000 yds. Altitude-22,000 Ft.
21. Approximate range last shot 10,000 yds. Altitude of plane 22,000 Ft.
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release -- Size of bomb --
23. Approximate range torpedo release --- Size of Torpedo --.
24. Number of hits on ship by bombs -- by torpedoes -- Was ship strafed ? No.
Size gun --
25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship --.
26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship)	SURE (Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship.	--	--	--	--
(b) Other aircraft	--	--	--	--

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" --.
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent,good,bad,poor) Excellent.
29. What failures in material occured in this action ? None
30. Sketch:
(a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
(b) Show relative position of sun.
(c) Indicate own maneuvers.



Location of ship (area) 26°-21'N ... 130°-08'E...U.S.S. RANDOLPH (CV-15)TG 58.3
Zone Time 2033 (-9).....Date 28 April 1945.....

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night Night
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar
3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10, less than 5 miles) more than 50 miles.

COMINCH F-01 AA-1
Feb. 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Total number of planes observed one (1) Type ---
5. Number of planes attacking own ship one (1) Type ---
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship one (1)
7. (a) Of those attacking own ship one (1) Type ---
   (b) Others ----- Type ---
8. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet 215 knots, 14,000 feet
9. Number of guns firing 6 by caliber 5"/38
10. Ammunition expended by caliber and type Mk40 - 61; Mk 18 - 8
11. Percent service allowance expended Mk 40 - 2.5%; Mk 18 - 0.2%
12. Method of control Mk 37 Director Radar Method of spotting ---
13. Method of ranging radar Method of firing rapid
14. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 30 seconds
15. Approximate time of first hits none observed
16. Approximate time first shot to last shot 1 minute
17. Approximate position angle open fire 20 degrees
18. Approximate position angle cease fire 70 degrees
19. Approximate bearing first shot 258 degrees
20. Approximate bearing last shot 120 degrees
21. Approximate range first shot 11,000 yds Altitude of plane 14,000 feet
22. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 5000 yds Altitude 14,000 feet
23. Approximate range last shot --- Altitude of plane 14,000 feet
24. Approximate altitude of bomb release --- Size of bomb ---
25. Approximate range torpedo release --- Size of torpedo ---
26. Number of hits on ship by bombs --- by torpedoes -- Was ship strafed?
    No
    Size Gun ---
27. Number near bomb misses damaging ship ---
28. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship)	SURE (Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship	---	---	---	---
(b) Other aircraft	---		---	---

29. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" ---
30. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad, poor) Excellent
31. What failures in material occured in this action? none
32. Sketch:
    (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
    (b) Show relative position of sun.
    (c) Indicate own maneuvers.



Location of ship (area) 26°-44' N, 130°-16' E USS RANDOLPH (CV-15) TG 58.3
Zone Time 1701 (-9) Date 29 April 1945

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night day
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar

ANNEX- E

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10, less than 5 miles) Over 50 miles.
4. Total number of planes observed one (1) Type Judy
5. Number of planes attacking own ship one (1) Type Judy
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship one (1)
   (a) Of those attacking own ship one (1) Type Judy
   (b) Others ----- Type ----
7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet 265 knots, 27,000 feet
8. Number of guns firing 12 by caliber 5"/38
9. Ammunition expended --- by caliber and type Mk 40 - 79; Mk 18 - 32
10. Percent service allowance expended Mk 40 - 3.3%; Mk 18 - 0.7%
11. Method of control Mk 37 director, Partial radar Method of spotting ---
    Method of ranging radar Method of firing rapid fire
12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 30 seconds
13. Approximate time of first hits none observed
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot 2 minutes
15. Approximate position angle open fire 65 degrees
16. Approximate position angle cease fire 60 degrees
17. Approximate bearing first shot 035 degrees
18. Approximate bearing last shot 270 degrees
19. Approximate range first shot 9700 yds Altitude of plane 27,000 feet.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 9300 yds Altitude 27,000 ft.
21. Approximate range last shot 16,000 yds Altitude of plane 27,000 feet.
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release ---- Size of bomb ----
23. Approximate range torpedo release ---- Size of torpedo ----
24. Number of hits on ship by bombs ----- by torpedoes --- Was ship strafed ? No.
25. Number near misses damaging ship -----
26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship)	SURE (Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship	-----	-----	----	----
(b) Other aircraft	-----	-----	----	----

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" -----
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent,good,bad,poor) excellent
29. What failures in material occured in this action? None
30. Sketch:
    (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
    (b) Show relative position of sun.
    (c) Indicate own maneuvers.

COMINCH F-01 AA-1
Feb. 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Location of ship (area) 30° -00N...132°-30' E.... U.S.S. RANDOLPH (CV-15)TG 58.3
Zone Time....0339 (-9)..... Date 13 May 1945.....

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1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night Night
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar
3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10, less than 5 miles) 50 miles
4. Total number of planes observed 1 Type —
5. Number of planes attacking own ship 1 Type —
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship 1
   (a) of those attacking own ship 1 Type —
   (b) Others — Type —
7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet 200 knots; 5500 Ft.
8. Number of guns firing 4 by caliber 5"/38
9. Ammunition expended by caliber and type - Mk40-13; Mk 18 - 11
10. Percent service allowance expended Mk.40 - 0.54%; Mk 18 - 0.23 %
11. Method of control - Full Radar Mk. 37 Director - Method of spotting —
    Method of ranging Radar Method of firing Rapid
12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 2 minutes
13. Approximate time of first hits None observed
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot 20 seconds
15. Approximate position angle open fire 020°
16. Approximate position angle cease fire ---
17. Approximate bearing first shot 150°
18. Approximate bearing last shot 170°
19. Approximate range first shot 11000 yards - Altitude of plane 5500 Ft.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 10000 Altitude 5500 Ft.
21. Approximate range last shot 11000 Altitude of plane 5500
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release — Size of bomb —
23. Approximate range torpedo release — Size of Torpedo —
24. Number of hits on ship by bombs — by torpedoes — Was ship strafed ?
    No.
    Size gun —
25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship —
26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (BY own ship)	SURE)Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship.	—	—	—	—
(b) Other Aircraft				

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" —
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad, poor) Excellent
29. What failures in material occured in this action ? None
30. Sketch:
    (a) Indicate direction o attack relative ship's head.
    (b) Show relative position of sun.
    (c) Indicate own maneuvers.

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Location of ship (area) 30°-50'N...133°-00'E..USS RANDOLPH (CV-15) TG 58.3.....
Zone Time.....0642...(-9)..... Date..... 14 May 1945 .....

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night Day
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar
3. Range plane was picked up (50,30,10, less than 5 miles) 30 miles
4. Total number of planes observed 5 Type Zekes
5. Number of planes attacking own ship 1 Type Zeke
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship 5
   (a) Of those attacking own ship 1 Type Zeke
   (b) Others 4 Type Zekes
7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet (1) 200 knots; (1) 6000 Ft., (2) - 160 knots; (2) 2000 Ft.
8. Number of guns firing 96 by caliber 5"/38-10; 40MM - 14 Quads; 20MM - 30
9. Ammunition expended by caliber and type Mk.40 - 10.; 40MM - 1002, Mk.18 - 21; 20 MM - 1810.
10. Percent service allowance expended Mk. 40 - 4.2%; 40MM - 0.89%, Mk.18 - 0.43% 20MM - less than 0.5%.
11. Method of control-Mk. 37 Director; Mk.51-2 Director;Mk.14 Sight; Optics, Method of spotting. ---
    Method of ranging Radar and Rangefinder- Method of firing Rapid
12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot (1) 20 Sec.;(2) 5 Sec., (3) 10 Sec.; (4)(10) Sec.
13. Approximate time of first hits-(1) 40 Sec.;(2) 5 Sec.;(3) - (4) 2 Sec.
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot- (1) 40 Sec. (2) 5 Sec.; (3) 10 Sec.; (4) 10 Sec.
15. Approximate position angle open fire- (1) 10° - (2) 2.5° - (3) 3° - (4) 5°
16. Approximate position angle cease fire-1-20°- (2) 0° - (3) 2° -(4) 0°
17. Approximate bearing first shot- (1) 174° - (2) 140° - (3) 300° - (4) 110°
18. Approximate bearing last shot-(1) 174° - (2) 140°- (3) 300° - (4) 090°
19. Approximate range first shot- (1) 12000 - (2) 6000 - (3) 4000 - (4) 6000 Altitude of plane- (1) 2000 - (2) 3000 - (3) 1000 - (4) 1500.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached- (1) 3500 - (2) 6000 - (3) 3000 (4) - 4000. Altitude- (1) 5000 - (2) 0 - (3) 1000 - (4) 0.
21. Approximate range last shot- Same as 20 Altitude of plane - Same as 20
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release --- Size of bomb ---
23. Approximate range torpedo release ___ Size of Torpedo ---
24. Number of hits on ship by bombs ___ by torpedoes -- Was ship strafed ? No.
    Size of gun ---
25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship ---
26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship)	SURE (Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship.	-	-	-	-
	-	4	-	-

CONFIDENTIAL.

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" 5"/38 - 1; 40MM - 1.
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent,good,bad,poor) Excellent
29. What failures in material occured in this action ? None
30. Sketch:
    (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
    (b) Show relative position of gun.
    (c) Indicate own maneuvers.



CV15/P6-1

Serial: 706

RESTRICTED

U.S.S. RANDOLPH (CV15)
% Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.

10/ejm

5 June 1945.

1st End. on MedOff, USS RANDOLPH Report of Casualties dated 3 June 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Subject: Report of Casualties, forwarding of.

1. Forwarded.

FELIX BAKER.

Copy to:
CinCPac

ANNEX- F

CV-15/P6-1

U.S.S. RANDOLPH (CV-15)
% FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

75/ja

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RESTRICTED

3 June 1945

From: The Medical Officer.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Via: (1) The Commanding Officer.

Subject: Report of Casualties, forwarding of.

Reference: (a) Para. 3518, BuM&S Manual.

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following information is submitted herewith, for the period from 5 April 1945 to and inclusive of 31 May 1945.

NAME	RANK RATE	SERVICE NUMBER	DATE	PLACE
EMBREE, Ralph Arnold	Comdr.,USN	77166	5-12-45	Enemy Territory
Disposition: Missing in action.				
HOWARD, David Goodale Jr.	Ens.A1, USNR	354891	5-21-45	At sea
Disposition: Missing in action.				
LEVIS, Leadean (none)	Lt(jg)A1,USNR	346805	5-21-45	At sea
Disposition: Missing in action.				
MASON, William Lloyd	Ens. A1, USNR	363361	4-17-45	At sea
Diagnosis: Injuries, Multiple, Extreme.				
Prognosis: Fatal.				
Disposition: Died.				
RUND, Lowell Wesley	Ens. A1, USNR	363520	4-21-45	Flight Deck.
Diagnosis: Burn, 1st degree, face, left arm, shoulder;3rd degree, neck.				
Prognosis: Favorable.				
Disposition: Retained on board.				
WELTY, Robert Lyman	Ens. A1, USNR	407132	5-14-45	Enemy Territory
Diagnosis: Injuries, Multiple, Extreme.				
Prognosis: Fatal.				
Disposition: Died.				
WHITE, Charles Lloyd	Ens. A1, USNR	407135	5-18-45	Enemy Territory
Diagnosis: Injuries, Multiple, Extreme.				
Prognosis: Fatal.				
Disposition: Died.				

RESTRICTED

Subject: Report of Casualties, forwarding of.

WOOD, James Julian — Lt. Al, USNR — 121906 — 5-2-45 — At sea.
Disposition: Missing in action.

WOODS, Lamar Oswell — Ens. Al, USNR — 354830 — 5-2-45 — At sea
Disposition: Missing in action.

ANDERSON, Richard Henry — ARM3c (CA)USNR — 704-38-44 — 5-4-45 — Enemy Territory
Diagnosis: D.U. (Injuries, Multiple).
Prognosis: Serious.
Disposition: Transferred 3rd Amphibious Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3 at OKINAWA, FFT.

HERBERT, Henry Andrew — ARM1c (CA)USNR — 645-66-92 — 5-23-45 — Enemy Territory
Diagnosis: Wounds, lacerated, chin.
Prognosis: Favorable.
Disposition: Retained on board.

MASTEN, Ronald Eugene — AOM2c (CA)USNR — 871-89-32 — 5-4-45 — Enemy Territory
Diagnosis: Wound, lacerated, forehead.
Prognosis: Favorable.
Disposition: Retained on board.

PEEVY, William Russell — BM2c V6,USNR — 849-65-42 — 5-14-45 — Gun Mount
Diagnosis: Odontoclasis.
Prognosis: Favorable.
Disposition: Retained on board.

TUCKER, Glaude Osville — S1c V6, USNR — 892-93-38 — 5-14-45 — Gun Mount
Diagnosis: Wound, lacerated, left leg.
Prognosis: Favorable.
Disposition: Retained on bboard.

W. J. James

SECRET

U. S. S. RANDOLPH (CV-15)

95/aa

CV-15/F41-6
Serial 0124

26 MAY 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 58.3.
(2) Commander Task Force 58.

Subject: Napalm Fire Bombs - Experience with use of.

Reference: (a) ComAirPac Conf. ltr. F41-6/FF12-5 (EBO-16-dlb), serial 02594, dated 8 April 1945.

1. Following unsatisfactory experience with the use of Napalm Fire Bombs during the IWO JIMA support activity, this ship instituted certain changes in practice. All experience since then indicates 100% functioning with good firing accuracy.

2. Tanks: Two 58-gallon tanks per fighter are used, one hung from each wing on the Mk 51 rack. Regular bomb sway braces are employed with leather pads under lag screws to prevent puncturing of the tanks. Advantages of the use of two 58-gallon tanks instead of one 150-gallon tank are:

(a) Arming wires may be run to positive arming controls so that the tanks may be dropped "safe" or "armed". It has been found that the pilot's confidence in the use of Napalm has been greatly enhanced, when using the E4R1 igniter, by the knowledge that the bombs may be dropped "safe".

(b) Observations indicate a higher dispersal result from two 58-gallon tanks. Since each tank is double-fuzed there are four igniters in the target area instead of one or two; also more of the gel mass is exposed to immediate ignition, making a satisfactory result more certain.

(c) The use of lighter tanks assists in retaining flexibility of operations. Frequently during heavy and changing flight schedules, plane assignments can not be made until a short time before launching. In such instances the 58-gallon tanks are placed on bomb skids and filled forward of the No. 1 5" gun mount in ample time to permit gelling and readiness. Then when planes are ready for loading, the tanks are handled as bombs and hung on the wing racks without loss of time. Recently a Napalm-loaded strike was ready for launching

ANNEX (G)

when an alert was sounded and it was necessary to put all planes in Condition 10. All 58-gallon Napalm tanks were dropped on bomb skids and moved adjacent to jettisoning ramps, placing planes in Condition 10 at once with full 150-gallon belly tanks. Subsequently, when the alert was secured, the Napalm tanks were reloaded and the strike launched with little delay.

(d) The low altitude from which these tanks may be dropped and the shape of the tanks eliminates need for tail fins. Pilots report satisfactory accuracy without violent tumbling.

2. Fuzing: All tanks are double-fuzed, nose and tail. The nose fuze is placed in the filling hole with precautions taken to secure it well. For the tail fuze a 12-gauge bracket is formed which receives the fuze and securely seats it fore and aft. The bracket is wired to the inboard side of the tank near the pointed tail. No fuzes have been observed to fly free of the tanks during flight. Special attention is given to lining up the fuzes so that the arming wires will be fore and aft. The small arming wires which come with the fuzes are discarded in favor of rocket arming wires which lead directly from the fuze to the bomb rack. The last step taken before launching is removal of the safety pin. All pins are retained and counted. After the arming wire is in place, the jump-out spring is depressed to insure that it is not frozen and that it will jump out when the arming wire is pulled.

3. Mixing: Mk 1 Mod. 0 Incendiary Mixer is used. By mounting the mixer on a collapsible arming stand about 30 inches above the deck, "boiling up" into the hopper has been eliminated, and a steady, uniform flow assured.

/s/
FELIX BAKER,


APPROACH
14 APRIL 1945
0400 - 0500
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
MAY 4, 1945.
APPROACH
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UNDER "RANDY"
CONTROL!
PICKED UP BY SM AT 0321
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ENEMY RADAR INTERCEPT
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SHOOT BACK FROM RANDY
PLANE HOLDING AT NAN 4
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AND TEAM ON SM
CENTERING
GOOD DOPE FROM THE SPRINGFIELD AND WILKES BARRE MADE INTERCEPT POSSIBLE
OKINAWA
APPROACH