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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-- Against --

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: MINAMI, Jiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows.

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Translated by
Defense Language Branch

1. I was born on August 10, 1874 at Hiji-machi, Cita Prefecture. After completing the usual course at a military preparatory school and the Military Academy, I was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant of Cavalry in 1895. I took part in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) as a captain of cavalry. At that time ear trouble developed as a result of concussion of cannon fire and for this reason, I have now lost my auditory sense.
2. In 1924, I became Cavalry Inspector as Lieutenant General; in 1926, Commander of the Sixteenth Division; in 1927 Assistant Chief of the General Staff; in 1929, Commander of the Korean Army; and in 1930, a Supreme War Councilor as Full General. On April 14, 1931 when the second WAKATSUKI Cabinet was formed, I was appointed Minister of War. The above a period in which the Japanese Army was reduced by four division to carry into effect the decisions of the Washington Conference, and energetic efforts were made in the retrenchment of the national budget. Especially the cabinets formed by the Minseito Party, viz., the KATO, Takaaki Cabinet (June 1924 - January 1926), the first WAKATSUKI Cabinet (January 1926 - April 1927), the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet (July 1929 - April 1931), and the second WAKATSUKI Cabinet above referred to took internally the policy of financial retrenchment and upheld externally the policy of peaceful and conciliatory diplomacy.

Although I was not a member of the MINSEITO, I had a thorough understanding of its policies because General UGAKI, my intimate senior and by whose recommendation I became his successor, had been in office as War Minister for a long time in the Minseito Cabinets ever since the formation of the KATO Cabinet mentioned above. On August 4, 1931, I called the customary conference of Division Commanders in the War Ministry for the first time since I assumed the office of War Minister. The address of instructions which I delivered on that occasion unexpectedly aroused the opposition of a section of the political circles. As it would be clear from a glance at its contents, I gave expression to nothing more than a view natural to a War Minister -- stating that every effort should be made in the training of soldiers to maintain the efficiency of the Imperial Army under the difficult conditions caused by arms reduction. It appears that an issue was created by the fact that some anti-government elements conspired to overthrow the government by intentionally distorting some of my statements. That I was not opposed to arms reduction may be recognized in the light of the fact that in May 1931, I revised the Army Pay Ordinance, with salary reductions ranging from 5.8 % for First Lieutenants to 12 % for Generals, and that I also endeavored even to effect a cut in pensions. I said no more than this: that,

while the European and American powers had swiftly modernised their armaments as a result of World War I, Japan has left her arms in the same condition as they had been in the previous century, and therefore stressed that in order to perfect our national defense with a minimum of arms, we must effect an improvement in quality. That I did not try to inspire a positive policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia may be best illustrated by the fact that, when an incident broke out later, I strenuously maintained the policy of non-expansion to such an extent that I was attacked for being too passive both by the army on the spot and by the people at home. What I said in my speech was that inasmuch as the pending question in Manchuria and Mongolia exceedingly complicated, and inasmuch as Premier WAKATSUKI and Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA had announced their views toward the new situation, the army also on its own part should not fail to give its attention thereto.

4. In the night on September 18, 1931 I was staying as usual in the official residence of War Minister. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, I was suddenly awakened by an officer on duty in the War Ministry, and handed a telegram despatched by the Special Service Organ in Mukden. The message said that about 10:30 p.m. of the 18th the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway northwest of Mukden had been destroyed by Chinese troops, that our railway guard unit had

been fired upon and that the Second Battalion of the Independent Garrison had started to move to the spot. About an hour later a telegram came from Commander HONJO which said: "Leave Port Arthur at 3:00 a.m. for Mukden." The telegram was simple and the situation was not clear, but as it was evident that a clash had occurred between the regular Japanese and Chinese troops, I immediately called Lieutenant General SUGIYAMA, Vice-Minister of War, Major General ^{KOISO} Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, and Lieutenant ^{Colonel} KUSHIBUCHI, my private secretary to my official residence to consider steps to meet the situation. At about 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. I reported the incident by telephone to the Premier, and the Foreign, Overseas and Navy Ministers, and to the Premier, I requested the immediate convening of an extraordinary cabinet meeting.

Meanwhile the General Staff Headquarters had also received a similar telegram and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA, Assistant Chief of the General Staff NINOMIYA and other responsible members of the Headquarters were in conference. At about 7 a.m. Director KOISO of the Military Affairs Bureau representing the War Ministry went to the General Staff Headquarters for liaison. About 9:00 a.m. the two parties came to an agreement, and decided upon the policy of non-expansion. What we feared more than anything else at the time was whether or not the lengthy railway line, the 200,000

Japanese residents and one million Koreans in Manchuria could be protected with the small Kwantung Army force of 10,000 men in the face of the formidable army of CHANG Hsueh-liang numbering 250,000. If the Nikolaievsk Incident involving the massacre of several hundreds of Japanese residents in Nikolaievsk by Russians in 1920 were to be repeated, it would be a serious matter and the army would be charged for negligence in proper performance of its duties to the people. For this reason opinion in the Supreme Command strongly favored the despatch of reinforcements for operational reasons and therefore it took some time before the War Ministry could come to a decision on the non-expansion policy. At an extraordinary cabinet meeting held at 10:00 a.m. the foregoing policy was adopted by the Cabinet, and thereafter the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff in turn reported the decision to the throne, and obtained the Imperial sanction. That afternoon, the Chief of the Army General Staff wired this fact as a Supreme Command order to Commander HONJO of the Kwantung Army and I sent telegraphic instructions on the government policy to the Commandant myself. From this time on, the military operations of the army on the spot came under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army General Staff as an exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command. At this time, Lieutenant General HAYASHI, Senjuro, Commander of the Korean Army, reported to Tokyo that the

sending reinforcements to Manchuria admitted of no delay, but a stop order was communicated to him through the Chief of General Staff.

5. In the afternoon of the 21st, while I was engaged in consultation with Premier WAKATSUKI after the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting and all cabinet ministers, had retired, a telegram arrived from the Commander of the Korean Army, reporting that, moved with irresistible sympathy over the fervent requests of the Kwantung Army, he had, at his own discretion, order the Shingishu Mixed Brigade to cross the border. After conferring with the Premier, I reported the border crossing of the Korean Army at its own discretion to a cabinet meeting held in the morning of the following day, the 22nd. The Cabinet, taking into consideration precarious position of the Kwantung Army, saw no alternative, but to approve the despatch of the said brigade and the defrayal of expenses accompanying such action. The Prime Minister immediately reported the affair to the Emperor, the Chief of the General Staff following suit, and the Imperial Order, for the crossing of the border was communicated to the Korean Army by the Chief of the Army General Staff. The cabinet meeting on the same day decided that as the action of the

Kwantung Army was a temporary seizure and not an occupation of Manchuria, no military administration was to be established. This decision was communicated to Commander HONJO by myself. Further, on September 26, the Cabinet passed a decision prohibiting Japanese participation in the movement to establish a new government in Manchuria, and telegraphic instructions to this effect were sent by the Foreign Ministry to foreign Office organs, in Manchuria and to the Kwantung Army by myself. Such instructions were considered necessary, because we had received reports that movements for the independence of Manchuria had suddenly become active with the outbreak of the incident, and especially that those in favor of restoring the Ching Dynasty had started vigorous activities and we were concerned lest the army on the spot should be dragged into such activities. Later, in the early part of November, a person by the name of TOYAMA, Takeo brought me a letter as a messenger of Emperor HSUANTUNG who had been residing in Tientsin. Although I did not personally talk with him, his message which was conveyed to me through my secretary or officer on duty-I do not remember which-was that: the Emperor HSUANTUNG was desirous of effecting ^a fundamental correction of the evil administration of the SHANG regime in Manchuria." As there was no reason for me to believe the words of such a messenger, and especially as it was the government's fixed

policy not to interfere in the domestic affairs of China and I did not favour the proposition, I ignored the letter without replying to the letter of Mr. PU YI.

Not only that, on November 15, I sent telegraphic instructions to the Commander of the Kwantung Army stating that: "While various rumors current about the question of Emperor HSUANTUNG, the Kwantung Army must strictly refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of China, and act with utmost caution." Several years later, when CHENG Hsiang-hsu, Prime Minister of Manchukuo, visited Japan, I called on him at the Imperial Hotel, and showing him the letter in question, asked him whether the letter was genuine or false. CHENG signed the letter certifying that it was the real handwriting of Emperor HSUANTUNG. I have kept this letter to this day as a souvenir.

6. On September 24, the Japanese Government issued its first statement concerning the Mukden Incident. Prior to this announcements on the situation were being issued, about twice a day by our delegation to the League of Nations. Conditions on the spot, however, were not sufficiently clear even to us cabinet ministers. After the incident, seemed to have been settled, a new situation developed with the result the situation was always ahead of the government statement, placing me in a very awkward position. This was because as

as a principle on which the army was established the War Minister could not interfere with military operations. The Kwantung Army, on the other hand, appealed to us that the situation on the spot was such that, while the army in Manchuria had to abide by the non-expansion policy it was unavoidable for them to take necessary measures for self defense in the face of constant attacks by an enemy whose forces were more than twenty times greater than our own and that unless they did otherwise nothing remained for them but self-annihilation. And yet, when a request came from the Kwantung Army for permission to despatch troops to Harbin for the protection of Japanese residents, we not only persuaded the Chief of the Army General Staff and had it flatly rejected, but also succeeded in having the main force withdraw to the railway zone. However, with the withdrawal of our troops CHANG Hsueh-liang's armies, taking advantage of the situation, advanced to the railway zone, causing disturbances in the rear. Consequently in the beginning of October, a reconnaissance flight was made by our aircraft over Chinchou, the headquarters, of the CHANG army. Then the report was received that as the CHANG forces had opened fire, our aircraft had dropped bombs on them. As the flight was made without any previous notification either to the Chief of the Army General Staff or to me, I immediately

issued a severe warning to Commander HONJO. In November MA Chan-shan's army destroyed a railway bridge over the Nonni River and fired on our units ^{which} went to repair it. As MA's troops failed to comply with our repeated warnings, the Kwantung Army decided to repulse them. Later the central military authorities ordered the Kwantung Army to evacuate immediately from TSITSIHAR and this order was effectively carried out. In the later part of November, when a riot broke-out among Chinese troops in Tientsin, a request came from the North China Garrison for reinforcements. Not only was this request refused, but the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army which had advanced to the neighborhood of Chinchow also was ordered to withdraw to the railway zone near Hsinmintun east of the river Tataoho. About this time, the annual army manoeuvres were held in Kyushu under the personal supervision of the Emperor. Although the War Minister had to accompany His Majesty, I remained in Tokyo with the Imperial permission as I had to attend to the ever changing situation both at home and abroad, and exerted my best efforts to prevent the expansion of the conflict, in close collaboration with Government as well as the Supreme Command. I still remember that when we succeeded in preventing the advance of the Kwantung Army to Chinchow the Prime Minister and I, just the two of us together, drank a toast congratulating ourselves on our success at the Premier's official

residence. Such being the case, I can state with the utmost confidence that at least while I was War Minister, there absolutely never was issued a false statement or a breach of international agreements committed, although because of the rapidly changing situation in Manchuria, the statements of the Japanese Government and the actual conditions on the spot were inverted in point of time and therefore were confused.

7. Aside from the many difficult problems in Manchuria mentioned above, I was informed in the middle of October that there were indications of possible disorder among a group of young officers at home. I had these elements immediately apprehended by the Gendarmerie, and had the matter properly dealt with. Because of the moderate policy of the WAKATSUKI cabinet, voices of dissatisfaction against it grew up both within and without Japan. This led the Prime Minister to try to reorganize the Cabinet by a coalition of the Minseitō and Seiyūkai parties. This attempt failed, however, and the independent action taken by Home Minister ADACHI caused the Cabinet to resign en bloc on December 10 because of disunity in the Cabinet. After my resignation from the office of War Minister, I was given the obscure post of Supreme War Councilor. There was nothing to do except to assemble about twice a year to hear lectures given by the

military authorities. As I had been requested to serve as tutor to the young Prince KAN-IN, I devoted my time to this work, and paid but little attention if any to political and military affairs. Just after three years, on December 10, 1934, I was unexpectedly appointed Ambassador to Manchukuo, and concurrently Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory and Commander of the Kwantung Army, at the recommendation of the OKADA Cabinet.

8. Being installed in the new posts by the personal command of His Majesty, I went to Hsinking, after consultations with Prime Minister OKADA, Foreign Minister HIROTA, Finance Minister TAKAHASHI, War Minister HAYASHI and Justice Minister OBARA, entrusted with the task of having the government's policy thoroughly carried out in Manchoukuo. Not only had the Japan-Manchuokuo Protocol been concluded and Japan recognized the independence of Manchoukuo the previous year, but the Vatican, the Republic Salvador and the Dominican Republic had also recognized her and Manchoukuo was growing as a new-born independent state. In January of the following year (1935), Foreign Minister HIROTA declared in the Diet the policy of amity toward and on February 3, Replies thereto came from General CHIANG Kai-shek, Mr. WANG Ching-wei and Mr. SUN FO, thus bringing about mutual understanding between China and Japan. This was followed by the satisfactory conclusion of various agreements between Manchoukuo and China

relating to customs, postal and telegraphic matters. In March, Manchukuo entered into agreements with Soviet Russia for the navigation of inland waterways and for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railways, and it was agreed that a committee be appointed for the settlement of the boundary question. His Field Marshal MUTO, the first Ambassador to Manchukuo, was received by the Emperor of that country on the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month, and General HISHIKAWA^R the second Ambassador, on the 2nd, 12th and 22nd, I, as the third, had the 3rd, 13th and 23rd of each month as my days for regular audiences. During the period between April 2 and April 27, the Emperor of Manchoukuo visited Japan, and was graciously received by our Imperial Family. Thus as Japan and Manchukuo stood on equal footing, it was the policy of the OKADA Cabinet and also my personal conviction that the independence of Manchoukuo should be completely respected and every encouragement given for her healthy growth as a sovereign state. Hence the Kwantung Army made the maintenance of peace and order as its primary function and for this reason I frequently gave them stern instructions not to meddle in politics or do anything injurious to^{the Prestige} of Manchoukuo. In pursuance of the policy of the government, as soon as I took office, I abolished the Special Service Department of the army and the government of the Kwantung

Leased Territory, and tried my best to simplify the Japanese organs in Manchukuo to every extent possible. During ^{my} tenure of office, there was never a case of Japanese troops crossing the border.

9. In May, 1935, the Japanese Legation in China was elevated to Embassy status and Ambassador ARIYOSHI presented his credentials to President LIN Shen of the Chinese Government. In June, General CHIANG Kai-shek promulgated the Neighborly Friendship Ordinance which greatly stimulated the growth of friendly sentiments between Japan and China. During the same month, in order to assure peace along the China-Manchoukuo border, the so-called "UMEZU-HO Yin-chin", DOIHARA-CHENG Te-chun" and other agreements were concluded. With regard to these agreements I received reports that they were concluded in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere. Although these agreements were of a local nature, they were concluded with the full approval of the governments of both countries. In July the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Commission was set up to deal with various economic questions on a basis of equality. In August, the Japanese government announced its decision to relinquish Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchoukuo. This was a serious decision on Japan's part, as she was to return to Manchukuo the rights and interests which she had hitherto enjoyed there. During the same

month, Prince TEH of Inner Mongolia came to Hsinking with a request for an audience with the Emperor. It is believed that the Prince, envious of the sound and peaceful development of Manchukuo, desired to make Inner Mongolia independent following the example of Manchoukuo. As for me, I believe that the independence of Inner Mongolia which Prince TEH was planning was not proper both from the standpoint of substance and time, and always refused his requests for assistance. Lieutenant Colonel TANAKA, Ryukichi, then a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, being well acquainted with the conditions in Mongolia because of his duties, was enthusiastic about the question of Mongolia. Even as late as 1942 he visited me in Tokyo with a request that I become the head of an association for assisting the independence of Mongolia. Of course, I refused to comply with the request. For the same reason, with regard to the North China question also, I only devoted my efforts for the maintenance of peace between China and Manchukuo, in accordance with the directions of the central government, and never at any time did I attempt to engage in political negotiations. I heard that the formation of the Hopei-Chahar regime toward the end of the same year was at the initiative of the Chinese government. On February 26, 1936, an armed insurrection broke out in Tokyo, resulting in the assassination of a number of prominent men. Lamenting over this situation,

I voluntarily requested to be relieved from my office. I was relieved of my post on March 6, and placed on the waiting list on April 18, and was transferred to the reserve list on April 22. Soon after my return to Japan, on August 5, I was unexpectedly appointed Governor General of Korea.

10. I think it was my predecessor as Governor General of Korea, General UGAKI, who recommended me as his successor. I took this office not as soldier but as civilian. As all military affairs were under the exclusive charge of the Commander of the Korean Army, I never handled military matters during tenure of office in Korea. As Governor General, I have nothing to say except that I devoted myself entirely to the elevation of the status and conditions of the Korean people.
11. After my retirement as Governor General of Korea on May 29, 1942, I was appointed a Privy Councilor, which post I held until March 1945. During my tenure of office His Majesty consulted the Privy Council with regard to a proposal concerning the revision of the government organization regulations to place the governor-generals of Korea and Formosa under the jurisdiction of Home Minister, in consequence of the establishment of the Ministry of Greater East Asia Affairs in October 1942. At that time, I was appointed a member of the Investigation Committee of this proposal by the President of the Council. Although I did not utter a

a single word about the Ministry of Greater East Asia tie Affairs, I vigorously opposed the government proposal concerning the office of the governor-general of Korea, on the basis of my personal experience, because I felt apprehensive lest the new measure have various undesirable effects upon colonial administration. However, the proposal was approved over my objection by the majority. I have nothing else to say with reference to my tenure of office as Privy Councillor.

12. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society formed during the KONOE Cabinet by the dissolution of all political parties, gradually lost the confidence of the people, and in its place the DAINIPPON SEIJI KAI (Japan Political Association) was established on March 30, 1945. Unlike the former, the latter was not a government serving organization. The chief aim of the new association was to reflect public opinion upon government, and thereby correct the policies of the government and the military. In this respect, the new organization was fundamentally different from the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, which had no link whatsoever with the people. I was recommended to lead this association by those who used to hold leading position in the former Seiyukai and Minseito Parties because in their opinion I ^{was} best qualified to restrain and control government and the military. Realizing intensely the necessity

of guiding Japanese politics in accordance with public opinion in view of the increasingly critical war situation I accepted the offer, pledging my life to the performance of my task. In order to attain the aims of the new association, I began my work as its head by establishing chapters in prefectures, cities, towns and villages throughout the country, with a view to maintaining direct contact, with the people. The expenses of the new society were met by membership fees. No financial support whatsoever was received from the government. In order to hear the true voice of the people, I personally attended the inaugural meeting of local chapters, and as soon as I returned to Tokyo from my trips, I counselled the government and military authorities as to how the people thought and what they wished. Less than six months after the association was formed, the war came to an end and it was dissolved on August 20, 1945.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

On this 8th day of January, 1947

at

Deponent MINAMI, Jiro

I, KONDO, Giichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KONDO, Giichi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Def Doc No. 989

Tokyo, Japan

Date 27 Mar. 1947

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Not used

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 南次郎

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of Doc No. 989

供
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供 述 書

南 次 郎

一 自分ハ明治七年（一八七四）八月十日大分縣日出町ニ生レマシタ。
幼年學校、士官學校ヲ經テ明治廿八年（一八九五）騎兵少尉ニ任官シ、

日露戰役（一九〇四—一九〇五）ニハ騎兵大尉トシテ從軍シマシタ。ソ
ノ時大砲ノ激音ノ衝撃ヲ受ケテ耳ニ故障ヲ生シ現在之レガタメ聽覺ヲ失
フニ至リマシタ。

二 大正十三年（一九二四）中將トシテ騎兵監トナリ大正十五年（一九二
六）第十六師團長、昭和二年（一九二七）參謀次長、昭和四年（一九二
九）朝鮮軍司令官ヲ歷任シ、昭和五年（一九三〇）大將トシテ軍參謀
官トナリ翌年（一九三一）四月十四日若槻第二次內閣ノ成立ト共ニ陸軍
大臣ニ任命セラレタノデアリマス。右ノ期間ハ丁度ワシントン會議ノ成
果ヲ實行スルタメニ日本陸軍ハ四ヶ師團ヲ減少シ極力豫算ヲ削減スルコ
トニ努力シタ時テ殊ニ民政黨ガ組織シタ加藤高明內閣（一九二四年六月
乃至一九二六年一月）若槻第一次內閣（一九二六年一月乃至一九二七年
四月）濱口內閣（一九二九年七月乃至一九三一年四月）及ヒ右ノ若槻第
二次內閣ハ內政ニ於テ緊縮政策ヲ採ルト共ニ外交上モ平和協調主義ヲ標

傍シテ居リマシタ。自分ハ民政黨員デハアリマセンガ右加藤内閣以來民政系内閣ノ要相トシテ長ラク留任シテ居タ宇垣大將ハ自分ノ親シイ先輩デアリ、其ノ推挙ニ因ツテ自分ガ假ノ後任トナツタノデアリマスカラ民政黨ノ政策ニ對シテハ充分ノ理解ヲ持ツテ居リマシタ。

昭和六年（一九三一）八月四日自分ガ陸相トナツテ初メテノ定例師團長會議ヲ皇軍省デ開キマシタ。然ルニソノ席上デ行ツタ自分ノ訓示ガ計ラズモ政界ノ一部カラ反對ヲ受ケルコトニナリマシタ。然シ其ノ内容ヲ一讀スレバ判ル通り軍需下ノ困難ナル情況ニ於テ皇軍ノ能率ヲ維持スルタメニ極力訓練ニ努メヨト云フ要相トシテ當然ノ所見ヲ申述ヘタニ通ギマセン。然ルニ之ガ問題ニナツタノハ自分ノ言葉ヲ亦更曲解シテ内閣ヲ失脚サセ濠ト云フ反政府的ノ者ノ陰謀デアツタト想ハレマス。自分ガ軍需ニ反對デナカッタ事ハ同年五月ニ陸軍給與令ヲ改正シ、中尉ノ給給ノ五分八厘ヨリ大將ノ給給ノ一割二分ニ至ル減額ヲ行ヒ又恩給迄ヲ切下ケヨウト試ミタ事ニ依テモ知り得ラレルト思ヒマス。

只當時歐米列強ガ第一次大戦ノ結果ニ裝備ヲ近代化シタニ反シ、日本ハ前世紀ノマ、ノ状態デアルカフ弱小限ノ軍備ヲ以テ國防ヲ全フセン

トスルナラバ質ヲ向上セシメネハナラヌト主張シタノニ過キマセン。尙
ホ又自分ガ滿蒙ニ對スル積極政策ヲ鼓吹セントシタモノデナイコトハ後
ニ事件ガ起ツテカラ極力不擴大方針ヲ維持シ。ソノタメ現地軍カラモ國
民カラモ余リニ消極的ナリトノ非難ヲ浴ビタ事實ニヨリ明カト思ヒマス
。唯當時ハ滿蒙ニ於ケル懸案ガ非常ニ紛糾シテ右槻首相幣原外相モ所見
ヲ發表シテ居ラレマスカラ陸軍トシテモ問題ニ對スル注意ヲ怠ツテハナ
ラヌト訓示シタノデアリマス。

昭和六年（一九三一）九月十八日ノ夜、自分ハ平日ノ通り陸相官邸ニ
宿泊シテ居マシタガ十九日ノ午前三時頃突然陸軍省ノ宿直將校ニ起サレ
マシタ。

ソシテ渡サレタ電報ヲ讀ンデ見ルト奉天特務機關發ノモノデ十八日ノ午
後十時半頃奉天西北方ノ滿鐵線路ガ支那兵ノタメニ破壞サレ、我守備兵
モ攻撃ヲ受ケタカラ、獨立守備第二大隊ガ現地ニ向ツテ出動シタト云フ
ノデアリマス。

次テ約一時間後本庄軍司令官ヨリ「午前三時旅順出發奉天ニ向フ」トノ
電報ガアリマシタ。極メテ簡單デ前後ノ事情モ分リマセンガ日支ノ正規

軍隊ガ衝突シタコトハ明瞭デアリマスカラ直ニ次官杉山中將軍務局長小磯少將、秘書官榊淵中佐等ヲ官邸ニ呼ヒ寄セ前後策ヲ考究スルコト、シマシタ。ソレカラ午前五時半カ六時頃ニハ兎モ角モ總理、外務、拓務、海軍ノ四大臣ニ電話デ通報スルト共ニ總理大臣ニ對シテハ遠ニ臨時閣議ノ開催ヲ求メタノデアリマス。

一方參謀本部ニ於テモ同様ノ電報ヲ受信シタノデ金谷參謀總長、二宮次長以下首腦部ガ參集シテ會議ヲ開イテ居リマシタ。七時頃陸軍省ヨリ小磯軍務局長ガ參謀本部ヘ連絡ニ行キ九時頃双方ノ意見ガマトマリ、不擴大方針ヲ決定シマシタ。當時自分達ガ最モ心配シタコトハ關東軍ノ兵力ガ僅カ一萬人ナルニ對シ張學良軍ハ二十五萬人ニ近イノデアルカラ長大ナル鐵道沿線及二十萬ノ在籍日本人、百萬ノ朝鮮人ヲ果シテ擁護シ得ルカ否カデアリマシタ。若シ大正九年（一九二〇）ニ港ニ於テ日本居留民ノ數百名ガ露人ニ虐殺サレタト云フ例ノ尼港事件ノ二ノ舞ヲ踏ムニ於テハ大變デアリ、國民ニ相濟マヌ理デアリマス。之ガ爲作戰ノ見地ヨリ統帥部ニ於テ増援軍ノ派遣ヲ主トスル論議ガ強ク陸軍省ガ之ノ意見ニ對シ不擴大方針ヲ決定スルニハ相當時間ガカ、リマシタ。午前十時臨時閣議

ガ開カレ右方針ヲ政府トシテ確定シ、首相及參謀總長ハ相次テ參内上奏
シ御裁可ヲ得マシタノデ午後其ノ旨參謀總長ヨリ統帥命令ヲ以テ關東軍
本庄司令官ニ下令セラレ政府ノ方針ハ自分ヨリ同司令官ニ訓電シマシタ。
爾後現地軍ノ行動ハ統帥權ノ發動トシテ參謀總長ノ指揮系統ニ入ツタノ
デアリマス。軍司令官林統十郎中將ヨリ滿洲増援ニ付テ急ヲ要スルモノ
アリトノ上申シテ參リマシタガ參謀總長ヲ通ジ中止命令ガ發セラレマシ
タ。

五然ルニ二十一日ノ午後閣議ヲ終リ、閣員ハ解散シ若槻首相ト自分トガマ
 ツテ打合せヲシテ居タ時、朝鮮軍司令官ヨリ電報ガ到着シマシタ
 ツレハ門東軍ノ切テル要求ニヨリ諺ニ於テ忍ビザルモノガアルカラ獨斷
 テ以テ在新義州混成旅團ヲ越境出動サセタト云フノデアリマヌ、自分ハ
 首相ト打合せ翌二十二日午前閣議ニ於テ朝鮮軍ノ獨斷越境ヲ報告シマシ
 タガ内閣ニ於テモ門東軍不安ナル情況ヲ鑑ミ右混成旅團派遣及ヒ之ニ伴
 々經費支出ノ円ムナキコトヲ追認、首相ハ直ニ參内上奏、參謀總長モ次
 テ上奏シ越境出兵ノ奉勅命令ガ參謀總長ヨリ朝鮮軍ニ傳達サレタノデア
 リマヌ、又同日ノ閣議ニ於テ門東軍ノ行動ハ滿洲占領テナク、一時的ノ
 占據デアルカラ電政ヲ布イテハナラヌト決定シ、之ヲ自分ヨリ本庄軍司
 令官ニ訓電シ、翌ニ九月二十六日ニハ滿洲ノ新政府樹立運動ニ日本人ノ門
 與禁止ガ決定セラレ其ノ旨ヲ外務大臣ヨリ在滿外務機關ニ又自分ヨリ關
 東軍ニ訓電シマシタ、斯様ヲ注意テ與エル必要ガアツタノハ事件發生ト
 同時ニ滿洲ニ於テ獨立運動ガ急激ニ盛トヨリ殊ニ清朝復辟主義者ガ猛烈

十運動ヲ起シテ屏ルト云フ情報ガ入りマシタノデ官ガ之ニ卷込マレテハナ
ラヌト必配シタカラデアリマス、後ニ十一月上旬頃天津ニ居住シテイタ、
宣統帝ノ使トシテ遠山尚雄ナル者ガ自分ニ手紙ヲ持ツテ來マシタ、彼ト直
接面談ハシマセソデシタガ秘書官デアツタカ宿直將校デアツタカ克ク記憶
シマセヨガ之ヲ述シテノ語デ「宣統帝ハ滿洲ニ於テ張政權ノ失政ヲ根本的
ニ是正シクイ」トノ希望デアリマシタ、然シソノ様ヲ使ノ云フ專ヲ信用ス
ル理ニ行カズ殊ニ支那ノ内政問題ニ關係スルニトハ不可デアルノト政府ノ
方針モアリ、自分モ亦之ヲ好ミマセソノテ溥儀氏ノ手紙ニハ返事ヲ出サズ
ニ放ツテ置キマシタ、

ソレノミヨラズ十一月十五日ニハ自分ヨリ関東軍司令官宛ニ電報ヲ以テ
「宣統帝ノ問題ニ付テハ種々ナル風聞ガアルガ関東軍トシテハ内政問題ス
ルコトハ嚴ニ之ヲ戒メ其ノ行動ヲ慎重ニセヨ」ト訓示シタノデアリマス、
其ノ後數年經ツテ滿洲國總理大臣鄭孝胥ガ日本へ參リマシタ時自分ハ彼ヲ
帝國ホテルニ訪問シ、右條同ヲ見セ眞偽ノ程ヲ問イテ見マシタ處、之レハ宣統帝ノ眞筆デアルト
ノ奥書ヲシテ呉レマシタ、ソレデ自分ハ記念ノ爲右書面ヲ今日迄保存シテ置イタノデアリマス、

六、サ、九月二十四日ニハ奉天ニ起ツタ事件ニ付テ最初政府聲明ヲ發表シマシタ。ソレマデモ一日ニ二回位ハ國際聯盟ノ我代表ヨリ情況ヲ公表シテ居タノデアリマスガ自分達關係ニモ現地ノ事情ガ充分ニ判ラズ或時ハ事件ガ一旦終了シタ様ニ見エ或時ハ又新ナ問題ガ惹起スルト云フ工合ニ事變ガ政府聲明ニ先行スル事トナリ自分ハ非常ニ困ツタ立場ニ置カレマシタ。

之シハ日本ニ於ケル軍ノ成立ノ立前トシテ陸軍大臣ハ軍ノ作戦行動ニ干與シ得ナイコトニナツテ居ルカラデアリマス。然シ一方關東軍カラハ現地ノ實情トシテハ不據大方針ヲ遵守スルトシテモ數十倍ノ敵ノ不斷ノ攻襲ヲ控エ自衛戰略上必要ナル行動ハ已々得ナイ。然ラサレバ自滅アルノミト訴ヘテ來ルノデアリマス。

而モ尙九月下旬ニハ哈爾濱ハ居民保護ノタメ出兵シタイト云フ關東軍カラノ要望ヲ參謀總長ニ要請シテ絶對ニ中止セシメタノミナラズ、主力ヲ鐵道沿線ヘ引上ゲサセルコトニ成就シマシタ。

所ガ我方ガ撤退スルト張學良ノ軍隊ガ盧ニ乘シテ鐵道沿線ニ進出シ後方
 擾亂スルノデ十月初ノ彼等ノ本據タル錦州へ偵察ニ行ツタ我ガ飛行機ガ
 射撃ヲ受ツタノデ之ニ對シ爆彈ヲ落シタト云フ事件ノ報告ガアリマシタ
 之ハ參謀總長ニモ又自分ニモ何ノ連絡モナク行ハレタモノデ自分トシテ
 ハ庄司令官ニ對シテハ直ニ嚴重ヲ戒告ヲ與ヘマシタ。十一月ニハ馬占
 山軍ガ嫩江橋梁ヲ破壊シ我ガ修理隊ヲ射撃シタ事件ガ起リ再三ノ警告ニ
 拘ラズ相手方ガ應シマセンノデ關東軍ハ之ヲ懲退スルコトニ決定シマシ
 タガ、其ノ後中央軍部ハ直ニテ、ハルヲ撤退スル様關東軍ニ命令シ且ツ
 實行サセタノデアリマス。十一月下旬ニハ天津ニ支那軍ノ暴動ガアリ我
 北支駐屯軍カラ増援要求ガアリマシタガ之ヲ拒否シタノミナラズ關東軍
 ノ救護部隊ガ錦州近クマデ進出シテ居タノヲ抑制シテ大道河ノ東方新民
 屯附近ノ鐵道沿線マデ復歸セシノマシタ。此ノ頃毎年行ハル、陸軍ノ定期
 期演習ガ天皇ノ統監ノ下ニ九州で行ハレ陛下ガ行幸セラレルノデ陸軍大
 臣ハ慮從シナレバナラナカッタノデスガ前述ノ如ク刻々變化スル内外

ノ情勢ニ對慮シナケレバナラナイノテ自分ハ陛下ノ御意許ヲ得テ東京ニ
留マリ政府ト緊密ニ連絡シテ且統帥物ト屢々連絡シ極力奉戴ノ擴大ヲ防
クコトニ専心シタノデアリマス。關東軍ノ錦州出發ヲ防止スルノニ成功
シタ時ハ首相官邸ニ於テ首相ト二人テ祝杯ヲ舉ゲタ事ヲ未ダニ記憶シテ
居リマス。サレバ少クトモ自分が陸相トシテ在任中ハ日本政府ノ聲明ト
現地事情トガ多少時間的ニ前後シタ事ハアリマシタガ虚偽ヲ發表シタト
カ國際的約束ヲ破ツタトカ云フ事ハ絶体ニ無イト確信シテ居リマス。

七、以上滿洲ニ於テ困難ナ問題ノ外ニ國內ニ於テ十月中旬、一部少壯將校ニ不穩ノ空氣ガアルト云フ情報ヲ入手シタノデ自分ハ憲兵隊ニ命令シテ彼等ヲ抑留セシメ夫々處分シマシタ。斯クテ内外共ニ若以內閣ノ穩健的政策ニ對スル反對ノ聲ガ高クナリマシタノデ首相ハ民政黨及政友會ヲ融合シテ内閣ヲ改組セント企テマシタガ之モ不可能トナリ結局安達内相ガ獨自ノ行動ヲ取ルニ至ツクノア十二月十日内閣不統一ノ爲メニ總辭職ヲスルコトニナリマシタ。自カハ陸相ヲ辭任シタ後ニ軍事參謀會ノ閑職ニ就キマシタ。之ハ一年ニ二回位參謀シテ陸軍當局ノ話ヲ聞クト云フ以外何モ仕事ヲスルコトハアリマセンデシタ。ソコデ自分ハ「從前ヨリ閣院若臣ノ御指導役ヲ任ゼラレテ居リマシタノデソノ方ニ専心シテ居リ」政治ニモ軍事ニモ殆ンド關係ナク暮シテ居リマシタ。其ノ間丁度三平經ネテ昭和九年（一九三四）十二月十日當時ノ岡田内閣ノ推挙ニヨリ計ラズモ主筆全權大使、關東總長官兼關東軍司令官ニ任セラレマシタ。

八、同平末全權大使、關東總長官及ヒ軍司令官トシテ陛下ヨリ親シク任

命セラレ、岡田首相、廣田外相、高橋蔵相、林陸相、小原法相繼トモ
 會談シテ中央政府ノ方針ヲ現地ニ徹底セシムベク新官ニ兼任シマシタ。
 ソノ時ニハ前年ニ於テ既ニ日清議定書ガ締結セラレ滿洲國獨立ヲ日本
 ガ承認シタノミナラズ、ローマ法王サルバドル共和国、ドミニカ共和
 國等モ之ニ承認ヲ與ヘ滿洲國ハ新生セル獨立國トシテ成長シツツアツ
 タノデアリマスガ翌年（一九三三）一月ニハ廣田外相ガ議會ニ於テ中
 國ニ對スル親善方針ヲ聲明シ二月、三月ニハ蔣介石氏汪精衛氏孫科氏
 等ガ之ニ答ヘテ双方ノ意思流通ガ行ハレマシタノデ其ノ後滿洲國ト中
 國トノ間ニ郵便、郵行、電信等ニ關スル各種ノ協定ガ圓滿ニ實施セラ
 レタノデアリマス。三月ニハ又「ソ」聯ト滿洲國トノ間ニ水陸協定及
 ビ東支鐵道賣買協定ガ成立シ國境問題モ委員會ヲ設ケテ解決スルコト
 ニナリマシタ、自分ノ前々任者武蔵元帥ハ滿洲國皇帝ト毎月一日、十
 一日、廿一日ヲ又前任者菱刈大將ハ二日、十二日、廿二日ヲ謁見日ト
 定メラレテ居リマシタガ自分ハ毎月三日、十三日、廿三日ニ守例トシ
 テ拜謁スルコト、ナリマシタ。四月二日ヨリ二十七日ニ至ル間、皇帝

ハ日本ヲ訪問セラレ我皇室ノ厚キ御款待ヲ御受ケニテツタノデアリマ
ス。即チ日清兩國ハ平等デアリマスカラ清洲口ノ完全ナル獨立ヲ愈重
シ之ガ健守ナル邊境ヲ所成スルト云フ事ハ當時ノ閣内閣ノ政策デア
リ、又自分ノ信念デアリマシタ。從テ門東軍ハ清洲國內ノ治安ヲ第一
主事ト致シマシタ、之カタメ軍人が政治ニ門與スルコトヲ戒メ清洲國
ノ邊境ヲ擁護セザル總管々訓示シテ居リマシタ。サレバ中央政府ノ意
圖ニヨリ自分ハ着任スルト同時ニ軍ノ陸軍部ヲ廢止シ又門東軍ヲ廢止
シ日本側ノ邊境ヲ出來ル限り簡略ニスルコトニ努メマシタ。自分ノ在
任中國境ヲ越ヘテ出兵シタ事ハ一度モアリマセン。

九サテ同年五月ニハ日本ノ駐支公使館ニ昇格シ有吉大使ガ中國政
 府ノ林森主席ニ謁見ヲ擧呈シ六月ニハ蔣介石氏ガ邦交教團令ヲ發シテ日
 支親善ノ空氣ハ益々濃クナリマシタ。同月中ニ滿支間國境ノ平和ヲ圖ル
 タメ所謂海津何憲欽協定、土肥原義徳純協定ナドガ締結サレマシタガ何
 レモ和氣轉々裡ニ行ハレタトノ報告ヲ受ケマシタ。之等ハ現地協定トハ
 云ハ日支兩國共ニ各々其ノ中央政府ノ承認ノ下ニ成立シタノデアリマス
 七月ニハ日滿經濟委員會ガ組織サレ日本ト滿洲國トハ對等ノ地位ニ立ツ
 テ各種ノ經濟問題ヲ處理スルコトトナリ、八月ニハ日本ノ滿洲國ニ於ケ
 ル治外法權ヲ撤廢スルコトヲ決定發表シタノデアリマス。之レハ從前日
 本ガ有シテ居ツタ權益ヲ滿洲國ノタメニ贖與スルノデアリマスカラ日本
 政府トシテハ餘程ノ英斷デアリマシタ。八月ニハ內蒙古ノ德王ガ皇帝ト
 ノ謁見ヲ求メニ新京ニ參リマシタ。ソレハ以上ノ様ナ平和的發展ヲ遂ケテ
 キル滿洲國ノ情態ヲ羨望シ蒙古モ之ニ倣ツテ獨立シタイト云フ希望カラ
 デアツタト想ハレマス。然シ乍ラ曰分トシテハ德王ノ企圖シアル內蒙ノ
 獨立ハ其ノ實質ニ於テモ又時機ニ於テモ適當ナラズト信シテ居リマシタ

カラ徳王カラノ援助要求ハ常ニ之ヲ拒絶シテ居リマシタ。但シ當時關東軍ノ參謀デアツタ田中隆吉中佐ハ職務上蒙古ノ事情ニ通シ蒙古問題ニハ熱心ニナツテ居リマシタ。後年（一九四二）彼ガ自分ヲ訪問シテ蒙古獨立ヲ援助スル協會ノ會長ニナツテ與レト願ミニ來タ時モ之ヲ謝絶シタ位デアリマス。同様ノ理由デ北支問題ニ關シテモ自分ハ中央政府ノ指示ニ從ヒ滿支間ノ平和維持ニ努力シテ居ツタノミデ政治的交渉ヲ試ミタ事ハ全クアリマセン。同年末ニ冀察政權ガ出來上ツタノハ寧ロ中國政府側ノ意圖デアルト聞イテ居リマス。

然ル處昭和十一年（一九三六）二月二十六日東京ニ於テ兵變ガ起リ多クノ要人ガ暗殺サレルト云フ大事件ガ突發シタノデ自分ハ世情ヲ慨嘆シテ進ンテ辭職ヲ乞フタノデアリマス。斯クテ三月六日免官トナリ四月十八日待命、二十二日豫備役ニ編入サレマシタ。然ルニ歸朝後間モナク八月五日ニハ計テズモ朝鮮總督ニ任命サレタノデアリマス

一〇朝鮮總督ノ前任者ハ宇垣大將デソノ推選デアツタト想ヒマスガ自分ハ

之ノ座ハ軍人トシテデハナク文官トシテ就任シタノデアリマス。從テ目分ノ總督在任中軍事ノ方ハ朝鮮軍司令官ガ專任スル所デ自分トシテハ關與スル事ハアリマセンデシタ。朝鮮總督トシテノ自分ハ半島人ノ地位向上ニ専心努力シタ外特ニ申述ブル事ハアリマセン。

一、昭和十七年（一九四二）五月二十九日朝鮮總督退官ト共ニ樞密顧問官ニ任ゼラレ昭和二十年（一九四五）三月迄在官致シマシタガ之ノ間昭和十七年十月大東亞省新設ノ官制改正ニ伴ヒ朝鮮、臺灣ノ總督ガ内務大臣ノ監督下ニ屬スルコトトナルベキ政府ノ官制改正案ガ樞密院ニ御諮詢ニナリマシタ。其ノ時自分ハ議長ヨリ政府案ニ對スル審査委員ヲ命セラレマシタガ大東亞省ニ就テハ一言モ發言セズ朝鮮總督問題ニ付テハ朝鮮總督在任ノ體驗ニ基キ政府案ハ外地統治ニ諸般ノ好マシカラサル影響ヲ及ホスヘキヲ憂慮シテ政府案ニ極力反對シマシタガ多數ヲ以テ其ノ案ハ通過シマシタ。其ノ他ニ付テハ別段申述ブル所ハアリマセン

一、二、近衛内閣時代ニ總テノ政黨ヲ解消シテ出來上ツタ翼贊政治會ハ次第ニ國民ノ信賴ヲ失ヒ遂ニ昭和二十年（一九四五）三月三十日大日本政治會

ガ生レル事トナリマシタ。大日本政治會ノ性格ハ眞實政治會ト異リ政府
 及軍部ノ施策ヲ是正スルガ結集ノ大眼目デアリマシタ。之ノ點ハ眞實政
 治會ガ國民ニ何等ノ連繫ガナカツタトハ本質的ニ異ルモノデアリマス、
 自分ハ大日本政治會創立ノ際舊政友會、民政黨双方ノ指導的地位ニアル
 幹部カラ「政府竝ニ軍部ヲ押ヘルニ適任」デアルトノ理由ヲ推薦ヲ受ケ
 タノデ戰爭狀態ノ益々惡境ニ在ル情況ニ鑑ミ國民ノ輿論ニヨリ日本ノ政
 治ヲ指導スルノ必要ヲ痛感シテ居ツタノデ一身ヲ挺シテ之レガ組織ヲ引
 受クマシタ。組織トシテ自分ハ結黨ノ主眼ヲ達成スル爲先ヅ全國各府縣
 市町村ニ支部ヲ設ケテ國民大衆ト繋リヲ求メ經營ノ如キモ政府カラ全ク
 援助ヲ受クルコトナク會員ノ會費ヲ以テ支辨シマシタ。又自ラ大部分ノ
 支部結成式ニ臨ミ眞誠ナル國民ノ聲ヲ傳ヘ、東京ノ度毎ニ夫々政府竝ニ軍
 首腦者ニ對シ輿論ノ向フ所ヲ進言シタノデアリマス。然シ其ノ後半歳ニ
 モ足ラズシテ終戦トナリ同年八月二十日大日本政治會ハ解散トナツタ次
 第デアリマス

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良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ誤秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザ

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昭和廿二年（一九四七年）一月八日於

供 述 者 南 次 郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證

明シマス

同 日

於東京

立會人

近 藤 儀 一