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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 U. S. ARMY FORCES
 IN THE
 PACIFIC

"DOWNFALL"

STRATEGIC PLAN

G-2 ESTIMATE
 OF
 THE ENEMY SITUATION

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Instructors Reading this Document

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ROUTING SLIP

- (1) General Lincoln *Gal*
- (2) Colonel Roberts *mm*
- (3) Colonel Cary *cr*
- ~~Colonel Johnson~~
- ~~Colonel Zimmerman~~
- (4) Colonel Tasker *ev*
- (5) Lt Col Leatherman *el*
- ~~Captain Martell~~



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
WITH RESPECT TO AN OPERATION AGAINST
KYUSHU-HONSHU
(ABBREVIATED)

DATE: 24 MARCH 1945

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
South West Pacific Area
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
With Respect to Operations Against
Kyushu and Honshu
(Abbreviated)

24 March 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Trends:

(1) General:

With our lightning-like re-conquest of the Philippines and the seizure of Iwo Jima, the Japanese have finally been compelled to drop their pretensions that they are still carrying on offensive war. Although glib Japanese commentators may continue to dismiss American advances as stumbling into well planned traps; although communiques may still attempt to laugh off Allied successes with a reassuring "we planned it that way", the fact is that insofar as the Japanese High Command is concerned the orgy of historical self-delusion is over. Irrespective of bombastic public pronouncements, these realistic gentlemen have accepted the stark military fact that Japan is now definitely on the defensive -- their plans and conduct of operations are no longer suggestive of an Army marching to victory, or even of one still trading punch for punch with the enemy.

Although the will to fight remains strong, current patterns are purely those of delaying action whereby they hope to gain sufficient time to regroup on a new Pacific battle position whose MLR is frankly indicated to be the shores of the Empire itself.

(2) Maintenance of Empire Strength:

The Empire proper is already beginning to receive first priority in defensive preparations. Divisions now in the home islands are only being released to outer areas which lie on the direct close approaches to the home islands, and the formation of new divisions is being expedited. Reinforcement of distant theatres has practically ceased; although the Japanese are striving to locally improve their

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position in the N.E.I.-Burma-India-Malaya theatres, by re-disposing troops now on the ground, no further augmentation from inner-zone sources is expected. It is believed that the Japanese will attempt to maintain their strength in China and will attempt to restore their strength in Manchuria; the potential threat from the U.S.S.R. dictates that some portion of available strength be used to replace the divisions drawn from the latter area during the past year. Troops guarding the direct approaches to the Empire are being freely sacrificed e.g. the Philippines, Iwo Jima. Air strength is apparently being conserved in a jealously guarded Empire reserve, even at the cost of ineffective support of the major delaying actions along the approaches. Aircraft production is enjoying the most urgent priorities. Remaining naval units are being concentrated in Empire waters, and currently are accepting no risk, calculated or otherwise.

(3) Efforts to Increase Fighting Efficiency:

The Japanese are striving, with some success, to improve the combat quality of aircraft types in protective armament, fire power, fuel capacity and engine power. Loss of N.E.I. sources has stimulated development of synthetic fuels. New tactical methods e.g. the suicide crash attack (Kamikaze) by both planes and small explosive-laden boats and the use of the rocket projectiles have recently been introduced. Efforts to obtain plans and expert assistance from German sources for development of new weapons, e.g. robot bombs are being pushed.

(4) Miscellaneous Preparations:

Evacuation of civilians from areas likely to become targets or objectives is being expedited. Key industrial plants are being dispersed, where practicable, to Manchuria.

b. Command Structure:

Supreme Command in the Empire proper is vested in Japanese G.H.Q. located in Tokyo. The islands are divided into 6 Army areas, (See Map Encl. No.2) each controlled by an Area Army as follows:

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TABLE I

AREA ARMY	AREA CONTROLLED	LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
Sixteenth	Island of Kyushu	Fukuoka
Fifteenth	Southwestern Honshu and Island of Shikoku	Osaka
Thirteenth	South Central Honshu	Nagoya
Twelfth	Central Honshu, including the Tokyo Plain	Tokyo
Eleventh	Northern Honshu	Sendai
Fifth	Island of Hokkaido	Sapporo

c. Ground Forces:

(1) Overall Strength:

Overall enemy strength in the Japanese Empire proper is currently estimated at approximately 937,000 ground troops including:

(a) Mobile Combat Units:	
11 Triangular Divisions	176,000
14 Depot Divisions	280,000
2 Independent Mixed Regiments	6,000
4 Independent Tank Regiments	4,000
	<hr/>
Total Mobile Combat	466,000
(b) Non-Divisional troops, including: Non Divisional Combat Units (i.e. Corps, Army, and Seacoast Artillery) A/A Units, Air Ground Personnel, Base and Service Troops	459,000
(c) Naval Ground Forces	12,000
	<hr/>
AGGREGATE	937,000

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(2) Distribution

TABLE II

AREA	TRIANGULAR DIVS	DEPOT DIVS	TOTAL DIVS	IND TANK REGTS	IND MIXED REGTS	NAVAL GUARD UNITS	NAVAL DEFENSE UNITS
KYUSHU							
North		6th 36th	2	18th		1	2
South	86th		1				
Total	1	2	3	1		1	2
SHIKOKU		55th	1				1
HONSHU							
Southwest Honshu	84th	5th	2			1	1
South Central Honshu	44th 73rd	3rd 4th 53rd	5	19th			1
North Central Coast	3 Gds 81st 93rd	52nd u/i	5			1	1
Tokyo Area	1 Gds 72nd	2 Gds 51st	4	2nd	16th 18th	1	2
Northern Honshu		2nd 57th	2	22nd			3
Total	8	10	18	3	2	3	8
HOKKAIDO	7th 77th	7th	3				1
(See Note)	4/5		4/5				
Aggregate	15/16	14	29/30	4	2	4	13

(Note: 4 to 5 new combat divisions are believed to have been graduated from depot divisions and replaced therein by newly inducted personnel since 31 December 1944. Numerical designation and present location of these divisions not yet determined.

Recapitulation:

- KYUSHU : 1 combat division, 2 depot divisions, 1 Tank Regiment, 1 Naval Guard Unit and 1 Naval Defense Unit.
- SHIKOKU : 1 Depot Division and 1 Naval Defense Unit
- HONSHU : 8 combat divisions, 10 depot divisions, 2 Independent Mixed Regiments, 3 tank regiments, 3 Naval Guard Units, and 8 Naval Defense Units.
- HOKKAIDO: 2 combat divisions, 1 Depot Division, and 1 Naval Defense Unit.
- UNKNOWN: 4 to 5 combat divisions.
(See Encls. Nos. 2 and 3)

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(3) Probable Reinforcement Prior to D-Day: A considerable increase in major combat units within the Empire prior to the Fall of 1945 is anticipated. In the depot divisions, new personnel are equipped and organized into a complete fully equipped new combat division and trained for approximately 6 months by a cadre left in the depot by the last combat division formed there. Upon completion of its training, the new division is given a new divisional number and departs for a new station, leaving a substantial cadre in the depot to organize and train another division. The Japanese succeeded in forming 29 new divisions in 1944. It is believed that they will be able to maintain this rate in 1945. It may therefore be expected that by the Fall of 1945 each of the 14 Depot Divisions will have turned out 1 additional combat division and 14 more will be in the depots in variable stages of training. It is estimated that the Japanese have ample reserve stocks of ground equipment for these new units. It is further expected that when attack on Kyushu becomes imminent, the Japanese are likely to draw upon their forces on the Continent for such additional divisions as they may consider necessary to complete their requirements for Empire defense which are estimated at approximately 36 combat divisions. Although our airforces operating from the Ryukyus may restrict such a movement in choice of routes, the route most generally used is across Korea Strait from Fusan to Shimonoseki, an 8 hour shuttle run easily traversible in one night. It is believed that it would be extremely difficult to seal off by air action alone; however, in view of the fact that these movements will probably not begin until the attack on Kyushu is imminent, increments from this source may not exceed 2 to 4 divisions before either the route is severed or traffic thereon is restricted to negligible proportions.

It is therefore estimated that by the Fall of 1945, Japanese forces within the Empire proper will probably include: thirty-one (31) to thirty-four (34) Combat divisions; fourteen (14) Depot divisions, or forty-five (45) to forty-eight (48) Total divisions, all classes.

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Expected distribution of reinforcements increased strength
is shown in the table below:

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TABLE III

AREA	COMBAT DIVISIONS	DEPOT DIVISIONS
Kyushu	6	2
Shikoku	2	1
Honshu	19/22	10
Hokkaido	4	1
Total	31/34	14

(4) Estimated Japanese Capabilities, Kyushu: It is estimated that by the Fall of 1945, the Japanese will have 3 combat divisions deployed south of the mountain mass that divides Southern Kyushu from Northern, and will have 3 additional combat divisions and 1 to 2 tank regiments in Northern Kyushu. It is believed that following our assault, they would reinforce Kyushu from their forces on Honshu to a strength of 10 divisions, the maximum they could tactically employ in the area. Reinforcements could arrive at the rate of approximately 1 division per day beginning by D / 4 or D / 5. 10 combat divisions could be sustained in continuous action from the resources of the 2 Depot Divisions located in Northern Kyushu. It is not anticipated that entry into the war of the U.S.S.R. would substantially alter capabilities with respect to Kyushu.

(5) Estimated Japanese Capabilities, Honshu: It is estimated that by the time an attack on the Tokyo Plain can be launched, the Japanese will have 10 combat divisions engaged or wasted in Kyushu. It is estimated that deployment on Honshu will probably be approximately as shown in the following table:

TABLE IV

AREA	COMBAT DIVISIONS	DEPOT DIVISIONS	TOTAL
Tokyo Plain	7*	3	10
Sendai Plain	2	1	3
Northern Honshu	1	1	2
Southwestern & Central Honshu	5/8		10/13
Total, Honshu	15/18	10	25/28

* Includes 1 Armored Division.

Probable dispositions in the Tokyo Plain are shown on Map Encl. No. 4.

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The 3 Depot Divisions will probably be in a very low state of training at this period, and used principally to provide replacements. In addition to the armed forces, approximately 2,000,000 men, half of whom are reservists of some military training and now engaged in industry and agriculture would be available to back up the regular forces and supply military labor; however, the effectiveness of this type of personnel against well-trained and equipped troops would be comparatively low.

It is estimated that by the time of attack, troop movement from Kyushu, Shikoku or from the Continent to Honshu will have become impracticable. Hence reinforcement of the Tokyo Plain will be limited to the 12 to 14 divisions then on Honshu or Hokkaido. These could be brought in via the following routes:

Tokkaido R.R. and main highway.
Nagoya Kofu R.R. and highway.
West Coast Takasaki R.R. and highway.
North Honshu-Utsunomia R.R. and highway.
North Honshu-Sendai-Mito R.R. and highway.

All these routes pass through vulnerable bottlenecks and are subject to damage and interdiction by air attacks. Therefore it is estimated that the sum total of traffic over all routes will not exceed 1 division per day, beginning 2 days after the first reinforcing unit initiates movement.

It is believed that the resulting maximum force of 19 to 21 combat divisions could be logistically maintained in the Tokyo Plain for approximately 3 months, provided transportation facilities do not fall below 50% of normal. Blockade of Japan from the continent would thereafter be expected to progressively limit the effectiveness of the Honshu forces.

It is not expected that entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war will materially affect the enemy reaction. It is believed that the Japanese would continue to give first priority to the defense of the home islands, even to the point of withdrawing troops from Manchuria were the lines of communication still open.

(6) Estimated Effect of Diversion Against the Sendai Plain

of Northern Honshu: It is expected that at the time of attack on the

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Tokyo Plain, the Japanese will have 2 divisions in the Sendai Plain.

An assault on that area would probably cause the commitment of both divisions within 48 hours. Subsequent commitment would depend on the enemy's estimate of whether the attack is a main effort, a diversion, or a preliminary effort. If he can be deceived into construing it as our main effort all forces that can be made available would be freely sacrificed to prevent our securing a lodgement. Allowing for interruption of a portion of the numerous routes a rate of reinforcement of approximately 1 division per day could be maintained until the direction of our main effort became apparent, thus reducing the number available for reinforcement of the Tokyo Plain.

d. Air Forces:

(1) Trend: Japanese employment of air power continues essentially as one of strategic air withdrawal, with maximum conservation for final defense of the Homeland. Since Leyte, they have consistently refused any substantial commitment--even in support of delaying actions along the direct approaches to the Empire. Heavy losses from recent carrier strikes and serious interruption of aircraft production by B-29 raids will probably restrict them to sparing commitments against our Ryukyus operations, in attempts to rebuild the Empire reserve to a safe level.

(2) Command Structure: The enemy's principal air striking force within the Empire is currently under command of the First Mobile Base Air Force. While composed primarily of Naval Air units, some Army Flying Regiments are also under its control. Other Naval air units deployed throughout the Empire are controlled by the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth and Twelfth Naval Air Fleets. Army flying units within the Empire are under command of the First and Sixth Air Armies.

(3) Estimated Strength: It is estimated that by the Fall of 1945 overall air strength, if not reduced by sacrificial commitments during prior operations, will probably consist of approximately 2,500 combat aircraft of all types. Approximately 80% (2,000) may then be deployed through Honshu-Hokkaido-Kuriles. Central China will probably hold only a token of air strength. Almost none may be deployed in

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isolated Japanese-held areas to the south. Aircraft production, sharply reduced by bombing raids, is unlikely to replace losses. Air crews will probably be at a low level of combat efficiency, but insofar as general effect is concerned, this weakness may be partly balanced by increased employment of suicidal methods in the defense of their Homeland by even the most inexperienced. Although the loss of N.E.I. sources of supply has rendered aviation gas a critical item, it is estimated that stockpiles plus limited Empire production will enable the Japanese to conduct operations on a maximum scale for at least one more year. (See Map Encl. No. 6)

(4) Probable Reaction, Kyushu: The enemy will probably expend freely all the aircraft strength he can spare in an all-out and violent reaction; however, his commitments are unlikely to exceed the losses he can take without reducing the Empire reserve below the level he considers necessary for final defense of Honshu. Subject to these limitations, this level has been variously estimated at 2,500 combat aircraft; however, recent losses and partial destruction of his replacement sources suggest a considerable reduction in this figure. If he has not already done so, he may be expected at this time to scrape the bottom of every barrel he possesses to augment his overall Empire forces.

It is estimated that aircraft strength in Kyushu by the Fall of 1945 may total approximately 300 combat aircraft. As a result of our Ryukyus operations the major portion of these will probably be fighters. These can be quickly augmented by additional aircraft from Southwestern Honshu, Shikoku and Korea; however, considerations discussed above will probably limit such reinforcement to small numbers. As a result of heavy attrition from D-Day onward, it is believed that such reinforcement as the Japanese will commit can maintain initial strength for a limited time only. Thereafter reactions would probably be limited to a progressively decreasing number of small sorties per day, which would probably continue for a long period, especially during hours of darkness.

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It may be expected that in the defense of Kyushu the enemy will make every attempt to compensate for inferiority in numbers by wide spread use of his cheap but profitable tactical methods, viz: suicide crashes.

(5) Probable Reaction, Honshu: An intense and violent reaction may be expected using all available aircraft including trainers manned by trainees, with little or no attempt at conservation of force. Suicide attacks on a large scale against our warships and troop transports; ramming attempts against our aircraft; can be expected as soon as the direction of our movements become apparent. The bulk of the enemy's aircraft will be readily available within not more than six flying hours from any base in the Empire. All other theaters will probably be stripped of the few remaining aircraft they possess at this time. Some effort to base immediately surviving and subsequently arriving aircraft beyond range may be attempted, though this would reduce total effectiveness against our immediate landing operations.

Under favorable conditions of weather it is possible that within the week to ten days following detection of our convoys, Japanese air strength will have lost its capability for effective opposition. The mass may, by then, have been destroyed in the all-out attempt to prevent our landings and consolidation.

Thereafter, violent day and night attacks may be expected on a diminishing scale of effort by surviving aircraft and dribblets of reinforcements continuing to trickle in from other theaters. Our limited area of operations may serve to increase our losses until land-based air forces are established; however, this disadvantage will be largely offset by the continuing enemy necessity for dividing his air effort in an attempt to provide some defense against our counter air force and strategic bombing operations elsewhere in the Empire. A further limiting factor will be his continuing apprehension of further Empire landings at widely separated points. The necessity imposed on the enemy of fighting a sustained air battle for air superiority may also be expected to reduce greatly his capability for prolonged effective opposition.

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(6) Effect of Entry of U.S.S.R. into War: It is not expected that enemy reactions will be appreciably changed by this contingency, except that the number of reinforcements drawn from the continent will be further reduced.

e. Naval Forces:

(1) Fleet Composition and Dispositions: The bulk of the Japanese Fleet is at present deployed in the Western Inland Sea. However, as a result of recent Allied carrier-based aircraft attacks on the Inland Sea area, it is probable that the Naval High Command will soon withdraw all operational fleet units to Yellow Sea-Sea of Japan anchorages. Naval units currently based in the Singapore area are now more or less isolated but it is possible that the enemy will succeed in returning these vessels to the Empire in the near future.

The current composition and disposition of the Japanese fleet is estimated to be as follows:

	<u>BB</u>	<u>XCV-BB</u>	<u>CV</u>	<u>CVL</u>	<u>CVE</u>	<u>CA</u>	<u>CL</u>	<u>DD</u>	<u>SS</u>
Empire	4	2	4	2	1/2	4	3	31	50
Singapore-N.E.I.						3	2	7	8

Maximum operational strength is estimated to be 4 BB, 2 XCV-BB, 3/4 CV, 2 CVL, 1/2 CVE, 4 CA, 4 CL and 30/35 DD. (See Map Encl. No. 9)

(2) Construction: Recent aerial reconnaissance of Japanese shipbuilding yards reveals a considerable amount of aircraft carrier construction and indicates that the enemy is concentrating on the production of this type of naval vessel. Analysis of photographs, plus information from POW's and captured documents, indicates that one (1) new carrier (CV) is either operational or in a training status, and that three (3) other CV's and probably four (4) CVE's, converted from tanker hulls, are in various stages of construction. It is believed that of five UNRYU class carriers (5) estimated being built, one (1) has become operational or is in a training status, and one (1) other has been sunk. It is further estimated that the carrier reported severely damaged or sunk at Yokohama on 19 February by Allied aircraft was a new escort carrier (CVE) which had recently become operational. In recapitulation, the current Jap carrier strength is estimated to be as follows:

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Operational	4 (one possibly training)	2	1/2
Under Construction	3		4

It has previously been indicated that four (4) ATAGO class heavy cruisers were under construction. However, it now appears possible that the ships thought to be cruisers are being converted to carriers and are one and the same as the UNRYU class carriers discussed above. If this is the case, cruiser construction is now limited to two (2) heavy cruisers of the TONE class. Numerous destroyers and other small escort vessels are also believed to be under construction.

In view of the fact that Japanese shipyards will continue to be subjected to heavy air attacks by both land-based and carrier-based aircraft, it is extremely doubtful that all of the above mentioned ships now under construction will ever be launched. However, assuming that new construction is completed and damaged vessels are repaired, Japanese over-all building capabilities in naval ships are still insufficient to enable her to alter the naval situation, and her strength will still be totally inadequate for the defense of the Empire.

(3) Naval Capabilities: Allied occupation of the Philippines and IwoJima, carrier strikes on the Empire, and the enemy's belief that landing operations are soon to be conducted in the Nansei Shotos, have faced the Japanese Naval High Command with the question of how to best employ the small Jap Navy to defend the homeland. Two courses of action are open: (1) They may withdraw the fleet from the Inland Sea, (which recent carrier plane raids have shown to be no longer a safe fleet anchorage) to the comparative safety of the Yellow Sea-Sea of Japan area and maintain the threat of a "fleet in being"; (2) They may organize remaining operational units into a fast striking force and strive to destroy any Allied force attempting to breach the line Empire-Nansei Shoto-Formosa.

It may be assumed that the High Command is anxious to redeem the reputation of the Jap Navy; however the main considerations governing the employment of the fleet are local control of the air and the strength of the Allied forces. If at any time the Japanese should

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consider that they have gained local control of the air it is possible that the fleet may sortie and proceed south to interdict any U.S. striking force approaching the Empire. Lacking local air control which it seems improbable he will be able to gain, enemy naval reaction to an Allied advance toward the Empire-Nansei Shoto line may be limited to such operations as night torpedo attacks by light forces, while the main body of the fleet withdraws northward to await the final battle in defense of Japan proper. However, since the establishment of Allied bases in the Nansei Shoto would insure the Allied naval forces of substantial land-based air support at the time of the assault on the Empire, thereby adding considerably to the already overwhelming strength of the Allied fleet, it is possible that the enemy fleet will make an all-out effort to deny the Allies a beachhead in the Nansei Shoto chain. If such an attempt is made the Jap fleet will undoubtedly have been destroyed prior to our assault on Kyushu.

The enemy submarine force will remain a serious threat to Allied operations against Japan. Although to date the Japanese have achieved little success with their submarines, it is probable that offensive submarine activity will reach a high level when an Invasion Force approaches Japan proper. The enemy has approximately 50 subs concentrated in home waters at the present time and this number will probably be increased as the result of the recall to the Empire of those subs now on patrol in distant waters for the defense of the Empire. A new unit called "Kaiten" has been noted recently in connection with submarine activity. The "Kaiten" is as yet unidentified but it is estimated to be a type of one man suicide torpedo. This weapon is known to have been used in the IwoJima area in March (results unknown) and may be used much more extensively in future operations. Midget submarine activity is also to be expected.

Regarded as a highly important "secret weapon" by the Jap Army is the so-called "Suicide Boat", better named an Assault Demolition Boat. These craft have been used against the Allied surface vessels in the Philippines and can be expected to play an important part in the Japanese strategy to repel Allied landings on Japan proper.

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The approaches to suitable Empire landing beaches will undoubtedly be mined.

f. Merchant Shipping Position: Japan was estimated, as of 1 February, to have 2,416,556 tons of powered and auxiliary-powered merchant vessels of 100 gross tons and upwards. Reducing this figure by 20 percent to allow for lay-ups and repairs, the total of serviceable shipping amounts to 1,935,000 tons.

With available shipping thus reduced the enemy is attempting to conduct military operations with a merchant fleet only 30 to 40 percent as large as that available to him in the first months of the war. It must be noted, however, that the enemy's shipping requirements have also been drastically reduced since the early phases of the Pacific war. During the first six months of 1942, when the Japanese had at their disposal some seven or eight million tons of merchant shipping, they were conducting military operations over vast distances and supplying forces on scores of islands within a great area extending from the Aleutians through Wake, the Marshall Islands, the Solomons, New Guinea, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and Burma. Now many of the outlying garrisons are eliminated; others have been cut off and are supplied only by submarine, if at all. With our conquest of the strategic areas of the Philippine Islands and the Ryukyus, we will soon be in a position to deny Japanese shipping passage through the waters between the Philippines and the China coast; the N.E.I., Malaya and Burma will be cut off from sea communications with Japan, except for such blockade-running as the enemy cares to risk. Thus in the very near future Japan's merchant shipping requirements will have been reduced to the maintenance of essential traffic between the home islands, Korea, Manchuria, China and the Kuriles.

These are relatively modest requirements, but it is not possible to state with any precision whether Japan's present total of about 2,400,000 tons of merchant shipping is adequate to meet them. With the enemy forced into a wholly defensive posture, even in his own home waters, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine what traffic he will be willing to sacrifice and which cargoes he will consider

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essential, and these are the factors which must underlie any estimate of shipping "requirements". The entire question of Japanese shipping requirements may soon be academic, however, if losses continue at anything like the present rate. That this possibility has occurred to the Japanese is indicated by a Tokyo broadcast on 17 February, the second day of our carrier task force attack on the Tokyo area, in which the Japanese forces in China and other overseas garrisons were warned that they might have to operate without help from the homeland.

Detailed analysis of the Japanese shipping position, as of 1 February 1945, is presented in the following table:

TABLE V

	Freighters & Transports		Tankers		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Totals as of 7 Dec 1941, plus captures and construction to 1 Feb 1945	6,426	8,063,912	300	1,314,644	6,726	9,378,556
War Losses estimated to 1 Feb 1945 (1000 GT upwards)	1,385	5,680,273	122	856,727	1,507	6,537,000
War Losses estimated to 1 Feb 1945 (100-1000 GT)	1,466	399,338	34	25,662	1,500	425,000
Total Losses	2,851	6,079,611	156	882,389	3,007	6,962,000
Total Available	3,575	1,984,301	144	432,255	3,719	2,416,556
Total Serviceable	2,860	1,590,000	115	345,000	2,975	1,935,000

The smallest ships, those below 100 gross tons (which are not included in the foregoing table), are chiefly engaged in fishing, picketing and general cargo traffic. An approximate break-down of vessels in this category follows:

20-99 Gross Tons:		
Full-powered :	About 2,500 ships	125,000 gross tons
Auxiliaries :	About <u>7,000</u> ships	<u>350,000</u> gross tons
Total :	About 9,500 ships	475,000 gross tons
Sailing vessels without engines are estimated as follows:		
Over 1000 GT :	750 ships	100,000 gross tons
20-99 gr tons:	6,000 ships	300,000 gross tons
5-19 gr tons :	<u>5,000</u> ships	<u>60,000</u> gross tons
Total	11,750 ships	460,000 gross tons

In addition, the Japanese, using native laborers, have built numbers of small wooden vessels in all the conquered southern territories. These, engaged chiefly in coastal and inter-island trade

in those areas, are not included in the foregoing estimates.

g. Terrain:

(1) Kyushu: (See Map Encl. No. 10)

(a) General Description: Kyushu Island and its fringe of smaller islands form a rough quadrangle 200 miles north-south by 125 miles east-west. The central and eastern sections are mountainous and much of this upland area is covered with loose volcanic ash. The south, north, and western margins have many small flattish coast plains and basins which are connected by narrow corridors and backed by irregular masses of hills and low rugged mountains. These lowlands are fairly easy to traverse except when their rice fields are flooded or soft (May-September in south; June-September in north). The southern lowlands are cut off from the northern and western basins and plains by the rugged central mountains which extend completely across the island from south west to north east.

(b) Topography: Southeastern Kyushu is a jumble of small lowlands, 1 to 2 by 3 to 5 miles broken by flat terraces. These lowlands are connected by generally flat corridors 1 to 5 miles long through small but rugged mountain areas rising to 1,500 to 2,500 feet. Ridges are broken by saddles of 500 to 1,500 feet elevation.

The central region is entirely mountainous, mostly of 3,000 to 4,000 feet elevation with some 5,000 to 6,000 foot peaks. A few deep and tortuous valleys penetrate the outer ridges for a distance but no through corridors exist.

Northwestern Kyushu is composed of flat-topped, steep-sided lava covered highlands of 800 to 2,500 feet elevation separated by belts of rolling hilly terrain of 300 to 600 feet elevation. Many shallow and winding valleys run through the hill belts and around the highlands.

Northern Kyushu is a quadrangular region 80 miles NW to SE and 56 miles SW to NE. A central mass of flat-topped, steep-sided lava-covered highland rises to 2,000 to 3,000 feet and is rimmed by belts of low rolling hills of 250 to 800 feet elevation, and low flat

16
DECLASSIFIED

coastal plains varying in area from 15 to 25 by 3 miles.

(c) Trafficability for Cross-Country Movement: Low

areas, valley floors and many terraces are covered by rice fields in the southeastern area; uplands and some lowlands have dense forests. Cross country movement in the central mountain area is very difficult even along the valleys. It is also difficult in the northwestern lava uplands but only moderately so in the rolling hill areas. In Northern Kyushu movement is easy in the low areas except when rice fields are flooded, moderately difficult in hilly areas and very difficult over the highlands; however, movement between coastal plains is facilitated by numerous corridors which connect most pairs of lowlands. In Southern Kyushu the soil affects trafficability adversely during late Spring and mid-Summer; most favorable period is during late Fall through mid-Winter.

(d) Railroads: Northern Kyushu has a fairly close network of railroads; Southern Kyushu has only 3 important lines with few inter-connections. A line from Moji at the northern end of the island splits into two lines at Tosu (67 miles southwest); one going to Nagasaki on the west coast; one to Kagoshima in Southern Kyushu, following the west coast most of the way. Another and longer line along the east coast also connects Moji and Kagoshima. A third line cuts off the west coast line 145 miles north of Kagoshima and follows an inland route; this line has many grades and sharp curves.

Nearly all lines are single track except a few in Northern Kyushu, and have a 3 foot 6 inch gauge. Road-beds are usually 16 feet wide.

Railroads pass through numerous sensitive points, viz: junctions, tunnels, long bridges, cuts and fills.

(e) Roads: In general roads follow valleys or part of a circular coastal pattern. The National Highways are the only first class roads by American standards. Normal width of National Highways which include the coastal roads around the island is 24 feet. Grades are 1 in 30. Bridges are required by law to be capable of supporting a 12 ton steam roller or an 8 ton wagon. Newer roads have 5 to 8 inch concrete surfaces. Older roads not built originally for motor traffic are believed

to have been re-conditioned.

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A notable feature of the road-net is the National Highway from Moji to Shimonoseki on Honshu which traverses an underwater tunnel suitable for cars and foot-traffic.

(2) Tokyo Plain of Honshu: (See Map Encl. No. 11)

(a) General Description: This is the largest lowland area in Japan. The plain covers the bulk of an irregularly shaped area centered on Tokyo and varying from 70 to 115 miles N to S and from 60 to 70 miles E to W. Its outer perimeter pierced by mountain masses from the northeast, northwest and west, and by the waters of Tokyo-Wan from the south. The southern and eastern edges of the plain reach the shoreline.


(b) Topography: Most of the region consists of smooth-surfaced inter-stream plains, and broad alluvial valleys slightly below the general level. In the east, north and southwest are moderately large areas of dissected terrace country with long narrow ridges separated by flat bottomed valleys 60 to 150 feet below the ridge lines. The plain is traversed by numerous large and small streams; direction of flow is principally south and southeast.

(c) Landing Beaches: Most of the east coast and that at the head of Sagami-Wan is fronted by sandy beach and is generally well suited to landing operations.

(4) Roads and Railroads: Tokyo is the focal point of a wide-spread net of north-south and east-west roads and railroads which spread across the plain to northern, western, and southwestern Honshu. Numerous transverse roads and railroads provide selective routes of advance toward or away from the capital. National Highways (24 foot--normally hard-surfaced) radiate from Tokyo across the plain and beyond it to northern Honshu, the northwestern coast, the interior of central Honshu, southeastern Honshu (along the coast) and to the eastern regions of the plain. These radial roads are supplemented and connected by an abundance of transverse and parallel secondary roads.

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GENERAL PACIFIC AREA
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
**ENEMY GROUND DISPOSITIONS
 GENERAL PACIFIC AREA
 24 MARCH 1945**

STRENGTH ESTIMATES INCLUDE ARMY MOBILE
 COMBAT, BASE DEFENSE AND LINE OF
 COMMUNICATIONS TROOPS.

UNLOCATED IN JAPAN
 XXX
 XXXVI

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During the early months of the Pacific War, the Japanese employed naval ground troops (particularly Special Naval Landing Forces) in offensive operations with considerable success. During the intermediate stages of the war, naval personnel have been extensively used to garrison outlying bases, where their functions were largely those of service troops. Shortly before or concurrent with Allied landings on Jap-held territory in recent months, particularly in the Marianas and in the Manila-Corregidor defenses of the Philippine campaign, it has been noted that the enemy normally absorbs his naval ground forces into the local army combat defense organization. There is ample precedent for such action at the time of an Allied Landing on the main islands of Japan.

Available information regarding enemy naval ground forces in the Empire is rather fragmentary, particularly in regard to the strength of the various units. However, the location of concentrations of naval troops is believed to be represented in Map Encl. 3 with reasonable accuracy.

NAVAL BARRACKS

Quarters and training for personnel awaiting assignment is provided at naval barracks located at the places listed below. The figures given are the latest known complements of permanently assigned personnel and indicate the relative size of the barracks:

Aiura (Nagasaki)	1589	Otake (Kure)	1589
Kure	569	Sasebo	558
Maizuru	983	Takeyama (Yokosuka)	1589
	Yokosuka	725	

GUARD UNITS (KEIBITAI)

The local defense (particularly AA & CD) of the areas in which they are located is believed to be the primary function of Guard Units. These units may have special weapons, tank and surface craft units attached to them and are thus at least theoretically capable of undertaking offensive action. Assigned strength of known Guard Units is as follows:

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Kure	208
Maizuru	688
Sasebo	718
Yokosuka	812
Ominato	?

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DEFENSE UNITS (BOBITAI)


Defense Units normally contain no mobile troops and employ mines and artillery as their primary weapons. It would not be considered improbable for otherwise unattached naval personnel to be assigned to Defense Units in an emergency. Nuclei strengths of known Defense Units are as follows:




Ise	163
Maizuru	358
Onagawa	123
Oshima	202
Saeki	479
Sasebo	506
Shimonoseki	249
Yokosuka	440
Kii	249
Ominato	290
Soya	?
Tsugaru	?

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
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-  DEFENSE UNITS
-  GUARD UNITS
-  BARRACKS


NUMBER AT SIDE OF SYMBOL INDICATES STRENGTH OF ORGANIZATION.

JAPAN
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
 NAVAL GROUND FORCES
 24 MARCH 1945



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff


ENEMY AIRBASES
24 MARCH 1945

LEGEND
○ OPERATIONAL AIRFIELD HAVING ALL WEATHER RUNWAYS AND/OR COMPLETE FACILITIES.
↓ SEAPLANE STATION HAVING COMPLETE FACILITIES.

- 2 BOFU
- 1 OZUKI
- 27 ASHITA
- 26 FUKUYAMA
- 25 GANNOSU
- 24 SHIGA
- 23 HAKATA
- 20 NAJIMA
- 21 ITAJUKU
- 22 IMAJIKU
- 19 TACHIARA
- 18 SASEBO
- 17 KAWATANA
- 15 & 16 ONIWA
- 14 WAIFU
- 13 GORO
- 12 IZUMI
- 11 KITAHARA
- 10 KAGOSHIMA
- 9 CHIRAN
- 8 KANNOYA
- 7 KANNOYA EAST
- 6 KUSHIRA
- 5 SHIBUSHI
- 4 MIYAZAKI - OYODO
- 3 NITTAGAHARA
- 2 KARASEHARA
- 1 TOMITAKA
- 35 SAENI MIZUNOKO
- 34 SAEKI
- 33 OITA
- 32 SAENI
- 31 OITA
- 30 USA
- 29 TSUKI
- 28 USONE
- 27 IWAKUNI
- 26 KURE
- 25 TAKUMA
- 24 KIZUGAWA
- 23 MIYAZAKI
- 22 SUZUKA
- 21 YOKAICHI
- 20 SAKAMOTO
- 19 SHIRAHAMA
- 18 HANSHIN
- 17 KIZUGAWA
- 16 KIZUGAWA
- 15 NISHINOMIYA
- 14 KAKOGAWA
- 13 MIYAZAKI
- 12 YONAGO
- 11 MIHO
- 10 SAIGO
- 9 MIHO
- 8 YONAGO
- 7 KURASHIKI
- 6 NAKAMITA
- 5 KURE
- 4 IWAKUNI
- 3 KURE
- 2 KURE
- 1 KURE

- 84 & 85 KOZAN
- 83 MISAWA
- 82 MATSUSHIMA
- 81 SENDAI
- 80 RYOZU
- 79 YATEBE
- 78 & 79 TATEYAMA
- 77 OTAWA
- 76 & 75 YOKOSUKA
- 74 KISARAZU
- 73 & 74 KISARAZU
- 72 NARIMASU
- 71 MOBARA
- 70 MATSUDO
- 69 SHIMOSHIZU
- 68 KASHIWA
- 67 KASHIMA
- 66 OSAWA
- 65 KONOIKE
- 64 SHIMAZU
- 63 KASUMIGAJURA
- 62 & 63 KASUMIGAJURA
- 61 TOMOBE
- 60 MITO
- 59 YATBE
- 58 KATORI
- 57 TOKOROZAWA
- 56 TATEBAYASHI
- 55 KOIZUMI
- 54 KIRYU
- 53 KUMAGAYA
- 52 SAKADO
- 51 TAKAHASHI
- 50 RUMOGAWA
- 49 TOYOOKA
- 48 YOKOTA
- 47 SHOWA
- 46 TACHIKAWA
- 45 CHOFU
- 44 HANEDATOKYO
- 43 ATSUMI
- 42 FUJISAWA
- 41 FUJISAWA
- 38 HACHIJU (LANDING GROUND)
- 37 KOCHI
- 36 INO
- 35 KOMATSUJIMA
- 34 OITSU
- 33 TOYOHASHI
- 32 KOWA
- 31 MITSUBISHI
- 30 MIKATAGAHARA
- 29 NAGOYA EAST
- 28 NAGOYA
- 27 KAGAMIGAHARA
- 26 KAGAMIGAHARA
- 25 KAGAMIGAHARA
- 24 TATESU
- 23 ITAMI
- 22 SUZUKA
- 21 SAKAMOTO
- 20 YOKAICHI
- 19 SHIRAHAMA
- 18 HANSHIN
- 17 KIZUGAWA
- 16 KIZUGAWA
- 15 NISHINOMIYA
- 14 KAKOGAWA
- 13 MIYAZAKI
- 12 YONAGO
- 11 MIHO
- 10 SAIGO
- 9 MIHO
- 8 YONAGO
- 7 KURASHIKI
- 6 NAKAMITA
- 5 KURE
- 4 IWAKUNI
- 3 KURE
- 2 KURE
- 1 KURE

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1" 15.78 miles


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff

ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS
 TOKYO PLAIN AREA, FALL OF 1945

~~SECRET~~
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DECLASSIFIED 5

HOKKAIDO DISPOSITIONS NOT SHOWN



LEGEND

- COASTAL DEFENSE GUNS
- HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS
- MEDIUM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

NOTE: EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS 10 GUNS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
 LOCATIONS OF
 KNOWN COASTAL DEFENSE
 AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS
 24 MARCH 1945

50 0 100 150 Miles

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
KURILES-HOKKAIDO-KARAFUTO-HONSHU

B	F	R	TTL
13	36	21	70

MANCHURIA - KOREA

B	F	R	TTL
0	81	43	124

CHINACHOSEN

B	F	R	TTL
102	195	174	471

JAPAN

B	F	R	TTL
646	1306	226	2178

RYUKYUS - FORMOSA


B	F	R	TTL
100	115	144	359

- XXXX BASE AIR FORCE
- XXX NAVAL AIR FLEET
- XXXX AIR ARMY
- XX FLYING DIV
- NAVAL AIR
- ARMY AIR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
ENEMY COMMAND AREAS
AND AIR DISPOSITIONS,
JAPANESE EMPIRE AND
APPROACHES THERETO

24 MARCH 1945

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


128° 130° 132° 134° 136° 138° 140° 142° 144° 146°

TOP SECRET

NOTE: BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO INCLUDE 24 MARCH 1945. KNOWN TO BE ACCURATE TO INCLUDE DECEMBER 1944. 4 TO 5 ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS POSSIBLY FORMED SINCE. EXPANSION RATE ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 30 NEW DIVISIONS PER YEAR.

UNLOCATED
XXX
XXXVI



G.H.Q.
XXX
TWELFTH
XX
1 GDS
XX
DEP 2 GDS

JAPAN

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff**


**ENEMY GROUND DISPOSITIONS
24 MARCH 1945**

SCALE
10 0 10 20 30 40 50
TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED


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130° 132° 134° 136° 138° 140° 142°




HOME ISLANDS - CHINA COAST

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
**EFFECT OF PROSPECTIVE
 COMBAT AIR RADII
 ON
 PRINCIPAL JAP SHIPPING ROUTES**



AZIMUTHAL EQUIDISTANT PROJECTION CENTERED ON TOKYO
 BOMBER COURSE TO TOKYO FROM ANY POINT ON THE MAP FOLLOWS A STRAIGHT LINE
 TRUE IN DISTANCE AND DIRECTION

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

ENEMY NAVAL DISPOSITIONS
24 MARCH 1945

C-IN-C COMBINED FLEET
C-IN-C 1ST STRIKING FLEET (COMDR. 3RD FLEET)
COMDR. 2ND FLEET
COMDR. 5TH FLEET

- 4 BB
- 2 XCV-BB(1)
- 4 CV
- 2 CVL
- 1/2 CVE
- 4 CA(1)
- 3 CL
- 30 DD(7)
- 7 DE
- 50 SS

NORTHEAST AREA FORCE
5TH FLEET, 12TH AIR FLEET
OMINATO - HQ N.E. AREA FORCE

1 DD

FORMOSA
COMDR. S.W. AREA FORCE
3RD SO. EXP. FLEET

4TH FLEET, 14TH AIR FLEET

MARIANAS
9 SS

MANILA - HQ S.W. AREA FORCE
HQ. 3RD SO. EXP. FLEET

4 SS

LEGEND

- BB - BATTLESHIP
- XCV - BB - A/C CARRIER (PARTIALLY CONVTD BB)
- CV - A/C CARRIER, LARGE
- CVL - A/C CARRIER, LIGHT
- CVE - A/C CARRIER, ESCORT
- CA - HEAVY CRUISER
- CL - LIGHT CRUISER
- DD - DESTROYER
- DE - DESTROYER ESCORT
- SS - SUBMARINE
- () - SHIPS DAMAGED OR DOCKING (I.E., TOTAL INCLUDING FIGURES IN PARENS. IS ON LEFT SIDE)

NOTE: "DIVERSION ATTACK FORCES ARE TASK FORCES FORMED FOR SPECIFIC TACTICAL MISSIONS AS REQUIRED, AND MAY COMPRISE ANY COMBINATION OF UNITS OF DESIRED CLASSIFICATION AND DRAWN FROM ANY FLEET OR COMBINATION OF FLEETS IN WHICH THEY ARE MOST READILY AVAILABLE."

1ST SO EXP FLEET
10TH AREA FLEET
13TH AIR FLEET

- 3 CA(2)
- 1 CL
- 6 DD
- 1 DE
- 8 SS

SOUTH WEST AREA FORCE

2ND SO. EXP. FLEET

2 SS

AMBON - HQ. 4TH. SO. EXP. FLEET

RABAUL - HQ. S.E. AREA FORCES

2 SS
SOLOMON ISLANDS

SURABAYA - HQ. 2ND SO. EXP. FLEET

1 CL(1)


4TH SO. EXP. FLEET

SOUTHEAST AREA FORCE
8TH FLEET, 11TH AIR FLEET

2 SS

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DECLASSIFIED



GLOSSARY


Japanese	English
-gata	lagoon, inlet
-jima	island
-kaikyō	strait
-ko	lake
-misaki	point, cape
-nada	sea, open bay
-rettō	island chain
-saki	point, cape
-san	mountain
-shima	island
-suidō	channel, strait
-wan	bay
-zaki	point, cape

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff**

Scale 1:1,000,000 at Latitude 35°

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GLOSSARY

Japanese	English
-gata	lagoon, inlet
-gawa	river
-jima	island
-kaikyō	strait
-kawa	river
-ko	lake
-misaki	point, cape
-nada	sea, open bay
-numa	lagoon
-saki	point, cape
-san	mountain
-shima	island
-ura	lagoon
-wan	bay
-zaki	point, cape
-zan	mountain, cape

CENTRAL HONSHU
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

Scale 1:1,000,000 at Latitude 35°

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