

(Copy for the Minister, Dr. Boltze)

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER/ (Secret Cipher Process)

/T.N. Pencil underlinings in original underscored once by typewriter; ink underlinings in original underscored twice by typewriter/

Left Berlin 26 March 1942, 0854 hours.
Arrived Tokyo 26 March 1942, 1915 hours.

Embassy Tokyo
No. 878 of 26 March

Confidential B.

FOR AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY

In conversation with Ambassador OSHIMA on 23 March I gave him more detailed statements on the present situation in which I started with the very bad prospect facing Russia, the atmosphere of deep depression existing in fact among the leading politicians in England, and the gigantic confusion reigning in reality in the United States with its blustering armament propaganda. If now the opponents' propaganda tried to keep us from profiting from our victory it was all the more necessary that we counter it with full utilization of the weakness of our opponents' position and bring to fruition in this very year the boldest conceivable strategic plans. Germany would this year definitely maneuver Russia into a position which would eliminate it as a decisive factor in the war. As a follow-up we then proposed to push forward into the Near East, in order to shake hands with Japan. Japan, too, was confronted with a situation wherein the safeguarding of its conquests to date could only be assured by the final annihilation of our enemies; therefore the Tripartite Pact powers "should" undertake this year further bold military offensive operations and in view of the current weakness of the opponents they "could" undertake them in order to end the war as soon as possible with the smallest possible number of sacrifices. I could imagine that Japan should obtain security for herself, that Australia could no longer become a base for attack against Japan that the Japanese fleet should advance into the Indian Ocean, occupy Ceylon and establish bases on Madagascar and that Burma would be completely occupied. Above all, however, I believed that an advance of the Japanese armies against Vladivostok and in the direction of Lake Baikal would be of especial significance. Naturally we did not expect anything of Japan which would overstep its power for Japan's strength was also ours. However, if Japan should be strong enough this year for

an attack on Russia, this would materially contribute to Russia's rapid and final elimination as an opponent in the war in view of the latter's steadily deteriorating position. Even now, the nutritional and economic situation in Soviet Russia was dreadful according to reports reaching us, and the Russians were literally devouring each other in many districts, as a captured Russian general stated recently. Russia had already lost 10 million of its best soldiers, while our total losses since the outbreak of war had only been about 237,000 dead and 750,000 wounded, and of the latter at least 500,000 to 600,000 could again be used in the war, at any rate, the German Army was much stronger today than last year and ready for the new offensive which /would be directed/ against the since frightfully decimated Russian army. There was therefore no doubt that we would attain our goal in Russia. Together with the common push of the Axis and Japan to the Indian Ocean, this blow would decide the war. If things went this way, the British Empire would collapse in the foreseeable future, and the U.S. would then be unable to do anything serious either to us or to Japan.

Ambassador OSHIMA agreed fully and completely with my views. To be sure, he had received no official communications on the Japanese intentions, but would do everything on his own initiative to decide his government to undertake the advance against Vladivostok and East Siberia this year, as he also was of the opinion that such a good opportunity would never return. Following this up I spoke further with the Ambassador on the future Economic cooperation between the Europe-Africa Sphere under the leadership of the Axis on the one hand and the Greater East Asia Area under the leadership of Japan on the other, in which connection I designated as the goal a large-scale economic agreement with preference for the partners provided for and third parties, America in particular, excluded as far as possible. A firm alliance, looking as far ahead as possible, between the Tripartite Pact Powers must form the basis of it. The main outlines for economic cooperation shall as soon as possible be laid down in a skeleton agreement.

OSHIMA emphasized the special significance which such an agreement would have as a substitute for and transfer of the heretofore existing economic ties between Japan and the U.S. We have in view a new discussion of this question in the very near future.

I impart the foregoing to you for your personal information and also for suitable use in your conversations there with influential Japanese individuals.

RIBBENTROP

TELEGRAM from RIBBENTROP TO GERMAN EMBASSY,
TOKYO.

DOC 4092

(6)

(12)

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RIBBENTROP

IPS DOC. NO. 4092

I certify that this photostatic copy of telegram No. 878, dated 26 March from Ribbentrop to Tokyo is a true print of microfilm contained in the files of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Office Secretary of War, Washington, D.C., which microfilm was made of documents taken from the files of the German Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ William S. J. Curley
WILLIAM S. J. CURLEY
Capt. AC
Chief, Intelligence
Branch
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

CHARGE OUT CLIP

DATE:

1/20 1948

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO.

4092

TRIAL BRIEF

EXHIBIT DOC. NO.

BACKGROUND DOC. NO.

FILE NO.

PRESENTS

U.S.S.E.S.

DEFENSE DOC. NO.

Signature

H. Sturmer

Room #

376

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4092

7 Jan 1948

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Embassy,
Tokyo

Date: 26 March 1942 Original () Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

IPS Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Strategic Bombing Survey

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

This telegram deals with a conference with Oshima on 23 March concerning Japan's participation in the war against Russia.

Translation of this document may be found in IPS Document 1230, Court Exhibit 807.

Analyst: Lt Kurt Steiner

Doc. No. 4092

Exhibit No. 3819

125. Doc. No. 4092

譯者註原本ハ鉛筆書下線アリタイプラリテ打ノ有ハハイキ書下線アリ

THE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 35

公使ホルン博士ニ対スル宗

暗号電報(秘密暗号法ニヨル)

一九四二年三月二十六日八時五十四分ベルリン發

一九四二年三月二十六日十九時十五分東京着

在東京大使館

三月二十六日附 第八七八号

要密織格納 B号

直接大使へ

三月二十三日大島大使ト會談ノ際彼ニ對シテ中情勢カニ
 付余ハ更ニ詳細ニ巨ル説明ヲ試ミタ。其際余ハ先ツ英事
 即チ露路兩面ニトリ現在ノ情勢ハ將ニ不利テアルコト
 ハ事實政界指導層ノ間ニ願ハ沈黙計ナ空気が流レテ
 中ニ及ビ合衆國ニテハ其鳴物入りノ軍備ノ宣傳ト
 共ニ大混乱ノ風靡シキナル等ノコトヲ話ヲ進メタ。所テ
 敵側宣傳カ我方ノ戰勝利用ヲ阻マント企圖スルニ於テハ
 我々之ニ對抗シテ敵側地歩ノ弱矣ヲ刺ストコトヲ利
 用スルコト及ヒ本年ヲ理想ニ得ル限リニ於テノ最大艦隊作
 戰計畫ヲ實施スルコトヲ益ニ望ム要トス。加應ハ今年ノ中

勿論 我々ハ日本ノ國力即之ハ我方ノ國力ヲ意
味スルトコロナルカ故ニ日本カ其國力ヲ跳越スル
行キ方ヲスルコトハ毛頭 日本ニ對シ期待シテハ
思ハナイ 併シテカウ 日本カ今年ノ中ニ對露路
進撃ヲ敢行スルニ充分強カトナレバ之レハ露路
西亞ノ益々重大化シラアル情勢カニ鑑ミ戰事ノ激
手トシテ地劣カラ露路ヲ急遽決定的ニ離脱セシムルニ
著大ニ貢獻ヲスルコトナラウ

我々ノ接受シテ諸情報ニヨルトノ聯内ノ食糧及綏
濟事情ハ現在既ニ深刻ナモノカアルモノカク敵ノ
俘虜カ一將官カ最近漏ニシテ所ニヨルト多クノ地域
ニ於テ 露路西亞人ハ文字通り互ヒニ相喰ヒタイ
有様ニアルトノコトカ 露路西亞ハ既ニ其最精銳ニ
千萬ノ兵ヲ喪失シテ 然ルニ開戰以來我方ノ損
害總數ハ戰死者カ約廿三万七千 戰傷者カ
約七十五万ニ止トマツテイル 然レモ後者ノ中カラハ甚
クトモ五十万乃至六十万ハ再ビ戰線ニ參加可能ト
ナルカアラウ 伊ブレニシテモ獨逸國防軍ハ今ヨリ
ハ昨年ヨリハ強カトナリ居リ新政勢カノ備ヘカ
去来ヲ居ル譯テアル 而シテ之カ此間恐ロシク弱
体化シテ露路軍ニ向ケラレルカアラウ 隨テ我方
カ露路西亞ニ於テ其目的ヲ達成スル事ハ疑ヒ

加露路西亞ニ於テ其目的ヲ達成スル事ハ疑ヒ

大島大使ハ余ノ言ニ全ク共鳴シテアツテ。成程彼
 ハ日本側ノ企圖ニ就テ格別公報ハ受取ラズイテ
 トノコトニアルガ、彼モ又新條ヲ好機ハ二度ト回カ
 リ来トラマデアラウトイフ見解ヲ持ツイルガ。日本政府
 ヲ勤クムニ係、尚又今年ノ中ニ浦垣及ヒ東部シベ
 リアニ対スル進歩ヲ試ミル様彼自身ノ発意ニ於テ
 凡ユル方法ヲ講ズルデアラウトイフコトデアル。

以上ニ加ヘ更ラニ余ハ同大使ト。樞軸ノ指導下ニ於
 テル歐洲—阿弗利加—西トイテ日本ノ指導下ノ
 大東亞圈トノ間、將來ノ經濟提携ニ就テ論
 シテアツル。

其ノ際余ハ目標トシテ加盟國ニ対スル優待權ヲ
 規定シ、且オ三國條ニアテカ可及的除外セル大
 規模ノ經濟協定ヲ試イテアツル。

三國同盟加盟國同ノ景ヲ遠大ニ視野ニ基ク輩
 固ク同盟カ右ニ対スル其盤ヲ構成シテケルコトヲ
 經濟協定ニ対スル其根幹ノ輪廓ハ出来得ル限り
 今ノ中ニ首組的協約ノ中ニ規定サルベキデアル。

大島ハ斯カル協約カ日米同ノ從來ノ經濟關係ニ
 ハリ且ツ之ヲ排除スルモノトシテモ、特殊ノ意義ヲ
 強調スル。我々ハ最近ノ中ニ再ビ此問題ニツイテ會
 談スルツモリデアル。以テ貴下自身ニ対スル情報
 トシテ、尚又貴下ニ於テ、貴下ト日本側有カ者

國際檢察部 文書第四〇九二號

余ハ此、三月二十六日附リントロップ (RIBBENTROP)
 發東京宛ヤハハ号電報ノ直接複寫寫真ハ
 コロムビア區華府 陸軍省米國戰畧爆畧調査
 部 (Off. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Office
 of Secretariat of War) 級中ニ在ル縮小フィルムノ真正ナル
 寫真版ニシテ、コノ縮小フィルムハ在日米國東京系独逸
 國大使館ノ書類綴中ヨリ押收サル書類ヨリ作製
 セラレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス。

米國戰畧爆畧調査部情報課長

航空陸軍大尉、ウィリアム・エス・バーカー

(署名)

(William S. B. Curdy)

Exhibit No. 3819

I.P.S. Doc. No. 4092

譯者註 原本ハ鉛筆書キ下線アリタイププラネテ打ツル原ハハイキ書下線アリ

RETURN TO ROOM 311

公使ホルツ博士ニ対スル宗

暗号電報(秘密暗号法ニヨル)

一九四三年三月二十六日八時五十四分ベルリン發
一九四三年三月二十六日十九時十五分東京着
在東京大使館

三月二十六日附 第八七八号

要密綴格納 B号

直接大使へ

三月二十三日大島大使ト會談ノ際彼ニ對シテ西ノ情勢ハニ
付余ハ更ニ詳細ニ巨ル説明ヲ試ミタ。其際余ハ先ツ政ノ事
即チ露路西亞ニトリ現在ノ情勢ハ將ニ不利テアルコト英國
ハ事實政界指導ニ層ノ間ニ懸シ沈鬱對テ空気の流レテ
ナル事及ヒ合衆國ニテリテハ其鳴物入りノ軍滿ノ宣傳ト
共ニ大混乱ノ風靡キテナル等ノコトカウ話ヲ進メタ。所テ
敵側宣傳ハ我方ノ戰勝利用ヲ阻マント企圖スルニ於テハ
我々之ニ對抗シテ敵側地步ノ弱點ヲ刺ストコトヒテ利
用スルコト及ヒ本年ヲ理想制ニ得ル限リニ於テノ最大艦隊作
戰計畫ヲ実施スルコトカ益ニ緊要トスル。加逸ハ今年ノ中

二 兩路西亞ノ戦争ノ決定的要因タルコトヲ明瞭ニ示シテ
 三 然ラズニ場ニ追ヒ込ムヤリ(痛)確ニ工作ヲ進ムルコトヲウケ。次イテ
 四 將來更ニ我々ハ日本ト握チスルヲ近東ヘモ進出スルヲ企
 五 圖シテキル。日本モ亦ソ今日迄ニ存シテ戰果ノ保全ハ我等
 六 敵ヲ徹底的ニ潰滅セラルコトニ依テノミ確保ヲ期シ得ル
 七 以テテ立場ニ四圍コレテ居リ。隨テ又最少ク據テテ戦争ノ
 八 可及的運ケニ終局サカシタリ。三國同盟加盟國、今更ニ
 九 大胆ト軍事上ノ攻勢ヲ作戦ヲ試シヨハキクテ敵ノ現下
 一〇 弱勢ニ鑑ミテモ之ヲ敢行シ得ルコトヲ示シ。日本ハ日
 一一 為ニ安全ヲ計ルベキテアルトイフコト。及オーストラリアノ自
 一二 軍ヲ日復攻ノ基地タリ得テイテ。日本艦隊ハ印度洋ニ出
 一三 撃チシ、セイロンヲ略取シテマカスカルニ其地ヲ建設スルハ
 一四 テアルニト又ヒルハ完全ニ占領カレルトイフコトヲ余ハ自
 一五 考ヘ得ルコトアル。併シ全ク就中ハ浦塩及ヒハイカル湖ニカ
 一六 面ニ對スル日本軍ノ進出ノ持ニ重要ナルヲ持チモテアル
 一七 コトヲ信ズルモノテアル。