

SECRET  
(When Filled In)

FIELD PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

*Le-punch*

TO HEADQUARTERS, RI	DATE 13 November 1958
FROM EE/G/L <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> AMEND <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOSE <input type="checkbox"/>

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: Cryptonym or pseudonym will be entered in Headquarters.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases:

SECTION I	
SENSITIVE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	1. SOURCE DOCUMENT
NON-SENSITIVE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
NAME (Last) ALBERT (First) LUDWIG (Middle) (Title)	SEX 3. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> F
NAME VARIANT	
TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)	
A ANDERS, LUDWIG	
A - 7	

PHOTO 4. YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	BIRTH DATE 5. 08 11 00	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. GERM	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. <i>Leipzig</i>	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1-UN 2. 3.
OCCUPATION/POSITION			OCC/POS. CODE 6. 6	

SECTION II	
CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11. EE/G/L	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.
--------------------------	------------------------	--------------------------	---------------------------

COMMENTS: Was member, W. Germ. Intel. Service. *EE/G/L*  
 Deceased *(red)*

PERMANENT CHARGE YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	RESTRICTED FILE YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE
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FORM 831a 10-57 SECRET HEADQUARTERS COPY (38)

PUNCHED ✓

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2-B  
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2007

KORN, Dr. Werner

Addr: Stutt

Reported in 1952 to be member of Land Board of Managers of the VVN.  
one of the German delegates (lawyers) to Brussels Congress.

per BRLN 1211, 14 Oct 53 (CONFIDENTIAL)  
EGSA 2159, 2 Nov 53. see abc's Dr. Hans BABER

West German delegate to Int'l Congress of Democratic Lawyers (CP Front), Brussels  
Nov 53. (BRLN 1211, 14 Oct 53)

Was to be soured out re his adherence to Commie Line, see if possibility  
existed he could be recruited. No locateable record this was done, or if so,  
what results, what decision reached. Presumably was NOT recruited or there  
would be a record of it.

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RLE:

Traces from ZIPPER files ~~xxx~~ on ALBERT (which I cannot see  
is a bit helpful) and KAESTNER (which indicate he of interest  
to RIS in 1948 as they dispatched CAESARIAN to find out  
address and occupation; blown to RIS thru source of his,  
one Arthur PETERS probably in 1949 the PETERS claims RIS  
trying recruit him only in 1951; also blown to Sfs by alias  
and description last year in UJ DROLLERY 118.) are attached.

Nothing to indicate AIS connection to either ALBERT, KAESTNER,  
or any of other arrestees.

Traces on others arrested either completely negative, or  
of level of compilation of fnu WALTERS on whom only fragmentary  
info. Considering how many fnu WALTERS, told Elsie not to  
bother. fnu ALBERTs were more carefully checked, however.

Trace on Dr. Werner KORN also attd.



HERMANN, Heinz .

1. One Heinz HERMANN, residing at 7 Merseburgerstrasse, Leipzig, alleged in 1952 to be working for the MSS in Leipzig.
2. One Heinz HERMANN was reported as driver for Edith BAUMANN, a prominent SED member. Information dated prior September 1953.
3. One Heinz HERMANN, born ca 1909, was alleged to be informant for the Sfs in the Cottbus area in June 1954. He lived in Prestewitz where he operated a restaurant. He was 5'10" tall, weighed 208 lbs, blond hair, blue eyes, straight nose. Information dated June 1954.
4. Heinrich HERMANN, from Thuringia, among list of leading German (mostly SED) personalities. date of info: 1950
5. One Heinrich HERMANN, Amt VI, RSHA, was reported turned over to the Yugoslavs by Allied authorities shortly after the war.
6. Heinrich Karl HERMANN, born ca 1907-1910. Palestinian German, speaks Arabic. Formerly interpreter, Brandenburg Division. With Sonderstab Felmy in Greece 1942. In Russia Jan 43.
7. Heinrich HERMANN, former chairman Beyreuth KPD, turned anti-communist and volunteered services to independant workers party. INFO: Aug 51

ix

Mr. "B" not "D" -  
Gehlen reports link that  
B was Schmitz' boss.

Herbert Bechtold  
13.3.20 in Mannheim, USA city.  
11.4.52-25.9.52 Bad G.,  
Günthersferstr 17, bei Oelze  
Schmitz lived here 52-53 after  
B. Both men registered. B was  
"journalist"

Internationales Komitee zur Verteidigung der Christlichen Kultur,  
Deutsche Sektion e.V.  
Cover firm for Schmitz  
Bonn, Burgstr 319  
tel 24280.

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*has per check for memo.*

1. Formal request for information obtained by CIC through sources

Heinrich SCHMITZ and Richard SCHWEIZER from Ludwig ALBERT on the GEHLEN org. We responsible for this organization, and should therefore have whatever info CIC obtained in this way on it.

2. Formal request for all info CIC got from the OBA on the Herbert BURKHARDT

case as a whole which would add to our knowledge of capabilities and aims, etc. of the MFS. From what little info which has been passed to us in conversations with Osta FISCHER and with staff members of the ~~HEE BND~~ (Federal IS) (GEHLEN org.... whichever term you want to use), it appears that ~~this complex~~ there are many features of this complex ~~of~~ which are different from or even contrary to those observed in other operations of the MFS. Since OBA apparently considers CIC rep of OGA in dealings with the US regarding the BURKHARDT case, CIC ~~rep~~ is our only means of access to this info. GEHLEN org understandably reluctant pass info on this since case is in the hands of the OBA.

3. Protest against CIC behavior in matter of penetration of the GEHLEN org....

past history of this is set forth in some detail in EGLA15761 attachment.

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ALBERT, Ludwig, by profession KRIMINALRAT  
BORN : 8 July 1900 in Frankfurt/Main  
RESIDENCE : Frankfurt-Sued, Am Wendelsweg 12  
Civil status: Married  
Political classification: Mitläufer

MC 1-48

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During the war, Albert was Kommissar in the GFP and was assigned special cases. He is considered one of the most able criminologists of Germany, and could be taken any time into the Political Police of Hessen in a leading position.  
MGKA-10583 No traces CIC, EUCOM, our files.

MGKA 14661 7 March 1950  
Born 8 July 1900; residence: 12, Am Wendelsweg, FRANKFURT a/M.

MGLA-1291 17 Feb 50 Chief, BV 2600/Nord. Was former police official (of MGL-A-48, Annex "B", for personalia.)

MGLA 3036 17 Aug 1950 Ludwig ALBERT, Frankfurt/Main is #2600.

@"ANDERS, Ludwig" [ ]

ALBERT, Ludwig

and /

MGLA 4533 22 Dec 1950  
Issued pistol, US Army, cal 45. Membr. GV L. Addr: Frankfurt/N. Wendelsweg 12.

MGLA-8090 2600 is in charge of UJ DROLLERY 4 (SPINHEREI) and runs "WALTER" who is in contact  
5 Sept 51 with the RIS.

MGLA 8160 When "WALTER" of UJ DROLLERY 4 told his brother in law (45.0 - WIELAND) that he  
17 Sep 51 had been approached by the RIS, WIELAND put "WALTER" in contact with 2600 who was better suited to handle the case.

MGLA-8567 Swiss authorities were given the true name of 2600 and were told that he would come  
15 Oct 51 to Switzerland to discuss surveillance to be performed by the Swiss when "WALTER" met his RIS case officer in Zurich. Meeting between "WALTER" and the RIS never came off in Switzerland.

see Mgl 944 6561 for MGLA-10879 Attached report on VVN addresses in foreign  
Personal Documentation 20 March 52 countries obtained by 2600 from informant with connections in VVN Hessen Landesvorstand.

MGLA-12343 Informant of 2600 obtained attached map from briefcase of Horst EICHLER, editor in  
17 July 52 KPD printing office in Frankfurt.

<sup>5 Dec 53</sup>  
MGLA-1352 2600 handled case of Hans Joachim BERTRAM (UJ DROLLERY 12).

MGLA-3705 2600 obtained following report on Konrad KAMINSKI from sources in KPD Hesse  
16 May 1953 Landesleitung.

MGLA-4353 2600 obtained attached info on possible Soviet penetration of Wiesbaden air base  
2 July 53 through Eva Maria MAACK who kept Air Force informed of her RIS contacts.

MGLA-4677 page 23 2600 reports on National Arme, the NDPD/NPD and the DGB. Page 43 - 2600 to  
28 July 53 attempt to recruit Wilma LUEDDKE, former secretary of VVN General Secretary Hans MEIER.

MGLA-5519 2618 and 2600 conduct with surveillance of dead letter drop used by GEIER of  
21 Sep 53 UJ Drollery 302 to communicate with Hungarian IS.

MGLA-6746 GV L Master List 2600 of Karlsruhe leader of Waldkapelle Hesse and chief of  
17 Dec 53 Special Connections (with security officials) in that area.

MGLA-8560 2600 headed surveillance team composed of 2661, 2836, 2659, 2681, 2675 and 2676  
4 April 54 to surveil, unsuccessfully, HIS courier servicing dead drop of UJ Drollery 302 in Sept 53.

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM: EGIA-16027  
(Personnel Security)

4. ALBERT LEIDL

Alfred BENTZINGER © Alfred LEIDL

Ludwig ALBERT was a longtime ZIPPER staff employee who consistently held sensitive jobs in ZIPPER's CI/CE field agency. When denounced as an SFS agent by a reliable informant and arrested for interrogation, ALBERT hanged himself. It is now assumed that ALBERT, who had as broad a view of ZIPPER operations and personalities as almost any conceivable ZIPPER field staff member could have had, was an SFS penetration of ZIPPER, probably for several years. Simultaneously, ALBERT was employed by CIC to penetrate ZIPPER, and kept UTILITY completely informed of the EEI's given him by CIC. In effect, the CIC operation, which was entirely uncoordinated with KUBARK and specifically denied on several occasions, provided insignificant results (compared to the results of POB's UJDREDGER project), but served the SFS well as cover for an extremely effective penetration of ZIPPER. Ironically, the ZIPPER CI/CE agency, headed by LEIDL has emerged as the principal known successful target of hostile penetration (since the catastrophic ALBERT case is not the only one). By now there appear reason enough to terminate LEIDL, on grounds of incompetence if not actual suspicion of complicity with ALBERT, but until now he has successfully played the role of the injured innocent bystander, as UTILITY does not see fit to take final action against him.

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DATE 2007

ALBERT-201  
(also to BENTZINGER-201)

SECRET





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SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



Not a pass - for identification only

HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN COMMAND  
HQ US SURVEY DETACHMENT  
UNITED STATES ARMY

This is to identify:

Ludwig ALBERT

The photograph appear hereon, as a German National, traveling on official business for the United States Armed forces.

The bearer is authorized to carry a locked briefcase and articles of US origin, which were issued to him and are legally in his possession.

If any questions concerning this matter should arise, they should be referred to the Liaison Officer.

Date issued: 12 JAN 1950  
Card No: 00836

Counterigned

Forwarded units: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT Albert, Ludwig DSN \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

FORM 3768 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 9-87

SECRET (When Filled In)

CL BY 0137242  
DECL OADR  
DRV MIS 2-82



**SECRET**

REG [ ] [ ] **NAME:** ALBERT, Ludwig  
**BIRTHDATE:** 8 Jul 1900 **ALIAS:** ANDERS  
**BIRTHPLACE:** Frankfurt/Main **V-#:** 2600  
**RESIDENCE:** Neu Isenburg, Rheinstr. 80 **TELEPHONE #:** NI-8692  
**RELATION:** \_\_\_\_\_ **VEHICLE:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**ADDRESS # (s):** \_\_\_\_\_

**PERSONAL DESCRIPTION AS OF**

**HEIGHT:** 5' 10"  
**WEIGHT:** 225 lbs  
**EYES:** brown  
**HAIR:** brown  
**PHOTO DATES:** Prior 55



**HAIR:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**EYES:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**OTHER:** \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**FAMILY BY DATA**

**FATHER:** \_\_\_\_\_ **DOB/POB:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**MOTHER:** \_\_\_\_\_ **DOB/POB:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**SPOUSE:** \_\_\_\_\_ **DOB/POB:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**CHILDREN:** (None) \_\_\_\_\_ **DOB/POB:** \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ **DOB/POB:** \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ **DOB/POB:** \_\_\_\_\_

**OTHER RELATIVES V/UPONING:** \_\_\_\_\_

**EMPLOYMENT**

**DOB:** 1949 **RANK:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**POSITION:** Chief **SECTION:** CV L **FROM:** \_\_\_\_\_ **TO:** \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:** Subject died on 15 Jul 1955. Suicide by hanging, in jail.

**DATE TERMINATION OR SEPARATION:** See Note above. Dossier available on Subject.

**NEW STATUS:** \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

*Subsources of  
Heinrich Schmitz  
in Gyn Campuses*

Sub-sources: X-892  
C-3 BAUMER, Helmut  
occupations:  
target: radical right

C-13 ECHERHANS,rau  
occupations:  
target:

C-15 ETTB, Heinrich  
occupations: *Quitting* ~~JOHN (?) or JANA (?)~~ police (?)  
target: general; police checks

C-16 ESSEN, Dr. Werner  
occupations: Auswertungsgesamt employee (?)  
target: general

C-24 HARTMANN, Karl  
occupations: Wirtschaftsministerium employee  
target: Wirtschaftsministerium

C-27 HOFFMANN, Ferdinand  
occupations: Journalist, ~~FOHM~~ editor of  
Indu. Zeitschrift

C-28 HOFFMANN, Kurt  
occupations: Journalist employed at Federal  
Press Archives, Bundesstag  
target: general

C-35

C-36 LINNERS, Kurt  
occupations: Kripp, SOLINEN  
target: general, police checks

C-46 REITER, Karl  
occupations: police officer (SOHN ?); employee  
of HITLUP police school  
target: police, police school, police checks

X-922

C-16

C-35 HERRING, Gerhardt  
occupations: Arbeitsgeberverband employee (Industrieschutz ?) (SOHN ?)  
target: Industrieschutz

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*Dunbar Wilson ?  
Fisher ?  
Loni ETTB ?*



X-899

C-45 RUPPERT, Arthur  
occupation: functionary of Volksbund fuer  
Frieden und Freiheit (VFF)  
target: VFF

C-46

C-48

C-52

C-53

C-54 WALLEISER, Gerhard  
occupation: free-lance journalist,  
Bundespressehaus  
target: SRP & radical right

C-55 WINDFORST, Karl  
occupation: policeman  
target: general

C-56 SEIST, Elisabeth  
occupation: Wirtschaftsministerium employee  
target: Wirtschaftsministerium

C-66 LEYCHOFF, Paul  
occupation: SG, KA, employee  
target: SG & Art Blank

X-933

C-46 SCHMITZ, Wilhelm Heinrich  
occupation: BfV informant/source  
target: BfV

C-48 SCHWARZ, Erika  
occupation: Bundeskanzleramt employee  
target: Bundeskanzleramt

C-52 UNGLAUBE, Heins  
occupation: BfV/BND informant/source  
target: BfV

C-53 WIEL, Ilse  
occupation: secretary to Industriekurier editor at  
Bundespressehaus  
target: Industrieschutz

C-55

C-66

V-12910

introduced C-48 to X-933

X-899

X-933

C-22 HAEUHEL, Hans  
occupation: BfV informant/source (employee)?  
target: BfV

C-22

ALBERT, Ludwig  
occupations: BND  
target:

FREYBERG, Leodegard  
occupation: Federal Press Archives (?)  
target:

GOSEWIL, Rudolf  
occupation: Industrieschutz  
target: Industrieschutz

H, A

HEINRICHBAUER, August  
occupation: Industrieschutz  
target: Industrieschutz

HEINZEL, Georg  
occupation: State Police, Lower Saxony  
target: police

HILDEBRANDT, Werner  
occupations: FAZ Editor & Manager  
target:

JAGUSH, Albert  
occupation: NRW Ministry of Interior  
target:

van (von) LOOK, Werner  
occupation: Kripo WIESBADE  
target: police, police checks



X-899

X-932

MAI, Dr. Alfred  
occupation: BfV informant/source  
target: BfV

? OSER, Achim  
occupation: Ant Blank employee  
target: Ant Blank

REHORN, Helmut  
occupation: VFF employee  
target: general

SAEVECKE, Theo  
occupation: SG, BKA  
target: SG, BKA, Interior Ministry

SCHLAGE, Albert  
occupations: BfV informant/BND informant  
target: BfV

S, A

WINKLER, Max  
occupations:  
target:

W, M

? Lange, Gerry  
BND employee or informant.

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

1-2600  
ODSUM 240  
FILE

ALBERT, Ludwig

NUMBER: MGL-A-48  
SUBJECT: Project CONSUL Odeum plan  
DATE: 29 June 1949  
FILED UNDER: 210.1 German police  
COMMENTS: agents under CI group "114"

b. ALBERT, Ludwig. Born 8 July 1900 in Frankfurt/Main.  
Married, no children.  
Residence: Frankfurt-Sued, Am Wendelsweg 12.  
Career: Former Kriminalrat. In the War, Kommissar in the GFP, assigned special cases. ALBERT is considered one of the most able criminalists in Germany, and he can be taken into the Political Police of Hesse any time as a leading man.  
Political: Party member, classified as Mitlaeufer.

*In Hesse*

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DATE 2007



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*Adam 240.1-2600 MK-A-10553*

31 August 1949

Chief, FOB

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Ludwig ALBERT and Richard BOHR

SH-A-48

1. There are no traces of subjects in CIC, EUCOM, or our files.



**Distribution:**

FOB 2  
FEM  
COS 2

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DATE 2007

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. MGL-A-1291

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division M DATE: 17 February 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe *clj/da*

SUBJECT: GENERAL - *General Introduction*

*Specific* - ODEUM - Introduction - a Study of Organisation 114

REF : MGL-W-3212

What follows is by no means the complete story of 114 or its personnel or operations. It is in the nature of a preliminary survey of material on which further study is to be based. It is hoped, however, that sufficient new material is at hand in the present report to enable a tentative assessment of 114's capabilities and potentialities to determine whether they are of positive value or an element of danger.

1. Budget:

In December 1949 Organisation 114 received DM 60,000. In January 1950, the sum was DM 56,000. Organisation 114 receives DM's only; no foreign currencies are issued. In addition, supplementary one-time payments are sent to accomplish specific missions. For example, the tapped courier line in the Ruhr made mention of one GUNTHER being the chief of all illegal (KP or Cominform) work in the Aachen, independently, a field organization of 114 reported that a man named Guenther Ismer travels between Frankfurt and Saarbruecken, and it was further mentioned that the man had recently attended some meeting in Budapest. To further clarify the person and actions of ISMER and to permit IGO to explore the tantalizing possibility of GUNTHER and Guenther ISMER being identical (and thus serving as a check on the questionable Ruhr material), IGO on 10 February 1950 sent 114 the sum of DM 1,000.

2. Locations (far from complete, extracted from MGL-A-1017):

a. LEIDL headquarters is in Karlsruhe at Cervigstrasse 36. This is a typical, older Karlsruhe apartment house. The ground floor apartment (four rooms) and another two or three rooms two flights up are used by LEIDL. This address is also the location of the Rolladen Fabrik STAEHEL (blinds and shutters) and the workshops are actually in the courtyard of the apartment house. Since the firm does considerable business, the physical cover for 114's headquarters is quite adequate. The business requirements also account for the rather liberal space allotment. The ground floor apartment also forms the living quarters of LEIDL and his mistress, Frieda STAEHEL, who is also on the ODEUM pay roll as official hostess of 114.

b. Regensburg, Pruefeningerstrasse 109. Field office and billets.

*Reisen in Regensburg  
add G 15  
add G 15  
add G 15  
add G 15*

FORM 51-28A

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION  
114 COPY

MGLA-1291  
17 Feb 50  
32-6-7-176



SECRET

- 2 -

g. Munich-Allach, Vogelshtrasse 3 and 11. Field office and A billets. Presumably the location of the southern wing of 11A's BV 2601.

*XREIN, Oskar @PRULE*  
d. Ruesselsau, Langenburgerstrasse 35, field office and billets. This is near Bad Mergentheim, Wuertemberg-Baden, and is the field office of RISCHE (BV 2603), the CE man of 11A.

3. Although the official ODEUM figure on the T/O strength of 11A amounts to 217 people, the totals reached by undersigned, on the basis of information from the paragraphs below, amount to 250 people. Within this round sum are 80 so-called staff personnel, which accounts for 11A headquarters' and field units' office personnel, typists, card file clerks, drivers, couriers, handy-men, etc. In addition, 11A has 86 agents in Western Germany and 32 in Eastern Germany. Further, other "carded sources" but not in agent status amount to 36 in Western Germany and 12 in Eastern Germany.

4. Organisation 11A's headquarters staff (from MLI-A-1084):

<i>Report true names</i>	a. LEIDL	Chief
	b. Dr. HAASE <i>Otto</i> (DELTUS-WAGNER)	Deputy
	c. NESS	CI staff officer
	d. HERTNER	Personnel section
	e. TROPP	Administration
	f. RISCHE (of MLI-A-1191)	CE staff officer
	g. SCHIRNIK	Card files
	h. STUMPF	Typist
	i. BRUNO	Courier
	j. GUR	Operational Briefing
	k. KUGLER	Training officer
	l. LINZ	Driver
	m. PREISSLER	Driver
	n. NANTKE	Handy man
	o. KIMMERLE (real name)	Hostess
	p. TOPP	Typist

SECRET

32-6-7-176



SECRET

REILE, OASD-3

This T/O strength of 16 is four less than that suggested by COEUM for a General Agency after the re-organization in the summer of 1949, and the total Agency strength of 250 is twenty below the recommendation. However, it should also be noted that at least two of the persons in this paragraph, HAASE and RISCHKE, appear again below in other capacities: HAASE as UV Oberrhein, and RISCHKE as BV 2603. RISCHKE is the newest man on the headquarters staff, having joined at the beginning of November 1949. He spent the first two months familiarizing himself with the material in IIA's files, and in January 1950 began his active position as CE case officer for IIA. However, in all probability and according to KLAUSSNER, RISCHKE is still only exploring possibilities for CE cases and not actually running a case.

Significant  
with respect to  
the...  
...  
...  
...

5. In general, the addition of RISCHKE is another confirmation of the general personnel pattern of IIA's top members: that, unlike most of COEUM, these people had their wartime intelligence experience in the West rather than in Russia. (Another example is cover name BERGMANN, head of BV 2601's Munich office. BERGMANN was with 1st Arras during the War.). A possible element of too deep a western involvement lies in the fact that the permanent addresses of both HAASE and RISCHKE are in the French Zone of Germany. As for actual contacts with the French, HAASE admits to seeing Cdt. TOUSSAINT, Innsbruck, and knows Major FRESNET and HUBERT of his staff. The head for this "minimum" contact, according to HAASE, is that since so much of COEUM's Hungarian interest runs through Hungarian emigre groups and individuals in the French Zone of Austria, he cannot afford to work behind the backs of the French, especially as he is well known to the French anyway. RISCHKE is sometimes visited by French intelligence officers when he turns up at his home in Trier. LEIDL claims to have had his last contacts with the French two years ago; at that time, at UTILITI's bidding, to further the COEUM Emergency Plan, he had three meetings somewhere in Germany at the French Zone border with a K. ARBONNIER, BSt Lille, who on the second meeting greeted the man who had introduced himself as "M. LEIDL" with "M. BENTZINGER."

extracted  
for  
FD-20

6. The field offices of IIA:

a. BV 2600/Word: chief, former police official Ludwig ALBERT (of MGL-48, Annex "B", for personalia). Headquarters, Frankfurt/Main. Staff of 20 persons; 24 agents in western Germany and 5 in Eastern Germany; 12 sources in Western Germany and one in the East. This regional office covers the Frankfurt-Kassel area, Hessen, the British Zone. Main emphasis of this group has been on legal and illegal KP activities, especially on courier routes centering on Frankfurt: Frankfurt-Hannover (MESCHKE), Hannover-Berlin, Frankfurt-Kassel (ZAHNWEITZER), Frankfurt-Saarbruecken-France (BLOCH-LAWOFF), Frankfurt-Switzerland. Attention is also paid to Hessen-Thuringia KP communications lines. A third, and major, undertaking of BV 2600 is the security clearing of contemplated new COEUM agent personnel living in Hessen or the British Zone. A fourth but minor interest is in KP cover and controlled organizations like VVN, etc. A fifth interest is the KPD Landesleitung Frankfurt and the activities of Prof. MATER (formerly Rote Kapelle) of the University of Leipzig and still a guest lecturer at the University of Frankfurt.

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On 16 January 1950, at a meeting at LEIDL's headquarters in Karlsruhe, KLAUSSNER, who is officially in charge of ODEUM's CI work, stated that this regional group's targets should be as follows: KP couriers, KP activities in the Bundesregierung stemming from the British Zone, the KP in the Ruhr; further, that the targets for this and other regional groups should be extended eastward to include Eastern German CI work, especially MGB and the political police.

b. BV 2601/Sued: chief, Franz GROESCHER (of MGL-A-48, Annex "B", for personalia.) Headquarters, COBURG. Deputy chief, BERGMANN, with offices in Munich. Staff of 12 persons, 3 interrogators, 4 agents in Western Germany, 23 sources in Western Germany and 1 in the East. Geographical area covered is Bavaria and Wuerttemberg-Baden. Activities include, first of all, a border police network all along the Bavarian border. Connected with border activity, a network is being built at Cham, Oberpfalz, on the Czech border, which includes contacts and connections into CSR. Next, in the Munich area, attention is paid to illegal KP activities (through Josef WIRSCH, important KPD functionary, Bavaria), especially the Rotspanier veterans' activities (through an agent who was himself with THAKMANN, still receives invitations to Eastern German veterans' meetings.) In and around Munich, another major interest is the security checking of services personnel for Nikolaus and the external security of the Nikolaus Compound. BV 2601 is also entrusted with security clearance of contemplated ODEUM agent personnel living in Bavaria and Wuerttemberg-Baden. Activities of the CSS in Wuerttemberg are watched, but without noticeable success. Finally, the three interrogators mentioned in the T/O form an interrogation group in Augsburg; the interrogators themselves are Russo-Germans (one is from OSWATYSKI), and they stress interrogations of returned PW's of CI interest (Antifa, etc.). These interrogators also supply the information which results in the YAKUSHEV reports.

c. BV 2602/Berlin: chief, KUNO. A staff of 10, with 3 sources in the Soviet Zone of Germany. KLAUSSNER has expressed dissatisfaction with the production of the field office and its general lack of activity. Legitimately, it should cover the Ministry of the Interior, the RIS, Eastern Zone and Berlin Volkspolizei. Minor work is accomplished in identifying Russian agents and informers. KLAUSSNER suggested as a starter that BV 2602 intensify efforts to tape the Volkerrat Vice President MATERN, pre-Nazi KP functionary of Koenigsberg, later a Gestapo-SD agent, now probably a Russian agent. This field agency operates on a monthly budget of DM 4,000.

d. BV 2603: RISCHE (of MGL-A-1191). Staff of 7 persons. Headquarters are located in Koenigsleau, near Bad Mergentheim. The new CI regional office, of Organization 114, destined to take over cases from other regional agencies when it is clear that they include lines going directly to the Russians. RISCHE is now assisting BV 2601 in setting up its Cham network; see "b" above. Further, if American higher headquarters believe that a case like that of Joseph Wilhelm BAYER (of MGL-A-1166) should be kept alive, it will be turned over to RISCHE for exploitation.

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e. SV (Sonderverbindung) CONDOR: The Russian group of SONIN (of MGL-A-553). Staff of 7 persons; 6 agents, 1 carded source. The group has been told to drop minor targets; MVD-like activities which produce 'suspicions of espionage' without tangible proof. Having concentrated on the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt, the group has been instructed to concentrate now on the Soviet Mission in Baden-Baden. The group also performs special interrogations of Russian deserters, etc. Recent special interrogations have included, for example, the case of Armin KORN, Russian deserter, of MGL-A-12530. In another case, SONIN's agent Theodor KARKAJEV (of MGL-A-357 and 544, not sent to Washington) was involved in an episode in Munich, identifying US Army deserters who wanted to defect to the Russians.

f. SV CZARDAS: The ODEUM Hungarian group of PAUL BODOSSY & STROEL. A staff of 3 persons, with 3 agents. Members of this group include Stefan KRBAH and Julius ATALIN. This group previously roamed loosely and insecurely in and out of Austria (of MGL-W-3826). By ODEUM edict, none of them may now operate outside Germany or undertake trips to Austria without prior ODEUM clearance in each instance. The group's chief activity now is surveillance of Hungarian shipping and illegal shipping on the Danube as seen from Passau, via the Hungarian Lloyd in that town. In the Munich area, the group reports on suspicious Hungarians. (In the past, Peter NIKOLAIDES and Philip GARCH have been involved with this group, especially in the BEGUS case, of WASH-0555, PULL-151; further, also Johannes BOHM & BERGER of PULL-151, who is now member of CONITA Kommanditgesellschaft, Munich, cover organization of FIS and Edy TOUSSAINT of Innsbruck in American Zone, Germany.)

extracted for PD 2

g. SV POLKA: The ODEUM Polish group under Gleb UMOV & UMORSKI. UMOV is the sole staff member, and he has 8 agents. UMOV, who is Ukrainian, first offered his services to the Germans in Kiev during the war; was used by BSHA, was interpreter for General DEB. This group has been attempting a penetration of the Polish Consulate in Munich, and insecurely, with agent Zbigniew BROMIRSKI trying to and succeeding in recruiting two CIC sources working on the same target, and with BROMIRSKI also chatting about his connections with AIS to several Poles hanging around the premises. AUSINA (of MGL-A-137) was also an old agent on this project. However, both since this is strictly CIC's mission and since ODEUM results have not been outstanding, RISCHKE has been called upon to correct the conditions here and to transfer the attention of the UMOV group to the Polish Consulate in Berlin. The Polish colony in the Ruhr was also suggested as an alternate and possibly fruitful field. The purpose for ODEUM in surveillance of Polish Consulates is to identify Polish agents and the Polish IS, thus to strengthen the security of ODEUM agents and projects running into Poland. A new marginal activity of this group has been reportage on developments within the Chopin Committee, recently founded in Warsaw and sponsored in Germany by General PRAWIN; the committee has been able to gather a group of intellectuals and non-communists to sponsor its work in Western Germany, but to date the investigations have not revealed any intelligence activity coupled with concerts of Chopin's music.

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h. UV (Unterrichtung) Oberrhein: This consists of Dr. HAASE, with one agent. This unit, geographically, works in the French Zone, Sued Baden and Sued Wuerttemberg. In addition to following traces of the Rote Kapelle remnants on the Bodensee, the main activity is in following up the continuation of KP courier lines into Switzerland, especially between Lorrach and Basel.

i. UV ML: A positive intelligence group with one staff member - LEIDL's brother - and 27 agents and 6 carded sources in Eastern Germany. LEIDL's brother, who is an oil expert, supplies reports from his group on the Leuna works, industrial espionage, etc. The group is only in 11A because of the family relationship. The group of Karl Heinz GERHARDT, with 13 sub-agents, probably falls into this UV.

j. Waldkapelle Berlin: Two men, both with police background, as interrogators and investigators, used in investigating any ODEUM flaps which turn up in Berlin.

7. The above gives in bare outline the organizational structure of Organization 11A. It does not cover all its activities or contacts. For example, in addition to the above, LEIDL has personal contacts to various Western German Laender governmental (especially Ministry of Interior) and high police contacts. We have mentioned 11A's role in ODEUM agent vetting, but it is still a moot question how much Western German police circles are contacted for file checks on ODEUM's behalf. It is also Organization 11A which is entrusted with carrying out field investigations on personnel in the CONSUL field submitted to ODEUM for checking; checks of this nature are handled on a priority basis.

a. Similarly, KLAUSNER has requested the top echelon of Organization 11A to note down all material about Rote Kapelle personalities, their present whereabouts and activities (precipitated by current intelligence hints reaching ODEUM that many of these people are around, held Rote Kapelle veterans' meetings, held important radio posts, and are involved in KP activities). Likewise, the names, addresses, and present activities of all Abwehr veterans were requested by KLAUSNER, together with indications of other intelligence services they might now be utilized by according to him, the number employed by the British, for example, would give ODEUM an indication of the scope of British intelligence coverage in Germany!

b. The significance and scope of Organization 11A's contacts in the CONSUL field are as yet unclear. It is definite, however, that LEIDL does have Bonn connections. For example, MGL-A-772 was largely from material supplied by 11A, although UTILITY did not so admit.

c. Previous mention has been made of LEIDL's and Dr. HAASE's disclosure to the undersigned in August-September 1949 of the readiness of Nordrhein-Westphalia industrialists to finance a German group for carrying out economic espionage. (At the time, a copy of the report to be prepared for UTILITY on this topic was promised to the undersigned; but it has never been received. The nature of the meeting with LEIDL and HAASE

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was so unorthodox that it was considered best not to bring up the topic with UTILITY directly.) That such activities have been subsequently continued is revealed in ODEUM's statement that Organization 114 was interested in an Industrial Security Service (Deutscher Wirtschafts-Schutzverband) to be set up in Württemberg-Baden. In this instance, ex-police official HAHN of Stuttgart (of MEL-A-1168) first exploited leads supplied by 114 and then decided to cut ODEUM out of the picture.

d. Lastly, for the purposes of this preliminary survey, Organization 114 is interested in ODEUM's agent training schools. During the latter half of 1949, LEIDL and HAASE were in frequent conference with the training staff to set up a special training course for CI officers attached to the various ODEUM field organizations. This course is now given at one of ODEUM's schools (the other is at Murnau) in Friedberg, Hesse, with Wilhelm BRITCHBAUM as chief instructor (of Annex "B", MEL-A-48).

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VIA: SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MGK-A-14661

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FDM

DATE: 21 February 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Odeum  
SPECIFIC - Agent Identity Cards - British Zone

1. There are enclosed photostats of five Odeum agent identity cards which are carried for identification purposes only in the British Zone.

2. This was one of the first efforts at reproduction at POB, and it is hoped future cards etc will come out more clearly.

Distribution:  
FDM 2 w/1 ea of 5 inc  
COS 1 w/1 ea of 5 inc

MICROFILMED  
JAN 10 1961  
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

INDEX

MGKA-14661

21 Feb 50

100 COPY

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR 1949

32-6-6-167



Incl. # 2

No. of Identity Card	Name
00835	<del>Paul HOTSCH</del> born: 25 Jan 1908 Residence: 49, Fruchlingstrasse, MAINFRANKENHEIM
00836	<del>Lea HOTSCH</del> born: 8 July 1900 Residence: 17, Am Wendelsweg, FRANKFURT a/M.
00837	<del>Heinz HOTSCH</del> born: 12 July 1920 Residence: 10, Mainzerlachstrasse, FRANKFURT a/M.
00838	<del>Carl HOTSCH</del> born: 26 Dec 1920 Residence: FRANKFURT a/M.
75512	<del>Karel LARVIN</del> born: 8 June 1910 Residence: HANNOVER

ATTACH. TO MGKA-14661

3272-169

MGKA-14661



DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. MGL-A-3036

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division M  
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe *CS*  
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational  
          SPECIFIC - Continuation of a Study on GV L  
REF : MGL-A-1291  
DATE: 17 August 1950

The following notes are the results of a visit August 1 through 3 with General Agency L's LEIDL at his headquarters in Karlsruhe and at his schooling center near Bad Mergentheim.

1. Agent Training: GV L's "Wuehlmann" (i.e., training and briefing of the agency's agents when necessary) has his headquarters near Bad Mergentheim, at Igersheim, in a requisitioned cafe and inn. The Wuehlmann, former Lt. Colonel SUCKOW (#3038) was the last superior officer of KLAUSNER for a couple of months in 1945. SUCKOW (see Primer entry for traces) and his wife now use the safe property as home and as holding center for GV L bodies sent to the West from Berlin or the Russian Zone. For example, if Major LEPTI's desertion materializes (of PULL-712), in which OFFSPRING is still interested in view of JUPITER, he would be held and debriefed at SUCKOW's inn.

2. Rote Kapelle: A house guest at the inn since May has been Heinrich REISER (#2661) former Kriminalkommissar (of MGL-A-1901). He was actually hustled there by LEIDL, who did not want any further CIC interference with REISER's activity in the Rote Kapelle field for OFFSPRING. In 1941-42, REISER, as RSHA, was in Paris as operational chief of Rote Kapelle (with Lt. Colonel SCHLEIDER, Abwehr, directing deception material from Berlin, through Lt. Colonel BREITL, Abwehr, in Paris, thus, together with all the old radio intercept specialists who used to work on the case now to be found in the 236 fold, bringing in a fair bit of Rote Kapelle into OFFSPRING.)

a. It is REISER who personally captured the "Grand Cher" Gilbert Otto TREPPER, in a dentist's chair in Paris, and ran him for about nine months. It is REISER who, with Gilbert's assistance, captured HARRY ROBINSON in a Paris Metro late in December 1942. In 1943, REISER was transferred back to Germany, with PANWITZ taking over the Rote Kapelle Paris assignment. (REISER states Gilbert managed to escape soon after PANWITZ took over.) After the war, REISER was delivered to the French on an extradition request. Up to June 1949, he sat in the Cherche-Midi jail in Paris, being debriefed on the Rote Kapelle by the French. When he was released, the Germans in Karlsruhe promptly put him in jail again (as an RSHA personality). When he was released in April 1950, he

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MAY 1949

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was immediately picked up by LEIDL, but with CIG and the British (of MGH-A-6233) also hot on the trail, and all eager for the same thing, REISER's Rote Kapelle knowledge.

b. REISER is now devoting his full time to a recapitulation of all he remembers about the case; several elaborate charts have been prepared, and his report, running to some 150 pages, should be ready in October. REISER and LEIDL feel there is enough current operational activity in the Rote Kapelle field to warrant OFFSPRING's submitting a developmental project based on it, after the long study has been submitted and studied by OFFSPRING and its American supporters. REISER now regrets that he buried his own files on the case in Karlsruhe in 1945 and that two additional trunkfuls he sent to Tauberbischofsheim were burned there by PANNITZ.

c. Of the important persons of the cast, REISER mentioned that Harry ROBINSON's man in Paris, VAENISCHAENSLIN, is still around and has a business enterprise, Unipektine, in Switzerland, (Zurich?) and still has his old secretary, Helene LAROCHE; that "Grand Chef" Gilbert was probably seen in Fribourg, Switzerland, in 1946 (this according to KLAUSNER, who does not remember the source); that Kent's "Paul" (in the Belgian Sinaxco), currently known as 1st Lt. NEFFRIMON, is often in Berlin these days; that Kent's man (out of Sinax in Marseilles), Isis SPRINGER, in Lyon, is still on hand, and that the group "Solja," set up in Paris and Marseilles by the Germans when they controlled the Rote Kapelle, still exists and now under French scrutiny; that the Bulgarian DIMITROFF, of the Kent Sinax-Marseilles show as member in Vichy/Clermont-Ferrand and having at that time a source close to Ambassador LEAHY and the Turkish ambassador, is still in Western Europe.

d. The study will, of course, devote considerable attention to the German remnants of the Rote Kapelle. REISER is convinced that the Rote Kapelle exists today, that it was not just something created as an espionage network for World War II. He claims that when he was interrogating Gilbert, he found among the Grand Chef's papers a document dated 1937 or 1938, dividing the Rote Kapelle's activities into three areas - Europe, the Americas, Asia. REISER claims that the "Director" was a man of high rank, responsible for this intelligence coverage firstly to the Comintern, secondly to MVD. The "Director" had at his disposal elements of MVD, of "OSS", the special services office, 'now Smersch', and of the Technological-Scientific Special Institute, Moscow. Each area had special support units for arranging various functions, first, W/T experts; second, a 'depot' for money, reports, and supplies; and third, a group for working out cover firms (like Sinax and Sinaxco). REISER characterizes as "OSS"-type activity today, and carried out under Rote Kapelle direction, events like the Prieis explosion in the French Zone of Germany, the Bordeaux forest fire, and British Naval sabotage. (MDE: we are including the above hodgepodge of history, current social notes and possible rumor as an example of the type of personnel with OV L, their line of thinking, their pre-occupation with Rote Kapelle, and as preparation for the expected project intended to penetrate the 'present Rote Kapelle'.)

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3. BEZIRKS VERRETUNG 2600 "Albert." #2600 is Ludwig ALBERT.  
(of MGL-A-48), Frankfurt/Main.

a. August HOPPE (#2697) is political commentator on NWDR (Nordwest Deutsche Rundfunk), Cologne, and lives in Cologne-Deuts. He is in close contact with Erik RINNE, of the NWDR Berlin office, who supplies political background material not necessarily used by HOPPE over the air. (RINNE will soon be tapped in Berlin directly by GV L's 'Frans Fuchs.') HOPPE, in addition to supplying political reports for GV L (some are given to the British by HOPPE, but those are so labeled and OFFSPRING then reserves them internally and gives them no dissemination), has also been working on a case of KOPATSCHEK (not yet reported to us) involving MVD/DDR recruiting. HOPPE, according to LEIDL, offers CE potentialities. (MDB: We imagine HOPPE has also been at least partly involved in UTILITI's attempts to get his brother, Hans, in Rome accepted as a source of background material from Italy for NWDR, thus getting Hans another bit of cover.)

b. #2600.1 (5002) is employed in Hersfeld and works exclusively on PW interrogation cards.

c. FmU SCHMINKER (#2600.395005), Frankfurt/Main, a doctor, worked as a PW in a PW hospital in Russia. Might offer CE potentialities.

d. FmU FREUSSLER (#2693), Frankfurt/Main, is in the KPD, and, according to LEIDL, a 'Cominform official.' Evidence of this claim should be forthcoming. Offers CE potentialities.

e. Adam GANJON (#2646, constituting UV of same number under BV 2600) lives in Frankfurt/Main. He is a former police official, and was again in the Frankfurt police in 1945-46, but was thrown out when a Gestapo prisoner accused GANJON of having beaten him up. (Cf MGL-A-48.)

f. FmU TISCH (#2681) does CI work in the Heidelberg area.

g. Walter HEERTH (#2682) is a Karlsruhe police official and part-time instructor for CI training at the OFFSPRING agent training school at Friedberg, Hesse. (Cf MGL-A-48, MGL-A-1290.) *not to FBI*

h. Dr. FmU SCHMIDT (#2680) lives in Hamburg. He is a Ruhr coal industries syndie and supplies chiefly reports on economic espionage (III W1).

i. FmU JUNG (#2679) is an old railroad official, supplying III W1 reports from the Cologne-Bremen area.

4. BEZIRKS VERRETUNG 2601 (Coburg), with UV 2620 (Munich).

a. FmU TOTENHAUPT (#2733) is a police official in Hof.

b. FmU ALTENBERGER (#2766), son of General ALTENBERGER, Munich, is shortly to quit OFFSPRING. He is going to Syria as a codes expert, for DM 3000 per month, part to be paid in gold.

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c. Fritz SKIBOLD (#2730), pre-war political police official, is case officer of Operation Ring. In addition, he does CI-CE and 'illegal KPD' work in the Munich area. (Cf MGL-A-48.)

d. Erich BERGMANN (#2620) has UV 2620, and is deputy chief of BV 2601. Pre-war experience was being Werkschutzführer of the Badische Soda und Anilinwerke.

e. Fnu WALD (#2739) lives in Munich. He does CI and 'illegal KPD' work. He is a Rotspanienkämpfer, International Brigade member, friend of Frans DAHLEM.

(MDS Comment: It is interesting to note that more and more of the personnel listed in attachment "B" to MGL-A-48, which constituted OFFSPRING's original proposal for Verfassungsschutz working level candidates, appear as members of GV L. On the basis of persons identified above in paras. 3 and 4, it is probably not too much to assume that all of the MGL-A-48 persons are members of GV L or close friends thereof. It would mean, also, that they are the persons who will supply Bonn with Verfassungsschutz-type material, insofar as such material will come from GV L at all.)

5. BEZIRKS-VERTRÉTUNG 2602, Berlin. KUNO, p. y real name, present alias "Franz Puchs." Abwehr veteran.

a. Fnu ANASTASOV (#2602/1) is a Bulgarian and lives in the Russian Sector of Berlin. He is an old, wartime, Balkan contact of DELIUS-WAGNER and was recommended by the latter to 2602.

b. Fnu WANDEL (#2793) and chief of the Filiale of the same number, lives in Berlin-Schmargendorf. He is an old Abwehr officer, sought by the Russians. His activity for GV L up to now has been chiefly in the 'teacher' field (background material, operational leads and tips), aided directly by #2602 ('Kuno'). WANDEL's operational target #1 is to build up the case against MATERN, who, according to him, was Gestapo informant, #1 in Koenigsberg while working simultaneously for the KPD (already mentioned in MGL-A-1291, but no further details supplied to date).

c. Fnu SUHR (#2778) lives in Berlin-Neukölln and works in the Schenker transport firm.

6. WALDKAPELLE 3080, the GV L Waldkapelle in Berlin, was originally supposed to be a small, two or three man team of trained investigators and interrogators to clear up flaps and carry out routine checks in Berlin. It has now grown to a twelve man team, and considering the sensitive functions they perform, KLAUSNER is worried because many of them live in the Eastern Sector of Berlin and even in the Russian Zone. For example, the Waldkapelle's deputy chief, Paul LEHMANN (#3081, born 3 February 1891 in Berlin) lives in Berlin-Karlshorst, Doenhoffstrasse 13. True, he works legally in a detective agency in Western Berlin and as an 'independent co-worker of an economic detective force.' LEIDL, of course, assured that everything was secure, but KLAUSNER requested a reconsideration of the Waldkapelle's present status, strength and security.

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7. BEZIRKS VERRETUNG 2603, REILE.

a. #2603.1, a Bonn source, is either to be dropped or transferred to ALBERT, 2600.

b. Eugen HEBELER (#2603.3), Wiesbaden, has been transferred to ALBERT.

c. WIEGAND (#2812, and subject of MGL-A-1842 et al) has been dropped, according to LEIDL, and a report to that effect should be forthcoming. The reason, according to LEIDL, is that "he has no interest in penetrating the French." However, LEIDL is interested in fending off any possible French attempt to penetrate OFFSPRING. Such an attempt, he feels, would most likely be directed by Colonel TOUSSAINT in Baden-Baden (not to be confused with the chap of the same name in Innsbruck) through his underling, Colonel BOURDIS (phonetic), in Trier, who has an interest in REILE, whenever the latter shows up at home. Another point at which the French might make such an attempt, according to LEIDL, might be through former Abwehr Colonel Alexander WAG, who was for a short time with GV C. WAG served in France, and after the war was assigned an attractive house in Tuebingen by the French.

d. Fnu PALASCH (#2603.5), a former Police official living in Welsede, is to be dropped or given to ALBERT, 2600.

e. The interesting thing to note about the developments in para. 7, above, (as discussed later between KLAUSNER and Bedford) is that LEIDL seems intent on having REILE drop most of his sources or have them transferred to other. As we see the picture, REILE tried to build up an independent CE group from scratch, without getting very far as results are concerned, rather than taking the logical approach of screening the incoming GV L CI material and from that reservoir picking likely targets and personnel for proper CE exploitation. LEIDL confirmed this thesis with his statement that REILE would be brought back from the field and would have to operate directly from GV L headquarters.

9. FOREIGN GROUPS: LEIDL plans to drop SONIN (#2625) if he gets OFFSPRING headquarters approval. LEIDL says the man is absolutely afraid to work directly against the MVD, even from the relative safety of the Western Zone. The conspicuous lack of success in penetrating the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt/Main probably added to this conviction and resolve. (Of the group, only Ivan SCHOSTAK, #2909, born 14 August 1923 in Varna, Bulgaria, has been retained as assistant to SONIN.) Paul HODOSSY and the Czarist remnants are already out and all of them, including HODOSSY, want to emigrate (naturally, to the USA). Gleb UMNOV and what is left of Polka are on the skids. LEIDL claims that his experiences with these refugee and DP groups have proved none of them can provide worth-while intelligence.

10. In pruning down the SONIN group, one member, Dr. Emil AUGSBURG, was taken over into GV L's headquarters staff, but works out of Munich. AUGSBURG comes from Lodz, and he speaks Polish and Russian. (Possibly agent #3056?) He has now been entrusted with the exploitation of Casé SCHWARZ (on which we

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- 6 -

have as yet received no reports). In Case SCHWARZ, one former General Staff Colonel WEISS of Berchtesgaden is the central figure. KUEHNE, SCHACK's deputy in OFFSPRING ICO, had been assisting the WEISS family while the husband was a PW. He returned home in the late spring of 1950 and wanted to express his thanks to KUEHNE. It developed that WEISS had been a PW of the Poles, and that he had been released when he agreed to work for the Polish IS. KUEHNE introduced an 'interested party' (AUGSBURG) and WEISS is now writing down his experiences. Since this might turn into a DA operation, AUGSBURG has been instructed to deliver his reports directly to KERBL (former scenery designer for Fritz FISCHER at the Gaertnerplatz Operntheater, and now LEIDL's headquarters on Munich visits, also a letter drop, from whence messages can be picked up directly by OFFSPRING headquarters. Operation RING reports also come in via this channel now, and carbon copies go on their slow, routine way back to Karlsruhe and from there, again down to OFFSPRING). KERBL's apartment is in Munich, Auen Strasse 2a.

11. SONDER VERTRETUNG 2628, is run by LEIDL's brother, an oil engineer (many years with Shell) who lives in Darmstadt and makes frequent business trips to Berlin. The work here was originally largely in the industrial espionage field, and would have more properly fitted into another General Agency, except for the blood relationship. However, LEIDL has been indoctrinating his brother 2628, and something interesting and potentially valuable in the straight CI field seems to be developing. For the background of these newer developments, it must be told that 2628 was earlier in touch with a young man close to PARTHENAU and Deutscher Union activities, who introduced him to "SCHMIDTHUBER," present cover name for Karl Heinz GERHARDT (#2668), bookshop owner in Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Eudendorferplatz 9. When the Deutscher Union met in Berlin, and talked of Europa Union, French intelligence became interested in the positive intelligence possibilities offered by members of the Deutscher Union group. GERHARDT in fact set up a group for the French, financed by the latter at DM 4000 per month. The French, curiously, were interested only in the positive intelligence take (in fascinating topics, as LEIDL explained, running the gamut to Baltic Sea fisheries, etc.) and completely ignored the counter intelligence material, which 2628 gratefully siphoned off for OFFSPRING. However, ambitious and expanding, GERHARDT looked around for additional sponsorship, and even came to the attention of BOB (cf. BRIN-2195, WGL-A-981). Finally, GVL settled their contribution to GERHARDT at DM 1500 monthly, as supplement to the French allotment. And GERHARDT has gone ahead, and a whole new group, sponsored by #2668.48, has come up, with nine other sources including #2668.54, information control officer for EISLER in the DDR. Many of the sources are of no interest to OFFSPRING, but GERHARDT is now in Western Germany (ches SUCKOW) for a month's intensive training, and will be closely watched and nursed, and taught how to prune his network to a small core of important producers.

12. The above social notes about GVL personnel and their doings comes from notes that undersigned made while KLAUSNER was going over a group of GVL agents in an attempt to properly assess them. It must be stressed that the activity of all GVL agents did not come up for review, but only those on which KLAUSNER wanted some clarification for his own satisfaction. It must also be admitted that the undersigned could not note down everything discussed, but this time tried to concentrate on noting down real news (which all of the above are, unless otherwise noted) during these particular meetings.

Dist: 2 - FDM 2 - File  
2 - COS

SECRET

32 10 7 11 48



ALBERT  
Alpha

TRACES

11 October 1951

Ludwig ALBERT (UJ DRÖLLERY 4)

German Primer

Hauptmann ALBERT - officer at SS Headquarters in Florence in March 1944.

German Primer

Kapitän zur See ALBERT @ Emil BAUER - IM Ast Hamburg; visited Paris in March 1944, and in June 1944, visited Madrid travelling as Emil BAUER.

German Primer

Dr. LUDWIG - name probably an alias; reported in October 1939 to be head of the Gestapo in Belgium, with an office in the German Embassy in Brussels.

German Primer

Brigadeführer Dr. Wilhelm ALBERT - born 8 September 1898; appointed Ustuf. in July 1933; in SD in December 1938; promoted Brigf. before August 1940; appointed Pol. Praes. Lods in February 1941 and was still there in May 1943; Party number 1,122,215; SS number 36,026.

SHAEP 130256

SS Macha. ALBERT - member of SD Kriminalabteilung, Nest Duenaburg, Latvia; last seen at Riga in July 1944; born about 1900; 1.50m tall; fat; brown hair.

SHAEP Card 132464

LUDWIG - member of Sipo and SD Krakow in September 1944.

Carded information (IR)

Standartenführer ALBERT, in early 1937, was head of Amt I, SD.

Carded information (IR)

Generalmajor der Gendarmerie ALBERT - chief of K20 Alpenvorland and Deputy to BRUNNER; last seen in Bolzano in April 1945.

Carded information (IR)

Kommissar ALBERT - chief of GYP 611 in Athens, succeeding ROFNECET in December 1941.

MGHA-4286 dated 30 January 1948

Albert LUDWIG - member of KPD Hamburg; Sachbearbeiter for Kulturarbeit; nicknamed "fat choir boy".

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

TO : Chief, SI  
VIA : Chief Foreign Division N  
FROM :  /HMS  
SUBJECT: GREEN LIST FDM

**SECRET**

3 December 1951

ALBERT  
alpha

- SECURITY INFORMATION
1. Name: Ludwig ALBERT
  2. Aliases: none known
  3. Date of birth: 8 July 1900
  4. Place of birth: Frankfurt am Main, Germany
  5. Nationality: German
  6. Past residences: Germany
  7. Current location: Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
  8. Occupation: police official (before 1945)

Has Subject been a Government Official, and if so, give details:

Commissar in the German Field Police during the war; regarded as an able criminologist.

9. Name of wife and other members of family:  
married
10. Other Pertinent Data:  
none available.

IB/SI to SI/OSO, 6 Dec 51:  
IB/SI has no record of subject.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

**SECRET**

Team



Request No. 56

*Project 6*

21 February, 1952

TO : 25. (25.37)  
FROM : 50 (30.a)  
SUBJECT : Application for the Purchase of a Motorvehicle.

1. It is requested that approval be given for the purchase of  
a Volkswagen Export.

The corresponding indications read as follows:

- a) Org.-member or Agency to which vehicle will be assigned:

GV "L" - BV - West

- b) Name of Org.-member on whose name vehicle will be registered:

Ludwig Albert, Neu-Ysenburg, Rheinstr. 80

- c) Job-description of Org.-member to whom vehicle will be assigned:

Chief of BV

- d) Intended place of location: Neu-Ysenburg

- e) Monthly kilometers (approx. estimate): 4 000 km

- f) Intended purpose for which vehicle will be used:  
Official trips by chief of BV

- g) Reasons for exchange of vehicle: BV-West works completely under  
German cover

- h) Type, make, police-registration number of exchange-  
vehicle which is to be returned:

Opel-Kapitan AH 68-3042.

2. This ~~is~~ is not an application for an additional vehicle.

Approved: *25.37*

Disapproved: *man SV*

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

ALBERT, Ludwig

I, Ludwig Albert, do hereby acknowledge that I have this date received the sum of DM 5,523.00 (five thousand, five hundred, twenty-three Deutsche Marks) from the Government of the United States of America. In accordance with the agreement under which these funds were entrusted to me, I have purchased with these funds on behalf of the United States Government one Volkswagen Export, motor number 1-0431-258, license number AH 85-4809.

In consideration for the delivery of these funds to me and for the granting of this vehicle into my custody and in consideration for such other benefits as I have received or shall receive from the Government of the United States, its Agencies or representatives, I do hereby agree as follows.

It is understood and agreed that this vehicle, although officially registered in my name, is now and will remain the sole property of the United States Government; and that it is to be held by me subject to the direction of the United States Government or its authorized representatives and that I have no personal proprietary interest in or claim upon this vehicle; and that in the event of my death or disappearance, or at such other time as the United States Government or its authorized representatives shall designate at its discretion, this vehicle shall be returned into the possession of the United States Government, and that neither I, nor my estate, nor my heirs, shall have any claim upon it.

It is further understood and agreed that this vehicle may not be sold, pledged, or otherwise obligated by me or my representatives or agents for any reason whatsoever, without specific authorization in writing from the United States Government or its authorized representatives.

It is further understood and agreed that this contract shall not be construed to grant to me, or my agents or representatives any rights or privileges not



specifically stated herein; and that I shall be personally responsible and liable to the United States Government for the proper custody of this vehicle.

It is understood and agreed that in addition to this acknowledgement, direct to the United States Government, for receipt of these funds I will also be required to affix my signature to a duplicate receipt (for these same funds) in which the firm Siegert & Co. G.m.b.H., acting on behalf of the United States Government, appears as the source of these funds. In signing this duplicate receipt with Siegert & Co. G.m.b.H., I fully understand that the purpose of this duplicate receipt is to be used only, if so directed by the United States Government and/or its authorized representatives, in the event of legal action arising out of my possession and/or disposition of these funds.

Ludwig Albert

New Isenburg, Rheinstr 80

DATED:

17.7.52.

*Ludwig Albert*

#56

Treuhandvertrag  
zwischen

Herrn Ludwig ALBERT, Neu.Isenburg, Rheinstr. 80  
nachfolgend Treuhänder genannt

und

der Firma SIEGERT & Co., G.m.b.H., Industrie-Vertretungen, München-2  
nachfolgend Treugeber genannt, Augusten-Strasse 78

wird folgender Treuhandvertrag geschlossen:

Der Treugeber stellt dem Treuhänder den Personenkraftwagen  
Type Volkswagen-Export Fahrgestellnr. 1-O 356 178  
Motornr. 1-O 431 258 für die ihm übertragenen Aufträge  
zur Verfügung.

2. Der Treuhänder verpflichtet sich, für den genannten Pkw die polizeiliche  
Zulassung auf seinen Namen zu bewirken.

3. Der Treuhänder verpflichtet sich, ohne Wissen und ohne schriftliche  
Genehmigung des Treugebers über den genannten Kraftwagen in keiner  
Weise zu verfügen, vor allem ihn nicht zu veräußern, zu verpfänden  
oder zur Sicherung abzutreten und etwaige Pfändungen sofort dem Treu-  
geber anzuzeigen, ferner den Wagen pfleglich und schonend  
zu behandeln und alle Unfälle dem Treugeber sofort mitzuteilen.

4. Der Treugeber verpflichtet sich, die Kosten der Haftpflichtversicherung  
und Teilkaskoversicherung sowie die Kfz-Steuer für den genannten Pkw  
zu übernehmen und dem Treuhänder die hierfür aufgerundeten Beträge zu er-  
statten.

5. Der Treuhänder verpflichtet sich, Versicherungsfälle umgehend dem Treu-  
geber mitzuteilen und sich den Weisungen des Treugebers hinsichtlich  
Pflege, Behandlung, Reparaturen u.ä. des Kfz. zu fügen.

6. Der Treugeber verpflichtet sich, zur Deckung der Betriebsunkosten  
DM 0,18 pro Kilometer zu erstatten für alle Geschäftsfahrten. Diese  
sind im Fahrtenbuch ausreichend nachzuweisen. Privatfahrten des Treu-  
händers werden nicht vergütet.

7. Der Treuhänder verpflichtet sich, den Pkw monatlich nicht mit mehr als  
10% der Fahrstrecke (in km) für private Zwecke zu benutzen.

8. Der Treugeber ist berechtigt, das Treuhandverhältnis jederzeit grund-  
und fristlos zu kündigen.

München, den 8.7.1952

Treuhandler:

Ludwig Albert

Treugeber:

Siebert & Co.

G.m.b.H.  
München  
Augustenstr. 78



SECRET CONTROL  
US OFFICIALS ONLY  
SECRET CONTROL

V-2600  
23 JUL 1953

NAME: ALBERT, Ludwig (last, first, et al) TITLES: ALIAS: ANDERS, Ludwig "ALBERT"  
BORN: 8 July 1900 ; Frankfurt/M (day, month, year, city/Prov.) App. Age: (+ or -# of yrs)  
Photo (if yes, date & file): Religion: Catholic, wife Protestant  
PERSONAL DESCRIPTION:  
Ht: 178 cms Wt: 112 kg Eyes: brown Teeth: Hair: brown  
Face-shape: Complexion: Scars: Build:

Prominent/ident. features:

FATHER: (last name, first, et al) (titles) (Birth day-mo-yr.: city/Prov.)

OCCUP: RESIDENCE:

MOTHER: (maiden name): OCCUP.: RESIDENCE:

SPOUSE:

CHILDREN: none '49

RESID: Neu Isenberg, 80 Reinstr. (city-suburb/Province, street #/floor) TEL.# MI-8692

BUSINESS: Criminologist; "Press Correspondent"

TTD# issued: for countries:

PASSPORT# issued: for countries:

KK# (true) H 349 718 issued: (date city)

KK# (@): H 489 502 issued: (date city)

ORG.: GV L POS'N: Chief, BV 2600/Wor. ROD: COVER UNIT: U.S. Survey Detachment

y# 2600 S# Payroll # Cryptonym:

E Card # ID Card # Emergency #

SPECIAL DOCUMENTATION: Gun Permit GC 01052 F&D 10 Mar 51; @ below

SUMMARY OF QUALIF., ACTIV.:

REFERENCES: MGLA-48, 29 Jun 49 MGLA-10142, 28 Jan 52  
MGKA-10553, 31 Aug 49 (no tr) " 10879, 20 Mar 52  
MGLA-1291, 17 Feb 50 " 11836, 5 Jun 52  
" 3036, 17 Aug 50 " 12343, 17 Jul 52  
" 7184, 9 Jul 51 " 12453, 22 Jul 52  
" 8090, 5 Sep 51 SPULL-4530, 1 Dec 52  
" 8160, 17 Sep 51 MGLA-1323, 3 Dec 52  
" 8567, 15 Oct 51  
" 8760, 26 Oct 51  
" 9532, 10 Dec 51

SPECIAL DOCUMENTATION: @ ANDERS, Ludwig: Historical Research Institute Statistical Branch, Interrogator's cards: SB-503, expired 30 Jun 50  
SB-00859, expires 31 Dec 53

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ALBERT, Ludwig  
Page -2-

Subject a criminal advisor and probably one of best-known in Germany; during WW II he was GFP Kommissar assigned to "Special Cases".

MGLA-1291, 17 Feb 50 (field offices of 114): (a) BV 2600/Nord, Chief, former police official Ludwig ALBERT, Headquarters, Frankfurt/Main. Staff of 20 persons, 24 agents in western Germany and 5 in Eastern Germany, 12 sources in Western Germany and 1 in the East. This regional office covers Frankfurt/Kassel area, Hessen, the British Zone. Main emphasis of this group has been legal and illegal KP activities, especially courier routes centering on Frankfurt; Frankfurt-Hannover (MESCHKE), Hannover-Berlin, Frankfurt-Kassel (ZAHNWEITZER), Frankfurt-Saarbruecken-France (BLOCH-LAMONT), Frankfurt-Switzerland; also Hessen-Thuringia KP communications lines. A third, and major, undertaking of BV 2600 is security clearing of contemplated new ZIPPER agent personnel living in Hessen or British Zone. A fourth, but minor, interest is KPD Landesleitung Frankfurt and activities of Prof. MAYER (formerly Rote Kapelle) of University of Leipzig and still guest lecturer at University of Frankfurt. On 16 Jan 50, at meeting LEIDL's hqs Karlsruhe, KLAUSSNER, officially in charge ZIPPER's CI work, stated this regional group's targets should be KP couriers, KP activities in Bundesregierung stemming from British Zone, KP in Ruhr; further, that targets for this and other regional groups should be extended eastward to include Eastern German CI work, especially MGB and the political police.

MGLA-3036, 17 Aug 50: identified "ALBERT" as Ludwig ALBERT. Personalia in MGLA-48, 29 Jun 49.

Subject prominent in UJ-DROLLERY 4 as controlling agent of "WALTER", prime figure in case; WALTER is brother-in-law of "WIELAND" (45-0).

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA Air  
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EGQW-13576

EGQW-13576

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE FEB 4 1954

ATTN:   
FROM Chief, EE

SUBJECT  GENERAL Operational/CALL  
 SPECIFIC Notes on Eugen HEBELER, CARAVEL and ZIPPER

REF: MGLA-3036 (1950)

1. Eugen HEBELER, formerly Chief of the Sicherungsgruppe and now in charge of Security in the Blank Office, has also been a figure in the CARAVEL operation. CARAVEL and HEBELER had, of course, a great deal of official contact and I believe that CARAVEL played a major role in removing HEBELER as Chief of the Sicherungsgruppe and confining him to supervision of the physical security and bodyguard force before HEBELER transferred to the Blank Office. Gaines will also recall that in the famous "synthetic diamonds" incident it was HEBELER who came to CARAVEL with the first story about the visit by two KUBARK Americans to Herbert MAINZ, the phonics scientist.
2. An old trace, MGLA-3036 (1950), indicates that HEBELER may have been a contact or agent of ZIPPER's GVL. This referenced memorandum, which is a comprehensive progress report on GVL, states "Eugen HEBELER, Wiesbaden, has been transferred to ALBERT." "ALBERT" refers to Ludwig ALBERT, a GVL employee in Frankfurt, formerly a secret field police official. No more is known about HEBELER's possible connection with GVL.
3. The famous ZIPPER GVL report, which stated that CARAVEL was an ODYOKE agent and which appeared only a short time after the diamond uproar, has never been satisfactorily explained. Since the source of most of the information of the ZIPPER report was obviously Christian FRIES, now Chief of the Frankfurt City Büro, it is possible that Ludwig ALBERT was the ZIPPER contact of FRIES and that Eugen HEBELER was the man who gave ALBERT the idea. All of this is conjecture, but HEBELER no doubt was a little tense about CARAVEL at that time.

4. We would/

(Releasing officer) EE/CE (Coordinating officer) EE/FIG EE/FIG/Z (Authorizing officer) EE/CE

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29  
JUN 1949

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page 2

4. We would like [ ] to question CARAVEL about HEBELER, his background and how he got his Sicherungsgruppe job. Our traces show that HEBELER was a Captain (also a Lt. Colonel) in the Abwehr in Kassel between March 1939 and March 1945 and that his local address there was Virchowstr. 18. He was also a member of the German Armistice Commission, Abteilung Abwehr, Nassauerhof, Wiesbaden. This was presumably the German-French Armistice Commission in 1940.
5. Pullach: Please check HEBELER with American sources. Both [ ] and Pullach should know that a new source of ours in the Security Group-- CARARIC 1--is a good friend of HEBELER.

Distribution:

- 3 - Fran
- 2 - FOB
- 1 - Bonn
- 1 - REG
- 1 - EE/FIG
- 1 - EE/FIG/Z
- 1 - EE/CE

27 January 1954

EE/CE/JMH/mf

SECRET

EGQW-13576



SECRET

Courier

EGQA - 56967

EE 8 FEB 1955

Chief of Base, Pullach  
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt  
Operational  
Earl A. PFORR

INFO: COB, Bonn  
Chief, IE

REF: FRAN 6116 - Ackledge of FIG

1. Attached is an additional copy of a Memorandum received from CIG's Liaison Officer to LfV Hesse.
2. We would appreciate any comments you may have on this incident.

Attachment:  
Memo re Dismissal of Karl A. Pforr (3 cys)

8 February 1955

Distributions  
2 - PFB w/att. (1 cy)  
2 - Bonn w/att. (1 cy)  
2 - IE w/att. (1 cy)

15 Apr  
Det FIG/WGan.  
FIG/CE w/att.

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DATE 2007

EGQA-56967

RI COPY

8 Feb 55

SECRET

SECRET

## OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: Department of the Army Detachment  
Attn: Mr. Cagliati

FROM: Heese LCV L/O-Mr. Johns

SUBJECT: PFCRR, Karl A. LCV Director; Re: Dismissal

REF:

Date: 28 January 1955

On 31 January 1955, (Ministerialrat) Arno MANECK, Chief of Personnel for the Hessian Ministry of the Interior and official responsible for Verfassungsschutz matters within the Interior Ministry informed the Liaison Officer that LCV Director Karl A. PFCRR had been forced into retirement as of 29 January 1955.

During the discussion with MANECK the following facts which played an important part in the forced retirement of PFCRR were brought out by MANECK.

MANECK stated that on 28 January 1955 Joachim ILMITZKY, LCV Official responsible for evaluation of right wing political matters, informed him, unofficially, that PFCRR had denied him permission to forward certain information on right wing activities to the Ministry of the Interior. When asked what the information consisted of, ILMITZKY explained that it pertained to Karl Heinz FRIESTER and the Deutsche Soziale Bewegung-DSB- and the fact that the leader, FRIESTER, had alleged that he had excellent connections to one or more officials of the Ministry of the Interior and that the latter were transmitting information to the leaders of various right wing organizations. ILMITZKY also informed MANECK that one Herr ALBERT of NEU-ISENBURG had called on PFCRR in his office on 21 and 24 January 1955.

On 29 January MANECK had PFCRR report to him in the former's office for an explanation of the charges brought up by ILMITZKY. MANECK explained that he already was aware of PFCRR's GEHLEN connection but assumed that he, as an official civil service employee, was not accepting payment for his services and was not using the LCV on behalf of the GEHLEN organization. Since ILMITZKY indicated that the latter might be the case, MANECK decided to question PFCRR personally on the matter.

MANECK stated that he began the interrogation of PFCRR by asking him whether or not he knew one ALBERT from NEU-ISENBURG. PFCRR replied in the affirmative and stated that he was an old friend from the war days. When asked as to the date that he last saw ALBERT, PFCRR replied that he had not seen him since shortly before Christmas 1954 and the meeting at that time was of a social nature. PFCRR denied that ALBERT ever contacted him in his office at the LCV and continued to

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Tel: FFM 8711/...

ENCL. 2

87A-56907



SUBJECT: PFORR, Karl A.

1 January 1955

deny having seen ALBERT since December 1954. MANECK permitted PFORR to withdraw his denial and reconsider the answer of he wished to. PFORR refused to change his answer and was then informed by MANECK that he, MANECK, was calling Grete REINER, LfV Secretary to the Director, to testify and that she would bring along the Visitors' Register. Confronted with this, PFORR, admitted that ALBERT had been in his office on 21 and 24 January for the purpose of receiving reports for further transmittal to GEHLEN.

In explanation of the above, MANECK stated that ALBERT had introduced himself to REINER as ANDERS and had solicited his name in the Visitors' Register. On 21 January 1955 when ALBERT @ ANDERS called to see PFORR, the latter was talking on the telephone and was then asked to be seated by REINER. Upon completing his telephone call, PFORR came into REINER's office, where ALBERT @ ANDERS was seated, and greeted him by using the name ALBERT. Prior to that time, the true identity of ANDERS had not been known by REINER.

PFORR was then questioned by MANECK as to the nature of the information which ILLITZKY was denied permission to forward to the Ministry of the Interior. PFORR stated that the information was to have been turned over to him personally by Werner STRUNK, LfV Right Wing Case Officer, Operations Section, and was not to have passed through LfV evaluation. After considerable questioning on the part of MANECK, PFORR admitted that he had received an "Auftrag" from GEHLEN to investigate certain personnel of the Hessian Ministry of the Interior, particularly MANECK and Ministerialrat KEIL, Chief of Public Safety. The allegation against MANECK was that he had close ties to extreme right wing personalities and was transmitting information to such persons. The allegations against KEIL were of a similar nature.

MANECK stated that after PFORR had been trapped due to his making false statements, the latter broke down and answered all questions freely. The false statements which trapped PFORR were:

- 1) That he had not seen ALBERT since December 1954 and MANECK's rebuttal that REINER would be called in to testify;
- 2) That he was not using the LfV on behalf of the GEHLEN organization and MANECK's rebuttal thereto that STRUNK had received a number of assignments directly from PFORR and that the results would be passed to PFORR personally and not routed through LfV channels. Here again MANECK threatened to have STRUNK testify;
- 3) PFORR's denial that he had previously been warned to cease his activities for GEHLEN, for pay, and not to use the Landeskriminalamt on behalf of the GEHLEN organization. In this connection MANECK

ENCLOSURE 5922 01917

114-55



SECRET: PFORR, Kurt

explained that in an investigation conducted in 1953, the subject was dismissed in 1953. In 1954, the subject made the allegation that PFORR was connected with the organization through ALBERT. The subject further stated that he had personally investigated the matter and learned that the Chief of the Landeskriminalamt, was using that office on behalf of GERLEN. Then on 8 June 1955 PFORR was presented with an order signed by the Hessian Ministry of the Interior in which he, PFORR, was ordered to cease his activities for GERLEN and to discontinue the use of his office on behalf of the GERLEN organization. PFORR at first denied having ever received such an order. MANECK then presented him with a copy of it which bore PFORR's signature under the date 8 June 1955 and in which the latter agreed to discontinue his activities for GERLEN.

During the interrogation PFORR admitted that he had been employed by GERLEN for approximately 4 1/2 to 5 years, that his contact was ALBERT, described as the "Landesleiter" for "Lund" (Lund) for the GERLEN organization and that he receives 500 DM per month from ALBERT. PFORR also stated that while Chief of the Landeskriminalamt he used that office on behalf of GERLEN and continued to use it even after having been ordered to cease. He added that very seldom did he use information from the Landeskriminalamt itself, instead used the personnel of the office to conduct investigations, surveillance, etc. as assigned by ALBERT. PFORR admitted using the same procedure after being appointed Chief of the LV in June 1954 and that only on a few occasions did he pass on material from the Amt itself.

At the conclusion of the interrogation MANECK informed PFORR that his dismissal was effective immediately and that for the purpose of avoiding a scandal he would be permitted to retire for reasons of health. PFORR was also denied permission to re-enter the LV office.

In addition, MANECK stated that during the interrogation of PFORR he wished to call a GERLEN representative in BAD GODESHERG by the name of REBLING (Phonetic spelling) in order to confront PFORR with proof that he was associated with GERLEN. Since MANECK did not have the phone number available, he called LV Director KAUFBERGER of MANECK. An official replied that if he, MANECK, wanted a GERLEN contact he need only go to 18 Karlstrasse, WIESBADEN. (Note: The Hessian LV is located at 18 Karlstrasse.) KAUFBERGER allegedly received the information that PFORR is associated with GERLEN from a French Military Officer.

MANECK also revealed that he had requested a meeting in either WIESBADEN or MUNICH between himself, the Hessian Minister of the Interior and GERLEN for the coming week. In this meeting GERLEN

H-114-55

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would be requested to furnish the Hessian officials with written assurance that he, GEHLEN, would not corrupt or attempt to corrupt any Hessian State employee in the future. GEHLEN would further be requested to remove ALBERT from Lead Base.

Foreseen as a replacement for PEORR is Gunther URBAN, presently a LfV official and a CDU member. URBAN has the approval of MANECK and the Ministry of the Interior.

Forwarded for your information.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

~~Summary of Facts~~

1. On 30 June 1955, OCA learned the Sicherungsgruppe was planning a large action on 2 July. No details were given at this time.  
Pullach
2. On 2 July our ~~SIC Liaison Officer~~ Officer informed us that the roundup was one started on the basis of information from Herbert WEINMANN alias BURKHARDT, who was in prison on the basis of black market charges and was offering information on persons in contact with the SFS in return for his freedom from prosecution. They also reported that two of the persons indicated by WEINMANN as SFS agents were SDU employees Robert KAESTNER and ~~Ludwig~~ Ludwig ALBERT.
3. On 7 July our CIC Liaison Officer ~~informed us that~~ learned from CIC HQ that the German authorities in conjunction with the BfV and SDU had conducted a swoop operation the weekend of 2-4 July and arrested 15 persons including 2 SDU members.
4. Also on 7 July Dr. Ernst BRUECKNER, chief of the Sicherungsgruppe informed a member of this office of the background of the arrests and confirmed the fact that ALBERT and KAESTNER were arrested. Aside from giving capsule account of WEINMANN's arrest and the gist of his disclosures, no details were given. BRUECKNER stated ~~explicitly~~ that ~~explicitly~~ one KARTHAL, fnu, an employee of the Deutsche Post in Frankfurt ~~had~~ had passed the SFS some military phone books. Other than this, BRUECKNER said, there were no ~~other~~ matters of a security nature affecting the U.S. except for the two SDU men, neither of whom had made any admissions. He said further that this was only a tentative ~~judgment~~ judgment, inasmuch as voluminous material found in ALBERT's possession was still being ~~studied~~ studied. There was, however, no doubt but that ALBERT had been in touch with the SFS, since the witness WEINMANN had on one occasion ~~seen~~ seen the SFS case officer whom he knew as



BERGER, give ALBERT some money at a clandestine meeting in the woods near Frankfurt. Subsequent meetings with BRUCHNER revealed no further information which he was willing to pass us.

5. On 19 July, BRUCHNER gave a list of the arrestees as follows:

- a. Kurt LEFEBRE, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Wetzlarerstr 28, born 8 July 1921 in Berlin. He was known to WEINMANN personally and confessed having worked for the Sfs in 1953. His confession is not complete.
- b. Heinz HERMANN, Berlin-Schwanenwerder, Inselstr 30, born 10 December 1914 in Dresden. He has made a partial confession.
- c. Dr. Rudi WALTER, Berlin, born 14 August 1912, Berlin. He had made a partial confession, including the fact that he recruited some people for the Sfs.
- d. Gerhard UMLAUF, Oranienstr 14, Berlin, born 1 March 1921 in Berlin. He has made a full confession.
- e. Felix VIETH, Berlin, chief of the Vertriebenestelle at Tempelhof. He has denied working ~~for~~ for the Sfs.
- f. Heinrich JONAS, Weiskirchen bei Offenbach, born ~~14~~ 7 February 1924 in Weiskirchen. Has confessed.  
Frankfurt/Main;
- g. Frau KARTHAL, Niddastr 8, Has confessed selling military phone books to Sfs through ~~XXX~~ WEINMANN.
- h. Alwin ROSENGARTEN, ~~Kxxxx~~ Frankfurt/M, mover and proprietor of omnibus company. He has confessed working for the Sfs since 1954.
- i. Georg Ernst TETZNER, Fassberg, born 16 February 1920 in Schmoelein, Kreis Altenburg. Released as case of mistaken identity.
- j. Karl BARTHOLOMAEUS, Braunschweig, born 18 September 1920, Goettnitz, Kreis Bitterfeld. No confession so far.
- k. Robert KAESTNER, Munich, SDJ employee, born 27 October 1913 in Frankfurt am Main. Denies any treasonable activity on behalf of an eastern intelligence service.
- l. Ludwig ALBERT, Neu Isenburg bei Frankfurt, Rainstr 80, born 8 July 1900

in Frankfurt. Committed suicide the night of 14 July in jail without having made any confession except that he was guilty of the misuse of ~~official~~ operational funds. He denied in his suicide note having had any contact with the SFS.

m. fnu HUNST ER, Frankfurt a/L. Released for lack of evidence.

n. ~~XXX~~/ZWICKER, Stuttgart. East-west trader. Has confessed working for SFS, also connection with DIA Metall and Meletex.

o. fnu SCHLIEDT, proprietor retail store Berlin-Tempelhof. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Associate of ~~XXXX~~ VIETH. No details known.

p. Martin SPINLER, Berlin, born 4 September 1918. He has confessed to having worked with JONAS (see 5f above) on behalf of the SFS against the Federal R public. He had been given a radio number code for receiving blind voice broadcasts and was also in po session of S/W material.

*In a section which vague & wanted for more details:*

a. *Small language with Det R, alleged SFS informant (Vieth). Made Russ talk driver Det R gave Maximian info on courses.*

b. *Married few employee Am Hotel Garnisch. Alleged agent.*

c. *Got in CIC Wbadeu alleged SFS contact. His Hq believed vicinity Ruderingsstr & Wbadeu.*



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DATE 2007

Name For Record:

Conversation with Utility, Edinger and Peters  
8 July 1955

WEINMANN Case:

1. Utility expressed view that legal position of SG on case made it impossible ZIPPER officially reveal details to us. EDINGER said he had been in touch with 841 on case and had received great help. Utility said he could not give us detailed written report on case at this time.

2. I raised question of SG data as general problem. Noted that SG had official channel to U.S. in Bonn and assumed that anything of official U.S. interest would be sent to U.S. liaison of SG in Bonn. Utility concurred this but noted that possibly on some points SG would prefer to pass info via ZIPPER. In general, Utility accepted point that SG would advise U.S. in Bonn of official U.S. interest items.

3. I told Utility that we definitely did not pass SG material received from ZIPPER to other agencies.

4. EDINGER gave detailed briefing on WEINMANN case. New points to me:

a. Either fifteen or seventeen have been arrested. Another 35 persons appear implicated.

b. Delay in arresting KAESTNER and ALBERT due desire to recheck WEINMANN as source by other arrestee reactions. Almost all of others arrested immediately confessed. With this info it was no longer thought that whole thing was a provocation. Neither ALBERT nor KAESTNER have confessed.

c. ROTH has team in Berlin any/all KAESTNER sources have been alerted but have not been brought out. This admittedly a very difficult decision. Org feels KAESTNER may have made money out of BERGER contact without revealing GDR sources.

d. Purely legal question whether KAESTNER can be held beyond questioning period. ZIPPER cannot guess. If he released a new problem faces us. A decision on his sources in GDR will be made after his release. Org accepts fact that his sources may have been reported already by him to SFS. ROTH has argued for calculated risk.

e. Albert has no sources in GDR. - Only problem is internal org staff security.

f. WEINMANN is the source of the derogatory info on the putzfrau in our Hq. However, his knowledge limited to fact that he once had to make local Pullach investigation. He has no knowledge of their (she and daughter) actually being engaged in any espionage. (In future this case will be followed up via 841 channel to Edinger).

g. In view of Utility remarks Edinger may be sticky in giving us information on this case. All we can do is (a) ask for info of direct U.S. interest...incl that pertaining to the KAESTNER and ALBERT cases...and hope that the other material will eventually also be passed to us. Do not think we should press Edinger too hard on the non-U.S. and non-ZIPPER material.

h. For present this will continue in POB staff to be an 841 case. 831 should eventually take a good look at the case for RIS CE info produced.

I WANT TO SEE ALL TRAFFIC ON THIS CASE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS....

Dist: 807  
829  
841  
831  
SFB Bonn

BURKHARDT  
File 240 WEINMANN  
X ALBERT

SECRET  
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE			
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION	
		2. RI FILE NO.	
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE
5. ANALYST		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.
6. DATE PROCESSED		9. EVALUATION	
10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION			
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
14.			
<p>ALBERT LUDWIG SEX M DOB ? CIT ? OCC ? ARRESTED IN KARLSRUHE AREA OF GERM 55</p> <p>032-006-007 XAAZ-27730 14 JUL 55 SER 5271 CHIEF EE</p> <p>R 6805230235</p> <p>FILE IN 201-_____</p>			
19. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		▶	

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DATE 2007

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-48)



14 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Penetration of ZIPPER by the East German Security Service (SFS)

1. The West German authorities recently arrested thirteen persons on charges of espionage for the SFS. Among the persons arrested were two ZIPPER staff members. One of these, Ludwig ALBERT, was deputy chief of a ZIPPER field base in the Karlsruhe area. The other, Robert KARSTEN, was a case officer with the ZIPPER field base in Munich.
2. The case developed as a result of the revelations of a certain Herbert August WEINMAN, aka WURKHAUPT, former SFS agent who was arrested some months ago by West German authorities on old criminal charges. ZIPPER has participated in the case from the outset. Full results of the investigations following the arrests are not yet available; however, we are informed that at this point the case against the two ZIPPERites sounds convincing. Examination of file copies of reports in ALBERT's possession at the time of his arrest tend to indicate that, in addition to ZIPPER and the SFS, ALBERT had a third employer. German authorities feel there are indications that this third employer could be an American agency. We have no evidence to support such a theory.
3. The involvement of Ludwig ALBERT is believed to tie onto a previous security case which ZIPPER has been investigating for more than a year. This case concerned the accidental discovery in the Stuttgart area of a dead letter drop containing a microfilm report on ZIPPER presumably intended for an Eastern intelligence service. The content of the report was such as to lead ZIPPER to the conclusion that it might have been written by someone in a key position in the Karlsruhe field base where ALBERT was serving as deputy. On the other hand, the case had certain other features which suggested that it was a provocation attempt against ZIPPER. The latter theory now seems to have been disproven by the current investigation which appears to promise clarification of this older case.
4. According to WEINMAN's testimony the following additional persons against whom no action has as yet been taken are in contact with the SFS or the EHR:
  - a. A female Russian emigrant who is employed as a language instructor in the U. S. Army intelligence school at Oberrhein, Germany.
  - b. A male Russian emigrant truck driver in the same school who previously provided WEINMAN with information on the course of instruction in the school.

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DATE 2007

32-6-7-5271  
(Gen. On [unclear] Pullach)

1. A female employee in an unmarked American hotel in  
Garmisch - Partenkirchen.

2. An American soldier with CIG in Wiesbaden.

An assessment of the reliability of the above allegations is now  
available at this time.

3. You will be kept informed of further developments.

Chief, Eastern European Division

ME/2/2    
14 July 1975  
Distribution  
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1 - C/ME  
1 - HI  
2 - ME/2/2



Executive Registry  
7-2523  
DD/P-1-7680

SECRET

15 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Penetration of ZIPPER by the East German Security Service (StB)

1. Reference is made to the EE memorandum, subject as above, dated 14 July 1955.

2. According to an additional report the total number of persons arrested is now fifteen. Of this number nine have made either full or partial confessions. Ludwig ALBERT, one of the ZIPPER members involved, committed suicide while in confinement without having confessed. Also among the remaining five who have not confessed is the other ZIPPER member Ludwig WANDER.

3. Also among those denying the charges is one Felix VIETH whose wife Ruth VIETH nee SCHWARZ was employed as a translator in the U. S. Army intelligence school at Oberammergau, Germany. Information as to the specific time of this employment is not available. No further details have been received concerning the other alleged penetrations of U. S. Army installations listed in paragraph 4 of the above-mentioned memorandum.

Deputy Chief of Operations  
Eastern European Division

EE/g/z, [ ]  
15 July 1955  
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DATE 2007

Conversation with Brückner 22 July 1955

1. Examination of the reporting of Albert to Gehlen since mid-1952 <sup>and the</sup> ~~material~~ <sup>material in Albert's files</sup> reveals the following information:

- a. Albert received regularly reports from one Heinrich SCHMITZ, Kriminalrat a.D., of Schulstr. 1 in Schlangenbad. ~~SCHMITZ~~ SCHMITZ' reports concerned his service with a U.S. intelligence office headed by a Col. fnu THOMAS, described as being 205cm tall and very husky, but not fat. According to SCHMITZ' information, this office was gathering information on the following ~~targets~~ targets: The Friedrich Wilhelm HEINZ case, Amt Blank, Abt VI (Public Safety) of the Federal Ministry of Interior, Gehlen Organization, Kaiser Ministry, BfV, Sicherungsgruppe.
- b. ~~The American office~~ The American office was allegedly concerned with the security of these various offices. The reports which SCHMITZ submitted contained a variety of personality information on members of these offices, internal gossip, personal feuds etc. Much of the material ~~consisted~~ consisted of mere squibs relating to the residence, office of employment and character of the subject and were no more than 3 or 4 lines long, in short OB information.
- c. ALBERT transmitted to Gehlen selected excerpts from these reports. To these he added information concerning <sup>"Col. Thomas"</sup> ~~the American~~ office itself which he had obviously obtained from SCHMITZ orally, since they were not contained in any documents found in ALBERT's home, where he kept his voluminous files.
- d. <sup>"CIA Thomas"</sup> The office was allegedly first in Bad Godesberg from 1952 until sometime in 1953 when it moved to Frankfurt. Late in 1953 SCHMITZ indicated to Albert, who passed it on to Gehlen, that the office was transferred to the direct control of the CIA office in Paris.
- e. The specific EBI which "Col Thomas" gave to SCHMITZ were all passed on to

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Albert, thence to Gehlen. The DMI showed in some measure the degree of success this American office was having in its operation. It became apparent, for example, that SCHMITZ had sources in ~~the~~ most of the assigned target areas. For example: his source on the HEINZ case was the Wiesbaden lawyer ~~fnu~~ KELCH, who has virtually abandoned his practice in order to get to the bottom of the HEINZ matter. ~~KELCH had represented~~ <sup>slander</sup> ~~represented~~ the Dutchman BLAND, who was involved in a ~~pending~~ suit against HEINZ, and also represented Fraulein SCHOTT, ~~HEINZ's former secretary~~.

SCHMITZ' sources in the Sicherungsgruppe were Theodor SAEVECKE (a personal friend and unwitting informant) and Paul LERCHHOFF, variously member of the Chancellor's Begleitkommando, the Schutz- und Sicherheits-SG kommando and finally the <sup>SG</sup> teletype central. It appears that SCHMITZ also had informants in the BfV, the Ministry of Interior and the Amt Blank, though these have not been identified.

f. ~~LERCHHOFF~~ ~~was~~ ~~informed~~ ~~by~~ ~~Albert~~, through Schmitz, was informed of the SG roundup of 2-4 July 1955 soon after it happened, although the details ~~did~~ <sup>did</sup> not ~~appear~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~report~~ ~~which~~ ~~SCHMITZ~~ passed to Albert.

g. SAEVECKE informed SCHMITZ about ~~his~~ the disciplinary action being carried on against him (SAEVECKE) and passed remarks re his personal opinion of the way the Sicherungsgruppe was handled. This information apparently did not go on to Gehlen.

h. SCHMITZ asked his American chief for a raise from 800 to 850 DM per month and a separation allowance of 220 DM monthly since his work forced him to live apart from his family.

2. SAEVECKE was interrogated in Karlsruhe on 19 and 20 July 1955 as a witness, not as an accused. His story ~~contained~~ contained the following allegations:

a. S knew SCHMITZ from his police days and they became good personal friends. S knew that SCHMITZ, who made no secret of it, worked for

an American intelligence office. When S<sup>was</sup> charged with war crimes during his service in Italy, he turned not only to OCA, which provided some material favorable to him, but also to SCHMITZ, since he did not know how effective the OCA material would be in exonerating him and felt that the more testimonials he could get the better.

- b. In the course of his relations with SCHMITZ, he also discussed his opinions of what was wrong with the leadership ~~with~~ of the Sicherungsgruppe.
  - c. When he returned from Karlsruhe on 20 July, SCHMITZ was waiting for him at his (SAFECHE's) home and asked what he knew about the death of ALBERT. SCHMITZ, who was a close family friend of ALBERT, had allegedly learned of the death from Frau ALBERT.
  - d. SARVECKE knew ALBERT from 1934 when he was an instructor and ALBERT a student at the Kolonialschule. They were not personal friends and had kept no steady contact since, although they had seen each other on infrequent occasions.
3. Paul LERCHHOFF was interrogated in Karlsruhe on about 19 July. He denied having furnished SCHMITZ with any information. The following day after he had returned home, he called the OCA in Karlsruhe and said he would like to talk to him and make some changes in his previous statement. The subsequent interrogation, conducted on 21 July contained briefly the following information:
- a. He had known SCHMITZ and one Richard SCHWEIZER during the war. Schweizer like LERCHHOFF was a Volksdeutscher from Lithuania. They met in Bad Godesberg in 1951 by accident and the three had a pleasant reunion. SCHMITZ revealed he worked for an American intelligence office and after numerous meetings asked L to assist his office in filling in some gaps in its information. This L claimed to be unable to do as he was only a member of the Chancellor's Begleitkommando and as such had access to no information of interest. He did, however, supply some items of a gossip nature which SCHMITZ received gladly. Before long, SCHMITZ



was paying L 200 DM per month for his information.

- b. L was <sup>erelhoff</sup> transferred two or three times between the Berleithkommando and the Schutz- und Sicherungskommando, which did not improve his ability to provide important information, although he was able to obtain squibs through talking to his colleagues.
- c. Sometime in 1954, L <sup>erelhoff</sup> was transferred to the teletype central of the SG and then began to be able to furnish more interesting information, although still only brief reports, since detailed reports were always pouched. In early July, SCHMITZ <sup>erelhoff</sup> allegedly approached L and said his (Schmitz) office had information that a large roundup of espionage agents was to take place, and could L <sup>erelhoff</sup> supply some information on it. From earlier experience, L <sup>erelhoff</sup> maintains he believed SCHMITZ' office or at least some U.S. officers were receiving information officially from the SG and other security organizations, so he did not see any reason why he should not accede to <sup>Schmitz</sup> request. He accordingly reported (and this report was found in ALBERT's files) that a prisoner who had been confined in Koenigswinter and was then removed to Linz a/R, had proffered information which had led to the preparation by the SB of a roundup under the name of Aktion Weimar, that BRUCKNER was known to have visited Karlsruhe recently, possibly in connection with this roundup and that Gehlen had visited the SG with another man on 17 June 1955, possibly also in this connection. L <sup>erelhoff</sup> claimed to have received the information on BRUCKNER and Gehlen movements from colleagues of his in the course of informal chats.
- d. SCHMITZ, SCHWEIZER and LERCHHOFF met frequently in various cafes and talked about the S<sup>U</sup> information. (Note: It is not clear whether SCHWEIZER also worked for Col. Thomas directly, or whether he was merely a subsource of SCHMITZ.)
- e. Shortly after the arrests on 2-4 July, SCHMITZ <sup>erelhoff</sup> asked L if he could find out if a Ludwig ALBERT or Albert LUDWIG had been arrested in the roundup.

*It is our impression that*  
~~Believe~~ *Lerschhoff* was able to confirm to SCHMITZ that ALBERT had been arrested.

f. L *Lerschhoff* learned that THOMAS was to have met SCHMITZ in Bonn on 18 July.

4. BRUECKNER had the following comments to make on the above:

a. None of the information which SCHMITZ passed to ALBERT from the Col.

Thomas office contained any state secrets. The material was largely gossip, rumors, dissatisfaction and "Beamtenklatsch" in general.

b. SCHMITZ has not yet been interviewed, nor has SCHWEIZER. BRUECKNER felt

that there was a good possibility I was identical with Col. Thomas and

wanted to put it up to me first. *[Comment: Since SCHMITZ was registered in*

Bad Godesberg, Schlangenbad and had a brother in Wiesbaden, and since the

information had first become available only a few days before, the SG had

not actually had time to locate the men.) I believe I convinced B that

this man was not a CIA agent and that I was not involved.]

c. B had not discussed this case with any other U.S. agencies and will regard

us as his middlemen in any inquiries of other agencies. He understands that

we stand in a command relationship to no military agency, and can therefore

not be responsible for any evasive action that may be taken. *He agrees to take*

*no action to find Schmidt or Schweizer until he hears from us.*

d. He concedes the possibility that SCHMITZ may have been warned or removed

by Col Thomas for any of the following reasons:

(1) knowledge of ALBERT's arrest may have alarmed SCHMITZ, though it is not known whether or not Col. Thomas was aware of the connection.

(2) the SG interviewed SCHMITZ' former landlady in Bad Godesberg, but in such a way that she would not connect it with police interest and so that it would probably not filter back to him;

(3) LERSCHHOFF may have warned SCHMITZ either after his first interrogation

or after his second, despite the fact that he signed a secrecy

agreement after his confession. <sup>a</sup> He is at present on leave status

from the SG.

B therefore realizes that his having revealed the facts of the case to me



need have nothing to do with SCHMITZ' disappearance <sup>in case</sup> he is gone when they finally get the clearance to go after him.

- e. B was not sure that we did not have the power to arrest and try SCHMITZ for having betrayed our trust. He knows now. He said that if we prefer to interrogate SCHMITZ in the presence of an SG representative that is perfectly all right, but we should not do so without the benefit of the evidentiary material they have in their possession.
- f. B has discussed his belief with both Gehler and the OBA in Karlsruhe that I may be identical with Col. Thomas. He assures me he did not have any such thought at the time he arranged the appointment with BA FISCHER for 26 July.
- g. He hopes the U.S. will acknowledge SCHMITZ if he is their agent, recognizing that no state secrets were passed and merely preparing to put up with the temporary embarrassment, which B concedes will not improve official relations. He assured me that no matter what the outcome it would not impair our contact.
- h. He eliminates the possibility that SCHMITZ could have been working for a political party under the guise of an American office, since the only party which would have been interested is the SPD and they have no need to employ such tactics, having plenty of party members in the target installations. If this is not a U.S. affiliation, it can only be part of a large eastern net. (Comment: It is not clear how he arrived at this latter conclusion.)
- i. Other than information on Col. Thomas, no other members of the American office have been identified, nor is the precise location of the office known. (Comment: It seems doubtful that the BfV is aware of the Col. Thomas angle, since they could doubtless conclude it was Tom Dale of CIE who has worked with them. Alternatively, they may have recognized it and informed either Benjamin or Tom Hughes, in which case Schmitz has already disappeared.)

SECRET

2 August 1955

M/R

SUBJECT: ALBERT's Role in UJ-DROLLERY # 300 (ADLER)

1. On 1 August, I visited @ RODERICH who had just returned from leave. The reason for my call was Fall STUDENT.

2. At the end of the conversation, @ RODERICH mentioned the current ALBERT flap and somehow the conversation got on the two Hungarian cases, ADLER and GEMER (FILIUS) (# 302). I asked whether ZIPPER had any hopes of saving these two cases, or whether they had to be written off. Thereupon, @ RODERICH immediately called in @ RISCHE and @ KUTZBACH.

3. From this conference the following facts were learned: Among ALBERT's files in the basement there was found in an as-yet-unidentified handwriting a booklet with the notation "Fuss 2600." Attached to it, written in the same hand, were true and cover data regarding ADLER. These included the data of a cover document and an Austrian identity card in the name of SCHAUER, or similar, which ADLER had never used, however. @ RISCHE commented that the data on this slip went beyond what ALBERT had to know or could use for his ZIPPER activity regarding ADLER. @ RISCHE also theorized that ALBERT tipped off the Hungarians about the proposed Switzerland EV and that as a result the switch to East Berlin was effected. @ RISCHE's thinking runs as follows:

When @ RISCHE discussed ADLER last with Disustelle 1A2, ALBERT sat in on the meeting although there was no apparent reason for this. When @ RISCHE mentioned that ZIPPER was all set to surveil ADLER in Switzerland and planned to use a Volkswagen rigged with photographic gear to take pictures of the HIS types that would make the meeting, ALBERT expressed interest and asked, "Do you often do such surveillance in Switzerland?" This question and a few others (which @ RISCHE did not describe further) led @ RISCHE to the remark that ALBERT had asked him "einige eiserne Fragen." These indicated posthumously that ALBERT had notified his Eastern masters of ZIPPER's plan to surveil ADLER in Switzerland, and as a result the rendezvous was changed to take place in East Berlin.

831

Distribution:

- Cy 1. File (Extra Cy in 240/ALBERT)
- Cy 2. 829, 841, 849, 836, 830
- Cy 3. 801
- Cy 4. ZIPPER Desk

240/ALBERT  
(Cover) Ludwig

SECRET

150.15 # 300

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007



UJ-DREGLA-15996

2 August 1955

TO : 801  
FROM : 833  
SUBJECT: ALBERT, Ludwig

In accordance with your request, attached is an expanded  
UJ-DREDGER report on Subject.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

Ludwig Albert 801

ALBERT, Ludwig  
b. 8 Jul 1900 Frankfurt/M  
Lived: 1949-55 Frankfurt/M and Neu Isenburg  
Died: 15 Jul 55 (suicide)

Camp-following Party member. Former Kriminalrat. WW-II officer commanding a Wehrmacht security police unit (Geheime Feldpolizei-GFP/Kommissar). Prior 1949, joined ZIPPER's major CI/CE group, Org. 114, Recommended June '49 as one of Germany's most able "criminalists" by ZIPPER for participation in planned political police organization of W. Germany. 1950-53: as head of GV L (Org. 114) regional office in Frankfurt/M, concerned with legal and illegal KP activities and security clearances of contemplated new agent personnel living Hesse and British Zone, his chief was LEIDL, who had many personal contacts to police and Ministry of Interior personnel. Fall '50: leader of GV L district agency BV 2600/NORD with 7 subordinate offices, their mission being security of operations in W. Germany. Early '51: leader BV 2600/NORD, living Neu Isenburg, operating in Hesse area and British Zone with 9 branch offices. Early '52: leader BV 2600/WEST, operating in same area. Apr '53: leader BV 2600, operating area Hesse; but by Dec '53 he was appointed to GV L hqs staff as Co-chief of security and remained leader of WK/Hesse (Waldkapelle: investigative squad) also concerned with special connections in that area. Aug '54: reported as deputy leader of Dienststelle 142 (GV L's new designation), chief of agency security and leader WK/Hesse concerned with special connections, his operating area expanded to W. Germany. During 1950-early '55, Subject was UTILITY's contact to Hesse gov't official Karl A. PFORR, dismissed Jan '55 for using his offices on ZIPPER's behalf. Exposed as an Sfs agent by Herbert BURKHARDT in May '55, Subject was arrested 4 Jul and hanged himself 15 Jul in jail without confessing. Evidence in his home incriminated him as long-time Eastern agent also employed by unidentified American IS in addition to ZIPPER.

-----  
ZIPPER Career

? EOD w/Org. 114, ZIPPER's chief CI/CE group.  
1949, feb-mar ALBERT assigned as special investigator by Org. 114 to assist Org. 13 re Fall HANNES, case of Rumanian Hannes KLOECKNER @ SCHLURBES, original agent leader of Org. 13 who was arrested and doubled by Rumanian Security Police in mid-'48. In Jan '49 KLOECKNER returned to Austria and contacted Org. 13. ZIPPER report of 14 Sep '49 stated "...he was interrogated for weeks by MALLNER, HACKENBUCHNER and LUDWIG (cover name) from organization LEIDL...it leaked out that 'Hannes' then



ALBERT, Ludwig

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confessed...details were strictly withheld from US knowledge for reasons imperceptible, all files and records pertaining to the investigation were kept from anybody but MALLNER, HACKENBUCHNER and LUDWIG. MALLNER and LUDWIG...on several occasions went to Munich, where they had discussions with Dr. KLAUSNER and SCHACK, taking complete files with them. In the end MALLNER, HACKENBUCHNER and LUDWIG in seclusion made up a report...destined for Org. 23."

- 1949, jun Ludwig ALBERT (liv. Frankfurt-Sued, Am Wendelsweg 12) was recommended by ZIPPER for participation in the planned political police organization of West Germany; he was described as a former Kriminalrat and WW-II GPF/Kommissar (assigned special cases) and one of Germany's most able criminalists; classified as a camp-following Party member. Slotted for Land Esse, ALBERT was marked as one of those best fitted and seriously recommended by ZIPPER out of the 35 selected from "llk", a large organization of agents covering Amzone with mission of performing CI functions ensuring security Zipper's op'l communications with Zone; ZIPPER claimed most of these men had worked in the Political Police prior to Hitler's seizure of power, had unobjectionable political backgrounds, and were largely men with professional police experience; their relations with police authorities and other German agencies in the Amzone were claimed to be good and effective; in keeping under surveillance possible points of danger to ZIPPER ops, the group reportedly unearthed considerable material chiefly of political police interest.
- 1950, feb Chief, GV L's EV 2600/WORD; his Frankfurt/M hqs a regional office covering Frankfurt-Kassel area, Esse and British Zone. Main emphasis legal and illegal KP activities and security clearances of contemplated new ZIPPER agent personnel living Esse or British Zone. His chief, @ LEIDL, has many personal contacts to police and Ministry of Interior personnel. See ANNEX "A" for detailed master list info including staff.
- " , jun Fnu ALBERT, Gary MILLER, Oskar REILE, fnu ZOELLNER named by Hans Jochen RUDLOFF to HICOG as members of Munich group cooperating with an American intelligence office; RUDLOFF stated he personally knew 3 of them were concerned with CE.
- " , ? Began liaison with Karl A. PFORR, Chief LKA/Esse (later Chief LfV/Esse), a UTILITY connection. ← PFORR
- " , oct Received Housing Loan for Dm 3,000. (Note: repaid in full by 31 Dec 53).

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ALBERT, Ludwig

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- 1951, feb Arranged contact with Police Vice-President (former director of railways in East Zone) in connection with suspected Communist penetration of Frankfurt/M Police Praesidium, and thereby hoped to clarify situation re Kennkarten procured through Inspektor SCHMIDT of Praesidium.
- " , ? Reported prior June '51 in untd Gv L master list as leader of BV 2600/WORD, living Neu-Isenburg, operating Hesse area and British Zone. See ANNEX "B".
- 1952, feb Reported in untd Gv L master list, rec'd Feb., as leader of BV 2600/WEST, living Neu-Isenburg, operating Hesse area and British Zone. See ANNEX "C".
- " , feb-jul As Chief of Gv L's BV WEST (working completely under German cover), Subject returned Opel-Kapitän AH-68-3042 (in which he had an accident 28 Jul 51, details unknown); as Presse-Korrespondent Albert LUDWIG, Neu Isenburg, Rheinstr 80, he purchased on 28 May 52 from Otto GLOBCKLER, Frankfurt/M, Darmstädter Landstr 154, a blue Volkswagen Export, licensed AH-85-4809. He executed 2 papers for ZIPPER: (1) 8 Jul 52, a receipt in which Siegert & Co. GmbH, Industrie-Vertretungen, Munich 2, Augustenstr 78 appears as source of funds and (2) 17 Jul 52, a contract acknowledging receipt of DM 5,523 and custody of vehicle for his official use.
- " , apr Known to ODOPAL by true name.
- " , " In pay bracket II ('55: av. DM 700-925 monthly) as district agency leader, BV WEST (Frankfurt-Hesse and northern part of Frankfurt/M zone, with 30 agents and informants). See ANNEX "D".
- " , " Reported by ZIPPER to have handled, since early '50, double-agent @ WALTER in CE case UJ-DROLLERY #4; @ WALTER was identified by ZIPPER as Lt. Col. Arthur WEBER and brother-in-law of "4530 (HARRA WIELAND)". (Note: this case seemed dead until Jun '54, when @ WALTER was approached by an SRIS courier; Subject, in @ WALTER's absence, was informed by Frau WALTER. ZIPPER decided, in view of control difficulties, not to play the case further.)
- " , may-nov Received tel. calls at his home no. Neu-Isenburg 8692 from 2 ZIPPER cover units, according to intercepted ZIPPER hqs toll slips; also,
- " , sep-nov from 29.2 office in Frankfurt/M, as reported by US officer there.
- 1953 Ludwig ALBERT, Kriminalrat, Frankfurt/M, Wendelsweg 12 still listed in Frankfurt/M City Directory (1953) name section only, probably in error since from the address section it appears Henninger Bräu AG controls the address.
- " , apr Reported in Gv L master list as leader of BV 2600, living Neu-Isenburg, operating in Hesse area with a considerably reduced staff. See ANNEX "E".
- " , may-jun Identified as PFORR (see 1950) contact to UTILITY, during interrogation by LfV of Paul SCHMIDT (former Hesse LfV Chief, dismissed Dec '52), who stated he had personally investigated matter and knew PFORR, at that time Chief LKA, was using that office on

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ALBERT, Ludwig

ALBERT(?) PFORR(?)  
re-copied for(?)

More information  
from the source  
in 1953  
1953

behalf of UTILITY. On 8 Jun 53 PFORR signed Hesse Ministry of Interior order directing him to cease his activities for UTILITY and to discontinue using his office on behalf of UTILITY's org.

- 1953, Jul GV L's report of activities for first half '53 indicated that BV 2600 and Subject were involved in and knowledgeable of ZIPPER's penetration ops against Soviet Mission/Pfm, Polish Society in Germany, Czech Liaison Mission/Pfm; also cases UJ-DROLLERY #112 and #112-D, concerned with SovZone MDPD and Hesse NPD political and psychological warfare ops in and against West Germany, and ZIPPER's most important RIS double agent opn; it is presumed likely that Subject knew true names of agents.
- " , dec Reported in GV L organization list as now on agency hqs staff as co-chief of Security for the GV (hqs Karlsruhe) and at the same time leader (living Neu-Isenburg) of WK/Hesse and special connections in that area. See ANNEX "P".
- " , " Accurately identified in DDR press expose on ZIPPER, following which GV L was redesignated as Dienststelle 142.
- 1953-54 ALBERT's neighbors at Neu Isenburg, Rheinstr 13, according to information ZIPPER submitted in connection with the emergency evacuation program, may have been:  
BERGER, Georg (V-7856): b. 13.5.06 Kemberg/Bez. Halle, teletype operator w/D. 161, Darmstadt.  
BERGER, Karl-Heinz: b. 28.12.32 Berlin, radio operator w/Sec. 400; reportedly living Nikolaus.  
MATTHES, Otto: b. 14.9.09 Kemberg-Willenberg, driver/courier and substitute air courier to Berlin.
- 1954, Jun Subject's Hesse gov't contact, Karl A. PFORR, appointed Chief of LfV/Hesse. (See 1950 and May 1953).
- " , " Bodo FROMM (Sov agent arrested 27 Jan 55) discovered dead letter drop containing material on ZIPPER presumably originating with a ZIPPER member acting as a penetration agent for a hostile service; agent source virtually identified himself as a member of D. 142, and finger pointed strongly to Subject's chief @ LEIDL.
- " , sep Ludwig ALBERT received duty rail ticket for travel under 7924 Army Procurement Team cover; destination unknown.
- " , aug D. 142 (GV L) organizational list reports Subject now as deputy GV leader, chief of GV security, and also continuing as leader of WK/Hesse with special connection responsibilities. See ANNEX "P".
- 1955, Jan 21 Visited PFORR's office, signed visitors' register as ANDERS but was greeted by PFORR as ALBERT in the secretary's presence; revisited this office 3 days later.

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ALBERT, Ludwig

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- 1955, Jan 28. PFORR was interrogated by LfV on charge of having (1) denied an LfV official permission to pass certain info on right wing activities to the Ministry of Interior and (2) received ALBERT's visits. PFORR finally admitted charges, and with respect to (2) confessed: 4 1/2-5 years' employment by UTILITY, the contact being ALBERT who paid him DM 500 monthly; use of his official offices on UTILITY's behalf before and after being ordered to cease; infrequent transmittal of LKA and LfV info from the Amts themselves but use of office personnel to conduct investigations, surveillances, etc. as assigned by ALBERT; receiving UTILITY's "Auftrag" to investigate certain Hesse Ministry of Interior personnel for alleged rightist ties.
- " , Jan 29. PFORR forced into retirement.
- " , Jan 31. ALBERT's removal from Land Hesse to be requested of UTILITY by LfV.
- " , Feb. UTILITY told [ ] that ALBERT had maintained liaison to PFORR when he was head of LKA Hesse but strongly denied ALBERT paid him, later repeating his denial officially to the Hessian government. (Note: subsequently it appears the DM 500 monthly payment could have been SFS or unidentified American IS (?) money.)
- " , mid-May. Subject exposed as SFS agent by Herbert BURKHARDT (SFS), arrested Aug '54 for 1945 blackmarketing, now seeking freedom from prosecution in exchange for revelation FedRep persons with Eastern Intelligence contacts. BURKHARDT and his SFS case officer fnu BERGER (see 1953-54) visited Neu-Isenburg 24 Apr '53 and in nearby woods BERGER debriefed ALBERT. BURKHARDT furnished exact personal description of ALBERT, his house and automobile.
- " , Jul 4. Arrested by Security Group; denied treasonable activity on behalf Eastern service; interrogation commenced by SG/BfV/ZIPPER. Incriminating evidence found in his costly home (about which he lied to ZIPPER re financing and which was filled with Persian rugs) included: DM 9,000; film emulsions, Sovzone manufactured microfilm reading device; voluminous files; carbon copies reports (some originating with SAEVECKE); detailed breakdown Amt BLANK and SG personnel; documents and info typed on American type typewriter seemingly prepared for American office, all initially indicating that ALBERT:
1. was for some time an Eastern agent (which would explain unresolved question LILLI MARLEN/Bodo FROMM-see Jun '54- operation where distinct evidence of source near @ LEIDL;
  2. was possible source of info which turned up in BOEHRER revelations;
  3. passed 1953 SG (Sicherungsgruppe) personnel list, unclassified, but ZIPPER apparently unaware he had it;
  4. worked for SFS, ZIPPER and also an unidentified American IS;
  5. submitted his own reports based on material received during past 2 years from Heinrich SCHMITZ, retired Kripo and SD officer who regularly informed ALBERT on his service with a US intel. officer under one Col. THOMAS;

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ALBERT, Ludwig

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1955

6. had somehow received carbons of reports prepared by Theodor SAEVECKE for another consumer. (Note: SAEVECKE recently stated he and ALBERT had known each other since 1930 when SAEVECKE as instructor and ALBERT as pupil were both at Kolonialsschule)

" , jul 8 ALBERT has no sources in GDR (E. Germany) and only problem is internal organization staff security: UTILITY statement to

" , jul 15 Subject committed suicide in jail by hanging; made no confession.

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ANNEXES

I. Master List information herein should be read as follows:

(1) 2600

Neu Isenburg; Bundesgebiet; BV Leiter  
(2) (3) (4)

1. V-number
2. Dwelling-place
3. Area of Operation
4. Position and/or target

II. True name is given, if known, otherwise an alias.  
"x" indicates no name in our card file.

III. Red line — indicates individuals who, according to the master lists, were on Subject's staff during years 1950 through 1953 and perhaps longer.

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V-2600: Ludwig ALBERT

ANNEX "A"

Undated GV L master lists received at POB during 1950 show Subject's position as follows with subordinate staff as shown on attachment.

- (1) BV NORD: Living : Frankfurt/M  
Operating: "  
Position : BV Leader (district agency ldr)
  
- (2) BV NORD/V-2600: Living : Frankfurt/M  
Operating: W. Germany  
Target : CE/security

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Letter BV HORD, liv. and ao: Frankfurt/M  
subordinate staff:

- 2600/5002 \*  
Mecklar; ao: Hersfeld; III/Antifa
- 2600/5003 \*  
Marburg; ao: Raum Hessen; III
- 2670 \*  
Ffm; Reg. Bez. Wiesbaden; III  
Rheinland; Pfals
- 2671 \*  
Ffm; Raum Hessen; III/Pol (Gewerksch.)
- 2672 Fritz KRAMER  
Kassel; Raum Hessen; III-III/W1
- 2673 \*  
Halle; Merseburg; III-III/W1 (Leuna)
- 2674 ~~von~~ STEGER  
Merseburg; Merseburg; III-III/W1 (Leuna)
- 2679. Helmut JUNK  
Koeln; Koeln; III-III/W1
- 2680 Dr. Gerhard SCHMIDT  
Hamburg; Hamburg/Brit.Zone; III-III/W1
- 2691 \*  
Hamburg; Hamburg/Brit.Zone; III-III/W1
- 2646 Adam GANJON  
Ffm; Ffm; III/Polizei
- 2647 Q DDERING  
Bebra; Fulda-Bebra Zonengrenze; III
- 2648 \*  
Kassel; Raum Kassel; III
- 2649 \*  
Kassel Sondershausen; Raum Kassel; III/Polizei
- 2650 \*  
Wiesbaden; Hessen-Hessen/Nassau; III/Regierung
- 2669 \*  
Wiesbaden; " ; " (durch 2650)
- 2651 \*  
Kassel; Nordhessen; III-III/W1

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• → V-2646 bis V-2651 werden als Filialleiter bezeichnet. <sup>gehehrt</sup>

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GV L  
BV NORD  
UV 2617

2617 Karl KRAFT  
Ffm; Ffm; Leiter der UV

2675 Herbert HAAGEN  
Ffm; Raum Ffm; III/Politik

2676 A  
Ffm; Raum Ffm; III

2693 Gustav PREUSSER  
Ffm; Raum Hessen; III (KPD)

GV L  
BV NORD  
UV 2618

2618 Friedrich BEISWENGER  
Mannheim; Mannheim; Leiter der UV

2694 Erich BUNDSCHUH  
Mannheim; Mannheim; III-Bearbeiter

2695 Hans PREISSER  
Mannheim; Mannheim; Schreibkraft

2696 Paul PROTSCH  
Mannheim; Mannheim; Kraftfahrer

2698  
Bremen-Osnabrueck; Bremen-Osnabrueck; Anlaufstelle Brit. Z BK

2707 Heinz LIMPET  
Niedersachsen; Raum Koeln; III/Pol/W1 (NWDR)

2697 August HOPPE  
Koeln-Deutz; Koeln; III/Pol/W1 (NWDR)

*see file 2654, next page*

GV L/BV NORD/UV 2618/Fl. 2653 (Mittelrhein)

2653 Karl Heinz DIETSCH  
Mannheim; Mannheim; L.d.Fil./III

2681 Alexander DIESCH  
Heidelberg; Heidelberg; III

2682 Walter HERGTH  
Karlsruhe; Karlsruhe; III/Polizei

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GV L/BV NORD/UV 2618/F11. 2654

2654 \*  
Dortmund; Dortmund Nordrhein; Westfalen; L.d.F11/III

2697 *August Hoppe*  
Koeln; Koeln; III/Pol/W1 (NWDR)

GV L/BV NORD/UV 2618/F11. 2655

2655 \*  
Goettingen; Goettingen; L.d.F11/III-III/W1

2685 \*  
Deiderode; Friedland; Kgf.-III/Antifa

2686 \*  
Goettingen; Goettingen; III

GV L/BV NORD/UV 2618/F11. 2656

2656 *Arno Boldt*  
Luebeck; Luebeck; L.d.F11/III

2689 \*  
Luebeck; Luebeck; III

2690 \*  
Luebeck; Luebeck; III

2692 \*  
Luebeck; Luebeck; III

GV L/BV NORD/UV 2618/F11. 2657

2647 *@ Joering*  
Eberbach; Hessen; III (Grenzpolizei)

2683 *oth Voges*  
2684 \*  
2687 \*  
2688 \*  
5836  
20X

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V-2600: Ludwig ALBERT

ANNEX "B"

Undated GV L master list received by POB apparently prior to June 1951;  
subordinate staff indicated on attachment.

BV 2600

Living : Neu Isenburg  
Operating: Hesse area and British Zone  
Position : Leader of district agency NORD

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GV L/BV 2600

V-2600/BV Letter

2600,1 x  
Mecklar; Hersfeld; III-Antifa

2600,1)\*  
2600,2)\* dropped 30.10.51

2600,4 x  
Frankfurt/M; Raum Frankfurt/M; III-Bundesbahn

2600,5\*  
Hanau; Raum Frankfurt/M; III-Ermittler  
Raum Hanau

2652 ) dropped 31.12.51 + WERBER  
2674 ) " 30.10.51 " STEGEM  
2620,9 ) " 30.10.51 x

2603,2 > 267 x  
z.Zt. Marburg; Bundesgebiet u. SBZD; III-Fall Prof. NOACK u. Hauheimer Kreis

2670 -  
Frankfurt/M; Reg. Bezirk Wiesbaden; III (dropped 31.12.51)  
Rheinland Pfalz

2671 -  
Ffm; Raum Hessen; III/Pol-Gewerkschaften

2671,1 x  
Ffm; Raum Hessen; III/Pol - Rote Falken FDJ

2672 FRIE KRAMER  
Kassel; Raum Hessen; III u. III/W1 (dropped 31.12.51)

2697 August HOPPE  
Koeln; Koeln; III-NWDR

2711 x  
Eschwege; Grenzabschnitt Brit.Zone/US Zone Bayern; III Grenzpolizei/Landespolizei-  
kommissariate/Eschwege-Fulda  
2835 Willy Heinrich FRIEDRICH  
Muelheim-Speldorf; Ost- u. Westdeutschland; III/Pol. Fall STENNES

3070 ) dropped 31.12.51 @ Alfred Reimer  
3070/z ) x

2673 x  
Halle; Merseburg; III u. III/W1 and I/W1 LEUNA-Verbindung

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GV L/BV 2600/UV - /Fil. 2646 (change: stutzpunkt)

2646 Adam GANTON  
Pfm; Pfm; III-Polizei

1-mal → Fil. 2647 (undtd change: stutzpunkt) @ JOERING  
dr 31.12.51  
• 2648  
• 2649  
• 2650

GV L/BV 2600/UV 2617

2617 Nori KRAFT  
Pfm; Pfm; UV-Leiter III-Polizei (dropped 31.12.51)

2675 Herbert WÄNGEN  
Pfm; Raum Pfm; III

2676 \*  
Pfm; Raum Pfm; III

2693 Gustav PRUSSIGER  
Pfm; Raum Hessen; III-KPD (dropped 31.12.51)

GV L/BV 2600/UV 2619

2619 Arthur HOFITZ  
Celle; Brit.Zone Ruhrgebiet; UV Leiter III

2619,3 \*  
Uelzen; Uelzen; III-Kripo/Fluechtl.Lager

2619,7 \*  
Soltau; Raum Soltau; III-Kripo-Ermittler

2619,2: dr 12.9.51  
2619,6: dr 31.12.51  
2619,8: dr 31.8.51  
2619,9: dr 31.12.51  
2619,10: dr 30.6.61  
2619,12: dr 31.8.51  
2619,13: dr 31.12.51  
2619,14: dr 31.12.51  
2619,14: dr 30.6.51 - transferred  
2619,15: dr 31.8.51 - Note: MUELLER (2826)  
2619,16: dr 30.6.51 - transferred

see page 4  
for details

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(3)

GV L/BV 2600/UV 2619 (later changed to BV 2857)

2655 x  
Goettingen; Goettingen; Anlauf und Kurierstelle der UV

2679 ~~Heinrich JANK~~  
Koeln; Koeln; III (transferred later to BV 2600)

2685 x  
Deiderode; Friedland; III-Antifa

2707 ~~Heinz LIPPERT~~  
Niederseesmar; Raum Koeln; III u. III/WI u. Pol. NWDR (dropped 31.8.51)

GV L/BV 2600/UV 2619/FIL. 2630 (later changed to BV 2857)

2630 (2619.1) ~~Johann Gottlieb BELAU~~  
Muelheim/Ruhr; Raum Ruhrgebiet; Fil. Leiter

2630/STRAHL x <sup>dr 31.10.51</sup>  
Oberhausen/Rheinl.; Raum Oberhausen; III - Kripo (Polizei-Sonderdienst KPD-Kreise)

2619,11: dropped 31.10.51

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(4)

UV I/BV 2600/UV 2619

- 2619  
Celle; Brit.Zone Ruhrgebiet; UV-Leiter III
- 2619,2  
Hannover; Hannover; Kurierstelle der UV (dropped 12.9.51)
- 2619,3  
Uelzen; Uelzen; III - Kripo / Fluechtl. Lager
- 2619,6  
Uelzen; Uelzen u. Umgebung; III-Kripo-Ermittler (dropped 31.1.51)
- 2619,7  
Soltau; Raum Soltau; III-Kripo-Ermittler
- 2619,8  
Peine; Raum Peine; III-Stuetzpunkt (KP-Moeglichkeit ist nicht mehr gegeben)  
(dropped 31.8.51)
- 2619,9  
Burgdorf b. Hannover; Raum Burgdorf; III-KPD-Kreisleitung HDJ-Kreise  
(dropped 31.12.51)
- 2619,10  
Duesseldorf; Raum Duesseldorf; III-Polizei u. Behoerden (dropped 30.6.51)
- 2619,12  
Liegburg; Raum Liegburg; III u. III/41 -Gerichte-Behoerden- Wirtschaft  
(dropped 31.8.51)
- 2619,13  
Petershagen/Minden; Raum Minden; III-Kripo-Ermittler (dropped 31.12.51)
- 2619,14  
Wentorf b. Hamburg; Raum Gross-Hamburg; III-Behoerden u. Hafen-Ermittler  
(transfer 30.6.51)
- 2619,15  
Hamburg; Raum Hamburg; III-Kripo-Ermittler (dropped 31.8.51)
- 2619,16  
Bremen; Raum Bremen; III-Kripo/Fluechtlingsamt u. Fluechtlingslager (tr 30.6.51)
- 2619/RUDI  
Bonn; Bonn u. Rheinland; III F Fall "RUDOLSTADT" (transferred/dropped 30.9.51)

*see p 72 herewith*

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V-2600: Ludvig ALBERT

ANNEX "C"

Updated GV L master list received by POB about Feb 1952; subordinate staff listed on attachment.

BV 2600

Living : Neu Isenburg  
Operating: Hesse area and British Zone  
Position : Leader of district agency WEST

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GV L/BV 2600

2600 - BV Leiter WEST

2836 (ex 2619.15) Heinz MUELLER  
Offenbach; Offenbach; Schreibkraft bei BV 2600

2837 Walter OTTEN  
Essen; Ruhrgebiet; III-III/W1

2838 Christian HOFFMANN  
Giessen; Koeln; III/VOPo (transferred prior Juniv to UV/Rhein Ruhr)

2600,1 x  
Mecklar; Herfeld; III-Antifa

2600,4 x  
Frankfurt/M; Raum Frankfurt; III-Bundesbahn

2600,5 x  
Hanau; Raum Frankfurt/M-Raum Hanau; III-Ermittler

2603,2 (2837) x  
Marburg; Bundesgebiet u. SBZD; III-Fall "Prof MOACK" "Naubeimer Kreis"

2857/Ostsee Waldemar HAMER  
Offenbach; Rheinland; III-Forscher

2675 Herbert HAAGEN  
Frankfurt/M; Raum Frankfurt/M; III

2676 x  
Frankfurt/M; Raum Frankfurt/M; III

2671 x  
Frankfurt/M; Raum Hessen; III/Pol-Gewerkschaften

2671,1 x  
Frankfurt/M; Raum Hessen; III/Pol - Rote Falken FDJ

2673 x  
Halle; Merseburg; III u. III/W1 Leuna - Verbindung (dropped or transferred June 1954)

2679 Helmut JUNK  
Koeln; Koeln; III

2697 August HOPPE  
Koeln; Koeln; III - NWDR

2835 Willi Heinrich FRIEDE  
Muelheim-Speldorf; Ost-u. Westdeutschland; III/Pol Fall STEINER

2646 x  
Frankfurt/M; Frankfurt/M; Staatsschutzstelle III - Polizei

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EV L/BV 2600 cont'd

*Co-workers dropped, but retained as informants, source.*  
*Als Mitarbeiter ausgeschlossen verbleiben aber weiterhin als Auskunftspersonen*

(Dropped but retained as info source)

2652 *han* WERBER

Wolfenbuettel; Bundesgebiet u. SRZD; III-III/W1  
Bundesbahn -Anbahnungsmöglichkeiten

2670 \*

Frankfurt/M; Reg. Bez. Wiesbaden Rheinland- Pfalz; III

2672 *Fritz* KRAMER

Kassel; Raum Kassel; III u. III/W1

2711 \*

Eschwege; Grenzabschnitt brit. Zone; III-Grenzpolizei  
Landespolizeikommissariate Eschwege-Pulda

3070 *@ Alfred* REITER

Duesseldorf; Raum Nordrhein-Westfalen; III-Innenministerium

3070/2 \*

----; Bonn; III-afV

2647 *@ DORRING*

Bebra; Zonengrenze Fulda-Bebra; III

2648 \*

Kassel; Raum Kassel; III

2649 \*

Kassel-Andershausen; Raum Kassel; III-Polizei

2650 \*

Wiesbaden; Hessen ; III - Regierung  
Hessen-Nassau

2669 \*

Wiesbaden; Hessen ; III-Regierung  
Hessen-Nassau

2617 *Karl* KRAFT

Frankfurt/M; Frankfurt/m; III-Polizei

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V-2600: Ludwig ALBERT

ANNEX "D"

Undated GV I master list; not known when received by POB but appears to have been effective ca. Feb 1952; corrected to Jun 1952.

BV 2600      Living : Neu Isenburg  
                  Operating: Hesse area and British Zone  
                  Position : Leader of district agency WEST

Subordinate staff: (following shown in Annex "C" as detailed on that organizational master list)

V-2836 (ex-2619.15)	Heinz MUELLER
*2837	Walter OTTEN
2600,1	-
2600,4	-
2600,5	-
2603,2	-
*2857/Ostsee	Waldemar HAMER
- 2675	Herbert HAAGEN
- 2676	-
- 2671	-
2671,1	-
-*2679	Helmut JUNK
-*2697	August HOPPE
*2835	Willy Heinrich FRIEDE
- 2646	-

\* subsequently dropped or transferred by Sep 1952.

*Don't know the  
function of FRIEDE  
of the Home Group - ?  
of 20. spins another  
possibility -*

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V-2600: Ludwig ALBERT

ANNEX "E"

Undated GV L master list received by POB in Apr 1953.

BV 2600      Living : Neu Isenburg  
              Operating: Hesse area  
              Position : Leader of district agency

Subordinate staff: (see Annex "C" for details)

V-2836      Heinz MÜLLER  
              Offenbach/M; Wiesbaden; Sachbearbeiter bei BV

2600,1      -  
2600,4      -  
2600,5      -  
- 2671      -  
- 2646      -  
- 2675      Herbert HAAGEN  
- 2676      -  
2603,2 (later changed to 2839, and dropped)

2713      Herbert BOEHRSCHE  
              Frankfurt/M; W. Germany; III-Forscher

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V-2600: Ludwig ALBERT

ANNEX "F"

GV I master list received by FOB in Dec 1953: in dual position of hqs staff man and leader of a regional office, as follows:

- (1) GV I hqs staff, under V-3030 (@ LEIDL)  
Living : Karlsruhe  
Operating: West Germany  
Position : Hqs security man and leader of Hesse investigative squad (Ref. Sicherheit zugl. Leiter und Leiter WK Hessen)
- (2) WK Hessen 2600 (Waldkappelle: investigative squad)  
Living : Neu Isenburg  
Operating: Hesse  
Position : Leader of investigative squad/Hesse, working directly with general agency hqs security chief, and leader of special connections (WK Leiter Hessen in Personalunion mit Ref. Sicherheit beim Stabe der GV und Fuehrer von Sonderverbindungen).

Subordinate staff:

-V-2646 -  
-2675 - Herbert MAAGEN  
-2676 -  
-2671 -  
2671,1 -  
2713 - Herbert BOERSCHE (transferred 1.5.55 to 131)  
2841 -  
Bonn; Bundesgebiet; III Hicog-Dept Amt Blank 7

**SECRET**

V-2600: Ludwig ALBERT

ANNEX "C"

Dienststelle 142 (GV L) master list dated 1 Aug 54 shows Subject as second-in-command, as follows:

D. 142 Stab

V-3030, leader (slot 1)

V-2600 Living: Neu Isenburg  
Operating: W. Germany (Bundesgebiet)  
Position: Deputy leader (slot 2) of D. 142, (Stellvertreter)  
Agency security chief (Leiter Ref. Sicherheit)  
Leader of various special connections (Leiter versch. SV)  
Leader of investigative squad/Hesse (Leiter WK Hessen)

V-2765 - Hellmuth HAGEMANN (security; photos; files)

V-3036 - Georg KLANK (Referent III C u. Schulung, zugl. Leiter, sowie E - Pers -  
(und I? - Sachbearbeiter.

V-3037 - Friedrich TROFF (Referent - V - zugl. Leiter)

V-3040 - Ida TROFF (typist, clerk, registry)

V-3042 - Josef FREISSLER (courier, driver)

V-3043 - Karl LINZ " "

V-3067 - ? (typist, clerk)

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DATE 2007

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EGLA-15175

- 3 AUG 1955

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: EE

Operational/CART

Conversation with ZIPPER's CE Chief, @ Dr. KLAUSNER, on 21 July 1955  
Regarding the ALBERT/BURKHARDT Flap

REFS: (1) SPULL-1318, (2) SPULL-1342, (3) EGLA-15174, (4) EGLA-15176 *Fiz/26*  
*16 Aug 55*

1. After discussing ZIPPER's situation in Austria (see EGLA-15174), the conversation became really animated and I had the feeling that @ Dr. KLAUSNER was speaking in a fairly frank and straightforward manner. Therefore, I brought up the BURKHARDT/WEINMANN case. I said that I realized that his staff was extremely preoccupied with this case and that I brought up this matter merely in order to ask him how he and his colleagues had divided up the various obvious jobs to be done; that @ Dr. KLAUSNER should consider that we Americans had an obvious security interest in this case; and that particularly we at FOB were in a spot vis-a-vis our own service. I added that we were particularly worried that now of all times, just before legalization, there was a flap which could seriously upset this if it developed into a publicized scandal. One of the good aspects of this flap, was, in my opinion, the close cooperation between the Security Group and ZIPPER, and I hoped, I said, that the SG was able to keep this case from becoming public. KLAUSNER explained that just about everybody in ZIPPER Headquarters had a specific role in this flap and that a coordination meeting had been held in @ KUEHNE's office 18 July. ZIPPER's "quellenarbeit" (@ KURZ, Headquarters Agent Control Officer) was reviewing the security of the ZIPPER sources in the East Zone who might be affected together with @ EDINGER's staff. @ ALBERTI and another officer (whose name I have forgotten, possibly @ BERNHARDT) had been up in Pforzheim and the British Zone carrying out interrogations. @ WILDEN was up in Karlsruhe or Stuttgart sifting the material found in ALBERT's basement. @ HORNBERG had a particularly important role in going over GN L with a fine-tooth comb since he knew this Field Agency well from the recent days of his work there. Similarly, the other CE officers who originally transferred from GV L to ZIPPER Headquarters, @ FRIESEN and @ RISCHE, were working on certain aspects of this flap. @ BAYERLE was also busy on this case. Other ZIPPER Headquarters officers (whose names slipped my mind since I never heard of them) were examining the Berlin Meldkopf and the entire courier structure as far as ALBERT might have been knowledgeable. @ KUTZBACH and @ RISCHE were examining current CE cases, particularly UJ-DROLLERY # 300 and # 302, LOTTERLE, SCHREINER, and a Polish operation which was new to me. After the current cases had been reviewed, they

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would dig into the old cases. Similarly, @ EDINGER's staff were reviewing some of the old and unresolved flaps involving GV L.

2. About this time I said that naturally we stood ready at any time to assist ZIPPER in this obviously tremendously important and involved affair and that if there was anything Dr. KLAUSNER needed in the way of special funds or special evacuation from Berlin, we would do all we could. KLAUSNER acknowledged this with thanks and began to talk about BURKHARDT/WEIMANN. He said that @ EDINGER had gone to Berlin and had managed to convince the legal authorities there to cancel or commute BURKHARDT's sentence, thereby getting BURKHARDT to talk. KLAUSNER explained that under existing German law, there was nothing like turning State's evidence and that hence the Security Group could not very well interrogate BURKHARDT since BURKHARDT would incriminate himself with every sentence, starting with his very first: "I worked as an SFS agent in the Federal Republic." ZIPPER, however, could well examine BURKHARDT's confessions without having BURKHARDT inextricably incriminate himself.

3. From the beginning of the interrogation, ZIPPER's @ ALBERTI, KLAUSNER said, was convinced that BURKHARDT was speaking essentially the truth--though holding back a great deal of information--while the BfV representative who sat in on these interrogations took a consistently sceptical view, believing that BURKHARDT was merely trying to lie his way out of jail. When BURKHARDT showed his SFS pass, the BfV representative immediately stated that this was not the right SFS Ausweis. Later, KLAUSNER said, it was determined that this identity document was BURKHARDT's pass to enter the Normannenstrasse Headquarters. I asked KLAUSNER why the BfV man had been that sceptical. KLAUSNER said that BURKHARDT was the man who guided Otto JOHN from West to East Berlin (sic). When I said that I had thought Dr. WOHLGEMUTH had driven JOHN to East Berlin, KLAUSNER paused, shook his head a little and said that @ ALBERTI had collapsed three times while conducting this interrogation because of his heart condition and that a physician had told him after examining him: "I can't understand why you haven't died." Consequently, his group insurance company had insisted that he take four weeks' leave in Bad Kissingen to which ZIPPER had added another two weeks. While there, @ ALBERTI was moaning to be kept up to date on the case, but KLAUSNER said this should only be done very sparingly. When I returned to Otto JOHN, KLAUSNER explained that the BfV representative had knocked off every weekend and that @ ALBERTI had doubled back into the jail afterwards and interrogated BURKHARDT throughout the Sundays. During one of these Sunday sessions, BURKHARDT had made this statement about his role in the Otto JOHN case. @ ALBERTI, KLAUSNER said, had immediately changed the subject, saying, "We will return to this point later" so as not to get the BfV interest in BURKHARDT increased. KLAUSNER thought that possibly the BfV was aware of the fact that BURKHARDT had a role in the JOHN case and was hence trying to discredit BURKHARDT's testimony. I replied that this didn't make much sense to me and that if that were the case, I would imagine the BfV grabbing hold of the case and trying to shut ZIPPER out of it.

4. KLAUSNER then said that this flap must also be considered as an opportunity for ZIPPER because BURKHARDT represented an excellent source for "some 20" positive CE leads. "If only three of these pan out," KLAUSNER said, "they will

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advance us by two years"! KLAUSNER halted at this point to impress me with the sensitivity of the case and the information because of the Security Group/ZIPPER involvement. He said: "We had to swear up and down to the Security Group that we wouldn't automatically give you people everything. Also, their own security is involved and they are understandably very touchy on this point." I said that I had gathered that the Security Group was concerned and that all their efforts were not purely prompted by brotherly love for ZIPPER. At this, KLAUSNER grinned a little and nodded assent. He then explained that when at first the personnel registers of the Art BLANK and the Security Group were found in ALBERT's basement, containing "all the names down to the last Putzfrau," the Security Group suspected for a while that ZIPPER was spying on them.

5. KLAUSNER then returned to BURKHARDT, whom he described as "quite a guy" ("ein toller Bursche"). He said that BURKHARDT had a brother in West Germany, "somewhere in Franken," who was also an SFS agent, but whom they did not want taken into custody at this time since this might seal BURKHARDT's lips. In addition, KLAUSNER said, BURKHARDT had all kinds of interesting girls with whom he had slept at one time or another and who were working as secretaries for the SFS--one even worked for the KGB. One other girlfriend, an elderly type who took a sort of maternal interest in BURKHARDT, has been residing in West Berlin, and ZIPPER was now trying to bring her to West Germany. Further, KLAUSNER said, BURKHARDT had spied, on his own, against his SFS case officers, he picked up on them, and surveilled some of their movements in West Germany. He had carried out some SFS missions which his superiors had been assigned to do and that when BURKHARDT had submitted his reports after carrying out these missions, his superiors had signed their own names to them. As a reason for this, BURKHARDT claimed that his SFS superiors had just been too lazy to carry out these "menial" tasks themselves. As a result, KLAUSNER said, this entire case should also be interpreted as an SFS flap since the SFS could not very well have an accurate picture of what had happened in West Germany. This was particularly so because he felt that BURKHARDT's SFS superiors could not afford to admit the true facts in this case and therefore had to cover up for BURKHARDT to some extent.

6. KLAUSNER added that one of these SFS superiors of BURKHARDT was an SFS colonel and that BURKHARDT had stated regarding this man: "You people can't turn him, he's doing much too well over there, but you can talk to him in West Germany" (sic). KLAUSNER also mentioned that BURKHARDT had almost skipped over his activities during the year, but I have forgotten which one (except that it was 195...?). As an example of how enterprising and daring BURKHARDT had been, KLAUSNER cited the fact that he had successfully hidden outside the Pullach Compound behind a bush with an "electric" mike and tried to pick up telephone conversations conducted inside Barracks 107 which is ZIPPER's Headquarters Evaluation Section. BURKHARDT had actually been able to record a few names in this manner, KLAUSNER said.

7. The conversation then returned to ALBERT. In ALBERT's basement the Security Group found 9,000 DM West and a suitcase containing intelligence reports, apparently in three separate sets. These reports included the name lists of Security Group and Art BLANK personnel. In addition, KLAUSNER said, they found documents

which asked ALBERT to procure these lists typed on an American typewriter. KLAUSNER was not quite clear on this point, but I gathered that these documents were either straight EKI's, calling for information on Security Group and Amt BLANK personnel, or documents which in some similar fashion tied these name rosters to an AIS office. KLAUSNER said that apparently ALBERT had worked for an American intelligence office in addition to his work for ZIPPER and the SFS. However, quite possibly, ALBERT had reported to an agent or case officer who merely had obtained some sort of AIS backstopping, fraudulently or otherwise ("hat sich wohl irgendwie beim Amerikaner abgedeckt"). The Security Group had traced this AIS tie to one Colonel THOMAS and Mr. STEVENS in Wiesbaden or Frankfurt. Tentatively, KLAUSNER said the Security Group had identified Colonel THOMAS as a Mr. WHITE. I commented that I thought that "Colonel THOMAS" sounded like a cover name and that I doubted that ALBERT had been in touch with any genuine American Army colonel. KLAUSNER agreed, but said that colonel also referred to lieutenant colonels. I said this was so, but that even lieutenant colonel appeared to me to be too high a rank for a case officer. I then asked KLAUSNER why in God's name he thought ALBERT had kept copies of three sets of reports which he had sent to various intelligence services. KLAUSNER said they had been unable to figure this out so far. I speculated that I thought ALBERT had to keep these file copies because he would occasionally receive queries from his three services regarding his reports and he had naturally found it impossible to memorize what he had sent to each on any given topic.

8. In addition to the money and these documents, KLAUSNER said, the SG discovered in ALBERT's basement some film emulsions ("einige Film Emulsionen") which they were trying to develop and to read, and a device manufactured only in the Soviet Zone, to read Microfilm. The rest of ALBERT's house was found to be "filled with Persian rugs." When the SG asked Mrs. ALBERT about the 9,000 DM's, she supposedly made the dark statement: "You ask my husband about that money and if he can't give you an answer, he can hang himself!" ("Fragen Sie meinen Mann und wenn er keine Antwort weiss, kann er sich aufhaengen!") ZIPPER and the SG had also established that ALBERT had lied to ZIPPER regarding his home--not only did it have about double the value of that claimed by ALBERT, but also the financial aid which ALBERT's mother-in-law supposedly had contributed was found to have been fictitious. All in all, KLAUSNER estimated that between 20,000 and 30,000 DM's of ALBERT's estate were as yet unaccounted for, although it was too early in the investigation to arrive at a definite estimate.

9. KLAUSNER then explained that for some time he no longer had been on speaking terms with @ LEIDL (Chief of ZIPPER's Dienststelle 142, and, as such, ALBERT's superior). KLAUSNER said that "dar Dicke," i.e., LEIDL, still believed in ALBERT's innocence. Fortunately, KLAUSNER added, LEIDL had asked to go to Bad Gastein on leave and this had been granted. LEIDL's absence, KLAUSNER explained, greatly facilitated their giving Dienststelle 142 the once-over with a really fine-tooth comb. The men to do this job were obviously @ HORBERG, @ FRIBSEN, etc., and others who knew the in's and out's of Dienststelle 142 intimately because they used to work there themselves. These men had run afoul of LEIDL one after the other, and consequently joined KLAUSNER's staff in Headquarters. Some time later, the large flaps, such as @ BOEKER and @ HAASE, rocked ZIPPER. As a result of some of these involving that particular field base, ZIPPER's operational security officer, @ EDLINGER,

See attached to Dienststelle 142



had told both LEIDL and ALBERT: "There is a hole in Dienststelle 142." Thereafter, KLAUSNER said, he began receiving denunciation reports from LEIDL regarding the men that had left Dienststelle 142 to join KLAUSNER's staff--@ FRIESEN was supposedly a murderous Gestapo official wanted by the French; @ RISCHEK was morally lax and had been drunk on his last trip to Trier; @ HORRBERG was suspect for a reason which I have forgotten; @ ALBERTI was too pro-Slavic and hence insecure; etc. KLAUSNER said these denunciation reports gave him no end of trouble and that @ PETERS, the physical security officer for the Pullach Compound, actually and seriously interrogated ALBERTI on suspicions of being a British agent because ALBERTI had worked at one time with the ANHEES Army in Italy. Now, KLAUSNER stated, they had reexamined all these reports and had analyzed them by their style and other characteristics as written by ALBERT for LEIDL's signature. KLAUSNER thought this to have been a diversion maneuver of ALBERT's who wanted to prove his counter-charge that "the hole wasn't inside Dienststelle 142, but rather inside ZIPFER Headquarters."

10. At this point, I brought up the Lili MARLENE case and said that I thought it might be useful to go over that case again since it might possibly shed some new light on all this. KLAUSNER agreed, generally speaking, but said that there were many other things to be checked first. I wondered whether any check of typewriters, etc., had been made, but KLAUSNER was obviously unable or unwilling to go into such details. He stressed, however, that the "Dr." mentioned in the Lili MARLENE document was undoubtedly meant to describe @ SCHUBERT, former CE Chief of ZIPFER's Darmstadt Field Base (Dienststelle 161). The conversation then returned to ALBERT. The night before his suicide, KLAUSNER said, the interrogators had gotten the impression that ALBERT was about to break. Accordingly, they warned the jail authorities to watch ALBERT during the night. This they did, but at eight the next morning, during an unguarded moment, ALBERT managed to hang himself with his pajama cord. KLAUSNER added that among the documents found in ALBERT's basement there were some which indicated an American request for KLAUSNER's true name, cover names, addresses, etc., and the information which ALBERT had sent in reply.

11. One of the Dienststelle 142 cases that needed examination when personnel is available, KLAUSNER said, is UJ-BROLLERY # 18 (Fall REPTIL). I said that we had been interested in the case from the time that the S/W had been analyzed as fairly medium-level, but that we had been frankly disappointed that KLAUSNER's man, @ BOHRERICH, had failed to notify us when the SERIS had reactivated this case. KLAUSNER loyally defended BOHRERICH by saying he didn't think that this had been omitted intentionally. I said I didn't think so either, but that nevertheless we would not have known of the reactivation of this interesting double agent operation if it had not been for a comparative study of SERIS letters which was conducted by @ KUTZ-RACH on UJ-BROLLERY's # 15 and #18.

12. Then I asked about KAESTNER. KLAUSNER said that so far KAESTNER had admitted nothing. When I mentioned his large bank deposits, KLAUSNER said that undoubtedly KAESTNER had deposited money for his East German agents to his own account; however, since these payments were intended to have been banked in West Germany for those agents, the propriety of KAESTNER's actions had not yet been clarified.

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13. The remainder of the evening was taken up with conversations about ZIPPER's position in Austria and the possibilities of a CE-UJ-ERACO trip. These points will be the subjects of separate dispatches (EGLA's-15174 and 15176).

14. The conversation with @ Dr. KLAUSNER reported above is one of the few longer talks which I have so far had with him on anything very sensitive. I could not help feeling that he spoke fairly frankly and probably meant most of what he said. I doubt whether alcohol had anything to do with the substance of his conversation since we only drank one Kirschwasser apiece and, in addition, consumed a bottle of wine each during a period from 1800 until 2315. However, as can be seen from SPULL-1342, KLAUSNER may have regretted some of his disclosures the next day when he called me urgently and entreated me not to make any use of the Colonel THOMAS/Mr. STEVENS information since it "had definitely been established" that Colonel THOMAS was Mr. WHITE and that Dr. BRUECKNER of the Security Group was on his way to see Mr. WHITE. KLAUSNER pleaded with me not to warn Mr. WHITE, stressing that BRUECKNER wanted no scandal, but merely desired to enlist Mr. WHITE's cooperation to get at his agent who had worked with ALBERT. KLAUSNER added that it had become apparent that this agent also had defrauded Mr. WHITE ("hat ihm betrogen") and that the Security Group would naturally like to identify, investigate and interrogate this agent.

NOTE: Developments on 22 July and subsequent events showed that this portion of KLAUSNER's statement dealing with Mr. WHITE being identical with "Colonel THOMAS" was a garbled version of some initial conjectures made by BRUECKNER. Presumably, KLAUSNER has learned in the meantime from BRUECKNER some results of the [ ] [ ] BRUECKNER talks and consequently has revised his opinion as to the true identity of "Colonel THOMAS."

Approved by:

BIDVEDI  
MORRIS

17 MAR 30 8 38 AM '51

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[ ]  
32-6-33-244 [ ]



**STRENG GEHEIM**

B-961a

Leiter 142

16.8.1955

Nr. 2068/100/55 str. geh.

An

123 Nr. 658 6 55 s. 9  
Eingegangen am: 22. Aug. 1955

- 123 -

2 Ausfertigungen  
1. Ausfertigung

Betr.: Fall "FRANKEN"

Bezug: 123/H B-960 a Nr. 576/55 str. geh. v. 25.7.55  
Ziffer 6

In der Anlage wird je eine Aufstellung über alle Mitarbeiter der Zentrale und der Aussenstellen in doppelter Fertigung übersandt, die ARTHUR im Laufe seiner Tätigkeit vermutlich kennen gelernt haben kann.

Es wird ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, dass die Aufstellung keinen Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit haben kann, d.h. ARTHUR kann einige der genannten MA nicht kennen und es besteht die Möglichkeit, dass er andere Herren kannte, ohne dass diese Tatsache hier bekannt wurde. L.

Anlagen: 2



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

250 ALBERT, Ludwig

Anlage zu 142 Nr. 2062/55 str. geh.

123 Nr. 658 6 55.9.  
Eingegangen am 2. Aug. 1955

Betr.: Fall "FRANKEN"

Bezug: 123/H Nr. 576/55 str. geh. v. 25.7.55  
Ziffer 6


1.) ARTHUR lernte im Laufe seiner Tätigkeit nachstehend aufgeführte Personen der Zentrale kennen:

- a) persönlich: 4 GEHLEN, Reinhard, GARNER, Dr. SCHNEIDER  
17 WOLLMANN @  
20 CASAR, ZETTLITZ @  
11 WEGENER I  
7 HÖWL  
3 FICHLER, Dr. KLAUSSNER, Dr. KOHLER /  
8 KUTZBACH @  
12 OTTO, Dr. @  
14 REUSS, RODERICH, ROTHKIRCH  
7 HERMANN @  
6 GRABER, GAY, GAUMOSER  
14 TIETZE, DAUSS  
15 SCHENK, SCHACK @  
3 DINGLER, DINTER, DILLBERG @  
9 v. JOHN  
7 HEINEMANN, Josef  
6 SCHLÖTTER  
10 v. LOSSOW T  
6 GELLERT, GEBAUER  
6 GÖLLNITZ, GÖLLMANN  
14 REHM  
1 BAIERLE @ Bauer T  
2 CLASSEN  
13 PETERS  
6 SCHÖNFELD  
14 RANDOW  
7 BUCK, EDINGER @  
5 FIEDLER, Dr.  
11 WINTERSTEIN, Dr. @ Weiss  
11 MEIER (Verw.)




ERHARDT, Dr. (RA)  
KÜHNÉ @  
KANNENBERG  
MATTHIS  
DEINZER  
KÖRNER  
HARTMANN, Dr. r  
KAISER  
ZANKEL  
MERTENS, Hennes @?  
WILLKE, Dr. @  
GALLWITZ, Dr. GALEN, GALUSCHKA  
DIEHL @  
WENDT @  
WILDEN @  
HAGER, Dr.  
Ltn. ROBERTSON Toiv?  
Maj. GORDON  
Maj. WALKER  
Col. HENDRICKS  
SMITH-EVANS Jean?  
POHL  
AMMER, Dr.  
SCHRÖDER  
HALTER, Toni, HAMMER @  
Mutter HALTER  
BOOK @  
NÖTH, Max 4V  
RÖMER, MEISEL  
VITZTHUM, Graf v.  
HARTWIG @  
DRUSCHNY  
@ MERTENS L. K. H.  
Z-Bearbeiter KÜCHLER, Berlin  
MOMMER, Dr.  
SCHELLING, Dr.  
@ MERKER, v. MELLERTHIN  
DOERNBERG @
























MÜNSTER  
GIERNER  
ZIEMERT

ERAPF

✓ LOEV (Fahrzeugrevision)

weiterer Herr der von Dienststelle KÖRNIG  
zur Schule WEINHEIM versetzt wurde Name hier  
nicht mehr bekannt.

b) namentlich ohne persönliches kennen:

GHELEN, Giovanni Italien

BUSCH, Schweiz

WINTER

GRÜNWALD, Dr. @

BANNER

HERDAHL @

@ WIELAND (vermutl. auch Klarname)

KROSSIN, v. KLEIST

KORTEN, Fr.

HUMMEL @

HEUSINGER, Dr. RONG

SCHÖNFELD, Fr.

SIEBEL, Dr. 280

RASCHKE, Herbert, RIESS

LEHNER

KRAMER

OHLENDORF, Dr.

HOLLWECK

GATSCHINSKI NOTIZIE vom -/

de ONDARZA

v. GODIN

MERKEL, STEPHANUS

BERWALD

@ KNUTH, v. KNESEBECK - T

HESCHEL

BUNTROCK Oberst a.D. (phon.) T

Bei Besprechungen die ARTHUR in Vernehmung Angelegenheiten mit Herren der Zentrale und Aussenstellen führte ist anzunehmen, dass er mit weiteren MA's dieser Stellen bekannt wurde, worüber hier jedoch keine Kenntnis vorhanden ist.

2.) ARTHUR lernte im Laufe seiner Tätigkeit nachstehend aufgeführte Personen der Aussenstellen kennen:

a) persönlich: DONATH, MALINER  
MAIER, Otto, v. BOLLSCHEWING  
HAKENBUCHNER, BUCHNER  
ZITZELSBERGER

CHENGL

ROTH, LUTZ

ROHLEDER

TOFFCARECK, Dr. SCHÄFER

PECHTEL, III. - Bearbeiter bei 12

SACKERMANN

KÖRNIG

NOLTE, v. NOSTIZ

KLEINKAMP, KLEIBER

WAGNER, WOGITZKI

GISKES

Dr. SCHUBERT, SCHUHMACHER

GEIER (712)

b) namentlich: GOLLI, OBERHOFER

UNGERMANN

ZAHN

FERRER

FREY (auch Klarname)



Leiter 142  
Nr. 2083/55 geh.

**Geheim**

B-767a  
17.8.1955

An

123 Nr. 3849 655  
Eingegangen am: 22. Aug. 1955

- 123 -

Betr.: MA der Dienststelle 142 und Vorgängerdienststellen.  
Bezug: Rücksprache Leiter 119, 123/H, Herrn LESCHE mit  
142 am 9.8.55

142 überreicht in der Anlage in doppelter Fertigung  
Liste der MA, der Dienststelle 142 und Vorgängerdienststellen,  
die ARTHUR während seiner hiesigen Tätigkeit bekennt wurden.

Die Liste ist - wie angeordnet - unterteilt nach

- a) persönlich
- b) namentlich c.

Anlagen: 2



SECRET

17 August 1955

M/R

SUBJECT:  Meeting with @ Dr. KLAUSNER, 16 August 1955

1. @ Dr. KLAUSNER brought up the WEINMANN/BURKHARDT case. He said that they were trying "to get to" SCHWANKOWSKI (I do not remember the name exactly). SCHWANKOWSKI was BURKHARDT's first Sfs case officer, has travelled in West Germany, is a member of the Zentralrat of the National Front, and an employee of the SED Central Committee. SCHWANKOWSKI apparently was given intelligence missions for West Germany and money for these missions. He did not carry them out; however, he pocketed the money and asked BURKHARDT to carry them out for him. Therefore, ZIPPER believes that SCHWANKOWSKI cannot afford to explain the true situation to his Sfs superiors.

2. @ Dr. KLAUSNER said that the BERGER of the Sfs was BURKHARDT's friend and that BURKHARDT was unwilling to incriminate him. He is also the one whom BURKHARDT had previously described as the Sfs colonel to whom ZIPPER "could talk in West Germany," but whom they could not defect because "he was doing too well in the East."

3. KEBASSA, @ Dr. KLAUSNER said, was BURKHARDT's first wife from whom he had been divorced. She was the "motherly" girlfriend that had been mentioned previously. Now ZIPPER is about to move her to Heilbronn. She is supposed to get an extra room and BURKHARDT will be moved into that one. @ Dr. KLAUSNER explained that there ZIPPER was able to keep an eye on the two.

4. BURKHARDT will be legalized in a very complicated manner. Part of it is already underway. After he gets out of jail, he will first move to North Rhine/Westphalia where ZIPPER has already made the appropriate police arrangements with the BfV, LfV and local Kripo. As soon as he is installed in North Rhine/Westphalia, he will move from there to Heilbronn. As soon as he is "angemeldet" in Heilbronn, the North Rhine/Westphalia police contact will pull BURKHARDT's registration card out of the North Rhine/Westphalia city Einwohner Meldeamt, wherever this may be (presumably in the vicinity of Duesseldorf), and will destroy the Meldekarte. In this manner, ZIPPER feels, BURKHARDT will properly and legally become a resident of Heilbronn, and yet anyone trying to trace his background or movements will run into a stone wall.

5. Concerning BURKHARDT's brother, @ Dr. KLAUSNER said that he is living in Frankenthal, is much less intelligent than BURKHARDT, and had apparently been a semi-witting Sfs agent. @ Dr. KLAUSNER explained that BURKHARDT had used him once to act as a courier to East Berlin, and that the brother must have had some idea of what he was doing, but probably had not been briefed too much. @ Dr. KLAUSNER added that they would try to transfer BURKHARDT's car to his brother.

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240/ALBERT

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

4 read



## SECRET

6. @ Dr. KLAUSNER then discussed ALBERT. ALBERT had owned 18 suits, each one costing 500 DM's. @ Dr. KLAUSNER shook his head at this and commented that he had one suit that had cost that much of which he was very proud and which he needed for official things and special festivities, but that he thought ALBERT had really been overdoing it. He added that they had found bills for these suits in ALBERT's house. ALBERT had always paid cash for everything including the 3,500 DM's which some of his many rugs had cost him. I asked whether PAPAIZIAN/TIGRIS were possibly mixed up in this rug business. @ Dr. KLAUSNER was not willing to speculate on that, but merely said it was possible.

7. The intelligence reports found in ALBERT's basement were mostly dated 1954 and very few were from 1951, 1952 or 1953. @ Dr. KLAUSNER believed that this signified that at one time ALBERT had made a clean sweep of all the material in his basement and that then had permitted the stuff to accumulate again. The entire registry of GV L, according to @ Dr. KLAUSNER, was something that baffled them. Every secret report received by GV L would normally receive a numerical stamp as soon as received. The identical number would also be stamped into an incoming log together with a short description of the subject and other data. Some of the intelligence reports found in ALBERT's basement had that number stamped on them, but when ZIPPER checked the log, they found that ~~that~~ particular number missing. This, @ Dr. KLAUSNER said, led ZIPPER to wonder whether or not the clerk keeping the "Eingangstagebuch" had been in cahoots with ALBERT. @ Dr. KLAUSNER said that among the batches of secret reports found in the basement, there were, of course, many which according to their security regulations should have been in the safes of the office and which could have been found missing at any routine inspection. Also in the basement were found @ Dr. KLAUSNER's Aufklaerungsforderung 600. This had been found with the staples removed, indicating without a doubt that ALBERT had photographed it.

8. @ Dr. KLAUSNER then cited the case of "Forschung ANNI" (NOTE: Never previously reported to POB). @ Dr. KLAUSNER said that @ DIRK while at GV L had handled "Forschung ANNI" and then was transferred to Dienststelle 161. While there, he once wanted to refer back to the case and accordingly asked Headquarters for the old file. Headquarters thereupon asked @ LEIDL to send the "Forschung ANNI" file to Headquarters. @ LEIDL replied that, unfortunately, this file had been destroyed. Now ZIPPER had found the file in ALBERT's basement.

9. In January, 1954, ALBERT had gotten himself new vehicle license plates and papers for his ZIPPER vehicle. He had reported to the Neu Isenburg police the loss of his pocketbook and all his identity documents together with his vehicle papers. In this manner he obtained brand-new papers and through his excellent connection at the Neu Isenburg police, was able to prevent the police from writing to Munich to ask for the "Kraftfahrzeugbrief." However, nobody in ZIPPER had ever noticed that ALBERT was driving around with brand-new plates. @ Dr. KLAUSNER marveled at the nerve of ALBERT in doing this and said that any routine administrative inspection would have shown this up. Yet, ALBERT felt that he was protected by everybody and that if anything went wrong the following would cover him: ZIPPER, the Americans, the German Criminal Police, the SPD (since he was an active member), and the Sfs.

10. @ Dr. KLAUSNER explained that BURKHARDT was on a trip through West Germany accompanied by the Security Group, "travelling from Kiel to Reichenhall."

## SECRET

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In this manner his memory would be refreshed on many additional points. BURKHARDT knew of two other possible Sfs penetrations of ZIPPER--one in Duesseldorf and one in Wiesbaden. In both instances, they had used city maps in order to pinpoint BURKHARDT's meetings, but that actual trips to the areas would be a more satisfactory means of reconstructing these. In Wiesbaden, the penetration lived close to the railroad station. When I brought up SCHMITZ and SCHWEITZER, @ Dr. KLAUSNER said that SCHMITZ's Wiesbaden address was Luxemburgerstrasse and asked me whether I happened to know if Luxemburgerstrasse was near the railroad station. I didn't know. During September the Security Group plans to take BURKHARDT on another trip throughout Germany, the purpose of which @ Dr. KLAUSNER did not explain.

11. Regarding KAESTNER, @ Dr. KLAUSNER said that they were now suspecting a member of the Weidenkamm school staff to be the Sfs penetration. BURKHARDT had seen this man dressed in a trench coat and wearing sunglasses; therefore, BURKHARDT recently had been shown various ZIPPER staff members who had worked at the school before it had been closed down. Naturally, these ZIPPERites were not aware of the fact that they were paraded for BURKHARDT's inspection. In this manner BURKHARDT had tentatively identified one man and had seen him both walking and with sunglasses on, but, unfortunately, had not been able to see him dressed in a trench coat. This man is at present at his home in Nuernberg.

12. As a sign that the Sfs had not yet fully appreciated what had happened in West Germany, @ Dr. KLAUSNER cited the fact that "long after the arrests," the Sfs had transmitted a blind radio broadcast to West Germany which ZIPPER had received and was able to read since they were in possession of the necessary code ciphers and signal plan. As one of the next moves of the Sfs, @ Dr. KLAUSNER said, they expected someone to contact BURKHARDT's brother.

831 T-7

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

VIA: PLAIN OR R.F. FOUO

DISPATCH NO. EQQA-67173

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

INFO: BORN  
FOB

TO: Chief, EE

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

23 AUG  
1955

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Operational/CARE

SUBJECT: SPECIFIC: Herbert BURKHARDT Case

Reference: FRAN-1721, 25 July 55

Attached hereto is an edited stenographic copy of the briefing given by   
 to General Phillips on 25 July on this case.

APPROVED:

Distribution:  
3-EE w/1 att.  
2-BORN w/1 att.  
2-FOB w/1 att.

18 AUG 55  
FCM:PGC

EQQA-67173  
23 Aug 55

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION  
RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A



**SECRET** 23 July 1955

CASE FILE

1. On 30 June, this year, OCA was informed by the SG, Bonn, that they were planning a large roundup on the 2d of July. A roundup of spies, no details were given at this time. On the 2d of July, our Pullach office informed us that this roundup was one started on the basis of information given by one Herbert BURKHARDT, alias WEINMANN, who is in prison on the basis of old Blackmarket charges, and he was offering information on persons in contact with the SFS in return for his freedom from prosecution. Two of the persons indicated by WEINMANN as SFS agents were employees of the GEHLEN organization; Robert KAESTNER and Ludwig ALBERT. On the 7th of July, our CIC Liaison Officer learned from CIC Headquarters that the German authorities in conjunction with RfV and the GEHLEN Organization had conducted a so-called "sweep operation" on the weekend of 2/4 July, rounding up fifteen (15) people, including the two above mentioned SDU people. On the 7th, I was seeing Dr. BRUECKNER, chief of the SG. I see him periodically on matters of common concern which mostly includes exchange of basic information; and at this time, he told me a capsule account of this roundup. He volunteered the fact that the two GEHLEN men had been arrested and he gave a general account of WEINMANN's disclosures. I asked him immediately if there was any U.S. security aspect to this case. He said, "yes and no." Yes, in that one KANTHAL, an employee of the German Post Office in Frankfurt had admitted his passing of telephone directories; but that other than this and the two GEHLEN people, there were no U.S. security aspects apparent at this time and that the GEHLEN men had made no admissions; but he said this was a tentative judgment, that the information was being evaluated by the SG people and by the GEHLEN people. He said, however, there was no doubt but that ALBERT was in touch with the SFS since WEINMANN, the initial informant leading to this roundup, had actual contact with an SFS case officer, whom WEINMANN knew only as BERGER, who had given money to ALBERT in the woods near Frankfurt.

2. I saw BRUECKNER a couple of times after that and he really had nothing to add until the 19th of July. On the 19th of July, he gave me a list of fifteen (15) arrestees; the names of which I have here, but I will, for the sake of brevity, give them to you in writing; some of them had admitted their SFS association, others had denied it. ALBERT, the principal witness in this whole thing, hanged himself on the 14th of July. The other GEHLEN man, KAESTNER, had and has consistently denied any SFS contact. In addition to this, BRUECKNER gave me the following information which he cautioned was very vague and incomplete; he said that they were trying through further analysis of the material to pin it down. There is a female language instructor in Oberammergau who is an alleged SFS informer; also a male Russian truck driver in Oberammergau who had given WEINMANN information on either of these people. There was no further identification on either of these people. There was a married female employee of an un-named American hotel in Garwisch who was alleged to be a Russian agent (sic); and thirdly, an American enlisted man allegedly

SFS  
informant

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with CIC in Wiesbaden, is supposed to be in STS contact. This CI's headquarters are believed to be in the vicinity of Industriestrasse 4, in Wiesbaden. Now, let me put the story together for you a little bit.

3. ALBERG was a GERZEN case officer. Presumably that his duties were at the time we don't know. Pullach is putting them together for us. He reported a large amount of the material to GERZEN and there was a large amount of material found in ALBERG's home, at the time of his arrest. A study of these two sets of material showed the following facts:

ITEM 1. ALBERG received reports regularly from one Herman SCHWITZ, a retired KRHO MD, living at Schulstrasse 1, in Soulsgraben, which is near Prinzluf. SCHWITZ was reportedly serving with a US Intelligence Office headed by a Colonel THOMAS, described as being the (2) meters, five (5) centimeters tall, very hunchy, but not fat. According to SCHWITZ, information, this office was gathering information on the following targets: The Bain case; the BLANK office; Department VI (Public Safety) of the Ministry of Interior; the GERZEN Organization; the KLISER Ministry; the BIV; and the SO. The nature of the information contained in these reports made it apparent that the office of Col. THOMAS was concerned primarily with the security of these offices.

ITEM 2. The reports which SCHWITZ submitted contained a variety of information on members of these offices; personality information, rumors, personal funds, that kind of thing. Much of the material was more equine, three and four lines long, of biographical information; where the man lives; where he works, etc.

ITEM 3. ALBERG transmitted to GERZEN excerpts from these reports to which he added information concerning the Col. THOMAS office which he had obviously obtained from SCHWITZ orally. I say obviously, since information which got into GERZEN's hands from ALBERG was not contained in the copies of reports which SCHWITZ had passed to ALBERG and which were found in ALBERG's house.

ITEM 4. Col. THOMAS' office was allegedly first in Bad Odenberg from 1952 until sometime in 1953 when it moved to Prinzluf. Late in 1953, SCHWITZ indicated to ALBERG, who passed it on to GERZEN, that THOMAS' office was transferred to the direct control of CIA in Paris.

ITEM 5. The specific KEL's which Col. THOMAS gave to SCHWITZ plus the reports which SCHWITZ prepared in answer to these KEL's were passed to ALBERG and thence to GERZEN, and showed with relative clarity the progress which Col. THOMAS' office had been able to make against the various targets. It became apparent that SCHWITZ had sources in most of the target areas; for example, his source on the HEINZ case was a lawyer named KELER. KELER lives in Wiesbaden and has practically dropped his private practice to clear up the mystery of the HEINZ case. SCHWITZ' source in SO were ALBERT, who is a personal friend and apparently unwitting informant of SCHWITZ; also one Paul KERSCHOFF, who was a member of the Chancellor's bodyguard and

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then transferred to the squad in charge of the protection of the public buildings in Peking and finally, to the SG teletype room. It appears that SCHWITZ also had informants in the RT, Ministry of Interior and the BLANK office, although these have not yet been identified.

ITEM 6. ALBERT was informed through SCHWITZ, who learned it through LENCHEWY, of the impending SG roundup of the 4th of July, although the details didn't appear in the report which SCHWITZ passed to ALBERT. I can give you an idea later of just about what that report contained.

ITEM 7. SAWYRKE had informed SCHWITZ about the disciplinary action which was being carried on against SAWYRKE in connection with war crime accusations made against him while he was in Italy. He also passed remarks relative to his personal opinion about the way the SG was handled. Interestingly enough, neither of these two items was passed on by ALBERT to GERBER.

ITEM 8. Insofar as BRIDGEMAN's remarks to me are concerned, they were that SCHWITZ, date unknown, asked his American child, Col. HERMUS, for a raise from 800 DM's to 850 DM's a month and a separation allowance of 220 DM's a month since he had to maintain two separate residences in order to carry on his work. These are the basic revelations from the studies of these two bodies of information (I am still on the 19th day of July and BRIDGEMAN's talk with me).

ITEM 9. SAWYRKE was interrogated in Karlsruhe on the 19th and the 20th of July as a witness, not accused, and his story contained the following items of primary interest - bear in mind that I did not have a recollection with me and I was able to jot down only the high points. SAWYRKE knew SCHWITZ during his police days and they had become good personal friends. SCHWITZ made no secret to SAWYRKE of the fact that he, SCHWITZ, worked for an American Intelligence Office. When SAWYRKE was charged with war crimes, in an effort to exonerate himself, he contacted GCA. He was able to provide from American files, a body of information which helped serve to exonerate him from the charges; however, that information was passed by GCA direct to the Ministry of Interior, not to SAWYRKE, and he had no indication of anything happening or how the Ministry was evaluating it; so knowing that SCHWITZ was working for the American Office, he turned to SCHWITZ in hope that SCHWITZ's office could bring further pressure to bear - just another line in the fire for SAWYRKE.

ITEM 10. In the course of his relationship with SCHWITZ, SAWYRKE did discuss his opinion of what was wrong with the leadership of the SG.

ITEM 11. When SAWYRKE returned from his interrogation on the 20th of July, SCHWITZ was waiting for him at SAWYRKE's house and asked him what he knew about the death of ALBERT. SCHWITZ was a very close family friend of ALBERT's and he had allegedly learned of ALBERT's death from Mrs. ALBERT's by depression is, and I can't guarantee this, that SAWYRKE did confirm the fact of ALBERT's death by SCHWITZ's holding more. SAWYRKE also knew ALBERT directly, but this went way back to the 30's when SAWYRKE was instructor at the police school at which ALBERT was a student. They were not personal

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friends; they had not seen each other except informally, casually and occasionally since the war. In other words, SAEVECKE's crime, if crime it was, was allegedly indiscretion; nothing of official nature and nothing that probably doesn't go on in government circles all the time. There is really nothing on the book against SAEVECKE and information available does not incriminate him in any way other than his connection with these two items.

4. LERCHHOFF was interrogated in Karlsruhe on the 19th of July. I might interpolate here in saying that the names of both SAEVECKE and LERCHHOFF were contained in a report which SCHMITZ had passed to Col. THOMAS; the original and carbon copy of which had gone to ALBERT; and reported fifty or sixty names of his sources and potential sources in the German government, and that is how the names of SAEVECKE and LERCHHOFF came to the attention of the SO men. They were anxious to get to them as soon as possible. LERCHHOFF at first denied having furnished SCHMITZ any information. The day after he returned home from Karlsruhe, he called the Federal Attorney and said he'd like to strike that denial and make another statement, which he did. His statement had in it the following points:

A. He had known both SCHMITZ and a man named Richard SCHMITZER during the war. SCHMITZER, like LERCHHOFF, was a Volkdeutscher (ethnic German) from Lithuania. They met - LERCHHOFF and SCHMITZ - in Bad Godesberg in 1951 by accident and had a reunion there about the old days in Lithuania. SCHMITZ again revealed to LERCHHOFF that he worked for an American intelligence office and after a number of local meetings with LERCHHOFF, asked if he would help him and his American office in filling some of the gaps in their information. LERCHHOFF claimed he couldn't do this because he was only a member of the Chancellor's bodyguard and as such, he had no access to such interests; however, he did supply a few squibs which SCHMITZ appeared to be happy to get. Before long, SCHMITZ was paying LERCHHOFF 200 DM's a month.

B. Sometime in 1954, LERCHHOFF was transferred to the teletype room of the SO and then was able to furnish more interesting information, although still very brief reports; since the detailed stuff was always sent by dispatch. In early July, LERCHHOFF claims that SCHMITZ approached him, saying that his office had information that a large roundup of spies was to take place and asked if LERCHHOFF could supply some information on it. LERCHHOFF claimed that from his experience he knew that the Americans were receiving information officially from various German security offices and saw no reason why carrying out this request would be damaging to anyone; so he reported and this report was found in ALBERT's files; that a prisoner, who had been confined in KOENIGSMINER and was then removed to LINZ had offered information which had lead to the SO roundup which was called "Operation WEIMAR". Also that BRUECKNER was known to have visited Karlsruhe recently, possibly in connection with this planned operation, and that GEHLEN had visited the SO on 17 June 1955, possibly also in connection with this operation. LERCHHOFF claimed to have received the information on the BRUECKNER and GEHLEN movements from colleagues of his in the course of informal chats. Shortly after the arrests were made between the 2d and 4th of July, SCHMITZ asked LERCHHOFF if he could confirm whether one Albert LUDWIG or Ludwig ALBERT, had been arrested. (It is my impression that LERCHHOFF did confirm the arrest of ALBERT).

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C. The final item from LERCHHOFF is that it was his impression that Col. THOMAS was to have met SCHMITZ in Bonn on the 18th of July. Now that is the story.

5. I'd like to give you BRUECKNER's comments. None of the information which SCHMITZ passed on to ALBERT contained any State secrets. They were largely rumors, gossip, and unofficial chatter. Secondly, SCHMITZ has not yet been interviewed nor has SCHMEITZER. The reason I mentioned SCHMEITZER in this connection is because it is not clear to me nor the SO whether SCHMEITZER worked for SCHMITZ only as a sub-source or whether he worked together with SCHMITZ directly for Col. THOMAS. BRUECKNER felt when he heard the physical description of Col. THOMAS that I was Col. THOMAS. I pointed out to BRUECKNER that he had better take another look. First of all, I am slightly under two meters, five centimeters tall, and secondly; I don't think I can be described as "strong but not fat". That at once cleared up the matter. BRUECKNER did discuss these theories of his with both GEHLEN and the Federal Attorney in Karlsruhe; but I am led to believe that I am off the hook with all parties. I pointed out that I'd hardly be conducting liaison with the office I am penetrating. Thirdly, BRUECKNER has not discussed this case with any other US agencies and from his standpoint, will regard us as the middleman in making inquiries of other U.S. agencies. He asked if I would make inquiries in the rest of the intelligence community after I assured him that this was not our operation. In accepting this request of his, I made it clear to him that we stand in no operational relationship to any military agency and therefore, we can be responsible for no action taken by any military agency, either to make or not make SCHMITZ available for interrogation. He agrees not to take any action against SCHMITZ or SCHMEITZER until he hears from me. That is the story.

6. I talked to BRUECKNER on the telephone the other night. He added that a Mr. "B", had been mentioned in some report which had been found - must be in the GEHLEN batch - in a contact which made it look as though Mr. "B" was either a colleague or the predecessor of Col. THOMAS. That is the only clue, we have no description or anything else. (Note: It has since emerged that this referred to Mr. Herbert RECHOLD.)

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25 August 1955

M/R

Subject: @ WILDEN on the BURKHARDT/ALBERT Case

I met @ WILDEN accidentally in front of Headquarters today while he parked to see the ZIPPER Front Office, and I was about to drive off. We chatted briefly and he immediately exclaimed how busy he had been recently. I said that he presumably had really had some insight into "field operations." He grinned and said: "Yes, how to run them and how not to." I asked him whether they were really getting to the bottom of all this. He said something that didn't make much sense to me like "Yes, as far as the Germans are concerned, but not regarding the Russians." I said that I meant whether they could tell from ALBERT's files just what he had reported and known. To this he replied that they would in time "viel klarer sehen," but that some of their questions would probably never be answered. I then said that I could understand ALBERT's collecting rugs, but why in the world did he hang on to all that material? @ WILDEN shook his head and said they didn't know either. After exchanging some pleasantries, we each went our way.

Distribution:

- ✓ Cy 1. File - ALBERT
- Cy 2. 829, 841
- Cy 3. 801
- Cy 4. File - WILCKE

831 T<sup>2</sup> DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

File: 240/ALBERT

SECRET

VIA: COURIER  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. BGLA-15 996

CLASSIFICATION

30 SEP 1955

TO : Chief, EE

DATE:

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COS

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— UJDREDGER Treatment of Ludwig ALBERT

1. In connection with Herbert BURKHARDT's denunciation of Ludwig ALBERT as an SFS agent, and ALBERT's subsequent suicide, POB analysis of the case included an expanded UJDREDGER treatment of Ludwig ALBERT, prepared by [ ]

2. Although we never found it necessary to carry attachment beyond the draft form necessary for internal POB use, we are forwarding it for your information. It will form a useful addition to the ALBERT file, and incidentally give you an indication of type and extent of material which can be compiled on a given ZIPPER staff member through POB file analysis.

Approved: [ ] [ ]

Distribution:

③-EE (w/1 cy att a/s)  
①-COS (w/1 cy att a/s)

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

29 Sept 55  
No. 51-28A  
949

CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY [ ] [ ]



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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25 November 1955

SUBJECT: The ALBERT-BURCKHARDT-LEIDL Case  
FROM: 831

1. @KLAUSNER stated frankly that this was pretty much of a fiasco and so far it had not been handled too well either by ZIPPER, himself or by other German agencies involved such as the Security Group:
2. Mrs. ALBERT has not been interrogated.
3. BURCKHARDT is free and by no means under constant ZIPPER surveillance. He has a car, a telephone and also receives mail at his brother's address at Frankenthal which is located in the French Zone. ZIPPER is trying to surveil him as much as possible but is experiencing considerable difficulty. ZIPPER's case officer for BURCKHARDT is @LUDWIG who @KLAUSNER states was previously in no way involved in the ALBERT-LEIDL case.
4. BURCKHARDT has definitely given ZIPPER and the Security Group much true information. On the basis of this information an Sfs or Soviet radio agent has been arrested in what is believed to be the Frankfurt area and has allegedly confessed. Similarly both in Berlin and in the Federal Republic other Sfs agents have been picked up and have admitted their activities. However, ZIPPER states that BURCKHARDT has lately been able to play the Security Group against ZIPPER, has repeatedly lied to both and is suspected to have resumed some sort of contact with the East Zone.
5. As an example of how BURCKHARDT was able to play the Security Group against ZIPPER, @KLAUSNER told the following story: While

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240/ALBERT, Ludwig

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in Berlin, BURCKHARDT insisted on chasing his very many lady friends much to the chagrin of his ZIPPER case officer. When the latter berated BURCKHARDT when he returned to their hotel at 4:00 a.m. after one of his many escapades, BURCKHARDT told the case officer to go to hell to which the case officer replied in an apparently threatening manner. After that BURCKHARDT went to his Security Group escort and complained about his ZIPPER case officer, saying that the latter had dropped his pistol right in the middle of the hotel lobby. Promptly the Security Group officer asked his ZIPPER colleague whether he had dropped his pistol to which the latter replied that he didn't even carry a gun. Immediately the Security Group officer confronted BURCKHARDT and accused him of lying to which BURCKHARDT replied with a satisfied smirk ~~that~~ that all he really wanted to know was whether his ZIPPER escort was armed.

6. @KLAUSNER stated that the Sfs penetration of the ZIPPER school at Weidenkamm was still unidentified. BURCKHARDT had claimed that outside of the school there had been a dead letter drop located in one of the stacks of wood. When ZIPPER confronted BURCKHARDT with the local forester, the forester identified BURCKHARDT as the man whom he had seen repeatedly hanging around the school.

7. @KLAUSNER mentioned V-1101 as being under suspicion in connection with BURCKHARDT's testimony. (This is believed to be related to V-3910.)

8. @KLAUSNER stated that on UTILITY's instructions ZIPPER had stayed out of the Security Group interrogation of Frl. SCHWARZ. This lady is apparently one of GLOBKE's secretaries who had been a source

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of SCHWEITZER. As such she had reported to SCHWEITZER about ZIPPER's  
<sup>trans: REPENSING</sup>  
ORAINER. SCHWEITZER had reported this information to SCHMITZ, SCHMITZ  
to ALBERT, and ALBERT to the Sfs or the Soviets. OKLAUSNER added that  
when the Security Group interrogated FrI. SCHWARZ, the latter was not  
at all subdued but reacted with a considerable amount of huff to any sug-  
gestion that she had been working for the East, mentioning allegedly  
that SCHWEITZER after all worked for the "Americans".

9. OKLAUSNER mentioned someone called JAKUSCH as also being in-  
volved with ALBERT and LEIDL. The security aspects of this case are be-  
ing reported under the cryptonym EVA while MAGDELENE is apparently ZIP-  
PER'S crypto for the positive CE aspects.

10. OKLAUSNER promised to furnish   with a report.

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Handwritten scribbles and a large 'S' in the top left corner of the document.

VIA AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

ATCH NO. ECLA-16939

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach  
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational  
          SPECIFIC - Development in Herbert BURKHARDT Case

DATE: 6 DEC 1955  
INFO: COS

1. On 30 November 1955 @ EDINGER informed the undersigned of the following development in the Herbert BURKHARDT case. This aspect, incidentally, is being handled by the ZIPPER IIIIF staff and was only informally related by @ EDINGER.
2. In Fall SCHREINER (UJROLLERY-113), @ SCHREINER has a brother living in Chemnitz who has been in touch with the SFS. Fall SCHREINER itself is considered dead by ZIPPER since the case was well known to Indig ALBERT and therefore is presumed entirely blown. Recently @ SCHREINER's brother from Chemnitz showed up in West Germany carrying a letter. The letter had been given to the brother by an SFS man who said he was from Berlin. The SFS man had taken the letter out of an envelope and in the brother's presence sealed the letter in an envelope lightly, obviously without any security checks, almost as if he purposely intended to indicate to the brother that the letter could be opened without danger. The brother had been instructed to deliver the letter to @ SCHREINER, who was to take it to Julius WEINMANN in Frankenthal for delivery to Herbert WEINMANN, @ BURKHARDT. Through @ SCHREINER, ZIPPER copied the letter. It was signed CARSTEN, the known cover name for BURKHARDT's latest SFS superior. The letter expressed some mild surprise that BURKHARDT had been able to get himself released, stated the assumption that BURKHARDT had conducted himself well or he would not have been released, expressed complete confidence in BURKHARDT, and stated that his letters had been received. (To the very best of ZIPPER's knowledge, believed accurate, BURKHARDT had not sent such letters.)
3. ZIPPER had @ SCHREINER deliver the letter, but @ SCHREINER merely left it at the address, as Julius WEINMANN was not there. Naturally, ZIPPER then waited with some interest to see whether BURKHARDT would report the letter. BURKHARDT told his case officer that he had written a letter to BERGER. (Presumably in order to cover up the reference in the letter to letter(s) received from BURKHARDT.) Then a proper number of days later BURKHARDT told his ZIPPER case officer he had received a letter, and it was waiting for him in Frankenthal. ZIPPER had the Security Group take BURKHARDT up to get his letter. While the Security Group man waited

Distributions:

- 3 - EE
- 3 - COS

1 December 1955

ECLA-16939  
6 DEC 55

Handwritten notes: "Biv of SFS" and "Wittner" with arrows pointing to checkboxes.

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM 51-28A

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WLA-16939  
Page 2

outside, BURKHARDT went in, came back out claiming that he had destroyed the actual letter (for security reasons!), but providing the SG man with a copy of the approximate text. This copy did not at all correspond with the original text. In the copy, BURKHARDT built himself up as on much more intimate terms with GABRIEL, and generally changed the text to cover BURKHARDT's story that he had written a letter recently. Asked how the letter was delivered, BURKHARDT did tell the truth, i.e., that it had been brought by G. SCHREIBER.

4. Although the objective(s) of the SFS in writing the letter is, of course, not entirely clear, it would appear that they purposely made sure ZIPPER intercepted the letter, presumably in order to undermine the validity of BURKHARDT's testimony. They presumably thought to do this by referring to previous letters, and by expressing confidence in him. Then the SFS supposedly wanted the letter actually to get to BURKHARDT, and their purpose in this was perhaps to begin to prepare him for some contact, or for eventual defection. We cannot estimate the possibility that BURKHARDT has actually been in previous recent touch with the SFS, but ZIPPER does not believe he has been. ZIPPER points out that if the SFS really wanted to carry on a secret correspondence with BURKHARDT, they would not have chosen this means, and this seems a reasonable assumption. Regardless of SFS purpose in sending the letter, their act had the very favorable (to ZIPPER) side effect of providing an excellent and specific cross check of BURKHARDT's relative honesty.

5. Unfortunately, no further details were available through G. SCHREIBER. We will follow up on this point as we can make opportunity.

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REF-71906

INFO: FBI  
NSA

Chief, G-5

Chief of Station, Germany

Operational/CI/SEC/INTELL

FEB 1955

Information Provided CIC by Ludwig ALBERT

REF: FUL-2014, 1 Dec 55 etc.


L file FETT 201

It is requested that you take up with CIC the question of obtaining  
from the material which Ludwig ALBERT provided by way of Heinrich  
SCHNEEL and Richard SCHNEIDER. Inasmuch as the exchange of information  
between them and the CIA is no longer going on, there is no reason why  
they could not supply this material to us. As CIC surely knows, XREF  
is our responsibility and this information on XREF is therefore of interest  
to us.

APPROVED:

Initials:

5-12  
7-12  
3-12  
13 Dec 56



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Courier

EGSA-7094

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Chief of Station, Germany

14 March 1956

Chief, CLS

Operational/CART/BURKHARDT

Information Provided CIC by Ludwig ALBERT

Ref: EGQA-74560

*Burkhart 201  
and Albert 201*

CIC says that "due to the sensitivity of the case and to the fact that G-2 has in the past and continues to control the case", referenced query for Subject information should be placed with G-2.

**Distribution:**

- 3 - COS
- 2 - POB (DIRECT)
- 2 - RE (DIRECT) INFO ONLY
- 2 - Files

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DATE 2007

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29 March 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with @ FRIESEN on 28 March 1956

1. I asked @ FRIESEN about Carola SAUER; he said there was nothing new. I also asked him about PAENITZ; however, @ FRIESEN thought that CAVATA was handling him and referred me to @ MERKEL.

2. @ FRIESEN then asked me about something that had been bothering him personally. He said that he had learned that "Reiner" SCHMITZ of Wiesbaden, who had worked with ALBERT, had investigated (aufgeklärt) @ FRIESEN. Oddly enough, he said, SCHMITZ and/or his American case officers had been disappointed when the information they had found on him turned out not to be derogatory at all. @ FRIESEN added that the whole thing worried him because he did not want to have a black mark against him in some classified American files.

3. I pointed out that both SCHMITZ and SCHWEITZER were now with UPWING. @ FRIESEN nodded and said he knew this, but that he had no direct access to them. However, he said that he had received some personal reassurance or vote of confidence from WILLIY personally.

4. I then went at length into the BUEHRARDT-WEINMANN-ALBERT-SCHMITZ case, explaining first of all that we were not the American service involved. Consequently, our insight was extremely limited. I doubted that CIC had given @ FRIESEN as a specific BRI, and that quite possibly it was ALBERT who had pushed the investigation of @ FRIESEN.

5. Both @ FRIESEN and I went into a great deal of repetitious discussion of ALBERT's vendetta against the former GV L members who had been transferred to UPWING headquarters. In the end, I stated that I knew of no derogatory information concerning @ FRIESEN. I said I would be willing to ask the Army for traces on him, if he so desired, but I did not think that our service would work as closely with him as we were doing if we did not consider him completely reliable. I did not think that either during or after the big SCHMITZ-SCHWEITZER flap CIC could or would fail to inform us if they had derogatory security information regarding @ FRIESEN in their files.

6. @ FRIESEN did not want me to ask for traces on him "because of UPWING

*famous last words*  
cc - 801  
cc - UPWING Desk (2)

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SOURCE'S METHOD EXEMPTION 9020  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

SECRET

✓ 240/ALBERT, L. S. G.  
CORIG. IN: 240/ELITE, H. S. G.  
(TR. BY: 240/BURKHARDT  
HERBERT)



**SECRET**

M/R  
Page 2

considerations," but thought that he might want to talk to me regarding this matter sometime in the future.

7. During the conversation, the following facts regarding @ FRIESEN came out:

a. He had studied at the University of Bonn, a fact which ALBERT had thought was not true, and SCHUTZ had tried to check with the Bonn University registrar.

b. @ FRIESEN worked with British intelligence after the war, and while doing so had seen his Berlin Documents Center file. Following the British employment, he had worked for a year or so for the Kaiser Ministry, during which time he came to the attention of URSING as the author of a yellow handbook on the Volkspolizei (?).

**SECRET**

800A-89617

Chief of Base, Pallasch

31 MAY 57

Chief of Station, Germany

INFO: ME

Operational/UPENDING

Discussion of the Luftwaffe ALBERT Case

REF: 800A-23797

1. Enough water has gone over the dam and G-2 attitudes have changed enough to make a discussion of the Subject case profitable for all concerned. The suggested approach seems well suited to achieve the objective, although we would like a small session prior to the meeting.

2. The only objection to the reference is the suggestion that General Milosevic should be the target for the briefing. It is most likely that, if he were briefed on the problem, he would only assign it to his staff, in this instance Col. Lindner, Chief of the CI Branch. Therefore we will request Lindner to discuss a date between 4 and 11 June for a discussion of the Subject case. You will be advised of the date.

APPROVED: [ ]

Distributions:

2-FBI

2-NSA

NSA:RSC

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

32W-2-28/7



SECRET  
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
Recommend Discussion of Ludwig ALBERT Case with General Willems		RI FILE NO.	32W	2	28/7	1
		DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			DATE	
		EGLA-23797				
		SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION		
ANALYST	DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN		DATE		
	8 JUN 1957					
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION						
CROSS-REFERRED TO THIS FILE			TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION						
<b>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007</b>						
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		➔	☐	☐	NS	

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54  
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-44)

MEMORANDUM FOR G-2, USAREUR

SUBJECT: Discussion of 10 June 1957 between representatives of G-2 and SDU concerning Ludwig ALBERT

1. On 10 June 1957, representatives of SDU and G-2 discussed in detail the Ludwig ALBERT case. SDU pointed out the security implications of the case as they affect the RND and requested that G-2 provide SDU with all information available to G-2 concerning ALBERT.

2. Specifically, it was agreed that G-2 would check their files and report to SDU with all reports given by ALBERT to Heinrich SCHMITZ, the exact dates of their relationship; a statement concerning the extent of SCHMITZ' knowledge of ALBERT and ALBERT's activities for the RND; a list of names of RND personnel known to ALBERT and passed by him to SCHMITZ.

3. It is SDU's position in which the G-2 representatives concurred, that the security of the RND is of major importance to American interests in Germany. SDU therefore, takes such steps as it is able to insure the security of the RND against hostile penetration. In this respect, it is SDU's position that with the information mentioned in paragraph 2 above, a more accurate assessment can be made of the possibility that penetrations of the RND exist that might be traceable to ALBERT's activities.

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DATE 2007



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COURIER

EOLA-26105

: Chief, EE

25 June 1957

: Chief of Base, Pallasch

INFO: COS, ULS

: Operational/UPSWING/CART

: Discussion with G-2 on the Ludwig ALBERT case

REF: EOLA-23797

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 1.

1. Under separate cover we are sending to ULS, a brief summary of our discussion of 10 June with G-2 on the ALBERT case. It is requested that ULS pass G-2 this summary which we trust will serve to remind them of their agreement to give KUBARK their information on ALBERT. Naturally, the sooner we get it the better.

2. [ ] and the undersigned of POB, [ ] of COS, [ ] of ULS and Mr. Donald Kempf and Captain Kinsaid of G-2 met on June 10 in Seidelberg to discuss Subject. The discussion was held along lines suggested in reference. In general, [ ] outlined KUBARK's interest and need in obtaining G-2's information. He used as a basis for his presentation, the several points he examined in the study of UPSWING security. This study was transmitted via EOLA-23180.

3. The G-2 reaction was, we believe, favorable, particularly since they felt called upon to emphasize their opinions regarding UPSWING security. There was no disagreement from any quarter that UPSWING's security was of material concern to PEPRIME interests in Germany, and with this principle established, it was wholly logical that G-2 should accede to [ ] request for their data on ALBERT.

4. We do not venture to predict just how much information will be forthcoming. G-2's representatives at the meeting took the line that ALBERT's reporting on UPSWING was merely incidental, that he was little more than a casual sub-source, and that they really were not sure where all the material presently reposes. The Subject - to them - was so dead that neither Kempf nor Kinsaid could express detailed knowledge of ALBERT's work.

Distribution:

- 3 - EE, w/1 cy Att(USC)
- 2 - COS, w/1 cy Att (USC)
- 2 - ULS, w/2 cy Att (USC)

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*Albert 201*

*220.2-28/7*

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EGIA-24105  
Page 2

work. Since they agreed to start a search for the material and to forward it to us when it is found, [ ] did not deem it pertinent to our purpose to point out certain misconceptions the gentlemen from G-2 seemed to be laboring under. Nevertheless, he took the occasion of this meeting to enlighten them on various other aspects of KGBARK-UPSI-TRO relations on which they were either not clear or misinformed. We will possibly have to indulge in occasional prods to get the promised G-2 reports, but when they are forthcoming, we believe they will prove useful and informative.

5. [ ] no doubt will provide Headquarters with a more complete run down on this general topic since he has now returned to Washington PCS.

Approved by:

Attachments: As Stated Above (UNDER SEPARATE COVER)

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300-2-28/7



NOTATION OF CABLE TRAFFIC

UPTD 1643, (IN 19256 ), 26 June 1957: To PULL 1. ref recent visit   
 for discussion ALBERT case. ~~RE~~ G-2 advises best source for details is ~~XXXXXX~~  
FERRANTE   former CIC staffer now at Hqs.

2. G-2 states   most knowledgeable and they perfectly willing he  
disclose all he knows. G-2 happy to fill gaps and answer questions which arise.

end

DIR-23932 (CUT 67774), 27 June 1957: To PULL. Info HEID :   outside  
PBPRIME for next two weeks. Propose have   discuss ALBERT case with him and  
pouch results.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA \_\_\_\_\_  
(Specify Air or Sea Route)

DISPATCH NO. EGLW-3507

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

24 JUN 57 12 49  
DATE JUN 57 09 18

TO : Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: COG, ULS

FROM : Chief, EE

SUBJECT { GENERAL : Operational  
SPECIFIC : Ludwig ALBERT Case

REFERENCE: HEID 1643, 26 June 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: Recontact G-2, USAREUR, as suggested below.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

1. As advised in reference, we got in touch with [ ] and discussed Subject case with him at some length. The advise was excellent as [ ] is probably the best informed individual on the aspects of the case which interest us. Please convey to G-2 our appreciation for the suggestion that we talk to [ ] and the clearance to do so on this Subject.

2. In general, the points made by [ ] are as follows: A long time CIC contact (perhaps since 1948) and yet a considerable handling problem and distinctly never considered entirely trustworthy by CIC, Heinrich SCHMITZ was only one of the principal agents of Operation CAMPUS. The contact and even the close relationship between SCHMITZ and ALBERT was known to CIC from an unspecified, but early, date. Until the middle of 1953 when CAMPUS was rather precipitously closed out, however, ZIPPER had never been targeted by CAMPUS, and ALBERT/SCHMITZ had not provided information on UPSWING. Shortly after CAMPUS folded, SCHMITZ wrote a letter of complaint to the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, and CIC, calling in [ ] as case officer again, hastily reestablished contact in September 1953, intending to satisfy SCHMITZ's demands in the interests of CAMPUS security, and drop him as soon as possible. Clearly this objective was not accomplished, as SCHMITZ and SCHNEIDER were both being run up to the time of ALBERT's arrest. though most of the handling was done by another CIC case officer, and [ ] was definitely out of the case as of about March 1955.

3. It was only upon being recontacted in September 1953 and being required to state and produce his assets that SCHMITZ came up with ALBERT as a disgruntled UPSWING member desirous of passing on information about UPSWING deficiencies to responsible authorities. Though SCHMITZ was of course paid by CIC, who was also aware that SCHMITZ admitted working for ALBERT and being paid by him, CIC never paid ALBERT.

(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

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FORM NO. 51-29  
JUN 1949



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Page Two  
BGLW-3507

No written reports were received by CIC from ALBERT. The reports received were allegedly SCHMITZ's written accounts of material supplied verbally by ALBERT.

4. Sharing entirely our views on the extreme importance of clarifying and coordinating this case, [ ] regrets that the details of ALBERT/SCHMITZ reporting which he can recall at this point in time and space are at best quite fragmentary. Yet it is exactly these details which may contain the clues which will allow us to get on with investigations possibly leading to serious security weak points within UPSWING. [ ] is of the opinion that the original SCHMITZ reports in German must still be retained at # 66th CIC headquarters in Stuttgart, and suggests that these might well be at once the most important items to see, because of their detail and the clues which might be provided by their form, and the easiest for CIC to provide us, as there should be no sterilisation problem. Will you please get in touch with G-2 again, making all of the above points, and requesting direct access to the SCHMITZ reports as a first step in our further investigation, or to other material which would provide the same data.

5. You will note from the Herbert WEIDMANN file that ALBERT was reporting to UPSWING on SCHMITZ's part in Operation CAMPUS since at least mid 1952 (undersigned believes the time was actually early 1952). There seems to be no currently available indication that ALBERT was in contact with SCHMITZ prior to that date. There are, however, various indications that ALBERT, rather than CIC or UPSWING, actually controlled SCHMITZ. The big question, of course, is who had the most effective working control of ALBERT. Having talked to [ ] we believe CIC would make no pretensions in this direction, and the evidence indicates UPSWING would have little basis for claiming principal control of ALBERT. Either ALBERT was for sometime relatively successfully playing all parties off against each other, or the basic control lay in the hands of his eastern employer. In our opinion, analysis of this key case gives the best promise of results in the direction of detection of major areas in which UPSWING may be penetrated. Proper analysis of this case depends upon bringing together for study at some point the details of the ALBERT-SCHMITZ relationship, the SCHMITZ interrogation by the Germans, and the ALBERT archives. We are unlikely to get our hands on the latter two until we have analyzed the first and are in a position to talk about it to UPSWING. This is the basis for our current requests to G-2, USAREUR. Please emphasize to G-2 as often as necessary that this is no simple historical research project, but a vital matter of security.

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Distribution:

- 2 - POB
- 2 - COS
- 2 - ULS
- 1 - RI
- 2 - EE/G/U

CEP:bjw(19 July 1957)

C/EE/G  
(Releasing Officer)

(Controlling Officer)

EE/G/G  
(Authenticating Officer)

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Ludwig  
ALBERT - 701

COURIER

SECRET

EGLA-21584

[ ] [ ]

: Chief, ULS  
: Chief of Base, Pullach  
: Operational/UPSWING/CART  
: Ludwig ALBERT Case

1 August 1957

INFO: EE, COS, GLS

REF: ECLW 3507 (not to GLS) NR

1. Pursuant to requests made in reference, we ask that you pass attachment, sent under separate cover, to G-2. As you will note therefrom, we want to make it crystal clear to G-2 that, as [ ] says, we are not engaged in a historical research project but rather a vital security matter.

2. Since G-2 will now know that [ ] [ ] have discussed the case per HEID 1643, we assume that there will be a green light given on the search for and the release of any and all relevant reports on file in Stuttgart. We ask that ULS advise GLS of the steps G-2 takes and the timing involved so that timely prods can be given from that end if necessary. When the reports are located they should be given direct to GLS for transmittal to FOB and thence to Headquarters.

3. If any problems develop, I am of course prepared to discuss them in Heidelberg or Stuttgart, as the case may be.

Attachment: As Stated Above (UNDER SEPARATE COVER)

Dist:  
2 - ULS (w/Att)  
2 - EE (w/Att)  
2 - COS (w/Att)  
2 - GLS (w/Att)

*copy to  
SA Upwing security  
DE/EE reading board.  
LM*

Approved by:

[ ]

[ ]

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[ ]

[ ]

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007



SECRET

2 August 1957

MEMORANDUM TO: G-2, USAREUR  
FROM: SDU  
SUBJECT: Ludwig ALBERT  
REF: Discussion Between Representatives of G-2 and SDU in Heidelberg, 10 June 1957

1. Following the discussion mentioned above and also your recommendation to BAD in Heidelberg, [ ] discussed the ALBERT case with [ ] in Washington. The latter gave as much information as he was able; however there were many details which he could not recall. Although we know that GIC did not receive written reports from ALBERT, [ ] has stated that there are reports on file which are allegedly Schmitz's written accounts of material supplied verbally to him by ALBERT. These are assumed by [ ] to be retained still at 66th GIC headquarters in Stuttgart.

2. As will be appreciated, a thoroughgoing analysis of BND security factors is largely dependent upon the extent of detailed information available. It is our belief, in which [ ] concurs, that the SCHMITZ reports of ALBERT's information can provide the missing details necessary to our undertaking. In this connection, it will be recalled that [ ] emphasized at the time of our meeting on 10 June that our interest in the ALBERT case is not a historic one but rather is it an effort to examine closely several problems of BND security involving possible high level penetration of that organization. This is clearly a matter concerning American interests as well as German.

3. For the above reasons, we request your assistance and continued cooperation in having a search made of the pertinent files for all information in written form pertaining to SCHMITZ's relations with ALBERT and the data learned from the latter about the BND and its personnel. When the reports are located, we ask that they be passed directly to BAD/Stuttgart.

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1 COPY [ ] [ ]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 448 BD/RFL/MR  
9 OCT 57

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR  
 FROM : HEIDELBERG ° ALBERT, Ludwig  
 ACTION: EE 6  
 INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, SC 2

OCT 10 0226Z 57

ROUTINE

IN 20416

TO PULL INFO FRAN STUT DIR CITE HEID 1832

UPSWING CART

RE ECLA 24584

CASE AVAILABLE

1. ALL REPORTS BEARING ALBERT (~~PORTION GARBLED-BEING SERVICED~~) IN HEID FOR PERUSAL. IF  CAN GIVE COUPLE DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE WILL LAY ON.  
ULS
2. DELAY DUE (~~PORTION GARBLED~~) OVERSIGHT NOT G-2 RELUCTANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2007

ALBERT, Ludwig  
 8 NOV 1957  
 DATE 9 OCT 57

S-E-C-R-E-T

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

VIA: COURIER  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCL)

DISPATCH NO. EGLA-25475

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief of Base, Munich  
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/UPSWING/CART  
SPECIFIC— Ludwig-ALBERT

DATE: 29 October 1957

INFO: ULS, CLS, COS

REF : A. EGLA 24584 *Reversal of info - sent to up - sent to R. P. Haus*  
B. HEID 1832

ACTION REQUIRED: ULS please see paragraph 4.

1. The undersigned went to Heidelberg on 24 October for the purpose of examining the ALBERT reports which G-2 had finally secured from ODOPAL. The G-2 representative responsible for handling this matter with us is Mr. Donald Kaempf, whom  will remember as the person who chaired the session we had with G-2 June 10 on the same subject.
2. Kaempf began our meeting by saying that he regretted the small number of reports, but in truth what he had been able to extract from ODOPAL's files was the sum total (approximately twelve). He indicated his willingness to let me read through the reports which, interestingly enough, were not the originals. They were English translations of Schmitz's accounts of ALBERT's remarks. Even so, as far as I could judge, there was no attempt to hold anything back.
3. After a great many preliminary remarks about the need to handle the material sensitively because of "continuing ODOPAL touchiness on the Subject," Kaempf produced the reports. Several are denunciations of UPSWING headquarters personnel, with @ Friesen and @ Dr. Klausner as the primary objects of ALBERT's criticism. There is also a report which contains ALBERT's comments on Schloss WEIDENKAM. Still another discusses the Lilli MARLENE case. There is also a report describing the organizational set-up of UPSWING headquarters.
4. After reading through the reports, I asked Kaempf if I could take them with me. He replied that this would not be possible since Colonel K. R. Lindner, Chief of G-2/USAREUR's Counterintelligence Branch, would have to be consulted and that, unfortunately, he was out of town at the moment. Kaempf said he had strong doubts that the approval would be granted in any case. After a good deal of explanation on my part as to why it was necessary for us to have the reports and

after renewed/

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3 - EE  
2 - ULS  
2 - CLS  
2 - COS

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

RI COPY

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EGLA-25475  
page 2

after renewed assurances that we really did understand the sensitive nature of the whole business, Kaempf rather blandly said he was sure he could get permission to pass the reports to us. ULS is therefore requested to check on receipt of this dispatch to see if the material is on its way to us for transmission to Headquarters.

5. A few general comments: As far as I was able to determine, the reports in point of time begin in the Fall of 1954 and end in June of 1955. When I commented that this seemed strange since we knew from Ferrante that Schmitz had been reactivated in 1953, Kaempf said that it had struck him as odd, too, but that what he was showing me was all there is. It may be that Schmitz did not put anything on paper until 1954. When I said that we strongly desired to have the reports in the original German, Kaempf replied that this would be neither practical nor possible since most of the material was scattered through the ODOPAL file and was interwoven with other reports which do not pertain to our request. Kaempf wished to make it very clear that Schmitz's reporting on UPSWING was at the most casual and informal.

6. Since [ ] is in the best position to evaluate the reports, we assume that Headquarters will want to undertake the major part of the analysis necessary. [ ] will also review the reports and will coordinate closely with [ ] regarding the use of the information in approaching the appropriate UPSWING [ ] on the subject.

Approved by:

[ ]

[ ]

A.C.P.

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[ ]



EE

Mail

EGHA 3266

SECRET

Chief, Munich Base  
Attn: Liaison Div.    
Chief, ULS

5 November 1957

Info: COS/G  
EE

Operational/UPSWING/GART

Ludwig ALBERT Case

Reference ECLA-24584, et al

Attached are the notes discussed during   recent  
visit. G-2 requests that no use be made of the material  
beyond that indicated during the discussion.

Attachment: a/s

Distribution:

- 2 - Munich Base w/att.
- 3 - COS/G w/o att.
- 2 - EE w/o att.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 382B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

5 December 1957

TO: C/EE/G  
FROM: C/GI/ICD  
SUBJECT: Ludwig ALBERT  
REF: EGIA-25175, 29 October 1957

In response to a request for comment received from your UPSWING Section, attached is a blind memorandum written by [redacted] which may be sent to the field if you so desire.

Attachment as noted (in 4 copies)

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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SECRET

Ludwig ALBERT

SUBJECT: Ludwig ALBERT

REFERENCE: EGLA-25475, 29 October 1957

1. In para 2 of reference, mention is made of the "small number of reports" contained in ODOPAL files, presented by G-2 as the sum total of the reports received by ODOPAL from Subject through Heinrich SCHMITZ. The number is described as "about twelve". While unsupported memory can often deceive, this figure for the ALBERT reports via SCHMITZ appears to be reasonable. The listing of subject matter dealt with in the reports (para 3 of reference) checks with my recollection.

2. Para 2 of reference also comments on the fact that the reports provided by G-2 were not the originals, but English translations of SCHMITZ's accounts of ALBERT's remarks. This should not be taken as an indication that ODOPAL is holding out. There were never any written reports received directly from ALBERT through the SCHMITZ channel, nor (to my knowledge) through any other channel. All the ALBERT reports were submitted by SCHMITZ, typed on SCHMITZ' own typewriter, and based (according to SCHMITZ) on detailed notes he himself took on what ALBERT said. When the SCHMITZ reports were "processed" for submission to ODOPAL Headquarters, the processing was limited to making as direct and complete a translation as possible, with the addition of full name identifications and the like. No substantive or substantial changes were made. Thus, the translations of the SCHMITZ reports would be extremely close to if not identical with the originals. The German language originals were kept in the operational files at the ODOPAL Regional Headquarters in Frankfurt. It will be difficult to get possession of or access to them, since they also contain operational data which are unrelated to the ALBERT complex.

NOT  
TRUE

3. Para 5 notes that "the reports in point of time begin in the Fall of 1954 and end in June 1955". When I commented that this seemed strange since we knew from [ ] that Schmitz had been reactivated in 1953, Kaempf said that it had struck him as odd, too, but that what he was showing me was all there is." In commenting on this quotation, it should be emphasized (and I have stated this myself on a number of occasions in discussing this matter with various interested officers both at Headquarters and in the field) that SCHMITZ' reporting on UPSWING was indeed both casual (as this paragraph in reference states) and marginal. In fact, aside from more or less parenthetical notes on one personality or another, mostly concerning the "notorious Gestapo-SD clique" in the Stuttgart-Karlsruhe UPSWING complex, there was nothing of any real pertinence to UPSWING until the Fall of 1954, when ALBERT

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got his "acute attack of indigestion" and began to cry on SCHMITZ' shoulder about the terrible conditions which reigned in the Organization. I had a meeting with SCHMITZ at that time, in support of the then handling C/O, and discussed the whole question with him. The upshot was that SCHMITZ should tell ALBERT that anything he wanted to say would be passed on to SCHMITZ' contacts for whatever might be done about it. I told SCHMITZ we would be interested in any leads from ALBERT which might direct an investigation toward weak spots or security threats in the Organization. On this basis, then, SCHMITZ submitted a series of reports based on meetings with ALBERT. The last of these would have been received about in June 1955. This was about the time of the suicide.

4. In general, I do not think that there is anything to be gained by pressing ODOPAL for the German originals. The reasons given by Kaempf are, so far as I can judge, valid and true. Neither do I think that anything is to be gained by giving ODIBEX representatives in or out of ODOPAL the impression that we think they are holding back. While I could not say for certain without a change to look at the reports Kaempf produced, I would hazard a strong guess that this collection represented all documents pertinent to the ALBERT affair.

-2-

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# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR  
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EGM 5262

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Base, Munich  
ATTN: Liaison Division  
FROM Chief, EE

DATE 13 Dec 57 13 32

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/UPSWING  
SPECIFIC Ludwig ALBERT

1. Attached for your information only is a copy of the comments of [ ] concerning reference. The comments indicate that [ ] has given us a reasonable answer, and that no further approach to them at this time is warranted - at least until we have carefully studied the reports handed over.

2. We would greatly appreciate your prompt forwarding of copies of the material provided by [ ]

ATTACHMENT: [ ]  
Comments of [ ]

11 December 1957 EE/G/U/ [ ] it

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2 - MOB/LD w/att  
2 - COS w/o att  
1 - RI w/o att  
2 - EE/G/U w/o att

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

EE/G/U  
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

EE/G/U  
(Authenticating officer)

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29  
JUN 1949

COURIER

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DIS. ATCH. NO.

EGMA-30725

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 19 December 1957

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

Info: COS

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/UPSWING/CART

SPECIFIC— Ludwig ALBERT Case

Reference: EGMW-5262, 13 December 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

Attached for your information are copies of the material provided by  
ODIBEX as requested in the reference.

Approved by

Attachment  
as stated above

Distribution:

3 - EE w/1 cc att  
2 - COS w/1 cc att

FWG/rbo

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**



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ATT TO EGMA-3072

0117-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 23 June 1955:

It has recently been learned that the GO training school was disbanded during the week of 17 June 1955. The reason for this action could not be learned. The information was made public in a form letter which was circulated to the various GO agencies and has resulted in a multitude of rumors as to why such action was taken. One such rumor, stemming from Col. Oskar REILE, GO employee, purports that someone within the school was under suspicion by a certain Dr. HARTMANN (cover name) of having delivered information, concerning the school outside of GO circles. REILE, himself, would not be surprised if this were true, as he feels that (fan) MELLENTHIN, the man in charge of the school, has not devoted as much time to such matters (security) as he should have.

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19 Dec 57



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WD 117-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 15 June 1955:

1. A member of the GHELEN Organization is one (fnm) BUX whose cover name is EBINGER (this apparently refers to Armin BUX, presently with the Defense Ministry). He is part of the KOHLER group and is primarily concerned with activities in the "Waldkapelle". Personally unobjectionable, but with no special aptitudes or knowledge, he strives in every way possible to carry out the exact desires of the GR. Since he is alleged to be equally responsible with KOHLER for certain security difficulties involving personnel, it behooves him to avoid any unfavorable report about himself in this regard.

2. Major General (fnm) KLEIKAMP s.D., chief of the GO's Augsburg office, and his assistant, Karl Heins GERHARD, have for some time been suspected of being in the employ of the French Intelligence Service. The GR, however, will take no action due to lack of supporting evidence and will take action only when someone is able to furnish more facts concerning these alleged connections. Certain members of the GO who are aware of this suspicion are convinced that inquiries at the former residence of GERHARD in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Leistowstrasse 3, and a surveillance of both GERHARD and KLEIKAMP in Augsburg will furnish facts enough to decide the matter one way or another.

V-2668

KLEIKAMP

Some handling error  
appeared in  
press copy

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Indz



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1017-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 24 June 1955:

Information has become available which tends to indicate that on at least two occasions, persons have been hired for employment with the GO without having to undergo a background investigation. This information came to light in connection with the Reinhard FETT case presently being conducted by the Frankfurt/Main office of the GO. Ludwig ALBERT, chief of the Frankfurt office, requested that (fau) DILLBERG, third ranking member of the GO, furnish the PHS or Life History to use as an aid in conducting the investigation. Finally DILLBERG was forced to admit that no such document existed. The second such case was one involving Carl SCHMIDT, formerly of the Darmstadt GO office. ALBERT stated to DILLBERG that his reaction to the situation was one of dejection in knowing that a person could be allowed to fill such a sensitive position without a prior check into his background. FETT has been employed with the GO since 1952.

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19-117-0176

The following information was submitted on or about 23 April 1955:

Employed in the "Abteilung - G" section of the GEMLEN Organization is a (fmu) FERT, who according to a recent report, has been a member of the KPD since 1951. FERT is divorced and his former wife (name unknown) is reportedly friendly with the mistress (name also unknown) of the owner of the Rheinland Bar in Frankfurt/M. This woman, the bar owner's mistress, is suspected by the GO of working for the French Intelligence Service.

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CD 117-0176

The following information was submitted on or about 28 March 1955:

The GELEN Organization, along with the BfV and Federal Ministry of Economics, has recently indicated an interest in the formation of an Industrial Counter Intelligence Commission. Although it has been rumored that Paul KOSMANN, former Chief Security Officer of the Federal Ministry of Economics, has aspirations in this direction, the question of who will take over the task of industrial security after the treaty ratification is primarily a question of whether it will be the BfV or the GO. GO policy to date has been that of proceeding carefully and cautiously, even though a definite interest is apparent. In any case, there is a very good probability exists that the Beratungsstelle fuer Betriebschutz - Advisory Office for Industrial Security - of Essen will be incorporated in any industrial security commission that is formed.

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101-7-0170

The following information was submitted on or about 30 March 1955:

1. With the exception of very few persons within the hierarchy of the GEHLEN group, there is no one person knowledgeable enough to be able to furnish an exact, overall picture of the internal structure and personnel of the Organization. Except in isolated cases, no member of one group or department can give detailed information concerning a member of another group or department. In many cases persons within a group are acquainted with each other only under a cover name. Therefore, all knowledge of the organization and its workings is based on statements made by long-time members and on observations which have been made from time to time during the course of everyday business.

2. The authoritative positions within the organization have been taken over by old-time former German General Staff people. The only exception is Department III F, which is led by Dr. (fmr) KOHLER/KLAUSNER and which is staffed primarily by former Sicherheitsdienst personnel. This fact is traceable to certain sociological considerations from which can be drawn a significant social-psychological complex. It is known that KOHLER, a non-General Staff man, has a "ferocious" attitude toward the General Staff people, who because of a traditional class consciousness, are presumptuous and frequently arrogant and insulting to the non-General Staff people. As a result of this, KOHLER has come to create in his department a counter-balance in the form of persons recruited from the ranks of the former Sicherheitsdienst. Because these men are not traditionally allied with the General Staff faction and in most cases are filled with resentments against the General Staff faction, KOHLER, by incorporating them in his own group, has strengthened his own position within the GEHLEN Organization.

3. By creating a sort of closed shop, the General Staff faction has protected its ability to carry out its own desires in regard to personnel policy. In this connection, continued efforts have been noticed on the part of the General Staff faction to neutralize KOHLER's III F department as well.

4. Former so-called "E-Offiziere" of the Abwehrstelle are present in all groups and levels. They are, however, ineffective as a group and act only as a "filler mass". These officers are not the best of their lot. In the years 1934 through 1936 the best officers were needed at the front. The rest were used in the Wehrmachtsersatz and Abwehrstellen. It was from this group that GEHLEN had to draw in reconstructing his organization, which had to be rebuilt from the ground up. At the present time, the personnel situation is considered difficult and as such treated as a "restricted matter".

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10117-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 30 March 1955:

1. The person in charge of the GEHLEN Organization's Darmstadt office is General (fnu) KRITSCHMER, alias KOENIG. KRITSCHMER was formerly the military attache to the German Embassy in Tokyo.

*SARGE contact?*

2. Dr. (fnu) SCHUMACHER, formerly identified as a GEHLEN employee in the GEHLEN office in Darmstadt is no longer employed by the GO. In addition to being named as a GEHLEN employee in a book written by Hans Joachim GEYER, SCHUMACHER was involved in an operational blunder that took place recently in Berlin. An operation was taking place during which a contact was to be made in a bar in West Berlin. Even though SCHUMACHER was warned that the French Intelligence was behind the whole thing, he wanted to intercalate. He was, however, not equal to the task and was, as a result, "taken in" by his opponents. In the end SCHUMACHER suffered a nervous breakdown and was subsequently relieved of his position with the GEHLEN group.

3. Werner REPENNIC recently came under fire in the GO as a possible cause for Karl PFORR being released as the head of the Land Hesse LfV. He is believed to have committed indiscretions which tipped off the Land Ministry of Interior to the fact that PFORR had been passing information on to the GO. REPENNIC is presently under investigation by the GO in connection with his contacts with Arno MANECK, PFORR's predecessor as chief of the Land Hesse LfV. At one time in a personal letter written by Ludwig ALBERT, GEHLEN employee in the Frankfurt area, ALBERT described REPENNIC as being a "charlatan" and a "tramp".

*How much of this Albert story  
Werner is his  
report Repen*

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WD 127-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 22 March 1955:

1. Dr. (fnu) SCHUMACHER, alias SCHUBERT, is believed to be working in the GEHLEN Organization's Darmstadt office. During World War II, SCHUMACHER who was at that time a Kripo official, was assigned for a time to the Breslau (now Poland) Kripo office. After the war, because of his service in Breslau, he was involved in the Stalag III trial. As a result of this trial, Josias, Prince of Weiningen, and the Breslau Kripo Chief (fnu) WIELEN (until 1939 WILOTZKY) were given long prison sentences by the British.
2. In the course of these proceedings, SCHUMACHER was arrested and taken to England, where he was held for a time. At the same time the English were searching unsuccessfully for one Dr. Guenther ABSALON, also formerly of the Breslau police. A short time later, SCHUMACHER was unexpectedly released by the British and appeared soon afterward in Hannover, where he attempted through acquaintances to determine the whereabouts of ABSALON. He was suspected of having been released by the British for just this purpose. His efforts, therefore, were futile.
3. SCHUMACHER was on the Soviet pick-up list at the time of these incidents. It is felt that the British used this as a lever to get SCHUMACHER to do their bidding. Otherwise he would not have acted for the British except under such pressure.

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MD 127-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 3 December 1954:

1. The GEHLEN Organization is attributing considerable importance to a certain phase of a fairly unimportant trial taking place in Linz/Rhine, Germany, which may reveal a heretofore undetermined weakness in the security aspect of the Organization. The trial, resulting from legal proceedings initiated by Frau Friedel BREITNER, nee HINTZE, residing in Unkel, Bahnhofstrasse 12, against the editorial staff of the publication "Freies Volk", KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany) PV (Partei Vorstand - Party Headquarters) news organ, is based on a December 1953 article naming HINTZE as an agent of the GEHLEN Organization. In reality, the article was an extract from a Soviet Zone publication which exposed some West Zone residents as so-called agents for the Organization.
2. HINTZE was for a short time in contact with GEHLEN people, but she was not aware of the Organization for which she was working at the time.
3. The interesting phase of the trial for the Organization is the defense attorney's statement that his Source can produce two individuals who can prove that HINTZE was an agent of the GEHLEN Organization. In order to do this, the court may request that the two individuals be identified. This may identify a "leak" in the Organization.

19 Dec 57

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Following information was submitted on or about 29 October 1953.

The "Waldkapelle" (Security Section) of the GEHLEN organization works independently of the Personnel Department of the GEHLEN General Direction (GD). The Personnel Department however does have leads to the Chief of the "Waldkapelle", particularly when they concern special investigations. The Chief of the "Waldkapelle" at the time was the former Lt. Colonel (Inf) KOHLER, alias KLADENKA, an Austrian national residing in Munich. He was a protégé of the GD's first Chief (Inf) BAUM, since deceased, although he was able at the same time to establish himself with General GEHLEN, who even during BAUM's tenure was looked upon as the first chief of the organization. Whether or not the name BAUM was an alias is unknown.

2. KOHLER's past is not altogether clear. During the war he was a reserve officer with counter intelligence. For certain unknown reasons he would not risk returning to his native Austria, and on the occasion of brief visits to relatives there, he invariably acted with extreme caution.

3. With KOHLER as the overall chief of the "Waldkapelle", the latter's activities have not been conducted as an independent unit. Rather, certain groups of Department III within the General Agencies (GA "General Vertretungen") performed the Waldkapelle work besides their regular Department III duties. However, for a long time the Department III staffs devoted their energies more to tasks appropriate to a political police, rather than to Department III assignments proper. This was due both to frequently incompetent leadership from above as well as to arbitrary and aimless criticisms of the individuals concerned as well as at headquarters level. The staffs were all anxious to deliver as much material as possible to their superiors with the result that their production could be gauged more by quantity than by quality. In particular, the Department III units devoted much attention to more or less unimportant local Communist activities. This is hardly anything that was undertaken within the framework of the Waldkapelle. KOHLER not only failed to notice these negative results, he never took any initiative to push the implementation of his own mission.

4. Thus was the negative course of events until the publication of the sensational East German press releases of December, 1953. After all possibilities had been thoroughly checked, it was established that the Soviets' knowledge of the GEHLEN organization did not stem from revelations made by persons apprehended in the East Zone in the course of security raids, nor from kidnapped individuals. Rather, the conclusion was reached that the Soviets would have called their knowledge only through the treason of someone within the GEHLEN organization. KOHLER still stubbornly clings to his opinion against this conclusion. He doubts the possibility of treason, without, however, offering any valid reason for an opinion which no one in the GD shares.

5. After the aforementioned 1953 events, the entire organization

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tion of Department III was liquidated and built up anew, for tactical reasons. Since that time, i.e. early 1954, the "Waidhelle" has its own organization composed of two independent agencies for the whole GEBLEN organization, again under a central chief, who is once more KOHLER.

6. In the opinion of one member of the GEBLEN Organization (presumably this refers to ALBERT himself), KOHLER is primarily to blame for the past failures. To say the least, he lacks professional qualifications. As to his own background, not everything is clear in that respect either. He enjoys a privileged position only because he was in the organization from its infancy. KOHLER was quite clarification in any case. This man (apparently ALBERT again) has made his opinion of KOHLER clear to the GD and, in the week ending 25 September 1954, spoke about KOHLER to (fn) DITTEL, alias DILLBERG, a relative of GEBLEN who recently returned from South Africa and is presently considered the third ranking man in the GEBLEN Organization. He gained the impression that DILLBERG shared his views of KOHLER, but is proceeding with caution in this matter only out of consideration for GEBLEN's own methods.

7. The suspicion that Heinz FELPE and the GD (Sicherheitsdienst - Nazi Security Service) clique which followed him into the organization are "enemies" has been growing steadily. About ten weeks ago FELPE showed up at one of GEBLEN Organization's offices in Munich. FELPE in reality had no grounds for being present. It was ascertained later that FELPE had made his appearance in various offices, each time asking for something or other, obviously with the intent of engaging in conversation, only to retreat then, stating that he was in the wrong office. The incident was immediately reported to the GD with a tip to forbidding FELPE access to any of the offices unless in the accomplishment of regular business. This was accomplished. As far as possible, FELPE is being kept away from Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the Bonn area, because he is not trusted. However, it is necessary to let him travel to these areas now and then since he still has two live contacts there. It is reported that FELPE still is in touch with former Cologne state prosecutor (fn) HERMES, who since 1950 is with the LfV (Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz - State Office for the Protection of the Constitution) in Dusseldorf. Shortly after FELPE was seen at the Munich office, that office received a postcard addressed to "City Office of the Gehlen Organization, Saedlabor". The unknown writer of this postcard expressed thanks for having had the opportunity of taking interesting pictures at the entrance of the "Saedlabor". This postcard is now in the possession of the GEBLEN GD, and is being treated as highly secret. Here too, FELPE is suspected, who undoubtedly sought revenge for the dressing down he was subjected to. It is likewise suspected that FELPE had something to do with the Ludwigsburg affair. With reference to that affair, the man who was apprehended after the film was found, as he was walking toward the cabs, is Walter KUNDE, born 9 July 1908 in Berlin. He is currently being held in protective custody in Ludwigsburg upon order of the Chief Prosecutor.

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NO 127-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 28 September

*Surely Albert submitted it before this*

1. A quick glance at the film report on the GEHLEN organization which was obtained in Ludwigsburg (reference here is to the WERNER/WEBER case), indicated that the information on the various personalities was correct, the references to the personal traits of General Gehlen excepted. The name "Arthur" appears repeatedly as the source of the report.

2. At the time the film was obtained in Ludwigsburg, an unknown individual appeared at the home of the sister of Arthur WEBER, former major, General Staff. The sister resides in Brandobersdorf. WEBER himself resides in Dusseldorf, Deichstrasse 20. The unknown individual told WEBER's sister that he came from Berlin and must speak to WEBER personally. He also attempted to find out about WEBER and his activities from the sister. WEBER was a fellow student of Count Johann Adolf von KILMANSEGG at General Staff College and is now engaged with a respected firm in Dusseldorf, although simultaneously working for the GEHLEN organization. He has worked for the latter organization for over a year, mainly in an effort against the Soviet case. Now (date of report), due to old ties WEBER is working on the Bank Office for GEHLEN. - UJDKOLLERY-V Co ALBERT

3. A short time later the unidentified individual appeared in Dusseldorf at WEBER's address and introduced himself as an agent sent from the Soviet zone. The person made offers to WEBER in an attempt to induce him to go to East Berlin. WEBER's reaction was negative, although the alleged agent attempted to provoke WEBER to call the police and have him arrested.

4. Members of the GEHLEN staff are of the opinion that:

a. The factual personal association included in the film report was another indication that there is at least one traitor in the midst of the organization.

b. The precautionary contact made to WEBER, whose identity and activities are scarce, strengthens the opinion concerning a traitor in their midst.

c. The film document, and the approach to WEBER, stem from opposition to the GEHLEN organization within the Federal Republic in an attempt to publicize the same, rather than representing a genuine operation of the organization.

d. By virtue of the fact that the name "Arthur" appears in the film document and WEBER was contacted by an individual, it is probably an attempt by the GEHLEN organization to have WEBER considered as a suspect by the GEHLEN headquarters, for increasing the sense of insecurity. Had WEBER called the police in haste, it would probably result in a press conference on the headlines:

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"Test" or "Double Agent" in the GEBLEN organization. Actually, [redacted] is not considered a suspect by GEBLEN.

5. With all due respect to General GEBLEN, there is not enough resoluteness in taking the necessary security measures. Examples of this are as follows:

a. There are in the organization persons such as [redacted] FELPE and Karl SCHUEZ, as well as a whole group of other persons, who gained entrance into the organization on the basis of past experience about which they made false statements. FELPE and SCHUEZ are suspect in the investigation of treason cases. All of the suspicions against these people are known to the headquarters, but a removal of these people is only possible when proof can be presented which could stand up in court. Such a situation is impossible in an intelligence organization.

b. As a result of the findings of a document in Ludwigsburg, immediate contact was established with the political police and the LfV (Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz) Office for the protection of the Constitution) in [redacted] expression was gathered, however, that the situation was [redacted] and without any particular interest, and especially [redacted] being called in on the case. The matter was reported to the [redacted] organization headquarters, and independent action [redacted] GEBLEN was hesitant to invade the jurisdiction of the [redacted] because of this, Edo PROMM has not yet been interrogated [redacted] manner.

6. (Paul) ROTH, alias LUTZ, has [redacted] professional background for his present activities [redacted] anything. In the first place, ROTH makes a good job [redacted] is interested in the business of his father-in-law, [redacted] there is also the friendship between ROTH and Fritz G [redacted] the one connected with the VSP). Solely through his [redacted] with GRAVER ROTH has disqualified himself for continuing [redacted] GEBLEN. Anyone could fall temporarily for CRAMER, but [redacted] between ROTH and CRAMER has already lasted too long.

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8. In the East Zone press release of December 1953, the following personality is mentioned, among many others: "Friedel HINTZE, Unkel/Rhine, Germany, Bahnhofstrasse, without number, born in 1918, agent (female) of GEBLEN and of the French Intelligence Service." It is a fact that HINTZE once worked for GEBLEN. However, she never worked for the French. The Soviet Zone press release otherwise matches the entry on the GEBLEN information card, where HINTZE's address is even given as "Bahnhofstrasse, without number". The following is known about the HINTZE case: (fnu) OTTEN, a close friend of Dr. Wilhelm H. SCHMITZ, recruited HINTZE for KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany) coverage. At that time, Ludwig ALBERT was responsible for NRW, and OTTEN was his subordinate. OTTEN had promised HINTZE not to give her name to his superiors, and all admonition notwithstanding, he stubbornly held to that promise. Shortly after his last interview on the HINTZE case with OTTEN, ALBERT relinquished his NRW field of activities to Carl SCHUETZ, for whom FELPE had set up the GEBLEN office in Dusseldorf. The turning over of the business by ALBERT to SCHUETZ took place in the Hotel Kaiserhof in Essen. Present at the time were also FELPE and Otten. Whereas ALBERT, in consideration of OTTEN's commitment to HINTZE, had agreed to the withholding of her real name (she was known by the cover name "Wilhelmine"), SCHUETZ brusquely demanded her real name. FELPE and SCHUETZ then took OTTEN sharply to task, stating that if he kept up his obstinacy, his job could not last long. To this, OTTEN merely said, "As you please!", an attitude which ALBERT rightly terms a clearcut stand. In the course of time, OTTEN softened, however, and gave HINTZE's real name to SCHUETZ and FELPE. That is how she was carried in the information card file. It is believed HINTZE has since been dropped as unproductive. Inasmuch as many other names of agents and co-workers mentioned in the Soviet Zone press release were within the sphere of knowledge of SCHUETZ and FELPE, the suspicion against them remains. The GD is aware of these factors.

9. One (fnu) von BECHMANN, cover name PETERS, of the GEBLEN GD, carries out security assignments in Munich-Fullach and the Munich area. Ludwig ALBERT, who fully trusts von BECHMANN, had a talk with the latter, in the course of which he stressed the need for keeping an eye on FELPE. Von BECHMANN promised his cooperation.

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19 February 1958

TO: ME/G/U  
FROM: C/OI/EGD  
SUBJECT: Comments on the Ludwig Albert Case  
REF: EGMA-30725, 19 December 1957

Attached are comments on reference by  in response  
to your request.

Attachment (4 copies)

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SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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SUBJECT: The Ludwig Albert Case - Comments on EGMA-30725, 19 December 1957

1. The following comments refer to the individual items forwarded under reference as attachments, in the order in which they occur (from top down):

a. The first 3 items are unknown to me; they stem from a period after I had detached myself from this operation, and I did not see most of the material from about May on. I was called back in briefly upon Albert's suicide, but did not review the reporting of the intervening period.

b. Item 4 appears to be complete.

c. I do not think Item 5 involved Albert - it looks like a Schmitz report, possibly embellished with some minor details from Albert.

d. Item 6 appears to be full and complete.

e. If I recall correctly, the last paragraph of item 7 stems from a letter Albert wrote to Schmitz (I could be wrong on this).

f. I think item 8 is mostly Schmitz, except for the first part of the first paragraph.

g. Item 9 seems to be complete.

h. Item 10 appears to be complete. The only editing done was the deletion of source's name (L.A.) and sterilization of a couple of operational supdata details. This we did at our place, when the reports were prepared from Schmitz' reports, and the supdata was included in a separate cover sheet which you would never get out of CIC.

i. Item 11 appears to be complete. I can not comment on your marginal note about the date, but we got this report after the Ludwigsburg affair had been running for a while (i.e. not right away), and this was not the first report received from Schmitz on the Marlene case. This report, by the way, falls in the period before L.A. cried on Schmitz' shoulder, starting the reporting phase on the G.O., unless I am badly mistaken chronologically.

2. This is not the full crop of L.A. reports. There seem to be several missing, but I don't know how I could identify which ones so that they could be asked for. There were several dealing (progressively) with personality reporting on G.O. people and those aspects

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about which L.A. was allegedly concerned security-wise. On the other hand, the reports do not seem to have been edited by CIC or by G-2 for passing to you (although I do not claim I can remember all details). The only editing which seems to have been made was what we did in our reporting from Frankfurt to Stuttgart in the original transmission, i.e. elimination of ops data and items that would pinpoint the source. The main thing that is not here is the first report on Schmitz' session with L.A. in which the latter poured out his troubles (the start of the whole thing).

-2-

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
14.				
<p>ALBERT, LUDWIG DOB 08 JUL 00 CIT GERMANY ? ANEU ISENBURG V 2600 DIENSTSTELLE 142 RECEIVED 4000 DM FOR INFO GIVEN TO SFS, ARRESTED IN STUTTGART, COMMITTED SUICIDE BY HANGING SB WEEKLY REPORTS FOR PERIOD JULY-DEC 55</p> <p>32W-002-013/4 EGFA-26336 18 MAY 59 P01 9715 X/CARAVEL Production</p>				
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(7-46)



## WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 263

Box: 00001 Folder: 0001 Document: 1

Series:

Copies: 0 Pages: 1

### ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Albert, Ludwig  
Document Date: 06-27-1960  
Document Type: Message  
From: Bonn  
To: Director

Subject:

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 39210

Withdrawn: 10-09-2007 by: NWMD

RETRIEVAL #: 39210 00001 0001 1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

**SECRET**

229

27 JUN 60

DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ATTENTION : EE 6

INFO : CI/OPS, FE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING	
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JUN 27 1906Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 17267

FRAN INFO MUNI DIR BRLN FROB CITE BONN 9926  
CART LIAISON

1. SG REQUESTS TRACES ? SEIBT ?

A. ELISABETH CHARLOTTE SCHEID DPOB 18 AUG 29 GERSWEILER/SAAR.

PRESENTLY EMPLOYED AS SECY FED REP EMB SAIGON.

B. DR. EUGEN KAHN, RESIDING BERLIN NIEDERSCHOENEWEIDE,  
MESSELWERDERSTR 3.

C. HANS ANTKOWIAK, RESIDING BRUCHSAL, WORTHERSTR. 9.

2. SCHEID FORMERLY WORKED ROECHLING WERKE SAARBRUECKEN

[REDACTED] ROECHLING WERKE  
SECURED POSITION WITH FORN OFF FOR HER AND SHE SENT SAIGON.

3. RECENTLY KAHN AND ANTKOWIAK APPROACHED PRIVATE DETECTIVE  
SAARBRUECKEN AND ASKED FOR FULL INVESTIGATION SCHEID. DETECTIVE  
INFORMED POLICE WHO CHECKED SG. SG HAS CHECKED BND/BFV AND RECEIVED  
BND TRACE THAT KAHN ADDRESS ONCE FOUND IN EFFECTS DEAD BND STAFFER  
WHO WAS UNDER SUSPICION MAINTAINING EGIS CONTACT. SAARBRUECKEN  
POLICE INVESTIGATING FURTHER AND SG IN CONTACT WITH FORN OFF SECURITY.  
NO BASE TRACES.

4. ALTHO BND DID NOT IDENTIFY DEAD STAFFER TO SG IN KAHN TRACE  
REPLY ASSUME HE IDENTICAL WITH LUDWIG ALBERT.

*Maybe! Too many possibilities come to mind*

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UJDRUM Interrogation Report MX-3046 8 March 1962:

UJDRUM speaking -

According to this conversation this employee, who had formerly worked in the files of the Sicherungsgruppe, had contacts with his former Kripo (criminal police) boss in Halle/Saale named WULFF, who on his part had come from the East Zone and brought money to ALBERT's wife (cf. pages 49ff. of this testimony) after the latter's suicide.

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EXTRACT from MI-3046, "UJDRUM Interrogation" pp. 73; 81-84  
as conducted by the Sicherungsgruppe in November-December, 1961.

UJDRUM speaking:

p. 73 The termination of BALTRUSCH /Fall ~~XXX~~ BALTHASAR/ followed, as I have already said, in later summer of fall 1955 and occurred at the time of the ALBERT flap in the BND. I know that when ALBERT was arrested in his apartment, I found finished reports from the BALTRUSCH, SICK and other official files. I don't know how ALBERT came into possession of these files. We guessed then that ALBERT had reported to his eastern handler about the things which were found in his possession. For that reason the BND ordered that every connection with the colleagues of BALTRUSCH and SICK who live in the Eastern Soviet Bloc and who are considered by the BND as real employees and paid by the BND be immediately broken off. I was not even permitted to warn these two.

At the next meeting with ALFRED, I then reported about the ALBERT affair and asked ALFRED whether ALBERT had worked for the RIS...ALFRED told me that ALBERT had not been run by his office and that he would inquire for which service ALBERT had worked. At a later meeting he told me that ALBERT was not run by either the RIS or the East Zone MfS, that, however, the possibility remained that ALBERT worked for the Polish Intelligence Service about which he could obtain no information.

p. 81 In 1953, I learned thorough Karl SCHUETZ that there is a so-called information office (I-Stelle) in Duesseldorf which belongs to Land Nordrhein-Westfalen. ...ALBERT was working with the GV L and was in contact with this office, and that this caused a lot of trouble for SCHUETZ...We distrusted the I-Stelle and especially /the deputy chief/ and ALBERT, his liaison man to us...we were frequently called anonymously on the telephone. Also our office was under surveillance. It was obvious that they wanted to make us feel insecure. We guessed that these things originated in the I-Stelle and we told all the details to the ~~EE~~ GV L. The result was that the Rhein-Ruhr sub-base had to move suddenly from Duesselodrf to Stuttgart in the fall of 1953....

I became personally acquainted with /ALBERT/ in Stuttgart. I met him in the office of my chief Karl SCHUETZ. He was responsible for security in the GV L Karlsruhe and a close friend of the chief of the GV L, LEIDEL...I got to know him when SCHUETZ one day told us to remove the most important files because ALBERT was there and proposed to review them. This order surprised SCHUETZ because of the prevalent distrust of /BERT/. This was based essentially on the memorandum which SCHUETZ had written in respect to the contact between ALBERT and the I-Stelle in Duesseldorf.

Approximately in the summer of 1955, SCHUETZ suddenly told me that ALBERT had been arrested on suspicion of having contacts with the East. SCHUETZ told me the following about the circumstances which led to ALBERT's arrest:

A man who was in prison in the Federal Republic on criminal charges...had offered important information in exchange for certain favors. This man finally pointed out ALBERT's apartment in Frankfurt and maintained that in his presence another eastern agent had brought money to the resident of this apartment and received intelligence material from him. As a consequence ALBERT was arrested and his apartment searched. In ALBERT's apartment they found official GEHLEN organization reports which were prepared by me...At the next meeting with ALFRED following the conclusion of the followup, I reported orally concerning the ALBERT-WEIMANN matter ~~ix~~... I raised the question whether ALBERT and WEIMANN had worked for RIS. As I later learned from ALFRED, both were employed neither by the RIS nor the MfS. ALFRED (over)



EXTRACT from MX-3045, "UJDROWSY Interrogation" p. 294, carried out by the Sicherungsgruppe on 8 Feb 1962

UJDROWSY speaking:

A few years ago ALBERT was arrested on suspicion of intelligence connections. ALBERT belonged to the office for which I worked in Karlsruhe and was active in the Frankfurt area. ALBERT committed suicide in prison.

This affair was several times a topic of conversation between CLEMENS and me, as well as with ALFRED. If I remember correctly, it was CLEMENS who first discussed the subject with ALFRED. ALFRED at first denied that there had been any intelligence connections on the part of the Soviets with ALBERT. He tried to support the thesis that ALBERT had perhaps worked for the Polish or Czech IS. In a later conversation with me he admitted that he did not know anything specific about the matter and tried to steer me away from the subject. I pointed out to him, however, that his predecessor MAX had once suggested to me that I try to be transferred to another office. This would presuppose that the Soviets already had some one in the Karlsruhe office, and after the ALBERT affair it was a good guess that ALBERT has been their source in this office. With this new turn in the conversation ALFRED became unsure of himself and admitted that one might look at it that way, but said that in any case he did not know anything about it. From his attitude I got the impression that he knew very well what it was all about but that he could not admit as much to me. I observed that he was in the same way unsure of himself in a later discussion about the FUHRMANN affair, which has since turned out to be true.

p. 295

...during my employment in Karlsruhe I gave the Soviets information on that office and its employees. I later found these names mentioned in East Zone publications, which, however, also contained many other names unfamiliar to me.

The 19-20 December edition of the newspaper Freies Volk exhibited... names of BND employees... mentioned previously in East Zone publications. Among them are some which I gave to ALFRED including ALBERT.

*and previous UJDROWSY denunciations are*

COMMENT: This testimony is apparently the source of the idea that ALBERT worked for the Soviets. If UJDROWSY was to be trusted (and there is no reason to think that he was to be), he never knew for sure that ALBERT actually worked for the RIS, and the above is certainly not a firm statement to that effect. In view of the fact that papers in the ALBERT collection, confiscated after his arrest, provided definite proof that ALBERT worked for the BND, the MFS, and for CIC, it seems odd that nothing was found to show an RIS connection if, in fact, there had been one.

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7 Mar 68

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ALBERT, Ludwig

See EGMW-11494 dated 9 Feb 62

Filed UJDROWSY 32W-5-38/19

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PERTINENT INFORMATION								
<p>14.</p> <p>ALBERT. LUDWIG  SEX M DOB ?  CIT ?  OCC ?</p> <p>SUBJECT APPEARS IN REFERENCE DOCUMENT, THE TRANSLATION OF THE SG INTERROGATION OF HEINZ FELFE WHO WAS ARRESTED AS A KGB AGENT IN NOV 61 FORMER RND MEMBER. DISCUSSION OF [ ] KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJ. AND SUBJ'S CONNECTIONS WITH THE KGB. SEE PAGES 294-296.</p> <p>#EGO EGM</p> <p>77W-005-038/19  MY -03045  08 MAR 62</p> <p>770599</p> <p>--- PAFR ---</p> <p>00_000000000000_00_000  11111_111111111111111111  222222222222222222222222  333333333333333333333333  4_444444444444_4444444  55555555_55_555555_55  666666_666_66666666666  77_7_7777_77_77_7777  8888888888888888888888  999999_999999999999JJ  INDENTIFY</p> <p>0770599</p> <p><i>Ssz details as given in extract from UJDRONSY interroga-tion to be found elsewhere in this file. He does not say ALBERT had KGB connections.</i></p>								
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<p>14.</p> <p>AIRFRFT LUDWIG  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SEX M DOB ?            CIT ?            OCC ?            MENTIONED IN SG INTERROG. OF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KGB            PENE. AGENT OF THE BND ARRESTED NOV 61. SEE            PAGES 81-84.</p> <p><i>See details as given in extract from UJDRUM interrogation to be found elsewhere in this file.</i></p> <p>#EGM EGO</p> <p><i>1687973</i></p> <p><i>15 Mar 68</i></p> <p>32W-005-038/19            MX -03046            08 MAR 62</p> <p>PAFR 1687973</p> <p>01000000000000000000            00000000000000000000            11111111111111111111            22222222222222222222            33333333333333333333            44444444444444444444            55555555555555555555            66666666666666666666            77777777777777777777            88888888888888888888            99999999999999999999</p>			
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ALBERT LUDWIG  
 SEX M DOB ?  
 CIT ?  
 OCC ?  
 KAPOK.

32W-005-038/19  
 EGMA-62283  
 27 MAY 63

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(7-66)

C/EE

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PROCESSING ACTION	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
TO <b>Chief, EE</b>		XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. <b>Chief of Station, Germany; Chief of Base, Bonn</b>			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM <b>Chief of Base, Berlin</b>			MICROFILM
SUBJECT <b>CALL/Operational Request for CAMPUS File</b>			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
Action: See Paragraph 2			
<p>1. We are informed by <input type="checkbox"/> that ODOPAL administered an Incompatible Operation in Germany during the period 1949 - 1954 which bore the name "Operation Campus."</p> <p>2. We hope that a review of ODOPAL files on this case might produce leads which could be exploited in our <input type="checkbox"/> Operations Program. Hence, we would appreciate it if Headquarters could attempt to gain access to these ODOPAL files, which we suspect are probably located in ODOPAL Headquarters, and forward either the files themselves or pertinent extracts to BCB for review. We would be particularly interested, of course, in the identities of persons engaged under "Operation Campus" who now hold positions in WHERUSH targets of interest to KUBARK.</p> <p>3. We can appreciate that obtaining and analyzing these files may be an arduous task, but we feel nonetheless that the process may well be worth the effort.</p>			
<p>Approved: <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Distribution: 2 - C/EE 2 - COB, Bonn 1 - COS/G/F 1 - COS/G/B</p> <p>GROUP I</p> <p>Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>EGBA-80234</b>	DATE <b>17 September 1965</b>	
	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	DIS FILE NUMBER <b>32w-120-47</b>	
ORIGINATING			
OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
COORDINATING			
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	

A (B) [Signature]

EB to Pax A:  
CAMPUS as one of the  
I files rev. I've already  
recently asked the  
look into.

- copy -

Albert Dg



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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE			
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PERTINENT INFORMATION			
14.			
<p>ALBERT LUDWIG SCA # 008 ?</p> <p>EGMA-68634 06 MAY 66</p> <p>CIT ? OCC ? FORMER BND STAFFER ACCUSED BY HERBERT BURKHARDT OF BEING MFS AGENT. ENOUGH EVIDENCE WAS FOUND IN SUBJS HOME TO INCRIMINATE HIM AS AN AGENT FOR AN EASTERN SERVICE BUT IT WAS ALSO LEARNED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ODDAL THROUGH HEINRICH SCHMITZ. SUBJ LATER HANGED HIMSELF IN HIS CELL.</p> <p>R 6605181078</p> <p>FILE IN</p>			
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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

FORM 887 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-66)

**DISPATCH**

**S E C R E T**

TO: Chief, EUR

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

Chief of Base, Munich

~~SATUSEK-URANDOM~~

Dr. Heinrich SCHMITZ

REFERENCE: SEE PARA THREE

ACTION: SEE PARA THREE

1. In connection with his current security investigations  
 GEFUSK's Alias BERNHARDT recently raised with us the old case of

Dr. Heinrich SCHMITZ

Alias Heinrich \*FRANZEN V-7873

DOB: 15 February 1907

POB: Frankfurt/Hoechst

OCC: Retired Kriminalrat

RES: (Last Known) Schlangenbad bei Wiesbaden.  
 Schulstr. 1

and his one-time agent:

Ludwig \*ALBERT

AKA: Ludwig ANDERS

AKA: HERMANN

AKA: LEONHARD AMRHEIN

DOB: 8 July 1900

POB: Frankfurt V-2600

Died by suicide July 1955 after arrest by West  
 German Police for espionage.

Munich files on both persons have been sent to Headquarters.

Distribution:

4-EUR

2-Germany

GROUP I EXCLUDED FROM  
 AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
 AND DECLASSIFICATION

*CS copy filed in*

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 DATE 2007

**11 OCT 1967**

ESMA-70828

9 October 1967

**S E C R E T**



2. BERNHARDT stated that according to their records SCHMITZ had been recruited by an AIS organization, presumably ~~WOFACT~~ possibly ODOPAL in the early post-war years to run ALBERT as a penetration of CATUSK. At that time ALBERT was working for CATUSK's GVL in Karlsruhe where UJDROWSY was also employed. SCHMITZ at that time allegedly asked ALBERT for specific information on key members of CATUSK in order to determine whether CATUSK was penetrated by the RIS. BERNHARDT gave us some of the names of the (then) CATUSKERS whom ALBERT was to investigate on behalf of SCHMITZ. BERNHARDT said there had been others whom he did not recall offhand. (NOTE: We note that none of the persons whose names he gave us are currently with CATUSK, except KOHLER who has been kept at arms length for six years.)

- Horst Alexander von MELENTHIN
- Hans Ludwig von LOSSOW
- Hans Heinrich WORGITZKY
- Kurt Harold KOHLER
- Heinz FELFE
- Carl Schuetz

*Note: this still is not returned (1968)*  
*actually per C.I.C. ALBERT provides all info*

3. BERNHARDT's questions are:

- a. Was SCHMITZ at the time in fact working for ~~WOFACT~~ or another AIS. *Not CIA. C.I.C.*
- b. If so, were these inquiry missions actually originated by AIS. *By C.I.C. under ACIS supervision.*
- c. If yes, what was the basis on which these persons were singled out for investigation by the AIS agency. *Opportunity*
- d. In view of the inclusion of FELFE on the list can the origin of the inquiry be traced. *(Tandom theory) Not related.*

4. We cite below the peripheral information BERNHARDT gave us in connection with this inquiry since we cannot determine how much of it is contained in WOFACT Files.

a. Ludwig ALBERT, apparently worked in the early fifties (and possibly before) simultaneously for CATUSK, AIS, the Soviets and later for the forerunner of the MFS.) He came a cropper when one WEINMANN (presumably identical with Herbert WEINMANN ) was arrested to serve out a sentence, in the West German jail at Celle, which had actually been imposed by an East German Court. In order to gain his freedom he was willing to talk. Under CATUSK interrogation he admitted among other things to arranging a meeting between ALBERT and MFS officers. When ALBERT was arrested he hung himself in his prison cell allegedly before he could compromise any information. That was in July 1955.

b. CATUSK knew at the time that SCHMITZ was working for AIS, (from whom if ALBERT did not talk?) But they did not know for which AIS SCHMITZ worked (Why not, they had him at one time under complete control?) After ALBERT's suicide CATUSK hired SCHMITZ (change of V-2688.6 to V-7873) as BERNHARDT put it, to annoy WOFACT and to keep tabs on him. Later on SCHMITZ was tried and convicted for his activity on behalf of AIS. The charge, in order to avoid espionage in connection with AIS, was bribery of Government officials on behalf of a foreign power, a nice synonym for espionage. After his conviction he was dropped by CATUSK. He is presumably still living and no longer in jail.

APPROVED

SECRET

27 February 1973

The following cases are ones on which  had research cards prepared by analysts in RID/CE. The cards are being sent to Archives. It is suggested that you may wish to note the names on this list for possible future re-search purposes.

DC/CI/R&A

CI/R&A  
2C-17  
JOB NUMBER 73-558

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27 February 1973

GI CASE CHRONOLOGIES

1. ALBERT, Ludwig

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

27 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Ludwig Albert

1. In 1955 Herbert E. Weinmann, @Burkhardt, a former SFS agent who was arrested by the West Germans on old criminal charges, offered to reveal his knowledge of West Germans in contact with East German intelligence in exchange for freedom from prosecution. After Weinmann furnished an exact personal description of Ludwig Albert (DPOB: 8 July 1900, Frankfurt/Main) including information about his home and his automobile, Albert was arrested on 4 July 1955. Although most of the first group implicated by Weinmann confessed to collaborating with the SFS, Albert denied that he was involved in treasonable activity. On 15 July 1955 Albert hanged himself in his prison cell.

2. A search of Albert's home after his arrest produced film emulsions, a microfilm reading device manufactured only in the Soviet zone, intelligence reports filed in three separate sets, personnel lists from various government organizations and a requirements list typed with an American typewriter which requested these lists. Albert's home was sumptuously furnished with Persian carpets and was discovered to be worth twice the value that Albert had claimed. Albert's claim that his mother-in-law had helped to finance the home was also found to be false. Receipts for the Persian carpets, one costing DM 3,500, and Albert's many expensive suits showed that Albert paid cash for his purchases. Other incriminating evidence included the fact that in January 1954 Albert requested new license plates and papers for his official BND vehicle with proper approval. Also, Albert once reported that his wallet had been stolen and so he received all new identification documents.

3. In 1950 Albert was the chief of the BV 2600/North, Frankfurt-Kassel regional office. The main emphasis of this office was legal and illegal communist party activities, especially courier routes and communist front organizations. In addition, the office conducted applicant security clearances for the Gehlen organization in the Hessen area.

4. At the time of his arrest in 1955, Albert was the deputy chief of the BND's field base in Karlsruhe, Dienststelle 142. As a result of several security flaps involving this base,

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including the June 1954 discovery in a dead letter drop of a sensitive BND document determined to have originated in Dienststelle 142, the BND operations security officer, @Edinger, informed Albert and his chief, @Leidl, that there was a security leak in Karlsruhe. Thereafter, @Klausner, chief of the BND CE section, began receiving reports from Leidl denouncing the men who had left the Karlsruhe staff for BND Headquarters. During Leidl's absence from Dienststelle 142, Klausner had former members of Dienststelle 142 search the Karlsruhe office. They determined that the notes had been written by Albert for Leidl's signature. Unfortunately, Heinz Felfe, a BND officer subsequently arrested for collaborating with the KGB, participated in the search.

5. Any current investigation of the Albert case is complicated by the fact that Felfe participated in a large portion of the original BND investigation. In addition to muddying the reliability of the results of the Albert investigation, during his interrogation statement Felfe proposed the theory that Albert was collaborating with the KGB. Felfe claims that because one of his early KGB case officers suggested that he transfer from Dienststelle 142, the KGB probably already had someone in Karlsruhe. Although Felfe admitted that a later KGB case officer would not confirm this assumption, Felfe claimed that information that he gave the Soviets about Karlsruhe was sometimes not the only Karlsruhe information appearing in Soviet publications. However, Felfe's guesswork is not supported by the evidence discovered in Albert's basement. No Soviet-originated intelligence requirements were discovered. Investigating authorities, supported by later Agency analysis, believe that Albert worked as an Sfs penetration of the BND (per Weinmann), as an oral-reporting CIC penetration source of the BND (per CIC's source Heinrich Schmitz, who wrote Albert's oral comments, and Schmitz's CIC case officer) and as General Gehlen's source of information on the requirements levied by the CIC against the BND.

CI/R&A/O

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1 - CI/R&A/O (penetration/Germany)  
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Leads from Albert (201-44320) File

Eugen Hebler - Former chief of Sicherungsgruppe. In 1954 in charge of security in the Blank Office of 114. Removed from Sicherungsgruppe and confined to supervision of physical security before being transferred to the Blank Office.

Felix Vieth and Ruth Vieth nee Schwarz - Identified by Herbert Weinmann @Burkhardt as being involved in the East German penetration of the BND. Felix a truck driver, Ruth a translator at the US Army intelligence school c. 1955.

Werner Repennig - Possibly tipped the Land Ministry of Interior that one Karl Pforr was working for the Gehlen organization. Repennig was under investigation by the Gehlen Organization because of his contacts with Arno Maneck, Pforr's predecessor as chief of Land Hess LFV. Ludwig Albert described Repennig as a charlatan.

Bodo Fromm - Discovered dead letter drop with BND document determined to be from Karlsruhe BND office. Arrested 27 January 1955 as a Soviet agent.

Christian Fries - Source of BND OVL report, which stated CARAVEL an ODYOKE agent.

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