

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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Vol. 1 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
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The United States Senate

R1572

Report of Proceedings

DATE 3/19/77  
BY ELG

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000151031

Thursday, October 9, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T S

WITNESS

PAGE

Bronson Tweedy

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EXHIBITS

FOR IDENTIFICATION

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

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Thursday, October 10, 1975

United States Senate,  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to  
Intelligence Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:25 o'clock  
a.m. in Room 407, The Capitol, the Honorable Richard Schweiker  
presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Profes-  
sional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

Senator Schweiker. Would you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Senator Schweiker. It has been nice meeting you.

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, Senator Schweiker left the hearing room.)

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, you have just received the oath from Senator Schweiker, who has now left the room, and you are under no obligation to continue to testify in his absence, but obviously the Committee would appreciate it greatly if you would continue to testify.

Are you willing to continue to testify in the Senator's absence?

Mr. Tweedy. I plan to testify fully.

Mr. Baron. You are willing to testify to the truth as best as you can do it?

Mr. Tweedy. I will indeed.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. You are appearing here voluntarily without

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1 counsel?

2 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

3 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you may cease answering  
4 questions at any point if you wish to consult with counsel?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

6 Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all of your Consti-  
7 tutional rights are intact, including your Fifth Amendment  
8 rights to remain silent?

9 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

10 Mr. Baron. All right, then.

11 Let us proceed to review a set of documents which were not  
12 available to us in your first examination. The attempt here  
13 today is not to go over a lot of old ground that we covered  
14 in your first examination but to focus our concerns on a few  
15 main events in the alleged story of an assassination plot  
16 against Lumumba, and to refresh your recollection by review of  
17 these documents.

18 Let me introduce as Exhibit 1 a cable from Allen Dulles  
19 to the Leopoldville Station, marked for Robert Guthman on  
20 October 26th, 1960.

(The document referred  
to was marked Tweedy  
Exhibit No. 1 for  
identification.)

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1 TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

2 Mr. Baron. We discussed this cable in your previous  
3 appearance, did we not?

4 Mr. Tweedy. August 26th.

5 May I correct the date? It is August 26th.

6 Mr. Baron. Certainly.

7 Mr. Tweedy. It is rather important.

8 Mr. Baron. It is August 26th.

9 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, we did indeed discuss it the last time.

10 Mr. Baron. After you took another look at this cable  
11 this morning before we went on the record, you made a remark to  
12 the effect that this cable was a source of authority as far as  
13 you were concerned at the time.

14 Is that your impression now?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

16 Let me just add to that a bit. The cable per se I did not  
17 remember, but it is perfectly obvious the cable is the authority.  
18 When I first talked to Mr. Bissell about this, he certainly  
19 implied the only reason the subject was being raised is because  
20 it had been of national policy level concern. I do not think  
21 it could be more clear-cut than that. This was basically, this  
22 was the formal expression of that by the Director himself.

23 I cannot remember which came first, did I see this cable  
24 first, or did I talk to Mr. Bissell first. I suspect that I  
25 talked to Mr. Bissell first. It must have been absolutely in

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1 the same time period.

2 This merely confirmed what I think I probably heard from  
3 Mr. Bissell first.

4 Mr. Baron. In this discussion with Mr. Bissell, you are  
5 referring to the subject of getting access to Lumumba for the  
6 purpose of assassination.

7 Mr. Tweedy. I think it probably came up in the sense that  
8 the thrust of the American position was that there was no  
9 solution in the Congo without the fall from power of Mr. Lumumba,  
10 and no measure should be overlooked to achieve this -- constitu-  
11 tional, revolutionary and indeed, executive action, if you want  
12 to call it that.

13 Mr. Baron. Meaning assassination?

14 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

15 But none of these possible measures were excluded, and the  
16 main point was that everybody agreed that Lumumba had to go or  
17 we were in for very serious trouble in the Congo.

18 Mr. Baron. You were referring a moment ago in discussing  
19 this cable from Allen Dulles to the fact that when you first  
20 discussed the possibility of assassinating Lumumba as one means  
21 of removing him from power with Richard Bissell, Bissell referred  
22 to this cable.

23 Mr. Tweedy. No, I would have seen this cable when it went  
24 out. I am afraid you cannot pin me down on this, because I  
25 cannot remember the sequence of events. It would have been a

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1 perfectly natural follow-up to my discussion with Bissell. It  
2 is conceivable that this went out before I talked to Bissell. I  
3 do not exclude that, but the two were totally in tandem.

4 Mr. Baron. Having taken a look at all of the documents  
5 that we are about to introduce into the record today, before  
6 we begin taking your testimony on the record, are you able to  
7 pinpoint with any more precision your initial discussion with  
8 Mr. Bissell of the prospect of assassinating Lumumba?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Pinpoint it in terms of time?

10 Mr. Baron. Yes.

11 Mr. Tweedy. No, not in terms of time. I can only assume --

12 Mr. Baron. It would have taken place shortly before this  
13 Allen Dulles cable?

14 Mr. Tweedy. Either shortly before, or shortly after,  
15 because the next series of cables obviously get the show, as  
16 it were, on the road.

17 May I comment just generally on those cables as a group?  
18 There are no surprises in them as far as I am concerned, in  
19 terms of detail. Much of it, even to this day, I still do not  
20 remember.

21 One aspect emerges very clearly for me, that we were very  
22 careful about examining this on the possibilities of doing  
23 anything against Lumumba. Basically, this whole period was a  
24 series of exchanges with the field who were seeking, as you can  
25 see from that cable traffic, various measures that might perform

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1 a number of them, because he wanted to remain familiar with  
2 them.

3 (Discussion off the record.)

4 Mr. Baron. Back on the record on this subject.

5 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not have any further recollection of  
6 detailed discussions with Bissell on this. On the other hand,  
7 it was perfectly clear that he remained actively interested in  
8 it. I am sure that he was the one that had the idea of Justin  
9 O'Donnell, for example, I think he undoubtedly came up with  
10 that idea. As you recall, I had forgotten entirely that Justin  
11 O'Donnell had ever played a role in this. I am sure when he  
12 fixed on O'Donnell the possibility to assist the Chief of Station  
13 he must have discussed this with him. I can almost say I  
14 remember it, but hardly.

15 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of what Bissell  
16 said to you in the series of discussions on the prospect of  
17 assassinating Lumumba about the level at which the exploration  
18 of this prospect had been authorized?

19 Mr. Tweedy. No. That is the aspect I was never clear on  
20 except that it was perfectly clear to me that he was quite  
21 confident that this was -- I am now talking about the elimination  
22 of Lumumba by whatever means. I am not talking necessarily  
23 about assassination; I want to be quite clear on that.

24 I was quite clear in my mind that the policy levels of  
25 Washington were agreed that Lumumba must go. I cannot go any

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1 further than that. I cannot say, for example, that Bissell  
2 said I think as an Agency we should consider assassination on  
3 this or that this had been discussed with the policy levels  
4 of government. I do not know, and it was never made clear to  
5 me nor does this cable make clear, but it was perfectly clear  
6 that Mr. Dulles felt quite quiet in his mind about discussing  
7 any of these aspects with the State Department or the Ambassador.

8 Mr. Baron. Off the record.

9 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

10 Mr. Baron. We are back on the record now.

11 When we stopped, we were discussing your account of your  
12 meetings with Richard Bissell where the subject of assassinating  
13 Lumumba had arisen among other means that had been considered  
14 in disposing of Lumumba. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate  
15 directly or indirectly to you that he had the authority of the  
16 President of the United States for moving forward with an  
17 operation which might include assassinating Lumumba?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Let me make it quite clear, he certainly  
19 never mentioned the President at all.

20 Mr. Baron. By name?

21 Mr. Tweedy. By name, or even by any indication. It was  
22 merely my impression reinforced, certainly, either before or  
23 after, of this cable of Allen Dulles that this was a policy  
24 level decision, but the extent to which the Executive had  
25 assassination discussed with him at all, I cannot comment on.

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1 It is perfectly obvious that the Agency felt that it had  
2 the support of the Executive in efforts to eliminate Lumumba.  
3 It was at least my impression throughout this whole period that  
4 if it ever came down to the point where somebody said, I think  
5 we can do it, and we decided upon the means, that someone would  
6 have said, well, before we do, obviously there has to be final  
7 approval. I would not have known where the final approval  
8 would have come from. I would not expect that my correspondence  
9 with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville would result in the  
10 assassination of Mr. Lumumba without further reference.

11 Mr. Baron. You were under the impression that whatever  
12 steps you were involved in toward eliminating Lumumba, as you  
13 put it, were fully authorized at the highest level of the  
14 government?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was.

16 Mr. Baron. That would include the President?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I do not really think I can answer that  
18 question, Mr. Baron. When somebody at my level, fairly senior  
19 though it was, receives clear-cut assurances that the policy  
20 level wants something done, it is very difficult for him to  
21 judge whether the President per se has been in contact with the  
22 Agency or that he has done this through his National Security  
23 Advisor, the Secretary of State, or whoever. There could be  
24 no way that I could judge that.

25 I think it would be quite misleading if I were to try to

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read into it either then or now.

Mr. Baron. Whatever impression you had of the extent of the authority for the steps that you were taking to eliminate Lumumba was derived from your conversations with Richard Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. And the cable.

Mr. Baron. And the cable by Allen Dulles.

Mr. Tweedy. Which merely indicated to me that the Agency was confident that it had its policy guidance and was thus acting accordingly.

Mr. Baron. Between this cable on August 26th which Allen Dulles dispatched to the Congo and the cable we will now mark Exhibit 2, which is a cable from yourself to Leopoldville on September 19th, marked Eyes Only, Guthman from Jadwin--

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. Were there any other meetings that you recall  
2 between yourself and Richard Bissell where he asked you to  
3 move beyond the exploratory stage to the implementation stage  
4 in assassinating Lumumba?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I do not know at all. I just do not recall  
6 that that ever occurred.

7 Mr. Baron. Let us turn, then, to this cable.

8 This cable indicates --

9 Mr. Tweedy. This is the one on the 19th?

10 Mr. Baron. Yes.

11 (Discussion off the record.)

12 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

13 This cable begins with your indication to the Chief of  
14 Station that someone was proceeding shortly to the Congo who  
15 would announce himself as Sid from Paris.

16 First of all, to backtrack, Guthman, in this cable, is  
17 the Chief of Station, is that right?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

19 Mr. Baron. Who we agreed would be referred to as the  
20 Chief of Station or by his alias, Hedqmana, and Jadwin is --

21 Mr. Tweedy. My pseudonym.

22 Mr. Baron. Did you have a first name in the pseudonym?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Thomas K.

24 Mr. Baron. Who was Sid from Paris?

25 Mr. Tweedy. I was trying to think. The identity is Sid

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1 Brown. Sid Brown as a name means nothing to me.

2 Mr. Baron. If I represent to you that we have had testimony  
3 from Sidney Gottlieb that this identity stood for himself, does  
4 that refresh your recollection?

5 Mr. Tweedy. It would not surprise me. It was my assumption  
6 that it probably was, but I could not recall, so I find -- in  
7 other words, your explanation, I think, is what I would have  
8 expected.

9 Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of  
10 dispatching Sidney Gottlieb on a mission to the Congo?

11 Mr. Tweedy. I have the most unclear recollection that I  
12 discussed with Mr. Bissell Sidney Gottlieb's going to the  
13 Congo. I have no recollections of any conversations I had  
14 with Mr. Gottlieb himself, although I am quite convinced I had  
15 them.

16 In other words, it is inconceivable to me that he would have  
17 gone to the Congo without seeing me. I cannot recall the  
18 substance of our discussions, although I assume, and I imagine  
19 Mr. Bissell must have shared in this, we discussed what it was  
20 all about, the operational problems involved, so that he, in  
21 turn, could be somewhat sensible about what his own supporting  
22 role in this might be.

23 When I say this, it is a reasonable assumption but it is  
24 not direct recollection.

25 Mr. Baron. Does this cable indicate to you that you did



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1 dispatch Sidney Gottlieb to the Congo on a highly sensitive  
2 mission?

3 Mr. Tweedy. It does indeed.

4 When you say I dispatched him, I would say it would be  
5 more accurate to say that Mr. Bissell and I dispatched him. I  
6 am sure the authority for him going would have come from he  
7 rather than me, but we arranged the details.

8 Mr. Baron. Your comment about the fact that the authority  
9 would have flowed from Mr. Bissell directly is borne out, is it  
10 not, by Mr. Bissell's initials on this cable?

11 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, exactly.

12 Mr. Baron. Was that a fairly unusual practice, to have  
13 both the DDP and the Chief of the Africa Division sign a  
14 cable?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Quite common. Throughout the organization  
16 on matters of either particular sensitivity or so important that  
17 the DDP wished to be constantly informed about correspondence  
18 on a subject, the Chief of the Division would originate and  
19 send out cables and have it actually signed off by the DDP.  
20 That was quite a common practice in the Agency.

21 Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection, having seen this  
22 document, of the fact that you set up a special channel using  
23 the YQPROP sensitivity indicator?

24 Mr. Tweedy. I did not recall YQPROP, but I recall special  
25 channels.

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1 Mr. Baron. This would have restricted all traffic from  
2 yourself to Chief of Station, is that correct?

3 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. My Deputy would also have access to it  
4 in my absence.

5 Mr. Baron. That would be Glen Fields?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

7 Mr. Baron. Would Richard Bissell have access to it?

8 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed he would.

9 Mr. Baron. Allen Dulles also?

10 Mr. Tweedy. Certainly if he wanted, absolutely.

11 Mr. Baron. Why was a special communications channel set  
12 up in this cable?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Because of the sensitivity of the subject.  
14 This, again, was a frequent procedure in the Agency on sensitive  
15 matters. If one was about to mount a sensitive operation, one  
16 of the first things normally done was to set up special  
17 communications procedures so the dissemination of the messages  
18 could be restricted to what was required.

19 Mr. Baron. In this case, the especially sensitive subject to  
20 which you were restricting communications access was the elimi-  
21 nation of Lumumba by one means or another?

22 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

23 Mr. Baron. What was the assignment that Sidney Gottlieb  
24 was to explain to the Chief of Station when he arrived in the  
25 Congo?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. That, I do not recall. I can only assume  
2 that Sidney Gottlieb would have discussed with the Chief of  
3 Station instruments which TSD might have which could be of  
4 assistance in an assassination attempt. I assumed he discussed  
5 his inventory, whatever it might be, and the two presumably were  
6 trying to come to some conclusions as to what might have the  
7 best chance or the most practical chance of being used.

8 This is my assumption. I think in this early stage, that  
9 would have been the purpose of the exercise.

10 Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you the testimony of Sidney  
11 Gottlieb about two conversations that he had at Headquarters  
12 before he undertook the mission to the Congo in September of  
13 1960.

14 First, when Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable and some  
15 subsequent cables which we will discuss today, he said these  
16 cables applied to himself. He confirmed the fact that he took  
17 a trip to the Congo and arrived on September 26th as is indicated  
18 by a subsequent cable, and left on October 5th, as is indicated  
19 by another cable.

20 Dr. Gottlieb said before he left the Congo -- I am sorry,  
21 before he left for the Congo -- he had a conversation with you  
22 and Glen Fields in which you instructed him to take a lethal  
23 material to the Congo and give it to the Chief of Station  
24 with instructions to assassinate Lumumba if it were possible  
25 and to instruct the Chief of Station in the technical means by

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1 which this lethal material could be administered through  
2 Lumumba's food or toothpaste or something that he would ingest.

3 Mr. Gottlieb also testified that in that conversation you  
4 indicated to him that these instructions were being given at  
5 Richard Bissell's authority.

6 Did that conversation take place?

7 (Discussion off the record.)

8 Mr. Tweedy. His testimony does not basically refresh my  
9 memory. The only aspect of it which I would find unrealistic is  
10 that he had an instruction from me to tell the Chief of Station  
11 to use this material and go ahead and assassinate Lumumba, as  
12 if, in effect, that is all the authority that was necessary.

13 To be frank, that does not make sense. The rest of it is  
14 perfectly feasible. I do not recall it in the detail, but I  
15 am not going to deny what Sid said. I think his recollection  
16 that I told him, in effect, to go to the Chief of Station and  
17 sort of get the show on the road and use the poison and  
18 assassinate Lumumba without any further ceremony is just not the  
19 way it would have happened.

20 Mr. Baron. Why is that?

21 Mr. Tweedy. For the simple reason that under no circumstances  
22 would that instruction have been given by me without reference  
23 to higher authority up through the chain of command.

24 Mr. Baron. When you say reference to higher authority,  
25 what do you mean?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. My higher authority in the first instance  
2 would be Mr. Bissell.

3 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb did testify --

4 Mr. Tweedy. I understand.

5 Mr. Baron. -- that you referred in your conversation with  
6 him to the fact that you had authority from Mr. Bissell for the  
7 assignment you were giving to Gottlieb.

8 Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that Mr. Gottlieb would disagree  
9 on is that there would be no further reference, which his  
10 statement implies from Leopoldville before they took any action  
11 on this matter, in other words, take the final action on this  
12 matter, and that was never a matter, to the best of my recollec-  
13 tion, that was ever delegated by Mr. Bissell. In other words,  
14 Mr. Bissell never said, look, you have the picture, go ahead  
15 and do it in your own good time without any further reference  
16 to me or anybody else, nor is the tenor of this correspondence  
17 as I read it that way at all.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you recall if Mr. Bissell ever went as far  
19 as telling you that if an opportunity arose to carry off the  
20 assassination of Lumumba in a situation where it would be  
21 practically impossible to confirm, that there was authority  
22 for proceeding with the assassination with Headquarters, that  
23 the Chief of Station would be, under those circumstances,  
24 authorized to proceed to assassinate Lumumba?

25 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.

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1 Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection about that one way  
2 or the other?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that he ever put it to me  
4 this way.

5 Mr. Baron. Let us then break down your statement about this  
6 meeting with Dr. Gottlieb into component parts.

7 You agree now, having heard Dr. Gottlieb's testimony, that  
8 it is true that you had asked Dr. Gottlieb to go to the Congo?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes.

10 Mr. Baron. It is also true that you knew that Dr. Gottlieb  
11 was to carry a lethal material to the Chief of Station in the  
12 Congo?

13 Mr. Tweedy. If he says so, I do not disagree with him.  
14 I do not frankly recall that at this point, but I am perfectly  
15 wadded to accept what he says.

16 Mr. Baron. Assuming, for the moment, that you would have  
17 required the Chief of Station to check back with Headquarters  
18 before he carried out an assassination mission, would it be  
19 true that you assigned Dr. Gottlieb the task of instructing  
20 the Chief of Station to assassinate Lumumba on that basis?

21 Mr. Tweedy. Dr. Gottlieb was the head of the Technical  
22 Services Division, or whatever it was called in those days.

23 Mr. Baron. Let me jump in for a moment.

24 At this point, for about a year and a half, he was the  
25 Science Advisor to Mr. Bissell, and he moved to Technical

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1 Services shortly thereafter.

2 Mr. Tweedy. The way you put it to me was that I instructed  
3 Gottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. The answer to that is, I am  
4 sure I never instructed Gottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. This  
5 is the way you put it to me.

6 Mr. Baron. Let me correct that.

7 What I meant to say was, would you have asked Gottlieb  
8 to convey the instruction to the Chief of Station that he was  
9 to assassinate Lumumba if he found a way to do it and if he  
10 confirmed it with Headquarters?

11 Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that is almost certainly not.  
12 That would have been covered in other correspondence, which I  
13 think is demonstrated by these cables, to the Chief of Station  
14 direct from me with authority of Mr. Bissell. I would not have  
15 used, neither would Mr. Bissell, Mr. Gottlieb as the channel  
16 for this instruction.

17 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb has also testified that, aside  
18 from carrying the materials to the Chief of Station and  
19 instructing in their use and giving him an instruction about a  
20 mission to assassinate Lumumba, that he had one further role  
21 in the Congo; he was to serve as a technical advisor to the  
22 Chief of Station on the feasibility of using these biological  
23 substances to carry off the operation.

24 As Gottlieb put it, Gottlieb was to stay down there for  
25 a short period of time to determine the technical feasibility

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21

1 of the operational plan that the Chief of Station might come  
2 up with.

3 Mr. Tweedy. This seems quite reasonable to me. Presumably  
4 with his technical knowledge of the nature of these materials  
5 he would be in a position to either comment on or advise the  
6 Chief of Station as he attempted to put together some kind of  
7 operation. That makes good sense to me.

8 He would require, basically, a technical advisor.

9 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb also testified that the materials  
10 he took with him were of a fairly short life. Their toxicity  
11 would wane within a matter of weeks.

12 Given that bit of information to refresh your recollection,  
13 does that make it more likely that Gottlieb was there to aid  
14 the Chief of Station in actually carrying off the administration  
15 of these drugs, as opposed to giving him general instructions  
16 in the use of such lethal substances?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I do not know really that I can comment on  
18 that. If the materials would deteriorate fast, the use of them,  
19 if possible, I would stress the latter, would necessarily have  
20 to be expedited, but the overwhelming concern of Headquarters  
21 and the field, again, demonstrated in this correspondence was  
22 our concern that this thing could be done at all, that it be  
23 done right, securely, and that the U.S. hand should be  
24 concealed.

25 If this were at odds with the life of these materials, I

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1 think that would have just been too bad. But I think it is  
2 perfectly clear that we would not have expedited anything at  
3 the risk of doing it unprofessionally.

tape 1b

4 Mr. Baron. At the point that Gottlieb left for the Congo  
5 after talking with you, would he have been empowered to convey  
6 to the Chief of Station that an assassination of Lumumba could  
7 be carried off if he could meet the criteria you just laid out,  
8 concealment of the U.S. hand and use of these materials before  
9 their potency waned?

10 Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that would be he would be in no  
11 position to do anything more with the Chief of Station if they  
12 reached that point in planning, that as of the last time he  
13 was at Headquarters that there would probably be an approval  
14 from Washington.

15 Mr. Baron. You would expect, then, the Chief of Station  
16 would have been expected to reconfirm with Headquarters the  
17 fact that he had a go-ahead?

18 Mr. Tweedy. It would never have occurred to me otherwise.

19 Mr. Baron. It would be your testimony that, although you  
20 do not specifically recall your conversation with Dr. Gottlieb  
21 you would have made that clear to Dr. Gottlieb?

22 Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought so, yes, but I could not  
23 comment any further.

24 Mr. Baron. The reason for that is you do not recall the  
25 conversation?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. Not only that; Dr. Gottlieb was as familiar  
 2 as I was with (a) the sensitivity of this particular project  
 3 and what was involved and the way that the Agency did its  
 4 business, which was things of this kind were not dealt with on  
 5 sort of an offhand basis.

6 Mr. Dawson. What is offhand?

7 Mr. Tweedy. The fact that the field and Dr. Gottlieb were  
 8 given something in the nature of a blank check as to how they  
 9 would go about it and when, without further reference to  
 1 Headquarters.

11 Mr. Dawson. If we are to tie this to the cables, then,  
 12 is there something in the cables predating Gottlieb's visit to  
 13 the Congo which would lead you to believe that it had previously  
 14 been authorized by some words in those cables?

15 Mr. Tweedy. What, Mr. Dawson, had previously been  
 16 authorized?

17 Mr. Dawson. The authorization of the assassination effort,  
 18 the elimination of Lumumba.

19 Mr. Tweedy. Only in the most general terms. No operation  
 20 had been put forward by the field. In our business, these  
 21 things were done by operational planning, at which point one  
 22 came up with an operation that was agreed upon by the Station  
 23 and by Headquarters, and this, then, would have been either  
 24 implemented or not, according to the say-so from Headquarters.

25 Mr. Dawson. That kind of operational planning is

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1 after Mr. Gottlieb arrives in the Congo, is that correct?

2 Mr. Tweedy. This, in effect, is that (Indicating). You  
3 can tell by the Chief of Station, there is no further  
4 reference to Mr. Gottlieb, as I recall.

5 Mr. Baron. In this cable traffic?

6 Mr. Tweedy. In this cable traffic, was looking at all  
7 sorts of ways and means of eliminating Lumumba, not restricted  
8 to assassination, which coincides exactly with my recollection  
9 of the period between when the subject was first broached to the  
10 Station and that rather indefinable period when, in effect, it  
11 was all over, which, I suppose, basically is the disappearance  
12 of Lumumba.

13 I think all of this traffic supports my contention that  
14 under the instructions he was given, the Chief of Station in  
15 Leopoldville set about exploring all alleys and found none  
16 crystal clear. There were problems with all of them. Some  
17 looked more promising than others. Individuals who might be  
18 used obviously looked more promising than others. Some were  
19 discussed and discarded. We commented on some. And so it  
20 went.

21 Mr. Baron. I think that we should proceed in a moment  
22 to go through these cables with a close eye, one by one.

23 One further point in Dr. Gottlieb's testimony, to be fair  
24 to him, he said he was under the impression that it was general  
25 Agency procedure that in a mission like this one the Chief of

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1 Station probably would check back with Headquarters, that any  
2 prudent Chief of Station would check back to reconfirm his  
3 authority to go ahead with an assassination operation, but Dr.  
4 Gottlieb said in his conversation with you he was not told  
5 that he should convey to the Chief of Station the requirement  
6 that he should check back with Headquarters before he proceeded  
7 with the assassination of Lumumba.

8 Mr. Tweedy. I cannot comment on his statements, because  
9 I cannot recall what I said to him. It certainly is perfectly  
10 conceivable to me that I could have had this conversation with  
11 him and not mentioned this, that this would be covered in all  
12 the basic correspondence that I was having with the Chief of  
13 Station.

14 Mr. Harou. So then it is possible -- or is it probable  
15 that in your instructions to Sidney Gottlieb about his mission  
16 to the Congo you might not have explicitly mentioned the  
17 requirement that the Chief of Station return to Headquarters  
18 to reconfirm his authority to move ahead with the assassination.

19 Mr. Tweedy. It is, I suppose, possible. I am not going  
20 to say it is not possible. I am merely saying that that is  
21 not the way we did business, and on the whole, Sidney Gottlieb  
22 would be as familiar with that as I would -- perhaps not as  
23 familiar with it, because he was on the technical side where I  
24 was on the operational side and used to this chain of command  
25 thing and the relationship between the Division and Station

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1 Chiefs in the field, to a greater extent than Dr. Gottlieb would.

2 The last thing I am doing is impugning his veracity and  
3 his testimony.

4 Mr. Baron. When you say it is not the way we do business,  
5 you meant to say it was your understanding in general Agency  
6 practice that the Chief of Station in a situation like this  
7 would be expected to check back with Headquarters?

8 Mr. Tweedy. When a Chief of Station was given the authority  
9 to carry out something entirely on his own initiative, that  
10 was made quite clear -- I'm not talking about this case, I mean  
11 generally -- this was made quite clear.

12 Mr. Baron. When you were talking about the fact that  
13 "this was not the way that we generally did business," you were  
14 not referring to the fact that you would have made it absolute  
15 explicit in any conversation with Sidney Gottlieb or anybody  
16 like him who was undertaking a sensitive mission that the Chief  
17 of Station would be expected to check back?

18 Mr. Tweedy. If I had not mentioned this to Sidney Gottlieb  
19 and he said I did not, I am perfectly prepared to believe him.  
20 It would be because it never occurred to me that the Chief of  
21 Station would act in any other way. That is it.

22 Mr. Dawson. Of course, Mr. Hedgeman also testified that  
23 it never would have occurred to him to have carried this out  
24 without having checked back, and he did so, of course; the  
25 cables will show that very clearly. What we are trying to focus

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1 on is exactly what Mr. Gottlieb conveyed to Mr. Hedgeman,  
2 which, of course, you could not testify to.

3 Mr. Tweedy. I could not.

4 Mr. Baron. Or what you said to him.

5 Mr. Tweedy. I think it is quite possible that I did not  
6 say to Mr. Gottlieb, Sid, for Heaven's sake, do not have the  
7 Chief of Station go off assassinating this fellow without  
8 referring back to Headquarters. It would never have occurred  
9 to me to do that. It would have been, in my view, superfluous.

10 Mr. Dawson. You are, of course, aware that Mr. Hedgeman  
11 was aware of this practice in the Agency?

12 Mr. Tweedy. Certainly.

13 Mr. Dawson. You had seen that happen. He had only been  
14 Station Chief for a short time; in spite of that, he was still  
15 aware of Agency practices?

16 Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be perfectly true to  
17 say that any clandestine services officer who had reached a  
18 certain seniority in field experience whether he was Chief of  
19 Station or not, he would have sucked this in with his mother's  
20 milk. We were, if I may say so, a very disciplined organization  
21 in that regard.

22 Mr. Dawson. Specifically as to Mr. Hedgeman, that would  
23 apply to him also?

24 Mr. Tweedy. It would indeed.

25 Mr. Baron. Let us proceed then to a document we will start

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1 Exhibit 3, which is a cable from Bronson Tweedy to the Chief  
2 of Station for his eyes only on September 22, 1960.

(The document referred  
to was marked Tweedy  
Exhibit No. 3 for  
identification.)

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1 Mr. Tweedy. This is mostly discussion of [redacted] <sup>NY</sup>

2 Mr. Baron. The man you referred to was at this time an  
3 agent that was in contact with the Chief of Station?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I remember him very well. I could not possibly  
5 remember his name. I remember him very well; I met him later.

6 Mr. Baron. He proved to be a highly effective agent for  
7 the Station?

8 Mr. Tweedy. He was a very good intelligence agent, an  
9 excellent intelligence agent, for the simple reason that he  
10 was able to make contact with groups and media in the Congo  
11 which was very difficult for non-Africans to reach. He was, for  
12 a year or two, a first-class intelligence source basically;  
13 not an action source, but an intelligence source.

14 Mr. Baron. When you read the sentence that is at the  
15 beginning of paragraph B on the first page where it says:  
16 "Concur this possibility worth watching, but if decided support  
17 for ~~TOP~~PROP objectives. Believe essential such be provided  
18 through third national channel with PBPRIE role completely  
19 concealed."

20 What are you referring to there?

21 Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure; I do not remember. I do not  
22 recall what the incoming cable said.

23 What I am obviously saying is [redacted] <sup>NY</sup> had, I guess, an  
24 [redacted] <sup>NY</sup> wife who was, at least had been, at [redacted] <sup>NY</sup>

25 ~~employee~~ I think what I was saying is, if we wanted to use

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1 [redacted] directly in an assassination attempt, that I would  
2 not dismiss it out of hand.

3 Mr. Baron. You would be concerned about its security?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

5 Mr. Baron. You then would say the phrase "YOPROP objec-  
6 tives" would refer to an assassination attempt?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. That the assassination, discussion of an  
9 assassination attempt, was being restricted to the YOPROP  
10 channel?

11 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

12 Mr. Baron. On the last page of this document --

13 Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that worries me about this  
14 conclusion of mine is this, the more I read it, 2-B is another  
15 paragraph, which may not have had anything to do with [redacted]

16 at all and I do not feel, at least I cannot recollect, why  
17 any leaks would almost certainly have included the [redacted]

18 if [redacted] were involved in this. Thus, I am inclined to  
19 feel I am talking about somebody else and not [redacted]

20 Mr. Baron. I will represent to you in other cable traffic,  
21 I believe, which we will review as we proceed here, there was  
22 discussion of the use of another [redacted].


23 Mr. Tweedy. This was probably the case. I do not think  
24 this refers to [redacted] B here I do not think refers to

25 [redacted] I cannot recall --

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1 Mr. Baron. Who?  
2 YQPROP objectives would still refer to exploring possibilities  
3 to an assassination attempt?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

5 Mr. Baron. This may refer to exploring it with a  
6 different agent?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. On the last page, paragraph 3, it tells the  
9 Chief of Station: "Not intended you construe above comments  
10 as basically negative. You and colleague understand we cannot  
11 read over your shoulder as you plan and assess opportunities.  
12 Our primary concern must be concealment PDRIME role unless  
13 outstanding opportunity emerges which makes calculated risk  
14 first class bet. Ready entertain any serious proposals you  
15 make based our high regard both your professional judgments."

16 What are you referring to in that paragraph? What message  
17 are you conveying to the Chief of Station?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think if you read the cable you will  
19 notice that we have found difficulty with a number of his  
20 proposals. These were exploratory proposals. I wanted --

21 Mr. Baron. For carrying off an assassination mission?

22 Mr. Tweedy. You keep coming off with an assassination  
23 mission as if this was always just around the corner. What I  
24 am saying is, we are in a period here quite common in our  
25 business of very intensive operational planning and exploration.

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All sorts of things were coming up from the field. I had commented on it here; in the end, I say, do not be discouraged because you do not see the probable channel we will use. I assume the colleague was Sid Gottlieb, because I guess he was still there.

Mr. Baron. The first time he had not arrived, but you had already cabled that his arrival was imminent?

Mr. Tweedy. I assume that that is the colleague. I do not think he would have talked to anybody else on it. That is all it means.

It is, if you like, a technique of management.

Mr. Baron. Moving on to a document that we will mark Exhibit 4, the next cable, is from Allen W. Dulles of September 24, 1960 and your pseudonym is also listed as one of the senders of the cable to the Chief of Station.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. In this cable, in the first paragraph, it says:  
2 "We wish give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba  
3 from any possibility resuming governmental position or if he falls  
4 in Leop" -- meaning Leopoldville -- "setting himself in Stanley-  
5 ville or elsewhere ?"

6 First, for the record, any time your pseudonym "Jadwin" or  
7 your name "Tweedy" appears in the upper lefthand corner of a  
8 cable or your signature appears on the bottom, you dispatched  
9 that cable? Is that not right?

10 I am referring generally to the cable traffic.

11 Mr. Tweedy. What it means is this. It could mean several  
12 things, but I personally dictated the cable and dispatched it  
13 without further reference, or for some reason I constructed the  
14 cable and had it released by a higher authority, either Mr.  
15 Bissell or Mr. Dulles. Although those were not the only alter-  
16 natives, if my name was on it, I was connected with it in one  
17 form or another.

18 I would guess that I dictated the cable and that Mr. Dulles --  
19 and I do not have any idea how this came about -- Mr. Dulles  
20 wanted to see it, and Mr. Bissell suggested that it go out  
21 from Mr. Dulles and myself. I just do not know. What this  
22 means is, Dulles and Tweedy were totally aware of the cable.

23 Mr. Baron. Returning then to the sentence I cited from  
24 the cable where you and Dulles were talking about giving every  
25 possible support in eliminating Lumumba, what message --

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1 Mr. Tweedy. "Eliminating Lumumba from any possibility  
2 resuming governmental position." This, if I may say so, reverts  
3 to the original instruction from Mr. Dulles which was that the  
4 U.S. position was that Mr. Lumumba must be removed from a  
5 position of authority in the Congo and that assassination was  
6 not by any means the only way by which this might be accomplished.

7 This, I think, merely reiterates that it is not a -- being  
8 a YQPROP cable does not refer specifically to assassination.

9 Mr. Baron. Would this cable, in using the phrase "elimina-  
10 ting Lumumba" in this context contemplate assassination as  
11 at least one of the possible means that might be used?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid if I may say so you are putting  
13 words in my mouth. This is exactly what it says. He has two  
14 messages now from Mr. Dulles. The first one, I think, was  
15 perfectly clear. Since then he has had messages from Mr.  
16 Dulles' subordinates like myself. This merely makes it clear  
17 again that Headquarters wishes to "give every possible support  
18 in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental  
19 position." and I cannot say more than that, and I think to say  
20 that this stresses assassination would be quite untrue. But the  
21 Chief of Station in Leopoldville was already under instruction  
22 to be considering this as one of the possibilities.

23 Mr. Baron. Assassination?

24 Mr. Tweedy. This does not change that.

25 Mr. Baron. I think that is fine.

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1 The interesting aspect of that sentence for me is the  
2 rest of the sentence where it makes it clear that not only is  
3 there a concern about Lumumba being able to resume his position  
4 in Leopoldville, but anywhere else, and it would seem that  
5 assassination would at least have to be one of very few means  
6 that could insure that fact that Lumumba would not resume a  
7 position of power anywhere.

8 Mr. Tweedy. I do not think I can comment any further.

9 Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 5 a cable  
10 dispatched from the Chief of Station on September 27th, 1960  
11 for your eyes only, and this cable begins with a reference to  
12 Dr. Gottlieb.

13 It says he was contacted 26 September. "We on same wave  
14 length." Then it continues, "Hence believe most rapid action  
15 consistent with security indicated."

16 The next paragraph says, "Basis 2 talks considering  
17 possibilities:" -- there follows a list of possibilities from  
18 A to G and paragraph 3 on the bottom of page 2 says, "Plan  
19 proceed on basis priorities as listed above, unless instructed  
20 to contrary."

(The document referred  
to was marked Tweedy  
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identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. Does that indicate to you that on the list of  
2 priorities, priority A would have been considered by the Chief  
3 of Station to be his top priority?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Can you read, by the way, paragraph 2: "Basis  
5 2 talks considering possibilities" of dispatching <sup>NY</sup> [redacted]  
6 to Stanleyville and taking refuge -- that would be refuge, would  
7 it not?

8 Mr. Baron. Yes. "Recall <sup>NY</sup> [redacted] from Stanleyville" --

9 Mr. Tweedy. -- "and have him take refuge with Big  
10 Brother" --

11 Mr. Baron. -- "Would thus act as inside man to brush up  
12 details to razor edge. Also would provide info on food and  
13 agricultural problem. Guthman recalling <sup>NY</sup> [redacted] to Leop."

14 When Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable, he testified that  
15 this cable indicated that he arrived in the Congo on the 26th  
16 of September. He had two talks with the Chief of Station where  
17 they discussed various operational possibilities of getting rid  
18 of Lumumba. The letter A represented their top priority plan.

19 Would you agree with that interpretation of the cable?

20 Mr. Tweedy. I would think so.

21 Mr. Baron. Would you --

22 Mr. Tweedy. When he says: "Plan proceed on basis prior-  
23 ities as listed above" this again is not what he was going to  
24 do at the conclusion of this without further reference carry  
25 out an assassination. He says, what we see is <sup>NY</sup> [redacted] the

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1 best answer to our problem.

2 Mr. Baron. Does he not indicate in this cable though  
3 that he would proceed to implement these plans unless he were  
4 instructed to the contrary? In other words, this very cable  
5 might constitute his request for a confirmation.

6 Mr. Tweedy. I disagree. I think these various possibili-  
7 ties still need further exploration is what he was suggesting  
8 to Headquarters. he concentrate on that is the best possible use  
9 of <sup>on</sup>  on this including further operational intelligence  
10 on the situation which might lead to an agreement that we would  
11 use this man, and then all these others, but it does not in any  
12 sense, as far as I am concerned, it is not in any sense the  
13 Chief of Station saying, if A looks terribly good I shall just  
14 go ahead and finish the job without further reference. Not at  
15 all.

16 Mr. Baron. I do not understand how you can read the phrase-  
17 "unless instructed to the contrary" in that way.

18 Mr. Tweedy. Because there are other possibilities here.  
19 I am sorry, but I am afraid looking at it fifteen years later --  
20 in the subject that you are engaged in, I think you would look  
21 at it entirely differently than I would, working on a day-to-day  
22 matter with the Chief of Station. There is absolutely nothing  
23 in this cable which says that they have the answer to

24 <sup>will</sup>  use.

25 Mr. Baron. Does paragraph A indicate that <sup>04</sup>  would

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1 Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence literally instead  
2 of an oblique reference to getting access to Lumumba's food by  
3 which he might be poisoned?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I would read it much more literally than that.

5 Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to Exhibit 6, which is a  
6 cable from the Chief of Station on September 30th to Jadwin,  
7 which is yourself --

(The document referred  
to was marked Tweedy  
Exhibit No. 6 for  
identification.)





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1 Mr. Baron. Presumably, it is responding to the cable that  
2 we just looked at, and in this cable, Glen Fields says, "You  
3 are authorized have exploratory talks with <sup>RU</sup> [redacted] to  
4 assess his attitude toward possible active agent or cut-out  
5 role."

6 Would you assume that Glen Fields consulted you before  
7 sending this authorization to the Chief of Station?

8 Mr. Tweedy. Not necessarily. I might have been out of  
9 town that day. As you will notice, all he says is, "You are  
10 authorized have exploratory talks" and "Agree with you initial  
11 discussions should be on hypothetical basis." And, of  
12 course, at that point, we would expect a report from the field  
13 on how it went. He was taking it one step further. He might  
14 not have cleared that with me if I were away. He might also  
15 have perhaps cleared it with Mr. Bissell.

16 Mr. Baron. As your Deputy, it would have been perfectly  
17 proper in your eyes for Glen Fields to have issued this cable  
18 without consulting you?

19 Mr. Tweedy. Certainly. It is quite possible, too, that  
20 he even told Mr. Bissell what he was planning to do. I cannot  
21 tell you specifically. This is all that this cable authorizes.  
22 I find it entirely within his delegated responsibilities.

23 Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure for  
24 Glen Fields, in your absence, to mention to Richard Bissell the  
25 fact that such authorization to be sent to the Chief of Station.

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1 on an exceptional and sensitive mission like this one?

2 Mr. Tweedy. Would you say that again?

3 Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure for  
4 Fields to check with Bissell in your absence before he sent such  
5 a cable?

6 Mr. Tweedy. No. Field's understanding of his authorities  
7 and his relationships with the DDP on such matters were exactly  
8 the same as mine. We would have seen eye to eye with him.

9 If I had sent the cable, undoubtedly I would have let  
10 Mr. Bissell know that I was planning to carry this thing that  
11 much closer. The reason for that is that we were getting close  
12 to informing a third party that this was in the wind. Therefore,  
13 before we actually took this step, I think something like  
14 this, a third party being 04

tape 2a

15 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 8, we will introduce a cable on  
16 October 7th, 1960, from the Chief of Station to Jadwin, which  
17 is yourself.

(The document referred  
to was marked Tweedy  
Exhibit No. 9 for  
identification.)

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1 opposed to moving to implementing?

2 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. Under no circumstances anything  
3 else.

4 Mr. Dawson. Based upon this Exhibit and the previous one  
5 then, Mr. Tweedy, is it your opinion that in this case no agent  
6 was ever asked to assassinate Lumumba?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, indeed. That also coincides with my  
8 best recollection which is not all that damn good. It is  
9 perfectly obvious that [redacted] was never requested to  
10 assassinate Lumumba, and I have no recollection of anybody  
11 having been asked to do this.


12 Mr. Dawson. Whether the discussion was hypothetical, as  
13 outlined in the previous exhibit.

14 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

15 Mr. Dawson. Why is it obvious that [redacted] was never  
16 asked to assassinate Lumumba in light of the sentence in this  
17 cable that reads, "Although did not pick up ball," -- referring  
18 to the fact that [redacted] did not necessarily pick up the  
19 ball on assassinating Lumumba in his conversation with the Chief  
20 of Station, the Chief of Station nevertheless believed "he  
21 prepared take any role necessary within limits security accom-  
22 plish objective."

23 Does that not indicate that [redacted] was at least viewed  
24 as someone who was prepared to undertake an assassination mission  
25 if he should be tasked with it?

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WARD & PAUL

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1 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say he was not. This at that time  
 2 is the Chief of Station's best assessment of what the  <sup>04</sup>  
 3 reaction would be if the thing was formally put to him so  
 4 bluntly that he understood entirely what it was all about. I  
 5 do not recall, I do not believe any of this residual traffic  
 6 indicates that it ever got so far that we did that, and I think,  
 7 my own belief is it is a 50-50 proposition on whether  <sup>04</sup>  
 8 would agree to do it. I think probably in "limits security  
 9 accomplish objective" is probably the controlling factor. I  
 10 cannot really recall anymore.

11 Mr. Dawson. Off the record.

12 (Discussion off the record.)

13 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

14 This report on October 7th by the Chief of Station refers  
 15 back to the exploratory conversations that he mentioned he  
 16 was --

17 Mr. Tweedy. Implied to by Fields.

18 Mr. Baron. -- authorized by Fields in the previous cable  
 19 of the 30th.

20 Mr. Tweedy. Right.

21 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 9, we will introduce a cable signed  
 22 by B. Tweedy to the Chief of Station in the YOPROP channel.

(The document referred  
 to was marked Tweedy  
 Exhibit No. 9 for



identification.)

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TOP SECRET

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1 Mr. Baron. It begins, "Had good discussion your colleague  
2 7 October. Comments follow:"

3 "A. Be assured did not expect YOPROP objectives  
4 be reached in short period and understand current situation  
5 fully warranted return your colleague."

6 And then it continues to discuss the fact that you were  
7 considering dispatching a third country national operator and  
8 a senior case officer from the CIA who would "run this op and  
9 outside agent full time under your direction."

10 Does this cable refer to the fact that you debriefed  
11 Sidney Gottlieb?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it does. That is what it must be,  
13 yes.

14 Mr. Baron. The first paragraph is meant to indicate that  
15 the Chief of Station should not feel that Headquarters would  
16 be disappointed in the fact that he did not pull off an  
17 assassination mission in such a short period of time?

18 Mr. Tweedy. I want to be careful to how I reply to that.  
19 All I was saying to a very professional colleague was that we  
20 had no illusions about the fact that the planning operation  
21 of this would be very difficult, at best, and would take time  
22 and thoroughly agree with the fact that prospects, immediate  
23 prospects, were such that there was no alternative for Sidney  
24 Gottlieb to return. That is all I was saying.

25 But to say what I was trying to express to him was the

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1 fact that we were not overly disappointed that Lumumba was not  
2 assassinated at this point is just not the level of intercourse  
3 that I had with a very professional Chief of Station. That is  
4 all.

5 Mr. Baron. Does not the paragraph A here indicate that  
6 the objective of the mission that was discussed in the YOPROP  
7 channel was to assassinate Lumumba in view or in light of the  
8 fact that Gottlieb had gone to the Congo with materials that  
9 were only going to be lethal for a short period of time?

10 Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.

11 Mr. Baron. In other words, what I am trying to explore  
12 with you is your characterization of this entire stage of the  
13 operation as one of planning and exploration when we know that  
14 Gottlieb took materials to the Congo which would only be lethal  
15 for a short period of time and presumably was prepared to move  
16 from exploration to implementation?

17 Mr. Tweedy. If, as a result of the Station focusing on  
18 the problem for the first time, as a result of Headquarters'  
19 request, they had come up with a plan that they thought was  
20 exceedingly solid and which Headquarters approved, it is not  
21 surprising, perhaps, that we wanted the materials there to take  
22 advantage of such, if you like, an unlikely event. But this  
23 would not change the normal sequence of events, which would be  
24 that the Station would explore, keep Headquarters informed,  
25 Headquarters would comment, it would then be a crescendo of

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TOP SECRET

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1 agreement or no agreement at all resulting from either a final  
2 request for approval or either approval or no approval. This  
3 would not have changed.

4 Mr. Baron. Because Gottlieb took lethal materials to  
5 the Congo with him that had such a short period of lethality,  
6 were you not contemplating at that time that the operation  
7 might well move from the exploration phase to the implementation  
8 phase just as soon as Gottlieb and Hedqeman determined that it  
9 was feasible?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I think I would put it quite differently.  
11 I think that I would say that we would have been remiss in not  
12 being in a position to exploit, if we reached the point where  
13 we all agreed that the thing was possible.

14 If they had merely gone over and said we think we can do  
15 it, by why do you not send the stuff from Headquarters, that  
16 would have been sort of nonsense, if you follow me.

17 Mr. Baron. You would have expected the Chief of  
18 Station to cable back for confirmation, but it was certainly  
19 within your contemplation at the time that when Gottlieb went  
20 to the Congo, when the Chief of Station cabled for confirma-  
21 tion, you would probably give him a go ahead to assassinate  
22 Lumumba?

23 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all.

24 Mr. Baron. If the operation were feasible?

25 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all. It would not have

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1 been my say-so. I do not know what the policy levels of my  
2 Agency, who in turn would have been reflected in the policy  
3 levels of the government, would have done if it had come to the  
4 point where somebody said, we can do it, do you want us to do  
5 it.

6 Mr. Baron. You would have referred that to Bissell?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. He would have referred it?

9 Mr. Tweedy. He would have referred it according to his  
10 lights. That was not my business. He was his own level of  
11 authority. He was as aware of his authority as I was at my  
12 level. I only assume that this would have been discussed at  
13 the highest level, certainly at the Agency. I assume that the  
14 decision would have had to have been made by Allen Dulles and  
15 who else he wished to consult in Washington.

16 These are pure assumptions on my part. Under no circum-  
17 stances would I have given the go ahead.

18 Mr. Dawson. That is interesting.

19 Mr. Baron. I just have one more question on this line.  
20 I realize we are going very closely over this ground. We would  
21 not be doing it if it weren't important in trying to get you to  
22 clarify for the record exactly what shade of meaning you want  
23 to attach here.

24 Would it be fair to say that when you dispatched Gottlieb  
25 to the Congo you expected to hear back --

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1 Mr. Tweedy. I expected this would result in a dialogue  
2 between the Station and ourselves as to what might be feasible.

3 Mr. Baron. You were hoping?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Gottlieb assisting the Chief of Station in  
5 his explorations.

6 Mr. Baron. In view of the entire policy of the Agency at  
7 that time, as indicated in the cables of Dulles and the cables  
8 from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that  
9 Gottlieb and the Chief of Station would find a feasible means  
10 of carrying out an assassination mission and then inform you of  
11 that.

WARD & PAUL

12 Mr. Tweedy. I am not going to comment on the hope. I do  
13 not know what my frame of mind was on that.


14 The purpose of the exercise was to see whether this was  
15 possible. One thing was clear, that I was the instrument of  
16 policy in carrying out the exploration which was entirely a  
17 professional matter. If the exploration had reached a point  
18 where we felt that we could submit to higher authority a plan  
19 which we thought made some sense, at that point higher authority  
20 would have to take the ball and run with it and let us know  
21 what they concluded.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

22 Mr. Baron. By higher authority here, you mean any  
23 authority higher than yourself?

24 Mr. Tweedy. It would start with me in my chain of command.  
25 I would not be concerned with the National Security Advisor

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1 to the President or anybody else, I was perfectly clear in my  
2 mind because of what had occurred and the way that these matters  
3 had been broached to the field by Mr. Dulles, that the thing  
4 was in the national arena and was just not in the Agency's  
5 arena.

6 What Mr. Dulles would have done and what he felt his  
7 authorities were from higher authority I cannot tell you.

8 Mr. Dawson. That would have been a matter that would have  
9 been between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, is that correct?

10 Mr. Tweedy. In the first instance, it would have been  
11 between Mr. Dulles and the outside world, the Executive.

12 Mr. Dawson. The chain of command would have been, you  
13 would have talked to Bissell, you would not have been expected  
14 or would have asked what Mr. Dulles' view was?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Mind you, we were also an Agency that was  
16 very flexible. I am not saying Mr. Dulles might not have talked  
17 to me about this, that was because Mr. Bissell was not  
18 immediately available, or something of this kind.

19 What I am saying is at the working level, the operational  
20 level, the Divisional and the Station level, we had come up  
21 with a plan which made professional sense to us which we felt  
22 sound enough so that we would present it to our masters, we  
23 would have done so and the resultant instruction to the field  
24 would have depended on their reaction as far as I was concerned  
25 within the Agency. As far as Mr. Dulles was concerned, I cannot

TOP SECRET



1 tell you.

2 In other words, the degree to which he thought he would  
3 have to refer further to Washington on, I have no idea.

4 Mr. Baron. It was your job to find a feasible way to carry  
5 out an assassination; it was the job of Bissell and those above  
6 him to decide whether to go ahead, as far as you were concerned?

7 Mr. Tweedy. As far as I was concerned, that is the way it  
8 started.

9 Mr. Dawson. You have no independent or specific recollac-  
10 tion that you ever went to Mr. Bissell and said, we do not have  
11 a shot at this, or we do, and we could do it this way, and him  
12 saying one thing or another? You have no recollection either  
13 way?

14 Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell read the same traffic I did.

15 Mr. Dawson. I did not know that.

16 Mr. Tweedy. He read these cables. When I say he read  
17 every single one of them word for word -- all I can say is he  
18 had full access to these cables and anything he had not read or  
19 had any reason to believe he had not read, I would have kept him  
20 generally briefed on the progress of the planning. Naturally,  
21 he would have been interested. He would not have followed it  
22 in detail.

23 Mr. Dawson. Would Mr. Dulles have had any access to these  
24 cables?

25 Mr. Tweedy. Not routinely. I think he would have expected

FORM 1A-48 (7-72) 544-5000

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544-5000

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1 Mr. Bissell to keep him orally informed on a thing like this.  
2 He did not want any more paper floating around in those days.  
3 Mr. Dulles was in even another building. Now, we were all down  
4 at the Reflecting Pool at that point, were we not, and Mr.  
5 Dulles was on E Street. It doesn't make any difference. The  
6 number of papers on this YOPROP thing would have been restricted  
7 to the absolute minimum. I do not think Mr. Dulles would have  
8 expected to be bothered with the operational details. What he  
9 would have expected from Mr. Bissell was progress on planning  
10 the elimination of Lumumba by whatever means.

11 Mr. Dawson. Was the routine way that that information  
12 would have been given to Mr. Dulles -- for instance, what I'm  
13 thinking was, were there staff meetings at which you attended  
14 with Mr. Bissell in Mr. Dulles' presence concerning what was  
15 happening generally on a routine quarterly or weekly basis?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell would have seen Mr. Dulles by and  
17 large every day.

18 Mr. Dawson. They would not review meetings on a weekly or  
19 routine basis?

20 Mr. Tweedy. He had his own staff meeting every morning,  
21 Mr. Dulles did. These were attended by his Deputy Directors, of  
22 which Mr. Bissell was one.

23 I used to see Mr. Bissell -- he had a staff meeting once  
24 a week which all Chiefs of Division attended. Nothing like  
25 this would be discussed at those. I had my own private meetings

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0000-001 (Rev. 7-27) 544-0000

FORM 4-64 30

FORM 4-64 30

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1 with him on these matters whenever it seemed necessary by one  
2 or the other of us.

3 Mr. Baron. Returning to the cable of October 7th, 1960,  
4 which you sent to the Chief of Station, the reference to a  
5 senior case officer who might be dispatched to the Congo, is that  
6 a reference to the fact that Bissell was considering dispatching  
7 Justin O'Donnell?

8 Mr. Tweedy. No other candidate, no other. I assume that  
9 is who it is.

10 Mr. Baron. O'Donnell's account that he was asked by  
11 Bissell to go to the Congo to carry off the assassination of  
12 Lumumba would fit here?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Sure.

14 Mr. Baron. The third country national referred to in this  
15 cable and in other cables as someone you are considering  
16 dispatching to the Congo to help with the operation, would that  
17 be QJWIN or WIROGUE?

18 Mr. Tweedy. As I told you before, definitely not WIROGUE.  
19 Presumably this other fellow, whose identity and what he was is  
20 very, very unclear to me.

21 Mr. Baron. The agent that was run by <sup>03</sup> ~~Arnold Silver~~

22 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. This would have been the man that would  
23 have worked with Justin O'Donnell if it had all happened.

24 Mr. Baron. That was QJWIN. I will represent to you that  
25 QJWIN was the agent who was supervised by Justin O'Donnell.

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VER

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WARD & PAUL

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FORM 1 (Rev. 1-25-60)

1 Mr. Tweedy. We read that that time, which is my only  
2 recollection of it. That is the person I am sure.

3 Mr. Baron. Let me correct myself here.

4 I will represent to you that QJWIN was the agent that was  
5 recruited by ~~Arnold Silver~~<sup>02</sup> and sent by ~~Silver~~<sup>03</sup> to the Congo for  
6 use by O'Donnell and perhaps by the Chief of Station.

7 Is that consistent with your recollection?

8 Mr. Tweedy. No, it is not consistent with my recollection.  
9 It is certainly consistent with what I read the last time I saw  
10 you, which I have no reason to dispute. I just cannot remember  
11 the blighter at all.

12 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 10, let us introduce a cable of  
13 October 15th, 1960, which is not sent in the ~~YOPROP~~ channel.  
14 It is marked ~~RIBAT WREFLAT~~<sup>02</sup> in the space where sensitivity  
15 indicators are usually placed.

(The document referred  
to was marked Tweedy  
Exhibit No. 10 for  
identification.)

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FORM 1 (Rev. 1-25-60)

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FORM (Rev. 2-27) 144-8000

1 Mr. Baron. This cable requests the views of the Chief of  
2 Station on suggestions A, B and C for various covert operations.  
3 In paragraph C, there is a reference to <sup>02</sup>WEROAK.

4 Mr. Tweedy, we have received the representation from the  
5 CIA that that was a cryptonym used to refer to Lumumba.  
6 Is that consistent with your interpretation of the cable?

7 Mr. Baron. It is indeed.

8 Mr. Tweedy. This paragraph C says in part: "Only direct  
9 action we can now stand behind is to support immobilizing or  
10 arresting <sup>02</sup>WEROAK, desirable as more definitive action might be.  
11 Any action taken would have to be entirely Congolese."

12 Now, you signed this cable, but it was not sent in the  
13 special sensitivity channel that dealt with Gottlieb's mission  
14 to the Congo?

15 Before we discuss this cable, let us also introduce into  
16 the record as Exhibit 11 another cable which you signed on  
17 October 15, 1960 which was sent in the YOPROP channel to the  
18 Chief of Station.

(The document referred to  
was marked Tweedy Exhibit  
No. 11 for identification.)

FORM (Rev. 2-27) 144-8000

FORM (Rev. 2-27) 144-8000

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1 Mr. Baron. This contains the following language: "You  
2 will note from cable through normal channel currently being  
3 transmitted" then it continues "on <sup>SA</sup>YQPROP suggestions. You  
4 will probably receive more along these lines as stumbling  
5 bloc<sup>02</sup> ~~W~~ROAK represents increasingly apparent all studying  
6 Congo situation closely and his disposition spontaneously  
7 becomes number one consideration."

8 Mr. Tweedy. I think by that, I think it is perfectly God-  
9 awful English.

10 Mr. Baron. The cable continues --

11 Mr. Tweedy. Obviously that means that everyone one talked  
12 to said there is no solution to the Congo as long as Lumumba  
13 stays in a position of power or influence there. That is what  
14 that means.

15 Mr. Baron. The cable continues: "Raise above so you not  
16 confused by any apparent duplication. This channel remains  
17 for specific purpose you discussed with colleague and also  
18 remains highest priority."

19 Now, does this pair of cables indicate that at this point  
20 despite the indication in the first cable that we looked at that  
21 "direct action would be limited to entirely Congolese action"  
22 the actual position of yourself and others at Headquarters  
23 involved in this operation was that exploration of an assassina-  
24 tion mission remained the highest priority for the Chief of  
25 Station?

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*1/18/52*

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WARD & PAUL

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1 Mr. Tweedy. I think that is accurate.

2 We had come to the end of the road, at least temporarily  
3 on the YQPROP aspect and for the time being we were in no  
4 position to approve anything but what was discussed in the  
5 <sup>02</sup> ~~WFLAP~~ cable. Nonetheless, as long as the threat to the Congo  
6 from Lumumba existed, there remained a high priority to search  
7 for means to take care of the YQPROP planning aspects.

8 Mr. Baron. When the cable refers to the specific purpose  
9 you discussed with colleague --

10 Mr. Tweedy. This is assassination with Gottlieb, I am  
11 sure.

12 Mr. Baron. It then says: This purpose remains highest  
13 priority. Would that not indicate to the Chief of Station  
14 that he should proceed to find a way that Lumumba could be  
15 assassinated?

16 Mr. Tweedy. What this would mean to the Chief of Station  
17 was that he should retain exploration of possible means of  
18 assassinating Lumumba as highest priority. He should continue  
19 to seek means to do this, not to do it.

20 Mr. Baron. Again, you are maintaining you have just made  
21 yourself clear, as far as you were concerned, you were still  
22 asking him to explore and not implement at this point?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Nothing else but.

24 Mr. Baron. Who would have had access to or received  
25 distribution of the first cable we looked at which travelled in:

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the <sup>02</sup>WIFLAT channel?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have been restricted, but not as restricted as the other.

Mr. Baron. Would somebody at the Embassy conceivably have been cut in on cable traffic in the channel that dealt with <sup>02</sup>WIFLAT operations?

Mr. Tweedy. Could be, certainly.

Mr. Baron. In other words, the purpose of sending a second cable on the same day which dealt with action against Lumumba was what?

Mr. Tweedy. The simple reason I think -- I say I think, because I cannot tell you so -- as I said a few minutes ago, obviously you'd come temporarily to the end of the line on YQPROP. Measures taken to shore up <sup>01</sup>WIFLAT's position in the Congo, Mabutu, would have served to support the general objective of containing Lumumba by whatever means. It is all part of the same purpose.

Once again referring to the original cable from Mr. Dulles which said all means, in effect, and I think the reason I'm putting this in the open channel, the open channel is still --

Mr. Baron. Simply the ordinary channel used between yourself --

Mr. Tweedy. Still a restricted channel. RIBAT is a restricted thing, in any event. This could have been discussed with the Ambassador or the Embassy, if any aspect of it seemed

3/BR

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1 appropriate by the Chief of Station.

2 Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YQPROP cable would only have  
3 been seen by the Chief of Station?

4 Mr. Tweedy. The Embassy would not have been shown this  
5 cable anyway. We do not show the traffic to the Embassy; we  
6 discussed it.

7 Mr. Baron. It would have been propr for the <sup>02</sup> ~~YQ~~ PLAT cable  
8 to be conveyed in some manner?

9 Mr. Tweedy. To be discussed.

10 Mr. Baron. Between the Chief of Station and perhaps the  
11 Ambassador?

12 Mr. Tweedy. Discussed; only orally.

13 Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YQPROP cable clearly would  
14 have been restricted to the Chief of Station?

15 Mr. Tweedy. I have no reason to believe that the YQPROP  
16 business was discussed with the Ambassador, I do not  
17 believe it was, although Mr. Dulles, in his original cable, said  
18 he could, if he wanted to.

19 Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as the final exhibit for  
20 the moment Exhibit 12, a cable of October 17, 1960 going to  
21 Jadwin from the Chief of Station.

22 In this cable, the Chief of Station is responding to your  
23 suggestion that a senior case officer might be dispatched to  
24 the Congo to handle the YQPROP operation. He says it is an  
25 excellent idea. Is that a fair interpretation?

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WARD & PAUL

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WARD & P. 21

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Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

(The document referred  
to was marked Tweedy  
Exhibit No. 12 for  
identification.)

1 Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station then makes a suggestion  
2 in the fourth paragraph for equipment that might be provided if  
3 such a case officer were to be sent. He says, "If case officer  
4 sent, recommend Headquarters pouch soonest high powered foreign  
5 make rifle with telescopic sight and silencer. Hunting good  
6 here when lights right. However as hunting rifles now forbidden,  
7 would keep rifle in office pending opening of hunting season."

8 Would you take that to be a recommendation by the Chief  
9 of Station, if a case officer was sent to the Congo to concen-  
10 trate on the YOPROP operation, he should be provided with the  
11 kind of weapon that would be suited for a sniper shot at  
12 Lumumba?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Not necessarily to be fired by the  
14 case officer, obviously not, but at least used in the operation.

15 Mr. Baron. This reference to the hunting season can be  
16 taken as a reference obliquely to the fact that Lumumba was in  
17 UN custody and that there would not be, in effect, "open  
18 season" on him until he showed his face outside of UN custody.  
19 Would that be a fair interpretation?

20 Mr. Tweedy. I would not have interpreted it quite the  
21 same way. I would have interpreted it this way, which was if  
22 it, as a result of Headquarters suggestion that a rifle be  
23 provided to the Station, the Station would come up with an  
24 operational plan involving the use of the rifle which Headquarters  
25 would approve, and that thus, in effect, the operation was on

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 by a rifle, that would be the opening of the hunting season.  
2 In other words, the point where they knew how it could be used  
3 and Headquarters had approved its use.

4 Mr. Baron. I have one other general question before we  
5 take a break, and that is, returning to Sidney Gottlieb's  
6 account of his conversation with Richard Bissell about making  
7 preparations for carrying off an assassination against an  
8 African foreign leader if it were required, Gottlieb said in  
9 that context that he had higher authority for such an operation.  
10 Gottlieb also said that he clearly interpreted Bissell to mean:  
11 that Bissell had Presidential authority for such an operation?  
12 Did you have any knowledge of such a conversation between  
13 Gottlieb and Bissell from any source?

WARD & PAUL

14 Tape 2b Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that Gottlieb and I ever  
15 discussed higher authority and approval. I do not say that it  
16 did not occur. If Gottlieb said that he had this impression  
17 in talking to Bissell, I cannot say no, but I cannot comment  
18 on it further.

19 Mr. Baron. For the moment, we have no further questions  
20 and we will take a break now and pick up again before the full  
21 Committee and Executive Session this afternoon.

22 Thank you very much for your patience in going through these  
23 documents one by one. It has been extremely helpful to us.

24 (Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m. the hearing concluded.)  
25

410 First Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

NO. W. DULLES  
OFF DCI  
17 3301  
18 APR 24 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  
**SECRET**

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OPERATIONAL  
IMMEDIATE

OUT 62985  
OUT 62986

LEOPOLDVILLA  
DIRECTOR  
CCP  
C/S C

LEOP  
PRIORITY  
RYBAT

INFO

CHZ DIR  
47587 47587

FOR ROBERT GUTHMAN FROM ASCHAM

1. IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION.

2. HENCE WE WISH TO GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY ALONG WITH LEOP 9772 AND LEOP 9745 AND DIR 46115 INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT. WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU AND IN ADDITION TO

WMS HERTZGORE AUTHORIZED, WE FURTHER AUTHORIZE EXPENDITURE

OPERATIONAL OFFICERS

**SECRET**

OPERATIONAL OFFICERS

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PAGE 2

OUT 82866  
DIR 47507

INFO ONE DIR  
 UP TO A TOTAL OF \$100,000 TO CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT HHS. ADVISE YOUR CASH NEEDS.

3. TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE.

4. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SEEN AND APPROVED AT COMPETENT LEVEL ODACID.

END OF MESSAGE

- (IN 39706)
- (IN 31222)
- (OUT 59559)

CABLE SECRETARIAT: LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MR. HELMS.

SEP 24 1945  
CIA

ISSUING OFFICE

COORDINATING OFFICER  
**SECRET**

ADMINISTRATING OFFICE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy 1/1

CONFIDENTIAL  
REF: 2443  
DATE: 19 September 1960

**SECRET**

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7/14/60  
GUTHMAN

TO : LEOLFOLDVILLE  
FROM : DIRECTOR  
CONF: C/AF  
INFO: DDP, S/K 2

OC (PRITY) LEOP

INFO

CITE GIB  
01443

014

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN FROM JADWIN

RYBAT YOPROP

1. IDEN PROCEEDING BRAZZAVILLE SHORTLY AND SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. HE WILL MAKE HIS WAY LEOP SOONEST THEREAFTER AND CALL YOU AT OFFICE ON ARRIVAL. WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS". BRIEF COVER DISCUSSION WILL THEN BE HELD IN WHICH "SID" SUGGESTS MEETING YOU AT OFFICE AND YOU WILL RESPOND BY AGREEING AND SETTING THE TIME. HOWEVER THE ACTUAL MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN TIME MENTIONED IN THIS CONVERSATION AND IN FRONT MAIN ENTRANCE NEW STANLEY HOTEL. "SID" WILL CARRY UNROLLED COPY OF "PARIS MATCH" IN LEFT HAND.

2. IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE IDEN SOONEST POSSIBLE AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. HOWEVER HIS ETA NOT FIRM AND YOU SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED BY SOME DELAY.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

**SECRET**

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

IRECTOR

P R E C E D E N C E	DEFERRED	
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INFO

PAGE TWO

CITE 212

3. ACKNOWLEDGE ABOVE SOONEST, WITH ANY REVISIONS YOU WISH MAKE IN ABOVE PROCEDURES. CONTINUE USE YOOPROP INDICATOR ALL TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.

END OF MESSAGE

*fl...*  
DD/P  
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**SECRET**

*...*  
C/AF  
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy 2



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO: Tweedy 589  
C/AF 2445  
19 September 1960

**SECRET**

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● LEOPOLDVILELE  
TO: DIRECTOR  
C/AF  
DDP, S/C 2

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71464

71465

(PRITY) LEOP INFO

CITE DIR 01443

RYBAT YQPROP

RE DIR 71464 (OUT 01443)

IDEN SIDNEY BRAUN.

END OF MESSAGE

DD/P  
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**SECRET**

C/AF  
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS MUST BE ADVISED BY THE ISSUING OFFICE IF REQUIRED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

24 24867  
C/AS  
2445  
22 September 1948

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LEOPOLDVILLE  
DIRECTOR  
C/AS  
2445

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OUT 74837

(PRIORITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 0300  
EYES ONLY GUTHMAN 0500  
RYBAT YQPROP  
RE LEOP 0025 (IN 18989)

IF VERY WELCOME. COMMENTS FOLLOW

A. RE 2A. CONCUR MAXIMUM USE [REDACTED] FOR COLLECTION OF INTEL. MUST REMAIN UNWITTING FOR TIME BEING ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] YOU WILL BE ASSESSING FOR MORE ACTIVE ROLE. ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] HAS APPARENTLY MAINTAINED SPLENDID COVER, MUST REMEMBER CLOSE EXAMINATION HIS BACKGROUND WILL REVEAL HE RESIDENTIALLY [REDACTED] ONE LEG ON [REDACTED] PASSPORT AND WIFE [REDACTED]

B. RE 2B. CONCUR THIS POSSIBILITY WORTH WATCHING BUT IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR YQPROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH PRIORITY ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. IMAGINE YOU CONCUR OUR BELIEF SUBJECT'S SECURITY LIKELY BE POOR AND LEAKS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY

CLUDE [REDACTED] 24 1948  
COORDINATING OFFICERS  
RELEASING OFFICERS [REDACTED]

UBR

SECRET

1	ROUTING	4
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TEXT  
DATE

TO :  
FROM: DIRECTOR  
CONF:  
INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPTIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 74837

INFO PAGE TWO

CITE DIR 10309#

C. RE 20. YOU MUST HAVE MUCH BETTER PERSPECTIVE  
 [redacted] THAN WE, BUT TRACES INDICATE [redacted] CONNECTIONS  
 AND THUS OUR COMMENTS ALONG LINES B ABOVE.

D. RE 2D. UNDERSTAND STATION HAS HAD REASONS QUESTION  
 [redacted] CLAIM REPORTING RELIABILITY AND WE MUST ASSUME [redacted]  
 CONNECTIONS COMMENTS AS ABOVE.

E. RE 2E. FROM TRACES HERE ASSUME SUBJECT MAY BE AN  
 ARM SUPPORTER OF KASAYUBU. NOTE PREVIOUS CZECH CONNECTIONS.  
 COMMENTS ALSO AS ABOVE.

F. RE 2F. AWAITING YOUR FURTHER EXPLORATION CNA CAPTA  
 CERTAINLY INTERESTED ANY POSSIBLE CNA SOLUTION. THIS SHOULD  
 PROVIDE MAXIMUM CREDIBILITY.

G. RE 2G. ASSUME YOU AGREE SUBJECT LEOP 0009 LIKELY BE  
 MOST RISKY VEHICLE THESE PURPOSES.

SEP 24 1975

CIA

RE PARIS THREE AND FOUR, INTERESTED YOUR CONTINUING

COORDINATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS  
SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

*[Handwritten signature]*

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INFO PAGE THREE

CITE DIR 03074

ASSESSMENT <sup>07</sup> ~~W~~BOTTLE AS GENUINE THIRD NATIONAL ASSET ON GROUND OF  
 WHATEVER ROLE THIS OP YOU MIGHT CONSIDER HIM. SOMEWHAT CONCERN  
 YOUR RECENT REPORT HE MISUNDERSTOOD OR DISOBEYED INSTRUCTIONS  
 RE <sup>06</sup> ~~EXPLOITATION~~ EXPLOITATION, BUT HIS APPARENT INCREASING ACCESS TO  
 MILIEU OF GREAT INTEREST. WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL  
<sup>CANDIDATE</sup>  
 WITHOUT CONTRACT AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL AND WILL ADVISE  
 SHORTLY.

3. NOT INTENDED YOU CONSTRUE ABOVE COMMENTS AS BASICALLY  
 NEGATIVE. YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER YOUR  
 SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN  
 MUST BE CONCEALMENT PBPRIME ROLE, UNLESS OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY  
 EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY  
 ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH REGARD  
 BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS.

*Handwritten signature*

END OF MESSAGE  
 1915

CLAF  
 ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

2  
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

A. J. Dulles  
DCI 570  
2801  
24 Sept. 60

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CST 73573  
CST 73573

OP IN LEOP INFO  
RYBAT <sup>02</sup> FLAT  
FROM ASCHAM AND JADWIN  
RE: LEOP 0002 (IN 17384)\*

02521  
02521

1. APPRECIATE EXCELLENT REPORTING YOUR REFERENCE AND COMMEND <sup>04</sup> HIS ALERT ROLE. WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP, SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

2. WHILE FULLY AWARE OF NEFARIOUS PLOTTING GHANA, CUNEA, UAR. TO RESTORE LUMUMBA, GREATLY DISTURBED AT REFERENCE TO MOROCCO AND PARTICULARLY TUNISIA AS MEMBER OF THIS CLIQUE. CAN YOU SUGGEST ANY ACTION WE CAN PROMOTE OR TAKE OTHERWISE TO HELP DETACH THEM FROM LUMUMBA

CAMP? <sup>01</sup> <sup>01</sup>

SEP 24 1960

CIA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

*[Handwritten initials]*

LEOPOLVILLE

DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

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INFO

CITE 24

3. DISTURBED AT POSSIBILITY THAT [REDACTED] MIGHT LOSE CONTROL OF HIS FORCES DUE POSSIBLE HIGHER PAY BEING OFFERED SOURCES HOSTILE TO US AS SUGGESTED PARA 4 YOUR REFERENCE. IS PAY SITUATION IN ORDER AND CAN ANYTHING FURTHER BE DONE ABOUT THIS THROUGH UN OR COVERTLY THROUGH [REDACTED] <sup>101</sup>

4. AGREE POSITION OUTLINED LAST SENTENCE REFERENCE WHICH WE ASSUME IS FULLY ENDORSED BY AMBASSADOR.

5. AT YOUR DISCRETION, SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH AMBASSADOR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: [REDACTED] <sup>04</sup> 2) reported on 23 September that Pierre Mulale, Gabriel Yumbi, and Antoine Gizenga of the PSA were mounting a coup against Mobutu and the Council of Commissioners

SEP 24 1975

CIA

DCI  
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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REC'D FROM

PAGE 2  
SEP 27 1975

CIA

PRIORITY

IN 18089  
LEOP 5226

D. <sup>02</sup>WELAM IN CONTACT 5 BALUBAS WHO HE SAYS ANXIOUS LAUNCH REF PROGRAM IF PROPER INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE.

E. HECTOR GEORGES MASSIANGA RECENTLY TOLD ODACID OFFICER AND GUTMAN HE IN CONTACT SMALL GROUP CNA TROOPS WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IF RECEIVE FINANCIAL ENCOURAGEMENT. GUTMAN WITHDREW FROM TALKS AND ARRANGED HAVE ODACID OFFICER INTRODUCE MASSIANGA TO OTHERS. NO RESULTS. THIS COULD BE PUSHED THROUGH ANOTHER

F. <sup>02</sup>WELAM TOLD BETTELHEIM HE IN CONTACT CIA CAPTAIN [REDACTED] REPRESENTS GROUP OF 4 (KASAVUBU, DEFENSE OFFICER, MEMBER OF COMMISSIONERS, BOLIKANGO AND CAPTAIN). ASKED <sup>02</sup>WELAM PUT HIM IN CONTACT BELGIAN, FRENCH OR OTHER GROUPS WILLING TRAIN AND ARM 1500 TROOPS LOCATED KITONA AREA. SAID HIS GROUP WANTS MOVE THEM LEOP IN ABOUT 8 DAYS TO TRY TAKE OVER CITY. PLAN NOT FEASIBLE AND DOUBT KASAVUBU AGREES. BUT MIGHT GET CAPTAIN INVOLVED REF OP.

G. SLIGHT CHANCE <sup>02</sup>W BOTTLE MIGHT TRY THROUGH SUBJECT LEOP 8009 (IN 18077).

3. PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO, CONTRARY.

SECRET

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4/88

PAGE - 3 -

PRIORITY

IN 18909  
LEOS 0220

TO

FROM

04

... NOT FEASIBLE, [REDACTED] POSSIBLE TO  
FOR PLANS OF C. [REDACTED] LIKE THIRD NAT  
IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR CUT-OUT FUNCTIONS, SUCH PERSON  
CONTINUED TO USE

END OF MESSAGE

RECEIVED FROM

SEP 22 1975

CIA

2182



STANLEYVILLE

Sept 27

REC'D CABLE SEC1.

PRIORITY

SEP 22 1975

CLIA

IN 12589

DIP

NO

ONE

LEOP 0926

EXES ONLY GADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT <sup>71</sup> YCPROP

REF: DIP 01443 (OUT 71464 )

1. IDEN REF CONTACTED 26 SEPTEMBER. WE ON SAME WAVE LENGTH  
GUTHMAN AFRAID <sup>DI</sup> [REDACTED] WEAKENING UNDER AFRO-ARAB PRESSURE. URGENT  
BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED.

2. RADIO TALKS CONSIDERING POSSIBILITIES:

A. RECALL <sup>DI</sup> [REDACTED] FROM STANLEYVILLE AND HAVE HIM TALK  
WITH HIS BROTHER. WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDER MAN TO BRING  
[REDACTED] HAZOP EDGE. ALSO WOULD PROVIDE INFO ON FOOD AND  
AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM. GUTHMAN RECALLING <sup>DI</sup> [REDACTED] TO LEOP.

B. SUBJECT LEOP 0981 (IN 16685 ) SAID HE PLANNED ACTION  
WITHIN 6 DAYS. DATE PASSED AND NO ACTION BUT IF PRICE RIGHT MIGHT  
GET SHOW ON ROAD.

C. <sup>05</sup> SENATOR PROMONTORIO WHO UNWITTING GUTHMAN POLITICAL  
CONTACT VISITED STATION 26 SEPTEMBER. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE  
IMMEDIATE ACTION. SAID HAS NAMES 4-MAN SQUAD WHO WANT INTERFERE  
ACHIEVE POSITIVE SETTLEMENT. IF <sup>05</sup> PROMONTORIO GROUP USED WOULD  
NEED CUT-CUT SUCH AS ROWTON. REALIZE PREFERABLE USE THIRD NATION.

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

5

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF (OR ~~HESS~~, AF DIV NOTIFIED 1940 30 SEP)

DDP, S/C 2

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IN 20057	

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LEOP 0030

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YOPROP

REF: DIR 03094 (OUT 74837)

SEP 22 1975

CIA

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE. WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.

2. RE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE [REDACTED] <sup>04</sup> BEST ASSET AVAILABLE. VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [REDACTED] <sup>04</sup> WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS [REDACTED] <sup>04</sup> PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT.

3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED POSSIBILITY [REDACTED] <sup>02</sup> BOTTLE PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING TO [REDACTED] <sup>02</sup>

SECRET

5/8

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF (OR HXSE, AF DIV NOTIFIED 1940 30 SEP)

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IN 28857		

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INFO

CITE

LEOP 8090

EYES ONLY JACWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RE: [REDACTED]

RYBAT YQPROP

SEP 22 1975

REF: DIR 83094 (OUT 74837)

CIA

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE. WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.

2. RE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE [REDACTED] BEST ASSET AVAILABLE. VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [REDACTED] WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS [REDACTED] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT.

3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED POSSIBILITY [REDACTED] BOTTLE PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING TO [REDACTED]

SECRET

PAGE 2

31	16
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	
IN 2003/1 LECP 2002	

TO INFO CITE

4. NEW POSSIBILITY EXISTS VIEW 29 SEPTEMBER GUTHMAN  
 [REDACTED] LISLE 1 TALKS. ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] LISLE 1 PREVIOUSLY FAVORED SUBJECT  
 REF OP, NOW BELIEVES [REDACTED] ANGOLAN GROUP WOULD BE SUPPRESSED IN  
 CONGO AND REPLACED BY GUINEAN SUPPORTED GROUP IF SUBJECT EVER  
 REGAINS ASCENDANCY. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION.  
 THEREFORE PROPOSE EXPLORE [REDACTED] LISLE 1 THINKING SOONEST TO SEE HOW  
 FAR HE WILLING GO AND DETERMINE HIS ASSETS. ASSUMING [REDACTED] LISLE 1  
 MEETING POSITIVE, DOES HQS CONSIDER HIM BE TRUE THIRD COUNTRY  
 NATIONAL FROM POINT VIEW SECURITY OF OP? IF [REDACTED] LISLE 1 REACTION  
 FAVORABLE, BELIEVE THIS OFFERS MEANS ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE EARLY ON  
 PAR WITH [REDACTED] IN SO FAR AS ACCESS AND SECURITY CONCERNED

5. RE PARA 1F REF: AS OF NOW DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFO  
 EVALUATE POTENTIAL OF CNA.

6. VIEW IMMINENT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] LISLE 1 MEETINGS, RE  
 QUEST HQS REPLY OPIM VIA EQUERRY LINK.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

8/BR

30 SEPTEMBER 1960

LEOPOLDBVILLE

DIRECTOR

C/AF

DDP, S/C

P R I O R I T Y	DEFERRED	30 31 32 34 19
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SEP 22 1960

OUT 7500  
OUT 1590  
0300

LEOP

INFO

CLM

CITE DIR

EYES ONLY OUTMAN

RYBAT <sup>13</sup> YEHTRON

RE LEOP 0052 (IN 20857)

CS COMMENT: \* URGED HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY TALKS TO DETERMINE IF SCHOTROFFE WILLING TO TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT.

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH [REDACTED] <sup>04</sup> TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT ROLE. AGREE WITH YOUR INITIAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS.

2. IT DOES APPEAR FROM HERE THAT OF POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE [REDACTED] <sup>04</sup> BEST. WE STILL HAVE SOME WORRY ABOUT PSBPRIME STAY TOGETHER WITH QUESTION OF WIFE. HOWEVER WE WILL WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY YOUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT HIS ATTITUDE AS WELL AS ANY SPECIFIC APPROACHES THAT MAY EMERGE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT A FEW DAYS STATUS QUD SITUATION WOULD ALLOW FOR MODERATE HASTE.

3. IN ABSENCE MORE DETAILS WE ARE RELUCTANT CONSIDER [REDACTED] <sup>02</sup> USLE CUE. WHEREAS HE HAS BEEN LONG TIME CONTACT AND IN HIS SPECIFIC FIELD HE IS IN MOST RESPECTS AN AGENT WE WOULD STILL HAVE BASIC QUESTIONS AS TO CONTROL AND SECURITY. WE DO AGREE YOU SHOULD EXPLORE HIS THINKING WITH QUESTIONS MORE OBLIQUE THAN DIRECT. IF YOU FEEL WE ARE WRONG ON [REDACTED] <sup>02</sup> USLE CUE ASSESSMENT PLEASE ADVISE AFTER NEXT TALKS WITH HIM.

4. APPRECIATE YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEMS. (END OF MESSAGE)

GREEN FIELDS C/IS

GREEN FIELDS

COORDINATING OFFICERS  
S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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LEOPOLD WELLS

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REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 24171

PRIORITY DIR

LEOP WELLS

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN\*

RYZAT YGPPROP

REF: DIR 53583 (OUT 75900 )\*\*

1. IDEN DIR 51443 (OUT 71404 ) DEPARTED LEOP FOR PBPBIME 5 OCT, VIEW EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS. HOWEVER LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. GUTHMAN PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP.

2. CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] REF. AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES, [REDACTED] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

3. IF HQS BELIEVES [REDACTED] PBPBIME STAY OR LOCATION WIFE PERMANENT BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WITH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. RECRUITMENT SUCH ASSET LOCALLY NOT FEASIBLE VIEW SECURITY PROBLEM AND LIMITED NUMBER POTENTIAL ASSETS. ONLY OTHER POSSIBLE ASSET HERE IS

BOTTLE 1. GUTHMAN DOUBTS HE CAPABLE SUCH ACTION. ALSO FEAR HE MIGHT REVEAL DETAILS TO [REDACTED]

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4. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

01'S COMMENT: \*EYES ONLY APPEARS TO BE IMPROPERLY USED. IN YOUR FIELD  
PLEASE ADVISE THE FIELD TO COMPLY WITH REGULATION 90-40.

\*\*WAS AUTHORIZED GUTMAN TO HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH  
TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR "OUT-OF-FOU"

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7 October 1960

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LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

FROM

12 OCT 1960

GIA

(PRIORITY) LEOP

INFO

CITE DIR

04802

RYBAT <sup>TOP</sup>PROP

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

XXXXXXXX

I. HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT. COMMENTS FOLLOW:

A. BE ASSURED DID NOT EXPECT <sup>TOP</sup>PROP OBJECTIVES BE REACHED IN SHORT PERIOD AND UNDERSTAND CURRENT SITUATION FULLY WARRANTED RETURN YOUR COLLEAGUE.

B. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES <sup>04</sup> [REDACTED] SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE MADE WITTING BUT FUTURE CIRCUMSTANCES TARGET WILL CONTRADICT WHETHER YOU WISH RAISE THIS POSSIBILITY AGAIN FOR OP INTEL OR MORE ACTIVE ROLE.

C. MEANWHILE WE CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD BATIC OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR

ISSUING OFFICER

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~~THIRD~~ OUTPOST ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. IF YOU CONCLUDE IT IS  
 SUITABLE AND BEARING IN MIND HEAVY EXTRA LOAD THIS PLACES  
 ON YOU, WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN  
 THIS OP AND OUTSIDE AGENT FULL TIME UNDER YOUR DIRECTION.  
 IN ANY CASE THIRD NATIONAL WOULD NOT BE WITTING PRIOR DISPATCH  
 FROM HERE AND WOULD OBTENSIBLY BE SCHEDULED PERFORM  
 GENERAL OPS ROLE. WILL ADVISE PROGRESS ON THIS MAN.

2. COLLEAGUE MENTIONED ARRIVAL YOUR FAMILY AND HOME TARIFF  
 LUANDA WEEKEND. WARMLY SUPPORT THIS AND ANY OTHER SHORT  
 LEAVE YOU CAN SCROUNGE. DO NOT WAIT TILL YOU TOO TIRED TO  
 BENEFIT FROM IT.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

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ROBERTSON P. P. 3662  
AFRICA  
3662  
15 October 1946

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LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

OUT 81476

LEOP

INFO

CITE DIA 06205

RYBAT <sup>02</sup> WFLAT

OS235

- RE A. LEOP 0101 (IN 25261)
- B. LEOP 0104 (IN 25967)
- C. LEOP 0072 (IN 23052)

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS FOLLOWING:

A. FORMATION <sup>01</sup> ~~MAINTENANCE~~ <sup>02</sup> ~~PRATORIAN~~ GUARD BY GIVING EXTRA PAY PERHAPS 25-50 PERCENT MORE THAN NOW BEING RECEIVED TO CORPS OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN UP TO 200. DO NOT FEEL THAT NATIONAL MILITARY SCHOOL GROUP CAN BE USED FOR THIS. RAISE QUESTION WHETHER LOYALTY ENLISTED MEN COULD BE SO HELD FOR LONG. SUGGEST THIS BEST HANDLED BY GIVING FUNDS TO <sup>02</sup> WFLAT 4 FOR HIM TO GIVE TO <sup>01</sup> WFLAT 4. PURPOSE THIS TO USE <sup>02</sup> WFLAT 4 TO KEEP <sup>01</sup> HIS SPINE STRAIGHT ENDED.

B. AMMUNITION: WHAT RESERVES AMMUNITION TO BE HELD UNDER <sup>01</sup> WFLAT 4 CONTROL WOULD BE REQUIRED. ASSUME 10,000 ROUNDS FOR SMALL ARMS MIGHT SUFFICE. WE WOULD REQUIRE INFO CALIBRE AND

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CITE DIR

TYPE WEAPONS INVOLVED. POSSIBLE METHODS DELIVERY ARE FOR  
 [REDACTED] PLANE TO TRANSPORT FROM ADJACENT TERRITORY, OR POSSIBLY  
 FROM MATADI BY PLANE OR TRUCK. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE GIVE  
 MONEY TO [REDACTED] AT 5 TO GIVE TO [REDACTED] AT 7 FOR HIM TO PURCHASE  
 DIRECT AND HAND OVER TO [REDACTED] 01

C. [REDACTED] WIPROAK - IN VIEW OUR DISTRUST SUBJECT REY A EXPLORE [REDACTED] KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO FETICHEUR TO DETERMINE WHETHER  
 BUYING OFF FETICHEUR AS [REDACTED] SPIRITUAL SUPPORT MIGHT BE SERIOUS  
 BLOW TO HIM. ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND IS TO  
 SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING [REDACTED]. DESIRABLE AS MORE  
 DEFINITIVE ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BE  
 ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. HOWEVER, WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS FOR  
 OUR REVIEW ON ANY WAY THIS COULD POSSIBLY BE ACCOMPLISHED.

END OF MESSAGE

RE  
 SUP 23 1975  
*[Handwritten signature]*

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SIGR

15 October 1960

57:

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(PRIORITY) LEOP

RYBAT YOPROP

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

1. YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA ON <sup>YOP</sup>ROP TYPE SUGGESTION. YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING <sup>OR</sup> BLOCK <sup>OR</sup>TRGAK REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL STUDYING OF SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES ONE CONSIDERATION. FOR EXAMPLE WE HAD SOME AFRICAN TALKS WITH THIS WEEK AND RE CONGO THEY CAME UP WITH THIS IMMEDIATELY. (NO INDICATION AT ALL FOING ANYTHING SPECIFIC ABOUT IT.)

2. RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. RE DIR 04302, RE YOUR REACTION TO POSSIBLE DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ADMINISTRATING OFFICERS

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CITE DIR 06200

SOONEST TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT. WE STILL WORKING  
 ON THIRD NATIONAL MENTIONED THAT REF, BUT WONDER WHETHER YOU  
 THINK EARLY ARRIVAL CASE OFFICER WOULD MAKE SENSE. SEEMS TO  
 BE YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCERN AT  
 YCPROP. ADVISE.

I HAVE DISCUSSED <sup>OR</sup> MACLAM WITH BETTELHEIM AND POSSIBILITY OF  
 COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION <sup>OR</sup> WIRROAK, EITHER VIA ASSAULT  
 ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IS <sup>OR</sup> WIRROAK  
 ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN AS RECENTLY. PICKED GROUP  
 OF <sup>al</sup> ~~WIRROAK~~ <sup>al</sup> MACNA TROOPS MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED. REQUEST YOUR  
 VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

*Handwritten signature*  
 COORDINATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER  
 SECRET

*Handwritten initials*  
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER



DIRECTOR

LEOPOLVILLE

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LEOP 8145

EYES ONLY CATWIN FROM GUTMAN

RYBAT <sup>OP</sup>PROP

REF: A. DIR 140212 (OUT 78336 )

B. DIR 16253 (OUT 81336 )

1. [REDACTED] HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENCOURAGED. THIS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS WEG.

2. BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE FOR OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. SITUATION WILL BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED WHEN WHAT GOES ELIZ 19 OCTOBER. IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE, GUTMAN WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS.

3. SERIOUSLY DOUBT POSSIBILITY ASSAULT HOUSE, VIEW STRONG CONCUR OP FEASIBLE IF SUBJECT GOES OUT INTO TOWN BUT VIEW ON WATCHING HOUSE, DOUBT HE WILL TRY THIS IN NEAR FUTURE. BELIEVE POSSIBLE TO MOUNT COMMANDO, PER REF B, BUT ASSUME HQS WOULD WANT THIS DONE BY THIRD NATIONAL ASSET.

4. IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH

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INFO

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POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SIGHT AND SILENCER  
 HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES  
 NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF  
 HUNTING SEASON.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: \*REQUESTED STA VIEWS RE POSSIBILITY USE COMBADO TYPE GROUP FOR  
 ABDUCTION (SUBJ).

SECRET