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reassertion of the freedom of union members to belong to political parties of their own choosing, and reelection of officers in order to eliminate the impression that the Sanbetsu was dominated by any particular political party.¹ The elections held at an extraordinary national convention in July, also the scene of self-criticism, did little to remove this impression, however, since, of the four important officers elected, two -- Vice Chairman KAMEDA Togo and Secretary General YOSHIDA Sukeji -- were members of the Kyōsantō.² Shortly after the convention, moreover, it was announced that the three ranking officers who had resigned in connection with the self-criticism movement had been appointed to other positions in the organization. KIKUNAMI Katsumi, who two months later announced his affiliation with the Kyōsantō, and DOBASHI Kazuyoshi were to represent the Sanbetsu on the Labor Relations Committee and similar bodies, and HOSOYA Matsuta, at that time a member of the Kyōsantō, was to be employed in the Secretariat.³

4. The Split in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai

a. Major Issues. The second national convention of the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, February 12-14, 1947, met in an atmosphere of controversy revolving primarily around political issues. Discussion of such economic issues as land reform and crop collection on their merits was subordinated to the question of the union's ties with the Socialists and Communists, and attention was focused on the activities of HIRANO Rikizo, member of the Central Executive Committee of the union as well as that of the Shakaitō.

The left-wing group, whose views were vociferously stated in the columns of the Kyōsantō organ Akahata, expressed dissatisfaction with Socialist economic and political policy and asserted that, under right-wing leadership, the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai had become completely subservient to the Shakaitō. Particularly disturbing to the leftists

1. Jiji Press releases, May 12, 14, and 15, 1947; Nippon Keizai Shimbun, May 13, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, May 15, 1947.
2. Asahi Shimbun, July 13, 1947.
3. Jiji Press release, July 22, 1947.

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was what they regarded as Socialist betrayal of the farmers in their stand on rice deliveries and land reform. Despite union condemnation of the government-sponsored Food Emergency Measures Law of August 1946, the Socialists, under pressure from Hirano and his supporters, had finally voted in its favor. A draft proposal drawn up by Hirano in anticipation of the February convention, moreover, called for a reversal of the union's opposition to the Land Reform Law -- a proposal that excited considerable left-wing antagonism. In the political field, the leftists bitterly condemned the leading role played by Hirano in negotiations for Socialist participation in the Yoshida cabinet, a move that they regarded as a thoroughgoing concession to the forces of reaction. Finally, the decision of the Nōmin Kumiai national leadership to support the Kyūoku Minshu Sensen Renmei, despite the exclusion of the Communists from the Socialist-sponsored united front organization, aroused the ire of left-wing proponents of the united front.¹

The right wing, on the other hand, made no secret of its concern over what it regarded as increasing Communist domination of the union and urged a clear-cut rejection of Communist participation. Support of government land reform measures was urged on the grounds that these measures were already in operation and should be utilized by the farmers to their own best interests; support of the emergency food measures was defended as based on Agriculture and Forestry Minister WADA Hiroo's commitment that arbitrary allotment of quotas would cease and that quotas would instead be assigned democratically by food committees set up in each city, town, and township. With regard to the coalition issue, Hirano argued that the pro-coalition faction in the Shakaitō, although emphasizing the importance of a cabinet based on national unity, had no intention of participating in a coalition cabinet unless the formation of such a cabinet was preceded by the resignation of the Yoshida cabinet and acceptance of Socialist policies.²

1. Akahata, December 24, 1946, January 5, 1947, and February 10, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, February 7, 1947; Mimpo, February 14 and 17, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, February 13, 1947.
2. Akahata, January 5, 1947; Jiji Press release, February 13, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, February 14, 1947; Mimpo, February 20, 1947. RESTRICTED

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b. Communist preparations for the convention. In addition to supporting the left-wing view in Akahata and elsewhere, the Kyōsantō apparently made extensive preparations for dominating the convention proceedings. On matters of policy, the Communists expressed their hope that the convention would take a stand against compulsory rice deliveries and the government land reform program; would support the unification of the farmers' front and remove opponents of the united front from office; and would demand the overthrow of the Yoshida cabinet and the establishment of a democratic government led by the Shakaitō and the Kyōsantō. At the same time Kyōsantō organs instructed Communists who were also members of the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai to be sure that the branches under their influence or control had paid their membership fees and to adopt other measures that would insure maximum Communist representation at the convention.¹

c. Convention proceedings. It was apparent from the opening of the convention that the majority of those present were leftist in sympathy, and it soon became evident, in addition, that Kyōsantō exploitation of left-wing Socialist resentments had been sufficiently adroit to lead to the exercise of considerable Communist control over the proceedings. The sessions, which lasted for three days, were marked from the outset by extraordinary disorder and disregard of procedural formalities; they ended with the complete withdrawal from the union of a minority right-wing faction.

The sessions opened on the morning of February 12 and were immediately thrown into confusion by controversy over the chairmanship, with the right wing supporting appointment by the Central Executive Committee and the left-wing advocating election from the floor. The appointment of a committee composed of one representative from each prefecture proved to be the only alternative to continued violence, and the problem was finally resolved by the committee's agreement that there be a rotating

1. Akahata, December 24 and 27, 1946, January 5, and February 10 and 16, 1947.

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chairmanship in which representatives of each faction would participate. The settlement of this controversy, however, was but a prelude to a second battle, this time over credentials. This dispute was caused by the fact that the Osaka, Yamanashi, and Ishikawa branches had already split into two factions, with representatives of both claiming to be the official delegates. Once again the controversy was referred to a committee, and the remainder of the session was spent in listening to the speeches of invited guests.¹

The second day opened with a pious resolution, passed by unanimous vote, to forget the differences of the past and concentrate on the maintenance of unity. If any doubt remained as to the predominance of leftist delegates, it was soon dispelled. Heated debates were opened by the attack of an Aomori delegate on members of the union executive who were attempting to bring about a coalition with "the reactionary Yoshida Cabinet." After some discussion a Hiroshima delegate introduced a motion putting the union on record against any coalition other than a democratic people's government with the Shakaitō as its nucleus. This proposal, carried by an overwhelming majority, was followed by a motion that the Nōmin Kumiai define democratic parties as including the Kyōsantō as well as the Shakaitō and that criticism of the Kyōsantō be deleted from the union's draft program. This motion, too, received majority support.²

On the third and final day of the convention, controversy centered around the procedure to be followed in electing the chairman of the Central Executive Committee and other leading officers. A proposal that these officers be elected at the Central Committee meeting the following day was vociferously opposed by a number of leftists. It was at this point that KURODA Hisao, leading left-wing Socialist in the union, appearing to feel the necessity for asserting the independence of left-

1. Jiji Press release, February 12, 1947; Tokyo Shimbun, February 13, 1947; Mimpo, February 14, 1947.
2. Jiji Press release, February 13, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, February 14, Mimpo, February 20, 1947.

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wing Socialists from Communist policy, appealed to the convention to defer the vote until the Central Committee meeting. The chairman then declared the meeting adjourned, and Hirano, together with a group of his supporters, left the hall. A number of delegates, however, refusing to recognize the adjournment, proceeded to hold an extraordinary session of the remaining representatives. No information is available as to the number of representatives present at the extraordinary session. Whatever the size of the group, however, it regarded itself as possessing sufficient authority to nominate two left-wing Socialists, KURODA Hisao and ONISHI Toshio, as chairman and secretary of the Central Executive Committee respectively and centrist Socialist NOMIZO Masaru as vice chairman.¹

When the Central Committee met on the following day, it was immediately confronted with the problem of dealing with the nominations put forward at the extraordinary session. The members of the Central Committee who had participated in the extraordinary session were, of course, in favor of confirmation of the nominations, while the rightists insisted that both the extraordinary session and the nominations were illegal since they had occurred after the adjournment of the convention. When a vote was taken, the majority supported the nominations and Hirano, together with delegates from eleven prefectures, withdrew. The nominations were then confirmed, Hirano was expelled, and an appeal was issued to his followers to return to the unions.² These dissidents, however, had already formed a new organization, the Nichino Sashin Domei (Japan Farmers' Union Reformation League) with the announced objective of purging the Communists from the farmers' union.³

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1. Jiji Press release, February 15, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, February 15 and 16, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, February 16, 1947; Mimpo, February 21, 1947.
 2. Yomiuri Shimbun, February 16, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, February 16 and 18, 1947; Jiji Press release, February 18, 1947.
 3. Asahi Shimbun, February 16, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, February 16, 1947; Mimpo, February 18, 1947.

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RESTRICTEDPART FOUR: THE LEFT IN OFFICEI. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE KATAYAMA CABINETA. The Election of April 1947

1. Factors Affecting the Election. A number of factors beyond the control of the left-wing parties affected their conduct of the election campaigns. In the first place, SCAP's request that a national election be held before the coming into force of the new Japanese Constitution on May 3, 1947 added to the elections already scheduled for April -- for prefectural and municipal executives on April 5, for the House of Councillors on April 20, and for prefectural and municipal assemblies on April 30 -- a fourth contest for the House of Representatives finally scheduled for April 25. This multiplicity of campaigns had obvious disadvantages for all the parties and was reflected particularly strongly in a paucity of political party candidates in the local elections. In the second place, the Liberals and Progressives, who had long been clamoring for a revision of the election laws, succeeded in attaining their objective despite the opposition of the Socialists and Communists. The election law amendments passed by the Diet on March 31 substituted for the 53 election districts and limited plural-entry ballot of the 1946 election 117 election districts with a single-entry ballot. The left-wing parties, which had, in general, benefited from the plural-entry system, felt these revisions to be aimed directly at undermining their prospects at the polls. Their resentment was particularly aroused by the passage of the amendments so soon before the election was to be held. Whatever disadvantages the left-wing parties may have suffered as a result of these revisions, however, the extreme unpopularity of the Yoshida cabinet redounded to their advantage. The Liberals

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and Progressives, and later the Democrats,¹ undoubtedly suffered from their identification with the cabinet and, although the extent to which the vote for the Socialists was essentially a negative protest vote against the parties in power cannot be estimated, there can be no doubt that this was a factor of some weight.

2. Conduct and Results of the National Elections²

a. The united front issue. The possibility of a united front agreement between the Shakaitō and the Kyōsantō for election purposes was eliminated early in the campaign. Once again, the Kyōsantō took the initiative. On March 1 it proposed that the Communists and Socialists cooperate in the election on the basis of the following joint objectives: eradication of black markets and control of inflation; national control and democratic management of financial organs and key industries; abolition of unjust taxes; the imposition of heavy taxes on wartime profiteers; a guaranteed monthly minimum wage of 700 yen and an average of 2,000 yen; provision of food, housing, and employment for the unemployed, war victims, and repatriates; abolition of compulsory rice deliveries; an increase in the rice price; establishment of the farmer's right to cultivate and control his land; greater freedom for women and youth; increased supply of material and funds for medium-sized and small mercantile and manufacturing enterprises; and eradication of conservative influences and formation of a democratic people's government.³

On March 5, the Kyōsantō proposal was unconditionally rejected by the Shakaitō, which stated, first, that each political party should place its own platform before the voters for their independent judgment; second, that the Socialists and

1. The Democratic Party was inaugurated on March 31, 1947. It included all the Progressive Party Diet members, a few seceders from the Liberal Party and the People's Cooperative Party (the latter formed March 8 by amalgamation of the People's and the Cooperative Parties), and a few independents.
2. For details on this subject see OIR-4310, An Analysis of the 1947 Japanese House of Representatives Election, September 1, 1947, RESTRICTED, and OIR-4334, The 1947 Japanese House of Councillors Election, January 15, 1948, RESTRICTED.
3. Shin Yukan, March 1, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, March 1, 1947; Akahata, March 3, 1947.

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Communists were in fundamental disagreement over the question of strikes for political purposes; and, third, that Communist claims of great popular support for the united front were contradicted by the facts.¹ Thereafter, the issue of Socialist-Communist cooperation in the national elections was closed.

b. Socialist policy. Because of the position of importance that the House of Representatives was to enjoy under the new constitution, all the parties tended to concentrate on elections for the lower house, in which 466 seats were to be filled. With the aim of winning at least 180 lower house seats, the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee decided to limit the number of its candidates to 250. This decision was based on the assumption that, on the basis of the party vote, in the 1946 elections the number of Socialists elected had been smaller than it should have been because of an overabundance of candidates. The maximum figure was apparently later raised to 300 but reduced again to 250 under the stimulus of the revisions in the election law.² When the period for filing closed, the Socialists had nominated 285 candidates, of whom 85 had been elected to the lower house in the 1946 elections.³ In the election for the House of Councillors, 22 Socialists were nominated for the 100 seats in the national constituency and 115 for the 150 prefectural seats.⁴

Candidates for the Diet were recommended to the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee by the prefectural branches of the party. The Central Executive Committee, although agreeing in general to accept the candidates recommended by the local branches, reserved for itself the right to select candidates of national reputation and assign them to appropriate constituencies. Three principles were adopted in selecting candidates: (1) men with long experience in the Socialist

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1. Jiji Press release, March 6, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, March 7, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, March 7, 1947.
 2. Jiji Press release, February 26, 1947, April 1, 1947.
 3. Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 1947.
 4. Ibid., March 13, 1947.

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movement were to be preferred; (2) recent party adherents were to be nominated only if they could be relied upon to observe party regulations; and, (3) as a general rule, no one was to be allowed to join the party merely for the purpose of becoming its candidate. Where exceptions seemed justified, the would-be candidate was to be carefully investigated before being admitted to the party.¹

For campaigning purposes an election committee was established at party headquarters under the chairmanship of HIRANO Rikizo and the country was divided into eleven districts, in each of which an electoral subcommittee was established under the supervision of a representative of party headquarters. The subcommittees were to advise on the preliminary selection of candidates and were to perform liaison functions between the Central Executive Committee and the prefectures in the actual conduct of the party's campaign.² In their campaign propaganda the Socialists naturally devoted considerable energy to underlining the deficiencies of the Yoshida cabinet, criticizing especially its failure to improve the distribution of staple food, to increase the production of coal, to curb inflation, and to honor its commitments to labor.³ For its own part, the Shakaito continued to advocate its basic program, placing particular stress on immediate proposals for government control of the coal mines and the fertilizer industry, heavy taxation of wartime and black-market profiteers, and suspension for one year of interest payments on wartime government bonds.⁴

As a result of the elections the Socialists gained 143 seats in the lower house as against 132 for the Liberals and 126 for the Democrats. In popular votes they were somewhat outdistanced by the Liberals with 7,235,242 votes, or 26.5 percent

1. Shin Hochi, February 25, 1947; Nippon Keizai Shimbun, February 27, 1947.
2. Nippon Keizai Shimbun, February 27, 1947.
3. Shakai Shimbun, March 31, 1947.
4. Ibid., March 28, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, April 10, 1947.

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of the total, as against 7,168,868, or 26.2 percent for the Socialists.¹ (See Table 2). In the upper house elections, dominated by independent rather than party candidates, the Socialists won 46 seats, the Liberals 39, and the Democrats 32, with 112 seats going to independent candidates. In the national constituency 3,479,814 votes, or 16 percent of the total, were cast for Socialist candidates, while in the prefectural constituencies the Socialists won 4,901,341 votes, or 22 percent of the total. (See Table 3).²

c. Communist policy. Placing its main emphasis on elections to the lower house, the Kyōsantō expressed its hopes of winning at least 50 seats in that body. After the revision of the election laws, the Communists reduced the number of their candidates from 170 to 120 in order to avoid having more than one candidate in each of the 117 electoral districts except in a few areas where the party felt itself to be particularly strong. In the election for House of Councillors the Kyōsantō ran 28 candidates in the national constituency and 53 candidates in the prefectural constituencies.³

In contrast to its practice in 1946, when an election committee was set up in party headquarters, the Kyōsantō conducted its 1947 campaign under the immediate direction of the Political Bureau. Candidates were recommended by the party's local committees to the Political Bureau, which then selected the official nominees and directed electioneering activities.⁴ Communist campaign propaganda, like that of the Socialists, relied heavily on the basic party program. Particularly emphasized were high property taxes, war and black-market profit taxes, and steeply graduated income taxes; state ownership and people's control of

1. OIR-4310, p. 57.

2. OIR-4334, p. 49.

3. Jiji Press release, February 28, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 13, 1947; Jiji Shimpō, April 4, 1947.

4. Tokyo Shimbun, March 3, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 1947.

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financial institutions; state control of Zaibatsu-owned enterprises and the coal, steel, iron, fertilizer, electricity, and transportation industries; increase in prices paid to farmers; popular control of food distribution; and guarantees of the farmers' right to their land.¹ Members of the Kyōsantō were instructed by the party organ that the policy of conducting an election campaign on the basis of the popularity of individual candidates was sheer social-democratic opportunism and that the Communists must seek to gain votes and support from the people by participating in and leading their daily struggles for ration deliveries, wage increases, and additional housing.²

In the lower house elections the Communists won four seats, as compared with five in 1946, and 1,002,884 popular votes, or 3.6 percent of the total, as compared with 3.9 percent in 1946.³ (See Table 2.) Although the Communist loss was slight, the fact that it occurred at a time when the Left as a whole was registering substantial gains was indicative of the fact that in the political sphere the Kyōsantō had lost ground in the year between the two elections. In the House of Councillors election the Communists received 610,498 votes, or 3 percent of the total, in the national constituency and 825,304, or 4 percent of the total, in the prefectural constituencies. (See Table 3.) Four Communists were elected to the upper house, three from the national constituency and one from the prefectural.⁴

d. Trade-Union Activities. The trade unions took an active and independent part in the 1947 national elections, supporting the candidacy of a number of trade-union leaders running for the Diet as Socialists, Communists, or independents. The form taken by union election activities, however, varied considerably in accord with the particular political orientation of the union involved.

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1. Akahata, February 28 and April 8, 1947.
 2. Ibid., February 26, March 3, and March 6, 1947.
 3. See-OIR-4310, p. 57.
 4. Ibid., pp. 49, 53.

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RESTRICTEDTable 2. 1947 JAPANESE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION:
VOTES CAST FOR PARTIES BY PREFECTURE

<u>Prefecture</u>	<u>Socialist</u>		<u>Communist</u>	
	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Hokkaido	306,160	29.3	36,356	3.4
Aomori	35,163	9.6	11,014	2.9
Ivate	105,401	25.0	9,033	2.1
Miyagi	133,045	26.3	9,794	1.9
Akita	89,012	22.3	19,055	4.7
Yamagata	97,519	20.4	9,294	1.9
Fukushima	184,535	28.2	14,133	2.1
Ibaraki	130,795	19.6	12,947	1.9
Tochigi	140,482	26.4	10,735	2.0
Gunma	176,844	29.2	18,524	3.0
Saitama	197,045	25.8	37,685	4.9
Chiba	81,698	12.2	14,323	2.1
Tokyo	568,523	36.2	134,625	8.6
Kanagawa	277,739	38.5	38,615	5.3
Niigata	237,472	29.5	25,718	3.1
Toyama	93,375	23.8	5,712	1.4
Ishikawa	74,213	21.8	23,318	6.8
Fukui	76,195	25.6	4,325	1.4
Yamanashi	102,563	33.0	11,133	3.5
Nagano	157,059	19.8	63,979	8.0
Gifu	140,029	25.8	8,920	1.6
Shizuoka	192,447	21.8	28,774	3.2
Aichi	273,519	22.6	46,595	3.8
Mie	96,711	18.2	22,088	4.1
Shiga	102,827	29.9	6,653	1.9
Kyoto	244,331	40.5	15,545	2.5
Osaka	369,932	31.8	70,020	6.0
Hyogo	319,863	28.9	37,775	3.4
Nara	51,948	15.9	12,992	3.9
Wakayama	98,073	28.8	8,119	2.3
Tottori	72,343	32.3	11,751	5.2
Shimane	126,436	33.9	20,597	5.5
Okayama	145,003	24.8	29,534	5.0
Hiroshima	235,250	30.6	19,420	2.5
Yamaguchi	132,259	26.2	22,575	4.4
Tokushima	55,605	19.7	3,230	1.1
Kagawa	114,508	31.7	8,573	2.3
Ehime	131,288	24.9	15,677	2.9
Kochi	64,235	19.2	8,721	2.6
Fukuoka	407,094	36.1	41,239	3.6
Saga	27,746	7.6	10,889	2.9
Nagasaki	116,557	24.8	11,239	2.3
Kumamoto	155,885	24.5	7,109	1.1
Oita	74,813	19.3	13,900	3.6
Miyazaki	82,121	22.8	7,233	2.0
Kagoshima	73,207	12.5	3,398	0.5
	<u>7,168,868</u>	<u>26.3</u>	<u>1,002,884</u>	<u>3.7</u>

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LEFT WING PARTY VOTES IN THE PREFECTURAL CONSTITUENCIES

Prefecture	Socialists		Communists	
	Votes	Percent of Total	Votes	Percent of Total
Hokkaido	175,897	21	28,115	3
Aomori	32,778	11	a	-
Iwate	a	-	a	-
Miyagi	122,668	30	a	-
Akita	97,415	30	13,475	4
Yamagata	123,699	30	18,450	5
Fukushima	95,672	18	17,520	3
Ibaraki	64,081	14	24,436	5
Tochigi	106,635	24	a	-
Gunma	93,033	18	16,293	3
Saitama	139,946	22	27,186	4
Chiba	70,839	14	14,382	3
Tokyo	317,281	27	77,934	7
Kanagawa	174,914	31	29,824	5
Niigata	135,482	21	22,925	3
Toyama	84,168	25	a	-
Ishikawa	67,849	24	20,458	7
Fukui	74,469	30	12,076	5
Yamanashi	90,366	34	13,254	5
Nagano	186,529	27	41,826	6
Gifu	b	-	b	-
Shizuoka	86,132	11	32,329	4
Aichi	147,035	15	a	-
Mie	70,090	16	18,909	4
Shiga	53,184	17	a	-
Kyoto	118,160	24	23,776	5
Osaka	265,434	28	42,474	5
Hyogo	247,312	27	28,032	3
Nara	49,425	17	a	-
Wakayama	56,424	19	5,551	2
Tottori	83,742	42	a	-
Shimane	74,031	23	26,888	8
Okayama	105,467	23	45,709	10
Hiroshima	167,910	26	a	-
Yamaguchi	103,605	25	33,004	8
Tokushima	62,881	30	a	-
Kagawa	33,274	11	a	-
Ehime	101,155	24	24,008	5
Kochi	29,168	11	a	-
Fukuoka	327,268	35	34,178	3
Saga	83,189	25	a	-
Nagasaki	118,921	33	a	-
Kumamoto	145,417	26	a	-
Oita	a	-	132,292	34
Miyasaki	90,855	29	a	-
Kagoshima	27,541	5	a	-
TOTAL	4,901,341	22	825,304	4

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FOOTNOTES TO TABLE 3

- a. No candidate competed for seats in this district.
- b. There was no contest in Gifu, since only two candidates competed for the two prefectural seats.

Source: SCAP statistics.

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In mid-February, the Sōdōmei Central Executive Committee announced that only Socialist candidates would receive the official support of the federation. For purposes of negotiating with the Shakaitō to obtain the party nomination for union-sponsored candidates, liaison committees were to be organized on a national and local basis and Sōdōmei affiliates were to assist the Shakaitō in conducting its campaign. Sōdōmei leaders proposed at this time for candidacy were successful in obtaining Shakaitō nomination and by, mid-March 39 Socialists were running with specific Sōdōmei endorsement.¹

The Sanbetsu, in accord with its so-called political neutrality, adopted a much more independent policy, endorsing Socialist, Communist, and independent candidates who were regarded as reflecting the will of the democratic front and representing the interests of the working masses.² Similarly, individual unions, such as those of the teachers and the electrical workers, gave their endorsement to independent candidates drawn largely from the ranks of their own leadership.

Another outlet for the expression of trade-union interest in the elections was the anti-cabinet committee originally organized by KATO Kanju at the time of the Yoshida cabinet crisis and composed largely of union representatives. In mid-March the committee made public its list of some fifty upper house candidates receiving its official support -- a disparate group of independents, anti-Communist leftists, Communist sympathizers, Communists, and Socialists.

On the basis of existing information, it is extremely difficult to determine either the extent of trade-union election activities or their effect. It is not known, for example, whether trade-union endorsement of candidates was accompanied by financial contributions or other campaign aid, nor are complete lists of union-supported candidates available. In view of the relatively small number of independents

1. Asahi Shimbun, February 19, 1947; Rōdō, February 2, and 28, 1947; Kyodo release, March 19, 1947.
2. Mimpo, February 16 and 27, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, March 20, 1947.

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elected to the lower house and their generally conservative complexion, it seems evident that trade-union activities were probably most effective in bringing organized support to Socialist candidates to whom unionized workers were already sympathetically inclined. In the upper house elections, where independent trade-union activities were most conspicuous, the results do not appear to have been particularly favorable, since of the 112 independent candidates elected to the House of Councillors only about a dozen can be definitely identified with the trade unions. Here again, however, it is possible that organized trade-union participation was responsible for bringing out some part of the vote cast for Socialist and Communist candidates.

3. Conduct and Results of the Local Elections. Because of the large number of offices to be filled -- 10,419 municipal mayoralties and ward headships, 193,881 seats in local assemblies, and 46 prefectural governorships -- and because of the greater attention naturally devoted to the national elections in the press, detailed and accurate information with regard to the conduct and results of the local elections is difficult to obtain.¹ Statistical compilations of the election results, moreover, are extremely misleading as an indication of the size of the vote cast by members or supporters of any particular political party. Since all the parties suffered from a shortage of candidates, they tended to give their support to independents whose political views seemed sympathetic or who appeared likely to be successful. The Japanese ballot, however, provides only for the writing in of the candidate's name without party designation; thus, only those votes were counted as Socialist, for example, that were cast for actual Shakaitō

1. The most comprehensive available statement of local election results is contained in pp. 70-73 of The Japanese Elections, April 1947, a report published by Government Section, SCAP, on June 20, 1947.

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members and the number of votes brought to any given independent candidate by Shakaitō endorsement is impossible to determine.

Of all the local elections, the gubernatorial elections, because of the small number of offices to be filled and their relative importance, best lend themselves to analysis. Much of what is said with regard to party policy in this campaign, however, is also true in general of the other local elections.

The policies of the left-wing parties in the gubernatorial elections, like those of the conservative parties, were inevitably affected by the necessity of running candidates in four series of elections taking place in rapid succession. From the outset, the Communists decided to avoid as far as possible the nomination of Kyōsantō candidates, proposing instead to support any candidate, whatever his party affiliation, who had the backing of the masses.¹ They pointed out, however, that if the local Socialist Executive Committees -- whose candidates, in general, the Communists might be expected to support -- refused to give the nomination to the candidate supported by the masses, the Communists might find it necessary to come forward with their own candidates.² Subsequent to the government's decision to call for a lower house election, moreover, the Communists made it clear that they attached primary importance to the elections for the House of Representatives and the local assemblies and only secondary importance to the elections for local executives.³ As a result of this policy, only nine gubernatorial candidates actually ran on the Communist ticket.

The Shakaitō initially attached considerable importance to the gubernatorial elections and planned to put forward a party candidate in each prefecture.⁴ Although many more candidates ultimately ran on the Socialist ticket than on those of any other party, the realities of the situation led the Socialists to reduce their

1. Akahata, September 14, 1946; Shizuoka Shimbun, November 3, 1946.

2. Akahata, November 6, 1946.

3. Ibid., February 26, 1947; Mimpo, February 27, 1947.

4. Jiji Shimpō, November 19, 1946.

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own candidates to 34 instead of running the full 46 originally planned.

Like the Communists, the Socialists had stated their willingness to support non-party candidates whose principles and program met with their approval,¹ and, like the conservative parties, they were attracted by the prospects of success offered by the incumbent governors who were running in 39 of the 46 prefectures. In Hiroshima, for example, after the Liberals failed to induce the incumbent to join their party as a prerequisite to party support, the Socialists made a similar attempt and were similarly unsuccessful.² Elsewhere, however, the Socialists were less insistent that the incumbent join the party if he wished to receive party support, and in three cases incumbents running as independents and supported by one or both of the conservative parties also received Socialist backing.

Cooperation with the conservative parties, on the whole, appears to have played only a minor role in Socialist election policy and is known to have occurred in only six prefectures. Much more important, of course, was the question of Socialist-Communist cooperation. On this question the policy of the local branches, with whom the initial responsibility for nominations lay, differed markedly in some cases from that of the national headquarters.

Despite the firmness of Shakaitō refusals to enter into a united front for national election purposes, joint Socialist-Communist support of candidates was one of the most conspicuous features of the gubernatorial campaign. Of the 35 gubernatorial candidates who ran on the Socialist ticket, 21 were supported by the Communists as well, and 6 do not appear to have been actively opposed by a Communist or Communist-supported candidate. Of the three independents who received their major party support from the Socialists, moreover, two were definitely supported by the Communists and the third may have been.

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1. Mimpo, October 22, 1946.
 2. Yukan Hiroshima, February 21, 1947.

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It is not unlikely, of course, that in many prefectures the local branches of the Shakaitō neither sought Communist support nor welcomed it. In a number of prefectures, contact between the two parties appears to have been at a minimum, with the Kyōsantō supporting its own candidate and only later withdrawing him in favor of the Socialist nominee. In other prefectures, however, there is evidence that united front election organizations, in which both parties participated, played active and influential roles. In Akita, for example, the Socialists originally proposed to nominate one of their local leaders. The Kyōsantō, the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, and a number of other unions in the prefecture supported an unaffiliated leftist, SUZUKI Kiyoshi. After a meeting of a united front Election Strife Committee, the Socialists agreed to admit Suzuki to the party and to nominate him for governor.¹ In Kyoto, long a center of united front activities, the Socialists initially seemed disposed to support a Communist candidate. Ultimately, however, the Socialists appear to have supported an independent candidate who had recently seceded from the Communist Party.² In only 11 prefectures did the Communists support candidates in opposition to those supported by the Socialists. Of these, 7 were candidates running on the Communist ticket; 4 were independents who received Communist but not Socialist support.³

The gubernatorial elections placed in office 4 Socialists, 4 Liberals, 4 Democrats, 4 minor party candidates, and 30 independents. Of the 4 successful Socialists, 3 had also been supported by the Kyōsantō. In addition, 4 of the independents supported by the Shakaitō, as well as by other parties, were successful. Popular vote tabulations for all local executives, including those of the municipalities and wards, gave Shakaitō-nominated candidates (as distinct from Shakaitō-supported independents) 6,424,100 votes, or 24 percent of the total.

1. Akitasakigake Shimbun, February 20, 1947; Yukan Miyako, March 4, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, March 14 and 15, 1947. Suzuki later seceded from the Shakaitō and in April 1948 joined the Kyōsantō.
2. Yukan Kyoto, March 9, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 28, 1947.
3. No information is available regarding Socialist activities in two prefectures in which Communists supported their own candidates.

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The Liberals followed with 2,127,758 votes, or 7.9 percent of the total, but the independents, a large majority of whom were conservatively inclined, led the field with 14,425,562 votes, or 53.9 percent of the total.¹

Results in the other local elections paralleled those of the gubernatorial race, with unaffiliated candidates obtaining the lion's share of popular votes and offices. In the election for municipal and ward executives the Socialists, with 264 successful candidates, trailed the Liberals with 379 and the Democrats with 339. In this election the Communists succeeded in capturing 11 positions. In the local assembly elections the independents once again led, with 31 percent of the popular vote and 173,999 seats, while the Socialists, with 17.5 percent of the popular vote, or slightly less than either the Liberals or the Democrats, obtained 5,924 seats, or almost 600 more than those occupied by affiliates of the two conservative parties. The Communists obtained 556,473 popular votes, or 1.8 percent of the total, and seated 420 assemblymen.²

B. The Coalition Negotiations of May 1947

1. Factors Affecting the Negotiations. The distribution of seats in the post-election lower house -- 143 for the Socialists, 133 for the Liberals, and 126 for the Democrats -- made a coalition cabinet inevitable. In principle, each of the three major parties supported a four-party coalition that would include the 31 representatives of the People's Cooperatives as well as themselves. In actual fact, however, the Liberals really wished a Liberal-Democratic coalition under Liberal domination, while the Democrats, although theoretically in the advantageous position of holding the balance of power between the Liberals and the Socialists, were unable to utilize their position effectively because of the controversy within the party between the Ashida and Shidehara factions. The

1. Kyodo release, April 9, 1947.

2. Government Section, SCAP, The Japanese Elections, April 1947, p. 72.

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Ashida faction from the outset advocated a four-party coalition cabinet headed by the Socialists and sought to influence the Liberals along these lines, whereas the Shidehara faction was closer to the Liberal view that the conservatives should dominate the coalition to the exclusion of the Socialists if necessary. Ashida's election to the Democratic presidency, moreover, gave the victory to his faction by so slim a margin that, despite his own willingness to participate in a cabinet with the Socialists and without the Liberals, he was forced to continue to seek Liberal participation in order to avoid a rupture in his own party.

The Socialists, in contrast to the Democrats and to their own previous behavior, acted with remarkable unity, adopting a fairly consistent position throughout the negotiations, shaken neither by Liberal vituperativeness nor by Democratic disunity. Although assuming a position somewhat opposed to that of the right wing, the left-wing Socialists neither argued vociferously within the party councils nor sought to gain mass support for their arguments, as they had in the past, through the organization of a trade-union opposition to right-wing policy.

It is probable that, to some extent, the change in Socialist methods of negotiation was a concession to the Left and was one factor behind the willingness of the left wing to subordinate itself. In previous coalition negotiations the Socialist Central Executive Committee had tended to operate in considerable secrecy without consulting any larger party group. The negotiations that preceded the formation of the Katayama cabinet, however, were opened by the Socialists, in accordance with a pre-election agreement, only after the party's position had been fully discussed by the Central Committee. In these discussions, and at meetings of the Shakaitō's Central Executive Committee and of Socialist Diet members, the general lines of the right-wing and the left-wing positions became apparent.

Both factions were agreed that, under the circumstances, a coalition government was inevitable. The Right argued that a national unity cabinet including the three

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major parties and the People's Cooperatives would provide the most satisfactory basis for labor-capital conciliation -- a prerequisite to economic rehabilitation --, for peace conference preparations, and for the recovery of the entire nation rather than that of any individual class or group. This being the case, they declared, they would not insist on the allocation of the premiership to the Shakaitō if there were any danger that such insistence would prevent four-party cooperation.

The Left, on the other hand, argued both for Socialist leadership of the cabinet and for the exclusion of the Liberals. The leftists agreed that achievement of economic recovery would be the most pressing duty of the future cabinet, but they declared that a mere mixture of divergent policies would retard rather than promote such recovery. They denied that a national unity cabinet, if not supported by domestic interests, was required by the international situation. In this field, they argued, unity could be obtained by organizing in the Diet a committee for peace conference preparations composed of members of each of the parties represented in the two houses.¹

On May 7, the Shakaitō Central Committee voted in support of a national unity cabinet and agreed to leave the final decision in the hands of the Central Executive Committee. A motion that the Central Committee set forth concrete terms for participation in a coalition cabinet and indicate the maximum concessions that the party was willing to make was withdrawn by its sponsor, a minor member of the left-wing faction, when the objection was raised that such a resolution would unduly tie the hands of the Central Executive Committee.²

On the following day Premier Yoshida called upon KATAYAMA Tetsu to take the initiative in forming a new cabinet. In the ensuing negotiations, the Socialists appeared to be willing to make major concessions to the Liberals and Democrats in

1. Mainichi Shimbun, April 28 and 29, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, May 4, 1947.
2. Jiji Press release, May 8, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, May 8, 1947.

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order to insure the formation of a four-party coalition. That left-wing hopes were ultimately answered by a cabinet in which Katayama was premier and in which the Liberals played no part was the result of Liberal intransigence rather than of Socialist unwillingness to compromise. The willingness of the Socialists to compromise was nowhere more clearly evident than in the adoption of the four-party policy agreement.

2. The Four-Party Policy Agreement. On May 12, at a four-party meeting, the Socialists submitted a six-point program as the basis for the formation of a cabinet dedicated to overcoming the economic crisis. Although the program called in general terms for a state-controlled economy, its vagueness and moderation indicated a willingness on the part of the Socialists to sacrifice much of their own economic policy to the exigencies of four-party cooperation. The six-point program included proposals for democratic state control of key industries; enlargement and strengthening of the Economic Stabilization Board; cooperation between industry and labor; establishment of a sound financial policy, with the banks brought under state control to the extent necessary to curb inflation; strict control of wages and prices and the enforcement of a rigid rationing system; and government enforcement of crop delivery quotas and the eradication of black-market practices.¹ On the following day, at a meeting of the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee, the agricultural aspects of the six-point policy statement were modified to include a demand that the government insure the distribution of fertilizer and other necessities to the agrarian communities. This alteration, insisted upon by the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, brought the six-point program more closely into agreement with the previous Shakaitō policy of opposing compulsory rice collection in the absence of measures for the aid of the farmers.²

The Liberal Party made clear its firm adherence to its financial policies as previously pursued by ISHIBASHI Tanzan and declared that any compromises on these

1. FBIB, Daily Report, May 13, 1947, p. AAA-4.

2. Jiji Press release, May 13, 1947.

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policies must be made by the Socialists. Specifically, the Liberals objected to the suspension of interest payments on national bonds, state control of key industries, and any attempt to register the yen as a preliminary step to the imposition of a higher tax rate on the so-called new yen group. The initial differences between Liberal and Socialist economic policies that constituted the stumbling block to Yoshida's coalition attempt in early 1947 thus remained, and the Liberals made clear their refusal to participate in any agreement with the Socialists that would vitiate the Liberal Party's financial policies.

On May 14, faced with the obvious unwillingness of the Liberals to accept the six-point program, the Democrats brought forward an eight-point program as a basis for compromise. This eight-point program differed from the Socialist plan in calling for state control of key industries only "in case of necessity"; in omitting any reference to state control of the banks; and in stating that no steps should be taken that would either freeze the new yen currency or have similar effects.¹

As a result of Democratic efforts, four-party agreement was obtained on May 16 to a ten-point policy statement that, in general, reflected the ideas set forth in the Democrats' eight-point program and, therefore, indicated that the major concessions had been made by the Shakaitō.²

3. The Left-Wing Manifesto of May 15. Another possible inducement to Liberal participation in the cabinet was provided by the so-called Left-Wing Manifesto of May 15. On this day KATO Kanju and SUZUKI Mosaburo issued a statement in which they asserted that the time had come to draw a firm line between Kyōsantō activities and those of the Shakaitō. Declaring that the principles of social democracy and those of Communism are absolutely irreconcilable, the two leftist leaders attacked the Kyōsantō for its advocacy of revolution by violence and of the dictatorship of

1. Kyodo release, May 15, 1947.

2. Jiji Press release, May 16, 1947.

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the proletariat, for obstructing Japanese recovery by its daily struggle tactics, and for opposing the importation of foreign capital. In a rather unconvincing explanation of earlier left-wing advocacy of the united front, Kato and Suzuki declared that in 1946 they had supported the united front as a device to forestall the revival of reactionary dominance and as a method by which the Shakaitō might wrest control of the trade unions from the Kyōsantō. The recent general elections, however, they said, had demonstrated that the Shakaitō had grown stronger while the Kyōsantō grew weaker, that the close ties between the Liberals and the Democrats had been broken, and that, therefore, the Shakaitō, which the writers claimed was now the dominating influence in 70 percent of the trade unions, was in a position henceforth to fight single-handed.¹

Whatever the intentions of the Left-wing Manifesto, the reactions it produced were generally unfavorable. Only the Socialist centrists appeared willing to accept the statement as genuine and sincere and to welcome it as improving the prospects for Shakaitō unity. Liberals and such right-wing Socialists as HIRANO Rikizo were suspicious of the sincerity of the statement and regarded it as primarily an attempt to obtain cabinet seats for the left-wing faction. The reaction of many leftists was equally unfriendly, with MATSUMOTO Jiichiro reaffirming the need for a joint Socialist-Communist front while ARAHATA Katsuzo indignantly denied that the implication of left-wing cooperation with the Communists in the past had any basis in fact.²

4. Organization of the Three-Party Cabinet. The adherence of the Liberals to the four-party agreement on May 16, it subsequently appeared, was of little practical effect in altering their opposition to participation in a four-party cabinet dominated by Socialists and Ashida Democrats. On May 19 Yoshida informed the Socialists that, although the Liberals would support Katayama in the lower house

1. Jiji Press release, May 15, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, May 27, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, May 30, 1947.

2. Jiji Press release, May 16, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, May 20, 1947.

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vote for the premier, they would not join the Socialists in a coalition unless the Shakaitō expelled its left-wing members. If for no other reason than that the left-wing faction occupied a substantial proportion of Socialist seats in the Diet, the Liberal demand was obviously one that the Shakaitō could not accept, although the Shakaitō was ready to commit itself to excluding leftists from the cabinet.¹ On May 21, a meeting of Liberal Diet members unanimously supported Yoshida's determination to remain outside the cabinet. On the same night, the election by Socialist-Democratic agreement of Socialist MATSUOKA Komakichi as speaker of the House of Representatives and Democrat TANAKA Manitsu as vice speaker further widened the rift between the Liberals, who had claimed the speakership for themselves, and the other two major parties.²

Nevertheless, on May 23, the Liberals joined the Socialists and the Democrats in voting for Katayama as premier in the lower house election, apparently on the assumption that the Democratic stipulation that Katayama's cabinet must include Liberals if the Democrats were to participate, combined with the strengthening of Shidehara's position as a result of the possibility that Ashida might be purged, would make it impossible for Katayama to form a cabinet. The Liberals remained aloof from further negotiations, devoting their attention for the moment to the discussion of a projected anti-Communist crusade.³

Meanwhile three-party talks continued, and on May 29, at Democratic insistence, the Socialists committed the future cabinet to vigorous opposition to the principles both of the extreme right and the extreme left, to prevention of leakage of state secrets, and to refraining from any speech or action that might cause social unrest.⁴ This statement, intended by the Democrats to restrict the

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1. Jiji Press release, May 20, 1947
 2. Ibid., May 21, 1947; Kyodo release, May 22, 1947.
 3. Kyodo release, May 23 and 27, 1947.
 4. Ibid., May 29, 1947.

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activities of the left-wing, failed to move the Liberals, and on May 31 the Katayama cabinet was formed on the basis of a coalition of the Socialist, Democratic, and People's Cooperative Parties committed to respect the principles of the four-party agreement despite Liberal non-participation.

The cabinet as finally organized contained seven Socialists, an equal number of Democrats, two People's Cooperatives, and one independent. In accordance with previous agreements, the seven Socialist members represented the right and center factions only. Despite heated Nippon Nōmin Kumiai opposition, HIRANO Rikizo was named Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. The other Socialist seats went to MORITO Tatsuo as Minister of Education, MIZUTANI Chosaburo as Minister of Commerce and Industry; SUZUKI Yoshio as Minister of Justice, NISHIO Suehiro as Minister without Portfolio and concurrently Chief Cabinet Secretary, and YONEKUBO Mitsusuke, who was to serve as Minister without Portfolio until such time as the projected Labor Ministry might be established. The appointment of Independent WADA Hiroo as Minister without Portfolio and concurrently head of the Economic Stabilization Board further strengthened the Socialist position, since Wada, although at one time a member of the Yoshida cabinet, was closer in his economic views to the Socialists than to the conservative parties.

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RESTRICTEDII. EIGHT MONTHS OF THE KATAYAMA CABINETA. Introduction

1. Problems of Policy. The principal problems of the Katayama cabinet, as of its predecessors, were problems of economic rather than political policy. This was the case not only because of the pressing nature of the economic problems confronting postwar Japan but also as a result of differences in occupation policy in the political and economic fields. In the political field primary emphasis was on the accomplishment of a program of reform the general direction of which had been established in Allied policy decision and the detailed development of which had to a very large extent been the responsibility of SCAP's staff. In such major fields as constitutional reform, the reorganization of national and local government, and the reform of the civil service, therefore, successive cabinets were less bound by the policies of their component parties than they were by the reform program sponsored by SCAP. Although a similar situation obtained in the field of economic reform, the policy of SCAP with regard to economic stabilization was to a much greater extent one of placing responsibility on the Japanese Government for the development of policy and its implementation. It was in the latter area, therefore, that the most heated controversies developed within the government and between the government parties and the opposition.

When the Katayama cabinet took office the economic crisis was acute. Successive cabinets, whatever their official programs, had signally failed to find effective remedies for an acute food shortage, rampant black markets, inflation, labor unrest produced by the wide disparity between ever rising prices and lagging wages, and slow progress in industrial rehabilitation. So desperate had the situation become and so marked were the inadequacies of government policy that on March 22, 1947 SCAP addressed a strong letter of

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reproof to Premier Yoshida urging the enforcement of strong economic controls and pointing out that SCAP was under no obligation to bolster the Japanese economy by importing food.

The Socialists, of course, had been among the most vocal critics of the economic failures of previous cabinets. Although their own proposals for economic policy were far-reaching, the Socialists could not expect that, given the nature of the coalition and the policies by which it was bound, the opportunity would arise under the Katayama cabinet to adopt wholesale socialization or other drastic changes in the economic structure. The two statements on economic policy issued by the new cabinet -- the eight-point program of June 11 and the White Paper of July 6 -- although somewhat stronger and more comprehensive in their commitments regarding enforcement of controls than the statements of previous cabinets, contained no really new elements. Even within the limited framework of policy projected, however, differences between and within the two major coalition parties were of increasing significance in delaying the adoption of policies on specific issues and in undermining the ability of the cabinet to carry out policy effectively once adopted.

2. Internal Cabinet Difficulties. Throughout the negotiations leading to the organization of the Katayama cabinet, the members of the Socialist left wing, previously outspoken in their objections to coalition with conservative elements, were unusually quiet. If the organization of the cabinet brought them no other benefits, it did strengthen their position within the party. In the appointment of new officers to positions vacated by cabinet members and parliamentary vice ministers, the leftists, who had previously held two out of thirteen party committee chairmanships, were -- with the support of the centrists -- successful in gaining three additional chairmanships, among them that of the Political Affairs Committee. In this key policy-drafting committee, moreover, subcommittee chairmanships and

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other positions were practically monopolized by leftists. The division of spoils that allocated cabinet posts to rightists and centrists and party posts to leftists, however, by no means established internal party unity. Rather, the existence of many frictions within the party was reflected in the Diet by the organization of factional clubs among the Socialist members of the Diet. Not only did Socialist Diet members affiliated with the two farmers' organizations, the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai and the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai,¹ form rival groups within the Diet, but also left-wing and right-wing Socialists organized other mutually hostile societies. On the left the most important of these was the May Society, led by KATO Kanju and SUZUKI Mosaburo. Right-wing societies included the Nineteen Club and the Anonymous Society, which, in general, owed allegiance to Hirano. Desire to prevent these rival factions from splitting the party inspired centrist Socialists to organize still another group, the Thursday Society, devoted to the maintenance of party unity and including among its members Acting Secretary General ASANUMA Inejiro and Cabinet Ministers MIZUTANI Chosaburo, SUZUKI Yoshio, and YONEKUBO Mitsusuke. Also devoted to maintaining party unity was a later group of some thirty right-wing Socialists, the Current Problems Council, that sought to prevent Hirano's final secession from the Shakaïto from reaching the proportions of a mass exodus.² With few exceptions, most Socialist Diet members belonged to at least one of these factions. Many belonged to more than one, with overlapping memberships representing slight shades of factional differences or, like the mingling of members of left-wing and centrist factions in the Socialist Cultural Society, some common interest or personal tie.

Equally disruptive of cabinet stability were the factions that existed among the Democrats. The factionalism that had been evident during the coalition

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1. Organized by the Nichinō Sasshin Dōmei in May 1947. See p. 216.
 2. Shakaï Shimbun, May 27, 1947; Tokyo Tomin, May 29, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, December 29 and 31, 1947.

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negotiations -- particularly the marked split between followers of Ashida and those of Shidehara -- became increasingly marked as the Democrats assumed the responsibilities of office in partnership with a party with the basic economic program of which they were fundamentally out of sympathy.

B. The Coal Mine Control Law and Socialist-Democratic Controversy

1. The Issues at Stake. Plans for legislation placing the coal mines under state control, in line with Socialist campaign promises, were first presented to the cabinet early in June. Agreement of the three coalition parties on the general principles to underlie such legislation was not attained until August 11, and it was not until September 18 that the cabinet gave its final approval to a draft bill. Continuing to follow a tortuous course, the bill remained in the lower house Mining and Industry Committee from September 25, the date of its submission, until November 26, when it was forced to the floor of the lower house.

The time consumed in negotiations over the bill, rather than reflecting a desire to deal exhaustively with a complicated and technical subject, was the outcome of disagreements between the Socialists and the Democrats on the principles of state control and, even more fundamentally, of disagreements among the Democrats themselves. The Socialists, under no illusions regarding the palatability of their philosophy to the Democrats, were prepared from the outset to accept a fairly limited plan for state control, reserving the fulfillment of their ultimate hopes for nationalization of the industry to some later date when the Shakaitō might be able to form a single-party cabinet. Socialist plans at this time called for the establishment in principle, of control over the entire industry, with Zaibatsu-owned enterprises and those with poor production records singled out for application of more stringent controls. As envisaged by the Socialists, these controls were to be applied primarily to the individual mines rather than to the central offices of the mining enterprises; control measures were to be devised by a hierarchy of councils composed of representatives of management, labor, technical experts, and coal consumers; and special controllers appointed to each mine were to share with management responsibility for carrying

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out control measures. Left-wing Socialists, in addition, favored distribution to the workers of profits above a certain maximum either through the establishment of a profit-sharing scheme or a welfare fund.¹

To the Socialists the passage of legislation for state control over the coal mines became, in the course of the acrimonious negotiations over its content, an end in itself -- a symbol of achievement to which the Socialists could point as their unique contribution to the policies of the coalition. In its pursuit of this end, the Shakaitō showed itself almost endlessly willing to alter the actual provisions of the bill to comply with Democratic demands. Even on this basis, however, achievement of Socialist-Democratic agreement on the coal bill was hampered by the split in the Democratic Party and the consequent inability of Democratic leadership to bind the party membership to its own course of action.

The leadership of the Democratic Party was committed in principle to accepting a scheme for state control of the coal mines. Although reconciled to the necessity of this concession to the Socialists if the coalition was to be preserved, Democratic leaders, impelled by their own convictions as well as by the pressure of the Shidehara faction, were anxious to reduce to a minimum any socialistic connotations that the bill might contain. In general the Democrats pressed for retaining as much as possible of the independence and authority of the mine owners. To this end, the Democrats urged that any bill passed be defined as temporary and as emergency in character; that the control features of the legislation be confined to newly opened mines and to mines with an annual productive capacity of at least 100,000 tons; that controls be operated through the central offices of the mining companies rather than on a mine-by-mine basis; and that the authority over mine operations of either government officials or of joint councils in which workers participated be minimal.²

1. Kyodo releases, June 9 and 10, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, June 10 and July 16, 1947; Nippon Keizai Shimbun, June 15, 1947; Jiji Press releases, July 8, 11, and 18, 1947.
2. Asahi Shimbun, July 1, 1947; Jiji Press release, July 23, 1947; FBIB, Daily Report, July 24, 1947, p. AAA-6, and August 7, 1947, p. AAA-2.

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2. Inter-party Negotiations. Early in June, Commerce and Industry Minister MIZUTANI Chosaburo presented a draft coal bill to the cabinet embodying Socialist ideas on a moderate form of state control. Unqualified opposition to the whole plan was soon announced by the Liberals; the Democrats opposed certain features of the proposal as bureaucratic, likely to disrupt cooperation between capital and labor, and apt to decrease rather than increase coal production; and left-wing Socialists, also finding the bill bureaucratic, demanded a greater voice for the workers in the administration of controls.¹

Then began the long process of inter-party negotiations involving both the leadership of the three coalition parties and the special coal committees set up in each of the parties.² On August 10 the presidents of the three parties reached an agreement on the principles to be embodied in the bill, and on the next day this agreement was ratified by the cabinet. The next four weeks were spent in drafting legislation that would embody these principles, and on September 5 a draft bill was approved by the cabinet. The bill as drafted made major concessions to Democratic demands for a clearly temporary measure, for a maximum of owner freedom, and for the exercise of controls through the central offices of the mining companies rather than wholly on the basis of individual mines. The various committees, national and regional, representing owners, consumers, and workers and the management-worker production councils to be established in individual mines designated for special control measures were relegated to an advisory position instead of being given the policy-making and administering functions originally envisaged by the Socialists. The controllers, charged with carrying out government-approved production plans in designated mines, were to be appointed by the owners, in each case after consultation with the production council of the mine involved and with

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1. Kyodo press releases, June 9 and 10, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, June 10, July 1, and July 16, 1947; FBIB, Daily Report, June 29, p. AAA-9, July 9, p. AAA-2, and July 24, p. AAA-6; House of Representatives, 1st Session, National Diet, Official Gazette Extra, No. 9, July 3, 1947, pp. 3, 4.
 2. The Shakaito committee was established under the chairmanship of KATO Kanju.

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the approval of the Minister of Commerce and Industry.¹

Despite these concessions and despite the fact that they had been accepted by the Democratic members of the cabinet, the draft bill aroused a storm of protest in the Democratic Party. Once again the Democratic leaders sought concessions from the Socialists, and the bill was amended by the cabinet to increase the authority of coal mine owners with regard to production plans for designated mines. Meanwhile the Socialists, although far from satisfied with the bill and under pressure from trade-union opponents of the concessions made to the Democrats, agreed to concentrate their efforts on its passage without further alterations -- a sufficiently difficult task in view of the Democrats' announced intention of introducing further amendments in the Diet and the obvious efforts of the Shidehara faction to prevent the passage of any bill, however amended.²

3. The Coal Bill in the Diet. Under these inauspicious circumstances, the Coal Bill was introduced in the lower house on September 25 and immediately referred to the Mining and Industry Committee. It soon became evident that the eight Liberal members and six dissident Democratic members of the thirty-member committee were determined to prolong the committee sessions indefinitely. In face of the deadlock created by the fact that these opponents of the Coal Bill, in combination with a number of minor party representatives who shared their views, controlled a majority in the committee, actual discussion of the bill's future reverted to the leadership of the three parties. New Democratic amendment proposals completely subordinating the controllers to the mine owners, deleting the requirement that the owner's choice for controller be approved by the Minister

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1. Jiji Press releases, August 10, 11, and 13, 1947; Kyodo releases, August 11 and September 4 and 6, 1947.
 2. Yomiuri Shimbun, September 13 and 17, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, September 15, 1947; Kyodo releases, September 16, 17, 18, and 20, 1947; Jiji Press releases, September 17 and 19, 1947.

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of Commerce and Industry, and further reducing the already insignificant powers of the production councils were reluctantly accepted by the Socialists.¹ The Democratic leaders, however, faced much greater difficulty with their party than had the Socialists. On November 12, a Democratic Party caucus voted approval of the bill with its amendments. Because 28 members of the lower house withdrew before the vote while 20 other Representatives and all the Democratic Councillors abstained, the vote of approval was only 66 to 2. Opponents of the bill therefore refused to accept the vote as binding, and the impasse in the Mining and Industry Committee continued.²

Government leaders then turned their efforts to forcing the bill to the floor of the lower house. A period of great confusion ensued, with various motions under consideration demanding that the Committee terminate its discussions and expressing confidence or lack of confidence in chairman of the Mining and Industry Committee ITO Ushiro and Lower House Speaker MATSUOKA Komakichi. Finally, on November 25, the Committee voted unfavorably on the bill. The next day it was passed by the House of Representatives by a vote of 233 to 155, with 27 Democrats voting against the bill and others absent.³ Two weeks later the House of Councillors voted its approval, and on December 20 the law was promulgated.³

The Socialists, however, had gained an empty victory, since the provisions of the law not only were far removed from their original proposals but also were in many cases so vague and left so much to the discretion of the Minister of Commerce and Industry that a change in the cabinet could be expected to have serious effects on the scope and vigor of the law's enforcement. Moreover, the unacceptability of

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1. Jiji Press releases, November 11, 12, and 13, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, November 14, 1947; House of Representatives, 1st Session, National Diet, Official Gazette Extra, No. 66, November 26, 1947, pp. 2-4.
 2. FBIB, Daily Report, November 14, 1947, p. AAA-3; Jiji Press release, November 15, 1947; Kyodo release, November 14, 1947.
 3. Jiji Press releases, November 22, 24, and 25, 1947; Kyodo releases, November 24 and 26, 1947.
 4. AS Law No. 219, Temporary State Control of Coal Mining Law, December 20, 1947.

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the law to some Democrats resulted in the first reduction of the Katayama cabinet's lower house majority. As a result of expulsions for violation of party discipline and resignations, twenty-eight members of the Diet, including Shidehara, were lost to the Democratic Party. Democratic defections were soon to be followed by Socialist losses as the dismissal of HIRANO Rikizo from the cabinet brought to a head a long-standing controversy in the Shakaitō.

C. The Hirano Controversy and the Split in the Shakaitō

1. Introduction. The appointment of HIRANO Rikizo to the post of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry was vigorously if unsuccessfully opposed by the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai. Despite the efforts of centrist Socialists to breach the split in the farmers' movement by bringing together the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai and the rival Hirano-led Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, the hostility of the two organizations and of their respective Diet factions continued to threaten the unity of the Shakaitō. Hirano's antagonism to the left wing, moreover, soon led to the disruption of his former alliance with Chief Cabinet Secretary NISHIO Suehiro, who, unlike Hirano, was determined to retain the left wing in the party and sought to conciliate leftist elements by supporting an increase in their influence in the Shakaitō in compensation for their exclusion from the cabinet. At the same time Hirano was rapidly becoming a center of controversy in the cabinet itself, since his desire to increase significantly the prices paid to farmers for their crops was diametrically opposed to the budgetary policies of Democratic Finance Minister KURUSU Takeo and to the wage-price stabilization policies of Director of the Economic Stabilization Board WADA Hiroo.

2. The Farmers' Union Issue. Late in May, at a national conference, Hirano's Nichinō Sesshin Dōmei served notice of its intention of organizing a new farmers' union and, for this purpose, set up a preparatory committee to form the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai (National Farmers' Union). Chaired by SATAKE Haruki, the conference voted to postpone the formal inauguration of the new group until July in order to

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give the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai time to purge itself of Communist influence and pave the way for a reunion of the two organizations.¹

At this juncture the centrist members of the Thursday Society, devoted to the preservation of Shakaitō unity, addressed themselves to the task of reconciling the two farmers' groups.² On the left this involved inducing the Socialists in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai to purge the organization of Communist control; on the right it involved persuading Hirano and his followers to abandon their plan for formal inauguration of a new union.

Prospects for driving a wedge between the left-wing Socialists and the Communists in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai appeared fairly favorable, since the Kato-Suzuki anti-Communist manifesto of May 15 had brought in its train increasing anti-Communism among left-wing Socialist Diet members affiliated with the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai. On the other hand, however, Communist influence in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai was sufficiently strong to make it unlikely that the union could adopt a clearly anti-Communist position without producing still another split. Moreover, an open break with the Communists was still vigorously opposed by the unity faction led by union president and Socialist Diet member KURODA Hisao and deriving most of its support from left-wing Socialists and independents in the union's prefectural branches.

It soon became evident that the anti-Communists were dominant in the union's Central Executive Committee while the Communists and their unity faction allies controlled the Central Committee. On July 4, the Central Executive Committee by a vote of 10 to 6 adopted a motion, proposed by OKADA Shoji, condemning Communist fractional activities within the union. The resolution concluded by "recognizing the fact that the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai must clearly define its stand against the Kyōsantō" and therefore urging "the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai to return to the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai as soon as possible."³ The right-wing organization's reception of

1. Jiji Press release, May 25, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, May 26, 1947.
2. Seiji Shimbun, June 13, 1947.
3. Jinmin, July 7, 1947; Mimpo, July 9, 1947; Akahata, July 10, 1947.

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this resolution was distinctly cold, however, and former members of the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai Central Committee who had seceded to the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai rejected the invitation to attend the sessions of the former in mid-July.¹

The resolution adopted by the Central Executive Committee met with no success in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai's Central Committee. On the first day of the session, attended by 142 of the original 256 Central Committee members, heated arguments raised by the demand of the pro-Communists, led by SHIMONOSAKE Masahide, for a reaffirmation of the February political neutrality resolution were ended by postponement of the final decision until the following day. At the second session only 120 members were present, and in the absence of a quorum, the meeting was adjourned without a vote. Press reports suggested that the small attendance at the second meeting was the result of the deliberate absence of anti-Communist elements, who realized that in the event of a vote the resolution would be defeated.²

Ten days later, on July 25, the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai was inaugurated as planned. The inaugural convention, attended by some 600 delegates representing 31 prefectural branches, elected KAGAWA Toyohiko president, SATAKE Haruki and MATSUNAGA Yoshio vice-presidents, and KANO Takashi secretary general. Advisers named included KATAYAMA Tetsu, HIRANO Rikizo, MATSUOKA Komakichi, and SUGIYAMA Motojiro. The new union, declaring that farmers must rise above preoccupation with the class struggle, attacked the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai for its excessive class-consciousness and its extreme leftism and predicted that internal controversy would soon result in the complete collapse of the rival organization. Calling for the maintenance of a sound Socialist union based on anti-Communism, anti-Fascism, and anti-Capitalism and pledging its support to Hirano's agricultural program, the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai urged the construction of an agrarian society free from

1. Jiji Press release, July 7, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 15, 1947.
2. Jiji Press releases, July 15 and 16, 1947; Seiji Shimbun, July 16, 1947.

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exploitation, thoroughgoing reform of land ownership, modernization of agriculture through cooperatives and scientific management, and world-wide stabilization of farm production.¹

The first formal break in an organization under Socialist control having been thus finalized, centrists and anti-Communist leftists redoubled their efforts to reconcile the two groups. While anti-Communist members of the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai sought local support for their policies, Shakaitō local leaders at a meeting on July 28 reported that the rivalry between the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai and the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai for control of prefectural units was having adverse effects on Shakaitō local organization.² Anti-Communist leftists made another attempt to assert their position on August 28, when forty-five Socialist Diet members affiliated with the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai issued a statement demanding that the union reject Communist leadership.³ To this the Kyōsantō replied with charges of Fascism and demands for emphasis on the freedom of union members to support any political party.⁴ On September 10, KURODA Hisao condemned the Diet members' statement as absolutely unauthorized and declared that there had been no change in the union's policy of recognizing the members' rights to complete freedom of political affiliation and action -- a declaration that was quickly followed by Communist demands for expulsion from the union of Nomizo and other anti-Communist leaders.⁵

The widening differences among leftist Socialists aroused the concern of MATSUMOTO Jinchiro, whose prestige as a proletarian elder statesmen was sufficiently great to bring the contending leftists together and whose influence in general was

1. Shakai Shimpō, July 22, 1947; Jiji Press releases, July 25 and 26, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 26, 1947.
2. Jimmin, July 24, 1947; Jiji Press release, July 28, 1947.
3. Seiji Shimbun, August 30, 1947.
4. Akahata, September 4, 1947.
5. Mainichi Shimbun, September 10, 1947; Nippon Keizai Shimbun, September 10, 1947; Akahata, September 13, 1947.

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exerted in favor of those who opposed rather than those who supported a break with the Communists. At Matsumoto's invitation a meeting was held at which Kuroda and the signers of the August 28 statement discussed their differences. As a result of this meeting still another statement was published reaffirming the principle of freedom of political action and condemning all attempts at partisan domination of the farmers' movement or disruption of its unity, whether inspired by the Communists, the Liberals, or the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai.¹ A disappointment to Socialist centrists, this statement was greeted with derision by Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai members as an expression of complete surrender by the anti-Communist elements of the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai.²

3. Hirano's Expulsion from the Cabinet. While prospects of Shakaitō unity declined, Hirano's policies were creating bitter controversy in the cabinet. Late in July, Hirano proposed the so-called ultra-emergency food program, the most important aspects of which were concerned with stimulating over-quota deliveries of the summer crops. Under this plan the government was to seek to purchase 1,200,000 koku³ of wheat, barley, rye, and Irish potatoes beyond the established quotas, offering for such over-quota produce a bonus amounting to about three times the official price.⁴ Hailed by the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai as a most timely measure, the Hirano program was attacked by SHIMOSAKA Masahide of the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai as designed to foster the interests of the wealthy farmer who could afford to produce more than his quota while offering no advantage to the poor farmer who could produce no more than his quota, if that, and received for his crops less than one-third of the cost of production.⁵

1. Tokyo Shimbun, October 5, 1947; Tokyo Mimpo, October 6, 1947.
2. Nippon Keizai Shimbun, October 7, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, October 8, 1947.
3. 1 koku = 5.1 bushels.
4. Asahi Shimbun, July 23, 1947.
5. Jiji Press release, July 24, 1947.

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Repercussions in the cabinet were more serious. To Finance Minister Kurusu, the estimated expenditure for the plan of 3 to 4 billion yen seemed completely contrary to the cabinet's commitment to stabilize finance, check inflation, and reduce government expenditures and one that would require a vastly enlarged supplementary budget. To Wada, Hirano's proposal seemed a direct attack on the recently established wage and price standards.¹ After some days of dispute, the issue was settled by a compromise establishing the bonus of twice the official price and cutting down the amount to be purchased by the government.²

Almost immediately, however, the issue arose again in the form of a dispute over the price to be set for the new rice crop. Again Hirano proposed a price regarded by other members of the cabinet as excessive and as likely to undermine budget and wage-price stabilization programs and again, after even more protracted discussion, a compromise was reached setting the price at 1,700 yen per koku as against Hirano's proposed 2,000 yen.³

By the time the rice price issue was settled, Hirano's alienation from the rest of the cabinet had become fully apparent and it was widely rumored that he was planning to organize a new party. On October 11, Hirano made a speech in Nara attacking Wada, Nishio, and the Socialist left wing and implying that there was need for a new election.⁴ On October 28, Hirano, who had left Tokyo, was asked by the District Procurator's Office to return in order to explain his failure to declare in his statement of qualifications that he had been editor and publisher of the nationalist magazine Kodō. This development and a number of indiscreet remarks made by Nishio and Justice Minister SUZUKI Yoshio gave rise to widespread belief that Hirano was about to be removed from the cabinet by purge action. This expectation

1. Mainichi Shimbun, August 1, 1947; Jiji Shimpō, August 6, 1947.
2. Jiji Press release, August 12, 1947.
3. Jiji Press releases, August 25, September 18, October 7, 14, 16, and 18, 1947; Kyodo releases, September 18, October 3, 10, 15, and 22, 1947.
4. Jiji Shimpō, October 12, 1947; Tokyo Times, October 12, 1947; Tokyo Mimpo, October 15, 1947.

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subsequently proved to be premature, however, and it soon became apparent that the purge issue, however justified, had been raised primarily as a device to encourage Hirano's resignation. When, after several days of negotiation, Hirano made it quite clear that he had absolutely no intention of resigning, he was dismissed by Katayama on the grounds of his disruptive activities in the cabinet and without reference to the purge.¹ Although Hirano gave no indication of immediate intention of quitting the Shakaitō, it was obvious that his plans might be strongly influenced by the Central Screening Committee's decision on his eligibility for public office. Meanwhile, the selection of a successor to his portfolio was proving difficult and was giving rise to a new left-wing offensive.

4. Controversy over the Succession. Hirano's dismissal from the cabinet was greeted relatively mildly by members of the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai faction, who, despite their criticisms of Katayama and Nishio, reversed their original plans to interpellate on the issue and for the moment confined themselves to demanding that Hirano's successor be selected from among their number, putting forward as desirable candidates SATAKE Haruke and INOUE Ryoji.² The leftists, welcoming Hirano's dismissal as a vindication of their own initial opposition to his appointment, regarded the occasion as favorable to the appointment of one of their own faction to the cabinet. With the support of the Thursday Society, they proposed allocation of the Agriculture and Forestry portfolio to NOMIZO Katsu, anti-Communist vice-president of the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai. The Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, the Democrats, and the People's Cooperatives quickly expressed their opposition to this selection, and the latter even threatened to withdraw from the coalition if Nomizo were appointed. Caught between these conflicting demands, Nishio announced that the selection of a new minister would be postponed until after the passage of the

1. Jiji Press releases, October 21 and November 1-5, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, November 3, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, November 4 and 6, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, November 5, 1947.
2. Jiji Press releases, November 4 and 5, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, November 6, 1947.

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On December 2 the May Society, in a resolution presented to Katayama, called upon the cabinet to effect a wholesale change in its policies by adopting Socialist-inspired measures to meet the current crisis; demanded that the independence of the Shakaitō be established by rejecting interference of other parties in filling the Agriculture and Forestry post; and reiterated May Society support for Nomizo's appointment.²

On December 8, the Left renewed the offensive by publishing the proposals of the Political Affairs Inquiry Committee for the compilation of the budget for the next fiscal year. The Committee proposed suspension of interest payments on wartime government bonds, reduction of taxation on workers in key industries, collection of a second property tax, and elimination of over-capitalization of business enterprises and expressed opposition to wholesale discharges of government employees as an economy measure.³ These particular aspects of the Committee's proposal aroused such intense Democratic opposition that Katayama was forced to declare that the plan represented only the personal ideas of SUZUKI Mosaburo, committee chairman, despite the fact that it had been approved by the Shakaitō's Central Executive Committee.⁴

On December 13, HATANO Kanae, Socialist member of the House of Councillors, was appointed to the Agriculture and Forestry position. This appointment was denounced by the Left as a surrender to the unreasonable intervention of the other parties in opposition to the wishes of a majority of Socialists and as an abandonment of cabinet leadership to the Democrats and People's Cooperatives. In a statement to this effect, eighty-five Socialist Diet members, declaring that only by Socialist measures could the current crisis be overcome, announced that they were reserving their future freedom of action, their right to criticize the coalition

1. Mainichi Shimbun, November 11 and 12, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1947; Kyodo release, November 13, 1947.
2. Mainichi Shimbun, November 3, 1947.
3. Jiji Shimpō, December 9, 1947.
4. Tokyo Mimpo, December 14, 1947.

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cabinet, and their right to press for the implementation of the party's own program.¹

While the left wing was becoming more aggressive, the extreme right wing was not inactive. Although no steps were taken toward the formation of a new party until more than a month after Hirano's dismissal, his followers showed themselves increasingly independent of party discipline. When the Liberals proposed a non-confidence motion against Nishio sixteen members of the Hirano faction abstained, and when the coal bill was brought to a vote in the lower house nine members of the faction were conspicuous by their absence.²

Finally, on December 11, after a conference with members of the People's Cooperative Party, the Farmers' Party, and the Dai Ichi Diet Members' Club who some days previously had formed a Council of New Politics for liaison purposes, Hirano announced his belief that a new party was needed.³ Eleven days later, Hirano and sixteen of his followers announced their intention of quitting the Shakaitō before January 16, the date scheduled for the party's national convention.⁴ On January 5, fifteen members of the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai announced their secession from the Shakaitō, stating that the Katayama cabinet had been a complete failure and had manifested its dictatorial tendencies in ousting Hirano. The seceding Socialists declared that they expected to be joined immediately by eight members of the People's Cooperative Party, six members of the Japan Farmers' Party, and four members of the Dai Ichi Diet Members' Club.⁵ Hirano's purge on January 13 dealt a serious blow to the new party movement without lessening the determination of the seceders to proceed with their plans. The weakening of the coalition through the loss of Hirano's followers, however, was soon overshadowed by the threat to its very existence caused by the expanded left-wing offensive.

1. Mainichi Shimbun, December 18, 1947.
2. Yomiuri Shimbun, November 28 and 29, 1947; Tokyo Mimpo, December 1, 1947.
3. Mainichi Shimbun, December 12, 1947; Seiji Shimbun, December 13, 1947.
4. Asahi Shimbun, December 23, 1947.
5. FBIB, Daily Report, January 5, 1948, pp. AAA 1-3.

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RESTRICTEDD. Wages, the Budget, and the Fall of the Cabinet1. The 1,800-Yen Wage Standard

a. Attitudes of labor toward the Katayama cabinet. Organized labor, on the whole, greeted the inauguration of the Katayama cabinet as fulfilling its own aspirations. Differences of approach between the two major federations were immediately apparent, however. The Sōdōmei, while urging strong measures for industrial recovery and an adequate rationing system, pledged its full support to the new government, whereas the Sanbetsu was more equivocal in expressing its allegiance, warning the cabinet that it could expect smooth sailing only if it carried out the Shakaitō program.¹ These differences of approach became more marked as plans were developed for a rally under Zenrōren auspices that would express labor's support and expectations of the new regime. Originally planned as a rally "to encourage the Katayama cabinet," the meeting, at Sanbetsu insistence and despite Sōdōmei opposition, was retitled a rally "to encourage the Shakaitō" in order to make it clear that it was the adoption of Socialist policy and not the cabinet as a whole that was being supported by labor.² On July 6, at the rally itself, Sanbetsu speakers were much more vehement in their criticisms of the Katayama cabinet for its alleged deviations from Socialist policies than were Sōdōmei representatives.³

By the time the rally was held, moreover, a specific issue had arisen that was destined increasingly to weaken and divide labor's support of the cabinet. On June 19 the government announced that it proposed to establish an average wage scale on an occupational basis -- an announcement greeted by the Kyōsantō as demonstrating the subservience of the cabinet to the interests of monopoly finance capital and countered by a Communist proposal that prices be stabilized before any action be taken to fix wages.⁴ The appeal of the Communist argument to organized

1. Kyodo release, June 1, 1947; Jiji Press release, June 3, 1947.

2. Jiji Press releases, June 27 and 30, 1947.

3. Jiji Press release, July 6, 1947; Tokyo Shimbun, July 7, 1947; Seiji Shimbun, July 13, 1947.

4. Jiji Press release, June 19, 1947; Akahata, June 25, 1947.

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labor was reflected in the slogan "Don't sacrifice labor for industrial rehabilitation" adopted by the Zenrōren committee for the July 6 rally. Two days before the rally, however, after discussions with labor representatives who demanded a wage level of 2,600 yen a month had made no progress, the government laid down wage levels by industry that, when averaged, formed a composite wage standard of 1,800 yen. On July 5 the prices of certain essential commodities and railroad and other service charges were doubled, and a further series of price changes in the next three months continued the upward trend.

Although no segment of organized labor showed any great enthusiasm for the government's wage policy, the reactions of individual unions were very much affected by their political orientation as well as by the degree to which the wage standard imposed particular hardships on their members. On the whole, the attitude of even the most radical unions was based on the assumption that the interests of organized labor were more likely to be protected by the Katayama cabinet than by any conceivable alternative. Within the bounds of this general approach, however, there was room for a fairly wide range of attitudes. The Sōdōmei, expressing its reluctant support for the government's program, advised its members not to seek higher wages but sanctioned campaigns for special allowances to counteract ration delays. The Sanbetsu, as well as leftist-controlled independent unions, disavowing any desire for the overthrow of the cabinet, embarked upon an increasingly outspoken campaign for the fulfillment of Socialist promises and the abandonment of the four-party agreement on the basis of which the coalition had been established.¹

Differences of approach between the Sōdōmei and the Sanbetsu were marked within the Tanzenkyō (Zenkoku Tanko Rōdō Kumiai Kyōgikai -- National Council of Coal Mine Workers' Unions), an organization set up for collective bargaining purposes in

1. Jiji Press release, July 26 and 29, August 12, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 11, 1947; Mimpo, August 7, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, August 13, 1947.

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January 1947 by the miners' affiliates of the two major federations together with a number of independent miners' unions. On October 11, 1947 the Tanzenkyō's national convention opened in an atmosphere of acute hostility between Sanbetsu and Sōdōmei elements. Reacting violently to criticisms of the Sōdōmei and the government, the Sōdōmei-affiliated union accused the Sanbetsu affiliate of seeking to give the Tanzenkyō executive powers and of taking action in the name of the Tanzenkyō that had not been agreed upon by the Sōdōmei members. Controversy also arose on questions of future policy, with the Sanbetsu affiliate opposing the cabinet's coal control plan and demanding abandonment of the 1,800-yen wage level while the Sōdōmei affiliate supported the coal control plan in principle and wished to avoid open attacks on the 1,800-yen wage scale. On the third day of the convention the Sōdōmei affiliate and an independent union that had supported its stand withdrew from the Tanzenkyō, taking with them about 120,000 members of a total of 300,000.¹

b. Demands of the government workers. By late summer labor's restiveness under the 1,800-yen standard was becoming increasingly evident in widespread demands for special allowances and wage increases. Since private employers in many cases had managed to evade the wage standard and since government workers' wages in general tended to lag considerably behind those in private industry, the main impact of the drive against the 1,800-yen standard was felt by the government in its relationships with its own employees. The major labor organizations involved in the dispute with the government were the Zentei (Zen Teishin Jugyoin Kumiai -- All Communication Workers' Union), a Sanbetsu affiliate with over 350,000 members; the Kokutetsu (Kokutetsu Rōdō Kumiai -- Government Railroad Workers' Union), an independent with over 550,000 members; and the Zenkankō (Zen Kankōchō Shokuin Rōdō Kumiai Renraku Kyōgikai -- Federated Council of Government and Public Office Workers'

1. Kyodo releases, October 11 and 13, 1947; Jiji Press release, October 11, 1947.

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Unions), a federation that included among its affiliates the Zentei, the Kokutetsu, and six other government workers' unions with a total membership of over a million and a half.

Leadership of the Zentei had been consistently Communist-controlled, but Communist efforts to dominate the Kokutetsu met with greater resistance. Conflict between pro- and anti-Communists in the Kokutetsu first became conspicuous in August and September 1946, when strike plans were being made in opposition to Transportation Ministry proposals for large-scale discharges of government railroad workers. In August the decision of the union's national leadership to schedule a railroad strike for September 15 led to accusations from the Nagoya local that the decision had been adopted by undemocratic methods and reflected the strong influence of Communist fractions.¹ Early in September, the Nagoya union and three other prefectural branches seceded from the national organization because of their opposition to the projected strike. As a result of this secession the union's strike committee was reorganized and SUZUKI Seichi, a left-wing Socialist, was named chairman.² On September 13 the union, against strong Communist opposition, accepted a Ministry proposal as a basis for further negotiations and the strike was called off.³

With the cessation of strike preparations the four seceding branches returned to the national union, but the anti-Communist issue was by no means dead. At an extraordinary national convention in March 1947 a delegate from the Tokyo union presented an urgent motion calling for the exclusion of Communists from union office. After two hours of debate, the motion was tabled at the request of Chairman Suzuki, who argued that its acceptance would split the union and violate the freedom of individuals to join political parties, guaranteed by the new Japanese

1. Jiji Press release, August 28, 1946.

2. Jiji Press release, September 5, 1946; FBIB, Daily Report, September 10, 1946, p. BD-5.

3. FBIB, Daily Report, September 13, 1946; Jiji Press release, September 14, 1946.

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Constitution.¹ This decision was hailed by the Communist press as establishing the fact that the majority of the union's members supported the Kyōsantō.²

Communist jubilation, however, proved to be premature. In October, a three-day national convention closed without decision on issues that had been a subject of continuous dispute. The most important of these issues were Communist-sponsored motions calling for an amendment of the union constitution to allow the Central Executive Committee to call strikes by a simple majority rather than a two-thirds vote and for wage increases beyond the 1,800-yen monthly standard established by the government. The failure of the Central Executive Committee to secure majority support for its opposition to these proposals led to the resignation of the union officers en bloc and hence created the need for new elections.³

At this juncture anti-Communist elements in the railroad workers' union inaugurated a vigorous campaign to increase their representation in the Central Executive Committee. On October 26, members of the Tokyo branch began preparations for the formation of an anti-Communist league among union members with the object of opposing the activities of Communist fractions and excluding Kyōsantō members from union office.⁴ On November 7, the anti-Communist league was inaugurated by 300 delegates, representing 75 locals, who pledged themselves to abide by the principles of social democracy.⁵ By the end of November the locals had completed their elections to the national Central Executive Committee and Communist representation had been reduced from about one-fourth to about one-sixth. A number of the most important Communist leaders, including II Yashiro, who had

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1. Jiji Press release, March 17, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 18, 1947.
 2. Akahata, March 27, 1947.
 3. Kyodo release, October 21, 1947; Akahata, October 24, 1947; Shakai Shimbun, October 27, 1947.
 4. Asahi Shimbun, October 28, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, November 1, 1947.
 5. Jiji Press release, November 7, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, November 7, 1947.

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dominated the February 1 strike preparations, were not returned to office.¹ Central Committee meetings at the beginning of December resulted in the election of KATO Etsuo, leader of the anti-Communist faction, as chairman of the union and adoption of policies prohibiting individual chapters from striking or filing requests for mediation without the consent of national headquarters and establishing the union's intention of acting independently of other government and public workers' unions.²

Despite the growing anti-Communism in the Kōkutetsu as opposed to outright Communist domination of the Zentei, the disputes of both with the Katayama cabinet followed parallel lines, and the adoption of militant tactics, such as the mass absenteeism of the Tokyo postal workers in October, was the exception rather than the rule even with regard to the most radical unions. The most pressing demands of all the unions involved were for immediate supplementary allowances and for the establishment of a minimum wage sufficient to cover living expenses. Negotiations with the government on these and other issues were carried on for some months with no great success and were marked by increasingly bitter attacks by the Sanbetsu and the Zentei on the policies of the cabinet, a growing tendency on the part of the Sōdōmei to disassociate itself from the Zenrōren and to criticize the tactics of the more militant unions, indications of doubts within the cabinet as to the feasibility of attempts to maintain the 1,800-yen standard, and hints that the government was contemplating legislative restrictions on Communist activity in trade unions.

Meanwhile, the Central Labor Relations Committee (CIRC), to which the government workers' case had been referred, evolved a compromise proposal. Published in November, the CIRC proposal called for the payment to government workers of an allowance equivalent to 2.8 months' wages and the establishment of a special wage

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1. Tokyo Shimbun, November 25, 1947; Kyodo release, November 25, 1947.
 2. Kyodo release, December 2, 1947; Jiji Press release, December 3, 1947.

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committee, consisting of representatives of the government, the unions, and the CIRC, to work out a new wage standard for government workers to be effective as of January 1948. After an initial display of considerable reluctance by both parties to the dispute, the CIRC formula was finally accepted in mid-December, and by the end of the month the government had disbursed the equivalent of two months' wages in allowances. The necessity of adopting a supplementary budget to provide for the remaining 0.8 allowance, however, as well as to cover other government expenditures, brought to a head a long-standing government dispute over budgetary policy and was to be the immediate cause of the fall of the Katayama cabinet.

2. The Budget Controversy

a. Background. Early in December a supplementary budget proposed by the cabinet and passed by the Diet had aroused considerable disquiet among Shakaitō representatives. Particular targets of opposition within the party were the increase in tobacco prices and in indirect taxes, increases that led left-wing Socialists to accuse the cabinet of following in the financial footsteps of ISHIBASHI Tanzen by imposing increased burdens on the masses rather than developing new and more effective and equitable budgetary practices. Hope was expressed by all factions of the party that the compilation of the budget for the next fiscal year might become the occasion for the application of Socialist principles, and it was agreed that the Political Research Committees of the three government parties would be consulted on budgetary questions.¹

The meetings of the three committees immediately demonstrated that the Democrats and the Socialists were far apart in their views regarding the principles upon which the new budget was to be based. At an early meeting SUZUKI Mosaburo put forward the plan of the Shakaitō committee for the elimination of fictitious capital, the

1. House of Representatives, First Session of the National Diet, Official Gazette Extra, No. 54, November 6, 1947, No. 64, November 24, 1947; Jiji Shimpo, November 7, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, November 10, 1947.

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reduction of taxation on the workers, the imposition of a second property tax, and the cancellation of interest payments on wartime government bonds. The last two proposals particularly aroused the ire of the Democrats, who charged that their adoption would be in violation of the four-party agreement.¹ Rather than embarking on an extended discussion of what specifically was intended by the rather vague terms of the agreement, the Shakaitō Political Research Committee, strongly seconded by the May Society, called for the abrogation of the agreement, supporting arguments against its continuing appropriateness by references to the fact that the Liberals as far back as mid-August had announced that they no longer regarded themselves as bound by its terms.²

Shakaitō leaders in the cabinet, caught between the uncompromising hostility of the Democrats to Suzuki's proposals and the threats of their own left wing to demand the resignation of the cabinet if Socialist budgetary measures were not put into effect, adopted a temporizing position. On the one hand, they denied that the budget proposals advanced by the Political Research Committee had any binding force in the party or that the defection of the Liberals had in any way affected the validity of the four-party agreement; on the other hand, they committed themselves to seeking some satisfactory arrangement with the Democrats and spoke vaguely of the eventual replacement of the four-party agreement by an agreement among the three coalition parties.³ Meanwhile, all factions of the party were seeking to strengthen their influence and solidify their alliances in preparation for the third Shakaitō national convention scheduled to begin its sessions on January 16, 1948.

b. The Shakaitō national convention. The left-wing offensive that had begun early in December over the issue of appointing a successor to Hirano reached a high

1. Tokyo Shimbun, December 5, 1947; Jiji Shimpō, December 9, 1947; Kyodo release, December 10, 1947; Jiji Press release, December 11, 1947.
2. Jiji Press releases, December 12, 17, and 19, 1947; Tokyo Shimbun, December 17, 1947; Asahi Shimbun, December 19, 1947; Mainichi Shimbun, December 20, 1947.

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point at the sessions of the Shakaitō's third national convention.¹ The ability of the Left to increase its representation in the governing organs of the party and to carry through its policy proposals successfully was facilitated, although not decisively affected, by the absence of the fifteen Hirano-faction Diet members who had seceded from the party on January 5 and of the three delegates from Kochi who, it was reported, had remained away from the convention at the urging of SATAKE Haruki.² Although the secession of Hirano's followers had not received any significant support in most of the local branches of the party and the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai had not in consequence of the secession withdrawn its support from the Shakaitō, on many questions the margin of votes was so slight as to make the absence of even a small group significant.

On January 17, the delegates from Okayama, Ehime, Aomori, Gumma, Oita, and Aichi introduced a resolution calling for the abrogation of the four-party agreement.³ Two days later, after prolonged debate in which Nishio had appeared as the principal supporter of the four-party agreement and Suzuki as its principal opponenet and after an attempt by Chairman MATSUOKA Komakichi to force adjournment without decision on the four-party agreement had been forestalled, the resolution was passed by a vote of 366 to 345. On the same day the party went on record as demanding immediate suspension of interest payments on wartime bonds and as rejecting freezing of the new yen.⁴

Despite the left-wing victory, some doubt remained as to the future status of the four-party agreement. In the face of strongly expressed Democratic and People's Cooperative disapproval of the action of the Shakaitō convention, Socialist cabinet members were inclined to dismiss left-wing arguments that the convention's decision

1. See above, p. 70.

2. Daichi Shimbun, January 21, 1948. Satake himself did not secede from the party until January 23.

3. Jiji Press release, January 17, 1948; Kyodo releases, January 17 and 18, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, January 18, 1948.

4. Jiji Press release, January 19, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, January 19, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 1948.

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was binding and required immediate action.¹ Finally, on January 28, the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee reached agreement that the convention's decision on suspension of interest payments on wartime bonds should be regarded as immediately binding.²

c. The dispute over the supplementary budget. In the midst of the controversy over the effect of Socialist convention decisions, the supplementary budget issue had become a new source of left-wing opposition to the policies of the cabinet. On January 27, the cabinet decided to meet financial needs created principally by the pending 0.8 payment to government workers by a 100 percent increase in railroad fares and postage charges. This proposal aroused the immediate and intense opposition of the May Society and of the unions involved as exposing them to popular condemnation for a rise in the cost of living.³ Suzuki, backed unanimously by the May Society, then proposed that the supplementary budget embodying the rate rises be withdrawn and that the necessary revenue be raised through cancellation of interest payments on wartime bonds and sale to the general public of rejected export goods being held by the Board of Trade.⁴ Despite the fact that the May Society position was being firmly supported by over 50 Socialist members of the lower house, the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee on February 4 gave its support to the cabinet's budget proposal by a vote of 14 to 10.⁵ On February 5, the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, by the combined vote of the left-wing Socialists and the opposition parties, passed a resolution demanding that the government withdraw the supplementary budget; on February 6 the budget was withdrawn; and on February 9, Katayama announced that his government would resign on the following day.

1. Yomiuri Shimbun, January 19, 1948; Jiji Press releases, January 19, 20, 22, and 23, 1948; Tokyo Shimbun, January 23, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, January 27, 1948.
2. Jiji Press release, January 28, 1948.
3. Jiji Press releases, January 27 and 30, February 1 and 4, 1948.
4. Jiji Press releases, January 29, 30, and 31, February 3, 1948.
5. Mainichi Shimbun, February 1 and 5, 1948.

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RESTRICTEDIII. THE ASHIDA CABINETA. Organization.

1. Controversy over the Succession. When the Katayama cabinet resigned early in February, 446 of the 466 seats in the House of Representatives were filled. Of these, 261 were controlled by the coalition parties -- the Socialists occupied 123 seats, the Democrats 100, and the People's Cooperatives 32. The Liberals, the major opposition party, were represented in the lower house by 119 members and could expect close cooperation from the 29 members of the Doshi Club, a group of former Democrats led by SHIDEHARA Kijuro, who had left the party over the issue of support of the Socialist-sponsored coal bill. Minor parties generally hostile to the coalition included the Zenno Club, the 16 members of which had been led out of the Socialist Party by HIRANO Rikizo, the Dai Ichi Diet Members' Club, with 15 members; and the Japan Farmers' Party, with 7 members.

This distribution of seats made it essential that the new cabinet be composed of at least two of the major parties and that it have, in addition, some minor party support. The fact that the refusal of the left-wing Socialists to follow the dictates of the party's Central Executive Committee had been the immediate cause of the cabinet's fall rendered impossible Socialist leadership of a new coalition. Instead the Shakaitō devoted itself primarily to restoring some semblance of internal unity and secondarily to seeking conditions that would make possible Socialist participation in a new cabinet without precipitating left-wing secessions.

Under these circumstances, the contest for leadership of the new cabinet was between the Liberals and the Democrats. The resignation of the cabinet on February 10 elicited an immediate demand from ONO Bamboku, Secretary General of the Liberal Party, for leadership of the next cabinet by YOSHIDA Shigeru, Liberal

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Party president. Later Ono explained that, although some Liberals favored a single-party cabinet that would dissolve the Diet and call a new election, Yoshida himself was willing to avoid dissolution by the formation of a conservative coalition. In the lower house Yoshida's candidacy was supported by the Doshi and Dai Ichi Clubs, while the Zenno Club, in its attempts to organize all the minor groups, including the People's Cooperatives, into a new party, showed a general pro-Liberal orientation. In the House of Councillors, the 42 Liberal Councillors were backed by a sufficient number of the 89 members of the Ryokufukai (an organization of independents) to give them majority support for their demand for Liberal leadership of the cabinet.¹ In their efforts to form a new and broader conservative party, however, the Liberals were somewhat impeded by internal differences as to whether organization of the new party should proceed on the basis of an alliance with the Doshi Club, other minor parties, and such dissident Democrats as could be lured away or whether formal steps should be delayed until the new group was certain to enlist the support of the bulk of the Democratic Party.

The Democrats responded to the Liberal drive by proposing a four-party national unity coalition under Democratic leadership. It seemed highly unlikely, however, that this maneuver was taken very seriously by its sponsors in view of the open refusal of the Liberals to consider participation in a cabinet that included the Socialists and the inevitable refusal of the Socialists to associate themselves with the Liberals. The real questions for the Democrats were whether to accede to the Liberal demand for leadership and enter a coalition on that basis and, if this were rejected, whether to insist on the elimination of left-wing Socialist

1. Nippon Keizai Shimbun, February 11, 1948; Tokyo Shimbun, February 13, 1948; Seiji Shimbun, February 13, 1948.

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leaders as a condition for a coalition with the Socialists. For the first proposal, strong support came from the group in the party led by SAITO Takao, Minister without Portfolio in the Katayama cabinet. On the other hand, alliance with the Liberals and other conservative elements, however logical from the point of view of similarity of policies, was unacceptable to the group led by Ashida not only because of personal antagonism toward Yoshida and Shidehara but also because it appeared to this group that a cabinet that excluded the Socialists would, almost inevitably, face an uncontrollable labor offensive. In his desire to gain Socialist support for a Democrat-led cabinet, Ashida was willing to make substantial concessions to the leftists, even to the point of granting them seats in the cabinet. This approach was opposed not only by Saito and his group but also by such Democrats as Welfare Minister HITOTSUMATSU Sadakichi and Finance Minister Kurusu, who, together with a large number of party members, favored inclusion of right-wing Socialists only and were inclined to demand that intransigent left-wing leaders be expelled from the Socialist Party.¹

Meanwhile the Socialists were discussing the advisability of participating in a new coalition cabinet. A gesture toward reestablishment of party unity having been made by Suzuki's resignation as chairman of the lower house Budget Committee, the left wing continued to insist that the Shakaitō remain outside the new cabinet. Its ability to advance this argument successfully, however, was compromised by a split within its own ranks, with two of its most prominent leaders, KATO Kanju and NOMIZO Masaru, advocating participation as a device to prevent conservative unity and safeguard the interests of labor in the government. The argument raged with seemingly little prospect of satisfactory settlement, and on February 16 the

1. Mainichi Shimbun, February 7, 13, and 17, 1948; Tokyo Shimbun, February 9, 11, and 12, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, February 10 and 16, 1948.

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Shakaitō Central Executive Committee announced that the party would make no formal decision until aspirants for cabinet leadership had published policy statements.¹

2. Discussion of Cabinet Policy. On February 18, the Democrats responded to the Socialist stand by publishing a ten-point policy statement proposed as the basis for a coalition cabinet.² The statement, in general, differed little from the four-party agreement. Nevertheless, since it made no mention of interest payments on wartime bonds and the freezing of the new yen, was somewhat stronger in favoring state controls of basic industries where necessary to increase production, and specifically rejected legislation aimed at restricting labor, it could be interpreted as an attempt to enlist the support of the Socialists and particularly that of the left-wing faction.

The Socialists, however, greeted the statement with little enthusiasm, criticizing it as far too abstract and demanding that the Democrats make clear the concrete plans by which they proposed to attain their policy objectives. Despite the objections of the Saito faction to further concessions to the Socialists, the Democrats responded to this demand on February 20 by publishing a number of amendments to the policy statement of February 18. These amendments included specific commitments to establish a five-year plan for the control of the coal, electric power, and transportation industries under the direction and supervision of a supreme economic conference; to appoint supervisory committees for the petroleum, power, and other key industries and for the Bank of Japan and the Reconstruction Finance Bank; to reduce corporate and earned income taxes; and to set up a board to promote the interests of small and medium-sized business.³

The left-wing Socialists, however, were far from satisfied with these concessions.

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1. Yomiuri Shimbun, February 11 and 13, 1948; Tokyo Shimbun, February 14, 1948.
 2. Tokyo Shimbun, February 19, 1948.
 3. Jiji Press release, February 20, 1948.

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Under their pressure, the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee, at a meeting on February 21, agreed to accept a policy statement formulated by the Political Research Committee that, once again called for suspension of interest payments on wartime government bonds, reduction of the tax on earned income, state ownership of the Bank of Japan, nationalization of the electric power industry and democratic state control of such key industries as fertilizer and steel, avoidance of administrative readjustments aimed only at discharging personnel, and preparation of a third land reform program.¹ At the same meeting, however, the right wing by a vote of 19 to 10 succeeded in passing a motion committing the Shakaitō to casting its ballots for Ashida as premier.² Later in the day, when the lower house finally met to vote on the premiership, 101 Socialist votes were cast for Ashida, while, of the remaining 22, a number of the most uncompromising leftists showed their unwillingness to accept the party decision by voting for Katayama, abstaining, or casting invalid ballots.³

Ashida's designation as premier, however, by no means solved the problem of attaining the Democratic-Socialist agreement on policy that was essential for revival of the coalition. Ashida's first step, therefore, was to seek the cooperation of the Socialists and the People's Cooperatives in organizing a three-party policy committee. Democratic proposals for opening negotiations on a policy agreement were accepted by the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee by a vote of 13 to 4, with 12 members, a number of whom were members of the left wing, absent.⁴ By March 2, the three-party committee had agreed on a policy draft the economic provisions of which called for reductions in earned income taxes and corporate taxes,

1. Mainichi Shimbun, February 20, 1948; Kyodo release, February 21, 1948; Jiji Press release, February 21, 1948.
2. Tokyo Shimbun, February 22, 1948.
3. Nippon Keizai Shimbun, February 22, 1948.
4. Jiji Press release, February 25, 1948.

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revision of the Bank of Japan Law, investigation of the Reconstruction Finance Bank with a view to its reorganization, enforcement of state management of the coal industry, extension of democratic state management of such key industries as fertilizer, iron and steel, and petroleum if necessary, and establishment of special organs for financing small and medium-sized industry and for financing rehabilitation and improvement of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. The statement also declared that the war bond interest payment question would be "duly taken care of" and that the Socialist proposals for additional property taxes would be studied carefully. On the following day compromises were reached on the remaining questions at issue. At this time, the three parties agreed to establish a research council to study the question of state control of the fertilizer industry and another to study the question of suspension of the war bond interest payments. The three parties further agreed to interpret the agricultural section of the policy statement to mean that the existing land reform program would be completed.¹

Despite agreement on policy issues, however, it was still far from certain that the three parties would succeed in forming a cabinet. During the course of the negotiations, three members of the People's Cooperative Party seceded in protest against their party's refusal to join in the Zenno Club's plans for a new party; the Democratic Taiyokai faction denounced its party for making too many concessions to the left-wing Socialists; and fourteen Democrats, including SAITO Takao, finally seceded from the party. In the Shakaitō, meanwhile, controversy continued not only between Right and Left but also within the left-wing group itself. On March 1 the May Society by a vote of 53 to 17 adopted a resolution calling upon the Shakaitō to assume an opposition role. On March 4 Katayama's refusal to join the cabinet, despite the urging of right-wing Socialists, was supported by the Central Executive

1. Tokyo Shimbun, March 3, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, March 3 and 4, 1948;
Asahi Shimbun, March 4, 1948.

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Committee. Despite the opposition of the majority of left-wing Socialists, however, Kato and Nomizo remained firm in their intention of participating in the cabinet. Confronted with this situation, SUZUKI Mosaburo, one of the leaders of left-wing opposition to participation in the cabinet, declared on March 7 in a conversation with Katayama and Secretary General Asanuma that the May Society would not actively oppose the entry of Kato and Nomizo into the cabinet on condition that Katayama and Asanuma remained outside and devoted themselves to rebuilding party unity.¹ Finally, on March 9, the new cabinet was formed with six Democratic members, eight Socialists, and two People's Cooperatives. Of the Socialists, four ministers had been members of the Katayama cabinet: NISHIO Suehiro, who became Deputy Premier; and MORITO Takuo, MIZUTANI Chosaburo, and SUZUKI Yoshio, who retained their posts as Education Minister, Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Attorney General respectively. New Socialist members included NAGAE Kazuo as Minister of Agriculture, TOMIYOSHI ~~Enji~~ as Communications Minister, KATO Kanju as Labor Minister, and NOMIZO Masaru as Minister without Portfolio.

B. Trade-Union Anti-Communism and the Revival of Communist United Front Efforts

1. Introduction. Even before the fall of the Katayama cabinet, mounting opposition within the trade unions to the policies of Communist leaders, together with efforts by the Socialists to expand their influence among organized workers, had led to the development of organized anti-Communism in a number of important unions that had been Communist-dominated or heavily infiltrated by Communist elements.² This threat to the Communist position, coupled with the widening split in the left wing of the Shakaitō (manifested in the budget crisis and the controversy over participation in the Ashida cabinet), was an important factor in stimulating the

1. Mainichi Shimbun, March 1, 1948; Jiji Press releases, March 1, 4, and 5, 1948; Nippon Keizai Shimbun, March 2, 1948; Kyodo releases, March 2 and 4, 1948; Mimpo, March 5, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, March 8, 1948.

2. See above, p. 228.

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revival of the Communist united front campaign. During the early months of Ashida's tenure both trends -- anti-Communism on the one hand and moves toward a united front on the other -- became increasingly marked.

2. Anti-Communism in the Trade-Union Federations. By the end of 1947 developments among press, mine, and railroad workers, as well as less dramatic manifestations of anti-Communism in other unions, had opened the way for a campaign to extirpate Communist influence from the trade-union movement as a whole. That the Sanbetsu was aware of the weaknesses resulting from accusations of Communist domination was demonstrated by the decisions reached at its national convention in November. The cry for trade-union unity was raised once again, but it was now decided that, if necessary, unions belonging to the Sanbetsu should drop their affiliation in order to bring about amalgamation with other unions in the same field and, further, that the Sanbetsu itself might be dissolved if this would promote trade-union unification.¹

On December 28, 1947, the Sōdōmei's Osaka branch took the initiative in suggesting the establishment of a new organization, the Rōdō Kumiai Minshuka Renmei (Trade-Union Democratization League) for the furtherance of trade-union democracy and the rejection of Communist influence in trade-union activities.²

The new group, the organization of which was unanimously approved by the Sōdōmei Central Executive Committee in mid-January, was to be composed not only of unions in sympathy with the organization's objectives but also of individual union members. Its aims were to be: to eliminate the dictatorial tendencies of political party members in trade unions, democratize the trade unions, and establish their autonomy; to fight capitalism as well as totalitarianism of the extreme right and left; to secure adequate living conditions for the workers through recovery of

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1. Asahi Shimbun, November 19, 1947; Yomiuri Shimbun, November 20, 1947; Seiji Shimbun, November 21, 1947.
 2. Jiji Press release, December 29, 1947.

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production and the furtherance of labor legislation; and, rejecting merely formal concepts of trade-union unity, to bring about unity on the basis of fraternity and trust.¹

The initial reactions of the Sanbetsu leadership to the Sōdōmei campaign were hesitant, and it was decided not to take positive countermeasures immediately but rather to rectify the misapprehensions of Sanbetsu members with regard to the position of the Communists in the organization and to acquaint the membership more fully with the policies adopted at the November convention.² Meanwhile, Sanbetsu leadership was demonstrating its ties with the Communists increasingly frankly by Central Executive Committee visits to Kyōsantō headquarters, in the course of which it was decided to promote a united front movement by all available means.³

Within a month, however, the Communist position was to be more seriously threatened by a new organization set up within the Sanbetsu itself. In mid-February, reportedly after conversations with Shakaitō and Sōdōmei members, elements in the Sanbetsu announced plans for the organization of a new group, the Sanbetsu Minshuka Dōmei (Sanbetsu Democratization League, commonly referred to as Mindō). The leaders of the Mindō -- the most conspicuous of whom were MITSUMURA Jinsuke, vice chairman of the Sanbetsu and member of the Zentei's Central Executive Committee; KANAYAMA Satoshi, chairman of the Sanbetsu Finance Department; KIDA Koji, chairman of the Sanbetsu Publications Department; and HOSOYA Matsuta, former assistant secretary general of the Sanbetsu, who had seceded from the Kyōsantō in 1947 -- announced their program as opposition to the revision of labor laws, opposition to the conversion of the Sanbetsu to a tool of capitalism, and opposition to control of the union movement by political parties.⁴

1. Jiji Press releases, January 9 and 13, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, January 14, 1948.
2. Jiji Press release, January 15, 1948; Mimpo, January 17, 1948.
3. Akahata, January 18 and 20, 1948.
4. Kyodo release, February 14, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, February 14, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, February 15, 1948.

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The day after the announcement of the Mindō's formation, the Sanbetsu secretariat by a vote of 14 to 3 decided to prohibit its activities. The three dissenters, Mitsumura, Kanayama, and Kida, thereupon resigned from their executive positions and, charging that 13 of the 19 members of the Sanbetsu secretariat and 30 of its 49 Central Executive Committee members were Communists, announced that they would not regard themselves as bound by the secretariat decision.¹ So strong was the unfavorable reaction to the secretariat decision in the Sōdōmei, the Kokutetsu, and other unions that the Sanbetsu executives evidently felt called upon to reconsider. On February 21, therefore, the Sanbetsu Central Executive Committee, accepting the resignation of the three Mindō leaders, decided to allow the organization to continue its activities as long as it did not violate Sanbetsu regulations and to place the final decision in the hands of the next Sanbetsu convention.²

In mid-June, after some months of activity within individual Sanbetsu unions and local branches and of liaison meetings with similar democratization movements in the Sōdōmei, the Kokutetsu, and other unions, the Mindō held its first national convention. Claiming 300,000 sympathizers in Sanbetsu-affiliated unions, the group looked forward to a period of further growth. Whatever its claims, however, the Mindō had not yet succeeded in gaining control over any single Sanbetsu affiliate, while the difficulties being encountered by the anti-Communist movement in the Kokutetsu served warning to similar groups in other unions that major obstacles lay in their path.

3. Weakening of the Anti-Communists in the Kokutetsu. By the end of 1947 anti-Communists in the Kokutetsu had established themselves in what appeared to be an

1. Yomiuri Shimbun, February 17, 1948; Kyodo release, February 18, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, February 19, 1948.

2. Jiji Press releases, February 19, 21, and 22, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, February

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unquestionably dominant position in the union leadership. In the early months of 1948, however, this position was to be seriously undermined by growing union opposition to leadership policies with regard to the establishment of a wage scale for government workers.

In November 1947 the Central Labor Relations Committee had coupled its recommendation for payment to government workers of an allowance equal to 2.8 months' salary with a proposal that a special wage committee be established to work out a new wage standard for government employees. Because of trade-union opposition the Temporary Wage Committee was not established until January 1948, and at that time the Kokutetsu was the only government workers' union that had agreed to participate in its deliberations. At the end of February the Committee published recommendations for a 2,920-yen average wage scale and for the development of a new system of employee classification. Recommendations with regard to the new wage level were accepted by the Ashida cabinet on March 13. Two days later the Kokutetsu opened a special convention to determine its attitude toward the proposal.

It was immediately apparent that the margin of control held by the anti-communists in the Kokutetsu had been substantially narrowed. It was only by a bare majority that the anti-Communists captured the chairmanship and the vice-chairmanship of the convention, the 2,920-yen wage scale was accepted, and a Communist-sponsored motion of no-confidence in the union's central struggle committee was defeated. An ominous sign for the future, moreover, was the organization of a new group within the union, the Kakushin Dōshikai (Reformist Comrades' Society), composed of so-called neutrals who were in actual fact to lend their support almost entirely to the Communists.¹

1. Jiji Press releases, March 15 and 17, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, March 20, 1948.

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During April, opposition to the 2,920-yen wage scale grew rapidly -- a situation utilized by the Kakushin Dōshikai to strengthen its own position. The results were evident in the union elections held in May and in the national convention that followed. In mid-May final returns in the Central Committee elections showed an almost equal division of strength between the anti-Communists on the one hand and the Communists and their increasingly close allies, the Kakushin Dōshikai, on the other.¹ On May 29, when the Central Committee met to elect the members of the Central Executive Committee, the anti-Communists were reduced from a 75 percent majority to control of **only** half the seats. KATO Etsuo, leader of the anti-Communists, barely succeeded in retaining the chairmanship that he had won the preceding December, while the vice chairmanship went to SUZUKI Ichizo, a member of the Kyōeantō, and the post of secretary general to KANEMASA Daikichiro of the Kakushin Dōshikai.

The delicate balance that now existed in the Kokutetsu was further exhibited in the sessions of the national convention opening on May 30. The right wing was victorious in maintaining the prohibition on initiation of acts of dispute by union locals without the consent of national headquarters, a victory made possible in part by a split in the Kakushin Dōshikai on this issue; the left wing was victorious in bringing about the adoption of a demand for a wage level of 5,100 yen and a commitment to coordinate the Kokutetsu wage demand policy with that of the Zenkankō.² At the end of June the convention of the Kokutetsu's Youth Department confirmed the decline in the anti-Communist position when the anti-Communists

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1. Available reports on the exact figures differ somewhat. The Tokyo Shimbun for May 18, 1948 gives the final results as anti-Communist 58, Communist 21, Kakushin Dōshikai 33, unaffiliated or unknown 15; Mimpo for May 26, 1948 gives the final figures as anti-Communist 50, Communist 25, Kakushin Dōshikai 30, unaffiliated or unknown 22.
 2. Jiji Press releases, May 29, June 1 and 2, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, May 31 and June 1, 1948; Kyodo releases, May 31 and June 1, 1948.

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were defeated by a vote of 199 to 83 in their attempt to dissolve the Department and succeed in electing only 18 members to the Central Committee as against 33 for the Communists.¹

4. Stalemate in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai. While anti-Communism in the trade unions was on the whole making advances despite set-backs in the Kokutetsu, the struggle between pro- and anti-Communists in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai continued to be inconclusive, with the former dominating the Central Committee and the latter the Central Executive Committee. Under these circumstances the anti-Communists adopted the strategy of utilizing their majority on the Central Executive Committee to force through repeated postponements of Central Committee meetings and of the union's national convention while at the same time seeking to increase their strength in the union's prefectural branches.

Plans for the formal organization of a democratization movement in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai patterned after those already established in other unions were laid in March when leaders of the anti-Communist chapters in Niigata, Toyama, Akita, and Saitama met for this purpose. Fifteen Socialist members of the Diet, led by INAMURA Junzo, SATAKE Shinichi, and TANAKA Orinoshin, immediately offered their support. On April 4 the Shutaisei Kakuritsu Domei (League for the Establishment of Independence) was formally inaugurated at a meeting of 50 representatives from 15 prefectural branches.²

At the same time, the union's Central Executive Committee met and, as a substitute for the repeatedly postponed national convention, agreed to hold a national conference in mid-April to be attended by five representatives from each prefecture, including the chairman and secretary general of each prefectural chapter.

1. Akahata, June 30, 1948.
2. Jiji Press releases, March 20 and 22, 1948, April 5, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 21 and 23, 1948; Kyodo releases, March 21 and April 5, 1948.

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To avoid a test of strength for which they were far from prepared, the anti-Communist majority on the Central Executive Committee laid down the ruling that only the immediate economic problems of the farmers were to be discussed at the conference.¹ This decision was unsuccessfully challenged by leftists at the conference, which, aside from securing an agreement to hold a Central Committee meeting in mid-May, appears to have accomplished little.²

The Central Committee sessions were even more inconclusive and, like previous Nippon Nōmin Kumiai gatherings, were conspicuous only for violent encounters, verbal and physical, on such issues as credentials and the election of convention officers.³ Thwarted in any hopes they may have had for capturing the Central Committee, the anti-Communists once again asserted their control of the Central Executive Committee by passing a resolution in that body calling for the eradication of Communist influence in the union. To this Kuroda and his followers replied by organizing a rival body to the Shutaisei Kakuritsu Domei, the Seitoha Dōshikai (Orthodox Comrades Group), pledged to maintain the principle of freedom of support for any political party.⁴

5. The Kyōsantō's Democratic Racial Front Campaign. By the end of June anti-Communism, despite set-backs, had made sufficient headway to be an obvious threat to Communist influence in the labor movement and Sōdōmei withdrawal from the Zenrōren on charges that it was Kyōsantō-dominated had withdrawn the last prop from the tottering edifice of trade-union unity. On the other hand, however, a renewed Communist popular front drive had met with some success among extreme left-wing members of the Shakaitō.

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1. Akahata, April 6, 1948; Mimpo, April 7, 1948.
 2. Jiji Press releases, April 13 and 14, 1948.
 3. Jiji Press release, May 17, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, May 18, 1948; Tokyo Shimbun, May 18, 1948.
 4. Kyodo release, June 23, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, June 24, 1948; Mimpo, June 24, 1948; Akahata, June 25, 1948.

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First evidences of the revived Kyōsantō campaign appeared in November 1947 with the opening of a series of farmer-labor round-table conferences in which prominent parts were played by such Communist supporters as DOBASHI Kazuyoshi and by such Socialists as KURODA Hisao and SUZUKI Seichi, who had consistently opposed a complete break with the Communists.¹ On February 6, the Kyōsantō Central Committee decided to inaugurate a campaign for a democratic racial front, a slightly new twist to an old line in its emphasis on the Communist version of nationalism² but otherwise the standard appeal for the organization of a joint front to include the petty bourgeoisie and small capitalists and landowners, as well as Communists, Socialists, and organized workers and farmers. On February 9 the Kyōsantō announced its Central Committee decision and the Sanbetsu issued an appeal for the formation of a democratic peoples' front; on February 10, Sanbetsu officers visited Communist Diet members and Socialist members of the left-wing May Society to request the early formation of a democratic front; and on February 11, at its fourth session, the farmer-labor round-table conference decided to organize a new farmer-labor council.³

In mid-March the Kyōsantō again approached the Shakaitō with a proposal for a united front to have three objectives: thorough democratization of Japan; stabilization and improvement of the workers' livelihood; and complete independence for Japan. As the Kyōsantō undoubtedly anticipated, however, in view not only of the past policy of the Shakaitō but also of more recent statements by such left-wing leaders as Kato and Suzuki that Socialist-Communist cooperation was impossible, the Shakaitō quickly rejected the invitation.⁴ Attention, therefore, continued to be focused on winning

1. Kyodo release, December 29, 1947; Tokyo Times, December 30, 1947; Akahata, January 3, 1948.

2. See above, p. 118.

3. Asahi Shimbun, February 11, 1948; Mimpo, February 12, 1948; Akahata, February 14 and 17, 1948.

4. Mainichi Shimbun, January 10, 1948; Mimpo, January 19, 1948; Jiji Press releases, March 15 and 16, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, March 16, 1948.

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the cooperation and support of those Socialists farthest to the left, who were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the concessions required by Shakaitō participation in coalition governments.

At the beginning of May a number of conferences were held, attended by trade-union leaders drawn largely from Sanbetsu affiliates, left-wing Socialists of the Kuroda faction, and independent members of the House of Councillors who owed their election to trade-union support. It was decided at these meetings that protection of the workers' interests required closer liaison than had existed in the past between the unions and those members of the Diet who represented the workers and farmers. On this basis, a new group, the Rōnō Renrakukai (Labor-Farmer Liaison Council) was to be established. Socialist sponsors of this group included lower house members TSUJI Taminosuke, TOKORO Makoto, AKAMATSU Isamu, SHIMAGAMI Zengoro, TAKATEU Seido, KURODA Hisao, and OKADA Haruo and upper house members KIMURA Kihachiro, SUZUKI Seiichi, UCHIMURA Seiji, CHIBA Makoto, and HORI Makoto.¹

To both the Shakaitō and the Sōdōmei the proposed group was an object of suspicion -- a transparent device for the extension of Communist influence. Nevertheless, relations within the Shakaitō were sufficiently exacerbated by a revived dispute over the budget and trade-union interest in the new group was sufficiently strong to indicate the advisability of a cautious approach. The Shakaitō, therefore, confined itself to insisting that those of its Diet members who wished to participate in the Renraku do so on an unofficial basis and that they make every effort to prevent it from becoming the nucleus of a united front movement. Even this limited approbation, moreover, was contingent upon acceptance of the Shakaitō-Sōdōmei demand that Renraku membership be limited to Diet members

1. Seiji Shimbun, May 4, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 1948; Mimpo, May 7, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, May 4, 1948; Jiji Press release, May 12, 1948.

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actually affiliated with the unions -- a condition eliminating all Communist Diet members except KIMURA Sakae. After some delay brought about by unsuccessful Kyōsantō efforts to extend membership to anyone connected with the labor or farmer movements, the Renraku was formally inaugurated on June 9, adopting at its inaugural meeting resolutions opposing the new 3,791-yen average wage for government workers proposed by the cabinet in May in the draft budget for fiscal 1948, reductions in appropriations for the new educational system, revisions in the Local Autonomy Law, and reduction of government personnel.¹

C. The Budget Controversy and the Split in the Shakaitō

1. The War Bond Interest Payment Question. The left-wing Socialist vote against the supplementary budget that had precipitated the fall of the Katayama cabinet in February had by no means ended the controversy over budget issues. The long overdue budget for fiscal 1948 had still to be agreed upon by the cabinet, submitted to the Diet, and accepted by that body; controversy among and within the coalition parties as to the principles upon which the budget was to be drawn up continued unabated; and the war bond interest payment question remained essentially unsettled.

Basic to the dispute over the last question was the fact that the Democrats, despite commitments made to insure Socialist participation in the cabinet, were fundamentally opposed to the entire principle of suspension. They, therefore, argued that the agreement to establish a committee to study the interest question that had been reached before the organization of the cabinet meant that the question of whether or not to suspend the payments would be studied anew. The Shakaitō, on the other hand, under pressure from the May Society, which argued that defeat on this issue would inevitably lead to Socialist defeats on other issues as well, and from

1. Yomiuri Shimbun, May 14 and 22, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, May 17 and June 10, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, May 19 and June 3, 1948; Jiji Press releases, May 21 and 25, 1948, June 10, 1948.

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the leftist dominated Political Research Committee, insisted that the agreement had rested on the assumption that interest payments would be suspended and that the only remaining issue was the method by which suspension was to be carried out.¹

The dispute continued throughout March and April, with May Society support for an appropriation of about 21 million yen in the April supplementary budget for interest payments insured only by a commitment that no such appropriations would appear in the budget for fiscal 1948.² A crisis developed early in May when the Democrats at a party convention voted opposition to suspension and were immediately countered by Shakaitō Central Executive Committee resolutions reaffirming the Socialist demand for suspension and calling for the dissolution of all party factions in the interests of greater unity of action.³

At this juncture, Democratic Chief Cabinet Secretary TOMABECHI Gizo came forward with a compromise proposal for the suspension of interest payments for a period of one year. Although opposed by the right-wing Democratic Taiyokai faction and by leftists in the Shakaitō led by SUZUKI Mosaburo and KUMURA Kihachiro, the proposal was ultimately accepted by the coalition parties and approved by the cabinet on May 14.⁴

2. Dispute over Budget Provisions. Although the war bond interest payments issue was thus temporarily disposed of, prospects for an early passage of the budget continued to be unpromising. On May 26 a draft budget for 1948 was approved by the cabinet, but it was quite evident, in the face of objections by Shakaitō elements to many of its provisions, Democratic opposition to Socialist revision proposals, and Democratic

1. Jiji Press releases, March 16, 23, and 31, 1948, April 6, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, March 25, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, March 31, 1948, May 1, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, May 2, 1948.
2. Nippon Keizai Shimbun, March 30, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, April 1, 1948.
3. Jiji Press releases, May 5 and 6, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, May 7, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, May 7, 1948.
4. Kyodo releases, May 9 and 16, 1948; Jiji Press releases, May 10 and 12, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, May 11, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, May 12, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, May 16, 1948.

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Liberal¹ determination to make the most of the opportunities presented by disputes between the major government parties, that securing its passage by the Diet would be a long and difficult process.

A good deal of Socialist discontent with the budget revolved, as in the past, around proposals for an increase in transportation and communication rates. As drafted by the cabinet, the budget called for a 350 percent increase in passenger fares and freight rates and a 400 percent increase in postal rates. To this the Socialists, particularly the May Society adherents, opposed a demand for a 250 percent increase in passenger fares and a 300 percent increase in postal rates. In addition, Socialists of the Kuroda faction insisted that an average wage level for government workers of 4,500 yen be substituted for the 3,791-yen average proposed in the budget, while more moderate leftists of the Suzuki faction were willing to postpone this issue in the interests of passing a budget. Socialists in general, moreover, objected to the sweeping character of the sales tax proposed in the budget and were determined to secure an increase in educational appropriations. The revenue losses that would result from acceptance of these demands, the Socialists proposed, should be made up through imposition of higher taxes on large incomes and a new tax on surplus profits.²

3. Effects of the Nishio Scandal. As three-party and interparty discussions continued on these issues with minor concessions and little constructive result, the outbreak of the Nishio scandal further confused the political picture and postponed decision on the budget. This scandal, the first of the major post-surrender in which leading Socialists were prominently involved, revolved around charges that

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1. The Democratic Liberal Party was inaugurated on March 15, 1948 by the Liberal Party, which was officially dissolved at that time. It was joined by a number of former Democrats who had previously seceded from their party.
 2. Yomiuri Shimbun, June 6, 19, 20, and 22, 1948; Kyodo releases, June 8, 16, and 19, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, June 12 and 24, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, June 18, 1948.

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Nishio, in his capacity as secretary general of the Shakaitō, had, before the 1947 elections, received from a group of building contractors contributions of half a million yen that, in violation of Administrative Ordinance Number 328, he had failed to report.¹

Although the Japanese courts subsequently accepted Nishio's contention that the contributions had been made to him as an individual and not as a party officer, thereby acquitting him of charges of violation of the ordinance and of perjury, Socialist reactions to Nishio's admission that he had accepted the funds derived their violence from issues that had little to do with the legal aspects of the case. In the first place, the fact that Nishio had accepted money from a group of building contractors, who in this case were simultaneously subsidizing conservative candidates and who as a class have been associated with the worst contract labor practices and more recently with extensive black-marketing, was regarded as bringing discredit upon a working class party. Secondly, the fact that Nishio distributed the funds he received only to right-wing Socialists added to the growing irritation of the leftists with what they regarded as his unduly conservative policies, a situation that Nishio's admission that he had distributed the money in this fashion at the urging of the contributors did nothing to improve.²

Shakaitō embarrassment over these revelations in the midst of complicated and delicate budget negotiations was, therefore, intensified by the leftists' obvious intention of utilizing the situation to destroy the power in the party of a leader who, since the departure of Hirano, had become the focus of their opposition and discontent. On June 9 a group of about forty Socialist Diet members led by SASAKI Kozo decided to organize a reform movement in the party. The next day this group published a demand that Nishio resign from the cabinet, that his case be

1. Kyodo release, June 1, 1948.

2. Yomiuri Shimbun, June 3, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, June 6, 1948.

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thoroughly investigated, and that a general party house cleaning be carried out. Socialist rightists soon responded with a demand that disciplinary action be taken against the members of the reform group, who, they charged, were acting as tools of the Kyōsantō in its efforts to bring about the overthrow of the cabinet. Centrist party leaders like Katayama and Asanuma, while in sympathy with the left-wing attitude toward Nishio, were primarily concerned with securing the passage of the budget and were therefore unwilling to press for Nishio's resignation because of the repercussions it might have on the general political situation and undoubtedly also because of recognition of Nishio's unquestioned capacity for achieving agreement with the other coalition parties. For these reasons, and with the support of the moderate leftists, Katayama urged that the Shakaitō take no action until the House of Representatives Illegal Property Transactions Investigation Committee had completed its investigation of the case and that meanwhile the Socialists unite in attempting to secure an acceptable budget as quickly as possible.¹

The need for agreement within the Shakaitō was intensified by the increasing imminence of a Democratic-Liberal motion of non-confidence in Nishio to be proposed in the House of Representatives session of June 24. Even within the ranks of reform group leftists there was no agreement on the position to be taken in the non-confidence vote, and it was not until the very day that the motion was to be introduced that the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee agreed that the party should vote against it and Katayama was able to secure the agreement of most members of the reform group to this policy. Despite the agreement, however, when the vote was taken twelve left-wing Socialists were absent -- a situation presaging what was to be similar obduracy on the budget issue.²

1. Mainichi Shimbun, June 10, 12, 13, and 17, 1948; Jiji Press releases, June 11, 12, 16, 17, and 18, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, June 15, 1948; Shakai Shimbun, June 16, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, June 18 and 20, 1948.
2. Jiji Press releases, June 21, 22, and 24, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, June 22, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, June 25, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 1948.

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4. Organization of the Orthodox Diet Group. Meanwhile a series of three-party meetings had been making some progress on the budget question. On June 30, at a final meeting, representatives of the three parties agreed on a 255-percent increase in railway passenger fares, a decrease in the number of essential items to be subject to the sales tax, an increase in the levies on higher-bracket taxpayers, and an increase in the appropriations for education, disaster relief, and repatriate housing projects.¹

Notwithstanding the fact that the Shakaitō had achieved some of its aims in the budget discussions, a small group of leftists remained intransigent and, with the enthusiastic support of the Sanbetsu, the Zenkankō, and the Renraku, clung to its determination to vote against the budget. Three lower house Socialists voted against the budget in the Budget Committee, thus bringing about its defeat in that body; twelve lower house Socialists cast a negative ballot and four were absent when the plenary session overruled the committee by a vote of 217 to 176. In the House of Councillors, five leftists voted against the budget and two abstained.² Having passed the budget the Diet adjourned, ironically enough without acting on the bill for suspension of interest payments on wartime bonds, which had been shelved in the upper house.

With the adjournment of the Diet, the Shakaitō was confronted with a major problem of party house cleaning. On the one hand there was still intense hostility toward Nishio, who, despite his resignation from the cabinet on July 6 and his indictment on July 7, remained a member of the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee. On the other hand there was an obvious need, for the sake of party prestige and

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1. Mainichi Shimbun, June 24 and 30, 1948; Kyodo release, June 29, 1948; Jiji Press release, June 30, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, July 1, 1948.
 2. Kyodo releases, July 1 and 3, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, July 1 and 2, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 3 and 4, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, July 5, 1948.

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discipline, to take some action against Kuroda and his followers.

The Kuroda group, vociferous in its demands that disciplinary action be taken against Nishio, was quick to deny that the vote against the budget had violated party discipline, arguing rather that the compromises accepted in the budget were contrary to Shakaitō policy. In any case, the extreme leftists argued, the question of the validity of their action and of disciplinary measures was one that could be decided only by the Central Committee or by a party convention. The moderate leftists, sympathetic to the demand that some action be taken against Nishio and that expulsions from the party be as limited as possible, urged that the first step taken be the removal of Nishio from the Central Executive Committee and that thereafter only Kuroda, Nakahara, Okada, Tamai, and Ota be expelled from the party, with disciplinary action against the other dissidents confined to deprivation of party office. For this position they received the support of important centrist elements in the party.¹

On July 7 the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee created a special subcommittee to consider the question of party discipline, and on the same day the subcommittee arrived at a decision that was immediately accepted by the Central Executive Committee. Under this decision, Nishio was to be asked to resign from the Central Executive Committee; KURODA Hisao, NAKAHARA Kenji, OKADA Haruo, TAMAI Yukichi, MATSUTANI Tenkoku, and OTA Tenrei were expelled; and the other dissidents were to be suspended from party office until their cases had been fully investigated. Two days later ten of Kuroda's followers -- TATE Shunzo, SAKAI Kazuo, ISHINO Hisao, YAMANAKA Hiroshi, TOKORO Makoto, KIMURA Kihachiro, SUZUKI Seiichi, CHIBA Shin, HORI Makoto, and MIZUEHASHI Fujisaku, who had already joined with the expelled group in organizing the

1. Mainichi Shimbun, July 5, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 6, 1948; Kyodo releases, July 6 and 7, 1948.

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Shakaitō Orthodox Diet Members' Association -- resigned from the party, thereby reducing Shakaitō lower house strength to 111.¹ Denying any intention of organizing a new party, the Orthodox group declared that it would seek the purification of the Shakaitō from outside the party.²

The first impact of the expulsions and secessions was felt in the traditionally leftist Shakaitō Youth Department, which held its national convention in mid-July. The convention adopted a resolution calling for the expulsion of Nishio from the Shakaitō but failed to adopt one demanding the reinstatement of the dissidents, confining itself instead, by a vote of 215 to 213, to calling for speedy convocation of the party's Central Committee. The defeated Kuroda supporters thereupon withdrew from the convention and proceeded to organize a committee to purify the Youth Department, while the remaining delegates elected moderate leftist TANAKA Orinoshin chairman of the Department to succeed the expelled Okada.³

D. The Fall of the Cabinet

1. Shakaitō Discussion of Diet Dissolution. The adjournment of the Diet left the Shakaitō reduced in size and largely frustrated in its attempts to impose Socialist policy upon its conservative colleagues. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that left-wing opposition to further **cooperation with the Democrats** should increase in strength. In mid-July, however, the leftist argument received unexpected support from the leader of the party when, on a provincial speaking tour, Katayama stated his belief that the three-party coalition had virtually come to an end and that the House of Representatives should be dissolved at a special session to be called in the near future.⁴

1. ARAHATA Kanson had already resigned from the Shakaitō in protest against the bug budget compromise but did not associate himself with the Orthodox group.
2. Kyodo releases, July 7, 8, 10, and 13, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 9, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, July 11, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, July 12, 1948.
3. Jiji Press releases, July 15, 16, and 19, 1948; Nippon Keizai Shimbun, July 18, 1948; Tokyo Shimbun, July 20, 1948.
4. Yukan Kyoto, July 13, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 18, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, July 19, 1948.

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Katayama's demand was taken up immediately by Kato, Suzuki, Matsumoto, and other leftists. This group not only supported the dissolution proposal but also added a proposal of its own that the Shakaitō should withdraw from the cabinet before the special session so that during the diet discussions the Socialists could assume an opposition position and make clear the differences on policy that separated them from the Democrats. In this way, it may be assumed, the leftists hoped to disassociate their party as far as possible from the policies of the Ashida cabinet, perhaps gain election advantages from throwing the onus of cabinet failures on the Democrats, and, in any case, establish an obstacle to possible post-election renewal of proposals for a coalition with the Democrats. Socialist rightists, on the other hand, apparently taken completely by surprise by Katayama's statement, were vigorously opposed both to dissolution and to withdrawal from the cabinet. Led by Matsuoka, Mizutani, Morito, and Nishio, this group pointed out that a special session was required to discuss a new wage base and a supplementary budget as well as to force upon the House of Councillors resumption of discussions of the bill for suspension of interest payments on wartime bonds. Under no circumstances, they argued, should dissolution be proposed until these issues had been settled, and Matsuoka went so far as to suggest that if anything were to replace the existing government it should be a four-party coalition. Katayama, supported by Yonekubo, stood firm on the demand for dissolution but was hesitant to join the leftists in supporting withdrawal from the cabinet as well -- partly on the theory that the Shakaitō might derive some advantage from going before the electorate as a government party. On July 22, a further element of uncertainty entered the discussions when General MacArthur addressed a letter to Premier Ashida calling for the revision of the National Public Service Law.¹

1. Kyodo release, July 20, 1948; Jiji Press releases, July 20 and 24, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 20 and 22, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, July 21, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, July 21, 1948; Tokyo Shimbun, July 22, 1948.

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RESTRICTED2. Effects of SCAP Demands for Revision of the National Public Service Law

a. Background. When the budget was passed early in July it made provision for a monthly wage level of 3,791 yen for government workers. The federation of government workers' unions, the Zenkankō, however, had never accepted this figure, pressing instead for an average wage level of 5,200 yen tax free. Dissatisfaction with the wage level as established in the budget had been partially responsible for the events that resulted in the expulsion of Kuroda and his followers from the Shakaitō, and on July 4 the moderate leftists who had voted for the budget demanded an increase in the wage level to 4,500 yen.

On July 7 the Zenkanko submitted its dispute with the government to the Central Labor Relations Committee for mediation -- a step that would have given most Zenkankō member unions legal freedom to strike after thirty days. Any plans that the Zenkankō may have had for actually calling a strike, however, were put to an end by the SCAP letter of July 22 and the government ordinance that followed it on July 31.

The SCAP letter in effect, recommended that the National Public Service Law, enforced on July 1, be amended to deny the right to strike to all government employees. This right, nowhere mentioned in the National Public Service Law, had hitherto been enjoyed with certain limitations under existing labor legislation by all but about 20 percent -- the so-called administrative category -- of the government's approximately 2.7 million employees. The text of the letter left in doubt the status of collective bargaining in the government service but indicated by its terms a probable SCAP intention that in the future collective bargaining, hitherto employed throughout the government service, should be limited to employees of the government railroads, the salt, camphor, and tobacco monopolies, and the Kodan.¹

1. Government corporations. Existing Kodan are concerned primarily with the distribution and allocation of essential commodities.

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Working closely with SCAP officials and basing their operations on the contention that, in effect, the July 22 letter was a directive, the cabinet moved quickly to put the terms of the letter into effect. On July 24, the government withdrew its representatives from the Central Labor Relations Committee's mediation proceedings, and on July 31, after some delay occasioned by Shakaitō reservations, it issued an ordinance denying the right of all government employees -- national or local -- to bargain collectively or to resort to strikes and other acts of dispute and providing penal measures for the punishment of violations. With this act, preparation of amendments to the National Public Service Law for submission to the Diet became the cabinet's next order of business.

b. Repercussions on the left. Reactions to the new situation among government workers and interested groups on the left were to a large extent conditioned by the part played by SCAP in bringing it about. Within this framework, however, the new developments, while leading organized labor in general to seek to protect its legal position, also intensified trends already in existence. The Communists and their supporters in the union movement seized the opportunity to intensify their growing and increasingly militant opposition to the government and to expand the campaign for the organization of a democratic front. Anti-Communist elements, meanwhile, were given a further stimulus to organization for the purpose of eliminating Communist leadership from the trade-union movement.

After an initial period of some hesitancy the Communists and their supporters in the Zenkankō and such completely Communist-dominated unions as that of the communications workers entered upon a campaign of unremitting opposition to the new principles upon which revisions of the National Public Service Law were to be based. Arguing that the government in its ordinance of July 31 had gone far beyond the requirements of the SCAP letter and had indeed acted in an unconstitutional fashion, Communist elements encouraged militant unions and locals to resort to widespread

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absenteeism and scattered local acts of dispute, which in turn led the government to retaliate in the form of arrests and convictions under the penal provisions of the ordinance.

Arrests under the ordinance provided further stimulus to the organization of the so-called Leagues to Defend Democracy, which, under Communist auspices and in line with the new program of defending racial independence, had been set up in various prefectures before the issuance of the SCAP letter. In mid-August a campaign was undertaken to combine these groups into a mass organization to which the adherence of trade unions, political parties, cultural societies, and interested individuals would be invited. These followed a series of preparatory committee meetings and mass rallies in which conspicuous roles were played not only by the Communists, the leftist trade unions, and representatives of the Renraku, but also by such well-known front organizations as the Jiyū Hōsō Dan (Free Bar Association), the Minshushugi Bunka Renmei (Democratic Cultural League), and the Minshu Shugi Kagakusha Kyōkai (Democratic Scientists' Association). Far from confining themselves to an attack on alterations in the legal status of government workers, these meetings ranged the entire field of the Communist racial front line, calling simultaneously for opposition to revision of the National Public Service Law; racial independence; the abolition of the colonial system; an early peace treaty and withdrawal of the occupation forces; protection of civil liberties, democratic culture, and minimum living standards; and the dissolution of the Diet.¹

With the Communists and their followers were combining unqualified opposition to the revision of the National Public Service Law with attempts to utilize proposals for revision for the furtherance of popular front activities, anti-Communists, attributing responsibility for the situation that had produced the

1. Jiji Press releases, July 16 and August 12, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, August 8, 1948; Mimpo, August 14, 1948; Akahata, August 17, 19, 22, and 29, September 12, 1948.

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SCAP letter to Communist abuse of labor rights, were equally active in combining efforts to preserve certain of the legal rights of government workers with an intensification of the campaign against Communist penetration of the trade unions. At the beginning of August the leaders of the Mindō, the anti-Communist group in the Sanbetsu, announced their opposition to the methods being used by the Sanbetsu and the Communist-led unions in opposing revision of the National Public Service Law, committed themselves to fighting unfavorable revisions by legal and democratic means, and declared their readiness to join with the Sōdōmei in organizing a new anti-Communist federation. In mid-August the same group clarified its position on revision of the National Public Service Law, calling for the preservation of both strike and collective bargaining rights for employees of government enterprises and civil servants in the so-called operating categories and retention of the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining for administrative employees. Shortly thereafter the Sōdōmei expressed its position, which, although more moderate than that of the Mindō, demanded the exclusion from the public service category -- and hence from restrictions on the right to organize, bargaining collectively, and strike -- of employees of the government railroads, communications, and tobacco enterprises; operating employees of public entities engaged in the operation of transportation, sanitation, and waterworks facilities; government-employed common labor; and employees of the occupation forces.¹

By the end of August, the anti-Communist movement in the trade unions had been joined by a new group, led by eleven members of the Zenkankō's Central Executive Committee who announced their intention of eliminating extreme leftist influence from

1. Kyodo releases, July 27, August 2 and 22, 1948; Jiji Press releases, August 1 and 2, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, August 3, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, August 16, 1948.

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the trade unions, respecting the principles of the SCAP letter, opposing the attempts of bureaucrats to utilize the SCAP letter for the suppression of labor, and seeking the maintenance of the right to organize and bargain collectively for government workers. By September attempts initiated by the Sōdōmei in July to bring together into one organization all anti-Communist unions and anti-Communist factions within unions were bearing fruit, and, on September 20, 400 representatives of thirteen organizations met to prepare for the formation of a united front of democratic trade unions that would oppose the extreme left-wing trend of the Zenrōren and Sanbetsu and fight for the right of government workers to organize and bargain collectively. At the end of the month, a high point of the anti-Communist campaign was reached with the reversal of previous trends in the Kokutetsu in the election of a Central Executive Committee completely dominated by democratization elements and the overwhelming defeat by the union convention of a number of Communist-inspired motions.¹

c. The position of the Shakaitō. The SCAP letter of July 22 placed the Shakaitō in a singularly embarrassing position. On the one hand KATO Kanju as Labor Minister had repeatedly announced his determination to oppose any attempts to revise Japan's labor laws and, while Nishio and other members of the right wing had tended to dismiss these statements as an expression of Kato's personal views, Kato's position had ultimately been supported by the Shakaitō Central Executive Committee, well aware of the importance the issue had assumed in the eyes of organized labor.² On the other hand, in the situation created by the SCAP letter, a Socialist decision to resign from the cabinet or to call for an immediate dissolution of the Diet could be interpreted only as an expression of opposition to the wishes of the Supreme Commander. After some initial hesitation, therefore, the Shakaitō decided to postpone the

1. Jiji Press releases, July 12, August 20, September 24, 25, 28, and 30, October 2, 1948; Rodo, September 17, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, September 21, October 1 and 4, 1948; Kyōdo releases, September 25, 29, and 30, October 3 and 4, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, October 3, 1948.
2. Jiji Press release, May 6, 1948.

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dissolution issue until after the National Public Service Law had been amended by the Diet and to remain in the cabinet in order to protect the interests of the workers in revision discussions.¹

With this decision the Shakaitō embarked simultaneously upon two courses of action. The most pressing issue -- the preparation of a Socialist position on revision of the National Public Service Law -- was undertaken by the Political Research Committee. At the same time the Committee began to formulate new policies on inflation, wages and prices, and land reform to be presented to a Shakaitō Central Committee meeting in the fall and, failing acceptance by the coalition government, to form the basis for a move to dissolve the Diet. On August 13, the Political Research Committee completed its first task, and a few days later, after some modifications had been made by Shakaitō ministers, the plan was presented to the cabinet.

The Political Research Committee plan, as modified, contained both a general statement of the Shakaitō position with regard to revision and specific proposals for revision. In general, the Shakaitō declared that it would fight against any attempts by the conservatives to utilize the necessity for revision to embark upon an offensive directed against the rights of labor; that since Kyōsantō labor policies had led to proposals for revision, government workers' trade unions should govern their future activities accordingly; and that, since the government must be held responsible for failing to curb inflation and to provide adequate living standards for the workers, the new series of measures to be proposed by the Shakaitō with regard to inflation, the wage level, and prices must be discussed in conjunction with revision proposals. With regard to the specific terms of revision the Socialists proposed that the distinction between operating and administrative employees be retained, with the right of operating employees to organize, bargain collectively,

1. Kyodo releases, July 26 and 27, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, July 27, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, July 31, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, August 4, 1948.

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and strike recognized in principle, subject to limitations on the exercise of these rights in the light of the status of the workers as public employees and the public character of the enterprises concerned; agreements already concluded dealing with economic and welfare matters remain valid for the future; the scope of the regular civil service¹ be carefully defined and limited to a minimum; reorganization of government enterprises be studied; and the administering authority for the National Public Service Law be thoroughly democratized.²

While discussions of revision in the cabinet and between the cabinet and SCAP representatives became increasingly time-consuming and less favorable to the ultimate achievement of Socialist demands, controversy within the Shakaitō over Diet dissolution and withdrawal from the cabinet continued along the lines already established.. Late in September the Showa Denko scandal gave the Left an opportunity to insist on cabinet resignation for reasons entirely extraneous to the National Public Service Law and yet to free the Shakaitō, to some extent at least, from responsibility for seemingly unavoidable revisions unfavorable to organized labor.

3. The Showa Denko Scandal. The Showa Denko scandal revolved around accusations that Democrat KURUSU Takeo, Director of the Economic Stabilization Board and Minister without Portfolio in the Ashida cabinet, had used his position as Finance Minister in the Katayama cabinet to obtain excessive loans for the Showa Electric Company, the president of which, who owed his position to Kurusu's influence, had then made heavy contributions to the Democratic Party. Allegedly involved with Kurusu in a complicated series of deals and negotiations were NISHIO Suehiro and a number of other politicians and businessmen.

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1. I.e., government employees subject to the provisions of the National Public Service Law.
 2. Jiji Press releases, August 13 and 18, 1948; Yomiuri Shimbun, August 14, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, August 18, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, August 18, 1948.

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At a cabinet meeting on October 1, shortly after Kurusu's arrest, Nomizo demanded that the government resign en bloc in order to assume responsibility for the involvement of leading members of the government parties in a scandal of major proportions. Although the rightists favored the adoption of a wait-and-see policy, the leftists backed Nomizo's demand for an immediate resignation and prepared to present concurrent demands for resignation of the cabinet, dissolution of the Diet, and the expulsion of Nishio to the Shakaitō Central Committee sessions scheduled to open on October 7. On that day, however, the issue was forced when both Kurusu and Nishio admitted to having received money from the Showa Denko.¹ The cabinet resigned the same day; a government was ultimately formed by the Democratic Liberals; and the Shakaitō returned to the opposition and to the prospect of a general election in the near future.

1. Kyodo releases, October 1 and 6, 1948; Jiji Press releases, October 1 and 6, 1948; Asahi Shimbun, October 2 and 8, 1948; Mainichi Shimbun, October 4, 1948.

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RESTRICTEDCONCLUSIONS

The left-wing movement in Japan has passed through two phases since the beginning of the occupation -- an initial period of marked growth in a new atmosphere of political freedom and a second period, after the elections of 1947, when the Socialist Party entered the government and, perhaps prematurely, assumed the responsibilities of this growth. The post-surrender left-wing revival began in an environment that was in many ways new and unprecedented. Full legal freedom and the support of highest authority for many of the reforms long fruitlessly urged by the Left represented only one side of the picture, on the other was the receptivity of the Japanese people to new doctrines -- a reaction against the past induced by the shock of defeat and probably a good deal stronger and more widespread than any previous similar reaction in Japan.

Within the Left, the fruits of the new situation were initially enjoyed principally by the Socialists, whose collectivist economic program was coupled with acceptance of the democratic principles urged by the occupation authorities and who demonstrated their new strength both in the trade-union field and, in the political arena, in the elections of 1946. The Communists, on the other hand, attaining their greatest political success in the very earliest period of the occupation, made an extremely unimpressive showing in the elections as compared with the Socialists. The gains of the Communists, despite traditional Japanese hostility to and fear of Russia and reiterated expressions of opposition to Communism by representatives of the United States, were nevertheless not inconsiderable in comparison with their prewar position, and weakness at the polls could be balanced by Communist strength in the rapidly growing trade-union movement.

With the elections of 1947 the Left faced new opportunities and new dangers. For the Socialists, election victories had created an opportunity to participate in

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the government of Japan and to give their theories practical application. The distribution of political power, however, made cooperation with conservative parties inevitable and thus accentuated the danger that existing internal schism would widen under the stress of the compromises that successful coalition would constantly require. Economic factors, on the other hand, not only placed strict limitations on the potential accomplishments of any government but also almost inevitably threatened any party in power with the prospect that the longer it held office the greater would be its unpopularity and its responsibility in the eyes of the masses for unremitting hardships.

The Communists proved no stronger politically in 1947 than in 1946 and by this demonstration of weakness, if for no other reason, lost the support of all but a few left-wing Socialists for the united front that had been a Kyōsantō objective since the revival of the party. Opportunities for the Communists were not entirely lacking, however. Controversies within the Shakaitō over the compromises of coalition could be utilized to revive the interest of the party's left-wing in united action with the Communists, and the compromises themselves could be attacked as betrayals of the working class; the possibility that some success by the moderate left in solving Japan's problems would undermine what popular support existed for the extreme left could be balanced against the existence of problems of such magnitude that failure, redounding to the advantage of political extremists, was infinitely more likely than success; and, meanwhile, Communist strength in trade unions and farmers' organizations could be used both to create difficulties for the government and to bolster arguments for subordination of left-wing doctrinal controversy in the interests of proletarian unity.

At the beginning of 1949, after a year and a half in office, the Shakaitō would appear to have suffered much more from the disadvantages of shared power in a time of acute crisis than it has gained from the opportunities of political leadership. Certainly, in facing the electorate once again it can neither offer the possible

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advantages of the untried nor claim, on the basis of the record, that the Socialists have at least left Japan better than they found it. It has to add to the claim of experience in office that it previously lacked only the dubious argument that without Socialist participation in the cabinet the situation might have been worse and that the weaknesses of government from May 1947 to October 1948 arose not from the weaknesses of the Shakaitō per se but from its failure to control the majority that would have made possible a genuine Socialist administration.

Added to the disadvantages to the Shakaitō resulting from identification with eighteen months of economic hardship, political futility, and public scandal will be those that result from the consequences of an internal disunity that was only implicit in 1947. In 1949 the Shakaitō will compete for popular support not only with the conservative parties and the Communists but also with two of its own offshoots, the Kakushin Shakaitō on the right and the Rōdōsha Nōmintō on the left. The Kakushin Shakaitō, in view of the negligible effects of the schism that produced it on the Shakaitō's local branches and of its inability to wean the one mass group under its influence, the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, completely away from its ties with the Shakaitō, shows little prospect of constituting a serious threat to the parent party. The Rōdōsha Nōmintō, on the other hand, appears likely to cut more significantly into the potential non-Communist left-wing vote. Such evidence as is now available indicates that the organization of the Rōdōsha Nōmintō has had much more serious repercussions in the local branches of the Shakaitō than did the earlier right-wing schism. A number of the leaders of the new party have important ties with the trade-union movement, where Socialist eleventh-hour rejection of the amended National Public Service Law may not prove as influential as what previously appeared to be rather complete, albeit uncomfortable, willingness to accept the inevitable. Equally important support for the new party at the expense of the Shakaitō may come from ties in the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, where the group that has

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neither openly avowed Communism nor been willing to break completely with the Communists has consistently held the balance of power between Kyōsantō elements and their opponents. Finally, although the Rōdōsha Nōmintō has been careful to disclaim formal ties with the Kyōsantō and the Kyōsantō has tended to reprove the leaders of the new party for discarding the opportunity to purify and influence the Shakaitō by their secession, it seems unlikely, in view of the past activities of Kuroda and his followers and the opportunism of the Communists, that these publicly expressed attitudes will be an important deterrent to joint action.

Even though the Kyōsantō can expect to benefit from the latest split in Socialist ranks, whether through outright cooperation with the Rōdōsha Nōmintō or merely through the accentuation of differences within the non-Communist left, the Communists suffer from serious weaknesses of their own. That the Japanese people, in general, appear to be moving toward the right rather than the left at this time need not affect the ability of the Kyōsantō to strengthen itself at the expense of other left-wing groupings. A more serious threat to the Communist position is the growing anti-Communism in labor organizations. This anti-Communism has not yet become sufficiently strong either to wrest from the Communists control of any group in which they had succeeded in gaining complete authority or to end decisively conflicts in organizations such as the Nippon Nōmin Kumiai where unresolved contention has long existed. Nor can trade-union anti-Communism, particularly in its present uncoordinated state, necessarily be expected to prevent a possible rise in the Communist vote in the coming elections. More important is the potential threat to the Communist ability to control the activities of mass organizations strategically located in the Japanese economy -- an area of Communist activity of much greater significance to long-term Kyōsantō prospects than Communist representation in the Diet, which, even should it be increased in 1949, will remain insignificant. The success achieved by the Communists in combating this trend will depend to a very

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important extent upon policies pursued by future Japanese governments. Should the trend toward conservatism now apparent carry Japan to the extreme right and be reflected in seriously disadvantageous revision of labor legislation and major reversals of the reform policies carried on under the aegis of the occupation, stock Communist arguments for proletarian unity in self-defense and for emphasis on militant direct action as opposed to parliamentary procedures may appeal increasingly to elements hitherto associated with the moderate left, particularly in the absence of a marked improvement in economic conditions.

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RESTRICTEDAPPENDIX ABIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON JAPANESE LEFT-WING LEADERS

These notes, prepared in cooperation with the Division of Biographic Information, are based on a wide variety of sources, including Japanese newspapers, studies of the proletarian movement in both Japanese and English, and standard Who's Who's. Many of these sources are vague, internally inconsistent, or mutually contradictory. In compiling these notes, an attempt has been made to eliminate such inconsistencies and contradictions through comparison and cross-checking, but no claims are made to complete accuracy. Nor should these notes be regarded as covering all left-wing leaders of present or potential importance, since, with a very few exceptions, a conscious effort was made to include only those leaders whose personal histories are available in sufficient detail to present a meaningful picture.

ABE Isao

Current Activities. Adviser to Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1865, Fukuoka; graduated from Doshisha (Kyoto) and Hartford (Conn.) Theological Seminary; taught at Waseda University for over twenty-five years; adviser to Rōdō Nōmintō in 1925; one of organizers of Shakai Minshūtō in 1926 and thereafter its president; chairman of Central Executive Committee of Shakai Taishūtō, 1932-40; resigned from Shakai Taishūtō in 1940 and led in the attempt to organize the Kindō Kokumintō; elected to Diet in 1928, 1932, 1936, and 1937.

AKAMATSU Tsuneko

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; chief of Women's Bureau, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei; member, House of Councillors, from national constituency.

Background. Born 1903, Yamaguchi; attended Kyoto Women's College; chief of Women's Department, Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei, 1934-40; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Welfare, April-October 1948.

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AOYAMA Kazuo

Current Activities. Member, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1905; active in left-wing cultural groups; imprisoned for five months in 1935; secured position with a firm in Shanghai in 1936; became adviser to WANG Peng-sheng (Chiang's adviser on Japanese affairs) in Nanking in 1937; in 1938 went to Chungking, where he organized the Japanese Democratic Committee and published Kokusai (International Affairs); returned to Japan early in 1946; member, Central Committee, Minshu Jimmin Renmei.

ARAHATA Katsuzo (Kenson)

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo; president of Kanto District Union of Metal Workers, which is affiliated with Rōdō Kumiai Sōdomei; labor representative, Central Labor Relations Committee.

Background. Born 1887, Yokohama; originally a syndicalist and leader of Shinyukai; became a Communist in 1917 and was one of organizers of Nippon Kyōsantō; attended Fourth Congress of the Communist International in 1922; imprisoned for one year in 1924; in 1925 met with Communist leaders in Shanghai and urged dissolution of the party; arrested in 1926 and released in 1928; apparently arrested again in or before 1930 and broke with Nippon Kyōsantō sometime thereafter; elected to Executive Committee of Association of Friends of Peace in the Far East, organized by KATO Kanju in 1933, and was also associated with Kato in Nippon Musantō; arrested for united front activities in 1937; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, August 1946-July 1948; chairman, Shakaitō Education Committee, 1947; chairman, Shakaitō Labor Committee, 1948; resigned from the Shakaitō, July 4, 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

ASANUMA Inejiro

Current Activities. Secretary general, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo.

Background. Born 1898, Tokyo; graduated from Waseda University, 1923; joined Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1924; arrested in 1924 for strike activities; chief secretary, Nōmin Rōdōtō; one of organizers of Nippon Rōnōtō; chief secretary, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; January 1931, chief of Organization Section and member of Central Executive Committee, Zenkoku Taishūtō; July 1931, chief of Organization Section and member of Central Executive Committee, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō; 1932-40, chief of Organization Section and member of Central Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō; September-November 1941, member of IRAPS; 1941-42, member of Standing Committee of Tokyo branch and counselor of Fukuoka branch, IRAA; 1944-45, counselor of Fukugawa branch of IRAA; member, Tokyo Municipal Assembly in 1933, 1937, 1943, became vice chairman in 1945; auditor, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946; Shakaitō election secretary, Kanto area, 1947; chairman, House of Representatives Rules Committee, June 1947-November 1948; elected to Diet, 1936, 1937, 1946, and 1947.

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BABA Tsunego

Current Activities. President, Yomiuri Shimbun; sponsor, Fabian Society.

Background. Born 1875, Okayama; attended Doshisha and Waseda Universities; 1924, active in the movement to organize a proletarian party; 1926, named adviser to Shakai Minshutō; 1932, appointed adviser to Shakai Taishūtō; adviser to Nippon Shakaitō, November 1945-September 1946.

BOBU Ontetsu

Current Activities. Candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyosantō.

Background. Korean, born 1909; primary school graduate; 1928, joined General League of Korean Labor; member of Tokyo Korean Labor Union; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1933; arrested in 1934, 1938, and 1941.

DOBASHI Kazuyoshi

Current Activities. President, Zentei (Communication Workers' Union); member, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1908, Shimane; graduate, Meiji University Law School (Tokyo); 1934, became minor official in the Tokyo Central Post Office; conscripted in 1943, served until 1945; organizer of communications workers, 1945; elected president of Zentei, 1946; vice chairman, Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi, 1940-47.

DOI Naosaku

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Kanagawa; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1900, Ishikawa; attended labor school; member, Kanagawa Prefectural Assembly, elected 1932, 1936, and 1940; member, Kawasaki Municipal Assembly, 1936-40; member of Central Committee and chairman of Kanagawa branch, Rōdō Kumiai Sōdomei; chief secretary, Kanagawa branch, Shakai Minshutō, 1930; chief secretary of Kanagawa branch and member of Central Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō, 1932-40; counselor, Kanagawa branch, IRAA, 1940; director, Kanagawa branch, Dai Nippon Seijikai, 1945; member of Central Committee and of Propaganda Division, Nippon Shakaitō, 1945; chairman, Communications Committee, House of Representatives, May-October 1948; elected to Diet, 1946 and 1947.

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EGUCHI Kiyoshi (Kan)

Current Activities. Chairman of Tohigi Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1887, Tokyo; attended Tokyo Imperial University; 1927, organized Japan Proletarian Literary Arts League; 1939, sentenced to two years' imprisonment for violation of Peace Preservation Law; sponsor of New Japan Literary Society; unsuccessful Communist Diet candidate, April 1946.

FUKUMOTO Kazuo

Current Activities. Free lance writer.

Background. Born 1893, Tottori; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1920; traveled in United States and Europe, 1922-24, and joined Communist Party while in Germany; after his return to Japan in 1924 became a lecturer and writer on Marxism, publishing a monthly magazine, Under the Marxist Flag; became theoretical leader of Nippon Kyōsantō in 1926, replacing YAMAKAWA Hitoshi; 1927, his doctrines were condemned by the Comintern and, after attending meetings in Moscow, he abjured them; arrested in 1929 and subsequently sentenced to ten years' imprisonment; expelled or seceded from Nippon Kyōsantō sometime after 1927.

FUSE Tatsuji

Current Activities. Member, Jiyū Hōsō Dan (Free Bar Association); member, League to Defend Democracy.

Background. Born 1881, Tokyo; graduate of Meiji University; active in 1924 in the movement for organization of a proletarian party; legal adviser to various trade unions and leftist organizations; 1926, adviser to Rōdō Nōmintō; member of the leftist faction opposing organization of the Shin Rōmōtō in 1929; disbarred, 1932; member of Executive Committee of Association of Friends of Peace in the Far East, organized by KATO Kanju in 1933; imprisoned 1933-35 and 1939-40; unsuccessful independent candidate for governor, Miyagi Prefecture, 1947; unsuccessful Rōdō Nōmintō Diet candidate in 1928.

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HAKAMADA Satomi

Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1904, Aomori; 1923, member of leftist faction of Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; 1925, one of organizers of Nippon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai; went to Moscow to study in 1925; returned to Japan in 1928 and became active in reorganization of Nippon Kyōsantō; imprisoned June 1928 - October 1932; 1933, became a candidate member of Nippon Kyōsantō's Central Committee and its Tokyo District Committee; December 1933, elected a member of Nippon Kyōsantō's Central Committee and chief of its Organization Section; arrested March 1935; imprisoned 1935-45; member of Central Committee and Political Bureau and chief of Control Department and Labor Organizing Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946; active in the organization of the Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi, 1946; chief of the Seinen Kyōsan Dōmei (Young Communist League), 1946-47.

HARA Hyo (Hyonosuke)

Current Activities. Member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Tokyo.

Background. Born 1894, Okayama; graduate of Tokyo Imperial University; member of Central Committee and chief of Education Section, Shakai Minshutō; professor of law, Hosei University, since 1929; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-47; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

HARA Toraichi

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency.

Background. Born 1897, Okayama; 1921, joined Nippon Rōdō Sōdōmei; led movement for expulsion of Communists from Sōdōmei in 1924; 1928, member, Central Committee, Shakai Minshutō; 1935, visited Europe as adviser to Japanese delegation to International Labor Conference; 1937-42, member, Tokyo Municipal Assembly; Labor representative on Central Labor Relations Committee and on Cabinet Payroll Committee of the Economic Stabilization Board, 1947; chairman, Labor Committee, House of Councillors, 1947; elected secretary general of Rōdō Kumiai Sōdōmei, 1946 and 1947; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1942; elected to Diet, 1947.

HASEGAWA Hiroshi

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee, Secretariat, and Political Bureau, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1903, Aichi; attended Kyoto Imperial University; 1928, joined Nippon Kyōsantō and arrested; 1933, became a member of Central Committee of Nippon Kyōsantō; arrested 1940, released 1943; member of Central Committee and Political Bureau, Nippon Kyōsantō, 1946-47.

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HATANO Kanae

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from Fukuoka; vice chairman, Political Affairs Investigation Committee, Nippon Shakaitō.

Background. Born 1896, Aichi; graduate of Tokyo Imperial University, law, 1920; studied in England and the United States; taught at Doshisha University and Kyushu Imperial University, 1925-47; chairman, Kyushu Economic Research Association; managing director, Fukuoka branch, East Asia League; Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, December 1947-March 1948.

HAYASHI Hyakuro

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Nagano; member, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1913, Nagano; graduate of Chuo University, law; joined Young Communist League, 1933; arrested in 1934, received suspended sentence; manager, Jiyū Hōsō Dan (Free Bar Association); member, Nagano Prefectural Labor Mediation Committee; unsuccessful Communist Diet candidate, 1946.

HIRANO Rikizo

Current Activities. Purged January 1948.

Background. Born 1898, Gifu; graduated from Waseda University, 1922; became member, Central Committee, Nōmin Kumiai, 1924; 1926, organized rightist Zen Nippon Nōmin Kumiai and Nippon Nōmintō; 1928, became chief secretary, Nippon Taishūtō; 1929-32, member of Executive Committee, Shakai Minshūtō; in early 1930's, associated with AKAMATSU Katsumaro in organizing Nippon Kokka Shakaitō (Japan National Socialist Party); 1934, became permanent secretary of Kōdōkai (Imperial Way Society) and editor of its official organ, Kōdō; 1937, president of Zen Nippon Nōmin Kumiai when it joined the Imperial Farmers' League in the Congress of Patriotic Farming Groups; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946-January 1948; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1946-47; organizer, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, July 1947; Minister of Agriculture, June-November, 1947; resigned from Shakaitō, January 5, 1948; purged, January 13, 1948; elected to the Diet, 1936, 1937, 1942, 1946, and 1947.

HORI Makoto

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency; member, Temporary Central Executive Committee, Rōdōsha Nōmintō.

Background. Born 1898; graduate of Tokyo Imperial University; lectured at Tokyo Imperial University, Keio University, and Hosei University; director, Jiyū Konwakai (Free Speech Society); elected to Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, January 1948; seceded from the Shakaitō, July 1948.

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HOSAKA Hiroaki (Komei)

Current Activities. Candidate member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1915; attended Tokyo Imperial University; joined Nippon Kyōsantō, 1938; arrested 1940.

HOSODA Tsunakichi

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee, chief of Publications Department, and chairman of Ibaragi branch, Nippon Shakaitō; director, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai (National Farmers' Union).

Background. Born 1899, Ibaragi; graduate of Nippon University, law, 1924; practiced law; member, Tokyo Municipal Assembly; member, Executive Committee, Nippon Rōnōtō; member, Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō; member, Central Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, since 1946; elected to Diet, April 1946.

HOSOKAWA Karoku

Current Activities. Member, House of Councillors, from national constituency; member, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1888; graduate of Tokyo Imperial University; lecturer, Tokyo Imperial University; member, Nippon Rōnōtō; member of staff, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute; imprisoned 1942-45; chairman, Social Science Research Institute.

HOSONO Michio

Current Activities. Chairman of Akita branch and member of Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, House of Representatives, from Akita.

Background. Born 1897, Aichi; graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, 1920; treasurer, Nōmin Rōdōtō, 1926; member of Executive Committee and treasurer of Rōdō Nōmintō, 1926-28, member, Executive Committee, Nippon Taishūtō; 1930, member, Central Executive Committee, Zenkoku Taishūtō; 1932-40, member, Central Executive Committee, Shakai Taishūtō; chief treasurer, Nippon Shakaitō, 1946; unsuccessful candidate for presidency of Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1947, joined Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai; chairman, Shakaitō Liaison Committee, 1947; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Education, April-October 1948; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

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INAMURA Junzo

Current Activities. Member of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Farm Committee, Nippon Shakaitō; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai; organizer, Shutaisei Kakushin Domei; member, House of Representatives, from Niigata.

Background. Born 1900, Hokkaido; graduate of Tokyo Imperial University; member, Central Committee, Musan Taishūtō, 1928; editor, Ronō, 1930; member of central executive committee of Akita branch and Central Committee, Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, 1933-34; arrested for popular front activities, 1937; member of organizing committee, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1945; adviser, Niigata chapter, Nippon Nōmin Kumiai, 1947; Shakaitō election secretary for northern Japan, 1947; elected to the Diet, 1946 and 1947.

INOUE Ryoji

Current Activities. Member, House of Representatives, from Osaka.

Background. Born 1898, Kochi; primary education; 1923, became business manager of Osaka Labor School; 1929, joined Rōdō Kumiai Zenkoku Dōmei; successively an officer in Zenkoku Taishūtō, Zenkoku Rōnō Taishūtō, and Shakai Taishūtō; member of IRAPS, January-March 1940; member, Central Executive Committee, Nippon Shakaitō, June 1946-January 1948; Parliamentary Vice Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, June 1947-October 1948; unsuccessful Diet candidate, 1942; elected to the Diet, 1937, 1946, and 1947.

ITO Kenichi

Current Activities. Member, Central Committee, Nippon Kyōsantō; labor representative, Tokyo Metropolitan Labor Relations Committee.

Background. Born 1912, Korea; primary education; 1928, joined Young Communist League; 1929, became a member of the Young Communist League Central Committee; imprisoned 1929-36; organizer and chairman, Kanto Area Labor Union Council; one of organizers of Zenkoku Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi; official of All-Japan Machinery Workers' Union, 1947; unsuccessful Communist Diet candidate, April 1946.

ITO Ritsu

Current Activities. Member of Central Committee, Secretariat, and Political Bureau, co-chairman of Akahata Department, and chairman of Farmers' Department, Nippon Kyōsantō.

Background. Born 1913, Gifu; 1932, expelled from Dai-Ichi Higher School for Communist Activity; 1932, member of Central Finance Committee, Young Communist League; 1933, chief of Business Affairs Bureau, Young Communist League; 1933-34, imprisoned; arrested intermittently thereafter and spent most of his time until August 1945 in prison; unsuccessful Communist Diet candidate, April 1947.

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