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harnessing their potential to combat terrorism**

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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**PAKISTAN'S LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES –
HARNESSING THEIR POTENTIAL TO COMBAT
TERRORISM**

by

Dilawar Khan

December 2008

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Robert O'Connell
Douglas A. Borer

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2008	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Pakistan's Law Enforcement Agencies - Harnessing their Potential to Combat Terrorism		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Dilawar Khan		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, the Pakistan Army or the Government of Pakistan .	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States of America embarked upon a massive global hunt for terrorists and launched "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan. Owing to its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as an ally of the U.S. in its war against terrorism. Terrorists, having been evicted from Kabul, found the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan an idyllic sanctuary to promote future terrorism. During this period, terrorists extended their activities to other parts of Pakistan. At various stages, Pakistan's Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), Federal and Provincial police, Frontier Constabulary, Levies, Frontier Corps and Rangers, were dovetailed into Pakistani Army operations against terrorists, but their ability to maintain security in their respective areas of responsibility has been questionable. They had neither conducted such operations anywhere in the past, nor were they sufficiently trained and equipped to produce a matching response to the terrorists' inventive and innovative techniques.</p> <p>Notwithstanding the sacrifices of troops employed against terrorists in Pakistan, it is extremely important to objectively review the LEAs' demonstrated training skills and combat worthiness in the country's ongoing counter terrorism campaign. This research focuses on appraising the existing infrastructure of Pakistan's LEAs and their potential to combat the menace of terrorism. Since Pakistan is currently fighting terrorism with the Army in a lead role, this thesis will emphasize the importance of enhancing the capabilities of LEAs other than the military to forestall, prevent, and effectively counter terrorists. The thesis emphasizes that the LEAs of Pakistan are a linchpin in the maintenance of law and order in the country, and their restructuring, training and funding ought to be a priority for the Pakistani government. It also lays down a comprehensive set of requisite and pragmatic recommendations for the up gradation of LEAs, which can transform these law enforcing bodies into an invincible security mechanism against the looming threat of multifaceted terrorism in Pakistan.</p>			
14. SUBJECT TERMS LEAs, Pakistan, Terrorism, FATA, Response Parameters, Reorganization, Training Methodology, Outlook of the LEAs, Execution Plan			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 125
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

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**PAKISTAN'S LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES – HARNESSING THEIR
POTENTIAL TO COMBAT TERRORISM**

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Requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States of America embarked upon a massive global hunt for terrorists and launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. Owing to its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as an ally of the U.S. in its war against terrorism. Terrorists, having been evicted from Kabul, found the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan an idyllic sanctuary to promote future terrorism. During this period, terrorists extended their activities to other parts of Pakistan. At various stages, Pakistan’s Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), Federal and Provincial police, Frontier Constabulary, Levies, Frontier Corps and Rangers, were dovetailed into Pakistani Army operations against terrorists, but their ability to maintain security in their respective areas of responsibility has been questionable. They had neither conducted such operations anywhere in the past, nor were they sufficiently trained and equipped to produce a matching response to the terrorists’ inventive and innovative techniques.

Notwithstanding the sacrifices of troops employed against terrorists in Pakistan, it is extremely important to objectively review the LEAs’ demonstrated training skills and combat worthiness in the country’s ongoing counter terrorism campaign. This research focuses on appraising the existing infrastructure of Pakistan’s LEAs and their potential to combat the menace of terrorism. Since Pakistan is currently fighting terrorism with the Army in a lead role, this thesis will emphasize the importance of enhancing the capabilities of LEAs other than the military to forestall, prevent, and effectively counter terrorists. The thesis emphasizes that the LEAs of Pakistan are a linchpin in the maintenance of law and order in the country, and their restructuring, training and funding ought to be a priority for the Pakistani government. It also lays down a comprehensive set of requisite and pragmatic recommendations for the up gradation of LEAs, which can transform these law enforcing bodies into an invincible security mechanism against the looming threat of multifaceted terrorism in Pakistan.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe my special gratitude to the God Almighty for his benevolence in making my stay at Monterey, California, a highly beneficial and remarkably blissful experience. I give my personal thanks to my wonderful wife, Uzma Dilawar, my lovely sons, Tayyab and Haider, and my precious daughter, Alisha for their unremitting support throughout the completion of this thesis. They have always been soothing companions and a great source of inspiration and encouragement.

I am indebted to the Pakistan Army for offering me this great learning opportunity at one of the supreme U.S. institutions: The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. I really appreciate the efforts of the Department Head, Professor Gordon McCormick, and all the staff and faculty members of the Defense Analysis Department, who have been a great contributors to and continuous supporters of my education at NPS.

I thank my thesis advisors, Professor Robert O'Connell and Professor Douglas Borer, for their exceptional guidance, encouragement, and direction in formulating my research work. Moreover, I have special appreciation for Dawn Dewaele for her outstanding support in editing this thesis. I also extend my thanks to all the writers whose works I have used in the thesis. Finally, I dedicate this research work to my father, who has been a great strength of my life and alas passed away during my stay in the United States.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

According to Clausewitz, “*Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions.*”¹ The credibility of this assertion stands the test of contemporary times. In the last few years, warfare’s spectrum has seen drastic changes. Unconventional warfare remains the focus of belligerents to achieve desired objectives, while conventional warfare has been relegated to backstage. Amongst numerous facets of unconventional warfare, terrorism is the most dreaded one in all its forms and manifestations. The existing spate of terrorist activities around the globe has brought about not only socio-cultural changes but has also invoked a need to formulate appropriate responses. Therefore, many developed countries have placed a host of available resources at the disposal of their Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to combat this menace in a befitting manner.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States of America embarked upon a massive global hunt for terrorists and launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan.² Owing to its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as an ally of the U.S. in its war against terrorism. Having been evicted from Afghanistan after the cleansing of Tora Bora, terrorists found the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA)³ in general, and South Waziristan Agency, in particular, idyllic sanctuaries to promote their future terrorism. Some major accounts of terrorism inside mainland Pakistan were also traced back to these tribal areas. Under such circumstances, the Government of Pakistan found no other option than to deny use of its tribal belt to foreign

¹ Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peace Building*, http://www.amazon.com/gp/search?index=blended&keywords=every%20age%20has%20its%20own%20kind%20of%20war&_encoding=UTF8 (accessed August 2, 2008).

² U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: August 19, 2002, “Diplomatic Support for Operation Enduring Freedom,” <http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12805.htm> (accessed July 14, 2008).

³ Constitution of Pakistan, “Chapter 3: Tribal Areas,” http://www.nrb.pk/constitutional_andlegal/constitution/part12.ch3.html (accessed June 13, 2008).

terrorists and their local sympathizers for conducting terrorist attacks in the Pakistani mainland and neighbouring countries. Pakistan's Army was employed to undertake the task of countering terrorism since the government had no other trained forces available to conduct such difficult operations in that inhospitable terrain.

Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)⁴ including Federal and Provincial Police, Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Corps, and Rangers were dovetailed into Army operations at various stages, but their performance in maintaining security in their respective areas of responsibility has been questionable.⁵ They had neither practiced nor conducted such operations anywhere in the past, nor were they sufficiently trained and equipped to produce a matching response to the innovative techniques being used by terrorists.

Moreover, the gaining and processing of intelligence saw new dimensions in the tribal environment along Pak-Afghan border. The Army and LEAs learned useful lessons, albeit the hard way, and succeeded, eventually, in attaining some of the desired objectives of counter terrorism campaign. Notwithstanding the sacrifices of troops deployed near the Afghanistan border in Operation Al Mizan,⁶ it is extremely important to review LEAs' demonstrated training skills and intelligence expertise to learn pertinent lessons for the ongoing fight against militancy in FATA, and to prepare for identical scenarios in future.

The fight against terrorism is now the first and overriding priority of the LEAs in Pakistan. All components of government machinery ought to devote all resources necessary to disrupt, weaken, and eliminate the infrastructure of terrorist organizations, to

⁴ Ikram Azam, *Pakistan's Security and National Integration: A Study in Opinions and Points of View* (Rawalpindi: London Book Co., 1974).

⁵ U.S. Department of State, "FY 2005 Performance Summary (The Plan)," <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfplan/2005/html/29303.htm> (accessed August 5, 2008).

⁶ The operations being conducted by Pakistan's armed forces against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the north-western part of the country have been codenamed as; "Operation Al-Mizan" which started in 2001 and presently about 100,000 troops of Pakistan are deployed in areas adjacent to Afghanistan border. Summary of terrorist activities for October 2007 at following link indicate the complexity of environment under which Pakistan's forces are operating, http://www.ipcs.org/Oct_07_terrorismPakistan.pdf (accessed June 26, 2008).

prevent or thwart terrorist attacks and to bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts. The unified objective of all LEAs should be to take terrorists off the streets using every available resource.

B. PURPOSE

Today, the northwestern areas of Pakistan (FATA) are allegedly considered safe havens for Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. Many top-ranking officials in the current U.S. administration and Afghan government believe that the terrorists based in those areas are responsible for the continuous unrest in Afghanistan. They also believe they are capable of embarking upon a high-profile 9/11 type terrorist venture in U.S. or elsewhere.⁷ In the wake of such presumptions, the role of Pakistan is considered the most crucial amongst all allies of the U.S. in the ongoing global war on terror.

The LEAs of Pakistan are expected to wipe out the terrorism from her northwestern areas by making sure that no safe haven exists for terrorists, and no attack in Afghanistan takes place with the support of Pakistani Taliban from that region. The Pakistani government has frequently drawn attention to the very difficult terrain along Pak-Afghan border, the complex operational and logistical environments being confronted by her security forces, and the very limited capabilities of her LEAs, other than armed forces, to perform duties in those inhospitable areas, but mostly U.S. and other international players engaged in the GWOT question the will of the Pakistan government instead of correctly evaluating the capacity of its LEAs.

⁷ Anwar Iqbal, "Next 9/11 to come from FATA: U.S. General," *The Dawn: Internet Edition*, May 23, 2008, <http://dawn.com/2008/05/23/top3.htm> (accessed August 1, 2008).



Figure 1. Map showing Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas⁸

Based mainly on the qualitative method, the purpose of this thesis is to illustrate a comprehensive account of all contours associated with the organization and existing capabilities of Pakistan's LEAs and to carry out an objective analysis of their performance fighting terrorism in the recent past.

The thesis initially develops a conceptual framework highlighting the importance of combating terrorism through police and intelligence operations by local LEAs rather than military forces. Then, it focuses on all of the security agencies of Pakistan, other than the conventional armed forces. It endeavors to analyze the role played, so far, by different LEAs in combating terrorism, highlight grey areas in their performance and suggest changes in roles, tasks, organization, equipment and training to enable them to deal effectively with the menace of terrorism. Lessons learned from a few relevant cases,

⁸ Map showing areas on either side of the Pak-Afghan border.
<http://search.msn.com/images/results.aspx?q=map+of+Fata&FORM=BIRE#focal=9a5b824f7a4e6066c69299b95b080c6e&furl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.longwarjournal.org%2Fmaps%2Fpakistan-map-FATA-NWFP.jpg> (accessed July 25, 2008).

like British LEAs' response to overcoming Irish Republic Army and Malayan Insurgency as well as ongoing counter terrorist campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, form part of the thesis. This may, in turn, support the rationale for the suggested course of action for Pakistan's LEAs.

The research will benefit Pakistan's LEAs in their efforts, already underway with the assistance of USA,⁹ to improve their capability to generate an effective and appropriate response to any future terrorist threats. Understanding the role of Pakistan's LEAs in the region and their current limitations may also be valuable to readers interested in South Asia's security developments.

⁹ Randeep Ramesh, "U.S. to Deploy Training Troops in Pakistan," *The Guardian*, March 4 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/04/pakistan.usa> (accessed August 5, 2008).

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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF FIGHTING TERRORISM- MILITARY VERSUS LEAS

War is not an effective answer to ending terrorism, but rather will entrap us in a spiral of violence. War will never change people's hearts. The use of violence in responding to terrorism would give rise to the permanent use of violence.¹⁰

Walter Altmann

A. INTRODUCTION

The 9/11 terrorists' attacks on World Trade Center have perhaps changed the world forever. The subsequent U.S. declaration of a Global War on Terror (GWOT) has given new meaning to various conflicts around the world. Consequently, the phenomenon of "terrorism¹¹" has manifested itself more fiercely than its previous waves.¹² The use of the military to fight this wave of terrorism has been a debatable issue since its planning stage. With every passing day, more questions are emerging about military's efficacy in dealing with terrorism in a cogent and appropriate manner.

After 9/11, most U.S. policy makers consented to relying on the use of the military against terrorists, and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were the consequences. Another school of thought is of the opinion that direct military action is never the best option to deal with this menace, because it is perpetrated by non-state actors who are hiding in different parts of the world and are deeply disguised within the public. This viewpoint suggests that an indirect police cum intelligence operation by LEAs might prove more beneficial to counter terrorism in the longer term than opting for

¹⁰ Harry Kawilarang, Quotations on Terrorism, Trafford Publishing's Web Bookstore, <http://www.trafford.com/4dcgi/robots/03-2212.html> (accessed June 11, 2008).

¹¹ Soliman M. Santos, "Wanted: A Legal Definition of Terrorism," <http://www.i-p-o.org/terrorism-legal-definition.htm> (accessed June 12, 2008).

¹² David C. Rapport, *Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, <http://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Critical-Concepts-Political-Science/dp/0415316502> (accessed August 5 2008).

quick fixes through military operations. A recent report by Rand Corporation on ‘How Terrorist Groups End’ strongly suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism.¹³

Empirical evidence, at least prima-facie, provides a mixed account of the military’s effectiveness dealing with terrorism. In a few cases, military operations arguably lead to reasonable success, as Peru’s military in Shining Path,¹⁴ Indian military in fighting Kashmiries, or the Sri Lankan army against Tamil Tigers (LTTE). However, most of the success in these cases hinged upon lessons learned from the military’s use and resultant transformation of strategies that were more in line with LEAs’ way of tackling terrorists.

In many other cases, use of the military against non-state actors/terrorists has proven catastrophic. The British Army against the IRA, the French and U.S. militaries in Vietnam (1950s and 1960s), Pakistan’s armed forces in FATA¹⁵ since 2001, and present U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq stand testimony to this point. This part of the thesis attempts to investigate the causes and consequences associated with a reliance on the military to fight terrorism and why the military becomes a problem rather than a solution to the campaign of counter terrorism.

B. DEFINING TERMS

Before specifically discussing the academic issues of employment of LEAs versus the military, it is appropriate to explain the meanings of the terms used in the subsequent paragraphs. The *use of military* means the employment of armed forces to carry out a full-fledged military operation against terrorists/insurgents. The military commands on

¹³ Rand Corporation, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaida,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9351/index1.html (accessed August 5, 2008).

¹⁴ History World Index Research, History of Peru, <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=919&HistoryID=aa91> (accessed June 9, 2008).

the ground are the major decision makers and control all tiers of the operations. The police/LEAs, if any, work under direct authority of the military command and are insignificant to the overall strategy of the campaign.

The *use of LEAs*¹⁶ implies that police and intelligence agencies are undertaking operations both overtly and covertly. The major reliance in this case is on use of local law enforcement and intelligence agencies, who mainly conduct their operations indirectly through close collaboration with the public, based on the formula of working, “by, with and through.”

Terrorism, as mentioned earlier, is yet to be unanimously and unambiguously defined.¹⁷ For this paper, however, *terrorism* refers to the violent activities of non-state actors and organizations like Al-Qaeda and other like-minded religiously charged groups. Although a brief mention of terrorist activities linked to other faiths/religions will come up as a case reference, this thesis will focus on the terrorism perpetrated by the Islamist terrorist organizations.

C. MILITARY VERSUS LEAS – EMPLOYMENT IMPLICATIONS

The application of the military to fight terrorism is a double-edged sword. On one side, if applied sparingly and intelligently, it may accrue tangible benefits and create conditions for further progression by other means. On the flip side, however, it often becomes a part of the problem itself. It is worthwhile to compare a few aspects regarding the use of the military and LEAs in fighting terrorism, their causes, conduct and consequences that affect terrorist networks and the overall campaign against terrorism.

All militant organizations have a natural tendency to split, as they are not flexible enough to accommodate the contradictory views of different factions. This is more relevant in case of religious groups, who believe their respective viewpoint comes from

¹⁵ John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., May 20, 2008, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/2008/105041.htm> (accessed June 18, 2008).

¹⁶ The Free Dictionary by Farlex, Definition of Law Enforcement Agencies, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/law+enforcement+agency> (accessed on June 13, 2008)

¹⁷ Soliman M. Santos, “Wanted: A Legal Definition of Terrorism,” <http://www.i-p-o.org/terrorism-legal-definition.htm> (accessed June 12, 2008).

divine guidance and any alternative to their interpretation of religion is beyond compromise. For instance, the advocates of jihad against near enemy and far enemy opposed each other in the 1990s and a clear split was experienced in jihadist groups after the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan.¹⁸

The employment of the military to fight such organizations stops the process of fissuring, and instead brings these groups, which are otherwise diverging in their philosophy and agenda, together. This forced convergence is mainly based on the notion of self-defense against a common enemy, rather than the individual group's religious ideology.¹⁹ Hence, the use of long-term military operations does not divide the enemy; it unifies them. For instance, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan were reportedly never as close before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as they have since become.²⁰

Figure 1 presents a diagrammatic comparison of operations by military and LEAs and their effects on terrorist groups/organizations. The terrorist groups (Figure 1a) who have independent identities and different agendas (at times conflicting with each other) are grouped together by a military action. As a result, the military fights its war against the synergetic effort of a unified enemy rather than individual small groups (Figure 1b). Conversely, LEAs adopt separate strategies for each group and fight with smaller factions of the enemy (Figure 1c). Adopting different strategies for each group allows for more chances of success.




Figure 2. Diagrammatic layout of Military and LEAs employment

¹⁸ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Pennsylvania: University Press, 2004), 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁰ Alain Roussillon, *The International Spectator*, vol. 37, Issue 1, January 2002, 35-45, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a792749558~db=all> (accessed June 18, 2008).

Military organizations have a unique culture of strict discipline and blind obedience along with a non-sentimental approach to the conduct of operations.²¹ All ranks and cadre in the military are well accustomed to this said way of life. Over a period of service, it gets engraved in their minds creating an inside-the-box thinking paradigm, especially since they spend much of their time at bases/cantonments in environments which are much different than remote areas. Thus, military men and women are bound to face difficulties in grasping various facets of the local culture/environments where operations against terrorists are conducted. Similarly, the intimate collaboration of military forces with local police and other LEAs is often difficult to achieve because of their opposing operational methods, different mindsets, and unmatched approaches to solve particular problems.

The problem becomes more profound if the military of one pursues terrorists in a part of the world that has different cultural dynamics. Lack of understanding of the local traditions and cultural complexities offends the neutral population, and by default, military forces get much less support from the local population.²² LEAs, however, have a reasonable representation of personnel who are well acquainted with local environments, and they adopt more logical and local friendly approaches to get support from the neutral component of the society, which helps deny passive support to the terrorists. In this context, Gordon McCormick's following model of counter insurgency, the "Mystic Diamond" strongly supports the employment of LEAs.²³

²¹ Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Military Culture and Ethics, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c5e.htm> (accessed June 12, 2008).

²² Support from local population is a significant component of the strategy to win against any insurgency as per Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond taught at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. According to this model, the State is required to win the population to provide information about the terrorists, while simultaneously countering the terrorists' influence on the population. LEAs, unlike the military, have mostly permanent presence in towns/villages, therefore they can have much better human intelligence to help approach population as well as penetrate terror networks.

²³ Ibid.




Figure 3. Mystic Diamond model by Gordon McCormick²⁴

Unlike LEAs, which have a well orchestrated intelligence mechanism in local areas (mostly rural, underdeveloped and remote), the military faces great difficulties in establishing links with locals and recruiting competent agents who can provide accurate and timely human intelligence. Unavailability of human intelligence is often a major cause of the failure of military operations against terrorists.²⁵ This problem is further compounded by the frequent rotation of military units. With every rotation, the process is restarted, making it less cost effective.

Most of the areas accessible to terrorists, like remote areas in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have traditional tribal cultures. These cultures are very hostile to any sense of military invasion. The locals often perceive military

²⁴ Picture presents various nodes and loops of the “Mystic Diamond” model along with their relationship. The model was constructed by Bruce Defeyer, a fellow student at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA for a joint project with the author.

²⁵ Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, *Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 153.

action in their areas as either an occupation of their land, or at the very least a major interference in their way of life. Consequently, they resist it regardless of its purpose. This notion of resisting occupation is applicable even when the military operations are conducted by the host country's own armed forces; therefore, foreign forces are even less acceptable to the local people. The perception of occupation of the Muslim Ummah's land by the Western forces in Afghanistan and Iraq has given rise to the idea of transnational jihad on the same lines with an addition of religious flavor to it.

Another important issue regarding the use of military to fight terrorism is that it circumvents the role of LEAs or local security apparatus. The LEAs, which are mostly netted into the local population, become defunct as the military commanders plan and execute operations in a conventional military way, and unconventional, low profile operations by the police and intelligence mechanisms are not employed.. This entanglement of the conventional military mindset and isolated approach ruins the potential benefits, which the existing infrastructure already established by police and other LEAs, can accrue. The military starts interaction with locals afresh every time, and that wastes time and effort. Conversely, the terrorist organizations can exploit the locals claiming to be flag bearers of resistance against occupation by the military. That argument is convincing and easy to justify with a large number of foreign boots on ground.

The military operations are also high profile media events. With the great leap forward in today's global technology, each and every military action is closely monitored by the razor-sharp eyes of the media. Some of the soldiers' intended/unintended abuse of civilians, especially women, children and prisoners, brought to light by the media, adversely affects the overall struggle to counter terrorism. The media reports showing extreme mistreatment of prisoners by soldiers at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay are the cases in point.²⁶ The recent event of a soldier using Quran for a target practice²⁷ in

²⁶ The Online News Hour, "Report Details Alleged Abuse of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib Detainees," http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/jan-june08/detainees_06-18.html (accessed June 19, 2008).

²⁷ "Global Intifada, U.S. Soldier Uses Quran for a Target Practice," <http://jinnzaman.hadithuna.com/us-soldier-uses-quran-for-target-practice/> (accessed June 19, 2008).

Iraq adversely affected the goodwill earned by U.S. forces there, and the highest commander of the force had to apologize. In the eyes of Muslims worldwide, this incident damaged the legitimacy U.S. military operations in Iraq.

Erosion of civil liberty is yet another problem created by the use of the military to deal with terrorists.²⁸ The terrorists are always hard to identify among the population in the areas of operation. According to Mao's well-worn dictum, insurgents must be like fish swimming in the "water" of general population.²⁹ The military operators, with very little ingress into the local area, face great difficulty clearly in recognizing the terrorists within the population. In the garb of terrorists, innocent people are arrested without proof of crime, put in military prisons indefinitely, unlawfully manhandled and, at times, killed by mistake or collateral fire. Such events create a critical disadvantage for the military operations against terrorists. They assist the terrorist organizations, who take advantage of the situation and augment their membership from the affected population. Consequently, the military force becomes a source of an increasing number of enemies, which hinders the effort to counter terrorism.

The employment of the military against terrorists commits the forces inextricably and an exit strategy becomes difficult. While fighting against small cells of non-state actors, it is unimaginable to assume that military forces will be able to eliminate all of them. Therefore, the issue of victory or defeat in war becomes debatable. The military forces generally struggle to define a moment when they can declare that the assigned mission has been fulfilled, and they can emerge as a winner. Similarly, any change in the strategy of war being fought by the military is not easy to bring about. LEAs on the other hand, can inaudibly alter their way of fighting and bring prudent changes to their strategy based upon experiences during previous stages of the campaign. They can even extricate partially or completely without a huge concern for national pride related to success or defeat in the war.

²⁸ Philip B. Heymann, *Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning without War* (Library of Congress cataloging-in-Publication Data, 2003), 87.

²⁹ The Economist, "Briefing Fighting Insurgents," October 27, 2007, 36.

D. USE OF MILITARY REINFORCES TERRORISTS' RATIONALE

When debating if the employment of the military is a solution or a problem when dealing with today's terrorists, it is critical to determine the effects on the proclaimed terrorists' rationale of the ongoing war. The Islamic militants, at least transnational jihadists, justify their war against apostates through the notion of religious ideology that can be sub-divided into two components: the concept of cosmic war theory³⁰ and self-defense against occupation of the Muslim lands (Dar-ul-Islam versus Dar-ul-Harab).³¹ The subsequent paragraphs explain both components of the ideology and the impact of military operations on them.

Mark Juergensmeyer articulated "Cosmic War" theory, which provides a conceptual framework for examining the larger-than-life confrontations in which religious extremists are often engaged.³² This concept refers to the metaphysical battle between the forces of Good and Evil that enlivens the religious imagination and compels violent action.³³ Many militant Muslims groups and individuals consider U.S. military operations against Islam an ideal setting for the implementation of the cosmic war theory.

The cosmic war has several defining characteristics, which can justify any extreme act by individuals or organizations, including suicide in the name of defending religion.³⁴ For instance, Islamists and Al-Qaeda's networks have placed their struggle against secularism, perceived Western domination, and the United States, in a cosmic context. This context animates and elevates their struggle giving it the authority of the

³⁰ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Los Angeles/Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1999), 145.

³¹ Syed Qutb, "A Muslim Belief and Nationality by Syed Qutb," <http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/politics/nationalism.htm> (accessed June 10, 2008).

³² Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Los Angeles/Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1999), 145.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

divine to fight against forces of non-believers. Therefore, according to all participants, fighting against U.S. military forces is a religious obligation, and the outcome of their fight is preordained; Islam in its purity will prevail.³⁵

Complimentary to the cosmic war notion, the perception of being under physical occupation by U.S. military forces is fundamental to very cause of the Islamists' struggle. The origin of Al-Qaeda and like-minded transnational jihadi organizations in 1980s was based on the notion that a Muslim country, namely Afghanistan, was under the occupation of Soviet forces, and all members of the Ummah should help oust the apostate forces from the Muslim land. This was also the first significant instance in Muslim history that fighters from different nation states gathered in the name of ideology (defensive Jihad of Ummah against occupiers of the Muslim Land) and fought with the belief in the Ummah's struggle against non-believers.

The rationale of fighting against occupation took off in a new direction once the U.S. attacked Iraq in 1991. That attack on a Muslim country, as well as, the Saudi Government's permission to base U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, provided jihadists a new enemy in the occupation of the most sacred Muslim place, that is the holy land of two mosques.³⁶ Most terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda over the next ten years (1990s) were based on the plea that the holy land was under the occupation of U.S. military forces. Similarly, since the 9/11 attacks, the Islamist rationale for terrorism has been the U.S. military's occupation of Muslim countries, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. This has served as a magnet for *jihadi* groups on an unprecedented level.³⁷

The Muslim perception of occupation persists to date, in a more profound form due to a protracted military presence of U.S. and allied forces in Muslim countries. The large flocks of foreign fighters and suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly illustrate the trend. It can be argued at this stage that the use of the military helped

³⁵ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Los Angeles/Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1999), 145.

³⁶ Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans, Document published by FBIS (London, 1996), 1-12.

³⁷ Julian Madson, "The Rationale of Suicide Terrorism," <http://www.risq.org/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=367> (accessed June 1, 2008).

facilitate rationalizing the terrorists' stance. In the absence of the U.S. military in Muslim countries, it might have been hard for terrorist organizations to justify violent acts amongst their sympathizers according to the concept of religious ideology per se. Therefore, it is fair to assume that use of the U.S. and allied militaries for counter terrorism is the contributory factor that justifies the terrorists' rationale in the eyes of moderate Muslims.

It is still inconclusive whether the U.S. strategy in the GWOT (by use of military) is achieving the objectives set for it. However, the continuous rise in the number of suicide attacks and the casualties of military and civilians indicates how the strategy of this war is reinforcing terrorists' rationale. A summary of major military activities since the start of the GWOT and corresponding rationale drawn by the terrorists are shown in Table 1.

Event in GWOT	Rationale of Militant Muslims
1. 9/11 Attacks on World Trade Center	Conspiracy ³⁸ against Muslims masterminded to create a raison d'être for U.S. occupation of oil/gas rich Muslim states and defeat the biggest force in the World- <i>The Islam</i> .
2. U.S. and Allies' attack on Afghanistan in 2001	Confirmation of the notion that U.S. wanted to attack the Islamic world militarily, and they have started in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime that implemented Sharia in the country.
3. Iraq's invasion in 2003 based on WMD and Saddam's link to Al-Qaeda	Further solidifying the suspicion that the U.S. wants to decapitate all major Muslim countries, based on fear of Islam's future in the world, and take control of the oil rich Middle East.
4. Failure to find WMD in Iraq and continuing use of the military	Unfolding of the U.S. falsehood attached to the military occupation of Iraq and continuous exploitation of Muslim oil, all while causing great damage to lives and properties of the Muslim population.
5. Reports on military plans to divide Iraq (three parts) to avoid civil war	U.S. causing a division of Muslim a country. They have created instability through military operations for access to precious oil, while dividing the Muslims into sects to weaken them as Ummah.

³⁸ Most of the deductions are based on the author's experience serving in Asia and Middle East, influenced by interaction with a wide variety of the Muslim community.

Event in GWOT	Rationale of Militant Muslims
6. The role of allied militaries in the GWOT	Pursuit of their own interests in the shape of assistance from U.S. or benefiting from local resources of occupied countries.
7. The Role of Muslim allies in the GWOT	They are apostates too, coalesced with west to protect their own political interests for ruling the Muslim lands illegitimately.
8. Collateral damage by military actions	Killing of innocent people without any sympathy to Muslim blood must be fought by all Muslims as self-defense.
9. Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib Jail	Ultimate disrespect for human values in military prisons , which in contrast, is very commonly preached in the West for own people
10. Suicide Attacks killing dozens of people	The only and best option to perform Jihad against an otherwise strong West and its allied militaries, and liberate Muslim lands. Moreover, a better way to die honorably (martyrdom) than to live an appalling life or die uselessly at the hands of the U.S. military.

Table 1. A summary of major military activities since the start of the GWOT

E. CAUSATIVE ASPECTS TO USE OF MILITARY

The argument in the preceding paragraphs indicates that use of LEAs (instead of the military) is a better option for fighting terrorism. Nevertheless, many countries in the world resort to the employment of the military for this task. At present, other than U.S. forces, many other countries are fighting terrorism with their military forces. Some examples include Pakistan's deployment of forces in FATA, the Indian army in Kashmir, Israel against Palestine, Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers, Philippines against (the) Abu Sayyaf Group,³⁹ and Thailand against Muslim terrorists in its southern provinces.⁴⁰ This part of the thesis identifies the reasons for the preference to use of military forces to counter terrorism.

³⁹ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Many countries in the world, especially under-developed/developing ones, do not have proficient police and LEAs to deal with terrorists effectively. The only option for such states is the employment of their military, which has more resources and comparatively better equipment and training. Unless such countries improve the capacity of their LEAs, they do not have a suitable alternative to the use of the military for fighting terrorism. Hence, it is an issue of lack of options for most of the states in the world. The U.S., however, had both options to choose from at the start of the GWOT and opted for the use of the military.

The gigantic size and huge conventional capability of the military forces mislead the policy makers; tempting them by promising the quick elimination of terrorists through sheer mass, as opposed to the slower more laborious appearing route of LEAs. In reaction to high profile terrorist activity, such as the spectacular 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers, the government comes under intense pressure from the domestic public to respond in kind. Low profile LEAs operations, which are characterized as unseen and unheard, do not fulfill such public expectations. They rather appear as inactivity and a lack of decision making power on the part of the current regime and leaders. In such a situation, the decision makers in the country feel bound to resort to military use against terrorists for the immediate satisfaction of the domestic population.

The theoretical concept of handling a counter insurgency with the initial use of the military followed by reconstruction from other agencies of the state frequently proves misleading when put into practice. After the military action starts, the lines between the military action phase and reconstruction phase of the campaign gets confusingly blurred. Hence, extrication of the military without a clearly visible victory becomes difficult. Their operations continue for a protracted period in contradiction to the initial plan. For instance, the clear identification of the planned and projected phases of the U.S. attack on Iraq between the Department of Defense and the State Department is still a question mark after five years of the war.⁴¹

⁴¹ "Phases of Iraq War," *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/iraq/iraq_phases.html (accessed June 19, 2008).

The initial strategy for fighting terrorism, at least conceptually, envisages the cohabiting of military and other security agencies in the area of operation and the execution of their respective roles simultaneously.⁴² However, soon after the commencement of operations, military commanders assume authority over all other agencies, marginalizing their critical roles over a period of time. This conventional military way of working transforms an otherwise a fairly integrated strategy for all agencies into a pure military operation. For example, during the fight against the IRA, the initial overwhelming presence and operations of England's military in Ireland averted any chance of negotiations with the insurgents. This was later addressed through a change of strategy. At present, the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq has similarly overshadowed the international agencies under the UN, U.S. agencies under the State Department and Non Governmental Organizations working there.

The political leaders have a specific tenure in a democratic system of government, and they yearn for the resolution of all problems at hand within their term. The use of the military with intent to produce speedy results against terrorism is therefore an attractive option to meet their political agendas. They cannot afford to rely on a long-term approach like the employment of LEAs, which does not bring visible and tangible results within their tenure. Their desire to magnetize the voters in the next election, based on success in a particular war on terrorism, obliges them to use the military.

⁴² Country Study Paper, India, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/csp/07.pdf (accessed June 18, 2008).

III. DIMENSION OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

A. DEFINITION

The word “terror” is derived from the Latin expression “terrere,”⁴³ which means, “to frighten.” Webster’s English Dictionary defines terrorism as the use of violence committed by a group in order to intimidate or coerce a population or government into granting their political demands.⁴⁴ However, finding a commonly accepted definition of terrorism is difficult, because it has constantly shifted and expanded its meaning and usage in a long chain of conflicts. Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining terrorism unanimously, few of the commonalities in almost all the definitions are as follows.

- It is a political act that is executed in diverse forms and manifestations
- It includes the use or threat of violence
- It intends to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims

In the context of Pakistan, defining today’s terrorism is even more complicated and problematic. Pakistan is a country, which was created in the name of Islam. However it is struggling to clearly delineate boundaries between the functionalities of the state and role of religion. More than half of the population is illiterate and living in under-developed areas with dogmatic socio-religious traditions and customs.⁴⁵ Stressed socio-economic environments and misguided cultural and religious connections make a fairly large part of the society easy prey for any radical interpretation of the religious values expounded by orthodox or extremist religious leaders. The radicalized groups of people then take the law into their own hands and create very complex law and order situation for the state.

⁴³ Edwin Post, *Latin at Sight, with an Introduction, Suggestions for Sight-Reading, and Selections for Practice* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1894), 41.

⁴⁴ Webster’s Online Dictionary, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/terrorism> (accessed September 12, 2008).

⁴⁵ Aamir Latif, “Alarming Situation of Education in Pakistan,” *Press International Report*, http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/know_sharing/grassroots_stories/pakistan_2.shtml (accessed September 29, 2008).

The existing capacity of the security infrastructure in the country to efficiently deal with such bewildered segments of the population is deplorable. In addition to the said domestic difficulties, repercussions from the flawed dimensions of the U.S./allies' counter-terrorist strategy, including abuses to prisoners, human rights violations, and the killing of innocent people by collateral damage in Muslim countries, add fuel to the fire. Based on the perceived notion that the GWOT is a war against Islam and substantiated by the above mentioned incidents, recruitment for terrorists groups has increased dramatically in the name of religion. In such a complicated scenario, it becomes really difficult to identify who is a terrorist and who is not. Consequently, even after the seventh anniversary of the terrorists' attacks on the World Trade Center, the meanings of terrorism are still debated by many Muslims around the World, and Pakistani society stands exceptionally divided on it.

B. PREVALENT THREAT ASSESSMENT

Presently, Pakistan is perceived as one of the most likely breeding grounds for Muslim terrorists.⁴⁶ With every passing day, terrorist activities within the country are on the rise, and it is taking dozens of innocent lives, destroying the state's infrastructure and challenging the writ of the government. Such a deteriorating situation in Pakistan and its effects on global peace demand a dispassionate threat assessment to identify the areas of concern and come up with an appropriate solution. The emergence of terrorism in Pakistan can be attributed to a host of contributory factors, broadly divided in two categories: Internal and External. Subsequent paragraphs present a brief account of these categories.

1. Internal Threats

The various internal threats presently faced by Pakistan include the following.

⁴⁶ Vijay Sappani, "Pakistan and Terrorism," September 20, 2008, http://www.intentblog.com/archives/2008/09/pakistan_and_te.html (accessed September 29, 2008).

a. *Failure to Meet Expectations from the Islamic System*

Before the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the Muslim nation in United India struggled for the creation of a country in the name of Islam.⁴⁷ Religion was the uniting and rallying force for the Muslims and it formed an ideological base for the new country. Muslims, who were living miserably in the United India and were repressed by Hindu majority in almost all walks of the life, had huge expectations for the creation of a separate Muslim country.⁴⁸ They anticipated that enforcement of Islamic order would lead to numerous benefits in their lives.⁴⁹ They also expected that an independent Muslim country would fulfill the will of the nation, establish a just social order devoid of exploitation, safeguard human rights, and above all strengthen religious ideology as the basis of the nationhood.

However, the creation of Pakistan could never meet their expectations. The country could neither appropriately dovetail religious customs into the functioning of the state nor could it offer a comprehensive alternative social system to meet the gigantic expectations of its public. The consequent disenchantment from the state, especially among the religiously influenced groups of the society, resulted in religious intolerance. This has become a source of emotional outbursts capable of leading to terrorist activities and the killing of innocent people. Such terrorist acts are common in the country today.

b. *Defective System of Education*

The prevalent education system in Pakistan was introduced by the British rulers to train the civil workers of the colony for various jobs under their rule.⁵⁰ After the Independence of Pakistan, the educational system could not be tailored effectively to meet the requirements of an independent Islamic state. To this day, many sections of the

⁴⁷ Peter Blood, ed. *Pakistan: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress), 1994, <http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/> (accessed September 29, 2008).

⁴⁸ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: Fifty years of Nationhood* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 218.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Peter Blood, ed. *Pakistan: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress), 1994, <http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/> (accessed September 29, 2008).

society, particularly in remote areas of Baluchistan and Frontier Provinces including the FATA, resist enrolling their kids into mainstream public schools, labeling them as too secular and non-Islamic. As an alternative, they send their children to religious schools for education under perceived Islamic guidance. The enrollment in religious schools is further facilitated by the scarcity of public schools in the rapidly growing population of the country. The shortage of mainstream schools is filled by a large number of religious schools that are not registered with the government.⁵¹ Some of these religious schools commonly known as Madrassahs⁵² are reputed to brainwash their students, help them become extremists or radicals and encourage them to join terrorist organizations.⁵³

c. *Regional Disparities and Ethnic/Sectarian Polarization*

In Pakistan, disparities among various regions based on culture and language, along with a sharp ethnic and sectarian divide, are significant causative features of the emergence and growth of terrorism in the country.⁵⁴ A sense of deprivation among the small provinces, a feeling of social injustice in many parts of the country and discrimination against certain classes of the society are manifest of this frustrating trend.⁵⁵ Some of these internal polarizing issues, along with external factors like the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Jihad against the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and the present sectarian situation in the Middle East have brought Shia-Sunni strife into sharp focus in Pakistan. Resultantly, the sectarian clashes are spreading throughout the country, further complicating the issues of religious bigotry and terrorism. Therefore, it is fair to believe that regional inequality and polarization built on ethnic and sectarian lines are playing a part in complicating the issue of terrorism in the country.

⁵¹ Ahmad Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (Penguin Group (USA), 2008), 236.

⁵² Madrassah is the Arabic word that refers to any type of school, secular or religious. For this research, the word refers to the Islamic religious seminaries in Pakistan.

⁵³ Christopher M. Blanchard, "Islamic Religious Schools; The Madrassas," CRS Report for Congress, Updated January 23, 2007, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf> (accessed August 27, 2008).

⁵⁴ Tariq Yousuf Khan and Komei Susaki, *Regional Disparity in Pakistan's Economy: Regional Econometric Analysis of Causes and Remedies*, Japan, Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, vol. 9 (2003), 293-308.

⁵⁵ Rahil Yasin, "Pakistan's Four Dictators: Same Legacy," *American Chronicle*, June 25, 2008, <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/66226> (accessed September 27, 2008).

d. Political Unsteadiness

Pakistan, since its creation, has witnessed recurrent political instability. For about half of its existence, the country has been under non-democratic regimes, and the other half has been under unscrupulous politicians who put personal greed and narrow political interests over national aims and objectives.⁵⁶ Most of the governments in Pakistan had their own policies reversing the previous ones without any long-term vision for the betterment of the populace or the country. The political instability and dissatisfaction of the public with the governments have also resulted in a leadership vacuum in the country. This has been exploited by religious fundamentalists. They have taken control of the remote areas like the FATA and Balochistan and have contributed significantly towards terrorism within the country and beyond.

e. Socio-Economic Conditions

Since the independence of Pakistan in 1947, a large segment of the society, especially the ones who were less educated and oblivious to world economic systems, upheld their ambitious dream of an Islamic socio-economic system based on justice and equal opportunities for everyone.⁵⁷ Contrarily, the interest based economy rampant with corruption, nepotism and illegitimate means has further troubled the distribution of wealth in Pakistan.⁵⁸ The moneyed classes have piled more money into their bank accounts through illicit business practices and the exploitation of the underprivileged, while the poor have become poorer, seriously shrinking the middle-class in the country. Hard work, honesty and other such virtues have lost their importance. Dishonesty, bribery, drug trade and other malpractices have become common ways to make easy money and enhance social status.⁵⁹ The black money earned through illegal and often immoral means has created increasingly visible privileged and unprivileged

⁵⁶ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: Fifty years of Nationhood* (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990), 186.

⁵⁷ Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London: Routledge, 1997), 171.

⁵⁸ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 171.

⁵⁹ Sofia Mumtaz, Jean-Luc Racine and Imran Anwar Ali, *Pakistan: The Contours of State and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 188-189.

classes in the society. This disturbs the already imbalanced social structure. The problems and sufferings of the people multiply with the denial of legitimate economic and civic rights.⁶⁰ This one factor alone is a serious predicament in the country. It creates an ideal environment for the creation and infiltration of terrorists in various sectors of the society.

f. Role of the Media

A free, fair, and responsible media plays a significant role in the make up of any society. In the case of Pakistan, since the recent past, the media in general and the electronic media in particular had been strictly controlled by the state. Therefore, it could not educate the masses or teach tolerance and moderation in the religiously influenced society.⁶¹ Radio and TV stations, other than the government controlled ones, were non-existent in the country until 1999. In addition, the government stance on many issues, broadcasted through official channels, has always been open to suspicion and distrust.

The lack of debate on religious issues and certain cultural taboos leaves people forced to rely on the given interpretations of religious issues unquestioningly. The ill-informed and conservative religious teachers were totally free to misuse the loud speakers of the mosques to propagate their extremist viewpoints on world affairs, without any checks and balances.⁶² Resultantly, the population encountered manipulated news and fundamentalist ideas, which caused flawed perceptions, unrealistic expectations, sensation, fanaticism, and sectarianism.⁶³ This dangerous combination of extreme

⁶⁰ Sofia Mumtaz, Jean-Luc Racine and Imran Anwar Ali, *Pakistan: The Contours of State and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 188-189.

⁶¹ Muhammad Abbas, "Media and National Stability," *Pakistan Times*, <http://pakistanimes.net/2003/11/20/guest1.htm> (accessed September 30, 2008).

⁶² The system to appoint Imams at mosques is not very clearly instituted in Pakistan, and it is mainly decided whimsically by the village elders and influential people. There are no defined criteria for people to be selected as an Imam except the requirement of a beard. Most of the religious teachers appointed as Imams at mosques, especially in the villages, have no educational background except attending Madrassahs/mosques during their childhood to learn recitation of the Quran. The majority of them are unable to translate the Arabic script of the Quran into any other language, including the country's national language-Urdu. They are totally oblivious to the world's affairs and are unable to present rational interpretations of certain teachings of the religion, particularly Jihad, in consonance with the developments in the world. Their narrow-minded approach leads some students at mosques and Madrassahs to become radicals or religious fanatics and subsequently join terrorist organizations.

⁶³ Yoginder Sikand, "Pakistan, Islam and Indian Media Stereotypes," *Countercurrents.org*, January 21, 2006, <http://www.countercurrents.org/ipk-sikand210106.htm> (accessed October 1, 2008).

interpretations of world events and a lack of debate at any level has caused religious intolerance and hatred. This is a great source of recruitment for terrorist organizations in Pakistan.

g. Spread of Narcotics

Ahmed Rashid, a known authority on terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan argues, “One of the major reasons for the failure of nation-building in Afghanistan and Pakistan was the failure to deal with the issue of drugs.”⁶⁴ Though efforts of the Pakistani government in the last two decades have been successful in almost eradicating the growth of opium in the country, the drug culture and networks could not be eliminated.⁶⁵ The spread of narcotics continues in the country because drug cartels exist in abundance, opium travels from Afghanistan easily, and drugs are readily available to all right under the nose of LEAs.

The drug networks in Pakistan create a haven for the poor people who are in distress due to their socio-economic environments and need an artificial bliss.⁶⁶ The non-existence of rehabilitation infrastructure in the country leaves no way back for such addicts, who can then easily be blackmailed for their involvement in criminal, and in some cases terrorist, activities. With the skyrocketing growth of opium in Afghanistan since 2001 and the Taliban’s significant influence over it, the involvement of a well-established drug network in Pakistan in the criminal activities of the region cannot be ruled out.⁶⁷ This further complicates the unraveling of the terrorist threads between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Additionally, narco-business has rendered Pakistani society

⁶⁴ Ahmad Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (Penguin Group (USA), 2008), 318.

⁶⁵ Ministry of Narcotics Control-pakistan.gov.pk, “Narcotics Control in Pakistan,” <http://unpan1.un.org/intrdoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan003474.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2008).

⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Letter to Pakistan’s Prime Minister to Abolish the Death Penalty,” http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/16/pakist19141_txt.htm (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁶⁷ Richard H. Curtis, “Pakistan’s Domestic Narcotics Problem Reflects Regional Instability,” *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, August/September 1996, <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0896/9608085.htm> (accessed September 12, 2008)

captive in the hands of drug barons who promote their interests through violence, cause wide spread frustration, and drain an already weak police department. This situation reduces the efficiency of LEAs against terrorists.

h. Sub-Nationalism

Pakistan is composed of four semi-sovereign provinces: Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North Western Frontier Province. Each has a provincial government and a federally administrated territory along the Pak-Afghan borders commonly known as the FATA. The map below illustrates the geographic boundaries of the provinces. Each province is shown in a different color.



Figure 4. Political Map showing four provinces of Pakistan⁶⁸

For the most part, these provinces have been functioning harmoniously under the federation despite their different cultures, varied demographic make-ups,

⁶⁸ Political map of Pakistan showing four provinces of the country and main cities, <http://www.mapsofworld.com/pakistan/pakistan-political-map.html> (accessed September 18, 2008).

separate languages, dissimilar socio-economic conditions and divergent religious forbearance. However, a recent upsurge in the sentiments of sub-nationalism, especially in the Baluchistan and Frontier provinces, has further aggravated the internal security scenario.⁶⁹ The recent synchronized activities of sub-national elements, frequently influenced and supported by foreign hands, have generated strong feelings against the Center, namely the Punjab Province and the Armed Forces of the country, which have majority representation from Punjab -the most populated unit of Pakistan.⁷⁰

The sub-nationalist leaders, as influential land owners and chiefs of their tribes and ethnic groups, can mobilize fairly large segments of the society. They conceal their personal political agendas under the label of religious or cultural issues and coerce and intimidate the poor, uneducated populace to join hands with anti-state forces.⁷¹ With Al-Qaeda and the Taliban operational in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, these sub-nationalist elements enhance the terrorist activities both in the country and the region.

i. Incompetence of Security Apparatus

The above mentioned breeding grounds for a deteriorating security situation in Pakistan demand an efficient security mechanism in the country, based on rightly equipped, well trained, appropriately netted and competently grouped LEAs. Unfortunately, the existing police department and other LEAs in Pakistan are in shambles. They are neither equipped appropriately nor trained to undertake counter terrorist measures. The next chapter will cover all the LEAs of the country in detail; however, suffice it to say here, that in their present state, they are not competent enough enforce the law, maintain order, or deal with the terrorists. Consequently, the military has been employed to handle the terrorists. This has its own inherent problems as they are employed against their own population.

⁶⁹ Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2002), 17.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Fareed Zakaria, "What People Will Die For," *Newsweek*, January 14, 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/84536> (accessed October 1, 2008).

2. External Factors

The international participation and the global agenda of the present Muslim terrorists are explicit indicators that the threat at hand is beyond the borders of any one country. Involvement of external factors in the security situation of a particular country is an obvious phenomenon. Pakistan is no exception, and a host of international players are both directly and indirectly contributing to ongoing terrorist activities. Some of the significant aspects are enumerated below.

a. *Al-Qaeda*

Al-Qaeda, an international organization, was created in Pakistan during the fight against the USSR. Jihadis from all over the Muslim world were free to travel to Pakistan and join any extremist organization with the tacit approval of the Pakistani and U.S. governments.⁷² This organization recruited members from all over the world, and most of them did not return to their countries after the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan. Many of them based themselves permanently in the less governed areas adjacent to the Pak-Afghan borders and continued their extremist activities uninterrupted by the government and funded through international underground channels. Somewhat before 9/11, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban teamed-up, and they are still actively operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁷³ A large number of casualties to international forces in Afghanistan during the year 2007-08 and rising incidents of terrorism in Pakistan are a result of the collaboration between Al-Qaeda and Taliban.⁷⁴

⁷² Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2002), 87.

⁷³ James Dao, "Afghan Warlord May Team Up with Al-Qaeda and Taliban," *The New York Times*, May 30, 2002, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E02E5D61E3BF933A05756C0A9649C8B63> (accessed July 23, 2008).

⁷⁴ Hekmat Karzai and Seth G. Jones, "How to Curb Rising Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 18, 2006, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/071806CSM.html> (accessed October 3, 2008).

b. *International Terrorist Organizations*

Many terrorist groups and organizations, influenced by or affiliated with Al-Qaeda, exist in different parts of the world. They are not only in the Muslim majority countries, but many cells also exist in non-Muslim western countries like the United Kingdom, France, and Spain etcetera.⁷⁵ Many of their members have been studying in the Madrassas in Pakistan and have associations with extremist religious leaders. With the perceived notion of a defensive jihad of Muslim Ummah against the U.S. and allies, some members of these organizations are travelling to Pakistan and joining terrorist organizations with money and weapons.⁷⁶

The hawkish strategy of the GWOT, consequent collateral damage, and conspiracies attributed to the war are sources of motivation to join the global jihad in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The despicable role of international terrorist organizations has a domino effect for terrorism and brings recruits, weapons, and money to the terrorists in Pakistan. This further complicates the issue of terrorism in the country.

c. *The Security Situation in Afghanistan*

Terrorists operating from the tribal areas of Pakistan are commonly perceived as the major source of unrest in the region, while the tumultuous situation inside Afghanistan is erroneously neglected or downplayed.⁷⁷ The hideouts and bases of the terrorists in the FATA are a contributory factor, but they are not the only cause of security concerns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The security situation in Afghanistan is deplorable, arguably worse than it was in 2001. The Afghan and International Forces have little control over half of the country, and the terrorists carry out their operations freely moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan and vice versa.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Antony Beret, Jason Burke and Zoe Smith, "Terror Cells Regroup- and Now their Target is Europe," *The Observer*, January 11, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/11/alqaida.terrorism> (accessed August 12, 2008).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ UN Report, "Security Situation in Afghanistan Deteriorating," *United Nations Radio*, September 29, 2008, <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/10802.html> (accessed October 3, 2008).

⁷⁸ Ahmad Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (Penguin Group (USA), 2008), 215-217.

The government officials of Pakistan have expressed their concern about the supply of weapons, ammunition, and money provided to the terrorists in Pakistan, and they have pointed fingers to the porous borders with Afghanistan. It is more logical to believe in the continuously expanding income of Taliban from their bumper crops of opium⁷⁹ in Afghanistan.⁸⁰ The Afghan refugees, who keep moving across borders in flocks, create another dilemma for the Pakistani government. Presently, Pakistan hosts more than two million refugees, and many of them maintain their associations with different terrorist organizations. This contributes to the unrest and terrorist activities both in Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁸¹

d. Involvement of India

Historically, the enmity between Pakistan and India is as old as the two countries. They have fought three full-blown wars and many skirmishes along their borders.⁸² Both countries are reputed to have the continuous involvement of their secret agencies in clandestine operations against each other to create unrest and destabilization. The present unrest in Pakistan gives India an opportunity to collaborate with anti-state elements in Pakistan, about which Pakistani officials have often expressed their concern.⁸³

India is considered the main supply line of weapons and finances to the terrorists in Baluchistan and NWFP. Moreover, after 9/11, the U.S. joined hands with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to uproot the nexus of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Through this arrangement, India gained influence in Afghanistan with the help of their

⁷⁹ Ahmad Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (Penguin Group (USA), 2008), 319.

⁸⁰ Christian Miller, "Post Invasion Chaos Blamed for Drug Surge," *Los Angeles Times*, October 4, 2004, <http://opioids.com/afghanistan/bumper-harvest.html> (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁸¹ M. Asharaf Haidri, "Reluctant to Return Home," *Quqnoos*, September 15, 2008, http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1607&Itemid=52 (accessed October 3, 2008).

⁸² Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1.

⁸³ John Kifner, "Train Blast Kills 23 and Pakistan Blames India," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1998, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902EEDD173AF93BA35755C0A96E958260> (accessed August 23, 2008).

old time allies-The Northern Alliance.⁸⁴ Instead of contributing to the establishment of security and restructuring of Afghanistan, India established several consulates in Afghanistan along the borders of Pakistan. These are seriously questioned in Pakistan and are believed to support militancy in the FATA.

e. Role of Muslim Countries

Since the 1980s, many Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran and Syria, have supported various religious and sectarian organizations in Pakistan. This assistance is not only coming from the governments of the said Muslim countries, but also from various individuals and charities within them. With the present volatility in the region and the global interests involved there, the aforementioned Muslim countries play their part to safeguard their own interests and consequently complicate the issue of terrorism in Pakistan. For instance, the United Arab Emirates have been reportedly involved in terrorist activities against the newly constructed Gwadar Port, perhaps because they fear competition with Dubai Port.⁸⁵ Similarly, Iran assisted the Shia community in Pakistan and leftists in Baluchistan to create unrest in the Province.⁸⁶ Anti-U.S. groups are also playing their part to strengthen the terrorists in Pakistan.

f. Trust Deficit in Pak-U.S. Relations

In recent months, U.S. officials blaming Pakistan for not doing enough against the terrorists in the FATA has been a common feature in the international media.⁸⁷ Pakistan, however, claims to be the biggest victim of the current terrorism and stands affronted because her sacrifices in counter terrorism are being trivialized. Since 2001, Pakistan has lost many innocent lives, including former Prime Minister Benazir

⁸⁴ Ahmad Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (Penguin Group (USA), 2008), 206.

⁸⁵ Shahid Buksh Lasi, "Indian Motivates in Balochistan," *South Asian Research and Studies*, February 28, 2006, <http://saras.org.pk/viewarticle.php?topicid=113> (accessed September 13, 2008).

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ David E. Sanger, "Cheney Warns Pakistan to Act against Terrorists," *The New York Times*, February 27, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/27/world/asia/27cheney.html> (accessed October 3, 2008).

Bhutto and more than 1200 security personnel, in the counter terrorism campaign led by the USA.⁸⁸ There have been hundreds of suicide attacks, which severely damages to the economy and destabilizes of the country.

With such a dismal state of affairs, the blame game being played against Pakistan is seen with suspicion and resentment by the country's population. The increased number of U.S. attacks inside Pakistan in last six months and resultant soft response of the Pakistani Government have further increased frustration in the country. This has motivated many tribes and individual groups and organizations to take arms against their own government and the U.S. This unnecessary entanglement, a result of trust-deficit between both countries, has increased anti-U.S. sentiments among the population of Pakistan thereby increasing the number of terrorist activities in the country.

C. TERRORISTS' METHODOLOGY

In order to achieve their objectives, the terrorists in Pakistan follow one or more of the methodologies enumerated below.

1. Kidnapping for Ransom, Assassination and Blackmail

Kidnapping incidents of government officials and security forces by terrorists have become a frequent feature of terrorism in Pakistan. Terrorist organizations ambush convoys of government officials, including the foreign dignitaries and members of the police and armed forces, when they are traveling in small groups and with less security. After the abduction, the terrorists take the hostages to underground places and present a list of demands to the government.

The terrorists' demands vary and include ransom, the release of captured terrorists, and policy changes in the war against terrorism. The kidnapping of Tariq Azizuddin,⁸⁹ Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan in February 2008 near Pak-Afghan

⁸⁸ Zafar M. Sheikh, "Pakistan Officials Blame Al-Qaeda for Bhutto's Death," *USA Today*, December 28, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-12-28-bhutto_N.htm (accessed October 1, 2008).

⁸⁹ *The Long War Journal*, February 12, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/02/taliban_kidnap_pakis_1.php (accessed September 25, 2008)

border and Abdul Khaliq Farahi,⁹⁰ Afghanistan's ambassador-designate to Pakistan in September 2008 are a few of the major incidents of this kind. Similarly, dozens of personnel from Pakistan's security forces have been kidnapped. The hostages have either been cruelly assassinated or traded for the release of captured terrorists.⁹¹

2. Bombs/Rockets/IEDs

Bombs, rockets and IEDs, each with different innovative methods of launch and ignition, have become favorite weapons of terrorists in Pakistan. They use rockets and remote control bombs, launched from the elevated peaks of the mountainous terrain in the FATA, to attack military camps or moving convoys of security forces. Figure 5 indicates the difficulty of movement into the FATA areas and the multitude of bottlenecks, which can be easily exploited by the terrorists.




Figure 5. Physical Terrain in FATA⁹²

⁹⁰ Islamic Republic News Agency, September 24, 2008, <http://www2.irma.ir/en/news/view/menu-234/0809249313164711.htm> (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁹¹ *The Daily Mail: Daily News from Pakistan*, <http://dailymailnews.com/200809/13/news/dmtopstory02.html> (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁹² Shahid Afsar and Chris Samples, "The Evolution of Taliban," http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/cgisirsi.exe/Fri+Oct+03+16:29:56+2008+/SIRSI/0/520/08Jun_Afsar.pdf (accessed October 2, 2008).

Similarly, the placing IEDs on the expected routes of the security forces and exploding them at the right moment, all while sitting invisibly, is a common technique employed by the terrorists. For terrorists, there is less risk involved with these weapons, and they are extremely effective in causing damage to infrastructure and inflicting casualties. These weapons, disguised in suitcases, shopping bags, toy bombs, and bicycle bombs are also commonly used in public places to disrupt public life, create municipal anxiety and challenge the writ of the state.⁹³ As the terrorists bear a resemblance to the population of the area where their activities are normally undertaken, their identification and apprehension during the planning and execution stage of any terrorist act has been problematic.

3. Suicide Bombing

As in Iraq and Afghanistan, suicide terrorism has become the most lethal and devastating method of terrorism in Pakistan. In the last few years, an ever-increasing supply of mentally indoctrinated individuals, with high motivation for heavenly life after death, has taken hundreds of lives in Pakistan. The ineffectiveness of a counter strategy to the threat of suicide terrorism has become a grave concern for the Pakistani government.

Suicide terrorists select high profile targets or attack security forces with the intent to create real panic among the masses after each attack.⁹⁴ Suicide bombers killed former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto⁹⁵ and Lieutenant General Mushtaq Ahmed Beg⁹⁶ in Rawalpindi. They also made many attempts on the lives of then President Pervez Musharraf,⁹⁷ Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz,⁹⁸ and interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan

⁹³ MI5 Official Site, "Terrorist Methods," <http://www.securityservice.gov.uk/output/Page27.html> (accessed October 4, 2008).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ BBC News, "Benazir Bhutto Killed in Attack," *Online News*, December 27, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7161590.stm (accessed August 23, 2008).

⁹⁶ Myra MacDonald, "Pakistan: Now or Never," *Reuter*, February 28, 2008, <http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/02/28/pakistan-afghanistan-and-the-death-of-a-general/> (accessed September 5, 2008).

⁹⁷ Ahmad Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (Penguin Group (USA), 2008), 232.

⁹⁸ K.J.M. Varma, "Bid on Shaukat Aziz's Life; 7 Killed," *rediff.com*, July 30, 2004, <http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/jul/30pak1.htm> (accessed July 12, 2008).

Sherpao.⁹⁹ These dreadful attacks on the highest-ranking officials who enjoyed the best security arrangements in the country caused colossal upheaval among the general public in Pakistan.

Shaul Shay, in his explanation of suicide terrorism lays down some reasons why this form of terrorism is preferred by terrorist organizations. Some reasons applicable to terrorism in Pakistan are as follows.¹⁰⁰

- Suicide attacks cause multiple deaths and grave damage to property. More importantly, people react to suicide incidents with exceptional horror, more so than to conventional terrorist attacks.¹⁰¹ The latest attacks on the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad, which killed more than fifty people and caused significant damage to property and exceptional horror for the public, stand testimony to the point.¹⁰²
- Suicide attacks receive broad media coverage. A suicide attack is a “media event,” as it requires determination and martyrdom on the terrorist’s part. Hence, it attracts more recruits for terrorist organizations. The growing incidents of suicide terrorism substantiate this argument.
- The control over the timing and venue enhances the lethality to cause optimal harm, more so than other techniques, like detonating an explosive charge using a clock or remote control. The suicide attacker is a sophisticated guided missile that knows how to launch the explosive charge at the appropriate place and time.
- Once the suicide attacker has set out on a mission, his success is almost guaranteed, because it is very hard to prevent the attack. Even if the security forces prevent his advancement towards the planned target, he can always change the target or detonate himself among the security forces. In the recent past, such attacks against the police force and military convoys have been frequent in Pakistan.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Bill Roggio, “Suicide Bomber Kills 28, Wounds Pakistan’s Interior Minister in the NWFP,” *The Long War Journal*, April 28, 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/04/suicide_bomber_kills.php (accessed June 12, 2008).

¹⁰⁰ Shaul Shay, *The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher, 2004), 7.

¹⁰¹ Talat Asad, *On Suicide Side* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 65.

¹⁰² Peter Symonds, “Marriot Hotel Bombing: Another Sign of Pakistan’s Deepening Crisis,” *World Socialist Web Site*, September 22, 2008, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/sep2008/paks-s22.shtml> (accessed October 4, 2008).

¹⁰³ *USA Today*, “Police: Suicide Attack Kills at Least 50 in Pakistan,” http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-12-21-pakistan-bombing_N.htm (accessed September 12, 2008).

- A suicide mission does not necessitate the preparation of escape routes, which constitutes a complex part of other types of attacks. Therefore, terrorist organizations prefer their members to adopt this method, avoiding the need for an extrication plan.
- In a suicide mission, the attacker is killed during the attack. There is no fear that he will fall into the hands of the enemy and divulge information about the organization. To date, very few potential suicide bombers have been arrested in Pakistan. Therefore, security forces have limited information on the terrorists' strategy to brainwash and indoctrinate people for suicide terror.

4. Use of Human Shields

Terrorists, especially in tribal areas near the Pak-Afghan border, skillfully plan and use the local populace as human shields. In some cases, where the writ of the state is weak and the terrorists have influence, they coerce or intimidate the locals to stay around them and provide them support against security forces. As an IO campaign, with a view to ensure that no local person gives any information about the terrorists to government agencies, they ruthlessly kill suspects in public. This warns others not to attempt such ventures in the future.¹⁰⁴ This phenomenon of human shield leads to collateral damage and causes death or injuries to innocent people. This has its own ramifications in the overall war against terrorism.

5. Monitoring and Intelligence of Targets

Terrorists carry out a deliberate selection of targets, which is followed by a process of constant monitoring and gathering of intelligence about the composition, pattern of activities and environments around them. Post attack analysis of the attempts to kill President Pervez Musharraf has revealed that for many days the terrorists monitored the move pattern of his cavalcade and possible soft points, including bottlenecks, to plan

¹⁰⁴ "Pakistan's Red Mosque Showdown: Jihadist Using Girls as Human Shields," *Spiegel International Online*, July 5, 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,492545,00.html> (accessed September 10, 2008).

and execute their nefarious designs.¹⁰⁵ The tactic of appropriate monitoring and intelligence gathering about the target, combined with the use of suicide terrorists, enhances the efficacy of the terrorists and creates a serious problem for the state.

6. Use of Latest Technology

The post-analysis reports on many terrorists' activities in Pakistan establish that terrorists make the best use of the latest technologies, especially regarding communication and explosives. The use of mobile phone chips for distant bomb detonation in attacks on the convoys of the Karachi Corp Commander and President Pervez Musharraf indicate this trend.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, the use of satellite mobile phones has been a permanent feature of all terrorist activities in Pakistan. Moreover, security forces, during their operations at Wana in 2004, captured the latest communication gadgets, including telephone exchanges, Thoraya satellite telephones, laptops, and software CDs - including the latest designs and techniques for bomb making and IEDs.¹⁰⁷ The preparation of propaganda movies and the frequent issue of fatwas and sermons on the internet are yet another example of the terrorists' use of the latest technology.

7. Break and Change of Pattern

The terrorists are always changing the pattern of their activities and adopting the most innovative, inventive, and modern methodologies to offset the counter measures planned by the security forces. They alternate among a variety of techniques. They use moving personnel of all ages as suicide bombers, at times dressed in traditional ladies' garb. They employ vehicles of all kinds from jeeps to trucks as a moving platform for their activities. They attack mosques, funeral ceremonies, religious schools, girls' institutions, power stations, train tracks, military installations, and police training centers, banks, restaurants, tribal heads, politicians, religious scholars, and many other targets.

¹⁰⁵ "Pakistan Court Upholds Death Penalty in Musharraf Attack Case," *Peoples Daily Online*, March 15, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/15/eng20060315_250628.html accessed October 4, 2008).

¹⁰⁶ MI5 Official Site, "Terrorist Methods," <http://www.securityservice.gov.uk/output/Page27.html> (accessed October 4, 2008).

The terrorists also alternate between attacks on single targets and simultaneous detonations at many places. When setting simultaneous explosions, a series of bombs are plotted at different congested public sites with a timed pattern to cause lethal destruction and affect paralysis on the security mechanism of the country. One example occurred on October 15, 2003, when twenty-one bomb blasts at Petrol Stations rocked Karachi.

The terrorists are mercilessly and evilly innovative. In an attempt to kill former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Karachi during her welcome procession, a terrorist tried to hand her an infant (few months old) laden with explosives and dressed in her party color.¹⁰⁸ Although she did not hold that young innocent boy and escaped death at that instant, more than fifty workers of her party lost their lives because of that unimaginably brutal baby explosion.¹⁰⁹

8. Exploitation of Weaknesses of LEAs

Many terrorist activities in Pakistan during last few years and the modus operandi adopted to execute them suggest that terrorists weigh the strengths and weaknesses of security forces before planning any attack. With a well-thought out plan, terrorists carry out their acts, exploiting the weaknesses and shortfalls of equipment, methodology and techniques used by security forces.

In year 2008 alone, terrorists have attacked police forces more than ten times, identifying loopholes in their procedures and breaching their security system. The successful bombing of the Marriot Hotel at Islamabad in September,¹¹⁰ killing more than fifty personnel and burning many buildings right in the center of the capital stands testimony to the fact that terrorists are exploiting the existing shortfalls of security forces

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West* (New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2008), 13.

¹⁰⁹ "Exclusive: Benazir Bhutto's Last Testament," *The Sunday Times*, February 3, 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3294410.ece> (accessed October 2, 2008).

¹¹⁰ Peter Symonds, "Marriot Hotel Bombing: Another Sign of Pakistan's Deepening Crisis," *World Socialist Web Site*, September 22, 2008, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/sep2008/paks-s22.shtml> (accessed October 4, 2008).

in Pakistan. Figure 6 represents the monthly number of casualties in Pakistan. It illustrates that terrorists are successfully exploiting the weaknesses of security forces of the country.




Figure 6. Number of Casualties in Pakistan during 2008¹¹¹

D. CONCLUSION

Pakistan is presently confronted with various dimensions of terrorism, which cause instability in the country. Terrorists have taken thousands of innocent lives, ruined dozens of villages, created panic among the population in all parts of the country and challenged the security apparatus of the state. As discussed, many internal and external players are contributing negatively to the ongoing quagmire, not only in the country, but also in the region. The terrorists are making the best use of technological advancements and innovative techniques to seriously jeopardize the writ of the state. Contrarily, the performance of the LEAs to handle the security situation in the country leaves much to be

¹¹¹ Muhammad Azam, "South Asia Conflict Report July 2008," Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies: South Asia Net, August 10, 2008, <http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN-Files/SAN-SouthAsia/SAN-SouthAsia-Article44/San-SA-A44-D.asp> (accessed October 4, 2008).

desired. The scenario necessitates a pragmatic and well thought out upgrade plan to ensure that the LEAs in the country are appropriately grouped, efficiently organized, vigorously trained and properly equipped. The next chapter presents an account of all LEAs in Pakistan along with an objective analysis of their efficacy to the tasks assigned.

IV. PAKISTAN LEAS – A PROLOGUE AND FAMILIARIZATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Pakistan has an existing security infrastructure built upon a fairly large number of LEAs; each varying in size, role and level of proficiency. They, at least theoretically, are structured to protect all parts of the country against any security threat, including terrorism in any of its forms and manifestations. However, their actual state of preparedness to guard against terrorism and undertake harmonious security operations in the country is quite deplorable. Most of them are too ill-equipped, weakly trained, and incongruously organized to triumph over the serious challenges posed by the terrorists in the country.¹¹² To further develop the subject, it is of utmost importance to have a familiarization with all the LEAs of the country. Subsequent paragraphs present an overview with a special focus on the origin, background history, mandate allotted, and state of preparedness of all the existing LEAs of Pakistan.

B. PAKISTAN POLICE

1. The Origin of the Police Force¹¹³

After gaining full control of United India, British rulers constituted a Police Commission on August 17, 1860 for the organization of a police force. The commission submitted its report within 22 days, and a draft Police Act was enacted in 1861 which resulted in a formal police force. This Police Act was drafted along the lines of Irish

¹¹² David Rohde, "Threats and Responses: Law Enforcement; Pakistan's Police Force Struggles to Find the Resources It Needs to Combat Terrorism," *New York Times*, September 30, 2002, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03EFD91438F933A0575AC0A9649C8B63> (accessed October 5, 2008).

¹¹³ The historical account of the origin of the police department has been summarized from the Visitors' Brief of the Pakistan Police and the author's interview with the Senior Superintendent of Police, Sialkot District in July 2006. The interview and collection of data about the Police Department was done for a study on "Restructuring of Pakistan's LEAs." The study was presented at General Headquarters, Rawalpindi on August 31, 2006, and the author was one of the members of the study panel.

Constabulary Act¹¹⁴ and was primarily preordained to create a police force that could consolidate and maintain the British Raj in India without any regard for the rights of the citizens. Ironically, the mandate laid down for this police force by the British rulers was very different from the philosophy, duties and objectives of the police forces in the United Kingdom. The police force in India was envisioned as an authoritarian and suppressive force without any outlook of being a service to the population of the country.

In July 1902, the government of India appointed a seven member commission, headed by A.H.L Fraser, to review the performance of its police force and recommend feasible improvements for its effectiveness. The commission recommended limited organizational and procedural modifications under which the force continued working for next three decades. The Police Rules were framed for the first time in 1934, providing detailed instructions and comprehensive procedures for all aspects police operations.¹¹⁵

The Independence of Pakistan in 1947 did not bring any major changes to the Police Act of 1861. During the next four decades, various administrations of Pakistan, in their uncommitted endeavors, appointed about two dozen commissions and committees to propose improvements for the Police Force. An overall lack of resolve and scarcity of resources meant most efforts at improvement were in vain. However, the Musharraf regime introduced the Police Ordinance 2002,¹¹⁶ which had a wide-ranging plan to transform the police department into a modern force.

The Police Ordinance 2002, though a well thought out and comprehensive document, brought little and sluggish improvement in the police force owing to a host of problems related to its implementation, political compulsions and resource constraints. More significantly, the lack of commitment from the Federal Government to pursue a ruthless implementation of the Ordinance has slowed progress in the improvement of the police force.

¹¹⁴ Royal Irish Constabulary, "The Oxford Companion to Irish History," <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O245-RoyalIrishConstabulary.html> (accessed October 20, 2008).

¹¹⁵ The Punjab Government, "The Punjab Police Rules 1934," http://haryanapolice.gov.in/PPR/PPR_Volume-II.pdf (accessed October 12, 2008).

¹¹⁶ The Government of Pakistan, "Police Ordinance 2002," http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/police_ordinance.pdf (accessed October 15, 2008).

2. Types of Police Services

In Pakistan, the Police Services are structured into the following categories.¹¹⁷

<u>Type of Police</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
Federal Capital Police	Maintains law and order within the boundaries of Islamabad- The Capital
Provincial Police for each Province	Responsible for maintenance within the boundaries of respective provinces
Railways Police	Guards the security of trains, railway tracks, and infrastructure
Prisons Police	Responsible for security of all prisons in the country
Federal Investigation Agency	The Federal Intelligence Agency
Levies Force	Maintains security for category B areas in Balochistan
Frontier Constabulary	Maintains law and order in the tribal areas

Table 2. Branches of Pakistan Police and their responsibility

3. Organization

All police services have their own organizational structures at federal and provincial levels respectively, and they work in parallel with very limited coordination

¹¹⁷ In addition to these types of the police, which work almost independently and continuously without any cooperation from other respective domains of the service, Pakistan has other types of the police forces like the Motorway Police under the Federal Government, the Patrol Police in many districts of the Punjab under the Provincial Government, and certain rescue services in all provinces. Such police forces, mainly created during the Musharraf Regime (1999- 2008), are performing their responsibilities in a comparatively efficient manner and are well respected in the country without any political involvement. However, with the democratic government in place and prevalent appalling reputation of the governments in politicizing police institutions for their personal agendas, the future performance of these police forces is yet to be seen.

among them.¹¹⁸ Although each has a specific role, the federal and four provincial police departments have wider ambit of duties and are the main forces responsible to counter terrorism. Their approximate strength¹¹⁹ is as follows.

1.	Federal Police	20,000
2.	Punjab	115,000
3.	Sind	90,000
4.	NWFP	44,000
5.	Balochistan	13,000

In addition, Elite force of company size is organized at Divisional level, which can react at short notice.

4. Problem Areas

Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, a well respected officer of the Pakistan Police, highlights some of the serious constraints undermining the police system of Pakistan, including the following aspects.¹²⁰

- An outdated legal and institutional framework¹²¹ devised for nineteenth century united India, consisting of near static villages with little urbanization or industrialization, and meant principally for a colonial rule
- Arbitrary and whimsical (mis)management of the police by the executive authority of the state. Policemen were increasingly recruited, trained, promoted and posted without regard to merit and mainly for their subservience to people with influence and power.
- Derisory accountability of individuals and branches
- Poor and meritless incentive system within the Department

¹¹⁸ David Rohde, "Threats and Responses: Law Enforcement; Pakistan's Police Force Struggles to Find the Resources It Needs to Combat Terrorism," *The New York Times*, September 30, 2002, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03EFD91438F933A0575AC0A9649C8B63> (accessed October 5, 2008).

¹¹⁹ The data is collected from various briefs and presentations of the policed in 2005-2006, which often kept varying due to the policies of different provincial governments and the enrollment/retirement of the police personnel.

¹²⁰ Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, "Reforming Pakistan Police: An Overview," http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008).

¹²¹ Ibid.

- Widespread corruption and nepotism
- Severe under-resourcing of law and order apparatus

5. Weapons, Equipment and Communication

All branches of the police department have an acute shortage of equipment and vehicles. The limited available equipment is in a pitiable state, which is further aggravated by the lack of maintenance funds.¹²² Major weapons held by the police force include an insufficient number of pistols and revolvers (.38 bore, 9mm), rifle G-3, rifle 303, sub machine guns / carbines, machine guns and AK - 47 rifles. The police are using old Motorola wireless sets from the 1980s, which have a limited communication range and are open to easy jamming by terrorists. Single line communication has been established through Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, which is a government owned company reputed for poor service. In addition, they have no special priority set for the maintenance of lines in case of a breakdown.

6. Training

The National Police Academy in Islamabad is only training police officers, whereas the lower ranks are trained through the Police Training Colleges and Centers in each province.¹²³ Despite some improvement in the last few years, the training colleges and centers are inappropriately outfitted for the comprehensive training of the police force. There is no research and analysis wing either in the colleges or in the Academy. The department has very limited facilities to train for counter terrorist activities. For the most part, they resort to on-job-training.¹²⁴ The maiden Anti Terrorist Training School at Razzaq Abad, Lahore is the principal training institution, but it can only run a few courses for a limited number of personnel.

¹²² Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, "Reforming Pakistan Police: An Overview," http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008).

¹²³ Government of Pakistan, "National Police Academy," http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentInfo.jsp?DivID=23&cPath=221_227_309&ContentID=779 (accessed October 11, 2008).

¹²⁴ International Crisis Group, "Reforming Pakistan's Police," July 14, 2008, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5570> (accessed October 2, 2008).

C. FRONTIER CONSTABULARY

1. Origin and Tasks¹²⁵

The Frontier Constabulary, in its present shape, was established in 1913 to guard the administered borders of NWFP. However, their tasks have continued to evolve and presently, the Frontier Constabulary looks after its jurisdiction from the Northern Areas of Pakistan to Karachi. It is governed by the Frontier Constabulary Act of 1915. The force was originally tasked to check tribal incursions and criminal gangs operating from the tribal and border areas, and control outlaws and their criminal activities in the border areas. However, since its inception, the following additional tasks have been undertaken by the force.

- Support other LEAs in grave emergencies
- Assist local administration and police in the maintenance of law and order
- Provide security to vital installations, key points and foreign missions
- Check smuggling of narcotics and contraband along the border of settled and tribal areas
- Perform any other duty assigned by the government

2. Strength/Organization

The Frontier Constabulary is organized into platoons. There are 403 general duties platoons (43 personnel in each) along with the Headquarters which comes to approximately 20,000 men.¹²⁶ The men are recruited from the border tribes of the NWFP. Recruitment for the Frontier Constabulary is entirely confined to the Pashtuns.¹²⁷ It is basically a preventive force and can be called upon to serve anywhere in Pakistan. This force does not have any dedicated agency for the provision of intelligence, and its

¹²⁵ The historical account and the tasks of the Frontier Constabulary have been derived from the visitor's brief of the organization and telephone talks of the author with (a) few officials of the Frontier Constabulary at Peshawar, Pakistan. After 9/11, the ineffectiveness of the Frontier Constabulary in dealing with terrorists was seriously exposed. Though this force is presently working with the Army and FC, its role in the overall campaign of counter terrorism in the country is quite marginalized.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

response on any crisis is mostly reactive rather than proactive. Administrative control lies with the Ministry of Interior, whereas operational control lies with the respective provinces where the Frontier Constabulary troops are deployed. Its budget comes from the Federal Government.

3. Training and Deployment

The Frontier Constabulary organizes training for its manpower at two schools, namely the Training School at Shabqadar and the Training Center at Swat.¹²⁸ Both schools are inadequately equipped, understaffed and poorly structured for good quality training. The deployment pattern of the Frontier Constabulary varies with the law and order situation in the country. The present deployment is as follows.

Location/Assignment	Number of Platoons	Remarks
Islamabad	27	Protection of Official buildings
NWFP	85	Working with provincial police
Sind	75	Employed with Sind Rangers
Balochistan	46	Working for the security of the area with the police and the Frontier Corps
Multi National Companies	29	Supervising security
FC Forts/Post	102	Available for additional duties
Northern Areas	34	Employed with the Army
Reserve/ Administration	5	
Total	403	

Table 3. Deployment of Frontier Constabulary in year 2005¹²⁹

¹²⁸ The historical account and the tasks of the Frontier Constabulary have been derived from the visitor's brief of the organization and telephone talks of the author with (a) few officials of the Frontier Constabulary at Peshawar, Pakistan. After 9/11, the ineffectiveness of the Frontier Constabulary in dealing with terrorists was seriously exposed. Though this force is presently working with the Army and FC, its role in the overall campaign of counter terrorism in the country is quite marginalized.

¹²⁹ Most of the platoons of the Frontier Constabulary are deployed in conjunction with other LEAs because of their low level of operational preparedness. Very rarely this force is assigned with any important task independently.

4. Weapons/Equipment and Communication

The Frontier Constabulary has neither specialized equipment nor heavy weapons. It uses no heavy or specialized vehicles, and operates only with normal light vehicles. It has no armored personnel carriers or artillery support to provide direct or indirect fire power.¹³⁰ The Frontier Constabulary has a limited wireless network facility linked to its various units. In fact, all the districts are connected through phone lines. Technologically, the force is backward and hardly uses any advancements of this field in its functioning. Recently, a few computers have been provided for better record keeping, but they are insufficient to meet even their minimal requirements.

D. LEVIES

1. Origin and Organization

Levies are a community police raised amongst local tribes in the Balochistan Province, and controlling law and order in “B” areas¹³¹ as a substitute for the police in other parts of the country.¹³² This force takes its origin in the British era, when a Federal Levies Force was raised through administrative reforms introduced by Sher Shah Soori. Under this arrangement, the local tribes and elders were responsible for the law and order situation within their respective territorial and tribal jurisdictions. After the abolition of the tribal states’ system in 1958, the Levies were made a provincial force and started maintaining law and order in the remaining “B” areas of the Province at par with

¹³⁰ Visitor’s brief, Frontier Constabulary.

¹³¹ The districts of the Balochistan Province are divided into A and B Areas. Presently, twenty two districts of the Province make up the A areas while remaining five are B areas. The responsibility of maintaining law and order in A areas rests with the provincial police department, whereas Levies have the responsibility to maintain law and order in B areas.

¹³² Malik Siraj Akbar, “More Crime in Police- Controlled Areas in Balochistan,” *Daily Times*, July 11, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C11%5Cstory_11-7-2007_pg7_13 (accessed October 7, 2008).

the police under the regular laws. The process of merging the Levies with the regular police is gradually making headway. Presently, only five districts in the country come under Levies. Some of the organizational aspects are as follows.¹³³

1. Total strength - 4200 approximately
2. Number of Levies' Districts - 5
3. Number of Levies' Police Stations - 42
4. Levies Posts & Piquet - 70

2. **Tasks**¹³⁴

Levies are presently performing following tasks.

- Maintain law and order in “B” areas of Balochistan Province
- Watch and ward functions, detection, prevention and apprehension of crime
- Investigation and prosecution of criminals and Highway Security
- Protect strategic installations, key points, and vulnerable areas
- Escort official (local and foreign) dignitaries

3. **Functional Inadequacies**

This force is the weakest of all LEAs in the country as it does not possess the requisite quality of manpower, or sufficient weapons, equipment, vehicles or funding.¹³⁵ Its inadequate weaponry includes old versions of KK rifles, light machine guns, G-3 rifles, and pistols with an insufficient supply of ammunition for training and operations.

¹³³ The data is based upon some of the discussions of the author with the Levies Officials in Balochistan.

¹³⁴ Tasks of the Levies are almost same as of the police, but they have a different uniform, culture and way of working. The Pakistani Government started merging this force into the police during 2003 with an objective to eliminate Levies and organize the police in all parts of the Province. The process is still continuing; however, it has seriously slowed down after the Musharraf Government.

¹³⁵ Siraj Akbar, “More Crime in Police- Controlled Areas in Balochistan,” *Daily Times*, July 11, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C11%5Cstory_11-7-2007_pg7_13 (accessed October 7, 2008).

No formal training center exists for personnel of Levies in the country. After rudimentary initial training or on the job training, the only opportunity to train the Levies' manpower comes from rare vacancies at the training institutions of the Army and police.

The automobiles of the force are limited and include a few pickups, ambulances, trucks and motorcycles. In most cases, the manpower of the Levies hires vehicles to reach incident sites. The communication infrastructure of the force is equally feeble. It depends upon very old and defective HF wireless sets, walkie-talkies, and a few line phones.

E. CIVIL ARMED FORCES (CAF)

In addition to the various police forces under direct control of the Provincial governments, Pakistan has a well organized set of CAF in the country. They are also known as paramilitary forces. They are organized under the control of Interior Ministry at Federal level, but operationally deployed and administered in their respective provinces.¹³⁶ These forces patrol the borders in their respective areas of responsibility, maintain law and order in the country, and act in response to all catastrophes and emergent situations. Presently, the CAF of the country includes the following major forces, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs.

- | | | |
|----|-----------------------|--|
| 1. | Pakistan Rangers | Punjab
Sind |
| 2. | Frontier Corps | North Western Frontier Province
Balochistan |
| 3. | Pakistan Coast Guards | Coastal Belt of Pakistan |

F. PAKISTAN RANGERS

The Pakistan Rangers are a federally administered force for protecting the eastern borders of Pakistan during times of peace.¹³⁷ They assist the Punjab and Sind provinces with the maintenance of law and order. After their creation in 1948, the Pakistan Rangers

¹³⁶ Pakistan Reality, "Pakistan Paramilitary Forces," <http://www.pakreality.com/military/pakistan-paramilitary-forces/> (accessed October 23, 2008).

¹³⁷ Pakistani Armed Forces, "Pakistan Rangers," <http://www.pakistanidefence.com/PakParamilitary/PakistanRangers.htm> (accessed October 7, 2008).

were acting as one force for the entire eastern border of Pakistan.¹³⁸ However, in March 1993, they were divided into two separate forces as the Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) and the Pakistan Rangers (Sind). With the current arrangement, they operate within the boundaries of their respective provinces, unless the Federal Government needs their services anywhere else.

1. Pakistan Rangers (Punjab)

a. Tasks

Following are a few of the significant tasks assigned to the Pakistan Rangers (Punjab).¹³⁹

- Defense of the eastern borders of the country in peace time. They come under operational control of the Army during war.
- Internal security duties both with and without the police force for the maintenance of law and order in the Punjab province¹⁴⁰
- Back-up support for the police and participation in joint large scale search and sweep operations against criminals
- Security in areas around the hilly ranges where the police force is not deployed
- Act as a large back-up reserve to be deployed in case of large scale disorder or rioting within their area of responsibility or elsewhere
- While functioning in support of the police, Rangers take over certain areas where the situation is more critical, and they conduct independent operations using their own intelligence network¹⁴¹

b. Strength and Deployment

This force, comprised of approximately 20,000 personnel, who are organized into four Rangers Corps, is tasked to defend about 1300 kilometers along the

¹³⁸ Pakistani Armed Forces, "Pakistan Rangers," <http://www.pakistanidefence.com/PakParamilitary/PakistanRangers.htm> (accessed October 7, 2008).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ "Pakistan Army, Rangers, Police Provide Security to Ashura Procession," *Pakistan Times*, <http://pakistanimes.net/2008/01/21/top5.htm> (accessed October 8, 2008).

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

border in peace time and help maintain law and order as required within Punjab and Islamabad.¹⁴² The bulk of the officers of this force come from the Army on deputation for tenure of 2-3 years. The present deployment of these corps is as given below.

<u>Name of the Corps/ Location</u>	<u>Number of Wings/Area of Responsibility</u>	<u>Location¹⁴³ for Wings</u>
Chenab Rangers/ Sialkot	5 Wings/ 377 Kilometers	Marala, Maharajke, Shakargarh, Narowal and Kala Khatai
Sutlej Rangers/ Lahore	4 Wings/ 325 Kilometers	Wagha, Heer, Kasur and Kanganpur
Desert Rangers/ Bahawalpur	4 Wings/ 325 Kilometers	Sulemanki, Bahawalnagar, Fort Abbas and Yazman
Cholistan Rangers/ Rahim Yar Khan	3 Wings/ 265 Kilometers	Khanpur, Rahim Yar Khan and Sadiqabad

Table 4. Deployment of various units of Pakistan Rangers (Punjab)¹⁴⁴

In the wake of the security situation in the country, the Punjab Rangers have formed three additional Internal Security Wings, which will be committed to

¹⁴² The information about the strength and responsibilities of the Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) has been procured from the telephone conversations of the author with officials of the force at their Headquarters in Lahore. However, this force is increasing its manpower due to its enhanced and frequent employment against terrorists in different parts of the country. For the first time, this force has enrolled female officers and soldiers and 60 of them passed out on October 25, 2008 after successful initial training.

¹⁴³ These wings of Pakistan Rangers are based in villages as shown in the table and mostly their areas of responsibility lie around those villages. They can readily react to any security situation within the area of their jurisdiction.

¹⁴⁴ These are the standard deployment positions of various wings of the Pakistan Rangers. However, depending upon the severity of the situation in different locations along the border or within the country, the deployment can be easily varied, and that has been a common phenomenon in the recent past.

maintaining law and order in the province.¹⁴⁵ This force, exclusively organized, equipped, and trained to fight internal security issues, is likely to be much more effective against terrorists than the conventional border patrol Rangers.

c. Weapons, Equipment and Communication

The Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) are a fairly well organized force with sufficient weapons, equipment and communication networks. In order to make the Rangers a real front line force ready for the present day challenges and emerging operational trends, a three year program, “Enhancement of Combat Efficiency (2002-2005)” has been completed.¹⁴⁶ The force has been provided with a new weapons system comparable to the regular infantry formation of the Army. Some of the new equipment includes sniper rifles, laser range finders, global positioning systems, night vision goggles, bullet proof jackets, metal detectors, walk-through security gates, new vehicles and communication equipment.

d. Training

All ranks of the force undergo basic training at the Pakistan Rangers Academy, and some of them are subsequently trained through courses and cadres run at Army institutions. In addition to routine training, the personnel of the Pakistan Rangers are being trained in anti-terrorist and commando courses at the Lahore Headquarters of the force. The anti-terrorist training focuses on following areas.¹⁴⁷

- Fighting in built up areas and the clearance of urban terrorists’ dens
- Special training in conducting raids, ambushes
- Patrolling and survival skills in inhospitable and remote areas

¹⁴⁵ Peter R. Blood, “Pakistan: A Country Study,” http://books.google.com/books?id=DRMTO7mn7hIC&pg=PA289&lpg=PA289&dq=intrenal+security+wi+ngs+of+pakistan+rangers&source=bl&ots=ScDg0czfBR&sig=Aa0A86L4_AJ7jnv_4P5pkYcXmAc&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result#PPA290,M1 (accessed October 23, 2008).

¹⁴⁶ Information based on discussions with Rangers Headquarters, Lahore.

¹⁴⁷ “Nation’s Support Vital for Success against Terrorism,” *Associated Press of Pakistan*, October 25, 2008, http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=56905&Itemid=2 (accessed October 27, 2008).

- Unarmed combat and rappelling
- Hostage rescue techniques
- Bomb disposal and the handling of IEDs
- Counter measures to the latest terrorists' techniques

2. **Pakistan Rangers (Sind)**

The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) guard the 912 kilometers of International Border with India and are actively involved in combating terrorism and ensuring law and order by providing intimate support to Sind Police in Karachi, Interior Sind, in Gilgit, Balochistan and overseas under United Nation Missions.¹⁴⁸

a. Role and Tasks

Conventionally, this force undertakes tasks similar to the Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) However, regarding Internal Security; the Sind Rangers are presently employed in following duties in the Sind Province.¹⁴⁹

- Patrolling Indus and National Highway in cases of emergencies
- Providing back-up support to the provincial police for all large scale search and sweep operations and participate in such operations, whenever required
- Deployment, at random, for the manning of protective bunds on the Indus River in areas where the police need back-up support
- Availability as a reserve in case of large scale disorder and rioting in Karachi
- Independent operations based on their own intelligence network

¹⁴⁸ Syed Ejaz Ahmed Shah, "Winning Accolades for Role in Peace Keeping Operations," *Daily Mail*, <http://dailymailnews.com/200606/14/dmarticlepage.html> (accessed October 24, 2008).

¹⁴⁹ "Sind Rangers Asked to Assist Police in Law Enforcement," *The Nation*, July 6, 2008, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/Karachi/06-Jul-2008/Sindh-Rangers-asked-to-assist-police-in-law-enforcement> (accessed October 23, 2008).

b. Strength and Deployment

The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) have and approximate strength of 25000 personnel including their officers from the Pakistan Army, who continuously rotate on deputation to Rangers. The present deployment of various components of Pakistan Rangers (Sind) is as follows.

a.		Rangers Headquarters	Location
	(1)	Thar Rangers	Hyderabad
	(2)	Shahbaz Rangers	Sukkur
	(3)	Bhittai Rangers	Karachi
	(4)	Qasim Rangers	Hyderabad
	(5)	Sachal Rangers	Karachi
	(6)	Indus Rangers	Nawabshah
	(7)	Abdullah Shah Ghazi Rangers	Karachi
b.	1 x Field Security Wing		Sind Province
c.	1 x Training Center & School		Karachi
d.	Central Record Office		Karachi
e.	Headquarters Wing		Karachi
f.	1 x Rangers Anti Terrorist Company ¹⁵⁰		Karachi
g.	1 x Dolphin Company (Coastal Area Force)		Badin
h.	1 x Motor Cycle Company		Karachi
j.	1 x Special Equipment Company		Karachi

Table 5. Deployment of various units of Pakistan Rangers (Sind)

¹⁵⁰ The Anti Terrorist Company was raised to deal exclusively with terrorists, but with the increased number of terrorist activities and the need to protect the important official installations and personalities in Karachi and other big cities of the Province, the other wings of the Rangers are also frequently employed in anti terrorist role. More can be read about the employment of the Pakistan Rangers (Sind) for law and order maintenance at http://server.kbri-islamabad.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3338&Itemid=43 (accessed October 23, 2008).

In the wake of ongoing operations against sub-nationalists in the Balochistan Province, the strength of the already employed force on inter-province border has been increased to monitor the movement and activities of miscreants. The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) also play a significant role in the resettlement of displaced tribes in the troubled areas. The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) has continuously enhanced its anti-terrorist component since 2001. They have raised an anti-terrorist company with high-quality commando skills, which has been trained by the Special Services Group of the Pakistan Army. This company has also participated in exercises with the United Kingdom's Special Air Services troops in Karachi.

The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) presently perform major internal security duties in the province. They are provide security to high value installations, including the Keamari Oil Terminal, Karachi Port Trust, Pakistan Steel Mill and a large number of foreign consulates, gas exploration companies and important hotels. They provide protection for various government and non-government organizations, major educational institutions, and mega events held in Karachi, and visiting foreign dignitaries. They also protect Karachi City, super and national highways with extensive mobile patrolling. The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) are also monitoring the canals to stop water theft and ensure fair distribution of irrigation water to the tail users.

c. Weapons, Equipment, Communication and Training

The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) are provided the same weapons and equipment as the Rangers in Punjab. Their up-gradation plan for communication is also identical. Similarly, their training level, emphasis on counter terrorism proficiency for manpower, and overall operational efficiency both in peace and war are almost the same (as discussed in the preceding paragraphs).

G. FRONTIER CORPS

The Frontier Corps (FC) was created as an organized and autonomous LEA in 1907 by combining the already existent seven scouts and militia units in the tribal areas

of the United India.¹⁵¹ Initially, this force was employed to monitor the movement across Durand Line. Though more units were added into the organization since its inception, it continued its initial role even after the independence of Pakistan. However, its continuous growth and responsibility, spread over 2500 miles of inhospitable terrain, led the force to split into two province based groups in 1973, namely FC NWFP and FC Balochistan.¹⁵² Presently, both independent forces fall under the ambit of the Interior Ministry, are financed by the Federal Government of Pakistan, and are placed under provincial Governors to undertake internal security duties within their respective provinces.

1. FC NWFP

a. *Tasks of the Force*

FC NWFP is responsible for border defense duties on the north western and western borders of Pakistan.¹⁵³ They are a well organized force comprised of men from tribes living in the NWFP and Balochistan provinces. The mission given to the FC NWFP combines both peacetime and war time functions. The mission of the force includes the following.

- Protect and provide surveillance of the Pak-Afghan border within the boundary of the NWFP province including the FATA areas
- Maintain law and order in the tribal territory of the NWFP and the FATA
- Assist the civil administration with internal security duties
- Perform specific tasks including anti smuggling operations and the security of routes
- Come under Army command during war or emergency

¹⁵¹ Hassan Abbas, "Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps," March 29, 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370292> (accessed October 3, 2008).

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

b. Organization of the Force

The FC NWFP, with its headquarters at Peshawar, is organized into corps and wings based in important areas along the Pak-Afghan borders. Each corps is commanded by a Colonel, who is directly responsible to the Inspector General (IG) of the FC. The IG, who is an army major general, answers to the Interior Ministry in Islamabad. Presently, the FC NWFP is comprised of eleven corps, each with thirty four rifle wings. The names of the corps generally represent their areas of responsibility in the FATA and the NWFP province. The force is split into the following corps.

- Chitral Scouts
- Dir Scouts
- Bajaur Scouts
- Mohmand Rifles
- Khyber Rifles
- Mahsud Scouts
- Kurram Militia
- Thal Scouts
- Shawal Rifles
- Tochi Scouts
- South Waziristan Scouts

c. Operational Efficiency

The FC NWFP is equipped with a fairly good number of aged weapons, equipment and communication assets and operates as a self-sufficient organization.¹⁵⁴ The force has its own training school, with a limited infrastructure and allied facilities. Before 9/11, the training of manpower was mainly focused on peace time security duties along friendly borders. However, in recent years, the emphasis has taken a paradigmatic shift towards training for anti terrorist activities. Presently, almost the entire force is

¹⁵⁴ Embassy of the United States, "U.S. Delivers Protective Equipment to Frontier Corps NWFP," December 5, 2006, <http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h06120501.html> (accessed October 12, 2008).

employed with the Pakistan military in anti-terrorist activities on the Pak-Afghan borders.¹⁵⁵ Initially, the performance of the force was quite deplorable; however, their performance is continuously improving.¹⁵⁶

2. FC Balochistan

The FC Balochistan, with its Headquarters at Quetta, consists of about 50,000 personnel, and falls under the domain of the Federal government. Its corps and wings are based and deployed in almost all parts of the Balochistan Province. They guard against anti-state and criminal activities, smuggling, and human trafficking along the Pak-Iran and Pak-Afghan borders.¹⁵⁷ This force has been engaged more than a few times in government's attempts to eliminate tribal and sub-nationalist counter agencies in the province.

a. Tasks of FC Balochistan

A few of the significant tasks of FC Balochistan are as follows.

- Guarding 2100 kilometers of the Pak-Afghan and Pak-Iran borders to protect movement of smugglers/unwanted local and foreign personnel
- Assisting the provincial government maintain civil power in the face of sub-nationalist threats, ethnic, tribal sectarian and economic disputes
- Protecting gas plants in the province like Sui, Pirkoh, Loti, Uch and mega projects, and providing security to foreign construction teams
- Protecting and securing 2900 kilometers of communication lines including national highways and the main railway link
- Checking and controlling human traffic along the borders
- Running anti-smuggling, anti-narcotics and anti-gun running operations

¹⁵⁵ "Over 1500 Militants Killed, 950 Arrested in Bajaur Operation," *Associated Press of Pakistan*, http://www.app.com.pk/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=56920&Itemid=2 (accessed October 5, 2008).

¹⁵⁶ Inspector General FC NWFP, Major General Tariq Khan, had a press conference on October 24, 2008 where he presented a commendable role played by FC troops while undertaking tough operations in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA. This agency appears to be under full control of the security forces of Pakistan, which is a big blow for the militants and a significant achievement for the FC troops deployed there.

¹⁵⁷ "No Military Operation is Going on in Balochistan," *Daily Gujranwala Times*, August 3, 2008, <http://gujanwalatimes.com/english/modules/news/article.php?storyid=93> (accessed October 25, 2008).

b. Deployment and Commitment Profile

Presently, seven of the fourteen corps of the FC Balochistan are deployed to monitor the borders. They are manning approximately 400 check posts. Six Corps are deployed in the interior areas of the Balochistan Province to maintain law and order and help the police and the Levies establish the writ of the state. They are also employed to maintain lines of communication and ensure the protection of development projects within the province.¹⁵⁸ The reserve corps looks after the administrative needs of the force and acts as a stand-by reserve to reinforce any of the deployed corps during emergencies.

c. Weapons, Equipment, and Training

This force holds an almost identical quantity and quality of weapons, operational equipment and communication assets as the FC NWFP.¹⁵⁹ However, a lot of new equipment and vehicles have been procured recently, which enhances the overall operational efficiency of the FC Balochistan. Similarly, over the past several years, on the job training against criminals, terrorists, and sub-nationalists has contributed to the improvement of the individual and collective skills of the troops.

H. PAKISTANI COAST GUARDS

The Pakistani Coast Guard looks after the coastal belt of Pakistan. The country has 650 miles of coastline falling in its Sind and Balochistan Provinces. The coastline borders the Northeastern Arabian Sea. The Exclusive Economic Zone covers an area of 196, 600 square kilometers, and the territorial waters stretch over 24000 square kilometers.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Hassan Abbas, "Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps," March 29, 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370292> (accessed October 3, 2008).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Wildlife of Pakistan, "Introduction to Pakistan," <http://www.wildlifeofpakistan.com/IntroductiontoPakistan/coastlineofPakistan.htm> (accessed October 2, 2008).



Figure 7. Map showing coastline of Pakistan¹⁶¹

Prior to 1971, Pakistan had no organized agency to ensure the protection of her coastline against smugglers, saboteurs and illegal immigrants, and the vast coastal belt of the country was exposed to any sort of threat. A very small number of personnel, in an insignificant official agency, “Sea Customs,” were hardly able to make their presence felt, let alone counter well equipped and armed smugglers. Therefore, the Pakistani Coast Guard was set up in June 1971 at Karachi. Since then, this force, headed by its Director General- a brigadier from the Army on deputation – has improved the performance of its duties to safeguard the coastal belt of the country.¹⁶²

The Pakistani Coast Guard, which is a federal LEA, works in modest collaboration with the Pakistan Navy, the FC Balochistan and local police to prevent the smuggling of illegal goods and narcotics, stop illegal immigration to and migration from the country, and stop enemy agents or saboteurs from infiltrating the country along the coastal areas. The significance of the Pakistani Coast Guard has dramatically increased in today’s situation of rising terrorism in the country.

¹⁶¹ Wildlife of Pakistan, “Introduction to Pakistan,” <http://www.wildlifeofpakistan.com/IntroductiontoPakistan/coastlineofPakistan.htm> (accessed October 2, 2008).

¹⁶² “Encyclopedia: Pakistan Coast Guard,” *NationMaster.com*, <http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Pakistan-Coast-Guard> (accessed September 23, 2008).

Despite having been deployed on a long coast for more than thirty five years, the Pakistani Coast Guard has serious operational limitations. The force has a severe scarcity of well trained manpower, and the lack the latest weapons and equipment to match the smugglers. This especially affects their capability during night operations. Similarly, a limited number of vehicles and an obsolete communication infrastructure further reduce the combat worthiness of the Pakistani Coast Guard.

I. CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a brief account of the LEAs in Pakistan with special emphasis upon their strength, organization, training, and operational capabilities. Pakistan has a fairly significant number of LEAs deployed in all parts of the country. Each could invariably deal with small security situations in their areas of responsibility with their existing structures and organizational state of affairs. Perhaps, this was one of the major reasons that the administrations of Pakistan always felt complacent and never critically evaluated the operational discrepancies in the LEAs of the country. The present wave of terrorism and the inability of the LEAs to maintain law and order in different parts of the country have exposed many of their limitations and shortfalls, which will be critically highlighted in the following chapter. Improving upon the vast existing infrastructure of the LEAs and addressing the weaknesses in their structure can enhance their efficiency significantly, and enable them to confront the menace of terrorism in Pakistan.

V. PAKISTAN LEAS -AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

The LEAs of Pakistan- an apparently strong looking group of forces- have generally been able to manage the law and order situation in the country since its creation. In difficult situations, when dealing with insurgent and sub-nationalist elements in Sind and Balochistan Provinces or responding to various catastrophes in the country, they have often been reinforced by the military to satisfactorily perform the necessary tasks. With this sort of tranquil arrangement in the country without the state's interference into trouble spots like the FATA, the various governments of Pakistan invariably felt satisfied with the performance of the LEAs. In addition, there has been the occasional up-gradation of the LEAs. Certainly, none of these sporadic ventures can be viewed as a resolute effort to make the LEAs a compatible force to fight terrorism, and this was never among the priorities of the decision makers in the country.

Before the current surge of terrorism in the country, which started after 9/11, Pakistani LEAs were never confronted with such a daunting task of maintaining law and order. The artificial satisfaction with the performance of LEAs has gained more exposure with every passing day during the counter terrorism campaign in the country. This doomsday scenario, which has made Pakistan a security risk, demands serious review of the performance of all LEAs in the country. This will enable the creation of a comprehensive plan to improve the efficiency of Pakistan's LEAs in their future efforts against terrorism.

B. OUTLOOK OF THE CHALLENGE

The LEAs of Pakistan are confronted with the gigantic challenge of countering robust, innovative, unconventional, and faceless terrorists in their country. The present

terrorism has demonstrated its ability to network globally by launching terrorist operations against the U.S. and its allies from a score of countries with local support.¹⁶³

The terrorists employ many sophisticated methods of operation, using local criminal networks, narcotics gangs, and networks of arms traffickers. They are technologically savvy and train for their missions like aspiring technologists.¹⁶⁴ The world's hunger for instant news on the global TV networks has provided a wide domain for terrorists to propagate their beliefs and wage psychological warfare. Interestingly, terrorists, despite their religious zeal, have exhibited out of the box thinking in the selection of targets, choice of venues, use of technology and method of operations.

C. IMPLICATIONS ON LEAS

The deteriorating law and order situation and continuous rise of terrorist activities in the country has serious implications for Pakistan's LEAs. In the near future, these forces will have to operate under the following scenario.

- The writ of the state remains diluted showing marginal improvement. This places more pressure on the LEAs to overcome the menace of terrorism.
- The overall law and order situation in the country, especially in the NWFP and Balochistan Provinces, along with the scarcity of funding will remain an area of concern for the LEAs; thus, the challenges posed to LEAs will continue for a reasonably long time.¹⁶⁵
- Weak governance, including rampant corruption, prevailing nepotism and a lack of accountability in the organizational system of the LEAs, will increase complications for improvement of these forces.¹⁶⁶
- The lethal combination of sophistication and ingenuity used by the terrorists for their nefarious acts is a widespread phenomenon, and LEAs will continue to face stiff challenges and security risks.

¹⁶³ Michel Chossudovsky, "Pakistan and the Global War on Terrorism," January 8, 2008, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7746> (accessed September 2, 2008).

¹⁶⁴ Gabriel Weimann, "How Modern Terrorist Uses the Internet," <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.pdf> (accessed September 14, 2008).

¹⁶⁵ Lisa Curtis, "Combating Terrorism in Pakistan: Going on the Offensive," July 15, 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1991.cfm> (accessed October 3, 2008).

¹⁶⁶ Transparency International, "Pakistan National Corruption Perception Survey 2006," August 11, 2006, <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&ct=result&cd=1&q=corruption+in+Pakistan+Police&spell=1> (accessed October 12, 2008).

- The provision of secure environments for developmental activities and the rebuilding of infrastructure in the trouble zones, particularly less governed areas like the FATA are likely to remain major areas of concern for the LEAs.
- The integration of the three principal LEAs, namely the FC, Rangers, and police to affect the writ of the state remains questionable as these three forces have different operational cultures and do not fall under a unified command mechanism.
- The Army plays a key stabilizing role in the country through its strong positioning and posturing. In the past, they have been repeatedly employed in an internal security mode to quell uprisings and troubles. The lead role of the Army appears to be continuing, thus hampering the confidence and self-reliance of the LEAs to deal with difficult situations.

D. AN INVESTIGATIVE VIEW OF THE LEAS

The LEAs of Pakistan are functioning within an age old system based on a time when their tasks were less challenging.¹⁶⁷ Today, with the threat scenario transformed and their employment more exigent, their organization, training standards, weapons and equipment are not adequate to meet the new demands. The subsequent paragraphs briefly highlight some of the major issues, which need a re-appraisal for the judicious and successful employment of the Pakistan's LEAs in the days to come.

1. Organizational Contours

a. Faulty Infrastructure

The existing infrastructure of each LEA is strictly hierarchical and rigid with no interagency collaboration.¹⁶⁸ The information and intelligence collected by one LEA is not shared with any other, and all of them operate in near isolation. This lack of cooperation results in slower, less effective responses to terrorist and criminal activities. Within each LEA, independent teamwork is not emphasized and a sluggish bureaucracy is dominant, which creates a less than prompt response to emergencies.

¹⁶⁷ Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, "Reforming Pakistan Police: An Overview," http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008).

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

b. Deficiency of Manpower

Almost all LEAs are deficient in their authorized manpower and perform their duties with limited personnel. The increasing population, rapidly growing cities and more frequent occurrence of terrorist activities in all parts of the country have made the tasks of the LEAs, especially the police, more challenging. The existing strength of the police, when compared to the large areas of responsibility deputed to each police station, is inadequate and at times laughable. Consequently, the role of the police is predominantly a reactive response rather than a proactive approach.¹⁶⁹

c. Shortage of Weapons and Equipment

The terrorists have kept a reasonably good pace with technological advancements, whereas the LEAs of Pakistan have not. The police, Frontier Constabulary and Levies operate with old vintage rifles that cannot compete with the latest multipurpose weapons used by the terrorists.¹⁷⁰ Some particular concerns include lack of close-quarter-battle weapons, bulletproof jackets, bomb disposal systems, armed personnel carriers, scanners, vehicle search apparatus, anti riot equipment, surveillance gear, forensic equipment, and IED jammers.

d. Lack of Compatible Mobility and Transport

In addition to the lack any aerial support for the LEAs of Pakistan, they also do not have a sufficient number of running vehicles, and this lack of mobility seriously hinders their smooth functioning. When speedy action is warranted based on reliable information about terrorists, the absence of requisite mobility foils the efforts of the LEAs. The following examples illustrate the seriousness of the situation.

¹⁶⁹ “Pakistan Police Reforms,” *Daily Times*, June 14, 2007, <http://pakistanpolicereforms.blogspot.com/2007/06/pakistan-police-reforms.html> (accessed September 11, 2008)

¹⁷⁰ James Bonomo, Giacomo Bergamo, David R. Flinger, John Gordon and Brian A. Jackson, “Steeling the Sword: Limiting Terrorists Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG510.pdf (accessed October 12, 2008).

- Each police station in the country, which is responsible for maintaining law and order in an area of up to 100 villages, has one or two official vehicles.¹⁷¹ If one team has left the police station, the other teams are forced to wait for the return of the vehicle, irrespective of the urgency of the situation. Alternatively, the victim of the crime must hire a vehicle for to bring the police to the site of the incident.
- An FC wing (600 personnel) is authorized only 10 vehicles for operational tasks, logistics, and communication; therefore it impossible to meet all requirements at one time.
- At present, most of the FC and Rangers check posts do not have any means of transportation. Every time a vehicle is required, it must come from another place. This acute deficiency of vehicles makes them ineffective against highly mobile terrorists.
- No LEA has a reserve or second line transport to replace their faulty vehicles. Since the vehicles are old and spare parts are unavailable, breakdowns are common.
- All LEAs hold negligible number of special vehicles like ambulances and shop vans. Therefore when combating terrorist activity, they need to hire or illegally force a civilian ambulance to help the victims.

e. Shortage of Communication and Surveillance Equipment

Most of the communication equipment held by the LEAs are outdated and do not work efficiently. Unsecured wireless communication often reveals the plans of the LEAs to terrorists, and unprotected line communication can be cut by the terrorists at any time. Similarly, the shortage of surveillance equipment within the LEAs poses serious problems. It facilitates the movement of terrorists into sensitive areas, and allows them to cross borders undetected. However, the United States is in the process of providing some surveillance equipment for the LEAs of Pakistan.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ The author had a telephone conversation with police officials from seven police stations in District Gujarat, located on the main highway in central Punjab. All but two have only one vehicle. The two with more vehicles appeared to be privileged to have more moving capability than their counter parts in the District. Some of the police stations in remote areas of the country do not have any official vehicles available to them for duty.

¹⁷² "U.S. to Give Security Equipment to Pakistan," *Dawn*, <http://www.dawn.com/2004/09/17/nat19.htm> (accessed October 24, 2008).

f. Revision of Tables of Organization and Equipment

The Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&Es)¹⁷³ officially represent the authorization of manpower, weaponry and equipment for each security organization in Pakistan. These are gravely outdated and need revision to make permanent changes in the authorization of these forces. Some of the LEAs have procured items and equipment outside their TO&Es through different government and nongovernment programs. This makes the organizations dependent on “adhocism.” There is a need to revise the TO&Es according to the changed scenarios and environments.

2. Training Inadequacies

a. Lack of Specialized Training

The LEAs do not have an appropriate system of specialized training for their manpower. For the most part, they learn through on job the training, which is really hard way to learn. Modern terrorists are very well trained, motivated and enjoy the advantages of initiative and invisibility. Thus, a wide gap of capability exists between the trained terrorists and the ill trained troops of the LEAs. This turns the tide in favor of the terrorists.

b. Training versus Application

Because of their traditional peace and war time roles, mostly along the borders, the personnel of the FC and Rangers do not prioritize their secondary task, which is to maintain law and order inside the cities and villages. Their training focuses on their duties along the borders. Once employed in a police role, they encounter serious problems adjusting to their new function.

¹⁷³ The term is commonly used in Pakistan’s military, and as the paramilitary forces are mainly run by the army officers employed on deputation into these forces, this term is also commonly used among all ranks of the paramilitary forces. This table lays down the complete detail of the actual authorization of manpower, weapons and equipment to respective forces under different contingencies of operations.

c. Training Schools of LEAs

The few poorly structured training schools of the police and CAFs are insufficient to train their manpower. As the terrorists target police training centers to damage the law enforcement mechanism, maintaining the security of the schools has further reduced the ability to provide adequate training.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, the output of these schools remains questionable in the absence of sufficiently trained instructors and adequate training aids. Since there are very few vacancies allotted to each other's schools, integrated training with operationally affiliated units is severely neglected.

d. Anti Terrorist Training

The LEAs do not have well organized anti-terrorist training centers of their own, and they are dependent upon the allotment of a few spaces in each course run at the Army's anti-terrorists' training complexes.¹⁷⁵ Due to the extensive involvement of the Army in their counter terrorism campaign and the continuous training requirements for the task the LEAs are not allowed many spots in Army Courses. In addition, there has been no effort by the LEAs to utilize existing army centers for additional courses. Therefore, a lack of the requisite anti-terrorist training has adverse effects on the efficacy of the LEAs against terrorism in the country.

¹⁷⁴ "Blasts Hit Pakistan Police School," *BBC News*, May 11, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4760463.stm (accessed October 1, 2008).

¹⁷⁵ Pakistan Army has placed special emphasis upon antiterrorist training since 2001, and has developed at least one complex at each Garrison in the country to train its manpower before deployment into the troubled areas of the country. As the employment of the Army against terrorists in the country is over stretched and a large number of troops need to undergo the anti terrorist training, only few vacancies are offered to the LEAs in such courses. This is insufficient to meet their requirements for efficient operations against terrorism.

3. Operational Imbalances

a. Integral Aviation Assets and Support

Considering the complexity of the threat, difficult terrain configuration, and requirement for speedy movement, LEAs require at least minimal integral aviation assets, both combat as well as cargo. Presently, none has any such asset and each has to rely on the Army's help for aerial support.

b. Logistic System

The LEAs operate their distribution of rations and supplies through badly managed contracts. This system often provides sub-standard supplies to the forces and fails to support the LEAs logistically during prolonged engagements. The system is not reliable and often becomes unworkable in the prevalent tense environment. This leaves the troops to manage their necessities on their own. In addition, the practice of procuring a widely dissimilar variety of vehicles, weapons, and equipment, without any long-term thinking about maintenance, needs to be replaced with an integrated recovery and maintenance system.

c. Engineer Assets

Presently, none of the LEAs has a worthwhile bomb disposal squad to handle the ever increasing number and variety of IEDs and bombs used by the terrorists.¹⁷⁶ Often, the LEAs are dependent upon military engineer assets for the disposal of bombs and IEDs, which is not a smooth arrangement for a prompt response against security threats in the country. There is an increased need for independent engineering organizations within each LEA. Each one needs independent bomb disposal squads and explosive sections.

¹⁷⁶ Terence J. Sigamony, "Civil Defense Bomb Disposal Squad without Latest Equipment," *Daily Times*, October 15, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C10%5C15%5Cstory_15-10-2008_pg11_10 (accessed October 23, 2008).

d. Intelligence and Scientific Means of Investigation

The absence of an accurate and efficient intelligence system is a limitation for all the LEAs of Pakistan, because none has an independent and proficient intelligence unit. Most of them rely on Federal and Military Intelligence agencies like the Federal Investigation Agency, Inter Services Intelligence, or Military Intelligence Directorate. This is a complicated, laborious and sluggish process.¹⁷⁷ This process limits the LEAs freedom to act and often proves counterproductive to their performance against terrorists. Additionally, at the moment, there is no forensic laboratory with any LEA, the lack of which makes scientific investigation a distant dream. Resultantly, investigations are conducted in an obsolete fashion without any great benefit to the cause of counter-terrorism.

e. Reinvigoration of Crisis Management Setup

Presently, a crisis management organization exists each at provincial and national level, but these organizations are underutilized. There is no clear designation of their role as it relates to the LEAs. The true concept of the National Crises Management Cell (NCCM) is not yet geared up to contribute substantially in the overall crisis management in the country. This set-up is required to ensure interagency coordination based on a modern network centric system and to gain real time information for a requisite superior response. Unfortunately, it does not yet exist in the country.

4. Unsatisfactory Work Environments and Functional Irritants

a. Allocation of Budget

The annual allocation of the budget for law enforcement, especially the police, Levies and Frontier Constabulary is too small to meet the very basic needs of the

¹⁷⁷ Intelligence Resource Program, "Pakistan Intelligence Agencies," <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/index.html> (accessed October 29, 2008).

personnel, let alone provide for the modernization of these LEAs. Very low pay and the absence of basic benefits and ancillary services for the manpower of the LEAs are major causes of corruption and a lack of seriousness regarding duty.

b. Morale and Motivation

Morale is directly related to the output of the force. Amongst the LEAs, a 1998 survey of 90 police officials conducted by a researcher of the Department of Sociology, University of the Punjab resulted in the following observations.¹⁷⁸

- 64.44% felt insecure about illegal transfer and / or suspension as a result of by political influence
- 50% felt insecure about victimization from their superiors
- 57.78% did not feel secure about their monthly salary
- 57% did not feel secure about the provision of residential facilities
- 47.78% felt insecure for the future of their children in case of any accident during professional performances
- Majority of the respondents (52.22%) did not feel safe from the sophisticated weapons possessed by the criminals
- 47.78% opined that there was no guarantee of proper legal action against the accused

c. Frequent Posting and Shifting of Police Officials

The shifting of police personnel for political reasons from one place to another has had deep effects on the performance of the organization. People with zeal and zest are often made to suffer and frequently rotated. On average, the tenure of an officer in Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukhur is 7, 5, and 4 months, respectively. The politicization of the police in other parts of the country also causes great damage to performance.

¹⁷⁸ Though there has been no survey conducted lately on the police department of Pakistan, the living conditions of the police force have not improved much in the country. However, the quality of life of the troops in the Pakistan Rangers and Frontier Corps is improving. The survey data has been taken from the Visitor's Brief of Sialkot Police.

d. Image Building

The overall image of the LEAs in Pakistan has deteriorated over the years owing to their poor performance and unjust treatment of the public.¹⁷⁹ The common citizens of the country do not have high expectations of these forces and are rarely willing to provide any information about the activities of terrorists and miscreants. Consequently, LEA operations get very little public support. Therefore, there is a dire need to improve the image of the LEAs. To garner willing support from the local populace for their operations, they must cast off their tarnished, ill-mannered, uncouth image and develop a public service oriented and people friendly outlook.

E. CONCLUSION

The LEAs of Pakistan face the daunting task of maintaining law and order in the country with meager resources and below par operational proficiencies. Traditionally, they have been trained to control riots or small disturbances and deal with minor security situations, which did not call for the massive use of force against their own people. However, the situation has changed since the influx of hard core, vigorously trained, and extremely radicalized foreign and local militants. These militants have access to sophisticated weaponry and lethal equipment that is far better than what the LEAs have. The country's policy makers need to come out of their comfort zone of complacency about the structure of their LEAs and make rigorous efforts to modernize these forces. The well thought out restructuring and increased empowerment of the LEAs should be a priority in the country, so that unprecedented challenge of terrorism can be overcome. This terrorism is a hurdle to peacemaking not only within Pakistan, but also around the world. The subsequent chapter lays down some recommendations to enhance the combat worthiness of the LEAs in Pakistan.

¹⁷⁹ Asghar Mahmood, "Police Occupational Culture," *Pakistan Times*, <http://pakistanimes.net/2004/02/16/guest1.htm> (accessed October 19, 2008).

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VI. RESPONSE PARAMETERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The complex and multifaceted manifestation of terrorism in Pakistan vis-à-vis the insubstantial security apparatus in the country in the form of feebly organized and scantily equipped/trained LEAs calls for a wide-ranging set of the recommendations to bolster the capabilities of the law enforcement mechanism in the country. At this crucial juncture in the history of the country, it is necessary for the Government of Pakistan to set a special priority for up-gradation of its LEAs. This will enable the country to generate a matching response to the despicable designs of the terrorist. This chapter first spells out the response parameters expected from the security mechanism in the country, and then suggests a course of action to build the capacity of the LEAs in Pakistan.

B. RESPONSE PARAMETERS

Any objective and dispassionate analysis of today's terrorism in Pakistan suggests that it is neither a simple nor a short term affair, and it defies the pure use of force.¹⁸⁰ Political, psychological, economic and other initiatives are needed to supplement the use of force. There is a great need for more subtle tactics and special techniques of use of force coupled with politico-economic expertise instead of amassed fire power from conventional military forces.¹⁸¹ The vital prerequisites to conduct successful anti-terrorist operations call for a reinvigorated crisis management setup, coherent operational doctrine, and suitably organized LEAs capable of reacting across the entire spectrum of terrorism in all parts of the country.

¹⁸⁰ Muhammad Khurshid, "Rule of Law Only Solution to Terrorism Problem in Tribal Areas," *American Chronicle*, August 30, 2007, <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/36414> (accessed October 30, 2008).

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

To combat terrorism proactively, a cohesive and integrated intelligence effort at the national level is of the utmost importance, which demands due attention by the policy makers. On the execution end, a legal framework is required to be constituted to assist the LEAs in equipping and applying themselves for the initial containment and following elimination of terrorism in the country. Similarly, each LEA needs to devise a comprehensive training module to train its manpower for counterterrorist operations. This should be coordinated at national level to make the best use of the resources available for all the LEAs.

C. NATIONAL RESPONSE

Within its existing policy framework, it is imperative for the Government of Pakistan to evolve a national strategy to counter the looming menace of terrorism. The country has no option but to synchronize its political, economic, social, diplomatic, psychological and military assets for a sustained effort to win against the terrorists. At the national level, the following measures are suggested in this regard.

1. Evolving National Anti Terrorist Policy

Pakistan's existing national defense policy, which is mainly focused on security along the eastern borders of the country, should be tailored to lay more emphasis on the threat of terrorism from local and foreign terrorists.¹⁸² The Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC)¹⁸³ should regularly review terrorist threat scenarios and formulate policies accordingly. The policies should be comprised of short-term and long-term measures for the consolidation and up gradation of the capacity of security mechanisms in the country.

¹⁸² Ihsan Ahrari, "Pakistan's Stakes in American War on Terrorism," <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pakistan.cfm> (accessed November 9, 2008).

¹⁸³ Government of Pakistan, "Overview of the Cabinet Division," http://202.83.164.26/wps/portal/Cabinet!/ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os_hQN68AZ3dnIwML82BTAYNXTz9jE0NfQwNLE_2CbEdFACM6vXU!/ (accessed November 2, 2008).

2. Formulation of National Antiterrorist Strategy

Based on the above mentioned national antiterrorist policy, an anti- terrorist strategy should be created at the national level. The strategy should focus on determining the threshold of terrorism in the country, allocating resources for infrastructure building to combat terrorism, and providing guidelines for Pakistan's LEAs to plan and conduct antiterrorist operations. A continuous reappraisal of this strategy conducted by a group of think tanks organized under the DCC will help keep the LEAs geared up for their antiterrorist pursuits.

3. Establishment of Internal Security (IS) Council

The permanent institution of an IS Council at the National level can help continuously monitor and review the security situation in the country. It should adopt a proactive approach to identify the potential terrorist threats and take measures to eradicate them. The Council should act as the focal point of all LEAs for coordinating requisite manpower and resources, providing intelligence and guidelines for impending operations, synchronizing the efforts of various government bodies at national and provincial levels, assisting the DCC in policy formulation, and above all acting as the mother institution to plan and supervise the joint training of all LEAs, commensurate to threat and response required. The suggested composition of the council is as follows.

- Chairman: Federal Secretary Interior
- Members: Each province's representative (Secretary Level)
 - A member each from the Ministries of Information, Interior and Foreign affairs
 - A representative from each of the LEAs
 - An officer each from the Army, Navy and Air Force
 - Two representatives from each intelligence agency
 - A representative each from the Judiciary and Media
 - A professional and learned analyst from each province, nominated by the executive head

4. Reinvigoration of Crises Management Setup

The government needs to reinvigorate the National Crises Management Cell (NCCM)¹⁸⁴ at a National level, under the IS Council. Provinces and districts can formulate such setups at their respective levels. These cells, if astutely instituted and aptly developed, can pay rich dividends when dealing with any crisis created by terrorist acts, through their swift and harmonious response.

5. Acquisition and Processing of Intelligence

The inability to acquire and process intelligence is a serious impediment to the proficient application of LEAs of Pakistan. The insightful and well planned management of intelligence and its coordination among various LEAs are vital for the success of any antiterrorist operation in Pakistan. This ought to be coordinated and synchronized at the highest level. A national intelligence organization, set up under the Ministry of Interior, should provide policy guidelines and establish antiterrorist intelligence and counter-intelligence networks throughout the country. This set up can work in close coordination with Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)¹⁸⁵ and other military intelligence agencies, whenever the military is required to reinforce the LEAs in antiterrorist operations.

6. Political and Economic Stability

The most important aspects of national integration in a democratic country are political and economic stability. The political and economic situation in Pakistan has yet to stabilize.¹⁸⁶ Both of these components have a symbiotic relationship with the security situation in the country. The government must initiate immediate short-term and solid

¹⁸⁴ The Cell exists at a national level, presently headed by Brigadier (Retired) Javed Iqbal Cheema, but it needs to focus more on the overall efficiency of the LEAs of Pakistan. Along with its reinvigoration as a potent institution to deal with all crises in the country, set ups should be established at each province level in close collaboration with the LEAs. At the moment, crisis cells are non-existent at the provincial level.

¹⁸⁵ Federation of American Scientists, "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence," <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/index.html> (accessed November 3, 2008).

¹⁸⁶ Jackie Northam, "Economic, Political problems Rising in Pakistan," *All Things Considered*, July 25, 2008, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92928662> (accessed November 9, 2008).

long-term measures to improve upon the various institutions of the country. This will terminate the process of whimsical decision making by different personalities and address the root causes of the menace of terrorism.

The parliament should constitute a comprehensive legal framework to assist the LEAs in combating terrorism. This will allow for decisions about the security situation that are dependent upon a defined constitutional process and not on the political expediency of various individuals or groups at the helm of affairs.

7. Curbing Religious Radicalism and Sectarianism

The government should promulgate constitutional rules and initiate administrative measures including the banning of religious extremist parties and their sympathizers. They should institute across the board registration and mainstreaming of madrassas to control the culture of sectarian hatred and religious violence. Similarly, a national strategy should be formulated for arms control and the disarmament of the civil population, including people in the tribal areas of the country. After the enactment of such rules, the LEAs should be facilitated to implement them vigorously without any political interference.

8. Effective Use of Media

The media should play a positive role in strengthening national security. The following aspects may help Pakistan effectively use the media to combat terrorism.

The formation of a National Media Policy and orchestration of a workable media strategy with a precise focus on the war against terrorism. Presently, the media in Pakistan is mostly critical of the LEAs, and at times, in labyrinth, supports religious fundamentalists more than it guides the law enforcement mechanism of the country.¹⁸⁷ The media policy should endeavor to address such aspects, while taking freedom of speech into consideration.

¹⁸⁷ Kenneth Ballen, "The Myth of Muslim Support for Terror," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html> (accessed October 3, 2008).

The establishment of an expert group of competent and broad minded defense analysts, moderate religious specialists, and unprejudiced correspondents to monitor media coverage and respond to any extreme interpretation of the terrorists. This will ensure a professional approach to the coverage of the terrorists' acts and the response of LEAs in such situations.¹⁸⁸

Pakistan should acquire a time and place in the international media to present the correct perspective of the situation in the country, highlight capacity problems of the LEAs, which are often mistaken as an unwillingness to tackle terrorism, and obliterate the doomsday picture painting of the security situation in the country. This will both discourage potential foreign terrorists who plan to travel to Pakistan, and encourage the LEAs of the country to take a more aggressive response against the terrorists.

D. ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE – EXECUTION END

1. Anti Terrorist Doctrine

The National Management Crisis Cell should formulate a comprehensive antiterrorist doctrine, which should clearly state procedures for anti-terrorist operations in the country. Based on the doctrine, training publications should be prepared by the respective LEAs. These will provide guidelines for antiterrorist operations. To develop the doctrine, the following measures are recommended.

The doctrine should be created at national level based on available assets and prospective capacity of all LEAs of the country, both at national and provincial levels. This should lay down a system of mutual support among all LEAs while employed in any part of the country.

All stake holders - the Federal Government, the Provincial governments, and the LEAs should be involved in the preparation of this doctrine. Similarly, the role of the military in the maintenance of security should also be streamlined as a reinforcing force to the LEAs in extreme cases.

¹⁸⁸ Pakistan Think Tank Forum, "What is the Reaction of Moderate Muslims to Terrorism," January 1, 2007, <http://pakistanthinktank.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=121> (accessed October 12, 2008).

The overall responsibility of coordinating and implementing the above plan should be permanently entrusted to one agency, the IS Council/Ministry of Interior.¹⁸⁹

The present and near future terrorism situations should be studied in more detail to project the threat contours more clearly and identify the center of gravity of terrorism in each potentially troubled area.

2. Antiterrorism Training Aspects

a. Training Philosophy

As identified earlier in the evaluation of the LEAs, what follows are three cardinal aspects on which the training philosophy of the LEAs of Pakistan should be based within the overall realm of the anti terrorist doctrine.

- Restore the confidence and credibility of all ranks of the LEAs in order to deal with terrorists more positively. Employment in the LEAs should be perceived as a sacred service to the populace of the country.
- Alienate the local public from the terrorists and augment the role of a civil citizenry to maintain peace and tranquility in their respective areas.
- Help the masses of affected areas join the national mainstream without fear of the terrorists. Focus especially on the educational facilities in remote areas of the country.

b. Training Methodology

The training methodology¹⁹⁰ of LEAs for a swift and matching response against terrorists should flow from the training philosophy and should be institutionalized at all levels as follows:

(1) Training Directive. A general training directive should be issued encompassing terrorist threats and responses. All LEA training institutions should

¹⁸⁹ Sajid Chaudhry, "National Transport Policy to be Presented for Cabinet's Approval," *Daily Times*, October 18, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C10%5C18%5Cstory_18-10-2008_pg5_4 (accessed October 23, 2008).

¹⁹⁰ The salient aspects of training methodology have been prepared by the author through extensive discussions with the police officials in Pakistan including Inspector Muhammad Akhtar, who is the elder brother of the author and is presently serving at the biggest Police Training Center Sihala, Rawalpindi.

prepare a comprehensive syllabus, based on this directive, to impart training to their men. The training emphasis, especially for the officers of the LEAs, should focus on the following aspects.

- Planning and handling of various complex terrorist situations
- Conducting operations in isolation and in coordination with other LEAs at team/sub team levels, particularly for countering potential suicide bombers
- Managing legal matters, handling of captured terrorists and interrogation techniques including access to forensic laboratories¹⁹¹
- Conducting psychological operations, public relations, and the art of negotiation and persuasion of people with due respect to their cultures and traditions
- Developing an analytical thought process, especially for handling different complicated situations and media personnel

(2) Training Institutions. Presently, all the LEAs of Pakistan have a limited number of individual training centers, and there is no institution for joint training at national level. At least five national level training institutions should be established, one at each national and provincial capital in the country. The training of should be planned progressively, starting with the respective training institutions of the LEAs and culminating in joint training at national level training institutions under the IS council.

The training institutions of the LEAs in Pakistan should arrange exchange training programs with developed countries to benefit from the law enforcement experience of contemporary LEAs. The Department of Homeland Security in the U.S., Scotland Yard in the United Kingdom and police departments in Germany and Canada may be few of the good institutions for the said exchange program.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ Kellie Ortega, "Anti Terrorist Laws in Pakistan," <http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/512/512%20kellie%20ortega.htm> (accessed October 23, 2008).

¹⁹² Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 15.

c. Subjects of the Training

The training module of LEAs in Pakistan should keep evolving to ensure that their manpower is adequately skilled to take on new techniques adopted by terrorists. A research and analysis wing, on a national level under the IS Council, can perform the task of continuously evaluating the training system and suggesting necessary modifications. Presently, individual, sub-team, and team training should focus the following:

- Techniques of antiterrorist operations in urban areas, with special emphasis on the avoidance of collateral damage
- Weapon handling to include firing from various positions, on the move, and at moving vehicles
- Unarmed combat, sniper skills, and the use of explosives
- Patrolling of trouble spots, cordon and search operations
- Establishing of road blocks and check posts as well as surveillance and spot checks of vehicles, personnel and houses
- Imposition of curfew, ambushes, raids, apprehension of terrorists and the interception or sealing off of operation areas
- Riot and mob control and search of civilians singly or jointly
- First aid and interaction with the media and civil society

E. ORGANIZATION RELATED ASPECTS

1. New Raising

The LEAs are comprised of a few specially trained outfits to face difficult situations created by terrorists. The state of affairs in the police department is particularly disturbing, as they often make ad hoc arrangements to fight complex law and order scenarios. The following set-ups should be a priority to enhance the proficiency of LEAs in controlling terrorism in the country.

a. The Police Department

(1) Platoon Size. It is a quick reaction force (30-40 personnel), suitably equipped with latest weapons, operational gear, communication systems, and reliable vehicles, should be raised at each Tehsil level. While acting as a readily available special reserve in each Tehsil, this force should be prepared to respond promptly to any terrorism threat in their area of responsibility.

(2) Company Size. It is an antiterrorist force (100-150 personnel), equipped and prepared along the lines of the above mentioned quick reaction force, should be raised at each district level.¹⁹³ After central training and coordination, this force should be split among two or three places in the district at the discretion of the District Police Officer. It should act as an exclusive force to proactively deal with terrorism anywhere in the respective district.

(3) “B Areas.” In these areas of Balochistan Province, where the Levies are responsible for maintaining law and order should be declared “A areas,” and the police force in those areas should be organized on the same lines as other districts of the country. The existing Levies force can be merged into the police department without creating a vacuum of the law enforcement in those areas.¹⁹⁴ Similarly, the Frontier Constabulary in the tribal areas can also be merged into the police department.

(4) District Level. At least one bomb disposal squad and an explosive section should be raised at each district level. They should work in close coordination with the quick reaction forces at Tehsils and the antiterrorist forces at a district level.

¹⁹³ Though not very well organized, the federal and provincial police have created a few outfits called anti terrorist squads. Recently a suicide bomber struck the headquarters of one such outfit in Islamabad. More details can be found on <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/10/09/pakistan-blast.html> (accessed October 24, 2008).

¹⁹⁴ “Levies-Police Merger to Help Curb Crime: Official,” *Dawn*, September 27, 2005, <http://www.dawn.com/2005/09/27/nat13.htm> (accessed October 23, 2008).

b. Civil Armed Forces

The following units should be raised in the FC (NWFP and Balochistan) and Rangers (Punjab and Sind) to enhance their efficiency against terrorism and their role with military during the war.

- 1-2 antiterrorist wings, fully equipped and trained to fight terrorism as their main role and support the military in war as a secondary role. Some of the CAFs are already in the process of raising these wings. They should be expedited and financed for optimal efficiency.
- A logistics battalion to ensure the administration and logistics of the respective CAF, while deployed in a law enforcement role
- A repair and maintenance battalion, capable of extending its services beyond the garrisons of the CAFs
- An engineering battalion organized into bomb disposal squads and explosive detection sub units
- An ordinance unit to ensure the supply of ammunition

2. Increase in Manpower of the LEAs

As discussed earlier, the LEAs are functioning with a serious deficiency of authorized manpower, which needs to be addressed as a priority.¹⁹⁵ The government of Pakistan should take immediate measures to fill all vacancies in the LEAs, along with planning an augmentation of manpower, where required. A board of police officers from all the provinces should be created under the Secretary Interior to rationally evaluate the authorized manpower of the police in each district according to the population growth in the respective area, and thereafter, determine enhancements of the police force and police stations.

Similarly, more wings are required for CAFs to effectively conduct both internal security tasks and their customary border protection duties. As a long- term measure, the plan should include a wing in each Corps as a reserve to achieve flexibility and quick reaction capability against the growing menace of the terrorism in the country.

¹⁹⁵ Mansab Dogar, "431 ASIs to be Transferred to District Police," *Daily Times*, November 10, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C11%5C10%5Cstory_10-11-2008_pg13_1 (accessed November 12, 2008).

The present arrangement of posting military officers on deputation to the CAFs should be revisited. Instead, these forces should permanently commission their own officers. Though it may not be possible to replace all the officers immediately, the process can be started by getting vacancies at the Police Academy Sihala and Pakistan Military Academy Kakul. As a long-term measure, a training academy for officers of the CAFs should be established, preferably in Islamabad, and newly commissioned officers of the Rangers and FC should be trained there.

3. Communication Infrastructure

Presently, the LEAs possess High Frequency (HF) sets, which are cumbersome and prone to easy jamming and disruption by terrorists during operations.¹⁹⁶ These sets should be replaced with the latest light weight Very High Frequency (VHF) radio sets, which are more secure tools of communication. Duplicate lines communication should also be established at all police stations and check posts, so they remain connected with each other despite individual line problems. During their mandatory training courses, LEA personnel should be educated to code and decode messages on wireless networks for security purposes, as this is one of the significant grey areas in the communication systems of LEAs in Pakistan.

4. Transportation System

The prevalent scarcity of agile and robust vehicles in the police department and the nonexistence of second line transport in the CAFs necessitate the provision of superior quality vehicles to LEAs. This will enable them to react to any terrorist threat with a more hands-on approach. The better transportation arrangement, along with a

¹⁹⁶ National Police Bureau, "Nationwide Integrated Radio Communication System for Police," http://www.npb.gov.pk/Backup%20%5B260608%5D/projects/radio_communication_system.asp (accessed October 30, 2008).

sufficient quantity of fuel, is likely to both change the sluggish attitude of LEAs about law enforcement and diminish the appalling trend in which victims are forced to arrange for transport.¹⁹⁷

In addition to ground mobility, the LEAs, especially the police, should own a minimum number of aviation assets for a swift response against terrorists. It is recommended that at each LEA level, one aviation squadron should be authorized to ensure the speedy and effective employment of the quick reaction forces. This will also provide prompt intelligence, casualty evacuation, logistics support and assistance in the pursuit of fleeing miscreants and terrorists.

5. Allocation of Special Equipment

In order to safeguard against mines, protect convoys from ambushes, neutralize heavily armed terrorists and potential suicide bombers, and reduce the number of casualties in operations, it is essential to equip LEA personnel with practical, modern protective gear. This required special equipment includes night vision goggles, vehicle scanners, explosive ordinance disposal suits, bulletproof jackets, mine detectors, laser ranger finders, global positioning systems, anti mine shoes, and lightweight helmets.

6. Procurement of Weapons and Equipment

The current weapons and equipment procurement process in Pakistan is quite laborious and involves many ministries for the endorsement of even trivial items. As a onetime measure, it may be prudent to constitute a board of officers from all involved ministries under the proposed IS council to work out and fulfill the minimum requirements of weapons and equipment for LEAs. Subsequently, weapons can be replenished through a more rapid process enforced by the Federal Ministry of Interior.

The Government of Pakistan should allocate a special budget to procure the said weapons and equipment for LEAs. The U.S. government, which is already helping

¹⁹⁷ Hassan Abbas, "Police Reform: Agenda of Change," March 4, 2008, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18117/police_reforms.html?breadcrum (accessed October 13, 2008).

Pakistan undertake the reforms of the FC, should assist Pakistan financially to equip her LEAs in a befitting manner. Although it is difficult to project the cost of the said project accurately, U.S. aid of one to two billion dollars every year exclusively for the up-gradation of Pakistani LEAs can produce excellent results in few years.

7. More Artillery and Mortar Assets

The existing terrorist threat has grown quite substantial, and the LEAs cannot fight them with small arms alone. This is particularly relevant in the tribal areas near the Pak-Afghan border, where the terrorists have safe havens. The use of artillery is a requirement to pin down and annihilate terrorists in inaccessible areas. Presently, authorized artillery and mortar batteries are insufficient, therefore additional artillery batteries are recommended for each of the FC and Ranger Corps.

8. Surveillance of Borders

Despite the fact that Pakistan has established more than one hundred posts on their side of the Pak-Afghan border and similar NATO and Afghan forces are deployed on the Afghanistan side, large gaps continue to exist and the terrorists conveniently travel back and forth from one country to another.¹⁹⁸ The porous border, coupled with the difficult terrain and innumerable routes, necessitates the procurement of surveillance equipment.

At least one ground surveillance radar, mounted on a mobile platform, should be provided to each wing of the FC, which is normally deployed along a front of 100 kilometers. Moreover, each post should be outfitted with a minimum of 1-2 Sophie Night Sights, which can help track and identify the intruders at a reasonable distance. This will enable an appropriate response from the LEAs' personnel.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Global Security.Org, "Pak-Afghan Border Remains in Profile," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/pakistan/2005/pakistan-051003-irna01.htm> (accessed November 2, 2008).

¹⁹⁹ "Electronic Surveillance on Pak-Afghan Border," *The Times of India*, December 28, 2006, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/966285.cms> (accessed November 7, 2008).

F. CHANGING THE OUTLOOK OF THE LEAS

While the traditional training and law enforcement processes have their merits, it may be valuable to explore how to make the LEAs of Pakistan more effective in the modern counter-terrorism matrix of the twenty first century. The following are some of the measures, which can help change the outlook of LEA personnel.

1. Changing the Mindset

The LEAs have to work assiduously to change the medieval mindset of the rank and file who deal with traditional miscreants and law abiders. They have to be cultured to keep themselves abreast of the ingenuity today's terrorists and the inventiveness of the crime world with which they are confronted.²⁰⁰ There is no alternative to periodic orientation courses, specifically designed for LEA personnel, to educate them on the latest trends and innovative techniques adopted by the terrorists. The overall focus should be to prepare all ranks of the LEAs to adopt a preemptive approach, thereby changing their reactive mindset.

2. Technology Orientation to Training

The training curriculum for LEAs should include an awareness of modern communication means, including the use of the Internet. Unless it is implemented at the recruit level, the forces will remain unable to use modern technological tools, and outmoded methods of addressing the problem of law enforcement will continue. Each LEA should be provided a sufficient number of computers with internet access at their training centers, and they should encourage students to study, debate and evaluate up-to-the-minute applications of the technology to maintain law and order. They should specifically focus on countering terrorist techniques like cyber crimes with the latest technological gadgets.

²⁰⁰ John Swartz, "Terrorists' Use of Internet Spreads," *USA Today*, February 21, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2005-02-20-cyber-terror-usat_x.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).

3. Creation of a Terrorist Database

A comprehensive database of terrorists, their criminal allies, and fellow travelers needs to be created, maintained and regularly updated at each LEA. The databases should also be easily accessible to other LEAs. The research and development section of each LEA should constantly evaluate the pattern of terrorist activities in the country and propose a modus operandi for pre-emptive measures.

4. Network Centric Response

The present socio-religious-politico-ethnic matrix in Pakistan is a serious security challenge for the LEAs of the country. This scenario necessitates intimate inter-agency coordination at all times on every level to gain up-to-date information and generate the requisite response. A “Modern Network System,” with terrorist databases, linked vertically and horizontally among all the LEAs of the country, and updated on a real time basis would accelerate the response. Such modern trends are vital to contemporary anti-terrorism, and LEAs must pay special attention to them.

5. War-Gaming by the LEAs

Military forces the world over successfully adopt the war-gaming technique to test their operational plans.²⁰¹ Such war-gaming, both at the respective LEA level and the joint level, should be developed and practiced. This is particularly important for senior officers to hone their leadership skills, logical reasoning, and decision-making in simulated terrorism situations. Frequent rehearsals of simulated situations will help formulate standard operating procedures for effective responses at various levels, create a common platform for all the LEAs, and reduce the failure of operations.

G. CONCLUSION

The perilous, complex terrorism of this century is a potent threat not only to Pakistan but to the whole of humankind. The manifestations of this threat are not

²⁰¹ Ayaz Ahmad Khan, “Armed Forces War Gaming,” <http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/august/gaming.htm> (accessed October 30, 2008).

restricted to any particular area, region or society. They are frightening to the inhabitants of all corners of the globe. The wide spectrum of the terrorist activities and the variety of circumstances leading to their initiation presents an enormous challenge to the experts and policy makers of the world.

The menace of terrorism is further complicated by the existing differences among various state and non state actors and their diverging interests. Within each society, particularly in the Muslim world, different segments of the population interpret the rationale behind religious terrorism differently. Problems with the implementation of the GWOT and abuses associated with it have further compounded the situation. Therefore, the unanimous characterization of terrorism has become a dilemma, despite the fact that world has already commemorated the seventh anniversary of the dreadful events of 9/11- an event led to extensive research and exploration of the rationale behind Islamic terrorism.

Today, the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular stand at the epicenter of the predicament of terrorism.²⁰² A delicate amalgamation of religious and political interests, the existence of international terrorist networks, and across states sponsorship has institutionalized terrorism as a cheap mode of warfare not only against non-Muslims but also believers in Islam. Since 9/11, Pakistan has turned out to be one of the biggest victims of terrorism along with Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Pakistan, more than two thousands personnel from the military and LEAs have lost their lives; thousands of her citizens have been killed or maimed by the terrorist activities. The state infrastructure has been devastated, and the economic stability of the country has been ruined. Despite the enormous sacrifices of the LEAs, their inadequate operational capacity, grave scarcity of requisite resources, and organizational ineptitude have proved be major impediments to significant success against the terrorists. Similarly, the lead role of the military in counter terrorist operations, instead of LEAs, has its own ramifications elaborated in Chapter II.

²⁰² Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 5.

An overall view of the phenomenon of terrorism in Pakistan, which was discussed at length in Chapter III, reveals that political, social and economic efforts with a controlled use of force are perhaps the keys to success for the ongoing counter terrorism campaign. This requires a concerted response not only at the governmental level but also at agency and individual levels. Every effort should be undertaken to resolve the menace of terrorism amicably, through a process of dialogue; however, the option of force remains an essential component of the overall strategy against today's terrorists.

In such scenarios, the role of LEAs in Pakistan cannot be over emphasized. They will be a linchpin in the law and order affairs of the country for years to come, and consequently their restructuring, training and funding, as highlighted in Chapters IV and V, should be key areas of concern for Pakistan's government. Chapter VI illustrates a set of recommendations for the up-gradation of LEAs, which need to be considered seriously. No stone should be left unturned to transform the LEAs of Pakistan into an invincible security mechanism against the looming threat of terrorism. Pakistan has no alternative but to organize, equip, train, and groom their LEAs to rise to the occasion and take on this emerging threat of terrorism squarely and with determination.

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