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Witness Safford afterwards.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Now, on the key for the 6th there had been apparently some mistake in transcription. Two of the letters got mixed up in the order. That caused trouble. Both were garbled and the officer who came in took time out to correct that before we made the delivery.

Senator Ferguson: I don't think you are quite answering my question. What I am trying to get at is this -I will put it in a little different way:

How far was the Army translation department from your office?

Captain Safford: It was about five-minutes walk.

Senator Ferguson: Five minutes walk? What I am getting at is why didn't you have a runner outside. You were anticipating, you were alerted fully to war, why didn't you have a runner standing by for that matter so that he could go immediately at 5 o'clock, or whatever time it was, when that message was delivered in your department or in the Intelligence Section -- or wasn't the Army office open?

Vas open or not. We had a runner available. We had an officer and an enlisted man on watch at the time. We had two men at all times on watch which always gave us a courier

Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson available for any immediate trips.

Senator Ferguson: So you had the men, then?

Captain Safford: I had the men, but we didn't have the translators.

Senator Ferguson: Whose duty was it to send this message when it came in there at 5 o'clock over to the Army translators? Let's get down to who is responsible for these delays.

Captain Safford: It was the responsibility of the officer on watch.

Senator Ferguson: Who would that be that morning?

Captain Safford: That was Lieutenant Commander

Brotherhood.

Senator Ferguson: Well, we can ask him about that.

The Vice Chairman: It is now 12:30. Would it be convenient for you to suspend now?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: We will take a recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 1:30 o'clock p. m., the same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing reconvened at 1:30 p.m.)

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Masten: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, we would like to read into the record at this time two short memoranda, which deal generally with this winds message problem.

One is a memorandum for Mr. Richardson from Lieutenant Colonel Harmon Duncombe, dated January 26, 1946, which reads as follows:

"Pursuant to the request of former counsel to the Committee, a comparison was made of the intercepted messages in the Army Signal Intelligence Service file which had been translated on 2, 3, and 4 December 1941 and those in the Navy file translated on the same dates. The purpose of the comparison was to ascertain whether the Army file contained a message not in the Navy file. The comparison, which was jointly made by the Army and the Navy, showed that each message in the Army file was also in the Nevy file.

"The results of the comparison were reported orally

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to the former counsel to the Committee at the time the comparison was completed.

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/s/ Harmon Duncombe.

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Lieut. Colonel, GSC."

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The second memorandum has to do with item 1(e) of Exhibit 142, and is from Lieutenant Commander Baecher,

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to Mr. Richardson, under date of February 1, 1946.

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It reads as follows:

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December 1941, please be advised that the time of receipt

"With reference to ALUSNA Batavia dispatch 031030

of this dispatch in the Navy Department was 0621 GCT 4

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December 1941, which correspondents to 1:21 am 4 December

1941, Eastern Standard Time. This message was transmitted

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from Radio Honolulu as deferred precedence.

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/s/ John Ford Baecher

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JOHN FORD BAECHER

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Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.R."

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We would also like to add, as another letter number to Exhibit 142, the photostat which has just been distributed,

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and which consists of a photostat of a letter dated November

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7, 1945, to Mr. George E. Sterling, Chief of Radio Intelli-

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gence Division, Federal Communications Commission, and

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certain enclosures, all of which had to do with the true winds execute which was received by the Federal Communicat-

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ions Commission on the afternoon of December 7, 1941. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 142-D, I think.

The Vice Chairman: It will be received as Exhibit 142-D, and all the memoranda read by counsel will be transcribed on the record.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 142-D.)

Senator Ferguson: May I inquire, what is meant by the "true"? You have used the expression "the true winds execute." What do you mean by that?

Mr. Masten: Senator, I was referring to the voice broadcast, which is included as item 4 in the Federal Communications material included in Exhibit 142.

Senator Ferguson: Why did counsel describe it as "true"?

Mr. Richardson: It is an actual message in the winds code. All other messages are in dispute here. That is the reason, Senator.

The Vice Chairman: Did you have something else?

Mr. Masten: Mr. Richardson would like to have this

memorandum read into the record at this time. It is a

memorandum dated December 6, 1941, which reads as follows:

"MEMORANDUM FORCOLONEL HOLBROOK:

"Word has just been received from O.N.I. by telephone

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to the effect that the Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned its Code Book and Ciphers last night.

/s/ James F. Perry

JAMES F. PERRY,

1st Lt., Military Intelligence Evaluation Subsection."

The memorandum is on the stationery of the War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington.

The Vice Chairman: Does that complete the exhibits? Mr. Masten: That is all, yes.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Richardson: I had intended to inject a couple of short witnesses here who had to leave town, but I think in my error, I told them to come at 2 o'clock, so I think we can proceed with the Captain until 2 o'clock, and when they come, we can pause and take their testimony.

The Vice Chairman: Without objection, that will be done. Senator Ferguson will examine you, Captain.

		Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson
h5	1	TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN LAURANCE FRY SAFFORD
	2	(Resumed)
	3	Senator Ferguson: This last exhibit that was read
	4	into the record, the memorandum for Colonel Holbrook,
	5	do you know a Colonel Holbrook? Did you ever have any
	6	dealings with him?
	7	Captain Safford: No, sir.
	8	Senator Ferguson: It says, "Word has just been
	9	received from O.N.I." what is the O.N.I.?
	10	Captain Safford: The Office of Naval Intelligence.
4 10	11	Senator Ferguson: That was the office over you?
0 940	12	Captain Safford: Yes, sir.
WARTEN	13	Senator Ferguson:"by telephone to the effect that
	14	the Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably
o S	15	reported to have burned its Code Book and Ciphers last
*1	16	night."
	17	This is dated December 6, 1941.
	18	Have you ever heard of that before?
	19	Captain Safford: I had not heard of that before.
	50	Senator Ferguson: And this is signed "James F.
	21	Perry, First Lieutenant, Military Intelligence, Evaluation
	21	Subsection."
	23	This is in the War Department.
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Did you know Perry?

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Captain Safford: No sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, if that kind of a message had come in, should not Communications have received it first? Or did Intelligence get things from Communications by telephone, that did not go through your department?

Captain Safford: That apparently by-passed me entirely.

Senator Ferguson: How is that?

Captain Safford: Apparently that one by-passed me.
I do not remember it.

Senator Ferguson: That is a rather significant message, is it not?

Captain Safford: It is.

Senator Ferguson: Now, who would know whether that was distributed to the White House, the Secretary of War the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of State, and the various others? Would you have anything to do with the distribution?

Captain Safford: It is not in my knowledge, and I had nothing to do with it.

Senator Ferguson: Was it ever distributed out of Washington? This information? Was it ever sent to Kimmel or Short, or to the Philippines?

Captain Safford: Not to my knowledge.

Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson

you not? Communications?

Senator Ferguson: You had charge of a department that not only received messages, but sent messages, did

Captain Safford: The Communications Center.

Senator Ferguson: Did you also send messages, as well as receive them in your Department?

Captain Safford: My department only sent technical messages pertaining to the work and methods of the work.

Intelligence was handled by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Information such as you describe would be the function of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson: What I am getting at, what department would send the message of November 24 to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Safford: That was actually handled by Naval Communications.

Senator Ferguson: That is your department, is it not?

Captain Safford: I was not in charge of it. I was

only a subordinate officer.

Senator Ferguson: Well, Noyes was in charge of it? Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Didthe top of the section handle all messages being sent out as so-called not information but direction orders?

Captain Safford: That is correct. I did.

Witness Safford

Senator Ferguson:

handle them personally?

Captain Safford:

Admiral released them what

Senator Ferguson:

tion in O.N.I., that "late"

the self-send airbane last them what

books and airbane last.

Senator Ferguson: You handled those, or did Noyes

Captain Safford: I prepared the messages and the Admiral released them when available.

Senator Ferguson: Then you never heard of this information in O.N.I., that "last night" which would be on the 5th "it was reliably reported to have burned its code books and ciphers last night"? That is the Japanese Embassy. You never heard of that before today?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You knew that there had been instructions to the Embassy here, that is, through intercepted codes, that they were to burn their ciphers and so forth, and their codes?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is that correct?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: I think that is shown on page 215 of Exhibit 1, from Tokyo (Togo) to Washington, December 2, 1941. Will you look at that to see whether or not that is what we are talking about, Exhibit 1, page 215?

Captain Safford: That is the one.

Senator Ferguson: That is the one?

Captain Safford: Yes.

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		Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson
h9	1	Senator Ferguson: Now, were you familiar with the
	2	fact that our Embassy in Tokyo was advised to destroy its
	3	codes?
	4	Captain Safford: I had no information about that.
	5	Senator Ferguson: Pardon me?
	6	. Captain Safford: I had no information about the Embassy.
	7	Senator Ferguson: The Military Attache or the Naval
	8	Attache?
	9	Captain Safford: The Naval Attache, yes; the Military
	10	Attache, no.
4 4 0	11	Senator Ferguson: You had it as far as the Naval
N.	13	Attache was concerned?
:	13	Captain Safford: Yes.
5 5	14	Senator Ferguson: On what date was that message sent?
5	15	It was sent, I believe, on the 5th, was it not?
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u.	17	Captain Safford: I believe that was on the 3rd.
		Senator Ferguson: Would you check that? It is impor-
	18	tant after we get this message of the 6th.
	19	Captain Safford: That message appears on page 42
	20	of Exhibit No. 37. It was sent on the 4th, Greenwich
	21	time, but on the 3rd Washington time.
	22	Senator Ferguson: So the instrument that we have just
	23	now read into the record would not be the foundation of
	24	sending that?
		Carcarago Canada

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Captain Safford: No.

Witness Safford

Senator Ferguson: What was the foundation, if you know, for sending that?

Captain Safford: The foundation for that was the message on page 215 of Exhibit 1, which you have just referred to, plus another message on page 209 of Exhibit 1, which may be identified as JD-1: 6984.

Senator Ferguson: Page 209? Can you help me again?
Captain Safford: Page 209. It is the first complete message.

Senator Ferguson: "Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately"? That is a London message.

Captain Safford: This was to Washington, No. 2444, just above it.

Senator Ferguson: The one above it, "The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my circular message No. 2447, the U.S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

"Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico

Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson from Washington."

Captain Safford: That is the one.

Senator Ferguson: That is the one?

Captain Safford: Yes. The other one was not translated until the 5th. We did not have it at the time.

Senator Ferguson: Will you go to page 245 of Exhibit No. 1, the message from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, No. 904, "Re my #902," -- 902 was the 14-parts message was it not?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: "There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.

"Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy."

Now that is the end of that message. Did you know that message came in?

Captain Safford: I did not know that message came in until Monday morning.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Now here is what you have: You have, first, the pilot message saying there is going to be a time of delivery and "we are going to send 901", which is the pilot message, and that told us, "the Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English)."

So that tells us the number of the message and it tells us it is going to be in English, so in intercepting it we would know immediately by the number 902 that we are getting a part of the 14-part message, would we not?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: So if we wanted to make haste we would have the information all in advance, as soon as we received the message? That is one of the first things that came in?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And it would not be a difficult thing to decipher and decode that number 902, would it?

Captain Safford: Except that was in Japanese and the Army translated it, not the Navy.

Senator Ferguson: Was the Army as good or not as good in translating? Do you make a distinction there by saying

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson Captain Safford: 904, sir. 902. Senator Ferguson: You do not understand? Captain Sairord: No. about, which is #904 --Captain Safford: Yes, sir, #902.

that the Army had it instead of the Navy? Do I understand now if one word in this message, for instance, this part about 901, or 902, happened to be in Japanese and the other part of the message was in English that you would have to send it over to the Army to have translated #902? Senator Ferguson: No. The long 14-parts message was

Captain Safford: I am sorry, sir, I did not understand.

Senator Ferguson: I did not understand you, then. You said that if this part 901 and 902, or whatever the number of the message was, was in Japanese it, therefore, had to be sent over to the Army. Is that right?

Captain Safford: This particular message we are talking

Senator Ferguson: No, I am back now to the pilot message.

Captain Safford: The pilot message was in English.

Senator Ferguson: The pilot message gave you the number of the 14-part message, didn't it?

Senator Ferguson: So if you knew that number you would know immediately that that was what you wanted to work on

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson at once, is that true?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Witness Safford

Senator Ferguson: You knew the number of the pilot message and the number of the 14-part message?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is not that what you were looking for that day?

Captain Safford: We were giving precedence to #902.

Senator Ferguson: Now, then, they not only told you. that they are going to describe the time of delivery of the message and give you the number of parts, they say, "I will send it in 14 parts", and they tell you they will give a time of delivery on it, but they sent another message, which you intercept on the same day, telling them not even to use a typist on it. What would that indicate to you?

Captain Safford: That that message was most important to the Japanese Government to keep secret until the #902 had been delivered to the United States Government.

Senator Ferguson: So that was further evidence that this 14-parts message was a very, very important message, and they wanted it secret until it was delivered, they did not want even any Japanese typists working on it?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senaior Ferguson: That was known to us here in washington?

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now there has been considerable said or questions asked about your absence on Sunday, and you told me it was your day off.

Captain Safford: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were there sufficient personnel in that office to intercept these messages and deliver them to the proper translation people?

Captain Safford: There were.

Senator Ferguson: Now coming back to this delay again, did you know of any other delays in delivery of these 14 parts of the message, or that #904 that said "Don't use a typist"?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Or the 1:00 o'clock message?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How do you account for those messages not being translated and delivered to the proper parties?

Captain Safford: We did not have enough translators to maintain a 24-hour watch with them.

Senator Ferguson: How many translators had they in the Army and Navy?

Captain Safford: I cannot give you those exact figures. We had very few.

Well, you did not have to translate Senator Ferguson:

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Witness Safford

the 14 parts?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now the only one that you had to translate was the short one that I just read, and the one about the delivery, isn't that true?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How many translators would it take to translate those, and in how long a time? They are very short, aren't they?

Captain Safford: They are very short.

Senator Ferguson: You said you had found the key so you knew how to do it that day.

Captain Safford: We knew now to do it that day.

Senator Ferguson: Now take that message I just read to you, #904, how long should it take to translate that? It is on page 245.

Captain Safford: That should take five to ten minutes. Senator Ferguson: Five to ten minutes. By how many translators?

Captain Safford: One.

Senator Ferguson: Now let us go to the 1:00 o'clock message. Have you got the number of it there?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: What is the page number?

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: That is another three-line message, and it starts out "Re my #902", which is the 14 part, so there would be another tip at least that it belonged to that series of messages, is that right?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Captain Safford: Page 248.

Senator Ferguson: And how long would it take to translate that message?

Captain Safford: Five to ten minutes.

Senator Ferguson: Five to ten minutes, so at the most we have 20 minutes to translate those two messages?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now let us go to the 14th part of the message. You will note at the top of it it has got the note, "In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase VERY IMPORTANT!."

So you have standing out on the 14th part of the 14-parts message in plain English to the broadcasting station so that anyone receiving it in Communications, or anyone else, would not have to use Japanese translation or anything else, they could see "very important", and it was #902?

Captain Safford: There was no delay on any of those messages, on any of the processes for which I was responsible.

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson
They were intercepted promptly, correctly, they were forwarded
almost immediately by teletype from the West Coast, and were
decoded promptly.

Senator Ferguson: Now I direct you to page 245, at the top of the page, to the plain English phrase "very important", and that was to the radio station. That would not be in Japanese, would it?

Captain Safford: No, sir, that was in English.

Senator Ferguson: That was in English and it did not have to be decoded?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So whoever received that message would have the flag "very important" right at the top of it?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: In English?

Captain Safford: In English.

Senator Ferguson: Have you any idea how long it would take to translate that 14th part? You told us they had the key.

Captain Safford: That would be roughly a half-hour.

Senator Ferguson: A half-hour?

Captain Safford: A half-hour, and possibly a few minutes longer.

Senator Ferguson: Now we are going to another subject.

Witness Safford

going to another subject.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Among these papers that you read from the other day --It has been suggested by counsel that he had other Witnesses here at 2:00 o'clock, so I would suggest that we take those other two witnesses and stop here, because I was

The Chairman: Captain, you may stand aside for a few minutes, until a couple of other witnesses are examined who must leave the city.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I assume you want to direct the reporter to place the testimony of these two witnesses following the completion of Captain Safford?

The Chairman: Yes. The testimony of the two witnesses that will come on now will be placed after the conclusion of Captain Safford's testimony.

(The testimony of witnesses Beatty and Dillon, taken at this point, will be found following the testimony of Captain Safford.)

The Chairman: Go ahead, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Captain, you had in your possession and gave to the committee a certain exhibit, dated May 14, 1945. It was attached to a memorandum that you read into the record that you said you made up in 1945. On that exhibit I see that on May 18, 1945 you have got in pen "delivered to Lieutenant Commander Sonnett by Lieutenant

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testimony

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Commander Linn about ten hundred May 15, 1945".

Will you explain that?

Captain Safford: I was asked for that and I sent over by Commander Linn and he made a note at the time and delivered it.

Senator Ferguson: On the end of this instrument you have this:

"9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the winds 'execute' message may exist — the record of proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the winds 'execute' did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my intelligence and my veracity."

You delivered this message to Sonnett?

Captain Safford: One of my officers did.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, but that was in it at the time that you delivered it to Sonnett?

Captain Safford: That was in it at the time I mailed it to Sonnett.

Senator Ferguson: Was that because of what Sonnett

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Ferguson had said to you or did anybody else question your sanity or your intelligence or your veracity?

Captain Safford: No. He had repeatedly told me that he thought my memory was playing me tricks and maybe I was suffering from hallucinations.

Senator Ferguson: So then you put it in writing and delivered it to him with this part that I have read to you? Captain Safford: Yes, sir, that was in it.

Senator Ferguson: Then you have -- this is in red pencil "see testimony of Colonel Fielder and Colonel Bicknell December 24, 1941." Was that on at the time it was delivered?

Captain Safford: That was put on afterwards, in December 1945, shortly before Christmas, after I had been permitted at length to read the testimony given before the Roberts Commission.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Now, did Schnett ever call you up or question that part of the memo that you had delivered to him, number 9?

Captain Safford: He never discussed that specifically with me after that. The next time I came over he made some remark that he didnot want to give that to Admiral Hewitt, though he would if I insisted. I told him I was only trying to assist and I was not trying to run that investigation. He gave it back to me and I made a notation as soon as I got back to the office of the date at which it was returned. Admiral Hewitt never did see that memorandum.

Senator Ferguson: Well, then, you have written across the face of it: "Withdrawn on May 18, 1945 at the suggestion of Lieutenant Commander Sonnett. Returned for possible use at the next (?) investigation Pearl Harbor, L. F. Safford."

Captain Safford: That was "retained", sir.

Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

Captain Safford: That was "retained".

Senator Ferguson: Now, then, do I understand then that this did not reach the possession of Sonnett or did he have it to read it?

Captain Safford: He did have that about three days and read it and then suggested that I withdraw it, though if I insisted he would give it to Admiral Hewitt. I withdrew it.

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He had read it.

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Senator Ferguson: So he had it from the 15th to the 18th? Yes, sir. Captain Safford:

Senator Ferguson: And the only conversation you had about it was what you relate now?

Captain Safford: And the other conversation was that I would not be permitted to inspect the records of the Roberts inwestigation; that was out.

Sanator Ferguson: Will you read that, please? (Answer read.)

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you have any conversation with Sonnett about inspecting the records of the Roberts investigation?

Captain Safford: None other than that.

Senator Ferguson: Just that part?

Captain Safford: I had requested it in writing and he said it could not be done.

Senator Ferguson: When did you request it in writing?

In my last paragraph. Captain Safford:

Senator Ferguson: Oh, in this instrument?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir. That was the only time.

Senator Ferguson: Did he say anything to you in any of the conversations about the wind execute message?

Captain Safford: We would discuss other matters and

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Witness Safford

Q uestions by: Sen.Ferguson

always get around to that question.

Senator Ferguson: What do you mean "get around to 1t"? Captain Safford: Well, I believe he would lead up to it or something. It kept cropping up in the conversation.

Senator Ferguson: Did he tell you why the Navy were making the Hewitt investigation?

Captain Safford: To see if they could reconcile conflicting testimony and to examine witnesses who had not been available before, particularly Captain McCollum and Admirel Wilkinson.

Senator Ferguson: Did you discuss what the reconciling testimony was that you did want to reconcile?

Captain Safford: It was largely in regard to the winds message. There were other matters which did not particularly concern me. All of these things on which I presented memorandums were not olear in his mind, at least, what the significance was, and I spent a lot of time preparing those to do my best to straighten them out from my point of view and from what I knew.

Senator Ferguson: Did he mention to you who had testified that there was no wind message?

Captain Safford: I believe that he told me that I was the only person who had any recollection of the winds message.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, that was on May 18, 1945.

Did he tell you or mention to you that on the 6th of June 1944 that Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, United States Navy, an Admiral, had been asked this question:

"68. Q. During November or December, 1941, were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements, by means of a partial weather report?

" A. Yes, I do recall such messages.

"Q 69. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?

"A. Yes.

"70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

"A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain is imminent."

Did Sonnett ever call that to your attention, that

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Admiral Ingersoll had said that?

Captain Safford: He did not.

Senator Ferguson: I am reading that which is in the Hart report. Now, were you told that by Mr. Sonnett?

Captain Safford: I was not.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what Admiral Ingersoll could be talking about there other than the wind code intercept execute?

Captain Safford: Nothing else at all.

Senator Ferguson: Now I am going to read you Admiral Ingersoll's testimony from another hearing, not the Hart hearing at all, and I would like to have the original so that we can get the date. This is the Navy. I want to find out the date he testified. I cannot find it but I will put it in the re cord later, when he is testifying before the Pearl Harbor Navy Board of Inquiry. It is a different investigation. The one I read from to you was the Hart investigation and this is in the first Navy. It is after Hart.

"Q. Can you remember under those circumstances what this doubt was" --

I think I will go back for enough to clear up that question.

"Can you state whether or not this information was discussed by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Ad1 .

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Going back to 35.

"A I don't remember whether it was discussed with Admiral Stark or not."

"36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result of the information that was contained in this document 15?

"A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt in the minds of the translators as to just what the translation should be.

"37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was?

MA. No, I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to whether they had an exact translation -- a difference of opinion among the translators as to what the Japanese words meant.

"38. Q. Can you recall whether this difference of opinion related to the subject of a declaration of war or whether it related to severance of negotiations, or what the discussion was about -- can you remember that?

"A. No, I don't remember that point now.

"39. Q. On or prior to ? December 1941 414 you

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receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the socalled 'winds' message?

"A. Yes.

Q. Will you state the circumstances?

"Ao I recall that some time I did see the messages which were supposed to put this 'winds' message, translated on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall whether Is aw them prior to December 7 or afterward. If I saw them prior to December 7 I am quite sure that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of coles at London, Washington, Manila and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941 any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the information contained in this execution of the 'winds' code which you state you saw?

As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after December

Withess Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

7 there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we
considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding
the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was
imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to
be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

#42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the 'winds' code?

"A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December 1941."

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Now, that was the testimony given on August the 31st, 1944. Did Mr. Sonnett call that to your attention?

Senator Ferguson: Now, he said he did not see any of these messages after December 1941. Now, let us take the message in exhibit 1, the so-called regular message of the weather. Do you know what I am talking about? The one that they had some trouble about translating.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Captain Safford: He did not.

Senator Ferguson: That is on page --

Captain Safford: 154 and 155.

Senator Ferguson: No, that is Circular 2353.

Captain Safford: Isn't that what you have reference to?

Senator Ferguson: I am talking about the one that came in on the 7th or 8th. They thought it was a wind execute. It is on page 251, the top of the page. It is dated the 7th of December 1941. (Reading)

" (Plain Japanese language using code names)

"Circular #2494

"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation."

Captain Safford: That was not the winds message. was in the hidden word code.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, but didn't some people think that

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that was a wind message?

Captain Safford: There has been some confusion over that.

Pardon? Senator Ferguson:

Captain Safford: There has been some confusion over that.

Senator Ferguson: Over that. Well, now, when did that come into the Navy Department?

Captain Safford: That was received a little after 10 A.M. and had been distributed to everybody in the Navy at least and to the White House and State Department by 11 A.M. on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

Senator Ferguson: What was wrong with that translation? Wasn't there some trouble over the translation?

Captain Safford: The translation was hurriedly made and the word "United States" or "U.S." should have been included in it.

Senator Ferguson: When did they make a correction of that?

Captain Safford: I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: Well, is the language "not in accordance with expectations", is that not a correct interpretation?

Captain Safford: That was the translation given by the Navy for the so-called hidden word code, which was the vehicle for sending this information. At a later date it was

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

pointed out to me -- this is 1944 -- that the Army translation of that was somewhat stronger, but that stronger translation was never distributed.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you know of this message, Circular No. 2494?

Captain Safford: I had known about that since the 8th of December 1941.

Senator Ferguson: And where was it kept?

Captain Safford: That was kept in the file along with the other translations of intercepted diplomatic messages which came in code.

Senator Ferguson: Well, you made a statement yesterday or the day before that they could not have been talking about this message because it was not in the Navy Department. What message were you talking about? I thought you were talking about this message that I am now showing you on page 251.

Captain Safford: I was not talking about this message at all.

Senator Ferguson: What message were you talking about? You made an answer that indicated that the message was not in the file, it was not in the Navy Department until 1944. What message we re you talking about?

Captain Safford: I am talking about a translation or a possible translation which somebody in the Army pointed out

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen.Ferguson

to me in 1944. It was not an official translation because it had never been distributed.

Senator Ferguson: What message is that that was never distributed?

Captain Safford: This same message. It was simply an independent translation made at some later date.

Senator Ferguson: So Admiral Ingersoll could not have seen a code, a winds code execute message with the "United States" on in the Navy Department in December 1941?

Captain Safford: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Because they never had one that contained the "United States" until 1944 as far as Circular No. 2494, December the 7th, 1941 was concerned?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So that is clear.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, you have been asked many questions on the subject of whether or not you saw this execute message. Now, at this late time in your examination are you positive that you did see such a message?

Captain Safford: I am positive, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Is there anything that you want to all to any of your testimony or subtract from in relation to the fact that you positively and without any loubt in your mind

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

saw the execute message on or about the 4th of December 1941 and prior to the time of the fourteen part message and the attack?

Captain Safford: That is exactly correct as you have stated 1t, sir.

Senator Ferguson: There is no loubt then in your mind? Captain Safford: There is no doubt.

Schator Ferguson: Are you familiar with a man by the name of Pettigrew, Colonel Moses W. Pettigr ew?

Captain Safford: I do not know him personally.

S enator Ferguson: Well, I want to read you something from an affiliavit of his, and he made this affilia wit on the 13th day of February 1945. (Reading)

"That someone whom affiant does not now recall showed affiant on or about the 5th of December 1941 an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japan-U.S. relations were in langer. That in view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had prepared that dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu at the request of soreone whom he loes not now recall, a secret cablegram a copy of which is attached."

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Now, what could Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, M. I.S. be talking about there if it was not the intercept message that you claim you saw?

Captain Safford: It was the same intercept winds wessage.

Senator Ferguson: And attached to that is this: exhibit attached is the Rochefort message:

"This is sent on No. 519 12-5

December 5, 1941

"Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-" Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant 14th Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. Miles."

Now, that is what he attaches to his affidavit and that is in the Army. Now, could they have been talking about the message on page 251 of exhibit 1 that came in on the 7th, because the Rochefort message is going out on the 5th? Captain Safford: They could not possibly.

Senator Ferguson: Now, to you know of any other message that Pettigrew could be talking about in that affidavit?

Captain Safford: I have never heard of any other message that Colonel Pettigrew could have been talking about.

Senator : Ferguson: Ani I went to real you " Top Secret

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Navy", of Admiral Turner, question 86:

"Q. Referring to this so-called 'Winds' ressage, are we correct in understanding that you had no knowleige of any execute of that message lesignating the objective of Japan?

"A. I will correct my previous answer on that. Admiral Noyes called me up on the telephone. What day or time of day I don't recall. I think it was on December 6. He said something like this: 'The Winds message came in, or something of that sort.

"87. Q. Did he report to you what the "Winds" message meant and what it was interpreted as?

MA. Yes.

Q. Was the Chief of Naval Operations aware 488° of that, either from information from you or otherwise?

"A. Not from me. I believe Admiral Noyes informed him.

Q. Was any discussion had as to the import-189. ance of sending that reply to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

Not so far as I know. I did not parti-"Ao cipate in any such discussion. I assured that the Cormander-in-Chief had that."

Now I want to read a couple more answers.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

"Cross examined by the interested party, Admiral Haroli R. Stark, U.S. Navy:

" 93 Q. Admiral, referring again to document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is the message which set up the socalled Winds code, do you recal! whether or not you had any feeling that the execute of the Winds code meant that war would necessarily follow between the United States and Japan or whether the execute of the Winds message merely meant a break in diplomatic relations or a strain in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan?

"My impression was that it was at least a break in diplomatio relations and probably war.

"Reexamined by the court:

Q. When you heard the news from Admiral 194. Noyes that an execute of the message had been received, did you consider that it was of such high significance that action should be taken immediately to transmit that information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

No, I assumed that he had it. On Friday there was a discussion between Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and me on the general situation,

"95. Q. Friday, December 5?

There was a discussion among the three of us, HA.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

and we all felt all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary. "

Then this is: "Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

"96. Q. In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the execution signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding that it referred to United States-Japanese relations?

"A. Yes.

" 97. Q.. Was it at any time before the 7th of December that you received information that the Commanderin-Chief was not receiving this decrypted, intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic, or was it after December 7, 1941, that you received that information?

I have never received such information. I have never been informed that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was not decrypting the diplomatic dispatches." And then he is re-examined by the court.

Now, did Mr. Sonnett ever tell you or relate that kind of test1 mony to you?

Captain Safford: I was never told that at all.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever know of that testimony before I read it to you?

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Capt ain Safford: After this investigation correnced the 15th of December 1945 or later and also in January of this year I was permitted to examine the records of those previous Pearl Harbor investigations. That was the first time I knew what other witnesses said and was the first time that I did not know that I was standing alone against the world in my testimony.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, Airiral Turner appeared before this committee and on page 5384 he testified:

"Admiral Turner" -- I have to go back a question so that we get the run of this. This is on the bottom of page (Reading) 5383.

"Senator Brewster: On the Winds message, I wanted to clear up a little of your testimony from your former statement.

"At that time you said in your examination, Admiral Turner, if I may quote from the questions which were asked you on page 10068

" In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the scout's signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding it referred to United States-Japanese relations?

"Your answer at that time was, 'Yes'.

"As I understand now, you feel you got it somewhat

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clearer?

"Admiral Turner: Was that before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Senator?

"Senator Brewster: Yes.

"Admiral Turner: That is correct, because up until the time I returned to San Francisco about two months ago I thought the entire thing in that Wind message was authentic and that they had merely made a mistake about that 'North Wind so and so'.

"On talking to some of the officers who had gone into it in San Francisco, why, they said it had been found out later that that was a false broadcast picked out of the ordinary news, but it was news to me at that time.

"Senator Brewster: That is all."

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: The question was asked of the witness whether or not Mr. Sonnett had informed him about the Admiral Turner testimony. The fact is that on page 96 of the Appendix, which is the Hewitt report, they cited the Turner testimony but nevertheless found there was no winds execute.

Senator Ferguson: Now, we have Adriral Turner's testimony here as well. I want to give you that in relation

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

to the other.

Now, 111 you or 111 you not read the Admiral Turner testirony?

Captain Safford: I do not recall reading any of the testimony before this committee except what appeared in the newspapers.

Senator Ferguson: Were you here when Justice Roberts was on the witness stand?

Captain Safford: I was, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You heard the two questions read to him in relation to this code message, did you?

Captain Safford: I heard them but I do not recall what they were.

Senator Ferguson: You to not recall them?

Captain Safford: Well, I --

Senator Ferguson: What do you want to say? . Do you want to answer 1t?

Captain Safford: No, sir, I cannot answer it.

Senator Ferguson: You just 111 not hear?

Captain Safford: I do not recall specifically what they were. There were questions asked and he answered them.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I will get this clear, so that there can be no mistake on what code message you were talking about or what the people were talking about in it. (Reading)

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Witness Safford

Questions by; Sen. Ferguson

The Chairman: It has been reported to me that about ten days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it and found out it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military forces here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

Now, to you know of any other three words prior to the 7th, - not including this one of the 7th -- but prior to the 7th, of any three word message other than the wind cole message?

Captain Saffori: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You know of none?

Captain Safford: I know of none.

Mr. Murphy: Now will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: What about the hattori and minari and the other one? Weren't those three words? "Nimami" was the United States and "Hattori" and one other one.

Senator Ferguson: Congressman, are you asking him a

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Mr. Murphy: No, no. I was just suggesting the three words. There was one, "Ninami" --

Senator Ferguson: I mean to you still want the answer to 1t? .

Mr. Murphy: No, I am not asking the witness. I am just suggesting it to you.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead.

Mr. Murphy: Go aheal, Senator.

Captain Safford: Excuse me, Senator. I thought I was asked the question.

Senator Ferguson: You thought there was a question pending?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, and I was looking up the answer.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, Congressman, have you got a question?

Mr. Murphy: I will hold it.

S enator Ferguson: Oh, you will pursue it later?

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: He will get to it later and present it and dlear the thing up.

How many times since Pearl Harbor have you contacted General Short?

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Witness Safford

Captain Safford: I have never seen General Short except in this room. I have never talked to him and have never written to him.

Senator Ferguson: Had you been in contact with Admiral Kirrel?

Captain Safford: I have seen Adriral Kirrel, as I previously testified, on the 21st of February 1944. Then I saw him next when I went in and took the witness stand as a witness before the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Senator Ferguson: Had that been the first time after Pearl Harbor that you saw him?

Captain Safford: Yes, Bir.

Senator Ferguson: And how many times since that have you seen him?

Captain Safford: I have probably seen him half a fozen times in Washington.

Senator Ferguson: Had you had any conversations with him about this trial?

Captain Safford: In a general way.

Senator Ferguson: As to what your testimony would be? Captain Safford: As to the fact that my testimony was just what I had given before; I was not making any changes.

Is that the substance of your conver-Senator Ferguson: Sations?

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Captain Safford: That was the substance of our con wersa-

Senator Ferguson: Now, you mentioned a long -- you described it as long, or it has been described as a long message drawn up by McCollum.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you read that message?

Captain Safford: I read it page by page.

Senator Ferguson: Can you tell me what was said which would indicate why somebody in the Intelligence Department like McCollum was wanting to get other than information out, wantint to get an order out to the Fleet?

Captain Safford: This was information of developments running back at least a month, probably more. It was very complete and very well thought out. After all this time I cannot give many of the details except the very last end, which is the part that interested me most, because the very last, you might call it, paragraph, there was a sentence there, was what ap peared to me the same information that had been put on as the translation of the winds code. That is, we were to have -- Japan was about to declare war on the United States, about to declare war on England, including the Netherlands East Indies, and so forth, and would maintain peace with Russia, and the last sentence, as I recall it,

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added the forecast or evaluation "war is imminent". Everything up to that last sentence had been pure information. The only piece of evaluation was the very last sentence, "War is imminent." There was no order or directive to do anything.

Senator Ferguson: It was information then?

Captain Safford: Information, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, can you give us the substance of the other part of the message, what was he conveying?

Captain Safford: Information showing the progressive deterioration of relations between the United States and Japan and of the sure indications, such as the withdrawal of merchant ships. I believe Captain McCollum has testified about other things. I cannot go into detail, Senator; it is too long ago.

Senator Ferguson: I just asked you the substance. Will you look at page 204 of exhibit 1? There is a message there from Tokyo to Berlin dated November the 30th in three parts. It shows that you only intercepted two parts, 1 and 3. The third part indicates that there was something in between and was missed by someone. (R eading)

"If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Itallans question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have alresty clarified our stritude toward the

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south," and so forth.

Doesn't that indicate that you are going to have war with the United States and not with Russia unless Russia comes inf Captain Safford: Yes, sir. That puts Russia out of the war with Japan.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, that being true -- that was translated the 1st of December. That was received on the 30th of November. Hadn't you all the knowledge that came in the so-called execute wind message? Why did you want to wait and if you had that information and which is set up in the first part: (Reading)

"Say very secretly to them that there is extreme langer that war may suffenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone ireams."

Dian't that give you warning that there was going to be war between the United States and Japan and Britain and Japan

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Captain Safford: That e a warning also.

Mr. Richardson: What wasthat last answer?

(Answer read.)

and not Russia unless Russia care in?

Senator Ferguson: But didn't it give you everything that you got in the code? Now, I am not saying anything about what the embassies were going to get, other embassies, but didn't they give to the United States here in Washington the whole answer?

Captain Safford: It gave a complete verification or proof of the winds me ssage -- of its evaluation I mean.

Senator Ferguson: Now, what happened to part 2 there? That would be a very important message, would it not? And what did you do to try to find it?

Captain Safford: We received parts 1 and 3 from Corregidor for forwarding. While we were working on ther we received a message from London which said, "We are forwarding parts 1 and 3 of Tokyo to Berlin, Serial No. 985. Have you got part 27" And the answer was sent back to the effect that we were sorry, that we did not have part 2. That was our lack of --

Senator Ferguson: What message 111 you read me there? What pege is it on? Did you read a message there?

Captain Safford: I am telling you the substance of a

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ressage that was received from London.

Senator Ferguson: Oh.

Captain Safford: It was relative to this Tokyo to Berlin No. 985.

Senator Ferguson: You were looking at a paper and I thought you were reading it out of a book.

Captain Safford: I was checking the number to see that I did not make a mistake.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, 114 you inquire from England again to see about that, as to whether or not they got that part 2?

Captain Safford: England had already asked us for it and we told them we did not have it. If they had had part 2 they would have sent it along with parts 1 and 3. We made a very careful check of the incoming traffic from all our stations and part 2 simply, - we had failed to get it, the same as England had.

Senator Ferguson: Did that happen often, Captain?

Captain Safford: It happened often enough to be very

distressing. It was not at all uncommon to have a hole in

messages, incomplete parts, sometimes the it was the first

part missing, sometimes it was the last. It was usually at

one end or the other rather than the middle.

Senator Ferguson: How to you account for that? Was 1t

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

ratio reception?

Captain Safford: Radio reception, interference and sometimes they were allowed to send one part of a message over one circuit and another part of a message would go over another circuit and due to some combination we could get the one and not the other.

Senator Ferguson: Then in effect you did not purport to be absolutely certain that you were getting all of the Jap ressages?

Captain Safford: We could not, sir, and we kept on telling our stations to that effect. We were endeavoring to get as much as we could but we could not guarantee a hundred per cent performance.

Senator Ferguson: And when you would deliver these raw messages to the various offices you were only trying to de-11 ver those that seemed important to you?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You did not deliver all that you intercepted but you delivered all that seemed important?

Captain Safford: And particularly those that seemed important to the White House and to the State Department,

Senator Ferguson: And is there any doubt but some of these messages in Number 1, diplomatio, and a so in Number 2, the ship roverents, is there any loubt that all those

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

messages were translated, as translated were sent to the White House and State Department? Do you know what exhibit 1 is?

Captain Safford: I have exhibit 1 here.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Captain Safford: I feel certain that everything in exhibit 1 was sent to the White House and the State Department.

Senator Ferguson: Doyou know what exhibit --

Captain Safford: Wait a minute. What is exhibit 2?

Senator Ferguson: Exhibit 2 is the large yellow one. It is ship movements. Itis Japanese messages concerning mili-

tary installations, ship movements, and so forth.

Captain Safford: A large part of exhibit 2 probably was not sent to the White House or the State Department as they were not interested. They were sent up to Naval Interlligence and they determined the subsequent distribution of them.

Senator Ferguson: All right. I will show you some and see whether or not they were sent. On page 12. Can you anawer that?

Captain Safford: I do not know.

Se nator Ferguson: Wasn't the State Department and the White House concerned with where war would come as well as when war would come?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, but I cannot tell you this from memory.

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Witness Saffori

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: I see. And you know of no records in your department which would indicate or any department, to your knowledge, - and I only want your knowledge on this, that would indicate which one of these messages did go or did not go?

Captain Safford: There may have been or there should have been a record in Naval Intelligence or in Captain Kramer's portion of the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence but I do not have any personal knowledge, or did not have.

Senator Ferguson: How far away from your lesk was Captain Kramer's lesk?

Captain Safford: At that time he was about half way down the corridor from me, in the Navy Building.

Senator Ferguson: Will you look on page 22? That is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo December the 3rd, 1941. I believe that was picked up by the Army at some station here in Virginia, but was sent to the Navy for translation. Did you ever see that?

Captain Safford: I had seen that before. Kramer called it to my attention on Monday, December 8, 1941.

Senator Ferguson: He called it to your attention on the 8th?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you had seen it prior to that?

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Captain Safford: I had not seen it prior to that.

Senator Ferguson: You had not seen it prior to that?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any conversation as to whether or not that was translated in the rough by Mrs. Eigars and put on his lesk on Saturday, the 6th?

Captain Safford: Just what we said about that at the time I do not recall. That question of Mrs. Edgars came up about two years later, when I checked up on it, but he did say, "Here is this thing, it is too late. What should I do with it?" He said, "It is in a bad shape, we cannot handle it now." And I said, "Well, you finish it anyhow and turn it into the file for purposes of record, it might be important." Then after it was smoothed up it did appear to be very important.

Senator Ferguson: Is that about all that you remember that he said in relation to that particular message?

Captain Safford: He asked me furthermore, - he told me that he had received it in imperfect form on Saturday afternoon around three of clock and that it was a question of working on that or working on the highly important fourteen parter and, therefore, he let this thing go to be finished when time was available.

Senator Ferguson: Were all of the interpreters in the

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Army and Navy sections busy on Saturday translating?

Captain Safford: Not in the Army, sir. I believe they all went home at about one o'clock.

Senator Ferguson: They all went hore in the Army? Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, coulin't Kramer have gotten someone in the Army or somewhere in the Navy to translate this message on page 22 of exhibit 2? I understood you were alerted for war.

Captain Safford: Mr. Ferguson, it was my understanding that this was much more than a mere translation. This is a very baily garbled message, which had to be thought out and I believe this has been in the testimony of other witnesses before other investigations. All I know about it is quite seconhanded and I would rather not discuss it.

Senator Ferguson: You know it second-handed. You rean you got 1t by hearsay from Kramer.

Captain Safford: Kramer said it was not a question of translating it. It was a question of taking away people off the purple system onto this.

Senator Ferguson: And that was given as the reason for not decoding this message other than in the rough as indicate1?

Captain Safford: Taking it back. I would rather let

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: All right. to be called as a witness can also describe it.

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Witness Safford

Captein Safford: And possibly Captain Rochefort if he is

Kramer describe that message than myself.

Senator Ferguson: I would like to ask counsel or the naval attache here if you know whether or not they are going to produce file 7001?

Commander Baecher: We have it here, sir.

Senator Fegguson: You have it?

Commander Baecher: Yes.

Could I see it? Senator Ferguson:

Commander Baecher: It is not in a file, sir. It is in a book.

Senator Ferguson: I think the committee would be interested in knowing what is meant by a file.

Mr. Richardson: We made the name "file". The Navy does not.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, the Navy loes not make the name "file"?

Mr. Richardson: No.

Senator Ferguson: Let us get it straightened out. Is this officer the custodian?

He is the present custodian. Corrander Baecher:

Maybe he can help us. Senator Ferguson:

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Commander Baecher: "Captain Kramer can explain it better than anyone else.

Senator Ferguson: Well, then I will wait until Kramer comes on. I don't want to waste any time.

Now, there has just been placed on my table here a wessage. Will you show the witness this message? It is one
you described the other day, that it went to CINCALF Urgent
and CINCPAC, which is Kimmel, priority, but it went to Hart
urgent. How do you account for that? How do you account
for the change? It was all marked "Urgent" you said.

Captain Safford: The action addressess were "urgent" out in the Asiatic station. The information addressess, that is CINCAP and COM 14 were only priority, but it was all in one message blank.

Senator Ferguson: One is marked "urgent" at the top and the other one is marked "priority".

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: But the one for information was only marked "priority".

Captain Safford: Priority.

Senator Ferguson: Now, that message was an intercepted Japanese message, was it not?

Captain Safford: That was, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And then it was sent out on December

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

the 1st, 1941 in this form to both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel, is that correct?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So that if you could send this kind of an intercepted message to you know any reason as the head or one of the officers in the Ormunications section that you would be risking any more to send that kind of a message out over the wires than you would to alert Hawaii on the morning of the 7th?

Captain Safford: None at all, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I am asking you as a Communications officer.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, and I am speaking as a cipher expert with years of experience behind it. There was no danger what soever in using our top grade ciphers for any kind of information.

Senator Ferguson: And there was no more danger of sending out that particular dispatch by McCollum and remased by Admiral L. Moyes on December the 1st, 1941? You understood my question?

Captain Saffori: Yes, sir.

And your answer is as an expert in Senator Ferguson: this field?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Now, so that there is no mistake on this record, when you were referring to a false weather report, an executed message, you are talking about the method that it was to translate or execute these three words relating to America, England, and so forth; the message would be a false weather report, not a correct weather report but a false one?

Captain Safford: A false weather report, correct, sir. Senator Ferguson: So that when in any of your statements or your language you are talking about a false weather report, that does not indicate, does it, that you never saw the report, or loes it indicate that?

Captain Safford: That indicates to what I have called the winds message in other testimony, to what I did see.

Senator Ferguson: And it is the execute part of the winds message?

Captain Safford: That is it, sir.

Senator Terguson: But it is false as far as the weather is concerned in Japan, is that correct?

Captain Safford: Or anywhere else, because the actual language that care over said, "North wind, south wind and west wind" -- I mean "North wind, east wind, west wind", all in the same manner and no places or direct name. It was obviously a false weather report which no one could mistake.

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Questions by; Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Now, that is what is known as a wordoipher-word, is it not?

Captain Safford: It is often --

Senator Ferguson: A wie word?

Captain Safford: This is in hidden word, yes, sir, or hidden word.

Senator Ferguson: Hillen words?

Captain Safford: Or open code it is sometimes called because it appears disguised in an apparently innocent message.

Senator Ferguson: But a hidden word can be sent in Morse code, Japanese Morse code or international code or by voice, is that right?

Captain Safford: Any way they want. There was no restriction. The message which set it up simply said "Japanese language broadcast," and that could have been in the form of Japanese, written, yes, sir, as well as voice, but it could not have been in English or any other foreign language.

Senator Ferguson: It had to be in Japanese?

Captain Safford: It had to be in Japanese.

Senator Ferguson: Now, to you know of any other messages in the same way that were transmitted and known as code word messages? Was that a customary way to send mes-

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Captain Safford: That was only done in an emergency.

Senator Ferguson: Now, was it your understanding that the various Japanese embassies had short wave radio and picked these messages up, or how did the Japanese embassies get these messages?

Captain Safford: Japan sent a series of broadcasts on short wave to their embassies overseas. They were mostly in Japanese and I think some of the broadcasts were in voice, but the important ones were in Morse code and they had radio receiving apparatus at each embassy and they had an operator who could take them in and they would change their schedules from time to time, discuss it in plain language. There was nothing secret about this arrangement. It was done openly and aboveboard.

Senator Ferguson: But 111 the Japanese embassies receive 1t on their own receiving sets?

Captain Safford: The Japanese embassies received it on their own receiving sets, yes, sir.

Benator Ferguson: And not on some commercial set?

Captain Safford: And not on some commercial set.

Senator Ferguson: So that it was going directly to the various erbassies?

Captain Safforda Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that was short wave radio?

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Captain Safford: Short wave receiving sets. If they wanted to send anything back they could not.

Senator Ferguson: And did we have short wave receivers at Tokyo so far as the Navy was concerned?

Captain Safford: I cannot say for Tokyo but we 414 in most of the capitals of the world. We had to get diplomatio clearance in every case.

Senator Ferguson: Now, how would an embassy, - let us assume that this kind of a message was received here on. Massachusetts Avenue, where their erbassy was, and they would decode back a message that they that received. How would they send their message back?

Captain Safford: This was normally used just for sending out press, for just information as it calls it, the general intelligence broadcasts and the news broadcasts.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, but how would the Japanese embassy get back a message to Tokyo?

Captain Safford: Through commercial radio.

Senator Ferguson: Through commercial radio?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that is when you were able to pick up that commercial radio, because they did use the commercial radio?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Senator Ferguson: It was not cabled; it was radioed? Captain Safford: It was practically one hundred per cent radio.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Captain, where were you born?

Captain Safford: I was born in Massachusetts.

Mr. Keefe: I believe you have testified that you have had 32 years of service in the Navy?

Captain Safford: Going on 34,

Mr. Keefe: The statement has been made quite repeatedly, especially by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who cross examined you at length, that you stand alone in your testimony with respect to this winds message.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, regardless of that, Captain Safford, is the testimony which you have given to this committee what you believe to be the truth?

Captain Safford: It is.

Mr. Keefe: You testified that you have thought that your testimony would be supported by certain witnesses whom you named. I take it the four in number were the names you gave us yesterlay?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir,

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Men who are expected to be witnesses before this committee following your testimony?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You were intimate with Captain Kramer, were you not?

Captain Safford: I served with him for two years and saw hir every lay.

Mr. Keefe: Did you hear Captain Kramer's testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Have you read it since this hearing began? Captain Safford: I have read it since this hearing began.

Mr. Keefe: From that testimony 111 you obtain the impression that Captain Kramer would support the testimony which you have given here?

Captain Safford: I did from that testimony.

Mr. Keefe: And from statements which he had previously made to you?

Captain Safford: And from statements he had previously made to me.

Mr. Keefe: Reference has been made by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson, to the testimony that has heretofore been given by Admiral Ingersoll, that has been read into the record

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Also some testimony previously given by Admiral Turner with respect to his knowledge of the existence of the winds execute message.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You have referred to your belief that Captain Saitler also has knowledge of the existence of this winds execute message on or about the 4th of December 1941?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Captain Saitler has also testified --

The Vice Chairman: Colonel Saitler.

Mr. Keefe: Colonel Saitler I believe it is, yes.

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: I don't want to demote him.

You were familiar with the testimony that Colonel Saitler had given before the Army Board?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, I read that within the two months, - within the past two months also.

Mr. Leefe: Yes. Now, from the reading of the testimony of these witnesses and from your knowledge of the facts as you have testified to them yourself, was that the basis of the statement which you make in response to Mr. Murphy's questions yesterlay that you expected some of these witnesses to justify the position which you have assumed before this inquiry?

Captain Safford: That is correct. It was not from their

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Mr. Keefe: Now, in order that the record may be clear at this time, in view of your previous cross-examination, I call your attention to the testimony of Captain Alwin D. Kramer before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Volume 5, pages 956 and 957, where he was asked question No. 30:

"Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and ask you if you saw them on or before the 7th of December, 1941. The first one I shall show you is Document 15 from Exhibit 63."

Now Document 15 was the original set-up of the winds message, was it not?

Captain Safford: I am sorry, I cannot answer that. Mr. Keefe: I think it will appear later on. .

"A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section.

"Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it?

"A. The fact that the date '28 November' is on here would indicate that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the first time. Also, these is an indication at the bottom that it was received by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly after received.

"Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to intercepting any communications which would have executed the phrases of this code?"

Obviously he was referring to this Document 15 being

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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the original set-up of the winds message.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That is clear, is it not?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Then Captain Kramer answers:

"On receipt of this particular message, on instructions of the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some cards, about 6 as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes."

Now stopping his answer right there, I want to ask you did you have knowledge of the fact that Captain Kramer had prepared these cards on the instructions of Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, he did.

Mr. Keefe: And those cards were turned over to Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford: They were turned over.

Mr. Keefe: Going on with the quote from Kramer's testimony:

"He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do know that he arranged with Captain Safford, the head of Op-20-G, the section of Communications that handled this material, to have any message in this phrasoology handled promptly by watch officers, not only

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in Op-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions contained in this exhibit," - referring to Exhibit 15 - "and the meaning. Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December," - I repeat that quote -"Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe wither the third or fourth of December, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes! office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the third or fourth.

"Q. You say it is your recollection that you received nome Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in Document 15; is that correct?

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"A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.

"Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

"A. Higashi No Kazeame, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of Higashi No Kazeame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

"Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, Higashi No Kazeame?

"A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

"Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you saw it?

"A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that were being read.

"Q. Can you indicate or state the source oc the information that was contained in this communication?

"A. No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is that it came in on teletype would indicate

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Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Keefe that it was a U.S. Navy intercept station."

Do you remember discussing, in your discussions with Kramer, that he had given you that information as to what his knowledge was on this situation prior to the time that you testified before either the Army Board or Naval Court or Hewitt examination?

Captain Safford: I discussed that with Kramer before he left Washington to go to Honolulu. I believe it was late in 1942 or early in 1943. I have not discussed it with him since.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Captain Safford, I want to get perfectly clear, in my mind at least, this set-up on the operation of this teletype device. That hasn't anything to do with cryptology?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Or anything secret at all. Teletypes are used all over the country.

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: Now, as I understand it, you had direct wires to your intercept stations on the East Coast and the West Coast; is that right?

Captain Safford: It was just like a long-distance telephone circuit. It went through switchboards. You rang the numbers and got your connections, but instead of talking

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

the messages are typed and automatically printed at the other end.

Mr. Keefe: That is the way all these messages came in? Captain Safford: At that time, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: At that time?

Witness Safford

Captain Safford: Yes, sir. We did not have leased lines at that time.

Mr. Keefe: So you had the regular teletype machine such as they have in a newspaper office or any other offices?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: There is a double roll, as I understand it, of the receiving paper.

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: On which the words are printed? Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So you would have an original and a copy? Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: And it was a regular yellow sheet, was it not? Captain Safford: Yes, a standard copy.

Mr. Keefe: A standard yellow sheet copy, the first sheet and then a carbon for the copy, is that right?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: And these messages would come in and the watch officer would take them off the teletype as they would

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

come in, and I suppose they would be handed over to the translators as to anything that might be considered to be important?

Captain Safford: They would have to be decoded first generally, and then the translator got them.

Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now Kramer, in his testimony before the Navy Court which I have indicated, states with positiveness that the watch officer on the 4th of December took a message off the teletype embodying three of these words, "Higashi No Kazeame".

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And he states positively that the watch officer brought that before him and he walked down with the watch officer. Do you recall that incident?

Captain Safford: Yes, I recall that incident.

Mr. Keefe: Now let us read on further:

"Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it: is that correct?

"A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be inference.

"Q. Have you seen that communication since?

"A. I have had no occasion to; no, sir.

The question was, have you seen it since?

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

"A. I have not, no, sir. I have not because I have had no occasion to.

"Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used certain words, it meant certain things?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message?

Did you consider it important enough that when that message
was received it would be a most important message in reply.

In other words, were you on the lookout for that answer?

"A. I am not sure what you mean by 'answer'.

"Q. Well, the execute of the message.

"A. Yes, sir, not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization were much much on the qui vive looking for that.

I prefer to refer to that as a warning.

"Q. When this execute came in, did you receive it?

"A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch officer who receives the information coming off the teletype.

"Q. Were you the officer who went to the communications officer and said, 'Here it is'.

"A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford's office.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

"Q. You had that information then?

"A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind.

"Q. About what was the time and date when you got that?

"A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. It may have been the 3rd.

"Q. What did you do with it?

MA. As I indicated before, I did not handle it from there on at all.

"Q. Who handled itA

"A. I left Commander Safford's office as soon as I knew he had the picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particularly plain language code because of his previous finstruction to me to make out these cards so that he could leave it with certain high officers and the Secretary, all with the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was any time of the day or night.

"Q. When the original winds message was received, was that to your knowledge sent to the Office of the Chief of Waval Operations?

"A. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

"Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

to Captain Safford, and, I believe said, 'Here it is', did you mean by that exclamation, 'Here it is', that this was the execution of the Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the message which executed the Japanese War Plan?

"A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the message myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to Commander Safford's office, and the expression, 'Here it is', simply meant that finally a message in this plain language code had come through -- a message which we had been looking for many days and that we had made special provisions to handle for many days.

"Q. To your mind that was of no more significance than here is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan and the United States?

"A. It meant more than that. This plain language sode did not refer specifically to the United States-Japanese magnitations. It referred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations concerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or relations which could very well involve a break."

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Now, thus Captain Kramer testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: As I have indicated?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: From that testimony, and from the other testimony, is that the reason why you testified yesterday that you had reason to believe that these witnesses would substantiate the story which you have told to this committee?

Captain Safford: It was.

Mr. Keefe: And you had reason to believe that you would not be coming before this committee standing alone, did you not?

Captain Safford: That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe: I shall not take the time to read at this time the testimony of Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler. Those witnesses will be here to testify. But from the whole picture as you had it from the testimony that these people gave under oath and from the information which they gave you in the tops you had with them subsequently, were you of the opinion that your position would be corroborated by these witnesses when they came here to testify?

I believed that they would support Captain Safford: me in general.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Now, the thing that has puzzled me, and I assume that it must be puzzling to other members of this committee, and I speak with utter and complete frankness, Captain Safford, I am unable to understand any possible interest, personal interest, that you might have in this controversy, and if you have any such personal interest, I would like to have you state it.

Captain Safford: I have no personal interest, except I started it and I have got to see it through.

The Chairman: The guests of the committee will be in order.

Mr. Keefe: You realize, of course, that in view of the implications that have been stated in the cross-examination of you, especially by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that you have made some rather strong charges?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That way well militate against your carerr as a Naval officer. Did you realize that when you came here as a witness?

Captain Safford: I realized that every time I have testified.

Mr. Keefe: And despite the fact that you have nothing personally to gain, and everything to lose, you have persisted in this story every time you have testified?

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Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Captain Safford: I have.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you have testified that from information which you subsequently obtained, Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood who was standing watch at 5 a.m. on the morning of the 7th had this final 14th part of the 14-part message plus the short message of instructions for its delivery to Secretary Hull at one o'clock?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: I take it that that testimony means, and you will correct me if I am in error, that the message was received, but not yet decoded or translated?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I am a little confused about the character in which this 14th part message and the short message came in? Did it come in in Japanese or English or what?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, after decoding, after taking it out of the purple machine, one of the messages, the 14th part was in what you might call a modified sort of English, and the other was in a modified form of Japanese.

There were a great many conventional symbols used also in combination which had to br broken down into numbers, capitals, punctuation points, all manner of things like that. So then the message had to be completely retyped

Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Keefe from that and in the case of the Japanese, of course, it had to be translated into English. So it was not quite as rapid a job to process them as would be in our own systems where it comes out straight.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you have no knowledge, personal knowledge, because you weren't there, as to what Brotherhood did with this message, have you?

Captain Safford: Brotherhood told me that --Mr. Keefe: I don't care what he told you.

Captain Safford: I have no personal knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, we will get that from Brotherhood at the proper time. I don't want you to testify to a lot of hearsay evidence. I want your own knowledge. You know nothing about what transpired as to the decoding or translating, or writing of the 14th part message, and the short message because you were not there?

Captain Safford: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Any knowledge which you might have on that has been gained as a result of conversations with those who were there?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you were rather bitterly assailed yesterday because you were home eating your breakfast in your pajamas on a Sunday, something which I personally do

Questions by: Mr. Keefe Witness Safford almost every Sunday, but you were assailed as though you had a direct responsibility to do something about this situation on Sunday, and failed to do it, although you are not here on trial. No charge has ever been made by anyone

Now, when you were at home on Sunday, was there anything that you could have done had you been in your office to have accomplished more than what was done in your absence?

Mr. Keefe: You are not a translator, are you? Captain Safford: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You had to rely upon other Army or Navy

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And on this particular Sunday there weren't any Navy translators there?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You had an arrangement, as I understand f.t, that the Army was to do translations on that Sunday? Captain Safford: Kramer had made that arrangement

Mr. Keefe: Previously entered into?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Although it was the Navy's day to do it,

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Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Keefe
You had done it, as I understood, for the Army on Saturday, and the Army was taking over your duties in Sunday;

is that correct?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So that if you had been there at five o'clock or six o'clock or any other time, you wouldn't have known any more about what was in that message than Brotherhood, would you?

Captain Safford: Less.

Mr. Keefe: Less.

Now, when you left your office at 4:30 or thereabouts, on Saturday, were you violating any order or directive, or regulation of the Navy in so doing?

Captain Safford: On the contrary, sir, I believe the official closing hours were 1 0'clock, but military personnel were supposed to stay on until 4:30. All the civil service employees went home at one o'clock that day in the Navy as well as the War Department.

Mr. Keefe: We had gone on a 40-hour week?

Captain Safford: I believe it was a 40-hour week then, I am not certain.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, counsel has asked you for your beliefs, asked you for conclusions repeatedly as to certain things. You expressed some hesitancy from time to time in

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Witness Safford

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe expressing those conclusions.

In the cross-examination it developed that you at least had a suspicion that there was some attempt in high places, in Opnav and the General Staff, to cover up and to make Kimmel and Short the goats in this transaction.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: May I have that last question read? (The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Keefe: I didn't mean counsel. I meant Mr. Murphy. You meant that did you?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Was that suspicion supported, as I believe you testified by the fact of the change in front in certain quarters with respect to this so-called winds execute message?

Captain Safford: It was increased and strengthened by that.

Mr. Keefe: And the disappearance, as you have related of the files relating to the so-called winds execute and certain other intercepts relating to it; is that the way I am to understand your testimony?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you have testified and Kramer testi-

Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Keefe field before the Naval Court of Inquiry that this winds execute message that was received on the 4th was sent right up to Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: After Admiral Noyes got that message and the same afternoon were messages prepared and sent out to Guam and our outlying possessions to destroy their codes and confidential papers?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, they were.

Mr. Keefe: Who drew those messages?

Captain Safford: I did myself personally.

Mr. Keefe: And were they sent out?

Captain Safford: They were all sent out.

Mr. Keefe: And did those messages follow in immediate sequence to the receipt of this so-called winds execute message?

Captain Safford: I began working on them, checking up to see what we had to do, immediately after the receipt of the message.

Mr. Keefe: And were those messages prompted entirely by the receipt of this winds execute message, so far as you were concerned?

Captain Safford: So far as I was concerned, they were.
Mr. Keefe: And did Admiral Noyes approve the sending

Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Keefe

of those messages forthe destruction of codes and confidential papers?

Captain Safford: Admiral Noyes did.

Mr. Keefe: Now, there is something a little peculiar.

As I have been reading this testimony, I am impressed that some of these messages did not get out.

For instance, the message to Guam, didn't get out.

No, I think that message did get out.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, Guam destroyed everything before they were captured.

Mr. Keefe: Oh, yes. That message got out. I think I was referring, perhaps to the McCollum situation.

When was the McCollum message drawn? I want to get that clear in my mind. In relation to the winds message, if it had any relation to it at all.

Captain Safford: It had apparently been drawn that day. McCollum had sent a message the day before, which Admiral Wilkinson had approved, had released, in fact, and the winds message came in quite early in the morning, about nine o'clock, and I saw the message all typed smooth on the pages, no changes or inter-lining, or anything like that, requiring only a signature, and depositing in the Naval Communications office to be on its way. I saw that message approximately 3 p. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: You drew a message?

Witness Safford

Captain Safford: The messages which I had drawn were up in Admiral Noyes' for discussion with him and his approval at the same time that I saw McCollum's message.

Mr. Keefe: Did the drafting of the McCollum message follow as a result of the receipt of this winds execute message?

Captain Safford: It did.

Mr. Keefe: The messages which you drew to send out after the receipt of the winds execute message to destroy codes, were sent?

Captain Safford: They were.

Mr. Keefe: Now, what happened to the McCollum message? Captain Safford: I do not know.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, did you talk with McCollum about drafting this message and getting this warning out?

Captain Safford: I did not talk to McCollum about that message and I did not talk to him about the messages that I was preparing myself that I have any recollection of. We simply got the same signal, and we proceeded to carry out our duties.

Mr. Keefe: You saw the McCollum message that afternoon in Admiral Noyes' office?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe Witness Safford Mr. Keefe: When it was discussed with Admiral hll 2 Turner, I believe? 3 Captain Safford: No, it was discussed between Admiral 4 Noyes, and Admiral Wilkinson. 5 Mr. Keefe: Oh, yes, Wilkinson, and they let you read 6 it? 7 Captain Safford: And they let me read it. 8 Mr. Keefe: And you are of the opinion that that long 9 message which you read which had been drawn by McCollum 10 in the last few sentences contained specific reference to 11 the winds message - - the winds execute message? 12 Captain Safford: Or the same information so that I 13 took for granted it was a quotation of the winds message 14 or a paraphrase of the winds message. 15 Mr. Keefe: You never testified before the Roberts 16 Commission, did you? 17 Captain Safford: No, sir. 13 Mr. Keefe: You mean by that, you were not asked to? 19 Captain Safford: I was not requested to; I did not 20 refuse. 21 The Chairman: I didn't understand. 22 Captain Safford: I said I was not requested. 23 Mr. Keefe: That is all. Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --24 The Chairman: Captain, let me ask you a question. AL fls 25 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: The Chairman

The Chairman: Captain McCollum testified before
this committee that he never saw the winds execute and
that the message he did prepare was in no way related to
it or based upon it. Notwithstanding that, you insist
on saying that he did see it and that the message he prepared
was based on it.

Captain Safford: That his Section had prepared it and I took for granted that he had prepared it personally or had 0.K.'d it.

The Chairman: But a little while ago you said that both he and you based the messages that you wrote on the winds execute. Do you modify that now by saying that you took it for granted?

Captain Safford: I took it for granted that McCollum initialled and approved all the messages released from the Far Eastern Section.

The Chairman: He testified that he never saw any winds execute message, that his message, the message he prepared, which was never sent, was not in any related to or based upon it. If he testified to that, would you accept his statement on it?

Captain Safford: I would think that there must be two messages, not one. That shorter message which he described, which I heard him describe, and the longer message,

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Witness Safford

Questions by: The Chairman

which I saw myself, and which I saw Admiral Wilkinson leave
Admiral Noyes shortly after three, a few minutes after three,
with in his hand, and he turned around and made the statement
"I am going to send this message if I can get the front
office to release it."

The Chairman: Well, you are talking now about the message that he said he wrote out which was never sent?

Captain Safford: I am talking about the long message

The Chairman: These messages that you say you prepared, under whose name were they sent?

Captain Safford: There were five altogether. One I released myself during the noon hour, because it was a rush job, and not particularly important. One of them Admiral Noyes released. The other three involved more than the festruction of codes, but also destruction of other confidential papers and Admiral Noyes started to release them himself and then he made some remark to the effect, "Well, this goes a little bit beyond the cognizence of Naval Communications and I guess I better take it around and have Admiral Ingersoll release it." That was done. They were all released.

The Chairman: You didn't sign any of them yourself? Captain Safford: Only one.

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The Chairman: Which one was that?

Captain Safford: I have a copy for the record. I can identify it.

The Chairman: To whom was it sent?

I believe you say that was not particularly important? Captain Safford: No, sir.

The Chairman: We won't pursue it.

Captain Safford: I only released it to save time.

The Chairman: All right. I waive that.

Now, awhile ago in response to a question by Mr.

Keefe you stated that you started out with this story, about which he was asking, and you had to stick to it, go through with it or stick to it, which ever expression you used.

Are you testifying now before this committee because you started out that way --

Captain Safford: No, sir, not on the story.

The Chairman: Well, he was talking about, I think he used the word "story", maybe not, but that is the impression I got, that your version of this thing, you were still sticking to it. I am wondering whether you mean to create the impression that because you started out with it you are going to stick to it?

Captain Safford: No, sir. If the Chairman will give me the opportunity -- I thought that he referred to what might

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Chairman

be termed my unsolicited support for Admiral Kimmel.

The Chairman: Well, when you were asked if you had any personal interest in this matter you said you had not. Did you disassociate any personal interest you might have in it with your interest in vindicating Admiral Kimmel to which you testified yesterday or the day before?

Captain Safford: I have no personal interest. I have never considered myself as anything except distantly acquainted with Admiral Kimmel. He knew who I was, that was about all.

The Chairman: That is all.

Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one or two questions along that particular line.

Captain, you say you were only slightly acquainted with Admiral Kimmel before the Pearl Harbor disaster?

Captain Kramer: In a personal manner. Officially I had served under him but not directly under him on several occasions.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

Senator Lucas: Did you have an intimate acquaintanceship with him, or was it a mere passing one?

Captain Safford: Not at all, sir. It was quite distant.

Senator Lucas: Quite a distant relationship? Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Well, now, when you wrote the letter to Captain Kramer back in 1943 -- is that right?

Captain Safford; There was one in December, 1943.

Senator Lucas: No one at that time had --

The Chairman: The Chair would like to ask the members of the committee if there is any chance of finishing with the Captain today. If not, we might as well suspend here.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to say that there was a request made that the Captain produce the letters he had written to other people. They have not yet been produced.

Captain Safford: I will get those at the first opportunity.

Mr. Murphy: A request was made that the Captain produce the material which he said was denied to him for four years, and which he only got two weeks ago. That has not been produced. There are certain other questions still open and not answered.

I am sorry that I am the one to ask these questions;

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somebody, if they want the truth, will have to ask them, and I propose to get the whole truth.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we go over until morning.

The Chairman: Obviously, we can't finish with the Captain, and we will suspend until 10:00 o'clock in the morning.

(At the direction of the Chairman, the testimony of Witnesses Beatty and Dillon, previously taken, is inserted at this point:)

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Witness Beatty

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Mr. Richardson: I would like to present, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Beatty.

The Chairman: Will Admiral Beatty come around?
Admiral, you will be sworn, please.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL FRANK E. BEATTY,

UNITED STATES NAVY

(Admiral Beatty was duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson: Admiral, will you state your full

name?

Admiral Beatty: Frank Edmund Beatty, Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

Mr. Richardson: How long have you been in the Navy?

Admiral Beatty: Since June, 1912.

Mr. Richardson: Where are you stationed now?

Admiral Beatty: I am now Commander Destroyers Atlantic Fleet, with my flagship at Portland, Maine.

Mr. Richardson: What was your engagement in the Nevy during the year 1941?

Admiral Beatty: I became Aide to Secretary Knox early in 1941.

Mr. Richardson: How long did that position continue?

Admiral Beatty: Until March, 1943.

Mr. Richardson: It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that you accompanied Secretary Knox on his trip to Honolulu following

Witness Beatty

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Admiral Beatty: It is.

the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. Richardson: Where your relations with Knox close and intimate?

Admiral Beatty: Extremely so.

Mr. Richardson: How were you connected with his office in the Navy Department?

Admiral Beatty: I was his Naval Aide.

Mr. Richardson: Was your office in connection with his?

Admiral Beatty: Very close to it; one room removed.

Mr. Richardson: When he was on duty in the Navy Department, were you required to be on duty also?

Admiral Beatty: I would not say I was required, but I was normally there whenever he was in the office.

Mr. Richardson: Did your connection with Secretary Knox put you in the position where you had definite knowledge of specific documents of importance with which he was concerned in the war effort?

Admiral Beatty: I would say most of them, but not necessarily all of them.

Mr. Richardson: When he went to Hawaii with you did you travel on the same plane?

Admiral Beatty: We did.

Mr. Richardson: Had frequent conversations with him?

Witness Beatty

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Admiral Beatty: Many conversations.

Mr. Richardson: Were you present at some of his conferences in Honolulu with Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Beatty: I was present at, I would say, most of them, yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Admiral, there has appeared in the testimony here a report, I think coming from Admiral Kimmel, that upon meeting Secretary Knox in Honolulu, upon the Secretary's visit there, Secretary Enox asked Admiral Kimmel whether Kimmel had received his message, which apparently had been sent by Knox to Kimmel Saturday night before Pearl Harbor, and that Kimmel replied, "No, I never received the message."

Now keeping that incident in your mind, I want to ask
you whether you have any information or knowledge or recollection or memory of any message that Secretary Knox sent,
or said that he sent, or announced that he thought he sent
to Admiral Kimmel on the Saturday before Pearl Harbor, and
particularly in connection with the receipt of the 1.3 or
14 parts message that came in on the night of the 6th and
morning of the 7th?

Admiral Beatty: I believe I understand the entire question. I have definitely no knowledge of any message being sent by Secretary Knox at that time.

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Witness Beatty

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Mr. Richardson: Have you any recollection of his ever having mentioned such a message to you?

Admiral Beatty: I have not.

Mr. Richardson: Was any such message, or copy of any such message returned to his office file, so far as you know?

Admiral Beatty: No, not so far as I know.

Mr. Richardson: Did Secretary Knox at any time mention to you any inference on his part that he had either prepared or authorized such a message?

Admiral Beatty: Not to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Richardson: In the ordinary routine of messages

would a message from the Secretary of the Navy proceed

directly to a field officer?

Admiral Beatty: I would say normally no. Before sending any message which would have been as vital as such a message would have been he would have taken it up with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Richardson: So you have any other information, Admiral, on this point, which would throw any light upon that transaction?

Admiral Beatty: Only this: At the time -- I better amplify this -- when I speak of the message now I speak of the message sent by General Marshall and agreed upon by Admiral Stark, sent over Army circuits or other circuits

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Witness Beatty

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

to Pearl Harbor as a final warning, and addressed, I believe, to General Short, to be delivered by him to Admiral Kimmel.

At the time the message was sent I did not know it was going out. It was a matter directly, apparently, between the Secretary and Admirai Stark. When I left Washington with the Secretary several days later I knew about the message, but I had apparently the misconceived idea that the message was sent on Saturday.

I came back from Pearl Harbor with that same idea, and endeavored out there to try to pick up at that end what became of the message at that end.

As I remember, we talked to General Short and Admiral Elmmel about it and found out the time of the receipt of the message in the Hawaiian Islands, the time it was decoded and the time it was delivered to those commanders. But there is nothing now that I can tie to that shows me that my recollection that the message was sent on Saturday is at all correct.

Mr. Richardson: There was only one message in any case? Admiral Beatty: Only one message, yes.

Mr. Richardson: And the message which you thought went on Saturday was the Marshall message?

Admiral Beatty: Was the Marshall-Stark message, yes. And is the message which is referred to Mr. Richardson:

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Witness Beatty

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Mr. Richardson Questions by: Mr. Murphy

in Secretary Knox; report to the President?

Admiral Beatty: It must have been, yes, sir. I presume it was. I saw his report to the President and I do not recollect the reference, but I presume it was the same message .

Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to ask a question.

The Chairman: Any questions, Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman: No questions.

The Chairman: Senator George?

(No response)

The Chairman: Congressman Clark?

(No response)

The Chairman: Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas: No questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral Beatty, I understand Captain Safford said that he thought that Lieutenant Commander Kramer was acting as counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox. Do you know of anything that Secretary Knox did in regard to the war effort that needed any defense?

Admiral Beatty: Absolutely nothing.

Mr. Murphy: Do you know, or did you ever hear of any such thing as a winds intercept having arrived in Washington

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Witness Beatty

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

on December 4?

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Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Chairman --

Mr. Murphy: (Continuing) Did you ever hear or do you know of it being brought to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy, which would show that the Japanese had announced that there would be war with England and war with the United States?

Mr. Keefe: Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. I do not know whether we have any rules at all here governing the admission of evidence, but I understood that Admiral Beatty was being called here for just one specific thing.

If we are going to open up this cross-examination into a general cross-examination of Admiral Beatty on all things connected with this I assure you he will not be here for just I did not understand that that is what he a few minutes. was being called here for, and under any ordinary rules of cross-examination, nothing has been asked about the winds message, and he was not brought here to testify on that subject.

If we are going into it, then let it be understood that each member of the committee will be privileged to cross-examine the witness on any subject relating to this whole controversy.

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